Title: Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLEHAROLD RICHARDSON, ) FOR PUBLICATION ) Petitioner/Appellee, ) Filed: December 28. 1995 ) vs. ) Davidson Chancery ) TENNESSEE BOARD OF ) Hon. C. Allen High, Chancellor DENTISTRY, ) ) No. 01S01-9502-CH-00027 Respondent/Appellant. )For Appellant: For Appellee:Charles W. Burson Michael M. Castellarin Attorney General & Reporter Moody, Whitfield & Castellarin Michael E. Moore Nashville, TN Solicitor GeneralSue A. Shelton Assistant Attorney General Nashville, TN OPINIONJUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS WHITE, J. REVERSED & CASE REMANDED TO TENNESSEE BOARD OF DENTISTRY At issue in this appeal by the Board of Dentistry is the validityand constitutionality of a proposed civil penalty against Harold Richardsonfor practicing dentistry and operating a dental clinic without a license. Alsocalled into question is the authority of the Davidson County Chancery Courtto resolve, on judicial review of an administrative order, constitutionalissues that were not addressed in the administrative order. For the reasonsthat follow, we hold that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to considerconstitutional issues not addressed in the administrative proceeding. As aresult, the Chancery Court's resolution of those issues in the first ChanceryCourt proceeding from which Richardson did not appeal, bars considerationof those issues. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore,reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Board of Dentistry for furtherproceedings. I In 1989, the General Assembly enacted Tennessee CodeAnnotated Section 63-1-134 authorizing health related boards to assess civilpenalties against unlicensed practitioners in health related professions. Thelegislation required each board to establish minimum and maximum civilpenalties which could be assessed. The Tennessee Board of Dentistry, astate administrative board responsible for licensing, regulating, anddisciplining dentistry practitioners in Tennessee under Tennessee CodeAnnotated Sections 63-5-101, et seq., established a "Schedule of CivilPenalties" which became effective on March 15, 1990. See Rules 0460-14-1-.01, -.02. -.03, Rules of Tennessee Board of Dentistry, Chapter 0460-14-1, "Civil Penalties." 2 On June 26, 1990, the Board served Richardson with a Noticeof Charges and Memorandum of Civil Penalty Assessment charging himwith practicing dentistry and with operating a dental clinic without a licensein violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 63-5-107 and 63-5-121.1 The notice alleged that Richardson, who did not hold a license to practicedentistry in Tennessee, had since 1986, owned and operated the BudgetDental Laboratory and the Madison Dental Center in Nashville, Tennessee.The notice charged fifty-seven consecutive violations of owning andoperating a dental practice occurring between March 15, 1990 and June 8,1990 and at least ten acts of practicing dentistry. For ownership of thedental practice for fifty-seven days and for the ten incidents of practicingdentistry without a license, the Board sought to impose the maximumpenalty of $38,500.2 The Board of Dentistry set a contested case hearing forSeptember 21, 1990. On August 6, 1990, Richardson filed a Petition for DeclaratoryOrder with the Board raising numerous state and federal constitutional1 63-5-107. License requirement. -- (a) It is unlawful for any person to practice dentistry, a specialty in dentistry or dental hygiene in this state, except those who are now licensed or certified as such pursuant to law and those who may hereafter be licensed or certified and registered pursuant to this chapter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-107(a) (1995 Supp.) 63-5-121. Dental practice to be owned by dentist. -- Except where dental services are regularly made available to employees by their employer, or where dental services are being provided by an official agency of the state government, or any subdivision, any nonprofit organization, hospital or any health maintenance organization, it is unlawful: ... (2) For an owner of an active dental practice to be other than a dentist duly licensed to practice in this state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-121(2) (1990 Repl.). 2 The maximum penalty for owning the dental practice was $500 per day. The maximum penalty for practicing without license was $1,000 per day. 3 challenges.3 See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 – -24 (1991 Repl.) . He attacked the constitutionality of Section 63-1-134, the civil penalty assessment statute, on several grounds.4 Since the statute punished by civil penalty the same acts made criminal by the criminal code, Richardson challenged the authority of the Board, a part of the executive rather than the judicial branch, to hear the case, alleging that the procedure would violate the separation of powers doctrine. He challenged the statute on its face as being violative of due process in its vagueness and its denial of a jury trial since it assessed a fine in excess of $50. He also questioned whether the statute authorized the Board to fine or punish a private citizen who is not and has never been a license holder. 3 Richardson also filed a Motion to Dismiss which was answered, but not ruled upon at this juncture. 4 63-1-134. Penalty for violation of statute, rule or order. -- Recovery. -- (a) With respect to any person required to be licensed, permitted or authorized by any board, commission or agency attached to the division of health related boards, each respective board, commission or agency may assess a civil penalty against such person in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each separate violation of a statute, rule or order pertaining to such board, commission or agency. Each day of continued violation constitutes a separate violation. (b) Each board, commission or agency shall by rule establish a schedule designating the minimum and maximum civil penalties which may be assessed under this section. In assessing civil penalties, the following factors may be considered: (1) Whether the amount imposed will be a substantial economic deterrent to the violator; (2) The circumstances leading to the violation; (3) The severity of the violation and the risk of harm to the public; (4) The economic benefits gained by the violator as a result of noncompliance; and (5) The interest of the public. (c) (1) Civil penalties assessed pursuant to this section shall become final thirty (30) days after the date a final order of assessment is served. (2) If the violator fails to pay an assessment when it becomes final, the division may apply to the appropriate court for a judgment and seek execution of such judgment. (3) Jurisdiction for recovery of such penalties shall be in the chancery court of Davidson County, or the chancery court of the county in which all or part of the violations occurred. (d) All sums recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state treasury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-134 (1990 Repl.) 4 On November 28, 1990, the Board convened a hearing toconsider Richardson's Petition for a Declaratory Order. The Secretary ofState assigned an Administrative Law Judge to make procedural andevidentiary rulings and to resolve questions of law. The judge ruled that theBoard was not authorized to consider the arguments on