Title: Centre v. J.T.W.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Centre Insurance Company, et al. v. J.T.W.
No. 52, September Term, 2006
J.T.W. v. Centre Insurance Company, et al.
No. 56, September Term, 2006
Headnote:  The term “service” as utilized in Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 2-
215 of the Insurance Article is defined by § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article.  As provided
by § 2-204(c), service of an order or notice may be accomplished by mailing.    
Circuit Court for Charle s County
Case #s 08-C-04-002356 & 08-C-05-002186 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 52
September Term, 2006
Centre Insurance Company, et al.
v.
J.T.W
No. 56
September Term, 2006
___________________________________
J.T.W.
v.
Centre Insurance Company, et al.
___________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   January 9, 2007
1 We have consolidated the two cases on appeal (No. 52 and No. 56) because each
case raises the same issue.  The pertinent question presented in a petition for certiorari in
case No. 52 was phrased as follows:
“Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the thirty-day
period in which a Petition for Judicial Review of an administrative decision
may be timely filed begins only upon actual receipt of the decision,
notwithstanding the fact that all that is required by the operative statute, § 2-
204(c) of the Insurance Article, is the mailing of the decision by regular first-
class mail?”
The question presented in the petition for certiorari in case No. 56 was phrased as follows:
“Was the Circuit Court correct when it held that the thirty-day period
in which a Petition for Judicial Review of a decision of the MIA may be
timely filed begins upon mailing of the order, given the fact that all that is
required by the operative statute, § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article, is the
mailing of the decision by regular first-class mail?”
2 Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.), §§ 2-201 through 2-215 of the Insurance
Article are the provisions of the code relevant to the case at bar.
3 No argument has been raised as to timeliness under the “General Provisions” of
Maryland Rule 1-203(c).  That rule, if applicable at all, would have no effect on Case No.
52.  Nowhere in the record have we found that J.T.W. brought the provisions of Rule 1-
203(c) to the attention of the trial judge.  Additionally, he did not raise it before this Court.
Accordingly, we do not address it in this case.  
4 On January 5, 2005 (Case No. 52) and December 12, 2005 (Case No. 56),
respectively, the Commissioner filed a Notice of Intention to Participate, and was joined as
an interested party to the proceedings.
5 The parties’ respective roles as petitioners and respondents are different in each
case.  In order to facilitate clarity and simplify our discussion, we shall generally refer in
(continued...)
This opinion addresses two cases before the Court which present a virtually identical
issue.1  The question to be resolved is:  When, under Title 2 of Maryland’s Insurance
Article,2 does the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an administrative
decision begin?3  Centre Insurance Company, Inc., Z.C. Insurance Agency, Inc., and the
Maryland Insurance Commissioner4 (“Commissioner”)5 argue that the plain language of the
5(...continued)
both cases, where the context dictates, to Centre Insurance Company, Inc., Z.C. Sterling
Insurance Agency, Inc., and the Commissioner collectively as “Centre” and to J.T.W. as
“J.T.W.”  J.T.W. appears pro se.
6 Throughout the proceedings in these consolidated cases, J.T.W.’s actual name has
been redacted and he has been referred to as “J.T.W.”
-2-
Insurance Article provides that the 30-day period begins when the order resulting from an
administrative hearing is mailed.  J.T.W.6 argues that the 30-day period begins when the
order resulting from an administrative hearing is received by the affected party.  We hold
that the plain language of the pertinent statutes provides that, in the context of the relevant
sections of the Insurance Article, the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review
of an administrative decision under §§ 2-204(c) and 2-215(d)(1) begins when the order
resulting from a relevant administrative hearing is mailed.
I. Facts
This case arises out of the unfortunate occurrence of a tornado, which touched down
in La Plata, Maryland on April 28, 2002.  The tornado destroyed J.T.W.’s home and
personal property.  In response to this incident, J.T.W. filed several claims with his
homeowner’s insurance carrier and agent, respectively:  Centre Insurance Company, Inc. and
Z.C. Sterling Insurance Agency, Inc.  J.T.W. received some benefits under his homeowner’s
insurance policy, but was not satisfied with the companies’ response as a whole.  As a result,
J.T.W. filed administrative complaints with the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”)
charging that Centre violated the Insurance Article by the manner in which it handled
7 Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-205(a)(1) of the State Government
Article provides that the MIA is permitted to delegate the authority to hold a hearing to the
OAH.
-3-
his claims.
No. 52
In October 2002, J.T.W. filed a complaint with the MIA, asserting that Centre
violated Maryland law by the manner in which it handled his claims (in particular, the fact
that some of his claims were denied).  In January 2003, the MIA notified J.T.W. that it had
failed to find any violations by Centre of the Maryland Insurance Article.  J.T.W. then
sought review of the MIA’s decision.  The parties entered into mediation before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  As a result of the mediation, on June 11, 2003, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement.
In October 2003 and February 2004, J.T.W. filed additional complaints with the MIA,
asserting that Centre had failed to cover his claimed losses and had failed to comply with the
settlement agreement.  The MIA notified J.T.W. in January and May 2004, respectively, that
it had again failed to find any violations by Centre.  J.T.W. requested administrative hearings
in both instances.  The claims were consolidated and referred to the Office of Administrative
Hearings (“OAH”).7  On July 28 and 29, 2004, the OAH held a hearing.  On September 27,
2004, the ALJ issued an order and decision, upholding in part and denying in part J.T.W.’s
complaint.  
8 The order was originally dated and mailed on September 27, 2004.  However, on
October 14, 2004, the ALJ mailed an amended version which superceded the prior order.
For the purposes of this case, the parties have agreed that October 14, 2004, is the operative
mailing date.
9 Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article states:
“(d) Filing petition for judicial review. — To take an appeal, a person
shall file a petition for judicial review with the appropriate circuit court within
30 days after:
    (1) the order resulting from the hearing was served on the persons
entitled to receive it;
    (2) the order of the Commissioner denying rehearing or reargument
was served on the persons entitled to receive it; or
    (3) the refusal of the Commissioner to grant a hearing.”  
(Bold emphasis added).  The process under § 2-215(d)(1) is further explained by § 2-204(c)
of the Insurance Article, which states:
“(c) Service. — An order or notice may be served on a person by:
    (1) mailing it to the person at the last known principal place of
business of the person, as listed in the records of the Commissioner; or
      (2) otherwise delivering it to the person.”
-4-
The order was mailed to the parties on October 14, 2004.8  It is uncontroverted that
J.T.W. did not receive the order until October 20, 2004.  On November 19, 2004, J.T.W.
filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County.  Centre then filed
a motion to dismiss J.T.W.’s petition.  Centre argued that, pursuant to Maryland Code (1995,
2003 Repl. Vol.), § 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article, a petition for judicial review must be
filed within 30 days after such a petitioner for judicial review is served with the order,9 and
that Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article defines
service as the mailing of an order.  Therefore, Centre argued that J.T.W. filed his petition
in an untimely manner, 36 days after the order had been mailed (October 14, 2004 -
November 19, 2004).  J.T.W. asserted, conversely, that the operative date for service was
10 Maryland Rule 7-203 states:
“(a) Generally.  Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a
petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of:
(1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought;
(2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action
to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or
(3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s order or
action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.”
-5-
his receipt of the order.  That occurred on October 20, 2004, which would mean that he filed
his petition within the required 30-day period.  The Circuit Court found in favor of Centre,
holding that service was effective upon mailing.  On April 20, 2005, the Circuit Court filed
an order dismissing J.T.W.’s appeal of the administrative order.
J.T.W. then timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  On April 28, 2006, the
intermediate appellate court filed its opinion, reversing the Circuit Court’s decision.  J.T.W.
v. Centre Ins. Co., 168 Md. App. 492, 897 A.2d 288 (2006).  The court agreed with J.T.W.’s
argument that, under Maryland Rule 7-203(a)(3),10 the 30-day time limit for filing a petition
for judicial review began to run on the date that he received the ALJ’s order and decision.
J.T.W., 168 Md. App. at 497, 897 A.2d at 291.  The court referenced § 2-215(d) of the
Insurance Article, finding that “J.T.W. was required to file a petition for judicial review
within thirty days following service of the order resulting from the hearing.”  J.T.W., 168
Md. App. at 497, 897 A.2d at 292.  Additionally, the intermediate appellate court cited to
Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d
1026 (2005), in support of the premise that “the term ‘serve’ implies actual receipt.”  J.T.W.,
11 J.T.W. asserts that the notice mailed with the order contained a statement reading:
(continued...)
-6-
168 Md. App. at 497, 897 A.2d at 292.  The court concluded, stating:
“The requirement that a petition for judicial review be filed within
thirty days after the order ‘was served on the persons entitled to receive it,’
implies that the party must have actually received the order.  Ins. § 2-
215(d)(1).  Consequently, ‘notice [is] required by law to be received by the
petitioner,’ and the thirty day limit begins to run ‘the date the petitioner
receive[s] notice of the agency’s order or action.’  Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3).”
J.T.W., 168 Md. App. at 498, 897 A.2d at 292.  The intermediate appellate court only briefly
referenced § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article (which defines “service”) and did not address
any impact that it would have upon the court’s interpretation of § 2-215(d)(1) of the
Insurance Article.
Centre timely filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court granted on August 29,
2006.  Centre Ins. Co. v. J.T.W., 394 Md. 307, 905 A.2d 842 (2006).    
No. 56
On September 14, 2004, J.T.W. filed another complaint with the MIA alleging that
Centre violated the Insurance Article by failing to reimburse him for costs associated with
the demolition of what remained of his La Plata home after the tornado.  The MIA found no
violations by Centre.  On May 4, 2005, J.T.W. requested an administrative hearing.  A
hearing was held by the OAH on September 15, 2005.  On October 18, 2005, the ALJ issued
and mailed an order and decision, finding in favor of Centre.  J.T.W. alleges that he received
the order in the mail on October 21, 2005.11  On November 18, 2005, J.T.W. filed a petition
11(...continued)
“‘A party aggrieved by this final decision of the Maryland Insurance
Administration may file a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, or if the party is an individual, to the circuit court where
the individual resides, within thirty (30) days after delivery of the decision.’”
While this statement is misleading considering our determination infra, it does not change
our analysis of the statutory law. 
12 Again we note that J.T.W. did not raise below, or in this Court, the impact, if any,
that Maryland Rule 1-203(c) might have, or the conflict, if any, between the rule and the
statute, in respect to case No. 56.  Accordingly, we also do not consider that general rule in
our resolution of case No. 56. 
-7-
for judicial review with the Circuit Court for Charles County, 31 days after the order was
mailed and 28 days after he received the order.  On December 8, 2005, and January 13,
2006, Centre filed motions to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted on March 30, 2006.
J.T.W. then timely filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior to the
intermediate appellate court hearing the matter, Centre filed a petition for writ of certiorari
in this Court.  On September 8, 2006, we granted certiorari.  See Centre Ins. Co. v. J.T.W.,
394 Md. 307, 905 A.2d 842 (2006).      
II.  Discussion
The Circuit Court, in both instances, dismissed J.T.W.’s petitions for judicial review
as untimely.  Delineating when the 30-day time period for filing a petition begins under §
2-215(d) is key to our determination.  Thus, the crux of this case is the definition of
“service,” as applicable to § 2-215(d)(1) of the Insurance Article.  Because we hold that
J.T.W.’s petitions were not filed within the relevant 30-day time period,12 the Circuit Court
(in both instances) was without any recourse – the proceeding was subject to a statute of
13 Judge Wilner, writing for the Court in Colao, explained the application of the time
period to petitions for judicial review:
“Lest this result seem harsh or unfair, it is worth remembering that one
of the important goals of the new procedure was to make the judicial review
process more efficient.  The basic battle in these cases is fought at the agency
level.  Whether acting under an administrative procedures act or under
common law principles, the court’s role is essentially limited to assuring that
the agency acted lawfully, that there was substantial evidence to support its
finding, and that it was not arbitrary. . . .  Making the 30-day requirement for
filing the petition in the nature of an absolute statute of limitations, subject to
waiver by failure of a respondent to raise the defense in a proper manner but
not subject to discretionary extension, was in furtherance of that objective . .
. .”
346 Md. at 364, 697 A.2d at 106-07. 
-8-
limitations.  Colao v. County Council of Prince George’s County, 346 Md. 342, 362-64, 697
A.2d 96, 106-07 (1997); see also Kim v. Comptroller of Treasury, 350 Md. 527, 536, 714
A.2d 176, 180 (1998).13  When the petitions were challenged, the trial court was required
to dismiss them. 
A.  Statutory Construction
Our first step in resolving the conflict between the parties is to determine whether the
Legislature intended that the term “service,” as used in § 2-215(d)(1) of the Insurance
Article, requires actual receipt of the order by the affected party or whether the mailing of
the order accomplishes service.  Our resolution of this issue requires an examination of the
statutes involved in the case sub judice.  
We recently discussed the canons of statutory construction in 
Chow v. State, 393 Md.
431, 903 A.2d 388 (2006):
-9-
“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the Legislature.  See Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d
727, 730 (2004).  Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the
statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates
interpretation of its terminology.  Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d
484, 487 (2004).
“In construing the plain language, ‘[a] court may neither add nor delete
language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle
interpretations that limit or extend its application.’  Price v. State, 378 Md.
378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003); County Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md.
399, 416-417, 780 A.2d 1137, 1147 (2001).  Statutory text ‘“should be read so
that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.”’
Collins, 383 Md. at 691, 861 A.2d at 732 (quoting James v. Butler, 378 Md.
683, 696, 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003)).  The plain language of a provision is
not interpreted in isolation.  Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a
whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so
that each may be given effect.  Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487;
Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204, 844 A.2d 406,
411 (2004).
“If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its
ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is
written.  Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89, 861 A.2d at 730.  ‘If there is no
ambiguity in that language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant
laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need
to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of
construction, for “the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and
said what it meant.”’  Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d
886, 894 (2004) (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160,
165 (2002)).”
Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d at 395 (some quotations omitted) (quoting Kushell v.
Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)); see also City of
Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assoc., ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ____ (2006) (No. 3,
September Term 2006) (filed Nov. 3, 2006).  Additionally, we have expounded upon the
importance of resolving ambiguity within a statute, stating:
-10-
“‘In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and
then the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of
the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of
statutory construction at our disposal.   However, before judges
may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must
exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more
reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.  Where the
statutory language is free from such ambiguity, courts will
neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine
legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute.
Only when faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the
literal or usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in
light of the objectives and purposes of the enactment.  As our
predecessors noted, “We cannot assume authority to read into
the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out.
Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an
ambiguity exists.”  Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of
statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the
statutory text.’
Price, at 387-88, 835 A.2d at 1226 (citations omitted); Goff v. State, 387 Md.
327, 342, 875 A.2d 132, 141 (2005); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57-58, 862
A.2d 419, 425 (2004).”
Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395.  It is also clear that “[w]e avoid a construction of
the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.”  Blake v. State,
395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869
A.2d 822, 835 (2005)); see Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).
We analyze the contested provisions of Maryland’s Insurance Article in the context
of the statutory scheme as a whole and construe the plain language so that the various
sections of the article do not conflict with one another.  Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at
395; Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487; Navarro-Monzo, 380 Md. at 204, 844 A.2d
at 411.  Furthermore, the Court recently emphasized in Walzer v. Osborne, ___ Md. ___, ___
-11-
A.2d ____ (2006) (No. 20, September Term, 2006) (filed Nov. 17, 2006):
“In addition, ‘“the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the
context in which it appears.”’ State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d
1339, 1341 (1996) (citations omitted).  As this Court has stated, 
[b]ecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory
scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative
purpose or goal must also be considered.  Thus, not only are we
required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate,
in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.
Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753, 757
(1997)  (citations omitted).”
Walzer, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ____.  
B.  “Service” in the Context of Title 2 of Maryland’s Insurance Article
The Circuit Court, in both cases, dismissed the petitions for judicial review because
they were filed in an untimely manner.  Section 2-215 of the Insurance Article provides the
statutory framework under which such petitions for judicial review are governed.  
