Title: State v. Adkins

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

236 Kan. 259 (1984)
689 P.2d 880
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
TABER D. ADKINS, Appellant.
No. 56,462

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 26, 1984.
Ralph J. De Zago, of Junction City, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Lloyd R. Graham, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Steven L. Opat, county attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Following pleas of nolo contendere, defendant Taber D. Adkins was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3421); aggravated sodomy (K.S.A. 21-3506); and attempted first-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-3401, 21-3301). The crimes occurred on May 31, 1983, in Junction City. The victim was a six-year-old girl. In his direct appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to commit him to a state mental institution for treatment pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3430 in lieu of imprisonment; and (2) K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-4608(1) is unconstitutional as it grants unlimited power to a trial judge to impose consecutive sentences.
We shall first consider the claim of abuse of trial court discretion in refusing defendant's request to be committed to a state mental institution in lieu of sentencing.
K.S.A. 22-3430 provides:
Defendant filed a notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219. In conjunction with the insanity defense, defendant was examined by three psychiatrists and one psychologist. In essence, each found defendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offenses and that his unlawful behavior was alcohol related as opposed to being the result of any major underlying mental illness. The experts included considerable material relative to defendant's background and current psychological condition in their respective reports. At the subsequent sentencing, the psychologist testified he felt defendant would benefit from long-term psychiatric treatment in the Larned State Security Hospital. The parties stipulated that the psychiatric and psychological reports prepared relative to the aborted attempt at an insanity defense should be used by the court in lieu of the psychiatric report of examination specified in K.S.A. 22-3429 in considering defendant's request for hospitalization in lieu of sentencing pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3430.
In the rather amorphous argument offered in support of defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard, the following themes predominate: (1) It is not fair to imprison a man for crimes he cannot remember committing, notwithstanding the fact consumption of alcohol is the sole cause of the memory loss; (2) the nature of the crimes is so heinous that, per se, psychiatric treatment should be imposed rather than imprisonment; (3) the trial court should have disregarded the stipulated-to psychiatric evidence and original psychological *261 report and considered only the psychologist's testimony at the sentencing hearing; and (4) defendant's request to be committed was reasonable and its denial did not benefit anyone.
It should be emphasized K.S.A. 22-3430 grants authority to the trial judge to order commitment in lieu of imprisonment only where the required report shows:
The trial judge is not required to order commitment where the report is in compliance with the statute. The statute permits an appeal by a defendant committed thereunder but does not authorize an appeal from a refusal to order a commitment. The statute does not require a trial judge to make any findings in invoking or refusing to invoke the statute. K.S.A. 22-3430, then, is a conditional grant of authority to a trial judge. It grants no right of entitlement to a defendant to be committed as opposed to imprisoned.
As previously noted, the parties stipulated that the mass of psychiatric and psychological evidence before the court should be used by the court as a substitute for the single report by an institution contemplated by K.S.A. 22-3429. On appeal defendant claims the court erred in considering the all of such evidence as opposed to a portion thereof favorable to his position. This argument is wholly lacking in merit.
We conclude the refusal to commit under K.S.A. 22-3430 is wholly a matter of trial court discretion and is not reviewable on appeal. We note that the report of the Kansas Reception and Diagnostic Center prepared subsequent to the sentencing herein does not find any serious mental disorder.
For his second issue defendant contends K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-4608(1) is unconstitutional as it grants unlimited power to a trial judge to impose consecutive sentences.
The sentences imposed were as follows: aggravated sodomy  ten years to life; aggravated kidnapping  life; attempted first-degree murder  ten years to life. The aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sodomy sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The attempted murder sentence is to be served consecutively to the other two sentences.
*262 K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-4608(1) provides:
Specifically defendant contends:
Defendant's position on this issue is predicated upon the proposition that the sentencing criteria set forth in K.S.A. 21-4606 are inapplicable to a trial court's consideration of whether the terms are to run concurrently or consecutively.
K.S.A. 21-4606 provides:
"(d) The degree of the defendant's provocation;
In State v. Buckner, 223 Kan. 138, 574 P.2d 918 (1977), the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery and sentenced (utilizing enhanced sentencing) to three consecutive *263 terms of 30 years to life. One of the issues on appeal was a claim the sentences were excessive. This court stated:
....
....
Buckner's aggregate sentences contained three elements  statutory terms for the crimes of which he was convicted plus enhancement under the Habitual Criminal Act (21-4504) plus the running of the terms consecutively (21-4608[1]). In reviewing the total sentences to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion, no distinction was made among the various elements contained in the aggregate sentences. The court concluded:
*264 In State v. Goering, 225 Kan. 755, 594 P.2d 194 (1979), defendant claimed imposition of six consecutive sentences constituted an abuse of discretion. This court cited its previous holdings in State v. Buckner, 223 Kan. 138, and held:
In State v. Case, 228 Kan. 733, 620 P.2d 821 (1980), this court stated:
The sentencing criteria set forth in K.S.A. 21-4606 apply to a trial court's determination of the sentence to be imposed and the sentence includes whether multiple terms of imprisonment are to be served consecutively or concurrently. Having concluded the basic contention from which defendant's constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-4608(1) arises is itself erroneous, we do not reach any constitutional issue.
It is clear from the record the trial court considered the *265 sentencing criteria in imposing the sentences herein. The facts involved in the crimes are heinous. Defendant took a six-year-old neighbor girl to his apartment. While there she was raped or sodomized (her appalling injuries precluded exact medical determination as to which crime or both had been committed). The victim was bludgeoned about the head causing severe head injuries. She was then placed in a locked closet within the padlocked apartment and left to die. She was discovered by police and skillful medical attention including multiple surgical procedures saved her life.
We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion in the sentences imposed herein.
The judgment is affirmed.
PRAGER, J., concurs in the result.