Title: State ex rel. Sanford v. Bureau of Sentence Computation

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8723.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8723 
THE STATE EX REL. SANFORD, APPELLANT, v. BUREAU OF SENTENCE 
COMPUTATION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, Slip 
Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8723.] 
Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel Bureau of Sentence computation 
to calculate time served under a state sentence as if the sentence were 
served concurrently with a federal sentence—Dismissal of petition for writ 
affirmed. 
(No. 2017-0014—Submitted June 20, 2017—Decided November 30, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 16AP-276, 2016-Ohio-7872. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, John W. Sanford, appeals the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals’ dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus.  We affirm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Background 
{¶ 2} Sanford’s complaint sets forth the following facts, which, for 
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals was required to accept as 
true.  In June 1992, Sanford was convicted of murder in Wood County, Ohio.  State 
v. Sanford, Wood C.P. No. 91-CR-238 (June 5, 1992).  The judgment entry 
sentenced Sanford to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction to be imprisoned for an indefinite term of a minimum of 15 years to life, 
to be served consecutively to the sentence defendant was then serving on federal 
charges. 
{¶ 3} On February 19, 2016, Sanford commenced the present action against 
appellee, Bureau of Sentence Computation (“BSC”), in the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals.1  Sanford requested a writ of mandamus to compel BSC to calculate his 
time served under his state sentence as if the sentence were being served 
concurrently with—not consecutively to—the federal sentence. 
{¶ 4} BSC filed a motion to dismiss.  The court of appeals accepted the 
magistrate’s recommendation to grant the motion.  Sanford timely appealed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} At the time of Sanford’s sentencing, former R.C. 2929.41, 143 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 1307, 1438, provided: 
 
(A)  Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a 
sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any 
other sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, 
another state, or the United States. In any case, a sentence of 
                                                 
1 The case was initially filed in the Sixth District Court of Appeals as State ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. 
of Sentence Computation, 6th Dist. No. 2016 WD 0008, but it was dismissed without prejudice.  
Sanford appears to have refiled the same document in the Tenth District without changing the 
caption. 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
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imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with a 
sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state or federal 
penal or reformatory institution. 
(B)  A sentence of imprisonment shall be served 
consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment, in the 
following cases: 
(1)  When the trial court specifies that it is to be served 
consecutively. 
 
Thus, under that law, a sentencing court could designate a second sentence to run 
consecutively to “any other sentence of imprisonment.”  Sanford contends that as a 
matter of statutory definition, incarceration on a federal crime did not qualify as 
“any other sentence of imprisonment.” 
{¶ 6} The plain language of former R.C. 2929.41 disproves Sanford’s 
claim.  The first sentence in division (A) referred to “a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed by * * * the United States.”  Thus, the statute plainly included federal 
sentences as one type of “sentence of imprisonment.”  Sanford’s argument would 
prevail only if use of the phrase in division (B) was construed differently than the 
use of the same phrase in division (A), which is an absurd suggestion. 
{¶ 7} Sanford’s reliance on R.C. 1.05(A) to reach a contrary result is 
misplaced.  That provision defines “imprisoned” as confinement in a state, county, 
municipal, or other nonfederal facility.  But R.C. 1.05(A) has a caveat: the 
definition it provides applies “unless the context otherwise requires.”  As shown in 
the previous paragraph, the context of former R.C. 2929.41 requires otherwise. 
{¶ 8} Alternatively, Sanford points to former R.C. 2929.41(C)(1), 143 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, at 1439, which spells out how to calculate minimum and maximum 
terms “[w]hen consecutive sentences of imprisonment are imposed for felony under 
division (B)(1).”  Sanford assumes that “imposed for felony” meant a felony under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Ohio law and therefore subdivision (B)(1) could not apply to a federal felony 
sentence.  But of course nothing in subdivision (C)(1) limits the consecutive 
sentences to only those circumstances involving two state convictions. 
{¶ 9} Finally, Sanford argues that running his two sentences consecutively 
violates equal protection and due process.  Sanford raised this argument for the first 
time in his objections to the magistrate’s recommendation.  He did not raise 
constitutional arguments in his complaint or in his pleadings in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss.  In an original action for mandamus, an issue raised for the first 
time in objections to the magistrate’s decision, without having appeared in the 
complaint, has been waived.  State ex rel. Durbin v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 10AP-712, 2012-Ohio-664, ¶ 10, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 10} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
John W. Sanford, pro se. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Kelly N. Brogan, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
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