Title: State v. Long

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Long, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5363.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5363 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LONG, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Long, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5363.] 
Criminal law—Speedy trial—Date on which an appellate court orders a case 
remanded is the appropriate date to start the clock to determine the relevant 
length of the delay for speedy-trial purposes—A motion to dismiss that 
alleges a violation of the right to a speedy trial does not reset the speedy-
trial clock—The four factors to be considered in determining whether there 
has been a denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial are 
(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s 
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the 
defendant. 
(No. 2019-0181—Submitted February 12, 2020—Decided November 24, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County, 
No. 2017-CA-84, 2018-Ohio-5163. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we determine whether a delay in proceedings that 
occurred after the Second District Court of Appeals reversed appellant John W. 
Long’s convictions and remanded the matter violated his speedy-trial rights under 
the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  For the following reasons, we conclude 
that it did.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, which upheld 
Long’s convictions in a second appeal, and vacate the convictions. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In 2015, following a guilty plea, the trial court convicted Long of two 
counts of aggravated robbery and one count of failure to comply with an order or 
signal of a police officer and sentenced him to serve an aggregate sentence of 11 
years in prison.  On March 7, 2016, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed 
Long’s convictions and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings because 
the trial court had not fully advised Long of his constitutional rights during his plea 
hearing.  State v. Long, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-64, 2016-Ohio-837.  The facts 
relevant to this appeal begin when the court of appeals remanded the case. 
{¶ 3} Long remained in the London Correctional Institution until June 21, 
2016, when he was transferred to the Clark County jail in anticipation of a hearing 
on remand.  At a hearing on June 22, 2016, the state told the trial court that it was 
willing to extend the same plea offer to which Long had originally pleaded guilty, 
with an agreed sentence of 11 years as had been originally imposed.  Long’s counsel 
asked the court to set the matter for trial.  The court said it would order the case to 
be scheduled for a final pretrial and ordered Long to remain in the Clark County 
jail “pending the new trial date.” 
{¶ 4} At a pretrial conference held on September 1, the state reiterated that 
it was prepared to extend the same plea offer and the court set a trial date of 
September 28.  On September 21, Long moved to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, 
arguing that the passage of 198 days from the date on which the Second District 
January Term, 2020 
 
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remanded the case violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  The next day, 
September 22, the trial court held a pretrial conference and set a date for the state 
to respond to Long’s motion to dismiss.  The court also stated it would use the 
September 28 trial date to hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss and that it would 
be the last date for Long to accept the offered plea agreement. 
{¶ 5} On September 28, the trial court held a hearing on Long’s motion to 
dismiss.  At the hearing, Long’s counsel submitted a notice that Long was pleading 
not guilty and demanding his right to a speedy trial and trial by jury.  The court 
heard brief statements from counsel for the parties, stated that it had not yet 
reviewed the state’s opposition to Long’s motion to dismiss, and allowed the parties 
an additional 48 hours “to file whatever filing they want to file” with regard to the 
motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 6} On October 24, 2016, the court held a brief hearing.  The court noted 
that the parties were waiting for a decision on Long’s pending motion to dismiss 
and asked the bailiff why the case was put back on the hearing docket.  The bailiff 
stated that he believed the state had requested the hearing, but counsel for the state 
was not present to respond.  The court then adjourned the hearing.  By entry dated 
October 26, the court denied Long’s motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 7} The next activity on the court’s docket occurred over nine months 
later, on August 7, 2017, when Long moved a second time to dismiss the indictment 
on speedy-trial grounds.  This time, Long pointed to the 518-day delay since the 
date on which the Second District remanded the case.  The trial court denied the 
motion by an entry dated August 16. 
{¶ 8} In an entry dated August 21, the trial court noted that the case had 
been scheduled for trial on August 16 but that the trial had been continued due to 
the court’s scheduling conflict with another jury trial.  However, the August 16 trial 
date does not appear on the docket. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 9} On August 22, Long moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s 
denial of his second motion to dismiss.  The trial court denied that motion on 
September 7. 
{¶ 10} On September 21, the court held a hearing at which Long pleaded no 
contest to the charges of having a weapon under disability and failing to comply 
with an order or signal of a police officer; the other charges were dropped.  The 
plea agreement included a suggested sentence of a total of 60 months in prison.  
The trial court imposed the agreed sentence and allowed jail-time credit from 
February 28, 2015. 
{¶ 11} On appeal, the Second District affirmed, concluding that Long’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated during the trial court’s remand 
proceedings. 
{¶ 12} We accepted Long’s discretionary appeal on the following 
proposition of law:   
 
A motion to dismiss alleging a violation of the right to a 
speedy trial does not reset speedy trial time.  When convictions are 
overturned on an appeal, courts must consider all applicable speedy 
trial time, beginning on the date that the charges are remanded. 
 
See 155 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2019-Ohio-1707, 122 N.E.3d 206. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} The speedy-trial protections of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution apply when a 
conviction is vacated and the case remanded for retrial.  State v. Hull, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 20.  The time within which a 
defendant must be brought to trial is “ ‘a reasonable period consistent with 
January Term, 2020 
 
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constitutional standards.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 
92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 
{¶ 14} To determine whether there has been a denial of a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court considers four factors identified in 
Barker: “(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s 
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.”  Hull 
at ¶ 22, citing Barker at 530.  No single factor controls the analysis, but the length 
of the delay is important. “Until there is some delay which is presumptively 
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the 
balance.”  Barker at 530.  Generally, a delay that approaches one year is 
presumptively prejudicial.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 
120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), fn. 1. 
{¶ 15} Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and 
fact.  Therefore, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported 
by competent, credible evidence, but we review the application of the law to those 
facts de novo.  See State v. Barnes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90847, 2008-Ohio-
5472, ¶ 17. 
Effect of motion to dismiss 
{¶ 16} Both parties agree that the date on which the Second District ordered 
the case remanded—March 7, 2016—was the appropriate time to start the clock to 
determine the relevant length of the delay here for speedy-trial purposes.  We agree.  
The court of appeals’ basis for choosing a different date—the date on which the 
trial court overruled Long’s first motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds—
despite the state’s concession that the date of the remand order was the proper 
starting point, is unclear.  But we see no reason to search for a justification.  Using 
the motion to dismiss to “reset” the start of the speedy-trial clock back to zero 
unfairly penalizes a defendant for invoking the speedy-trial right.  Such a rule could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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even create the absurd result that a delay would never reach the presumptively 
prejudicial one-year period. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals’ incorrect determination regarding when the 
clock started led that court to conclude that the delay was approximately 11 months 
and, therefore, not presumptively prejudicial.  Because we conclude that the proper 
starting point is the date of remand, we find that more than a year passed before 
Long entered his plea.  Specifically, we agree with the dissenting opinion in the 
court of appeals that more than 483 days had elapsed between the date of remand 
and the date on which Long filed his second motion to dismiss, even excluding the 
time during which Long’s first motion to dismiss was pending.  Accordingly, we 
presume that the delay was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant consideration of the 
Barker factors to determine whether there was an unreasonable violation of Long’s 
speedy-trial rights. 
Calculate speedy-trial time from remand 
{¶ 18} Long points out that the only Barker factor that the court of appeals 
did not weigh in Long’s favor was the first factor—the length of the delay.  He 
argues that this conclusion was based on the court of appeals’ incorrect finding that 
the relevant delay was less than one year and not “presumptively prejudicial.”  Long 
therefore argues that all four Barker factors weigh in his favor and that this court 
should vacate his conviction.1 
{¶ 19} As discussed above, we agree with Long that the relevant length of 
delay in his trial was in excess of one year after the matter was remanded.  Thus, 
we find the delay is presumptively prejudicial.  See State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 
429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 90, citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 
                                                          
 
1.  We recognize that the proposition of law accepted here relates only to the effect of the motion to 
dismiss on the proper speedy-trial calculation.  And, as noted above, the state has conceded that the 
speedy-trial clock started when the case was remanded.  But because our review is de novo, we 
independently review the application of all the Barker factors to the facts here. 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, fn. 1 (“delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it 
approaches one year”).  We conclude that this factor weighs in Long’s favor. 
{¶ 20} The court of appeals’ incorrect finding about the relevant delay also 
affected its conclusion regarding the second Barker factor—the reason for the 
delay.  The court of appeals found that even though the delay after remand was due 
to the inattention of the trial court and the state, the second factor weighed “only 
marginally” in Long’s favor because the delay was “only bordering” on being 
presumptively prejudicial.  2018-Ohio-5163, ¶ 20.  As discussed above, the relevant 
delay was well over one year.  When the length of the delay is coupled with the 
trial court’s and the state’s inattention to Long’s case on remand, we conclude that 
the second Barker factor decidedly tips in Long’s favor. 
