Title: White v. Diamond Intern. Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

White v. Diamond Intern. Corp.1983 WY 64665 P.2d 463Case Number: 5795, 5796Case Number: 5795, 5796Decided: 06/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
Anne U. WHITE, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

DIAMOND INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Anne U. WHITE, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

CHEYENNE LUMBER COMPANY, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). Nos. 5795, 5796

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Edwin H. 
Whitehead of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Thomas E. 
Campbell of Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee Diamond Intern. 
Corp.

Arthur Kline of 
Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee Cheyenne Lumber 
Co.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellee, Diamond 
International Corporation, in Case No. 5795 (sometimes referred to as Diamond 
International) and the appellee, Cheyenne Lumber Company, in Case No. 5796 
(sometimes referred to as Cheyenne Lumber) brought separate actions against the 
appellant to enforce materialman's liens filed by each. The county court judge 
consolidated the cases for trial and an order was entered awarding the appellees 
judgment for the amounts claimed to be due and owing in the lien statements. The 
judgment was appealed to the district court and an "Order on Affirmance" was 
entered on September 3, 1982, from which an appeal was perfected by appellant 
Anne White to this court. She frames the issues for our review as 
follows:

"1. Were not the lien 
statements recorded by Diamond International Corporation and Cheyenne Lumber 
Company fatally defective as both lacked verification and did not both lower 
Courts err in finding such an express statutory requirement could be excepted 
under W.S. § 29-16 (1957); W.S. § 29-2-101 (Republ. 1977)?"1

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     The appellant, Anne 
White, entered into a contractual relationship with Woodroof Construction 
Company for the purpose of framing a dwelling house on unencumbered property 
which she owned in LaramieCounty. Pursuant to this agreement, 
William P. Woodroof, the chief executive officer of Woodroof Construction 
Company, opened accounts with both Cheyenne Lumber and Diamond International for 
building materials to be used in construction. The evidence reflects that both 
Woodroof and several of his employees signed invoices for materials from both 
suppliers and that these materials were delivered.

[¶4.]     After some delay, 
appellant's home was finally framed and she paid Woodroof Construction Company 
according to the terms of the contract. Woodroof failed to pay on either of the 
accounts opened with the appellees.

[¶5.]     On October 10, 1980, 
appellee Cheyenne Lumber recorded its "Lien Statement" with the LaramieCounty clerk, claiming a lien against 
White's residence in the amount of $2,424.70 for materials supplied for 
construction. A similar filing was accomplished by appellee Diamond 
International on October 28, 1980. In its "Mechanic's and Materialman's Lien" 
Diamond International claimed a lien against appellant's property in the amount 
of $5,845.54 for materials it furnished in the home's 
construction.

[¶6.]     No payments on the 
claims were remitted and the appellees filed the previously mentioned actions. 
In response to the complaints, appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the lien statements had not been properly verified as required by statute. 
The county court judge ruled that Cheyenne Lumber's statement was properly 
verified and that Diamond International's lien statement, although only 
notarized and not verified, was not void because the defect was only of a minor 
nature.

[¶7.]     On appeal to the 
district court, the appellant again argued that the liens were unenforceable and 
of no effect because of the lack of statutorily required verifications. In 
rejecting appellant's contentions, the district judge issued a letter opinion 
which found as follows:

"With reference to issue 
No. 1, the Court has considered the citations in the briefs of the parties and 
it appears that the Wyoming court has not yet passed on this 
issue. However, the testimony in this case clearly shows that the materials 
delivered by both appellees were used in the construction of the appellant's 
home and that the appellant was aware of that fact. In view of the fact there is 
no real factual issue as to the delivery of the material in this case by each of 
the appellees, and their use in the appellant's property with her knowledge and 
consent, the Court believes that the better view is that where a lien statement 
is notarized but not verified, that the Court should not deny its enforcement, 
but that equity requires the application of the provisions of Sec. 29-2-114, 
W.S. 1977 Republished Edition, which provides, in material part as 
follows:

"`. . . provided, however 
that in any action begun by any . . . materialman . . . to enforce a lien under 
the provisions of this chapter, if the petition shall state and the evidence 
shall show that the work and labor was done and the materials furnished for the 
use in, upon, and about the property therein described and against which the 
lien is sought to be enforced, and shall also state and show that the owner or 
proprietor of said property or his agent, had knowledge of the fact that said 
work and labor was being done and said materials were being furnished for use 
in, upon and about said property, then and in that case any and all defects in 
the statement of said lien account as filed or notice given as provided in this 
chapter shall be disregarded; . . .'

"The legislature in 
enacting this statute last quoted made some exceptions to the defects which 
might be disregarded when it included the following language in that 
section:

"`. . . provided, that 
said lien account as filed states the amount for which, the property against 
which, and the labor materials for which, a lien is claimed, so as to enable the 
owner or his agent to identify the same; . . .'

"By making this exception 
(and also a further exception requiring that the notice shall be given and the 
lien account filed within the time limited), the legislature made it clear that 
it excepted all other defects than these specifically excepted from that statute 
(Sec. 29-2-114). Accordingly, the Court feels constrained to hold that the 
judgment of the county court should be affirmed."

THE VERIFICATION 
ISSUE

[¶8.]     The statutes applicable 
to the perfection and enforcement of the materialman's liens challenged in this 
case are those formerly codified as §§ 29-2-101 through 29-2-124, W.S. 1977.2 In accordance with these 
provisions, both Diamond International and Cheyenne Lumber filed lien 
statements. The contents of such a statement were governed by the provisions of 
§ 29-2-109, W.S. 1977, which provided:

"It shall be the duty of 
every original contractor, within four (4) months, and every subcontractor, and 
every journeyman and day laborer, and every other person seeking to obtain the 
benefits of the provisions of this act [§§ 29-2-101 to 29-2-124], within ninety 
(90) days after the indebtedness shall have accrued, to file in the office of 
the register of deeds of the proper county, a just and true account of the 
demand due him, her, or them, after all just credits shall have been given, 
which is to be a lien upon such building or improvements, and a true description 
of all the property, or so near as to identify the same, upon which said lien is 
intended to apply with the name of the owner or owners, contractor or 
contractors, or both, if known to the person filing the lien, which in all cases 
shall be verified by the oath of the person filing the lien, or by some reliable 
person for him; provided, that the original contractor shall not file a lien 
prior to the expiration of sixty (60) days after the completion of his contract, 
and no provision contained in any contract made between the owner and the 
original contractor shall be construed to in any way affect or restrict the 
right of any subcontractor, journeyman or day laborer, to file his lien in the 
manner provided by this section."

As can be seen, 
the legislature specifically provided that "in all cases" the lien statement "shall be verified by the oath of the person 
filing the lien." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     The appellant argues 
that both the county court and the district court erred in not declaring the 
liens void because, from her viewpoint, neither Cheyenne Lumber's nor Diamond 
International's lien statements were properly verified. She argues that the lack 
of verification is a fatal defect requiring the dismissal of Cheyenne Lumber's 
and Diamond International's claims.

[¶10.]  The appellees in both appeals argue in 
favor of the results reached by the county and district courts. Appellee 
Cheyenne Lumber urges that its lien statement was properly verified under § 
29-2-109, W.S. 1977. Diamond International does not suggest that its lien 
statement satisfied the verification requirement but it relies on the curative 
provisions of § 29-2-114, W.S. 1977. That last-cited provision 
reads:

"The pleadings, practice, 
process and other proceedings in cases arising under this chapter [§§ 29-2-101 
to 29-2-124] shall be the same as in ordinary civil actions and civil 
proceedings in the courts of this state, except as herein otherwise provided. 
The petition among other things shall allege the facts necessary for securing a 
lien under this chapter and a description of the property to be charged 
therewith. Provided, however, that in any 
action begun by any laborer, materialman, subcontractor or other person, to 
enforce a lien under the provisions of this chapter, if the petition shall state 
and the evidence shall show that the work and labor was done and the materials 
furnished for the use and benefit of the party or parties designated in the 
petition, and for use in, upon or about the property therein described and 
against which the lien is sought to be enforced, and shall also state and show 
that the owner or proprietor of said property or his agent, had knowledge of the 
fact that said work and labor was being done and said materials were being 
furnished for use, in, upon and about said property, then and in that case any 
and all defects in the statement of said lien account as filed or notice given 
as provided in this chapter shall be disregarded; provided, that said lien 
account as filed shall state the amount for which, the property against which, 
and the labor or materials for which, a lien is claimed, so as to enable the 
owner or his agent to identify the same; provided, further, that said notice 
shall be given and said lien account filed within the time limited by statute 
for so doing." (Emphasis added.)

It is Diamond 
International's position that if the evidence shows that it supplied materials 
for the work and labor responsible for the construction of Anne White's house 
and that Anne White knew of the construction of improvements on her property 
with materials provided by Diamond International, then the lack of a 
verification is a defect that shall be disregarded. Appellee Cheyenne Lumber 
also relies on the provisions of § 29-2-114 as an argument secondary to its 
contention that the lien statement filed by it complied in all respects with the 
provisions of § 29-2-109. Of course, the appellant would have us reject the 
above contentions because in her opinion the lack of a verification is not a 
defect intended to be cured by § 29-2-114. We agree with Cheyenne Lumber and 
Diamond International.

[¶11.]  Even though we have not previously 
addressed the question which asks whether a lien statement must be verified in 
order to be considered valid, we have continuously held that in order to perfect 
a materialman's or mechanic's lien, full compliance with all statutory 
requirements is necessary. Foster Lumber 
Company, Inc. v. Hume, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1176 (1982); Tottenhoff v. Rocky Mountain 
Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 609 P.2d 464 (1980); Arch Sellery, Inc. v. 
Simpson, Wyo., 346 P.2d 1068 (1959). This requirement of full compliance 
arises directly from the general purpose designed to be achieved by the lien 
statutes. We discussed this basic underpinning of the lien statutes in United Pacific Insurance Company v. Martin 
and Luther General Contractors, Incorporated, Wyo., 455 P.2d 664, 675 
(1969), where we said:

"Any interpretation of 
our lien statutes or evaluation of precedent must of necessity be undertaken in 
the light of the current situation and of the basic purpose of lien statutes, 
namely, that they are intended to create a new means of securing the claims of 
particular classes of creditors and to prevent unjust enrichment arising from 
the enhancement in value of property from work and materials expended thereon 
which would otherwise go without payment. 36 Am.Jur. Mechanics' Liens §§ 3 and 
4; see Ladue Contracting Company v. Land 
Development Company, Mo. App., 337 S.W.2d 578, 584."

 

Additionally, we 
have expressed the view that the lien statutes are to be strictly construed 
since they are in contravention of the common law, in view of the fact that they 
structure a new cause of action in suppliers of materials for building projects. 
Tottenhoff v. Rocky Mountain Construction 
Co., supra.

[¶12.]  Keeping these principles in mind, we will 
discuss whether either of the challenged lien statements were properly verified 
as required by § 29-2-109.

[¶13.]  The lien statement filed by appellee 
Diamond International was signed by the local manager of the corporation, and it 
was notarized with the following caption attached:

"The above and foregoing 
instrument was acknowledged before me, a Notary public, by Malcolm Monaghan, 
Manager of Diamond International Corporation on this 27 day of October, 
1980."

Diamond 
International admits that the lien statement was only acknowledged and not 
verified. Rather than arguing compliance with § 29-2-109, Diamond relies solely 
upon the curative provisions of § 29-2-114. We will more fully discuss that 
argument later in the opinion.

[¶14.]  The lien statement filed by Cheyenne 
Lumber contains different language, and Cheyenne Lumber contends that it was 
sufficiently verified. The statement contained the filing:

" Warren L. Gullett , 
being first duly sworn according to law, deposes and says:

* * * * * 
*

"CHEYENNE LUMBER CO. 

