Title: GERINGER v. BEBOUT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GERINGER v. BEBOUT2000 WY 16510 P.3d 514Case Number: 00-168Decided: 08/14/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JIM GERINGER, as the 
Governor of the State of Wyoming, Appellant (Plaintiff),v. ELI D. BEBOUT, as the Speaker 
of the Wyoming House of Representatives; JIM TWIFORD, as President of the 
Wyoming Senate; and the MEMBERS OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, Appellees (Defendants).

Certified Question from 
the District of Laramie County The Honorable Edward Grant, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General, and Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General.Representing Appellee: James L. Applegate and Misha 
Westby of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Rex O. Arney and Scott 
Klosterman of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ.

HILL, J. delivered the 
opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, C.J., files a dissenting opinion 
with whom THOMAS, J. joins; and THOMAS, J. 
files a dissenting opinion.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] In this 
appeal we are called upon to resolve a dispute between the Governor of the State 
of Wyoming, Jim Geringer, and the Wyoming Legislature and its members and 
leadership. On May 15, 2000, the Governor filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment, seeking judicial review of procedures employed by the Legislature in 
proposing amendments to the Wyoming Constitution during its year 2000 session. A 
joint motion to certify the matter here, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11, was filed in 
the district court, and by order entered on June 22, 2000, the district court 
granted that motion. The case was docketed here on June 30, 2000. In accordance 
with W.R.A.P. 7.06(d), an abbreviated briefing schedule was agreed to by the 
parties, and opening briefs were filed on July 10, 2000, followed by reply 
briefs filed on July 17, 2000. The Court considered the matter at its weekly 
conference on July 18, 2000, and by order entered on July 19, 2000, the case was 
assigned to the expedited docket, with a goal of completing resolution of the 
certified question before the August 15, 2000 deadline for ballot preparation 
for the 2000 General Election.

THE CERTIFIED 
QUESTION

[¶2] The 
question we have agreed to answer is phrased thus:

I. Does the Wyoming 
Constitution require the presentment to the Governor of a joint resolution 
proposing a constitutional amendment for his approval or disapproval before it 
can take effect and before the proposed constitutional amendment can be placed 
on the ballot?

[¶3] We will 
answer the certified question in the affirmative, and hold that the Wyoming 
Constitution mandates that the Legislature present proposed constitutional 
amendments to the Governor for approval or disapproval, before they may appear 
on the ballot in a General Election

SUMMARY OF THE 
ISSUE

[¶4] In its 2000 
Budget Session, the Legislature enacted a joint resolution to amend Art. 4, § 9, 
of the Wyoming Constitution which would have the effect of diminishing the 
line-item veto authority of the Governor. Lest any confusion seep into the task 
at hand, that the Legislature was intent on trimming the veto power of the 
Governor is not the source of the conflict we are called upon to resolve. 
Rather, it was a change to the rules under which the Legislature governs its 
procedures with respect to proposal of amendments to the Wyoming Constitution 
that brings this controversy to the door of the Judicial Branch of government. 
The change in those procedures was dramatic and operated in a manner so as to 
sweep away over one hundred years of practice and tradition. Since the 
establishment of Statehood in 1890, the Legislature has followed a practice of 
presenting to the Governor, for his approval or disapproval, all proposed 
amendments to the Wyoming Constitution. If the Governor disapproved, the 
Legislature, of course, had the option of overriding the Governor's veto. If the 
Governor approved, the proposed constitutional amendment would then be forwarded 
by the Legislature, to the Secretary of State, so that the amendment could be 
placed on the ballot for the next General Election.

FACTS

[¶5] The 
certified question comes to us with a stipulation as to the facts, which are 
viewed by the parties as pertinent to resolution of this 
matter:

STIPULATION OF 
FACTS

[¶6] The 
Plaintiff and Defendants in the above-entitled matter stipulate to the following 
facts:

1. The historical records 
of the Wyoming Legislature show that from 1899 through 1999, 118 proposed 
constitutional amendments have been passed by the House and the Senate and 116 
of those have been presented to the Governor. Certified copies of these proposed 
amendments are attached as and marked as "Exhibit 1 thru Exhibit 
118."

2. Two of these proposed 
amendments (Exhibits 71 and 117) were rescinded or repealed (Exhibits 78 and 
119) by the Legislature. Two of these proposed amendments were vetoed by 
Governor Nels Smith in 1941 (Exhibit 30) and by Governor Lester Hunt in 1947 
(Exhibit 39). In 1941, Governor Nels H. Smith disapproved Enrolled Joint 
Resolution No. 3 proposing to amend Art. III, § 22 of the Wyoming Constitution 
attached as Exhibit 127. Governor Lester C. Hunt, in 1947, disapproved or vetoed 
Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 2 proposing to amend Art. XVI, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution attached as Exhibit 128.

3. Three Joint 
Resolutions for proposed constitutional amendments were not presented to 
Governor Geringer but were delivered directly to the Secretary of State. 
(Exhibits 117,118 and 120)

4. Senate Enrolled Joint 
Resolution No. 1 of the 2000 Budget Session of the 55th Legislature (Exhibit 
120) is one of three proposed joint resolutions for constitutional amendment 
enacted by any Wyoming Legislature in its 110 year history that have not been 
presented to the Governor for approval or disapproval. The other two joint 
resolutions for proposed constitutional amendments were enacted by the 55th 
Legislature in 1999, regarding military eligibility. (Exhibits 117 and 
118)

5. On February 11, 1998, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature v. 
Geringer, 953 P.2d 839 (Wyo. 1998), ruled that the partial veto authority 
(line-item veto authority) of the Governor conferred by Article 4, Section 9 of 
the Wyoming Constitution applied to any portion of any bill making 
appropriations, including substantive provisions that do not appropriate 
money.

6. During the 1998 Budget 
Session of the Wyoming Legislature, "House Joint Resolution No. HJ0010" (Exhibit 
121) was introduced proposing to amend Art. IV, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution 
to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (line-item veto authority) to 
general appropriations bills and to appropriations items within those 
bills.

7. House Joint Resolution 
No. HJ0010, referred to in paragraph 6 above, was enacted by the House of 
Representatives and the Senate and became "House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 
1." (Exhibit 116).

