Title: Relish v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Relish v. State1993 WY 122860 P.2d 455Case Number: 92-185Decided: 09/24/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Kenneth 
C. RELISH,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Tony 
S. Lopez argued, of Zimmers & Lopez, Laramie, for 
appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Kenneth Relish 
was convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle for the death of Thomas Neal 
under W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii) (Cum.Supp. 1993)1. After trial, Relish filed a motion 
for a new trial alleging that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence. Relish's motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment and sentence 
were entered. Relish appeals claiming that undisclosed, exculpatory evidence 
required grant of a new trial; that the district court erred in denying him an 
instruction concerning Neal's death certificate; and that insufficient evidence 
existed to support the jury's verdict.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Relish describes 
the issues as follows:

ISSUE 
I: Whether defendant's rights to a fair trial were denied by non-disclosure of 
material evidence by the State of Wyoming?

ISSUE 
II: Did the Court err in refusing the defense's request and instruction based on 
Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 48 [448] (Wyo., 1971)?

ISSUE 
III: Was the evidence presented sufficient to convict?

FACTS

[¶4]      In the late 
evening and early morning hours of November 4 and 5, 1991, an early season 
winter storm blanketed the high plains of southeastern Wyoming. As occurs 
frequently, the elements of a winter storm - strong winds, blowing snow, frigid 
temperatures, and ice - created treacherous driving conditions on Interstate 80 
(I-80) in southeastern Wyoming. Visibility was very poor, and at times whiteout 
conditions reduced visibility to near zero.

[¶5]      I-80 crosses, 
east to west and west to east, the full length of the southern tier of Wyoming. 
One particular stretch of fifty miles between Laramie and Cheyenne, Wyoming 
commences from Laramie, at an altitude of 7,200 feet, climbs east up Sherman 
Hill to almost 9,000 feet, and then gradually descends into Cheyenne, to an 
altitude of 6,100 feet. On the night of November 4, 1991, approximately 
seventeen miles east of Laramie, just past Sherman Hill where I-80 sits on a 
high plateau, unprotected from notoriously high winds, the driving conditions 
worsened. According to one eyewitness, "the road * * * was either snow or packed 
ice * * *[,]" it was a "whiteout[,] * * * we could not even see the reflectors 
on the side of the road."

[¶6]      Two very 
different vehicles were travelling that section of I-80 in the late evening and 
early morning of November 4 and 5, 1991. The first was a blue compact sedan 
carrying four young adults, Amy Detgen (Detgen), Scott Soble (Soble), George 
Ballard (Ballard) and Tom Neal (Neal). The second was an eighty thousand pound 
eighteen wheel semi-truck (semi) driven by appellant, Ken Relish (Relish). 

[¶7]      The sedan and its 
four occupants had stopped in Laramie at around 11:00 p.m. on November 4, 1991, 
before continuing east on I-80 towards Cheyenne at approximately 11:30 p.m. When 
the sedan departed Laramie, Soble was driving; Ballard occupied the front 
passenger seat; Detgen sat in the rear passenger seat behind Ballard; and Neal 
sat in the rear seat directly behind the driver Soble. As they travelled along 
I-80, the road conditions sharply deteriorated forcing Soble to reduce his 
speed, from near normal just outside of Laramie to ten or fifteen miles per hour 
as they approached mile marker 334, seventeen miles east of Laramie. Because of 
the conditions, Soble turned on the sedan's hazard lights and then pulled off 
the interstate. This initial stop was brief, however, because they believed the 
spot to be too precarious due to oncoming traffic. After continuing another half 
mile, the sedan slid off the interstate. Soble, Ballard, Detgen, and Neal 
decided that continuing was too dangerous, and thus Soble powered the sedan 
completely off the highway and shoulder so that the sedan sat approximately ten 
to fifteen feet off of the paved shoulder. At this time, Soble turned the car 
off leaving the hazard lights on, and all but Soble settled in to 
rest.

[¶8]      At approximately 
the same general time, Relish, after a ten-hour layover in Laramie, continued 
his journey along I-80 and headed east towards Cheyenne. Relish, a truck driver 
for forty years, was hauling a load of vegetables back to his home state of 
Wisconsin. After cresting the top of Sherman Hill, ten or so miles outside of 
Laramie, Relish stated he was travelling at fifty to fifty-five miles per hour 
in blowing snow, on a snow covered highway. Several miles beyond Sherman Hill, 
Relish claims the weather deteriorated significantly, and between mile markers 
334 and 335 he felt a bump as if "something or someone hit me, or I ran over a 
stone or something."

[¶9]      Meanwhile, the 
four companions in the sedan had been parked off the interstate for about five 
minutes, just beyond mile marker 334. Then, as Detgen describes it, "I heard a 
very loud roaring noise, and I was, we were getting pushed forward, we were 
flying forward across the snow." After this impact, Detgen, Soble, and Ballard 
managed to extricate themselves from the badly damaged sedan. Immediately after 
exiting the sedan Detgen screamed to Soble, "What hit us, what happened?" Soble 
replied, "[i]t was a truck, he came flying by, he hit us, it was a truck." Neal 
remained in the sedan, the portion of the car where he sat had suffered the 
brunt of the impact and was crushed beyond recognition. Soble managed to flag 
down another truck driver as it approached the accident scene. Soble, Ballard 
and Detgen climbed into the truck for warmth while the trucker radioed local law 
enforcement for assistance. Neal, however, remained trapped within the badly 
damaged sedan.

[¶10]   Deputy Chris Lundval (Deputy 
Lundval) of the Laramie County Sheriff's Department was first on the scene, 
arriving at around 12:50 a.m. on November 5. Deputy Lundval immediately checked 
Neal for vital signs and determined that he had died. Later, the Albany County 
Coroner determined that Neal had died from a cerebral hemorrhage caused by a 
skull fracture. Soble and Ballard informed Deputy Lundval that they had been hit 
by a "semi truck." Wyoming Highway Patrolman Jeffrey Baltimore (Patrolman 
Baltimore) arrived soon after Deputy Lundval. Patrolman Baltimore remained on 
the scene, while Deputy Lundval drove east on I-80 in search of the 
semi.

[¶11]   Approximately one mile down the 
interstate, Deputy Lundval came upon a disabled semi parked on the side of the 
highway. Deputy Lundval discovered that the semi's owner and operator was 
Relish. Deputy Lundval noted extensive damage to one of the rear axles on the 
passenger side of the trailer and asked Relish whether he was in an accident. 
Relish explained to Deputy Lundval that, "I hit something while in a whiteout." 
After learning that Relish had radioed for a wrecker for his truck, Deputy 
Lundval asked Relish to remain with his truck until the Highway Patrol arrived 
to take a more detailed statement. 

[¶12]   Patrolman Baltimore finished 
investigating the accident scene, then drove down the interstate to question 
Relish. Patrolman Baltimore observed that Relish was "pretty anxious to take his 
load to Wisconsin" and that he "never said much about the accident itself." In 
addition, a second highway patrolman, Mike Johnson (Patrolman Johnson), talked 
to Relish soon after the collision and noted that he was "uncaring, pretty laid 
back, not very concerned," despite knowing another vehicle was involved. Later 
that morning, after having temporary repairs completed on his trailer while 
still on the side of I-80, Relish drove his semi back to Laramie for more 
permanent repairs.

[¶13]   Based upon inspections of the 
accident scene and the two vehicles, Patrolman Baltimore was able to testify 
that Relish's semi veered completely off the interstate, colliding with or 
running over the blue sedan as it sat parked ten to fifteen feet off the paved 
shoulder of the road. The semi then "veered back up to the interstate * * * 
almost getting back on the road, the [semi] went back down toward the slope a 
little bit, and then veered back up to the interstate" and continued down the 
highway until the semi became disabled. Patrolman Baltimore then testified that: 
(1) twenty-five miles per hour was a reasonably safe speed in the conditions as 
they existed that evening and morning; (2) Relish was travelling at sixty to 
sixty-five miles per hour at the time of the accident; and (3) sixty to 
sixty-five miles per hour was too fast in those 
conditions.

[¶14]   After his semi was repaired in 
Laramie, Relish continued on his trip to Wisconsin. On November 21, 1991, a 
criminal complaint was filed charging Relish with aggravated homicide by 
vehicle, and on February 8, 1992, he was arrested. On May 6, 1992, after a 
three-day trial, Relish was convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle. On June 
5, 1992, Relish filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the prosecutor had 
withheld exculpatory evidence. On July 20, 1992, the district court denied 
Relish's motion for a new trial. Judgment and sentence were entered on August 
18, 1992. Relish appeals from the judgment and the denial of his motion for a 
new trial.

