Title: Mak-M v. SM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mak-M v. SM1993 WY 78854 P.2d 64Case Number: C-92-7Decided: 06/08/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
MAK-M and DMM, a Minor 
Child,

 Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

SM,

 Appellee (Respondent). 

 

Roger Cowan of 
Harris, Morton & Cowan, P.C., Evanston, for appellants.

Paul Thomas 
Glause of James & Glause, Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]            
Appellant, the biological mother (mother), appeals from the district 
court's dismissal of her petition to determine nonexistence of paternity of the 
presumed father (appellee).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The mother raises 
two issues:

I. Whether appellee 
presented any evidence to entitle him to dismissal or summary judgment as a 
matter of law.

II. Whether the trial 
court's dismissal is contrary to the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act and the 
adoption laws of the State of Wyoming.

[¶4]            
Appellee frames the issues as follows:

1. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition to Determine 
Non-Existence of Paternity and for Child Custody after finding that the action 
was not brought within a reasonable time.

2. Whether there was 
sufficient evidence presented to support the findings of the trial court in 
dismissing the Petition to Determine Non-Existence of Paternity and for Child 
Custody.

3. Whether the trial 
court's dismissal is contrary to the Wyoming Parentage Act and the adoption laws 
of the State of Wyoming.

FACTS

[¶5]      In early 1986, 
during the time that appellee and the mother were dating, the mother became 
pregnant. On November 12, 1986, the mother gave birth to a baby boy (child). The 
child was given appellee's surname on the child's birth certificate, and the 
mother had, until this action, maintained that appellee was the natural father 
as named on the child's birth certificate. Approximately four months after the 
child's birth, appellee and the mother were married. 

[¶6]      Two years after 
the child's birth, the mother moved to another state, taking the child with her. 
Several months after arriving in the other state, the mother placed her child 
under the care and custody of the child's maternal grandmother. One year later, 
in May of 1990, the grandmother returned the child to appellee in Wyoming. Since 
that time, the child has been under the care and custody of 
appellee.

[¶7]      After the return 
of his child, appellee filed for and was granted a divorce from the mother by 
default. On September 26, 1991, the district court entered a decree of divorce 
in favor of appellee and against the mother, awarding appellee the care, custody 
and control of the child.

[¶8]      Just prior to the 
issuance of the divorce decree, but well after appellee's complaint for divorce 
was filed, the mother filed a petition to determine nonexistence of paternity 
and for child custody against appellee. Over the next year, appellee filed two 
separate motions to dismiss the mother's petition and the mother filed a motion 
for summary judgment as well as a motion to set aside the divorce decree. On 
October 21, 1992, the district court issued a decision letter which dismissed 
the mother's petition because the mother had failed to bring the action within a 
reasonable time after the birth of the child as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-104(a)(ii) (Cum.Supp. 1992).1 The mother challenges the propriety 
of this dismissal.

DISCUSSION

Best Interests of the 
Child

[¶9]      The mother, in 
addition to a determination of nonexistence of paternity, also seeks custody of 
the child. We are, therefore, required to focus primarily on the best interests 
and welfare of the child. Matter of Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Wyo. 1992); see also Matter of SAJ, 781 P.2d 528, 530 (Wyo. 1989) (the best 
interests of a child are irrelevant in an action purely to establish paternity). 
In a similar case, dealing with determining the care, custody, and parenthood of 
a child of ambiguous biological lineage, this court described the principles 
which shape its inquiry into the best interests of the child:

In contemplating the best 
interests of the child and the child's welfare, we note there is a strong policy 
against bastardy. * * * In support of that policy, the Wyoming Legislature has 
enacted stringent provisions that tend to insure children born during wedlock 
will not be considered illegitimate. That presumption of paternity is 
sufficiently strong in certain instances to override even the fact of biological 
parenthood.

Matter of 
Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d  at 1093 (emphasis added). In this instance, we 
agree with the district court and find that the best interests of this child 
will be served by sustaining appellee's presumptive parenthood.

