Title: Commonwealth v. Keown

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10593 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES KEOWN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 10, 2017. - October 23, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable 
cause.  Search and Seizure, Computer, Warrant, Affidavit, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Evidence, Information 
stored on computer, Relevancy and materiality, Inflammatory 
evidence, Prior misconduct, Hearsay, State of mind, Motive.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury.  Dangerous 
Weapon. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 3, 2005. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Sandra 
L. Hamlin, J., and the case was tried before her. 
 
 
 
Claudia L. Bolgen for the defendant. 
 
Jamie M. Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eoghan Casey, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Gregory T. Nojeim, of the District of Columbia, & Andrew 
Crocker & Stephanie Lacambra, of California, & Donald S. 
Bronstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Chauncey B. 
Wood, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, Alexis L. Shapiro, & 
Margaret L. Sullivan, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation for 
poisoning his wife, Julie Keown.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that (1) the trial judge erred in denying a motion to 
suppress certain computer evidence because the warrant used to 
obtain the evidence was defective; (2) the trial judge abused 
her discretion in declining to exclude evidence related to the 
defendant's computer username and Internet search results, the 
defendant's prior bad acts, and the victim's statements and 
electronic mail (e-mail) messages; (3) the prosecutor's closing 
argument was improper; and (4) the trial judge's instruction to 
the jury on the inference of malice lowered the Commonwealth's 
burden of proof.  We affirm the defendant's conviction and 
decline to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.1 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that could have been 
found by the jury and reserve certain details for the discussion 
of the issues.  On September 4, 2004, the defendant took his 
wife, the victim, to Newton-Wellesley Hospital (hospital), where 
she lapsed into a coma from which she would never recover.  The 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, the Center for Democracy & Technology, and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation; and the amicus brief of 
Professor Eoghan Casey. 
3 
 
 
victim died on September 8 after being removed from life 
support.  The medical examiner concluded that the cause of death 
was both acute and chronic ethylene glycol (EG) poisoning.  EG 
is a transparent liquid that is used in a variety of different 
solvents, including antifreeze. 
 
The victim and the defendant were college sweethearts who 
had been married for seven and one-half years when they moved to 
Waltham from Missouri in January, 2004.  The couple's move was 
prompted by the defendant falsely telling his wife and his 
employer that he had been accepted into Harvard Business School.  
Based on this misrepresentation, the employer, a consulting firm 
for nonprofit organizations, permitted him to move to 
Massachusetts and work remotely while he attended classes.  The 
victim, a registered nurse, also reached an agreement with her 
employer, a health-related software design firm, to allow her to 
work remotely. 
 
The victim first showed signs of illness in May, 2004.  At 
the end of July -- after weeks of flu-like symptoms, diarrhea, 
nausea, and malaise -- she visited a doctor.  The doctor 
prescribed a medication for gastroesophageal reflux disease, 
which did not alleviate her symptoms.  In early August, the 
victim visited an urgent care facility, where she was diagnosed 
with gastritis and continued on the same medication. 
 
The victim's condition continued to deteriorate, and on 
4 
 
 
August 20, 2004, she awoke with slurred speech, an inability to 
walk, and dizziness.  She went to the hospital with the 
defendant.  The doctors at the hospital observed that the victim 
displayed signs of neurological impairment as well as abnormal 
kidney function.  The doctors did not diagnose EG poisoning at 
this time but concluded that poisoning of some sort was the 
likely explanation.  During her stay, a doctor asked the victim 
if she felt safe at home, to which she responded, "Yes, 
absolutely."  Shortly after the victim's discharge on August 23, 
her parents came for a three-day visit and the group of four 
drove up to Maine.  During the drive, Julie told her mother that 
the doctors at the hospital had asked her repeatedly, "Are you 
sure your husband isn't giving you something?"  The victim 
laughed when recounting this for her mother and said she thought 
the questions were "completely ridiculous."  When asked by the 
victim about these questions on the drive, the defendant said he 
had been "really getting annoyed" that the doctors kept asking 
whether the victim had been "getting some kind of poison." 
 
On the morning of September 4, 2004, the defendant spoke on 
the telephone with an on-duty doctor at the hospital about the 
victim's condition.  The defendant told the doctor that the 
victim was confused, had difficulty walking, and had garbled 
speech.  The doctor told the defendant that the victim should be 
brought back to the hospital immediately, but the defendant did 
5 
 
 
not take the victim to the hospital until after 9 P.M. that 
night.  By the time the victim was seen by a physician she was 
unconscious.  The victim died four days later. 
 
