Title: People v. Davis

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Davis, No. 81595 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 81595-Agenda 5-May 1998.
Opinion filed December 31, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Arlie Ray Davis, was charged in Henry County with five counts of 
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1994)), two 
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2), (a)(4) 
(West 1994)), and one count each of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 
5/12-13(a)(1) (West 1994)), kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1) (West 1994)), 
aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 1994)), robbery (720 ILCS 
5/18-1(a) (West 1994)), and concealment of a homicidal death (720 ILCS 
5/9-3.1(a) (West 1994)). These charges related to the August 1995 murder of 
Laurie Gwinn in Kewanee, Illinois. The jury returned verdicts of guilty against 
defendant on all counts, and the circuit court entered judgment thereon.
At the first phase of a bifurcated capital sentencing hearing, the jury found 
defendant eligible for the death penalty on three grounds: (1) that the victim 
was murdered in the course of the commission of the felony of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault; (2) that the victim was murdered in the course of the 
commission of the felony of aggravated kidnapping; and (3) that the victim was 
murdered in the course of the commission of the felony of robbery. 720 ILCS 
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994). Defendant waived his right to a jury for the second 
phase of the sentencing hearing. After considering evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation, the circuit court found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude 
imposition of the death penalty and sentenced defendant to death. The circuit 
court also imposed prison sentences of 3 years for concealment of a homicidal 
death, 6 years for robbery, 20 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault, and 
15 years for aggravated kidnapping, the latter two sentences to run 
consecutively. The circuit court vacated the remaining convictions as 
lesser-included offenses.
Defendant filed a post-trial motion requesting a new trial and sentencing 
hearing, which the circuit court denied. Defendant's death sentence has been 
stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 
134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
FACTS
The State's evidence showed that, on Monday, August 21, 1995, Laurie Gwinn 
was reported missing after she failed to arrive at her job with the county 
health department. The next day, sometime after 11 a.m., Gwinn's dead body was 
found floating in the Hennepin Canal north of Annawan, Illinois. She was nude 
and was missing several pieces of expensive jewelry that she always wore.
Dr. Violette Hnilica, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, 
testified that the body was decomposing and swollen. Hnilica used dental records 
to make a positive identification of the body as Gwinn. She also identified 
injuries to the body including torn skin on the right side of the mouth and 
cheek; "broken back" fingernails; bruises on the upper abdomen, shoulders, and 
right side of the head; hemorrhages and tissue compression in the neck; a 
blunt-force injury to the scalp; and bruises in the vagina. Hnilica stated that 
the cause of death was strangulation and blunt-force injuries, and that the 
victim's injuries were consistent with sexual assault.
A Kewanee police officer testified that Gwinn was his friend. At 10 p.m. on 
Sunday, August 20, 1995, the officer saw Gwinn at Graf's, a local tavern. The 
officer also saw defendant there.
Monica Grasty testified that she tended bar at Graf's from 5 p.m. on August 
20, 1995, until 1:30 a.m. on August 21, 1995. At about 5:30 p.m., defendant 
entered Graf's with another man, James Linsley. Defendant had been in Graf's 
several times before and had introduced himself to Grasty as "Jim Smith." Gwinn 
entered Graf's around 7:30 or 8 p.m. Gwinn talked and played pool with defendant 
and Linsley for several hours. Later, Grasty saw defendant and Gwinn kiss. About 
1:30 a.m., just before Grasty closed the tavern, she saw defendant, Gwinn, and 
Linsley leave together. When Grasty herself left the tavern directly after them, 
they were gone, but Gwinn's car was still in the parking lot. Gwinn's car was 
later recovered from the parking lot.
Junior Hanson testified that he lives in Kewanee and is a distant cousin of 
defendant. Early in August of 1995, defendant arrived at Hanson's home 
unannounced and asked to stay through the Labor Day weekend, when he planned to 
go to Texas. Defendant slept on Hanson's front porch for a few days. After that, 
Linsley joined defendant at Hanson's house, and they erected a tent in Hanson's 
yard. On August 20, Hanson arrived home around 10:30 p.m. and went to sleep. He 
heard nothing unusual during the night. At 6:45 a.m. on August 21, Hanson 
watched as defendant quickly loaded the tent into his car. Defendant told Hanson 
that he and Linsley would be renting a campsite at a nearby park. Defendant and 
Linsley left by 7 a.m. Hanson did not see defendant again until the trial.
Crecinda Harris lives across the street from Hanson. She identified defendant 
and Linsley as the two men who had been living in a tent in Hanson's yard in 
August of 1995. In the early hours of August 21, Harris was awake sewing 
bridesmaid dresses. Harris took a break and sat outside on her front steps at 
about 2 a.m. While sitting there, she heard a woman loudly cry out in a pleading 
voice, "No, not that. Oh, no, not that." Harris described the voice as coming 
from the tent in Hanson's yard. She heard nothing else. Fearful, Harris crawled 
back into her house and went to bed. She did not call police because she had no 
telephone.
At 6:30 a.m. that same morning, as Harris was leaving to drive her son to 
work, she saw defendant's car parked on Hanson's side terrace, where she had 
never seen it parked before. Harris returned home 15 minutes later and saw that 
defendant's car had been moved to the driveway, with its motor running. She 
observed defendant "hurriedly" break down his tent and place it in the car. 
Linsley was standing nearby. Harris went inside her house. She never saw 
defendant or Linsley at Hanson's house again.
Kevin Curran testified that he lives in Annawan. On August 21, he left for 
work at 7:05 a.m. Shortly after that, Curran saw a car with two white males 
inside pulling out of a gravel road in the Hennepin Canal area at a high rate of 
speed onto Route 78. The car did not stop as it approached Route 78, which 
Curran characterized as dangerous because the car could have been hit by 
oncoming traffic. Feeling that something was amiss, Curran followed the car and 
wrote down its license plate number, MMJ 296. This license plate number matched 
the Illinois plates on defendant's car. When Curran later heard that a dead body 
was found in the canal, he called police. In court, Curran identified defendant 
as the driver of the car and Linsley as the passenger.
Alice Hanson, the daughter-in-law of Junior Hanson, also lives in Kewanee. 
She met defendant and Linsley through her relatives. Defendant stayed at her 
home once or twice, and Linsley slept there a few times. Before Gwinn's murder, 
defendant told Alice that he and Linsley had gone swimming in a canal near 
Annawan.
A vaginal swab taken during Gwinn's autopsy contained seminal material and 
sperm cells. Kristin Boster, a forensic scientist and expert in deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) analysis, testified that she isolated the DNA taken from the swab and 
determined it to be too degraded for a restriction fragment length polymorphism 
(RFLP) analysis. Elizabeth Benzinger, a molecular biologist and also an expert 
in DNA analysis, agreed that there was insufficient DNA to perform an RFLP 
analysis. She explained that the DNA was degraded because the murderer had 
placed Gwinn's body in the canal. Benzinger therefore analyzed the DNA using the 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technique. She compared the DNA taken from the 
swab to samples taken from defendant, Linsley, and the victim. Benzinger 
concluded that Linsley could not have contributed to the vaginal swab. Benzinger 
could not, however, exclude defendant as the source of the semen on the swab. 
According to Benzinger, the percentage of the United States' population that 
could have contributed the DNA recovered from the swab was 2.6% of white persons 
and 3.6% of black persons.
A police officer for the City of Coffeyville, Kansas, testified that he 
pulled defendant and Linsley over on August 21, 1995. The officer took Linsley 
into custody on an outstanding warrant from the State of Washington, but did not 
detain defendant.
A police officer for the City of Tucson, Arizona, testified that he 
approached defendant for questioning at 1 a.m. on August 29, 1995. Tucson 
authorities then held defendant in custody after discovering that he was wanted 
on an Illinois warrant charging him with Gwinn's murder.
James Linsley, defendant's cousin, testified for the prosecution. In August 
of 1995, Linsley was living at the Rescue Mission in Galesburg, Illinois, when 
defendant picked him up and drove him to Hanson's home in Kewanee. For the first 
few days, Linsley slept in defendant's car and defendant slept on Hanson's front 
porch. They then erected a tent in Hanson's yard. Linsley slept in the tent one 
night, but then slept at Hanson's son's house.
On August 20, at about 5 p.m., Linsley and defendant went to Graf's and 
played pool. Around 9 p.m., Laurie Gwinn, whom Linsley did not know, came into 
Graf's. Gwinn played pool with defendant and Linsley until 11 p.m. Gwinn and 
defendant sat together and talked from 11 p.m. until closing time. While at 
Graf's, Linsley drank a couple of beers which defendant purchased for him.
The bartender announced last call around 1:15 a.m., and Linsley walked out to 
defendant's car. Defendant and Gwinn then walked out to the car. Defendant told 
Gwinn that he would drive her home because she was too drunk to drive herself. 
Gwinn accepted. Once in the car, defendant told Gwinn that he would drop Linsley 
off at Hanson's house first.
They arrived at Hanson's house at about 1:45 a.m. Gwinn, defendant, and 
Linsley exited the car and walked toward the tent in Hanson's yard. Linsley 
noticed that Gwinn was wearing some expensive jewelry while at Graf's and when 
she exited defendant's car. Gwinn and defendant started arguing because Gwinn 
wanted to go home. Gwinn appeared frightened. Defendant then grabbed her arm, 
hit her in the face, and squeezed her throat with his hand while Gwinn gagged 
and coughed. With one hand still on Gwinn's throat, defendant grabbed her hair 
with his other hand and pulled her into the tent.
Linsley stated that he was "too scared" to help Gwinn. He just walked back to 
the car, parked about 15 feet away, and drank some beer. Defendant lit a candle 
in the tent, which allowed Linsley to see shadows of what was happening. Linsley 
saw the shadow of defendant as he removed Gwinn's pants. He saw defendant's 
shadow move up and down on top of Gwinn. Defendant appeared to be having sexual 
intercourse with Gwinn. Gwinn's body did not move. After a while, defendant 
stopped. He later started up again. Gwinn's body never moved. At some point 
Linsley had heard Gwinn cry out, "No, not that. Oh, no, not that."
A few hours later defendant exited the tent and drove his car to Hanson's 
side yard. Defendant carried Gwinn's clothed body from the tent and placed it in 
the car's front seat. Defendant told Linsley to get into the car's back seat, 
and Linsley complied. Defendant drove to the canal near Annawan, where he and 
Linsley had gone swimming the week before. They arrived at the canal around 6 
a.m. Defendant removed Gwinn's body from the car, placed it on the cement boat 
dock, and removed Gwinn's clothing. Defendant and Linsley threw Gwinn's body in 
the canal and returned to Hanson's house. Defendant was laughing and 
smiling.
At Hanson's house, defendant directed Linsley to buy coffee. Linsley walked 
to a nearby convenience store, purchased two cups of coffee, and returned. 
Linsley overheard defendant tell Hanson that they were going camping. Defendant 
quickly broke down the tent and loaded it into the car. Defendant and Linsley 
then drove back to the canal area. There, defendant drove down a gravel road, 
but stopped when he noticed a car behind them. Defendant became angry, turned 
around, and sped out onto the highway.
Defendant stopped at some pawn shops in Davenport, Iowa. He then showed 
Linsley a wad of money. Defendant laughed and said, "Look, where did I get all 
this money?" The pair also stopped at rest areas, where defendant threw items 
into garbage cans.
That night police stopped them in Kansas. The police arrested Linsley on a 
felony charge pending against him in the State of Washington. Linsley gave his 
first statement to two officers on August 26, 1995. Linsley gave his second 
statement to the same officers the next day. Linsley acknowledged that in his 
first statement he omitted telling police that he saw defendant hit Gwinn and 
have sex with her.
In his testimony, Linsley acknowledged that he had mental problems, suffered 
from hallucinations, and had been committed to mental hospitals throughout his 
life. At times, he had difficulty remembering past events. Linsley also has 
epilepsy, for which he takes a prescription drug, which he should not mix with 
alcohol. He tends to get confused if he drinks alcohol while taking his 
medication.
Linsley further testified that he was in custody because he, like defendant, 
was charged with Gwinn's murder. His attorney had advised him of his fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination and that anything he said in court 
could be used against him. Linsley still wanted to testify. Linsley stated that 
he had no agreement with the Henry County State's Attorney's office regarding 
the charges against him. Nor did Linsley expect anything in return for his 
testimony. The State's Attorney had offered to recommend a sentence of 20 years' 
imprisonment if Linsley pled guilty to murder. Linsley, however, had rejected 
that offer.
On cross-examination, Linsley explained that he was arrested in Kansas 
because he had a felony charge pending against him in Washington. The following 
colloquy occurred when defense counsel asked Linsley whether he had any 
expectation of leniency regarding the Washington charge:
Linsley's attorney later testified and confirmed that the Henry County 
State's Attorney's office had offered to recommend a prison sentence of 20 years 
for Linsley if he pled guilty to Gwinn's murder and testified against defendant. 
At the time this offer was made, Linsley had already given his statements to 
police. Linsley rejected the offer and testified against defendant without an 
agreement. The attorney further explained that the offer had never been 
withdrawn, so Linsley could choose to accept it after defendant's trial if it 
was still available.
William Joe Tennison, a convicted forgerer, burglar, and domestic batterer, 
shared a cell with defendant for four days while defendant was awaiting trial. 
Tennison testified regarding statements defendant made to him in jail. According 
to Tennison, defendant said, in reference to Linsley, "I wish I killed him too." 
When Tennison remarked to defendant that Tennison "would have got rid of all 
[the] witnesses," defendant responded, "that's the reason I went back out there 
the second time." Defendant also stated that he planned to "get rid" of Linsley 
in Arizona, but was foiled when police arrested Linsley in Kansas. Lastly, when 
Tennison asked defendant "what was it like to have sex with a dead woman," 
defendant laughingly replied that "it was a dead fuck."
Tennison denied expecting anything from the State's Attorney's office in 
exchange for his testimony. He admitted, however, that there was a case pending 
in juvenile court involving his wife's children. Regarding that case, Tennison 
acknowledged that he had caused problems for his wife and her children with the 
Department of Children and Family Services, and that he wanted to reconcile with 
his wife. The first person to whom Tennison attempted to communicate defendant's 
statements was the assistant State's Attorney who accepted Tennison's guilty 
plea to domestic battery. She referred him to the State's Attorney of Henry 
County.
After the State rested its case, defendant presented the testimony of more 
than 20 witnesses. Several of these witnesses related knowledge of Gwinn's 
recent divorce and her whereabouts during the weekend before her murder. The 
witnesses denied that there was any animosity between Gwinn and her former 
husband. The witnesses also denied suspecting her former husband in Gwinn's 
death. On Sunday, August 20, around 6 p.m., Gwinn played pool with friends at 
Esser's, another local tavern, before proceeding to Graf's. Gwinn was wearing 
her jewelry that evening, as always.
Junior Hanson testified for the defense that the dogs in his yard would bark 
if someone they did not know entered the yard. Hanson would have expected the 
dogs to bark if Gwinn came into his yard. He heard no barking on that night, 
however. On cross-examination, Hanson noted that his dogs do not bark at people 
whom they know. His dogs were familiar with defendant and Linsley because they 
had been staying at the house.
Dr. Robert Kirschner, a forensic pathologist, testified that he reviewed the 
autopsy reports and photographs of Gwinn. He agreed that Gwinn's death was the 
result of a violent act properly classified as a homicide. Kirschner, however, 
found insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Gwinn had been 
strangled. He concluded that asphyxiation was the cause of Gwinn's death. 
Asphyxiation can result from both suffocation and drowning, in addition to 
strangulation.
A Kewanee detective testified that defendant's car was messy and cluttered 
inside when he saw it in Tucson. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
"dusted" the car for fingerprints, removed and bagged all items found in the 
car, pulled the seats apart, and vacuumed the interior. An FBI agent testified 
that he examined all the items that had been removed from defendant's car. He 
found no hair that matched Gwinn's hair. He explained, however, that the absence 
of Gwinn's hair in the vehicle did not prove that Gwinn had not been there. An 
FBI fingerprint specialist stated that he examined four latent fingerprints of 
value from among the 51 lifts taken from defendant's car and the items therein. 
He identified defendant's and Linsley's prints on items in the car and on the 
outside fender. He matched all prints that were suitable for comparison, 
although he was not given Gwinn's prints to check against the latent prints. The 
specialist explained that the absence of a person's fingerprints within a car 
does not mean that the person was not inside the car. He also explained that a 
dead person is not likely to leave fingerprints.
Defendant testified in his own behalf and denied any knowledge of, or 
involvement in, Gwinn's death. In August of 1995, defendant was staying at 
Hanson's house with Linsley. Defendant and Linsley were at Graf's on August 20. 
There they met Gwinn, with whom they played pool. At about 1 or 1:30 a.m., as 
defendant was leaving the tavern, he asked the bartender whether any other 
taverns were open. The bartender replied that Zodiac's was a late-night 
establishment, but she did not know how late it stayed open on Sunday nights. 
Defendant then asked Gwinn if she wanted to meet him at Graf's the following 
Friday night. She agreed. Defendant, Gwinn, and Linsley then walked outside. 
Linsley said he was tired and went to the car. Gwinn told defendant that she 
would see him the next Friday, and they said goodbye to each other. At that 
moment, an older car drove by and honked its horn. Gwinn waved at the car, which 
pulled into a lot across the street. Defendant went to his car, and he and 
Linsley returned to Hanson's house. Defendant asserted that he did not know what 
happened to Gwinn after he drove away from the tavern.
According to defendant, after they arrived at Hanson's house, Linsley slept 
in the tent and defendant slept in the car. Defendant did not hear anything 
unusual during the night. The next day, defendant awoke at daybreak, which was 
his custom. He and Linsley broke down the tent and packed it into the car. 
Defendant sent Linsley for coffee and to get directions to Linsley's sister's 
house. Defendant decided to leave that morning even though he had made plans to 
meet Gwinn the next Friday.
Defendant stated that he and Linsley drove toward Interstate 80. When 
defendant missed the on-ramp for Interstate 80, he turned his car around on a 
gravel road. Defendant noticed a driver of another vehicle look at him as he did 
this. Defendant then proceeded to Rock Island, Illinois, where Linsley 
unsuccessfully attempted to reach his sister. They then drove west to Kansas, 
and Linsley was arrested. Following Linsley's arrest, defendant went to Las 
Vegas, Nevada, for a few days, and then to Tucson. Police arrested defendant in 
Tucson.
After defendant's arraignment, defendant's attorney told him not to speak 
with anyone about his case. Defendant heeded his attorney's advice. Defendant 
did not speak with anyone about his case, including cellmate Tennison, whom 
defendant caught reading his legal papers upon returning from a shower.
In an effort to bolster his claim that he never spoke with Tennison about his 
case, defendant presented the testimony of several jailers and jail inmates. The 
jailers testified that, to their knowledge, defendant did not speak with the 
other inmates much. The jail inmates testified that they never heard defendant 
speak about his case and that, when asked by other inmates about his case, 
defendant would not respond.
Defense counsel also questioned the jailers about defendant's behavior in 
jail. The jailers acknowledged that defendant followed commands, was polite in 
his interactions with staff, and was not known to cause harm to other inmates or 
staff members.
Finally, in a further effort to bolster defendant's claim that he never spoke 
with Tennison about his case, defendant called Gilbert Cady, sheriff of Henry 
County, to the stand. Cady testified that defendant was in custody at the Henry 
County jail while awaiting his trial. Defendant had no place in his cell to 
secure his legal papers. His cellmates therefore had access to those papers, 
particularly when defendant left the cell to take a shower. In March or April of 
1996, defendant's attorney asked Cady not to place anyone else in defendant's 
cell. Cady could not accommodate this request because of the number of prisoners 
in the jail.
The defense rested. The jury retired to deliberate after hearing closing 
arguments and receiving its instructions. As earlier noted, the jury returned 
verdicts finding defendant guilty of all the charges.
Defendant's bifurcated capital sentencing hearing commenced. At the first 
phase, the jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty. Defendant then 
waived the jury for the second, aggravation-mitigation phase.
In aggravation, the State initially presented brief victim impact testimony 
from Gwinn's father, sister, and mother. The State also offered additional 
testimony from Linsley. Linsley stated that after defendant picked him up in 
Galesburg, they went to several bars where defendant became "pretty drunk." 
While drunk, defendant told Linsley that he had killed several women around 
Peoria, Illinois. Defendant smiled as he said this. Linsley did not know whether 
defendant was serious or joking. Linsley claimed that he informed the police in 
Kansas about this statement, but acknowledged that the statement did not appear 
in the police's written records.
The State presented Peoria Detective Terry Pyatt as its last witness in 
aggravation. Over defendant's continuing objection, Pyatt testified regarding 
his conversations with several Peoria-area prostitutes. Five prostitutes stated 
that defendant had physically assaulted them. A sixth prostitute told Pyatt 
that, while in defendant's car, she saw handcuffs and a photograph of a missing 
Peoria woman, who appeared dead.
Pyatt further related conversations that he had with defendant's former 
girlfriend, Connie Waldren. Waldren told them that, among defendant's 
belongings, she found two Polaroid snapshots of what appeared to be nude, 
deceased women, bound about their throats, arms, body, and legs. Waldren thought 
that the women had orange rope around their throats and that the photos had been 
taken inside of defendant's car. Defendant took the photos away from 
Waldren.
In mitigation, defendant's mother, Dorothy Davis, testified that defendant, 
her only child, was born in Gillette, Arkansas, in 1955. She described defendant 
as a good boy, who received grades of Bs and Cs in school. While in high school, 
defendant worked as a janitor. Defendant dropped out of high school in the tenth 
grade. He then lived at home with his mother and worked at a laundromat and 
general store.
Mrs. Davis related that defendant had eight children by four different women 
throughout his lifetime. He married his first wife at age 21, and they had four 
children together. The family often visited with Mrs. Davis, and she thought 
that defendant was loving toward his children. After a divorce in 1980, 
defendant returned home to live with his mother. Defendant then married his 
second wife, with whom he had two children. Mrs. Davis thought that defendant 
treated these children well. For a time, seven children were living with 
defendant, including defendant's six children and his second wife's child from a 
previous marriage.
After defendant's second divorce, he moved in with his mother, who was then 
living in Illinois. Defendant had a seventh child with a third woman. In late 
1994, defendant entered into a relationship with Connie Waldren, and they had a 
child together. When Waldren became pregnant, her mother would no longer let her 
stay with her, so Waldren moved in with Mrs. Davis and defendant. Later, when 
Waldren struck one of her children in the eye, the Department of Children and 
Family Services removed Waldren's three children from her care. Waldren signed 
papers giving up her parental rights to her children. Defendant, however, never 
gave up his rights to his and Waldren's child.
On cross-examination, Mrs. Davis explained that defendant would support his 
children "while he was with them." She may have told a detective that defendant 
does not pay rent or help with chores. Mrs. Davis acknowledged that she once 
threatened to cut defendant with a paring knife if he did not leave her alone; 
that defendant charged $3,000 to her credit card, which he never paid; that 
defendant would stay out until 5 or 6 a.m.; and that defendant could be 
lazy.
Ramon Streitmatter, defendant's uncle, testified that there was nothing 
unusual about defendant when he was a boy. Streitmatter thought that defendant 
got along fine with his mother, former wives, and children. He never saw 
defendant act violently. As an adult, defendant worked as a laborer and janitor, 
but not often. Defendant had no disability that prevented him from working, but 
Streitmatter thought that defendant would have difficulty finding employment due 
to his lack of education and skills. On cross-examination, Streitmatter stated 
that defendant's children received state aid.
Donald Fulton, a jailer, was recalled to testify at sentencing. During the 
seven months that defendant was incarcerated at the Henry County jail, Fulton 
never saw him violate any rules or engage in any conduct that would be cause for 
discipline. In Fulton's opinion, defendant had "adjusted well" to 
incarceration.
After considering the evidence, the circuit court found no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced defendant 
to death for the murder of Gwinn. The circuit court also imposed prison terms 
for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and 
concealment of a homicidal death.
Additional facts are presented in the analysis portion of the opinion where 
necessary.
ANALYSIS
I. Trial Issues
A. Cross-Examination of James Linsley
Defendant initially contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right 
to confront and cross-examine State witness James Linsley by the circuit court's 
refusal to allow him to elicit the nature or the severity of the criminal charge 
pending against Linsley in the State of Washington. Defendant alternatively 
argues that, to the extent that his defense counsel acquiesced in the circuit 
court's ruling, defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel.
The record discloses that, before trial, the State filed a motion in 
limine to bar defendant from cross-examining Linsley about the felony 
charge pending against Linsley in Washington. The charge was for rape of a child 
in the first degree. The State asserted that the pending charge could not be 
properly used for impeachment because there had been no conviction. The State 
argued further that, since there was no evidence that Linsley had been offered 
anything or had any expectation of leniency regarding the charge as a result of 
his testimony in this case, the State's case would be unduly prejudiced by 
allowing defendant to inquire into the matter. Defense counsel countered that 
defendant had the right to cross-examine Linsley about whether he was testifying 
against defendant with an expectation of leniency regarding the pending charge. 
Defense counsel added: "I don't even care [if] we necessarily explain to the 
jury exactly what the charge is. If there is prejudice attached to that, *** I 
am willing to work with the court and the State in terms of how the question is 
phrased."
The circuit court granted the State's motion in part. The court first ruled 
that the pending charge was not proper for general impeachment purposes because 
there was no conviction. The court then explained that another aspect of 
impeachment remained to be considered: i.e., whether defendant was 
entitled to use the pending charge to impeach Linsley by showing that he had a 
motive to testify falsely. The circuit court ruled that defendant must be 
permitted to cross-examine Linsley about any expectation of leniency that he had 
regarding the pending charge. The court, however, forbade defendant from 
mentioning the name or nature of the pending charge, other than stating that it 
was a "felony."