"[/s/] Warren L. Gullett 

Vice-Pres.

"Subscribed in my 
presence and sworn to before me this 10th day of October , 
1980."

Appellee's 
agent, however, testified that at the time of making the statement he did not 
take any oath but simply signed the statement in the notary's presence. On the 
basis of this testimony, appellant challenges Cheyenne Lumber's claim that the 
statement was properly verified.

[¶15.]  The parties are correct in asserting that 
we have never before specifically dealt with the question of the verification 
required by § 29-2-109. Other courts, however, have sufficiently discussed such 
a requirement. The general rule to be gleaned from the case law is that the 
requirement that a lien statement be verified is one that cannot be overlooked 
and is necessary for a lien to be perfected and enforceable. First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 
Utah, 631 P.2d 919 (1981); D.J. Fair 
Lumber Co. v. Karlin, 199 Kan. 366, 430 P.2d 222 (1967); Saunders Cash-Way Lumber & Hardware 
Company v. Herrick, 179 Mont. 233, 587 P.2d 947 (1978). A good discussion of 
the verification requirement appears in H.A.M.S. Company v. Electrical Contractors 
of Alaska, Inc., Alaska, 563 P.2d 258 (1977). There the Alaska statute in 
effect required that the lien statement be verified by oath. The court in 
holding that the challenged lien statements were defective 
noted:

"It is established in law 
that a verification is a sworn statement of the truth of the facts stated in the 
instrument which is verified. A verification differs from an acknowledgement in 
that the latter is a method of authenticating an instrument by showing that it 
was the act of the person executing it. The text of AS 34.35.070(c)(5) is clear. 
It requires that the claim of lien shall `be verified by the oath of the 
claimant or another person having knowledge of the facts.'

"Neither of the 
questioned claims of lien contains a verification that the facts stated in the 
lien claims are true. The respective jurats merely state that the person 
executing the document did so on behalf of the corporation and acknowledge that 
the corporation executed the document pursuant to its bylaws or a resolution of 
the Board of Directors." (Footnotes omitted.) 563 P.2d  at 
260.

The court in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 
supra, cited the above quotation from the Alaska Supreme Court in holding that a 
lien statement was not properly verified where the subscriber had only sworn to 
the truth of the proposition that he was a person capable of filing a lien on 
behalf of the claimant corporation. 631 P.2d  at 921. The gist of these decisions 
is that to satisfy the verification requirement, the claimant must indicate by 
sworn statement that the facts contained in the lien statement are 
true.

[¶16.]  A somewhat different rule is applied in 
the case of Home Plumbing and Contracting 
Company v. Pruitt, 70 N.M. 182, 372 P.2d 378 (1962). The New Mexico statute 
in question required the lien statement to be verified by oath. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court noted that through judicial opinion it had been decided that 
substantial compliance with statutory requirements for filing and perfecting a 
lien was sufficient. Following this general rule, it was established in New 
Mexico that with respect to the 
verification-by-oath-requirement,

"`* * * where it appears 
that the miner or mechanic has used words which by plain intendment were 
designed to operate as a verification, and where it is evident that the miner or 
mechanic was endeavoring to secure the benefit of the statute provided for such 
cases, and where such statement is sworn to, it ought to be regarded as a 
verification, within the meaning of the statute.'" 372 P.2d  at 380, quoting from 
Hot Springs Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984, 990 
(1934).

After citing the 
above rule, the court went on to hold in Home Plumbing and Contracting Company 
that one of the challenged lien statements was not in substantial compliance 
because the statement failed to contain "any words whatsoever which by 
intendment, plain, or otherwise, `were designed to operate as a verification.'" 
372 P.2d  at 380. In the same opinion, 372 P.2d  at 379, the court found a second 
lien statement which contained the following language to satisfy the 
verification-by-oath requirement:

"`State of New Mexico ) ) 
ss The County of Curry )

"`W.C. Burran, Being duly 
sworn, says:

That he is the 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Home Lumber Company, a corporation, named in the 
foregoing claim; that he has read said claim and knows the contents thereof; and 
that the matters and facts therein started (sic) are true and 
correct.

"`W.C. 
Burran'"

The same rule 
was relied upon in Garrett Building 
Centers, Inc. v. Hale, 95 N.M. 450, 623 P.2d 570, 572 (1981), where the 
court upheld a lien statement which contained the statement, "`This Claim of 
Lien has been prepared and read by me and the contents of said lien are true and 
correct.'"

[¶17.]  We cite the above cases not for the 
purpose of recognizing the rule of substantial compliance because we have never 
adopted that approach, but rather for the purpose of pointing out that even 
under such a rule the courts require some language in the lien statement which 
indicates the subscriber swears to the truth of the materials contained therein 
in order to comply with the verification requirement.

[¶18.]  Considering the above, we are of the 
opinion that it is a difficult question to decide whether or not the lien 
statement filed by Cheyenne Lumber was verified by oath as required by § 
29-2-109. Some courts under a substantial-compliance rule may hold that it is 
verified, while others under a strict-compliance rule would hold that it is not. 
Given the fact that the question is one of extreme difficulty, and subject as 
easily to a negative as well as a positive response under the case law, we 
prefer to uphold the Cheyenne Lumber lien like Diamond International's, through 
an application of the curative provisions of § 29-2-114. We note that none of 
the above jurisdictions had a statute in effect with provisions similar to those 
the legislature incorporated in § 29-2-114.

APPLICATION OF § 
29-2-114, W.S. 1977

[¶19.]  At trial, both appellees relied upon the 
provisions of § 29-2-114 as a means whereby each of the filed liens could be 
enforced. As noted previously, we agree that under the facts as presented in the 
record, § 29-2-114 is applicable and permitted the county court to uphold the 
liens and the district court to affirm that decision. 

[¶20.]  Section 29-2-114 generally provides that 
any defect in a lien statement "shall be disregarded" if certain conditions are 
met. The conditions which must be satisfied in this case in order to trigger the 
curative language are:

1. The petition must 
state and the evidence must show that materials were furnished for use in, upon 
or about the property;

2. The petition must 
state and the evidence must show that the owner (Anne White) had knowledge that 
the claimed materials were being furnished for use in, upon and about her 
property;

3. The lien account must 
state the amount for which, the property against which, and the labor and 
materials for which the lien is claimed;

4. Notice of intent to 
file a lien must be given;

5. The lien account must 
be timely filed. § 29-2-114.

[¶21.]  Relating these statutory conditions to 
the facts of the present case, there is no challenge concerning conditions 3, 4 
and 5 listed above. The lien account properly contained the amounts claimed, the 
materials for which the liens were claimed, and the property on which they were 
claimed. Nor is there any question concerning the giving of notice, and the 
timely filing of the lien statement under § 29-2-109. Appellant's real 
contention raised with respect to the applicability of § 29-2-114, is that the 
lack of proper verification is not a defect intended to be addressed by the 
statute. There is also some suggestion by appellant concerning her knowledge of 
the delivery of the materials for which Cheyenne Lumber and Diamond 
International base the liens.

[¶22.]  Upon reading the language used by the 
legislature in § 29-2-114, we are of the opinion that the statute was intended 
to cure any and all defects in the 
statement of the lien account if the conditions listed above are met in the 
present case. We cannot accept appellant's position that the lack of 
verification is fatal to enforcement of the lien, yet that failure to comply 
with the verification requirement is not a defect covered by § 29-2-114. In Sargent v. Delgado, Wyo., 492 P.2d 193 
(1972), we held that the failure to name the owner of the property in a lien 
statement was a defect that can be cured,3 and we have never made distinctions 
between one of the required elements of a lien statement and another. To accept 
appellant's position would be to negate the full legislative intent of § 
29-2-114, and that we cannot do. Wyoming 
State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982). Thus, we are of the 
opinion that the lack of a proper verification in a lien statement is a defect 
intended to be cured by operation of § 29-2-114 if the evidence satisfies the 
requirements which trigger that provision.

[¶23.]  We are also of the opinion that the 
evidence supports Cheyenne Lumber's and Diamond International's contention that 
the materials were delivered for use in construction of appellant's home on her 
property and that appellant had knowledge of that fact.4 Under such circumstances § 29-2-114 
operated to cure the claimed defect in both Cheyenne Lumber's and Diamond 
International's lien accounts.

[¶24.]  The district court orders affirming the 
county court decisions in Case No. 5795 and Case No. 5796 are 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 29-16, W.S. 1957 
was recodified as § 29-2-114, W.S. 1977.

2 These statutes were 
substantially changed by the legislature and now appear at §§ 29-2-101 through 
29-2-109, W.S. 1977 (1981 Replacement).

3 We upheld a trial court 
application of § 29-16, W.S. 1957, the former codification of § 29-2-114, W.S. 
1977.

4 Appellant was at the 
homesite almost daily, and she testified to seeing delivery trucks and the 
Woodroof Construction employees using building materials.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting, with whom ROONEY, Chief 
Justice, joins.

[¶25.]  I can concur in the result which is 
reached by the majority opinion with respect to Cheyenne Lumber Company, but I 
can only do so upon a different ground than that relied upon in the majority 
opinion. I must dissent with respect to the disposition of this case as to 
Diamond International Corporation. I would reverse that judgment on the ground 
that the lien statement was not properly verified as required by the language of 
§ 29-2-109, W.S. 1977, which provides in the part here 
pertinent:

"* * * which [the lien] 
in all cases shall be verified by the 
oath of the person filing the lien, or by some reliable person for him; * * *" 
(Emphasis supplied.)

[¶26.]  The better rule is that compliance with 
this statute is essential in order to create a lien. The curative statute upon 
which the majority of the court relies, § 29-2-114, W.S. 1977, becomes operative 
only in an action to enforce a lien. The curative statute assumes the existence 
of a lien which I submit does not exist in the absence of verification. I agree 
with the conclusion in the majority opinion that there was no verification as to 
the Diamond International Corporation lien statement, and consequently there was 
no compliance with the statute which would justify the bringing of any action to 
enforce a lien.

[¶27.]  As to Cheyenne Lumber Company, I am 
satisfied that there was an adequate verification of the lien which was filed. 
Consequently there is no need to invoke the curative statute. I would not feel 
compelled to pursue the substantial compliance rule such as that invoked in 
New Mexico. Garrett Building Centers, Inc. v. Hale, 
95 N.M. 450, 623 P.2d 570 (1981); Home 
Plumbing and Contracting Company v. Pruitt, 70 N.M. 182, 372 P.2d 378 
(1962). However, if that rule were relied upon it would serve to make the 
conclusion of verification as to the Cheyenne Lumber Company lien an even more 
proper result. See also, Stephenson v. 
Ketchikan Spruce Mills, Inc., Alaska, 412 P.2d 496 (1966); First Security Mortgage 
Co. v. Hansen, Utah, 631 P.2d 919 
(1981).

[¶28.]  The application of the curative statute 
in favor of Diamond International Corporation results in a holding that is a 
denial and denigration of the rule heretofore in effect in Wyoming that this lien 
statute is to be strictly construed because it is in contravention of the common 
law. Tottenhoff v. Rocky Mountain 
Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 609 P.2d 464 (1980). The majority of the 
court gives only lip service to this rule, and in fact the curative statute is 
applied quite liberally in favor of the materialman in this 
instance.

[¶29.]  I would call attention to language from 
prior cases decided by this court. In Wyman v. Quayle, Wyo., 9 
Wyo. 326, 331, 
63 P. 988 (1901), this court said:

"* * * It is therefore 
indispensable to the creation of the 
lien that the prescribed account or statement be filed. And the statement must 
contain a just and true account of the demand due him after all just credits 
shall have been given, a description of the property sufficient to identify the 
same, the name of the owner or owners, contractor or contractors, or both, if 
known to the person filing the lien, and it must be verified by oath." (Emphasis 
supplied.)

In Becker v. 
Hopper, 22 Wyo. 237, 253-254, 138 P. 179, Ann.Cas. 1916D 
1041, affirmed 23 Wyo. 209, 147 P. 1085, Ann.Cas. 1918B 35 
(1914), this court spoke only to the content of the lien and 
said:

"* * * There is 
considerable apparent conflict in the decided cases on the question of what 
particularity is required in a lien statement. We say apparent conflict for the 
reason that in nearly all of the cases the decisions have been based upon the 
particular language used in the several statutes, in a number of which it is 
expressly provided that inaccuracy in the statement shall not invalidate the 
lien. Our statute requires a just and true account of the demand which is to be 
a lien; and we are of the opinion that the lien statement in this case was a 
substantial compliance with that requirement. * * * To be sufficient the 
statement should be sufficiently specific to enable one, not a party to the 
contract, to identify the things for which the lien is claimed. * * 
*"

[¶30.]  We have noted previously that the source 
of our mechanic's lien statute is the law of Missouri. Wyman v. Quayle, supra; Lasich v. Wimpenney, 73 Wyo. 345, 278 P.2d 807 
(1955). The Supreme Court of Missouri, in interpreting their statute which is 
the source of § 29-2-109, W.S. 1977, treated the statement of lien account and 
the requirement for verification separately. In Mitchell Planing-Mill Co. v. Allison, 
138 Mo. 50, 40 S.W. 118, 121, 60 Am.St.Rep. 544 (1897), that court 
said:

"* * * The account which 
this law contemplates is such a statement of the claim as fairly apprises the 
owner and the public of the nature and amount of the demand asserted as a lien. 
The account may consist of one or more items. It may be all on one side, or 
mutual in its showing. To be valid, however, it must disclose on its face that 
the demand is of a sort within the terms of the lien law. The affidavit required 
to verify the account may be considered along with the account itself in 
ascertaining the sufficiency of the latter. * * *"

See also Moller-Vandenboom Lumber Co. v. 
Boudreau, 231 Mo. App. 1127, 85 S.W.2d 141 (1935).

[¶31.]  Other courts which have addressed the 
question of whether an acknowledgement is to be accepted as a substitute for the 
verification required by their lien statutes in order to perfect a lien have 
held that it is not, and that no lien is created. H.A.M.S. Company v. Electrical Contractors 
of Alaska, Inc., Alaska, 563 P.2d 258 
(1977); Bell and Zajicek, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson 
Company, 23 Conn. Sup. 296, 182 A.2d 339 (1962); D.J. Fair Lumber Company v. Karlin, 199 
Kan. 366, 430 P.2d 222 (1967); Hub City 
Wholesale Electric, Inc. v. Mik-Beth Electrical Co., Ltd., Ky.App., 621 S.W.2d 242 (1981); Saunders Cash-Way 
Lumber & Hardware Company v. Herrick, 179 Mont., 233, 587 P.2d 947 
(1978); Home Plumbing and Contracting 
Company v. Pruitt, supra; and First 
Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra. The Supreme Court of Utah aptly 
stated the proposition in First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra, 631 P.2d  at 922, as 
follows:

"Verification is not a 
hypertechnicality that we can discount. Without verification, no lien is 
created. * * *"

To the same 
effect is H.A.M.S. Company v. Electrical 
Contractors of Alaska, Inc., supra. There the Supreme Court of Alaska 
rejected the argument that under their statutory scheme a defective verification 
could be cured under that state's liberal validation statute. The court 
concluded that the requirement of verification contained in the statute was a 
mandatory condition precedent to the very creation and existence of a valid 
lien. In the absence of a valid lien there was no opportunity to apply the 
remedial portions of the mechanic's lien statute. The holding of the Alaska 
court is applicable in this case, as previously indicated, because until the 
verification requirement has been met there exists no lien which can be 
enforced. The bringing of an action to enforce a valid lien is a prerequisite to 
the invocation of the curative statute.

[¶32.]  For the reasons stated I would affirm as 
to Cheyenne Lumber Company and reverse as to Diamond International 
Corporation.