Title: Trudell v. Vermont

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Trudell and Dorfman v. State and
Markowitz (2011-311)
 
2013 VT 18
 
[Filed 29-Mar-2013]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@state.vt.us or by
mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont
05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this
opinion goes to press.
 
 
2013 VT 18
 
No. 2011-311
 
Gerald Trudell and Myron Dorfman
  
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Washington Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
State of Vermont and Deborah
  Markowitz, 
Secretary of State
September Term, 2012
 
 
 
 
Geoffrey
  W. Crawford, J.
 
Charles L. Merriman of Tarrant, Gillies, Merriman &
Richardson, Montpelier, for 
  Plaintiffs-Appellants.
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Keith Aten and
Micaela Tucker, Assistant Attorneys
  General, Montpelier, for Defendants-Appellees.
 
 
PRESENT:   Reiber, C.J., Skoglund and Burgess,
JJ., and Cohen and Eaton, Supr. JJ.,
                    
Specially Assigned
 
 
¶ 1.            
SKOGLUND, J.  Independent candidate Gary Trudell and voter
Myron Dorfman challenge the constitutionality of Vermont's schedule for filing
candidate petitions, alleging that the uniform deadline for all party (major
and minor) and independent candidates is discriminatory and impermissibly
impinges upon the associational and voting rights of candidates and voters
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Because we
conclude that the filing deadline is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory
regulation, justified by Vermont's regulatory interests, we affirm the decision
of the lower court in declaring the deadline constitutional.
¶ 2.            
In 2009, Congress enacted the Military Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE)
Act to address reports that U.S. troops stationed overseas had difficulties
voting by absentee ballot.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a)(8)(A).  The
Act imposed fixed deadlines by which states had to prepare their ballots.
 For general elections, ballots are required to be completed 45 days in
advance of the election.  Id.  Vermont previously held
primary elections relatively late in the electoral cycle on the second Tuesday
in September.  To comply with the requirements of the MOVE Act, Vermont
enacted Act 73.  2009, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.  Section 1 of
Act 73 moved Vermont's primary election date to the fourth Tuesday in
Augusttheoretically the latest possible date by which the Secretary of State
could receive the primary results from the towns, complete the canvas process,
prepare the ballot styles, and receive the general election ballots back from
the printers in time to meet the 45-day federal deadline.  17 V.S.A. §
2351 (setting primary date to comply with MOVE Act).  Because of the new primary
election date, the Legislature moved the deadline for primary registration to
mid-June.  Id. § 2356 ("not later than 5:00 p.m. on the second
Thursday after the first Monday in June"). 
¶ 3.            
The Legislature enacted an additional change: the Legislature moved the
date by which independent candidates were required to file their statements of
nomination to run in the general election so as to make that deadline coincide
with the deadline by which party candidates were required to file their primary
petitions.  Compare 2009, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), §1(codified at 17 V.S.A.
§ 2402(d)), with 17 V.S.A. § 2402(d) (prior to amendment).
 Independent candidates were previously permitted to file nominating
petitions up to three days after the primary election.  The Director of
Elections testified that a change was required to comply with the MOVE Act but
believed that the Thursday before the primary (two working days plus the
intervening weekend) would provide adequate time to review the independents'
petitions and identify all candidates, including those running on multiple
tickets. 
¶ 4.            
Instead of four calendar days before the primary election, the
Legislature required independent candidates to register on the same day as
primary candidates.  That is, independents now have to file their petition
for candidacy by the second Thursday after the first Monday in June, advancing
the registration date by approximately seventy days.  See 17 V.S.A. §
2356. 
¶ 5.            
Plaintiff Gerald Trudell has a longstanding interest in politics and the
environment.  To bring attention to environmental issues, Trudell first
ran for Vermont's seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2006, claiming
1000 votes.  He ran again in 2008 and acquired 10,000 votes.  In
2010, Trudell decided to run again, two days before the newly-implemented June
deadline but was unable to collect the requisite signatures for registration.
 In late August, he filed a petition anyway but was denied a place on the
ballot due to his delinquency.  He ran instead as a write-in candidate.
¶ 6.            
Plaintiff Myron Dorfman is a Vermont resident and voter, and occasional
supporter of Mr. Trudell.  Dorfman voted for Trudell in 2006.
 Dorfman, like many Vermonters, is more attracted to individual candidates
than to parties, generally.  He opposes a June registration deadline for
independent candidates because he believes it limits his choice as a voter.
 For example, he would have voted for Trudell in 2010, but Trudell was not
on the ballot because of the advanced deadline.  Consequently, both
Trudell and Dorfman contend that the new registration date for independent
candidates violates their rights, as candidate and voter, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and that the trial court erred
in finding it constitutional.  This contention is unavailing.
¶ 7.            
It is beyond cavil that the "rights of qualified voters to cast votes
effectively and the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes
are of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."
 Council of Alt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 70 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983).  The right to vote in any manner and the right to
associate for political purposes, however, is not absolute.  Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).  Article I of the U.S. Constitution
provides that states may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on voting, and thus, courts have recognized that states retain the power to
regulate their own elections.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).   Common sense, as well as
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active
role in structuring elections, and there must be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest.  See, e.g., Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
¶ 8.            
The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the test for determining the
constitutionality of ballot access restrictions: 
A
court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against the
"precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights."  
 
