Title: STATE EX REL. McCLURE ETC. v. MARION SUP. CT. ETC.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

239 Ind. 472 (1959)
158 N.E.2d 264
STATE EX REL. McCLURE ETC.
v.
MARION SUPERIOR COURT, ETC.
No. 29,787.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 1, 1959.
Rehearing denied June 3, 1959.
*474 Glenn W. Funk and Smith & Yarling, both of Indianapolis, for relator.
Nelson Grills, John G. McNutt, of counsel and John M. Heeter, of counsel, all of Indianapolis, for respondent.
ARTERBURN, J.
This is an original action asking for a writ of prohibition and mandate. It involves a dispute over the office of the Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court. The facts appear to be as follows:
*475 Harry Gasper, Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court, died on April 7, 1959. The next day, April 8th, the Governor of this State designated the relator, Edwin McClure, as an appointee to fill the vacancy and issued his commission for such appointment. The relator took the oath of office and on the 9th day of April submitted his bond to the Board of County Commissioners of Marion County for approval. One of the members approved the bond, but two members, Durham and Virt, refused to do so, contending that they had the power to make the appointment rather than the Governor. McClure thereupon filed an action in mandate in the Marion Circuit Court to compel the Commissioners to perform the ministerial duty of approving the bond. Thereafter, on the same day, the Marion Circuit Court, after due notice and appearance by the County Commissioners, made and entered an order mandating the Commissioners to accept the bond and approve same, and as a basis for such action found that:
On the same day, but thereafter however, the two members of the Board of Commissioners, namely, Durham and Virt, purported to appoint Louise Gasper as Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court, and she thereupon filed an action in quo warranto in the Marion Superior Court Room No. 1, Walter M. Bell, Jr., Judge. As part of the relief in such action the respondent Judge issued without notice an order restraining the relator McClure "from entering said office and pretending to perform or performing any of the duties thereof, ..." It is apparent that this order is in direct *476 conflict with the order made in the Marion Circuit Court.
On April 10th the relator herein filed his petition for a writ of mandate and prohibition directed against the Marion Superior Court Room No. 1, respondent herein. We issued a temporary writ.
There is in this case without question a conflict of assumed jurisdiction between two courts of equal and coordinate powers. It is well settled in such instances that the first court assuming such jurisdiction has such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other equal or coordinate court. State etc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. etc. (1959), 239 Ind. 327, 157 N.E.2d 481. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Sup. Ct. etc. (1958), 238 Ind. 664, 154 N.E.2d 375, 376; State ex rel. Seal v. Superior Court of Knox County (1943), 221 Ind. 36, 41, 46 N.E.2d 226.
The Supreme Court of this State has imposed upon it by statute the duty of determining a dispute or conflict in jurisdiction between lower courts. Burns' Annotated Statutes § 3-2201, 1946 Replacement (Supplement).
Both parties to this action insist that the real controversy here is: Who has the authority to fill a vacancy in the office of clerk of the circuit court  the Governor of the State of Indiana or the Board of County Commissioners? The parties have asked this court to make a final disposition of this controversy on the plea that they have no adequate remedy at law and that the public welfare requires a speedy determination of the issue in view of the approaching primary election and in order that the judicial processes not be hampered.
The Constitution makes no direct statement as to who shall fill a vacancy occurring in the office of clerk *477 of a circuit court. However, there are provisions therein which serve as a guide in the determination of the question.
In 1951 the Hon. Henry F. Schricker, Governor of the State of Indiana, requested an official opinion on the specific question here involved from Hon. J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General of the State (1951 Attorney General's Official Opinion No. 104, p. 312). That opinion held that a vacancy in the office of clerk of the circuit court should be filled by the Governor and not "by the Board of County Commissioners."
Since that opinion is a rather exhaustive review of the law covering the constitutional provisions, we set forth the more pertinent parts thereof:
The right and duty of the Governor to make such appointments as here in question have become the uniformly accepted practice in this State.[1]
*482 We are particularly impressed with the cogency of the reasoning in the case of Taylor v. State ex rel. (1906), 168 Ind. 294, 80 N.E. 849, in which this court held that an Act of 1901, which fixed the terms of certain county officers including "county clerks" was not applicable to clerks of the circuit courts.
