Title: State v. Robert A. Mendoza

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0952-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Robert A. Mendoza,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 803, 584 N.W.2d 174 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 13, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Laurence Gram 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert A. Mendoza,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The State of Wisconsin (State) 
seeks review of the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Mendoza, 220 Wis. 2d 803, 584 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998), which 
reversed Robert A. Mendoza's (Mendoza) conviction on grounds 
that the circuit court erred when it removed four prospective 
jurors for cause.  The issues presented are whether the circuit 
court erroneously removed the four jurors because they had been 
convicted of crimes, and, if so, whether automatic reversal of 
Mendoza's conviction is required. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶2 
The facts are not in dispute.  Mendoza was charged 
with possessing a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to 
deliver, as a second or subsequent offense, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 161.41(3m) (1993-94).1  A three day trial, beginning 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
2 
August 29, 1996, was held in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Laurence C. Gram, presiding. 
 
¶3 
The relevant facts concern jury selection, not the 
actual trial.  After the State completed its examination of the 
jury panel as a whole, five prospective jurors were examined in 
chambers.  The examination revealed that four of the jurors had 
been convicted of crimes and one had a brother-in-law who had 
been convicted of a drug offense. 
 
¶4 
The first prospective juror called into chambers, 
Crane C. (Juror Number Two), was arrested on April 5, 1996, for 
misdemeanor possession of cocaine.  He pled guilty to the charge 
in Milwaukee County and was sentenced to 16 days in jail with 
Huber privileges starting September 19, 1996.  Crane C. assured 
the court that he could be fair to both the prosecutor and 
Mendoza and render a decision based on the facts of the case. 
 
¶5 
The second juror, Douglas F. (Juror Number 12), 
revealed that his brother-in-law was arrested and convicted of 
cocaine possession in California the previous year.  Douglas F. 
stated that he could not ignore his experience with his brother-
in-law but would try to be fair and impartial.2  
                     
2 The record reveals that Douglas F. did not serve on the 
jury.  He was not struck for cause.  Therefore, it can be 
assumed that he was eliminated from the jury pool through the 
use of a peremptory strike by either the State or Mendoza.  
Since Douglas F. was neither convicted of a crime himself 
nor struck for cause, he is not a focus of our review.  Only the 
four jurors who themselves were convicted of crimes are the 
subject of our review. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
3 
 
¶6 
The third juror, James M. (Juror Number 19), disclosed 
that he had been convicted in Milwaukee County of armed robbery 
in 1966 and convicted of two misdemeanors (carrying a concealed 
weapon and resisting an officer) in 1982 or 1983.  He stated 
that he believed his sentence for the armed robbery was too 
stiff and that the sentence still bothered him.  He said he felt 
he should not have been arrested for the incident in the early 
1980s.  Nevertheless, James M. stated that he thought he could 
be impartial to both the State and Mendoza if he was chosen to 
sit as a juror. 
 
¶7 
The fourth juror, Ike S. (Juror Number 11), disclosed 
he had been convicted of burglary in Alabama about 30 years 
before.  He stated he had no problem with the manner in which 
the police or the prosecutor's office handled the situation.  
Ike S. stated that he knew he could be fair sitting as a juror. 
 
¶8 
The fifth prospective juror, Luciano R. (Juror Number 
9), revealed he was convicted of burglary in 1994 in New York 
and incarcerated for eighteen months.  He claimed he did not 
commit the burglary and that the woman who owned the burglarized 
building did not like him and falsely accused him of the 
burglary.  He also stated that he thought people are set up by 
others who don't like them.  Luciano R. assured the court that 
his case would not affect Mendoza's case. 
 
¶9 
After the defendant's examination of the jury pool, 
the assistant district attorney asked the circuit court to 
strike for cause the four prospective jurors who had been 
convicted of crimes: 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
4 
 
MR. BENKLEY: [Assistant District Attorney]:  Your 
Honor, I believe we have three persons who are 
convicted felons on the jury and I feel that that 
history itself is 
sufficient for 
striking 
those 
persons for cause.  I think specifically Mr. [R.], Mr. 
[M.], and Mr. [S.].  Additionally Mr. [C.] has been 
recently convicted of possession of cocaine, has not 
yet even served his sentence and . . . must report for 
his 
sentence 
to 
incarceration 
at 
the 
House 
of 
Corrections on September I believe he said 19th, 
roughly three or four weeks from now or [three] weeks 
from now.  Although he articulated it wouldn't affect 
him I'm just very uncomfortable with that situation. 
 
