Title: Byars v. Mixon

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

299 So. 2d 262 (1974)
Louise Cobb Mixon BYARS
v.
Pauline C. MIXON et al.
SC 718.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 1, 1974.
Rehearing Denied September 12, 1974.
*263 W. H. Albritton, Andalusia, and J. Robert Ramsey, Dothan, for appellant.
Lee & McInish, Dothan, for appellees.
MERRILL, Justice.
The widow of Travis Mixon, Jr., Louise Cobb Mixon Byars, hereinafter referred to as "the widow," appealed from the rulings and decree of the Circuit Court of Houston County relating to assignment of her dower in the lands of her deceased husband. The widow, who remarried after the institution of these proceedings, owned no real estate at the time of her husband's death but did own a separate estate in personality of the value of $26,387.23.
Letters of administration on the estate were granted to the widow on November 6, 1967, and the administration was duly removed from the probate court to the circuit court on March 29, 1968.
Travis Mixon, Jr. left surviving him a daughter, Katrina Mixon Wilder, an appellee in this appeal, and a son, Travis Mixon, *264 III, who died March 22, 1970, leaving a widow, Pauline Mixon, but no children. Appellant, as widow, and appellees, Katrina Mixon Wilder and Pauline Mixon, are the only parties having an interest in the property here involved.
At the time of his death, Travis Mixon, Jr. owned a very substantial amount of real estate of various classifications and locations, including farm lands in Houston County and vacant lands, business buildings and dwellings in the City of Dothan.
On July 5, 1972, Katrina Mixon Wilder filed a petition in circuit court alleging, among other things, that "the dower interest to which the widow, Louise Cobb Mixon, is entitled can be duly and justly assigned to her by metes and bounds" and praying that said dower interest be "set off and assigned to her by metes and bounds."
The widow answered the petition, denied that her dower interest could be duly and justly assigned to her by metes and bounds for a number of specified reasons, alleged that assignment by metes and bounds would be impractical and unjust and prayed for assignment of compensation in lieu of dower.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found (1) "that the dower interest of Louise Cobb Mixon in the lands of Travis Mixon, Jr., deceased, can be duly and justly assigned to her by metes and bounds"; (2) that such dower interest consisted of an estate for her lifetime in one-third of the described real estate, and (3) that the Sheriff of Houston County "is directed to summon five freeholders, not connected with the parties, by consanguinity, or affinity, to allot and set off by metes and bounds the dower of Louise Cobb Mixon, having regard to the improvements and quality of the land, as well as to the quantity of the dower."
The decree of the trial court lists the property in which the widow has a dower interest. It includes 10 residential parcels, most of which are presently being rented, 8 commercial lots and a business building, all in Dothan. Also included is one vacant lot and 12 tracts of rural acreage, all outside the City of Dothan. The total gross annual rental on the rural acreage was $13,000.00.
Dower is defined in Tit. 34, §§ 40 and 41:
From this record, we assume that § 40(1) and § 41(3) are applicable in this particular case.
In Sanders v. McMillian, 98 Ala. 144, 11 So. 750, this court said:
In Hollis v. Watkins, 189 Ala. 292, 66 So. 29, it was said:
The widow states in brief that she is not seeking "commuted dower"a lump sum awardbut she seeks compensation in lieu of dower so as to provide her "with the annual legal interest upon one-third of the value of the premises as of the date of the assignment, to be paid to her annually, during her life, as a charge upon the lands, or upon the proceeds of the land in the event of sale."
The widow contends that her dower interest cannot be assigned to her by metes and bounds as required by common law without manifest injustice to her. She cites the following from Harmon v. Peery, 145 Va. 578, 134 S.E. 701:
She asserts that the common law also applies in Alabama, Tit. 1, § 3, Code 1940, that she would be entitled to have her dower interest assigned in each separate tract of land by metes and bounds, but such a procedure would be "inequitable, unjust and impractical," as would be the procedure authorized by the trial courtthat of assigning her dower by metes and bounds in selected parcels.
Her contention is that allotment of dower by metes and bounds in each separate tract or selected tracts is unjust to her because of the difference in the nature, location, valuation, income, rents and profits of the lands involved. She also argues that the lands representing more than one-half the value of all lands owned by the decedent are open, vacant acreage and lots in Dothan, with a ready market value but without income potential to the widow with only a life interest.
*266 This particular question has never been decided by this court and this aspect of the case is one of first impression here.
The facts in Harmon, the Virginia case, are different. There, the widow was seeking to have dower assigned to her out of 201 acre tract of land that had been ordered sold during her husband's lifetime to satisfy his debts. The purchaser at the sale was contending that the 201 acre tract should be exonerated, and her claim of dower should be satisfied out of other lands which the husband had not sold or allowed to be sold. Here, there are no third parties involved.
There is no question but that under the common law, and in Alabama, that a widow has a dower interest in each separate tract of land owned by her husband during coverture.
In 28 C.J.S. Dower § 99c., p. 209, it is stated:
The following appears in 25 Am.jur.2d, Dower and Curtesy, § 183, p. 227:
The following principles have been enunciated in our decisions:
1. In allotting homestead and dower, the rights of children as well as widow are to be considered. Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 So. 814.
