Title: Dudley v. Ferguson Trucking Company

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

297 P.2d 313 (1956) 61 N.M. 166 James B. DUDLEY, Claimant-Appellee, v. FERGUSON TRUCKING COMPANY, a Corporation, Employer, and Travelers Insurance Company, Insurer, Defendants-Appellants. No. 5934. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 15, 1956. Hubert O. Robertson, Silver City, for appellants. Garland & Sanders, James T. Martin, Jr., Las Cruces, for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. The defendants, employer and insurer, appeal from a judgment of the district court awarding claimant, employee, workmen's compensation benefits. Claimant sustained a compensable injury when he was helping to load oil well drilling equipment on a truck. A drill collar rolled off a flat bed and struck his right foot. It was necessary that the great toe on this foot be amputated through the proximal portion of the first phalanx. Claimant was hospitalized at Farmington, New Mexico, in excess of two and one-half months, during which time four operations were performed on his foot. The insurer paid for the medical and hospital expense involved and also paid $392.29 for the period of time of claimant's temporary total disability. After claimant's release from the hospital he moved to Deming, New Mexico, where he commenced work on his brother's farm. The insurer sent claimant a check for $450 for settlement of his compensation on the basis of loss of the great toe. Claimant refused this settlement and thereafter *314 he was examined by Dr. W.C. Basom, an orthopedic specialist in El Paso, Texas, whose medical report, communicated to the defendant insurer by claimant's attorney, indicated further surgical treatment would probably improve the condition of claimant's foot. The insurer again offered $450 in settlement for the loss of the toe plus $300 for future medical expense and loss of time. This offer, too, was refused by claimant and suit by him was then instituted. Trial was had to the court which found claimant entitled to compensation at the rate of $30 per week for (a) fifteen weeks for the loss of his great toe, and (b) twenty-five weeks for twenty-five percent permanent disability to his right foot, and, in addition, that he should recover: (1) $400.00 for necessary medical treatment which will be required in the future; (2) Four weeks' compensation for temporary total disability incurred in the future as a result of additional medical treatment; (3) $55 for a specially built boot purchased by claimant; (4) $34 for medical services rendered by the El Paso doctor; (5) $350 for services of claimant's attorney. Judgment was entered making these awards. The defendants maintain on this appeal that the judgment improperly pyramids the benefits allowed to claimant in that he was allowed compensation for the loss of the great toe on his right foot and also for twenty-five percent permanent disability to the right foot. Principal reliance is placed upon the decision in Gonzales v. Pecos Valley Packing Co., 1944, 48 N.M. 185, 146 P.2d 1017. That case held a workman could not recover an award for loss of a specific bodily member under the statutory schedule and also an award for general percentage disability which, as the Court assessed the proof in that case, was necessarily based upon the loss of member. Superficially, it would appear that the instant awards do allow claimant double compensation, upon the assumption that the loss of claimant's toe must have at least entered into the computation of disability to the foot. However, the medical testimony, viewed most favorably as to claimant-appellee, and bolstered by all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, seems to us adequate to support the permissibility of both awards. Dr. Basom's testimony, by deposition, was, in part: Claimant, in his answer brief, asserts: "From this testimony it is quite apparent *316 that Dr. Basom concluded that there were two separate and distinct injuries, one being to the forepart of the foot and the other being the amputation of the great toe." We believe the fact finder was justified in so interpreting this testimony. It should also be noted that the claimant exhibited his foot to the court, pointing out the parts involved, at which time he testified: There was substantial evidence before the court that claimant sustained an injury which extended beyond his toe. The testimony given by Dr. Basom may fairly be interpreted that he did not include the loss of the toe in his computation of disability to the foot. As a result of these particular circumstances, this case falls within the principle of our decisions in Mathews v. New Mexico Light & Power Co., 1942, 46 N.M. 118, 122 P.2d 410, and Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945, 49 N.M. 4, 154 P.2d 1000. Similar allowances have been approved in these cases from other states: General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Beatty, 1932, 174 Ga. 314, 162 S.E. 668; Lane v. Sonken-Galamba Corp., 1925, 119 Kan. 256, 237 P. 875; Fame Armstrong Laundry Co. v. Brooks, 1928, 226 Ky. 22, 10 S.W.2d 478; Lentz v. Mumy Well Service, 