Title: Warner Jackson v. John T. Benson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 90 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
97-0270 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell Harris, 
The Reverend Andrew Kennedy, Rabbi Isaac 
Serotta, Ceil  Ann Libber, Father Thomas J. 
Mueller, Reverend John N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, 
Colleen Beaman, Mary Morris, Penny Morse, 
Kathleen Jones and Philip Jones,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, Dinah 
Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong Yang, 
Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine 
Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, by 
its President, M. Charles Howard, Michael 
Lengyel, Donald Lucier, Tracy Adams, Milwaukee 
Public Schools Administrators and Supervisors 
Council, Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl 
A. Gobel, People for the American Way, by its 
Executive Vice President and Legal Director, 
Elliott M. Minceberg, John Drew, Susan Endress, 
Richard Riley, Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, 
Bertha Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
2
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, Dinah 
Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong Yang, 
Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine 
Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney, Lois Parker, 
on behalf of herself and her minor child, 
Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D. Scott, on behalf of 
himself and his minor children, Deresia C.A. 
Scott and Desmond L.J. Scott, Constance J. 
Cherry, on behalf of herself and her minor 
children, Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, 
and William A. Branch,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official 
capacity,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION 
OF PART II OF FEBRUARY 19, 2002 OPINION 
2002 WI 14 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, BRADLEY and SYKES, JJ., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
2002 WI 90 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  97-0270  
(L.C. No. 
95CV1982, 95CV1997, 96CV1889) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell  
Harris, The Reverend Andrew Kennedy,  
Rabbi Isaac Serotta, Ceil  Ann Libber,  
Father Thomas J. Mueller, Reverend John  
N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, Colleen Beaman,  
Mary Morris, Penny Morse, Kathleen Jones  
and Philip Jones,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2
 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education  
Association, by its President, M. Charles  
Howard, Michael Lengyel, Donald Lucier,  
Tracy Adams, Milwaukee Public Schools  
Administrators and Supervisors Council,  
Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl A.  
Gobel, People for the American Way, by  
its Executive Vice President and Legal  
Director, Elliott M. Minceberg, John  
Drew, Susan Endress, Richard Riley,  
Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, Bertha  
Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
National Association for the Advancement  
of Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney,  
 
 
3
Lois Parker, on behalf of herself and her  
minor child, Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D.  
Scott, on behalf of himself and his minor  
children, Deresia C.A. Scott and Desmond  
L.J. Scott, Constance J. Cherry, on  
behalf of herself and her minor children,  
Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, and  
William A. Branch,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official  
capacity,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
MOTIONS 
for 
reconsideration 
and 
modification.  
Reconsideration denied; modification granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Respondents, Carl Gobel, Warner Jackson, 
Father Thomas Mueller, and Wendell Harris, and Attorney Ed 
Garvey and the law firm of Garvey, Stoddard, S.C. move the court 
for reconsideration of Part II of its opinion in Jackson v. 
Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545,1 finding the 
motion to vacate the court's 1998 decision in the case to be 
frivolous and remanding the matter to the Dane County Circuit 
Court for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney 
fees and costs.  
                                                 
1 A copy of the February 19, 2002 opinion is attached to 
this decision as Appendix B.  
No. 
97-0270   
 
4 
 
¶2 
Respondents Gobel, Jackson, Mueller and Harris have 
also filed a separate motion to modify the sanctions order to 
remove them from the obligation to pay any sanctions which might 
ultimately be imposed.  The State of Wisconsin has expressly 
indicated it does not oppose a modification of the sanctions 
order to exclude the individual respondents from any obligation 
to pay sanctions, and no party has objected to such a 
modification. 
¶3 
The motion to modify the sanctions order to remove 
respondents 
Gobel, 
Jackson, 
Mueller 
and 
Harris 
from 
any 
obligation to pay sanctions is granted. 
¶4 
The motion for reconsideration of Part II of this 
court's opinion, which found the motion to vacate frivolous and 
remanded the matter to the Dane County Circuit Court for a 
determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and 
costs, is denied without costs.  
¶5 
The dissent deserves some response.  We all agree, 
including the dissenting justice, that "[t]he respondent's 
inordinate delay in filing the motion to vacate mocks the 
fundamental and vital principle of finality, which is essential 
to the operation of a society governed by law."  Jackson v. 
Benson, 2002 WI 14, ¶22, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545.   
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, four of the five members sitting 
on this case found the respondent's motion frivolous and awarded 
fees, costs, and attorney fees.   
¶6 
Both Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(a) and § 814.025(1) are 
mandatory.  See § 809.25(3)(a) ("If an appeal or cross-appeal is 
No. 
97-0270   
 
5 
 
found to be frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the 
successful party costs, fees and reasonable attorney fees under 
this section."); § 814.025 ("If an action . . . is found, at any 
time during the proceedings or upon judgment, to be frivolous by 
the court, the court shall award to the successful party costs 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees."); see 
also Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 531, 576, 597 
N.W.2d 744 (1999); Sommer v. Carr, 95 Wis. 2d 651, 653-54, 291 
N.W.2d 301 
(Ct. 
App. 
1980), 
rev'd 
on 
other 
grounds, 
99 
Wis. 2d 789, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981).  Every single reported case 
in the last 20 years involving a finding of frivolousness has 
resulted in the award of attorney fees and costs.  We have 
searched for any case involving a finding of frivolousness in 
which attorney fees and costs were not awarded.  We have found 
none.  See, e.g., Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 824, 840-42, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993); Elmakias v. Wayda, 228 
Wis. 2d 312, 318-23, 596 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1999); Chase 
Lumber & Fuel Co., Inc. v. Chase, 228 Wis. 2d 179, 206-10, 596 
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999); Gardner v. Gardner, 190 Wis. 2d 216, 
248-51, 527 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1994); Schapiro v. Sec. Sav. & 
Loan, 149 Wis. 2d 176, 187-89, 441 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1989); 
Tracy v. DOR, 133 Wis. 2d 151, 162-63, 394 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 
1986); Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d 575, 580-84, 338 
N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1983).  
¶7 
JON P. WILCOX, ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DIANE S. SYKES, 
JJ., did not participate. 
 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
1
¶8 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I joined Part I of the court's decision of February 19, 2002, 
denying the petitioners'2 motion to vacate this court's decision 
in Jackson v. Benson.3  Jackson upheld the constitutionality of 
the "school voucher" law.  The petitioners do not challenge this 
part of the decision.  
¶9 
I dissented from Part II of the February 19, 2002, 
decision.  That decision sanctioned the petitioners for bringing 
the motion to vacate, which the court declared frivolous.  The 
petitioners seek reconsideration of Part II of the decision. The 
majority denies reconsideration. 
¶10 I continue to maintain that the court has erred in 
declaring the petitioners' motion frivolous and in imposing 
sanctions on the petitioners in this case. 4  I have two reasons 
for dissenting here:   
¶11 First, the court's decision declaring the petitioners' 
motion frivolous and imposing sanctions is erroneous on its face 
as a matter of law.  The court has failed to justify the 
declaration of frivolousness and the imposition of sanctions as 
required by either Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c) or § 802.05(1)(a). 
                                                 
2 Carl Gobel, Warner Jackson, Father Thomas Mueller, Wendell 
Harris, Attorney Ed Garvey, and the law firm of Garvey & 
Stoddard, S.C., are the petitioners requesting the court to 
reconsider and withdraw Part II of its February 19, 2002, 
decision. 
3 Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 
545. 
4 The court relieves the individual petitioners from the 
sanctions, not because the court concludes it erred, but because 
of the parties' agreement.  
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
2
¶12 Second, the declaration of frivolousness and the 
imposition of sanctions in this case undermines confidence in 
the legitimacy of this court's decision-making process and the 
integrity of this court as an institution.  
 
I 
¶13 Statutes, rules, and case law govern the finding of 
frivolousness and the imposition of sanctions.  This court did 
not adhere to the applicable law in the present case. 
¶14 The court addressed the issue of frivolousness and 
sanctions in the final two paragraphs of its decision.  I have 
appended the entire two-paragraph opinion on frivolousness and 
sanctions to this dissent so readers can easily judge for 
themselves the court's failure to make findings or present any 
reasoning or justification for its finding of frivolousness or 
the imposition of sanctions (see Appendix A). 
¶15 In its finding of frivolousness and in its imposition 
of sanctions, the court relies on Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c), as 
the State's private counsel urged.5  As a condition to imposing 
sanctions under § 809.25(3)(c), this court must make one of two 
findings:   
                                                 
5 The entire argument of the State's private counsel appears 
in the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate and Motion 
for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to Wis. 2d 809.25(3) at 32-
33. 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
3
(1) 
The motion was filed, used, or continued "in bad 
faith, 
solely 
for 
purposes 
of 
harassing 
or 
maliciously injuring another";6 or 
(2) 
The party or party's attorney knew, or should have 
known, that the motion "was without any reasonable 
basis in law or equity and could not be supported 
by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law."7   
¶16 The court made neither of these findings before it 
imposed sanctions.  Yet, "as this court has emphasized, the 
[frivolous claims] statute does not allow the . . . [court] to 
conclude frivolousness or lack of it without findings stating 
which statutory criteria were present . . . ."8  
¶17 The court never found that the motion was filed, used, 
or continued "in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or 
maliciously injuring another" under Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c)1.  
Rather, this court merely stated, in a conclusory fashion, that 
on the basis of the untimeliness of the motion and its coming 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c)1. 
7 Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c)2. 
8 Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236, 
517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (quoting Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 
792, 
299 
N.W.2d 856 
(1981), 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025(3), 
which 
is 
precisely 
the 
same 
language 
as 
§ 809.025(3)(c)). 
As one commentator noted, appellate courts are "reluctant 
to utilize [§ 809.25(3)(c)], however, partly because it requires 
the court to make a finding."  Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate 
Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin § 16.3b, at 16-5 (2d ed. 
1995). 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
4
"shortly before oral argument in the United States Supreme 
Court," the "only reasonable inference" is that the motion "was 
filed in bad faith, for improper purposes, to undermine the 
public's confidence in the legitimacy of this court's decision 
and the integrity of this court as an institution."9     
¶18 This court could not make the first required finding 
because the record does not contain sufficient facts to justify 
such a finding of subjective intent.10  No basis exists in the 
record to conclude that the "sole" basis of the petitioners' 
motion was to harass Justice Wilcox, any other justice, or the 
court. 
¶19 The court's opinion is absolutely silent regarding the 
second finding required under Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c)2 that 
the motion was without reasonable basis in law or equity.  This 
court never decided the merits of the challenge in the present 
case, that is, the court never decided whether Justice Wilcox 
erred in participating in Jackson v. Benson.  That the 
petitioners' motion was denied because it was untimely is not 
the same as a finding that there was no reasonable basis in law 
or equity to bring the motion.     
¶20 Because this court did not even come close to making 
either of the findings required under Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c), 
                                                 
