Title: Copp v. Redmond

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Copp v. Redmond1993 WY 114858 P.2d 1125Case Number: 93-8Decided: 09/03/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
C.O. 
BUD COPP; John Hewitt; Jim Rogers; and John Rogers, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v. 

Bryan 
Thomas REDMOND and Robbin Lee Redmond, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Sixth Judicial District, Campbell 
County.

Cameron 
Walker, Patrick T. Holscher and William S. Bon of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & 
Walker, Casper, for appellants.

Gary 
L. Shockey, Heather Noble and Robert R. Rose of Spence, Moriarity & 
Schuster, Jackson, for appellees.

The 
Petroleum Ass'n of Wyoming, The Wyoming Mining Ass'n, The Wyoming Trucking 
Ass'n, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, The Wyoming Lodging 
and Restaurant Ass'n, The Wyoming Auto Dealers Ass'n, The Wyoming Ass'n of 
Commerce and Industry, Coastal Chem, Inc., Sinclair Oil Corp., Little America 
Refining Co., The FMC Wyoming Corp., and Rissler & McMurry Corp.: Patrick R. 
Day, P.C., of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, amici 
curiae.

Richard 
E. Day and Patrick J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, amicus curiae of Pacificorp.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Answering a 
certified question of law, we hold that for claims accruing between July 1, 
1987, and February 18, 1993, culpable negligence is the degree of negligence 
that an injured employee must prove against a co-employee in an action to 
recover damages for personal injury suffered in a work-related 
accident.

BACKGROUND

[¶2]      Brian Redmond, an 
employee of Jim's Water Service, was seriously injured on May 3, 1988, when he 
was struck, knocked to the ground and run over by a 75,000 pound 1981 Kenworth 
"slickback" truck operated by C.O. Bud Copp, a supervising co-employee. At the 
time of Redmond's injury, Redmond, Copp, and several other co-employees were 
involved in moving a rig from a storage yard to a drilling site southwest of 
Gillette, Wyoming. In a personal injury action to recover damages, Redmond and 
his wife sued Copp and several other co-employees alleging negligence, gross 
negligence, and culpable negligence.

[¶3]      The instant case 
was filed in 1988, but was held in abeyance pending this court's final decision 
upon the rehearing of Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992). In Mills this 
court held that the Wyoming legislature transgressed constitutional limitations 
by its 1986 repeal of what has become known as the "culpably negligent" rule. 
That rehearing decision generated an inquiry whether the applicable standard for 
such cases after the effective date of the 1986 amendment1 should be a revival of the 
"culpably negligent" standard, or a simple negligence 
standard.

CERTIFIED 
QUESTION

[¶4]      After the Mills 
decision was released, proceedings in this matter resumed, and the district 
court certified the following question for review pursuant to WYO. R.APP.P. 
11:

1. 
When the Wyoming Supreme Court declared the joint employee immunity created by 
W.S. § 27-14-104(a) to be unconstitutional in Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 
(Wyo. 1992), did that decision enable recovery in co-employee cases pursuant to 
common law and Markle v. Williamson [518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1974)], to-wit: for 
ordinary negligence, or did it revive repealed 1977 W.S. § 27-12-103(a), so as 
to permit tort recovery between co-employees covered by the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act only when the defendant co-employee is chargeable with culpable 
negligence? If neither of these positions is correct, 
then:

2. 
What is the standard for recovery between such 
co-employees?

[¶5]      By order issued 
on January 13, 1993, the court agreed to review the certified 
questions.

ANALYSIS

[¶6]      Before its repeal 
in 1986, WYO. STAT. § 27-12-103(a) (1983) provided:

     (a) The rights and 
remedies provided in this act for an employee and his dependents for injuries 
incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and 
remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, or 
his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees 
are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies 
available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person.

(Emphasis 
added).

[¶7]      In the Mills 
decision, the court recounted the divers changes this provision has undergone in 
the years both before and after 1986. Effective February 18, 1993, this 
provision now reads:

§ 
27-14-104. Exclusive remedy as to employer; nonliability of coemployees; no 
relief from liability; rights as to delinquent or noncontributing 
employer.

     (a) The rights and 
remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and 
his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu 
of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer 
making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within 
the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause 
physical harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not supersede any 
rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any 
other person.

WYO. 
SESS. LAWS, ch. 47, § 1 (emphasis added).

[¶8]      The task of this 
court is to settle what standard applies to such cases between the July 1, 1987 
effective date of the repeal of the "culpable neglect" language and the most 
recent amendment which went into place on February 18, 1993. Our decision today 
does not construe the language which is now in place. The effect of our decision 
in Mills was simply this: For the purpose of suits, such as the instant case, 
the language, "or his employees acting within the scope of their employment 
unless the employees are culpably negligent," which appeared in § 27-12-103(a) 
is revived and governs all such cases for that time period. See Morris v. Smith, 
837 P.2d 679, 682 (Wyo. 1992). 

[¶9]      In determining 
the status of the law when a statute is declared unconstitutional following 
amendment, we found other authorities in support of the result we reach in this 
case. A California case states it simply: "[T]he constitutional invalidity of 
amendatory legislation does not affect the validity of preceding enactments." 
Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 227 (1983) (citation 
omitted). Generally, when an amendment to an original act is declared 
unconstitutional, the unconstitutional amendment has no effect, and the law as 
it existed before the amendment is controlling. State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 637 P.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S. Ct. 56, 74 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1982); Western Int'l v. Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Iowa 1986); 
Bongard v. Bongard, 342 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn.App. 1983). See also, 1 Norman J. 
Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.07 at 42 n. 23 (1985) ("Former 
act remains in force when the unconstitutional amendment is declared void."); 
Annotation, Previous statute as affected by attempted but unconstitutional 
amendment, 66 A.L.R. 1483 (1930).

[¶10]   We are unwilling to attribute to 
the legislature an intent to repeal the "culpably negligent" standard even in 
the face of our finding of unconstitutionality. Ascribing such intent to the 
legislature would leave the law in this area in a state of chaos for a period 
which lasted almost seven years. It would be inconsistent, as well as 
irresponsible, with our precedents to assign the burden of such an absurd intent 
to the legislature. Parker Land & Cattle v. Wyoming Game & Fish, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-1045 (Wyo. 1993); Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1356 (Wyo. 1992) 
(Golden, J., concurring).

CONCLUSION

[¶11]   Under the circumstances presented 
here, we hold that our decision in Mills revived the "culpably negligent" 
standard. Applying the general rule, we further hold the unconstitutional 
amendment had no effect and left the statute as it was before the amendment - 
for the limited purpose of maintaining the "culpably negligent" standard in 
cases where that standard properly applies.

THOMAS, 
Justice, concurring.

[¶12]   I agree with the result reached by 
the opinion of the court in this case, and I have no quarrel with the rationale 
incorporated in the court's opinion. I perceive, however, in this instance, we 
find a nuance which does not seem to be a part of the ratio decidendi of 
the persuasive authority from our sister jurisdictions.

[¶13]   It is very clear that, in the case 
of amendatory legislation, if the new statute is declared unconstitutional, the 
effect of that declaration is to treat the new statute as though it had not been 
adopted. This approach reaches even to striking the enactment clause of the new 
statute, and the effect is to reinstate the prior statute. In addition to the 
cases and the annotations cited in the majority opinion, I would call attention 
to Clark County, By and Through Bd. of City Comm'rs v. City of Las Vegas, By and 
Through Bd. of City Comm'rs, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981); Clark v. State, 
287 A.2d 660 (Del. 1972), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S. Ct. 139, 34 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1972); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952); State 
v. Greenburg, 187 Neb. 149, 187 N.W.2d 751 (1971); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985); State ex rel. Thornton v. Wannamaker, 248 S.C. 421, 150 S.E.2d 607 (1966); State ex rel. Dieringer v. Bachman, 131 W. Va. 562, 48 S.E.2d 420 
(1948).1 None of these cases, however, 
address the instance in which an entire codification, such as our workers' 
compensation act, is purportedly repealed and amended and re-enacted. This is 
the nuance I conclude should be addressed.

[¶14]   Succinctly, the question is: 
Conceding that, when an amendment to a statute is declared unconstitutional and 
that declaration of unconstitutionality serves to strike the enacting clause, 
should the same result ensue when the repealing clause is much broader and 
extends to a number of other statutory provisions? Obviously, the striking of 
the repealing clause in toto would lead to legal chaos but, perhaps, the 
situation could be saved by the concept of implied repeal. In my view, however, 
it makes far better sense to simply say the repealing clause will be held to 
have been stricken only as to the specific statutory section, the 
constitutionality of which is in issue and, as to the other statutes, the 
repealing clause would be valid so there would remain in the statutes only the 
new provisions. All of the justifications for the proposition that an earlier 
statute is reinstated when a succeeding amending statute is declared 
unconstitutional are pertinent and applicable to the situation presented by this 
case. There is no reason to attribute any different intent to a legislature 
under these circumstances than is to be attributed in the facts of the cases 
from our other states that hold the legislature would intend to maintain the 
prior version of the statute.

[¶15]   Consequently, I am entirely 
satisfied with the result reached in the majority opinion. The earlier version 
of the statute relating to actions against co-employees must be applied from the 
date of the purported repeal and its replacement by the unconstitutional 
enactment to the effective date of the newest version of the 
statute.

CARDINE, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶16]   If this case were resolved by pure 
application of law only, there can be no question but that the decision would be 
for the workman by allowing recovery upon proof of negligence in coemployee 
suits. Unfortunately, courts have never felt constrained by the law if they 
dislike the result of its application. And so we have here a discussion of 
legislative intent and reliance upon cases from other jurisdictions, neither of 
which have any application to this case.

[¶17]   Let us review the historical 
background of this controversy. The prohibitions upon the limitation of damages 
and the right to recover damages were dealt with separately by the framers of 
our constitution. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Wyo. 1982). To begin 
with, Wyoming Constitution, art. 10, § 4 provides:

     No law shall be 
enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or 
death of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any 
right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall 
be void. As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by 
law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall 
be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications 
to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such 
as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to 
the culpable negligence of the injured employee. The fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from the fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any 
person or persons by reason of the injuries or death. Subject to conditions 
specified by law, the legislature may allow employments not designated 
extrahazardous to be covered by the state fund at the option of the employer. To 
the extent an employer elects to be covered by the state fund and contributes to 
the fund as required by law, the employer shall enjoy the same immunity as 
provided for extrahazardous employments.

The 
common law of England was adopted by Wyoming in 1876. Wyoming Statute 8-1-101 
provides:

     The common law of 
England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is of a general 
nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes 
made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth 
year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 
forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and ninth 
chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature and 
not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority.

[¶18]   In Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1974), this court recognized the adoption of the common law and the 
existence of coemployee liability for ordinary negligence. We iterated the 
pervading rule that valuable common law rights shall not be deemed destroyed by 
a statute except by clear language. We require clear and precise language before 
compensation rights can be taken away, so also must there be clear and precise 
language before common law rights are abolished. Id., at 
624.

[¶19]   In 1975 the legislature provided 
coemployee immunity for "employees acting within the scope of their employment 
unless the employees are grossly negligent." 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149. The 
words "culpably negligent" were substituted for "grossly negligent" by the 
legislature in 1977. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142.

[¶20]   In Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 
we held that the provision granting coemployees immunity except for culpable 
negligence was constitutional and not violative of art. 10 § 4 of our 
constitution because it did not limit the amount of damages to be recovered. 
Instead, the statute specifically limited the causes of action available for 
recovery.

[¶21]   In 1989, the legislature again 
amended W.S. 27-14-104(a) providing for total immunity of 
coemployees:

     The rights and 
remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and 
his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu 
of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer 
making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting 
within the scope of their employment, but do not supersede any rights and 
remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other person. 
[emphasis added]

Mills 
v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992), held W.S. 27-14-104(a) unconstitutional 
inasmuch as it violated the equal protection clause of the Wyoming Constitution, 
art. 3 § 27, by creating classifications which treated similarly situated people 
differently. The court further held that § 27-14-104(a) was violative of art. 1 
§ 8 of the Wyoming Constitution because it denied access to courts in granting 
complete immunity from suits, including immunity for intentional acts and for 
willful and wanton misconduct, by coemployees to employees who were acting 
within the scope of their employment.

[¶22]   In declaring W.S. 27-14-104(a) 
unconstitutional, no provision was made for revival of the predecessor statute. 
Wyoming Statute 8-1-106 provides:

If 
any law is repealed which repealed a former law, the former law is not thereby 
revived unless it is expressly provided.

Thus, 
the question we are presented is: In the absence of an express provision for 
revival as required by § 8-1-106, is the predecessor statute, W.S. 27-12-103(a) 
limiting recovery for injury by the coemployee to culpable negligence, 
nevertheless revived? That question has been answered in this 
way:

a) 
If holding a statute unconstitutional leaves no void in the law, the prior 
statute is not revived.

b) 
If, on the other hand, a void in the law will occur upon declaration of 
unconstitutionality, the prior statute is revived.

[¶23]   In Wyoming, there is no void in the 
law upon declaration of unconstitutionality because the common law provides for 
recovery by the worker upon proof of negligence. The common law right to sue a 
fellow employee remained unchanged throughout the amendments to art. 10 § 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution, and that right continues to date. Markle v. 
Williamson, 518 P.2d  at 625. Revival of the predecessor statute, § 27-12-103(a), 
does not occur because revival was not provided for as required by § 8-1-106. 
Without revival, the worker's right of recovery against a coemployee is governed 
by common law. I find support for this conclusion in the cases cited by 
appellants. Each case provides for revival of a prior statute because the 
invalidated statute left a void due to the lack of a common law counterpart. 
Here there is a common law rule and hence no void. The cases cited are as 
follows: State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976); State v. 
Kolocotronis, 73 Wn.2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968); Selective Life Ins. Co. v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 101 Ariz. 594, 422 P.2d 710 (1967); Bongard v. 
Bongard, 342 N.W.2d 156 (Minn.App. 1983); Boeing Co. v. State, 74 Wn.2d 82, 442 P.2d 970 (1968); State ex rel. Musa v. Minear, 240 Or. 315, 401 P.2d 36 (1965); 
Topeka Cemetery Ass'n v. Schnellbacher, 218 Kan. 39, 542 P.2d 278 (1975); Frost 
v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S. Ct. 235, 73 L. Ed. 483 (1929); Weissinger v. 
Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (Ala. 1971); Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206 
(Miss. 1975); State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 637 P.2d 1117 (1981); Clark County v. 
City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981); Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660 (Del. 1972); State v. Greenburg, 187 Neb. 149, 187 N.W.2d 751 (1971); State 
ex rel. Thornton v. Wannamaker, 248 S.C. 421, 150 S.E.2d 607 (1966); State v. 
Reed, 75 S.D. 300, 63 N.W.2d 803 (1954); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 
(Fla. 1952); State ex rel. Dieringer v. Bachman, 131 W. Va. 562, 48 S.E.2d 420 
(1948); People ex rel. Farrington v. Mensching, 187 N.Y. 8, 79 N.E. 884 (1907); 
State ex rel. Malott v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 89 Mont. 37, 296 P. 1 
(1931).

[¶24]   It is curious also that the 
worker's compensation fund, always facing bankruptcy, gains funds by 
reimbursement from third party recoveries, yet takes no position in this 
dispute. And the complaint of the eleven amici curiae companies and corporations 
is that they pay accident insurance premiums to workers compensation for their 
industrial accident insurance and also to private carriers for separate 
insurance to cover their employees. Three thoughts immediately come to mind. 
First, the eleven amici do not have to provide insurance coverage for their 
employees. Second, if they choose to do so by buying insurance, what is wrong 
with that? And, third, they could pay the premiums now paid to private insurance 
carriers to worker's compensation for coemployee coverage.

[¶25]   And so, my final thought. There has 
always been a quid pro quo for the workman giving up his right to sue for 
injury. "In adopting the new system, both employees and employers gave up 
something that they each might gain something else, and it was in the nature of 
a compromise." Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 989 (1918). The act "protects both employer and employee; the former from 
wasteful suits and extravagant verdicts; the latter from the expense, 
uncertainties and delays of litigation in all cases and from the certainty of 
defeat if unable to establish a case of actionable negligence." Id., quoting 
Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915). If now the 
worker is to give up the right to sue coemployees, then perhaps additional 
premiums should be paid to worker's compensation to provide industrial accident 
insurance for coemployees. These additional premiums would provide a 
corresponding increase in benefits to injured employees awarded benefits under 
worker's compensation. See Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d  at 58 (Cardine, Justice, 
specially concurring).

[¶26]   I am still of the opinion, as 
previously stated in Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d  at 58-59, that as a 
constitutional amendment was necessary to abrogate a worker's right to recover 
from his employer for his injuries during employment, so too a constitutional 
amendment is necessary to abrogate his right to sue someone other than his 
employer for such injuries.

[¶27]   For the reasons stated, I would 
hold the prior statute not revived.

 

 FOOTNOTES

1 WYO. STAT. § 27-14-104(a) is located in Section 3 of the 1986 Session 
Laws. As provided in Section 6 of the 1986 Session Laws, Section 3 became 
effective July 1, 1987.

FOOTNOTE 
for Concurrence

1 For the proposition that, when an amended statute is declared 
unconstitutional the statute as worded prior to the amendment is re-enacted, see 
the authorities cited in Annotation, Previous Statute as Affected by Attempted 
but Unconstitutional Amendment, 66 A.L.R. 1483 
(1930).