Title: Thomas B. Gibson v. Florida Department of Corrections

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
No. SC02-2362 
____________ 
THOMAS B. GIBSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Respondent. 
ON REHEARING 
[October 21, 2004] 
PARIENTE, C.J. 
This case concerns the statutory authority of the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) to forfeit gain time from an expired sentence and apply the forfeiture to a 
sentence being served on a different offense.  We review Gibson v. Florida 
Department of Corrections, 828 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), in which the First 
District Court of Appeal certified the following question of great public 
importance: 
Does the forfeiture penalty enunciated in Eldridge v. Moore, 760 
So.2d 888 (Fla.2000), apply where a defendant receives a sentence of 
incarceration for one offense followed by a sentence of probation for 
another offense, where both crimes were scored on a single scoresheet 
and the trial court awards prison credit pursuant to Tripp v. State, 622 
 
- 2 - 
So.2d 941 (Fla.1993), upon violation of probation for the second 
offense? 
Id. at 424.1 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In three different cases arising from crimes committed on different dates in 
1993, Gibson was convicted of committing numerous counts of forgery and 
uttering a forged instrument or forged bills, all third-degree felonies.  All the 
offenses were included in a single guidelines scoresheet because the cases were 
pending for sentencing at the same time.2  The trial court sentenced Gibson to 
consecutive terms of five years in prison in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 for a 
total of ten years' incarceration, followed by consecutive terms of five years on 
probation on the counts of uttering a forged instrument and five years on probation 
on the counts of forgery in Case No. 93-360 for a total of ten years' probation.  
Thus, the sanctions in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 contained no probationary 
                                        
1.  The First District's certification of a question of great public importance 
gives us discretionary jurisdiction to review its decision.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.  We have chosen to retain jurisdiction although Gibson's sentence has 
expired so we may address the certified question and resolve uncertainty reflected 
in the district court opinion on the applicability of section 944.28(1), Florida 
Statutes (1993), to sentences like those imposed here.  This is an issue affecting 
numerous sentences imposed upon revocation of community control or probation.  
Cf. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984) ("It is well settled that 
mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction . . . when the questions 
raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.").  
2.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(1) ("One guideline scoresheet shall be 
utilized for each defendant covering all offenses pending before the court for 
sentencing."). 
 
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component and, as originally imposed, the sanctions in Case No. 93-360 contained 
no incarceration. 
Gibson completed his cumulative ten-year sentence in Case Nos. 93-216 and 
93-297 through a combination of time actually served and accrued gain time.  
Computations by the DOC show that Gibson fulfilled his ten-year sentence 
(consisting of 3650 days) by serving 1660 days in prison and 21 days in county 
jail, for a total of 1681 days (approximately 4.6 years) actually served, and by 
accruing 1969 days (approximately 5.4 years) of unforfeited gain time.3 
Upon his release from prison in April 1998, Gibson commenced the terms of 
probation in Case No. 93-360.  He subsequently violated the conditions of 
probation.  The trial court revoked probation and sentenced Gibson to consecutive 
terms of four and three years in prison for a total of seven years' incarceration.  On 
Gibson's motion, and pursuant to our decision in Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 
(Fla. 1993), the trial court granted credit for time served of 1681 days from the 
completed sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 against the overall seven-
year sentence in Case No. 93-360. 
                                        
3.  Gibson's service of his sentence was fulfilled as follows: 
 
    21 days  Original county jail credit 
1660 days 
Time served in prison 
1200 days 
Basic gain time 
  979 days 
Additional gain time 
 -210 days Gain time forfeited for disciplinary reasons 
3650 days 
Ten years (10 x 365 days) 
 
