Title: Green v. Wiese

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

78 N.W.2d 776 (1956) Ross M. GREEN v. Ewald WIESE, Sheriff of Wells County, North Dakota. Cr. 272. Supreme Court of North Dakota. September 28, 1956. *777 Lord & Ulmer, Mandan, for plaintiff and respondent. Leslie R. Burgum, Atty. Gen., Kenneth M. Moran, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel Krause, Wells County State's Atty., Fessenden, for defendant and applicant. SATHRE, Justice. The Attorney General has petitioned this court to exercise its original jurisdiction and to issue a supervisory writ to review the propriety, regularity and validity of a certain order issued by the district court, fourth judicial district, Wells County, vacating and setting aside an order of commitment issued by the county court of Wells County, binding one Ross M. Green over to the district court for trial on the charge of manslaughter. The undisputed facts upon which the application for a supervisory writ is founded are as follows: A complaint was filed with the judge of the county court of Wells County, North Dakota, the same being a court of increased criminal and civil jurisdiction, charging Ross M. Green with the crime of manslaughter in the first degree. A warrant for arrest of said Green was issued by the said court and he was brought before the court and thereafter a preliminary hearing was had after which the said Ross M. Green was bound over to the district court of Wells County for trial. His bail was fixed at $2,000 which was promptly furnished. Thereafter the said Ross M. Green made application to the district court of Wells County for a writ of habeas corpus which application is as follows: Upon such application the district court issued a writ of Habeas Corpus as follows: The Sheriff of Wells County filed his return to the said Writ of Habeas Corpus which is as follows: "Dated this third day of October, 1955 at Fessenden, North Dakota. Counsel for Green argues that the transcript of the proceedings before the committing magistrate was competent evidence for consideration by the district court in the habeas corpus proceedings in determining whether there was probable cause to bind the defendant Green to the district court. The attorney general contends, however, that habeas corpus proceedings will not lie where as in the instant case the defendant is not restrained of his liberty. Then follow several subdivisions specifying the conditions entitling a party who is held in custody to discharge. None of these conditions apply to the defendant Ross M. Green since the sheriff's return shows that he is not in custody and is not restrained of his liberty. The statute quoted can therefore have no application to the habeas corpus proceedings in the instant case. An examination of the statutes governing habeas corpus proceedings make it clear that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus must establish that he is imprisoned or is restrained of his liberty. Sections 32-2203 and 32-2204, NDRC 1943 likewise provide that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus must be imprisoned or deprived of his liberty. *780 The nature and sufficiency of restraint to warrant intervention by habeas corpus proceedings is thus defined in 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 9, pages 439, 440; In the case of Ex Parte Nichols, 158 Tex.Cr. 218, 254 S.W.2d 518, 519, the Supreme Court of the State of Texas said: In 25 Am.Jur. Sec. 24, page 158, Habeas Corpus, is the following statement: In the case of Ex Parte Robilotto, 24 N.J.Super. 209, 94 A.2d 207, 209, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that: In the case of Ex Parte Ancheta, 80 Cal. App. 2d 255, 256, 181 P.2d 686, the Supreme Court of California said: Likewise in the case of Ex Parte Lowery, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 45, 204 S.W.2d 519, it was held that where it was shown that relator was not in custody at the time of his application for writ of habeas corpus, relator was not entitled to the writ. In the case of State ex rel. Johnson v. Broderick, 75 N.D. 340, 27 N.W.2d 849, 859, the relator applied for a supervisory writ directed to the district court. In that case the said court had released or was about to release an inmate from the State Training School in habeas corpus proceedings. Since no appeal lies from the decision of the district court in habeas corpus proceedings the application was made to this court for a supervisory writ. In granting the supervisory writ this court said: Under the statutes quoted herein and the judicial decisions cited it is clear that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus must establish that he actually is restrained of his liberty. The petitioner in the instant case has not in any manner been restrained of his liberty. He has at all times been free to go any place he might choose in the state or out of the state without any restrictions whatsoever. When Ross M. Green, the defendant in the criminal action involved here was bound over to the next term of the district court his bail was fixed at $2,000. His bail was furnished and thereafter he was never in the custody of the sheriff and his liberty was never restrained. He was at large at the time of the commencement of the habeas corpus proceedings. It is the contention of the attorney general therefore, that the said Ross M. Green was not restrained of his liberty within the meaning of the statutes governing habeas corpus proceedings or any other law pertaining to same, and therefore he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. At the hearing upon the application for a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner introduced in evidence a transcript of the proceedings had before the committing magistrate at the preliminary hearing. The district court examined the said transcript and held that it failed to show the commission of the crime charged, and that there was no probable cause to hold the said Ross M. Green. The district court thereupon ordered the said Ross M. Green discharged from custody and his bond exonerated. It is the contention of the attorney general that the only question before the court in the habeas corpus proceeding was whether or not the petitioner was actually restrained of his liberty. The facts show that the said Ross M. Green was at liberty under bond since the preliminary hearing and at no time was he in the custody of the sheriff, nor had the sheriff at any time attempted to exercise any physical control over him. It is further contended by the attorney general that since Green was not in any way restrained of his liberty he had no grounds for relief in habeas corpus proceedings, and that it was error on the part of the district court to give consideration to the transcript of the proceedings in the preliminary hearing since the petitioner was neither imprisoned nor under any restraint of his liberty. We think the contention of the attorney general is correct. We conclude therefore upon the record and the law that the purported order of the Honorable H. E. Rittgers, judge of the district court of Wells County, entered in the habeas corpus proceedings against the Sheriff of Wells County discharging the said Ross M. Green and exonerating his bail was in all things null and void and of no effect. Accordingly it is ordered that a writ issue out of this court directing the Honorable H. E. Rittgers, judge of the said district court, to enter an order vacating the said purported order entered in the said habeas corpus proceeding and declaring the same in all things null and void and without any legal effect. BURKE, C. J., and JOHNSON, GRIMSON and MORRIS, JJ., concur.