Title: Christine L. Tensfeldt v. F. William Haberman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1638 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert William Tensfeldt, John F. Tensfeldt and 
Christine L. Tensfeldt, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
     v. 
F. William Haberman, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Roy C. LaBudde and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants there were 
briefs (in the court of appeals) by Thomas R. Schrimpf and 
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas 
R. Schrimpf. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Gary M. Young and Law Offices of Gary M. 
Young, Madison, and oral argument by Gary M. Young. 
 
 
 
2009 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1638  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1871) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert William Tensfeldt, John F. Tensfeldt and 
Christine L. Tensfeldt, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
 
Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
F. William Haberman, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Roy C. LaBudde and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
 
Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Michael N. Nowakowski, Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  This case is before this court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
2 
 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (2007-08).1   It involves a dispute between 
the children of the deceased, Robert Tensfeldt, and the two 
attorneys who provided his estate planning services, Attorneys 
LaBudde and Haberman.  Both the children and Attorney LaBudde 
appealed a circuit court order on their cross motions for 
summary judgment.2   
¶2 
Attorney 
LaBudde asserts that the circuit court 
improperly granted the children's motion for summary judgment, 
thereby concluding as a matter of law that LaBudde is liable for 
intentionally aiding and abetting his client's violation of a 
divorce judgment.  First, he contends that he is not liable 
because the judgment was not enforceable.  Second, he asserts 
that the question was fairly debatable, entitling him to 
qualified immunity and the good faith advice privilege. 
¶3 
We determine that the circuit court properly concluded 
that LaBudde is liable as a matter of law for intentionally 
aiding and abetting his client's unlawful act.  The divorce 
judgment was enforceable at the time it was entered and at the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 According to the certification memorandum, the children 
appeal an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Michael N. 
Nowakowski, 
Judge, 
dismissing 
Attorney 
Haberman 
from 
the 
lawsuit.  In addition, Attorney LaBudde appeals the order 
granting the children's motion for summary judgment and denying 
LaBudde's motion for summary judgment. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
3 
 
time Robert asked LaBudde to draft an estate plan that violated 
the judgment. Under these facts, LaBudde is not entitled to 
either qualified immunity or the good faith advice privilege. 
¶4 
Additionally, on the children's third-party negligence 
claim, LaBudde argues that the circuit court improperly denied 
his motion for summary judgment.  We determine that the circuit 
court erred in denying LaBudde's motion for summary judgment 
because the children cannot establish that LaBudde's negligence 
thwarted Robert's clear intent. 
¶5 
Regarding the claim against Attorney Haberman, the 
Tensfeldt children assert that the circuit court erroneously 
granted Haberman's motion for summary judgment. They contend 
that Haberman is liable for negligently advising their father 
regarding his estate.  We conclude that the circuit court did 
not 
err 
in 
granting 
summary 
judgment. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, Haberman is not liable to third parties for his 
negligent advice, and further, the children failed to present 
evidence sufficient to show that they were harmed by Haberman's 
negligent advice. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
order of the circuit court, and we remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings.3 
                                                 
3 On 
remand, 
we 
expect 
that 
there 
will 
be 
further 
proceedings on the aiding and abetting claim as well as the 
civil conspiracy claim.  
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
4 
 
I 
 ¶7 Robert Tensfeldt and his first wife, Ruth, had three 
children——Christine, Robert William, and John.4  When Robert and 
Ruth 
divorced 
in 
1974, 
they 
entered 
into 
an 
agreement 
stipulating to various terms of the divorce.  The divorce court 
determined that the stipulation was "fair and reasonable" and 
incorporated the stipulation into the divorce judgment.5   
¶8 
One of the terms of the stipulation provides that 
Robert would make and maintain a will leaving two-thirds of his 
net estate to the children: 
Will in Favor of Children: Simultaneously with the 
execution of this Stipulation, [Robert] shall execute 
                                                                                                                                                             
After concluding that LaBudde was liable as a matter of law 
for aiding and abetting, the circuit court denied LaBudde's 
motion for summary judgment on the civil conspiracy claim.  It 
remarked that LaBudde's defenses to aiding and abetting and 
civil conspiracy were identical, and "[f]or the same reason 
these arguments failed in regards to the aiding and abetting 
claim, they must also fail now."  The court concluded that "[i]t 
would be possible that a reasonable jury would find from these 
facts that LaBudde committed civil conspiracy."   
We agree with the circuit court that LaBudde's defenses to 
aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy are identical and that 
the 
parties' 
arguments 
concerning 
these 
two 
claims 
are 
interchangeable.  Therefore, we do not separately address the 
civil conspiracy claim in this opinion. 
4 For ease of reference, Robert and Ruth's children will be 
referred to as the Tensfeldt children throughout this opinion.  
5 The divorce judgment provided in part: 
That the Stipulation heretofore entered into by and 
between the parties is fair and reasonable and the 
Court herewith approves the same and the same is 
incorporated as part of the Judgment in this action. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
5 
 
and shall hereafter keep in effect, a Will leaving not 
less than two-thirds (2/3) of his net estate outright 
to the three adult children of the parties, or to 
their heirs by right of representation.  Except as 
herein provided, [Robert] shall have the right to make 
such disposition of his estate as he may desire, 
except as limited herein, and further, except as 
limited 
by 
the 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
[the 
provision dealing with unpaid alimony.]  As used 
herein, the term "net estate" shall mean [Robert's] 
gross estate passing under his Will (or otherwise, 
upon the occasion of his death), less funeral and 
burial expenses, administration fees and expenses, 
debts and claims against the estate, and Federal and 
State taxes. 
¶9 
Robert married his second wife, Constance, in 1975.  
They remained married until Robert's death in 2000.  Robert and 
Constance had no children together, although Constance had three 
children from a previous marriage.  In 1978, Robert executed a 
will that was compliant with the stipulation and order——one-
third of the net estate went to Constance, and two-thirds of the 
net estate went to his children or their issue.   
¶10 In 1980, Robert retained Attorney LaBudde (LaBudde) of 
Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP to provide estate planning 
services.  It is undisputed that Robert made LaBudde aware of 
his obligation to his children from the outset.  When Robert 
initially met with LaBudde, he gave the attorney a copy of the 
divorce judgment and stipulation.  LaBudde told Robert that he 
had three choices: comply with the stipulation; negotiate with 
the children to alter his obligation; or ignore the stipulation, 
knowing that the children might contest Robert's will upon his 
death.  Robert chose the third option, and in 1981, LaBudde 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
6 
 
drafted an estate plan that did not leave two-thirds of the net 
estate outright to the Tensfeldt children. 
¶11 After Robert executed the non-compliant estate plan, 
LaBudde received a letter from Robert's divorce attorney, J.M. 
Slechta.  Attorney Slechta wrote: 
Since you have drafted a will for Mr. Robert Tensfeldt 
of Oconomowoc, I recalled that in his divorce in 1974 
in which proceedings I represented him, it was agreed 
in the Stipulation made part of the judgment, some 
restrictions on the disposition of his estate . . . .  
Realizing this might have some effect upon the 
disposition which you have proposed I am enclosing a 
copy of such stipulation for your examination.  There 
does not seem to be any sanction against disposition 
of assets during his lifetime.   
LaBudde wrote back: 
Your letter . . . asks whether Mr. Tensfeldt's most 
recent Will . . . violates his obligations under that 
decree . . . . 
In my opinion, Mr. Tensfeldt's present Will needs some 
revision in light of the obligations under the divorce 
decree, of which I was unaware until receipt of your 
letter.  On the other hand, the so-called "Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981" does, as you know, offer 
significant new estate and gift tax advantages which 
may be available to Mr. Tensfeldt to some extent 
despite the decree. 
¶12 Robert and LaBudde never changed the estate plan to 
bring it into compliance with the divorce stipulation and 
judgment.  Even though Robert and Constance moved to Florida in 
1985, they continued to retain the attorneys at Michael Best & 
Friedrich to handle their estate planning.  Over the course of 
12 years, LaBudde drafted and executed a series of revisions to 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
7 
 
the plan for Robert,6 including the 1992 plan that was in effect 
when Robert died.  None of the revised plans left at least two-
thirds of his net estate outright to the three adult children of 
his first marriage. 
¶13 Attorney LaBudde later scaled back his practice, and 
Robert first consulted with Attorney Haberman (Haberman) in 
1994.  In 1999, Robert met with Haberman to discuss his estate 
plan in depth.  According to a memo from his file, Haberman 
"carefully outlined the assets passing to his children and his 
wifes children, and [Robert] decided to leave things as they are 
and make no changes" to the 1992 estate plan.  
¶14 According to the 1992 plan, after Robert's death the 
Tensfeldt children would receive some money and property up 
front.  However, the majority of Robert's estate would pour into 
an inter vivos trust.  Constance would receive an income from 
the trust during her life, and after Constance's death her 
children would receive a cash payment from the trust.  The 
Tensfeldt children would receive the remainder of the balance.   
¶15 When he met with Robert in 1999, Haberman was unaware 
of a recent Florida case that would have a substantial impact on 
the distribution of Robert's assets.  This decision, Bravo v. 
Sauter, 727 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999), allowed a 
surviving spouse to elect against the will (thereby taking 30 
percent of the estate off the top) and continue to receive 
                                                 
6 New plans with minor revisions were executed in 1982, 
1986, 1989, and 1992. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
8 
 
income from the revocable trust for the remainder of her life.7  
Because he was unaware of Bravo, Haberman did not inform Robert 
of the likely impact of this decision——that Constance could 
elect to receive a larger share of the estate than Robert 
contemplated and to defer the bulk of the Tensfeldt children's 
inheritance until after her death.  It is undisputed that 
Haberman was negligent in failing to properly advise his client.  
¶16 Robert died in 2000.  Robert's son and Constance were 
appointed personal representatives of the estate, and Haberman 
was retained as counsel.  At that point, Haberman learned about 
the divorce stipulation, and he told Constance and the Tensfeldt 
children about its existence.   
¶17 The estate was probated in Florida, with Haberman as 
the attorney representing the estate.  See Estate of Robert C. 
Tensfeldt, Deceased, Case No. 00-809-CP-02-HDH.  This probate 
action 
turned 
into 
a 
lengthy 
dispute, 
encompassing 
two 
independent actions in the Florida circuit court.8  Initially, 
the Tensfeldt children sued to enforce the stipulation and order 
promising them two-thirds of Robert's net estate outright.  See 
Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, Case No. 01-26-CA-HDH.  Constance 
objected to the claim, elected against the will, and expressed 
her intention to continue to receive income under the inter 
                                                 
7 Most states permit a surviving spouse to take an elective 
share of the deceased spouse's estate.  However, the surviving 
spouse's 
decision 
to 
elect 
against 
the 
will 
generally 
extinguishes the spouse's other rights under the will. 
8 There were two separate actions in the Florida trial 
courts.  They were consolidated into one appeal.  
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
9 
 
vivos trust.  The children objected to Constance's election and 
argued that it was untimely.  Haberman, representing the estate, 
also objected to Constance's election and argued that Bravo was 
wrongly decided.  
¶18 The court determined that Constance's election was 
timely, that she was entitled to partial distribution of her 
elective share, and that under Bravo she was also entitled to 
receive income from the trust.  Further, the court held that the 
children's claim for two-thirds of the estate was barred by the 
20-year statute of limitations for judgments.   
¶19 The 
children appealed both determinations.  The 
Florida court of appeals concluded that Constance's election was 
timely and that she could both receive an elective share of the 
estate 
and 
continue 
to 
receive 
income 
under 
the 
trust.  
Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720, 727 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2003).  However, applying Florida law, the court concluded that 
the children's claim for two-thirds of the estate was not barred 
by the statute of limitations for judgments because it was 
enforceable as a contract.9  Id. at 724-25.  The court held that 
Constance's elective share (30 percent) would be calculated 
before the children's claim for two-thirds of Robert's net 
estate.  Id. at 727.  
                                                 
