Title: Smith v. Stowe

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 15, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0198 
_________________________ 
 
Louie Martin Smith, Emily Diane Smith, and Joshua Martin 
Smith  
 
v. 
 
 Katherine Elizabeth Stowe 
 
 
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court 
(CV-15-900253) 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0200 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
2 
 
Louie Martin Smith, Emily Diane Smith, and Joshua Martin 
Smith  
 
v. 
  
Katherine Elizabeth Stowe and Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company 
 
 
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court 
(CV-19-000006) 
 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
 
 
In appeal no. SC-2023-0198, Louie Martin Smith, Emily Diane 
Smith, and Joshua Martin Smith ("the Smiths") appeal from a judgment 
of the Jackson Circuit Court declaring that Katherine Elizabeth Stowe 
has a prescriptive easement over the Smiths' property to allow her to 
access her property for agricultural and recreational purposes. In appeal 
no. SC-2023-0200, the Smiths appeal from a judgment granting Stowe a 
right-of-way over both their property and a railroad crossing owned by 
Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk").   We affirm. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 
In August 2013, Stowe purchased 15.8 acres of land in Jackson 
County for the purpose of building a house.  The property was landlocked, 
providing Stowe with no legal access to a public road. The Stowe property 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
3 
 
is bounded on the west by property owned by Stowe's parents, and 
bounded on the east by property owned by Ricky Hornbuckle;1 the 
Hornbuckle property is bounded on the east by property owned by the 
Smiths. All four properties are bounded on the south by an approximately 
80-foot-wide tract of land owned by Norfolk on which its railroad tracks 
lie.  U.S. Highway 72, which is owned by the State, is located south of the 
Norfolk railroad tracks and runs parallel to the tracks.  U.S. Highway 72 
is the closest public highway to the four properties. The Smith property 
has direct access to U.S. Highway 72 by means of a railroad crossing 
owned by Norfolk referred to as the "middle crossing."  (The appendix to 
this opinion depicts where the various properties, the railroad tracks, the 
highway, and the railroad crossing are situated.)  Norfolk granted the 
Smiths a license to use the middle crossing.  Located on the southwestern 
portion of the Smith property is an old "farm road."  For over 20 years, 
Stowe and her predecessors in title have used that road to access their 
property for agricultural and recreational purposes. Before purchasing 
her property, Stowe asked the Smiths if she could use the farm road to 
 
1Stowe acquired a deeded easement over the southern portion of the 
Hornbuckle property.  
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
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reach the Norfolk middle crossing to access U.S. Highway 72.  The Smiths 
agreed to that request. However, after the Smiths that learned Stowe 
intended to build a house on her property, they refused to sign a written 
easement agreement. Stowe commenced an action against the Smiths 
and Norfolk in the Jackson Probate Court, pursuant to § 18-3-1 et seq., 
Ala. Code 1975, alleging that her property was landlocked and seeking 
the condemnation of a right-of-way over the Smiths' farm road and 
Norfolk's middle crossing so that she could access U.S. Highway 72.  
Stowe also commenced a separate action against the Smiths in the 
Jackson Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that she had 
acquired an easement by prescription over their farm road.  The probate 
court entered an order granting Stowe a nonexclusive right-of-way over 
the farm road.  The Smiths appealed that order to the circuit court for a 
trial de novo. For the purpose of conducting a single bench trial, the 
circuit court consolidated the appeal from the probate court and the 
circuit-court case.   
 
At trial, the evidence was undisputed that the Stowe property was 
landlocked.  The Smiths maintained that Stowe had not established the 
existence of a prescriptive easement over their farm road but that, if she 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
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had, the scope of the easement was limited to allowing her to access her 
property only for agricultural and recreational purposes. The Smiths also 
took the position that there were other reasonably adequate means for 
Stowe to access a public highway other than by condemning a right-of-
way over their property -- for example, they presented evidence 
indicating that Stowe could use an existing railroad crossing located in 
Madison County referred to as the "western crossing" or that Stowe could 
seek to  condemn a right-of-way over Norfolk's railroad tracks directly 
from the Stowe property to U.S. Highway 72.  Norfolk opposed the 
building of a new crossing on the basis that a new crossing it would, 
among other things, create potential safety issues.  Norfolk took the 
position that Stowe could use any of its existing crossings but that the 
middle crossing near the Smith property was the safest and preferred 
crossing. After considering the testimony of witnesses, documentary 
evidence, and personally inspecting the properties at issue, the circuit-
court judge entered a judgment (1) declaring that Stowe had established 
the existence of an easement by prescription over the Smiths' farm road 
until it reached the Hornbuckle property and that the easement was 
limited in scope to allowing her access to her property only for 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
6 
 
