Title: POKORNY v. SALAS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

POKORNY v. SALAS2003 WY 15981 P.3d 171Case Number: 02-241Decided: 12/12/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

 

RICHARD 
POKORNY and JULIA GOLDENSOHN,

Appellants(Intervening 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs),

and

SNAKE 
RIVER HOLDINGS, LLC,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

                                                                                                

PATRICK D. SALAS and KATHLEEN L. SALAS;

SAL G. GIACINTO and LINDA T. GIACINTO

(Trustees); DONALD L. WADSWORTH and

GWENN E. WADSWORTH (Trustees),

Appellees(Plaintiffs),

 

and

                                                                                                

PORCUPINE CREEK RANCH  LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANY; HEREFORD-BALLY

RANCH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;

CREED LAW and ALTA CLARENE LAW,

Appellees(Intervening Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County

The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing Appellant(s):

            
Christopher Hawks of Christopher Hawks, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming 

 

Representing Appellee(s):

            
Peter F. Moyer, Jackson, Wyoming; David K. Larson and 

Matthew E. Turner of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, 
Wyoming

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This case concerns 
two easements in the Game Creek Plateau area of Teton County, Wyoming.  Due to the area's 
topography, the easements provide the only viable access to various properties 
within the Game Creek Plateau.  The original owners of a large portion of the 
land created the two easements to provide access to residential subdivisions in 
the area and to guarantee future access to the land they retained, which 
otherwise was inaccessible.  Both appellants and appellees are successors 
in interest to the original owners, yet the former contend neither easement 
provides such access, while the latter argue both easements do just that. 
The district court held both easements provide access to all owners in the 
area.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented  
are:   
(1) Whether appellants are estopped by the doctrines of collateral 
estoppel, res judicata and/or judicial estoppel from claiming that the 1972 
right of way easement does not grant access rights to the appellees;  and (2) Whether the 
1978 reserved easement is appurtenant or in gross?

 

FACTS

 

The 1972 Easement

 

[¶3]      The original Game 
Creek Plateau landowners, Hugh and Donna Marie Soest (Soests), owned a large 
parcel of land contiguous to the only public access, the Game Creek Road.   In 1972, the 
Soests granted a 60-foot wide right-of-way easement to Squaw Creek Ranches, 
Inc., a subdivision.  
Without the easement, the Squaw Creek Ranches property owners would have 
been landlocked.  
The easement also granted access to "any other person or persons, for his 
or their benefit and advantage, at all times freely to pass and repass . . . " 
over and across Squaw Creek Road from the terminus of the Game Creek Road1 through lands owned by the Soests.  Their land was 
ultimately divided into four separate contiguous parcels which lie south of the 
Game Creek Road terminus:  Segment One, adjoining the road, the Squaw 
Creek Draw 40, the Reardon 40 and the Hayfields (see attached map, Appendix 
A).  The 
easement terminated at the south end of the Squaw Creek Draw 40 property, and 
did not continue south to the remainder of the Soests' property (the Reardon 40 
and the Hayfields).  

  

The 1978 Easement

 

[¶4]      After granting the 
1972 easement, the Soests began selling parcels of their land.  A portion of Segment 
One, now called "The Horse Palace," was one of the first parcels to be sold and 
was conveyed to James and Patty Scott (Scotts) in 1974.  In a 1978 warranty 
deed, the Soests conveyed forty acres to the Reardon group (Reardon 40).  In a 1979 warranty 
deed, the Soests conveyed another forty acres to a different buyer (Squaw Creek 
Draw 40).  The 
Reardon 40 is located just south of the Squaw Creek Draw 40 and north of the 
large tract of land retained by the Soests (Hayfields).

