Title: State ex rel. Hiatt v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Hiatt v. Indus. Comm., 99 Ohio St.3d 32, 2003-Ohio-2453.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. HIATT, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hiatt v. Indus. Comm., 99 Ohio St.3d 32, 2003-
Ohio-2453.] 
Workers’ compensation — Calculation of death benefits — Industrial 
Commission sets claimant’s death benefit at the minimum statewide 
average weekly wage — Departure from R.C. 4123.61’s standard 
average weekly wage formula not warranted, when. 
(No. 2002-1116 — Submitted April 15, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-979. 
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COOK , J. 
{¶1} 
Decedent, James F.A. Knowles, applied for a normal service 
retirement from appellee Millenium Petrochemicals, Inc. in September 1985 at the 
age of 65.  His retirement was to be effective three months later.  Prior to this 
effective date, Knowles saw a physician complaining of “minimal respiratory 
difficulties.”  The physician diagnosed asbestosis and opined that Knowles was 25 
percent impaired.  His only instructions were for Knowles to have a yearly 
pulmonary test as well as an annual vaccination against pneumonia and flu. 
{¶2} 
Knowles continued to work without problem and retired as 
planned.  He did not work thereafter.  Appellee Industrial Commission allowed an 
occupational disease claim for asbestosis in 1989, and specifically noted that 
Knowles had sustained no compensable lost time.  A 1992 medical examination 
noted that Knowles was doing well, denying any shortness of breath, chest pain, 
fevers, chills, or hemoptysis.  Chest x-rays, however, led the physician to suspect 
primary bronchogenic carcinoma and he recommended further testing.  Knowles 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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refused the further testing because he claimed to be “feeling well.”  The 
physician’s suspicions unfortunately proved to be correct, and Knowles died from 
metastatic lung cancer four years later. 
{¶3} 
A district hearing officer allowed widow-claimant, appellant 
herein, the minimum death benefit payable for decedent’s year of death pursuant 
to R.C. 4123.59.  A staff hearing officer affirmed this order. 
{¶4} 
Claimant appealed to the commission, seeking a death benefit 
increase to the AWW for the year prior to the diagnosis of asbestosis rather than 
the standard AWW for the year prior to the onset of disability.  The commission 
disagreed with claimant, finding that this court’s newly released decision in State 
ex rel. Thompson v. Ohio Edison Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 290, 707 N.E.2d 940, 
supported awarding the statutory minimum.  The commission reasoned that the 
minimum rate was proper under Thompson since decedent’s AWW for the year 
preceding the onset of disability was zero, given that decedent never suffered any 
disability due to his voluntary retirement. 
{¶5} 
The Tenth District Court of Appeals agreed and denied a writ of 
mandamus, prompting claimant’s appeal to this court as of right. 
{¶6} 
For dependents of those whose deaths were caused by industrial 
injury or occupational disease, weekly compensation is based on “sixty-six and 
two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wage * * * and not in any event less 
than a minimum of weekly compensation which is equal to fifty percent of the 
statewide average weekly wage”  R.C. 4123.59(B).  AWW, in turn, derives from 
“the decedent’s average weekly wage for the year preceding * * * the date the 
disability due to the occupational disease begins.”  R.C. 4123.61. 
{¶7} 
Appellant generally claims that the commission should have found 
that decedent’s diagnosis date governed the award of death benefits and that 
decedent’s AWW should be calculated based upon earnings for the year prior to 
that date.  This court has previously resisted, however, pegging a claimant’s 
January Term, 2003 
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disability date to the date of diagnosis, noting instead that disability is the inability 
to work.  State ex rel. Preston v. Peabody Coal Co. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 72, 73-
74, 12 OBR 63, 465 N.E.2d 433.  Appellant reluctantly concedes—as she must—
that her decedent had no legally cognizable date of disability.1 
{¶8} 
The absence of any disability in this case did not leave the 
commission completely without guidance.  Four years ago, this court considered 
this issue in State ex rel. Thompson v. Ohio Edison Co., 85 Ohio St.3d 290, 707 
N.E.2d 940.  Thompson is remarkably similar to this case.  In each, the decedent 
took a normal service retirement unrelated to any health concerns and never 
worked thereafter.  Years later, both were diagnosed with long-latency 
occupational diseases that ultimately claimed their lives.  In both instances, the 
commission set the death compensation amount at fifty percent of the statewide 
average weekly wage for the year of death, i.e., the statutory maximum. 
{¶9} 
Thompson approved the commission’s award, using a two-step 
analysis.  It first determined that the commission could deviate from R.C. 
4123.61’s standard formula because “special circumstances” pursuant to that 
same statute indeed existed in that case.  Id. at 292, 707 N.E.2d 940.  The “special 
circumstances” were comprised of (1) the presence of a slow-onset occupational 
disease, (2) the fact that the standard calculation necessarily produced a zero 
AWW, and (3) the fact that decedent was never removed from work—i.e., 
disabled—by the occupational disease.  From there, the next “more difficult” 
question was “whether ‘special circumstances’ notwithstanding, the AWW set by 
the commission is substantially just.”  Id.  The court answered affirmatively: 
                                          
 
1 Claimant, at one point in her brief, claims that the commission’s 2/28/00 order established a date 
of disability.  This is not true. It is clear that the commission simply inserted a claimant’s date of 
diagnosis into the wrong space.  All prior commission orders reflect no compensable lost time—a 
concession noted by claimant regarding the 2/29/00 order. 
 
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{¶10} “AWW ‘ “is designed to find a fair basis for award for the loss of 
future compensation.” ‘ (Emphasis added.)  [State ex rel.] Wireman [v. Indus. 
Comm. (1990)], 49 Ohio St.3d [286] at 287, 551 N.E.2d 1265.  Here, when 
mesothelioma struck, the decedent had no future compensation to lose.  He had 
withdrawn from the labor market without evidence of an intent to reenter.”  
Thompson at 292, 707 N.E.2d 940. 
{¶11} Appellant seeks to distinguish Thompson by arguing that her 
decedent—unlike Thompson—worked the year prior to diagnosis.  While true, it 
is an irrelevant distinction, since date of diagnosis is not germane to compensation 
calculation.  Accordingly, claimant’s assertions concerning lack of disability and 
character of disease merely echo those already discussed and discarded in 
Thompson and do not advance her cause. 
{¶12} Appellant also claims that the commission’s calculation penalizes 
dependents of those with long-latency occupational diseases by arguing the   
concepts of “zero AWW” and “zero compensation” interchangeably.  But zero 
AWW does not translate into no compensation.  R.C. 4123.59(B) specifically 
states that dependents of those killed by industrial causes must receive at least 50 
percent of the statewide AWW.  Moreover, since the purpose of workers’ 
compensation benefits is to replace future earnings, appellant’s pursuit of wages 
that her decedent long ago voluntarily relinquished by his retirement from the 
labor force for reasons unrelated to any industrial injury or occupational disease. 
{¶13} We agree with the decisions of both the commission and the court 
of appeals that Thompson dictates the result here. 
{¶14} The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
January Term, 2003 
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__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, Marc J. Jaffy 
and Sue A. Fauber; Siebold & Hammelrath Co., L.P.A., and W. Smith 
Hammelrath, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Gary E. Becker and Brian C. Thomas, for 
appellee Millenium Petrochemicals, Inc.. 
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