DISCUSSION

I. 
Motion For New Trial

[¶15]   Relish asserts first that he was 
denied a fair trial because the prosecution failed to disclose two allegedly 
exculpatory witnesses. The argument is the same as that presented by Relish to 
the trial court in his motion for a new trial.

[¶16]   The standard of review to which 
this court adheres when reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial is as 
follows:

[A] 
motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
this court will not reverse unless the appellant affirmatively demonstrates an 
abuse of discretion.

Warren 
v. State, 809 P.2d 788, 790 (Wyo. 1991); see also Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 
536 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶17]   In Relish's brief to this court and 
in his motion for a new trial he argued that his trial was unfair because the 
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. He cites a line of federal 
cases centered around Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). The landmark Brady decision requires prosecutors to disclose 
evidence "that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or 
punishment." Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 543 (Wyo., Aug. 16, 1993). In 
order to establish a Brady violation, Relish must prove: (1) suppression of 
evidence by the prosecution; (2) that the evidence would have been favorable to 
him; and (3) that the evidence is material. United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 923, 109 S. Ct. 304, 102 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1988); see also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1972).

[¶18]   It is important to note that the 
Brady rule is not a rule of discovery; instead, it is grounded in the United 
States Constitution's due process clauses and is intended to protect the 
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
107-114, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2399-2402, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). The allegedly 
exculpatory evidence, on which Relish relies to support his claim for a new 
trial, consists of the proposed testimony of two witnesses who were interviewed 
by the prosecution but not presented at trial. The first witness is John Daily 
(Daily), an accident reconstruction expert, and the second is Amy Nagle (Nagle), 
an eyewitness to the weather conditions.

A. 
Daily's Proposed Testimony

[¶19]   The first prong, which must be 
satisfied in order to establish a Brady violation, is nondisclosure or 
suppression by the prosecution. Wolf, 839 F.2d  at 1391; Moore, 408 U.S.  at 
794-95, 92 S. Ct.  at 2568. In Moore, the defendant appealed his conviction for 
murder claiming, in part, that he was denied a fair trial because the 
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory statements made by prosecution 
witnesses to the prosecutor. Moore, 408 U.S.  at 793-94, 92 S. Ct.  at 2567. In 
holding that the Brady rule was not implicated, the Moore court said, "[w]e know 
of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and 
detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work." Moore, 408 U.S.  at 795, 92 S.Ct at 2568. In this regard, we have said the prosecution "has 
no duty to manufacture evidence." Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 255 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶20]   The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
has developed a standard for determining whether evidence has been suppressed 
for purposes of the Brady rule. It stated:

Evidence 
is not "suppressed" if the defendant either knew or should have known of the 
essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence. 
[citations omitted]

United 
States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1174, 
103 S. Ct. 823, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1983). Applying this standard to the facts of 
this case leads to the conclusion that the prosecution did not suppress Daily 
for Brady purposes.

[¶21]   The prosecutor disclosed Daily to 
Relish as a potential prosecution witness in a pretrial document titled 
Memorandum of Matters Agreed Upon. The prosecution's disclosure of Daily, 
by including his name on the stipulated witness list, was sufficient to meet any 
duty the prosecutor may have had under Brady. The witness list revealed to 
Relish that Daily was a potential government witness which should have alerted 
Relish that Daily might have relevant information concerning the 
case.

[¶22]   This result is in accord with 
Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968), United States v. Beasley, 
442 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.La. 1977) and People v. DeStefano, 30 Ill. App.3d 935, 
332 N.E.2d 626 (1975), all of which suggest that a simple disclosure of a 
witness' identity is sufficient unless it is combined with a misrepresentation 
by the prosecutor. In Jackson, the Fifth Circuit held that the prosecution's 
disclosure of a witness who had exculpatory information by name and address only 
was insufficient because the prosecution affirmatively misled the defendant 
concerning the value of the witness' information. Jackson, 390 F.2d  at 
298.

[¶23]   In Beasley, following a conviction, 
the defendant filed a motion for a new trial arguing, in part, that the 
prosecutor was aware that certain witnesses' testimony would favor the defense 
and that the prosecutor had a duty to communicate that awareness to the defense. 
Beasley, 442 F. Supp.  at 1157. That court rejected Beasley's contention, finding 
no duty for the prosecutor to disclose his own view of potential testimony and 
stating:

The 
defense had every opportunity to call [the witnesses], their testimony was not 
concealed or misrepresented by the government, and the decision not to call them 
was a strategic and knowing one.

