Title: Barlow v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF : JAMES W. BARLOW, AND EMPLOYEE OF GREY WOLF DRILLING, INC.: JAMES W, BARLOW v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2011 WY 120Case Number: No. S-10-0243Decided: 08/24/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:  
JAMES 
W. BARLOW, AN EMPLOYEE OF GREY WOLF DRILLING, INC.:JAMES W. 
BARLOW,Appellant (Employee/Claimant),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,Appellee 
(Objector/Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Larry 
B. Jones of Simpson Kepler & Edwards, LLC, The Cody, Wyoming Division of 
Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, PC, Cody, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James M. Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, 
Assistant Attorney General.  

 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a dissenting opinion 
in which KITE, C.J., 
joins.
 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
James W. Barlow, injured his knee while climbing into his employer-provided 
truck as he was preparing to leave on a work-related trip.  His request for workers’ compensation 
benefits related to his injury was denied by the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and 
Compensation Division (“Division”), which denial was upheld on summary judgment 
by the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), and affirmed by the district 
court.  We will 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Did the OAH 
correctly apply the “going and coming rule,” as codified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), when it granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Division?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The relevant 
facts are undisputed.  The appellant 
was a salaried employee with Grey Wolf Drilling Company (“employer”).  His employer provided him a truck to use 
for travel related to his job and for personal use.  On December 1, 2008, as the appellant 
was climbing into his truck to leave for a work trip, his foot slipped and he 
hit his right knee on the stirrup of the truck.  The injury resulted in immediate pain in 
the appellant’s knee and required medical attention.
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
requested workers’ compensation benefits for the injury resulting from this 
incident, which request the Division denied.  The matter was referred to the OAH, and 
the Division filed a motion for summary judgment.  The appellant filed a response and the 
OAH held a hearing on the motion.  
The OAH granted summary judgment in favor of the Division.  The appellant then filed a Petition for 
Review with the district court, and the district court affirmed the OAH’s 
decision.  The appellant timely 
appealed the matter to this court 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      As noted above, 
this matter was decided on summary judgment.
 
The 
summary judgment procedures set forth in W.R.C.P. 56 apply to worker’s 
compensation cases, and we apply our well-established standard for reviewing 
summary judgments.  Chavez v. Mem’l Hosp. of Sweetwater 
County, 2006 WY 82, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo. 2006). 
 The purpose of summary judgment is 
to dispose of suits before trial that present no genuine issue of material fact. 
 Id.  Summary judgment motions are determined 
under the following language from W.R.C.P. 56(c):
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
This 
Court reviews a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using 
the same materials and following the same standards.  Chavez, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d  at 188.  We view the record from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party who opposed the motion and give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. 
 Id.
 
Quinn 
v.  Securitas Sec. 
Servs., 
2007 WY 91, ¶ 8, 158 P.3d 711, 713 (Wyo. 
2007).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      The broad 
question raised here is whether the appellant is entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits for the injury he suffered as he was entering his 
employer-provided vehicle to leave for work.  To prove entitlement to benefits, the 
appellant had to show that he sustained an “injury” as defined by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2011).  
The definition of “injury” in that statute is:
 
any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer’s business requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.
 
However, 
the term “injury” does not include: “(D) Any injury sustained during travel to 
or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by a vehicle of the employer[.]”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  This statute 
is the codification of a concept known as the “going and coming” rule, which is 
based on “a long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred while either 
going to or coming from work are not compensable unless the employer has in some 
fashion provided the employee with transportation or has reimbursed him for the 
costs of those travels.”  Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 
1990).  This rule constitutes “a legislative determination that, while no 
compensable nexus with the employment is generally present when an employee is 
travelling between home and work, such a nexus is created where the employer has 
assumed the cost of that travel.”  Id. at 93.
 
[¶7]      With these 
concepts in mind, we turn to the specific question before us: whether the 
appellant’s injury was sustained while, as the statute requires, he was being 
“transported by a vehicle of the employer.”  Essentially, the question is 
whether the act of entering an employer-provided vehicle to embark on a 
work-related trip falls within the scope of “being transported by a vehicle of 
the employer.”  We have not previously addressed this specific question, as 
all cases in which we have considered the effect of our statutorily defined 
“going and coming rule” involved accidents while the employee was moving in 
transit.  See Quinn, 2007 WY 91, 158 P.3d 711; Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 
23, 106 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 
2005); Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 85, 93 P.3d 1001 (Wyo. 2004); Chapman v. Meyers, 899 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1995); Richard v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. 
Div., 831 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 
1992); Archuleta, 787 P.2d 91; In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 
1947).
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
argues that we should adopt a broad interpretation of the statutory language, 
asserting that “it is the relationship of the injury to the reason for providing 
transportation which is important, and not wether [sic] the employee is sitting 
in the vehicle at the time of the incident.”  The appellant cites two Oklahoma cases as 
support for his position.  In the 
first case, F.W.A. Drilling Co. v. Ulery, 1973 OK 82, 512 P.2d 192 (1973), the claimant 
was injured when he slipped and fell as he was placing work clothes and food 
into the back of his truck.  Id. at 193.  The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the employer’s work was a 
“major factor for the employee’s attempted travel” and concluded that because 
the food and clothes the claimant was packing were necessary for the work he was 
to undertake, “[t]he injury which occurred was inextricably connected with the 
necessities created by the work to be performed.”  Id. at 194.  In the other case relied upon by the 
appellant, Love v. BIPO, Inc., 2006 OK Civ. App. 136, 146 P.3d 873 
(2006), the claimant was injured when he fell while crossing the street to get 
into his employer’s vehicle.  Id. at 874.  Relying on F.W.A. Drilling, the Oklahoma court 
reversed a denial of benefits reasoning simply that the employer-provided 
transportation was a “necessity of employment.”  Id. at 875.
 
[¶9]      The Division 
refutes the appellant’s arguments and reliance on these cases by pointing out 
that the Oklahoma workers’ compensation laws extend coverage far more broadly 
than Wyoming’s, providing coverage for injuries which occur during a “scheme of 
employer provided travel” or when employer-provided transportation is a 
“necessity of employment.”  The 
Division then calls our attention to a California case, State Lottery 
Commission v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  In State 
Lottery, the claimant was injured when he slipped and fell on the icy 
sidewalk leading from the front door of his house to his employer-owned vehicle 
he was about to enter to drive to work.  
Id. at 746.  The State Lottery court characterized 
California’s exception to the “going and coming rule” as follows: “if the 
employer provides the employee with a vehicle and requires it to be used as an 
incident of employment, an injury suffered by the employee during the commute to 
or from work will be compensable.”  Id. at 747.  The California court 
found that this exception was inapplicable inasmuch as the claimant was not 
actually driving the employer-provided vehicle when he sustained his 
injury.  Id.  In support of its conclusion, the court 
stated:
 
Neither 
the Board nor [the claimant] has cited any authority which extends the reach of 
the above exception to facts such as those presented here, and we have found 
none.  In every case where this 
exception has been held to apply, the employee was actually driving the 
employer-furnished vehicle when he or she sustained injury.  (See, e.g., Smith v. Work[ers’] Comp. App. Bd. 
(1968) 69 Cal. 2d 814, 815 [, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 447 P.2d 365]; Kobe v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., [35 Cal. 2d 33, 35, 215 P.2d 736, 737 (1950)].)  To stretch this exception so far as to 
include cases where the employee has not yet entered the vehicle, such as the 
present case, would make it almost infinitely elastic.  If an employee has already begun his 
commute in an employer-supplied vehicle when he steps out the door of his 
house, he might just as well be said to have begun it when he steps out of bed 
in the morning.  Both conclusions 
are absurd, and the second is not more so than the first.
 
We 
acknowledge that drawing the line at any particular point so as to cut off 
compensation under any of the exceptions to the “going and coming” rule may 
appear arbitrary.  (See Santa 
Rosa Junior College v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., [40 Cal. 3d 345, 352-353, 220 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97-98 (1985)].)  With 
respect to the “employer-supplied vehicle” exception, however, the appearance of 
arbitrariness is less striking than it might be with some of the other 
exceptions.  The rationale for this 
exception is that “the employer [has] agree[d], either expressly or impliedly, 
that the [employment] relationship shall continue during the period of 'going 
and coming’ . . .” (Kobe v. Industrial Acc. Com., [35 Cal. 2d  at 35, 215 P.2d at 737]), 
by furnishing the vehicle and requiring its use.  This rationale necessarily entails that 
the employer’s agreement to continue the employment relationship during the 
employee’s commute extends only to the period when the employee is actually in 
the employer-supplied vehicle: it is the employee’s use of the vehicle as an 
incident of employment which extends the employment relationship beyond the 
workplace, not the mere fact that the employee is at some stage of progress to 
or from work.
 
Id. 
at 747-48 (emphasis in original).
 
[¶10]   In considering the above-discussed 
cases, we note that the present case is both factually and legally 
distinguishable.  While all of the 
cases considered the “going and coming rule” and the relevant exception, the 
important difference between our case and the Oklahoma and California cases is 
that those cases relied on the common law application of the rule, whereas 
Wyoming has codified the rule and defined its application with specific 
statutory language.  Therefore, to discern the proper application of the 
rule, as defined in our statute, we must undertake a brief statutory analysis. 
 Our rules of statutory 
interpretation are well established:
 
We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes 
that determination as a matter of law.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  In 
effectuating the plain language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.  
We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, 
and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  If, on the other 
hand, we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general 
principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature’s 
intent.
 
In 
Re Claim of Prasad, 
11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 
2000).
 
[¶11]   We have already determined that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is unambiguous.  Quinn, 2007 WY 91, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d  at 714; 
Berg, 2005 WY 23, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d  at 871; 
Lloyd, 2004 WY 85, ¶ 13, 93 P.3d  at 
1004.  Therefore, we must give 
effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute.  As quoted previously, the statute states 
that the definition of “'[i]njury’ does not include: . . . (D) Any injury 
sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed 
for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the employer[.]”  The appellant’s employer owned the 
vehicle used by the appellant and provided the vehicle to use for work; 
therefore, we must examine the plain meaning of the phrase “transported by the 
vehicle of the employer.”  The 
compensability of the appellant’s injury hinges on the meaning of the word 
“transported.”  If the term 
“transported” encompasses entering the vehicle, then the appellant would be 
entitled to benefits for the injury he sustained as he was getting into his 
truck.
 
[¶12]   The definition of “transport” is: 
“to carry from one place to another: convey.”  Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1200 
(3d ed. 2005).  The ordinary and 
obvious meaning of that word, when read and considered in the context of the 
statute, leaves no doubt that an injury sustained during travel is only 
compensable if it occurs as the claimant is being carried or conveyed from one 
place to another (i.e. sitting in the vehicle and moving from one place to 
another).  Entering the vehicle, as the appellant was doing here, simply 
does not fit within the plain language of the statute.  Because of the 
specific and narrow nature of the language of the statute, there is simply no 
room for the notion that injuries suffered while “preparing to travel,” or that 
all injuries suffered while doing any activity tangentially related to any 
travel “necessary to employment,” are compensable.  Such an interpretation 
would require us to supply terms or read language into the statute that does not 
exist.
 
When 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible 
substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the 
legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis 
other than the language invoked by the legislature. . . .  If the language selected by the 
legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language establishes the rule of 
law. . . .  This inhibition upon 
statutory construction offers assurance that the legislative efforts and 
determinations of elected representatives will be made effective without 
judicial adjustment or gloss.
 
Krenning 
v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 
2009 WY 11, ¶ 20, 200 P.3d 774, 781 (Wyo. 2009) 
(citations omitted).
 
[¶13]   We conclude the language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) plainly and unambiguously requires that for an 
“injury sustained during travel” to be compensable, it must occur as the 
employee is being “transported by the vehicle of their employer.”  That is, 
the vehicle must be carrying the employee from one place to another. 
 Because the appellant here was entering the vehicle in preparation for 
that transportation, the injury he sustained while entering the vehicle is not 
compensable. 
 
[¶14]   We affirm the OAH’s 
decision.
 
 
BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom KITE, Chief Justice, 
joins.
[¶15]   I respectfully dissent because I 
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that compensability of the claimant’s 
injury hinges on the meaning of the word “transported,” as that term is used in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  
Instead, when an employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by an employer’s vehicle, as in this case, we must determine whether 
the claimant’s injury was sustained “during travel.”  I conclude that the claimant’s injury 
did arise “during travel,” and that the claimant has satisfied the general test 
for compensability by establishing a “causal nexus” between the injury and his 
employment.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the OAH’s grant of summary judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings.
 
[¶16]   The majority posits that the 
specific question before us is “whether the appellant’s injury was sustained 
while, as the statute requires, he was being 'transported by a vehicle of the 
employer.’”  By phrasing the issue 
in this manner, however, the majority unnecessarily restricts its interpretation 
of the statute to include only the situation in which an injury occurs 
simultaneously with the act of “being transported.”  But this is not what the statute 
demands.  Rather, the statute 
provides that the term “injury” does not include “[a]ny injury sustained during travel to or from employment 
unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or 
is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (emphasis added).  
The statute does not require that the injury occur simultaneously with 
“being transported,” just as it does not require that the injury occur while the 
employee is “being reimbursed” for travel expenses.  In this case, the claimant’s employer 
provided him with a truck to use for his work and as needed when he was not 
working.  The claimant was subject 
to being called into work at any time.  
In light of these facts, the claimant has established that he was 
“transported by a vehicle of the employer.”
 
[¶17]   The question we must 
answer, then, is whether the claimant’s injury was sustained “during 
travel.”  The hearing examiner, 
correctly determining that “the dispositive legal issue is whether or not any 
injury [the claimant] sustained was, as a matter of law, sustained 'during 
travel,’” referred to the definition of travel contained in Black’s Law 
Dictionary.  According to the 
hearing examiner, “[t]ravel is defined as going from one place to another at a 
distance.”  Using that definition, 
the hearing examiner concluded that “in order for there to be vehicle travel or 
transportation there must be at least some initial movement by the vehicle in 
which the employee is traveling as this is the most reasonable demarcation point 
between preparing for travel and actually traveling.”  Although the majority focuses upon the 
statutory phrase “is transported by,” it appears that the majority would also 
interpret “during travel” to require initial movement of the vehicle in order 
for the injury to be compensable.  
However, there is no indication in the statute that the legislature 
intended to impose that limitation on compensability.  From a common sense perspective, it is 
obvious that an individual must enter the vehicle to travel in it.  So long as the employee was entering the 
vehicle in furtherance of the employment, there is no reason to deny 
recovery.  In this case, the 
claimant, who was subject to being called in to work at any time, was called by 
his superior to a meeting in Casper, Wyoming, which is approximately 235 miles 
from his home in Powell, Wyoming.  
The claimant was injured on the stirrup of his employer’s truck as he was 
climbing into the vehicle to make the trip to Casper.  The claimant was injured “during 
travel.”
 
[¶18]   The majority attempts 
to create a bright-line rule for determining whether an injury is sustained 
during travel, and states that travel includes only the situation in which “the 
vehicle [is] carrying the employee from one place to another.”  As noted in 1 Larson’s Workers’ 
Compensation Law, § 13.01[1], “[w]hen a line of this kind is drawn, there are 
always cases very close to each side of the line.”  The determination of whether an injury 
is sustained during travel, however, can be made without attempting to divine a 
bright-line rule from the statute.  
Indeed, we need not go beyond the existing standard, discussed below, 
which requires a “causal nexus” between the injury and the circumstances of 
employment in order for an injury to be compensable.  It is simply impossible to anticipate 
all of the potential ways in which an employee could be injured “during 
travel.”  Certainly, the employee 
could be injured while the vehicle is moving, but an employee could also be 
injured while the vehicle is not in motion.
 
[¶19]   Rather than deciding 
these cases based on a finely drawn rule, it is better to approach each 
individual set of facts in light of the “causal nexus” standard that we have 
previously articulated.  In 
interpreting the definition of injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi), 
we have repeatedly stated that, for an injury to be compensable, “there must be 
'a causal nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment.’”  Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2010 WY 3, ¶ 8, 222 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 2007 WY 91, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007).  Further, we have held 
that
 
Subsection 
(D) is the codification of “a long-standing common law rule that injuries 
incurred while either going to or coming from work are not compensable unless 
the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation or 
has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.”  Archuleta [v. Carbon County School District No. 1], 
787 P.2d [91,] 92[ (Wyo. 1990)]; Claims 
of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 
1241 (Wyo. 1986).  As we stated in 
Archuleta, in terms of our “nexus 
test,” subsection (D) of § 27-14-102(a)(xi) “constitutes a legislative 
determination that, while no compensable nexus with the employment is generally 
present when an employee is traveling between home and work, such a nexus is 
created where the employer has assumed the cost of that travel.”  Id. [at 93].       

 
Berg 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 23, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005).  The injury sustained 
by the claimant in this case satisfies the general “nexus test.”  As indicated above, the claimant was 
injured climbing into his employer’s truck while on his way to a work-related 
meeting.  The claimant had no choice 
but to enter his employer’s vehicle by opening the door and stepping up to the 
driver’s seat.  The claimant’s 
injury was directly related to a requirement of his employment, namely, that he 
would use his employer’s truck to travel to the meeting.  Consequently, the claimant’s injury is 
compensable under our “nexus test.” 
 
[¶20]   Among the 
jurisdictions that rely on common law application of the “going and coming rule” 
to determine whether an employee’s injury is compensable, the decision in 
State Lottery Commission v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) appears to distinguish California as the only 
jurisdiction requiring that an employee’s injury be sustained while the employee 
is actually in the employer’s vehicle.  
The decisions reached in F.W.A. Drilling Co. v. Ulery, 1973 OK 82, 512 P.2d 192 (1973) and Love v. 
BIPO, Inc., 2006 OK Civ. App. 136, 146 P.3d 873 (2006), appear to represent 
the most common approach in these cases, which is to rest judgment on whether 
the employee’s injury is sustained during an activity that is reasonably 
necessary or incidental to the employment.  
This principle, which is analogous to our nexus test, is expressed in F.W.A. Drilling v. Ulery as 
follows:
 
            
We are of the opinion that the argument of the employer attempts, by a 
too finely drawn analysis, to differentiate between necessities of employment, 
and conditions under which work was required to be performed. Without question, 
the major factor for the employee’s attempted travel was the employer’s work. 
The employer saw fit to furnish transportation for the sixty-mile trip to the 
site. The employee had to bring his lunch because food was not available on the 
site, and the practice was for the employees to bring clothing to be worn during 
actual work. The conditions under which claimant’s work was to be performed 
required these things be taken to the job site. The 
injury which occurred was inextricably connected with the necessities created by 
the work to be performed.    

 
            
Claimant’s injury occurred under conditions as incidental to his 
employment as an injury which might have resulted from falling while attempting 
to enter the truck to begin the journey to the job site. From these 
circumstances the trial court correctly determined [the] causal connection 
between conditions under which the work was required to be performed and 
claimant’s injury.
 
Id. at 194 (emphasis 
added).  In line with the analysis 
in F.W.A. Drilling, other 
jurisdictions have determined that an injury is compensable when the employee is 
engaged in an act that is reasonably necessary or incidental to the 
employment.  See, e.g., Hafer’s Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 526 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1974) 
(claimant’s injury held compensable where claimant was injured while installing 
a spring-loaded shock absorber in his work vehicle on the day prior to a sales 
trip); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cothran, 136 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. App. 
1964) (claimant’s injury held compensable where claimant was injured while 
moving lumber out of a truck blocking the entrance to his home); 
Advanced Diagnostics v. Walsh, 437 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(claimant’s injury held compensable where claimant salesman was getting into a 
work vehicle in his own driveway when another car left the street and caused 
injury).  In accordance with the 
analysis employed in these jurisdictions, and the similar analysis required 
under our nexus test, I would find that the claimant’s injury in this case was 
compensable.  The OAH’s decision 
granting summary judgment to the Workers’ Compensation Division should be 
reversed.