Title: Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2470.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2470 
BANFORD ET AL.; FERGUSON, APPELLEE, v. ALDRICH CHEMICAL  
COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2470.] 
Nuisance — Damages for annoyance and discomfort must be based on physical 
discomfort — Fear not separately compensable — Limitation of damages 
to those arising from particular explosion and evacuation upheld. 
(No. 2009-0305 — Submitted December 16, 2009 — Decided June 9, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 22600, 
180 Ohio App.3d 107, 2008-Ohio-6837. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} We must determine whether a plaintiff must present evidence of 
physical discomfort to recover damages for annoyance and discomfort in a 
nuisance claim.  In addition, we must determine whether the trial court properly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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limited evidence at trial regarding plaintiffs’ fears and concerns about future 
harm. 
{¶ 2} This case involved a trial on proximate cause and damages only 
resulting from the evacuation of residents within a one-mile radius of a factory 
following an explosion.  The defendant did not contest liability and the court 
granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the existence of a nuisance.  The 
plaintiffs alleged no personal injuries.  The case went to the jury on claims for 
out-of-pocket expenses and damages for the loss of use of property and 
annoyance and discomfort as a result of the explosion and evacuation only. 
{¶ 3} Before trial, the court ruled that evidence would be limited to the 
explosion and the 24-hour period of evacuation, that the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate physical discomfort in order to recover damages for annoyance and 
discomfort, and that fear alone would not be an independent item of damages.  
We agree.  Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we hold that in order to recover 
damages for annoyance and discomfort in a nuisance claim, a plaintiff must 
establish that the nuisance caused physical discomfort.  We also hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it limited evidence to damages resulting 
from the explosion and evacuation.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} Appellant, Aldrich Chemical Company, Inc., owned Isotec, a 
factory that distilled nitric oxide, a hazardous chemical.  On September 21, 2003, 
at approximately 10:00 a.m., there was an explosion at the Isotec factory followed 
by a shock wave.  One Isotec employee suffered cuts on his hand, but no other 
employees were injured.  Local emergency-services personnel evacuated residents 
living within a one-mile radius of the factory as a precautionary measure.  
Residents were permitted to return home approximately 24 hours later.  
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Approximately three months later, Aldrich permanently ceased operations at 
Isotec. 
{¶ 5} On December 1, 2003, Christine Banford and Doug Graeser, 
individually and on behalf of all others who lived and owned property within one 
mile of Isotec, filed a class-action complaint (case No. 03CV-8704) against 
Aldrich Chemical Company, Inc. and Aldrich Chemical Company, Inc., d.b.a. 
Isotec (“Aldrich”) for damages sustained as a result of the explosion and 
evacuation.  The trial court certified a limited class of homeowners and lessees in 
a partial class action.  There were other complaints filed by other residents based 
on the same facts and circumstances.1  The trial court consolidated the cases for 
purposes of pretrial and trial proceedings. 
{¶ 6} The court ordered the case to proceed in four parts.  The first phase 
was to determine liability as to the entire class.  The second phase was to 
determine individual compensatory damages.  The third and fourth phases 
involved a class determination of liability for punitive damages and, if necessary, 
an amount of punitive damages.  The trial court eventually dismissed all claims 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiffs had failed to 
produce sufficient evidence of severe and debilitating emotional injury.  The 
claims that remained included negligence, strict liability for engaging in an 
ultrahazardous activity, and nuisance. 
{¶ 7} Prior to trial, Aldrich decided not to contest liability, which 
eliminated the need to conduct Phase I of the case.  In April 2007, the case 
proceeded to trial on Phase II with a randomly selected group of plaintiffs 
                                          
 
1.  Susan Grooms and others filed case No. 05CV-7221, and Patricia Gray and others filed case 
No. 06CV-4053.  
 
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presenting their damages claims for out-of-pocket evacuation expenses, loss of 
use of property, and annoyance and discomfort.2   
{¶ 8} In advance of trial, the court ruled that only evidence regarding 
proximate cause and damages resulting from the explosion and evacuation would 
be admissible, and that evidence regarding events outside the 24-hour evacuation 
period, such as prior accidents at Isotec and public discussions after the 
evacuation, would be inadmissible unless the evidence related to the explosion 
and evacuation. 
