Title: Eau Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3197 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Eau Claire County,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
General Teamsters Union Local No. 662,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 640, 599 N.W.2d 423 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Keith R. Zehms, Mindy K. Dale, corporation 
counsel, and oral argument by Keith R. Zehms. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Naomi E. Soldon and Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & 
Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Naomi E. 
 
2 
Soldon. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John J. 
Prentice and Prentice & Phillips, Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott L. Cox, 
Menomonie, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of County 
Corporation Counsel. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gordon E. 
McQuillen, Shana R. Lewis, and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Professional Police 
Association/Law Enforcement Employment Relations Division. 
 
 
2000 WI 57 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3197 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Eau Claire County,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
General Teamsters Union Local No. 662,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations  
Commission,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Eau 
Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662, 228 
Wis. 2d 640, 599 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1999), reversing a 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, Paul J. 
Lenz, 
Judge. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
enjoined 
the 
Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission 
(WERC) 
from 
acting 
on 
a 
prohibited practice complaint filed by General Teamsters Union 
Local No. 662.  The Union's complaint alleged that Eau Claire 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
2 
County refused to arbitrate the dismissal of Deputy Sheriff John 
R. Rizzo under the collective bargaining agreement between Eau 
Claire County and the Union.  The circuit court entered judgment 
dismissing the complaint, holding that Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) 
(1997-98)1 establishes a circuit court as the exclusive forum in 
which an aggrieved county law-enforcement employe may challenge 
an order of a civil service commission to dismiss, demote, 
suspend, or suspend and demote the employe.  The court of 
appeals reversed the judgment, concluding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c) does not establish a circuit court as the 
exclusive forum in which an aggrieved county law-enforcement 
employe may challenge an order of a civil service commission to 
dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and demote the employe and 
that 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
providing 
for 
arbitration of such disputes is valid and enforceable.  We 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The issue presented in this case is whether a county 
law-enforcement employe's appeal to a circuit court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) is the employe's exclusive appeal 
procedure when a civil service commission issues an order to 
dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and demote the employe.  Or 
may the county law-enforcement employe use the grievance 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be to the 1997-98 volumes unless otherwise specified.  
The 
circuit 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.21(8)(b)6 
(1991-92), 
the 
precursor 
to 
the 
current 
§ 59.52(8)(c). 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
3 
procedures, including arbitration, provided in the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement, in lieu of an appeal to a 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c)? 
¶3 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the 
circuit court is not the exclusive forum in which a county law-
enforcement employe may challenge an order of a civil service 
commission to dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and demote 
the employe.  We conclude that after a civil service commission 
issues an order to dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and 
demote a county law-enforcement employe, the employe may proceed 
either with an appeal to the circuit court pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) or with the grievance procedures, including 
arbitration, provided in the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement.  The employe may not, however, pursue both the 
statutory appeal procedure to the circuit court set forth in 
§ 59.52(8)(c) and the grievance procedures set forth in the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement. 
I 
¶4 
The parties stipulated to the relevant facts giving 
rise to this dispute.  Eau Claire County and the Union are 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  The collective bargaining agreement was 
signed on March 14, 1996, and was in effect from January 1, 
1996, through December 31, 1997.  The collective bargaining 
agreement 
required 
"just 
cause" for 
discipline, 
including 
suspension or discharge, of a deputy sheriff (a county law-
enforcement employe) and provided for arbitration as the last 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
4 
step in the grievance procedures.  Eau Claire County Deputy 
Sheriff 
John 
R. 
Rizzo, 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding at issue, was covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
¶5 
Eau Claire County has established a civil service 
system under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(a) that addresses the tenure 
and status of county personnel.2  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.52(8)(b) 
provides that a county law-enforcement employe may not be 
dismissed, demoted, suspended, or suspended and demoted by a 
civil service commission unless the commission determines there 
is "just cause" to sustain the charges.  The statute sets forth 
the 
standards 
the 
commission 
shall 
apply 
in 
making 
its 
determination of "just cause."  The Eau Claire County Board 
Committee on Personnel acts as the statutory civil service 
commission and determines whether the sheriff has just cause to 
dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and demote a deputy 
sheriff.  Relying on City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 
492, 534 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995), Eau Claire County advised 
the Union prior to the Rizzo dispute that neither the Union nor 
an aggrieved county law-enforcement employe could proceed to 
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement after the 
statutory just cause proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(b). 
                     