8. House Enrolled Joint 
Resolution No. 1, (Exhibit 116) referred to in paragraph 7 above, was signed by 
the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and was presented to 
the Governor for his approval or disapproval. The Governor vetoed House Enrolled 
Joint Resolution No. 1 on 12 March 1998. An attempted legislative override of 
the veto was unsuccessful.

9. The Rules of the 
Second Legislature of the State of Wyoming in 1893 contained the following 
provision at Joint Rule #8 (see RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TOGETHER 
WITH THE JOINT RULES AND THE STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE, THE REPUBLICAN 
BOOK AND JOB PRINT, 1893, P. 18):

[¶7] When a 
bill, joint resolution or memorial shall have been signed, the chief clerk shall 
endorse on the back thereof a certificate specifying in which House the same 
originated. It shall then be presented by the enrolling committee of the House 
in which the same originated to the Governor of the State for his approval. 
After having performed said duty, the committee shall report to the House in 
which the paper originated, the day and hour of presentation to the Governor, 
which facts shall be entered upon the journal of said House. Said committee is 
further empowered to report at any time to either House any matter committed to 
it.

[¶8] The same 
rule is found in Joint Rules of the Fourth State Legislature (1897); the Fifth 
State Legislature (1899); the Eleventh State Legislature (1911); the Twelfth 
State Legislature (1913). Similar language is also found in the Joint Rules of 
the Fifteenth State Legislature (1919); the Sixteenth State Legislature (1921); 
Eighteenth State Legislature (1925); Nineteenth State Legislature (1927); the 
Twentieth State Legislature (1929); Twenty-first State Legislature (1931.); 
Twenty-second State Legislature (1933); the Twenty-fourth Legislature (1937); 
and all legislatures from 1939 through 1969.

10. The Rules of the 49th 
(1987-88), 50th (1989-90), 51st (1991-92), 52nd (1993-94), 53rd (1995-96) and 
the 54th (1997-98) Legislatures, with regard to presentment to the Governor, 
provided as follows:

Joint Rules § 
4-3

ENROLLED ACT 
SIGNING

"4-3 When enrolled acts 
are presented to the presiding officer for signing, they shall be the first 
order of business after the current order and be signed immediately after their 
titles have been publicly read and the fact of signing shall be at once entered 
in the journal. When both presiding officers have so signed, the messenger shall 
present the act to the governor for approval and exchange the act for a signed 
receipt which gives the day and hour of presentation to the 
governor."

11. However, in January 
1999, the House and the Senate of the Defendant 55th (1999-2000) Legislature of 
the State of Wyoming adopted the following rules regarding 
presentment:

[¶9] Amend JOINT 
RULE 4-3 and create new Joint Rules 4-4 and 4-5 as 
follows:

ENROLLED ACT 
SIGNING

[¶10] 4-3 When 
enrolled acts are presented to the presiding officer for signing, they shall be 
the first order of business after the current order and be signed immediately 
after their titles have been publicly read and the fact of signing shall be at 
once entered in the journal. When both presiding officers have so signed, the 
messenger shall present the act to the governor for approval and exchange the 
act for a signed receipt which gives the day and hour of presentation to the 
governor. (Ref: Mason's §§ 738, 739).

PRESENTMENT TO 
GOVERNOR

[¶11] 4-4 When 
both presiding officers have signed an enrolled act, except for an act proposing 
an amendment to the Wyoming Constitution, the messenger shall present the act to 
the governor for approval and exchange the act for a signed receipt which gives 
the day and hour of presentation to the governor. (Ref. Mason's §§ 
740)

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS, DELIVERY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

[¶12] 4-5 When 
both presiding officers have signed an enrolled act proposing an amendment to 
the Wyoming Constitution, the messenger shall deliver the act to the secretary 
of state and exchange the act for a signed receipt which gives the day and hour 
of delivery to the secretary of state.

12. During the 1999 
General Session of the Wyoming Legislature "House Joint Resolution No. HJ0006" 
(Exhibit 122) was introduced proposing to amend Art. IV, § 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (line-item veto 
authority) to general appropriations bills and to appropriations items within 
those bills. This bill did not pass the house of origin.

13. During the . . . 
General Session of the 55th Wyoming Legislature "Senate Enrolled Joint. 
Resolution No. 2" (Exhibit 117) and "Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 3" 
(Exhibit 118) were signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the 
Senate and both Enrolled Joint Resolutions were delivered directly to the 
Secretary of State without presentation to the Governor.

14. During the 2000 
Budget Session of the Wyoming Legislature "Senate Joint Resolution No. SJOOO1" 
(Exhibit 123) was introduced proposing to amend Art. IV, § 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (line-item veto 
authority) to general appropriations bills enacted pursuant to Art. III, § 34 of 
the Wyoming Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution No. SJO001 was enacted by the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.

15. Senate Joint 
Resolution No. SJOOO1 became "Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1, Senate" (Exhibit 
120) of the Budget Session of the Fifty-fifth Legislature of the State of 
Wyoming. A copy of the Legislative Journal entry showing the votes taken on 
Senate Joint Resolution No. SJOOO1 is attached as Exhibit 135. Senate Enrolled 
Joint Resolution No. 1 was signed by Defendant Bebout, as Speaker of the House, 
and also signed by Defendant Twiford, as President of the Senate. Senate 
Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 contained the customary signature line for the 
Governor, but was not presented to the Governor for his approval or 
disapproval.

16. Senate Enrolled Joint 
Resolution No. 1 (Exhibit 120) of the 2000 Budget Session was delivered directly 
to the Secretary of State, without presentation to the Governor. The joint 
resolution was received by the Secretary of State on 6 March 
2000.

17. The only other joint 
resolution for a proposed constitutional amendment enacted by the Fifty-fifth 
Legislature during the 2000 Budget Session was "House Joint Resolution No. 
HJ0001" (Exhibit 124) regarding a proposed constitutional amendment to military 
eligibility. This became "House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1" (Exhibit 119) 
and was presented to the Governor on 13 March 2000. This joint resolution was 
signed on 13 March 2000 by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State. 
The Chief Clerks of both the House and the Senate on 13 March 2000 sent letters 
(Exhibits 125 and 126) to the Governor informing him that the presentation of 
House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 to him had been in error according to 
Joint Rule 4-5 of the 55th Legislature.

