Title: People v. Burt

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86898-Agenda 2-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								RONALD BURT, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Ronald Burt, appeals from an order of the circuit
court of Stephenson County dismissing his amended petition for
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because
defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying murder
convictions, the present appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill.
2d R. 651(a).
BACKGROUND
	This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal. See
People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49 (1995). Therefore, we discuss only
those facts and evidence necessary to the disposition of this
appeal.
	On January 16, 1992, the bodies of H. Steven Roy, age 48,
and Kevin Muto, age 18, were found in two separate bedrooms of
the farm house that Roy rented. Roy and Muto, who had been
employed by Roy as a farmhand, had been shot to death.
	Defendant was arrested in connection with the deaths on
January 17, 1992. Initially, defendant stated that he knew nothing
about the crimes. However, after a detective informed defendant
that the authorities had gathered information about defendant's
involvement in the crimes from Dannie Booth and David Craig,
defendant provided a statement.
	In his first statement, defendant said that he, Booth and Craig
went to Roy's farm to collect a debt allegedly owed to Booth.
While inside Roy's house, defendant pointed a .22-caliber rifle at
Roy, demanded his wallet and then ordered Roy to walk to a
bedroom. Defendant and Booth followed Roy to the bedroom,
while Craig remained in the hallway. Defendant pushed Roy onto
a bed. According to defendant, when Roy made a movement,
defendant shot him because he was afraid Roy might try to "pull
something." Booth then took the rifle and shot Roy several times.
	Defendant stated that, after the shooting, he, Booth and Craig
took a VCR and meat from Roy's home. While they were taking
these items, Muto knocked on the door. When Muto refused to
leave, Booth took the gun from defendant and walked Muto to a
different bedroom. Booth took Muto's wallet, ordered him to lie
on the floor, and shot him in the back of the head and back.
Defendant then took the rifle from Booth and shot Muto in the
back. Subsequently, the three men left the house with the meat, the
VCR, a gun, and some of Roy's personal checks.
	On January 18, 1992, defendant provided another statement.
This statement was tape-recorded and was similar to defendant's
first statement. In this statement, defendant added that, after he
shot Roy, he and Craig discussed shooting Booth for fear that
Booth would disclose the events surrounding Roy's murder. Upon
hearing this, Booth took the rifle from defendant and shot Roy
several times. Defendant repeated his assertion that he shot Muto
in the back only after Booth had shot him in both the head and
back.
	On January 24, 1992, six days later, defendant asked to speak
to authorities. He then provided a third statement. In this third
statement, defendant said that he did not shoot Muto, but rather
that Booth was the only person who had shot Muto. Defendant
stated that he had admitted to shooting Muto to protect Booth,
because Booth was only 14 years old.
	On February 5, 1992, defendant was charged with, inter alia,
two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(3) (West 1998)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West
1998)) relating to the murders of Roy and Muto. A jury was
empaneled to hear the charges in the circuit court of Stephenson
County. Prior to defendant's jury trial, the State moved to exclude
defendant's third statement, given on January 24, 1992, because,
the State argued, it was self-serving hearsay. The trial court
granted the State's motion in limine. However, both defense
counsel and the trial court clarified on the record that the court's
decision to exclude the January 24 statement applied only to the
trial and not to the potential sentencing stage of the proceeding.
Defense counsel did not attempt to introduce the January 24
statement at defendant's sentencing hearing.
	Also prior to trial, on July 13, 1992, defense counsel
requested that defendant undergo a fitness evaluation. Pursuant to
an order of the circuit court, Dr. Donald Pearson, a psychologist,
examined defendant and, after administering 14 tests, concluded
that defendant was fit to stand trial. Dr. Pearson noted in his report
that defendant stated that he was taking the medications Empirin
(imipramine), Sinequan and Valium. Defense counsel stipulated
to Dr. Pearson's report, and the trial court found defendant fit to
stand trial. No other inquiry into fitness was ordered or conducted.