During the victim's hospitalization, a doctor had asked the 
defendant whether the victim had been swallowing tablets or 
liquids and whether she was suicidal, which are routine 
questions in cases that involve toxicity.  The defendant said 
that he had not found anything at home indicating that the 
victim had swallowed something and that she was not suicidal.  
When the doctor asked him why he had not immediately taken the 
victim to the emergency room following his morning telephone 
conversation with the doctor on September 4, the defendant said 
that the victim had refused.  However, in the waiting room of 
the intensive care unit while the victim was still alive, the 
defendant told the victim's mother that the victim may have 
accidentally consumed a bottle of antifreeze while on a walk.  
The defendant also told this story on September 7 to a State 
police trooper, who had become involved after the victim's 
mother reported to the police that the victim was suffering from 
EG poisoning.  The defendant further informed police that the 
victim was "talking about death" and had recently purchased 
chloroform on the Internet.  In addition to these inconsistent 
explanations, the defendant, also on September 7, questioned a 
medical student assigned to the victim's case about the 
6 
 
 
"hospital's role . . . in determining cause of death" and, if 
ruled an accidental death, whether that would be "the end of the 
case."  On that same day, the defendant allowed Waltham police 
officers to conduct a search of his residence.  The search did 
not turn up any EG. 
 
Not long after the victim's death, the defendant abandoned 
his home in Massachusetts, without informing his landlord, and 
moved back to Missouri at some point in late 2004.  He left many 
personal effects and computer equipment behind but brought a 
Sony VAIO laptop computer (laptop computer) with him.  The 
defendant remained in Missouri until he was arrested in 
November, 2005. 
 
Following the arrest, the defendant's mother obtained the 
laptop computer and mailed it to the defendant's attorney in 
Massachusetts.  A warrant was issued that authorized the 
examination of the contents of the laptop computer.  The search, 
which was performed by a computer forensics investigator, 
yielded important evidence in the Commonwealth's case against 
the defendant.  Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
evidence from the search of the laptop computer.  The trial 
judge denied this motion. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant had 
poisoned his wife to hide from her the fact that the couple was 
on the edge of financial ruin and to reap the benefits of her 
7 
 
 
life insurance policy.  In support of this theory, the 
Commonwealth introduced evidence that the defendant had 
embezzled from his employer and forged his admissions letter to 
Harvard Business School.  The employer discovered these frauds 
in July, 2004, and promptly fired the defendant.  Financial 
records from the end of August, 2004, also introduced in 
evidence, tended to show that the couple's finances were nearly 
depleted.  In addition, evidence of the victim's e-mail messages 
sent to friends and acquaintances shortly before her final 
admission to the hospital supported a conclusion that the victim 
was not aware that the defendant had been fired, that he had 
never attended Harvard Business School,2 and that they had 
virtually no money left. 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced the following:  evidence 
that a number of searches had been conducted on the laptop 
computer while the victim was still alive for queries such as 
"antifreeze death human" and "poison recipe"; evidence that the 
taste of EG can be masked by putting it in Gatorade and the 
defendant had been insistent that the victim drink Gatorade in 
the days and weeks before her death; and testimony by the 
medical examiner that the victim's symptoms throughout the 
summer suggested that she had been given small doses of EG over 
                                                          
 
 
2 The defendant took one class at Harvard University 
Extension School in the spring of 2004. 
8 
 
 
a length of time and then a lethal dose prior to her final 
admission to the hospital.  The medical examiner further 
testified that the victim's manner of death was inconsistent 
with suicide. 
 
The defendant's position at trial was that the victim's 
death was the result of either an accident or suicide.  The 
defendant further argued that the victim was aware of the 
defendant's deceits, in order to rebut the Commonwealth's theory 
of motive, namely, that the defendant killed the victim so she 
would not discover his web of lies.  The primary evidence 
offered of the victim's knowledge of the defendant's lies was 
that she told some people her husband was at Harvard University 
to finish his bachelor's degree, and others that he was at 
Harvard Business School.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The defendant's appeal from his conviction is 
before us pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Discussion.  1.  The laptop computer warrant.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant brought a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained from the search of the laptop computer as well as an 
additional hard drive.3  That motion was denied and information 
found during a search of the laptop computer was used at trial.  
                                                          
 
 
3 For ease of reference we refer to both devices 
collectively as the "laptop computer." 
9 
 
 
The defendant renews his challenge to the search on three 
grounds:  (1) the search warrant affidavit did not establish 
probable cause for the search; (2) the warrant failed to 
describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity; 
and (3) the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner.4  We 
conclude that the affidavit in this case established probable 
cause to search the laptop computer for evidence relating to the 
victim's death, the warrant described the items to be searched 
with sufficient particularity, and the search was conducted 
reasonably. 
 
