Title: Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

00.

 

BENJAMIN N. PULAWA, ITI; DANELLE L. PULAWA,
individually and as Prochein Ami of DARCIE L. PULAWA,
and BENJAMIN N. PULAWA, IV, minor children,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

GTE HAWAIIAN TEL; E. E. BLACK, Defendants and|
‘Third-Party Plaintiffe-Appellees,

O12 Hd 41 38 0a

 

and

UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC, LTD., fa OCC-ELECTRICAL, LTD.,
‘Third-Party Defendants-Appellees,

and
JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOB CORPORATIONS 1-10,

DOR PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOB GOVERNNENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
AND DOE NON-PROFIT ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

 

No. 26715
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 98-3683)

SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.,
AACOBA, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING, SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
Plaintiffs-appellants Benjamin Pulawa, III (Pulawa) and
Danelle Pulawa, individually and ae Prochein Ami for Darcie

Pulawa and Benjamin Pulawa, IV [hereinafter, collectively, the

 

qa
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plaintiffs or the Pulawas],” initiated the instant action for
negligence arising out of an incident in which Pulawa, a
construction superintendent, was seriously injured as a result of
being struck in the head by a hardened bag of cement that was

propelled into the air during the course of excavation work. ‘The

 

plaintiffs alleged that defendante-appellees £.8. Black, an
excavation and duct line contractor, and G7E Hawaiian Tel (GTE),
which had contracted with E.£. Black to conduct excavation and
duct Line work, were responsible for burying the cement bag
approximately two to three years prior to the subject incident
during the course of installing a telephone duct line in the sane
approximate area where Pulawa was overseeing excavation work in
connection with a subsequent project.

‘The plaintiffs appeal from that portion of the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit's May 25, 2004 final judgment* entered
pursuant to an order granting summary judgment in favor of 5.8.
Black and GTS. Essentially, the circuit court ruled that £.8.
Black did not ove a legal duty of care to Pulawa. The plaintiffs
also challenge that portion of the circuit court’s order denying

in part their motion to disallow costs.

 

on August 19, 1996, Danelle Pulawa soved for an order appointing her
‘ae Prochein Ami for Darcie Pulawa and Benjamin Pulava, TV, the Pitawae’ two
‘Minor children, On the sane day, the Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall granted
the order

 

* the Honorable Dexter Del Rosario presided over the underlying
proceedings unlest otherwise indicated.

 
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For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit
court's May 25, 2004 final judgment.
T. BACKGROUND
A, actual Backoround

‘The relevant facts of the instant case involve two

  

separate construction projects in the Kaka‘ako Improvement
District in Honolulu, Hawai'i. The first project was conducted
in 1993-1994 by E.£, Black. The second project was conducted in
1995-1996 by O'ahu Construction Company (OCC), during which

Pulawa sustained his injuries

 

 

1. The 1993-1994 Project (Conducted by E.R. Black)
Sometime in 1993, GTE hired E.E. Black to install
underground telephone lines along Xamake'e Street in the Kaka‘ako
Improvenent District [hereinafter, the underground duct Line
project]. 8.8. Black was responsible for furnishing all of the
materials and labor, as well as for performing all of the

necessary work for the project. Although a GTE engineer served

 

as an inspector for the pro} hired Engineers Surveyors
Hawai'i (ESH) to also provide inspection work for the project.
The underground duct line project involved certain
excavation and backfill work. According to GTe’s “standard
Specifications for Placing Underground Telephone Lines," which
“are intended to govern the work on all contracts awarded for
placenent of underground telephone systens by GTE
1 ss throughout the State of Hawai'i,” *{a}1l wood and debris
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shall be removed from [the excavated] trench before
backfilling[,]* and *{blackfil1 material shall be free of wood,

paper or other objectionable material." The GTE inspector

 

of the foregoing requirements w

 

testified that the purpor
prevent “settlement and/or street failure.* an E.E. Black
foreman agreed that inappropriate backfill could lead to
settlement and/or street failure. The BSH inspector also
testified that improper backfill could potentially pose a danger
to “equipment used by a future contractor” as well as to the
safety of future contractors.

E.B, Black began excavation at the intersection of
Kamake'e and Kona Streets on or about October 21, 1993. E.E.
Black then backfilled the excavated area, using “select borrow
backfill material, on December 22, 1993. “Select borrow’ is a
type of backfill material, where the largest pieces of material
used as backfill are no more than one inch in diameter.

During the underground duct line project, E.B. Black
used “hand mixed" cenent in order to make small repairs or patch
existing sewer lines in the areas of construction. An ESH
inspector witnessed E.2. Black mixing cement at the job site
approximately ten tines during the course of the project. £.E.

Black’s use of cement during the underground duct line project

 

was acknowledged by an B.E. Black project engine’
 

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According to a “contract set of plans” that £.E. Black
apparently utilized during its project, the fact that “there
would be future underground work along Kamake'e Street" *[a] fter
B.B. Black performed its work" was reflected on those plane.

E.B. Black’s project appeared to have concluded sometime in early
ssa.
2, The 1995-1996 Project (Conducted by occ)

Sometime in 1995, OCC began work on the installation of
water and electrical lines, as well as widening roads and
constructing new sidewalks and pavement in the Kaka'ako
Improvement District. As part of the project, OCC was required
to perform excavation work. On August 20, 1996, during the
course of the excavation work, it appears that OCC encountered
the GTE duct line that E.=. Black had previously installed. on
that day, Pulawa, a construction superintendent employed by Occ,
was overseeing the excavation work being performed by three other
OCC employees at the intersection of Kamake'e and Kona Streets.

one employee was operating a loader,” the second was operating a

hydraulically operated
tor and can be uged to lift

 

2 According to one court, *{a) loader is
accessory that attaches to the front of the ©
and move gravel, sand, dirt, and the like.”
wipowell, 96 7.341251, 1283 m.2 (Or. Ce. App. 2008)

 

 

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backhoe,‘ and the third employee was acting ae a grade checker.
The backhoe operator was excavating a trench and placing the
excavated material sonewhere near the trench. The loader
operator would then pick up the material and deposit it in a dump
truck. Because of the limited space in the excavation area, the
loader operator would have to drive over the pile of excavated
material in order to place the scooped-up material into the dump
truck. The loader operator would then reverse back over the pile
and repeat the process until the excavated material was renoved.
While removing the excavated material as described
above, the loader operator indicated that he heard a “whoosh
sound as he was reversing over the pile of excavated material and
saw what appeared to be a “rock” being propelled from the left
rear tire of the loader, striking Pulawa on the head. when the
accident occurred, Pulawa was apparently standing approximately
fifteen to twenty feet away from the loader. According to the
loader operator, he later believed that the “rock” was “a half
bag of concrete." Another OCC enployee described the "rock" as
having “pieces of cement bag embedded in it." During the
discovery process, it was apparently revealed that the “rock" was

“a 30-pound chunk of hardened cenent” “in a cement bag with brown

+ According to one court, *[a) backhoe is 2 tractor-like machine used
primariiy for digging trenches. sal corp. 376
‘4.24 1058, 1060 a1 (R.z. 1977). It is unclear from the record waether the
‘operating a backhoe or a hoptos, which, according to #-B. Black
fonslier than a backhoe. Nevertheless, it is immaterial for
of this case whether the employee was operating a backhoe or

   

 
 

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packaging and plastic wrapping." As a result of the accident,
Pulawa sustained severe head injuries, including a depressed and
open skull fracture.

B. Procedural Hiatory

On August 19, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
against GTE, E.£, Black, and Morrison Knudsen Corporation/Walter
& SCI Construction (USA) (Morrison Knudsen).* On April 12, 2000,
the plaintiffa filed a first amended complaint, adding M. Sakuma

Electrical, Inc. (Sakuma), a construction company, as a defendant

 

and dismissing Morrison Knudsen as a defendant.‘ The plaintiffs

 

alleged that the “rock” that struck Pulawa was “a piece of cement
[that] originated from a discarded bag of hardened cement which
was left in the area [of the accident) or abandoned. The

plaintiffs further alleged:

 

Defendants OTR, £.E. Black and/or (Sakuma)
performed work in the area fof the accident] or project site
Prior co [occ]. Said [ajefendante negligently failed to
ick up, clean up or resove the cenent bag after completion
Sf their work oF portion of work at the job site

 

 

9. said [dlefendants knew or should have know that
the failure to renove a cement bag, oF properly clean up the
job site, would create a hazardous condition or threaten the
atety of other workers on the job site, and therefore the
[defendants had the duty to remove the cenent bag after
completion of their portion of work.

