Title: In re Lopez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re RICO RICARDO LOPEZ 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S258912 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A152748 
 
Sonoma County Superior Court 
SCR32760 
 
 
April 3, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
In re LOPEZ 
S258912 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
In 2005, Rico Ricardo Lopez was tried along with several 
codefendants for the murder of Ignacio Gomez.  A jury convicted 
Lopez and three of his codefendants (Peter Amante, Rogelio 
Cardenas, and Patrick Higuera, Jr.) of Gomez’s first degree 
premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)1 and 
found true the gang-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(22)) and the criminal street gang sentencing 
enhancement 
(§ 186.22, 
subd. (b)(1)). 
 
The 
remaining 
codefendant (Mario Ochoa-Gonzales) was acquitted of murder 
but convicted of being an accessory after the fact (§ 32) with a 
gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  The trial court 
sentenced Lopez to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed.  (People v. Amante (Sept. 3, 2009, A113655) [nonpub. 
opn.].) 
Later, following our opinion in People v. Chiu (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), Lopez filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus challenging his conviction.  Lopez alleged his jury had 
been instructed on the natural and probable consequences 
theory of aiding and abetting first degree murder, which we 
found invalid in Chiu, and this error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The trial court agreed with Lopez and 
 
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
granted relief.  The prosecution appealed, and the Court of 
Appeal reversed.  (In re Lopez (Sept. 25, 2019, A152748) 
[nonpub. opn.].) 
The Court of Appeal relied on our then-recent opinion in 
People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1 (Aledamat).  Aledamat 
discussed the standard of prejudice when a jury is instructed 
with two theories of an offense, one of which is legally valid and 
one of which is legally invalid, otherwise known as “alternative-
theory” error.  (Id. at p. 9.)  We held that “no higher standard of 
review applies to alternative-theory error than applies to other 
misdescriptions of the elements.  The same beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard applies to all such misdescriptions . . . .”  (Ibid.)  
“The reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after 
examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 13.) 
The Court of Appeal held that the Chiu error here was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the gang-murder 
special circumstance, which required the jury to find that an 
aider and abettor acted with intent to kill, and the 
“overwhelming” evidence against Lopez more generally.  The 
Court of Appeal discounted the prosecutor’s discussion of the 
natural and probable consequences theory of first degree 
murder in his closing argument, and it found a jury note 
referencing 
that 
theory 
inconsequential 
under 
the 
circumstances. 
We granted review to discuss the import of Aledamat on 
this record, including the jury’s true finding on the gang-murder 
special circumstance and the potentially “overwhelming” nature 
of the evidence against Lopez.  We conclude the gang-murder 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
special circumstance here does not necessarily render the Chiu 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, a 
reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would be 
impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the 
findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings 
that would support a valid theory of liability.  (Aledamat, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  Indications in the record that the jury may 
have actually relied on an invalid theory, such as a prosecutor’s 
closing argument or a jury note, do not preclude a finding of 
harmlessness if this standard is satisfied.   
These principles reflect our holding in Aledamat that “no 
higher standard of review applies to alternative-theory error 
than applies to other misdescriptions of the elements.”  
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  Misdescriptions (or 
omissions) of the elements will invariably involve indications 
that the jury actually relied on an invalid theory, since the 
invalid theory was the only theory provided to it.  Nonetheless, 
such errors may be found harmless if it would be impossible, 
based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected 
in its verdict without also finding the missing fact as well.  
(People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 832 (Merritt).) 
The Court of Appeal was therefore incorrect to hold that 
the gang-murder special circumstance, standing alone, showed 
that the Chiu error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
And, 
while 
“overwhelming” 
evidence 
may 
demonstrate 
harmlessness, a court’s analysis of whether the evidence is 
“overwhelming” in this context is not as subjective or free-
ranging as that term might imply.  Instead, the analysis 
requires a court to rigorously review the evidence to determine 
whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty 
based on an invalid theory, and made the factual findings 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily have found the 
defendant guilty based on a valid theory as well.  (Aledamat, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  Based on its short discussion, the 
Court of Appeal does not appear to have fully appreciated the 
proper standard for harmlessness in this context.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for 
reconsideration in light of the standards we describe in this 
opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Trial Evidence 
Sometime before midnight on June 26, 2002, Miguel and 
Rebecca S. stopped their car on a bridge in Santa Rosa, 
California because Miguel saw his father walking on the side of 
the road.  Miguel got out to speak with him, while Rebecca 
remained in the car with their young children.  A creek and 
bicycle path ran underneath the bridge.  Miguel saw the victim, 
Gomez, riding his bicycle.  Miguel knew Gomez was his father’s 
friend, but he did not recognize Gomez at the time.  Gomez said 
hello to Miguel and his father, and they whistled back and forth.  
Gomez turned, rode underneath the bridge, and continued along 
the bicycle path.  Gomez was wearing blue clothing indicative of 
the Sureño criminal street gang.  He was engaged to a Sureño 
associate and knew their distinctive whistle.   
Miguel and Rebecca noticed a group of young men jumping 
over a fence that separated the creek from an apartment 
complex.  Four men, two of whom Rebecca identified as Higuera 
and Ochoa-Gonzales, walked past.  One of the unknown men 
said “Norte” or asked if Miguel “bang[ed] Norte.”  The man 
showed Miguel what appeared to be a knife handle in his pants 
pocket.  Miguel responded, “I don’t bang nothing,” and the men 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
kept walking.  Miguel and Rebecca had been associated with the 
Norteño criminal street gang in the past, but no longer.   
Three of the men went down the path after Gomez, while 
Ochoa-Gonzales hung back.  A fifth man, apparently Amante, 
came by afterward.  He was with two young women.  Miguel saw 
Amante drop a knife, pick it up, and run toward Gomez.  From 
a distance, Miguel saw three men attacking Gomez.  One man, 
wearing a white shirt, had a knife and was making stabbing 
motions.  Miguel later identified that man as Amante.   
After the attack, the group walked back past Miguel and 
Rebecca.  Miguel saw blood on two of the men.  Both were 
wearing white shirts, and one was Amante.  Miguel later 
clarified that Amante was wearing a red San Francisco 49ers 
football jersey with a white tank top underneath; the blood was 
on the tank top but not the jersey.  Miguel and Rebecca drove 
away and called police to report the attack.   
Police officers responded, but they did not find anything at 
the time.  Gomez’s body was discovered the next morning, along 
the bicycle path.  His pants were pulled down, and there was 
blood nearby.  Police also found four pieces of a broken knife 
blade at the scene.   
An 
autopsy 
revealed 
that 
Gomez 
had 
suffered 
approximately 40 to 44 sharp-force injuries, including 38 to 
40 stab wounds.  The majority of the stab wounds, 
approximately 25 to 28, were inflicted on Gomez’s left flank.  
These wounds perforated Gomez’s left lung, his diaphragm, and 
his left kidney.  One stab was so forceful that it broke one of 
Gomez’s ribs.  Gomez also had three stab wounds and four 
incised wounds to his head, including a stab wound behind his 
left ear, a slash across his left jaw, and a large incised wound to 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
his scalp.  Finally, Gomez had three stab wounds to his chest, 
one of which pierced his heart and caused his death.   
The two women in the group, Kacee Dragoman and 
Lindsay Ortiz, testified at trial.  Both were granted immunity, 
and their accounts of the night’s events were largely consistent.  
Dragoman had been in a relationship with Amante for several 
years, and they had a child together.  They lived in the 
apartment complex near the creek.  The backyard of their 
apartment faced the creek itself.  Ortiz lived in the same 
apartment complex as Dragoman and Amante.  Ortiz described 
Dragoman as her best friend, and she loved Amante like a 
brother.  Ortiz had known Lopez for a couple years and did not 
care for him.  Dragoman had met Lopez only a few nights before 
the attack.   
On the night of the attack, the defendants here — Lopez, 
Amante, Higuera, Cardenas, and Ochoa-Gonzales — were 
drinking and socializing with Dragoman, Ortiz, and others in 
the apartment shared by Amante and Dragoman.  Lopez, 
Amante, Higuera, Cardenas, and Ochoa-Gonzales were all 
active participants in the Norteño criminal street gang.  
Dragoman associated with the Norteño gang, and Ortiz was 
friends with many Norteños.  As described further below, the 
Norteños were in a deadly rivalry with the Sureños.  Amante 
himself had been stabbed and severely wounded by Sureños 
during a Cinco de Mayo celebration a couple months earlier.   
During the party, Dragoman was outside on her patio with 
several other people.  They heard some whistling, and 
Dragoman recognized it as a Sureño gang whistle.  It was a “bad 
sign,” according to Dragoman, because “[u]sually if they 
whistled, more were coming.  They’re hollering for more people 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
to come out.  They’re signaling.”  Someone at the party said, 
“ ‘It’s a Scrap whistle,’ ” and Ochoa-Gonzales yelled some 
remarks over the fence.  (“Scrap” is a derogatory term for 
Sureño.)  Dragoman recalled everyone getting “antsy” and 
“mak[ing] each other excited.”  The defendants ran into the 
kitchen.  Dragoman and Ortiz heard sounds like drawers 
opening and closing.   
The defendants ran outside.  Dragoman and Ortiz 
followed.  The women came upon Amante, who had tried to climb 
over the fence but got stuck.  Amante appeared to be intoxicated.  
Dragoman and Ortiz thought the situation was somewhat 
humorous and helped him down.  Amante kept walking toward 
the creek, while Dragoman and Ortiz took a longer way around.   
Dragoman and Ortiz saw Amante again on the bridge.  He 
was approaching several people who had stopped there, 
presumably Miguel, Rebecca, and Miguel’s father.  Ortiz said 
Amante had a knife in his hand like he was going to stab 
someone.  Dragoman recalled that Amante dropped a large 
butcher’s knife at that point, picked it up, and said something 
rude to Miguel and his father.  Dragoman recognized the 
butcher’s knife as one from her kitchen.  Ortiz thought that 
Amante either dropped the knife or Dragoman took it from him.  
Regardless, Amante continued along the path toward the creek.   
Ortiz testified that Amante disappeared from view for 
about five minutes.  She initially saw Lopez, Cardenas, and 
Ochoa-Gonzales coming back from the creek, without Amante 
and Higuera.  Lopez was wearing a white Raiders football jersey 
with black lettering, and Ortiz noticed blood on the front of his 
shirt.  Amante and Higuera emerged afterward.  Higuera had a 
cut on his arm and appeared to be in pain.   
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
Dragoman recalled seeing Amante meet up with the other 
defendants, then walk farther down the path with Higuera.  
They were gone for about 15 or 30 seconds.  She confirmed Lopez 
was wearing a white Raiders jersey and Amante was wearing a 
red 49ers jersey with a white shirt underneath.  When 
Dragoman saw Lopez, he was wearing a dark blue beanie that 
he did not have before the attack.   
The defendants, Dragoman, and Ortiz all walked back 
over the bridge to the apartment complex.  Lopez had a black 
knife handle in his hand, which Dragoman recognized from a 
knife set in her kitchen.  After the group arrived back at the 
apartment, Dragoman remembered that Lopez was “[v]ery 
bouncy” and “[h]appy.”  He had the blue beanie on his head and 
“was kind of like bragging[,] like walking around with a little 
strut, stuff like that.”  Ortiz saw Lopez wearing the blue beanie 
as well, which she remembered as having the word “Sur” on it.  
Ortiz thought Lopez was “excited” and “pretty happy.”  He said 
“something about that guy dying” and told Amante that “this 
was for Cinco de Mayo.”  Amante responded, “ ‘What the fuck 
are you talking about?’ ”  Lopez said something in response, and 
everyone got quiet.   
Dragoman watched Ochoa-Gonzales flush a knife handle 
(apparently the one Lopez was carrying) down the toilet.  
Dragoman put the knife Amante was carrying back in a kitchen 
drawer.  Dragoman did not see anyone else with a knife that 
night.   
Dragoman asked Lopez and Ochoa-Gonzales to take their 
clothes off so she could wash them.  Ortiz helped.  Dragoman 
saw blood on Lopez’s shoes.  Ortiz saw Ochoa-Gonzales pacing 
back and forth.  He looked scared.  He kept saying there were 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
“ ‘cops in the creek.’ ”  At one point, Ochoa-Gonzales said, “ ‘I 
don’t think that guy was a Scrap.’ ”  Eventually, all of the 
defendants except Amante left the apartment.   
The next morning, Dragoman found the blue beanie in her 
kitchen.  She put it in a brown paper sack and threw it away in 
a stranger’s garbage across town.  Dragoman also noticed that 
her knife set was no longer complete; several knives were 
missing.  All of the knives had markings and serial numbers 
that would identify them as part of a set, so Dragoman and 
Amante decided to get rid of the remaining knives.  They drove 
into the countryside and threw them away, along with the knife 
block.  Police were able to recover several of those knives, and 
Dragoman identified them as part of her set.  Dragoman 
identified the broken knife blade found near Gomez’s body as 
part of her set as well.   
Dragoman and Ortiz initially lied to police about what 
happened that night.  A few months later, Dragoman started 
speaking with the police again and disclosed additional details.  
Ortiz eventually did as well, apparently at Amante’s request.  
Dragoman, Ortiz, and Amante discussed what they remembered 
about that night before Ortiz came forward.  Ortiz also received 
police reports (or summaries) from Dragoman about the case.  
By the time of trial, neither Dragoman nor Ortiz had a 
relationship with Amante.   
According to a pathologist, it was difficult to tell with any 
degree of certainty how many stabbing instruments were 
involved in the attack.  The knives police recovered from 
Dragoman’s knife set (apparently steak knives) could have made 
any of the wounds on Gomez’s body.  Other knives of a similar 
size could have made the wounds as well.  The knife whose blade 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
was found broken at the scene could have inflicted some of the 
stab wounds, including two of the wounds to Gomez’s chest.  In 
the pathologist’s opinion, a single person could have inflicted all 
of the wounds in less than a minute.   
A criminalist tested the broken knife blade for traces of 
blood.  He obtained a presumptive positive result, but further 
testing could not confirm the presence of blood.  The criminalist 
also examined the knife’s serrated edges.  Based on his 
experience, the criminalist would have expected to see more 
blood, tissue, or other material in the serrated areas of the knife 
if it had been used to stab a person.   
A police gang expert also testified.  He was familiar with 
both Norteños and Sureños.  In his opinion, the Norteños were 
a criminal street gang under California law.  (§ 186.22, 
subd. (f).)  They were a group of three or more people.  They had 
common signs or symbols, such as the number 14 and the color 
red.  They had as their primary activities various crimes such 
as assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, attempted murder, 
and murder.  The Sureños were a criminal street gang as well.  
They adopted the number 13 and the color blue.  They often used 
the term “Sur” for Sureño.   
The Norteños claimed all of Northern California, and they 
came into conflict with Sureños who moved into the region.  The 
expert described several murders and attempted murders 
committed by Norteño gang members against Sureño gang 
members in Sonoma County.   
Sureños claimed various areas in Santa Rosa, and the 
creek where Gomez was killed was disputed territory.  The 
expert explained, “At the time this crime occurred . . . Sureños 
had pretty much claimed that area just north of there as theirs.  
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
Quite a few Norteño gang members were living just south of that 
area, also living east and west of there and using that path to go 
to and from places.”  Both gangs had painted graffiti in the creek 
and crossed out graffiti painted by their rival.  These “crossouts” 
are a sign of serious disrespect to a rival gang.   
A common Norteño graffiti mark is “SK” or “ ‘Scrap killa.’ ”  
Sureño graffiti includes, “ ‘We Chap killas,’ ” with “ ‘Chap’ ” 
being a derogatory term for Norteños.  Along the same road that 
spanned the creek here, Sureño graffiti mourned the death of a 
Sureño gang member killed by a Norteño.  Nearby, someone had 
written, “ ‘Fuck Whacky Die Slow.’ ”  “ ‘Whacky’ ” was Amante’s 
gang moniker.  The expert explained, “This is very significant to 
me in that it shows that Sureño gang members know 
Mr. Amante as a rival gang member, that they’re well aware he 
was assaulted and seriously injured, and that they want him to 
