Title: Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
BRADLEY S. TANNER, ET AL.  
 
v.   Record No. 080998 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                          April 17, 2009 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in rejecting a constitutional challenge to a municipal noise 
control ordinance. 
 
Bradley S. Tanner and Eric A. Williams (collectively, the 
owners) own and operate BAE Ventures, Inc., t/a The Peppermint 
Beach Club (the club), a licensed restaurant and entertainment 
venue located in the 1800 block of Atlantic Avenue in the City 
of Virginia Beach (City).  The club is located in a part of the 
City commonly referred to as the “oceanfront,” which includes 
restaurants, bars, hotels, and outdoor entertainment venues. 
 
The club, which is on the ground floor of the Howard 
Johnson Hotel, hosts disc jockeys and occasional “live” 
entertainment groups that play various types of music including 
“hip-hop,” “punk rock,” “emo,” and “indie” music.  The owners 
repeatedly have been warned by City police officers about music 
sound levels, and have received citations for violations of 
Virginia Beach City Code § 23-47 (the ordinance).  The ordinance 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to create, or 
allow to be created any unreasonably loud, 
disturbing and unnecessary noise in the city or 
any noise of such character, intensity and 
duration as to be detrimental to the life or 
health of persons of reasonable sensitivity or to 
disturb or annoy the quiet, comfort or repose of 
reasonable persons. The following acts, among 
others, are declared to be loud, disturbing and 
unnecessary noise in violation of this section, 
but such enumeration shall not be deemed to be 
exclusive: 
 
(1) The playing of any television set, 
radio, tape player, phonograph or any musical 
instrument in such a manner or with such volume 
as to annoy or disturb the quiet, comfort or 
repose of reasonable persons. 
(2) The keeping of any animal which, by 
causing frequent or long-continued noise, shall 
disturb the quiet, comfort or repose of the 
neighborhood to such an extent as to constitute a 
nuisance. 
(3) The creation of any excessive noise on 
any street adjacent to any school, institution of 
learning or court, while the same is in session, 
or adjacent to any building used as a place of 
public worship, while being so used or adjacent 
to any hospital, which unreasonably interferes 
with the workings of such school, institution or 
court or the services being conducted in such 
place of public worship or which disturbs or 
unduly annoys patients in such hospital. 
(4) The shouting and crying of peddlers, 
hawkers and vendors which disturbs the peace and 
quiet of the neighborhood. 
(5) The use of any drum, loudspeaker or 
other instrument or device for the purpose of 
attracting attention, by creation of noise, to 
any performance, show or sale or display of 
merchandise. 
 
 
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Virginia Beach City Code § 23-47.  Any violation of the 
ordinance constitutes a class 4 misdemeanor.  Id. 
 
In June 2007, the owners filed a complaint seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional on 
its face because it is vague, and that it is unconstitutional as 
applied to the club.  The owners alleged that the ordinance is 
vague because it fails to provide citizens with “fair notice” 
regarding what conduct is unlawful, and because the ordinance 
language invites selective prosecution by granting law 
enforcement officials the “unfettered individual discretion” to 
make enforcement decisions.  The owners separately alleged that 
City police officers have applied and enforced the ordinance 
against the owners “in a subjective and selective manner.” 
 
In response to the owners’ complaint, the City filed a 
demurrer, which the circuit court sustained in part based on its 
previous determination that the ordinance was constitutional on 
its face.  Relying on that prior decision, the circuit court 
held, among other things, that the ordinance is not vague, and 
dismissed the owners’ facial constitutional challenge with 
prejudice. 
 
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of the City’s 
application of the ordinance to the sound levels generated by 
the club’s music.  Certain City police officers testified that 
the City used two enforcement standards in evaluating noise 
 
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emanating from oceanfront business establishments.  The first 
standard used was the “reasonable person” standard provided for 
by the ordinance.  The second standard employed was an “across 
the street” assessment established by Police Captain Anthony F. 
Zucaro. 
 
Addressing the “reasonable person” standard, Captain Zucaro 
testified that police officers determine whether noise is 
“unreasonably loud, disturbing and unnecessary” by employing the 
officers’ “[b]ackground, experience, knowledge of the dynamics 
of the moment, listening, [and] witnessing.”  Officers Albert L. 
Mills, Christopher D. D’Orio, and Steven J. Kennedy testified 
that officers usually exercise their discretion whether to issue 
a citation for violation of the ordinance.  These officers 
generally conceded that “reasonableness” is a standard that 
depends on an individual officer’s assessment and on 
environmental factors such as the weather, the volume of ambient 
noise, and the time of day. 
 
