Title: Oregon v. Dulfu

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

No. 51	
September 20, 2018	
647
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CATALIN VODA DULFU,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 201204555) (CA A153918) (SC S064569)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 19, 2017.
Ryan Scott, Portland, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, 
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Kistler, 
Nakamoto, Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices.**
DUNCAN, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and circuit court 
are reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court 
for resentencing.
______________
	
**  Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Jay A. McAlpin, Judge. 282 Or 
App 209, 386 P3d 85 (2016).
	
**  Landau, J., retired December 31, 2017, and did not participate in the deci­
sion of this case.
648	
State v. Dulfu
Case Summary: Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes based on child 
pornography on his computer. At sentencing, the trial court increased defendant’s 
criminal history score after it sentenced him for each crime, until it reached the 
maximum criminal history score. Defendant appealed, arguing that his convic­
tions constituted one criminal episode, and therefore one crime could not be used 
to increase his criminal history score for the other crimes. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Held: (1) A conviction does not count toward a defendant’s criminal his­
tory score if, under a double jeopardy analysis, it arose out of the same criminal 
episode as the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced; and (2) posses­
sion of multiple items of contraband, at the same time and place, constitutes a 
single criminal episode.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and circuit court are reversed, and the 
case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
649
	
DUNCAN, J.
	
In this criminal case, defendant asserts that the trial 
court erred in calculating his criminal history score under 
the felony sentencing guidelines. Under the guidelines, prior 
convictions generally increase a defendant’s criminal history 
score, unless they arose out of the same criminal episode as 
the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. In this 
case, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes based on 
child pornography on his computer. Over defendant’s objec­
tion, the court increased defendant’s criminal history score 
after it sentenced him for each of the crimes, until it reached 
the maximum criminal history score.
	
Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, 
that his convictions were based on his possession of multiple 
images of child pornography at the same time and place and 
that possession of multiple items of contraband at the same 
time and place constitutes a single criminal episode. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Dulfu, 282 Or App 209, 
386 P3d 85 (2016). On review, we reverse and remand.
	
As explained below, the rule that governs the calcu­
lation of a defendant’s criminal history score, OAR 213-004-
0006, provides that a defendant’s criminal history score is 
based on the defendant’s criminal history at the time the 
defendant’s “current crimes” are sentenced; therefore, a 
defendant’s “current crimes” do not count toward the score. 
The legislative history of the rule shows that, by “current 
crimes,” the drafters of the rule were referring to crimes 
arising from the same “criminal episode,” which they under­
stood to include crimes that, under the statutory and con­
stitutional double jeopardy provisions, must be brought in 
a single criminal prosecution. Thus, a conviction does not 
count toward a defendant’s criminal history score if, for 
double jeopardy purposes, it arose out of the same criminal 
episode as the crime for which the defendant is being sen­
tenced. In other words, if double jeopardy principles require 
crimes to be joined in a single criminal prosecution, then a 
conviction for one of the crimes cannot be used to increase 
the defendant’s criminal history score for sentencing on any 
of the other crimes.
650	
State v. Dulfu
	
In this case, the state prosecuted defendant for 
multiple crimes based on the possession of multiple items of 
contraband at the same time and place, and, under double 
jeopardy rules, those crimes were part of a single criminal 
episode. Therefore, the trial court erred in using defendant’s 
convictions for those crimes to increase his criminal history 
score as it did.
I.  HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
	
Law enforcement officers seized and searched 
defendant’s computer and duplicated its hard drive. During 
a search of the duplicated hard drive, a forensic investiga­
tor discovered computer files containing visual recordings 
of sexually explicit conduct involving children. The state 
charged defendant with crimes based on 15 of the files. For 
each of the 15 files, the state charged defendant with one 
count of encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree 
(ECSA I), ORS 163.684, and one count of encouraging child 
sexual abuse in the second degree (ESCA II), ORS 163.686, 
for a total of 30 counts. (For example, Count 1, which charged 
defendant with ECSA I, and Count 16, which charged defen­
dant with ECSA II, were based on the same file.) The indict­
ment alleged that the crimes occurred on eight different 
dates.1
	
As relevant here, a person commits ECSA I if the 
person either knowingly “duplicates * 
* 
* a visual recording 
of sexually explicit conduct involving a child” or knowingly 
“possesses * 
* 
* such a visual recording with the intent to 
* 
* 
* duplicate” it. ORS 163.684(1)(a)(A).2 And, as relevant 
	
1  Specifically, the indictment alleged that the crimes occurred on November 26, 

2011 (Counts 1 and 16); January 1, 2012 (Counts 2 and 17); January 6, 2012 (Counts 
3 and 18); January 20, 2012 (Counts 4 and 19); January 24, 2012 (Counts 5, 6, 7, 
20, 21, and 22); January 30, 2012 (Counts 8, 9, 10, 23, 24, and 25); January 31, 

2012 (Counts 11, 12, 13, 26, 27, and 28); and February 2, 2012 (Counts 14, 15, 
29, and 30).
	
2  ORS 163.684 defines ESCA I, a Class B felony, as follows:
	
“(1)  A person commits the crime of encouraging child sexual abuse in the 
first degree if the person:
	
“(a)(A)  Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, disseminates, 
exchanges, displays, finances, attempts to finance or sells a visual recording 
of sexually explicit conduct involving a child or knowingly possesses, accesses 
or views such a visual recording with the intent to develop, duplicate, pub­
lish, print, disseminate, exchange, display or sell it; or
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
651
here, a person commits ECSA II if the person “knowingly 
possesses * 
* 
* a visual recording of sexually explicit conduct 
involving a child for the purpose of arousing or satisfying 
the sexual desires of the person or another person.” ORS 
163.686(1)(a)(A)(i). Thus, ECSA I applies to the duplication 
of recordings and the possession of recordings with intent to 
duplicate them, whereas ECSA II applies to the possession 
of recordings for a sexual purpose.
	
The case was tried to a jury. The state presented 
evidence that the 15 files were on defendant’s computer 
when it was seized from his house and that defendant down­
loaded the 15 files on eight different dates. The state argued 
that defendant was guilty of the ESCA I counts because he 
had possessed the files with the intent to duplicate them; it 
also argued, in the alternative, that defendant was guilty of 
those counts because he had duplicated the files by down­
loading them. The state did not elect a theory of ECSA I, 
and the jury verdict form did not identify a theory. The jury 
convicted defendant on all 30 counts (one ECSA I count and 
one ECSA II count for each file).
	
The trial court sentenced defendant on the ECSA I 
counts first. Under the sentencing guidelines, a defendant’s 
presumptive sentence for a crime is based on the crime seri­
ousness ranking of the crime and the defendant’s criminal 
history score. OAR 213-004-0001. The guidelines include a 
99-block grid, with eleven crime serious categories on the 
vertical axis, ranging from “1” to “11,” and nine criminal 
history categories on the horizontal axis, ranging from 
“A” to “I.” Id. (describing the sentencing guidelines grid); 
OAR ch 213, App 1 (setting out sentencing guidelines grid); 

OAR 213-017-0000 - 213-017-0011 (setting forth the complete 
crime seriousness scale); OAR 213-004-0006 (describing 
the criminal history scale). “A” is the highest criminal his­
tory category and applies if a defendant’s “criminal history 
includes three or more person felonies in any combination 
	
“(B)  Knowingly brings into this state, or causes to be brought or sent 
into this state, for sale or distribution, a visual recording of sexually explicit 
conduct involving a child; and
	
“(b)  Knows or is aware of and consciously disregards the fact that cre­
ation of the visual recording of sexually explicit conduct involved child abuse.”
652	
State v. Dulfu
of adult convictions or juvenile adjudications.” OAR 213-
004-0007. “I” is the lowest criminal history category and 
applies if a defendant’s criminal history “does not include 
any juvenile adjudication for a felony or any adult conviction 
for a felony or Class A misdemeanor.” Id. When sentencing 
a defendant for a crime, a trial court identifies the crime’s 
seriousness ranking on the vertical axis and the defendant’s 
criminal history score on the horizontal axis, and the grid­
block where those axes intersect contains the presumptive 
sentence for the defendant’s crime. OAR 213-004-0001.
	
