Title: People v. Brown

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Brown (Ill. S.Ct.) 

Docket No. 82186-Agenda 6-May 1998.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the 
court:
After a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the 
defendant, Anthony Brown, was convicted on two counts of first degree murder and 
on one count each of aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated criminal sexual 
assault, and armed robbery. The defendant waived his right to a jury for 
purposes of a death penalty hearing, and, following a hearing, the trial judge 
sentenced the defendant to death for the convictions for first degree murder. 
The judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment 
for his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated 
vehicular hijacking; the judge did not impose any sentence for the armed robbery 
conviction, finding that it merged with that for vehicular hijacking. The 
defendant's execution has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons set 
forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The following evidence was presented at trial. We will 
describe this testimony in detail, in light of the defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Steven Fitch testified that on January 12, 1994, 
he, Reginald Wilson, and Wilson's girlfriend, Felicia Lewis, were driving in 
Wilson's Chevrolet Blazer. They stopped at a gas station so that Fitch and 
Wilson could use the restroom. When Fitch returned to the Blazer, he saw a 
person in the doorway on the passenger side of the vehicle; the person was 
letting someone else in the back. Fitch could see that the person standing 
outside the vehicle was not Wilson. As Fitch walked toward the Blazer, the 
person standing outside the vehicle asked Fitch what he was looking at. Fitch 
did not reply. He saw someone other than Wilson sitting in the driver's seat of 
the Blazer.
Fitch returned to the gas station, but the door was locked. 
The Blazer then drove off. Fitch ran across the street to a telephone to call 
the police. When the police arrived, Fitch reported what had happened, and he 
rode with the police to look for the Blazer. Wilson had a pager with him, so 
Fitch tried to call his friend on the pager throughout the night. Fitch did not 
receive any response, however.
On January 13, Fitch went to the Sauk Village police station 
and spoke with officers there. Later, Fitch went to Area One headquarters and 
talked to detectives. At Area One Fitch also viewed a lineup, and he identified 
the person whom he had seen standing outside the passenger side of the 
Blazer.
Zarice Johnson, a codefendant, also testified on behalf of 
the prosecution at the defendant's trial. Johnson, 26 years old at the time of 
trial, described the commission of the offenses in this case. On January 12, 
1994, the defendant came to Johnson's apartment around 10 or 10:30 p.m. They 
then left together, in the defendant's car, a two-door Chevrolet Caprice. Three 
other persons-Scott Chambers, Stanley Hamelin, and Carl Williams-were already in 
the vehicle. The defendant drove around awhile, and Hamelin suggested that they 
steal a vehicle. The defendant agreed to that plan. They located a vehicle and 
parked near it, but they later changed their minds when they saw the number of 
persons in it.
The defendant then drove to a gas station located at 79th 
Street and the Dan Ryan expressway. Hamelin got out of the car to purchase gas; 
as he tried to close the car door, it swung open; the defendant became upset and 
said that anyone walking by could see a gun, a 9-millimeter pistol, that was 
sitting on the front seat of the car. The defendant then closed the car door. 
Hamelin bought gas and returned to the car. As they were leaving the station, 
they noticed another vehicle pulling in, and someone commented about the rims on 
it. Hamelin told the defendant to pull over so that he could get out. The 
defendant did so, and Hamelin, Chambers, and Williams then got out of the car 
and went back to the gas station. Johnson saw Chambers get into the vehicle, a 
Blazer. Hamelin stood by the passenger side; Johnson did not notice what 
Williams was then doing. Johnson next saw a person approach the passenger side 
of the Blazer and then walk back to the gas station fast, as though he was 
trying to get in the building. Johnson later saw the same person walk back to 
the side of the service station and climb a fence.
The defendant then drove his car around the block and 
returned to the gas station. Johnson could see Chambers and Hamelin, but not 
Williams. Chambers was standing on the driver's side, and Hamelin was on the 
passenger side of the Blazer. They got in the Blazer and it then drove off, 
following the defendant's Caprice. Johnson was seated in the back seat of the 
Caprice. The defendant drove the Caprice to the Dan Ryan expressway and drove 
north to 71st Street, where the defendant pulled to the side of the highway. The 
Blazer pulled off the road too and parked in front of the Caprice. The defendant 
got out and walked to the Blazer. Johnson stayed in the Caprice and therefore 
could not overhear the defendant's conversation with the occupants of the 
Blazer. After several minutes, the defendant returned to the Caprice and said 
that a man and a pretty woman were in the Blazer. The defendant then drove off, 
continuing northbound on the Ryan.
The defendant left the expressway at 43rd Street and drove 
to 47th and Vincennes. There, the defendant pulled into a parking lot and 
directed the Blazer where to park. The defendant got out of the Caprice and 
talked to Hamelin and Williams. Johnson was still seated in the back of the 
Caprice, but he could hear their conversation because the car door was open. The 
defendant asked the others if there was any "loot" in the Blazer. Stanley 
Hamelin mentioned a car alarm and stereo, and Carl Williams mentioned a CD 
player. The defendant also asked whether there was any money, and neither one 
responded immediately. The defendant then got back in the Caprice, and Stanley 
Hamelin walked over and handed the defendant a bundle of money, which the 
defendant put in his pocket. Hamelin also showed the defendant a ring he had 
taken, and Hamelin then put it back in his pocket.