die slowly.  He is an enemy, and they want him to suffer.”   
The expert explained each defendant’s relationship to the 
Norteños.  He opined that each defendant was an active 
participant in the Norteño criminal street gang.  For Lopez, the 
expert showed photos with Lopez together with other Norteño 
gang members displaying gang symbols and writing.  Lopez had 
a facial tattoo of one dot and four dots, for the number 14, which 
showed his affiliation with the Norteño gang.  Lopez had 
Norteño tattoos on his hands as well, though he may have 
removed one.  Lopez admitted to police officers that he was a 
Norteño gang member and wore clothing associated with the 
Norteño gang.   
The prosecutor presented the expert with a hypothetical 
mirroring the facts of the prosecution’s case and asked whether 
such a murder would have been committed for the benefit of or 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
in association with a criminal street gang.  The expert responded 
that it would, based on the clothing worn by the victim, which 
was consistent with clothing worn by Sureño gang members or 
affiliates; the act of defendants arming themselves together; the 
confrontation with Miguel where he was asked if he “bang[ed] 
Norte”; and the brutal nature of the stabbing.  Such a murder 
would benefit the gang because it shows the gang’s power, which 
it can use to recruit new members, compete with its rivals, and 
intimidate the public.  The participation of gang members in 
such a violent attack would also enhance their individual 
standing in the gang.  Indeed, according to the expert, “the gang 
members are expected to participate [in such an assault] if they 
are in the area of that assault.  To not participate could in fact 
cause retribution to be brought upon them.”   
In testimony to be considered against Lopez only, a jail 
inmate named Richard Smith recounted an argument with 
Lopez while they were both incarcerated.  During the 
confrontation, Lopez turned to Smith and said, “ ‘I’ll kill you just 
like I killed the guy in the creek.’ ”  Smith had several previous 
felony convictions.  He was a longtime heroin addict and was 
taking methadone.  On cross-examination, Lopez’s counsel 
introduced various letters Smith had written to the prosecutor 
requesting favors.  Smith said he hoped his testimony would 
help him at sentencing in a pending criminal case, although the 
prosecution had not promised anything.   
B.  Closing Arguments 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not expressly 
name the person or persons who stabbed Gomez.  He explained, 
“In this case, there is no burden on the People to establish who 
the actual stabber was . . . .  Simply that there was a stabber 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
and that the defendants here on trial were either that stabber 
or an aider and abettor in the crime of that stabber.”  The 
prosecutor discounted the possibility that either the broken 
knife found at the scene or the large butcher knife Amante 
carried were the murder weapon.  Both knives were too large 
and, as to the broken knife, it did not have the expected amount 
of blood on its blade.  The prosecutor suggested that the wounds 
were entirely consistent with the smaller steak knives from 
Dragoman’s knife set.  He argued that at least one other 
defendant must have had a knife and used it against Gomez.  
Given this uncertainty, the prosecutor focused on two theories 
of aiding and abetting, either directly or under the doctrine of 
natural and probable consequences.  He explained each theory 
to the jury.   
Regarding Lopez specifically, the prosecutor noted that he 
was wearing a white Raiders jersey, so he could have been the 
stabber Miguel identified.  He also had blood on his shirt, 
according to Ortiz, and on his shoes, according to Dragoman.  
The prosecutor argued that Lopez personally wielded the knife 
that was found broken, “because there’s no other evidence of 
another broken knife out at the scene or anywhere else.”  It must 
have broken against a rock or the asphalt path, and “[t]hat tells 
you that [Lopez] was there and he was actively participating in 
the attack on [Gomez].  Whether or not that knife pierced 
[Gomez’s] body makes no difference.”  The prosecutor argued 
that Lopez had an added incentive to kill someone he believed 
to be a Sureño, since he was from an out-of-town subset of the 
Norteños.  It was an enormous success for him to kill a Sureño, 
and his attitude afterward reflected that.   
The prosecutor said it was possible Lopez personally 
stabbed Gomez, but it was not probable given the size of the 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
broken knife and the absence of any substantial amount of 
blood.  So, according to the prosecutor, Lopez was a direct aider 
and abettor to murder:  “He knew of the unlawful purpose of the 
person right there with him.  Maybe it was the person who 
pantsed [Gomez].  Maybe it was the person who stabbed [Gomez] 
in the head splitting his skin to his skull or driving the knife 
into his chest.  But he was there.  He was right there.  And he 
shattered his knife during the attack.  Absolutely had 
knowledge.  Intended to commit or encourage or facilitate the 
crime?  Beyond any question.  By act or advice did he aid, 
promote, encourage or instigate its commission?  Of course he 
did.  Whether or not he’s the actual stabber.”   
The prosecutor also touched on the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine:  “And finally, nonhomicide target crimes.  
Even if you think that he was down there just trying to stab a 
Scrap, maybe.  Maybe, despite all the evidence, he just wanted 
to really seriously wound the guy.  It doesn’t matter.  He aided 
and abetted in that serious attack someone that was right there 
with him.  Murdered [Gomez].  And of course under these 
circumstances, that was inevitable.  [¶]  So whether he is an 
actual stabber or not, whether he aided and abetted with the 
intent to kill or not, he’s guilty of murder as a natural and 
probable consequence of his act.”  But the prosecutor did not 
believe the jury needed to reach that theory:  “I would submit to 
you that he is either an actual stabber, which is possible, or he’s 
an aider and abettor to murder, period.  You don’t even need to 
get to this theory as to Rico Lopez.”   
Lopez’s counsel criticized the prosecutor’s reliance on 
three alternate theories.  He repeatedly attacked the credibility 
of Smith, the inmate who testified to Lopez’s admission.  He 
noted that the prosecutor seemed almost to concede that the 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
knife Lopez was carrying was not used to stab anyone, so Lopez’s 
alleged admission to Smith was inconsistent with the evidence.  
Lopez’s counsel attacked the prosecution’s arguments as 
speculative, and he argued the prosecution’s witnesses lacked 
credibility.  He contended that Ortiz and Dragoman were 
accomplices to murder, and their testimony was insufficiently 
corroborated.  He criticized Miguel for testifying to an attack 
that was far away, at night, without any lighting.   
Lopez’s counsel emphasized that the defendants were all 
drinking, and Amante was drunk, so no one could have formed 
the specific intent necessary to commit first degree murder or 
otherwise intend to kill.  He argued there was no evidence of 
premeditation and deliberation since the defendants did not 
know who they would encounter down by the creek.  While the 
evidence of multiple stab wounds could indicate premeditation 
and deliberation, it could also be “a berserk rage” with no 
“thought process going through except blinding rage, for one 
reason or another, which might be alcohol induced.”   
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor denied that 
Dragoman and Ortiz were accomplices and posited that even if 
they were, their testimony was amply corroborated by other 
evidence.  He asserted that the prosecution’s witnesses were 
credible, persuasive, and largely consistent.  He disagreed that 
any of the defendants were so intoxicated that they could not 
intend to kill or premeditate and deliberate a killing, especially 
in light of the circumstances of the attack and the number of 
wounds inflicted on the victim.  The prosecutor also noted that, 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a 
defendant did not have to have the intent to kill to be found 
guilty of murder.  He denied that the two theories of aiding and 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
abetting were somehow fallback positions.  They were, instead, 
“the law of the State of California.”   
C.  Jury Instructions 
The trial court instructed the jury that a principal in a 
crime includes both a person “who directly and actively 
commit[s] the act constituting the crime” and a person “who 
aid[s] and abet[s] the commission of the crime.”  (See CALJIC 
No. 3.00.)  The court described direct aiding and abetting as 
follows:  “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime 
when he or she:  [¶]  . . . [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful 
purpose of the perpetrator, and  [¶]  . . . [w]ith the intent or 
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the 
commission of the crime, and  [¶]  . . . [b]y act or advice aids, 
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”  
(See CALJIC No. 3.01.)  The court went on to explain the 
doctrine of natural and probable consequences, as it was 
understood at the time:  “One who aids and abets another in the 
commission of a crime or crimes is not only guilty of those 
crimes, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a 
principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the 
crimes originally aided and abetted.”  (See CALJIC No. 3.02.)  
The elements were (1) the commission of a target crime, here 
breach of the peace, an assault, a battery, an assault with a 
deadly weapon, or an assault by force likely to produce great 
bodily injury; (2) “[t]he defendant aided and abetted one of those 
crimes”; (3) “[a] co-principal in that crime committed the crime 
of murder”; and (4) “[t]he crime of murder was a natural and 
probable consequence of the commission” of the target crime.  
(Ibid.)  The court instructed the jury on the elements of the 
target crimes, as well as first degree murder, second degree 
murder, and manslaughter.   
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
For the gang-murder special circumstance, the court 
instructed the jury in relevant part as follows:  “The People have 
the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance.  If you 
have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is 
true, you must find it to be not true.  [¶]  If you find that a 
defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or if you 
are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer 
or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the special circumstance 
to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill 
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder 
in the first degree.  [¶]  You must decide separately as to each of 
the defendants the existence or nonexistence of each special 
circumstance alleged in this case.”  (See CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)  
The court continued, “To find that the special circumstance 
‘intentional killing by an active street gang member’ is true, it 
must be proved:  [¶]  1. The defendant intentionally killed the 
victim; [¶]  2. At the time of the killing, the defendant was an 
active participant in a criminal street gang; [¶]  3. The members 
of that gang engaged in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity; [¶]  4. The defendant knew that the gang members 
engaged in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity; and [¶]  5. The murder was carried out to further the 
activities of the criminal street gang.”  (See CALJIC 
No. 8.81.22.)   
D.  Jury Deliberations and Verdict 
The jury deliberated for approximately four and a half 
days before reaching a verdict.  During deliberations, the jury 
requested that Miguel’s testimony be read back.  It also asked 
two legal questions.  First, the jury requested instructions for 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
the criminal street gang sentencing enhancement.  The court 
directed the jury to the appropriate instruction, which it had 
already provided.  Second, the jury asked for clarification on 
premeditation and deliberation in the context of the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine.  Its note stated, “We are having 
difficulties with the sentence[,] ‘To constitute a deliberate and 
premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the 
question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice 
and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does 
kill,’ versus deliberated and premeditated breach of peace or 
assault that results in a killing.  [¶]  We need more clarification 
of premeditation and deliberation [CALJIC No. 8.20] and how to 
relate it to [CALJIC No. 3.02, regarding natural and probable 
consequences].”  After a lengthy discussion with counsel, the 
court provided the following response:  “The term ‘deliberate and 
premeditate[d]’ refers only to First Degree Murder.  First 
Degree Murder is defined by jury instruction 8.20.  [¶]  The term 
‘deliberate and premeditate[d]’ is not an element of any of the 
following:  Breach of the Peace, Assault, Battery, Assault by 
Means of Force [L]ikely to Produce Great Bodily Injury, or 
Assault with a Deadly Weapon.  Those crimes are defined 
elsewhere in the Court’s instructions[.]  [¶] . . . [¶]  Jury 
instruction 3.02 may refer to First Degree Murder, Second 
Degree Murder or Voluntary Manslaughter, depending upon 
what you determine the facts to be.  Those crimes are defined 
elsewhere in the court’s instructions.”   
The jury returned verdicts against each defendant, as 
described above.  The court sentenced Lopez to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and the 
judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.   
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
E.  Writ Proceedings 
As noted, following our opinion in Chiu, Lopez filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the jury was 
improperly instructed on the natural and probable consequences 
theory of aiding and abetting first degree murder.  In her return, 
the district attorney argued that any error was harmless 
because the jury did not rely on the doctrine of natural and 
probable consequences in reaching its verdict.  The district 
attorney pointed to the prosecution’s closing argument as to 
Lopez, which did not emphasize the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, and the jury’s gang-murder special-
circumstance finding, which showed the jury believed Lopez 
intended to kill.   
After hearing argument, the trial court granted relief.  It 
believed that the Chiu error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The court found persuasive the jury’s note 
regarding the natural and probable consequences instruction.  
In the court’s view, it showed the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine “was on the jury’s mind shortly before it 
rendered its verdict, and . . . the jury was potentially grappling 
with its applicability as to all defendants.”  The court believed 
that the evidence at trial was consistent with liability under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine.  It therefore 
vacated Lopez’s first degree murder conviction.   
The prosecution appealed.  While the appeal was pending, 
we decided Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1, which addressed the 
harmlessness standard for alternative-theory error, where the 
jury was instructed with valid and invalid theories of liability.  
Relying on Aledamat, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
of Appeal highlighted the jury’s gang-murder special-
circumstance finding.  It explained, “A true finding as to this 
circumstance required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Lopez acted with an intent to kill, as opposed to the intent to 
commit one of the target crimes.”  The Court of Appeal further 
held that the jury’s note regarding natural and probable 
consequences was not tied to Lopez, so its import was unclear, 
and the evidence against Lopez was “overwhelming.”  We 
granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Valid and Invalid Theories 
“There are two distinct forms of culpability for aiders and 
abettors.  ‘First, an aider and abettor with the necessary mental 
state is guilty of the intended crime.  Second, under the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is 
guilty not only of the intended crime, but also “for any other 
offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the 
crime aided and abetted.” ’ ”  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 158.)  
Chiu eliminated the latter form of aiding and abetting for first 
degree premeditated murder:  “[A]n aider and abettor may not 
be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine.  Rather, his or her 
liability for that crime must be based on direct aiding and 
abetting principles.”  (Id. at pp. 158–159, italics omitted.)  Chiu 
is retroactive and may be raised, as here, in a petition for writ 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
of habeas corpus.  (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1222 
(Martinez).)2 
Applying Chiu, the parties agree the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury that it could find Lopez guilty of first degree 
murder based on the theory of natural and probable 
consequences.  They likewise agree (or at least do not contest) 
that the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could find 
Lopez guilty of first degree murder as a direct aider and abettor 
or as the actual perpetrator of the first degree murder. 
For a defendant to be liable as a direct aider and abettor, 
“the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or 
encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the 
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or 
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its 
commission.  [Citation.]  Because the mental state component — 
consisting of intent and knowledge — extends to the entire 
crime, it preserves the distinction between assisting the 
predicate crime of second degree murder and assisting the 
greater offense of first degree premeditated murder.  [Citations.]  
An aider and abettor who knowingly and intentionally assists a 
confederate to kill someone could be found to have acted 
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, having formed 
his own culpable intent.  Such an aider and abettor, then, acts 
with the mens rea required for first degree murder.”  (Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.) 
 
