Title: Doe, Sex offender Registry Board No. 209081 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12282 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 209081  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 5, 2017. - December 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Administrative Law, Rehearing, 
Proceedings before agency, Regulations.  Regulation.  
Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 3, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Rose for the plaintiff. 
 
David L. Chenail for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth Caddick, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In 2008, the Sex Offender Registry Board (board), 
after a hearing, classified the plaintiff, John Doe, as a level 
2 
 
 
three sex offender.  Doe did not appeal from that decision.  
Over six years later, he sought to reopen his classification 
hearing, contending that the board violated his procedural due 
process rights when it went forward with his hearing without 
ensuring that his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.  
When the board summarily denied his petition for rehearing as 
untimely, he filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking 
review.  A Superior Court judge granted the board's motion to 
dismiss the petition, and the plaintiff appealed.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
We conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the plaintiff's petition to reopen his classification 
hearing where the petition, which was filed six years after the 
board's final decision, did not adequately explain the delay and 
did not allege prejudice.1  Although we do not reach the 
plaintiff's due process claim, we caution that pursuant to the 
board's own regulations, the board must ensure that sex 
offenders who choose to represent themselves at classification 
                     
 
1 We note that we consider here solely the question whether 
the board abused its discretion in declining to reopen the 
plaintiff's hearing.  We have no jurisdiction to review the 
classification decision itself, as the plaintiff failed to file 
a complaint in the Superior Court within thirty days of 
receiving notice of the board's decision in December of 2008.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1).  See also School 
Comm. of Franklin v. Commissioner of Educ., 395 Mass. 800, 809 
n.8 (1985). 
3 
 
 
hearings "knowingly and voluntarily" waive their statutory right 
to counsel.2  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.09(5) (2016). 
 
Background.  On two different dates in 2008, the plaintiff 
pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault and battery on a 
person over fourteen, and to two counts of rape and abuse of a 
child.3  In June, 2008, while the plaintiff was incarcerated for 
the first conviction, the board notified him of his duty to 
register with the board as a sex offender and preliminarily 
classified him at level three.4  The plaintiff requested a 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
 
3 The plaintiff received a sentence of two and one-half 
years in a house of correction with one year to serve and the 
balance suspended with three years' probation on the former 
conviction, and two and one-half years committed from and after 
that sentence with five years' probation on the latter 
convictions. 
 
 
4 The Sex Offender Registry Board (board) classifies sex 
offenders within a system of three different levels based on 
risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness, with level one 
representing the designation for offenders presenting the least 
serious risk of reoffense and level of dangerousness and level 
three for those presenting the most serious.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2).  The board begins with a preliminary recommended 
classification.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1); 803 Code Mass Regs. 
§ 1.06(3) (2016).  Any offender who disagrees with the 
recommended classification may request a de novo evidentiary 
hearing conducted by a board member, a panel of three board 
members, or a hearing examiner.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.06(4), 1.08, 1.14 (2016).  If no such 
request is made, the board's recommended classification decision 
becomes its final classification determination.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (1).  Where a sex offender does request a hearing, a 
board attorney and the sex offender may both present evidence at 
 
4 
 
 
hearing to challenge the board's classification recommendation 
by filling out a form provided by the board.  On that form, he 
checked a box indicating that he would represent himself at the 
hearing. 
 
At the October, 2008, hearing, however, the plaintiff 
refused to sign a waiver of counsel form and told the hearing 
examiner that, in fact, he did not wish to appear without 
counsel.  The plaintiff indicated that he had expected that his 
criminal defense attorney would be present, and that there had 
been a misunderstanding regarding his representation.  The 
hearing examiner treated the plaintiff's statements as a motion 
to continue the hearing so that the plaintiff could obtain an 
attorney, but denied the motion based on the plaintiff's initial 
indication, on the written board form, that he would represent 
himself.5  The plaintiff did not offer any evidence during the 
                                                                  
it, and the sex offender is entitled to be represented by 
counsel; the board must provide notice to the sex offender that 
if he or she is indigent, he or she has a right to have counsel 
appointed.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2); 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.09, 1.18 (2016).  At the conclusion of the hearing, a board 
member, board panel, or hearing examiner issues a written 
decision that determines the sex offender's final classification 
level and sets out the findings on which the classification 
determination was based.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K; 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 1.20, 1.33 (2016).  A sex offender has a right to seek 
judicial review of the final classification decision in 
accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178M. 
 
