Title: Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.1989 WY 7767 P.2d 158Case Number: 87-120, 87-121Decided: 01/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LLOYD K. 
HASHIMOTO, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARATHON 
PIPE LINE CO., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND PENTON JERRY DIXON, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
MARATHON 
PIPE LINE CO., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND PENTON JERRY DIXON, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
LLOYD K. 
HASHIMOTO, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
John E. 
Stanfield and Bruce Waters of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for Hashimoto.

 
 
Richard E. 
Day of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, and Daniel J. Sullenbarger 
of Marathon Pipe Line Co., Houston, Tex., for Marathon Pipe Line 
Co.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Ret.*

 
 

* Retired 
June 30, 1988.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     These cross appeals 
involve two automobile accidents where the same person was victimized by two 
rear-end collisions in about eight months. Victim Lloyd K. Hashimoto (Hashimoto) 
is appealing his jury verdict awarded damages as inadequate based on several 
contended trial errors. The colliding vehicle's driver, Penton Jerry Dixon 
(Dixon), and his employer, Marathon Pipe Line 
Company (Marathon), are appealing the award of 
deposition costs to Hashimoto and contended inadequate award to them of other 
litigative costs. Hashimoto comprehensively phrases the issues for which he 
seeks review as:

 
 
1. Is it 
fair to relieve the defendant of any burden of proof as to affirmative defenses 
asserted by him?

 
 
2. Is it 
fair to force the plaintiff to disprove affirmative defenses asserted by the 
defendant?

 
 
3. Should 
the Wyoming Supreme Court adopt the comprehensive Restatement rules as to apportioning 
damages in cases involving multiple tort-feasors?

 
 
4. Between 
an injured victim and a negligent wrongdoer, who should bear the burden of proof 
as to whether the harm and the damages are divisible and can be 
apportioned?

 
 
5. Is it 
fair to relieve a wrongdoer from any burden of proof on his claim that a second 
collision caused some or all of the injured victim's 
damages?

 
 
6. Is it 
fair to force the plaintiff to prove his damages to a "reasonable certainty" in 
a case involving apportionment of damages?

 
 
7. Should 
the "reasonable certainty" standard be abandoned in Wyoming as to the proof 
of damages?

 
 
8. Is it 
time to replace "reasonable certainty" and "reasonable medical certainty" with 
"reasonable probability" and "reasonable medical probability" in civil cases? 
[Emphasis in original.]

 
 

[¶2.]     Dixon and Marathon tender 
these issues:

 
 
1. The 
trial court abused its discretion in the award of discovery deposition costs to 
the Plaintiff for a deposition not used during the course of trial proceedings 
or during the trial itself.

 
 
2. The 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to award costs to the Defendant for 
pretrial interviews with Plaintiff's examining physicians and for expert medical 
witness fees for the time actually spent in court by subpoenaed medical 
witnesses.

 
 

[¶3.]     We affirm on 
Hashimoto's appeal, although determining that reasonable certainty is not the 
appropriate standard of damage proof in civil cases, and affirm awarded costs on 
the cross appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Hashimoto, while 
stopped to make a left turn, was rear-ended by Dixon as driving a Marathon vehicle. Dixon was speeding, ran a stop sign, and having 
consumed several beers within working hours immediately before, was under the 
influence of alcohol - with a blood alcohol test of .197%. Neck injuries to 
Hashimoto resulted from this first collision.

 
 

[¶5.]     The second collision 
occurred about eight months later on October 9, 1984; coincidentally while 
Hashimoto was again stopped, waiting to make another left-hand turn. As now 
rear-ended by Todd Morgan (Morgan), this second collision caused injuries to 
Hashimoto's lower spine, with some aggravation of the earlier collision neck 
injuries.1

 
 

[¶6.]     Hashimoto filed a suit 
for damages resulting from both collisions on December 16, 1985, by suing 
Dixon, Marathon,2 and Morgan,3 including claims for punitive 
damages against Marathon and Dixon. Marathon was awarded summary judgment on punitive damages. 
In advance of trial, the trial court ruled that because of the second collision, 
Hashimoto had to meet the burden of proving to a "reasonable certainty" that his 
subsequent problems were caused by the first collision and not the second to 
recover from the two remaining defendants, Dixon 
and Marathon. Jury instructions as subsequently 
given also reflected that same decision. The jury returned a judgment awarding 
Hashimoto $4,500 for actual damages and punitive damages against Dixon of $3,000. Various 
motions were heard regarding awardable costs with judgment for a net award to 
Hashimoto of $241.49 ($806.49 as offset by Marathon's and Dixon's awarded costs of 
$565). Following a denied motion for new trial by Hashimoto, both parties timely 
appealed.

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 

[¶7.]     Although the parties 
collectively phrased numerous issues, we choose to address them by three 
categorizations: (1) burden of proof; (2) reasonable certainty; and (3) 
costs.

 
 
1. Burden of Proof When Successive Injuries 
Occur.

 
 

[¶8.]     Hashimoto contends that 
Marathon and Dixon have the burden in a 
successive impact case to prove and apportion the damages resulting from 
injuries for which they are responsible or, if that apportionment is not 
possible, Marathon and Dixon may then be liable for all damages. We 
disagree.

 
 

[¶9.]     For this first 
impression issue in this state, the trial court correctly applied the reasoning 
of Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 (1971). Bruckman 
is a case remarkably similar where the plaintiff was injured in two automobile 
accidents occurring within a little less than a year of each other. Defendants 
were the owner and driver of the truck involved in the first collision, and the 
plaintiff claimed aggravation of the first injuries caused by a second 
collision. That court held it was error to give an instruction which placed the 
burden of proving plaintiff's disability on the defendants since their liability 
should be limited to the damages proximately caused by their negligence. 
Bruckman, 487 P.2d  at 568.