It is to be noted that the legislature at the next session, in an amendatory Act with reference to its erroneous use of the term "county clerk," stated:
and thereupon made a specific provision for the term of office of a clerk of a circuit court separate and distinct from the legislation pertaining to other county offices. Acts of 1903, ch. 19, p. 32.
We therefore have a distinct recognition by the legislature that the office of clerk of the circuit court is not a county office.[2]
Under the authority of Article 6, Section 9 of the Constitution of Indiana the legislature provided that *483 the board of county commissioners may fill vacancies only "in county or township offices." Thus we see the legislature has not given the county commissioners the power to fill a vacancy in the office of clerk of a circuit court. Burns' § 49-405, 1951 Replacement.
The legislature on the contrary has provided:
With the foregoing precedents before us we have no alternative but to hold that the clerk of the circuit court is not a county officer but rather a circuit officer, and that the appointive power to fill vacancies therein resides in the Governor of this State. To hold otherwise would reverse long-standing precedent in this State, observed by the legislative and executive divisions of the government, as well as the judicial.
The respondent calls our attention to the Journal of the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850, in which a discussion is recorded as to the method of filling a vacancy in the office of clerk of the circuit court. With reference to that rather extensive discussion in the respondent's brief, we need only point out that a proposal to have such a vacancy filled by the board of county commissioners was abandoned by the Convention. Nothing, so far as we can find, resulted from the discussion and therefore it is of no value on the point here involved.
The record shows in this case that the relator McClure was appointed and assumed the duties of the office of Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court on a de facto *484 basis, prior even to the purported appointment of Louise Gasper by the County Cimmissioners. In her action in the respondent Marion Superior Court she alleges that Edwin McClure "has taken possession of the office of Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court." The respondent, Marion Superior Court Room No. 1 is therefore in the position of presuming to oust a de facto officer who is in possession of the office, and installing one who is not, in the office, by use of a restraining order or injunction. Such action disturbs the status quo pending litigation and cannot be upheld.
Judge Fansler, speaking for this court in State ex rel. McGovern et al. v. Gilkison, Judge (1935), 208 Ind. 416, 423, 196 N.E. 231, makes the following statement:
There is neither a de facto nor a de jure basis for the issuance of the restraining order or injunction against the relator, Edwin McClure, who acts under the commission and appointment of the Governor of the State of Indiana as Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court.
The alternative writ heretofore issued is made absolute and permanent. In view of the public emergency, the Clerk of this Court is directed to certify this opinion forthwith to the respondent court below.
Landis, C.J. and Achor and Bobbitt, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
This case is here in an original action on a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Prohibition.
There are grave questions raised herein, the first of which is the question of jurisdiction of this court where there is pending in the court below an INFORMATION FOR QUO WARRANTO entitled State of Indiana ex rel. Louise Gasper v. Edwin McClure. This would in my opinion be the proper action, in the proper forum, for the determination of the questions there raised. The second question is the propriety of deciding here and now, on the merits, a question that in the ordinary method of procedure would, or could, come to this court after a trial on the merits in the court below, only by way of appeal.
The real party in interest, in the outcome of the quo warranto proceedings, Louise Gasper, is not before this court in this action.
Both the relator and the respondent, in the response, the Relator's Verified Reply to Respondent's Return, and their briefs urge this court, in this action, to determine the ultimate question involved in this litigation, namely: WHEN A VACANCY OCCURS IN THE OFFICE OF CLERK OF A CIRCUIT COURT BY DEATH, RESIGNATION OR OTHERWISE, DOES THE GOVERNOR, OR THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, OF THE COUNTY WHEREIN THE VACANCY EXISTS, HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT A SUCCESSOR TO FILL THE VACANCY?
On the theory that the parties hereto have not only waived, but have invited this court to assume jurisdiction that otherwise might be questioned, and on the further theory that the public welfare requires a speedy determination of the issues here involved, in *486 order that the legal processes and the administration of justice in Marion County, Indiana, be performed and administered without question and confusion, the court decided to accept such jurisdiction and to determine such question.
In arriving at a decision in this case the court proceeded to the determination of the ultimate question of who has the authority to fill the vacancy created by the death of the clerk of the Marion Circuit Court.