2  
As we explained in People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 
843, 849, the Legislature later eliminated liability for second 
degree murder under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine as well.  (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
For a defendant to be liable as an actual perpetrator, the 
prosecution must prove that the defendant unlawfully killed a 
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.  (§ 187, 
subd. (a).)  “If the murder is ‘willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated,’ it is first degree murder.  [Citation.]  ‘ “ ‘In this 
context, “premeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and 
“deliberate” means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as 
a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for 
and against the proposed course of action.” ’ ”  [Citation.]  “ ‘An 
intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred 
as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than 
unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ”  [Citations.]  “The true test is 
not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the 
reflection.  Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity 
and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”  
(People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.) 
B.  Standard of Prejudice 
Where a jury is instructed on alternate theories of 
liability, one legally valid and one legally invalid, a federal 
constitutional error has occurred.  The defendant has been 
deprived of his or her right to “a jury properly instructed in the 
relevant law.”  (Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1224; 
see U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)  The error therefore 
requires reversal unless we determine the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9, 
citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(Chapman).) 
In Aledamat, we explored the meaning of the harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in this circumstance 
involving alternative theories of liability.  We noted that “[t]his 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
harmless error rule applies in a variety of contexts, such 
as . . . error in omitting entirely one or more elements of a 
charged offense.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  We held 
that the application of this standard for alternative-theory error 
should be consistent with, and not different from, the 
application of the same standard for other misdescriptions of the 
charged offense.  (Ibid.)  Specifically, we rejected the argument 
that alternative-theory error could be found harmless only 
where “there is a basis in the record to find that ‘the jury has 
“actually” relied upon the valid theory.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Instead, a 
reviewing court may “examine[] what the jury necessarily did 
find and ask[] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, 
for the jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as 
well.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  In other words, if “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” 
would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact, 
given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the 
error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Ibid.) 
For that last point, Aledamat quoted our earlier opinion in 
Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 832, which considered a 
relatively more straightforward instructional error involving 
the omission of one or more elements of the offense.  Merritt, in 
turn, relied on the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of 
a similar error in Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 
(Neder).  (Merritt, at pp. 825–826.)  Merritt quoted Neder’s 
distillation of the applicable test as follows:  “ ‘Is it clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error?’ ”  (Id. at p. 827, quoting 
Neder, at p. 18.)  This test is “essentially the same” as the test 
to be applied when other federal constitutional errors have 
occurred.  (Neder, at p. 18.)  It applies here as well.  (Aledamat, 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 11–12; accord, Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 
555 U.S. 57, 61 (Hedgpeth).) 
This test is exacting, and it requires much of a reviewing 
court.  “[S]afeguarding the jury guarantee will often require that 
a reviewing court conduct a thorough examination of the record.  
If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been 
the same absent the error — for example, where the defendant 
contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to 
support a contrary finding — it should not find the error 
harmless.”  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 19.)  “A reviewing court 
making this harmless-error inquiry does not, as Justice Traynor 
put it, ‘become in effect a second jury to determine whether the 
defendant is guilty.’  [(Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 
(1970) p. 21.)]  Rather a court, in typical appellate-court fashion, 
asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally 
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.  
If the answer to that question is ‘no,’ holding the error harmless 
does not ‘reflect a denigration of the constitutional rights 
involved.’  [Citation.]  On the contrary, it ‘serves a very useful 
purpose insofar as [it] blocks setting aside convictions for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having 
changed the result of the trial.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Although Aledamat seemingly settled the issue, Lopez 
contests the relevance of Neder and Merritt to the alternative-
theory error here.  Relying largely on California authorities that 
predate Aledamat, and federal authorities that predate Neder, 
Lopez proposes a multistep “protocol” for a reviewing court 
considering whether an alternative-theory error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under the proposed protocol, if a 
jury’s verdicts do not themselves show that the jury necessarily 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
relied on a valid theory in convicting a defendant, a reviewing 
court “should then proceed to consider the entire cause, but it 
should consider first those aspects of the record that most clearly 
indicate the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict.”  
If there are indications the jury considered the invalid theory, 
either because the prosecutor relied on the invalid theory during 
argument or because the jury referenced the invalid theory 
during deliberations, then reversal is required regardless of any 
other circumstances.   
Lopez’s proposed protocol contradicts the central holding 
of Aledamat, which was “that no higher standard of review 
applies to alternative-theory error than applies to other 
misdescriptions of the elements.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 
at p. 9; accord, Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 61.)  In cases 
where the instructional error at issue is a misdescription or 
omission of elements with no alternative theory presented, the 
prosecutor argued and the jury necessarily considered the 
invalid theory because it was the only one presented.  Indeed, in 
such cases we can be sure the jury actually relied on the invalid 
theory, again because it was the only one presented to it.  But 
this circumstance does not categorically bar a reviewing court 
from finding the error harmless where any rational jury would 
have found the defendant guilty notwithstanding the error.  
(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18; Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 827.)  Similarly, here, the fact that the prosecutor argued, or 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
the jury considered, an invalid alternate theory is not dispositive 
when conducting a harmless error analysis on appeal.3   
 
