Title: Lozano v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lozano v. State1988 WY 44751 P.2d 1326Case Number: 87-226Decided: 03/29/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
LESLIE LOZANO, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Program, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Leslie Lozano 
pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the commission of a burglary in violation 
of §§ 6-1-201(a) and 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977. She received a three-to-five-year 
suspended sentence and was placed on probation for a period of four years. 
Appellant now appeals to this Court from an order revoking her probation and 
imposing the original sentence.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not it was 
error for the District Judge to preside over the Probation Revocation Hearing 
when he was a witness."

[¶4.]     The probation given 
appellant carried with it certain conditions, among which were the 
following:

"1. The Defendant is 
placed on probation to and shall be under the supervision of the State Probation 
Officer and his successors in office, and shall report to said Officer as 
directed and the State Probation Officer shall report to the Court with respect 
to the Defendant;

"Said supervision may be 
transferred to the State of Nebraska if said supervision is accepted by 
the State under the Interstate Compact. Defendant shall remain in the State of 
Nebraska and shall not return to Cheyenne, Laramie 
County, Wyoming 
[any] more than two (2) days per year.

* * * * * 
*

"6. The Defendant shall 
not consume alcoholic beverages or frequent places where such is dispensed [.]" 
(Emphasis added.)

Appellant was 
allowed to go to Nebraska under the interstate compact. 
However, her Nebraska officer attached an 
additional condition to the interstate compact making it necessary for appellant 
to obtain prior approval from the Wyoming 
department of probation and parole before she returned to Wyoming.

[¶5.]     A petition for 
revocation of appellant's probation was filed on July 29, 1987, alleging in part 
that appellant had violated the terms of her probation by coming to Wyoming without obtaining 
the required permission and by being present in a lounge where alcoholic 
beverages were being dispensed. One of the people who saw appellant present in 
the lounge was the district judge who had placed her on probation and who 
presided over her probation revocation hearing.

[¶6.]     At the hearing, Rod 
Waldo, a Wyoming probation and parole agent, 
testified that he had been advised by appellant's supervising probation officer 
in Nebraska that appellant had left Nebraska and had come to Wyoming without permission. Mr. Waldo further 
testified that he had received information about appellant's presence in 
Wyoming 
because "Judge Grant saw her at the Lamp Lounge." Immediately after this 
statement was made, the attorney for appellant declared, "I'll object to 
foundation." Judge Grant replied:

"Well, I guess [we have] 
a procedural problem. I indeed saw Leslie Lozano on that date, as, indeed, [did] 
many other people in the Lamp Lounge. I inquired of Mr. Waldo whether that was 
in keeping with her probationary terms. Obviously, it was not, but * * * having 
been in the Lamp Lounge on that date is the least of Leslie's problems in 
connection with this Petition to Revoke Probation. Anyway, objection's 
overruled."

[¶7.]     After Mr. Waldo 
testified, appellant's request that she be able to address the court was 
granted. She freely admitted that she had violated the terms of her probation by 
drinking alcohol:

"THE DEFENDANT: I did 
drink, and I just didn't realize how serious it would be. I didn't think I'd 
really get violated because I thought I was doing good by not doing the narcotic 
I originally had a habit with.

"THE COURT: But, you 
understand the terms and conditions of probation prohibited you from drinking, 
not just using drugs.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I 
understand that."

Appellant also 
explained that she had come to Wyoming without permission from her probation 
officer:

"THE COURT: You knew you 
weren't supposed to [come to Wyoming without permission]. You asked 
permission, it was denied, and you came anyway.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
did. I should have made a simple phone call to Rod Waldo, but I 
didn't."

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
it was plain error for Judge Grant to preside over her probation revocation 
proceedings because he observed a violation of her probation. Also, for the 
first time on appeal, appellant asserts that, given the circumstances, the judge 
abused his discretion when he did not recuse himself from the proceedings. We do 
not agree.

[¶9.]     To establish plain 
error, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated and that she was materially prejudiced thereby. Stone v. State, 
Wyo., 745 P.2d 1344 (1987); McDonald v. State, 
Wyo., 715 P.2d 209 (1986). Likewise, when an issue was not raised at the trial court level, 
appellant must establish that the alleged error was plain error. Sanchez v. 
State, Wyo., 751 P.2d 1300 (1988); Gresham v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 49 
(1985).

"In order for an alleged 
error to fall within this doctrine, specific minimum criteria must be met. It 
must be clear from the record, without resort to speculation or equivocal 
reference, exactly what occurred at trial. The proponent of the doctrine must 
demonstrate the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and the 
particular facts of the case must clearly and obviously, not just arguably, 
transgress that rule. Finally, once these criteria have been met, it must be 
shown that some substantial right of the accused has been adversely affected. 
These criteria apply even when constitutional error is alleged; and unless each 
one of them is satisfied, any claim for review under the plain-error doctrine 
must fail." Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679, 681 
(1977).

See also 
Gresham v. 
State, 708 P.2d  at 55, and Sanchez v. State, supra.

[¶10.]  In her argument, appellant identifies 
Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct as being the clear rule of law which 
was violated. Canon 3C provides in pertinent part that:

"(1) A judge should 
disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

"(a) He has a personal 
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]"

[¶11.]  Even assuming arguendo that a canon of 
ethics is a clear and unequivocal rule of law, there is nothing in the record 
which indicates that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced against appellant 
in any manner. In addition, there are no disputed evidentiary facts. Appellant 
requested that she be able to testify and freely admitted that she had violated 
the terms of her probation by drinking alcoholic beverages and by returning to 
Wyoming without first obtaining the required permission.

[¶12.]  Appellant failed to demonstrate in what 
manner she was prejudiced. The mere fact that the judge presided over 
appellant's revocation proceedings after observing a violation of her probation 
is not sufficient to establish plain error.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶14.]  Singularly significant, I would find, was 
the disinclination either of appellant, who knew the trial judge, or of her 
trial-experienced counsel, to raise any recusal question until after the 
hearing, and then only as an appeal issue when the revocation results were 
unappreciated. Obviously, a conscious decision was made by counsel at the 
hearing not to ask Judge Grant to recuse himself, which he undoubtedly would 
have done if asked. Strategy and waiver are seen in defendant's consideration of 
the recognized and admitted parole violation.