Title: State v. Atkins

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 9A94
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RANDY LYNN ATKINS
Appeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-
27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by
Saunders, J., at the 29 November 1993 Criminal Session of
Superior Court, Buncombe County.  Additionally, defendant appeals
from an order denying his motion for appropriate relief entered
by Ferrell, J., on 16 May 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court 27
May 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by G. Patrick Murphy,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Kenneth J. Rose, for
defendant-appellant.
LAKE, Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 12 April 1993 for first-degree
sexual offense and for the first-degree murder of his eight-
month-old son, Lyle James Atkins.  On 18 November 1993, defendant
entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty
to the first-degree murder charge and the State agreed to dismiss
the pending sexual offense charge and not to submit any evidence
pertaining to this or any other sexual assaults purportedly
committed by defendant.  Following a capital sentencing
proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended
that defendant be sentenced to death for the murder of his infant
son.  Judge Saunders sentenced defendant accordingly.
The State presented evidence at the sentencing proceeding
tending to show that, on 16 March 1993, defendant inflicted fatal
injuries to his son, Lyle.  Defendant, Lyle, and Lyle’s mother
were living together at the time at the Lazywood Mobile Home Park
in Buncombe County.
Lyle’s mother, Ms. Colleen Shank, testified that on the
morning of 16 March 1993, she asked defendant to watch Lyle while
she washed some clothes.  Ms. Shank stated that she heard a
“bang.”  Following the “bang,” Ms. Shank heard Lyle begin to cry,
and she rushed to the living room.  Ms. Shank testified that she
then observed defendant hitting Lyle’s head against the trailer
wall a “few times.”  She testified further that she saw defendant
“swing him [Lyle] very strong” and that “Lyle hit the wall very
hard.”  Ms. Shank tried to comfort Lyle and attempted to lay the
child down to rest.  However, Lyle soon began to cry, and Ms.
Shank noted that he was turning blue.  The mother administered
CPR and requested that defendant go to a neighbor’s home to call
911 for emergency assistance.
Defendant then went to the home of a neighbor and called
911.  The 911 operator testified that defendant responded to her
questions concerning medical history related to Lyle’s emergency
by replying “it [Lyle] may have been sick two or three days, but
no other.”  Lyle’s mother testified that while waiting for
emergency personnel to arrive, defendant told her, “Don’t say
anything, because I will hurt you too.”
Following the arrival of emergency medical personnel, Lyle
was transported by helicopter to Mission Memorial Hospital in
Asheville.  Upon admission to the hospital, Lyle was noted to be
limp, not moving, and exhibiting a slow heart rate.  The
admitting physician noted numerous injuries to the small child,
including bruising on both sides of his head, an older bruise on
his left elbow, bruising on his right wrist and right hand, a
deformation of his pelvis, and an improperly healed fracture of 
his right lower leg.
A detective from the Woodfin Police Department questioned
defendant and Ms. Shank in the waiting room of the hospital. 
Defendant initially told the officer that Lyle had stopped
breathing “because of the Ker-O-Sun heater.”  Defendant responded
to the officer’s further inquiry by adding that “a couple of days
ago I was holding him, and he slipped and fell, and he hurt his
arm.”  The officer subsequently arrested both defendant and Ms.
Shank and transported them to the Buncombe County jail.  Later
that day, while in police custody, defendant issued a written
statement in which he admitted the following:
Today Lyle was crying as I was holding him, and my
temper and patience snapped again, as he was crying and
crying no matter how soothing and gentle I was.  He
just kept crying, and I couldn’t handle him any more,
and I started hitting him on the side of his head and
trying to get him to stop crying, and he wouldn’t.  I
kept telling him to stop it, and he wouldn’t, and I
kept on hitting him with my hand on his head.
  
Despite aggressive medical efforts to save Lyle’s life, he
died at Asheville’s Mission Memorial Hospital on 18 March 1993. 
Following Lyle’s death, defendant was indicted for the first-
degree murder of his infant son.  Defendant entered into a plea
agreement dated 18 November 1993, consenting to a guilty plea to
first-degree murder.  As a condition to the plea, the State
agreed to dismiss the first-degree sexual assault charge pending
against defendant.
A capital sentencing proceeding was held in Superior Court,
Buncombe County, beginning on 29 November 1993.  The State
presented evidence in support of one statutory aggravating
circumstance:  that the murder was “especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1988) (amended
1994).  An experienced pediatric radiologist testified at the
sentencing proceeding concerning the extent of injuries suffered
by Lyle.  The testimony indicated that the eight-month-old infant
exhibited the following injuries upon admission to Mission
Memorial Hospital on 16 March 1993:  healing fracture of the
right clavicle, healing bone along the midshaft of the right
upper arm, extensive injury of the left upper arm, dislocation of
the left elbow, healing bone indicative of a fracture of the
right hip, skull fractures and bruising on both the left and
right sides, and a compression fracture of the spine.  Further
testimony indicated that the injuries occurred in at least two
episodes of injury to Lyle.  The pediatric radiologist estimated
that the time of the origin of injuries ranged from four weeks
prior to the hospital admission up to within a day of the
admission.  Several treating physicians also testified at the
sentencing proceeding that Lyle exhibited symptoms of “battered
child syndrome.”  The State presented expert testimony by Dr.
Cynthia Brown, a pediatrician, who defined a “battered child” as
a “child that presents with multiple purposely inflicted injuries
that are of varying ages.”
Defendant presented evidence of twenty-five potential
mitigating circumstances in addition to the statutory “catchall”
mitigating circumstance during the capital sentencing proceeding. 
The jury rejected all but two of these potential mitigating
circumstances, finding only (1) “the [d]efendant qualifies as
having a learning disability due to his IQ variations,” and (2)
“the [d]efendant was diagnosed by Dr. Clabe Lynn in April of 1993
as having a personality disorder and adjustment disorder with a
mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct.”  On 8 December 1993,
the jury unanimously recommended that defendant be sentenced to
death.
On 21 June 1995, defendant filed a motion for appropriate
relief, and this Court remanded the motion in order that an
evidentiary hearing could be held.  At the 11 December 1996
session of Superior Court, Buncombe County, Judge Ronald K. Payne
denied defendant’s motion for discovery of all documents in the
State’s possession concerning the case, including attorney work-
product material.  This Court denied review of this order on 15
January 1997.  An evidentiary hearing was conducted at the 10
March 1997 session of Superior Court, Buncombe County, Judge
Forrest A. Ferrell presiding.  By order dated 16 May 1997,
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief was denied.  Defendant
appeals the denial of this motion to this Court, along with his
sentence of death for the first-degree murder.  We consider both
in this review.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred by permitting the State to enter into a plea
agreement requiring the court to withhold evidence in support of
an aggravating circumstance.  Defendant argues that evidence of
the first-degree sexual offense was relevant to two statutory
aggravating circumstances:  (1) “[t]he capital felony was
committed while the defendant was engaged . . . in the commission
of . . . a sex offense”; and (2) “[t]he capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(5), (9).  Defendant asserts that the plea agreement
creates reversible error, as it introduces an impermissible,
arbitrary factor into capital sentencing proceedings, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina
Constitution.  We hold that the plea agreement did not preclude
the introduction of aggravating circumstances supported by the
evidence, and therefore the trial court did not err by accepting
the agreement.
Defendant is correct to note that this Court has held a
district attorney may not exercise his discretion as to when an
aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence will or will
not be submitted to the jury.  See State v. Case, 330 N.C. 161,
163, 410 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1991).  The mandatory submission of all
statutory aggravating circumstances is necessary to ensure the
integrity of the capital sentencing procedure and “to prevent
capital sentencing from being irregular, inconsistent and
arbitrary.”  Id.
However, the principle enunciated by this Court in Case is
clearly contingent upon the presence of genuine evidence
supporting the statutory aggravating circumstances.  Id.  In the
case sub judice, the plea agreement did not require the trial
court to withhold submission of a statutory aggravating
circumstance supported by credible evidence.  The uncontroverted
medical evidence indicated that Lyle endured an extended series
of beatings, resulting in broken bones and bruises.  Expert
testimony further indicated that these injuries occurred during a
four-week period prior to Lyle’s death on 18 March 1993.  The
only evidence indicating a potential sexual assault was the
presence of a relaxed rectal sphincter.  The evidence relating to
this potential sexual offense indicated that the relaxed
sphincter was present in January 1993, two months prior to Lyle’s
murder.  There was no apparent connection between this prior
condition and the circumstances leading to or causing Lyle’s
death.  The total absence of evidence indicating any sexual
offense during the four-week period of physical abuse and battery
that caused Lyle’s death leads to the inevitable conclusion that
the trial court did not err by accepting the plea agreement which
excluded evidence detrimental to defendant.  We hold that
defendant’s initial assignment of error is without merit.
In his second assignment of error, defendant asserts  the
trial court erred by permitting evidence and argument as to
whether various medical experts had seen injuries as severe as
those exhibited by Lyle.  Over defense objections, four medical
experts individually testified as to the severity of the victim’s
injuries in comparison to other injuries occurring to other
children which the experts had treated in their respective
medical practices.  Dr. Jon Silver, a neurosurgeon, testified
that Lyle’s injuries were worse than the injuries sustained by a
child he had previously treated who had been run over by a
tractor.  Dr. Robert Wiggins, a pediatric ophthalmologist,
indicated that he had seen only one other patient with retinal
hemorrhages as severe as Lyle’s.  Dr. David Merten, a pediatric
radiologist, testified that, “In the twenty-two years that I have
been doing pediatric radiology and in the nine years that I
practiced pediatrics before becoming a pediatric radiologist, I
have never seen as extensive bone injuries as this baby had.” 
Dr. Cynthia Brown, the pediatrician initially responsible for
Lyle’s care upon his hospital admission on 16 March 1993,
testified that Lyle was “probably the most severely battered
child I’ve ever seen.”
Defendant contends that the admission of such comparative
expert testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial.  Defendant
asserts that allowing the introduction of such expert testimony
potentially opens a Pandora’s box, ultimately leading to battles
among experts over the limits of their subjective experiences
supporting or denying a description of a particular event as
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  Defendant suggests
the trial court should have limited the evidence and testimony to
the issue of whether the injuries to Lyle were caused by a
brutality greater than that normally found in other first-degree
murder cases, not whether the injuries were worse than other
injuries encountered in particular medical experts’ prior
experiences.  We conclude the admission of such comparative
expert testimony was not error, as defendant has misstated the
purpose and relevance of the testimony.
Admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing proceeding
is not subject to a strict application of the rules of evidence,
but depends on the reliability and relevance of the proffered
evidence.  State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 451 S.E.2d 211 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).  However,
even strict application of the evidentiary rules supports the
admission of the testimony offered by Drs. Silver, Wiggins,
Merten and Brown.  The expert medical testimony in question fully
comports with the standards set forth in Rule 702, which
provides, “If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education[] may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.” 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(1) (1992).  Drs. Silver, Wiggins,
Merten and Brown all qualified as expert witnesses based upon the
standard set forth in Rule 702.  The State submitted only one
aggravating circumstance supporting a sentence of death, that the
crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  The State
bore the ultimate burden of establishing the presence of the
(e)(9) aggravating circumstance by showing that the brutality of
Lyle’s death exceeded that normally present in a homicide.  See
State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).  The trial
court appropriately allowed the State to present testimony and
evidence attempting to quantify and qualify the extent of
injuries sustained and thus the amount or degree of suffering
endured by Lyle.  Comparisons of the extent of Lyle’s injuries in
relation to other injuries previously treated by the respective
physicians clearly was evidence of a matter “relevant to
sentence,” which the trial court correctly deemed to have
“probative value” in assisting the jury in evaluating the sole
aggravating circumstance.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(3).  The trial
court did not permit the State to usurp the jury’s function by
eliciting expert testimony that Lyle’s death met the standard set
forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) as “especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.”  Rather, the trial court simply allowed
comparative expert testimony, within the frame of the experts’
experiences, which provided a measure or benchmark for the jury’s
consideration.  We hold that the trial court did not commit error
by permitting this testimony.
In his third assignment of error, defendant asserts the
trial court erred by excluding potential mitigating testimony by
Department of Social Services worker Audrey Bryant.  The
testimony concerned an interview the social worker conducted with
defendant while he was in police custody.  Defendant contends the
social worker should have been allowed to testify that defendant
was distraught, was suffering from emotional distress and was
suicidal.  Defendant suggests that this excluded testimony was
essential to contradict evidence presented by the State depicting
defendant as remorseless.
The trial court limited the testimony as follows:
Q.  Was there any indication of a suicide attempt [by
defendant] or threat concerning that time?
A.  I was told that there was.
[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection; move to strike.
[THE] COURT:  Sustained; disregard, members of the
jury.
Q.  When you interviewed Mr. Atkins, was the door open
or shut?
A.  It was open.
Q.  And why was that?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection, calls for hearsay.
[THE] COURT:  Sustained.
Q.  Was there anyone else present within a few feet or
so of you during your interview?
A.  There was a deputy outside the door.
Q.  And why was that?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection; calls for hearsay.
[THE] COURT:  Sustained.
Defendant did not make an offer of proof developing the
witness’s responses to the questioning.  Accordingly, defendant
has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review according
to the standard set forth in N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).  We
do not agree that the substance of the excluded testimony was
necessarily “apparent from the context within which questions
were asked” and that therefore no offer of proof was necessary to
preserve this issue for appeal.  Although the initial thrust of
the questioning related to suicide, the substance of Ms. Bryant’s
full testimony in response is not readily apparent.  Ms. Bryant
may very well have responded to the inquiries by stating that she
did not know why the cell door was open or why an officer was
stationed outside the cell.  It is speculative for this Court to
attempt to presume her testimony.
Assuming arguendo that this issue had been properly
preserved and that the testimony may have indicated a suicide
threat and arguably remorse by defendant, the exclusion of this
testimony did not amount to prejudicial error.  Our review of the
record and transcript indicates that the trial court did not
restrict defendant’s counsel from inquiring as to Ms. Bryant’s
personal observations concerning defendant’s demeanor and
emotional state at the time of her interview.  Moreover, to the
extent the desired result from this testimony was evidence of
defendant’s history or an incident of attempting suicide, such
evidence was introduced through the testimony of Dr. Joseph
Horacek.  Defendant also was free to seek testimony from
correctional officers to verify a potential or actual suicide
threat, rather than trying to introduce this impression by Ms.
Bryant’s hearsay testimony.  Defendant chose not to pursue these
avenues, and we thus hold that the trial court properly exercised
its discretion in excluding the testimony, which had no
mitigating value.
In his fourth assignment of error, defendant contends  the
trial court erred by denying him the right to confront a witness
testifying against him.  Specifically, defendant contends  the
trial court improperly limited his ability to impeach the
testimony of the State’s primary witness at the sentencing
proceeding, Lyle’s mother, Colleen Shank.  The trial court
refused to permit defendant’s counsel to inquire of Ms. Shank as
to whether she could receive the death penalty for her
involvement in Lyle’s death.
Defendant asserts that this Court’s holding in State v.
Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997), should mandate an
order directing a new capital sentencing proceeding.  In
Prevatte, this Court ordered a new sentencing hearing following a
review of a trial court decision denying the defendant the
opportunity to ask a prosecution witness about promises or
expectations of preferential treatment in the resolution of
pending charges against the witness.  We conclude that, in the
matter sub judice, the trial court properly restricted the
questioning of Colleen Shank and did not thereby deny defendant
the opportunity to confront a witness against him.
The trial court allowed exactly the type of questioning
mandated by Prevatte.  A review of the record reveals the
following testimony:
Q.  What are you charged with in this case?
A.  Aiding and abetting first-degree murder.
Q.  So you can’t get the death penalty, can you?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Objection.
A.  I don’t know.
THE COURT:  Sustained. It’s a question of law.
Q.  What kind of promises, Ms. Shank, has the State
made you in exchange for your testimony?
A.  None.
Defendant was clearly allowed to inquire into any potential
bias of Ms. Shank based upon any arrangement between the witness
and the prosecution.  The trial court properly sustained an
objection to a question that required Ms. Shank to reach a legal
conclusion.  The trial court specifically allowed inquiry into
any potential arrangement, and Ms. Shank responded that no such
arrangement existed.  It is entirely proper for a trial court, in
the exercise of its discretion, to sustain an objection calling
for the legal knowledge of a lay witness.  State v. Mason, 295
N.C. 584, 248 S.E.2d 241 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984, 60
L. Ed. 2d 246 (1979); accord State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482, 206
S.E.2d 229 (1974).  We hold that the trial court committed no
error by refusing to allow the questions posed to Ms. Shank
concerning her potential punishment.
In his fifth assignment of error, defendant contends  the
trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury
not to consider parole in its deliberations, thus violating this
Court’s holding in State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584
(1955).  During voir dire, a prospective alternate juror
expressed concern about his ability to make a sentencing decision
based only upon the facts and the law unless he could be assured
that a life sentence included a stipulation that there could be
no parole.  Based upon this expression, the trial court properly
excused the prospective juror for cause.  Defendant contends this
discussion, which took place in the presence of the other jurors,
triggered a duty for the trial court to issue a “life means life”
instruction.
Defendant did not request that the trial court give a  “life
means life” instruction following the prospective juror’s
comments.  Defendant’s failure to raise this issue constitutes
waiver under Rule 10(b)(2).  This Court has applied the plain
error analysis only to instructions to the jury and evidentiary
matters.  We decline to extend application of the plain error
doctrine to situations in which the trial court has failed to
give an instruction during jury voir dire which has not been
requested.  Accordingly, we conclude that this assignment of
error is without merit.
In his sixth assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to comment on
defendant’s post-arrest silence, in violation of his 
constitutional right to remain silent.  The State presented
testimony from a Buncombe County police officer who indicated
that defendant did not express remorse when informed that Lyle
had died.  According to the testimony, defendant responded to the
news of Lyle’s death by stating, “You don’t know how they’re
treating me in here. You don’t know how bad it is in the jail.” 
The prosecutor commented on defendant’s callous response to
Lyle’s death during his closing argument, noting, “He didn’t say
‘I’m sorry.’  He didn’t say, ‘Bless that baby’s heart.’  He said,
‘You don’t know how tough it is where I’m staying.’  That was his
statement.  Now, if he felt remorse, you don’t think there’s
[sic] been some mention of that?”
This Court has consistently recognized that, as a general
rule, “[p]rosecutors are granted wide latitude in the scope of
their argument.”  State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 253, 357 S.E.2d
898, 911, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 959, 98 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1987). 
Counsel may properly argue “the facts in evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.”  State v.
Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 112, 322 S.E.2d 110, 123 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985).  A prosecutor may
not, however, refer to a defendant’s election to exercise his
constitutional right not to testify.  Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976); State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551, 434
S.E.2d 193 (1993).
We do not find that the comments and testimony challenged by
defendant impermissibly address defendant’s choice to exercise
his right to remain silent or not to testify.  The comments were
clearly directed toward providing an accurate portrayal of
defendant’s emotionless response to Lyle’s death.  This evidence
was relevant and necessary to adequately support the State’s
contention that the jury should assign no mitigating value to the
submitted circumstance that “[t]he defendant is remorseful.”  The
testimony in question and the prosecutor’s closing comments did
not focus on defendant’s decision to remain silent.  The comments
simply drew attention to the relevant evidence of defendant’s
conduct and voluntary statements following his receipt of the
news of Lyle’s death.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
properly permitted this argument, and this assignment of error is
overruled.
In his seventh assignment of error, defendant asserts the
trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of defendant’s
expert witness concerning fees charged by the expert, as well as
the expert’s role in two other death-penalty appeals.  Defendant
further contends the trial court permitted the prosecutor to
distort the expert’s testimony by characterizing the witness as a
“hired gun” attempting to overturn death-penalty sentences on
appeal.  Defendant also suggests that the mention of Dr.
Horacek’s potential role in an appeal in the prosecutor’s closing
argument mandates the award of a new sentencing proceeding under
State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979).
With respect first to the expert witness, the State
appropriately attempted to illustrate a potential source of
witness bias, as revealed by the expert witness’s own curriculum
vitae.  The subject of compensation of a defendant’s expert
witness is clearly an appropriate matter for cross-examination. 
North Carolina’s Rules of Evidence permit cross-examination of a
witness “on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
including credibility.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (1992).  
This Court has additionally stated that the scope of
cross-examination is subject to the control of the trial court,
and “questions must be asked in good faith.”  State v. Williams,
279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971).  Our review of the
trial transcript reveals significant discrepancies between the
diagnosis made by defendant’s psychiatric expert and the
diagnosis reached by the State’s expert.  In view of this, it was
entirely proper to elicit testimony indicative of potential
witness bias.  This Court specifically approved of such inquiry
in State v. Wilson, 335 N.C. 220, 436 S.E.2d 831 (1993).
