Title: Swisher v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOBBY WAYNE SWISHER 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record Nos. 980677 & 980678 
November 6, 1998 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Thomas H. Wood, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder 
conviction, sentence of death, and related convictions imposed 
upon Bobby Wayne Swisher. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
On April 28, 1997, an Augusta County grand jury indicted 
Swisher for the following offenses:  capital murder of Dawn 
McNees Snyder in the commission of abduction with the intent 
to defile the victim of such abduction or in the commission of 
or subsequent to rape or forcible sodomy in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31; abduction with intent to defile Snyder in violation 
of Code § 18.2-48; rape of Snyder in violation of Code § 18.2-
61; and forcible sodomy of Snyder in violation of Code § 18.2-
67.1. 
 
Swisher was tried before a jury and found guilty of the 
charged offenses.  The jury fixed Swisher's punishment at life 
imprisonment for the abduction with intent to defile 
conviction, life imprisonment for the rape conviction, and 
life imprisonment for the forcible sodomy conviction.  In the 
penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the jury fixed 
Swisher's punishment at death, finding that he represented a 
continuing serious threat to society and that his offense was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it 
involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to 
the victim.  After considering a report prepared by a 
probation officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, the trial 
court sentenced Swisher in accord with the jury verdicts. 
 
We have consolidated the automatic review of Swisher's 
death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder 
conviction.  Former Code § 17-110.1(F).*  Swisher's appeal of 
his non-capital convictions was certified from the Court of 
Appeals, former Code § 17-116.06, and was consolidated with 
his capital murder appeal and given priority on our docket. 
II.  THE EVIDENCE 
 
On February 5, 1997, Dawn McNees Snyder disappeared from 
a florist shop where she worked in Stuarts Draft in Augusta 
County.  Her body was found on February 21, 1997, near a 
riverbank about two miles from the florist shop.  Animals had 
eaten extensive portions of her face, neck, and upper chest, 
and her identity was established by use of her dental records. 
                     
* Effective October 1, 1998, Title 17 was superseded by 
Title 17.1.  As this appeal was briefed and argued prior to 
the effective date of Code § 17.1-313, our review was 
 
2
 
On February 22, 1997, the defendant, age 20, was at an 
apartment with two friends, one of whom was Clarence Henry 
Ridgeway, Jr.  Swisher told Ridgeway that Swisher had 
abducted, raped, sodomized, and killed Snyder.  Swisher 
stated:  "You know the woman, Dawn Snyder . . . I killed her."  
Swisher related the following details to Ridgeway. 
 
On February 5, 1997, about 7:15 p.m., Swisher's uncle 
drove Swisher by car to a grocery store located near the 
florist shop where Snyder worked.  Swisher left the grocery 
store and walked to the florist shop.  Swisher entered the 
shop, approached Snyder, and said, "I have a gun in my 
pocket."  Swisher showed Snyder a "butcher knife with ridges" 
and directed her to go with him. 
 
Swisher forced Snyder to leave the florist shop through a 
rear door, and they walked for some distance until they 
reached a field by the South River.  Then, Swisher stopped 
Snyder and told her to "suck his dick."  He forced her to 
perform an act of oral sodomy upon him, and he made her remove 
her clothes.  After he raped her, she put her clothes on, and 
he forced her to perform another act of oral sodomy upon him. 
 
Swisher decided to kill Snyder because she had "seen his 
face."  He "pulled out the butcher knife" that had "ridges 
                                                                
conducted pursuant to otherwise identical provisions of the 
formerly applicable Code sections. 
 
3
around the edge of the blade," and he "slit her across the 
left side of the face and was holding her; then slit her 
throat and then gouged her and then tossed her into a river."  
He walked along the riverbank, watching her in the river, 
asking her, "[a]re -- are you dead yet?"  After Snyder floated 
in the river for awhile, Swisher saw her "crawl up the bank."  
Then, "he got scared and took off running straight to his 
house from that field."  Swisher threw his knife in the river. 
 
When Swisher finished his confession to Ridgeway, Swisher 
stated that "[i]t feels like [I] could do it again."  The 
following morning, Ridgeway informed the Augusta County 
Sheriff's Office of Swisher's crimes. 
 
