Title: Charette v. Charette

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 4 
Docket: 
Aro-12-168 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
November 28, 2012 
Decided: 
January 8, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
DIANE L. CHARETTE 
 
v. 
 
DALE N. CHARETTE 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Dale N. Charette appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court 
(Fort Kent, Soucy, J.) denying his motion to modify the parties’ divorce judgment 
and finding him to be in contempt of the divorce judgment for failing to pay 
spousal support as ordered.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.  We also 
take this opportunity to discuss the manner in which Charette and his counsel 
raised an allegation of judicial bias and the court’s exemplary response to it. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The historical facts are not disputed.  The parties were married in 1980 
and divorced in 2007.  The divorce judgment incorporated a settlement agreement 
in which the parties agreed that Dale would pay Diane L. Charette $200 per week 
as general spousal support until the death of either of them or Diane’s remarriage.  
 
2 
The spousal support award was made subject to future judicial review, but by 
agreement it could not be increased. 
 
[¶3]  In July 2010, Dale filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment to 
eliminate or reduce his spousal support obligation on the grounds that (1) he could 
no longer afford to pay it due to a disability; and (2) Diane was cohabitating with 
her boyfriend, thereby eliminating her need for support.  Following a hearing, the 
court entered an order on March 18, 2011, finding that a reduction was warranted 
due to Dale’s significantly changed medical circumstances; however, the court 
found that Diane’s relationship did not warrant any change in spousal support 
because “[t]here is no evidence that [Diane and her boyfriend] share the burdens of 
maintaining a household.”  Accordingly, the court reduced Dale’s spousal support 
obligation to $165 per week. 
 
[¶4]  In September 2011, Diane filed a motion to enforce, alleging that Dale 
had failed to make five of the reduced payments; the motion was set for hearing on 
October 28.  On the day of the hearing, seven months after the court granted his 
first motion to modify, Dale again moved the court to eliminate or further reduce 
his spousal support obligation on the same grounds advanced in his original 
motion.  The court heard and granted Diane’s motion to enforce and ordered Dale 
to pay the arrearage owed; it did not hear Dale’s renewed motion at that time.  On 
 
3 
November 7, Diane filed a motion for contempt, asserting that Dale had failed to 
comply with the court’s October 28 order. 
 
[¶5]  On January 23, 2012, the court held a contested hearing on Dale’s 
second motion to modify and Diane’s motion for contempt.  Dale was represented 
by his current counsel and Diane was unrepresented.  Following the hearing, upon 
finding that Dale had not demonstrated a further significant change in his financial 
circumstances and that Diane’s continuing relationship still did not result in a 
significant change in her need for support, the court issued a written order denying 
further modification of the spousal support award.  The court also found Dale to be 
in contempt for failing to pay support as ordered, resulting in a $3990 arrearage at 
the time of the hearing. 
 
[¶6]  Dale moved for further findings pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a).  In response, on March 21, 2012, the court entered extensive 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  This appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Modification of Spousal Support 
 
 
[¶7]  The court could modify the spousal support award if it found “a 
substantial change in either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.”  Day 
v. Day, 1998 ME 194, ¶ 5, 717 A.2d 914; see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4) (2012); 
Levy, Maine Family Law § 8.4 at 8-21 (2010 ed.).  Dale asserts that he satisfied 
 
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both alternatives at the hearing on his second motion to modify through evidence 
of Diane’s cohabitation and his own diminished financial circumstances.  We 
review the court’s decision concerning a proposed modification of the spousal 
support award for an abuse of discretion, considering “(1) whether factual findings, 
if any, are supported by the record pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether 
the court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given 
the facts and applying the law, whether the court weighed . . . the applicable facts 
and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness.”  McAllister v. McAllister, 
2011 ME 69, ¶ 11, 21 A.3d 1010 (alterations removed) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
1. 
Cohabitation 
 
[¶8]  In its March 2011 order reducing Dale’s spousal support obligation to 
$165 per week, after finding that at that time “[t]here is no evidence that [Diane 
and her boyfriend] share the burdens of maintaining a household, or that their 
commitment to each other will be long-lasting,” the court posited that “[i]f the 
relationship endures, and [her boyfriend] and Ms. Charette enter into a mutually 
supportive relationship that is the functional equivalent of marriage, a reduction or 
cessation of spousal support may be appropriate.”  Although Dale asserts that this 
observation established the “law of the case” and required the court to grant his 
second motion to modify seven months later once he showed that the relationship 
was still ongoing, the court (1) could not do so without finding a substantial change 
 
5 
in circumstances occurring between the two motions, see id. ¶ 12; and (2) did not, 
on this record, abuse its discretion in finding that the relationship between Diane 
and her boyfriend was not a financial one reducing her need for support. 
 