9 In making this determination, the court said that while 
the statute of limitations for enforcing a judgment had passed, 
the stipulation was a contract and was therefore enforceable.  
Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2003). 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
10 
 
¶20 On 
remand, 
the 
circuit 
court 
awarded 
Constance 
statutory attorney fees of $444,000 for the entire action under 
Florida Statutes §§ 733.106(3) and 733.6171(4)(a).  The court 
determined that the elective share issue was intertwined with 
the children's claim on the estate, and that it was not possible 
to isolate fees for the elective share litigation.  The fees 
were to be paid out of the estate and subtracted from the 
Tensfeldt children's portion of the estate.  Ultimately, the 
parties settled the dispute. 
¶21 After settling, the children filed suit in Wisconsin 
against Attorneys LaBudde and Haberman.  They alleged various 
intentional torts, including aiding and abetting and civil 
conspiracy, as well as negligence against LaBudde for helping 
Robert violate the divorce judgment.10  Further, they alleged 
negligence against Haberman, arguing that they have been injured 
because of his failure to advise Robert of the impact of Bravo.  
In addition, they asserted that LaBudde and Haberman's law firm, 
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, was liable for claims against the 
two attorneys.  Following discovery, all parties moved for 
summary judgment.   
¶22 The circuit court determined that as a matter of law 
LaBudde aided and abetted Robert's violation of the divorce 
                                                 
10 The children alleged tortious aiding and abetting, civil 
conspiracy, negligent will drafting, intentional interference 
with inheritance, and intentional interference with a contract 
to make a will.  The circuit court dismissed the intentional 
interference 
with 
inheritance 
claim 
and 
the 
intentional 
interference with contract claim at summary judgment. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
11 
 
judgment and set trial for the issues of causation and damages.  
Further, the court determined that the civil conspiracy and 
negligence claims against LaBudde presented questions of fact 
for the jury to decide.  However, the court dismissed all claims 
against Haberman, concluding that he was negligent as a matter 
of law but that the evidence that his negligence had actually 
caused harm to the children was speculative.  Specifically, the 
court stated that the children presented no evidence that Robert 
would have changed his estate plan had he known that Constance 
could simultaneously elect against the will and receive income 
from the trust.   
¶23 The children appealed and LaBudde cross-appealed.  The 
court of appeals certified the cross-appeal to this court, 
noting that the claims against Haberman could be resolved based 
on existing law.  However, the court said that the claims 
against LaBudde presented unanswered questions of law.11  We 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals certified the following questions to 
this court: 
First, 
does 
a 
trial 
court 
have 
authority 
to 
incorporate into a divorce judgment a stipulation 
requiring a party to maintain a will in favor of an 
adult child?  Assuming so, is such a stipulation 
thereafter enforceable only as a judgment or as [a] 
contract to make a will, or both?  In either case, 
should an attorney who drafts a will at his client's 
direction, which he knows violates the terms of such 
an incorporated stipulation, but who also advises the 
client that the will could potentially be challenged 
as a breach of contract, be excused from any third 
party liability under either a qualified immunity 
theory or some other good faith advice defense? 
Certification memorandum, ¶2. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
12 
 
accepted jurisdiction of the entire case pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 and address the questions as argued and briefed by the 
parties. 
 
State 
v. 
Mitchell, 
167 
Wis. 2d 672, 
677, 
482 
N.W.2d 364 (1992). 
II 
¶24 The circuit court ruled on cross motions for summary 
judgment.  We review a grant or denial of summary judgment using 
the same methodology as employed by the circuit court.  Novell 
v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶23, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)).   
¶25 This case addresses issues of the liability of an 
attorney for aiding and abetting a client's alleged violation of 
a 
divorce 
judgment, 
the 
enforceability 
of 
the 
judgment, 
qualified immunity, and the good faith advice privilege.  As 
discussed here, the issues present questions of law which we 
decide independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court.  See State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶29, 306 
Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61.  The case also raises a question of 
whether there was sufficient evidence of harm to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact.  This also presents a question of law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination, but applying the same methodology and benefitting 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
13 
 
from its analysis.  AccuWeb, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, 2008 WI 
24, ¶16, 308 Wis. 2d 258, 746 N.W.2d 447. 
III. Intentional Tort Claims Against Attorney LaBudde 
¶26 The Tensfeldt children allege that between 1980 and 
1992, Attorney LaBudde assisted Robert in unlawfully violating a 
court order mandating that Robert make and maintain a specific 
will.  During that time, LaBudde drafted five wills for Robert, 
each of them noncompliant with a divorce judgment.  The circuit 
court determined that these actions constituted aiding and 
abetting as a matter of law:12 
The parties stipulate that Robert desired to violate 
the judgment requiring him to leave two-thirds of his 
net estate to the Children, an indisputably unlawful 
act.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(1)(b).  However, to do 
so, he needed help in drafting his will, and LaBudde 
provided this assistance.  There is also no question 
that LaBudde intended that the will would violate the 
judgment.  He was aware of the court's judgment and 
knew that the will he drafted violated it. Since there 
are no disputed material facts and the only inferences 
that can be drawn from them lead to the conclusion 
that LaBudde aided and abetted Robert in his violation 
of a court judgment and consciously intended to do so, 
summary judgment is appropriate.  
The court then scheduled trial on the issue of damages.   
¶27 LaBudde disagrees with the court's determination.  He 
asserts that the court order to make and maintain a will was not 
enforceable because the court lacked authority to impose it, and 
                                                 
12 A person is liable in tort for aiding and abetting if the 
person (1) undertakes conduct that as a matter of objective fact 
aids another in the commission of an unlawful act; and (2) 
consciously desires or intends that his conduct will yield such 
assistance.  Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 371 
N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985).   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
14 
 
thus it was not an unlawful act for Robert to violate it.  
Alternatively, he argues that the judgment was no longer 
enforceable after 20 years had passed.  Finally, LaBudde 
contends that he cannot be sued by a third party for actions 
taken to fulfill his professional obligations, absent fraud or 
malice.  He argues that either qualified immunity or the good 
faith advice privilege bars the claim of aiding and abetting.  
We address each argument in turn.   
A. Can the Judgment Be Enforced? 
¶28 LaBudde argues first that the judgment requiring 
Robert to create a will in favor of his children was 
unenforceable at its inception because the court had no 
authority to incorporate a stipulation for property distribution 
to children into a divorce judgment.  Citing Vaccaro v. Vaccaro13 
and Estate of Barnes v. Hall,14 LaBudde asserts that the statutes 
in effect in 1974 did not allow a court to order property 
division for the benefit of children of the marriage, rendering 
the judgment unenforceable.  He further asserts that even if 
this court eventually concludes that it was unlawful for Robert 
                                                 
13 67 Wis. 2d 477, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975). 
14 170 Wis. 2d 1, 486 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
15 
 
to violate the judgment, the question of whether it was unlawful 
was fairly debatable.15   
¶29 In both Barnes and Vaccaro, the judgment of divorce 
incorporated a stipulation which provided that the former 
husband would maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit 
of the minor children.  In both cases, the children attempted to 
enforce the stipulation as a property right after they had 
become adults.  Both this court and the court of appeals 
concluded that under such circumstances, the provisions were for 
child support rather than property division for the benefit of 
adult children.16  
¶30 In Vaccaro, a divorce judgment obligated Mr. Vaccaro 
to maintain a substantial life insurance policy naming his three 
minor sons as beneficiaries.  Vaccaro, 67 Wis. 2d at 478-79.  
Sixteen years after the judgment was entered, Mrs. Vaccaro 
sought a court order requiring her former husband to withdraw 
money from the life insurance policies in order to pay for the 
sons' college tuition.  In making its determination that the 
children did not have a property right to the funds, this court 
                                                 
15 An attorney is generally immune from liability for advice 
and assistance given in good faith when pursuing a client's 
interest on a matter fairly debatable in the law. Stern v. 
Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 242, 517 N.W.2d 658 
(1994).  Immunity and the good faith advice privilege are 
addressed below, in Part III.C. 
16 The concurrence/dissent relies heavily on Barnes and 
Vaccaro.  Its reliance is misplaced.  Neither of these cases 
concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to incorporate the 
parties' stipulation into a divorce judgment.  Indeed, the word 
"jurisdiction" does not appear in either case.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
16 
 
concluded that the provision was child support, rather than 
property division.  Id. at 482.  We noted that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 247.26, "[a] final property division can be made only between 
husband and wife."  Id. at 483. 
¶31 The analysis of Estate of Barnes relies heavily on the 
above quoted sentence from Vaccaro.  In Barnes, the divorce 
judgment obligated the husband to maintain an insurance policy 
for the benefit of the two youngest children of the marriage.  
Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 5.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the language was ambiguous as to whether the provision was 
intended as child support or property division.  Ultimately, the 
court interpreted it as one for child support: "[B]ecause the 
law does not allow estate planning in a divorce for purposes of 
creating a property benefit for adult children, the clause at 
issue, as a matter of law, must be treated as one relating to 
child support."  Id. at 13. 
¶32 Both Vaccaro and Barnes conclude that because divorce 
is created by statute, divorce courts had the authority to order 
only what was allowed for under § 247.26 at that time——division 
of the estate between the spouses, alimony, and child support.17  
In both cases, the provisions could reasonably have been 
interpreted as either property division for the benefit of the 
                                                 
17 Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-74) provided, in part: 
The court may also finally divide and distribute the 
estate, both real and personal, of either party 
between the parties . . . . 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
17 
 
children of the marriage or child support intended to expire 
when the children reached the age of majority.  In both cases, 
the courts chose the interpretation that was expressly provided 
for in § 247.26——child support for the minor children. 
¶33 Here, however, we do not face the same dilemma.  Given 
that there were no minor children to support at the time of the 
divorce, the divorce stipulation could not have been intended as 
child support.  Instead, this stipulation and judgment must have 
been an attempt to divide the estate for the benefit of the 
adult children.   
¶34 To the extent that Barnes can be read to imply that a 
property benefit for adult children cannot be incorporated into 
a court order, we reject the premise.  It is not a complete 
statement of the law.  The 1973-74 statutes explicitly provided 
for the parties to stipulate to a division of the estate, and 
for the court to accept the parties' stipulation and incorporate 
it into the divorce judgment: 
. . . the parties may, subject to the approval of the 
court, stipulate for a division of estate, for 
alimony, or for the support of children, in case a 
divorce or legal separation is granted . . . . 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 247.10 
(1973-74) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Unlike 
§ 247.26, which permitted the court to "finally divide and 
distribute the estate . . . between the parties," there is no 
restriction on who can be the beneficiary of the parties' 
voluntary stipulation for a division of the estate under 
§ 247.10. (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
18 
 
¶35 Although the court on its own initiative does not have 
the authority to impose an order for property division to adult 
children, the parties may voluntarily stipulate to do so.  The 
parties may freely and knowingly stipulate to an overall 
settlement that is fair and equitable and not against public 
policy, 
and 
the 
court 
can 
incorporate 
their 
voluntary 
stipulation into its judgment.  See Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 
Wis. 2d 635, 
637-38, 
178 
N.W.2d 35 
(1970); 
Rintelman 
v. 
Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984); Ross v. Ross, 
149 Wis. 2d 713, 439 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1989).18  In such a 
case, violation of the judgment is unlawful and can subject the 
violator to sanctions for contempt of court.  Bliwas, 47 
Wis. 2d at 641. 
¶36 Even if the interpretation of Vaccaro and Barnes was 
fairly debatable, as LaBudde asserts, it was not fairly 
debatable that a client must follow a court judgment.  By 
asserting that the judgment was unenforceable, LaBudde misses 
the mark.   
¶37 Robert was obligated to follow the court's judgment 
unless it was modified in a proceeding in the circuit court or 
on appeal.  See State v. Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 114 
                                                 
