Title: Pinther v. State, Dept. of Admin. and Information

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pinther v. State, Dept. of Admin. and Information1994 WY 3866 P.2d 1300Case Number: 92-287Decided: 01/11/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming

Ron 
PINTHER, Petitioner (Plaintiff),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION AND 
INFORMATION, and Mike Miller, Respondents (Defendants).

Mitchell E. Osborn of Grant 
& Osborn, Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. and Sleeter C. Dover, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for 
respondents.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Petitioner Ron 
Pinther filed a grievance and requested the formation of a grievance committee, 
claiming that he had been denied a veteran's preference, after the Department of 
Transportation hired another applicant for a senior planner position. Respondent 
Mike Miller, State Personnel Administrator for Respondent State of Wyoming, 
Department of Administration and Information, denied both the grievance and the 
request for the formation of a grievance committee.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Pinther presents 
the following issues for our review:

1. Is Petitioner, Ron 
Pinther, Entitled to the Establishment of a Grievance Committee Pursuant to the 
Wyoming Personnel Rules?

2. Does "Veterans 
Preference" Only Apply in Cases of "Initial Hiring o[r] Appointment to 
Positions["] with the State of Wyoming?

3. Is "Veterans Preference" 
Provided Only an Individual when he is "Otherwise Equally 
Qualified"?

4. Is "Veterans Preference" 
Applied Only in Cases Where "Scored Examinations["] are 
Given?

[¶4]      The district 
court certified this case to the Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b). 
The facts, as found by the district court, are as follows:

Petitioner Ron Pinther is presently employed by the 
State of Wyoming as a Senior Planner for the Department of Administration and 
Information. On or before February 12, 1992, he applied for a vacant position of 
Senior Planner with the Department of Transportation of the State of Wyoming. On 
March 4, 1992 Petitioner was granted an interview for the position. On March 12, 
1992, he received a phone call from [the Department of Transportation]. [It] 
told Pinther []he had not been selected, however, [it] informed him that the 
decision was a close one and that [another applicant] had been selected. Mr. 
Pinther believes he should have been selected for the position based upon his 
qualifications, experience and the fact that he should have been given 
preference as a qualified veteran. On March 23, 1992, pursuant to the Wyoming 
Personnel Rules, he filed a grievance with . . . the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, and on March 27, 1992, Pinther was informed by [the Department 
of Transportation] that: 1) "Veterans Preference" only applies to scored exams, 
2) "Veterans Preference["] only applies on initial hiring, 3) [h]e could not 
file a grievance concerning another agency's decision, and 4) . . . the 
selection was given to the "person best matching the job requirements[."] [The 
Department of Transportation] stated that [it] didn't find Pinther's grievance 
to be valid. On April 1, 1992, pursuant to the Wyoming Personnel Rules, 
Petitioner Pinther filed a grievance with . . . the Director of the Wyoming 
Department of Transportation and Mike Miller, the Personnel Administrator for 
the State of Wyoming. On April 10, pursuant to the Wyoming Personnel Rules, 
Pinther requested establishment of a grievance committee from Mike Miller. On 
April 21, 1992, he received a letter from Mike Miller, refusing to establish a 
grievance committee. It is upon this letter that Petitioner filed his Petition 
for Review.

[¶5]      When a case is 
certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b): "[W]e must review the 
decision `under the appellate standards applicable to a reviewing court of the 
first instance.'" Amax Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825, 828 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Campbell County v. Wyoming Community College 
Commission, 731 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Wyo. 1987)), quoted in Texaco, Inc. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 845 P.2d 398, 399 (Wyo. 1993). The scope of our review of 
administrative decisions is defined by Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). See 
Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Study, 866 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Wyo. 
1994).

Grievance 
Committee

[¶6]      Pinther requested 
the formation of a grievance committee to determine the proper interpretation of 
the veteran's preference statute, Wyo. Stat. § 19-6-102 (1977). He contends 
that, under chapter XII, section 5(e) of the personnel rules, the personnel 
administrator abused his discretion when he decided not to form a grievance 
committee. We disagree.