9 Jackson, 249 Wis. 2d at 697, ¶24. 
 
10 Bad faith requires a factual determination of subjective 
intent. 
 
Tomah-Mauston 
Broadcasting 
Co. 
v. 
Eklund, 
143 
Wis. 2d 648, 658, 422 N.W.2d 169 (1988). 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
5
the court cannot lawfully determine that the petitioners' motion 
was frivolous or impose sanctions under that section. 
¶21 Under what authority then did the court determine that 
the petitioners' motion was frivolous and impose sanctions?  
This court had to search for another provision, not cited or 
relied on by the State's private counsel seeking sanctions, to 
reach the result it sought.  So in footnote seven of the 
February 19, 2002 decision, the court states for the first and 
only time that it has "consider[ed]" the sanctions to be imposed 
"under both §§ 802.05(1)(a) and 809.25(3)."  This court may have 
considered Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3), but as its decision clearly 
demonstrates, the court did not make the requisite findings of 
frivolousness and thus could not impose sanctions under that 
statute.   
¶22 Therefore, 
this 
court 
must 
have 
determined 
frivolousness 
and 
imposed 
the 
sanctions 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a), the only other authority this court 
states that it considered.  Section 802.05(1)(a) is a provision 
in chapter 802 governing procedure and practice in civil actions 
in circuit courts.11  It requires an attorney to sign papers and 
states that the attorney's signature certifies that the attorney 
has determined that "the pleading, motion or other paper is not 
used for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary 
delay 
or 
needless 
increase 
in 
the 
cost 
of 
litigation."  A circuit court may impose sanctions under 
§ 802.05(1)(a) if the circuit court finds that the attorney has 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2). 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
6
not determined that "the pleading, motion or other paper is not 
used for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary 
delay 
or 
needless 
increase 
in 
the 
cost 
of 
litigation."   
¶23 If 
this 
court 
were 
to 
rely 
on 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.05(1)(a), should not the court have addressed the legal 
question of whether § 802.05(1)(a), which governs circuit court 
proceedings, applies in this case, given that § 809.25(3) 
already exists and explicitly covers sanctions for frivolous 
appeals?12  The sanction provisions are scattered in the statutes 
                                                 
12 By citing Wis. Stat. § 809.84, the decision seems to say 
that § 802.05 applies to the present case.  Section 809.84, a 
default provision, provides that "[a]n appeal to the court [of 
appeals or supreme court] is governed by the rules of civil 
procedure as to all matters not covered by these rules [in 
chapter 809] unless the circumstances of the appeal or the 
context of the rule of civil procedure requires a contrary 
result." 
 
A citation to and quotation of Wis. Stat. § 809.84 does not 
suffice, however, to make § 802.05(1) applicable to the present 
case.  First, § 809.25 explicitly covers appellate procedure and 
§ 809.25(3)(c) covers frivolous appeals.  Thus, the very 
language of § 809.84 alerts the reader that § 802.05(1)(a) does 
not apply in the present case because the matter of frivolous 
appeals is covered in chapter 809 relating to appellate 
procedure. 
 
Second, the context of Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) requires 
that it not be applied to proceedings in the supreme court.  
Section 802.05 initially covered only pleadings, not motions or 
other papers.  There are no pleadings in appeals.  Section 
802.05(1)(a) was created by court rule and amended in 1987 by 
the legislature to include motions and other papers.  There are 
motions 
in 
appeals. 
 
The 
1987 
amendment 
also 
created 
§ 814.025(4), which provides that "to the extent s. 802.05 is 
applicable and differs from [§ 814.025], s. 802.05 applies."  
See Wis. Stat. § 814.025(4); Drafting File, 1987 Wisconsin Act 
256, 1987 Sen. Bill 550, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wisconsin.   
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
7
and overlap and conflict.13  For example, the only two statutes 
upon which the majority opinion relies conflict.  Section 
809.25(3)(a) relating to appeals states that if an appeal is 
found 
frivolous 
the 
court 
shall 
award 
costs, 
while 
§ 802.05(1)(a) relating to frivolous motions states that the 
court may impose costs.  And should not the parties have been 
given an opportunity to present arguments on the legal question 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Section 814.025 was created by Laws 1977, ch. 209, and, 
like § 802.05(1)(a), governs costs and fees for frivolous 
litigation in the circuit courts.  The February 19, 2002, 
decision does not refer to § 814.025.  Sections 814.025 and 
802.05 are, however, interconnected.  Their interconnection 
demonstrates that both cover only circuit court actions.   
 
To govern frivolous appeals, Wisconsin Stat. § 809.25(3) 
was created by 1981 Laws, ch. 316.  The legislature used the 
same language in § 809.25(3) to govern frivolous appeals as it 
had in 1977 in § 814.025(3) to govern frivolous matters in the 
circuit courts.  See Drafting Files Laws of 1981 ch. 316, 1981 
Sen. Bill 823, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.  
Nothing in § 809.25, however, refers to § 802.05 or determines 
which provision governs in the event of any conflict.    
 
The interplay of Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05(1)(a), 809.25(3)(c), 
809.84, and 814.025 demonstrates that the legislature intended 
§§ 802.05(1)(a) and 814.025 to govern frivolous matters in 
circuit courts and § 809.25(3)(c) to cover frivolous matters in 
appellate courts. 
13 The Judicial Council has recommended revision of the 
current law on sanctions for frivolous matters.  See Amended 
Petition No. 99-07 filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, 
October 30, 2000.  One of the objectives was to eliminate 
conflicting 
and 
overlapping 
provisions. 
 
For 
a 
further 
discussion of the need for revision of our law governing 
sanctions, see also Janine P. Geske & William C. Gleisner III, 
The Effect of Jandrt on Satellite Litigation, Wis. Lawyer, May 
2000, at 11.    
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
8
of the applicability of § 802.05(1)(a)14 and to be accorded a 
hearing and present testimony and argument on the factual bases 
for the imposition of sanctions under § 802.05(1)(a)?  The 
answer to these questions is clearly yes.  But this court failed 
to take any such action. 
¶24 Where are this court's findings about the frivolous 
claim 
if 
the 
court 
is 
imposing 
sanctions 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a)?  There are none.  Where did this 
court find, as it is required to do, that the attorneys did not 
make the determinations required under § 802.05(1)(a) that "the 
pleading, motion or other paper is not used for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation"?  The court made no 
such finding.  The court merely concluded that "the only 
reasonable inference" is that the motion was for "improper 
purposes."    
¶25 Furthermore, the court does not describe the "improper 
purposes" except to write, without explanation, that the purpose 
of the motion was "to undermine the public's confidence in the 
legitimacy of this court's decision and the integrity of this 
court as an institution."15 
¶26 Does this court consider it an improper purpose for a 
litigant to challenge a justice's impartiality?  Does the court 
                                                 
14 For a critique of a court deciding issues that the court 
has identified on its own, see Adam A. Milani & Michael R. 
Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by 
Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002). 
15 Jackson, 249 Wis. 2d at 697, ¶24.  
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
9
consider it an improper purpose for a litigant to attempt to 
vacate a decision so that any persuasive value of the decision 
would be diminished when a similar case is later argued before 
the U.S. Supreme Court?  The proponents of school vouchers 
argued that "timing [of the filing of the motion to vacate] is 
so suspicious as to leave no other inference than that the 
movants [the petitioners] think nothing of using this Court's 
scarce resources in a larger, national battle over school 
choice."16  But the Wisconsin school voucher law and this case 
have been of national interest since their inception. 
¶27 The petitioners filed their motion six weeks before 
the U.S. Supreme Court was to hear an Ohio school voucher case.17  
This court issued its decision denying the motion to vacate 
Jackson v. Benson the day before the Ohio case was argued before 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Is the timing of these events 
coincidental?  Does it matter?  Lawyers frequently attempt to 
undermine cases that are not in their favor.  They ask courts to 
distinguish, limit, vacate, or overrule prior cases.  And this 
court has distinguished, limited, vacated, or overruled cases or 
has refused to do so.  That is the common law process.   
                                                 
16 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate and Motion 
for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3) 
at 33. 
17 The Ohio school voucher case before the U.S. Supreme 
Court is Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), 
cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976, 122 S.Ct. 23 (2001). 
On June 27, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Ohio school voucher law on a 5-4 
decision.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-
1779, 2002 WL 1378554 (U.S. June 27, 2002). 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
10
¶28 In sum, this court's decision declaring the motion 
frivolous and imposing sanctions is erroneous on its face as a 
matter of law.  This court has failed to follow the law.  It did 
not 
make 
the 
requisite 
findings 
under 
either 
Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3)(c) or § 802.05(1)(a).  This court is not 
above the law.  Therefore, the court should vacate Part II of 
its February 19, 2002, decision. 
 
II 
¶29 This cases raises additional concerns for me.  I 
believe that the majority's decision about frivolousness and the 
imposition of sanctions are incompatible with this court's 
institutional responsibility to be open and accessible and to 
deal forthrightly with challenges and criticism.  
¶30 Neither courts nor litigants should be subject to 
actions without substance.  A significant purpose of the 
frivolous action provisions is to maintain the integrity of the 
judicial system.  Yet a determination of frivolousness is "an 
especially delicate area; a court must be cautious in declaring 
an action frivolous."18  This court must give the public wide 
berth to exercise its constitutional right "to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances."19  Keeping this court 
open to people who are challenging a decision of this court on 
                                                 
18 Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 
639-40, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
19 U.S. Const. amend. I; Wis. Const. art. I, § 4. 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
11
the basis of a justice's alleged bias is especially critical, 
because this court is the only venue where a party can make this 
kind of challenge. 
¶31 This court is not immune from criticism.  When dealing 
with challenges and criticism, the court has legitimate concerns 
about protecting its integrity and the integrity of the entire 
judicial system.  But a court protects its integrity by 
seriously, forthrightly, and fully considering a challenge, not 
by acting in a way that belittles or appears to belittle the 
challenge or the challengers, that punishes or appears to punish 
challengers by imposing substantial costs and expenses, and that 
implicitly or explicitly tries to silence future critics and 
challengers with the threat of dire costs and expenses.  
Attorneys John Skilton and Mark Frankel rightly assert on behalf 
of the petitioners that the court's decision to declare this 
motion frivolous and to impose sanctions in the present case 
sends a chilling message to any person who might consider 
questioning a justice's impartiality and to any lawyer asked to 
represent that person.  That is not the message this court 
should be sending. 
¶32 If we are to protect the integrity of the judiciary, 
this court must ensure that it remains an institution that is 
open and accessible.  It must not succumb to the temptation to 
silence challengers by attacking them personally or by diverting 
attention away from the merits of a challenge.  Anyone 
challenging a decision of this court, the impartiality of a 
justice, or the integrity of this institution must receive a 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
12
full, fair, and impartial hearing, without even a hint of 
recrimination, retribution, or retaliation.  That is the message 
the court should be sending. 
¶33 The court must be big enough in stature, strong enough 
in spirit, and gracious enough in action to respond fairly and 
fully on the merits to any challenge to its integrity, and then 
without vengeance or even the appearance of vengeance move on to 
our other business.  The people of this state deserve no less. 
¶34 I am disappointed in the court for not treating the 
challenge in the present case with the grace and dignity 
befitting this institution.  Declaring the motion frivolous and 
imposing sanctions in the present case——in which the court is 
asked to sit in judgment on one of its own members——can too 
easily be read, in my opinion, as being spiteful.  The 
imposition of sanctions can also be viewed as undermining 
confidence in the legitimacy of this court's decision-making and 
the integrity of this court as an institution. 
¶35 Whether a 
challenge 
to 
a 
justice's 
impartiality 
undermines the court's integrity as an institution does not turn 
on the nature of the challenge.  Rather, it turns on the nature 
of this court's response to that challenge.  This court's 
response in the present case was and continues to be, in my 
opinion, flawed, whether viewed from the law applicable to 
frivolous appeals or from the vantage point of the court's 
institutional responsibilities. 
¶36 For these reasons, I dissent from the denial of this 
motion for reconsideration.   
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
13
 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Excerpt from the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in 
Jackson v. Benson, 249 Wis. 2d 681, ¶¶23-24 
(Part II Re Sanctions) 
 
II 
¶23 The State of Wisconsin and Marquelle Miller, et al., 
ask this court to assess reasonable attorney fees and costs 
against 
respondents 
and 
their 
counsel 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3).[fn7]  We agree that the extraordinary 
untimeliness of the motion to vacate justifies a finding of 
frivolousness.  The fact that the motion was filed a mere six 
weeks before the scheduled oral argument of another state-funded 
private school voucher case in the United States Supreme Court 
calls the timing of and motives behind the respondents' motion 
into question. 
¶24 We conclude that the motion to vacate, coming as it 
did almost two years after the public disclosure of the 
information pertinent to the respondents' claims and shortly 
before oral argument in the United States Supreme Court, was 
filed in bad faith, for improper purpose, to undermine the 
public's confidence in the legitimacy of this court's decision 
and the integrity of this court as an institution.  The 
seriousness of a motion of this sort is not an excuse for 
tardiness in bringing it; to the contrary, the gravity of this 
type of motion compels that it be timely brought to ensure a 
prompt resolution.  The only reasonable inference that can be 
drawn from the inordinate untimeliness and suspect timing of 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
this motion is that it was brought in bad faith for improper 
purpose.  Any other conclusion would seriously undermine the 
concept of frivolousness.  We grant the motions of the state and 
Marquelle Miller, et. al., for an award of reasonable attorney 
fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion to vacate.  
We remand the matter to the Dane County Circuit Court for a 
determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. 
 
[fn7] Wisconsin Stat. § 809.25(3) provides: 
(3) Frivolous appeals. (a) If an appeal or cross-
appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs, fees 
and reasonable attorney fees under this section.  A 
motion for costs, fees and attorney fees under this 
subsection shall be filed no later than the filing of 
the respondent's brief, or if a cross-appeal is filed, 
the cross-respondent's brief. 
(b) The costs, fees and attorney fees awarded under 
par. (a) may be assessed fully against the appellant 
or cross-appellant or the attorney representing the 
appellant or cross-appellant or may be assessed so 
that the appellant or cross-appellant and the attorney 
each pay a portion of the costs, fees and attorney 
fees. 
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be 
frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one or 
more of the following: 
 
The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or continued in 
bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously 
injuring another. 
The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have 
known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. 
 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
3 
 
 
Although the state and Marquelle Miller seek costs and 
attorneys fees under § 809.25(3), we note that § 802.05(1)(a) 
provides, in pertinent part, 
 . . . The 
signature 
of 
an 
attorney 
or 
party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to 
the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief, 
formed 
after 
reasonable 
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law; and that the pleading, 
motion or other paper is not used for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay 
or 
needless 
increase 
in 
the 
cost 
of 
litigation.  . . .  If the court determines that an 
attorney 
or 
party 
failed 
to 
read 
or 
make 
the 
determinations required under this subsection before 
signing any petition, motion or other paper, the court 
may, upon motion or upon its own initiative, impose an 
appropriate sanction on the person who signed the 
pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented 
party, or on both. The sanction may include an order 
to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred by that party because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including 
reasonable attorney fees. 
Section 809.84 provides: [a]n appeal to the court is 
governed by the rules of civil procedure as to all matters not 
covered by these rules unless the circumstances of the appeal or 
the context of the rule of civil procedures requires a contrary 
result. 
We thus consider the state's and Marquelle Miller's motions 
under both §§ 802.05(1)(a) and 809.25(3).   
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
2002 WI 14 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  97-0270  
(L.C. No. 
95CV1982, 95CV1997, 96CV1889) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell  
Harris, The Reverend Andrew Kennedy,  
Rabbi Isaac Serotta, Ceil Ann Libber,  
Father Thomas J. Mueller, Reverend John  
N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, Colleen Beaman,  
Mary Morris, Penny Morse, Kathleen Jones  
and Philip Jones,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 19, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education  
Association, by its President, M. Charles  
Howard, Michael Lengyel, Donald Lucier,  
Tracy Adams, Milwaukee Public Schools  
Administrators and Supervisors Council,  
Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl A.  
Gobel, People for the American Way, by  
its Executive Vice President and Legal  
Director, Elliott M. Minceberg, John  
Drew, Susan Endress, Richard Riley,  
Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, Bertha  
Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________ 
National Association for the Advancement  
of Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney,  
Lois Parker, on behalf of herself and her  
minor child, Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D.  
Scott, on behalf of himself and his minor  
 
 
 
children, Deresia C.A. Scott and Desmond  
L.J. Scott, Constance J. Cherry, on  
behalf of herself and her minor children,  
Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, and  
William A. Branch,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official  
capacity,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION to vacate decision of June 10, 1998.   Dismissed; 
matter remanded to the Dane County Circuit Court.    
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   Four 
of 
the 
twenty-nine 
plaintiffs-
respondents20 in Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 
602 (1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998), move this court to 
vacate 
its 
decision 
of 
June 
10, 
1998, 
upholding 
the 
constitutionality of the state's amended Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP).  As grounds for their motion, the four 
respondents assert that they recently received new information 
that this court's decision was rendered by an improperly 
constituted panel because of the participation of a justice 
disqualified by law.  The respondents seek to reinforce their 
motion by noting that the school choice issue is currently 
pending before the United States Supreme Court on a similar 
                                                 
20 Carl A. Gobel, Warner Jackson, Father Thomas J. Mueller, 
and Wendell Harris. 
No. 
97-0270   
 
4 
 
constitutional challenge to an Ohio school choice program.  See 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert 
granted, 533 U.S. ___ (No. 00-1571).  Oral argument in Zelman is 
scheduled for February 20, 2002.  The respondents assert that at 
least three parties to this court's decision in Jackson v. 
Benson who support school choice have submitted amicus briefs to 
the United States Supreme Court and are likely to have cited 
Jackson v. Benson as persuasive authority.   
¶2 
We dismiss the respondents' motion because it is 
untimely and frivolous as a matter of law.  More than 1300 days 
have passed since this court issued its decision in Jackson v. 
Benson.  More importantly, more than 600 days have passed since 
the information advanced by respondents in support of their 
disqualification claim21 became publicly known.  Inasmuch as 
                                                 