On February 23, 1997, Sergeant William E. Lemerise, 
Sergeant K.W. Reed, and two other deputies went to a house 
where Swisher resided with his uncles, Paul H. Swisher and 
William E. Swisher.  Sergeant Reed advised Bobby Swisher that 
he was a suspect in the murder of Dawn Snyder and asked if 
Swisher would accompany the deputies to the Sheriff's Office 
for questioning.  Swisher, who did not object, accompanied the 
deputies.  Sergeant Lemerise informed Swisher that he would be 
required to wear handcuffs while en route to the Sheriff's 
Office because of a departmental policy which required that 
the sheriff's personnel transport suspects in restraints for 
safety considerations.  Lemerise told Swisher that he would 
 
4
have to wear these restraints even though he was not under 
arrest. 
 
When Swisher arrived at the Sheriff's Office, about 10:15 
p.m., the handcuffs were immediately removed from him, and he 
was taken to a "briefing room."  The briefing room is an open 
room with a coffee machine and a drink machine.  There are no 
bars on the windows or door locks in that room.  Swisher was 
permitted to smoke cigarettes, and he was given coffee. 
 
Sergeant Lemerise explained to Swisher that he was not 
under arrest, that he was a suspect, that the sheriff's 
personnel were going to ask him some questions, and that he 
was free to leave.  Lemerise asked Swisher "how did he feel 
about the fact that he could walk out of there if he chose to, 
words to that effect . . . and [Swisher] appeared at that 
point in time, although he was nervous . . . to be fine with 
the situation." 
 
Swisher spoke with the deputies, but did not confess to 
the commission of any crimes until after he was arrested and 
twice read his Miranda rights after midnight on February 24.  
Swisher admitted, in an audiotaped confession, that he had 
sodomized, raped, and murdered Snyder by cutting her throat.  
He also stated that after he cut her throat, he threw her into 
the South River.  
 
5
 
Dr. David Oxley, a medical examiner who performed an 
autopsy on Snyder's body, was unable to render an opinion 
about the specific cause of Snyder's death.  He did state, 
however, that it was an inescapable conclusion that Snyder's 
death was the result of violent causes "probably related to 
the neck."  Dr. Oxley was not able to determine positively 
whether the victim's throat had been cut because animals had 
eaten her larynx, trachea, and the large arteries and veins 
that were in her neck.  The highest concentration of blood on 
the victim's clothing appeared on a shirt around the neck area 
extending onto the chest area. 
 
Patricia Taylor, a forensic scientist in the Forensic 
Biology Unit of the Western Regional Laboratory for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, qualified as an expert witness on 
the subject of forensic DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).  She 
examined some panties that were found on Snyder's body.  Her 
examination revealed that DNA consistent with Swisher's DNA 
was found in semen deposited on Snyder's panties.  Taylor 
testified that the odds of the DNA found on Snyder's panties 
belonging to someone other than Swisher were one in 
380,000,000 in the Caucasian population. 
 
Spots of blood were found on Swisher's coat.  Taylor 
testified that the DNA profile obtained from that coat is 
consistent with the DNA profile of Snyder and different from 
 
6
the DNA profile of Swisher.  Taylor testified that the 
probability of randomly selecting an individual unrelated to 
Snyder who had a DNA profile consistent with the DNA on 
Swisher's coat was approximately one in 1.3 billion in the 
Caucasian population.  Dr. Taylor testified that the DNA 
profile obtained from spermatozoa heads extracted from the 
victim's stomach and esophagus were consistent with Swisher's 
DNA profile. 
III.  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED 
 
Swisher argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to "declare the Virginia capital murder and death 
penalty statutes unconstitutional and to prohibit the 
imposition of the death penalty."  Swisher claims that 
Virginia's death penalty statutes, "specifically . . . Code 
§§ 19.2-2[6]4.2 through 19.2-264.5, [and former Code §§ 17-
110.1 and 17-110.2] . . . on their face and as applied, 
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair 
trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law."  In support of his contentions, Swisher 
merely refers this Court to a memorandum of law that he filed 
in the trial court. 
 