	Defendant's case then proceeded to a jury trial on March 23,
1993. On March 26, 1993, just prior to the time that the State
indicated it would rest its case and before the presentation of any
defense, defendant's attorneys informed the court that, against
their advice, defendant wished to change his plea from not guilty
to guilty on all charges. The court admonished defendant
concerning the consequences of pleading guilty. When defendant
persisted in his guilty pleas, the court determined that, based on
the evidence that had been admitted in the proceedings, there was
a factual basis to accept the pleas. On March 26, 1993, the court
entered judgments of guilty on the counts of first degree murder of
Kevin Muto, first degree murder of Steven Roy, and armed
robbery.
	At a separate sentencing hearing on March 26, 1993, the State
sought to prove defendant eligible for the death penalty. The State
argued that defendant was eligible for the death penalty because
defendant was convicted of murdering two or more individuals
(see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998)) and because defendant
killed an individual in the course of another felony (see 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1998)), in this case, armed robbery. The jury
found defendant eligible for the death penalty only under section
9-1(b)(3), the multiple-murder aggravating factor. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998).
	Subsequently, at defendant's death penalty hearing, the State
presented two witnesses in aggravation. The defendant presented
seven witnesses in mitigation. Six of those witnesses were family
members or friends of defendant, and testified as to his troubled
childhood, exposure to family violence, alcohol and drug use and
his capacity for kindness. Defendant also presented expert
testimony from a clinical psychologist, who concluded that
defendant committed the murders while under the influence of an
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
	The jury determined that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(g) (West 1998). Defendant moved for a new trial and
sentencing hearing, which the trial court denied. On April 1, 1993,
defendant was sentenced to death.
	On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions
and sentence. People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49 (1995). Rehearing was
denied on December 4, 1994. Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certiorari. Burt v.
Illinois, 517 U.S. 1211, 134 L. Ed. 2d 936, 116 S. Ct. 1832 (1996).
On January 2, 1996, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction
petition in the circuit court of Stephenson County. Following the
appointment of counsel, defendant filed an amended petition for
post-conviction relief on December 29, 1997. The circuit court
dismissed defendant's petition for post-conviction relief without
an evidentiary hearing.

ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 1998)) provides a remedy for criminal defendants who have
suffered a substantial violation of their federal or state
constitutional rights during their original trial or sentencing
hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). An action
for post-conviction relief is not an appeal from the underlying
judgment, but rather a collateral attack on trial court proceedings
in which a defendant has the burden to establish substantial
constitutional violations that have not been and could not have
been previously adjudicated. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257,
268 (2000). Issues that were decided on direct appeal are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, and issues that could have been raised
on direct appeal, but were not, are waived. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at
268.
	 An evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not a
matter of right, but rather is warranted only where the defendant's
allegations make a substantial showing that his constitutional
rights were violated. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28
(1998). In determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on
a post-conviction petition, all well-pled facts in the defendant's
petition and any accompanying affidavits are taken as true. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d  at 503. However, nonfactual and nonspecific assertions
which merely amount to conclusions are insufficient to require a
hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998).
	We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389.

I. Defendant's Fitness
	Defendant raises three issues relating to his fitness to stand
trial. In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant contended
that: (1) he was denied due process of law because throughout the
proceedings he was taking psychotropic medications and yet failed
to receive a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par.
104-21(a)); (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
his attorneys failed to request a fitness hearing when they became
aware of reasons to doubt his fitness and failed to invoke his
mandatory right to a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing; and (3) he
was denied due process of law when the circuit court failed to
reopen an inquiry into his fitness and conduct a fitness hearing
where information known to the court created a bona fide doubt as
to his fitness.
	We will address each of defendant's contentions individually.

A. Statutory Right to a Fitness Hearing
	In his opening brief, defendant argues that he was entitled to
a mandatory fitness hearing pursuant to section 104-21(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par.
104-21(a)) because he was taking psychotropic medications from
the time of his arrest through sentencing.
	At the time of defendant's trial and sentencing, section
104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated:
			"A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or
other medications under medical direction is entitled to a
hearing on the issue of his fitness while under
medication." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a).
	In People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 160 (1996), this court held
that a defendant may raise in a post-conviction petition that the
denial of a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing constitutes a denial
of due process. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 160. Relying on People v.
Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995), we determined that the legislature
equated a defendant's ingestion of psychotropic drugs with a bona
fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d  at 159,
citing Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461; People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394
(1995). Therefore, a defendant could properly claim a due process
violation from his failure to receive a section 104-21(a) fitness
hearing.
	Subsequent to the filing of defendant's initial brief, this court
overruled Nitz and Gevas and held that the court had erred "when
it implied[ ] that the legislature equated the administering of
psychotropic medication to a defendant with a bona fide doubt as
to his fitness to stand trial." People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312,
331 (2000). Mitchell concluded that, because a defendant's right
to a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing is statutory, and not
constitutional, a defendant has no due process right to a section
104-21(a) fitness hearing. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 337. The failure
to receive a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing, therefore, is not a
constitutional deprivation and not cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief unless it is framed in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 337-38.
	In his reply brief defendant concedes that, in light of Mitchell,
he was not denied due process of law for failure to receive a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing merely because he ingested
psychotropic drugs. We therefore do not consider that claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	While defendant concedes that he cannot claim a due process
of law violation for his failure to receive a section 104-21(a)
fitness hearing based solely on his ingestion of psychotropic drugs,
he argues that the totality of the circumstances during his trial
proceedings established a bona fide doubt of his fitness and,
therefore, his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a
fitness hearing. As stated, prior to trial, defense counsel requested
that defendant be evaluated for fitness and receive a hearing to
determine if he was fit to stand trial. Defendant underwent a
fitness evaluation by Dr. Donald Pearson, a psychologist, who
concluded that defendant was fit. A copy of Dr. Pearson's report
was given to the trial court, and defendant's attorneys stipulated to
it. When no other evidence regarding defendant's fitness was
offered to the trial court, the court determined that defendant was
fit to stand trial and that no fitness hearing was necessary.
	According to defendant, after the trial court's determination
that no fitness hearing was necessary, facts arose which suggested
a bona fide doubt of his fitness. Defendant offers no evidence to
establish that a bona fide doubt of his fitness arose prior to the
circuit court's determination that a fitness hearing was not
necessary. Rather, defendant's argument focuses on circumstances
which arose subsequent to that determination.
	A defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel
at trial and at a death sentencing hearing. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both deficient
performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	In order to satisfy the deficient performance prong of
Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was
so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693-94, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984). Indeed, a defendant must show that
"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687,  80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Further, in order for a defendant to establish
that he suffered prejudice, he must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999).
	"[T]o establish that his trial counsel's alleged incompetency
prejudiced him within the meaning of Strickland, defendant must
show that facts existed at the time of his trial that would have
raised a bona fide doubt of his ability to understand the nature and
purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. Defendant
is entitled to relief on this post-conviction claim only if he shows
that the trial court would have found a bona fide doubt of his
fitness and ordered a fitness hearing if it had been apprised of the
evidence now offered." People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 318-19
(2000), citing People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 193 (1998);
People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512-13 (1991). In
determining whether a bona fide doubt exists as to a defendant's
fitness, relevant factors for a court to consider include the
defendant's irrational behavior, the defendant's demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on the defendant's competence to
stand trial. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 319.
	Defendant offers several arguments in support of his
contention that a bona fide doubt of his fitness arose during the
proceedings. First, defendant contends that his decision to change
his pleas to guilty midway through trial was irrational and
illustrated that his "will had become flattened" and "his desire for
self-preservation disappeared." See Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d  at 322.
Thus, according to defendant, a bona fide doubt existed as to his
fitness.
	As we have discussed, defendant changed his plea to guilty on
the fourth day of his jury trial, just prior to the State's resting its
case. At this point in the trial, the jury had heard two confessions
given by defendant, as well as extensive evidence of his guilt. In
light of this, defendant's decision to plead guilty does not appear
to be irrational.