[¶10]   On this same topic, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas provides persuasive reasoning in response to the argument that 
the best interests of a child will always be served by a paternity determination 
of his or her biological father. That court wrote:

The shifting of paternity 
from the presumed father to the biological father could easily be detrimental to 
the emotional and physical well-being of any child. Although someone may suffer, 
it should never be the child, who is totally innocent and who has no control 
over or conception of the environment into which he or she has been 
placed.

Matter of 
Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 783 P.2d 331, 338-39 (1989). While the mother's 
petition does not seek to shift paternity but only to deny paternity, we think 
the reasoning explained above is equally applicable. Since the child is now 
almost seven years old, appellee is the only father the child has ever known, 
and because both the child and appellee were mislead for almost five years 
concerning their biological relationship, we feel that sustaining appellee's 
presumptive parenthood would promote the best interests of the child. Regardless 
of the identity of the true biological father, appellee and the child have 
formed a family unit and we will not now disrupt this stability and continuity 
to the detriment of the child. See Happel v. Mecklenburger, 101 Ill. App.3d 107, 
56 Ill.Dec. 569, 427 N.E.2d 974, 983 (1981).

Dismissal

[¶11]   Since the district court dismissed 
the mother's petition, we consider the facts alleged in the mother's complaint 
as admitted and we view the mother's allegations in the light most favorable to 
her. Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Mostert 
v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987)).

[¶12]   The mother makes two arguments. 
First, she claims the dismissal was in error because there was insufficient 
evidence before the district court for it to find that the petition was not 
timely filed. Second, the mother alleges that the dismissal of her petition is 
inconsistent with Wyoming's statutes concerning parentage and adoption because 
it results in a de facto adoption.

[¶13]   The district court found, based on 
the facts alleged in the pleadings, that appellee was the presumptive father of 
the child under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a)(iii) (1986), and that the mother had 
failed to bring the petition to determine nonexistence of paternity within a 
reasonable time as required by Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104. We must determine whether 
the district court, based on the information provided in the pleadings, could 
have concluded and found as it did.

[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a) 
provides:

(a) A man is presumed to 
be the natural father of a child if:

* * * * * *

(iii) After the 
child's birth, he and the child's natural mother married or attempted to 
marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law * * *; 
and:

(A) He has acknowledged 
his paternity of the child in writing filed with the state office of vital 
records services; or

(B) With his consent, 
he is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate; 
or

(C) He is obligated to 
support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court 
order;

(iv) While the child is 
under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child.

(Emphasis 
added.) Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104 provides, in part:

    (a) A child, his natural 
mother or a man presumed to be his father under W.S. 14-2- 102(a)(i), (ii), or 
(iii) may bring action:

* * * * * *

(ii) For the purpose of 
declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under 
W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) only if the action is brought within a 
reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event 
later than five (5) years after the child's birth. * * *

(b) Any interested party 
may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or 
nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under W.S. 
14-2-102(a)(iv).

[¶15]   The mother's petition provides 
ample support for the district court's conclusion that appellee is the child's 
presumptive father under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102. First, the mother admits that 
she and appellee were married soon after the child's birth. Second, she admits 
that appellee was named, albeit mistakenly, as the child's biological father on 
the child's birth certificate. Without a doubt, these two facts place appellee 
squarely within the language of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a)(iii)(B). Therefore, we 
find, based solely on the information contained in the mother's pleadings, that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellee was 
the child's presumptive father under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a)(iii).

[¶16]   Since the district court properly 
concluded that appellee is a presumptive father, the next step is to determine 
if, under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii), the mother's petition was brought 
"within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts." In our 
review of the district court's determination that the mother did not file this 
action within a reasonable time, we are guided by several principles. First, 
deciding the issue of a reasonable time is a question of fact for the district 
court; therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district 
court. Second, "to conclude that a reasonable time had not expired, we must find 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court." Matter of Adoption of 
R.S.C., 837 P.2d  at 1094. In Matter of Adoption of R.S.C., this court affirmed a 
finding that a "reasonable time" had passed where the parties were aware that 
the presumptive father was not the biological father for almost four years 
before the petition to declare nonexistence of paternity was filed. Id. at 
1094.

