Title: State v. Bradford

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

219 Kan. 336 (1976)
548 P.2d 812
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DENNIS RAY BRADFORD, Appellant.
No. 47,883

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1976.
Richard H. Seaton, of Everett & Seaton, of Manhattan, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellant.
Dennis C. Sauter, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, and Paul E. Miller, county attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
*337 The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
Dennis Ray Bradford appeals from a conviction of murder in the second degree. He was tried on an information charging him with first-degree murder, committed during the perpetuation of a robbery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401. He raises these points on appeal: that the court erred in instructing on second-degree murder because that offense is not included within a charge of felony murder; that testimony by a state's witness that defendant had been in prison inflamed and prejudiced the jury; that the court erred in denying defendant the services of a psychiatrist; and that the prosecutor's description, in closing argument, of a blood test not in evidence was improper. This case was well briefed and presented by able counsel.
We turn first to the evidence, which revealed a needless, cruel and bizarre homicide. Dennis Ray Bradford and Carlie Moss spent the evening of June 2, 1974 drinking together and walking around Manhattan, Kansas (Moss testified as a witness for the state). Around midnight, while they were walking down Colorado Street, Bradford said something about robbing somebody, and the two separated. A few minutes later Moss heard Bradford say, "Hand me your billfold" and he heard someone respond that he didn't have one. Moss then rejoined Bradford and recognized the third man as Scott Carlson. Bradford and Moss both struck Carlson who attempted to flee. Bradford again hit Carlson, knocking him down. Carlson fell against the curb and was knocked out. Bradford and Moss then dragged the prostrate Carlson into an alleyway between Pierre and Colorado Streets. Bradford said, "He's already half gone, why not finish him off." Carlson, unconscious, was lying on his back. Bradford picked up a large rock or cement block and struck Carlson repeatedly in the face and head, crushing his skull. Bradford said to Moss, "This is how you kill a man. He won't see anyone no more." Bradford then went through Carlson's pockets, removing a paper pad which Bradford had in his possession at the time of his arrest later that morning.
We will consider first the final three points raised by defendant. Sybil Mings was called as a witness by the state. During her testimony she mentioned that the defendant had been in the reformatory and in prison. The trial court struck the testimony and admonished the jury to disregard it. It is apparent from the record and counsel for the defendant concedes that these statements by the witness *338 were unsolicited and were not intentionally placed before the jury by the state. Evidence of defendant's prior incarceration was, of course, inadmissible. The court took prompt action to strike it and to admonish the jury.
The defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. Whether inadmissible testimony constitutes harmless or reversible error depends upon the particular evidence and the circumstances of the case in which the question arises. As we said in State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170, 542 P.2d 686:
And in State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 523 P.2d 397, we said:
We have reviewed the entire record in this case. There is a wealth of evidence to support the conviction. Under the facts here disclosed we conclude that the inadvertent reference to defendant's prior incarceration did not prejudice his substantial rights and was but harmless error.
Early in this proceeding the trial court committed Bradford to the State Security Hospital at Larned, presumably under K.S. A 22-3302, for the purpose of a psychiatric examination so that his competency to stand trial might be determined. The court held a hearing for that purpose upon receipt of a written report from the hospital. Defendant and his counsel were present. At the conclusion of the hearing the court determined that Bradford was "able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings *339 against him and to make or assist in making his defense and that he is therefore competent to stand trial."
Upon his arraignment some thirty days later, the defendant requested that the court authorize the obtaining of psychiatric services pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4508. The motion alleged that such services were necessary:
The journal entry recites that the motion was argued by counsel for both parties and was overruled. No supporting evidence, affidavits or medical records were provided so far as we are informed, and no notice of an intention to rely on the defense of insanity was served pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219. The oral argument on the motion is not reproduced in the record.
The granting or denial of a motion for psychiatric or other services for an indigent defendant under K.S.A. 22-4508 is a discretionary matter. In State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 500 P.2d 21, we observed that:
Here the trial court had before it the written motion and the report of the State Security Hospital. It heard the arguments of counsel. Further, the defendant was personally present in court. Upon this record we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion nor do we believe that the defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced. The record before us discloses no compelling reason why psychiatric services should have been provided. We find no error in this matter.
Defendant's counsel, in closing argument, asked why no test was run on the blood that was on the clothes, to be compared with that of the victim and the defendant. The prosecutor, in closing, responded that there was a test run; that the blood type of Bradford, Moss and Carlson was Type A, and thus the tests proved nothing. *340 The trial court overruled defendant's objection to the argument. There was nothing in the evidence concerning blood tests.
No rule governing oral argument is more fundamental than that requiring counsel to confine their remarks to matters in evidence. The stating of facts not in evidence is clearly improper, and the trial court erred in failing to sustain defense counsel's prompt objection.
However, the question before us is whether the argument was so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial and thus to require a new trial. We said in State v. Murrell, 215 Kan. 10, 523 P.2d 348:
The argument here complained of was not inflammatory. It was an attempt by the state to explain the absence of evidence which "doesn't show anything." The prosecutor did not attempt to link the defendant to the crime by reference to the absent tests. Had he argued tests which were not in evidence but which allegedly showed the defendant to have worn clothing containing blood of the type of the deceased alone, our ruling might be otherwise. But under all the circumstances here present, we conclude that the state's argument, though objectionable and improper, was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. We find error, but not reversible error.
We turn now to defendant's contention that the trial court should not have instructed on second-degree murder, because it is not included within a charge of felony murder. Murder in the first degree is defined by K.S.A. 21-3401 as follows:
Second-degree murder is defined by K.S.A. 21-3402 as follows:
*341 The trial court instructed on felony murder, as well as murder in the second degree. Defendant objected to the giving of a second-degree murder instruction, contending that second-degree murder is not a lesser included offense of felony murder.
K.S.A. 21-3107 (3) provides as follows:
Thus, if the crime charged included lesser offenses, and if the evidence would support a conviction of lesser offenses, it was the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury upon such lesser included crimes. In order to determine whether or not the instructions were proper we shall examine some of our recent decisions dealing with this recurring problem.
The defendant in State v. Reed, 214 Kan. 562, 520 P.2d 1314, was charged with and convicted of felony murder. It was claimed that he killed a store clerk during the perpetration of a robbery. Eyewitness testimony disclosed that he approached the store clerk and demanded the contents of the cash register. He received the money and then demanded more. Told that he had been given all of it, the defendant shot the clerk in the head, causing his death, and then fled. Reed was arrested minutes later carrying the approximate sum missing from the cash register, and a weapon later identified as the one used in the robbery and murder. He sought instructions on the offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused to give those instructions and this court agreed. We said:
A similar situation occurred in State v. Masqua, 210 Kan. 419, 502 P.2d 728, cert. den., 411 U.S. 951, 36 L. Ed. 2d 413, 93 S. Ct. 1939. There, the defendant was charged with felony murder in the killing of an elderly woman following the perpetration of a forcible rape upon her. The medical evidence was uncontradicted that the victim was raped during her lifetime near the time of the murder. The trial court refused to instruct on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. In affirming the judgment, and in addition to the quotations set forth above, this court said:
We concluded that either the defendant committed the rape and felony murder, or he was not guilty of any degree of homicide.
The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Reed and Masqua. In those cases the evidence was uncontradicted that a felony had occurred. There was no conflicting testimony. This court therefore held that because the jury could not have found Reed and Masqua not guilty of the felonies with which they were charged, and yet guilty of the murder charged, instructions on lesser degrees of homicide were inappropriate.
In the case at hand, conflicting evidence was presented as to whether or not the felony charged, robbery, had occurred. The evidence introduced by the defendant was calculated to suggest to the jury that the defendant had not committed the robbery or *343 else he would have had something in his possession beyond a valueless notepad to show for it. Defendant's evidence indicated that the deceased had a large sum of money with him prior to his death. Defendant had but five dollars in his possession when arrested. The evidence was thus disputed and unclear as to whether or not a robbery had been perpetrated. Lacking was the clear and uncontroverted evidence of robbery in Reed, or of forcible rape in Masqua.
The testimony of Carlie Moss, defendant's accomplice, was subject to doubt in part or in whole. He told the police numerous stories, some not involving the defendant, before settling on the story which he told to the jury. The jury might well have believed his testimony as to the manner of the victim's death, but not concerning the attempted robbery.
Felony murder is of course murder in the first degree. The malice, intent, premeditation and deliberation which distinguish first-degree murder from other homicides are supplied by evidence of the felony being committed. Thus the state is relieved from the burden of separately demonstrating these elements. State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 471, 497 P.2d 275; State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 460 P.2d 586; State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879.
Ordinarily, in a felony murder case, where the evidence of the commission of the felony is clear and uncontroverted, no instruction on lesser degrees of homicide should be given. But where, as here, there is conflicting evidence as to the commission of the felony, and where the evidence will support a conviction of a lesser degree of homicide, instructions on appropriate lesser degrees should be given.
Felony murder has all of the elements of any other murder in the first degree. The only difference is that in felony murder the prosecution may show malice, premeditation and deliberation by showing that the killing took place during the commission or attempt to commit another felony. First-degree murder, whether felony murder or not, is the highest degree of homicide. Second-degree murder is a lesser included offense.
We find the following cogent comment in 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 392 c, pp. 210, 211:
*344 Appellant advances no argument that the judgment is not supported by the evidence. There is an abundance of substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict. The submission of instructions on lower degrees is to a defendant's advantage, and even in the absence of supportive evidence any error in this regard is in his favor. The rule is thus set forth in Am Jur 2d:
And see State v. Carpenter, 215 Kan. 573, 578, 527 P.2d 1333; State v. Yargus, 112 Kan. 450, 211 Pac. 121; and State v. Long, 253 S.W. 729, 732 (Mo.).
While we agree that in a felony murder case no instructions on lesser degrees of homicide should be given where all of the evidence demonstrates that the homicide was committed during the commission of a felony (40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 534), we hold that the rule is otherwise where, as here, evidence of the commission of the felony is disputed or unclear, where the evidence supports instructions on lesser degrees, and where different inferences and conclusions might be drawn by the trier of fact as to which degree of homicide, if any, was committed. State v. Wilson, 182 Or. 681, 684, 695, 189 P.2d 403.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing on murder in the second degree under the facts of this case.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.