Title: WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV. v. GERRARD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV. v. GERRARD2001 WY 717 P.3d 20Case Number: 00-56Decided: 01/29/2001

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2000

January 
29, 2001

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY ANDCOMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellant(Petitioner),

v.

SHANNON 
M. GERRARD,

Appellee(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Carrie Hesco, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ.

            
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
The 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) awarded attorney's fees and costs to 
Appellee Shannon M. Gerrard's appointed attorney.  Appellant State of Wyoming ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) filed a request for 
reconsideration asserting the amount awarded was in excess of the benefits at 
issue in the case and therefore violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) (LEXIS 
1999).  The OAH denied the request 
for reconsideration concluding that the Division had raised causation as an 
issue and for this reason § 27-14-602(d) did not apply to limit attorney's 
fees.  The Division appealed the 
order awarding attorney's fees and the denial of the request for reconsideration 
to the district court, and the district court certified the case to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court.  We disagree with the 
OAH's determination that § 27-14-602(d) does not apply but affirm the attorney's 
fee award because the attorney's fees are reasonable and within the hearing 
examiner's jurisdiction pursuant to application of 
§ 27-14-602(d).

ISSUES

[¶2]           
The 
Division presents two issues: 

I.  Was 
the Hearing Examiner's award of attorney fees in excess of the uncontested 
amount of "benefits at issue" contrary to law and an abuse of 
discretion?

II.  In 
the alternative, were the Hearing Examiner's findings and conclusions 
inadequate?

Ms. 
Gerrard frames a single issue:

Was the 
Hearing Examiner's award of attorney fees in the amount of $486.25 arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law?

FACTS

[¶3]           
In 
September 1997, while working for the City of Cheyenne, Ms. Gerrard 
injured her neck when she hit her head on the door frame of her work 
vehicle.  The Division issued a 
final determination on October 31, 1997, that the injury was covered and 
compensable.  Ms. Gerrard had 
surgery on her cervical spine and  
received  post-procedure 
treatment for her left arm and left shoulder pain.  On July 8, 1998, the Division denied a 
claim for coverage of carpal tunnel syndrome treatment because the condition was 
not related to the original head/neck injury.  Ms. Gerrard appealed the denial on July 
16, 1998, and requested a hearing.  
Attorney Carrie Hesco was appointed to represent Ms. Gerrard.  A contested case hearing before the OAH 
was scheduled.1

[¶4]           
On 
August 4, 1998, the Division denied a claim for coverage of left shoulder 
treatment because the condition was not related to the original head/neck 
injury.  Ms. Gerrard appealed the 
shoulder treatment denial on August 7, 1998, and requested it be combined with 
the carpal tunnel syndrome denial which was already scheduled for hearing.  She submitted a statement of benefits 
claimed to the OAH on August 19, 1998, which listed medical expenses incurred 
for both the carpal tunnel syndrome and left shoulder treatments.2  The contested case hearing3 was held on December 16, 1998, and 
the OAH issued an order denying benefits for treatment related to carpal tunnel 
syndrome on January 14, 1999.  The 
order did not mention or address the pending left shoulder treatment claims in 
any manner.

[¶5]           
On or 
about December 10, 1998,4 Ms. Gerrard applied for temporary 
total disability (TTD) benefits for the period July 6 through July 10, 1998, in 
the amount of $160.61.  The Division 
issued a final determination on December 17, 1998, by which it denied the 
application because it was not filed within sixty days of the previous period of 
temporary disability.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(d)(i) (LEXIS 1999).  Ms. Gerrard appealed this denial on 
December 28, 1998, and requested a hearing.  The OAH issued an order setting a 
hearing for April 6, 1999, and again appointed Attorney Hesco to represent the 
claimant pursuant to § 27-14-602(d).  
On February 10, 1999, Ms. Gerrard filed a statement of benefits claimed 
which listed the TTD benefits in the amount of $160.61.  On March 15, 1999, Ms. Gerrard and the 
Division submitted a stipulated withdrawal of the TTD benefits appeal.  The stipulation did not set forth the 
reason for the withdrawal.  As of 
March 15, 1999, the record reflects unresolved medical claims related to left 
shoulder treatments in the amount of  
$1,511.90.5  When added to the TTD claim for $160.61, 
the total unresolved benefits equaled $1,672.51. 6 

[¶6]           
Attorney 
Hesco filed a motion and application for attorney's fees and costs of $494.68.7  The OAH awarded the attorney's fees and 
costs without reduction.  The 
Division filed a request for reconsideration contending the award violated 
§ 27-14-602(d) and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) because 
no specific findings were made regarding the benefits at issue in the contested 
case hearing.  It did not question 
that Attorney Hesco expended the represented time on the case, but it did take 
issue with the legality of the award in light of the statute and the WAPA 
requirements.  Attorney Hesco filed 
a response and asserted the injury to Ms. Gerrard's left shoulder would have 
been an issue had a hearing been conducted and for this reason the benefits at 
issue could have exceeded the TTD claim ($160.61).  The OAH issued an order denying the 
Division's request for reconsideration stating that the case did solely rest on 
the issue of timeliness of the TTD application but the Division had raised the 
question of causation and thus § 27-14-602(d) was not applicable.  The Division appealed the order awarding 
attorney's fees and the denial of the request for reconsideration to the 
district court which certified the case to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b). 