2 The procedures for disciplining law-enforcement employes 
of counties that (unlike Eau Claire County) have not established 
civil service commissions under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(a) are set 
forth in § 59.26(8)(b)3. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
5 
¶6 
On October 11, 1996, the Eau Claire County sheriff 
notified Rizzo and the Union that the sheriff intended to 
recommend Rizzo's termination to the Eau Claire County Board 
Committee on Personnel.  Rizzo had been disciplined previously 
on six separate occasions.  The committee held a hearing at 
which Eau Claire County and Rizzo were represented and evidence 
was presented.  After the hearing, the committee issued a 
written decision to terminate Rizzo.  The committee also 
notified Rizzo of his right to appeal to the circuit court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c).  Rizzo did not, however, 
appeal to the circuit court.  Instead, he filed a grievance with 
the sheriff and the Eau Claire County Board Committee on 
Personnel pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, 
contesting the "just cause" determination.  The sheriff denied 
the grievance.  The Committee on Personnel never met to consider 
Rizzo's grievance, having already conducted a "just cause" 
hearing.  Eau Claire County informed Rizzo that it did not 
consider the grievance arbitrable, contending that under Wis. 
Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) a county law-enforcement employe's exclusive 
procedure to challenge a dismissal order was an appeal to the 
circuit court.  
¶7 
The Union then filed a prohibited practice complaint 
with WERC pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3), alleging that Eau 
Claire County had committed a prohibited practice by refusing to 
arbitrate 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement.  In response, Eau Claire County filed a declaratory 
action in the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, seeking to 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
6 
enjoin WERC from exercising jurisdiction over the Union's 
prohibited practice complaint.  The circuit court's judgment 
enjoined WERC from proceeding on the complaint, holding that 
Rizzo's exclusive forum was the circuit court by an appeal 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c).  The Union appealed, and 
the court of appeals concluded that the statutory appeal 
procedure to the circuit court set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c) is not the exclusive method to review an order of 
a civil service commission to dismiss, demote, suspend, or 
suspend and demote a county law-enforcement employe.  Thus the 
collective bargaining agreement providing arbitration as the 
final step in settling such disputes is valid and enforceable. 
II 
¶8 
This case involves statutory interpretation and the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) to undisputed facts.  
Interpretation of a statute and application of the statute to 
undisputed facts are questions of law that this court decides 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses. 
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) provides that if a civil 
service commission (here the Eau Claire County Board Committee 
on Personnel) orders a county law-enforcement employe to be 
dismissed, demoted, suspended, or suspended and demoted, the 
employe "may" appeal the order to the circuit court.  The word 
"may" connotes, as the court of appeals observed, either that 
other avenues of appeal are available or that appeal to the 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
7 
circuit court is within the discretion of the aggrieved employe. 
 Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) reads as follows: 
 
If a law enforcement employe of the county is 
dismissed, demoted, suspended or suspended and demoted 
by the civil service commission or the board under the 
system 
established 
under 
par. 
(a), 
the 
person 
dismissed, demoted, suspended or suspended and demoted 
may appeal from the order of the civil service 
commission or the board to the circuit court by 
serving written notice of the appeal on the secretary 
of the commission or the board within 10 days after 
the order is filed.  Within 5 days after receiving 
written notice of the appeal, the commission or the 
board shall certify to the clerk of the circuit court 
the 
record 
of 
the 
proceedings, 
including 
all 
documents, testimony and minutes.  The action shall 
then be at issue and shall have precedence over any 
other cause of a different nature pending in the 
court, which shall always be open to the trial 
thereof.  The court shall upon application of the 
accused or of the board or the commission fix a date 
of trial which shall not be later than 15 days after 
the application except by agreement.  The trial shall 
be by the court and upon the return of the board or 
the commission, except that the court may require 
further return or the taking and return of further 
evidence by the board or the commission.  The question 
to be determined by the court shall be: Upon the 
evidence is there just cause, as described in par. 
(b), to sustain the charges against the employe?  No 
cost shall be allowed either party and the clerk's 
fees shall be paid by the county.  If the order of the 
board or the commission is reversed, the accused shall 
be immediately reinstated and entitled to pay as 
though in continuous service.  If the order of the 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
8 
board or the commission is sustained, it shall be 
final and conclusive.3 
 