18. In 1998, Governor 
Geringer became the third Wyoming Governor to veto a joint resolution for a 
constitutional amendment when he vetoed House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 
(Exhibit 116) on 12 March 1998. A copy of Governor Geringer's veto message is 
attached as "Exhibit 129." The House of Representatives of the Fifty-fourth 
Wyoming State Legislature, Special Session, attempted to override the veto. The 
unsuccessful override vote is represented by "Exhibit 130" which is 
attached.

19. After the 1998 
Session of the Legislature adjourned, there was discussion among legislative 
leaders about the process of amending the Wyoming Constitution. A legal research 
memo prepared by Legislative Service Office Staff Attorney McMullen on 1 May 
1998 (Exhibit 131) was presented to the Legislative Management Council at 
meetings in September and December 1998 and discussions thereon resulted in the 
proposal to the 55th Legislature to adopt new rules in January 1999 relating to 
"Enrolled Act Signing," "Presentment to Governor," and "Proposed Constitutional 
Amendments; Delivery to Secretary of State" detailed in ¶ 11 of this 
Stipulation.

20. THE EMPLOYEE'S MANUAL 
OF PROCEDURES AND DUTIES OF THE WYOMING STATE LEGISLATURE, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (1st Revision 1960) provides the following drafting rules for 
"resolutions" at :

Resolutions:

1. Expressions of the 
opinion or sentiment of the legislature.

a. The only way in which 
State Constitutional amendments may be referred to the 
electorate.

2. Do not have the force 
of law, but legislative procedure is the same as with bills. (Emphasis added. 
The same language is found in the 1957 first printing of the EMPLOYEE'S MANUAL 
OF PROCEDURES AND DUTIES, at .

21. In 1991, WYOMING 
MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, WYOMING STATE LEGISLATURE at pages 4 and 5 
(Exhibit 132) describes the "Form of Measures" including "Joint Resolutions" 
as:

[¶13] This is 
the form in which state constitutional amendments may be proposed and referred 
to the voters. See Article 20, Wyoming Constitution, and W.S. 22-20-101 through 
22-20-109. Passage requires a two-thirds majority vote of both bodies. Also, it 
is the only form in which amendments to the United States Constitution are 
ratified by the legislature. See Article V, United States Constitution. Passage 
requires a majority vote of both bodies.

22. This foregoing 
provision of the 1991 Manual of Legislative Procedure was deleted when the 
Manual was revised in 1994 and again in 1999. The only reference in either the 
1994 Manual (Exhibit 133) or in the 1999 Manual (Exhibit 134) is contained in 
Appendix I, Legislative Vote Requirements, under the list of actions requiring a 
two-thirds vote of elected members.

23. The 1996 Legislative 
Handbook prepared by the Wyoming Legislative Service Office at Chapter IV 
Bill/Amendment Drafting contains a description of "Resolutions" including 
Resolutions proposing amendments to the Wyoming Constitution. (Exhibit 
136)

24. Article 3, Section 20 
of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

§ 20. Laws to be passed 
by bill; alteration or amendment of bills.

[¶14] No law 
shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on 
its passage through either house as to change its original 
purpose.

[¶15] 25. 
Article 3, Section 28 of the Wyoming Constitution 
provides:

[¶16] § 28. 
Signing of Bills.

[¶17] The 
presiding officer of each house shall, in the presence of the house over which 
he presides, sign all bills and joint resolutions passed by the legislature 
immediately after their titles have been publicly read, and the fact of signing 
shall be at once entered upon the journal.

[¶18] 26. 
Article 3, Section 41 of the Wyoming Constitution 
provides:

41. Resolutions; approval 
or veto.

[¶19] Every 
order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be 
necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the 
transaction of business of the two houses, shall be presented to the governor, 
and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or being disapproved, be 
repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case of a 
bill.

[¶20] 27. 
Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

§ 8. Approval or veto of 
legislation by Governor; passage over veto.

[¶21] Every bill 
which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes law, be presented to 
the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it 
with his objections to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the 
objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the bill, 
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the 
members elected, it shall become a law; but in all such cases the vote of both 
houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members 
voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the journal of each house 
respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor within three days 
(Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same shall be a law, 
unless the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it 
shall be a law, unless he shall file the same with his objections in the office 
of the secretary of state within fifteen days after such 
adjournment.

28. Article 4, Section 9 
of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

§ 9. Veto of items of 
appropriations. 

[¶22] The 
governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts of 
any bill making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items, 
and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or 
items and part or parts disapproved shall be void unless enacted in the 
following manner: If the legislature be in session he shall transmit to the 
house in which the bill originated a copy of the item or items or part or parts 
thereof disapproved, together with his objections thereto, and the items or 
parts objected to shall be separately reconsidered, and each item or part shall 
then take the same course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over the 
executive veto.

[¶23] 29. 
Article 20, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution 
provides:

§ 1. How amendments 
proposed by legislature and submitted to people.

[¶24] Any 
amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of 
the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the 
members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or 
amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause 
the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive 
weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, 
published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the 
same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this 
constitution.

30. Time is of the 
essence in this case since the proposed constitutional amendment at issue is 
scheduled to be placed on the 2000 ballot. The Secretary of State must publish 
proposed Constitutional amendments on August 15 and prepare the form of the 
ballot in early September prior to the November 2000 general 
election.

31. The exhibits 
identified above are hereby offered into evidence without objection from either 
party. All exhibits to be made part of the official record in this 
case.

DISCUSSION

[¶25] In its 
excellent briefing, the Legislature urges this Court to consider the language in 
Art. 20, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution as determinative of the issue, without 
reference to any other provision or provisions of the constitution. Art. 20, § 1 
provides:

[¶26] § 1. How 
amendments proposed by legislature and submitted to [the] 
people.

[¶27] Any 
amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of 
the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the 
members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or 
amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause 
the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive 
weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, 
published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the 
same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this 
constitution.