18 In 
Bliwas, 
we 
enforced 
a 
divorce 
judgment 
which 
incorporated the parties' stipulation that the father would 
contribute to the education of his adult son.  Bliwas v. Bliwas, 
47 Wis. 2d 635, 637-38, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970).  In Rintelman, we 
enforced a divorce judgment which incorporated the parties' 
stipulation that alimony would continue even if the former wife 
remarried.  Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 
N.W.2d 498 (1984).   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
19 
 
N.W.2d 118 (1962); Cline v. Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 439, 129 
N.W. 400 (1911).  A judgment imposes a legal obligation and 
violating it can subject an individual to contempt proceedings.  
This is true even if the judgment was entered in error, unless 
the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the judgment.  The 
exceptions to this proposition prove the rule. 
¶38 In State v. Ramsay, the dispute surrounded a court 
order issued in a divorce proceeding between two spouses, Mr. 
and Mrs. Bowser.  Ramsay, the superintendent of the Milwaukee 
County Children's Home, was not a party in the divorce action.  
The court gave custody of the Bowsers' sons to the Milwaukee 
department of public welfare and ordered the Milwaukee County 
Children's Home to accept the boys.  When Ramsay refused to do 
so, the circuit court determined that Ramsay was in contempt.   
¶39 This court reversed, concluding that the circuit court 
did not have jurisdiction to impose an order on Ramsay, who was 
not a party in the divorce action.  We stated: 
The universal rule is that the failure of a person to 
obey an order that is void for want of jurisdiction in 
the 
issuing 
court 
is 
not 
punishable 
as 
contempt. . . .  
. . . .  
On the other hand, disobedience of an order made by a 
court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, 
although the order may be clearly erroneous. 
Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d at 165. 
¶40 As explained above, a court order or judgment must be 
complied with even if the party——or his attorney——disagrees with 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
20 
 
the order.  LaBudde cites a United States Supreme Court case, 
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), but that case lends 
further 
support 
to 
the 
proposition 
that 
under 
these 
circumstances, it was unlawful for Robert to violate the divorce 
judgment.   
¶41 In Maness, the attorney advised his client on Fifth 
Amendment grounds to violate a court order to produce documents.  
The court imposed contempt sanctions against the attorney.  
Ultimately, the Maness court concluded under the circumstances 
of that case that "[c]ompliance could cause irreparable injury 
because appellate courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once 
the information has been released."  Id. at 460.  In reversing, 
the Supreme Court emphasized the rule that court orders and 
judgments are to be obeyed unless subsequently modified in court 
proceedings: 
We begin with the basic proposition that all orders 
and judgments must be complied with promptly.  If a 
person to whom a court directs an order believes that 
order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, 
absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order 
pending 
appeal. 
 
Persons 
who 
make 
private 
determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order 
generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is 
ultimately ruled incorrect. . . .  [A]n order issued 
by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter 
and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is 
reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. 
Id. at 458-59 (citations and quotations omitted).   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
21 
 
¶42 Here, there is no claim that the divorce court lacked 
jurisdiction19 or that obeying the judgment would irrevocably 
release information that could be used against Robert.  Even if 
LaBudde believed that the judgment exceeded the divorce court's 
authority under the 1974 statutes, the only lawful courses of 
action were to follow the judgment, to ask the court to modify 
it, or to appeal the judgment. 
¶43 Although LaBudde has not advanced an issue about 
jurisdiction in this court or any other, we digress to address 
it here because the concurrence/dissent has raised the issue on 
its own and assembled an argument on LaBudde's behalf.  Likely 
this jurisdictional issue was not raised here or below because 
it overlooks Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74), which was in effect 
at the time of the judgment, and because it is inconsistent with 
our case law.  Without the benefit of any briefs or arguments by 
the parties on a jurisdictional issue, the concurrence/dissent 
incorrectly asserts that the divorce judgment was void from its 
inception because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
                                                 
19 The concurrence/dissent takes issue with our statement 
that 
there 
is 
no 
claim 
that 
the 
divorce 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction here.  See concurrence/dissent, ¶130, n.31.  The 
concurrence/dissent simply misstates LaBudde's claims. 
In his brief, LaBudde argued that the stipulation was 
enforceable as a contract but not as a judgment.  However, he 
never argued that the divorce judgment was void for lack of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
The 
words 
"void" 
and 
"jurisdiction" do not appear in his argument that the judgment 
is unenforceable.   
 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
22 
 
to incorporate into the judgment a stipulation for the benefit 
of adult children.  See concurrence/dissent, ¶112.  
¶44 As the concurrence/dissent states, the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a court must be construed at the time of the 
entry of a judgment.  See concurrence/dissent, ¶108.  The 
statutes in force at the time of the Tensfeldts' divorce 
provided that "the court may finally divide and distribute the 
estate . . . between the parties."  Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-
74).  However, they also provided that a court could accept the 
parties' stipulation "for a division of estate."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 247.10 (1973-74).   
¶45 Section 247.10 
did 
not 
restrict 
stipulations 
for 
division of the estate to a division between the parties to the 
divorce.  It permitted the court to incorporate into the 
judgment any stipulation for division of the estate, provided 
the court determined that it was fair and reasonable.  Id.; see 
also Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 637-38.  Under the relevant case law 
at the time, it was apparent that the court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to incorporate the Tensfeldts' stipulation into its 
judgment.  See Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 637-38.20 
                                                 
20 The concurrence/dissent misconstrues the breadth of our 
holding.  It states that our holding permits a divorce court to 
enter any type of stipulation into a divorce judgment, thereby 
expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.  See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶115, 117, 118.  The concurrence/dissent's 
concern is unwarranted.  It is clear that the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over division of the estate, and the 
stipulation at issue here was for a division of the estate.    
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
23 
 
¶46 In addition to the clear statutory authority which 
undermines the argument advanced by the concurrence/dissent, our 
case law also thwarts the argument.  In Bliwas, the parties 
stipulated that Mr. Bliwas would contribute to the education of 
his son beyond his twenty-first birthday.  Id.  This stipulation 
was entered into the divorce judgment, even though the statutes 
in force permitted the court to order support of minor children 
only.  Id. at 638.  When Mr. Bliwas failed to comply with this 
stipulation, Mrs. Bliwas sought contempt sanctions.  Id. at 637.   
¶47 Mr. Bliwas protested that contempt sanctions could not 
be imposed because the divorce court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the stipulation into the divorce judgment.  Id.  The 
parties agreed that "if there had been no stipulation or 
agreement of the parties involved, the family court would have 
been without jurisdiction to enter an order requiring the father 
to contribute to the education of his son beyond the son's 
twenty-first birthday."  Id. at 637-38.   
¶48 In concluding that the judgment was enforceable, the 
Bliwas court repudiated the same lack of jurisdiction argument 
advanced by the concurrence/dissent today.  We stated, "A party 
cannot invoke the jurisdiction and power of a court for the 
purpose of securing important rights from his adversary through 
its judgment, and, after having obtained the relief desired, 
repudiate the action of the court on the ground that it was 
without jurisdiction."  Id. at 641.  Because the parties had 
agreed to the stipulation and the divorce court accepted it and 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
24 
 
incorporated it into the judgment, we concluded that the 
judgment was enforceable.21  Id. at 638-39. 
¶49 Further, in Ross, the court incorporated into the 
judgment 
the 
provisions 
of 
a 
lengthy 
marital 
settlement 
agreement negotiated by the parties and their attorneys.  149 
Wis. 2d at 714.  In part, it provided that Mr. Ross would make 
periodic payments to Mrs. Ross, and that "neither the term nor 
the amount of the . . . payments shall be subject to change by 
further agreement or Court order."  Id.  Several years after the 
divorce judgment was entered, Mr. Ross filed a motion in court 
to modify the provision. 
¶50 We rejected Mr. Ross's contention that the provision 
was unenforceable because the court's authority to order such a 
provision was not expressly conferred by statute: 
We agree with [Mr. Ross] that divorce is a statutory 
procedure and that the divorce court's authority is 
limited to "those express and incidental powers that 
                                                 
21 The 
concurrence/dissent 
argues 
that 
Bliwas 
is 
not 
applicable because it relies on a theory of estoppel.  It 
asserts that because LaBudde was not a party to the divorce, he 
cannot be estopped. 
This argument misses the mark for two reasons.  First, our 
case law has explained that "the 'estoppel' rule of Rintelman 
and Bliwas is not one based on the historic elements of the 
equitable doctrine.  It is simply a rule of law which holds the 
parties to the terms of a stipulated divorce judgment in cases 
where the stipulation is fair and not violative of public 
policy, and where, but for the parties' agreement, the court 
could not have entered the judgment it did."  Ross v. Ross, 149 
Wis. 2d 713, 718-19, 439 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1989).  Second, 
whether LaBudde could be estopped is irrelevant.  The relevant 
questions are whether Robert committed an unlawful act and 
LaBudde aided and abetting his client's act. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
25 
 
are conferred by statute."  We also agree that no 
statute 
expressly 
provides 
for 
the 
type 
of 
"unamendable" spousal support ordered in this case 
and, further, that the court could not order such 
payments absent the parties' agreement.  But the 
court's authority to impose an obligation on one or 
both of the parties without their consent is one 
thing, and the authority to do so upon their agreement 
and at their request is quite another.  In the latter 
situation, the supreme court has had little trouble 
approving and enforcing divorcing parties' agreements 
even when those agreements transcend the provisions of 
the applicable statutes. 
Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
¶51 In support of its argument to the contrary, the 
concurrence/dissent cites just one case for the proposition that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to incorporate the 
parties' stipulation into the divorce judgment.  See Stasey v. 
Miller, 168 Wis. 2d 37, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992).  That case is 
readily distinguishable.  First, it involved an "extraneous 
issue"——a dispute between an attorney and a client for fees owed 
rather than a dispute between the divorcing parties.  See id. at 
59-60.  Second, it did not involve a voluntary stipulation 
between the parties that was deemed fair and reasonable and not 
against public policy.  
¶52 Here, by contrast, the legislature expressly permitted 
a divorce court to incorporate the parties' stipulation for 
division of the estate into a divorce judgment, and this court 
has concluded that such a judgment is enforceable by contempt 
sanctions.  See Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74); Bliwas, 47 
Wis. 2d at 638.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
26 
 
¶53 The law in 1974 was clear that when a party agreed to 
a stipulation for division of the estate that was incorporated 
into a divorce judgment, the judgment was enforceable.  The 
concurrence/dissent's assertion to the contrary is simply 
erroneous.22  
¶54 Thus, we conclude that the court judgment requiring 
Robert to maintain a will giving two-thirds of his net estate 
outright to his children was enforceable.  We further determine 
that it was unlawful for Robert to violate the judgment and that 
his obligation to abide by the judgment was not fairly 
debatable. 
B. Does a Statute of Limitations or Repose Bar this Claim? 
¶55 LaBudde also asserts that, even if the judgment was 
enforceable at the time it was entered, it was subject to the 
                                                 
22 Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975) 
does not support the concurrence/dissent's argument.  See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶118, n.19.  In that case, there was a 
dispute as to the intent of the parties in entering the 
stipulation.   
The parties had stipulated that Mr. Schmitz would make 
child support payments "for the minor children . . . until each 
of said children attains the age of 21 years[.]"  Id. at 884.  
When the legislature changed the age of majority from 21 to 18, 
Mr. Schmitz asked the court to modify the judgment.  Id.  The 
court interpreted the language of the stipulation, determining 
that the intention was to provide for the children until they 
reached the age of majority.  Id. at 889.   
Here, there is no dispute that the parties intended to 
incorporate into the judgment a provision for estate division to 
benefit the adult children.  Unlike Mr. Schmitz, Robert did not 
ask the court to modify the judgment in light of changing law.  
He simply ignored it.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
27 
 
20-year statute of repose for actions to enforce a judgment.23  
As such, he claims that after December 5, 1994, the divorce 
judgment no longer had any force or effect and Robert had broad 
authority to revise or replace his will at any time prior to his 
death.  He concludes that there is no basis for the Tensfeldt 
children to argue that Robert's estate plan was unlawful in 
2000, at the time of his death.  
¶56 Again, LaBudde's argument misses the mark.  The issue 
is not whether the judgment survives an asserted statute of 
repose for enforcement of judgments.  Rather, the focus is on 
when the tortious conduct occurred. 
¶57 Because the alleged tortious conduct at issue in this 
case——the drafting of the noncompliant estate plans——occurred 
between 1980 and 1992, we find no occasion to determine whether 
the court order to make a will continued to be enforceable in 
2000, when Robert died.  To resolve this dispute, it is 
                                                 
23 See Wis. Stat. § 893.40: 
Except as provided in ss. 846.04(2) and (3) and 
893.415, action upon a judgment or decree of a court 
of record of any state or of the United States shall 
be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or 
decree is entered or be barred.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
28 
 
sufficient to conclude that it was unlawful for Robert to 
violate the court order between 1980 and 1992.24   
¶58 The parties acknowledge that the discovery rule, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.04, applies to this action.  See Hansen v. A.H. 
Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  However, 
we do not decide here whether any other statute of limitations 
bars this tort claim or when the causes of action accrued.  
                                                 
24  The concurrence/dissent asserts that "because Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 bars enforcement of the judgment against Robert 
subsequent to December 5, 1994, the claim for aiding and 
abetting 
is 
necessarily 
barred 
as 
well." 
 