7
 
We hold that Swisher's assertions are insufficient and 
constitute a procedural default.  "An appellant who asserts 
that a trial court's ruling was erroneous has an obligation to 
state clearly to the appellate court the grounds for that 
assertion.  A cross-reference to arguments made at trial is 
insufficient."  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 99, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 622, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460-61, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). 
IV.  ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Swisher raised certain issues on appeal which have been 
decided adversely to his claims by our previous decisions.  We 
adhere to those rulings, and we will not discuss them further.  
The issues previously resolved are: 
 
(1)  Whether the defendant should have been granted 
additional preemptory challenges.  See Strickler v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 489, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991); Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 364, 371, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223 (1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 834 (1991); Spencer, 240 Va. at 84-85, 393 S.E.2d at 613; 
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 405, 384 S.E.2d 757, 
767 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990). 
 
(2)  Whether the trial court erred in denying the 
defendant's request to mail a questionnaire to the potential 
 
8
jury venire.  See Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Strickler, 
241 Va. at 489-90, 404 S.E.2d at 232. 
V.  BILL OF PARTICULARS 
 
Swisher filed a motion for a bill of particulars, 
requesting that the trial court enter an order requiring the 
Commonwealth: 
"a)  To identify the grounds, and all of them, on 
which it contends that defendant is guilty of 
Capital Murder under . . . Code § 18.2-31. 
 
"b) To identify the evidence, and all of it, upon 
which it intends to rely in seeking a conviction of 
Defendant upon the charge of Capital Murder. 
 
"c) To identify the aggravating factors, if any, 
upon which it intends to rely in seeking the death 
penalty, should defendant be convicted of Capital 
Murder.  Additionally: 
 
 
"1)  If the Commonwealth intends to prove 
'vileness' as an aggravating factor, as set out 
in . . . Code . . . § 19.2-264.4C, to identify 
as many of the components of the factor, 
including torture, depravity of mind, and 
aggravated battery, on which it intends to 
offer evidence. 
 
 
"2)  If the Commonwealth intends to prove 
'vileness' as an aggravating factor,  as set 
out in . . . Code . . . § 19.2-264.4C, to 
further identify every narrowing construction 
of that factor on which it intends to offer 
evidence. 
 
 
"3)  If the Commonwealth intends to prove 
'future dangerousness' as an aggravating 
factor, as set out in . . . Code . . . § 19.2-
264.4C and pursuant to . . . Code . . . § 19.2-
264.3:2, to identify any unadjudicated 
 
9
allegations of misconduct by defendant upon 
which it intends to offer evidence and any 
circumstances of the offense it contends are 
relevant to proof of the factor.  
 
 
"4)  If the Commonwealth intends to prove 
'future dangerousness' as an aggravating 
factor, as set out in . . . Code . . . § 19.2-
264.4C and pursuant to . . . Code . . . § 19.2-
264.3:2, to further identify every narrowing 
construction of that factor on which it intends 
to offer evidence. 
 
"d)  To identify the evidence, and all of it, on 
which it intends to rely in support of the 
aggravating factors identified, and all other 
evidence which it intends to introduce in support of 
its contention that death is the appropriate 
punishment for this Defendant." 
 
 
Swisher essentially contends that the Commonwealth should 
have been required to identify its evidence so that he could 
have made pretrial challenges to the application of Virginia's 
capital murder statute.  Swisher also asserts that the 
aforementioned bill of particulars was needed to:  insure that 
he would have effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment; assist him in challenging the suppression 
of certain evidence and; assist him in challenging the 
constitutionality of the vileness and future dangerousness 
factors in Code § 19.2-264.4, one of which must be established 
before the death penalty may be imposed.  We disagree with 
Swisher. 
 
"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to state 
sufficient facts regarding the crime to inform an accused in 
 
10
advance of the offense for which he is to be tried.  He is 
entitled to no more."  Hevener v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 802, 
814, 54 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1949); accord Goins, 251 Va. at 454, 
470 S.E.2d at 123; Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 372, 402 S.E.2d at 
223, Strickler, 241 Va. at 490-91, 404 S.E.2d at 233.  A 
defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter 
of right.  Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 372, 402 S.E.2d at 223.  
Rather, Code § 19.2-230 states that a trial court "may direct 
the filing of a bill of particulars." 
 
The trial court's decision whether to require the 
Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars is a matter that 
rests within its sound discretion.  Goins, 251 Va. at 454, 470 
S.E.2d at 123; Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 372, 402 S.E.2d at 223.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Swisher's motion.  The indictment adequately informed Swisher 
of the charged offenses, and we are of opinion Swisher did not 
wish to use the bill to challenge the sufficiency of the 
indictment, but, as he has admitted in his brief, he desired 
the bill of particulars for other reasons. 
 
Furthermore, Paragraphs B and D are simply demands for 
pre-trial disclosure of the Commonwealth's evidence to be 
introduced at trial and, as we have held, there is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, even 
when a capital offense is charged.  See Strickler, 241 Va. at 
 
11
490-91, 404 S.E.2d at 233.  We do note that the Commonwealth, 
as required by Code § 19.2-264.3:2, provided Swisher with 
evidence of unadjudicated conduct that the Commonwealth 
planned to use to establish his future dangerousness, and 
Swisher does not claim that such information was not given to 
him.  Moreover, as the trial court observed, Swisher was 
aware, well before trial, of the entirety of the 
Commonwealth's evidence through the Commonwealth's undisputed 
open file policy. 
VI.  DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
A. 
 
Swisher filed a motion to suppress a confession that he 
made to the deputies after he had been given his Miranda 
warnings, and the trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, 
Swisher contends that his confessions were "made at a time 
when he had not been advised of his rights to remain silent 
and his right to counsel and were not made within the 
guidelines of the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966)."  We disagree with Swisher. 
 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual 
must be warned before questioning by police of his right to 
remain silent and his right to an attorney only when that 
"individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is 
 
12
subjected to questioning. . . ."  Id. at 478.  The Supreme 
Court subsequently explained in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 
492, 495 (1977), that Miranda warnings are implicated only 
during a custodial interrogation: 
"Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a 
police officer will have coercive aspects to it, 
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer 
is part of a law enforcement system which may 
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a 
crime.  But police officers are not required to 
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 
question.  Nor is the requirement of warnings to be 
imposed simply because the questioning takes place 
in the station house, or because the questioned 
person is one whom the police suspect.  Miranda 
warnings are required only where there has been such 
a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 
'in custody.'  It was that sort of coercive 
environment to which Miranda by its terms was made 
applicable, and to which it is limited.” 
 
 
We have also observed that Miranda warnings are not 
required in every instance when a suspect is interrogated at a 
police office.  Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47, 307 
S.E.2d 864, 872 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984).  
We have stated that "[i]t is the custodial nature rather than 
the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity 
for giving Miranda warnings."  Id. at 47, 307 S.E.2d at 872; 
accord Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 
124, 129 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995); see 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346 (1976). 
 
13
 
Applying these principles, we hold that the deputies did 
not violate Swisher's Miranda rights.  Initially, we note that 
Swisher did not make any incriminating statements between the 
time he left his uncles' house and the time he was placed 
under arrest at 12:05 a.m. on February 24.  Before Swisher was 
arrested, the deputies informed him that he was free to leave 
the Sheriff's Office.  After Swisher was arrested, he was 
informed of his Miranda rights twice.  The record reveals that 
his confession was made knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, and that his 
confession was "the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker."  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); accord Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 340-41, 468 S.E.2d 98, 108, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996). 
B. 
 
Swisher filed a motion to suppress "all evidence, oral 
and physical, including any statements made by [him], whether 
prior to or subsequent to his arrest, and any property seized 
as a result of the arrest, detention or interrogation of 
[him]" and any property "seized by a warrantless search of the 
premises occupied by [him], and any property or goods seized 
by virtue of the search warrant for [his] body, which warrant 
was issued . . . on [February 25, 1997]." 
 
14
 
Swisher contends that:  his arrest was illegal; the 
deputies unlawfully searched and seized certain items from the 
house where he lived and; the deputies unlawfully searched his 
person by obtaining pubic hair, head hair, and blood. 
 
