Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Foster

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Foster, 92 Ohio St.3d 411, 2001-Ohio-199.] 
 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. FOSTER. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Foster (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 411.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Pattern and practice 
of carelessness, inattention to detail, procrastination, and failure to 
communicate with clients and court officials in practicing bankruptcy 
law. 
(No. 01-368 — Submitted April 2, 2001 — Decided July 18, 2001.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-42. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  On June 5, 2000, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a 
complaint charging respondent, Thomas Joseph Foster of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0058540, with several violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, primarily with respect to his conduct in handling 
bankruptcy matters. 
 
When respondent failed to answer the complaint, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“board”) referred the matter  to 
one of its members, Jonathan Hollingsworth (“board member”), for ruling on the 
motion for default filed by relator. 
 
Based upon the affidavits attached to relator’s motion for default, the 
board member found that relator’s complaint, which was sent by certified mail, 
was received by “Fredda Sherman” at respondent’s address. Relator made several 
other attempts to effect actual service of the complaint, including attempting to 
contact respondent not only at his home address but also at his office address. 
 
The board member found that in July 1998, Richard Mullis retained 
respondent by paying him $475 to file a personal bankruptcy. Thereafter, Mullis 
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was unable to contact respondent, and in June 1999, Mullis filed a complaint with 
relator.  Respondent filed a bankruptcy case for Mullis in October 1999.  The 
board member also found that by February 1999, Kathy Opatich had paid 
respondent the entire $675 fee to file a personal bankruptcy for her.  Unable to 
communicate with respondent, Opatich filed a complaint regarding him with 
relator in June 1999.  In August 1999, respondent filed a bankruptcy petition for 
Opatich but did not file the schedules and statement of affairs within the time 
required by rule. 
 
The board member also found that in early 1999, respondent accepted 
$1,000 from Jamison Johnson to take over an uncontested divorce proceeding 
from her previous counsel and to file a personal bankruptcy case for her.  In April 
1999, respondent misrepresented to Johnson that the bankruptcy petition had been 
filed, but, in fact, he did not file it until June 1999.  However, after filing the 
bankruptcy action, respondent did not provide the services to Johnson required by 
court rule.  As a result, the court dismissed Johnson’s case with prejudice, and she 
was barred from filing a second bankruptcy case for six months. 
 
From March 1998 through October 1999, respondent filed seventeen 
bankruptcy cases, including the Mullis, Opatich, and Johnson cases.  In eight of 
those cases, the clients signed the petitions substantially earlier than the dates on 
which respondent filed the cases.  In one case, the date of the signature had been 
“whited over” and a photocopy of the paper filed instead of an original so as to 
make the date of actual signing unclear. In eleven cases, respondent did not file 
the schedules of debts and statement of financial affairs as required by the 
bankruptcy rules; in four of those cases, respondent filed the schedules and 
statement over one hundred days after the petition dates; in three of the cases, 
respondent never filed them.  In five of the cases, respondent did not file in a 
timely manner other necessary documents.  Though directed in July 1999 by the 
bankruptcy court clerk to redo the Patricia Burba petition because his signature 
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3 
was omitted, respondent had not complied as of May 2000.  Four of the cases 
were dismissed because respondent failed to file appropriate documents or failed 
to attend the required first meeting of creditors. 
 
The board member concluded that respondent’s conduct in these cases 
demonstrated a pattern and practice of carelessness, inattention to detail, 
procrastination, and failure to communicate with clients and court officials and 
indicated that he was not competent to practice bankruptcy law.  The board 
member concluded that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s ability to practice law), 6-101(A)(1) 
(a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter that he is not competent to handle), 6-
101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (a 
lawyer shall not fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client), and 7-101(A)(3) (a 
lawyer shall not prejudice or damage his client). 
 
The board member recommended that the motion for default be granted 
except for the charge that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not 
attempt to handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the 
circumstances) because relator did not establish this violation by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The board member recommended that respondent be 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and that reinstatement depend 
upon his making full and complete restitution to his former clients.  The board 
adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the board member. 
 
We have reviewed the record and adopt the findings and conclusions of 
the board.  As we noted in Dayton Bar Assn. v. Andrews (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
109, 112, 679 N.E.2d 1093, 1095, “ ‘the counseling of a client in financial matters 
* * * is a serious matter that deserves the attention of a qualified attorney.’  If the 
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attorney cannot or will not give this matter his necessary attention, or is not 
qualified to handle the matter he undertakes, he violates our Disciplinary Rules.”  
Id., quoting Columbus Bar Assn. v. Flanagan (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 674 
N.E.2d 681, 683.  See, also, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Wolosin (1999), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 401, 704 N.E.2d 566, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Dahling (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 246, 737 N.E.2d 25, where the orders we issued disbarring attorneys were 
based in large part on their neglect of bankruptcy cases.  In this matter, we agree 
with the recommendation of the board.  Respondent is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  Full and complete restitution to respondent’s 
former clients for payments made and services not received is a prerequisite to the 
filing of any application for reinstatement.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Pamela N. Maggied, Randall S. Arndt, Patricia K. Block and Bruce A. 
Campbell, for relator. 
__________________