Title: In re Gamble

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,037 
 
In the Matter of ERIC MICHAEL GAMBLE, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed December 5, 2014. Six-month suspension. 
 
Kate F. Baird, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary 
Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Eric 
Michael Gamble, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Eric Michael Gamble, of Kansas City, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 2003. 
 
 
On March 24, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on April 17, 2014. A hearing was held 
on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on May 
13, 2014, where the respondent was personally present. The hearing panel determined 
that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and KRPC 8.4(g) (engaging in 
conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
 
2 
 
 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
 
"8. 
An expectant 18-year-old mother arranged for the adoption of the baby 
she was carrying. Shortly after the child's birth, she executed a consent to adopt on 
October 12, 2012. The child was immediately placed with the adoptive parents. The 
adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption on October 16, 2012, in Johnson County 
District Court. 
 
"9. 
The biological father did not consent to the adoption. The court 
scheduled a hearing on the termination of the biological father's parental rights and 
adoption for June 27, 2013. The respondent represented the biological father in the 
proceedings. 
 
"10. 
Prior to the hearing, on June 18, 2013, the respondent deposed the 
biological mother. At this point in the proceedings, the biological mother was not 
represented by counsel. The adoptive parents appeared through their attorney. During the 
deposition, the biological mother testified that, at age 17, she worked with the biological 
father at a restaurant. The biological mother testified that after having worked together 
for a few months, they went on a date. The biological mother testified that she became 
pregnant on their first date. The biological mother decided to arrange for the adoption of 
the child as she and the biological father were not in a relationship. Throughout her 
pregnancy and after the birth of the baby, the biological mother was resolute about her 
decision to have the child adopted. The biological mother clearly testified that she was 
not prepared to be a mother. Finally, the biological mother testified that the process was 
'emotionally exhausting.' 
 
3 
 
 
 
"11. 
On June 20, 2013, 2 days after the deposition, the respondent sent the 
biological mother a private message through Facebook. The private message provided: 
 
 
'Dear [biological mother] 
 
 
'I wish to offer you some reasons why you should stand up and 
fight for your daughter. As you know, I am the attorney for [the 
biological father]. We held your deposition in my office. I wanted to give 
you the chance to make things right. This may be your last opportunity to 
be a mom for [the baby]. As I told you after your deposition in my office, 
it is not too late. You still have a wonderful opportunity to have a real 
relationship with your daughter if you so choose. I have attached a 
document for you to consider signing and bringing to court or to my 
office. It is a revocation of your consent to adopt. If you sign this 
document there is a very good chance that you will be able to call [the 
baby] your own and [the baby] will call you her mom. I can't begin to 
explain how beautiful and wonderful parenthood is. I have a little girl 
myself and she is my world just like you are your dad's world. [The 
baby] deserves to know her parents. She deserves to know that you love 
her and care for her as well. Do not let this opportunity pass you by 
because you will live with this decision the rest of your life and [the 
baby] will know someday what happened. [The adoptive parents] do not 
legally have to ever let you see her again after court (although they are 
probably trying to convince you otherwise with the idea of an 'open 
adoption'). The reason why you don't know about the trial was because 
they don't want you there because that doesn't help [the adoptive parents] 
case. This is your time to get rid of the guilt and standup and do what is 
right and what [the baby] deserves. She deserves to have her parents love 
and care for her. She deserves to know her grandparents and extended 
family. If she's adopted, she won't have that chance. [The biological 
father] wants to be her dad and to love her. She deserves that. I urge you 
to print, sign, and notarize this document and bring it to my office before 
4 
 
 
 
court. Trial is June 27, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. at the Johnson County 
Courthouse, Division 15. I hope to see you and your father there.' 
 
"12. 
The respondent drafted a 'revocation for relinquishment of parental rights 
and consent to adoption of minor child,' for the biological mother's signature. The 
respondent attached the document to the private Facebook message. The respondent 
urged the biological mother to print, sign, and notarize the document and bring it to his 
office prior to the hearing and bring it to the courthouse on June 27, 2013. 
 