 
 

[¶10.]  We are cognizant, as was the Bruckman 
court, of the principle that when a tort-feasor injures someone with a 
pre-existing condition, he is liable for the total damage when no apportionment 
between the pre-existing condition and the damage defendant caused can be made. 
Thus, the defendant must take his victim as he finds him. See Alexander v. 
White, 488 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Colo. App. 1971), where the Bruckman situation is 
distinguished from a pre-existing condition scenario.

 
 
[B]ut it is 
quite another thing to say that a tort-feasor is liable, not only for the damage 
which he caused, but also for injuries subsequently suffered by the injured 
person.

 
 
Bruckman, 
487 P.2d  at 568.

 
 

[¶11.]  The ultimate injuries were caused by the 
second collision which is a distinct intervening cause because the first 
injuries had stabilized. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to hold 
Marathon and Dixon liable for the entire damage when no 
correlation between the two accidents was shown. Essentially, Hashimoto did not 
prove that the second collision, which was the subsequent injury-producing act, 
was a sequela of the first collision. Additionally, no foreseeability of the 
second accident was shown by Hashimoto and consequently, the first injuries were 
not the proximate cause of the second accident. Proximate cause cannot be 
established by mere guess or conjecture, but rather must be proved by evidence 
of probative force as "based upon reasonable probabilities and which precludes 
the fact finder from having to make an arbitrary choice between unproved 
conclusions." State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Farah 
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 691 (Tex. App. 1984).

 
 

[¶12.]  Hashimoto has shown no reason for this 
court to abandon the general rule

 
 
that one 
injured by the negligence of another is entitled to recover the damages 
proximately caused by the act of the tort-feasor, and the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to establish that the damages he seeks were proximately 
caused by the negligence of the defendant.

 
 
Bruckman, 
487 P.2d  at 568. See also Annotation, Proximate Cause: Liability of Tortfeasor 
for Injured Person's Subsequent Injury or Reinjury, 31 A.L.R.3d 1000, 1003-04 
(1970).

 
 

[¶13.]  In accord with our result, see Guerrero 
v. Bailey, 658 P.2d 278, 279 (Colo. App. 1982), where the original and 
subsequent injuries were not physical in nature; Brown v. Kreuser, 38 Colo. App. 
554, 560 P.2d 105, 109 (1977); Alexander, 488 P.2d at 1125-26; Jurney v. 
Lubeznik, 72 Ill. App.2d 117, 218 N.E.2d 799, 806 (1966); Becker v. D & E 
Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Iowa 1976); McGuire v. Oliver, 227 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1969), where the plaintiff was involved in three accidents within 
seventeen days; Bolin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 204 So. 2d 49, 51 
(La. App. 1967); Watkins v. Hand, 198 
Neb. 451, 253 N.W.2d 287, 289 (1977); Armstrong 
v. Bergeron, 104 N.H. 85, 178 A.2d 293, 294 (1962); Williams v. Gragston, 7 
Ohio App.3d 
369, 455 N.E.2d 1075 (1982); and 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 115 (1988). See also G. 
Douthwaite, Jury Instructions on Medical Issues, ch. 9 at 512 (3d ed. 1987) 
which differentiates the Bruckman situation from one where the second injury is 
a result of ordinary medical malpractice.

 
 

[¶14.]  This decision on burden of proof 
dispositively resolves Hashimoto's first five issues as presented by these 
facts.

 
 
2. Reasonable 
Certainty.

 
 

[¶15.]  Hashimoto's next three issues concern the 
phraseology of jury instructions. Hashimoto alleges error in giving three 
instructions:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13

 
 
The 
defendants in this case have admitted liability and therefore you must fix the 
amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Hashimoto for those 
elements of damage proved by the evidence to have been caused by the negligence 
of the Defendants, taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of 
the injury. The claimed elements of damage are:

 
 
(a) The 
pain and suffering experienced as a result of the injuries and those reasonably certain to be experienced in 
the future.

 
 
(b) 
Disability.

 
 
(c) Loss of 
enjoyment of life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the 
award given for any other element of damage, and any loss of enjoyment of life 
reasonably certain to be experienced 
in the future.

 
 
Whether any 
of the elements have been proved is for you to determine. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 14

 
 
The 
objective sought in awarding damages is to compensate the Plaintiff for loss, 
and although damages can not always be calculated with absolute certainty, they 
must be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty to be 
recoverable. Remote, uncertain and conjectural or speculative damages are not 
allowed. [Emphasis added.]

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15

 
 
There is no 
formula the court can give you for the determination of damage for pain and 
suffering or loss of enjoyment of life or disability, or any future damages as 
may be reasonably certain to arise. It is not necessary that any witness shall 
have expressed any opinion as to the dollar amount of damages therefor. Your 
award, if any, should be such sum as will fairly and adequately compensate the 
plaintiff. Furthermore, the arguments of counsel as to the amount of damages is 
not evidence of reasonable compensation. The amount awarded, if any, rests 
within your sound discretion and is for you to determine, taking into 
consideration all the evidence in this case and from your knowledge, 
observation, and experience in life. Your award, if any, should be for what 
damages are reasonable and just.

 
 
It is 
insufficient for the litigant in objection to merely state that the instruction 
is not complete or an accurate statement of the law. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 
1975). See also Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, 
P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987); Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488 
(Wyo. 1965); Com. v. Duke, 750 S.W.2d 432 
(Ky. 1988); 
and W.R.C.P. 51.

 
 
Error may 
not be assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement 
of the matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and 
indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted, * * 
*.

 
 
Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 968 (Wyo. 1973).

 
 
"In 
reviewing alleged errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone 
sufficient to reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf, 
Inc., Wyo., 
634 P.2d 908 (1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established 
by the parties. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, supra [526 P.2d 986 
(Wyo. 
1974)]."