 
5 The hearing examiner seemed to acknowledge at least some 
confusion on the part of the plaintiff about the right to 
 
5 
 
 
hearing.  In a decision issued on November 18, 2008, the hearing 
examiner ordered the plaintiff to register as a level three sex 
offender based on the evidence introduced by the board. 
 
The plaintiff waited more than six years, until after he 
had completed his criminal sentence, including five years of 
probation, to file in June, 2015, a petition to reopen the 
initial classification hearing with the board.  In the petition, 
plaintiff claimed that the hearing examiner's actions during the 
2008 proceeding deprived him of his due process rights and 
violated the board's regulations.  Specifically, the plaintiff 
contended that he had had insufficient time to prepare for the 
hearing, and that the hearing examiner failed to telephone the 
plaintiff's criminal defense attorney or postpone the hearing 
after becoming aware that the plaintiff was confused without his 
attorney.  Further, the plaintiff claimed that it was error for 
the hearing examiner to proceed with the hearing and issue a 
decision despite his refusal to sign a statement acknowledging 
that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 
 
The board summarily denied the plaintiff's petition to 
reopen on the grounds that it was untimely and the plaintiff had 
(initially) indicated that he would represent himself.  The 
plaintiff timely filed in the Superior Court a complaint for 
                                                                  
counsel. 
6 
 
 
judicial review of the board's denial of his petition.  See 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1).  In response, the board filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint, which a Superior Court judge allowed.6  
The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred his appeal to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  The board's denial of the plaintiff's 
request to reopen the classification hearing.  The board has 
inherent authority to reopen a classification proceeding and 
reconsider its decision at any time, by motion of the sex 
offender or by the board's own motion.  Soe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 
381, 395-396 (2013) (Soe).  One reason the board may decide to 
reconsider a sex offender's classification level after it has 
become final is to prevent or mitigate a miscarriage of justice.7  
                     
 
6 We note that a timely claim for judicial review of an 
agency's decision should be resolved through a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings rather than a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's claim.  See Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 
Mass. 106, 109-110 (2017). 
 
 
7 In Soe, we noted that a miscarriage of justice may occur 
for many reasons, including when the board substantially relies 
on evidence that was later demonstrated to be false.  Soe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
466 Mass. 381, 395 (2013) (Soe).  "In such cases, the sex 
offender's claim is not that he has become less sexually 
dangerous since his classification hearing because of a change 
in circumstances over the past three years, but that he was less 
sexually dangerous than his classification level reflected at 
the time of the hearing because the hearing examiner rested the 
classification decision on evidence that subsequently was 
 
7 
 
 
Id. at 394-395.  The board's broad inherent authority in this 
area is "reviewable only for an abuse of discretion."  Id. at 
396.  We note that "[i]n general, administrative agencies have 
broad discretion over procedural aspects of matters before 
them."  Zachs v. Department of Pub. Utils., 406 Mass. 217, 227 
(1989).  When reviewing an agency's decision for abuse of 
discretion, we look to see whether the decision was reasonable.  
See Soe, supra at 392-393; Zachs, supra at 228; Massachusetts 
Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 376 Mass. 294, 307-308 
(1978). 
 
An agency's inherent power to reopen proceedings "must be 
sparingly used if administrative decisions are to have resolving 
force on which persons can rely."  Soe, 466 Mass. at 395, 
quoting Stowe v. Bologna, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 616 (1992).  
See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Department of 
Pub. Utils. (No. 2), 461 Mass. 190, 195 (2011) (noting that 
party seeking to reopen proceedings "must demonstrate compelling 
circumstances").  While each agency's decision to reopen a 
proceeding must be considered in the specific context of the 
circumstances presented and statutory scheme involved, factors 
generally to be weighed by the agency include the advantages of 
preserving finality, the desire for stability, the degree of 
                                                                  
affirmatively shown to be erroneous."  Id. 
8 
 
 
haste or care in making the first decision, timeliness, and the 
specific equities involved.  See 2 K.C. Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 18.09, at 607 (1958), cited in Aronson v. 
Brookline Rent Control Bd., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 700, 706 (1985). 
 