"13. 
At the time the respondent sent the biological mother the message, he 
knew what the biological mother's position was regarding the adoption, as he had taken 
her deposition 2 days before. 
 
"14. 
The biological mother appeared at the June 27, 2013, hearing pursuant to 
a subpoena issued by the adoptive parents. She declined to revoke her consent to the 
adoption. Opposing counsel brought the respondent's communication to the biological 
mother to the court's attention. At the outset of the hearing, the court took up the matter. 
The court made no specific rulings on the respondent's conduct. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court took the termination of parental rights issue under advisement. 
 
"15. 
On June 28, 2013, the respondent sent a letter to the disciplinary 
administrator, self-reporting his conduct. The respondent's letter provided: 
 
'I wish to self-report a likely violation of the following rules of 
professional conduct. I do so because I believe I may have given legal 
advice to an unrepresented person. 
 
'I am currently representing a father in a parental rights termination 
proceeding in Johnson County, KS. See Johnson County Case No. 
12AD182. During the course of my representation of this client, and in 
preparation of trial, on 6/20/13 I sent a communication to the biological 
mother of the minor child who is the subject of the termination/adoption 
proceedings. Mother is unrepresented. Previously, on 10/12/12, mother 
5 
 
 
 
signed and filed a Consent to Adoption of Minor Child of her and my 
client's infant daughter. I have attached her Consent to the Adoption of 
Minor Child filed in this case. In addition, I have enclosed a copy of the 
email I sent her via my Facebook Account and a copy of the Revocation 
of Relinquishment of Parental Rights and Consent to Adoption of Minor 
Child which I attached to my email. I couldn't print the Facebook email 
from my account so I forwarded it to my yahoo account for purposes of 
printing it out. 
 
'The purpose of my communication to this particular individual was to 
inquire of her whether she wished to reconsider her desire to place the 
child for adoption. I believe the communication contained legal advice to 
an unrepresented person. Whether this legal advice was 100% correct, I 
am unsure. Clearly, it was my objective to advocate for my client's 
desired goal to have custody of the child. I attempted to influence this 
unrepresented witness in hopes of advancing my own client's goal to 
have custody of his daughter. The document was drafted in anticipation 
of an extremely contested trial. In hindsight, it was a communication that 
was hastily drafted and sent without proper revision. 
 
'I believe the following rules apply with respect to this communication: 
 
'4.3 Transactions with Persons Other than Clients:  Dealing with 
Unrepresented Person 
 
'In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by 
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. 
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. 
 
'As applied to this communication, I identified myself as the attorney for 
[] the biological father of the child. In fact the mother/witness [] 
6 
 
 
 
previously knew who I was and who I represented because I took her 
deposition in my office on 6/18/13. See enclosed copy of deposition. 
However, the comments to this rule indicate that a lawyer should not 
give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain 
counsel.  
 
'In addition, I believe I may have violated the following rule:   
 
'KRPC 226:  4.1 [2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 617] Transactions with 
Persons other than Clients: Truthfulness in Statements to Others 
 
'In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
 
'(a) 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
 
'(b) 
fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by 
a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by or made discretionary under 
Rule 1.6. 
 
'Although I do not believe I submitted a false statement of material fact, 
my statement to her that "[the adoptive parents] do not legally have to 
ever let you see her again after court" could be considered legal advice. 
My understanding in this matter is that once the adoption passes, she will 
have no rights to the child. This is how I interpret her consent as it states 
she is "permanently giving up all custody and other parental rights to the 
child." Thus, I believe this to be a true statement. But nevertheless, it 
contains legal advice. [The biological mother] has not signed the 
Revocation document, nor did she change her mind about wanting to be 
a mother. Trial was held on this matter on 6/27/13 and she did not wish 
to reconsider relinquishing her rights. I admit, however, that my 
7 
 
 
 
emotional commentary could have been left out of the message and 
could be considered a "false statement." 
 
'Please consider this act of self-reporting an acknowledgement on my 
part of this violation. I have realized over the years that I can sometimes 
be a little overzealous in my representation of my clients. I should not 
have sent the message. Thank you.' 
 
"16. 
On July 17, 2013, the court issued an order terminating the biological 
father's parental rights. The court finalized the adoption on July 31, 2013. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"17. 
Based upon the respondent's admissions during the hearing and the above 
findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d) and KRPC 8.4(g), as detailed below: 
 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"18. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
professional misconduct when he sent the electronic mail message to the biological 
mother. 
 
"19. 
First, the respondent knew that the biological mother had consented to 
the adoption and he was well aware after her deposition that she did not want to revoke 
her consent to the adoption. The respondent, by sending the electronic mail message, 
attempted to manipulate the biological mother and, as a result, interfered with justice. The 
respondent's misconduct in this regard was knowingly done. 
 
"20. 
In addition, the respondent included false statements of material fact in 
the electronic mail message. The respondent had no evidence that the adoptive parents 
were keeping the fact of the hearing from the biological mother or that the adoptive 
8 
 
 
 
parents did not want her to be there. In fact, the opposite was true. The adoptive parents 
had the biological mother under subpoena to appear at the hearing. The respondent's 
statement that the adoptive parents were attempting to conceal the fact of the hearing 
from the biological mother was a material false statement of fact. While there is no 
evidence that the respondent knew that the facts were false at the time he made the 
statement, his failure to fully investigate the facts before sending the email message is 
professional misconduct. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent recklessly 
made a false statement of material fact which was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
 
"21. 
Next, the respondent made a false statement of law in the electronic mail 
message. The respondent stated that if the biological mother signed the revocation of 
consent that there was 'a very good chance' that the baby would again be hers. However, 
the respondent was not familiar with K.S.A. 59-2114. That statute provides: 
 
'A consent is final when executed, unless the consenting party, 
prior to final decree of adoption, alleges and proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the consent was not freely and voluntarily 
given.' 
 
The respondent had no evidence that the biological mother's consent was not freely and 
voluntarily given—again, the opposite was true. The biological mother consented to the 
adoption and continued to consent to the adoption. Once again, the respondent failed to 
research the law in this area and made the statements based upon his false supposition. 
Negligently including a false statement of law in the communication is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
 
"22. 
Further, the respondent prepared legal documents which would 
dramatically alter the life of an 18 year old, he presented her with the legal documents, 
and at no time did he suggest or recommend that she seek counsel. The respondent's 
preparation and presentation of the revocation of consent to the biological mother 
constituted legal advice to an unrepresented interested party without the suggestion that 
she seek counsel is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The hearing panel 
9 
 
 
 
concludes that the respondent's professional misconduct in this regarding was knowingly 
done. 
 
"23. 
Thus, the hearing panel concludes that by sending the electronic mail 
message, the respondent engaged in professional misconduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, in several distinct ways, in violation of KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
 
"KRPC 8.4(g) 
 
"24. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). The 
respondent engaged in professional misconduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to 
practice law when he sent the electronic mail message to the biological mother. Despite 
the biological mother's clear testimony that she did not wish to change her mind and that 
the process was 'emotionally exhausting' for her, 2 days later the respondent sent the 
electronic mail message which, in essence, amounted to emotional blackmail. The 
respondent told the biological mother that this was her 'chance to make things right.' He 
stated, 'it is not too late.' The respondent told the biological mother that the baby 
'deserves to know that you love her.' Additionally, he told her that this was her 'time to 
get rid of the guilt and stand up and do what is right and what [the baby] deserves.' The 
respondent warned the biological mother to 'not let this opportunity pass you by because 
you will live with this decision the rest of your life.' He also threatened that the adoptive 
parents 'do not legally have to ever let' her see the baby again. Finally, the respondent 
related his own personal experiences as a parent. The respondent's intentional bullying 
tactics directly reflect on his fitness to practice law as an attorney. Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"25. 
The disciplinary administrator also alleged that the respondent violated 
KRPC 4.1, KRPC 4.3 [2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 622], and KRPC 4.4 [2013 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 622]. While portions of the respondent's misconduct are covered by each rule, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent's misconduct does not fit squarely in those 
three rules. 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
"KRPC 4.1 
 
"26. 
KRPC 4.1(a) provides, '[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.' In 
his June 20, 2013, electronic mail message, the respondent certainly made false 
statements of material fact and law to the biological mother. However, the respondent's 
false statements were made negligently and recklessly—he took absolutely no steps to 
research the law or the facts to verify the statements that he made to the biological 
mother. No evidence was presented to establish that the respondent's conduct was done 
knowingly. 
 
"27. 
In attorney disciplinary cases, for a violation to have been committed 
knowingly, actual knowledge must be established. Further, however, knowledge can be 
imputed from the circumstances. KRPC 1.0(g) and In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 125, 311 
P.3d 321, 343 (2013). In this case, it is not reasonable to impute knowledge to the 
respondent from the circumstances present. While the hearing panel believes that the 
respondent' s failure to properly investigate facts and law before make statements—or his 
incompetence—should not be a defense in a disciplinary case, the hearing panel finds that 
this specific conduct is in violation of another rule, as detailed above. 
 
 
"KRPC 4.3 
 
"28. 
Next, we turn to KRPC 4.3. 
 
'In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer 
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, 
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.' 
 
There was no evidence presented that the respondent stated or implied that he was 
disinterested. The record is clear that the biological mother knew who the respondent 
represented and the respondent's role in the matter. However, the respondent did violate 
11 
 
 
 
the comment to KRPC 4.3, by providing legal advice—other than advice to seek 
counsel—to the biological mother. The comment to KRPC 4.3 has not been incorporated 
into the rule and, as a result, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent did not 
violate KRPC 4.3. 
 
 
"KRPC 4.4 
 
"29. 
Finally, KRPC 4.4(a) provides: 
 
'In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third 
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights 
of such a person.' 
 
In this case, the respondent's electronic mail message was designed to embarrass, burden, 
and create guilt in the mind of the biological mother so she would revoke her consent to 
the adoption. The message was inappropriate and should not have been sent. However, 
the respondent's purpose in sending the message was to improve his client's position. 
Improving his client's position is a substantial purpose. Thus, the 'no substantial purpose' 
requirement of KRPC 4.4 has not been met and the hearing panel finds no violation of 
KRPC 4.4. 
 
 
"American Bar Association 
 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"30. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
12 
 
 
 
"31. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the public to maintain 
his personal integrity. 
 
"32. 
Mental State. The respondent negligently, recklessly, knowingly, and 
intentionally violated his duty, as detailed in each conclusion of law above. 
 
"33. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual and potential serious injury. The respondent fails to recognize the injury that he 
caused. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified that the adoption 
went through so the adoptive parents were not injured. He also testified that he was the 
only one injured by his misconduct. The respondent needs to understand that he caused 
injury to the legal system, to the legal profession, to the biological mother, to the adoptive 
parents, and potential injury to the baby. The respondent's inability to acknowledge any 
injuries by his conduct, except his own time and the time spent by the hearing panel for 
hearing the matter, is troubling to the hearing panel. 
 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"34. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
"35. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously 
disciplined on two occasions. 
 
 
a. 
The first occurrence, in 2005, the Respondent entered into the 
attorney diversion program for having violated KRPC 4.2. In that case, the respondent 
did not believe that a conservatee wanted his conservator to take the action that the 
conservator was taking, so the respondent contacted the conservatee to find out the 
conservatee's position on the litigation. The respondent successfully completed the terms 
and conditions of diversion and following the period of diversion, that complaint was 
dismissed. 
13 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Second, on January 10, 2013, a hearing panel of the Kansas Board for 
Discipline of Attorneys informally admonished the respondent following a hearing on a 
formal complaint. In the final hearing report, the hearing panel concluded that the 
respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d) and provided the following guidance for the respondent 
and any future hearing panels hearing attorney disciplinary cases regarding the 
respondent: 
 
'60. 
The Respondent's attitude displayed during the 
disciplinary hearing and throughout the domestic case in Shawnee 
County, Kansas, was unprofessional and needs improvement. If the 
Respondent's attitude and treatment of others does not change, he will 
find himself where he does not want to be—right back before a Hearing 
Panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. 
 
'61. 
According to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, § 6.21, suspension was a real possibility in this case. The 
Respondent knowingly violated a court order. The Respondent was put 
on notice of the court hearing scheduled for September 28, 2011, and did 
not appear. The Respondent's motion to continue was inappropriate and 
did not explain to the court why he was not available. Further, the 
Respondent took no steps to ensure that an attorney appeared on his 
behalf. The Respondent's conduct was not negligent—it was done with 
knowledge. As such, Standard § 6.21 arguably applies. [Emphasis in 
original.] 
 
'62. 
A statement that Judge Yeoman made during the January 
6, 2012, hearing sums up the Respondent's conduct throughout the 
domestic case as well as the disciplinary case: "[W]ell, you, Mr. Gambel 
[sic] seem to want to push the limits wherever they are." And, just as 
Judge Yeoman concluded, the most troubling thing about this matter is 
the Respondent's failure to attend a scheduled hearing. 
 
14 
 
 
 
. . . The thing that concerns me most about all of this is 
that the [the Respondent] refused to attend a scheduled 
hearing, announcing his request for continuance. I've 
recited this before, but I think it [is] worth repeating. 
Direct quote: [The Respondent] will not be present at 
this hearing, as it is unduly burdensome to appear in 
court on such an issue. [The Respondent] will be 
available by cell phone if the Court pleases. The 
impotence [sic] reflected by that borders on 
contemptuous. We have learned and [he] appears to 
concede that he was not, in fact, available by cell phone 
at the time the hearing was held even if that was to be 
considered. The request for continuance was not 
properly presented, not—no continuance was obtained in 
advance of the hearing, he had an obligation to be there. 
If he was—if he, in fact, had some event occurring in his 
life that would not allow him to be there, he, like any 
other lawyer, would have the responsibility to see that 
someone was there instead and he didn't do that. And he 
didn't do that, not just because of what he couldn't do, 
but I'm satisfied, because of an attitude.' 
 
In order to have a career which does not end in revocation of his license 
to practice law, the Respondent must change his attitude. 
 
'63. 
In light of his youth and the Hearing Panel's hope that 
the experience of the discipline hearing will serve as a wake-up call to 
the Respondent and that he will change his attitude and conduct, the 
Hearing Panel is not inclined to recommend that the Respondent be 
suspended or censured for his conduct. However, if the Respondent does 
not make some significant changes, a loss of his Kansas license is 
inevitable. 
 
15 
 
 
 
'64. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and the Standards listed above, the Hearing Panel 
unanimously recommends that the Respondent be informally 
admonished. This Final Hearing Report shall serve as the Respondent's 
informal admonition for his violations of KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
'65. 
If the Respondent engages in future misconduct, the 
Hearing Panel would suggest to any future Hearing Panels that the 
Respondent's chances have been used up and any subsequent 
disciplinary matters should result in proceedings before the Kansas 
Supreme Court. [Emphasis added.]' 
 
"36. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. This is the third time the respondent has 
engaged in misconduct. The three cases are similar in that each of the cases involved the 
respondent's failure to comport with appropriate boundaries. 
 
"37. 
Vulnerability of Victim. The biological mother and the adoptive parents 
were vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct. 
 
"38. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
"39. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. While the respondent self-reported the misconduct, admitted the facts, 
and admitted the two rule violations, his demeanor and attitude during the hearing 
regarding the disciplinary process and Ms. Baird was not one of cooperation. 
 
"40. 
Inexperience in the Practice of Law. While the Kansas Supreme Court 
admitted the respondent to the practice of law in 2003, the respondent is inexperienced in 
the practice of adoption law. 
16 
 
 
 
 
"41. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent stated that he was 
remorseful for being at the disciplinary hearing and he regretted sending the electronic 
mail message. The respondent's remorse is a minor mitigating factor. 
 
"42. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
 
'6.32 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
engages in communication with an individual in the legal system 
when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper, 
and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes 
interference or potential interference with the outcome of the 
legal proceeding. 
 
 
'6.33 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is 
negligent in determining whether it is proper to engage in 
communication with an individual in the legal system, and 
causes injury or potential injury to a party or interference or 
potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding. 
 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed 
as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, 
the public, or the legal system. 
 
 
'8.3 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
 
 
(a) 
negligently violates the terms of a prior 
disciplinary order and such violation causes 
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, 
the legal system, or the profession; or 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
has received an admonition for the same 
or similar misconduct and engages in further 
acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential 
injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
"43. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law. Further, the disciplinary administrator recommend 
that the hearing panel consider ordering a reinstatement hearing, pursuant to Kan. Sup. 
Ct. R. 219. 
 
"44. 
The respondent argued that suspension was not warranted in this case. 
The respondent suggested that an informal admonition was a more appropriate sanction 
for the misconduct. 
 
"45. 
The respondent's presentation during the hearing on the formal complaint 
was emblematic of the respondent's unprofessional conduct that brought him before the 
hearing panel. For example, the hearing panel notes the following five examples of the 
respondent's approach—speaking without thinking—which trouble the hearing panel. 
 
"46. 
First, during the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent 
complained that it took an excessive time period—more than 15 months—from the time 
of the self-report letter to the hearing on the formal complaint. Later, the respondent 
acknowledged that he self-reported the misconduct on June 28, 2013, and the hearing 
occurred on May 13, 2014, less than 11 months later. While the respondent is not privy to 
this information, the hearing panel would like to point out that the amount of time that 
passed from the self-report to the hearing on the formal complaint was perhaps the 
shortest amount of time in the hearing panel's memory. 
 
"47. 
Second, the respondent made an unwarranted personal attack on Ms. 
Baird. He accused her of having a personal vendetta against him. The respondent argued 
18 
 
 
 
that her approach was overreaching. Ms. Baird is employed to review complaints and 
investigations and prosecute complaints when so directed by the review committee of the 
Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. The idea that Ms. Baird is personally attacking 
the respondent by simply doing her job is outrageous. As the respondent will see below, 
Ms. Baird was not excessive in her recommendation. 
 
"48. 
Third, the respondent argued that there are many other attorneys 
practicing in Kansas who have engaged in much worse misconduct than he did and they 
have not been brought before the hearing panel. The hearing panel finds this argument to 
be absurd. To the respondent's credit, he did not actually argue that he should not be 
disciplined because the anonymous rule-breaking attorneys are not being disciplined. 
However, to make that statement during a disciplinary hearing seems unusual to the 
hearing panel and indicative of the respondent's poor attitude. 
 
"49. 
Next, the respondent argued that the attorney disciplinary system has 
oppressed him. He suggested that there ought to be a better system to handle attorney 
disciplinary cases than to require attorneys to come before a hearing panel of the board. 
Unfortunately for the respondent, the attorney disciplinary system in Kansas, as well as in 
other jurisdictions, requires attorneys who have violated the rules of professional conduct 
to be held accountable for their actions. Due process necessitates a hearing with an 
opportunity to be heard. In this case, the respondent knew that he had engaged in 
misconduct, he self-reported the misconduct eight days after sending the electronic mail 
message to the biological mother. Further, in the self-report letter, the respondent 
admitted that his conduct was in violation of the rules. In order to avoid the attorney 
disciplinary system, all the respondent has to do, as Ms. Baird pointed out, is to comply 
with the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
"50. 
Finally, perhaps the most troubling of all the statements made by the 
respondent was the statement that he did not prepare for the attorney disciplinary hearing. 
If the respondent wanted to maintain his license, he ought to have at least prepared for the 
hearing. It would have benefitted the respondent to plan what he said to the hearing 
panel, rather than to just say what came to his mind. While the respondent can repeatedly 
state that he does a good job for his clients, the hearing panel only observes the 
19 
 
 
 
respondent during the hearing on the formal complaint. The hearing panel is called upon 
to make recommendations based on the evidence presented as well as observations made 
during the hearing. Nothing about the respondent's presentation aided his case during the 
hearing. The respondent's statement that he did not prepare for the hearing is somewhat 
related to the misconduct in this case. Perhaps if he had employed proper preparation in 
representing the biological father, if he had stopped to think about what he was saying, 
maybe he would have not sent the electronic mail message to the biological mother. 
 
