Title: State v. Duke

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 320 (1974) 518 P.2d 570 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Norman Orvel DUKE, Appellant. No. 2601. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 31, 1974. *321 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, for appellee. Ed Bolding, Pima County Public Defender, by William H. Callaway, First Asst. Public Defender, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of second degree murder, §§ 13-451 and 13-452 A.R.S., together with a sentence thereon of not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the Arizona State Prison. We are called upon to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of these matters on appeal are as follows. For several months prior to October 1971, the defendant, Norman Orvel Duke, age 59, was a patient at the Veteran's Hospital in Tucson, Arizona. The defendant stayed at the Veteran's Hospital during weekdays and on weekends would normally stay either with his sister or his former wife, Dorothy Duke, in a quonset-type house owned by Dorothy's employer, Cactus Craft. The house was at one time the office of Cactus Craft and was located next to the factory. Although divorced, the defendant had been living with Dorothy since September of 1970 and there was evidence that they intended to be remarried sometime in October or November of 1971. On Saturday, 2 October 1971, Norman, who was staying with Dorothy Duke, and Dorothy started drinking in the morning. Testimony indicated that Norman was drinking blackberry brandy and Dorothy beer and brandy. An argument followed concerning Dorothy's married daughter by a previous marriage and a car that the daughter wished to buy. Dorothy wanted to loan the daughter the money to help pay for the car, and Norman was opposed to the idea. Norman and Dorothy continued to drink and some friends came over and then left. An argument also developed over whether Norman should return to the Veteran's Hospital as he stated he wished to do, or whether he should remain with Dorothy for the rest of the weekend. At approximately 7:30 on the evening of 2 October 1971, Dorothy's daughter phoned the Sheriff's Department and asked them to go to her mother's residence as she was worried about her mother. The deputy testified that he went to the house at approximately 8:00 in the evening and found no disturbance or argument going on at the location and that both Norman Duke and Dorothy Duke indicated that everything was normal. At about 10:00 that evening, the Sheriff's Department received a call from Norman Duke concerning a possible suicide. The officers arrived and found Dorothy seated in a chair with a .45 caliber singleaction revolver in her right hand, her index finger between the trigger guard and the trigger of the revolver. She was pronounced dead upon arrival at Tucson Medical Center sometime after 10:00 p.m. The defendant stated to the officer at that time and later when he testified in court, that he was lying on a couch asleep when a shot or loud noise woke him up. He tried to awaken Dorothy and when it became obvious that she would not respond, he called the police. The officers secured the premises and made a search of the house. The .45 Colt revolver contained five live rounds and one empty chamber with no spent cartridge present. A search revealed a spent cartridge in a cigar box and a spent .45 bullet on the floor. Testimony by the pathologist, the path of the bullet through the body and the chair, and testimony concerning the extent of the powder burns on Dorothy's blouse, indicated that the gun was fired at approximately a 45 angle downward, through the body of the deceased, from a distance of three to five feet. Paraffin tests on the hands of both the deceased and the defendant were negative. Defendant gave a blood sample at 2:15 in the morning of 3 October which showed a blood alcohol reading of .17 and *323 a blood sample of deceased also indicated a similar blood alcohol level. Defendant was arrested and charged on an open count of murder. From a verdict and judgment of guilty to murder in the second degree and sentence thereon, the defendant appeals. PREJUDICE DURING THE VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY During the voir dire of the jury, the court asked the jurors the following question: One of the jurors responded: At this point in the questioning, Miss Ruelas became emotional and began to cry. The defendant moved for a mistrial contending then and on appeal: Appellee points out, correctly we think, that defendant's motion for mistrial was actually a challenge for cause to the entire panel. The Arizona Court of Appeals has stated: We do not find that the interest of justice demands such action in the instant case. The challenge to the jury panel did not show that any other juror, let alone the entire jury panel, was prejudiced by the actions of this one juror. Absent a clear showing of abuse of the trial court's wide discretion in the selection of the jury, we will not set aside a ruling upon a challenge to the jury. State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81 (1965). We find no error. *324 WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE PREMISES After the body of the deceased was taken away, the police, without permission and without warrant, proceeded to search the premises. Although there is a question whether or not the premises on which