Title: Wesley Chapel v. Baltimore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Wesley Chapel Bluemount Association, et al. v. Baltimore County, Maryland
No. 90, September Term, 1996
Open Meetings Act: Baltimore County Board of Appeals, when considering development
plan, must conduct its deliberations in open session.
Baltimore County
CV 9462
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 90
September Term, 1996
______________________________________
WESLEY CHAPEL BLUEMOUNT
ASSOCIATION et al.
v.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
          Eldridge, J. , dissents.
______________________________________
Filed:  September 5, 1997                        
            
The question before us in this appeal is whether the Baltimore County Board of
Appeals was required by the State Open Meetings Act to deliberate in open session when
considering an appeal from a hearing officer’s approval of a development  plan.  An ancillary
question, which the record does not permit us to resolve, is whether, upon a finding by the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County that the board was so required and violated the law in
not conducting its deliberation openly, the court was justified in requiring the county to pay
65% of the attorney’s fees incurred by the persons challenging the board’s action.  We shall
hold that the State Open Meetings Act applies to the consideration of development plans and
thus required the board to deliberate in open session, and we shall therefore reverse a
contrary judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Because the circuit court omitted to
make certain findings, however, the case will have to be remanded for further proceedings
in that court with respect to whether (1) the violation justifies vacating the board’s order, and
(2) it justifies the award of attorney’s fees.
This case is governed by four sections of  the State Open Meetings Act, codified as
Maryland  Code (1995 Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-501 through 10-512 of the State Government
Article.   Section 10-501 recites the legislative policy behind the Act.  It begins by declaring
essential to the maintenance of  a democratic society that, except in special and appropriate
circumstances, public business be performed in an open and public manner and that citizens
be allowed to observe the performance of public officials and the deliberations that go into
the making of public policy.  It then expresses the truism that the ability of the public to
attend and report on meetings of public bodies and to witness their deliberations ensures the
-2-
 Petitioners never raised the issue in this Court of whether consideration of a development
1
plan could also involve the “enforcement of any zoning law or regulation,” and we shall therefore not
address that issue.
accountability of government and increases the faith of the public in government.  That
legislative policy undergirds and pervades the Act and necessarily sets the general direction
for its interpretation.
Section 10-505 states, simply and directly, that, except as otherwise provided in the
Act, “a public body shall meet in open session.”   Two sections of the Act provide
“otherwise.”  Section 10-508(a) lists 14 circumstances in which a public body may meet in
closed session; none of them apply in this case.  Section 10-503, which defines the “scope”
of the Act,  provides, in subsection (a), that the Act does not apply when the public body is
carrying out an executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial function or to a chance encounter, social
gathering, or other occasion that is not intended to circumvent the Act.  Section 10-503(b),
however, states that the Act does apply to a public body when it is meeting to consider “(1)
granting a license or permit; or (2)  a special exception, variance, conditional use, zoning
classification, the enforcement of any zoning law or regulation, or any other zoning matter.”
 The first, and principal, issue before us is whether  consideration of a development plan
constitutes “any other zoning matter” and thus falls within the ambit of subsection (b)(2).1
 
That issue, and the ancillary one regarding the assessment of counsel fees, also invoke
§ 10-510, which provides for enforcement of the Act.  Section 10-510(b) allows a person
adversely affected by an alleged violation of the Act to file a petition in the circuit court to
determine the applicability of the Act, to require the public body to comply with the Act,
-3-
and to void an action of the public body taken in violation of the Act.  Section 10-510(d)
permits the court to issue an injunction and determine the applicability of the Act but allows
it to void the action complained of only if it finds that the public body “willfully failed to
comply” with the Act and that no other remedy is adequate.  § 10-503(d)(4).  As part of its
judgment, whatever it may be, the court is permitted under § 10-510(d)(5) to assess against
any party reasonable counsel fees and other litigation expenses that the party who prevails
in the action incurred and to require a reasonable bond to ensure payment of the assessment.
Section 10-510(d)(5) does not, on its face,  require a finding of willfulness as a precondition
to the assessment of counsel fees and litigation expenses.
BACKGROUND
Governmental control over land development is effected principally in three ways —
through the adoption of  (1) master plans delineating the desired uses for all land within the
planning area, both for development and for roads, parks, schools, and other public purposes,
(2) zoning regulations designed to implement the master plans by placing legal restrictions
on the use of the land by non-governmental persons and entities,  and (3) subdivision and
other development regulations designed to ensure that private development of the land is
consistent with the applicable master plan and zoning regulations.  Although each of these
devices has an independent purpose and may be subjected to a separate development and
approval procedure, their functions, to some extent, coalesce, in that they are all designed
to assure that land development occurs in a manner that is consistent with overall legislative
-4-
 Section 7.03 makes most of Article 66B inapplicable to the chartered counties, of which
2
Baltimore County is one.  
policy and community welfare.    Thus it is that zoning decisions take into account the
provisions of the applicable master plan and subdivision and development approvals take into
account compliance with applicable zoning regulations.  See Board of County Comm’rs v.
Gaster, 285 Md. 233, 401 A.2d 666 (1979).
