Title: Ex parte Eugene Milton Clemons II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF Death CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 05/04/2007 Ex parte Clemons
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1041915
_________________________
Ex parte Eugene Milton Clemons II
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Eugene Milton Clemons II
v.
State of Alabama)
(Shelby Circuit Court, CC-93-313.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-01-1355)
LYONS, Justice.
1041915
2
Eugene Milton Clemons II petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of his Rule 32,
Ala. R. Crim. P., proceeding, and we issued the writ as to
three issues. We now quash the writ in part and reverse and
remand.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Clemons was convicted in September 1994 of capital murder
in the death of Robert Althouse, an officer with the Drug
Enforcement Administration, a federal agency, during the
course of a robbery. Clemons had already been convicted of the
same offense in federal court and sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In the
sentencing phase of Clemons's trial in state court, the jury
unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to death. The
trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Clemons to death.  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and
this Court affirmed Clemons's conviction and sentence on
direct appeal.  See Clemons v. State, 720 So. 2d 961 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996), aff'd, 720 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1998).  The
1041915
3
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review, 525 U.S.
1124 (1999).
Clemons then filed a timely Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
petition.  After the trial court held a hearing on the
petition, it summarily dismissed some of Clemons's claims,
pursuant to Rule 32.7(d) and Bishop v. State, 608 So. 2d 345
(Ala. 1992). The  trial court then denied the remaining
claims.  Clemons appealed the denial of his Rule 32 petition
to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  While Clemons's appeal was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), holding unconstitutional the
execution of mentally retarded defendants. After the opinion
in Atkins was issued, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded
Clemons's case for the trial court to determine whether
Clemons is mentally retarded.  See Clemons v. State, [Ms. CR-
01-1355, August 29, 2003] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2003).  After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial
court on remand determined that Clemons falls "in the
borderline range of intellectual functioning [but] ... is not
mentally retarded."  
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4
On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
the trial court's finding that Clemons is not mentally
retarded and unanimously affirmed the trial court's judgment
denying Clemons's Rule 32 petition.  See Clemons v. State,
[Ms. CR-01-1355, June 24, 2005] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003) (opinion on return to remand). Although the State
did not assert as a defense the preclusion of Clemons's claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Court of
Criminal Appeals determined, sua sponte, that "any claims
related to the performance of trial counsel are procedurally
barred in this postconviction proceeding." ___ So. 2d at ___.
Clemons then filed his petition for a writ of certiorari.
II. Standard of Review
The plain-error standard of review applicable in a death-
penalty case does not apply in a Rule 32 proceeding in such a
case, and all the procedural bars of Rule 32 apply. Ex parte
Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763, 766-67 (Ala. 2001); Siebert v. State,
778 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). We apply the
standards set out in Rule 39(c), Ala. R. App. P. See Dobyne,
805 So. 2d at 767. However, "when the facts are undisputed and
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5
an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law,
the court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo." Ex
parte White, 792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001).
III. Analysis
This Court issued the writ of certiorari to review the
following issues: 
A. Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider
Clemons's borderline intellectual capacity as a mitigating
factor in the sentencing phase of his trial;
B. Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in sua
sponte applying a procedural bar to preclude Clemons's
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims; and 
C. 
Whether 
Clemons's 
appellate 
counsel 
rendered
ineffective assistance.
A. Borderline Retardation as Mitigating Evidence
We note that Clemons did not present in his Rule 32
petition the issue whether his sentence of death should be
reversed on the basis that the trial court failed to consider
his borderline intellectual capacity as a mitigating factor,
independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
1041915
Although the State concedes that Clemons "functions in
1
the borderline range of intellectual ability," it contends
that Clemons is not borderline mentally retarded. Because we
quash the writ as to the issue whether Clemons's borderline
intellectual capacity should have been considered as a
mitigating factor, it is not necessary for us elaborate upon
the significance of any such distinction.