In 2007, Zucaro issued a letter that was distributed to 
oceanfront business owners in an effort to achieve voluntary 
compliance with the ordinance.  The letter informed the business 
owners that police officers would take enforcement action if 
“[t]he intensity of the noise emanating from an establishment is 
at such a level it can be definitively linked to that particular 
 
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establishment from across the street or a distance equal to that 
measurement despite the presence of other ambient noise levels.” 
 
Several police officers testified regarding incidents in 
which noise emanating from the club resulted in the issuance of 
citations to the owners.  Relying on this and other evidence, 
the circuit court determined that the evidence “unequivocally 
establishe[d] that the enforcement of the noise ordinance is 
selective and uneven.”  However, the circuit court held that 
because the owners failed to prove that this selective 
enforcement was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the 
club’s constitutional challenge to the City’s application of the 
ordinance failed.  The owners appealed from the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
 
On appeal, the owners first argue that the circuit court 
erred in rejecting their facial constitutional challenge to the 
ordinance.  They contend that the ordinance is vague and, thus, 
is unconstitutional on its face because business owners must 
engage in guesswork to determine whether certain sound levels 
violate the ordinance.  The owners further assert that several 
terms in the ordinance, including the terms “unnecessary,” 
“loud,” “disturbing,” “character,” and “intensity,” are purely 
subjective and do not establish clear standards that permit 
uniform enforcement. 
 
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In response, the City argues that the ordinance clearly 
articulates an objective, “reasonable person” standard that is 
well established and is sufficiently definite to permit persons 
to conform their conduct to the law.  The City concedes that the 
terms of the ordinance are not quantitatively precise, but 
argues that such a level of precision is not required to survive 
a vagueness challenge.  The City contends that only a flexible 
standard such as the one prescribed by the ordinance can fairly 
define criminal conduct related to the “wide swath of settings 
and circumstances” involved when assessing noise levels. 
 
The City further argues that the term “unnecessary” does 
not render the ordinance vague because the ordinance requires 
that noise be unreasonably loud, disturbing, and unnecessary 
before a criminal citation can issue.  The City contends that 
instead of rendering the ordinance vague, the term “unnecessary” 
narrows the category of noise that constitutes a criminal 
violation and provides added protection to potential offenders.  
However, the City further maintains that if this Court 
disagrees, it should sever any offending language rather than 
invalidate the entire ordinance.  We disagree with the City’s 
arguments. 
 
Our review of the ordinance begins with the principle that 
that duly enacted laws are presumed to be constitutional.  
Marshall v. Northern Virginia Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 427, 
 
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657 S.E.2d 71, 75 (2008); In re Phillips, 265 Va. 81, 85, 574 
S.E.2d 270, 272 (2003); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Quillian, 
264 Va. 656, 665, 571 S.E.2d 122, 126 (2002); Finn v. Virginia 
Retirement System, 259 Va. 144, 153, 524 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2000).  
We are required to resolve any reasonable doubt concerning the 
constitutionality of a law in favor of its validity.  In re 
Phillips, 256 Va. at 85-86, 574 S.E.2d at 272; Finn, 259 Va. at 
153, 524 S.E.2d at 130; Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 
427, 497 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1998).  Thus, if a statute or 
ordinance can be construed reasonably in a manner that will 
render its terms definite and sufficient, such an interpretation 
is required.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001); 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954); Pedersen v. 
City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 1065, 254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979). 
 
In this context, we consider the constitutional principles 
applicable to a vagueness challenge involving a penal statute or 
ordinance.  The constitutional prohibition against vagueness 
derives from the requirement of fair notice embodied in the Due 
Process Clause.  See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. ___, 
___, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008); City of Chicago v. Morales, 
527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108 (1972).  The doctrine requires that a statute or 
ordinance be sufficiently precise and definite to give fair 
warning to an actor that contemplated conduct is criminal.  See 
 
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Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Grayned, 408 U.S. 
at 108.  Thus, the language of a law is unconstitutionally vague 
if persons of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
[the] meaning [of the language] and differ as to its 
application.”  Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 391 (1926); accord Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 
611, 614 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968). 
The constitutional prohibition against vagueness also 
protects citizens from the arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of laws.  A vague law invites such disparate 
treatment by impermissibly delegating policy considerations “to 
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.”  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; see 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-61. 
Because legislative bodies are “[c]ondemned to the use of 
words,” courts cannot require “mathematical certainty” in the 
drafting of legislation.  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.  For this 
reason, an ordinance that lacks meticulous specificity 
nevertheless may survive a vagueness challenge if the ordinance 
as a whole makes clear what is prohibited.  See id.; Esteban v. 
Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 
1969). 
 