21 Respondents contend that Justice Jon P. Wilcox was 
disqualified under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) and (3) (1999-2000), 
which provides: 
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
(a) When a judge is related to any party or counsel 
thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of 
kinship. 
(b) When a judge is a party or a material witness, 
except that a judge need not disqualify himself or 
herself if the judge determines that any pleading 
purporting to make him or her a party is false, sham 
or frivolous. 
(c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to any 
party in the same action or proceeding. 
No. 
97-0270   
 
5 
 
motions such as this constitute an attack on the integrity of 
this court's decisions, they must be brought promptly.  This one 
was not.  Respondents' inordinate and unexplained delay in 
raising 
the 
disqualification 
issue 
in 
a 
timely 
fashion 
constitutes a waiver of whatever objections they may have had in 
this regard and lead us to the conclusion that the motion to 
vacate is frivolous.   
I 
¶3 
We set forth the significant facts surrounding Jackson 
v. Benson and respondents' claims that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
should not have participated in the decision.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal 
instrument or paper whose validity or construction is 
at issue. 
(e) When a judge of an appellate court previously 
handled the action or proceeding while judge of an 
inferior court. 
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the matter.  Such 
interest does not occur solely by the judge being a 
member of a political or taxing body that is a party. 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he 
or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in 
an impartial manner. 
(3) Any disqualification that may occur under sub. (2) 
may be waived by agreement of all parties and the 
judge after full and complete disclosure on the record 
of the factors creating such disqualification.  
All 
subsequent statutory 
references to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 
1999-2000 
volumes 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
 
No. 
97-0270   
 
6 
 
¶4 
 The constitutionality of the amended MPCP has been 
before this court on two occasions.  In 1996 this court heard 
argument in an original action.  On March 29, 1996, this court 
split three-three over the constitutionality of the amended 
MPCP, with Justice Wilcox voting to uphold it.  State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714, 720, 546 N.W.2d 140 
(1996).  The case was remanded to Dane County Circuit Court, 
which later found the statute unconstitutional.   
¶5 
On April 1, 1997, Justice Wilcox won a ten-year term 
on this court, defeating Milwaukee attorney Walter Kelly by a 
margin of 185,437 votes.22  On April 3, 1997, two days after the 
election, there was a press report that an anonymous group of 
individuals had spent an estimated $135,000 to print and mail as 
many as 450,000 postcards to support Justice Wilcox's election.23  
In April 1997 Mark Block, the campaign manager for the Justice 
Wilcox for Justice Campaign (JWJC), admitted to the public that 
he had been contacted in January and March by the group that 
sent the postcards, but he did not identify the group.  The 
names of the persons who gave the money were not revealed at 
that time, nor was it revealed that the donors were school 
choice proponents. 
                                                 
22 The vote totals were 476,900 for Justice Wilcox and 
291,463 for Attorney Kelly.  State of Wisconsin Blue Book at 870 
(1997-98). 
23 Cary Segall, Expense for Wilcox Goes Unreported, WISCONSIN 
STATE JOURNAL, April 3, 1997.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
7 
 
¶6 
On June 16, 1997, an organization called The Wisconsin 
Coalition for Voter Participation (WCVP) was identified as the 
group that coordinated the postcard mailing.  On July 30, 1997, 
the State Elections Board voted unanimously to investigate the 
anonymous mass mailing.  The investigation ultimately revealed 
that WCVP made disbursements and incurred obligations of 
approximately $200,000 on mailings and telephone calls to 
targeted voters.  
¶7 
On August 22, 1997, the court of appeals, in a two-one 
decision, affirmed an order of the circuit court for Dane 
county, Paul B. Higginbotham, Judge, finding the amended MPCP 
unconstitutional.  Jackson v. Benson, 213 Wis. 2d 1, 570 N.W.2d 
407 (Ct. App. 1997).  The majority of the court of appeals 
concluded that the amended MPCP was invalid under Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution because it directed 
payments of money from the state treasury for the benefit of 
religious seminaries.  This court granted the state's petition 
for review on October 14, 1997.  In late December 1997 the WCVP 
filed a lawsuit seeking to halt the investigation into possible 
ties between the group and the Wilcox campaign. 
¶8 
This court heard oral argument in Jackson v. Benson on 
March 4, 1998.  The court issued its decision on June 10, 1998.  
Justice Steinmetz authored the majority opinion reversing the 
court of appeals.  Justices Wilcox, Geske, and Crooks joined the 
majority opinion.  Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch 
dissented.  Justice Bradley did not participate.  On June 26, 
1998, intervenors/respondents Parents For School Choice, et al., 
No. 
97-0270   
 
8 
 
filed a motion for clarification of the opinion, so that for a 
time a post-decision motion was pending before this court.24  The 
motion was subsequently withdrawn.  On November 9, 1998, the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 
¶9 
In November 1999 the court of appeals allowed the 
State Elections Board to proceed in its investigation of the 
connection between the WCVP mailing and the Wilcox campaign, 
affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the WCVP's lawsuit to 
halt the investigation and have the mailing declared legal.  
Coalition for Voter Participation v. Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 
670, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 231 Wis. 2d 
377, 607 N.W.2d 293 (1999).   
¶10 On 
March 
22, 
2000, 
the 
State 
Elections 
Board 
unanimously adopted the following motion: 
MOTION: TO EXPRESS THE SENSE OF THE ELECTIONS BOARD 
THAT JUSTICE JON WILCOX DID NOTHING ILLEGAL AND WAS 
NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
OF HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT, THE ELECTION FOR WHICH WAS HELD IN 
APRIL 1997; . . .  
¶11 In the spring of 2000 the identities of the persons 
who contributed to the WCVP became publicly known.25 
                                                 
24 The respondents did not file any post-decision motion at 
this time.  
25 Cary Segall and Andy Hall, Big, Out-of-State Donors 
Weighed In For Court Case, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, March 19, 2000; 
Cary Segall and Andy Hall, Wilcox Backers Revealed, GOP School-
Choice Supporters Funded Secret Effort, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, 
April 20, 2000.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
9 
 
