Title: MICHAEL ROBERT KOBOS, A Minor Child two years of age, by and through MICHAEL KOBOS and REBECCA KOBOS, his parents and next friends, MICHAEL KOBOS and REBECCA KOBOS v. RICHARD G. SUGDEN, M.D., KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, CHARLES EVERTS, M.D., Teton Radiology Associaties, P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, JAMES R. LITTLE, M.D., Jackson Pediatrics, P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, THOMAS J. POCKAT, M.D., JOHN DOES I-X and DOE Partnerships, Corporations, and/or other entities I-X

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MICHAEL ROBERT KOBOS, A Minor Child two years of age, by and through MICHAEL KOBOS and REBECCA KOBOS, his parents and next friends, MICHAEL KOBOS and REBECCA KOBOS v. RICHARD G. SUGDEN, M.D., KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, CHARLES EVERTS, M.D., Teton Radiology Associaties, P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, JAMES R. LITTLE, M.D., Jackson Pediatrics, P.C., A Wyoming Professional Corporation, THOMAS J. POCKAT, M.D., JOHN DOES I-X and DOE Partnerships, Corporations, and/or other entities I-X1985 WY 13694 P.2d 110Case Number: 84-283Decided: 01/25/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL ROBERT KOBOS, A 
MINOR CHILD TWO YEARS OF AGE, BY AND THROUGH MICHAEL KOBOS AND REBECCA KOBOS, 
HIS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, MICHAEL KOBOS AND REBECCA KOBOS, PETITIONERS 
(PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

RICHARD G. SUGDEN, M.D., 
KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., KENNETH L. LAMBERT, M.D., P.C., A WYOMING PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, CHARLES EVERTS, M.D., TETON RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.C., A WYOMING 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, JAMES R. LITTLE, M.D., JACKSON PEDIATRICS, P.C., A 
WYOMING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, THOMAS J. POCKAT, M.D., JOHN DOES I-X AND DOE 
PARTNERSHIPS, CORPORATIONS, AND/OR OTHER ENTITIES I-X, RESPONDENTS 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Lawrence B. 
Hartnett, Hartnett & Moyer, Jackson, Richard J. Mulligan, Jackson; and Andrew S. Hartnett, Honolulu, Hawaii, signed the brief on behalf of 
petitioners-plaintiffs.

Frank D. Neville 
and T. Michael Golden, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, signed the brief 
on behalf of defendant-respondent Richard G. Sugden, M.D.

Paul B. Godfrey, 
Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, signed the brief on behalf of 
defendant-respondent Kenneth L. Lambert, M.D.

J.E. Vlastos, 
Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, P.C., Casper, signed the brief on behalf of 
defendants-respondents Charles Everts, M.D. and Teton Radiology Associates, 
Inc.

Carl L. Lathrop, 
Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, signed the brief on behalf of 
defendant-respondent James R. Little, M.D.

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee, Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, signed the brief on behalf of 
defendant-respondent Thomas J. Pockat, M.D.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This matter came before 
this court on a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing an order denying 
a motion to change judge for cause in Civil Action No. 5357 in the District 
Court, Ninth Judicial District, County of Teton. All parties submitted briefs on the 
issue and the Honorable Robert B. Ranck expressed his position in the matter by 
letter. 

[¶2.]     Rule 40.1(b), W.R.C.P., 
Cum.Supp. 1984, reads in pertinent part:

"(2) Disqualification for 
Cause. - Whenever the grounds for such motion become known, any party may move 
for a change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge (A) has 
been engaged as counsel in the action prior to his election or appointment as 
judge, (B) is interested in the action, (C) is related by consanguinity to a 
party, (D) is a material witness in the action, or (E) is biased or prejudiced 
against the party or his counsel. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit 
or affidavits of any person or persons, stating sufficient facts to show the 
existence of such grounds. Prior to a hearing on the motion any party may file 
counter-affidavits. The presiding judge shall rule on the motion and if he 
grants the same shall immediately call in another district judge to try the 
action.

"(3) Effect of Ruling. - 
A ruling on a motion for a change of district judge shall not be an appealable 
order, but the ruling shall be entered on the docket and made a part of the 
record and may be assigned as error in an appeal of the 
case."

[¶3.]     The last quoted 
subsection, Rule 40.1(b)(3), would seem to dispose of petitioners' position. 
However, because a hearing was not had on petitioners' motion for a change of 
judge, and in view of the time and money to be spent in the trial of this 
matter, the issuance of a writ of certiorari was ordered.

[¶4.]     The request for a 
change of judge was made on the ground that the judge was biased or prejudiced 
against the plaintiffs or their counsel. A review of petitioners' 70-page brief 
reflects that only one of the alleged instances reflecting bias and prejudice on 
the part of Judge Ranck has to do with that other than orders and actions taken 
with reference to the case, which orders and actions are subject to appeal in 
the normal course of civil procedure. It would be novel, to say the least, for 
us to address alleged errors of law at a pretrial time under the guise of 
ascertaining bias and prejudice rather than on the merits of the legal error 
itself at the time they are properly placed before us on appeal. The instances 
of this nature are those pertaining to rulings on pretrial conference matters, 
depositions, number of jury challenges, trial and other procedural settings and 
continuances thereof, rulings on protective orders, designation of expert 
witnesses and method of payment for their services, and appointment of guardian 
for the minor child.

[¶5.]     The one allegation of 
bias and prejudice not pertaining to case orders or actions is to the effect 
that one of the defendant-physicians was a personal friend of the trial judge; 
that the physician was a treating physician of the judge and his wife; and that 
the judge had made a statement to the effect that he held the professional skill 
and competence exercised by the physician in high regard. As already noted in 
Rule 40.1(b)(3), an unfavorable ruling on the motion made for this reason would 
be presented to us only as error on appeal of the case. However, inasmuch as a 
hearing was not had on the motion, as contemplated by this rule, an ultimate 
appeal would contest the procedure and not only the ruling on the motion. 
Accordingly, the parties were afforded the opportunity to present their 
positions through briefs in this certiorari proceeding. That having been done, 
we find petitioners have failed to substantiate the existence of bias and 
prejudice from the judge's association with the defendant-physician. In Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725, 729 
(1979), we noted the difference between "bias" and "prejudice" and 
said:

"A judge would not be 
very effective or efficient in a community the size of Sheridan, if he were 
bound to recuse himself from cases involving those with whom he had `close 
political affiliations and social relationships' or with whom he had been `a 
close personal friend throughout a greater part of' his life. There is no more 
of a disposition for a judge to rule in favor of an acquaintance or friend 
because of that fact than there is a disposition for him to rule against an 
acquaintance or friend because of that fact. The fact of friendship could result 
in a `leaning over backwards' to maintain impartiality, or it could result in 
the opposite. But an allegation of friendship, without more, is not sufficient 
to establish that either is likely to happen.

"In response to a 
contention that the judge should be disqualified because of a close personal 
relationship with an associate of the defendant, the court said in Firnhaber v. Sensenbrenner, U.S.D.C. 
Wis., 385 F. Supp. 406, 412 (1974):

"`* * * If this were the 
appropriate standard for determining when recusal is necessary, either very few 
cases could be heard by the federal judiciary, or federal judges would be 
rendered hermits upon their appointment. * *'

"See Plechner v. Widener College, Inc. 
(3rd Cir.), 569 F.2d 1250 (1977); and Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 
U.S.D.C.Va., 406 F. Supp. 721 (1975).

"Without a valid reason 
for recusal, a judge has a duty not to recuse himself.

"`Recusal and 
reassignment is not a matter to be lightly undertaken by a district judge. 
While, in proper cases, we have a duty to recuse ourselves, in cases such as the 
one before us, we have concomitant obligation not to recuse ourselves; absent a valid 
reason for recusal, there remains what has sometimes been termed a "duty to 
sit." [Citations.]' Simonson v. General 
Motors Corporation, U.S.D.C.Pa., 425 F. Supp. 574, 578 (1976)." (Emphasis in 
original and footnote omitted.)

[¶6.]     The 1980 census for 
Jackson, Wyoming was 4,511. The judge probably has 
acquaintanceship with the majority of the residents. The case is to be tried to 
the jury. Petitioners have now been afforded the opportunity to present and 
argue their motion for disqualification. For the reasons stated, the motion 
should not be granted.

[¶7.]     The case is remanded 
and a mandate will issue immediately so that the district court can process the 
case in the regular course of its business.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶8.]     I 
dissent.

[¶9.]     The court in its 
opinion relies heavily upon cases from the federal courts. But, federal courts 
sit primarily in large population centers where the judge is rarely known by the 
mass of population; and so, Jackson, Wyoming, with its population of 4,511, points 
up the clear difference between the federal judiciary and that of our state 
courts. The state court judge may have close personal relationships with a large 
percentage of persons in a small town. Occasionally, for honest and legitimate 
reasons, one of those persons may feel that the judge should not try his case. A 
litigant in this circumstance who believes he will not receive a fair trial by a 
particular judge should not have to try his case before that judge. There are 
two judges in the ninth judicial district, one of whom resides in Lander. It 
would have been a simple matter to assign this case to the Lander 
judge.

[¶10.]  With respect to the claim of prejudice, 
plaintiff's attorneys Larry and Andrew Hartnett discussed with the judge more 
than a year ago his not sitting on this case. The judge advised plaintiff's 
counsel that:

"[I]f they filed a motion 
to swear me off the case, I would withdraw my permission for Andrew Hartnett to 
represent the plaintiffs in this case; * * * and I told Larry Hartnett that that 
is what I would do."

[¶11.]  I am unable to understand why the judge 
threatens this kind of sanction when asked not to hear this case. Finally, 
plaintiffs state that the judge is a personal friend of one of defendants. For 
the reasons stated, I at least would have preferred to hear oral argument on the 
certiorari petition.