Title: State v. Brown

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4623.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4623 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BROWN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4623.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2919.21(B)—Failure to provide support pursuant to a court’s 
order—A defendant may be charged with nonpayment of support under 
R.C. 2919.21(B) when conduct underlying charge occurred while a support 
order was in effect, even if defendant’s child is emancipated at time charge 
is brought, so long as statute of limitations has not run and statute’s other 
elements are met—Trial court erred in dismissing the charges simply 
because appellant’s child had been emancipated at time appellant was 
charged—State v. Pittman distinguished—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2019-0737—Submitted May 13, 2020—Decided September 30, 2020.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Greene County, 
No. 2018-CA-29, 2019-Ohio-1666. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
Introduction 
{¶ 1} This appeal concerns charges filed against appellant, Chalmer Brown, 
for failure to pay court-ordered child support under R.C. 2919.21(B).  The trial 
court dismissed the charges based on our decision in State v. Pittman, 150 Ohio 
St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-8314, 79 N.E.3d 531, but the Second District Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that Pittman does not apply to the present case.  We 
agree with the Second District.  We therefore affirm its judgment and answer the 
certified-conflict question in the affirmative. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 2} In August 2001, the Greene County Juvenile Court ordered Brown to 
pay $87 a month in child support for K.M., his child.  In December 2017, the Greene 
County Child Support Enforcement Agency emancipated K.M. as of September 13, 
2017, and the juvenile court ordered Brown to pay $117 a month in arrearages. 
{¶ 3} In January 2018, appellee, the state of Ohio, charged Brown in Xenia 
Municipal Court with two counts of nonsupport of dependents under 
R.C. 2919.21(B).  At that time, R.C. 2919.21(B) provided that “[n]o person shall 
abandon, or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person 
whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally obligated to support.”  2015 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64.1  According to the charging document, Count I was based on 
nonpayment between July and December of 2016 and Count II was based on 
nonpayment between January 2017 and the effective date of K.M.’s emancipation 
in September 2017. 
{¶ 4} Brown moved to dismiss, arguing that he could not be prosecuted for 
violating R.C. 2919.21(B), because he was not subject to a legal order for support 
                                                 
1. R.C. 2919.21(B) was materially amended effective February 11, 2019.  See 2018 Sub.S.B. No. 
70.  This case concerns only the version of the statute in effect between January 1, 2016, and 
February 11, 2019. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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at the time he was charged.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the charges based 
on its reading of our decision in Pittman, 150 Ohio St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-8314, 79 
N.E.3d 531.  In Pittman, we affirmed the dismissal of charges under 
R.C. 2919.21(B) against a defendant who had failed to make payments required by 
an arrearages order.  That conclusion was compelled, we held, by the present-tense 
nature of the language in R.C. 2919.21(B): “[b]ecause the statute uses the present 
tense in the phrase ‘is legally obligated to support,’ a person charged with a 
violation must be under a current obligation to provide support.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Pittman at ¶ 18, quoting former R.C. 2919.21(B), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 352, 
147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2606, 2659.  The trial court in the present case relied on 
the additional statement in Pittman that “Pittman’s criminal liability for 
nonpayment of support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children were 
emancipated,” id. at ¶ 19.  Because K.M. was emancipated at the time charges 
against Brown were brought, the trial court held that Pittman barred the charges. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Second District reversed.  It distinguished Pittman on 
the ground that the charges against Pittman were based on nonpayment under an 
arrearages order in effect after his children’s emancipation, whereas the charges 
against Brown were based on nonpayment under the 2001 order of support that was 
in effect before K.M.’s emancipation.  The fact that K.M. was emancipated at the 
time Brown was charged simply did not matter, because the charged conduct took 
place at a time when the support order was in effect—between July and December 
2016 for Count I and between January 2017 and September 13, 2017, for Count II.  
The Second District therefore reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges 
against Brown and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
{¶ 6} The Second District certified the existence of a conflict between its 
judgment in this case and the Eleventh District’s judgment in State v. Hubbard, 
2018-Ohio-3627, 119 N.E.3d 798 (11th Dist.).  In Hubbard, the Eleventh District 
vacated the defendant’s convictions under R.C. 2919.21(B) based on its view that 
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Pittman required the state to bring the charges before the defendant’s child was 
emancipated.  The Second District certified that its judgment conflicts with 
Hubbard on the following question: 
 
May a child support obligor be prosecuted for failure to pay child 
support under R.C. 2919.21(B) where a child support order was in 
place for the time period specified in the charging document, but the 
charging document was filed after the child for whom support was 
owed had been emancipated and the child support obligation had 
terminated? 
 
2019-Ohio-1666, 135 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 12.  We recognized the conflict.  156 Ohio 
St.3d 1491, 2019-Ohio-3263, 129 N.E.3d 475. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law.  State v. Straley, 
139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 9.  We therefore review 
the Second District’s decision de novo.  Id. 
{¶ 8} Brown argues that the holding of Pittman prohibits the state from 
bringing charges under R.C. 2919.21(B) once the obligor’s child has been 
emancipated.  He relies on our observation in Pittman that the statute uses the 
present tense—proscribing nonpayment when an obligor “is legally obligated to 
[provide] support”—as well as our statement in Pittman that “Pittman’s criminal 
liability for nonpayment of support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children 
were emancipated,” 150 Ohio St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-8314, 79 N.E.3d 531, at ¶ 19.  
Brown argues that when viewed together, Pittman and the statutory language 
establish that charges under R.C. 2919.21(B) must be filed while a support order is 
still in effect.  He also points out that emancipation of an obligor’s child does not 
mean that the obligor cannot be charged for wrongful conduct under another 
January Term, 2020 
 
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statute—for example, R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) (providing at the time Brown was 
charged that “[n]o person shall abandon, or fail to provide adequate support to  
* * * [t]he person’s child who is under age eighteen, or [the person’s] mentally or 
physically handicapped child who is under age twenty-one,” 2015 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 64).  For these reasons, Brown argues, the Hubbard court correctly applied 
Pittman to bar charges brought after the defendant’s child has been emancipated. 
{¶ 9} The state responds by focusing on the language of the statute, which 
sets out the elements of the offense.  Relevant here, former R.C. 2919.21(B) 
prohibited a person’s failure to provide support to “another person whom, by court 
order or decree, the person is legally obligated to support.”  2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
64.  The element contained in the present-tense phrase “is legally obligated to 
support” is met, the state argues, when the nonpayment occurs at a time when a 
support order was in effect.  The state contends that whether the obligor’s child has 
been emancipated at the time charges are brought is irrelevant under the language 
of R.C. 2919.21(B).  Accordingly, the state argues that the Second District correctly 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges against Brown because the 
charges were based on conduct that took place while Brown’s support order was in 
effect.  And Pittman does not change that conclusion, the state contends, because 
the conduct underlying the charges in Pittman occurred at a time when only an 
arrearages order was in effect. 
{¶ 10} We agree with the state.  As the state correctly notes, “[a]n offense 
is committed when every element of the offense occurs,” R.C. 2901.13(E).  A plain 
reading of the version of R.C. 2919.21(B) that was in effect at the times relevant to 
this case shows that the offense is committed when a person fails to make a payment 
required by a support order then in effect.  That is the meaning of the statute’s use 
of the present tense in the phrase “is legally obligated to support.”  If the support 
order is subsequently rescinded due to the child’s emancipation, the state may still 
charge the person under R.C. 2919.21(B) for the person’s failure to make payments 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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required by the support order when it was in effect as long as the statute of 
limitations has not passed. 
{¶ 11} When former R.C. 2919.21(B) is applied to this case, it is clear that 
the trial court erred by dismissing the charges simply because K.M. had been 
emancipated at the time Brown was charged.  The support order was in effect 
between 2001 and September 13, 2017, the date of K.M.’s emancipation.  Both 
counts against Brown were based on nonpayment before September 13, 2017.  
Brown does not argue that the statute of limitations has run on either count.  As a 
result, the charging documents sufficiently allege that the nonpayment relates to 
another person the obligor “is legally obligated to support” as required by 
R.C. 2919.21(B). 
{¶ 12} Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from Pittman.  In 
Pittman, the defendant was subject to a support order starting in 1989.  150 Ohio 
St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-8314, 79 N.E.3d 531, at ¶ 2.  His children were emancipated 
on August 31, 2006, and the support order was terminated as of that date.  Id. at ¶ 3.  
The defendant was further required to pay arrearages pursuant to an order entered 
in November 2006.  Id.  When he failed to make arrearage payments required by 
that order, he was charged with nonpayment of support under R.C. 2919.21(B).  Id. 
at ¶ 5. 
{¶ 13} This court considered the validity of two charges against Pittman 
based on nonpayment between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009—after the 
emancipation of his children.  We stated that the use of the present tense in the 
phrase “is legally obligated to support” in former R.C. 2919.21(B) meant that “a 
person charged with a violation must be under a current obligation to provide 
support.”  Id. at ¶ 18.  We therefore determined that the charges were unlawful 
because they were based on conduct that took place at a time when the defendant 
was not subject to a support order:  “The 2006 orders were not for support but 
instead granted judgments against Pittman for the arrearage amounts.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  
January Term, 2020 
 
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That is materially different from the present case, in which the charges are for 
conduct committed when Brown was subject to a support order. 
{¶ 14} We also reject Brown’s argument that Pittman compels a different 
conclusion based on our statement that “Pittman’s criminal liability for nonpayment 
of support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children were emancipated,” id.  
This statement is best understood as indicating that insofar as Pittman failed to 
make a payment under the arrearages order entered after his children were 
emancipated, he could not be charged under R.C. 2919.21(B), because the 
arrearages order was not a current support order issued prior to emancipation for 
purposes of the statute. 
{¶ 15} Based on the language of the statute, we hold that a defendant may 
be charged with nonpayment of support under R.C. 2919.21(B) when the conduct 
underlying the charge occurred while a support order was in effect, even if the child 
of the defendant is emancipated at the time the charge is brought, so long as the 
statute of limitations has not run and the other elements of the statute are met. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} For these reasons, we answer the certified-conflict question in the 
affirmative, and we affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
_________________ 
Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher 
A. Murray, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Adam James Stout, for appellant. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. 
Walton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien. 
SUPREME COURT OF O1110