{¶ 9} The court considered additional briefing on whether physical 
discomfort was required to recover damages for annoyance and discomfort.  
Before trial, the court ruled that the law required that the plaintiffs demonstrate 
physical discomfort in order to recover damages for annoyance and discomfort.  
Fear alone would not be an independent item of damage but evidence of fear 
could be admissible if relevant to other factual issues. 
{¶ 10} At trial, plaintiffs testified about their fears and concerns to the 
extent that they were relevant to the explosion and evacuation.  However, the 
court gave the jury the following limiting instruction: 
{¶ 11} “Let me explain to the jury, in this trial one of the items that is not 
the subject of a damage calculation by the jury are the fears or the subjective 
concerns of the homeowners, and there may be testimony in upcoming witnesses 
that may have relevance in a limited degree with respect to other testimony, but 
just so you understand at this point you are not to be – you will not be awarding 
any damages based upon any of the individual homeowner’s internal fears or 
concerns.” 
{¶ 12} Appellee, Taylor Ferguson, age ten at the time of the explosion, 
testified that she was visiting a friend when the explosion occurred.  Her friend’s 
                                          
 
2.  Some class members had participated in a claims-reimbursement process.   
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mother sent the girls to a basement crawl space following the explosion “for about 
five or six minutes.”  Ferguson testified that “it was really weird,” “everybody 
was upset,” and “it was just really awkward.”  She also testified that she was 
upset, worried, and concerned about her parents.  Ferguson and her parents spent 
the night at her grandparents’ house. 
{¶ 13} The jury returned verdicts in favor of individual plaintiffs in 
amounts ranging from $35 to $625.  The jury awarded Taylor Ferguson damages 
of $100 for annoyance and discomfort for the period before the evacuation. 
{¶ 14} Only Ferguson appealed.  She asserted that the trial court erred 
when instructing the jury that the fears or subjective concerns of the homeowners 
would not be subject to a damage calculation and that fear alone was not an item 
of compensable damages.  In addition, Ferguson asserted that the court erred 
when instructing the jury that there must be “an appreciable, substantial, tangible 
harm resulting in actual, material physical discomfort” for a plaintiff to recover 
damages for annoyance and discomfort.  Ferguson also asserted that the court 
should have permitted plaintiffs to recover for the loss of use and enjoyment of 
their property for any period after the 24-hour evacuation period. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 
{¶ 16} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  121 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2009-Ohio-2511, 907 N.E.2d 323. 
Proposition of Law I 
{¶ 17} The first issue before us is whether a plaintiff must present 
evidence of physical discomfort to recover damages for annoyance and 
discomfort in a nuisance claim.  “ ‘Nuisance’ is a term used to designate the 
wrongful invasion of a legal right or interest. It comprehends not only the 
wrongful invasion of the use and enjoyment of property, but also the wrongful 
invasion of personal legal rights and privileges generally.”  Taylor v. 
Cincinnati (1944), 143 Ohio St. 426, 431-432, 28 O.O. 369, 55 N.E.2d 724.  For 
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there to be an action for nuisance, the injury must be real, material, and 
substantial.  Eller v. Koehler (1903), 68 Ohio St. 51, 55, 67 N.E. 89.  Damages for 
nuisance may include diminution in the value of the property, costs of repairs, 
loss of use of the property, and compensation for annoyance, discomfort and 
inconvenience.  Widmer v. Fretti (1952), 95 Ohio App. 7, 16-17, 52 O.O. 343, 
116 N.E.2d 728; Ohio Stock Food Co. v. Gintling (1926), 22 Ohio App. 82, 153 
N.E. 341. 