3  
While the prosecutor will nearly always argue the invalid 
theory in misdescription or omission cases, since closing 
argument normally tracks the court’s jury instructions, it is true 
the jury does not always provide an indication of the content of 
its deliberations.  But, in at least one prior case, we confirmed 
that the Neder standard applies notwithstanding the jury’s 
expression of interest in the invalid theory.  (People v. Gonzalez 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 665 (Gonzalez).)  We rejected the 
defendant’s argument that, in light of a jury note, the test under 
Neder was inapplicable and a reviewing court should consider 
“whether circumstances make it clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this jury” relied on a valid theory rather than an 
invalid one.  (Gonzalez, at p. 665.)  We likewise rejected the 
defendant’s argument that, under Neder, we should examine the 
evidence in a vacuum, without regard for the findings the jury 
necessarily made in its verdicts.  (Gonzalez, at p. 665.)  Instead, 
we explained, “the Neder court concluded a demonstration of 
harmless error does not require proof that a particular jury 
‘actually rested its verdict on the proper ground [citation], but 
rather on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error 
[citation].  Although the former can be proof of the latter 
[citation], the Neder majority made clear that such a 
determination is not essential to a finding of harmlessness 
[citation], which instead “will often require that a reviewing 
court conduct a thorough examination of the record.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
There are sound reasons for performing the same type of 
harmless error analysis in cases involving an alternative-theory 
error.  In Aledamat, we recognized that “ ‘drawing a distinction 
between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in 
[several cases including Neder] would be “patently illogical,” 
given that such a distinction “ ‘reduces to the strange claim that, 
because the jury . . . received both a “good” charge and a “bad” 
charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious 
than . . . where the only charge on the critical issue was a 
mistaken one.’ ” ’ ”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 11, quoting 
Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 61.)  Yet Lopez’s proposed 
protocol would make such an illogical distinction.  We therefore 
reject it.  “Providing the jury with both a valid and an invalid 
theory should not be subject to a higher standard of review than 
applies when the court provides the jury only with an invalid 
theory.”  (Aledamat, at pp. 11–12.) 
Lopez notes that our earlier decisions have referenced 
circumstances such as a prosecutor’s argument or a jury’s note 
during deliberations as one factor supporting our conclusion 
that an alternative-theory error was not harmless.  (See, e.g., 
 
