Title: City of Cheyenne v. Laramie County Bd. of Comm'rs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING, a Municipal Corporation v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF LARAMIE, WYOMING, and DEBORAH K. LATHROP, in her official capacity as the County Clerk of Laramie County, Wyoming, and JOSEPH D. FENDER and SHARI-SUE FENDER, Husband and Wife2012 WY 156Case Number: S-12-0058Decided: 12/13/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before final publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
CITY OF CHEYENNE, 
WYOMING, a Municipal Corporation,
 
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF LARAMIE, WYOMING, and DEBORAH K. LATHROP, in her 
official capacity as the County Clerk of Laramie County, Wyoming, and JOSEPH D. 
FENDER and SHARI-SUE FENDER, Husband and Wife,
 
Appellees
(Defendants).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable 
Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
John H. Ridge and 
Daniel E. White, City of Cheyenne, City Attorney’s Office, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Ridge.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Alexander K. Davison, 
Patton and Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Mark T. Voss, Laramie County Attorney’s 
Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming; John M. Walker and Robert J. Walker, Hickey and 
Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Voss and Mr. 
Davison.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Roundup Heights is a 
subdivision in Laramie County, located within one mile of the City of 
Cheyenne.  The City claims that the partial vacation of the 
plat of this subdivision required joint approval by both the City and the 
County.  The district court rejected the City’s claim and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the County.  The City 
challenges that decision.  We will affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]        
The issue as stated 
by the City is “Whether Title 34, Chapter 12 of the Wyoming Statutes requires 
joint City/County approval before a partial vacation of a plat may be recorded, 
when the affected plat of land is located within one (1) mile of a city 
boundary.”
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The facts were 
established by stipulation of the parties.  Roundup Heights is 
a subdivision located in the County.  It was platted in 
1955.  In 2010, the owners of certain lots applied for County 
approval of a partial vacation of the subdivision plat to eliminate some lot 
boundaries and rights-of-way.  During the review process, the 
City submitted a comment stating that the affected property is within one mile 
of the City limits, and asserting on that basis that both City and County 
approval were required for the partial vacation.  The County 
disagreed, and granted the partial vacation without City approval.  
The City filed suit, seeking declaratory judgment that joint City and 
County approval is required for partial vacation if the affected land is within 
one mile of the City.  The district court issued summary 
judgment in favor of the County, and the City appealed.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶4]        
Because summary 
judgment involves a purely legal determination, we undertake de novo 
review of a trial court’s summary judgment decision.  
Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 16, ¶ 6, 
176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  “Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 
191 P.3d 125, 128 (Wyo. 2008), 
citing W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming 
Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 
2002).  The parties’ stipulation to all of the material facts 
in this case “forecloses any factual dispute.”  Farmers 
Ins. Exchange v. Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820, 821 (Wyo. 
2000).  The remaining question is whether the County was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  To answer that, we 
must interpret the pertinent statutes.  Statutory 
interpretation also presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Qwest Corp. v. State, 2006 WY 35, ¶ 8, 
130 P.3d 507, 511 (Wyo. 2006).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶5]        
Subdivision of 
property is governed by Title 34, Chapter 12 of the Wyoming 
statutes.  The task before us is to interpret these statutes 
and determine whether they require joint City and County approval for the 
partial vacation of a subdivision plat if the affected land is within one mile 
of the City.
 
When interpreting 
statutes, we follow an established set of guidelines.  First, 
we determine if the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous.  A 
statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able 
to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability. 
 Unless another meaning is clearly intended, words and phrases 
shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense.  Conversely, 
a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject 
to varying interpretations.  
 
BP America Prod. Co. 
v. Department of Revenue, 2006 WY 27, 
¶ 20, 130 P.3d 438, 464 (Wyo. 2006), quoting State Dept. of 
Revenue v. Powder River Coal Co., 2004 WY 54, ¶ 5, 90 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Wyo. 2004).
 
[¶6]        
Our first step, then, 
is to read the statutes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-102 
(LexisNexis 2009) states that a property owner, to subdivide property, “shall 
cause a plat of such subdivision, with references to known or permanent 
monuments, to be made.”  The next statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34-12-103, deals with governmental approval of such subdivision plats, 
and provides in pertinent part:
 
Every such plat . . . 
shall meet the approval of the board of county commissioners if it is of land 
situated without the boundaries of any city or town or by the governing body of 
the city or town if situated within the boundaries of such city or 
town.  When thus executed, acknowledged and approved, said 
plat shall be filed for record and recorded in the office of the clerk of the 
proper county; provided, however, that any such plat of land adjacent to any 
incorporated city or town, or within one (1) mile of the boundaries of any such 
city or town, shall be jointly approved by both the board of county 
commissioners of said county and the governing body of said city or town before 
same shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk as 
aforesaid.
 
The vacation of 
subdivision plats is covered by three pertinent statutes.  The 
first, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-106, is entitled “Vacation; generally,” and 
it provides in relevant part:
 
No plat or portion 
thereof within the corporate limits of a city or town shall be vacated as herein 
provided without the approval of the city or town.  No plat or 
portion thereof for which a subdivision permit has been obtained [from the 
commissioners of the county in which the land is located] shall be vacated as 
herein provided without the approval of the county 
commissioners.
 
The second, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-108, is entitled “Vacation; partial vacation; when 
permitted,” and it provides as follows:
 
Any part of a plat 
may be vacated under the provisions, and subject to the conditions of this act 
[§§ 34-12-101 through 34-12-104, 34-12-106 through 
34-12-115]; provided, such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the 
rights and privileges of other proprietors in said plat; and provided, further, 
that nothing contained in this section shall authorize the closing or 
obstruction of any public highways laid out according to law.
 
The third is Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-110, entitled “Vacation; duty of county clerk,” and it 
provides:
 
The county clerk, in 
whose office the plats aforesaid are recorded, shall write in plain, legible 
letters across that part of said plat so vacated, the word “vacated”, and also 
make a reference on the same to the volume and page in which the said instrument 
of vacation is recorded.
 
[¶7]        
The parties agree, 
and the statutory language clearly indicates, that Section 103 requires joint 
County and City approval for the subdivision of property located 
in the County but within one mile of the City.  The City 
concedes, based on Section 106, that City approval is not required for the 
complete vacation of the plat of a subdivision 
located in the County, even if the affected property is within a mile of the 
City.  The parties disagree about whether joint City and 
County approval is required for the 
partial vacation of a subdivision plat when the 
property is within one mile of the City limits.  
 
[¶8]        
In its summary 
judgment argument before the district court, the County asserted that Section 
106 “could not be more clear” in providing that the City has authority to 
approve the vacation of plats for property within the City, and the County has 
authority to approve the vacation of plats for property located in the 
County.  The statute contains no provision for joint City and 
County approval of any vacation, complete or partial.  The 
County maintained that the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and 
“Section 106 requires no further interpretation or 
clarification.”  The district court agreed with the County, 
ruling that Section 106:
 
provides a clear and 
unambiguous answer regarding the authority of cities and counties concerning the 
vacation of plats.  This statute provides that a city has 
authority to approve the vacation if the plat or portion thereof . . . is within 
the corporate limits of the city or town.  It does not give a 
city authority when the plat or portion thereof is within 
one mile of the 
corporate limits. 
 
On appeal, the County 
defends the district court’s decision.
 
[¶9]        
The City contends 
that Section 106 must be considered in the context of the other statutes dealing 
with the platting and subdivision of property.  It cites 
Kuntz v. Kinne, 395 P.2d 286, 288 (Wyo. 1964) for “the 
fundamental rule of statutory construction and interpretation that legislative 
acts dealing with related matters must be considered 
in pari materia and the meaning of each such 
statute be correlated so as to give intelligent meaning to both whenever 
possible.”  We have explained more recently, as the City 
points out, that “we construe statutes in harmony with existing law, 
particularly other statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 
purpose.”  Hede v. Gilstrap, 
2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005).
 
[¶10]     
Among these other 
statutes, the City focuses primarily on Section 108.  As 
quoted above, it explicitly applies to partial vacations, and it incorporates 
other provisions and conditions of the act.  The City 
maintains that the incorporated provisions include Section 103, which, as 
also quoted above, requires joint City and County approval of plats for 
subdivisions located in the County but within a mile of the City.  
The City asserts that a partial vacation is accomplished by filing a new 
plat to indicate what parts of the original subdivision plat are being 
amended.  It claims that Section 103 therefore mandates that 
the new, amendatory plat must be approved jointly by the City and the County 
when the affected property is in the County but within a mile of the 
City.
 
[¶11]     
The City has cited no 
statute or other authority supporting its contention that a partial vacation 
must be accomplished by filing a new, amendatory plat.  We 
find statutory language that undermines the City’s position.  
As quoted above, Section 110 provides that: 
 
The county clerk, in 
whose office the plats aforesaid are recorded, shall write in plain, legible 
letters across that part of said plat so vacated, the word 
“vacated”, and also make a reference on the same to the volume and page in which 
the said instrument of vacation is recorded.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The first emphasized language confirms that this 
procedure applies to partial vacations.  The second emphasized 
language indicates that a vacation is done by an “instrument of 
vacation.”  There is no suggestion anywhere in the pertinent 
statutes that this “instrument of vacation” must be a new, amendatory 
plat.  In fact, this Court has previously reviewed a partial 
vacation that was accomplished with “an affidavit for 
vacation.”  Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, 
¶ 36, 273 P.3d 1065, 1076 (Wyo. 2012). 
 The partial vacation in that case was deemed invalid on other 
grounds, but there is no suggestion in the opinion that the vacation failed 
because the “instrument of vacation” was an affidavit rather than a new, 
amendatory plat.  Id., ¶ 38, 273 P.3d  
at 1077.
 
[¶12]     
Because we reject the 
City’s contention that a partial vacation requires a new plat, we are 
also unpersuaded by the City’s argument that the Section 103 
requirements for approving plats necessarily apply to partial 
vacations.  Section 103 begins with the indication that it 
applies to “[e]very such plat.”  In context, the word “such” 
can refer only to the plat discussed in the immediately preceding statute, 
Section 102.  Section 102 requires an original plat when 
property is subdivided, but makes no mention of a new plat relating to the 
vacation of the original.  The statutory language and 
structure of Section 102 and Section 103 plainly indicate that both 
statutes apply to original plats of new subdivisions, not to new, amendatory 
plats associated with partial vacations.  We therefore 
conclude that the joint approval requirements of Section 103 apply to the 
approval of original plats for new subdivisions, not to subsequent plats filed 
in order to accomplish a partial vacation.
 
[¶13]     
The City is correct 
that Section 108 expressly incorporates other statutory provisions, but that 
incorporation also includes Section 106, which expressly deals with 
vacations.  The City asserts, however, that the Section 106 
requirements for the vacation of plats apply only to complete vacations, not to 
partial vacations.  This statute expressly applies to the 
vacation of a “plat or portion thereof.”  The City asserts 
that the quoted phrase does not refer to partial vacations, but only to 
situations where a portion of the platted subdivision is in the County and a 
portion in the City.  This, the City urges, indicates that 
Section 106 was not meant to apply to partial vacations at all, but only to 
complete vacations.  The City does not dispute that the 
statute requires City approval for vacations of plats within the City, and 
County approval of vacations of plats within the County.  It 
contends, however, that these distinct approval requirements apply only to 
complete vacations, not to partial vacations.
 
[¶14]     
The City may be 
correct that the statute’s reference to a “portion” of a subdivision in Section 
106 probably means something different from a “partial” vacation referred to in 
other statutes.  But precisely because the two words mean 
something different, we cannot say that the legislature’s use of the word 
“portion” in this statute somehow suggests that the statute does not apply to 
partial vacations.  In fact, Section 106 makes no 
explicit mention of partial vacations or of complete vacations.  
Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that it should not apply 
equally to partial and complete vacations.  
 
[¶15]     
To the contrary, we 
note that the title of Section 106 is “Vacation; generally.”  
This suggests that Section 106 applies “generally” to both complete 
and partial vacations.  We are aware that the title of a 
statute may not be “part of the substantive law of the enactment.”  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-105(c).  Still, the 
statutory title may be useful in interpreting that statute.  
Counts v. State, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 18, 
197 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Wyo. 2008) (“Although the 
title of the statute is not part of the statute, it does suggest 
. . . .”); Patel v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt., 
LLC, 2010 WY 147, ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Wyo. 2010) 
(“The clear purpose of the statute, as evidenced by its title and by its 
language, is . . . .”).  It was explained many 
years ago that “the language of the title cannot overcome the plain intent 
manifested in the language used in the body of the act, yet where that language 
is of the same purport as the language used in the body of the act, it is 
corroborative of the legislative intent.”  Ward v. Board 
of Commr’s of Johnson County, 36 Wyo. 460, 464, 256 P. 1039, 1040 (Wyo. 1927).  The language of Section 
106 makes no distinction between complete vacations and partial vacations, and 
its title, “Vacation; generally,” corroborates the legislative intent that the 
statute applies to both complete and partial vacations.
 
[¶16]     
We accept the City’s 
position that all of the pertinent statutes must be considered 
in pari materia, and have carefully considered the 
other statutes and the City’s arguments about them.  Our 
review convinces us that the statutory language and structure do not support the 
City’s proposed interpretation.  The statutes are not 
ambiguous and, reading their language in its ordinary and usual sense, we 
conclude that joint City and County approval is not required for the partial 
vacation of a subdivision plat when the subdivision is within the County but 
within one mile of the City limits.  
 
[¶17]     
The City emphasizes 
that City and County cooperation is desirable in subdivision and platting 
activities involving property located near the City.  Benefits 
of such cooperation include the alignment of proposed new streets with existing 
rights-of way, adequate sizing of utility corridors to fit community-wide needs, 
and minimization of drainage problems and other natural hazards.  
It notes that, when a plat requires joint City and County approval, the 
City and County might “spend extensive amounts of time and money negotiating the 
rights-of-way, sewer lines, drainage corridors, and other necessities associated 
with an initial plat.”  If joint approval is not necessary for 
the partial vacation of that plat, however, then the City posits that the County 
could immediately approve a partial vacation that “eliminates the very 
rights-of-way, sewer lines, drainage corridors and other items that were created 
by virtue of the negotiations.”  On that basis, the City 
advocates that joint approval should be required for the partial vacation of 
plats of property in the County but near the City.
 
[¶18]     
We have already 
concluded, however, that the statutes unambiguously do not require joint City 
and County approval of partial vacations if the affected property is wholly 
within the County.  “When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words.”  Mountain Cement Co. v. Laramie Water & Sewer 
Dist., 2011 WY 81, ¶ 13, 255 P.3d 881, 885 (Wyo. 
2011).  Courts should not “usurp the power of the legislature 
by deciding what should have been said.”  
Hede, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d  at 
163.  The City’s argument may persuade the legislature to 
amend the statutes in the future.  It does not allow us to 
disregard the unambiguous language of the statutes as they are currently 
written.  
 
[¶19]     
The City makes a 
final claim that the partial vacation of Roundup Heights is invalid because it 
was not approved by all of the current owners in the subdivision.  
The City relies on Carnahan, ¶ 38, 273 P.3d  at 
1076-77, for the proposition that Section 106 requires “all owners of lots” in a 
subdivision “to join in a written instrument . . .  
declaring the plat to be vacated.”  In this case, 
however, the “record contains no indication that the [City] asked the district 
court to consider this argument, and we have repeatedly stated that we will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”  
Wyoming Bd. of Land Comm’rs v. Antelope Coal Co., 2008 
WY 60, ¶ 16, 185 P.3d 666, 670 (Wyo. 
2008).  The record actually shows that, in proceedings before 
the district court, the City explicitly disavowed any claim that the partial 
vacation was invalid because of failure to comply with Section 106.  
In its response to the County’s motion for summary judgment, the City 
wrote, “It is important to note that the City does not contend that the 
provisions of W.S. § 34-12-106 were violated when the County 
Commissioners approved the partial vacation of Roundup Heights.  
As stated above, W.S. § 34-12-106 is not applicable to 
the partial vacation of Roundup Heights.”  We decline to 
consider this claim by the City, because it was raised for the first time on 
appeal, and further, is directly contrary to the City’s claim before the 
district court.
 
[¶20]     
The district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the County is 
affirmed.