 
 
Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Wyo. 1985) 
(quoting from Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 
1983)).

 
 
In order to 
hold an improper instruction reversible, the record must show that substantial 
rights were affected. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. For an error to be harmful, there must 
be a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might 
have been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the appellant to show 
where the error is prejudicial. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). Merely showing an 
error occurred does not create a presumption of prejudice as injury to an 
appellant. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 
(1984).

 
 
Condict, 
743 P.2d  at 885.

 
 

[¶16.]  Hashimoto's claimed error with the jury 
instructions pertains to the burden of proof and that the future damages had to 
be proven on a basis of "reasonable certainty" rather than "reasonable 
probability" or "reasonable medical probability." The issue as to the burden of 
proof was properly dealt with in the preceding section and thus, there was no 
error giving the instructions that required Hashimoto to prove his own 
damages.

 
 

[¶17.]  Initially, we note that Instruction No. 
15 was not objected to by Hashimoto. W.R.C.P. 51 mandates in part that "[n]o 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection." Thus, this court is precluded from reviewing any potential error 
with this instruction unless the giving of it amounted to plain error. Cutbirth 
v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Morris v. 
State, 644 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1982); Alberts v. 
State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982).

 
 

[¶18.]  Instruction Nos. 134 and 145 were properly objected to below; 
therefore, the propriety of giving these two instructions which utilized the 
"reasonable certainty" standard will be addressed.6

 
 

[¶19.]  While we note that the phrase "reasonable 
certainty" is used in many of the pattern civil damage instructions,7 we find the standard to be 
illogical and thus improper.8 McElroy v. Luster, 254 S.W.2d 893 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1953) provides a discussion of the three views and differentiated 
approaches. The first comes from jurisdictions which adopt the "reasonable 
probability" rule, the second view as an acceptance by some jurisdictions of the 
"reasonable certainty" rule with a liberal interpretation of the phrase which 
equates "reasonable certainty" with "reasonable probability," and the third view 
utilizes the "reasonable certainty" rule with a strict requirement that 
"reasonable certainty" means "free from doubt" or "reasonably free from 
doubt."9

 
 

[¶20.]  Wyoming's view of apparently accepting 
the "reasonable probability" rule can be traced back to an early case of Mahoney 
v. Pearce, 38 Wyo. 151, 265 P. 446, 449 (1928), interpreting the phrase 
"reasonably compensate" in a jury instruction involving personal injury to not 
be prejudicial because "future annoyance and pain was probable * * *." See 
Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 805 (1952) where Chief Justice 
Blume was faced with a situation where the trial court refused the requested 
instruction which included the "reasonable certainty" terminology, and one issue 
on appeal was whether the deletion of the phrase "reasonable certainty" was in 
error in the future pain and suffering jury instruction. This court found no 
error because the instruction amounted to the Mahoney requirement. Borzea, 258 P.2d  at 806.

 
 
"The use of 
the terms `reasonably certain' in defining the degree of proof required of the 
defendant, was clearly objectionable. `Certain' means `free from doubt,' (Webst. 
Dict. Word certain;') and to say that proof of a fact must be made reasonably 
certain is by the literal import of the words tantamount to saying the proof 
must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. This has been expressly held as to the 
phrase `moral certainty,' * * * which we take it is equivalent to the words 
`reasonable certainty,' * * *."

 
 
McElroy, 
254 S.W.2d  at 895 (quoting from St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 
Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 (1888)).

 
 
The phrase 
"with reasonable certainty" went far beyond the simple requirement of a 
preponderance of the evidence. It put the unwarranted burden on plaintiff of 
proving defendant's negligence by a much higher degree of proof. To require 
plaintiff to prove defendant's negligence to "a reasonable certainty" was to 
require him to prove it to such degree as to leave no reasonable doubt, which 
was equivalent to saying that he must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. It is 
of course well known that in prosecutions by the State the guilt of a defendant 
must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" but that requirement has no place 
whatsoever in a civil action. Payne v. Reed, 332 Mo. 343, 59 S.W.2d 43 
[(1933)].

 
 
Stephens v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Mo. App. 
1948).

 
 

[¶21.]  We note in DeLuna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 
(Wyo. 1972) 
that this court used the terms "reasonable certainty" and "reasonable 
probability" interchangeably in a case involving exhibit tampering. However, the 
concepts behind the two phrases are not the same, and we hold that the words 
"reasonable probability" should more precisely be the standard employed in civil 
personal injury jury instructions to avoid confusion. As the Supreme Court of 
Errors of Connecticut in Johnson v. Connecticut 
Co., 85 Conn. 
438, 83 A. 530, 531 (1912) aptly phrased it:

 
 
"Reasonable 
certainty" and "reasonable probability" bear no resemblance to each other, and 
judicial construction which brings them into apposite relation seems to us 
forced, perhaps, to save the appearance of a rule which violates a fundamental 
of the theory of evidence. This attempt has been aided by text-book writers who 
no doubt saw that the requirement of proof of future injuries to a reasonable 
certainty was an exception to the ordinary requirement of 
proof.

 
 

[¶22.]  Justice Rose, dissenting in Olson v. 
Federal American Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 719 (Wyo. 1977), pointed out the difference between 
"possible" and "probability," as both terms are used in a medical 
setting:

 
 
We are 
involved in an area which does not lend itself to medical certainties - only to 
probabilities and likelihoods.

 
 

Id. at 724. 
Consequently, with damages in a personal injury situation dependent upon medical 
testimony as much as worker's compensation injuries are dependent upon medical 
certainty,10 it makes no sense to hold injured 
parties to a standard of "reasonable certainty." See Ortkiese v. Clarson & 
Ewell Engineering, 126 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1961) for a case finding error with the 
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in the worker's compensation 
arena.