[¶28] The 
essence of the Legislature's contention is that because Art. 20, § 1, makes no 
mention of submitting a proposed constitutional amendment to the Governor for 
approval or disapproval, no such requirement can be deemed to exist. This 
contention does not comport with a long-standing principle used by this Court in 
construing our state constitution. Our cases explain that every statement in the 
constitution must be interpreted in light of the entire document, rather than as 
a series of sequestered pronouncements, and that the constitution should not be 
interpreted to render any portion of it meaningless, with all portions of it 
read in pari materia and every word, clause and sentence considered so that no 
part will be inoperative or superfluous. Management Council of the Wyoming 
Legislature v. Jim Geringer, Governor of the State of Wyoming, 953 P.2d 839, 845 
(Wyo. 1998); County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960, 964 (Wyo. 1988); 
Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 790 (Wyo. 1982); 
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 597 (1957); Grand 
Island & N.W.R. Co. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 P. 494, 498 
(1896).

[¶29] In 
contrast, in equally strong briefing, the Governor urges that Art. 20, § 1, be 
read together with Art. 3, § 41, which provides:

[¶30] § 41. 
Resolutions; approval or veto.

[¶31] Every 
order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be 
necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the 
transaction of the business of the two houses, shall be presented to the 
governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being 
disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case 
of a bill.1

[¶32] The 
Governor contends that a measure proposing an amendment to the constitution 
requires a vote of both houses of the Legislature and, therefore, Art. 3, § 41, 
requires that every such measure be presented to his office for approval or 
disapproval. We agree with that reasoning. When the two constitutional 
provisions set out above are read together, it is plainly declared that 
legislative measures, however denominated, which propose an amendment to the 
constitution, must be presented to the Governor for approval or disapproval. The 
language of Art. 3, § 41 is broad and inclusive, using the words "every order, 
resolution or vote." We are confident that this language encompasses a vote to 
propose a constitutional amendment.2 Where we find the language of the 
constitution to be plain and unambiguous, and thus the intent of the framers' 
and of those who adopted the constitution is clear, we need not employ 
principles of construction to ascertain the constitution's intended meaning. 
Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 843. The Legislature's contention that Art. 20, 
§ 1, should not be read in light of Art. 3, § 41, because of the language 
contained in that later provision, "before it shall take effect," is also 
unavailing. Summarized, that contention asks us to conclude that a proposed 
constitutional amendment cannot and does not "take effect" as a result of the 
Legislature's vote, but only "takes effect" upon a vote of the people. We are 
not persuaded by that reasoning either. The thrust of legislative action with 
respect to constitutional amendments "takes effect," and is complete, when a 
proposed amendment is submitted to the secretary of state for inclusion in the 
next General Election ballot. All that remains to be done is a vote of people of 
the State of Wyoming and the ministerial act of the governor issuing a 
proclamation, if the amendment passes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-108 (LEXIS 1999). 
Before such legislative action "takes effect" as outlined above, approval by the 
governor, or an override of disapproval, is mandated.

[¶33] Even if we 
concluded that the constitutional language was ambiguous, our analysis would 
lead to the same result. To resolve the ambiguity, we look to the legislative 
history, and we clearly see that every legislature since statehood has 
interpreted this provision of the Constitution as we do, including those 
convening immediately upon adoption of the Constitution. The Legislature 
implicitly maintains that the procedures it used in the more than 100 years that 
preceded the amendment of its internal operating rules in 1999, were mistaken, 
voluntary or merely deferential. But we have said that "[w]e are not at liberty 
to presume that the framers of the constitution, or the people who adopted it, 
did not understand the force of language." Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 843 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897)). From the 
earliest days following the framing and adoption of our constitution, proposed 
constitutional amendments were presented to the governor for approval. Can it 
credibly be said that they did not understand the force of language? We think 
not. Such an argument runs counter to the decisions of this Court which span 
that same 100-year period of time. We have consistently held that we give much, 
though not conclusive, weight to legislative interpretation, and although the 
legislature's interpretation of the constitution is not binding on this Court, 
we would be loath to interpret the constitution otherwise. Coronado Oil Co. v. 
Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 411 (Wyo. 1979); Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co. v. Ohio 
Oil Co., 70 Wyo. 263, 248 P.2d 198, 204 (1952); Laverents v. City of Cheyenne, 
67 Wyo. 187, 217 P.2d 877, 883 (1950); State ex rel. Irvine v. Brooks, 14 Wyo. 
393, 84 P. 488, 492-93 (1906). As recently as 1998 the very same proposed 
constitutional amendment which gives rise to this litigation was voted upon by 
the Legislature and sent to the Governor for his approval. The Governor 
disapproved the proposed amendment, and an attempt to override that veto was 
unsuccessfully initiated in the House of Representatives.

[¶34] The 
legislature calls to our attention cases from several of our sister states, 
which support its position. "Indeed it is the right and therefore the obligation 
of any independent sovereign to interpret and apply the document that defines 
its sovereign powers." Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 842. Montana has done so 
and arrived at a decision, which supports the Governor's 
position.

[¶35] We have 
held that decisions in other states bearing on the same or similar 
constitutional language are afforded persuasive effect. The Governor cites the 
case of State of Montana ex rel. Neil C. Livingston v. Frank Murray, as the 
Secretary of State of Montana, 354 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Mont. 1960), in support of 
his position. In that case the Montana Supreme Court, in construing 
constitutional provisions which are virtually identical to those we consider 
here, likewise determined that its constitution was not ambiguous and that its 
legislature was required to present proposed constitutional amendments to the 
governor for approval or disapproval.

[¶36] Finally, 
we take note that it is almost universally true that the procedures instituted 
for the amendment of constitutions have purposely been made cumbersome, in order 
that the organic law may not readily be remolded to fit situations and 
sentiments that are relatively transitory and fleeting. 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law § 22 (1998). The interpretation that we have placed on our 
constitution with respect to this issue certainly does not add any significant 
burden to that process. All that is required is that the proposed amendment be 
presented to the governor for approval or disapproval. If approved, there is no 
burden. If disapproved, both houses need muster only the same two-thirds 
majority required for initial passage in order to override the governor's veto. 
Disapproval may persuade some legislators that their proposal is, inter alia, 
not wise or prudent, may be a reaction to fleeting or transitory circumstances, 
or does comport with other provisions of the Wyoming Constitution or the United 
States Constitution - the sort of "stuff" that political courage is often made 
of.

[¶37] The 
Legislature cites Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 1 L. Ed. 644 (1798) for the 
proposition that that when a legislative body is acting in a constitution-making 
capacity, rather than a legislative capacity, the provisions of the United 
States Constitution relating to requirements applicable to legislation do not 
apply. Article I, § 7 of the United States Constitution 
provides:

[¶38] Section 
7

Procedure in Passing 
Bills and Resolutions

[¶39] All Bills 
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the 
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other 
Bills.