{¶ 18} In this case, the trial court instructed the jury to consider three 
categories of damages:  loss of use of property, annoyance and discomfort, and 
evacuation expenses.  Regarding annoyance and discomfort, the trial court 
instructed:  
{¶ 19} “By a preponderance of the evidence, you will determine whether 
the plaintiffs suffered any personal annoyance and discomfort as a proximate 
result of the explosion and/or evacuation and, if so, what reasonable amount of 
money, if any, Aldrich ought to pay to the plaintiffs for that discomfort and 
annoyance. 
{¶ 20} “When considering annoyance and discomfort damages, no precise 
rule for ascertaining the damage can be given as, in the very nature of things, the 
degree of personal annoyance and discomfort is not susceptible to exact 
measurement.  However, a plaintiff may not recover for trifling annoyance and 
unsubstantiated or unrealized fears.  There must be an appreciable, substantial, 
tangible harm resulting in actual, material physical discomfort.  However, the 
plaintiffs need not demonstrate bodily injury to establish physical discomfort.  
Furthermore, evidence of pecuniary loss is not required to recover damages for 
discomfort and annoyance. 
{¶ 21} “Fear, standing alone, is not an item of compensable damages.  
However, testimony of fear may be considered for the limited purpose of 
determining whether the plaintiffs have suffered the compensable items of 
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damages of loss of use of property and annoyance and discomfort as defined by 
the Court.” 
The requirement of physical discomfort. 
{¶ 22} The trial court’s instruction requiring physical discomfort followed 
the standard in Antonik v. Chamberlain (1947), 81 Ohio App. 465, 37 O.O. 305, 
78 N.E.2d 752.  Antonik involved whether a private airport constituted a nuisance 
to nearby residents and should be enjoined.  The Summit County Court of 
Appeals, in deciding whether the airport constituted a nuisance, stated that a 
private nuisance “generally turns on the factual question whether the use to which 
the property is put is a reasonable use under the circumstances, and whether there 
is ‘an appreciable, substantial, tangible injury resulting in actual, material, 
physical discomfort, and not merely a tendency to injure.  It must be real and not 
fanciful or imaginary, or such as results merely in a trifling annoyance, 
inconvenience, or discomfort.’"  Id. at 476, quoting 39 American Jurisprudence, 
Nuisance, Section 30. 
{¶ 23} The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals followed Antonik in 
Schoenberg v. Davis (June 23, 1983), Cuyahoga App. No. 45611, 1983 WL 5501, 
in evaluating both the existence of a nuisance and damages in a dispute between 
neighbors over a driveway.  Id. at *3.  In Bullock v. Oles (Sept. 24, 2001), 
Mahoning App. No. 99CA223, 2001 WL 1199858, the Mahoning County Court 
of Appeals similarly analyzed damages for nuisance.  In Bullock, the county board 
of health had declared that runoff from a defective septic tank into the Bullocks’ 
property constituted a nuisance.  At trial, the plaintiffs testified that they were 
unable to use their back yard and swimming pool, that their grandchildren were 
unable to play in the yard, and that Mr. Bullock had to wear a mask while mowing 
grass and suffered from nausea, headaches, and fatigue.  The court of appeals 
concluded that this testimony sufficiently supported an award of damages for 
inconvenience, annoyance, and physical discomfort. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 24} Aldrich relies on Antonik and its progeny as authority for its 
position that physical discomfort is necessary in order to recover for annoyance 
and discomfort.  Ferguson contends that Antonik applies to determine the 
existence of a nuisance, but not damages after a nuisance is already established.  
Because Aldrich has admitted the existence of a nuisance, Ferguson claims that 
she need not reach that threshold of physical discomfort and may recover for fears 
or emotions without a physical component. 
{¶ 25} This argument, however, is logically inconsistent.  If the existence 
of a nuisance depends upon "an appreciable, substantial, tangible injury resulting 
in actual, material, physical discomfort," then it logically follows that the element 
of physical discomfort must be present for a plaintiff to have been damaged by the 
nuisance.  The same standard must apply whether evaluating the existence of a 
nuisance or evidence of the damages caused by the nuisance.  In this case, 
although Aldrich accepted legal responsibility for its actions, the legal standard 
for the existence of the nuisance must likewise apply to a determination of 
damages. 