When the deputies went to Swisher's uncles' house, they 
knocked on the door, and one of Swisher's uncles permitted the 
deputies to enter.  As we have already stated, the deputies 
asked Swisher to accompany them to the Sheriff's Office, and 
he voluntarily agreed to do so.  As Swisher was about to leave 
the house, one of the deputies asked Swisher if he would like 
to take a jacket with him because it was cold outside.  A 
deputy helped Swisher put the jacket on. 
 
At the Sheriff's Office, Sergeant A.C. Powers noticed a 
few dark spots on Swisher's jacket, and he asked Swisher for 
permission to test the jacket to determine whether the spots 
were blood.  Swisher replied, "[t]hat's all right with me, 
because I don't know nothing about what you're talking about."  
When the test showed that blood was present on the jacket, 
Sergeant Lemerise asked Swisher for permission to send the 
jacket to a forensic laboratory for further testing and 
Swisher agreed. 
 
While Swisher was still at the Sheriff's Office, some of 
the deputies asked one of Swisher's uncles for permission to 
search two large "burn barrels" which were on the uncles' 
 
15
property.  The uncle gave the deputies permission to search, 
and they recovered several items from the barrels, including 
burned sneakers and a green shirt. 
 
On February 24, 1997, some deputies returned to Swisher's 
uncles' house and asked William Swisher for permission to 
search the premises.  The deputies gave William Swisher a 
consent form and told him that he did not have to consent to a 
search.  William Swisher gave the deputies permission to 
search, and he signed the consent form.   
 
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence because the 
defendant's uncles gave the deputies consent to search the 
house and the "burn barrels."  We also note that none of the 
items taken from the consensual search of the "burn barrels" 
was admitted in evidence at Swisher's trial.   
 
Additionally, the trial court did not err in refusing the 
defendant's motion to suppress the jacket.  Swisher gave the 
deputies consent to test his jacket.  The evidence of record 
supports the trial court's finding that in each instance, 
Swisher's consent was voluntary.  See Gray v. Commonwealth, 
233 Va. 313, 327, 356 S.E.2d 157, 164, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
873 (1987). 
 
We do not consider Swisher's conclusional statement that 
his arrest was illegal and, therefore, his pubic hairs, head 
 
16
hairs, and blood were illegally seized.  Swisher does not 
assign as error that he was subject to an illegal arrest.  
Thus, this argument is beyond the scope of any assignment of 
error, and it is procedurally defaulted.  Rule 5:17(c); 
Burket, 248 Va. at 613, 450 S.E.2d at 133. 
VII.  VENUE 
 
Swisher argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a change of venue because the media coverage of his 
crime was purportedly inflammatory and contained information 
regarding his confession.  Swisher asserts that these aspects 
of the media coverage required a change of venue in order to 
protect the rights afforded him under the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  We disagree. 
 
There is a presumption that a defendant can receive a 
fair trial from the citizens of the jurisdiction where the 
crimes occurred.  The defendant must overcome this presumption 
by demonstrating that the feeling of prejudice on the part of 
the citizenry is widespread and is such that would "be 
reasonably certain to prevent a fair trial."  Mueller v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993) (quoting Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 314 S.E.2d 371, 380, cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984) (citation omitted)).  The decision 
whether to grant a change of venue rests within the sound 
 
17
discretion of the trial court.  Roach, 251 Va. at 342, 468 
S.E.2d at 109.  The trial court's ruling whether to change 
venue will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record 
affirmatively shows an abuse of discretion.  Mueller, 244 Va. 
at 398, 422 S.E.2d at 388. 
 
Extensive media coverage about an accused and his crimes 
does not necessarily require a change of venue.  Buchanan, 238 
Va. at 407, 384 S.E.2d at 767-68.  Additionally, a significant 
factor that the trial court must consider is "the difficulty 
encountered in selecting a jury."  Mueller, 244 Va. at 398, 
422 S.E.2d at 388. 
 
Swisher did not overcome the presumption that he could 
receive a fair trial in Augusta County, and the evidence of 
record does not affirmatively show that the trial court abused 
its discretion.  Our review of the record reveals that the 
trial court was able to empanel a jury with relative ease.  
Swisher does not challenge on the appeal the seating of any 
juror on the basis of pre-trial publicity.  Thus, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Swisher's motion 
for a change of venue. 
VIII.  VOIR DIRE
 
Swisher argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
permit him to ask certain questions to the jury panel during 
voir dire.  Swisher says that because his trial was 
 
18
extensively covered by the media, he should have been 
permitted to ask a wide range of questions to potential 
jurors.  We disagree with Swisher's contentions. 
 
As we stated in LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 
581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 
(1984), "[a] party has no right, statutory or otherwise, to 
propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire 
questioning ad infinitum.  The court must afford a party a 
full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective 
jurors 'stand indifferent in the cause,' but the trial judge 
retains the discretion to determine when the parties have had 
sufficient opportunity to do so."  Swisher fails to identify 
any questions that the trial court prohibited.  Swisher's 
conclusional contention does not specify how the trial court 
abused its discretion, and he fails to demonstrate how he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's rulings.  
IX.  DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT 
 
Swisher asserts that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with capital 
murder under Code § 18.2-31(1), which states in relevant part: 
 
"The following offenses shall constitute 
capital murder, punishable as a Class 1 felony: 
 
1.  The willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing of any person in the commission of 
abduction, as defined in § 18.2-48, when such 
abduction was committed with the intent to extort 
 
19
money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to 
defile the victim of such abduction;" 
 
 
Swisher claims that the term intent "to defile" fails to 
inform "a defendant or any person of ordinary intelligence of 
what conduct makes him eligible for a death sentence through 
commission of capital murder."  Continuing, Swisher says that 
the term intent "to defile" does not provide sufficient 
guidance to the jury as it considers whether to impose the 
sentence of death.  Swisher claims that these purported 
statutory deficiencies contravene his constitutional rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
 
We find no merit in Swisher's contentions.  An act which 
creates a statutory offense "must specify with reasonable 
certainty and definiteness the conduct which is commanded or 
prohibited . . . so that a person of ordinary intelligence may 
know what is thereby required of him."  Caldwell v. 
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 458, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1956); 
McCutcheon v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 30, 35, 294 S.E.2d 808, 
811 (1982).  We have stated that the phrase intent "to defile" 
is interchangeable, within the meaning of Code § 18.2-48, with 
the phrase "sexually molest."  Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
519, 525 n.2, 323 S.E.2d 572, 576 n.2 (1984); see Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 103-04, 452 S.E.2d 669, 675, cert. 
 
20
denied, 516 U.S. 841 (1995).  We are of the opinion that a 
person of ordinary intelligence would also conclude that the 
term intent "to defile" is interchangeable with the phrase 
intent to "sexually molest."  Thus, we hold that the 
indictment adequately informed Swisher of the charges against 
him and that the jury would have concluded that the term 
intent "to defile" was synonymous with the phrase intent to 
"sexually molest." 
X.  ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
 
As we have already stated, Patricia Taylor testified as 
an expert witness on the subject of DNA on behalf of the 
Commonwealth.  During her direct examination, Taylor testified 
that the DNA profile obtained from sperm found in Snyder's 
rectum, vagina, esophagus, and stomach was consistent with the 
mixture of DNA profiles of Swisher and Snyder, that sperm 
found on the crotch of Snyder's panties was consistent with 
Swisher's DNA, and that blood found on Swisher's coat was 
consistent with the DNA profile of Snyder. 
 
During cross-examination, Swisher attempted to examine 
Taylor about "genetic material" found on a pillowcase which 
had not been admitted in evidence.  The Commonwealth objected 
to the defendant's questions about the pillowcase on the basis 
that the pillowcase had not been admitted in evidence, and the 
pillowcase was not relevant to any issues at trial.  The trial 
 
21
court gave Swisher's counsel several opportunities to explain 
to the court the relevance of the pillowcase.  The trial court 
ruled that Swisher's questions about the pillowcase were not 
relevant because the pillowcase had not been admitted in 
evidence, no chain of custody had been established which would 
permit the admission of the pillowcase in evidence, and 
testimony about the pillowcase would only be confusing to the 
jury. 
 
The decision to refuse or admit evidence based on 
relevance rests within the discretion of the trial court, Beck 
v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85, 484 S.E.2d 898, 905, 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 608 (1997), and we hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Indeed, 
Swisher's counsel was unable to demonstrate either in the 
trial court or on brief why the questions about the pillowcase 
were relevant to any issues at trial. 
XI.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Swisher proffered the following jury instructions which 
were refused by the trial court: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. R-1 
 
 
"If you find that the defendant was so greatly 
intoxicated by the voluntary use of alcohol and 
drugs that he was incapable of deliberating or 
premeditating, then you cannot find him guilty of 
capital murder or murder in the first degree. 
 
 
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"Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to 
second degree murder or manslaughter." 
 
"INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
 
 
"You have been instructed on more than one 
grade of homicide and if you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the grade of the offense, then you must 
resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant, and 
find him guilty of the lesser offense." 
 
 
"For example, if you have a reasonable doubt as 
to whether he is guilty of capital murder or first 
degree murder, you shall find him guilty of first 
degree murder.  If you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether he is guilty of first degree murder or 
second degree murder, you shall find him guilty of 
second degree murder or of voluntary manslaughter.  
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he is 
guilty at all, you shall find him not guilty." 
 
 
Swisher, who stated in his confession to the deputies 
that he had consumed crack cocaine and alcohol on the day of 
the murder, argues that the trial court erred by refusing to 
grant Instruction R-1.  Swisher says that the trial court 
erred by refusing to grant Instruction Q because "the evidence 
was that [he] was on crack cocaine and one of the effects of 
the drug is that it inflames the passions of the user." 
 
Swisher's assertions are without merit.  Generally, 
voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any crime.  Wright 
v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 627, 629, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1988).  
We have stated that the only exception to this general rule is 
in cases involving deliberate and premeditated murder.  Id.  
Even though it has long been the rule in this Commonwealth 
 
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that a defendant may negate the specific intent requisite for 
capital murder or first degree murder by showing that he was 
so greatly intoxicated that he was incapable of deliberation 
or premeditation, Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 281-82, 
322 S.E.2d 216, 219-20 (1984); Fitzgerald, 223 Va. at 631, 292 
S.E.2d at 807; Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1073, 
266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1980), "[v]oluntary immediate drunkenness 
is not admissible to disprove malice or [to] reduce the 
offense to manslaughter."  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 
524, 531, 115 S.E. 673, 676 (1923) (quoting Willis v. 
Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 929, 926 (1879)). 
 
We hold that the trial court properly refused the 
defendant's proposed instructions because these instructions 
contained incorrect statements of the law.  The proposed 
instructions would have permitted the jury to find the 
defendant guilty of manslaughter because of his purported 
voluntary intoxication, which is contrary to the common law of 
this Commonwealth. 
XII.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Former Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) requires this Court to 
review the imposition of the sentence of death imposed upon 
Swisher, based on the trial record, to determine whether (i) 
the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or (ii) the sentence 
 
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is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.  
We observe that Swisher does not contend that the death 
penalty was imposed under the influence of any of the above 
factors prohibited by the statute, nor does he contend that 
the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases.  Nevertheless, we have examined the 
records of all capital cases reviewed by this court, pursuant 
to former Code § 17-110.1(E).  See Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 
252 Va. 161, 179-80, 477 S.E.2d 270, 281 (1996), cert. denied, 
__ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1724 (1997); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 
Va. 68, 89, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 
(1994). 
 
Upon review of these cases, as well as cases in which 
life imprisonment was imposed, we hold that Swisher's sentence 
of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in 
Virginia for crimes of a similar nature.  Furthermore, based 
upon our review of the record, we find nothing that suggests 
that Swisher's sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor. 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
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We find no reversible error in the issues presented here.  
Having reviewed all Swisher's contentions and the imposition 
of Swisher's sentence of death pursuant to former Code § 17-
110.1, we hold that the conviction of capital murder and 
sentence of death will be affirmed, and we will also affirm 
the judgments entered for Swisher's non-capital convictions. 
Record No. 980677 - Affirmed. 
Record No. 980678 - Affirmed. 
 
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