Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CLIFTON. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Clifton (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 496.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — While filling dual 
role of guardian and attorney to the guardian, allowing ward’s assets to 
dissipate and appropriating funds of the estate for business and personal 
use. 
(No. 96-2805 — Submitted May 7, 1997 — Decided October 1, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-58. 
 
On October 21, 1994, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed an 
amended complaint charging in two counts that respondent, William Deems 
Clifton II of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0038076, violated eight 
Disciplinary Rules while acting as the guardian of an estate, and in another count, 
that respondent violated an additional Disciplinary Rule and a Rule for the 
Government of the Bar by failing to pay attorney registration fees on a timely basis 
during the 1989/1991, 1991/1993 and 1993/1995 biennia.  After respondent filed 
an answer, the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
The panel found that on February 3, 1984, the Hamilton County Probate 
Court appointed respondent guardian of the person and estate of Ollie R. Cawein, 
an incompetent, after the death of her brother, who was the prior guardian.  At the 
time of respondent’s appointment, Cawein’s assets totaled over $500,000, mostly 
consisting of stocks, bonds and cash, in addition to two residences in Cincinnati 
and two lots in Florida.  Between February 1984 and December 1992, when 
respondent resigned as guardian, respondent placed estate funds totaling 
 
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$296,236.72, either into his private business or personal accounts and used them 
for business and personal expenses. 
 
Between April 1986 and September 1990, respondent not only retained for 
his own use dividends and interest belonging to the estate, but also borrowed 
$172,407 from Cawein’s estate without authority.  He retained proceeds of sales of 
the estate’s stocks, proceeds from the sales of stocks received in stock splits, and 
proceeds from distributions of the estates of Cawein’s relatives and executed six 
personal five-year promissory notes for the borrowed amounts.  He did not timely 
pay these notes because he determined at the time the notes were due that 
Cawein’s estate did not need the money and that it was not convenient for him to 
make the payments.  Respondent transferred the funds represented by the notes to 
Jamaica Trading Shares, Inc., a Delaware corporation that he formed and owned. 
The funds in Jamaica Trading were used to meet respondent’s professional and 
personal obligations, such as the purchase of an automobile for himself.  
Respondent did not report the receipt of stock from stock splits in his annual 
guardianship reports.  Not only did the estate fail to receive the funds represented 
by the notes, but it also failed to realize interest had the funds been received and 
invested. 
 
Cawein was an incompetent as a result of a stroke incurred in 1976. She 
resided in a nursing home and had little prospect of occupying either of the two 
residences she owned in Cincinnati.  Yet respondent failed to sell either property, 
and during his guardianship realized only $13,205.62 in rental income from one of 
the properties.  During respondent’s tenure as guardian, operating expenses of 
these two properties exceeded the rental income by $15,287.99.  In addition, while 
he was guardian respondent spent an additional $64,442.34 in repairs on these 
properties.  Respondent did not maintain insurance on either property, and because 
 
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he did not file tax returns for the estate for several years, tax liens were placed on 
the properties.  Eventually, the liens were removed after respondent paid the taxes 
and penalties. 
 
Respondent also neglected to maintain the two real estate lots in Florida 
appraised at $11,000 and owned by the estate.  His failure to pay property taxes on 
the Florida real estate resulted in the lots’ being sold at a sheriff’s sale. 
 
Because respondent failed to account for the use of Social Security income 
from November 1989 through March 1993, the Department of Health and Human 
Services suspended Cawein’s Social Security payments totaling $27,429.  
Although the suspended amounts were ultimately recovered, the estate lost $5,800 
in interest that could have been realized had the funds been received and invested. 
 
Without court approval, respondent paid himself an aggregate of $66,985 in 
attorney fees and guardianship fees during the period he served as both attorney 
and guardian.  However, respondent did not retain records of time expended or 
work performed to support the fees charged. 
 
The panel also found that during his guardianship respondent visited 
Cawein infrequently.  His testimony indicated that during the six years of his 
guardianship, he purchased only $800-$1,200 in clothes for her, and the 
employees of the nursing home testified that Cawein was dressed with clothes left 
at the nursing home when other occupants departed or died.  Respondent also 
claimed that he did repair Cawein’s broken television at one time, and that if it 
was subsequently not working, he did not know about it.  Respondent would not 
authorize speech therapy for Cawein, nor would he authorize the purchase for 
Cawein of a recommended “lap board” and a “communication board” (an item 
with icons to which she could point to indicate her needs).  The estate, however, 
maintained a subscription to The Wall Street Journal. 
 
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On May 31, 1991, the nursing home contacted the Hamilton County Probate 
Court indicating serious concerns about the Cawein guardianship.  The nursing 
home cited not only respondent’s failure to visit his ward and his disregard for her 
everyday needs, but also the fact that the estate owed the nursing home over 
$18,000 for care and maintenance of Cawein.  After an investigation by the court, 
respondent resigned as guardian in December 1992. 
 
On January 8, 1993, the court appointed Dolores Schuessler as successor 
guardian.  When Schuessler visited the nursing home three days after her 
appointment, she found Cawein dressed in very worn clothing and living in a 
crowded, shabby room, with no curtains on the windows.  Schuessler purchased 
clothing for Cawein, as well as a television set and a recliner chair to replace her 
wheelchair.  Schuessler requested an immediate dental exam of Cawein and 
arranged to have fresh flowers sent to Cawein every week.  Schuessler rescinded 
the order of respondent “do not hospitalize” and told the nursing home Cawein 
was to have every care possible.  During the approximately seventy days she was 
guardian until Cawein died on March 17, 1993, Schuessler visited Cawein eight 
times. 
 
As a result of the audit requested by Schuessler, the Hamilton County 
Probate Court found in September 1994 that during the term of his guardianship, 
respondent had violated his fiduciary duty to the Cawein estate; the court ordered 
him to make restitution in the amount of $400,282.88 for funds he had 
mismanaged, commingled, or lost.  The restitution amount consisted of the 
following: $22,869.95 for losing or forfeiting assets; $79,094.91 for unpaid 
interest on the six promissory notes; $41,194.07 for interest lost on funds not 
received by the estate and not accounted for by the promissory notes; $74,187.33 
for losses incurred in the management of the estate’s real property; $66,985 for 
 
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attorney and guardianship fees received by the respondent; $47,369.58 for 
statutory interest on the above amounts from January 1, 1993 through September 
1, 1994; and $68,582.04 for the expenses incurred by the successor guardian to 
trace assets of the estate and satisfy liens.  The order of restitution was affirmed on 
appeal. In re Guardianship of Cawein (Nov. 1, 1995), Hamilton App. No. C-
940885, unreported, 1995 WL 653853. 
 
The panel found that the $172,704 which respondent had borrowed from the 
estate had been repaid and that respondent’s bonding company had settled the 
$400,282.88 judgment. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent had clearly and convincingly violated 
DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-
102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects 
upon the fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal 
matter), 7-101 (A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the 
course of the professional relationship), and 9-102(A) and (B) (failing to preserve 
the identity of the funds and property of the client).  As to the charge that 
respondent had failed to pay attorney registration fees on a timely basis, the panel 
found violations of Gov.Bar R. VI(1)(A) and DR 1-102(A)(6).  Inasmuch as 
respondent’s activities took place over a six-year period and were designed to 
conceal the defalcations, the panel found no mitigating circumstances.  The panel 
recommended that respondent be disbarred. 
 
The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the 
panel. 
__________________ 
 
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J. Warren Bettis, Interim Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown and Cynthia 
L. Roehl, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Gary R. Lewis, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The respondent undertook the dual roles of guardian and 
attorney for the guardianship of  both the person and the estate of an incompetent 
woman who it appears had no close relatives.  As the record indicates, respondent 
failed miserably in the performance of his duties in both roles.  Over a six-year 
period respondent wasted his ward’s considerable estate through both negligence 
and design.  Just as important, over those same six years, respondent failed to 
provide adequately for the care and comfort of his ward. 
 
A guardian of the estate is required by R.C. 2111.14(B) to manage the estate 
for the best interest of the ward.  The duty of management requires that the 
guardian attend to the assets of the ward as a prudent person would attend to his or 
her own assets. The record here indicates that respondent, filling the dual role of 
guardian and attorney to the guardian, not only allowed assets of Cawein’s estate 
to dissipate but also appropriated funds of the estate to his own use. 
 
A guardian of the person is required by R.C. 2111.13(A) to protect the 
person of the ward and to provide suitable maintenance as the amount of her estate 
justifies.  Thus, the guardian of an elderly woman has a duty to provide care and 
maintenance according to her means and position in life. Tonge v. Salisbury 
(1934), 54 R.I. 170, 171 A. 372.  The successor guardian found Cawein poorly 
dressed in a crowded, shabby room with no curtains, a broken television, and an 
inadequate wheelchair.  Under those circumstances, respondent failed to maintain 
Cawein according to the means of a woman with an estate initially valued at over 
 
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$500,000. The successor trustee in this case took the kind of responsible action 
that should have been taken by respondent. 
 
A guardian of the person of an elderly incompetent must take steps to see 
that the ward, however incapacitated, has the comfort and care that he or she could 
afford were the ward personally able to order such care.  Frankly, we find 
respondent’s actions as the guardian of the person and estate of Cawein to be 
despicable and contemptuous. 
 
As to respondent’s responsibility as attorney for the guardianship, we said 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 14 OBR 322, 324, 
470 N.E.2d 888, 890, “‘There are few ethical breaches which impact more 
negatively on the integrity of the legal profession than the misuse of a client’s 
funds.’”  Recently we said, “Public trust in the legal profession is tested daily in 
the service provided by each individual lawyer to his or her clients.  When a 
lawyer, who has taken responsibility for a client’s papers or property, commingles 
client funds or dissipates that property, the lawyer not only ill serves the client but 
also contributes to the erosion of public trust in the profession.” Miami Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Hallows (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 676 N.E.2d 517, 518.  In that case 
and in Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Armon (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 497, 678 N.E.2d 1371, 
we noted that the appropriate sanction for the misuse of client funds is disbarment. 
 
In this case, unlike Miami Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hallows, we find no mitigating 
circumstances whatever.  Respondent is permanently disbarred from the practice 
of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.