Title: Hillard v. Marshall

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hillard v. Marshall1995 WY 7888 P.2d 1255Case Number: 94-6Decided: 01/30/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Earl 
HILLARD, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Gary R. MARSHALL; Thomas W. Dennison and Barbara W. 
Dennison, husband and wife, Appellees (Defendants)

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Johnson County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

Lawrence A. Yonkee and John 
G. Fenn of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellant.

Greg L. Goddard and John P. 
LaBuda of Goddard, Perry & Vogel, Buffalo, for appellee 
Marshall.

Hayden F. Heaphy, Jr. of 
Burgess, Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, for appellees 
Dennison.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired.

[¶1]      This action 
concerns title to a nine-acre tract of land which was fenced in by the 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Earl Hillard (Hillard) appeals from the 
district court's denial of his claim of title to the nine acres by virtue of 
adverse possession and quieting title in the defendants, Thomas and Barbara 
Dennison.

[¶2]      Hillard presents 
four issues for our consideration:

1. Did the District Court err by denying Appellant a 
presumption that Appellant's possession of a nine (9) acre tract of land was 
adverse where Appellant actually occupied the tract under a mistaken belief as 
to the true boundary, for the period prescribed by law, openly, notoriously and 
exclusively, and in a manner plainly indicating that he acted as owner 
thereof?

2. Did the Court err by concluding that livestock 
grazing and fence maintenance are not uses which plainly indicate that Appellant 
acted as owner of the land in his possession?

3. Did the Court err by denying Appellant's claim of 
adverse possession for the reason that it was more convenient to maintain the 
fence in its location rather than on the deed line?

4. Did the District Court err by holding that a 
fourteen (14) acre tract was adversely possessed by Appellant while another nine 
(9) acre tract at a different location on the same place was 
not?

FACTS

[¶3]      This dispute 
centers around land that was originally owned by one person, Melissa Ray 
Schrater. The land in question is located near Buffalo, Wyoming and includes a 
portion of Johnson Creek. After World War I, Melissa Schrater split the land 
with her brother, Frank. Sometime in the early 1920s, a fence was built 
separating the two parcels. The location of the fence has never 
changed.

[¶4]      After Frank died 
in 1940, his widow, Eleanor, leased the land to others. In 1950, Hillard began 
leasing the land; in 1961, he purchased the land outright. Hillard irrigated 
portions of the land, growing at various times, oats, alfalfa, wheat and hay. He 
also pastured cattle on some sections.

[¶5]      Meanwhile, 
Melissa Schrater's land had ended up in the hands of Gary Marshall (Marshall), 
who bought it in 1991. Marshall subdivided the land and sold a tract to Thomas 
and Barbara Dennison (the Dennisons). Marshall had a survey of the property done 
which revealed that Hillard's fence line did not match the property 
line.

[¶6]      Relevant to this 
case are two tracts of land. The first is a 14.19-acre tract (the fourteen-acre 
tract) belonging to Marshall which was enclosed by Hillard's fence. The second 
is a separate 9.01-acre tract (the nine-acre tract) of the Dennisons which was 
also enclosed by Hillard's fence.1

[¶7]      The district 
court found that Hillard had grazed cattle, irrigated and hayed and leased 
portions of the fourteen-acre tract. The court concluded that Hillard had 
"occupied the * * * 14.19 acre tract of land for the period prescribed by law 
(more than 10 years), openly, notoriously, exclusively, and in a manner plainly 
indicating that he acted as owner thereof." After concluding that Marshall had 
failed to meet his burden of explaining Hillard's possession, the court quieted 
title in the fourteen-acre tract in Hillard.

[¶8]      The court, 
however, reached a different conclusion with regard to the nine-acre tract, 
which is adjacent to Johnson Creek. The court found that Hillard had used the 
tract for grazing and that the tract was not "usable for much else." The 
property line ran near Johnson Creek; and the terrain there contained brush, 
trees and was swampy. The court concluded that the fence was one of convenience, 
and therefore Hillard had failed to establish color of title. Title was quieted 
in the Dennisons.