p. 666.)  Thus, given the jury’s finding that the defendant had 
intent to kill, we concluded based on the evidence that “no 
rational juror could find that [the defendant] intended to murder 
[the victim] but did not personally act with premeditation and 
deliberation.”  (Ibid.)  The “absence of an instruction on this 
point was harmless” because “the evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found that [the 
defendant] personally premeditated and deliberated the 
attempted murder of [the victim].”  (Id. at p. 667.) 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1226–1227; Chiu, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at pp. 167–168.)  But, as we explained in Aledamat, 
these decisions do not reflect a higher or different standard of 
review.  “In both Chiu and Martinez, we examined the record 
and found that it affirmatively showed the jury might have 
based its verdict on the invalid theory.  Because no other basis 
to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was at 
issue, we did not explore whether other ways of finding the error 
harmless existed.  Those cases merely provide one way in which 
a court might evaluate harmlessness.  They do not preclude 
other ways.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13, italics added.)  
Chiu and Martinez did not consider the role of the prosecutor’s 
argument or a jury note if the standard for harmlessness under 
Neder and Merritt (and later Aledamat) had been met.4 
Lopez relies on Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 
which considered whether a defective jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt was subject to harmless error review.  In this 
context, Sullivan explained, “Harmless-error review looks, we 
have said, to the basis on which ‘the jury actually rested its 
verdict.’  [Citation.]  The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, 
in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
error.  That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict 
that was never in fact rendered — no matter how inescapable 
 