In accordance with the circuit court's ruling, defense counsel limited his 
cross-examination of Linsley to whether Linsley expected any lenient treatment 
on his pending "felony" charge in Washington in exchange for his testimony in 
this case. Linsley denied having any expectation of leniency.
Defendant now contends that the circuit court's ruling precluding him from 
mentioning the name or nature of the Washington charge pending against Linsley, 
other than stating that it was a "felony," deprived him of his constitutional 
right to confront and cross-examine Linsley. Defendant asserts that this ruling 
prevented him from adequately informing the jury of the extent of Linsley's 
motivation to offer false testimony, because defendant was not allowed to elicit 
the nature or the severity of the charge Linsley faced. According to defendant, 
Linsley was the State's key witness, and the jury likely would have acquitted 
defendant had they disbelieved Linsley's testimony.
A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to confront the 
witnesses against him and this includes the right to conduct a reasonable 
cross-examination. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513, 519, 109 S. Ct. 480, 482-83 (1988); People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 474 (1985). Accordingly, a defendant has the right to inquire into 
a witness' bias, interest or motive to testify falsely. See Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 
(1974); Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d  at 475. Evidence that a witness has been 
arrested or charged with a crime is a proper subject for cross-examination where 
it would reasonably tend to show that the witness' testimony might be influenced 
by bias, interest or motive to testify falsely. See Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d  at 475. A defendant need not show that a promise of leniency has in fact been 
made to the witness, or that an expectation of special favor exists in the mind 
of the witness; rather, the evidence used need only give rise to the inference 
that the witness has something to gain or lose by testifying. See 
Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d  at 475-76. A circuit court "has no discretion to 
deny a defendant this right, but only to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing 
interrogation." People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 67 (1992).
The improper denial of a defendant's constitutional right to 
cross-examination does not always mandate reversal, but may be found to be 
harmless error. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 686, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986); People v. Johnson, 116 Ill. 2d 13, 28-29 (1987); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967).
See People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 43-44 (1989).
In the present case, we conclude that, even if the circuit court improperly 
restricted defendant's cross-examination of Linsley, that error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming 
even when considered apart from Linsley's testimony, and the restriction imposed 
on defendant's cross-examination of Linsley was not significant.
Evidence other than Linsley's testimony showed the following. Defendant and 
Linsley were seen leaving Graf's tavern with the victim Laurie Gwinn at about 
1:30 a.m. on August 21, 1995. Gwinn did not report to work later that same 
morning. Gwinn's car never left Graf's parking lot and was later recovered 
therefrom. At about 2 a.m. that day, Crecinda Harris, who lived across the 
street from Junior Hanson's house where defendant was staying, heard a woman 
loudly cry out in a pleading voice, "No, not that. Oh, no, not that." She 
described the voice as coming from defendant's tent in Hanson's yard. Harris was 
so frightened as a result that she crawled back into her home. Around 6:30 a.m. 
that day, defendant was observed as he quickly packed his tent into his car. 
Defendant and Linsley then left Hanson's house and never returned. Defendant did 
not stay through the Labor Day weekend, although he had earlier informed Hanson 
that he would. Nor did defendant go camping at a nearby campsite, despite 
telling Hanson of his plan to do so.
Further, at approximately 7:05 a.m., Kevin Curran witnessed defendant's car 
leave the Hennepin Canal area at a high rate of speed. Suspicious, Curran 
followed the car and wrote down its license plate number, MMJ 296. This license 
plate number matched the plates on defendant's car. Curran identified defendant 
as the driver of the car and Linsley as the passenger. The pair then fled the 
Kewanee area. The next day, Gwinn's body was recovered from the Hennepin Canal. 
The jewelry that Gwinn always wore was missing. An autopsy revealed that she had 
been raped and murdered. In addition, before Gwinn disappeared, defendant told 
Alice Hanson that he and Linsley had gone swimming in that canal, which was 
evidence of his familiarity with the canal.
Finally, William Joe Tennison, one of defendant's cellmates, testified that 
defendant made several incriminating statements to him. DNA experts testified 
regarding seminal material taken from Gwinn's vagina during the autopsy and the 
tests performed thereon. As a result of those tests, Linsley was excluded as the 
donor of that seminal material. Defendant, however, could not be excluded as the 
source. All the foregoing facts, when considered together, provide overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt. Thus, the evidence of defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming, even when considered without Linsley's eyewitness testimony to the 
crimes.
We note, furthermore, that defendant was permitted a full cross-examination 
of Linsley in all other respects. The jury was advised of a wealth of 
information with which to make an informed decision about Linsley's motivation 
for offering false testimony. The jurors were informed that Linsley was in 
custody because he, like defendant, was charged with Gwinn's murder. The jurors 
were also informed that the Henry County State's Attorney had offered to Linsley 
to recommend a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment if Linsley pled guilty to the 
murder and testified against defendant. Linsley rejected that offer. Finally, 
the jurors were informed that Linsley was arrested in Kansas and that he had a 
felony charge pending against him in Washington. Regarding the Washington 
charge, defendant cross-examined Linsley about whether he had any expectation of 
leniency, which Linsley denied. The one restriction placed on defendant's 
cross-examination of Linsley by the circuit court was minor in the context of 
this case. Indeed, upon our review of the entire record, we are certain that 
defendant would have been adjudged guilty of the same crimes had the circuit 
court permitted him to mention the name or nature of the charge pending against 
Linsley in Washington. We therefore conclude that any error in this regard was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address defendant's 
alternative argument that his counsel was ineffective for acquiescing in the 
limitation placed on his cross-examination of Linsley.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant next alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in his attorney's 
failure to rebut certain testimony of Sheriff Gilbert Cady.
The record shows that defendant called Cady to testify at trial. Cady 
testified that, around April of 1996, defendant's attorney asked him not to 
place anyone else in defendant's cell. Cady did not recall defense counsel 
stating to him that the reason for this request was because there had been a 
problem with other inmates reading defendant's legal papers and then making 
accusations against him in an effort to secure favorable treatment. Rather, 
under the State's cross-examination, Cady recalled that defense counsel made 
this request "because he was afraid that [defendant] would talk to the other 
inmates." Defense counsel objected to this testimony, remarking: "How could he 
respond [to] what's in my mind, it forces me to testify in this case now." The 
circuit court sustained defense counsel's objection, and the jury was instructed 
not to consider evidence to which objections were sustained.
According to defendant, Cady's testimony severely undermined the defense case 
because it enhanced the credibility of State witness William Joe Tennison, who 
testified that defendant made incriminating statements to him while in jail. 
Defendant asserts that Cady's testimony gave jurors the impression that even his 
own lawyer thought that he would speak to other inmates about his case. 
Defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to repair this 
damage. He asserts that his counsel could have impeached Cady with Cady's prior 
inconsistent statement or could have testified to counsel's own recollection of 
their conversation or both.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
show that (1) his defense counsel's performance was deficient and (2) there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel's deficient performance, 
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 
(1984). A court need not consider the deficiency prong of this test where the 
defendant fails to meet the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
Defendant here has failed to show the requisite prejudice. Cady's remark that 
defense counsel was afraid that defendant would talk to the other inmates about 
his case was but a trifle in the evidence presented against defendant at trial. 
As set forth in detail above, the State introduced overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt, in addition to Linsley's eyewitness testimony. Given the 
overwhelming evidence, we cannot conclude that the result of defendant's trial 
would have been different, but for his counsel's failure to contradict Cady's 
remark that counsel was afraid that defendant would talk to the other inmates. 
Furthermore, the circuit court sustained defense counsel's objection to this 
remark by Cady and instructed the jury to disregard it altogether. The jury is 
presumed to have followed its instructions. See People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 373 (1992). We therefore reject this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.
II. Sentencing Issues
A. Improper Refusal to Consider Mitigating Evidence
Defendant contends that, at the second phase of his death penalty hearing, 
the circuit judge improperly refused to consider mitigating evidence of 
defendant's positive adjustment to incarceration. This evidence consisted of 
testimony from jailers to the effect that, while defendant was incarcerated in 
jail awaiting trial, he followed commands, was polite in his interactions with 
staff members, and never caused any harm to staff members or other inmates. 
Although defendant presented this testimony during the trial phase, he 
specifically relied on it during sentencing. One of the jailers, Donald Fulton, 
was recalled to testify at the sentencing hearing. Fulton stated that he had 
never known defendant to violate any rules or engage in any conduct that was 
reason for discipline. In Fulton's opinion, defendant had "adjusted well" to 
incarceration. The State presented no evidence in rebuttal. In closing argument 
at sentencing, defense counsel stressed that the jailers' testimony showed that 
defendant had adjusted well to institutional life and is not a threat to others 
while imprisoned. Counsel relied heavily upon this mitigating evidence in 
requesting that defendant be sentenced, not to death, but to a term of 
imprisonment.
In imposing the death sentence, the circuit judge stated:
Defendant argues that the judge's comments show that he improperly ignored 
the mitigating evidence presented on defendant's behalf. According to defendant, 
this action by the sentencing judge violated his constitutional rights to a fair 
and reliable death penalty hearing. See U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV.
The State first counters that defendant waived this claim because he neither 
objected to the judge's comments at sentencing nor raised the issue in his 
post-trial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). 
Application of the waiver rule, however, is less rigid where the basis for the 
objection is the circuit judge's conduct. See People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996). Because the basis for defendant's claim is the circuit 
judge's alleged refusal to consider certain mitigating evidence at defendant's 
death penalty hearing, which concerns the fundamental fairness of that 
proceeding, we review the claim for error. See People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 146-47 (1991); People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 56 
(1990); People v. Odle, 128 Ill. 2d 111, 134 (1988).
Since the mid-1970s, the United States Supreme Court has issued a series of 
decisions explaining what the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution require with regard to the consideration of mitigating 
factors in capital cases. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359-62, 
125 L. Ed. 2d 290, 300-02, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-66 (1993) (summarizing the case 
law). One rule that emerged and is now well established is that the State cannot 
place any limitation on the admission of relevant and reliable evidence offered 
in mitigation at a death penalty hearing. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824 (1987); 
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1670-71 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8-9, 102 S. Ct. 869, 874-75 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978) (plurality 
opinion). As a corollary principle, the Court has also held that the sentencing 
authority, whether judge or jury, may not refuse to consider such mitigating 
evidence as a matter of law. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S.  at 394, 398-99, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 350, 353, 107 S. Ct.  at 1822, 1824; Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 
113-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10-11, 102 S. Ct.  at 876-77. The sentencer and the 
reviewing court "may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating 
evidence," but "may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their 
consideration." Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 114-15, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 11, 102 S. Ct.  at 877.
As an initial matter, we address whether the evidence offered by defendant 
was relevant and mitigating. Defendant urges that Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986), controls this 
inquiry. In Skipper, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder and 
rape. The State of South Carolina sought the death penalty. At the petitioner's 
capital sentencing hearing, the trial court refused to admit into evidence the 
testimony of two jailers and a "regular visitor" at the jail to the effect that 
the petitioner had "made a good adjustment" during his time spent in jail. 
Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 3, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 5-6, 106 S. Ct.  at 1670. The 
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of this evidence violated the petitioner's 
constitutional right to place before the capital sentencer relevant mitigating 
evidence. See Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 4, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 6, 106 S. Ct.  at 
1671. The Court therefore ordered the petitioner's death sentence reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. See Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 9, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673. In doing so, the Court left no doubt that it 
considered evidence of a defendant's good behavior in jail and good adjustment 
to prison life to be mitigating in nature and thus relevant to the sentencing 
determination. The Court noted that such evidence gives rise to inferences that 
unquestionably would be mitigating because those inferences might serve as a 
basis for imposing a sentence less than death. See Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 
4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 7, 106 S. Ct.  at 1671. The Court thus held that "a 
defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life 
in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to 
the sentencing determination." Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 7, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 
8, 106 S. Ct.  at 1672.
As in Skipper, the evidence at issue in this case concerns 
defendant's good behavior in jail and his positive adjustment to incarceration. 
We therefore agree with defendant that, pursuant to Skipper, this 
evidence must be considered relevant and mitigating. The State does not suggest 
otherwise. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court precedent set forth above, the 
sentencing authority may not refuse to consider this mitigating evidence as a 
matter of law. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S.  at 394, 398-99, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 
350, 353, 107 S. Ct.  at 1822, 1824; Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 113-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10-11, 102 S. Ct.  at 876-77.
The dispositive inquiry here thus becomes whether the sentencing judge 
refused to consider this mitigating evidence as a matter of law, as defendant 
claims. The State argues that the sentencing judge's comments do not mean that 
the judge would not, under any circumstance, consider evidence of good jail 
behavior as mitigating a death sentence. Rather, the State contends, the judge's 
comments show only that he "was concerned not with Defendant's ability to live 
peaceably in jail, but with the risk that defendant would pose to society upon 
his release if he was given a term of years." By admitting that the judge was 
not concerned with defendant's ability to live peaceably in jail, the State in 
effect concedes that the judge refused to consider the proffered mitigating 
evidence of defendant's good jail behavior and his positive adjustment to 
incarceration. This was not permissible.
As noted, the Supreme Court has firmly established that while a capital 
sentencer "may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence," 
the sentencer "may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence" from its 
consideration. Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 114-15, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 11, 102 S. Ct.  at 877. The sentencing judge's comments here reveal that he did not 
determine the weight to be given the mitigating evidence of defendant's good 
jail behavior and his positive adjustment to incarceration, but rather refused 
to consider this evidence at all. The judge first stated: "I've heard as far as 
mitigating factors here some discussion about the rehabilitative potential of 
Mr. Davis. In two areas, one is an adjustment to jail life. I have difficulty 
putting rehabilitation in the context of the adjustment of jail life. 
Rehabilitation is not living in jail. Rehabilitation is living on the streets 
with ordinary people and not breaking any laws." By these comments, the judge 
was undoubtedly referring to defendant's proffered mitigating evidence of his 
good jail behavior and his positive adjustment to incarceration. The judge then 
continued: "So I don't care how great a prisoner is, the real test and 
issue is what's going to happen upon release." (Emphasis added.) With this 
latter comment, the judge expressed the categorical belief that such evidence is 
never relevant to a capital sentencing decision. The judge's comments thus 
demonstrate that he did not consider defendant's proffered mitigating evidence 
of his good jail behavior and his positive adjustment to incarceration, based 
upon the judge's mistaken belief that such evidence is not mitigating. 
Consequently, we must hold that the sentencing judge's refusal to consider this 
mitigating evidence in determining whether to impose capital punishment upon 
defendant deprived him of the individualized consideration required by the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments.
This case is analogous to Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). In Eddings, the sentencing judge, in 
sentencing the defendant to death, remarked: "Nor can the Court in following the 
law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent background." 
The Supreme Court determined that the judge's remark evidenced his refusal to 
consider in mitigation the circumstances of the defendant's unhappy upbringing 
and his emotional disturbance. The Court held that the judge's refusal to 
consider this proper mitigating evidence as a matter of law violated the 
defendant's constitutional rights to an individualized death penalty 
determination. The Court therefore reversed his death sentence and remanded for 
further proceedings. See Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 117, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 12, 
102 S. Ct.  at 878.
Here, like in Eddings, "it is clear that the trial judge did not 
evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider 
the evidence." (Emphasis in original.) Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 113, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10, 102 S. Ct.  at 876. In Eddings, the trial judge was 
laboring under the mistaken belief that he could not consider evidence of a 
difficult childhood and emotional disturbance as mitigating. Similarly, in this 
case, the sentencing judge proceeded under the mistaken belief that he could not 
consider evidence of a defendant's good jail behavior and positive adjustment to 
incarceration as mitigating.
The dissent, however, asserts that our application of the foregoing Supreme 
Court precedent to this case is legally flawed. According to the dissent, 
Eddings is distinguishable from this case because Eddings 
requires reversal of a death sentence only when the sentencer "applies an 
erroneous legal standard in determining whether the sentencer may consider 
certain mitigating evidence." Eddings is not distinguishable on this 
basis. As we explained above, that is precisely what happened in this case. 
Moreover, to the extent that the dissent suggests that Eddings applies 
only where the sentencer has been precluded from hearing certain mitigating 
evidence, the dissent is not accurate. In Eddings, as in this case, the 
mitigating evidence at issue was fully admitted at the sentencing hearing and 
was thus heard by the sentencing judge. Yet the sentencing judge in 
Eddings, like the sentencing judge here, refused to consider that 
mitigating evidence in determining whether to impose capital punishment. 
Therefore, the dissent's attempt to distinguish Eddings fails.
The dissent also claims, on a related note, that the other Supreme Court 
cases that we cite "stand simply for the proposition that the sentencer in a 
capital case must be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence." 
Although these cases do stand for the principle that the State cannot place any 
limitation on the admission of relevant and reliable evidence offered in 
mitigation at a death penalty hearing, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated 
that they stand for an additional principle as well, i.e., that a 
capital sentencer may not refuse to consider such mitigating evidence as a 
matter of law. Hitchcock, 481 U.S.  at 394, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 350, 107 S. Ct.  at 1822 ("We have held that in capital cases, ` "the sentencer" ' 
may not refuse to consider *** any relevant mitigating evidence"); 
Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 4, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 6, 106 S. Ct.  at 1671 ("Equally 
clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider" 
mitigating evidence); see also Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 113-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10-11, 102 S. Ct.  at 876-77 ("Just as the State may not by statute 
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the 
sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 
mitigating evidence"). Consequently, we reject the dissent's limited 
interpretation of these cases.
The dissent next argues that our application of the foregoing Supreme Court 
precedent to this case is factually flawed. According to the dissent, the 
sentencing judge here did consider the mitigating evidence at issue. The 
dissent, however, makes this claim in a conclusive manner. The dissent cites no 
evidence from the record in support of its claim; nor could it, because there is 
none. Rather, the sentencing judge's comments, which we fully set forth above, 
plainly show that the sentencing judge refused to consider the mitigating 
evidence at issue. Therefore, the opinion is factually correct.
In cases in which a capital sentencer has not considered mitigation evidence 
in violation of the above principles, the Supreme Court has in effect vacated 
the defendant's death sentence as invalid. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S.  at 
399, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 353, 107 S. Ct. at 1824-25; Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 
117, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 12, 102 S. Ct.  at 878; Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 8-9, 
90 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673. The Court in Hitchcock v. 
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824 
(1987), stated that, in the absence of a showing by the State that the error was 
harmless or that it had no effect on the sentencing judge or jury, the death 
sentence cannot stand. In the present case, the State fails to make the showing 
required for an affirmance of defendant's death sentence. The record discloses 
that the evidence that the sentencing judge refused to consider was a 
significant part of the defense case in mitigation. The jailers' testimony 
showed that defendant behaved well in jail and had made a positive adjustment to 
incarceration. The State presented no evidence to contradict the jailers' 
testimony. In closing argument, the defense relied heavily on this mitigation 
evidence in requesting a sentence of less than death for defendant. Yet the 
sentencing judge refused to give this evidence any consideration whatsoever. The 
judge was under the impression that such evidence is not mitigating, despite 
Skipper's pronouncement to the contrary. Under our death penalty 
statute, the sentencer must consider the mitigating factors, weigh those against 
the aggravating factors, and determine whether the mitigating factors are 
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. See People v. 
Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 452 (1988). On the record before us, we cannot 
say that the judge's refusal to give any consideration to the mitigating 
evidence of defendant's good jail behavior and his positive adjustment to 
incarceration was harmless or that it had no effect on the outcome. As a result, 
defendant's death sentence must be vacated. See Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 8, 
90 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673 (holding that the exclusion of such 
evidence from the sentencing jury's consideration was "sufficiently prejudicial 
to constitute reversible error" "under any standard"); People v. 
Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 494-95 (1989) (similarly vacating a death 
sentence where the sentencing judge refused to consider certain mitigating 
evidence).
Having vacated the death sentence, we remand this cause to the circuit court 
for a new sentencing hearing. The State is not precluded from seeking the death 
penalty for defendant on remand. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S.  at 399, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 353, 107 S. Ct.  at 1824; Skipper, 476 U.S.  at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d  
at 9, 106 S. Ct.  at 1673. If the State seeks capital punishment for defendant on 
remand, however, only the second phase of defendant's capital sentencing hearing 
need be conducted anew. See People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 573 
(1989); People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 523 (1988). Defendant has 
raised no assertion of error in this appeal regarding the jury's determination 
that he is eligible for the death penalty.
B. Aggravating Evidence
Defendant also maintains that the circuit judge abused his discretion when he 
admitted certain aggravating evidence at the second phase of defendant's death 
penalty hearing. Defendant insists that he is entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing as a result. Given that we have already vacated defendant's death 
sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, we need not address this 
issue in order to dispose of this appeal. We therefore express no opinion on the 
propriety of the circuit judge's rulings in this regard.
C. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
Defendant last challenges the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty 
statute on three grounds. He contends that the statute is unconstitutional 
because it places a burden of proof on defendants to show that mitigating 
evidence outweighs aggravating evidence, allows sentencers to weigh a vague 
aggravating factor, and fails to minimize the risk of arbitrarily imposed death 
sentences. As defendant acknowledges, this court has repeatedly rejected these 
claims. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439-40 
(1995) (and cases cited therein); People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 
407-08 (1995) (and cases cited therein); People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993) (and cases cited therein). Defendant offers no reason why we 
should reconsider our prior decisions. Therefore, we adhere to those decisions 
and once again reject these claims.
As a final matter, we are compelled to address a statement made in Justice 
Harrison's partial concurrence and partial dissent. Justice Harrison cites to 
this court's majority opinion in People v. Bull, No. 81578 (November 
10, 1998), and asserts that in reaching that decision it was an "undisputed 
fact" that Illinois' capital sentencing scheme will "inevitably lead to the 
execution of innocent persons." We disagree with this statement. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's convictions, but vacate his 
death sentence. This cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Convictions affirmed;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that we should affirm defendant's convictions, vacate his death 
sentence, and remand this cause to the circuit court for resentencing. Contrary 
to the majority, however, I do not believe that the State should be permitted to 
seek the death penalty on remand. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in 
People v. Bull, No. 81578 (November 10, 1998), Illinois' present death 
penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2) and is therefore 
unenforceable.
In reaching this conclusion, I am fully aware that my six colleagues have 
voted unanimously to uphold this State's capital sentencing scheme, 
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that it will inevitably lead to the 
execution of innocent persons. See People v. Bull, slip op. at 26-28; 
People v. Brown, No. 82186, slip op. at 24-25 (November 10, 1998). If 
the majority's view involved nothing more than a dispute over a legal point, 
e.g., the construction of a statute, I would normally feel constrained 
to adhere to its position no matter how misguided I felt it to be. Once the 
court has ruled on a question of law and its members have had the chance to 
voice their disagreement, the majority's ruling becomes the law of the state and 
is binding in all pending and future cases. No further dissents are appropriate. 
People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 59 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting). 

The situation here, however, is qualitatively different. The flaw in 
Illinois' death penalty law goes beyond questions of statutory construction, 
legal interpretation, or judicial philosophy. The problem inheres in the system 
itself. Experience has shown that the present mechanism for handling capital 
offenses simply does not work in a just and reliable way. Under these 
circumstances, the result in every death case is suspect, and no sentence of 
death should be allowed to stand. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court 
should be directed on remand to impose a sentence other than death.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
The majority holds that the death sentence imposed in this case must be 
reversed because the sentencing judge violated the United States Constitution by 
refusing to consider evidence of defendant's good behavior during pretrial 
incarceration. Because this holding is both legally and factually flawed, I 
respectfully dissent.
The majority claims that reversal of defendant's death sentence is compelled 
by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 
(1982). In Eddings, however, the sentencing judge mistakenly believed 
that, as a matter of law, he was not allowed to consider a particular mitigating 
circumstance (in that case, the defendant's difficult and violent childhood). 
Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 113, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10, 102 S. Ct.  at 876. The 
Supreme Court held that because the defendant was entitled to have the evidence 
in question considered by the sentencer, the judge's ruling that the evidence 
was improper necessitated resentencing. Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 113-17, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 10-12, 102 S. Ct.  at 876-78. Eddings thus requires 
reversal of a death sentence only when the trial court applies an erroneous 
legal standard in determining whether the sentencer may consider certain 
mitigating evidence. The other cases cited by the majority stand simply for the 
proposition that the sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence, as a close examination of the facts of those cases 
will reveal. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347, 
107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987) (reversing death sentence where trial court erroneously 
precluded sentencer from considering certain mitigating circumstances); 
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669 
(1986) (holding that trial court erred in precluding defendant from introducing 
at capital sentencing hearing evidence of his good behavior during pretrial 
incarceration); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating state death penalty statute 
which precluded sentencer from considering all relevant mitigating 
circumstances).
In this case, the sentencing judge heard all relevant mitigating evidence, 
and was under no mistaken impressions of what evidence he could consider. Having 
heard all of this evidence, the judge concluded that defendant's good behavior 
while incarcerated did not justify imposition of a sentence other than death. 
The majority asserts that the judge refused to consider evidence of defendant's 
behavior while incarcerated. That is incorrect. The judge's specific references 
to and discussion of this evidence demonstrate that he did consider it. 
Having considered it, however, he determined that it was not a 
mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty. Reversal of 
defendant's death sentence thus is not compelled by Eddings or by any 
other Supreme Court case interpreting the United States Constitution.
For these reasons, I would affirm the death sentence imposed by the circuit 
court.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN and JUSTICE MILLER join in this 
dissent.