Title: FULSOM v. FULSOM

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

FULSOM v. FULSOM  FULSOM v. FULSOM 2003 OK 96 81 P.3d 652 Case Number: 96458 Decided: 11/12/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DENISE DIANNE FULSOM, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. BODINE FULSOM, Defendant/Appellee, and JOE FULSOM and JEAN FULSOM, Intervening Defendants/Appellants. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I DISTRICT COURT OF OSAGE COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE B. DAVID GAMBILL, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Mother and father divorced in 1997. The divorce decree gave father custody of their two minor children. In 2000 mother sought to modify the decree to place custody with her, which father opposed. Paternal grandparents intervened in the post-divorce-decree proceeding, seeking the decree's modification to place custody with them. After hearing, the trial court dismissed grandparents' motion to modify, granted mother's motion and awarded her custody. Both parents moved to have grandparents pay their attorney fees, each relying on CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT ORDER REVERSED. B. H. Shoemake of Shoemake Law Office, Pawhuska, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee. Grace K. Yates and Kenneth E. Holmes of Holmes and Yates, Ponca City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. Patti J. Palmer of Palmer & Lamirand, Pawhuska, Oklahoma, for Intervening Defendants/Appellants. LAVENDER, J.: ¶1 In this case we decide whether PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ¶2 The focus of this case is gauging the meaning of § 110(D); thus, confronting us is a question of law. A legal question involving statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review [Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, PART II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. ¶3 Mother and father divorced in 1997. The divorce decree awarded father custody of the parties' two minor children. In 2000 mother sought to modify the decree to place custody with her, which father opposed. Paternal grandparents intervened in the post-divorce-decree child custody modification proceeding and sought to place custody with them. After hearing, via an "Order of Modification" filed in March 2001, the trial court dismissed grandparents' motion to modify based on a finding they failed to show either mother or father was unfit, granted mother's motion and awarded her custody. PART III. ANALYSIS. ¶7 The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature. TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, ¶8 This Court stated the following in State ex rel. Tal v. City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma follows the American Rule ... . The Rule is generally that each litigant pays for their own legal representation and our courts are without authority to assess attorney fees in the absence of a specific statute or contract allowing for their recovery. Exceptions to the Rule are narrowly defined and carved out with great caution because it is understood liberality of attorney fee awards against the non-prevailing party has a chilling effect on our open access to courts guarantee. [Citations omitted.] Oklahoma jurisprudence, thus, recognizes that attorney fee statutes are strictly applied because to do otherwise holds out the real possibility of chilling access to the courts. Beard v. Richards, ¶9 In McDonald v. Wrigley, ¶10 In matrimonial litigation generally, the propriety of a counsel-fee allowance does not depend on prevailing party status, but is based on a judicial balancing of the equities. Thielenhaus v. Thielenhaus, C. Upon granting a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, the court may require either party to pay such reasonable expenses of the other as may be just and proper under the circumstances. D. The court may in its discretion make additional orders relative to the expenses of any such subsequent actions, including but not limited to writs of habeas corpus, brought by the parties or their attorneys, for the enforcement or modification of any interlocutory or final orders in the dissolution of marriage action made for the benefit of either party or their respective attorneys. ¶12 Nothing in the other subsections of § 110 expresses an intent that others, such as intervening grandparents, were meant to fall within the ambit of the expense provisions found in § 110(C) and (D). See supra note 7 for other subsections of § 110. For us to rule that intervening grandparents are included within the terms of the provisions would entail rewriting the language, something we have no warrant in undertaking. If the Legislature intends to include others in addition to the divorcing or divorced spouses within the discretionary equitable sweep of § 110(C) and (D), it is that body which must do so. To date, the Legislature has not expressed such an intention. ¶13 We also find nothing in If the court finds that visitation rights of the grandparent have been unreasonably denied or otherwise unreasonably interfered with by the parent, the court shall enter an order providing for one or more of the following: ... assessment of reasonable attorney fees, mediation costs, and court costs to enforce visitation rights against the parent[.] The 2003 amendments did not alter § 5(E)(6)(d). ¶14 In § 5 the Legislature has been direct and express in grandparental visitation matters concerning its intent to allow attorney fees in the circumstances covered by § 5(E)(6)-(7) and (H). No such directness or expression is found in § 110, other than as to the divorcing or divorced spouses. It may be that the Legislature provided for attorney fees in the visitation situation because it recognized visitation proceedings involving grandparents would be numerous, as opposed to custody requests which involve a more onerous infringement on parental rights. In other words, the Legislature may have simply decided that a general equitable attorney fee provision as to the latter was either not needed or warranted. In any event, § 5, concerning as it does grandparental visitation, simply cannot be stretched to engulf a proceeding not involving a visitation quest, but legal custody. It must also be stated that the wisdom of such legislative choices is not our concern, because such choices - absent constitutional or other recognized infirmity - rightly lie within the legislative sphere. ¶15 We also reject father's argument, to the effect, that intervening grandparents may somehow act with impunity in child custody proceedings brought in divorce cases if we fail to include them within § 110's attorney fee reach. The argument is misplaced. If grandparents attempt intervention on wholly frivolous (legal and/or factual) grounds or somehow engage in bad faith litigation misconduct, there are statutory and inherent mechanisms available to deal with the situation. Title PART IV. SUMMARY. ¶16 The parents of two minor children, grounding their requests on § 110, sought to have intervening grandparents pay their attorney fees in a post-divorce-decree child custody modification proceeding. The trial court awarded attorney fees to both parents and against grandparents. The COCA, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the attorney fee awards. Although the COCA's majority opinion correctly reversed, certiorari was granted by us to decide a question of first impression concerning the applicability of § 110(D) in the circumstances of this case. We now hold § 110(D) does not provide authority for the attorney fee awards against grandparents. Instead, § 110(D) only gives a trial court discretionary equitable authority to award attorney fees for or against the two original parties to the divorce case, i.e., the divorced spouses at the time of the modification proceeding, based on a judicial balancing of the equities between those two parties. ¶17 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is VACATED and the trial court order granting attorney fees against intervening defendants/appellants and in favor of plaintiff/appellee and defendant/appellee is REVERSED. FOOT