The defendant said that he was going to make the woman 
perform oral sex on him; the defendant was laughing while he said this. The 
defendant went to the Blazer and told the woman to get out, and he directed 
Johnson to move to the front seat of the Caprice. Johnson moved to the front 
passenger seat, and Hamelin handed him a Kenwood stereo and a portable CD player 
taken from the Blazer. The defendant then put the woman in the back seat of the 
car and got in. After the act of oral sex, the defendant told the woman to 
remove her pants; she was crying, and Johnson told her to stop crying and to 
cooperate with the defendant. The woman then said that she had had a baby in 
November and that she was having her period. The defendant said the woman was 
lying, and she replied that she was wearing a sanitary pad. The defendant then 
told the woman to place her coat on the car seat, and he started having sex with 
her. Later, he told her to perform oral sex again. While they were in the car, 
the defendant forced the woman to submit to several acts of sexual 
intercourse.
The defendant instructed Hamelin and Chambers to keep the 
victims in the Blazer until the defendant returned, after he could locate a 
place to kill the victims. The defendant, Carl Williams, and Johnson then drove 
off in the Caprice. The defendant drove around the area where they had parked. 
The defendant later parked the car and walked back toward the Blazer with Carl 
Williams. The defendant looked at the Blazer, which was across the street, and 
then returned to the Caprice. The defendant was upset and said that he did not 
know why the victims had been killed in the Blazer and then left there sitting 
up. The defendant told Johnson to drive the defendant and Williams to the 
defendant's home, at 38th and Vincennes.
Johnson, the defendant, and Williams later met Hamelin and 
Chambers at Hamelin's sister's apartment. The defendant asked them why they had 
shot the victims in the Blazer. Hamelin responded that they did not kill the 
victims there, and he explained that he and Chambers had made the victims get 
out of the vehicle, had walked them to a dumpster, and had made them climb into 
it. Chambers then shot the man in the head once; the woman started screaming and 
put her hands up, and Chambers reached up under her arm and shot her twice. They 
then walked off, and Hamelin told Chambers that he was "bogus" because he had 
shot the woman twice and the man once-so Chambers returned to the dumpster and 
shot the man in the head again.
According to Johnson, the defendant that evening gave each 
of the offenders a part of the money taken in the crimes. They later returned to 
the Blazer and found about 20 to 25 compact discs and cassette tapes, which 
Chambers put in a plastic bag and gave to the defendant. Chambers then said that 
he wanted to take a large stereo speaker to Johnson's house, and they then did 
that.
The defendant returned to Johnson's apartment a couple hours 
later. Johnson and his cousin then left with the defendant, in the defendant's 
Caprice. Johnson noticed that the Blazer was parked behind the defendant's car, 
and that the Blazer contained Hamelin and Chambers. They got on the Dan Ryan 
expressway, with the Blazer following the defendant's car, and drove to Sauk 
Village; Williams was not with them. After parking at a McDonald's restaurant, 
the defendant gestured for Chambers and Hamelin to get in the Caprice, and they 
did. Later, Chambers and Hamelin drove off in the Blazer. They came back several 
minutes later, pursued by the police. Hamelin jumped out of the Blazer and tried 
to run; a female officer stopped her car, got out, and chased him. Hamelin fell, 
and the officer arrested him. Johnson, his cousin, and the defendant then drove 
back to Chicago in the defendant's Caprice.
Johnson was with the defendant again during the night of 
January 13, 1994, and they were arrested at that time. They were taken to a 
police station, and Johnson was questioned about the offenses. Johnson explained 
to the jury that he was charged in this case and that he later entered into a 
plea agreement. The agreement required Johnson to plead guilty to one count each 
of first degree murder, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and vehicular 
hijacking. In exchange for his truthful testimony, the State would recommend a 
35-year sentence. Johnson said that he would be eligible for release after 17½ 
years if he received day-for-day good-time credit on his sentence. Johnson also 
said that he had lived in the witness protection program in the county jail for 
the five months preceding his testimony. On cross-examination, Johnson 
acknowledged that he initially denied his involvement in these offenses when 
police questioned him.
A nearby resident, Clemon Cunningham, discovered the 
victims' bodies around noon on January 13. Cunningham reported his discovery to 
the police, who then began an investigation. One of the officers responding to 
that call, James Hogan, a forensic investigator for the Chicago police 
department, testified that on the afternoon of January 13, 1994, he went to 4800 
S. Vincennes to investigate a report of two bodies found in a dumpster. Hogan 
photographed the bodies and gathered up four cartridge cases. The cartridge 
cases were stamped "9 mm Win"; two of them were lying at the bottom of the 
dumpster, and two were lying on the chest of the male victim.
Mark DiSanto, a Sauk Village police officer, testified that 
on the morning of January 13, 1994, he received an assignment to check on a 
suspicious vehicle. Officer DiSanto went to the area, which was residential, and 
found a black Blazer parked with its engine running. DiSanto parked behind the 
vehicle and walked up to it, and the Blazer then speeded away. DiSanto followed 
the Blazer, which traveled a distance of about four or five houses and later 
came to a stop on a nearby lawn. The driver and a passenger jumped out of the 
vehicle and ran off in different directions. DiSanto chased the driver, Scott 
Chambers, and apprehended him. Another officer later arrived, and DiSanto saw 
that she already had the Blazer's passenger, Stanley Hamelin, in her squad 
car.
Edward Winstead, a Chicago police detective, testified that 
on the afternoon of January 13, 1994, he and his partner went to the place where 
the victims' bodies had been discovered. Winstead and the others removed the 
bodies from the dumpster. The female victim had a bra entwined in her hands. A 
photo identification card disclosed her identity as Felicia Lewis. No 
identification could be found on the male victim. The officers later went to the 
address on the woman's ID card.
Later that afternoon Officer Winstead went to Sauk Village; 
other detectives from Chicago were also there. Winstead spoke with the victims' 
friend Steven Fitch at the Sauk Village police station. Winstead testified that 
Fitch later viewed a lineup containing Chambers, Hamelin, and five other 
persons. Fitch identified Hamelin as the person he had seen getting into the 
Blazer.
Other testimony revealed that the defendant had about $500 
or $510 in cash with him at the time of his arrest on January 13. Investigators 
later recovered a number of items from the defendant's Caprice, including 
videotapes, compact discs, cassette tapes, a Kenwood stereo, a Panasonic CD 
player, and an adapter.
Investigators examined the defendant's Caprice and Reginald 
Wilson's Blazer for fingerprints and searched the vehicles for other evidence. 
Investigators lifted three prints from various places inside the Caprice. They 
found an earring stud on the seat, a cassette radio in the trunk, and a glove 
and a stocking cap. They also inspected the Blazer. There, the only fingerprint 
impression they could find was on a compact disc. They also found an earring, a 
plastic camera, an instruction manual for a Kenwood stereo, a Kenwood storage 
case, a Panasonic CD player case, and various cards and papers.
Pamela Fish, employed at the time of the investigation by 
the Chicago police department crime laboratory, testified that on January 18, 
1994, she examined evidence from this case. Fish stated that swabs taken from 
the female victim were all negative for the presence of semen. Fish explained 
that this was not unusual, and that half of these are negative. Fish determined 
that Felicia Lewis' blood type was type O. Fish also tested seat cushions taken 
from the Caprice and found a small area that tested positive for human blood. 
Its small size, however, precluded further testing. Fish said that the spot 
appeared to be a smear-type stain and that it could have been placed there by a 
person's hands.
Fish also found a reddish-brown stain the size of a nickel 
inside the underwear the defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest in this 
case. Fish concluded that this was a smear stain and was a mixture of human 
blood and seminal material. She later tested the defendant's blood type and 
found that it was type O, and she also obtained genetic markings from blood 
samples taken from the defendant and Felicia Lewis. Fish attempted to test the 
underwear stain for genetic markings but was unable to obtain any results. She 
explained that the inability to obtain a typing result from a stain is generally 
the consequence of two possible causes: that the sample is too small, or that 
the DNA material in the stain has degraded. On cross-examination, Fish stated 
that half the population in the United States has type O blood. She could not 
determine when the blood was placed on the car seat or when the stain was placed 
in the underwear.
Dr. Barry Lifschultz, a staff pathologist with the Cook 
County medical examiner's office, performed autopsies on the two victims. In 
examining Reginald Wilson, Dr. Lifschultz found a number of gunshot wounds. Two 
were located on the victim's head. One of these was an entrance wound to the 
right top of the head, and there was an exit wound in the left neck. Also, there 
was an entrance wound on the right side of the head above the ear, and an exit 
wound on the victim's face. Dr. Lifschultz also found a gunshot would to the 
upper left chest, and a bullet was lodged in the victim's chest. In addition, 
Dr. Lifschultz found a gunshot wound to the upper front part of the left arm, 
and a bullet was lodged in the elbow of the left arm. Dr. Lifschultz stated that 
the nature of this wound suggested that the bullet had traveled through 
something else before striking the arm, and he explained that the bullet could 
have passed through the head and then into the chest. Dr. Lifschultz concluded 
that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
In his examination of Felicia Lewis, Dr. Lifschultz found 
four gunshot wounds on her. An entrance wound was on the back of the lower part 
of the left arm, and there was a corresponding exit wound on the lower part of 
the arm. Dr. Lifschultz also found an entrance wound on the lower part of the 
arm, which exited on the inner part of the same arm. Dr. Lifschultz found two 
other gunshot wounds, and both of these were to the head. One was an entrance 
wound to the right side of the head, and he recovered a bullet from the jaw. 
Another entrance wound was to the middle part of the face, and the bullet from 
this wound was lodged in the upper left chest. Dr. Lifschultz stated that the 
wounds to the victim's arms were consistent with a person trying to shield 
herself. Dr. Lifschultz concluded that the cause of the victim's death was 
multiple gunshot wounds. A sanitary napkin was recovered from the victim, and 
swabs were taken of the victim's oral, vaginal, and rectal cavities. Dr. 
Lifschultz did not find any evidence of trauma to the victim's genital 
area.
The defense presented testimony from two witnesses. The 
first witness called by the defense was Richard McGrath, a Chicago police 
officer who worked as a latent fingerprint examiner. McGrath stated that he was 
not able to match any of the latent prints taken from the Caprice with the 
defendant's known fingerprint standard. On cross-examination, McGrath stated 
that the three prints from the Caprice did not match those of the defendant, 
Zarice Johnson, Scott Chambers, Stanley Hamelin, or Carl Williams. Felicia 
Lewis' fingerprints were found on a pill container and on a makeup case found in 
the Blazer. One of Reginald Wilson's prints was on an insurance document found 
in the Blazer, and also on a birth certificate found in the Blazer. McGrath was 
not able to match some of the prints with anyone. He said that it was not 
surprising that a car owner would not leave any latent prints in his own car, 
for the owner would be touching things repeatedly and would not leave clear 
impressions.
Also called as a witness by the defense was Scott Rochowicz, 
of the microscopic trace evidence unit of the Chicago police department crime 
laboratory. Rochowicz testified that in June 1994, he examined all the hair 
evidence in the case and compared it with samples taken from the defendant and 
from Felicia Lewis. Rochowicz found that the hairs recovered from Felicia Lewis' 
clothing were similar to her own hairs, and that the hairs recovered from the 
defendant's clothing were similar to his own hairs. Hairs found in the 
defendant's underwear were similar to his own hair, and not to 
Lewis'.
At the close of evidence, the jury returned verdicts finding 
the defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Reginald Wilson and Felicia 
Lewis, of the armed robbery of Reginald Wilson, of the aggravated vehicular 
hijacking of Reginald Wilson, and of the aggravated criminal sexual assault of 
Felicia Lewis. The matter was then continued for a capital sentencing 
hearing.
The sentencing hearing commenced on October 15, 1996, before 
the trial judge alone, the defendant having previously waived his right to a 
jury. The State alleged that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty 
because of his commission of multiple murders. See 720 ILCS 9-1(b)(3) (West 
1994). Also, evidence established that the defendant, born on January 7, 1972, 
was 22 years old when he committed the present offenses. The State asked the 
judge to take judicial notice of the defendant's convictions in this case. At 
the conclusion of this stage of the hearing, the judge found the defendant 
eligible for the death penalty on the basis of the multiple-murder aggravating 
circumstance.
The matter then proceeded to the presentation of evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation. In aggravation the State introduced evidence of the 
defendant's criminal history, and in mitigation the defendant presented 
testimony from his family members, as well as a report prepared by a clinical 
social worker. In aggravation, Paul Wallace, a Chicago police officer, testified 
that on July 10, 1988, he arrested the defendant at the Museum of Science and 
Industry, in response to a report of an attempted pickpocketing incident there. 
According to the report, a woman riding in an elevator was bumped, and when she 
looked down at her purse she saw that it had been opened. Another woman in the 
elevator saw the defendant reach into the purse; when the second woman said 
something, the defendant withdrew his hand.
Chris Karedes, a sergeant with the Chicago police 
department, testified that on September 24, 1988, he was working as a patrolman 
and was called to the Holiday Inn City Center to investigate a report of an 
attempted pickpocket incident. According to the information Karedes received, 
two woman were about to get on the elevator when a man, not the defendant, 
pretended that his foot was stuck in the door. At that time, one of the women 
saw the defendant's hand coming out of her purse. The defendant and the other 
man then fled. The hotel doorman was able to capture the defendant, and the 
officer placed the defendant under arrest. Nothing was taken from the 
woman.
Vincent Avery, a Chicago police officer, testified that 
early in the morning on June 5, 1993, he stopped the vehicle in which the 
defendant was riding for a traffic violation. At the time, Officer Avery saw the 
defendant remove a weapon from the area of his waistband and put it on the floor 
of the car. The weapon turned out to be a semiautomatic .38 containing seven 
live rounds. Officer Avery also discovered a .38 revolver in the middle of the 
front seat of the car. The defendant later was charged with and found guilty of 
unlawful use of a weapon.
Eric T. Stokes, a security officer with the Cook County 
jail, testified that on March 17, 1995, he gave the defendant a disciplinary 
ticket for interfering with an officer's duties. Stokes had directed an inmate 
to remove civilian clothing and to put on a jail uniform, but the defendant had 
told the inmate not to do that. Officer Stokes told the defendant to mind his 
own business, and the defendant then swore at Stokes. The defendant received 10 
days in solitary confinement for this infraction.
Raven Davis, who was 15 years old at the time of her 
testimony at the sentencing hearing, testified that on August 31, 1993, she was 
11 years old and then lived with her grandparents. Her four younger brothers 
lived there, too. On that day she and three of her brothers went to a shoe store 
with their grandmother. The grandmother bought about $400 worth of shoes for the 
children, paying cash for the purchases. The defendant and other man, Mark, were 
in the store at the time. Later that night, Raven woke up and saw the defendant, 
Mark, and two women in her grandparents' house. The intruders were looking for 
money. During the incident, Raven was slashed in the throat by one of the women 
and was shot four times. Raven later identified the defendant in a lineup as one 
of the persons she had seen that night. On cross-examination Raven acknowledged 
that she did not initially tell the police that the defendant was one of the 
intruders. On redirect examination she again stated, however, that the defendant 
was present in the house and that he held a gun on her grandparents.
Further testimony in aggravation was provided by Crystal 
Lewis, sister of Felicia Lewis; by Mary Tinsley, aunt of Reginald Wilson, and 
Francita Williams, Reginald Wilson's mother. These three witnesses read victim 
impact statements that they had prepared. Their testimony will be summarized in 
greater detail later in this opinion.
The State also presented certified copies of the defendant's 
conviction for possession with intent to deliver, for which he was sentenced to 
probation. This also represented a violation of his bail bond, and he received 
62 days in the county jail for the bail bond violation and 24 months' probation 
for the possession offense. Also, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of 
weapons, the offense to which Officer Avery testified. The defendant was 
sentenced to six months' time served for that offense.
The defense presented several witnesses in mitigation. The 
defendant's mother, Joanna Brown, and an uncle, Michael Brown, and aunt, 
Victoria Brown, all provided favorable testimony. The uncle and aunt are 
siblings of the defendant's mother. The defendant also presented mitigating 
testimony from Dr. George Savarese, a licensed clinical social worker, who 
conducted a mitigation investigation for the defense and who prepared a report 
detailing his findings; Dr. Savarese's report was admitted into evidence. In 
conducting his investigation, Dr. Savarese interviewed the defendant and his 
family members, reviewed various records, and talked to a number of neighbors 
and teachers of the defendant.
The defendant attempted to cast doubt on Raven Davis' 
identification of him as one of the intruders in her grandparents' home. As part 
of the evidence in mitigation, the defense presented the parties' stipulation 
that a detective would testify that one of the doctors treating Raven Davis 
related that she was in shock and could not give a detailed account of the 
offenses when she was brought in for treatment. At that time, she could say only 
that the persons involved in the offenses wore masks and tried to harm 
her.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial judge 
sentenced the defendant to death for the two murder convictions. The judge also 
imposed concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment for the defendant's convictions 
for aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The 
judge did not impose a separate sentence for the defendant's conviction for 
armed robbery, finding that it merged with the hijacking 
conviction.
I
The defendant first argues that the State failed to 
establish his guilt for the present offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
particular, the defendant challenges the accomplice testimony of Zarice Johnson, 
a codefendant in these offenses. The defendant asserts that Johnson's testimony 
lacked the "absolute conviction of its truth" (People v. Williams, 65 Ill. 2d 258, 267 (1976)), and that the accomplice's testimony therefore fails to 
provide a sufficient basis for the jury's verdicts.
Although the testimony of an accomplice " `has inherent 
weaknesses' " (People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 47 (1989)), it will 
be sufficient to sustain a conviction "if it convinces the jury of the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 74 (1997). A criminal conviction will not be set aside on appeal unless 
the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 
(1997); People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). The question on review 
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Having reviewed the record in this case, we believe 
that Johnson's testimony is sufficient to sustain the defendant's 
convictions.
Johnson provided a detailed account of the events leading up 
to the offenses. He also described the commission of the offenses, beginning 
with the taking of the Blazer at the gas station, and ending with the murders of 
the victims in the dumpster. In addition, he recounted the steps taken by the 
defendant and the others to divide the money and property taken from the 
victims. Finally, he related the subsequent capture of Scott Chambers and 
Stanley Hamelin in Sauk Village, as well as the eventual arrest of the defendant 
in Chicago.
The record shows that Johnson's testimony was corroborated 
in many important respects. Johnson's testimony about the arrival of the Blazer 
at the gas station and the location of Hamelin on the passenger side of the 
vehicle was corroborated by prosecution witness Steven Fitch, who testified 
similarly, and who identified Hamelin as the person standing on the passenger 
side of the Blazer. Johnson's testimony about the placement of the victims in 
the dumpster, which he knew from what the codefendants had told him, was 
corroborated by civilian and police testimony describing the discovery and 
location of the bodies. Johnson further testified that each victim was shot 
twice; four cartridges were found near the bodies, and the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy concluded that each of the victims was shot twice. Johnson 
also stated that one of the weapons in the car, and apparently used in the 
offenses, was a 9-millimeter pistol. The cartridges found with the bodies would 
have matched that weapon.
Johnson also stated that, during the sexual assault, the 
female victim told the defendant that she was wearing a sanitary napkin and was 
having her period. The pathologist found a sanitary napkin in the victim's 
clothing. In addition, a bloodstain was found on the back seat of the Caprice, 
where the assault occurred, and a bloodstain matching the victim's blood type 
was found in the defendant's underwear.
In addition, Johnson testified about the items taken from 
the Blazer, including a Kenwood stereo and a Panasonic CD player. Steven Fitch, 
who was with the victims immediately before the crimes, testified that he had 
brought his Panasonic CD player with him that night and that Reginald Wilson had 
a Kenwood stereo and an adapter in the Blazer. Investigators searching the 
defendant's Caprice discovered a Panasonic CD player and an adapter in the glove 
compartment and a Kenwood stereo in the trunk. Fitch identified the CD player as 
the one he had brought with him that night. Finally, Johnson's description of 
the arrests of Chambers and Hamelin in Sauk Village was corroborated by the Sauk 
Village police, who provided a similar account of the arrests.
The defendant acknowledges that portions of Johnson's 
testimony may be sufficient to establish the occurrence of these offenses. The 
defendant contends, however, that there is no corroboration of Johnson's 
additional testimony that the defendant himself participated in the crimes. In 
this regard, the defendant notes that his fingerprints were not found on any 
property recovered by investigators, or even in the Caprice, that no seminal 
fluid was found in the female victim, that the bloodstain found on his underwear 
matched his own blood type, and that there was no evidence of hair transfer 
between him and the female victim. The defendant maintains that the 
corroborating evidence discussed earlier simply confirms the occurrence of these 
offenses without implicating him in any way.
We believe that the record in this case contains sufficient 
corroboration of Johnson's testimony and that the lack of corroboration noted by 
the defendant is not significant here. Testimony adduced at trial demonstrates 
why the prosecution could not corroborate certain details in Johnson's 
narration. Notably, none of the 18 fingerprints lifted from the physical 
evidence could be matched to any of the five persons involved in the offenses. 
The fingerprint examiner explained that when he searched the Caprice its 
interior was quite damp, and he also stated that in cold weather persons do not 
leave fingerprint impressions as readily as they do in warm weather. In 
addition, the witness testified that it was not surprising that an owner would 
not leave impressions in his own car. The witness explained that a regular 
driver of a vehicle would be constantly handling everything and therefore would 
not leave clean, intact impressions.
In opposition to the jury's verdicts, the defendant also 
cites the testimony that seminal material was not found on swabs taken of the 
female victim. The prosecution's expert, Pamela Fish, stated that half of all 
sexual assaults test negative for the presence of semen. The witness did not 
elaborate on the reasons for the absence of seminal material in those cases. The 
bloodstain found on the defendant's underwear matched the blood types of the 
female victim and the defendant, both of whom had type O blood. According to the 
witness who obtained the underwear from the defendant after his arrest, the 
defendant did not bear any sign of injury and did not complain of any injury. 
Fish explained that she was unable to do more precise testing on the bloodstain 
because the DNA in the sample had degraded.
Given the detailed nature of Johnson's account of the 
offenses and the substantial corroboration of his testimony-including the 
discovery in the defendant's car of a number of items taken from the Blazer-we 
do not believe that the absence of the additional corroboration noted by the 
defendant is sufficient to undermine Johnson's testimony implicating the 
defendant in these crimes. A conviction will not be reversed "simply because the 
defendant tells us that a witness was not credible." People v. Byron, 
164 Ill. 2d 279, 299 (1995). Any infirmities perceived in Johnson's testimony go 
to its weight as evidence and to his credibility as a witness. People v. 
Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1989). The jury learned the details of Johnson's 
plea agreement with the State. In addition, the jury received the cautionary 
instruction on accomplice testimony. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, No. 3.17 (3d ed. 1992). It was the function of the jury, as the trier 
of fact, to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to 
their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented. 
People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). As noted earlier, the question 
on review is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. 
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Applying that standard to the present 
case, we must conclude that that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence 
of the defendant's guilt, and we see no reason to disturb the jury's 
verdicts.
The defendant next argues that the prosecutor, in his 
opening statement, improperly alluded to inadmissible victim impact evidence. 
The defendant complains of the following portion of the prosecutor's comments. 
After reminding the jurors that the judge had listed the names of witnesses and 
other persons involved in the case during jury selection, the prosecutor 
stated:
The defendant argues that this allusion to 
the lives of the victims was improper, for victim impact evidence is not 
admissible at the guilt-phase of a capital prosecution and the prosecutor 
therefore should not have commented on it.
Defense counsel did not object to this portion of the 
prosecutor's opening statement, and therefore the defendant's belated objection 
must now be considered waived. The defendant argues, however, that the present 
allegation is cognizable as plain error, and he makes the companion argument 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this part of the 
prosecution's opening statement.
We do not agree with the defendant the prosecutor's comment 
was error. In contrast to the cases cited by the defendant, discussed below, the 
prosecutor's accurate statement to the jury did not reveal what the victim 
impact evidence might have consisted of. Simply calling attention to this type 
of information was not error, in the context in which the comments were made 
here. The prosecutor did not invite the jury to speculate about what the 
evidence would have revealed about the victims' lives. We note, moreover, that 
the comment complained of occurred at the beginning of opening statement, and we 
do not believe that the jury would have focused its attention on this particular 
comment, among the many made.
The cases cited by the defendant in support of this argument 
are distinguishable. In People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 496-97 
(1983), the prosecutor told the jurors, " `Well, ladies and gentlemen, we 
can't tell you everything he did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe when 
this is over I will tell you what he did when he was arrested.' " This 
court found reversible error in the prosecutor's suggestion that the defendant 
was guilty of further misconduct and the prosecutor's invitation to the jurors 
to speculate about what it might be. In People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359 (1964), the prosecutor elicited testimony about the murder victim's 
surviving family members and then commented on the information in closing 
argument. Because of that error, this court reversed the defendant's murder 
conviction and granted the defendant a new trial. See also People v. 
Littlejohn, 144 Ill. App. 3d 813, 827 (1986) (reversible error found in 
prosecutor's comment that juvenile victim would never experience things that 
most people experience).
Unlike the cases cited by the defendant, the prosecutor in 
the present case did not comment about inadmissible matters or otherwise inform 
the jury of matters that would not be introduced into evidence. Here, the 
prosecutor simply attempted to erect a verbal bridge between the identification 
of the offenders, the identification of the victims, and the evidence to be 
presented at trial. Because we find no error in the prosecutor's comment, we 
have no need here to consider whether the comments rose to the level of plain 
error or, alternatively, whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to make an appropriate objection to the comment.
The defendant next contends that the prosecutor, in closing 
argument, improperly commented on the defendant's right not to testify at trial. 
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 
109-10, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1232-33 (1965). In closing argument the prosecutor 
stated:
These remarks occurred near the beginning 
of the prosecutor's summation. The defendant contends that the comments 
improperly alluded to the defendant's exercise of his right not to testify at 
trial. The defendant maintains that the instruction referred to by the 
prosecutor was the one telling the jurors that they should not consider the 
defendant's failure to testify.
Defense counsel failed to object to this portion of the 
closing argument; recognizing that default, the defendant now contends that the 
comments were plain error and that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
register an objection to the prosecutor's argument. In response, the State 
maintains that the challenged comments, when read in context, were simply 
designed to help rehabilitate prosecution witness Zarice Johnson and to explain 
to the jurors why it had been necessary to seek his testimony. The State 
suggests further that the reference to the jury instructions was aimed at 
Johnson, and that Johnson could not be made to incriminate himself.
We do not agree with the defendant that the jury would have 
dwelled on the prosecutor's oblique reference to the defendant's failure to 
testify. We believe that if any error occurred in the preceding comments, it was 
slight and does not rise to the level of plain error. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) 
(on review, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court"). 
The plain error exception to the rule of waiver is properly invoked when the 
evidence is closely balanced, or the alleged error is so substantial that it 
denies the defendant a fair proceeding. People v. Banks, 161 Ill. 2d 119, 143 (1994); People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 300 (1994). We 
do not believe that either condition obtains here. We note also that the jury 
was instructed on the purpose of closing argument and was told that comments 
made in oral argument are not evidence.
For similar reasons, we do not believe that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by his failure to object to the prosecutor's brief 
comment. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show both a deficiency in performance and prejudice resulting from 
counsel's error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To establish prejudice, a defendant 
"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, a court "need not determine 
whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. 
Here, the prosecutor made only a brief and indirect allusion to what might be 
considered the defendant's failure to take the stand in his own behalf. The 
prosecutor did not dwell on the point. We believe that any error in this regard 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828-29 (1967); People 
v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 147-48 (1991).
II
The defendant also raises several arguments regarding the 
sentencing hearing conducted in this case. The defendant first contends that the 
prosecution improperly introduced victim impact evidence at the second stage of 
the capital sentencing hearing. The defendant maintains that the challenged 
evidence violates the proscription of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 
96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), because the statements expressed the 
witnesses' views of what they believed to be the appropriate punishment in this 
case. Given the nature of this contention, we will set out these comments in 
some detail.
The defendant specifically complains of the following 
portions of the victim impact evidence. First, Crystal Lewis, in reading her 
statement, said of her sister:
The victim impact statement prepared by 
Mary Tinsley, Reginald Wilson's aunt, was read aloud by the prosecutor; it 
stated in part:
The victim impact statement prepared by 
Francita Williams, Reginald Wilson's mother, was also read aloud by the 
prosecutor. It stated in part:
The defendant argues that the preceding 
evidence improperly characterized the offenses in this case and contained 
improper pleas for imposition of the death penalty.
In People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 155-58 
(1991), this court adopted the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court 
in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 
(1991), allowing the prosecution to present victim impact testimony as evidence 
in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing. In reaching that result, 
Payne overruled contrary decisions in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), and South Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989). 
Payne did not address or disturb, however, Booth's prohibition 
on the introduction of opinion testimony regarding the appropriate punishment 
for a capital defendant. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 553 (1992); 
Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 157. This court has similarly held that 
witnesses' opinions regarding the proper punishment in a capital case are 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. 
People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 155-56 (1998); People v. 
Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 67 (1984).
In the present case, the defendant did not object to any of 
the comments challenged in this appeal. To overcome that procedural default, the 
defendant contends that the remarks complained of rose to the level of plain 
error and, alternatively, that counsel's failure to object to the comments 
constituted ineffective assistance. Both arguments must fail.
In imposing sentence, the trial judge made no reference to 
the victim impact evidence challenged in this appeal. The judge 
stated:
"I have reviewed the evidence from the trial. I have 
reviewed the evidence presented at the sentencing phase, both in aggravation and 
mitigation. I have heard the arguments of the attorneys. I have also reviewed 
the statutory mitigating factors and nonstatutory mitigating factors that are 
applicable to this case, and also to the aggravating factors that are applicable 
to this case.
This should never be a decision taken lightly. When it comes 
to somebody's time in life as it does, I think they should move on; but at this 
time, I can find no mitigating factors that are present to preclude the 
imposition of death on Mr. Anthony Brown."
In light of the judge's comments, and the nature of the 
testimony offered by the witnesses, we do not believe that the portions of the 
victim impact statements now challenged by the defendant played any role in the 
trial judge's decision to impose the death penalty in this case. As we have 
noted, the defendant's sentencing hearing was a bench proceeding, and reviewing 
courts will assume that a trial judge considers only admissible evidence 
(People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 153 (1992); People v. 
Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 219 (1989); People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 95-96 (1988)). Consistent with that precept, we will assume here that the 
trial judge did not consider the evidence now challenged by the defendant. 
Notably, the trial judge did not refer to the victim impact statements when he 
announced his decision to impose the death penalty. The defendant observes in 
his reply brief that the same judge, in sentencing codefendants to sentences 
other than death, spoke of his empathy for the surviving family members. That 
the judge did not make similar comments in this case suggests that the judge did 
not consider the challenged evidence here in deciding to impose the death 
sentence. Moreover, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing was not 
closely balanced, and we do not believe that these brief portions of the family 
members' statements could have influenced the trial judge's sentencing decision. 
See Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 156-57.
The defendant next argues that the trial judge improperly 
denied the defendant's request to speak in allocution at the conclusion of the 
capital sentencing hearing. The defendant observes that the same judge allowed a 
codefendant, Stanley Hamelin, to speak in allocution at the conclusion of that 
person's separate capital sentencing hearing, and the defendant notes that the 
judge sentenced the codefendant to natural life imprisonment rather than to 
death. The defendant argues that he should have been allowed the same 
opportunity at his own capital sentencing hearing.
This court has consistently held that a capital defendant 
does not have either a statutory or a constitutional right to address the judge 
or jury in allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Brown, 
172 Ill. 2d 1, 61 (1996); People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 307-08 
(1994); People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 382 (1993); People v. 
Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 280-82 (1989); People v. 
Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d 96, 127-29 (1987); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 374-79 (1981); see also People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 
95 (1986); People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 88-89 (1985). In addition, 
the court has held that allowing allocution in noncapital sentencing proceedings 
(see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-4-1(a)(5)) while forbidding it in 
capital sentencing proceedings does not deny capital defendants equal 
protection. Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d at 128-29; Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d  at 379-80. Here, the trial judge acted consistently with that extensive 
line of authority in denying the defendant an opportunity for 
allocution.
We do not believe that the judge's apparent inconsistency in 
allowing allocution in another case but not in this one unfairly penalized the 
defendant. The judge acted properly in denying the defendant's request to 
address the court. That the same judge, in prior cases, allowed allocution does 
not, in our view, require that this defendant now enjoy the same benefit, for we 
do not believe that the judge was required to render the same ruling here. 
Nothing suggests that the judge's decision not to grant the defendant's request 
for allocution rested on any invalid ground or was based on any animosity toward 
the defendant.
III
As a final matter, the defendant raises two challenges to 
the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. 720 ILCS 5/9-1 
(West 1994). The defendant first argues that the Illinois death penalty statute 
is unconstitutional because, inevitably, innocent persons may be put to death 
under it. The defendant insists that no sentencing scheme could be devised that 
would always prevent the execution of innocent persons, and for that reason the 
defendant maintains that the present sentencing process must be considered 
unconstitutional. This court recently rejected the identical argument in 
People v. Bull, No. 81578 (November 10, 1998). There, the court 
concluded that the sentencing system possesses sufficient safeguards to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, and we see no reason to reach a different 
result in this case.
The defendant also argues that the death penalty statute 
places a burden of proof on the defense that effectively prevents the sentencing 
authority-judge or jury, as the case may be-from giving meaningful consideration 
to mitigating evidence. The defendant complains of the requirement in the 
statute that the death sentence be imposed unless there exists mitigating 
evidence sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), 
(h) (West 1994). The defendant asserts that this requirement prevents the 
sentencer from giving full effect to the mitigating evidence introduced by a 
capital defendant. Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, 
concluding that the argument "rests on a strained interpretation of the 
statutory language" (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 
(1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 
176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 
(1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. 
Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)).
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of 
Cook County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order 
setting Wednesday, March 17, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death 
entered in the circuit court of Cook County is to be carried out. The defendant 
shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996)). 
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case 
to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, 
and to the warden of the institution where the defendant is now 
confined.
Judgment 
affirmed.