Beasley, 
442 F. Supp.  at 1157.

[¶24]   In DeStefano, an Illinois Appeals 
Court held that a defendant was denied a fair trial due to the prosecution's 
deliberate misrepresentation concerning a material witness. DeStefano, 332 N.E.2d  at 631. In that case the prosecutor gave the defense a witness list which 
stated, "George Leighton, address unknown," despite the fact that George 
Leighton was a Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court who had chambers in the 
same building as the prosecutor. Id.

[¶25]   Relish asserts in his brief that 
Daily's name was omitted from the State's witness list despite what the record 
reveals. However, at oral argument, Relish's counsel admitted that Daily's name 
was on the witness list and instead implied that the prosecutor had misled him 
after he inquired about Daily. This claim is apparently asserted for the first 
time on appeal.

[¶26]   We agree with the reasoning 
employed in Jackson, Beasley and DeStefano, that is, disclosure of the witness' 
name is sufficient to satisfy Brady and, in the absence of an affirmative 
misrepresentation concerning the witness or the testimony of the witness, will 
defeat a claim of concealment or suppression of evidence. Relish was provided 
with Daily's name before trial, and there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record to establish that the prosecution concealed or misrepresented the content 
of Daily's opinions. Therefore, we hold that the prosecutor did not suppress 
potentially material evidence concerning Daily.

[¶27]   The second and third prongs of the 
Brady rule require that the suppressed testimony be favorable to the defendant 
and that it be material. Having determined that the evidence was not suppressed 
by the prosecution, we need not explore or determine the effect of satisfying 
these prongs of Brady upon this case, and we decline to do 
so.

B. 
Nagle's Proposed Testimony

[¶28]   Unlike the State's disclosure of 
Daily's identity, the State admits that it did not disclose Nagle's identity to 
Relish. Therefore, the second and third prongs of the Brady analysis must be 
explored.

[¶29]   In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985), the United States Supreme Court 
refined the standard for determining when evidence, not disclosed by the 
prosecution, is sufficiently material to amount to constitutional error by 
stating:

The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.

Bagley, 
473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383; see also Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 77 
(Wyo. 1991). In addition, the Bagley Court held that this standard applies 
regardless of whether the defense had made "no request," a "general request," or 
a "specific request" for exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383; see also Bagley 473 U.S.  at 685, 105 S. Ct.  at 3385 (Justice White 
concurring, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concur as to 
the standard set by Justice Blackmun's lead opinion); Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 77; 
see also Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d § 557.2 (1993 
Pocket Part).

[¶30]   Nagle's affidavit offers little, if 
any, material evidence. Her affidavit states that she was travelling on I-80 
sometime on November 5, 1991; that she saw what may have been the sedan off the 
road and what may have been Relish's semi parked on the side of the road; that 
she discussed these observations with the prosecutor on a couple of occasions; 
and that there were whiteout weather conditions near the 
scene.

[¶31]   Even if Nagle could positively 
identify the two vehicles she observed, as the sedan and the semi, and she could 
testify to the precise time she was travelling on November 5, 1991, her 
testimony would only be cumulative. Evidence which is "at best cumulative" does 
not meet the Bagley materiality standard. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1275 (1st Cir. 1991). Two eyewitnesses, Detgen and Relish, testified at 
trial to the weather conditions. Although Nagle states in her affidavit that she 
could corroborate Relish's testimony concerning the weather conditions at the 
site of impact, that would not help Relish because he admitted on 
cross-examination that the weather conditions were accurately described by 
Detgen during the State's case.

[¶32]   In regard to Nagle's affidavit and 
her proposed testimony, the following statement is 
applicable:

[T]he 
prosecution has no mandatory obligation to produce all witnesses 
conjecturally available to provide relevant testimony. The prosecution has no 
defined duty to try the case for the defendant, and consequently it is not an 
assumed responsibility to provide the defendant's evidence. The Brady obligation 
stops with hiding and non-disclosure of evidence and does not extend to 
affirmative compilation and production. [citations omitted and emphasis in 
original]

Miller 
v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 426 (Wyo. 1992). Nagle's proposed testimony is clearly 
relevant, but it is far from being sufficiently material to warrant a conclusion 
that, with it, a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached 
a different verdict.

[¶33]   We, therefore, reject Relish's 
claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a 
new trial. We do so because it was reasonable for the district court to conclude 
that Daily was disclosed to the defense and that Nagle would not have undermined 
the jury's verdict.

