Title: Johnson v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

655 N.E.2d 502 (1995)
Van JOHNSON, APPellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 48S02-9503-CR-345.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 25, 1995.
Montague M. Oliver, Jr., Anderson, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen, Julie Zandstra Frazee, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellee.
SULLIVAN, Justice.
This case implicates the following principle enunciated by Chief Justice Shepard in Penley v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806:
Id. at 808.
On June 18th 1992, a jury convicted Dr. Van Johnson in Madison Circuit Court of Voluntary Manslaughter,[1] a Class A felony. The trial court, having found that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, enhanced the presumptive sentence of 30 years by 10 years and suspended 10 years.
Johnson appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Johnson v. State (1994), Ind.App., 645 N.E.2d 643. Johnson then petitioned this court to transfer the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we granted his petition on March 10, 1995. We now reverse.
The Court of Appeals adequately stated the facts of the case and we simply quote from its opinion:
Johnson, 645 N.E.2d  at 645.
Johnson raises one issue that we find dispositive: whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence testimony of uncharged misconduct.
The State charged Johnson with Murder.[2] Johnson's lawyer made a motion in limine to prevent the prosecution from offering evidence of an incident that occurred approximately two months before the shooting of Mr. Wagner that gave rise to this case. In that incident, two people from the management of Johnson's apartment complex came to inspect the fire extinguisher in Johnson's apartment. Sherry Granger knocked on Johnson's door and twice announced housekeeping. When no one answered the door, Granger attempted to use her passkey to open the door. The security chain was on the door, and as the door opened a crack, Johnson shouted, "Don't come in I will shoot, don't come in I will shoot."
Johnson looked through the crack in the door, saw Granger and James Layman, and opened the door for them. When the door opened completely, Johnson was facing Granger and Layman, and he held a pistol in his hand about six inches from Granger's chest. After seeing their identification and after about a ten minute conversation, Johnson allowed Granger and Layman to inspect his fire extinguisher.
The trial court denied Johnson's motion to exclude evidence concerning this incident, overruled Johnson's objection when the prosecutor referred to the incident in opening argument, and overruled Johnson's objection when the prosecutor called Granger and Layman as witnesses.
The presentation of evidence in this case occurred between June 2nd and June 15th of 1992. Even before we adopted Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) in 1994 or Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in October of 1992 in Lannan v. State (1992), Ind, 600 N.E.2d 1334, evidence of extrinsic acts, also sometimes known as prior bad acts, was only admissible to show such things as motive, opportunity, intent, purpose, preparation, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or that the commission of a crime was part of a common scheme or plan. E.g., Dockery v. State (1994), Ind, 644 N.E.2d 573, 578.
In argument opposing Johnson's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the fire extinguisher incident, the prosecutor said the following:
In opening argument the prosecutor offered the jury the following preview of his case:
Later during the trial, when calling Granger and Layman as witnesses, the prosecutor attempted to justify admission of their testimony about the fire extinguisher incident to show Johnson's intent. The trial court overruled Johnson's renewed objection to the evidence, saying:
The State's information charged Johnson with knowingly killing the victim. Johnson never claimed that he did not intentionally arm himself before meeting the victim at the door. We do not see how evidence of an incident in which the defendant confronted people other than and unrelated to the victim in this case and in which a shooting did not occur makes it more likely either that Johnson knew that he was killing the victim or that the shooting was not an accident. See United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992).
The prosecution belatedly argued at trial, and now the State argues on appeal that the evidence was admissible to rebut Johnson's claim of self-defense made in statements to police, which statements the prosecution itself offered into evidence. We reject this argument. The trial court refused to give the jury an instruction on either accident or self-defense because it found there was insufficient evidence to justify either instructions. If there was insufficient evidence to justify an instruction on self-defense, selfdefense was not an issue in the case, and Granger's and Layman's testimony could not have been relevant to rebut what was not there to be rebutted.
While we review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, a trial court abuses its discretion when it admits evidence of extrinsic acts that are relevant to no issue other than character and to proof of behavior in conformity with that character. The record speaks for itself in this case. It was the very theory of the prosecution's case that Johnson, when he shot the victim, acted in conformity with what it alleged to be his violent character, born of his days in Chicago. The prosecution offered the evidence of the fire extinguisher inspection precisely to prove character, and the trial court permitted the prosecutor to discuss the incident during opening argument, over objection, and permitted Granger and Layman to testify, also over objection, explicitly for the forbidden purpose. The exclusive value of the evidence of the fire extinguisher incident related not to the crime but to the alleged criminal. Hernandez, 975 F.2d  at 1040.
Accordingly, having granted transfer, we now vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind.Appellate Rule 11(B)(3), and reverse Johnson's conviction for Voluntary Manslaughter.
DeBRULER, DICKSON and SELBY, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs with separate opinion.
SHEPARD, Chief Justice, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, but wish to add a note about the possibility of a second trial.
Johnson made a tardy request to plead insanity. If that defense is permitted in a retrial, the admissibility of evidence about Johnson's behavior towards people on his front porch would be resolved by reference to rules other than the ones we apply today.
[1]  Ind.Code § 35-2-1-3 (1993).
[2]  Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).