Title: State v. Ferguson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FERGUSON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2003-1904 — Submitted November 8, 2005 — Decided April 12, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,  
No. 02-CR-0353. 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} 
Darrell W. Ferguson, defendant-appellant, was convicted of, and 
sentenced to death for, the aggravated murders of Thomas King, Arlie Fugate, and 
Mae Fugate.  Ferguson raises 16 propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, 
we affirm his convictions.  We have also independently weighed the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors and have compared Ferguson’s 
sentences of death to those imposed in similar cases, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires.  
As a result, we affirm Ferguson’s death sentences. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In July 1999, Ferguson was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 
two years in prison.  On November 8, 2001, Ferguson, while on postrelease 
control, was ordered to complete a substance-abuse treatment program at Talbert 
House in Cincinnati. 
{¶ 3} On December 20, 2001, Ferguson was granted a two-day pass to 
visit his mother at her Dayton home.  The pass was effective from 9:00 a.m. on 
December 21 until 12:00 p.m. on December 23, when he was required to return to 
Talbert House.  Ferguson went to his mother’s Dayton home, but he did not return 
to Talbert House when his pass expired. 
{¶ 4} Around 4:00 a.m. on December 23, 2001, Ferguson broke into the 
Dayton apartment of James Nicholson, a double amputee in a wheelchair, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
William Ferrell.  Once inside the apartment, Ferguson knocked Nicholson to the 
ground, removed Nicholson’s wallet from his pants pocket, and took cash from 
the wallet.  As he left, Ferguson warned Nicholson and Ferrell that if they called 
the police, he would return and kill them. 
{¶ 5} At some time on December 25, 2001, Ferguson went to Thomas 
King’s home in east Dayton.  Ferguson knew the 61-year-old King because 
Ferguson’s mother had been married to King’s brother.  King was disabled and 
could walk only with crutches. 
{¶ 6} Ferguson knocked on the door, and King, who was alone, let 
Ferguson into the house.  After Ferguson and King talked for a time, Ferguson 
attacked King, repeatedly stabbed him with a kitchen knife, and kicked and 
stomped King with his steel-toed boots.  Following the attack, Ferguson took a 
13-inch television, a 19-inch television, and a stereo “boom box” and fled. 
{¶ 7} According to his later confession, Ferguson then went to a Meijer’s 
store and purchased some gold spray paint to “huff,” i.e., to inhale the paint 
vapors for a quick high.  Ferguson then went to an area underneath a bridge and 
“tried to put a bread bag over [his] face to go ahead and just do [himself] in 
because [he] knew what [he] did was wrong.” 
{¶ 8} On the evening of December 26, Ferguson went to the home of 68-
year-old Arlie Fugate and 69-year-old Mae Fugate in east Dayton.  Ferguson 
knew them because Ferguson’s family had once lived near the Fugate home. 
{¶ 9} Ferguson knocked on the Fugates’ door and asked to use their 
bathroom.  The Fugates let Ferguson inside their house.  After Ferguson came out 
of the bathroom, he took a knife from the kitchen and attacked the Fugates.  
Ferguson repeatedly stabbed, stomped, and kicked both of them with his boots.  
Following the attack, Ferguson stole Mae’s wedding ring and other jewelry, 
Arlie’s wedding band, and loose change that was kept in jars and jugs in the 
house.  Ferguson then left the house. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 10} After leaving the Fugate home, Ferguson walked to Sid’s Towing 
Service.  Around 1:00 a.m. or 1:30 a.m. on December 27, Ferguson approached 
Jeffrey Fleming Jr., an acquaintance who worked at Sid’s Towing.  Ferguson 
asked Fleming for a ride to another location in Dayton, and Fleming drove him 
there.  Fleming noticed blood on Ferguson’s jeans, but Ferguson told Fleming that 
the blood was from a fight. 
{¶ 11} After the murders, Ferguson traded several of the stolen items to 
Vicki Miller for crack cocaine.  Miller identified Ferguson from a photo array as 
the man who had made the trade.  Police recovered this property from Miller’s 
residence in Dayton, from Miller’s father, and from a Dayton pawn shop.  The 13-
inch television was never recovered. 
{¶ 12} Around noon on December 27, Ferguson went to the Dayton home 
of Ricky Webb, an acquaintance.  Webb, Dwayne Abney, and Willie Townsend 
were at the house when Ferguson arrived.  Ferguson said that he wanted to watch 
the noon headlines on television.  The group then watched news coverage of the 
three murders.  Ferguson said that he had killed the victims at both locations.  In 
describing what happened, Ferguson said that “one guy went to pull a weapon on 
him.  * * * He said he let him have it.  And * * * that’s what they * * * had 
coming to them for trying to pull a weapon on him.” 
{¶ 13} While watching the news, Ferguson asked how to get blood out of 
clothes.  Townsend told him to soak the clothes in cold water.  Abney noticed that 
there were darkish brown stains on the bottom of Ferguson’s jeans and that 
Ferguson was wearing black, steel-toed boots. 
{¶ 14} Later on December 27, Ferguson went to the Dayton home of Irma 
Hess, where he washed his pants to get the blood out.  Ferguson remained at the 
Hess home until he was arrested the next day. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 15} Around 8:00 p.m. on December 26, police were dispatched to the 
King home after a friend found King’s body.  Police noticed that the rear door to 
the house was ajar, but found no signs of forced entry. 
{¶ 16} King’s body, found on the dining room floor, had sustained 
multiple knife wounds and a severe beating to his face.  Two kitchen knives were 
found near King’s body.  The wall near King’s body was heavily covered with 
blood spatter.  Police also found a distinctive bloody footprint on King’s pants, 
and similar bloody footprints were found on the carpet near his body. 
{¶ 17} The dining room area had been rifled, but the rest of the house 
showed no signs of being ransacked.  Police later determined that a 19-inch 
television had been stolen from the dining room, a stereo “boom box” from the 
kitchen, and a 13-inch television from the bedroom. 
{¶ 18} Around 9:00 a.m. on December 27, James Cornett, the Fugates’ 
son, discovered Arlie’s and Mae’s bodies on their living room floor.  Police 
arriving at the Fugate home found the front door ajar, but found no signs of forced 
entry. 
{¶ 19} The bodies of Arlie and Mae were found next to each other in the 
living room.  Arlie and Mae sustained multiple stab wounds and had been badly 
beaten.  It appeared that the bodies had been arranged in the center of the room, 
and that Arlie had been dragged by his shoulders to that position, because his 
pants and underwear were pulled down to his hips.  A bloodstained kitchen knife 
was found near the bodies.  Police also found bloodstains near the front door, on 
living room furniture and carpeting, and on a dining room chair and carpeting.  A 
bloody foot impression was also left on Arlie’s face. 
{¶ 20} The living room had been ransacked.  Arlie’s wallet was next to 
his feet, and its contents were scattered on the floor.  A fanny pack and Mae’s 
wallet were lying next to Arlie’s head, and her wallet had been rifled through.  
After talking to Cornett, police learned that Mae’s rings and Arlie’s wedding band 
January Term, 2006 
5 
had been taken from their hands.  Jugs and jars filled with coins were also missing 
from the home. 
{¶ 21} As the investigation progressed, Ferguson was identified as the 
primary suspect.  On December 28, the police obtained an arrest warrant for 
Ferguson for the Nicholson robbery and learned that Ferguson was staying at the 
Hess home. 
{¶ 22} At 3:00 p.m. on December 28, Detectives Gary Dunsky, Doyle 
Burke, and another uniformed police officer went to the Hess home.  When the 
police came to the door, Irma Hess confirmed that Ferguson was inside.  The 
police then entered the house, placed Ferguson under arrest, and took him to the 
police station. 
{¶ 23} At the station, Det. Burke advised Ferguson of his Miranda rights, 
and he waived those rights.  Subsequently, Ferguson provided the police with a 
detailed account of the murders reflecting facts already described.  Ferguson also 
gave a videotaped confession. 
{¶ 24} Denise K. Rankin, a forensic scientist, conducted DNA testing of 
bloodstains on Ferguson’s boots.  DNA testing of one bloodstain showed “a 
mixture where Arlie Fugate and Thomas King * * * are possible contributors.”  
DNA testing of another bloodstain on the boots showed “a mixture where Arlie 
Fugate is a possible contributor.”  According to Rankin, the probability of an 
individual contributing to the mixed profile of this second stain is one in 
62,770,000 Caucasians, one in 43,220,000 African Americans, one in 40,210,000 
Southeastern Hispanics, and one in 21,120,000 Southwestern Hispanics.  
Ferguson is a Caucasian. 
{¶ 25} Daniel Lee Bibby, an expert in trace analysis, compared sole prints 
from Ferguson’s boots with bloody impressions found on the victims’ bodies and 
at the King and Fugate homes.  Bibby concluded that the imprint left on Arlie’s 
face was consistent with Ferguson’s right boot heel.  Bibby also found that shoe 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
impressions on two carpet samples from King’s home were consistent with the 
tread pattern from Ferguson’s right boot.  Finally, Bibby found that impressions 
from “red-brown material” on King’s pants were similar to an element in the tread 
pattern of Ferguson’s boots. 
{¶ 26} Dr. Russell Uptegrove, Deputy Coroner for Montgomery County, 
performed or supervised autopsies of all three victims.  Mae suffered numerous 
stab wounds and blunt-force injuries to the head and face.  She died as the result 
of “multiple stab wounds of the back.”  Arlie suffered numerous blunt-force facial 
injuries that were consistent with being kicked or stomped.  Arlie died from 
“[m]ultiple stab wounds of the chest.”  King also suffered numerous blunt-force 
injuries to the head consistent with being kicked or stomped with steel-toed boots.  
He suffered six stab wounds in the chest caused by a single-edge knife.  King died 
as the result of multiple sharp and blunt-force injuries. 
{¶ 27} Before trial, Ferguson wrote letters to the judge and the prosecutor.  
In a January 3, 2003 letter, Ferguson informed the prosecutor, “I committed all 3 
murders[,] burglarys, [and] robberys.”  (Sic.)  Ferguson also wrote, “I wish to get 
this over with as soon as possible.  * * * I Darrell Wayne Ferguson wishes to seek 
the Death penalty.”  (Sic.) 
{¶ 28} In a January 7, 2003 letter, Ferguson wrote the trial judge that 
when he went to King’s home, he “hit [King] and beat hime to death and then 
stabbed hime.  [He] took the t.v. and sold them.”  (Sic.)  As to the Fugate 
murders, Ferguson stated, “[I] club[b]ed [Mae] in the forehead with a metal and 
wooden candle stick holder.  I beat her down untill she could not move.  I beat 
arlie to death as well and then stabbed both of them.”  (Sic.)  Ferguson wrote, 
“[W]hat is done is done and if i could bring them back i wouldn’t.  I have no 
Remorse for what i did.”  (Sic.)  He also wrote, “[I] * * * is asking you in my 
right state of mind would you please Find it in good will to give me the Death 
penalty.”  (Sic.) 
January Term, 2006 
7 
Case history 
{¶ 29} A grand jury indicted Ferguson on six counts of aggravated 
murder.  Count 6 charged Ferguson with the aggravated murder of King while 
committing aggravated burglary, and Count 7 charged him with the aggravated 
murder of King while committing aggravated robbery.  Count 11 charged 
Ferguson with the aggravated murder of Mae while committing aggravated 
burglary, and Count 12 charged him with the aggravated murder of Mae while 
committing aggravated robbery.  Count 13 charged Ferguson with the aggravated 
murder of Arlie while committing aggravated burglary, and Count 14 charged him 
with the aggravated murder of Arlie while committing aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 30} The six counts of aggravated murder each contained five identical 
death-penalty specifications: murder to escape detection or apprehension, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3); murder while at large after breaking detention, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(4); murder as a “course of conduct” in killing two or more people, 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5); murder while committing or attempting to commit 
aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); and murder while committing or 
attempting to commit aggravated robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 31} Ferguson was also indicted for escape in Count 1, aggravated 
burglary of Nicholson’s residence in Count 2, robbery of Nicholson in Count 3, 
aggravated burglary of the King home in Count 4, and aggravated robbery of 
King in Count 5.  Additionally, Ferguson was charged with aggravated burglary 
of the Fugate home in Count 8, aggravated robbery of Mae in Count 9, aggravated 
robbery of Arlie in Count 10, and evidence tampering in Count 15. 
{¶ 32} Ferguson waived a jury trial and pleaded guilty to all counts and 
specifications.  After reviewing a court-ordered competency evaluation and 
questioning Ferguson about his decisions, the trial court ruled that Ferguson was 
competent to stand trial and that he had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to a jury trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 33} The three-judge panel accepted Ferguson’s guilty plea and found 
Ferguson guilty on all the noncapital counts, and the state presented evidence of 
Ferguson’s guilt on the capital counts pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 
11(C)(3)(c).  See State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 104, 689 N.E.2d 556 
(holding that in a capital case, a three-judge panel accepting a guilty plea must 
hear evidence to determine whether the defendant is guilty of aggravated murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt).  Having found Ferguson to be competent, the three-
judge panel found Ferguson guilty of all counts and specifications.  Ferguson 
waived the presentation of mitigating evidence.  After finding that Ferguson was 
competent to waive mitigation, the three-judge panel sentenced Ferguson to death 
for the murders and to prison for the remaining offenses. 
{¶ 34} Ferguson now appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
{¶ 35} Competency evaluation.  In his first, second, third, and fourth 
propositions of law, Ferguson challenges the sufficiency of his competency 
evaluation. 
{¶ 36} In his first proposition of law, Ferguson claims that the 
psychologist who examined him was not qualified to evaluate his competency, 
because Ferguson had been prescribed psychotropic medications.  Ferguson 
argues that only a psychiatrist licensed to prescribe medication would be qualified 
to render an opinion on his competence. 
{¶ 37} Before trial, Ferguson informed the court that he wished to waive a 
jury trial, plead guilty, and waive mitigation.  The trial court, sua sponte, ordered 
an evaluation of Ferguson to determine his “general competency and competency 
to waive mitigation.”  The defense then requested that a psychiatrist be appointed 
as one of the examiners.  On March 31, 2003, the trial court appointed Dr. Barbra 
A. Bergman, a clinical psychologist, to conduct a competency evaluation. 
{¶ 38} During April and May 2003, Dr. Bergman conducted her 
competency evaluation of Ferguson.  On May 21, 2003, Dr. Bergman completed a 
January Term, 2006 
9 
written report finding that Ferguson was competent to stand trial and competent to 
waive mitigation.  The defense then requested that a psychiatrist be appointed to 
provide a second opinion on Ferguson’s competency.  However, the trial court 
denied this request and thereafter found that Ferguson was competent. 
{¶ 39} R.C. 2945.371(A) provides that a competency examination shall be 
conducted by an “examiner,” defined by R.C. 2945.37(A)(2)(a) as either a 
“psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist.”  The appointment of Dr. 
Bergman, a licensed clinical psychologist, met that criterion. 
{¶ 40} Dr. Bergman was fully qualified to evaluate whether Ferguson’s 
prescription medications would have affected his competency.  In a very similar 
case, State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 34-
35, this court held that clinical psychologists appointed to conduct separate 
competency examinations were qualified to evaluate the effects of antidepressant 
medication in evaluating the defendant’s competency. 
{¶ 41} Moreover, Dr. Bergman’s report shows that before concluding that 
Ferguson was competent, she was aware that Ferguson was taking or had taken 
various prescription medications.  Dr. Bergman learned from Ferguson that he 
had been “prescribed Depakote (a mood stabilizer), Effexor (an antidepressant), 
Ativan (to decrease agitation), and Risperdal (to control aggressive behavior).”  
Ferguson told Dr. Bergman that he had taken those medications for 14 months but 
had refused to take them for the two and a half months that he had been in jail.  
Ferguson said that taking the medication had resulted in “drooling, acid reflux, 
and ‘feeling bad.’ ”  He also said that “the doctors did not care about the side 
effects, because the medication kept him from ‘killing someone and going into 
black rages.’ ”  However, Ferguson reported that since he stopped taking these 
medications, “he is better able to focus, feels more motivated, and feels better 
about himself.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 42} Dr. Bergman also conducted a mental-status examination and other 
psychological tests to evaluate Ferguson’s mental state.  When Ferguson was not 
taking his medication in jail, he displayed “no symptomatic behaviors” and “no 
active symptoms of a major mental disorder.”  Dr. Bergman then made her 
primary diagnosis that Ferguson had an antisocial-personality disorder.  Thus, Dr. 
Bergman was aware that Ferguson had been prescribed various medications and 
that he had ceased taking those medications, and she considered those factors 
before concluding that Ferguson was competent. 
{¶ 43} Further, the defense had an alternative means of bringing the effect 
of prescription medications to the court’s attention.  Before the competency 
evaluation, Dr. Douglas Mossman, a psychiatrist and defense consultant, 
examined Ferguson.  Dr. Mossman reviewed Ferguson’s medical records and was 
aware of prescription medications that Ferguson was taking or had taken.  Thus, 
Dr. Mossman was available to alert the defense to any issues regarding the effects 
of prescription medication on Ferguson’s competency.  However, the defense 
never mentioned to the court whether Dr. Mossman had any concerns on that 
score. 
{¶ 44} Moreover, the court received Ferguson’s own assurances that his 
ability to understand the proceedings was not adversely affected by any 
prescription medication.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 
805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 37.  After receiving Dr. Bergman’s competency evaluation, 
the trial court questioned Ferguson about taking prescription medications before 
accepting his request to waive a jury trial.  The trial court asked Ferguson whether 
he was “under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or medication that would 
impair — stand in the way of — [his] ability to understand [the court] here today 
and to think logically.”  Ferguson answered, “No, sir.” 
{¶ 45} The three-judge panel also questioned Ferguson about taking 
prescription medications before accepting his guilty plea.  The panel asked 
January Term, 2006 
11 
Ferguson, “[Are] you[ ] under the influence of any alcohol, drug, or medication 
that would impair — meaning, stand in the way of — your ability to understand 
me or to think clearly[?]  Any medication that you’re on or is there anything that’s 
blocking your ability to comprehend and dialogue with me here today?”  
Ferguson replied, “No, sir.” 
{¶ 46} Finally, even if Ferguson had been taking psychotropic medication, 
this fact alone would not have affected the court’s findings on competency.  R.C. 
2945.37(F) provides that a “court shall not find a defendant incompetent to stand 
trial solely because the defendant is * * * receiving or has received psychotropic 
drugs or other medication.”  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-
1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 38.  Indeed, a defendant may be emotionally disturbed 
or even mentally ill and yet competent to stand trial.  Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v. 
Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 28 OBR 207, 502 N.E.2d 1016. 
{¶ 47} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Ferguson’s first proposition. 
{¶ 48} In his second proposition of law, Ferguson argues that the court 
erred in finding that he was competent before previously ordered 
neuropsychological testing of Ferguson had been completed. 
{¶ 49} In a pretrial motion, the defense requested funds to conduct a 
thorough neuropsychological test battery, a sleep-deprived electroencephalogram 
(“EEG”), a lumbar puncture, and a positron emission tomographic (“PET”) study 
of Ferguson’s brain.  Dr. Mossman, the defense psychiatric expert, submitted an 
affidavit stating that such testing would assist in evaluating Ferguson’s mental 
status and whether he suffered from brain damage or mental retardation.  In an 
order dated February 25, 2003, the trial court approved the defense request. 
{¶ 50} The record is unclear whether the additional neuropsychological 
testing on Ferguson was ever conducted.  In a pretrial hearing on March 13, 2003, 
Ferguson informed the court that he intended to plead guilty and waive 
mitigation.  The focus of the trial proceedings then shifted to whether Ferguson 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
was competent to waive a jury trial, plead guilty, and waive mitigation.  During 
the remainder of the trial, the defense neither mentioned whether 
neuropsychological testing was conducted nor disclosed the test results if such 
testing had been completed. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, Ferguson failed to object at trial to the competency 
evaluation based on claims that neuropsychological testing was not completed or 
that test results were not considered.  Thus, Ferguson has waived all but plain 
error.  See State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 
545, paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 
13-14, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332. 
{¶ 52} There was no plain error.  R.C. 2945.371(G) requires the examiner 
to file a written report with the court that shall include (1) the examiner’s 
findings, (2) the facts on which the findings are based, in reasonable detail, and 
(3) the findings or recommendations applicable to the issue of the defendant’s 
competency to stand trial, i.e., whether the defendant is capable of understanding 
the nature of the proceedings and of assisting in his or her defense.  Dr. 
Bergman’s competency evaluation met these criteria. 
{¶ 53} Dr. Bergman clinically interviewed Ferguson for nine and one-half 
hours over five days.  During these interviews, Ferguson provided Dr. Bergman 
with a detailed history of his family background, his history of substance abuse, 
and his mental problems.  Dr. Bergman also administered various psychological 
tests, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2, and the Personality Assessment Inventory.  
Additionally, Dr. Bergman reviewed Ferguson’s medical records from Dr. Robert 
Hardman, a pediatric neurologist, the Miami Valley Hospital, Greene Memorial 
Hospital, and Talbert House.  She also considered police reports and other court 
documents relating to the charged offenses.  Thus, Dr. Bergman considered an 
abundance of information about Ferguson’s medical and psychiatric history. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
{¶ 54} Moreover, the defense controlled whether additional neurological 
testing of Ferguson was completed and whether the test results were provided to 
Dr. Bergman and the court.  Thus, Dr. Bergman could consider evidence of 
neurological testing only if the defense disclosed the results of such testing.  
However, this was not done. 
{¶ 55} Finally, Ferguson does not reveal how additional neurological 
testing would have changed the results of his competency evaluation.  It is purely 
speculative whether additional testing would have made any difference in the 
outcome of his competency evaluation.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 
2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 94. 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Ferguson’s second 
proposition. 
{¶ 57} In his third proposition of law, Ferguson argues that the trial 
court’s findings of competency were flawed because the evaluations did not 
adequately address medical diagnoses requiring psychotropic medication, his 
suicide attempts, and his hospitalizations.  However, this claim also lacks merit. 
{¶ 58} In the competency evaluation, Dr. Bergman discussed Ferguson’s 
medical diagnoses.  After reviewing Ferguson’s medical records, Dr. Bergman 
informed the court that Ferguson “has been given a number of different diagnoses 
since childhood.  Some of the diagnoses were apparently supplied by Mr. 
Ferguson (i.e. Multiple Personality Disorder and Schizophrenia) and have not 
been given by qualified mental health professionals.  Dr. Robert Hardman, M.D., 
a pediatric neurologist, treated Ferguson with medication for ADHD [Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder] and Bipolar Disorder.  He also diagnosed [a] 
Conduct Disorder.  On two occasions, during contacts at Miami Valley Hospital, 
Mr. Ferguson was diagnosed with drug-induced psychotic reactions.”  Dr. 
Bergman also reported that Ferguson had a long history of substance abuse and 
treatment in various substance-abuse programs. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶ 59} Dr. 
Bergman’s 
evaluation 
discussed 
various 
prescription 
medications that Ferguson had taken.  These included Ritalin and Wellbutrin (an 
antidepressant) that Ferguson had been prescribed as a child.  Additionally, Dr. 
Bergman noted that his prescription for Effexor was refilled when he was sent to 
Talbert House. 
{¶ 60} Dr. Bergman also reported medications that Ferguson said had 
been prescribed for him, including “Depakote (a mood stabilizer), Effexor (an 
antidepressant), Ativan (to decrease agitation) and Risperdal (to control 
aggressive behavior).”  Ferguson said that he had taken these medications for 14 
months, but he has refused to take them while in jail, with the result that he feels 
better, more motivated, and more focused. 
{¶ 61} Dr. Bergman’s report also addressed Ferguson’s suicide attempts.  
Dr. Bergman reported that “when he was 19 years of age (1997), he made a 
suicide attempt by eating rat poison and was hospitalized in the psychiatric unit at 
Miami Valley Hospital for three weeks.  He indicated that he was hospitalized at 
Miami Valley Hospital because of suicidal feelings several times in 1997.  Then, 
according to [Ferguson], he began getting into a lot of legal trouble, so he 
‘stopped feeling suicidal.’ ”  Dr. Bergman also reported that Ferguson “denied 
any current thoughts or impulses for self harm.” 
{¶ 62} Finally, 
Dr. 
Bergman’s 
report 
discussed 
Ferguson’s 
hospitalizations.  He was treated at Miami Valley Hospital in 1997 for two drug-
induced psychotic episodes, an emergency-room contact after a suicide attempt, 
and an emergency-room contact with referral for outpatient substance-abuse 
treatment.  Ferguson was also evaluated at Greene Memorial Hospital.  Dr. 
Bergman reported that, after an intake evaluation, Ferguson was referred to a 
substance-abuse treatment program, but he did not follow up on the referral.  
Additionally, Dr. Bergman reported that while Ferguson was on parole during 
2001, he admitted himself into a drug-detoxification program at the Kettering 
January Term, 2006 
15 
Medical Center to “avoid ‘getting slammed’ by his Probation Officer for having a 
dirty urine.” 
{¶ 63} Thus, Dr. Bergman’s report informed the court of Ferguson’s 
various diagnoses and prescription medications, his suicide attempts, and his 
hospitalizations.  After carefully taking all these factors into consideration, Dr. 
Bergman found that Ferguson was competent. 
{¶ 64} Ferguson does not explain how his competency evaluation suffered 
from any lack of information about his diagnoses, psychotropic medication, 
suicide attempts, or hospitalizations.  Nor does he claim that his medical or 
mental-health records included information that would have changed his 
competency determination.  Thus, we reject Ferguson’s claim that his competency 
evaluation was flawed.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 
805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 55. 
{¶ 65} Moreover, as discussed regarding Ferguson’s first proposition of 
law, Dr. Mossman, the defense psychiatric consultant, was available to challenge 
Dr. Bergman’s competency evaluation.  However, the defense chose not to 
challenge Dr. Bergman’s findings by calling Dr. Mossman as a witness. 
{¶ 66} Finally, in addition to Dr. Bergman’s report, the trial court had the 
opportunity to observe Ferguson’s demeanor and behavior in court.  Both the trial 
court and the three-judge panel questioned Ferguson extensively before finding 
that he was competent.  See State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 63, 706 
N.E.2d 1231.  We find that neither the trial court nor the three-judge panel abused 
its discretion in finding Ferguson competent, because reliable and credible 
evidence supported these findings.  See State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-
Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 67} Based on the foregoing, we reject Ferguson’s third proposition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 68} In his fourth proposition of law, Ferguson argues that because he 
actively sought the death penalty, greater scrutiny was required in determining his 
competency. 
{¶ 69} We have previously held that greater scrutiny is not required in 
conducting a competency evaluation merely because the defendant seeks the 
death penalty.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 
N.E.2d 1064, at ¶ 56-61.  We find no basis for overturning that ruling. 
{¶ 70} Ferguson argues that Mink is distinguishable because two 
psychologists conducted separate competency evaluations in that case and only 
one psychologist evaluated Ferguson.  However, we reject this argument.  First, 
the trial court was not required to appoint more than one examiner to conduct the 
competency evaluation.  See R.C. 2945.371(A).  Second, Ferguson fails to show 
how the appointment of a second examiner would have changed the outcome of 
his competency evaluation.  Moreover, Dr. Mossman, the defense psychiatric 
consultant, evaluated Ferguson and was available to challenge the findings of Dr. 
Bergman, but never did so.  Thus, it is purely speculative whether a second 
examiner would have made a difference in the outcome of Ferguson’s 
competency evaluation. 
{¶ 71} Furthermore, the trial court went to great lengths before finding 
that Ferguson was competent.  On its own motion, the trial court ordered that 
Ferguson undergo a competency evaluation.  Thereafter, Dr. Bergman evaluated 
Ferguson and found that he was competent.  The trial court then thoroughly 
questioned Ferguson before finding that he was competent to stand trial and 
competent to waive his right to a jury trial. 
{¶ 72} After the three-judge panel assembled, the court questioned 
Ferguson at length before finding that he was competent to stand trial, to waive 
his right to a jury trial, and to plead guilty.  Moreover, before the penalty phase, 
January Term, 2006 
17 
the three-judge panel questioned Ferguson again before finding that he was 
competent to waive mitigation. 
{¶ 73} Based on the foregoing, Ferguson’s fourth proposition is overruled. 
{¶ 74} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his sixth proposition of law, 
Ferguson raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 75} Reversal of convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel 
requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient, 
and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense in such a way 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 76} First, Ferguson claims that his counsel were deficient in failing to 
request a psychiatrist to conduct the evaluation.  However, the record shows that 
trial counsel did request the appointment of a psychiatrist.  Following Dr. 
Bergman’s evaluation, trial counsel requested that Dr. Douglas Lehrer, a 
psychiatrist, provide a second opinion on Ferguson’s competency.  Moreover, 
after the three-judge panel was assembled, trial counsel renewed their request that 
a psychiatrist provide a second opinion on Ferguson’s competency.  Thus, we find 
that this claim of ineffectiveness lacks merit. 
{¶ 77} Second, Ferguson argues that his counsel were deficient in failing 
to object to the competency evaluation because the examiner completed it without 
the benefit of Ferguson’s psychiatric records.  Dr. Bergman stated that she 
reviewed Ferguson’s medical records from Dr. Hardman, the Miami Valley 
Hospital, Greene Memorial Hospital, and Talbert House.  However, Ferguson 
does not identify other medical records that Dr. Bergman failed to consider, and 
this claim is therefore speculative.  Thus, we also reject this ineffectiveness claim. 
{¶ 78} Third, Ferguson asserts that his counsel were ineffective by not 
objecting to the competency evaluation because it failed to discuss the possible 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
impact of medication on Ferguson’s original decision to request the death penalty.  
Dr. Bergman reviewed Ferguson’s medical records and considered the 
medications that he was prescribed but no longer taking.  As discussed regarding 
his first proposition of law, Ferguson told Dr. Bergman that he stopped taking his 
prescription medications during the two and one-half months that he was in 
pretrial confinement.  Ferguson reported that after he stopped taking these 
medications, “he is better able to focus, feels more motivated, and feels better 
about himself.”  Defense counsel could reasonably presume that the effects of 
Ferguson’s medications on his decision to request the death penalty were not a 
concern.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 
1064, ¶ 92.  Accordingly, we find that counsel were not deficient for failing to 
raise this objection. 
{¶ 79} Fourth, Ferguson contends that his counsel were ineffective in 
failing to object to the competency evaluation because it did not address the 
medical diagnoses that caused a physician to prescribe psychotropic medications.  
He also claims that his counsel were deficient by stipulating to Dr. Bergman’s 
testimony and thus giving up the opportunity to cross-examine her. 
{¶ 80} Ferguson does not explain how his counsel’s failure to object to 
the failure to link his prescription medications to a specific medical diagnosis 
would have made a difference in the outcome of his competency evaluation.  Dr. 
Mossman, the defense psychiatric consultant, was aware of Ferguson’s 
medications, reviewed his medical records, and was aware of his medical 
diagnoses.  Thus, counsel may have decided to forgo an objection based upon 
information obtained through their own expert.  Given the “strong presumption” 
that counsel’s performance constituted reasonable assistance, we reject this 
allegation.  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 81} Moreover, counsel were not ineffective in stipulating that Dr. 
Bergman “would be qualified as an expert and she would testify in accordance 
January Term, 2006 
19 
with her report.”  The state would have likely called Dr. Bergman as a witness if 
the defense had not agreed to stipulate.  By stipulating, the defense avoided the 
danger of reiterating the state’s evidence and eliciting further expert testimony 
that might be damaging.  Thus, counsel’s action was a “legitimate tactical 
decision” that does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. 
Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 90; State v. 
Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 121-123. 
{¶ 82} Finally, Ferguson claims that his counsel were deficient in failing 
to assert his rights under international law.  As discussed regarding Ferguson’s 
seventh proposition, his rights under international law were not violated by 
imposition of the death penalty.  Thus, we find that counsel were not deficient by 
failing to assert these rights at trial.  See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-
Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 95. 
{¶ 83} Weighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.  
In his fifth proposition of law, Ferguson argues that the death penalties must be 
vacated because the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating 
factors of substance abuse and mental problems beyond a reasonable doubt.  We 
will consider this argument during our independent sentence evaluation. 
{¶ 84} Constitutional and international law challenges.  In his seventh 
through 16th propositions of law, Ferguson raises various constitutional and 
treaty-related challenges against Ohio’s death-penalty statutes.  However, 
Ferguson failed to raise these claims at trial and thereby waived them.  See State 
v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus.  
Moreover, these challenges lack merit. 
{¶ 85} In his seventh proposition of law, Ferguson contends that his 
execution will violate international law and treaties to which the United States is a 
party.  However, we have rejected similar arguments.  See State v. Issa (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 49, 69, 752 N.E.2d 904; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 502, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 
643. 
{¶ 86} In his eighth proposition of law, Ferguson argues that Ohio’s 
death-penalty statutory scheme violates the United States and Ohio constitutional 
prohibitions against arbitrary and unequal punishment.  However, these claims are 
without merit.  See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 169-170, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 124-125, 31 
OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383. 
{¶ 87} In his ninth proposition of law, Ferguson claims that Ohio’s death-
penalty scheme is unconstitutional because of unreliable sentencing procedures.  
However, we have rejected these arguments on previous occasions.  See State v. 
Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 12-13, 529 N.E.2d 192; State v. Stumpf (1987), 
32 Ohio St.3d 95, 104, 512 N.E.2d 598; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 172-
173, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶ 88} In his tenth proposition of law, Ferguson asserts that Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes unconstitutionally fail to provide individualized sentencing 
because they require proof of aggravating circumstances during the guilt phase.  
This argument also has no merit.  See Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988), 484 U.S. 231, 
108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568; State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 28-
29, 528 N.E.2d 1237; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 178, 15 OBR 311, 473 
N.E.2d 264. 
{¶ 89} In his 11th proposition of law, Ferguson contends that Ohio’s 
death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible risk 
of death on capital defendants who choose to exercise their right to a jury trial.  
We also reject this argument.  See State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 138, 
22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795, citing State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 
8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2006 
21 
{¶ 90} In his 12th proposition of law, Ferguson challenges Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes because R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires submission of defense-
requested presentence investigations (“PSIs”) and mental-health evaluations to the 
judge or jury.  However, this argument is inapplicable to Ferguson’s case because 
he declined a PSI and mental-health evaluation prior to sentencing.  Moreover, we 
have previously rejected these arguments.  See State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d at 
138, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795. 
{¶ 91} In his 13th proposition of law, Ferguson disputes the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), the felony-murder aggravating 
circumstance, because it repeats the definition of felony murder set forth in R.C. 
2903.01(B).  However, we rejected similar arguments in State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio 
St.3d at 178, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; see, also, State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio 
St.3d at 28-29, 528 N.E.2d 1237; Coe v. Bell (C.A.6, 1998), 161 F.3d 320, 349-
350. 
{¶ 92} In his 14th proposition of law, Ferguson asserts that language in 
R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it gives the sentencer 
unfettered discretion to weigh a statutory mitigating factor (see R.C. 2929.04(B): 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense”) as an aggravator.  We have also 
previously overruled this claim.  See State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 
453, 700 N.E.2d 596, citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994), 512 U.S. 967, 973-
980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750. 
{¶ 93} In his 15th proposition of law, Ferguson challenges the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty proportionality review.  We summarily 
reject this claim.  See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 
N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 
383, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 94} Finally, in his 16th proposition of law, Ferguson argues that his 
death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
because the trial court did not consider all of the evidence of mitigation in his 
case.  However, Ferguson was found competent to waive mitigation, and thus 
Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 63, 706 N.E.2d 1231, applies.  The court was not 
obliged to build a mitigation case for him.  Nevertheless, the three-judge panel 
searched the record for mitigating evidence and considered such mitigation before 
sentencing Ferguson to death.  Thus, we reject this claim. 
{¶ 95} Pro se motion to waive oral argument.  On August 12, 2004, 
Ferguson filed in this court a pro se motion “to [w]aive any and all [o]ral 
[a]rguments in this and any other cases.”  In his pro se filing, Ferguson stated, “I 
make this statement to speed up the process in this case, that I do not wish to 
delay, postpone, or cease this case in any way.” 
{¶ 96} Ferguson is represented by counsel and has not requested to 
relinquish counsel and represent himself.  He filed this motion after the case had 
already been briefed by his counsel and the state had filed an answer brief.  
Moreover, Ferguson’s counsel filed no motions to waive oral argument. 
{¶ 97} Ferguson has no constitutional right to self-representation in the 
appellate process on direct appeal.  Martinez v. California Court of Appeal, 
Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000), 528 U.S. 152, 163, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 
597.  Furthermore, “[a] defendant has no right to a ‘hybrid’ form of representation 
wherein he is represented by counsel, but also acts simultaneously as his own 
counsel.”  State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 138, 689 N.E.2d 929, citing 
McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122. 
{¶ 98} We find that Ferguson’s pro se motion lacks merit.  Moreover, we 
determined that oral argument would be helpful in resolving the issues in this case 
and heard oral argument.  Thus, Ferguson’s pro se request was denied. 
Independent sentence evaluation 
{¶ 99} Having considered Ferguson’s propositions of law as required by 
R.C. 2929.05(A), we now independently review Ferguson’s death sentences for 
January Term, 2006 
23 
appropriateness and proportionality.  The evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ferguson was properly convicted of the aggravating 
circumstances, namely, murder while under detention or while at large after 
having broken detention, R.C. 2929.04(A)(4), a “course of conduct” in killing two 
or more people, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and murder while committing or attempting 
to commit aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Before the penalty phase, 
the three-judge panel merged the two (A)(7) specifications and merged the (A)(3) 
(escaping detection) specification with the (A)(5) and (A)(7) specifications. 
{¶ 100} We now weigh the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B).  Ferguson presented no 
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  However, he elected to make a 
statement in allocution prior to being sentenced.  The three-judge panel also 
reviewed Dr. Bergman’s competency evaluation and scoured the record for 
mitigating evidence before sentencing Ferguson to death. 
{¶ 101} The record reveals that Ferguson was born in Phoenix, Arizona 
and moved with his family to Dayton when he was three or four years old.  His 
parents never married, and his father never lived with the family.  Ferguson 
reported that his father visited him a few times during his childhood years, but he 
did not see very much of him. 
{¶ 102} Ferguson’s mother had a number of boyfriends and married his 
stepfather when Ferguson was 17 or 18 years old.  Ferguson said that his mother 
and most of her boyfriends used marijuana and alcohol.  Ferguson’s mother runs a 
business cleaning houses, and his stepfather works for the city of Dayton.  
Ferguson has a very close relationship with his mother, but does not get along 
with his stepfather.  Ferguson also has an older sister and an older brother.  He 
had another brother who committed suicide when Ferguson was 20 years old. 
{¶ 103} Ferguson attended Dayton area schools.  Ferguson said that he 
was receiving As and Bs, but was in the “developmentally handicapped (DH) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
class and was slow to learn.”  During the tenth grade, Ferguson was expelled from 
Dunbar High School.  Ferguson said that his expulsion was related to “positive 
results on a drug test.” 
{¶ 104} Ferguson has been involved in two serious relationships with 
women.  His first relationship started when he was 15 years old and lasted four 
years.  Ferguson physically abused her, and the relationship ended when he “just 
left” because he could not stand to be around her any longer.  Ferguson had a 
daughter during this relationship, but he has never had any contact with her. 
{¶ 105} Ferguson’s second relationship began when he was 19 years old 
and lasted for two years.  Ferguson said that his girlfriend left the relationship 
because she was afraid of him.  According to Ferguson, “[s]he saw the type of 
rage that I am capable of.”  On one occasion, Ferguson admitted that he “threw 
his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend through the window of a bus and then left the scene.”  
Ferguson had a son during this relationship but has had no contact with the child 
since he was a baby.  Ferguson “believes that his son would benefit from a 
relationship with him and also believes that if his son was with him, he would not 
have committed the instant offenses, because he would have been doing things for 
his son.” 
{¶ 106} Ferguson reported that after he left school, he worked as a 
stripper and was a street fighter.  Ferguson described street fighting as an illegal, 
“underground” enterprise.  According to him, he had “a trainer and a promoter 
and was paid between eighty and one hundred thousand dollars per fight, of which 
he actually pocketed forty thousand dollars.”  Ferguson said that he “engaged in 
ten to fifteen fights per year and was never seriously hurt.”  Ferguson also said 
that he “enjoyed jumping a freight train and riding somewhere.”  He would 
sometimes be gone from four to six months at a time and always had money in his 
pocket as a result of his street-fighting success. 
January Term, 2006 
25 
{¶ 107} Ferguson said that he began using Toluene at the age of 16, 
steroids at the age of 17, and crack cocaine at the age of 20.  Ferguson stated that 
he got addicted to crack and was using one to three ounces every three to four 
days.  He also sold crack cocaine to cover his expenses and stated that he was 
“robbing the ‘dope boys’ – beat them up and take it.” 
{¶ 108} Ferguson reported that he had no juvenile criminal history.  
However, Ferguson said that when he was 19, he was charged with numerous 
offenses, including several assaults, carrying a concealed weapon, several thefts, 
grand theft, and child endangering.  He stated that he was placed on probation for 
these offenses.  In 1999, Ferguson was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 
two years in prison. 
{¶ 109} Testing showed that Ferguson has below-average intelligence.  
Ferguson’s full-scale IQ was 77 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III.  
Personality testing “showed significant elevations on the Mania, Antisocial 
Features, and Aggression scales.”  According to Dr. Bergman, “[t]he antisocial 
features of the profile appear to be most prominent and markedly elevated.  An 
individual with such personality characteristics is typically unreliable and 
irresponsible, with little sustained success in social or occupational realms.”  Dr. 
Bergman also found that “the aggression scale was also markedly elevated, 
indicative of an individual who is easily provoked and who shows explosive anger 
when frustrated.”  However, Dr. Bergman found “no active symptoms of a major 
mental disorder,” and her primary diagnosis was that Ferguson had an antisocial 
personality disorder. 
{¶ 110} Ferguson’s medical records show that he received treatment over 
several years for ADHD.  He has also received treatment for “several psychiatric 
disorders, including bipolar disorder.”  Dr. Mossman reported that Ferguson “has 
engaged in activities frequently associated with brain damage, and that past 
medical records suggest the possibility of neurological abnormalities.”  Moreover, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
Dr. Mossman states that “a clinical psychiatric examination and evaluation of Mr. 
Ferguson’s medical records provide strong reasons to believe that he has high 
impulsivity and that he may have brain dysfunction.” 
{¶ 111} Before sentencing, counsel stated that Ferguson wanted to read a 
letter to the court even though his lawyers advised him not to do so.  Ferguson 
made the following statement to the court: 
{¶ 112} “Today I stand before the Court to be judged and sentenced for 
the crimes of murders of Thomas S. King, Sr., Arlie Fugate, and Mae Fugate.  I 
do understand that the victim’s family and the friends of the victim’s family as 
well as others wants justice served * * * on a platter to them for what I did * * * 
in December of 2001. 
{¶ 113} “* * * 
{¶ 114} “I, Darrell W. AKA Gator Ferguson, does not care if you’re here 
to get justice served to you or not.  I, Darrell W. AKA Gator Ferguson, does not 
care what you don’t like about what I did to your loved ones.  And I, Darrell W. 
AKA Gator Ferguson, does not care what you think about me, because who I am 
and what I am and * * * [I] will always remain that way. 
{¶ 115} “When I killed Thomas S. King, Sr., and Arlie Fugate and Mae 
Fugate, I did it intentionally, and the killings * * * were malicious and hideous 
acts just as I intended them to be.  I took the satisfaction, Brenda King and James 
Cornett, of killing your loved ones with pleasure.  And I enjoyed it. 
{¶ 116} “* * * 
{¶ 117} “I, Darrell W. Gator Ferguson, does not have no remorse for 
either side of the victim’s family nor do I have no remorse for their slaughtered 
loved ones.  I hate you and I hate you and I hate you. 
{¶ 118} “I pray that Thomas S. King, Sr., Arlie Fugate, and Mae Fugate 
are in hell right now in agonizing pain and torment.  They shall never rest, only 
burn for eternity. 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 119} “Brenda King and James Cornett, if I had the power to bring 
your loved ones back, I, Darrell W. Gator Ferguson, would not bring them back.  I 
will never show any remorse even on that day that I die. 
{¶ 120} “The only thing I want for Thomas S. King, Sr., Arlie Fugate, 
Mae Fugate, is to suffer, burn, and have agonizing pain in hell. 
{¶ 121} “I sit in my cell every day for the past 21 months and * * * asked 
myself over and over where was your Jesus * * * to save his poor, innocent 
lambs.  Your God of false hope has vanished into nothingness. * * * And if you 
consider my god, lord Satan, a killer, then it is his blood that runs through my 
veins and fills my heart full of hideous acts and hatred. 
{¶ 122} “* * * Let’s just say that if I was to be freed to go back out in 
society, I’d pick up where I left off from and take the pleasure of causing 
destruction.  I’m not afraid of death like some of you are.  * * * 
{¶ 123} “* * * I will pray night and day as I sit in prison in my own 
darkness that for every one of you who are here to see justice served that you and 
your precious loved ones are driving down the road and the * * * car blows up 
and kills every one of you.  May death come over all of you. 
{¶ 124} “To my God, and to my family and friends, love.  And to my 
enemies, death.  Hail, lord Satan.  Done.” 
{¶ 125} Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offenses appears 
mitigating.  On December 25, 2001, Ferguson murdered King, an elderly and 
disabled man, and burglarized his home.  On December 26, 2001, Ferguson 
murdered Arlie and Mae Fugate, an elderly couple, and burglarized their home.  
Ferguson committed all three murders as part of a course of conduct while he was 
at large after not returning to Talbert House. 
{¶ 126} We find that the statutory mitigating factors are generally 
inapplicable, including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation), and (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 127} We give little weight to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) mitigating factor 
(youth of the offender) because Ferguson was 23 years old at the time of the 
offenses.  See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 
836, ¶ 197; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306, 754 N.E.2d 1150; 
State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319, 652 N.E.2d 988. 
{¶ 128} We find the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor (lack of a 
significant history of prior criminal convictions) to be inapplicable because of 
Ferguson’s prior conviction for burglary. 
{¶ 129} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor is not applicable, 
because there was no evidence that Ferguson, by reason of a mental disease or 
defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  However, under the 
catchall provision, R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we give weight to Ferguson’s history of 
mental health problems.  Ferguson suffers from ADHD and has received 
treatment for a bipolar disorder.  He also has a long history of drug and alcohol 
abuse.  Moreover, Dr. Mossman’s evaluation suggests the possibility that 
Ferguson may have a neurological abnormality.  On the other hand, Dr. 
Bergman’s comprehensive evaluation of Ferguson found “no active symptoms of 
a major mental disorder,” and she diagnosed him with an antisocial-personality 
disorder. 
{¶ 130} We also give some weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) to 
Ferguson’s cooperation with the police and his guilty pleas.  See State v. Mink, 
101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, at ¶ 125; State v. Rojas 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 143, 592 N.E.2d 1376. 
{¶ 131} However, Ferguson expressed no remorse for his crimes.  Indeed, 
in his allocution statement, Ferguson stated in graphic terms that he took great 
satisfaction in killing his victims, felt no sorrow for his victims or their surviving 
family members, and if he was ever free, he would “pick up where [he] left off * * 
January Term, 2006 
29 
* and take the pleasure of causing destruction.”  Thus, by his own words, 
Ferguson is a remorseless, sadistic, and incorrigible killer. 
{¶ 132} We find that Ferguson’s history and background provide some 
mitigating value.  Ferguson had a disruptive childhood and was raised in a 
dysfunctional family.  Otherwise, his character offers no redeeming features. 
{¶ 133} After weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors, we find that the aggravating circumstances as to each 
aggravated murder outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Ferguson’s course of conduct in murdering Thomas King and Arlie and Mae 
Fugate during the course of an aggravated burglary and while he was at large after 
breaking detention constitute grave aggravating circumstances.  Ferguson’s 
mitigating evidence pales in comparison. 
{¶ 134} We reject Ferguson’s argument, in his fifth proposition of law, 
that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating factors because 
of the severity of his mental problems.  Ferguson’s primary diagnosis was an 
antisocial personality, and he displayed no active symptoms of a major mental 
disorder. 
{¶ 135} We find that the death penalties imposed in this case are both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with other “course of conduct” 
murders.  See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 
836, at ¶ 203; State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 
1047, ¶ 182; State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 
1064, ¶ 130.  They are also appropriate and proportionate when compared to 
sentences in other burglary-murder cases.  State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 
2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 145; State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
403, 423, 739 N.E.2d 300; State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 56, 630 
N.E.2d 339.  Finally, the death sentences are appropriate and proportionate to 
sentences in other murders committed while the defendant was under detention or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
at large after breaking detention.  State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-
3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 130; State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 
767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 172. 
{¶ 136} Accordingly, we affirm Ferguson’s convictions and sentences of 
death.  We also dismiss Ferguson’s pro se motion to waive oral argument. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram and Natalia S. Harris, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
 
Altick & Corwin, L.P.A., and Gary W. Crim; and Dennis J. Adkins, for 
appellant. 
______________________