Title: State ex rel. Wellington v. Kobly

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Wellington v. Kobly, 112 Ohio St.3d 195, 2006-Ohio-6571.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. WELLINGTON, SHERIFF, APPELLEE, v. 
KOBLY, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Wellington v. Kobly,  
112 Ohio St.3d 195, 2006-Ohio-6571.] 
Sheriff released convicted misdemeanant from the county jail in violation of 
judge’s order not to release the prisoner early — Court of appeals’ 
judgment granting writ of prohibition preventing judge from proceeding 
with a contempt hearing against the sheriff reversed. 
 (No. 2006-1163 ─ Submitted November 29, 2006 ─ Decided  
December 20, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, 
No. 05 MA 228. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of prohibition 
that prevents a municipal court judge from proceeding with a contempt hearing 
against a sheriff who violated the judge’s order by releasing a convicted 
misdemeanant from the county jail..  The writ of prohibition also prevents the 
municipal judge from issuing further orders that would compel the sheriff to 
violate a prisoner-release order issued by the court of common pleas.  We reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} This case involves contradictory court orders to appellee, Sheriff 
Randall A. Wellington.  One is from appellant, Youngstown Municipal Court 
Judge Elizabeth A. Kobly, and the other is from the Mahoning County Court of 
Common Pleas.  Some background is needed to understand the conflict. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 3} In a federal court class action in 2005, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, found that the 
Mahoning County Justice Center and the Minimum Security Jail were 
understaffed and overcrowded, creating unsafe and dangerous conditions.  
Roberts v. Mahoning Cty. (Mar. 10, 2005), N.D. Ohio E.D. No. 4:03CV2329.  
Because these conditions were held to be unconstitutional, a special master was 
appointed to determine the appropriate remedy.  With respect to the jail 
population, the district court noted that the approved capacity of the Justice 
Center when it first opened was 432 inmates. 
{¶ 4} To respond and to resolve the problems related to understaffing 
due to inadequate funding of the jail, the Mahoning County Court of Common 
Pleas unanimously adopted a prisoner-release policy aimed at maintaining an 
inmate population of no more than 296 and providing for the release of inmates 
from the Justice Center based on a rating system for the seriousness of offenses. 
{¶ 5} On November 29, 2005, Judge Kobly convicted Ronald Tomlin of 
the fourth-degree misdemeanor of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 
2919.25(C) and sentenced him to seven days in the Justice Center.  Judge Kobly 
specified in the sentencing entry, “Sheriff not to release early.” 
{¶ 6} Notwithstanding Judge Kobly’s order, Sheriff Wellington released 
Tomlin the day that he was sentenced, in accordance with the prisoner-release 
policy.  The next day, Judge Kobly ordered Sheriff Wellington to appear and 
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of her do-not-release order. 
{¶ 7} Sheriff Wellington responded with a motion to disqualify Judge 
Kobly from holding the contempt proceeding, which the presiding judge of the 
court of common pleas denied. 
{¶ 8} Sheriff Wellington filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Mahoning County for a writ of prohibition (1) to prevent Judge Kobly from 
conducting the contempt hearing scheduled for December 28, 2005, regarding the 
January Term, 2006 
3 
sheriff’s release of Tomlin and (2) to prevent Judge Kobly from issuing further 
orders that would cause the sheriff to violate the prisoner-release policy issued by 
the court of common pleas.  The court of appeals granted an alternative writ on 
December 27, 2005, and restrained Judge Kobly from conducting the contempt 
hearing.  The parties filed motions for summary judgment.   
 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, granted the writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Kobly from proceeding.  Judge Kobly appealed the 
judgment to this court.  The Ohio Municipal League filed an amicus curiae brief 
in support of Judge Kobly, and Judge Robert A. Douglas and Judge Robert P. 
Milich of the Youngstown Municipal Court also filed an amicus curiae brief in 
support of Judge Kobly.  The Association of Municipal/County Judges filed an 
amicus curiae brief that the association claimed was in support of neither party to 
the appeal. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
Motions to Strike Amicus Curiae Briefs 
{¶ 11} Sheriff Wellington requests that the amicus curiae brief submitted 
by Judge Douglas and Judge Milich be stricken because he was never served with 
a copy. 