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After Gibson began serving his sentences for violation of probation in Case 
No. 93-360, the DOC declared a forfeiture of the 1969 days of previously 
unforfeited gain time from the sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 pursuant 
to section 944.28(1).  DOC's policy in applying the gain time forfeiture is to 
compare the length of the new sentence after deduction for time previously served 
to the amount of the forfeiture penalty, and to require the prisoner to serve the 
greater of the two.  Essentially, this method views the forfeiture penalty and the 
new sentence less time served as concurrent sentences, and ensures that the 
prisoner will serve no less than the forfeiture penalty.4  
In Gibson's case, the new sentence of seven years (2555 days) less time 
previously served of 4.6 years (1681 days) would have yielded a net sentence of 
2.4 years (874 days).  Because the gain-time forfeiture penalty of 5.4 years (1969 
days) was greater than the revocation sentence of 2.4 years after deduction of Tripp 
credit, the DOC in effect required Gibson to serve the forfeiture penalty. Thus, the 
DOC applied section 944.28(1) in a manner that required Gibson to serve the 
forfeiture penalty as the punishment for violation of probation.   
                                        
4.  This method of calculation is more beneficial to the prisoner than adding 
the forfeiture penalty to the new sentence after deducting credit for time served.  In  
Gibson's case, treating the forfeiture penalty as consecutive to the new sentence 
would have resulted in his serving 288 days more than the seven-year sentence 
imposed.  
 
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Gibson challenged the DOC's authority to forfeit the gain time by filing a 
petition for a writ of mandamus, which the trial court denied.  The First District 
agreed with the trial court and denied his petition for common-law certiorari, 
concluding that the forfeiture of gain time from the expired sentences in Case Nos. 
93-216 and 93-297 applied to Gibson's sentences in Case No. 93-360.  The First 
District explained that it was guided by this Court's holding in Tripp that "credit for 
time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after 
revocation of probation on the second," and its previous interpretation of Tripp "to 
mean that separate crimes and sentences may constitute a split sentence where both 
crimes were scored on a single scoresheet."  Gibson, 828 So. 2d at 423 (relying on 
Larimore v. State, 823 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). 
In a specially concurring opinion, Judge Lewis agreed with the majority 
view that the forfeiture of gain time from the sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 
93-297 could be applied to the sentence upon revocation of probation in Case No. 
93-360 "because the offenses were [originally] scored on a single scoresheet and 
considered together in forming his scoresheet sentence." Id. at 424-25 (Lewis, J., 
specially concurring).  Judge Benton dissented.  In his view, the gain-time 
forfeiture unlawfully revived the expired sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-
297 and made them components of an unauthorized "general sentence."  Id. at 426-
28 (Benton, J., dissenting). 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation.  We thus begin with 
the actual language of the statutes that the DOC relies upon for its assertion of 
authority to declare a forfeiture penalty of gain time from a sentence that was 
already fully served and apply it to another sentence imposed upon revocation of 
probation. 
A.  Statutory Authority 
Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: 
If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency, conditional 
release as described in chapter 947, probation or community control 
as described in chapter 948, provisional release as described in s. 
944.277, parole, or control release as described in s. 947.146 granted 
to the prisoner is revoked, the department may, without notice or 
hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned according to the 
provisions of law by such prisoner prior to such escape or his or her 
release under such clemency, conditional release, probation, 
community control, provisional release, control release, or parole. 
(Emphasis supplied.)5  Section 944.28(1) is one of two provisions that authorized 
forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of probation at the time of the offenses in 
this case.  The other, section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1993), provided: 
                                        
5.  In 1989, revocation of probation or community control was added to the 
circumstances contained in section 944.28(1) that authorize the DOC to forfeit an 
offender's gain time.  See ch. 89-531, § 6, at 2717, Laws of Fla.; Dowdy v. 
Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052, 1053-54 (Fla. 1998).  The 1989 legislation superseded 
State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989), in which this Court held that under a 
previous version of section 944.28(1), credit both for time actually served and for 
gain time must be granted against a sentence imposed upon revocation of the 
 