[¶40] Every Bill 
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, 
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; if 
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections 
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections 
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall 
be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall 
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both

[¶41] Houses 
shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for 
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in 
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

[¶42] Every 
Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take 
Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be passed 
by two thirds of the Senate and the House of Representatives, according to the 
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

[¶43] That 
provision is similar in many respects with Article 3, § 41, and Article 4, § 8 
of the Wyoming Constitution. The reasoning process employed by the United States 
Supreme Court in reaching its decision is not contained in that Court's decision 
in the Hollingsworth case. Moreover, the Hollingsworth decision was published in 
the heat of a bitter controversy over the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to 
the United States Constitution ("The Judicial power to the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State."). Hollingsworth has been criticized by many 
legal scholars, but we are not so much concerned with the tenor of that 
criticism as we are with the preservation of our own precedents with respect to 
the interpretation of the Wyoming Constitution. Of course, we are not privy to 
the reasoning used in the Hollingsworth case, but our review of that case, as 
well as other cases that have relied upon it, reinforces our confidence that the 
Wyoming Constitution must be interpreted as we have set out 
above.

[¶44] We have 
given careful and thoughtful consideration to the other arguments made and the 
authorities cited to us by the Legislature in its briefs, as well. We will not 
explicate each in detail because the following general observations will 
suffice. The cases, both federal and state, which rely upon the federal model 
for amending the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. V, are not 
persuasive because the federal model is readily distinguishable from the model 
chosen by the framers of the Wyoming Constitution. In some instances, we do not 
find cited cases persuasive because the interpretive rule, which led to a result 
which differs from our result in this case, was based on reading constitutional 
provisions as sequestered pronouncements. We continue to be persuaded that our 
rule of reading the Wyoming Constitution as an integrated document composed of 
separate parts but united together for a more complete, harmonious and 
coordinated entity is the proper rule of interpretation. In some instances the 
pertinent language of the constitutions of other states is so different that 
there is little if any room for comparison by analogy. In some states, the 
legislature need pass proposed constitutional amendments by a simple majority. 
Thus, an interpretation which allowed a gubernatorial veto and the need for an 
override excessively circumscribed the amendment process as envisaged by the 
framers of those constitutions. In several cases, an appellate court's result 
was reached by distinguishing "law making" from proposals of constitutional 
amendments, which were viewed by those courts as not being "law making." We 
perceive little if any difference between the process employed by the 
legislature in enacting bills which may become a part of Wyoming Statutes and 
the process used to propose constitutional amendments. To the extent there is a 
difference, it is not a meaningful distinction which we need to recognize. In 
the final analysis, the Legislature is engaged in the process of "law making." 
We are unable to find anything in the cited decisions, which rely on that line 
of reasoning, that persuades us to adopt it. Finally, as has been said by many, 
if not all, appellate courts which have interpreted constitutions - our 
constitution, in some respects, is unique. That being so, it is altogether a 
benefit to the democracy founded upon the bedrock law of the Wyoming 
Constitution. The interpretation we articulate here enhances the strength of 
that bedrock law.

[¶45] For the 
reasons set out above, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and 
hold that the Secretary of State shall not place the proposed constitutional 
amendment on the 2000 General Election ballot for consideration by the People of 
the State of Wyoming.

LEHMAN, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, 
joins.

[¶46] Because 
the Wyoming Constitution contains no express provision conferring upon the 
governor veto power over a proposed constitutional amendment, I would answer the 
certified question in the negative. The process for amending the Wyoming 
Constitution is found in article 20 of that document, and nowhere does it 
require a proposed constitutional amendment be presented to the governor for his 
approval. Article 4, § 8 delimits the governor's veto power, and that provision 
includes no veto power over proposed constitutional amendments. Likewise, the 
legislative article, art. 3 (specifically § 41 of that article), contains no 
express provision requiring a proposed constitutional amendment be presented to 
the governor for his approval. For the following reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.

[¶47] Two 
important principles guide the interpretation of the constitution in this case. 
The first and primary principle underlying an interpretation of constitutions or 
statutes is that the intent is the vital part, and the essence of the law. * * * 
Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute or 
instrument under consideration. * * * If the language employed is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no room left for construction. It must be presumed that in 
case of a constitution the people have intended whatever has been plainly 
expressed. Courts are not at liberty to depart from that meaning which is 
plainly declared.

[¶48] Management 
Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 
(1897)).

[¶49] The second 
principle to be observed is that our constitution makes clear that no branch of 
government may exercise any power unless expressly permitted by the 
constitution. Article 2 provides:

§ 1. Powers of government 
divided into three departments. The powers of the government of this state are 
divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and 
judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers 
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution 
expressly directed or permitted.

[¶50] (Emphasis 
added.) In respect to the separation of powers provision, this Court has 
rejected the "airtight compartment" approach. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 
413-15 (Wyo. 1990). However, the question presented in this case is not whether 
one branch of government is infringing on another in an arena where both 
branches are permitted to act. Id. Instead, the question is whether the governor 
has any power to act at all, i.e., whether the governor has the power of veto 
over proposed constitutional amendments.

[¶51] The first 
and clearest answer to this question is that Wyoming's Constitution includes a 
specific provision governing amendments to the constitution, from which 
submission to the governor is carefully excluded. Article 20, entitled 
"Amendments," provides in pertinent part: 

[¶52] § 1. How 
amendments proposed by legislature and submitted to people. Any amendment or 
amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of the 
legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the 
members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or 
amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause 
the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive 
weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, 
published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the 
same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this 
constitution.

[¶53] Given the 
principles that guide the interpretation of our constitution, it is important to 
look at not only what that document says, but also what it does not say. 
Requirement of presentment of a proposed constitutional amendment to the 
governor requires that words be read into art. 20 that are not there. Indeed, 
reading such a requirement into art. 20 is contrary to the words that are 
there.