[¶9]      Hillard now 
appeals the trial court's decision that he had failed to adversely possess the 
nine-acre tract of land.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   In order to establish adverse 
possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous possession of another's property which is hostile and under claim of 
right or color of title. Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 502, 273 P. 908, 910 (1929). Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years. W.S. 
1-3-103 (1988); Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Wyo. 
1988); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1983). Where there is no clear 
showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the statutory 
period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner thereof, 
is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the burden shifts to the 
opposing party to explain such possession. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 342 
(Wyo. 1966) (quoting City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 517, 273 P. at 
915-16). However, if a claimant's use of the property is shown to be permissive, 
then he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 344 
(citing Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 228-29, 179 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Wyo. 
1947)).

[¶11]   In some circumstances, enclosing 
land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the `flag' of an adverse claimant." 
Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 343; Doenz, 665 P.2d  at 936 (presence of fence and continuing 
farm operations put record landowners on notice of adverse claim). The pasturing 
of animals within a substantial enclosure is sufficient to establish the 
elements of adverse possession. Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Wyo. 
1982) (quoting Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 902 (Wyo. 1979)). However, a 
fence kept only for the convenience of the parties or to separate pastures or 
irrigated meadows from grazing lands has no effect on the true boundary between 
tracts. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 297 (Wyo. 1983); State v. 
Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 439, 19 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo. 
1933).

[¶12]   Hillard's argument is that the 
trial court improperly denied him the presumption to which he was entitled. 
Hillard claims that he established the elements of adverse possession: he 
occupied the land in a hostile manner and under color of title (by his 
predecessor's fencing in the tract) in an actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous manner and by utilizing the property for what it was best suited - 
grazing.

[¶13]   Hillard also argues that the 
evidence that the topography dictated the location of the fence does not clearly 
prove a permissive use. Hillard asserts that the only evidence that the fence 
was one of convenience was the testimony of a surveyor who described the lay of 
the land and concluded that the fence was placed off of the property line 
because of the topography. Hillard claims that the burden was on the Dennisons 
to prove that the "topography dictated the fence location to such a degree that 
it was obvious that an agreement was made between the adjoining owners." Hillard 
surmises that if he had been properly accorded the presumption, the Dennisons' 
evidence was not enough to overcome that presumption.

[¶14]   A presumption is a required 
conclusion in the absence of explanation. See 1 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, 
Federal Evidence § 66 (2nd ed. 1994). 
The concept of a presumption of adverse possession in favor of the claiming 
party was first articulated by Justice Blume in Sturm:

[W]hen a man has occupied a piece of ground, though 
under a mistaken belief as to the true boundary, for the period prescribed by 
law openly, notoriously, exclusively and in a manner plainly indicating that he 
acted as owner thereof, the presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory 
circumstances showing the contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and 
under a claim of right, casting the burden of explaining such possession upon 
the person who disputes his right.

39 Wyo. at 517, 273 P.  at 
915-16. Thus, in the context of adverse possession, a presumption arises in 
favor of the claimant when a prima 
facie case has been made, requiring a conclusion in favor of adverse 
possession absent explanation. Similarly, it could be said that a presumption in 
favor of the record title holder exists, unless and until the adverse claimant 
makes out his prima facie case, 
because the initial burden of proof is on the party claiming adverse possession. 
Sowerwine, 671 P.2d  at 302; Miller v. Bell, 764 P.2d 389, 390 (Colo. App. 1988) 
("An initial presumption favors the record title holder as against the adverse 
possession claimant."); Accord Gonthier v. Horne, 576 A.2d 745 (Me. 1990); 
Miceli v. Foley, 83 Md. App. 541, 575 A.2d 1249 (1990). Once the adverse 
possession claimant has made out his prima facie case, and absent any 
explanatory circumstances to the contrary, the burden shifts to the opposing 
party to produce evidence contrary to the presumption. Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 517, 
273 P. at 915-16; Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d 364, 368 
(Wyo. 1989); accord Szombathy v. Shell Oil Co., 676 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. App. 
1984).

[¶15]   The district court could have 
arrived at its decision through one of two routes. First, it could have 
concluded that Hillard had not made a prima facie case because the convenience 
fence was an explanatory circumstance to the contrary; or, second, it could have 
found that Hillard had made out a prima 
facie case and that he was entitled to a presumption but concluded that the 
evidence that the fence was one of convenience had rebutted the presumption. The 
record is devoid of any indication by which of these means the trial court did 
arrive at its decision.

