Title: WYSE v FOURTH JUD DIST COURT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-119 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 WYSE , R e l a t o r , D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE FOURTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, MISSOULA COUNTY, JOHN S. HENSON, D i s t . Judge, R e s p o n d e n t . ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For R e l a t o r : R o n a l d C. Wyse, Pro Se, M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t : R o b e r t L . D e s c h a m p s , 111, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : 85 m F i l e d : @OV 2 5 1981 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. R e l a t o r , Ronald C. Wyse, p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of review on March 2 3 , 1981, concerning t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Missoula, f i n d i n g him g u i l t y of contempt a s h e r e a f t e r s t a t e d . R e l a t o r Wyse is an a t t o r n e y d u l y l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law i n t h e S t a t e of Montana. I n t h e a f t e r n o o n of October 28, 1980, Wyse was c o n t a c t e d by Alan Robbins, a C a l i f o r n i a s t a t e s e n a t o r . Robbins informed Wyse t h a t he had r e c e n t l y been charged w i t h s e x u a l misconduct i n v o l v i n g two minor g i r l s . Robbins f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t one of t h e minor g i r l s making t h e a c c u s a t i o n s f o r m e r l y r e s i d e d i n Missoula, and it was Robbins' b e l i e f t h a t s h e had been t h e s u b j e c t of a j u v e n i l e proceeding while i n Missoula. Robbins informed Wyse t h a t a grand j u r y was t o be convened on October 30 ( f o r t y - e i g h t hours l a t e r ) t o c o n s i d e r t h e c h a r g e s . Wyse agreed t o provide a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n he could o b t a i n t o " a s s i s t Robbins. T h a t same day Wyse d i s c o v e r e d t h a t h i s f i r m had r e p r e s e n t e d t h e mother of t h e g i r l i n a dependent and n e g l e c t e d c h i l d a c t i o n i n 1977. Wyse decided t o look a t t h e c o u r t f i l e i n t h e m a t t e r t o determine i f it c o n t a i n e d any i n f o r m a t i o n which was n o t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e law f i r m ' s f i l e . Wyse o b t a i n e d t h e c o u r t f i l e from t h e c l e r k of c o u r t by r e p r e s e n t i n g himself a s a member of t h e f i r m t h a t handled t h e n e g l e c t e d c h i l d a c t i o n . L a t e r t h a t same day Wyse went t o examine t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s f i l e . The county a t t o r n e y ' s f i l e c o n t a i n e d a p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s r e p o r t t h a t was n o t p r e s e n t i n t h e o t h e r files. Wyse made a photocopy of the report, included it with the other information he had collected and sent the information to Robbins and his attorney in California. Upon discovering that Wyse had obtained this informa- tion from the files, the Missoula County Attorney petitioned the District Court for an order directing Wyse to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court under section 3-1-501(1), MCA. Although this action involved contempt of court, the specific act at issue was the release by Wyse of dependent and neglected child files to persons not authorized to receive them. Section 41-3-205, MCA, prohibits "dissemination" of such files without authorization, and anyone violating this provision is deemed guilty of "a misdemeanor." At the hearing, Wyse made a motion in limine to restrict any testimony as to how he obtained the file from the county attorney's office. The motion was denied. Wyse admits he was aware that such files are confidential and could be released pursuant to some statutory procedure. However, he did not attempt to comply with the statute. The District Court held that Wyse's actions constituted a viola- tion of the duty of an attorney and was found in contempt of court under section 3-1-501(l)(c), MCA. The basic issue here is whether an unauthorized dissemination, under section 41-3-205, MCA, occurred when relator (Wyse) released the information contained in the dependent and neglected child files. Section 41-3-205, MCA, provides: "Confidentialitx. (1) The case records of the department of social and rehabilitation services and its local affiliate, the county welfare department, the county attorney, and the court concerning actions taken under this chapter and all records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect shall be kept confidential except as provided by this section. Any person who permits or encourages the unauthorized dissemination of their contents is guilty of a misdemeanor. "(2) Records may be used by interagency interdisciplinary child protective teams as authorized under 41-3-108 for the purposes of assessing the needs of the child and family, formulating a treatment plan, and monitoring the plan. Members of the team are required to keep information about the subject individuals confidential. "(3) Records may be disclosed to a court for in camera inspection if relevant to an issue before it. The court may permit public disclosure if it finds such disclosure to be necessary for the fair resolution of an issue before it. "(4) Nothing in this section is intended to af fect the confidentiality of criminal court records of law enforcement agencies." (Em- phasis added. ) Relator argues that in order to ascertain the intent of the statute, the word "dissemination" must be strictly analyzed. He alleges that the meaning of the word "dissemination" is synonymous with "public disclosure" and is defined by the dictionary as "to broadcast" or "communicate widely." (Webster's International Dictionary, 2nd Ed. at 753.) Therefore, he argues that the statute does not apply to the type of communication involved here. The intent of a statute cannot be derived from the definition of one word. ,A statute derives its meaning from the entire body of words taken together. This Court in State ex rel. Freepan v. A b s t r a c e s Board of Examiners (1935), 99 Mont. 564, 577, 45 P.2d 668, 670, stated: "'The meaning of a given term employed in a statute must be measured and controlled by the connection in which it is employed, the evident purpose of the statute, and the subject to which it relates' (Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont. 608, 612, 214 Pac. 596), and, if the term has a well-defined meaning in the law, its use, without specific definition, will not render the Act inoperative for uncertainty (State ex rel. Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 Pac. 129)." Relator admits in his brief, and admitted at the hearing, that he knew the records of juvenile matters were generally protected and that one could not disseminate such information publicly. He also stated that he did not bother to look up the statute, but that he "would have expected to have found some provision for some kind of court hearing to get a ruling as to its ultimate public disclosure." Relator cannot argue that the statute is vague when he admits knowing that this type of statute exists and admits knowing that a court order is required to obtain the information in the file. Relator is an officer of the court, a licensed professional. He is not subject to the reasonable man standard but to a higher standard, one dictated by the nature of his profession. Relator further contends that the provision contained in section 41-3-205(3), MCA, which provides for court approval to release the information does not apply here because there was no issue before the court. Relator had simply to file a petition requesting the court to release the information and an "issue" would have been before the court . The next argument relator presents is that the information must be communicated to the defendant and co-counsel to determine if the information is relevant to their defense; also, that any requirement that defense counsel obtain a court order prior to that time makes it impossible to obtain such an order. The statute is clear that information relating to depenaent and neglected children will not be released unless a court order is obtained. To say that one needs to release the information before one can determine if it is relevant is contrary to the clear intent of the statute. If the information contained in the file is not relevant, then the attorney will just have to "discover" other sources of information. The attorney takes a chance that the file contains relevant information. Again, the attorney must obtain a court order before he obtains the information in the file, not after the fact. Finally, the relator contends that, "Authorized dissemination is not limited to statutory authorization." Relator suggests by his argument that persons who are not authorized by statute to receive the information often do and that he should not be singled out. The law is often applied discriminately. A police I I officer does not cite all speeders, drinking drivers, I negligent drivers, etc. The fact that relator was cited is part of the discretionary aspect of the law and simply I because a possible violation may have gone unnoticed does 1 not mean that all persons are thereby free to violate the , statute. The writ of review is hereby denied. i .-? I W e concur: I C h i e f Jus'tice M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber s p e c i a l l y concurs: I concur i n t h e conclusion of t h e majority t h a t t h e requested w r i t of review be denied. However, I do n o t concur i n a l l t h a t i s s a i d i n t h e majority opinion. I do n o t f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 41-3-205(3), MCA, s e t s o u t a procedure under which r e l a t o r could have p e t i t i o n e d t h e Court f o r a r e l e a s e of information and thereby c r e a t e d an " i s s u e " a s provided i n t h a t code section. I b e l i e v e paragraph (3) a p p l i e s where a c o u r t already has an i s s u e before it and record d i s c l o s u r e r e l a t e s i n some manner t o t h a t i s s u e . That i s n o t the f a c t s i t u a t i o n here. Nonetheless, I do f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 41-3-205 (1) contains a p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t unauthorized dissemination. That paragraph i n p a r t s t a t e s : "Any person who permits o r encourages t h e unauthorized dissemination of t h e i r contents i s g u i l t y of a misdemeanor." The f a c t s show a dissemination by r e l a t o r of information t o an a t t o r n e y and c l i e n t i n C a l i f o r n i a which was n o t authorized i n any manner. Relator is charged with a contempt under s e c t i o n 3-1- 501 ( c ) , MCA, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t provides: " (1) The following a c t s . . . i n r e s p e c t t o a c o u r t of j u s t i c e o r proceedings there- i n a r e contempts of t h e a u t h o r i t y of court: " ( c ) . . . v i o l a t i o n of duty by an attorney 11 . . . Relator i s both an a t t o r n e y and law professor and i s aware of t h e standards of professional conduct required of him i n those c a p a c i t i e s . Relator could r e a d i l y have contacted a judge of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n Missoula, whether i n person o r by telephone, and requested a u t h o r i t y t o disseminate t h e information. He chose i n s t e a d t o make an unauthorized dissemination t o t h e persons i n C a l i f o r n i a . Clearly t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of h i s duty a s an a t t o r n e y and i s t h e r e f o r e a contempt w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e . Relator i n good f a i t h was seeking t o h e l p a f r i e n d and c l i e n t and was faced w i t h l i m i t e d t i m e i n which t o f u r n i s h t h e information. However, I do n o t f i n d f a c t s warranting t h e unauthorized dissemination. I t h e r e f o r e j o i n i n t h e holding of t h e m a j o r i t y . M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n d i s s e n t l a t e r .