the constitutionalityof the statute or the arguments that the statute as applied wasunconstitutional, but was to consider a single issue: whether the statuteauthorized the assessment of a civil penalty against persons that are requiredto be, but are not, licensed. In its Declaratory Order filed on December 28, 1990, the Boardanswered the question affirmatively. Specifically, the Board held that (1) itwas without jurisdiction to consider federal or state constitutionalchallenges to the statute or its application; (2) the statute applies to personsrequired to be licensed by the Board to practice dentistry, regardless ofwhether they are licensed; and (3) in the event the allegations againstRichardson were established, civil penalties could be assessed. Richardson sought judicial review of the Declaratory Order inthe Davidson County Chancery Court. His Petition for Review raised theconstitutional challenges to the statute and its application and questionedthe authority of the Board to assess a civil penalty against an unlicensedcitizen. Additionally, the petition attacked the administrative law judge'sruling prohibiting the Board from considering the constitutional issues asarbitrary, capricious, and illegal. 5 After allowing briefing and oral argument, the chancellorissued an order affirming the Board action. The chancellor defined the issuebefore the court as "whether the order of the Board is in violation ofconstitutional provisions, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or in excess ofstatutory authority." The chancellor found that the statute authorizedcriminal and civil sanctions and that, in this case, the Board was pursuing acivil rather than a criminal remedy. Therefore, there were no constitutionalviolations. Additionally, the chancellor found that the Board wasauthorized to assess a civil penalty against an unlicensed person. Finally,the chancellor found no basis for Richardson's claim that the Board actionwas arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or in excess of statutory authority. Richardson sought first an interlocutory appeal. The chancellordenied the motion finding his order to be a final order, not an interlocutoryorder. Next, Richardson sought an extraordinary appeal which was deniedby the Court of Appeals. After filing his Petition for a Declaratory Order, but prior to theresolution of those issues in the Davidson County Chancery Court,Richardson filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Board restating hisconstitutional challenges.5 This motion was still pending when the assistantgeneral counsel for the State of Tennessee served a Request for Admissions.The request sought admissions which would have established that5 On October 7, 1992, Richardson amended his Motion to Dismiss based on State ex rel. Town of South Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992). He argued that the Board lacked the constitutional qualifications set forth in Article VI, Section 4 and, therefore, could not interpret or enforce the criminal law. 6 Richardson owned a dental practice and had practiced dentistry without alicense at the times alleged in the notice. Shortly thereafter, the state filed aMotion in Limine asking that Richardson be precluded from arguingconstitutional issues or from asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. Eventually, the state filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. In October 1992, a second administrative law judge presided ata conference concerning the pending motions. After considering argument,the administrative law judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted boththe Motion to Compel Discovery and the Motion in Limine. The judgefound that the Board was not exercising concurrent jurisdiction with acriminal court in assessing a civil penalty and that the Board was notauthorized to rule on constitutional issues. As to Richardson's privilegeagainst self-incrimination, the judge deemed it inapplicable since the statuteof limitations had expired on any possible criminal liability and since theBoard was seeking only a civil penalty.6 Richardson appealed a second time to the Davidson CountyChancery Court. In the Petition for Review, Richardson requested thereversal of the administrative law judge's order and a dismissal of thecharges against him. The state defended on the basis that Richardson'sclaims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel as a result of the6 Violation of the licensing statutes is a Class B misdemeanor. Tenn Code Ann. §§ 63-1- 123 & 63-5-128(a)(1990 Repl. & 1995 Supp.). Misdemeanors are subject to a twelve month statute of limitations. Tenn Code Ann. § 40-2-102 (1990 Repl.). The Notice of Charges set the date of the last offense as June 8, 1990. The time for filing criminal charges for the conduct listed in the Board's notice expired on June 9, 1991, more than a year before the state served its Request for Admissions. 7 first chancery proceeding and requested a supplementation of the recordwith the former record which was ultimately granted. After hearing argument, the chancellor held that theconstitutional issues had been determined in the first chancery case andaffirmed the order of the administrative law judge in full without discussionof Richardson's self-incrimination claim. This time, Richardson appealedthe Chancery Court's judgment to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 3of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the Court of Appeals, Richardson raised nine issuesincluding the constitutional challenges to the Board's authority, the self-incrimination issue, the Board's statutory authority to assess a penalty, theBoard's refusal to hear argument concerning the proper interpretation ofSection 63-1-134, and the supplementation of the record with that from theprior chancery proceeding. The state argued that Richardson was barredfrom raising the constitutional issues because he had not appealed the priorChancery Court order. The appellate court held that the record in the prior chanceryproceeding was properly supplemented in support of the state's defense.Nonetheless, the court rejected the defense since it found that the chanceryruling on the constitutional issues was "without appropriate pleading . . . ,coram non judice and void." The court held that only the portion of thejudgment pertaining to the statute's applicability to unlicensed persons wasvalid. Finally, the court held that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-1- 8 134 is unconstitutional to the extent it authorizes any board to assess a civilpenalty for acts otherwise declared to be criminal offenses. Therefore, thecourt reversed and vacated the Board's actions, pretermitted all other issues,and dismissed the charges. II In the appeal before us, the state raises two issues: 1. whether the Board of Dentistry's proposed assessment of civil penalties for conduct also declared to be a criminal offense is an unconstitutional exercise of administrative authority; and 2. whether the Davidson County Chancery Court is authorized under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act to resolve constitutional issues not addressed in the administrative order under review.7Our conclusion on the second issue is dispositive of this case and removesthe necessity of addressing the first issue. Since the resolution of this caseripens it for a determination on the merits, we address the self-incriminationissue as well. A. In addressing the appropriateness of the Chancery Court's firstorder disposing of Richardson's constitutional challenges, we consider firstto what extent an administrative body in a contested case has the authorityto resolve constitutional questions. The general rule is that an7 Richardson argues that the state may not rely on its res judicata or collateral estoppel defense because the issue was not affirmatively raised in this appeal. We disagree. Although the words res judicata or collateral estoppel are not used in the statement of the issues, it is implicit in the Court of Appeals' disposition. Further, it was argued at both the chancery and appellate levels. 