[¶54] The words 
that are contained in art. 20, § 1 set out a rather simple process for amending 
the constitution. First, a proposal must be made in either branch of the 
legislature. Next, a vote is taken in both houses. If two-thirds of the members 
of both houses agree, the proposed amendment, with the yeas and nays thereon, is 
entered upon their journals. Publication is the next step, followed by 
submission to the electors at the next general election. If a majority of the 
electors ratify the amendment(s), the amendment(s) "shall become a part of th[e] 
constitution." Nowhere in these words is a requirement of presentment expressed. 
Nor can such a requirement be implied, as it is not the place of this Court to 
create constitutional powers that are not expressly enunciated. Wyo. Const. art. 
2, § 1. However, because the other constitutional provisions must be read in 
pari materia, this does not end the analysis.

[¶55] Article 4, 
concerning the executive power, includes a provision expressly delimiting the 
governor's veto power:

[¶56] § 8. 
Approval or veto of legislation by governor; passage over veto. Every bill which 
has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with 
his objections to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the 
objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the bill, 
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the 
members elected, it shall become law; but in all such cases the vote of both 
houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members 
voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the journal of each house 
respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor within three days 
(Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same shall be a law, 
unless the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it 
shall be a law, unless he shall file the same with his objections in the office 
of the secretary of state within fifteen days after such 
adjournment.

[¶57] Clearly, 
nothing in this provision includes a specific veto power over proposed 
constitutional amendments.

[¶58] Turning to 
the legislative article, art. 3, I do not believe the language of § 41 of that 
article can be tortured to permit, much less require, presentment. That section 
provides:

[¶59] § 41 
Resolutions; approval or veto. Every order, resolution or vote, in which the 
concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the question of 
adjournment, or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two 
houses, shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect be 
approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses 
as prescribed in the case of a bill.

[¶60] 
Unmistakably, this section contains no express provision requiring "proposed 
amendments" be presented to the governor. Instead, such a requirement, if there 
is to be one, must be implied. See Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A. 538, 541 (Md. 
1905) ("Unless the express language of the Constitution has unequivocally 
clothed the Governor with [veto] authority in relation to proposed 
constitutional amendments, * * * it cannot be borrowed from some other provision 
pertaining to a wholly different subject.") It is suggested that the amendment 
process contained in art. 20 includes a "vote," and that process thus falls 
within the parameters of § 41. However, I am of the opinion that the "vote" 
provision of § 41 refers to art. 3, § 25, entitled "Vote required to pass bill." 
Indeed, "bill" is not referred to in § 41, and I believe this interpretation of 
"vote" found in § 41 is sound and by no means renders that provision 
superfluous. However, even assuming a proposed amendment falls within the "vote" 
requirement, the "shall take effect" language found in § 41 separates it from 
the proposed amendment realm. Section 41 indicates that presentment is required 
of those votes that, upon the governor's approval, "shall take effect." Clearly, 
no amendment to the constitution takes effect until it is approved by a majority 
of the voting electorate.

[¶61] After a 
review of the pertinent provisions, I can discern no clear intent on the part of 
the framers of the Wyoming Constitution that the governor hold the power of veto 
over proposed amendments. First, art. 20, the specific article governing 
amendments to the constitution, does not include a veto provision. In addition, 
art. 4, § 8, concerning the governor's veto power, does not permit or imply a 
veto over proposed constitutional amendments. Another clear indication of the 
framers' intent is that the two-thirds vote requirement found in art. 20, § 1 is 
the same proportion required to override the governor's veto under art. 3, § 41. 
For these reasons, after having read the various constitutional provisions in 
pari materia, I would conclude the framers did not intend that the governor have 
the power of veto in this instance.

[¶62] Additional 
reasons support this conclusion. First, applying § 41 to the amendment process 
would place a proposed constitutional amendment on the same footing as a bill. 
However, there is a fundamental structural difference between general 
legislation, including bills, and the constitutional amendment process. In the 
case of general legislative action, the legislature proposes laws that are 
subject to gubernatorial veto. It is, therefore, those two authorities that 
control general legislative action. By contrast, constitutional amendments, 
although proposed by the legislature, are subject to the final approval of the 
electorate of this state. In this way, these two authorities, the legislature 
and the electorate, work together in amending the constitution. Instead of the 
governor, the people hold the power of veto over a proposed constitutional 
amendment. "Whilst the Governor is intrusted with power to protect the people 
against hasty legislation, he is not given a prerogative to guard them against 
themselves in the matter of amending the [constitution]. He is not superior to 
them. It is their will which he must obey; it is not his will which they must 
subserve." Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A.  at 541.

[¶63] 
Application of § 41 of the legislative article should be rejected for another 
reason. The pertinent cases generally agree that "[t]he legislature, in taking 
any steps toward the framing of a constitution, does not act in its legislative 
capacity." Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 71 P.2d 140, 145 (N.M. 1937); Mitchell v. 
Hopper, 241 S.W. 10, 12 (Ark. 1922); Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 3-7 (Ind. 
1912); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 53, 57 (Me. 1970); State ex rel. 
Wineman v. Dahl, 68 N.W. 418 (N.D. 1896). This conclusion is based on the 
following reasoning:

[¶64] In 
submitting propositions for the amendment of the constitution, the legislature 
is not in the exercise of its legislative power, or of any sovereignity of the 
people that has been intrusted to it, but is merely acting under a limited 
power, conferred upon it by the people, and which might with equal propriety 
have been conferred upon either house, or upon the governor, or upon a special 
commission, or any other body or tribunal.

[¶65] Hutcheson 
v. Gonzales, 71 P.2d  at 147. The framers of Wyoming's Constitution must have 
recognized this distinction. Indeed, if the framers had viewed the task of 
proposing amendments to the constitution as simply another law-making function, 
they could have placed the amendment provision in the legislative article. 
However, the framers of our constitution did not do this. They recognized this 
distinction made a difference and placed the amendment process in a separate 
article, art. 20. It is this article that should control the outcome of this 
case, not the legislative article.

[¶66] Along the 
same lines, we must not forget that, under our concept of government, 
sovereignty has its source in and represents a grant from the people who are 
governed. Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 822-23 (1897). The 
preamble to the Constitution of the State of Wyoming makes this 
clear:

[¶67] We, the 
people of the State of Wyoming, grateful to God for our civil, political and 
religious liberties, and desiring to secure them to ourselves and perpetuate 
them to our posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution.