the body was found was, in fact, defendant's home as well as the home of the deceased, assuming, arguendo, that the defendant exercised some control over the premises, we do not believe this was an unreasonable search and seizure. In a previous opinion of this court we stated: Our holding in Sample, supra, concerning the warrantless search of the scene of the crime has been disapproved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir.1972). We believe, however, that this case is distinguishable from Sample and the language quoted above is still applicable. In Sample, supra, the search occurred two hours or more after the officers first discovered the body of the deceased and had moved it from the premises, and after the officers had left the scene and then returned. In the instant case, the officers at the scene of the crime proceeded to make a search of the area, relying at first on the representations of the defendant that the deceased had committed suicide. Under these circumstances, a contemporaneous warrantless search of the scene of a crime at the time of the discovery of the body was, we believe, reasonable, and not made unreasonable and unconstitutional by the fact that the defendant may have shared possession of the premises with the deceased victim. HEARSAY STATEMENT OF THE VICTIM The victim's daughter testified over the objection of the defendant's attorney that her mother had told her on the day that she died, that the defendant had threatened her the night before with a gun. The daughter testified: We have previously stated: In the instant case, we believe that the testimony of the daughter and the surrounding facts made the statement by the decedent sufficiently reliable for its admission. The defendant, by statements before the trial and by testimony at the trial, was interposing a defense of suicide. The defendant testified that the deceased indicated that she would commit suicide if he ever tried to leave her. The expression of fear by Dorothy indicated Dorothy's state of mind and contradicted the defense of suicide raised by the defendant. DIRECTED VERDICT At the close of the State's case and again at the close of all of the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first degree murder only, it being the contention of the defendant that the State had failed to show a wilful, deliberate, or premeditated killing. Viewed in a light most strongly in favor of upholding the decision of the trial court and the verdict of the jury, State v. Manis, 95 Ariz. 27, 386 P.2d 77 (1963), we disagree. To be entitled to an instruction for first degree murder, the State must show, in addition to evidence of an unlawful killing with malice, evidence that the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. State v. McIntyre, 106 Ariz. 439, 477 P.2d 529 (1970). In the instant case, the evidence amply supports the finding of an unlawful killing, and use of a deadly weapon such as a gun, standing alone, is sufficient evidence from which the jury may find malice. State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1966). Premeditation need not be prolonged: The fact that there was no evidence of a fight or physical altercation prior to the shooting, the fact that the deceased was seated in a chair when the bullet was fired from three to five feet away, as well as defendant's conduct thereafter including the removal of the spent cartridge from the gun, is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find that the shooting was deliberate and premeditated, and we do not find any abuse of the trial court's discretion in instructing on first degree murder. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER Defendant contends that the failure of the trial court to give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was reversible error, although an instruction was given on voluntary manslaughter. Defendant claimed that the deceased committed suicide and presented no evidence that would indicate any degree of homicide. The evidence as a whole supported instructions for murder and voluntary manslaughter, but there was no evidence of any unintentional act which would support an instruction for involuntary manslaughter. There being no such evidence, it was not error to refuse to give such instruction. State v. Young, 109 Ariz. 221, 508 P.2d 51 (1973). CLOSING ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR The defendant in his brief states: We do not believe the jury was misled. The jury was properly instructed as to the effect of voluntary intoxication and while we agree that prior decisions of this court, State v. Contreras, 107 Ariz. 68, 481 P.2d 861 (1971); State v. Hudson, 85 Ariz. 77, 331 P.2d 1092 (1958); State v. Saunders, 102 Ariz. 565, 435 P.2d 39 (1967), have indicated that voluntary intoxication may produce a state of mind which incapacitates an accused from forming or entering the malicious intent or malice aforethought which is essential as an element of murder, State v. Coward, 108 Ariz. 270, 496 P.2d 131 (1972), that is a question for the jury. Finding that intoxication had not negated the malice, the jury could consider the question of whether there was provocation to negate malice which is the difference between manslaughter and murder. State v. Sellers, 106 Ariz. 315, 475 P.2d 722 (1970); State v. Maloney, 101 Ariz. 111, 416 P.2d 544 (1966); §§ 13-451, 13-455 A.R.S. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.