Title: Heier v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Heier v. State1986 WY 199727 P.2d 707Case Number: 86-98Decided: 11/06/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Bradley HEIER, Appellant, 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Public 
Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Judith A. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald Miller, Legal Intern, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Bradley Heier 
was convicted by a SweetwaterCounty jury of burglary and sentenced by 
the court to a term in the state penitentiary. On appeal appellant raises two 
issues:

"Whether the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant a new trial based on Appellant's testifying without 
being sworn.

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to give credit against Appellant's sentence 
for time served in presentence confinement."

[¶2.]     We will affirm the 
judgment of conviction and modify the sentence.

I

[¶3.]     During trial, at the 
close of opening statements, the court asked that all prospective witnesses be 
sworn at the same time. The court reporter noted that all the prospective 
witnesses had been sworn in by the clerk of court. At the conclusion of the 
trial and after a guilty verdict had been returned, appellant filed affidavits 
stating that he had not been sworn at the time the other witnesses were sworn. 
Based on this alleged neglect, appellant asked for, and was denied a new 
trial.

[¶4.]     Appellant brings to our 
attention Rule 603, Wyoming Rules of Evidence, which 
states:

"Before testifying, every 
witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or 
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and 
impress his mind with his duty to do so."

[¶5.]     Appellant reminds us 
that use of the word "shall" usually indicates a mandatory intent. Mayland v. 
State, Wyo., 
568 P.2d 897 (1977). The main thrust of appellant's argument, however, is that 
because he was not sworn, "The jury could easily have given less credence to 
appellant's testimony."

[¶6.]     In Larsen v. State, 
Wyo., 686 P.2d 583, 587 (1984) this court said, "It is generally held that the 
failure to require an oath or affirmation before testifying must be raised by 
objection or it is considered waived." The Larsen case cited United States v. 
Perez, 651 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981), wherein the defendant objected on appeal 
that a witness had not been sworn as required by Rule 604, Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Defense counsel did not object at trial. The Fifth Circuit held that 
Perez waived his objection by failing to bring the matter to the trial court's 
attention:

"It has long been the 
general rule that even a failure to swear a witness may be waived. This may 
occur either by knowing silence and an attempt to raise objections after verdict 
or by the mere failure of counsel to notice the omission before completion of 
the trial. * * *" (Emphasis added.) United States v. Perez, supra, at 
273.

[¶7.]     In Wilcoxon v. 
United States, 231 F.2d 384 
(10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S. 943, 76 S. Ct. 834, 100 L. Ed. 1469, acting on the premise that the witnesses gave testimony without being 
under oath, the Tenth Circuit found that when the testimony was given in the 
presence of appellant and his attorney it then became their duty to take notice 
in the several steps in the proceedings. That duty necessarily included notice 
of the manner in which the oath was administered to the witness. The court held 
that the appellant and his counsel could not stand by silently during testimony 
and then urge on appeal that the witness had testified without being under oath 
and that such required reversal of his conviction.

"* * * By failing to 
bring the matter to the attention of the trial court in some manner until after 
completion of the trial, he effectively waived the right to seek a new trial on 
that ground. * * *" Wilcoxon v. United States, supra, at 
387.

[¶8.]     In the case before us 
the unsworn witness (appellant) testified after being called by his attorney. 
Accordingly, appellant and his attorney were ultimately responsible for securing 
testimony under oath. Since appellant failed to object to the omission of the 
oath and since he was in the best position to realize that no oath was given, 
the oath was effectively waived. Under the circumstances here, we do not believe 
that the inadvertent omission to administer an oath to appellant constituted 
error.

[¶9.]     The value and purpose 
of the oath is twofold: 1) it is meant to bind the conscience of the witness; 
and 2) to make him amenable to prosecution if he gives perjured information. 
Wilcoxon v. United 
States, supra. It is speculative to contend 
that an oath serves to impress the jury with the witness' credibility. This is 
particularly true in this case. In his brief, appellant says, "It slipped 
everyone's mind that he (appellant) had not been sworn." If this neglect slipped 
the minds of the trial court, respective attorneys, and the appellant, how can 
we imagine it was noted by the jury or if such omission in any way influenced 
the jury? Appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice.

II

[¶10.]  Appellant was sentenced for not less than 
eight years and not more than ten years. The maximum penitentiary sentence for 
burglary is ten years. § 6-3-301(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

[¶11.]  Appellant was indigent and was in 
presentence confinement for sixty days. The trial court did not give appellant 
any credit for pretrial confinement. Appellant contends that he should be given 
credit for presentence confinement off both the minimum and maximum 
sentence.

[¶12.]  In Pote v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617, 629 
(1985), we said:

"* * * This sentence was 
the statutory maximum. One hundred fifty-seven days spent in pre-trial 
confinement plus the ten years sentence exceeds the statutory limit of ten 
years. Therefore, appellant is technically entitled to receive a full 157 days 
credit on the upper limits of his sentence for concealing stolen property. * * 
*"

[¶13.]  As an indigent, appellant is entitled to 
credit for sixty days off the maximum sentence. Pote v. State, supra. Otherwise, 
the time spent in presentence confinement plus the ten year sentence would 
exceed the statutory maximum of ten years.

[¶14.]  In Munden v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 621, 627 
(1985), we said: 

"With regard to such 
credit being given against appellant's minimum terms, we again decline to accept 
the proposition espoused by the public defender's office and hold that `[t]here 
is no fundamental right to credit for presentence custody beyond that which will 
result in more jail time than that authorized by law.' 
[Citation.]"

[¶15.]  A minimum sentence need not be reduced by 
the time spent in presentence detention. This is within the discretion of the 
judge and we will reverse only when there is an abuse of discretion. In Martin 
v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 (1986), citing 
Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981), we stated that 
appellant has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice. Abuse of discretion has been 
defined in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980), as an error in law which exceeds the "bounds of reason under the 
circumstances." In determining appellant's sentence, the trial court considered 
appellant's extensive record and other "compelling reasons indicated by the 
presentence investigation." Nothing in the record indicates an abuse of 
discretion, and appellant has offered no cogent argument nor authority that 
would support such a showing.

[¶16.]  We affirm the judgment and sentence; 
however, we direct that the court modify the judgment and sentence to give 
appellant sixty days credit on the maximum portion of his sentence.