II. 
Jury Instruction

[¶34]   In his second argument, Relish 
asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it refused to 
give an instruction, requested by Relish, which stated that the county coroner's 
death certificate on Neal was prima facie evidence that Neal's death was an 
accident and not a homicide. The offered instruction is as 
follows:

The 
State has introduced the Death Certificate of Thomas Neal. You are instructed 
that the Death Certificate is prima facie evidence of the truth of all facts 
contained in it.

Relish 
derives his argument from the case of Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448 (Wyo. 1971). 
In his appellate brief, Relish describes Alcala as:

[the] 
case wherein the prosecution, being unable to prove the cause of death in a 
homicide because of the decomposition of the body, utilized the death 
certificate to prove the cause of death. The fact that the coroner had written 
homicide on the death certificate, was used as absolute proof that the decedent 
had, in fact, been the victim of a homicide.

Therefore, 
Relish argues, since Neal's death certificate states that he died from an 
accident, not homicide, and since Relish's theory of defense is that the 
collision was an accident, then the proposed instruction was one on his theory 
of defense and to which he was entitled.

[¶35]   There was no error by the district 
court when it denied Relish's proposed instruction based on Alcala because 
instructions containing incorrect or erroneous statements of the law are 
properly refused. Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 256 (Wyo. 1988); Nimmo v. 
State, 607 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo. 1980); Benson v. State, 571 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 
1977). Relish's instruction was an incorrect statement of the law in 
Alcala.

[¶36]   In Alcala the prosecution was 
permitted to introduce the decedent's death certificate as evidence that the 
decedent likely died from asphyxia. Alcala, 487 P.2d  at 452. The death 
certificate did not state that the death was the result of murder, negligence or 
accident and was not offered for such a conclusion. Id. Other pieces of 
circumstantial evidence, such as the fact the body was concealed under water 
with cement blocks, provided proof of the corpus delicti. Therefore, Alcala does 
not support the proposition that a coroner's report is prima facie proof of a 
conclusion that the death was the result of criminal activity or accident. The 
offered instruction was properly refused.

III. 
Sufficiency of The Evidence

[¶37]   In his final argument, Relish 
asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle. Wyoming's aggravated homicide by vehicle statute can be 
found at W.S. 6-2-106(b) (Cum.Supp. 1993) and it provides, in relevant 
part:

(b) 
A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle * * * 
if

* 
* * * * *

(ii) 
He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the 
proximate cause of the death of another person.

[¶38]   This court applies an oft-repeated 
standard when reviewing claims of insufficient evidence. We view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State and determine whether it is sufficient to 
support a finding of a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶39]   The essence of Relish's argument is 
that his actions were not sufficiently egregious to constitute driving in a 
reckless manner. Although reckless is not defined in the criminal 
code, the term recklessly is defined as follows:

A 
person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the 
harm results. The risk shall be of such nature and degree that disregarding it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation[.]

W.S. 
6-1-104(a)(ix) (1988). This definition is a fair statement, long accepted in 
law, and a reasonable definition of what the legislature intended as behavior 
that would constitute driving in a reckless manner.

[¶40]   At trial the State was able to 
demonstrate that: (1) Relish was travelling I-80, a road he had driven often, 
during a snow storm at a minimum speed of 45 miles per hour and perhaps as high 
as 60 miles per hour; (2) the safe speed in those conditions was 20-25 miles per 
hour; (3) Relish was in a hurry to deliver a load of perishable vegetables to 
Wisconsin and unconcerned about being involved in a collision; (4) Relish drove 
his truck completely off the paved portion of the interstate onto the shoulder 
where he slammed into a parked vehicle with its hazard lights on, crushing the 
car and Tom Neal with it; and (5) Relish continued down the interstate 
approximately one mile until his semi would go no further. Relish, as an 
experienced interstate truck driver, was well aware of the dangerousness of 
winter weather conditions on this section of I-80, yet he pushed his 80,000 
pound semi at unsafe speeds. These facts are sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Relish was operating his semi 
in a reckless manner.

CONCLUSION

[¶41]   Because we find that the prosecutor 
did not commit a Brady violation regarding witnesses Daily and Nagle, the 
district court acted properly in denying Relish's request for an instruction 
based on Alcala, and there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
driving in a reckless manner, Relish's conviction is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii) provides:

(b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) 
years, if:

* * * * * *

(ii) He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his 
conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another 
person.