¶10 Nowhere 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c) 
does 
the 
legislature explicitly state that the statutory appeal procedure 
to the circuit court is the exclusive remedy available to a 
county law-enforcement employe to challenge an order of the Eau 
Claire County Board Committee on Personnel or that § 59.52(8)(c) 
supersedes grievance procedures, including arbitration, provided 
by the applicable collective bargaining agreement for settlement 
of such disputes.  
¶11 The parties urge us to examine several indicia of 
legislative intent to determine whether the circuit court is the 
exclusive forum in which a county law-enforcement employe may 
challenge an order of the Committee on Personnel.  
¶12 The first indicator, the Union argues, is that the 
legislature's failure to provide explicitly that the statutory 
appeal procedure under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) is the exclusive 
appeal procedure suggests that the legislature did not intend 
the statutory appeal procedure to be exclusive.  
¶13 The Union reasons as follows: County law-enforcement 
employes are covered by collective bargaining agreements that 
                     
3 Chapter 59 of the Statutes was recodified by 1995 Wis. Act 
201, effective September 1, 1996.  Section 59.07(20) was 
renumbered Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8); section 59.21 was renumbered 
§ 59.26.  See 1995 Wis. Act 201 §§ 134, 273.  In contrast to the 
collective bargaining agreement, this statute does not appear to 
give the sheriff an opportunity for review of a decision not to 
dismiss, 
demote, 
suspend, 
or 
suspend 
and 
demote 
a 
law-
enforcement employe. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
9 
govern wages, hours and conditions of employment, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.70(1)(a) and 111.70(3)(a), including grievance procedures 
such as arbitration for discipline and termination.  If the 
legislature had intended Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c), the statutory 
appeal procedure, to be exclusive, the legislature would have 
been making a drastic change in the law and would have, in all 
probability, explicitly set forth such a change.  But the 
legislature did not explicitly set forth any such change. 
¶14 The Union further urges that in interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 111.70 and § 59.52(8)(c) and the collective bargaining 
agreement, a court attempts to harmonize the statutory and 
contract provisions to the extent possible, recognizing that the 
declared legislative intent is to encourage voluntary settlement 
of 
disputes 
in 
municipal 
employment 
through 
collective 
bargaining.4  See Wis. Stat. § 111.70(6).  Moreover, "[t]he law 
of Wisconsin favors agreements to resolve municipal labor 
disputes by final and binding arbitration."5 
                     
4 See Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 
83 Wis. 2d 90, 103-04, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978).  See also 
Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 194, 533 N.W.2d 770 
(1995) (citing Glendale and stating that a court was to 
harmonize the statutes and a collective bargaining agreement 
whenever possible). 
5 Fortney v. School Dist. of West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 
172, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982) (quoting Oshkosh v. Union Local 796-
A, 99 Wis. 2d 95, 102-03, 299 N.W.2d 210 (1980)).  See also 
State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1055, 512 
N.W.2d 499 (1994) ("[i]t has been the policy of the state and 
this 
court 
to 
foster 
arbitration 
as 
an 
alternative 
to 
litigation"). 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
10
¶15 The concept that a court should harmonize the statutes 
and a collective bargaining agreement finds support in the 
decisions in Brown County Sheriff's Dept. v. Employees Ass'n, 
194 Wis. 2d 265, 533 N.W.2d 766 (1995), and Heitkemper v. 
Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995).6  In Heitkemper, 
the court concluded that a sheriff's powers pertaining to the 
re-appointment of deputy sheriffs established by Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.21(1) and (4) (1991-92) could be limited by a collective 
bargaining agreement between the county and the labor union.  
Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 200-01. 
¶16 Similarly, in Brown County, 94 Wis. 2d 182, the court 
concluded that a sheriff's power to dismiss or not reappoint a 
previously appointed deputy was not statutorily protected and 
therefore may be subject to the collective bargaining agreement 
between the county and the labor union.  Brown County, 194 
Wis. 2d 
at 
273-74. 
 
Both 
decisions 
invoke 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement's arbitration provisions and harmonize 
those provisions with potentially conflicting statutes. 
                     
6 The court of appeals and the Union point out that WERC 
weighed in on an analogous question more than 16 years ago.  In 
Dodge County, Decision No. 21574 (WERC April 10, 1984) (see Eau 
Claire County’s appendix at 59-79), WERC determined that it was 
possible to harmonize appeal procedures established in Wis. 
Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1981-82) and a collective bargaining 
agreement by treating the grievance arbitration forum as an 
alternative appeal forum if a circuit court appeal was not 
taken.  WERC reasoned that enforcing the arbitration provisions 
did not nullify the statutory appeal procedures because those 
procedures still apply to nonbargaining unit employees. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
11
¶17 We agree with the Union and the court of appeals that 
the legislature's failure to declare explicitly that Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c) is the exclusive remedy to challenge a dismissal 
order demonstrates a legislative intent of non-exclusivity.  The 
court of appeals concluded: 
 
A legislative intent to contravene not only the 
declared public policy of this state but also the 
long-standing traditional public policy of this entire 
nation must not be so readily inferred in a statute 
that is ambiguous as to its intent.   Given such 
strong 
statements 
of 
public 
policy 
favoring 
arbitration, it is difficult to conceive that the 
legislature 
would 
enact 
a 
statute 
directly 
in 
contravention of this state's announced public policy 
without using specific explicit language to do so.  
Such a dramatic change in public policy should not 
have to be made by inference.  228 Wis. 2d at 648. 
 
¶18 The second indicator of legislative intent is the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c).  The parties 
dispute 
whether 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c) 
demonstrates 
a 
legislative 
intent 
that 
the 
statutory appeal procedure is exclusive and renders null the 
grievance procedures in the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement.  
¶19 As initially proposed, the 1993 legislation upon which 
Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8) is based would have explicitly permitted a 
collective bargaining agreement between a Union and a county to 
supersede the statutory procedures for dispute resolution, if 
the collective bargaining agreement specifically so stated.7  Eau 
                     
7 1993 Senate Bill 66. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
12
Claire County argues that the legislature's failure to adopt 
this proposal makes clear that the statutory appeal procedure to 
the circuit court is the exclusive remedy.  The Union counters 
that the legislature's failure to pass this proposal is not 
significant because this bill would have allowed a collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
to 
supersede 
the 
statutory 
appeal 
altogether.  The Union argues that this bill would have meant 
that a county law-enforcement employe covered by a grievance 
procedure in a collective bargaining agreement would not have 
been permitted to use the statutory appeal procedure.  The 
legislature's failure to pass this bill, the Union claims, was 
an affirmation of the legislature's intent that a county law-
enforcement employe have a choice in deciding whether to follow 
the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure or the 
statutory appeal to the circuit court. 
¶20 Another 1993 legislative proposal that was not adopted 
gave county law-enforcement employes the option of appealing a 
civil service commission's order either to the circuit court or 
to an arbitrator.8  Eau Claire County concludes that this 
proposal was a clear legislative recognition that without 
specific language, arbitration is simply not available.  Judge 
R. Thomas Cane in dissent in the court of appeals concludes that 
the Union "now attempt[s] to have this court do what the 
legislature specifically refused to do."  228 Wis. 2d at 653. 
                     