[¶16]   We conclude that it does not matter 
because under either scenario, the district court's decision would stand. 
Whether the record title holder is seeking to show explanatory circumstances to 
the contrary or is attempting to rebut a presumption, the standard of proof does 
not change. A presumption shifts the 
burden of proof, it does not heighten the standard of proof. W.R.E. 301(a), 
Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 393 
(Wyo. 1993). Thus, if the evidence that the fence was one of convenience is 
sufficient to establish that fact in the first place, then it is sufficient to 
rebut a presumption.

[¶17]   A presumption is not a magic elixir 
that imbues its holder with an exalted level of protection against an 
evidentiary attack. A presumption simply means that in the absence of any other 
evidence to the contrary, the fact presumed is conclusive. If, however, there is 
sufficient evidence to the contrary, then it becomes a question of weight and 
credibility for the trier of fact. See Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 345 ("when there is a 
question of doubt as to whether the possession was adverse, it becomes a 
question of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts") (citing Sturm, 39 
Wyo. at 518, 273 P. at 916). Thus, in reality, what Hillard is challenging here 
is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that 
the fence was one of convenience.

[¶18]   We sustain a trial court's findings 
and judgment on questions of evidence unless they are clearly erroneous or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, while keeping in mind the 
following principles:

The judge who presided at the trial heard and saw the 
witnesses. He is in the best position to determine questions of credibility and 
weigh and judge the evidence, both expert and non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is 
a firmly established and oftstated rule that we must accept the evidence of the 
successful party as true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be 
drawn from it.

Sowerwine, 671 P.2d  at 301; 
(citing Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, 649 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1982) and City of Rock 
Springs v. Police Protection Ass'n, 610 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 
1980)).

[¶19]   The trial court found that it was 
more convenient to place the fence where it was rather than on the property line 
because of the terrain. The evidence supporting that finding came from a 
surveyor who had observed the terrain and from other testimony that showed that 
the fence followed the property line in other areas, implying that the people 
who built the fence knew where the property line was located. This was 
sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the fence was one of 
convenience, and its ruling was not clearly erroneous.

[¶20]   Hillard, however, insists that the 
evidence would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of adverse possession. 
His argument is predicated on his evidence that he had grazed cattle on the 
tract, which was not suitable to other purposes, and our prior cases finding 
that grazing cattle on land suited for that activity can be the basis of an 
adverse possession claim. See Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 901 (Wyo. 1979). 
However, as we have already pointed out, a fence "kept simply for convenience 
(as held by the court in this case) has no effect upon the true boundary between 
tracts of land." Sowerwine, 671 P.2d  at 297. This is so because a fence of 
convenience creates a permissive use, and a permissive 
user

cannot change his possession into adverse title no 
matter how long possession may be continued, in the absence of a clear, positive 
and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the title of the true owner brought 
home to the latter's knowledge; there must be either actual notice of the 
hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and notorious 
that actual notice will be presumed in order to change a permissive or otherwise 
non-hostile possession into one that is hostile.

Stewart v. Childress, 269 
Ala. 87, 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (1959). The record does not disclose any evidence nor 
does Hillard point us to any which demonstrates that he acted in a manner that 
would have turned his permissive possession into a hostile 
one.

[¶21]   Finally, we briefly address two 
other issues raised by Hillard. First, Hillard asserts that two witness 
depositions should not be considered because the deponents lack personal 
knowledge and their testimony is hearsay. Assuming that Hillard's 
characterization is true, we find no error. The trial court stated that it was 
not going to consider one of them, and Hillard has failed to demonstrate that 
the court relied on the other. On appeal, we presume that the district court 
disregarded any improperly admitted evidence unless the record affirmatively 
demonstrates that the court's decision was influenced by the evidence. Schacht 
v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Rawlins, 620 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1980); X v. Y, 482 P.2d 688, 691 (Wyo. 1971).

[¶22]   Second, Hillard argues that 
Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981) establishes the 
rule that adverse possession is an all-or-nothing proposition. He asserts that 
since the possession of the nine-acre tract arose out of the same set of 
circumstances as the fourteen-acre tract, by adversely possessing one he 
necessarily had to have adversely possessed the other.

[¶23]   In Kranenberg, the adverse claimant 
had built a portion of his home on the defendant's land. A contiguous tract of 
that land was also used by the claimant as a yard, including the placement of a 
swing set, a sandbox, a barbecue and a root cellar. Kranenberg, 623 P.2d  at 
1197-98. The district court found that the claimant had adversely possessed the 
portion around the house but not that portion which was utilized as a yard. 
Kranenberg, at 1196. We reversed, holding that the continuous possession of the 
entire portion of the property for the same purpose, residential use, was 
sufficient to show adverse possession. Since the defendant had failed to 
demonstrate a permissive use, we concluded that the claimant had adversely 
possessed the entire tract. Kranenberg, 623 P.2d  at 
1199-1200.

[¶24]   Kranenberg is distinguishable from 
this case. Here the land claimed is neither contiguous nor was used for the same 
purposes. Hillard used the fourteen-acre tract mainly for farming, while the 
nine-acre tract was exclusively used for grazing purposes. Further, the fact 
that the two parcels are physically separate could mean there are different 
reasons for them being fenced in, as the trial court found to be the case here. 
Although the tracts were created at the same time, their non-contiguous nature 
and the different uses on each requires the adverse claimant to prove his case 
for each tract individually. Hillard failed to do that. Kranenberg is not 
applicable.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   In sum, there is a presumption in 
favor of the record title holder which can be rebutted if the adverse possession 
claimant makes, in the absence of explanatory circumstances to the contrary, a 
prima facie case of adverse possession, whereupon the burden shifts back to the 
record title holder who must produce evidence contrary to the presumption by 
showing that the claimant's possession was permissive. If the title holder can 
do that, then it becomes a question of weight and credibility to be determined 
by the trier of fact.

[¶26]   Here, there is sufficient evidence 
to support the trial court's conclusion that the fence enclosing the nine-acre 
tract of the Dennison's land was one of convenience.

[¶27]   Affirmed.

Footnote

1 
The tract is located in the NE 1/4 SW 1/4 and the East 1/2 NW 1/4 of Section 7, 
Township 51 North, Range 82 West, 6th P.M., Johnson County, Wyoming, described 
as follows:

Commencing at the southwest 
corner of said Section 7 (3" brass cap per L.S. 324); thence N27° 1812"E, 
2909.44 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING, said point being the intersection of a 
fence line and the west line of said NE 1/4 SW 1/4; thence N57° 0344"E, 130.02 
feet along said fence line to a point; thence N18° 1918"E, 343.47 feet along 
said fence line to a point; thence N01° 09 ·04"W, 286.50 feet along said fence 
line to a point; thence N08°2640"W, 44.57 feet along said fence line to a point; 
thence N04° 3640"W, 245.72 feet along said fence line to a point; thence N02° 
4647"W, 223.01 feet along said fence line to a point; thence N03° 3447"W, 
1172.69 feet along said fence line to a point; thence N37°1741"W, 30.74 feet 
along said fence line to a point; thence N69° 0501"W, 37.10 feet along said 
fence line to a point; thence N07° 2726"E, 90.65 feet along said fence line to a 
point; thence S74° 3328"W, 68.73 feet along said fence line to a point on the 
west line of said East 1/2 NW 1/4; thence S00° 0926"E, 1343.89 feet along said 
west line to a point (aluminum cap per L.S. 324); thence S00° 0922"E, 1130.76 
feet along said west line to the POINT OF BEGINNING.

TAYLOR, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom MACY, 
J., joins.

[¶28]   Earl Hillard purchased 310.62 acres 
of land near Buffalo, Wyoming from Eleanor M. Schrater in December, 1961. Prior 
to Mr. Hillard's purchase of the land, he had leased the same tract of land for 
approximately ten years. The entire acreage is enclosed by a fence which was 
erected in the early 1920's. Within the fenced perimeter, there is a 14.19 acre 
tract of land and a 9.01 acre tract of land. Both of these tracts of land are 
the subject of this dispute. The district court found that Mr. Hillard 
established title by adverse possession to the 14.19 acre tract, but not to the 
9.01 acre tract.

[¶29]   Mr. Hillard used both tracts of 
land in his farming and ranching operations for more than thirty years. Both 
tracts of land are within the same boundary fence maintained by Mr. Hillard. Mr. 
Hillard's neighbors recognized and acknowledged the fence to be his property 
line.

[¶30]   In my mind, the possession by Mr. 
Hillard of both the 14.19 acre tract and the 9.01 acre tract is virtually 
identical. Mr. Hillard's possession of both tracts of land was open, notorious, 
exclusive and continuous for thirty years. His use of both tracts was hostile 
and under claim of right.

[¶31]   I would reverse the district court 
and quiet title to the 9.01 acres in Mr. Hillard.