{¶ 26} A physical component is inferred in much of our case law that 
discusses damages for annoyance and discomfort.  In the cases that have awarded 
damages for annoyance and discomfort, the type of the nuisance had affected a 
person’s senses, resulting in physical discomfort.  "Cases supporting recovery for 
personal discomfort or annoyance involve either excessive noise, dust, smoke, 
soot, noxious gases, or disagreeable odors as a premise for awarding 
compensation."  Widner v. Fretti, 95 Ohio App. 7, 18, 52 O.O. 343, 116 N.E.2d 
728.  These conditions affect one’s sight, sound, smell, hearing, or touch, which 
may cause a physical discomfort.  See McClung v. N. Bend Coal & Coke Co. 
(1895), 9 Ohio C.C. 259 (smoke, soot, or gases upon the plaintiff's property 
caused physical discomfort or injury);  Frey v. Queen City Paper Co. (1946), 79 
Ohio App. 64, 34 O.O. 454, 66 N.E.2d 252 (smokestack blew coal particles over 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
the plaintiff's house, clothing, and even food);  Miller v. Horn (June 28, 1996), 
Clark App. No. 95-CA-113, 114, 1996 WL 354756 (odors from nearby kennel 
caused gagging);  Bullock v. Oles, Mahoning App. No. 99CA223, 2001 WL 
1199858 (defective septic tank that discharged into neighbor's yard caused 
nausea, headaches, and fatigue);  Polster v. Webb (June 21, 2001), Cuyahoga 
App. No. 77523, 2001 WL 703875 (damages for annoyance and discomfort 
caused by the dirt, noise, and smell entering plaintiffs' residence from nearby 
nuisance). 
{¶ 27} In cases in which courts have determined that circumstances did 
not rise to the level of nuisance and refused to award damages for annoyance and 
discomfort, the offending situation had no effect on the senses and thus no 
physical component of annoyance and discomfort.  Rautsaw v. Clark (1985), 22 
Ohio App.3d 20, 20 OBR 54, 488 N.E.2d 243 (no nuisance or injury from trees 
that grew onto a neighbor’s fence);  Schoenberger v. Davis, Cuyahoga App. No. 
45611, 1983 WL 5501 (no nuisance or damages to a homeowner when neighbor 
placed railroad ties and surveyor stakes over driveway that infringed on  the 
homeowner’s property). 
{¶ 28} It has long been recognized that a nuisance must materially 
interfere with physical comfort.  Weishann v. Kemper (1928), 27 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 
269 278.  “ ‘The discomforts must be physical, not such as depend upon taste or 
imagination.  But whatever is offensive physically to the senses, and by such 
offensiveness makes life uncomfortable, is a nuisance * * *.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Co. (1869), 20 N.J.Eq. 201, 205-206.  
Consequently, we hold that in order to recover damages for annoyance and 
discomfort in a nuisance claim, a plaintiff must establish that the nuisance caused 
physical discomfort. 
Fear and emotional harm alone are insufficient for damages  
for annoyance and discomfort. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} In Ohio, a person may pursue a claim for damages for emotional 
distress without manifestation of physical injury.  Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759.  This is premised upon a negligent or 
intentional act that results in emotional injuries that are foreseeable.  Id.  The 
emotional injury or distress must be beyond trifling mental disturbance, mere 
upset, or hurt feelings.  It must be both severe and debilitating.  Id. at 78.  Here, 
the plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress were dismissed because they did not 
rise to the compensable level of severe and debilitating. 