4  
For the same reasons, Lopez’s reliance on lower court 
opinions such as In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797 and 
People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 211 is misplaced.  These 
opinions also do not consider the role of a prosecutor’s argument 
or a jury note if the standard for harmless error discussed in the 
text had been met. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
the findings to support that verdict might be — would violate 
the jury-trial guarantee.”  (Id. at p. 279.)  Because Sullivan did 
not believe that a jury verdict rendered with a defective 
reasonable doubt instruction was “a jury verdict within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of 
Chapman review is simply absent.”  (Id. at p. 280.) 
Neder, however, sharply limited the application of 
Sullivan’s broad language.  It acknowledged that “this strand of 
the reasoning in Sullivan does provide support” for the idea that 
harmless error cannot apply to omitted element errors.  (Neder, 
supra, 527 U.S. at p. 11.)  But it held that this reasoning “cannot 
be squared with our harmless-error cases.”  (Ibid.)  Instead, “the 
absence of a ‘complete verdict’ on every element of the offense 
establishes no more than that an improper instruction on an 
element of the offense violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial 
guarantee.”  (Id. at p. 12.)  Neder went on to explain that such 
an error, like other federal constitutional errors, may be held 
harmless where it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.”  (Id. at p. 18.)  And, as explained above, we made clear in 
Aledamat that the relevant inquiry is not whether the jury’s 
verdict actually rested on a valid theory, but whether any 
rational jury would surely have rendered the same verdict had 
it been properly instructed.  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 9.)5 
 
5  
Justice Scalia, who authored Sullivan, dissented in Neder.  
(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 30 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).)  His 
dissent explained his more limited view of harmless error in the 
omitted-element scenario:  “The failure of the court to instruct 
 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
Lopez also relies on the more recent Court of Appeal 
opinion in People v. Thompkins (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365, 
which considered the standard of prejudice for alternative-
theory error in light of Aledamat.  The discussion in Thompkins 
reflects the complexity of this area of law.  (Id. at pp. 398–401.)  
We need not examine this discussion in detail, except to note 
that Thompkins was incorrect to elevate Sullivan over more 
recent discussions of harmless error in Neder, Hedgpeth, and 
Merritt.  (Thompkins, at pp. 400–401.)  We disapprove 
Thompkins to the extent it is inconsistent with our description 
of the standard of prejudice in this opinion. 
In sum, as we held in Aledamat, no higher standard 
applies to alternative-theory errors than applies to other 
misdescriptions or omissions of the elements of an offense.  
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  A reviewing court must 
 
the jury properly — whether by omitting an element of the 
offense or by so misdescribing it that it is effectively removed 
from the jury’s consideration — can be harmless, if the elements 
of guilt that the jury did find necessarily embraced the one 
omitted or misdescribed.  This was clearly spelled out by our 
unanimous opinion in Sullivan . . . , which said that harmless-
error review ‘looks . . . to the basis on which “the jury actually 
rested its verdict.” ’  [Citation.]  Where the facts necessarily 
found by the jury (and not those merely discerned by the 
appellate court) support the existence of the element omitted or 
misdescribed in the instruction, the omission or misdescription 
is harmless.  For there is then no ‘gap’ in the verdict to be filled 
by the fact finding of judges.”  (Id. at pp. 35–36 (dis. opn. of 
Scalia, J.), fn. omitted.)  The dissent complained that the 
majority was “casting Sullivan aside” by failing to follow its 
reasoning.  (Id. at p. 36 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).)  Justice Scalia’s 
view of harmless error is analogous to the protocol proposed by 
Lopez, and it was not adopted by the majority.  Subsequent 
cases, as discussed, have further repudiated it. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
determine whether any rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty based on a valid theory if the jury had been 
properly instructed.  “The reviewing court examines what the 
jury necessarily did find and asks whether it would be 
impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without also 
finding the missing fact as well.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  In other words, 
if “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury that made all of these findings could 
have failed to find’ ” the facts necessary to support a valid 
theory, the alternative-theory error was harmless.  (Ibid.)   
C.  Harmlessness Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
The Attorney General bears the burden of showing that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman, 
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1227.)  
He argues that the jury’s verdicts, combined with the evidence 
at trial, leave no reasonable doubt a rational jury would have 
convicted Lopez of first degree murder based on a valid theory if 
it had been properly instructed.   
The valid theory of direct aiding and abetting required the 
jury to find “that the defendant aided or encouraged the 
commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful 
purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of 
committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission.”  (Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  “ ‘When the offense charged is a 
specific intent crime, the accomplice must “share the specific 
intent of the perpetrator”; this occurs when the accomplice 
“knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and 
gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of 
facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  What this means here, when the charged 
offense and the intended offense — murder or attempted 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
murder — are the same, i.e., when guilt does not depend on the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine, is that the aider 
and abettor must know and share the murderous intent of the 
actual perpetrator.”  (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 
1118 (McCoy), fn. omitted.)  “An aider and abettor who 
knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to kill 
someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and 
with premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent.  
Such an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required 
for first degree murder.”  (Chiu, at p. 167.)6 
The Court of Appeal below first held that the jury’s 
verdict, standing alone, shows that the jury made the findings 
necessary for first degree murder.  It has long been established 
that an alternative-theory error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt where “ ‘it is possible to determine from other 
portions of the verdict that the jury necessarily found the 
defendant guilty on a proper theory.’ ”  (Aledamat, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 8.) 
The Court of Appeal noted that the jury did not merely 
find Lopez guilty of first degree murder.  The jury also found 
true the gang-murder special circumstance.  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(22).)  Under the trial court’s jury instructions 
 
