Title: Commonwealth v. Jackson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 070524 
 
 
 
  JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      June 6, 2008  
KENNETH EDWARD JACKSON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
T. J. Markow, Judge 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of the Circuit 
Court for the City of Richmond, which dismissed the 
Commonwealth’s petition for the civil commitment of Kenneth 
Edward Jackson as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”).  The 
Commonwealth contends that the circuit court erred because the 
requirements to establish probable cause under Code § 37.2-906 
had been met.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
I.  RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
The Commonwealth timely filed a petition under Code § 37.2-
905 seeking a determination that Jackson was a SVP under the 
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code 
§§ 37.2-900 et seq. (the “SVPA”).1  The circuit court appointed 
                     
1 Although neither the statute nor its predecessor is titled 
as such, we have referred to Code §§ 37.2-900 et seq. and its 
predecessor, Code §§ 37.1-70.1 et seq., as Virginia’s Sexually 
Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”).  See Ellison v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. 254, 257 & n.1, 639 S.E.2d 209, 211 & n.1 (2007) 
(affirming circuit court’s involuntary commitment under the 
“Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), Code § 37.1-70.1 et 
seq.”); and Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 117, 613 
S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of 
 
counsel for Jackson and conducted a probable cause hearing on 
December 18, 2006 pursuant to Code § 37.2-906.  At the hearing, 
the Commonwealth introduced three exhibits: a stipulation that 
Jackson was serving a criminal sentence for a sexually violent 
offense, the Virginia Department of Corrections Static-99 risk 
assessment scoring sheet which rated Jackson’s relative risk as 
“[m]oderate-[h]igh,” and the mental health evaluation report 
prepared by the Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Dennis R. Carpenter. 
Dr. Carpenter’s report consisted of two parts.  Dr. 
Carpenter opined in his original report that “Jackson does not 
meet the criteria as a [s]exually [v]iolent [p]redator.”  In a 
later addendum, Dr. Carpenter reached the opposite conclusion, 
primarily due to additional information he received from the 
Commitment Review Committee (“CRC”) about a 1997 rape charge 
against Jackson which had been dismissed.2 
The Commonwealth also introduced testimony from two 
witnesses:  Eric Madsen, a senior psychologist with the 
Department of Corrections and supervisor of the sex offender 
screening unit, and Dr. Carpenter.  Madsen testified that 
Jackson was referred to the CRC pursuant to Code § 37.2-903 
because Jackson received a score of four on the Static-99 test 
                                                                  
“Virginia’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (‘SVPA’), Code 
§§ 37.1-70.1 through -70.19”). 
2 The CRC is the body referenced in Code § 37.2-902 and 
other parts of the SVPA. 
 
2
 
and had been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined 
in Code § 37.2-900 because the victim was under the age of 13 
and suffered physical bodily injury.  This offense, a 1998 
conviction for aggravated sexual battery of an eight-year old 
girl, served as the requisite predicate offense for purposes of 
meeting the definition of a SVP under Code § 37.2-900. 
Dr. Carpenter testified that based on his review of 
Jackson’s criminal and medical records, conversations with his 
prior probation and parole officers, and his clinical interview 
with Jackson, Jackson met the statutory requirements to be 
classified as a SVP.  More specifically, Dr. Carpenter testified 
that based on Jackson’s criminal and sexual histories, he 
diagnosed Jackson with “paraphilia NOS” or paraphilia “[n]ot 
otherwise specified.”  According to Dr. Carpenter, an individual 
suffering from paraphilia NOS has “intense sexuality urges or 
fantasies or behaviors that involve . . . engaging in sex with a 
non-consenting person . . . tak[ing] place over a six month 
period at least or longer.” 
In addition to paraphilia NOS, Dr. Carpenter testified that 
he also diagnosed Jackson with “a personality disorder NOS [not 
otherwise specified] with antisocial features in addition to 
. . . dependent and avoiding features.”  This diagnosis 
describes an individual who is “involved in a pervasive pattern 
usually of unlawful behavior, that violates the rights of 
 
3
 
others.”  Dr. Carpenter also identified Jackson’s “extensive 
substance abuse history beginning at an early age” and diagnosed 
Jackson with “alcohol abuse in remission in a controlled 
environment,” “cocaine dependency in a controlled environment in 
remission,” and “opium [dependency] in remission in a controlled 
environment.”  Taking all of these factors into consideration, 
Dr. Carpenter characterized the risk that Jackson would commit 
another sexual offense in the future “from moderate to high.”  
In arriving at his final opinion, Dr. Carpenter testified that 
when both the adjudicated 1998 aggravated sexual battery 
conviction was considered with the unadjudicated 1997 rape 
charge, “[i]t appears that [Jackson] had established a pattern 
of having inappropriate sexual behavior with minors.” 
On cross-examination Dr. Carpenter admitted that in his 
original report to the CRC, he concluded that Jackson was not a 
SVP.  He explained that when he reviewed Jackson’s criminal 
record to formulate his first diagnosis, that record included 
the 1997 rape charge but contained no further information about 
that offense.  Dr. Carpenter testified that in the absence of 
further information regarding that charge, he could not conclude 
that Jackson exhibited a pattern of inappropriate sexual 
behavior consistent with that of a SVP.   
To formulate his revised opinion about Jackson’s SVP 
status, Dr. Carpenter stated that he relied upon more specific 
 
4
 
information about the 1997 rape charge, which the CRC sent to 
him following his original diagnosis.  According to Dr. 
Carpenter, the additional information from the CRC indicated 
that Jackson had been charged with rape for “sexually assaulting 
a 14-year-old girl in which according to the victim stated that 
he had fondled her breasts and had stuck his penis in her 
vagina."  The victim had been examined by a nurse practitioner 
who concluded, “that the physical trauma was consistent with 
sexual activity/sexual assault.”  Based on this additional 
information, Dr. Carpenter assumed that the 1997 rape charge was 
true for the purposes of his evaluation, then filed an addendum 
to his original evaluation finding that Jackson met the 
statutory requirements as a SVP.  The circuit court acknowledged 
Jackson’s argument that if Dr. Carpenter was unable to rely on 
the unadjudicated 1997 rape charge, then Dr. Carpenter would be 
“back to [his] original provisional diagnosis” that Jackson did 
not qualify for SVP status. 
Dr. Carpenter opined, in the original evaluation, that the 
risk that Jackson would commit another sexual offense in the 
future was lowered because of Jackson’s age and his health 
status.3  After receiving the supplemental information from the 
CRC, Dr. Carpenter reassessed these factors and opined that in 
                     
3 Jackson was diagnosed with Grave’s Disease and Chronic 
Renal Failure and has been on dialysis since 1995. 
 
5
 
finding Jackson was a SVP, “it is evident that his present 
medical conditions were not debilitating enough to prevent him 
from committing his sexual offenses.” 
Dr. Carpenter also testified that he had performed 
approximately 40 mental health evaluations under the SVPA.  On 
cross-examination, Dr. Carpenter testified that of the 40 
individuals examined, he found only three to be non-SVPs upon 
his initial evaluation.  In two of those three cases, including 
Jackson’s, the Commonwealth or CRC forwarded additional 
information to Dr. Carpenter, and he subsequently changed his 
diagnosis to find SVP status. 
 
At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the 
circuit court held that “I don’t believe that probable cause is 
found here.  I’m going to dismiss the case at this stage.”  The 
circuit court confirmed its bench ruling in an order entered 
December 19, 2006, which stated “the court determines that 
probable cause does not exist to believe that Kenneth E. Jackson 
is a sexually violent predator.”  We granted the Commonwealth 
this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Code § 37.2-906 requires a circuit court to “determine 
whether probable cause exists to believe that the [defendant] is 
a sexually violent predator.”  The meaning of “probable cause” 
 
6
 
and the standards of a probable cause hearing under the SVPA 
have not been previously addressed by this Court.  The General 
Assembly has also not defined “probable cause” for purposes of 
the SVPA.  See Code § 37.2-900 (setting forth definitions under 
the SVPA).  Although SVP adjudication under Code § 37.2-906(C) 
is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, Code § 37.2-908(H), 
see Ellison v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 254, 256, 639 S.E.2d 209, 
211 (2007) (a proceeding under Code § 37.2-900 et seq., is a 
“civil proceeding”), we believe it reasonable to look to the 
standards applicable to probable cause determinations in a 
criminal proceeding for guidance. 
Probable cause is assessed in preliminary hearings in 
Virginia criminal cases “essentially [as] a screening process.”  
Moore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 391, 237 S.E.2d 187, 
190 (1977).  “Its primary purpose is to determine whether there 
is ‘sufficient cause’ for charging the accused with the crime 
alleged.”  Id.  Like a criminal probable cause hearing, the SVP 
probable cause hearing is concerned with the liberty interest of 
the defendant and whether sufficient grounds exist to warrant 
further proceedings against him.  We conclude that the SVP 
probable cause hearing serves a similar purpose as the criminal 
probable cause hearing, that of ensuring that there is 
“sufficient cause” to believe the individual is a SVP. 
 
7
 
Probable cause in the criminal context is found when “there 
is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been 
committed and . . . the accused is the person who committed it.”  
Moore, 218 Va. at 391, 237 S.E.2d at 190.  Similarly, under the 
SVPA, the circuit court must determine whether probable cause 
exists to believe that the defendant is a SVP.  Code § 37.2-
906(C). 
With such strong similarities between probable cause in the 
criminal and SVP contexts, we shall apply the standard of review 
in a SVPA proceeding that we use in criminal cases: 
On appellate review, we give deference to the 
historical facts determined by the trial court, but we 
review de novo whether the legal standard of probable 
cause was correctly applied to the historical facts. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 
595, 598 (2004); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  
Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419, 620 S.E.2d 760, 762 
(2005).  “[W]e will not disturb the factual findings of the 
trial court unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. 
The issue of whether . . . probable cause [existed,] however, is 
a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.”  
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 39, 639 S.E.2d 217, 224-25 
(2007) (citations omitted).  Thus, the circuit court’s SVP 
probable cause determination is a mixed question of fact and 
law. 
 
8
 
B. The Merits 
The Commonwealth does not contest that it has the burden of 
proof at the SVP probable cause hearing.  The SVPA places the 
burden on the Commonwealth in a Code § 37.2-906 proceeding to 
introduce evidence sufficient to permit the circuit court to 
verify the identity of the defendant and to support a finding 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe (1) the defendant 
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, and (2) 
because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, the 
defendant “finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior, 
which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.”  
Code § 37.2-900. 
The Commonwealth contends that it conclusively satisfies 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause under Code 
§ 37.2-906(C) “when the Commonwealth produces a prima facie case 
addressing the essential elements of an SVP. . . .  Unless the 
Commonwealth’s evidence is proven manifestly wrong or so 
inherently incredible that a reasonable person could not believe 
it, the trial court cannot dismiss the petition at the probable 
cause hearing.”  To establish a prima facie case, the 
Commonwealth contends it “must present some evidence, more than 
a scintilla, on each of the elements of an SVP.”  In the 
Commonwealth’s view, if its evidence “satisfies all of the 
elements of proof necessary” and if the evidence is not “‘so 
 
9
 
incredible, insubstantial, or otherwise of such a quality that 
no reasonable person could rely on it to conclude that the 
Commonwealth had met its burden of proof,’ then the judge must 
determine that probable cause has been met.”  We disagree with 
the Commonwealth. 
In a criminal case, there is no precedential basis upon 
which to claim that a court must find probable cause, as a 
matter of law, simply because the Commonwealth produces more 
than a scintilla of evidence that a crime has been committed and 
that the defendant committed that crime.  Inherent in the 
court’s function at a preliminary hearing is the exercise of the 
court’s discretion in weighing the evidence to determine whether 
probable cause has been shown.  See Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 
Va. 670, 674, 212 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1975) (“the trial court, 
acting as fact finder, must evaluate the credibility of the 
witnesses, resolve the conflicts in their testimony, and weigh 
the evidence as a whole”).  At a preliminary hearing on a 
criminal charge, the court acts as the trier of fact, considers 
the witnesses’ testimony, observes the reaction of the witnesses 
during cross-examination, and evaluates the credibility of the 
witnesses.  We see no basis upon which to view a SVP probable 
cause hearing differently. 
Under the Commonwealth’s view, the circuit court at a SVP 
probable cause hearing would be an administrative functionary.  
 
10
 
Unless the evidence was “manifestly wrong or so inherently 
incredible that a reasonable person could not believe it,” 
probable cause would be required to be found as a matter of law.  
We do not find in the plain language of the SVPA that the 
General Assembly intended such a constricted view of a Code 
§ 37.2-906 probable cause hearing.  Indeed, the Commonwealth’s 
proposed construct of a probable cause proceeding appears 
partially inconsistent with the SVPA, which explicitly states 
that an expert opinion introduced at a probable cause hearing 
“shall not be dispositive of whether the respondent is a 
sexually violent predator.”  Code § 37.2-906(C). 
It is a common canon of statutory construction that when 
the legislature uses the same term in separate statutes, that 
term has the same meaning in each unless the General Assembly 
indicates to the contrary.  See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. 
Board of Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-88 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 
(1983) (courts “interpret the several parts of a statute as a 
consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the 
legislative goal”); Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405, 
100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (“statutes are not to be considered as 
isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a 
great connected, homogeneous system, or a single and complete 
statutory arrangement”) (citation omitted).  There is nothing in 
the SVPA to indicate that the General Assembly intended any 
 
11
 
different construction of probable cause in Code § 37.2-906 
than, for example, Code § 16.1-127 or Code § 19.2-218.  See Barr 
v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 
672, 674 (1990) (courts “assume that the legislature chose, with 
care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute”).  
In these other probable cause determinations, the court is not a 
mere gatekeeper, but is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The Commonwealth relies heavily on cases from other 
jurisdictions with SVP statutes as support for its proposed 
“more than a scintilla” and “prima facie” probable cause 
standard.  See Commonwealth v. Reese, 781 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 
(Mass. 2003) (evidence presented must be of “suitable quality to 
allow the action to proceed further”).4  In particular, the 
Commonwealth cites Massachusetts case law as precedent for its 
argument in the case at bar.  However, the probable cause 
proceeding under Massachusetts law has fundamental differences 
from a SVPA proceeding in Virginia. 
Like Virginia, a SVP proceeding in Massachusetts is begun 
by petition and a judge is required to hold a hearing to 
                     
4 See, e.g., State v. Robbins, 785 So.2d 620, 622 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001)(evidence must “cause a person of ordinary 
prudence to believe that the respondent is a sexually violent 
predator”); State v. Watson, 595 N.W.2d 403, 420 (Wis. 1999) 
(evidence “must establish a plausible account on each of the 
required elements”). 
 
12
 
“determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually dangerous person.” 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 12(c). If probable cause is found, 
the defendant is committed to a treatment center where “two 
qualified examiners” conduct an evaluation and report to the 
court.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 13(a).  After these reports 
are filed, a second petition is required to put the question of 
whether the person is “sexually dangerous” before the court.  
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 14(a). 
By contrast, a Code § 37.2-904 assessment in Virginia 
includes a mental health examination, as by Dr. Carpenter, 
before the probable cause hearing is conducted.  Further, there 
is only one petition filed under the SVPA, not two as in 
Massachusetts.  Thus, the probable cause hearing in a 
Massachusetts SVP proceeding takes place under a significantly 
different procedural setting from that in Virginia, and under a 
regime in which a less exacting evidentiary basis appears 
established for the hearing.  That Massachusetts apparently uses 
a more relaxed probable cause standard than we believe applies 
in Virginia may be partly attributable to these differences in 
the statutory framework between the two states. 
None of the cases cited by the Commonwealth actually uses 
the standard the Commonwealth promotes.  In any event, we would 
find such a case inapposite for construing probable cause under 
 
13
 
Code § 37.2-906 without specific direction from the General 
Assembly invoking a standard other than the one traditionally 
applied in Virginia.  Thus, even if we assumed that the 
Commonwealth produced more than a scintilla of evidence to prove 
the statutory elements that Jackson was a SVP, that showing 
would not, in and of itself, establish probable cause.  Having 
rejected the Commonwealth’s proposed standard, we turn to the 
record in this case to determine whether the disposition of this 
proceeding below withstands scrutiny under the standard of 
review we noted earlier, which directs that the circuit court’s 
judgment be affirmed unless it was plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it. 
The Commonwealth advanced the position that Dr. Carpenter’s 
expert opinion – that Jackson was a SVP – was not contradicted 
by any evidence from Jackson, and therefore, the circuit court 
was required to accept that uncontradicted evidence to reach a 
finding of probable cause.  In the Commonwealth’s view, since 
Jackson did not rebut Dr. Carpenter’s opinion with direct 
evidence of his own, there was uncontradicted evidence that 
Jackson was a SVP and the circuit court was thus bound to find 
probable cause as a matter of law.  Again, we disagree with the 
Commonwealth’s reasoning. 
“A litigant is bound by the uncontradicted evidence of his 
opponent when not inherently improbable and counter to no 
 
14
 
reasonable inference.”  Hailey v. Johnson, 201 Va. 775, 778, 113 
S.E.2d 664, 666 (1960) (citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. 
Lenz, 158 Va. 732, 737, 164 S.E. 572, 573 (1932)).  However, the 
trier of fact may disregard testimony of a witness impeached on 
cross-examination.  See, e.g., Cheatham v. Gregory, 227 Va. 1, 
4, 313 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1984) (“A trier of fact must determine 
the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses, 
but may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence of 
unimpeached witnesses which is not inherently incredible and not 
inconsistent with facts in the record, even though such 
witnesses are interested in the outcome of the case.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Blount v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 807, 809, 195 
S.E.2d 693, 695 (1973) (“[U]ncontradicted testimony may be 
disregarded if the jury believes that it is untrue.  In 
determining whether it is untrue the jury may rely on such 
factors as the manner of the witness, as the jury here was 
advised in the usual credibility instruction, and the inherent 
improbability of his statements.”). 
Dr. Carpenter’s testimony as to Jackson’s SVP status was 
not uncontradicted.  He was subject to rigorous cross-
examination which pointed out, among other things, that Dr. 
Carpenter had given two SVP opinions: one that Jackson was a SVP 
and another that he was not.  Dr. Carpenter admitted on cross-
examination that the reason he changed his original opinion, 
 
15
 
that Jackson was not a SVP, was solely based on his receipt of a 
report of unadjudicated conduct concerning a 1997 rape charge. 
While Code § 37.2-906(C) permits the consideration at a SVP 
probable cause hearing of “prior convictions or charges,” there 
is no statutory mandate that an unadjudicated charge must be 
taken as true for purposes of the hearing.  Jackson’s counsel 
effectively impeached Dr. Carpenter’s reliance on the 1997 
charge based on the surrounding facts.  For example, Dr. 
Carpenter conceded, when considering the alleged 1997 assault by 
Jackson, that “I’m not a physician so I can’t be in a position 
to say whether or not that’s refutable information.”  
Dr. Carpenter admitted that his change of opinion on 
Jackson’s SVP status was predicated on the veracity of the 1997 
rape charge because that “established a pattern of having 
inappropriate sexual behavior with minors.”  Without that basis, 
the circuit court recognized that Dr. Carpenter’s original SVP 
assessment would otherwise stand. 
In SVP probable cause hearings, the defendant has limited 
resources, other than appointed counsel, to contest the 
Commonwealth’s case.  For example, the right to the assistance 
of experts under Code § 37.2-907 has not yet matured at the time 
of the probable cause hearing.  Nonetheless, the defendant is 
not required to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence with direct 
evidence of his own in order to contradict the Commonwealth’s 
 
16
 
case.  As in the case at bar, the impeachment of the 
Commonwealth’s expert witness, Dr. Carpenter, by effective 
cross-examination, removes Dr. Carpenter’s opinion that Jackson 
was a SVP from the realm of uncontradicted evidence. 
This Court will not substitute its judgment on the 
credibility of a witness for that of the circuit court. “[T]he 
credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony 
are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity 
of seeing and hearing the witnesses.”  Schneider v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736–37 (1985); 
see also Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 252, 257 S.E.2d 
797, 803 (1979). 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court was entitled to weigh Dr. 
Carpenter’s conflicting opinions on Jackson’s SVP status in 
determining whether the Commonwealth had established probable 
cause.  There was evidence in the record, established by cross-
examination, that impeached Dr. Carpenter’s SVP diagnosis.  As 
such, we cannot say the circuit court’s decision that probable 
cause had not been shown was plainly wrong or without evidence 
to support it. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
 
17
 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
Today, the majority decides an issue of first impression 
without acknowledging that it is doing so, without any 
explanation for its decision, and without citation to any 
relevant authority.  In concluding that a probable cause hearing 
under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SPVA), Code §§ 37.2-
900 et seq., should follow the standards applicable to probable 
cause determinations in criminal proceedings, the majority holds 
that “[a]t a preliminary hearing on a criminal charge, the court 
acts as the trier of fact, considers the witnesses’ testimony, 
observes the reaction of the witnesses during cross-examination, 
and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”  This is the 
role that a court performs as a trier of fact in a criminal 
bench trial.  See Lane v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 603, 611, 35 
S.E.2d 749, 752 (1945) (As the trier of fact, findings of the 
court regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence “stands on the same footing as the verdict of a 
jury.”).  This Court, however, has never previously decided 
whether a court at a preliminary hearing on a criminal charge 
functions in the same capacity as it does when acting as the 
trier of fact in a bench trial in terms of resolving conflicts 
in the evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses. 
 
18
 
We know that a “preliminary hearing is essentially a 
screening process [to determine] whether there is reasonable 
ground to believe that the crime has been committed and whether 
the accused is the person who committed it.”  Moore v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 391, 237 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1977); see 
also Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 297, 300, 163 S.E.2d 565, 
567 (1968) (the only issue to decide at a preliminary hearing is 
whether there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has 
been committed and that the accused was the person who committed 
the crime).  And, this Court has defined the term “probable 
cause” as “knowledge of such a state of facts and circumstances 
as excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such facts 
and circumstances, that the [accused] is guilty of the crime of 
which he is suspected.”  Gresham v. American Ry. Express Co., 
147 Va. 395, 399, 137 S.E. 471, 472 (1927); see also, Wheeler v. 
Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1861) (probable cause is “the 
existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, 
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge 
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the 
crime for which he was prosecuted”); Scott v. Shelor, 69 Va. (28 
Gratt.) 891, 905 (1877) (defining probable cause as “[a] 
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances 
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in 
the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offence with 
 
19
 
which he is charged”).  “ ‘Probable cause, as the very name 
implies, deals with probabilities.’ ”  Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 
Va. 413, 421, 410 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1991) (quoting Saunders v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 294, 300, 237 S.E.2d 150, 155 (1977)).  We 
also know that, pursuant to Code § 19.2-183(B), “the rules of 
evidence applicable to criminal trials in this Commonwealth” 
govern the introduction of evidence at a preliminary hearing, 
and the accused has the right to “cross-examine witnesses, 
introduce witnesses in his own behalf, and testify in his own 
behalf.”  Furthermore, if there is “not sufficient cause for 
charging [the accused] with the offense,” the court “shall 
discharge the accused.”  Code § 19.2-186. 
But, we did not know until today that a court at a 
preliminary hearing on a criminal charge acts as a trier of fact 
and that this role is “the one traditionally applied in 
Virginia” at preliminary hearings.  The majority offers no 
explanation for this conclusion, and I find no support for it in 
our jurisprudence.  Indeed, the authority cited by the majority, 
Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 212 S.E.2d 293 (1975), 
pertains to a trial court’s role as the trier of fact in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has carried its burden to 
show that a confession was freely and voluntarily made.  Id. at 
674, 212 S.E.2d at 297. 
 
20
 
I agree that the probable cause hearing mandated by the 
provisions of Code § 37.2-906 is analogous to a preliminary 
hearing in the criminal context and that the determination 
whether there is probable cause to believe that an individual is 
a sexually violent predator, as that term is defined in Code 
§ 37.2-900, should be guided by the same standards used to 
determine probable cause at a preliminary hearing on a criminal 
charge.  In my view, however, the function of the court at a 
preliminary hearing in the criminal context is more 
circumscribed than its role as the trier of fact in a bench 
trial.  As the court explained in State v. Dunn, 359 N.W.2d 151 
(Wis. 1984): 
 
A preliminary hearing as to probable cause is not 
a preliminary trial or a full evidentiary trial on the 
issue of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is 
intended to be a summary proceeding to determine 
essential or basic facts as to probability. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
[A]lthough the judge at a preliminary examination 
must ascertain the plausibility of a witness’s story 
and whether, if believed, it would support a bindover, 
the court cannot delve into the credibility of a 
witness.  The issue as to credence or credibility is a 
matter that is properly left for the trier of fact. 
 
. . . . 
 
We stress that a preliminary hearing is not a proper 
forum to choose between conflicting facts or 
inferences, or to weigh the state’s evidence against 
evidence favorable to the defendant.  That is the role 
of the trier of fact at trial. 
 
 
21
 
Id. at 154-55 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
Courts in numerous other jurisdictions have similarly 
defined the role of a court in a preliminary hearing to 
determine probable cause on a criminal charge.  See, e.g., 
People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo. 2004) (At a preliminary 
hearing to determine probable cause, “[a] judge may not engage 
in credibility determinations unless the testimony is incredible 
as a matter of law,” meaning testimony that is “ ‘in conflict 
with nature or fully established or conceded facts.’ ” (quoting 
People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807, 809 (Colo. 2001))); Smith v. 
O’Brien, 251 A.2d 323, 324 (N.H. 1969) (Since the purpose of a 
preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause 
exists to believe that a crime has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it, “[t]he hearing is not a judicial trial 
of the issue of guilt or innocence, . . . [h]ence [the] court is 
not called upon to reconcile any conflicting testimony, or judge 
the credibility of witnesses.”); In re A.J.S., 877 N.E.2d 997, 
1001 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (A juvenile court at a preliminary 
hearing to determine if sufficient credible evidence exists to 
transfer jurisdiction to an adult court “does not find facts, 
choosing one party’s evidence over the other when the credible 
evidence is contradictory as to a fact or element of an 
offense.”  Instead, the juvenile court “evaluates the quality of 
the evidence and then decides whether the credible evidence 
 
22
 
adduced justifies a belief that the juvenile committed a 
particular offense.”); Liciaga v. Court of Common Pleas, 566 
A.2d 246, 248 (Pa. 1989) (“The committing magistrate is 
precluded from considering the credibility of a witness who is 
called upon to testify during the preliminary hearing.”); State 
v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998) (While “a magistrate 
may review the credibility of evidence presented at a 
preliminary hearing, . . . the magistrate’s evaluation of 
credibility . . . is limited to determining that ‘evidence is 
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the [prosecution’s] claim.’ . . . [A] 
magistrate at a preliminary hearing is precluded from evaluating 
the weight of otherwise credible evidence.” (third alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995))); see also In re Care & Treatment of Martineau, 242 
S.W.3d 456, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (in the context of a 
sexually violent predator proceeding, “the trial court does not 
weigh evidence or make credibility determinations at preliminary 
hearings” to determine probable cause).∗ 
                     
∗ I recognize that some courts advocate a more expansive 
role for a court at a preliminary hearing.  See, e.g., Jones v. 
Superior Court, 483 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Cal. 1971) (In a 
preliminary examination, “it is clear that it is the 
responsibility of the committing magistrate to weigh the 
evidence, resolve conflicts and give or withhold credence to 
particular witnesses.”). 
 
23
 
 
Thus, contrary to the majority, I conclude that it is not 
part of a court’s inherent function at a preliminary hearing in 
the criminal context to act as a trier of fact by weighing the 
evidence and making credibility findings.  Nor is it a function 
of the court in a SVPA proceeding when determining probable 
cause under Code § 37.2-906.  Instead, in both instances, the 
court, in my view, should determine whether the evidence, if 
believed, supports a finding of probable cause.  Dunn, 359 
N.W.2d at 155.  Only in those rare instances when evidence is 
“incredible as a matter of law,” Fry, 92 P.3d at 977, or “is 
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue,” Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438, should the court make 
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. 
This limited role of a court when determining probable 
cause, whether in the criminal context or in a SVPA proceeding, 
is in accord with the function of a preliminary hearing as a 
“screening process,” Moore, 218 Va. at 391, 237 S.E.2d at 190, 
to “ferret[] out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions.”  
Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438.  It is also consistent with the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-186.  That statute, as previously 
pointed out, directs the court to discharge an accused if there 
is “not sufficient cause for charging [the accused] with the 
offense.”  Id.  But, if the court “considers that there is 
sufficient cause only to charge the accused with an offense 
 
24
 
which [the court] has jurisdiction to try, then [the court] 
shall try the accused for such offense and convict him if [the 
court] deems him guilty.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This statutory 
distinction signifies that, when trying an accused, a court 
functions as a trier of fact but that it does not do so when 
deciding only whether there is “sufficient cause” to charge the 
accused with the offense. 
The majority’s decision that a court at a preliminary 
hearing on a criminal charge acts as a trier of fact by weighing 
the evidence and making credibility determinations has the 
potential of turning preliminary hearings into “mini-trials.”  
It also will likely permit defendants to use preliminary 
hearings as discovery tools, a practice that is not in accord 
with the purpose of a preliminary hearing.  See Foster, 209 Va. 
at 300-01, 163 S.E.2d at 568 (holding that “[a] preliminary 
hearing may not be used for the purpose of discovery” and that 
the court at a preliminary hearing did not err by refusing to 
allow the defendant to present testimony about an incriminating 
statement and confession because such testimony was not relevant 
to the issue whether there was reasonable ground to believe the 
defendant committed the charged offense); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 729, 160 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1968) 
(same). 
 
25
 
 
26
 
Turning now to the case before us, I thus conclude that the 
circuit court was not entitled to weigh what the majority 
characterizes as “Dr. Carpenter’s conflicting opinions on 
Jackson’s [sexually violent predator] status.”  In my opinion, 
Dr. Carpenter’s testimony that Jackson met the statutory 
requirements to be classified as a sexually violent predator was 
not incredible as a matter of law.  Thus, his testimony, along 
with the other evidence presented by the Commonwealth, 
established probable cause to believe that Jackson is a sexually 
violent predator.  See Code § 37.2-906(C).  The circuit court’s 
finding to the contrary was plainly wrong.  The court erred in 
assuming the role of a trier of fact at the probable cause 
hearing. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part.  I would reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court and remand this case for further proceedings under the 
SVPA.