Title: Brown v. Moore

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES A. BROWN, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
v.  Record No. 971587   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN  
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
FRENCH H. MOORE, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Charles B. Flannagan, II, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in ruling that a certain “strip” of real property was not a 
public way but was acquired by an adjoining landowner through 
adverse possession. 
The disputed property is about 8 feet wide and is located 
in the Town of Abingdon.1  The property lies along the northern 
boundary of residential property owned by French H. Moore, Jr., 
and Mary Ann Garrett Moore (Moore), and along the southern 
boundary of a farm owned by James A. and Bliss M. Brown (Brown).2
The disputed property is located to the east of Henry 
Street and to the west of Crestview Drive.  Each of these Town 
streets leads to the top of a hill and ends in a cul-de-sac.  
                     
 
1 The exact width of the disputed property is not clear from 
the record.  At various times it is described as 7½ feet wide, 
8.34 feet wide, and 8½ feet wide.  The exact measurement is not 
required for purposes of deciding this appeal. 
 
2 Although the property owned by Moore is located within 
Town boundaries, only the southern portion of the Brown farm is 
located within Town limits. 
The disputed property constitutes a portion of the land lying 
between the two cul-de-sacs. 
In March 1989, Brown filed an amended motion for 
declaratory judgment against Moore, seeking a declaration that 
the disputed property is a public right of way.  In the 
alternative, Brown asked that if the court determined the 
disputed property is not publicly owned, the court declare that 
Brown has a private right of way over the property, and that 
Moore has failed to establish adverse possession of the 
property. 
The following evidence was presented in a bench trial.  
Prior to 1872, Edward M. Campbell owned certain real property, 
including the disputed property.  In 1872, Campbell conveyed all 
but an approximately 18-foot-wide “strip” of his property (18-
foot strip) to Washington McClanahan.  This 18-foot strip was 
located along the entire northern border of Campbell’s property.  
The disputed property lies within a portion of the 18-foot 
strip. 
Since 1872, deeds conveying property surrounding the 
disputed property reference the 18-foot strip, using various 
terms including, “lane,” “public pass way,” “right-of-way,” and 
“alley.”  Also, a Town zoning map, a street plan, a “corporate 
boundary” plat, and a 1948 annexation order refer to Henry 
 
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Street in the general area in which the disputed property is 
located. 
In June 1964, French H. Moore, Jr., James H. Bowden, Jr., 
and Paul F. Wagner acquired three contiguous tracts of land, 
including one tract from James and Dorothy Spencer (Spencer 
tract).  The deed conveying the Spencer tract to Moore, Bowden, 
and Wagner (Spencer deed) provides that the property being 
conveyed is bordered on the north by an “alley.”  The referenced 
“alley” is in the same location as the 18-foot strip.  The 
Spencer deed describes the northern boundary of the Spencer 
tract as extending 199.5 feet from its southern line. 
Moore, Bowden, and Wagner later decided to divide the land 
they had acquired.  To provide access to each lot, they sought 
to extend Crestview Drive in a westerly direction over a portion 
of the 18-foot strip.  To accomplish this purpose, Moore, 
Bowden, and Wagner submitted a subdivision plat to the Abingdon 
Town Council for approval. 
Moore requested approval of the subdivision plat at the 
January 3, 1966 regular meeting of the Abingdon Town Council.  
The minutes of this meeting reflect that the surveyor who 
drafted the subdivision plat presented it to the Town Council 
“with [a] proposal for closing a part of the alley referred to 
in the request, and advised [the Council] regarding reference to 
the alley as a lane.”  The minutes further state that “[s]ince 
 
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it was not determined if this were an alley and if the Town had 
any interest therein, [the council referred this issue] to the 
Town Attorney for advice as to what the Town can do, and for his 
recommendation on the matter.” 
Although the request for approval of the subdivision plat 
was discussed two weeks later at the January 17, 1966 Council 
session, the minutes of the meeting do not refer to any 
discussion of the “alley” or “lane.”  Instead, the minutes 
reflect that the Town Council informed Moore that a 50-foot 
right of way was required before the Council would approve the 
extension of Crestview Drive.  To comply with this requirement, 
Moore agreed to provide the Town with a 17-foot parcel from the 
northern border of the Spencer tract.  Landowners on the 
northern side of Crestview Drive also provided a 17-foot parcel 
from the border of their property.   
There also was no discussion of the 18-foot strip in 
February 1966, when the Town Council approved the subdivision 
plat which provided for the extension of Crestview Drive ending 
in a cul-de-sac at the northeast corner of the Spencer tract.  
This cul-de-sac ended just short of the eastern edge of the 
disputed property.  The subdivision plat was recorded in October 
1967, and Crestview Drive later was extended in accordance with 
the plat specifications. 
 
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Moore, Bowden, and Wagner then executed a partition deed in 
December 1967, which, among other things, conveyed the Spencer 
tract to Moore.  The partition deed makes no reference to an 
“alley.”  However, the metes and bounds description in the 
partition deed depicts the northern boundary line of the Spencer 
tract as extending 207.84 feet from the southern border, a 
distance of 8.34 feet more than the 199.5 feet set forth in the 
Spencer deed.  This additional 8.34-foot portion of land 
comprises the disputed property. 
Shortly after the subdivision plat was approved in 1966, 
Moore graded his property in preparation for the construction of 
a house.  As a result of the grading, the elevation of the 
disputed property was lowered 13 feet.  Moore also planted trees 
on the disputed property. 
Brown obtained his property by deed dated September 20, 
1975.  The plat attached to the deed shows a right of way which 
borders the southern boundary of the property and connects Henry 
Street to Crestview Drive.  The right of way shown on this plat 
is in the same location as the 18-foot strip and includes the 
disputed property.  In 1986, when Brown attempted to improve the 
disputed property to create another access to his property, 
Moore objected and Brown filed this action. 
At trial, Brown presented testimony from several witnesses, 
including Barry L. Proctor, an attorney who concentrated his 
 
5
practice in real estate title examinations.  Proctor testified 
that the disputed property was dedicated for public use when the 
Campbell conveyance excluded the 18-foot strip and that, in his 
opinion, the Town “considered itself to have a public street in 
this vicinity.”  Roy K. Balthis, a certified land surveyor, 
identified the above-mentioned discrepancies between the Spencer 
deed and the partition deed and noted the references in various 
deeds to the 18-foot strip. 
Elizabeth S. Jones, an attorney, testified that she found 
no documents of record indicating that the Town had accepted an 
offer of dedication of the disputed property.  Jones stated 
that, in her opinion, there is not a public right of way over 
the disputed property.  Herman McCormick, Jr., superintendent of 
public works for the Town from 1963 to 1990, whose 
responsibilities included supervision of street maintenance, 
garbage collection, snow removal, and traffic signs, testified 
that the Town never maintained the portion of land between the 
cul-de-sac at the end of Henry Street and the cul-de-sac at the 
end of Crestview Drive. 
The trial court held that Brown failed to establish that 
the disputed property was dedicated as a public right of way.  
The court also held that, even if Brown once had a private right 
of way over the disputed property, this right was extinguished 
by Moore’s adverse possession of the property. 
 
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On appeal, Brown first argues that the disputed property 
was dedicated to public use by implication.  In support of this 
argument, Brown relies on Campbell’s 1872 conveyance to 
McClanahan of all but 18 feet of Campbell’s property, and on the 
references in later deeds to a “lane,” a “public pass way,” a 
“right-of-way,” and an “alley”. 
Brown also relies on the separate doctrines of implied 
acceptance and partial acceptance.  Under the doctrine of 
implied acceptance, Brown contends that the Town’s actions 
regarding the disputed property constituted an implied 
acceptance of the purported offer of dedication.  Brown asserts 
that the Town considered at least a portion of the 18-foot strip 
to be a public way, since only 34 additional feet were required 
from the adjoining landowners to create the 50-foot right of way 
for the extension of Crestview Drive.  Brown also argues that, 
by referring to the 18-foot strip on a Town map, a “corporate 
limit” plat, a street plan, and in the 1948 annexation order, 
the Town accepted the purported offer of dedication.  Under the 
doctrine of partial acceptance, Brown argues that the Town’s 
acceptance of a portion of the 18-foot strip for the extension 
of Crestview Drive constituted an acceptance of the entire 18-
foot strip, including the disputed property. 
Lastly, Brown contends that he obtained a private right of 
way over the disputed property because a right of way was shown 
 
7
on the plat attached to his deed.  He argues that the evidence 
does not support the trial court’s ruling that Moore acquired 
the disputed property through adverse possession. 
In response, Moore contends that even if the disputed 
property was dedicated for public use, the Town did not accept 
the offer of dedication.  Moore also argues that any private 
right Brown may have had regarding the disputed property has 
been superceded by Moore’s adverse possession of that property.  
We agree with Moore. 
We recently stated the following principles relevant to our 
disposition of this appeal: 
Dedication, at common law, was a grant to the public, by a 
landowner, of a limited right of use[] in his land.  No 
writing or other special form of conveyance was required; 
unequivocal evidence of an intention to dedicate was 
sufficient.  Until the public accepted the dedication, it 
was a mere offer to dedicate. 
 
McNew v. McCoy, 251 Va. 297, 299, 467 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1996) 
(citing Brown v. Tazwell County Water & Sewerage Auth., 226 Va. 
125, 129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983)); see also Bradford v. 
Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 198-99, 294 S.E.2d 866, 875 
(1982).  Because a dedication imposes the burden of maintenance 
and potential tort liability on the public, a dedication is not 
completed until the public or competent public authority 
manifests an intent to accept the offer.  Ocean Island Inn, Inc. 
 
8
v. City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 474, 477, 220 S.E.2d 247, 250 
(1975). 
The acceptance of an offer of dedication by the governing 
authority may be “formal and express, as by the enactment of a 
resolution by the appropriate governing body, or by implication 
arising from an exercise of dominion by the governing authority 
or from long continued public use[] of requisite character.”  
McNew, 251 Va. at 299-300, 467 S.E.2d at 478.  The present 
record contains no evidence of a formal or express acceptance by 
the Town of the disputed property.  Therefore, we consider 
whether the Town impliedly accepted the property by exercising 
dominion over the property or from long continued public use of 
requisite character. 
In determining whether an offer of dedication has been 
impliedly accepted, courts have given consideration to such 
governmental actions as the installation of public utility lines 
in or across a street, the opening and paving of a street, and 
the repair of a street.  See Ocean Island Inn, 216 Va. at 477, 
220 S.E.2d at 250-51.  These actions constitute affirmative 
conduct showing an implied acceptance by the governmental body.  
The record before us does not contain any such evidence of 
affirmative conduct by the Town regarding the disputed property. 
The record also provides no evidence that the Town 
exercised dominion over the disputed property by performing any 
 
9
maintenance on the property.  In fact, Herman McCormick’s  
testimony provided contrary evidence that the Town did not 
maintain the land between the two cul-de-sacs from 1963 through 
1990, the period McCormick served as the Town’s superintendent 
of public works. 
We disagree with Brown’s contention that the Town exercised 
dominion over the disputed property by showing a portion of the 
18-foot strip, including the disputed property, on various maps 
and in the annexation order.  These notations reflect only the 
physical location of the 18-foot strip and are not evidence of 
an assumption by the Town of any duty to maintain the property.  
The contrary conclusion urged by Brown is untenable because it 
would require the Town to maintain any road or way appearing on 
any Town document, without regard to whether the Town had 
engaged in affirmative conduct manifesting an implied acceptance 
of that particular road or way. 
The evidence also was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish implied acceptance of the disputed property by public 
use of requisite character.  This principle of implied 
acceptance is applicable when the public has made such long use 
of property offered for dedication as to render its reclamation 
unjust and improper.  See Body v. Skeen, 208 Va. 749, 752, 160 
S.E.2d 751, 753-54 (1968); City of Norfolk v. Meredith, 204 Va. 
 
10
485, 491, 132 S.E.2d 431, 436 (1963); Buntin v. Danville, 93 Va. 
200, 204-05, 24 S.E. 830, 830-31 (1896). 
James Brown testified that when he purchased his farm in 
1975, a “roadbed” was visible on the disputed property but the 
property was “grown up in briars and brush.”  He also stated 
that in 1975, the disputed property was passable by means of a 
four-wheel-drive vehicle.  The evidence also showed that some 
people crossed over the disputed property in traveling between 
Henry Street and Crestview Drive.  However, the evidence does 
not show the duration of such usage or its frequency over any 
period of time.  Thus, while the record indicates that at some 
time in the past the disputed property was used as a passageway, 
the evidence of this use is insufficient to demonstrate “long 
continued public use[] of requisite character.”3  See McNew, 251 
Va. at 299-300, 467 S.E.2d at 478; Body, 208 Va. at 752, 160 
S.E.2d at 753-54; Meredith, 204 Va. at 491, 132 S.E.2d at 436; 
Buntin, 93 Va. at 204-05, 24 S.E. at 830-31. 
Under the doctrine of partial acceptance, however, Brown 
argues that the Town’s approval of the subdivision plat for the 
extension of Crestview Drive manifested its acceptance of at 
                     
 
3 We also find no merit in Brown’s contention that, in 1966, 
Moore “admitted” that the disputed property was part of a public 
right of way.  A statement by a landowner cannot create an 
implied acceptance by a local governing body, and Brown had the 
burden of proving such acceptance irrespective of any statement 
by Moore. 
 
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least a portion of the 18-foot strip.  Brown contends that, 
without a portion of that strip, the additional 17 feet from the 
landowners on the north and south of Crestview Drive would have 
been insufficient to create a 50-foot right of way for the 
extension of Crestview Drive.  Brown concedes that the disputed 
property is not located within the particular portion of the 18-
foot strip that the Town accepted.  However, Brown argues that 
in accepting a portion of the 18-foot strip, the Town has 
accepted the entire 18-foot strip. 
This argument is without merit.  We have limited 
application of the doctrine of partial acceptance to instances 
in which “a governing body has accepted part of the streets 
appearing on a recorded plat and no ‘intention to limit the 
acceptance’ is shown.”  Ocean Island Inn, 216 Va. at 479, 220 
S.E.2d at 252; see Hurd v. Watkins, 238 Va. 643, 651-52, 385 
S.E.2d 878, 883 (1989).  “[S]uch partial acceptance constitutes 
acceptance of all of the streets, provided the part accepted is 
sufficiently substantial to evince an intent to accept the 
comprehensive scheme of public use[] reflected in the plat.”  
Ocean Island Inn, 216 Va. at 479, 220 S.E.2d at 252.  Since the 
disputed property does not appear on a recorded subdivision plat 
which depicts a group of streets, the doctrine of partial 
acceptance is inapplicable. 
 
