Title: Timothy Harris v. Dept. of Services for Children and their Families

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TIMOTHY HARRIS,’
No. 43, 2015
Respondent Below,
Appellant, Court Below—Family Court of

the State of Delaware in and for
y, New Castle County
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR
FAMILIES/DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES,

File No. 14-10-01 TN
Pet, No. 14-26935

Petitioner Below,
Appellee,

and

COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL
ADVOCATE,

Appellee.

Submitted: July 2, 2015
Decided: September 10, 2015

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 10" day of September 2015, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Timothy Harris (“Father”), has appealed the Family Court's

order dated January 6, 2015, terminating his parental rights in his daughter born in 2010

' By Order dated February 4, 2015, the Court assigned a pseudonym tothe appellant. Del. Supr. Ct. R
1.
and his son born in 2011 (collectively, the “Children”).? Father's counsel (‘“Counse!”)
haa filed an opening brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c)?
‘Counsel asserts that he has made a conscientious review of the record and the law and
‘can find no arguable grounds for appeal. In response to the Rule 26.1(c) brief filed by
Counsel, Father has submitted points for the Court's consideration. The appellees, the
Division of Family Services (“DFS”) and the Court Appointed Special Advocate, have
responded to Counsel’s position and Father’s points and have moved to affirm the Family
Court judgment.

(2) The record reflects that Father is a Tier II registered sex offender having
been convicted in 2003 on four counts of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree

for having sexual contact with a minor.’ Father was incarcerated on a viol:

    

of

probation during most of the underly

 

wg dependency/neglect and termination of parental
rights proceedings.

(3) _ DES initiated dependency/neglect proceedings in October 2013 based on
concems that the Children were dependent and neglected in their mother’s care, By ex
‘parte order the Family Court granted emergency custody of the Children to DFS. At the

preliminary protective hearing, and at each of the mandated review hearings that

‘The Family Court also terminated the parental rights ofthe Children’s mother. The Children’s mother is
not party to this appeal
* See Del. Supe. Ct. R.26.1(6) (governing appeals without merit in termination of parental
* On March 7, 2003, the Superior Court sentenced Father to eight years at Level V suspended after

<cighteen months for Level IV and probation. Father is curently incarcerated ona violation of probation
and expects tobe released in 2016,

 

 

2
followed, the Family Court found that the Children were dependent and continued
custody with DFS.

(4) _ In March 2014, DFS filed a “motion for no reasonable efforts” indicating

 

reunification services to Father. The Family

 

the Department had elected not to p
Court granted the motion in April 2014.

(5) In September 2014, DFS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental
rights based on his felony convictions of offenses against a child® and his failure to plan

adequately for the Children’s physical needs or mental and emotional health and

 

development.” The Family Court scheduled a termination of parental rights (“TPR”)
hearing for October 2014,

(6) Father appeared with Counsel at the TPR hearing. At the outset of the
hearing, Father submitted a written consent to the termination of his parental rights and
asked to be excused from the remainder of the hearing, Before excusing Father and
‘Counsel from the hearing, the Family Court conducted a colloquy on the record to ensure
that Father understood the weight and effect of his decision to voluntarily terminate his,

parental rights.*

* See 13 Del. C. 110%4) (providing in pertinent part that DFS is not required to perform reunification
services when the grounds for terminating parental right is the respondent's conviction ofa felony level
offense against a child)

*13 Del. C.§ 1103¢ax Xa).
"13 Del. C. § 110365).

* See generally Wilson v. Div. of Family Serv, 988 A.24 435 (Del. 2010) (discussing statutory
requirements to conduct a colloquy on a consent to termination of parental rights).

3

 
(1) In Delaware, termination of parental rights is based on a two-step statutory
analysis.” First, the Family Court must determine whether there is clear and convincing,
evidence of a statutory basis for termination.'® If the Family Court determines there is a
statutory basis for termination, the Family Court must determine whether there is clear
‘nd convincing evidence that severing parental rights is in the best interest of the child."

(8) In Father's case, the Family Court concluded there was clear and
convincing evidence of a statutory basis for terminating Father's parental rights by
consent. Also, after thoroughly considering the best interest factors and making factual
findings as to each, the Family Court found it was in the Children’s best interests to
terminate Father's parental right.

(9) This Court's review of a decision to terminate parental rights requires
consideration of the facts and the law as well as the inferences and deductions made by
the Family Court."? To the extent rulings of law are implicated, our review is de novo."
To the extent issues implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a limited review of the factual
findings of the Family Court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record

and are not clearly wrong." This Court will not disturb inferences and deductions that

713 Del. C.§ 110340).
"Jd. Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.24 533, $37 (Del. 2000).

"See 13 Dek C. § 722(aX1)48) (listing best interest factors). Powell v. Dep't of Ser. for Children,
Youth & Their Families, 963 42d 724, 731 (Del 2008).

Wilson v. Div. of Family Serv., 988 A.24 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010) citing cases),
"1a, 440,
Ma,

 

 
are supported by the record and the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.'*
If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our review is limited to abuse of
discretion."

(10) In this case, having carefully considered the parties’ submissions on appeal

and the Family Court record, we conclude there is clear and convincing

 

nce

supporting the Family Court's te

 

tion of Father's parental rights by consent and
‘because termination was in the Children’s best interests. Father's written consent for
termination of his parental rights included all of the elements required by the governing
statutes.'” Nothing in the record suggests that Father misunderstood or misapprehended

the nature and consequences of his consent."*

 

(11) Father's points on appeal do not contest his written or verbal consent to
the termination of his parental rights. Rather, Father contends that he should have had
supervised visitation with the Children when he was incarcerated and on probation, and

he requests “some form of vi

 

ation and open adoption” with the Children. Father's
contention is without merit, and his request is unavailing. Under the sentence imposed

for

  

riminal convictions and as a condition of his probation, Father was not allowed to

 

 

id
"ua

"13 Deb. C. §§ 1106, 1106A (governing termination of paren
and contents of consent to terminate and transfer parental rights)
"* Wilson v. Div. of Family Ser, 988 A.24 435, 440 (Del. 2010) (*Generally, in evaluating the validity of
an individual's consent, this Court must consider fist, whether it was “the product of a free and
Geliberate choice’... and second, whether it was “made with a fll awareness ofboth the nature ofthe
tight being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it”) (citing DeJesus v. Site,
{655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 1995), superseded by stare on other grounds, quoting Moran v. Burbne, 475,
US. 412, 421 (1986)).

 

ights by consent, consent requirement,

 

5
hhave contact with any child, including the Children. In the written consent signed by
Father, and in the colloquy with the Family Court, Father stated that he understood that
he was giving up all rights in the Children. When parental rights are terminated, “the
rights, duties, privileges, and obligations” between the person whose parental rights are
terminated and the child “cease to exist.”

(12) This Court can discem no abuse of discretion in the Family Courts factual
findings and no error in the court's acceptance of Father’s written consent to terminate
and transfer parental rights. We are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious effort to
examine the record and the law and properly determined that Father could not raise a

‘meritorious claim on appeal

 

AFFIRMED. Counsel's motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

13 Del. C.§ 111349.