Title: Smith v. Ohio State Univ.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Smith v. Ohio State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-764.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-764 
SMITH, APPELLEE, v. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Smith v. Ohio State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-764.] 
Subject-matter jurisdiction—Affirmative defenses—Discretionary immunity—R.C. 
2743.02—R.C. 2743.03—Under R.C. Chapter 2743, Court of Claims has 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear suits brought against the state when the 
state has waived its sovereign immunity—The state has not waived its 
sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its highly discretionary 
legislative, judicial, executive, or planning functions—Discretionary 
immunity is a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense, to suits brought 
against the state in Court of Claims—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed 
and cause remanded to court of appeals. 
(No. 2023-0009—Submitted September 13, 2023—Decided March 6, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 22AP-125, 2022-Ohio-4101. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals, we consider whether discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional 
bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state or its 
instrumentalities.  We hold that the Court of Claims, the statutory body that has 
original jurisdiction over claims against the state, does not have such jurisdiction 
when discretionary immunity applies.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Tenth District regarding discretionary immunity and remand this matter to that 
court to determine whether Ohio State University is protected by discretionary 
immunity regarding its decisions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—namely, 
to suspend in-person instruction, transition to virtual learning, restrict access to its 
campus, and provide limited refunds to students. 
I.  Facts and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and for a portion of the 
spring 2020 semester, appellant, Ohio State University (“Ohio State”), suspended 
face-to-face instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, and restricted in-person 
access to its campus.  Ohio State also provided pro rata refunds to students for the 
recreational fee and for room and board.  However, pro rata refunds were not 
provided for the instructional fee, general fee, learning-technology fee, student-
activity fee, student-union-facility fee, international-undergraduate-student fee, bus 
fee for the Central Ohio Transit Authority (“COTA”), program fees, course fees, 
and nonresident surcharges. 
{¶ 3} Appellee, Brooke Smith, was a fourth-year student at Ohio State and 
enrolled in the College of Education and Human Ecology when Ohio State 
suspended in-person instruction.  Smith filed a class-action complaint in the Court 
of Claims against the Ohio Department of Higher Education (“ODHE”) and Ohio 
State, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion.  According 
to Smith, students “lost the benefit of the education for which they paid, and/or the 
January Term, 2024 
3 
 
services for which their fees paid, without having their tuition and fees refunded to 
them” as a result of ODHE and Ohio State’s decisions in response to the COVID-
19 pandemic.  Smith sought the “disgorgement of the pro-rated portion of tuition 
and fees, proportionate to the amount of time that remained in the Spring Semester 
2020 when classes moved online and campus services ceased being provided.” 
{¶ 4} ODHE moved to dismiss the action.  ODHE argued that it was not a 
proper defendant in the matter, because it did not operate any Ohio institution of 
higher education or collect any tuition or fees from students.  In response, Smith 
voluntarily dismissed her claims against ODHE. 
{¶ 5} Ohio State also moved to dismiss Smith’s complaint but on the basis 
that Smith failed to state a claim.  Ohio State did not reference discretionary 
immunity in its motion to dismiss.  The Court of Claims denied Ohio State’s motion 
to dismiss and ordered Ohio State to answer Smith’s complaint.  In its answer, Ohio 
State asserted discretionary immunity as an affirmative defense. 
{¶ 6} Subsequently, Smith moved the Court of Claims to certify the case as 
a class action.  In a footnote in her motion, Smith stated that she was no longer 
pursuing her conversion claim.  Ohio State opposed Smith’s motion for class 
certification and filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.  The 
Court of Claims issued a decision granting Smith’s motion for class certification 
and certifying the class as “all undergraduate students enrolled in classes at the 
Columbus campus of The Ohio State University during the Spring 2020 semester 
who paid tuition, the general fee, student activity fee, learning technology fee, 
course fees, program fees, and/or the COTA bus fee.”  Ohio State appealed that 
decision to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, see R.C. 2505.02(B)(5), and Ohio 
State’s summary-judgment motion remains pending before the Court of Claims. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, Ohio State asserted eight assignments of error challenging 
the Court of Claims’ class certification.  2022-Ohio-4101, 200 N.E.3d 1249, ¶ 23.  
In two of its related assignments of error, Ohio State argued that the Court of Claims 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
failed to conduct a rigorous analysis under Civ.R. 23 regarding the common 
evidence of class-wide injury.  In another of its assignments of error, Ohio State 
argued that the Court of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the matter, because 
Ohio State’s “decision to temporarily close or restrict access to its facilities in the 
face of the COVID-19 pandemic” was protected by discretionary immunity.  2022-
Ohio-4101 at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals agreed with Ohio State that the class was 
improperly certified, finding that the Court of Claims failed to rigorously analyze 
the requirements for class certification.  Id. at ¶ 48.  However, the Tenth District 
did not agree with Ohio State that discretionary immunity was a jurisdictional bar; 
instead, the court held that discretionary immunity is an affirmative defense.  Id. at 
¶ 28-29.  The court of appeals declined to decide in the first instance whether Ohio 
State was entitled to discretionary immunity as an affirmative defense.  Id. at ¶ 30.  
The court of appeals determined that its decision regarding the Court of Claims’ 
failure to rigorously analyze the requirements for class certification rendered moot 
the remaining assignments of error.  Id. at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 9} Ohio State appealed to this court only on the issue whether 
discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense.  We 
accepted the following proposition of law for review: “The Court of Claims does 
not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims against the State that are subject 
to discretionary immunity.”  See 169 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2023-Ohio-758, 204 N.E.3d 
565. 
{¶ 10} We hold that discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar, not an 
affirmative defense, to suits brought against the state in the Court of Claims.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District regarding discretionary 
immunity and remand this matter to that court to determine whether discretionary 
immunity applies as a jurisdictional bar to Smith’s suit against Ohio State. 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
5 
 
II.  Law and Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 11} Whether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  State v. Hudson, 169 Ohio St.3d 216, 2022-Ohio-
1435, 203 N.E.3d 658, ¶ 19; see also State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. 
State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12. 
B.  Sovereign Immunity and the Court of Claims 
{¶ 12} Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “a state is not subject to 
suit in its own courts unless it expressly consents to be sued.”  Proctor v. 
Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 7.  The Ohio 
Constitution as amended in 1912 allows “[s]uits [to] be brought against the state, 
in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”  Ohio Constitution, 
Article I, Section 16. 
{¶ 13} This constitutional provision is “not self-executing,” but rather, 
“legislative authority by statute is required as a prerequisite” to allowing suits 
against the state.  Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 518, 118 N.E. 102 (1917); 
see also Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), paragraph 
three of the syllabus (“statutory consent is a prerequisite”), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 
426 N.E.2d 784 (1981).  This court has also held that sovereign immunity may, 
consistent with this constitutional provision, be altered or abrogated judicially.  
Schenkolewski at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Through the Court of Claims Act, R.C. 2743.01 et seq., the state 
waived sovereign immunity with respect to certain claims and consented to be sued 
and have its liability determined in the Court of Claims.  Under R.C. 2743.03(A)(1), 
the Court of Claims “has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against 
the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the 
Revised Code.”  In addition to having jurisdiction over civil suits against the state 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
for money damages, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over ancillary claims for 
injunctive or declaratory relief.  Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 
62 Ohio St.3d 97, 103-104, 579 N.E.2d 695 (1991); see also R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) 
(“If the claimant in a civil action as described in [R.C. 2743.03(A)(1)] also files a 
claim for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief against 
the state that arises out of the same circumstances that gave rise to the civil action 
described in [R.C. 2743.03(A)(1)], the court of claims has exclusive, original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine that claim in that civil action”).  As used in R.C. 
Chapter 2743, “ ‘[s]tate’ means the state of Ohio, including, but not limited to, the 
general assembly, the supreme court, the offices of all elected state officers, and all 
departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, institutions, and other 
instrumentalities of the state.”  R.C. 2743.01(A).  And under R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), 
the state “consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, * * * in accordance 
with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties.” 
{¶ 15} While the judiciary may abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity, 
this court has held that the judiciary may also determine the outer limits of the 
statutory waiver of that immunity.  “In Reynolds v. State[, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 471 
N.E.2d 776 (1984)], * * * this court squarely addressed the meaning of R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1), [and] this court acknowledged that the state’s potential liability 
under R.C. Chapter 2743 is not unbounded.”  Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 
96 Ohio St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 34.  In particular, “this 
court rejected the notion that the General Assembly’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity in R.C. 2743.02 extended to essential acts of governmental 
decisionmaking.”  Id., citing Reynolds at 70.  In Reynolds, this court held: 
 
