Title: State v. Calbero

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

785 P.2d 157 (1989) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos CALBERO, Defendant-Appellant. No. 13549. Supreme Court of Hawaii. December 28, 1989. Benjamin B. Cassiday, III, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Vickie L. Silberstein, Office of the Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee. Before LUM, C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT and WAKATSUKI, JJ., and BURNS, Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge, in place of HAYASHI, J., recused. PADGETT, Justice. This is an appeal, after a jury trial, from convictions of sexual assault in the second degree and sexual assault in fourth degree. Because of errors in evidentiary rulings by the trial court, we reverse and remand for a new trial. The indictment under which defendant-appellant Carlos Calbero (appellant) was charged read as follows: "Sexual assault in the second degree" is defined as follows: "Sexual assault in the fourth degree" is defined as follows: Appellant admitted kissing and touching the breasts of the complaining witness but denied touching her vagina or penetrating her vagina with his finger. The jury acquitted appellant of Count II which charged him with his admitted touching of the complaining witness' breasts, but convicted him of Counts I and III, which charged him, respectively, with penetration, and touching, of the complaining witness' vagina. Obviously, the issues which the jury had to pass on at trial were (1) whether there was compulsion and (2) the credibility of the complaining witness versus the appellant. From the testimony of the complaining witness and the appellant, it is clear that the complaining witness never, in express words, consented to appellant's advances. On the other hand, it is equally clear that she never, by express words, objected to the advances, nor did she physically attempt to prevent them. There is a conflict in the evidence as to who took off the complaining witness' turquoise-colored, midcalf-length spandex pants, and as to whether appellant touched the complaining witness' vagina, or inserted his finger into her vagina. In the course of the complaining witness' direct testimony, the following occurred: Tr. 10/3-4/88 at 78. At a sidebar conference, the following occurred: Id. at 150-51. After a lengthy discussion and argument, the court ruled as follows: Id. at 152-54. Subsequently, appellant's counsel wanted to have appellant testify as to the statements which the complaining witness made to him during the course of the encounter. The following occurred: HRE 412 reads as follows: Despite his assertion to the contrary at oral argument, appellant's counsel did not give the notice required under HRE 412(c)(1) and consequently there was no ruling thereunder, so the issue in this case does not involve the exclusion of evidence properly offered by appellant under HRE 412. HRE 412 cannot override the constitutional rights of the accused. Under sections 5 and 14 of Article I of our State Constitution, appellant's right of confrontation includes a right to appropriate cross-examination of the complaining witness. When the complaining witness, on questions by the prosecution on direct, stated with respect to the incident in question "I [had] never been in that situation before", that statement was obviously offered for the purpose of bolstering a necessary element of the offenses charged, to wit: compulsion, and negating the defense of consent. Appellant's counsel wanted to cross-examine the complaining witness as to whether people had tried to kiss her in the past and whether she had told them not to (Tr. 10/3-4/88 at 151) and the court below denied even that. Id. at 154.[1] In State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986), the Supreme Court of Ohio, dealing with the Ohio rape shield law, a statute (RC 2907.02(D)), stated: Id. at 36, 487 N.Ed.2d at 562-63. In another case, dealing with Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which is, in all important respects, identical with HRE 412, the court in Government of Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.V.I. 1986), stated as follows: Here, the government deliberately inserted into the record the victim's statement "I [had] never been in that situation before." Reasonable cross-examination on *162 that subject should have been allowed under the right of confrontation. It was not, and the court below erred in prohibiting it. Moreover, there was error when the court below prohibited appellant from testifying as to everything the complaining witness had said to him during the course of their encounter, about her past sexual experience, since her statements were clearly relevant to the issue of consent. In Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir.1981), the issue was whether the victim had consented to the act charged. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court affirmed a trial court order permitting the defendant to introduce, among other things, telephone conversations that the defendant had with the alleged victim. In construing FRE 412, the court stated: The ruling below was not based on relevance (HRE 401) or on prejudicial affect (HRE 403), but on HRE 412. Due process, however, allows the introduction of evidence relevant to the issue being tried. Whether or not the complaining witness had had past sexual experience was relevant only to the extent the State, by eliciting her answer "I [had] never been in that situation before," had injected her past experience into the trial. But her alleged boasting of her past sexual experiences to appellant (if the jurors believe it occurred), while parked in his car at the beach could be construed by reasonable jurors to be an invitation to sexual advances, and, coupled with her failure to object, by either words, or actions, to those advances, to constitute consent. The issue being tried here was consent, and the complaining witness' statements as to her past sexual experience, in the context made, clearly were relevant to that issue and, consequently, should have been admitted. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. [1] In the course of oral argument, the deputy prosecuting attorney denied that this was what had happened but the transcript speaks for itself.