Title: BROWNING v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BROWNING v. STATE2001 WY 9332 P.3d 1061Case Number: 00-166Decided: 10/09/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                              

 

MICHAEL 
SEAN BROWNING, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Elizabeth 
Franklin, Student Director.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan 
Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      In February 2000, 
appellant, Michael Sean Browning, entered nolo contendere pleas to aiding and 
abetting an unlawful clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), a felony, and possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2001), a misdemeanor.  Appellant subsequently filed what the 
district court characterized as a motion to withdraw the appellant's pleas, 
which the district court denied.  On 
appeal, appellant contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) is 
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to his case, and that the 
district court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his pleas because the State 
allegedly breached the parties' plea agreement.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
two issues on appeal:

 

I.          
Does Wyoming Statute 35-7-1059 violate principles of due process 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution because the statute is vague 
and generally fails to provide fair notice to citizens of their potential 
liability?

 

II.          
Did the trial court err when it denied Mr. Browning's motion to withdraw 
his plea, when Mr. Browning proved that the State reneged on its obligations 
pursuant to the plea agreement?

 

The 
State of Wyoming, as appellee, phrases the issues in substantially the same 
manner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On February 15, 
2000, the district court held a change of plea hearing.  The parties indicated that they had 
reached a plea agreement, the terms of which were placed on the record.  According to the specified terms, 
appellant agreed to plead nolo contendere to both of the aforementioned charges, 
and the State agreed to recommend that any sentence be suspended (crediting 
appellant for time previously served) and that the district court grant 
appellant probation immediately.  In 
placing the terms of the plea agreement on the record, neither party referenced 
returning appellant's personal property.  
The parties apparently did not file a formal written plea agreement with 
the district court.

 

[¶4]      The State 
provided a factual basis for appellant's pleas, which appellant assented to and 
the district court accepted.  
According to that factual basis, appellant and his female companion, 
Deanna Pine, traveled from Custer, South Dakota, to Niobrara County, Wyoming, in 
August 1999.  After the two had a 
"falling out," a Niobrara County deputy sheriff stopped appellant, who was 
driving a Chevy Blazer.  Appellant 
consented to a search of the Chevy Blazer, from which the deputy sheriff seized 
a triple beam Ohaus scale and an orange industrial water cooler containing 
tubing, acid, iodine, phosphorus, alcohol-based solvent, methamphetamine, and 
other chemicals and materials used "in the synthesis of methamphetamine."  Several of the materials were in a 
partial stage completion of methamphetamine "synthesis" and unused materials 
that would be "useful for future synthesis of methamphetamine" 
remained.

 

[¶5]      The deputy 
sheriff also seized a piece of paper from appellant's personal address book that 
contained various figures and notes associated with the "synthesis of 
methamphetamine," including that it would cost $750.00 to obtain a pound of 
sudanephrine or epinephrine (a principal ingredient in methamphetamine), and a 
glass tube with methamphetamine residue was seized from appellant's personal 
effects and clothing.  Appellant's 
fingerprint appeared on one item in the aforementioned water cooler, and 
authorities seized a towel stained with iodine from Pine, who had iodine stains 
on her hand, along with papers indicating an interest in ingredients associated 
with the "synthesis of methamphetamine."

 

[¶6]      The district 
court accepted appellant's pleas and imposed sentence in accordance with the 
plea agreement.  The district court 
filed a formal Judgment and Sentence on April 12, 2000.  The Judgment and Sentence states, 
without specifying the terms of the parties' plea agreement, that "said pleas 
were the product of a plea agreement which was fully disclosed and accepted by 
the Court."  The second-to-last 
paragraph in the Judgment and Sentence, which is separate and apart from the 
district court's findings and reference to the parties' plea agreement, also 
states:

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that any property of the 
Defendant held by the Sheriff of Niobrara County be released to the Defendant or 
his duly authorized agent, except for property of the Defendant which now is 
held or detained as, or for evidence in any pending state or federal criminal 
action, proceeding or investigation, and except for property of the Defendant 
which otherwise is unlawful for the Defendant to control or 
possess.

 

[¶7]      On April 10, 
2000, appellant, pro se, filed a motion to support a writ of habeas corpus, 
which the district court treated as a motion to withdraw appellant's pleas.  Appellant appeared with counsel for a 
motion hearing later that day, claiming that the State had not returned his 
personal property in accordance with the parties' plea agreement, and requesting 
that the district court allow him to withdraw his pleas.