The language in R.C. 2743.02 that “the state” shall “have its 
liability determined * * * in accordance with the same rules of law 
applicable to suits between private parties * * * ” means that the 
January Term, 2024 
7 
 
state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the 
exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making 
of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of 
a high degree of official judgment or discretion. 
 
(Ellipses in original.)  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} Therefore, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction when the 
state makes highly discretionary decisions pursuant to its legislative, judicial, 
executive, or planning functions, because the state has not waived its sovereign 
immunity for those decisions.  Consequently, discretionary immunity is a 
jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense.  See State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Bur. 
of Sentence Computation, 166 Ohio St.3d 497, 2022-Ohio-236, 187 N.E.3d 526, 
¶ 18.  Because the Court of Claims does not have subject-matter jurisdiction when 
discretionary immunity applies, discretionary immunity cannot be waived and may 
be raised at any time.  See State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 
951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 17} It is important to note that discretionary immunity is not absolute.  
Once a discretionary decision has been made to engage in a certain activity, “the 
state may be held liable, in the same manner as private parties, for the negligence 
of the actions of its employees and agents in the performance of such activities.”  
Reynolds at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Wallace at ¶ 35.  This means 
that when a suit challenges the manner in which the state implements one of its 
discretionary decisions, the Court of Claims will not be barred from hearing the 
case.  See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 145 Ohio St.3d 55, 2015-Ohio-4443, 46 
N.E.3d 687, ¶ 23. 
C.  Subject-Matter Jurisdictional Bar Versus Affirmative Defense, in Practice 
{¶ 18} “ ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear 
and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
a valid judgment in a particular action.’ ”  Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, 
L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 6, quoting 
Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction may never be waived and may be challenged at any time.  Mbodji at 
¶ 10.  “ ‘[I]n the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court lacks the authority 
to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.’ ”  Hudson, 169 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2022-Ohio-1435, 203 N.E.3d 658, at ¶ 22, quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 
102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 19} An affirmative defense is different than a subject-matter 
jurisdictional bar because an affirmative defense considers the pleadings and claims 
of the parties.  See Parker Bey, 166 Ohio St.3d 497, 2022-Ohio-236, 187 N.E.3d 
526, at ¶ 17-18.  An affirmative defense “ ‘ “admits that the plaintiff has a claim 
* * * but asserts some legal reason why the plaintiff cannot have any recovery on 
that claim * * *.” ’ ”  Id. at ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 
v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 661 N.E.2d 187 (1996), quoting 1 Klein, 
Browne & Murtaugh, Baldwin’s Ohio Civil Practice, Section T 13.03, 33 (1988).  
This means that any “defense that prevents a plaintiff * * * from even establishing 
a prima facie case is not an affirmative defense.”  Id.  Unlike a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, all affirmative defenses, other than those listed in Civ.R. 12(B), 
“are waived if not raised in the pleadings or in an amendment to the pleadings,” 
Jim’s Steak House, Inc. v. Cleveland, 81 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 688 N.E.2d 506 
(plurality opinion). 
{¶ 20} The Tenth District erred by finding that Ohio State had not 
demonstrated that discretionary immunity is jurisdictional in nature.  Based on this 
error, the court of appeals did not decide whether discretionary immunity applies 
to this case.  Therefore, we remand this matter to the Tenth District to determine 
whether Ohio State is immune from suit in the Court of Claims regarding its 
decisions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including to suspend in-person 
January Term, 2024 
9 
 