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We disagree with Brown’s contention that a different result 
is required based on the minutes of a January 1994 regular 
meeting of the Town Council.  These minutes contain a statement 
that the Council construes its act of approving the subdivision 
plat in 1966 as an “official ruling” closing Henry Street.  
Brown contends that this statement in the minutes demonstrates 
that the Town previously accepted the offer of dedication of the 
18-foot strip.  Such a statement, made 28 years after the 
described action, is of no probative value on this issue.4
We also conclude that the trial court was not plainly wrong 
in ruling that any claim by Brown to a private right of way over 
the disputed property has been extinguished by Moore’s adverse 
possession of the disputed property.  “To establish title to 
real property by adverse possession, a claimant must prove 
actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, 
under a claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 years.”  
Hollander v. World Mission Church, 255 Va. 440, 442, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (1998) (quoting Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 43, 431 
S.E.2d 285, 286-87 (1993)).  These elements must be proved by 
                     
 
4 We need not address Brown’s argument that the Town did not 
properly close the public way, and that the Town’s attempt to 
close Henry Street “violates public policy against sanctioning 
and perpetuating racially segregated residential communities.”  
These issues are moot, in light of our ruling that the Town did 
not accept the purported offer of dedication. 
 
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clear and convincing evidence.  Calhoun at 43, 431 S.E.2d at 
287. 
Brown contends that Moore failed to meet his burden of 
proving adverse possession because Moore occupied the disputed 
property under the mistaken belief that it belonged to him under 
the terms of the partition deed and subdivision plat.  This 
“mistake,” according to Brown, defeats Moore’s claim of adverse 
possession.  
We agree with the principle that one who possesses 
another’s land under a mistake regarding the boundaries of the 
property and does not intend to claim land beyond the “true” 
property line, cannot adversely hold the land in question.  See 
Hollander, 255 Va. at 443, ___ S.E.2d at ___; Christian v. 
Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74, 102-03, 90 S.E. 661, 670 (1916).  However, 
[w]hether the positive and definite intention to claim as 
one’s own the land up to a particular and definite line on 
the ground existed is the practical test . . . .  The 
collateral question whether the possessor would have 
claimed title, claimed the land as his own had he believed 
the land involved did not belong to him, but to another, 
that is, had he not been mistaken as to the true boundary 
line called for in his chain of title, is not the proximate 
but an antecedent question, which is irrelevant and serves 
only to confuse ideas. 
 
Hollander, 255 Va. at 443, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (quoting Christian, 
120 Va. at 111, 90 S.E. at 672) (emphasis deleted). 
In Hollander, a landowner occupied disputed land under the 
mistaken belief that it belonged to her under the terms of a 
 
14
deed.  The evidence indicated that the landowner performed 
maintenance and upkeep on the disputed land for more than 15 
years.  We held that the landowner possessed the property with 
adverse or hostile intent because her claim was not based solely 
on the deed description, but also on her belief that the 
property belonged to her.  We noted that this belief was 
evidenced by the landowner’s maintenance and upkeep performed on 
the disputed land.  Hollander, 255 Va. at 443, ___ S.E.2d at 
___. 
Similarly, although the Moores may have believed that the 
disputed property belonged to them under the terms of the 
partition deed, the testimony of French Moore was clear that he 
intended to claim the disputed property “against anybody.”  
Moreover, this belief was manifested by Moore’s acts of 
excavating and planting trees on the disputed property. 
The evidence also supports the trial court’s ruling that 
Moore met his burden of proving the other elements of adverse 
possession by clear and convincing evidence.  As stated above, 
soon after the subdivision plat was approved in 1966 and before 
his home was completed in 1968, Moore excavated his property and 
lowered the level of the disputed property by about 13 feet.  
Brown acknowledged that he could not drive a vehicle on the 
“actual alley, because it had been disturbed by the grading 
there and was too steep to drive on.”  Further, the evidence is 
 
15
uncontradicted that shortly after the subdivision plat was 
approved, Moore planted trees on the disputed property.  Thus, 
the evidence showed that Moore proved actual, hostile, 
exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under a claim of 
right, for at least 15 years.  See Hollander, 255 Va. at 442, 
___ S.E.2d at ___; Calhoun, 246 Va. at 43, 431 S.E.2d at 286-87. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed.
 
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