The relator contends and urges that the Governor of the State of Indiana has the sole authority to appoint the clerk of said court and issue the commission to his appointee. In support of such contention he cites the following authority:
The case of The Governor v. Nelson (1855), 6 Ind. 397, (correct citation 6 Ind. 496), cited and relied on by relator, was a controversy over the term of the commission issued by the Governor to the clerk and not over the appointment. The appointment of Nelson as clerk of the Allen Circuit Court having been made by the board of commissioners of Allen County to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Joseph Sinclear who had been in June, 1852, commissioned as clerk for the term of seven years and who died in September, 1854. Nelson was qualified, entered on the duties of the office and served till the next general election in October, 1854, at which election Nelson was duly elected clerk of the Allen Circuit Court, a certificate of his election was forwarded to the proper office, and on March 15, 1855, a commission issued to him as clerk of the Allen Circuit Court, for the term of seven years from June 15, 1852. He requested corrected commission for a term of four years which the governor refused, hence the controversy.
The case of Gosman v. The State, ex rel. Schumacher (1886), 106 Ind. 203, 6 N.E. 349, cited by the relator, was a proceeding by information to determine which of two claimants was entitled to the office of clerk of the circuit court of Dubois County. There was no dispute as to the facts.
At the general election held in October, 1876, Gosman was elected for a term to commence August 18, 1877. He qualified, took office and at the general election in October, 1880, was re-elected. On August 18, 1881, he entered upon his second term. At the general election held in November, 1884, Basil L. Green was *495 elected to succeed Gosman. On August 6, 1885, after he had received his commission and filed his bond, but, without having taken the oath of office, Green died. The board of commissioners appointed the relator Schumacher to fill the vacancy August 19, 1885. He was duly commissioned by the governor and qualified according to law. Gosman, claiming the right to hold over until his successor was elected and qualified, refused to surrender the office. The court held that as Gosman was ineligible to hold over on account of the statutory and constitutional prohibition of the clerk continuing in office "more than eight years in any period of twelve years". Sec. 2, Art. 6 (Sec. 152, R.S. 1881) and Sec. 3, Art. 15 (Sec. 225, R.S. 1881) he could not hold over, that the office became vacant and the appointment of Schumacher by the board of county commissioners and the issuance of his commission by the governor was valid and that he was entitled to the office and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The case of Enmeier v. Blaize (1932), 203 Ind. 475, 181 N.E. 1, cited by the relator, concerned a controversy between the parties to determine the rights and status of the parties as affected by Chapter 59, Acts 1929, p. 157, which purported to change the time of the beginning of the term of office of the clerk of the circuit court of Knox County at a time different than the expiration of the term of office of the then incumbent holding such office. The original action was filed by Blaize who was elected clerk at the general election November 2, 1926, for a term of four years, and on January 3, 1927, he filed his bond as such clerk-elect and took and subscribed his oath of office, and took office February 25, 1928, pursuant to such election and his commission. Thereafter the act above referred to was enacted. Appellant, Enmeier, was elected clerk *496 of the Knox Circuit Court for the full term of four years at the general election on November 4, 1930, and thereafter received from the Governor his commission. The question to be decided by the court was whether the term of the appellant, Enmeier, clerk-elect, began February 25, 1932, at the end of the term of appellee, Blaize, or whether the term of appellant, Enmeier, began January 1, 1933, as provided by Chapter 59, Acts 1929, p. 157, supra. The question presented was this, did the act violate certain sections of the state constitution?
The case cited does not bear on the point in issue in this case, and therefore, we do not pursue it further.
The case of Hovey, Governor v. The State, ex rel. Schuck (1891), 127 Ind. 588, 27 N.E. 175, 22 Am. St. Rep. 663, 11 L.R.A. 763, cited by the relator, was an action by the appellee, Schuck, to mandate the governor to issue to him (Schuck) a commission as the duly elected Auditor of Jennings County. The complaint alleged among other things that the relator, Schuck, was duly elected to the office of Auditor of Jennings County at the regular election held in November, 1890; that the proper returns were made out and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, that thereafter Schuck demanded of the Governor, in his office at Indianapolis, that the Governor issue him his commission as such Auditor. It further appears that there was a controversy as to whether the relator, Schuck, who prior to his election as such Auditor had been Treasurer of Jennings County, had failed to account for certain funds as such Treasurer. The question involved was this: Could the relator, Schuck, mandate the Governor to issue to him a commission as Auditor of Jennings County? This court there decided adversly to the relator Schuck.
