Title: Commonwealth v. Chamberlin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11877 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER CHAMBERLIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 6, 2015. - February 19, 2016. 
 
Present (Sitting at New Bedford):  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, 
Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Subpoena.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Subpoena, Warrant.  Search and Seizure, Warrant. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 21, 2007. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by D. 
Lloyd Macdonald, J., and the cases were tried before Robert J. 
Kane, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, 
Kevin S. Prussia, & Caitlin W. Monahan for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Norfolk District, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the aftermath of an attempted robbery in 2007, 
where the victim was bound, threatened, and shot, the police 
conducted an investigation seeking three attackers who had fled 
the scene.  As part of that investigation, a detective obtained 
from a cellular telephone service provider certain subscriber 
records for the defendant's telephone number.  The information 
thus obtained formed part of a later affidavit offered in 
support of a search warrant that, in turn, ultimately yielded 
several items of an incriminatory nature subsequently admitted 
at trial.  Before trial, the defendant without success moved to 
suppress the telephone records and the physical evidence 
obtained pursuant to the warrant.  He was convicted of armed 
robbery while masked, G. L. c. 265, § 17; kidnapping for 
purposes of extortion, G. L. c. 265, § 26; and armed assault 
with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18.  Following affirmance 
of his convictions by the Appeals Court, see Commonwealth v. 
Chamberlin, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 713 (2014), we allowed the 
defendant's application for further appellate review, limited to 
issues related to his cellular telephone records. 
 
The basis for the defendant's challenge is the government's 
failure to comply with G. L. c. 271, § 17B, the telephone 
records demand statute, as then in effect.  That statute in 
essence authorized the Attorney General or a district attorney 
on certain conditions to demand of common carriers (like the 
3 
 
cellular telephone service provider here), by means of an 
administrative subpoena, all pertinent records in the provider's 
possession.  There is little question that the means used here 
to obtain the records -- a request made by a detective directly 
to the provider for voluntary production forthwith of the 
records -- was not in compliance with the formal process 
contemplated in G. L. c. 271, § 17B.  The defendant maintains 
that G. L. c. 271, § 17B, establishes a baseline formal process 
necessary to the government's gaining access to such records.  
The government, on this view, having failed to comply with G. L. 
c. 271, § 17B, is foreclosed from circumventing its requirements 
and obtaining such records by informal means; the records 
obtained should accordingly be suppressed, along with any 
related evidence derived therefrom. 
 
We conclude that G. L. c. 271, § 17B, as then in effect, 
did not itself preclude the government from obtaining the 
records at issue here.  Although the means employed to obtain 
the records also had to comply with the requirements of the 
Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
(2006), we discern no error in the motion judge's determination 
that those requirements were met in this case.  Accordingly, the 
4 
 
motions to suppress were correctly denied and we affirm the 
convictions.1 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  On September 24, 2007, 
three masked men held Antonio Alberto, the owner of a real 
estate agency, at gunpoint in his office; they bound his hands 
and ordered him to open a safe in the building.  When Alberto 
did not open the safe, the men threatened him, stating that they 
knew where he lived and "had [his] wife."  After a struggle, 
Alberto was shot through the ear.2  He pretended to be dead until 
the intruders left, then called for emergency assistance and was 
taken to a hospital. 
 
The following day, Alberto described the robbery to 
Lawrence Ferreira, a detective of the Fall River police 
department.  Alberto said that he had recognized the voice of 
one of the intruders as belonging to "Marco," a man who had 
called him several times in the weeks before the robbery to 
express interest in properties listed by his real estate agency, 
and who had scheduled a meeting with him for the time of the 
robbery.  Alberto also informed Ferreira that the intruders had 
threatened his family, but did not appear actually to know where 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and the amicus letter of the district attorney 
for the Norfolk district. 
 
 
2 Notwithstanding the location of the gunshot wound, Alberto 
suffered relatively minor injuries. 
5 
 
he lived, despite claims to the contrary.  Nevertheless, 
following the robbery, Alberto had been receiving hang-up calls 
at work and at home that "scared the hell out of" him. 
 
Alberto reviewed the call log from his cellular telephone 
with Ferreira, and they were able to identify a telephone number 
for "Marco."  Ferreira then searched for the number on a "police 
related search engine" that provided him with the subscriber 
information associated with that number.  The subscriber 
information included the defendant's name and address. 
 
What followed was the conduct contested in this appeal:  on 
September 26, 2007, Ferreira sought the defendant's telephone 
records directly from an employee in the cellular service 
provider's law enforcement relations department.  Rather than 
causing the provider to be served with an administrative 
subpoena or some other form of legal process, Ferreira gave the 
employee over the telephone "a brief synopsis" of his 
investigation, and promised that he would provide a subpoena 
within forty-eight hours.  On the night of September 26, 2007, 
Ferreira sent the employee a letter that included the suspect's 
phone number and a summary of the investigation.3  A few hours 
                     
 
3 The letter stated: 
 
 
"On Wednesday September 26, 2007[,] I Detective 
Lawrence D. Ferreira while assigned to the Major Crimes 
Division investigated a shooting incident in the city of 
Fall River[,] Ma.  The victim, a white male[,] sustained a 
6 
 
later, the employee provided Ferreira with the defendant's 
subscriber information and a call log for the defendant's 
cellular telephone number for the prior two weeks.4  The 
following day, September 27, 2007, Ferreira asked the assistant 
district attorney assigned to the case to send the provider a 
                                                                  
single gunshot wound to the head area.  This victim is 
currently being treated by medical personnel. 
 
 
"The suspect in this case is currently outstanding and 
has been contacting the victim's family via cellular 
telephone.  This suspect has threatened the victim's family 
with bodily harm.  Through this investigation, Major Crimes 
Detectives obtained the suspect[']s [tele]phone number to 
be [(xxx) xxx-xxxx]. 
 
 
"I am respectfully requesting information pertaining 
to the suspect[']s call log from September 16, 2007 to the 
current date.  I am also requesting subscriber information 
as to the suspect[']s name and address. 
 
 
"I will comply with a court [subpoena] with the 
[forty-eight hour] window as required by [the cellular 
service provider].  Please assist the Fall River Police 
Department with the request." 
 
 
4 The subscriber information that the law enforcement 
relations officer sent to Ferreira included the defendant's 
name, address, and birthday; his cellular, home, and work 
telephone numbers; and his Social Security number.  This 
information corroborated the name and address that Ferreira had 
already found using the search engine.  The call log listed all 
calls to and from the defendant's telephone number from 
September 16, 2007, to September 26, 2007.  The log included 
approximately ten calls to Alberto's cellular telephone and 
office numbers.  Ferreira discussed the name, address, and call 
log in his affidavit supporting an application for a warrant to 
search the defendant's home.  They were also used at trial as 
evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
7 
 
subpoena for the records.  A grand jury subpoena apparently was 
sent the same day.5 
 
As noted, the defendant's pretrial motions to suppress the 
records produced were denied after an evidentiary hearing.  In 
essence, the judge who heard the motions (motion judge) 
determined both that G. L. c. 271, § 17B, was not the exclusive 
means by which the government could obtain such records and that 
the service provider's good faith, voluntary disclosure of the 
records in exigent circumstances did not violate the Federal 
Stored Communications Act.  After a jury convicted the 
defendant, the Appeals Court determined, inter alia, that the 
defendant's motions to suppress properly were denied, see 
Chamberlin, supra at 706-710, and we allowed the defendant's 
application for limited further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Because the defendant does not raise any 
constitutional claims,6 our inquiry is limited to whether 
Ferreira was permitted to request the defendant's telephone 
                     
 
5 The subpoena itself was not in evidence and is not in the 
record. 
 
 
6 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-745 (1979) 
(telephone subscribers have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in telephone records under Fourth Amendment to United States 
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 178, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998) (telephone subscribers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone records under 
art. 14 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).  But see 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244-255 (2014), S.C., 
472 Mass. 448 (2015). 
8 
 
records directly from the service provider without first 
complying with at least the formal process set out in G. L. 
c. 271, § 17B.  "[W]hen reviewing a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, but independently review the judge's ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 628 (2015).  In light of 
its text and legislative history, we conclude that G. L. c. 271, 
§ 17B, as in effect in 2007, did not preclude the government 
from asking a service provider to disclose customer records 
voluntarily.7  Nonetheless, under the Federal Stored 
Communications Act, service providers are permitted to disclose 
those records voluntarily only in certain limited circumstances.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(1)-(6).  Because we discern no error in 
the trial court judge's determination that one such set of 
circumstances existed here, we affirm. 
                     
 
7 Although some formal process appears to have been provided 
in this case eventually in the form of a grand jury subpoena, 
formal process generally cannot be an afterthought.  See 
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 219 (1981), S.C., 389 
Mass. 441 (1983) ("We can find no authority for applying the 
'inevitable discovery' rule to cure an illegal warrantless 
search on the basis that it was inevitable that a warrant would 
be obtained").  We assume without deciding that the grand jury 
subpoena that was eventually provided was not sufficient on its 
own to overcome the defendant's motion to suppress.  Cf. Vinnie, 
428 Mass. at 178 (telephone records obtained by means of 
procedurally insufficient subpoena may be suppressed). 
9 
 
 
1.  Statutory overview.  General Laws c. 271, § 17B, was 
first enacted in 1966, apparently as part of a broader effort to 
combat the use of landline telephones in illegal gaming 
operations.  See, e.g., 1966 House Doc. No. 3610 (summarizing 
bills targeting illegal telephone gaming operations).  As 
originally enacted, the statute provided that the Attorney 
General or a district attorney could demand customer records 
from a service provider whenever there were reasonable grounds 
to believe that a subscriber to that provider's service was 
using the service for an unlawful purpose.  G. L. c. 271, § 17B, 
as inserted by St. 1966, c. 352.  By allowing the government to 
compel service providers to disclose customer records in the 
early stages of an investigation even when there was not yet 
probable cause for a warrant, the statute thus supplied "an 
investigatory tool, not as invasive as a house search or a 
wiretap, but nevertheless probing at the edges of privacy."  
Commonwealth v. Feodoroff, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 728 (1997).  
As we emphasized, "the statute [did] not provide the district 
attorney with a free hand to issue routine administrative 
subpoenas."  Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 178, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998).  If the Attorney General or a 
district attorney had "no reasonable grounds for belief that the 
target was using the telephone for an unlawful purpose," the 
telephone records could be suppressed.  Id.  General Laws 
10 
 
c. 271, § 17B, remained essentially unchanged until 2008.  See 
St. 2008, c. 205, § 3.8 
 
Twenty years after the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 271, 
§ 17B, in 1966, the United States Congress enacted the Federal 
Stored Communications Act.  See Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 
(1986).  The Federal Stored Communications Act aims "to protect 
the privacy of users of electronic communications" during 
government investigations (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 235 (2014).  It achieves that aim, as 
relevant here, by exposing to civil liability service providers 
that improperly disclose customer records to the government.  
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2707-2708.9  Service providers are permitted and 
indeed required to disclose customer records to a "governmental 
entity" when that entity has complied with one of the limited 
number of formal processes for making a demand, such as a 
warrant, a court order, or an administrative subpoena, as set 
forth in the act.10  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).  
                     
 
8 The two other amendments to G. L. c. 271, § 17B, were 
minor changes in wording that have no bearing on the outcome of 
this case.  See St. 1997, c. 164, § 292; St. 2008, c. 169, § 80. 
 
 
9 See Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1208, 1241-1242 (2004) (noting shortcomings of civil liability 
enforcement scheme). 
 
 
10 A "governmental entity" is defined as "a department or 
agency of the United States or any State or political 
subdivision thereof."  18 U.S.C. § 2711(4) (2006). 
11 
 
Providers are permitted to disclose those records voluntarily to 
the government, however, only in limited circumstances.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(1)-(6).  One such circumstance is when "the 
provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving 
danger of death or serious physical injury to any person 
requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the 
emergency."  18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). 
 
Hence, in 2007, when the records at issue in this case were 
requested, the government was required to comply with the 
applicable provisions of the Federal Stored Communications Act.11  
See Telecommunications Regulatory Bd. of P.R. v. CTIA-Wireless 
Ass'n, 752 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (Puerto Rico statute 
requiring service providers to disclose subscriber information 
without formal demand preempted by 18 U.S.C. § 2702[c]).  
Nevertheless, the Federal Stored Communications Act creates only 
a minimum set of privacy protections that States are free to 
supplement.  See Lane v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., 612 F.Supp.2d 
623, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("Congress expressly authorized states 
                     
 
11 The defendant does not dispute that, had the prosecutor 
rather than Ferreira issued to the service provider a timely 
administrative subpoena, that demand and the same documents as 
were provided here would have been compliant with both G. L. 
c. 271, § 17B, and the Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq. (2006).  Given what Alberto told 
Ferreira, it is not contested that the requisite reasonable 
grounds existed for belief that the defendant's telephone number 
was being used for an unlawful purpose. 
12 
 
to legislate in this field").12  Thus, regardless of whether a 
service provider is permitted to disclose a customer's records 
voluntarily under the Federal Stored Communications Act, State 
law may prohibit the government from informally requesting such 
disclosure.  The question before us is whether G. L. c. 271, 
§ 17B, as in effect in 2007, prohibited the government from 
making such an informal request. 
 
2.  Minimum formal process under G. L. c. 271, § 17B.  The 
defendant contends that G. L. c. 271, § 17B, as enacted in 1966 
and in effect in 2007 when the records at issue in this case 
were obtained, established a minimum formal process that the 
government must comply with in all circumstances.  To support 
this view, he argues that St. 2008, c. 205, § 3, amending G. L. 
c. 271, § 17B, should guide our understanding of the statute as 
originally enacted. 
 
"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Custody of 
Victoria, 473 Mass. 64, 73 (2015), quoting Sebago v. Boston Cab 
Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 339 (2015).  Neither the plain 
                     
 
12 See also U.S. Internet Service Provider Association, 
Electronic Evidence Compliance -- A Guide for Internet Service 
Providers, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 945, 983 (2003) ("since the 
original wiretap law in 1968, it has been clear that a state may 
have stricter [but not more lenient] requirements"). 
13 
 
text of G. L. c. 271, § 17B, nor the context of its enactment 
supports the defendant's construction of the statute. 
 
We consider the language of the statute in effect when the 
records at issue in this case were obtained.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 560-561 (2013).  The statute 
provided, in relevant part: 
 
"Whenever the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or a district 
attorney has reasonable grounds for belief that the service 
of a common carrier . . . is being or may be used for an 
unlawful purpose he may, acting within his jurisdiction, 
demand all the records in the possession of such common 
carrier relating to any such service.  Such common carrier 
shall forthwith deliver to the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or 
district attorney all the records so demanded" (emphasis 
supplied).  G. L. c. 271, § 17B, as enacted by St. 1966, 
c. 352. 
 
On its face, G. L. c. 271, § 17B, set out an "investigatory 
tool" by which the government "may" obtain telephone records 
during an investigation.  See Feodoroff, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 
728.  The use of the word "may" in a statute generally 
"reflect[s] the Legislature's intent to grant discretion or 
permission to make a finding or authorize an act."  Commonwealth 
v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 558 (2014).  By using the word "may" 
here, the Legislature indicated no more than that the government 
may, but need not, obtain telephone records by using this tool. 
 
The defendant would read the Legislature's silence as to 
any other means available to the government as limiting the 
government only to formal processes such as a search warrant or 
14 
 
a grand jury subpoena.  However, we discern nothing in the 
language of the statute that imposed such constraints, and we 
must "not read into the statute a provision which the 
Legislature did not see fit to put there" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 
(2015).13  That the Legislature supplied prosecutors with a 
statutory means to compel disclosure accordingly has no bearing 
on whether the government could also seek voluntary compliance 
from telephone companies in turning over customer business 
records.14 
 
The legislative history of G. L. c. 271, § 17B, is 
consistent with this construction of the statutory text.  It 
contains no suggestion that the Legislature intended to prevent 
the government from asking service providers to disclose 
customer records voluntarily.  When G. L. c. 271, § 17B, was 
originally enacted, see St. 1966, c. 352, the law was just one 
                     
 
13 See also Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of the Holyoke 
Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 473 Mass. 515, 519 (2016), 
quoting Sellers's Case, 452 Mass. 804, 810 (2008) (interpreting 
statutory silence in context of legislative purpose). 
 
 
14 Prior decisions of this court have recognized the 
possibility that extrajudicial process might be available to 
obtain "investigative materials."  See Commonwealth v. Odgren, 
455 Mass. 171, 186 n.26 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 791-792 n.12 (2005) ("[a]ny informal 
extrajudicial process that exists . . . by which a party 
involved in litigation may successfully obtain investigative 
materials that may be of help in preparing for trial, or may be 
useful during trial, is beyond the scope of this case"). 
15 
 
of several contemporaneous bills that sought to address the 
possibility of collusion between landline telephone service 
providers and illegal bookmaking operations.  See, e.g., 1966 
House Doc. No. 1494 (creating special commission to investigate 
alleged aid to bookmakers by service providers); 1966 House Doc. 
No. 1497 (prohibiting service providers from providing service 
to illegal gaming operations); 1966 House Doc. No. 3610 
(summarizing bills aimed at service provider collusion with 
illegal bookmakers).  The "investigatory tool" that the 
Legislature created in G. L. c. 271, § 17B, thus apparently 
provided a means to combat illegal bookmaking when voluntary 
disclosure by a telephone service provider was not forthcoming 
or otherwise possible.  Notwithstanding the Federal Stored 
Communications Act's later concern about voluntary disclosure of 
telephone customer records by service providers, there is no 
evidence that the Legislature in 1966 had in mind any constraint 
on voluntary disclosure of this sort. 
 
Recognizing the law's silence with respect to voluntary 
disclosure, the defendant urges us to understand the version of 
G. L. c. 271, § 17B, in effect when the records at issue in this 
case were obtained in light of St. 2008, c. 205, § 3 (2008 
amendment).  However, "the views of a subsequent [Legislature] 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
one."  Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
16 
 
Co., 371 Mass. 186, 194 (1976), quoting United States v. Price, 
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).  Although the Legislature "may amend a 
statute simply to clarify its meaning," amendments typically 
presume a change in the law.  See Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 
Mass. 548, 554 (2013), quoting Boyle v. Weiss, 461 Mass. 519, 
525 (2012). 
 
The 2008 amendment updated the 1966 statute that was 
originally enacted to combat illegal telephone gaming operations 
to take into account electronic communications services that 
later came into widespread use.15  In addition, it substantively 
altered the standard that the Attorney General or a district 
attorney must meet in order to compel service providers to 
                     
 
15 The 2008 amendment provided, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Except as otherwise prohibited under [18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703], whenever the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or a district 
attorney has reasonable grounds to believe that records in 
the possession of: (i) a common carrier . . . . ; or (ii) a 
provider of electronic communication service as defined in 
[18 U.S.C. § 2710(15)]; or (iii) a provider of remote 
computing service as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 2711], are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation, 
the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or district attorney may issue an 
administrative subpoena demanding all such records in the 
possession of such common carrier or service, and such 
records shall be delivered to the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or 
district attorney within [fourteen] days of receipt of the 
subpoena. . . . Nothing in this section shall limit the 
right of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral or a district attorney to 
otherwise obtain records from such a common carrier or 
service pursuant to a search warrant, a court order or a 
grand jury or trial subpoena." 
 
St. 2008, c. 205, § 3. 
17 
 
disclose customer records.16  These changes were more than simple 
clarifications.  Accordingly, neither the text of the 2008 
amendment nor its legislative history affects our construction 
of the statute in effect in 2007. 
 
We leave for another day whether G. L. c. 271, § 17B, as 
amended by St. 2008, c. 205, § 3, precludes the government from 
asking a service provider to turn over customer records 
voluntarily.  As noted above, the Legislature is free to 
supplement the statutory baseline provided in the Federal Stored 
Communications Act with additional privacy protections.  Neither 
the text nor the legislative history of G. L. c. 271, § 17B, in 
effect in 2007, however, supports the conclusion that the 
Legislature had already done so before the records at issue in 
this case were obtained. 
 
3.  Compliance with Federal Stored Communications Act.  
Although the government was not prohibited from asking the 
service provider to disclose the defendant's records, the 
service provider was only free to provide that information to 
the government if one of the statutory exceptions set out in the 
                     
 
16 Where previously prosecutors had needed "reasonable 
grounds for belief that the service of a common carrier . . . is 
being or may be used for an unlawful purpose" in order to demand 
customer records, see G. L. c. 271, § 17B, as amended through 
St. 1997, c. 164, § 292, after the 2008 amendment they only need 
reasonable grounds for belief that those records are "relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."  St. 2008, 
c. 205, § 3. 
18 
 
Federal Stored Communications Act was met.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(c)(1), (4).  The motion judge considered specifically 
whether the service provider's disclosure in this case satisfied 
the exigent circumstances exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).  
Under that exception, a service provider may disclose customer 
records voluntarily to the government if the service provider 
believes in good faith that an "emergency involving danger of 
death or serious physical injury . . . requires disclosure 
without delay of information relating to the emergency."  18 
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). 
 
We defer to the findings of the motion judge unless they 
were clearly erroneous.  See Jewett, 471 Mass. at 628.  The 
judge found that the service provider produced the defendant's 
records to the government voluntarily and in good faith, and did 
not violate the Federal Stored Communications Act.  The judge 
further found that exigent circumstances existed at the time the 
information was sought. 
 
The record provides ample support for the judge's findings.  
Ferreira provided an employee in the service provider's law 
enforcement relations department with "a brief synopsis" of his 
investigation over the telephone, sent the employee a letter 
stating that the defendant, a customer of the service provider, 
was a suspect in a shooting incident and had threatened the 
victim's family, and promised that he would provide a subpoena 
19 
 
within forty-eight hours.  Although Ferreira's letter apparently 
misstated some of the facts of the investigation,17 the service 
provider had a good faith belief that exigent circumstances 
justified disclosing the defendant's records to Ferreira, and 
disclosed those records voluntarily.  There was no error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                     
 
17 For example, the letter stated that the defendant had 
"been contacting the victim's family via cellular telephone."  
There is no indication in the record that the hang-up calls to 
the defendant's home were made by a cellular telephone.  
Nonetheless, the judge who heard the motions to suppress 
determined that the police acted reasonably at the time they 
requested the defendant's records.  Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2707-2708 
(providing civil remedy for knowing or intentional violation of 
Federal Stored Communications Act).