¶10 Mendoza's counsel objected, stating: 
 
MR. MALONE [Defense Counsel]:  For the record, Judge, 
I would object to the individuals that the State has 
requested that there be a challenge for cause to 
because I think during the individual voir dire that 
was conducted they said that they basically could be 
fair by the law.  I think that the inference here is 
that a person has been convicted of a felony and that, 
therefore, they somehow do not qualify for service on 
a jury is something analogous to saying that if there 
is a case involving police officers, if somebody who 
is sitting on the jury panel is a police officer, that 
they are not qualified and I think the Court has 
already ruled – the courts in this state, trial court 
has ruled that's not so. 
 
. . .  
 
Here we have a situation where we have three – four 
people, three involving felony offenses.  I believe 
all except for Mr. [R.], Number Nine, who pled guilty 
and so these are people that despite their convictions 
and despite maybe that they aren't particularly happy, 
accepted 
their responsibility 
and 
for 
that 
they 
received a conviction.  That does not automatically 
disqualify them because they haven't – they haven't 
said anything in response to questioning during voir 
dire that has left any reason to doubt their ability 
to be fair and impartial. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
5 
 
¶11 Judge Gram granted the State's motion to strike, 
stating: 
 
THE COURT:  Well, let me say this as a general 
proposition.  That I was concerned as a I heard some 
of the responses to the questions about the panel as a 
whole.  I felt there were an unusual number of people 
that had perhaps problems who indicated that they 
might have difficulty being fair and that bothers me, 
the 
number, 
because 
many 
times 
I 
have 
denied 
challenges for cause and pointed out that we have 
peremptory challenges and they are for a reason and to 
a certain extent that's true but when I get this 
number it bothers me. 
 
 
So, I tell you what I'm going to do.  This is a 
matter that goes to the broad discretion of the Court. 
 We have a panel here of 25 people.  We have five 
people challenged.  If we strike all five people, we 
will have – we have got – we are left with 20.  We 
still have the basis of selecting a jury and I think, 
if we select a jury from those 20, we are more likely 
to have a fair and impartial jury than if we – than if 
I simply – I think I could either accept all of them, 
I could summarily deny all of them.  In this case I'm 
going to accept all of them which means that we will 
strike Juror Number Two [Crane C.], Juror Number Six 
[Jacqueline D.],3 Juror Number Nine [Luciano R.], Juror 
                     
3 Jacqueline D. disclosed that her son had pled guilty to 
felony distribution of illegal substances, served time in April 
for the offense, and was on parole.  She stated that she felt 
her son was treated fairly by the system but that the experience 
was very recent and she was still bitter about it.  She stated 
she may not have been able to be fair to the State or to 
Mendoza. 
Mendoza's attorney challenged prospective juror Jacqueline 
D. for cause.  He asserted that Jacqueline D. was not sure she 
could be fair to the State or Mendoza. 
Jacqueline D., like prospective juror Douglas F., is not a 
focus of our review because she was not herself convicted of a 
crime.  Our focus remains on those prospective jurors who were 
convicted of crimes and struck for that reason. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
6 
Number Eleven [Ike S.], Juror Number 19 [James M.] and 
we proceed to select the jury from the balance.  I 
don't think we have to do any changing of positions or 
anything like that.  Everybody knows who we struck and 
at this point except for those we have struck, 
everybody is part of the basic panel. 
 
¶12 After the court struck these five prospective jurors, 
the parties exercised their peremptory strikes.  The remaining 
jurors then sat as the jury that heard Mendoza's case. 
¶13 Mendoza was convicted of possessing a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver as a second or subsequent 
offense.  He appealed and the court of appeals reversed, holding 
in part that the circuit court "failed to exercise its 
discretion by removing the four jurors for cause, solely because 
each had been convicted of a crime."  Mendoza, 220 Wis. 2d at 
813-14.  The court of appeals concluded: 
 
§ 972.03 grants each side not only the right to four 
peremptory challenges of its own, but also the right 
that the other side not be entitled to more than four 
peremptory challenges.  Furthermore, we conclude that 
by erroneously granting the State's request to remove 
four jurors for cause, the trial court effectively 
granted 
the 
State 
four 
additional 
peremptory 
challenges.  By effectively granting the State eight 
peremptory 
challenges, 
the 
trial 
court 
deprived 
Mendoza 
of 
his 
statutorily 
created 
right 
under 
§ 972.03 that each side be "entitled to only 4 
peremptory challenges."  Therefore, we conclude that 
the trial court's erroneous removal of the four jurors 
requires reversal of Mendoza's conviction. 
Id. at 816. 
ANALYSIS 
 
¶14 This case presents the flip side of State v. Ramos, 
211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997).  In Ramos, we were faced 
with a situation in which the circuit court failed to dismiss a 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
7 
prospective juror for cause when the prospective juror should 
have been struck.  This failure caused the defendant to use one 
of his peremptory strikes.  We concluded that "the use of a 
peremptory challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate 
grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the 
defendant of a statutorily granted right."  Id. at 14. 
 
