Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SARAH W. STANTON: DARLENE BAKER V. JULIE ENIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Sarah W. Stanton

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SARAH W. STANTON: DARLENE BAKER V. JULIE ENIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Sarah W. Stanton2005 WY 74114 P.3d 1246Case Number: No. 04-179Decided: 07/11/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF                 

SARAH 
W. STANTON, Deceased:                        

                                                                                                

DARLENE BAKER,                                                 

Appellant 
(Respondent),                                          

                                                                                                

 v.                                                        

                                                                                                

JULIE 
ENIS, Personal Representative of the        

Estate 
of Sarah W. Stanton,                                    

Appellee 
(Petitioner).                                               

 

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofHot 
SpringsCounty

The Honorable Gary P. 
Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas C. Bancroft, of 
Bancroft Law Firm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

William R. Shelledy, Jr., 
of Scott, Shelledy & Luhm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This case 
involves interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Sarah W. Stanton.  The district court determined that the 
will was unambiguous and ordered distribution of the assets in dispute through 
the residual clause of the will.  
Appellant, Darlene Baker, challenges that decision.  We reverse.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Baker states 
the following issues:

 
 

1.                  
Did the decedent intend 
to leave, to her sister, the decedent's capital stock located in a safety 
deposit box she owned jointly with her sister?

 
 

2.                  
Is Article III of the 
Last Will and Testament of Sarah Stanton ambiguous?

 
 
Julie Enis, the personal 
representative of the estate, identifies one issue:

 
 

1.                  
Whether the District 
Court correctly interpreted sentence 1 of Article III, of the Last Will and 
Testament of Sarah W. Stanton wherein it determined that said paragraph excepted 
the stock held in Sarah Stanton's name individually and placed said stock in the 
residuary estate for distribution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Sarah Stanton 
signed her Last Will and Testament on May 24, 2001, in Thermopolis, Wyoming.  
Ms. Stanton died on October 11, 2003.  The will was admitted to probate and 
Julie Enis was appointed as personal representative.

            

[¶4]      At the time of 
her death, Ms. Stanton held a safety deposit box at First State Bank jointly 
with her sister, Ms. Baker.  The 
safety deposit box contained, among other items, stock certificates in the sole 
name of Ms. Stanton.  The stock was 
valued at $253,252.16.

 
 
[¶5]      Article III of 
Ms. Stanton's will states:

 
 
To my sister, Darline 
[sic] Baker, I give her the contents of my Safety Deposit Box No. 287 located at 
the First State Bank, said box held in our joint names and that she is entitled 
to all property therein with the exception of any joint tenancy property or 
property such as stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit that are issued in some 
other name or names besides hers and/or mine jointly.  These items, if any, will descend to 
those persons names [sic] either as joint tenant with me or as named legal owner 
of the property located therein.  
All other property located in said safety deposit box will become the 
sole and absolute property of Darline [sic] Baker together with all the contents 
of my home, including but not limited to jewelry, antiques, furniture and 
furnishings, dishes, heirlooms, keepsakes, appliances, etc., provided she 
survives me by sixty (60) days.

 
 
[¶6]      The will also 
contained a residuary clause.  
Pursuant to that clause (Article V), Ms. Stanton directed that any 
remaining or residual property in her estate be divided into five equal shares 
and distributed to the beneficiaries identified in the residuary clause.  Ms. Enis and her husband were named as 
beneficiaries of one of those shares.  

 
 
[¶7]      Ms. Enis, as 
personal representative of the estate, petitioned the district court for 
authorization to sell the stock and distribute the proceeds to the beneficiaries 
named in the residuary clause.  Ms. 
Baker objected to the petition on the basis that she was the rightful 
beneficiary of the stock pursuant to Article III of the will.  Ms. Enis responded with a motion seeking 
the district court's interpretation of Article III.  Ms. Baker countered with a request for 
resolution of the dispute pursuant to the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act.1

 
 
[¶8]      A hearing was 
held on July 2, 2004.  No evidence 
was presented.  After hearing 
argument, the district court announced its decision 
stating:

 
 
. . . Article 3, of Sarah 
W. Stanton's Will is unambiguous.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
The Court therefore 
determines that the intent here was to except out the stock held in Sarah 
Stanton's name. 