Here, we agree with the Superior Court judge that the board 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's petition 
to reopen the hearing.8  First, the plaintiff has failed to 
explain adequately his six-year delay in responding to the 
board's classification decision.  The hearing examiner informed 
the plaintiff that he had thirty days from the receipt of the 
board's decision to seek judicial review of that decision.  The 
hearing examiner further suggested that the plaintiff should 
consult an attorney regarding his appellate rights.  In 
addition, the board's final classification decision included 
notice in three places, in bold and all capitalized print, that 
he had thirty days to appeal that decision to the Superior 
Court.  Despite the plaintiff's claim that he mistakenly 
believed that he could not pursue an appeal of the board's 
classification decision until after he completed his sentence, 
the repeated references to the thirty-day deadline for filing an 
                     
 
8 The judge erroneously suggested that the board lacked the 
authority to reopen the hearing.  See Soe, 466 Mass. at 395-396.  
However, the judge concluded further that the board's denial of 
the plaintiff's petition was justified on alternative grounds, 
i.e., that the board did not abuse its discretion in denying 
that petition because the petition was not timely. 
9 
 
 
appeal provided more than adequate notice that, at the very 
least, he needed to explore his appeal options in a more timely 
way. 
 
Second, although it is apparent that the board failed to 
ensure that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to be represented by counsel at his classification 
hearing, the plaintiff failed to articulate in any manner how he 
was prejudiced by the error.  The plaintiff's petition does not 
include an affidavit or, indeed, any mention of specific facts 
or mitigating circumstances that, if represented by counsel, he 
would place before the board at a reopened hearing that could 
lead it to reconsider its decision.9  See Matter of Powers, 465 
Mass. 63, 81 (2013) (concluding that respondent was not 
prejudiced because of denied request to appear before regulatory 
body where he "provided no proffer of what he or his attorney 
would have said to the [body] had his request for an appearance 
been honored"); Martorano v. Department of Pub. Utils., 401 
                     
 
9 The plaintiff's motion to reopen the initial 
classification hearing does contain the following statement in 
paragraph 20:  "[The plaintiff] had mitigating circumstances and 
evidence to bring to the hearing which he did not present, as 
appears from the [t]ranscript, relying on his attorney to handle 
the case."  However, neither in the petition nor on appeal has 
the plaintiff described any of the mitigating circumstances or 
evidence to which he referred.  Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Rosario, 477 Mass. 69, 73, 80-81 (2017) (motion judge did not 
abuse discretion in granting new trial approximately thirty 
years after defendant's conviction where defendant's motion 
cited newly discovered evidence). 
10 
 
 
Mass. 257, 262 (1987) ("There must be some showing of prejudice 
before an agency's disregard of its own rules may constitute 
reversible error"). 
 
Finally, the sex offender registration system administered 
by the board provides a plaintiff with the right to a new 
reclassification proceeding.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31 
(2016).  The plaintiff notes correctly that, under the board's 
regulations, the burden to prove a sex offender's classification 
level shifts from the board in an initial classification hearing 
to the sex offender in a reclassification hearing.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 1.10, 1.37C(2) (2004); 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.14(1), 1.31(1) (2016).  However, the existence of this 
reclassification mechanism is an additional factor specific to 
the board's regulatory scheme weighing in favor of the agency's 
decision to reject his request to reopen his initial 
classification proceeding six years after it had concluded. 
 