 

[¶5]      In the Reardon 40 
transaction, the Soests reserved for themselves an easement (the 1978 easement) 
to preserve access across the Reardon 40 to the Hayfields.  This easement, 
together with the 1972 easement, provided access all the way from the Game Creek 
Road, through Segment One, through the Squaw Creek Draw 40, and through the 
Reardon 40 to the retained Hayfields.  No other access to the Hayfields existed at 
the time the 1978 easement was created.2

 

The 1981 Litigation

 

[¶6]      In 1981, litigation 
ensued concerning the 1972 easement (Scott v. Squaw Creek 
Ranches, Inc.).  
The Scotts, owners of the only land contiguous to the Game Creek Road, 
which was the singular public access to the Game Creek Plateau, sought quiet 
title to their land against all individuals using the 1972 easement who did not 
own property in the Squaw Creek Ranch subdivision, a grantee of the easement 
which is south of the Scotts' property.  In other words, the Scotts sought a court 
ruling to the effect that only Squaw Creek property owners could use the 1972 
easement, and all other property owners in the Game Creek Plateau area would be 
barred from using it, including the owners of the Hayfields and the other 
subdivisions in the area.  The defendants in that 1981 litigation, who 
did not own property in Squaw Creek, argued the express terms of the 1972 
easement granting access to "any other persons"  provided them and all of the Game Creek Plateau residents access.  Some of the 
appellants in this action who seek to defeat the 1972 easement are successors to 
those defendants who took the opposite position in the 1981 litigation.  

 

[¶7]      At trial, the district 
court granted a directed verdict3 motion and entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  
Although the Scotts filed a notice of appeal, the appeal was dismissed on 
February 1, 1982.

 

The Present Case

 

[¶8]      Over fifteen years 
after the 1981 litigation ended, the current Hayfields Property Owners,4 apparently seeking to confirm their easement, 
requested that the appellants,5 landowners in the Reardon 40 and the Squaw Creek 
Draw 40, sign a document entitled "Confirmation."  When the appellants refused to do so, the 
Hayfields Property Owners sued seeking a declaratory judgment that the easements 
allowed them access over and across the Squaw Creek Draw 40 and the Reardon 40, 
all the way through to the Hayfields.  The appellants  asserted the Hayfields Property Owners did not 
have access under the 1972 easement because it was not intended for general use. 
They also contended the Hayfields Property Owners had no access across the 
Reardon 40 under the 1978 easement because it was not appurtenant to the 
Hayfields and terminated when the Soests sold their property.

 

[¶9]      The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment on November 13, 2001.  After a hearing on 
November 19, 2001, the district court entered an order granting the Hayfields 
Property Owners' motion for summary judgment finding that the 1972 easement 
granted access to the general public, which included the Hayfields Property 
Owners. Further, the court held the 1972 easement was confirmed by the 1981 
judgment in Scott v. Squaw Creek Ranches, Inc.  Thus, the appellants 
were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel from 
denying the Hayfields Property Owners and their heirs and successors access 
across the 1972 easement.

 

[¶10]   As to the 1978 easement, the district 
court held it was a valid, enforceable easement appurtenant to the 
Hayfields.  This 
appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

            

The 1972 Easement

 

 [¶11]  The appellants claim the 1972 easement is 
not a public easement6 and its use is limited to successors in interest 
to the Squaw Creek Ranch subdivision which was specifically named as a grantee 
of the easement.  
Further, they argue this claim is not barred by judicial estoppel, 
collateral estoppel, or res judicata.  Conversely, the Hayfields Property Owners 
argue that the 1972 easement is a public easement, 
and the doctrines of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata 
do apply.   
For reasons set forth below, we need discuss only the latter two 
doctrines.

 

[¶12]   Collateral estoppel and res judicata are 
analogous, but not synonymous.  Although they share a common interest  in finality,  the doctrines 
themselves are different.  Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997).  We recently reiterated their differences:  

 

In Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶¶ 15-20, 25 P.3d 511, ¶¶ 15-20 
(Wyo. 2001), we extensively recognized that res judicata and collateral estoppel 
are related but distinct concepts.

Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated 
claims or causes of action. Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 
1993).  Four 
factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: 
(1) identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the 
same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them.  Id.  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of 
previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four similar 
factors: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical 
with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior 
adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
the prior proceeding.  
Id.  (Quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4443 
at 382-85 (1981)).

 

Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 
15, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 1255, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶13]   Collateral estoppel is issue preclusion, while res judicata is claim preclusion.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 
55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 
2001).  
The appellants' claims in this case are not, in their entirety, identical 
to the previous claims in the 1981 litigation.  However, an issue decided in the prior 
adjudication is identical to an issue presented in this case and, therefore, 
collateral estoppel is applicable.  

 

[¶14]   The appellants argue the district court 
erred when it found the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred them from denying 
the successors in interest to the Hayfields properties access over and across 
the 1972 easement.  
The appellants claim that because the district court granted a motion for 
a directed verdict in the 1981 litigation, their predecessors in interest were 
not given a full opportunity to present their case and, consequently, the issues 
were never fully heard or considered.  Thus, according to the appellants, the 
district court should not have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  We 
disagree.

 

[¶15]   The elements of collateral estoppel are 
as follows: 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the 
issue presented in the present action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a 
judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.    Eklund, ¶ 15.

 

[¶16]     Here, the district court appropriately applied 
the doctrine because all of its elements were satisfied.  First, the issue 
decided in Scott v. Squaw Creek Ranches, Inc. was 
identical to the issue appellants seek to raise in this lawsuit ­­­- 
whether the 1972 easement gave access to persons other than those in the Game 
Creek Ranch.  
The defendants' pretrial memorandum in the 1981 case reflects as 
much:

 

This case involves the use of a road which runs across 
Plaintiff's property (the Scott's property).  Each of the Defendants own or have an interest 
in real property in the vicinity of the Scott's property.  A written easement 
is the basis for the various Defendants' claim of a right to utilize the roadway 
for ingress and egress to their properties; with certain of the Defendants 
basing that claim on the fact that they are successors in interest to the named 
grantees in the easement and the remainder of said Defendants basing their claim 
on the right to use said roadway on the language in the easement referring to 
any other person or persons, for his own or their benefit and advantage, at all 
times freely to pass and repass on foot, or with animals, vehicles, loads or 
otherwise through and over' the road.

 

[¶17]   Second, the 1981 litigation resulted in 
a judgment on the merits.  The district court determined, after hearing 
the plaintiffs' evidence and testimony, that the defendants were entitled to a 
directed verdict.  
Directed verdicts are granted when all reasonable minds pondering the 
case could only come to the same conclusion the directed verdict 
contemplates.  
Halliburton Co. v. Claypoole,  868 P.2d 252, 256 (Wyo. 
1994); Barnes v. Fernandez, 526 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 
1974);  see also 19 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2524 at 544 (1990).  In Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 
1977), we said:

 

In reviewing the grant of a directed verdict by a trial 
court, consideration must be given to all evidence favorable to party against 
whom the motion is directed, as well as to all reasonable and legitimate 
inferences which might be drawn therefrom. McCarthy 
v. Croker, Wyo. 1976, 549 P.2d 323; Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo. 1974, 526 P.2d 983; Brennan v. Laramie Newspapers, Inc., Wyo. 1972, 493 P.2d 1044. Whether or 
not the evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an issue for the jury is 
solely a question of law to be answered by the trial court. That court must 
determine whether or not the evidence is such that, without weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise, considering the weight of the 
evidence, there is but one conclusion as to verdict which men of reason could 
reach.  Barnes v. Fernandez, 569 P.2d  at 1250.

 

At the directed verdict stage, the plaintiff is given all 
favorable inferences, yet is still unable to sustain his position.  We agree with the 
jurisdictions that hold a directed verdict is indeed a judgment on the 
merits.  See Casey v. Pennsylvania Asphalt Paving Co., 109 F. 744 
(C.C.W.D.Pa. 1901), affirmed in 114 F. 189, (C.C.A.3 Pa. 1902), ([A] judgment on 
a directed verdict in a federal court, based upon full evidence, is not a mere 
judgment of nonsuit, but it is in all respects a judgment on the merits); see 
also, Sherman v. Benson, 1998 Neb. App. LEXIS 211 
(1998); Latimer v William Mueller & Son, Inc, 386 N.W.2d 618 (Mich.App. 1986);  Phipps v. Payley, 
368 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. 1988).  After a directed verdict is granted, judgment 
is entered just as if both parties had litigated; and that judgment has the same 
force and effect as any other judgment.  

 

[¶18]   Both parties concede the third 
requirement.  
There is, indeed, privity between the parties to the 1981 litigation and 
the present case.  

 

[¶19]   Fourth, and finally, the appellants' 
predecessors had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior 
litigation.  
They mistakenly argue that due to the directed verdict, there was no 
"full and fair opportunity" to litigate this issue in 1981.  However, this factor 
does not require that the party actually receive a full trial.  Rather, the 
requirement is that the party be presented with the opportunity to litigate.  The appellants'  predecessors were presented with such an 
opportunity.  
They answered the complaint, conducted discovery, and submitted pretrial 
memoranda.  
Although there was no transcript, we must presume the trial was a fair 
one.  Where 
there is no transcript before 
the court on appeal, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the competency of 
the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be presumed.  Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 
920 P.2d 662, 663 (Wyo. 
1996).   
Although the appellants' predecessors were presented with the opportunity 
to litigate, they were unable to present a case sufficient to survive the 
directed verdict stage.

 

[¶20]   The district court properly concluded 
that collateral estoppel applied.  Thus, the appellants are collaterally estopped 
from asserting that the 1972 easement language does not grant access to the 
Hayfields.  
Because collateral estoppel is determinative on the 1972 easement issue, 
we decline to decide whether the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel 
also apply.

 

The 1978 Easement

 

[¶21]   The issue surrounding the 1978 easement 
is whether it is appurtenant or in gross.  The appellants contend that the 1978 Warranty 
Deed from the original landowners to the Reardons "does not describe a benefited 
parcel," and the 1978 easement is therefore an easement in gross and thus was not assigned when the dominant 
estate was assigned.  
As a result, they argue the easement did not transfer to the current 
owners when they purchased the Hayfields property.  The Hayfields 
Property Owners, on the other hand, contend the 1978 easement is appurtenant to 
the land because it was clearly intended to benefit the land retained by the 
original grantors of the easement and their successors; and, therefore, the 1978 
easement did transfer to the current owners when the Hayfields were conveyed 
"subject to all easements."

 

[¶22]   In Hasvold v. 
Park County School District No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶¶ 13-14, 45 P.3d 635, ¶¶ 13-14 
(Wyo. 2002), we distinguished between easements appurtenant and in 
gross:

 

"An easement is appurtenant to land when the easement is 
created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the 
land.'" Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 
1974) (quoting Restatement of Property § 453, at 2914 
(1944)).  In 
contrast, "an easement is in gross when it is not created to benefit or when it 
does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such 
possessor.'" Id. (quoting Restatement of Property, supra, § 454, at 2917). An 
easement will not be presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to 
be appurtenant.  
Id.  R.C.R., Inc., 978 P.2d  at 586.

 

Wyoming law is consistent with the Restatement (Third) Property, which specifically details 
the differences between easements appurtenant and in gross as follows:          

            

            
(1) Except where application of the rules stated in § 4.1 leads to a 
different result, the benefit of a servitude is:

(a) appurtenant to an interest in property if it serves a 
purpose that would be more useful to a successor to a property interest held by 
the original beneficiary of the servitude at the time the servitude was created 
than it would be to the original beneficiary after transfer of that interest to 
a successor;

(b) in gross if created in a person who held no property 
that benefited from the servitude, or if it serves a purpose that would be more 
useful to the original beneficiary than it would be to a successor to an 
interest in property held by the original beneficiary at the time the servitude 
was created[.]

Restatement (Third) Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 
(2000).

[¶23]   This Court has recognized a strong 
preference to construe an easement as appurtenant rather than in gross.  Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 12, 41 P.3d 537, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 
2002).  "When 
construing an easement, we seek to determine the intent of the parties to the 
easement . . . and begin by attempting to glean the meaning of the easement from 
its language."  
R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 
1999); See also Restatement 
(Third) Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 (2000).  If the language of 
the easement is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the easement as a matter of 
law, without resorting to the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties' intent.  
R.C.R., 978 P.2d  at 586.  If, however, the language is ambiguous, then 
the court looks to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent.  Hasvold, ¶ 13; R.C.R., Inc., 
978 P.2d  at 586; Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and 
Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 
1996).  We 
conclude the language of the 1978 easement is clear and unambiguous. However, we 
do not arrive at that conclusion in a vacuum.  To determine the intent of the parties, the 
context in which the easement was drafted must be considered.  

 

The language of a contract is to be construed within the 
context in which it was written. In so doing, the court may look to the 
surrounding circumstances, the subject matter and the purpose of the contract. 
The purpose of examining the context within which the contract was drawn, 
however, is limited to ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time the 
agreement was made. The context cannot be invoked to contradict the clear 
meaning of the language used, and those extraneous circumstances do not justify 
a court in proceeding "to insert therein a provision other than or different 
from that which the language used clearly indicates, and thereby, in effect, 
make a contract for the parties.

Snow v. Duxstad, 147 P. 174 (Wyo. 1915).

 

[¶24]   We do not purport to change or 
contradict the clear meaning of the language used in the 1978 easement.  Taking into account, 
however, the surrounding circumstances of the 1978 Warranty Deed, such as when 
the Soests sold which parcels of land, and when each easement was granted, 
confirms the parties clearly intended the 1978 easement to be appurtenant.  The 1978 Warranty 
Deed reserving the easement provides for a reservation "unto themselves [the 
Soests], their heirs, successors, and assigns, an easement for roadway purposes over and across the above-described 
property . . . ."  
By 1978, the Soests started selling parcels of their land which were 
contiguous to the only public access to the area, while retaining other lands 
which required such access.  Access through Segment One and the Squaw Creek 
Draw 40 had been granted with the 1972 easement.  Without a similar right of way through the 
Reardon 40, however, access from the Game Creek Road to the Hayfields ends at 
the Squaw Creek Draw 40.  Looking at the four corners of the document in 
the context in which it was drafted compels the conclusion that the grantor of 
the easement intended it to be appurtenant to the Hayfields.  The appellants' own brief cites a Colorado case supporting this very 
result.  "When 
an easement is created by a grant or reservation in a deed, the determination of 
whether the easement is appurtenant to a certain parcel of property or personal 
to a certain individual depends upon the intention of the parties as ascertained 
by reading the words of the deed in light of the attendant circumstances."  Westland Nursing Home, Inc.  v. Benson, 517 P.2d 862 (Colo.App. 1974).  We agree.  

 

[¶25]   The present case has all of the earmarks 
of an easement appurtenant.  To identify easements appurtenant, this Court 
established certain "badges" of an appurtenance which include:  (1) the easement was 
created to benefit a specific tract of land; (2) the grant was for a perpetual 
right-of-way for ingress and egress; (3) the grantee has the right to inspect 
and maintain the easement; (4) the right is not limited to the possessor 
personally; (5) the grant expressly extends the right to the grantees, their 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, assigns and legal representatives; 
and (6) the easement document does not contain any limitations on the 
transferability of the easement to future transfers of both the dominant and 
servient estates.  
Hasvold, ¶ 21.

 

[¶26]   The 1978 easement language satisfies 
most of those badges.  
First, the only purpose of the easement was to assure the grantors access 
to their retained lands. Second, the grant was  perpetual ". . . for roadway purposes . . . 
said easement being a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width whose center line 
is the centerline of that presently existing graded road traversing the above 
described property."  
Third, the right is not limited only to the possessor of the land and the 
easement expressly states the reservation is not only for the original 
landowners, but for their "heirs, successors, and assigns."  
Fourth, the easement contains no limits on the transferability of the 
easement to future dominant and servient estate owners.

 

[¶27]   The decisions of other courts support 
this interpretation.  
For instance, the Utah Supreme Court considered a case similar in facts 
to the instant one.  
The issue in Ernst v. Allen was stated as 
follows: "Can the owner in fee of a parcel of land convey a part thereof and 
reserve from the part conveyed a right of way for herself, her heirs and 
assigns, over a strip contiguous to that retained by herself, unless the 
conveyance describes the land so retained by the grantor?"  Ernst v. Allen, 184 P. 827, 829 ( Utah 
1919).    
The Ernst court discussed the differences 
between appurtenant easements and easements in gross and noted that when the 
original landowner granted the easement, she still owned other lands upon which 
she was residing, "land contiguous to the right of way and dependent upon it as 
a means of ingress and egress to and from the back portion of her 
premises."  Id. at 830.  The Utah court concluded:

 

It seems to us that this matter is too plain for 
controversy.  
The right of way in question, viewed in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, has all the earmarks of an easement appurtenant, and unless, as 
contended by appellant, it was necessary in the deed to describe the dominant 
tenement or land to which the right of way was appurtenant, the judgment should 
be affirmed as far as the right of way is concerned.  

Id.  Similarly, a New Mexico court stated:

In construing a grant, however, a court must consider the 
circumstances surrounding it. "If the granting instrument does not specify 
whether the easement is appurtenant or in gross, the court decides from the 
surrounding circumstances, but generally begins with the presumption that it is 
appurtenant." E. Rabin, Fundamentals of Real Property 
Law 434 (2d ed. 1982). See Restatement of 
Property § 453 (1944); 28 C.J.S. Easements 4 (1941). 
See also Siferd v. Stambor, 5 Ohio App. 2d 79, 214 N.E.2d 106 (1966) (whether easement is appurtenant must be determined from 
language used in deed, the surrounding circumstances at the time the right was 
created, and the intention of the parties at the time the deed was executed); Ernst v. Allen, 184 P. 827 (Utah 1919) (an 
instrument attempting to create an easement should be read in light of 
surrounding circumstances, the situation of the parties and property involved; 
if the grant refers to no land to which the easement can be appurtenant, but 
such land in fact exists, that fact may be established to give effect to the 
words used).

 

Luevano v. Group One, 779 P.2d 552, 555 (N.M. 1989).  

 

[¶28]   The only support the appellants offer in 
asserting that the  
1978 easement is in gross is  that  the language of the 1978 Warranty Deed does 
not specifically describe a benefited or dominant parcel.  However, they 
provide no authority that suggests an easement must do so or be deemed in 
gross.  Instead, 
they hastily label the easement as in gross, and then 
proceed to argue whether in gross easements are 
assignable or not.  
That argument is misguided because the easement cannot be construed as in gross based on the clear language and the context 
within which it was written.

 

[¶29]   We hold the 1978 easement was created 
for the benefit of the original landowners and their successors and, therefore, 
is appurtenant to the Hayfields property.

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 

 APPENDIX A

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The Game Creek Road is the 
"public" access road to the Game Creek Plateau area.  While the record 
does not tell us the exact nature of the Game Creek Road, for purposes of this 
case, we will presume it is a public road.

 

2It was argued in the 
summary judgment hearing that the easement was not the only route to the 
Hayfields.  
However, one suggested alternative route was a forest service trail that 
required a permit and was completely washed out and unusable.  The other suggested 
route, the Porcupine Road, was not in existence in 1978.

 

3The term directed verdict 
is now identified as judgment as a matter of law.  A motion for a directed verdict is 
procedurally identical to a motion for judgment as a matter of law under the 
current W.R.C.P. 50.  
Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57, 62 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

4Patrick D. Salas and 
Kathleen L. Salas, Sal G. Giacinto and Linda T. Giacinto (Trustees), Donald L. 
Wadsworth and Gwenn E. Wadsworth (Trustees), Appellees/Plaintiffs, and the 
Porcupine Creek Ranch Limited Liability Company; Hereford-Bally Ranch Limited 
Liability Company; Creed Law and Alta Clarene Law, Intervening 
Plaintiffs/Appellees.

 

5Richard Pokorny and Julia 
Goldensohn, Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiffs, and Snake River Holdings, LLC, 
Defendant.  
(Game Creek Ranch; Squaw Creek Ranch; and  Porcupine Properties, Appellants/Intervening 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, moved for voluntary dismissal after oral argument.  With no objection 
from the appellees, those parties were dismissed from the case on November 18, 
2003.)

 

6The parties selected the 
adjective "public" to modify the word "easement."  Technically, we are not deciding whether the 
easement is "public," but rather whether the easement is usable by a particular 
component of the public.  Owsley v. Robinson, 
2003 WY 33, ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 374, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 
2003) expounds on the crucial components of a technically public easement.  In the instant case, 
there was no public dedication of an easement.  Further, the easement in the present case is 
not being used in the same manner as areas typically regarded as public, such as 
streets, alleys, and parks. Rather, the easement is for a limited purpose.