Title: State v. Woods

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

191 Kan. 433 (1963)
381 P.2d 533
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
GERALD LEE WOODS, Appellant.
No. 43,401

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 11, 1963.
Chester I. Lewis, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Howard Hudson, of Fort Scott, argued the cause and William M. Ferguson, attorney general, and Charles M. Warren, county attorney, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
Walter B. Patterson and Frank O'Brien, both of Fort Scott, were on the briefs as amici curiae.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKSON, J.:
On the evening of August 20, 1962, John D. Rogers had a date with Lola Stuteville, who was then eighteen years of age. They attended a movie in Fort Scott and then drove out to Gunn Park at the southwest edge of town. Rogers parked his Mercury sedan north of the south shelter house in the park. Rogers and Lola were sitting in the front seat smoking and listening to the radio and had been parked only about five minutes when Lola heard footsteps on her side of the car. Three or four figures stood near the car. Lola screamed. Rogers on looking closely could see that they were colored men. He criticized them for sneaking up and scaring them. They asked for money and cigarettes. He had no money but gave them cigarettes. He then noticed that there were about three or more on his side of the car also. He *434 then attempted to start his car but they grabbed his arm and prevented him from doing so.
One of the Negroes on Lola's side of the car opened the door and sat down in the seat beside her. Rogers was pulled out of his seat on the driver's side and another one of them got into the seat on the other side of Lola. Lola, badly frightened, jumped over the back of the front seat and out of the car on the driver's side, ran up to Rogers and held on to his arm.
There is no reason to go into detail of all that occurred, but they attempted to make Rogers and Lola have intercourse in the back seat of the car. When this failed, they took Lola and Rogers to the shelter house and attempted to force them to have intercourse on the table. After about five minutes, Rogers was pulled away and they began taking turns raping Lola. During this time she was raped ten or twelve times.
Gerald Lee Woods was the first of the boys to be tried. The appeal here is apt to be followed in the other cases. It might be said that appellant's counsel has brought into the picture almost every objection possible.
The appellant first raises the question of the denial of a continuance. In the case at bar, defendant was first charged only with the crime of rape on August 23, 1962. On August 27, he was charged with kidnaping in the first degree as well as with forcible rape. Within thirty-two days after his arrest, the trial date of the defendant had been set. The fact that defendant's counsel lived in Wichita was not a matter which could be taken into consideration in finding that he was not ready for trial. As far as the record would indicate, counsel for the defendant was entirely ready and most alert in making every point for his defendant.
But while appellant argues that he needed more time in which to prepare his case, we would rather think that had there been any delay, counsel would have been the first to argue that his defendant was entitled to a speedy trial. We find no abuse of discretion in compelling defendant to go to trial at the time the case was set. State v. Sweet, 101 Kan. 746, 168 Pac. 1112; State v. Johnson, 70 Kan. 861, 79 Pac. 732; State v. Wiswell, 128 Kan. 659, 280 Pac. 780, Syl. 1; and see State v. Badgley, 140 Kan. 349, 37 P.2d 16.
Not to overlook anything, it is then contended that defendant was entitled to bail. Section 9 of our own Bill of Rights to the state constitution reads as follows: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient *435 sureties except for capital offenses, where proof is evident or presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted." First degree kidnaping is a capital offense and the jury convicted the defendant although they did not assess the death penalty. It would seem clear that the presumption was great and the proof evident.
The appellant filed a motion for change of venue and argues strongly that feelings ran high against the defendants in the town. Notice also that the affidavits and motion filed asked that the case be removed from the district as well as from the county since the application was evidently filed under G.S. 1949, 62-1319, and not under G.S. 1949, 62-1318: It should also be noted that the application was not made during the term of defendant's arraignment under provision of section 62-1324 and should not have been considered without an additional affidavit under section 62-1325. Needless to say, there were no affidavits showing that the defendant could not receive a fair trial in Linn or Miami county, which counties are a part of the same district with Bourbon county of which Fort Scott is the county seat. The state did file an affidavit showing that a fair trial could be had in Linn county. Moreover, there were a number of affidavits taking issue with the ones filed by the defendant. See section 62-1321. The trial court took the question seriously, passed upon it and found that there existed no serious threat of violence or feeling against the defendants in general and that a fair trial could be had in Bourbon county. We know of no reason why the court should be reversed on this holding.
