Title: Ex parte Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis Bennett, Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (Howard Jones and Dorothy Jones v. Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis Bennett, Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer) (Dallas Circuit Court: CV-17-900090).

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: May 31, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0327 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis 
Bennett, Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer   
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS  
 
(In re: Howard Jones and Dorothy Jones  
 
v.  
 
Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis Bennett, 
Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer)  
 
(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-17-900090) 
 
SC-2023-0327 
2 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
 
 
PETITION DENIED. NO OPINION. 
 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
 
Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
 
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins. 
 
 
SC-2023-0327 
3 
 
COOK, Justice (concurring specially). 
I concur with the denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus. I 
write specially to explain my disagreement with Justice Sellers. 
I. What We are Not Deciding Here 
I want to be clear about what we are not being asked to decide at 
this stage. In reaching our decision here, our Court has not decided the 
merits of the questions being raised by the parties in this case.  Instead, 
we 
have 
merely 
decided 
whether 
the 
requirements 
for 
the 
"'extraordinary remedy'" of a writ of mandamus -- that is, "'(1) a clear 
legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the 
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of 
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the 
court'" -- have been met. Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 
629, 632 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 
1272 (Ala. 2001), citing in turn Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 
2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000)). 
As explained below, at this time, I do not believe that the 
defendants -- Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis Bennett, 
Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer -- have shown a "clear legal 
SC-2023-0327 
4 
 
right" to the relief they are seeking here. While they may eventually be 
able to demonstrate on appeal that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists in this case and that they are entitled to a judgment in their favor 
as a matter of law, that is a determination for the future and has no 
bearing on the outcome here.  
II. Background 
In May 2015, Howard Jones was working at his job with Bush Hog, 
Inc., when he was injured while helping to operate a chain hoist, which 
is a piece of equipment that uses a chain to lift and move heavy 
components during a manufacturing process.  Jones was holding one such 
component while it was being moved by the chain hoist.  The materials 
before our Court suggest that a chain hoist can be equipped with a "chain 
bag" intended to hold excess slack chain that is not under tension.  
According to Jones, the chain bag that had been installed on the chain 
hoist had fallen into disrepair, and, on the day of his injury, the excess 
chain would not stay in the bag. At some point, the excess chain became 
stuck in a gear box. When the chain hoist moved, the lodged excess chain 
suddenly released from the gear box, causing Jones's arms to "jerk," 
which, he says, resulted in injuries to his arms, neck, knees, and back.   
SC-2023-0327 
5 
 
 
After Jones settled a claim against Bush Hog for workers' 
compensation benefits under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act 
("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, in March 2017, he and his 
wife Dorothy ("the plaintiffs") commenced the present action in the 
Dallas Circuit Court against the defendants, who were some of his 
coworkers. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' 
"willful conduct" in failing to maintain the chain bag had caused Jones's 
injuries.  See generally § 25-5-11(b), Ala. Code 1975 (providing, in 
relevant part, that, "[i]f personal injury or death to any employee results 
from the willful conduct, as defined in subsection (c) herein, of any officer, 
director, agent, or employee of the same employer …, the employee shall 
have a cause of action against the person …."), and § 25-5-11(c)(2) 
(defining "willful conduct" in relevant part as "[t]he willful and 
intentional removal from a machine of a safety guard or safety device 
provided by the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury 
or death would likely or probably result from the removal" (emphasis 
added)). 
The defendants subsequently moved for a summary judgment, 
asserting in part that the chain bag was not provided by the 
SC-2023-0327 
6 
 
manufacturer of the chain hoist at issue -- Ingersoll-Rand. Accordingly, 
the defendants argued that they were entitled to immunity under the 
Act.   
The trial court denied the defendants' motion, and they petitioned 
this Court for a writ of mandamus.  See Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d 
387, 391 (Ala. 2017) ("[T]he denial of a summary-judgment motion based 
on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Act is … reviewable by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus."); Ex parte Varoff, 380 So. 3d 371, 375 (Ala. 2022) (issuing a 
writ of mandamus in a co-employee action brought pursuant to § 25-5-11 
and noting that the Act "expressly immunizes employees from suits by 
their co-employees stemming from on-the-job accidents unless there is 
some evidence of the defendant employee's willful conduct"). 
III. The Present Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
According to the defendants, Jones's claim can be submitted to a 
jury only if there is substantial evidence that his injury was "caused by 
(1) the removal, omission or failure to maintain (2) a manufacturer-
provided (3) 'safety device,' which is not a component part of the machine, 
(4) with knowledge that injury was probable or likely to result." Petition 
SC-2023-0327 
7 
 
at 16 (citing Layne v. Carr, 631 So. 2d 978, 983 (Ala. 1994); Mallisham v. 
Kiker, 630 So. 2d 420, 423-24 (Ala. 1993); and Lane v. Georgia Cas. & 
Surety Co., 670 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1995)). The defendants contend that 
the evidence they presented below "unquestionably demonstrates" that 
the chain bag was not provided by the manufacturer of the chain hoist. 
Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Therefore, they contend, they were entitled 
to a summary judgment on the basis of immunity under §§ 25-5-52 and 
25-5-53 of the Act.1 The plaintiffs, pointing to their expert's affidavit 
testimony and verbiage in the manufacturer's manual for the chain hoist, 
contend, 
however, 
that 
they 
presented 
substantial 
evidence 
demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
the chain bag was a safety device provided by the manufacturer. 
"Provided by the Manufacturer" 
The crux of the parties' dispute here appears to be whether the 
 
1Section 25-5-52, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part: "Except as 
provided in [the Act], no employee of any employer subject to [the Act] ... 
shall have a right to any other method, form, or amount of compensation 
or damages for an injury or death" resulting from a workplace accident. 
Section 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the Act bestows the 
exclusive rights and remedies for employees injured in workplace 
accidents, and it extends the immunity coverage of § 25-5-52 to co-
employees, except when the cause of action is based upon willful conduct. 
 
SC-2023-0327 
8 
 
chain bag (safety device) was "provided" by the manufacturer of the chain 
hoist. See § 25-5-11(c)(2) (stating, in relevant part, that "willful conduct" 
includes "[t]he willful and intentional removal from a machine of a safety 
guard or safety device provided by the manufacturer of the machine with 
knowledge that injury or death would likely or probably result from the 
removal" (emphasis added)).2  
 
In support of their summary-judgment motion below, the 
defendants attached, among other things, the affidavit from Bush Hog's 
vice president of operations, Tyrone Trawick. According to the 
defendants, Trawick provided undisputed evidence based on his personal 
knowledge that established that the chain bag was not "attached" by the 
manufacturer of the chain hoist. Petition at 6 (emphasis added). 
However, this assertion does not directly respond to the key language in 
§ 25-5-11(c)(2) because it does not address whether the chain bag was 
"provided" by the manufacturer of the chain hoist.   
Trawick also stated in his affidavit that the chain bag was not 
"supplied" by the manufacturer of the chain hoist "unless purchased 
 
2Neither side provides any argument concerning the "knowledge" 
element in § 25-5-11(c)(2).  
SC-2023-0327 
9 
 
separately." (Emphasis added.) Once again, however, this does not 
directly respond to the language in § 25-5-11(c)(2) because the chain bag 
could have been purchased separately from the manufacturer.   
Trawick's deposition testimony is even less helpful. During his 
deposition, Trawick stated that Bush Hog had purchased hoist systems 
from various sources, that some offered chain containers with their hoist 
systems, and that he did not know from which source Bush Hog had 
purchased the chain hoist that was involved in Jones's injury.  See, e.g., 
Petition, Ex. 3 -- Trawick deposition at 15 ("Q. … [A]ll indications point 
to the company that manufactured the chain hoist, they also provided the 
chain bag; correct?  A.  Not in all cases, but sometimes we -- they didn't 
have a bag.  We purchased bags ourselves from a different source.  Q.  Oh, 
you did?  A.  In some cases, yes." (emphasis added)); id. at 16 ("Q.  But at 
the end of the day, whoever sold y'all the chain hoist system, they also 
offered chain bags?  A.  Not in all cases, but in some cases, yes." (emphasis 
added)); id. ("Q.  Do you know who sold [the chain bag on that system] to 
Bush Hog?  Q.  I do not." (emphasis added)).  Again, none of this testimony 
directly addresses the key language in § 25-5-11(c)(2). Although the 
defendants contend that Trawick's testimony was supported by invoices 
SC-2023-0327 
10 
 
they submitted from a supplier for chain bags, I note that those invoices 
were from after the date of the injury.  
Based on the foregoing, I disagree with Justice Sellers that 
Trawick's affidavit was sufficient to meet the defendants' prima facie 
burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the manufacturer of the chain hoist "provided" the 
chain bag.   
That being said, I do agree with much of what Justice Sellers writes 
regarding the problems with the affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs 
from their expert in mechanical, structural, and safety engineering, 
Robert T. Tolbert, in opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment 
motion.  In his affidavit, Tolbert opined that the chain bag and the chain 
hoist were provided by the same manufacturer. However, Tolbert claimed 
to base his conclusion, in part, on his interpretation of the chain hoist 
manual. Whether it is appropriate for this expert to interpret the wording 
of an equipment manual and then to use such an interpretation to testify 
about a historical fact is a difficult evidentiary question. See, e.g., Kirksey 
v. Schindler Elevator Corp., Civil Action 15-0115-WS-N, Sept. 21, 2016 
(S.D. Ala. 2016) (not reported in the Federal Supplement) (rejecting 
SC-2023-0327 
11 
 
expert testimony in similar situation). Further, Tolbert's opinion on this 
issue is inconsistent. For instance, at one point, he testifies that it is his 
"opinion" that the manufacturer of the chain hoist provided this chain 
bag, but, at another point, he opines that it is merely "plausible" that the 
manufacturer did so. Thus, like Justice Sellers, I question whether 
Tolbert's affidavit alone could provide substantial evidence indicating 
that Ingersoll-Rand provided the chain bag along with the chain hoist it 
manufactured. 
 
Despite my agreement with Justice Sellers on this issue, however, 
as stated previously, at this stage, our Court is not deciding the merits of 
the issues being raised by the parties here. Instead, we are merely tasked 
with determining whether the defendants have demonstrated that they 
have a "clear legal right" to the relief they are seeking here. Based on the 
facts and materials before us at this time, I do not believe that the 
defendants have shown a "clear legal right" to immunity under the Act. 
It is for this reason that I concur with the denial of their mandamus 
petition.  
 
 
SC-2023-0327 
12 
 
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
 
 
I would grant the petition for a writ of mandamus in this matter.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
In May 2015, Howard Jones was working at his job with Bush Hog, 
Inc., when he was injured while helping to operate a chain hoist, which 
is a piece of equipment that uses a chain to lift and move heavy 
components during a manufacturing process.  Jones was holding one such 
component while it was being moved by the chain hoist.  The materials 
before the Court suggest that a chain hoist can be equipped with a "chain 
bag" intended to hold excess slack chain that is not under tension.  Jones 
has alleged that, on the day of his injury, excess chain would not stay in 
a chain bag that had been installed on the chain hoist and became stuck 
in a gear box.  According to Jones, when the chain hoist moved, the lodged 
excess chain suddenly released from the gear box, causing his arms to 
"jerk."  He claims that this caused him to suffer injuries to his arms, neck, 
knees, and back.  He also claims that, before the day of the accident, the 
chain bag at issue had fallen into disrepair and that the condition of the 
chain bag caused the excess chain to fall out of the bag and, ultimately, 
resulted in his injuries. 
SC-2023-0327 
13 
 
 
Jones sought workers' compensation benefits from Bush Hog under 
the Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  Jones 
and Bush Hog settled that claim in March 2017.  Jones then commenced 
an action under § 25-5-11, Ala. Code 1975, against some of his co-
employees, namely, Jay Phillips, Tyrone Trawick, Ron Pettway, Curtis 
Bennett, Gerald Worthington, and Darrell Moorer ("the defendants"), 
alleging that their "willful conduct" had caused Jones's injuries.  See 
generally § 25-5-11(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("If personal injury or death to any 
employee results from the willful conduct, as defined in subsection (c) 
herein, of any officer, director, agent, or employee of the same employer 
…, the employee shall have a cause of action against the person ….").  
Jones's wife Dorothy joined as a plaintiff and sought to recover for her 
loss of consortium. 
Jones relied on § 25-5-11(c)(2), which defines "willful conduct" in 
part as intentionally and willfully removing from a machine a safety 
guard or safety device provided by the manufacturer of the machine with 
knowledge that injury will likely or probably result from that removal.  
This Court has suggested that "the failure to maintain and/or repair a 
safety guard or device provided by the manufacturer of a particular 
SC-2023-0327 
14 
 
machine" may qualify as the removal of a safety device for purposes of § 
25-5-11(c).  Moore v. Reeves, 589 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 1991).  Jones claims 
that the defendants' alleged failure to maintain the chain bag constituted 
the removal of a safety device from the chain hoist. 
The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, asserting 
in part that the chain bag was not provided by the manufacturer of the 
chain hoist at issue, which was Ingersoll-Rand.  Thus, they asserted, the 
alleged failure to maintain the chain bag could not be considered willful 
conduct under § 25-5-11(c), which refers to the removal of safety devices 
"provided by the manufacturer."  Accordingly, the defendants argued 
that they are entitled to immunity under the Workers' Compensation 
Act.  The trial court denied the defendants' motion, and they petitioned 
this Court for a writ of mandamus.  See Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d 
387, 391 (Ala. 2017) ("[T]he denial of a summary-judgment motion based 
on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Act is … reviewable by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus."); Ex parte Varoff, 380 So. 3d 371, 375 (Ala. 2022) (issuing a 
writ of mandamus in a co-employee action brought pursuant to § 25-5-
11(c) and noting that the Workers' Compensation Act "expressly 
SC-2023-0327 
15 
 
immunizes employees from suits by their co-employees stemming from 
on-the-job accidents unless there is some evidence of the defendant 
employee's willful conduct"). 
Tyrone Trawick, who is Bush Hog's vice president of operations and 
one of the defendants in this case, submitted an affidavit, based on his 
personal knowledge, identifying the chain hoist that Jones was using 
when he was injured and averring that "chain bags are not supplied by 
the manufacturer unless purchased separately," that "Bush Hog 
purchases chain bags and chain containers from third-party suppliers," 
and that "[c]hain bags are sold as 'after-market accessories' by Ingersoll-
Rand."  In my view, Trawick's affidavit was sufficient to meet the 
defendants' prima facie burden of establishing that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the manufacturer of the chain 
hoist provided the chain bag.   
In response to the defendants' summary-judgment motion, Jones 
submitted an affidavit from his expert witness, engineer Robert Tolbert.  
Based on a few pages in the operations manual that came with the chain 
hoist, which provided guidance on installing and using a chain bag, 
Tolbert opined that the chain hoist Jones was using came with the chain 
SC-2023-0327 
16 
 
bag in question and that the chain bag was therefore "provided by the 
manufacturer" of the chain hoist.  But I do not believe that these 
instructions support anything other than the idea that chain bags can (or 
perhaps should) be used with chain hoists and, at most, speculation that 
the chain bag at issue here possibly could have been provided by the 
manufacturer of the chain hoist.  Thus, I cannot read Tolbert's affidavit 
as substantial evidence indicating that Ingersoll-Rand provided the 
chain bag along with the chain hoist it manufactured and that the 
defendants' alleged failure to maintain the chain bag amounted to the 
removal of a safety device provided by the manufacturer of the chain 
hoist.  In any event, regardless of where the chain bag came from, I do 
not believe there is substantial evidence indicating that the defendants 
took any action with respect to the chain bag "with knowledge that injury 
or death would likely or probably result."  § 25-5-11(c)(2).  Mere 
negligence is not sufficient to support a co-employee action under § 25-5-
11(c), which requires evidence of intentional willful conduct, including 
evidence indicating that the defendants knew or should have known that 
their acts or omissions probably would injure a coworker.  Jones has not 
cleared that high bar.  
SC-2023-0327 
17 
 
Because I do not believe that Jones has presented substantial 
evidence indicating that the "willful conduct" of the defendants caused 
Jones's injuries, I would conclude that they are immune under the 
Workers' Compensation Act.  Accordingly, I would grant the petition for 
a writ of mandamus. 
Mendheim, J., concurs.