*497 The case cited does not bear on the point in issue in this case, and therefore, we do not pursue it further.
The case of Tucker v. State (1941), 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, cited by the relator, is too long to attempt to compress the various questions therein raised in this opinion. We, therefore, incorporate here the portion thereof quoted in relator's brief as being in point in this case:
The case of Taylor v. State ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 294, 80 N.E. 849, cited by the relator states:
and later said:
The respondent contends and urges that the boards of commissioners of the various counties in the state have the sole authority to appoint a clerk of the circuit court, and that said officer is a county officer.
Article 6, § 2, of the Constitution of Indiana, Vol. 1, page 131, Burns' Revised Statutes, 1955 Replacement, reads as follows:
The respondent in his brief urges with equal vigor that the office of clerk is a county office, the authority to fill a vacancy therein being vested in the board of county commissioners. The respondent makes the following points in his brief:
Article 6, Section 3, provides:
"Burns' Ind. Ann. Stat. Sec. 49-406 provides:
The respondents filed photostatic copies of certain pages of the convention journal, to incorporate those pages here would require an opinion entirely too voluminous, and we, therefore, here attempt to summarize that portion applicable to the issue here in controversy.
Quoting from page 842 of the Convention Journal, Mr. Borden makes the following point:
Quoting from page 844 of the convention journal, Mr. Borden offered the following suggestion:
In arriving at a decision we think it significant that the amount of the clerk's bond is fixed and approved by the board of county commissioners. Acts 1875, ch. 24, § 2, p. 37, being § 49-2703, Burns' 1951 Replacement.
In looking to the statute for a definition of the duties of the clerk and for aid in determining the question before us, we are compelled to the belief that the duties *507 of the clerk of the circuit court as an arm of the court constitute the ministerial duties of his office and that the other and major portion of the duties required of him by statute and in the performance of which he is required to exercise his discretion, judgment, and final decision, makes the duties of his office far more than ministerial. The duties of the clerk required by statutes are far too numerous to incorporate in this opinion.
Acts 1939, ch. 164, § 3, p. 753, being § 4-3803, Burns' 1946 Replacement, provides as follows:
Acts 1931, ch. 39, § 1, p. 99, being § 4-2901, Burns' 1946 Replacement, create the Marion County Probate Court. Acts 1907, ch. 151, § 4, p. 240, being § 4-2904, Burns' 1946 Replacement, provides as follows:
Acts 1925, ch. 194, § 1, p. 457, being § 4-2501, Burns' 1946 Replacement, create the Marion County Municipal Court. Acts 1925, ch. 194, § 8, p. 457, being § 4-2508, Burns' 1946 Replacement, provides as follows:
Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 34, § 1, p. 111, being § 4-2301, Burns' 1946 Replacement, creates criminal courts in certain counties (one of which was Marion). Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 34, § 2, p. 111, being § 4-2302, *508 Burns' 1946 Replacement, provides among other things as follows:
Acts 1907, ch. 207, § 1, p. 360, being § 4-1401, Burns' 1946 Replacement, establishes the Marion Superior Court. Acts 1871, ch. 22, § 3, p. 48, being § 4-1404, Burns' 1946 Replacement, provides as follows:
Acts 1945, ch. 347, § 1, p. 1647, being § 9-3101, Burns' 1956 Replacement, created juvenile courts in certain counties (one of which was Marion). Acts 1945, ch. 347, § 4, p. 1647, being § 9-3104, Burns' 1956 Replacement, provides as follows:
The above courts are county courts, and the legislature in creating them and by legislative enactment designating the clerk of the circuit court the clerk of the various courts the legislature created, certainly adopted and approved the 1850 constitutional convention action in classifying the clerk of the circuit court as a COUNTY officer.
The majority opinion herein relies heavily on 1951 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 104, p. 312, heretofore set out in full in this opinion. In the case of Dodd and Others v. The State (1862), 18 Ind. 56, this court there passed on the validity of the opinion of the attorney general in the following words at pages 66 and 67:
Interestingly enough in the years that have elapsed since the rendition of the original opinion, this court has not seen fit to change its opinion as to the effect of an attorney general's opinion.
The relator places emphasis on the COMMISSION issued to the various officers, and we deem it proper to incorporate here that section of the statute relating thereto, reading as follows:
In the case of Glascock v. Lyons (1863), 20 Ind. 1, at page 3, 89 Am. Dec. 299, on the question of the necessity of a commission, this court said:
In the case of The State ex rel. Cornwell v. Allen (1863), 21 Ind. 516, 83 Am. Dec. 367, on the question of commission where the former auditor, having been duly elected and having entered on his duties as such, abandoned the office to enlist in the army, served a part of his term of enlistment and then returned and claimed the office in 1862; the relator, Cornwell, was a candidate for and elected to the office at the general election in October, 1862. On November 8, 1862, he demanded from the governor a commission as auditor, which commission the governor refused to issue; thereafter, the relator at a special session of the board of commissioners of said county tendered his bond which was accepted. He took the oath of office before the clerk of the Vigo Circuit Court and demanded possession of the office. Possession of the office was refused and suit was filed. The judgment in the lower court was for the defendant, and on appeal the decision of the trial court was reversed. This court in that case said at page 521 of 21 Ind. that "... it is probably the law that where the title to an office is solely derived from Executive appointment, the commission of the Executive is the only legal evidence of such title. Beal v. Morton, 18 Ind. 346; while, on the other hand, where *511 the title to an office is derived from popular election, the commission of the Executive is not absolutely necessary to the right to exercise the duties of such office. Glasscock v. Lyon, 20 Ind. 1."
In the case of Shannon v. Baker (1870), 33 Ind. 390, 391, this court there said: "It seems to be settled, that where the title to an office is derived from popular election, the commission of the executive is not necessary to the right to exercise the duties of such office. State, ex rel. Cornwell, v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516; Glascock v. Lyons, 20 Ind. 1."
Again in the same case this court said at page 393, "It is not the certificate of the clerk in one case, nor of the commission issued by the governor in the other, that confers the right. Such certificate and commission are only evidence of such right."
The majority opinion asserts that there is a conflict of assumed jurisdiction between two courts of equal and co-ordinate powers and that the Marion Circuit Court having first assumed jurisdiction the Marion Superior Court, Room No. 1, Walter M. Bell, Jr., Judge, was, therefore, without authority to act. With the principle of law I agree, but I disagree with its application to the facts here. Factually, the action in the Marion Circuit Court was an action in mandate by the relator, McClure, against the commissioners to compel them to approve his bond; the action in the Marion Superior Court, Room No. 1, Walter M. Bell, Jr., Judge, was in quo warranto by Louise Gasper against McClure to determine which of the two claimants was entitled to the office. In my opinion that court had, and still has, first and, therefore, exclusive jurisdiction to determine that question.
In the event that all of the proper parties to the action below were properly before this court and in *512 the event this court had full and proper jurisdiction of the persons and subject matter of this action, then the decision of this court should have been:
A. That the office of the clerk of the circuit court is a county office;
B. That the board of commissioners has the power and duty to fill a vacancy in such office;
C. That the Marion Superior Court, Room No. 1, Walter M. Bell, Jr., Judge, had authority to issue the temporary restraining order here complained of by the relator;
D. That the Temporary Writ of Mandate and Prohibition heretofore issued by this court on April 10, 1959, should be vacated and set aside.
NOTE.  Reported in 158 N.E.2d 264.
[1]  Appointments made during the last ten years by the Governor to fill vacancies in office of clerk of circuit court.

[*] Denotes appointment made pursuant to Opinion of Attorney General 11/29/51.
(S) Appointment by Governor Henry F. Schricker
(C) Appointment by Governor George N. Craig
(H) Appointment by Governor Harold Handley
[2]  The same is true of judges of the circuit court, as well as prosecuting attorneys. The State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker (1874), 46 Ind. 355, 359; State v. Patterson (1914), 181 Ind. 660, 105 N.E. 228.
[1]  State v. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360, 368-9, 1901.
[2]  1951 O.A.G. No. 104.
[1a]  Taylor v. State ex rel., Supra 296-7.
[2a]  Vollmer v. Board of Commissioners, 53 Ind. App. 152-3, 1912.
[1b]  Arnet v. St. ex rel., 168 Ind. 180.