2. The children of the decedent are entitled to have allotted the dower interest so that the balance of the estate may be disencumbered. Aniton v. Robinson, 273 Ala. 76, 134 So. 2d 764; Wilkinson v. Brandon, 92 Ala. 530, 9 So. 187.
3. The assignment of dower is by metes and bounds when it is practicable, Sanders v. McMillian, 98 Ala. 144, 11 So. 750, but not when it would be a "manifest injustice." Wood v. Morgan, 56 Ala. 397.
We do not think it is practicable to assign dower by metes and bounds in each separate tract of the many tracts here involved. We do think it is practicable to assign dower in whole tracts if the widow's share is allotted so as to provide her with a life interest in one-third of the acreage and value of the land. That is our understanding of the trial court's order. This would unencumber two-thirds of the land, and would appear to be an equitable solution if it were without manifest injustice to either the widow or the children. That question arises when the assignment is made and is subject to confirmation by the trial court. This is in line with the holding in Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 109 W. Va. 260, 153 S.E. 918 (1930), where the husband owned several tracts of land at the time of his death and his widow dissented from the will, and the decedent's *267 sons instituted a suit for assignment of dower. The court said:
Insofar as we are informed, this court has never had occasion to provide for or approve "compensation in lieu of dower." We have approved "commuted dower" in cases of prior alienation of land by the husband without the joinder of the wife in the conveyance; where the equivalent of her dower interest was insufficient personalty to pay the widow a fair share, or where the widow joined in requesting a sale for division. In Cox v. United States, 421 F.2d 576 (5th Cir., 1970), the court stated:
The only Alabama case where we have noticed the expression "compensation in lieu of dower" is in Sanders v. McMillian, 98 Ala. 144, 11 So. 750, which is quoted in this opinion supra. As already noted, Sanders is an alienation case and it is argued that the statements in Sanders are applied only to an alienation situation. We do not now decide that question, nor do we foreclose the addition of other instances where "commuted dower" might be the only fair solution to the problem.
Here, there was evidence before the court that the properties could be divided into thirds so that an individual could be assigned a third of the property in such a way that the value and income and yield would be approximately the same.
We find no error in that part of the court's decree.
Assignments of error 9 and 10 charge that the court erred in permitting the witness Wilder to testify that in his opinion, the real property owned by Travis Mixon, Jr., at the time of his death, "can be divided so that a third interest in the property could be assigned by metes and bounds to be set aside to Mrs. Louise Cobb Mixon, the widow of Travis Mixon, Jr."; and in permitting the witness Floyd to testify that in his opinion, the same property could be "divided into thirds so that a third of the value and income and yield could be assigned to an individual."
Appellant argues that neither witness was qualified to make such judgment. Wilder was the husband of appellee, Katrina Mixon Wilder. He was "semi-retired, a banker and a farmer" and a former system analyst; he appraised land for the Bank of Graceville, Florida, and was familiar with the lands in question. The witness Floyd was a licensed real estate broker in Alabama and had dealt in real estate in and around Dothan for many years.
The use of expert testimony is expressly authorized by Tit. 7, § 437, and the question of whether or not a particular witness will be allowed to testify as an expert *268 is largely discretionary with the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal except for palpable abuse. Maslankowski v. Beam, 288 Ala. 254, 259 So. 2d 804; Baggett v. Allen, 273 Ala. 164, 137 So. 2d 37. We find no abuse of discretion in the action of the trial court.
Appellant also argues that the questions called for a conclusion of the witnesses as to the very question submitted for determination by the court. We cannot agree.
The questions called for opinions, not legal conclusions. There was no question of an invasion of the province of the jury because the case was tried before the trial court without a jury.
The fact that a question propounded to an expert witness will elicit an opinion from him in practical affirmation or disaffirmation of a material issue in a case will not suffice to render the question improper. Watson v. Hardaway-Covington Cotton Co., 223 Ala. 443, 137 So. 33; Colvin v. State, 247 Ala. 55, 22 So. 2d 548.
Moreover, the opinion in Maslankowski v. Beam, supra, quotes with approval the following from Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649:
The testimony of the two expert witnesses probably aided the trial court in reaching the decision which we think was right and proper, because it was the court's duty to order the assignment of dower by metes and bounds if practicable and not manifestly unjust.
A tabulation in appellant's brief of the various properties by present market value and income show the total value of the properties to be approximately $947,700.00, and the approximate annual income from these properties to be $29,740.00.
It clearly appears that the property is not producing income commensurate with its value. The trial court rejected appellant's contention that her dower should be based on the total market value of the land and that she should receive payment of the interest on one-third of that value for the rest of her life. For example6% interest on $300,000.00 (1/3 of the value) is $18,000.00 per annum, which would consume all but $11,000.00 of the total annual income from the property. This would be manifestly unjust to the children.
The decree of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
HARWOOD, MADDOX and FAULKNER, JJ., and SIMMONS, Supernumary Circuit Judge, concur.