{¶ 30} Nuisance, however, involves a restriction or infringement upon the 
use and enjoyment of property.  Columbus Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Freeland 
(1861), 12 Ohio St. 392.  It must cause damages that are real, material, and 
substantial.  Id.  A plaintiff may seek damages for decrease in the value of 
property, for the loss of use of the property, and for discomfort and annoyance 
that are related to the use of the property.  Frey v. Queen City Paper Co., 79 Ohio 
App. 64, 34 O.O. 454, 66 N.E.2d 252. For instance, a person may recover for 
annoyance and discomfort for a nuisance, including fear and other emotions, 
without a physical component if the annoyance or discomfort are connected to the 
person’s loss of use or loss of enjoyment of property.  In Stoll v. Parrott & 
Strawser Properties, Inc., Warren App. CA2002-12-133, 2003-Ohio-5717, 2003 
WL 22427815, ¶ 25, the jury awarded damages for annoyance and discomfort that 
the plaintiffs experienced in the use and enjoyment of their property.  The 
plaintiffs testified that they had been unable to leave their property when it 
flooded due to work in a nearby development.  After each flooding incident, they 
spent two to three days cleaning up debris in their yard. 
{¶ 31} In the case before us, the Phase II trial involved proximate cause 
and damages only.  To facilitate the trial, the court narrowed the issues and 
focused on the evidence necessary for the plaintiffs to establish the categories of 
damages available.  Prior to trial, the court had the parties brief the law on 
January Term, 2010 
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damages for annoyance and discomfort.  The court carefully explained its 
reasoning behind the jury instruction on damages in light of the limited issues 
before the court in Phase II.  Because the existence of a nuisance was not before 
the jury, the jury had no instruction to address the legal elements of nuisance.  
The trial court decided that the jury should be instructed on what was meant by 
damages for annoyance and discomfort under the facts of this case and how to 
measure those damages.  The court concluded that the instruction from former 
Ohio Jury Instructions Section 345.13, now (2009) Section 621.13.4, was 
insufficient because it did not limit damages for annoyance and discomfort. 
{¶ 32} During the trial, the court allowed the plaintiffs to testify about 
their emotions, fears, and concerns so long as the evidence was kept within the 
limits of the precipitating event of the explosion and the subsequent evacuation.  
We cannot say that under the circumstances of this case, the court abused its 
discretion when it instructed the jury that physical discomfort was necessary to 
support damages for annoyance and discomfort and that fear alone was not 
compensable. 
Proposition of Law II 
{¶ 33} In the second proposition of law, Aldrich contends that the trial 
court properly excluded evidence regarding prior incidents that occurred at Isotec 
and town hall meetings that were conducted after the explosion and evacuation.  
The plaintiffs had sought to introduce these events as evidence of a continuing 
nuisance and their alleged loss of use and personal annoyance and discomfort for 
the period of time after the explosion until December 2003 when Aldrich ceased 
operations at Isotec.  The trial court ruled that such evidence was not relevant to 
Phase II issues of proximate cause and damages and that it was inadmissible per 
Evid.R. 403 because its probative value would be substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 34} Prior to trial, the court addressed several evidentiary motions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Regarding Aldrich’s motion to exclude 
evidence of damages occurring outside the established 24-hour evacuation period, 
the court agreed that, theoretically, the plaintiffs may have suffered annoyance 
and discomfort before the evacuation that may have continued after the 
evacuation period.  However, the court ruled that testimony regarding damages 
outside the 24-hour evacuation period would be admissible only if the damage 
resulted from the explosion or evacuation. 
{¶ 35} At trial, the plaintiffs proffered evidence that there had been a 
previous explosion at Isotec in 1995 and a leak in 1998 and that these incidents 
had been discussed within the community at town meetings following the 2003 
explosion.  Some plaintiffs intended to testify that the information they learned at 
the town meetings increased their fears and added to their annoyance and 
discomfort. 
{¶ 36} Ferguson contends that this evidence is relevant to the scope of 
damages because the nuisance was not just the explosion and evacuation but also 
Isotec’s ongoing operations that continued until December 2003.  Ferguson 
argues that plaintiffs should be entitled to produce evidence of annoyance and 
discomfort, including fear, until the nuisance was abated. 