[¶9]  Dale’s testimony at the modification hearing established that Diane and 
her boyfriend had a significant, ongoing relationship, a fact that Diane did not 
dispute.  In the context of that relationship her boyfriend helped out around 
Diane’s home; for example, he did some minor carpentry work, mowed her lawn, 
and did her snow blowing.  Dale failed to prove that Diane’s boyfriend provided 
direct financial support of any significance to Diane, however, and the court was 
entitled to credit Diane’s and her boyfriend’s testimony that he maintained his own 
home and paid his own bills, while Diane paid hers.  Both Diane and her boyfriend 
testified that their relationship did not involve financial assistance in either 
direction.  See State v. McCurdy, 2002 ME 66, ¶ 10, 795 A.2d 84 (“The weight of 
the evidence and . . . determinations of witness credibility are the exclusive 
provinces of the factfinder.”). 
 
[¶10]  In determining the proper amount of spousal support to award a court 
may consider as a factor whether the recipient shares expenses with another 
person.  See Harmon v. Harmon, 2009 ME 2, ¶ 8, 962 A.2d 959.  In deciding a 
motion to modify, a court may consider the recipient’s cohabitation with another 
person if the cohabitation was not anticipated by the divorce decree.  See Haag v. 
 
6 
Haag, 609 A.2d 1164, 1165 (Me. 1992).  However, unmarried cohabitants have no 
legal obligation to support each another, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 
(Me. 1980), and “cohabitation, which [this Court] has defined as maintaining a 
relationship with another person that is the practical equivalent of marriage, [does 
not] establish[] a prima facie case for termination of spousal support,” Levy, 
Maine Family Law § 8.4 at 8-20 (2010 ed.) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶11]  Here, although the parties’ settlement agreement and the divorce 
judgment anticipate the termination of spousal support upon Diane’s remarriage, 
neither mentions the possibility of her cohabitating with someone.  Moreover, the 
evidence presented at the hearing did not establish the existence of a relationship 
that is the practical equivalent of a marriage; to the contrary, the weight of the 
evidence supported a conclusion that the relationship did not involve any financial 
support at all.  For that reason, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
further lower Dale’s spousal support obligation on this ground. 
 
2. 
Dale’s Ability to Pay Spousal Support 
 
[¶12]  The court’s factual finding that Dale was able to continue paying 
$165 per week in spousal support is not clearly erroneous.  See McAllister, 2011 
ME 69, ¶¶ 11-12, 21 A.3d 1010.  Dale points to his loss of $450 per month in 
rental income caused by a tenant leaving a mobile home that Dale owns in 
disarray, but at the January 2012 hearing his wife testified that the tenant had paid 
 
7 
rent through December 2011, and that she hoped to have the property rented again 
by March 2012.  Dale has an IRA worth more than $13,000.  His wife testified at 
the hearing that she and Dale had a household income of $50,000 in 2011, which 
included $8181 in gifts from their parents and withdrawals from the IRA.  They 
effectively live rent-free in a house owned by Dale’s father.  Furthermore, in the 
time period between Dale’s first motion to modify and the second, he put down 
$3000 on a $28,000 pontoon party boat that he bought with his father and his son. 
 
[¶13]  Dale’s general assertion that money is tight at the end of the month 
did not, in the face of the evidence recited above and the court’s finding that other 
evidence proffered by Dale and his wife was not persuasive, compel the court to 
find that Dale’s ability to pay spousal support had significantly changed in less 
than one year to the extent that justice required a further reduction in support.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4). 
B. 
Contempt 
 
[¶14]  The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Dale 
accumulated a $3990 arrearage in the months following its March 2011 order 
reducing his spousal support obligation, that he had the ability to make the missed 
payments, and that he was therefore in contempt of the order.  It ordered him to 
pay an additional $400 per month until the arrearage was cleared or face 
incarceration should he fail to meet his burden at a show cause hearing.  Dale does 
 
8 
not dispute the amount of the arrearage; rather, he contends that he did not have the 
ability to pay. 
 
[¶15]  In addressing a contemnor’s challenge we review the court’s factual 
findings for clear error and, if none is found, we then review the judgment of 
contempt for an abuse of discretion.  Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ME 31, ¶ 18, 
39 A.3d 58.  At the hearing, it was Diane’s burden to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that Dale failed or refused to comply with the court’s support 
order and that he had the present ability to comply.  See id. ¶ 19. 
 
[¶16]  There is ample competent evidence in this record to support the 
court’s finding that Dale had the ability to make the $3990 in missed payments, 
beginning with the evidence that he paid $3000 toward the purchase of a party 
boat.  The court also had evidence of Dale’s $13,000 IRA, which his wife testified 
had been used to cover other shortfalls in their household budget.  Assuming 
arguendo that the $3000 could not be recovered by selling the boat, less than 
one-third of the remaining IRA would have satisfied the entire arrearage existing at 
the time of the hearing.  Because the court’s factual finding that Dale had the past 
and present ability to comply with its March 2011 order was not clearly erroneous, 
its judgment of contempt was not an abuse of its discretion. 
 
[¶17]  Dale further contends that the contempt order must be vacated 
because the court did not sufficiently articulate the facts supporting its 
 
9 
determination that he had the ability to pay spousal support as ordered.  The court 
had discretion in fashioning its response to Dale’s motion for further findings 
because 
[a] trial court is not required to make further findings in response to 
every post-judgment request for findings pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(a).  If the court’s original findings are sufficient to support 
its conclusions, and if those findings are supported by evidence in the 
record, a decision is sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law appear therein. 
 
In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶ 15, 959 A.2d 734 (quotation marks omitted); M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(a).  Here the findings the court specifically made, both initially and in 
response to Dale’s motion, coupled with the evidence in the record discussed 
above, support its ultimate finding by clear and convincing evidence that Dale 
could have, but did not, pay spousal support as ordered. 
C. 
Allegation of Judicial Bias 
 
[¶18]  In his motion for further findings, Dale requested three findings that 
insinuated bias on the part of the trial judge.  Specifically, Dale requested that the 
court find that (1) the judge did not disclose that he employed Diane’s brother to 
provide carpentry services for him, (2) Diane testified that her brother holds a 
mortgage on a building she owns in Fort Kent, and (3) the judge did not disclose 
that the parties’ daughter is a good friend of his step-daughter. 
 
10 
 
[¶19]  The court directly addressed and rejected Dale’s insinuation in its 
statement of further findings.  Pointing out that neither Diane’s brother nor the 
parties’ daughter were witnesses in the case and that neither had any connection to 
the disputed issue of spousal support, the judge explained that he had hired Diane’s 
brother to perform general handyman work on an apartment building in Fort Kent 
that he owned with his siblings, without knowing of his employee’s relationship to 
Diane; and that his step-daughter might have been a close friend of the parties’ 
now-adult daughter when they were in school some years before, but he was 
“unaware of any ongoing relationship between them.” 
 
[¶20]  Dale filed his notice of appeal on April 6, 2012.  Two weeks later, 
after this Court issued its docketing notice, Dale filed a motion for recusal in the 
trial court, asserting that “the Judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning the 
Defendant or his lawyer or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding as a result of . . . family member[] contacts and should 
recuse himself.”  The motion was denied after hearing.  Dale’s brief to this Court 
contains comments that could be read as a further suggestion of judicial bias, but 
he does not directly advance that argument on appeal.1  Although Dale does not 
                                         
1  For example, the brief asks rhetorically, “Why was the court so protective of Diane?,” and 
speculates that, “Maybe the court already ‘assumed’ other facts not contained in the record to fashion its 
decision.”  If the intent of such comments is to indirectly suggest that a party was prejudiced as a result of 
judicial bias and should therefore be granted relief on the merits of the appeal actually argued, that 
approach is improper and beneath the dignity of the bar.  Such a serious assertion, if supportable, directly 
 
11 
assign as error the court’s denial of his post-judgment recusal motion, we address 
the issue because it has a direct bearing on the future course of this proceeding and 
calls into question the integrity of the judicial process. 
 
[¶21]  Although not styled as such, Dale’s requested findings can only be 
interpreted as a request that the court recuse itself post-judgment, even though his 
formal motion for recusal was not filed until after the case came to us on appeal.2  
Pursuant to the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, “a judge must recuse himself on 
motion for recusal made by any party in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned or in which the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding.”  DeCambra v. Carson, 2008 ME 127, ¶ 8, 953 A.2d 1163; 
M. Code Jud. Conduct I(3)(E)(2). 
 
[¶22]  Here, however, the facts Dale requested were not developed at the 
hearing and were presumably always within his knowledge or that of his attorney.  
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Dale was unaware of the activities of 
his former brother-in-law of twenty-seven years working in the same small 
                                                                                                                                   
impacts a party’s right to a fair and impartial hearing and must therefore be made clearly and forthrightly 
so that the appellate court may fully consider it. 
 
2  The court apparently came to the same conclusion, noting in its further findings that “[i]t is not clear 
why the defendant’s attorney has included these statements in his request for findings.  The statements are 
not accompanied by a request for recusal, but the statements themselves suggest bias or perhaps a conflict 
of interest by the judge in the case.” 
 
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community as he, or that he was unaware of his daughter’s close friends when she 
was still in school.  In these circumstances, where Dale moved for recusal only 
after the court issued a judgment unfavorable to him, his failure to make a timely 
motion 
constitutes an implicit waiver of the objection to the judge’s 
qualification.  Once judgment is entered, a party has waived his right 
to disqualify the trial judge and if he has waived that issue, he cannot 
be heard to complain following an unfavorable result. 
 
  
The rationale for this rule is obvious: A party should have no 
incentive to ‘roll the dice’ for a favorable decision and then, if the 
decision is unfavorable, raise grounds for recusal of which [he] or 
[his] counsel had actual knowledge prior to the decision being made. 
 
In re Kaitlyn P., 2011 ME 19, ¶¶ 8-9, 12 A.3d 50 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we review the judge’s decision not to recuse in this case 
only for obvious error.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 
[¶23]  We find no error, obvious or otherwise, in the court’s treatment of 
Dale’s indirect request for recusal.  Once Dale’s concerns were made known to it, 
the court fully and “promptly disclose[d] to the parties . . . any fact known to the 
judge that [was] relevant to the question of impartiality.”  State v. Atwood, 
2010 ME 12, ¶ 22, 988 A.2d 981 (citing M. Code Jud. Conduct I(3)(E)(3)) 
(quotation marks omitted).  It then carefully considered whether there was any 
ground for recusal, applying the appropriate standards established by the Maine 
Code of Judicial Conduct and this Court.  Once the court concluded that there was 
 
13 
no reasonable basis for recusal, it would have been an abuse of its discretion to do 
so.3  See In re Michael M., 2000 ME 204, ¶ 15, 761 A.2d 865 (“Although the 
granting or denying of a motion to recuse is within the discretion of the court, a 
judge who disqualifies himself or herself, after trial and judgment, for no reason 
other than an unfounded and meritless claim of partiality, has abused the judge’s 
discretion.”); see also State v. Murphy, 2010 ME 140, ¶ 18, 10 A.3d 697; Atwood, 
2010 ME 12, ¶ 22, 988 A.2d 981. 
 
[¶24]  In sum, we fully agree with and adopt the trial court’s eloquent 
explanation of its common-sense and entirely proper approach to how an issue of 
potential judicial bias should be addressed, when it said: 
 
It is an unavoidable fact of litigation in small Maine 
communities that a judge, or members of his or her family, may know 
of a party, or a witness, or someone related to a party or a witness, or 
may even have done business with somebody whose name may come 
up in a case.  If any such affiliation should cause any concern 
                                         
3  Other courts have recognized that a judge’s casual acquaintances or social relationships do not result 
in automatic disqualification, particularly when the judge sits in a small community, as many Maine 
judges do.  See, e.g., Medley v. State, 600 So. 2d 957, 961 (Miss. 1992) (“We note that in many areas, 
particularly rural areas, where judges have known practically all the people for many years, if such were a 
disqualification, the judge could never preside on most cases.”); Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251, 254 
(Nev. 1984) (“[A] judge, especially a judge in a small town, need not disqualify himself merely because 
he knows one of the parties.”); Phillips v. State, 271 P.3d 457, 469-70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (stating 
that potential disqualification based on personal relationships turns on “the precise nature of the judge’s 
relationship with that person, and the way in which that person is connected to the litigation”; also 
quoting with approval the observation that “judges are not expected to withdraw from society” (alteration 
removed) (quotation marks omitted), and citing Alaska cases standing for the proposition that, especially 
in small communities, a judge who is familiar with a person involved in a case need not necessarily 
recuse); see also Tatham v. Rogers, 283 P.3d 583, 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (Korsmo, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Unless a judge in a small community was a hermit or a newcomer to the region (neither of which is a 
good foundation for the position) before assuming the bench, the judge will necessarily have had 
relationships—business or personal—with most of the attorneys in the community. That is not necessarily 
a bad thing.”). 
 
14 
whatsoever on the part of a litigant or their attorney, the matter should 
be immediately brought to the attention of the court to be addressed 
without delay.  The court, similarly, will endeavor to fully disclose 
relevant relationships if the court has the impression that the 
relationship might reasonably cause the judge’s impartiality to be 
questioned. . . . 
 
 
We all—the judge, the clerks, security personnel, court staff, as 
well as attorneys and their staff—have a responsibility to promote and 
preserve the integrity of our legal system by avoiding impropriety and 
appearances of impropriety.  The need for openness is particularly 
acute in rural communities where judges, prior to their service on the 
bench, may have been active community members with widespread 
contacts in the community.  The responsibility we share includes 
bringing matters such as the concerns expressed by the defendant’s 
attorney . . . to everyone’s attention in a timely manner, to provide the 
best opportunity for the litigant’s confidence in our legal process to be 
preserved and enhanced.  When such matters are only raised at the 
end of the litigation, we run the risk that the litigants’ confidence in 
our legal system will be undermined.  
 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Theodore M. Smith, Esq., Smith Law Office, LLC, Van Buren, for appellant 
Dale Charette 
 
Luke M. Rossignol, Esq., Bemis & Rossignol, LLC, Presque Isle, for 
appellee Diane Charette 
 
 
 
Fort Kent District Court docket number FM-2006-113 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY