Title: In re B.L.S.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92643-Agenda 16-September 2002.
In re B.L.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellant, v. B.L.S., Appellee).
Opinion filed December 5, 2002.


	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	B.L.S. was adjudicated an habitual juvenile offender and
committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division,
(DOC) until his twenty-first birthday, as mandated by section
5-815(f) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS
405/5-815(f) (West 2000)). The appellate court affirmed the
adjudication and commitment, but held that B.L.S. was entitled to
credit for time spent in custody before sentencing. 325 Ill. App. 3d
96, 100. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	The State asks this court to hold that B.L.S. is not entitled to
receive predisposition credit against his commitment. B.L.S. seeks
cross-relief, asking this court to hold that the appellate court erred
in determining that a social investigation report was not required
before committing him to the DOC. We affirm the appellate court
and hold that: (1) an habitual juvenile offender is entitled to
receive predisposition credit against a determinate sentence; and
(2) the trial court's failure to order a social investigation report
before committing B.L.S. to the DOC was harmless error.

I. BACKGROUND
	B.L.S., a minor, pleaded guilty to an aggravated battery and
was held in custody in a juvenile detention home before being
adjudicated an habitual juvenile offender under section 5-815(f)
of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000)). Pursuant to the
requirements of section 5-815(f) of the Act, B.L.S. was committed
to the DOC until his twenty-first birthday. The trial court did not
award any predisposition credit, nor did the trial court order a
social investigation report before committing B.L.S. to the DOC.
The appellate court affirmed the adjudication and commitment,
but held that B.L.S. was entitled to predisposition credit and
remanded the cause for calculation of predisposition detention
credit. 325 Ill. App. 3d 96. This court allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS
	At issue is whether habitual juvenile offenders are entitled to
receive credit for predisposition custody. The relevant portion of
the Act, section 5-815(f), provides as follows:
			"If the court finds that the prerequisites established in
subsection (a) of this Section have been proven, it shall
adjudicate the minor an Habitual Juvenile Offender and
commit him to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile
Division, until his 21st birthday, without possibility of
parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence.
However, the minor shall be entitled to earn one day of
good conduct credit for each day served as reductions
against the period of his confinement. Such good conduct
credits shall be earned or revoked according to the
procedures applicable to the allowance and revocation of
good conduct credit for adult prisoners serving
determinate sentences for felonies.
			For purposes of determining good conduct credit,
commitment as an Habitual Juvenile Offender shall be
considered a determinate commitment, and the difference
between the date of the commitment and the minor's 21st
birthday shall be considered the determinate period of his
confinement." 705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000).
	The State contends that habitual juvenile offenders are not
entitled to credit for predisposition confinement because the Act
does not expressly provide for such credit. B.L.S. argues that an
habitual juvenile offender is entitled to receive the same credit as
an adult offender sentenced to a determinate sentence.
	Also at issue is the social investigation report requirement of
the Act. Section 5-705(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
			"At the sentencing hearing, the court shall determine
whether it is in the best interests of the minor or the public
that he or she be made a ward of the court, and, if he or
she is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall
determine the proper disposition best serving the interests
of the minor and the public. *** No order of commitment
to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, shall
be entered against a minor before a written report of social
investigation, which has been completed within the
previous 60 days, is presented to and considered by the
court." 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2000).
	B.L.S. argues that the trial court erred in failing to order a
social investigation report before committing him to the DOC. The
State contends that a social investigation report is not required
before sentencing an habitual juvenile offender to the DOC
because the trial court has no sentencing discretion.
	The parties raise issues of statutory construction. We review
issues of statutory construction de novo. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). The primary purpose of statutory construction is
to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent, while
presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd,
inconvenient, or unjust results. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 418-19. The
best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute.
In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). If the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids of
construction. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d  at 9. A statute is ambiguous if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is
proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter
and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City
of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947).