[¶7]      Under section 
5(e), the decision as to whether to form a grievance committee is within the 
discretion of the personnel administrator:

(e) If the decision of the 
agency head or the designee is unsatisfactory to the employee and if the 
grievance involves a written reprimand, a disciplinary suspension or an 
involuntary reappointment, the employee may, within five (5) days of receipt of 
the decision, request the establishment of a Grievance Committee. Other matters may be considered by a 
Grievance Committee at the discretion of the Personnel 
Administrator.

PERSONNEL RULES OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF WYOMING STATE GOVERNMENT ch. XII, § 5(e) (1989) (emphasis 
added).

[¶8]      Whether the 
personnel administrator should have granted Pinther's request for the formation 
of a grievance committee depends upon the construction and application of the 
personnel rules. "When rules are adopted pursuant to statutory authority and are 
properly promulgated, they have the force and effect of law. Thus, an 
administrative agency is bound to follow the applicable statutes and its own 
rules and regulations." Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Security Commission, 858 P.2d 1122, 1123-24 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted). This Court will defer to an 
administrative agency's construction of its rules unless that construction is 
clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of the rules. Doidge v. 
State Board of Charities and Reform, 789 P.2d 880, 884 (Wyo. 1990) (citing 
Croxton v. Board of County Commissioners of Natrona County, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 
1982)).

[¶9]      Pinther has 
failed to show that the personnel administrator's interpretation of the 
personnel rules was clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of 
the rules. He argues that his questions concerning § 19-6-102 present an "other 
matter" worthy of the establishment of a grievance committee. Section 5(e) 
grants the personnel administrator discretionary power to form a grievance 
committee to hear other matters, which are not grievances involving written 
reprimands, disciplinary suspensions, or involuntary reappointments. Pinther's 
claim clearly qualifies as an "other matter" under the language of section 5(e). 
His request for the formation of a grievance committee invoked the personnel 
administrator's section 5(e) discretionary power.

[¶10]   The personnel administrator denied 
Pinther's request because the personnel rules precluded Pinther from filing a 
grievance against the Department of Transportation. The personnel rules define 
"grievance" as:

Any dispute, excluding dismissal or reduction in 
force, between an employee and the management of 
the employee's agency which involves the interpretation or application 
of policies, rules, regulations and/or statutes which have been adopted by an 
agency, Governor's Executive Order or the State Legislature to cover personnel 
practices and/or working conditions.

PERSONNEL RULES, supra, at 
Appendix, Definition No. 32 (emphasis added). The definition of "grievance" 
makes it clear that Pinther, as a Department of Administration and Information 
employee, could not file a grievance against the Department of Transportation. 
The personnel administrator correctly interpreted and applied the personnel 
rules when he denied both the grievance and the request for the formation of a 
grievance committee. His conclusions of law were in accordance with law, and his 
denial of Pinther's requests was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).

Veteran's 
Preference

[¶11]   Pinther presents three issues 
involving § 19-6-102, the veteran's preference statute. The statute provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) In every public 
department and upon all public works in Wyoming, members of the United States 
military establishment in any war or conflict as defined in section 101, title 
38, United States Code, honorably discharged from service, and the widows of 
members during widowhood, shall be preferred for appointment or 
employment.

Section 19-6-102(a) 
(emphasis added). Pinther argues that the Legislature intended for a qualified 
veteran to be given preference any time he makes an application for a state job 
vacancy. He claims that the preference should be given regardless of whether or 
not the veteran is a state employee. The personnel administrator interpreted the 
statute as granting a preference to veterans only when they are initially being 
considered for state government positions.

[¶12]   The parties' divergent 
interpretations of § 19-6-102(a) are evidence that the statute is ambiguous. 
State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d 97, 99 (Wyo. 1985). 
Our rules for statutory construction are well established:

"[A] statute is ambiguous . . . if it is found to be 
vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." "[W]hether an 
ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the 
court."