9 administrative agency may not determine constitutional issues. An agencyis not authorized to consider or question the constitutionality of a legislativeact; nor may it declare unconstitutional the statutes which it was created toadminister or enforce. This recognition of the limited authority of agenciesto resolve constitutional issues has been widely recognized. See e.g.,Downen v. Warner, 481 F.2d 642 , 643 (9th Cir. 1973)(resolving claimbased on constitutional right is inappropriate for an administrative board);Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 698 F. Supp. 809 , 813-14 (D.C.N.D. 1990),rev'd on other grounds, 898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990)(agency withoutpower to adjudicate constitutional issues); Key Haven v. Board of Trusteesof the Internal Impr'mt. Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982)(forum forconsideration of constitutional question was in court upon judicial review);Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 309 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio1974)(constitutionality of zoning ordinance is matter for the court); DowJones & Co. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843 (Okla.1990)(commissioner properly refused to address constitutional issues);Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204 , 218(Wyo. 1978)(agency does not determine facial constitutionality of statute orconstitutionality of its application). See also 73 C.J.S., "PublicAdministrative Law and Procedure," § 65 at 536; 1 Am. Jur.2d,"Administrative Law," § 185 at 989-90. These limits on the authority of administrative agencies toresolve constitutional questions are based upon the fundamentalconstitutional principle of separation of powers. See State ex rel. Town ofSouth Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 , 897 (Tenn. 1992). The powers 10 of government, divided into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches,are separate and divisible. The legislative branch has the authority to make,alter, and repeal the law; the executive branch administers and enforces thelaw; and the judicial branch has the authority to interpret and apply the law.State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d 936 , 939 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appealdenied, (Tenn.1993) ; Tenn. Const. Art. II, §§ 1, 2. Since the United StatesSupreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137(1803), it has been the sole obligation of the judiciary to interpret the lawand determine the constitutionality of actions taken by the other twobranches of government. Tennessee Small School Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 , 148 (Tenn. 1993). The Tennessee Constitution forbids anencroachment by one department upon the powers or functions of another.Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2; State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d at 939. Thus, alegislative action vesting executive branch agencies with the authority todetermine the constitutionality of statutes would violate the separation ofpowers doctrine. See Williams v. Carr, 404 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1966);LaFever v. Ware, 365 S.W.2d 44 , 47 (Tenn. 1963); Peay v. Nolan, 7 S.W.2d 815 , 816 (Tenn. 1928). While the doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental toour form of government, it is not absolute. State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d at939. It does not require that administrative agencies never consider theconstitutionality of an administrative action. A careful examination of thecases in Tennessee and in other states demonstrates that an absolutemandate against administrative resolution of constitutional issues isoverbroad. Most states, including Tennessee, have recognized that, 11 although the general rule is that agencies do not have the authority to decideconstitutional issues, agencies must consider and apply constitutionalprinciples in determining procedures and rendering decisions in contestedcases. See e.g. Flint River Mills v. Henry, 216 S.E.2d 895 , 896-97 (Ga.1975)(officer of board is powerless to declare a statute unconstitutional);City of Joplin v. Industrial Comm'n of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d 687 , 689 (Mo.1959)(en banc) (administrative agencies have no authority to considerconstitutionality of legislation); First Bank of Buffalo v. Conrad, 350 N.W.2d 580 , 585 (N.D. 1984)(agency must presume statute is valid until ajudicial determination to the contrary); Johnson v. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123 ,126 (N.D. 1978)(general rule is that agencies have no authority to rule uponconstitutionality of their operating statutes). For example, in a proceeding before the Tennessee CivilService Commission, the Commission, without objection, heard andresolved the issue of whether a party could assert a privilege against self-incrimination before the Commission. England v. Civil ServiceCommission of Metro Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 617 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. ), cert. denied, (Tenn.1981). The Commission's authoritywas not challenged and its determination that the privilege was not availablewas upheld on appeal. Id. at 140. Conversely, in Goodwin v. MetropolitanBoard of Health, the Court of Appeals stated: "a non-judicial board has nopower or authority to make constitutional rulings." Goodwin v.Metropolitan Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 , 387 (Tenn. App.), perm. toappeal denied, (Tenn. 1983). 