See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶136.  The assertion that after 20 years a 
divorce judgment is no longer enforceable could have disastrous 
results for some litigants.  For example, a 70-year-old divorcee 
who relied on long-term court-ordered maintenance could find 
that her only source of income was unexpectedly extinguished 
after 20 years.   
Moreover, the concurrence/dissent purports to cite two 
cases in support of this proposition that "there can be no 
recovery for aiding and abetting if there can be no recovery for 
violation of the divorce judgment."  See concurrence/dissent, 
¶136.  Neither of these cases is on point. 
Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 731 
N.E.2d 1075 (Mass. 2000) and Tate v. Dep't of Mental Health, 645 
N.E.2d 1159 (Mass. 1995) are both employment discrimination 
cases.  Both mention in passing that if there is no unlawful 
employment discrimination, there is necessarily no aiding and 
abetting of unlawful discrimination.  This proposition is 
unremarkable and has no application to the facts of this case.   
Here, we have concluded that it was unlawful for Robert to 
violate the divorce judgment by executing noncompliant wills 
between 1980 and 1992.  We have further determined that 
LaBudde's conduct satisfied the elements of aiding and abetting.  
The Tensfeldt children do not bring an action to enforce a 
judgment, and therefore the statute of repose for enforcing a 
judgment is simply not relevant in our analysis. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
29 
 
Those issues were not briefed to this court and it is properly 
within the province of the circuit court upon remand to address 
such issues if argued by the parties.   
C. Is LaBudde Protected by Either Immunity or Privilege? 
¶59 Finally, LaBudde raises the defenses of qualified 
immunity and good faith advice.  He argues that an attorney is 
not liable to third parties for acts committed on behalf of his 
client in the exercise of his professional responsibilities as 
an attorney.  He cites Yorgan v. Durkin for the proposition that 
"[t]he well established rule of law in Wisconsin is that absent 
fraud or certain public policy considerations, an attorney is 
not liable to third parties for acts committed in the exercise 
of his duties as an attorney."  2006 WI 60, ¶27, 290 
Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160. 
¶60 We agree that in most cases, an attorney is immune 
from liability to third parties based on the attorney's failure 
to perform a duty owed to a client.  However, failure to perform 
an obligation to a client is entirely distinct from conduct that 
assists the client committing an unlawful act to the detriment 
of a third party.   
¶61 In Yorgan v. Durkin, we refused to hold an attorney 
personally 
liable 
for 
the 
fees 
his 
client 
owed 
to 
a 
chiropractor.  The client had directed Attorney Durkin to pay 
the chiropractor's fees out of the proceeds she received from a 
personal injury lawsuit, but Durkin failed to follow his 
client's instructions.  The chiropractor brought suit against 
Durkin, alleging that Durkin was liable to third party creditors 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
30 
 
for failing to properly settle his client's obligations.  Id., 
¶23.  We concluded that the public policy factors "implicated by 
the nature of the situation at hand" did not weigh in favor of 
imposing liability to third party creditors.  Id., ¶¶29, 35.   
¶62 The public policy implicated by the nature of this 
case weighs differently.  Under these facts, the public policy 
balance favors liability.  Unlike in Yorgan v. Durkin, the 
theory of liability advanced by the Tensfeldt children is not 
vicarious.  It is not based on LaBudde's failure to fulfill a 
professional obligation to Robert to the detriment of the 
Tensfeldt children.  Indeed, the parties agree that Robert asked 
LaBudde to draft the will in violation of the court judgment, 
and LaBudde was not negligent in performing this service.  In 
contrast to Yorgan v. Durkin, the basis for liability here is 
that LaBudde knowingly assisted the commission of the unlawful 
act.25    
                                                 
25 The Supreme Court Rules of professional conduct for 
attorneys 
provide 
guidance 
regarding 
the 
scope 
of 
representation.  An attorney "shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent[.]"  SCR 20:1.2(d) (2008).  We have 
stated 
that 
"[t]here 
is 
a 
critical 
distinction 
between 
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct 
and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be 
committed with impunity."  Id. cmt. 9.  If a client insists upon 
pursuing an unlawful course of conduct, the attorney has one 
option——withdraw from the representation of the client.  SCR 
20:1.16(a)(1).  
We are mindful that a violation of the rules does not 
impose civil liability on an attorney per se.  Yorgan v. Durkin, 
2006 WI 60, ¶25 n.8, 290 Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
31 
 
¶63 A thorough discussion of an attorney's liability to 
third parties is found in Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 
331 N.W.2d 350 (1983).  In that case, we stated that immunity is 
not available when the attorney engages in fraudulent or 
unlawful acts:   
[An attorney] is duty bound . . . to exercise good 
faith.  He must not be guilty of any fraudulent acts, 
and he must be free from any unlawful conspiracy with 
either his client, the judge, or any other person, 
which might have a tendency to either frustrate the 
administration of justice or to obtain for his client 
something to which he is not justly and fairly 
entitled.   
Id. at 429 (quoting Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 206 N.W. 
181 (1925)).  Further, the court concluded:  
[T]he immunity of an attorney who is acting in a 
professional 
capacity 
is 
qualified 
rather 
than 
absolute.  The immunity from liability to third 
parties extends to an attorney who pursues in good 
faith his or her client's interest on a matter fairly 
debatable in the law.  However, the immunity does not 
apply 
when 
the 
attorney 
acts 
in 
a 
malicious, 
fraudulent or tortious manner which frustrates the 
administration of justice or to obtain something for 
the client to which the client is not justly entitled.   
Id. at 429-30. 
¶64 Here, LaBudde drafted documents that obtained for 
Robert something he was not legally entitled to——an estate plan 
that violated a court judgment requiring Robert to leave two-
thirds of his net estate to his children outright.  Under these 
circumstances, LaBudde is not entitled to qualified immunity.   
¶65 LaBudde cites several cases from other jurisdictions 
for the proposition that an attorney is entitled to qualified 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
32 
 
immunity for aiding his client in committing an unlawful act.  
After reading these cases carefully, we determine that they do 
not support this proposition.26  None of these cases involves the 
client's commission of an unlawful act.  Instead, they involve 
the client's breach of a contract or fiduciary duty.  We reject 
LaBudde's assertion that cases involving fiduciary duty are 
analogous to this case, which involves a client's court-imposed 
obligations.   
¶66 LaBudde also argues that he is entitled to the good 
faith advice privilege.  This privilege is based on the 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, 
Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (Cal. App. 2005) (concluding that 
under a California statute, a creditor could not bring an action 
against the debtor company's attorney for conspiring to waste 
the company's assets through legal fees to resist involuntary 
bankruptcy because the attorney had no fiduciary duty to the 
creditor);  Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006) 
(concluding that a lawyer may not be liable to a third party for 
aiding and abetting his client's breach of fiduciary duty to 
that third party); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 
S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App. 2005) ("[W]e decline . . . to allow a 
non-client to bring a cause of action for 'aiding and abetting' 
a breach of fiduciary duty[.]"); McDonald v. Stewart, 182 N.W.2d 
437 (Minn. 1970) (concluding that an attorney is not liable to 
third parties for counseling the client to commit a breach of 
contract, but noting that immunity may not be invoked by 
attorneys who participate in the perpetration of a fraudulent or 
unlawful act); D&C Textile Corp. v. Rudin, 246 N.Y.S.2d 813 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (holding that an attorney is not liable to 
third parties for inducement to breach of contract, and noting 
that the dismissed complaint failed to state any facts to show 
any acts by the attorneys in furtherance of a tortious 
conspiracy); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994) 
(determining that an attorney is not liable to a third party 
beneficiary for giving negligent advice, without more); McKasson 
v. State, 776 P.2d 971 (Wash. 1989) (holding that an attorney 
who gives advice which, taken by client, harms a third party is 
not liable to that third party). 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
33 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 (1979), which this court has 
neither adopted nor rejected as applied to attorneys.  Notably, 
this section of the Restatement focuses on advice leading to a 
breach of contract: 
One who intentionally causes a third person not to 
perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective 
contractual relation with another does not interfere 
improperly with the other's contractual relation, by 
giving the third person 
(a) 
truthful information, or 
(b) 
honest advice within the scope of a request for 
the advice. 
Id.  We acknowledge that in some circumstances, an attorney may 
in good faith advise a client to breach a contract.  That is not 
the situation before us today. 
¶67 The action here is not for breach of contract.  
Rather, it is an action in tort for assisting a client to 
unlawfully violate a court judgment.  Further, LaBudde did not 
merely give advice.  He drafted an estate plan that violated the 
judgment.  We conclude that, under these facts, LaBudde is not 
entitled to this privilege.   
¶68 In sum, we determine that the circuit court properly 
concluded that LaBudde is liable as a matter of law for aiding 
and abetting his client's unlawful act.  The divorce judgment 
was enforceable at the time it was entered and at the time 
Robert asked LaBudde to draft an estate plan that violated the 
judgment.  Under these facts, LaBudde is not entitled to either 
qualified immunity or the good faith advice privilege.   
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
34 
 
