Title: In re S.J.K.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621.] 
 
 
IN RE S.J.K. 
[Cite as In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621.] 
Appeals – Mootness – “Collateral disability” exception to mootness – Appeal not 
moot even when appellant has voluntarily satisfied the judgment appealed 
from if appellant shows collateral disability as a result of judgment – 
Imposition of points on appellant’s driving record and their effect on 
appellant’s insurance rates or insurability can be collateral disability 
sufficient to overcome mootness challenge. 
(Nos. 2006-0673 and 2006-0798 — Submitted February 28, 2007 — Decided 
June 13, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 22721, 2006-Ohio-653. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The imposition of points on a traffic offender’s driving record is a statutorily 
imposed penalty sufficient to create a collateral disability as a result of the 
judgment and preserves the justiciability of an appeal even if the offender 
has voluntarily satisfied the judgment. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} We must determine whether the imposition of points against a 
traffic offender’s driving record and the effect of the points on the driver’s 
insurability constitute a “collateral disability” so as to preserve the justiciability of 
an appeal even after the traffic offender has satisfied the judgment. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that the imposition of points 
on a traffic offender’s driving record is a statutorily imposed penalty sufficient to 
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create a collateral disability as a result of the judgment and preserves the 
justiciability of an appeal even if the offender has voluntarily satisfied the 
judgment. 
{¶ 3} On August 17, 2004, appellant, S.J.K., a minor, was cited for 
reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.20.  Prior to trial, 
S.J.K. moved to dismiss on grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been 
violated.  After several continuances, the case was tried before a magistrate on 
February 24 and 25, 2005.  The magistrate denied S.J.K.’s speedy-trial motion, 
concluded that S.J.K. was a juvenile traffic offender by virtue of his reckless 
operation, and ordered him to pay a fine of $20 and $62 in court costs.  The 
record reflects that S.J.K. paid the fine and costs on February 28, 2005. 
{¶ 4} S.J.K. then filed objections.  The court overruled them, adopted the 
magistrate’s decision, and entered judgment on May 4, 2005. 
{¶ 5} S.J.K. appealed.  The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as 
moot because the appellant had already satisfied the judgment.  S.J.K. opposed 
the motion, arguing that he continued to suffer adverse consequences as a result of 
the judgment — specifically, the assessment of points against his driving record, 
which may result in higher insurance premiums or jeopardize his ability to obtain 
insurance at all.  The court of appeals acknowledged that S.J.K. had been assessed 
four points for the violation; however, the court concluded that the assessment 
was not a collateral disability.  There was no evidence that the points jeopardized 
or impaired S.J.K.’s driving privileges.  The appellate court dismissed the appeal 
as moot because S.J.K. had failed to demonstrate any collateral disability or loss 
of civil rights arising from his adjudication as a juvenile traffic offender. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals certified that its opinion in this case was in  
conflict with the judgment of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth District 
Courts of Appeals in State v. Ingalls, Stark App. No. 2003CA00311, 2004-Ohio-
3441; Cleveland v. Jennings (Feb. 17, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76810, 2000 
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WL 193253; Westlake v. Connole (Sept. 2, 1999), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 74727 and 
74910, 1999 WL 685606; State v. Brown (Sept. 26, 1991), Mahoning App. No. 90 
C.A. 107, 1991 WL 192140; and State v. Simmons (Dec. 26, 1989), Pickaway 
App. No. 88CA8, 1989 WL 159030. 
{¶ 7} We granted jurisdiction by accepting a discretionary appeal and by 
determining that a conflict exists over the following question: 
{¶ 8} “Whether an assessment of points against a traffic offender’s 
record qualifies as a ‘collateral disability’ or a ‘loss of civil rights stemming from 
[the] conviction’ sufficient to demonstrate that the traffic offender continues to 
have a ‘substantial stake in the judgment of conviction’ even after paying the 
fines and costs also levied in the judgment of conviction.” 
{¶ 9} In State v. Wilson (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 
N.E.2d 236, syllabus, we held that “[w]here a defendant, convicted of a criminal 
offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence for that offense, 
an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be 
drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil 
rights from such judgment or conviction.”  Once a sentence is served, any appeal 
is moot because there is no subject matter for the court to decide.  St. Pierre v. 
United States (1943), 319 U.S. 41, 42, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199.  S.J.K. has the 
burden of establishing that his appeal is not moot.  Wilson;  State v. Golston 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226, 643 N.E.2d 109.  Under the disjunctive test in 
Wilson, he must offer evidence of either “some collateral disability” or “loss of 
civil rights” from the judgment or conviction.  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 10} S.J.K. does not allege a loss of his civil rights.  He contends that 
the imposition of points on his driver’s license is a collateral disability because 
points affect his driving record and they, in turn, will affect his insurability and 
the cost of insurance in the future.  A collateral disability is an adverse legal 
consequence of a conviction or judgment that survives despite the court’s 
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sentence having been satisfied or served.  See Pollard v. United States (1957), 
352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393.  For example, a person may be subject 
to further penalties or disabilities under state or federal law even after a judgment 
has been satisfied.  St. Pierre, 319 U.S. at 43, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199. 
{¶ 11} The state concedes that the court assessed four points on S.J.K.’s 
driving record.  See R.C. 4510.036(C)(10).  However, the state argues that the 
appellate court correctly held that points are not a collateral disability, because 
there is no evidence that they have jeopardized S.J.K.’s driving privileges, and 
any effect on insurance is speculation. 
{¶ 12} The conflicting appellate districts reached the opposite conclusion.  
In State v. Ingalls, Stark App. No. 2003CA00311, 2004-Ohio-3441, the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals concluded that the imposition of two points on the 
defendant’s driving record as a result of being convicted of failure to comply with 
an order or signal of a police officer was a collateral legal consequence within the 
meaning of Wilson.  Thus, Ingalls’s appeal was not moot even though he had paid 
the fine and costs associated with the judgment.  Id. at ¶ 10.  In State v. Brown 
(Sept. 26, 1991), Mahoning App. No. 90 C.A. 107, 1991 WL 192140, the Seventh 
District Court of Appeals concluded that the points charged against a person’s 
driving record for a conviction, as well as the resultant increase in insurance 
premiums, are a substantial burden. 
{¶ 13} We agree with these appellate districts on this issue.  Courts are 
required to assess points for violations pursuant to a statutorily imposed formula 
based upon the type of traffic offense committed.  R.C. 4510.036(C).  The Bureau 
of Motor Vehicles maintains a record of the points assessed on a person’s driver’s 
license.  R.C. 4510.036(A).  Depending upon the existing number of points on a 
person’s driving record, an additional four points may even result in the 
suspension of a person’s driver’s license when 12 or more points are accumulated 
within a two-year period.  R.C. 4510.037(B).  The points may also increase the 
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severity of future penalties, raise insurance rates, or impair the ability to obtain 
insurance.  Thus, the imposition of points is a penalty that constitutes a collateral 
disability flowing from a conviction for a traffic offense. 
{¶ 14} The state contends that any effect on S.J.K.’s ability to purchase 
insurance or an increase in premiums is speculative. However, a collateral 
disability need not have an immediate impact or impairment but may be 
something that occurs in the future.  Evitts v. Lucey (1985), 469 U.S. 387, 391, 
105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, fn. 4.  It must be a consequence that is imposed on 
the basis of the challenged judgment.  Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d at 237, 70 O.O.2d 
431, 325 N.E.2d 236.  An appeal is moot “only if it is shown that there is no 
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed upon the basis 
of the challenged conviction.”  Id.  Therefore, we hold that the imposition of 
points is a statutorily imposed penalty sufficient to create a collateral disability. 
{¶ 15} The appellate court relied in part on State v. Berndt (1987), 29 
Ohio St.3d 3, 29 OBR 173, 504 N.E.2d 712.  In Berndt, the defendant had pleaded 
guilty to a charge of OMVI.  He voluntarily paid a fine and completed his 
sentence.  The court of appeals proceeded to decide the merits of his appeal.  We 
reversed the court of appeals’ judgment on the basis that Berndt’s appeal was 
moot.  He had voluntarily completed his sentence, and the record contained no 
reference to a claim of collateral disability or loss of civil rights that would have 
preserved the justiciability of his claim.  Id. at 4, 29 OBR 173, 504 N.E.2d 712. 
{¶ 16} The dissenting opinion in Berndt suggested that a conviction of 
OMVI may impose sufficient collateral disabilities to meet the Wilson test.  
Berndt, 29 Ohio St.3d at 7, 29 OBR 173, 504 N.E.2d 712 (H. Brown, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent noted that courts may take judicial notice of a statutory 
penalty imposed by the General Assembly such as the imposition of points.  Id.  
The dissent also noted that points have negative implications on the offender’s 
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driving record, and the conviction has financial implications for insurance rates.  
Id. at fns. 4 and 5. 
{¶ 17} We believe that the facts of this case are more closely aligned with 
the Berndt dissent’s reasoning.  It is undisputed that R.C. 4510.036(C) imposed 
four points on S.J.K.’s permanent driving record.  Unlike the defendant in Berndt, 
S.J.K. raised the issue of the collateral disability of points and their adverse effect 
on his driving record in his brief in opposition to the state’s motion to dismiss his 
appeal.  State v. Wilson appears to require that the offender offer evidence of the 
collateral disability but did not articulate when during the proceedings the 
evidence becomes relevant.  S.J.K. contends that he had no opportunity to present 
any evidence.  We agree.  The appellate court did not ask the parties to brief the 
issue or to present evidence.  Nevertheless, the appellate court ultimately decided 
against the existence of a collateral disability and dismissed S.J.K.’s appeal. 
{¶ 18} We are convinced that S.J.K. adequately presented an argument of 
his collateral disability, and the state agrees that S.J.K. was assessed points on his 
driving record.  The points constitute a penalty that is collateral to his conviction.  
It survives even though S.J.K. paid his fine and court costs and is sufficient to 
preserve the justiciability of his appeal.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, BROWN and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
 
SUSAN BROWN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for O’CONNOR, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
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{¶ 19} I respectfully dissent.  I would hold that the assessment of points 
on a traffic offender’s record does not constitute a collateral disability, unless the 
assessment of points results in the actual suspension of driving privileges. 
{¶ 20} Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “civil disability” as “[t]he 
condition of a person who has had a legal right or privilege revoked as a result of 
a criminal conviction.”  Black’s (8th Ed.2004) 494.  In this case, appellant has not 
had any legal right or privilege revoked by the imposition of the points on his 
driving record.  Neither will an increase in insurance premiums have the effect of 
revoking his privilege to drive.  Having a legal disability, by its nature, implies an 
inability to do something.  On the facts of this case, and undoubtedly many others 
like it, the offender cannot demonstrate that he is currently unable to do that 
which he was permitted to do prior to the imposition of the points. 
{¶ 21} Furthermore, the majority decision is not in accord with this 
court’s decision in State v. Berndt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 3, 29 OBR 173, 504 
N.E.2d 712.  As in Berndt, any purported disability in this case has not been 
realized and, indeed, may never be.  If future violations and future impositions of 
points result in the suspension of appellant’s driving privileges, then, at that point, 
he could be said to have a collateral disability.  Yet “no such disability will exist 
if [appellant] remains within the confines of the law.”  Id. at 5, 29 OBR 173, 504 
N.E.2d 712.  The majority decision obviates this distinction. 
{¶ 22} While there may well indeed be cases where the imposition of 
points on a traffic offender’s record does result in a suspension of driving 
privileges, thereby creating a collateral disability sufficient to sustain the 
justiciability of an appeal, that is not this case.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
S. David Worhatch, for appellant. 
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Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________