That judicial review of both the board's final 
classification and its reclassification decisions is subject to 
the timing constraints of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178M, reflects a legislative acknowledgement that there is 
value in finality of sex offender classification proceedings.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178M (requiring offenders to seek review of 
board decisions within thirty days, under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 
and requiring completion of judicial review within sixty days).  
11 
 
 
Although the public's interest in such finality does not trump 
an interest in rectifying a miscarriage of justice, here, 
because the plaintiff failed to show prejudice, it was not 
unreasonable for the board to conclude that finality and 
timeliness outweighed the plaintiff's interest in reopening the 
proceedings.  Given the circumstances, the board's denial of the 
plaintiff's petition to reopen his classification hearing was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
 
2.  Right to counsel in Sex Offender Registry Board 
classification proceedings.  Because we conclude that in the 
circumstances of this case, the board did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to reopen the plaintiff's classification 
proceeding, we do not reach the plaintiff's claim that his right 
to counsel at the hearing was denied.  That being said, it is 
clear from the record that the hearing examiner required the 
plaintiff to proceed pro se despite concluding that the 
plaintiff wanted to be represented by counsel.  We therefore 
make the following observations. 
 
"[A] sex offender is . . . entitled by statute to request 
an evidentiary hearing to challenge the board's recommended 
classification, to be represented by counsel at that hearing and 
to have counsel appointed if he is indigent."  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No 941 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 460 Mass. 336, 
12 
 
 
339 (2011).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L.10  The Legislature has 
granted the board broad authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations providing for evidentiary hearings in accordance 
with G. L. c. 6, § 178L.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178D; St. 1999, 
c. 74, § 16.  If an offender decides to represent himself or 
herself at the hearing, the board, by regulation, provides that 
"[t]he [h]earing [e]xaminer shall require the offender to sign a 
statement, or affirm under oath in the case of video-conference 
hearings, that he or she has been informed of his or her right 
to have representation and that he or she has knowingly and 
voluntarily waived that right" (emphasis added).  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.09(5).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.14(1) (2002) 
(imposing similar requirement in earlier promulgated 
regulation).  At a minimum, the board is expected to follow its 
own regulations.11  Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 
                     
 
10 In Poe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 801, 811 
(2010), we concluded that "sex offenders are entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel at classification hearings and 
that the civil formulation of the Saferian standard governs 
claims of ineffectiveness."  See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
 
 
11 In this case, the hearing examiner seemingly did the 
opposite of what we expect would be required for the plaintiff 
to have "knowingly and voluntarily" waived counsel pursuant to 
the board's regulation.  See 803 Code Mass Regs. § 1.09(5).  
After the plaintiff refused to sign the required form, the 
hearing examiner confirmed that the plaintiff wanted to be 
represented by counsel, and then refused to continue the hearing 
to allow for such representation.  At oral argument, counsel for 
 
13 
 
 
Mass. 425, 427 (1983). 
 
At oral argument, the board's counsel indicated that 
pursuant to the board's current practice when an offender 
attends his or her classification hearing without counsel, the 
board engages in a colloquy with the offender to ensure that the 
offender is giving up his or her right to counsel knowingly, 
intelligently, freely, and voluntarily.  The colloquy addresses 
the offender's right to counsel and the potential ramifications 
of classification, regardless of any initial indications that 
the offender would represent himself or herself.  Further, under 
current practice, the board's hearing examiners must continue an 
offender's classification hearing if at any point during the 
hearing the offender determines that he or she would like to be 
represented by counsel, providing the offender with the 
opportunity to obtain counsel.  These practices appear to 
satisfy the requirement that the board ensure that any waiver of 
counsel is knowing and voluntary.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.09(5).  We recommend that they continue. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we remand 
the case to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment affirming 
the board's decision denying the plaintiff's petition to reopen 
the initial classification hearing. 
                                                                  
the board acknowledged that the hearing examiner in the 
plaintiff's case erred. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  In 
2013, we declared in Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 395 (2013) (Soe), 
that the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) "has the inherent 
authority to reconsider a decision or reopen a proceeding to 
prevent or mitigate a miscarriage of justice."  We also declared 
that the board's decision not to exercise such authority is 
reviewable for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 396.  Where, as 
here, the plaintiff petitioned to reopen his initial 
classification hearing on the ground that he was required to 
proceed without counsel despite his refusal to make a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of that statutory right at the hearing, I 
believe that it is an abuse of discretion for the board to deny 
the petition without deciding whether reopening the hearing is 
necessary to prevent or mitigate a miscarriage of justice.  
Because the board failed to reach that decision, and because the 
plaintiff made a substantial claim that he suffered a 
miscarriage of justice at the initial classification hearing, I 
would reverse the Superior Court judge's allowance of the 
board's motion to dismiss the complaint for judicial review, and 
remand the matter to the judge, directing that he remand the 
plaintiff's petition to the board.  Consequently, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
 