8 Amendment 1 to 1993 Senate Bill 66. 
No. 
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13
¶21 This proposal, however, limited the traditional power 
of an arbitrator: The arbitrator would not make factual findings 
or decide the dispute; rather, the arbitrator would merely 
review a civil service commission's decision and determine 
"[u]pon the evidence" whether "the action of the board or 
commission . . . [was] appropriate."9  The Union urges that the 
defeat 
of 
this 
proposal 
is 
properly 
interpreted 
as 
the 
legislature's affirmation that an arbitrator should keep its 
traditional role in cases involving decisions made by a civil 
service commission under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(b). 
¶22 The last piece of legislative history relevant to the 
present case is a bill introduced in 1998 that would have 
authorized county law-enforcement employes and municipal police 
and fire employes subject to collective bargaining agreements to 
utilize the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining 
agreements in place of the statutory appeal procedure to the 
circuit court in Wis. Stat. §§ 59.52(8)(c) and 62.13(5)(i).10  
The bill also would have provided that county law-enforcement 
employes could not use both the statutory appeal procedure and 
the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. 
 The 1998 bill was not adopted.  Eau Claire County argues, once 
again, that the legislature's refusal to enact the bill 
demonstrates that the legislature intended the statutory appeal 
procedure under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) to be exclusive. 
                     
9 See Amendment 1 to 1993 Senate Bill 66 at § 3.  
10 1997 Assembly Bill 944. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
14
¶23 We do not draw the same inference as does Eau Claire 
County from the legislature's failure to enact the 1998 bill.  
The legislature may have refused to enact this bill for several 
reasons, not merely the one Eau Claire County espouses.  For 
example, the 1998 bill governed not only county law-enforcement 
employes under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8) but also municipal fire and 
police 
employes 
under 
§ 62.13(5). 
 
Under 
§ 62.13(5) 
the 
statutory appeal procedure for municipal fire and police 
employes is the exclusive procedure and supersedes the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement.11  The 1998 bill would thus 
have changed the appeal procedure for municipal fire and police 
employes.  The legislature may have rejected the 1998 bill 
because the legislature did not want to change § 62.13(5).  
¶24 The 
parties draw 
different 
conclusions 
from the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) and make good 
arguments to support their respective positions.  We conclude, 
however, that the legislative history of rejected bills does not 
provide decisive evidence to support either party's view of 
legislative intent about the exclusivity of the statutory appeal 
                     
11 See City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 533 
N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
15
procedure 
set 
forth in 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(c).12 
 The 
legislative history is thus not determinative of the legislative 
intent regarding the exclusivity of the statutory appeal 
procedure.  
¶25 The third indicator of legislative intent is that in 
199313 the legislature adopted similar discipline provisions for 
both municipal fire and police employes and county law-
enforcement employes.  Eau Claire County maintains that the 1993 
legislation demonstrates that the legislature intended that 
county law-enforcement employes and municipal police and fire 
employes be treated in the same manner.  Because the statutory 
                     
12 It is not clear what impact a legislature's failure to 
enact an amendment or subsequent law should have on the 
interpretation of statutes.  One commentator argues that a court 
"must 
exercise 
great 
caution 
in 
drawing 
inferences 
of 
legislative intent from the circumstance that amendments had 
been accepted or rejected" during the legislative process.  
Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction, 
§ 48A:18 at 861, 876, 878 (6th ed. 2000).  As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote: "It is a delicate business to base 
speculations about the purposes or construction of a statute on 
the vicissitudes of its passage."  Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United 
States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922). 
Several Wisconsin cases hold that a legislature's failure 
to adopt a bill does not necessarily indicate that a statute 
should be interpreted in a certain way.  See, e.g., City of 
Madison v. Hyland, Hall, & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 372, 243 N.W.2d 
422 (legislature's failure to pass bills specifically permitting 
a county to sue for treble damages in antitrust actions was not 
determinative of whether a county had such a right).  But see 
also Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 232, 243, 142 N.W.2d 
827 (1966) (failure to pass bills allowing unemployment benefits 
to those out of work during a strike indicated legislative 
intent that the alternative interpretation governs). 
13 1993 Wis. Act 53. 
No. 
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16
appeal procedure for municipal fire and police employes is the 
exclusive appeal procedure,14 Eau Claire County asserts that the 
statutory appeal procedure for county law-enforcement employes 
also should be the exclusive appeal procedure.  
¶26 Eau Claire County reasons as follows: Before 1993 Eau 
Claire 
County's 
disciplinary 
procedures 
for 
county 
law-
enforcement employes were governed only by the grievance 
procedures established in the county's collective bargaining 
agreement with the Union.  In 1993 the legislature authorized 
counties to establish civil service commissions to provide 
county law-enforcement employes with "just cause" procedures 
before discipline.15  The 1993 law provided substantially similar 
"just cause" procedures for county law-enforcement employes and 
for municipal fire and police employes.  See 1993 Wis. Act 53. 
¶27 Eau Claire County explains that in City of Janesville 
v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App 1995), the 
court of appeals held that the statutory appeals procedure in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) (1991-92) was the exclusive procedure to 
challenge the Police and Fire Commission's disciplinary order 
and that the collective bargaining agreement could not alter the 
statutory appeals procedure.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
because the Police and Fire Commission was the exclusive body to 
conduct a "just cause" hearing under § 62.13(5) and only that 
decision was subject to court review, allowing arbitration would 
                     
