Title: Mary Ann Jones v. The Estate of Robert G. Jones

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 61 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1025 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mary Ann Jones,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
The Estate of Robert G. Jones,  
 
Defendant, 
Lane Jones and Robert Jones, Individually and in 
their capacity as Co-Personal Representatives of 
the Estate of Robert G. Jones, deceased,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Murphy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Dennis H. 
Milbrath, Robert J. Asti and Levy & Levy, S.C., Cedarburg, and 
oral argument by Dennis H. Milbrath. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Robert H. Halvorsen and Halvorsen Law 
Offices, S.C., Sheboygan, and oral argument by Robert H. 
Halvorsen. 
 
 
2002 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1025  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-335) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mary Ann Jones,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Estate of Robert G. Jones,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Lance Jones and Robert Jones,  
Individually and in their capacity as  
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate  
of Robert G. Jones, deceased,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, Honorable John P. Murphy, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the Court of Appeals, District II, 
pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000). 
 
The parties 
dispute whether a spouse can waive the homestead protection in a 
premarital agreement.  Mary Ann Jones (hereinafter Mary Ann) and 
Robert G. Jones (hereinafter Robert), in contemplation of 
No. 
01-1025   
 
2 
 
marriage, signed a prenuptial agreement stating, among other 
things, that each party shall hold his or her solely owned 
property "free from all rights or claims therein by the other."  
During their marriage, Robert owned the home where they resided 
as individual property.  In 1998, Robert deeded the home to Mary 
Ann, and on the same day, Mary Ann subsequently deeded the home 
to Robert's sons, her stepsons.  Robert passed away, and Mary 
Ann now seeks to declare the second warranty deed invalid.  Mary 
Ann claims that the home is homestead property, and Robert's 
failure to sign the second warranty deed makes it invalid under 
the statute of frauds, Wis. Stat. § 706.02 (1997-1998).1 
¶2 
We first conclude that the property is homestead 
property.  However, we also conclude that pursuant to the 
premarital agreement, Mary Ann and Robert waived the homestead 
protection.  Mary Ann, therefore, could transfer the property to 
Robert's sons without needing Robert's signature.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the circuit court's order denying Mary Ann's motion 
seeking to declare the deed of transfer between Mary Ann and 
Robert's sons invalid.  
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On August 3, 
1978, before they were married, Mary Ann and Robert signed a 
premarital agreement.  Among other things, the agreement 
specifically stated: 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
1998 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
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3 
 
During their marriage each party shall hold all of his 
or her solely owned property, including real estate, 
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, free from all 
rights or claims therein by the other, with full power 
to sell, mortgage, transfer, assign, give or otherwise 
dispose of any interest in such property without the 
consent of the other. 
During the course of their marriage, the agreement was modified 
on several occasions; however, none of the modifications 
affected this provision or the issues in this case. 
¶4 
Mary Ann and Robert were married later in 1978 and 
lived in a home that Robert had owned before the marriage.  
Robert later sold the home and purchased a new home located in 
the Village of Kohler, Wisconsin (hereinafter "the Woodlake 
home").  Robert and Mary Ann then lived in the Woodlake home. 
¶5 
On September 16, 1998, Robert transferred the Woodlake 
home to Mary Ann by Warranty Deed.  The deed specifically 
identified the home as Robert's individual property, and as 
homestead property.  On that same day, Mary Ann conveyed the 
Woodlake home by Warranty Deed to Robert's two sons, her 
stepsons, Robert A. Jones and Lance B. Jones (hereinafter 
"Robert's sons").  In the deed, Mary Ann reserved "the right to 
reside in the residence for the life of Robert G. Jones plus one 
year from the date of his death."  Again, the deed identified 
the property as homestead property.  Robert did not sign the 
deed by which Mary Ann transferred the Woodlake home to his 
sons.  Furthermore, the two deeds were simultaneously recorded 
in the office of the Register of Deeds for Sheboygan County on 
October 
27, 
1998, 
as 
documents 
1522214 
and 
1522215, 
respectively. 
No. 
01-1025   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Robert died on March 13, 1999. 
¶7 
On June 29, 1999, Mary Ann filed suit in Sheboygan 
County Circuit Court, against the Estate of Robert G. Jones, and 
Lance B. Jones and Robert A. Jones, both individually and in 
their capacity as co-personal representatives of their deceased 
father.  Among other things, Mary Ann sought a declaration of 
interest in the Woodlake home, as the homestead of Robert and 
herself.  Mary Ann subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asking the court to find that the deed transferring 
the Woodlake home to Robert's sons was invalid as a matter of 
law under the statute of frauds.  Specifically, Mary Ann claimed 
that the deed conveyed homestead property, which requires the 
signature of both spouses under Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f).  Mary 
Ann argued that since Robert did not sign the deed, the transfer 
was invalid.  The circuit court, the Honorable John P. Murphy, 
denied the motion.  Relying on language in the premarital 
agreement, the court concluded that the Woodlake home had never 
been classified as homestead property; therefore, the transfer 
to Robert's sons was valid.   
¶8 
Mary Ann appealed the circuit court's decision, and 
the Court of Appeals, District II, certified the case to this 
court.2 
                                                 
2 We note that the court of appeals certified three 
questions to this court. 
1. 
Can a spouse waive the homestead protection in a 
premarital agreement? 
2. 
May a spouse who has conveyed homestead property 
to a third party later invoke the statute of 
No. 
01-1025   
 
5 
 
II 
¶9 
Whether spouses can waive the homestead protection in 
a premarital agreement is an issue of first impression in 
Wisconsin.  It poses a question of statutory interpretation and 
contract interpretation, which we review de novo, but benefiting 
from the circuit court's analysis.  Weber v. Weber, 176 
Wis. 2d 1085, 1090, 501 N.W.2d 413 (1993). 
¶10 Before we can answer the first certified question, we 
must determine whether the Woodlake home is homestead property.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 706.01(7) 
defines 
"homestead" 
as 
"the 
dwelling, and so much of the land surrounding it as is 
reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, but not 
less than one-fourth acre (if available) and not exceeding 40 
acres."  All of the parties in this case, before this court, 
                                                                                                                                                             
frauds, Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f)(1999-2000), as 
a sword to undo the conveyance because the other 
spouse did not join in the conveyance? 
3. 
Does the ban against equitable reformation of a 
homestead conveyance by a spouse as stated in 
State Bank of Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 
Wis. 2d 148, 286 N.W.2d 547 (1979), apply where 
the conveyance is not the product of fraud, 
overreaching or an unscrupulous attempt by one 
spouse to divest the other of the homestead 
interest? 
We only reach the first issue, however, because we answer 
it affirmatively and therefore, we do not need to address the 
remaining certified issues.  Mary Ann has affirmatively waived 
the homestead protection; therefore, we do not need to decide 
whether Mary Ann can invoke the statute of frauds as a sword.  
Similarly, we do not reach the issue of equitable reformation. 
No. 
01-1025   
 
6 
 
concede that the Woodlake home was homestead property.3  The 
circuit 
court, 
however, 
relying 
on 
the 
language 
of 
the 
premarital agreement, concluded that the Woodlake home was not 
homestead property.  We disagree with the circuit court's 
conclusion.  The warranty deed conveying the property from 
Robert to Mary Ann, and the warranty deed conveying the property 
from Mary Ann to Robert's sons, both on their face state that 
the property is homestead property.  Both deeds specifically 
state, "This is homestead property."  Further, the Woodlake home 
is "the dwelling" that Robert and Mary Ann used as their home.  
Based on the facts, the parties' positions that the Woodlake 
home is homestead property, and the plain language in both 
deeds, we, therefore, conclude that the property in question is 
homestead property. 
¶11 We now turn to the issue of first impression——whether 
spouses can waive the homestead protection in a premarital 
agreement.  Wisconsin Stat. § 706.02(1), otherwise referred to 
as the statute of frauds, provides that a conveyance of real 
property is not valid unless it complies with the statutory 
requirements.  Section 706.02(1)(f) specifically addresses the 
                                                 