a.  Probable cause.  The general principles governing our 
consideration of a claim that probable cause to support a search 
warrant is lacking are well known.  "Under the Fourth Amendment 
[to the United States Constitution] and art. 14 [of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], a search warrant may issue 
only on a showing of probable cause."  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 
451 Mass. 59, 68 (2008).  "The probable cause necessary to 
support the issuance of a search warrant does not require 
definitive proof of criminal activity."  Id. at 69.  The 
probable cause inquiry is limited to the "four corners of the 
affidavit," Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant does not squarely raise an argument on 
reasonableness grounds on appeal, but we analyze the issue 
nonetheless. 
10 
 
 
(1995), but a magistrate may also consider "[a]ll reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn from the information in the 
affidavit."  Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 501 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  In 
addition, "[a]n affidavit must contain enough information for an 
issuing magistrate to determine that the items sought are 
related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that 
they reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched at the time the search warrant issues."  Commonwealth 
v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 767, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 910 
(2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  Search warrants should not 
be "subjected to hypercritical analysis," but rather should be 
"interpreted in a realistic and commonsense manner." Anthony, 
supra at 69, quoting Donahue, supra.  "Importantly, '[w]e give 
considerable deference to a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause.'"  Dorelas, supra, quoting McDermott, supra. 
 
The defendant's probable cause argument focuses on a 
supposed insufficient nexus between the suspected criminal 
activity (murder) and the items sought (the laptop computer).5  
                                                          
 
 
5 The defendant also argues that the judge used the wrong 
test to evaluate probable cause.  The defendant is correct that, 
in addition to the traditional probable cause rubric, the judge 
employed the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which is typically used to 
determine probable cause when an unnamed informant is involved.  
See generally Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); 
11 
 
 
We disagree. 
 
Nexus between the crime and the items sought "may be found 
in 'the type of crime, the nature of the . . . items [sought], 
the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and 
normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide 
[items of the sort sought].'"  Anthony, 451 Mass. at 70, quoting 
Cinelli, 389 Mass. at 213. 
 
Here, the affidavit drew sufficient nexus between the 
suspected criminal activity and the items sought by the warrant.  
First, the affidavit established the defendant's sophistication 
with computers by noting he had been employed as a Web designer.  
The affidavit also established that the defendant had forged 
contracts and documents from Harvard Business School, based on 
the affiant's conversation with the defendant's former boss.  
One could reasonably infer that he created these forgeries by 
using a computer.  See Donahue, 430 Mass. at 712.  Second, these 
forgeries relate specifically to the motive alleged in the 
affidavit:  that the defendant had been lying to his wife about 
his accomplishments and their finances and killed her to prevent 
her from finding out about these deceits and to obtain her life 
insurance benefits.  Third, the affidavit specified that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-375 (1985).  That the judge added an 
additional -- albeit unnecessary -- layer of analysis to her 
nearly 120-page ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress 
does not undermine her resolution of the probable cause issue. 
12 
 
 
victim had died from EG poisoning, which the affiant noted, 
based on his nearly twenty years of investigatory experience, 
would likely have involved research that a computer savvy person 
like the defendant would have conducted online in 2004.  
Accordingly, the connection between the search of the computer 
and the suspected criminal activity was sufficient.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 591-592 (2016) (no nexus 
between criminal activity of armed robbery and shooting 
suspect's cellular telephone where only connection made in 
affidavit was affiant's assertion, based on his experience, 
"that, given the type of crime under investigation, the device 
likely would contain evidence"). 
 
b.  Particularity.  Under the Fourth Amendment, warrants 
must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized."  Article 14 requires warrants 
to be "accompanied with a special designation of the persons or 
objects of search, arrest, or seizure."  This particularity 
requirement "both defines and limits the scope of the search and 
seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, 
which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance."  
Preventive Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 
830 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 8 
(2002).  Searches of the "many files" on electronic devices, 
such as computers and smart cellular telephones, "must be done 
13 
 
 
with special care and satisfy a more narrow and demanding 
standard" than searches conducted in the physical world.  
Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502. 
 
The defendant claims that the warrant for the laptop 
computer lacked particularity in general, and also was an 
impermissible general warrant because it contained a 
typographical error and lacked an articulated search protocol.  
We disagree. 
 