14 See City of Janesville, 193 Wis. 2d 492. 
15 1993 Wis. Act 53. 
No. 
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17
render the "just cause" procedure meaningless.  Janesville, 193 
Wis. 2d at 504-05.  The court of appeals concluded in Janesville 
that 
when 
an 
irreconcilable 
difference 
exists 
between 
a 
statutory 
procedure 
and 
the 
arbitration 
provisions 
of 
a 
collective bargaining agreement, the statute controls. 
¶28 Eau Claire County argues, and Judge Cane agrees in his 
dissent in the court of appeals, that the Janesville case 
controls the present case because Wis. Stat. §§ 59.52(8)(c) and 
62.13(5), which are similar, should be construed similarly.16  
Eau Claire County asserts that had the legislature disagreed 
with the decision reached in Janesville, it could have changed 
the statute in 1995 when it adopted amendments to these 
statutes.17  The legislature did not make any such change.  
                     
16 Eau Claire County argues that ch. 59 and ch. 62 of the 
statutes have been interpreted similarly in other cases.  In 
Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 548 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. 
App. 1996), a deputy sheriff was discharged in his first year of 
employment during his probationary period because of poor 
performance.  The court of appeals applied the reasoning of 
Kaiser v. Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 311 N.W.2d 646 
(1981), a case involving a municipal police officer, and held 
that the deputy sheriff, like the probationary police officer, 
could be discharged without following the statutory procedures. 
 Hussey, 201 Wis. 2d at 18-21.  Similarly, in In re Discipline 
of Bier, 220 Wis. 2d 175, 582 N.W.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1998), 
involving a deputy sheriff, the court of appeals looked for 
guidance to Jendrzjoyewski v. Board of Police and Fire Comm'rs, 
257 Wis. 536, 44 N.W.2d 270 (1950), a case involving a municipal 
police officer. 
17 1995 Wis. Act 201, adopted on April 4, 1996, renumbered 
Wis. Stat. § 59.07(20) as § 59.52(8) and § 59.21 was renumbered 
§ 59.26.  There were no relevant substantive changes to these 
statutes. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
18
¶29 We are not persuaded that the Janesville case is 
dispositive of the issue we confront today.  The Janesville case 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) (1991-92), not § 59.52(8).  
Although Eau Claire County emphasizes the similarities between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 62.13(5) 
and 
59.52(8)(c), 
and 
there 
are 
similarities, the differences between the two statutes must be 
examined. 
¶30 The most important distinction, as noted by the court 
of appeals in this case, 228 Wis. 2d at 650, is that there are 
"fundamental differences between the 'bodies' responsible for 
making disciplinary determinations" under the two statutes, as 
well as differences in the procedural protections granted to the 
employes under each statute. 
¶31 A Police and Fire Commission, established under Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(1), is composed of five members appointed by a 
mayor and hears disputes regarding the discipline of municipal 
fire and police employes under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5). 
¶32 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 59.52(8) 
does 
not 
establish 
guidelines for creating county civil service commissions.  In 
this case, for example, the Eau Claire County Board Committee on 
Personnel, which made the decision to terminate Deputy Sheriff 
Rizzo, was composed of several Eau Claire County Board members 
who were designated as the Committee on Personnel.  Eau Claire 
County argues that the Eau Claire County Board Committee on 
Personnel is no more political or biased than a Police and Fire 
Commission created under Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  Eau Claire County 
notes that Eau Claire County Board supervisors are all elected 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
19
on a nonpartisan basis and the Committee on Personnel does not 
act as the agent of the sheriff or the Eau Claire County Board.  
¶33 The Union argues, however, that because the Eau Claire 
County Board Committee on Personnel is composed of county board 
members, it is potentially biased.  The Eau Claire County Board 
appears to have an interest in the dispute and is at the same 
time the decision-maker under the statute.  The Union claims 
that this potential for bias justifies permitting a fresh look 
at the dispute by an arbitrator. 
¶34 We 
agree 
with 
the 
Union. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.52(8)(a), the Eau Claire County Board could have designated 
itself as the civil service commission.  Therefore the County 
Board could have decided under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(b) whether 
"just cause" exists to dismiss Deputy Sheriff Rizzo.  The Eau 
Claire County Board thus is a party to the collective bargaining 
agreement, it is the entity against which the grievance is 
filed, and it also decides the grievance.18 
¶35 In light of the difference in the decision-making 
bodies under §§ 62.13(5) and 59.52(8)(c), the legislature may 
very well have decided that a county law-enforcement employe 
should be given the choice of having a circuit court review the 
                     