 
 
From 
Hippocrates to the Mayos and the Oschners, the medical profession has progressed 
by research and experimentation, by chasing the guinea pig through the 
laboratory. In this manner it has progressed so rapidly to new and better 
methods of treatment, if it knew any such rule as reasonable medical certainty 
today, it would be discarded for a different one tomorrow, * * 
*.

 
 

Id. at 
564.

 
 

[¶23.]  For cases clearly finding fault with 
proving damages to a reasonable certainty as exceeding the burden of proof in 
civil cases, see Leggett v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 72 Ill. App. 577 (1897); 
and St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 
(1888). In applying the English language as it is written, we would not find the 
phrases "reasonable probability" and "reasonable certainty" to be equivalent. 
State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain, 350 Mo. 316, 165 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1942); Johnson, 83 A.  at 531. The term "reasonable probability" is 
equivocal, and is not synonymous with reasonable certainty. Hallum v. 
Village of Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051, 1053 
(1904).

 
 

[¶24.]  For a case that refers to "reasonably 
certain" in an instruction for damages for future consequences of the injury as 
not equating with "reasonable probability," and finding the appropriate standard 
to be "reasonable probability," see Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Harriett, 80 
Tex. 73, 15 S.W. 556, 558-59 (1891). See Brown v. Forrester & Nace Box Co., 
243 S.W. 330, 331 (Mo. 1922) for the proposition that changing the word "likely" 
in a jury instruction to "reasonable certain" caused the meaning of the 
instruction to substantially change, since "likely" referred to "probable" 
injury which would be one more reasonably expected to happen than not to happen, 
and a "reasonably certain" injury would be one that human experience shows 
nearly always results from such a defect.

 
 

[¶25.]  Contrarily, some authorities have 
construed the phrases "reasonable certainty" and "reasonable probability" to be 
equivalent which redefinition we choose not to follow. See Lane v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 396, 308 N.W.2d 503, 512 (1981); Marion v. 
American Smelting & Refining Co., 192 Neb. 457, 222 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1974); 
Wilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N.C. 20, 62 S.E. 748, 750 (1908); Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 53 Ohio App. 255, 4 N.E.2d 700, 705 (1935); and Holt 
v. School District No. 71 of King County, 102 Wn. 442, 173 P. 335, 338 (1918). 
For a case finding the words "reasonably certain" to be the same as "probable," 
see Swift & Co. v. Raleigh, 54 Ill. App. 44 
(1894).

 
 

[¶26.]  We find error in the standard utilized to 
prove future earnings in both instructions given and the substitute instruction 
proposed by Hashimoto; however, we fail to see where Hashimoto has demonstrated 
a prejudicial error.

 
 

[¶27.]  Although we find the use of "reasonable 
certainty" as an improper phrase, borrowed from the criminal context into the 
civil context, we do recognize the jury in this case still found for Hashimoto 
even when applying this greater burden of proof. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. 
Co. v. Burke, 81 S.W. 774, 775 (Tex. App. 1904), where the court construes the 
phrase "reasonable degree of certainty" to "mean a higher degree of evidence 
than is furnished by a preponderance of the evidence." Therefore, for the jury 
to have concluded that the damages were proven to a "reasonable certainty" they 
necessarily had to find implicitly that they were proven well over the 
"reasonable probability" standard. As such, Hashimoto was not prejudiced by this 
error of instructing on the improper standard. The evidence was relatively 
specific and generally uncontroverted. The $4,500 jury compensatory award was 
solely general damages. The apparent medical expenses of $428 had been advanced 
in behalf of Marathon and Dixon, and by Instruction No. 13A, the jury was 
instructed not to include that amount in any award. Medical testimony 
referencing injury from the first impact considered as physically minor in 
force, indicated that Hashimoto was "asymptomatic" and "essentially healed from 
the first impact" until the second significantly more severe impact occurred 
causing substantial aggravation as well as new injury. Considering the record 
presented, we do not find prejudicial error in the instructions since all 
evidence was available and the jury accorded a substantial verdict considering 
the relatively minor impact and injury.11

 
 

[¶28.]  In summary, the phrase "reasonably 
certain" or "reasonable certainty" connotes freedom from doubt. Since none of us 
can see into the future, it appears quite illogical to attach such a standard to 
proving future pain and suffering in a personal injury case. The law is 
encumbered by human infirmities and thus should not reflect a standard that can 
only be met by a mind reader. Therefore, we find error in the standard of proof 
utilized in the jury instructions, but also find that Hashimoto was not 
prejudiced with respect to Instruction Nos. 13 and 14. Concerning Instruction 
No. 15, Hashimoto did not appropriately preserve this issue as a challenge in 
appeal for which reversal of the jury verdict is justified. Likewise, a plain 
error premise12 for reversal is not denominated by 
the injury testimony presented to the jury as sufficient to demonstrate the 
miscarriage of justice character of a jury verdict decision. Goggins, 704 P.2d  
at 1291; Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 
3. Litigative Court 
Costs.

 
 

[¶29.]  The area of costs is a nebulous topic as 
found with reference within many statutes which include the word "costs" as 
never expressly defined. Additionally, this court has never considered this 
subject of the relative relation of rules of court in regard to the definition 
of allowable costs as related to the statutory provisions which provide that 
costs may be awarded.13 This confusion is clouded in this 
case because in addition, a pretrial offer by Marathon and Dixon of judgment in 
accordance with W.R.C.P. 68 was made of $10,000 to include all costs accrued to 
offer date. That offer was not accepted and the case proceeded to trial 
resulting in the recovery of only the $4,500 in compensatory damages and $3,000 
in punitive damages. In post-trial proceedings, both parties filed their bills 
of costs and each objected to what the other had submitted. Following hearing, 
the court awarded Hashimoto in final judgment his costs incurred to date of 
offer of judgment.14 Consequently, to determine if the 
court abused its discretion in award of costs, it is necessary again to consider 
for disposition of the cross appeal what is properly included by case law and 
precedent to come within the term "allowable costs." Clearly within the confines 
of definition terms, the determination of allowable costs to be taxed pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 54(d) is within the discretion of the trial court. Duffy v. Brown, 
708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985). See also Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986), and for criminal cases, 
Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987) and 
Note, The Assessment and Collection of the Costs of a Criminal Prosecution in 
Wyoming, 13 
Wyo.L.J. 178 (1959).