The warrant adequately described the items to be searched 
with sufficient particularity.  The scope of the search 
authorized by the warrant included electronic files on the 
laptop computer related to the health or death of the victim; 
other prominent poisoning cases; EG or other poisons; and the 
financial records, life insurance plans, and wills of the victim 
and the defendant.  As discussed supra, the affidavit 
accompanying the warrant established probable cause to search 
for evidence on the laptop computer relating to the defendant's 
role in his wife's death.  These categories of evidence were 
related to the means of committing the crime and the motive of 
the defendant, and provided sufficient guidance to the examiners 
so that they were not on a fishing expedition.  See McDermott, 
448 Mass. at 770. 
 
The typographical error in the affidavit identified by the 
defendant does not change our conclusion about the affidavit's 
14 
 
 
adequate particularity.  As written, the affidavit requested the 
authority to search the laptop computer for Internet-activity-
related "computer files of the type described in Paragraph 2 of 
this affidavit."  Paragraph 2 simply described the items to be 
searched (i.e., the laptop computer).  It was obvious that this 
incongruous and nonsensical cross reference was the result of a 
typographical error, and any reasonable magistrate would have 
recognized that fact.  "[M]inisterial errors do not nullify 
search warrants."  Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 4 
(2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 405 Mass. 86, 88, 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989).6 
 
Nor does the absence of search protocols mean the warrant 
lacked particularity for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14.  This court has specifically declined to require search 
protocols in the past.  McDermott, 448 Mass. at 776 ("Advance 
approval for the particular methods to be used in the forensic 
examination of the computers and disks is not necessary").  
However, the proliferation of technology over the ten years 
since we decided McDermott and the eleven years since the search 
                                                          
 
 
6 The obviousness that this was a typographical error was 
confirmed by the affiant's testimony that instead of referring 
to the paragraph describing the items to be searched, the cross 
reference should have been to paragraphs pertaining to the 
victim's health, EG, and financial records.  The motion judge 
credited this testimony, and also credited the affiant's 
testimony that the search was actually conducted in accordance 
with the correct parameters. 
15 
 
 
warrant in this case was executed has heightened the concern 
regarding searches of electronic devices.  See Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-2490 (2014).  We recognized 
this concern in Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502 ("more narrow and 
demanding standard" required for searches of electronic 
devices).  We have further expressed concern about the lack of 
formal guidelines in the Commonwealth for executing search 
warrants for digital evidence, Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 
388, 398-399 (2017), but noted that the Attorney General's 
existing digital evidence guide is helpful.7  If the Commonwealth 
were to offer such guidelines in its warrant applications, it 
would certainly help address particularization and 
reasonableness concerns.  Cf. Kerr, Executing Warrants for 
Digital Evidence:  The Case for Use Restrictions on 
Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2015) ("The 
best way to minimize the unwarranted intrusions upon privacy for 
computer searches is to impose use restrictions on the 
nonresponsive data revealed in the course of the search").  
While recognizing that the searches of electronic devices 
present major constitutional hazards, see Riley, supra, in the 
context of this case, where the search was conducted reasonably 
                                                          
 
 
7 See Office of the Attorney General, Massachusetts Digital 
Evidence Guide (June 9, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs 
/cybercrime/ma-digital-evidence-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/WN9C-NJNY]. 
16 
 
 
(see discussion infra), and took place more than a decade ago in 
an entirely different technological landscape, we do not 
conclude that the laptop computer warrant lacked particularity 
because it did not include ex ante search protocols.  See 
Molina, supra at 397; McDermott, supra. 
 
c.  Reasonableness.  Although not squarely raised in the 
defendant's brief, we conclude that the search was conducted 
reasonably.  The manner of the execution of a search warrant 
must "satisfy the 'ultimate touchstone' of reasonableness." 
Molina, 476 Mass. at 397, citing Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 
Mass. 205, 213 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).  
Here, the examiners used a list of fifty search terms that was 
supplemented along the way by nineteen additional terms.  While 
these search terms were not part of the warrant application, 
they are squarely related to the categories of evidence that 
were articulated in the affidavit.8  Lastly, the examiner only 
looked closely at approximately 325 files of the nearly 400,000 
found on the laptop computer.  We are satisfied that the search 
was conducted in a reasonable manner. 
 
