Title: Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:06/26/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1140642
_________________________
Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Mark D. Trotter
v.
Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-14-902840)
SHAW, Justice.
Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit
1140642
Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to
the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of
participation in the trial.  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2012, the respondent, Mark D. Trotter, was
injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by
a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured
motorist.  In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa in the Mobile
Circuit Court seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured-
motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance
issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of
the 2012 accident.  Trotter did not include Davis as a
codefendant in his action against Alfa.
Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding
Davis as a third-party defendant.  More particularly, Alfa's
third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was
determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa
was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that
liability from Davis.  Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to
Realign Parties," which stated, in part:
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1140642
"Pursuant to the principles set out in the case
of Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 521 So. 2d
1309 (Ala. [1988]), Defendant Alfa Mutual General
Insurance Company would move the Court to realign
the parties so that Daniel Elijah Davis is a
Defendant and to allow the Defendant Alfa Mutual
General Insurance Company to opt out of the
litigation."  
Without explaining the findings on which its decision was
based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion.  In response,
Alfa filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.  
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001). 
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate means
for challenging a trial court's refusal to grant a UIM carrier
the right to opt out of litigation pursuant to Lowe [v.
Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988)]."  Ex
parte Geico Cas. Co., 58 So. 3d 741, 743 (Ala. 2010).  
Discussion
Alfa, citing Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d
1309 (Ala. 1988), maintains that an insurer that is named as
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a party to litigation against a UIM motorist "[has] the right,
within a reasonable time ..., to elect either to participate
in the trial (in which case its identity and the reason for
its being involved are proper information for the jury), or
not to participate in the trial (in which case no mention of
it or its potential involvement is permitted by the trial
court)."  521 So. 2d at 1310.  Alfa's petition makes clear its
understanding, as our caselaw mandates, that, even if
permitted to opt out of participation at trial, Alfa
nonetheless agrees to be "bound by the factfinder's decisions
on the issues of liability and damages."  See Lowe; Driver v.
National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 658 So. 2d 390, 394 (Ala.
1995).  Alfa further expresses its intent, upon electing not
to participate, for its counsel to continue to defend Davis. 
See Driver, 658 So. 2d at 395 ("If the uninsured motorist
carrier opts out of the trial of the case and there is no
defense counsel already in place to represent the defendant
motorist, then there is no mechanism to protect the interests
of the insurer if the defendant motorist fails to, or chooses
not to, defend his case.  Understanding the need for the
uninsured 
motorist 
insurance 
carrier 
to 
protect 
its 
interests,
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we hold that once the carrier opts out of the trial under
Lowe, it may, in its discretion, hire an attorney to represent
the uninsured motorist defendant.").  See also Ex parte State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 75, 77 (Ala. 1995) (plurality
opinion).  
Trotter, who contends that his action against Alfa was
permissible, see, generally, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala. App. 426, 286 So. 2d 302
(Ala. Civ. App. 1973), nonetheless concedes that Alfa
possesses the above-described rights under Alabama law. 
However, according to Trotter, in order for Alfa to be
permitted to realign the parties, withdraw, then provide 
Davis with counsel, Alfa may not continue to prosecute the
subrogation claims asserted in its third-party complaint. 
More specifically, Trotter contends that our decisions in
Driver, supra, and in Ex parte Littrell, 73 So. 3d 1213 (Ala.
2011), require that a UIM carrier must waive any subrogation
rights it might have against the uninsured/underinsured 
motorist to avoid a conflict of interest between the carrier
and the party it is defending.  We disagree.
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Although, as Trotter notes, the UIM carrier in Driver had 
waived its right of subrogation, that decision does not
indicate that such a waiver is required.  Additionally,
Littrell involved the ability of the plaintiff's UIM carrier 
to provide counsel to an underinsured motorist; that decision
is careful to distinguish the ability of a UIM insurer to
provide counsel to uninsured motorists, such as in this case. 
73 So. 3d at 1219.  Littrell does not hold that a UIM carrier
must waive any subrogation rights before hiring counsel to
represent an uninsured-motorist defendant.  Further, Justice
Murdock specifically noted in his dissenting opinion in
Littrell:
"It is true that in Driver the Court did make
note of the fact that the uninsured-motorist carrier
in that case had waived its subrogation rights
against the alleged tortfeasor 'in order to avoid
any conflict [of interest],' 658 So. 2d at 394 ....
Nowhere, however, does the Court in Driver state
that the uninsured-motorist carrier's waiver of
subrogation rights was necessary to its holding that
the tortfeasor could be represented by the same
counsel 
that 
previously 
had 
represented 
the
uninsured-motorist carrier.  There was no mention of
any such waiver in [Ex parte] State Farm [Automobile
Insurance Co., 674 So. 2d 75 (Ala. 1995)]. Further,
the potential conflict referenced by the Court is
one 
t ha t 
w o u l d  
b e 
b e t we e n 
the
uninsured/underinsured-motorist carrier and the
alleged tortfeasor. (If anything, a less than
zealous representation of the alleged tortfeasor
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1140642
resulting from counsel's knowledge that the insurer
with whom he or she maintains a relationship
maintains a right of subrogation against the alleged
tortfeasor would tend to work to the plaintiff's
advantage.)  Again, I fail to see how, in a case
where the alleged tortfeasor (and his or her
liability carrier if applicable) chooses to be
represented 
by 
an 
attorney 
proposed 
by 
the
uninsured/underinsured-motorist 
carrier, 
and
accordingly waives any possible conflict relating to
such 
representation, 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
any
'standing' to complain as to whom the alleged
tortfeasor chooses to have represent him or her.
Insofar as I can see, the alleged tortfeasor's
choice of attorney does not disrupt the arrangement
adopted in Lowe or, more specifically, deprive the
plaintiff of the 'benefit' intended for the
plaintiff by that arrangement, i.e., litigating all
its claims in one proceeding."
73 So. 3d at 1222-23 (Murdock, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).  Trotter identifies no authority mandating, in every
case, a waiver of subrogation rights.  
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Alfa has
demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign
the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the
underlying litigation.  No authority is cited requiring that,
in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first
release the right of subrogation to which it is also clearly
entitled.  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Turner, 662 So. 2d
237, 240 (Ala. 1995) (holding "that an insurer that pays
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underinsured motorist benefits to a party pursuant to a
wrongful death claim is entitled to subrogation from the
wrongdoer").  As a result, Alfa's petition for the writ of
mandamus is due to be granted.  Accordingly, we direct the
Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its February 18, 2015, order
denying Alfa's motion to realign the parties and to allow it
to opt out of the litigation.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur in the result.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
To the extent the main opinion suggests that the result
in this case depends upon a distinction between cases
involving underinsured motorists and uninsured motorists, I
decline to concur in that reasoning.  I concur in the result
reached based solely on the reasoning reflected in my
dissenting opinion quoted in the main opinion.  ___ So. 3d at
___ (quoting Ex parte Littrell, 73 So. 3d 1213, 1222-23 (Ala.
2011) (Murdock, J., dissenting)).  That said, it should be
noted that the Court is not asked in the present case to
revisit Littrell insofar as it suggests a distinction of the
nature stated above. 
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