* According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, Morrison Knudsen “is and was
at all times material herein, « partnership and successor in interest to oF
Business interest of B.8. Blacks)"

 

« marlier, on May 11, 1999, Morrison Knudsen moved for summary judgment
inasmuch as it did not perform any work in or around the area where the
accident occurred. “On Sune 15, 1999, Morricon Aaudsen withdrew ite motion for
Summary Judgnent in light of the parties’ stipulation for dismissal without
prejudice of ai] claing against Morrison Knudsen to be filed with the circuit
Eoure, On June 17, 1999, the parties filed the aforementioned stipulation-

 

 

 

 
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‘the first amended complaint set forth two counts against GTE,
E.B. Black, and Sakuma: (1) negligence (Count 1); and (2) loss

of consortium (Count II). The loss of consortium claim was

 

asserted by Danelle Pulawa on behalf of herself and the Pula
two minor children.

on April 5, 2001, Sakuma moved for summary judgment,
contending that there was no evidence that the trench excavated
by Occ was in the same location where Sakuma had conducted an
excavation project sometime in 1994, two years prior to the
subject accident. specifically, Sakuma claimed that "its :project
area was across the street from the site where (Pulawa] was
working and where the cement bag was apparently uncovered.*
(auphasis omitted.) On Nay 6, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a
statement of no opposition to Sakuma’s motion for summary
judgment. On May 9, 2001, B.8. Black and GTE filed their
menorandun in opposition to Sakuma’s motion for summary
judgment.’ On May 30, 2001, the circuit court entered an order
granting Sakuna’s motion for summary judgment.

on March 10, 2004, GTE moved for summary judgment
against the plaintiffs on the basis that ‘the undisputed facts in

this case establish that it cannot be held liable to [the

 

+ BE, Black and OTE had previously filed a cross claim against sakuna
on April 24, 2000. in turn, Sakuma had filed a cross claim against 2.5. Black
Gn way 23, 2000,, Purthermore, on October 13, 2003, B.E, Black and OTE filed a
Ghitd’party complaint against Universes! Electric, itd. fka Occ-Blectrical,
Ita. F subcontractor of 00¢ who was performing excavation vork at the tine
Polawa was injured.

 

 

    

 

 
 

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pliaintiffe for ‘negligently failing to pick up, clean up or
remove the cement bag after completion of their work or portion
of their work at the job site’ as alleged in (the p}laintitts’
[f]ixat [a]mended (clomplaint.* Specifically, GTB maintained
that it “did not perform the excavation or backfill work for the
earlier project, particularly in the area in question.” Rather,
GTE asserted that it “contracted with E.B. Black, an independent
contractor, to perform duct Line work, which involved certain
excavation and backfilling work, in 1993.°

on March 17, 2004, 5.5. Black moved for summary
judgnent against the plaintiffs on the ground that “it did not
owe a legal duty of care to [the p]laintiffe because it was not
reasonably foreseeable that [Pulawa] would be injured or subject
to an unreasonable risk of harm created by any alleged negligent
conduct on the part of E.E, Black relating to the ‘large piece of
cement’ that ‘originated from a discarded bag of hardened
cenent.’* E.B. Black maintained that “[t]here is no evidence on
the basis of which a jury can conclude that £.B. Black knew or
had reason to know of a dangerous condition relating to leaving
or abandoning a ‘discarded bag of hardened cement’ underground

and that the condition created a foreseeable risk of harm to

 

(Pulawa).* (Emphasis in original.)
On April 20, 2004, the circuit court held a hearing on,
inter alia, GTE’s and £.8. Black’s motiona for summary judgnent.
At the end of the hearing, the circuit court stated that it was
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cited in GTE’s and

 

pereuaded by the arguments and authoriti
E.B, Black's motions for summary judgment and, thus, orally
granted their motions for summary judgment." on May 12, 2004,
the circuit court entered its written order granting GTE's and
ELE. Black’s motions for summary judgment. ‘The circuit court
also ruled that GTE’s and E.£. Black’s joint motion for summary
judgnent regarding epoliation of evidence was rendered moot by
its order granting GTE‘s and £.£. Black's separate motions for
summary judgment.

on May 25, 2004, final judgment was entered in favor of
E.E. Black and GTE.? On May 27, 2004, 8.8. Black and GTB filed
their notice of taxation of costs, requesting costs in the amount

of $25,509.50, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure

+ prior to the March 10 and 17, 2006 motions for summary judgment filed
Giack, respectively, GIE and E-f. Black had filed a Joint
etion for sumary judgnent regarding spoliation of evidence, specifically,
Gre and BB, Black had contended that the hardened bag of concrete that struck
Pulawa wae “never sade available to B.B, Black or OTE for inspecticn,
Cxamination o testing.” Although the hardened bag of concrete was
photographed after the accident, the beg was apparently thrown avay soon after
Rhe accident. The motion for summary judgnent regerding spollation of
evidence wae algo to be heard by the circuit court on April 20, 2004.

However, lnaemich as the circuit court orally granted OTE's and B.E. Black's
Separate notions for summary Judgment, the circuit court stated that it was
Rot neceoeary co address the Joint motion for summary judgment regarding
spoliation of evidence

 

 

 

 

 

the final judgment indicated that, inasmuch as judgment was entered
in favor of -B. Black and Gre, any renaining crose-clains and third-party
claims were rendered moot. See gupra note 7.

 

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(HRCP) Rule S4(d) (2004)** and Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

 

§ 607-9 (1993). on dune 3, 2008, costs in the amount of
$35,509.50 were taxed by the clerk of the circuit court against
the plaintiffs. On June 16, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion
to disallow costs, contending that it would be inequitable to
award costs against the plaintiffs inasmuch as Pulawa remains
unemployed and Danelle Pulawa’s loss of consortium claim on
behalf of herself and the Pulawas’ two minor children are merely
derivative. The plaintiffs aleo challenged several entries made

by B.2. Black and GTE in their notice of taxation of costs.

\ mCP mule 54(@) provides in relevant part:

(@) costs: attorneve- tees.
(2) COSTS OTHER THAN ATTORNEYS’ FEES. Except when expré
provision therefor is made esther ina statute or in these
ules, costs shall be allowed as of cours
party unless the court otherwive directs(
be taxed by the clerk on 48 nours’ notice
within 5 days thereafter, the action of the clerk nay be
Feviewed by the court.

 

    

 

(underscored emphasis and capital letters in original.)
ups § 607-9 provides:

No other costs of court shall be charged in any court
in addition to those prescribed in thie chapter in any suit,
action, or other proceeding, except aa otherwise provided by
ise.

 

 

Aneluding but not Limited
for witnesses and counsel,

a2] actual disbursement
co, intrastate travel expent

 

 

expenses for deposition transcript originale and copies, and
other incidental expenses, including copying costs,
intrastate long dletance telephone charses, and postage,
worn to by an attorney or a party, and deemed reasonable by

 

the court, may be ailoved in taxation of costa. In
determining whether and what costs should be taxed, the
court may consider the equities of the situation.

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At a hearing held on July 27, 2004, the circuit court
orally granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion
to disallow costs and entered its written order on August 6,
2004." Specifically, the circuit court denied costs in the
amount of $45.95 attributed to meals and granted costs in the
amount of $35,463.55. On August 31, 2004, an amended judgment
was entered in favor of E.E. Black and GTZ, incorporating the
circuit court's August 6, 2004 order. On September 7, 2004, the
plaintiffs filed their amended notice of appeal.”

IZ. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a tion ment

‘This court reviews the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. O'ahu Transit Servs.. Inc, v. Northfield Ins.
Cou, 107 Hawai'i 231, 234, 112 P.3d 717, 720 (2005) (citing
Hawai'i Cnty. Fed, Credit Union v, Keka, 94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11
P.3d 1, 9 (2000). The standard for granting a motion for

sunmary judgment is well settled:

 

* on June 4, 2004, the clerk of the circuit court sent 2 notice to the
parties that the iiscane case was reaasigned to the Honorable Bert Ayabe. AS
Such, Judge Ayabe presided over the plaintiffs’ motion to disallow costs,

 

 

‘the plaintiffs had prematurely filed 2 notice of appeal on July 23,
2004, during the pendency of the motion to disallow costs and is considered
Filed on August 6/2008, when the order disposing of the motion vas entered by
the circuit court, See Havai's Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule

aia) (2). (2008) (providing enac, "(iln any case in which a notice of appeal has
been filed prematurely, such notice ghali be considered as filed innediately
after the tine the judgment becones final for che purpose of appeal") =
Consequently, the July 23, 2004 notice of appeal is a timely appeal of the May
35, 2008 final Judgment and the August 6, 2004 order granting in part and
Senying in part the plaintiffs’ notion £5 disallow costs

 

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(Sluneary judgrent is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
Eile, together with the affidavies, sf any. show that chere
fe no genuine issue as to any saterial fact and that the
uoving party ie entitled to Jusgnent as a satter of law. A
fact ie material if proof of that fact would have che effect
of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of
S'case of action or defense asserted by the parties, The
Cvidence mst be Viewed in the 1ight most favorable to the
pon-moving party. In other words, we sust view 21] of the
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the Light
ost favorable to the party opposing the motion,

Price v, AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co., 107 Hawai'i 106, 110, 111 P.3d 1, 5
(citation omitted) (brackets in original), reconsideration
denied, 107 Hawai'i 106, 111 P.3d 1 (2005).

 

 

 

B. Duty of Care

“thie court addresses whether a defendant owes a duty
of care to a particular plaintiff as a question of law under the

Blair v. Ing, 95 Hawai‘i 247, 253, 21

 

right/wrong standard.
P.3d 452, 458 (2001) (citation omitted).
C. Taxation of Costs

“The award of a taxable cost is within the discretion
of the [circuit] court and will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” Wong v, Takeuchi, 88 Hawai'i 46, 52, 962
P.2d 611, 617 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). ‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the [circuit]
court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded
rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial
detriment of a party litigant." Hac v, Univ, of Hawai'i, 102
Hawai'i 92, 101, 73 P.3d 46, $5 (2003) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)

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TTT. DISCUSSION

 

on appeai, the plaintiffe challenge the circuit court
order granting sunmary judgment in favor of B.8. Black and GTE
and the order denying in part the plaintiffs’ motion to disallow
costs. Each of the plaintiffs’ contentions will be discussed in
turn.
A Black’ Ju

‘The plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of E.E. Black because it

failed to recognize that B.B. Black

 
 

had a duty to protect
Ligence notwithstanding the fact

ible range of danger" extended to the public and
‘ors, and the triske of hazards" whose

‘the conduct “unreasonably dangerous"

Included the specific sequence of events that led to

: severe head injuries:

   

 

    

 

‘The plaintiffs further argue that the circuit court “failed to
consider the material and competent evidence that had been
presented and which showed that #.8. Black owed a legal duty to

» Pulawa under the facts and circumstances of this case.”
‘the plaintiffs primarily rely on the testimony of Alan Los Banos,
gr. the plaintiffs’ construction safety expert, who generally
testified in his affidavit and deposition that "burial of objects
such as a bag of cement, in lieu of proper fill, creates a risk
that a future contractor’s heavy construction vehicles or
equipnent would strike or rollover the object and project it

through the air with great force." Thus, the plaintiffs maintain

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that Los Banos’ expert testimony “alone, at the minimum, created
a genuine issue of fact, which precluded summary judgment.”
Preliminarily, 2.8. Black contends that the plaintiffs
confuse the “foreseeability” issue “by citing and referencing
sforeseeability’ in the context of @ breach of a legal duty
and/or causation inatead of the context of whether there is a
legal duty in the first instance.” (Emphases omitted.)
Consistent with ite assertion that *[fJoreseeability, in the
context of a legal duty, is a question of law[,]" B.E. Black
argues that “Los Banos’ opinions regarding the issue of
foreseeability within the context of whether £.E. Black had a
legal duty of care owed to [the p]laintiffs should be
disregarded, per prevailing case law as they cannot be used or
considered to establish a legal duty of care.* &.5. Black
maintains that it owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs because

the foreseeable danger or harm related to use of improper:
backfill for roade pertains to settlement of the road and
Ete failure related co those traveling on oF Using ehe road.
Voids, scttlenent, and street failure that possibly could
Gnéanger people using and driving on the street are he
foreseeable dangers if inproper Backfill such as a bag of
Genent is used. The risk or hazara is not that the fill
faterial will be dug up, run over by a vehicle, and
projected into che air by the tire of the vehicle. it is a
Generous stretch of the imagination to conclude

St law that the risk or hazard that fill material will be
ug up, run over by a vehicle, and projected into the air by
the tive of that vehicle da the likely or probable result of
the alleged conduct

 

 

   

 

 

(Citations to the record omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)

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Foreseeability in the Context of Duty

 

“I]t de fundamental that a negligence action lies only

 

tite.”

 

where there is a duty owed by the defendant to the pla:

Bidar v. Amfac, Inc, 66 Haw. 547, 551-52, 669 P.2d 154, 159
(1983) (citations omitted) .

The existence of a duty oved by the defendant to the
plaintiff, that is, whether. - such a relation exists
Between the parties that the community will inpose a legal
obligation pon one for the benefit of the other —- or, more
Sinpiy, whether the interest of the plaintif® woich hi
suffered invasion wae entitled legal protection at the hands
Gt the defendant, is entirely @ question of Law.

Knodle v, Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d

377, 383 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

 

    

{ellipsis in original). Regarding the imposition of a duty of
care, thie court has stated that, generally,

[i]m considering whether to impose a duty of
reasonable care on a defendant, we recognize that duty ie
hot sacrosanct in itself, Sut only an expression of the sum
fetal of those considerations of policy which lead the law
fo say that the perticslar plaintife is entitled to
protection: Legal duties are not discoverable facts of
Bature, but merely conclusory expri chat, in cases of
a particular type, liabilicy should be imposed for danage
Gone. in determining whether or not a duty i owed, we must
weigh the considerations of policy which favor the
iplaintift'e) recovery against those waich favor Limiting
the (defendant's) liability. the question of
owen a duty to another mist be decided on a ci
baste.

 

   

 

   

 

Blair, 95 Hawai'i at 259-60, 21 P.3d at 464-65 (citations
omitted) (format altered). In addition to the aforementioned
principles, this court has also regarded several factors in

determining whether to impose a duty:

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wlhether a special relationship exists, the foreseeability
of har to the injured parey, the degree of certainty that
the injured party suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendanta’ conduct and the injury
Suifered, the mora. blane attached to the defendants, the
policy of preventing harm, the extent of the burden to the
Setendante ana consequences te the comunity of imposing
Guty to exercise care with resulting Liability for Breach,
Gnd’ the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved:

 

Ida at 260, 21 P.3d at 465 (ellipsis and citation omitted)

(format altered).

Regardless of the source of a particular duty,
Inowever;] 4 defendant's 1lability for failing to adhere to
the requisite standard of care is limited by the
priolposition that the defendant’ s obligation to refrain
from particular conduct (or, as the circunstances may’
warrane, Co take whatever affirmative steps are reasonable
fo protect another] is owed only to those who are
foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect
to those risks oF hazards whose likelihood made the conduct
[er omission] unreasonably dangerous. Thus, if it is not
reasonably foreseeable that the particular plaintiff will be
[sjured if the expected harm in fact occurs, the defendant
does not ove that plaintiff a duty reasonably to prevent the
expected harm.

 

    

 

 

pares v. re of , 100 Hawai'i 34, 72, 58

P.ad 545, 583 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations

 

omitted) (firat set of brackete and bold emphases added); see
also Janssen v. Am. Hawai'i Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34, 732
P.2d 163, 166 (1967) (stating that ‘a defendant owes a duty of
care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct
and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood
made the conduct unreasonably dangerous") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Huleman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65
Haw, 58, 68, 647 P.2d 713, 720 (1982) (same).

The test of foreseeability “is whether there is some

probability of harm sufficiently serious that a reasonable and

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prudent person would take precautions to avoid it." Knodle, 69

Haw. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (internal quotation marks, brackets

 

n foreseeability of any

 

and citations omitted). “It does not m
harm whatsoever, and it is not sufficient that injury is merely
possible." Henderson v, Prof’) Coatings Corp., 72 Haw. 387, 396,
819 P.2d 84, 90 (1992) (quoting 65 C.J.8. Nealigence § 5(5)
(1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted); gee also Lee v.
Corregedore, 83 Hawai'i 154, 167, 925 P.2d 324, 337 (1996)

*(T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee

 

forever and thus determine liability but none on which that
foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable
Limit on recovery of damages for that injury.* (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted.)).

“(T]he concept of ‘duty[,]’ [however,] involves more
than mere foreseeability of harm." Taylor-Rice v. State, 91

Hawai" 60, 71-72, 979 P.2d 1086, 1097-98 (1999).

 

[Al court’s task —- in determining "duty" -- 4s
decide [merely] whether a particular plaineiff”s injury wa
reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's
Conduct, ut rather to evaluate more genersily whether the
category of negligent conduct at iesue is sufficiently
Likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that
Liability say appropriately be imposed on the negligent
parey.

Id. at 72, 979 P.2d at 1098 (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d

814, 819 2.3. (Cal. 1989)) (internal quotation marks and citation

   

 

omitted) .

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Foreseeability in the Context of Duty: Question of Law
versus Question of Fact

   

on appeal and at the circuit court level, the parties
Gispute whether foreseeability ie an issue of fact for the trier
of fact to decide or is an issue of law for the court to
determine. The plaintiffs maintain that “[r]easonable

foreseeability is the very prototype of a question that must be

 

left to a jury.” (Citation omitted.) on the other hand, B.B,
Black maintains that foreseeability in the context of duty is an
issue of law for the court to determine.

This court has previously noted that, in the coritext of
determining the existence and scope of a duty, foreseeability is

jolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw

 

a question of law for the court to r
at 553 n.3, 669 P.2d at 159 n.3 (noting that foreseeability may
‘play an important role in the definition of duty and the

delineation of ite scope by the court") (citing Huleman, 65 Haw.
at 68, 647 P.2d at 720-21 (duty owed only to those foreseeably

foreseeability is a question of law); Aiiroai v

 

endangere:
State, 59 Haw. 515, 527, 583 P.2d 980, $88 (1978) (foreseeability

of risk of harm to plaintiff ie a question of law when
determining whether plaintiff is among those to whom defendant's
duty of care extends); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56
Haw. 204, 208, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (as a matter of law, duty
not owed to one to whom defendants could not reasonably foresee

consequences)). Indeed, other jurisdictions have aleo recognized

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that foreseeability, in the context of determining the existence
and scope of a duty, is a question of law for the court to

dv. Uribe, 715 P.24 624, 629 n.6 (Cal.

 

determine. See Ball
1986); Knoll v. Bd, of Reaente of the Univ, of Neb., 602 N.W.2d
757, 162-63 (Neb. 1999); "
Inc., 694 A.24 1017, 1020-21 (W.J. 1997).

Foreseeability, however, in the context of breach of
duty and causation is a question of fact for the trier of fact to

resolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw. at 552-53, 669 P.2d at 159-60.

 

“[t]he distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty
and as it applies to proximate cause is a critical distinction

that is too often and too easily overlooked." Knoll, 601 N.W.2d

at 763.
Foreseeability os it impacts duty determination:

rebended. the risk reasonaDl erceived det ine.

x sbeneion.of in hae

Esken into account in deterals Thea

CT
Foreseeability that affects proxinate cause, on the

other hand, relates co the question of whether the specific
fact or omisaion of the defendant was such that the ultimate
injury to the plaintif® reasonably flowed from defendant's
breach of duty. Foreseeability in the proximate cau
context relates to renoteness rather than existence
auey.

 

   

Glohesy, 694 A.2d at 1021 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphasis added); gee algo Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763;

AtL. Mut. Ins, Co, v, Kenney, 592 A.2d 507, 515 (Md. 1992)

(*Foreseeability as a factor in the determination of the

existence of a duty involves a prospective consideration of the

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facte existing at the time of the negligent conduct.
Foreseeability as an element of proximate cause pernits a

retrospective consideration of the total facts of the

 

cccurrence[.]* (Citation omitted.) (Emphases added.)).
Here, the plaintiffs have ‘overtooked" *(t)he

distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty and as

it applies to proximate cause." Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763. For

example, the plaintiffs maintain that *{t]he precise manner of

the injury or the specific harm or consequence of the negligence

 

need not be foreseeable." However, as B.B. Black points out,
“trlhe cases cited by [the p)laintiffs all involve] factual
analysis relating to foreseeability in the context of causation,"
not foreseeability in the context of duty. See Rovers ex rel.
Standley v. Retrum, 825 P.24 20, 22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that “the particular manner in which the injury is
brought about need not be foreseeable” in the context of “legal
cause"); Tisder v. Little, 602 So. 24 923, 927 (Fla. Dist. ct.
App. 1987) (stating that the “foreseeability aspect of the
proximate cause elenent is . . . satisfied in this case" because
“[elhe collapse of a brick wall resulting in the death of a
person near such wall is plainly a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of negligently designing and constructing such a wall
without adequate supports in violation of applicable building
codes"); Christopher v. Father's Huddle Café, Inc., 762 N.E.2d

527, 526 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that, in the context of

 

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causation, "(t]he specific kind of harm need not be foreseeable
as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm from the
act which constituted the negligence”). Consequently, to the
extent the plaintiffs rely on their cited cases for the
proposition that *[tJhe precise manner of the injury or the
specific harm or consequence of the negligence need not be
foreseeable,” we disregard them as not germane to the issues
presented in the instant appeal. Inasmuch as the issue of
foreseeability in the context of duty is a question of law for
the court to resolve, the court, not the trier of fact, must
determine the existence and scope of duty, if any, owed by B.B.
Black to the plaintiffs.
3. Duty in the Context of this case

As previously stated, the plaintiffs rely on Los Banos’
expert opinion to establish the fact that *[t]he risk of a buried
cement bag becoming projectile was . . . clearly foreseeable {]

and not ‘highly extraordinary.'" Specifically, Los Banos’

 

affidavit provides in relevant part

2. 1 am employed as a Safety Coordinator and Program
specialist for the AFL-CIO, Plasterers & Cement Mason
Local 630, and Bricklayers ¢ Allied Craftworkers, Local 1

3. ‘ram a safety opecialist who investig
construction accidents. I have been so employed over the
past nine years, and have vorked in the conservction field
Since 1979. My’ background and experience includes various
forms of training in construction and construction safety
and Oska-approved ch

 

    

 

8." in'my opinion, it Le improper for a contractor to
bury objects not consistent with the job specifications as
#411 materials, such as this object buried under a public
Foadway such as Kanake'e Street. Such practices have

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resulted in materials being buried that could pose hazarde
fo future construction workers.

3. the dangers of engaging in such practices would
include the risk ef heavy construction equipment or Vehicles
striking or rolling over materials such has [sic] hardened
fenent go a to project them through the air with great
Force, Jeoparaizing the lives and safety of workers and
other persone in the immediate area.

on appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Los Banos’ “expert testimony

 

established, at least for summary judgment purposes,” that:
Burial of objects such as a bag of cement, in lieu of proper
Fill, creates a risk that s future contractor's heavy
Construction vehicles or equipment vould strike or rollover
the object and project it through the air with great force.

 

Doing 20 “has the potential for being a projectile that can
basically fly."

Heavy construction equipaent and "the amount of pressure
MOTT gan launch" euch object

votunks will fy from the tires, if it spins.-

sti)hen you've on @ hard surface and you have a rubberized
thing that’s preseing don, sosething bas to give. The weak
area can be rocks that fly."

 

sinen wheels spin... things fly from the tires
Bepecially in the back, when it sping, the traction. a=
they're moving, you see it picks up sosetines in the grooves
of the tires aad just launches itself.”

 

 

gn Hawal't, construction workers know that such objects can
be propelled tarough the air.
construction safety training classes are conducted which

Gover the danger of flying construction debris caused by
Unproper materiale that are abandoned or left at a job site.

 

Indeed, similar incidents have occurred at construction
worksites in Hawai'i.

=.» Los Banos has personally seen large rocks fly out from
inde: Reavy equipment at construction vites.

A flying object “jeopardizes the lives and safety of
workers.

‘me frequency with which this happens depends on the type of
Squipnent being operates, the speed at which it is being
operated, and the type of materiale in the vicinity.

E.E. Black, however, maintains that Los Banos’ opinions

they cannot be used or considered to

 

are inadmissible inasmuch

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establish a legal duty of care. In response, the plaintitts

assert that

egal duty must be examined in Light of ite factual context,
not in a vacuum. “Mr. Los sance provided facts relevant to
the court's legal duty analysis, and these facts establien
sone probability of harm sufficiently serious that a
Feasonable and prodent person (e.g. Contractor) would have
taken precautions to veld it

 

 

(Citation omitted.)

Generally, “(t]he testimony of expert witnesses is

+ confined to matters of fact, as distinguished from matters

of law." Create 21 Chuo, Inc. v. Southwest Slopes, Inc., 81
Hawai'i 512, 522 n.4, 918 P.2d 1168, 1178 n.4 (App. 1996). In
other words, an “expert or nonexpert opinion that amounts to a
conclusion of law cannot be properly received in evidence, since
the determination of such questions is exclusively within the
province of the court." Id, (citation omitted). Nevertheless,
in the context of duty, “expert testimony might be relevant to
help establish some underlying fact on which duty may ultimately
rest(.]" Parra v ion 2, 982 S.W.2d 278, 284
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998); see also Peck v, Horrocks Eng’xs, Inc., 106
F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir. 1997) (*Whether a duty of care exists is
a question of law, although expert testimony may be helpful on
the issue." (Citations omitted.)).

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ position, however, Los
Banos did not “provide(] facts relevant to the court’s legal duty

(Emphasis added.) A closer

 

analysis[]*" in the instant case
examination of Los Banos’ deposition testimony reveale that the

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basis for the “fact that “{t]he risk of a buried cement bag
becoming a projectile was . . . clearly foreseeable|) and not
‘highly extraordinary’* was Los Banos’ prior observations of

nine-inch rocks traveling "maybe about five feet, six feet away.”

 

 

Specifically, Los Banos testified

 

0: [By defense counsel} How big was the biggest rock
that you've seen fly like that”

[PLAINTIFS* COUNSEL]: Like that?

[DEFENSE CouNseL]:" well, when a loader or plece of
equipmant goes over it and then shoots it out.

{los EANoS];, About ~~ I've seen rocks about, roughly,
this big fly out of there.
(By [defense counsel}): when you say “this big" --

  

 
  

  

 

 

A: [By los Banos] Roughly, what, ‘about nine inches
Around. the

Q: Mine inches, arouna?

A: Yeah.

Q: How far did de fay?

Ri Gaually, it soomn'c fly chat far. it just flies maybe
abour five feat, six feat aviv.

(Emphasis added.) However, in the present case, the cement

 

“rock* that was propelled into the air weighed approximately
thirty pounds and traveled at least fifteen to twenty-five feet
before atriking Pulawa in the head. When apprised of these

facts, Los Banos testified:

 

0: [By defense counsel) was this ac
y
a: Tay ton Banos) My opinion --

Mell. i feel it's
unlsual. “Especially the launching that far- 1
thought it was, like, wow, i
@: Going over 20 feet and the thingl. dies, the concrete
srock*] is, what, 20, 30 pounds

  
    

just kind of
inst far, ieee, like, wor you knoe. ?

(Emphases added.) Thus, inasmuch as “(t]he opinion of an expert

must pertain to the facte of the particular case[,]" Jortes v.

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King County, 84 P.3d 252, 258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), and Los

opinion does not, his opinion as to the “fact” that “(t]he

 

Bano:
rink of a buried cement bag beconing a projectile was

clearly foreseeable{) and not ‘highly extraordinary’* ie
not helpful to this court's “legal duty analysis." See Nebraska
Plastics, Inc, v. Holland Colors Ama., Inc., 408 F.3d 420, 426
(eth Cir. 2005) (etating that *{a]n expert opinion that faile to
consider the relevant facts of the case is fundamentally
unsupported)” and, therefore, “must be excluded"). Accordingly,
we next curn to the dispositive issue in this case, that is,
whether E.E. Black owed a legal duty of care to Pulawa.

Other jurisdictions have recognized that ‘a contractor
has a duty to maintain the premises on which it performs work in
a reasonably safe condition for persons who the contractor may
reasonably expect to cone onto the site.” Raino v. Fischer, 059
A.2d 709, 722 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (citation

omitted); see also Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 374 P.2d 185, 190

(cal. 1962) (stating that an independent contractor's duty of

 

care is “a general duty imposed by law to use reasonable care to
prevent damage to persons whem [sic] he may reasonably expect to
be affected by his work") (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In other words, a contractor generally

Je reasonable care both in his or her work
fe Of performance of the work{) hlovever, the
Guty of reasonable care is not, of course, owed to the world
at large, but rather £0 those vho wight reasonably be
foveneen ae being subject ro injury By the breach of the
uty.

 

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Peters v. Forster, 804 N.B.2d 736, 743 (Ind. 2004) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citations onitted). Indeed, as

previously discussed, this court has held that "the defendant's
obligation to refrain from particular conduct . . . ie owed only

to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only

 

respect to those rieke or hazar: Kel ih
conduct nreasonably dangerous.” Dos Parents No. 1, 100
see aleo Janssen,

69 Haw. at 34, 731 P.2d at 166. Moreover, “in determining the

 

Hawai'i at 72, 58 P.3d at $83 (emphasis added)

scope of the defendant's duty, the focus is on the defendant’s
viewpoint, that is, whether the defendant could reasonably
foresee the plaintiff's injury." Yager v, Illinois Bell Tel

Cox, 667 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (I11. App. Ct. 1996) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, Pulawa was standing approximately fifteen to
twenty feet away from the excavation area that was located in the
same vicinity of an excavation site of a prior construction
project that was backfilled by E.E. Black two years earlier.
Although #.£. Black “has a duty to use reasonable care in both
[ite] work and in the course of performance of the work[,]" it
cannot be said that Pulawa was foreseeably endangered by E.E.
Black’s conduct such that the cenent bag it allegedly failed to
remove would be propelled in the air by the tire of a loader and
strike Pulawa in the head. The plaintiffs adduced testimony from
several GTE inspectors and engineers, as well as an E.B, Black

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project engineer, who purportedly oversaw the 1993-1994

underground duct line project. The testimony focused on the

 

risks or hazards created by 8.£. Black’s alleged failures to
remove the cement bag and to comply with contract specifications

egarding proper backfill requirements. The risk or hazard that

   

was consistently identified focused on the possibility of
settlement of the road and street failure. In fact, the
plaintiffs, in their memorandum in opposition to B.E. Black’
motion for summary judgment, posited that *{alppropriate backfi1)
is necessary to assure ‘the integrity of the pavement structure,’
while inappropriate fill can promote voids or settlement and
allow for failure of the roadway." (Citation omitted.) The
plaintiffs also argued that *(ulse of improper fill by (8.8.
Black] under a public roadway such as Kamake'e Street could lead
to settlement and road failure." (Citations omitted.) The GTE
inspector who oversaw the underground duct line project in 1993-
1994 testified that compliance with contract specifications
regarding proper backfill requirements is to prevent "settlement
and/or street failure.* Indeed, the plaintiffs’ own expert, Los
Banos, confirmed that the purpose of job specifications relating
to proper backfill requirements is to promote “uniforn
compaction," which, in turn, prevents “voids.” Moreover, Los
Banos testified that the purpose of such job specifications is

fot to prevent the possibility of non-conforming backfill

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material being unearthed and projected into the air, striking

somebody:

 

0: [By defense counsel] £0 the purpose for designating
specificelly the size of backfill materials is 60 that

there is proper compact ion?

[By Lot Banos) Uniform compaction.

‘The purpose for those specifications are not so that

[e‘does impose « danger to others, right?

What do you sean? Por the size, you mean?

Yeah. No.

That_has nothing te do with, well. vou know. if vou
cave racks about five, 40 tnehes in there(i.en. in
She trench. [and It somebody diss is-out it misht Rit

A: Sn it's just engineering standards. You know,
you're talking about dynamics.

oror oF

(Bmphases added.)
Although the plaintiffs adduced some testimony that

 

improper backfill could potentially pose a danger to the safety
of future contractors and that £.8. Black was generally aware
that there would be future underground work along Kamake'e
Street, such evidence does not meet the test of foreseeability,
to wit, ‘whether there is sone probability of harm sufficiently
serious that a reasonable and prudent person would take
precautions to avoid it." Knodle, 69 Haw. at 368, 742 P.2d at
385 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The aforementioned test “does not mean
foreseeability of any harm whatecever, and it is not sufficient
that injury is merely possible.” Henderson, 72 Haw. at 396, 819
P.2d at 90 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(enphasis added); see Ethyl Corp. v. Johnson, 49 $.W.3d 644, 648

(ark, 2001) (recognizing that “there is no duty to guard against

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merely possible, as opposed to likely or probable, harm"). Based
on the evidence in the record, it appears that, although Pulawa
did indeed suffer harm, such harm, though unfortunate, was
smerely possible” and not “likely or probable” under the
circumstances of this case.

Furthermore, the authorities relied upon by the
plaintiffs regarding contractors all involve the type of
foreseeable harm related to excavation and resurfacing work, that
is, settlement, street failure, and holes. See Brent v, Unico!
Inc., 969 P.2d 627, 626 (Alaska 1998) (subsequent construction
worker fell into a hole between an excavation wall and a rig mat
left by a prior contractor) ; Mal ard Gor: 482
N.B.2d 787, 791-93 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (painter fell from
scaffold after ground under scaffold caved in where utility had
earlier installed underground gas line; utility was under a duty
to prevent or correct subsidence at the site of its excavations
and could discharge such duty by, inter alia, “filling in any
subsidence caused by the expected settling of the earth after
such an excavation") (emphasis added); Hankins v. Elro Corp., 386
N.W.2d 163, 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (bicycle on
which plaintiff was riding struck a gap between two pieces of

cement); Kapalczynski v, Globe Conatr, Co., 172 N.W.2d 852, 852-

53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (plaintiff fell into a hole ina street

 

that defendant had resurfaced). The plaintiffs’ two remaining

cases dealt with foreseeable harm relating to the improper

 

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See Chance, 374 P.2d

 

installation of furniture and containe:
at 167 (diner fell into open planter box installed in a narrow
foyer of a busy restaurant); Raimo, 659 A.2d at 721 (plaintiff
descending temporary staircase injured when staircase fell away
from @ house). Thus, the evidence adduced below, coupled with
the arguments of the parties, clearly established that the risk
or hazard of the buried cement bag being propelled into the air
during a future excavation was not what made the failures to
renove the cement bag and to comply with the contract
specifications by £.£. Black unreasonably dangerous. In other
words, B.B, Black's general duty to use reasonable care did not
include within ite scope the protection of Pulawa from the
particular risk that he encountered. See Selwyn v. Ward, 879
A.2d 882, 883, 887-29 (R.Z. 2005) (holding that harm resulting
from a minor igniting a bottle of grain alcohol for sport was not
a foreseeable consequence of selling alcohol to a minor; rather,
foreseeable consequence would have been injuries resulting from
minor’s consumption of illegally obtained alcohol) .

Consequently, based on the state of the record, it cannot be eaid
that E.R, Black owed a legal duty to the plaintiffs.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in

granting summary judgment in favor of E.B. Black.

 

the plaintiffs argue for the firet time on appeal in their reply

brief that BE. Black “purported to prove the facte underlying ies notion [for
sumary juégnent] by attaching deposition transcripts that were authenticated
improperly by their attorney.” Inasmuch as "(t]he snadsiseibility of evidence
(Goneined.--)

 

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8. "9 Motion for sur o
‘The plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judoment in favor of GTE because GTE is liable

for (1) B.2. Black's acts and omissions and (2) its own acts and

omissions. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that “the
evidence shows that GTE established sufficient control over B.2.
Black to render GIE liable for the acts and omissions of B.5.
Black” inasmich as "GTE had an employee on the job site daily
overseeing the progress of the construction{.]* Although not
entizely clear from their opening brief, it appears from their
reply brief that the plaintiffs allege that GTE is liable for its
own acts and omissions based on negligent supervision of 2.8.
Black.

Inasmuch as EE, Black did not owe a legal duty to the
plaintiffs, it follows that GTE likewise would not be liable to
the plaintiffs for B.B. Black's alleged acts and/or omissions in

“failling] to pick up, clean up or remove the cenent bag after

(continued)
is a sufficient basis to reverse sumary judgment,” the plaintitts contend
that “a Hawai't appellate court can review the adniseibility of docoments ‘eva
sponte,’ even if the ieeue was not raised Below. in wupport of their
contention, the plaintiffs rely on Nakato v. Machara, 69 Hawai'i 75, 68, 969
Pola 624, $33 (App. 1998). Nakata, however, does not support the plaincifts'
Contention. in Nakato, the appellants challenged the sdmissibilicy of the
exnibic at issue hearing on the motion for summary judgment. ié. at
85, 969 P.2d at ‘he such, the appellants in Nakavo properly preserved
their right to challenge the admissibility of the exhibit on appeal. Here
the plaintiffs essentially concede that they failed to challenge £.2. Black's
exhibits at the circuit court level. Consequently, they are precluded from
Challenging auch exhibice for the firet time on appeal. See Acoba-v, Gen.”

ze, ince, 92 Hawai'i 2, 12, 966 P.24 268, 299 (1999) (precluding appellant
Fron challenging the adwigsibiiity of appellee's affidavite on appeal when
appellant failed to make an objection ar the circuit court level)

 

 

 

 

 

 

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completion of their work or portion of work at the job site.”
Moreover, because “negligent supervision may only be found where
an employee is acting outside of the scope of his or her
employment,” Dairy Road Partnere v, i#land Ins, Co., 92 Hawai‘s
398, 427, 992 P.24 93, 122 (emphasis in original),

i jenied, 92 Hawai'i 398, 992 P.2d 93 (2000), and
the plaintiffs do not allege that B.B. Black was acting outside
the scope of its alleged employment with GTE, the plaintiffs’
complaint cannot be said to state a claim for negligent
supervision. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not
err in granting summary judgment in favor of GTB.

c. Ta costs

lastly, the plaintiffs assert that the circuit court
abused its discretion by denying in part their motion to disallow
costs because: (1) the circuit court’s award of summary judgment
in favor of £.E. Black and GTE was erroneous; (2) it was
inequitable to award costs in light of Pulawa’s unemployment and
limited means; and (3) joint and several liability for costs
should not be imposed against Danelle Pulawa and the Pulawas’ two
minor children in light of the fact that their claims are
derivative. E.B, Black and GTE, on the other hand, contend that
HRCP Rule 54(d) creates a “strong presumption” that the
prevailing party will recover costs, and “[a]ctual indigency, not
merely limited financial resources, must be demonstrated.”
Inasmich ae Pulawa “receives Social Security benefits

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(approximately $1,500 per month), benefits from the Operating
Engineers Trust Funds, and workers’ compensation benefite,* £.8,
Black and GTB claim that the plaintiffs have not shown that they
were incapable of paying the costs awarded to £.£, Black and OTB.
Moreover, 8.B. Black and GTE contend that HRCP Rule 54(d) “does
not distinguish between derivative and non-derivative clains(,)*
and, thus, costs were properly awarded against all the
plaintiffs.

As previously stated, £.£. Black and GTE filed their
notice of taxation of costs pursuant to HRCP Rule 54(d) and HRS
§ 607-9. ERCP Rule 54(d) provides that, “[e]xcept when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs[.]" (Emphasis added.) ERCP

Rule 54(@)

creates a strong presumption that the prevailing party will
Fecover costs... The presumption that the prevaliing
party 1a entitled to costs must be overcone by sone showing

the burden of making this showing.

   

‘The Tosing party

Mong v, Takeuchi, 88 Hawai'i 46, 52, 961 P.2d 611, 617 (1998)
(quoting 10 Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 54.102(1) (a-b) (3d ed. 1998)

 

(emphasis added). HRS § 607-9 provides that:

No other costs of court shall be charged in any court in
addition to those prescribed in this chapter in any suit,
action, or other proceeding, except as otherwise provided by
ise.

 

 

 

ALL actual disbarsenents, including but not limited to,
intrastate travel expenses for witnesses and counsel,
expenses for deposition transcript originals and eepi
Cther incidental expenses, including copying cost
Gntrastate long distance telephone charges, and postage,

   

 

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(Emphasis

sworn to by an attorney or a party, and deened reasonable by
the court, may be alloved ia taxation of costs. In

Seterminine whether and what costs shoilé be taxed. the

5 of the situation’
added.)
Several courts of appeals have held that indigency. or

 

Rodest means, is a factor that 2 district court may consider
Sn awarding costs (pursuant Eo Federal Rules of civil
Procedure (FRCP) Rule se(g)-""] See, e.d., cherry v.
hampicn int") Comp., 186 F.34 442, 447 (den Cir_ 1999)
evaluating whether a non-indigent losing plaintiff had the
weffective ability to satiety [the defendant's) bill of
costs’ or was “of such modest means that it would be unjust
or inequitable fo enforce [PRCP] Rule s4(d) (1) against
her" 136 P.34
Sie, 945 (eh Cir, 1997) (-(tThe losing parey's Inability to
Day will suffice to justify denying costs."). Other courte
That have adopted this approach also caution that a losing
party's indigescy of an inability to pay coste does not
Rutomatically sean that a coste avard levied against that
party se inequitable. see. eaver vs Tooabs, 946 7.24
Toot, 2008 (eth cir, ‘fuberended by statute as staked
dp Ih ee Prison Litigation Reformat, 105 P-3e 1131 (een
Gict "1s97)1 (holding that Indigency may be a enield to
impoeieion of cots, but that ie ie not an absolute shield).
‘This case-by-case approach to the “indigency" factor has
leo been exprestly or implicitly endorsed by noted
Comentators on the subject. Sez, e.g. 10 Moore's (Fed.
Prac.) $5 54.1021) {b], at 54-153, 54.304 (31 (al (el, at 54-
158 to 34-201 ((34 ed. 1999)]; 10'wright(, miller &’ Kane,
Fed. Prac. & Procedure] § 2673, at 305-09 [(3d ed. 1998)]

 

 

 

  

 

 

Ince Paoli 8.8. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 463 (3d Cir.
2000) (emphasis in original); see also Whitfield v. scully, 241

 

“ PRoP Rule 54(@) provides in relevant part:

(Bold enphasi in original.)

 

(2) Costs other than Attorneys’ Fees. Except when expres
provision therefor ie nade either in a statute of the United
States or in Files, comte other than attorneys’ feen
Shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise directs; but cost against the United
States, ite officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to
the extent permitted by law. Such costs may be taxed by the
clerk on one day's notice. On motion serves within § days
Ehereaster, the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the

   

 

  

 

‘This court has previously noted that FACP Rule

sia) ie stunetionsily ideatical” to ARCP Rule SU(@)- Mong, 68 Hawai'i at 52
bits 961 Pid at 627 H.8, “Where # Hawai'i rule of civil procedure is
Identical co the federal rule, the interpretation of this rule By federal
courte ie highly pereuesive."| id, (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)

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F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that, *[als a general
matter([,] a district court may deny costs on account of a losing
party's indigency, but indigency pex se does not automatically
preclude an award of costs”); Chapman v, AI Transp., 229 F.3d
2012, 1039 (12th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that “a non-
prevailing party's financial status is a factor that a district
court may, but need not, consider in its award of costs pursuant

to [FRCP] Rule 54(4)*). In Inge Paoli, the United states court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) held that, “if a
losing party is indigent or unable to pay the full measure of
costs, a district court may, but need not automatically, exempt

the losing party from paying costs. 221 F.3d at 464 (emphases

in original). In so holding, the Third Circuit stated:
Such an approach is somewhat at odds with the
traditional rule at law that the prevailing party wa
automatically entitled co ita coste, but ir ie consistent
ith the rule at equity that the district court exercise ite
Giscretion to insure that the avard be equitable, Allowing
for the indigency factor ia cervain cases is also in keeping
with the Anerican tradition of not providing total
Feimbursenent..\. . (T]he types of costs recoverable under
(FRCP) Rule 54 (4) (2) are quite circunscribed. These costs
do not include such litigation expenses as attorney's fees
and expert witness fees in excess of the standard daily
Witness fee, and as a reeule, while a prevailing party is
Svarded its’ [Face] Rule 54 (dj (2) costs, those costs often
fall well short of the party’e actual litigation expenses (.)

 

 

 

 

 

Id, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

 

Nevertheless,

 

(5)f a aiserice court.) in determining the amount of cot
fo award(,] chooses to consider the non-prevalling party"
Hinancial status, it should require substancial
documentation of a rue inability to pay. See

Eaulkner], 18 7.34 [456,] 459 [(7th Cir. 1994)] (non
Prevailing party offered no documentary support, relying
Instead on “unsupported, self-serving etatenenta*); Cherry,
Lee Pood at 449 (ho Feduction in cose award despite proot

 

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that plaintif£ had “no independent income and owned no
property in her own name” because she had “aufficient access
fo marital property” and a 401 (k)plan)

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039; gee also Corder v, Iucent Techs, Inc.,
162 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the burden is on
the non-prevailing party to provide evidence of inability to pay
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the prevailing party
is entitled to recover costs); 10 Moore’s Fed. Prac.
§ 54.101[1] [b], at 54-154 to 54-155 (34 ed. 2006) (stating that
[a] substantiated claim of the losing party's indigency may
justify a reduction or denial of costs to the prevailing party,
although such indigency is not an absolute shield to the
imposition of costs") (footnotes omitted) .

Moreover, the non-prevailing party mist show more than
a mere “drop in incomes to substantiate his or her claim of
Andigency because such fact alone informs the court nothing of
the non-prevailing party’s “other financial resources.” Corder,
162 F.3d at 929; gee algo 10 Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 54.101(1] (bl,
at 54-155. Cf, McGill, 18 F.3d at 459 (stating that

incarceration alone is inadequate to show indigence). In A.D

 

Deere & Co., 229 F.R.D. 189 (D.N.M. 2004), the prevailing parties
moved for costs against the non-prevailing parties pursuant to
Pep Rule 54(d). Id, at 192. The non-prevailing parties (A.D.

and Sue Richins and Sue Richins as next friend of Arthur Dloyd

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Richins, Jr.) (hereinafter, collectively, the Richins]
contended that costs should not be taxed against then inasmuch as
“they currently have no earned incone, and that they subsist on
social security and worker’s conpensation.* Id, In addition,
the evidence in the case reflected that the Richins’ future
medical expenses, not all of which would be covered by worker's
compensation, would exceed $2,000,000. Id, The Richins argued
that they had **practically' no ability to adequately care for
A.D. Richards and thus cannot pay the [prevailing parties)’
costs.” Id. The United states District Court for the District
of New Mexico (the court) held that, inasmich as the Richins
failed to overcome the presumption that the prevailing parties
would recover costs, they did not demonstrate why the court
should not award costs against the Richins. Id. at 159.
Specifically, the court stated:

‘The Richins’ claimed indigency is not an absolute
shield to the award of costs. Noreaver, the Richins have
hot shown that they are indigent such that the (clout
Should not eax 6 ‘t'may well be that the Richins are
lunable to pay the costs. But given the record before the
Iclourt, the [clourt would be speculating to so find. while
there certainly was evidence at trial that A.D. Richins"
edical bills vill be considerable, and that hie earning
Capacity is limited, the (c]ourt does not recall evidence
aboct the Richine("| assets. Normally, a balance sheet of
the plaintiffs would not be relevant. At thie stage,
however, that information is needed. While the [elourt
Assumes ‘that the Richine are Of modevate means. they have
hot provided the detailed and specific information that the

 

    

 

 

M nithough not stated in the opinion, it appeare that the non
prevailing parties consist of @ husband, wide, and the wife aa next friend of
Z'sinor, presumably the child of the husband and vite. See id. at asl. it
Sppears that the underlying action stemmed from an sccident in'vrich the
Purported husband, A.D. Richards, sustained personal injuries as a result of
operating excavation machinery. See Richins v. Deere &-C9,. 231 P.R.D. €23,

62e (Dam. 2008)

 

 

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[clourt could wae to determine whether they could pay an
$8,000 cost bill.

Id, at 193-94 (citation omitted); see also Corder, 162 F.3d at
929 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to modify its costs order despite the losing
party's allegation that her income had decreased)

Similarly, in the instant case, the evidence adduced at
the circuit court level regarding the Pulawas’ inability to pay
costs taxed against them revealed that, as a result of Pulawa’s
severe head and brain injuries, he remains unemployable eight
years after the accident. The Pulawas claim that they receive
Social Security benefits, operating Engineers Trust Funds
benefits, and workers’ compensation benefits."” Finally, the

Pulawas presented evidence that their taxable income in 2003

 

totaled 25,534. However, such evidence alone does not inform

" other financial resources. See Corder,

 

the court of the Pula
162 F.3d at 929; 10 Moore's Fed. Prac. § 54.101(2][b], at 54-155.
Indeed, the Pulawas did not present any evidence about their

assets. In other words, the circuit court was presented with

 

income stream after the accident, but

 

evidence of the Pulaw

not any evidence of the Pulawas’ income stream prior to the

 

© on appeal, the plaintiffs do not indicate how much they receive each
month from the three sources Of income, A letter from the Social Security
Rasinistration £0 the Palawas, dated December 21, 1997, reveale that the
Pulawas were to receive ¢14,390 on or about December 27, 1957 and $1,448 on oF
about the thira Weds a not

 

 

the amount they receive
ind workers’ compensation. Although not
rom the record, it appears that Pulava also receiver a sonthly

 

Operating agit
entirely clear
pension.

 

 

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accident and accumulation thereof. See, e.g., Broccoli v
Echostar Communications Corp., 229 P.R.D. 506, 517 (D, Md. 2005)
(district court concluding that losing party presented eufficient
evidence of inability to pay coste due to low income and lack of
any assets). In ruling on the plaintiff’s motion, the circuit
court stated that it had “reviewed the motion [to disallow costs)
and heard the arguments" made by the parties, which focused on
the plaintiffs’ inability te pay. In taxing coste against the
plaintiffs, the circuit court implicitly determined that the
plaintiffs failed to rebut *(t]he presumption that the prevailing
party is entitled to costs” “by some showing that an award would
be inequitable under the circumstances." Mone, 68 Hawai'i at 52,
961 P.2d at 617. Therefore, inasmuch as the decision to award
costs is discretionary and the circuit court “may,” but need not,
“consider the equities of the situation,” ERS § 607-9, we cannot
say that the circuit court's refusal to grant the plaintiffs’
motion to disallow costs was an abuse of discretion in this case.
‘The concurring and dissenting opinion (the dissent),
however, maintains that, because “HRCP Rule 54 is aubject to HRS
§ 607-9," “(1]imitations on the trial court's consideration ‘of
the equities of the situation’ would violate the express language
in HRS § 607-9." Dissent at 4, As such, the dissent proposes
that trial courts may consider (1) “the chilling effect [that] a
disproportionate award of costs may have on a person’a right to
bring suit,” dissent at 6-8, and (2) “the relative disparity of

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jent at 5-6, in determining whether

 

wealth bewteen parties," dii

to assess costs pursuant to HRS § 607-9. Here, the plaintiffs on
appeal never argued that: (1) imposing costs against them would

reault in a chilling effect on a person’s right to bring suit;

 

and (2) “relative disparity of wealth between parties" is a

factor to be considered in determining whether to award costs.
In fact, the entirety of the plaintiffs’ argunent pertaining to
the circuit court’s consideration of the equities in determining
whether to assess costs against them states:

Evidence that an avard is inequitable under the
cixcunstances can provide basis for denying costs.

THaw(ai's] 46, 52, 961 P.2d 611, 617 (2998)

fact) § 54-201(2) (ab) (3 ed.

 

Takeuchi,

(citing 20 hore’ s Pea‘
‘The moat important equitable factor 12 indigency or

snapiliey £2 pay.

251 P.3d 449, 463 (Grd Cir 2000)- Such inability £0 Bay

Permits a court to exempt the party fron paying corte. ida

‘The court awarded $35,463 in costs against [the
plaintiffs). This award was an abuse of discretion and both
Inequitable and erroneous.

‘Ben Pulawa sustained severe and permanent head and
brain injuries and renaine unemployable eight years later:
His continued existence depends upon disability benefits
from the Social Security Administration, Operating Engineers
‘Trust funds, and workers’ compensation benefits. He has not
been cleared for any form of employment over the past 8
years and has no prospect of becoming employable in the
future.

 

 

(Citations to the record omitted.) Under the circumstances of
this appeal, we, therefore, decline to consider any theories not

advanced by the plaintiffs.

nt maintains that “remand is

 

Finally, the dii
necessary in this case[]” because “fairness . . . dictates that
[the p]laintiffs be given the opportunity . . . to show whether

their assete are insufficient to satisfy [the] costs [taxed

 

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against them] .* Dissent at 10, 13. However, as the dissent

 

points out, the plaintiffs already had the opportunity to support
their position before the circuit court, namely, that
*[clompelling equitable circumstances weigh heavily in favor of
disallowing an award of costs{.]* Dissent at 11-12 n.2 (citation
omitted). rt was up to the plaintiffs to support their position
in the first instance by adducing sufficient evidence to
demonstrate a “true inability to pay." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039
(citations omitted). rt may well be that the Pulawas are, in
fact, unable to pay the assessed costs; nevertheless, given the
state of the record, we defer, as we mst, to the discretion of
the circuit court in implicitly determining that the Pulawas
failed to meet their burden of overcoming the strong presumption
that £.E. Black and GTE, as the prevailing parties, recover costs

pursuant to HRCP Rule 54(d). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has

 

recognize:

Although a district court must *4
ite refusal to tax costs to the losing
held that a district court must specify reasons for ite
decision to abide the presumption and tax comes to the
losing party. The distinction is critical. A district
court deviates fron normal practice when it refuses to tax
Gosts fo the losing parey, and that deviation triggers the
Fequirenent to "specify veasons.”

 

  

The requirement that district courts give reasons for
denying costs flows logically from the presumption in favor
of costs that is embodied in the text of the Tulel, ie.
PRP Fule 54(4)]; if a district court wishes to depart from
that presumption, is must explain way so that the sppellate
court will be able to determine whether or not the trial
Court abused ite discretion... -. Our requirenent that
@istrict court give reasons for denying costs is, in

yseence, a requirenent chat the court explain why ac
not orainazy,

 

 

 

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‘This reasoning suggests, ae ve hold today, that a
dsatricr court need not give affireative reasons for
sé, it need only Find that the reasons
‘not sufficiently persuasive to
umption in favor of an award. The

Sratding coat. and when a dietrict court states no reason
‘foramarding coate, we wil] assune It acted based on that
reaumotion’

ining district court needs no affirmatively expressed
reason to tax costs. Father, st need only conclude that the
Feanons advanced by the party bearing the burden -- the
{osing party -- are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome
the presumption. in the circumstances of this case, the
presumption itsclf provided an adequate reasons for’ the
Eiserict court to award costs. We decline to adopt a rule
that would place on district courts the burden of justifying
routine awards of costs agsinst losing parties(.]

‘Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945-46 (9th Cir.

2003) (citations and some emphasis omitted) (some ellipses and

   

   

 

 

s added). We likewise decline to adopt a rule that would

 

enpha
place on circuit courts the burden of justifying a routine award
of costs against losing parties. such a burden may be incurred
Af we remand the instant case for a redetermination of the

jment of coats as the dissent would have it. Dissent at 10-

 

13.

Accordingly, notwithstanding that the circuit court
may, but need not automatically, exempt the plaintiffs from
paying costs, we believe that the circuit court did not abuse its
@iscretion in taxing costs against the plaintiffs. ve,
therefore, hold that the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to disallow costs.”

 

he plaintiffe aleo contend that costs should not be taxed against
then jointly and severally. Their contention is seemingly based on their
belief that, Decause Danelie Pslawa'e loss of consortium claim on behalf of
(continued...)

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IV. CONCAISTON

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

May 25, 2004 final judgment.
on the brief

Kenneth T. Okamoto and F

John D. Zalewski (of Price Bee Ak tvinae

Okamoto Hineno & Lun), and
Dan. Ikehara (of the Law
Offices of Dan 8. Tkehara), Nut Obraneeryore
for plaintiffs-appellants

Caen €, Brags +

 

Jeffrey H. K. Sia, Diane W.
Wong, J. Thomas Weber, and
Ronald M. Shigekane (of Ayabe
Chong, Nishimoto, Sia &
Nakamura) for defendants

and third-party plaintiffs-
appellee GTE Hawaiian Tel
and £. 8. Black

on the zecord:

Keith K. Hiraoka and
April Luria (of Roeca,
Louie & Hiraoka), for
third-party defendant -
appellee Universal
Electric, Ltd.

 

4(.. continued)
herself and the Pulavas’ two minor children are merely derivative, auch clains
“eagea (B-2. Black and GTS] to incur no or minuscule coste.” However, as
previously stated, ~[t]he avard of a taxable cost is within the discretion of
Phe (eizcuit] court and vill not be disturbed absent 2 clear abuse of
Giscretion.” long, 88 Kawai't at $2, 961 P.2d at 617 (internal quotation
farks and citation omitted). rnaamich aa the general rule ig that a court
“nay apportion coats between the prevailing and non-prevailing parties ae it

fiet,]* mre Paoli, 221 F.2d at 469 (citations omitted), we believe that
the circuit court did not abuse ite discretion in deciding to’ inpose costs
jointly and severally in the instant case.

 

 

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