Title: Orbe v. Johnson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA:
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Tuesday, the 30th day of March, 
2004. 
 
 
Dennis Mitchell Orbe, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  against  
 
Record No. 040598 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. CH-04-419-1 
 
Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia 
  Department of Corrections, et al., 
 
 
 
Appellees. 
 
 
Upon an appeal from an order and a judgment rendered by 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond on the 10th and 12th 
days of March, 2004. 
 
 
 
Appellant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 
 
By order dated February 12, 2004, the Circuit Court of York 
County directed that the sentence of death imposed upon Dennis 
Mitchell Orbe ("Orbe") be carried out on March 31, 2004.  On March 
5, 2004, Orbe filed a Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond 
seeking an adjudication that the particular method of 
implementation of lethal injection employed by the Commonwealth and 
anticipated to be utilized in his execution "constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and violates due process of law under Article I, 
Sections 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia."  Additionally, 
Orbe requested the issuance of a permanent injunction "barring [the 
Commonwealth] from carrying out [his] execution using a protocol 
that will cause unnecessary pain."  In a separate motion, Orbe 
 
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requested the issuance of a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction "to protect the status quo ante" and 
enjoining the Commonwealth from carrying out Orbe's execution on 
March 31, 2004.  In pleadings before this Court, Orbe states that 
he makes no federal constitutional claims in this action. 
 
On March 10, 2004, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond 
denied Orbe's Motion for Preliminary Injunction holding that it was 
"without jurisdiction to grant the motion, pursuant to Virginia 
Code § 53.1-232.1," that Orbe's claim "is a habeas corpus claim and 
does not lie in a declaratory judgment proceeding," and that even 
"if the court had jurisdiction and declaratory judgment was the 
proper proceeding, the court would find that [Orbe] could not 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits."  By order dated 
March 12, 2004, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond dismissed 
the entire Bill of Complaint, holding that Orbe's claim "is a 
habeas corpus claim which does not lie in a declaratory judgment 
proceeding, and that [the court] is without jurisdiction to 
consider habeas corpus claims brought by persons sentenced to death 
pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-654(C)." 
 
On March 22, 2004, Orbe filed his notice of appeal from the 
denial of a preliminary injunction and from the dismissal of the 
entire Bill of Complaint. On appeal, Orbe asserts: 
1. 
The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction 
on the ground that it supposedly lacked jurisdiction to do 
 
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so under Code § 53.1-232.1. 
2. 
The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction 
on the ground that the issue in Plaintiff's bill of 
complaint for declaratory judgment supposedly was a habeas 
corpus claim. 
3. 
The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction 
on the ground that Plaintiff could not demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
4. 
The circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint on the 
ground that the Plaintiff's bill of complaint was a second 
or successive habeas petition. 
 
Orbe requests this Court to remand the declaratory judgment 
action to the trial court for trial and to issue a preliminary 
injunction or remand to the trial court with directions to enter 
such an injunction prohibiting the Commonwealth from "carrying out 
Orbe's execution using their current protocol." 
Orbe's bill of complaint is not a claim for habeas relief.  
See Dennis Mitchell Orbe v. William Page True, Warden, decided 
today.  Orbe's action is one for declaratory judgment.  However, it 
may not be sustained.  Because Orbe is deemed to have selected 
lethal injection rather than electrocution, he has waived any 
challenge to the constitutionality of lethal injection under the 
Constitution of Virginia.  Orbe's claim is based upon Article I, 
Sections 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia.  He 
specifically disclaims any federal constitutional claims.  Under 
Virginia law, he cannot use a declaratory judgment action to decide 
an issue he has waived by prior act. 
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 53.1-234, Orbe had the 
 
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right to choose whether his execution will be by lethal injection, 
as it is administered in Virginia, or by electrocution.  If the 
condemned prisoner has not made a choice by at least fifteen days 
prior to the scheduled execution, the statute provides that the 
method of execution shall be by lethal injection.  Under these 
circumstances, the condemned prisoner may affirmatively choose 
electrocution, affirmatively choose lethal injection, or choose the 
statutory consequences of a failure to specify, namely, lethal 
injection.  In any case, it is the condemned prisoner's choice. 
 
We have previously held that execution of prisoners by 
electrocution does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 
172, 202, 563 S.E.2d 695, 715 (2002),cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 
(2003);  Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 
569 (1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994), 
cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995); Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215, 402 S.E.2d 196, 209-10 (1991); 
Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 
(1980); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 S.E. 582, 
587 (1921).  We take this occasion to hold that execution of 
prisoners by electrocution also does not violate Article I, 
Sections 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia. 
When a condemned prisoner has a choice of method of execution, 
 
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the inmate may not choose a method and then complain of its 
unconstitutionality, particularly when the constitutionality of the 
alternative method has been established.  In Stewart v. LaGrand, a 
case involving a challenge to execution by lethal gas, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that 
Walter LaGrand, by his actions, has waived his claim that 
execution by lethal gas is unconstitutional.  At the time 
Walter LaGrand was sentenced to death, lethal gas was the 
only method of execution available in Arizona, but the 
State now provides inmates a choice of execution by 
lethal gas or lethal injection, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-
704(B) (creating a default rule of execution by lethal 
injection).  Walter LaGrand was afforded this choice and 
decided to be executed by lethal gas.  On March 1, 1999, 
Governor Hull of Arizona offered Walter LaGrand an 
opportunity to rescind this decision and select lethal 
injection as his method of execution.  Walter LaGrand, 
again, insisted that he desired to be executed by lethal 
gas.  By declaring his method of execution, picking 
lethal gas over the state's default form of execution − 
lethal injection − Walter LaGrand has waived any objection 
he might have to it. 
 
526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). 
 
Orbe's circumstances are legally indistinguishable from those 
presented to the United States Supreme Court in LaGrand.  As 
previously discussed, under Code § 53.1-234, Orbe could have chosen 
electrocution or he could have chosen lethal injection.  Instead, 
he chose to allow the statutory default provisions to apply.  The 
Commonwealth did not make his choice.  The Commonwealth only 
provided the choices for him, including the choice of allowing the 
default provisions to apply.  Orbe has waived any right he may have 
 
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to complain about lethal injection as it is administered in 
Virginia. 
 
The effect of his waiver removes Orbe's claims from those that 
may be properly considered by declaratory judgment under Virginia 
law.  Declaratory judgment proceedings were not available at common 
law.  This statutory cause of action is dependent upon "cases of 
actual controversy."  Code § 8.01-184.  Declaratory judgment is not 
intended to provide advisory opinions.  Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes, 
240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990). Orbe's waiver of the 
right to contest the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is 
administered in Virginia removes the requirement of "actual 
controversy" from the case.  Simply stated, Orbe has no cognizable 
cause of action. 
 
Additionally, a declaratory judgment action is not a 
substitute for an appeal or collateral attack upon conviction.  
Declaratory judgment "does not provide a means whereby previous 
judgments by state or federal courts may be reexamined, nor is it a 
substitute for appeal or post conviction remedies."  Shannon v. 
Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966).  "A declaratory 
judgment action is not part of the criminal appellate process."  
State v. Brooks, 728 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).  The 
issue Orbe presents in his declaratory judgment action should have 
 
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been raised before the trial court in Orbe's criminal case and on 
direct appeal from that judgment. 
 
While the trial court erred in characterizing Orbe's claim as 
one for habeas corpus rather than declaratory judgment, the trial 
court did not err in dismissing the action.  It is unnecessary to 
address each of Orbe's assignments of error because they are 
predicated upon the legitimacy of the underlying declaratory 
judgment action itself.  Orbe's appeal from the judgment orders of 
the trial court dated March 10, 2004 and March 12, 2004 is denied.  
All of Orbe's other motions attendant to this appeal are denied. 
_______________ 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
In denying the petition for appeal, the majority states that 
Orbe’s circumstances are “legally indistinguishable” from that in 
Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999).  In my opinion, the 
circumstances are both factually and legally different. 
Unlike LaGrand, where the issue was whether death by the 
administration of any poisonous gas was cruel and inhuman 
punishment, Orbe is complaining that the specific chemical protocol 
of the lethal injection to be used is the constitutional offender, 
not lethal injection per se.  Moreover, the defendant in LaGrand 
affirmatively elected the specific method of execution of which he 
then complained.  Contrary to the view taken by the majority, Orbe 
 
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did not elect a method of execution. 
The majority’s rationale is that by not exercising his right 
to select the method of execution, Orbe effectively selected his 
method of execution and, thus, waived his right to challenge the 
constitutionality of that method.  I disagree. 
Code § 53.1-234, in pertinent part, states:  “The method of 
execution shall be chosen by the prisoner.  In the event the 
prisoner refuses to make a choice at least fifteen days prior to 
the scheduled execution, the method of execution shall be by lethal 
injection.”  The majority would add language to the statute to the 
effect that if “the prisoner refuses to make a choice . . . he 
shall be deemed to have selected lethal injection.”  “But, courts 
are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they 
permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial 
interpretation.”  Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 213, 
547 S.E.2d 899, 909 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 
(2001).  Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, 
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not 
assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General 
Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.  Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003). 
The plain meaning of Code § 53.1-234 is that where the 
 
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prisoner fails to make the selection between the two available 
methods of execution within the required time, the Commonwealth 
makes the selection of the method of execution.  In the absence of 
an affirmative act by the prisoner, there can be no waiver of the 
right to challenge the constitutionality of the method of 
execution.  Were this not the case, then the rationale expressed by 
the majority would result in the inability of a prisoner to 
challenge this statute under any circumstances.  Accordingly, I 
would hold that Orbe has not waived his right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the method of his execution. 
The majority further holds that “a declaratory judgment action 
is not a substitute for an appeal or collateral attack upon 
conviction.”  While I agree that this is a correct statement of the 
law with regard to declaratory judgments, the majority misconstrues 
Orbe’s request for declaratory judgment.  Orbe expressly states 
that he is not challenging the legality of his conviction and 
sentence, but rather that he is challenging the specific chemical 
protocol of the lethal injection to be used to carry out that 
sentence. 
Similarly, the majority’s assertion that “[t]he issue Orbe 
presents in his declaratory judgment action should have been raised 
before the trial court in Orbe’s criminal case and on direct appeal 
from that judgment,” is unavailing in my opinion.  I recognize that 
 
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in LaGrand, the Court held that the defendant’s failure to raise 
the question of the constitutionality of lethal gas as a method of 
execution was barred by his failure to raise that claim at the time 
of his direct appeal.  However, at the time of LaGrand’s trial, 
lethal gas was the only method of execution in use in Arizona.  
LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 117.  The Court further noted that 
there was sufficient debate about the constitutionality 
of lethal gas executions that Walter LaGrand cannot show 
cause for his failure to raise this claim.  Arguments 
concerning the constitutionality of lethal gas have 
existed since its introduction as a method of execution 
in Nevada in 1921.  In the period immediately prior to 
Walter LaGrand’s direct appeal, a number of states were 
reconsidering the use of execution by lethal gas, and two 
United States Supreme Court Justices had expressed their 
views that this method of execution was unconstitutional.  
In addition, lethal gas executions have been documented 
since 1937, when San Quentin introduced it as an 
execution method, and studies of the effect of execution 
by lethal gas date back to the 1950s. 
 
LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 119-20 (internal citations omitted). 
Here, the record shows that the debate about the efficacy of 
the specific chemical protocol of the lethal injection has only 
recently arisen.  Moreover, the Commonwealth only provided Orbe 
with the particulars of the protocol less than a month ago.  Thus, 
even assuming that Orbe could have raised his challenge to the 
method of execution at trial, but see People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 
544, 578 (Cal. 1999) (holding that a challenge on direct appeal to 
the legality of the method of execution for a death sentence must 
be “rejected out of hand” because it does not challenge “the 
 
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validity of the sentence itself”), under these circumstances I 
would hold that there was “cause and prejudice to excuse the 
default,” LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 117, arising from his failure to do 
so. 
 
In the case of Nelson v. Campbell, 347 F.3d 910 (11th Cir.), 
cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 835 (2003), presently on 
review before the United States Supreme Court, the principal issue 
to be determined is whether a prisoner may challenge the method of 
his execution through a civil proceeding.  While I recognize that 
the issues in Nelson relate to federal law and the federal 
constitution, the similarity of that case to the circumstances and 
procedures here are undeniable. 
Given that “[t]he awesome severity of a sentence of death 
makes it qualitatively different from all other sanctions,” 
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 262 (1987) (Marshall, J. 
concurring), and cognizant of the fact that the forthcoming 
decision in Nelson may inform our decision, I believe that the 
proper course in this case would be to grant the appeal and award a 
stay of execution, so that the Court might have time to more fully 
explore the issues raised herein.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
This order shall be certified to the said circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
       A Copy, 
 
 
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Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk