Title: Littell v. Bridges

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 29 
Docket: 
Was-22-50 
Submitted 
On Briefs:  November 17, 2022 
 
 
Decided: 
 May 11, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
CANDY A. (BRIDGES) LITTELL 
 
v. 
 
COLE G. BRIDGES 
 
 
STANFILL, C.J. 
[¶1]  Cole G. Bridges appeals from a judgment of divorce from 
Candy A. (Bridges) Littell entered by the District Court (Calais, Budd, J.).  In his 
appeal, Bridges argues that the court erred in its valuation and classification of 
a Cessna airplane and lacked jurisdiction to dissolve Cole G. Bridges Wild 
Blueberry LLC (Wild Blueberry LLC).  We vacate the judgment as to the 
disposition of property and the dissolution of Wild Blueberry LLC and remand. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Bridges and Littell were married in 1992 and have three adult 
children together.  In 2019, Littell filed for divorce, but she voluntarily 
dismissed the complaint in June 2019.  See M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).  On January 10, 
2020, Littell filed for divorce a second time.  The final divorce hearing began on 
 
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September 14, 2021, continued on November 4 and 5, 2021, and concluded on 
February 1, 2022. 
[¶3]  Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, the court found 
the following facts.  Bridges’s extended family has been involved in the 
blueberry farming industry for about one hundred years.  Bridges and Littell 
have been involved in several blueberry farming businesses, including Wild 
Blueberry LLC, during their marriage.  Bridges and Littell are the sole members 
of Wild Blueberry LLC and agree that their interests in Wild Blueberry LLC are 
marital.   
[¶4]  During the marriage, the parties acquired multiple real property 
interests and a “universe of personal property items.”  A significant personal 
property issue in the case involved two airplanes, a Cessna and an Aviat Husky.   
[¶5]  The Cessna was owned by one of the businesses that the Bridges 
family operated, Bridges Wild Blueberry Co., Inc.  In 2013, the business sold the 
Cessna to Bridges.1  After the first divorce suit was filed, Bridges transferred the 
 
1  Multiple witnesses testified that they believed that Bridges was supposed to inherit the Cessna.  
Other evidence in the record, however, indicates that Bridges’s father transferred the airplane to 
Bridges Wild Blueberry Co., Inc., ten years before his death.  Regardless, the court found—as 
supported by competent evidence—that the Cessna was owned by Bridges Wild Blueberry Co., Inc., 
following Bridges’s father’s death and that it did not pass directly to Bridges through Bridges’s 
father’s will.  Even on appeal, Bridges acknowledges that “[t]he Cessna was an asset of Bridges Wild 
Blueberry Company” and that Bridges came into ownership of the airplane through a later 
transaction with Bridges Wild Blueberry Co., Inc.   
 
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Cessna to his mother.  Bridges’s mother intended to return the Cessna to 
Bridges after the divorce was finalized.  Bridges testified that the Cessna was 
worth $150,000, and Littell testified that the Cessna was worth $185,000.   
[¶6]  The court found that the parties did not dispute that the Aviat was 
“marital in character, and [it] is an asset of” Wild Blueberry LLC.2  Bridges also 
purported to transfer that airplane to his mother.  As with the Cessna, Bridges’s 
mother intended to return the Aviat to Bridges after the divorce was finalized.   
 
[¶7]  The court entered a judgment of divorce on February 15, 2022.  The 
court ordered the parties to “sell [Wild Blueberry LLC’s] assets, divide the 
proceeds and then dissolve its corporate existence.”  It classified the Cessna as 
marital property because Bridges purchased the airplane during the marriage 
with marital property.  The court valued the Cessna at $150,000 and the Aviat 
at $125,000 and distributed both to Bridges.  The court found that Bridges’s 
transfer of the airplanes to his mother constituted economic misconduct; it also 
 
2  The court also found that “[b]oth planes are, at the moment, owned by [Bridges’s] mother.”  
Indeed, it does not appear that Wild Blueberry LLC ever had title to the Aviat.  Rather, it appears that 
Bridges purchased it in his personal capacity in 2006 and continued to own it in his personal capacity 
until he transferred the airplane to his mother.  Although the Aviat was used to secure a loan from 
the USDA to Wild Blueberry LLC, it appears that the parties may have also been individually 
responsible for that loan.  Whether it belonged to Bridges individually or to Wild Blueberry LLC does 
not change the analysis; it is now in the hands of Bridges’s mother. 
 
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noted that Littell filed a separate lawsuit in Superior Court alleging a fraudulent 
transfer of the airplanes.3   
 
[¶8]  Bridges timely appealed the court’s judgment.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 104 
(2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  Bridges argues that the court did not have jurisdiction over 
Wild Blueberry LLC and thus could not order its dissolution.  Additionally, 
Bridges asserts that the court erred in its valuation and classification of the 
Cessna.   
A.  
Jurisdiction over nonparties 
 
[¶10]  We first consider whether the court lacked jurisdiction over 
Wild Blueberry LLC and, relatedly, whether the court lacked jurisdiction to 
distribute the airplanes.  See Howard v. Howard, 2010 ME 83, ¶¶ 10-12, 2 A.3d 
318.  The limit of a trial court’s jurisdiction is an issue of law that we review 
de novo.  Id. ¶ 10. 
1. 
Jurisdiction over Wild Blueberry LLC 
[¶11]  Bridges first contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve 
Wild Blueberry LLC. “In a divorce proceeding, the District Court has subject 
 
3  On appeal, Bridges does not challenge the finding of economic misconduct.   
 
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matter jurisdiction to determine the ownership interests of the spouses in 
order to divide their marital property.”  Id. ¶ 11.  However, “[a] person or entity 
must be a party to a case in order for the court to have personal jurisdiction.”  
Id. ¶ 12.  Thus, because “[a] limited liability company is an entity distinct from 
its members,” 31 M.R.S. § 1504(1) (2023), courts may not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over an LLC in a divorce action because an LLC is not a party, see 
Howard, 2010 ME 83, ¶ 12, 2 A.3d 318.4   
[¶12]  We conclude that the court did not have jurisdiction over 
Wild Blueberry LLC because Wild Blueberry LLC was not a party and is a 
distinct legal entity from Bridges and Littell.  Moreover, an LLC may not be 
dissolved as part of a judgment of divorce.  “Maine’s Limited Liability Company 
Act provides that a court may order dissolution of an LLC only in certain 
circumstances. . . . [It] does not recognize the divorce of one or more of the 
parties who created an LLC as a basis for dissolution.”5  Ahern v. Ahern, 2008 
 
4  In Robinson v. Robinson, 2000 ME 101, ¶ 11, 751 A.2d 457, we recognized a narrow exception to 
this rule and held that a divorce court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a third-party business 
that is “represented in all but name before the court” such that the spouse and corporation are 
“essentially the same party.”  Here, although Bridges and Littell are the only members of 
Wild Blueberry LLC, Robinson is inapplicable.  In contrast to the court in Robinson, the court here did 
not allocate the entire interest in the marital business to one spouse, and, “given the acrimony 
between [Bridges and Littell] and the disregard each has for the other’s reliability,” Wild Blueberry 
LLC was not “represented in all but name before the court.”  Id.   
 
5  Title 31 M.R.S. § 702 (2006), the iteration of the Maine Limited Liability Company Act cited in 
Ahern v. Ahern, 2008 ME 1, ¶ 20, 938 A.2d 35, has since been repealed and replaced, but its 
replacement similarly does not include divorce in its exhaustive list of circumstances in which courts 
 
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ME 1, ¶ 20, 938 A.2d 35; see also 31 M.R.S. § 1595(1) (2023).  Indeed, generally 
the District Court does not have jurisdiction to dissolve an LLC; such an action 
must be brought in the Superior Court.  31 M.R.S. § 1595.  Although courts 
should “avoid creating situations where the divorced parties remain in joint 
management of . . . income producing property,” Smith v. Smith, 1997 ME 29, 
¶ 4, 690 A.2d 970 (quotation marks omitted), they may not exceed their 
jurisdictional limitations in pursuit of this goal.  For these reasons, the court 
erred in ordering the dissolution of Wild Blueberry LLC as part of the judgment 
of divorce.  
[¶13]  To be clear, although it lacked jurisdiction to dissolve 
Wild Blueberry LLC, the court had jurisdiction over the marital personal 
property owned by the parties, which included their respective fifty percent 
membership interests in Wild Blueberry LLC.  The court could have set aside 
some or all of the membership interest of either party to the other, or it could 
have left each party with a fifty percent interest.  What it could not do was 
dissolve the company.  
 
can order the dissolution of an LLC.  See P.L. 2009, ch. 629, §§ A-1, A-2 (effective July 1, 2011) (codified 
at 31 M.R.S. § 1595(1) (2023)). 
 
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2. 
Jurisdiction to distribute the airplanes 
[¶14]  Relatedly, Bridges contends that a court cannot order, as part of a 
divorce judgment, a nonparty to sell or transfer assets.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 953 
(2023).  Although he raised this argument in the context of Wild Blueberry 
LLC’s assets, we note that the court distributed the Cessna and the Aviat to 
Bridges despite recognizing that “[b]oth planes are, at the moment, owned by 
[Bridges’s] mother.”   
[¶15]  “As we [have] articulated, the District Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over a non-party to a divorce action.”  King v. King, 2013 ME 56, 
¶ 21, 66 A.3d 593.  A party to a divorce “must institute a separate action against 
a third party to resolve disputes over property.”  Id.  Here, the Cessna was 
owned by Bridges’s mother and not Bridges or Littell at the time of the divorce 
and, consequently, was not part of the marital estate subject to division.  See 
Howard, 2010 ME 83, ¶¶ 11-12, 2 A.3d 318.   
[¶16]  The Aviat is somewhat trickier.  It is not clear from the court’s 
findings whether the Aviat is currently owned by Wild Blueberry LLC or by 
Bridges’s mother.  See supra ¶ 6 & n.2.  Whether owned by Wild Blueberry LLC 
or Bridges’s mother, the Aviat would be outside the marital estate as nonparty 
property and thus not subject to distribution in this proceeding.  See 31 M.R.S. 
 
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§ 1505(2) (2023); see also Janvier v. Janvier, No. CV-13-139, 2017 Me. Super. 
LEXIS 70, at *7 (May 11, 2017) (“[A]n LLC is an entity distinct from its members 
and members do not have a property interest in the property of the LLC.”).6   
[¶17]  In short, the court erred in distributing to the parties property 
presently owned by nonparties.  Accordingly, we vacate the court’s judgment 
as it relates to the property distribution.   
B. 
Classification and valuation of the Cessna airplane 
 
[¶18]  Bridges next contends that the court erred in its classification and 
valuation of the Cessna airplane.  We review the classification and valuation of 
property for clear error.  Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 12, 976 A.2d 
949.   
 
[¶19]  Although the court lacked the authority to distribute the Cessna, 
the Cessna’s valuation and classification remain relevant on remand.  The court 
found that Bridges’s transfer of the airplanes to his mother constituted 
economic misconduct,7 and it is entitled on remand to determine how much 
these transactions “unreasonably and inappropriately diminished the value of 
 
6  Despite its order setting aside the Aviat to Bridges and finding that the Aviat was an asset of 
Wild Blueberry LLC, the court also acknowledged that it could not “simply order [Wild Blueberry 
LLC] to distribute individual items of equipment or property to [Littell or] Bridges individually.”   
7  If Littell’s fraudulent transfer action has been decided before the trial court considers this 
divorce on remand, the consequences of that action should be taken into account.   
 
9 
the marital estate.”  Harper v. Harper, 2017 ME 171, ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 385 
(emphasis added).  Thus, we must address Bridges’s contentions that the 
Cessna was not part of the marital estate and that its value was nominal.  
[¶20]  Property obtained during a marriage is presumed marital, but it is 
nonmarital if a spouse obtained it by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.  19-A 
M.R.S. § 953(2)(A).  The party attempting to characterize the property as 
nonmarital bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption.  
Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 8, 850 A.2d 354.  Bridges asserts that he 
obtained the Cessna by bequest or, in the alternative, by gift.   
[¶21]  The court did not commit clear error in finding that Bridges failed 
to overcome the statutory presumption that the airplane—which he obtained 
during the marriage—was marital.  Bridges did not obtain the Cessna by 
bequest because competent evidence in the record supports the finding that 
Bridges obtained the airplane from Bridges Wild Blueberry Co., Inc., four years 
after his father’s death.  Likewise, we find no clear error in the court’s 
determination that Bridges purchased the airplane from Bridges Wild 
Blueberry Co., Inc., because competent evidence in the record suggests that 
Bridges gave consideration in exchange for the Cessna. 
 
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[¶22]  Similarly, the court did not err in finding the value of the Cessna to 
be $150,000.  “The value of the parties’ property is determined as of the time it 
is to be distributed . . . .”  Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.8[1] at 7-64 (8th ed. 2013).  
The parties to a divorce “may testify and give their opinion as to the value of 
[their] property.”  Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 13, 976 A.2d 949.  “As with any 
other testimony or evidence, the court may then evaluate the credibility of that 
evidence and reach a conclusion which accepts the valuation offered by one or 
the other of the witnesses . . . .”  Id.  Here, Bridges—“a veteran pilot and 
experienced airplane mechanic”—testified that the airplane was worth 
$150,000.  Accordingly, the court did not err in accepting Bridges’s testimony 
and finding that the Cessna was worth $150,000 at the time of its order.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶23]  The court erred when it ordered the dissolution of Wild Blueberry 
LLC because it lacked jurisdiction to do so.  It also erred in setting aside 
personal property—the airplanes—to Bridges when that property was not 
owned by Bridges or Littell.  Because the court erred in its personal property 
distribution, on remand the court may “reevaluate the property distribution.”  
 
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Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2022 ME 52, ¶ 10, 284 A.3d 89.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
court’s judgment as it relates to the entire property distribution.8 
 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated as to the distribution of 
property.  The remainder of the judgment is 
affirmed.  Remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maxwell G. Coolidge, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellant Cole G. Bridges 
Donald F. Brown, Esq., Don Brown Law, P.C., Brewer, for appellee Candy A. 
Bridges 
 
 
Calais District Court docket number FM-2020-5 
For Clerk Reference Only 
 
8  We note that the trial judge in this case has since retired.  On remand, the court may, in its 
exercise of sound discretion, decide the case based on the existing record or receive additional 
evidence.