Title: Dimino v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CARL ANTHONY DIMINO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 131Case Number: S-12-0014Decided: 10/05/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
CARL 
ANTHONY DIMINO,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Carbon County
The Honorable Wade E. 
Waldrip, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate 
Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Lucas J. Esch, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      
After conditionally pleading guilty to possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana, Carl Anthony Dimino challenges the district court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his 
vehicle.  He maintains that he was unconstitutionally detained 
for a drug dog sniff after a traffic stop and that the subsequent search of his 
vehicle was illegal.  We affirm, concluding the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to detain him and the search was legal.  

 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Mr. Dimino states a single issue on appeal:
 
Did the trial court 
err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of 
his illegal detention and the subsequent search of his rental 
vehicle?
 
The State articulates 
two issues, which we rephrase:
 
1.    
Did the 
trooper have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
to justify detaining Mr. Dimino momentarily so the trooper’s drug 
dog could walk around the rental car for a free air sniff?
 
2.    
Did the 
trooper have probable cause to search Mr. Dimino’s rental car, with 
or without the drug dog alert?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
On February 17, 2011, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Green 
stopped Mr. Dimino on Interstate 80 in Carbon County, Wyoming for 
driving 79 to 80 miles per hour in a 75 miles per hour zone.  
The trooper approached the driver’s side window to speak with 
Mr. Dimino and briefly smelled marijuana.  
Although he tried, he could not “regain” the scent, smelling only 
cigarette smoke and pine after that.  Mr. Dimino 
provided the trooper with his driver’s license and a rental car 
agreement.  The rental agreement indicated that he had rented 
the car in San Francisco, California for approximately $1,300.   

 
[¶4]      
The trooper asked Mr. Dimino to accompany him to his patrol 
car while he wrote out a warning.  In response to the 
trooper’s questions about his travel plans, Mr. Dimino stated that 
he was traveling to the east coast to pick up some items because he had recently 
relocated to San Francisco after a divorce.  He explained that 
he had flown to San Francisco two weeks earlier and had been interviewing for a 
position at Bed, Bath & Beyond.  

[¶5]      
Mr. Dimino stated that he had rented the car to drive to the 
east coast because his own car was “a piece of crap.”  When 
asked if it would not have been less expensive to fly back to the east coast 
rather than rent a car, Mr. Dimino said that renting a car was less 
expensive because he had waited until the last minute to make his travel 
plans.  Throughout the stop, Mr. Dimino displayed 
signs of nervousness.  Trooper Green observed that he was 
sweating and his eyes welled up with tears and he was often hesitant to answer 
the trooper’s questions.    
 
[¶6]      
Trooper Green completed the warning, and Mr. Dimino got out 
of the patrol car.  As Mr. Dimino was returning to 
his car, the trooper asked if he would answer a few more questions but told him 
that it was not required.  Mr. Dimino agreed to 
answer more questions, and the trooper asked if he was involved in criminal 
activities like transporting marijuana, which he denied.  
Mr. Dimino refused the trooper’s request to search his 
vehicle, so the trooper told him that he was going to have his drug dog, Kato, 
perform an exterior sniff of the vehicle.  The dog was very 
excited when he was released from the patrol car, but shortly calmed down and 
alerted to the trunk area of Mr. Dimino’s car.  
After retrieving the keys from Mr. Dimino, Trooper Green opened 
the car and found a duffle bag containing fifteen pounds 
of marijuana.1    

 
[¶7]      
Mr. Dimino was arrested and charged with one count of 
possession of marijuana in a felony amount and one count of possession with 
intent to deliver marijuana.  He pleaded not guilty to the 
charges and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search 
of his car.  He presented two arguments in furtherance of his 
motion to suppress – 1) the trooper did not have 
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining him for the 
dog sniff; and 2) the dog was not sufficiently reliable, so his alert could not 
establish probable cause for the search of the car.  After a 
hearing, the district court denied Mr. Dimino’s motion to 
suppress.  He then entered into a plea agreement with the 
State in which he pleaded guilty to the possession with intent to deliver charge 
and the other charge was dismissed.  Mr. Dimino’s 
guilty plea was conditional as he reserved his right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  The district court 
sentenced him to serve three to five years’ incarceration, and he 
appealed.  
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶8]      
We apply the following standard in reviewing a denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence:
 
Factual findings made 
by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless 
the findings are clearly erroneous.  Meek v. State, 
2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002).  
Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess 
witness credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and 
conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court’s determination.  Id.  Whether 
an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo.1999).
 
O’Boyle v. State, 
2005 
WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  
See also Sutton v. State, 2009 WY 148, ¶ 9, 
220 P.3d 784, 787 (Wyo. 2009); Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 
10, 169 P.3d 538, 542 (Wyo. 2007).  
 
DISCUSSION 

 
            
Detention
 
[¶9]      
Mr. Dimino claims Trooper Green violated his constitutional 
right to be free from illegal searches and seizures by detaining him for the 
drug dog sniff.  He does not present an independent evaluation 
of protections offered by the Wyoming Constitution; consequently, we limit our 
review to federal constitutional standards.  See 
Flood, ¶ 12, 169 P.3d  at 543.  The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  
 
[¶10]   
There are three tiers of interaction between police and citizens under 
the Fourth Amendment – consensual encounter, investigatory detention and 
arrest.  Sutton, ¶ 10, 220 P.3d  at 
788.  See also Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 
13, 135 P.3d 620, 624-25 (Wyo. 2006); Collins v. State, 
854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo. 1993).  A traffic stop 
is analogous to a second tier “investigatory detention” and is sometimes called 
a Terry stop, after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968).  Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, 
¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).  “[A]n 
investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop . . . . ”  O’Boyle, 
¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414.  The officer may expand 
the investigative detention beyond the scope of the initial stop only if the 
citizen consents to the expanded detention or if “there exists an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is 
occurring.”  Id., ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 414, 
citing Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 
64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003) and Brown v. State, 
944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997).  
Mr. Dimino refused to consent to a search of his car and 
indicated that he wanted to leave; consequently, Trooper Green could only extend 
the investigative detention for the purposes of employing the drug dog if he had 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Dimino was involved in criminal 
activity.  
 
[¶11]   
The district court ruled that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to 
detain Mr. Dimino:
 
Once Trooper Green 
did not let Mr. Dimino leave and conducted the drug dog sniff around 
the rental vehicle, their police-citizen interaction progressed from a 
consensual encounter to an investigatory detention.  
Mr. Dimino was not free to leave at that point and Trooper 
Green confined him to the borrow pit, away from Mr. Dimino’s 
car.  Therefore, in order to detain Mr. Dimino for 
the drug dog sniff around the rental vehicle, Trooper Green needed reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Mr. Dimino was engaged in criminal 
activity.
 
At the time that 
Trooper Green expanded the consensual encounter into an investigatory detention, 
he knew the following facts:
 
1.            
Trooper 
Green “briefly smelled the odor of Marijuana” emanating from 
Mr. Dimino’s rental vehicle when he approached the driver’s side 
window;
 
2.            
Mr. Dimino could not say 
which Bed, Bath & Beyond store he would be managing even after being asked 
twice, eventually describing only a general geographic area; 
 
3.            
The 
accuracy of Mr. Dimino’s claim that it would be less expensive to 
drive back to New Jersey rather than fly was immediately questionable 
considering the $1,300.00 cost for the rental vehicle; and
 
4.            
Mr. Dimino’s nervousness 
never subsided throughout the traffic stop even after learning he would receive 
only a warning citation for speeding; he continued to sweat profusely and shake 
while in the patrol car.
 
In examining the 
totality of the circumstances present when Trooper Green deployed Kato for a 
free air sniff around the rental car, the Court finds that a law enforcement 
officer would have had an objectively reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Mr. Dimino was transporting controlled substances in the 
car.  The four facts set out above constitute 
specific, articulable facts that, taken together with rational 
inferences, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Dimino had 
committed or was committing a crime.  See Dods 
v. State, 2010 WY 133, ¶ 8, 240 P.3d 1208, 1209 (Wyo. 
2010).  Therefore, the Court holds that Trooper Green 
possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain Mr. Dimino 
for the drug dog sniff as part of an investigatory detention.  

 
[¶12]   
Mr. Dimino makes a recurring argument throughout his brief, 
which we address first.  He maintains that, because the 
trooper told him he was free to leave, there had to be additional facts 
developed during the second encounter to meet the reasonable suspicion 
requirement.  He claims the only additional fact was his 
refusal to consent to the search, which may not be used to establish reasonable 
suspicion.
 
[¶13]   
Mr. Dimino is, of course, correct that “'[t]he failure to 
consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable 
suspicion.’”  Damato, ¶ 19, 
64 P.3d  at 708, quoting United States v. Wood, 
106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997).  
However, he points to no authority for the proposition that the facts 
gathered by Trooper Green during the initial stop could not be used to provide 
reasonable suspicion for the later detention to run the drug dog around the 
car.  Mr. Dimino insists Trooper Green did not 
have reasonable suspicion when he released him the first time or he would not 
have released him.  We disagree with that premise.  
The trooper may have preferred to approach the situation by releasing 
Mr. Dimino and seeing if he could obtain Mr. Dimino’s 
consent for more questions and/or a search.  
 
[¶14]   
Mr. Dimino does not direct us to any cases where we have 
called into question an officer’s decision to release a citizen even though he 
already has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and then pursue further 
questioning.  To the contrary, Sutton is an example of 
a case where we relied on facts developed before the officer told the citizen he 
was free to leave to find reasonable suspicion to support a later 
detention.  The trooper stopped Mr. Sutton for speeding, 
issued him a warning, and told him he was free to leave.  As 
in this case, the trooper then inquired as to whether he could ask Mr. Sutton a 
few more questions, to which Mr. Sutton acquiesced.  After 
questioning him about the presence of drugs in the car and receiving negative 
responses, the trooper asked for permission to search the car, which Mr. Sutton 
refused.  Nevertheless, the trooper detained him for 
a  drug dog sniff and, after the dog alerted, the car was 
searched and marijuana was found.  Id., ¶¶ 5-6, 
220 P.3d  at 786.  
 
[¶15]   
Mr. Sutton appealed, claiming the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to 
detain him for the drug dog sniff.  In reviewing his claim, we 
considered facts discovered or observed by the trooper before he told Mr. Sutton 
he was free to leave.  Id., ¶¶ 18-26, 
220 P.3d  at 790-91.  See also Feeney v. State, 
2009 WY 67, 208 P.3d 50 (Wyo. 2009).  
Considering this precedent, we conclude it was proper for the district 
court to consider the facts developed during the initial stop to determine 
whether the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to further 
detain Mr. Dimino for a drug dog 
sniff.      
 
[¶16]   
This ruling is consistent with other principles we employ in determining 
whether an officer had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth 
Amendment.  We routinely state that we must look to the 
totality of the circumstances and how those circumstances developed during the 
officer’s encounter with the occupant of the vehicle.  
See Custer, ¶ 20, 135 P.3d  at 626.  
In considering the totality of the circumstances, “'[c]ommon sense 
and ordinary human experience are to be employed, and deference is to be 
accorded a law enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions.’”  Damato, ¶ 16, 
64 P.3d  at 707, quoting Wood, 106 F.3d  at 
946.   
 
[¶17]   
In analyzing the specific facts of this case, we start with the odor of 
marijuana.  Trooper Green testified that he had advanced 
training in controlled substance interdiction and that he was familiar with the 
very unique smell of marijuana.  Although the trooper 
testified he smelled the odor only briefly when he first approached 
Mr. Dimino’s window, he stated that he recognized the odor as 
marijuana.  On appeal, Mr. Dimino argues the 
trooper’s testimony was equivocal because he testified that he only “thought” he 
smelled the odor of marijuana and he could not regain the odor, later smelling 
only cigarettes and pine like from a menthol cigarette.  While 
in his initial testimony the trooper stated he “thought” he smelled marijuana, 
he later confirmed that, although he also smelled tobacco and pine, he had 
smelled marijuana first.  The district court obviously found 
the trooper’s testimony to be credible and there is nothing to refute 
it.  
 
[¶18]   
The distinctive odor of marijuana establishes 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual may be engaged 
in violation of narcotics laws.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1393 
(10th Cir. 1987).  In fact, as will be discussed in 
more detail later, the odor of marijuana has been found to satisfy the more 
stringent “probable cause” test.  See, 
e.g., McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶¶ 9-10, 
165 P.3d 96, 98 (Wyo. 2007); Rideout v. State, 
2005 WY 141, ¶ 17, 122 P.3d 201, 205-06 (Wyo. 2005). 
         
 
[¶19]   
Although the odor of marijuana alone was sufficient to justify detaining 
Mr. Dimino, the trooper and the district court also found other 
circumstances which raised reasonable suspicion about criminal 
activity.  One such factor was Mr. Dimino’s travel 
plans.  “[U]nusual or inconsistent travel plans are a 
proper consideration in a reasonable suspicion analysis.”  
Feeney, ¶ 20, 208 P.3d  at 56.  
See also Flood, ¶¶ 30, 33, 169 P.3d  at 
547-48.  Although Mr. Dimino stated that he had 
flown to California and he had a car on the east coast, he rented a car to drive 
all the way across the country.  He said he did so because his 
car was a “piece of crap” and it was less expensive to rent the car than to fly 
back to the east coast.  The trooper found this explanation 
suspicious because Mr. Dimino paid approximately $1,300 to rent the 
car.  See also Feeney, ¶¶ 5, 21, 
208 P.3d  at 52, 56-57; Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, ¶¶ 
15-16, 172 P.3d 725, 729 (Wyo. 2007) (stating a rental agreement 
that contradicts or is somehow inconsistent with the traveler’s plans is an 
appropriate consideration in a reasonable suspicion analysis).  
These circumstances were suspicious and provided grounds for finding 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity.   
 
[¶20]   
The district court also relied on Mr. Dimino’s nervousness as 
one of the factors establishing reasonable suspicion.  The 
trooper testified that Mr. Dimino was sweating and asked to roll 
down the window in the patrol car even though it was only 25 degrees outside and 
the interior temperature of the car was 65 degrees.  When the 
trooper asked Mr. Dimino questions, he would hesitate and stall 
before he answered.  The trooper testified that 
Mr. Dimino “touched his face quite a bit, which is usually a sign of 
deceit, and the carotid artery on his neck was throbbing the entire 
time.”  The trooper also noticed the bottom lid of 
Mr. Dimino’s eyes welled up with tears, which is usually a sign of 
an “adrenaline dump.”  He considered all of these signs as 
indicative of “nervousness that continued throughout the 
stop.”    
 
[¶21]   
As we have recognized in other cases, a citizen may be expected to be 
somewhat nervous when stopped by law enforcement for a traffic violation; 
therefore, generic nervousness has little weight in establishing reasonable 
suspicion.  Flood, ¶ 27, 169 P.3d  at 
546.  However, unusual and continued nervousness is entitled 
to more weight.  Id.  Considering the 
many signs of anxiety in this case, we conclude Mr. Dimino’s 
nervousness is a factor that may be given some weight in the reasonable 
suspicion analysis.  
 
[¶22]   
All of these factors together justified the trooper’s suspicion that 
Mr. Dimino was engaged in illegal activities.  The 
district court properly held that Mr. Dimino’s constitutional rights 
were not violated when the trooper detained him for the drug dog 
sniff.  
 
Search
 
[¶23]   
Mr. Dimino also challenges the search of his vehicle without 
a warrant.  Under the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
illegal searches and seizures, warrantless searches are generally per se 
illegal.  One exception to the warrant requirement is the 
search of a vehicle if law enforcement has probable cause to believe it contains 
contraband.  Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, ¶ 22, 
214 P.3d 236, 243 (Wyo. 2009); Callaway v. State, 
954 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Wyo. 1998).  “Probable cause justifying a stop and search of a vehicle is 
established if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair 
probability that the car contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime.”  Tucker, ¶ 22, 214 P.3d  at 
243.
 
[¶24]   
In this case, Trooper Green searched Mr. Dimino’s car after 
the drug dog alerted to the presence of illegal drugs. “An alert by a properly 
trained and reliable drug dog provides probable 
cause to search a vehicle.”  Phelps v. State, 
2012 WY 87, ¶ 36, 278 P.3d 1148, 1158 (Wyo. 2012), citing 
Dickey 
v. State, 2011 WY 
136, ¶ 14, 261 P.3d 739, 743 (Wyo. 2011). 
 Mr. Dimino challenged the drug dog alert 
claiming the trooper’s and dog’s training was not sufficient and the dog was not 
reliable.  The district court did not make a determination on 
the validity of the drug dog alert but ruled, instead, that the odor of 
marijuana was sufficient to establish probable cause for the search.  

 
[¶25]   
In McKenney, ¶¶ 9-10, 165 P.3d  at 98 
(Wyo. 2007), citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 
3.6(b), at 310-11 (4th ed. 2004), we ruled 
that the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from a particular place can 
establish probable cause to search.  In this case, the 
detection of the odor of marijuana by an officer specially trained in drug 
interdiction was sufficient to create a fair probability that 
Mr. Dimino’s vehicle contained contraband.  
Tucker, ¶ 22, 214 P.3d  at 243.  The 
district court obviously found the trooper’s testimony to be credible and, as we 
stated earlier, there is nothing to undermine that finding.  

 
[¶26]   
Mr. Dimino dovetails his challenge to the search with his 
objection to the detention, arguing the illegal detention tainted any subsequent 
finding of probable cause to search.  He claims the discovered 
marijuana was fruit of the poisonous tree and, therefore, should have been 
suppressed as evidence by the district court.  Given we have 
concluded the detention was supported by reasonable articulable 
suspicion and was not illegal, this argument must also fail.  
The district court correctly ruled that the trooper had probable cause to 
search Mr. Dimino’s vehicle and his constitutional rights were not 
violated.   
   
 
[¶27]   
Affirmed.  
 
FOOTNOTES
1The duffle bag also contained another drug, THC 
crystals (“Keefe”).