ECSA I has a crime seriousness ranking of “8.” OAR 
213-017-0004(14). Defendant’s criminal history score for 
Count 1 was “I.” Therefore, defendant’s gridblock for Count 
1 was “8-I,” for which the presumptive prison term is 16-18 
months. See OAR ch 213, App 1 (showing presumptive sen­
tences for gridblock). The trial court imposed an 18-month 
prison term on Count 1.
	
The trial court then had to determine whether to 
include defendant’s conviction on Count 1 when calculating 
his criminal history score for Count 2. The calculation of a 
defendant’s criminal history is governed by OAR 213-004-
0006, which provides, in part, that a defendant’s criminal 
history is based on the number of convictions “in the offend­
er’s criminal history at the time the current crime or crimes 
of conviction are sentenced.”
	
Defendant argued that, under this court’s case law, 
a conviction cannot be included in a defendant’s criminal 
history if it arose out of the same “criminal episode” as the 
crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. See State 
v. Cuevas, 358 Or 147, 150, 361 P3d 581 (2015) (so stating). 
Defendant further argued that the term “criminal episode” 
has the same meaning for the purposes of the criminal his­
tory calculation as it does for the purposes of double jeopardy 
analysis. Thus, according to defendant, if two crimes were 
part of the same criminal episode for double jeopardy pur­
poses and, therefore, had to be joined in a single criminal 
prosecution, then they were also part of the same criminal 
episode for criminal history calculation purposes. They are 
the defendant’s “current” crimes, and a conviction for one of 
them cannot be used to increase the defendant’s criminal 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
653
history score for any of the others. Applying that rule, defen­
dant argued that, under State v. Boyd, 271 Or 558, 571, 533 
P2d 795 (1975), his convictions arose out of a single criminal 
episode for double jeopardy purposes and, by extension, for 
criminal history purposes.
	
In Boyd, a double jeopardy case, this court held that 
two charges based on the defendant’s possession of two dif­
ferent items of contraband at the same time and location 
arose out of a single criminal episode. Id. In this case, defen­
dant relied on Boyd to argue that his convictions based on 
the possession of different pornographic images at the same 
time and location arose out of a single criminal episode and, 
as a result, none of the convictions could be used to increase 
his criminal history score for any of the others.
	
The state agreed that, if multiple convictions arise 
out of a single criminal episode, none of the convictions can 
be used to increase a defendant’s criminal history score for 
any of the others; but the state did not agree that defendant’s 
convictions arose out of a single criminal episode. The state 
contended that defendant’s criminal history score could be 
increased for each crime committed on a different date.
	
The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that, 
because the state had prosecuted him for possession of the 
computer files at the same time and place, his convictions 
arose out of a single criminal episode. The trial court did 
so by making its own finding regarding the basis for defen­
dant’s guilt on the ECSA I counts. Specifically, the trial 
court found that defendant was guilty of the ECSA I counts 
because he duplicated the images by downloading them:
“[Defendant’s] conduct was not one criminal episode, but 
rather multiple criminal offenses. I find that he was con­
victed of downloading and duplicating these videos on eight 
separate dates.”
Accordingly, the trial court increased defendant’s crimi­
nal history score for sentencing on Count 2 and each of the 
remaining counts until it reached the maximum criminal 
history score of “A.”
	
Increasing defendant’s criminal history score 
increased defendant’s presumptive sentences. As mentioned, 
654	
State v. Dulfu
on Count 1 defendant’s gridblock was 8-I, for which the pre­
sumptive prison term is 16-18 months. Because the court 
included defendant’s conviction on Count 1 in its calcula­
tion of his criminal history score on Count 2, defendant’s 
gridblock on Count 2 was 8-D, which carries a presump­
tive prison term of 27-28 months. Then, because the court 
continued to increase defendant’s criminal history score 
after sentencing defendant for each conviction, defendant’s 
gridblock on Count 3 was 8-B, which carries a presumptive 
prison term of 35-40 months, and his gridblock on Count 4 
was 8-A, which carries a presumptive prison term of 41-45 
months. Because “A” is the highest criminal history score, 
defendant’s gridblock on the remaining ECSA I counts was 
8-A, and his gridblock on all the ECSA II counts was 5-A. 
See OAR 213-017-0007(9) (providing that ECSA II has a 
crime seriousness ranking of 5).
	
On each count, the trial court imposed the maxi­
mum presumptive prison term.3 The court ordered defen­
dant to serve some of the prison terms consecutively, for a 
total of 180 months (15 years).
	
Defendant appealed, renewing his argument that 
all his convictions arose from a single criminal episode and, 
therefore, none of his convictions could be used to increase 
his criminal history score for sentencing him on any of the 
others. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
II.  PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
	
On review, the parties agree that the issue in this 
case is whether defendant’s convictions arose out of a sin­
gle criminal episode for the purposes of the criminal history 
rule, OAR 213-004-0006. But, they do not agree on what 
constitutes a criminal episode or whether defendant’s crimes 
were part of a single criminal episode.
	
Defendant argues that the term “criminal episode” 
has the same meaning in the criminal history context as it 
does in the double jeopardy context and, therefore, if crimes 
must be joined in a single criminal prosecution for double 
	
3  Thus, defendant’s prison terms were as follows: 18 months (Count 1); 28 
months (Count 2); 40 months (Count 3); 45 months (Counts 4-15); and 16 months 
(Counts 16-30).
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
655
jeopardy purposes, a conviction for one cannot be used to 
increase the defendant’s criminal history score for any of 
the others. Defendant further argues that there are multiple 
tests for determining whether crimes are part of the same 
criminal episode, and that this court identified three of them 
in Boyd. As discussed below, one is the “same act or trans­
action” or “cross-related” test, which is whether the charges 
are for crimes that “ 
‘are so closely linked in time, place and 
circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot 
be related without relating details of the other charge.’ 
” 
Boyd, 271 Or at 563-64 (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 267 Or 
266, 273, 516 P2d 1280 (1973)). Another is the “same crim­
inal objective test,” which is whether the charges are for 
“ 
‘continuous and uninterrupted conduct that establishes at 
least one offense and is so joined in time, place and circum­
stances that such conduct is directed to the accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective.’ 
” Id. at 564-65 (quoting ORS 
131.505(4)). And, a third is whether the crimes are for the 
possession of contraband at the same time or place. Id. at 
570-71. Defendant argues that, under each of those three 
tests, his crimes were part of a single criminal episode.
	
In response, the state argues that the only test for 
whether crimes are part of a single criminal episode for the 
purposes of the criminal history rule is the “same crimi­
nal objective” test. Under that test, the state contends that 
defendant’s crimes were not part of a single criminal epi­
sode because, even though the jury did not make an express 
finding regarding the bases for its verdicts on the ECSA I 
counts—that is, even though the jury did not expressly find 
whether defendant duplicated the files or possessed them 
with the intent to duplicate them—the trial court itself 
could find that defendant was guilty of the ECSA I counts 
for duplicating the files by downloading them, and the trial 
court could further find that defendant downloaded the files 
on eight separate dates, during eight separate criminal 
episodes. Alternatively, the state argues that, even if the 
trial court itself could not make a finding that defendant 
duplicated the images and even if the other two tests apply, 
defendant’s crimes were not part of a single criminal episode 
under any of the tests because defendant came into posses­
sion of the images at eight different times. Finally, the state 
656	
State v. Dulfu
argues that, even if defendant’s crimes were part of a sin­
gle criminal episode and the trial court erred in calculating 
his criminal history scores as it did, the error was harmless 
because the trial court “could and would impose the same 
total sentence on remand.”
	
Thus, although the parties agree that a conviction 
cannot be used to increase a defendant’s criminal history 
score if it arose out of the same criminal episode as the 
conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced, they 
disagree about what constitutes a criminal episode for the 
purposes of the criminal history rule. To resolve that dis­
agreement, we must interpret that rule.
III.  ANALYSIS
	
The Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines were 
developed by the Oregon Criminal Justice Council, adopted 
as administrative rules by the Sentencing Guidelines 
Board, and expressly approved by the legislature. Oregon 
Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual 3 (1989) 
(hereafter Guidelines Implementation Manual); Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Mandatory Felony Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Oregon Model, 25 UC Davis L Rev 695, 699-700 (1992); 
State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 486-87, 847 P2d 834 (1993). The 
guidelines were intended to address two primary concerns: 
inconsistent sentencing practices and prison overcrowding. 
Or Laws 1987, Ch 619 (providing that sentencing decisions 
“must be made on a systemic basis that will maintain insti­
tutional populations within a level for which the Legislative 
Assembly and the people of the state are prepared to pro­
vide”); see also OAR 213-002-0001(3)(a) (“The response 
of the corrections system to crime * 
* 
* must reflect the 
resources available for that response. A corrections system 
that overruns its resources is a system that cannot deliver 
* 
* 
*.”).
	
When interpreting a sentencing guidelines rule, 
this court applies the methodology for interpreting statutes 
outlined in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 
606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), as modified by State v. 
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). See also 
State v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 314, 855 P2d 1100 (1993) 
(stating that when interpreting a sentencing guideline rule 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
657
this court’s “normal procedure for interpreting statutes 
applies”). We first examine the text and context of the rule, 
Gaines, 346 Or at 172, including related statutes and case 
law, State v. Klein, 352 Or 302, 309, 283 P3d 350 (2012). We 
then consider any legislative history that appears helpful 
to our analysis. Gaines, 346 Or at 172. If the legislature’s 
intent remains unclear, we apply general maximums of stat­
utory construction to resolve the uncertainty. Id.
A.  Text of the Criminal History Rule
	
We begin with the text of the criminal history rule. 
OAR 213-004-0006 provides, in part:
	
“(2)  An offender’s criminal history is based upon the 
number of adult felony and Class A misdemeanor convic­
tions and juvenile adjudications in the offender’s criminal 
history at the time the current crime or crimes of conviction 
are sentenced.”4
(Emphasis added.)
	
OAR 213-004-0006(2) establishes the point in time 
at which a defendant’s criminal history score is to be calcu­
lated for sentencing purposes: “the time the current crime or 
crimes of conviction are sentenced.” The drafters’ use of the 
plural term “crimes” reflects their recognition that a defen­
dant may have multiple current crimes of conviction. Under 
	
4  In full, OAR 213-004-0006(2) provides:
	
“An offender’s criminal history is based upon the number of adult fel­
ony and Class A misdemeanor convictions and juvenile adjudications in the 
offender’s criminal history at the time the current crime or crimes of convic­
tion are sentenced. For crimes committed on or after November 1, 1989 a con­
viction is considered to have occurred upon the pronouncement of sentence in 
open court. For crimes committed prior to November 1, 1989 a conviction is 
considered to have occurred upon pronouncement in open court of a sentence, 
or upon the pronouncement in open court of the suspended imposition of a 
sentence. Prior adult convictions or juvenile adjudications which have been 
expunged shall not be considered when classifying an offender’s criminal his­
tory. Prior findings of ‘guilty except for insanity’ shall not be considered when 
classifying an offender’s criminal history.”
Thus, not all a defendant’s convictions or adjudications are included in the calcu­
lation of a defendant’s criminal history score. Only convictions and adjudications 
for felony and Class A misdemeanor are included; convictions for Class B misde­
meanors and Class C misdemeanors are not included.
	
The criminal history rule was originally adopted as former OAR 253-04-006 
(Nov 1, 1989). It was renumbered to OAR 213-004-0006 in 1996.
658	
State v. Dulfu
the rule, if a defendant has multiple current crimes of con­
viction, the defendant’s criminal history score is calculated 
at “the time” those “crimes” are sentenced. The drafters’ use 
of the singular “time” and the plural “crimes” indicates that 
they intended that, when a defendant has multiple current 
crimes of conviction, the defendant’s criminal history score 
is calculated at one time—specifically, at the outset of the 
sentencing of the group of crimes. That is, the defendant’s 
criminal history score is calculated before the sentencing on 
the first crime and remains the same for sentencing on the 
remainder of the group of crimes.
	
If the drafters of the criminal history rule had 
intended that, when a defendant has multiple current crimes 
of conviction, each conviction could be used to increase the 
defendant’s criminal history on the subsequent convictions, 
the drafters would have simply stated that a defendant’s 
criminal history score is based on the defendant’s crim­
inal history at the time the current “crime” is sentenced. 
As the Court of Appeals has observed, “If, upon sentencing, 
each crime becomes part of the criminal history, * 
* 
* then 
the reference in the rule to prior convictions at the time of 
the crimes of conviction becomes mere surplusage.” State v. 
Allen, 151 Or App 281, 290-91, 948 P2d 745 (1997) (empha­
sis added). To hold that a defendant’s criminal history score 
must be increased after each crime is sentenced would be to 
ignore the express reference to “crimes” of conviction, which 
we are not to do. See ORS 174.010 (providing that courts 
are not to “omit what has been inserted” when construing 
statutes).
	
Thus, the plain text of OAR 213-004-0006 shows 
that, when a defendant is sentenced for multiple current 
crimes, none of the current crimes are to be used in the cal­
culation of the defendant’s criminal history. The question 
then becomes: what are a defendant’s “current crimes”? For 
the answer to that question, we look to this court’s decisions 
in Bucholz, State v. Miller, 317 Or 297, 855 P2d 1093 (1993), 
and Cuevas, in which this court construed the criminal his­
tory rule. See State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100, 261 P3d 1234 
(2011) (stating that a statute’s context includes prior cases 
interpreting the statute).
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
659
B.  Cases Construing the Criminal History Rule
	
As discussed below, in Bucholz and Miller, this court 
construed the criminal history rule as originally adopted, 
former OAR 253-04-006 (Nov 1, 1989). In Bucholz, this 
court stated that the legislative history of the rule indicated 
that the drafters of the rule did not intend a conviction to 
be used to increase a defendant’s criminal history score if 
the conviction arose out of the same “criminal episode” as 
the conviction for which the defendant was being sentenced. 
Bucholz, 317 Or at 317. In other words, the legislative his­
tory indicated that the drafters equated a defendant’s “cur­
rent crimes” with the crimes committed in the same “crimi­
nal episode.” In Miller, this court followed Bucholz and noted 
that the drafters presumed that crimes joined in a single 
criminal prosecution would be limited to those that had 
been committed as part of a single criminal episode. Miller, 
317 Or at 302-06. In Cuevas, this court again construed the 
criminal history rule, which had been amended and renum­
bered to its current version, OAR 213-004-0006 (Mar 8, 
1996), and it adhered to its earlier decisions in Bucholz and 
Miller. It held that a conviction does not count as part of 
a defendant’s criminal history if it arose out of the same 
“criminal episode” as the conviction for which the defendant 
is being sentenced. Cuevas, 358 Or at 154. Because Bucholz, 
Miller, and Cuevas concern the meaning of “criminal epi­
sode” in the criminal history context—and because the par­
ties dispute that meaning—we examine those cases in some 
detail.
1.  State v. Bucholz
	
In Bucholz, the issue was whether a defendant’s 
current crimes include all the crimes for which the defen­
dant is sentenced in a single day, regardless of whether 
the crimes were committed, charged, or tried together. The 
defendant in Bucholz was charged, in separate indictments, 
with one count of theft and one count of delivery of metham­
phetamine. The crimes were committed more than a month 
apart. The defendant pleaded guilty to both crimes and both 
cases were set for sentencing on the same day. After sen­
tencing the defendant in the theft case, the trial court used 
660	
State v. Dulfu
the theft conviction to increase the defendant’s criminal his­
tory score for sentencing in the drug case.
	
The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial 
court had erred in calculating his criminal history score. 
Specifically, he argued that “the theft conviction, having 
been sentenced on the same day as the drug conviction, 
could not be counted in [his] criminal history as a prior 
conviction.” Bucholz, 317 Or at 311. The Court of Appeals 
agreed, holding that “the legislative history [of the criminal 
history rule] demonstrates a legislative intent that convic­
tions sentenced at the same time are present convictions that 
are not counted in the criminal history, irrespective of rules 
governing prior criminal history.” State v. Bucholz, 113 Or 
App 705, 707, 834 P2d 456 (1992) (first emphasis added; sec­
ond and third emphases in original).5
	
5  To provide background for the discussion of the legislative history of 
the criminal history rule, we note that, as originally proposed by the Oregon 
Criminal Justice Council and approved by the Sentencing Guidelines Board, the 
rule provided, in pertinent part, that a defendant’s criminal history was based 
on “the number of adult felony and Class A misdemeanor convictions and juvenile 
adjudications in the offender’s criminal history at the time the current crime was 
committed.” See Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 98 (setting out the legislative amend­
ments to the text of the original rule) (emphasis added); see also Guidelines 
Implementation Manual 50 (describing original rule). When the legislature 
reviewed the sentencing guidelines in connection with the bill intended to imple­
ment them, Senate Bill (SB) 1073 (1989), Representative Kelly Clark proposed 
that the criminal history rule be amended so that a defendant’s criminal his­
tory would be based on the defendant’s criminal history at the time the current 
crime or crimes were sentenced. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, SB 1073, June 20, 1989, Tape 103, Side 
A (statement of Rep Kelly Clark). The amendment was approved by the House. 
Senate and House Journal, Regular Session, SB 1073, S-216 (1989).
	
In addition to the amendment of the criminal history rule, the House sub­
committee made other amendments to SB 1073—which was one of the last 
bills of the legislative session—before passing it, including the insertion of the 
substance of ten other bills that had not been heard by the House Judiciary 
Committee yet. Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Crime and Corrections, SB 1073, June 20, 1989, 12. The House approved SB 
1073 as amended, but the Senate did not concur in all of the House’s amend­
ments. Senate and House Journal, Regular Session, SB 1073, S-216 (1989). As 
a result, the Senate inserted the guidelines provisions of SB 1073, including the 
provisions relating to the criminal history rule, as amended by the House, into 
a different bill, House Bill (HB) 2250 (1989), which had already been approved 
by the House. Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 2250, June 29, 1989, 
3-5. HB 2250 proceeded to a conference committee, in which it was repeatedly 
explained that the provisions relating to the criminal history rule were the 
product of the House’s amendments and were identical to the provisions that the 
House approved in SB 1073. Tape Recording, Joint Conference Committee, HB 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
661
	
The legislative history on which the Court of Appeals 
relied included a statement from one of the drafters of the 
rule, Judge James Ellis, that, when a defendant appears in 
front of a court for sentencing on multiple crimes, the crimes 
are “present convictions,” not “prior convictions.” Tape 
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Crime and Corrections, June 20, 1989, Tape 103, Side 
A (statement of Judge James Ellis). Ellis made the state­
ment when the drafters were discussing whether, when a 
defendant is being sentenced on multiple crimes, the rule 
requires a trial court to increase a defendant’s criminal his­
tory score after imposing each sentence. One of the drafters, 
Representative Kelly Clark, identified the issue before the 
drafters as whether, “when you’ve got one criminal episode, 
but you’ve got four or five offenses,” the offenses count “as 
prior criminal history for purposes of sentencing.” Id. (state­
ment of Rep Kelly Clark). Clark then asked Ellis how he 
understood the rule, and Ellis answered:
“The defendant who’s before you for sentencing on four dif­
ferent felonies at the same time—three of those are not to 
me prior convictions. They’re present convictions. * 
* 
* So 
you wouldn’t count them as part of prior criminal history, 
no matter what rule you use for figuring prior criminal 
history.”
Id. (statement of Judge James Ellis) (emphasis added). The 
other drafters agreed with Ellis’s statement. Id. Later in 
the discussion, Clark referred back to Ellis’s statement and 
voiced his agreement again, stating, “[I]t seems to me the 
question being whether you’re talking about this criminal 
episode or some intervening criminal episode. * 
* 
* If it’s 
this criminal episode—I agree with Judge Ellis—that’s not 
a prior criminal history. That’s this criminal history—the 
2250, July 1, 1989, Tape 1, Side A (statement of Sen Joyce Cohen that the Senate 
did not change the House language for the criminal history score amendments); 
id. at Tape 1, Side B (statement of Rep Tom Mason that he did not believe that 
there was any difference between the criminal history score amendments in SB 
1073 and those in HB 2250). The legislature passed HB 2250, giving effect to the 
sentencing guidelines. Senate and House Journal, Regular Session, HB 2250, 
H-55 (1989); Or Laws 1989, ch  790, §  90 (“The rules of the State Sentencing 
Guidelines Board, as adopted pursuant to chapter 619, Oregon Laws 1987, and 
chapter 151, Oregon Laws 1989 (Enrolled Senate Bill 632), become effective on 
November 1, 1989.”). Therefore, the legislative history of the criminal history 
rule includes the history of both SB 1073 and HB 2250.
662	
State v. Dulfu
one for which you’re being sentenced.”6 Id. (statement of Rep 
Kelly Clark).
	
In keeping with the drafters’ expressed understand­
ing of the rule, the official commentary to the rule explains 
the drafters’ intention regarding the calculation of a defen­
dant’s criminal history score when the defendant has mul­
tiple current offenses. Guidelines Implementation Manual 
50-51 (1989). It states:
“[T]he offender’s criminal history is to include all prior con­
victions * 
* 
* entered against the offender ‘at the time the 
current crime or crimes of conviction [are] sentenced.’
	
“This reference to ‘current crime or crimes of conviction’ 
was intended to prohibit the consideration of convictions 
arising from the current proceeding in classification of the 
offender’s criminal history.”
Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted).7
	
Based on the legislative history of the criminal 
history rule, the Court of Appeals held that, because the 
	
6  The drafters’ agreement with Ellis’s statement was consistent with their 
desire to ensure that sentences imposed under the guidelines did not exceed 
the state’s correctional resources. When the drafters were discussing the rule, 
a staff member of the Criminal Justice Council informed them that, if a defen­
dant had “multiple current offenses” and each offense increased the defendant’s 
criminal history score for the remaining offenses, that would increase the cor­
rectional resources required to implement the guidelines. Tape Recording, 
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, 

June 20, 1989, Tape 103, Side A (statement of Kathryn Ashford). One of the draft­
ers characterized the projected increase as “substantial,” id. (statement of Rep 
Tom Mason), and all the drafters, in agreeing with Ellis, appear to have intended 
to avoid such an increase.
	
7  The commentary further explains, “[A] ‘conviction’ or ‘juvenile adjudica­
tion’ should be considered to have occurred upon the pronouncement of sentence 
in open court. This is a convention established only to provide continuity in the 
application of these rules with respect to convictions from other proceedings 
against the offender.” Guidelines Implementation Manual 51 (emphasis added). 
Thus, although the commentary states that a conviction is considered to have 
occurred upon the pronouncement of sentence in open court, the purpose of that 
statement—which was later inserted into the criminal history rule itself, former 
OAR 253-04-006 (Nov 1, 1993)—is to establish the criteria for using a conviction 
from another proceeding in the calculation of a defendant’s criminal history score. 
It was necessary because, as the Council members discussed, under Oregon law, 
there were many definitions of “conviction.” Minutes, Oregon Criminal Justice 
Council, Sept 18, 1989, 9-10. For example, a conviction could be deemed to have 
occurred upon pronouncement of sentence or upon entry of a sentencing order. Id. 
Thus, it was important to identify at what point in another proceeding a convic­
tion occurred.
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
663
defendant’s theft conviction and drug conviction were sen­
tenced at the same time, the trial court had erred in using 
the theft conviction to increase the defendant’s criminal his­
tory score on the drug conviction. Bucholz, 113 Or App at 
707 (citing discussion of legislative history of former OAR 
253-04-006(2) in State v. Seals, 113 Or App 700, 703-04, 833 
P2d 1344 (1992)).
	
On review, this court reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. Bucholz, 317 Or at 312. It acknowledged 
the legislative history upon which the Court of Appeals had 
relied, but did not interpret it as broadly as the Court of 
Appeals had. Id. at 315-18. This court rejected the defen­
dant’s argument that the legislative history showed that the 
criminal history rule prohibited the “use of any conviction 
for which [the] sentence was pronounced on the same day 
in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score.” Id. at 
315-16. It explained that the legislative history showed only 
that the drafters “distinguished between a single criminal 
episode, which they thought was not prior criminal his­
tory for use in sentencing on some other conviction from 
the same episode, and crimes from more than one episode.” 

Id. at 317 (emphases added). According to this court, it was in 
the context of discussing separate convictions from a single 
criminal episode that the drafters agreed with Judge Ellis’s 
comment that the convictions were not “prior convictions,” 
but instead were “present convictions.” Id. Similarly, this 
court explained that the commentary’s reference to “convic­
tions arising from the current proceeding,” appeared to be 
a reference to convictions for crimes “committed in a sin­
gle criminal episode.” Id. at 318 (observing that “the word­
ing of the commentary [regarding the prohibition against 
using convictions from the current proceeding to increase a 
defendant’s criminal history score] makes the most sense if 
it is taken to be addressing only multiple convictions from 
a single criminal episode”). Thus, this court concluded, the 
legislative history of the criminal history rule establishes, 
at most, that a conviction cannot be used to increase a 
defendant’s criminal history score for sentencing on another 
conviction arising out of the same criminal episode. Id. at 
317-18. Consequently, the legislative history did not aid the 
defendant, because there was no dispute that his theft and 
664	
State v. Dulfu
drug convictions arose out of separate criminal episodes; as 
this court observed, the defendant’s theft crime was com­
mitted more than one month before the drug crime, and the 
two crimes were “separate and distinct.” Id. at 313. Because 
the theft crime was not part of the same criminal episode as 
the drug crime, defendant’s theft conviction could be used 
to increase his criminal history score for sentencing on the 
drug crime.
	
To summarize, the legislative history discussed 
in Bucholz shows that the drafters of the criminal history 
rule recognized that a defendant could appear before a trial 
court for sentencing on multiple crimes, which the drafters 
described as “current” crimes. The legislative history also 
shows that the drafters did not intend the trial court’s pro­
nouncement of sentence on each current crime to result in 
an increase in the defendant’s criminal history score on the 
remaining crimes. In addition, the history shows that the 
drafters equated the defendant’s “current” crimes with all 
the defendant’s crimes that arose out of the same “crimi­
nal episode.” That equation made sense, given that—as 
this court held in Miller, which was decided the same day 
as Bucholz and is discussed below—the drafters presumed 
that the only charges that would be before a trial court as 
part of the same criminal proceeding or case were those 
for crimes committed as part of a single criminal episode, 
because those were the only charges that could be joined at 
the time.
2.  State v. Miller
	
In Miller, the defendant was charged with commit­
ting multiple crimes against each of three different victims 
on three different dates. The charges were joined in a sin­
gle indictment, but there was no dispute that they arose out 
of three separate criminal episodes. Therefore, following 
Bucholz, this court held that the defendant’s convictions for 
each criminal episode could be used to increase his criminal 
history score for sentencing the convictions in each of the 
subsequent criminal episodes. Miller, 317 Or at 302 (holding 
that the trial court had not erred when it “considered the 
August 14 series of acts in sentencing [the] defendant on the 
August 26 and September 2 series of acts” (emphasis added)).
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
665
	
In Miller, this court also considered whether the sen­
tencing guidelines rule that limits the total amount of prison 
time that can be imposed through consecutive sentences 
applied to the defendant’s convictions. The rule, which was 
previously numbered former OAR 253-12-020 (Mar 8, 1996), 
and is now numbered OAR 213-012-0200, limits the total 
amount of prison time for consecutive sentences to 200 per­
cent of the prison term for the defendant’s primary offense. 
The defendant in Miller argued that the limit applied to all 
his convictions, even though they arose from three sepa­
rate criminal episodes. This court disagreed, accepting the 
state’s argument that the 200 percent rule applies only to 
consecutive sentences for convictions arising from a single 
episode. Miller, 317 Or at 306. This court acknowledged that 
the text of the 200-percent rule does not contain any such 
limit. Id. at 303. But this court reasoned that the legisla­
ture, which approved the rule, would have presumed that 
the rule applied only to sentences for convictions committed 
as part of a single criminal episode, because, when the rule 
was drafted, those were the only crimes that could be joined 
in a single criminal prosecution. Id. at 303-05. In other 
words, this court accepted the state’s argument that
“the legislature, in approving the 200 percent rule, must 
have had in mind that the rule would apply only to offenses 
arising from criminal charges from a single criminal epi­
sode because, at the time that the 200 percent rule was 
proposed by the council, promulgated by the board and in 
the process of being adopted by the legislature, only single-
episode criminal acts could have been joined in one indict­
ment or criminal case. ORS 132.560(1) (1987).”8
Miller, 317 Or at 303. This court acknowledged that, in 
the same 1989 legislative session in which the legislature 
	
8  ORS 132.560 (1987), which governed permissive joinder, provided:
	
“The indictment must charge but one crime, and in one form only, except 
that:
	
“(1)  Where the crime may be committed by the use of different means, 
the indictment may allege the means in the alternative.
	
“(2)  When there are several charges against any person or persons for 
the same act or transaction, instead of having several indictments, the whole 
may be joined in one indictment in several counts; and if two or more indict­
ments are found in such cases, the court may order them to be consolidated.”
666	
State v. Dulfu
approved the sentencing guidelines, including the 200-
percent rule, the legislature expanded the bases for joinder 
of charges under ORS 132.560, the permissive joinder stat­
ute. Miller, 317 Or at 303-04 (citing Or Laws 1989, ch 842, 
§ 1).9 Despite that amendment, this court in Miller held that 
the legislature intended the 200-percent rule to apply only 
to those charges that “could have been joined in one indict­
ment or criminal case” prior to the expansion of the bases 
for permissive joinder under ORS 132.560. Miller, 317 Or at 
303-06. And, this court described those charges as charges 
“from a single criminal episode.” Id. at 306. Thus, Miller 
stands for the proposition that the drafters of the sentenc­
ing guidelines presumed that the only crimes that would be 
joined were those that were part of the “same act or trans­
action,” which it equated with those that were committed as 
part of the same “criminal episode.” That description was 
consistent with this court’s decision in Boyd, in which it 
stated that there was an “equivalence” between crimes that 
were committed as part of the “same act or transaction,” and 
crimes that were committed as part of the same “criminal 
episode.” Boyd, 271 Or at 565.
	
Since Bucholz and Miller, both this court and the 
Court of Appeals have held that the sentencing guidelines 
limits on increasing a defendant’s criminal history score and 
imposing consecutive sentences apply only to convictions 
arising out of the same criminal episode. See, e.g., State v. 
Martin, 320 Or 448, 451-52, 887 P2d 782 (1994); State v. 
Plourd, 125 Or App 238, 242, 864 P2d 1367 (1993).
3.  State v. Cuevas
	
In Cuevas, the defendant asked this court to over­
rule its decisions in Bucholz and Miller, asserting that it 
had erred in holding that the criminal history rule and the 
200-percent rule apply only to sentences for convictions aris­
ing out of a single criminal episode. This court reviewed the 
decisions and explained that they both
	
9  Prior to the session, the only charges that could be joined under ORS 
132.560 were those that were “for the same act or transaction.” ORS 132.560 
(1987), amended by Or Laws 1989, ch 842, § 1. During the session, the legislature 
amended that statute to also allow for joinder of charges “of the same or similar 
character” and charges “connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.” Or Laws 1989, ch 842, § 1.
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
667
“start from a proposition that the court identified in Miller. 
The court explained that, when the Criminal Justice 
Sentencing Commission drafted the sentencing guidelines 
rules, ‘only single-episode criminal acts could have been 
joined in one indictment or criminal case’ and sentenced in a 
single judicial proceeding. The court noted that the sentenc­
ing guidelines rules were consistent with that assumption. 
That is, they limited the length of consecutive sentences 
imposed in a single judicial proceeding on the assumption 
that the offenses being sentenced in that proceeding arose 
out of a single criminal episode. However, the sentencing 
guidelines did not place that limit on sentences imposed 
in separate proceedings, which would have arisen out of 
separate criminal episodes.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“That same context informed the court’s decision in 
Bucholz.”
Cuevas, 358 Or at 152-23 (emphasis added; citations omit­
ted). In other words, Bucholz and Miller were based on 
the proposition that the drafters of the rules at issue had 
assumed that the rules would apply only to charges that 
could be joined in a single criminal case, and the only 
charges that could be joined in a criminal case were those 
that arose out of a single criminal episode.
	
This court adhered to that view in Cuevas, noting 
that, in the 20 years since they had been decided, Bucholz 
and Miller had become “an integral part of the fabric of 
Oregon sentencing laws,” and “[d]uring that time, neither 
the legislature nor the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission 
[had] amended the sentencing guideline rules to restore 
what [the] defendant contend[ed] was the true meaning of 
those rules.” Cuevas, 358 Or at 154. “Those considerations,” 
this court concluded, “counsel[ed] against disturbing the 
decisions in Miller and Bucholz.” Id. Therefore, this court 
declined the defendant’s invitation to overrule the decisions 
and, as relevant to the issue in this case, the law is that, 
“when a court sentences a defendant for multiple convictions 
in a single sentencing proceeding, the sentence imposed on 
the first conviction counts as part of the defendant’s crim­
inal history in determining the sentence for the second 
668	
State v. Dulfu
conviction unless the convictions arose out of a single crimi­
nal episode.” Id. at 149-50.
	
Thus, the question in this case becomes what the 
drafters of the criminal history rule understood a “criminal 
episode” to be. As noted, the parties dispute the meaning of 
that term in the criminal history context.
C.  The Meaning of “Criminal Episode” in the Criminal 
History Context
	
The legislative history of the criminal history rule 
discussed above provides clues about what the drafters of 
the rule understood the term “criminal episode” to mean. 
First, at the time the drafters used the term, it had an 
established meaning in the double jeopardy or former jeop­
ardy context. See, e.g., Boyd, 271 Or at 563-571 (discussing 
meaning of criminal episode); State v. Shields, 280 Or 471, 
473, 571 P2d 892 (1977) (noting that a defendant may not 
be serially prosecuted for crimes arising out of the same 
criminal episode). Thus, the drafters’ use of the term sug­
gests that they intended it to have the same meaning as it 
does in the double jeopardy context. Second, the drafters 
used the term to describe crimes that could be in front of a 
court in a single criminal proceeding, that is, crimes that 
could be joined. That use suggests that, at a minimum, the 
legislature intended the term to have the same meaning 
as it does in the double jeopardy context, because the stat­
utory and constitutional double jeopardy provisions govern 
mandatory joinder. See Or Const, Art I, § 12; ORS 131.515. 
Under those provisions, if crimes are part of the same crim­
inal episode, they cannot be prosecuted serially; if they can 
be prosecuted in the same court and are known to the pros­
ecutor, they must be joined. Third, nothing in the legisla­
tive history of the rule indicates that the drafters intended 
the term to have one meaning in the criminal history con­
text and a different meaning in the double jeopardy con­
text, which would lead to significant confusion. Instead, it 
appears that the drafters concluded, at a minimum that, if 
crimes were sufficiently related that they had to be brought 
in a single criminal proceeding, then a conviction for one 
could not be used to increase the defendant’s criminal his­
tory score for sentencing on the others. Consequently, we 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
669
conclude that the term “criminal episode” has the same 
meaning in the criminal history context as it does in the 
double jeopardy context.
	
That conclusion leads to the question whether 
defendant’s crimes were part of the same criminal episode, 
as that term is used in the double jeopardy context; that 
is, whether defendant’s crimes had to be joined in a single 
criminal case. On that issue, this court’s decision in Boyd is 
dispositive.
D.  The Meaning of “Criminal Episode” in the Double 
Jeopardy Context
	
In Boyd, police officers searched the defendant’s 
house and discovered a stolen television and amphetamines. 
In separate indictments, the state charged the defendant 
with theft, based on her possession of the television, and 
criminal activity in drugs, based on her possession of the 
amphetamines. Boyd, 271 Or at 560 (“Both charges were 
based solely upon her possession of the contraband items.”) 
The theft case was tried first, and a jury found the defen­
dant not guilty. The defendant then moved to dismiss the 
indictment in the drug case on double jeopardy grounds, 
relying on Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, 
which provides, “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for 
the same offence [sic],” and State v. Brown, 262 Or 442, 497 
P2d 1191 (1972), in which this court held:
“[U]nder Article I, section 12, of our constitution, a second 
prosecution is for the ‘same offense’ and is prohibited if 
(1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction, and 
(2) the charges could have been tried in the same court, and 
(3) the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known 
of the facts relevant to the second charge at the time of the 
original prosecution.”
Id. at 457-58. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the indictment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
	
On review, this court endeavored to clarify when 
charges must be brought in a single prosecution to avoid 
violating Article  I, section 12, which protects defendants 
against “undue harassment.” Boyd, 271 Or at 562-63. It 
identified three alternative tests for determining when a 
670	
State v. Dulfu
prosecution for one charge will bar a later prosecution for 
another charge.
	
The first test is whether the charges arose out of 
the same “act or transaction,” as that term was defined in 
Fitzgerald, for the purposes of permissive joinder under ORS 
132.560. In Fitzgerald, this court held that “two charges 
arise out of the same act or transaction if they are so closely 
linked in time, place and circumstance that a complete 
account of one charge cannot be related without relating 
details of the other charge.” Fitzgerald, 267 Or at 273. That 
test is referred to as the “cross-related” test, and, although 
it was first articulated as a test for permissive joinder, this 
court held in Boyd that it was “sufficiently related to the 
purposes of the double jeopardy concept as to serve as a cri­
terion for application of ‘single act or transaction’ for double 
jeopardy purposes as well.” Boyd, 271 Or at 567. Therefore, 
this court concluded, “[w]henever multiple charges are as 
interrelated as the test demands, the failure to join them 
in the first proceeding is inexcusable and therefore a sub­
sequent attempt by the state to prosecute would constitute 
undue harassment.” Id.
	
The second test is whether the charges arose out 
of a “single criminal episode,” as that term is defined for 
the purposes of the double jeopardy statute, ORS 131.515, 
which provides, in part, “No person shall be separately pros­
ecuted for two or more offenses based upon the same crim­
inal episode, if the several offenses are reasonably known 
to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of commencement 
of the first prosecution and establish proper venue in a sin­
gle court.” For the purposes of the double jeopardy statute, 
“criminal episode” is defined by ORS 131.505(4), which pro­
vides, “ 
‘Criminal episode’ means continuous and uninter­
rupted conduct that establishes at least one offense and is 
so joined in time, place and circumstances that such con­
duct is directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective.”
	
The third test is for charges based on the posses­
sion of contraband. In Boyd, this court ruled that possession 
of multiple items of contraband at the same time and place 
constitutes a “single episode.” Boyd, 271 Or at 570-71. This 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
671
court explained that the Fitzgerald test was inapplicable in 
cases like the one before it, which involved charges for pos­
session of stolen property and drugs, because the possession 
charges were not based on separate “relatable events,” but 
rather a “single condition”:
	
“The nature of the circumstances upon which crimi­
nal culpability rests in this situation—the act or circum­
stances of possession—make it impossible to resolve the 
question by reference to the Fitzgerald test based upon the 
factual interrelation of the charges. The interrelationship 
deemed essential in Fitzgerald is lacking in the present 
case because the possession of the separate items of prop­
erty do not constitute relatable events but rather a single 
condition characterized by the manner in which the items 
are held by the accused.”
Id. at 570 (emphasis in original). This court further 
explained, “The criminal code treats the fact of possession 
as a criminal act of a continuing nature. In this statutory 
sense, the possession of the television set and the drugs, 
existing at the same place and time, constitute a single 
occurrence.” Id. This court concluded, “Once unlawful pos­
session of goods, without more, is recognized as criminal 
conduct, there is no reason for fragmenting the criminal 
conduct into as many parts as there are different items of 
property, however acquired.” Id. at 570-71. Therefore, this 
court held:
“If a defendant is charged with the possession of drugs, 
some of which had been acquired at one time and the rest 
at another time, it would seem clear that he would be enti­
tled to object to multiple prosecutions. There would be no 
reason other than harassment of the defendant for the state 
to divide the condition of possession into parts and prose­
cute separately on each. The case should not be treated any 
differently simply because the items of contraband happen 
to be different types. We hold, therefore, that the Court of 
Appeals properly treated this as a single episode.”
Id. at 571 (emphasis added). Thus, under Boyd, the posses­
sion of multiple items of contraband, at the same time and 
place, constitutes a single criminal episode. That is because, 
if the possession of multiple items of contraband at the same 
time and place is not treated as a single criminal episode, 
672	
State v. Dulfu
then the state could subject defendants to harassment 
through serial prosecutions.
E.  Defendant’s Convictions
	
Defendant argues that, under each of the three 
tests identified in Boyd, his conviction arose from a single 
criminal episode. His primary argument is that all his con­
victions were based on his possession of the computer files 
and, because he possessed the files at the same time and 
place, his possession constitutes a single criminal episode 
under Boyd.
	
Before addressing the merits of that argument, it is 
necessary to address the state’s argument that it does not 
matter whether defendant possessed the files at the same 
time and place because the trial court could and did find 
that defendant was guilty of the ECSA I counts for dupli­
cating the files by downloading them and that he had down­
loaded them during eight separate criminal episodes. The 
state acknowledges that it presented alternative theories 
regarding the actus reus of the ECSA I counts; it argued 
that the jury could convict defendant of those counts either 
on a theory that defendant duplicated the files by download­
ing them or on a theory that defendant possessed the files 
with the intent to duplicate them. The state also acknowl­
edges that the jury’s verdict does not reflect the theory on 
which the jury based its verdicts. Nevertheless, the state 
contends that the trial court could make its own finding at 
sentencing regarding the factual basis for defendant’s guilt 
on the ECSA I counts.
	
That is incorrect. In a jury trial, it is the jury’s role 
to determine what criminal conduct, if any, the defendant 
engaged in. See, e.g., Or Const, Art I, § 11 (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial 
by an impartial jury * 
* 
*.”); State v. Hoffman, 236 Or 98, 
107, 385 P2d 741 (1963) (“[T]he words ‘criminal prosecu­
tion,’ as set forth in Article I, [s]ection 11[,] of our constitu­
tion, refer to establishing before a jury acts declared to be 
criminal by legislative action.”). In sentencing defendant, 
the trial court could not make its own finding regarding 
the basis for defendant’s guilt; that finding was within the 
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
673
exclusive province of the jury. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or 
383, 405, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005) (Under Article I, 
section 11, “the facts [used to enhance a defendant’s sen­
tence] which constitute the crime are for the jury and those 
which characterize the defendant are for the sentencing 
court.”). Although the state may present alternative the­
ories of a defendant’s guilt to a jury, a trial court cannot 
impose a sentence that is contingent upon the jury having 
made a particular finding regarding the defendant’s guilt if 
the record does not reflect that the jury actually made that 
finding. See State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598, 600, 652 P2d 773 
(1982) (holding that the trial court’s imposition of a firearm 
minimum sentence violated the defendant’s Article I, sec­
tion 11, jury right when, in finding the defendant guilty, the 
jury did not need to find that the defendant had personally 
used or threatened to use a firearm in the commission of 
his crimes).
	