 
 

[¶30.]  By their cross appeal, Marathon and 
Dixon claim 
discretional error by the court in four items:

 
 
a. 
Discovery deposition costs awarded to Hashimoto for the deposition of 
co-defendant Morgan whose case was settled before trial. The amount involved if 
allocated from a joint bill would total $203.50;

 
 
b. Reduced 
witness fees for Dr. Sandeen, Marathon's and Dixon's medical witness, as 
ultimately approved on an hourly rate of $250 but applied only to the time of 
testimony and not "show up and wait" time resulting in the billed total of $750 
to be reduced by $221 to an award of $529;

 
 
c. Pretrial 
consultation time between Marathon's and Dixon's counsel and the medical witness of $50; 
and

 
 
d. Pretrial 
consultation by both counsel and Dr. Peter W. Beall as another medical witness 
of $45.50.

 
 

[¶31.]  Consequently at issue in this cross 
appeal is allowed costs to Hashimoto of $203.50 and disallowed costs to Marathon 
and Dixon of 
$316.50, as totalling $520.

 
 

[¶32.]  We will not yield to temptation by the 
broad scope of issue argument by litigants or the plethora of Wyoming case law touching 
on awardable costs to expand consideration for this opinion beyond the subject 
presented:

 
 
1. 
Discovery deposition costs of witnesses whose depositions were not used at trial 
but for whom the discovery was determined by the trial court to be reasonably 
necessary for case preparation; and

 
 
2. Witness 
fees of expert witnesses as allowable for trial time appearance only and 
excluding show up time and pretrial conference sessions with 
counsel.

 
 

[¶33.]  Among the myriad of Wyoming piecemeal cases,15 we would apply Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361; State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1985); and Duffy, 708 P.2d 433 as 
controlling.16

 
 

[¶34.]  Applying current precedent to the 
specifics involved here as avoiding the generalized confusion obviously 
existent, it is directly concluded that:

 
 
1. Award of 
costs including subpoena, reporter and witness fees for discovery deposition is 
discretionary with the trial court as coming within the criteria of "reasonably 
required for trial preparation." Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361; Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1;

 
 
2. Expert 
witness fees as determined by the court to be reasonable in amount should 
include actual time for testimony and do not include charges of the experts for 
pretrial conferences or time during the trial session while waiting to actually 
testify.

 
 

[¶35.]  In the absence of a defining rule or a 
controlling statute, it should be recognized that we do not deny the right to 
charge daily witness costs pursuant to W.S. 1-14-102 for witnesses who are 
attending court or deposition sessions under subpoena even though on particular 
days they may not testify. We limit the expert witness provision provided here 
to a higher hourly rate to be assessable against the opposing party only for the 
time that the expert may actually testify as the court may, in its discretion, 
limit the amount of the award by that restriction.17 Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1. Cf. Kaess, 
748 P.2d 698 and Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361. Consequently, we affirm the exercise of 
discretion by the trial court in award of costs from which the cross appeal was 
taken.

 
 
SUMMARY

 
 

[¶36.]  Since the trial court found that the 
discovery deposition of Morgan was reasonably necessary as, at that point in 
time he was still a party in the proceeding, it was appropriate for the costs of 
his discovery deposition to be assessed under the Dieringer standard for expert 
witness fees in accord with Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361. The trial court was justified 
in only assessing testimony time. In the same vein, the pretrial interview 
expenses were properly disallowed as preparation and not trial 
expenses.

 
 

[¶37.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 For recent informative 
discussions of soft tissue injuries such as neck and back injuries, see 2 S. 
Preiser, M. Preiser and C. Wecht, Handling Soft Injury Cases: Medical Aspects 
(1987) and H. Rein, Thermographic Evidence of Soft Tissue Injuries 
(1987).

 
 

2 Originally, Marathon 
Oil Company was made a party in this case as well as Marathon Pipe Line Company. 
Both Marathons answered the complaint, with Marathon Oil Company essentially 
alleging that their only connection with the incident was that they were 
possibly the owners of Marathon Pipe Line Company. It appears that Marathon Oil 
Company just "dropped out" of the suit, although a motion was made to dismiss 
them, there is no order in the record reflecting such a disposition. However, 
the parties apparently agreed to treat Marathon Oil Company as dismissed as it 
was left off the caption from the point in time when summary judgment on 
punitive damages was awarded. Henceforth, "Marathon" will be used to refer to Marathon Pipe Line 
Company only.

 
 

3 Following settlement 
between Morgan and Hashimoto, that claim was dismissed with 
prejudice.

 
 

4 [MR. STANFIELD:] The 
plaintiff objects to Instruction # 13 on the grounds that it is inappropriate to 
require the plaintiff to prove elements of damage on the basis of those which 
are "reason[a]bly certain" to the extent that is expressed in the Wyoming 
patterned jury instructions. There was a dispute on that, and in fact, I think 
there is a sub-note that there were objections that the proper burden should be 
those reasonably probably to be experienced.

 
 

5 [MR. STANFIELD:] And 
Instruction # 14, we object to for the same reason. It's duplicative, it's 
slanted directly to the defendants. They already have - they are already 
instructed, I believe, in 1 and 2, that pertain to, oh, require certainty and 
prohibiting speculative damages, and it's put in twice and it's highly 
prejudicial for that reason - and, it's contrary to law.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
MR. STANFIELD: I have 
to go back and vehemently object to your # 14, because I submitted a # 27, which 
I submit is the law, and which applies the conjecture and speculation to all 
evidence and theories and notions and so on, and the Court's Instruction 14 
limits it exclusively to damages and that is not fair. The defense has no right 
to engage in speculation. I think the requested 27 is fair and cuts both 
ways.