The plain language of the statute reads in relevant part: “To take an appeal, a person
shall file a petition for judicial review with the appropriate circuit court within 30 days after:
(1) the order resulting from the hearing was served on the persons entitled to receive it . . . .”
§ 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added).  J.T.W. contends that the term
“service,” as utilized in § 2-215(d)(1), means actual receipt by the involved party.  Under that
definition, the 30-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial review, pursuant to the
Insurance Article, would begin to run on the date that an individual receives an order
resulting from an administrative hearing.  Consequently, in the particular circumstances of
the case sub judice, under the J.T.W.’s interpretation of § 2-215(d)(1), he would have timely
-12-
filed both of his petitions for judicial review with the Circuit Court.  We disagree with this
interpretation.  
In support of his argument, J.T.W. cites to Maryland Rule 7-203(a), which states in
relevant part:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial
review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of:
(1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought;
(2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action
to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or
(3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s order or
action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.”
J.T.W. asserts that the determinative factor under Rule 7-203(a) is that a petition for judicial
review shall be filed within 30 days of the latest of the enumerated dates – i.e., in the present
circumstances, the date on which J.T.W. received notice.  Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3).  J.T.W.,
however, fails to acknowledge that Rule 7-203(a) specifically provides qualifications to this
requirement, stating:  (1) “Except as otherwise provided . . . by statute . . . ,” (emphasis
added) and (2) “. . . if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.”  We find
that the Legislature has so otherwise provided by statute (specifically § 2-204(c) of the
Insurance Article) and, accordingly, notice was not required by law to be received by J.T.W.
under the statutory scheme of the relevant sections of the Insurance Article.
Additionally, J.T.W. fails to recognize that this Court, albeit in a slightly different
procedural context, has previously ruled on the timeliness of an appeal from an order issued
under the Insurance Article.  In Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, 231 Md. 543, 191
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A.2d 222 (1963), the Court addressed the time for filing an appeal from an order of the
Insurance Commissioner in the context of Maryland Rule B4, the predecessor rule to Rule
7-203.  In that case, the Court was concerned with whether the 30-day period began with the
filing of an order rather than the mailing of the order.  Id. at 544, 191 A.2d at 223.  The Court
concluded that an appeal within 30 days of the mailing of the order was timely, stating:
“If notice is required to be sent in every decision in a contested case, it would
seem to bring this case within the exception to the Rule, regardless of the court
in which review is sought.  The appellee [Commissioner] did in fact send
notice of its action, and we hold that the appeal therefrom, within thirty days
from its mailing, was timely.”
Id. at 546, 191 A.2d at 224.  While Nuger is somewhat distinguishable from the case sub
judice, it does show that this Court interpreted a related 30-day filing period as beginning
with the mailing of an order.  Furthermore, Nuger has never been overruled, and continues
to represent this Court’s interpretation of the statutory law, albeit in a different procedural
situation, and in the context of the predecessor Rule B4.    
J.T.W. relies, in part, on this Court’s decision in Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005).  In Rockwood, the Court
analyzed service under § 19-406 of the Insurance Article, a section relating to workers’
compensation.  As the Court explained, “Section 19-406 of the Insurance Article requires the
insurer to serve the employer with notice and gives the insurer two ways to accomplish
service:  personal service or service by certified mail.”  Rockwood, 385 Md. at 109, 867 A.2d
at 1031 (footnote omitted).  Specifically, § 19-406 states:  “[A]n insurer may not cancel or
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refuse to renew a workers’ compensation insurance policy before its expiration unless, at
least 30 days before the date of cancellation or nonrenewal, the insurer:  (1) serves on the
employer, by personal service or certified mail . . . a notice of intention to cancel or
nonrenew the policy . . . .”  § 19-406(a) of the Insurance Article.  
In interpreting the plain language of § 19-406(a)(1), the Rockwood Court first looked
to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “serve,” which states:  “1.  To make legal
delivery of (a notice or process) . . . .  2.  To present (a person) with a notice or process as
required by law . . . .”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1399 (8th ed. 2004); see also Rockwood, 385
Md. at 109-10, 867 A.2d at 1032.  The Court found that, in the context of the workers’
compensation sections, “[t]he term implies actual receipt.”  Rockwood, 385 Md. at 110, 867
A.2d at 1032.  Judge Greene, writing for the Court, expounded upon this, stating:  “If the
Legislature intended some lesser standard, it could have just required the insurer to send or
mail the notice to the employer by regular mail.  Instead, it requires the insurer to serve the
notice by personal delivery or by certified mail.”  Id.  Based on its analysis of § 19-406(a),
the Court concluded:  “[W]e hold that § 19-406(a) permits an insurer to choose whether to
serve notice of cancellation of insurance by personal delivery or by certified mail.  Service
by certified mail, however, is not complete upon mailing.  The statute contemplates actual
delivery of notice.”  Rockwood, 385 Md. at 121, 867 A.2d at 1039.
J.T.W. rests his reliance upon Rockwood on a misinterpretation of the Court’s holding
in that case.  J.T.W. grasps the Court’s statement that “[t]he term [service] implies actual
-15-
receipt,” id. at 110, 867 A.2d at 1032, and applies it out of context with the rest of the
Rockwood holding, ignoring this Court’s contrasting of the language there applicable with
our comment that if the Legislature had meant a lesser standard to apply it would have “just
required the insurer to send or mail the notice to the employer by regular mail.”  385 Md. at
110, 867 A.2d at 1032.  In the present case, the Legislature created just that type of lesser
standard.  
The Rockwood Court found that the term serve, in the context of § 19-406 of the
Insurance Article, implies actual receipt.  This is evident from the fact that § 19-406(a)
specifically requires that the insurer serve the notice by personal delivery or by certified mail.
In the case sub judice, on the other hand, as we have stated, we are concerned with the term
serve as it is utilized in § 2-215(d)(1).  Placed into context with the rest of Title 2 of the
Insurance Article (in particular, in context with § 2-204(c)) the term serve, as used in § 2-
215(d)(1), does not imply actual receipt.               
Instead, § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article provides the definition of “service” which
is to be applied in the context of the statutory scheme of Title 2 of the Insurance Article.
Section 2-204(c) states in relevant part:
“An order or notice may be served on a person by:
(1) mailing it to the person at the last known principal place of business
of the person, as listed in the records of the Commissioner; or
(2) otherwise delivering it to the person.”
The plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and reflects the intent of the
Legislature.  Moreover, it is clearly distinguishable from the statutory language construed in
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Rockwood.  As pertinent to Title 2 of the Insurance Article, the Legislature has specifically
provided in § 2-204(c) that service of an order may be accomplished by the mailing of the
order to the involved person.
We must read and interpret § 2-215(d)(1) in the context of the statutory scheme of the
Insurance Article as a whole.  In doing so, we harmonize the definition of “service” in § 2-
204(c) with the term as it is utilized in § 2-215(d)(1).  It is unambiguous that service, in that
context, may be accomplished by the mailing of an order.  Thus, we shall give effect to the
statute as it is written.  Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395; Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89,
861 A.2d at 730.  Additionally, holding that service required the receipt of the order could
lead to unreasonable or illogical results, i.e., service might never be able to be accomplished.
For example, if the individual to whom an order was mailed happened to be out of the
country for several months or years he or she would not be deemed to have been served
because they had not actually received the order.  As stated supra, we avoid such
unreasonable and illogical construction of statutes.  Blake, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026
(citing Gwin, 385 Md. at 462, 869 A.2d at 835); see Frost, 336 Md. at 137, 647 A.2d at 112.
J.T.W. also relies on the Court of Special Appeals’ holding below, where that court
found that:
“The requirement that a petition for judicial review be filed within
thirty days after the order ‘was served on the persons entitled to receive it,’
implies that the party must have actually received the order.  Ins. § 2-
215(d)(1).  Consequently, ‘notice [is] required by law to be received by the
petitioner,’ and the thirty day limit begins to run ‘the date the petitioner
receive[s] notice of the agency’s order or action.’  Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3).”
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J.T.W., 168 Md. App. at 498, 897 A.2d at 292.  The intermediate appellate court based its
holding on this Court’s decision in Rockwood.  The Court of Special Appeals, however,
failed to distinguish the Rockwood holding, as we have, supra.  Additionally, the
intermediate appellate court did not interpret the Legislature’s use of the term serve in § 2-
215(d)(1) in the context of Title 2 of the Insurance Article as a whole, especially in light of
§ 2-204(c).  The court briefly mentioned § 2-204(c), but did not apply its definition of how
service may be accomplished.
Furthermore, this Court has previously held, in situations similar to that of the case
sub judice, that service does not always require actual receipt.  In Renehan v. Public Service
Commission, 231 Md. 59, 188 A.2d 566 (1963), the Court addressed the timeliness of an
appeal from an order of the Public Service Commission to a Circuit Court.  231 Md. at 61,
188 A.2d at 566.  The Court affirmed the Circuit Court for Carroll County’s dismissal of a
petition for judicial review as untimely.  This Court reached its conclusion by analyzing Rule
1101(d)(2), a predecessor rule to Rule 7-203.  The Court concluded that service was made
by mailing the order to the affected party and specifically stated that:  “There is no provision
of law which requires that notice of the action of the Public Service Commission be received
by a party in order to make it effective.”  Renehan, 231 Md. at 63, 188 A.2d at 568.  
In Lee v. State, 332 Md. 654, 632 A.2d 1183 (1993), the Court considered whether the
State had “complied with the notice requirement of Maryland Rule 4-245(b) in seeking
enhanced punishment” of an individual for a second conviction of possession of cocaine.
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332 Md. at 656, 632 A.2d at 1184.  At the time, Rule 4-425(b) required that the State’s
Attorney “‘serve[] notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel . . . at
least 15 days before trial in circuit court . . . .’”  Lee, 332 Md. at 658, 632 A.2d at 1184
(quoting Md. Rule 4-245(b)).  The State’s Attorney’s office mailed such a notice to the
defendant.  The defendant, however, argued that he never received the notice and, therefore,
was not properly served.  Id. at 657, 632 at 1184.  The Court disagreed with the defendant’s
contention that Rule 4-245(b) required that notice be received in order to be effective.
Construing Maryland Rules 1-321 and 4-245(b), the Court held that:
“The latter rule mandates that the state’s attorney serve notice at least 15 days
prior to trial.  This rule, combined with the provision of Rule 1-321 that
service is complete upon mailing, makes it clear that service of the enhanced
punishment notice must be either hand-delivered 15 days prior to trial or
mailed 15 days prior to trial.  What Rule 4-245(b) does not require is receipt
of the notice 15 days prior to trial.”
Lee, 332 Md. at 664, 632 A.2d at 1188.  Moreover, the Court concluded:
“If the drafters of the rules had wanted to guarantee that the defendant
actually received a copy of the notice 15 days before trial, they would not have
used the words ‘serves notice’ in Rule 4-245.  Rather, the rule would have
required personal service, certified mail, or some other means of both assuring
actual receipt by the defendant and defining a point from which to measure
time.”
Lee, 332 Md. at 665, 632 A.2d at 1188.
In the case sub judice, unlike in Rockwood, the statutory provision in question (§ 2-
215(d)(1)) does not provide for personal service or service by certified mail.  Moreover, §
2-204(c) defines “service” as mere mailing.  If the Legislature had wanted “service” in the
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context of Title 2 of the Insurance Article to require actual receipt of an order by an affected
party it would have so provided.           
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that, under §§ 2-204(c) and 2-215(d)(1) of the Insurance
Article, the 30-day filing period for a relevant petition for judicial review of such an
administrative decision begins on the date that the order is mailed to the affected party.
Therefore, J.T.W. did not comply with the requirement for timely filing in either of his
appeals.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in case No. 52 and affirm
the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County in case No. 56.
IN CASE NO. 52 JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
CHARLES
COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY JTW.  IN CASE NO 56
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY JTW.
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