Title: State v. Longe

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Longe (98-088); 170 Vt. 35; 743 A.2d 569

[Filed 24-Sep-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-088

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.		                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit

Barry Longe	                                 January Term, 1999

Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

       Edward G. Adrian, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans,
  for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Barry Longe appeals the decision of the
  Franklin District  Court denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
  following a jury verdict of guilty for operating  a motor vehicle after
  license suspension in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674(b).  On appeal,
  defendant  argues that the reason for defendant's underlying suspension is
  an essential element of a § 674(b)  charge which the trial court
  erroneously removed from the jury's consideration.  We disagree and  affirm
  the conviction.

       As a threshold matter, the parties disagree on our standard of review. 
  Defendant maintains  that this case presents an error of law, and
  accordingly is subject to de novo review.  The State 

 

  contends that this case involves a discretionary ruling regarding
  prejudicial evidence pursuant to  V.R.E. 403 which is reviewed only for
  abuse of discretion.  Although the issue was raised initially  under V.R.E.
  403, the actual question before us is whether the trial court improperly
  removed an  essential element from the jury's consideration.  This question
  presents a question of law and,  accordingly, we review it de novo.    

       At issue in this case is the connection among three related sections
  of Title 23 of the  Vermont Statutes.  Defendant was charged with operating
  a motor vehicle while his license was still  suspended as a result of his
  failure to comply with 23 V.S.A. § 1209a.  Section 1209a provides in 
  relevant part that no license suspended or revoked under the subchapter
  shall be reinstated unless the  person has successfully completed an
  alcohol and driving education program.  Section 1201  prohibits any person
  from operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control
  of any  vehicle on a highway when the person's alcohol concentration is .08
  or more.  See 23 V.S.A. §  1201(a)(1).  Finally, § 674(b), the section with
  which defendant was charged, provides in part that:

     [a] person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has 
     been suspended or revoked for a violation of section 1201 of this title 
     . . . and who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon a 
     public highway before reinstatement of the license shall be 
     imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000, 
     or both.

  23 V.S.A. § 674(b).   Stated more succinctly: first, defendant's license
  was revoked for driving under  the influence of alcohol, see id; second, he
  failed to satisfy the alcohol and driving education  program, see id. §
  1209a; third, he was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his
  license was  still suspended (DLS) due to his failure to satisfy the
  requirements of § 1209a, see id. § 674(b).  	

 

       Before the trial began, defendant indicated to the State and the court
  that he would object to  any mention of driving under the influence (DUI). 
  Accordingly, the State produced two witnesses,  neither of whom testified
  that the defendant had been suspended for a DUI conviction.  An employee 
  of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) testified that defendant's
  privilege to operate a motor  vehicle was suspended on October 24, 1997,
  and had not been reinstated as a result of his failure to  complete the §
  1209a requirements.  During the employee's testimony, however, the State
  introduced  two exhibits documenting the suspension, one of which was a
  license suspension notice from the  DMV indicating that defendant's license
  was suspended for operating a motor vehicle with a  blood  alcohol content
  of .08 or more.   Defendant objected to admitting the documents, arguing
  that any  language relating to alcohol concentration be redacted.  Before
  admitting these documents,  the court  agreed to delete all language
  relating to DUI to avoid prejudice to the defendant.  

       Later, during a colloquy regarding jury instructions, the State
  suggested that § 1201 need not  be mentioned to the jury.  Instead, the
  State contended that § 1209a could act as a "surrogate" for  §1201, thereby
  avoiding the potentially prejudicial language of § 1201.  The court
  responded that  the issue raised a question of law for the court to
  resolve.  In the presence of counsel only, the court  found, as a matter of
  law, that the defendant had a previous conviction for operating a motor
  vehicle  with a blood alcohol concentration of more than .08 percent, and
  that the underlying suspension was  a result of that conviction.  The court
  later instructed the jury that the State's information charged  the
  defendant with DLS for failing to satisfy 23 V.S.A. § 1209a, in violation
  of 23 V.S.A. § 674(b).  The court further instructed:

     The information that I read to you earlier made reference to . . . 
     § 674(b) and that statute provides a person whose license or privilege 
     to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked for a 

     violation of § 1209 of this title and who operates . . . a motor vehicle 
     upon a public highway before the suspension period imposed for the 
     violation has expired shall be punished according to the law.
          Now, in this case the State must prove the essential elements 
     as follows, each of them beyond a reasonable doubt:  
          First, that it was the defendant. . . .  
          That his operation of a motor vehicle was on a public highway.
          That at the time of the operation, the defendant's right to operate a 
     motor vehicle was under active suspension, and that it had not been 
     reinstated.
          Do not be concerned about the actual language of . . . § 1209a 
     or § 1201.  It is sufficient if the State has shown beyond a reasonable 
     doubt that the defendant was under suspension at the time of 
     operation. 

  Defendant was convicted of DLS in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674(b). 
  Defendant made a motion for  judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a
  new trial, both of which were denied.  	

       On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in instructing the
  jury not to be concerned  with the language of §§ 1201 or 1209a.  He
  contends that the court's determination that, as a matter  of law,
  defendant had been convicted of DUI, along with the corresponding jury
  instruction,  removed an essential element of the crime from the jury's
  province and generated two errors.  First,  defendant argues that there was
  no evidence that defendant's license was suspended for violation of  § 1201
  and, accordingly, the motion to acquit should have been granted.  Second,
  even if there were  sufficient evidence to convict defendant of a § 1201
  violation, defendant argues that the court erred  in refusing to instruct
  the jury that a verdict of guilty depended on a finding as to the reason
  for the  suspension.   	 

       The statutes governing DLS grade the offense depending on the section
  violation on which  the underlying suspension is based.  In the instant
  case, § 674(b) establishes a maximum of two years  imprisonment, a fine of
  $5,000, or both, if the underlying suspension was a result of a violation
  of

 

  § 1201.  Operation after suspension for any reason other than a violation
  of sections 674, 1091, 1094,  1128, 1133, 1201, or 1205 of Title 23
  constitutes a civil traffic violation.  See 23 V.S.A. § 674.     Defendant
  argues that because the section violation of the underlying suspension
  determines whether  the offender will be subject to criminal or civil
  penalties, the fact that defendant drove after his  license was suspended
  for a violation of § 1201 was an essential element of § 674(b), and this 
  element should have been determined by the jury rather than the court.  See
  State v. Williams, 160  Vt. 615, 617,