Title: Joe Morgan v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07­799 JOE MORGAN Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered November 29, 2007 PRO SE MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD AND EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, AND MOTION TO TREAT APPEAL AS PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS [CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CR 2002­2106, HON. MARION HUMPHREY, JUDGE] APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION FOR ACCESS TO RECORD MOOT; MOTION TO TREAT APPEAL AS PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN TRIAL COURT DENIED. PER CURIAM In 2003, appellant Joe Morgan, who is also known as Joe E. Morgan, entered a plea of guilty to rape and first­degree sexual assault. The trial court sentenced appellant to sixty years’ and thirty years’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Subsequently, appellant filed in the trial court a petition for relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. We dismissed appellant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petition. Morgan v. State, 360 Ark. 264, 200 S.W.3d 890 (2005). Appellant later filed in the trialcourt a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus pursuant to Act 1780 of2001 as amended byAct 2250 of2005 and codified asArk. Code Ann. §§16­112­201–16­112­208 ­2­ (Repl. 2006). The trial court denied the petition, and appellant has lodged an appeal in this court from that order. Now before us are appellant’s pro se motion for access to the appellate record and for an extension of time to file appellant’s brief­in­chief and motion to treat the appeal as a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. We need not consider the motion for access to the record as it is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this appeal if it were permitted to go forward. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and hold the motion for access moot. An appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. See Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). In his petition, appellant claimed that he entered the plea of guilty although he was legally incompetent to do so. He prayed for neurological testing to determine whether he suffered from an organic mental defect, i.e., abnormal brain functioning. He alleged that the need for the testing was “newly discovered,” and that the testing was withheld from him at the time of his guilty plea. If determined to be legally incompetent as a result of this mental defect, he asked to be released from his “involuntary” guilty plea and to proceed to trial or receive medical treatment. Act 1780 provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16­112­103(a)(1)(Repl. 2006) and sections 16­112­201–208; see also Echols v. State, 350 Ark. 42, 84 S.W.3d 424 (2002) (per curiam) (decision under prior law). It is a requirement of the statute that the “identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation ­3­ or prosecution of the offense being challenged[.]” Section 16­112­202(7). When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, the guilty plea is the trial. Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984); Irons v. State, 267 Ark. 469, 591 S.W.2d 650 (1980). In entering his plea of guilty, appellant admitted that he committed the offense. See Curtis v. State, 255 Ark. 428, 500 S.W.2d 767 (1973) (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)). His identity was thus not in question. See Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004) (per curiam) (decision under prior law). Appellant failed to show that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was at issue during the investigation or prosecution. Moreover, as to the requirement that the requested testing prove the petitioner’s actual innocence, appellant failed to show that the neurological testing would have proved that he was actually innocent of the crime. Instead, the stated purpose for the testing would have been to challenge whether he was mentally competent to enter a plea of guilty. As the arguments made by appellant did not present a proper basis for postconviction relief pursuant to Act 1780 with regard to actual innocence or identity, appellant could not be successful on appeal. Next, appellant’s motion to treat the appeal as a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis is denied. It is not necessary for appellant to obtain this court’s permission to file a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court because he entered a plea of guilty. Where a judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the judgment ofconvictionwas not appealed, a petition for writ oferror coram nobis is filed directly in the trial court. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per curiam). Appeal dismissed; motion for access to record moot; motion to treat appeal as petition to ­4­ reinvest jurisdiction in trial court denied.