Burdick, 504 U.S.  at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460
U.S. at 789).  Accordingly, when a state imposes a severe restriction on
access to the ballot, the regulation "must be narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance."  See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 280 (1992).  And when, a state election law provision imposes
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions."  Burdick, 504 U.S.  at 434 (quotations omitted). 
¶ 9.            
In Anderson, the Court overturned an Ohio statute requiring
independent candidates to file petitions, signed by 5000 voters, five months
before major parties chose their candidates, and nearly eight months before the
general election.  460 U.S.  at 783 & n.1.  The Court stressed two
main points.  First, the early filing deadline did not apply equally to
all candidates, placing independent candidates at a disadvantage.  Id.
at 790-91.  Independent candidates who failed to file by the early
registration deadline were precluded from appearing on the ballot while
candidates elected through major party nominating conventions, regardless of
whether they filed a nominating petition, were guaranteed a place on the
ballot.  Id.  Thus, by early spring, minor parties were
confined to their candidate selection, "whereas the major parties retained the
flexibility to react to changing events by nominating candidates who did not
emerge until months later."  Hooks, 179 F.3d  at 72 (quoting Anderson,
460 U.S.  at 790-91 n.11).  Additionally, the Court concluded that the new
filing deadline impeded the signature-gathering efforts of independents due to
the remoteness of the elections; caused foreseeable obstacles in recruiting and
retaining volunteers, generating media publicity and campaign contributions,
and spurring interest amongst voters; and made other organizing efforts more
difficult.  See Anderson, 460 U.S.  at 792.  
¶ 10.        
Second, the Court emphasized that the Ohio statute regulated
presidential elections, not state or local elections.  Anderson,
460 U.S.  at 794.  It explained that presidential election procedures
"implicate a uniquely important national interest" because the President
"represent[s] all the voters in the Nation," and "the State has a less
important interest in regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local
elections, because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by
voters beyond the State's boundaries."  Id. at 794-95.
¶ 11.        
After finding that the early filing deadline severely burdened the
independents' associational rights, the Court considered the State's asserted
interests: voter education, equal treatment, and political stability.  Anderson,
460 U.S.  at 796.  The Court iterated that an informed voting pool is an
important, legitimate state interest.  Id.  However, because
of the advances in technology and the rapid dissemination of information, the
Court found that voters could receive sufficient information in less than five
months.  Id. at 797-98 (finding that details about the election are
"instantaneously communicated nationwide" and that it is "somewhat unrealistic"
to suggest that more than seven months are needed to inform the electorate
about the candidate).[1] 
The Court also rejected the notion that a uniform deadline provided "equal
treatment" because the procedures for getting on the ballot were incongruent as
between independents and major party nominees.  Id. at 799.
 Finally, the Court decided that the statute was not drawn to promote
"political stability" or protect the parties from intra-party feuding.  Id.
at 801-05.  Moreover, the Court held that the Ohio restriction was
unconstitutional because the State's proffered justifications were not narrowly
tailored to advance compelling state interests and were outweighed by the
severe burdens imposed on the independent presidential candidates.  Id.
at 806. 
¶ 12.        
While election laws will "invariably impose some burden upon individual
voters," not all restrictions are unconstitutional.  Burdick, 504 U.S.  at 433.  In determining the nature and magnitude of the burden
Vermont's election procedures impose on independent candidates and voters,[2] we must examine the entire ballot access
scheme.  Hooks, 179 F.3d  at 67; Libertarian Party of Wash. v.
Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1994).  "The inquiry is whether
the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the availability
of political opportunity."  Anderson, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (quotation
omitted).  Put another way, we must determine whether a reasonably
diligent independent candidate can gain access to the ballot or if instead he
or she will rarely succeed.  Munro, 31 F.3d  at 762. 
Plaintiffs have the initial burden of showing Vermont's advanced deadline