 
 
THE COURT: That's in - 
takes in 1 or 2, that language is in 1 or 2.

 
 
MR. STANFIELD: Okay, 
but that brings up an issue that I'll put in a Motion In Limine later, but I can 
see it is in there. I still re-assert the objections that I had to 14 for the 
reason that it's unfairly slanted against the plaintiff and duplicative of the 
other one, which is not necessary under the circumstances, and that our 27 is a 
correct statement of the law, is fair and ought to have been 
given.

 
 

6 We are cognizant that 
the instruction Hashimoto proffered is not a correct statement of the present 
law and is itself inconsistent. Hashimoto objects on the basis that the proper 
standard ought to be "reasonable probability" or "reasonable medical 
probability," but Hashimoto's offered instruction replaces "reasonable 
certainty" with "probably" alone. Additionally, we note that the proffered 
instruction itself is internally inconsistent in that the standard is changed to 
"probably" throughout part of the instruction, but in subpart (d), the medical 
expenses are still to be proved "reasonably certain." Consequently, while we 
cannot say that the proffered instruction should have been given, we do find the 
standard of "reasonable probability" or "reasonable medical probability" to be a 
more appropriate one. The proffered instruction outlined:

 
 
If you decide for the 
plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money 
which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for those elements of damages 
proved by the evidence to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, 
taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the 
injury.

 
 
The claimed elements 
of damage are:

 
 
(a) The pain and 
suffering experienced as a result of the injuries and which will probably be 
experienced in the future.

 
 
(b) Disability and/or 
disfigurement.

 
 
(c) Loss of enjoyment 
of life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the award 
given for any other element of damage. And any loss of enjoyment of life which 
will probably be experienced in the 
future may also be awarded.

 
 
(d) Medical expenses. 
The reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment, and services 
received to date, and any medical expense reasonably certain to be incurred in the 
future.

 
 
Whether any of these 
elements have been proved is for you to determine.

 
 
GIVEN:

 
 
 __________________________________ 

 
 
JUDGE

 
 
Authority: Adapted 
from Instruction No. 4.01, W.C.P.J.I. [Emphasis added.]

 
 

7 For examples, see 
W.C.P.J.I. No. 4.01 (1981); W.C.P.J.I. No. 4.02 (1981); and W.C.P.J.I. No. 4.09 
(1981).

 
 

8 Noteworthy is the 
Colorado jury 
instruction pertaining to the Bruckman situation in which the terminology 
"reasonably certain" is not used.

 
 
6:9 CONDITION 
AGGRAVATED BY LATER INJURIES

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
If you find after the 
occurrence of (insert date) plaintiff, (name), was injured and that later injury 
aggravated or made worse any ailment or disability of the plaintiff caused by 
the (insert appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the 
defendant, (name), and that the later injury was not caused by the (insert 
appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant, then the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the ailment or disability caused by 
the (insert appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the 
defendant, but he is not entitled to recover damages for any later injuries he 
may have incurred which were not caused by the (insert appropriate description, 
e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant.

 
 
If you find that a 
later injury aggravated or made worse any ailment or disability caused by the 
(insert appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant 
and that the later injury was not caused by the (insert appropriate description, 
e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant, then it is your duty to 
determine, if possible, the amount of damages caused only by the (insert 
appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant. But if 
you find that the evidence does not permit such a determination, then the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages caused by the (insert appropriate 
description, e.g., "negligence"), if any, of the defendant between (insert date 
of occurrence between plaintiff and defendant) and (insert date of plaintiff's 
later injury), but he is not entitled to recover damages after (insert date of 
plaintiff's later injury) for the ailment or disability.

 
 
CJI-Civ.2d 6:9 
(1988).

 
 

9 Perhaps the inquiry 
was best stated by Justice Jacob Fuchsberg as one of the more urbane but 
practical jurists of recent time:

 
 
The rule that evolves 
appears to be the one well stated in Matter of Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133, 168 N.E.2d 811, 813 [(1960)] where the 
court made clear that it is not a dictionary dilettantism that is to govern, but 
whether it is "reasonably apparent" that "the doctor intends to signify a 
probability supported by some rational basis."

 
 
Matott v. Ward, 48 N.Y.2d 455, 423 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648, 399 N.E.2d 532, 535 
(1979).

 
 
Where in discussion, 
it was recited:

 
 
The foregoing 
standards of "possibility," "probability," "medical certainty," and "did" are 
only illustrative; in numerous other cases the courts permit or require opinions 
in such terms as "most probable," "definite possibility," "most likely," 
"reasonable probability," and "more likely than not."

 
 
Martin, The Uncertain 
Rule of Certainty: An Analysis and Proposal For a Federal Evidence Rule, 20 
Wayne L.Rev. 781, 785 (1974) 
(footnotes omitted). See also Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: 
Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 Tex.L.Rev. 630 
(1953).

 
 
See also a succeeding 
case, Aspiazu v. Orgera, 205 Conn. 623, 535 A.2d 338, 342-43 (1987) 
(quoting from Matott, 48 N.Y.2d  at 463, 423 N.Y.S.2d 645, 399 N.E.2d 
532):

 
 
While we do not 
believe that it is mandatory to use "talismanic words" or "the particular 
combination of magical words represented by the phrase `reasonable degree of 
medical certainty [or probability]'"; * * * there is no question that, to be 
entitled to damages, a plaintiff must establish the necessary causal 
relationship between the injury and the physical or mental condition that he 
claims resulted from it.