In sum, the warrant authorizing the search of the laptop 
computer adequately established probable cause, was sufficiently 
particularized, and was executed reasonably. 
                                                          
 
 
8 As an example, the search terms included murder, death 
benefit, antifreeze, and widower, along with a number of names 
of potential poisons. 
17 
 
 
 
2.  Motions in limine.  Prior to trial, the defendant filed 
several motions in limine arguing that certain evidence should 
be excluded from trial.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
the judge abused her discretion in denying the motions relating 
to the following evidence, which was admitted at trial:  (a) the 
defendant's use of the computer username "Kaiser Soze"; (b) 
certain prior bad acts of the defendant; (c) the victim's 
statements and e-mail messages; and (d) incriminating searches 
performed on the laptop computer using the search engine Google 
(Google searches). 
 
"Whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect are 
matters entrusted to the trial judge's broad discretion and are 
not disturbed absent palpable error."  Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 
456 Mass. 182, 192 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 
Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001).9  An abuse of discretion occurs only 
where the judge makes "'a clear error of judgment in weighing' 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . , such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives."  
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
a.  "Kaiser Soze".  At trial, the judge permitted the 
                                                          
 
 
9 Prior bad act "evidence is inadmissible where its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant, even if not substantially outweighed by that 
risk."  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 n.27 (2014). 
18 
 
 
Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the defendant's use of the 
username "Kaiser Soze" on the laptop computer to show the 
defendant's possession, custody, and control of the device. 
Kaiser Soze is a fictional character from the 1995 crime film, 
"The Usual Suspects," who is a criminal mastermind and 
supposedly murdered his wife and some of his children rather 
than allow them to be kidnapped.  The Usual Suspects (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1995). 
 
The defendant argues that the decision to allow evidence of 
this name was an abuse of the judge's discretion because the 
name was unduly prejudicial and there was other, less 
inflammatory evidence showing the defendant's use of the laptop 
computer.10 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the 
"Kaiser Soze" evidence to be admitted at trial for the limited 
purpose of showing the defendant's possession, custody, and 
control of the laptop computer.  Although there may have been 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant also argues that the judge abused her 
discretion in admitting the "Kaiser Soze" evidence because she 
was not familiar with the motion picture and instead relied on 
her law clerks' and the prosecutor's descriptions of the 
character.  The defendant does not argue, however, that the 
prosecutor's description of the character to the judge during 
the motion hearing was inaccurate in any way.  Indeed, the 
defendant quotes this description in his brief to explain his 
theory of prejudice related to the use of the "Kaiser Soze" 
name.  Not watching the motion picture, and instead relying on 
an undisputed description of the Kaiser Soze character, was not 
an abuse of discretion. 
19 
 
 
other ways to show the use and control of the computer, it was 
the defendant who chose to use the name of a fictional criminal 
mastermind as his username.  Further, the evidence did not focus 
on who Kaiser Soze was, or what that name meant.  Instead, the 
only "Kaiser Soze" evidence admitted was that the name was used 
as the name of a wireless network on the defendant's work 
computer when he returned to Missouri following the victim's 
death, and that the name was a username on the laptop computer, 
under which a number of incriminating Google searches were 
performed.  In addition, the judge instructed the jury that the 
"Kaiser Soze" evidence was "admitted solely on the issue of the 
use and control of the computers."  The judge also repeated a 
version of this instruction after telling the jury that those 
familiar with the character Kaiser Soze could not describe the 
character to those unfamiliar with the film in response to a 
question from the jury.  "We presume that a jury understand and 
follow limiting instructions."  See Donahue, 430 Mass. at 718. 
 
b.  Prior bad acts.  At trial, the Commonwealth was allowed 
to present two instances of the defendant's prior misconduct to 
show his state of mind, motive, and intent, as well as give 
context to the victim's death.  These two prior bad acts 
involved the fraud and embezzlement that resulted in his 
termination from his employment and his forgery of documents and 
misrepresentations regarding his alleged admission to Harvard 
20 
 
 
Business School. 
 
"Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show a 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged 
crime, but may be admissible if relevant for other purposes such 
as common scheme, pattern of operation, identity, intent, or 
motive."  Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 550 (2017), 
citing Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 16 (2014).  Such 
evidence may also be used if relevant to the defendant's state 
of mind.  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 420 (2014).  
The judge must find that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs any undue prejudice to the defendant.  See Crayton, 
470 Mass. at 249 n.27.  "To be sufficiently probative the 
evidence must be connected with the facts of the case [and] not 
be too remote in time."  Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 
574 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 
(1994).  Further, prior bad acts may be admissible if they are 
"inextricably intertwined with the description of events . . . 
of the killing."  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 
(1982). 
 