IV. Negligence Claim Against Attorney LaBudde 
¶69 Having addressed the intentional tort claims, we turn 
next to the negligence claim against Attorney LaBudde.  The 
circuit court denied LaBudde's motion to dismiss the Tensfeldt 
children's 
claim 
that 
LaBudde 
was 
negligent 
in 
the 
administration of Robert's estate.  Because the Tensfeldt 
children were named in Robert's will, the court determined that 
they have standing to bring a negligence claim against LaBudde 
under the rule established in Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 111 
Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). 
¶70 In Auric, this court established an exception to the 
general rule that an attorney is not liable in negligence to 
third parties for acts committed in the exercise of his 
professional obligations to his client.  In that case, it was 
undisputed 
that 
the 
decedent 
intended 
to 
make 
Auric 
a 
beneficiary of his will.  Auric's attorney drafted a will in 
accordance with the decedent's testamentary intent.  However, 
the 
attorney 
negligently 
failed 
to 
collect 
the 
proper 
signatures, and as a result, the will was deemed invalid.  Auric 
filed suit against the decedent's attorney, alleging negligence. 
¶71 We concluded that the third party beneficiary of a 
will may maintain an action against an attorney who negligently 
drafted or supervised the execution of the will.  Id. at 509.  
Our decision was based on the irreparable failure on the part of 
the attorney to carry out the decedent's intent: 
In this state, there is a constitutional right to make 
a will and to have it carried out according to the 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
35 
 
testator's intentions.  This right reflects a strong 
concern that people should be as free as possible to 
dispose of their property upon their death.  Allowing 
a will beneficiary to maintain a suit against an 
attorney who negligently drafts or supervises the 
execution of a will is one way to make an attorney 
accountable for his negligence. 
Id. at 513 (citations omitted). 
¶72 In such cases, the attorney's negligence frustrates 
the decedent's testamentary intent because it prevents the 
decedent's will from being enforceable.  In cases falling under 
the Auric exception, there is no question that the decedent's 
intent was thwarted due to the attorney's negligence.  In these 
cases, if the court did not allow the third party beneficiaries 
to bring suit, there would be no one to vindicate the client's 
expectation of competent representation because by definition, 
the client is deceased.  Thus, Auric allows third party 
beneficiaries of a will to stand in for the deceased testator to 
ensure that his testamentary intent is fulfilled.  This 
exception is a narrow one.  
¶73 Here, the circuit court ruled that the Tensfeldt 
children were entitled to bring a claim of negligence against 
LaBudde because the children were named in the estate plan he 
drafted and executed.  It is true that under Wisconsin law, a 
plaintiff must be named in a will in order to bring a negligence 
action against the attorney who negligently drafted or executed 
the will.  See Beauchamp v. Kemmeter, 2001 WI App 5, ¶9, 240 
Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 2000).  Being named in the 
instrument is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
overcoming the general rule that attorneys are immune from 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
36 
 
liability for negligence to third parties.  The third party 
beneficiary must be able to establish that the attorney's 
failure thwarted the decedent's clear intent.  See Auric, 111 
Wis. 2d at 513. 
¶74 It is undisputed that LaBudde carried out Robert's 
explicit instructions when he crafted an estate plan that did 
not leave two-thirds of Robert's net estate outright to his 
children.  To this end, we determine that the children's third 
party negligence claim cannot be maintained because they cannot 
establish that LaBudde's negligence thwarted Robert's clear 
intent.  We conclude that the circuit court erred in denying 
LaBudde's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim. 
V. Negligence Claim Against Attorney Haberman 
¶75 We turn now to the claim against Attorney Haberman.  
The circuit court dismissed the children's claim that Haberman 
was negligent for failing to advise Robert about the likely 
consequences of Bravo v. Sauter, 727 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1999).  There is no dispute that Haberman's failure to inform 
Robert about Bravo was negligent.  The dispute here is whether 
that negligence gives rise to liability and damages.   
¶76 The children contend that they were damaged in two 
ways by Haberman's negligent advice to their father.  They argue 
that they received a smaller share of the estate and had to 
await 
Constance's 
death 
to 
recover 
their 
inheritance.  
Additionally, they argue that they had to undertake expensive 
probate litigation in Florida, reducing the value of their 
inheritance still further.  They assert that if Haberman had 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
37 
 
properly advised Robert, he would have made a definitive 
decision about whether to allow Constance to continue to receive 
income from the trust even if she elected against the estate.  
Therefore, they claim, the probate litigation would have been 
unnecessary.  
¶77 As discussed above, an attorney generally is not 
liable to third parties for negligence in the performance of his 
duties to a client, even if the negligent advice causes the 
third party harm.27  See Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶27.  Estate 
planning is one exception.  Under Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 509, the 
beneficiary of a will may maintain a lawsuit against "an 
attorney who negligently drafted or supervised the execution of 
the will even though the beneficiary is not in privity with that 
attorney." 
 
Here, 
Attorney 
Haberman 
neither 
drafted 
nor 
supervised the execution of Robert's estate plan.  His only role 
was giving Robert admittedly negligent advice.  Extending the 
Auric exception to attorneys who give negligent advice stretches 
the exception too far.   
¶78 Additionally, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined that the children's claim that they had been harmed 
as a result of Haberman's negligence was speculative.  The 
                                                 
27 The circuit court, the court of appeals, and the parties 
refer to this issue as standing.  Wisconsin liberally interprets 
the concept of standing, and parties who are aggrieved are 
generally thought to have standing to sue.  See In re 
Guardianship of Muriel K., 2002 WI 27, ¶16, 251 Wis. 2d 10, 640 
N.W.2d 773.  This issue is more properly understood as a 
question of whether an attorney is entitled to qualified 
immunity from lawsuits brought by third parties. 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
38 
 
court's review of the evidence revealed no proof that Robert 
would have altered his estate plan had he realized the likely 
impact of Bravo. 
¶79 The Tensfeldt children argue that they presented some 
evidence that Robert would have changed his mind had he known 
about the likely impact of Bravo, and that this evidence is 
sufficient to pass summary judgment.  Specifically, they point 
to Robert's 1999 approval of an estate plan that did not take 
into account Connie's right to elect against the estate.  The 
children 
contend that this distribution scheme represents 
Robert's testamentary intent and is evidence that, had he 
understood that Constance could elect against the estate, he 
would have increased the distribution to his children.  In 
addition, the children point to statements made by Haberman in 
Florida probate court when he argued on behalf of the estate 
against Constance's decision to elect against the will. 
¶80 The 
circuit court correctly determined that the 
children's evidence of injury was speculative, and was therefore 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  See 
AccuWeb, 308 Wis. 2d 258, ¶21.  Robert's 1999 approval of the 
distribution scheme is evidence of what his desires would have 
been had Bravo not been a factor.  Looking at this evidence, 
however, there is simply no way to make even an educated guess 
about what Robert would have done had he understood that this 
distribution plan would not be carried out due to Bravo.  A 
reasonable jury, looking at this evidence, would have no basis 
to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that Robert 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
39 
 
would have altered his estate plan had he understood Constance's 
rights under Florida law. 
¶81 Further, the circuit court correctly determined that 
Haberman's arguments in probate court are not evidence of what 
Robert would have done had he been advised about Bravo.  Because 
Haberman did not inform Robert of Bravo, Haberman never learned 
whether and how Robert would have altered his estate plan.   
None of Haberman's statements to the court reflects any personal 
knowledge about what Robert would have done had he been properly 
advised. 
¶82 Under 
these circumstances, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment.  
Haberman is not liable to third parties for his negligent 
advice, and further, the children failed to present sufficient 
evidence that they were harmed by Haberman's negligent advice to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. 
VI 
¶83 In sum, we determine that the circuit court properly 
concluded that Attorney LaBudde is liable as a matter of law for 
aiding and abetting his client's unlawful act.  The divorce 
judgment was enforceable at the time it was entered and at the 
time Robert asked LaBudde to draft an estate plan that violated 
the judgment. Qualified immunity and the good faith advice 
privilege do not apply under these facts.   
¶84 Additionally, we determine that the children's third 
party negligence claim against LaBudde cannot be maintained 
because they cannot establish that LaBudde's negligence thwarted 
No. 
2007AP1638   
 
40 
 
Robert's clear intent.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court 
erred in denying LaBudde's motion for summary judgment on the 
negligence claim.  Finally, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Attorney 
Haberman.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part 
the order of the circuit court, and we remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded. 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. did not participate in this 
decision. 
 
 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   I agree with the majority opinion that 
the third-party claim for negligence against Attorney Roy C. 
LaBudde (LaBudde) should be dismissed and that the claims 
against Attorney F. William Haberman should be dismissed as 
well.1  I write separately for three reasons:  (1) I conclude 
that the plaintiffs' claim against LaBudde, based on aiding and 
abetting Robert Tensfeldt (Robert) in allegedly violating a 
provision of a 1974 divorce judgment that required him to will 
two-thirds of his net estate to his three adult children, fails 
to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the 
estate planning provision of the divorce judgment exceeded the 
circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) I conclude that 
LaBudde was immune from liability in drafting Robert's 1992 will 
because LaBudde proceeded in a good faith belief that the 
provision in the 1974 divorce judgment that required estate 
planning in favor of the adult children was void from its 
inception, as a judgment; and (3) I conclude that even if I were 
to assume, arguendo, that the directive to make a will in the 
1974 divorce judgment were enforceable when made, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40, a 20-year statute of repose, precluded actions on the 
divorce judgment after December 5, 1994.  Therefore, the divorce 
judgment had no effect, as a judgment, in 1999 when Robert 
reaffirmed the will that he made in 1992, and it had no effect 
at his death in 2000.  As a result, the aiding and abetting 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶84. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
2 
 
claim against LaBudde must be dismissed.  Because the majority 
opinion concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent from that 
portion of the majority opinion that addresses the aiding and 
abetting claim. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶86 Robert and Ruth Tensfeldt were divorced in 1974.  At 
the time of the divorce, they had three adult children:  
Christine, Robert William and John (hereinafter referred to as 
the adult children).  As part of the divorce judgment, Robert 
and Ruth entered into a very detailed stipulation that required 
many financial accommodations by Robert.  One of those financial 
obligations involved estate planning, in that Robert agreed to 
make a will that would provide two-thirds "of his net estate 
outright to the three adult children."2  
¶87 Robert married Constance in 1975.  In 1985, Robert and 
Constance changed their domicile to Florida.  In 1992, LaBudde 
assisted Robert in drafting a will that did not comply with the 
requirement to leave two-thirds of his net estate to the adult 
children.  Robert made the estate plan after LaBudde advised 
Robert that this estate plan did not comply with his 1974 
agreement to leave two-thirds of his net estate to the adult 
children.   
¶88 In 1999, Robert's estate plan was reviewed again with 
him, this time by Haberman.  Robert decided to make no changes.  
Robert died on April 22, 2000, survived by his second wife, 
                                                 
2 The stipulation that was incorporated into the 1974 
divorce judgment is attached to the complaint. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
3 
 
Constance.  In June of 2000, Robert's 1992 will, which he 
affirmed in 1999, was entered into probate in Florida as Estate 
of Robert C. Tensfeldt, Deceased, No. 00-809-CP-02.   
¶89 The adult children did not know of the 1974 divorce 
stipulation until Robert's 1992 will was entered into probate 
court in 2000 and Haberman told them of the 1974 stipulation.  
In November of 2000, the Tensfeldt children filed claims in 
probate court seeking two-thirds of Robert's net estate in 
accord with the 1974 stipulation.  Constance filed a claim for a 
spousal elective share of the estate, pursuant to Fla. Stat. 
§ 732.212 (1997).   
¶90 The adult children also filed a separate action 
against Constance, individually, and as personal representative 
of Robert's estate.  In the separate action, the adult children 
claimed that:  (1) they were enforcing the 1974 Wisconsin 
divorce judgment; (2) if the divorce stipulation were held to be 
a contract to make a will, they were third-party beneficiaries 
of the contract, which had been breached; and (3) Constance's 
election against the will should be disallowed as untimely made.  
Constance moved for summary judgment dismissing their claims, 
which the probate court granted.   
¶91 The adult children appealed to the Florida Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Tensfeldt 
v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  The 
court of appeals held that the divorce judgment could not be 
enforced because it had never been "domesticated" in Florida, 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
4 
 
and the statute of limitations to enforce the decree in Florida 
barred enforcement.  Id. at 725.   
¶92 However, the court of appeals also concluded that the 
divorce stipulation could be enforced as a contract to make a 
will and that the children were third-party beneficiaries of 
that contract.  Id. at 721-22.  Constance had argued that if the 
adult children had a breach of contract claim, it accrued on the 
date of the 1992 will.  Therefore, it was barred by Florida's 
five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims.  
Id. at 724.  The court of appeals rejected that argument, 
concluding that "a cause of action for breach of a contract 
requiring the promisor [to] make a will devising a percentage of 
his or her estate does not accrue until the death of the 
promisor."  Id.  Therefore, the court sent the matter back to 
probate court to determine what amount should be paid to the 
adult children for their claim.  However, before doing so, the 
court also held that the adult children's third-party rights as 
determined by the probate court could not affect Constance's 
right under Fla. Stat. § 732.212, which permitted her to elect 
against the will.  Id. at 727.  As the court explained, even 
"[h]ad the children been properly listed as beneficiaries in the 
will, Constance's elective share would have taken precedence 
over their bequest."  Id.   
¶93 On remand to probate court, the adult children settled 
their claims with the estate.  In so doing, they agreed that 
after certain payments in favor of Constance, the distribution 
to them of "the remaining balance of the estate, outright and 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
5 
 
free of further trust, [is] in full satisfaction of their claim 
under the Divorce Decree."3    
¶94 On June 8, 2005, the adult children filed a complaint 
in Dane County Circuit Court against LaBudde, Haberman and 
Michael Best & Friedrich, alleging numerous intentional torts.  
Aiding and abetting was asserted against LaBudde, based on the 
alleged violation of the divorce judgment that LaBudde's 
drafting of the 1992 will brought about.  It is the drafting of 
the 1992 will that the adult children assert aided and abetted 
an "unlawful act," i.e., violation of the 1974 divorce judgment.4   
¶95 LaBudde, 
Haberman 
and 
Michael 
Best 
& 
Friedrich 
answered, denying wrongdoing and raising affirmative defenses 
such as the failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted, statute of limitations, and claim and issue preclusion 
based on prior judicial proceedings in Florida.  
¶96 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit 
court held against LaBudde on the adult children's aiding and 
abetting claim, on which it concluded that the adult children 
should prevail as a matter of law.  The circuit court based its 
decision on its conclusion that it was unlawful for LaBudde to 
draft the 1992 will because it aided Robert in contravening the 
1974 judgment that was still effective in 1992.  The majority 
                                                 
3 The Settlement Agreement for the Estate of Robert C. 
Tensfeldt is attached to the affidavit of Robert William 
Tensfeldt in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
4 Claims were made against Haberman in the complaint, but 
because I agree with the resolution of those claims by the 
majority opinion, I do not list them here.   
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
6 
 
opinion agrees, and it remands only the claim of aiding and 
abetting the violation of the 1974 divorce judgment to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.5   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶97 Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction to 
take a particular action is a question of law, requiring 
independent review.  State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶20, 283 
Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508.  Whether a defendant is entitled to 
qualified immunity under undisputed facts is also a question of 
law that we decide independently.  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 
Wis. 2d 371, 
384, 
592 N.W.2d 606 (1999).  Finally, we 
independently review as a question of law whether a statute of 
repose bars an action on a judgment.  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 
WI 50, ¶14, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.  
B. 
Aiding and Abetting   
¶98 Aiding and abetting is the only claim that the 
majority opinion sends back to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.6  A civil claim for aiding and abetting has two 
elements:  "(1) The person undertakes conduct that as a matter 
of objective fact aids another in the commission of an unlawful 
act; and (2) the person consciously desires or intends that his 
conduct will yield such assistance."  Winslow v. Brown, 125 
Wis. 2d 327, 336, 371 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985).  According to 
the majority opinion, the "unlawful act" that LaBudde aided and 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶¶83-84. 
6 Id. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
7 
 
abetted by drafting Robert's 1992 will is the violation of the 
1974 divorce judgment.7    
C. 
The Parties' Positions 
¶99 LaBudde claims that he did not aid and abet an 
unlawful act in drafting the 1992 will because Robert's promise 
was not enforceable as a judgment.  LaBudde maintains that the 
stipulation to make a will was a contractual obligation, as the 
Florida Court of Appeals concluded.8  He also contends that he 
proceeded in a good faith belief that his acts did not assist 
Robert in violating an enforceable judgment.9  Furthermore, 
LaBudde contends that even if the stipulation to make such a 
will were enforceable against Robert as a judgment when the 
stipulation was made, it ceased to be enforceable on December 5, 
1994, 20 years after the divorce judgment was entered.10  
Therefore, no judgment required Robert to make a will of any 
type, either in 1999 when Robert reconfirmed the 1992 will, or 
in 2000 when he died.11   
¶100 The adult children acknowledge that "LaBudde contends 
that Robert's divorce judgment was unenforceable from its 
inception."12  However, the adult children never examine the 
                                                 
7 Id., ¶3.  
8 Cross-Appellants' brief at 31-32. 
9 Id. at 31, 33. 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 Id. 
12 Cross-Respondents' brief at 19. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
8 
 
judgment at its inception.  Instead, they rely on dicta of the 
court of appeals in Estate of Barnes v. Hall, 170 Wis. 2d 1, 486 
N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1992), wherein the court speculated about 
possible extensions of our opinion in Rintelman v. Rintelman, 
118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984).13  Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 
13.  The adult children do not note that Barnes specifically 
examined whether "the statutes in force in 1973 allowed 
divorcing spouses to agree to some sort of estate planning, as 
part of the divorce judgment, to benefit their children."  Id. 
at 9.  Barnes concluded that the statutes did not.  Id. at 10.   
D. 
The 1974 Divorce Judgment 
¶101 The majority opinion concludes that LaBudde is liable 
for aiding and abetting an unlawful act based on LaBudde 
drafting Robert's 1992 will that was subsequently entered into 
the 
Florida 
probate 
proceedings.14 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
the 
20-year 
statute 
of 
limitations 
on 
enforceability of judgments had not run when the 1992 will was 
made.  Its focus on the drafting of the will misses the legal 
principle on which this case turns.  This case requires 
analyzing whether Robert's stipulation to make a will in favor 
of the adult children was enforceable as a judgment in 1974.   
1. 
Void judgments——general principles  
¶102 If that portion of the divorce judgment that required 
Robert to make a will in favor of his then adult children was 
rendered in excess of the circuit court's subject matter 
                                                 
13 Id. at 24. 
14 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
9 
 
jurisdiction in the divorce action, that part of the judgment is 
void.  46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 29 (instructing that a 
judgment is void if it is in excess of a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction).  Contravening a void judgment is not an unlawful 
act because a void judgment can be lawfully ignored.  Cowie v. 
Strohmeyer, 
150 
Wis. 
401, 
440, 
136 
N.W. 
956 
(1912).  
Accordingly, LaBudde's drafting the 1992 will contrary to a void 
provision in the divorce judgment does not support a claim for 
aiding and abetting because drafting such a will is not aiding 
and abetting an "unlawful act."   
¶103 It is black letter law that a "judgment pronounced by 
a tribunal having no authority to determine the matter in issue 
is necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown to be so in 
any collateral or other proceeding in which it is drawn in 
question."  Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 18, 154 N.W. 701 
(1916) (quoting 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 120).  As we have 
explained:  
If the court exceeded its jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, then the judgment is no protection 
whatever.  It may be ignored altogether. . . .  The 
rule is elementary, that if the matter dealt with by 
the judgment in this case was entirely outside of the 
court's jurisdiction, then, . . . the result was not 
merely erroneous and so, binding on all parties which 
the court had jurisdiction of, and their privies, till 
set aside in some of the ways appointed by law, not 
including collateral attack, but was a usurpation and 
. . . void in the broadest sense of the term. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41).   
¶104 Furthermore, parties cannot create subject matter 
jurisdiction for a court by waiver, consent or the application 
of estoppel.  As we explained in Wisconsin's Environmental 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
10 
 
Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 267 
N.W.2d 609 (1978), this has long been the law in Wisconsin: 
It is fundamental that parties cannot confer 
subject matter jurisdiction on a court by their waiver 
or consent.  Sec. 801.04, Stats.; Gelatt v. DeDakis, 
77 Wis. 2d 578, 584, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977); Joint 
School v. Wisconsin Rapids Ed. Asso., 70 Wis. 2d 292, 
[296-97,] 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Vishnevsky v. U.S., 
418 F. Supp. 698[, 699 n.2] (E.D. Wis. 1976).  Nor can 
subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by estoppel.  
Wisconsin E. R. Bd. v. Lucas, 3 Wis. 2d 464, [472,] 89 
N.W.2d 300 (1958); State ex rel. Gaudynski v. Pruss, 
233 Wis. 600, [606,] 290 N.W. 289 (1940). . . . 
Id. at 515-16. 
¶105 The subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts in 
divorce actions is limited to the authority granted by statute.  
Stasey v. Miller, 168 Wis. 2d 37, 48, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992).  As 
we have explained, "the jurisdiction [of a circuit court] in 
divorce actions is entirely dependent on legislative authority."  
Id. (citing Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 327 N.W.2d 655 
(1983)).   
¶106 When an argument is raised that a portion of a divorce 
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, "all that is needed 
is the determination that, in fact, jurisdiction was not 
acquired in the proceedings that led up to the entry of the 
judgment."  West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 262 N.W.2d 87 
(1978).  While circuit court jurisdiction is generally broad, 
that is not the case when a circuit court sits in a divorce 
proceeding.  Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 49.  In divorce proceedings, 
the legislature has limited the court's jurisdiction to actions 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
11 
 
affecting the family, id., which actions are specifically 
described in the statutes, id.15   
2. 
Void provision in the 1974 judgment 
¶107 Recognizing when a portion of a judgment is void is 
particularly important in this case because if the will 
provision in the 1974 judgment is void, then contravening that 
                                                 
15 The majority opinion concludes that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 247.10 (1973-74) permitted the divorce stipulation that is 
under review here, that statutory provision expanded the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to comport with the 
terms of the parties' stipulation.  Majority op., ¶¶34-35.  The 
majority opinion's conclusion is erroneous for at least two 
reasons:  (1) it ignores at least 69 years of precedent, which 
uniformly has concluded that subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred on a court by agreement of the parties, see 
Wisconsin's 
Environmental 
Decade, 
Inc. 
v. 
Public 
Service 
Commission, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 515-16, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978); State 
ex rel. Gaudynski v. Pruss, 233 Wis. 600, 606, 290 N.W. 289 
(1940); and (2) it ignores Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-74), which 
specifically directed to whom property division may be made.  
Section 247.26 (1973-74) provided that a circuit court sitting 
in a divorce action "may also finally divide and distribute the 
estate, both real and personal, of either party between the 
parties."  § 247.26 (1973-74) (emphasis added).  Nothing in 
§ 247.10 (1973-74) even implies that the division of property in 
a divorce can be made in favor of one who is not a party to the 
divorce action, an interpretation that would otherwise trump the 
explicit directive of § 247.26 (1973-74).  Rather, § 247.10 
(1973-74) simply permitted the parties to present to the court 
their agreement on how their property should be divided between 
them.    
The 
majority 
opinion's 
careless 
conclusion 
that 
a 
stipulation between the parties can expand the subject matter 
jurisdiction 
of 
a 
circuit 
court 
sitting 
in 
divorce 
is 
particularly troubling because stipulations continue to be 
permitted in divorce judgments.  Wis. Stat. § 767.251(1) (2007-
08).  Therefore, the majority opinion's conclusion in this case 
will affect a dramatic sea change in Wisconsin, if the majority 
opinion truly means to conclude that parties can expand the 
subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court by agreement.   
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
12 
 
provision is not an unlawful act.  As explained above, if there 
is an "absence of an express statutory grant of jurisdiction to 
the circuit court," then that portion of a judgment was made in 
excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 57; 
and 
orders made in excess of a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction are void, Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41.   
¶108 Furthermore, "[j]udgments are construed at the time of 
their entry."  Weston v. Holt, 157 Wis. 2d 595, 600, 460 N.W.2d 
776 (Ct. App. 1990).  In 1974, when the divorce judgment was 
entered, the Jefferson County Circuit Court sitting in the 
divorce proceedings had not been given jurisdiction by the 
legislature to order Robert to make a will in favor of the adult 
children.  Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 13 (concluding that a court in 
a divorce proceeding did not have a grant from the legislature 
to take an estate planning action in favor of adult children and 
suggesting that any remedy was for the legislature, not the 
courts).  Barnes interpreted the same version of the Wisconsin 
divorce statutes as were in effect in 1974 when Ruth and Robert 
were divorced.   
¶109 In Barnes, the court of appeals examined jurisdiction 
in regard to estate planning for adult children.  The court 
explained that:  "The real issue is whether the statutes in 
force in 1973 allowed divorcing spouses to agree to some sort of 
estate planning, as part of the divorce judgment, to benefit 
their children."  Id. at 9.  In reliance on Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 
67 Wis. 2d 477, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975), and ch. 247 of the 1973-74 
Wisconsin Statutes, the court concluded that "property division 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
13 
 
can be made only between husband and wife."  Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d 
at 10 (quoting Vaccaro, 67 Wis. 2d at 483).   
¶110 I have independently reviewed the statutes in effect 
in 1974 when Ruth and Robert were divorced.  Chapter 247 of the 
1973-74 Wisconsin Statutes contained the legislative grant of 
authority to circuit courts in "Actions Affecting Marriage."  
The legislature granted jurisdiction as follows: 
Jurisdiction.  (1) The county courts, and circuit 
courts, 
. . . 
have 
jurisdiction 
of 
all 
actions 
affecting marriage and of all actions under s. 
52.10. . . .16 
Wis. Stat. § 247.01 (1973-74).  Actions affecting marriage were 
listed with specificity by the legislature: 
Actions 
affecting 
marriage. 
 
(1) 
Actions 
affecting marriage are: 
(a) To affirm marriage. 
(b) Annulment. 
(c) Divorce. 
(d) Legal separation (formerly divorce from bed 
and board). 
(e) Custody. 
(f) For support. 
(g) For alimony. 
(h) For property division. 
Wis. Stat. § 247.03 (1973-74).  In regard to property division, 
the legislature specified that "[t]he court may also finally 
divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 52.10 (1973-74) contained the Revised 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
14 
 
either party between the parties and divest and transfer the 
title of any thereof accordingly."  Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-
74) (emphasis added).   
¶111 Property 
division during a divorce is expressly 
limited to the parties to the action.  The adult children were 
not parties to Ruth and Robert's divorce action.  Therefore, 
there was no grant of jurisdiction to the divorce court to award 
the property of either party to the adult children.  Barnes was 
correctly decided under the statutes then in effect.  The 
majority opinion's overruling of Barnes17 has no foundation in 
the statutory grant of authority to circuit courts sitting in 
divorce proceedings in 1974.   
¶112 The Jefferson County Circuit Court was without subject 
matter jurisdiction to order Robert to will two-thirds of his 
property to his adult children; therefore that part of the 
judgment is void and of no effect, as a judgment.  Cowie, 150 
Wis. at 440.   
¶113 One cannot be held in contempt of court for failing to 
comply with a judgment that has been held to be void.  State v. 
Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 114 N.W.2d 118 (1962) (citing State 
v. Marcus, 259 Wis. 543, 553, 49 N.W.2d 447 (1951); Seyfert v. 
Seyfert, 201 Wis. 223, 229, 229 N.W. 636 (1930)).  "On the other 
hand, disobedience of an order made by a court within its 
jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order may be 
clearly erroneous."  Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d at 165 (citing Wis. 
Employment Relations Bd. v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
15 
 
Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 400, 299 N.W. 31 (1941)).  
Accordingly, violation of a void provision in a judgment cannot 
be an "unlawful act."  Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440.   
¶114 However, 
the adult children must establish that 
LaBudde aided and abetted an "unlawful act" in order to meet the 
first element of their aiding and abetting claim.  Winslow, 125 
Wis. 2d at 336.  Because that part of the judgment requiring 
Robert to will the adult children two-thirds of his net estate 
is void as a judgment, and Robert's violation of that provision 
cannot be unlawful, although it has been held to be a breach of 
contract, the adult children have failed to state a claim for 
aiding and abetting as a matter of law.  Accordingly, that claim 
should have been dismissed on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
¶115 The majority opinion heavily relies on Bliwas v. 
Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970), to support its 
argument that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court 
sitting in divorce proceedings may be expanded by stipulation of 
the parties under Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74).18  However, the 
majority opinion's reliance on Bliwas is misplaced in regard to 
LaBudde.   
¶116 In Bliwas, the parties entered into a post-judgment 
stipulation, which was incorporated into a court order, to 
reduce the amount of child support that Arnold Bliwas would pay 
for his son's support, in exchange for Arnold's agreeing to 
contribute to his son's educational expenses beyond the boy's 
                                                 
18 Majority op., ¶¶35, 46-48. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
16 
 
twenty-first birthday.  Id. at 636-37.  Both parties agreed that 
if there had been no stipulation, the divorce court would have 
been without jurisdiction.  Id. at 637.  However, we did not 
conclude that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court 
determined whether the stipulation that was incorporated into a 
court order would be honored.   
¶117 To the contrary, in reviewing the legal principles 
that we would apply, we affirmed the legislative jurisdictional 
limitation by explaining that a "trial court's jurisdiction to 
make provisions for the care, custody, maintenance and education 
of children of the parties is limited to minor children."  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  We did enforce the stipulation, but not 
because the subject matter jurisdiction of the divorce court had 
been expanded by agreement of the parties.  Rather, we estopped 
Arnold from making arguments by which to overturn the order that 
required 
him 
to continue to pay support for his son's 
educational expenses.  We explained: 
"[W]here the court disposes of the property of the 
parties by stipulation in a manner in which it could 
not have disposed of the property in an adversary 
proceeding, the general rule applies that a party who 
procures or consents to the entry of the decree is 
estopped to question its validity, especially where he 
has obtained a benefit from it." 
Id. at 640 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, 
§ 907, at 1030).  We also relied on the reasoning of a Kansas 
decision to further explain: 
"A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction and power of a 
court for the purpose of securing important rights 
from his adversary through its judgment, and, after 
having obtained the relief desired, repudiate the 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
17 
 
action of the court on the ground that it was without 
jurisdiction." 
Id. at 641 (quoting Bledsoe v. Seaman, 95 P. 576, 578-79 (Kan. 
1908)).   
¶118 And finally, we affirmed that "'[t]he parties cannot 
by stipulation proscribe, modify or oust the court of its power 
to determine the disposition of property, alimony, support, 
custody, or other matters involved in a divorce proceeding.'"  
Id. at 639 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting Miner v. Miner, 10 
Wis. 2d 438, 442-43, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960)).  Bliwas never 
concluded that Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74) permitted the 
parties to stipulate to expand the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the divorce court.19   
 
¶119 Instead, Bliwas turns on the estoppel of a party.  
That is, Arnold Bliwas was prevented (estopped) from challenging 
the validity of the order in the first place.  In relation to 
the circumstances of this case, if Robert were alive and trying 
to avoid an obligation to which he stipulated, Bliwas could be 
raised to estop Robert from arguing that the court did not have 
                                                 
19 Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 
(1975), provides further support for my conclusion that the 
parties to a divorce action cannot stipulate to expand the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court.  In Schmitz, 
the parties stipulated at the time of the divorce that Harold 
would pay $15 per week per child until each child reached 21 
years of age.  Id. at 884.  Five years later the legislature 
changed the age of majority to 18.  Id.  Harold stopped paying 
for those children who had turned 18, and we upheld his 
decision, notwithstanding the parties' stipulation that Harold 
pay for each child until the child reached 21.  Id. at 884, 891.  
In so concluding, we explained that it was the legislature, not 
the parties, that established the authority of the circuit court 
sitting in a divorce.  Id. at 891. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
18 
 
subject matter jurisdiction to award the parties' property to 
non-parties.20   
¶120 However, LaBudde was not a party to the Tensfeldt 
divorce.  He did not make a promise that he is trying to avoid.  
Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to estop LaBudde from 
challenging the estate planning portions of the judgment as 
being 
void 
for 
lack 
of 
circuit 
court 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.21  Stated otherwise, there is no legal impediment 
to LaBudde's asserting that the portion of the judgment that 
attempted to do estate planning for the benefit of the adult 
children was void from its inception.  Our conclusion in Bliwas 
                                                 
20 The majority also cites to Ross v. Ross, 149 Wis. 2d 713, 
439 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1989), to support the same arguments it 
makes using Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 
(1970).  Majority op., ¶¶49-50.  I do not disagree that under 
these cases Robert likely could have been estopped from 
contesting the validity of the provision requiring him to 
execute a will in favor of his adult children.  However, neither 
of these cases estops LaBudde from arguing that that provision 
of the judgment was void here, and the violation of a void 
judgment cannot be an unlawful act.   
21 In order to successfully assert estoppel one must address 
the following: 
(1) Was the promise one which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a 
definite and substantial character on the part of the 
promisee? 
(2) Did the promise induce such action or 
forbearance? 
(3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise? 
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 
267 (1965).    
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
19 
 
turned on the estoppel of Arnold Bliwas; here, LaBudde cannot be 
estopped.  Therefore, Bliwas cannot be applied to preclude 
LaBudde's defenses to the adult children's aiding and abetting 
claim.  
¶121 Furthermore, 
as 
the 
Florida 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
concluded, Robert's promise is enforceable as a contractual 
obligation that was not breached until Robert died without a 
will that was in accord with the stipulation.22  Tensfeldt, 839 
So. 2d at 724.  The adult children have been fully paid for 
their 
third-party 
contractual 
rights 
through 
the 
Florida 
proceedings.23   
¶122 I recognize that appellate courts on occasion have 
concluded that a circuit court in a divorce action was without 
statutory authority to enter some portion of the judgment 
without explaining that that part of the judgment was void 
because of the restricted jurisdiction of a circuit court in a 
                                                 
22 A lawyer does not act unlawfully when he assists a client 
with actions that may breach a contractual obligation of the 
client.  Rather, if the contract of a client is breached, the 
client pays damages.  Benderson Dev. Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
998 F.2d 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Postal 
Service, "like any contracting party obtains the right to 
perform or to breach its contractual obligations"); 30 E. End v. 
World Steel Prods. Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (N.Y. Spec. Term 
1952) (concluding that the breach of a contract is not "wrongful 
or unlawful").  Robert's contractual obligations with respect to 
the adult children have already been litigated, and the adult 
children have been paid in full for their claim of breach of 
contract.  See supra note 3.  
23 The adult children agreed that after certain payments to 
Constance, the distribution to them of "the remaining balance of 
the estate, outright and free of further trust, [is] in full 
satisfaction of their claim under the Divorce Decree."  Florida 
Settlement Agreement for the Estate of Robert C. Tensfeldt. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
20 
 
divorce action.  Barnes is a good example of that.  However, in 
Barnes, there was no need to explain that the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction made that part of the divorce judgment void.  
All that was needed was to determine whether that part of the 
judgment was enforceable.  
¶123 By contrast with Barnes, our discussion in Stasey was 
more complete, even though all that was needed was to determine 
whether the portion of the divorce judgment awarding attorney 
fees as between an attorney and client was in excess of the 
court's subject matter jurisdiction.  Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 39-
40.  We concluded that the divorce court had exceeded its 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 57.  Furthermore, we went 
on to explain the resulting effect on the portion of the 
judgment 
made 
in 
excess 
of 
the 
court's 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction when we said, "We have concluded that that part of 
the judgment awarding attorney fees is void."  Id. at 61.  
¶124 Stasey is of significance for the case now before us 
because here there is a need to understand why the 1974 divorce 
judgment is not enforceable as a judgment.  Stasey helps my 
analysis in two major respects.  First, Stasey clearly explains 
that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting 
in a divorce action is limited to the express grant of authority 
by the legislature.  Id. at 48.  Second, Stasey confirms that 
when a divorce court acts in excess of its subject matter 
jurisdiction, that portion of the judgment is void.  Id. at 61.  
Because the violation of a void judgment is not an unlawful act, 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
21 
 
LaBudde did not aid and abet an unlawful act.  Accordingly, the 
aiding and abetting claim against LaBudde should be dismissed. 
E. 
Qualified Immunity 
¶125 An attorney who acts in a professional capacity has 
qualified immunity for the actions he takes in assistance of his 
client.  Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 242, 
517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (citing Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 
418, 429, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983); Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 
102, 105, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975); Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 
277, 301, 206 N.W. 181 (1925)).  "An attorney is immune from 
liability to third parties so long as the attorney pursues in 
good faith his or her client's interests on a matter fairly 
debatable in the law."  Id.   
¶126 Here, LaBudde drafted the 1992 will with the good 
faith belief that a provision in the 1974 judgment was not 
enforceable as a judgment, but rather, that it was a contractual 
obligation.24  It is important for the reader to note that in 
June of 1992, the court of appeals decided Barnes, which 
concluded that a circuit court has no authority to order estate 
planning in a divorce judgment.  LaBudde drafted Robert's will 
in November of 1992.  Therefore, at the time LaBudde drafted 
Robert's 1992 will, the most recent decision on whether the 
estate planning provisions of the divorce judgment were valid 
was established in Barnes.  Based on the law then in effect, 
LaBudde concluded that Robert had only a contractual obligation 
to make a will bequeathing two-thirds of his estate to his adult 
                                                 
24 Cross-Appellants' brief at 31. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
22 
 
children.  I agree with that conclusion, as I have explained 
above.  
¶127 The majority opinion asserts that "it was not fairly 
debatable that a client must follow a court judgment."25  The 
majority then asserts that "Robert was obligated to follow the 
court's judgment unless it was modified in a proceeding in the 
circuit court or on appeal."26   
¶128 The law on one's obligation to follow a judgment to 
which one is a party is not so absolute as the majority asserts.  
One does not have an obligation to follow a void provision in a 
judgment.  Cline v. Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 442, 129 N.W. 400 
(1911).  Rather, a void provision may be challenged at any time, 
in any "proceedings in which it is drawn in question."  
Fischbeck, 162 Wis. at 18.  Here, the will provision in the 1974 
divorce judgment has been drawn into question.  As I have 
explained above, that provision is void as a judgment, having 
been made in excess of the circuit court's subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 61.  Robert could not be 
required by contempt proceedings to follow that part of the 
divorce judgment, unless he were estopped from arguing that the 
circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction to order estate 
planning in favor of the adult children, as we concluded Arnold 
                                                 
25 Majority op., ¶36. 
26 Id., ¶37 (citing State v. Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 
114 N.W.2d 118 (1962) and Cline v. Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 439, 
129 N.W. 400 (1911)). 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
23 
 
Bliwas was.27  Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41.  The provision could 
also be enforced as a contract provision, as was done in the 
Florida courts.  Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d at 722.28  The law in 
regard to the effect of void judgments and Barnes' recently 
released conclusion provided LaBudde with at least a good faith 
belief that assisting Robert in the estate plan he chose was not 
aiding and abetting an unlawful act, although LaBudde may have 
been assisting a breach of contract.29  In my view, it is 
patently unfair of the majority opinion to overrule Barnes, 
which was decided only a few months before LaBudde drafted the 
1992 will, and then to declare there was no law on which LaBudde 
could have based a good faith belief that he assisted Robert 
only in a potential breach of contract.   
¶129 The 
majority 
opinion 
cites 
Ramsey 
and 
Cline.30  
However, those cases do not support the position the majority 
opinion has taken. 
 In Ramsey, we examined Wis. Stat. 
§ 256.03(3) (1961-62), which provides: 
                                                 
27 In Bliwas, we estopped Arnold Bliwas from contesting the 
validity of the order that incorporated his stipulation.  
Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 640.  
28 As explained above, LaBudde had advised Robert that the 
stipulation created only a contractual obligation. 
29 As I explained above, breaching a contract is not 
committing an illegal act.  When one breaches a contract, one 
pays damages.  See supra note 22.  Paying damages for the breach 
of a contract to make a will is what the Florida court ordered.  
Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720, 721-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003).   
30 Majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
24 
 
Every court of record shall have power to punish, as 
for a criminal contempt, persons guilty of either of 
the following acts and no other:   
. . .  
(3) Wilful disobedience of any process or order 
lawfully issued or made by it. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
We 
explained 
that 
§ 256.03(3) 
was 
a 
codification of the common law.  Ramsey, 16 Wis. 2d at 165.  In 
our 
discussion 
of 
the 
common 
law, 
and 
therefore 
our 
interpretation of § 256.03(3), we further explained that the 
first order of business was to determine whether the court order 
had been "lawfully issued or made."  Id.  We explained that this 
was important because "[t]he universal rule is that the failure 
of a person to obey an order that [a court has held] is void for 
want of jurisdiction in the issuing court is not punishable as 
contempt."  Id. (citations omitted).   
¶130 I agree that the first question to be addressed when 
it is claimed that a court order has been violated is whether 
the court that made the order had subject matter jurisdiction to 
do so.31  Because the divorce court did not have subject matter 
                                                 
31 The majority opinion says, "there is no claim that the 
divorce court lacked jurisdiction."  Id., ¶42.  It also opines 
that "[e]ven if LaBudde believed that the judgment exceeded the 
divorce court's authority under the 1974 statutes, the only 
lawful courses of action were to follow the judgment, to ask the 
court to modify it, or to appeal the judgment."  Id.  With all 
due respect, the majority opinion is wrong on the facts and on 
the law.  LaBudde has consistently maintained that the divorce 
court was without power to order Robert to maintain a will in 
favor of the adult children, and that Robert's obligation to the 
adult children was contractual in nature.  Furthermore, the law 
in Wisconsin does not require compliance with a void judgment.  
Ramsey, 16 Wis. 2d at 165.    
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
25 
 
jurisdiction to order Robert to maintain a will leaving two-
thirds of his net estate to the adult children, Ramsey actually 
supports my position that Robert did not act unlawfully when he 
did not comply with that portion of the divorce judgment.  
Therefore, LaBudde's drafting of the 1992 will did not aid and 
abet an unlawful act.  Cline is similar to Ramsey, in that its 
discussion is qualified by first providing that the court must 
have subject matter jurisdiction to enter a lawful order.  
Cline, 144 Wis. at 442.    
¶131 It has been LaBudde's position throughout these 
proceedings that the will provision in the 1974 divorce judgment 
was 
unenforceable 
as 
a 
judgment, 
from 
its 
inception.32  
Certainly, given the many cases cited above, LaBudde had at 
least a good faith belief that his assistance to Robert did not 
violate a lawful provision of the divorce judgment.  Therefore, 
I conclude that LaBudde has immunity from liability for the 
legal representation he provided.  
F. 
Statute of Repose 
¶132 The majority leaves open the question of what statute 
of limitations applies to LaBudde's act of drafting the 1992 
will.33  I leave that question unaddressed as well.  However, I 
write to point out that even if I were to assume, arguendo, that 
                                                 
32 Cross-Appellant's brief at 35-36.  The majority opinion 
asserts that the word "void" does not appear in LaBudde's brief.  
Majority op., ¶43 n.19.  However, "void" is an apt term to 
describe a judgment that was unenforceable as a judgment from 
its inception, as LaBudde asserts here.  Stasey v. Miller, 168 
Wis. 2d 37, 61, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992).  
33 Majority op., ¶58. 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
26 
 
drafting the 1992 will aided and abetted an unlawful act, Robert 
reconfirmed that will in 1999.  On December 6, 1994, 20 years 
after the judgment was entered, the 20-year statute of repose 
found in Wis. Stat. § 893.40 established a bar to an action to 
enforce the judgment.  Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶27.   
¶133 LaBudde raises Wis. Stat. § 893.40 as a bar to the 
adult children's claims.34  Section 893.40 provides: 
Action on judgment or decree; court of record.  
Except as provided in ss. 846.04(2) and (3) and 
893.415, action upon a judgment or decree of a court 
of record of any state or of the United States shall 
be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or 
decree is entered or be barred.35   
¶134 In Hamilton, we addressed Wis. Stat. § 893.40 relative 
to a divorce judgment.  We were asked to examine whether the 
State, as the real party in interest, could seek to collect 
unpaid child support on a divorce judgment entered in 1970 and 
modified in 1977, through an action the State commenced May 22, 
2000.  Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶15.  In order to answer that 
question, we examined § 893.40, which we concluded was a statute 
of repose, rather than a statute of limitations.  Id., ¶28.   
¶135 We explained that "[s]tatutes of repose operate 
differently from statutes of limitations.  A statute of 
limitations usually establishes the time frame within which a 
claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually 
                                                 
34 Cross-Appellants' brief at 12, 32. 
35 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.04 applies to mortgage foreclosures 
and Wis. Stat. § 893.415 applies to actions to collect child 
support or family support.  Neither provision has any relevance 
to the claims of the adult children.   
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
27 
 
accrues."  Id., ¶29 (citing Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 
2000 WI 98, ¶26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).  We contrasted 
this with the operation of a statute of repose, which actually 
"limits the time period within which an action may be brought 
based on the date of an act or omission."  Id.  Most importantly 
for my analysis here, we explained that "[a] statute of repose 
does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action.  In fact, 
it may cut off litigation before a cause of action arises."  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  We also explained that the "act" that 
triggers Wis. Stat. § 893.40 is the entry of the judgment.  Id. 
¶136 In the adult children's aiding and abetting action, 
they necessarily seek to enforce the terms of the divorce 
judgment because their damages for aiding and abetting are 
dependent on their recovery had the judgment been enforceable.  
That is, there can be no recovery for aiding and abetting if 
there can be no recovery for violation of the divorce judgment.  
74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 60 (instructing that "[o]ne who . . . 
aids[] or abets a wrongful act by another is regarded as being 
as responsible as the one who commits the act, so as to impose 
liability upon the former to the same extent as if he had 
performed the act himself"); see also, e.g., Abramian v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1088 
(Mass. 2000) (concluding that because the underlying claim was 
dismissed, 
the 
aiding 
and 
abetting 
claim 
based 
on 
that 
underlying claim could not be maintained); Tate v. Dep't of 
Mental 
Health, 
645 
N.E.2d 
1159, 
1164 
n.2 
(Mass. 
1995) 
(explaining that because "plaintiff would not be able to satisfy 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
28 
 
her burden of proof that the Association discriminated . . . 
summary judgment should be granted on the plaintiff's claim that 
the department and the commission aided and condoned the actions 
of the Association").  LaBudde, by aiding and abetting Robert, 
can be no more liable than Robert himself would be.  Therefore, 
because Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars enforcement of the judgment 
against Robert subsequent to December 5, 1994, the claim for 
aiding and abetting is necessarily barred as well.   
¶137 The act that started the running of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40's statute of repose was the entry of the divorce 
judgment on December 5, 1974.  Id.  Accordingly, no action could 
be brought to enforce the terms of the judgment, as a judgment, 
after December 5, 1994.  In 1999, Robert reaffirmed the will 
that was probated at his death in 2000.  At that time, Robert 
was no longer constrained by the judgment, as a judgment, in 
regard to what posthumous distribution he chose for his 
property.  As we have noted throughout, Robert had contractual 
obligations that remained.  However, those obligations were 
litigated and payment was made for them in the Florida probate 
proceedings.  Accordingly, the adult children's action now 
before us is precluded by § 893.40.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶138 I write separately for three reasons:  (1) I conclude 
that the plaintiffs' claim against LaBudde, based on aiding and 
abetting Robert in allegedly violating a provision of a 1974 
divorce judgment that required him to will two-thirds of his net 
estate to his three adult children, fails to state a claim on 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
29 
 
which relief can be granted because the estate planning 
provision of the divorce judgment exceeded the circuit court's 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) I conclude that LaBudde was 
immune from liability in drafting Robert's 1992 will because 
LaBudde proceeded in a good faith belief that the provision in 
the 1974 divorce judgment that required estate planning in favor 
of the adult children was void from its inception, as a 
judgment; and (3) I conclude that even if I were to assume, 
arguendo, that the directive to make a will in the 1974 divorce 
judgment were enforceable when made, Wis. Stat. § 893.40, a 20-
year statute of repose, precluded actions on the divorce 
judgment after December 5, 1994.  Therefore, the divorce 
judgment had no effect, as a judgment, in 1999 when Robert 
reaffirmed the will that he made in 1992, and it had no effect 
at his death in 2000.  As a result, the aiding and abetting 
claim against LaBudde must be dismissed.  Because the majority 
opinion concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent from that 
portion of the majority opinion that addresses the aiding and 
abetting claim. 
¶139 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2007AP1638.pdr 
 
 
 
1