Title: David F. Losch v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Gregory L. Lewis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew D. Fisher 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 20S00-0405-CR-235 
 
DAVID F. LOSCH,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court, No. 20C01-0212-MR-162  
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Direct Appeal  
_________________________________ 
 
September 29, 2005 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
David Losch pleaded guilty to the murder of his sister-in-law.  He committed the murder 
by dismembering the victim, which rendered him eligible for life without parole.  The trial court 
found certain mitigating factors, but held that they failed to outweigh the single aggravating fac-
tor of dismemberment.  The sole issue in this case is the appropriateness of the sentence of life 
without parole.  We affirm. 
 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
In the afternoon of December 23, 2002, David Losch left his home and drove to the home 
of his sister-in-law, Lindsay Losch.  When he arrived, Lindsay invited Losch inside and offered 
him a cigarette.  Losch responded by lunging at her and attempting to cut her throat with a small 
knife he had brought from home.  When the knife bent, Losch proceeded to choke Lindsay into 
unconsciousness.  Perceiving that Lindsay was still alive, Losch attempted to break her neck.  
Although he partially succeeded in this, he found that she had survived this attack as well.  He 
then went into the kitchen, retrieved a butcher’s knife, and severed Lindsay’s head.  After 
decapitating Lindsay, Losch retrieved another knife from the kitchen and stabbed the body in the 
chest three times, leaving the knife embedded.  Losch then washed his hands in Lindsay’s sink 
and called the police to report that he had just murdered a woman.  In interviews with the police, 
Losch admitted that he went to Lindsay’s home with the thought of killing her and recounted in 
detail the events described above.  
The state charged Losch with murder and sought the death penalty.  Losch then pleaded 
guilty under an agreement calling for a sentence from sixty-five years to life without parole.  At 
sentencing, the trial court found that the state proved dismemberment, which is one of the aggra-
vating circumstances rendering a person eligible for the death penalty or life without parole.  The 
trial court found several mitigating circumstances but held that they were outweighed by the sin-
gle aggravating circumstance of dismemberment and imposed life without parole, as recom-
mended by the state.  This direct appeal followed.   
The Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court gave the proper weight to the 
mitigating factors that it found to exist in this case.  Losch does not argue that the trial court 
failed to find mitigating factors that were established by the record.  Nor does he contest the find-
ing of the single aggravating factor, dismemberment, which rendered him eligible for the sen-
tence of life without parole.  Losch’s sole argument is that that the trial court committed error in 
failing to find that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factor.  He contends that a 
proper weighing of the mitigating factors would have produced a sentence of sixty-five years. 
 
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The statute governing both life without parole and the death penalty requires that “(l) the 
state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances 
listed in subsection (b) exists; and (2) any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by 
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.”  Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(l) (2004).  The defen-
dant has a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of the existence of a statutory aggrava-
tor.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 
(2000); Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. 2004).  A defendant may, however, waive his 
right to a jury trial and authorize a judge to act as the fact finder.  Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d 
743, 750 (Ind. 2003).  In this case, Losch did that.  The trial court found that the state proved the 
existence of the aggravating circumstance of dismemberment beyond a reasonable doubt.  Losch 
does not challenge this finding.  
The trial court found that Losch had established more than thirty mitigating circum-
stances.  In general, these were based on Losch’s mental illness and his generally good deport-
ment prior to the crime.  There were, however, issues as to both categories of mitigators and the 
trial court concluded that these mitigating circumstances, taken as a whole, failed to outweigh the 
single aggravating circumstance of dismemberment.  
Losch argues that the trial court’s weighing of these circumstances was erroneous.  We 
give great deference to a court’s determination of the proper weight to assign to aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and the appropriateness of a sentence, which is in the court’s discre-
tion.  Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d at 748.  We will set aside the court’s weighing only upon the 
showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.  Id.  Unlike the existence of aggravating circum-
stances, which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the weighing of aggravators against 
mitigators is not required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 265, 
268.  In Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind. 1994), we concluded, as a matter of state law, 
that the weighing of aggravators against mitigators was a balancing process, not a factual deter-
mination subject to a reasonable doubt standard.  Ritchie held that Apprendi and its progeny did 
not change this conclusion:  “[the weighing process] is an exercise in judgment that is not capa-
ble of evaluation beyond a reasonable doubt, and our statute properly omits any standard by 
which it is to be measured.”  Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 268. 
 
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Because of the seriousness of the potential sentence under our capital statute, we require 
that the sentencing judge articulate the reasons behind the sentencing determination more com-
pletely than we require in other cases.  “The trial court’s statement of reasons (i) must identify 
each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and rea-
sons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate 
that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determin-
ing the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court’s own conclusion that the sentence is ap-
propriate punishment for this offender and the crime.”  Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d at 748.  The 
trial court’s careful sentencing order met this standard and Losch does not contend otherwise. 
Judge Shewmaker gave a detailed appraisal of each mitigating circumstance as he bal-
anced them against the one aggravator.  Although he found that the defendant’s lack of any adult 
criminal convictions, standing alone, would be a substantial mitigating factor, he concluded that 
it should be given only minimal weight when considered in the light of other factors.  The court 
concluded that Losch’s continuous use of marijuana since age 13 and the fact that he stole money 
from his family indicated his contempt for the laws of the state and lessened the weight of his 
lack of an adult criminal record as a mitigating fact. 
Judge Shewmaker also found that Losch suffered from an impaired mental condition.  
Twelve mitigating circumstances existed that bore upon Losch’s mental or emotional disturbance 
at the time of the murder and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform 
his behavior to the requirements of law.  Judge Shewmaker found that these mitigating circum-
stances existed and would be accorded substantial weight if viewed in isolation, but were entitled 
to only minimal weight in the light of all the circumstances.  The considerations reducing the 
weight of these mitigators included: (1) no credible testimony clearly linked any of the mitigat-
ing circumstances to the acts performed in the commission of the crime; (2) Losch’s mental state 
at the time of the crime could not be determined; (3) each of Losch’s parents indicated they 
would have committed Losch to a mental facility if they believed he was a danger; their failure 
to do so suggested he was not suffering from debilitating mental conditions on the date of the 
crime; (4) Losch himself stated he was still in his right mind when committing the murder and no 
credible evidence suggested that he suffered from a mental impairment; (5) Losch was able to 
function on a daily basis unhampered by debilitating mental conditions; (6) Losch accepted full 
 
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and complete responsibility for his commission of the offense of murder by entering a plea of 
guilty (he did not enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill); (7) Losch’s mental condition could well 
have been self-induced since he used marijuana and would not regularly take medicine pre-
scribed for him; and (8) in his video statement made within hours after the murder, Losch articu-
lately described the crime and his behavior indicated that he was in control of his thought proc-
esses and was oriented as to time and place.  The court concluded that these eight aspects of the 
mitigating circumstances substantially lessened the weight of the mitigators relating to Losch’s 
mental condition. 
Finally, the court found that a number of additional mitigating factors were proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.  These included the fact that the defendant was unlikely to commit an-
other crime, was only 21 years old when the crime was committed, was generally kind and con-
siderate toward others, and was active in his church.  The trial court concluded that these addi-
tional mitigating circumstances should be given only minimal weight.  Among the reasons given 
by the court for this conclusion was the fact that the mitigators were based on events and actions 
that were remote in time from the date of the murder.  Moreover, these observations of friends of 
the defendant were contradicted by Losch’s actual behavior, and failed to explain or excuse his 
actions.  We conclude that Judge Shewmaker’s balancing of these considerations on this record 
was well within his discretion. 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, and Sullivan, J.J., concur. 
Rucker, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
 
 
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