[¶7]           
 

            
W.R.A.P. 12.09 provides for judicial review of agency action according to 
W.S. 16-3-114(c), which states that the reviewing court 
shall:

"(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;  [or]

                                    
. . .

"(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

Mitchell 
v. State Recreation Commission Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 39 (Wyo. 1998).  We review 
an administrative decision certified pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) under the 
standards applicable to a reviewing court of first instance.  Armstrong v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 140, 142 (Wyo. 
1999); Sheridan Race Car Association v. Rice Ranch, 864 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 
1993).

            
When an abuse of discretion is the issue on review, the reviewing court 
examines the question of whether the agency's "decision was based on a 
consideration of relevant factors and whether it is rational."  Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996).  The failure of any essential 
finding to be supported by substantial evidence results in an arbitrary and 
capricious decision and must be reversed.  
Our definition of substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency.'"  State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting 
Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 
1995)).  When there is substantial 
evidence present to support the agency's finding of fact, we do not substitute 
our judgment for the agency finding.  
The reviewing court, however, may adjust the findings of fact when they 
are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.

Pino v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 996 P.2d 679, 683 (Wyo. 2000) (some citations omitted).  In determining whether the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence, we examine the entire record.  Pittman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, 917 P.2d 614, 617 (Wyo. 
1996).  "Agency conclusions of law 
are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law."  Hampton v. Lifecare Center of 
Cheyenne, 3 P.3d 837, 840 (Wyo. 
2000). 

[¶8]           
This 
case also requires this Court to consider a question of first impression with 
regard to the proper interpretation of § 27-14-602(d) as amended in 1995.      

The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act is a 
question of law over which our review authority is plenary.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.

Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1998) (citations omitted); see also Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 10 P.3d 544, 547 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶9]           
Our review 
begins with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed by the legislature according to the manner in which those words are 
arranged.  Platte Development 
Company v. State Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 
1998).  If more than one reasonable 
interpretation exists, we resort to general principles of statutory 
construction. Id. However, when the legislature has spoken in unambiguous 
terms, we are bound to the results so expressed.  Id. 

            
 

[¶10]      
The 
Division contests the validity of both the OAH's order awarding attorney's fees 
and the denial of reconsideration of that order.  It contends these orders violate 
§ 27-14-602(d)8 and, in the alternative, fail to 
provide sufficient findings of fact to comport with the requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LEXIS 1999)9 and W.R.C.P. 54(d).10  Having thoroughly reviewed the record, 
we conclude this latter complaint is legitimate with regard to the original 
order awarding attorney's fees issued on or about August 10, 1999.  The document contains no findings of any 
nature to support the attorney's fee award.  It appears to be a fill-in-the-blank 
form order and, we speculate, may be used when there is no initial Division 
objection to a fee application and the requested fee appears on its face to be 
reasonable.  Although the Division's 
contentions are valid with regard to this first order, that order was 
supplemented by the order denying the request for reconsideration.  This subsequent order set out the 
findings:  "The Final Determination 
in this case did rest solely on the issue of timeliness of the temporary total 
disability application.  However, by 
the Division's own disclosure statement filed on February 24, 1999, the Division 
also raised the question of causation."  
On the basis of these findings, the OAH reached the following conclusion 
of law:  "Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) (Michie 
1997)[,] limiting attorneys fees to the amount in controversy, is not 
applicable."

[¶11]      
From our 
review of this entire record, we conclude the finding that the case involved the 
sole issue of timeliness of the TTD benefits application is not supported 
by substantial evidence.  The record 
clearly evidences that Ms. Gerrard appealed the compensability of her left 
shoulder treatments in August of 1998.  
The Division asserts Ms. Gerrard only listed the TTD benefits in her 
statement of benefits claimed filed on February 10, 1999.  However, the record reveals that she had 
already raised these issues in her August 19, 1998, statement of benefits 
claimed which was filed with the OAH and served on the Division.  The record also reflects that she made 
at least two separate requests that the shoulder issue be addressed at the 
scheduled carpal tunnel syndrome hearing.  
The OAH decision regarding the carpal tunnel syndrome claims failed to 
adjudicate the left shoulder claims.  
The record contains a minimum of nine separate medical bills which 
were denied coverage and remained unresolved at the time the parties stipulated 
to terminate the contested case proceeding.11  Conspicuously absent from the record is 
any OAH decision resolving the outstanding left shoulder claims.  On the basis of this overwhelming 
evidence, we conclude that the contested case issues remaining for consideration 
at the time the parties stipulated to terminate the contested case proceeding 
included the TTD benefits denial and all the outstanding shoulder claims.  A hearing examiner's decision as to the 
facts will be overturned if it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence.  Shryack v. Carr 
Construction Company, Inc., 3 P.3d 850, 854 (Wyo. 2000).