[¶17]   Again, the mother's pleadings 
contain sufficient support for the district court's determination that a 
reasonable time had passed. First, the child was born in November 1986 and the 
mother's petition was filed in September 1991; nearly five years after the 
child's birth. Second, the mother was distinctly aware, at the time of the 
child's birth, that the biological father could easily be someone else. Third, 
despite the mother's knowledge concerning the child's true biological father, 
she married appellee without revealing that knowledge. Fourth, over fifteen 
months elapsed from the time the child was returned to appellee in Wyoming until 
the mother filed her petition. Last, and perhaps most convincing, over almost 
seven years of his life, the only "father" the child has known is the 
appellee.

[¶18]   We, therefore, hold that the 
district court properly found that the mother failed to file her petition within 
a reasonable time as required by Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii). In reaching this 
decision, we are heavily persuaded by the fact that the best interests of this 
child lie in avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy. A ruling disestablishing the 
presumptive parenthood of appellee - regardless of whether the child now knows 
his true biological ancestry - would not be in the best interests of the 
child.

[¶19]   The mother's second argument 
alleges that the district court acted contrary to Wyoming's statutes governing 
parentage and adoption. The mother claims that the district court's dismissal 
results in a de facto adoption of the child by appellee, which is violative of 
both the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-101 through 14-2-120 
(1986 & Cum.Supp. 1992), and Wyoming's adoption statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-22-101 through 1-22-116 (1988 & Cum.Supp. 1992).

[¶20]            
Concerning the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act's purpose and intent, we 
have said that "[t]he Act is primarily designed to accord all children, whether 
legitimate or illegitimate, Fourteenth Amendment substantive legal equality. The 
Act is a legislative attempt to erase the stigma associated with out-of-wedlock 
birth." Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1259-60. In reality, the 
district court's dismissal is completely consistent with the purposes of the 
Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act because by sustaining appellee's presumptive 
fatherhood, the district court leaves intact the child's legal 
legitimacy.

[¶21]   The mother is correct in stating 
that the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act and Wyoming's adoption statutes must be 
strictly construed and that there must be substantial compliance with statutory 
procedures. Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1988); Matter of 
TRG, 665 P.2d 491, 497 (Wyo. 1983). The mother, however, is incorrect in terming 
the dismissal as a de facto adoption. At this point, any reference to adoption 
is incorrect because under the strict construction of the Wyoming Parentage Act, 
appellee is the presumptive father of the child and he need not resort to 
adoption in order to establish his parental rights.

[¶22]   The mother mistakenly argues that 
the dismissal by the district court gives appellee parental rights and thus 
circumvents the strict procedures of the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act. It is 
not the act of dismissing this case which makes appellee the presumptive father. 
Instead, it was the actions of the mother - getting married, naming appellee as 
the natural father on the birth certificate, and failing to bring the petition 
within a reasonable time - combined with the plain language of the presumptive 
parent statute which makes appellee the presumptive father. Hence, contrary to 
the mother's argument, the district court complied with the clear mandates of 
the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act.

[¶23]   In reviewing the record, we 
discovered that the child was not joined as a party to this action. Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-107 (1986) requires that the child be made a party in any paternity action, 
including an action to declare the nonexistence of the father and child 
relationship. Although neither the district court nor the parties addressed this 
issue, we think that the failure to join the child as a party merits brief 
mention. Previously, this court has held that failure to join the child and to 
appoint a guardian ad litem renders a paternity decree void. Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811, 813 (Wyo. 1989). However, since we hold that the mother is foreclosed 
from her cause of action because she failed to timely file, then no action 
exists in which to join the child as a party, and the issue is moot.

DISPOSITION

[¶24]   We affirm the order of the district 
court dismissing the mother's petition to determine nonexistence of appellee's 
paternity and to obtain custody. The district court, under the facts pleaded, 
properly concluded that appellee was the presumptive father of the child and 
that the mother was barred from bringing an action to declare the nonexistence 
of paternity because she failed to file the petition within a reasonable time, 
although she was aware for almost five years of the true circumstances of the 
child's birth.

FOOTNOTES

1 On November 19, 1992, 
the district court issued two orders: (1) dismissal of the mother's petition to 
determine nonexistence of paternity, and (2) dismissal of the mother's motion to 
set aside the divorce decree.