seriously restricts the availability of political opportunity.  See id.
at 762.
¶ 13.        
Under Vermont law, for a candidate's name to appear on the Vermont
ballot, he or she must follow the primary election process or the petition
process.  The primary election process is only available to candidates
representing a "major political party," which is defined as any party garnering
at least five percent of the votes cast for that office in the most recent
general election.  17 V.S.A. § 2103(23).  In fact, the primary
election, as explained by the Director of Elections in her testimony, serves
only as a nomination process for the major political parties.   In
2012, Vermont recognized three major political parties, namely Democrats,
Republicans, and Progressives.  See T. Hallanbeck, "Vermont's Liberty
Union Will Be Back As Major Party," Burlington Free Press, Nov. 8, 2012,
http://blogs.burlingtonfreepress.com/politics/2012/11/08
/vermonts-liberty-union-will-be-back-as-major-party/. 
¶ 14.        
Candidates participating in the primary election process start by filing
nominating petitions with the Secretary of State around mid-June pursuant to 17
V.S.A. § 2356.  As part of the petition, candidates for state and
congressional offices must submit 500 signatures.  Id.
§ 2355.  County offices and state senate positions require only 100 signatures.
 Id.  If the statutory requirements are met, candidates' names
appear on the primary election ballot, and if they are successful in winning
their party's nomination, their names are listed on the general election
ballot. 
¶ 15.        
Candidates not affiliated with one of the major political parties must
use the petition process to appear on the ballot.  Independent candidates,
like the major party candidates, are required to obtain the requisite
signatures for the desired office.  See id. § 2401.  Prior to
the statutory change, independent candidates were required to file their
petition three days after the primary election.  Now, independents, along
with all major party candidates, must submit their petition and nomination
statement by mid-June.  See id. § 2356; see also id. §
2402(d)(providing requisites of nomination statement).  Nevertheless, if a
candidate is unable to get on the ballot, there is always an opportunity for
Vermont voters to write in their candidate of choice.  See id.
§ 2472(c). 
¶ 16.        
That said, Vermonters have a particular affinity for independent
candidates.  Vermont's attachment to unorthodox voting goes back to 1990
when the state elected the first independent congressman in forty years, Bernie
Sanders.  Mr. Sanders went on to be elected to the U.S. Senate and was
reelected to his Senate seat again this year. See L. Eaves, "This Year, Record
Numbers of Independents Elected," IVN, Nov. 22, 2012, http://ivn.us/2012/11/22/this-year-record-numbers-of-independents-elected/. 
Though Mr. Sanders is by far one of the most visible independent candidates of
Vermont, he is hardly alone.  In fact, in 2012, there were a total of
forty-six independent candidates on the ballot in Vermont, with representatives
from Liberty Union, United States Marijuana, VoteKISS, Republican, Peace and
Prosperity, Working Families, and Democrat parties.  See Vermont Secretary
of State, Official Vermont General Election Ballot, available at
http://vermont-elections.org/elections1/2012
ElectionResults2012%20Sample%20Ballot.pdf.  
¶ 17.        
Plaintiffs allege that a uniform filing deadline makes all members of
our society "bend their First Amendment, constitutional rights of association
to a time table created for the benefit of two associational groups," by which
we assume they mean the two major national political parties.  Yet, they
fail to succinctly specify how the advanced deadline imposes a burden on
candidates or voters.  Plaintiffs do not complain of issues recruiting
volunteers to help acquire the requisite 500 signatures.  See, e.g., Anderson,
460 U.S.  at 792.  There is no filing fee that requires candidates to
solicit campaign contributions.  Further, there is no indication that the
advanced deadline creates a barrier in procuring media attention.  See,
e.g., id.  In fact, the superior court found that: 
[T]he
general public pays limited attention to the primary races and virtually none
to the independent candidates during the summer months. The primaries see low
voter turnout in most years. Independent candidates obviously do not appear on
primary ballots (unless they have registered as independents and primary
candidates) and are rarely included in debates and candidate forums until after
the primaries.  An independent candidate lucky or skilled enough to
attract some media attention could get a small bump from an early registration
and announcement.  Most languish unnoticed until the general election
season is underway. 
 