[¶68] In setting 
out the process for amending the constitution, the people, pursuant to the 
constitution, have delegated a portion of this duty to the legislature under 
art. 20. At the same time, however, the people have retained the final power to 
amend the constitution by popular vote. Because nowhere does the constitution of 
this state clearly express that the people have delegated to the governor any 
involvement in the constitutional amendment process, I would not imply such a 
delegation.

[¶69] The 
majority criticizes the case of Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 
1 L. Ed. 644 (1798), while at the same time acknowledging that art. I, § 7 of the 
United States Constitution is "similar in many respects" to art. 3, § 41 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. Unlike the majority, I find this similarity significant 
for two reasons. First, Hollingsworth was decided in 1798. When the framers of 
the Wyoming Constitution convened over 90 years later, they employed essentially 
the same language in art. 3, § 41 as that found in the United States 
Constitution. Under the majority's view, despite use of the same language, the 
framers of the Wyoming Constitution intended an opposite result than that 
reached by the United States Supreme Court in Hollingsworth. Without clear 
language so indicating, I cannot agree that this was the framers' intent. In 
addition, even assuming Hollingsworth initially stood on shaky ground, it has 
found solid footing in the opinions of the numerous courts that have followed 
its reasoning. In fact, the vast majority of courts deciding this issue have 
reached the conclusion that presentment is not required. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Attorney General v. Griest, 46 A. 505, 510 (Pa. 1900); Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A. 538, 545 (Md. 1905); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 53, 57-58 (Me. 1970); 
Kalber v. Redfearn, 54 S.E.2d 791, 796-98 (S.C. 1949); Mitchell v. Hopper, 241 S.W. 10, 12-14 (Ark. 1922); State v. Mason, 9 So. 776, 795-96 (La. 1891); People 
ex rel. Stewart v. Ramer, 160 P. 1032, 1033 (Colo. 1916); Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 45 (Fla. 1934); State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl, 68 N.W. 418, 418-419 
(N.D. 1896).

[¶70] Finally, 
it is insisted that great weight should be given to the legislature's 
longstanding practice of presenting proposed constitutional amendments for 
approval. However, even a long-continued practice of the legislature cannot have 
the effect of imposing duties upon the governor beyond those provided by the 
constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d  at 58; Kalber v. Redfearn, 54 
S.E.2d at 794-95; Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A.  at 541; see also Campbell County 
School District v. Catchpole, 2000 WL 800566 at *8 (Wyo. June 23, 2000) ("If a 
statute is ambiguous, we will give some deference to an interpretation by the 
agency charged with execution of the statute unless its interpretation is 
clearly erroneous. * * * Even then, however, we are not bound by an agency's 
interpretation; the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a question for 
the court.") Regardless, the governor's argument presents a double-edged sword. 
At its core, the argument is that the legislature's interpretation of the 
constitution, i.e., that presentment is required, should be given deference. 
However, assuming the legislature's decision on presentment should be given 
deference, should not the same deference be given to the current legislature's 
decision to forgo presentment? In addition, the fact that the question presently 
before the Court has never been determined despite three (one in 1941, one in 
1947, and Governor Geringer's 1998 veto) previous vetoes of proposed amendments 
is of little moment; it is not for this Court to investigate the circumstances 
and motives surrounding those prior vetoes. Instead, this Court is only 
concerned with the question of law currently before it, a question I would 
answer in the negative.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶71] I join 
without reservation in the dissenting opinion authored by the Chief Justice. I 
have some concerns, in addition to the views there set forth, that I choose to 
address. Primarily, I am concerned about the advisability of structuring a 
single person impediment to the control our citizens are entitled to maintain 
over their constitution. I also wonder how the secretary of state is to comply 
with mandatory, statutory language, relating to the ratification of an amendment 
in light of the majority resolution of this question. Furthermore, it seems to 
me that the majority opinion has ignored an exception articulated in Wyo. Const. 
art. 3, § 41, even though the majority opinion essentially relies on that 
provision of the Constitution to justify its answer to the certified 
question.

[¶72] My 
philosophical premise is that in our country and the State of Wyoming the 
citizens possess all the attributes of sovereignty. They have chosen to delegate 
those powers, in part, to both the state and federal governments, and the 
instruments by which that delegation is accomplished are the constitutions. More 
than a century ago this Court spoke to that principle in a case in which the 
intent of the first sentence of Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 9 ("[n]o person shall have 
the right to vote who shall not be able to read the constitution of this 
state.") was in issue. In the course of holding that, since the constitution was 
written in English, this sentence required an elector to have the ability to 
read it in English, the court said:

[¶73] The 
subject-matter of the article in which it appears is "Suffrage." It prescribes 
the qualifications of electors. In gathering the intent from the language 
employed in a law covering that subject, there are certain additional rules of 
construction which should be observed. Statutes which confer or extend the 
elective franchise should be liberally construed. Suth. St. Const. 441. The 
voter must, without any undue straining of the language in any direction, come 
within the terms of the law, and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in his 
favor. "Such is the fair tendency of our institutions." People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 
406, 417. As a reasonable corollary of those principles, we think it should 
follow that any provision which excludes any class of citizens from the exercise 
of the elective franchise ought to receive a strict construction, without, 
however, doing violence to or distorting the language, to the end that none 
shall be held excluded who are not clearly designated. Such a rule would seem to 
be the natural and reasonable outgrowth of the fundamental principles of our 
form of government. The sovereignty resides in the people, although, by written 
constitutions, they have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to several 
departments. The people "retain in their own hands a power to control the 
governments they create as far as they have thought needful to do so; and the 
three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, 
changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised 
in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon." Cooley, Const. Lim. 598. 
"Participation in the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a right, and 
it is granted or denied on grounds of public policy; the prevailing view being 
that it should be as general as possible consistent with the public safety." Id. 
599. The sovereign power residing primarily in all the people, but in fact and 
practically with those only who possess the right of suffrage, it would seem 
that none who are not clearly embraced in any restriction upon such right should 
be excluded.

[¶74] Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 132-33, 50 P. 819, 822-23 (1897) (emphasis 
added).

[¶75] In my 
judgment, the majority resolution of this case is antithetical to the retained 
power of the people to control their government in the mode previously agreed 
upon. The mode agreed upon in the Wyoming Constitutional Convention clearly is 
articulated in Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1:

[¶76] Any 
amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of 
the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the 
members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or 
amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause 
the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive 
weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, 
published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the 
same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this 
constitution.

[¶77] No mention 
is made in this Article of any participation by the Governor, and I cannot 
conceive that the Constitutional Convention could have intended that the 
citizens of Wyoming "`retain in their own hands a power to control the 
governments they create as far as they have thought needful to do so * * *,§" 
and yet at the same time subject that sovereign power to the control of one 
person. Rasmussen, 50 P.  at 822 (quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. 598). That result 
inverts the understanding that, "`the three departments are responsible to and 
subject to be ordered, directed, changed, or abolished by them.§" Rasmussen, 50 P.  at 822 (quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. 598). Surely, the sovereign rights owned 
by the people are far too valuable to permit one single person to control the 
process.

[¶78] The 
majority opinion claims that the process that it visualizes does not impose any 
significant burden on the process for amending the Wyoming Constitution. It is 
clear to me that the same rationale that the majority applies with respect to 
Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 would apply with equal force to the provisions of Wyo. 
Const. art. 20, § 3 providing for the legislature to call a constitutional 
convention. My vision is that politics being politics, a requirement that there 
be a second vote agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each house in 
order to override a gubernatorial veto of a proposed amendment probably makes 
the amendment of the Constitution not simply difficult, but in most instances 
impossible. I simply refuse to believe that the people, acting through their 
representatives at the Constitutional Convention, intended to sacrifice so 
easily their control over their sovereign rights.

[¶79] The 
majority result certainly does not acknowledge the mandatory duties imposed upon 
the secretary of state and other officials with respect to ballot ratification 
of proposed amendments. For example, pertinent statutes 
require:

(a) A proposed amendment 
shall be transmitted to the office of the secretary of state by the house in 
which it originates or by a constitutional convention. The secretary of state 
shall letter each proposed amendment serially in the order received from the 
legislature or convention and shall endorse upon a proposed amendment, a brief 
statement of the purpose of the amendment. If the bill proposing the amendment 
provides this statement, it shall be adopted by the secretary of 
state.

(b) The letter and 
statement endorsed on a proposed amendment are part of the amendment for 
purposes of reference in submitting the amendment to the electors and shall 
constitute the ballot statement of the amendment.

[¶80] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-20-102 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).

[¶81] The 
secretary of state shall mail a certified copy of a proposed amendment and 
statement of its purpose filed in his office to each county clerk not less than 
sixty (60) days prior to the election at which the proposed amendment is 
submitted to the electors. The county clerk shall immediately post in his office 
the copy of a proposed amendment and statement of its purpose received from the 
secretary of state. The copy shall remain posted until after the election at 
which the amendment is submitted to the vote of the 
electors.

[¶82] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-20-103 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).

(a) The secretary of 
state shall publish each proposed amendment and a notice that it will be 
submitted to the electors at the next general election, once a week for at least 
twelve (12) consecutive weeks prior to the election in a newspaper of general 
circulation published in each county and, if possible, once each week for three 
(3) consecutive weeks within thirty (30) days prior to the election in one (1) 
other newspaper of general circulation in each county.

(b) The clerk may 
supplement publication thereof by radio or television broadcasts or both. The 
broadcasts shall identify the proposed amendment or other question, by letter 
and statement of purpose as prescribed by law, and shall state the name of the 
newspaper in which the published notice will appear and the date on which it 
will appear.

[¶83] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-20-104 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).

[¶84] The 
secretary of state shall print a reasonable number of pamphlets containing every 
proposed amendment and provide a copy of the pamphlet upon request to any person 
or organization.

[¶85] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-20-105 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).

[¶86] The county 
clerk shall print on the official nonpartisan general election ballot for the 
next general election the statement of purpose of each proposed amendment 
certified to him by the secretary of state.

[¶87] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-20-107 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added). All of these statutes use the 
mandatory verb "shall," indicating that no discretion can be exercised with 
respect to the duties imposed. In Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-101 (Lexis 1999) no 
mention is made of any participation by the Governor in connection with the 
requirement that the amendment be transmitted to the secretary of state by the 
house in which it originated.

[¶88] In the 
implementation of the process of ratification by these statutes, which are 
rather precise, it is strange that the legislature did not provide for the 
proposed amendment to be transmitted by the Governor to the secretary of state 
if the constitutional intent is that claimed by the majority opinion. It seems 
that when these statutes were adopted, there was no perception that the Governor 
would have a role in the process of the amendment of the constitution, other 
than the proclamation required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
22-20-107.

[¶89] Finally, I 
cannot help but wonder about the exception incorporated in the language of Wyo. 
Const. art. 3, § 41:

[¶90] Every 
order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be 
necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the 
transaction of the business of the two houses, shall be presented to the 
governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being 
disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case 
of a bill.

[¶91] (Emphasis 
added.) I am persuaded that Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 describes legislative 
action "relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses * * 
*." Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 41. This constitutional provision 
reads:

[¶92] Any 
amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of 
the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two -thirds of all the 
members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or 
amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause 
the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive 
weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, 
published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the 
same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this 
constitution.

[¶93] Wyo. 
Const. art. 20, § 1 (emphasis added). This language clearly imposes a duty on 
the legislature to submit the amendment to the electors at the next general 
election, and its clear meaning is to describe a matter "relating solely to the 
transaction of the business of the two houses * * *." Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 41. 
The mandatory statutes quoted above were adopted to accomplish these duties 
imposed by the constitution.

[¶94] I 
recognize that the majority must prefer the view that the exception found in 
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 41 must be read in a limited way to describe the internal 
operating procedures of the legislature. The language, however, is not clearly 
so limited, and I see no reason why it could not be applied to the legislative 
duties set forth in Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1.

[¶95] For these 
reasons, in addition to the rationale set forth in the dissenting opinion of the 
Chief Justice, I would answer the certified question in the 
negative.

FOOTNOTES

1 The phrase 
"as required in the case of a bill" is in reference to Art. 4, § 8, which 
requires every bill to be presented to the governor for approval or 
disapproval.

2 The 
Legislature's briefs suggest that a decision to require approval of the governor 
of proposed constitutional amendments would of necessity include a requirement 
that the governor approve a call for a constitutional convention under Art. 20, 
§ 3. We decline to speculate in that regard.