6
counsel. However, in his brief to the Court of Criminal
Appeals on his appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition,
he argued that, under Atkins, supra, "Dr. [Charles] Golden[,
a clinical neuropsychologist whose testimony the trial court
excluded,] could have provided evidence that would have
established 'a reasonable probability that the jury would have
found that [Clemons] suffered from mild or borderline mental
retardation or that a non-statutory mitigating circumstances
existed.'"  Further, in his petition and briefs to this Court,
Clemons argues that, under cases decided subsequent to Atkins,
supra, such as Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004),
and Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), evidence of borderline
mental retardation  is "inherently mitigating." See Tennard,
1
542 U.S. at 287. See  also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535
(2003) (noting that where the defendant had an IQ of 79, "his
1041915
7
diminished mental capacities ... augment his mitigation
case").
We cannot, however, consider the issue whether the trial
court erred in failing to consider Clemons's borderline
intellectual capacity as a mitigating factor in the sentencing
phase of his trial because the issue was not presented to the
trial court in Clemons's Rule 32 petition.  See Ex parte
Linnell, 484 So. 2d 455, 457 (Ala. 1986) ("[T]he rule against
raising an issue for the first time at the appellate level
applies even if the issue raised would present constitutional
questions."). As to the claims based on Tennard and Smith,
Clemons could not have raised such claims under Tennard before
the trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals, because that
line of cases had not yet been decided when Clemons's case was
pending in those courts.  We are not at liberty to consider
claims in a Rule 32 petition that are raised for the first
time on appeal.  Ex parte Linnell, supra.
Whether Clemons may raise any of these issues in a
successive Rule 32 petition is not before us. See Rule
32.2(b)(2) ("A successive petition on different grounds shall
1041915
8
be denied unless .... the petitioner shows both that good
cause exists why the new ground or grounds were not known or
could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence
when the first petition was heard, and that failure to
entertain the petition will result in a miscarriage of
justice."). We therefore quash the writ as improvidently
granted as to this issue.
B. Sua Sponte Application of Rule 32.2(a)
We now turn to Clemons's second issue -- whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals erred in sua sponte applying a Rule
32.2(a) procedural bar to preclude Clemons's ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. This issue presents us
with a question of first impression. Despite the State's
failure to assert any procedural bars to Clemons's Rule 32
petition in the trial court or on appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals, in its opinion on return to remand, held:
"Because the appellant was represented by different
counsel at trial and on appeal and because the [Ex
parte] Jackson[, 598 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1992),]
procedure was in effect at the time of the
appellant's conviction, any ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims should have been raised in
a motion for a new trial and on direct appeal. In
fact, he did raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
1041915
The order entered by the trial court denying Clemons's
2
Rule 32 petition was an order proposed by the State; it
states:
"The State of Alabama could have asserted a
procedural bar to the consideration of the current
petition 
as 
these allegations [of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel] could have been raised
or addressed during the Motion for New Trial hearing
and on direct appeal. The State waived this
procedural bar ...."
9
counsel claims in his motion for a new trial and on
direct 
appeal. 
Therefore, 
the 
appellant's
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are
precluded pursuant to the provisions of Rule
32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P."
___ So. 2d at ___.
In its brief before this Court, the State conceded that
it "waived that non-jurisdictional procedural bar."  In fact,
2
the State agreed with Clemons's contention that the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in sua sponte applying the non-
jurisdictional procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a), and it
initially asked this Court to "remand Clemons's case to the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions to
consider the merits of each of his ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims." However, in oral argument before this
Court, the State reversed course, without prior notice to this
1041915
10
Court or to Clemons, and argued that the procedural bars of
Rule 32.2(a) are jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
Accordingly, the State contended, the Court of Criminal
Appeals correctly applied those bars sua sponte to Clemons's
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, despite the
State's failure to assert the procedural bars in the trial
court.
The State attempted to justify its change in position on
the ground that, at the time it waived the procedural bars of
Rule 32.2(a), the Court of Criminal Appeals had not yet
decided Davis v. State, [Ms. CR-03-2086, March 3, 2006] ___
So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), which, the State contends,
supports the State's most recent position.  In Davis, the
State similarly failed to assert any procedural bar to claims
asserted in Davis's Rule 32 petition, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals applied the procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a)
sua sponte to those claims. In his application for rehearing
to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis contended that the sua
sponte application of the procedural bars deprived him of
notice of, and an opportunity to disprove, any of the Rule
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11
32.2(a) procedural bars, as required by this Court's decision
in Ex parte Rice, 565 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 1990). On rehearing,
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the procedural bars of
Rule 32.2(a) were mandatory and that any error in its sua
sponte application of a Rule 32.2 procedural bar to preclude
claims in Davis's petition was harmless under Young v. State,
600 So. 2d 1073 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). The State now claims
that it could not have waived any procedural bars to Clemons's
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claims 
because, 
under
this rationale, those bars are jurisdictional.
We begin by noting that the Court of Criminal Appeals in
Davis never characterized the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars as
jurisdictional. Instead, it described them as "mandatory" but
treated them as jurisdictional, holding that they may be
applied sua sponte.  In support of this conclusion, the Court
of Criminal Appeals quoted State v. Obsborne, 329 Mont. 95,
98, 124 P.3d 1085, 1087 (2005), which in turn quoted Peña v.
State, 323 Mont. 347, 361, 100 P.3d 154, 163 (2004), and noted
that 
"'"the 
statutory 
rules 
which 
circumscribe 
the
postconviction process are jurisdictional in nature."'"
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12
Davis, ___ So. 2d at ___ (emphasis added). After noting its
ability to "sua sponte apply the limitations provision
contained in Rule 32.2(c) ... because it is a mandatory
provision," the Court of Criminal Appeals then concluded that
the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars are likewise mandatory.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals characterized the
procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a) as mandatory, its holding in
Davis 
eliminates 
any meaningful distinction between 
a
mandatory rule of preclusion and one that is jurisdictional.
The State's most recent position in this case confirms
that the Court of Criminal Appeals ascribed to the Rule
32.2(a) preclusive bars a jurisdictional field of operation
while characterizing them as "mandatory"; the State now argues
that, under Davis, the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars are
jurisdictional and could not have been waived by the State. We
disagree.
Rule 32.3 states:
"The petitioner shall have the burden of
pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence 
the 
facts 
necessary 
to 
entitle 
the
petitioner to relief. The state shall have the
burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, but
once a ground of preclusion has been pleaded, the
1041915
13
petitioner shall have the burden of disproving its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence."
(Emphasis added.) Rule 32.3 expressly imposes upon the State
the burden of pleading an affirmative defense.  Rule 32.7(d),
"Summary Disposition," authorizes sua sponte action by "the
court." Rule 1, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides: "These rules shall
govern the practice and procedure in all criminal proceedings
in all courts of the State of Alabama, and political
subdivisions thereof, except as otherwise provided by court
rule."   However, the context of the reference to "the court"
in Rule 32.7(d) clearly limits the applicability of the rule
to proceedings in the trial court.  See, e.g., the last
sentence of Rule 32.7(d), providing that "[o]therwise [under
circumstances where the petition is not summarily dismissed],
the court shall direct that the proceedings continue and set
a date for hearing." (Emphasis added.)  Whether the trial
court's authority continues after service of an answer
omitting a defense is a question not before us.
The question before us in this proceeding is whether the
State may waive the affirmative defense of the procedural bars
of Rule 32.2(a) and thereby enable the trial court to
1041915
14
entertain the proceeding on its merits.  Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R.
Crim. P., provides: 
"(a) Preclusion of Grounds.  A petitioner will
not be given relief under this rule based upon any
ground:
"(1) Which may still be raised on direct appeal
under the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure or by
posttrial motion under Rule 44; or
"(2) Which was raised or addressed at trial; or
"(3) Which could have been but was not raised at
trial, unless the ground for relief arises under
Rule 32.1(b); or
"(4) Which was raised or addressed on appeal or
in any previous collateral proceeding not dismissed
pursuant to the last sentence of Rule 32.1 as a
petition that challenges multiple judgments, whether
or not the previous collateral proceeding was
adjudicated on the merits of the grounds raised; or
"(5) Which could have been but was not raised on
appeal, unless the ground for relief arises under
Rule 32.1(b)." 
(Emphasis added.)  Although the rule is written in the passive
voice, if it were converted to the active voice it would read:
"A court will not give relief to a petitioner."  If we apply
Rule 32.2 strictly according to its terms, no court could
grant relief in a setting where preclusion is available as a
defense.    
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15
The Montana court in State v. Osborne, 329 Mont. at 98,
124 P.3d at 1087, the case the Court of Criminal Appeals
relied on in Davis, treated a similar requirement of Montana
law as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the court.
However, the Montana court was interpreting an act of the
Montana Legislature that provided for postconviction relief,
not a rule of procedure. See 329 Mont. at 100, 124 P.3d at
1088 ("Thus the legislature intended the statutory language as
a limit on the courts' authority to hear and decide, in the
context of postconviction proceedings, issues that were, or
could have been, raised on direct appeal. Because there is no
other source of law granting courts jurisdiction over such
issues, § 46-21-105(2), MCA, effectively prohibits the courts
from exercising jurisdiction over grounds for relief that
could reasonably have been raised on appeal." (emphasis
added)). Here, we are interpreting a rule of procedure
promulgated by this Court pursuant to authority conferred by
Ala. Const. 1901, Art. VI, § 150 (Official Recomp.) (Amendment
No. 328, § 6.11).  Section 150 provides: 
"The supreme court shall make and promulgate
rules governing the administration of all courts and
1041915
"From a practical standpoint, this Court's ability to
3
handle the ever-increasing number of appeals from Rule 32
petitions would be greatly impeded if we could not sua sponte
apply the procedural bars set out in Rule 32.2, Ala. R. Crim.
P."  Davis v. State, ___ So. 2d at ___ (opinion on application
for rehearing).
16
rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts; provided, however, that such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of
any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and
district courts ...."
(Emphasis added.) 
If we were to read Rule 32.2 as a limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the circuit court to grant relief in instances
where preclusion is available as a defense, thereby enabling
an appellate court to invoke the defense sua sponte, we will
have construed a rule of procedure in a manner contrary to the
authority 
conferred 
upon 
this 
Court 
by 
the 
Alabama
Constitution.  This we simply cannot do. The fact that
adherence to the constitutional limitation upon our rule-
making power will result in practical difficulties cannot
justify our disregarding that limitation.  Of course, the
3
State can avoid most of the issues created by an appellate
court's sua sponte application of a Rule 32 procedural bar by
1041915
17
exercising 
due 
diligence 
and 
care 
when 
answering 
a
postconviction petition.  If that burden proves to be too
great, then the legislature is the appropriate forum in which
relief should be sought.
However, our holding that the procedural bars in Rule
32.2(a) are not jurisdictional does not lead to the conclusion
that an appellate court can never assert them sua sponte.
Federal courts of appeals have, sua sponte, overcome waiver of
the defense of preclusion in postconviction proceedings under
extraordinary circumstances.  In United States v. Guess, 203
F.3d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2000), for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
"However, the government failed initially to
argue the default issue. It first raised Appellant's
potential default in its response brief to this
court. In United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), we declared, '[This
court] ... will usually not allow the government to
raise a petitioner's default for the first time on
appeal, when it did not take the opportunity to do
so before the district court.' 172 F.3d at 1156.
When the government raises a petitioner's default
for the first time on appeal, this court usually
finds that the government has 'waived' its default
defense. 
Id. 
Barron 
thus 
requires 
that 
the
government show 'extraordinary circumstances' which
suggest that 'justice would be served by overlooking
1041915
18
the government's omission [at the district court]'
in order for the government to avoid waiver. Id." 
(Emphasis added.)
In Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732-33 (2d
Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit dealt with this issue in considerable detail:
"We may, nevertheless, raise these issues [not
asserted below by the government] sua sponte. See,
e.g., United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1067
(10th Cir. 1998); see also Washington v. James, 996
F.2d 1442, 1448 (2d Cir. 1993) (raising defendant's
procedural default sua sponte on state prisoner's §
2254 petition). We believe that consideration of
these issues is appropriate here for three reasons.
"First, it is necessary to protect the finality
of federal criminal judgments. See United States v.
Allen, 16 F.3d 377, 379 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1994) ('the
important interests served by the principle of
finality [of criminal judgments] cannot always be
foreclosed by waiver'); see also United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d
816 (1982). Raising the issue of defendants'
procedural 
default 
is 
particularly 
appropriate
where, as here, the movants pled guilty. We
recognize that 'the concern with finality served by
the limitation on collateral attack has special
force with respect to convictions based on guilty
pleas.' United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780,
784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979); see
Bousley [v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621], 118
S.Ct. [1604] at 1610 [(1998)]. 'The impact of
inroads on finality is greatest in the context of
guilty pleas because the vast majority of criminal
convictions result from such pleas and because the
1041915
19
concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in
the conviction of an innocent defendant is only
rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty
plea.' Lucas v. United States, 963 F.2d 8, 14 (2d
Cir. 1992) (internal quotation omitted).
"In addition, the unique circumstances of this
case compel the conclusion that the government was
not blameworthy in failing to raise this issue.
Because dictum in Triestman v. United States, 124
F.3d 361, 369 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1997), indicated that a
§ 2255 movant's Bailey [v. United States, 516 U.S.
137 (1995),] claim could easily hurdle a procedural
bar 
challenge, 
the 
government 
may 
well 
have
concluded that it would be subject to criticism for
raising a frivolous argument. It was only in May
1998 -- one month after the government submitted its
brief in this appeal -- that the Supreme Court
suggested in Bousley that the Triestman dictum might
be incorrect. See De Jesus v. United States, 161
F.3d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998).
"Finally, the procedural default is manifest
from the record and, hence, resolution of this
defense does not require further fact-finding. Thus,
additional scarce judicial resources need not be
expended by remanding this case to the district
court. See Washington, 996 F.2d at 1449.
"Granted, appellate courts should not lightly
raise the issue of a defendant's procedural default
sua sponte. We are aware that prisoners seeking
habeas corpus relief lack the resources available to
the government. We should hesitate to lend the
weight of the judiciary to this already uneven
fight, lest we be cast in the role of a second line
of defense, protecting government prosecutors from
their errors. We are satisfied, however, that this
appeal warrants the exercise of our inherent power
1041915
20
to raise the previously unaddressed issue. We now
turn to it."
164 F.3d at 732-33. 
We agree that an appellate court "should not lightly
raise the issue of a defendant's procedural default sua
sponte." Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d at 733.  Suffice
it to say that the State has not shown extraordinary
circumstances that suggest that justice would be served by
overlooking its failure to assert in the trial court the
affirmative defense of preclusion. We are not here dealing
with a proceeding in which the defendant pleaded guilty, which
militates against concerns with the finality of criminal
judgments that would be otherwise implicated in a collateral
proceeding.  The State's "blameworthiness" is not in serious
question here, as it is clear that the State intentionally
waived the defense. Because of the foregoing circumstances we
need not reach the question of the ease with which the issue
could be resolved at the appellate level without the necessity
for further fact-finding.
In summary, the preclusive provisions of Rule 32.2(a)
cannot be read as jurisdictional. Because those procedural
1041915
21
bars are nonjurisdictional, they may, as they were here, be
waived. Only in extraordinary circumstances may such waiver be
overcome by an appellate court acting sua sponte. Those
circumstances do not exist here. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case
for consideration of Clemons's claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Trial/Appellate Counsel
We note that Clemons also raises claims of ineffective
assistance of post-trial/appellate counsel, but because any
relief on those claims could be rendered moot by a finding by
the Court of Criminal Appeals on remand of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, we defer consideration of the
claims of ineffective assistance of post-trial/appellate
counsel until such time as may be necessary.  We therefore
quash the writ as improvidently granted as to the issue of
ineffective assistance of post-trial/appellate counsel.
 IV. Conclusion
We quash the writ as to the issues whether the trial
court erred by failing to consider borderline mental
1041915
22
retardation as a mitigating factor and whether post-
trial/appellate 
counsel's 
assistance 
was 
ineffective. 
 
Because
the State waived the preclusive bars of Rule 32.2(a) by not
raising them in the trial court, it may not raise those bars
here 
as 
a 
defense 
to 
Clemons's 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial
counsel claims. Because the preclusive bars of Rule 32.2(a)
are nonjurisdictional in nature, the Court of Criminal Appeals
may not raise them sua sponte, except in extraordinary
circumstances, and such circumstances are not present here. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals and remand the case to that court for consideration of
Clemons's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
WRIT QUASHED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Woodall, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs in the result.
Murdock, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs
in the result.
Cobb, C.J., and Smith, J., recuse themselves.
1041915
23
STUART, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree with the main opinion's holding that the
procedural bars in Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., are not
jurisdictional.  I also agree that remand of this case to the
Court of Criminal Appeals is proper to allow that court to
further analyze Clemons's claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.  I, however, believe that in addition to the
"exceptional circumstances" recognized by the main opinion
that permit an appellate court to sua sponte apply a
procedural bar that has been waived, sua sponte application of
the waived procedural bar by an appellate court is also
appropriate if that application is harmless, i.e., if the sua
sponte application of the waived procedural bar does not
"probably injuriously affect[] substantial rights" of the
petitioner or the State.  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.
Therefore, I concur in the result. 
I agree with the main opinion that the procedural bars
set forth in Rule 32.2(a) are not jurisdictional.  The main
opinion, however, implies that there is not a meaningful
distinction between a rule of procedure that is mandatory and
1041915
The main opinion finds confirmation for its conclusion
4
in the State's position at oral argument that the procedural
bars of Rule 32.2(a) are jurisdictional.  In my opinion, the
State, like the main opinion, is erasing the distinction
between the meanings of the terms jurisdictional and
mandatory. 
24
one that is jurisdictional.   I disagree.  A mandatory rule is
4
not the equivalent of a jurisdictional rule.
This Court has long recognized that although the failure
of a court or a party to comply with a mandatory rule of
criminal procedure may be reversible error, the failure to
comply with such a rule does not divest a court of
jurisdiction.  For example, Rule 14.4, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
provides that before a trial court can accept a plea of guilty
from a defendant the trial court must address the defendant
personally in the presence of counsel and advise the defendant
of the consequences of his guilty plea.  See Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).   In Cantu v. State, 660 So. 2d
1026 (Ala. 1995), this Court held that the failure of a trial
court to properly advise a defendant and determine that the
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered
his plea –- i.e., a trial court's failure to comply with Rule
1041915
25
14.4 -- is not a jurisdictional defect.  Therefore, even
though a rule of criminal procedure may be  mandatory and the
failure to comply with the rule may be reversible error, a
trial court's failure to comply with the mandatory rule does
not necessarily create a jurisdictional defect.
"Jurisdiction" is "'[a] court's power to decide a case or
issue a decree.'"  Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala.
2006)(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004)).
Rule 32.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., states: "Subject to the
limitations of Rule 32.2, any defendant who has been convicted
of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the court
of original conviction to secure the appropriate relief ...."
See also Smith v. State, 918 So. 2d 141, 161 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)("By virtue of §§ 12-11-30(2) and 12-12-51, Ala. Code
1975, and Rule 32.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., the court of original
conviction has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a Rule
32 petition."(Baschab, J., concurring in the result)).  Thus,
a court's jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 32 petition rests
upon whether the petitioner files the petition in the court in
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which he was originally convicted and whether the petition
satisfies "the limitations of Rule 32.2."
A plain reading of Rule 32.2(a) establishes that the
jurisdictional reference in Rule 32.1 to "the limitations of
Rule 32.2" does not include the procedural bars set forth in
Rule 32.2(a).  Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides: 
"(a) Preclusion of Grounds.  A petitioner will
not be given relief under this rule based upon any
ground:
"(1) Which may still be raised on direct appeal
under the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure or by
posttrial motion under Rule 24; or
"(2) Which was raised or addressed at trial; or
"(3) Which could have been but was not raised at
trial, unless the ground for relief arises under
Rule 32.1(b); or
"(4) Which was raised or addressed on appeal or
in any previous collateral proceeding not dismissed
pursuant to the last sentence of Rule 32.1 as a
petition that challenges multiple judgments, whether
or not the previous collateral proceeding was
adjudicated on the merits of the grounds raised; or
"(5) Which could have been but was not raised on
appeal, unless the ground for relief arises under
Rule 32.1(b)." 
Rule 32.2(a) addresses the grounds upon which a court can or
cannot base its decision; it does not address the court's
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jurisdiction to decide.  Therefore, the plain language of Rule
32.2(a) unequivocally establishes a mandatory rule that a
trial court must apply  the  procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a)
to claims in a Rule 32 petition; the language does not
establish that the court loses its jurisdiction to entertain
a petition if it fails to apply the mandatory rule.
Consequently, I disagree with the conclusion in the main
opinion that there is not a meaningful distinction between a
mandatory rule and a jurisdictional one.
Because the application of, or the failure to apply, the
procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a) does not impact the court's
jurisdiction to address a Rule 32 petition, the question
presented by this particular case is whether an appellate
court can sua sponte apply the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars to
claims in a petition when the State has failed to plead the
procedural bars in its response.  In other words, can an
appellate court sua sponte recognize the applicability of the
mandatory procedural bars to claims in a Rule 32 petition,
apply those bars to the claims, and refuse to address the
merits of the claims?
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In Ex parte Rice, 565 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 1990), this Court
held that Temp. Rule 20, Ala. R. Crim. P. (now Rule 32.3, Ala.
R. Crim. P.), which requires the State to plead in its
response the applicability of any of the procedural bars
provided in Rule 32.2 (then Temp. Rule 20.2) to the claims in
the petition, is a mandatory rule of procedure.  In Ex parte
Rice, the Court explained that due process required the State
to plead the procedural bars that it maintains apply to the
claims in a Rule 32 petition to give "the petitioner the
notice he needs to attempt to formulate arguments and present
evidence to 'disprove [the] existence [of those grounds] by a
preponderance of the evidence.'" 565 So. 2d at 608.  See also
Nicks v. State, 783 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).  Thus,
the State must comply with the pleading requirement of Rule
32.3.
The main opinion concludes that because the State's
compliance with Rule 32.3 is mandatory, if the State fails to
comply with the rule, it waives application of the procedural
bars and an appellate court cannot sua sponte apply the
procedural bars to claims in the petition, unless "exceptional
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circumstances" are present.  I maintain that, in addition to
these "exceptional circumstances," if sua sponte application
of the waived  procedural bar by an appellate court is
harmless, i.e., if the sua sponte application of the waived
procedural bar does not "probably injuriously affect[]
substantial rights" of the petitioner or the State, it is
appropriate for the appellate court to apply the procedural
bar. 
Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P., states:
"No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor
new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on
the ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving
or refusal of special charges or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, nor for error as
to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in
the opinion of the court to which the appeal is
taken or application is made, after an examination
of the entire cause, it should appear that the error
complained of has probably injuriously affected
substantial rights of the parties."
(Emphasis added.)   
A harmless-error analysis is proper in this case.  Here,
the State admits that it did not plead the applicability of
the procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a) to Clemons's claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court
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did not apply the procedural bars when it addressed those
claims.  The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, applied these
mandatory procedural bars and thus did not address the merits
of Clemons's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims.
Therefore, we are presented with the question whether the sua
sponte application of the procedural bars by the appellate
court has "probably injuriously affected substantial rights"
of the State or Clemons.  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.  I
believe that if it is obvious from the record that the
procedural bars are applicable and nothing in the record
establishes that Clemons's or the State's substantial rights
will probably be injuriously affected, then the sua sponte
application of the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars by the Court
of Criminal Appeals is harmless.
The Court of Criminal Appeals conducted such a harmless-
error analysis in Young v. State, 600 So. 2d 1073, 1075-76
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992), stating:
"Young contends that this cause must be remanded
because the prosecutor failed to file a response in
compliance with Rule 32.7(a).  The attorney general
has offered no response to this argument.  In Ex
parte Rice, 565 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 1990), our supreme
court held that the prosecutor's failure to file a
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statement of the specific grounds of preclusion upon
which he relies violates the petitioner's right to
due process and falls short of the prosecutor's
burden 
of 
pleading 
set 
forth 
in 
Rule 
20.3,
A.R.Cr.P.Temp. (now Rule 32.3, A.R.Cr.P.).
"We conclude, under the narrow facts before us,
that the prosecutor's failure in this case is
harmless error.  The purpose of Rule 32.3 is to
'giv[e] the petitioner the notice he needs to
attempt to formulate arguments and present evidence
to "disprove [the] existence [of those grounds] by
a preponderance of the evidence."'  565 So. 2d at
608 (quoting language in Rule 20.3, A.R.Cr.P.Temp.,
which is identical to Rule 32.3, A.R.Cr.P.).  Under
the present circumstances, had Young been given
adequate notice of the applicable grounds of
preclusion, Young could not have formulated any
plausible argument or presented any evidence to
overcome the facts supporting application of the
limitations period, to dispute the fact that one
issue had previously been decided on its merits, or
to overcome the legal requirement that Young could
attack only the validity of the murder conviction
and sentence in the present petition, not the
validity of the prior convictions used to enhance
his sentence.  The facts upon which the preclusion
grounds are founded –- the date of issuance of
certificate of judgment, the date of the filing of
the instant petition, and the trial court's finding
that Young's prior convictions are adult convictions
–- are beyond dispute; we have discerned them from
records before us."
600 So. 2d at 1075-76.
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I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the
State's failure to plead the procedural bars may, under
certain circumstances, be considered harmless. 
Because I believe that a harmless-error analysis is
appropriate in this case, I have thoroughly reviewed the
record to determine whether "the error complained of has
probably injuriously affected substantial rights of" Clemons.
Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.  The facts of this case with regard
to trial counsel are unusual.  The record reflects that the
State recognized the unusual circumstances and made an
affirmative decision to waive, on the record, the application
of the Rule 32.2(a) procedural bars to Clemons's claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  It appears from the
State's actions and representations to the court that the
State believed that application of the procedural bars would
probably injuriously affect the substantial rights of either
Clemons or the State, if not in the State postconviction
proceeding then in the federal habeas proceedings.  Therefore,
in light of the unusual circumstances with regard to Clemons's
trial and appellate counsel and the State's actions and
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representations during the Rule 32 proceedings, I cannot
conclude that the State's failure to plead application of the
procedural bars in this case and the Court of Criminal
Appeals' sua sponte application of the procedural bars to
Clemons's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
were harmless.  Therefore, I agree that remand to the Court of
Criminal Appeals for that court to address Clemons's claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is proper.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
I concur in the analysis of the main opinion in all
respects except one.  I am not at this time fully persuaded of
the 
merit 
of 
the 
so-called 
extraordinary-circumstances
exception to the general rule we announce today regarding the
inability of an appellate court to raise sua sponte a Rule
32.2(a) preclusive bar that has been waived by the State or,
if such an exception is to exist, precisely what its
parameters should be.  Moreover, I see no need to decide these
issues in this case.  These issues have not been briefed to
this Court, and, as the main opinion itself notes, the facts
of this particular case would not appear to lend themselves to
such an exception.  I, therefore, would not go so far as does
the main opinion in affirmatively recognizing and defining
such an exception in the present case.