{¶ 37} The precipitating event of this nuisance was the isolated explosion 
that resulted in a precautionary evacuation for 24 hours.  For there to be a 
continuing nuisance, the tortious conduct must be ongoing and generating new 
violations.  Kramer v. Angel’s Path, L.L.C., 174 Ohio App.3d 359, 367, 2007-
Ohio-7099, 882 N.E.2d 46, ¶ 18. The plaintiffs did not allege any subsequent 
explosions.  Instead, Ferguson relies on unrelated prior events at Isotec unknown 
to plaintiffs at the time and on comments made during subsequent town hall 
meetings that generated ongoing fears and concerns about Isotec operations in 
general.  However, unsubstantiated or unrealized fears are not compensable 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
damages under a theory of nuisance.  Miller v. Horn, Clark App. No. 95-CA-113, 
-114, 1996 WL 354756.  The trial court also properly concluded that these events 
were not related to the explosion and evacuation and were inadmissible per 
Evid.R. 403. 
{¶ 38} The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial 
court.  State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
529, 533, 751 N.E.2d 1032.  The trial judge is in a significantly better position to 
analyze whether testimony or evidence is relevant or irrelevant and the impact of 
the evidence on the jury; thus the court's decision will be reversed only upon a 
showing of an abuse of discretion.  Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 27, 31, 
556 N.E.2d 150.  “Abuse of discretion” implies that the court acted in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner.  State ex rel. Sartini v. Yost, 
96 Ohio St.3d 37, 41, 2002-Ohio-3317, 770 N.E.2d 584.  The abuse of discretion 
must materially prejudice a party in order the for trial court’s decision to be 
reversed.  Krischbaum v. Dillon (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 66, 567 N.E.2d 1291. 
{¶ 39} The trial court organized this multiparty litigation in phases, and 
the parties knew in advance that Phase II would involve issues relating to 
proximate cause and damages only.  The court ruled that Phase II would not 
address the cause of the explosion (Phase I) or issues related to punitive damages 
(Phases III and IV).  The claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress had 
already been dismissed because of insufficient evidence. 
{¶ 40} In pretrial rulings, the court addressed the extent of the Phase II 
evidentiary issues.  After the parties filed pretrial briefs on the extent of damages 
for annoyance and discomfort in a nuisance claim, the trial court ruled that 
evidence that related to the cause of the explosion, prior incidents at Isotec, and 
events that occurred after the evacuation period were not relevant to Phase II 
compensatory damages and, therefore, were inadmissible.  Thus, the court 
properly limited testimony to damages resulting from the explosion and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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evacuation.  Evidence regarding Isotec’s past history and prior events that may 
have occurred at the factory would have no impact on Ferguson’s annoyance and 
discomfort experienced during the explosion and evacuation.  In addition, 
comments made at town meetings following the 24-hour evacuation period 
likewise would not be relevant to these damages.  The trial court recognized that 
this nuisance arose from a single explosion and was not ongoing.  Therefore, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the evidence to damages 
resulting from the explosion and evacuation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} The trial court properly instructed the jury on damages for 
annoyance and discomfort in a nuisance claim and did not abuse its discretion 
when it limited evidence to damages resulting from the explosion and evacuation.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 42} The most salient issue in the case before us is that the defendant-
appellant, Aldrich Chemical Company, Inc., did not contest liability as to 
nuisance.  The majority underemphasizes that fact.  In admitting nuisance, 
Aldrich admits “the wrongful invasion of the use and enjoyment of property, 
[and] also the wrongful invasion of personal legal rights and privileges generally.” 
Taylor v. Cincinnati (1944), 143 Ohio St. 426, 432, 28 O.O. 369, 55 N.E.2d 724.  
It has admitted that it has caused “material and substantial” injury.  Eller v. 
Koehler (1903), 68 Ohio St. 51, 55, 67 N.E. 89.  The plaintiffs did not have to 
prove the elements of their cause of action – they had to prove their damages. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 43} The proper inquiry in a nuisance claim is not whether the 
discomfort or annoyance was physical, but rather whether it was substantial: 
“There is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, 
of a kind that would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by 
property in normal condition and used for a normal purpose.” 4 Restatement of 
the Law 2d, Torts (1979), Section 821F.  Again, in admitting nuisance, Aldrich 
has already admitted that the plaintiffs met this threshold, i.e., that the harm they 
suffered was sufficient to constitute nuisance.  It was for the jury to determine 
how the plaintiffs would be compensated for the harm they suffered. 