agricultural and 
recreational 
purposes; 
(2) 
granting Stowe 
a 
nonexclusive right-of-way over the Smiths' farm road and ordering her to 
pay them $2,643 for the right-of-way; (3) declaring that Stowe had 
established a prescriptive easement over the Norfolk middle crossing; 
and (4) granting Stowe a nonexclusive right-of-way over the Norfolk 
middle crossing and ordering her to pay Norfolk $2,000 for the right-of-
way. These consolidated appeals filed by the Smiths followed. We note 
that Norfolk did not appeal from the circuit court's judgment declaring 
the existence of a prescriptive easement over the middle crossing and 
granting a right-of-way over the crossing.   Rather, Norfolk has favored 
this Court with a brief in support of that judgment.  
II.  Standard of Review 
 
The circuit court conducted a bench trial at which oral testimony 
was given; thus, the ore tenus standard of review applies: 
 
"The ore tenus rule affords a presumption of correctness 
to a trial court's findings of fact based on ore tenus evidence, 
and the judgment based on those findings will not be 
disturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous and 
against the great weight of the evidence. Reed v. Board of Trs. 
for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala. 2000). It is 
grounded upon the principle that when a trial court hears oral 
testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and 
credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 
410 (Ala. 1986). The ore tenus rule does not cloak a trial 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
7 
 
court's conclusions of law or the application of the law to the 
facts with a presumption of correctness. Kennedy v. Boles 
Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2010)." 
 
Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 958 (Ala. 2011).  "In addition, the ore 
tenus presumption is further strengthened in a case involving a dispute 
over real property, where the trial judge views the land in question." 
Hereford v. Gingo-Morgan Park, 551 So. 2d 918, 920 (Ala. 1989). 
III.  Discussion 
A.  Appeal No. SC-2023-0198 -- Prescriptive Easement 
 
The Smiths argue that the circuit court erred in declaring that 
Stowe had established the existence of an easement by prescription over 
their farm road because, they say, Stowe's use of the farm road had been 
permissive, as opposed to adverse or under a claim of right.   
"To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must 
use the premises over which the easement is claimed for a 
period of twenty years or more, adversely to the owner of the 
premises, under claim of right, exclusive, continuous, and 
uninterrupted, with actual or presumptive knowledge of the 
owner." 
 
Bull v. Salsman, 435 So. 2d 27, 29 (Ala. 1983).  In Alabama, there is a 
presumption that the use of a right-of-way is permissive and that the 
permissive use of a right-of-way for a period of 20 years or more does not 
ripen into a prescriptive easement. Cotton v. May, 293 Ala. 212, 214, 301 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
8 
 
So. 2d 168, 169 (1974).  Therefore, a party claiming a prescriptive 
easement must prove that his or her use of a right-of-way was adverse to 
that of the owner or under claim of right.  Id.   The Smiths point out that 
the evidence at trial was undisputed that the farm road had been used 
by local farmers and property owners, including Stowe and her 
predecessors in title, for more than 20 years; that none of the users had 
sought the Smiths' permission before using the farm road; and that none 
of the users had been asked by the Smiths to discontinue their use of the 
farm road.  The Smiths contend that the circumstances in this case are 
similar to those in Cotton, 293 Ala. at 214, 301 So. 2d  at 169 (holding 
that the use of a "farm road" had been permissive and concluding that 
the testimony indicating that the users had never asked permission to 
use the farm road failed to meet the requirements for acquiring a 
prescriptive easement); and Hanks v. Spann, 33 So. 3d 1234, 1237 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2009) (concluding that easement by prescription had not been 
established when use of a road for more than 20 years had been merely 
permissive, specifically when "none of the users had sought the 
permission of the owners before they used the road" and "none of the 
users had been asked by the owners to discontinue their use of the road").  
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
9 
 
