Title: STATE v ORSBORN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13334 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STI-TE OF M O N T A N A 1976 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - C A R L L E O ORSBORN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert S. Keller, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant: Fennessy, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana David Id. Harman argued, Libby, Montana For Respondent : Eon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John North, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana William A. Douglas, County Attorney, argued, Libby, Montana Submitted: August 30, 1976 P r- -. Decided: %- Lr) 3 xi ':A- F i l e d : :". M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant appeals from h i s conviction of one count of aggravated a s s a u l t and the 20 year sentence imposed by the d i s t r i c t court, Lincoln County. The record reveals t h i s sequence of events: On August 12, 1974 defendant Carl Leo Orsborn began a lengthy period of drinking by consuming a drink shortly a f t e r a r i s i n g a t about 6:00 a.m. Later i n the morning he had a drink with a friend. A t approxi- mately 1:00 p.m. he entered the Mine Lounge i n Libby, Montana and had several drinks including one with a fellow patron, Charles A. Lowder. After drinking most of the day Orsborn encountered Jesse F i r s t Raised and they went t o the Mine Lounge t o close out the day of drinking. Lowder was still a t the bar q u i t e intoxicated and the barmaid pursuaded Orsborn and F i r s t Raised t o g e t him out of the bar so she could close up. They put Lowder i n Orsborn's c a r and a f t e r driving around f o r sometime they parked a t a gravel p i t located out of town. The testimony is i n c o n f l i c t a s t o whether o r not the two men were going t o "roll" Lowder but there was no question t h a t some kind of fracas occurred a t the gravel pit and Lowder w a s h i t by a rock thrown by Orsborn. After t h i s incident, Orsborn and F i r s t Raised got back i n t h e car and continued driving u n t i l they encountered Thomas A. Miller who was parked along the roadside with a f l a t t i r e . They stopped and got a t i r e iron out of the trunk of Orsborn's c a r t o f i x the f l a t t i r e . What happened next is subject t o conflicting testimony. F i r s t Raised t e s t i f i e d Orsborn struck Miller with a pulaski (an axe-hoe combination tool). Miller testified Orsborn swung down with something. Orsborn testified he did not attack Miller. At any rate, Miller suffered bruises to his neck and shoulder. Based on these two incidents, an Information was filed in district court on August 15, 1974, charging Carl Leo Orsborn with two counts of aggravated assault in violation of section 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. Count I charged defendant with aggravated assault by purposely or knowingly causing bodily injury to Charles Albert Lowder by means of a weapon. Count 11 charged the same as to Tom A. Miller. Trial was had on October 16, 1974, with Jesse First Raised appearing as a witness for the state having been granted immunity from prosecution for any role he had in the incidents, The jury after retiring to consider a verdict reported it was deadlocked, whereupon the court declared the matter a mistrial. On November 12, 1974, a motion to sever the two counts and request for separate trials was made by defendant. This motion was subsequently denied. Defendant was again tried on the two counts of aggravated assault on December 2, 1974. At the close of the state's case, defendant's motion to dismiss Count I was denied. On settling jury instructions, the court refused de- fendant's proposed Instruction No. 2, covering the lesser included offense of assault, section 94-5-201, R.C.M. 1947. The jury found defendant not guilty on Count I and guilty on Count 11. Following the verdict, a presentence investigative report was filed and on December 26, 1974, a presentence hearing held. Defendant was sentenced to 20 years in the Montana State Prison. Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence. These issues are presented for review: 1. Whether the sentencing judge may receive and adopt information from sources other than the testimony of witnesses in open court? 2 . Whether the Montana Youth Court Act applies to the facts pertaining to sentencing in this case? 3. Whether the district court erred in refusing to give defendant's proposed Instruction No. 2, covering the lesser included offense of assault? 4 . Whether the district court erred in refusing to grant defendant% motion for separate trials on separate counts? 5 . Whether the district court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss Count I at the end of the state's case. Issue 1. Defendant contends his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by the pro- ceedings at the presentence hearing. United States Constitution, sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; Article 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution. In support defendant cites Kuhl v. District Court, 139 Mont. 536, 568, 366 P.2d 347. The specific portion of the presentence hearing which defendant objects to is what occurred after defendant gave facts in mitigation of sentence. (We note here that a copy of the presentence report was furnished defendant and his counsel). At this point the trial .judge said: "This pre-sentence investigation report is silent with respect to running off to Texas with your younger brother and some girl. I am aware of that. I am satisfied you are aware of that. But I am not satisfied that the report shows that I am aware of it. And it is the kind of a thing that I think you should have an opportunity to explain if you want to, because it cer- tainly is all black in the Court's mind." In answer defendant, represented by counsel, admitted the occurrence to be true. He made no statement in mitigation of the facts the trial judge referred to. We find no constitutional violation. Our examination af.Kuh1, ~ - in relation to present Montana statutory law and relevant federal case law, leads to the conclu- sion that under the circumstances of this case defendant received due process at the presentence hearing. In - Kuhl we note this statement by the Court: "* * * However, keeping in view, as we must, the provisions of sections 94-7813 and 94-7814, supra, the ques- tion arises: Was the trial judge authorized to disregard the mandates of the two-last mentioned sections and to proceed to pass sentence upon the defendant Kuhl without giving him or his counsel an opportunity to learn or know any of the circumstances set forth in the investigator's report and without giving either the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to rebut or refute any of the re- presentations therein contained?" (Emphasis supplied.) Section 94-7813, R.C.M 1947, referred to in Kuhl provided that the sentencing court in its discretion could hear circum- stances in aggravation or mitigation of sentence. Section 94- 7814, R.C.M. 1947, provided that such "* * *circumstances must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court * * * . I 1 However, subsequent to - Kuhl these statutory sections were repealed. Sections 95-2203 and 95-2204, R.C.M. 1947, now require that presentence information in mitigation or aggravation of punishment be made available to the sentencing judge where conviction may result in commitment of one year or longer. Section 95-2205, R.C.M. 1947, the present applicable statute pertaining to sources of sentencing information, reads: "* * * If the court discloses the identity of persons who prozded information, the judge may, in his dis- cretion, allow the defendant to cross-examine those who rendered the information. * * * " (Emphasis supplied.) There is no lack of due process where the trial judge brings to the attention of defendant facts he knows, that defendant knows he knows, and gives defendant an opportunity to explain them in a mitigation procedure, as in the instant case. Under section 95-2205, the right of cross-examination in a presentence hearing is a discretionary matter of the trial court. Such a change in policy is reflective of the trend towards distinguishing evidential procedure at trial from that at the sentencing stage. The United States Supreme Court in Williams v . New York, 337 U . S . 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L ed 1337, 1342, stated: "* * * A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant--if not essential--to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest in£ ormation possible concerning the defendant' s life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sen- tencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain per- tinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) However, this does not mean that the spirit of - Kuhl is dead. A . . convicted defendant still has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation. The real question before us then is whether defendant received that protection. Here: ( 1 ) Defendant was represented by counsel at the time the sentencing information was made known to him. Townsend v . Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L ed 1690; Mempa v . Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L ed 2d 336; United States v . Hone, ( 2 ) He had the opportunity to rebut the information. United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553; United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66. ( 3 ) Defendant chose to affirm the accuracy of the information. United States v . Horsley, 519 F.2d 1264; United States v . Brown, 479 F.2d 1170; State v . Mann, - Mont . , 546 P.2d 515, 33 St. Rep. 278. Thus, any danger of utilizing misinformation in sentencing was thus averted by the trial judge. Issue 2 . Defendant contends that the source of the presentence information was his juvenile record. Since defendant had reached the age of majority, its use in sentencing without his consent or upon court petition is claimed to be prejudicial error under the terms of the Montana Youth Court Act, Title 10, Chapter 12, R.C.M. 1947. The record, including the presentence investigative report, reveals no indication of a juvenile record on the part of de- fendant or that he was ever under the jurisdiction of the Youth Court. We find no merit in defendant's second issue. Issue 3. Defendant argues the use of a weapon was not sufficiently established under Count I1 of the Information, thus the district court erred in not giving defendant's proposed Instruction No. 2 on the lesser included offense of assault. Specifically defendant contends that since Jesse First Raised could have been charged with accountability pursuant to sections 94-2-106 and 94-2-107, R.C.M. 1947, for his part in the Tom Miller incident, any testimony he gave as to the use of a weapon in that incident required independent corroboration under section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant claims the state failed to supply the necessary corroboration. The s t a t e , while not disputing the need for corroboration due t o the fact that F i r s t Raised had been granted immunity from prosecution i n exchange for h i s testi- mony, takes the position that the use of a weapon by defendant against Miller was sufficiently corroborated. The issue then becomes---What kind of evidence is sufficient t o corroborate the testimony of one legally accountable? Section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, states: "A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, as defined i n section 94-2-106, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which i n i t s e l f , and without the a i d of the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, tends t o connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration i s not sufficient, it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof." State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P. 265, has been cited many times Bs to- the general guidelines for determining the suffi- ciency of evidence corroborating the testimony of one legally accountable. Though - Cobb was decided under section 11988, R.C.M. 1921, since repealed, the language of the old s t a t u t e i s nearly identical t o that of section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, i n pertinent part. W e note these guidelines from - Cobb: "(a) The corroborating evidence may be supplied by the defendant o r h i s witnesses. "(b) It need not be direct evidence--it may be circumstantial. "(e) It need not be sufficient t o connect the defendant with commission of the crime; it is sufficient- i f it tends t o do so. "(f) Whether the corroborating evidence tends t o connect the defendant with the commission of the offense is a question of law, but the weight of the evidence * * * is a matter for the consideration of the jury." (Emphasis supplied.) , The testimony concerning the assault on Miller is undisputed on these facts: F i r s t Raised's testimony that defendant for no reason struck Miller with a pulaski but fortunately Miller saw or heard the action and moved so that he was only struck i n the shoulder and neck. The blow stunned Miller but he was able t o recover enough t o run away, chased a short time by defendant carrying the pulaski. Miller saw enough t o t e s t i f y it was de- fendant, "not the Indian" who swung on him. Defendant and F i r s t Raised immediately fled the area and went t o Idaho. F i r s t Raised t e s t i f i e d he had the pulaski on the t r i p t o Idaho and threw it out of the c a r somewhere between Libby and Priest River, Idaho. W e hold that such circumstantial evidence tends t o connect de- fendant with the use of a weapon i n the attack on Miller. See: State v. Spielmann, 163 Mont. 199, 516 P.2d 617; State v. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 462 P.2d 186; 30 Am Jur 2d Evidence, 5 1153. Therefore, the d i s t r i c t court did not err refusing defendant ' s proposed Instruction No. 2 on the lesser included offense of simple assault. Spielmann, supra; State v. Perry, 161Mont. 155, 505 P.2d 113, Issue 4; , Defendant alleges the d i s t r i c t court committed reversible error i n failing t o grant defendant's motion for separate t r i a l s on separate counts of aggravated assault. Though con- ceding that two offenses of the same class may be joined pursuant t o section 95-1504(a), R.C.M. 1947, defendant notes that the s t a t u t e on joinder of offenses further provides at section 95- 1504(c), R.C.M. 1947: "If it appears that a defendant * * * i s prejudiced by a joinder * * * of separate charges * * * the court may order separate t r i a l s * * * o r provide any other re1 ief as justice may require." W e find no error due t o the fact defendant had separate and distinct defenses t o the two counts. H e plead self- defense t o the f i r s t count and the jury must have believed him for a t the second t r i a l he was acquitted. A s to Count 11, he denied the assault alleging that F i r s t Raised was guilty. Section 95-1504(c) is similar t o Rule 14, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and for t h i s reason we have examined federal case law on the potentialities of prejudice resulting from the joinder of two crimes of the same class. Federal courts have found three basic kinds of prejudice that may occur upon the joinder of similar offenses. Wright, 1 Fed.Pract. & Proc., Criminal, 222, p. 437. F i r s t , .the jury may consider defendant who is subject t o multiple :charges to-,be .a bad man. The prejudice claimed is that the jury may tend t o accumulate evidence against him u n t i l it finds him guilty of something. However, our examination of federal cases reveals that such a claim of prejudice rarely has been found sufficient t o provide r e l i e f . See: Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, cert.den. 385 U.S. 857, 87 S.Ct. 105, 1 7 L ed 2d 84; Pumrnill v. United States, 297 F.2d 34. W e do not find such a claim of prejudice sufficient here. The burden of showing prejudice i s on defendant and here he failed t o make such a showing. Second, proof of g u i l t of one offense may be used t o convict the defendant of another offense even though such proof may be inadmissible a t a separate t r i a l . However, where, as here, the alleged fact of the separate offenses was sufficiently dis- t i n c t t o allow the jurors t o keep them separate i n t h e i r minds, no prejudice w i l l be found. See: Drew v. United States, 331 E.2d 85; Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847; United States v. Kellerman, 432 F.2d 371. - 10 - Third, prejudice may result where the defendant wishes t o t e s t i f y on h i s own behalf on one charge but not on the other. But w e note federal courts have only considered such a claim of prejudice where the alleged offenses were t o t a l l y separate a s t o time, place and evidence. See: Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987; United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917; Holmes v. Gray, 526 F.2d 622. The factual circumstances of the instant case do not lend themselves t o a claim of t h i s type of prejudice. For the reasons s e t forth, we f a i l t o find any prejudice resulting t o defendant from the joinder of the two counts of aggravated assault. Issue 5. Defendant contends the d i s t r i c t court erred i n , failing t o dismiss Count I of the Information a t the end of the s t a t e ' s case. H e c i t e s two reasons for t h i s position. F i r s t , the evidence on Count I was insufficient t o support a guilty verdict, and second, the court was under a continuing duty t o protect the defendant from prejudicial joinder of separate offenses. W e simply say that i n view of t h i s Court's position on joinder of the two offenses i n t h i s case, and the fact de- fendant was found not guilty on Count I, no prejudice t o defendant was demonstrated. The judgment of the t r i a l court is affirmed. m We Concur: Justices 6