¶12 On March 20, 2001, the civil action brought by the 
State Elections Board against the JWJC and campaign manager Mark 
Block ended with a monetary settlement, stipulation, and order 
for dismissal.  In a statement attached to the stipulation, 
Justice Wilcox stated: 
Last March the State Elections Board stated that it 
was the sense of the Board that I did nothing illegal 
and was not personally responsible for any illegal 
activities of my campaign.  However, the Board's 
investigation has implicated my campaign manager and 
others in violations of the state's campaign finance 
law.  I choose not to contest this.  I acknowledge 
that I had a responsibility for the conduct of 
campaign staff.  Therefore, as the candidate, I am 
funding my campaign committee so that the committee 
can pay a monetary penalty to settle this matter.  
¶13 On January 9, 2002, respondents filed their motion to 
vacate the Jackson v. Benson decision, claiming that the facts 
set forth above demonstrate that Justice Wilcox was disqualified 
by law from participating in the case.  
¶14 The general rule is that, after remittitur, the 
supreme court has no jurisdiction to vacate or modify its 
judgment.  Ott v. Boring, 131 Wis. 472, 110 N.W. 824 (1907).  
Where a justice who participated in a case was disqualified by 
law the court's judgment in that case is void.  Case v. Hoffman, 
100 Wis. 314, 72 N.W. 390, reh'g granted 74 N.W. 220 (1898).  We 
have previously stated, "[a]n attack on the validity of a 
judgment of the state's highest court on the ground of a 
member's disqualification by law for an apparent inability to 
act impartially is not, nor can we conceive of it ever being, a 
'routine matter.'"  State v. American TV & Appliance, 151 
No. 
97-0270   
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d 175, 192, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989).  We have also said, 
however, that it behooves the court in the defense of its own 
legitimacy and of its integrity to consider a party's claim that 
a decision may be void because a justice should not have 
participated in the case.  City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 
190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995).   
¶15 The chronology of events in this case demonstrates 
that the respondents were on notice by the spring of 2000 as to 
the identity of the donors to WCVP and their support of the 
school choice issue.  Instead of bringing their motion at that 
time, the respondents remained silent for almost another two 
years, raising their disqualification objection on the eve of 
the United States Supreme Court's oral argument in another case 
raising the issue of the constitutionality of a private school 
voucher program.   
¶16 Although respondents claim "it was not until a few 
months ago that information was made public casting a shadow on 
the 1997 supreme court election and highlighting the role of 
money in that election from the advocates for the defendants in 
a pending case," the record amply demonstrates that all 
information arguably pertinent to any disqualification issue in 
the case was publicly known by the spring of 2000.  By failing 
to raise the issue in a timely fashion, respondents waived 
whatever objections they may have had to Justice Wilcox's 
participation in the court's decision.  
¶17 We came to a similar conclusion in City of Edgerton.  
In that case Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc., (ES&G) moved to 
No. 
97-0270   
 
11 
 
vacate this court's decision or, in the alternative, moved for a 
rehearing in the matter.  Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc., argued 
that Justice Geske improperly participated in the case.  At the 
outset of oral argument, Justice Geske stated on the record that 
the previous night she noted for the first time that one of the 
companies listed in the appendix to an amicus brief was St. Paul 
Companies, the employer of Justice Geske's husband.  Justice 
Geske stated she did not believe that fact presented any 
conflict and it would not influence her.  She informed the 
parties that if anyone had any objections to her sitting on the 
case, she would appreciate hearing from them by letter by the 
end of the week.   
¶18 No objection was raised by any of the parties until a 
non-party, Kenosha Auto Transport (KAT), raised the question of 
Justice Geske's participation in a proposed amicus brief KAT 
tendered to the court in support of a motion for reconsideration 
filed over seven months later.  The motion to file an amicus 
brief was denied and the movants' request to seek Justice 
Geske's disqualification was dismissed.  More than two months 
later ES&G filed a motion to vacate the decision, arguing that 
Justice Geske was disqualified under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) and 
(3) from participating in the original decision and asking for 
the vacation of the decision or, in the alternative, for 
rehearing without Justice Geske's participation.  Edgerton Sand 
& Gravel, Inc., argued that Justice Geske's disclosure about her 
connection with St. Paul Companies had been incomplete.  
No. 
97-0270   
 
12 
 
¶19 The Edgerton court noted that the disqualification 
statute provides that any disqualification "may be waived by 
agreement of all parties and the judge after full and complete 
disclosure 
on 
the 
record 
of 
factors 
creating 
the 
disqualification."  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(3).  The Edgerton court 
found it significant that ES&G did not argue that Justice 
Geske's disclosure and her setting of a time limit to object or 
to waive objection to her participation in the case was not a 
proper procedural framework for the waiver of disqualification.  
Instead, 
ES&G 
argued 
Justice 
Geske's 
disclosure 
was 
not 
sufficient 
and 
did 
not 
constitute 
a 
"full 
and 
complete 
disclosure."  The Edgerton court said: 
We conclude that under the circumstances of this case 
the disclosure made by Justice Geske was sufficient——
that all the facts necessary for counsel to determine 
whether to assert or waive any disqualification were 
either disclosed or were readily obtainable of record 
prior to the "weekend deadline" suggested by Justice 
Geske.  Following that disclosure, if ES&G had been 
concerned, 
it 
could 
have 
examined 
the 
financial 
disclosures Justice Geske had filed with the Ethics 
Board and if those disclosures did not satisfy ES&G in 
respect to Justice Geske's financial ties to St. Paul 
Companies, it could have asked for more information 
from her or could have advised her "by the end of the 
week" that it objected to her participation. 
If ES&G's counsel examined the public record, it 
apparently 
did 
not 
deem 
the 
information 
in 
it 
sufficient to pursue the disqualification issue.  Now, 
however, 
ES&G's 
substituted 
counsel 
asserts 
that 
Justice Geske's disqualification was required on the 
basis of inferences it makes from that information.  
Clearly, ES&G waived any possible disqualification by 
not acting by the "end of the week" and for one year 
following oral argument.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
13 
 