 
 
Therefore, the Court 
concludes that the stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit enumerated in the 
aforementioned motion does pass under the Will under Article 5, the residual 
clause.

 
 
An order to that effect 
was entered.  Ms. Baker appeals from 
that decision.

 
 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court determined that the Last Will and Testament of Sarah W. Stanton was 
unambiguous and expressed her intention that stock in her name be distributed 
pursuant to the residuary clause of the will.  Whether language is ambiguous is a 
question of law which we review de 
novo.  Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 266 
(Wyo. 
1994).  The proper interpretation of 
an unambiguous will is also a question of law which we review de novo.  In re Estate of Armijo, 995 P.2d 487, 
489 (N.M.App. 1999); Woods v. Wells Fargo 
Bank Wyoming, 2004 WY 61, ¶42, 90 P.3d 724, ¶42 (Wyo. 2004).  Because we conduct a de novo review, we afford no deference 
to the legal conclusions of the district court. In re Estate of Corpening, 2001 WY 18, 
¶7, 19 P.3d  514, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001); Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 
(Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Ms. Stanton's intent, as expressed 
in the will, controls the legal effect of her disposition.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-105 (LexisNexis 
2003).  We articulated our standards 
for the construction of wills in In re 
Estate of Seader where we stated:

 
 
We note that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-1-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) also emphasizes the importance of 
testamentary intent:

 
 
(a)       This code 
shall be liberally construed and applied, to promote the following purposes and 
policies to:

 
 
. . .  

 
 
(ii)  Discover and make effective the intent 
of a decedent in distribution of his property[.]

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
Consistent with the above 
statutory directives, "the intention of the testator must govern."  Hammer v. Atchison, 536 P.2d 151, 155 (Wyo. 1975).  Furthermore, the intent of the testator 
must be ascertained solely from the meaning of the words used in the will.  Churchfield v. First Nat. Bank of 
Sheridan, 418 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 1966); 
In re Boyd's Estate, 366 P.2d 336, 
337 (Wyo. 
1961).  Where the will is clear and 
unambiguous, the court may not read into a will something the testator did not 
place there.  Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 81 
(Wyo. 1983); Kortz v. American Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, 571 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 1977).  The courts will not supply words for the 
testator.  In re Lendecke's Estate, 79 Wyo. 27, 329 P.2d 819, 
822 (1958).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-6-112 (LexisNexis 2003), which requires wills to be in writing, precludes 
ascribing to a testator any intention not expressed in the instrument 
itself.  Churchfield, 418 P.2d  at 1003; In re Boyd's Estate, 366 P.2d  at 
337.

 
 

In re Estate of 
Seader, 
2003 WY 119, ¶¶31-32, 76 P.3d 1236, ¶¶31-32 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶11]   Although both parties assert that 
the will is unambiguous and clearly reflects Ms. Stanton's intent, they offer 
competing interpretations of the will relating to distribution of the stock held 
solely in the name of Ms. Stanton.  
If a will is unambiguous the intent of the testatrix is to be determined 
solely from the language of the will.  
In re Estate of Croft, 713 P.2d 782, 783 (Wyo. 1986).  If a will is ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence may be utilized to properly interpret the will.  Id. 
at 784.  A will is ambiguous if it 
is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a 
double meaning is present.  
Id.  Disagreement between the parties as to 
the will's meaning does not create an ambiguity.  See, e.g., Wolter v. Equitable Resources 
Energy Co., 979 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo. 1999).    

 
 
[¶12]   We must determine if Ms. Stanton's 
intent regarding distribution of the disputed assets is unambiguously expressed 
in her will.  The parties agree that 
the three sentences of Article III should serve as the primary focus of our 
inquiry.  In the first sentence, Ms. 
Stanton expressed her intention to bequeath the entire contents of the safety 
deposit box to Ms. Baker, except for two types of property described in that 
sentence.  The second sentence of 
Article III provides direction regarding distribution of the excepted 
property.  In the third sentence, 
Ms. Stanton reiterated her intention that the contents of the safety deposit box 
be distributed to Ms. Baker.  

 
 
[¶13]   The dispute centers around the 
excepted property referenced in the first sentence.  Specifically, we must determine Ms. 
Stanton's intent regarding the phrase "hers and/or mine jointly."  The parties offer differing 
interpretations of this phrase.  We 
agree that this phrase, read in isolation, is subject to more than one 
meaning.  The parties concede that 
in order to determine Ms. Stanton's intent, we must construe the provisions of 
the will in pari materia.  However, they focus on different words, 
phrases and provisions of the will to ascertain Ms. Stanton's 
intent.

 
 
[¶14]   Ms. Baker contends that the plain 
meaning of the first sentence is that Ms. Baker is to receive all stock in the 
name of Ms. Baker (her name), stock in the name of Ms. Stanton (my name), and/or 
stock in the name of Ms. Baker and Ms. Stanton jointly.  According to Ms. Baker, this 
interpretation is buttressed by the second sentence of Article III where Ms. 
Stanton describes and provides instruction regarding the property which would 
not pass to Ms. Baker.  The second 
sentence states, "[t]hese items, if any, will descend to those persons names 
[sic] either as joint tenant with me or as named legal owner of the property 
located therein."  "These items" 
refers to property excepted from the bequest made to Ms. Baker by the preceding 
sentence.

 
 
[¶15]   Ms. Enis asserts that the language 
of Article III can be reduced to the following:

 
 
To my sister [Darlene 
Baker] . . . I give her the contents of my safety deposit box . . . and that she 
is entitled to all the property therein with the exception of . . . stocks . . . 
that are issued in some other name or names besides hers and/or mine 
jointly.

 
 
Ms. Enis views the 
exception as very specific and detailed.  
She contends that unless the stock in the safety deposit box was held 
jointly by Ms. Baker either with Ms. Stanton or with a third party, it would not 
become Ms. Baker's property.  Ms. 
Enis asserts that if Ms. Stanton wanted Ms. Baker to have all of the stock 
located within the safety deposit box, Ms. Stanton could have simply stated 
so.

 
 
[¶16]   We agree with the position advanced 
by Ms. Baker.  The task of this 
Court is to ascertain testamentary intent and give it effect. We must determine 
the intent of the testatrix by taking into account the entire will giving effect 
to every word, if that can be done, 
without defeating the general purpose of the will.  In re Estate of Bell, 764 P.2d 689, 692 (Wyo. 1988); In re 
Estate of Ogburn, 406 P.2d 655, 658 (Wyo. 1965).  See also, Percival v. Percival, 526 P.2d 342, 344 (Wyo. 
1974) (explaining that various parts of the will are to be construed in pari materia).  The meaning of Article III of Ms. 
Stanton's will is not to be ascertained by "random words and phrases . . . 
construed in isolation."  Lockwood v. Killian, 425 A.2d 909, 913 
(Conn. 
1979).  Rather, intent must be 
derived from the will as a whole.  
Crowell v. Chapman, 154 N.E. 397, 399 (Mass. 1926); In re Estate of Bell, 764 P.2d  at 692; In re Estate of Ogburn, 406 P.2d  at 
658.   

 
 
[¶17]   Admittedly, interpreting the phrase 
"hers and/or mine jointly" in isolation subjects the clause to double meaning 
and creates ambiguity.  Possible 
interpretations of the phrase would include those previously mentioned by the 
parties.  Additionally, we recognize 
stock in the name of "Darlene Baker and/or Sarah Stanton jointly" as a possible 
interpretation.  There may be other 
interpretations of the phrase if read without reference to other provisions of 
the will.  However, we must construe 
the provisions of the will in pari materia.  When we apply such an analysis, we 
conclude that the will unambiguously reflects Ms. Stanton's intent that the 
stock held solely in the name of Ms. Stanton, located in the safety deposit box, 
be distributed to Ms. Baker.

 
 
[¶18]   The second section of Article III 
illuminates Ms. Stanton's intent.  
It unambiguously reflects her understanding of the "excepted" items.  It states:  "[t]hese items, if any, will descend to 
those persons names [sic] either as joint tenant with me or as named legal owner 
of the property located therein."  
The parties agree that the term "these items" unambiguously refers to the 
exceptions, i.e., the stock that does not pass to Ms. Baker.  "These items" includes joint tenancy 
property which identifies Ms. Stanton as one of the joint tenants.  "These items" also includes property 
which would "descend" to the "named legal owner of the property."  At the time of her death, Ms. Stanton 
was the "named legal owner" of the stock at issue.  She could not have intended that stock 
in her name "descend" to herself.  

 
 
[¶19]   Ms. Enis contends that the term 
"named legal owner of the property" refers to the residuary legatees identified 
in Article V.  We disagree.  Ms. Enis provides no plausible 
explanation or legal authority which would allow an interpretation that equates 
"named legal owner" with residuary legatee.   The term "named legal owner" 
refers to the named legal owner on the stock certificate.  

 

[¶20]   When the first two sentences of 
Article III are read together, Ms. Stanton's intent is clear:  Ms. Stanton intended to give Ms. Baker 
all of the contents of the safety deposit box except:  (1)  joint tenancy property; and  (2)  securities in the name of someone other 
than Ms. Stanton or Ms. Baker, or the two of them jointly.  Any other interpretation would go beyond 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of Article III and ignore the 
language of the second sentence of Article III.  

 
 
[¶21]   In her final contention, Ms. Enis 
claims the residuary clause and the trust clause support her interpretation that 
Ms. Stanton 
intended the stocks to pass under the residuary clause.2  Ms. Enis asserts that if the securities 
pass to Ms. Baker, no property is available to fund the residuary clause or the 
trust.  Even if this contention is 
accurate, it is not relevant to our determination.  "The fact that the residuary legatees 
may receive little or nothing has no bearing on the proper construction of the 
will."  NationsBank of South 
Carolina v. Greenwood, 468 S.E.2d 658, 663 (S.C.App. 
1996).  It is worth remembering that 
"[t]he basic purpose of a residuary clause . . . is to prevent partial 
intestacy."  Swearingen v. Giles, 565 S.W.2d 574, 576 
(Tex.App. 1978).  See also, Renn v. 
Williams, 64 S.E.2d 437, 438 (N.C. 1951).  "A general residuary clause will cover 
everything which is not otherwise well disposed of in other parts of the will . 
. . . "  Hawks v. Creswell, 60 Wyo. 1, 16; 144 P.2d 129, 
133 (1943).  Here, the second 
sentence of Article III qualifies the exception created by the first sentence 
and limits it to "these items, if 
any."  (emphasis added).  The use of the phrase "if any" 
undermines Ms. Enis' contention that Ms. Stanton intended to fund the residuary 
clause with the disputed assets.  
"If any" suggests Ms. Stanton's uncertainty regarding the existence of 
such property.  

 
 
[¶22]   Additionally, we note that Article 
III required Ms. Baker to survive Ms. Stanton by sixty (60) days in order to 
take under the will.  If Ms. Baker 
did not survive Ms. Stanton, the will provided for Ms. Baker's share to pass 
through the residuary clause.  A 
residuary clause is designed for precisely this purpose.  There simply is no indication that Ms. 
Stanton's intent was to fund the residuary clause (and subsequently the trust) 
with the stocks contained in the safety deposit box absent Ms. Baker's failure 
to survive Ms. Stanton by the requisite sixty (60) days or some other failure of 
a devise in the will.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   In construing the will as a whole, 
giving effect to each word, clause and provision, we find that the Last Will and 
Testament of Sarah W. Stanton is unambiguous.  The stock at issue should be distributed 
to Ms. Baker.  The decision of the 
district court is reversed and remanded for entry of an order in accordance with 
this opinion.  

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq.  (LexisNexis 
2003).

2Article V of 
the will states:

 
 
            
Any remaining or residual property of whatever kind and lapsed devise or 
gift, regardless of the form of the property, after all debts are paid, and 
following the distribution as I have set out above, I shall give, devise and 
bequeath to my sister, Darline [sic] Baker, one share, my niece, Renee (Warren) 
Abelsen, one share, my friend and "adopted granddaughter", Sherry Tervo, one 
share, Jim Enis and Julie Enis, husband and wife, together as one share and Mike 
Enis and Kim Enis, husband and wife, together as one share, all together in five 
equal shares, share and share alike, or to the survivors.  If either of the husband or wife above 
should predecease me, the surviving spouse shall take their joint 
share.

 
 
Article VIII 
establishes a trust which would pay Ms. Tervo, a minor, her residuary share at 
the rate of $1,000 per month.  Ms. 
Stanton also made a specific bequest to Ms. Tervo in Article II of the 
will.