Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Pamela F. SKOKOS v. Theodore C. SKOKOS

95-1029                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 16, 1998


1.   Appeal & error -- right to appeal waived by acceptance of benefit
     inconsistent with claim of right. -- An appellant waives his or her
     right to an appeal by accepting a benefit that is inconsistent
     with the claim of right that he or she seeks to establish by
     the appeal.

2.   Appeal & error -- no dismissal where party relies on promise that
     acceptance of payment will not prejudice right to appeal. -- An appellee
     may, as the appellee in this case did in part, "waive" his
     right to declare a waiver of appeal on the part of an
     appellant; an appeal should not be dismissed where, as here,
     the appellant has acted in reliance upon the appellee's
     promise that her acceptance of payment under the judgment will
     not prejudice her right to appeal.  

3.   Appeal & error -- unambiguous agreement permitted appellant to appeal
     decree despite acceptance of benefits under it. -- Considering the
     agreement between the parties from its four corners, the
     supreme court concluded that the terms clearly and
     unambiguously stated that appellant would accept payment from
     appellee subject to her right to an accounting and her right
     to appeal the decree; construing the unambiguous terms
     according to the plain meaning of the language employed, the
     supreme court held that the agreement permitted appellant to
     appeal the decree despite her acceptance of benefits under it.

4.   Appeal & error -- right to appeal decree under agreement did not include
     right to appeal denial of post-decree motion to vacate judgment. -- Where
     the agreement between the parties allowed appellant to appeal
     the "decree" but did not contemplate post-decree motions, the
     supreme court held that the right to appeal the decree
     conferred on appellant by the agreement did not encompass the
     right to appeal an order denying her motion under Ark. R. Civ.
     P. 60 to vacate the judgment; because appellant's acceptance
     of more than $6 million under the judgment was inconsistent
     with her argument that the judgment should be vacated under
     Rule 60, the court concluded that the point was waived.  

5.   Deeds -- factual dispute -- chancellor's determination not reversed unless
     clearly erroneous. -- Where there is a factual dispute about the
     conditions surrounding the making of a deed, the determination
     by the chancellor, whose job it is to assess the credibility
     of the witnesses, will not be reversed unless it is clearly
     erroneous or unless it is clearly against the preponderance of
     the evidence, the appellate court viewing the evidence in the
     light favorable to the appellee.

6.   Property -- marital residences -- case remanded for reconsideration of
     distribution of parties' interests in. -- The supreme court remanded
     the case for reconsideration of distribution of the parties'
     interests in the marital residences because the reversionary
     interests that were created and acquired by the parties during
     the marriage were clearly marital property under Ark. Code
     Ann.  9-12-315(b) (Repl. 1993), and those reversionary
     interests were erroneously not considered in the distribution
     of the marital property.

7.   Witnesses -- chancellor erred in finding appellant's witness had conflict
     of interest that rendered his expert testimony inadmissible per se. -- The
     chancellor clearly erred in determining that a witness for
     appellant had a conflict of interest that rendered his expert
     testimony regarding the value of the parties' shares in an
     out-of-state cellular-telephone company inadmissible per se
     where there was no dispute that the witness's involvement in
     the case was limited to reviewing information about the
     company and preparing an assessment of the parties' interest
     in it; that the out-of-state company had nothing to do with
     the local cellular-telephone market and did not compete with
     any entity in which the witness's employer had an interest;
     that the witness had no occasion to review confidential
     financial records of a local cellular-telephone company in
     which the parties had an interest; that the witness would not
     have given an opinion concerning the value of the parties'
     interest in that company; and that the witness did not know
     much about litigation between his employer and appellee.

8.   Witnesses -- bias does not necessarily disqualify. -- Even if
     appellant's expert witness could have been considered biased,
     he should not necessarily have been disqualified.

9.   Evidence -- cumulative evidence -- excluded testimony did not amount to. -
     - According to Ark. R. Evid. 403, relevant evidence may be
     excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
     "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
     presentation of cumulative evidence"; having compared the
     testimony of both of appellant's expert witnesses, the supreme
     court concluded that the witnesses were not so similar in
     their credentials, opinions, and approaches to the valuation
     question that the introduction of the excluded witness's
     testimony would have amounted to a "needless presentation of
     cumulative evidence."  [Ark. R. Evid. 403.]

10.  Divorce -- marital property -- recovery of interest in -- fraudulent
     transfer. -- In a divorce action, a spouse may recover his or
     her interest in marital property that the other spouse has
     transferred if the latter made the transfer for the purpose of
     defrauding the former of his or her interest in the property.

11.  Appeal & error -- argument not made in trial court and ruled upon not
     addressed. -- Where appellant made no request to the trial court
     to impose any surcharge with respect to one of two gifts made
     through trusts; where appellant's proposed findings of fact
     and conclusions of law referred to only one of the two gifts;
     and where, even if appellant had requested the chancellor to
     impose a surcharge on any gift that the parties' children
     might have received through the trust in question, the
     chancellor's final decree did not address such a claim, and
     the abstract did not otherwise indicate that the chancellor
     made a ruling on that issue, the supreme court did not reach
     the merits of appellant's claim asserting an entitlement to a
     fifty percent surcharge on any gift the children might have
     received through the trust; the supreme court declines to
     address an argument if the abstract does not show that it was
     made in the trial court and ruled upon there.

12.  Trusts -- evidence supported chancellor's ruling that gift through trust
     was not improperly made. -- Where there was ample evidence in the
     record to support the chancellor's conclusion that the gift
     through a second trust was not improperly made, such as
     testimony that the parties and their children had met with
     bank personnel, executed the appropriate documents, and
     understood the provisions of the immediate predecessor of the
     successor trust at issue, the supreme court held that the
     chancellor's ruling was not clearly erroneous.

13.  Divorce -- marital property -- fraudulent transfer not proved. -- Whether
     or not appellant was aware of or consented to the creation of
     the successor trust and the gift to her children authorized by
     the trust, no authority entitles a spouse to be reimbursed in
     a divorce proceeding for every nonconsensual transfer of
     marital funds made by the other spouse; it was necessary for
     appellant to prove that appellee had effectuated that transfer
     of marital property with the specific intent to defraud
     appellant of her interest in that property; proof of that sort
     was clearly lacking in the record.

14.  Appeal & error -- review of chancellor's decision. -- Ordinarily, the
     supreme court does not reverse a chancellor where the decision
     turns largely on disputed facts and witness credibility, as it
     accedes to her superior position to observe the witnesses and
     gauge their demeanor.

15.  Divorce -- chancellor's ruling that evidence was insufficient to establish
     impropriety of payments to third party not clearly erroneous. -- Noting
     that the propriety or lack of propriety, other than in the
     context of the relationship between appellant and appellee, of
     payments to a third party was not at issue on appeal, the
     supreme court emphasized its concern with whether the payments
     were made to defraud appellant of her marital interest in the
     funds and held that the chancellor's ruling that there was
     insufficient evidence to establish any impropriety regarding
     the payments was not clearly erroneous.

16.  Judges -- recusal -- when proper. -- Judges must refrain from
     presiding over cases in which they might be interested and
     must avoid all appearance of bias.

17.  Judges -- review of refusal to recuse. -- The supreme court will not
     reverse a judgment on the basis of a trial judge's decision
     not to disqualify unless the judge has abused her discretion;
     to decide whether there was an abuse of discretion, the court
     reviews the record to determine if any prejudice or bias was
     exhibited.

18.  Judges -- presumption of impartiality -- burden of showing bias on party
     seeking disqualification. -- The question of bias is usually
     confined to the conscience of the judge; judges are presumed
     to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification has
     the burden of showing otherwise.

19.  Judges -- bias -- rulings did not exhibit sort requiring recusal. -- Bias
     will not ordinarily be evidenced in the fact of adverse
     rulings such as the evidentiary rulings complained of in this
     case; although it was error to have refused the testimony of
     appellant's expert witness and may have been error to have
     limited the cross-examination of appellee's expert witness,
     the supreme court could not say that those rulings exhibited
     the sort of personal bias toward appellant's case that would
     have required recusal.

20.  Judges -- record did not demonstrate bias resulting from appearance and
     withdrawal of attorney with firm representing chancellor in unrelated
     matter -- recusal not required. -- Where the supreme court could not
     tell from the record the extent, if any, of the participation
     in the case of an attorney with a law firm representing the
     chancellor in an unrelated matter beyond his having been
     consulted and listed as an expert witness for appellee; where
     the chancellor remarked that she did not know the attorney who
     had appeared in the courtroom and that he had, to her
     knowledge, not appeared before her previously; where the
     record did not demonstrate any bias resulting from the
     incident, and, given the withdrawal of the attorney, the
     supreme court could not say that any appearance of bias was
     such as to require recusal.  

21.  Judges -- discretionary decision not to recuse upheld. -- The supreme
     court declined to reverse the chancellor's decision not to
     recuse on the basis of a communication made by the
     chancellor's court reporter to a chancellor in another
     judicial district regarding one of appellant's lawyers; the
     decision was a discretionary one, and the court could not say
     that the record demonstrated that the chancellor was biased
     toward appellant or her counsel.


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Alice S. Gray, Chancellor;
Jim R. Hannah, Chancellor On Assignment; affirmed in part; reversed
and remanded in part.
     Henry Hodges; and Robinson, Staley & Marshall, by: Robert L.
Robinson Jr., for appellant.
     Dover & Dixon, P.A., by: Philip E. Dixon; and Dodds, Kidd,
Ryan & Moore, by: Judson C. Kidd, for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Pamela F. Skokos, the appellant, filed a complaint for divorce
against Theodore C. Skokos, the appellee, on June 1, 1993.  Custody
and property issues were litigated before Chancellor Alice Gray in
hearings that were protracted and acrimonious.  The final decree,
entered on March 30, 1995, granted a divorce to Ms. Skokos, awarded
custody of the parties' minor child to Mr. Skokos, and divided
property.  Prior to the entry of the decree, while the case was
pending in the Chancery Court, the parties brought matters before
this Court for resolution.  See Skokos v. Gray, 318 Ark. 571,