Even after the court's decision on June 16, 1994——
after learning that Justice Geske was the scrivener 
for the court——ES&G's counsel did not raise the 
question of Justice Geske's qualification to sit but 
asserted in its reconsideration motion only that the 
court had failed to follow what counsel considered 
controlling law.  Despite the fact that ES&G had been 
served with a copy of KAT's proposed amicus motion and 
brief raising the disqualification issue, it did not 
join in KAT's motion or express to the court in its 
motion for reconsideration on the merits any position 
in respect to disqualification.   
Hence, we conclude that on at least two discrete 
occasions, ES&G's counsel failed to make any objection 
to Justice Geske's participation.  These successive 
waivers in themselves bar ES&G from asserting its 
motion for vacatur at this time, months after it could 
have informed itself of the facts on which its motion 
is based and made any concern known to the court.   
Id. at 518-19.   
¶20 The same analysis applies with even greater force in 
this case.  Although there was no judicial disclosure here, the 
basic facts upon which the respondents now rely in raising the 
issue of Justice Wilcox's participation were readily available 
as of the spring of 2000.  Yet respondents did not raise the 
disqualification issue at that time; indeed, their inaction 
continued for almost another two years. 
¶21 Not until January 9, 2002, twenty-one months after the 
identity of the donors to WCVP became publicly known, did 
respondents file a motion to vacate the decision.  Respondents' 
delay in bringing the motion mandates a finding of waiver.  
Although respondents claim the motion was filed in January of 
2002 because of "new information," this court has searched the 
entire record and found nothing "new."  Instead, all of the 
No. 
97-0270   
 
14 
 
facts arguably pertinent to the disqualification claim were well 
known in the spring of 2000.   
¶22 The respondents' inordinate delay in filing the motion 
to vacate mocks the fundamental and vital principle of finality, 
which is essential to the operation of a society governed by 
law.  See Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith, 80 Wis. 2d 332, 342, 
259 N.W.2d 515 (1977).  Motions such as this, having the 
potential to undermine the public's trust and confidence in the 
legitimacy of this court's decisions and the integrity and 
impartiality of this court as an institution, are very serious 
indeed, and, accordingly, must be raised in a timely fashion. 
II 
¶23 The State of Wisconsin and Marquelle Miller, et al., 
ask this court to assess reasonable attorney fees and costs 
against 
respondents 
and 
their 
counsel 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3).26  We agree that the extraordinary 
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Stat. §  809.25(3) provides: 
(3) Frivolous appeals. (a) If an appeal or cross-
appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs, fees 
and reasonable attorney fees under this section.  A 
motion for costs, fees and attorney fees under this 
subsection shall be filed no later than the filing of 
the respondent's brief, or if a cross-appeal is filed, 
the cross-respondent's brief.  
(b) The costs, fees and attorney fees awarded under 
par. (a) may be assessed fully against the appellant 
or cross-appellant or the attorney representing the 
appellant or cross-appellant or may be assessed so 
that the appellant or cross-appellant and the attorney 
each pay a portion of the costs, fees and attorney 
fees. 
No. 
97-0270   
 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be 
frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one or 
more of the following: 
The 
appeal 
or 
cross-appeal 
was 
filed, 
used 
or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have 
known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. 
Although the state and Marquelle Miller seek costs and 
attorneys fees under § 809.25(3), we note that § 802.05(1)(a) 
provides, in pertinent part,  
 . . . The 
signature 
of 
an 
attorney 
or 
party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to 
the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief, 
formed 
after 
reasonable 
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law; and that the pleading, 
motion or other paper is not used for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  
 . . . If the court determines that an attorney or 
party failed to read or make the determinations 
required under this subsection before signing any 
petition, motion or other paper, the court may, upon 
motion 
or 
upon 
its 
own 
initiative, 
impose 
an 
appropriate sanction on the person who signed the 
pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented 
party, or on both.  The sanction may include an order 
to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred by that party because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including 
reasonable attorney fees.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
16 
 
untimeliness of the motion to vacate justifies a finding of 
frivolousness.  The fact that the motion was filed a mere six 
weeks before the scheduled oral argument of another state-funded 
private school voucher case in the United States Supreme Court 
calls the timing of and motives behind the respondents' motion 
into question. 
¶24 We conclude that the motion to vacate, coming as it 
did almost two years after the public disclosure of the 
information pertinent to the respondents' claims and shortly 
before oral argument in the United States Supreme Court, was 
filed in bad faith, for improper purpose, to undermine the 
public's confidence in the legitimacy of this court's decision 
and the integrity of this court as an institution. The 
seriousness of a motion of this sort is not an excuse for 
tardiness in bringing it; to the contrary, the gravity of this 
type of motion compels that it be timely brought to ensure a 
prompt resolution.  The only reasonable inference that can be 
drawn from the inordinate untimeliness and suspect timing of 
this motion is that it was brought in bad faith for improper 
purpose.  Any other conclusion would seriously undermine the 
concept of frivolousness.  We grant the motions of the state and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Section 809.84 provides: [a]n appeal to the court is 
governed by the rules of civil procedure as to all matters not 
covered by these rules unless the circumstances of the appeal or 
the context of the rule of civil procedures requires a contrary 
result.  
We thus consider the state's and Marquelle Miller's motions 
under both §§ 802.05(1)(a) and 809.25(3).  
No. 
97-0270   
 
17 
 
Marquelle Miller, et. al., for an award of reasonable attorney 
fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion to vacate.  
We remand the matter to the Dane County Circuit Court for a 
determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and 
costs.  
¶25 JON P. WILCOX and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, JJ., did not 
participate.  
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶26 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring in 
part, dissenting in part).  I join only Part I of the court's 
opinion.  I do not join Part II of the opinion remanding the 
matter to the Dane County Circuit Court to determine the amount 
of reasonable attorney fees and costs for a frivolous action.  
This proceeding ought to end now.   
 
 
 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
1