 

[¶8]      The Niobrara 
County sheriff's department apparently possessed appellant's Chevy Blazer and 
several items of appellant's personal property ("a lot of stuff," tools, "very 
very good wrenches," a black leather coat, a set of jumper cables, overnight 
bag, motorcycle title allegedly endorsed to appellant, etc.).  After receiving information that a Tim 
Barber reported that the black leather coat had been stolen from him in Custer, 
South Dakota, the Niobrara County sheriff's department mailed the coat, 
motorcycle title, and jumper cables to the Custer, South Dakota sheriff's 
department.  Because Mr. Barber 
indicated that he would not pursue criminal charges if these items were released 
to him, the South Dakota authorities apparently released the items to 
Barber.  Appellant's remaining 
personal property, including the Chevy Blazer, tools, and "stuff," etc., was 
returned to an individual appellant designated to receive the property on his 
behalf.  Appellant claimed at the 
hearing that the remaining items were of "considerable value" and necessary to 
"liquidate everything I have for my daughter and for my legal aid."1

 

[¶9]      The district 
court found that returning appellant's personal property was an enforceable term 
of the parties' plea agreement, but that the black leather coat was subject to a 
pending criminal investigation in Custer, South Dakota, and fell within the 
exception contained in the applicable Judgment and Sentence provision.  The district court was not sure why the 
jumper cables and motorcycle title were sent to South Dakota and concluded that 
the circumstances did not warrant allowing appellant to withdraw his pleas, 
indicating also that it would enforce the agreement "and see that [appellant's] 
rightful property is provided to him."

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Constitutionality of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059

 

[¶10]   Appellant first argues that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059 is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied 
to his case.  In particular, 
appellant contends that the non-exclusive list of "laboratory equipment" in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) contains items one ordinarily 
can lawfully possess, and the statute fails to adequately define the 
circumstances from which one can infer that an actor "intended" to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii).  Appellant further 
argues that the statute is vague as applied to the facts of his case because he 
did not have sufficient notice that "merely transporting items that belonged to 
Ms. Pine," which "were legal items to possess," could allow one to infer that 
he, based on the combination of these items, intended to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation.

 

[¶11]   In challenging a statute for facial 
vagueness, appellant must demonstrate that the statute reaches a "substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct;[2] or the statute specifies no standard of conduct 
at all."  Campbell v. State, 
999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 2000).  The ultimate test is "whether a person 
of ordinary intelligence could read the statute and comprehend what conduct is 
prohibited" because laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.  Id.  "A statute employs a standard, for 
purposes of vagueness, if "by [its] terms or as authoritatively construed [it 
applies] without question to certain activities, but whose application to other 
behavior is uncertain,"'" whereas a vague statute impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.  Id. (quoting 
Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 1995) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 
976 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶12]   Every law is presumed 
constitutional, with all doubt resolved in its favor.  Campbell, 999 P.2d at 
657 (quoting Luplow, 897 P.2d at 
466 and Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 
266 (Wyo. 1985)).  "In considering statutory language, the 
plain, ordinary and usual meaning of the words used controls in the absence of 
clear statutory provisions to the contrary."  Campbell, 999 P.2d at 
657 (citing Keser, 706 P.2d at 
266).  While penal statutes are strictly 
construed, they need not be given unnecessarily narrow meaning in disregard of 
the obvious legislative purpose and intent.  Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 
657.  Indeed, "lack of precision is not 
itself offensive to the requirements of due process.'"  Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 
1033 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957)).

 

[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a) 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(ii)  Possess laboratory 
equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation[.]

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(iv) defines "[e]quipment" or "laboratory equipment" as 
"all products, components or materials of any kind when used, intended for use 
or designed for use in the manufacture, preparation, production, compounding, 
conversion or processing of a controlled substance in violation of this 
article."  The same section provides 
that "[e]quipment" or "laboratory equipment" includes a "[g]lass reaction 
vessel," "[s]eparatory funnel," "[g]lass condensor," "[a]nalytical balance," or 
"[h]eating mantle."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1058(a)(ii) defines "[c]landestine laboratory operation" 
as:

 

            
(A)  Purchasing or procuring 
chemicals, supplies, equipment or a laboratory location for the illegal 
manufacture of controlled substances;

 

            
(B)  Transporting or 
arranging for the transportation of chemicals, supplies or equipment for the 
illegal manufacture of controlled substances;

 

            
(C)  Setting up equipment or 
supplies in preparation for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances; 
or

 

            
(D)  Distributing or 
disposing of chemicals, equipment, supplies or products used in or produced by 
the illegal manufacture of controlled substances.

 

[¶14]   Considering our precedent and the 
applicable statutory language, the statute, without question, applies to certain 
activities.  We addressed the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a) in Statezny v. State, 
2001 WY 22, ¶¶ 11-14, 18 P.3d 641, 644-45 (Wyo. 2001).  In that case, Statezny was convicted of 
engaging in an unlawful clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a) (Lexis 1999).  
The items which formed the basis for Statezny's conviction included a 
Coleman gas stove and fuel, PH test strips, two used syringes, pay stubs, two 
chemistry books, Ace Glass ordering catalogue, physics book, scales, smoking 
pipes, empty pill capsules, neoprene gloves, tubing with pseudoephedrine 
(methamphetamine precursor), isopropyl alcohol, glass beaker, coffee decanter, 
gallon can of acetone, Efidac 24, and hydrochloric acid.  Statezny, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 7, 18 P.3d  at 644.  Officers also seized a bag containing 
methamphetamine from Statezny's personal effects and a trial witness apparently 
testified that when she asked Statezny what he was going to do with "all the 
items he was bringing into the apartment, cook up a batch of crank?'" he 
replied that "he could not because his glassware was broken."  Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 18 P.3d  at 
644.

 

[¶15]   Statezny argued that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1059 was similarly unconstitutionally vague.  The "thrust of Statezny's argument" was 
that he merely possessed "common household chemicals, as well as other items 
that are as common in wholly innocent settings as they are in clandestine 
laboratory operations."  
Statezny, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 13, 18 P.3d  at 645.  Finding that Statezny possessed more 
than "just innocent household chemicals," and that the statute required not only 
the possession of such items, but also the possession with intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation, we declined to conduct further analysis with 
"no suggestion that the statutes are unconstitutional on the face of things, or 
as applied to Statezny."  Id. 
at ¶¶ 13-14, 18 P.3d  at 645.

 

[¶16]   Appellant argues that 
Statezny is factually distinguishable because Statezny possessed both 
methamphetamine precursors and equipment required for methamphetamine production 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(i) and (ii), whereas appellant 
only possessed equipment and not precursors.3  Considering the factual and legal 
similarities between Statezny and the instant case, we do not view this 
as a meaningful distinction.  In the 
context of the statutory language (not the sufficiency of the evidence), the 
issues in both cases are identicaldoes the statutory language allow a person of 
ordinary intelligence to comprehend what is prohibited?  In Statezny, we found "no 
suggestion" that the statute was deficient in this regard.  Statezny, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 14, 18 P.3d  at 645.

 

[¶17]   The statute defines nearly every 
applicable term, including "laboratory equipment" and "[c]landestine laboratory 
operation."  The list of "laboratory 
equipment" contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(iv), while not exclusive, 
applies to the specified items, as well as "all products, components or 
materials of any kind when used, intended for use or designed for use in the 
manufacture, preparation, production, compounding, conversion or processing of a 
controlled substance . . .."  As 
both parties recognize, it is not the mere possession of "laboratory equipment 
or supplies" that is unlawful; rather, it is unlawful to possess these items 
with the intent to "engage in a clandestine laboratory operation[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii).  Appellant does not contend that 
"[c]landestine laboratory operation," the object of "intent," is vague.  In fact, the definition of 
"[c]landestine laboratory operation" sets forth several specific actions (i.e., 
purchasing or procuring, transporting, setting up equipment, distributing or 
disposing) in the context of manufacturing a controlled substance, which further 
defines the object of "intent."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(ii).

 

[¶18]   Appellant essentially argues that 
the statute is vague because "intent" might be inferred from the very items 
possessed, and the statutory language does not provide sufficient guidance 
regarding what circumstances permit the inference of an intent to "engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation[.]"  
However, other criminal statutes state "intent" in general terms.  For example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2001) provides that a "person is guilty of burglary if, 
without authority, he enters or remains in a building * * * with intent to 
commit larceny or a felony therein."  
The objects of that intent, larceny or a felony, are, not unlike the 
intent to "engage in a clandestine laboratory operation," specifically defined 
in other statutes.  In addition, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a) provides that it "is unlawful for any person to . 
. . possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance."  A finder of fact may infer specific 
intent from circumstantial evidence.  
Wentworth v. State, 975 P.2d 22, 26 (Wyo. 1999).

 

"The 
mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, his conduct, his words 
and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances of the 
case.  To hold otherwise would 
create an impossible burden in a case requiring a finding of specific 
intent."

 

Id. 
(quoting Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 135 (Wyo. 1989)).  Circumstantial evidence which proves the 
"facts and circumstances from which the main fact to be proved reasonably 
follows according to common experience of mankind'" is sufficient to establish 
the elements of a crime.  Saldana 
v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 620 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Murray v. State, 671 P.2d 320, 328 (Wyo. 1983)) (holding that circumstantial evidence of 
Saldana's connection with previously convicted drug dealers and the quantity and 
purity of cocaine ("such that it would not be likely a possessor would have 
acquired it for personal use") justified inference of specific intent to 
deliver).  See also Patterson v. 
State, 691 P.2d 253, 260 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 
(1985).

 

[¶19]   The statute is not rendered 
unconstitutionally vague on its face merely because the requisite intent might 
in some instances be inferred from circumstantial evidence, possibly including 
the nature and character of the items possessed.  We are cognizant of appellant's concern 
in this regard; however, the concern does not arise from any vagueness in the 
statutory language, but is more appropriately addressed in the context of the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an issue which is not before us.  See, generally, Bush v. State, 
908 P.2d 963, 966-68 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶20]   We find that, based on our decision 
in Statezny and the applicable statutory language, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) applies to certain conduct and is not so deficient that it sets 
forth "no standard of conduct at all."  
Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 657.  
The statutory language is such that a person of ordinary intelligence can 
read the statute and comprehend what conduct is 
prohibited.

 

[¶21]   Appellant also contends that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.4  Accordingly, we must determine whether 
the statute affords sufficient notice to a person of average intelligence that 
appellant's conduct would be illegal, and whether the facts demonstrate 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  
McClellan v. State, 933 P.2d 461, 466 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶22]   Appellant reiterates his argument 
that the statute fails to adequately set forth the basis from which an intent to 
"engage in a clandestine laboratory operation" can be inferred, claiming that 
because one can lawfully possess the listed items, "[n]o one of ordinary 
intelligence could know when a combination of items gives rise to an inference 
of intent because there is nothing in the statute that informs them."  Interestingly, appellant argues that 
further evidence of the statute's deficiency is the fact that he "readily 
acquiesced" to a search of his vehicle, for if appellant "had realized that the 
government would consider his actions a crime, it is highly unlikely that he 
would have consented to the search . . .."

 

[¶23]   Considering the aforementioned 
statutory language, we do not hesitate in concluding that a person of ordinary 
intelligence could read the statute and comprehend that it would be unlawful to 
possess and transport a pipe with methamphetamine residue, a separate quantity 
of methamphetamine, a triple beam scale, tubing, acid, iodine, phosphorous, 
alcohol-based solvent, and written notations indicating what it would cost to 
purchase a pound of sudanephrine or epinephrine.  Notably, the materials seized were in a 
partial stage completion of methamphetamine synthesis and unused materials for 
future synthesis remained.  
Appellant, whose fingerprint appeared on one of the items contained in 
the water cooler, was not merely "transporting items that belonged to Ms. Pine" 
which might otherwise have been lawfully possessed.

 

[¶24]   Constitutional notice 
determinations should not be based on speculation regarding why an individual 
subjectively "readily acquiesced" to a search.  Appellant could just as easily have 
"readily acquiesced" in hopes that the officer would not proceed with the search 
or "readily acquiesced" in order to shift the responsibility to Ms. Pine once it 
became likely that the officer would discover the contraband contained in his 
vehicle.

 

[¶25]   We conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to appellant's case 
and find no evidence that the statute was applied to appellant in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner.

 

            
Motion to Withdraw 
Pleas

 

[¶26]   Appellant next argues that the 
State breached the parties' plea agreement by not returning all of appellant's 
personal property, resulting in "manifest injustice" to appellant such that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his pleas.  
The facts relevant to this issue are essentially 
undisputed.

 

[¶27]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that if a 
motion to withdraw a plea is made after sentencing, a plea "may be set aside 
only to correct manifest injustice."  
"Manifest injustice" contemplates a "situation that is unmistakable or 
indisputable, was not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a 
party."  McCarthy v. State, 
945 P.2d 775, 777 (Wyo. 1997).  It is, in part, intended to address ""a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice 
or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure."'"  United States v. 
Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Todaro, 
982 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 943 
(1993) and F.R.Cr.P. 32(d)).  The party seeking to withdraw his pleas 
bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice.  State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 
139 (Wyo. 1998).  Justification for this heightened 
standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based in 
the

 

"practical 
considerations important to the proper administration of justice.  Before sentencing, the inconvenience to 
court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as 
compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to 
trial by jury.  But if a plea of 
guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused 
might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, 
and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.  The result would be to undermine respect 
for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the 
sentencing process."

 

Id. at 138 
(quoting Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 749 (Wyo. 1975) and Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963)) 
(emphasis in original).

 

[¶28]   A district court has discretion in 
determining whether a party has proved manifest injustice.  Absent an abuse of that discretion, we 
will not disturb the district court's determination.  McDermott, 962 P.2d  at 
138.  A district court's decision to deny a 
motion to withdraw a plea "will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion so 
long as the district court reasonably could conclude as it did."  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 869 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶29]   It is dubious, at best, that 
returning appellant's property was actually a term of the parties' plea 
agreement.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2) 
requires that if "a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court 
shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court . . 
. at the time the plea is offered."  
Full disclosure of the details of plea agreements is imperative to 
"reliably guarantee that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary and fully 
understood by the [court and the] parties themselves.'"  United States v. Blackner, 721 F.2d 703, 708 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. 
Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C. Cir. (1977), aff'd, 445 U.S. 552 
(1980)).  In accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11, the 
State placed the terms of the parties' plea agreement on the record at the 
change of plea hearing.  Appellant 
assented to those terms and proceeded to enter his pleas.  Neither party indicated that returning 
appellant's property was a term of the plea agreement at that time, and the 
record does not contain a formal written plea agreement.  The second-to-last paragraph of the 
Judgment and Sentence, separate and apart from the district court's plea 
agreement reference, does order that appellant's property be returned under 
certain circumstances.  Because the 
State has not argued that this provision was not a plea agreement term and the 
district court found that it was indeed an enforceable term of the plea 
agreement, we will, for purposes of this appeal, accept the district court's 
finding.

 

[¶30]   Appellant argues that the State 
breached the parties' plea agreement because the black leather coat, jumper 
cables, and motorcycle title were not returned to him.  When a plea "rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971).5  Indeed, only "breaches of material 
promises" allow "a court to conclude that a plea was involuntarily induced and 
thus constitutionally infirm."  
Rodriguez v. State of N.M., 12 F.3d 175, 175 (10th Cir. 
1993) (citing United States v. Pollard, 
959 F.2d 1011, 1028 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 
(1992)).  "As in contract, the terms of a plea 
agreement and their relative materiality are evaluated by an objective 
standard."  Rodriguez, 12 F.3d  at 175-76.

 

[¶31]   The state of the record regarding 
the plea agreement term at issue undermines any nexus between returning 
appellant's property and its inducement or consideration for him to enter his 
pleas.  Neither party mentioned the 
term at the change of plea hearing in placing the plea agreement's terms of 
record prior to appellant entering his pleas, and the record contains no 
evidence regarding the value of appellant's personal property in relation to any 
similarly unsupported expenses he expected to incur in retaining private counsel 
for his federal criminal defense (appellant does not allege that his federal 
public defender was ineffective) or in supporting his daughter.  At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court asked appellant if he paid child support for his daughter, to 
which appellant replied "[n]o, I raise her.  I contribute to raising her."  Accordingly, we find that appellant's 
pleas did not rest to a significant degree on, and certainly were not induced 
by, this particular term; the term was not a "material" term of the plea 
agreement.

 

[¶32]   Nevertheless, whether the 
government has breached a plea agreement is reviewed de novo.  Clingman v. State, 2001 WY 46, ¶ 
4, 23 P.3d 27, 28 (Wyo. 2001) (citing United States v. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 844 (1995)).  In determining whether a breach has 
occurred, we:  (1) examine the 
nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's 
reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.  Clingman, 2001 WY 46, ¶ 20, 23 
P.3d at 31 (Golden, J., specially concurring, with 
which Lehman, C.J., joined) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 893 
(2001)).  "Principles of general contract law 
guide our analysis of the government's obligations under the agreement.'"  Clingman, 2001 WY 46, ¶ 20, 23 P.3d  at 31 (quoting Peterson, 225 F.3d at 1170-71).  It follows that, "as in contract," a 
party should not be released from its obligations under a plea agreement absent 
another party's material or substantial breach of that agreement.  See, generally, United States v. 
Lezine, 166 F.3d 895, 901-04 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that a defendant must commit a 
"substantial breach" before the government is released from its obligations 
pursuant to a plea agreement and holding that the defendant's conduct 
constituted a "substantial breach" of the agreement); United States v. 
Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1080 (10th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 937 (1991) (finding that any breach of the plea 
agreement by the government was not "material" in light of what occurred at 
sentencing); and St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Colo. 
1997) (stating that a party is released from 
its plea agreement obligations in situations where the other party materially 
and substantially breaches an obligation under the plea agreement).  A material or substantial breach is one 
that goes to the whole consideration of the agreement.  Williams v. Collins Communications, 
Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 891 (Wyo. 1986).  Several factors are relevant to whether 
a breach is material or substantial, including the extent to which the 
non-breaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected and 
the extent to which the breaching party's conduct comports with the standards of 
good faith and fair dealing.  
Id.; Stillwell Welding Co. v. Colt Trucking, 741 P.2d 598, 
600-01 (Wyo. 1987).

 

[¶33]   Even if we were to assume that the 
property release was a "material" term of the plea agreement, appellant 
bargained for the return of his property under certain circumstances.  The State did not breach the plea 
agreement by not returning the black leather coat to appellant because it 
clearly was held as evidence in a pending criminal theft investigation in South 
Dakota, a circumstance contemplated by the parties' 
agreement.

 

[¶34]   Any breach by the State relating to 
the jumper cables and motorcycle title was not material or substantial.  Appellant received his Chevy Blazer and 
its contents, overnight bag, tools, and "very very good wrenches," etc., which 
would appear to comprise the items of "considerable value" to appellant in 
attempting to retain private counsel for his federal criminal defense and 
support his daughter.  In this 
context, the State's failure to return the jumper cables and a motorcycle title 
already endorsed to appellant did not go to the "whole consideration of the 
agreement," and appellant essentially received the benefit he reasonably 
expected, especially considering his purpose in seeking the property's 
return.  Appellant does not allege 
that the State acted in bad faith regarding the jumper cables and motorcycle 
title.

 

[¶35]   Accordingly, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances did not cause 
"manifest injustice."

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶36]   We conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, or as applied to 
appellant, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas; therefore, appellant's convictions are 
affirmed in all respects.  Our 
decision by no means condones any party breaching the terms of a plea agreement, 
and we "admonish the government to avoid occasions for questioning its 
meticulous adherence to the terms of a plea bargain.' . . .."  United States v. Griffin, 816 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Bullock, 
725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Appellant was 
facing a felon in possession of a firearm indictment in federal court, to which 
he conditionally pled guilty.  
See United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153, 1156 
(10th Cir. 
2001).

  2Appellant does 
not argue that the statute reaches any form of constitutionally protected 
conduct.

  3Depending on 
more specific information, acid, iodine, phosphorous, and alcohol-based solvent 
might also be considered precursors under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(vi) and 
(vii).

  4The State 
asserts that, by entering a nolo contendere plea, appellant has waived his right 
to argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague "as applied" to his 
particular case.  Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993).  
However, in Ochoa, the appellant pled nolo contendere to indecent 
liberties with a minor, claiming on appeal that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague both facially and "as applied."  While Ochoa does stand for the 
proposition that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant waives all 
non-jurisdictional defenses, we proceeded to analyze Ochoa's facial and "as 
applied" vagueness challenges, stating specifically that "they are both 
preserved beyond the nolo contendere plea and properly before this court."  Id. at 1361, 
1363.

  5In 
Santobello, one prosecutor promised, as a term of the plea agreement, 
that the State would not make a sentence recommendation to the trial court.  Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 
258.  Another prosecutor appeared at 
sentencing and recommended the maximum sentence.  The trial judge had also changed in the 
interim.  Id. at 259.  The new trial judge indicated that he 
would disregard the prosecutor's statements recommending a particular sentence, 
but proceeded to impose the maximum sentence.  Id. at 259-60.  The court found that the defendant 
"bargained" for a particular plea in order to secure dismissal of more serious 
charges, but also on condition that no sentence recommendation would be made by 
the State.  Id. at 262.  The State conceded that it had made the 
promise to abstain from recommending a particular sentence, and the court found 
that the State was not in a "good position to argue that its inadvertent breach 
[was] immaterial" because the "staff lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the 
burden of letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing' or has 
done.  That the breach of agreement 
was inadvertent does not lessen its impact."  Id.  The court remanded the case to the trial 
court to determine whether to grant the defendant specific performance of the 
agreement or allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.  Id. at 
263.