Title: State v. Danaher

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Danaher (2001-469); 174 Vt. 591; 819 A.2d 691

[Filed 20-Nov-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-469

                               MAY TERM, 2002


  State of Vermont                   }           APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
       v.                            }           District Court of Vermont,
                                     }           Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
  Martin M. Danaher                  }
                                     }           DOCKET NOS. 6361/6362-10-00Cncr

                                                 Trial Judge: Michael S. 
                                                              Kupersmith

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

        1 Defendant Martin M. Danaher appeals the trial court's finding
  that he violated the "no contact" condition of his probation.  On appeal,
  defendant argues that the court erred in concluding that he violated the
  "no contact" probation condition by being in physical proximity to the
  victim and that he was not provided fair notice that such actions
  constituted "contact."  We affirm.

        2 On October 11, 2000, defendant was charged with one felony
  count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, G.D., and two counts of
  prohibited acts with the same victim.  On January 31, 2001, pursuant to a
  plea agreement, he pled no contest to the charge of lewd and lascivious
  conduct and to one count of prohibited acts.  In exchange for his plea,
  defendant was placed on probation and received a deferred sentence.  Both
  the probation and the deferred sentence included the condition that
  defendant have "[n]o contact with G.D. or her family without their prior
  consent and prior approval of the P[robation] O[fficer]."  Further,
  defendant was required to reside outside of his home and not have overnight
  visits there until his probation officer and sex offender counselor
  approved.  Defendant could, however, be at his home during the day, but if
  his children were present, his wife was to supervise. 

        3 Defendant's probation officer testified that on February 28,
  2001, she met with defendant to review his conditions of probation and
  explain what was expected of him.  She also testified that while discussing
  the terms of the "no contact" provision, they discussed the fact that
  defendant lived up the hill from a residence frequented by G.D.  The
  probation officer testified that she told defendant  "he's not to have any
  contact with [G.D.].  That he shouldn't be down there when [G.D.] is down
  there."

        4 At all times pertinent to this case, G.D. lived on Kelly Road
  in Underhill.  One of her close friends, Kaitlyn Corbett, lived with her
  family on Russin Road, a small, private residential road.  Defendant also
  lived on Russin Road.  Although there is no road connecting Kelly Road with
  Russin Road, a path connects the two.
   
        5 On May 14, 2001, G.D. and Kaitlyn drove an ATV from the
  former's home to the latter's home.  As they approached the Corbetts'
  residence, they saw defendant on Russin Road 

 

  feeding his horse.  Defendant was also able to observe the two girls.  At
  that time, defendant was boarding his horse on the Corbetts' property.

        6 After G.D. and Kaitlyn arrived at the Corbetts' home,
  defendant came toward them, apparently to put his horse in the Corbetts'
  pasture, which was located near the Corbetts' barn.  As he approached, G.D.
  brought one of the Corbetts' dogs into the Corbetts' house to prevent it
  from scaring the horse.  She then returned to do the same with another dog. 
  When defendant opened the gate to the pasture, Kaitlyn's horse exited.  As
  the girls attempted to secure Kaitlyn's horse, defendant remained within
  proximity to the girls and watched.  He offered to help, but Kaitlyn
  declined his offer.  Though Kaitlyn asked defendant to leave, he did not do
  so. (FN1)  Defendant remained in proximity to G.D. for approximately fifteen
  minutes, following her with both his eyes and body posture.  At one point
  defendant was no more than ten feet from G.D.  Eventually, defendant left.

        7 The following day, May 15, G.D. was waiting for the school
  bus with Kaitlyn at a bus stop located at the bottom of Russin Road. 
  According to G.D.'s testimony, defendant saw her as he drove up, stopped,
  then called to his own daughters who were also waiting at the bus stop.  He
  rolled down his window and kissed both of his daughters.  He stared at G.D.
  during this event, which lasted approximately four minutes.  No evidence
  was presented regarding the physical distance between defendant and G.D.

        8 Three other incidents involved defendant staring at G.D.  One
  was brief and involved defendant pulling onto Russin Road, seeing G.D. at
  the Corbett residence, and slowing down and staring at G.D. as he drove
  past.  The other lasted over an hour and involved defendant continually
  staring at G.D. while she was riding her horse.  On a third occasion,
  defendant and his wife were walking their horses down Russin Road.  G.D.
  and others were at the Corbett residence helping a veterinarian treat one
  of the Corbetts' horses.  When defendant and his wife came within fifty
  feet of the group, they stopped briefly, then turned and went back toward
  their own home.  Defendant's wife testified that as soon as she saw G.D.
  she told defendant, "She's here. We need to turn around and go back home." 
  Defendant, according to his wife, agreed.  When asked why she made that
  statement to her husband, she testified  "he is not allowed to have contact
  with her."  The trial court found that while these three instances did not
  constitute contact, they provided circumstantial evidence from which it
  could be inferred that the two May incidents were not inadvertent.

        9 The trial court found that the defendant had violated the "no
  contact" condition of both his probation and the deferred sentence warrant. 
  It directed the court clerk to set a time for sentencing.  Defendant
  appeals the trial court's decision to this Court.

        10 The first claim defendant makes on appeal is that neither of
  the two events relied upon by the court to revoke his probation amounted to
  "contact" in violation of the "no contact" provision of his probation. 
  Findings of fact fairly and reasonably supported by any credible evidence
  must stand.  State v. Sanborn, 155 Vt. 430, 436, 584 A.2d 1148, 1152
  (1990).  This Court will uphold the trial court's legal conclusions if
  reasonably supported by its factual findings.  Id.
   
 

        11 As described in the trial court's findings, the first
  probation violation the court relied upon to revoke defendant's probation
  took place on May 14.  Defendant saw G.D. and Kaitlyn ride an ATV to
  Kaitlyn's home.  Despite the probation officer's instruction not to "be
  down there [at Kaitlyn's residence] when [G.D.] is down there," defendant
  placed himself in physical proximity to G.D. and remained there for
  approximately fifteen minutes, even after Kaitlyn had asked him to leave. 
  This reasonably supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant
  intentionally placed himself in physical proximity to G.D. in violation of
  the "no contact" condition of his probation.

        12 The court further found that on May 15, when defendant placed
  himself in proximity to G.D. at the bus stop and stared at her, he
  intentionally violated the "no contact" provision of his probation.  The
  court opined that to avoid violating this provision, he should have driven
  by the bus stop without stopping near G.D.  On appeal, defendant claims
  that since there was no evidence or testimony regarding his distance from
  G.D. during this event, the court could not infer that he was close enough
  to be within "proximity" to her.  This Court may presume that the lower
  court properly inferred essential facts from its factual findings.  Plant
  v. Ahlberg, 104 Vt. 16, 19, 156 A. 535, 536 (1931).  Both G.D. and
  defendant's daughters were waiting at the same bus stop.  There is no
  reason the court could not properly infer that by coming near his daughters
  at their bus stop while he knew G.D. was also present, defendant purposely
  put himself within physical proximity to G.D.  See State v. J.T., 683 A.2d 1166 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (using totality of circumstances to
  draw inferences is an acceptable practice for a trial court).

        13 Defendant also claims that he was not given fair notice of
  what constituted "contact" for the purposes of the "no contact" provision
  of his probation.  "Due process requires that the defendant receive fair
  notice as to what acts may constitute a violation of his probation, thereby
  subjecting him to loss of liberty."  State v. Gleason, 154 Vt. 205, 216,
  576 A.2d 1246, 1252 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).  When a violation
  of a condition would not by itself amount to a criminal act, due process
  mandates actual notice.  Mace v. Amestoy,