Title: State v. Jones

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,420 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
AUSTIN N. JONES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Immunity under K.S.A. 21-3219 cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal 
after conviction.  
 
2. 
A prosecutor commits error if he or she argues that premeditation can occur in an 
instant, engages in argument that inflames the passions or prejudices of the jury rather 
than urging it to discharge its duty to decide a case on the evidence, or misstates the law 
governing the way in which the jury can arrive at a guilty verdict. In this case, one of two 
prosecutors delivering closing argument engaged in misconduct only by misstating the 
law governing the way in which the jury could arrive at a guilty verdict. However, the 
error was not gross and flagrant and was not the product of ill will. Given the substantial 
evidence against the defendant in this case, the State has met its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of 
the entire record. No reversal is required. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID J. KAUFMAN, judge. Opinion filed November 8, 
2013. Affirmed.   
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant.  
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, chief appellate attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Defendant Austin N. Jones appeals his jury conviction of two counts of 
first-degree murder. He argues for the first time on appeal that under Kansas' version of a 
"Stand-Your-Ground Law" in effect at the time of the crime, K.S.A. 21-3219, he is 
immune from prosecution. In the alternative, he alleges that prosecutorial misconduct 
deprived him of a fair trial.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
It is undisputed that defendant Austin N. Jones shot and killed Emmanuel 
Delatorre and Jesus M. Esparza in a parking lot outside of Jones' apartment on July 2, 
2009. 
 
Jones went to his friend Adrian Rodriguez' apartment to "hang out" in the 
afternoon before the shooting. The apartment had been leased in Jones' name; but Jones 
allowed Rodriguez to live there after Jones moved into his girlfriend's apartment in the 
same complex. Jones had brought a .45 caliber pistol he was interested in selling to 
Rodriguez. Although Rodriguez expressed interest, he said he could not afford the gun at 
that time. Jones placed the pistol in his waistband.  
3 
 
 
 
 
Later in the afternoon, sisters Jessica and Lindy Vestering arrived. A short while 
later, Josh Johnson and Esparza also arrived. Rodriguez, Johnson, and Esparza were 
recording rap songs while Jones and the Vestering sisters played drinking games. The 
group drank brandy and beer.  
 
Meanwhile, Delatorre and Johnny Nash were drinking beer at Nash's dad's 
residence. The pair then went to a sports bar and consumed more beer. They then decided 
to go to another bar, but Delatorre wanted to stop by his apartment first. Delatorre's 
apartment was in the same complex as Jones'. Delatorre also wanted to see Esparza, 
another resident of the same complex.  
 
Before they reached the apartment complex, Delatorre told Nash that he was upset 
with Jones because he had heard that Jones assisted Delatorre's estranged girlfriend in 
moving out of the apartment she shared with Delatorre. Delatorre had also heard that 
Jones received an entertainment center from the apartment. Delatorre told Nash that he 
wanted to ask Jones whether he had helped the girlfriend. If he had, Delatorre said, he 
was going to "beat [Jones'] ass."  
 
When Delatorre and Nash reached the apartment complex, they encountered 
Rodriguez and Esparza in the parking lot. Rodriguez told Delatorre to go get some beer 
from his refrigerator. Delatorre entered the apartment and saw Jones sitting on a couch.  
 
At this point in the chronology of events, the participants' descriptions of what 
transpired diverge.  
 
Jones would eventually testify that Delatorre "slammed open" the door to the 
apartment and asked, "[W]here the fuck is [Jones?]" Jones described Delatorre as "angry" 
4 
 
 
 
and saying, "I'm going to beat your ass." Jones said Delatorre tried to fight with him in 
the apartment, but Jones stood up and said, "I don't want any problems with you. I don't 
want to fight." Jones also claimed that Delatorre continued "cussing [him] out, and saying 
he was going to beat [his] ass." According to Jones, this confrontation lasted 2 to 3 
minutes.  
 