The defendant argues that these acts should not have been 
admitted because "there was no nexus between the lies and the 
murder" and that they were too remote in time from the murder. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that there was a 
21 
 
 
clear connection between the lies and the murder.  The 
Commonwealth theorized that the defendant killed his wife to 
reap the financial benefit of the victim's life insurance policy 
and to conceal their dire financial status.  Under this theory, 
the lies that caused the defendant to lose his job -- and thus 
put him and the victim on the edge of financial ruin -- went 
directly to the defendant's motive, intent, and state of mind.  
The prior acts were also not too remote in time.  Some of the 
lies occurred in 2002 and 2003, but they were directly connected 
to the reason the defendant was fired from his job weeks before 
the victim's death. 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that 
the danger of undue prejudice from these prior acts did not 
outweigh their probative value.  Moreover, the judge 
specifically instructed the jury that they were not permitted to 
use these past events to decide that the defendant had a 
"criminal personality,"11 and the jury are presumed to have 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant argues that by referring specifically to 
"Harvard Business School" and the name of his employer in the 
final jury instruction, the judge impermissibly drew the jury's 
attention to the prior bad acts.  The defendant objected to this 
following the instructions, and the judge stated that she felt 
the instruction "would not have been intelligible to [the jury]" 
without referring to the two institutions.  The judge did not 
speak about specific conduct in her charge and instead referred 
to "certain conduct and acts of the defendant pertaining to the 
Harvard Business School [and his employer]."  This instruction 
was proper.  "A judge may state the evidence and discuss 
possible inferences to be drawn therefrom."  Commonwealth v. 
22 
 
 
followed the judge's instruction.  Donahue, 430 Mass. at 718. 
 
c.  Victim's statements and Internet browsing history.  The 
defendant argues that the admission of certain statements of the 
victim contained in e-mail messages, as well as the admission of 
the victim's Internet browsing history shortly before her death, 
was improper.  The defendant objected to the admission of this 
evidence at trial, so we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(c)(2) (2017).  If a statement is offered for any 
purpose other than for its truth, it is not hearsay.  See P.C. 
Giannelli, Understanding Evidence 446 (4th ed. 2013).  When 
determining whether a statement is offered for its truth, one 
must ask, "How is this statement relevant to the case?" 
 
The evidence in question, which will be outlined below, was 
introduced for two purposes:  (1) to show that the victim's 
state of mind was inconsistent with suicide; and (2) to evaluate 
the defendant's motive and state of mind.  The judge instructed 
the jury that they were to use the victim's statements -- other 
than those given to health care providers -- for these limited 
purposes. 
 
i.  Victim's state of mind inconsistent with suicide.  At 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 319 (1983). 
23 
 
 
trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence to show that the 
victim's state of mind was inconsistent with suicide.  This 
evidence included the following:  a spreadsheet found on the 
victim's laptop computer, last accessed on September 1, 2004, 
that listed questions relating to kidney disease and pregnancy 
options; the victim's Internet browsing history from September 
4, which showed that she was researching her illness and also 
visiting Web sites related to her doll-making hobby; and e-mail 
messages from the victim to friends and acquaintances sent over 
the course of the week leading up to her final hospitalization 
on September 4 in which she used phrases that showed that she 
had (or attempted to have) a positive outlook on her failing 
health.12  Because we conclude that these statements were 
properly admitted to show that the victim's state of mind was 
inconsistent with suicide, we do not reach the question of 
prejudice. 
 
"A murder victim's state of mind becomes a material issue 
if the defendant opens the door by claiming that the death was a 
suicide . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 Mass. 589, 594 
(1998).  The defendant argued in both his opening and closing 
statements that the victim may have ingested EG in an attempt to 
commit suicide, and thus opened the door to the admission of the 
                                                          
 
 
12 For example, the victim used the phrase "knock on wood" 
when she stated that the medication she was on was making her 
feel better. 
24 
 
 
victim's statements and Internet browsing history to show the 
victim's state of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 
Mass. 678, 697-698 (2001).  The victim's e-mail messages and 
searches on the Internet were not offered to prove the truth of 
the matters contained in these statements.  Rather, the 
statements were admissible to refute the defendant's theory that 
the victim committed suicide. 
 
