Title: The People v. Remy Smith

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 29  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Remy Smith,
            Appellant.
Richard Ware Levitt, for appellant.
Vincent Rivellese, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of two
counts of assault in the first degree, and one count each of
attempted coercion in the first degree and criminal possession of
a weapon in the second degree, in the shooting of a friend during
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No. 29
a dispute.
On appeal, defendant challenges, under both state and
federal law, the preclusion of an argument she wished to make at
summation -- namely that it was the victim of the shooting who
first produced the gun that resulted in her being shot.1 
Defendant's challenges fail because to allow the requested
summation argument would be to permit defense counsel to call
upon the jury to reach conclusions that are "not fairly inferable
from the evidence" (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110
[1976]).  The privilege of counsel to comment in summation on any
matters of fact pertinent to questions that the jury must decide
is not absolute.  The privilege "can never operate as a license
to state to a jury facts not in evidence" (Williams v Brooklyn E.
R. Co., 126 NY 96, 103 [1891]), or to argue theories for which
there is absolutely no evidentiary support.  
Here, regardless of whether there was evidentiary
support for the argument that the victim was shot during a
struggle over the gun, the jury heard no evidence from which it
would be reasonable to conclude that the gun was first displayed
by the victim.  In particular, the testimony of a police officer,
1 Defendant also claims that it was reversible error to
preclude defense counsel from arguing at summation that the
victim struggled with defendant over the gun.  We do not address
whether that ruling was error because the ruling was harmless. 
Defense counsel was permitted to argue that the gun went off
accidentally, during a struggle over a handbag, and that
defendant did not intend to cause serious physical injury.
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No. 29
that the victim told him that the gun with which she was shot was
"heavier" than a gun he showed her for the purpose of comparison,
is irrelevant to the issue whether the defendant or the victim
first produced the gun.  Moreover, the officer himself clarified
the term, saying "heavier, meaning larger," and a victim's
recollection of the size of a gun in no way supports the theory
that she first displayed the gun.
Defendant also challenges that part of the jury charge
instructing the jury that if it found that the victim was
"truthful and accurate in her testimony to you, [then] her
testimony without any other eyewitness to what happened inside
the car, under the law satisfies the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."  Where, as here, a single sentence in a jury charge is
challenged by the defendant, we "do not consider the challenged
sentence alone and in a vacuum but instead must read the
instruction as a whole to determine if it was likely to confuse
the jury" (People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]).  Here,
although the challenged sentence itself does not accurately
convey the principle that a single victim's testimony can on its
own prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Supreme Court
immediately went on to state that principle correctly.  The court
charged the jury that if the victim's testimony "after your
careful scrutiny does satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt then
her testimony alone can be sufficient to convict without other
eye witness testimony" (emphasis added).  Moreover, Supreme Court
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No. 29
emphasized, in parts of the jury charge immediately before and
after the challenged sentence, that the central duty of the jury
was to decide whether the charged crimes had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.  In light of the charge as a whole, no
reasonable juror would have concluded that if he or she found the
victim's testimony credible, then he or she had to find defendant
guilty -- without assessing whether all of the evidence was
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
guilty.
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People v Remy Smith
No. 29 
JONES, J. (dissenting):
By limiting defendant’s argument on summation, the
trial court impermissibly infringed on defendant’s constitutional
right to present an argument to the jury which was reasonably
supported by the evidence.  Further, by misstating the
appropriate standard of proof in a portion of the jury charge
(see Memorandum Decision at 3-4), the trial court unwittingly
fostered a guilty verdict in accordance with the victim’s
testimony.  Because these errors, individually and cumulatively,
deprived defendant of a fair trial, I respectfully dissent.
On July 14, 2007, defendant and the victim attended the
birthday party of a mutual friend at a restaurant on 14th Street
and Ninth Avenue in Manhattan.  As the party ended, defendant
noticed that $3,000 was missing from her pocketbook.  Because the
victim had held the pocketbook at one point during the evening,
defendant suspected she had stolen the money.  After leaving the
restaurant, defendant confronted the victim with a gun in the
front seat of the victim’s car.  Other than defendant and the
victim, who was behind the wheel, there was no one else in the
car.  According to the victim, defendant cocked the gun as she
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approached her car.  Once in the car, defendant demanded to
search her handbag, she refused, and she was shot while they
struggled.  Although the victim testified that she did not touch
the gun with which she was shot, a police officer testified that
the victim told him that the gun at issue was “a little bit
heavier” than a gun he showed her for comparison purposes. 
Defendant did not testify at trial. 
After the People rested, defense counsel sought a
ruling as to whether it would be permissible to argue during
summation that there was a struggle for the gun before the gun
went off.  The court asked defense counsel to address the
People’s argument that “there is no evidence of the struggle over
a gun.”  Counsel responded, “it is not an unreasonable inference
during such an altercation in the car with a gun loaded that at
some point she attempted . . . to pull the gun away.”  Supreme
Court concluded that counsel would not be permitted to argue on
summation that there was a struggle over the gun because there
was “no evidence of that.”  The court only allowed counsel to
argue on summation that there was a struggle over the bag and the
gun went off accidentally.
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution has the right to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 462 [1938]).  This
right was deemed necessary to ensure the fundamental human rights
of life and liberty (id.), and made obligatory on the states by
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the Fourteenth Amendment (see Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335
[1963]).1  “[T]he right to the assistance of counsel has been
understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the
function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord
with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has
been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”
(Herring v New York, 422 US 853, 857 [1975]).  In short, this
right ensures that criminal defendants have a full and fair
opportunity to participate in the adversary factfinding process
(id. at 858).
“[C]losing argument for the defense is a basic element
of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial” (id. at
858),2 and the “last chance to persuade the trier of fact that
1 Article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution provides
in pertinent part that a defendant “shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel.”   Although “[t]he Right
to Counsel Clause in the State Constitution is more restrictive
than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution[,]” this Court, “by resting the right upon this
State's constitutional provisions guaranteeing the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to assistance of counsel
and due process of law[, has] provided protection to accuseds far
more expansive than the Federal counterpart” (People v Bing, 76
NY2d 331, 338-339 [1990] [citations and footnote omitted]).
2 As the Herring Court stated:
“It can hardly be questioned that closing
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the
issues for resolution by the trier of fact in
a criminal case.  For it is only after all
the evidence is in that counsel for the
parties are in a position to present their
respective versions of the case as a whole. 
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there may be a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt” (id. at
862).  This Court wrote:
“It is the privilege of counsel in addressing
a jury to comment upon every pertinent matter
of fact bearing upon the questions which the
jury have to decide.  This privilege [] is
most important to preserve and [] ought not
to be narrowed by any close construction, but
should be interpreted in the largest sense. 
The right of counsel to address the jury upon
the facts is of public as well as private
consequence, for its exercise has always
proved one of the most effective aids in the
ascertainment of truth by juries in courts of
justice, and this concerns the very highest
interest of the state.  The jury system would
fail . . . if freedom of advocacy should be
unduly hampered and counsel should be
prevented from exercising within the four
corners of the evidence the widest latitude
by way of comment, denunciation or appeal in
advocating his cause”
(Williams v Brooklyn El. R.R. Co., 126 NY 96, 102-103 [1891]).3
That said, “summation is not an unbridled debate in which the
restraints imposed at trial are cast aside so that counsel may
employ all the rhetorical devices at his command.  There are
certain well-defined limits” (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109
[1976]).  For example, because juries must decide issues on the
Only then can they argue the inferences to be
drawn from all the testimony, and point out
the weaknesses of their adversaries'
positions”
(422 US at 862). 
3 The right of counsel to address the jury upon the facts is
guaranteed to the defendant and prosecutor alike (see People v
Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109 [1976] [citations omitted]).
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evidence, counsel, in summing up a case, is permitted to make any
summation argument “within the four corners of the evidence”
(Williams, 126 NY at 103).  In addition, counsel must avoid
making comments which have no bearing on any legitimate issue in
the case (see Ashwal, 39 NY2d at 109 [citations omitted]).  “Thus
[counsel] may not refer to matters not in evidence or call upon
the jury to draw conclusions which are not fairly inferrable from
the evidence” (id. at 109-110 [citations omitted]). 
Finally, trial judges have great latitude in
controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing
summations (see Herring, 422 US at 862).  For example, a trial
judge, in the exercise of his or her broad discretion, may seek
to ensure that counsel’s argument does not stray unduly from the
mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the
trial (id.).
In this case, the evidence adduced lent itself to
several interpretations.  For example, in accordance with the
People’s theory of the case, one could reasonably view the
evidence as establishing that defendant entered the victim’s car
with a gun, struggled with the victim in an effort to seize the
victim’s bag and then intentionally shot the victim.  Another
reasonable view of the evidence was that, even accepting the
victim’s testimony as true, the gun accidentally discharged
during the course of the struggle over the victim’s bag or over
the gun itself.  However, defense counsel was precluded from
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making the argument concerning a struggle over the gun because
Supreme Court found that it lacked evidentiary support.  The
Appellate Division determined that Supreme Court’s preclusion
order was a proper exercise of that court’s discretion.  I
disagree because the alternative theory defense counsel sought to
advance was supported by the evidence; thus, Supreme Court lacked
discretion to deprive defendant of what amounted to her only
viable theory of defense (see Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284,
294 [1973] [cited for the proposition that the right to present a
defense is one of the “minimum essentials of a fair trial”]).
If the jury did not believe the victim’s account of
what happened, it could certainly have rejected all of her
testimony, including her claim that defendant entered her car
with an already cocked gun.  Clearly, defense counsel’s proposed
argument -- that defendant and the victim struggled over the gun
rather than the victim’s bag -- was relevant, material, and
“within the four corners of the evidence” (Williams, 126 NY at
103).  There was evidence adduced at trial from a police officer
that the victim described the gun in terms of weight, that is, it
was “heavier” than the other gun the same officer presented to
her for comparison purposes.  Although the majority seeks to
explain this away by pointing out that “the officer himself
clarified the term, saying ‘heavier, meaning larger[]’”
(Memorandum Decision at 3), this explanation actually raises
factual questions for the jury as to whether the witness held the
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two guns and was able to compare their weights.  I submit that
this evidence can reasonably be interpreted to support the view
that the victim in fact held the gun, that she lied when she
denied doing so, and that, therefore, she lied when she testified
that defendant (1) entered her car with a cocked gun in hand, and
(2) struggled over the bag rather than the gun.  However, the
jury did not have an opportunity to accept or reject the theory
defense counsel sought to advance -- an argument that could have
sharpened and clarified the issues for resolution by the jury.    
Thus, by upholding the lower court rulings precluding
defense counsel from making the stated summation argument, the
majority not only put this Court’s imprimatur on rulings that
deprived defendant of the opportunity to advance a viable theory
of defense, it deprived defendant of her right to fully and
fairly participate in the adversarial factfinding process. 
Further, because defense counsel was not allowed to argue the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from all the testimony, the
jury could not adequately perform its function as trier of fact.
In declining to determine whether the trial court erred
in striking defense counsel’s summation argument that the victim
struggled with defendant over the gun (see Memorandum Decision at
2, footnote), the majority casts this ruling as “harmless” based
on the argument the trial court actually allowed defense counsel
to make (id.).  I do not agree that this ruling can be deemed
“harmless.”  The precluded argument bears directly on the
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question whether defendant intended to cause serious physical
injury, an element required to prove first-degree (intentional)
assault.  If the jury believed that the struggle was over the
gun, that would tend to disprove the mens rea necessary for
intentional assault.  Moreover, defense counsel, in advancing the
only summation argument he was permitted to make (that the
shooting was accidental), was effectively relegated to conceding
the truthfulness of the victim’s account of the incident (that
defendant entered the car with a gun and the struggle was over
the victim’s handbag).  And certainly it would be far more likely
for the gun to discharge accidentally in a struggle over the
weapon itself, than in a struggle over a handbag.  In light of
the foregoing, the challenged ruling cannot be considered
harmless.
Finally, I address defendant’s challenge to a portion
of the jury charge.  At trial, the jury was instructed that “if
you find [the victim] was truthful and accurate in her testimony
to you, her testimony without any other eyewitness to what
happened inside the car, under the law satisfies the proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.”  It is undisputed that this sentence does
not accurately convey accepted reasonable doubt principles, and
that the trial court did not correct this portion of the charge. 
It is also undisputed that the trial court stated the applicable
principles correctly in other parts of the jury charge.  
While I am well aware of this Court’s jurisprudence
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holding that where a sentence in a jury charge is challenged,
courts do not consider such sentence in a vacuum, but read the
charge as a whole to determine if it is likely to confuse the
jury, I am troubled by the fact that this portion of the charge
related specifically to the victim’s testimony.  This error is
magnified by the fact that defendant did not testify, and the
victim and defendant were the only persons present in the
vehicle.  Given the charging error and the trial court’s rulings
as to what defense counsel was allowed to argue on summation, it
is likely that the incorrect reasonable doubt standard fostered a
guilty verdict.
This case concerns me for the following reasons.  The
trial court erroneously precluded a summation argument that was
reasonably supported by the evidence.  Moreover, considering the
impact of the trial court's rulings, the erroneous portion of the
charge concerning reasonable doubt and the fact that this is
essentially a one-witness case, defendant was placed in an
untenable position upon exercising her right not to testify. 
Based on the foregoing, I would reverse the order of
the Appellate Division and grant defendant a new trial.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, in a memorandum.  Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read,
Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones dissents and votes to
reverse in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
Decided February 24, 2011
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