Title: Lamb v. Commonwealth

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2017
‘TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000255-MR
PAUL LAMB APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY JON KALTENBACH, JUDGE
NO. 14-CR-00107

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
AEFIRMING
Appellant, Paul F, Lamb, appeals from a judgment of the McCracken
Circuit Court convicting him of eleven crimes: 1) failure to or improper signal;

2) careless driving; 3) two counts of first degree trafficking in a controlled

 

substance (Percocet), greater than ten dosage units, subsequent offense;
4) trafficking in marijuana, less than eight ounces, subsequent offense;

5) possession of drug paraphernalia; 6) trafficking in marijuana, greater than

  

five pounds, firearm enhanced; 7} first degree trafficking in a controlled

substance (Percocet), greater than ten dosage units, firearm enhanced; 8) first
degree possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), firearm
enhanced; 9) possession of drug paraphernalia, firearm enhanced; and 10)
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to prison for
2 total of seventy years. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred

by 1) allowing him to waive counsel, 2) failing to suppress evidence from an
illegal search, 3) allowing entry of improper character evidence, 4) denying a
directed verdict, and 5) allowing Appellant's sentence to be enhanced as a
subsequent offender. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Appellant’s
convictions.

1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant became the focus of an investigation after police received a
complaint that illegal drugs were being sold from the house in which he
resided. As part of this investigation, McCracken County Sheriff Department
(MCSD) detectives used a confidential informant to buy Percocet from Appellant
‘at a local bar. Five days later, the confidential informant told the detectives
that Appellant was then at the same bar attempting to sell hydrocodone pills.
Detectives surveilling the bar watched Appellant leave, get into his vehicle, and
drive away. The detectives followed in an unmarked car. After seeing
Appellant cross over the center line of the highway, they contacted the MCSD
canine officer and informed him that they were following Appellant, that
Appellant had previously sold illegal drugs to an informant, that the informant
had told them that Appellant was in possession of hydrocodone which he had
attempted to sell, and that Appellant could have a handgun.

‘The canine officer, in a marked police vehicle, then took over the task of
following Appellant. When he saw Appellant make a right turn without using
his turn signal, the officer stopped Appellant. As he approached Appellant’s
vehicle, he detected a faint odor of burnt marijuana, He instructed Appellant
to exit the vehicle; he then patted Appellant down for weapons. Although he

2
did not detect a weapon, he felt what he believed to be a “bundle of drugs.”
Appellant passed a field sobriety test and the portable breath test did not
detect alcohol beyond the legal limit. Appellant refused consent for a search of
his vehicle and his person.

Ten minutes after stopping Appellant, and with Appellant standing away
from his vehicle, the canine officer deployed his dog to search the exterior of
the unoccupied vehicle. The dog alerted to the driver's door. The officer then
searched inside the vehicle but found only a nine millimeter clip in the trunk.
He then searched Appellant's person and found six doses of hydrocodone, 26
doses of Percocet, 39 grams of marijuana, and $2,480 cash, including $80 of
the cash used by the confidential informant for the Percocet purchase five days
earlier. Appellant was arrested. Additional charges followed when a search of
Appellant's residence led to the discovery of other contraband.

ML. ANALYSIS

A. The Trial Court Properly Determined that Appellant Had Waived His
Right to Counsel

‘Two months after being appointed counsel, Appellant moved the court to
relieve his counsel of further duty and allow him to represent himself. After
conducting a Faretta hearing,' the trial court concluded that Appellant
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The court
granted Appellant's motion to act as his own counsel and directed his

appointed attorney to act as standby counsel.

* Raretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
3
In Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.34 819, 822 (Ky. 2009), this Court
offered model questions that trial judges could use to assist them in
determining whether waivers of the right to counsel were being knowingly and
intelligently made. Appellant complains that the trial judge in this case did not
use Terry's model questions. In particular, he complains that the trial court
id not review with him the crimes charged and their associated penalty
ranges; did not discuss the procedure to be employed if he chose to testify; and
failed to advise him against self-representation. Consequently, Appellant
asserts that he was left without a proper appreciation of the disadvantages of
self-representation, and thus he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waive his right to counsel.

‘The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution provide the right of self-representation for
defendants who knowingly and intelligently relinquish their right to
professional legal counsel. Faretta holds:

When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a

purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated

with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent

himself, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo those

relinquished benefits. ... [The accused] should be made aware of

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the

record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice

is made with eyes open.

422 US

 

t 835 internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
‘The Supreme Court explained in Faretta that a defendant choosing self-
representation “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of

self-representation” but that he need not have “the skill and experience of a
rep
4
lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation,”
and “technical legal knowledge . . . was not relevant to an assessment of [one's]
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” The Supreme Court further
noted that “[tJhe trial judge had warned Faretta that he thought it was a
mistake not to accept the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 835-836. However, it
‘appears in Faretta that an extensive discussion of the dangers associated with
self-representation was not undertaken.

Faretta does not specifically require the trial court to inform a defendant
seeking self-representation of the charges against him, the possible penalties,
or the procedures that may be pertinent to the defense of his case. Nor must

the defendant be specifically warned against self-representation. As we have

 

stated in other cases, the inquiry to determine if a particular defendant is
making an intelligent waiver of counsel and adequately understands the
potentially adverse consequences of his choice, must be adapted to the
circumstances of the individual case, The inquiry will depend on case-specific
factors, such as the defendant's education, experiences, sophistication, the
complexity or simplicity of the charges, and the stage of the proceeding for
which the defendant seeks to waive counsel. Depp v. Commonwealth, 278
S.W.Sd 615, 617 (Ky. 2009) (quoting fowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 7, 88 (2004)};
Terry, 295 8.W.3d at 825, n, 3, “{T]he requirement remains that a trial court,
must provide a defendant proposing self-representation enough information to
demonstrate that the defendant's waiver of counsel was done with ‘eyes open.”

Terry, 295 8.W.34 at 820. Ultimately, the trial court must ascertain that the

5
defendant is competent to waive his right to counsel, not that the defendant is
competent to represent himself, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993).

Consequently, the trial judge in this case was not required to impart
specific knowledge or warnings to Appellant as a prerequisite for finding that
he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Rather, it was
sufficient that Appellant was alerted generally to the difficulties of navigating
the trial procedure pro se. Upon review, we are satisfied that the trial court
adequately cautioned Appellant so that he had an appropriate understanding
of the dangers of self-representation. The question is not how well the trial
court employed the model questions offered as guidance in Terry, but whether
the trial court provided enough information to assure that Appellant's waiver of
counsel was done with “eyes open.” See Grady v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.34
333, 342 (Ky. 2010); Terry, 295 S.W.3d at 825. As in Faretta, “the record
affirmatively shows that [Appellant] was literate, competent, and
understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will”
when he elected to represent himself, 422 U.S. at 835. The trial court did not
err by allowing Appellant to waive counsel.

B. The Trial Court Properly Declined to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a
Result of the Search of Appellant's Person

‘The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained
after the warrantless stop of his vehicle, and after the seizure and subsequent
search of his person. Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s findings of

fact, but asserts the trial court erred in its application of law.
‘The trial court concluded that; 1) the arresting officer had probable cause
to stop Appellant's vehicle after he failed to use a turn signal in violation of
KRS 189.380(1);? and 2) the officer executed the subsequent sobriety test, drug
dog search, and pat-down search based upon the information he received from
the detectives. ‘The trial court concluded that once the canine alerted to
‘Appellant's driver’s side door, the officer had probable cause to search
‘Appellant's vehicle and person pursuant to Morton v. Commonwealth, 232
'S.W.3d 566 (Ky. App. 2007), and the automobile exception to the constitutional
warrant requirement.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress by examining
whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
and if those factual findings are not clearly erroneous, by then conducting a de
novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. Davis v.
Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citations omitted). Since
neither party challenges the trial court's findings of fact, we turn our attention
to its application of the law.