instruction, transition to virtual learning, restrict access to its campus, and provide 
pro rata refunds to students only for the recreational fee and for room and board. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 21} Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2743, the Court of Claims has subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear suits brought against the state when the state has waived 
its sovereign immunity.  The state has not waived its sovereign immunity when it 
acts pursuant to its highly discretionary legislative, judicial, executive, or planning 
functions.  Therefore, discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar, not an 
affirmative defense, and the Court of Claims does not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over suits brought against the state when discretionary immunity 
applies.  Since the Tenth District Court of Appeals concluded that discretionary 
immunity was an affirmative defense and did not decide whether discretionary 
immunity applied in this case, we remand this matter to the Tenth District for it to 
determine whether discretionary immunity protects Ohio State from Smith’s suit. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY and STEWART, 
JJ. 
__________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
 
 
{¶ 22} Ohio’s sovereign-immunity-waiver statutes allow people to bring 
actions against the state for liability and damages, determined in the same manner 
as in actions between private parties.  See R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) and 2743.03(A)(1).  
Private parties generally do not engage in legislative or judicial functions.  Thus, 
people are barred from bringing suit against the state for its decisions involving 
legislative or judicial functions.  But the state may not necessarily be shielded from 
liability for injury or loss that occurs when it implements such decisions.  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
statutes by which the state waives sovereign immunity do not bar the Court of 
Claims from hearing or deciding whether the state is immune from suit or liability.  
If that were the case, the mere raising of an immunity defense would negate that 
court’s ability to act.  Because the majority’s decision, in effect, creates this kind 
of rubric, I respectfully dissent. 
Statutory basis for the Court of Claims’ subject-matter jurisdiction 
{¶ 23} Under statutory law, the Court of Claims has exclusive subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims against the state for money damages.  See R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1) and 2743.03(A)(1); see also Bla-Con Industries, Inc. v. Miami 
Univ., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-06-127, 2007-Ohio-785, ¶ 12 (citing several 
cases in support of its statement that “the Court of Claims retains exclusive 
jurisdiction over complaints against the state seeking monetary damages”).  
Appellee, Brooke Smith, properly invoked the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
Court of Claims when she filed her money-damages claim against appellant, Ohio 
State University (“Ohio State”).1  If following this court’s remand the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals determines that Ohio State is entitled to discretionary immunity, 
its decision does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.  
Thus, even if the state is no longer a party or money damages are no longer sought, 
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to resolve the case, because its subject-matter 
jurisdiction as defined by statutes permits it to render a valid judgment in the action 
before it.  See Nease v. Med. College Hosps., 64 Ohio St.3d 396, 399, 596 N.E.2d 
432 (1992), quoting R.C. 2743.03(E)(2) (“ ‘The court may remand a civil action to 
the court in which it originated upon a finding that the removal petition does not 
justify removal, or upon finding that the state is no longer a party.’ * * * The court 
 
1. Under R.C. 2743.01(A), Ohio State meets the definition of “state” because it is a state 
instrumentality.  See Thacker v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 35 Ohio St.2d 49, 51-52, 298 
N.E.2d 542 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds by Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks 
Sys., 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 426 N.E.2d 784 (1981). 
January Term, 2024 
11 
 
is not required to remand the case upon a finding that the state is no longer a party” 
[emphasis sic]); Cristino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2008-
10773, 2013-Ohio-5936, ¶ 36, quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 
290 N.E.2d 841 (1972) (“Plaintiff has failed to provide support for the assertion 
that the Court of Claims can ‘transfer’ a case to a common pleas court when 
monetary damages are no longer sought.  ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court 
connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits * * * [and] defines the 
competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action’ ”). 
{¶ 24} Thus, when no state actor remains in the case or when money 
damages are no longer sought, a determination that immunity applies does not 
deprive the Court of Claims of jurisdiction.  Moreover, the power to determine 
immunity is just one facet of the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, and when the state 
does not argue that immunity applies, the Court of Claims is not deprived of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the action.  See In re K.K., 170 Ohio St.3d 
149, 2022-Ohio-3888, 209 N.E.3d 660, ¶ 48, quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 
162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14, quoting State v. 
Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23 (explaining 
that subject-matter jurisdiction is not dependent on the rights of the parties in a 
particular case, but “ ‘instead, “the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent 
to hear the controversy” ’ ”). 
Discretionary immunity as an affirmative defense 
{¶ 25} The state’s argument that discretionary immunity applies should be 
treated as a belated affirmative defense that, even though pled in its answer, was 
neither timely argued nor proved in a trial court, as required.  See State ex rel. Koren 
v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 629 N.E.2d 446 (1994); State ex rel. Vanni v. 
McMonagle, 137 Ohio St.3d 568, 2013-Ohio-5187, 2 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 13-15. 
{¶ 26} The state’s claim of immunity, a question of law, may be determined 
by a court of common pleas, by the Court of Claims, or by an appellate court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
reviewing a lower court’s decision.  Common pleas courts and the Court of Claims 
are trial courts under provisions of the Ohio Constitution and the Revised Code.  
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B); R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) and (2).  A court 
of common pleas may hear an action against the state for declaratory judgment or 
injunctive relief.  See R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) (“To the extent that the state has 
previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability”); R.C. 
2743.03(A)(2).  But a court of common pleas does not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate money-damages claims against the state, see R.C. 
2743.03(A)(1), even though it may be able to determine whether a state entity is 
immune from suit or liability, see R.C. 2743.03(A)(2). 
{¶ 27} The majority’s decision today appears to relegate the determination 
of discretionary immunity to only courts of common pleas and appellate courts on 
review, even though the Revised Code specifically states that the Court of Claims 
has jurisdiction over all claims before it.  So, under the majority’s approach, the 
critical question at the outset is whether there is an unresolved issue of, in this case, 
discretionary immunity. 
The Court of Claims may determine its own jurisdiction 
{¶ 28} Cloaking the question of discretionary immunity as “jurisdictional” 
does not mean that it is a jurisdictional question.  If it did, the Court of Claims 
would not be permitted to determine its own jurisdiction.  Yet the majority confuses 
the issue by remanding this case to the court of appeals, appearing to depart from 
the general jurisdictional grant of R.C. 2743.02 and 2743.03 in contravention of 
statutory law that the Court of Claims has “exclusive, original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in 
section 2743.02 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2743.03(A)(1).  What the majority 
opinion should not be read to say is that if there is even a whiff of an immunity 
argument, the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to decide that question, even 
though it and each and every other court is imbued with the power to determine its 
January Term, 2024 
13 
 
own jurisdiction.  See State ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. O’Donnell, 172 
Ohio St.3d 407, 2023-Ohio-428, 224 N.E.3d 1057, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Plant 
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5 (“Thus, 
‘[i]n the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction’ ” [brackets 
sic]).  The statutory language is clear that an immunity question may be determined 
by the Court of Claims.  If the immunity question has been determined by another 
court, such as on removal under R.C. 2743.03(E), the case comes to the Court of 
Claims with that question having already been decided.  The statute continues to 
describe the broad powers of the Court of Claims: 
 
The court shall have full equity powers in all actions within its 
jurisdiction and may entertain and determine all counterclaims, 
cross-claims, and third-party claims. 
If the claimant in a civil action as described in division 
(A)(1) of this section also files a claim for a declaratory judgment, 
injunctive relief, or other equitable relief against the state that arises 
out of the same circumstances that gave rise to the civil action 
described in division (A)(1) of this section, the Court of Claims has 
exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine that claim in 
that civil action. 
 
R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) and (2).  The statute creating the Court of Claims promotes 
flexibility, and hence judicial economy and fair process, by permitting entire 
actions, including the issue of discretionary immunity, to be decided in one action 
by the Court of Claims.  Finally, if there had ever been any caselaw before now 
holding that discretionary immunity was jurisdictional, there would be a plethora 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
of decisions from the Court of Claims considering the issue sua sponte, because 
every court holds a duty to ensure it has jurisdiction to hear the claims before it. 
{¶ 29} In short, I do not want the majority’s decision today to create 
confusion and render the statute inoperable or to in effect cause nearly every action 
that is brought in the Court of Claims to be subject to dismissal at the moment the 
state raises the defense of discretionary immunity.  Nor do I want litigants and their 
lawyers who would have filed a comprehensive set of claims the first instance in 
the Court of Claims to feel compelled to instead first file a declaratory-judgment 
action in a court of common pleas for a determination whether discretionary 
immunity exists under the law.  Otherwise, it is highly likely that direct appeals of 
the immunity question would ensue, resulting in the case dragging on in the courts 
for years.  And I do not want to see cases that are meritorious ultimately fail when 
they are finally brought before the Court of Claims on their merits because of 
statute-of-limitations or statute-of-repose bars.  See, e.g., Everhart v. Coshocton 
Cty. Mem. Hosp., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4670, __ N.E.3d __.  This could 
occur because common pleas courts and courts of appeals appear limited in their 
ability to remove a plaintiff’s case to the Court of Claims.  See Adams v. Cox, 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-684, 2010-Ohio-415, ¶ 11-12 (holding that a court of 
common pleas had no authority to transfer a plaintiff’s case to the Court of Claims 
under R.C. 2743.03(E), which is the sole mechanism for removal); R.C. 
2743.03(E)(1) (allowing for removal to the Court of Claims only when a third-party 
complaint or counterclaim is filed against the state in an action commenced in any 
court other than the Court of Claims and requiring the timely filing of a petition for 
removal to the Court of Claims).  Thus, without a “transfer” or “removal” of a case, 
any new case filed in the Court of Claims uses the date of the filing in that court for 
the purposes of statutes of limitations and repose. 
{¶ 30} Many cases brought before the Court of Claims involve serious 
personal injury or death allegedly caused by wanton and reckless actions of the 
January Term, 2024 
15 
 
state or by medical malpractice.  Issues of immunity that may affect the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Claims should therefore be raised—and decided—at the earliest 
possible point in litigation, as part of the action on the merits and not in a bifurcated 
process between two courts. 
Remand should be to the Court of Claims 
{¶ 31} While Ohio State asserted discretionary immunity as an affirmative 
defense in its answer, the Court of Claims did not consider whether discretionary 
immunity applied, because Ohio State did not argue the doctrine in its motion to 
dismiss or in its motion for summary judgment.  Determining whether discretionary 
immunity applies could have been the subject of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or summary judgment, but, again, the issue was not considered by the 
Court of Claims. 
{¶ 32} When discretionary immunity is timely raised, discovery and 
evidence are often required to determine whether it applies, making it more likely 
than not a mixed question of fact and law.  When discretionary immunity is not 
timely raised and is instead raised at the appellate level, the matter should be 
remanded to the Court of Claims, or other appropriate trial court, for it to oversee 
the discovery process, make evidentiary rulings, and ultimately determine the 
immunity issue. 
{¶ 33} The Court of Claims, which has expertise developed from years of 
litigation on the specific issue of the state’s waiver of immunity, is best suited for 
the immunity issues raised by the state here.  The purpose of the statutes by which 
the state waives its sovereign immunity should not be defeated by a reading that all 
questions of the state’s immunity are jurisdictional and not able to be determined 
by the Court of Claims.  This case is an outlier, one arising from the rare occurrence 
of a worldwide pandemic.  It appears that the majority reached its conclusions on 
jurisdiction because this is one of those unicorns.  Its holding should not be 
universally applied.  Otherwise, egregious situations caused by the state would go 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
unchecked, despite the existence of specific statutes by which the state waives 
sovereign immunity. 
Common-law immunity versus statutory immunity 
{¶ 34} It is concerning that the majority declares that this court may alter or 
abrogate the immunity provisions prescribed by the General Assembly.  Majority 
opinion, ¶ 13.  This is not correct law, statutorily or constitutionally.  Perhaps what 
the majority means is that it can do so in the context of common law when 
discretionary immunity is being raised by the state for the first time on appeal.  And 
perhaps this is a situation when the court is trying to do its job as a keeper of the 
common law. 
{¶ 35} The case the majority relies on, Schenkolewski v. Cleveland 
Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 426 N.E.2d 784 (1981), explains that courts can 
set the bounds of the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, id. at paragraph 
one of the syllabus, which is not at issue here.  And in my view, the majority is 
using Schenkolewski to wedge this unicorn case into some kind of caselaw category 
that will help it solve the unusual problems presented here.  But Schenkolewski 
implies that both the judiciary and the legislature may simultaneously “provide” the 
laws governing suits against the state.  Id. at 35 (noting that Article I, Section 16 of 
the Ohio Constitution “provides simply that suits may be brought against the state 
as may be provided by law” but does not explain which branch of government is to 
do the providing).  For clarity’s sake, Schenkolewski is a case involving the 
application of common-law sovereign immunity to a municipal-park district, not 
the state, id. at 31-32, and at least one appellate court has recognized that 
Schenkolewski has no applicability in determining questions related to statutory 
immunity, see R.K. v. Little Miami Golf Ctr., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, ¶ 10 
(1st Dist.). 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
17 
 