. . . 
.

When the court determines that a statute is 
ambiguous, the court "will resort to general principles of statutory 
construction in the effort to ascertain legislative intent." We believe 
that

"in ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a 
statute . . . the court . . . must look to the mischief the act was intended to 
cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the 
state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts 
and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the 
intention of the lawmaking body."

"Knowledge of the settled 
principles of statutory interpretation must be imputed to the legislature." This 
court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes "with full knowledge of the 
existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be 
construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a 
general and uniform system of jurisprudence. . . ."

. . . . 

Another rule of statutory interpretation we have 
occasionally invoked is that, in construing an ambiguous statute, the 
administration of which is charged to a particular executive branch agency, we 
will give deference to that agency's interpretation unless it is clearly 
erroneous.

. 
. . If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with 
administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that 
construction. After all, the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a 
question for the court.

Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043-45 (Wyo. 1993) 
(citations omitted).

[¶13]   Applying the rules for statutory 
construction, we read the phrase "members of the United States military 
establishment in any war or conflict . . . honorably discharged" in conjunction 
with the phrase "shall be preferred for appointment or employment." Taken 
together, these phrases evince a legislative intent to encourage qualified 
veterans to pursue state government employment. Amendments to § 19-6-102(a) 
since its enactment in 1890 support such an 
interpretation.

[¶14]   The veteran's preference statute as 
originally enacted read in pertinent part:

In and upon each public department and work of the 
territory and cities and counties thereof, honorably discharged union soldiers 
and sailors shall be preferred for appointment and employment provided they 
possess the proper and necessary qualifications to the discharge of the duties 
and responsibilities of the position for which they apply and are equal to or 
superior to all other applicants for such positions.

1890 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 44, 
§ 1. The text of the preference statute remained unchanged until 1945. In 1945, 
the Legislature amended the statute to include female veterans and widows of 
male veterans, to limit the preference to veterans of wars, and to include an 
additional preference for disabled veterans and widows. 1945 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 
54, § 1. The 1969 Legislature broadened the statute's scope to include qualified 
veterans of a "conflict." 1969 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 3, § 1.

[¶15]   The Legislature intended for the 
veteran's preference statute to give qualified veterans the benefit of a 
competitive advantage in the state hiring process. By giving them an advantage 
over equally qualified nonveteran job candidates, the statute encourages 
qualified veterans to seek state employment. The state confers the benefit 
granted by § 19-6-102(a) and fully satisfies the legislative purpose behind the 
statute by giving preference only to veterans who are initially seeking state 
employment. Giving a preference to veterans who are pursuing a transfer or 
promotion within the state government in no way advances the legislative purpose 
behind § 19-6-102(a).

[¶16]   The Legislature's failure to alter 
or amend the language of § 19-6-102(a), despite the Department of Administration 
and Information's practice of giving the preference to veterans only when they 
are initially applying for state employment, supports our interpretation. 
Pinther cites no authority indicating that the state has ever given the 
veteran's preference outside the initial employment application process. The 
Legislature has not amended the statute to clarify when the state should give 
the preference. The Legislature's inaction regarding the application of § 
19-6-102(a), thus, indicates its acquiescence to the state's practice of 
restricting the giving of the veteran's preference to initial applications for 
government employment. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d  at 
99.

[¶17]   The veteran's preference contained 
in § 19-6-102(a) does not extend to a qualified veteran who is a state employee 
seeking a transfer to another state agency. The personnel administrator 
correctly interpreted the personnel rules and § 19-6-102(a), and he correctly 
applied them to Pinther's case. His conclusions of law were in accordance with 
law, and his actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).

[¶18]   Because the veteran's preference 
issue is dispositive, we will not address the issues relating to qualifications 
and scored examinations under § 19-6-102(c).

[¶19]  Affirmed.