	Further, defendant's suggestion that his will had become
"flattened" and "his desire for self-preservation disappeared" is
contradicted by the record. First, it is apparent from the record that
defendant disregarded his attorneys' strong advice against a plea
of guilty. Before accepting defendant's pleas, the trial judge
admonished defendant to carefully consider his attorneys'
recommendation against a guilty plea, stating, "I want you to
weigh what they advise you very heavily, because they do have the
experience of dealing with cases and some knowledge of the law
that's related to this, and that's why you have attorneys and that's
why the Constitution requires that you be furnished with attorneys
***. Even without their agreement are you still desiring to enter
pleas of guilty?" Defendant responded that he did, in fact, wish to
enter guilty pleas, despite disagreement on the part of his
attorneys. Defendant's decision to plead guilty despite his
counsel's recommendation to the contrary shows that his will was
not "flattened."
	Moreover, the record establishes that defendant did not lose
his "desire for self-preservation." Throughout the proceedings,
defendant was frequently examined by Dr. Edward H. Navakas,
M.D., a psychiatrist at the Illinois Department of Corrections. In
his reports, Dr. Navakas stated that defendant did "appear to feel
some grief, but this is quickly shouldered aside in favor of his own
needs," that "though [defendant] has not slept recently, he is
determined to fight his court battles," that defendant "seems to
avoid pain and suffering for himself at almost any cost," and that
defendant "appears to be invested in any legal maneuvers that will
ensure his survival." Defendant advances no arguments contesting
the validity of Dr. Navakas' reports.
	In addition, defendant clearly understood the consequences of
his guilty pleas. At the time that he pled guilty, the court provided
defendant with a detailed explanation as to the proceedings that
would follow, both if defendant persisted in his pleas of not guilty
and if defendant entered pleas of guilty. Defendant stated that he
"underst[ood] fully" that if he plead guilty there would be a
conviction on each count and the jury determination would be
limited to whether defendant would receive the death penalty or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant
explained that he was receiving his medication, that he had
discussed his guilty pleas with his attorneys and that he understood
that his attorneys disagreed with his decision to plead guilty.
Finally, defendant stated that he understood the proceedings until
that point. Therefore, we conclude that defendant's decision to
plead guilty did not illustrate a bona fide doubt as to his fitness.
	Next, defendant contends that his difficulty concentrating
during court proceedings provided reason to doubt his fitness.
Defendant provides one example of this alleged difficulty in
concentrating in court. During voir dire, defense counsel requested
a one-day continuance. Counsel stated that defendant felt that,
because of his medication and because he was having difficulty
sleeping, he could not participate in jury selection that day.
Defendant had indicated to counsel that he was "burned out."
After confirming that defendant was taking his medications as
prescribed and had not required the attention of a doctor, the trial
judge denied the request for a continuance. However, the judge
noted that he would order a recess if it appeared that defendant
was having trouble staying awake. The judge also informed
defendant that he could renew his request for a continuance if
necessary.
	Subsequently, during post-trial proceedings on defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the trial judge stated:
			"I do recall once and I think it was during jury selection
I inquired as to whether the defendant was feeling well,
inquired in the proceedings so I did observe him entirely
throughout this because there were problems I understood
when he was not in the courtroom. There was one
outburst at one time in the courtroom and there was one
time that he sat for a few moments with his head down
and I was concerned that he wasn't feeling well or was
not awake even but he indicated he was all right and we
could go on.
			Other than that I thought he conducted himself very
well and very normally throughout the proceedings and
certainly felt that he was attentive and if you can be
attentive through five days of jury selection I think if you
can be attentive to just about anything because that is not
the most exciting event in any of our lives but it is an
important one and the point of it is also that at all times he
was here conferring with counsel, counsel were advising
him and conferring with him throughout the proceedings.
I observed that on a number of occasions and I can't
believe that there was any inability on his part to
communicate with counsel and understand their
communication with him."
	We accept the trial court's observation that defendant
appeared to be alert in court and participated in his defense.
Defendant communicated with his counsel and the court at various
times throughout the proceedings and indicated on several
occasions that he understood the proceedings. Defendant's desire
to postpone jury selection for one day because he was tired did not
raise a bona fide doubt as to his fitness.
	In support of his argument that a bona fide doubt of his fitness
existed, defendant also points to an affidavit from one of his trial
attorneys. In this affidavit, which is attached to defendant's post-conviction petition, the attorney states that defendant had frequent
mood swings, that he demonstrated belligerent or explosive
behavior and that he threatened to become violent in the
courtroom. Defendant argues that this provides evidence that a
bona fide doubt as to his fitness arose and that his attorneys should
have inquired into his fitness at that time. Again, fitness refers to
a defendant's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
and participate in his defense. Our review of the record persuades
us that defendant's "mood swings" did not affect his
understanding of the proceedings or his ability to participate in his
defense. At various times, defendant stated on the record that he
was able to follow the proceedings and that he understood the
nature of the charges alleged in his indictment. The record is also
replete with instances of discussions between defendant's counsel
and the court indicating that counsel was communicating with
defendant. For example, on one occasion, defendant clarified a
confusion between his counsel and the court as to the
circumstances surrounding his confessions. Specifically, during a
pretrial motion to suppress the statements in which he confessed
to shooting Roy and Muto, defendant provided the title and the
police department of the law enforcement officer who took those
statements. Accordingly, even accepting that defendant's behavior
was at times "belligerent," this does not suggest any impairment
in his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or
participate in his defense.
	In support of his petition for post-conviction relief, defendant
has attached a report from Dr. Lyle Rossiter, a forensic
psychiatrist. Dr. Rossiter offers no new evidence. Rather, his
report is based on a review of the record in this case. He states
that, in his view, a fitness determination was indicated due to
defendant's psychiatric history and use of psychotropic
medications. Defendant argues that Dr. Rossiter's conclusion
stands "unrebutted."
	It is for this court, and not Dr. Rossiter, to determine whether
there existed a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness. We have
reviewed the proceedings in this case and conclude that defendant
has not demonstrated that, at the time of his trial, a bona fide doubt
existed as to his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings and to assist in his defense. Therefore, we hold that
defendant has failed to establish that he suffered prejudice under
Strickland for his attorneys' failure to reopen an inquiry into his
fitness.
	Defendant additionally contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to invoke his
mandatory right to a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a). In
order to show that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to
request a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing, defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, had he received a fitness
hearing, he would have been found unfit to stand trial. Mitchell,
189 Ill. 2d  at 338. We have held that no bona fide doubt existed as
to defendant's fitness at any time during the proceedings. Because
there was no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness, defendant
cannot establish a reasonable probability that he would have been
found unfit to stand trial had he received a fitness hearing.
Defendant has failed to meet the prejudice prong required by
Strickland. We therefore reject defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on this issue.

C. Circuit Court's Failure to Reopen Fitness Inquiry
	In a related argument, defendant claims that his due process
rights were violated because the circuit court failed to reopen an
inquiry into his fitness after its initial determination that no fitness
hearing was necessary. Defendant claims that information came to
the court's attention during subsequent proceedings which created
a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness and which obligated the
court to, sua sponte, reopen the issue of his fitness. Defendant
offers the same facts and arguments in support of this claim that
he offered in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
	Because we have held that there was no bona fide doubt of
defendant's fitness to stand trial, the trial court did not err in
failing to reopen a fitness inquiry. Nothing arose during the course
of the proceedings that suggested a bona fide doubt of defendant's
fitness. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in
dismissing defendant's petition for post-conviction relief with
respect to this claim.

II. Brady Claim
	Defendant next contends that his due process rights were
violated when the State failed to disclose material evidence in
mitigation. Defendant argues that the State's failure to disclose
testimony by Craig, one of the codefendants involved in the
murders, constituted a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
	Defendant was sentenced to death on April 1, 1993. On May
5, 1993, at Booth's sentencing hearing, Craig testified for the State
that:
		"We did indeed go down to the basement, began taking
meat out of the freezer. There was a knock on the door,
which was Mr. Muto. Dannie was the one who answered
the door, invited Mr. Muto in, and he said Steve is
sleeping, does not want to be bothered. Burt went
upstairs, said something. 'Hi. You're just in time for a
picnic. What's your name? Did you say your prayers?' I
was in the basement. I heard a gun fire. I heard another
one. I go to the bottom of the basement steps. I see Burt
looking down at me, Mr. Ron Burt, looking down at me.
