Title: PINNACLE BANK v. VILLA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PINNACLE BANK v. VILLA2004 WY 150100 P.3d 1287Case Number: 03-234Decided: 11/30/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

PINNACLE 
BANK, a National Banking

Corporation,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

ROSEMARY L. 
VILLA,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Certified 
Questions

from 
the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
T. Holscher of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Holscher.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bradley 
D. Bonner and Laurence W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson PC, Powell, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Bonner.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This case 
comes before this court as two certified questions from the District Court, 
Fifth Judicial District, State of Wyoming.  
We are asked to consider whether a city ordinance addressing the removal 
of snow and ice establishes the applicable duty of care or whether Wyoming's 
common law regarding the natural accumulation of snow and ice applies.   We are additionally asked to 
consider whether the State of Wyoming is to be included in the comparative fault 
analysis even though the State is immune from suit in these circumstances. 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The certified 
questions are:

 

The City of 
Worland municipal ordinance establishes the duty of [Appellant Pinnacle] Bank 
under the circumstances of this case and it is the Court's intention to instruct 
the jury as to the standard of care pursuant to the City of Worland municipal 
ordinance, and not on the common law rules pertaining to natural accumulation of 
snow and ice.  The Court finds that 
the city ordinance, which is a specifically enacted rule, controls over the 
general common law rules pertaining to natural 
accumulation.

 

2.  Whether the Defendant is not entitled to 
compare the fault of the State of Wyoming for the purposes of W.S. § 1-1-109 
because the State is, pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
absolutely immune from recovery under these circumstances.  

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The district 
court's certification order sets forth a brief statement of facts relevant to 
the certified questions.  

 

1.  . . . 
Villa fell on the sidewalk in front of Pinnacle Bank on November 10, 1998.  [Villa's] fall was caused by an 
accumulation of ice in front of the Pinnacle Bank Building. [Villa] contends 
that the ice was formed by improper drainage off the facade of the building. 
[Pinnacle Bank] contends that the ice formed as a natural accumulation of frozen 
water.

 

2.  The 
City of Worland has a municipal ordinance governing sidewalks such as the one 
upon which [Villa] fell which reads as follows:

 

It shall be 
the duty of the occupant of any premises within the city limits or, in case the 
same are unoccupied, then the owner or his agent to keep the sidewalks in front 
of and adjoining his premises safe and clear for pedestrians and to repair the 
same from time to time.  Such 
occupant, owner or agent shall, with all reasonable dispatch, remove snow, ice, 
slush, mud or other impediment to safe and convenient foot travel.  Every person failing to comply with the 
provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of committing a nuisance and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined.

 

3.  . . . 
[Pinnacle] Bank owns the sidewalk.

 

Additionally, 
Pinnacle Bank claimed that the State negligently designed and constructed the 
sidewalk as part of a project on a state highway easement.

 

[¶4]      When making its 
ruling encompassed in the certified question, the district court noted that the 
reasoning for its ruling was more thoroughly set forth in its Order on Motions 
In Limine and Legal Trial Issues.  
That order stated:

 

3.  The 
Court has been called upon to determine the governing standard under Wyoming law 
for [Pinnacle Bank's] duty to remove accumulations of snow, ice and the 
like.  [Villa] asserts that a City 
of Worland ordinance concerning removal establishes [Pinnacle Bank's] duty, and 
that the common law rules pertaining to natural and unnatural accumulations of 
snow and ice do not therefore apply.  
[Pinnacle Bank] argues the opposite, that the rules of natural and 
unnatural accumulation control and the City of Worland ordinance has no role in 
establishing [Pinnacle Bank's] duty here.  
Looking at the history of cases determined by the Wyoming Supreme Court 
which discuss similar city ordinances, and the history of cases on the natural 
accumulation rule, the Court determines in this matter that the City of Worland 
ordinance does in fact impose a duty upon [Pinnacle Bank], and it would appear 
that it should be a question for the jury to make a determination as to whether 
[Pinnacle Bank] did in fact remove the hazard with all the reasonable dispatch 
as required by the ordinance.  The 
Court rules that the ordinance does in fact set the standard of care, and the 
jury will not be instructed on the natural and unnatural accumulation 
rules.

 

            
Additionally, for the same reasons the jury will not be instructed on 
natural and unnatural accumulation, the jury will not be instructed on the 
"open-and-obvious-danger" rule.  
Like the natural accumulation rule, the purpose of the 
open-and-obvious-danger rule is to determine a party's duty of care to warn of 
or remove a hazard under a certain circumstance.  Here, however, that duty already is 
established by the City of Worland ordinance.  Accordingly, the only role for the 
open-and-obvious-danger rule in this case will be for purposes of arguing 
comparative fault of [Villa]. 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]      We review 
certified questions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.  Under this rule, we are asked to settle 
questions of law in which it appears there is no controlling precedent from this 
court.  W.R.A.P. 11.01.  "[Q]uestions of the application of the 
law, including identification of the correct rule, are considered de novo."  EOG Resources, Inc. v. State, 
2003 WY 34, ¶7, 64 P.3d 757, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003).

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      Pinnacle Bank 
initially argues that pursuant to Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 
1981), this court must apply Wyoming's established common law regarding natural 
accumulation of snow and ice and disregard the standard set forth in the 
ordinance.  In explaining the state 
of the common law, we have stated:

 

            
In Wyoming, the owner or occupier of premises is not liable for injuries 
resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of snow and ice.  Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 897 (Wyo. 1994).  Further, 
we have held that there is no liability when the dangers surrounding such 
natural accumulation are obvious or are as well known to the plaintiff as the 
defendant.  Sherman v. Platte 
County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982).  
Liability attaches only if the owner or occupier creates an unnatural 
accumulation that is substantially different in volume or course than would 
naturally occur.   
Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 898.   To prove that an accumulation of 
snow and ice is unnatural, a plaintiff must show that the defendant created or 
aggravated the hazard, that the defendant knew or should have known of the 
hazard, and that the hazardous condition was substantially more dangerous than 
it would have been in its natural state.  
Myers v. Forest City Ent., Inc., 92 Ohio App.3d 351, 635 N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (1993).

 

Pullman v. 
Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1996).  We have also 
stated:

 

            
Liability will only attach if the owner or occupier creates an unnatural 
accumulation that is substantially different in volume or course than would 
naturally occur.  Pullman, 
924 P.2d  at 418; Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 898.   To establish that an accumulation 
of snow and ice is unnatural, a plaintiff must show that the defendant created 
or aggravated the hazard, that the defendant knew or should have known of the 
hazard, and that the hazardous condition was substantially more dangerous than 
it would have been in its natural state.  
Pullman, at 418.   
Furthermore, no duty exists which requires either the removal of an 
obvious danger or a warning of its existence.  Eiselein, at 895.   In Sherman v. Platte 
County, [642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982),] we stated 

 

there is the 
rule that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger 
or a warning of its existence.  
Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation 
of snow and ice.  The latter rule 
broadens the protection accorded possessors of land under the former rule.  It covers that class of cases where the 
ice and snow naturally accumulate in a fashion where there is a lurking danger, 
i.e., the ice is covered by the snow. 

 

642 P.2d  at 
789.   We have also stated that 
even the most ably constructed and carefully maintained parking lot will 
probably contain minor indentations in which naturally occurring water can 
accumulate and freeze; naturally occurring water which naturally concentrates in 
such a lot is still considered a natural accumulation.  Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 
898.

 

Paulson v. 
Andicoechea, 926 P.2d 955, 957-58 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶7]      Nevertheless, in 
as early as 1963, this court suggested that the existence of an ordinance 
requiring a different standard of care for the removal of snow and ice might 
override Wyoming's natural accumulation of snow and ice common law.  Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718 
(Wyo. 1963).  One year later, this 
court again implied in Kalman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 390 P.2d 724, 727 (Wyo. 1964), that a city ordinance calling for the maintenance of every 
city sidewalk so as to be clean and free from snow, ice, and slush established a 
duty that the owner use reasonable care to keep a sidewalk free from snow and 
ice.  Thus, this court again 
indicated that an applicable city ordinance might increase the responsibility of 
a property owner above and beyond that established by the common law.  Still later in Johnson v. 
Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 1981), upon reviewing the history of 
Wyoming's slip-and-fall-on-ice-and-snow cases, this court 
announced:

 

In our 
judgment, the most accurate interpretation of the Wyoming cases discussed above 
involving slips on icy sidewalks is that a storekeeper, in the absence of 
an ordinance, is not under a duty to remove natural and obvious 
accumulations of snow and ice from the public sidewalk outside his 
business.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶8] 
However, in Kalman this court reasoned that the violation of any such 
ordinance might be used as evidence of the landowner's negligence, but it would 
not establish the landowner's negligence per se.  Kalman, 390 P.2d  at 727.  In Distad, at 179, quoting 
Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 119 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Ohio 1954), we recognized the 
proposition that when a conglomeration of circumstances are relied on in order 
to find the statutory or regulatory violation, use of the negligence per se 
doctrine is not desirable.

 

[I]f a positive and definite standard of care has been established by 
legislative enactment [administrative regulation] whereby a jury may determine 
whether there has been a violation thereof by finding a single issue of fact, a 
violation is negligence per se; but where the jury must determine the negligence 
or lack of negligence of a party charged with the violation of a rule of conduct 
fixed by legislative enactment from a consideration and evaluation of multiple 
facts and circumstances by the process of applying, as the standard of care, the 
conduct of a reasonably prudent person, negligence per se is not involved. 

 

[¶9]      In Distad, 
this court was faced with reviewing various standards of care set forth by 
statute, ordinance, and administrative regulation and how they might affect the 
applicable duty of care in a medical malpractice action.  Ultimately, this court held that the 
effect of a violation of statute, ordinance, or regulation which defines a 
standard of conduct in negligence actions would be resolved under the 
Restatement of Torts (Second).  
Distad, at 175.  Thus, 
we concluded that the district court had properly instructed the jury that the 
unexcused violation of state and federal laws defining the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent 
conduct because such a holding was consistent with the Restatement of Torts 
(Second) § 288B(2).  Distad, 
at 176.

 

[¶10]   In the instant case, the city 
ordinance in effect specifies that it is the affirmative duty of an occupant, 
owner, or agent of property within the city limits of Worland, Wyoming to keep 
the sidewalks in front of and adjoining the premises safe and clear for 
pedestrians and to repair the same from time to time.  This duty explicitly includes the 
responsibility to remove snow, ice, slush, mud, or other impediment with all 
reasonable dispatch to assure safe and convenient foot travel.  The ordinance obviously broadens the 
responsibilities enumerated beyond that prescribed by the common law.  We further conclude that even though the 
ordinance does not specifically repeal the established common law in the area, 
the ordinance cannot be construed as consistent with the common law.  This fact evidences the Worland city 
council's clear intent under its delegated authority to establish a heightened 
standard of care within the city limits.  
Accordingly, the municipal ordinance provides the applicable standard of 
care. 

 

[¶11]   Pinnacle Bank additionally argues 
that under Distad and its apparent adoption of the Restatement of Torts 
(Second) § 288(d), this court may refuse to adopt the ordinance's defined 
standard of care.  The Restatement 
of Torts (Second) § 288(d) provides:

 

The court 
will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements 
of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is 
found to be exclusively

 

. . .

 

(d)  to protect a class of persons other than the one whose 
interests are invaded[.]
 

However, § 
288(d) makes it clear that such an option by a court exists only where the 
enactment is intended to protect a class of persons other than the one whose 
interests were invaded.  Upon 
considering the intent of the ordinance, it is undeniable that the ordinance was 
enacted in an effort to protect pedestrians and assure safe and convenient foot 
travel within the City of Worland.  
Villa obviously falls squarely within the intended protected 
class.

 

[¶12]   Pinnacle Bank also asserts that if 
this court decides to apply the standard expressed by the ordinance, we should 
do so in conjunction with Wyoming's natural accumulation of snow and ice common 
law.  A review of the arguments 
proffered by the parties on this matter actually discloses that both are in 
agreement in this area.  Pinnacle 
Bank asserts that the open-and-obvious-danger rule must still be applied in 
order to determine Villa's comparative negligence.  Similarly, Villa contends that the 
open-and-obvious-danger rule should be utilized for comparative negligence 
purposes, but not for establishing the duty of care.  Additionally, we note that the district 
court apparently reached this same conclusion when it ruled that the only role 
for the open-and-obvious-danger rule in this case would be for the purpose of 
arguing Villa's comparative fault.  
Under established Wyoming law, we agree with the parties' positions and 
the district court's ruling.

 

[¶13]   The city ordinance creates an 
affirmative duty for an owner, occupant, or agent of property within the city 
limits to remove snow, ice, slush, or other impediment with all reasonable 
dispatch.  Such an established 
affirmative duty negates the necessity for a determination of 1) whether 
the accumulation of snow and ice was natural or unnatural, 2) whether the 
defendant created or aggravated the hazard, 3) whether the defendant knew 
or should have known of the hazard, or 4) whether the hazardous condition 
is substantially more dangerous than it would have been in its natural state 
under our established common law.  
Rather, the determination that needs to be made by a jury in determining 
whether Pinnacle Bank was at fault is whether the snow, ice, slush, or other 
impediment was removed with all reasonable dispatch so as to assure safe and 
convenient foot travel as set forth by the ordinance.  Thereafter, the jury must assess Villa 
and the State's comparative fault.  

 

[¶14]   In determining whether Villa was at 
fault, the jury must consider if Villa kept a proper lookout and apply the 
open-and-obvious-danger rule.  
Although the ordinance has created a heightened standard of care, a 
pedestrian cannot act recklessly merely because ice, snow, slush, or other 
impediment has not been properly removed.  A pedestrian's duty to remain observant 
and careful continues to exist.  To 
hold otherwise, this court would relieve parties who slip and fall on snow, ice, 
slush, or other impediment located on sidewalks within the Worland city limits 
of their duty to also act in a reasonable manner.  

 

[¶15]   Accordingly, consistent with the 
above-cited authorities, we hold that the district court properly ruled that the 
jury be instructed as to the standard of care set forth by the municipal 
ordinance.  Because trial of this 
case now appears inevitable under our defined guidelines, we note that the jury 
will be required to carefully consider and evaluate multiple facts, 
circumstances, and factors in order to apply the standard of care expressed by 
the ordinance and to assess any possible comparative fault issues.  This leads us to our discussion of the 
second certified question.  

 

[¶16]   The second certified question 
essentially asks us to determine whether the jury can consider and compare the 
fault of the State of Wyoming, even though the State is immune from recovery 
under these circumstances, i.e., whether the State can appear on the verdict 
form.  Pinnacle Bank requested that 
the State be included because it claimed the State negligently designed and 
constructed the sidewalk.  At oral 
argument, Villa actually concluded that the State can be included on the verdict 
form and conceded this point.  We 
agree with Villa's conclusion under the comparative fault statute.  The relevant portions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2003) addressing comparative fault 
state:

 

(a)  As 
used in this section:

 

(i) 
"Actor" means a person or other entity, including the claimant, whose fault is 
determined to be a proximate cause of the death, injury or damage, whether or 
not the actor is a party to the litigation;

 

. . .

 

(iv) 
"Fault" includes acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death 
or injury to person or property, that are in any measure negligent, or that 
subject an actor to strict tort or strict products liability, and includes 
breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration of a 
product;

 

. . .

 

(b)  Contributory 
fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any claimant or the claimant's 
legal representative to recover damages for wrongful death or injury to person 
or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty 
percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the 
claimant.

 

(c)  Whether 
or not the claimant is free of fault, the court shall:

 

(i)  If 
a jury trial:

 

(A)  Direct 
the jury to determine the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant 
without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the 
percentage of fault attributable to each actor; and

 

(B)  Inform 
the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

 

(ii) 
If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, 
determining the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant without regard 
to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of 
fault attributable to each actor.

 

(d)  The 
court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (c) of this 
section in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant and 
enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection 
(e) of this section.

 

(e)  Each 
defendant is liable only to the extent of that defendant's proportion of the 
total fault determined under paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) of this 
section.

 

As 
can be seen by the plain language of this statute, the Wyoming legislature has 
decided that the jury must determine the percentage of fault attributable to 
each "actor."  
§ 1-1-109(c)(i)(A).  
This required determination facilitates the legislature's objective to 
hold each defendant liable only for his proportion of fault.  § 1-1-109(e).  The question then becomes whether the 
State fits the definition of actor.  

 

[¶17] 
The definition of "actor" includes an entity whose fault is determined to be the 
proximate cause of the injury whether or not a party to the litigation.  The State, although immune from suit, 
certainly may be the proximate cause of the death, injury, or damages and 
clearly fits that portion of the definition.  However, because the definition of actor 
contains the word "fault," we must also consider that definition.  As defined, "fault" includes an act or 
omission determined to be the proximate cause of the injury that is in any 
manner negligent or that subjects the actor to some sort of strict liability. 
§ 1-1-109(a)(iv).  While the 
State is not here subject to strict liability, it can act in a negligent manner 
by failing to use reasonable care.  
We therefore conclude that the State can be at "fault" and, therefore, 
fits the definition of "actor." 

 

[¶18]   Furthermore, considering the intent 
of the comparative fault scheme, it is apparent that the State should be 
included.  As noted, it is clear 
that each defendant is liable only for the percentage of fault attributed to 
him.  Should an "actor" not be 
included because it is immune, the defendants and other actors are apportioned a 
share of that "actor's" fault.  
Indeed, "immunity" 
does not mean that a party is not at fault; it simply means that the party 
cannot be sued.  Allocating a 
portion of an immune party's fault to other "actors" thwarts the intent of the 
comparative fault scheme.  
Additionally, it 
is well established that, under Wyoming's comparative fault scheme, a jury is 
entitled to apportion the fault of all those whose acts 
proximately caused injury to the claimant, parties and nonparties alike.  Smyth v. Kaufman, 2003 WY 52, 
¶24, 67 P.3d 1161, ¶24 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis added).  Indeed, 
because the legislature includes both parties and non-parties in the definition 
of "actor," it is clear that some parties may be apportioned fault but may not 
actually be liable to the plaintiff.   

 

[¶19] 
For these reasons, we conclude that the State, even though immune, can be 
included in the jury's comparative fault analysis.  Of course, when placing a party on the 
verdict form, it must be remembered that it is inappropriate for the judge to 
give an instruction that is not sustained by the evidence.  Anderson Highway Signs and 
Supply, Inc. v. Close, 6 P.3d 123, 126 (Wyo. 2000).  Accordingly, there must be at least some 
competent proof that the non-party actors were at fault before they are placed 
on the verdict form.  Should this 
qualification be met, the defendants will be entitled to argue the State's 
comparative fault.   

 

 

CONCLUSION

[¶20]     The district court's finding that the 
ordinance established Pinnacle Bank's duty under the circumstances of this case 
was correct.  The ruling of the 
district court that the city ordinance, which is a specifically enacted rule, 
controls over the general common law rules pertaining to natural accumulation of 
snow and ice is affirmed.  Moreover, 
the negligence per se doctrine shall not be used by the jury when making its 
determination of negligence with respect to Pinnacle Bank.  If Pinnacle Bank is found to be 
negligent, the open-and-obvious-danger rule shall be applied in assessing 
whether Villa was comparatively negligent.  
We also determine that the jury may compare the fault of the State of 
Wyoming even though the State is immune in these circumstances.