Title: Borgwardt v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Borgwardt v. State1997 WY 121946 P.2d 805Case Number: 96-249Decided: 10/21/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

CARL LEE BORGWARDT, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Diane M. Lozano, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellant: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Charmaine Reed, Student 
Intern for Prosecution Assistance Program.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Carl 
Borgwardt appeals from the judgment and sentence which the district court 
entered after he conditionally pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Borgwardt 
presents two related issues for our review: 

 

ISSUE I

The evidence obtained during the warrantless search 
of [Borgwardt]'s vehicle should have been suppressed as it was obtained without 
a warrant and does not fall within the "plain view" exception to the warrant 
requirements of the United States and Wyoming 
constitutions.

ISSUE II

The evidence obtained during the warrantless search 
of [Borgwardt]'s vehicle should have been suppressed as the search was not 
supported by probable cause.

 

FACTS

[¶4]      On February 29, 
1996, Kevin Hughes and Chris Cook, agents with the Division of Criminal 
Investigation (DCI), and Sheridan police department officers were investigating 
a matter at a Sheridan saloon which was not related to this case. After Agent 
Hughes left the bar, Agent Cook called him on the radio, stating that a woman 
had reported that Borgwardt had a significant amount of marihuana in his car 
which was parked in the bar's parking lot. Agent Hughes returned to the bar. The 
woman, who was drunk, stated that Borgwardt had a pistol and that, when he found 
out that the police officers were at the bar, he placed his jacket in the front 
seat of his car and left the area. She also volunteered that she did not like 
Borgwardt.

 

[¶5]      At Agent Hughes's 
request, the dispatch checked the car's license plate number and determined that 
the car did, in fact, belong to Borgwardt. Agent Hughes recognized Borgwardt's 
name and confirmed that DCI had previously investigated him. The agent also 
discovered that Borgwardt had been arrested on several felony charges and 
convicted of a number of misdemeanors. One of the convictions was for possession 
of a controlled substance.

 

[¶6]      Agent Cook 
observed two rifles in the back window of Borgwardt's car. The interior car 
lights were on, and Agent Hughes shined his flashlight into the car through the 
windows. The car windows were covered with a slight dusting of snow, and, 
although he could see into the car without doing so, Agent Hughes proceeded to 
wipe the snow off of the windows so that he would have a better view. He 
observed two baggies which were lying partially under a denim shirt on the back 
seat floor and saw that one baggie contained marihuana. Agent Hughes also 
noticed a blanket in the back seat which looked like it was covering 
something.

 

[¶7]      Consistent with 
the woman's report, Agent Hughes observed a jacket in the front seat of the car. 
Agent Cook entered the car to determine whether a pistol was in the jacket, and 
he found one. He then went inside the bar to look for a man who matched 
Borgwardt's description. When Agent Cook returned after being unable to locate 
Borgwardt in the bar, Agent Hughes directed him to continue searching the car. 
During his search, Agent Cook found: (1) a small container which he suspected 
contained marihuana; (2) a marihuana pipe; and (3) the baggies, which Agent 
Hughes had seen earlier, containing marihuana. The car was impounded, and 
Borgwardt was arrested the next day.

 

[¶8]      Borgwardt pleaded 
not guilty to a charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance. He moved to suppress the evidence which was seized during the search 
of his car, but the district court denied his motion. Borgwardt changed his plea 
to a conditional plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal from the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress. After Borgwardt was 
sentenced, he appealed to this Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Borgwardt 
contends that the warrantless search of his vehicle was unconstitutional. He 
argues that the evidence which was seized as a result of that search was 
inadmissible and that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress. The State maintains that the evidence was admissible because the 
police had probable cause to search the vehicle and because the evidence was in 
plain view.

 

[¶10]   When a district court makes 
specific factual findings regarding a motion to suppress, those findings are 
binding upon this Court unless they are clearly erroneous. Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 
(Wyo. 1996); Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). When, as in 
this case, the district court does not make specific findings of fact, "this 
court upholds the general ruling of the trial court if it is supportable by any 
reasonable view of the evidence." Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1330. "The issue of 
law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of 
constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo." Gronski, 910 P.2d  at 
563.

 

[¶11]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
generally prohibit warrantless searches. 910 P.2d  at 564. The rule that 
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se is subject to only a few specific 
and well defined exceptions. Id.

 

The search and/or seizure of an automobile upon 
probable cause is one of the recognized exceptions. In an earlier decision, this 
court recognized that differences exist between motor vehicles and other 
property, which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in 
which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1330. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Reasonableness is 
determined by all the circumstances of each case.

Id. (some 
citations omitted). The police may, therefore, search an automobile without 
having a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that the car contains 
evidence of a crime or contraband. See Gronski, 910 P.2d at 564-65; Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 
1334.

 

[¶12]   Borgwardt maintains that, because 
the woman's report was inherently unreliable, the law enforcement personnel did 
not have probable cause to search his car. He claims that, since the woman was 
drunk and admitted that she disliked him, the officers could not rely upon her 
report in determining whether they had probable cause to search the 
car.

 

[¶13]   In deciding whether a report from 
an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause, courts have generally 
drawn a distinction between reports from common citizens and reports from 
informants who regularly supply information to the police. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3 at 88-89 (3d ed. 1996). Factors which courts consider 
in determining whether an informant's report established probable cause include 
the informant's veracity and reliability and the basis of his knowledge. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah.Ct.App. 1992). Courts ordinarily deem citizen informants, in contrast to police informants, to be 
presumptively reliable sources of information. Id.; see also People v. 
Fortune, 930 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Colo. 1997) (en banc).

 

[¶14]   In this case, the woman was a 
citizen informant rather than a police informant and would generally be entitled 
to a presumption that she was reliable. Of course, the fact that the woman was 
intoxicated and openly expressed hostility toward Borgwardt could be construed 
as detracting from the inherent reliability of her report. Her report was, 
however, corroborated. The car was parked in the bar's parking lot, and the 
police observed the jacket, which the woman had described, in the front seat of 
the car. Furthermore, the officers and agent did not rely solely upon the 
woman's report in determining that they had probable cause to conduct the 
search. Agent Hughes independently determined that Borgwardt was the subject of 
other DCI investigations and that he had a rather extensive criminal record 
which included one prior conviction for possession of illegal drugs. Considering 
these facts together, we conclude that probable cause supported the warrantless 
search of the car.

 

[¶15]   Appellant also claims that the 
search was improper because it did not fall within the plain view exception. 
Since we have concluded that probable cause supported the warrantless search of 
the car without taking into account Agent Hughes's observation of the marihuana, 
we do not need to determine whether the search was proper under the plain view 
exception.

 

[¶16]   Affirmed.