Title: New Jersey v. Hagans

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                   State v. Malcom C. Hagans (A-37-16) (078014)

Argued January 16, 2018 -- Decided April 23, 2018

TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.

         In this case, the Court considers the validity of a driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially
denied a police officer’s request to search it.

           In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged
taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without
signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and
defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle
and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, arrested
him, handcuffed him, called for back-up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust then asked Chandler to step out
of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle.
Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant
had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car.

         Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust
told Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud.
He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she
could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw
her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.”

         Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search
warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied,
“Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked,
“Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded,
“Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then
again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded “yes.” Faust repeated for the
Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her
mind and consented because she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a
loaded .22 caliber pistol.

         Defendant admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful
possession of a weapon, fourth-degree child abuse, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. At
a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over and for a search.
Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 
44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), militated
against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the
consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence.

         The Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor
vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.” 
229 N.J. 161 (2017).

HELD: Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to
search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the search.

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1. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court’s factual
findings underlying that decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 
229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). The panel’s
decision here predated the Court’s opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of
the MVR. The Court adheres to the principle enunciated in S.S. (pp. 7-8)

2. Consent to search is a long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent searches of motor vehicles
that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid
motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop; and (2) the consent is given
knowingly and voluntarily. (pp. 8-10)

3. In State v. King, the Court delineated factors for use in considering the voluntariness of consent. 
44 N.J. at 352-53.
Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested;
(2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused
initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of
contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the
defendant was handcuffed.” Ibid. Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: “(1) that consent
was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant
admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.” Id. at 353.
The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his
conclusion.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case
“necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. (pp. 10-11)

4. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but
found that Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of those factors cut against a finding
of voluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial
refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations
that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’s view, the video evidence was more compelling
than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. Over fifty years
ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not exist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are
increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another important tool with the capacity to aid in the search
for the truth. The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted visual and audial evaluation of the police and
driver’s interaction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVR footage helped the trial court determine that
Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Sufficient credible evidence supports that
determination. (pp. 11-13)

5. Defendant contends that Faust’s statement—“We are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just
kinda going to prolong the inevitable”—coerced Chandler’s consent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was
somewhat anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was used here was not coercive. As a best
practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and
should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the
issuance of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. Faust’s statement was a candid assessment of the
likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant. (p. 14)

6. Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. Here,
technological advancements permitted the trial court to better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent.
Such possibilities—which are increasingly common today—are precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts
rather than rigid absolute authority. (p. 15)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

       CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

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                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
37 September Term 2016
                                                 078014

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

MALCOLM C. HAGANS,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued January 16, 2018 – Decided April 23, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Rebecca Gindi, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for appellant
         (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Rebecca Gindi, of counsel, and
         Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, on the
         briefs).

         Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
         S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jane
         C. Schuster, of counsel and on the briefs).

    JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In this case, the Court considers the validity of a

driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially

denied a police officer’s request to search it.    Because the

trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly

and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by

sufficient credible evidence, we find that the trial court

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properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence

seized during the search.

                                   I.

    We garner these undisputed facts from the record, including

the dash-cam videos taken at the scene by the Mobile Video

Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle.       The parties stipulated to

the admission of the MVR recording and agreed it contained

sufficient facts for a hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress.   No witnesses testified, and the parties agreed to rely

solely on the MVR recording to support their arguments.       We have

reviewed that video.

    In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled

over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate

295 in Burlington County.   The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had

changed lanes without signaling.       There were passengers in

Chandler’s car:   her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back

seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front

passenger seat.   Faust approached the passenger side of the

vehicle and asked Chandler for her driving documents.

    While waiting, Faust smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in

the vehicle.    He asked defendant, who was on his cell phone, to

hang up.    When defendant objected, Faust asked him to step out

of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back-

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up, and administered Miranda warnings.    Miranda v. Arizona,