{¶ 12} We deny the motion.  The evidence establishes that Judge Douglas 
and Judge Milich properly served their brief as required by the Supreme Court 
Rules of Practice and that service was complete on mailing.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
XIV(2)(B) through (D).  In addition, after the judges’ counsel became aware that 
Sheriff Wellington’s counsel had not received a copy of their amicus curiae brief, 
they sent one via facsimile transmission to the sheriff’s attorney.  Finally, the 
arguments raised in the judges’ brief are raised by the other briefs in the case and 
are specifically addressed in Sheriff Wellington’s brief.  Therefore, Sheriff 
Wellington is not prejudiced by the denial of his motion.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Antonucci v. Youngstown City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 564, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
566, 722 N.E.2d 69, fn. 1; see, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(2)(D)(2) (“If the Supreme 
Court determines that service was made as required by this rule or that service 
was not made but the movant was not adversely affected, it may deny the 
motion”). 
{¶ 13} Sheriff Wellington also requests that we strike the amicus curiae 
brief filed by the Association of Municipal/County Judges.  We grant the motion 
because although the association claims that its brief does not support the position 
of either party, its brief manifestly supports the position of Judge Kobly, but was 
not timely filed under S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(6)(B) (“If the amicus brief is in support of 
an appellant, the brief shall be filed within the time for filing allowed to the 
appellant to file a merit brief”). 
Prohibition 
{¶ 14} Judge Kobly asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting the 
writ of prohibition to prevent her from conducting a contempt hearing on whether 
the sheriff violated her sentencing order in Tomlin’s case and to prevent her from 
issuing any comparable orders that conflict with the common pleas court’s 
prisoner-release policy.  To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Sheriff 
Wellington must establish that (1) Judge Kobly is about to exercise judicial 
power, (2) the exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) denying the 
writ will result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-
4382, 833 N.E.2d 293, ¶ 9.  Sheriff Wellington established the first requirement 
because Judge Kobly was about to exercise judicial power by conducting 
proceedings on the contempt charge. 
{¶ 15} However, this judicial power was authorized.  Municipal courts 
“have jurisdiction within the corporate limits of their respective municipal 
corporations” and “of the violation of any misdemeanor committed within the 
limits of its territory.”  R.C. 1901.02(A) and 1901.20(A)(1).  Based on these 
January Term, 2006 
5 
statutes, Judge Kobly had jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence Tomlin on the 
domestic-violence charge. 
{¶ 16} The mere fact that courts of common pleas may also have 
jurisdiction over these types of charges does not limit the concurrent jurisdiction 
of municipal courts.  R.C. 2931.04 (“Sections 2931.01 to 2931.03, inclusive, of 
the Revised Code, do not affect, modify, or limit the jurisdiction of municipal 
courts”).  In addition, “[i]n any action or proceeding of which a municipal court 
has jurisdiction, the court or any judge of the court has the power to * * * punish 
contempts * * * and to exercise any other powers that are necessary to give effect 
to the jurisdiction of the court and to enforce its judgments, orders, or decrees.”  
R.C. 1901.13(A)(1). 
{¶ 17} Therefore, Judge Kobly had statutory jurisdiction to conduct a 
contempt proceeding to determine whether the sheriff had violated that order by 
releasing Tomlin before he had served the sentence. 
R.C. 341.02 and Kohler v. Powell (1926), 115 Ohio St. 418, 154 N.E. 340 
{¶ 18} Under R.C. 341.01, “[t]he sheriff shall have charge of the county 
jail and all persons confined therein.  He shall keep such persons safely, attend to 
the jail, and govern and regulate the jail according to the minimum standards for 
jails in Ohio promulgated by the department of rehabilitation and correction.” 
{¶ 19} Pursuant to R.C. 341.02, the sheriff or jail administrator prepares 
policies and procedures for the jail, which are adopted upon approval by the court 
of common pleas: 
{¶ 20} “The sheriff or jail administrator shall prepare written operational 
policies and procedures and prisoner rules of conduct, and maintain the records 
prescribed by these policies and procedures in accordance with the minimum 
standards for jails in Ohio promulgated by the department of rehabilitation and 
correction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 21} “The court of common pleas shall review the jail’s operational 
policies and procedures and prisoner rules of conduct.  If the court approves the 
policies, procedures, and rules of conduct, they shall be adopted.” 
{¶ 22} R.C. 341.02 does not vest any exclusive jurisdiction in the court of 
common pleas to promulgate jail policies and procedures.  Instead, R.C. 341.02 
merely permits the common pleas court to approve the policies prepared by the 
sheriff and jail administrator.  That did not occur here.  In this case, the common 
pleas court prepared and issued the prisoner-release policy instead of approving a 
policy prepared by the sheriff. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, R.C. 341.02 states nothing about suspending the 
execution of sentence and releasing prisoners before they have served their 
sentences.  R.C. 341.02 thus does not provide the requisite statutory specificity to 
permit the sheriff to suspend the execution of a sentence ordered by a court.  State 
v. Smith (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60, 61, 537 N.E.2d 198. 