¶ 18.        
While we agree that a June deadline requires a bit more foresight and
advance planning from the independent candidates and can thwart candidates who
decide to run in response to events arising after June and while we agree that
Vermonters have a strong interest in maintaining a solid independent candidate
base; nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "some cut off period is
necessary."  See Hooks, 179 F.3d  at 74 (quotation omitted). 
And there is no indication from the record that the cutoff here is unreasonable
or unfairly deters independent candidates.  In fact, the record suggests
the oppositedemonstrating the most dramatic increase in registered independent
candidates in previous years, with a total of forty-six registered independent
candidatesready and able to meet the statutory requirements.  As the
court noted, Vermont fosters "an atmosphere in which independent candidates
flourish."  In addition, there is no evidence that major party candidates
are advantaged by the system. 
¶ 19.        
As such, we conclude that the Vermont filing deadline applies equally to
all candidates and does not place independents at a particular disadvantage for
accessing the ballot.  Rather, the registration deadline is a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory regulation that imposes at most a minor burden on plaintiffs'
rights. 
¶ 20.        
 Even a minor burden requires an evaluation of the State's
proffered justifications for the advanced deadline.  The State contends
that its interests in advancing the deadline for independent candidates are to:
1) comply with federal election law; 2) enable the Secretary of State's Office
to physically complete and send ballots within the forty-five-day deadline;
3) promote voter education and transparency; and 4) deter "sore loser
candidates."  "Because the burden is not severe, the State need not
proffer a narrowly tailored regulation that advances a compelling state
interest.  Instead, important regulatory interests provide a sufficient
justification."  Hooks, 179 F.3d  at 78.
¶ 21.        
The State need not provide empirical evidence justifying its interest;
however, the State cannot rely on hollow or contrived arguments as
justifications.  See, e.g., Price v. N.Y. Bd. of State Elections,
540 F.3d 101, 110 (2nd Cir. 2008) (holding that, while there are many plausible
reasons a state may not provide absentee ballots, New York's "contrived
argument that tabulating absentee ballots could cause a delay in finalizing"
ballots was not sufficient justification to outweigh minor burden imposed by
regulation).  Nevertheless, not all courts require a rigorous showing of
legitimacy by the state and accept conceivable notions of interest.  In
fact, some courts have raised state interests sua sponte.  For example,
the Third Circuit found a New Jersey statute, which advanced the filing date
for independent candidates to be fifty-four days before the primary election
(amended to the day of the primary), to be fair and not discriminatory, merely
creating a mild burden for candidates and voters, alike.  Hooks,
179 F.3d 64.  The court concluded sua sponte that New Jersey had a strong
interest in treating all candidates equally by requiring them to all file on
the same day; that New Jersey's deadline is designed to allow primary voters to
identify and evaluate all candidates in advance of casting their votes at the
primary or to at least have some knowledge of the political terrain; and that
New Jersey has a legitimate interest in limiting frivolous candidacies and
maintaining a stable and efficient election process, i.e., preventing "sore
loser" candidacies.[3]
 Id. at 78-80.  Moreover, there is no bright-line rule in
assessing the state's interests; courts must take a hard look at the benefits
of the regulation to see if they justify the burdens imposed on voters' and
candidates' rights.
¶ 22.        
We agree that the State has a legitimate interest in complying with the
federal MOVE Act.  However, the MOVE Act merely requires general election
ballots to be complete forty-five days in advance of the election.  The
Act does not expressly require any change in the filing deadline for
independent parties.  While it is of great import for the State to ensure
that the Secretary of State's Office is able to physically complete and send
ballots within the forty-five-day federal deadline, the Director of Elections
testified that her office could sufficiently meet the federal mandate if
independent candidates filed their petitions four days before the primary elections.
 In other words, the Secretary of State's Office could process independent
candidates' petitions if filed during the first week of August.  As
such, the Director's testimony directly refutes the State's contention that the
uniform filing deadline is necessary to comply with the MOVE Act.
¶ 23.        
The State next suggests the new registration deadline will promote voter
education and transparency "because voters learn the entire field of candidates
before they have to make a decision about voting in the primary."  There
is no debate that voter education is an important state interest.  See Storer,
415 U.S.  at 735; Anderson, 460 U.S.  at 796.  In the abstract, the
earlier one knows the political terrain, the earlier a voter can evaluate the
candidates.  But the State fails to tie that truism to a requirement that
independent candidates register at the same time as major party candidates.
 
¶ 24.        
The State finally asserts that requiring independents to file their
petition on the same as day as major party candidates prevents sore-loser
candidates.  As noted above, a "sore-loser" candidate is one who loses in
a major-party primary election and then seeks to run in the same election as an
independent or minor party candidate.  Other courts have held that various
state interests are furthered by sore-loser statutes.  In Storer,
415 U.S.  at 735, the Supreme Court addressed a California sore-loser provision,
and emphasized the importance of sore-loser statutes in discouraging
intra-party feuding and in reserving "major struggles" for general election
ballots.  See also Backus v. Spears, 677 F.2d 397, 399-400 (4th
Cir. 1982).  In Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 596 (2005), the
Court later explained that "sore-loser statutes prevent a candidate who has lost
a party primary or nomination from effecting a splinter' of a major political
party, by joining a minor party while retaining the support of the major
party's voters, thereby undermining the major party in the general election."
 S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 612 F.3d 752, 756
(2010). 
¶ 25.        
Vermont does not have a sore-loser statute.  The State claims to
have a legitimate interest in creating a system that precludes so-called sore
losers and prevents intra-party feuding. Two of the legislators testifying at
trial thought it "unfair" to give such candidates "two bites at the apple."
 Since 1974, sore-loser candidates have affected almost one out of every
five state-wide election.  However, while the new registration deadline will
generally deter the sore-losers, party candidates are still permitted to
register simultaneously for primaries as well as independents.
 Nonetheless, these individuals registered as both party and independent
will be known in advance, and there will no longer be any surprise when the
candidate who describes himself or herself as a major party candidate runs as
an independent after losing the primary.  Based on the supporting case
law, the State-claimed desire to prevent sore-loser candidacy finds support.
¶ 26.        
In sum, the early registration for voters is reasonable,
nondiscriminatory, and places a de minimis burden on voters and independent
candidates, such that we find that the State's interests, though attenuated,
are legitimate and sufficiently justify any mild burden imposed.
¶ 27.        
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the statute,
plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in relying on legislators'
testimony regarding the purpose for the change in deadline.  Courts
generally give little weight to an individual legislator's interpretation of
the law once enacted because it cannot reflect the thought processes of the
entire Legislature.  See Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2507
(2010).  Here, three legislators testified as to their understanding of
the purpose behind the new registration deadline.  As noted above, two
Senators testified that they did not like sore-loser candidates being allowed
to run.  A former Representative testified that she thought the law would
provide greater transparency.  Over objection, the court permitted
the testimony to provide a "historical" or "factual" basis for the hearings due
to the State's inability to procure transcripts from the legislative hearings
themselves.  Plaintiffs allege that the court improperly derived the
legislative intent of the statute from the three legislators' testimony and
concluded that the supposed justification, as announced by the legislators,
satisfied the State's burden for its imposition on voters' rights.  
¶ 28.        
Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless, unless a party's
substantial right is affected.  See V.R.C.P. 61.  The burden rests
with the plaintiff to show that the error resulted in prejudice.  See In
re B.S., 163 Vt. 445, 454, 659 A.2d 1137, 1143 (1995). 
¶ 29.        
It does not appear that the court gave considerable, if any, weight to
these particular testimonies, merely noting the legislators' opinions in its
decision.  In fact, it noted that "[t]his court does not decide whether a
deadline which reduces the sore loser' phenomenon is a good or a bad
idea."  It simply held that "[t]he decision to make it more difficult for
primary candidates to run after losing is a legitimate policy choice which the
Vermont legislature voted into law."  Plaintiffs fail to address how they
were prejudiced by such testimony, and we fail to find any.  Therefore,
even if the evidence were improperly admitted as historical evidence, the
error, if any, was harmless.
¶ 30.        
Finally, plaintiffs assert that the alteration in deadlines for
independent candidates violates their rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the
Vermont Constitution.  As this Court has previously held, a party's
failure to present any substantive analysis or argument on state constitutional
issues constitutes inadequate briefing, which we decline to address.  State
v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 221, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (1985).
¶ 31.        
Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, or the Common Benefits Clause, is
Vermont's corollary to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.  Article 7 has been perceived as a more liberal analogue to
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Plaintiffs, without more, cite the Baker
decision to assert that the registration deadline is unconstitutional under
Vermont law.  See Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 94, 744 A.2d 864
(1999).  Because plaintiffs fail to present any substantive analysis or
articulation as to why Article 7 should accord a different read on the
constitutionality of the statute, we decline to address the claim.
¶ 32.        
With respect to Article 8, or the right-to-run provision, plaintiffs
contend that because there is no constitutional corollary, the protections
afforded by the Vermont Constitution are patently distinguishable from the U.S.
Constitution and require no explanation.  While plaintiffs correctly
highlight that there is no federal counterpart to the right-to-run provision,
such a void does not dispense with plaintiffs' requirement to present their argument
to this Court nor does it provide plaintiffs with a get-out-of-briefing-free
card.  In fact, the opposite would be true.  Without demarcating how
the statute at issue is repugnant to the spirit and law of the Vermont
Constitution, plaintiffs fail to adequately brief their claim. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 
 