In this case, as in any criminal case tried to a jury, 
it was the jury’s role to determine whether the state car­
ried its burden of proving the actus reus and mens rea of 
each charged crime. Thus, for each ECSA I count, it was 
the jury’s role to determine whether the state proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant had duplicated the files, 
that defendant had possessed the files with the intent to 
duplicate them, or both. That was not the trial court’s role. 
Once the jury issued its verdict, the trial court could deter­
mine whether defendant’s criminal conduct—as found by 
the jury—constituted one or more criminal episodes. See 
Cuevas, 358 Or at 168. But the trial court could not make its 
own finding about what defendant’s conduct was. In order for 
the state to have the trial court sentence defendant based on 
a finding that defendant was guilty of the ECSA I counts for 
duplicating the files, the state needed to obtain that finding 
regarding the basis for defendant’s guilt from the jury. It did 
not.10
	
10  In most cases, the jury’s finding regarding the actus reus of each crime will 
be apparent from the charging instrument, jury instructions, and jury verdict 
form. In cases like this one, where the state proceeds on alternative theories 
regarding an element of the crime, a special verdict form can be submitted to the 
jury to obtain findings regarding each of the theories.
674	
State v. Dulfu
	
Therefore, we return to the merits of defendant’s 
argument that, under Boyd, his convictions arose out of a 
single criminal episode because the state prosecuted him 
for his possession of the files at the same time and place. 
Because, as we have explained above, the term “criminal 
episode” has the same meaning in the criminal history con­
text as in the double jeopardy context, we agree with that 
argument. It is clear that, under Boyd, the state could not 
have brought serial prosecutions against defendant in this 
case, each based on possession of a different computer file. 
For example, the state could not have brought a case against 
defendant for possession of one file, and then, after that case 
was resolved, have brought a second case based on posses­
sion of a second file at the same time and location, even if 
the second file was obtained at a different time. As in Boyd, 
“[t]here would be no reason other than harassment of the 
defendant for the state to divide the condition of posses­
sion into parts and prosecute separately on each.” 271 Or 
at 571. Therefore, the crimes would have to be joined in a 
single criminal prosecution. That is true, even if defendant 
acquired the files on different dates. Id. (stating that “[i]f a 
defendant is charged with the possession of drugs, some of 
which had been acquired at one time and the rest at another 
time, it would seem clear that he would be entitled to object 
to multiple prosecutions”).11 And, as explained, the drafters 
of the criminal history rule intended that, when a defendant 
was being sentenced for such crimes, a conviction for one 
would not increase the defendant’s criminal history score 
on the others. Therefore, the trial court could not increase 
defendant’s criminal history score as it did.
	
The state argues that holding that defendant’s pos­
session of the computer files at the same time and location 
	
11  Boyd’s holding was dependent on the fact that the state prosecuted the 
defendant for possession of the stolen television and drugs. As this court observed,
“Had defendant been charged with the actual theft of the television set on one 
occasion and the illegal purchase of drugs at another time, it would be clear 
enough that the events would be unrelated and therefore obviously not uni­
tary. But the state did not charge defendant with the acts which eventually 
culminated in defendant’s possession of the television set and the drugs. The 
charge is a single charge of illegal possession of goods at one time and place.”
Boyd, 271 Or at 570.
Cite as 363 Or 647 (2018)	
675
constitutes a single criminal episode will result in unrea­
sonable sentences. Specifically, the state argues,
“The necessary result of defendant’s proffered rule is that a 
person who separately acquires unlawfully multiple items 
of contraband but then destroys or otherwise disposes of 
them is treated more harshly than a similar person who 
separately and unlawfully acquires the same multiple 
items of contraband and then chooses instead to continue 
to retain it all.”
The result to which the state objects is the result of the 
drafters’ importation of double jeopardy principles into the 
criminal history context. Application of those principles can 
result in defendants being treated differently. For example, 
a defendant who possesses multiple items of contraband at 
separate times and locations can be serially prosecuted, but 
a defendant who possesses multiple items of contraband at 
the same time and location cannot. Arguably, the first defen­
dant is treated more harshly than the second. But the differ­
ent treatment is not unreasonable; as this court explained 
in Boyd, joinder of the second defendant’s crimes is neces­
sary to protect against undue harassment. And, it was not 
unreasonable for the drafters of the criminal history score 
rule to conclude that, if crimes had to be joined in a single 
criminal proceeding, they would count as present crimes, 
not prior crimes, when calculating the defendant’s criminal 
history score.
	
Certainly, the legislature could have used one test 
for determining whether crimes had to be joined for dou­
ble jeopardy purposes and a different test for determining 
whether crimes could be used to increase a defendant’s 
criminal history score, but it did not. As this court held in 
Bucholz, and affirmed in Cuevas, the drafters of the crim­
inal history rule “distinguished between a single criminal 
episode, which they thought was not prior criminal history 
for use in sentencing on some other conviction from the same 
episode, and crimes from more than one episode.” Bucholz, 
317 Or at 317 (emphases added). And, as explained above, 
“criminal episode” was a term used in the double jeopardy 
context, and the drafters used it in the same way: to identify 
crimes that would be before the court for sentencing in the 
676	
State v. Dulfu
same criminal proceeding. And, they reasonably concluded 
that crimes that would be before the court in the same crim­
inal proceeding should be treated as present crimes for sen­
tencing purposes.
F.  Harmlessness
	
Having concluded that the defendant’s simultane­
ous possession of the computer files constitutes a single crim­
inal episode, we turn to the state’s final argument, which is 
that, even if the trial court erred in calculating defendant’s 
criminal history, the error was harmless because the trial 
court “could and would impose the same total sentence on 
remand.” See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), §  3 (stating 
that this court shall affirm a judgment, notwithstanding 
any error in the trial, if the court is of the opinion that the 
judgment “was such as should have been rendered in the 
case”); ORS 131.035 (providing that no error in a criminal 
proceeding “renders it invalid, unless it has prejudiced the 
defendant in respect to a substantial right”). Even assuming 
that the trial court could impose the same total prison term, 
we cannot conclude that the trial court’s sentencing error 
was harmless. As described above, the trial court’s error in 
calculating defendant’s criminal history had a significant 
effect on defendant’s presumptive sentences. It increased 
defendant’s presumptive sentences rapidly and significantly; 
his presumptive sentence on Count 1 was 16-18 months, but 
by the time he was sentenced on Counts 4-15, it was 41-45 
months. Given the effect the error would have had on the 
trial court’s understanding of the maximum total sentence 
it could impose on defendant, it is far from certain that the 
error had no bearing on the trial court’s determination of 
what sentence to impose. Thus, the record does not estab­
lish that, had the trial court properly calculated defendant’s 
criminal history, it would have imposed the same total 
prison sentence.
	
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and circuit 
court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit 
court for resentencing.