With respect to mention of the expert’s compensation during
the prosecutor’s closing argument, we further conclude that the
argument did not violate the scope of permissible prosecutorial
conduct.  As we held in State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 367 S.E.2d
626 (1988):
“[C]ounsel must be allowed wide latitude in the
argument of hotly contested cases.  He may argue to the
jury the facts in evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom together with the
relevant law, so as to present his side of the case. 
State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 [1975];
State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E.2d 750 [(1974),
death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1205
(1976)].  Whether counsel abuses [t]his privilege is a
matter ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, and we will not review the exercise of
this discretion unless there be such gross impropriety
in the argument as would be likely to influence the
verdict of the jury.”
Allen, 322 N.C. at 195, 367 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting State v.
Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 327-28, 226 S.E.2d 629, 640 (1976)).
When viewed in context of the conflicting evidence
concerning defendant’s psychological condition at the time he
committed his assaults upon Lyle, we determine that it was not a
“gross impropriety” to argue the witness’s potential bias related
to his compensation and his similar participation in other death-
penalty proceedings.
With regard to the mention of appellate review, defendant
misstates the extent of our holding in Jones.  We did not
conclude that every mention of appellate review mandates a new
sentencing proceeding.  Rather, we adopted a “rule precluding any
argument which suggests to the jurors that they can depend on
judicial or executive review to correct an erroneous verdict and
thereby lessen the jurors’ responsibility.”  Jones, 296 N.C. at
502, 251 S.E.2d at 429.  In the case sub judice, the prosecutor’s
argument was intended solely to suggest that Dr. Horacek’s
involvement in numerous criminal cases indicated bias in favor of
defendant.  The argument in no way suggested that jurors could or
should abdicate their responsibility and rely on appellate review
to determine an appropriate sentencing recommendation, as
prohibited by this Court in Jones.  Accordingly, we hold that
defendant’s seventh assignment of error is without merit.
In his eighth assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu to
restrict the prosecutor’s closing argument in several respects. 
Defendant suggests the prosecutor’s closing arguments, when
viewed as a whole, violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1230, as well as
defendant’s rights to due process, fundamental fairness and a
nonarbitrary capital sentencing proceeding.  It is important to
note at the outset that defendant’s counsel did not object to any
portion of the closing argument at the sentencing proceeding. 
When a party fails to object to a closing argument, the appellate
court must decide whether the argument was so improper as to
require the trial court’s intervention ex mero motu.  State v.
Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 457, 302 S.E.2d 740, 747, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 908, 78 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1983).  This Court has further stated
that the trial court is not required to intervene ex mero motu
unless the argument strays so far from the bounds of propriety as
to impede defendant’s right to a fair trial.  State v. Small, 328
N.C. 175, 400 S.E.2d 413 (1991).  A review of the record reveals
the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments were
appropriate when viewed in light of the brutality of the crime
and the fact that the State was seeking the imposition of the
death penalty.
First, defendant suggests the trial court allowed the
prosecutor to misstate North Carolina case law to his prejudice. 
Specifically, defendant argues the prosecutor’s closing argument
misled the jury into concluding that our holding in State v.
Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987), required a finding of
the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating
circumstance in all cases in which the victim did not die
instantly.  Our review of the record reveals that, when viewed in
context, the prosecutor’s closing arguments created no such
impression.  The prosecutor appropriately pointed out the four-
week ordeal of pain and suffering endured by Lyle prior to his
death.  Lyle’s torment was adequately supported by competent
evidence and testimony.  The prosecutor’s reference to Stokes
illustrated that a lingering death may be a factor supporting a
finding of the (e)(9) statutory aggravating circumstance, that
the crime was indeed “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
Continuing his eighth assignment of error, defendant also
contends the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to
characterize mitigating circumstances as, in effect,  aggravating
circumstances.  In this regard, defendant suggests the prosecutor
equated an alleged mental illness with a depraved mind,
attempting to discredit the credibility of the entire psychiatric
profession.  We do not read the prosecutor’s comments in that
manner.  Rather, we discern that the prosecutor suggested to the
jury only that the diagnosis of defendant’s expert psychiatrist
should not be believed.  The prosecutor, in his argument,
contended only that this particular defendant was not mentally
ill; the prosecutor did not contend that all psychiatrists
routinely characterize depravity as a type of mental illness.
Defendant further contends the trial court erred by allowing
the prosecutor to argue law and facts not supported by the
evidence.  As previously discussed, this Court has held that
trial counsel are allowed wide latitude in their arguments to the
jury and may argue any fact in evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn from them.  Craig, 308 N.C. at 454, 302 S.E.2d
at 745.  Our careful review of the record as to each specifically
challenged assertion does not lead us to conclude that the trial
court permitted the argument of any fact which was not either
supported by testimony or reasonable inference from testimony or
based upon established knowledge.  In reviewing the prosecutor’s
closing argument, we must consider the context in which the
remarks were made and the overall factual circumstances to which
they refer.  State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 446 S.E.2d 298
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). 
The prosecutor has a duty to strenuously present the State’s case
and to “‘use every legitimate means to bring about a just
conviction.’”  State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 680, 263 S.E.2d 768,
774 (1980) (quoting State v. Monk, 286 N.C. at 515, 212 S.E.2d at
130).  We also dismiss defendant’s suggestion that the prosecutor
attempted to introduce an additional nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance, the age of the victim.  These assertions by
defendant are without merit.
Continuing his eighth assignment of error, defendant further
argues the trial court erred by allowing the State in closing
argument to distort the meaning and application of mitigating
circumstances.  Specifically, defendant argues the trial court
failed to respond to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law
concerning mitigating circumstances by not giving instructions
designed to clarify and correct the misstatement.  Defendant
challenges the prosecutor’s following statement to the jury: 
“They’ve told you the aggravating has to do with the death. 
Well, so do mitigating.  It has to have something to do with what
happened to that child.”
Defendant is correct in that this comment in the
prosecutor’s argument was not a proper description of North
Carolina law.  A mitigating circumstance does not have to relate
to what happened to the victim but rather may relate to “any
aspect of defendant’s character, record or circumstance of the
particular offense.”  State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 104, 282
S.E.2d 439, 447 (1981) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57
L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978)).  However, as to this comment, we conclude
that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero
motu, in the absence of defense counsel’s objection.  Moreover,
the record reveals the trial court adequately corrected any
possible harm from the prosecutor’s statement by properly
instructing the jury during its charge on what constitutes
mitigating circumstances and the weight to be given to them.
Defendant makes several other contentions of improper
statements by the prosecutor during closing argument.  However,
our careful review finds each statement to be well within the
wide discretion accorded by this Court during closing argument,
within the context of hotly contested cases, and thus we conclude
each contention is without merit.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
In his ninth assignment of error, defendant asserts the
trial court erred by failing to submit the statutory mitigating
circumstance of defendant’s age at the time of the crime.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7).  Notwithstanding the fact that
defendant was twenty-nine years old at the time of the offense,
he argues that there was substantial evidence to support the
mitigating circumstance and that the trial court was required to
submit the issue to the jury.  We conclude that the evidence did
not support the circumstance and that the trial court did not err
by failing to submit the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance.
In support of the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant
elicited the testimony of Dr. Horacek, who stated that defendant
suffered from a dissociative identity disorder, as well as an
attention deficit disorder.  Dr. Horacek further noted that
defendant exhibited a “learning disability profile” and
reportedly spent long periods of time playing Nintendo.  Lyle’s
mother, Colleen Shank, confirmed defendant’s interest in
Nintendo.
When evaluating the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, this
Court has characterized “age” as a “flexible and relative
concept.”  State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 393, 346 S.E.2d 596,
624 (1986).  We have also noted that “the chronological age of a
defendant is not the determinative factor under G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(7).”  State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 372, 307 S.E.2d
304, 332 (1983).  However, while defendant has presented evidence
that he suffered from conditions or disorders commonly found in
adolescents and participated in an activity or activities often
enjoyed by some youngsters, our review of the record reveals no
evidence that defendant exhibited decisional skills and
understanding equivalent to an adolescent.  To the contrary,
uncontroverted evidence showed defendant had an IQ of 107, was
functioning in the average to high-average range of intelligence,
and had a relatively good understanding of social nuances. 
Additional evidence indicated that defendant graduated from high
school and joined the Air Force, where a recruiter described him
as a “positive force.”  More recently, defendant worked at a
cleaners, operating complicated machinery, ultimately leaving
that job to assume a better-paying position.  Therefore, we hold
the trial court had no duty to submit the age statutory
mitigating circumstance based on the evidence presented at the
sentencing proceeding.
In his tenth assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred by failing to submit the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance, that “defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1).  Prior to
submitting this circumstance, a trial court must “determine
whether a rational jury could conclude that defendant had no
significant history of prior criminal activity.”  State v.
Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 143, 367 S.E.2d 589, 604 (1988).  If the
trial court decides that a rational jury could so conclude from
the evidence, the jury is entitled to determine whether the
evidence reveals a significant history.  Id.  A significant
history of prior criminal activity for purposes of N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(1) is one likely to influence the jury’s sentence
recommendation.  State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 444 S.E.2d 879,
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1994).  Because
defendant’s history of prior criminal activity was so excessive,
we conclude the trial court did not err in deciding that no
rational juror could determine that the circumstance existed. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to
submit the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance.
Substantial evidence of defendant’s prior criminal activity
included references to defendant’s extensive and recent pattern
of criminal behavior.  Defendant was involved in an illegal
sexual relationship with Lyle’s mother and another male. 
Evidence indicated that defendant abused drugs from an early age. 
Further, defendant was involved in three alcohol-related fights,
which resulted in his being discharged from the Air Force after
only three months.  Defendant assaulted Lyle’s mother during her
pregnancy and threatened further violence if she informed police
of his assaults on Lyle.  Finally, defendant repeatedly abused
his infant son Lyle over the course of Lyle’s brief life,
ultimately killing him as a result.  Given the extent of this
criminal activity, the trial court properly could have determined
that no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant’s history
of prior criminal activity was insignificant.
This case is substantially similar to State v. Daughtry, 340
N.C. 488, 459 S.E.2d 747 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133
L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996), where we upheld the trial court’s
nonsubmission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance.  The
defendant in Daughtry was sentenced to death for beating his
girlfriend to death with a large stick or log.  The evidence of
defendant Daughtry’s prior criminal history included numerous
beatings of the victim, shooting an acquaintance in the leg,
being convicted of driving under the influence, and pleading
guilty to a prior assault in which defendant hit a man in the
head with a large stick causing serious injuries.  There, we
stated that “[g]iven the extent of this history, particularly
defendant’s prior use of a large stick as a dangerous weapon and
his multiple beatings of the victim, the trial court properly
could have determined that no reasonable juror could have
concluded that defendant’s criminal history was insignificant.” 
Id. at 522, 459 S.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added).  In the case sub
judice, defendant’s prior history of criminal activity, like that
in Daughtry, is mainly related to assaultive behaviors which were
primarily directed toward the ultimate victim of his violence and
the ultimate cause of his being convicted of murder.  Defendant
here had a significant history of violent attacks, including
fights in the military and repeated assaults on Colleen Shank
even while she was pregnant.  He also repeatedly and viciously
beat his own son, a completely defenseless infant and the victim
of murder in this case.  Combined with the evidence of his other
prior criminal activities, these assaultive criminal activities
make defendant’s case for submission of the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance at least as weak, if not weaker, than the argument
which we rejected in Daughtry.  Therefore, we hold the trial
court did not err by declining to submit the (f)(1) circumstance,
and defendant’s assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant’s eleventh assignment of error asserts the trial
court committed plain error by failing to properly instruct the
jury concerning eighteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
uncontroverted by the evidence.  Assuming this Court finds the
instructions to be without error, defendant contends that
comments made by the trial court following the instructions
served to invalidate them and caused the jury to improperly
consider the mitigating circumstances at issue.  We find these
contentions to be without merit.
At the sentencing charge conference, defendant’s counsel
requested a peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances established by the evidence.  The trial court
agreed to issue the following instruction:  “The Court instructs
the jury that this factor has been established by the evidence. 
It is for you, the jury, however, to determine whether or not it
has mitigating value.”  The trial court gave substantially this
same instruction on all the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
requested by defendant.  Defendant did not object to the jury
instructions at the close of the charge.
Defendant’s failure to object to the instructions requires
us to consider this challenge under a plain-error analysis. 
State v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 487 S.E.2d 734 (1997), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 140 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1998).  Defendant, in his brief
to this Court, relies on our holding in State v. Lynch, 340 N.C.
435, 459 S.E.2d 679 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 558 (1996), for support of his argument that the
instructions in the matter sub judice were insufficient.  In
Lynch, this Court suggested the use of the following peremptory
instructions for nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:
All the evidence tends to show [named mitigating
circumstance].  Accordingly, as to this mitigating
circumstance, I charge that if you find the facts to be
as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer,
“Yes,” as to the mitigating circumstance Number [#] on
the issue and recommendation form if one or more of you
deems it to have mitigating value.
Id. at 476, 459 S.E.2d at 700.
Defendant’s case was tried two years prior to our decision
in Lynch.  However, even application of the Lynch standard does
not lead us to the conclusion that the instructions here were
inadequate.  A trial court is not required to give a requested
instruction verbatim.  State v. Corn, 307 N.C. 79, 296 S.E.2d 261
(1982).  The trial court’s instructions conveyed the proper
message to the jury--that the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances in question were established as existing
circumstances by the evidence but that the jurors could “‘reject
the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance if they [did] not deem
it to have mitigating value.’”  State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142,
174, 443 S.E.2d 14, 32-33 (quoting State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467,
492, 434 S.E.2d 840, 854 (1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046,
130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).  We conclude the peremptory
instructions challenged by defendant accurately conveyed the
applicable law to the jurors.
Furthermore, we determine that defendant’s argument that the
trial court’s concluding instruction negated any potential value
of the peremptory instructions lacks merit.  Defendant objects to
the following instruction:
The law requires the presiding judge to be
impartial.  You’re not to draw any inference from any
ruling I may have made or inflection in my voice or
expression on my face or anything else I may have said
or done during the trial that would lead you to believe
that I have an opinion or have intimated one as to
whether any part of the evidence should be believed or
not, as to whether any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance has been proved or not, or as to what your
recommendation ought to be.  It is your exclusive
province and duty to find the true facts of this case
and make a recommendation reflecting the truth as you
find it.
When viewed in proper context, the trial court’s concluding
instruction, which is verbatim from North Carolina’s pattern jury
instructions, did not negate the earlier peremptory instructions. 
The trial court was simply advising the jury, in the customary
language, that the law requires the presiding judge to be
completely impartial.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
did not err by stressing the impartiality of the court in its
closing charge to the jury.
In his twelfth assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred by permitting the placement of leg irons on
defendant during the sentencing proceeding.  Defendant argues
that the trial court violated the statutory provisions of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1031, as well as defendant’s right to due process. 
We hold that the trial court did not commit error in this regard.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1031 provides the following:
A trial judge may order a defendant or witness
subjected to physical restraint in the courtroom when
the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably
necessary to maintain order, prevent the defendant’s
escape, or provide for the safety of persons.  If the
judge orders a defendant or witness restrained he must:
(1)
Enter in the record out of the presence
of the jury and in the presence of the
person to be restrained and his counsel,
if any, the reasons for his action; and
(2)
Give the restrained person an
opportunity to object; and
(3)
Unless the defendant or his attorney
objects, instruct the jurors that the
restraint is not to be considered in
weighing evidence or determining the
issue of guilt.
If the restrained person controverts the stated reasons
for restraint, the judge must conduct a hearing and
make findings of fact.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1031 (1997).
Our review of the record reveals the trial court followed
the procedure mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1031.  The trial court
conducted a hearing pursuant to the statute, following a report
of defendant’s possible escape attempt from his jail cell. 
Additional evidence indicated, and the trial court noted, that
defendant had a propensity towards violence, as illustrated by
his guilty plea to the brutal beating of his infant son and
expert testimony at defendant’s prior competency hearing
reflecting a violent disposition.
The ultimate decision concerning the restraint of a
defendant rests within the trial court’s discretion.  State v.
Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976).  The trial court is
in the best position to balance the conflicting interests between
defendant’s right to a proceeding free of prejudice and the
State’s need to maintain control over and prevent disruption of
the court proceedings.  The trial court’s discretion is not
unbridled and must be exercised in a manner that is “not
exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is
right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and
directed by reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” 
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 75 L. Ed. 520, 526 (1931). 
The circumstances appropriate for the trial court’s consideration
include, inter alia:  defendant’s temperament and character, his
age and physical attributes, his past record, his past escapes or
attempted escapes, evidence of a present plan to escape, and
threats to harm others or to cause a disturbance.  See State v.
Tolley, 290 N.C. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368.
The trial court in the instant case found evidence of
numerous factors supporting the physical restraint of defendant. 
A hearing was conducted to allow argument by all parties
concerning the need for restraint.  All discussions concerning
the need for physical restraint took place outside of the
presence of the jury.  The trial court ensured that a cloth was
draped over defendant’s counsel table to completely conceal the
leg restraints from view by the jurors, thus limiting any
potential prejudice to defendant.  Defendant always entered the
courtroom before the jurors and left the courtroom after the
jurors so they would not view his leg irons.  It is abundantly
clear from the record that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering defendant to wear restraints during the
proceeding.  Rather, it is apparent that the trial court took
every conceivable precaution to evaluate the need for restraints
and to minimize any potential prejudice to defendant. 
Accordingly, defendant’s twelfth assignment of error is
overruled.
In his thirteenth assignment of error, defendant argues the
trial court erred by requiring a defense expert to issue a
written report and to produce materials beyond those required by
the applicable statute.  Defendant objects to the trial court’s
order which mandated the disclosure of the following:
[A]ll results or reports of physical or mental
examinations or of tests, measurements or experiments
made in connection with this case, or copies thereof,
within the possession or control of the defendant which
the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the
trial or which were prepared by a witness or the agent
or employee of a witness whom the defendant intends to
call at the trial.
Furthermore, at the competency hearing, the trial court
ordered defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Horacek, to supply “all
of his notes,” including those from conversations and interviews
with defendant.  Defendant argues the trial court erred by
requiring such extensive discovery, which was later used to
cross-examine defendant’s witness.  Defendant suggests the
discovery order violated not only N.C.G.S. § 15A-905(b), but also
violated defendant’s attorney’s work-product privilege, his right
against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.  We hold
that the discovery order did not result in reversible error.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-905 provides the procedures for court-ordered
pretrial discovery in criminal cases.  The statute addresses
mental examinations and tests, in relevant part, as follows:
If the court grants any relief sought by the defendant
under G.S. 15A-903(e), the court must, upon motion of
the State, order the defendant to permit the State to
inspect and copy or photograph results or reports of
physical or mental examinations or of tests,
measurements or experiments made in connection with the
case, or copies thereof, within the possession and
control of the defendant which the defendant intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial or which were
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to
call at the trial, when the results or reports relate
to his testimony.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-905(b) (1997).
The issue before this Court regarding defendant’s challenge
to the discovery order is not whether defendant intended to
introduce specific tests at trial, but whether the expert relied
on or gleaned any information from the tests and answers which
related to the expert’s testimony.  See State v. McCarver, 341
N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134
L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996).  Our review of the record clearly reveals
that Dr. Horacek relied on the challenged discovery material at
the competency hearing, as well as at the sentencing proceeding. 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by issuing
the discovery order, and we overrule this assignment of error.
Defendant, in his fourteenth assignment of error, contends
the trial court erred by allowing State witnesses to testify to
specific prior acts of misconduct by defendant based on hearsay,
without adequate notice and unrelated to any aggravating
circumstance.  Specifically, defendant objects to (1) the
testimony of Lyle’s mother, in which she related earlier abuse of
Lyle and herself by defendant; and (2) the testimony of Wanda
Frady, in which she indicated potential child abuse dating back
to the time when Lyle was only three weeks old.  We conclude that
this assignment of error is without merit.
As an initial matter, we note that defendant did not object
to the testimony during the sentencing proceeding.  Accordingly,
this has not been preserved for review.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446
(1997); N.C. R. App. P. 10(b).  However, assuming arguendo that
defendant had preserved this claim for appellate review, this
assignment of error nevertheless fails.  Formal rules of evidence
do not apply at a capital sentencing proceeding.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-
1, Rule 1101(b)(3) (1992).  The trial court has latitude and
discretion to allow any evidence it deems relevant to sentencing. 
