Title: The People v. Daniel J. Ballman

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 100  
The People &c.,
            Appellant-Respondent,
        v.
Daniel J. Ballman,
            Respondent-Appellant.
Catherine A. Walsh, for appellant-respondent.
Shirley A. Gorman, for respondent-appellant.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
This appeal raises the issue whether Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1192 (8) allows an out-of-state conviction
occurring prior to November 1, 2006 to be considered for purposes
of elevating a charge of driving while intoxicated from a
misdemeanor to a felony.  We hold that it does not.
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Defendant was indicted for driving while intoxicated as
a felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and for obstructing
governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law
195.05) for acts committed on February 22, 2007.  As the basis
for elevating defendant's driving while intoxicated charge to a
felony, the People filed a special information charging that
defendant had a 1999 conviction for driving with an unlawful
alcohol concentration in the state of Georgia (OCGA § 40-6-391),
which would have been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1192 (2) had it occurred in New York.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment raising
several arguments, including that the date of the Georgia
conviction rendered it ineligible to serve as a predicate for
elevating the charge to driving while intoxicated as a felony. 
Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that the legislative
intent behind Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (8) was to treat
prior out-of-state convictions as if they were prior convictions
for the same actions occurring in New York State.  The same court
denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence against him
and defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to driving while
intoxicated as a felony in full satisfaction of the indictment.
The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the plea,
dismissed the first count of the indictment for felony driving
while intoxicated without prejudice to the People to re-present
appropriate charges, reinstated the second count of the
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indictment for obstructing governmental administration and
remitted to County Court for further proceedings on that second
count (64 AD3d 9 [4th Dept 2009]).  The Court determined that,
based on the language of the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1192 (8) and its enabling language, convictions
occurring prior to the November 1, 2006 effective date of the
statute, including defendant's 1999 Georgia conviction, could not
be used to raise a driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense from a
misdemeanor to a felony.  The Court, however, upheld Supreme
Court's suppression ruling.  A Judge of this Court granted both
parties leave to appeal.  We now affirm.
At issue here is the interpretation of Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1192 (8), as amended in 2006.  The statute reads as
follows:
"A prior out-of-state conviction for
operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs shall be deemed
to be a prior conviction of a violation of
this section for purposes of determining
penalties imposed under this section . . .
provided, however, that such conduct, had it
occurred in this state, would have
constituted a misdemeanor or felony violation
of any of the provisions of this section"
(Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [8]).  The subdivision further
provides that, if the out-of-state conduct would have been a
violation of § 1192 had it occurred in-state, but would not have
constituted a misdemeanor or a felony, the conduct will be deemed
a prior conviction of driving while ability impaired for purposes
of determining the appropriate penalties (see Vehicle and Traffic
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Law § 1192 [8]).
The enabling language accompanying the amendment
specifies that "[t]he provisions of [Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1192 (8)], as it existed prior to the amendment made by . . .
this act, shall apply only to convictions occurring on or after
November 29, 1985 through and including October 31, 2006 and
provided, further, that the provisions of [Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1192 (8)] as amended by . . . this act shall apply only to
convictions occurring on or after November 1, 2006" (L 2006, ch
231, § 2).  The amendment took effect on November 1, 2006 (L
2006, ch 231, § 3).
The dispute centers on the meaning of the term
"convictions" in the enabling language -- whether it applies to
domestic or prior out-of-state convictions.  "When presented with
a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d
653, 660 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). 
Although the text itself is generally the best evidence of
legislative intent, where "the language is ambiguous, we may
examine the statute's legislative history" (Roberts v Tishman
Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]).  Here, the
enabling language presents such an ambiguity.
In order to best understand the 2006 amendments, it is
helpful to trace the evolution of this subdivision.  The initial
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version of this provision, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (7),
was enacted in 1985 to allow prior out-of-state convictions for
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol to be considered
when determining appropriate penalties for subsequent New York
offenses (L 1985, ch 694, § 1).  Until that time, prior out-of-
state convictions had not been considered for penalty purposes
(see Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 694).  Under § 1192
(7), all such prior out-of-state convictions were treated as
traffic infractions, rather than misdemeanors or felonies,
regardless of the level of the crime in the other state or the
degree of any equivalent violation in New York (L 1985, ch 694, §
1).  The enabling language of the legislation provided that the
"act shall take effect on the one hundred twentieth day next
succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law and shall
apply to out-of-state convictions occurring on or after such
date" (L 1985, ch 694, § 2).  Since the statute was enacted
August 1, 1985, its effective date was therefore November 29,
1985.
When this provision was renumbered from subdivision
seven to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (6) in 1988, the
statutory language remained largely the same.  However, the bulk
of the enabling language was incorporated into the body of the
statute -- providing that the subdivision would only be
applicable to convictions occurring after November 29, 1985 (L
1988, ch 47, § 18).  The primary difference in the statutory
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language was the omission of the term "out-of-state."  The
subdivision was again renumbered to Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1192 (8) (L 1990, ch 173, § 62), where it appears today.
As noted above, the 2006 amendments ended the practice
of treating all prior out-of-state convictions as mere traffic
infractions under New York law.  Rather, for purposes of
determining penalties, a prior out-of-state conviction is now
treated as a conviction of the equivalent conduct under New York
law.  In addition, the amendment again moved the date
restrictions, this time from the statute to the enabling
language.
This history reflects that the Legislature recognized
the harsher penalties that had been applied when a person had a
prior in-state conviction, as opposed to a prior out-of-state
conviction, and intended to remedy that discrepancy.  "This bill
would eliminate one of the loopholes that allows repeat DWI
offenders to face lesser penalties simply because prior
convictions occurred out of state" (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill
Jacket, L 2006, ch 231).  The stated purpose of the amendment was
"[t]o ensure that a prior out-of-state conviction for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall
be deemed to be a prior conviction for the same action as if it
had occurred in New York State" (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill
Jacket, L 2006, ch 231).
Although the legislative history does not specifically
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discuss a time limitation, it is significant that the Legislature
chose to continue applying the November 29, 1985 date originally
used to allow for consideration of out-of-state convictions.  The
most sensible interpretation of the enabling language is that the
Legislature chose to remedy this differential treatment going
forward, by continuing to apply the previous statutory scheme to
out-of-state convictions occurring prior to November 1, 2006, and
applying the statute as amended to out-of-state convictions
occurring after that date.  The People's argument that
"convictions" in the enabling language refers to current New York
convictions is belied by the use of that November 29, 1985 to
October 31, 2006 time frame.  In addition, if "convictions
occurring on or after November 1, 2006," was meant to refer to
current New York convictions, the enabling language establishing
the effective date of the statute as November 1, 2006 (L 2006, ch
231, § 3) would be redundant.  Treating "convictions" as prior
out-of-state convictions also avoids any potential ex post facto
problem arising from the People’s proposed interpretation of the
statute.
The enabling language of the 2006 amendments should be
interpreted consistently with the language of the statute itself. 
The subdivision is entitled “Effect of prior out-of-state
conviction” and throughout the subdivision the only references
are to prior convictions – when a prior out-of-state conviction
will be deemed a prior conviction under New York law.  Moreover,
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use of the prior out-of-state convictions is necessary at the
inception of the case, for charging purposes, in order to make
the initial determination of whether a defendant can be indicted
for misdemeanor or felony DWI.  Based upon all of the above
considerations, the most reasonable interpretation of the statute
and its enabling language is that out-of-state convictions from
prior to November 1, 2006 cannot be used to elevate a DWI offense
to a felony.
In light of this disposition, it is not necessary to
address defendant's argument concerning whether the conduct
underlying his Georgia conviction would have been the equivalent
of a misdemeanor under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192.  In
addition, defendant's cross appeal is dismissed, since he was not
adversely affected by the Appellate Division order within the
meaning of CPL 450.90 (1).
Accordingly, on the People's appeal, the order of the
Appellate Division should be affirmed.  Defendant's appeal should
be dismissed upon the ground that the order from which the appeal
is taken is not adverse or partially adverse within the meaning
of CPL 450.90 (1) (see People v Edwards, 96 NY2d 445, 451 n 2
[2001]).
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
On the People's appeal, order affirmed.  Defendant's appeal
dismissed upon the ground that the order from which the appeal is
taken is not adverse or partially adverse within the meaning of
CPL 450.90(1) (see People v Edwards, 96 NY2d 445, 451 n 2
[2001]).  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided June 10, 2010