12 A series of cases have spawned confusion on the applicableTennessee rule. See Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1988)(caseimplying that courts, not agencies, must determine constitutional issues inTennessee); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn.1991)(administrative agencies have the authority to consider theconstitutionality of a statute); Crawford v. Tennessee ConsolidatedRetirement System, 732 S.W.2d 293 , 297 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appealdenied, (Tenn. 1987)("only a court may pronounce a declaratory judgmenton the subject of the constitutionality of a law . . . ."). This unfortunateconfusion has arisen primarily because our courts have seldomdifferentiated between the various kinds of constitutional issues that may beraised in administrative proceedings. Given the array of complexconstitutional issues that surround agency law and the proceduralrequirements of due process, it is unrealistically simplistic and unworkableto state a general rule that administrative bodies either have or do not havethe authority to consider constitutional questions. Courts must delineate ina principled manner between those issues that are within the purview of anadministrative body with limited authority and those that are solely withinthe jurisdiction of the judicial branch. The former include proceduralconstitutional issues that may arise in the context of a contested case. Thelatter involves constitutional challenges to the statutes creating the agencyand defining its subject matter and authority. Our examination of Tennessee case law discloses that threetypes of constitutional issues arise in contested administrative hearings.The first are those that challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute 13 authorizing an agency to act or a rule adopted pursuant to a statute. Thesecond challenges the actions of an agency in applying a rule or statute.The third challenges the constitutionality of the procedures employed by theagency. Once the differences in the issues are noted, the seeminglyinconsistent approaches disappear. Tennessee courts generally hold that administrative agenciesand boards are not authorized to rule on facial constitutional challenges tostatutes or rules. Goodwin v. Metropolitan Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1983)(constitutionality ofBoard of Health regulations). Courts, moreover, have entertained theseconstitutional challenges in cases in which the issues were not addressed atthe agency level. See, e.g., Plasti-Line, Inc. v. Tennessee Human RightsComm'n, et al., 746 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1988)(administrative action pendingwhen declaratory judgment filed but no suggestion that agency shouldresolve issue); Pharr v. Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry., 208 S.W.2d 1013 , 1017(Tenn. 1948); see also Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1988). In cases in which a party challenges the application of a statutein a given situation, the Tennessee courts have acknowledged the agency'sauthority to resolve the issue before submitting the matter to judicial review.See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1991)(challenge toapplicability of sales tax to catalog sales); Crawford v. TennesseeConsolidated Retirement System, 732 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. App.), perm. toappeal denied, (Tenn. 1987)(applicability of statute and agency rule toplaintiffs' retirement rights). Courts have also implicitly recognized an 14 agency's authority to resolve constitutional questions involving proceduralmatters. See England v. Civil Service Comm'n of Metro Gov't of Nashville& Davidson County, 617 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App.), cert. denied, (Tenn.1981) (privilege against self-incrimination). Thus, we conclude that whether an agency can resolveconstitutional issues raised in a contested case proceeding depends on thenature of the constitutional issue. The applicable rules may be summarizedas follows: (1) Facial Constitutionality of a Statute The facial constitutionality of a statute may not be determinedby an administrative tribunal in an administrative proceeding. Anadministrative agency is a creation of the legislature. While it may havejudicial characteristics and may be required to perform quasi-judicialfunctions, an agency is not part of the judicial branch of government.Plasti-Line, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm'n, et al., 746 S.W.2d 691 , 694(Tenn. 1988). As a result, the legislature may not confer upon an agency thepower to determine the constitutionality of a statute. Hoover Motor Exp.Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 233 , 238(Tenn. 1953); Pharr v. Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry., 208 S.W.2d 1013 , 1017(Tenn. 1948). Nor may an agency assume that power. That power restswith the judiciary. Tennessee Small School Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 , 148 (Tenn. 1993). To vest an agency with the authority to determinethe constitutionality of the legislation empowering the agency to act wouldviolate the doctrine of the separation of powers. Tenn. Const. Art. II, §§ 1& 2. Therefore, we reiterate that an administrative agency, board, 15 commission or administrative law judge acting in a contested case hearinghas no authority to resolve facial challenges to the constitutionality of astatute. (2) Unconstitutional Applications of a Statute or Rule When the focus of an aggrieved party's claim is an "as applied"challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or any challenge to theconstitutionality of an agency rule,8 the agency may initially rule on thechallenge. The policy behind this general rule is to allow the agency theopportunity to correct any error it has made in drafting an unconstitutionalrule or in enforcing a constitutional mandate in an unconstitutional manner.Upon discovery, an agency may modify its rule to comport withconstitutional requirements. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1991); Crawford v. Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System, 732 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1987). This rulecomports with the provision of the Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-223 (1991 Repl.). Therefore, an administrative body in acontested case proceeding may resolve questions of the unconstitutionalapplication of a statute to the specific circumstances of the case or theconstitutionality of a rule that the agency has adopted. (3) Constitutional Challenges to Agency Procedure8 An agency rule is, in essence, an application of the statutes which govern the agency. An unconstitutional rule is an unconstitutional application of an otherwise constitutional statute. 16 Similarly, an agency may address a claim that an agency'sprocedure is constitutionally deficient. In contested case proceedings,administrative law judges, boards, and commissions are bound by theprocedural due process requirements imposed by the Tennessee and UnitedStates constitutions. Full consideration of constitutional procedural issuesby the agency will assure that the responsible agency has a full opportunityto reach a considered decision on a complete record after a fair proceeding. Our courts have long recognized the wisdom of allowing a trialcourt to correct errors in the conduct of a trial before submitting the case forappellate review. To require administrative tribunals to ignore proceduralissues and delay correction until judicial review in the chancery court woulddiminish the effectiveness of administrative proceedings and cause aconsiderable waste of effort on the part of the parties and the tribunal.Therefore, we conclude that an agency has the authority in a contested caseproceeding to consider procedural constitutional issues and conform itsprocedures to constitutional requirements. To summarize, administrative agencies have no authority todetermine the facial constitutionality of a statute. They are authorized,however, to determine the constitutionality of the application of statutes orrules and of the procedures employed. The agency resolution of thoseissues is subject to judicial review in the chancery court. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 4-5-322 (1995 Supp.). B 17 Next, we must consider whether the Davidson CountyChancery Court was authorized to resolve constitutional issues which wereraised but not resolved in a contested case proceeding. Tennessee's Administrative Procedure Act provides twomethods for obtaining judicial determination of constitutional issues. First,any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case before anadministrative tribunal is entitled to judicial review in the Davidson CountyChancery Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1)(1991 Repl. & 1995Supp. amend. eff. 7-1-95). Preliminary, procedural, and intermediaterulings may be reviewed immediately if the review of a final ruling wouldnot provide an adequate remedy. Id. The Chancery Court review is withouta jury and is confined to the record, unless procedural irregularities notshown in the record are alleged. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g)(1991 Repl.& 1995 Supp.). In that situation, the Chancery Court may take proof. Id.After review, the Chancery Court may affirm or remand for furtherproceedings. If the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, ordecisions (1) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) exceed theagency's statutory authority; (3) were made "upon unlawful procedure;" or(4) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and prejudice theparty, the Chancery Court may reverse or modify the decision. Tenn. CodeAnn. § 4-5-322(h)(1991 Repl. & 1995 Supp.). The Administrative Procedures Act also allows an "affectedperson" to petition the Davidson County Chancery Court for a declaratoryjudgment regarding the legal validity of a state, rule, or agency order in 18 limited circumstances. A declaratory judgment may be sought if the agencyhas, upon petition by an affected person, refused to issue a declaratoryorder. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 & -224 (1991 Repl.). If the person hasfirst sought a declaratory order in the agency, the agency has refused toissue a declaratory order, and the statute, rule, or order, or its applicationinterferes with, impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the person'srights, the Chancery Court may enter declaratory judgment. Id. TheChancery Court may declare a statute or rule invalid only if it "violatesconstitutional provisions, exceeds the statutory authority of the agency, wasadopted without compliance with the rulemaking procedures . . . orotherwise violates state or federal law." Id. at § -224(c). The declaratory judgment and judicial review provisions do notrequire that constitutional issues be raised at the agency level. In fact, bothSection 4-5-224 (declaratory judgments) and Section 4-5-322 (judicialreview) direct the trial court to determine whether the agency's action ordecision violated a constitutional provision or exceeded the agency'sstatutory authority. Implicit in the declaratory judgment procedure availablewhen an agency refuses to issue a declaratory order is the recognition thatsome constitutional issues would be considered initially by the ChanceryCourt. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223(a)(2) – -224 (1991 Repl.). The judicialreview provisions confine review to the record, but allow the court to takeproof in circumstances in which the irregularities are not shown on therecord. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223(g)(1991 Supp. & 1995 Supp.). Thestatutes clearly contemplate that, in a number of circumstances, 19 constitutional issues may be raised and addressed for the first time inchancery court. To better illustrate the appropriate rules and procedures, weaddress each of the three types of constitutional issues separately: (1) Facial Unconstitutionality of a Statute Since an administrative agency has no authority underTennessee law to consider the constitutionality of a statute, the agency mustrefuse to address facial constitutional challenges raised in contested caseproceedings. Hearing challenges to issues which the agency cannot resolvemay unduly prolong and complicate administrative proceedings. We see nogood reason to require that parties raise facial constitutional challengesbefore agencies which lack the power to resolve the issue. The law shouldnot require one to perform useless and futile acts. See e.g. Watts v.Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839 , 848 (6th 1988); Key Haven v. Board of Trustees ofInternal Improvm't Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153 , 157 (Fla. 1982); Duncan v.Missouri Bd. for Architects, 744 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1988); Johnson v.Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123 , 127 (N.D. 1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of RockyRiver, 309 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio 1974). If a party in a contested case proceeding petitions an agency fora declaratory order, the agency should determine those issues which arewithin the scope of its authority or refuse to issue an order. The party mayseek judicial review of the resolved issues and of those issues that theagency refused or was without authority to consider. In either circumstance, 20 the party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute regardless ofwhether it was raised at the agency level. (2) Unconstitutional Application of a Statute or Rule A party's challenge to the application of a statute or theconstitutionality of an agency rule may initially be considered anddetermined by the agency. This comports with the principles of judicialeconomy and allows correction of errors at the initial hearing level. Notwithstanding these important policy considerations, thelegislature specifically authorizes the chancery court to reverse or modifythe agency decision if the party's rights have been prejudiced by a violationof constitutional or statutory provisions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(1)(1991 Repl. & 1995 Supp.). This supports a conclusion that theissues need not be raised during the agency proceeding. In addition,practical considerations convince us that the failure to raise a constitutionalchallenge during an agency proceeding should not preclude the chancerycourt's consideration. First, agencies employ diverse procedures withvarying degrees of formality. An administrative judge or hearing officermay, with the agreement of the parties, conduct all or part of the hearing bytelephone, television, or other electronic means. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-312 (1991 Repl.). The party charged may or may not be represented bycounsel. In some instances, the fact that an agency has exceeded itsauthority may not be apparent until the agency has issued its final order.See Pharr v. Nashville C. and St. L. Ry., 208 S.W.2d 1013 (Tenn.1948)(order requiring railroad to move tracks violates separation of 21 powers). To prohibit a party from raising constitutional issues in thechancery court which were not addressed at the agency level could preventan aggrieved party from having a full and fair judicial hearing on an allegedclear violation of a constitutional right. Secondly, administrative agencies may be ill-equipped to ruleon constitutional issues. Although agency personnel have considerableexpertise on the subject matter which the legislature has delegated to theagency, board members and other agency fact-finders are less likely to havetraining in constitutional law sufficient to enable an appropriate resolutionof the issues. Finally, the importance of correctly resolving constitutionalissues suggests that constitutional issues should rarely be foreclosed byprocedural technicalities. Veach v. State, 491 S.W.2d 81 , 83 (Tenn. 1973).Certainly, issues of constitutionality should not first surface on appeal, seeLawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927 , 929 (Tenn. 1968), but thesignificant procedural and substantive differences between chancery courtreview of an agency decision under the Administrative Procedure Act andappeals from final judgments of trial courts under Rule 3, Tennessee Rulesof Appellate Procedure requires a more flexible approach in the former. Based on the plain language of the Administrative ProceduresAct and the policy and practical principles discussed above, we hold that thefailure to contest the constitutionality of a statute as applied or theconstitutionality of an agency rule does not prevent a party from raising 22 those issues upon judicial review. However, we note that in most instances,a party may save considerable time and expense by raising the issue througha declaratory order proceeding or other appropriate pleading. (3) Constitutional Challenges to Agency Procedure Constitutional challenges to agency procedure may includeissues such as the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,and the right to procedural due process. See England v. Civil ServiceCommission, 617 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. ), cert. denied, (Tenn.1981)(privilege against self-incrimination). Objection at the agency level willallow incorrect procedures to be eliminated thereby saving time and expensefor the parties. Nonetheless, the legislature clearly intended to allowprocedural irregularities in contested case hearings to be addressed for thefirst time on judicial review. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(3)(1991 Repl.& 1995 Repl.). Review at the chancery court level ensures thatconstitutional issues are addressed by law-trained judges with the legalknowledge to resolve the issues. In summation, although an agency has no authority todetermine the constitutionality of a statute, an agency may rule onconstitutional challenges to the application of a statute, to a rule, and toprocedures used in a contested case proceeding. Nevertheless, the failure toraise these constitutional issues before the agency will not preclude a partyin a contested case from raising the issue for the first time upon judicialreview. 23 Parties to contested case proceedings may challenge theconstitutionality of a statute or a rule, either facially or as applied, byseeking a declaratory order from the agency pursuant to Tennessee CodeAnnotated Section 4-5-223. If the agency refuses to rule on the issue, as itmust if the challenge is to the facial constitutionality of a statute, then theparty may petition the chancery court for a declaratory judgment pursuant toSection 4-5-224. If the agency issues a declaratory order, an aggrievedparty may seek judicial review of the order in the Davidson CountyChancery Court pursuant to Section 4-5-322. A final judgment of thechancery court may be appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-323 (1991 Repl.). Parties may also raise constitutional issues through the judicialreview of a final agency order or, when appropriate, through the review ofan interlocutory order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (1991 Repl. & 1995Supp.). During chancery court review of a final agency order, parties mayraise constitutional challenges to statutes or rules, challenges to theapplication of statutes or rules, and challenges to agency procedures,regardless of whether the issue was raised at the agency level. The chancerycourt may take further evidence or may order the agency to take the proofrequired in appropriate cases. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(e), (g)(1991Repl. & 1995 Supp.). Once again, parties may appeal to the Court ofAppeals from the final order of the chancery court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-323 (1991 Repl.). C 24 Having defined the scope of an agency's limited authority toresolve constitutional issues and of the chancery court's broad powers toconsider those issues either in a petition for declaratory order or uponjudicial review, we must now apply those principles to the facts in this case.In doing so, we conclude that both the Davidson County Chancery Courtand the Board of Dentistry's fact-finding tribunals conformed to theprinciples delineated above. Richardson petitioned the Board for a declaratory order onAugust 6, 1990, approximately six weeks before the scheduled hearing date.He raised broad constitutional challenges to the facial validity of TennesseeCode Annotated Section 63-1-134 and agency rule 0460-14-1.04. Thegravamen of his constitutional issues was the agency's lack of authority toact. Since Richardson was charged with conduct that was made criminal bystatute, he contended that an agency determination of his "guilt" wouldviolate the principles of separation of power and due process. In addition,Richardson challenged whether the statute or rule applied to him, anunlicensed citizen. The Board refused to address the constitutional issues findingthat it was not authorized to resolve them. It did issue a declaratory order,however, stating that Section 63-1-134 applied to persons who should belicensed as well as those who are licensed and that civil penalties could beassessed against Richardson if the allegations were proven. Richardsonpetitioned for judicial review in the Chancery Court once again raising his 25 constitutional challenges to the agency's authority and to the application ofthe statute and rule to unlicensed persons.9 In the first case before it on judicial review, the Chancery Courtaddressed all of the issues raised in the petition including thoseconstitutional issues not resolved by the agency. The chancellor's actionswere proper. The administrative agency was not authorized to declare thechallenged statute unconstitutional. If the chancellor was prohibited fromdetermining the constitutionality of the statute as the Court of Appeals held,the party challenging the statute would have no available forum in which toraise the issue.10 The parties in this case briefed and argued the constitutionalissues. The chancellor stated the issue as "whether the order of the Board isin violation of constitutional provisions, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or inexcess of statutory authority." In the Memorandum and Order enteredJanuary 3, 1992, the chancellor found that: The statute authorizes the Board of Dentistry to assess a civil penalty against a person who should be, but is not, licensed by the Board.9 Richardson contended that Section 63-1-134 was unconstitutional on its face. Specifically, he alleged a violation of Article I, Section 8, Article II, Section 1, and Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution, due process under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the right to trial by jury under the 6th Amendment. In addition, he argued that Sections 63-1-134, 63-5-107 and 121 were void for vagueness and consequently, violative of due process. 10 We are aware of the holding in Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 , 387 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1983), in which the Court of Appeals held that a chancery court could not hear an action for declaratory judgment simultaneously with one brought as a petition for writ of certiorari. Goodwin does not apply in this instance, however, because petitioner was seeking review under Section 4-5- 322 of the Administrative Procedures Act which specifically gives a chancery court the authority to consider constitutional challenges to agency action. 