The material facts in this appeal are not in dispute.  When 
 
 
2 
the plaintiff requested a hearing on the board's initial 
classification of him as a level three sex offender, he checked 
the box that read, "I will represent myself at the hearing."  At 
the time he checked this box on July 11, 2008, the plaintiff was 
serving a sentence in a house of correction after pleading 
guilty to one count of indecent assault and battery on a person 
over fourteen years of age, and was represented by counsel in a 
pending criminal case.  At the classification hearing, the 
plaintiff appeared without counsel.  The plaintiff, when advised 
of his rights by the hearing examiner, refused to sign the 
written waiver of his right to counsel, and told the hearing 
examiner, "I don't want to waive my [right to] counsel."1  The 
hearing examiner understood that the plaintiff wished to have an 
attorney appointed or to retain his own attorney, but denied the 
request and proceeded with the hearing.  The board offered in 
evidence the classification report and its five attachments, and 
rested its case.  When asked by the hearing examiner whether he 
intended to present evidence, the plaintiff replied, "I'm not 
sure what evidence I need to present to the [b]oard."  He 
offered no evidence in his defense. 
                     
 
1 The plaintiff later explained to the hearing examiner that 
he thought his criminal attorney would represent him at the 
hearing, stating, "[W]hen I had my lawyer present, I was told 
not to waive [my right to counsel] because that's something he 
would take care of." 
 
 
3 
 
The board concedes that the hearing examiner "blew it" when 
he refused to continue the hearing to allow the plaintiff to 
obtain counsel.  At the time of the hearing, the board's 
regulations provided that a sex offender may represent himself 
at the hearing only after the offender signs a statement 
declaring that "he knowingly and voluntarily has waived" his 
right to counsel.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.14(1) (2002). 
 
The plaintiff, although notified of his right to appeal 
from the board's final determination that he was a level three 
offender, did not timely seek judicial review of that 
determination.  In 2015, after completing his incarceration and 
term of probation, the plaintiff petitioned the board to reopen 
his classification hearing because he had been denied his right 
to counsel.  The board denied the plaintiff's petition on two 
separate grounds:  first, because the classification hearing had 
been conducted more than six years earlier; and second, because 
the plaintiff had "indicated he would represent himself" -- a 
reference, apparently, to the fact that the plaintiff had 
checked the box waiving his right to counsel when he requested 
the hearing. 
 
The plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review of the 
board's denial of his petition.  The Superior Court judge in 
2016 allowed the board's motion to dismiss the complaint, 
concluding that "[the b]oard's regulations do not authorize a 
 
 
4 
petition to the hearing examiner to reopen a hearing or conduct 
a new hearing once a decision is final." The judge's conclusion 
was factually accurate but an error of law.  Although the 
board's regulations do not specifically countenance petitions 
for reconsideration or reopening of a hearing, this court had 
declared in 2013 in Soe, 466 Mass. at 395, that the board 
retains the inherent authority to reconsider a decision or 
reopen a proceeding to prevent or mitigate a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
The judge also stated an alternative ground for the 
dismissal:  that the board did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the petition because the petition was not timely, given 
the delay of more than six years.  This, too, was an error of 
law, because the public interest in finality is not so great 
that it justifies the failure to rectify a miscarriage of 
justice. 
"Although the public's interest in . . . finality . . . is 
weighty, it is not always paramount."  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 
438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  In the criminal context, we have 
long recognized the "fundamental principle . . . that, if it 
appears that justice may not have been done, the valuable 
finality of judicial proceedings must yield to our system's 
reluctance to countenance significant individual injustices."  
Commonwealth v. Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 388 (2015).  See, e.g., 
 