 
 

10 We note the standard 
of "reasonable medical certainty" is used in many worker's compensation cases: 
Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Injury to 
Taylor, 718 P.2d 63 (Wyo. 1986); Matter of Injury to Kemp, 711 P.2d 1142 (Wyo. 
1986); Nuanes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 694 P.2d 86 
(Wyo. 1985); Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 689 P.2d 1387 (Wyo. 1984); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div. v. Schwilke on Behalf of Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 1982); Jim's Water 
Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979); Claim of Vondra, 448 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 
1968). The propriety of that standard is not in question in this appeal since 
its correctness in that context is not here adjudicated as a personal injury 
damage case. In technical context of the words themselves, it may not be totally 
facetious to compare "reasonably certain" with "somewhat" pregnant or "half" 
dead.

 
 

11 Hashimoto settled for 
his injuries in the second collision in an amount which was apparently just 
below policy limits as totalling $49,500.

 
 

12 W.R.A.P. 7.05 
provides that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court."

 
 

13 W.S. 1-14-124 
provides:

 
 
Costs shall be allowed 
to the plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor in an action for the recovery of 
money only or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, unless 
otherwise provided by law.

 
 
W.S. 1-14-126 
provides:

 
 
In other actions the 
court may award and tax costs and apportion them between the parties on the same 
or adverse sides as it deems right and equitable. When a civil case is settled 
too late for the clerk of court to advise the jury panel that the jurors should 
not appear on the date summoned the court may order that any or all parties 
reimburse the proper fund for the fees and mileage paid to the jurors and 
bailiffs for their appearance.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 54(d) 
provides:

 
 
Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
but costs against the state of Wyoming, its officers or agencies, shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law.

 
 

14 Defendants' costs for 
the deposition fee of Dr. Peter Beall in the amount of $187.50 and the reporting 
fees of the deposition of Dr. Beall in the amount of $69.16 and the reporting 
fee of the deposition of Lloyd K. Hashimoto in the amount of $213.74 be denied 
upon the grounds and for the reasons that said costs were incurred prior to the 
time of the Offer of Judgment on October 24, 1986.

 
 
* * * Defendants' 
costs for the pretrial telephone conference of Dr. Beall in the amount of $45.50 
and the consultation fee prior to trial charged by Dr. John Sandeen in the 
amount of $50.00 be in the same is hereby denied for the reason that although 
incurred after October 24, 1986, the costs incurred in interviewing witnesses 
prior to trial are not proper costs; and

 
 
* * * witness fee 
charged for Officer C. Woods of the Laramie Police Department in the amount of 
$60.00 is unreasonable in that Officer Woods is not an expert witness and a 
reasonable fee in this matter would be $15.00 per day. It appears that Officer 
Woods appeared in Court on two consecutive days, therefore, a witness fee in the 
amount of $30.00 is hereby granted; and

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
* * * Defendants' are 
entitled to reimbursement of a reasonable witness fee charged by Dr. John 
Sandeen. It appears from the Court's records that Dr. Sandeen testified for a 
total of 127 minutes and although the doctor was present in the courtroom for a 
total of three hours, the Court finds that he is only entitled to a witness fee 
for the time spent in actual testimony. The Plaintiff has questioned the 
reasonableness of the doctor's charge of $250.00 per hour, therefore, the Court 
finds that the Defendants must submit proof as to the reasonableness of the 
doctor's charge for witness fee. Upon submission of such proof the Court will 
enter this witness fee's costs in the Final Judgment.

 
 
(Based on affidavit 
evidence, the hourly rate of $250 was then approved in the final judgment.) 
Hashimoto was awarded $806.49 as offset by Marathon's and Dixon's costs of $565 for 
a net recovery by Hashimoto of $241.49.

 
 

15 Walker v. Graham, 706 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1985); Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 
699 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1985); Lebsack v. Town of 
Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1985); U.S. Through Farmers Home Admin. v. 
Redland, 695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985); Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, 674 P.2d 232 (Wyo. 1984); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); 
Anderson v. Meier, 641 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1982); State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, 
640 P.2d 746 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 
(1982); Downing v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1981); State Sur. Co. v. Lamb 
Const. Co., 625 P.2d 184 (Wyo. 1981); Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 
620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980); Roberts Const. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 
1976); Combs v. Walters, 518 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1974); Mader v. Stephenson, 481 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 1971); Kalman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 390 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 
1964); Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 
(1941); In re Greybull Valley Irr. Dist., 52 Wyo. 168, 71 P.2d 801 (1937); 
McInerney & Conway Finance Corporation v. Smith, 42 Wyo. 380, 295 P. 273 
(1931); Board of Com'rs of Natrona County v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 
40 Wyo. 144, 275 P. 102 (1929); Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101 
(1929); Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 
272, 243 P. 118 (1926); WyomingCentral Irr. Co. v. Laporte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360 
(1920); In re Organization of Bench Canal Drainage District, 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610 (1916); Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 134 P. 260 (1913); City of Rawlins v. 
Murphy, 19 Wyo. 238, 115 P. 436 (1911); Pointer v. Jones, 15 Wyo. 1, 85 P. 1050 
(1906); Lewis v. England, 14 Wyo. 540, 85 P. 1049 (1906); Matthews v. Nefsy, 13 
Wyo. 238, 78 P. 664 (1904); Gramm v. Sterling, 8 Wyo. 527, 59 P. 156 (1899); 
Holgate v. Downer, 8 Wyo. 334, 57 P. 918 (1899); Rock Springs Nat. Bank v. 
Luman, 5 Wyo. 159, 38 P. 678 (1894).