The victim's e-mail messages, spreadsheet, and Internet 
browsing history "tended to disprove a suicide," id. at 698, as 
they could be understood to indicate that the victim was seeking 
a diagnosis and treatment for her condition, and engaged in 
activity that brought her pleasure, rather than trying to die.13  
The judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the victim's 
statements, not for their truth, but for the purpose of showing 
that her state of mind was inconsistent with suicide. 
 
ii.  Evaluating the defendant's motive and state of mind.  
On appeal, the defendant argues that three of the victim's 
statements contained in e-mail messages were improperly 
introduced to show the defendant's motive and state of mind.  
These statements are:  a January 20, 2004, message from the 
victim to the defendant that indicates she was unaware of his 
                                                          
 
 
13 The Commonwealth also presented direct evidence on the 
victim's state of mind in the form of testimony from two of her 
friends to the effect that the victim was happy and ready to 
battle her illness. 
25 
 
 
embezzlement from his employer; a September 3, 2004, message 
from the victim to an acquaintance where the victim describes 
the defendant as a "wonderful person" who was going to school 
and working full time; and a September 1, 2004, message from the 
victim to a friend that contained a statement of the victim that 
the defendant "keeps wanting me to drink Gatorade."14 
 
Out-of-court statements may be introduced to understand the 
defendant's motive by showing another's state of mind, including 
friendliness and knowledge, if such issues are material.  See 
Commonwealth v. Caldron, 383 Mass. 86, 91 (1981).  A murder 
victim's state of mind may be material to the defendant's 
motive, "but only if the defendant knew of the victim's state of 
mind and, most importantly, 'would be likely to respond to it.'"  
Magraw, 426 Mass. at 594, quoting Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 
Mass. 163, 167 (1997). 
 
Here, the judge stated in her final charge to the jury that 
one of the limited uses of the victim's statements was to 
"evaluat[e] the defendant's motive."  We conclude, however, that 
if this was error, it was not prejudicial.  The bulk of the 
                                                          
 
 
14 This statement was cumulative of other evidence:  the 
victim's mother recalled seeing a bottle of Gatorade in the 
victim and defendant's refrigerator and, more importantly, the 
victim's friend testified that during a telephone conversation 
with the victim in August, 2004, the defendant yelled to her in 
the background, "Tell Julie to drink her Gatorade," in an 
apparent attempt to get the friend to convince the victim to 
drink Gatorade.  Further, the evidence of the defendant's guilt 
was overwhelming. 
26 
 
 
complained-of statements were admitted in evidence for another 
permissible purpose (i.e., to show that the victim's state of 
mind was inconsistent with suicide), and their innocuous nature 
makes it unlikely that they would (or could) have been used 
improperly by the jury.  Contrast Magraw, 426 Mass. at 596-597 
(error to allow testimony that murder victim, who was 
defendant's wife, said that she feared she would be found dead 
in manner that made her death appear to be accident). 
 
d.  Google searches on the laptop computer.  The defendant 
argues, as he did in a motion in limine and at trial, that the 
judge improperly admitted evidence of a number of Google 
searches conducted on the laptop computer, because there was no 
concrete testimony about who conducted the searches and, thus, 
their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
 
The complained-of searches occurred prior to the victim's 
death and involved searches on poisons in general and also one 
for "antifreeze death human."  This latter search occurred on 
August 18, 2004.  There was no evidence offered on who conducted 
these searches as they all occurred under the username "JKeown," 
which could stand for either Julie or James Keown, and was 
another username on the laptop computer, aside from "Kaiser 
Soze." 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting 
27 
 
 
evidence of the Google searches that occurred on the laptop 
computer prior to the victim's death.  Evidence was presented 
that the victim only used laptop computers provided by her 
employer, and the defendant took the laptop computer with him 
when he returned to Missouri while leaving a number of other 
computers and possessions behind.  Although there was no direct 
evidence that the defendant conducted the incriminating 
searches, a jury could reasonably infer that it was the 
defendant who conducted the searches.  See Commonwealth v. 
Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 451 (2011); Commonwealth v. Vera, 88 Mass. 
App. Ct. 313, 317 n.3 (2015).  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 104(b), 901(b)(4).  The probative value of this evidence was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
3.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's closing argument was improper because the 
argument (a) used the victim's statements for their truth and 
(b) incorrectly attributed one of the incriminating searches on 
the laptop computer to the "Kaiser Soze" username.  The 
defendant raises these arguments for the first time on appeal, 
so we review these claims to determine whether there was a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 394 (2008). 
 
a.  Victim's statements.  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor made a number of references to statements contained 
28 
 
 
in the victim's e-mail messages sent in the days before she 
slipped into a coma.  The statements used by the prosecutor 
pertained to the victim's research of her medical condition, and 
her expressions of hope to friends and acquaintances.  At trial, 
evidence of the victim's statements was admitted for a 
permissible purpose.  See part 2.c, supra.  See also Magraw, 426 
Mass. at 594.  The prosecutor was plainly not reciting these 
statements for their truth, but rather to show that the victim's 
state of mind was inconsistent with suicide -- the very purpose 
for which the statements were admitted.  The prosecutor may 
argue for a conviction based on the evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).  There was no error. 
 
b.  Reference to "Kaiser Soze" username.  During his 
closing, the prosecutor referred to the "Kaiser Soze" username 
on the laptop computer five times over the course of two 
transcript pages.  These references incorrectly attributed a 
search for "ethylene glycol death human" that occurred on August 
18 to the "Kaiser Soze" username.  Prosecutors may not "misstate 
the evidence or refer to facts not in evidence."  Kozec, 399 
Mass. at 516.  "However, '[r]emarks made during closing 
arguments are considered in the context of the whole argument, 
the evidence admitted at trial, and the judge's instructions to 
the jury.'"  Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 703 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 680 (2013). 
29 
 
 
 
There were two errors regarding this reference.  First, the 
search was actually for "antifreeze death human."  The jury, 
however, had been educated that EG was commonly found in 
antifreeze.  This minor misstatement did not cause a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
DaSilva, 471 Mass. 71, 83 (2015) (error in misstating timing by 
one minute did not result in substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice). 
 
Second, there was no evidence under which username this 
search occurred.  The prosecutor's statement attributing the 
search to the "Kaiser Soze" username was improper.  The 
prosecutor's statement, however, was directing the jury to draw 
the fair inference that the search was conducted by the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 142 
(2007).  The statement did not attempt to use the "Kaiser Soze" 
username for an impermissible purpose.  The jury were instructed 
by the judge several times regarding the permitted use of the 
"Kaiser Soze" username, and were further instructed "both before 
and after closing arguments that the arguments of counsel are 
not evidence, and that, if either party referred to facts not in 
evidence during closing, the jury should disregard them." 
Walters, 472 Mass. at 703.  The jury are presumed to have 
followed the judge's instructions.  See Donahue, 430 Mass. at 
718.  The prosecutor's misstatement was not so great that it 
30 
 
 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Walters, supra. 
 
4.  Jury instruction.  The defendant argues that the 
judge's instruction to the jury, permitting them to infer an 
intent to kill based on the use of poison, impermissibly lowered 
the Commonwealth's burden of proof in violation of his due 
process rights.  The defendant objected to the jury instruction 
at trial, so we review for prejudicial error.  Cruz, 445 Mass. 
at 591. 
 
Specifically, the defendant claims that the jury should not 
have been permitted to infer an intent to kill from the use of 
EG because it is not "dangerous per se."  Contrasting the use of 
EG with the use of a weapon that is dangerous per se (e.g., a 
firearm), the defendant claims that the judge's instruction 
allowed the jury to infer an intent to kill even though the use 
of EG against another more readily equates to an "intent to 
harm."  We disagree. 
 
We have held that certain weapons, such as firearms and 
daggers, are dangerous per se for purposes of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon).  See 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303 (1980).  Weapons are 
dangerous per se when they are "designed for the offense or 
defense of persons."  Id.  Other items that are not dangerous 
weapons per se may, however, qualify as dangerous weapons as 
31 
 
 
used.  See id. at 304, and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Farrell, 
322 Mass. 606, 615 (1948).  See Commonwealth v. Lord, 55 Mass. 
App. Ct. 265, 269 n.7 (2002) ("The degree of bodily harm that a 
weapon must be capable of inflicting is the same, whether the 
weapon is inherently dangerous or dangerous as used.  The 
primary difference between weapons in these two categories is in 
their design and purpose").  Whether an item is dangerous as 
used is a question for the jury.  See Appleby, supra at 305; 
Farrell, supra. 
 
The "jury are permitted to infer malice from the use of a 
dangerous weapon," Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 107 
(2004), "even in connection with first prong ('intent to kill') 
malice."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 444 Mass. 143, 153 (2005), 
citing Guy, supra.  This is so even when the jury are instructed 
that a dangerous weapon is an item that is capable of causing 
serious injury (in addition to death) because it is a reasonable 
inference that one who attacks another with an item that is 
capable of causing serious injury intends to kill that person.  
See Perez, supra (malice may be inferred from use of dangerous 
weapon).  See also Commonwealth v. Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 860-
861 (1984) ("Certainly, the jury were entitled to infer malice 
from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, so long as the 
judge's instructions did not compel them to do so").  Here, the 
judge's instruction properly instructed the jury on the use of 
32 
 
 
dangerous weapons.  There was no error. 
 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed the entire record on both the 
law and the facts pursuant to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, as the interests of justice do not require the entry of 
a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt or a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.