 
5 
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 477 Mass. 69, 70, 78, 81 (2017) 
(affirming order granting new trial based on "substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice" approximately thirty years after 
defendant's conviction); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 
689-690 (2002) (remanding criminal case for new trial based on 
"substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice," notwithstanding 
defendant's six-year delay in filing postappeal motion for new 
trial).  That principle applies with equal force to the board's 
risk classification proceedings, where -- as we have recently 
reiterated -- important liberty and privacy interests are at 
stake.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 311 (2015).  See also Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
428 Mass. 90, 100-101 (1998) (Doe No. 972).  Classification as a 
sex offender is "a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating 
regulation of the person," Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 
149 (1997) (Fried, J., concurring), with severe collateral 
consequences, often "cast[ing] a continuing shadow of further 
criminal sanctions and possible reincarceration."  Doe No. 972, 
supra at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
Indeed, the interest in finality is considerably less 
weighty in a sexual risk classification proceeding than in a 
criminal case.  In a criminal case, the issue is whether a 
 
 
6 
defendant committed a crime in the past with the intent required 
for that crime.  In a risk classification proceeding, the issue 
is whether a person at the present time poses so substantial a 
risk of sexual recidivism that he or she should be classified a 
level one, two, or three sex offender.  The purpose of the 
classification is not to punish or condemn for past crimes, but 
to protect the public from the risk of the sex offender 
committing future crimes.  The plaintiff here, in a proceeding 
where he was denied his right to counsel, was classified as a 
level three sex offender and has suffered the consequences of 
that classification for the past nine years.  In contrast with a 
criminal conviction, however, such a classification is never 
final; it is always subject to change over time as the person's 
risk of sexual recidivism changes, as it often does with age.  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(1) (2016) ("The [b]oard 
recognizes the risk to reoffend . . . posed by a sex offender 
may decrease over time"); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 483 (2015) 
("[The board must] base its classification determinations on a 
sex offender's 'current' risk to the community, in order to 
protect the offender's right to due process").  See also Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 622-623 (2010) (board's failure to consider 
evidence of offender's age in classification determination was 
 
 
7 
"arbitrary and capricious"). 
Moreover, the concerns that in the past have typically 
weighed in favor of finality -- the deterioration of evidence, 
the need to resummon witnesses, the cost and time associated 
with readjudication, see Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 
618, 637 (1997) -- are present in a criminal case but largely 
absent in the context of a classification hearing.  Here, the 
board simply offered in evidence the classification report and 
its related attachments, and rested.  During oral argument, the 
board admitted that this is the norm in classification hearings.2  
Where the administrative burden of reopening a proceeding is 
minimal, as here, the need for finality is correspondingly 
limited. 
At a minimum, before finality is allowed to trump the 
demands of justice, an administrative agency (and, on review, a 
judge) must first evaluate whether there was a miscarriage of 
justice and balance the importance of rectifying or mitigating 
that miscarriage against the public interest in finality.  The 
board did not do that here; to the extent that it even 
considered whether there was a miscarriage of justice, it erred 
                     
 
2 When asked what evidence the board would present if the 
plaintiff's hearing were to be reopened, counsel for the board 
stated:  "Honestly, in the twelve years that I've been with the 
[board], I don't think I've ever called a witness.  It's 
basically the documentary evidence." 
 
 
8 
by focusing solely on the plaintiff having checked the box 
regarding the waiver of counsel before the hearing, while 
ignoring the plaintiff's refusal to make a knowing and voluntary 
waiver at the hearing when the board's own regulation required 
just such a waiver. 
Certainly, a more searching inquiry is necessary where the 
board concedes, as it does here, that the plaintiff was denied 
his statutory right to counsel.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L.  In Poe 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 801, 812 (2010), we held 
that a sex offender's statutory right to counsel at a 
classification hearing implies a right to effective counsel.  We 
concluded that, "[i]n light of the serious ramifications of 
erroneous classification, the principle of fundamental fairness 
that underlies the statutory entitlement to counsel would be 
ill-served if sex offenders were afforded something less than 
what we usually refer to as the effective assistance of 
counsel."  Id. at 813.  Where the performance of counsel at a 
classification hearing "fall[s] measurably below that which 
might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer," id. at 812, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), we 
order a new hearing where the plaintiff proves prejudice, that 
is, "a 'reasonable probability' that 'but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.'"  Poe, supra at 813, quoting Commonwealth v. 
 
 
9 
Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 15 (2004).  Here, the plaintiff was not 
denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; he was 
denied his right to any assistance from counsel, in violation of 
statute (§ 178L) and of the board's own regulation (803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.14[1]). 
The court essentially concludes that the standard for 
reopening a classification hearing is the same for an individual 
who received the ineffective assistance of counsel as for an 
individual who was denied the right to counsel altogether, even 
though we have recognized that classification as a sex offender 
implicates a "constitutionally protected liberty . . . 
interest."  Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 100.  Where a liberty 
interest is at stake, we have never before equated the two 
situations; we have always recognized that the denial of the 
right to counsel itself, unlike the ineffective assistance of 
counsel, is a structural error requiring a new trial because 
prejudice must be presumed.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 859 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
317 (2015) (distinguishing between "circumstances where the 
essential right to the assistance of counsel itself has been 
denied," and prejudice is presumed, and "circumstances where 
ineffectiveness is based on '[a]n error by counsel,'" where 
prejudice must be shown [citation omitted]).  In criminal cases, 
it is without question that the denial of counsel is so 
 
 
10 
"inherently unfair" that it "require[s] no showing of prejudice 
to warrant reversal."  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 
194 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 81, 88-89 
(2009) ("Because the right to the assistance of counsel is 
essential to individual liberty and security, . . . its 
erroneous denial can never be treated as harmless error").  And 
in the context of civil proceedings, too, our appellate courts 
have held that the denial of counsel is so "presumptively 
harmful" -- and its consequences so "pervasive, undetectable, 
and immeasurable" -- that justice requires new proceedings.  
Adoption of Gabe, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 293-294 (2013) 
(ordering new trial on termination of parental rights). 
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to 
be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it 
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have" 
(citation omitted).  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 
(1984).  Here, it is apparent from the record that without 
counsel the plaintiff received a classification hearing in form 
only; in substance, he had no meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the board's evidence.  Unlike other errors that may 
require a showing of prejudice, the denial of counsel -- in 
violation of the plaintiff's statutory right -- creates "a 
serious risk of injustice" that must be weighed against any 
interest in finality.  Id. at 656, quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
 
 
11 
446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980). 
Nor, where the plaintiff has been denied his statutory 
right to counsel, is it reasonable to deny rehearing because he 
failed timely to seek judicial review of his classification.  We 
have held that failure to file a timely notice of appeal 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel where the 
defendant would have prevailed on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 129 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Cowie, 
404 Mass. 119, 122 (1989) (failure to timely appeal probation 
revocation was ineffective assistance of counsel).  Here, there 
can be no doubt that, if the plaintiff had timely sought 
judicial review of his classification, he would have prevailed 
in obtaining a new hearing based on the denial of his right to 
counsel.  He should not be left without an adequate remedy 
merely because he was unable, while incarcerated and without the 
assistance of counsel, timely to recognize that he had been 
denied his right to counsel. 
 
Nor can it reasonably be expected that, given the passage 
of time, justice can now be served by the plaintiff's 
eligibility to request a reclassification hearing.  Under the 
current board regulations, the plaintiff would bear the burden 
at such a hearing to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that his or her risk of sexual recidivism has decreased 
since the final classification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
 
 
12 
§ 1.31(2)(c) (2016).3  This is a far cry from the standard that 
would apply were he to be given a new classification hearing 
examining his current risk of sexual recidivism, where the 
burden would remain on the board to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that his risk of sexual recidivism warrants 
his classification as a level three offender.  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.14(1) (2016).  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
326573 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 477 Mass. 361, 367 n.7 
(2017). 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the Superior Court 
judge's allowance of the board's motion to dismiss, and remand 
the matter to the judge with instructions that he remand it to 
the board for consideration consistent with our law. 
 
                     
 
3 We have yet to confront a case that challenges the 
constitutionality of the burden placed on sex offenders seeking 
reclassification by this regulation.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 326573 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 477 Mass. 
361, 367 n.7 (2017) (declining to address constitutionality of 
regulation).