‘The initial traffic stop and pat-down search are not challenged, and we
see no error associated with these police actions. The question is whether the
second search of Appellant, the search of his person that followed the drug
dog's alert on the vehicle, was lawful. Appellant contends that even if the

2 KRS 189,980(1) provides: “A person shall not turn a vehicle or move right or

left upon a roadway until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor
without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.”
initial stop of the vehicle w

 

justified, the officer nevertheless improperly
detained him for a second search of his person even after he had passed the
sobriety tests and after the search of his vehicle had yielded no evidence of
‘criminal activity. In support of his argument Appellant further cites the
officer's suppression hearing testimony that he conducted the second risk of
‘Appellant's person out of concern that Appellant might have a firearm, even
though the officer had already patted him down for that purpose during the
initial stages of the stop.

However, as further explained below, with the higher, probable cause
standard having already been met for the initial stop, and ultimately for the
{felony arrest of Appellant for drug trafficking, the second search of Appellant
was a permissible warrantless search incident to arrest, and so it is
unnecessary to perform an analysis from the perspective that the stop was an
investigatory stop, allowed under the lower, articulable reasonable suspicion
standard, Southem Financial Life Insurance Company v. Combs, 413 8.W.3d
921, 926 (Ky. 2013) (citation omitted) (“I]t is well settled that we are not bound
by the analysis of the [lower court] and may affirm on any grounds supported
‘by the record.”).

In any event, the officer’s subjective intention is irrelevant here;
‘subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth Amendment. “(T]he fact that
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not

8
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). We accordingly reject
Appellant's argument insofar as it is premised upon some defect in the officer's
subjective intentions; at all stages of the stop the officer’s actions were
objectively reasonable.

Appellant further argues the point that the challenged search arose
solely from the traffic stop and was, thus, impermissible under Davis v.
Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2016) (holding that the officer
inappropriately extended a traffic stop beyond its original purpose, determining
the driver's sobriety, to perform a search). But that is not what happened here.
Probable cause for the Appellant's drug trafficking arrest preceded the reason
for the traffic stop. If we consider only the facts known to the officer before the
‘second search of Appellant's person, it is clear that probable cause existed to
Justify Appellant's arrest for illegally trafficking in controlled substances.

‘The traffic violation certainly provided probable cause to authorize the
initial stop, however the officer was also authorized to stop Appellant for the
purpose of arresting him for drug trafficking entirely separate and apart from
the tum signal violation, The record plainly discloses that the arresting officer
‘was already aware of Appellant's involvement in the previous Percocet
transaction and that Appellant had just left a nearby bar with hydrocodone to
sell, That information provided probable cause for Appellant's arrest
notwithstanding the traffic stop and his apparent sobriety.

9
KRS 431.005(1)(c) provides that an officer may make an arrest without a
warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested
has committed a felony. To establish probable cause, the prosecution must
show that ‘at the moment the arrest was made . .. the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’
Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Beck v. Ohio.
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

‘The knowledge upon which the arresting officer bases probable cause to
arrest need not be derived exclusively from his own personal observations.
Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an arresting officer is entitled to act
‘on the strength of the knowledge communicated from a fellow officer and he
‘may assume its reliability provided he is not otherwise aware of circumstances
‘sufficient to materially impeach the information received. See United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-233 (1985) (Under the collective knowledge
doctrine, when law enforcement officers are in communication regarding a
suspect, the knowledge of one officer can be imputed to the other officers};
Darden v. Commonwealth, 298 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Ky. 1957) (“The necessary
elements [of probable cause to arrest] are that the officer acts upon a belief in
the person's guilt, based either upon facts or circumstances within the officer's

own knowledge or upon information imparted to him by reliable and credible

10
third persons, provided there are no circumstances known to the officer
sufficient to impeach materially the information received.” (citations omitted)

The trial court’s undisputed findings of fact which detailed the
investigative efforts that revealed Appellant's illegal drug trafficking, and the
aspects of that information which were relayed to the officer who arrested
Appellant, clearly establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Appellant on the drug charges at the time he stopped the vehicle. Once
authorized to make a lawful arrest, the officer was justified in conducting a
substantially-contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee, and it
makes no difference that the formal arrest was subsequent to the search
incident to that arrest. Williams, 147 S.W.3d at 8 (citing State v. Overby, 590
N.W.2d 703 (N.D. 1999); see Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348, 350
(ky. 1979), aff'd, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (‘{T]he police
clearly had probable cause to place petitioner under arrest. Where the formal
arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's
person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the
arrest rather than vice versa.”). A search incident to lawful arrest is justified
by “the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] on
the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial.” Robinson,
414 U.S. at 234, When one is searched incident to arrest, a warrant is not
required, and an officer is permitted to search the person arrested. McCloud v
Commonwealth, 286 $.W.3d 780, 785 (Ky. 2009) (citing Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969}).

u
We are satisfied that the arresting officer’s second search of Appellant's
person was conducted lawfully; Appellant's right against unreasonable
searches of his person was not violated. We affirm the trial court's denial of
‘Appellant's motion to suppress the fruits of that search.

©. Entry of Evidence that the Confidential Informant’s Work Resulted in
Convictions in Other Cases Was Not Palpable Error

‘Two detectives testified at Appellant's trial about the confidential
informant’ experience as an informant, inchiding his work on éases in which
the defendants had pled guilty. Citing Fairrow v. Commonwealth, 175 8.W.3d
601 (Ky. 2005), Appellant argues that this reference to the informant’s work on
other cases was improper character evidence to bolster the informants
credibility and to imply that Appellant was also guilty. Appellant contends that
the Commonwealth relied heavily on the informant's testimony to prove
Appellant was guilty of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, greater
than or equal to ten dosage units of Percocet, based upon his alleged.
transaction with the informant.

Because the issue was not preserved at trial, Appellant seeks palpable
error review under RCr 10.26. In Young v. Commonwealth, 426 8.W.3d 577,
584 (Ky. 2014), we articulated this exacting standard for correcting palpable

error on appeal under RCr 10.26:

 

2 As provided in RCr 10.26, “al palpable error which affects the substantial
rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new tral or by an
‘appellate court on appeal, even though insuificiently raised or preserved for review,
‘and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice
thas resulted from the error.”

12
For error to be palpable, “it must be easily perceptible, plain,
obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206
S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). The rule's requirement of manifest
injustice requires “showing... [a] probability of a different result
or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to
due process of law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3
(Ky. 2006). Or, as stated differently, a palpable error is where “the
defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially
intolerable.” Id. at 4. Ultimately, “(manifest injustice is found if
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the proceeding.” Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.3d 824, 831 (Ky. 2013) (quoting McGuire v. Commonwealth,
368 S.W.3d 100, 112 (Ky. 2012).

We first note that if the cited testimony was error at all, it was not so

5 to qualify as “palpable.” Implicit in

the concept of palpable error correction is that the error is so obvious that the

   

readily apparent, or “easily perceptible”
trial court was remiss in failing to act upon it sua sponte.

Secondly, references to the informant's previous successes could not
have so unduly enhanced the informant’s credibility that it influenced the
result of the trial or jeopardized Appellant's due process rights. Regardless of
the informant's previous performance, his credibility in this instance was
substantially documented. The jury heard testimony from the informant and
the detectives detailing the controlled buy from start to finish. The detectives
made sure that the informant had no contraband when he entered the bar with
five specifically identifiable $20 bills to buy Percocet from Appellant. The

informant returned with ten Percocet pills and only one of the $20 bills. When

 

arrested, Appellant had on his person four of the $20 bills police had provided
to the informant for use in the drug buy.

13,
There is no substantial probability that the outcome of the case would
have been different if the trial court had intervened sua sponte to reject the
portion of the testimony at issue. Appellant's substantial rights were not
affected by the testimony. Consequently, he is not entitled to relief under RCr

10.26.

 

Appellant Was Not Entitled to a Directed Verdict
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Appellant moved for a directed

 

verdict on the charge of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance. He
asserted that the video recording of the controlled buy in which Appellant
allegedly sold ten Percocet pills to the informant did not depict a drug

transaction. The motion was denied.

 

When deciding a motion for a directed verdict “the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given.” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187
(ky. 1991). Questions about the credibility and weight to be given to the
evidence are reserved to the jury. Id. “On appellate review, the test of a

directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly

 

unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a

 

directed verdict of acquittal.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d

3 (Ky. 1983)

14
Appellant now reiterates his claim that the video failed to document that
a drug transaction occurred and that the informant’s testimony is the only
evidence of Appellant's guilt. Based upon that evidence, it would not be clearly
‘unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant guilty of first degree trafficking in a
controlled substance. The trial court did not err when overruling Appellant's
motion for a directed verdict.

E. KRS 218A.010(41) Is Not an Unconstitutional Sentencing Enhancement

Prior to trial, by way of a motion for declaratory judgment, Appellant
challenged the constitutionality of KRS 218A.010(41) because it enhances
‘subsequent convictions for drug trafficking no matter how far in time they are
removed from the defendant's previous conviction. The trial court rejected his
argument.

Appellant was convicted in 1985 of trafficking in marijuana over eight
‘ounces and trafficking in schedule I non-narcotic controlled substances. In
the instant case, the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of first degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, greater than or equal to ten dosage units
of Percocet, and one count of trafficking in marijuana, less than eight ounces,

‘as a subsequent offender under KRS 218A.010(41).4 KRS 218A.010(41) states:

 

[Aln offense is considered as a second or subsequent offense, if,
prior to his or her conviction of the offense, the offender has at any
time been convicted under this chapter, or under any statute of the
United States, or of any state relating to substances classified as
controlled substances ...

 

“ Effective April 27, 2016, KRS 2184.010(42) contains the definition of second.
or subsequent offense.

18
‘The jury recommended sentences of 15 years and 10 years pursuant to
KRS 218A.1412(3)(a),* respectively, for the two first degree trafficking charges
and a sentence of 5 years pursuant to KRS 218A.1421(2)¢ for the trafficking in
‘marijuana charge. As he asserted in his pre-trial motion, Appellant argues
that the sentence enhancements for these drug trafficking charges under KRS
218A are unconstitutional. He complains that his due process rights were
violated because KRS 218A.010(41) does not limit the time for which a prior
offense can be used to enhance the punishment for a later offense.

Appellant points out that other sentencing enhancements for subsequent
offenses impose a time limitation beyond which any subsequent offenses must
be treated as a first offense. As examples, he cites KRS 532.080 (persistent
felony offenders), KRS 189A.010 (driving under the influence), and KRS.
533.010(4) (limiting for probation purposes to ten years the time span for
which a prior crime may signify the “likelihood” that a defendant will commit
another crime)

Although Appellant views KRS 218A.010(41) as fundamentally unfair,
“the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is
vested with the legislature.” Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19, 39
tracking in w controled substance by teeing in 10 or more dosage unit ofa
controlled substance that is classified in Schedules I or Il and is a narcotic drug, or a

controlled substance analogue, shall be guilty of a Class C felony for the first offense
and a Class B felony for a second or subsequent offense.

© KRS 218A.1421(2) provides that trafficking in less than 8 ounces of marijuana
is a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a Class D felony for a second or
subsequent offense.

16
(ky. 2011) (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)); Gore v. United
‘States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). The legislature may, as it deems proper,
impose restrictions on the remoteness of prior offenses for the purposes of
enhanced sentencing. Or, it may choose to punish second or subsequent
offenses more harshly than first offenses regardless of the age of the prior
offense, We see no constitutional barrier to this legislative prerogative.

We are not persuaded that KRS 218A.010(41) is unconstitutional
because it enhances the punishment of second offenses regardless of when the

prior offense occurred, even if other statutory regimens do take into account

  

the age of the prior convictions. We honor a presumption that a statute is
constitutional “unless its violation of the constitution is clear, complete and
unequivocal.” Comelison v. Commonwealth, 52 8.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky. 2001)
(citations omitted). The party challenging the statute bears the burden of
showing the constitutional violation. Id. at 572-573. Appellant has not met
that burden. The trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for
declaratory judgment and allowing the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant's
prior trafficking convictions for sentence enhancements of his current
trafficking convictions.
MI, CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction is affirmed.

All sitting. All concur.

7
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Steven Jared Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

‘Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

Micah Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General

18