Title: Society Insurance v. LIRC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP3135 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Society Insurance and James Meyer, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Labor & Industry Review Commission and Gary 
Liska, 
          Defendants, 
Work Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale L. English   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was argued by David 
A. Hart III, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by James 
W. Goonan, Grace M. Kulkoski, and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, 
S.C., Madison, and oral argument by James W. Goonan. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, Eric 
J. Weiss, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and oral argument by James A. 
Friedman. 
 
 
 
2010 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP3135 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV449) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Society Insurance and James Meyer, Inc.,    
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents,   
 
 
v. 
 
Labor & Industry Review Commission and Gary 
Liska,   
 
 
Defendants, 
 
Work Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Dale L. English, judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes before 
us by certification from the court of appeals.  The certified 
question is:  "Whether retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as amended effective April 1, 2006, 
is unconstitutional." 
¶2 
On June 25, 1982, Gary Liska (Liska) sustained a work-
related injury to his right leg that required amputation below 
the knee.  Society Insurance Co. (Society), the insurer for 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
2 
 
James Meyer, Inc. (Meyer), paid worker's compensation benefits 
to Liska.  Society paid temporary total disability benefits 
intermittently from June 25, 1982 through June 12, 1990, and 
permanent partial disability benefits, which were paid in 
advance on February 18, 1983.  On February 25, 2004, Liska filed 
a claim for additional medical expenses.   
¶3 
Under the law in effect at the time of Liska's injury, 
Society's liability to pay Liska's benefits or treatment expense 
expired on June 12, 2002, pursuant to the 12-year statute of 
limitations.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4) (2003–04).1  Therefore, 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(4) (2003–04) states (emphasis 
added): 
The right of an employee, the employee's legal 
representative, or a dependent to proceed under this 
section shall not extend beyond 12 years from the date 
of the injury or death or from the date that 
compensation, other than treatment or burial expenses, 
was last paid, or would have been last payable if no 
advancement were made, whichever date is latest.  In 
the case of occupational disease, a traumatic injury 
resulting in the loss or total impairment of a hand or 
any part of the rest of the arm proximal to the hand 
or of a foot or any part of the rest of the leg 
proximal to the foot, any loss of vision, any 
permanent brain injury, or any injury causing the need 
for a total or partial knee or hip replacement, there 
shall be no statute of limitations, except that 
benefits or treatment expense becoming due after 12 
years from the date of injury or death or last payment 
of compensation shall be paid from the work injury 
supplemental benefit fund under s. 102.65 and in the 
manner provided in s. 102.66.  Payment of wages by the 
employer during disability or absence from work to 
obtain 
treatment 
shall 
be 
deemed 
payment 
of 
compensation for the purpose of this section if the 
employer knew of the employee's condition and its 
alleged relation to the employment. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
3 
 
any subsequent payments to Liska would have been paid from the 
Work Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund (the Fund).  See Wis. 
Stat. § 102.66(1) (2003–04).2  Subsequently, the legislature 
amended 
§§ 102.17(4) 
(2005-06)3 
and 
102.66(1) 
(2005-06),4 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.66(1) (2003–04) states (emphasis 
added): 
In 
the 
event 
that 
there 
is 
an 
otherwise 
meritorious 
claim 
for 
occupational 
disease, 
a 
traumatic injury resulting in the loss or total 
impairment of a hand or any part of the rest of the 
arm proximal to the hand or of a foot or any part of 
the rest of the leg proximal to the foot, any loss of 
vision, any permanent brain injury, or any injury 
causing the need for a total or partial knee or hip 
replacement, and the claim is barred solely by the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
under 
s. 
102.17(4), 
the 
department may, in lieu of worker's compensation 
benefits, 
direct 
payment 
from 
the 
work 
injury 
supplemental benefit fund under s. 102.65 of such 
compensation and such medical expenses as would 
otherwise be due, based on the date of injury, to or 
on behalf of the injured employee.  The benefits shall 
be 
supplemental, 
to 
the 
extent 
of 
compensation 
liability, to any disability or medical benefits 
payable from any group insurance policy whose premium 
is paid in whole or in part by any employer, or under 
any federal insurance or benefit program providing 
disability 
or 
medical benefits.  Death benefits 
payable under any such group policy do not limit the 
benefits payable under this section. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(4) (2005–06) states (emphasis 
added): 
Except as provided in this subsection, the right 
of an employee, the employee's legal representative, 
or a dependent to proceed under this section shall not 
extend beyond 12 years from the date of the injury or 
death or from the date that compensation, other than 
treatment or burial expenses, was last paid, or would 
have been last payable if no advancement were made, 
whichever date is latest. In the case of occupational 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
4 
 
effective April 1, 2006, and in so doing, shifted the burden of 
payment of an employee's benefits or treatment expense for 
                                                                                                                                                             
disease; a traumatic injury resulting in the loss or 
total impairment of a hand or any part of the rest of 
the arm proximal to the hand or of a foot or any part 
of the rest of the leg proximal to the foot, any loss 
of vision, or any permanent brain injury; or a 
traumatic injury causing the need for an artificial 
spinal disc or a total or partial knee or hip 
replacement, there shall be no statute of limitations, 
except that benefits or treatment expense for an 
occupational disease becoming due after 12 years from 
the date of injury or death or last payment of 
compensation shall be paid from the work injury 
supplemental benefit fund under s. 102.65 and in the 
manner provided in s. 102.66 and benefits or treatment 
expense for a traumatic injury becoming due after 12 
years from that date shall be paid by the employer or 
insurer.  Payment of wages by the employer during 
disability or absence from work to obtain treatment 
shall be deemed payment of compensation for the 
purpose of this section if the employer knew of the 
employee's condition and its alleged relation to the 
employment. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.66(1) (2005–06) states: 
In 
the 
event 
that 
there 
is 
an 
otherwise 
meritorious claim for occupational disease, and the 
claim is barred solely by the statute of limitations 
under s. 102.17(4), the department may, in lieu of 
worker's compensation benefits, direct payment from 
the work injury supplemental benefit fund under s. 
102.65 of such compensation and such medical expenses 
as would otherwise be due, based on the date of 
injury, to or on behalf of the injured employee.  The 
benefits shall be supplemental, to the extent of 
compensation liability, to any disability or medical 
benefits payable from any group insurance policy whose 
premium is paid in whole or in part by any employer, 
or under any federal insurance or benefit program 
providing 
disability 
or 
medical 
benefits. 
Death 
benefits payable under any such group policy do not 
limit the benefits payable under this section. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
5 
 
traumatic injuries becoming due after 12 years from the date of 
injury, death or last payment of compensation, from the Fund to 
the insurer or employer.  2005 Wis. Act 172, §§ 15, 62.  The 
parties 
concede, 
for 
purposes 
of 
this 
appeal, 
that 
the 
legislature intended such changes to apply retroactively, 
thereby requiring Society to pay Liska's benefits or treatment 
expense becoming due after June 12, 2002. 
¶4 
The Fund appeals an order of the circuit court 
declaring the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1) (2005–06),5 "unconstitutional as being violative of 
due process and the contract clause." 
¶5 
We conclude that the retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as amended effective April 1, 
2006, is unconstitutional as applied to Society for two reasons:  
(1) it violates Society's due process rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (2) it 
substantially 
impairs 
Society's 
contractual 
obligation 
in 
violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
                                                 
5 All references to Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), 
as amended effective April 1, 2006, are to the 2005–06 version 
of the statutes.  All other references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 2007–08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
6 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On June 25, 1982, Liska, while employed by Meyer, 
sustained a work-related injury that required amputation of his 
right leg below the knee.  For this traumatic injury, Society, 
Meyer's insurer, paid Liska worker's compensation benefits.  
Specifically, Society paid temporary total disability benefits 
to Liska intermittently from June 25, 1982 to June 12, 1990, 
totaling $6,873.08.  Society also paid permanent partial 
disability benefits to Liska, which accrued each week temporary 
total disability benefits were not paid.  Society admitted 
liability for 337.5 weeks (6.49 years) of permanent partial 
disability and paid such benefits in an advance lump on 
February 18, 1983, which, less the interest credit of $5,537.99, 
totaled $24,837.01.  It is undisputed that June 12, 1990 is the 
date of Society's last indemnity payment to Liska. 
¶7 
On February 25, 2004, Liska filed an additional 
worker's compensation claim for payment of treatment expenses 
totaling $14,364.94 plus transportation costs, along with an 
application for a hearing with the Department of Workforce 
Development 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Division 
(Department).  
Society answered alleging that Liska's claim was time-barred 
pursuant to the 12-year statute of limitations under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(4) (2003–04).  Accordingly, it denied Liska's claim, 
and directed Liska to submit his claim to the Fund pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 102.66(1) (2003–04).  On September 16, 2004, an 
administrative law judge issued an order declaring Liska's claim 
as to Society barred by the statute of limitations and directed 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
7 
 
the Fund to pay $3,322.43 for various expenses incurred by 
Liska. 
¶8 
On July 27, 2006, the Fund began forwarding Liska's 
treatment expense invoices to Society for payment.  Society 
filed an application for hearing.  An administrative law judge 
for the Department held a hearing on the matter.  On 
December 14, 2007, the Department issued an order concluding 
that pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) (2003–04) 
the 12-year statute of limitations ran on Liska's traumatic 
injury claim on June 12, 2002; however, 2005 Wis. Act 172, which 
amended §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), suspended the 12-year 
statute of limitations for a certain category of traumatic 
injuries shifting the burden of payment back to the insurer.  
Concluding that the amendments applied retroactively to Liska's 
claim, but expressly declining to rule on the constitutionality 
of the amendments, the Department concluded that "Society 
Insurance has liability for [Liska's] claim and is ordered to 
make payment of . . . medical expenses associated with this 
injury." 
¶9 
Society petitioned the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission 
(Commission) 
for 
review 
of 
the 
Department's 
interlocutory order.  On May 13, 2008, the Commission affirmed 
the findings and order of the Department.  It expressly declined 
to decide the constitutionality of the retroactive application 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) noting that "the 
Commission 
. . . 
has 
no 
authority 
to 
address 
the 
constitutionality of statutes it enforces." 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
8 
 
¶10 Society sought review of the Commission's decision in 
the circuit court.  On September 29, 2008, the circuit court 
concluded that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1), as amended effective April 1, 2006, to apply 
retroactively.  The circuit court further concluded "that the 
retroactive application of [§§ ]102.17(4) and 102.66(1) as 
amended effective 4/01/06 is unconstitutional as being violative 
of the contract clause and due process rights of Society."  
Accordingly, the circuit court directed the Fund to reimburse 
Society for any treatment expense Society paid to Liska after 
April 1, 2006, and declared "that the Fund shall be responsible 
for Mr. Liska's . . . medical expenses regarding the June 25, 
1982, injury from this point forward." 
¶11 In so concluding, the circuit court made several 
findings of fact.  First, in determining that the impairment of 
Society's contractual obligation was substantial, the circuit 
court calculated the treatment expenses Liska had submitted 
since the 12-year statute of limitations ran.  It found that in 
2004, "Liska submitted over $14,000 worth of expenses for 
payment" of which the Fund was ordered to pay approximately 
$3,300.  The circuit court further found that Liska submitted 
additional expenses in 2007 in the amount of $2,189.80 or 
$8,159.09, depending on whether Liska's health insurer was to be 
reimbursed.  The circuit court concluded that these were 
substantial expenses to impose on Society.  Second, the circuit 
court found that "there isn't any way for [Society] to address 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
9 
 
premiums to pay for currently existing expenses for claims where 
the statute of limitations has already run." 
¶12 The Fund appealed.  The court of appeals certified the 
appeal, which we accepted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2).6  
We now affirm the decision of the circuit court. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶13 Whether the retroactive application of a statute is 
constitutional presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  See Barbara B. v. Dorian H., 2005 WI 6, ¶8, 277 Wis. 2d 
378, 690 N.W.2d 849 (citing Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. 
Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160).  Although 
"'this 
court 
does 
defer 
to 
a 
certain 
extent' 
to 
the 
interpretation and application of the statute by the enforcing 
agency," we need not do so here because the enforcing agency 
expressly declined to rule on the constitutionality of the 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1), as amended.  Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 
401 N.W.2d 568 (1987) (quoting Pigeon v. DILHR, 109 Wis. 2d 519, 
525, 
326 
N.W.2d 
752 
(1982)). 
 
In 
determining 
whether 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) are unconstitutional, we will uphold 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.05(2) provides in relevant part:  
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or any 
other proceeding pending in the court of appeals if:  . . . [i]t 
grants direct review upon certification from the court of 
appeals prior to the court of appeals hearing and deciding the 
matter . . . ." 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
10 
 
the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  See id. at 184. 
B.  The Fund and 2005 Wis. Act 172 
¶14 To determine whether Society's constitutional rights 
have been violated by the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), some background on the Fund, 
including the changes implemented by 2005 Wis. Act 172, is 
necessary.   
¶15 The Fund, established under Wis. Stat. § 102.65, 
creates a source of supplemental worker's compensation benefits 
for certain cases in addition to the benefits the Worker's 
Compensation Act (the Act) requires an insurer "to pay to an 
employee who is injured or who dies in the course of his 
employment."  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, 
¶34, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  Additional monetary 
burdens are imposed on employers or insurers in certain 
circumstances "to pay dependent children of deceased employees 
and injured employees who would otherwise be undercompensated."  
Id., ¶36. 
¶16 We have concluded that the administration of the Fund 
is consistent with the overall purpose of the Act.  Id., ¶37. 
The fundamental purpose of the [Act] is to compensate 
injured employees.  The [Act] ensures employees 
smaller but more certain recoveries than might be 
available in tort actions, while employers are freed 
from the risk of large and unpredictable damage 
awards.  Accordingly, the [Act] balances the interests 
of employers and employees by ensuring a recovery 
sufficient to meet an employee's economic damages 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
11 
 
while 
keeping 
the 
expense 
of 
funding 
worker's 
compensation manageable for employers. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
¶17 "The Fund is financed by payments from employers or 
worker's compensation carriers."  Id., ¶35; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.65 ("[M]oneys payable to the state treasury under ss. 
102.35(1), 102.47, 102.49, 102.59, and 102.60, together with all 
accrued interest on those moneys, . . . shall constitute [the 
Fund].").  Employers and insurers are required to make payments 
upon the occurrence of certain specified events.  Payments must 
be made into the Fund as follows:  (1) a surcharge must be paid 
"of not less than $10 nor more than $100" for failing to keep 
records or make reports in accordance with the Act or for 
falsifying such records or reports, Wis. Stat. § 102.35(1); (2) 
"[i]n each case of injury resulting in death" $20,000 must be 
paid, Wis. Stat. § 102.49(5)(a); (3) "in each case of injury 
resulting in death leaving no person dependent for support," the 
amount of the entire death benefit must be paid, § 102.49(5)(b); 
(4) "in each case of injury resulting in death, leaving one or 
more persons partially dependent for support," the amount of the 
death benefit to a wholly dependent survivor less the death 
benefit to a partially dependent survivor must be paid, 
§ 102.49(5)(c); (5) "[i]n the case of the loss or of the total 
impairment of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye," $20,000 must be 
paid, Wis. Stat. § 102.59(2); and (6) in the case of an injury 
sustained by a minor illegally employed, amounts equal to or 
double the amount recoverable by the injured employee, but not 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
12 
 
exceeding $7,500 or $15,000 depending on the violation, must be 
paid, see Wis. Stat. § 102.60(1m)(a)–(d). 
¶18 The Fund distributes an additional death benefit to 
the minor children of an employee who dies as the result of an 
injury, see Wis. Stat. § 102.49(1), and makes payments for 
supplemental benefits or treatment expenses to claimants with 
certain meritorious claims that are barred solely by the 12-year 
statute of limitations, see Wis. Stat. § 102.66(1).  2005 Wis. 
Act 172 made changes to the class of meritorious claims barred 
by the statute of limitations that are eligible for payment 
distributed from the Fund. 
¶19 An employee is barred from proceeding against an 
employer or insurer if an application for a hearing is not filed 
within 12 years from the date of injury, death or the last 
payment of compensation was paid or would have been paid if no 
advancement was made, whichever date is latest.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(4) (2003–04); § 102.17(4) (2005–06).  2005 Wis. Act 172 
did not affect this provision. 
¶20 2005 Wis. Act 172 amended both Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1).  2005 Wis. Act 172, §§ 15, 62.  Prior to the 
passage of 2005 Wis. Act 172, § 102.17(4) (2003–04) provided 
that "[i]n the case of . . . a traumatic injury resulting in the 
loss or total impairment . . . of a foot or any part of the rest 
of the leg proximal to the foot, . . . there shall be no statute 
of limitations, except that benefits or treatment expense 
becoming due after" the 12-year statute of limitations has run 
"shall be paid from the [Fund]."  Additionally, § 102.66(1) 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
13 
 
(2003–04) provided that "[i]n the event that there is an 
otherwise meritorious claim for . . . a traumatic injury 
resulting in the loss or total impairment . . . of a foot or any 
part of the rest of the leg proximal to the foot, . . . and the 
claim is barred solely by the statute of limitations under s. 
102.17(4), the department may . . . direct payment from the 
[Fund]." 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(4), as amended, provides that 
"benefits or treatment expense for a traumatic injury becoming 
due after" the 12-year statute of limitations has run "shall be 
paid by the employer or insurer."  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.66(1), 
as amended, removes traumatic injuries from the class of 
"otherwise meritorious claim[s]" "barred solely by the statute 
of 
limitations 
under 
s. 
102.17(4)" 
that 
are 
entitled 
supplemental benefits from the Fund.  The amendments, enacted 
under 2005 Wis. Act 172, took effect April 1, 2006.  See 2005 
Wis. Act 172 ("Date of publication:  March 31, 2006"); Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 991.11 
(Unless 
an 
effective 
date 
is 
expressly 
prescribed, "[e]very act . . . shall take effect on the day 
after its date of publication."). 
¶22 Accordingly, Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as 
amended effective April 1, 2006, eliminated the 12-year statute 
of limitations for traumatic injuries and shifted the burden of 
payment of benefits or treatment expense becoming due after 12 
years from the date of the injury, death or last payment of 
compensation, from the Fund to the employer or insurer.  See 
Wis. Legislative Council Act Memo for 2005 Wis. Act 172, at ¶8 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
14 
 
(June 9, 
2006), 
available 
at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/data/lc_act/act172-sb474.pdf. 
C.  Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation  
as Applied to Society 
¶23 For purposes of this appeal, the parties concede that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as amended effective 
April 1, 2006, apply retroactively to Liska's claim. 
¶24 It is undisputed that under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4) 
(2003–04) the statute of limitations ran on June 12, 2002, 12 
years after Society made its last payment of compensation for 
temporary total disability benefits to Liska on June 12, 1990.7  
It is further undisputed that prior to 2005 Wis. Act 172, 
Liska's benefits or treatment expense coming due after June 12, 
2002, were payable from the Fund, see § 102.17(4) (2003–04) and 
Wis. Stat. § 102.66(1) (2003–04).  However, pursuant to the 
retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as 
                                                 
7 The statute of limitations runs "12 years from the date of 
the injury or death or from the date that compensation . . . was 
last paid, or would have been last payable if no advancement 
were made, whichever date is latest."  Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4) 
(emphasis added).  June 25, 1982, was the date of Liska's 
injury.  June 12, 1990, was the date Society made its last 
payment of compensation for temporary total disability benefits 
to Liska.  In addition to paying temporary total disability 
benefits, Society also admitted liability for 337.5 weeks, or 
6.49 years, of permanent partial disability benefits, which were 
paid in an advance lump sum on February 18, 1983.  If no 
advancement had been made, Society would have made its last 
payment to Liska in August 1989.  June 12, 1990, being the 
latest of the three dates, is used to calculate when the statute 
of limitations ran on Liska's claim.  See § 102.17(4).  As such, 
the statute of limitations ran on June 12, 2002, 12 years from 
June 12, 1990, the date that compensation was last paid. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
15 
 
amended, Liska's benefits or treatment expense coming due after 
June 12, 2002, must be paid by Society. 
¶25 Accordingly, Society and the Fund dispute only whether 
the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 
102.66(1), as applied to Society, is unconstitutional.  Society 
argues that the retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) and 
102.66(1), deprives it of a substantive property right without 
due process of law and substantially impairs its contractual 
obligation.  We agree with Society and conclude that the 
retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as 
amended effective April 1, 2006, unconstitutionally deprives 
Society of property without due process of law and violates the 
contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 
¶26 The 
legislature 
can 
pass 
a 
statute 
that 
has 
retroactive effect so long as it does not violate the federal or 
state constitution.  As with all legislation, "[r]etroactive 
legislation is presumed constitutional."  Barbara B., 277 
Wis. 2d 378, ¶17.  "This presumption is based on our respect for 
a co-equal branch of government and is meant to promote due 
deference to legislative acts."  Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶16, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 
344.  Because a facial constitutional challenge attacks the law 
itself as drafted by the legislature, claiming the law is void 
from 
its 
beginning 
to 
the 
end 
and 
that 
it 
cannot 
be 
constitutionally 
enforced 
under 
any 
circumstances, 
the 
presumption of constitutionality is proper.  State v. Wood, 2010 
WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
16 
 
¶27 Society, however, mounts an as-applied challenge,8 
claiming 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1) 
are 
unconstitutional as applied to Society.  In an as-applied 
challenge, our task is to determine whether the statute has been 
enforced in an unconstitutional manner.  While we presume a 
statute is constitutional, we do not presume that the State 
applies statutes in a constitutional manner.  Because the 
legislature plays no part in enforcing our statutes, "deference 
to legislative acts" is not achieved by presuming that the 
statute has been constitutionally applied.  Dane Cnty., 279 
Wis. 2d 169, ¶16.  As such, neither the challenger nor the 
enforcer of the statute face a presumption in an as-applied 
challenge.9  The challenger, however, has the burden of proof, a 
                                                 
8 That Society advanced an as-applied challenge here is 
evident from Society's briefs and oral argument.  Moreover, even 
if Society had advanced both a facial challenge and an as-
applied challenge, as the dissent asserts, dissent, ¶6 n.3, a 
"facial challenge should generally not be entertained when an 
'as-applied' challenge could resolve the case."  Colorado 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 
U.S. 604, 624 (1996) (citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323–
24 (1991)). 
9 The dissent improperly presumes the statutes in this case 
were constitutionally applied.  It states:  "Society has fallen 
far short of meeting its burden of overcoming the presumption of 
constitutionality, much less proving it unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Dissent, ¶10.  As we just explained, 
because Society is not mounting a facial challenge to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), it need not overcome the presumption 
of constitutionality.  Instead, Society has the burden of 
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statutes were 
applied to it in an unconstitutional manner. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
17 
 
concept distinct from the presumption of constitutionality.  
Society, as the challenger, has the burden of proving the 
statute, as applied to it, is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶18, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent further confuses the distinction between facial 
and as-applied challenges in faulting Society for its failure to 
put forth evidence estimating "how many claims Society would 
face from claimants who would be in the same position as the 
claimant here" and "the magnitude of future liability imposed on 
Society."  Dissent, ¶9.  Because these facts are absent, the 
dissent asserts that Society has failed to meets its burden of 
proving the statutes unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and therefore, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is necessary.  
Id., ¶10. 
Because Society makes an as-applied challenge, not a facial 
challenge, "we assess the merits of the challenge by considering 
the facts of the particular case in front of us, 'not 
hypothetical facts in other situations'" and determine whether 
"the challenger [] show[ed] that his or her constitutional 
rights were actually violated."  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13 
323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 (quoting State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 
113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785).  As such, evidence 
estimating the retroactive statutes' impact on other claims like 
Liska's that Society may face and the potential liability 
resulting from any such claims are facts outside "the particular 
case in front of us," id., and therefore, are not relevant.  The 
evidence presented by Society regarding the facts of this 
particular case is sufficient to demonstrate that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1) 
as 
applied 
to 
Society 
are 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
18 
 
1.  Due process 
¶28 The due process clauses of Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution10 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution11 protect individuals from being 
deprived of property without due process of law.  Barbara B., 
277 Wis. 2d 378, ¶18.  We have adopted a two-part test to 
determine whether retroactive statutes comport with due process.  
See id., ¶¶19–20.   
¶29 We first determine whether application of the statutes 
in question to the party challenging the statute actually has a 
retroactive effect.  Id., ¶20.  This inquiry turns on whether 
the challenging party has a "vested" right.  Id.  "'The concept 
of vested rights is conclusory——a right is vested when it has 
been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by statute.'"  
Id. (quoting Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14) (further internal 
quotations and citation omitted).   
                                                 
10 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "All people are born equally free and independent, 
and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty 
and 
the 
pursuit 
of 
happiness; 
to 
secure 
these 
rights, 
governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed." 
11 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides in relevant part:  "No State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
We have concluded that the due process clause in our state 
constitution is the "substantial equivalent" to its counterpart 
in the federal constitution.  Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. 
Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
19 
 
¶30 However, merely "identifying a substantive, or vested, 
property right is not dispositive for due process purposes."  
Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14.  After a vested property right has 
been identified, we employ the balancing test set forth in 
Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), which 
"examines whether the retroactive statute has a rational basis."  
Barbara B., 277 Wis. 2d 378, ¶19; Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶¶14–
15.  "Whether there exists a rational basis involves weighing 
the public interest served by retroactively applying the statute 
against the private interest that retroactive application of the 
statute would affect."  Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 
2001 WI 82, ¶27, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842 (citing Martin, 
192 Wis. 2d at 201).  The retroactive legislation must have a 
"'rational legislative purpose.'"12  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 192 
                                                 
12 We note that Neiman, and other cases following Neiman, 
require a showing of a "substantial" or "'significant and 
legitimate'" public purpose for retroactive legislation to 
survive a due process challenge.  Id., ¶23 (quoting Chappy v. 
LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 187, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987)).  Such a 
requirement is absent from our discussion because it is 
inconsistent with the rational basis test that applies to a due 
process challenge to retroactive legislation. 
In 
a 
contract 
clause 
challenge, 
"[t]he 
degree 
of 
[contractual] impairment determines the level of scrutiny to 
which the legislation in question will be subjected."  State ex 
rel. Cannon v. Moran, 111 Wis. 2d 544, 558, 331 N.W.2d 369 
(1983).  "[T]he requirement that there exist a significant and 
legitimate public interest arises only where there exists a 
substantial impairment [of a contractual obligation].  If the 
impairment is less than substantial, a diminished degree of 
scrutiny is required."  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 188. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
20 
 
(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 
U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).  To survive a due process challenge, the 
"public purpose . . . [must] outweigh[] the private interests 
. . . overturn[ed]" by the challenged legislation.  Neiman, 236 
Wis. 2d 411, ¶23 (citing Martin, 192 Wis. 2d 156); Matthies, 244 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶48 ("conclud[ing] that any public interest served 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
contrast, 
we 
review 
a 
due 
process 
challenge 
to 
retroactive legislation under a rational basis review.  Neiman, 
236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶9.  As such, "when a retroactive statute is 
challenged, the due process test [requires a] showing 'that the 
retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified 
by a rational legislative purpose.'"  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 192 
(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 
U.S. 717, 730 (1984)). 
In Neiman, we were confronted with whether retroactive 
legislation violated due process.  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶1.  
In that case we relied on Chappy's discussion of a public 
purpose that justifies a substantial impairment of contract in 
our discussion of the due process balancing test.  We explained: 
The balancing test employed in Chappy included an 
examination of the public purpose behind the statute.  
We stated that the public purpose must be "significant 
and legitimate" and "directed towards remedying a 
broad and general social or economic problem."  As in 
the Chappy analysis, the public purpose supporting 
retroactivity under a due process analysis must also 
be substantial, valid and intended to remedy a general 
economic or social issue. 
Id. at ¶23 (quoting Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187–88) (internal 
citations omitted). 
We conclude that requiring a showing of a "significant and 
legitimate public purpose" in the course of a due process 
challenge improperly subjects the retroactive legislation to a 
heightened level of scrutiny.  Retroactive legislation must be 
"justified by a rational legislative purpose."  Pension Benefit, 
467 U.S. at 730. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
21 
 
. . . is substantially outweighed by the impairment of Matthies' 
right to recover"); Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 211 ("conclud[ing] 
that the private interest outweighs the minimal public interest 
served by the retroactive application of the cap."). 
¶31 In Neiman, we were asked to determine whether the 
retroactive application of a statutory increase in recovery for 
the loss of society and companionship for wrongful death of a 
minor violated due process.  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶1.  At 
the time of the accident that caused Neiman's child to be 
stillborn, a statute limited damages for the loss of society and 
companionship of a minor child in a wrongful death action to 
$150,000.  Id., ¶1 & n.1.  Subsequently, the legislature 
increased the damages limit by statute to $500,000.  Id., ¶1 & 
n.2.  Because Wisconsin law provides that the amount of 
recovery, when set by statute, "is fixed on the date of injury," 
id., ¶13 (citing Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 206–07), we concluded 
that the insurer, American National Property and Casualty 
Company (American National), had "a right to a fixed exposure to 
liability that accrued on the date of the injury which would be 
adversely affected by retroactive application" of the change in 
statutory damage limits.  Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶20 
(discussing Neiman).  Accordingly, the retroactive increase in 
damages available "affect[ed] a substantive right," in regard to 
the amount of the payment, which vested on the date of the 
injury.  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶13. 
¶32 In applying the balancing test, we concluded that the 
retroactive 
legislation 
"unfairly 
overturn[ed] 
settled 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
22 
 
expectations."  Id., ¶22.  Specifically, we explained that 
American National had a private interest in having "its 
liability fixed on the date of injury," and on the date of 
injury, the insurer's exposure to liability for damages was not 
to exceed $150,000.  Id., ¶20.  Because American National's 
liability for damages increased to $500,000, the retroactive 
legislation "unsettled" American National's private interest in 
fixed liability.  Id. 
¶33 We 
further 
looked 
to 
whether 
the 
retroactive 
legislation swept away American National's settled expectations 
"'suddenly and without individualized consideration.'"  Id., ¶21 
(quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)).  
Insurers, such as American National, "reasonably rely upon the 
law as set forth by the courts and the legislature."  Id.  
Accordingly, the retroactive legislation "deprived [American 
National], as well as other defendants in tort actions, of a 
meaningful notice of the potential increase in exposure to 
claims or an opportunity to increase premiums to pay the expense 
of this increased exposure."  Id. 
¶34 We then turned to the second prong of the balancing 
test 
to 
determine 
"whether 
the 
public 
purpose 
for 
this 
retroactive application of the statute outweighs the private 
interests it overturns."  Id., ¶23.  We considered all of the 
public purposes identified by Neiman, the legislative history 
and the general context of wrongful death claims and concluded 
that while "the public interests identified would arguably 
support prospective application of an increase in damages . . ., 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
23 
 
these reasons provide[d] weak support for retroactive increases 
in damages."  Id., ¶¶24–30.  Because the public interests served 
did not outweigh the private interests overturned by retroactive 
application, we concluded "that the retroactive application of 
the statute violate[d] due process."  Id., ¶31.  
¶35 More recently, in Matthies, we were confronted with 
whether 
retroactive 
legislation 
"amending 
the 
statute 
on 
contributory negligence, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, to limit joint 
and several liability to a person found 51% or more causally 
negligent[,]" as applied to Matthies' negligence claim, violated 
due process.  Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶1.  Matthies' hand was 
injured by a punch press.  At the time of Matthies' injury, 
"joint and several liability was a common-law rule in Wisconsin 
which permitted a plaintiff to recover his or her damages from 
any one of two or more persons whose joint or concurring 
negligent acts caused the plaintiff's injury."  Id.  After 
Matthies' accident, but before he filed his negligence claim, 
the legislature amended § 895.045.   
¶36 In 
identifying 
the 
public 
interest 
served 
by 
retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045, we first noted 
that "there [was] nothing in the Legislative Reference Bureau's 
legislative drafting file which indicate[d] that the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 895.045 in response to a pressing, or 
otherwise, economic or social issue."  Id., ¶32.  Accordingly, 
we explained that "to determine, based on the legislative 
history available, what motivated the legislature to modify the 
doctrine, requires speculation."  Id.  As a result, we 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
24 
 
considered Positive Safety's contentions regarding the public 
interest served by retroactive application of the statute.  We 
rejected each of Positive Safety's contentions, concluding that 
they did not establish a public interest and that the record was 
devoid of any evidence in support of its contentions.  Id., 
¶¶33–36. 
¶37 In 
contrast, 
we 
concluded 
that 
"retroactive 
application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) would severely impair 
Matthies' right to recover all of his damages . . . without any 
real notice."  Id., ¶46.  At the time he was injured, Matthies 
was entitled to a full recovery of his damages from any 
defendant found causally negligent.  The amended statute had the 
potential to reduce Matthies' damages by 50 percent, possibly 
more.  Id., ¶¶46–47.  In balancing the respective interests, we 
concluded that "the substantial impairment of Matthies' right to 
recovery significantly outweigh[ed] the public interest, if any, 
served by retroactive application of § 895.045(1)."  Id., ¶47.  
"Accordingly, 
retroactive 
application 
of 
§ 895.045(1)'s 
modification 
of 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
[was] 
an 
unconstitutional violation of due process."  Id. 
¶38 Finally, our decisions establish the significance of 
an insurer's inability to recover from its insured, through 
increased 
premiums, 
losses 
resulting 
from 
retroactive 
legislation.  See Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 193–94; State ex rel. 
Briggs & Stratton v. Noll, 100 Wis. 2d 650, 657-58, 302 N.W.2d 
487 (1981).  In Chappy, we concluded that the retroactive 
application of Wis. Stat. § 102.43(7)(b), which increased the 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
25 
 
worker's compensation benefits of employees suffering a renewed 
period of temporary total disability, did not violate due 
process.  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 174–75.  In Chappy, we 
distinguished Noll, a case in which we concluded that the 
retroactive application of an increase in maximum worker's 
compensation benefits violated due process.  Noll, 100 Wis. 2d 
at 658.  We explained:  
In Noll we held that the challenged statute was 
unconstitutional because it retroactively affected the 
employer's obligation which already had been set by 
law.  Our conclusion was based upon the fact that 
there was no opportunity for the insurer, through 
increased premiums, to recover for statutorily imposed 
increased disability payments growing out of past 
events. 
Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 194 (internal citation omitted).  By 
contrast, the challenged statute in Chappy "create[d] new 
obligations with respect to past transactions, only upon the 
occurrence of a new, prospective event."  Id.  Because the 
triggering event was prospective, nothing prevented an insurer 
from seeking a rate increase based on the actuarial probability 
that a future claim, based on a past injury, would arise.  Id. 
¶39 We apply this background of constitutional principles 
to the challenged legislation.  We "'view[] statutes of 
limitations as substantive statutes[, which] create and destroy 
rights.'"  State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, ¶12, 261 Wis. 2d 139, 
661 N.W.2d 72 (quoting Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 172 
Wis. 2d 141, 149, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992)).  "'[T]he right which is 
subject to constitutional protection is that which vests at the 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
26 
 
time the statute runs, not before.'"  Id., ¶13 (quoting Ortman 
v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 225 N.W.2d 635 
(1975)).  As such, "'once a statute of limitations has run, the 
party relying on the statute has a vested property right in the 
statute-of-limitations defense, and new law which changes the 
period of limitations cannot be applied retroactively to 
extinguish that right.'"  Id., ¶13 (quoting Borello v. U.S. Oil 
Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 416, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)).  Conversely, 
"'where a new extended period of limitations [is] provided by 
statute in the interim between the accrual of the cause of 
action and the running of the original period of limitations, 
the new period would apply.'"  Id. (quoting Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 
at 416).  In the latter instance, because the statute of 
limitations has not run, the right to a statute of limitations 
defense has not yet vested and, therefore, is not subject to the 
same constitutional protection. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(4) (2003–04) imposed a 12-
year 
statute 
of 
limitations 
on 
traumatic 
injury 
claims.  
§ 102.17(4) (2003–04) ("The right of an employee . . . to 
proceed under this section shall not extend beyond 12 years from 
the date of the injury or death or from the date that 
compensation . . . was last paid.").  It is undisputed that the 
12-year statute of limitations ran on Liska's claim on June 12, 
2002, prior to the passage of 2005 Wis. Act 172.  See supra ¶24 
& note 7.  Accordingly, applying the rule set forth in Haines, 
Society has a substantive property right in its statute of 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
27 
 
limitations defense, which vested on June 12, 2002, when the 
statute of limitations ran. 
¶41 However, we recognize that Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4)'s 
statute of limitations operates differently than the typical 
statute of limitations in that it does not bar a claimant from 
initiating a claim for relief, see Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 
103, ¶50, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (explaining that a 
statute of limitations establishes a timeframe within which a 
claim must be initiated); instead, it limits the liability of 
the employer or insurer such that they are required to pay an 
employee's benefits or treatment expenses for a fixed period 
before the Fund takes over, § 102.17(4) (2003–04).  
¶42 Whether Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4) (2003–04) operates as a 
traditional statute of limitations does not alter the fact that 
Society has a substantive, vested property right because 
Society's statute of limitations defense translates into a 
vested right of fixed exposure to liability.  Following Neiman, 
we conclude that Society has a vested right in limiting its 
liability to pay Liska's benefits or treatment expense once 12 
years from the date of the last payment of compensation had 
passed.  See Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶13.  Let us explain more 
fully. 
¶43 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(4) 
(2003–04) 
imposed 
liability on Society for Liska's benefits or treatment expense, 
and the statute of limitations established that such liability 
expired 12 years from the date of its last payment of 
compensation to Liska.  On June 12, 2002, 12 years from the last 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
28 
 
payment of compensation, the statute of limitations ran, and 
Society's liability to Liska expired.  See § 102.17(4) (2003–
04).  It was on that same date that Society's right to 12 years 
fixed liability vested.  This is so because on June 12, 2002, 
the running of the statute of limitations gave Society a 
complete defense to further liability on Liska's claim.  See 
Haines, 261 Wis. 2d 139, ¶13.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 
102.66(1), which were enacted after Society's right to fixed 
liability 
vested, 
renewed Society's liability for Liska's 
benefits or treatment expense until Liska's death.  Accordingly, 
the retroactive legislation affected Society's substantive, 
vested "right to a fixed exposure to liability" that accrued on 
the date the statute of limitations ran.  See Matthies, 244 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶20 (discussing Neiman). 
¶44 Because 
we 
have 
concluded 
that 
the 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1) 
"'retroactively affects a substantive right that accrued before 
the passage of the legislation,'" "we proceed [to] the Martin 
balancing test."  Barbara B., 277 Wis. 2d 378, ¶20 (quoting 
Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶27).  First, we consider the private 
interests overturned by this retroactive legislation, including 
any unfairness inherent in its application.   
¶45 As we explained above, Society has a right to fixed 
exposure to liability, which vested on June 12, 2002, the date 
the statute of limitations ran.  At the time of Liska's injury, 
Society was responsible for all benefits or treatment expense 
for 12 years from the date of the last payment of compensation.  
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
29 
 
See Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4) (2003–04).  Society's right to fixed 
liability is unsettled by the retroactive application of 
§ 102.17(4) and Wis. Stat. § 102.66(1) because the statutes 
renewed Society's liability for Liska's benefits or treatment 
expense until Liska's death. 
¶46 While Society's total liability for Liska's future 
benefits 
or 
treatment 
expense 
is 
unknown, 
its 
potential 
liability is significant.  This can reasonably be inferred from 
the treatment expense previously incurred.  Since the statute of 
limitations ran in 2002, Liska submitted expenses for payment of 
which the Fund was ordered to pay approximately $3,300.  In 
2007, Liska submitted expenses in the amount of $2,189.80, or 
$8,159.09 if Liska's health insurer was to be reimbursed.  
Because Liska's injury will require ongoing medical treatment 
and because Society's liability is limited only by Liska's 
death, it is reasonable to assume that Society will be 
responsible for paying thousands of dollars of treatment 
expenses in the future.  The above-listed expenses, incurred by 
a single insured over the course of a few years, are not de 
minimis and have the potential to be substantial. 
¶47 Society's right to fixed liability was unsettled 
"'suddenly and without individualized consideration.'"  Neiman, 
236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶21 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266)).  
Insurers, such as Society, "reasonably rely upon the law as set 
forth by the courts."  Id.  Additionally, Society had no notice 
of the change in its liability prior to the passage of 2005 Wis. 
Act 172, which went into effect the day after its date of 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
30 
 
publication.  Accordingly, retroactive application of 2005 Wis. 
Act 172 deprived Society of any meaningful notice of the 
potential increase in exposure to claims. 
¶48 The retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1) not only exposes Society to liability for Liska's 
claim after the statute of limitations ran, but also prevents 
Society from any opportunity to recover, through an increase in 
Meyer's premiums, the expense of Society's increased exposure on 
Liska's claim.  The circuit court made a finding that Society 
had no way to recoup the expenses resulting from Liska's claim 
through premiums.  The Fund has not demonstrated that such a 
finding is clearly erroneous.  Moreover, because Society's 
increased liability arises out of a past event——Liska's injury——
and not a prospective event, Noll supports the circuit court's 
finding that Society had no opportunity to recoup expenses 
through increased premiums.  See Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 194 
(discussing Noll). 
¶49 We now turn to the other side of the Martin balancing 
test and consider the public interest served by retroactive 
application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1).  
¶50 We note, as in Matthies, that there is nothing in the 
Legislative Reference Bureau's legislative drafting file that 
demonstrates 
a 
rational 
legislative 
purpose 
justifying 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1).  See Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶32.  As such, "to 
determine . . . what motivated the legislature to modify the 
doctrine, requires speculation."  Id. 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
31 
 
¶51 The Fund contends that the legislature amended Wis. 
Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) "for the purpose of maintaining 
the solvency of [the Fund]."  There is nothing in the drafting 
file or anywhere else in the record that suggests that the Fund 
was insolvent or that retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1) would affect the solvency of the Fund.   
¶52 Contrary to our holding in Chappy, the public purpose 
identified here is at odds with the purpose of the Act.  Chappy, 
136 Wis. 2d at 193 (explaining that the public purpose of the 
retroactive legislation was "consistent with the basic purpose 
of worker's compensation").  The fundamental purpose of the Act 
is to compensate injured employees through smaller, but more 
certain recoveries than might be available in tort actions, 
while employers or insurers are freed from the risk of large and 
unpredictable damage awards.  Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶37.  
Because the retroactive legislation makes Society responsible 
for Liska's benefits or treatment expense without limit until 
Liska's death after the statute of limitations had run on such 
claim, 
the 
retroactive 
legislation 
subjects 
Society 
to 
potentially 
significant 
and 
unpredictable 
damage 
awards.  
Therefore, the retroactive legislation undermines the Act's goal 
of 
keeping 
the 
expense 
of 
funding 
worker's 
compensation 
predictable and manageable.  See id. 
¶53 Now 
that 
the 
respective 
interests 
have 
been 
identified, we must balance them to determine whether the public 
interest served by the retroactive legislation outweighs the 
private interest at stake.  In so doing, we conclude that 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
32 
 
Society has met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1), as amended, violated its right to due process.  
Balancing 
the 
public's interest against Society's private 
interest, 
we 
weigh 
Society's 
private 
interest 
as 
more 
substantial.   
¶54 Shifting the burden of traumatic injury benefits or 
treatment expense to self-insured employers or insurers to 
maintain the solvency of the Fund, as Society contends, provides 
weak 
support 
for 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1).13  We reiterate that the record is 
devoid of any evidence demonstrating that the legislature 
intended §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) to apply retroactively to 
maintain the solvency of the Fund.  However, assuming that 
requiring insurers to pay for time-barred traumatic injury 
claims maintains the solvency of the Fund, we think this weighs 
in Society's favor because it demonstrates the significant 
financial burden being shifted to insurers.  This is so because 
in order to impact the solvency of the Fund, time-barred 
                                                 
13 Despite our conclusion that maintaining the solvency of 
the 
Fund 
is 
an 
insufficient 
public 
purpose 
to 
justify 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) 
and 
102.66(1), the same public purpose may justify prospective 
application of the statutes.  See Martin v. Richards, 192 
Wis. 2d 156, 201, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995) ("'The [retroactive] 
aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must 
meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the 
latter may not suffice for the former.'") (quoting Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976)).  We, however, 
do 
not 
decide 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
prospective 
application of §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1). 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
33 
 
traumatic injury claims must necessarily involve payment of 
significant benefits or treatment expense.   
¶55 The evidence in the record supports our conclusion 
that 
the 
challenged 
legislation 
will 
expose 
Society 
to 
potentially significant losses.  For the years 2004 through 
2007, Liska submitted medical expenses totaling either $5,512.23 
or $11,481.52, depending on whether Liska's health insurer is to 
be reimbursed.  We view this as significant.  Also, weighing in 
Society's favor is the unfairness resulting from its inability 
to recoup its losses through increased premiums.  See supra ¶48.   
2.  Contract clause 
¶56 Retroactive legislation may not unconstitutionally 
impair the obligation of contract in violation of Article I, 
Section 10 of the United States Constitution14 or Article I, 
Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution.15  We are bound by the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United 
                                                 
14 Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution 
provides:  
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or 
confederation; 
grant 
letters 
of 
marque 
and 
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any 
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of 
debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, 
or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant 
any title of nobility. 
15 Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and 
no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of 
estate." 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
34 
 
States Constitution's contract clause.  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 
186.  Additionally, we generally interpret the state and federal 
contracts clauses coextensively, although we are not bound to do 
so.  Id. 
¶57 The constitutional proscription against impairment of 
the obligation of contract is not absolute.  Id.  Instead, the 
prohibition of the contract clause must accommodate the police 
power of the state to pass law that promotes the common wealth 
or is necessary for the general good of the public, though 
contracts previously entered into may thereby be affected.  Id. 
at 186–87.  As such, we have developed a multi-part test to 
analyze whether retroactive legislation impairs a contractual 
obligation such that it rises to the level of a constitutional 
violation.   
¶58 The first step is to determine how severely the 
contractual relationship has been impaired by the challenged 
legislation.  Id. at 187–88.  This determination measures the 
level of scrutiny to which the legislation is subjected.  Id. at 
187 (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light 
Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983)).  "If the legislation constitutes 
a substantial impairment, there must exist a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the legislation."  Id. (citing 
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411).  "If the impairment is less 
than substantial, a diminished degree of scrutiny is required."  
Id. at 188.  If there is no impairment or only minimal 
impairment, we end the inquiry.  Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n v. 
Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶147, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807.  
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
35 
 
Under any degree of scrutiny, the public purpose ought to be 
"directed towards remedying a broad and general social or 
economic problem."  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 188.  Accordingly, 
the greater the severity of the impairment, the higher the 
hurdle the legislation must clear.  Id. at 187. 
¶59 To determine the extent of the impairment, we "look to 
the reasonableness of the parties' reliance upon the contract 
affected."  Id.  It is important that we consider "whether the 
industry affected has been regulated in the past, whether the 
legislation nullified a basic term of the contract, and the 
potential liability imposed as a result of the challenged 
legislation."  Id. (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242–47 (1978)).   
¶60 Finally, once we have identified a significant and 
legitimate public purpose, the inquiry is whether the challenged 
legislation "is based 'upon reasonable conditions and is of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the 
legislation's adoption.'"  Id. at 188 (quoting Allied, 438 U.S. 
at 244) (brackets omitted). 
¶61 In Cannon, retroactive legislation operated to reduce 
the salaries of certain Milwaukee County circuit court judges by 
the amount of pension benefits they received from the Milwaukee 
County Employees' Retirement System.  State ex rel. Cannon v. 
Moran, 111 Wis. 2d 544, 545, 331 N.W.2d 369 (1983).  We declared 
the 
retroactive 
legislation 
unconstitutional 
because 
it 
substantially impaired a contractual obligation.   
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
36 
 
¶62 We first noted that "legislation which alters the 
contractual expectations of the parties impairs the obligation 
of contract."  Id. at 555 (citing Allied, 438 U.S. at 245–46); 
see also Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶155.  Accordingly, 
because the challenged legislation operated to reduce the 
circuit court judges' salaries by the amount of pension benefits 
they received, the legislation impaired the circuit court 
judges' obligations under their benefit contracts.  Cannon, 111 
Wis. 2d at 557. 
¶63 We then turned to whether the contractual impairment 
was substantial.  We noted that in Allied, the Supreme Court 
concluded that a retroactive statute created a substantial 
impairment because "the legislation . . . nullified an express 
term of the contract which was bargained for and reasonably 
relied upon by the parties, resulting in a completely unexpected 
liability."  Id. at 558. 
¶64 Relying on the standard in Allied, we concluded that 
the 
contractual 
impairment 
was 
substantial. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
plaintiffs' contracts "expressly entitled them to a certain 
amount of pension benefits," which was "nullified" by the 
challenged 
legislation. 
 