26 The State is pursuing only civil remedies at this time, so the Court finds no constitutional violations. Since the statute authorizes the Board to assess a civil penalty against an unlicensed person, the Board's order is not arbitrary, capricious, illegal or in excess of statutory authority. Implicit in the chancellor's order is the holding that the mattersbefore the Board were civil and not criminal in nature and, therefore, theBoard was not acting in violation of any constitutional provisions orexceeding its statutory authority. The nature of this appeal does not requireus to determine whether those findings were correct. Rather, we areconcerned with whether that chancery court order was a final one, and, if so,whether certain determinations now form the basis for a res judicata orcollateral estoppel defense. The term "res judicata" is defined as a "[r]ule that a finaljudgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits isconclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them,constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,demand or cause of action . . . . [T]o be applicable, it requires identity ofcause of action, or person and parties to action, and of quality in persons foror against whom claim is made." Black's Law Dictionary 1172 (5th ed.1979)(citations omitted). We have recently discussed the doctrine and itsrelated counterpart, collateral estoppel, as follows: The doctrine of res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the 27 former suit. Collateral estoppel operates to bar a second suit between the same parties and their privies on a different cause of action only as to issues which were actually litigated and determined in the former suit.Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347 , 349 (Tenn. 1989)(quoting fromMassengil v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629 , 631 (Tenn. 1987)). Res judicata andcollateral estoppel apply only if the prior judgment concludes the rights ofthe parties on the merits. A. L. Kornman Co. v. Metropolitan Gov't ofNashville & Davidson County, 391 S.W.2d 633 , 636 (Tenn. 1965). Onedefending on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel mustdemonstrate that 1) the judgment in the prior case was final and concludedthe rights of the party against whom the defense is asserted, and 2) bothcases involve the same parties, the same cause of action, or identical issues.Scales v. Scales, 564 S.W.2d 667 , 670 (Tenn. App. 1977), cert. denied,(Tenn. 1978). Both of these conditions are met in this case.11 Most cases interpreting what is meant by the term "finaljudgment" arise in the context of a Rule 3 appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3. InTennessee, a judgment is final "when it decides and disposes of the wholemerits of the case leaving nothing for the further judgment of the court."Saunders v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 38311 As noted in the quotation from Massengil, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are very similar. Res judicata bars litigation if a second suit involves the same parties and the same cause of action that was determined in the first action. Collateral estoppel prevents identical parties from relitigating in a different action issues determined in a previous suit. Massengil v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629 , 631 (Tenn. 1987) In this case, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues determined in the previous chancery suit between these identical parties. However, res judicata is often used to mean "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided." Black's Law Dictionary 1174 (5th ed. 1979). It is in this general sense that the term is used in this opinion. 28 S.W.2d 28 , 31 (Tenn. 1964). An order denying a motion for summary judgment, for example, is not a final judgment because the entire suit remains for disposition. C.O. Christian & Sons Co., Inc. v. Nashville P.S. Hotel, Ltd. & Condel Const'n Co., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 754 , 756 (Tenn. App. 1988), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1989)(quoting from In Re Estate of McCord, 661 S.W.2d 890 , 891 (Tenn. App. 1983)). Likewise, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not end a lawsuit or constitute a final judgment. Id. The chancellor's January 3, 1992, Memorandum and Order was the final judgment in the initial chancery proceedings. It conclusively determined all issues before the Chancery Court on their merits and left nothing for further judgment of that court. Just as the agency's declaratory order was a final order subject to judicial review in the Chancery Court, the Chancery Court's Memorandum and Order was a final order subject to appeal under Section 4-5-323. The judicial review of the agency decision was not a continuation of the agency proceeding, but was an original judicial review proceeding under Section 4-5-323 subject to review by the appellate courts.12 Richardson made various efforts to appeal the Chancery Court judgment but failed to comply with the appellate procedure specified in Section 4-5-323. That section provides: 12 We agree that the wording of the order was infelicitous in that it finds no constitutional violations "at this time." However, those words are mere surplusage and in no way affect the finality of the Chancery Court's decision on the claims the parties had brought before it. 29 (a) An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the chancery court under this chapter by appeal to the court of appeals of Tennessee. (b) The record certified to the chancery court and the record in the chancery court shall constitute the record in an appeal. Evidence taken in court pursuant to § 4-5-322(g) shall become a part of the record. (c) The procedure on appeal shall be governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-323 (1991 Repl.). Richardson did not comply withany of those requirements, and, therefore, the Chancery Court'sMemorandum and Order is a final adjudication of the case. The parties and the issues in the second Chancery Courtproceeding, with one single exception, were identical to those in the firstproceeding. The single nonidentical issue was raised in Richardson'samendment to his Motion to Dismiss which was filed several months afterthe original Chancery Court judgment. That amendment contested theBoard's authority to act under Article VI, Section 4 of the TennesseeConstitution and under the principles enunciated in State ex el. v. Town ofSouth Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1990). Theadministrative law judge denied the motion and granted the state's Motion toCompel and Motion in Limine based on the agency's position that it wasseeking only civil penalties. Richardson filed a Petition for Review in the Chancery Courtraising the same constitutional issues he had raised in the first chanceryproceeding, and additionally, the constitutional challenge based on Town of 30 South Carthage. He also challenged the ruling on the state's Motion toCompel asserting that it deprived him of his privilege against self-incrimination. The