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A different concern arises, however, when a vague statute 
implicates citizens’ rights under the First Amendment.  In such 
circumstances, vague language in a statute or ordinance may 
cause citizens to avoid constitutionally permissible conduct 
based on a fear that they may be violating an unclear law.  
Thus, a vague statute may inhibit the exercise of 
constitutionally protected activities.  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 
108-09. 
In applying these principles, we first acknowledge that the 
regulation of noise by a locality creates special problems 
regarding the drafting and enforcement of legislation.  See 
Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (Miss. 1991); 
People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (N.Y. 
1982).  These problems arise from the nature of sound, which 
invites the use of broadly stated definitions and prohibitions.  
Nichols, 589 So. 2d at 1283; Trap Rock, 442 N.E.2d at 1226. 
 
The ordinance before us prohibits any “unreasonably loud, 
disturbing and unnecessary noise,” noise of “such character, 
intensity and duration as to be detrimental to the life or 
health of persons of reasonable sensitivity,” or noise that 
“disturb[s] or annoy[s] the quiet, comfort or repose of 
reasonable persons.”  The ordinance also describes various acts 
that constitute per se violations. 
 
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We conclude that these provisions fail to give “fair 
notice” to citizens as required by the Due Process Clause, 
because the provisions do not contain ascertainable standards.  
See Thelen v. State, 526 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. 2000); Nichols, 589 
So. 2d at 1284.  Instead, the reach of these general descriptive 
terms depends in each case on the subjective tolerances, 
perceptions, and sensibilities of the listener. 
Noise that one person may consider “loud, disturbing and 
unnecessary” may not disturb the sensibilities of another 
listener.  As employed in this context, such adjectives are 
inherently vague because they require persons of average 
intelligence to guess at the meaning of those words.  See 
Thelen, 526 S.E.2d at 62; Lutz v. City of Indianapolis, 820 
N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Nichols, 589 So. 2d at 
1283. 
The references in the ordinance to “reasonable persons,” 
and to persons of “reasonable sensitivity,” do not provide a 
degree of definiteness sufficient to save the ordinance from the 
present vagueness challenge.  Such terms, considered in their 
context, delegate to a police officer the subjective 
determination whether persons whom the police officer considers 
to be of reasonable sensitivity would find the noise detrimental 
to their life or health.  Likewise, these terms leave to a 
police officer the determination whether persons the police 
 
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officer considers to be reasonable would be disturbed or annoyed 
in their comfort or repose by the particular noise at issue. 
Determinations of this nature invite arbitrary enforcement.  
Police officers likely will have differing perceptions regarding 
what levels of sound exceed the described tolerance levels and 
sensitivities of reasonable persons.  Because these 
determinations required by the ordinance can only be made by 
police officers on a subjective basis, we hold that the language 
of the ordinance is impermissibly vague.  See Grayned, 408 U.S. 
at 108-09; U.S. Labor Party v. Pomerleau, 557 F.2d 410, 412 (4th 
Cir. 1977); Thelen, 526 S.E.2d at 62.  The imposition of 
criminal penalties for the violation of an ordinance cannot rest 
on the use of subjective standards, nor may an ordinance consign 
a person to penal consequences without first providing 
sufficiently definite notice of prohibited activities.  See 
Thelen, 526 S.E.2d at 62; Nichols, 589 So. 2d at 1284. 
We find no merit in the City’s argument that its use of the 
term “reasonable persons” nevertheless rescues the ordinance 
from the present vagueness challenge because the criminal law 
employs a “reasonable person” standard in various other types of 
determinations.  Such comparisons are inapposite.  Here, the 
City attempts to satisfy the notice requirement of the Due 
Process Clause by using a standard that does not notify or warn 
citizens in clear and definite terms what noise levels are 
 
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prohibited.  In contrast, the use of a “reasonable person” 
standard elsewhere in the criminal law does not attempt to 
provide notice to citizens regarding the reach of a criminal 
statute or ordinance, but sets a standard for a court to use in 
determining police compliance with certain constitutional and 
other legal requirements.  See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 
551 U.S. 249, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405-06 (2007) (“seizure” 
within meaning of Fourth Amendment occurs when reasonable person 
would not feel free to leave); Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (probable cause exists when 
facts and circumstances of which police officer has “reasonably 
trustworthy information . . . warrant a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed”) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 
284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)). 
In concluding that the ordinance is vague, we do not 
directly address the list of per se violations contained in the 
ordinance.  Each of these per se violations is defined as 
constituting “loud, disturbing and unnecessary noise” and, thus, 
cannot be evaluated separately from those vague terms. 
 
Finally, we hold that we are unable to sever from the 
ordinance the unconstitutional language that we have identified 
and give its remaining language a definite and permissible 
construction.  Instead, the vague language adjudged 
 
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unconstitutional in this opinion affects the content of the 
entire ordinance.∗ 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and will enter final judgment for the owners declaring 
that the entire ordinance is unconstitutional because it is 
vague. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
∗ In view of our holding that the ordinance is vague, we do 
not reach the owners’ remaining contentions alleging that the 
ordinance is overbroad and has been enforced selectively by City 
police. 
 
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