State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1, 473 S.E.2d 310 (1996), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997).  The evidence in
question was clearly related to defendant’s sentencing. 
Defendant’s treatment of Lyle and Lyle’s mother tended to explain
why Lyle’s mother did not seek earlier medical treatment during
the four-week period leading up to Lyle’s death.  The testimony
also revealed important information concerning the parental
relationship between defendant and Lyle, supporting the jury’s
recognition of the sole submitted aggravating circumstance, that
the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
In his fifteenth assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to
present evidence and argument concerning defendant’s activities,
which included reading horror books and playing Nintendo. 
Defendant contends that this issue is controlled by the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.
159, 117 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1992), where the Court held that evidence
of gang membership had no relevance to the issues being decided
in the proceeding and that admission of the evidence violated the
First Amendment.  The Court noted that “the evidence proved
nothing more than [defendant’s] abstract beliefs.”  Id. at 167,
117 L. Ed. 2d at 318.  For the following reasons, we reject this
assignment of error.
Unlike the evidence in Dawson, the challenged evidence
presented at defendant’s sentencing proceeding was directly
relevant to issues before the jury.  Defendant offered numerous
circumstances which he suggested mitigated his culpability for
the murder.  Among these mitigating circumstances were
suggestions that defendant was under the influence of a mental or
emotional disturbance and that defendant was remorseful.  The
State’s evidence and arguments concerning defendant’s interest in
horror books were used to impeach defendant’s contention that he
suffered a mental or emotional disorder.  The prosecutor argued
the alleged mental illness was simply a recitation of stories
gleaned from the horror books.  The evidence concerning Nintendo
use was presented to show defendant’s lack of remorse following
his various assaults on Lyle.  Dawson did not prohibit all
evidence related to activities protected by the First Amendment,
but merely required the evidence to be relevant to an issue in
the capital sentencing proceeding.  Contrary to defendant’s
argument, we conclude the evidence was not employed for the
purpose of inflaming the jury’s moral sensibilities.  We hold the
trial court did not err when it permitted the testimony in
question.
In his sixteenth assignment of error, defendant argues the
trial court erred by accepting defendant’s guilty plea to first-
degree murder.  Defendant contends that the trial court lacked
sufficient factual basis for the plea, and that the plea was
accepted without a knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant’s
rights.  As to the first part of this contention, defendant
maintains the plea proceeding record is devoid of any evidence to
support a plea of premeditated and deliberate murder.  Defendant
calls our attention to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022, which provides in
pertinent part:
(c) The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or
no contest without first determining that there is a
factual basis for the plea.  This determination may be
based upon information including but not limited to:
(1)
A statement of the facts by the
prosecutor.  
(2)
A written statement of the defendant.  
(3)
An examination of the presentence
report.  
(4)
Sworn testimony, which may include
reliable hearsay.  
(5)
A statement of facts by the defense
counsel.  
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022(c) (1997).
The statute clearly does not require the trial court to find
evidence from each, any or all of the enumerated sources.   The
trial court may consider any information properly brought to its
attention, and the trial record must reflect the information and
evidence relied upon in reaching the decision that an adequate
factual basis does exist.  State v. Sinclair, 301 N.C. 193, 270
S.E.2d 418 (1980); State v. Dickens, 299 N.C. 76, 261 S.E.2d 183
(1980).  In the present case, the trial court relied on the
State’s summary of the evidence, as well as medical evidence
detailing Lyle’s injuries.  Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the evidence provides a sufficient factual basis to
support defendant’s plea of guilty to premeditated murder.
In defendant’s presence in open court, the State presented
an evidentiary recitation showing the following:  Lyle was not
breathing when medical personnel first responded to his
emergency; Lyle ultimately died of a fractured skull, which the
doctors said took “tremendous force”; Ms. Shank witnessed
defendant attacking Lyle; and Lyle had endured a series of
bruises and broken bones occurring over a several-week period. 
Moreover, at a competency hearing conducted the day prior to the
guilty plea, the same trial court heard Dr. Clabe Lynn testify
that defendant made a statement admitting that he was “playing
with [Lyle] and the next thing he knew he was hitting him on the
top of the head.”  We hold that this recitation was sufficient to
provide a factual basis for defendant’s plea.
Further, it is well settled that premeditation and
deliberation can be inferred from circumstances such as the
brutality of the killing, the nature and number of the victim’s
injuries, and the dealing of lethal blows after the victim has
already been incapacitated.  State v. Rasor, 319 N.C. 577, 356
S.E.2d 328 (1987).  The medical evidence presented by the State
tended to show that multiple, brutal injuries had been inflicted
upon Lyle by defendant over a sustained period of time.  From
this, one can readily infer that defendant totally abdicated his
parental role, providing Lyle not with support and nurturing, but
rather providing continued, deliberate pain and violence which
culminated in the child’s death.  This evidence provided a
sufficient basis from which premeditation and deliberation could
be inferred.  We therefore perceive no error in the trial court’s
acceptance of defendant’s plea of guilty to murder in the first
degree.
Turning to the second part of defendant’s assignment of
error concerning the guilty plea, defendant argues the trial
court erred by accepting the plea without a sufficient showing
that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.  A plea of
guilty involves the waiver of several fundamental rights,
including freedom from self-incrimination and the right to a
trial by jury.  See State v. Barts, 321 N.C. 170, 174, 362 S.E.2d
235, 237 (1987).  It is therefore imperative that guilty pleas
represent a voluntary, informed choice.  Sinclair, 301 N.C. at
197-98, 270 S.E.2d at 421.  
Our review of the record of defendant’s plea proceeding
reveals the plea was knowingly and voluntarily given, as
evidenced by the following exchange between the trial court and
defendant:
Q.  Mr. Atkins, I’m going to now ask you a series of
questions from this Transcript of Plea.  If you would
please speak up so the Court Reporter over here can
make a notation for the record, it would be
appreciated.  First of all, are you able to hear and
understand me?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you understand you have the right to remain
silent and any statement you make may be used against
you?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Are you under the influence of any alcohol, drugs,
narcotics, medicines, pills, or any other intoxicants?
A.  No.
Q.  Have you discussed your case fully with your
attorneys, and are you satisfied with their services?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you understand that you’re pleading guilty to
the felony of first-degree premeditated and deliberated
murder?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And that there are two parts to a potential capital
case, the guilt or innocence phase and the sentencing
phase, do you understand that?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Have the charges been explained to you by your
lawyer, do you understand the nature of the charges,
and do you understand each and every element of the
charge?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you understand that upon your plea, depending
upon the sentencing phase, that the jury could
recommend life or death as the verdict?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you understand you have the right to plead not
guilty, to have a jury trial, and at the trial to
confront and cross examine the witnesses against you,
and by this plea you’re giving up all of your other
Constitutional Rights, as well as your confrontation
rights related to a trial by jury?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you plead guilty, and are you in fact guilty?
A.  Yeah.
. . . .
Q.  Other than the plea arrangement, has anybody made
any promises or threatened you at all to cause you to
enter this plea against your will?
A.  No.
Q.  Are you entering this plea of your own free will,
fully understanding what you are doing?
A.  Yes, sir.
Q.  Do you have any questions about what has been said
to you or anything else connected with your case?
A.  No.
Q.  You are thirty years of age and completed  the
twelfth grade?
A.  Yes, sir.
Following this discussion with defendant, the trial court
heard the prosecutor present a summary of the facts and evidence
against defendant.  Following a brief recess, the trial court
held that “there’s a factual basis for the plea, which is freely,
voluntarily and understandingly entered; the defendant is
satisfied with his attorney, is competent to stand trial, and the
pleas are his informed choice and being freely, voluntarily and
understandingly made, it is accepted and is ordered recorded.” 
We agree with the trial court’s decision that the plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily, and accordingly we overrule this
assignment of error.
In his seventeenth assignment of error, defendant contends
the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the
prosecutor to introduce evidence and testimony indicating that
Lyle suffered from “battered child syndrome” and that such
syndrome was a cause of Lyle’s death.  Defendant argues that the
introduction of such evidence was error as a matter of law and
that the evidence was extremely confusing and its probative value
substantially outweighed by prejudice to defendant.  We disagree.
The evidence concerning “battered child syndrome” was
extemely relevant to the jury in reaching an appropriate
sentencing decision.  Evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
401 (1992).  Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.  
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992).  This Court has stated that “in
a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light
upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible.”  State v.
Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994).
Relevant evidence may, however, be excluded “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, 
Rule 403 (1992).  “Whether to exclude relevant but prejudicial
evidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion
of the trial court.”  State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 532, 419
S.E.2d 545, 554 (1992).  We conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by permitting a neurologist and a pediatric
radiologist to testify that battered child syndrome was the cause
of Lyle’s death.
This Court has previously approved the admission of expert
testimony with respect to battered child syndrome.  State v.
Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978).  Evidence
demonstrating battered child syndrome “‘simply indicates that a
child found with [certain injuries] has not suffered those
injuries by accidental means.’”  Id. at 570, 247 S.E.2d at 911
(quoting People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 919, 921 (1971)).
This Court approved the use of battered child evidence in a
capital proceeding in State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 475 S.E.2d
202 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1997). 
In the present case, the evidence of battered child syndrome was
relevant both to the circumstances of the crime and to the sole
submitted aggravating circumstance.  Concerning the circumstances
of the offense, the evidence was relevant to demonstrate
premeditation and deliberation.  The State presented evidence
that Lyle suffered extensive injuries over a four-week period,
leading to his ultimate death.  This evidence supported the
State’s contention that defendant did not simply “snap” and “lose
control” on 16 March 1993.  Rather, the evidence indicated that
defendant engaged in a deliberate, prolonged process of severely
beating and torturing Lyle.
The battered child syndrome evidence was also relevant to
support the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance that the crime was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  The evidence revealed
a horrifying picture of a crippled, helpless, eight-month-old
infant who slowly died at the hands of his father, the defendant. 
This evidence was probative and necessary to demonstrate to the
jury the presence of the (e)(9) circumstance, that this crime
demonstrated a killing which was “‘conscienceless, pitiless, or
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.’”  State v. Lynch, 340
N.C. 435, 459 S.E.2d 679 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134
L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996) (quoting State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 65,
337 S.E.2d 808, 826-27 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 733 (1986)).  Given the high probative value of the
testimony concerning battered child syndrome, we hold the trial
court did not err by permitting the introduction of this
evidence.
Furthermore, while defendant is technically correct in his
assertion that battered child syndrome cannot be a cause of
death, his argument is of no avail.  According to the expert
witnesses who testified at trial, battered child syndrome is
nothing more than a profile of indicative symptoms, which, when
noticed by a medical professional either in isolation or in
combination, lead to the conclusion that a child is being
battered or has been battered in the past.  Such symptoms might
include such things as distinctive burns, extensive bruising,
head and abdominal injuries, bones broken in patterns which
correlate with those of known cases of abuse, and retinal
hemorrhaging (indicating violent shaking or beating of the
child’s head).  Since battered child syndrome is merely a
diagnostic profile, it cannot therefore be a technical cause of
death.
The distinction drawn here, however, is largely semantic and
does not justify a new sentencing proceeding in the instant case. 
When examined closely, it is apparent that neither the witnesses
in their testimonies nor the prosecutor in his closing argument
were claiming that the “syndrome” itself was the cause of death. 
What they were asserting was that the cumulative effect of
injuries suffered by Lyle as a result of his horrific battering,
which also qualified him for the diagnosis of battered child
syndrome, was the cause of death.  Thus, we find no error in the
trial court’s admission of such evidence and argument.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In his eighteenth assignment of error, defendant contends
the trial court denied defendant’s constitutional right to be
present at all stages of his capital trial.  Defendant argues the
trial court conducted three separate off-the-record bench
conferences involving only counsel.  Defendant contends this
Court’s holding in State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619, 481 S.E.2d 649
(1997), mandates the award of a new capital sentencing
proceeding.  Our review of the record and applicable precedent
leads us to hold that the off-the-record bench conferences did
not violate defendant’s constitutional right to be present at all
stages of his trial.
Defendant correctly states that, in a capital trial, a
defendant must be present at every stage of the proceeding.  N.C.
Const. art. I, § 23.  This constitutional mandate serves to
safeguard both defendant’s and society’s interests in reliability
in the imposition of capital punishment.  State v. Huff, 325 N.C.
1, 30, 381 S.E.2d 635, 651 (1989), sentence vacated on other
grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990).  This
constitutional protection imposes upon the trial court the
affirmative duty to ensure defendant’s presence at every stage of
a capital trial.  Additionally, defendant’s right to be present
at every stage of his capital trial is not waivable.  State v.
Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 297, 384 S.E.2d 470, 480 (1989), sentence
vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1990); State v. Huff, 325 N.C. at 31, 381 S.E.2d at 652.
However, defendant’s reliance on State v. Meyer is
misplaced.  In Meyer, this Court disapproved of unrecorded, in-
chambers discussions between the trial court and attorneys,
noting that “the nature and content of the discussion cannot
otherwise be gleaned from the record.”  Meyer, 345 N.C. at 623,
481 S.E.2d at 652.  The Court further determined that “the State
has failed to meet its burden of showing the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we are required to order
a new sentencing proceeding.”  Id.
In contrast, our review of the record in the case sub judice
indicates the three off-the-record conferences were conducted not
in chambers, but in the courtroom with defendant present and able
to physically observe the context of the discussion and free to
inquire of his attorneys as to the nature of the discussions. 
Additionally, the off-the-record bench conferences were all
reconstructed for the record following each conference.  The
record reveals the three conferences concerned the following:  a
request by defense counsel to lodge a Batson challenge, a
discussion of a scheduling problem with a State witness, and
scheduling for the final week of defendant’s sentencing
proceeding.  Assuming arguendo the trial court did err by
conducting the conferences off the record, the reconstruction
permits the State to clearly show beyond a reasonable doubt that
any error was harmless.  See State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439
S.E.2d 547, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994). 
Based upon the aforementioned reasons, we reject this assignment
of error.
In his nineteenth assignment of error, defendant contends
the trial court erred by failing to properly determine questions
of juror competency, purportedly violating defendant’s rights
pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 9-3 and 15A-1211.  Defendant alleges the
trial court failed to determine the statutory qualifications of
the jurors and singled out a single juror for questioning about
citizenship.  Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the trial court complied with the statutory mandates in the
selection of the jurors.
The trial court “must decide all challenges to the panel and
all questions concerning the competency of jurors.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1211(b) (1997).  In the case sub judice, the record reflects
that defendant never challenged the jury panel selection process
in any manner.  The applicable statute specifically states that
while a defendant may make a challenge to the jury panel, the
challenge:
(1)
May be made only on the ground that the jurors
were not selected or drawn according to law.
(2)
Must be in writing.
(3)
Must specify the facts constituting the ground of
challenge.
(4)
Must be made and decided before any juror is
examined.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1211(c). 
In light of the fact that defendant failed to follow the
procedures clearly set out for jury panel challenges and further
failed, in any manner, to alert the trial court to the alleged
improprieties, we hold that this assignment of error is not
properly before this Court for review.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446; see
State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 476 S.E.2d 301 (1996).
In his twentieth assignment of error, defendant argues that 
the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to
attempt to rehabilitate jurors who expressed opposition to the
death penalty.  Defendant argues that this Court’s decision in
State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 430 S.E.2d 905 (1993), supports a
right of rehabilitation of prospective jurors who express
uncertainty about their ability to impose the death penalty
according to the laws of North Carolina.  We disagree with
defendant’s analysis of purported “uncertainty.”  In his brief,
defendant draws this Court’s attention to the following voir dire
of prospective juror Barbara Robison by the trial court:
Q.  Could you make a decision in this matter based only
on the evidence and the law and not on anything else?
A.  I’m not in favor of the death penalty.
Q.  Are you indicating then that as a matter of
conscience and regardless of what the facts and
circumstances were that you could not render a verdict
based upon the evidence and the law?
A.  Probably not.
Q.  If you were selected to serve as a juror and the
State proved the three things it’s required to prove,
it would be your duty as a juror, if you were going to
give the State a fair trial, to recommend the death
penalty.  Do you understand that?
A.  Yes.
Q.  Could you do that duty if you were convinced that
they proved everything they were required to prove
notwithstanding your reservations?
A.  I don’t know if I could do it.
Q.  Is that a no or you’re not sure?
A.  I’m not sure, but I don’t think I could do it.
Q.  Then are your views concerning the death penalty
such that you would be prevented or substantially
impaired from performing your duties as a juror in
accordance with the instructions and your oath?
A.  If I made a decision like that, I think I would
probably regret it.
Q.  Okay.  Are you indicating that your views
concerning the death penalty then would impair you from
making a decision recommending it even if the State
proved each and every one of the things they were
required to prove so that it would be your duty to make
that recommendation?
A.  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Tender for cause?
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  The court will excuse you, ma’am, for
cause--you may step downstairs, ma’am--concluding that
as a matter of conscience regardless of the facts and
circumstances, she couldn’t render a verdict with
respect to the charge in accordance with the law and
that her views concerning the death penalty would
prevent or impair her from performing her duties in
accordance with the instructions and her oath.
Our review of the record clearly reveals that, while
prospective juror Robison initially struggled with her
convictions, she ultimately responded in a manner which
unequivocally indicated that she would be unable to follow the
law and recommend a death sentence if appropriate.  Therefore, it
was entirely proper for the trial court to exercise its
discretion in permitting the State’s challenge for cause.
The record further indicates that all other prospective
jurors excused for this cause likewise expressed opinions and
answers supporting the trial court’s decisions.  The trial court
is best situated to make such determinations, as it hears the
jurors’ answers and observes the jurors’ demeanor.  “The
defendant is not allowed to rehabilitate a juror who has
expressed unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in response
to questions propounded by the prosecutor and the trial court.  
The reasoning behind this rule is clear.  It prevents harassment
of the prospective jurors based on their personal views toward
the death penalty.”  State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 307, 389
S.E.2d 66, 71 (1990).  We will not disturb the trial court’s
ruling on a challenge for cause absent a showing of an abuse of
that discretion.  See State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. at 43, 430
S.E.2d at 908.  We hold the trial court in the case sub judice
did not abuse its discretion when denying defendant’s request to
attempt to rehabilitate various prospective jurors.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In his twenty-first assignment of error, defendant asserts
the trial court erred by failing to excuse prospective juror
Denise Sales for cause on the ground that she had formed fixed
opinions prior to the sentencing proceeding.  The record reveals
Ms. Sales clearly indicated to the trial court that she had
strong personal feelings about child abuse.  However, Ms. Sales
never unequivocally stated she would be unable to follow the law
and fulfill her duties as a juror.  She stated, “I can be fair,
but a baby being involved I’d be more harsh about it.  That’s all
I can tell you.”  Following this expression, defense counsel
never challenged prospective juror Sales for cause.  Counsel
chose instead to make a peremptory challenge excusing her from
jury selection.  This claim has not been preserved for appellate
review according to the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h). 
See State v. Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 476 S.E.2d 328 (1996), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997).  In the absence
of a proper challenge for cause during the trial court
proceeding, it is impossible for us to attempt to evaluate this
assignment of error.
In his twenty-second assignment of error, defendant assigns
as error the trial court’s denial of individual voir dire during
jury selection.  Defendant contends that excessive pretrial
publicity caused prospective jurors to be exposed to misleading
and prejudicial statements during the jury selection process. 
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
defense counsel’s motion for individual voir dire.
The North Carolina General Assembly has provided guidance
concerning individual voir dire and the sequestering of jurors
during the selection process.  The applicable statute provides: 
“In capital cases the trial judge for good cause shown may direct
that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case each juror
must first be passed by the State.  These jurors may be
sequestered before and after selection.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(j)
(1997).  A trial court’s ruling on whether to grant sequestration
and individual voir dire of prospective jurors will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 353 S.E.2d 352 (1987), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998).  While it is true
that many prospective jurors indicated that they had read about
or heard about the present case prior to trial, our review of the
record does not reveal the selection of any juror who indicated
that he or she would have difficulty setting aside any pretrial
impressions if selected for service.  Conversely, the record
reveals that challenges for cause were appropriately granted
whenever any prospective juror stated that he or she could not
set aside any preconceived notions.  Moreover, the trial court
advised the defense, when issuing the order denying defendant’s
motion for individual voir dire, “[The] motion is denied at this
time.  It does not preclude reassertion, depending upon the
circumstances, as the voir dire is carried out.”  Defendant’s
counsel never renewed the motion for individual voir dire as jury
selection proceeded.  Defendant has failed to demonstrate any
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order denying individual
voir dire.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his twenty-third assignment of error, defendant argues
the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to cross-
examine a defense expert witness concerning testimony presented
at a previous competency hearing.  Defendant attempts to support
this position with reference to N.C.G.S. § 15A-959(c), which
provides in pertinent part:
(c) Upon motion of the defendant and with the
consent of the State the court may conduct a hearing
prior to the trial with regard to the defense of
insanity at the time of the offense.  If the court
determines that the defendant has a valid defense of
insanity with regard to any criminal charge, it may
dismiss that charge, with prejudice, upon making a
finding to that effect.  The court’s denial of relief
under this subsection is without prejudice to the
defendant’s right to rely on the defense at trial.  If
the motion is denied, no reference to the hearing may
be made at the trial, and recorded testimony or
evidence taken at the hearing is not admissible as
evidence at the trial.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-959(c) (1997).
We determine the trial court did not err by permitting the
cross-examination.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-959(c) prohibits subsequent
use of testimony introduced at hearings concerning pleas of
insanity.  The testimony used to cross-examine defendant’s expert
was presented at a competency hearing, not at an insanity
hearing.  Contrary to the suggestion in defendant’s brief,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-959(c), by its plain language, does not refer or
apply to competency hearings.
Additionally, we note that our review of the record reveals
that defendant himself, through his expert witness, first
introduced evidence referring to the testimony of a Dorothea Dix
psychiatrist initially presented at the previous competency
hearing.  The defense expert testified that he was provided with
a copy of the Dorothea Dix evaluation and “relied on the report
and things contained therein.”  During direct examination, the
defense expert also took pains to explain why his evaluation
differed from that provided by the Dorothea Dix psychiatrist. 
Defendant cannot now be heard to complain about evidence which he
initiated and introduced into the proceeding.  Accordingly, we
find this assignment of error meritless.
Defendant, in his twenty-fourth assignment of error,
contends the trial court erred by permitting the State to make
substantive use of defendant’s Dorothea Dix competency evaluation
at the sentencing proceeding.  Defendant suggests the
introduction and use of such evidence violated his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights, relying on the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d
359 (1981).  We disagree and hold that the trial court’s
admission of the report did not violate defendant’s
constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court, in Estelle, determined that
under the facts present in that case, the petitioner’s challenge
to the introduction of a psychiatric evaluation must be upheld. 
However, the Court emphasized the limited scope of that holding,
stating that the decision turned on the “distinct circumstances”
of that case.  Id. at 466, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 371.  The
distinguishing characteristics of the Estelle controversy
included the following:  the trial court had ordered, ex mero
motu, the psychiatric examination; the petitioner had not
asserted an insanity defense; and the petitioner never offered
any psychiatric evidence at trial.  In stark contrast, in the
case sub judice, the competency hearing was performed at
defendant’s request; defendant presented a defense strategy
alleging, inter alia, a learning disorder, an adjustment
disorder, and disturbances of emotion and conduct; and defendant
introduced expert testimony concerning his mental status.  The
instant case is clearly distinguishable from Estelle.  As the
Supreme Court noted in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 336 (1987), the use of state-conducted psychiatric
evaluations for the limited purpose of rebuttal of a defendant’s
psychiatric testimony does not constitute a Fifth Amendment
violation.  Id. at 423, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 355.  Additionally, the
Court noted that no Sixth Amendment violation occurs when such
evaluations are used at a trial in which a defendant asserts a
defense including “mental status,” as defense counsel are
certainly on notice that following the use of such a “mental
status” defense, the use of psychological evidence by the
prosecutor is expected.  Id. at 423, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 356. 
Defendant initially introduced expert testimony concerning his
mental status.  Defendant’s expert witness admitted that he
relied upon the very report to which defendant now objects as a
basis for his expert opinions at the sentencing hearing.  The
State was clearly entitled to use this same evidence to rebut
defendant’s assertions.  We hold that this assignment of error is
without merit.
Defendant also raises additional assignments of error
associated with the trial court’s rulings on his motion for
appropriate relief, on remand from this Court.  Defendant first
contends the trial court erred and violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1415(f) by excluding portions of the State’s attorney work-
product materials from his discovery request.  Defendant suggests
that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) fails to exclude work-product
materials from post-conviction discovery in capital cases, and as
such, the trial court committed error by reviewing certain work-
product materials in camera and by ultimately withholding the
material from discovery.  We hold the trial court did not err in
reviewing the requested material in camera for two reasons:  (1)
the expedited post-conviction discovery provided by N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f) applies only to cases following completion of direct
appeal, and defendant had not reached such a stage when he made
his motion; and (2) despite the fact that we are not required to
review defendant’s discovery request, the trial court
nevertheless complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1415(f) when evaluating defendant’s request.
On 21 June 1996, the North Carolina General Assembly
ratified “An Act to Expedite the Postconviction Process in North
Carolina.”  Ch. 719, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 389, 397.  Among other
things, the Act amended N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415 to add this new
subsection:
(f) In the case of a defendant who has been
convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death,
the defendant’s prior trial or appellate counsel shall
make available to the capital defendant’s counsel their
complete files relating to the case of the defendant. 
The State, to the extent allowed by law, shall make
available to the capital defendant’s counsel the
complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes
committed or the prosecution of the defendant.  If the
State has a reasonable belief that allowing inspection
of any portion of the files by counsel for the capital
defendant would not be in the interest of justice, the
State may submit for inspection by the court those
portions of the files so identified.  If upon
examination of the files, the court finds that the
files could not assist the capital defendant in
investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for
appropriate relief, the court in its discretion may
allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.  
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) (1997).
As recently noted by this Court, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)
applies only to the post-conviction process and only to
defendants who have been convicted of a capital crime and
sentenced to death.  State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276
(1998).  Defendant’s allegation of error does not come under the
provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), as defendant had not
exhausted his direct appeal opportunities at the time of his
discovery request.  Accordingly, the trial court was not
obligated to utilize the more liberal discovery provisions of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), and it did not abuse its discretion when
reviewing the documents in camera.
Defendant correctly notes that the apparent legislative
intent of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) is to “expedite the post-
conviction process in capital cases while ensuring thorough and
complete review.”  Bates, 348 N.C. at 37, 497 S.E.2d at 280-81. 
It is apparent the statute fits into a broader statutory scheme
designed to provide full disclosure to counsel for capital
defendants so that “they may raise all potential claims in a
single motion for appropriate relief.”  Id.  As again noted in
defendant’s brief, a “thorough review of the conviction avoids
piecemeal and delayed presentation of claims.”  However,
defendant is asking this Court to sanction exactly such piecemeal
analysis.
Defendant had not completed appellate review when the trial
court made its discovery order.  Both cases relied on by
defendant involved discovery motions made following completion of
direct appellate review.  See State v. McHone, 348 N.C. 254, 499
S.E.2d 761 (1998); State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276. 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court was not bound by
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) and therefore did not err when making the
decision to review the requested materials in camera. 
Moreover, assuming arguendo that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) did
apply to defendant’s discovery request, the trial court fully
complied with and satisfied the statutory mandate by conducting
an in camera review of the work-product materials.  This Court
has held that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) “does not provide an express
or implied protection for work product of the prosecutor or law
enforcement agencies.”  Bates, 348 N.C. at 37, 497 S.E.2d at 281. 
However, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) does not mandate disclosure of
all materials relating to a capital conviction which may be in
the possession of the State pursuant to a motion for appropriate
relief.  The statute specifically, by clear and unequivocal
language, allows the State, upon “reasonable belief that allowing
inspection of any portion of the files by counsel for the capital
defendant would not be in the interest of justice,” to initially
submit the documents not to a defendant, but to the trial court
for inspection of such portion.  The statute authorizes a trial
court to deny access to such portions of the files, providing
that when the “court finds that the files could not assist the
capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a
motion for appropriate relief, the court in its discretion may
allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1415(f).
In the matter sub judice, the State challenged the release
of what it deemed to be sensitive documents.  The trial court
appropriately reviewed the documents in camera, ultimately
concluding that the documents would not assist defendant. 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court acted pursuant to this
statute and did not abuse its discretion in reviewing and denying
access to the work-product documents.
In his final assignment of error, defendant alleges that the
trial court’s dismissal of his motion for appropriate relief
resulted in denial of his statutory and constitutional rights
during the capital trial.  Specifically, defendant contends the
following:  (1) that because of his hearing impairment and poor
conditions inside the Buncombe County courthouse, he was unable
to hear and fully participate in all of the proceedings against
him; (2) that due to physical restraints, defendant was unable to
see significant portions of the evidence against him when
witnesses utilized exhibits outside the witness stand; (3) that
the trial court failed to accommodate his hearing impairment,
denying defendant his constitutional right to be present at all
stages of his capital trial; (4) that defendant’s trial counsel’s
failure to investigate his hearing loss and take appropriate
measures to protect his rights denied defendant his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; and (5) 
that defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as well as North
Carolina law.  Our review of the record leads us to conclude the
trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief, as defendant failed to meet his burden of
“proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential
to support the motion.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(5) (1997).
This Court has held that the decisions of a trial court
concerning a motion for appropriate relief are binding on
defendant if they were supported by evidence, “even though the
evidence is conflicting, . . . and notwithstanding defendant’s
testimony at the hearing to the contrary.”  State v. Stevens, 305
N.C. 712, 720, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982).  The evidence and
testimony presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief amply support the trial court’s decision
denying the motion.  All parties present at the motion hearing
agreed that the acoustics inside the Buncombe County courthouse
were less than ideal.  However, the acoustics and audiometer
measurements of the courthouse were not the real issue concerning
the court at the motion hearing.  The real issue concerned
defendant’s actual ability to hear, understand and participate in
the capital proceedings.
Both the State and defendant proffered evidence evaluating
defendant’s hearing abilities.  Again, all parties agree that
defendant suffered some degree of hearing impairment.  There was,
however, a marked difference of opinion between the parties
concerning defendant’s ability to hear and understand the
proceedings.  William Auman, defendant’s trial counsel, testified
at the hearing that defendant consistently “respond[ed] or
react[ed] in a way throughout the trial that led you to believe
that he could hear what was going on during his trial.”  Mr.
Auman’s co-counsel, Curtiss Graham, likewise testified that
throughout the competency hearing and sentencing proceeding
defendant never indicated that he could “not hear the witnesses
against him or the instructions of the Court or anything that any
of the lawyers were saying.”  Defendant himself indicated during
his plea colloquy with the trial court that he was able to hear
and understand the court.  This evidence, combined with other
testimony at the hearing on the motion for appropriate relief,
amply supports the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s
motion in this regard.
We also conclude the trial court did not err when dismissing
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.    The
United States Supreme Court has held that in order to prevail on
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
satisfy a two-pronged test.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Our statutorily enacted test for
prejudice mirrors the Strickland test.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a)
(1988); State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d 241 (1985). 
To satisfy this test, a defendant must initially show that
counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was not
“functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
693.  A defendant must then show that counsel’s deficient
performance deprived him of a fair trial.  Id.  Application of
this standard to the case before this Court establishes that
defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 
Nothing in our review of the record and transcript suggests that
defendant’s trial counsel failed to deliver an appropriate level
of “counsel” or representation.  Importantly, defendant presented
no evidence at the hearing which indicated that he informed trial
counsel that he was unable to hear and understand any part of the
evidence or proceedings against him.  This contention is
meritless.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court’s failure to
adequately address his hearing impairment violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1997). 
Defendant’s claim is based primarily on section 12132 of the Act,
which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, . . . be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  A regulation
promulgated under the Act elaborates this particular provision by
requiring public entities to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids
and services where necessary to afford an individual with a
disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the
benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity.”  28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (1998).  Since
defendant failed to produce any evidence that he was unable to
hear or participate in the instant proceedings because of his
alleged hearing impairment, we hold the trial court did not
violate the provisions of the Americans with Disability Act
during defendant’s sentencing proceeding.
As previously discussed, the trial court was presented with
conflicting evidence as to the extent of defendant’s hearing
impairment.  From this evidence, the trial court made numerous
findings of fact, including the following:
29.  At times during the trial, counsel for the
defendant met with the defendant on evenings and
weekends.  Discussions regarding what had occurred in
court were had.  The defendant never indicated to his
counsel that he wasn’t hearing or understanding what
was going on in the trial.
. . . .
39.  In open court during the arraignment and the
court’s inquiry from the Transcript of Plea, the
defendant was able to hear and understand and respond
to the questions put to him by the presiding judge.
. . . .
65.  The defendant’s hearing condition was not such
that he could not reasonably hear and understand the
proceedings.
Our review of the record clearly indicates that the above
findings of fact are amply supported by competent evidence.
Assuming arguendo the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to
defendant’s situation, it is apparent the trial court complied
with the provisions of the Act by providing defendant an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings.  The evidence does
not indicate that defendant was denied participation based upon
his hearing impairment.  This assignment of error is without
merit.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises ten issues which he concedes have been
decided against his position by this Court:  (1) the trial court
erred by excusing prospective jurors for cause based on their
feelings about capital punishment; (2) the trial court erred by
limiting the questioning of jurors opposed to a life sentence,
violating defendant’s rights pursuant to Article I, Section 19 of
the North Carolina Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the
trial court erred by issuing North Carolina pattern jury
instructions imposing a “duty” upon the jury to return a
recommendation of death if it finds the mitigating circumstances
were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and
the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to
call for the death penalty; (4) the trial court erred by
instructing the jury in a manner requiring the jurors to consider
only the mitigating circumstances they individually found and not
to consider mitigating circumstances found by other jurors; (5)
the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the
State had the burden of proving the nonexistence of each
mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and by placing
the burden on defendant to prove each mitigating circumstance by
a preponderance of the evidence; (6) the trial court’s use of the
term “may” in sentencing Issues Three and Four made consideration
of proven mitigating circumstances discretionary with the
sentencing jurors; (7) the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that mitigating circumstances must outweigh aggravating
circumstances; (8) the trial court erred by submitting to the
jury the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating
circumstance within the context of instructions that “failed
adequately to limit the application of this inherently vague and
overly broad circumstance”; (9) the trial court erred by
instructing the jurors that they could reject nonstatutory
mitigating evidence on the basis that it had no mitigating value;
and (10) the death penalty is discriminatory and arbitrary on its
face and as applied to this case.  We have fully considered
defendant’s arguments relating to these assignments of error and
find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings on
these issues.  Therefore, we overrule each of these assignments
of error.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having concluded that defendant’s plea and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we are
required by statute to review the record and determine (1)
whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstance found
by the jury; (2) whether passion, prejudice or “any other
arbitrary factor” influenced the imposition of the death sentence
in this case; and (3) whether the sentence “is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).  After thoroughly reviewing the record,
transcript and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the
record fully supports the aggravating circumstance found by the
jury.  Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death
in this case was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.  We therefore turn to
our final statutory duty of proportionality review.
One purpose of proportionality review “is to eliminate the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action
of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362
S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed.
2d 935 (1988).  Another is to guard “against the capricious or
random imposition of the death penalty.”  State v. Barfield, 298
N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S.
907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).  We defined the pool of cases for
proportionality review in State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79-80,
301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177
(1983), and State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 106-07, 446 S.E.2d 542,
563-64 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083
(1995), and we compare the instant case to others in the pool
that “are roughly similar with regard to the crime and the
defendant.”  State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493,
503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985). 
Whether the death penalty is disproportionate “ultimately rest[s]
upon the ‘experienced judgments’ of the members of this Court.” 
State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.
In the case sub judice, defendant entered into a plea
agreement, pleading guilty to the first-degree murder of his
infant son, Lyle Atkins.  At sentencing, the trial court
submitted the sole aggravating circumstance that the murder was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(9).  The jury unanimously found the existence of this
aggravating circumstance.  The jury at sentencing did not find
either of the two statutory mitigating circumstances submitted
for its consideration:  (1) that the capital felony was committed
while defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional
disturbance, or (2) that the capacity of defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(f)(2), (6).  The jury also did not find the existence of any
other statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstance not
specifically submitted pursuant to the “catchall” provision
mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9).  The jury did, however,
find the existence of two of the twenty-three nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances submitted for its consideration:  (1)
that defendant qualifies as having a learning disability due to
his IQ variations, and (2) that defendant was diagnosed by Dr.
Clabe Lynn in April of 1993 as having a personality disorder and
adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and
conduct.
This case has several distinguishing characteristics: the
victim was a helpless, defenseless infant; the victim’s brutal
murder was found to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in
that the victim suffered great physical pain before his death;
and finally, the victim endured a protracted series of severe
beatings inflicted by his father, resulting in multiple
fractures.  These characteristics collectively distinguish this
case from those in which we have held the death penalty
disproportionate.
In our proportionality review, it is appropriate to compare
the present case to those cases in which this Court has concluded
that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State v. McCollum,
334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  Of the cases in which this
Court has found the death penalty disproportionate, only two
involved the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
aggravating circumstance.  State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352
S.E.2d 653; State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170
(1983).  Neither Stokes nor Bondurant is similar to this case.
In Stokes, the defendant and a group of coconspirators
robbed the victim’s place of business.  This Court vacated the
sentence of death because defendant Stokes was only a teenager,
and it did not appear that he was more deserving of death than an
older accomplice, who received only a life sentence.  In the
present case, defendant alone, a twenty-nine-year-old adult, was
responsible for Lyle’s death.  In Stokes, the defendant was
convicted under a theory of felony murder, and there was
virtually no evidence of premeditation and deliberation.  In the
present case, the series of senseless beatings amply supports an
inference of premeditation and deliberation.  Finally, in Stokes,
the victim was killed during a robbery, at his place of business. 
In this case, the victim was killed in his home, at the hands of
his father.  A murder in one’s home “shocks the conscience, not
only because a life was senselessly taken, but because it was
taken [at] an especially private place, one [where] a person has
a right to feel secure.”  State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358
S.E.2d 1, 34, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406
(1987).  The violation of the right to security in one’s own home
is even more shocking when the victim is a small infant, totally
dependent upon others for care.
In Bondurant, the victim was shot while riding with the
defendant in a car.  Bondurant is distinguishable because the
defendant immediately exhibited remorse and concern for the
victim’s life by directing the driver to go to the hospital.  The
defendant also went into the hospital to secure medical help for
the victim.  In the present case, by contrast, defendant
attempted to conceal his assaults upon Lyle, forbidding Lyle’s
mother from seeking medical care for him during the four-week
ordeal leading up to Lyle’s death.  It was only after defendant
inflicted injuries rendering Lyle totally unresponsive that the
victim’s mother demanded medical care.  While it is true that
defendant did call 911 following a demand from Lyle’s mother, he
continued to conceal the cause of Lyle’s injuries from emergency
medical personnel.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that each case where
the jury has found the “especially heinous, attrocious, or cruel”
aggravating circumstance and this Court has found a sentence of
death disproportionate is distinguishable from the case sub
judice.
It is also proper for this Court to “compare this case with
the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be
proportionate.”  McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  
Although this Court reviews all of the cases in the pool when
engaging in our duty of proportionality review, we have
repeatedly stated that “we will not undertake to discuss or cite
all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.”  Id.  It
suffices to say here that we conclude the present case is more
similar to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of
death proportionate than to those in which we have found the
sentence of death disproportionate or to those in which juries
have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment.
Of particular note is the similarity of this crime to the
crime in State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 475 S.E.2d 202,
resulting in the imposition of the death penalty.  In Elliott, as
in the case sub judice, an individual entrusted with providing
care for a young child betrayed that trust and inflicted fatal
injuries upon the child.  While both cases involve “boyfriends”
of the victim’s mother, the instant case is even more heinous, as
defendant was not only a “boyfriend,” but also the victim’s
father.  Both defendants engaged in violent assaults upon the
helpless victims, and both defendants attempted to conceal the
victims’ injuries rather than seeking emergency medical care.
Finally, we noted in State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 446
S.E.2d 298, that similarity of cases is not the last word on the
subject of proportionality.  Similarity “merely serves as an
initial point of inquiry.”  Id. at 287, 446 S.E.2d at 325; see
also State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 46-47.  The
issue of whether the death penalty is proportionate in a
particular case ultimately rests “on the experienced judgment of
the members of this Court, not simply on a mere numerical
comparison of aggravators, mitigators, and other circumstances.” 
Daniels, 337 N.C. at 287, 446 S.E.2d at 325.
Based on the nature of this crime, and particularly the
distinguishing features noted above, we cannot conclude as a
matter of law that the sentence of death was excessive or
disproportionate.  We hold that defendant received a fair capital
sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.
 NO ERROR.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.