Title: Fuller v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 
 
2021 WY 36 
 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 24, 2021  
 
 
 
DILLON WAYNE FULLER, 
 
Appellant 
(Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 
 
S-20-0080 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County 
The Honorable Thomas W. Rumpke, Judge 
 
Representing Appellant: 
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Mr. Westling. 
 
Representing Appellee: 
 
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, 
Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Jones. 
 
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ. 
 
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final 
publication in the permanent volume. 
 
1 
 
KAUTZ, Justice.  
 
[¶1] 
Law enforcement officers entered Dillon Wayne Fuller’s apartment without a 
warrant to arrest him after he failed to stop for a traffic violation.  Mr. Fuller filed a motion 
to suppress, arguing the warrantless entry was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The district court decided the warrantless 
entry was justified by exigent circumstances—the “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect—and 
denied Mr. Fuller’s motion.  Mr. Fuller appeals from that denial.  We reverse and remand. 
 
ISSUE 
 
[¶2] 
Did the district court err in concluding law enforcement’s warrantless entry into Mr. 
Fuller’s apartment to arrest him was constitutional under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement? 
 
FACTS 
 
[¶3] 
At around 3:30 A.M. on March 20, 2019, Campbell County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan 
Kellison observed a sport-utility vehicle (SUV) with no visible registration traveling 
through downtown Gillette.  He activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and attempted to 
stop the SUV.  The SUV did not stop, but rather sped up slightly from 35 mph to 40 mph.  
After traveling about four blocks, the SUV pulled into a single-story apartment complex.  
The driver jumped out of the vehicle, looked at Deputy Kellison, and ran into an apartment.  
Before the driver entered the apartment, Deputy Kellison twice told him to stop.    
 
[¶4] 
Deputy Kellison called for back-up.  While waiting for back-up to arrive, Deputy 
Kellison approached the SUV, where he found a female passenger.  The passenger 
identified herself but claimed not to know the driver’s name.  Deputy Kellison ran the 
passenger’s name through dispatch; she did not have any outstanding warrants.  Deputy 
Kellison waited near the front door of the apartment for back-up.  
 
[¶5] 
Back-up officers arrived “a couple of minutes” after Deputy Kellison requested their 
assistance.  Deputy Kellison walked around the apartment building and discovered the only 
other potential exit from the apartment was a back window, which was closed.  Officers 
positioned themselves around the building while Deputy Kellison and other officers 
“stacked up” to enter the apartment.  After knocking and announcing their presence three 
times, the officers kicked in the door, which had been blocked by a table.  Once inside the 
apartment, officers found Mr. Fuller and arrested him.  Mr. Fuller “had slurred speech . . . 
[and] could not walk or stand without swaying or being helped by [the officers].”  Deputy 
Kellison smelled “a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from [Mr. Fuller’s] facial 
area” and the odor of burnt marijuana coming from his person.  Another officer found 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia in plain view.  Deputy Kellison subsequently obtained a 
2 
 
search warrant for the apartment.  The search revealed a vape pen cartridge with suspected 
THC oil.     
 
[¶6] 
Mr. Fuller was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance (Count 1); 
felony driving while under the influence (Count 2); misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to 
elude a police officer (Count 3); and misdemeanor interference with a police officer (Count 
4).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-204(a), 31-5-225, 31-5-233(b)(iii)(C), 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) 
(LexisNexis 2019).  He filed a motion to suppress all evidence found in his apartment, 
arguing the officers’ warrantless entry without his consent violated the Fourth 
Amendment.1  The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which the State stipulated 
the apartment was Mr. Fuller’s home.  The district court denied the motion to suppress.  It 
concluded the officers’ warrantless entry into Mr. Fuller’s home was reasonable because 
(1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Fuller for driving without a visible 
registration and eluding and interfering with a police officer; and (2) exigent circumstances 
existed—Deputy Kellison was in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect.    
 
[¶7] 
Mr. Fuller entered conditional guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 2, reserving the right to 
appeal from the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.  The district court 
sentenced him to prison for 2-4 years on Count 1 and 3-5 years on Count 2 and ordered the 
sentences to run concurrently.  Mr. Fuller timely appealed.  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
[¶8] 
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the district court’s decision and accept the district court’s factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Baker v. State, 2010 WY 6, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 542, 
547 (Wyo. 2010).  “The underlying question of law—whether the search was unreasonable 
and therefore unconstitutional—is reviewed de novo.”  Robinson v. State, 2019 WY 125, 
¶ 20, 454 P.3d 149, 156 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Jennings v. State, 2016 WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 
788, 790 (Wyo. 2016)). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9] 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  “[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.”  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 
1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).  See also, United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. 
Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (“[P]hysical 
 
1 Mr. Fuller also argued the warrantless entry was unconstitutional under art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  He does not raise an argument under the Wyoming Constitution in this appeal. 
 
3 
 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”).  However, warrantless entries into the home to effectuate an arrest are valid 
under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.  Payton, 
445 U.S. at 587-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1381.  See also, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 741, 
104 S.Ct. 2091, 2093, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (“[A]bsent probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”); 
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004) (“[W]arrantless searches 
and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they are justified by probable cause and 
established exceptions.”) (citing Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 1995)).  Mr. 
Fuller does not dispute Deputy Kellison had probable cause to arrest him for driving 
without visible registration and eluding a police officer.  He disputes only the existence of 
exigent circumstances. 
 
[¶10] Exigent circumstances exist “when there is compelling need for official action and 
no time to secure a warrant.”  Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 
56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (citations omitted).  Such circumstances include the need to (1) 
provide emergency assistance to a home’s occupant; (2) engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing 
suspect; (3) prevent harm to the police or to other persons; (4) avert the imminent 
destruction of evidence; (5) prevent the suspect’s escape; and (6) enter a burning building 
to put out a fire and investigate its cause.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, ---- U.S. ----, 136 
S.Ct. 2160, 2189, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 
, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013)); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 
110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).  See also, Baker, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d at 547 
(recognizing “a search conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect” is an exception 
to the warrant requirement (quoting Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 708, 712 
(Wyo. 2002)).  We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether exigent 
circumstances existed.  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149, 133 S.Ct. at 1559.  See also, Pena, ¶ 29, 
98 P.3d at 870 (“The existence of exigent circumstances is dependent upon all of the facts 
or circumstances viewed in their entirety.”).  The State bears the burden of showing the 
existence of exigent circumstances.  Pena, ¶ 29, 98 P.2d at 870. 
 
[¶11] The district court concluded the officers’ warrantless entry into Mr. Fuller’s 
apartment was justified by exigent circumstances—the “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect 
(hereinafter referred to as the “hot pursuit” exception).  It explained: 
 
[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, [Deputy] 
Kellison’s entry into [Mr. Fuller]’s home to effectuate an 
arrest was reasonable.  Not only were the offenses at issue [(no 
visible registration and eluding the police)] jailable offenses, 
[Mr. Fuller] repeatedly and quickly escalated his criminal 
behavior.  In a matter of minutes, [Mr. Fuller] went from not 
having a properly displayed vehicle registration to trying to 
elude the police in a vehicle to running away from a deputy 
4 
 
sheriff as he attempted to make an arrest.  Under these facts, 
the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine applies and prohibits rewarding [Mr. 
Fuller] for escalating his criminal behavior and avoids 
penalizing law enforcement for apprehending a suspect who 
by his own actions drew law enforcement into his home. 
 
[] Moreover, [Deputy] Kellison knew almost nothing 
about the suspect in this case except that he was willing to 
continue to escalate his criminal behavior at 3:30 a.m.  
[Deputy] Kellison testified that he did not recognize [Mr. 
Fuller] from any earlier contacts.  Moreover, [Deputy] 
Kellison was unable to run the registration on the [SUV] to 
determine who the owner might be.  Finally, the female 
occupant of the [SUV] refused to tell [Deputy] Kellison who 
had been driving the vehicle.  Under these circumstances, the 
hot pursuit doctrine provided a ‘rare’ exception to the warrant 
requirement.  See State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131 (Utah. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 
[¶12] Mr. Fuller argues the district court erred in applying the “hot pursuit” exception.  He 
maintains the pursuit was not “hot” because Deputy Kellison paused his pursuit to speak 
with the SUV passenger and to wait for back-up.  He also contends there was no need for 
immediate police action because the violation leading to the chase was minor (no visible 
registration), no evidence was being destroyed, there were no imminent safety issues to the 
officers, and there was no danger of Mr. Fuller escaping because officers had surrounded 
the apartment building.   
 
[¶13] For the “hot pursuit” exception to apply, there must be a “pursuit” and the pursuit 
must be “hot.”  Pursuit requires “some sort of a chase, but it need not be an extended hue 
and cry in and about (the) public streets.”  United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 
96 S.Ct. 2406, 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (quotation marks omitted).  It must, however, 
be “immediate or continuous . . . from the scene of a crime.”  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 
S.Ct. at 2099.  See also, Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The 
‘pursuit’ begins when police start to arrest a suspect in a public place, the suspect flees and 
the officers give chase.”) (citing Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 686 (6th Cir. 
2005)).  For a pursuit to be “hot,” there must be an emergency requiring immediate police 
action.  Smith, 716 F.3d at 931 (“What makes the pursuit ‘hot’ is the emergency nature of 
the situation, requiring immediate police action.”) (citation and some internal quotation 
marks omitted).  See also, Cummings, 418 F.3d at 686 (“Typically, hot pursuit involves a 
situation where a suspect commits a crime, flees and thereby exposes himself to the public, 
attempts to evade capture by entering a dwelling, and the emergency nature of the situation 
necessitates immediate police action to apprehend the suspect.”) (emphasis added) 
5 
 
(citations omitted).  The officers’ entry into Mr. Fuller’s apartment in this case was neither 
a “pursuit” nor “hot.”   
 
[¶14] Deputy Kellison chased Mr. Fuller in his vehicle for four blocks and into an 
apartment complex.  However, at the time the officers entered Mr. Fuller’s apartment, the 
chase was no longer “immediate or continuous . . . from the scene of a crime” because it 
had been interrupted by Deputy Kellison’s decision to call and wait for back-up.  Once 
back-up arrived, Deputy Kellison walked around the apartment building and other officers 
secured its perimeter.  Although only 8-13 minutes passed from the time Deputy Kellison 
called for back-up and the officers’ entry into Mr. Fuller’s apartment, this “break” rendered 
Deputy Kellison’s pursuit of Mr. Fuller neither “immediate” nor “continuous” from the 
scene of a crime.  There was no “pursuit.” 
 
[¶15] The Supreme Court’s decision in Welsh is instructive.  After swerving off the road 
and coming to a stop in a field, Mr. Welsh exited his vehicle and walked away from the 
scene.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742, 104 S.Ct. at 2093-94.  A few minutes later, the police 
arrived at the scene and learned Mr. Welsh’s address was within walking distance.  Id.  
Without first obtaining a warrant, the officers went to the address, entered the home, found 
Mr. Welsh in his upstairs bedroom, and arrested him.  Id. at 743, 104 S.Ct. at 2094.  The 
Supreme Court concluded the “hot pursuit” exception did not justify the officers’ 
warrantless entry into Mr. Welsh’s home “because there was no immediate or continuous 
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.”  Id. at 753, 104 S.Ct. at 2099.  That 
was so even though Mr. Welsh’s vehicle went off the road “[s]hortly before 9 [p.m.]” and 
the police arrived at his residence “about 9 p.m.”  Id. at 742-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2093-94.  Like 
the officers in Welsh, Deputy Kellison did not immediately or continually chase Mr. Fuller 
from the streets of downtown Gillette.  Rather, Deputy Kellison stopped his pursuit and 
called for back-up.  
 
[¶16] The pursuit in this case was also not “hot.”  At the time the officers entered Mr. 
Fuller’s apartment, there was no emergency requiring immediate police action.   
 
[¶17] The officers’ warrantless entry to arrest Mr. Fuller was not necessary to prevent 
harm to Deputy Kellison or another person.  Mr. Fuller had not threatened Deputy Kellison 
or any other individual with physical harm.  There was no indication Mr. Fuller was armed.  
There was also no evidence of a third party inside the apartment or that Mr. Fuller posed a 
danger to any other person while holed up in his apartment.  Indeed, by retreating into his 
apartment, any danger he posed to the community by driving without a visible registration 
and in excess of the speed limit had dissipated.  While the passenger in the SUV claimed 
not to know Mr. Fuller’s identity, she identified herself and Deputy Kellison was able to 
quickly determine she had no warrants.  Moreover, at the time of entry, back-up officers 
had arrived and secured the passenger. 
 
6 
 
[¶18] At the time of entry, there was little to no risk of Mr. Fuller escaping because officers 
had secured the apartment’s perimeter.  There was also no risk of any relevant evidence 
being destroyed because the only criminal activity Deputy Kellison had observed at that 
time was driving without a visible registration and eluding and interfering with a police 
officer.  While Mr. Fuller was eventually arrested and charged with driving under the 
influence and possession of marijuana, the evidence supporting those charges was not 
discovered until after the officers unlawfully entered Mr. Fuller’s apartment.   
 
[¶19] Deputy Kellison testified that at the time of entry, he had probable cause to arrest 
Mr. Fuller for driving without a visible registration, eluding a police officer, and interfering 
with his investigation by ignoring his commands to stop.  “[A]n important factor to be 
considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying 
offense for which the arrest is being made.”  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. at 2099.  
“[A]lthough no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that 
a serious crime has been committed, . . . application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to 
believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed.”  Id. (citation omitted).  In 
Rideout, we concluded “the distinction drawn . . . between minor offenses that do not justify 
a warrantless entry into a residence and those offenses that do is predicated upon whether 
the subject offense carries a potential jail term.”  Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, ¶ 30, 122 
P.3d 201, 210 (Wyo. 2005).   
 
[¶20] The district court decided driving without a visible registration was a “minor 
offense.”  However, it concluded the eluding and interference offenses were jailable 
misdemeanors.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-204(a) (“A person commits a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with 
or resists arrest by a peace officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.”); 31-5-225(b) (“[E]very person convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a police 
officer shall be punished by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), 
or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.”).  The court also noted Mr. 
Fuller had escalated his criminal behavior from a minor traffic infraction to interference 
with a police officer.  Although the eluding and interference offenses are not considered 
“minor offenses” under Rideout, they were nonetheless non-violent misdemeanors in this 
case.  Moreover, Mr. Fuller did not escalate his criminal behavior any more than any other 
suspect who avoids arrest by seeking refuge in his home.  While we do not condone his 
actions, Mr. Fuller did not attempt to, nor did he, physically harm Deputy Kellison or any 
other person.   
 
[¶21] The State argues Deputy Kellison’s decision to call and wait for back-up did not 
interrupt the pursuit and was reasonable given the risks to his safety.  It explains:  “Deputy 
Kellison pursued [Mr.] Fuller through the public streets of Gillette at 3 a.m., then found 
himself positioned between the fleeing suspect, who had barricaded himself inside an 
7 
 
apartment, and the suspect’s passenger sitting in the [SUV] behind him. . . .  With no 
information about the suspect, no way to find the registered owner of the [SUV], and no 
reassurance from the passenger, Deputy Kellison made the reasonable choice to call for 
assistance, secure the apartment’s front door, and proceed into the home to conclude the 
pursuit and arrest [Mr.] Fuller before the situation got worse.”  It relies on several federal 
cases for the proposition that the “hot pursuit” exception applies even when an officer takes 
the time to assess the situation and plan for his own safety.  See United States v. Fuller, 
572 F.Appx. 819 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164 
(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. White, 185 F.Supp.3d 1295 (D. Utah 2016).   
 
[¶22] The reasonableness of Deputy Kellison’s decision to call for back-up is not before 
us.  The question is whether the officers’ entry into Mr. Fuller’s apartment without first 
securing a warrant was justified under the “hot pursuit” exception.  The answer is no.  The 
cases the State relies on do not convince us otherwise.  They involved pursuits where the 
officers lost sight of the fleeing suspects.  Although the officers had to obtain information 
to re-locate the suspects, they did so during their pursuit of the suspects.  As a result, there 
was no “break” in the pursuits; they were “continuous or immediate . . . from the scene of 
a crime.”  See Fuller, 572 F.Appx. at 820 (while pursuing fleeing suspects, officer learned 
over the police radio that two suspicious individuals were in a nearby backyard); 
Robertson, 305 F.3d at 165-66 (upon losing sight of suspects, officers were immediately 
informed by a bystander that suspects had boarded a public bus); White, 185 F.Supp.3d at 
1300-1301 (after suspect fled into one of four apartments, officers quickly eliminated three 
of the apartments as the suspect’s hiding place).  In this case, Deputy Kellison never lost 
sight of Mr. Fuller and there was a “break” in the pursuit to call and wait for back-up.  
Moreover, in each of these cases, unlike here, emergencies existed which necessitated 
immediate police action.  See Fuller, 572 F.Appx. at 820-21 (during pursuit of three 
individuals who had fled on foot from a stolen vehicle, officer observed the defendant, who 
was wearing tactical gear with a police insignia, remove a gun from his waistband and drop 
it into a trash can he was sitting on); Robertson, 305 F.3d at 165-66, 169 (pursuit of robbery 
suspects, one of whom was allegedly armed, onto a public bus); White, 185 F.Supp.3d at 
1299-1301, 1309-10 (pursuit of suspect believed to be armed and with a known history of 
drug distribution, violent crimes, and gang membership who had hidden in one of four 
apartments).   
 
[¶23] The circumstances in this case are more analogous to those in Mascorro v. Billings, 
656 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2011).  Officer Billings observed 17-year-old Joshua Mascorro 
driving without taillights.  Id. at 1202.  When Officer Billings attempted to pull him over, 
Joshua did not stop but drove two blocks to his parents’ house, ran inside, and hid in the 
bathroom.  Id.  Officer Billings followed Joshua to his home, entered the home, and arrested 
him.  Id. at 1202-03.  Joshua’s parents sued Officer Billings, claiming, inter alia, unlawful 
entry.  Id. at 1203.  Officer Billings argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because 
the warrantless entry into the Mascorros’ home was justified by probable cause and the 
“hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect.  Id. at 1204.  The Tenth Circuit disagreed.  Id. at 1207.  
8 
 
While Officer Billings had probable cause to arrest Joshua for a traffic offense, the court 
decided the circumstances did not amount to the kind of exigency excusing an officer from 
obtaining a warrant before entering a home.  Id. at 1205-07.  It explained: 
 
The intended arrest was for a traffic misdemeanor committed 
by a minor, with whom the officer was well acquainted, who 
had fled into his family home from which there was only one 
exit.  The risk of flight or escape was somewhere between low 
and nonexistent.  Moreover, there was no evidence which 
could have potentially been destroyed and there were no officer 
or public safety concerns.  There is nothing to indicate the sort 
of “real immediate and serious consequences” of postponing 
action to obtain a warrant required for a showing of exigent 
circumstances.  See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 2091. 
The warrantless entry based on hot pursuit was not justified. 
 
Id. at 1207. 
 
[¶24] Deputy Kellison was not familiar with Mr. Fuller and a third-party was present.  
Nevertheless, like in Mascorro, the intended arrest in this case was for non-violent 
misdemeanors committed by an individual who fled to his single-exit apartment.  The risk 
of escape was low to nonexistent due to the presence of back-up officers surrounding the 
apartment.  There was no evidence which could have been destroyed, and any officer or 
public safety concerns were minimal due to the presence of multiple officers and the lack 
of any physical threats.  Quite simply, there was no compelling need requiring immediate 
police action.2 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[¶25] The district court erred in concluding the officers’ warrantless entry into Mr. 
Fuller’s apartment to arrest him was constitutional under the “hot pursuit” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  We reverse the district court’s denial of Mr. 
Fuller’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
2 We recognize many of the emergencies making a pursuit “hot” are also “exigent circumstances” justifying 
a police officer acting without a warrant, i.e., officer and public safety, imminent destruction of evidence, 
and preventing a suspect from escaping.  This overlap is natural given “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect is 
itself an “exigent circumstance.”