These devices are provided for by both State and Baltimore County law.  Maryland
Code (1957, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, §§ 3.01 through 3.09 authorize the non-chartered
counties to create and appoint planning commissions to develop, for consideration by the
county legislative body, a plan to “serve as a guide to public and private actions and
decisions to insure the development of public and private property in appropriate
relationships . . . .”  § 3.05(a).   That same authority is granted to Baltimore County by
2
§§ 522 , 522.1, and 523 of the County Charter which, respectively, create a planning board
and provide for the development of a master plan, for submission to the County Council,
setting forth “comprehensive objectives, policies and standards to serve as a guide for the
development of the county.”  § 523(a).  Further implementation of the planning function is
provided for in § 26-81 of the County Code, which directs the county planning board to
prepare a master plan for the physical development of the county and specifies the matters
that may be included in the plan.
Sections 4.01 through 4.09 of Article 66B empower the non-chartered counties to
develop and, by ordinance, adopt zoning regulations that, among other things, may establish
-5-
 The terms “development plan” and “subdivision plan” are sometimes used interchangeably,
3
as most development plans not only entail a subdivision of the affected tract but hinge on that
subdivision.  
zoning districts and regulate the use of land and structures within those districts.  See § 4.02.
Section 4.03 requires that the zoning regulations “shall be made in accordance with the
plan.”  That general authority is granted to chartered counties by the Express Powers Act
(Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), § 5(X) of Article 25A).   It is implemented in
Baltimore County by §§ 522 through 524 of the county charter, which provide for an office
of planning and zoning, a director of that office, and zoning commissioners, and by §§ 26-
116 through 26-135 of the County Code, which, among other things, provide for zoning
districts and for the development and adoption of zoning regulations and maps.
Sections 5.01 through 5.08 of Article 66B , and, in particular, §§ 5.03 and 5.04,
provide for the adoption of subdivision regulations by the non-chartered counties and, upon
the adoption of those regulations, for the approval of subdivision plats by the planning
commission before the plats may be recorded.  Similar authority is granted to Baltimore
County by § 522.1(a)(3) of the County Charter and is implemented by §§ 26-166 through 26-
283 of the County Code.  Sections 26-166 and 26-167 set forth the purpose and functions of
the development regulations; both sections make clear that development must conform to the
master plan.
This case involves the third of the three devices — the approval of a development, or
subdivision,  plan.   It had its origin in a “concept plan” filed by Gaylord Brooks Realty
3
Company (Gaylord) in June, 1993.  In that concept plan, Gaylord proposed to build 34
-6-
single-family dwellings on 172.7 acres of land in northern Baltimore County.  Nearly all of
that land was zoned RC-4, a resource conservation zone designated for watershed protection.
No change in that zoning was requested.  The property was completely wooded and had
streams and wetlands running through it.  Gaylord proposed to cluster the development by
building the homes on 51 acres, comprising 30% of  the tract,  and leaving the remaining 120
acres — 70% of the tract — as a conservancy area.  
The procedure for reviewing and approving development plans in Baltimore County
is set forth in §§ 26-201 through 26-283 of the Baltimore County Code.    As a first step,
before preparing the concept plan, the applicant is urged to meet privately with county
agencies to obtain information about their policies and standards that might affect the
property  and with the Department of Permits and Development Management (DPDM) to
discuss concept plan requirements.  § 26-202.  The concept plan must set forth “an
informative conceptual and schematic representation of the proposed development in a
simple, clear and legible manner” and contain the other information required by § 26-
202(c)(1) and (d).  The second step is for the applicant to file the concept plan with DPDM,
which transmits copies to various county agencies.  Within 10 days, DPDM holds a concept
plan conference with the applicant and the county agencies (1) to receive comments from the
agencies, (2)  to determine whether there is any conflict between the concept plan and the
master plan, and (3) to identify the persons to be invited to a community input meeting.  If
a conflict between the concept and master plans is identified, a copy of the concept plan is
sent to the planning board.   Otherwise, within 10 days, the property is posted and a
-7-
community input meeting is scheduled.  The community input meeting is a required step, to
allow the applicant to present and explain the concept plan, to allow the invited citizens to
make comments,  and to give the county agencies an opportunity to respond to comments.
Any comments or proposed conditions not resolved at this meeting must be addressed by the
appropriate county agency as part of its development plan review.  
This preliminary process was completed by Gaylord .  A concept plan conference was
held on June 21, 1993,  and community input meetings were conducted in August and
October, 1993.
Within 12 months after the final community input meeting, the applicant may file a
development plan with the county Department of Public Works.  That plan is far more
specific than the concept plan and must contain the detailed information required by § 26-
203.   The plan is first reviewed by the Department of Public Works for conformance to the
concept plan presented at the community input meeting and for compliance with § 26-203.
 If approved by the Department in those respects, it is forwarded to other county agencies for
comment, and a hearing is scheduled before a DPDM hearing officer.  § 26-204.  Prior to
that hearing, a public development plan conference is held, at which the Director of Zoning
Administration and Development Management attempts to resolve any conflict in agency
comments and any remaining unresolved comments raised or conditions proposed at the
earlier community input meeting.  All comments must be submitted to the hearing officer at
least five days before the hearing and remain available for public inspection. § 26-205.
After the hearing, which is recorded, the hearing officer must resolve all open
-8-
 Section 26-127 requires the Zoning Commissioner to hold a public hearing on applications
4
for variances and special exceptions if a formal request for such a hearing is filed.  That section does
not require a hearing on requests for interpretations of the zoning law.
comments and proposed conditions and render a final decision within 15 days.  If the
development plan requires a special exception, variance, special hearing, or interpretation
of the zoning regulations, the applicant may combine the public hearing on the development
plan with any hearing required by § 26-127 with respect to those zoning issues.   § 26-206.1.
4
The  hearing on Gaylord’s development plan lasted three days, between June 7 and June 13,
1994.  Petitioners attended the hearing to oppose the plan.  Through 24 witnesses and 20
exhibits, they challenged whether the 70% conservancy area was large enough to protect the
environmental features of the property and raised concerns over reduced density and lot
reduction, the safety of roads, the health and environmental impact on surrounding properties
from sceptic and well location, stormwater management, and compatibility with neighboring
property.    Gaylord presented five witnesses and 20 exhibits.  The hearing officer apparently
agreed with some of petitioners’ concerns, for we are apprised in their brief that he required
certain modifications and attached certain conditions to Gaylord’s development.  In the end,
however, he approved the plan, on July 7, 1994.
Section 26-209 permits any person aggrieved by a final action on a development plan
to appeal to the county Board of Appeals.  Petitioners filed a timely appeal, raising 13 issues,
some legal, others factual in nature.    Much of their argument was based on conditions and
criteria established for R.C.4 zones in a 1992 zoning ordinance (Bill No. 113-92).  Among
other things, that ordinance declared that, in such a zone, a “minimum” of 70% of the
-9-
 Section 603 of the County Charter authorizes the Board of Appeals to adopt rules of
5
practice and procedure to govern the conduct of its proceedings, those rules being subject to approval
by the County Council.
acreage of the tract must be designated a conservancy zone; petitioners argued that, in this
case, 70% was not adequate and that the hearing officer failed to consider evidence on that
issue.  The ordinance also provided that each lot in a rural cluster development must contain
its own private water and sewage system and that, if the Director of Environmental
Protection and Resource Management finds that a lot cannot support a proposed dwelling
unit without endangering potable water supply or metropolitan district reservoirs, or creating
a health or environmental nuisance for neighboring properties, a dwelling unit is not allowed
on that lot.  Petitioners argued that an appropriate determination had not been made by the
director or reviewed by the hearing officer and that sceptic and well locations would create
a health and environmental problem for the neighborhood.  They also contended that the
hearing officer erred in determining that the development plan complied with the spirit and
intent of the zoning classification and that it met all of the county regulations for
development.
Section 26-209 (c) requires the board to conduct a proceeding by hearing oral
argument and receiving written briefs.  At its discretion, the board may receive additional
evidence.  Section 26-209(f) requires the hearing to be conducted “in accordance with the
county board of appeals rules of practice and procedure.”   At the outset, petitioners
5
requested that the board (1) conduct a de novo hearing, and (2) conduct its deliberations in
-10-
 There was never any question about conducting the oral argument part of the hearing in
6
open session, as that much is required by county law.  Section 603 of the County Charter provides
that “[a]ll hearings held by the board . . . shall be open to the public.”
public, as, in their view, required by the Open Meetings Act.  Both of those requests were
denied.  On August 31, 1994, the board heard argument from counsel in open session and
then ended the hearing.  On September 15, 1994,  it rendered a written opinion discussing
the issues raised by petitioners and affirming the decision of the hearing officer.  With
respect to the Open Meetings Act, the board stated:
“The appeal that is being heard by the Board is a development
plan appeal which was before the Hearing Officer and not the
Zoning Commissioner for Baltimore County.  No zoning
petitions (i.e., special exceptions, variances, special hearings)
were filed with the development plan; hence, there is no zoning
matter before the Board in these proceedings.  This Board has
previously ruled that appeals of development plans to this Board
are not subject to the open meetings law unless they involve
`other zoning matters.’  It is pointed out that an open hearing
was conducted on the record before this Board with regard to
the appeal filed in this matter; however, this Board concludes
that Section 10-503(b) does not apply as to the deliberation
process since the Board is hearing a development plan appeal as
opposed to a zoning matter appeal.”6
Aggrieved by both the board’s  affirmance of the hearing officer’s approval and its
denial of their request that the board’s deliberations be conducted in open session, petitioners
filed two actions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County — a petition for judicial review
of the board’s decision affirming the hearing officer’s approval and a petition under State
Government Article, § 10-510 to enforce the Open Meetings Act.  In the latter petition,
petitioners claimed that, in light of a prior circuit court decision in another case finding that
-11-
the Act applied to the Board of Appeals, the decision of the board to conduct its deliberations
in private constituted a willful violation of the Act.  They asked that the court determine that
the Act applied and that notice and open deliberations were required, that the board’s action
approving the development plan be voided, and that petitioners be awarded attorney’s fees.
Petitioners’ request that the two actions be consolidated was granted, following which
Gaylord was allowed to intervene as an interested party.
The Open Meetings Act issue was presented to the court on cross-motions for
summary judgment.   The county’s position was, and remains, that, under § 10-503(b)(2),
the board is required to deliberate in public session only if the matter before it falls within
one of the specific categories listed in that subsection or is an “other zoning matter” and that
a development plan neither comes within any of the listed categories nor constitutes a
“zoning” matter.   Petitioners urged that, as a development plan cannot be approved unless
it conforms with applicable zoning requirements, every such plan constitutes a “zoning”
matter, whether or not there is joined with it a request falling within one of the specific
categories.  Ultimately, the court agreed with petitioners’ view and concluded that the board
was required to deliberate in open session.  On June 21, 1995, it entered an order granting
petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, remanding the case to the board for further
proceedings (thereby, we presume, tacitly voiding the board’s decision) and requiring the
county to pay $2,387, constituting 65% of petitioners’ counsel fees incurred in bringing the
action to enforce the Act.   In light of the remand based on the Open Meetings Act violation,
the court found it unnecessary to address the other issues presented in the petition for judicial
-12-
review.  Unfortunately, as we shall see, the court did not make the findings necessary under
the Act to justify voiding the board’s decision and did not indicate precisely what the Board
of Appeals was to do when the case was remanded.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed on the ground that review of a development
plan is not a “zoning matter” within the meaning of § 10-503(b)(2) and, for that reason, the
board was not required to conduct its deliberations in open session.  Baltimore v. Wesley
Chapel, 110 Md. App. 585, 678 A.2d 100 (1996).  The appellate court determined that
planning, zoning, and subdivision or development control were separate and distinct areas
of regulation and that one ordinarily did not include the other.   The court traced some of the
legislative history of § 10-503(b)(2), in particular the 1991 law that enacted the section as
it currently reads.  Noting that, as initially proposed in the 1991 bill, the section would have
applied to a public body when making “a land use decision” and that it was later rewritten
to apply only to zoning matters, the court determined that the General Assembly intended
a more limited scope.
DISCUSSION
Section 10-503(b)(2), on its face, is ambiguous as to whether “other zoning matter”
includes review of a development plan.  As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out,
commentators and courts, including this Court, have drawn distinctions between the
planning, zoning, and subdivision or development control functions and  processes.  See
Board of County Comm’rs v. Gaster, supra, 258 Md. 233, 401 A.2d 666; Board v. Stephans,
-13-
286 Md. 384, 408 A.2d 1017 (1979); Clarke v. County Comm’rs, 270 Md. 343, 311 A.2d
417 (1973).  It is by no means pellucid, from just reading the statute, that consideration of
a development plan constitutes a “zoning matter.”  Given the close connection between the
planning, zoning, and development regulation functions, however, and the fact that
compliance with applicable zoning regulations is a prerequisite for approval of a
development plan, it is also not clear at a glance that consideration of a development plan
does not constitute a “zoning matter” for purposes of § 10-503(b)(2).
As we have said many, many times, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and carry out the true intention of the Legislature.  C.S. v. P.G. County Social
Services, 343 Md. 14, 24, 680 A.2d 470, 475 (1996); City of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md.
88, 93, 656 A.2d 757,760 (1995).  Especially when, as in this case, the words of the statute
are susceptible to more than one meaning, it is necessary to consider their meaning and effect
“in light of the setting, the objectives and [the] purpose of the enactment.”  Tucker v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986); see also Fraternal
Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting
Tucker).  One principal way to do that is to examine the relevant legislative history of the
statute.
Although there were a variety of open meetings laws in effect earlier, the first
comprehensive legislation in this regard came in 1977, with the enactment of new §§ 7
through 15 of Article 76A of the Maryland Code.  The 1977 Act applied to each “public
body,” a defined term, but only when the public body was exercising a legislative, quasi-
-14-
legislative, or advisory function.  By express provision, the Act did not apply when the
public body was exercising an executive, judicial, or quasi- judicial function.  See § 9 of
former Article 76A.  The heart of the Act was in §§ 10 and 11.  Section 11 listed 13
circumstances under which a public body otherwise subject to the Act could meet in closed
session.  Section 10 specified that, unless the public body was acting under § 11, its meetings
had to be open to the public.  Sections 12 and 13 required, respectively, that the public body
give reasonable advance notice of its public meetings and that it keep minutes of all of its
meetings, whether open or closed.  In 1984, as part of the ongoing Code Revision process,
the provisions of Article 76A were recodified, without substantive change, as §§ 10-501
through 10-510 of the State Government Article.
The exemption in the 1977 law for quasi-judicial functions served, in effect, to permit
zoning boards, boards of appeals, and other administrative agencies to continue deliberating
in closed session with respect to contested case hearings. In point of fact, the Act drew no
generic distinction between the information-gathering and the deliberative aspects of a
proceeding; whether a public body was required to meet in public depended on the nature
of the function it was performing (whether it was advisory or quasi-judicial, for example)
and the matter before it, not necessarily  whether the body was gathering evidence, listening
to presentations, or deliberating as to a decision.  In our first look at the Act, in City of New
Carrollton v. Rogers, 287 Md. 56, 410 A.2d 1070 (1980), we observed that, to the extent the
Act applied, it was “the deliberative and decision-making process in its entirety which must
be conducted in meetings open to the public since every step of the process, including the
-15-
 This was a departure, based on the breadth of the statute, from a position taken earlier by
7
this Court with respect to a more limited open meetings law.  In Sullivan v. Northwest Garage, Inc.,
223 Md. 544, 165 A.2d 881 (1960), we construed a Baltimore City ordinance requiring that the
Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals conduct public “meetings” as applying only to “hearings”
conducted by the Board.  We said, at 550, 165 A.2d at 884, that “the hearings of the Board must be
public but that the deliberations of the Board after the hearing is completed may be in private.”   As
noted earlier, § 603 of the Baltimore County Charter draws that same distinction with respect to the
County Board of Appeals, requiring that only “hearings” be conducted in public.
final decision itself, constitutes the consideration or transaction of public business.”  Id. at
72,  410 A.2d at 1079.   We noted that, although the Act did not afford the public any right
7
to participate in the meetings, “it does assure the public right to observe the deliberative
process and the making of decisions by the public body at open meetings.”  Id.
By 1990, liberal exercise of the broad exemption for public bodies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, initially provided for in § 9 of Article 76A (then set forth in § 10-505 of
the State Government Article)  and some of the categorical exclusions initially provided for
in § 11 (recodified as § 10-508 of the State Government Article) had produced demands for
an expansion of the law and a limitation of the exceptions to it.  In response to those
demands and at the apparent behest of the news media, Senate Bill 620 was introduced into
the 1990 session of the General Assembly.  That bill would have repealed the exemptions
for executive, judicial, and quasi-judicial functions, eliminated or limited some of the
categorical exceptions to the open meeting requirement, and directed that, unless one of the
narrower exceptions applied, public bodies must meet in open session.  It also would have
allowed meetings of public bodies to be videotaped, televised, broadcast, or otherwise
recorded.  Two letters of opposition, which are of some interest, appear in the legislative
files.  One, from the Maryland Association of Counties, expressed concern over a number
-16-
 It is not clear from the sentence, taken as a whole, whether the Association really was
8
objecting to conducting hearings in public or only to requiring the agency to deliberate in open
session.
 The two categorical exceptions that seemed to draw the most fire were those allowing
9
personnel decisions to be made in closed session and a “catchall” provision allowing a public body
to close a session for “an exceptional reason” that two-thirds of the members of the public body found
“so compelling that the reason overrides the general public policy in favor of open sessions.”
of provisions in the bill, including removal of the exemption for quasi-judicial functions, as
to which the Association made the rather extraordinary complaint that “requiring Quasi-
Judicial bodies, such as a board or commission, to conduct a contested case hearing in public
and in front of the parties to the case may have a chilling effect in those deliberations.”
(Emphasis added.)   The chairman of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Hagerstown
8
sought an amendment that would have allowed “deliberative sessions” of a zoning board to
be conducted in private.  He expressed the view that the function of a zoning board was “not
an exercise of representative government” but merely a “weighing of evidence in determining
whether to grant relief . . .  from zoning requirements.”  He added that “[n]o discernible
purpose may be served by public presence in such a proceeding,” especially as the public had
no right to participate in the deliberations.
Senate Bill 620 did not pass; it was, instead, referred by the Senate Economic and
Environmental Affairs Committee for interim study by an Open Meetings Law Subcommittee
of the Committee.  That subcommittee held two work sessions during the summer of 1990,
at which it considered a variety of issues, including whether to continue the exemption for
executive, judicial, and  quasi-judicial functions and whether to modify the categorical
circumstances justifying a closed session.   One suggestion offered by the State Department
9
-17-
of General Services was that public bodies continue to be allowed to discuss real estate
acquisitions in closed session and that the existing exception covering that circumstance be
expanded to include discussion of other procurement.  The product of the subcommittee’s
deliberations was Senate Bill 170, sponsored by the Chairman of the Economic and
Environmental Affairs Committee and introduced into the 1991 session.
Senate Bill 170 proposed sweeping changes in the Open Meetings Law, mostly
directed at requiring more open meetings by limiting the circumstances under which public
bodies could meet in closed session.  Unlike the 1990 bill, this one retained generally the
broad exemption for executive, judicial, and quasi-judicial functions but, through new
language, narrowed that exemption with respect to certain kinds of matters.  In its initial
form, the bill specified that, notwithstanding that a public body is exercising one of those
functions, the Act would apply when the public body is “granting a license or permit or
making a land use decision.”  
That language provoked considerable opposition, principally from or on behalf of
county and municipal governments.   Although articulation of the opposition varied
somewhat, essentially three concerns were raised.  The first, and most general, one was
directed at requiring deliberations on the part of any quasi-judicial agency on any matter to
be conducted in public, the argument being that such a requirement would chill free and
honest debate.  A second, somewhat more specific, complaint was made with respect to
deliberating zoning decisions in particular.  Finally, several groups expressed concern that
the term “land use decision” might encompass such things as the acquisition of property or
-18-
the location of businesses within a county.  Closed sessions as to those matters were
permitted under the 1977 law and under Senate Bill 170, and the groups opposed any change
in that approach.  The Maryland Municipal League suggested an amendment to strike the
proposed language and limit application of the Act to a public body “when it is hearing
testimony regarding the granting of a license or permit or a request for a change of zoning
classification.”   That amendment would have allowed  public bodies to deliberate in private
with respect to all quasi-judicial matters before them and, indeed, would have permitted
closed information-gathering sessions except in license, permit, and zoning reclassification
cases.   The League likened quasi-judicial bodies, when deliberating,  to juries.  It asserted
that, during such deliberations, frank interchange was essential and that there should be no
requirement that the deliberations of any quasi-judicial body be held in open session.  It
complained also that many quasi-judicial bodies did not decide contested cases immediately
after the hearing but deliberated later, often informally by telephone, that the members of
many public bodies served without compensation, and that placing the deliberative function
within the ambit of the Act, thereby forcing the members to return for another public session,
would place an unjustified burden on them and compromise the functioning of public bodies.
Finally, it urged that the term “land use decisions” was vague and that “request for a change
of zoning classification” would provide “the necessary clarity.”
Similar views were expressed by the Mayor of Baltimore, the Baltimore County
Board of Appeals, and the Howard County Council.  A letter from the Mayor’s legislative
liaison suggested that the provision dealing with licenses, permits, and land use decisions be
-19-
amended to apply only to the portion of the meeting devoted to public testimony.  The same
view was taken by the Howard County Council, which urged that quasi-judicial bodies be
permitted “to deliberate on a contested case involving permits, licenses and land use
decisions in closed session.”  The Baltimore County Board of Appeals analogized its
deliberations to those of an appellate court.  Requiring those deliberations to be conducted
in public, it said, would “chill debate and render the decision-making process a sham.”  None
of these opponents, in presenting this broad objection, drew any distinction between zoning,
development plans, other land use matters, licenses, or permits, but contended that the
decision-making process generally would be jeopardized if required to be conducted in
public.
The more focused concerns tended to overlap somewhat and hinged on the term “land
use decision.”   The Maryland Association of Counties complained  that the term was
“subject to several interpretations, including zoning, land acquisition, and proposed use of
county-owned property,” and, if so construed, the provision “could conflict with exceptions
to the law granted to discuss acquisition of real property or the locating of a business or
industry in the county.”  Apart from that, the Association expressed particular opposition to
conducting deliberations on zoning matters in public.   Similar concern directed specifically
to zoning matters was expressed by the State Board of Airport Zoning Appeals.  Noting that
its function was to consider requests for  variances from airport zoning regulations, mostly
by property owners wishing to construct residential or commercial structures within the noise
zone surrounding Baltimore/Washington International Airport, it complained that, if it were
-20-
 An amendment proposed on the Senate floor to add the language suggested by the
10
Maryland Municipal League — i.e., to limit the open meeting requirement, in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, to when the public body is “hearing testimony regarding the granting of a license or
permit, or a request for a change of zoning classification” — was defeated by a vote of 11 to 31.  
required to conduct its deliberations in public, there would be a chilling effect on free and
frank discussion.  It suggested either deleting the proposed language entirely or exempting
deliberations following a contested case hearing.  Finally, the Public School Superintendents’
Association of Maryland noted a concern over the section requiring that public bodies keep
and make public minutes of closed sessions, to the extent that it would disclose actions taken
“regarding land acquisition matters.”
There was, of course, a great deal of support for the bill as well, principally from the
news media and organizations such as Common Cause.  The Economic and Environmental
Affairs Committee, and ultimately the Legislature as a whole, rejected both the broad attack
on requiring any deliberations to be conducted in public and the narrower objection to
requiring deliberations on zoning matters to be conducted in open session  but did address
10
some of the concerns expressed over the vagueness of the term “land use decision.”  The
Committee struck the term “land use decision” and inserted in its place the current language
— “special exception, variance, conditional use, zoning classification, the enforcement of
any zoning law or regulation, or any other zoning matter.”  Unfortunately, there is nothing
in the legislative history to indicate the origin of that language.  We know only that it was
adopted by the Committee and remained intact throughout the rest of the legislative process.
The county, stressing the distinctions that have historically been made between the
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planning, zoning, and development regulation functions, insists that we give the phrase
“other zoning matter” a narrow construction, in line with those distinctions.  Approval of a
development plan does not constitute zoning, it urges.  Gaylord already had the required
zoning; it needed no reclassification, variance, conditional use, or special exception and
sought none.  Ergo, what was before the board was not a “zoning matter.”  That, indeed, was
the view of the Court of Special Appeals as well.  As we observed in another context in
Clarke v. County Comm’rs, supra, 270 Md. at 347, 311 A.2d at 420, however, “the answer
here does not lie in distinguishing between those two functions in the abstract” but turns on
what the Legislature intended.  
There can be little doubt, and the county concedes the point, that, had the “land use
decision” language remained in the bill, it would have sufficed to cover an appeal from the
approval (or disapproval) of a development plan.  The drafters of Senate Bill 170 clearly
intended that the deliberative process on matters concerning land use be conducted in open
meetings.  It is telling, we think, that none of the opposition to the “land use decision”
language sought to draw any distinction between pure zoning cases — variances, special
exceptions, conditional uses, reclassifications, and the like — and development or
subdivision plan cases.  As noted, the counties and municipalities objected, first, to requiring
open deliberations in any contested case, second, to requiring open deliberations in any
contested land use case, and, third, to open deliberations in any contested zoning case.  No
one complained of requiring open deliberations in development plan approval cases.  Indeed,
the only focused concern raised about the phrase “land use decision” was whether it might
-22-
include proposals for land acquisition, either by the government or by a business entity
seeking to locate within the county.  There is no evidence — none whatever — that the
technical distinctions the courts had drawn between land use planning, zoning, and
development control ever were considered by the Legislature or played any part in the
development of the statutory language.
Neither the cases relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals nor the ultimate
statutory language itself supports the county’s view that development plan consideration is
shielded from public view.  It is true that those cases drew the distinctions noted, but the
distinctions were drawn in very different contexts, having nothing to do with open meetings.
In Clarke v. County Comm’rs, supra, 270 Md. 343, 311 A.2d 417, for example, the issue was
whether approval of a residential subdivision plan by the county planning and zoning
commission with respect to land in an agricultural zone actually constituted a zoning
reclassification, which could be done only by the county commissioners.   The argument was
made that a residential subdivision was not allowed in an agricultural zone.  We held that
such a subdivision was permitted in the agricultural zone, that the subdivision approval
therefore did not constituting a rezoning, and that the approval, accordingly, was within the
authority of the planning and zoning commission.  In Board v. Stephans, supra, 286 Md.
384, 408 A.2d 1017, the issue was whether a statute allowing judicial review of a “zoning
action” by a local legislative body allowed review of the adoption of a zoning text
amendment or a comprehensive “mini” plan.  After reviewing the legislative history of the
statute, much as we have done here, we concluded that, notwithstanding the facially broad
-23-
 We can find no basis for construing the statute as requiring public deliberations on a
11
development plan only when accompanied by an incidental request for variance, special exception,
reclassification, or conditional use.  There is nothing in the statutory language or in the legislative
history to justify such a distinction.  Perhaps the board concluded that, if it is required to deliberate
publicly on some other matter, it will, as a matter of grace, allow the public to observe its
deliberations on the development plan as well.  
term, the Legislature meant it to cover only zoning reclassifications.  The critical word in that
case was not “zoning,” but “action.”  In Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 438 A.2d
1339 (1982), we held, in relevant part, that to justify a zoning reclassification based on a
“mistake,” the mistake had to be in the comprehensive rezoning, not in a master plan.
These cases, and others in which the separate functions of planning, zoning, and
development control have been discussed, have to be viewed in context.  The fact that
planning, zoning, and development regulation are separate processes, sometimes committed
to the jurisdiction of different agencies, often will have significance, depending on the issue
before the court.  The issue here is whether, in revising the Open Meetings Act to let in more
sunshine, the General Assembly intended to keep consideration of development plans in the
dark.  The legislative history establishes no such intent.  Nor does use of the phrase “other
zoning matter” require that result.  Although a development plan does not always or
necessarily involve a variance, special exception, conditional use, or reclassification, it may.
As we have indicated, the County Code allows those kinds zoning matters to be joined with
a request for development plan approval, and we were informed at oral argument that, in
such a case, the Board of Appeals conducts its deliberations on all matters before it,
including the development plan, in public.   Beyond that, a development plan cannot be
11
approved unless it is in compliance with applicable zoning regulations and conditions, and
-24-
 Notwithstanding the view expressed by the county in its brief, those kinds of agencies
12
cannot, of course,  exercise a judicial function.  Although the separation of powers provisions of
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights have been held inapplicable to local government (see
when compliance is challenged, as it was here, zoning issues are necessarily involved.  In
complaining about the adequacy of the conservancy area, the number of lots, and the
adequacy of the proposed private sewage systems, petitioners were invoking and relying on
provisions set forth in a zoning ordinance.  Their argument was that this development plan
did not conform to some of the requirements in that ordinance or that procedures required
by that ordinance had not been followed.
To construe the term “other zoning matter,” as used in § 10-503(b)(2),  in the narrow
fashion adopted by the Court of Special Appeals would be to render it almost meaningless.
Section 10-503(b)(2) has application only when the public body is carrying out an executive,
judicial, or quasi-judicial function.  If it is carrying out some other function — presumably
a legislative, quasi-legislative, or advisory function — it must meet in open session in any
event, unless allowed to close the session pursuant to § 10-508.  That would take care of
zoning text and map amendments and other reclassifications that are legislative in nature.
When considering § 10-503, the attention of the General Assembly was focused most
particularly on administrative agencies, like zoning commissions and boards of appeals.  The
Legislature made clear, by specific enumeration, that those agencies were to deliberate in
open session when considering special exceptions, variances, conditional uses, zoning
classifications, and enforcement — the  kinds of pure zoning matters most often coming
before them in an executive or quasi-judicial context.   Yet, by adding the catchall “other
12
-25-
Wicomico County v. Todd, 256 Md. 459, 260 A.2d 328 (1970); Pressman v. D’Alesandro, 193 Md.
672, 69 A.2d 453 (1949)), the purported vesting of judicial power in any Executive branch agency,
State or local, would contravene Article IV, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, which vests the judicial
power of the State in the enumerated courts.
 When asked at oral argument what kinds of zoning matters, other than those enumerated
13
in the statute, might come before the Board of Appeals, the county referred to a statement in its brief
that “[t]here are other ways to change the zoning of a property which are not specified in the Act,
such as historic area zoning, incentive zoning, performance zoning, spot zoning, conditional zoning,
‘use it or lose it’ zoning, floating zones and text amendments.”  When pressed whether those matters,
none of which are defined by the county and some of which are not entirely clear, come before the
Board of Appeals, the county acknowledged that some are determined by the county legislature, and
“[s]ome of these happen in other jurisdictions that don’t necessarily happen in Baltimore County, and
I don’t know how every county handles it.”  More to the point, this colloquy occurred:
“[The Court]: If there is a dispute that arises as to whether the plan is
zoning matter,” it obviously intended to require open sessions in other matters as well.
The Court of Special Appeals applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis in limiting the
scope of the catchall term.  As we made clear in In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 193, 634
A.2d 53, 57 (1993), however, quoting in part from Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 462, 124
A.2d 273, 274 (1956), that doctrine “should not be invoked where it would ‘subvert [the
statute’s] obvious purpose.’” Adopting the premise set forth in 2A Sutherland Stat. Const.
§ 47.22, at 210, we explained that “‘the general words will not be restricted in meaning if
upon a consideration of the context and the purpose of the particular statutory provisions as
a whole it is clear that the general words were not used in the restrictive sense.’” Id. at 193,
634 A.2d at 57.  That is certainly the case here.   If the Legislature did not intend to include
within the ambit of the catchall term other land use matters likely to come before the agency
that did not fall within one of the enumerated areas but nonetheless had some nexus to
zoning, the catchall would have no effect, and therefore no purpose.   Statutes are not to be
13
-26-
in compliance with all the zoning requirements, would the approval or
disapproval of the plan then constitute an ‘other zoning matter,’ if the
board was required to make some ruling on compliance
[County Attorney]: Yes. . . . Had [petitioner] gotten before the board
of appeals and said we believe the hearing officer violated the zoning
ordinance, then that issue should have been handled as an open
meeting on that issue. . . .  If there was an allegation that the hearing
officer had violated the zoning law and had in fact exercised a zoning
function, then yes that would be a matter that should be raised to the
board and that issue should be addressed open, publicly.”
As we have seen, an argument was made before the Board that the development plan was not
in compliance with provisions in the 1992 zoning ordinance (Bill No. 113-92).
construed in that manner; to the contrary, statutes are to be read “so that no word, clause,
sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”
Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994) (citations
omitted).
When viewed in this way, it seems clear that the review of development plans, which
have a very close nexus to zoning, constitutes a kind of “other zoning matter” intended to be
included within § 10-503(b)(2).  That result is consistent with both the legislative history and
the overall policy of the Open Meetings Act.  It is also consistent with the general policy
embodied in the County Code itself, which subjects development plans to community input
throughout the process and, indeed, is consistent with the earlier decision of the Court of
Special Appeals in Miller v. Forty West Builders, 62 Md. App. 320, 489 A.2d 76 (1985)
(approval of subdivision plan under then-applicable Baltimore County development
regulations “involves zoning”).
Our conclusion that the Board of Appeals was required by § 10-503(b)(2) to conduct
-27-
its deliberations in open session does not, unfortunately, end the matter.  As we indicated,
§ 10-510, which deals with enforcement, gives the court broad injunctive power upon finding
a violation of the Act, but § 10-510(d)(4) allows the court to void the public body’s action
only upon a finding that the public body “willfully failed to comply with § 10-505 . . . and
that no other remedy is adequate.”  (Emphasis added.)  The circuit court made no such
findings in this case.  The only relevant finding made by the court, announced from the
bench, was that consideration of the development plan involved a zoning matter and that, as
a result, the board was required to hold “an open hearing on [its] deliberations.”  The order
signed by the court expressed no findings at all but simply stated that the case was
“remanded to the Board of Appeals for further proceedings, not inconsistent with the reasons
for the remand as stated in open Court.”  Assuming that the order of remand, at least tacitly,
had the effect of vacating or voiding the board’s decision, the order was inappropriate in the
absence of the prerequisite findings.
We shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals because it rested on
a construction of law with which we disagree.  We cannot direct that the judgment of the
circuit court be affirmed, however, because that judgment also was inappropriate.  We shall
therefore direct that the Court of Special Appeals remand the case to the circuit court in order
that it may consider, and make specific findings, whether the statutory conditions to voiding
an action taken in violation of the Open Meetings Law are present.  Although, as we have
indicated, an assessment of attorney’s fees under § 10-510(d)(5) does not depend on a
finding of willfulness, the animus of the board, if any, would certainly be a factor to
-28-
 It is not entirely clear that the issue of attorney’s fees is before us in any event.  It was
14
raised by the county in the Court of Special Appeals, but, as that court held that there was no
violation of the Act, it did not address the assessment issue.  Petitioners’ brief in this Court
understandably addressed only the issue decided by the Court of Special Appeals.  Although normally
we might direct the Court of Special Appeals to consider the issue it did not reach earlier, as further
findings would, in any event, be required by the circuit court, there is no reason to have further
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.
consider.  We do not believe that the Legislature intended for such assessments to be
automatic upon a finding of a violation, for that would require the diversion of scarce public
funds for fee-shifting purposes merely because a public body guessed wrong on the eventual
outcome of a legal issue.  Courts considering fee assessments need to take into account,
among other things, whether, how, and when the issue of a closed session or other
prospective violation was presented to the public body, the basis, if any, the public body
gave for concluding that its action was permissible under the Act, whether that basis was a
reasonable one under the law and the circumstances, whether the amounts claimed are
reasonable, and the extent to which all parties acted in good faith.  The circuit court will have
an opportunity to do that and to make appropriate findings when the case is remanded to it.14
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
ORDER REMANDING CASE TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO 
BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.
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Dissenting Opinion follows next page:                                                                                
 
Eldridge, J., dissenting:
As a matter of public policy, the majority's construction of the Open Meetings
Act is preferable to and more rational than the construction of the statute by Baltimore
County and the Court of Special Appeals.  Unfortunately, however, the majority's
construction is not supported by the unambiguous language of the statute, by its legislative
history, or by the numerous opinions of this Court which have drawn a sharp distinction
-1-
between "planning" and "zoning."  The approval or disapproval of a development plan is
simply not a "zoning matter."  For these reasons, thoroughly discussed in Judge Hollander's
excellent opinion for the Court of Special Appeals, Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel, 110
Md. App. 585, 678 A.2d 100 (1996), I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.