Title: Flores v. Bell

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Rafael Flores v. Ronald Bell, et al. 
No. 65, September Term, 2006.
APPEAL AND ERROR - HARMLESS ERROR: Court of Special Appeals
judgment vacating jury verdict reversed.  Submission of driver-
identification question to the jury, answered in accordance with
the parties’ stipulation, did not prejudice respondent and in any
case, assuming arguendo error, was harmless.  
In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. 02-C-03-091859 MT
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 65
September Term, 2006
RAFAEL FLORES
v.
RONALD BELL, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Wilner
Cathell
Battaglia
Greene
Bloom, Theodore G. (Retired, specially
assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   March 20, 2007
* Wilner, J. now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.  
1 We also granted writ of certiorari to consider the following question: “Can the Court
of Special Appeals, sua sponte, vacate a jury’s verdict as a sanction against defense counsel
for making a statement to the Circuit Court that it perceived to constitute a
misrepresentation?”  In light of our holding, we do not reach this question.  We take no
position as to whether defense counsel’s conduct and statements constituted a
misrepresentation, and we leave this issue to be considered in another forum.
Respondents Ronald and Melanie Bell filed an action sounding in negligence in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against petitioner Rafael Flores, alleging that Flores
negligently caused injury to Mr. Ronald Bell in an automobile accident on October 4, 2000.
The issue before this court concerns a stipulation entered into by the parties before the trial
began, and the impact this stipulation had on questions submitted by the trial court for
consideration by the jury.  At the conclusion of a seven-day jury trial in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bells and awarded $5,329
in damages.  The Bells appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and, in an unreported
opinion, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new
trial.  
We granted Flores’ petition for writ of certiorari to primarily address the following
question:1
“On review of the trial court’s decision to reserve ruling on a
motion for judgment and submit an issue to the jury, can the
Court of Special Appeals vacate a jury’s verdict when, if it was
error, it was harmless?”
Flores v. Bell, 394 Md. 478, 906 A.2d 942 (2006).
-2-
I.
Ronald Bell was struck from behind while driving a van near Crofton, Maryland on
October 4, 2000.  Seventeen days later, on October 21, 2000, Mr. Bell was in a second
automobile accident.  The Bells filed a Complaint against Flores for injuries that Mr. Bell
allegedly sustained in the first accident and filed a separate suit against a different party for
injuries that Mr. Bell claimed occurred in the second accident.
Prior to trial, counsel for both sides orally agreed to stipulate that Flores was liable for
the underlying accident.  The stipulation was not reduced to writing, nor was it formally
placed on the record.  During opening argument, the Bells’ counsel informed the jury that the
parties have “stipulated that — and they admitted that it was Mr. Flores’ fault.”  Flores’
counsel, in opening argument, also acknowledged the stipulation for liability.  Flores’
counsel stated:  
 “In this case, liability has been admitted.  Why?  Because Mr.
Flores admits that he made a mistake. . . .  For whatever reason,
whether Mr. Flores didn’t pay enough attention, took his eyes
off the road, thought he had more time to stop than he did, for
whatever that reason is, he couldn’t stop in time to avoid an
impact so an impact occurred.  Now, he has admitted it.  He has
accepted responsibility for that and he comes before you today
not to try to avoid responsibility, but to say that even though he
is responsible for causing this impact . . . he is not responsible
for this litany of medical expenses that you have just heard.” 
In the Bells’ case-in-chief, the investigating police officer at the scene identified
Flores as the driver of the vehicle that crashed into the Bells’.  The officer, examined by the
Bells’ counsel, testified as follows:
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“Q.  Who did you determine was operating the vehicles?
“A.  The gentleman sitting in the Defendant’s seat . . . He was
driving the passenger vehicle.  The gentleman sitting next to you
was driving the white van.  
*****
“Q.  Officer, testifying from your report, can you tell us who
was in which car?
“A.  Mr. Rafael Flores was driving a Dodge Caravan, my
correction, and Mr. Bell was driving a Ford van that was white
in color.”  
At the close of respondents’ case and after the jury had been excused from the
courtroom, Flores’ counsel informed the trial court that he intended to make a motion.
Before counsel articulated the grounds for his motion, the trial court, sua sponte, raised the
issue of whether the Bells had proven that Flores was driving the vehicle that hit the Bells’
van.  The following colloquy occurred:
“[THE COURT]:  For the record, the Plaintiff has rested his
case.  I will consider a motion by the Defendant at this time.  Let
me ask you a question?  Has anybody put the Defendant behind
the wheel of the car that hit the Plaintiff from behind?
“[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.  
“[THE COURT]: I didn’t think they did.  Mr. Miklasz [the
Bells’ counsel], I don’t think there is any evidence that puts that
man behind the wheel of the trailing car. 
“[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: And it is on that basis, Your Honor,
that we would move for judgment in favor of the Defendant, Mr.
Flores.  
-4-
“[THE COURT]: I have been waiting.
*****
“[BELLS’ COUNSEL]: Now, the Defendant has admitted
liability.  They said that they have admitted liability in this case;
they stipulated to liability.  The question before the Court was
for damages, and that is what we were here for . . . . 
*****
“[THE COURT]: Let me just say — as you know — Mr. Evans
[Flores’ Counsel] didn’t even begin his motion, and I knew
exactly what the motion would be about.  And I have gone home
from this five-day trial everyday thinking, “I wonder when Mr.
Miklasz [the Bells’ counsel] is going to put this Defendant
behind the wheel.”
*****
“[THE COURT]:  How about your admission of liability?
“[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: We were careful.  We admitted
responsibility for the damages if the damages were causally
proven to have related from this accident.  That is a difference
between saying that we admitted that he was the driver on that
day in the vehicle.  He could be a third party responsible party,
just like an insurer, or just like any other — the parent of a
minor child, saying that they will be responsible should the jury
find that damages were causally related to an accident.  But
there is a distinction between that and saying that Mr. Flores was
the operator of the vehicle in question at the time of the
accident.  Mr. Flores has not taken the stand, and was not called
as an adverse witness in their case.”
The trial judge reserved ruling on Flores’ Motion for Judgment and informed counsel
that he would include a question on the verdict sheet asking the jury to determine whether
Flores was the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Bells’ vehicle.  The first question
2 Courts may presume prejudice, under certain circumstances, although it is the
exception rather than the rule.  See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 638, 843 A.2d 64, 75
(2004) (holding that presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations created a
presumption of prejudice); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 289, 825 A.2d 1008, 1011 (2003)
(presuming prejudice based on improper contact during the trial between a juror and a police
witness for the State); Murrell v. Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 197, 829 A.2d 548, 564 (2003)
(violating procedure established in city code may present structural trial error whereby
prejudice is presumed); Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319-20, 529 A.2d 356, 360-61 (1987)
(presuming prejudice where erroneously imposed disqualification deprives a litigant of the
right to chosen counsel); King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284 Md. 368, 372, 396 A.2d 267, 270
(continued...)
-5-
on the verdict sheet stated as follows: “Do you find that the Plaintiffs have proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Rafael Flores, was the operator of the
second vehicle involved in the accident of October 4, 2000?”  The Bells’ counsel objected
to including the question on the verdict sheet.  
The jury answered “yes” to the first question (driver-identification), “yes” to the
second question (whether Ronald Bell’s injuries were proximately caused by Flores’
negligence), and awarded $5,329 in damages: $2,149 for past medical expenses; $680 in lost
wages; $2,500 in non-economic damages; and $0 for loss of consortium.  
II.
It has long been the policy in this State that this Court will not reverse a lower court
judgment if the error is harmless.   Greenbriar v. Brooks, 387 Md. 683, 740, 878 A.2d 528,
563 (2005);  Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91, 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004).  The burden is
on the complaining party to show prejudice as well as error.2  Greenbriar, 387 Md. at 740,
2(...continued)
(1979) (noting that prejudice may be presumed where deviation from prescribed court
procedure impairs or denies full exercise of peremptory challenges). 
-6-
878 A.2d at 563; Crane, 382 Md. at 91, 854 A.2d at 1185; Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321,
330, 368 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1977).
Precise standards for determining prejudice have not been established and depend
upon the facts of each individual case.  Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 356, 825 A.2d 1042,
1050 (2003); see also State Deposit v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17, 580 A.2d 1044, 1051 (1990)
(reiterating that appellate court balances the probability of prejudice from the face of the
extraneous matter with the circumstances of the particular case).  Prejudice can be
demonstrated by showing that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below; an error
that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.  Crane, 382 Md. at 91, 854
A.2d at 1185; Beahm, 279 Md. at 331, 368 A.2d at 1011 (1977).  We have also found
reversible error when the prejudice was substantial.  Fry, 375 Md. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050.
The focus of our inquiry is on the probability, not the possibility, of prejudice.  Crane, 382
Md. at 91, 854 A.2d at 1185; Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 148, 577 A.2d 7,
12-13 (1990).  We discussed the standard of review in civil cases in Crane, 382 Md. 83, 854
A.2d 1180, noting as follows:
“Prejudice will be found if a showing is made that the error was
likely to have affected the verdict below.  ‘It is not the
possibility, but the probability, of prejudice which is the object
of the appellate inquiry.’  ‘Courts are reluctant to set aside
verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence
-7-
unless they cause substantial injustice.’  Substantial prejudice
must be shown.  To justify the reversal, an error below must
have been ‘. . . both manifestly wrong and substantially
injurious.’”
Id. at 91-92, 854 A.2d at 1185 (citations omitted).
III.
Petitioner argues that, even if the trial court erred by submitting the driver-
identification issue to the jury, the error, if any, was harmless because respondents suffered
no prejudice.  Petitioner further asserts that, because the error was harmless, it was improper
for the Court of Special Appeals to vacate the jury’s verdict.  Respondents reply that the trial
court erred in submitting any issue other than damages to the jury because the jury had been
advised that liability was not contested and it was not disputed that Flores was the driver of
the vehicle.  Respondents assert also that submitting the driver-identification issue to the jury
resulted in substantial prejudice, as evidenced by the small amount of damages awarded in
relation to the damages proved.
Respondents claim that submitting the driver-identification issue to the jury was
reversible error.  We need not decide whether the trial court erred, because, assuming
arguendo that it was error for the trial court to submit the first question to the jury, the
ultimate question is whether prejudice resulted.
Respondents rely on Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 825 A.2d 1042, to support the
assertion that the driver-identification question was prejudicial because it distracted the jury
-8-
from focusing on the determination of damages.  In Fry, a traffic control manager was killed
alongside a highway when he was struck by roof trusses extending over the side of a passing
flat-bed tractor-trailer.  Id. at 344, 825 A.2d at 1043.  The issue in Fry was whether the
defendant tractor-trailer driver was negligent, not whether the defendant could have avoided
the accident at the last minute.  Id. at 355, 825 A.2d at 1050.  Nevertheless, the trial court
instructed the jury on unavoidable accidents.  Id.  We held that it was error for the trial court
to give an unavoidable accident instruction in a negligence action.  Id. at 347, 825 A.2d at
1045.  Moreover, we held that the instruction was prejudicial and constituted reversible error.
We stated as follows:
“The unavoidable accident instruction was prejudicial because
it permitted the jury to speculate as to whether [the defendant]
could have avoided the accident at the last minute . . .
Suggesting to the jury that it could decide the case on the
grounds that the event was unavoidable was misleading because
it diverted juror attention from the pivotal issue in the case —
negligence.  The verdict in this case was a general verdict; thus
it is unclear how the jury reached its verdict.  The jury might
have relied upon the unavoidable accident instruction as a basis
for its verdict.”
Id. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
Respondents argue that the reasoning in Fry applies to the case sub judice because the
jury was distracted from the issue of damages when it had to consider an issue conceded and
resolved through stipulation.  We disagree.  Fry addressed an improper jury instruction and
the case sub judice concerns a question submitted to the jury.  Moreover, it was unclear in
Fry how the jury reached its verdict because it was a general verdict.  Because we were
-9-
unable to determine the conclusions utilized by the jury in making its decision, it was
possible and probable that the jury relied on the improper instruction as a basis for its verdict.
In the instant case, there was a special verdict.  The special verdict sheet required that the
jury provide a separate answer to the driver-identification question.  The jury’s verdict to this
question was in favor of respondents and, even if submitting the question to the jury was
error because the issue had been resolved by stipulation, there is nothing in this record, other
than the verdict itself, to suggest that the question distracted the jury from reaching a fair and
proper verdict on the question of damages.  The question did not prejudice respondents.
Respondents, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, rely on Bloom v. Graff, 191 Md.
733, 63 A.2d 313 (1949).  In Bloom, the parties stipulated in open court that “if a verdict is
found in favor of the plaintiff it should be in the amount of $896.09.”  Id. at 736, 63 A.2d at
315.  In instructing the jury, however, the trial court stated that “[i]f you want to find for the
plaintiffs you don’t have to bring in a verdict of $869.09.”  Id.  The jury rendered a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff for $250.  Id. at 735, 63 A.2d at 314.  We held that it was error for
the court to allow the jury to find contrary to the agreement of the parties and we entered a
final judgment for $869.09.  Id. at 737, 63 A.2d at 315.  
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that “[a]s in Bloom, the circuit court erred
by ignoring the stipulation between [the Bells] and Flores.”  The instant case and Bloom are
markedly different.  In Bloom, the trial court told the jury it could disregard the parties’
stipulation and that it could render a verdict contrary to the parties’ agreement.  In the case
-10-
sub judice, the trial court merely submitted a question to the jury, and the jury returned a
verdict consistent with the stipulation.  There was no prejudice. 
Submission of issues or questions to the jury does not necessarily constitute reversible
error, particularly when the question is answered in favor of the complaining party.  In
Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534 (1972), the trial court submitted a question
to the jury although the information sought by the question was uncontested.  Specifically,
the trial court asked, “Did Dr. Richard G. Holz obtain [appellant’s] consent through
misrepresentation?”  Id. at 446, 290 A.2d 541.  Appellant in that case argued that it was
conceded on her part that Dr. Holz did not deliberately lie nor intentionally misrepresent the
facts in order to obtain her consent to the operation.  Id. at 446-47, 290 A.2d 541.  Appellant
further asserted that the question should not have been submitted to the jury because it
prejudiced her cause for the jury to think she was making the contention referenced in the
question.  Id. at 447, 290 A.2d 541.  This Court held that it was not reversible error for the
trial court to submit the question to the jury because the “question had to be answered in the
negative.”  Id.  Moreover, we stated that, “[w]e think her apprehension on this point is totally
unwarranted.”  Id.  
The facts and rationale of Kruszewski are applicable to the instant case.  Here,
respondents are concerned that submission of the driver-identification question prejudiced
their cause by confusing the jury, about the stipulation and evidence on one hand and the
court’s questions on the other.  Respondents assert that the confusion manifested itself in a
3 The jury was responsible for determining the injuries and resulting damages related
to Ronald Bell’s accident with Flores as opposed to Bell’s second accident, which occurred
seventeen days later.  This was a complicated issue, but it is not probable that submission of
the driver-identification question affected the jury’s ability to determine damages.
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substantially reduced verdict.3  Nevertheless, the jury answered the question in accordance
with respondents’ view of the stipulation, and there is no evidence on the record indicating
that the damages award was influenced by the submission of the driver-identification
question.  As in Kruszewski, it was not reversible error to include the driver-identification
question on the jury verdict sheet.  The driver-identification question, answered in
accordance with the parties’ stipulation, did not prejudice respondents. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCU IT 
COURT 
FOR 
ANNE
ARUNDEL COUNTY.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY RESPONDENTS.