{¶ 21} We further conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the third Barker 
factor—the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial—also weighs in 
Long’s favor.  Indeed, the consideration of this factor demonstrates why the court 
of appeals’ decision to start the speedy-trial clock from zero after the court denied 
Long’s first motion to dismiss is inappropriate.  It hardly makes sense to task a 
defendant with the responsibility to assert his speedy-trial right in order to preserve 
a constitutional challenge if the assertion of that right restarts the speedy-trial clock 
at zero.  Here, Long’s two motions to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds demonstrate 
that he did assert his right to a speedy trial; therefore, this factor weighs in Long’s 
favor. 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals concluded that the fourth factor—prejudice—
marginally weighed in Long’s favor.  The prejudice factor in the analysis “should 
be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right 
was designed to protect.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  
The three interests are “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the defense will be impaired.”  Id.  The third interest warrants special emphasis 
because prejudice in that context “skews the fairness of the entire system.”  Id. 
{¶ 23} Here, the court of appeals noted that “Long has suffered anxiety and 
pretrial incarceration as a result of the delay in the instant case.”  2018-Ohio-5163 
at ¶ 22.  It also noted that Long “did not claim any particularized trial prejudice in 
his motions to dismiss, and the record does not suggest that he has suffered 
prejudice of that kind.”  Id. 
{¶ 24} The state argues that the prejudice factor weighs in the state’s favor 
because “there was no trial [and] the delay did not affect witnesses, evidence, or 
testimony.”  The state also asserts that Long’s “interest in oppressive pretrial 
confinement is limited” because Long agreed in his plea agreement to serve a prison 
sentence.  The state contends that Long made no showing of anxiety, and it further 
asserts that Long initially “expressed a willingness to serve at least 3 years in prison, 
and as a part of his no contest plea, he was willing to spend 5 years.” 
{¶ 25} It is true that Long has not asserted a particularized prejudice relating 
to the impairment of his defense.  But, contrary to the state’s assertion, the prejudice 
factor is not lacking simply because Long was allegedly willing to serve a prison 
term greater than the time he was confined after the remand and before his plea.  
The relevant prejudice inquiry looks at the conditions and circumstances of the 
delay before trial.  If we looked only at the outcome—that is, the length of the 
ultimate prison sentence imposed or the nature of the plea agreement ultimately 
reached—the speedy-trial right would be no more than a harmless-error inquiry. 
{¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that unreasonable 
pretrial delay produces more than one sort of harm.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 
S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520.  For that reason, the pretrial delay, including 
“ ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ ” and “ ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ ” 
are relevant factors to the prejudice inquiry.  Id., quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 
January Term, 2020 
 
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92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  And, in Barker, the court described the serious 
disadvantages to an accused in pretrial incarceration: 
 
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the 
individual.  It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and 
it enforces idleness.  Most jails offer little or no recreational or 
rehabilitative programs.  The time spent in jail is simply dead time. 
 
Barker at 532-533.  Additionally, the court recognized in Doggett that negligence 
in bringing an accused to trial does not compel relief in every case, but “neither is 
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate 
exactly how it has prejudiced him.”  Doggett at 656-657. 
{¶ 27} Here, the court of appeals found that the “reason for the delay 
appears to be the inattention of the trial court and the State.”  2018-Ohio-5163 at  
¶ 19.  Indeed, there is no dispute that after Long’s first attempt to assert his speedy-
trial right, the court and prosecution did nothing to advance the case for more than 
nine months despite the state’s willingness to offer the same plea agreement it had 
offered before he was first convicted.  We agree with the court of appeals’ 
conclusion that Long’s pretrial incarceration for a presumptively prejudicial period 
coupled with the anxiety of pending charges on remand tip the balance of prejudice 
toward Long.  Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the fourth Barker 
factor of prejudice weighs in Long’s favor. 
{¶ 28} Because all four Barker factors weigh in Long’s favor, we conclude 
that Long’s right to a speedy trial was violated after his case was remanded to the 
trial court for retrial.  Accordingly, Long’s conviction must be vacated. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Second District’s 
judgment and vacate Long’s conviction.  Given that Long was released from prison 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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on May 23, 2019, and thereafter served a six-month period of postrelease control 
that terminated in November 2019, there is no need to remand this matter. 
Judgment reversed 
and conviction vacated. 
FRENCH, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the court’s judgment to the extent that it reverses 
the judgment of the court of appeals, because the speedy-trial clock begins to run 
on the date the court of appeals overturns a conviction and remands the case to the 
trial court, but dissents from this court’s judgment to the extent that it vacates 
appellant John W. Long’s conviction and would remand the cause to the court of 
appeals to evaluate his speedy-trial claim in light of this court’s decision clarifying 
the law. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 30} I agree with the portion of the court’s analysis that concludes that a 
motion to dismiss that alleges a violation of the right to a speedy trial does not reset 
the speedy-trial clock and that when a conviction is overturned on an appeal, the 
speedy-trial clock begins to run on the date on which the court of appeals orders 
the case remanded.  And I concur in the portion of the court’s judgment reversing 
the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 31} I respectfully disagree, however, with the portion of the court’s 
opinion that weighs the factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 467 U.S. 514, 530, 92 
S.Ct 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).  And I dissent from the portion of the court’s 
judgment that vacates appellant John W. Long’s convictions.  I do not find any 
particular fault with the substance of the court’s analysis on this issue; however, 
because the court of appeals did not have the opportunity to consider this case in 
January Term, 2020 
 
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light of this court’s clarification of the law, I would remand the cause to the Second 
District so that it may weigh the Barker factors in the first instance, applying the 
law as set forth by this court.  On these bases, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Second District and remand the cause to that court to resolve the remaining issues 
in this appeal. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 32} The majority concludes that the delay that occurred in this case 
violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.  It 
justifies this result by referring to the factors outlined by the United States Supreme 
Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).  
But the majority fails to properly apply the factors, substituting broad conclusory 
statements and cursory reasoning for the careful balancing required under Barker.  
When the factors are properly applied, it is clear that there is no constitutional 
violation.  I therefore dissent. 
I.  The history of this case 
{¶ 33} The majority skips past the facts of the underlying charges.  But 
because “the peculiar circumstances of the case” are relevant to the speedy-trial 
analysis, id. at 530-531, I will not. 
{¶ 34} John Long was accused of approaching a line of cars in the drive-
through lane of a Clark gas-station convenience store in Springfield, Ohio.  Going 
down the line from one car to the next, Long walked up to the window of each car, 
stuck out a gun, and demanded money from the people inside.  Seeing what Long 
was doing, the drivers tried to back out—but they were blocked in by other cars 
and were unable to escape. 
{¶ 35} Long fled the scene in a car when police arrived.  After being 
pursued for several blocks, Long jumped out of the car and attempted to get away 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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on foot, but police caught up and apprehended him.  Police believed that Long had 
thrown a gun out of the car during the chase. When they retraced their route, they 
found a PK .22-caliber semi-automatic handgun on the side of the road. 
{¶ 36} Based on those events, Long was indicted on ten charges:  
  five counts of aggravated robbery, each with an attendant firearm specification;  
  one count of kidnapping;  
  one count of failing to comply with a signal of a police officer; 
  two weapons charges—having a weapon while under a disability and improper 
handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle; and 
  one count of tampering with evidence. 
{¶ 37} Long worked out a deal with the state in which he pleaded guilty to 
two of the aggravated-robbery counts and the failure-to-comply charge.  The trial 
court convicted him and sentenced him to 11 years in prison.  Long appealed, and 
on March 7, 2016, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed his convictions 
because of deficiencies in the plea colloquy and remanded the matter to the trial 
court.  2016-Ohio-837. 
{¶ 38} Our review of Long’s speedy-trial claim begins with the remand 
order.  The trial court did not order that Long be transferred from prison to the 
county jail for further proceedings until June 6, three months after the court of 
appeals had entered its judgment.  Long’s first court date following remand took 
place on June 22, at which time the state offered Long the same plea deal he had 
previously accepted.  Long’s attorney said he needed to discuss the options with his 
client and consider “whether or not any pretrial motions should be filed.”  Defense 
counsel asked the court to set the case for trial but did not object when the judge 
scheduled the matter for a final pretrial instead.  The judge told counsel that the 
pretrial would be used “for a hearing on any motions that would get filed.” 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
{¶ 39} Counsel filed no motions during that interim.  When the parties 
returned for the pretrial on September 1, the judge verified that discovery was 
complete and that there were no other matters for the court to resolve before trial.  
This time, the court directly asked defense counsel if he planned to file any pretrial 
motions, and counsel said no.  Satisfied that the parties were ready for trial, the 
court scheduled a jury trial for September 28—a little over six months after the case 
was remanded to the trial court.  The court directed the parties to report for a pretrial 
the week before the trial date. 
{¶ 40} The day before the pretrial—exactly one week before trial was set to 
begin—Long’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.  As a 
result of the last-minute filing, the court postponed the jury trial and used the 
September 28 trial date to hold a hearing on the motion instead.  The trial court 
issued its decision denying the motion a month later, on October 26. 
{¶ 41} What happened to the case after that is unclear.  The next item 
reflected on the docket is the filing of Long’s second motion to dismiss nine months 
later, on August 7, 2017.  The trial court subsequently put on an entry saying that 
Long’s case had been scheduled for a jury trial on August 16 but needed to be 
rescheduled because another jury trial was ongoing.  The August 16 trial date does 
not appear on the docket.  (Indeed, after the remand, none of the hearing dates in 
this case appear on the docket.) 
{¶ 42} The court ultimately denied Long’s second motion to dismiss, and 
Long entered no-contest pleas to the weapons-under-disability and failure-to-
comply charges, both felonies of the third degree.  The state and Long agreed to a 
sentence of five years in prison, which the trial court imposed.  In all, a period of 
17 months passed between the dates that the court of appeals remanded the case to 
the trial court and that Long filed his second motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 43} Long filed a second appeal, contending that the charges against him 
should have been dismissed because the state had violated his constitutional right 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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to a speedy trial under the state and federal Constitutions.  The Second District 
determined that there had been no speedy-trial violation and upheld Long’s 
convictions.  2018-Ohio-5163.  We accepted Long’s petition for discretionary 
review. 
II.  The right to a “speedy public trial” under the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 44} Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides: “In any trial, 
in any court, the party accused shall be allowed * * * a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury * * *.”  Long bases his speedy-trial claim in part on this clause but 
offers no analysis of the state constitutional protection beyond a single citation to 
it in his merit brief.  Instead, both Long and the majority presume that the standards 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court for reviewing speedy-trial claims 
under the Sixth Amendment apply equally to the Ohio provision. 
{¶ 45} The same assumption is reflected in this court’s precedent, which 
has routinely lumped the two constitutional provisions together and resolved both 
using federal standards, without any consideration of the text or history of the state 
provision.  See, e.g., State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 
N.E.3d 127, ¶ 87-88; State v. Hull, 110 Ohio St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 
N.E.2d 706; State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, 
¶ 38.  When addressing an Ohio constitutional provision that parallels its federal 
counterpart, it’s worth noting that “even if the provisions were initially understood 
to provide functionally the same protections, we are not bound to mirror subsequent 
United States Supreme Court decisions delineating the scope of the protection.”  
State v. Smith, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4441, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 28.  
Nevertheless, the parties have not advocated for a different mode of reviewing 
claims under Ohio’s speedy-public-trial provision, so I will apply the standards 
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court for analyzing federal 
constitutional speedy-trial violations. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
III.  Long’s federal constitutional speedy-trial right was not violated 
{¶ 46} When evaluating a claim that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial has been violated, we have been instructed to weigh four factors 
commonly referred to as the “Barker factors.”  The relevant considerations are 
whether there was an “uncommonly long” delay before trial, whether the 
government or the defendant is “more to blame” for that delay, whether the 
defendant timely asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered 
prejudice from the delay.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 
2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 
L.Ed.2d 101. 
{¶ 47} As everyone agrees, the court of appeals did not calculate Long’s 
speedy-trial time properly.  The court should have considered the full 17-month 
period from the time the case was remanded from the court of appeals until Long 
filed his second motion to dismiss in reviewing the trial court’s decision to deny 
that motion. 
{¶ 48} This miscalculation affected the court of appeals’ analysis with 
respect to each of the Barker factors, and they should all be freshly reviewed.  I 
would have no problem remanding the case for the court of appeals to evaluate 
Long’s claim and weigh the factors in view of the events of the entire 17 months.  
But a majority of this court has chosen to conduct that review here, and unlike the 
justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, I do find fault with the majority’s 
analysis.  The majority says that it is performing a de novo review of the speedy-
trial claim, but its analysis is cursory and unduly deferential to the court of appeals’ 
conclusions.  Further, it fails to follow applicable federal precedent in its 
application of the Barker factors. 
{¶ 49} I will address each of the Barker factors in turn. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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A.  The length of the delay 
{¶ 50} The United States Supreme Court has told us that the length of the 
delay is in part a “triggering mechanism”; in other words, the length of the delay 
must be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant further review of the speedy-trial claim.  
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  There is no hard line for 
when this threshold has been satisfied; it depends on the circumstances of the case.  
Id. at 530-531.  The Supreme Court has suggested that delays nearing one year are 
often sufficient to trigger a full inquiry.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 
120 L.Ed.2d 520, fn. 1 (“Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts 
have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it 
approaches one year” [emphasis added]).  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
“the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than 
for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”  Barker at 531. 
{¶ 51} If the length of time “has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary 
from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay,” Doggett at 652, quoting Barker at 530, 
then the court must engage in a second inquiry regarding the length of the delay.  
The court should consider, “as one factor among several, the extent to which the 
delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of 
the claim.”  Id. 
{¶ 52} The length of the delay in this case is 17 months.  As detailed above, 
Long was facing a multitude of serious charges involving multiple victims and 
witnesses; therefore, more time is tolerable than in cases involving simpler, lower-
level crimes.  But it is also true that no additional discovery took place after remand 
and the parties indicated early on that they were prepared to proceed to trial.  Thus, 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that in this case, a 17-month delay is 
sufficient to warrant further investigation into Long’s speedy-trial claim. 
{¶ 53} But the majority skips over the second part of the length-of-the-delay 
analysis.  In this case, the delay extended just five months beyond the roughly one-
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
year threshold for review.  Thus, while this factor weighs in Long’s favor, it does 
so only minimally.  See State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 
N.E.2d 186, ¶ 66 (finding a delay of 17 months to be “barely” sufficient to trigger 
review in a capital-murder case). 
B.  The reasons for the delay 
{¶ 54} Let’s turn to the majority’s analysis of the second factor: the reason 
for the delay.  The majority begins by noting that “the court of appeals found that 
* * * the delay after remand was due to the inattention of the trial court and the 
state.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 20.  Because the court of appeals believed the total 
delay lasted less than 12 months, it concluded that the state’s negligence weighed 
only marginally in Long’s favor.  2018-Ohio-5163 at ¶ 20.  Rather than review the 
court of appeals’ conclusion, the majority just starts where the court of appeals left 
off.  It notes that the delay lasted 17 months and then declares: “When the length 
of the delay is coupled with the trial court’s and the state’s inattention to Long’s 
case on remand, we conclude that the second Barker factor decidedly tips in Long’s 
favor.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 55} The majority provides zero analysis of the reasons for the delay.  It 
simply defers to the court of appeals’ conclusions regarding the reasons and the 
weight to be given those reasons and then turns the dial more in Long’s favor 
because the length of time the court of appeals relied upon was incorrect. 
{¶ 56} When evaluating the reasons for the delay, we have been instructed 
that “different weights should be assigned to different reasons.”  Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  Reasons for the delay are characterized as 
deliberate, neutral, or valid.  Id. at 531; see also United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 
243, 260 (2d Cir.2019); United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir.2009).  
Deliberate attempts to hamper the defense weigh heavily against the government.  
Barker at 531.  Delays occasioned by official negligence or overcrowded courts are 
“more neutral” and therefore weigh less heavily, though they ultimately count 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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against the government.  Id.  A valid reason will “justify appropriate delay.”  Id.  In 
addition, “a court should consider whether some of the delay is attributable to the 
defendant.”  United States v. Brown, 498 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir.2007). 
{¶ 57} There is no suggestion that the government deliberately delayed in 
bringing Long to trial.  Much of the 17-month period between remand and Long’s 
second motion to dismiss is attributable to government negligence; according to the 
state, that negligence was initially due to the court’s case flow and subsequently 
due to inattention.  These reasons fall into the “neutral” category, though on balance 
they weigh against the government. 
{¶ 58} Still, not all of the delay is attributable to the state.  Long’s attorney 
indicated in June, at the first appearance following remand, that he was considering 
filing pretrial motions; as a result, the trial court explicitly stated it would address 
any defense motions at the September 1 pretrial.  Rather than file any motions 
during that time, Long waited two and a half months—until the trial was only a 
week away—to file his motion to dismiss.  When evaluating the reasons for the 
delay, this court should not be blind to the fact that Long’s motion was timed in a 
way that forced his trial to be delayed.  Long is fully entitled to assert his speedy-
trial right, but his assertion of the right provides a valid justification for the court’s 
decision to delay the first trial. 
{¶ 59} Of course, while Long’s first motion precipitated the delay following 
the first trial date, it does not excuse the court’s subsequent inaction on the case.  
Thus, I would find that a greater portion of the delay is attributable to the state.  But 
because the reasons for the state’s delay are neutral, because Long’s attorney did 
not object to the trial court’s scheduling of the case in the time leading up to the 
first trial, and because some delay is justified as a result of Long’s late motion, this 
factor weighs only marginally in Long’s favor. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
C.  Long’s assertion of his speedy-trial right 
{¶ 60} The third Barker factor involves the defendant’s assertion of his 
speedy-trial right.  The majority decides this factor in a single sentence—telling us 
that because Long filed two motions to dismiss in which he contended that he had 
been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, this factor weighs in his favor.  
But a defendant’s having filed a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds is not 
dispositive.  This factor is not just a box to be checked to make sure the defendant 
raised the issue in the trial court (indeed, if he hadn’t, this would be an easy case). 
{¶ 61} The question is not only whether the defendant asserted his right but 
also when and how he did so.  The right must be timely asserted.  United States v. 
Patterson, 872 F.3d 426, 435 (7th Cir.2017), citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 
S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (the defendant must assert the right “in due course”); 
Hall, 551 F.3d at 272.  As the Barker court explained, the court should “weigh the 
frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to 
a purely pro forma objection.”  407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  An 
important consideration is whether a defendant’s assertions put the state and the 
trial court on notice that he wanted a speedy trial.  Black, 918 F.3d at 263.  The 
majority offers no analysis on any of these points. 
{¶ 62} At the hearing on the first motion to dismiss, counsel presented a 
written speedy-trial demand that Long had purportedly made in March 2015, soon 
after his indictment, prior to his initial conviction and appeal.  Long’s attorney 
contended that this demand—which he said had been given to the prosecutor at the 
time—was sufficient to notify the state that Long intended to assert his speedy-trial 
rights after the case was remanded to the trial court.  But Long’s attorney conceded 
that the March 2015 demand had never been filed or made a part of the record nor 
had Long filed a renewed demand after the remand. 
{¶ 63} Moreover, as discussed above, the actions of Long’s attorney during 
this period do not demonstrate an assertion of the right.  Defense counsel made no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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objection to the court’s scheduling of the case.  And while counsel did initially 
request that the case be set for trial, he also told the court he might file pretrial 
motions and acquiesced to the court’s decision to set a pretrial date to rule on those 
anticipated motions.  Counsel said nothing even remotely suggesting that his client 
demanded a speedy trial in the first six months after the case had been remanded. 
{¶ 64} Of course, when Long did file his first motion to dismiss six months 
after remand, it might have put the prosecution and the court on notice that he 
intended to assert that right going forward.  But the timing of his motion—a week 
before his jury trial was scheduled to begin—leaves the impression that it was filed 
less out of serious concern about the speed at which his case was progressing and 
more as a last-ditch attempt to avoid going to trial. 
{¶ 65} Long’s assertion of his right in his first motion to dismiss also might 
have had greater force had he followed it up with objections to the delay that came 
after.  Nine months passed after the trial court’s denial of Long’s first motion to 
dismiss, during which, according to the docket, the court took no action on the case.  
True, the obligation ultimately falls to the government to bring a defendant to trial 
in a constitutionally compliant manner, but that does not negate the defendant’s 
concomitant obligation to assert his right.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 
33 L.Ed.2d 101.  It is notable that Long did nothing on the case during this time—
at no time did his attorney file a renewed demand for a speedy trial or ask to have 
the case put on the docket to address the delay on the record.  And despite the fact 
that none of the scheduled hearings in this case appear on the docket, the trial court 
indicated that Long’s case had been scheduled for trial on August 16.  In that event, 
Long’s tactics leading up to his second trial date were identical to those leading up 
to his first: he waited until a week before trial to file his second motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 66} Thus, the only two times Long can be said to have asserted his 
speedy-trial right following remand both occurred a week before he was scheduled 
to have the trial he ostensibly wanted.  And in both of these instances, his assertions 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
of the right came after the delays he complained of—delays that he had not objected 
to—had already occurred.  The timing of Long’s motions just before trial and his 
general acquiescence to the delays otherwise does not convey an earnest desire to 
have his case move quickly.  This factor does not weigh in support of finding a 
speedy-trial violation.  See Patterson, 872 F.3d at 435-436 (defendant’s motions to 
dismiss amounted to “belated assertions” of his speedy-trial right). 
D.  Prejudice from the delay 
{¶ 67} The majority spends the most time analyzing the fourth Barker 
factor—prejudice.  As the majority notes, when evaluating prejudice from pretrial 
delay, we have been told to consider the extent to which the accused has suffered 
three types of harms: “oppressive pretrial incarceration,” “anxiety and concern,” 
and impairment to his defense.  Barker at 532.  The impact of the delay on the 
ability of the defendant to prepare his defense is the most important of the three.  
United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.2018), citing Barker at 532. 
{¶ 68} Long has not alleged any actual prejudice, nor could he—by every 
indication, the delay in this case worked to his advantage.  He initially pleaded 
guilty to three counts, two of which were felonies of the first degree, and received 
an 11-year prison sentence.  But the state’s plea offer improved significantly with 
the passage of time: the state agreed to dismiss all the high-level felonies in 
exchange for his plea to two third-degree felonies and his agreement to a five-year 
sentence.  As the Barker court explained, the speedy-trial right is unusual in that 
deprivation of the right sometimes works to the advantage of the accused.  407 U.S. 
at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (“Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. 
As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses 
may become unavailable or their memories may fade”). 
{¶ 69} Thus, Long’s only viable argument is that notwithstanding the lack 
of particularized prejudice, the delay in this case was so excessive that prejudice 
should be presumed.  This is different from the question whether the length of the 
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22 
delay is “presumptively prejudicial” for the purposes of triggering the full-fledged 
Barker inquiry.  Maples v. Stegall, 427 F.3d 1020, 1030 (6th Cir.2005).  The 
prejudice analysis that occurs at the outset of the court’s review merely requires 
that the delay be sufficiently long to state a speedy-trial claim—usually as it 
approaches one year.  Id.  Conversely, presuming prejudice under the fourth Barker 
factor depends on whether the delay was excessive.  Id.; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. 
at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (“excessive delay presumptively 
compromises the reliability of trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that 
matter, identify”). 
{¶ 70} As explained above, some portions of the delay were justified by 
Long’s assent to the trial court’s scheduling of the case prior to the first trial and 
the last-minute nature of his first motion to dismiss.  Long cannot be prejudiced by 
delays to which he contributed.  Barker at 529 (“if delay is attributable to the 
defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine”).  
Rather, under the prejudice inquiry, we look at the portion of the delay that is 
attributable to the government. See Maples at 1031; Barker at 533-534. 
{¶ 71} When the delay results from government negligence, whether or not 
prejudice will be presumed depends on the length of the delay.  United States v. 
Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 564-565 (6th Cir.2000), citing Doggett at 657 (“our 
toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness”).  “[T]o 
warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice 
must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice.”  
Doggett at 657. 
{¶ 72} The delays fairly attributable to governmental inattention are the 
three-month period that passed between Long’s remand and his first court date and 
the nine-month delay that followed the trial court’s denial of his first motion to 
dismiss.  It is unusual for a case to be delayed for nine months without explanation, 
and Long’s incarceration during this time presents one of the concerns to which the 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
speedy-trial right is addressed.  See Barker at 532.  Nevertheless, a total delay of 
12 to 13 months is not excessive enough that prejudice should be presumed.  
Indeed, courts have typically declined to presume prejudice under even longer 
delays.  See Barker, 107 U.S. at 533-534, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (declining 
to presume prejudice for a delay of more than four years); Maples at 1031 (citing 
cases).  Therefore, this factor weighs against finding a speedy-trial violation. 
E.  Balancing the factors 
{¶ 73} The extent to which the total length of the delay—17 months—
extended beyond the threshold needed to trigger inquiry was not substantial and 
therefore weighs only minimally in Long’s favor.  And while the nine-month period 
in which the government neglected to take any action on Long’s case weighs in 
Long’s favor, it does so only marginally because Long caused and acquiesced in 
earlier delays in the case.  On the other hand, Long did not assert his speedy-trial 
right in a timely fashion and raised the issue only after the fact, in separate motions 
to dismiss filed one week before each of his scheduled trials.  Moreover, he suffered 
no actual prejudice from the delay and the delay was not so excessive as to presume 
prejudice.  On balance, these factors counsel against finding that Long’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 74} Under proper application of the Barker factors, Long has not 
suffered a deprivation of his constitutional speedy-trial rights.  I respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s decision to vacate his convictions. 
_________________ 
 
Daniel P. Driscoll, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and John M. Lintz, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Patrick T. Clark, Assistant 
State Public Defender, for appellant. 
_________________