18 Furthermore, counsel for Eau Claire County conceded that 
nothing in the statute prevented him, as counsel for Eau Claire 
County, to meet with the Committee on Personnel regarding the 
disciplinary hearing.  However, counsel indicated that he would 
be 
prevented 
from 
doing 
so 
by 
the 
attorneys' 
Code 
of 
Professional 
Conduct. 
 
We 
mention 
this 
issue 
merely 
to 
demonstrate the potential for conflict of interest in the 
statutory procedure. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
20
existence of "just cause" on the paper record made by the civil 
service commission or having a disinterested arbitrator make a 
decision after hearing the facts. 
¶36 Furthermore, the procedures for deciding the dispute 
are different under Wis. Stat. §§ 62.13(5)(d) and 59.52(8)(b).  
Section 62.13(5)(d) requires a Police and Fire Commission to 
hold a hearing at which a municipal fire or police employe has 
the right to be represented by an attorney and to compel the 
attendance of witnesses.  
¶37 Section 59.52(8)(b) merely states that a county law-
enforcement employe may not be dismissed, demoted, suspended, or 
suspended and demoted, unless "the commission or the [county] 
board determines whether there is just cause . . . to sustain 
the charges."  Section 59.52(8)(b) does not explicitly require 
that a hearing be held or that the county law-enforcement 
employe may be represented at a hearing by an attorney and may 
call witnesses.19 
¶38 In 
light 
of 
these 
procedural 
differences 
in 
§§ 62.13(5)(d) and 59.52(8)(b), the legislature may very well 
have decided that a county law-enforcement employe should be 
given the choice of having a circuit court review the existence 
of "just cause" on the paper record made by the civil service 
commission or having a disinterested arbitrator make a decision 
after hearing the facts. 
                     
19 Eau Claire County points out that a full hearing was 
conducted 
in 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
against 
Rizzo, 
including sworn testimony and exhibits. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
21
¶39 Because of these 
differences 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 62.13(5) and 59.52(8)(c), we conclude that the Janesville 
case does not govern the present case.  The differences in the 
statutes governing municipal and county employes support the 
conclusion that the legislature did not intend the exclusive 
statutory appeals procedure for municipal fire and police 
employes to be applied to county law-enforcement employes. 
¶40 The fourth and final indicator of legislative intent 
regarding the exclusivity of the statutory appeal procedure is 
that the legislature did not intend to allow a county law-
enforcement employe to get the proverbial "two bites at the 
apple."  Eau Claire County argues that the legislature could not 
have 
intended 
to 
waste 
resources 
by 
giving 
county 
law-
enforcement employes a hearing before the Committee on Personnel 
and a new fact-finding process by an arbitrator.  As we stated 
previously, the legislature might have concluded that a new 
fact-finding process should be available when the statute does 
not mandate a hearing before a neutral body. 
¶41 Eau Claire County also argues that allowing an employe 
"two bites" is inconsistent with Milas v. Labor Ass'n of Wis., 
Inc., 214 Wis. 2d 1, 571 N.W.2d 656 (1997).20  But the present 
                     