However, the Smiths fail to acknowledge that the presumption of 
permissive use may be overcome when, as in this case, the claimant's use 
of a right-of-way is the only means of vehicular ingress and egress to his 
or her property. In such a situation, a landowner is charged with 
presumptive knowledge that the use of his or her property is under a 
claim of right.  See Belcher v. Belcher, 284 Ala. 254, 257, 224 So. 2d 613, 
615 (1969) (holding that, when the users of a private road had used the 
road to access their property for over 20 years and the road was the only 
means of vehicular ingress and egress to their property, the owners of the 
private road had actual or presumptive knowledge of that use and that 
the use for over 20 years was under a claim of right, thus supporting the 
existence of a prescriptive easement); see also Quinn v. Morgan, 215 So. 
3d 1090 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (holding that the Morgans had acquired a 
prescriptive easement over a private road because they had used the road 
for 20 years as their only means of vehicular ingress and egress to their 
property, they had used the road without the owner's permission, and the 
owner knew that the Morgans had used the road to access their property); 
and Ex parte Gilley, 55 So. 3d 242 (Ala. 2010).   In other words, when the 
owner of property has knowledge that an adjoining neighbor is using a 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
10 
 
right-of-way as the only means of ingress and egress to the neighbor's 
landlocked property, the owner must take some affirmative action to 
restrict the neighbor's use of the right-of-way.  Otherwise, the owner of 
the property runs the risk of a court's declaring that the neighbor has 
established the existence of a prescriptive easement over the right-of-
way.  In this case, it was undisputed that the farm road was the only 
means of vehicular ingress and egress to the Stowe property for more 
than 20 years, either by Stowe herself or by her predecessors in title. 
Under those circumstances, the Smiths were charged with presumptive 
knowledge that the farm road was being used under a claim of right.  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not commit reversible error in declaring 
that Stowe had established the existence of a prescriptive easement over 
the farm road to access her property for agricultural and recreational 
purposes.  
B.  Appeal No. SC-2023-0200 -- Condemnation 
 
The Smiths argue that the circuit court erred in condemning a 
right-of-way over their farm road, and they raise several arguments as to 
why they claim the circuit court's judgment should be reversed.  Section 
18-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes the owner of landlocked property to 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
11 
 
maintain a private condemnation action to obtain a right-of-way to the 
nearest or most convenient public road.   Section 18-3-1 provides: 
 
"The owner of any tract or body of land, no part of which 
tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to any public 
road or highway, shall have and may acquire a convenient 
right-of-way, not exceeding in width 30 feet, over the lands 
intervening and lying between such tract or body of land and 
the public road nearest or most convenient thereto provided 
written approval is obtained from the municipal government 
and the planning board of such municipality." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117, 1121 (Ala. 
2000) (noting that, "under § 18-3-1, a landowner is not entitled to 
condemn a right-of-way across a neighbor's intervening land if the 
landowner has an existing, reasonably adequate means of access to his 
property, or if he could construct such access without prohibitive 
expense"). 
 
Section 18-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, establishes limits on private 
condemnation actions under § 18-3-1: 
 
"In the establishment and condemnation of such right-
of-way, no road or right-of-way shall be established through 
any person's yard, garden, orchard, stable lot, stable, gin 
house or curtilage without the consent of the owner; and the 
applicant must pay the owner for the value of the land taken 
and compensation for damage to the land, through which said 
right-of-way is established, resulting from the establishment 
of such road or right-of-way." 
 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
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(Emphasis added.)    
 
The Smiths first argue that the circuit court erred in condemning a 
right-of-way over their farm road because, they say, the circuit court 
failed to consider the term "yard" as used in § 18-3-2. This argument is 
without merit.  The Norfolk middle crossing, which traverses its railroad 
tracks, runs directly into the Smith property, presenting the option of  
going straight, which leads to a "shop" on the Smiths' property; the option 
of going right, which connects to a gravel driveway leading to the Smiths' 
house; and the option of  going left, which is the area where the farm road 
is located.  In the judgment, the circuit-court judge indicated that he had 
personally observed that the area where the farm road was located 
contained several young trees that had been planted after the 
condemnation proceeding had been commenced and that the trees were 
"years from bearing fruit or nuts"; that the area where the farm road was 
located was "unremarkable, flat and easily traversable"; and that there 
were "no gardens, orchards, stable lots, stables, gin houses, or curtilage 
involved in this route."  The judge specifically observed that, when 
crossing the middle track, the curtilage of the Smiths' house is 
immediately recognizable as the area beyond and to the east of the farm 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
13 
 
road.  See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (noting that, 
to determine the boundaries of a home's curtilage, courts are instructed 
to consider whether the area in question is so "intimately" linked to the 
home itself that it should be afforded Fourth Amendment protection);  Ex 
parte Maddox, 502 So. 2d 786, 788 (Ala. 1986) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment protection provided to one's home also applies to the area 
immediately surrounding one's home, "often referred to as the curtilage"); 
and Holland v. State, 11 Ala. App. 164, 166, 65 So. 920, 920 (1914) 
("Generally speaking, the curtilage is the space of ground adjoining the 
dwelling house, used in connection therewith in the conduct of family 
affairs and for carrying on domestic purposes.").  Photographs of the 
Smiths' property contained in the record confirm the judge's observation 
that the farm road was not within the curtilage of the Smiths' house or 
their yard.  Notably, the probate judge also viewed the proposed right-of-
way over the farm road, expressly noting that it did not go through the 
Smiths' "yard." Rather, according to the probate-court order, Stowe could 
simply "drive over flat, unimproved land and access the existing, paved 
crossing, as has been done for at least 50 years."  In this case, the fact 
that the circuit court made no specific finding that the Smiths' "yard" was 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
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not within the condemned right-of-way has no bearing on the propriety 
of the condemnation judgment when viewing the entirety of that 
judgment in context. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. 
AmSouth Bank, N.A., 608 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992) (noting that, when 
a trial court makes no specific findings of fact, "this Court will assume 
that the trial judge made those findings necessary to support the 
judgment"). 
 
The Smiths next challenge the circuit court's finding that it would 
be cost-prohibitive to condemn a right-of-way over Norfolk's railroad 
tracks directly from the Stowe property to U.S. Highway 72. The Smiths 
specifically contend that the circuit court erred in finding that a new 
crossing would be cost-prohibitive because, they say, there was no 
documentary evidence submitted at trial regarding the cost to construct 
such a crossing.  Contrary to the Smiths' assertion,  Stowe introduced 
into evidence, without any objections, an estimate that Norfolk had 
obtained from S&S Railroad Construction to remove the middle crossing 
near the Smith property and to construct a new crossing near the Stowe 
property.  According to that estimate, the cost to install a new crossing 
was $82,000, with $2,000 of that amount attributable to demolition cost 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
15 
 
to remove the existing crossing. William Miller, the Public Safety 
Director for Norfolk, testified that Norfolk had used S&S for prior work 
and that its prices were generally reasonable.  Stowe also testified that 
she could not afford to construct a new crossing.  Based on the evidence 
presented, the circuit court explained that the cost to install a new 
railroad crossing would be cost-prohibitive because Stowe had paid 
$79,000 for her property, the appraised value of the property was 
$53,700, and the cost to install a new crossing -- $82,000 -- was 103% of 
the purchase price of the Stowe property and 152% of its assessed value.  
See Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d at 1122  (holding that cost-prohibitive 
means "an unreasonable expense disproportionate to the value" of 
property).  The circuit court's determination that it would be cost-
prohibitive for Stowe to build a new railroad crossing to access U.S. 
Highway 72 is a finding of fact that is adequately supported by the 
evidence and, thus, under the ore tenus rule, is presumed to be correct.  
See Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d at 1119 ("The ore tenus rule is especially 
applicable in private condemnation cases under § 18-3-1."); see also 
Brothers v. Holloway, 692 So. 2d 845, 847-48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) ("We 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
16 
 
note that our standard of review in condemnation cases is highly 
deferential.").      
 