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Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever 
probation, community control, or control release, including the 
probationary [or] community control portion of a split sentence, is 
violated and the probation or community control is revoked, the 
offender, by reason of his misconduct, may be deemed to have 
forfeited all gain-time or commutation of time for good conduct, as 
provided by law, earned up to the date of his release on probation, 
community control, or control release. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  This subsection provides general authority to forfeit gain 
time and specifically refers to split sentences.6 
The issue in this case is whether the DOC may apply the forfeiture penalty 
of section 944.28(1) across offenses to the guidelines sentence imposed upon 
violation of probation for a crime that was originally included in the same 
guidelines scoresheet as the offense on which the gain time was accrued.  Section 
944.28(1) does not specify whether the forfeiture penalty applies to split sentences.  
Its analog, section 948.06(6) (now section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes (2003)), 
specifies that the forfeiture penalty applies to the revocation of probation or 
community control imposed as part of a split sentence.7  Similarly, section 
921.0017, Florida Statutes (2003), which applies to offenses committed on or after 
January 1, 1994, specifies that upon revocation of probation when an offender is 
                                                                                                                              
probationary portion of a split sentence.  See id. at 927.  The present version is 
essentially unchanged from the 1993 version applicable to Gibson. 
6.  Section 948.06(6) was enacted in chapter 89-531, section 13, at 2720, 
Laws of Florida.  
7.  Effective May 30, 1997, forfeiture of gain time is mandatory under this 
provision, which was redesignated section 948.06(7).  See ch. 97-239, § 5, at 4403, 
Laws of Fla.; ch. 97-299, § 13, at 5381-82, Laws of Fla. 
 
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serving a "split sentence pursuant to section 948.01," the trial court shall only order 
credit for time served and not for gain time. 
Although none of the statutory provisions governing forfeiture of gain time 
define a split sentence, two provisions in section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2003), 
relating to the trial courts' sentencing options, do explain the split sentence option.  
Section 948.01(6) provides, in full: 
Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a 
felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its 
discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sentence 
whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation or, with respect to 
any such felony, into community control upon completion of any 
specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years 
or less. In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition 
of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant and direct 
that the defendant be placed upon probation or into community 
control after serving such period as may be imposed by the court. The 
period of probation or community control shall commence 
immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, 
whether by parole or gain-time allowances. 
Section 948.01(11) provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period 
of incarceration or, with respect to a felony, into community control, 
as follows: 
(a) If the offender meets the terms and conditions of probation 
or community control, any term of incarceration may be modified by 
court order to eliminate the term of incarceration. 
(b) If the offender does not meet the terms and conditions of 
probation or community control, the court may revoke, modify, or 
continue the probation or community control as provided in s. 948.06. 
If the probation or community control is revoked, the court may 
 
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impose any sentence that it could have imposed at the time the 
offender was placed on probation or community control. 
Section 948.01(6) defines what this Court has described as a "true split 
sentence."  See Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 1988).  In Poore, we listed 
the five sentencing options then available to the trial court in imposing a sentence 
for a criminal offense: 
[A] judge has five basic sentencing alternatives in Florida: (1) a 
period of confinement; (2) a "true split sentence" consisting of a total 
period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period 
suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended 
portion; (3) a "probationary split sentence" consisting of a period of 
confinement, none of which is suspended, followed by a period of 
probation; (4) a Villery sentence, consisting of a period of probation 
preceded by a period of confinement imposed as a special condition; 
and (5) straight probation. 
Id. at 164.  We further explained in Eldridge that 
[a] true split sentence is a prison term of a number of years with part 
of that prison term suspended, contingent upon completion on 
probation of the suspended term of years.  When a defendant violates 
a true split sentence, the most severe sentence the trial court may 
impose on resentencing is to "unsuspend" the previously suspended 
prison term.  That is, that the defendant is reincarcerated and must 
actually serve the previously suspended term of years in prison. . . . In 
[the probationary split] sentence, if the defendant violates probation, 
the trial court may impose any sentence it might have originally 
imposed. 
760 So. 2d at 889 n.1; see also § 948.06(1).  In State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444, 
446 (Fla. 1997), we recognized that section 948.01(11), enacted after Poore, 
authorizes a sentence not described in that case—a period of probation followed by 
a period of incarceration, which we labeled a "reverse split sentence." 
 
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B.  The Tripp Line of Cases 
Tripp, the case principally relied upon by the DOC and the First District as 
justifying the imposition of a forfeiture penalty in this case, concerned credit for 
time served on a completed sentence when a defendant is sentenced on a different 
offense to a term of incarceration upon revocation of probation.  In Tripp, the 
Court rejected the contention that because convictions for two separate crimes 
result in two separate sentences, the offender is not entitled to credit for time 
served.   See 622 So. 2d at 942.  We determined that where a term of incarceration 
on one offense is followed by a term of probation on another, credit for time served 
on the first offense must be awarded on the guidelines sentence imposed after 
revocation of probation on the second offense.  See id. 
Although we did not identify the combined sanctions in Tripp as a true or  
probationary split sentence, we emphasized that the offenses were "factors that 
were weighed in the original sentencing."  Id.  We stated that our decision served 
two purposes:  first, to ensure that offenses originally sentenced as a unit "continue 
to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been 
violated," and second, to prevent offenders from receiving a sentence upon 
revocation of probation that, combined with the sentence originally received, 
exceeds the maximum guidelines sentence.  Id. 
 
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In a decision issued shortly after Tripp, Horner v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 
1993), we stated that the provision now found in section 948.01(6) defines "split 
sentencing with regard to the sentencing that the trial court is imposing for all 
cases against the defendant."  Id. at 313.  Horner involved a "multiple-case 
sentence," id. at 312, in which the defendant was sentenced in three separate cases.  
We concluded that because the trial court adjudicated "three cases in one hearing 
and imposed a single split sentence," a term of probation on one offense that 
created a gap between the incarceration and probation imposed on another offense 
did not violate the statutory requirement that probation immediately follow 
incarceration in a split sentence.  Id. at 313. 
In subsequent decisions based on Tripp, we continued to emphasize that 
several sentences imposed in a single sentencing based on a single scoresheet were 
to be treated as a single unit upon revocation of probation or community control.  
In Hodgdon v. State, 789 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2001), we repeated the imperative that 
"offenses treated together at sentencing via a single scoresheet continue to be 
treated as a single unit for purposes of sentencing upon a violation of probation."  
Id. at 962 n.5 (emphasis supplied).  The issue in Hodgdon was whether the 
defendant was entitled to have Tripp credit applied individually to the sentence for 
each offense on which he violated probation.  This Court held that Tripp's 
requirement of credit for time previously served applies to the overall sentence 
 
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imposed upon violation of probation rather than against each individual count on 
which probation is revoked.  See id. at 963. 
The driving force in Hodgdon, as in Tripp, was fairness.  To have applied 
credit against the sentence on each individual count rather than against the overall 
sentence would have circumvented the guidelines by providing "a sentencing boon 
or windfall to defendants upon violations of probation."  Id.  In Hodgdon, per-
count credit would also have resulted in the defendant serving no time in prison—a 
result surely contrary to the trial court's intent.  See id. at 962. 
In another case arising from Tripp, this Court reaffirmed that because of the 
continuing interrelationship of sentences originally imposed together, "Tripp 
should be applied notwithstanding the fact that the newly imposed sentence is 
within the guidelines." State v. Witherspoon, 810 So. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. 2002).  
Thus, we held in a single-scoresheet scenario that an offender was entitled to Tripp 
credit even though the sentence imposed upon violation of probation would not 
exceed the maximum overall guidelines sentence when combined with the time 
previously served on a different offense.  Id. at 873.  Most recently, in Moore v. 
State, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S432 (Fla. Aug. 26, 2004), this Court held that Tripp does 
not apply to the Criminal Punishment Code, which is effective for offenses 
committed on or after October 1, 1998.  We explained that the interrelationship of 
sentences under the guidelines is absent from the Criminal Punishment Code, 
 
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which provides no ceiling other than the statutory maximum penalty and authorizes 
consecutive sentences.  See id. at S435. 
C.  Tripp Meets Eldridge 
In Eldridge, we construed the statutory provision applicable here in a case 
that involved true split sentences of prison and probation imposed for a number of 
offenses.  See 760 So. 2d at 889.  We held that upon revocation of community 
control or probation imposed as part of a true or probationary split sentence for a 
single offense, both the trial court and the DOC have the authority to forfeit gain 
time.  See id. at 892.  We had previously explained, in Forbes v. Singletary, 684 
So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1996), that the trial court's authority derives from language in 
section 948.06(6) providing that upon revocation of the probationary or community 
control portion of a split sentence, the offender may be deemed to have forfeited all 
gain time earned up to the date of his release.  We held in Eldridge that pursuant to 
section 944.28(1), the DOC may forfeit the gain time even if the trial court chooses 
to retain it.  See 760 So. 2d at 891. 
We recognized in Eldridge that actual time served and gain time are not the 
same when it comes to awarding credit to a defendant upon revocation of 
probation.  "While the award of gain time reduces an inmate's release date, just as 
actual time spent incarcerated, it is clearly not synonymous with actual time 
served.  On the contrary, gain time is time not served."  Id.  The DOC explained 
 
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that the authority to award and forfeit gain time (as opposed to the trial court's 
authority to award credit for time served) is used to "encourage good behavior in 
prison and on supervision."  Id. at 890.  We observed that it was the "Legislature 
that provided for the award of gain time in the first place and it made the retention 
of that gain time conditional upon the satisfactory completion of the inmate's 
supervision."  Id. at 892.  Thus, under Eldridge, when a defendant is sentenced to a 
prison term upon revocation of probation imposed as part of a split sentence for a 
single offense, the DOC has the complete authority to forfeit all gain time 
previously awarded.  As in the single-unit sentence scenario addressed in Tripp, 
the effect of this forfeiture on single-offense sentences is to require the offender to 
serve either the forfeiture penalty or the new sentence less time previously served, 
whichever is greater.  
In this case, the First District concluded that the sanctions initially received 
by Gibson were a probationary split sentence within the meaning of Eldridge.  See 
Gibson, 828 So. 2d at 423.  Relying on Tripp, Horner, Hodgdon, and Eldridge, 
Judge Lewis elaborated on this conclusion in his separate concurrence: 
[E]ven though he was convicted of multiple offenses, Gibson received 
only one sentence because the offenses were scored on a single 
scoresheet and considered together in forming his scoresheet sentence. 
As Gibson received only one sentence for his three cases, his 
initial sentence constituted a probationary split sentence.  Thus, 
pursuant to Eldridge, the Department had the authority to forfeit any 
accrued gain time upon revocation of probation.  
 
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Id. at 424-25 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). 
 
Judge Lewis's analysis correctly applies our precedent in this area.  We 
conclude that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to the single-unit 
sentence structure first addressed in Tripp is consistent with our prior case law in 
which we have recognized the continuing relationship among guidelines sentences 
that were originally imposed in relation to one another.  Application of section 
944.28(1) to single-unit sentences also serves the Legislature's purpose of 
penalizing offenders for violation of probation through the forfeiture of gain time.
 
We conclude that extending the interrelationship of single-unit guidelines 
sentences to gain-time forfeiture does not violate the requirement in section 
775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.701(d)(12) that the offender receive a sentence for each offense.  An offender 
sentenced for multiple offenses receives a separate sentence for each offense, even 
though the sentences for offenses scored on a single scoresheet are viewed as a 
single unit out of concern for fairness and uniformity in sentencing.  So long as 
each sentence remains within the statutory and guidelines maximums, the 
application of the gain-time forfeiture does not turn separate sentences into an 
unauthorized general sentence. 
Viewed from the perspective of fairness and uniformity, an offender 
sentenced upon revocation of probation that was imposed as part of a single-unit 
 
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sentence should not be exempt from the gain-time forfeiture penalty of section 
944.28(1) while an offender sentenced upon revocation of probation imposed as 
part of a split sentence for a single offense is subject to the forfeiture penalty.  
Allowing the forfeiture penalty to be applied to single-offense split sentences while 
precluding application of the penalty to single-unit sentences on which the offender 
received Tripp credit would result in disparate treatment based solely on sentence 
structure rather than for any purpose served by either Tripp or section 944.28(1). 
We recognize that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to single-unit 
sentences will in some cases counteract much of the benefit of Tripp credit.  
However, if we were to hold that section 944.28(1) does not extend to single-unit 
sentences, the credit for unforfeited gain time applied to sentences imposed upon 
revocation of probation would give offenders such as Gibson a windfall in 
comparison to those sentenced to prison upon violating probation imposed as part 
of a single-offense split sentence.  As we stated in Hodgdon, "Tripp was never 
intended to provide a sentencing boon or windfall to defendants upon violation of 
probation."  789 So. 2d at 963.   
III.  THIS CASE 
Gibson completed his sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 with no 
post-release supervision of any kind and thus was not subject to reimprisonment in 
those cases.  The trial court sentenced Gibson to seven years of incarceration in 
 
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Case No. 93-960.  When Gibson applied for Tripp credit, he received 1681 days of 
credit for time actually served on the previous sentences. 
The First District stated that the trial court also credited unforfeited gain 
time accrued on the initial prison sentences.  See Gibson, 828 So. 2d at 423.  
However, the record does not indicate exactly how much credit the trial court 
intended to grant under Tripp.  If the trial court had knowingly granted 1969 days 
of credit for unforfeited gain time as well as 1681 days of credit for the 1681 days 
actually served, see supra at 3, Gibson would have received ten years of credit on a 
seven-year sentence, which would have negated any punishment for violation of 
probation.  We therefore reject Gibson's assertion that he should have received 
credit for both time served and gain time from the expired sentence without being 
subjected to the forfeiture penalty. 
Gibson also asserts that the gain-time forfeiture from the expired sentences 
in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 caused a double jeopardy violation, because in 
effect the forfeiture of gain time resurrects a sentence that has been fully served.  
This concern is also implicit in Judge Benton's view that a prison sentence without 
a probationary component cannot be revived once the sentence has expired.  See 
Gibson, 828 So. 2d at 428 (Benton, J., dissenting).   
We conclude that the gain-time forfeiture did not result in a double jeopardy 
violation in this case.  Gibson received a cumulative seven-year sentence upon 
 
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revocation of probation.  Had he received neither Tripp credit nor the gain-time 
forfeiture penalty, he would have been compelled to serve all seven years, less any 
newly earned gain time.  However, after the trial court granted Tripp credit, the 
DOC subtracted 1681 days of Tripp credit on the sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 
and 93-297, yielding 874 days or 2.4 years to be served on the seven-year (2555-
day) term.  Then, in order to effectuate intent of section 944.28(1) that the prisoner 
be penalized for probation violation by loss of gain time previously accrued, the 
DOC applied section 944.28(1) in a manner that required Gibson to serve no less 
than the forfeiture penalty upon revocation of probation.  Because the forfeiture 
penalty exceeded the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation after 
deduction of time served on the prior sentence, Gibson served only the forfeiture 
penalty, rather than the seven years he would have served without either the credit 
or the penalty.  Accordingly, he did not suffer a "Tripp penalty" in which the 
forfeiture of gain time from the completed sentences resulted in a sentence on 
violation of probation longer than he would have received without taking into 
consideration the completed sentence for purposes of either the Tripp credit or 
statutory forfeiture penalty.  With no net increase in the revocation sentence based 
on the expired sentence, there is no double jeopardy violation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
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The certified question in this case asks whether the forfeiture penalty 
authorized by our interpretation of section 944.28(1) in Eldridge also applies to the 
type of sentence imposed in Tripp––i.e., those in which offenses pending for 
sentencing are included in the same scoresheet and incarceration is imposed for 
one offense and probation or community control for another.  For the reasons 
explained herein, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve 
the decision below. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D02-0118 
 
Robert Augustus Harper and Michael Robert Ufferman of Robert Augustus Harper 
Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel and Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, 
Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent