Title: Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/17/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
PABLO ZAMORA,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S100352
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 5 F035221
CLAYBORN CONTRACTING GROUP, 
)
INC.,
)
)
Fresno County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. 627693-5
__________________________________ )
This appeal arises out of a typo.  In typing up an offer to compromise
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 9981 (section 998 offer), an attorney’s
legal assistant types the word “against” instead of the phrase “in favor of.”  As a
result, the typed document mistakenly offers to settle the matter for a judgment
against the attorney’s client in the amount of $149,999.  Not surprisingly, the
opposing party jumps at the offer.  We now consider whether the party who made
the erroneous section 998 offer may obtain relief pursuant to the discretionary
relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b), and conclude he may.
                                                
1
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
FACTS
Pablo Zamora (Zamora), doing business as Creative Engineering and
Fabrication, filed suit against Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (Clayborn),
alleging breach of contract and other related claims.  The complaint alleged that
Clayborn failed to pay for road signs produced and supplied by Zamora and
sought approximately $143,000 in damages plus attorney fees.  Clayborn
answered and filed a cross-complaint.  Although the cross-complaint did not
specify the amount of damages sought, Clayborn sent Zamora an invoice for
approximately $157,000 before filing the cross-claim.
Less than two months before trial, Zamora’s counsel mailed Clayborn a
section 998 offer.  Although Zamora apparently intended to offer to settle for a
judgment in his favor in the amount of $149,999, the actual offer sent to Clayborn
stated:  “Plaintiff Pablo Zamora aka Pablo Iniguez dba Creative Engineering and
Fabrication hereby offers to have judgment taken against himself and for
defendant Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. . . . pursuant to Section 998 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for the sum of $149,999 . . . .”
Clayborn filed a notice of acceptance of the offer approximately three days
after reviewing it.  One week later and two days after learning about the mistake in
the offer, Zamora’s counsel advised the court of his intention to file a motion to set
aside “the judgment based on mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect.”  After
obtaining an order shortening the time for hearing the motion, Zamora filed a
motion to set aside the section 998 offer or to vacate entry of judgment pursuant to
the discretionary relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b).
In support of the motion, Zamora submitted declarations from himself, his
counsel, the legal assistant who typed the section 998 offer and other litigants in
3
related cases.  Zamora averred that he only authorized his attorney to settle for a
judgment in his favor in the amount of $149,999 and never authorized his attorney
to agree to any judgment in favor of Clayborn.
Zamora’s counsel declared that he, by phone, instructed his legal assistant to
prepare a document offering to settle for a judgment against Clayborn in the amount of
$149,999 pursuant to section 998.  Zamora’s counsel, per office policy, authorized his
legal assistant to send the document with his stamped signature even though he had not
reviewed it, because he was out of town and time was of the essence.  He further stated
that, before making this offer, Zamora had never offered to settle the matter for less
than $150,000 from Clayborn.  His legal assistant largely corroborated his story and
claimed that she “mistakenly typed the word ‘against’ as opposed to the phrase ‘in
favor of’ Pablo Zamora.”
Zamora’s counsel also stated that, after accepting the section 998 offer,
Clayborn unilaterally cancelled depositions and took pending motions to
coordinate this action with other actions and to amend the cross-complaint off
calendar without informing Zamora or other interested parties.  A declaration from
another litigant involved in the coordination motion corroborated these statements.
In opposition, Clayborn submitted declarations claiming that it acted in
good faith and believed the offer was correct as written.  Clayborn claimed that the
proposed amount of the settlement—$149,999—was consistent with the amount
stated in its latest invoice to Zamora—approximately $157,000.  Clayborn’s
counsel further stated that he had told Zamora’s counsel that Clayborn would not
give Zamora any money and had suffered significant damages due to Zamora’s
conduct.  Finally, Clayborn identified two tax levies against Zamora for
4
approximately $31,000, as grounds for its failure to question the validity of the
offer.
After a hearing, the trial court found that Zamora’s counsel made a
ministerial or clerical error and granted the motion to set aside the judgment
pursuant to the discretionary relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b).  The
Court of Appeal affirmed.  After ordering the trial court to “enter judgment, nunc
pro tunc as of February 17, 2000, pursuant to the section 998 offer filed that
date,”2 the court concluded that:  (1) Section 473, subdivision (b) permitted relief
from a judgment entered in accordance with a section 998 settlement for “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; and (2) the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by granting Zamora relief from the section 998 settlement.
We granted review.
DISCUSSION
As relevant here, the discretionary relief provision of section 473,
subdivision (b) provides that:  “The court may, upon any terms as may be just,
relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order,
or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  According to Clayborn, this
provision applies only to involuntary judgments or dismissals; therefore, Zamora
could not obtain relief from the voluntary judgment entered pursuant to his section
998 settlement under section 473, subdivision (b).  We disagree.
                                                
2
The trial court had never formally entered judgment in accordance with the
accepted offer, as required by section 998, subdivision (b)(1).
5
Our analysis begins with the statutory language.  (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.)  The discretionary relief provision of section 473,
subdivision (b) applies to any “judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding.”
Ostensibly, this statutory language does not limit the application of the
discretionary relief provision to involuntary judgments or dismissals.  Indeed, our
courts have interpreted the provision in this manner for over a century.
The Legislature first enacted the discretionary relief provision found in
section 473, subdivision (b) in 1872, and the language of this provision has not
changed appreciably since then.  (See Historical Note, 15 West’s Ann. Code Civ.
Proc. (1979 ed.) foll. § 473, p. 96 [“As originally enacted in 1872, the section
read:  ‘The Court . . . may, upon such terms as may be just, and upon payment of
costs, relieve a party, or his legal representatives, from a judgment, order, or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect’ ”].)  Since 1872, California courts have consistently applied the
discretionary relief provision of section 473 to voluntary judgments or dismissals.
For example, as early as 1901, this court affirmed an order setting aside a
voluntary dismissal entered pursuant to a settlement agreement.  In holding that
the trial court had authority to do so under the discretionary relief provision of
section 473, this court rejected Clayborn’s very contention and held that a party
who “consented to the dismissal to his injury, under a mistake of fact, excusable
under the terms of the statute, . . . is not barred of relief.”  (Palace Hardware Co.
v. Smith (1901) 134 Cal. 381, 384 (Palace Hardware); see also Troxell v. Troxell
(1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 147, 151-152 (Troxell) [holding that the statutory phrase
“taken against” does not limit the discretionary relief provision of section 473 to
default judgments].)
6
Palace Hardware was not an aberration.  California courts have long held
that “[e]ven after a voluntary dismissal with prejudice has been filed, the trial
court has jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of dismissal under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473 where it has been entered as a result of the plaintiff’s
‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’ ”  (Basinger v. Rogers &
Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 21, fn. omitted (Basinger).)  Thus, “[a]n order or
decree incorporating a settlement agreement may be set aside under section 473.”
(In re Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 465.)  “ ‘Where justice
requires it,’ a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered is entitled to
relief from the judgment as well as the party against whom it is rendered.”
(Stevens v. Stevens (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 426, 429.)  In accordance with these
principles, California courts have consistently held that parties may obtain relief
from judgments, dismissals, or stipulations voluntarily entered into pursuant to a
voluntary agreement through the discretionary relief provision of section 473.3  In
fact, Clayborn cites no majority decision to the contrary.4
                                                
3
(See, e.g., Harth v. Ten Eyck (1941) 16 Cal.2d 829, 832-834 [setting aside a
voluntary dismissal entered pursuant to a settlement agreement]; County of
Alameda v. Risby (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430-1431 [denying relief from a
stipulation]; Basinger, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 21-23 [denying relief from a
voluntary dismissal with prejudice entered pursuant to a settlement agreement]; In
re Marriage of Kerry, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at pp. 465-466 [vacating a stipulated
judgment]; In re Marriage of Carter (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 479, 488-489 [denying
relief from a stipulation]; Stevens v. Stevens, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at pp. 429-430
[denying relief from a judgment of divorce incorporating a property settlement];
Sanserino v. Shamberger (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 630, 634 [denying relief from a
stipulation]; Troxell, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at pp. 152-153 [denying relief from a
stipulation]; Bice v. Stevens (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 222, 232-233 (Bice) [setting
aside a voluntary dismissal with prejudice entered pursuant to a settlement
agreement]; Robinson v. Hiles (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 666, 669-672 (Robinson)
(footnotes continued on next page)
7
Indeed, this longstanding interpretation of the discretionary relief provision
of section 473 comports with its underlying purpose.  (See Wilcox v. Birtwhistle,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977 [courts may look to the purpose behind the statute in
interpreting it].)  “It is well settled that appellate courts have always been and are
favorably disposed toward such action upon the part of the trial courts as will
permit, rather than prevent, the adjudication of legal controversies upon their
merits.”  (Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 525 (Benjamin).)  Thus,
“the provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be liberally
construed and sound policy favors the determination of actions on their merits.”
(Riskin v. Towers (1944) 24 Cal.2d 274, 279.)  By applying the discretionary relief
provision of section 473 to judgments entered pursuant to section 998, subdivision
(b)(1), we simply remain faithful to these venerable principles.
In doing so, we reject Clayborn’s contention that the statutory phrase
“taken against” limits the discretionary relief provision to involuntary judgments
or dismissals.  Clayborn’s contention relies heavily on the analysis found in
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
[same]; Neblett v. Neblett (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 859, 862-863 [setting aside a
judgment of divorce incorporating a property settlement]; Kelsey Co. v. Spears
(1918) 37 Cal.App. 27, 32-33 (Kelsey Co.) [vacating a judgment entered pursuant
to a settlement agreement]; but see Huens v. Tatum (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
266 (Huens) (conc. opn. of Blease, J.).)
4 
Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990)
218 Cal.App.3d 1058, does not support Clayborn’s interpretation.  In Philippine
Export, the Court of Appeal refused to vacate a stipulated judgment entered
pursuant to a settlement agreement because the moving party did not allege
“carelessness or inadvertence.”  (Id. at p. 1076.)  The court did not hold that
discretionary relief under section 473 was unavailable as a matter of law.
8
Huens, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 259.  We do not, however, find Huens persuasive in
this context.
First, the Huens majority confined its analysis to the mandatory relief
provision of section 473, subdivision (b).  Huens therefore has no bearing on our
interpretation of the discretionary relief provision.  Indeed, the same Court of
Appeal has subsequently limited Huens to the mandatory relief context and
applied the discretionary relief provision to a voluntary dismissal entered with the
consent of the attorney for the party seeking relief.  (See State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 609-610 & fn. 4 (Pietak).)  To
the extent the majority in Huens suggests that the “use of the word ‘against’ ”
limits the discretionary relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b) to
“involuntary dismissals,” we disagree.  (Huens, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 264.)
Given its plain meaning, the word “against” indicates nothing about the
voluntariness of any action.  (See Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 21
(Webster’s) [against means “in opposition or hostility to,” “contrary to”].)  In any
event, the Court of Appeal that issued Huens has subsequently held that Huens
merely “construed the word ‘dismissal’ as having a limited meaning in the context
of the mandatory provision of section 473[, subdivision] (b) . . . .”  (English v.
IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 147.)
Second, the construction of the verb “taken” found in Justice Blease’s
concurring opinion in Huens is not persuasive.  With no citation, Justice Blease
contends the verb “taken” as used in the discretionary relief provision “implies
that the adverse action must be involuntary.”  (Huens, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
266 (conc. opn. of Blease, J.).)  This contention is, however, questionable.  (See,
e.g., Webster’s, supra, p. 1201 [“take” may mean “to receive or accept whether
9
willingly or reluctantly”].)  Moreover, the contention appears erroneous because
section 998, subdivision (b) uses the verb “taken” in reference to a judgment
entered voluntarily pursuant to a section 998 settlement.  (§ 998, subd. (b) [“any
party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow
judgment to be taken . . . in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that
time” (italics added)].)  Because the Legislature has used the verb “taken” in
conjunction with a voluntary judgment, we doubt it intended the verb to limit the
discretionary relief provision to involuntary dismissals.
The recent addition of a mandatory relief provision to section 473 for
attorney fault also does not dictate a contrary result.  Under this provision, “the
court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months
after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s
sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect,
vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and
which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment
or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default
or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect.”  (§ 473, subd. (b), italics added.)  The purpose of this
provision “was to alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due
solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.”  (Huens,
supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 264.)  Thus, the Legislature created a narrow
exception to the discretionary relief provision for default judgments and
dismissals.  (See Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 681 (Garcia).)
In enacting this exception, the Legislature, however, made no changes to
the discretionary relief provision of section 473, and the legislative history
10
indicates no intent to alter the scope of this provision.  Indeed, the Legislature has
never substantively altered the statutory language at issue here despite the long
line of California cases permitting discretionary relief from judgments entered
pursuant to a settlement agreement (see ante, at pp. 6-7, fn. 3), even though it has
amended section 473 many times.  Thus, the Legislature has apparently adopted
this longstanding interpretation of the provision.  (See People v. Daniels (1969) 71
Cal.2d 1119, 1128 [“ ‘repeated reenactment of a statute’ ” following judicial
interpretation of that statute suggests legislative adoption of that interpretation].)
Having established that Zamora may avail himself of the discretionary
relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b), we now consider whether the trial
court properly applied it.  “A ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under
section 473 shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.”
(Pietak, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.)  “ ‘[T]hose affidavits favoring the
contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but
also all facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom, and where there is a
substantial conflict in the facts stated, a determination of the controverted facts by
the trial court will not be disturbed.’ ”  (Lynch v. Spilman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 251,
259, quoting Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women (1955) 45 Cal.2d 501,
508.)  As explained below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by granting Zamora relief.
“A party who seeks relief under section 473 on the basis of mistake or
inadvertence of counsel must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or
general neglect was excusable because the negligence of the attorney is imputed to
his client and may not be offered by the latter as a basis for relief.”  (Generale
Bank Nederland v. Eyes of the Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1399.)
11
In determining whether the attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, “the
court inquires whether ‘a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances’ might have made the same error.’ ”  (Bettencourt v. Los Rios
Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276, italics added.)  In other
words, the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from
attorney error “fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have
made.”  (Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.)  “Conduct falling below the
professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly
advance an argument, is not therefore excusable.  To hold otherwise would be to
eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively
eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.”  (Ibid.)
The party seeking relief under section 473 must also be diligent.  (See
Benjamin, supra, 31 Cal.2d at pp. 527-528.)  Thus, an application for relief must
be made “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the
judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”  (§ 473, subd. (b).)
Where the mistake is excusable and the party seeking relief has been
diligent, courts have often granted relief pursuant to the discretionary relief
provision of section 473 if no prejudice to the opposing party will ensue.  (See,
e.g., Robinson, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at pp. 671-673; Fickeisen v. Peebler (1946)
77 Cal.App.2d 148, 151-152.)  In such cases, the law “looks with [particular]
disfavor on a party who, regardless of the merits of his cause, attempts to take
advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.”
(Reed v. Williamson (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 244, 248.)
Here, the trial court reasonably concluded that the mistake made by
Zamora’s counsel was excusable.  The erroneous substitution of the word
12
“against” for the phrase “in favor of” is a clerical or ministerial mistake that could
have been made by anybody.  While counsel’s failure to review the document
before sending it out was imprudent, we cannot say that his imprudence rendered
the mistake inexcusable under the circumstances.  Indeed, appellate courts have
routinely affirmed orders vacating judgments based on analogous mistakes made
by an attorney or his or her staff.  For example, courts have set aside judgments
where:  (1) The attorney mistakenly checked the “with prejudice” box instead of
the “without prejudice” box (see Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231,
1237 (Romadka)); (2) an associate misinterpreted the instructions of the lead
attorney and gave incorrect information at a hearing (see Bergloff v. Reynolds
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 349, 358-359); and (3) the attorney’s secretary lost the
answer to be filed (see Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273, 275-276).
In addition, Zamora was diligent in seeking relief, and Clayborn suffered
no apparent prejudice.  Finally, the record suggests that Clayborn took unfair
advantage of the mistake.  We find it hard to believe that Clayborn had no inkling
that the section 998 offer was a mistake when the uncontroverted record
established that:  (1) Zamora’s complaint sought over $140,000 in damages; (2)
Zamora had never offered to settle for less than $150,000 from Clayborn prior to
making the offer; (3) the section 998 offer proposed to settle the matter for almost
the same amount ($149,999) as Clayborn’s entire claim for damages
(approximately $157,000); and (4) Clayborn knew Zamora was having financial
difficulties and had failed to pay approximately $31,000 in tax levies.  Clayborn’s
rush to get approval of the settlement and its abrupt cancellation of depositions
and hearings on pending motions with no notice to the parties involved cast further
13
doubt on its claim of innocence.  Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by granting relief to Zamora pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b).
Contrary to the assertions of Clayborn, both Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas
Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658 (Pazderka) and Premium Commercial
Services Corp. v. National Bank of California (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1493 are
factually distinguishable.  In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services,
the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside
a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for
attorney fees and costs was “not the type of mistake ‘ordinarily made by a person
with no special training or skill.’ ”  (Pazderka, at p. 671; see also Premium
Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497.)  By contrast, the inadvertent clerical
error alleged here is such a mistake.5
The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid settlement
agreement absent “fraud or undue influence” does not compel a different result.
(Pazderka, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 672.)  Pazderka merely recognized the
longstanding rule that “a judgment or order may be set aside on the ground of
[extrinsic] fraud, [extrinsic] mistake or lack of jurisdiction, independent of the
remedy found in section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, when the application is
seasonably made and the fraud or misrepresentation is alleged and proved.”  (In re
Estate of Sankey (1926) 199 Cal. 391, 407.)  Indeed, the remedy afforded under
section 473 “is merely concurrent with the remedy afforded by equity under
proper circumstances.”  (Winn v. Torr (1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 623, 627.)  Thus,
                                                
5 
In recognizing this distinction, we express no opinion as to whether
Pazderka or Premium Commercial Services was correctly decided.
14
neither Pazderka nor contract law limits section 473 relief from judgments entered
pursuant to a section 998 settlement to cases involving fraud or undue influence.
Finally, in reaching this holding, we do not offend the public policies
favoring the private resolution of civil disputes.  Although the law favors
settlements (Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668,
677), it only favors authorized settlements.  “An attorney does not, without
specific authorization, possess the power or authority to bind his client to a
compromise settlement of pending litigation.”  (Bice, supra, 160 Cal.App.2d at pp.
231-232, italics added.)  Where, as here, an attorney makes a clerical mistake that
results in a settlement on terms clearly not authorized by his client, the public
policy favoring settlements has no force.  (See Romadka, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1237.)  Rather, the client, in the interests of justice, should be “given an
opportunity to have” his “respective rights . . . tried and adjudicated.”  (Kelsey Co.,
supra, 37 Cal.App. at p. 33; see also Palace Hardware, supra, 134 Cal. at p. 384;
Bice, at pp. 233-234.)
Our holding also does not circumvent longstanding principles of contract
law.  Even if, as Clayborn contends, Zamora was limited to the contractual defense
of unilateral mistake, ample evidence supports the trial court’s decision.  As noted
above (see ante, at p. 12), the undisputed facts strongly suggest that Clayborn “had
reason to suspect that a mistake had been made” (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001)
26 Cal.4th 261, 280).  Moreover, even assuming Clayborn had no knowledge of
Zamora’s mistake, enforcement of the section 998 settlement would still arguably
be unconscionable.  (See Donovan, at p. 281 [rescission for unilateral mistake may
be appropriate “where ‘the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable’ ”].)  Thus, requiring Zamora to file a separate
15
action in order to rescind his section 998 offer would not promote the sanctity of
contract law.  It would only waste judicial resources.
In any event, we are confident trial courts will exercise this discretionary
power to vacate judgments entered pursuant to a settlement agreement both
carefully and sparingly.  We suspect most, if not all, courts will see through claims
of buyer’s remorse or breach of contract.  (See, e.g., Basinger, supra, 220
Cal.App.3d at p. 23 [holding that the alleged breach of a settlement agreement was
not grounds for relief under section 473].)  Indeed, courts have been exercising
this power for over a century with no apparent ill effects.  (See ante, at pp. 6-8.)
Most cases still settle, and courts rarely set aside settlement agreements.  Our
holding today should not change that.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
16
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 90 Cal.App.4th 1088
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S100352
Date Filed: June 17, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Fresno
Judge: Stephen Joseph Kane
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Weintraub Genshlea Chediak Sproul, Charles L. Post, Thomas G. Trost and Thadd A. Blizzard for
Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Glen E. Gates for Plaintiff and Respondent.
17
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Charles L. Post
Weintraub Genshlea Chediak Sproul
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor
Sacramento, CA  95814
(916) 558-6000
Thadd A. Blizzard
Weintraub Genshlea Chediak Sproul
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor
Sacramento, CA  95814
(916) 558-6000
Glen E. Gates
575 East Alluvial, Suite 105
Fresno, CA  93720
(559) 432-0283