The state cites the case of State v. Parmenter, 70 Kan. 513, 79 Pac. 123, which is in point on the matter, and which came from the same county.
The defendant next makes a strong argument to show that the jury which tried the defendant was not impartial because of the fact that it was claimed no Negro had sat on a jury in Bourbon county since 1936, citing many cases since Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S. Ct. 625, 27 L. Ed. 354.
In order to prove discrimination, defendant introduced Exhibit 1, which was an excerpt from the 1950 and 1960 U.S. census reports prepared by an official state agency, the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. This exhibit shows that the total population of Bourbon county for the year 1950 was 19,153, of which number 18,478 were white and 675 non-white, or 3.5%. Of the 675 non-whites, 661 or 3.45% were Negroes.
*436 While the state attacks this showing as not being an official document and actually of no worth, it agrees to assume that the figures are correct. But the state attacks the exhibit mainly on the ground that there is no showing of how many of the Negroes were between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five and therefore eligible for jury duty. While it is said in the briefs that all Negroes in the county live in Fort Scott, that would not appear to be accurate as to the census figures.
It was further shown that often no jury is called during an entire term of court.
After full consideration, the trial court gave the following ruling:
Thus, the court shows that he had taken steps some time before to set aright the jury lists of Bourbon county so that four Negroes were actually drawn for the jury in this case.
We would raise a technical question as to whether appellant's challenge to the array was made in time. Challenges to the array at common law must be made at once and before the beginning of the voir dire. As we read appellant's brief and abstract, counsel readily admits that the voir dire was about over before he ever challenged the array. We would direct attention to the case of State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256, 122 A.L.R. 417. In this case, decided in 1939, it was held that a challenge to the remaining members of the jury amounted to a challenge to the array and could not be allowed after the voir dire examination had begun.
Four Negroes were drawn on the panel; the one notified was excused for health reasons from the present jury, therefore we fail to see how it can be contended that there was discrimination in this case.
Appellant next attempts to base error upon the order refusing to *438 provide for the separation of witnesses. It seems that in Fort Scott there are no facilities for such separation and the court therefore must deny such a request. But the appellant is brave enough to admit that the ruling is simply based upon the sound discretion of the trial judge. Furthermore, this court held in State v. Davis, 48 Kan. 1, 28 Pac. 1092, which was a capital case, that there was no abuse of discretion in denying such an order. See also State v. Sweet, 101 Kan. 746, 168 Pac. 1112, a murder case.
Under the sixth section of his brief, the defendant contends that he was in fact charged with the crime of conspiracy and tried therefore although he was not so charged in the information.
The trouble here is that conspiracy has never been considered to be an indictable offense in this state. See State v. Robinson, 124 Kan. 245, 259 Pac. 691. See also State v. Borserine, 184 Kan. 405, 337 P.2d 697. We believe instruction No. 9 clearly followed State v. Borserine, supra.
Next, the defendant objects to the fact that instruction No. 6 omitted the part of the statute G.S. 1961 Supp. 21-449, which deals with secret confinement in first degree kidnaping. In the case of State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832, the kidnaping statute was defined in a case which had much the same facts involved as this case. The same arguments were made in the Brown case and specifically answered. We shall not repeat them herein, but see p. 384, et seq.
The last matter referred to in defendant's brief is the contention that the court should have instructed on second degree kidnaping and attempted rape. The state first mentions that nothing is abstracted as to requested instructions on these points. So any error thought possibly to exist would be waived on the record before us.
It is pointed out by the state that the same objection was raised in State v. Brown, supra. See p. 390, et seq. As said there, "the defendant was either guilty of kidnaping in the first degree under the evidence or he was not guilty of kidnaping in any degree."
The case at bar seems to be a stronger case than the Brown case, so the above quotation should be important.
Likewise, if it be thought that the evidence in this case would convict the defendant of attempted rape but not of the crime of rape, the jury should acquit the defendant, and he would have no ground to complain that the attempt was not put into the picture.
*439 We feel that the defendant had a fair trial. He was found guilty as charged. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
PRICE, J., concurs in the result.