20 In Milas v. Labor Ass'n, 214 Wis. 2d 1, 571 N.W.2d 656 
(1997), this court accepted certification to determine whether 
the statutory appeal procedure to the circuit court created by 
Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92) was the exclusive remedy 
following an adverse decision or whether an employe could pursue 
a grievance procedure pursuant to the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement.  The court did not reach that issue. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
22
case offers a different scenario than that in Milas.  In Milas 
the county agreed to arbitration under the county's collective 
bargaining 
agreement. 
 
Then, 
when 
the 
county 
lost 
in 
arbitration, it argued that the arbitration had been an illegal 
procedure.  In this case Rizzo does not seek two different 
reviews of the decision of the Committee on Personnel.  Rather, 
after the Committee's decision to terminate his employment, 
Rizzo wanted to choose between the circuit court and an 
arbitrator.  He did not seek to litigate both before the circuit 
court and the arbitrator.   
¶42 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that a circuit 
court is not the exclusive forum in which a county law-
enforcement employe may challenge an order of a civil service 
commission to dismiss, demote, suspend, or suspend and demote 
the employe under Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c).  We conclude that 
after a civil service commission issues an order to dismiss, 
demote, suspend, or suspend and demote a county law-enforcement 
employe, the employe may proceed either with an appeal to the 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.52(8)(c) or with the 
grievance procedures, including arbitration, provided in the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement.  The employe may 
not, however, pursue both the statutory appeal procedure to the 
circuit court set forth in § 59.52(8)(c) and the grievance 
procedures set forth in the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
98-3197 
 
 
23
 
98-3197.dss 
 
1 
¶43 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (dissenting).   I respectfully 
dissent.  For the reasons more fully stated by Judge Cane in his 
dissent in the court of appeals, I conclude that City of 
Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 
1995), controls this case, and cannot be distinguished.  Eau 
Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662, 228 Wis. 
2d 640, 651-52, 654-56, 599 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1999).  
¶44 The statute at issue in City of Janesville, Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5), which governs 
reviews 
of 
disciplinary 
actions 
against municipal police and fire personnel, was enacted 
together with the statute at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.52(8), which governs 
reviews 
of 
disciplinary actions 
against county law enforcement personnel.  1993 Wis. Act 53.  As 
Judge 
Cane 
noted, 
the 
procedures 
are 
nearly 
identical, 
"parallel[ing] each other almost word for word."  Eau Claire 
County, 228 Wis. 2d at 652.  City of Janesville held that Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5) provides the exclusive method for obtaining 
review of municipal police and fire personnel disciplinary 
decisions, superseding any irreconcilable collective bargaining 
agreement 
provisions, specifically, 
arbitration. 
 
City of 
Janesville, 193 Wis. 2d at 509-11. 
¶45 The majority does not overrule City of Janesville, 
but, rather, distinguishes it on the basis of certain procedural 
differences between the two statutory schemes, differences 
which, like Judge Cane, I find too minor to "justify a 
conclusion that the legislature must have intended to allow 
arbitration 
after 
the 
required 
statutory 
just 
cause 
98-3197.dss 
 
2 
hearing . . . ."  Eau Claire County, 228 Wis. 2d at 656.  When 
statutes are enacted together and concern the same subject 
matter, they are considered in pari materia and are construed 
together and harmonized.  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 
325, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976).  Accordingly, and for the reasons 
more fully stated by Judge Cane in the court of appeals, id. at 
654-56, I respectfully dissent.   
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent.