Title: GRIFFIN v. WYOMING DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GRIFFIN v. WYOMING DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION2002 WY 8247 P.3d 194Case Number: 01-80Decided: 05/28/2002
 
April Term, A.D. 2002

 

 

GEORGE 
GRIFFIN, 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel.,

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION, 

Appellee(Respondent) 
. 

 

 

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang of Kirkwood, Nelson & Vang, P.C., Laramie, 
WY.

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
H.M. MacMillan, Attorney General; Rowena L. Heckert, Deputy Attorney General; 
and Mary L. Loos, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and VOIGT, JJ., and BRACKLEY, 
D.J.

 

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      George 
Griffin (Griffin) seeks judicial review of an order of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding his implied consent suspension of his 
driver's license.  The agency 
decision arose from a contested case hearing on October 27, 1999, and the 
suspension resulted from Griffin's refusal to submit to a chemical test in 
violation of Wyoming's Implied Consent Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-6-101 through -108.  The district court upheld the agency 
action, and this appeal followed.  
We find that (1) the testimony of the police officer in administering and 
assessing field sobriety tests provided sufficient foundation to admit the 
officer's testimony regarding such tests in an administrative proceeding; (2) 
the hearing examiner did not err by admitting the evidence; and (3) there was 
substantial evidence of probable cause to arrest Griffin for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol (DWUI).  We 
affirm.

 

 

Issues

 

[¶2]      The parties are 
in agreement that the issues on appeal are:

 

1.  Do standardized field sobriety tests utilized by the 
arresting officer require scientific or technical knowledge that require a 
proper foundation for their admission into evidence under W.R.E. 702 through 
704?
 

2.  Did 
the hearing examiner err by admitting and placing any significance on the 
standardized field sobriety maneuvers utilized by the arresting 
officer?

 

3.  Was 
there sufficient admissible evidence to find that the arresting officer had 
probable cause to arrest the Petitioner for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol?

 

 

Facts

 

[¶3]      At approximately 
2:00 a.m. on July 3, 1999, Police Officer Hampton observed Griffin driving 
between sixty and seventy m.p.h. in a forty m.p.h. zone, and he observed  the vehicle swerve and cross the center 
line.  As a result, the officer 
stopped Griffin's vehicle.  Upon 
contact, the officer observed that Griffin had watery and bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol.  
When questioned, Griffin admitted to drinking two or three beers.  The officer asked to see Griffin's 
driver's license, which he had a hard time locating, taking three attempts to 
get the license out of his wallet and hand it to the officer.  When the officer returned the license, 
Griffin dropped it.  The officer 
then asked Griffin to exit the vehicle so that field sobriety maneuvers could be 
performed.  Griffin agreed.  

 

[¶4]      Griffin performed 
a number of maneuvers, the first of which was the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
(HGN) test.   When questioned 
about his qualifications to administer the HGN, the officer testified that he 
had been a police officer for a little more than three years and had completed 
DWUI training at the police academy, as well as refresher courses following 
academy graduation.  The officer 
stated that he estimates the forty-five degree angle used in conducting the HGN 
as recommended in the National Highway Traffic Administration (NHTSA) 
manual.  After confirming that 
Griffin was neither ill nor on medication, the officer held a pen eighteen to 
twenty-four inches from Griffin's nose and told Griffin to follow the pen as he 
moved it from side to side.  The 
officer observed the tracking of Griffin's eyes and noted that Griffin showed a 
lack of smooth pursuit and had nystagmus onset prior to forty-five degrees in 
both eyes, which is an indication of intoxication.  

 

[¶5]      The officer next 
asked Griffin to recite the alphabet.  
Griffin recited the alphabet correctly, but, when he got to Z, he became 
confused and said he did not remember what came after Z.  The officer next asked Griffin to 
perform the Rhomberg test.  The 
officer told Griffin to stand with his feet together, bend his knees slightly, 
put his head back, close his eyes, and count to thirty.  Griffin could not follow these 
directions and was confused about counting to thirty.  

 

[¶6]      The final 
maneuver Griffin was asked to perform was the walk and turn.  The officer instructed Griffin on how to 
perform the maneuver, but he was confused and had to have the instructions 
repeated.  When taking the first 
nine steps of the maneuver, Griffin appeared unsteady, and he missed the 
heel-to-toe requirement in four of the nine steps.  Rather than continuing the maneuver, 
Griffin had to ask the officer what to do next.  The officer told him to take a series of 
small steps so that he would be headed back in the direction from which he came, 
and then instructed Griffin to take nine steps heel to toe in that 
direction.  Griffin began taking the 
small steps to turn around and, contrary to instructions, counted out those 
steps.  Griffin then took nine steps 
towards the beginning point of the maneuver and missed the heel-to-toe 
requirement in five of the nine steps.  

 

[¶7]      The officer next 
asked Griffin to blow into an Alco-sensor, which is a small hand-held field unit 
that indicates if a person has been drinking.  Griffin did not blow into the sensor as 
instructed.  Based on his experience 
and observations, the officer decided that he had probable cause to arrest 
Griffin for DWUI.  Following the 
arrest, Griffin was informed of the requirement for chemical testing and the 
consequences for refusal to submit to testing, according to the implied consent 
advisement required by statute.  The 
officer asked Griffin to submit to a test of his blood or urine, as the 
breathalyser was out of service;  
Griffin refused.

 

[¶8]      The Department of 
Transportation (Department) informed Griffin by letter dated July 12, 1999, that 
it intended to suspend his Wyoming driver's license and operating privileges 
based upon his refusal to submit to the required chemical testing of his blood, 
urine, or breath.  The Department 
proposed an eighteen-month suspension because the certified record showed that 
Griffin had been convicted of a previous DWUI on June 1, 1998.  This matter came before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) on October 27, 1999.  After the Office reviewed all of the 
evidence available to the officer at the time of Griffin's arrest, the OAH 
concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest Griffin, and the 
proposed eighteen-month suspension was upheld.  The district court upheld the 
suspension, and this appeal followed.  

 

 

StanDARD OF rEVIEW

 

[¶9]      We accord no 
special deference to the district court's decision and will consider the case as 
if it came directly from the agency.  
In re Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶9, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  Our review is limited to a determination 
of the factors specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)  Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and
 

(ii)  Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings 
and conclusions found to be:
 

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

. . .

 

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

[¶10]   "Absent evidentiary dispute, the 
standard of review for contested case hearings is simply stated as whether an 
agency's conclusions are in accordance with the law."  Parodi v. Dep't of Transp., 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1997).   
We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, and we will 
correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying the 
law.  In re Jensen, ¶10.  In reviewing findings of fact, we 
examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings.  
Id.  If the agency's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusion, so long as there is more than a scintilla of evidence.  Id.  Findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the record, the 
reviewing court can discern a rational premise for those findings.  World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1236 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 813 P.2d 185, 200 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1992)).

 

 

dISCUSSION

 

Proper Foundation
 

[¶11]   The first 
query is whether standardized field sobriety tests utilized by an arresting 
officer require scientific or technical knowledge that require a proper 
foundation for their admission into evidence under W.R.E. 702 through 704.  However, W.R.E. 702 through 704 do not 
apply to administrative hearings.  
While scientific and technical evidence admissibility in a judicial 
proceeding is governed by W.R.E. 702 and the four-part Daubert test, 
administrative hearings are governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
(WAPA).  See Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).  
Administrative agencies acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity 
are not bound by the rules of evidence that govern trials by courts or 
juries.  Smith v. State ex rel. 
Dep't of Transp., 11 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2000).  The WAPA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 to 
-115, sets the broad standard for admissibility of evidence at an administrative 
hearing:  The evidence must be of 
the type that is "commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct 
of their serious affairs."  § 
16-3-108(a).  
 

[¶12]   This court 
recently articulated the rule of admissibility of field sobriety tests as 
follows:  "If the evidence 
establishes the tests were properly administered by a qualified person, the 
foundation is sufficient for admission in an administrative hearing."  Smith, 11 P.3d  at 935.  Given this rule of law, we analyze 
whether the police officer in the instant case was qualified to administer the 
field sobriety tests.  The officer 
testified that he had a little more than three years of law enforcement 
experience; that he received additional certification; that he received training 
for the tests conducted on Griffin based on the NHSTA from the Wyoming Law 
Enforcement Academy; and that he had received additional instruction in this 
area from the Rawlins Police Department.  
Additionally, the officer testified that he did not look at each of the 
field maneuvers in isolation and did not relate Griffin's failure of them to any 
particular alcohol concentration.
 

[¶13]   The officer's 
qualifications in the instant case are similar to those expressed in 
Smith, 11 P.3d  at 936, wherein this court found the testing officer 
qualified to perform the field sobriety tests.  There is sufficient evidence in the 
record to conclude that the officer conducted the testing and assessment in 
substantial accordance with his training.  
The officer testified how the tests were to be administered and how he 
administered the tests to Griffin.  
He also explained the manner in which he determined the results of the 
test.  This evidence was sufficient 
for the agency to conclude that the officer was adequately trained in the 
administration and assessment of the field sobriety tests, and the foundation 
was sufficient for admittance of the evidence.
 

 

Admitting Evidence
 

[¶14]   The second 
issue is whether the hearing examiner erred in admitting test evidence and 
placing significance on the standardized field sobriety tests.  Whether the hearing officer erred is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  This court recently described the 
standard of an abuse of discretion as "reaching the question of reasonableness 
of the choice made by the trial court [agency]."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  "Judicial 
discretion is a composite off many things, among which are conclusions drawn 
from objective criteria; it means [exercising] sound judgment . . . 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  
Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).  The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
the witnesses.  City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 451 (Wyo. 1995).  
The deference normally accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court 
is extended to the administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the 
facts will not be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence.  Wyoming 
Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994).
 

[¶15]   This court 
has permitted a hearing examiner to rely on field sobriety tests in addition to 
the officer's personal observations to determine whether the officer had 
probable cause during a DWUI stop.  
Nellis v. Dep't of Transp., 932 P.2d 741, 744 (Wyo. 1997).   The field sobriety test results 
are the type of evidence commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the 
conduct of their serious affairs.  
Smith, 11 P.3d  at 935.  
We have found that proper foundation was laid as to the techniques used 
and the officer's qualifications, and conclude that the hearing officer did not 
abuse his discretion in admitting and placing significance on the standardized 
field sobriety maneuvers utilized by the arresting officer.   
 

Probable 
Cause for Arrest
 

[¶16] 
  The final issue is whether the 
officer had probable cause to arrest Griffin for DWUI.  

 

[W]e do 
not disturb the decision of the hearing examiner unless a claimant 
. . . can demonstrate that it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.  This rule affords the petitioner the 
opportunity to show that the findings of fact were contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence.  When 
an agency's action or decision is "based on a consideration of relevant factors 
and is rational," we will not rule that the action or decision is arbitrary or 
capricious.

 

Helm v. 
State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 982 P.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Wyo. 1999) (emphasis added and footnote omitted) (quoting 
Mortage Guaranty Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509, 520 (Wyo. 
1981)).

 

[¶17]   Based on his 
experience and observation, Officer Hampton decided he had probable cause to 
arrest Griffin.  The officer 
observed Griffin speeding and crossing the road's center line.  He had watery and bloodshot eyes and 
smelled of alcohol.  When asked, 
Griffin admitted to drinking that evening.  
The officer asked to see Griffin's driver's license, which he had a hard 
time locating, taking three attempts to get the license out of his wallet and 
handing it to the officer.  When the 
officer returned the license, Griffin dropped it.  After exiting his vehicle and during the 
field sobriety maneuvers, Griffin was confused, his speech slurred, and his 
balance unsteady.  Prior to 
performing the HGN maneuver, Griffin was unable to reach out and touch the tip 
of the officer's pen.  He touched 
the middle of the pen instead.  
Griffin also failed to successfully complete any of the field sobriety 
maneuvers.  Consistent with the 
evidence, the hearing examiner concluded that probable cause existed for 
arrest.  The circumstances in this 
case justified a reasonable person to conclude that Griffin was intoxicated to 
the point that his ability to drive was impaired.
 

 

CONCLUSION
 

[¶18]   This court 
finds that proper foundation was established for admitting the field sobriety 
tests and results utilized by Officer Hampton in determining probable 
cause.  The court further concludes 
that even without the field sobriety tests, the record shows sufficient evidence 
to prove probable cause that Griffin had been driving upon a public street in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  The Order of the administrative hearing 
agency is affirmed.