Title: Coppedge v. US Bank National Association, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES COPPEDGE & KRISHA 
JOHNSON COPPEDGE, 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
US Bank National Association, as 
Trustee for BAFC 2007-3 assignee 
of Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System, 
Inc., 
as 
nominee 
for 
American Home Mortgage, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§ 
§   
§  No. 466, 2014 
§   
§   
§  Court Below—Superior Court  
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County, 
§  C.A. No. K11L-02-042 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 29, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 5, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 5th day of October 2014, upon consideration of the appellants’ opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm,1 and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellants, James Coppedge and Krisha Johnson Coppedge (the 
“Coppedges”), filed an appeal from the Superior Court’s August 22, 2014 order 
                                                 
1 The Court has not considered the Coppedges’ request to respond to the motion affirm, which is 
essentially a response to the motion to affirm.  Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), a response to a 
motion to affirm is not permitted unless it is requested by the Court.  
2 
 
denying their motion to set aside a prior judgment and to stay a sheriff’s sale.  The 
appellee, US Bank National Association, as Trustee for BAFC 2007-3 assignee of 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., as nominee for American Home 
Mortgage (“Bank”), has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.2  We agree and affirm.   
(2) 
The record reflects that, in February 2011, the Bank filed a complaint 
against the Coppedges seeking to foreclose on their property located at 52 Barkley 
Court, Dover, Delaware 19904 (the “Property”), due to their failure to make 
mortgage payments.   The complaint was filed pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3901(a), 
which requires the defendant to file an affidavit setting forth the nature of any 
defense with factual specificity.  Instead of filing the required affidavit, the 
Coppedges filed a document titled “Affidavit of Rebuttal to Complaint by 
Counterclaim and Petition for Sanctions” that failed to conform either to the 
Superior Court Civil Rules or to the requirements of Section 3901.  The Coppedges 
also filed additional unintelligible documents.   
(3) 
The Bank moved for summary judgment, requesting that the Superior 
Court strike the Coppedges' answer to the complaint, deem the allegations in the 
complaint admitted under Section 3901(d), enter judgment in favor of the Bank, 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 
 
and bar any future frivolous pleadings by the Coppedges.  By an order and opinion  
dated September 15, 2011, the Superior Court, deeming the allegations in the 
complaint to be admitted under Section 3901(d), granted the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court.3 
(4) 
The Bank proceeded to a sheriff’s sale, but the sale was stayed after 
the Coppedges filed for bankruptcy.  After the bankruptcy action was dismissed, 
the Bank filed an alias writ of levari facias on June 10, 2014 to reinitiate the sale 
process.  James Coppedge then filed a document titled “Petition/Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment of Sheriff’s Sale Due to Full Settlement of the Accounting and 
Stay Proceeding Pending Trial By Jury, Pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)6(1)(2), 
11(b), 11(c), Title USC 1933, 18 USCA §§ 1961(5), 1962(c), 18 USC 241, 242.”  
The Bank opposed the motion, arguing that the mortgage remained in default and 
the Coppedges continued to make unintelligible arguments.  Based upon its 
September 2011 decision and in the absence of anything significant provided by 
the Coppedges since that decision, the Superior Court denied the motion.  This 
appeal followed.        
(5) 
On appeal, the Coppedges assert a variety of confusing claims that can 
be fairly summarized as follows: (i) they were deprived of a jury trial; (ii) the 
                                                 
3 Coppedge v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2011 WL 6393197 (Del. Dec. 19, 2011). 
4 
 
mortgage debt was discharged by a $465,958.57 money order or personal check; 
(iii) the Bank did not respond to various affidavits sent by the Coppedges; (iv) an 
artificial entity cannot sue living persons; (v) the Superior Court lacked personal 
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction; (vi) the Bank did not provide the 
original, wet ink note; and (vii) the Bank cannot foreclose on the Property.  We 
review the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment and a motion to stay for 
abuse of discretion.4  
(6) 
The Coppedges have not shown they were entitled to a jury trial after 
they failed to answer the complaint in compliance with 10 Del. C. § 3901, the 
Superior Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and this Court 
affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  The Coppedges also fail to cite any 
relevant authority in support of their contentions that: (i) the Bank was required to 
respond to the various affidavits they sent; (ii) the Bank could not sue living 
persons; and (iii) the Bank had to produce an original, wet ink note in order to 
foreclose on the Property.  The record reflects that the Superior Court had 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the Bank’s claim.  
(7) 
The record also reflects that the mortgage debt remained unsatisfied.  
The $465,958. 57 money order to be paid from a United States Treasury Account 
                                                 
4 In re Marta, 672 A.2d 984, 987 (Del. 1996) (denial of motion to stay reviewed for abuse of 
discretion); Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1977) (denial 
of motion to open judgment is within discretion of Superior Court). 
5 
 
funded by an alleged $465,958.57 payment to the Internal Revenue Service and the 
$465,958.57 personal check with the handwritten notations “Certified,” “For 
E.F.T. Only,” and “Not For Deposit” were returned to the Coppedges with a 
request for payoff by legal U.S. tender.  Finally, the record does not support the 
Coppedges’ claim that the Bank was unable to foreclose on the Property.  Under 
these circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in concluding that there was no 
basis for setting the aside the prior judgment and in denying the motion to set aside 
the prior judgment and to stay the sheriff’s sale.               
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
Justice