 
 

16 It is apparent from 
even a casual review of the some 31 Wyoming cases where allowable costs as a 
litigative expense had become an active appellant issue, that a demanding need 
exists for this court and the statutory rules advisory committee to develop a 
specific and determinate rule for ascertainment of costs which is amply 
justified by precedent and authority. Whether litigative costs should be awarded 
is a proper province for legislation. What those costs then include, although 
not necessarily beyond the authority of the legislature, are certainly found to 
be an authorized responsibility of the rule making function of the supreme court 
in its administrative responsibility for the justice delivery system pursuant to 
Wyo. Const. art. 5. In the absence of a rule or statute, the process will 
continue to be confused and irregular. The observation of Chief Justice Blume in 
Board of Com'rs of Natrona County, 275 P.  at 103 has continued unabated that 
"the term [costs] is, it is true, an indefinite one, * * *." See also Roberts 
Const. Co., 547 P.2d 1171.

 
 

17 W.S. 1-14-102 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(b) In any civil or 
criminal case, any party may call expert witnesses to testify and if the court 
finds any witness to be a qualified expert and the expert gives expert testimony 
which is admitted as evidence in the case, the expert witness shall be allowed 
witness fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the court allows 
according to the circumstances of the case. Expert witness fees may be charged 
as costs against any party or be apportioned among some or all parties in the 
discretion of the court. [Emphasis added.] 

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶38.]  I agree with the majority that this case 
should be affirmed.

 
 

[¶39.]  The majority determined that it was 
harmless error to use the phrase "reasonable certainty" in the instructions to 
the jury on future damages. I do not agree, however, that the phrase "reasonable 
probability" should be substituted for "reasonable certainty" in instructing the 
jury on future damages.

 
 

[¶40.]  I agree with and adopt Justice Thomas' 
analysis in his dissent regarding the proper standard to be employed with 
respect to future damages. However, I would not reverse this case and believe 
the instructions given by the trial court were correct.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶41.]  I am constrained to dissent from the 
disposition of this case according to the majority opinion. I am in agreement 
with the disposition of the issue relating to burden of proof with respect to 
successive injuries, and I have no difficulty joining in that aspect of the 
opinion addressing court costs. I cannot agree with the disposition of the 
standard with respect to proof of damages.

 
 

[¶42.]  In Wyoming, we have a long-standing rule that 
damages cannot be the object of speculation or conjecture. E.g., Reiman 
Construction Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985); Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 667 P.2d 665 (Wyo. 1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 
580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); Opheim v. United 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 511 P.2d 1289 (Wyo. 1973); 
Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1961). This rule has been expressed by 
using the phrase "reasonable certainty" in our cases. In Blakeman, the phrase 
was invoked with respect to future damages.

 
 

[¶43.]  We have, however, developed an anomaly in 
the law. We have adopted as elements of damages for personal injuries future 
pain and suffering, future loss of enjoyment of life, future loss of earnings, 
future medical expenses, and future caretaking. The majority of the court very 
perceptively note that "none of us can see into the future, * * *." Ante at 167. 
Accepting the truth of this statement requires a conclusion that the award of 
damages for those things to be experienced or incurred in the future inherently 
is speculative or conjectural. These future damages historically have been 
allowable to the extent that they were "reasonably certain" to be experienced or 
incurred. The use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" with respect to these 
elements of damage can best be perceived as an effort to balance the rule which 
says that damages cannot be the object of speculation or conjecture with the 
knowledge that damages for personal injuries do not necessarily end at trial, 
and yet future damages must be the object of speculation and conjecture. There 
perhaps is inherent wisdom in the use of the phrase "reasonable 
certainty."

 
 

[¶44.]  The majority, as I understand this case, 
now proposes to substitute the standard of "reasonable probability" for 
"reasonable certainty." I suppose that is a choice that the court can make but, 
if it is to be made, then Hashimoto deserves the opportunity to have the jury 
consider his future damages according to the proper standard. I object to the 
conclusion that there is error, but it was not prejudicial because the court 
simply has substituted its own speculation or conjecture for that of the jury. 
Our usual rules of jurisprudence do not permit us to do that. Since the court is 
changing the standard, Hashimoto is entitled to have the damage award retried, 
and the case should be reversed.

 
 

[¶45.]  I do not agree, however, that we should 
change the phrase. My analysis persuades me that a distinction is necessary when 
the jury is instructed about future damages as compared to past damages. With 
respect to the latter, I have no difficulty in agreeing with the use of the 
phrase "reasonable probability." That is simply another way of describing a 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. I might prefer to emphasize 
the preponderance of the evidence standard. When the problem of instructing with 
respect to future damages is contemplated, however, we must recognize that we 
are asking the jury to quantify damages that, according to our legal standard, 
the jury cannot possibly award. If the phrase "reasonable certainty" is 
perceived as a legal standard, then truly we are presenting the jury with a 
concept that is antithetical to the rule that damages cannot be the object of 
speculation or conjecture. I am persuaded that without identifying the 
justification or the necessity, we have invoked the words "reasonable certainty" 
as a rhetorical phrase, a communicative device only, which serves to balance the 
inherently speculative nature of future damages with our legal standard that 
forecloses speculation in submitting those elements of damage to the 
jury.

 
 

[¶46.]  While the instructions of the district 
court could have described this concept more precisely, they do not depart 
substantially from the approach that I believe to be correct. The judge did 
attach the limitation to future damages and did explain that such damages must 
be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty. The 
phrase was not used in instructing the jury except with respect to future 
damages. Consequently, I find no error with respect to these instructions. I 
would suggest the possibility of more precisely explaining to the jury why there 
is a difference between past and future damages. Perhaps such an explanation 
would eliminate the need to use the phrase "reasonable certainty." In the 
context of the instructions given in this case, which apparently came from the 
Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions Civil, I am satisfied that the use of that 
phrase, when traced into the closing arguments of counsel, presents the most 
appropriate balance. It is not a legal standard but a communicative effort 
designed to ameliorate the clear departure from the usual rule that damages 
cannot be the object of speculation or conjecture. I would find no error with 
respect to these instructions.