Title: Vena v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vena v. State1997 WY 83941 P.2d 33Case Number: 95-304Decided: 06/25/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

JOSEPH J. VENA,

 Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender, PDP; Peter 
H. Froelicher, Assistant Public Defender, argued.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Jon Forwood, Special Assistant Attorney General; Mary Beth Wolff, Laramie County 
Deputy District Attorney, argued. 

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1]      The primary focus 
in this appeal, taken by Joseph J. Vena (Vena) from his convictions of 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-1-303 
(1988), and first degree murder, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-2-101 (Supp. 
1994), is upon the voluntariness of statements given to law enforcement officers 
in which Vena admitted his involvement in the charged crimes. Vena asserts that 
the trial court erred in its pretrial ruling that the statements were voluntary, 
and also in improperly instructing the jury on the issue of voluntariness of the 
statements. Additional assertions of error in Vena's brief and argument include 
the denial of access to the psychiatric evaluation of a codefendant; the failure 
of the trial court to apply the doctrine of merger to the sentences for 
accessory to first degree murder and conspiracy to commit that murder; the 
denial of a motion for a mistrial after violation of an order in limine entered by the trial court; 
and the failure to admit the entirety of Vena's written and recorded confession. 
Our study of this record and application of pertinent legal rules reveals that 
no reversible error was committed at Vena's trial. The Judgment and Sentence 
entered in the trial court is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      Six issues are 
set forth in the Brief of Appellant, filed on behalf of 
Vena:

I.          
Were Vena's statements voluntary?

II.          
Did the district court commit reversible error in denying Vena's motion 
to discover his codefendant's mental evaluation?

III.         
Should the district court have applied the doctrine of merger of 
sentences to Vena's convictions of accessory to murder and conspiracy to 
murder?

IV.        Did the 
district court commit a clear abuse of discretion when it denied Vena's motion 
for a mistrial?

V.        Was it 
reversible error for the district court not to admit Vena's entire recorded 
confession upon request by the defendant in accordance with the rule of 
completeness?

VI.        Did the 
district court err when it instructed the jury?

 

Only four issues are 
articulated in Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming:

I.          
Whether Appellant's statements to law enforcement were voluntary and the 
jury was properly instructed on the issue of 
voluntariness.

II.          
Whether the trial court properly denied Appellant's discovery request for 
Paul Brown's mental evaluation report.

III.         
Whether Appellant was properly sentenced to consecutive life sentences 
for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree 
murder.

IV.        Whether the 
district court properly ruled on Appellant's motions for mistrial and for 
admission of the tape recorded confession.

 

[¶3]      In October of 
1994, Vena owned and operated the Lincolnway Detail Center (Detail Center) in 
Cheyenne. When an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) 
went to the Detail Center to order an accessory for his vehicle, Vena suggested 
to the agent that Paul Brown (Brown), one of Vena's employees, could provide 
information about criminal activity in Cheyenne. Shortly after that another 
special agent of the ATF contacted Brown and hired him as an 
informant.

 

[¶4]      During the next 
several weeks, Brown supplied information concerning illicit firearm and 
narcotics activities in Cheyenne to the ATF. Between November 18, 1994 and 
November 21, 1994, Vena assisted Brown in making two controlled buys of 
narcotics for the ATF. Vena had worked extensively as an informant for several 
federal law enforcement agencies, including the Secret Service, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Customs 
Service, and most frequently, the ATF. On November 28, 1994, Vena signed a 
confidential informant agreement with the ATF. 

 

[¶5]      The victim was a 
transient who had been working at the Detail Center for Vena and using a back 
room at the Detail Center as his living quarters. During that month of November, 
the victim became aware of Brown's and Vena's work as informants for the ATF. 
Vena and Brown were concerned about the fact that the victim "knew too much" 
about their business, and they feared he might inform local narcotics and 
firearms dealers that Vena and Brown were working as informants. On the evening 
of November 28, 1994, Vena and Brown decided to kill the victim at the Detail 
Center.

 

[¶6]      Later that 
evening, Vena and Brown took a shotgun and some specially loaded shotgun shells 
and drove to the Detail Center. Vena waited in his office while Brown went to 
the back room. The victim was asleep in his sleeping bag on a cot in that room, 
and Brown shot him twice at close range with the shotgun, once in the chest and 
once in the head. Vena and Brown then took the victim's body, still in the 
sleeping bag, and loaded it into the trunk of the car which they had parked 
outside. They disposed of the body by leaving it along side the road near Nunn, 
Colorado.

 

[¶7]      Vena and Brown 
then returned to Cheyenne where they cleaned the back room of the Detail Center. 
Brown broke down the shotgun, and Vena and Brown concealed the shotgun parts, 
the left over special shells, and their bloody clothing in several places along 
Interstate 80 between Cheyenne and Laramie. The victim's body was found in a 
ditch outside of Nunn on November 30, 1994. Later on that day, two employees of 
the Wyoming Highway Department discovered bags of personal items and bloody 
clothes in two different trash barrels along Interstate 80 between Laramie and 
Cheyenne. Among the items found were identification cards belonging to the 
victim. The Wyoming Highway Patrol sent a teletype to authorities in Wyoming and 
Northern Colorado inquiring if a body had been discovered, and within an hour, 
they received a response from Weld County, Colorado, where the victim's body had 
been found.

 

[¶8]      Pursuing the 
investigation, Cheyenne police officers determined that the victim's last known 
residence was the back room of the Detail Center, and he was last seen there on 
November 28, 1994. Evidence of blood spatter was uncovered in that back room, 
and the officers determined that the sleeping bag in which the victim's body had 
been found had been his bedding. The officers also learned that Brown owned a 
shotgun and that Vena and Brown were seen together in a car, which Vena was 
driving, during the early morning hours of November 29, 1994. The officers 
examined the car, on December 3, 1994, and found evidence of blood in the trunk 
and passenger compartment. After being interviewed at the police station later 
that evening, Brown was arrested for the victim's murder.

 

[¶9]      The investigators 
then located Vena, and they advised him that Brown had been arrested as a 
suspect in a homicide. Vena insisted on first speaking privately with the ATF 
agent with whom he had been working. Vena denied shooting the victim, but he 
furnished the officers with a general outline of what had transpired on the 
evening of November 28, 1994. Vena voluntarily went with the officers to the 
police department where he was advised of his constitutional rights as required 
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Vena continued to furnish further details 
in response to precise questions posed by the investigating officers. In an 
attempt to bolster his truthfulness, Vena directed the officers to various 
locations along Interstate 80 where he and Brown had disposed of parts of the 
shotgun and the remainder of the special shot shells.

 

[¶10]   The following day, December 4, 
1994, Vena again was advised of his rights pursuant to the Miranda decision, and the interview by 
the officers continued. In the course of this interview, Vena admitted that he 
was involved with Brown in planning the victim's killing. After making this 
admission, Vena was arrested and charged with the victim's murder. Following a 
jury trial, Vena was found guilty on both charges, conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder and first degree murder. He was sentenced to consecutive life 
terms at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. 

 

[¶11]   Vena's main claims of error relate 
to the voluntariness of statements he made to the ATF agent and the police 
officers with respect to the victim's murder. He contends that the inculpatory 
statements made to these officers on December 4, 1994 were not voluntary because 
he believed he was assisting the officers in his role as an ATF informant and 
the statements were induced by comments from the officers that "the only thing 
we're interested in * * * [is] who pulled the trigger." Vena argues that these 
comments implied that the sole target of their criminal investigation was the 
person who pulled the trigger, and therefore incorporated a reasonable assurance 
that his statements would not be used against him. He asserts reversible error 
by the district court in denying his motion to suppress the inculpatory 
statements arising after these assurances from the police officers, and further, 
that the court erroneously instructed the jury on the issue of 
voluntariness.

 

[¶12]   It is established firmly in Wyoming 
that the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress a confession are 
binding unless clearly erroneous. This rule first was adopted in Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 
(Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). In Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 1994), we summarized the justification for the rule:

Since the district court conducts the hearing on the 
motion to suppress and has the opportunity to: assess the credibility of the 
witnesses; the weight given the evidence; and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the district court's determination.

This rule, as stated in 
Wilson, was followed in Witt v. 
State, 892 P.2d 132, 140 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶13]   Twenty five years ago, we adopted 
for Wyoming the standard that, in evaluating the voluntariness of statements by 
an accused person, we look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation. Jarrett v. State, 500 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 1972). Recently we summarized in Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1242-43 
(Wyo. 1996):

 

[¶14]   Denial of a motion to suppress is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1344 
(Wyo. 1996). When the issue of voluntariness is raised in a suppression issue, 
the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was 
voluntary. Id.; Miranda v. Arizona 
[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1996)], 384 U.S.  at 444-45, 86 S. Ct.  at 1612. If the 
State cannot carry its burden, then evidence attained either directly or 
indirectly may not generally be used at trial. Wong Sun [Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)], 371 U.S.  at 485-86, 83 S. Ct.  at 416. Because claims 
of involuntary confessions and Miranda violations are resolved after 
examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding such claims, a 
review of all relevant facts is required. Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 
1993); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); and Thompson v. Keohane [Thompson v. Keohane, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 457, 464, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995)], ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct.  at 
464.

 

Statements are considered 
voluntary if they are "the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986), quoted with approval in Witt, 892 P.2d  
at 139; Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 
664 (Wyo. 1993); Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1993); and Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 1986). Emotionalism, confusion, and 
subjective perception do not necessarily invalidate a statement or confession. 
Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 975 n. 
4 (Wyo. 1991); Witt, 892 P.2d  at 139; 
Bravo v. State, 897 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Wyo. 1995); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225 (Wyo. 1993); Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶15]   In this case, the record 
establishes that the officers advised Vena that "the only thing we're interested 
in * * * [is] who pulled the trigger." Our cases establish, however, that 
statements by the police suggesting that it would probably go easier for the 
accused if the accused cooperates have been declared innocent and 
constitutionally accepted. Witt, 892 P.2d  at 139. In analogous instances, belief as to a promise of nonprosecution; 
belief that the accused was considered a victim rather than a perpetrator; and 
belief that a girlfriend would be benefited by the statement have not been 
perceived as resulting in an involuntary admission. Bravo, 897 P.2d  at 1305; Burk, 848 P.2d  at 232; Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 607. Vena was 
advised of his Miranda rights on two 
separate occasions before he admitted his participation in the victim's murder. 
The statement by the officers, upon which Vena relies, was made at a point in 
the interview after he already had admitted that he and Brown specifically had 
discussed the necessity of killing the victim and had planned, at least 
generally, the way that it would be done. At that juncture, the only information 
the police lacked was whether it was Brown or Vena who shot the 
victim.

 

[¶16]   The comments of the trial judge are 
perceptive and sound:

 

In his direct examination Vena was unable to give any 
cogent statement as to just when, where and by whom the alleged promises were 
made to him, except by way of affirmative responses to his counsels' suggestions 
that "[the police detective] and [the ATF agent]" were the people by whom and 
"the 3rd and 4th" as the times at which the assurances were given. 

* * *

On cross-examination Vena was very uncooperative and 
unable to give any coherent recitation of the critically important chronology 
and content of the conversations and interviews. When he was pressed, it was 
clear that counsel did not want the subject pursued.

 

In ruling upon the motion to 
suppress the court said this:

Vena is a 53-year-old man, long experienced in 
working with law enforcement in the course of investigative work and not likely 
to be duped by a ruse so primitive as a fake promise that he would not be 
prosecuted if he told about his involvement in a murder.

The totality of the circumstances and the 
preponderance of the evidence surrounding Vena's several statements show that he 
made these statements voluntarily. The police did not use implied promises of 
immunity to coerce Vena into making these statements in violation of his rights 
to due process. Accordingly, the motion to suppress these statements made on 
December 3, 4 and 5, 1994, will be denied.

 

[¶17]   The district court, in this case, 
had the requisite opportunity to consider the totality of the circumstances, 
which have been outlined previously, and the demeanor of the witnesses who 
presented the evidence. Upon review of the record, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the determination by the district court, we cannot 
conclude that its finding of voluntariness was erroneous. There was no abuse of 
discretion, and therefore no error in admitting Vena's statements into 
evidence.

 

[¶18]   Pursuing the issue of 
voluntariness, Vena contends that the district court committed error in its 
instruction to the jury on the law relating to the voluntariness of statements 
by the accused. The jury was instructed:

 

Statements made by the defendant to law enforcement 
officers may be considered by you only if you first determine that such 
statements were made voluntarily, in whole or in part. Statements are made 
voluntarily if they are the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
by intimidation or coercion, or in reliance upon an express or implied promise 
of special favor, leniency, or benefit. The fact that the defendant was advised 
of his constitutional rights, the conduct of the officers during the interview, 
the apparent intelligence of the defendant, his age and experience with the law 
enforcement are but a few of the factors you are to consider as part of the 
totality of the circumstances under which the statement was made. In making this 
determination you must view these factors as a reasonable person would view 
them.

If you find the statement is not voluntary, you must 
not consider it as evidence against the defendant. If you find it is voluntary 
in whole or in part, you must consider only that part of the statement which you 
find to have been voluntary.

The submission of this issue 
to the jury was in accordance with the procedure that we have espoused. After 
the trial court makes its determination that a statement is to be received into 
evidence as voluntarily made, the defendant then has the right to have the 
question of the confession's voluntariness submitted to the jury for its 
independent determination. Witt, 892 P.2d  at 140; Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 309-10 (Wyo. 1977); Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 607.

 

[¶19]   Vena argues that this instruction 
erroneously stated the law of voluntariness because the jury was required to 
view the totality of the circumstances underlying Vena's confession from the 
perspective of a reasonable person. Vena's contention is that the proper 
instruction would have advised the jury that it should examine the voluntariness 
of the confession in light of Vena's intelligence and other subjective factors. 
The instruction was essentially drawn from the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instructions § 6.12 (1996). It did inform the jury that it should consider 
Vena's intelligence, his age, and his experience with law enforcement officers 
when the jury was deciding whether the statements were voluntary. We hold that 
the instruction was an accurate statement of the law with respect to the 
voluntariness of Vena's admissions, and the court did not err in giving 
it.

 

[¶20]   In his second issue, Vena asserts 
that the district court erred when it denied him access to Brown's psychiatric 
evaluation that was prepared prior to Vena's trial. Vena sought the psychiatric 
evaluation pursuant to WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16, which provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) Disclosure 
of evidence by state.

1) Information Subject to 
Disclosure.

* 
* * * * *

(D) Reports of Examinations and Tests. - Upon written 
demand of a defendant, the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy 
or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of 
scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the 
possession, custody, or control of the state, the existence of which is known, 
or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the 
state, and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended 
for use by the state as evidence in chief at the trial.

 

[¶21]   In Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990), 
we approved a trial process pursuant to which materials are to be examined in 
camera by the trial court, and a ruling then made without disclosure of the 
material to the accused. While we have addressed the standard of review only 
twice, and somewhat tangentially, we are satisfied that the standard of review 
is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in refusing to order 
enforcement of a discovery order or disclose materials sought by the accused. 
The record discloses that the trial court did examine the psychiatric evaluation 
that Vena sought to obtain, and ordered that it be sealed and made a part of the 
record on review. The essence of the ruling of the court was that the report was 
not material.

 

[¶22]   The language of the discovery rule 
requires that when a request for such report is presented, like that made by 
Vena, the report of the examinations must be material to the preparation of the 
defense. In Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994, 998 (Wyo. 1996), we quoted favorably language to the effect that 
evidence sought on discovery is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the case would have been different. The 
requirement of materiality is tested by the court's inquiry as to whether the 
evidence which is sought is likely to affect the outcome of the trial. Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 763 (Wyo. 
1993). Young quoted from Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 625 (Wyo. 
1985), where we said:

[The] evidence must both possess an exculpatory value 
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed [or made available], and 
also be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable 
evidence by other reasonably available means * * *.

In Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 544 
(Wyo. 1993), we stated the proposition that there is no duty of disclosure with 
respect to evidence that is only speculatively helpful to a defendant or merely 
exhibits a potential for leading to exculpatory material.

 

[¶23]   The trial court obviously was 
concerned about the language found in WYO. STAT. § 7-11-303(h) (1987) which 
reads:

* 
* * No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination or 
treatment pursuant to this section and no information received by any person in 
the course of the examination or treatment shall be admitted in evidence in any 
criminal proceeding then or thereafter pending on any issue other than that of 
the mental condition of the accused.

It is clear that Brown's 
psychiatric evaluation was conducted pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 
7-11-303. The trial court was obviously concerned about the privileged nature of 
the information. The claim that it might have been used to insure a more 
"thorough" investigation of Brown hardly seems sufficient to overcome that 
privilege. Further, Vena does not explain whether the information could have 
been obtained through other reasonably available means, in addition to the fact 
that Vena, a close associate of Brown's, might have been in an excellent 
position to be aware of Brown's background.

 

[¶24]   The thrust of the justification 
argued by Vena is that had he been given access to this evaluation, he would 
have been able to investigate Brown's background more thoroughly, or 
alternatively, he would have possessed evidence of Brown's history of 
hallucinations which could have either provided Brown with the motive to kill 
the victim, or could have been used to demonstrate that Brown lacked the 
requisite intent to commit first degree murder. It is in these respects that 
Vena contends the information was material to the preparation of his defense. 
With respect to the history of hallucinations, Vena assumes that the only 
relevant intent with respect to the murder was that of Brown. He overlooks the 
proposition that the jury could have found him guilty based upon his own intent, 
even though Brown may have lacked the requisite intent. In any event, the 
contention is purely speculative. The report itself refutes this latter 
contention, and the history of hallucinations is only speculatively 
helpful.

 

[¶25]   In Roach v. State, 901 P.2d 1135, 1137 
(Wyo. 1995), we held that it is inappropriate to attempt to circumvent statutory 
privileges by invoking the rules of discovery in criminal cases. There was no 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ruling that Vena could not 
obtain Brown's psychiatric evaluation. We hold that the trial court did not 
commit error in failing to order disclosure of the psychiatric 
evaluation.

 

[¶26]   Vena's third issue presents the 
proposition that the doctrine of merger forecloses his separate life sentences 
for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and being an accessory to first 
degree murder. The doctrine of merger is a product of the double jeopardy clause 
of the Constitution of the United States and the Wyoming Constitution, both 
prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense. Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 942 
(Wyo. 1992); Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1990). Whether one is being punished twice for the same offense is 
analyzed under the "statutory elements" test, whereby:

[T]he first [goal] is to determine whether the 
offenses have identical elements, and the second is to determine if some 
elements of either offense are identical to those of the other. In either 
instance, concerns about double jeopardy are implicated because a second 
prosecution and sentence for the identical crime or a second prosecution and 
sentence for a lesser-included crime are proscribed by the double jeopardy 
clauses of both our state and federal constitutions. The essence of this test is 
that, when the elements or the facts of a charged offense make it separate and 
distinct from another charged offense, then the intention of the legislature to 
authorize separate or cumulative punishments for both offenses is presumed. In 
such an instance, the trial court can lawfully impose separate and cumulative 
sentences if the defendant is convicted of both crimes.

DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584, 589 (Wyo. 1993); followed in Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 
193 (Wyo. 1995). 

 

[¶27]   Conspiracy and the completed 
substantive offense are separate offenses because they incorporate different 
elements requiring different evidence to prove each of the charges. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1077-78 
(Wyo. 1992); Garcia v. State, 774 P.2d 623, 624 (Wyo. 1989); Schultz v. 
State, 751 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo. 1988). The record in this case demonstrates 
that the evidence necessary to support the conspiracy charge is different from 
the evidence required to support the accessory to murder charge. The requisite 
agreement formed to commit the murder was made, and once either Vena or Brown 
took any action that would constitute an overt act, the crime of conspiracy was 
completed. The record discloses that Vena and Brown planned the victim's murder; 
armed Brown with a shotgun and special shells; and drove to the Detail Center. 
At that juncture the crime of conspiracy had been completed, and the victim had 
not yet been killed.

 

[¶28]   In connection with the charge of 
being an accessory to first degree murder, it was essential to demonstrate that 
the victim was killed, and Brown and Vena then disposed of the body and 
concealed the murder by disposing of the shotgun and discarding their bloody 
clothes, in addition to removing blood stains from the car and the Detail 
Center. It was necessary that the State establish those facts in order for Vena 
to be convicted of the separate and distinct offense of accessory to first 
degree murder. Consequently the doctrine of merger was not applicable, and the 
trial court was vested with discretion to determine whether sentences for 
separate crimes should be imposed consecutively or concurrently. Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶29]   We turn to the last two issues 
raised by Vena. He asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for a mistrial and that error also occurred in the failure to admit into 
evidence the entirety of his confession upon his request. The determination of a 
motion for a mistrial and rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence 
are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such rulings "will 
not be overturned on appeal without demonstration of a clear abuse of 
discretion." Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1996); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1995). An abuse of discretion is not found unless the court acts 
in a way that exceeds the bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law under 
the circumstances. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d  at 956; Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). Stated another way:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 
704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986); See also, Vit v. State, 909 P.2d  at 957; 
Hogan v. State, 908 P.2d 925, 928 
(Wyo. 1995); Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1131 (Wyo. 1995); Cavender v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 1993); Rude v. State, 851 P.2d  at 
23.

 

[¶30]   In asserting his right to a 
mistrial, Vena argues that a police officer testified with respect to his "prior 
narcotics involvement," and that this testimony violated an order in limine entered by the district court. 
The testimony that Vena points to is:

Q. Okay. Now, back to that point in time, what 
differences, if any, did he relate now on December 5th compared to your first 
interview on December 2nd?

A. Several differences. Now I asked him to start the 
interview by explaining to me his knowledge of the death of [the victim]. He did 
so. He started by saying that he was with Mr. Brown on the night of the 28th 
when Mr. Brown shot him with a shotgun. He stated that he helped dispose of the 
body, that the shooting took place in the Detail Center, in [the victim's] room 
where he was sleeping while he was on the cot. They used a vehicle owned by his 
accountant to transport the body to the State of Colorado, that they took the 
clothes and the weapon itself, the shotgun, dismantled the shotgun and threw it 
along I-80 west of Cheyenne, different locations. He stated that he, in fact, 
did have a shotgun in his apartment when he lived over on Parkview at one time 
prior to this, that Paul Brown brought the shotgun over, that he kept it in his 
bedroom closet at one point. He kept it in his living room closet at one point. 
That the reason that the shotgun come 
over there to his apartment, Mr. Vena's apartment is because he had been having 
some trouble with some individuals, referenced some money owed because of a dope 
deal.

(Emphasis added). The point 
of Vena's argument here, which he made at trial, is that this constituted 
improper character evidence in violation of WYO. R. EVID. 
404(b).

 

[¶31]   Vena incorrectly characterizes the 
position of the district court with respect to his alleged narcotics activity. 
The district court stated, responding to Vena's request that any prior narcotics 
activity should be treated as constituting improper character 
evidence:

So I will sustain the objection to any testimony 
going to drug dealing between Mr. Vena and others prior to those transactions 
that he did in cooperation with the ATF. That doesn't mean that I find 
inadmissible the other testimony that goes with that, as I mentioned a moment 
ago, the alleged anger on behalf of Mr. Vena and the others. I don't think it's 
necessary to bring in the drug dealing, and so I'll sustain the 
objection.

At the time the court ruled, 
the State's theory of the case was that a motive for Vena and Brown to murder 
the victim existed because the victim had learned too much about their narcotics 
activities while they were working as informants for the ATF. The district court 
ruled explicitly that the State could make reference to those narcotics 
activities while Vena and Brown were acting in their capacity as informants for 
the ATF.

 

[¶32]   When the police officer testified 
about the narcotics activities prior to Vena's capacity as an ATF informant, the 
testimony was offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating that Vena had 
access to the murder weapon, and that he offered an excuse for having the weapon 
which was not related to the plan to kill the victim. We hold that no abuse of 
discretion was committed by the district court in its denial of Vena's motion 
for a mistrial based upon this isolated statement.

 

[¶33]   As to Vena's assertion that he had 
a right to have his full tape-recorded confession played to the jury pursuant to 
WYO. R. EVID. 106, our examination of the record demonstrates that the entire 
confession eventually was played before the jury during the testimony of the 
investigator who had conducted that interview. We cannot conceive of an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the district court in waiting until the investigator 
who conducted the actual interview testified before the tape of that interview 
was played back in its entirety before the jury. There was no error in this 
regard.

 

[¶34]   We conclude that no reversible 
error occurred in Vena's trial, and the Judgment and Sentence entered in the 
district court must be affirmed.