"51. 
Despite the respondent's abysmal attitude, absent the prior discipline, the 
hearing panel may have been inclined to recommend a censure to be published in the 
Kansas Reports. However, the misconduct in this case occurred just a few short months 
after the respondent was strongly admonished by the previous hearing panel. The 
respondent's misconduct in all three of the attorney disciplinary cases is linked by the 
respondent's overreaching approach and failure to recognize reasonable boundaries. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, the Standards listed 
above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent be suspended for 
a period of 60 days. 
 
"52. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 356). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
20 
 
 
 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 
court. The respondent did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. 
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 
(2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 375). 
 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 8.4(d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) 
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and KRPC 8.4(g) 
(engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law). We adopt 
the panel's legal conclusions regarding the respondent's violation of KRPC 8.4(d) and 
8.4(g).  
 
 
At the hearing before this court, Kate F. Baird, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, 
urged this court to also find violations of KRPC 4.1(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 617) 
(truthfulness in statements to others) and KRPC 4.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 622) 
(dealing with unrepresented person). Although we recognize the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office is not required by court rule to file exceptions to a hearing panel 
report, we are reluctant to determine issues on which additional briefing has not been 
presented to the court when, as in this case, little would change even if we found 
additional violations. As we will more fully discuss, we agree with the Disciplinary 
Administrator's recommendation regarding the sanction to be imposed against the 
respondent for the violations found by the hearing panel and conclude that a finding of 
additional violations would not alter our assessment of the appropriate sanction.  
 
At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of 
the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be suspended for a 
21 
 
 
 
period of 6 months, rather than the 60 days recommended by the hearing panel; the 
Disciplinary Administrator also requested we order a reinstatement hearing under 
Supreme Court Rule 219 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 407). The respondent suggested that 
published censure was the appropriate sanction because respondent self-reported his 
conduct and he has undertaken anger management therapy.  
 
The hearing panel's recommendation is "advisory only and shall not prevent the 
Court from imposing sanctions greater or lesser than those recommended." Supreme 
Court Rule 212(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 377). Here, we do not view the panel's 
recommended 60-day suspension as adequate. Rather, we agree with the Disciplinary 
Administrator's argument that the egregious nature of the respondent's conduct warrants a 
longer period of suspension than that recommended by the hearing panel. As the hearing 
panel noted, respondent "attempted to manipulate the biological mother and, as a result, 
interfered with justice." Respondent's conduct "amounted to emotional blackmail" of an 
unrepresented 18-year-old who was dealing with a process that was already "'emotionally 
exhausting.'" His "electronic message was designed to embarrass, burden, and create guilt 
in the mind of the biological mother." These "bullying tactics directly reflect on 
[respondent's] fitness to practice law as an attorney." Consequently, we hold that the 
respondent should be suspended for a period of 6 months. A minority of the court would 
impose a longer period of suspension. We unanimously order a reinstatement hearing 
under Rule 219. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Eric Michael Gamble be suspended for 6 months 
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas effective on the filing of this opinion in 
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 300). 
 
22 
 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 406) and, in the event of his filing of a petition for 
reinstatement, shall be subject to a reinstatement hearing under Supreme Court Rule 219 
(2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 407). At the reinstatement hearing, the respondent is required to 
present clear and convincing evidence that he understands the gravity of his conduct and 
that he has successfully completed anger management and any other treatment or therapy 
that has been recommended by a physical or mental health care professional. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 112,037 
to fill the vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.