 The Smiths also argue that the western crossing located in 
Madison County was a reasonable alternative means for Stowe to access 
a public highway and that the circuit court erred in not declaring Norfolk 
to be the owner of western crossing.  In its judgment, the circuit court 
explained that, pursuant to a survey in the record, the western crossing 
was subject to a one-hundred-foot railroad right-of-way but that the 
owner of the crossing was unknown.  The circuit court further indicated 
that Miller, the Norfolk representative, had testified that, "other than 
where the tracks are laid," Norfolk did not own property in Madison 
County  in the area where the western crossing was located.  The circuit 
court concluded that, because no deed had been located that identified 
the owner of the western crossing, Stowe would be required to expend 
considerable legal fees to identify the owner.  The Smiths contend that, 
with the aid of a "Valuation Map" produced by Norfolk and the guidance 
provided by this Court in Brown v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 544 
So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1989), the circuit court could have determined ownership 
of the western crossing, which was subject to the railroad right-of-way. 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
17 
 
Other than asserting that Norfolk produced the valuation map pursuant 
to "the requirements of the 1913 Valuation Act which required the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to assess the value of railroad 
property," the Smiths' brief at 38, the Smiths make no attempt to discuss 
the valuation map or how it would have assisted the circuit court in 
determining ownership of the western crossing.  Moreover, the Smiths 
provide no discussion of Brown.  Notably, the Smiths do not challenge 
any of the additional reasons cited by the circuit court for rejecting the 
western crossing as a reasonable alternative means of accessing a public 
highway. The circuit court explained that, to reach the western crossing, 
Stowe would have to cross over 440 feet of land belonging to 2 nonparties, 
but that, to reach the middle crossing, she would have to travel only 246 
feet across the Smith property. Finally, the circuit-court judge identified 
specific safety concerns that he had observed regarding the western 
crossing: (1) Stowe's view of oncoming trains upon entering the western 
crossing would be obstructed by the curvature of the tracks; (2) her view 
of eastbound traffic when entering the highway would be obstructed by a 
curve in the highway; and (3) her view of westbound traffic would be 
limited by the angle of her vehicle to the highway. The circuit court's 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
18 
 
findings for rejecting the western crossing as a reasonable alternative 
means for Stowe to access a public highway are well taken, and those 
findings are entitled to great deference.  Cater, 772 So. 2d at 1119.   
 
Finally, despite the fact that Norfolk did not appeal the circuit 
court's judgment condemning a right-of-way over its middle crossing, the 
Smiths nonetheless attempt to challenge the circuit court's authority to 
do so.  The Smiths specifically argue that the circuit court erred in 
condemning a right-of-way over the middle crossing because, they say, "it 
would appear" that Alabama law does not permit a private party to 
condemn a right-of-way over an active railroad track.  The Smiths' brief 
at 41.  In other words, the Smiths challenge that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment that was adverse only to Norfolk.  "Only a party 
prejudiced or aggrieved by a judgment can appeal. ... 'A party cannot 
claim error where no adverse ruling is made against him.'" Alcazar 
Shrine Temple v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 868 So. 2d 1093, 
1094 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Holloway v. Robertson, 500 So. 2d 1056, 1059 
(Ala. 1986)); see also Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Constr. 
Co., 466 So. 2d 83, 88 (Ala. 1985) ("[W]hen an error applies only to a party 
who does not appeal therefrom, another party cannot make any such 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
19 
 
error an issue on appeal.").  The Smiths assert several reasons that, they 
say, confer on them the capacity to appeal from that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment unfavorable to Norfolk; however, they provide no 
authority for any of the reasons they cite. Moreover, even assuming that 
the Smiths had the capacity to appeal from that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment adverse to Norfolk, the Smiths never raised their 
specific argument before the circuit court. Therefore, this Court would be 
precluded from addressing their argument for the first time on appeal. 
See ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ala. 
1993) ("Issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered for 
the first time on appeal.").  
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The circuit-court judge received oral testimony, considered 
evidentiary materials, personally inspected the properties at issue, and 
entered a judgment containing detailed findings, all of which are 
supported by the record.  The Smiths have failed to demonstrate that 
those findings are clearly erroneous or against the great weight of the 
evidence.  Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
SC-2023-0198 -- AFFIRMED. 
SC-2023-0198 and SC-2023-0200 
20 
 
 
SC-2023-0200 -- AFFIRMED.  
 
Parker, C.J., and Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur. 
 
Wise, J., recuses herself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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APPENDIX