Jessica Vestering would eventually testify that Delatorre and Jones began talking 
with each other "like friends talk" after Delatorre entered the apartment. Although she 
could not hear exactly what they were saying, she said, "It wasn't mean or anything like 
that." On cross examination, however, she acknowledged that she had told police shortly 
after the shooting that Delatorre was "mad" about something. According to her, after the 
conversation between Delatorre and Jones, Delatorre announced that he was leaving and 
did so. Rodriguez and Esparza, who had followed Delatorre into the apartment, also left. 
Jessica Vestering said that she too left the apartment and met her sister and Johnson 
outside, leaving Jones alone in the apartment. Jones came outside "almost right after" she 
did, and he was holding a gun in his hand. She said that she heard two shots and saw two 
flashes of light, but she did not actually see the shooting.  
 
Lindy Vestering would eventually testify that she and Johnson had left the 
apartment because she "was getting too drunk." She talked with Nash for a couple 
minutes when he and Delatorre pulled into the parking lot. Shortly after that 
conversation, as she was walking back to the apartment, Jones walked out of the 
apartment and past her. Jones "ignored" her and "didn't even acknowledge" her when she 
said something to him. Moments later she heard gunshots.  
 
Rodriguez would eventually testify that, once inside the apartment, Delatorre 
began "[a]rguing with [Jones] or something." After Jones and Delatorre argued for "a 
little bit," Rodriguez walked Delatorre and Esparza out of the apartment. The three had 
5 
 
 
 
met Nash in the parking lot, when, "less than a minute" later, Jones came outside. 
Rodriguez said that Jones raised his hand, and then Rodriguez heard shots.  
 
Johnson would eventually testify that Delatorre, Esparza, and Nash "circled 
around" Jones and "were talking shit." At one point, according to Johnson, Nash reached 
for his pocket. Johnson said he heard Nash say, "I'm going to kill you," and Delatorre 
punched Jones. Johnson had not told detectives about Nash's statement or Delatorre's 
punch. He did tell detectives that Jones looked down at Delatorre and Esparza after 
shooting them and said, "[F]uck you." At trial, Johnson said he could not remember this 
part of his earlier account.  
 
Nash would eventually testify that he waited outside while Delatorre went into the 
apartment. Nash estimated that Delatorre was in the apartment for "about 2 minutes." 
When Delatorre came back outside, he told Nash about the argument inside with "that 
pussy" Jones. Nash told Delatorre that he should "beat [Jones'] ass" and encouraged him 
to fight. Despite this, Nash said that the members of the entire group generally had been 
friendly with one another and that they occasionally settled disputes by boxing and then 
drinking beer together. According to Nash, Esparza convinced Delatorre to "let it drop" 
and said there was no need to fight because "[Jones] is our friend." Nash also said that 
Jones appeared and shot Delatorre and Esparza before he, Delatorre, and Esparza could 
leave to go to a local bar as the three of them had planned. Nash said he ran away as 
Jones shot at him.  
 
Autopsies revealed that Delatorre died as a result of a gunshot wound to the back 
of the head, and Esparza died from a gunshot wound to the rear side of the head. The 
autopsies also showed that Delatorre had a blood alcohol content between .14 and .17 
grams, and Esparza had a blood alcohol content between .07 and .11 grams. Delatorre's 
6 
 
 
 
autopsy did not reveal any bruises, blunt force injury, or other evidence that he was 
"fighting with his knuckles."   
 
The State charged Jones with two counts of first-degree murder, see K.S.A. 21-
3401(a)); one count of aggravated assault, see K.S.A. 21-3410(a); and one count of 
criminal possession of a firearm, see K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(3).   
 
Jones was the only witness to testify in the defense case. He said he shot Delatorre 
and Esparza in self-defense. According to Jones, Delatorre, Esparza, and Nash 
surrounded him when he went outside after the argument in the apartment. Delatorre then 
punched him in the face, and someone else hit him from behind. After being hit, Jones 
said, he reached into his waistband and pulled out the gun he had tried to sell to 
Rodriguez. Jones said, "I shot once in front of me and I shot once behind me." He also 
said that he pulled out the gun because he was in fear for his life. Jones' testimony at trial 
contrasted with the content of his first interview with detectives after the shooting; at that 
time he said he could not remember what had happened.   
 
It is undisputed that, after shooting Delatorre and Esparza, Jones fled in his truck, 
which hopped a curb and collided with a tree. When an officer arrived at the scene of the 
accident, Jones ran. The officer pursued Jones on foot, and, approximately 50 yards from 
the truck, Jones stumbled, fell, and was apprehended.  
 