Determining discretionary immunity 
{¶ 36} Elementally, the state’s consent to be sued is explicit in statutes 
establishing and governing the Court of Claims, specifically, R.C. 2743.02 and 
2743.03.  The state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) is 
general, and the determination of liability is “subject to the limitations set forth” in 
R.C. Chapter 2743.  Specifically reserved within R.C. Chapter 2743 is the state’s 
immunity from liability for matters that relate to “the performance or 
nonperformance of a public duty,” R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a), except when a “special 
relationship” exists between the injured party and the state, R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(b).  
Ohio State has not asserted that public-duty immunity under R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) 
applies here.  Immunity must be raised and proved, and a general assertion of 
immunity does not divest the Court of Claims of jurisdiction.  See Vanni, 137 Ohio 
St.3d 568, 2013-Ohio-5187, 2 N.E.3d 243, at ¶ 13-14. 
{¶ 37} The majority misapplies Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 471 
N.E.2d 776 (1984) (“Reynolds”), in reaching its conclusion that discretionary 
immunity is a jurisdictional bar.  See majority opinion at ¶ 15-16.  In Reynolds, we 
interpreted statutory language waiving sovereign immunity that is contained in R.C. 
2743.02.  That language requires that the state shall “have its liability determined 
* * * in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private 
parties.”  R.C. 2743.02(A)(1).  We explained that this language means that the state 
cannot be sued for the exercise of its legislative or judicial functions or its exercise 
of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision 
that requires the exercise of a “high degree of official judgment.”  Reynolds at 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 38} But that interpretation has little application here.  And although Ohio 
State was not exercising legislative or judicial functions when it suspended in-
person classes or closed certain facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, it may 
have been exercising executive function involving a basic policy decision requiring 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
a “high degree of official judgment.”  However, Smith is not challenging the 
university’s decisions.  She is seeking reimbursement for the effects of Ohio State’s 
decisions.  Smith claims that she did not get what she paid for, and that is the sum 
and substance of her claim for money damages.  Thus, as in Reynolds, Smith may 
seek money damages that arose from Ohio State’s decisions, even though she may 
not challenge the propriety of those decisions. 
{¶ 39} In Reynolds, the issue was whether the plaintiffs could maintain their 
claims for money damages against the state, even if the decision that caused the 
money damages was barred from suit.  We said they could.  Id. at 70-71.  We first 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim insofar as they were attempting 
to challenge the state’s decision to furlough a prisoner under state law.  Id. at 70.  
We established, however, that while discretionary immunity, if applicable, makes 
immune from suit the decision of the state, it does not shield the state from liability 
for an injury or loss that occurs in implementing that decision.  Id. at 70-71.  We 
said that a cause of action could be maintained against the state for personal injuries 
proximately caused by the failure to confine the furloughed prisoner during 
nonworking hours pursuant to R.C. 2967.26(B), because such a failure to confine 
is negligence per se.  Id. at 70.  We therefore determined that the Court of Claims’ 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action was reversible error, and we remanded the matter 
to the Court of Claims.  Id. at 71. 
{¶ 40} In Reynolds, on remand, the Court of Claims reviewed the evidence 
of the state’s conduct following its decision to furlough the prisoner and found the 
state liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries, ordering the state to pay money damages to 
the plaintiffs.  Reynolds v. Div. of Parole & Community Servs., 23 Ohio Misc.2d 
31, 39, 492 N.E.2d 172 (Ct. of Cl.1985).  Importantly, in Reynolds, the state moved 
for summary judgment in the Court of Claims, arguing that it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  See Reynolds v. State, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 83AP-
January Term, 2024 
19 
 
348, 1983 WL 3745, *1 (Oct. 27, 1983), rev’d, Reynolds, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 471 
N.E.2d 776. 
{¶ 41} Reynolds does not support any conclusion that discretionary 
immunity is a jurisdictional bar or that it can be raised for the first time on appeal.  
Even if Reynolds could be read to imply that discretionary immunity is a 
jurisdictional bar, its holding applies only to claims made against the decision 
giving rise to the injury or loss and not to the injury or loss that may have occurred 
as a result of that decision being implemented once decided.  Thus, the state could 
be entitled to immunity in making its decision, but under Reynolds, claims for 
money damages survive for the purposes of adjudication.  Consequently, the 
majority’s use of Reynolds to support its conclusion that discretionary immunity is 
an all-encompassing jurisdictional bar is a misapplication of Reynolds, majority 
opinion at ¶ 15-16. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 42} Whether raised in boiler-plate language in the answer with no further 
argument before the Court of Claims or thereafter argued for the first time in the 
court of appeals, Ohio State’s assertion of discretionary immunity is without merit.  
No amount of cloaking Ohio State’s discretionary-immunity defense with the 
import of being a jurisdictional issue saves it from waiver, because neither the 
statutes nor caselaw support the conclusion that the immunity question, itself, is 
jurisdictional.  When the legal determination of discretionary immunity may turn 
on evidence, it is even more important for discretionary immunity to be raised 
before a trial court and not the first time before a court of appeals.  The Court of 
Claims should determine whether immunity exists, and the court of appeals should 
determine whether the Court of Claims’ decision is correct under the law. 
{¶ 43} A hard-and-fast rule that discretionary immunity or the 
determination of any type of immunity is a jurisdictional question could thwart the 
state’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in R.C. Chapter 2743 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
thereby undermine the Court of Claims’ ability to address claims such as Smith’s 
(i.e., claims that the Court of Claims may hear according to Reynolds).  Our review 
of these issues should not advance any limitation to the state’s consent to be sued 
beyond what is provided in the Revised Code or beyond how we have fairly applied 
the sovereign-immunity-waiver statutes under common law.  No general statement 
that sovereign immunity may be “altered or abrogated judicially,” majority opinion 
at ¶ 13, creates such power.  Accordingly, this court should not make the broad and 
unlimited statement that discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar; if we do, we 
gut sovereign immunity without having any statutory or constitutional authority to 
do so. 
{¶ 44} For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
discretionary immunity is a jurisdictional bar to suits brought against the state in 
the Court of Claims.  Ohio State should have done more than assert discretionary 
immunity as a boiler-plate defense in its answer.  It should have argued the issue 
before the Court of Claims.  Having failed to do so, this case should be remanded 
to the Court of Claims to fairly address any necessary evidentiary issues related to 
Ohio State’s belated defense of discretionary immunity.  Accordingly, and for the 
reasons expressed in this separate opinion, I respectfully dissent. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Climaco Wilcox Peca & Garofoli Co., L.P.A., and Scott D. Simpkins; and 
Bursor & Fisher, P.A., and Joshua D. Arisohn, for appellee. 
Squire Patton Boggs (U.S.), L.L.P., John R. Gall, Traci L. Martinez, 
Christopher F. Haas, E. Joseph D’Andrea, Elizabeth P. Helpling, and Roger M. 
Gold, for appellant. 
________________________