3 Although the Estate of Robert G. Jones, Lance B. Jones, 
and Robert A. Jones, argued in their brief that the Woodlake 
property is not homestead property, the estate and the sons 
conceded at oral argument that it was homestead property and 
relied solely on the argument that Mary Ann waived the homestead 
protection.  In response to a clarifying question from the 
court, counsel conceded that he was not arguing that this is not 
homestead property.  Rather, counsel indicated his position to 
be that this is homestead property, the rights in which Mary Ann 
waived by the premarital property agreement. 
No. 
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7 
 
conveyance 
of 
homestead 
property 
and 
requires 
that 
the 
conveyance "[i]s signed, or joined in by separate conveyance, by 
or on behalf of each spouse, if the conveyance alienates any 
interest of a married person in a homestead under s. 706.01(7) 
except conveyances between spouses . . . ." 
¶12 Mary Ann argues that because Robert did not sign the 
warranty deed conveying the Woodlake home to the sons, the deed 
is 
invalid 
for 
not 
conforming 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f).4  Mary Ann contends that the Marital 
Property Act, Chapter 766, relates only to ownership and 
classification and that the statute of frauds relates only to 
conveyances of property.  She claims that even though a 
premarital agreement conveys sole ownership of a homestead to 
one spouse, this does not eliminate the need to comply with the 
statute of frauds, which requires both spouses to sign a 
subsequent conveyance of the property.  Mary Ann argues that the 
Marital Property Act, or a premarital agreement, cannot trump 
the statute of frauds requirements, nor can the parties use a 
premarital agreement to opt out of the statute of frauds.  
According to Mary Ann, § 706.02 creates an "absolute veto" for 
one spouse upon the other spouse's power to alienate or transfer 
the homestead.  See Wangen v. Leum, 46 Wis. 2d 60, 63, 174 
                                                 
4 We note that the warranty deed conveying the Woodlake home 
from Robert to Mary Ann falls within the exception listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f) because it is a conveyance between 
spouses.  Accordingly, with regard to the homestead protection 
in § 706.02(1)(f), we are concerned with the warranty deed 
conveying the Woodlake home from Mary Ann to Robert's sons. 
No. 
01-1025   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 266 (1970) (citing Cumps v. Kiyo, 104 Wis. 656, 661, 80 
N.W. 937 (1899)).  Finally, Mary Ann appeals to public policy, 
arguing that strict compliance with the statute of frauds 
protects "the roof over the family's heads" as well as innocent 
third parties. 
¶13 We first acknowledge that Mary Ann and Robert's 
premarital agreement predated the Marital Property Act, so the 
Act does not directly govern the outcome in this case.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 766.58(12)(a), 
however, 
recognizes 
that 
a 
premarital 
agreement 
predating 
the 
Act, 
"is 
enforceable . . . without reference to this chapter . . . ."  
Mary Ann's reliance on various provisions of the Marital 
Property Act is therefore questionable, since the Act does not 
directly apply.  Nonetheless, we discuss the Act because this 
decision will undoubtedly influence future decisions regarding a 
premarital agreement governed by the Act. 
¶14 As noted earlier, whether spouses can waive the 
homestead protection in a premarital agreement is a question of 
first impression in Wisconsin.  While we have addressed issues 
No. 
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9 
 
involving the homestead protection on several occasions,5 we have 
addressed issues related to this case only twice, in Jones v. 
First National Bank & Trust Co. of Racine, 254 Wis. 258, 36 
N.W.2d 95 (1949), and Weber v. Weber, 176 Wis. 2d 1085, 501 
N.W.2d 413 (1993).  Although both cases provide guidance, we 
note that neither is directly on point. 
¶15 In First National Bank we addressed the homestead 
protection in the context of a premarital agreement where the 
spouses each gave up any claims he or she might have had against 
the estate of the other.  254 Wis. at 259.  The issue before the 
court, however, was whether the wife could take the statutory 
allowance or if she was bound by the premarital agreement.  
Relying on the language of the premarital agreement, this court 
concluded, "It is evident that the widow expressly gave up any 
right to the statutory allowance," id. at 260, and held that she 
was bound by the terms of the premarital agreement.  Id. at 261.   
                                                 
5 State Bank of Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 Wis. 2d 148, 
286 N.W.2d 547 (1980) (holding that the mortgage on the 
homestead was void because the husband's signature was forged; 
therefore, there was no compliance with the statute of frauds); 
Glinksi v. Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979) 
(holding that the statute of frauds bars the enforcement of a 
real estate contract, but finding that a separate tort cause of 
action may exist against the spouse misrepresenting the non-
signing spouse's acquiescence); Wangen v. Leum, 46 Wis. 2d 60, 
174 N.W.2d 266 (1970) (holding that the agency relationship, 
either apparent or actual authority, is insufficient to transfer 
the homestead without the signature of a spouse); Rosenthal v. 
Pleck, 166 Wis. 598, 166 N.W. 445 (1918) (holding that the 
contract to convey the homestead is void because the wife 
refused to sign the conveyance); Cumps v. Kiyo, 104 Wis. 656, 80 
N.W. 937 (1899) (holding that a spouse has an "absolute veto" 
upon the other spouse's power to alienate the homestead). 
No. 
01-1025   
 
10 
 
¶16 In Weber we addressed the relationship between the 
homestead 
protection 
in 
the 
statute 
of 
frauds, 
Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f), and the rule of civil procedure, 
§ 802.02(3), which requires a party to plead affirmatively the 
statute of frauds 
as 
a 
defense. 
 
176 Wis. 2d at 
1092.  
Specifically, 
the 
court 
addressed 
whether 
the 
homestead 
protection in the statute of frauds, § 706.02(1)(f), could be 
waived by a party's failure to plead it affirmatively.  After 
reviewing the history of the homestead protection as derived in 
the statutes and the case law, the court held that the homestead 
protection was "unique" and therefore the lower court "was wrong 
to subject sec. 706.02(1)(f) to the same affirmative pleading 
rules governing the statute of frauds generally."  Id. at 1097.  
The 
court 
specifically 
stated, 
"the 
homestead 
signature 
requirement must be waived affirmatively by the spouse through 
the actual signing of the mortgage."  Id. 
¶17 We thus conclude that spouses may affirmatively waive 
the homestead protection in Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f) in a 
premarital agreement.  First National Bank establishes that a 
premarital 
agreement 
can 
affirmatively 
waive 
a 
statutory 
presumption.  Furthermore, although Weber related to the rules 
of civil procedure, the court's holding leads us to conclude 
that a spouse can waive the statute of frauds homestead 
protection when the waiver is an affirmative act.  In Wisconsin, 
premarital agreements "are regarded with favor rather than 
disfavor" and "there is nothing inherently suspicious or bad 
about such agreements."  Estate of Koeffler, 215 Wis. 115, 123, 
No. 
01-1025   
 
11 
 
254 N.W. 363 (1934).  Parties entering into a premarital 
agreement use the document for several reasons, including 
establishing how property is titled or held, and as demonstrated 
by the premarital agreement at issue here, to establish each 
spouse's ability to convey property to others.  A premarital 
agreement is a binding contract, in writing, and as such, it is 
an 
affirmative 
act 
where 
the 
parties 
are 
intentionally 
relinquishing a known right. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938).  Individuals are able to waive statutory 
protections; see e.g., State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, 248 
Wis. 2d 986, 
637 
N.W.2d 62 
(statutory 
right 
to 
prompt 
disposition); In re Estate of Reist, 91 Wis. 2d 209, 281 
N.W.2d 86 
(1979) 
(reliance 
on 
dead 
man's 
statute), 
and 
constitutional rights; see e.g., State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, 
249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301 (right to a jury trial); State 
v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (right to 
counsel); State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 533 N.W.2d 167 
(1995) (right to postconviction appellate review); State v. 
Gove, 
148 
Wis. 2d 936, 
437 
N.W.2d 218 
(1989) 
(right 
to 
confrontation).  We, therefore, conclude that spouses can 
validly waive the homestead protection by affirmatively entering 
into a premarital agreement.6 
                                                 
6 We note that our decision here is consistent with 
decisions from other jurisdictions.  See In re Howe's Estate, 
183 P.2d 329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (holding that the 
premarital agreement declaring that neither spouse should at 
"any time" claim "any interest" in the separate property of the 
other waived the homestead protection); Hartwell v. Blasingame, 
584 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1991) (affirming the court of appeals' 
No. 
01-1025   
 
12 
 
¶18 We further conclude that this decision is consistent 
with the purpose of the homestead protection.  As this court has 
recognized for over one hundred years, the purpose of the 
homestead protection in Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f) is to protect 
the homestead and the family from unilateral action by one 
spouse to the detriment of the other.7  See State Bank of 
Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 Wis. 2d 148, 157, 286 N.W.2d 547 
(1980); Wangen, 46 Wis. 2d at 65; Rosenthal v. Pleck, 166 Wis. 
598, 600, 166 N.W. 445 (1918); Cumps, 104 Wis. at 662.  Where 
both spouses act affirmatively by entering into a premarital 
agreement, 
however, 
we 
are 
not 
faced 
with 
one 
spouse 
unilaterally acting to the detriment of the other.  Rather, both 
spouses 
are 
acting 
together, 
in 
agreement, 
and 
making 
                                                                                                                                                             
decision holding that the spouse waived the homestead rights in 
the prenuptial agreement); In re Estate of Arbeitman v. Rabin, 
886 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the language of 
a 
prenuptial 
agreement 
waived 
the 
statutory 
allowances, 
including the homestead allowance); In re Estate of Lula M. 
Moore v. Schermerhorn, 307 P.2d 483 (Or. 1957) (concluding that 
the prenuptial agreement can waive the homestead exemption, at 
least where no minor children are involved). 
7 We limit our decision to the facts presented because it 
would be inappropriate to speculate on issues or facts not 
before the court.  Accordingly, we decline to address whether or 
how any changed circumstances——for example, the presence of 
minor children——would affect the holding in this case.  Rather, 
we limit the scope of this decision to the facts presented here—
—where both spouses are acting together, through a premarital 
agreement, and their decisions regarding homestead property do 
not affect minor children.  See Schermerhorn, 307 P.2d at 491 
(declining to address whether a minor's rights could be affected 
by a prenuptial agreement of his or her parents waiving the 
homestead exemption because the present case did not involve 
minor children). 
No. 
01-1025   
 
13 
 
collaborative 
decisions 
regarding 
their 
possession 
and 
conveyance of property.  Our holding that the homestead 
protection can be waived by a premarital agreement, therefore, 
is indeed consistent with the purpose of § 706.02(1)(f). 
¶19 Turning to the premarital agreement at issue here, we 
conclude that Mary Ann cannot assert the homestead protection in 
Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f) to invalidate the deed because she and 
Robert affirmatively waived the homestead protection in the 
premarital agreement.  Mary Ann and Robert, by using the 
premarital agreement, agreed to distinct terms of property 
ownership and conveyance.  Specifically, they agreed that each 
would own his or her property, "free from all rights or claims 
therein by the other, with full power to sell, mortgage, 
transfer, assign, give or otherwise dispose of any interest in 
such property without the consent of the other." (Emphasis 
added.)  These terms demonstrate that Mary Ann and Robert 
contemplated the rights and obligations that would result from 
entering into marriage with each other.  Furthermore, they chose 
all-inclusive terms to waive those rights, especially those 
rights relating to each spouse's individual ability to convey 
property.  It would be difficult to find terms that enunciate 
waiver in a more simple or comprehensive manner than "all rights 
or claims," "full power" and "without the consent of the other."  
While the better practice would be to include explicit language 
indicating that the parties are waiving their homestead rights, 
we conclude that consistent with the meaning of "all rights or 
claims", the parties here intended to, and did, waive the 
No. 
01-1025   
 
14 
 
statute of frauds homestead protection.8  The Woodlake home 
became Mary Ann's individual property upon transfer from Robert 
to Mary Ann, and Mary Ann's signature was not needed because it 
was a conveyance between spouses under § 706.02(1)(f).  Since 
she 
had 
already 
waived 
the 
homestead 
protection 
in 
§ 706.02(1)(f) in the premarital agreement, Mary Ann had full 
authority to convey the Woodlake home to Robert's sons without 
Robert's signature.  Both warranty deeds are valid; therefore, 
we affirm the circuit court's order. 
III 
¶20 In summary, we have concluded that spouses can waive 
the homestead protection by affirmative language in a premarital 
agreement.  By examining the language in the premarital 
agreement between Mary Ann and Robert, we further have concluded 
that Mary Ann and Robert waived the homestead protection.  
Consequently, Robert's signature was not required to transfer 
the Woodlake home from Mary Ann to Robert's sons, and the 
warranty deed at issue here, is therefore, valid.  Since we 
answer the first certified question affirmatively, we do not 
reach the remaining questions certified by the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
8 There is no claim here that the premarital agreement is 
invalid.  Accordingly, we conclude that the premarital agreement 
is valid, and that, as a binding contract, the spouses waived 
the statute of frauds homestead protection. 
No. 
01-1025   
 
 
 
1