¶15 In this case, the circuit court did not fail to 
dismiss a prospective juror who should have been struck for 
cause; it struck four prospective jurors who arguably should not 
have been struck for cause.  Mendoza argues that when the 
circuit court improperly struck four jurors on grounds that they 
had been convicted of a crime, it allowed the State eight 
peremptory challenges while he was allowed only four. 
I. 
 
¶16 We first examine whether the circuit court committed 
error when it struck four prospective jurors for cause because 
they had criminal records. 
A. 
 
¶17 The 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Wisconsin's 
Constitution guarantee an accused an impartial jury.  U.S. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
8 
Const. amends. VI and XIV; Wis. Const., art. I, § 7.4  To ensure 
an impartial jury, Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) provides for juror 
disqualification if a prospective juror "is not indifferent in 
the case."   
¶18 This court has stressed that even the appearance of 
bias should be avoided.  State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 478, 
457 N.W.2d 484 (1990); see also State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 
481, 503, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998); Nolan v. Venus Motors, Inc., 64 
Wis. 2d 215, 223, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974); Kanzenbach v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956).  
In Louis, Justice Bablitch wrote in dissent that "It is the 
appearance of partiality that gives great pause.  Jurors must 
not only be fair and impartial; they must also not have a 
relationship to either side which leaves doubt about their 
impartiality."  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 486.  
¶19 In State v. Faucher, No. 97-2702-CR (S. Ct. July 8, 
1999) (of even date), we clarified the terms we intend to use 
when examining juror bias.  A prospective juror is biased, and 
should therefore be removed for cause, if the prospective juror 
                     
4 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed. . . ."  Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, 
§ 7, provides in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense 
shall have been committed. . . ."  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
9 
is (1) statutorily biased, (2) subjectively biased, or (3) 
objectively biased.  Faucher, No. 97-2702-CR, op. at 13. 
STATUTORY BIAS 
¶20 A prospective juror is statutorily biased if the 
prospective juror falls into one of the statutorily-recognized 
groups in Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1). Prospective jurors are 
statutorily biased if they are related by "blood or marriage to 
any party or to any attorney appearing in the case" or "[have] 
any financial interest in the case."  § 805.08(1).5  "Statutory 
bias is a conclusion of law premised on the belief that certain 
relationships are so inherently prone to partiality that an 
individual case-by-case inquiry is not worth the time or 
effort."  State v. Kiernan, No. 97-2449-CR, op. at 8 (S. Ct. 
July 8, 1999) (of even date).  Whether a prospective juror is 
statutorily biased and should be dismissed for cause involves 
the application of a statute to specific facts.  This is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo. Id. 
SUBJECTIVE BIAS 
                     
5 We note that Wis. Stat. § 756.02 defines others who are 
qualified to serve as jurors.  Section 756.02 states: 
Every resident of the area served by a circuit court 
who is at least 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen and 
able to understand the English language is qualified 
to serve as a juror in that circuit unless that 
resident has been convicted of a felony and has not 
had his or her civil rights restored. 
 
By clear implication, a non-resident, a person less than 18 
years of age, a non-citizen, and a person not able to understand 
English are not qualified to serve. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
10
¶21 A prospective juror is subjectively biased if the 
record reflects that the juror is not a reasonable person who is 
sincerely willing to set aside any opinion or prior knowledge 
that the prospective juror might have.  Id. at 8.  In Faucher, 
we stated that "subjective bias refers to the bias that is 
revealed by the prospective juror on voir dire:  it refers to 
the prospective juror's state of mind."  Faucher, No. 97-2702-
CR, op. at 15.  "Subjective bias" leads to a judicial 
determination that the juror is biased in fact.  Subjective bias 
is usually discerned from the prospective juror's verbal 
responses to questions as well as the juror's demeanor in giving 
those responses.  Kiernan, No. 97-2449-CR, op. at 8.  "These 
observations are best within the province of the circuit court." 
 Id.  Therefore, whether a prospective juror is subjectively 
biased is a factual determination of the circuit court that will 
be upheld unless the decision is clearly erroneous. 
OBJECTIVE BIAS 
¶22 A prospective juror is objectively biased if "a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
prospective 
juror's 
position 
objectively could not judge the case in a fair and impartial 
manner."  State v. Erickson, No. 98-0273-CR, op. at 18 (S. Ct. 
July 8, 1999) (of even date).  As an example, when there is 
evidence from voir dire that a prospective juror had formed an 
opinion or had prior knowledge, a court must ask if a reasonable 
person in the juror's position could set aside the opinion or 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
11
prior knowledge.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 498.6  A court's 
determination of whether a prospective juror is objectively 
biased is a mixed question of fact and law.  Faucher, No. 97-
2702-CR, op. at 18.  An appellate court should give weight to 
the circuit court's determination that a prospective juror is or 
is not objectively biased.  Id. at 19.  An appellate court will 
not reverse a circuit court's conclusion unless as a matter of 
law a reasonable judge could not have reached such a conclusion. 
 Id.  However, unlike the situation addressed in Faucher, a 
circuit court's determination that a group of people with 
similar characteristics is objectively biased is a question of 
law that we review de novo. 
 
¶23 In this case, the assistant district attorney asked 
the circuit court to strike four prospective jurors with 
criminal convictions.  The circuit court granted the request and 
indicated that a fair and impartial jury would be more likely by 
striking these jurors.  By granting the State's request and 
striking the four prospective jurors for cause, the circuit 
court equated criminal conviction with cause.  That was an error 
of law.  
 
¶24 Both the United States Supreme Court and this court 
have been reluctant to exclude groups of persons from serving as 
                     
6 Although a prospective juror may not have formed any 
opinion or have any prior knowledge about the case, the juror 
may have such ingrained attitudes about the subject of the case 
that a reasonable person in the juror's position objectively 
could not set aside his or her views and judge the case in a 
fair and impartial manner.  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
12
petit jurors as a matter of law.  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 479; 
Nolan, 64 Wis. 2d at 223 (court refused to discharge all present 
or former employees of Sentry Insurance Company or their 
spouses).  Rather, the circuit court has been given broad 
discretion to scrutinize and remove individual jurors in order 
to ensure that the final jury is impartial.  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 
at 479. 
¶25 We concluded in Louis that "law enforcement officials 
of the jurisdiction where the crime was committed should not be 
automatically disqualified from the petit jury as a matter of 
law."  Id. at 474.  "We see no rational reason why the question 
of whether individual law enforcement officials can serve 
impartially on the petit jury should be removed from the circuit 
court's discretion.  Law enforcement officials are not among 
those groups the legislature has expressly excluded from jury 
service."  Id. at 479-80. 
 
¶26 Under the laws of this state, criminal convictions do 
not automatically disqualify prospective jurors.7  In 1996, Wis. 
Stat. § 756.01 provided that a prospective juror had to be an 
                     
7 This rule is contrary to common law.  In Nolan v. Venus 
Motors, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 223-24, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974), 
Chief Justice Hallows quoted from Brown v. Woolverton, 121 So. 
404, 406 (Ala. 1928):  "[A]t common law the grounds for 
challenge were classified under four heads . . . (4) challenges 
propter delictum are for some misdemeanor or crime which affects 
the juror's credit and renders him infamous, as for conviction 
of treason, felony, perjury, or conspiracy."  See also McCarten 
v. Connecticut Co., 131 A. 505, 508 (Conn. 1925), where the 
court noted that at common law a challenge would lie "for want 
of qualifications, as for . . . a prior conviction for certain 
infamous crimes . . ." 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
13
elector of the state.8  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.03(1)(b) provides 
that persons convicted of treason, felony, or bribery cannot be 
electors unless their civil rights are restored.  A person's 
civil rights are restored, and the person is therefore an 
elector eligible to be a prospective juror, by serving out his 
or her term of imprisonment or otherwise satisfying his or her 
sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 304.078.   
 
¶27 We conclude that the circuit court erred when it 
granted the State's request to strike four prospective jurors 
for cause solely because they had been convicted of crimes.  The 
court did not find that the four individual jurors were 
statutorily biased, subjectively biased, or objectively biased. 
 Instead, the circuit court excluded an entire suspect group 
from serving as jurors.9   
¶28 The court may have considered that the prospective 
jurors convicted of crimes were, as a group, objectively biased, 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.01 was vacated by the repeal and 
recreation of Wis. Stat. §§ 756.001 to 756.03 by S. Ct. Order 
96-08, effective July 1, 1997.  See, now, Wis. Stat. § 756.02 
(1997-98).  
9 State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992), is 
the only case in which this court excluded an entire group of 
persons from serving as jurors.  In Gesch, we held that 
"prospective jurors who are related to a state witness by blood 
or marriage to the third degree . . . must be struck from the 
jury panel on the basis of implied bias."  Id. at 662.  Under 
the terms recently adopted, the court in Gesch in effect 
recognized that the specific class of persons in question were 
objectively biased regardless of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances and the particular prospective juror's assurances 
of impartiality.  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
14
but such a determination would have been in conflict with the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  We see no reason why a circuit court judge 
should not be able to determine individually whether prospective 
jurors convicted of crimes may serve impartially.  But the 
court's blanket decision to strike a class of jurors was an 
error of law. 
B. 
¶29 Our review of the circuit court's decision to strike 
the four prospective jurors does not stop there.  We review the 
record, juror by juror, to determine if it supports striking the 
four prospective jurors for cause. 
¶30 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
circuit court found any of the four jurors statutorily biased.  
Such a determination, if made, would have been an error of law. 
 A 
prospective 
juror 
is 
statutorily 
biased 
only 
if 
the 
prospective juror is "related by blood or marriage to any party 
or to any attorney appearing in the case or has any financial 
interest in the case."  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  The record 
contains no evidence that any of the prospective jurors struck 
for cause were related to any party or attorney in the case or 
had a financial interest in the case. 
¶31 There is also nothing in the record to suggest that 
the circuit court found the four jurors subjectively biased.  A 
prospective juror must be struck for cause if the juror's state 
of mind reveals that the juror is biased in fact.  Here the 
record reveals that each of the four prospective jurors assured 
the attorneys and the court that he could be fair and impartial. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
15
 After assessing their honesty and credibility during voir dire, 
the circuit court made no individual assessment that any juror 
was subjectively biased. 
¶32 Finally, a prospective juror should be struck for 
cause if he or she is objectively biased.  As stated earlier, a 
prospective juror is objectively biased if "a reasonable person 
in the prospective juror's position objectively could not judge 
the case in a fair and impartial manner."  Erickson, No. 98-
0273-CR, op. at 18.  We examine the four individual prospective 
jurors to determine whether the record supports a decision by 
the circuit court to strike them as objectively biased.   
¶33 Crane C. had recently pled guilty to a charge of 
misdemeanor possession of cocaine and was sentenced to 16 days 
in jail.  Crane C. expected to report to the Milwaukee House of 
Correction for incarceration within three weeks from the time he 
was questioned during voir dire.  The facts in the record 
support a finding that Crane C. was objectively biased.  
¶34 A reasonable judge could have concluded that Crane C. 
was not impartial because of his status as a recently convicted 
drug offender.  He pled guilty to a cocaine charge within 
several months of appearing for Mendoza's cocaine trial and was 
about to serve his own sentence three weeks later.  Crane C. was 
not a person convicted of a crime 30 years ago; he was a 
potential juror whose contact with the criminal justice system 
was recent and continuing.  
 
¶35 The facts in the record support a finding that James 
M. was objectively biased.  James M. not only disclosed that he 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
16
had been convicted in Milwaukee County of armed robbery in 1966 
and then two misdemeanors in 1982 or 1983 but also stated that 
he believed his sentence was too stiff for the armed robbery 
charge and that the sentence still bothered him.  James M. 
further stated that he felt he should not have been arrested for 
the incident in the early 1980s involving a concealed weapon and 
resisting an officer.10  Mendoza's defense attorney admitted that 
James M. was among those jurors not "particularly happy" about 
his brush with the criminal justice system.  The juror's 
statements provided evidence of residual hostility. 
¶36 A person who is still bothered by the length of his 
sentence and does not accept responsibility for his actions many 
years after being convicted of a felony may not be impartial.  
Because this court has stressed that even the appearance of bias 
should be avoided, Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478, we find that the 
record supports a judicial decision to strike James M. for cause 
as an objectively biased juror. 
¶37 Similarly, a reasonable judge could have concluded 
that Luciano R. was objectively biased.   Luciano R. revealed he 
was convicted of burglary in 1994 in New York and incarcerated 
for eighteen months.  He stated that he did not commit the 
                     
10 The circuit court did not know the nature of the 
concealed weapon, but the circuit court would have known that if 
the concealed weapon had been a firearm, the juror could have 
been charged with a felonyfelon in possession of a firearm.  
Wis. Stat. § 941.29.  The circuit court did not know the nature 
of the resisting charge, but it might have considered the 
possibility that the juror lied to the police.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
17
burglary and that the woman who owned the burglarized building 
did not like him and accused him falsely.  He also stated that 
he thought people are set up by others who do not like them.  
Right or wrong, Luciano R. was not accepting responsibility for 
his conduct; he was still showing resentment.  
¶38 A person who believes he was once set up and that 
others are set up for crimes may not be an impartial juror.  We 
find that, like James M., the record supports a decision to 
strike Luciano R. for cause as an objectively biased juror.  We 
could not say that no reasonable judge could reach that 
conclusion, especially a judge trying to avoid the appearance of 
bias. 
 
¶39 Ike S. stands in sharp contrast to the other three 
prospective jurors.  Ike S. disclosed that he pled guilty to 
burglary in Alabama about 30 years before.  Unlike James M. and 
Luciano R., Ike S. stated he had no problem with the manner in 
which the police or prosecutor handled the case.  There was no 
indication that he harbored any negative feelings that would 
affect his impartiality.  
¶40 A prospective juror convicted of a crime more than 30 
years earlier who does not harbor any apparent negative feelings 
after his run-in with the criminal justice system cannot be 
labeled as objectively biased.  No reasonable judge could have 
concluded that Ike S. was objectively biased. 
¶41 The trial court improperly struck the four prospective 
jurors for cause as a class on grounds that they were convicted 
criminals.  While three of the four prospective jurors could 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
18
have been struck for cause individually as objectively biased 
jurors, the other prospective juror, Ike S., was struck 
erroneously as the record revealed no factual or legal grounds 
for his dismissal. 
II. 
 
¶42 Having determined that the circuit court erred by 
removing prospective juror Ike S., we must determine whether 
automatic reversal is required.   
¶43 Mendoza claims, and the court of appeals held, that 
improperly granting the State's motion to remove a prospective 
juror for cause effectively granted the State four additional 
peremptory challenges and deprived Mendoza of his statutorily 
created right to an equal number of peremptory strikes.  The 
court of appeals held that under Ramos such a deprivation 
requires reversal of Mendoza's conviction.  See Mendoza, 220 
Wis. 2d at 816. 
 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.03 provides, in part:  "Each 
side is entitled to only 4 peremptory challenges except as 
otherwise provided in this section. . . ."  (emphasis supplied) 
 We agree with the conclusion that "by using the word 'only,' 
the legislature clearly intended to limit each side to four, and 
only four, peremptory challenges."  Mendoza, 220 Wis. 2d at 816. 
 We also agree that "§ 972.03 grants each side not only the 
right to four peremptory challenges of its own, but also the 
right that the other side not be entitled to more than four 
peremptory challenges."  Id. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
19
 
¶45 We do not agree, however, that the circuit court 
effectively 
granted 
the 
State 
four 
additional 
peremptory 
challenges and deprived Mendoza of his statutorily created right 
to equality, requiring reversal of his conviction. 
 
¶46 The circuit court erred as to only one prospective 
juror.  After reviewing the law, we conclude that the erroneous 
dismissal did not grant the State an additional peremptory 
strike. 
 
¶47 Challenging a juror for cause is different from 
removing a juror through a peremptory strike.  There are no 
limits on challenges for cause.  A defendant may move for a 
change of the place of trial on grounds that an impartial jury 
cannot be had in the county.11  This amounts to challenging the 
county's entire jury pool for cause.  Normally, of course, 
challenges for cause are targeted to remove prospective jurors 
"on a narrowly specified, provable, and legally cognizable basis 
of partiality."  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), 
overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986).  Because of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, challenging a juror for cause frequently implicates 
constitutional rights. 
 
¶48 Peremptory challenges are qualitatively different.  
Peremptory 
strikeschallenges 
without 
cause, 
without 
explanation, and without judicial scrutinyafford a suitable and 
necessary method of securing juries which in fact and in the 
                     
11 See Wis. Stat. § 971.22(1).  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
20
opinion of parties are fair and impartial.  Swain, 380 U.S. at 
212.12 
 
The persistence of peremptories and their extensive 
use demonstrate the long and widely held belief that 
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by 
jury. . . .  The function of the challenge is not only 
to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but 
to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they 
try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence 
placed before them, and not otherwise.  In this way 
the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its 
high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice.'" In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136. 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. 
¶49 In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988), the 
Supreme Court described peremptory challenges as "a means to 
achieve the end of an impartial jury."  Because peremptory 
challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the 
Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of 
peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and 
the manner of their exercise.  Id. at 89. 
¶50 In Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1998), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial 
court had erroneously granted the State's challenge to a 
prospective juror.  Id. at 390.  In response to the defendant's 
argument that the erroneous dismissal of the prospective juror 
                     
12 The phrase "without judicial scrutiny," lifted from the 
Swain case, is no longer valid.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 100 (1986).  Even peremptory challenges can raise 
questions. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
21
effectively granted the State an extra peremptory, the court 
stated: 
 
Challenges for cause go to legal qualifications of 
jurors, whereas peremptory challenges are used to 
eliminate jurors who are thought (or felt) to be 
undesirable on a partisan evaluation.  A juror's 
disqualification 
is 
not 
related 
to 
the 
juror's 
desirability.  It is especially wrong to equate the 
State's challenge for cause to a peremptory challenge, 
because 
the 
State 
has 
the 
right 
to 
challenge 
disqualified jurors even when their disqualifications 
might seem to make them favor the State. 
Id. at 393. 
 
¶51 We agree with the Texas analysis.  A peremptory 
challenge entails the right to challenge a juror without 
assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the 
challenge.  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).  This is a 
self-interested act designed to rid the jury panel of those who 
a party believes may be unreceptive to the party's position.  
Challenges 
for cause, 
on 
the other 
hand, 
seek a 
legal 
determination by the circuit court that the prospective juror in 
question is, under the law, unqualified or biased and should not 
serve on the jury.  These are two very distinct occurrences.   
¶52 The 
erroneous 
dismissal 
of 
a 
prospective 
juror 
constitutes an error by the court; it does not compute as a 
peremptory challenge by a party.  We decline to recognize the 
erroneous dismissal of a juror for cause as an additional 
peremptory challenge.  Consequently, the defendant was not 
denied an equal number of peremptory strikes. 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
22
¶53 In this case, both the defendant and the State had 
four peremptory strikes.  We agree with the court of appeals on 
the importance of maintaining an equal number of peremptory 
strikes in two-party cases.13  If we recognized erroneous 
dismissals for cause as extra peremptory challenges and directed 
new trials to deter such dismissals, our rule would adversely 
impact the State but not affect the defendant.14  Technically, 
both parties would be equal; but one party would be "more equal" 
than the other.  Moreover, there would be a chilling effect on 
the State's motions to strike because an erroneous dismissal 
would automatically require a new trial. 
¶54 Because we determine that the erroneous dismissal of a 
prospective juror does not result in an additional peremptory 
strike, the error by the circuit court did not deprive Mendoza 
of the right to an equal number of peremptory strikes.  Both 
Mendoza and the State exercised their four allotted peremptory 
challenges.  No right was violated by the court's error, and so 
reversal under Ramos is not available. 
 
¶55 Even if we recognized the erroneous dismissal of Ike 
S. as giving the State an extra peremptory challenge, we would 
decline to extend Ramos to these facts.   
                     
13 We note that, under Wis. Stat. § 972.03, individual 
defendants are not treated the same as the State when there are 
multiple defendants.   
14 We believe Jacqueline D. was properly removed for cause. 
 But the circuit court did not offer any particularized reason 
for her removal.  Consequently, her removal stands on the same 
footing as Crane C., James M., and Luciano R.  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
23
 
¶56 Ramos involved a defendant on trial for first degree 
intentional homicide.  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 14.  During voir 
dire, a prospective juror revealed that she could not be fair to 
the defendant.  Id.  The judge refused to believe the juror had 
admitted bias, refused to have the transcript read back in 
court, and refused to remove the prospective juror for cause.  
Ramos then struck the juror with one of his peremptories.  Id. 
at 14-15.  We found that the failure to dismiss the prospective 
juror for cause was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id. at 
16.  We ultimately concluded that "the use of a peremptory 
challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate grounds for 
reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of [the 
statutorily 
granted 
right 
to 
exercise 
all 
seven 
of 
his 
peremptory challenges]."  Id. at 24-25. 
 
¶57 This case presents the flip side of Ramos:  a court's 
erroneous dismissal of a prospective juror as opposed to a 
court's erroneous failure to dismiss.  The key distinction 
between Ramos and this case is the long-standing principle that 
courts should liberally grant requested strikes for cause.  We 
encourage circuit courts to liberally grant requested strikes 
for cause to avoid the appearance of bias.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 495-96; Ramos, 212 Wis. 2d at 29-30 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring); Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 
621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956) ("[B]ecause it preserves the 
appearance as well as the reality of an impartial trial, it is a 
good rule for the trial judge to honor challenges for cause 
whenever [the judge] may reasonably suspect that circumstances 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
24
outside the evidence may create bias or an appearance of bias on 
the part of the challenged juror.").   
¶58 In Ramos, the court's failure to follow this salutary 
principle deprived the defendant of his full complement of 
peremptory strikes.  In this case, the defendant was not 
required to correct an erroneous dismissal; he was allowed to 
use all his peremptory strikes as he saw fit and not required to 
use any to correct an error. 
 
¶59 There is another subtle yet important distinction 
between Ramos and this case.  In Ramos, the court's error solely 
affected the defendant's right.  In this case, the court's error 
affected two competing interests:  Mendoza's right to an equal 
number 
of 
strikes 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
important 
discretionary power to strike jurors to avoid the appearance of 
bias.  In the long run, a court's discretionary power to remove 
questionable jurors and avoid the appearance of bias outweighs 
the right of parties to an equal number of strikes.  Over time 
the court's discretionary power is likely to accomplish more to 
attain impartial juries than the exercise of peremptories. 
 
¶60 The United States Supreme Court has concluded that not 
every error, even constitutional error, requires automatic 
reversal of a conviction.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 22 (1967).  
The Supreme Court also has recognized that 
an 
erroneous 
dismissal 
of 
a 
prospective 
juror 
does 
not 
automatically 
require 
reversal 
if 
an 
impartial 
jury 
was 
impaneled.  In Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 
646 (1886), the Supreme Court stated: 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
25
 
[The prospective juror] was . . . challenged, and the 
allowance of the challenge constitutes the first error 
assigned. . . .  [I]f we regard the challenge as for 
cause, its allowance did not prejudice the company.  A 
competent and unbiased juror was selected and sworn, 
and the company had, therefore, a trial by an 
impartial jury, which was all it could demand. 
¶61 Several federal courts and numerous state courts have 
recognized the principle enunciated in Northern Pacific, and 
applied it in the criminal arena.15 
¶62 A defendant is entitled to fair and impartial jurors, 
not jurors whom he hopes will be favorable towards his position. 
 See Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 207-08, 253 N.W.2d 560 
(1934), overruled in part by State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 
27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).  A defendant's rights go 
to those who serve, not to those who are excused. 
¶63 We therefore hold that automatic reversal is not 
required when a circuit court erroneously grants a party's 
motion to strike a prospective juror for cause.  To hold 
                     
15 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 
1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 (1994); 
United States v. Prati, 861 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1988); Shettel 
v. United States, 113 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1940); State v. 
Walden, 905 P.2d 974, 988 (Ariz. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 
1146 (1996); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1997); Wheeler 
v. People, 165 P. 257, 258 (Colo. 1917); Wells v. State, 404 
S.E.2d 106, 107 (Ga. 1991); State v. Clark, 278 P. 776, 777-78 
(Idaho 1929); State v. Kendall, 203 N.W. 806, 807 (Iowa 1925); 
Hunt v. State, 583 A.2d 218, 234 (Md. 1990); State v. Hurst, 193 
N.W. 680, 682 (Minn. 1922); State v. Hill, 827 S.W.2d 196, 199 
(Mo. 1992); State v. Huffman, 296 P. 789, 790 (Mont. 1931); 
Bufford v. State, 26 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Neb. 1947); State v. 
Martinez, 278 P. 210, 210-11 (N.M. 1929); State v. Carson, 249 
S.E.2d 417, 423 (N.C. 1978); State v. Wells, 103 S.E. 515, 516 
(S.C. 1920); State v. Larkin, 228 P. 289, 289 (Wash. 1924).  
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
26
otherwise would undermine our long-standing assertion that 
circuit court judges should liberally grant requests to strike 
prospective jurors for cause.   
¶64 We stated in Ferron that "[t]he circuit courts are 
. . . advised to err on the side of striking prospective jurors 
who appear to be biased, even if the appellate court would not 
reverse their determinations of impartiality.  Such action will 
avoid the appearance of bias, and may save judicial time and 
resources in the long run."  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 503.  This 
continues to be sound policy.  
 
¶65 Reversal is not required in this case.  Instead, we 
employ a harmless error analysis.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 
provides that an error is harmless if it does not effect the 
substantial rights of the party seeking reversal of the 
judgment.  Section 805.18 is applicable to criminal cases 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 
525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  Mendoza concedes that an 
impartial jury convicted him.  His statutory right to an equal 
number of peremptory strikes was not violated by the erroneous 
dismissal of a prospective juror.  Therefore, we conclude the 
circuit court's error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
¶66 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
dismissed one of the four prospective jurors in question.  But 
this erroneous dismissal does not require a reversal of 
Mendoza's conviction.  The erroneous dismissal did not affect 
No. 97-0952-CR  
 
27
any of Mendoza's substantial rights and was therefore harmless. 
 We accordingly reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No. 97-0952-CR 
 
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