Title: POOL v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

POOL v. STATE2001 WY 817 P.3d 1285Case Number: 99-241Decided: 01/29/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

JAMES 
KIRKPATRICK POOL,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Guy Cleveland, 
Student Intern.

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Monique B. 
DuPont Armijo, Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, 
JJ.

  
            
THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]           
In this 
case, the new issue for Wyoming is found in the claim of James Kirkpatrick 
Pool (Pool) that the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (Lexis 
1999) requires the State to prove the controlled substance was not "obtained 
directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice" or "otherwise 
authorized by this act."1  The other question presented in this 
case is the sufficiency of the chain of custody of the controlled substances 
seized at the time of Pool's arrest.  
The controlled substances were admitted without objection at trial, and 
review requires consideration of that error under the plain error doctrine.  We hold that no error occurred with 
respect to the admission of the controlled substances into evidence, and the 
trial court correctly denied Pool's motion for judgment of acquittal.  The Judgment and Sentence entered in the 
trial court is affirmed.

[¶2]           
This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of 
Appellant:

I.          
Whether the State failed to demonstrate with a reasonable certainty that 
the chain of custody of the evidence seized from Mr. Pool had not been altered 
or tampered with and thereby calling into question the integrity and 
trustworthiness of the evidence used to convict Mr. Pool.

II.          
Whether the statutory language making it unlawful to possess controlled 
substances unless the substance was obtained directly from or pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order is an essential element of the charged crime and 
therefore incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, in 
fact, Mr. Pool was in possession of a controlled substance not obtained pursuant 
to a valid prescription or order.

This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I.          
Whether a sufficient "chain of custody" was presented to support the 
admission of marijuana and methamphetamine seized from 
appellant.

II.                   
Whether 
there is any merit to appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claim or to his 
proposed construction of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(iii).

[¶3]           
On April 
16, 1998, a Teton County deputy sheriff encountered a gray 1989 Volkswagen in 
the eastbound lane of Highway 22 near the bottom of Teton Pass, which Pool was 
driving.  The Volkswagen had its 
hazard lights flashing, and was traveling very slowly.  When the deputy sheriff approached, Pool 
drove the Volkswagen off the road and stopped.  The deputy sheriff also pulled off the 
road behind the Volkswagen to see if Pool needed assistance.  As the deputy sheriff approached the 
Volkswagen, Pool started to get out of the passenger side 
door.

[¶4]           
When 
they met, the deputy sheriff noticed that Pool had very bloodshot and glassy 
eyes, and appeared to be nervous and impatient.  When the deputy sheriff asked for 
evidence of identification, Pool produced an inmate card from the Idaho State 
Board of Corrections.  The deputy 
sheriff then determined, through the assistance of the Teton County Dispatch 
Center, that Pool's driver's license was suspended.  The deputy sheriff asked Pool what he 
did time for, and Pool's reply was "trafficking."  The deputy sheriff also had seen that 
the trunk lid to the Volkswagen was "punched."  

[¶5]           
Pool 
attempted to return to the vehicle on more than one occasion during the 
encounter with the deputy sheriff, and the deputy sheriff became concerned about 
his safety.  The deputy sheriff told 
Pool that he was not under arrest, but he asked Pool to turn around and place 
his hands behind his back interlocking his fingers.  Pool complied with that direction, and 
the deputy sheriff then conducted a "pat down" search for weapons.  In the course of the "pat down" search, 
the deputy sheriff felt several hard objects in the left vest pocket of Pool's 
jacket.  The deputy sheriff asked 
permission to retrieve them, and Pool told him he could, but the deputy sheriff 
was not able to open the zipper on the pocket because it was on the inside of 
the jacket.  He then asked Pool to 
remove the items and Pool did so.  
At that time, the deputy sheriff observed a baggy containing a green 
leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana, and asked Pool what was in the 
baggy.  Pool told him it was 
marijuana.

[¶6]           
At that 
juncture, the sheriff deputy placed Pool under arrest for possession of a 
controlled substance.  A further 
search of Pool's person incident to that arrest produced a second plastic baggy 
from his right front pocket, which contained what was subsequently identified as 
approximately 6.89 grams of methamphetamine, together with $656.51 in cash and 
coins.  In the meantime, the deputy 
sheriff had called for assistance, and another officer arrived to provide a 
canine search of Pool's car.  The 
canine officer had his dog sniff test the baggies at the scene and the animal 
alerted to both of them.  
Additionally, the dog alerted to the cassette in the tape deck in the 
vehicle.

[¶7]           
The 
deputy sheriff then placed the two baggies in the console of his patrol car 
where they remained during the drive to the Teton County jail.  The deputy sheriff left them in his 
locked patrol car until he had finished processing Pool into the jail.  He then retrieved the two baggies, and 
started the process of filling out the evidence logs and paperwork.  At that time, he tested each substance, 
and the contents of the first baggy tested presumptively positive for marijuana, 
while the contents of the second baggy tested presumptively positive for 
methamphetamine.

[¶8]           
Pool was 
charged with one count of driving while his license was suspended in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-134(a) (Michie 1997), one count of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A), a 
misdemeanor, and one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii), a felony.  Following a preliminary hearing before 
the justice of the peace, Pool was bound over for trial in the district 
court.

[¶9]           
Pool 
moved to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest, and the trial 
court denied that motion.  Pool was 
tried by a jury with verdicts of guilty being returned on all three counts.  Subsequently, Pool was sentenced to a 
term of not less than two and not more than four years in the state penitentiary 
on Count 3; he was sentenced to a term of one year on Count 2, which sentence 
was made to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 3; and on Count 1, he 
was sentenced to the Teton County jail for a period of six months to run 
consecutively with the concurrent sentences for Counts 2 and 3.  The trial court then ordered that the 
six month sentence on Count 1 would be deemed to have been served while Pool was 
awaiting trial and that sentence was deducted from his credit for pretrial 
confinement of 251 days, leaving a credit of seventy-one days on his prison 
sentence.  Pool has appealed from 
the Judgment and Sentence of the trial court.

[¶10]      
We turn 
initially to Pool's second claim of error in which Pool contends that his motion 
for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the State failed to 
prove that he did not have a valid prescription or order of a practitioner for 
the methamphetamine.  The parties 
advance as a potential standard of review the proposition that the trial court 
will accept as true the evidence of the prosecution together with all logical 
and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom while leaving out any 
evidence to the contrary.  Smith 
v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Apodaca 
v. State, 796 P.2d 806, 807 (Wyo. 
1990)).  We agree with the augmentation of that 
standard of review found in the State's brief, in which it is suggested that 
Pool's claim does not raise a question of sufficiency of the evidence, but 
injects a question of law as to whether lack of a valid prescription or order of 
a practitioner is an element of the charged offense.  If the lack of the prescription or order 
is an element of the offense, it is clear that no evidence about the absence of 
a prescription or order was offered by the State, and any reasonable juror must 
have had a reasonable doubt as to the existence of that element.  Smith, 959 P.2d at 
1197 (quoting Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 
1981)); 
Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 563 (Wyo. 1992); 
Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 172 (Wyo. 
1979).  
We perceive the contention as raising a question of law which we review 
de novo.

[¶11]      
Pool 
relies upon State v. 
Keating, 
30 Wash. App. 829, 638 P.2d 624, 626 (1981), 
for its holding that in order to carry its burden of proof, the State was 
required to demonstrate that the substance was illegally possessed by evidence 
that Keating did not have a prescription to justify lawful possession.  Because of its failure to prove that the 
substance was not controlled by a prescription, the Washington court held that 
the State had failed to establish an essential element of the offense.  Id.  The State relies upon the provisions of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1050(a) (Lexis 1999), which 
provides:

(a) It 
is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this act 
in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in any trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding under this act.  The burden of proof of any exemption or 
exception is upon the person claiming it.

The 
trial court relied upon this statute, and we uphold its ruling because the 
statute articulates the correct rule in Wyoming.

[¶12]      Our 
holding is consistent with the rule adopted in the federal courts in construing 
a parallel provision of federal law, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and a similarly worded 
state statute, La. Rev. Stat. 40:961 et seq. (West 1992 and Supp. 
2001).  Woods v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 970 (1988); 
United States v. Forbes, 515 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C.Cir. 1975).  The Wyoming controlled substance statute 
has been derived primarily from the federal statute, and we accept federal case 
law as persuasive authority in our determination of the intent of the Wyoming 
legislature.  Palato v. 
State, 988 P.2d 512, 514 (Wyo. 
1999); 
Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 
1981); 
Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1053-54 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶13]      Furthermore, 
the rule articulated in the Wyoming statute has been accepted by other states 
following the lead of Forbes.  
E.g., Schuller v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind.App. 
1993); 
Burgin v. State, 431 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind.App. 1982); 
State v. Rodriguez, 554 So. 2d 269, 270 (La. 1989); and 
Com. v. Pero, 402 Mass. 476, 524 N.E.2d 63, 67 (1988).  See also State v. Everidge, 77 
N.M. 505, 424 P.2d 787, 790 (1967).  We hold that the trial court did not err 
in refusing to grant Pool's motion for judgment of acquittal.  It is not incumbent upon the State in 
prosecutions for violations of the Controlled Substances Act to prove a negative 
fact, i.e., that there was no prescription or valid order authorizing possession 
of the substance.  In many 
instances, that would be an impossible burden for the State to 
assume.

[¶14]      With 
respect to Pool's first claim of error relating to the failure of the State to 
establish the chain of custody for the evidence, the thrust of Pool's argument 
is that the deputy sheriff did not have the baggies in his personal possession 
all of the time from the arrest until they were logged into evidence.  The deputy sheriff identified Exhibits 1 
and 2 as the baggies that were taken from Pool after he was arrested.  We are satisfied that this issue is 
disposed of by prior cases in Wyoming.  
The state of the law is summarized in Rosenbaum v. State, 915 P.2d 1200, 1201-03 
(Wyo. 1996) (emphasis added), from which we quote 
extensively:

Generally, 
all relevant evidence is admissible.  
Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 436 
(Wyo.1995).  As part of the 
relevancy determination, Wyo. R. 
Evid. 901 requires the authentication or identification of physical 
evidence before the evidence is admissible.  Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 656-57 
(Wyo.1993).  Proper foundation for 
the admission into evidence of controlled substances requires that a chain of 
custody be established.  
Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 490 
(Wyo.1983).  The purpose for this 
standard for the admission of exhibits into evidence is that there must be a 
showing that the physical exhibit being offered is in substantially the same 
condition as when the crime was committed.  
Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 369 
(Wyo.1986).  This determination is 
to be made by the trial judge and may not be overturned but for a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Candelaria, 895 P.2d  at 436.

DISCUSSION

The 
character of controlled substance evidence requires laying of a particular type 
of foundation in order to satisfy Rule 901 since, typically, a specific 
controlled substance sample has no distinct characteristic by which to readily 
differentiate it from other such samples or from similar appearing but lawfully 
possessed substances.  
Robinson, 716 P.2d  at 368-69.   Authentication and identification 
of the specific sample are accomplished by setting out the circumstances 
surrounding its custody in the period between seizure and trial.  Id.; United States v. 
Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1531-32 
(10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909, 109 S. Ct. 3197, 105 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1989).  If the opponent seeks 
exclusion based on alteration, misidentification, or contamination of the 
evidence, he must support that charge with more than speculation.  Robinson, 716 P.2d  at 369; see 
Westwood v. State, 693 P.2d 763, 767 
(Wyo.1985).

* * 
*

Rosenbaum's 
challenge required the trial court to consider the nature of the evidence the 
State would present, the circumstances surrounding its preservation and custody, 
and the likelihood of any tampering.  
The trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence 
if it can rationally conclude from these factors that the evidence to be 
introduced is in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the 
defendant's alleged crime.

The 
State's burden in meeting the foundation requirement is not a heavy one for Rule 
901 is intended to preserve the general preference of the rules of evidence in 
favor of admissibility.  Once 
the proffered evidence is connected to the charged crime, any defects or 
uncertainties whether evident in the State's foundation or deriving from 
contrary evidence by a defendant should be held to affect only the weight of the 
proffered evidence, not its admissibility.  Taul, 862 P.2d  at 
657.

The 
burden of the State with respect to such a chain of custody is to set forth such 
facts as would permit a reasonable certainty that a drug sample, which has 
otherwise been identified and tied to the case, has not been materially tampered 
with or altered subsequent to its seizure.  
Westwood, 693 P.2d  at 767.   Some prima facie foundation must 
be provided making it reasonably probable that no material change has occurred 
to the sample which would render its admission misleading.  Robinson, 716 P.2d at 
368-69;  Westwood, 693 P.2d  
at 767; DeLuna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021, 1025 
(Wyo.1972).  Although in controlled 
substances cases the State must generally show a continuous chain of custody of 
the drugs, it need not show that its agents maintained a round-the-clock watch 
over that evidence or produce the testimony of each person who handled the 
evidence.  Robinson, 716 P.2d  
at 368-69.

Our 
review of the record indicates that standard procedures were followed by State 
agents.  The forensic chemist 
testified he found no evidence of an actual, material alteration of the 
composition of the substance or material tampering with it.  In view of the legal principles just 
discussed, we agree with the State's view that a defendant cannot have 
controlled substances evidence excluded by pointing solely to a discrepancy 
related to the weight of the proffered substances.

[¶15]      In 
Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 369 (Wyo. 
1986) (emphasis added), upon which the court 
relied in deciding Rosenbaum, we said:

In drug 
cases like this one, the physical evidence often has no distinctive 
characteristics so the circumstances, or more specifically the chain of custody, 
must be established.  Ostrowski 
v. State, Wyo., 665 P.2d 471, 490 (1983); 
5 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, [Federal Evidence] § 515 at 88 
(1981).  But 
the

"proponent 
need not maintain physical objects * * * under round-the-clock watch, and need 
not call as authenticating witnesses each person who handled the object from the 
time of its recovery to the time of trial, so long as enough testimony is 
presented to permit a reasonable inference that the object offered is what the 
proponent claims it to be."  5 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 
515 at 88-89.

If the 
opponent seeks exclusion based on alteration of the evidence, he must support 
that charge with more than speculation.  
Ostrowski v. State, supra, 665 P.2d  at 490.

[¶16]      We are 
satisfied that the record in this case established a sufficient chain of custody 
for the evidence taken when Pool was searched to justify its admission into 
evidence by the trial court in the appropriate exercise of its discretion.  We note in passing that no objection was 
made to the admission of this evidence at trial, and consequently we have 
considered it under the plain error doctrine.  In applying the "plain error" rule, we 
hold that there was no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law when the 
trial court admitted this evidence.

[¶17]      The 
Judgment and Sentence of the trial court is affirmed in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

  1In that part relevant to this 
discussion, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) provides:

            
(c)  It is unlawful for any 
person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or 
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or except as otherwise authorized by this act.