The State's closing arguments were split between two prosecuting attorneys. One 
delivered the opening segment and a second, the rebuttal segment.  
 
During the opening segment, discussing premeditation, the first prosecutor said:  
"How about when he pulls the five-pound pressure on that trigger to make that gun 
discharge[?] How about then[?] Yes." During rebuttal, the second prosecutor said: "How 
7 
 
 
 
long does it take to think over a plan[?] It depends. It depends. That's what premeditation 
is about. But in this instance we know he had a gun, we know he walked out and put—
raised his arm and pulled the trigger." 
 
During the first segment, the prosecutor referenced an admitted photograph of 
Esparza lying on the ground after the shooting and said:  "Jesus Esparza can't be here to 
testify about what happened. But his body is crying out evidence to you based on [a 
police officer's] ability to take this photograph." Later, during rebuttal, the other 
prosecutor said:  "There's no sympathy that day when [Jones] pulled th[e] trigger[] three 
times. There's no sympathy there. But you can't, and you're legally obligated not to[,] 
allow that to influence you." 
 
During rebuttal, the second prosecutor also said: "[B]efore you get all the way to 
this lesser excuse kind of homicide, voluntary manslaughter, . . . you have to all agree 
that there's no premeditation." 
 
The jury convicted Jones on all four counts. For each of the two first-degree 
murder charges, Jones received a hard 25 life sentence. 
 
This appeal follows. Jones' first argument is that he should have been immune 
from prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3219(a). His second, alternative argument is that he is 
entitled to a new trial because of three incidents of prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing argument. We address each of Jones' arguments below; and we affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
 
8 
 
 
 
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION 
 
Jones concedes that he "did not specifically move for relief pursuant to K.S.A. 21-
3219(a)" but asserts that "he did clearly raise self-defense as justification in this case, . . . 
which in turn invokes the immunity provisions of [the statute]."  
 
The State responds by arguing that Jones cannot seek immunity from prosecution 
under K.S.A. 21-3219 for the first time on appeal. It also argues that Jones' briefing of the 
 
issue was inadequate and should lead this court to treat it as abandoned on appeal.  
 
We address the State's last point first because it raises a threshold question. If 
Jones abandoned this issue on appeal, we need proceed no further in our analysis. See 
State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 622, 102 P.3d 406 (2004) (appellant abandons issue on 
appeal by not adequately briefing issue). Our review of Jones' brief persuades us that he 
did not abandon the immunity issue. Both sides principally rely on the only directly 
applicable authority—the language of the statute itself. Because the necessary timing of 
an immunity assertion under K.S.A. 21-3219 raises a question of first impression, it is not 
surprising that on-point secondary legal authority for the parties' positions is nonexistent 
and thus uncited in their briefs. Parties in the position of those in this case are free (and 
encouraged) to direct us to potentially persuasive law from other jurisdictions, but their 
failure to do so is not fatal to consideration of their appellate arguments.       
 
The next preliminary point is identification of our standard of review. Because the 
district court judge was never called upon to rule on the question before us, strictly 
speaking, the phrase "standard of review" is a misnomer. There is no decision before us 
to review. But we note that, had the district judge been given an opportunity to weigh in, 
our review of that decision on such a question of law would have been plenary. See State 
v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 203, 290 P.3d 640 (2012) (review of question on whether 
9 
 
 
 
appellate issue preserved unlimited). Likewise, interpretation and construction of statutes 
raises questions of law subject to unlimited appellate review. See State v. Bruce, 295 
Kan. 1036, 1038, 287 P.3d 919 (2012) (interpretation of statute subject to de novo 
review). We thus have no hesitation in applying the same standard of review in this case. 
 
K.S.A. 21-3219 provides:  
 
 
"(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3214, 
and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3211, 21-3212 or 21-3213, 
and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the 
use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement 
officer who was acting in the performance of such officer's official duties and the officer 
identified the officer's self in accordance with any applicable law or the person using 
force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement 
officer. As used in this subsection, 'criminal prosecution' includes arrest, detention in 
custody and charging or prosecution of the defendant. 
 
 
"(b) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the 
use of force as described in subsection (a), but the agency shall not arrest the person for 
using force unless it determines that there is probable cause for the arrest. 
 
 
"(c) A county or district attorney or other prosecutor may commence a criminal 
prosecution upon a determination of probable cause." 
 
Only two prior cases before this court have addressed immunity under K.S.A. 21-
3219. 
 
In the first, McCracken v. Kohl, 286 Kan. 1114, 1118, 191 P.3d 313 (2008), this 
court explained that "a prerequisite to immunity [under K.S.A. 21-3219] is that the use of 
force be justified by K.S.A. 21-3211 [defense of person], K.S.A. 21-3212 [defense of 
10 
 
 
 
dwelling], or K.S.A. 21-3213 [defense of property other than a dwelling]." K.S.A. 21-
3211 obviously is the prerequisite that Jones would have had the district court apply in 
this case. But, other than laying this floor under our analysis, McCracken is otherwise 
unhelpful on today's question. 
 
In our second case, State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013), 
defendant Manuel Ultreras appealed his conviction of three counts of aggravated battery. 
The charges stemmed from an altercation in which Ultreras, working security at a bar, hit 
three other men with a metal baton. Before trial, Ultreras filed a motion to dismiss, 
claiming immunity from criminal prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3219. The district court 
held a hearing on the motion, and, after considering arguments from the parties, 
determined that Ultreras had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
his use of force was necessary in order to qualify for immunity under the statute. This 
court disagreed. We held that the standard of proof for whether a defendant is entitled to 
immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3219 is probable cause, and 
the State bears the burden of establishing that force was not justified as part of the 
probable cause determination. 296 Kan. at 845. 
 
Under Ultreras, had Jones filed a pretrial motion to dismiss based on a claim of 
immunity under K.S.A. 21-3219, it is clear that the State would have borne the burden of 
establishing that force was not justified as part of the probable cause determination 
required under K.S.A. 21-3219(b) and (c). See Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2; 
McCracken, 286 Kan. at 1118. But Jones filed no such motion. Ultreras does not answer 
whether he could assert immunity under K.S.A. 21-3219 for the first time on direct 
appeal of his conviction. 
 
The language of K.S.A. 21-3219 also does not clearly answer the question before 
us. See Ultreras, 296 Kan. at 842 (statute provides little guidance on procedure for 
11 
 
 
 
application); see also State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131, 145, 298 P.3d 1102 (2013) (plain 
language of statute provides starting point for statutory interpretation). Jones argues that 
this appeal is a continuation of his "criminal prosecution," as that phrase is defined in 
K.S.A. 21-3219(a)—"'[C]riminal prosecution' includes arrest, detention in custody and 
charging or prosecution of the defendant"—and thus he can be held to be immune from 
it, as well as the law enforcement and district court proceedings that led to it. We 
disagree. The statutory definition of "criminal prosecution" to include a "prosecution" 
tells us nothing. And this appeal, as was pointed out during oral argument, was initiated 
by Jones, not by the State. The State's "prosecution" of Jones ended with his sentencing.  
 
Jones also argues that claiming self-defense was enough to invoke K.S.A. 21-3219 
immunity. This self-executing method of invocation certainly is not laid out in the statute. 
Jones may attempt to divine it from this court's third syllabus paragraph in McCracken, 
which states:  "To establish that a use of force is a justifiable defense, so as to invoke the 
immunity of K.S.A. 21-3219, the party claiming immunity must pass both a subjective 
and an objective test." 286 Kan. 1114, Syl. ¶ 3. But this syllabus phrase cannot be 
stretched to Jones' purposes here. It gave content to the prerequisites for claiming K.S.A. 
21-3219 immunity; it did not dictate procedure or the lack of it.  
 
Jones also attempts to draw an analogy to qualified immunity for government 
officials. But, to the extent such a comparison is sound, an issue we do not decide today, 
qualified immunity is waived if it is not raised early in a case as an affirmative defense. 
See Bentley v. Cleveland County Bd. of County Com'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 604-05 (10th Cir. 
1994) (citing, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 300 [6th Cir. 1986] 
["'[I]mmunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense which must be 
affirmatively pleaded . . . .'"], cert. denied 479 U.S. 1103 [1987]). As we recognized in 
McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 272 Kan. 627, 35 P.3d 815 (2001):  
 
12 
 
 
 
"'Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation." [Citation omitted.] The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial." [Citation omitted.] As a result, "we repeatedly have 
stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation." [Citation omitted.]'" 272 Kan. at 637 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
200-01, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 [2001]). 
 
Jones also makes a legislative purpose argument. See State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 
305 P.3d 641, 655 (2013) (when statutory language ambiguous, court may consider 
background considerations that speak to legislative purpose and employ canons of 
statutory construction). Before enactment of K.S.A. 21-3219 in 2006, he argues, criminal 
defendants could already assert self-defense. Thus the legislature enacted K.S.A. 21-3219 
to provide additional protection. K.S.A. 21-3219 "must be construed to allow persons to 
use force in self-defense without fear of prosecution and conviction . . . ." Jones' assertion 
is consistent with the general purpose of recognized immunities. See Siegert v. Gilley, 
500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); Ultreras, 296 Kan. at 840 
("'This aspect of the new law is meant to provide not merely a defense against liability, 
but protection against the burdens of prosecution and trial as well.'") (quoting Rodgers v. 
Com., 285 S.W.3d 740, 753 [Ky. 2009]). 
 
But, in Ultreras, we identified the additional protection that the statute afforded an 
accused: 
 
"Generally, a detached Kansas magistrate considering whether to issue a warrant or 
summons merely determines 'that there is probable cause to believe both that a crime has 
been committed and that the defendant has committed it.' K.S.A. 22-2302(1). Under 
K.S.A. 21-3219, however, once a defendant raises justified use-of-force immunity before 
a court, a probable cause determination must also include a determination that the 
defendant's use of force was not justified under K.S.A. 21-3211, K.S.A. 21-3212, or 
13 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 21-3213. Hence, the statute as written with a probable cause standard adds an 
additional requirement and is meaningful." Ultreras, 296 Kan. at 844. 
 
And this additional protection can be realized only if immunity under K.S.A. 21-
3219 is asserted as early as possible prior to trial. In other words, to the extent that Jones 
urges us to look at the purpose of the statute to construe the procedure to be followed, his 
argument that immunity can be raised for the first time on appeal is self-defeating. If the 
purpose of the statute is to protect individuals from the burdens of prosecution and 
conviction, that purpose cannot be effected when immunity is raised for the first time on 
appeal. By that time, prosecution and conviction have occurred. The burdens they impose 
cannot be lifted.  
 
We also note that, although the question of whether K.S.A. 21-3219 immunity 
may be invoked for the first time on appeal is one of law, the determination to be made 
on the existence of probable cause under subsections (b) and (c) once the statute has been 
invoked necessitates a factual inquiry and determination. District courts are the places to 
hold evidentiary hearings. Appellate courts are not. Indeed, Jones' case, with its many 
alcohol-imbibing witnesses and their conflicting stories, is an excellent example of a 
situation in which all of the factual examination and credibility weighing abilities and 
expertise of district courts would be well used. 
 
The State directs the court's attention to K.S.A. 22-3208(4), which provides that 
"consent to trial upon a complaint, information or indictment shall constitute a waiver of 
defenses and objections based upon the institution of the prosecution . . . ." The only 
sensible reading of K.S.A. 21-3219 is that it creates an affirmative defense to which 
K.S.A. 22-3208(4) applies.  
 
14 
 
 
 
Thus, on the only question before us today, we hold: If a defendant believes he or 
she is entitled to Stand-Your-Ground immunity under K.S.A. 21-3219, then the defense 
must be asserted before trial opens or a dispositive plea is entered. Such an assertion is a 
timely trigger of the State's probable cause burden. A defendant who waits to invoke 
K.S.A. 21-3219 immunity until appeal after conviction simply waits too long. By that 
time, the facts and the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt have been established. 
In Jones' situation in particular, the jury rejected his claim of self-defense. This means the 
State has already borne an evidentiary burden far higher than the probable cause burden 
imposed upon it by the Stand-Your-Ground statute.   
 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Jones' alternative argument on appeal is that the prosecutorial team committed 
reversible misconduct by implying that premeditation can occur instantaneously, by 
appealing to the passions of the jury, and by misstating the law on how the jury could 
reach a guilty verdict.  
 
Our standards governing review of prosecutorial misconduct claims have often 
been recited:  
 
 
"Review of prosecutorial misconduct claims involves a two-step process. The 
appellate court first decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a 
prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was misconduct. 
Second, if misconduct is found, the court must determine whether the improper 
comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial."   
 
 
"The case of State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 97, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004), identified 
three factors to consider in determining if the prosecutorial misconduct so prejudiced the 
jury against the defendant that a new trial should be granted: (1) whether the misconduct 
15 
 
 
 
was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's 
part; and (3) whether the evidence against the defendant was of such a direct and 
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of 
the jurors. Under Tosh, none of these three factors is individually controlling. And before 
the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to 
say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), have been 
met." State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 306 P.3d 244 (2013). 
 
We have also recently reviewed the two harmlessness tests and how they intersect 
in a prosecutorial misconduct analysis. Under the constitutional harmless error analysis 
defined in Chapman,  
 
"'the error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.' State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 
256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
 
"Under the harmless error analysis defined in K.S.A. 60-261, the test is equally 
clear. The court 'determine[s] if there is a reasonable probability that the error did or will 
affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record.' [Citation omitted.]   
 
 
"Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error . . . bears the burden of 
demonstrating harmlessness. State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1110, 299 P.3d 292 (2013). 
That burden is higher when the error is of constitutional magnitude. See Herbel, 296 Kan. 
at 1110 ('Clearly, the party benefiting from the constitutional error must meet a higher 
standard to show harmlessness than the standard required in nonconstitutional error.')." 
Bridges, 306 P.3d at 260. 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
In addition, when  
 
"both the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the very same acts 
and omissions, we logically begin with our harmlessness analysis of the constitutional 
error. . . . [I]f we decide the constitutional error is not harmless and reverse the 
convictions, there is no point in analyzing whether the State met the lower standard for 
harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261." Bridges, 306 P.3d at 262 (citing Herbel, 296 Kan. at 
1111). 
 
Premeditation 
 
Jones' first claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that the State improperly implied 
that premeditation can be instantaneous. This court has repeatedly found reversible error 
in such cases. See State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 849, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); see also State v. 
Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 585, 86 P.3d 535 (2004) (prosecutor committed reversible 
misconduct when she pantomimed firing of gun, said:  "One squeeze of a trigger is all it 
takes."); State v. Holmes, 272 Kan. 491, 497-500, 33 P.3d 856 (2001) (prosecutor 
committed reversible misconduct:  "Ladies and gentlemen, premeditation can occur in an 
instant. That's the law in the State of Kansas."). Premeditation is more accurately 
described as a "'"state of mind"' that relates 'to a person's reasons and motives for acting 
as he or she did.'" Hall, 292 Kan. at 850 (quoting State v. Doyle, 272 Kan. 1157, 1162, 38 
P.3d 650 [2002]).  
 
"'"'Premeditation means to have thought the matter over beforehand, in other words, to 
have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no specific time 
period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires more than the 
instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life.'" State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 301, 
83 P.3d 1216 (2004) (quoting State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 88, 82 P.3d 470 [2004]). 
Several factors may give rise to an inference of premeditation, including:  (1) the nature 
of the weapon used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant's conduct before and 
17 
 
 
 
after the killing, (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the 
occurrence, and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered 
helpless. State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 109, 21 P.3d 516, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1047 
(2001). Moreover, premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established 
circumstances of a case, provided the inference is a reasonable one. State v. Scott, 271 
Kan. at 108; see also State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 404, 109 P.3d 1158 (2005).' State v. 
Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 474-75, 153 P.3d 532 (2007)." Haberlein, 296 Kan. at 205. 
 
Jones contends that the prosecutors' references to his "five-pound pressure on [the] 
trigger" and to Jones raising his arm and pulling the trigger effectively reduced the time 
necessary for premeditation to the time in which it takes to pull the trigger. Although 
neither prosecutor used the word "instantly," Jones believes the message conveyed was 
the same.  
 
The State argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from our earlier 
cases in which we held there was reversible prosecutorial misconduct, because neither 
prosecutor stated outright or gestured unmistakably to communicate that premeditation 
can occur in an instant. In its view, the references to the trigger being pulled, when 
viewed in context, were not error. 
 
In this case, we agree with the State.  
 
The first prosecutor started off his premeditation discussion by stating three times 
that premeditation required Jones to have thought the matter over before the killing. The 
prosecutor then identified key factual intervals at which Jones may have had the 
opportunity to do so. The prosecutor posed a rhetorical question:  "At what point did the 
defendant think this over in his mind?" Jones' placement of a "five-pound pressure on that 
trigger" marked the end of the prosecutor's string of factual intervals. In context, it is 
18 
 
 
 
clear to us that the first prosecutor argued only that Jones had plenty of opportunity to 
premeditate the killings well before firing the gun at the victims.   
 
The second prosecutor's comment on premeditation also did not diminish it. 
Informing the jury that the time it takes to think over a plan "depends" and then outlining 
three crucial facts is not misconduct. See Hebert, 277 Kan. at 86-87 (premeditation 
"'merely requires a decision to act, and in this case, a decision to pull the trigger'" not 
outside considerable latitude given prosecutor, considering prosecutor's entire argument). 
Moreover, the second prosecutor explicitly stated at the outset of her rebuttal that 
premeditation "has to be something more than an instantaneous act." 
 
Because we see no error in the two prosecutors' statements about premeditation, 
we need not consider harmlessness at this point. 
 
Passions of the Jury 
 
Jones' second line of attack on the State's closing argument asserts that the State’s 
two prosecutors inflamed the passion of the jury and improperly invoked sympathy for 
the victims. 
 
A jury must decide a case on evidence and controlling law, and not on sympathy, 
emotion, or prejudice. See State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 212-13, 284 P.3d 977 (2012); 
State v. Minski, 252 Kan. 806, 813-14, 850 P.2d 809 (1993) (citing Com. v. Marshall, 523 
Pa. 556, 568 A.2d 590 [1989]). Thus a prosecutor has a duty to refrain from making 
improper, leading, inflammatory, or irrelevant statements to the jury. State v. Scott, 286 
Kan. 54, 77, 183 P.3d 801 (2008). "[A] prosecutor must guard against appeals to jurors' 
sympathies or prejudices." Hall, 292 Kan. at 853; see State v. Friday, 297 Kan. 1023, Syl. 
¶ 5, 306 P.3d 265 (2013) (prosecutor may comment on admitted evidence as long as the 
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remarks accurately reflect evidence; accurately state law; do not inflame passions, 
prejudices of jury; do not divert jury from its duty to decide case on fact, law).  
 
Jones challenges the first prosecutor's statement that Esparza's body was "crying 
out evidence." This comment was isolated and did not rely on facts not in evidence. See 
State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 604, 257 P.3d 767 (2011) (prosecutor's comment 
about involvement in investigation of case improper, harmless). The prosecutor was 
making a point about the position of Esparza's body, which showed that he was standing 
when he was shot and that he was shot from behind. This was well within the wide 
latitude granted a prosecutor in discussing the evidence.  
 
Read in context, the second prosecutor's statement about sympathy also does not 
trouble us. The prosecutor told jurors they were required "to eliminate . . . feelings of 
sympathy of someone who sits before you and maybe they look young to you. Or maybe 
they have been looking at you the whole time and you just—you want to be 
sympathetic." This appears to have been addressed to any sympathy the jurors might feel 
for Jones. The prosecutor was correctly reminding the jurors of their duty to base their 
decision on the evidence rather than emotion. This was not improper commentary. See 
State v. Williams, 42 Kan. App. 2d 725, 727-28, 216 P.3d 707 (2009), rev. denied 290 
Kan. 1104 (2010) (not "inherently pernicious to tell jurors not to do things they should 
not do" in context of no-sympathy jury instruction). We do note, however, that the 
Pattern Instructions for Kansas no longer suggest inclusion of a no-sympathy instruction 
in the usual criminal case. See State v. Aguero-Hernandez, No. 106,079, 2012 WL 
2149793, at *5 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 296 Kan. ___ 
(2013). This may counsel caution for the State in this type of argument. 
  
20 
 
 
 
Misstatement of Law 
 
Jones' final argument on prosecutorial misconduct focuses on the way the second 
prosecutor explained how the jury could reach a guilty verdict. Specifically, the 
prosecutor said:  "[B]efore you get all the way to this lesser excuse kind of homicide, 
voluntary manslaughter, . . . you have to all agree that there's no premeditation." Jones 
claims that the prosecutor incorrectly told jurors they had to reach a unanimous acquittal 
on first-degree murder before considering voluntary manslaughter and thus misstated the 
law. 
 
Jones is correct. See State v. Scott-Herring, 284 Kan. 172, 178-79, 159 P.3d 1028 
(2007); State v. Hurt, 278 Kan. 676, 682, 101 P.3d 1249 (2004) (improper for prosecutor 
to state unanimous acquittal required before considering lesser included offenses). The 
second phrase of the prosecutor's statement should have been "at least one of you must 
believe there is no premeditation" or an equivalent, see Hurt, 278 Kan. at 682, rather than 
"you have to all agree that there's no premeditation." The prosecutor communicated 
exactly the opposite, telling the jurors that each had to reject premeditation before a lesser 
included offense could be considered. This was error. Unanimity is required for 
conviction but not for acquittal.  
 
Because of this error, we must examine harmlessness, and we do so first under the 
constitutional standard. See Bridges, 306 P.3d at 262. Jones argues, per Tosh, that the 
prosecutor's misconduct was gross and flagrant and the product of ill will.   
 
"In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was gross and flagrant, among 
the things an appellate court considers are whether the comments were repeated, 
emphasized improper points, were planned or calculated, or violated well-established or 
unequivocal rules."  
 
21 
 
 
 
 
"In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was motivated by ill will, 
among the things an appellate court considers are whether the conduct was deliberate, 
repeated, or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling." Bridges, 306 P.3d 244, Syl. ¶¶ 
18, 19. 
 
Before making her incorrect statement of law about the jury's process, the second 
prosecutor correctly stated:  "[I]f you cannot agree [on the existence of premeditation], 
only then do you go to second and determine whether or not the State has proven second-
degree murder." See Hurt, 278 Kan. at 682 (quoting State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 661, 
647 P.2d 1301 [1982]) (words "'if you cannot agree,'" when used to preface instruction on 
lesser charge, do not require unanimous acquittal of greater charge). "Where a prosecutor 
makes both a misstatement of the law and a correct recitation of the applicable law in a 
closing argument, we have been loath[] to characterize the misstatement as being gross 
and flagrant misconduct. [Citations omitted.] Neither does such a situation support a 
finding of ill will." State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 62, 260 P.3d 86 (2011). We remain loath 
to characterize the prosecutor's error here as either gross and flagrant or the product of ill 
will.  
 
Our constitutional harmlessness analysis next turns to the State's argument that 
there is no reasonable possibility the misstatement of law contributed to the outcome of 
the trial. See Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6. As the State points out, the evidence against 
Jones was substantial. Two witnesses testified that Jones rushed past them, and moments 
later they heard gunshots. Nash testified that he saw Jones suddenly appear and shoot 
both victims in the back of the head. The coroner testified that both victims died from 
gunshot wounds to the back of the head. Jones fled after the shooting, suggesting a 
culpable mental state rather than a subjective belief that the shooting was necessary to 
defend himself, undercutting his theory of the case. We hold, under the Chapman 
standard for harmless constitutional error, the State has met its burden of proving 
22 
 
 
 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of . . . did not affect the outcome of 
the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., . . . there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the verdict." See Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6. Given this holding, 
we need not determine whether the State has also met its burden of showing harmless 
error under the lower threshold articulated in K.S.A. 60-261. See State v. Ochs, 297 Kan. 
1094, 306 P.3d 294, 302 (2013) (citing Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1110-11). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Immunity under K.S.A. 21-3219 cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal 
after conviction. Further, in this case, one prosecutor's single misstatement of law during 
the rebuttal portion of closing argument, although error, was harmless. It did not deprive 
defendant Austin N. Jones of a fair trial. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.