I hear another gun fire. I get to the middle of the stairs. I
hear another gun fire. Get to the top of the stairs, Burt is
turning the corner going towards the bedroom where
Dannie and Mr. Muto were. Dannie had handed Ron Burt
a .22 rifle, and Mr. Burt ran across the front of the living
room and approached me at the front door as I was trying
to leave. He had gave [sic] Dannie the gun. He picked up
a double-barrel and told me he would blow my brains
out."
On cross-examination, Craig admitted that he had pled guilty to
murder and armed robbery, that the State had recommended a
sentence of 30 years' imprisonment, and that he was arguing for
a lesser sentence. Craig stated that his sentencing hearing was
scheduled for the following week. He also admitted that he heard
defendant state, "Did you say your prayers this morning? I hope
so. You're going to need them." Moreover, Craig was impeached
with a prior statement he had given to law enforcement officials
which stated that, after defendant spoke to Muto, "it sounded like
they went to the back bedroom, and I heard five or six shots
spaced apart. I went upstairs and saw Ronny and Dannie walking
toward me."
	Defendant argues that Craig's testimony was Brady evidence
that should have been disclosed. According to defendant, because
the testimony was consistent with his final custodial statement to
the police, it should have been disclosed to the defense and known
to the jury that imposed defendant's sentence.
	Defendant concedes that Craig's testimony would not have
affected his eligibility for a death sentence, because defendant still
would have been accountable for the murders of both Roy and
Muto. However, according to defendant, Craig's testimony would
have "carried great weight in mitigation and might well led [sic]
the jury to return a sentence other than death."
	The State has a constitutional obligation to disclose evidence
that is both favorable to the accused and "material either to guilt
or to punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.  at 87,  10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97; People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,
485-86 (1996). Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985); Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 486. Therefore, in
order to succeed in a Brady claim, the defendant must show that:
(1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either wilfully or
inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued to
the defendant. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286, 302, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). Because
defendant's Brady claim does not satisfy the first of these
elements, we reject it.
	Even if we assume that Craig's testimony was both known to
the State and wilfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, the
testimony is not exculpatory. Craig testified that he, defendant, and
apparently Booth were in the basement of Roy's home when Muto
arrived at the door. After Muto's arrival, both Booth, and later
defendant, went upstairs and spoke to Muto. Next, Craig claimed
he heard a gun fire two times. Craig stated that after he heard these
gun shots, he went to the bottom of the basement stairs and saw
defendant at the top of the stairs. At that point, Craig heard two
more gun shots.
	Craig's testimony does not disprove the State's claim that
defendant shot Muto. According to Craig's testimony, he did not
see defendant until after he heard two shots fired. In fact, the
testimony was more detrimental than helpful to defendant, as
Craig stated that defendant threatened Muto immediately prior to
his murder.
	Because Craig's testimony was not exculpatory to defendant,
we hold that no Brady violation occurred in the case at bar.
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to post-conviction relief
with respect to this claim.

III. Failure to Introduce Mitigation Evidence
	In his final argument, defendant contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to attempt to introduce in mitigation at
defendant's sentencing hearing the statement given by defendant
to police on January 24, 1992. As discussed earlier in this opinion,
in the January 24, 1992, statement, defendant claimed that he did
not shoot Muto. The State successfully argued the inadmissability
of that statement at the guilt phase of defendant's trial. However,
the trial court advised defense counsel that any objection to that
ruling could be renewed at the sentencing hearing. Defendant
argues that his counsel's failure to attempt to introduce this
statement at the sentencing hearing constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
	We have considered and rejected this argument on
defendant's direct appeal. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 75-77. As such,
principles of res judicata bar reconsideration of this issue, and we
therefore decline to address it.

CONCLUSION
	In light of the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
judgment dismissing without an evidentiary hearing defendant's
amended petition for post-conviction relief. We direct the clerk of
this court to enter an order setting Thursday, January 17, 2002, as
the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court
of Stephenson County shall be carried out. Defendant shall be
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West
1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the
mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of
Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution
where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	The majority's attempt to find sanity in Burt's insistence on
pleading guilty illustrates why our system of capital punishment
has fallen into such disrepute. Demanding to enter an open guilty
plea in the middle of a trial, over counsel's objections, where the
State is seeking the death penalty and the nature of the underlying
charges is such that death eligibility is certain, is an inherently
irrational act. It is tantamount to requesting an immediate death
warrant. It is something no clear thinking person would ever do.
Once trial was underway, a clear thinking person would heed his
lawyer's advice, recognize that he had nothing to lose, and take his
chances with the jury. At a minimum, he would attempt to extract
some kind of concessions from the prosecution in exchange for his
plea, including an agreement to forgo the death penalty.
	Burt did none of that. It is interesting that the majority's
disposition leaves out why. This is not a situation where the
defendant searched his soul and abandoned his defense because he
knew he was guilty and wanted to make a swift peace with his
maker. Apparently, Burt just wanted to take a smoke. This is no
exaggeration. According to one of Burt's attorneys, Burt's abrupt
decision to change his plea from not guilty to guilty was motivated
by his desire to leave the county jail, where smoking was banned,
and return to the Department of Corrections, where smoking was
permitted.
	Considering Burt's psychiatric history, low IQ, brain
impairment and drug addiction, there is a real question as to
whether he ever possessed the ability to think rationally. There can
be no real doubt, however, that whatever decisionmaking sense he
possessed abandoned him during trial. Burt suffered from frequent
mood swings, he complained of feeling "burned out," he feared
snakes in his cell and reported hearing voices in his head. He
became belligerent, and he ingested large doses of psychotropic
medication throughout the period between his arrest and
sentencing. Something was clearly wrong. Under the law in effect
at the time, the trial court had a duty to determine what it was (725
ILCS 5/l04-11(a), 104-21(a) (West 1992); People v. Brandon,
162 Ill. 2d 450, 456 (1994)), but no fitness hearing was ever held.
	The majority's efforts to justify that result ring hollow. No
matter how artfully the legal precedent is strung together, the fact
remains that the capital punishment system failed here as we have
seen it fail so often in recent years. It is time to abandon the
pretense. History has moved on. The failure of our present system
of capital punishment is documented and indisputable. That is why
our court is no longer entrusted to have the final say on when men
are put to death. It is why the Governor has declared a moratorium
on executions.
	The issue our court should consider now is what to do next.
The court has enacted a comprehensive set of new rules governing
the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death
penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in
People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 35-39 (September 27,
2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), I believe that the procedures
contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an
accurate determination of innocence or guilt and should be applied
to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Burt was tried,
convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his
convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause
should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Burt were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules,
his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in
my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and
unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Burt's
sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West
1998). Because he was convicted of murdering more than one
victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998).
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I agree with Chief
Justice Harrison that defendant's convictions and sentence should
be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in
accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital
cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases
prior to this court's adoption of the new rules were inherently
unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant's
constitutional rights. For this reason, the new rules should be
applied retroactively to all capital defendants' direct and post-conviction appeals.
	The case at hand presents a number of examples of why all
capital defendants must have the benefit of the new rules. First,
without casting any aspersions upon defendant's trial attorneys,
the two court-appointed attorneys had no prior capital litigation
experience. The attorneys readily acknowledged their lack of
experience and requested that the trial court relieve them of their
appointments. Second, the attorneys also conceded their lack of
knowledge of the Illinois statutory provisions providing for fitness
hearings for defendants taking psychotropic medications. Third, as
noted by Chief Justice Harrison, the defendant unexpectedly pled
guilty over the objection of counsel, yet there is no explanation of
why counsel could not or did not procure any concessions from the
State in return for defendant's guilty plea, such as an agreement
not to seek the death penalty. See People v. Burt, No. 86898, slip
op. at 16 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Each of these examples is a
type of deficiency commonly tolerated under the old system and
thoroughly addressed by the new rules. Since defendant was tried,
convicted and sentenced to death without the benefit of the new
rules, I respectfully dissent.