A. Credit Against Commitment for Time Spent in
Predisposition Detention
	On the first issue, section 5-815(f) of the Act requires that an
habitual juvenile offender be committed to the DOC until age 21.
705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000). Commitment as an habitual
juvenile offender is considered a determinate commitment and
good-conduct credit for habitual juvenile offenders is determined
according to the procedures applicable to adult prisoners. 705
ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000). Section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (the Code) provides the rules for calculating
the length of imprisonment for offenders and states that "[t]he
offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence *** for
time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2000).
Whether an habitual juvenile offender is entitled to credit for
predisposition detention is an issue of first impression.
	Our appellate court districts are divided on the issue of
whether a delinquent minor should receive sentence credit for time
spent in predisposition detention. Compare In re E.C., 297 Ill.
App. 3d 177 (4th Dist. 1998), and In re Jesus R., 326 Ill App. 3d
1070 (4th Dist. 2002) (holding that juveniles sentenced to
indeterminate terms are entitled to predisposition credit), with In
re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327 (2d Dist. 1998), and In re C.L.P.,
332 Ill. App. 3d 640 (2d Dist. 2002) (holding that juveniles
sentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predisposition
credit).
	The appellate court in this case relied on E.C. to reach its
conclusion that habitual juvenile offenders are entitled to
predisposition credit. In his brief, B.L.S. relies on E.C. and Jesus
R. to support his argument that there is no statutory support for
denying predisposition credit. As the State correctly points out,
E.C., Jesus R., J.J.M., and C.L.P. are distinguishable because each
of those cases involved an indeterminate commitment. We agree
with the State that the issue of whether a juvenile sentenced to an
indeterminate term is entitled to predisposition credit is not before
this court.
	The issue before this court is confined to whether an habitual
juvenile offender sentenced to a determinate term is entitled to
receive credit for predisposition detention. In other words, we
must determine whether the rules for calculating the length of the
term of imprisonment for offenders, provided in section 5-8-7 of
the Code, are applicable to an habitual juvenile offender sentenced
to a determinate term under section 5-815(f) of the Act. We need
not decide whether a juvenile sentenced to an indeterminate term
is entitled to predisposition credit.
	The State argues that B.L.S. is not entitled to credit for his
predisposition confinement. According to the State, the right to
predisposition credit is statutory and no such right has been
provided to habitual juvenile offenders by the Act. The State
reasons that the legislature's failure to include such a provision
demonstrates its intent to render the statutory right to
predisposition detention credit inapplicable to habitual juvenile
offenders. Conversely, B.L.S. argues that nothing in the Act
prohibits granting predisposition detention credit to an habitual
juvenile offender.
	The State's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
However, B.L.S.'s construction of the statute is just as reasonable.
A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.
People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Here, the statute
is clearly subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and is
thus ambiguous. See B.C., 176 Ill. 2d  at 543. Accordingly, we
must employ aids of statutory construction to determine legislative
intent, while avoiding absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. See
D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 419. Where the language of the statute is
ambiguous, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history.
People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (1994). In this case, the
intent of the legislature concerning predisposition credit was
absent from the legislative history of the Act. Another source to
ascertain legislative intent is the council commentary to the
statute. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995). Although not
binding upon this court, council commentary is persuasive
authority. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d  at 352.
	The council commentary to section 5-8-7 of the Code states,
in relevant part, "[t]his section *** gives full credit for time served
in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed. This would apply irrespective of where the offender was
confined ***." 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-8-7, Council Commentary, at
622 (Smith-Hurd 1997). The council commentary continues,
explaining, "[g]enerally, Illinois has operated under a full crediting
statute *** to give benefit to the offender for all time served in
confinement both prior to and subsequent to actual imprisonment."
730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-8-7, Council Commentary, at 622 (Smith-Hurd 1997). Accordingly, the council commentary indicates the
legislature's intent that offenders receive credit for all time spent
in confinement.
	Moreover, this court has stated that "[t]he credit requirement
of section 5-8-7(b) is meant to account for all time served in
confinement for a particular offense." People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 270 (1998). The purpose of the credit requirement of section
5-8-7(b) is to ensure that offenders do not ultimately remain
incarcerated for periods in excess of their eventual sentences.
Latona, 184 Ill. 2d  at 270. "Through section 5-8-7(b) the
legislature has explicitly required that offenders receive credit
against their terms of imprisonment when they are 'in custody as
a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.' "
People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 462 (1996).
	Accordingly, the resolution of the issue before us is
straightforward. The habitual juvenile offender provisions mandate
a determinate sentence in the DOC. Section 5-8-7(b) of the Code
requires full credit against determinate sentences for all time
served in confinement. Thus, the legislature had no need to include
any predisposition credit provision in the habitual juvenile
offender statute.
	Nothing in the Code restricts section 5-8-7(b) to adult
offenders, and we can conceive of no rationale for denying a
juvenile credit against a determinate sentence for time spent in
predisposition custody. Consequently, we conclude the legislature
intended that the rules for calculating the term of imprisonment for
an offender sentenced to a determinate sentence are applicable to
an habitual juvenile offender. Any other interpretation would lead
to an absurd and unjust result. Moreover, the State has not
presented any argument as to harm that would result from granting
such predisposition credit.
	Furthermore, our holding here is consistent with this court's
recent ruling concerning the applicability of another rule in
juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001). In
A.G., we considered whether Supreme Court Rule 604(d),
governing appeals from a judgment entered on a guilty plea, is
applicable to juvenile proceedings. We recognized that recent
amendments to the Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings that
are similar to adult criminal proceedings. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 317-19. We commented that amendments to the Act "represent[ ] a
fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to
include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and
holding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law."
A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 317. We further noted that "virtually all of the
constitutional requirements of a criminal trial have been
introduced into juvenile delinquency proceedings." A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 318. Accordingly, we held that compliance with Rule 604(d)
is required in juvenile proceedings. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 319.
	A similar result is compelled by the circumstances in this
case. Public safety and punishment are now the overriding
concerns of the juvenile justice system. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 317.
The incarcerated juvenile's liberty is restrained just as effectively
as that of an adult offender. See In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 541
(1967). We therefore hold that an habitual juvenile offender is
entitled to receive credit for time spent in custody prior to
sentencing.

B. Commitment Under Section 5-815(f) Without a Social
Investigation Report
	In his request for cross-relief, B.L.S. contends that the
appellate court erred in holding that a social investigation report
was not required prior to committing him to the DOC. Respondent
bases his claim on the mandatory language of section 5-705(1) of
the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2000)), requiring the trial
court to consider a social investigation report before committing
a minor to the DOC.
	Section 5-705(1) of the Act specifies the circumstances to be
considered in determining whether to make the minor a ward of
the court. If the minor is made a ward of the court, then the trial
court must determine the disposition best suited to the interests of
the minor and the public. Section 5-705(1) further provides that
the judge may rely on "[a]ll evidence helpful in determining these
questions, including oral and written reports." 705 ILCS
405/5-705(1) (West 2000). A social investigation report includes
information of the minor's physical and mental history and
condition, family situation and background, economic status,
education, occupation, personal habits, and history of delinquency
or criminality. 705 ILCS 405/5-701 (West 2000). Thus, the social
investigation report provides the trial court with information to
assist in determining whether to make the minor a ward of the
court and in determining an appropriate disposition for the minor.
	Here, the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously
states that "[n]o order of commitment to the Department of
Corrections, Juvenile Division, shall be entered against a minor
before a written report of social investigation *** is presented to
and considered by the court." 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West
2000). There are no exceptions made for those situations when the
judge lacks sentencing discretion. Therefore, a social investigation
report must be prepared before sentencing any minor to the DOC,
and the trial court erred by sentencing B.L.S. without the benefit
of the report.
	In affirming the trial court, the appellate court erroneously
held that a social investigation report was not required in this case.
However, we may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis
established by the record. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 511
(1999). We are instructed by Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill.
2d R. 615(a)) that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Rule
615(a) is applicable in juvenile appeals. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 322 (1995). Here, the trial court had no sentencing discretion
because, once B.L.S. was adjudicated an habitual juvenile
offender, section 5-815(f) of the Act mandated that the trial court
commit him to the DOC until his twenty-first birthday. Thus, a
social investigation report would have served no purpose in the
decision to enter the sentencing order and remandment for
resentencing is not necessary because B.L.S. was not prejudiced
by the absence of the report. 
	We recognize that information provided in a social
investigation report may be useful to the DOC and others involved
in the ward's care, treatment, and rehabilitation. However, B.L.S.
has not raised such an argument, and we have been provided with
no information that the DOC requires such a report. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court's error in failing to order a social
investigation report was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION
	We hold that an habitual juvenile offender is entitled to
receive credit against a determinate sentence for time spent in
predisposition detention. We also hold that the trial court's failure
to order a social investigation report prior to committing B.L.S. to
the DOC was harmless error.
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.



Affirmed.