[¶12]      
We now 
consider whether the finding that the Division raised the issue of causation has 
any relevance to the application of § 27-14-602(d) or the award of attorney's 
fees in this matter.  The Division 
did assert in its disclosure statement that Ms. Gerrard would have to establish 
causation as an element of proving her entitlement to TTD benefits.12  It is logical that, had the TTD benefits 
proceeded to hearing, the causation nexus between Ms. Gerrard's original 
head/neck injury and her later claim for TTD benefits would be a required 
element of her proof.  State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Wyo. 
1999).  It is nonetheless irrelevant 
to the applicability of § 27-14-602(d) or the award of attorney's 
fees.  The OAH seems to treat the 
mention of causation as a means to except the attorney's fees award from the 
statute.  We find no authority in 
the case law or statutes for this legal conclusion.  Section 27-14-602(d) nowhere mentions 
the word "causation" nor does it provide for such an exception.  This being the case, we must conclude 
the causation finding was irrelevant to the determination of the applicability 
of § 27-14-602(d) and the OAH's legal conclusion that the statute did not 
apply was in error. 

[¶13]      
It being 
concluded § 27-14-602(d) applies, we now address the pivotal issue of whether, 
as the Division contends, the statutory language precludes the employee's 
attorney from being awarded attorney's fees in excess of the sums at issue in 
the contested case proceeding.  In 
order to ascertain this issue, we must examine and interpret the language of the 
statute. 

[¶14]      
In 1995, 
§ 27-14-602(d) was amended by the legislature to add the language denoted by 
bold italics, as follows:

(d) Upon 
request, the hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the employee 
or claimants and may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his 
services at the conclusion of the proceeding.  An appointed attorney shall be paid 
according to the order of the hearing examiner either from the worker's 
compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants or from 
the employer.  In any 
contested case where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing 
employer's attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the 
hearing examiner from the worker's compensation account, not to affect the 
employer's experience rating.  An 
award of attorney's fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not 
exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing.  In all other cases if the 
employer or division prevails, the attorney's fees allowed an employee's 
attorney shall not affect the employer's experience rating.  Attorney fees allowed 
shall be at an hourly rate established by the director of the office of 
administrative hearings and any application for attorney's fees shall be 
supported by a verified itemization of all services provided.  No fee shall be awarded in any case in 
which the hearing examiner determines the claim or objection to be 
frivolous and without legal or factual justification.

1995 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193, § 1.

[¶15]      
The 
first sentence of the statute remained unchanged and provides that "the hearing 
examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may 
allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion 
of the proceeding."  The hearing 
examiner's jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the employee and award reasonable 
attorney's fees at the conclusion of the proceeding was retained wholly 
intact.  The change affected by the 
added amendment language was that, in the event of a contested case regarding 
compensability of an injury, a prevailing employer's attorney's fees could be 
awarded but were not to exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case 
hearing.  The hearing examiner's 
jurisdiction to award a prevailing employer's attorney's feesnot to exceed the 
benefits at issue in the contested case hearingwas added.  Contrary to the Division's contention, 
the language did not diminish or limit the hearing examiner's jurisdiction to 
appoint counsel for the employee and award that attorney reasonable fees.  To conclude otherwise would render the 
first sentence of the statute meaningless, and this we will not do.  US WEST Communications, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 989 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Wyo. 
1999); McClellan v. State, 933 P.2d 461, 465 (Wyo. 
1997).  

[¶16]      
Our 
conclusion is further supported by the preamble language to this session 
law:

AN ACT 
to amend W.S. 27-14-602(d) and 27-14-615 relating to worker's compensation; 
allowing payment of attorney fees incurred by prevailing employers in contested 
cases and appeals; specifying that fees shall not be awarded in the case of 
certain frivolous claims or objections; and providing for an effective date. 

1995 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193.  Likewise 
it is consistent with our holding in Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 
1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an 
employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding compensability 
of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the 
conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case 
hearing is held. 

[¶17]      
This 
Court has the authority to adjust factual findings based on the overwhelming 
evidence in the record and to correct errors of law.  Pino, 996 P.2d  at 683.  The record clearly reflects that 
Attorney Hesco was appointed pursuant to § 27-14-602(d).  This provision specifies that the 
hearing examiner may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for services 
at the conclusion of the proceedings.  
Attorney Hesco's participation and the resulting stipulated dismissal 
meant the considerable expense of a full contested case hearing was 
avoided.  In Painter, we 
anticipated that the early involvement of appointed attorneys on behalf of 
employees would have this kind of positive effect and result in only those 
matters requiring a full contested case hearing proceeding to that extent.  Such an outcome benefits all 
parties.  The Division conceded 
Attorney Hesco's fees were reasonable.  
Therefore by application of § 27-14-602(d), the hearing examiner had the 
jurisdiction to award these reasonable attorney's fees.

[¶18]      
We turn 
briefly to the Division's position that these OAH orders failed to provide 
sufficient findings of fact to comport with the requirements of § 16-3-110 and 
W.R.C.P. 54(d).  The OAH reached the 
correct resultpayment of the attorney's feesthrough the wrong course.  In the exercise of our authority, we 
have remedied the errors and applied the correct law to the facts contained in 
the record.  We believe remand under 
these circumstances for issuance of findings of fact consistent with this 
decision would be a superfluous requirement.  In this regard, we note with some 
concern that funds in excess of the fee sought in this matter were expended by 
the Division to contest the payment.  
Clearly, Attorney Hesco also incurred additional costs.  The time and resources of this Court 
were likewise utilized.  We are of 
the opinion that the decision to bring this case presents a questionable use of 
limited means.

[¶19]      
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1On October 15, 1998, the hearing was 
vacated and reset from October 29, 1998, to December 16, 1998. 

  2The statement of benefits claimed 
stated:

5.  As a 
compensable injury, Claimant is also entitled to the payment of all medical 
expenses incurred as a result of medical procedures to Claimant's left 
shoulder.  Medical expenses, known 
at this time, incurred as a result of medical procedures to Claimant's left 
shoulder include, but are not limited to, one bill from the Center for Spine 
& Orthopedic Surgery in the amount of $212.50.

  3No transcript of the December 16, 
1998, hearing was certified as part of the record.  

  4The certified record does not 
contain a copy of Ms. Gerrard's TTD benefits application; however, the Division 
asserts it was filed on December 10, 1998.  
This date would appear to be consistent with the date of the denial and 
is not at issue in this proceeding.

  5All dates reflect the date of the 
Division's final determination denying coverage for the specific medical 
bill:  8/4/98 ($85.50); 12/28/98 
($57); 1/13/99 ($808.20 & $188.10); 1/19/99 ($60); 1/19/99 ($134.80); 2/2/99 
($28.50); 2/2/99 ($15); and 2/18/99 ($134.80).

6  Ms. Gerrard contends in her brief that 
the benefits at issue were a minimum of $1,525.71.  The $146.80 discrepancy between her 
computation and our record review is not relevant or significant to resolution 
of this case.

  7Attorney's fees of $486.25 and costs 
of $8.43 comprised the total requested sum of $494.68.

  8Section 27-14-602(d) 
provides:

(d) Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an 
attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the 
proceeding.  An appointed attorney 
shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner either from the 
worker's compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants 
or from the employer.  In any 
contested case where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing 
employer's attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the 
hearing examiner from the worker's compensation account, not to affect the 
employer's experience rating.  An 
award of attorney's fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not 
exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing.  In all other cases if the employer or 
division prevails, the attorney's fees allowed an employee's attorney shall not 
affect the employer's experience rating.  
Attorney fees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established by the 
director of the office of administrative hearings and any application for 
attorney's fees shall be supported by a verified itemization of all services 
provided.  No fee shall be awarded 
in any case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim or objection to 
be frivolous and without legal or factual justification.

  9Section 16-3-110 
provides:

            
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be 
in writing or dictated into the record.  
The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.  Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.  Parties shall be notified either 
personally or by mail of any decision or order.  A copy of the decision and order shall 
be delivered or mailed forthwith to each party or to his attorney of 
record.

  10W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2)(C)  (emphasis added) 
states:

 (C)  On request of a party or 
class member, the court shall afford an opportunity for adversary submissions 
with respect to the motion in accordance with Rule 43(e).  The court may determine issues of 
liability for fees before receiving submissions bearing on issues of evaluation 
of services for which liability is imposed by the court.  The court shall find the facts and 
state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 52(a), and a judgment shall be 
set forth in a separate document as provided in Rule 
58.

            

  11See supra note 
5.

  12The Division's disclosure statement 
dated February 24, 1999, stated in pertinent part:

(f)  The Employee-Claimant has the burden 
of proof in this case as to all other elements of a claim for temporary total 
disability including, but not limited to, causation and the actual existence of 
the disability itself.