Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1811.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1811 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. PESKIN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-
1811.] 
Attorney misconduct — Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — 
Conduct adversely reflecting on attorney’s fitness to practice law — Two-
year suspension with 18 months stayed on conditions, including probation. 
(No. 2009-2009 ⎯ Submitted December 16, 2009 ⎯ Decided April 29, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-050. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Lawrence Frederick Peskin of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0059391, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1992.  For violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his 
possessing and using crack cocaine, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline recommends that we impose a two-year suspension, stayed upon 
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conditions.  We accept the board’s findings of misconduct.  However, we 
conclude that respondent’s conduct, his failure to acknowledge the seriousness of 
his misconduct, and his obvious resentment over the consequences of his 
misconduct warrant an actual suspension from the practice of law.  Accordingly, 
we impose a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed upon the conditions 
recommended by the board. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} Relator, Ohio State Bar Association, charged respondent with 
professional misconduct in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting any 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulate that on June 29, 2007, respondent was 
arrested in Brookpark, Ohio, and was subsequently indicted by a Cuyahoga 
County grand jury for possession of crack cocaine and resisting arrest.  
Respondent pleaded guilty to both charges and was placed in and successfully 
completed an intervention-in-lieu-of-conviction program that resulted in dismissal 
of all charges against him. 
{¶ 4} At the panel hearing, respondent testified that he obtained a 
doctorate degree in psychology and worked as a licensed psychologist for 
approximately eight years before attending law school.  At the time of his arrest in 
2007, respondent was a lead trial attorney in large medical-malpractice actions. 
{¶ 5} Respondent admitted he had used marijuana occasionally since age 
15.  After an acquaintance offered him crack cocaine in 2004, he used it 
approximately one weekend a month—15 to 20 times—over an 18-month period.  
He attributed his cocaine use to a number of personal difficulties including his ex-
wife’s terminal cancer, his teenage daughter’s difficulty handling that diagnosis, 
and his second wife’s eating disorder and alcoholism. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 6} Respondent claimed that he was never impaired while working and 
that his drug use did not interfere with the representation of his clients.  But his 
admitted use of marijuana and purchase of crack cocaine just days before he filed 
an important motion demonstrate that that his conduct did place his clients at risk.  
Respondent criticized his former employer for notifying his clients of his arrest 
and implied that his conduct was not serious enough to warrant the subsequent 
termination of his employment.  Instead, he attributed his firing to a personality 
clash with a majority partner and the firm’s desire to retain his share of the fees 
for two very lucrative cases. 
{¶ 7} Respondent testified that as part of his intervention-in-lieu-of-
conviction program, he reported to a probation officer each month for one year 
and submitted to random drug testing and a substance-abuse assessment.  While 
he claimed that both that assessment and a separate assessment completed by Dr. 
Lee Horowitz determined that he did not have a substance-abuse problem, he did 
not submit any documents to support this contention. 
{¶ 8} After his arrest, respondent voluntarily contacted the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and began to attend Alcoholics 
Anonymous (“AA”) meetings.  After approximately one year, he separated from 
OLAP under less than amicable circumstances.  He also stopped attending AA 
meetings, claiming that the program is outdated and ineffective.  He further 
rejected AA’s focus upon submission to a higher power and its requirement that 
participants admit that they have a substance-abuse problem, which he does not 
believe he has. 
{¶ 9} As part of the disciplinary investigation, respondent submitted to a 
psychological evaluation with Arthur L. Rosenbaum, M.D.  Although Dr. 
Rosenbaum did not specifically diagnose an addiction to illegal substances, he did 
report that respondent has used cocaine and marijuana at various times throughout 
his life and remains at risk to return to such conduct.  Specifically, Dr. 
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Rosenbaum stated:  “Mr. Peskin has been a user of forbidden substances most of 
his life.  His use has been minimal, according to him.  Although his tendency 
observed several times in this session and detailed above, to attribute cause for his 
actions to external circumstances and to others and emphasis of his role as victim 
are important clues to his character composition, I do not believe on the basis of 
the information available to me that his drug use, history of failed relationships in 
his personal and professional lives or personality characteristics indicated by his 
denial and the evidence that he is able to ignore the dictates of his conscience rise 
to the level of a diagnosable mental illness.  There is no information available to 
me that his work with clients has been compromised.  I do believe that he will be 
best served if there is ongoing monitoring of his sobriety for an indefinite period.  
Any route that leads to forbidden pleasure once opened remains available and by 
history he is a person who has been vulnerable.” 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulate, and we agree, that clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that respondent’s conduct violates Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and 
(h) as charged. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final determination, we also 
weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10(B) 
of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings 
Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD 
Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-
5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary case is unique, we are not 
limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into account “all relevant 
factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 12} The parties did not stipulate to any mitigating or aggravating 
factors.  Nonetheless, in mitigation, the board noted that respondent does not have 
a prior disciplinary record and that his conduct was not driven by dishonest or 
selfish motives.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (b).  The board also considered 
respondent’s full cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding as well as six 
character-reference letters, all of which endorsed his ability to provide quality 
legal representation and recommended that he be permitted to continue practicing 
law.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e). 
{¶ 13} As for aggravating factors, we find that respondent terminated his 
participation in OLAP.  Moreover, his testimony at the panel hearing 
demonstrates that he fails appreciate the seriousness of his conduct and the 
substantial risk of harm to which he subjected his clients.  And although he claims 
to be remorseful, he resents that he has been publicly humiliated, lost his job, and 
had disciplinary proceedings brought against him, while others, who he claims 
have had more significant addictions and more egregious criminal records, have 
been permitted to deal with their misconduct in private. 
{¶ 14} The parties jointly recommended that the board impose a one-year 
suspension of respondent’s license, stayed subject to numerous detailed 
conditions.  Finding that the proposed sanction was cumbersome and ambiguous, 
the panel and the board rejected it and now recommend that we impose a two-year 
suspension from the practice of law, all stayed upon the following conditions:   
{¶ 15} “1. Respondent remain drug-free and alcohol-free and commit no 
further criminal violations; 
{¶ 16} “2. Respondent enter into a two-year drug-related contract with 
OLAP and submit to random drug screens, at his own expense, on a periodic basis 
as determined by OLAP.  Respondent shall not be required to participate in 
OLAP’s 12-step meetings.  Instead Respondent shall meet with an OLAP 
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counselor on a periodic basis as determined by OLAP so that it may monitor his 
drug screens and his compliance with condition #3 below;  
{¶ 17} “3. Respondent obtain mental health/substance abuse counseling, 
at his own expense, with a qualified psychologist/psychiatrist on a regular basis as 
determined by that treating professional.  Respondent shall provide any such 
professional a copy of Dr. Rosenbaum’s report in this matter along with a copy of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in this matter.  Respondent shall notify OLAP of the 
name and address of the mental health/substance abuse counselor.  Upon request 
by OLAP, respondent’s mental health/substance abuse counselor shall send 
periodic reports to OLAP confirming Respondent’s ongoing treatment. 
{¶ 18} “4. Respondent submit to OLAP and to his mental health/substance 
abuse counselor the name and dosage of all prescription medications as well as 
the name and address of the prescribing physician.  Respondent shall waive the 
doctor/patient privilege with respect to any such prescribing physician for the 
duration of this two year stayed suspension. 
{¶ 19} “5. Respondent shall timely communicate any changes in his 
prescription medications to OLAP and his mental health/substance abuse 
counselor. 
{¶ 20} “6. Respondent submit, within one year of the release of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in this mater, a qualified health-care professional’s 
certification that he has successfully completed a substance abuse treatment 
program and is, in that professional’s opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, able to practice law in a competent, ethical, and professional manner.  
Upon submission of such a report condition [#]3 shall be deemed satisfied. 
{¶ 21} “7. Respondent shall commit no further misconduct. 
{¶ 22} “8. A monitoring attorney shall be appointed by Relator [pursuant 
to Gov.Bar R. V(9)] to monitor Respondent’s compliance with conditions 1-7 and 
January Term, 2010 
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if Respondent fails to comply with the terms of conditions 1-7, he shall serve the 
entire two-year suspension from the practice of law.” 
{¶ 23} In support of their recommendation, the panel and board cite our 
decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. May, 106 Ohio St.3d 385, 2005-Ohio-5320, 
835 N.E.2d 372, imposing a two-year suspension, stayed upon conditions, for an 
attorney who had used forged prescriptions to obtain Vicodin.  Id. at ¶ 3-4.  Like 
respondent, May had successfully completed a treatment-in-lieu-of-conviction 
program that resulted in the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.  Id. 
{¶ 24} While our decision in May is instructive, it is factually 
distinguishable from the present case because in May, the respondent’s chemical 
dependency qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  Id. at ¶ 8.  Here, while the record contains substantial 
evidence regarding respondent’s use of illegal substances, Dr. Rosenbaum’s 
carefully worded report does not specifically diagnose a chemical dependency or 
state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that respondent is able to engage 
in the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.  In the absence of this 
mitigating factor and in light of respondent’s failure to acknowledge the 
seriousness of his misconduct and his obvious resentment over the consequences 
of his misconduct, we conclude that an actual suspension from the practice of law 
is necessary to protect the public from further misconduct. 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we suspend respondent from the practice of law in 
Ohio for two years, with 18 months stayed on the conditions recommended by the 
board, including probation.  If respondent fails to comply with the conditions of 
the stay or probation, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the full 
two-year suspension from practice.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, 
ACTING 
C.J., 
and 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
__________________ 
Mitchell, Catalano & Boda Co. and William Mann; and Eugene Whetzel, 
Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Steven D. Bell Co., L.P.A., and Steven D. Bell, for respondent. 
__________________