Id. 
 
Furthermore, 
because 
the 
plaintiffs "reasonably relied upon the contract terms," the 
challenged legislation created a "completely unexpected and 
substantial loss."  Id. at 558-59. 
¶65 Applying the test set out above, we conclude that 
Society has met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
37 
 
and 102.66(1), as amended, unconstitutionally impairs Society's 
rights of contract. 
¶66 First, we determine whether Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) 
and 102.66(1) impair Society's contractual obligations.  See 
Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187.  We conclude that they do.  In 
exchange for a set premium, Society contracted to provide Meyer 
with worker's compensation insurance for its injured employees.  
Society negotiated its underwriting, pricing and premiums based 
upon the Act as it then-existed, including the then-existing 12-
year statute of limitations applicable to traumatic injury 
claims.  Retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) 
"alter[ed] the contractual expectations of" Society by renewing 
its liability on Liska's claim after its original liability 
expired on June 12, 2002, the date the statute of limitations 
ran.  See Cannon, 111 Wis. 2d at 555.  As such, the legislation 
impaired the obligation of contract.   
¶67 Applying the factors set out in Chappy and following 
our analysis in Cannon, we further conclude that the impairment 
of Society's contractual obligation was substantial.  The 
legislation 
here 
modified 
a 
basic 
term 
of 
an 
insurance  
contract——the extent of an insurer's liability for traumatic 
injury claims——which was bargained for and reasonably relied 
upon by the parties.  This "result[ed] in a completely 
unexpected liability" to Society after its original period of 
liability had expired, namely, new liability on Liska's claim 
until his death.  See id. at 558.  Furthermore, this completely 
unexpected liability exposes Society to potentially significant 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
38 
 
losses.  The record reflects that since the statute of 
limitations ran, Liska submitted medical expenses totaling 
either $5,512.23 or $11,481.52, depending on whether Liska's 
insurer is reimbursed.  Either figure is a significant expense.  
Finally, because Society is liable for all benefits or treatment 
expense for a serious and permanent injury until Liska's death, 
the "potential liability" is significant.  See Chappy, 136 
Wis. 2d at 187. 
¶68 Because we conclude that the legislation constitutes a 
substantial 
impairment 
of 
Society's 
contract 
rights, 
the 
challenged legislation is subject to heightened scrutiny.  As 
such, there must exist a significant and legitimate public 
purpose behind the legislation.  Id. at 187–88.  In declaring 
the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 
102.66(1) 
unconstitutional 
for 
violating 
due 
process, 
we 
concluded that the retroactive legislation was not justified by 
a rational legislative purpose under a diminished degree of 
scrutiny.  See id. at 192 (quoting Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 
730) ("[W]hen a retroactive statute is challenged, the due 
process test is met by showing 'that the retroactive application 
of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative 
purpose.'").  Because the retroactive legislation is not 
justified by a rational legislative purpose, we must necessarily 
conclude that it is not justified by a significant and 
legitimate public purpose.  Accordingly, it is unnecessary to 
proceed any further in our analysis and we conclude that the 
retroactive application of §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) to Society 
No. 
2008AP3135 
 
39 
 
violates the contract clause.  See Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 
¶150 (ending its contract clause analysis because "WPPA [was] 
unable to complete the first step in an impairment analysis"). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶69 We conclude that the retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1), as amended effective April 1, 
2006, is unconstitutional as applied to Society for two reasons:  
(1) it violates Society's due process rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (2) it 
substantially 
impairs 
Society's 
contractual 
obligation 
in 
violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
By the Court.—Order affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶70 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The United 
States Supreme Court has observed that "[w]here the burden of 
proof lies on a given issue is, of course, rarely without 
consequence and frequently may be dispositive to the outcome of 
the litigation[.]"1  In the course of this litigation, both 
parties, Society Insurance Co. (Society) and the Work Injury 
Supplemental Benefit Fund (the Fund), have acknowledged that the 
record was missing facts necessary to perform the Martin 
balancing test and answer the question of whether Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.17(4) and 102.66(1) can constitutionally be retroactively 
applied. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, 
the 
legal 
framework 
prescribed 
for 
constitutional 
analysis——that 
statutes 
are 
presumed constitutional, and that the challenging party bears 
the burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt——
usually referenced in passing at the outset of a case, instead 
becomes the whole ballgame.   
¶71 In Chappy v. LIRC, in the context of a similar 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
retroactive 
application of a statute, we set forth the presumption and 
burden governing this challenge: 
Having determined that [the statute in question] 
applies retroactively, we now turn to the question of 
whether 
its 
retroactive 
operation 
renders 
[it] 
unconstitutional. In determining whether [the statute] 
is constitutional, the lower courts' findings of 
evidentiary or historical facts will be upheld unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  However, the lower 
courts' holdings that [the statute] is constitutional 
                                                 
1 Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976). 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
2 
 
is a question of law, and thus we do not give 
deference to the lower courts' decisions.  
Furthermore, in reviewing the constitutionality of 
[the 
statute], 
we 
recognize 
there 
is 
a 
strong 
presumption 
that 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
is 
constitutional.  This court has often explained that 
the party challenging the statute carries a heavy 
burden of persuasion. It is not sufficient that the 
challenger show that there is doubt as to the act's 
constitutionality. The challenger of a statute must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act is 
unconstitutional.  
Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 184-85, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987) 
(citations omitted). 
¶72 Society acknowledges its burden under Chappy.  At page 
8 of its brief, Society makes reference to the Fund's brief's 
citation of Chappy:  "The next section of [the Fund's] brief 
discusses the constitutional issue, citing the general principle 
that 
legislation 
enjoys 
a 
strong 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality.  This appears to be an explanation of the 
burden of proof. This burden of proof is not disputed."  The 
majority acknowledges that in its challenge, Society has the 
burden 
of 
proving 
the 
statute 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt.  Majority op., ¶27.  It is clear from the lack 
of evidence submitted that Society has not even come close to 
proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶73 When we apply the Martin test to determine whether a 
retroactive statute comports with due process, we "weigh the 
public interest served by the retroactive statute against the 
private interests that are overturned by it."2  In a concise and 
                                                 
2 Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 201 531 N.W.2d 70 
(1995).   
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
3 
 
well-reasoned brief to the circuit court, Society pointed out 
that "the balancing test that the court must use in its 
constitutional determination is dependent on facts relating to 
the public interests served and the private interests overturned 
by retroactive application."  Society went on to note that the 
necessary evidence had not been presented and that the lack of 
facts cut both ways:  "The defendants clearly struggle with the 
same issue as the plaintiffs: no hearing has been held, and no 
evidence has been presented.  Therefore there is no evidence for 
the court to weigh on either side of the balancing test."  
Indeed, the Fund acknowledged in its brief to the circuit court 
that "applying these rules in this case is made difficult 
because there was no hearing and only an abbreviated record[.]" 
¶74 Society's 
brief 
proceeded 
to 
offer 
a 
withering 
critique of the Fund's attempt to "overcome the lack of evidence 
by suggesting possible outcomes that might come about if 
evidence were presented."  Society went on to quote this court's 
observation in Chappy that "[a]bsent any showing or indication 
of the costs involved for potential, similar claims, it would be 
pure speculation for this court to hold that Bituminous's 
contract rights were substantially impaired."  Society then 
accurately identified both the problem and the solution: 
The plaintiffs agree with the defendants and the 
Chappy court that evidence should be presented.  The 
plaintiffs' "failure" to present evidence, and indeed, 
the defendants' failure to present evidence is only 
due to the lack of a forum in which to bring forth any 
evidence. The only way to accomplish this properly is 
to remand the case back to the LIRC, and then the ALJ.  
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
4 
 
¶75 The question before us concerns a facial challenge to 
a statute's retroactive application on grounds that it is not 
constitutionally permissible.3  We are equipped for the task with 
                                                 
3 The majority attempts to relieve Society of its burden by 
characterizing the challenge as an as-applied, rather than 
facial, challenge to the retroactivity of the statutes.  See 
majority op., ¶27.  First, this characterization is not 
supported by the arguments made by Society in its brief.  
Society certainly never characterizes its challenge as as-
applied challenge, and it gives every indication on virtually 
every page of its 19-page brief that the challenge is a facial 
one, starting with its statement on page 2 that "[g]iven the 
potential for significant financial liability  to insurance 
companies and employers for a lengthy period of time, this case 
is clearly one of substantial and continuing public interest[.]"  
Its arguments invariably refer to the retroactive statutes' 
effects on insurance companies in general (e.g., its references 
to "the extreme cost for self-insured employers and insurance 
companies" (in Society's brief at page 10); its arguments that 
"raising premiums is not a realistic option for insurers" (page 
9) and that the claim here "clearly illustrates the far-reaching 
and costly effect on self-insured employers and self-insured 
carriers" (page 11); its argument that "[t]he contractual rights 
of Society, and the great number of other insurers similarly 
situated, 
are 
substantially 
impaired 
by 
the 
retroactive 
liability placed on them[]" (page 13); its statement urging that 
"the contract rights of Society and similar insurers must not be 
impaired[]" (page 14); its assertion that "[t]he statute of 
limitations has long since run on each and every insurer and 
self-insured employer affected by the retroactive legislation[]" 
(page 17); and its reference to "insurers and self-insured 
employers being liable retroactively such  that their contracts 
and vested rights are being impaired[]" (page 18)).   
And second, frankly, as far as the presumption of a 
statute's constitutionality is concerned, it makes no difference 
what kind of challenge is being mounted.  In State v. Smith, 
2010 WI 16, concerning a challenge specifically denominated an 
as-applied challenge to a statute's constitutionality, Justice 
Ziegler wrote,  
"A statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.  
To overcome that presumption, a party challenging a 
statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden.  It 
is insufficient for the party challenging the statute 
to 
merely 
establish 
either 
that 
the 
statute's 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
5 
 
well-established precedent that governs our inquiry.  Our case 
law gives statutes a presumption of constitutionality and 
stresses 
that 
a 
party 
challenging 
the 
statute's 
constitutionality has the heavy burden of proving the statute 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.4  We have a well-
established balancing test to apply to make our determination.  
All that remains is to apply the Martin test, balancing the 
relevant public interest against the relevant private interests, 
using the facts of record. 
¶76 Unfortunately, no evidence has been presented and 
therefore the court has no way to apply the required test.  As 
is clear from the submissions of the parties themselves, this is 
not news to anyone.  The scarcity of facts, obvious from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitutionality is doubtful or that the statute is 
probably 
unconstitutional. 
 
Instead, 
the 
party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt.  In this case, Smith claims that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 . . . is 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied to him.  Therefore, Smith must prove that as 
applied to him, § 301.45 is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt."   
State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶¶8-9,  323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 
90(internal quotations and citations omitted).  As noted above, 
see 
¶3, 
Society 
disputes 
neither 
the 
statute's 
strong 
presumption of constitutionality nor its burden of proof.  
4 Majority op., ¶26, citing Barbara B. v. Dorian H., 2005 WI 
6, 
¶17, 
277 
WIs. 
2d 378, 690 N.W.2d 849 ("Retroactive 
legislation is presumed constitutional. It is the challenger's 
burden to overcome that presumption, by demonstrating the 
statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
6 
 
time the constitutional challenge was first raised,5 remains 
fatal to any attempt by a court to perform the necessary 
analysis. 
¶77 Given a record that both parties acknowledge is 
inadequate, 
one 
would 
expect 
that 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality and the question of who bears the burden to 
prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt 
would be especially relevant.  Unfortunately, though both are 
acknowledged, neither is given effect.  The majority instead 
holds the wrong party accountable for the failure to provide the 
facts necessary to the balancing test.6  The party penalized for 
"a record devoid of evidence"7 is not the one that has the burden 
of proving a presumed constitutional statute unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
¶78 Furthermore, the evidence cited by the majority in 
support of Society is thin.  It does not consist of any estimate 
                                                 
5 The decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission 
(the Commission) had been appealed to the circuit court; neither 
the administrative law judge from the Department of Workforce 
Development Worker's Compensation Division who initially heard 
the case nor the Commission had addressed the constitutionality 
of the statute.  See majority op., ¶9.  As the Commission noted 
in its memorandum opinion affirming the ALJ's order, "[t]he 
commission, like most agencies, has no authority to address the 
constitutionality of the statutes it enforces. McManus v. DOR, 
155 Wis. 2d 450, 454 (Ct. App. 1990). The commission interprets 
the statutes as written and does not address constitutional 
issues."  After the circuit court's decision was appealed to the 
court of appeals, the court of appeals certified the questions 
to this court, which accepted the certification. 
6 See majority op., ¶¶ 50, 53. 
7 Id., ¶54. 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
7 
 
of how many claims Society would face from claimants who would 
be in the same position as the claimant here (i.e., a claimant 
for whom the statute of limitations on claims ran prior to the 
effective date of the amended legislation, April 1, 20068).  Nor 
does it consist of any estimate whatsoever of the magnitude of 
future liability imposed on Society.  In the absence of these 
pertinent facts, the majority is left with the following: first, 
a finding made by the circuit court with little support in the 
record that "Society had no way to recoup the expenses resulting 
from Liska's claim through premiums" (majority op., ¶48); and 
second, the fact that "[f]or the years 2004 through 2007, Liska 
submitted 
medical 
expenses 
totaling 
either 
$5,512.23 
or 
$11,481.52, depending on whether Liska's health insurer is to be 
reimbursed."  Majority op., ¶55.  The majority states that it 
"can 
reasonably 
be 
inferred" 
from 
"previously 
incurred" 
treatment 
expenses 
that Society's "potential liability is 
significant."  Id., ¶46.  The majority further states that "the 
above-listed expenses, incurred by a single insured over the 
course of a few years, are not de minimis and have the potential 
to be substantial."  Id..  Though no facts about the extent of 
needed ongoing treatment are in the record, the majority says 
"it is reasonable to assume" that the cost will be "thousands of 
dollars." Id. So in this case, the party that bears the burden 
of proving an act of the legislature unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by a showing that the private interests 
                                                 
8 See 
majority 
op., 
¶39 
(comparing 
constitutional 
considerations in cases where the statute of limitations has run 
with those in cases where it has not). 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
8 
 
outweigh the public interests, has succeeded on the strength of 
assumptions and inferences drawn from past claims over the 
course of three years totaling less than $12,000, and possibly 
even less than $6,000. 
¶79 As the parties themselves have acknowledged, relevant 
facts are missing, and because the balancing test depends on 
facts, I would reverse and remand this case to the Commission 
for an evidentiary hearing.  As Society stated in its brief, 
"Without any evidence, neither side can present a case for the 
court 
to 
properly 
determine 
the 
effect 
of 
retroactive 
legislation."  Although Society has fallen far short of meeting 
its burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality, 
much less proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, 
I agree with Society's statement in its brief to the circuit 
court that "[t]he parties that do have a significant interest in 
this case should be allowed to present evidence in this matter 
to 
substantiate 
their 
claims." 
 
I 
agree 
and 
therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2008AP3135.npc 
 
 
 
1