{¶ 44} The admission of nuisance made the trial judge’s instruction from 
3 Ohio Jury Instructions (2006), Section 345.13(2) and (4), particularly 
applicable.  The OJI jury instruction makes a determination of any damages from 
annoyance and discomfort the next step after determining the existence of a 
nuisance and the nuisance’s proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff:  
{¶ 45} “ANNOYANCE AND DISCOMFORT. If you find by the greater 
weight of the evidence that the defendant created a nuisance and the nuisance 
proximately caused damages to the plaintiff, you will further decide whether the 
plaintiff suffered personal annoyance and discomfort. When considering 
annoyance and discomfort damages, no precise rule for ascertaining the damage 
can be given as, in the very nature of things, the degree of personal annoyance 
and discomfort is not susceptible to exact measurement.  Therefore, you must 
decide what the plaintiff should have in money, if any, and what the defendants 
ought to pay, if any, in view of the discomfort or annoyance to which the plaintiff 
may have been subjected.” Section 345.13(4). 
{¶ 46} The OJI instruction does not include a requirement of physical 
discomfort, nor should it.  This court has never required physical discomfort in 
the calculation of a damages award in a nuisance claim.  Further, in regard to 
damages for wrongful invasions of property, the Restatement says nothing about a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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requirement of physical discomfort to the plaintiff in order for the plaintiff to 
recover damages for annoyance and discomfort — it merely states that one 
element of damages is “discomfort and annoyance” to occupants. 4 Restatement 
of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 929(1)(c).  In commenting about those damages, the 
Restatement establishes a delineation between bodily harm and discomfort and 
annoyance:   
{¶ 47} “Discomfort and annoyance to an occupant of the land and to the 
members of the household are distinct grounds of compensation for which in 
ordinary cases the person in possession is allowed to recover in addition to the 
harm to his proprietary interests.  He is also allowed to recover for his own 
serious sickness or other substantial bodily harm * * *.” Comment e to Section 
929(1)(c). 
{¶ 48} The plaintiffs’ fear and anxiety should have been considered by the 
jury as part of damages for annoyance and discomfort.  Mental reactions to an 
invasion of property can form a legitimate basis to prove a nuisance claim. “In 
determining whether the harm would be suffered by a normal member of the 
community, fears and other mental reactions common to the community are to be 
taken into account, even though they may be without scientific foundation or 
other support in fact.”  Restatement, Section 821F, Comment f. 
{¶ 49} Plaintiffs still must prove that their discomfort and annoyance — 
caused entirely by fear or anxiety or not — was worthy of a monetary award.  I 
agree with the appellate court below that “internal fears and concerns should 
neither be excluded as potential elements of the annoyance damages nor 
segregated as discrete components of annoyance damages,” 2008-Ohio-6873, ¶ 
108, and thus dissent from the majority’s holding regarding Proposition of Law I. 
{¶ 50} Since fear and anxiety were factors the jury should have 
considered in regard to damages for discomfort and annoyance, the jury should 
have been able to consider evidence of fear and anxiety that continued from the 
January Term, 2010 
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time of the explosion through the abatement of the nuisance three months later.  
All of the bases of that fear, including evidence of prior incidents shared at town 
meetings after the explosion and evacuation, should have been admitted into 
evidence.  The jury should have been able to consider how the Aldrich plant’s 
checkered history affected the plaintiffs after the explosion.  Accordingly, I 
dissent from the majority’s holding regarding Proposition of Law II. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Dyer, Garofalo, Mann & Schultz, John A. Smalley, and Jeffrey G. 
Chinault; Leppla Associates and Taylor Jones Jr.; CR Washington Co., L.P.A., 
and Cheryl R. Washington; and Behnke, Martin & Schulte, Richard W. Schulte, 
and Stephen D. Behnke, for appellee. 
Faruki, Ireland & Cox, P.L.L., Martin A. Foos, and Charles J. Faruki; and 
Thompson Coburn, L.L.P, and Gordon L. Ankney, for appellant. 
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