6  
Because a direct aider and abettor’s guilt “is determined 
by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that 
person’s own mens rea” (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1122), it 
is possible for the aider and abettor to be guilty of a more serious 
offense than the direct perpetrator.  “If that person’s mens rea 
is more culpable than another’s, that person’s guilt may be 
greater even if the other might be deemed the actual 
perpetrator.”  (Ibid.)  The parties do not rely on this principle 
here, so we need not consider it further. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
(see CALJIC No. 8.80.1), this true finding shows that the jury 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez either 
(1) “intentionally killed the victim” or (2) “with the intent to kill 
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder 
in the first degree.”   
The Court of Appeal focused on the latter alternative, and 
it does appear far more likely the jury believed Lopez was an 
aider and abettor rather than an actual killer.  The only direct 
evidence of the identity of the stabber came from Miguel, who 
identified Amante.  Miguel also said the stabber was wearing a 
white shirt, which could include Lopez because he was wearing 
a white Raiders jersey, but Miguel did not identify Lopez 
specifically.  The prosecutor argued that Lopez could have 
stabbed Gomez, but he described this possibility as unlikely 
because the knife Lopez carried was too large to make most of 
Gomez’s wounds and the broken knife blade found at the scene 
did not have any confirmed blood or other tissue that would 
indicate the blade was used for stabbing.  The prosecutor 
therefore contended Lopez was “an aider and abettor to 
murder.”  Likewise, in his own briefing, Lopez argues that “this 
scenario [that he was an actual killer] is undermined by the 
record, as the prosecutor felt compelled by the weakness of the 
evidence to argue explicitly to the jury that [Lopez] was an aider 
and abettor to murder rather than an ‘actual stabber.’ ”   
In any event, we need not decide whether the jury could 
have found that Lopez was an actual killer.  Even assuming the 
jury found the gang-murder special circumstance true based on 
its belief that Lopez “intentionally killed the victim,” the 
Attorney General concedes the special circumstance does not 
itself establish the elements of first degree premeditated murder 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
under either a direct perpetrator or an aiding and abetting 
theory.  Based on the special circumstance instructions alone, if 
the jury found Lopez was an actual killer, it is reasonably 
possible the jury could have believed he did not personally 
premeditate and was liable only for second degree murder.  
If the jury did not find that Lopez was an actual killer, it 
must instead have determined that Lopez “with the intent to kill 
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder 
in the first degree.”  (See CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)  The Court of 
Appeal described the true finding as proof that “Lopez acted 
with an intent to kill, as opposed to the intent to commit one of 
the target crimes” and was therefore persuaded that the jury 
made the findings necessary to support the valid theory of direct 
aiding and abetting.  But intent to kill is only one of the elements 
required to prove direct aiding and abetting.  It does not, itself, 
show the jury necessarily found Lopez guilty on a proper 
theory.7 
 
7  
In passing, Lopez contends the jury may not have found 
that he acted “with a true intent to kill,” notwithstanding its 
gang-murder special-circumstance finding.  The State Public 
Defender, as amicus curiae, expands on this idea.  Their 
argument is that the trial court’s instruction on natural and 
probable consequences confused the jury regarding intent to kill 
in the context of murder, and that confusion carried over to the 
special circumstance.  We are not persuaded.  The instruction 
on natural and probable consequences expanded the scope of 
liability for murder; it did not alter the predicate elements of the 
murder offense itself.  A reasonable juror would not have been 
confused about the relationship between the two.  Nor would a 
juror have been confused about the intent to kill element of the 
gang-murder special circumstance.  The relevant jury 
 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
The 
Attorney 
General 
argues 
that 
the 
special 
circumstance finding still demonstrates harmlessness because, 
in addition to intent to kill, it shows the jury made all of the 
remaining findings necessary to support the valid theory of 
direct aiding and abetting first degree murder.  This argument 
is unpersuasive.  While the relevant language evokes similar 
concepts, it does not cover all of the elements of direct aiding and 
abetting. 
As noted, for a defendant to be liable for first degree 
murder as a direct aider and abettor, “the prosecution must 
show that the defendant aided or encouraged the commission of 
the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 
perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, 
encouraging, or facilitating its commission.”  (Chiu, supra, 
 
instruction was patterned on CALJIC No. 8.80.1 and explicitly 
stated, “If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of 
a human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the 
defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you 
cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that 
defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted 
any actor in the commission of the murder in the first degree.  [¶]  
You must decide separately as to each of the defendants the 
existence or nonexistence of each special circumstance alleged 
in this case.”  (Italics added.)  Similarly, the specific jury 
instruction covering the gang-murder special circumstance 
required the jury to find that a defendant who actually killed 
the victim must have “intentionally” done so.  (See CALJIC 
No. 8.81.22.)  We have credited similar findings of intent to kill, 
notwithstanding 
a 
natural 
and 
probable 
consequences 
instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 1, 108.)  Lopez and the State Public Defender have 
failed to show we cannot similarly credit the jury’s findings here. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  The jury here was likewise instructed 
more broadly that “[a] person aids and abets the commission of 
a crime when he or she:  [¶]  . . . [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful 
purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶]  . . . [w]ith the intent or 
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the 
commission of the crime, and [¶]  . . . [b]y act or advice aids, 
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”  
(See CALJIC No. 3.01.)  Moreover, “[a]n aider and abettor who 
knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to kill 
someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and 
with premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent.  
Such an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required 
for first degree murder.”  (Chiu, at p. 167.)  The gang-murder 
special-circumstance instruction falls far short of explaining 
these principles to the jury. 
The Attorney General relies on People v. Beck and Cruz 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, but that case is distinguishable because it 
involved conspiracy to commit murder, not the gang-murder 
special circumstance.  In Beck, we noted the defendants “were 
charged with conspiracy to murder, not conspiracy to commit a 
lesser crime that resulted in murder.”  (Id. at p. 645.)  We 
therefore held there was “no possibility they were found guilty 
of murder on a natural and probable consequences theory.”  
(Ibid.)  Beck has little relevance here because, among other 
things, the findings necessary for conspiracy to commit murder 
and the findings necessary for the gang-murder special 
circumstance are materially different.  Conspiracy to murder 
requires not only intent to kill, but also intent to agree and 
actual agreement.  (§ 182; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
593, 600, 607.)  “Consequently, it logically follows that where 
two or more persons conspire to commit murder — i.e., intend to 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
agree or conspire, further intend to commit the target offense of 
murder, and perform one or more overt acts in furtherance of 
the planned murder — each has acted with a state of mind 
‘functionally indistinguishable from the mental state of 
premeditating the target offense of murder.’  [Citation.]  The 
mental state required for conviction of conspiracy to commit 
murder necessarily establishes premeditation and deliberation 
of the target offense of murder — hence all murder conspiracies 
are conspiracies to commit first degree murder, so to speak.”  
(People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1232.)  Unlike the 
conspiracy instruction, the gang-murder special-circumstance 
instruction does not necessarily establish all of the elements of 
directly aiding and abetting first degree murder.  Thus, it does 
not in and of itself show the jury made the necessary findings 
for a valid theory. 
This conclusion, however, does not end the harmlessness 
inquiry.  “In determining . . . whether the error was harmless, 
the reviewing court is not limited to a review of the verdict 
itself.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.)  The Court of 
Appeal below nodded to this further inquiry by describing the 
evidence against Lopez as “overwhelming.”  While it is common 
(including in this court) to shorthand the analysis in this way, 
such a description may obscure the specific question a reviewing 
court must answer in order to find an omitted element or 
alternative-theory error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As discussed, this further harmlessness inquiry requires 
a reviewing court to “examine[] what the jury necessarily did 
find and ask[] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, 
for the jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as 
well.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  In other words, a 
reviewing court must be persuaded that, in light of the jury’s 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
findings and the evidence at trial, any rational juror who made 
those findings would have made the additional findings 
necessary for a valid theory of liability, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, if the jury had been properly instructed.  (Gonzalez, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 666.)  If the reviewing court determines 
beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational juror would have 
made the additional findings, based on the jury’s actual verdict 
and the evidence at trial, the error is harmless because the 
presentation of the invalid theory to the jury made no difference.  
The error did not contribute to the verdict.  (See Neder, supra, 
527 U.S. at pp. 15–16; Aledamat, at p. 13; Merritt, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 827.) 
Lopez objects to this mode of analysis because the jury 
could only have rendered its special circumstance finding after 
finding Lopez guilty of first degree murder.  He argues that, 
regardless of the content of the special circumstance finding, the 
jury’s first degree murder verdict could have been based on the 
invalid theory of natural and probable consequences.  Lopez’s 
argument reflects a misplaced focus on what the jury 
subjectively thought, rather than what a reviewing court can 
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a rational jury 
would have found if it had been properly instructed.  We rejected 
that focus in Gonzalez, Merritt, and Aledamat, just as the United 
States Supreme Court did in Neder and Hedgpeth. 
Lopez also contends various circumstances in this matter 
preclude a finding of harmlessness.  For example, he asserts 
that the natural and probable consequences theory was the 
“easiest way” for the jury to find him guilty, but this contention 
again reflects an unduly restrictive focus on what the jury 
actually thought, rather than what a reviewing court can 
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any rational jury 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
would surely have found based on the verdict and the evidence 
here.  The proper analysis under Aledamat does not rest on “ ‘the 
likelihood that the jurors would have applied the erroneous 
instruction,’ ” but whether the jury could have found what it did 
find without also making the findings necessary for a valid 
theory.  (People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 598, 
fn. 42, review granted July 27, 2022, S274792.)  Lopez also 
argues the error cannot be held harmless because the evidence 
was “sufficient” to support a conviction based on the invalid 
theory.  But this circumstance merely shows it was possible for 
a rational jury to rely on the invalid theory; it does not foreclose 
a conclusion that any rational jury would have found Lopez 
guilty based on a valid theory as well, based on the jury’s actual 
findings and the evidence here.8 
Along the same lines, Lopez focuses on what he 
characterizes as “indications” the jury actually relied on an 
invalid theory, including the prosecutor’s closing argument and 
the jury’s note during deliberations.  Lopez is correct that our 
review for harmless error should encompass “the entire cause, 
 