1954, 340 Mich. 1, 64 N.W.2d 673. Defendants under their second point protest that the trial court has allowed an award of compensation for permanent partial disability before an end medical result has been reached. This argument is based upon the medical testimony in the case that claimant's condition would be benefited by a further operation; that claimant has refused at this time to undergo such operation; and that under § 59-10-20, N.M.S.A. 1953, it is in the discretion of the court to reduce or suspend compensation if the workman shall refuse to submit to medical or surgical treatment as is reasonably essential to promote his recovery. As here material, this section provides: While the doctors testifying were of the opinion further surgery would eliminate part of claimant's disability, there was other testimony, already noted above, that claimant had present permanent partial disability in his foot which Dr. Basom estimated at twenty-five percent. Claimant's testimony about the further operation was: It cannot be said that claimant's refusal to submit to another operation is unreasonable and the court's finding of present permanent partial disability is supported by substantial evidence. This brings us, however, to another matter objected to by defendants that is, the allowance to claimant of $400, the estimated cost of further surgical treatment and four weeks' compensation for temporary disability to be incurred in the future as a result of additional medical treatment. We agree with defendants that our Workmen's Compensation Act contains neither authorization nor suggestion for a present award of future medical expenses and temporary disability benefits where the claimant refuses the present administration of such treatment and it is only speculative whether the treatment will ever be undertaken in the future. Our statute, § 59-10-19, N.M.S.A. 1953, provides, in part: The defendants have already expended $1,390.06 for claimant's medical treatment; claimant has never requested further medical treatment; instead, he presently refuses it and has been given an award for permanent partial disability based upon his present condition. In this situation, the award made for possible future medical treatment and temporary disability has no justification under the statute. Claimant, as already stated, was awarded $55 for a specially built boot which he purchased. The defendants challenge the validity of this allowance, as well as an award of $34 given claimant for expense of an examination of his condition made by Dr. Basom. The trial court found the plaintiff was required to wear a specially constructed boot by reason of his injury and that the boot cost $55, that he had received medical services from Dr. Basom and the latter's fee of $34 was reasonable for the examination. The record discloses that on his own initiative claimant ordered a pair of cowboy boots made for him at a boot and saddle shop in El Paso, Texas, but at no time did he ever notify defendants in any manner of his need of or desire for special shoes or boots, or for any further medical treatment after he left the care of the doctors and hospital in Farmington, except, as already stated, that Dr. Basom's medical report was sent to the defendant insurer by claimant's attorney. *318 In addition to portions of § 59-10-19, supra, already set forth, it is there provided: It is apparently the contention of the claimant that under our compensation act to support the award of the sums for the boot and the medical examination he need only show the expenditures were justified from a medical standpoint and were of reasonable amount. Certainly these matters must be shown, but it must also be established that some request or demand, however informal, was made upon the employer or insurer to provide the articles or services. We note in this connection the following language from George v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 1950 54 N.M. 210, 213, 219 P.2d 285, 286: See also: Wright v. Schultz, 1951, 55 N.M. 261, 265, 231 P.2d 937; Rowland v. Reynolds Electrical Engineering Co., 1951, 55 N.M. 287, 294, 232 P.2d 689. This is the general rule under statutory provisions similar to ours. 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 61.12; Annotation: 7 A.L.R. 545. In view of our determination the awards made to claimant for compensation for loss of his great toe and partial disability to his foot should stand, we must reject defendants' final contention on this appeal that they had offered claimant all the compensation to which he was entitled and that an award of attorney's fees in the sum of $350 by the trial court was improper. Claimant's attorneys will be allowed $200 for their services in this Court. The judgment is reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of claimant for compensation at the rate of $30 per week for (a) fifteen weeks for loss of the great toe and (b) twenty-five weeks for twenty-five percent permanent partial disability in the right foot, and for attorneys' fees as directed herein. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN and SADLER, JJ., concur. KIKER, J., not participating.