¶ 33.        
REIBER, C.J., concurring.   I acknowledge that the
permissive federal constitutional standard applied to nondiscriminatory
ballot-access regulations compels the outcome we have reached in this
case.   I write, however, to emphasize the common-sense observation
that the advanced deadline for independent-candidate registration serves mainly
to deprive Vermonters of potential choices at the ballot box.   It
goes almost without saying that a lot can change in the months and weeks
leading up to an election.  An early deadline will prevent or discourage
from running otherwise qualified contenders whose candidacy arises in direct
response to those changing circumstances, limiting the range of options
available to Vermont citizens.  That the earlier deadline accomplishes
this reduction in choice with a nearly imperceptible benefit is added cause for
concern.  
¶ 34.        
I note also that I share my colleagues' dismay at plaintiffs' failure to
adequately brief their claims under the Vermont Constitution.  It is
rapidly approaching three decades since we first clearly called the bar's
attention to the importance of our state charter as an independent and unique
source of individual and collective rights.  See State v. Jewett,
146 Vt. 221, 223, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (1985).   Plaintiffs might well
have found a standard in the Vermont Constitution requiring more demanding
scrutiny of election regulations.  
¶ 35.        
I am authorized to state that Judge Cohen joins this concurrence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice
 
 

[1]
 We note that Anderson was decided thirty years ago and the speed
with which information is disseminated today is stunning.  
 
[2] 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, " the rights of voters
and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws
that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative
effect on voters.' "  Anderson, 460 U.S.  at 786 (quoting Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
[3]
 A "sore loser" candidacy is one in which an individual loses in a party
primary and then seeks to run in the same election as an independent or minor
party candidate.  While the New Jersey statute in Hooks was not
designed to prevent sore losers and therefore was not narrowly tailored to
effectuate a compelling state interest, the Hooks court found that New
Jersey's interest in preventing "sore losers" rises to the level of a
legitimate, important state interest.  179 F.3d  at 80.