{¶ 24} In fact, the jail policies and rules of conduct for prisoners must be 
prepared “in accordance with the minimum standards for jails in Ohio 
promulgated by the department of rehabilitation and correction.”  R.C. 341.02.  
These minimum standards are set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-8-01 to 
5120:1-12-19 and do not authorize a sheriff to release inmates before their 
sentences have expired.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-7-01(D); see, also, 2005 Ohio 
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2005-026 (county sheriff may not release from county jail a 
person who has not served entire term of imprisonment based on concerns of 
overcrowding and budget shortfalls unless the early release had been ordered by a 
court or the Governor). 
{¶ 25} Furthermore, R.C. 341.12 specifies, “In a county not having 
sufficient jail or staff, the sheriff shall convey any person charged with the 
commission of an offense, sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail * * * to a 
jail in any county which the sheriff considers most convenient and secure.”  
January Term, 2006 
7 
Under R.C. 341.12, Sheriff Wellington has a duty to convey persons sentenced to 
imprisonment in the county jail to a jail in another county if Mahoning County 
has insufficient jail space or staff.  Insofar as R.C. 341.02 could be construed to 
conflict with the manifest mandate of R.C. 341.12, R.C. 341.12 controls.  See 
Allan Nott Ents., Inc. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C., 110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-
Ohio-3819, 851 N.E.2d 479, ¶ 40, citing R.C. 1.51 (“Where statutes conflict, the 
more specific provision controls over the more general provision”). 
{¶ 26} Finally, our decision in Kohler v. Powell (1926), 115 Ohio St. 418, 
154 N.E. 340, does not warrant a different interpretation of R.C. 341.02.  In 
Kohler, at the syllabus, we held, “Section 3162 of the General Code confers upon 
the common pleas court full, complete, and exclusive authority to promulgate 
rules and regulations for the management and control by the sheriff of the county 
jail and the persons confined therein, including the feeding of the prisoners.”  In 
Kohler, however, we construed former G.C. 3162, which, unlike R.C. 341.02, 
provided that the “court of common pleas shall prescribe rules for the regulation 
and government of the jail of the county, not inconsistent with the law” upon ten 
specified subjects, including “regulations necessary to promote the welfare of the 
persons.”  Kohler involved a sheriff’s refusal to comply with a common pleas 
court’s rules related to the feeding of prisoners; it did not consider a common 
pleas court’s prisoner-release policy.  Indeed, even in Kohler, we emphasized that 
“[t]he first duty of the sheriff is to keep the prisoners committed to jail until they 
are legally released.”  Id. at 424, 154 N.E. 340. 
{¶ 27} Kohler is thus distinguishable from the case at bar. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, R.C. 341.02 does not patently and unambiguously 
divest Judge Kobly of jurisdiction to enforce her sentencing entries and to punish 
alleged violations of those court orders by contempt.  “The courts of common 
pleas were established by the Ohio Constitution as courts of general original 
jurisdiction in Ohio, but the Constitution itself limits their jurisdiction to that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
which is expressly conferred by the General Assembly.”  Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. 
v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 208 (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 524 
N.E.2d 151.  The final issue is whether the sheriff has an adequate remedy at law. 
Adequate Remedy by Appeal 
{¶ 29} In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, 
Sheriff Wellington has an adequate remedy via an appeal from any adverse 
judgment in the contempt proceeding..  State ex rel. Mancino v. Campbell (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 611 N.E.2d 319 (“appealing a contempt order is an 
adequate remedy at law which will result in denial of the writ”); Manrow v. Lucas 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 20 OBR 
285, 485 N.E.2d 713. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, Judge Kobly does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to enforce her sentencing orders in contempt.  
She has basic statutory jurisdiction to do so, R.C. 1901.13(A)(1), and R.C. 341.02 
does not patently and unambiguously divest her of that jurisdiction.  Sheriff 
Wellington thus has an adequate remedy by way of the contempt proceeding and 
appeal to raise his contentions.  By so holding, we express no opinion on the 
merits of the underlying issues, including whether the sheriff is actually in 
contempt of Judge Kobly’s order, because our review is limited to a determination 
of whether Judge Kobly patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to 
proceed.  State ex rel. CNG Financial Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-
Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 18.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred in 
granting extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} Because I believe that the order of the Mahoning County Common 
Pleas Court adopting the prisoner-release policy takes precedence over the 
sentencing order of the municipal court judge in this case, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 32} The facts giving rise to this litigation include the following.  On 
March 30, 2005, the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas adopted a 
prisoner-release policy to prevent overcrowding at the Mahoning County Jail, in 
response to a federal mandate.  The release policy was served on Sheriff 
Wellington that same day.  Sheriff Wellington implemented the release policy in 
compliance with the common pleas court order. 
{¶ 33} On November 29, 2005, Sheriff Wellington received a judgment 
entry from Judge Kobly, sentencing inmate Tomlin to a period of seven days’ 
incarceration in the Mahoning County Jail.  Judge Kobly’s judgment entry 
included the order “Sheriff not to release early.”  Tomlin was released on 
November 29, 2005, pursuant to the prisoner-release policy adopted by order of 
the common pleas court.  The following day, Judge Kobly ordered Sheriff 
Wellington to appear before her and show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court for releasing Tomlin. 
{¶ 34} Sheriff Wellington filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Mahoning County for a writ of prohibition (1) to prevent Judge Kobly from 
conducting the contempt hearing scheduled for December 28, 2005, regarding the 
sheriff’s release of Tomlin and (2) to prevent Judge Kobly from issuing further 
orders that would cause the sheriff to violate the prisoner-release policy issued by 
the court of common pleas.  The court of appeals granted an alternative writ on 
December 27, 2005, and restrained Judge Kobly from conducting the contempt 
hearing.  The parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 35} In an affidavit in support of his motion, Sheriff Wellington noted 
that Judge Kobly had issued 36 “do not release early” orders on criminal 
defendants sentenced by her to the Mahoning County Jail and that other judges 
had begun issuing comparable orders in their sentencing entries.  According to 
Sheriff Wellington, all of these inmates would be released under the prisoner-
release policy adopted by the common pleas court but for judges’ orders.    
{¶ 36} Ultimately, in a split decision, the court of appeals granted the writ 
of prohibition to prevent Judge Kobly from proceeding with her contempt hearing 
against Sheriff Wellington and to prevent her from issuing further orders that 
would compel Sheriff Wellington to violate the prisoner-release policy. 
{¶ 37} Today this court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals, 
concluding that Judge Kobly does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to enforce her sentencing orders through contempt proceedings.  
Thus, the majority holds, Sheriff Wellington has an adequate remedy via an 
appeal from any adverse judgment in the contempt proceeding.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
{¶ 38} R.C. 341.02 grants supervisory authority over the operational 
policies and procedures of a county jail to the common pleas court.  The statute 
provides: 
{¶ 39} “The court of common pleas shall review the jail’s operational 
policies and procedures and prisoner rules of conduct.  If the court approves the 
policies, procedures, and rules of conduct, they shall be adopted.” 
{¶ 40} Further, this court has recognized since 1926 that once the 
common pleas court has provided for the rules and regulations of a county jail, it 
becomes the “plain duty of the sheriff to obey and enforce and to command his 
subordinates to obey and enforce the rules established by the court.”  State ex rel. 
Kohler v. Powell (1926), 115 Ohio St. 418, 422, 154 N.E. 340. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
{¶ 41} When Sheriff Wellington released Tomlin early, he relied on the 
prisoner-release policy.  Jurisdiction to adopt the release policy was conferred 
exclusively upon the common pleas court by R.C. 341.02.  Thus, the court of 
appeals properly held that once the common pleas court exercised its jurisdiction 
under R.C. 341.02, Judge Kobly was without jurisdiction to override that policy. 
{¶ 42} Further, the release policy does not impermissibly modify the 
sentence issued by Judge Kobly; it merely gives the sheriff the ability to furlough 
inmates until such time as there is space in the jail for persons to serve their 
sentences.  And as for R.C. 341.12, which states that the sheriff shall convey 
prisoners to other jails if there is not sufficient jail space or staff in the sheriff’s 
county jail, in my view, this statute would be triggered only when there is no 
policy that has been adopted by the common pleas court ordering the sheriff to 
furlough inmates under R.C. 341.02. 
{¶ 43} Judge Kobly’s actions placed Sheriff Wellington between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place.  If he were to comply with her municipal court 
sentencing order, he would violate the prisoner-release policy adopted by order of 
the common pleas court.  In a perfect world, it would clearly be preferable for 
inmates to serve their sentences immediately.  However, the extenuating 
circumstances necessitated that the common pleas court act to remedy the 
declaration by the federal court that the conditions at the jail were 
unconstitutional.  Because I believe that Judge Kobly, a municipal court judge, 
was patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to countermand the order of 
the common pleas court, I dissent. 
___________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gina 
DeGenova Bricker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Iris Torres Guglucello, Youngstown Law Director, and Anthony J. Farris, 
Deputy Law Director, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Byron & Byron Co., L.P.A., Barry M. Byron, and Stephen L. Byron; and 
John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
 
Christopher Sammarone, urging reversal for amici curiae Judge Robert P. 
Milich and Judge Robert A. Douglas of the Youngstown Municipal Court. 
______________________