state argues that the "new" Town of South Carthagechallenge to the agency's authority is not "new" at all. We agree.Richardson has contended from the outset that the Board has no authority tointerpret or enforce criminal statutes. In its final order in the firstproceeding, the Chancery Court held that the Board of Dentistry wasseeking only civil, and not criminal remedies, a procedure clearly within itsauthority. The fact that Richardson has identified another argument tosupport his constitutional challenge does not alter the fact that the issue wasresolved in the first chancery proceeding. Between these parties, theresolution is final. In the Memorandum and Order issued in the second suit, thechancellor wrote: In an earlier interlocutory13 proceeding in this same matter, Docket No. 91-636-II, the petitioner sought relief from a declaratory order of the Board which held that he could be assessed these "civil penalties." In that appeal, the petitioner made the same arguments he has made in this appeal; basically that the statute he is charged with violating are criminal statutes and he13 The trial court erred in referring to the first review as an interlocutory proceeding. The statutes allowing a petition for a declaratory order at the agency level are not part of the contested case procedures. In fact, when an affected person (not party) petitions an agency for a declaratory order "as to the validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency, the agency must convene a contested case hearing pursuant to the provisions of [the] chapter." Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223(a)(1) (1991 Supp.). The agency's declaratory order was a final agency decision in a contested case proceeding. 31 is entitled to Fifth Amendment Constitutional protection and the Board lacks Constitutional authority to conduct this hearing and enforce the statute. By Memorandum and Order entered January 3, 1992 in that matter, this Court concluded that this was not a criminal prosecution and it has not yet changed its mind. The chancellor's first Memorandum and Order was a finalorder. The parties were identical, the issues, save one, were the same.Richardson failed to perfect an appeal from the chancellor's Memorandumand Order. The judgment is final. The Court of Appeals erred in holdingthat the constitutional challenges to agency authority were coram nonjudice. With the exception of one issue, we are barred from consideration ofthe constitutional issues. III The single constitutional issue presented in the secondchancery proceeding was whether Richardson's privilege against self-incrimination would be violated if he was compelled to answerincriminating Requests for Admission. The Board's order refused torecognize the privilege in the contested case proceeding because the statuteof limitations had expired on any potential criminal violations. The orderrecited that if the criminal violations remained viable, the decision mighthave been different. The Chancery Court's Order affirming the Board actiondid not address the self-incrimination issue. The Court of Appeals' opiniondismissing the charges deemed a discussion of the issue "unnecessary."Because this matter will be remanded for further proceedings in which theprivilege may again be asserted, we will address the issue. 32 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution andArticle I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution of the State of Tennesseeguarantee that those accused of crimes may not be compelled to testify orgive evidence against themselves. U. S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. Art.I § 9. The scope of the privilege is comprehensive; Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 47 (1967), its availability is not dependent upon the type ofproceeding in which the protection is invoked but on the nature of thetestimony. The privilege protects any disclosures which a witness mightreasonably believe would be used in a criminal prosecution or which couldlead to other evidence that might be so used. Murphy v. WaterfrontCommission, 378 U.S. 52 , 94 (1964); State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, 612 S.W.2d 454 , 459 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981). "The privilegecan be claimed in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative orjudicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 , 94 (1964); See In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 , 102 (Tenn.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1983); State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech,612 S.W.2d at 459. Although the privilege is available in a civil suit, itdoes not protect witnesses in circumstances in which the answer maysubject them only to civil liabilities. Zollicoffer v. Turney, 14 Tenn. (1Yer.) 297, 300-301 (1834); Cook v. Corn, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 340, 341(1808) Hence, the privilege is not available to Richardson. The Noticeof Charges alleges that Richardson's violations as occurred between March 33 15, 1990 and June 8, 1990. The violations alleged are of provisions of thechapter establishing and regulating the Division of Health Related Boardand are Class B misdemeanors. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-1-123(a), 63-5-128(a)(1990 Repl. & 1995 Supp.). The statute of limitations for theprosecution of misdemeanors is twelve months. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-102 (1990 Repl.) If reasonable grounds existed to believe that compellingRichardson's testimony would lead to a criminal prosecution, Richardsoncould assert the privilege against self-incrimination in the administrativeproceeding. However, since any criminal prosecution on these charges isbarred by the statute of limitations, the privilege against self-incriminationmay not be successfully asserted to avoid responding to the discoveryrequests or otherwise in the proceedings before the Board of Dentistry. Conclusion An administrative agency has no authority to resolve facialchallenges to the constitutionality of a statute. An agency may rule on theconstitutionality of its own rules and procedures and the applicability of astatute to a particular case. The Chancery Court, on judicial review or in adeclaratory judgment action, may consider constitutional issues arising asthe result of a contested case proceeding even though the issues were notraised in the agency or, if raised, were not addressed. Here, the Chancery Court did not err by addressingRichardson's constitutional challenges to the agency's authority in its 34 Memorandum and Order in the first chancery proceeding. Since Richardsonfailed to perfect an appeal of that decision to the Court of Appeals, thechancellor's rulings are final. Richardson is precluded by the doctrine ofcollateral estoppel from relitigating those issues. We, therefore, do notaddress the merits of the constitutional challenges. As to the only remainingissue, we hold that while the privilege against self-incrimination is viable inadministrative proceedings, the circumstances of this case make itinapplicable and unavailable to Richardson on the present charges. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case isremanded to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ___________________________________ Penny J. White, JusticeCONCUR:Anderson, C.J. Drowota, Reid, Birch, J.J. 35