Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Johnson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. JOHNSON. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Johnson (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Violating a 
Disciplinary Rule — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, 
fraud, or misrepresentation — Neglect of an entrusted legal matter — 
Failing to carry out employment contract — Causing prejudice to client in 
course of professional relationship — Failing to promptly pay or deliver, 
on request, client funds or property to which client was entitled — Neglect 
or refusal to assist in disciplinary investigation — Indefinite suspension 
recently imposed in separate case. 
(No. 98-1239 – Submitted August 19, 1998 – Decided December 2, 1998.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-78. 
 
On August 11, 1997, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed a complaint 
alleging that respondent, Mitchell L. Johnson, formerly of Mayfield Heights, Ohio 
(last known address Chicago, Illinois), Attorney Registration No. 0058430, 
violated six Disciplinary Rules and two Rules for the Government of the Bar.  
When Johnson failed to file an answer or otherwise plead to the complaint, relator 
filed a motion for default.  The matter was submitted to a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Relator’s complaint stemmed from Johnson’s representation of Wesley 
Chrapko, who hired Johnson to file an employment-discrimination action on his 
behalf.  Chrapko paid Johnson a $1,500 retainer and agreed to pay him $105 per 
hour.  If the action was successful, Johnson was to receive one-third of any 
recovery, less any hourly fees already paid.  Johnson filed the action in the Court 
 
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of Common Pleas of Medina County; the action was subsequently removed to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 
 
In October 1995, Johnson told Chrapko that he needed $1,000 to retain an 
economist as an expert witness on the issue of damages.  Chrapko wrote a check in 
that amount, payable to Johnson.  Although Johnson negotiated the check, he did 
not retain, or even discuss the case with, any such expert.  Chrapko later asked for 
his money back, but Johnson did not return it. 
 
As the action proceeded in the federal court, Johnson repeatedly failed to 
provide discovery as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.  He also failed to attend a 
scheduled status conference and Chrapko’s deposition.  When the defendants filed 
a motion for summary judgment, Johnson failed to file a timely brief opposing the 
motion, and failed to request an extension until two weeks after his brief was due.  
The federal court granted summary judgment as to Chrapko’s federal claims and 
remanded his state-law claim to the common pleas court.  Eight days after the 
federal court granted partial summary judgment, Johnson filed a brief opposing 
summary judgment.  Johnson never informed Chrapko what the federal court had 
done with his case. 
 
During Johnson’s representation of Chrapko, Chrapko filed for personal 
bankruptcy.  The trustee in bankruptcy informed Johnson that Chrapko could no 
longer honor his agreement with Johnson for hourly fees, and could pay for 
Johnson’s services only on a strict contingency basis.  Johnson agreed to modify 
his fee agreement with Chrapko accordingly.  Yet, despite this, Johnson later 
demanded an additional $1,000 from Chrapko.  Johnson told Chrapko that “there 
were ways around the bankruptcy,” and instructed Chrapko to have a third party 
issue a check to Johnson on his behalf.  Chrapko complied with Johnson’s 
demand, fearing that Johnson would not otherwise pursue his lawsuit. 
 
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On August 29, 1996, Chrapko finally fired Johnson.  Chrapko asked that 
Johnson turn over his file and return the $1,000 paid to retain an expert witness.  
Johnson did not turn over Chrapko’s file.  This prejudiced Chrapko’s ability to 
pursue his lawsuit.  Moreover, Johnson neither refunded any of Chrapko’s money 
nor provided an invoice detailing the time spent on the case. 
 
Finally, after Chrapko filed a grievance with relator, relator sent two letters 
to Johnson concerning the matter.  Johnson never replied. 
 
On June 11, 1997, having ascertained Johnson’s office address, relator 
served a Notice of Intent and a draft copy of the complaint on Johnson at his office 
by certified mail.  A copy of the receipt is in the record.  On August 11, 1997, 
relator filed its complaint with the board.  The board served a copy of the 
complaint upon respondent by certified mail.  A copy of that receipt is also in the 
record.  The board issued a Notice of Formal Hearing, but this was not 
successfully served upon Johnson.  Accordingly, a copy was served upon the 
Clerk of this court pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B). 
 
On October 6, 1997, relator wrote Johnson to inform him of relator’s intent 
to file a motion for default.  Relator sent copies of this letter to Johnson’s business 
and home addresses by both certified and regular mail.  The letter sent by regular 
mail to Johnson’s home was apparently received, as it (unlike the other three 
copies) was not returned to relator. 
 
On December 23, 1997, relator filed its default motion.  On February 19, 
1998, Johnson wrote to relator, providing his mailing address in Chicago.  After 
this, Johnson orally contacted the chairman of the panel and requested an 
opportunity to explain why a hearing should be held on the default motion.  The 
chairman granted Johnson’s request and ordered that he explain by March 6, 1998, 
why he failed to answer the complaint and the default motion, and why he failed to 
 
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inform this court of any change in his address.  However, Johnson filed nothing 
and offered no explanations. 
 
Based on the facts alleged in relator’s unanswered complaint, the panel 
concluded that Johnson had violated DR 1-102(A)(1) (violating a Disciplinary 
Rule), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(2) 
(failing to carry out an employment contract), 7-101(A)(3) (causing prejudice to 
client in course of professional relationship), and 9-102(B)(4) (failing to promptly 
pay or deliver, on request, client funds or property to which client was entitled).  
The panel also found that Johnson had violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (neglect or 
refusal to assist disciplinary investigation) and V(6)(A)(1) (attorney misconduct).  
The panel recommended that Johnson be permanently disbarred.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph G. Schneider and Erica L. Eversman, for relator. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We find that Johnson has received adequate notice and the 
opportunity to plead or respond to the complaint and to participate in the 
proceedings against him.  We further note that recently, in a separate case, we 
indefinitely suspended Johnson for neglect of entrusted legal matters and failure to 
assist in an investigation.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Johnson (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
74, 689 N.E.2d 537.  Given the undisputed facts in this case, we agree with the 
board that disbarment is appropriate. 
 
We therefore adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the 
board.  We hereby permanently disbar Mitchell L. Johnson from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
 
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 Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.