8  
We likewise reiterate that the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a valid theory is not the appropriate standard either.  
(Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1225–1226.)  Instead, the 
combination of the evidence and the jury’s actual verdict must 
be so compelling that a reviewing court can conclude any 
rational juror who made the findings in the actual verdict would 
have found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory if the 
jury had been properly instructed.  In other words, “[t]he 
reviewing court examines what the jury necessarily did find and 
asks whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the 
jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.”  
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  As noted, this standard is 
quite high, and it will often require an “exhaustive[] review[]” of 
the trial evidence.  (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 666.) 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
including 
the 
evidence” 
and 
consider 
“all 
relevant 
circumstances.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.)  But if a 
reviewing court can conclude the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt under Neder and Aledamat because any 
rational juror who made the findings reflected in the actual 
verdict and heard the evidence at trial would also have made 
the findings necessary to support a valid theory, such 
“indications” will not generally be significant.  The prosecutor’s 
mere reliance on an invalid theory will not overcome a showing 
of harmlessness under Neder and Aledamat.  Indeed, as 
discussed, if the prosecutor’s mere reliance on an invalid theory 
were dispositive on the issue of harmlessness, trial court errors 
of omission and misdescription of an offense’s elements could 
almost never be held harmless because the prosecutor almost 
invariably argues based on the theories in the trial court’s 
instructions.  For similar reasons, a jury note showing mere 
consideration of an invalid theory will not overcome a showing 
of harmlessness under Neder and Aledamat.  Every jury 
presented with instructions that omit or misdescribe the 
elements of an offense will have considered — and actually 
relied to some extent on — an invalid theory of liability.  These 
“indications” are no bar to a finding of harmlessness under 
Neder, Merritt, and Aledamat.9 
 
9  
In this context, we observe that the jury note here is 
distinguishable from a note that affirmatively showed that one 
or more jurors did not believe the valid theory had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See, e.g., People v. Wear (2020) 
44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1021.)  In such a circumstance, the State 
Public Defender and the Attorney General agree that reversal 
would be required.   
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
The Court of Appeal here correctly based its analysis on 
Aledamat, but it appears to have misapprehended certain 
aspects of the harmless error analysis.  As noted, the Court of 
Appeal described the evidence against Lopez as “overwhelming” 
and found the Chiu error harmless on that basis.  It explained 
that Lopez “was seen after the murder with blood on his clothes 
and shoes and holding a knife handle, and he also bragged about 
the stabbing afterward.  His appellate attorney in the original 
appeal did not even challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his first degree murder conviction, which was 
reasonable given the record.”  We find this reasoning 
inadequate, for two main reasons. 
First, the Court of Appeal does not appear to have 
considered whether a rational jury, having rendered the verdicts 
at issue here, would necessarily have to believe the cited 
testimony regarding Lopez, especially his bragging about the 
stabbing.  The evidence a court may consider under Aledamat 
does not necessarily extend to the whole body of evidence 
supporting the verdict.  Rather, a court must determine what 
evidence a jury would rationally have to believe.  For example, 
as Lopez correctly points out, “Although jurors evidently 
believed Dragoman and Ortiz’s testimony that [Lopez] joined in 
the attack on the victim, one or more jurors may have doubted 
the credibility of those witnesses’ assertions portraying [Lopez] 
as the most culpable attacker.”  It is well settled that the jury 
has wide latitude to believe or disbelieve witnesses, or even 
specific portions of their testimony, as it sees fit.  “ ‘[T]he jury 
properly may reject part of the testimony of a witness, though 
not directly contradicted, and combine the accepted portions 
with bits of testimony or inferences from the testimony of other 
witnesses thus weaving a cloth of truth out of selected available 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
material.’ ”  (Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 
67–68; accord, People v. Crooker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 348, 355 [“The 
jury may accept as true a portion of the testimony of a witness 
and disbelieve the remainder or have a reasonable doubt as to 
its correctness”].)   
Second, the Court of Appeal’s reference to the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting Lopez’s first degree murder 
conviction is contrary to the applicable standard under 
Aledamat.  The question here is not the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a valid theory, but its opposite.  To 
determine the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court 
essentially asks whether any rational juror could have made the 
findings necessary to convict the defendant on a valid theory.  
To determine harmlessness under Aledamat, a reviewing court 
essentially asks whether any rational juror who made the 
findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial 
could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings 
necessary to convict the defendant on a valid theory.  “The 
reviewing court examines what the jury necessarily did find and 
asks whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the 
jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.”  
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.) 
To summarize, under Aledamat, “no higher standard of 
review applies to alternative-theory error than applies to other 
misdescriptions of the elements.  The same beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard applies to all such misdescriptions, including 
alternative-theory error.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  
“The reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after 
examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 13.)  
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
“ ‘Sometimes it is possible to determine from other portions of 
the verdict that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty 
on a proper theory.’ ”  (Id. at p. 8.)  But where, as here, the jury’s 
verdict does not necessarily allow for such a determination, a 
court may look to “the entire cause, including the evidence.”  (Id. 
at p. 13.)  “The reviewing court examines what the jury 
necessarily did find and asks whether it would be impossible, on 
the evidence, for the jury to find that without also finding the 
missing fact as well.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  In other words, if “ ‘[n]o 
reasonable jury that made all of these findings could have failed 
to find’ ” the facts necessary to support a valid theory, the 
alternative-theory error was harmless.  (Ibid.)  Indications that 
the jury considered an invalid theory, without more, do not 
undermine that conclusion.   
Finally, while we have the discretion to apply the correct 
standard to the facts here (see, e.g., Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 
at pp. 13–15), we decline to do so given the size and complexity 
of the underlying trial record.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 8.516(b)(3) [“The court need not decide every issue the 
parties raise or the court specifies”].)  We therefore remand the 
matter to the Court of Appeal to reconsider whether the Chiu 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the 
standards we discuss in this opinion.  We express no view on the 
proper resolution of that question. 
In re LOPEZ  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur:  
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Lopez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 9/25/19 – 1st Dist., 
Div. 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S258912 
Date Filed:  April 3, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Sonoma  
Judge:  Raima H. Ballinger 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey M. 
Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Bridget 
Billeter, Seth K. Schalit, Donna M. Provenzano and Amit Kurlekar, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation. 
 
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Respondent Rico Ricardo Lopez. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Nerissa Huertas and Samuel 
Weiscovitz, Deputy State Public Defenders, and Elias Batchelder for 
the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent 
Rico Ricardo Lopez. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Amit Kurlekar 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3810 
 
Victor J. Morse 
Attorney at Law 
3145 Geary Boulevard, PMB # 232 
San Francisco, CA 94118 
(415) 387-5828