Title: LLOYD v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LLOYD v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2004 WY 8593 P.3d 1001Case Number: 03-149Decided: 07/16/2004
April Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

RONALD 
"PETE" LLOYD,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY and COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Shickich of Law Offices of R. Michael Shickich, LLC, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Shickich.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Radosevich.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the denial of the worker's compensation benefits claim made by appellant 
Ronald "Pete" Lloyd (Lloyd).  
Lloyd's claim was denied based on the conclusion that Lloyd was acting 
outside the scope of his employment when the accident occurred.  We 
reverse.  

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Lloyd sets forth 
the following issues:

 

(1)  Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings erred when it failed to apply the Wyoming 
"nexus" test.

 

(2)  Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings erred when it failed to apply the "special 
mission" doctrine.

 

(3)  Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings erred when it failed to apply the 
"dual-purpose" doctrine.

 

 

I.  Whether 
the hearing examiner properly applied Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) as a 
clear and unambiguous statute to determine that Appellant's injuries occurred 
outside the scope of his employment for purposes of worker's compensation 
coverage, due to Appellant's accident while traveling to his home in his 
personal vehicle without reimbursement.

 

II.  Whether 
the hearing examiner's decision to deny medical and temporary total disability 
benefits to Appellant was supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Sage Technical 
Services (Sage) operates a truck driving school with locations in Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.  
Sage employed Lloyd as a driving instructor in Casper, Wyoming, and Lloyd 
was later promoted to the position of lead instructor.  As lead instructor, Lloyd was not only 
required to teach Sage students, but also ensure that the trucks and trailers 
used by Sage were safely maintained and operated.  

 

[¶4]      Sage found that 
as a part of its normal operations it was occasionally necessary to move trucks 
and trailers from one Sage location to another.  From time to time, Sage asked Lloyd to 
assist in transporting these trucks and trailers.  In fact, Lloyd believed that part of his 
responsibilities as lead instructor included assisting with the transport of 
Sage's trucks and trailers from one location to another. 

 

[¶5]      In February of 
2002, Sage needed a truck transferred from its Casper location to its Billings, 
Montana location.  Lloyd indicated 
that he would deliver the truck if the drop-off location could be changed from 
Sheridan, Wyoming to Frannie, Wyoming because Lloyd needed to retrieve his 
personal vehicle in Cody, Wyoming.  
After considering other options, Sage approved Lloyd's delivery of the 
truck on these terms.  At the time 
of this approval, Lloyd understood that, pursuant to established Sage policy, he 
would be reimbursed for mileage concerning his return trip in his personal 
vehicle. 

 

[¶6]      On the morning of 
February 9, 2002, Lloyd delivered the truck in Frannie and was directly 
transported by a friend from Frannie to Cody.  After picking up his personal vehicle, 
Lloyd immediately returned to Frannie to check on the security of Sage's 
truck.  After making sure that 
Sage's truck was secure, Lloyd at once commenced his return trip retracing the 
route that he had taken from Casper.  
Lloyd was then injured in a single car accident when he fell asleep at 
the wheel. 

 

[¶7]      Because Lloyd was 
incapacitated due to injuries sustained in the accident, Lloyd's supervisor 
advised that he would complete the necessary reimbursement documentation for 
Lloyd concerning his trip.  However, 
upon the supervisor's inquiry to Sage's main office, he was advised that Sage 
had determined that Lloyd would not be reimbursed for his return trip made in 
his personal vehicle.  Lloyd then 
submitted a timely request for worker's compensation benefits.  This request was denied by the State. 

 

[¶8]      After a hearing 
before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), OAH affirmed the denial of 
benefits.  Subsequently, upon filing 
a petition for review, the district court affirmed the decision of the OAH.  This appeal followed. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      We recently 
stated the applicable standard of review in Ludwig v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2004 WY 34, ¶¶5-7, 86 P.3d 875, ¶¶5-7 (Wyo. 
2004) (footnote in original):

 

            
The parameters for judicial review of an agency action are found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114.1  Serda v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
38, ¶18, 42 P.3d 466, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002).  
Our standard of review when reviewing administrative agency action was 
clarified and refined in the case of Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo. 2002).  That case held that "the substantial 
evidence test is the appropriate standard of review . . . when factual 
findings are involved and both parties submit evidence."  Newman, at ¶22.  

 

            
In appeals where both parties submitted evidence at the hearing below and 
the dispute is over the soundness of the factual findings of the agency, Newman mandates the appellate review be 
limited to application of the substantial evidence test.  Id.  This is true regardless of which party 
appeals from the agency decision.  
The substantial evidence test provides:

 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

Newman, 
at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001)).  This 
court is required to review the entire record in making its ultimate 
determination on appeal. Newman, at 
¶¶19 and 24-26. 

 

            
In State ex rel. Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶9, 26 P.3d 1029, ¶9 
(Wyo. 2001), we acknowledged that:

 

            
The interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review 
authority is plenary. Collicott [v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2001 WY 35], at ¶4[, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶4 (Wyo. 2001)].  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id.

 

In 
accord see Vaughan 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 
2002 WY 131, ¶6, 53 P.3d 559, ¶6 (Wyo. 2002).

  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Lloyd mounts three separate 
arguments that he is entitled to worker's compensation benefits.  He first contends that an exception to 
the "coming and going" rule, recognized in common law and codified in 1986 
within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), exists when there is a link 
between the employee's activities and a benefit to the employer.  Hence, Lloyd argues that under this 
"nexus test," worker's compensation benefits must be provided to the 
employee.  Next, Lloyd asserts that 
another exception to the "coming and going" rule, known as the "special mission" 
or "special errand" doctrine, is applicable.  Under this exception, when an employee 
undertakes activities at the request of the employer, worker's compensation 
benefits extend to the employee even if the employee would technically be 
excluded under the "coming and going" rule.  Finally, Lloyd proffers that the "dual 
purpose" doctrine also applies.  
Under this doctrine, an employer remains responsible to provide worker's 
compensation benefits to an employee if the employee made the journey at the 
direction of the employer, even if the employee received a personal 
benefit.  Thus, if the employee's 
work creates the necessity for travel and the employee is in the course and 
scope of employment, even though the employee is serving at the same time a 
personal purpose of his or her own, worker's compensation coverage still 
exists.

 

[¶11]   In attempting to counter each of 
these arguments, the State takes a more simplified view.  The State argues that § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is unambiguous, making the exceptions asserted by Lloyd 
inapplicable.  In particular, the 
State asserts that upon the codification of § 27-14-102(a), any "common law" 
exceptions to the "coming and going" rule were renounced except for those 
exceptions specifically enumerated within § 27-14-102(a).  In making this argument, the State also 
relies upon the language within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101(b).2   In addition, the State contends 
that sufficient evidence existed to support the denial of benefits.  

 

[¶12]   Given the facts in this case and 
simple application of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), we conclude that Lloyd must be 
afforded worker's compensation benefits.  
Therefore, on this occasion, we neither specifically embrace nor reject 
the "nexus test," the "special mission" or "special errand" doctrine, or the 
"dual purpose" doctrine upon which Lloyd relies.   

 

[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

(a)  As 
used in this act:

 

. . .

 

(xi)  "Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out 
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and 
which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

 

. . .

 

(D)  Any 
injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee 
is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer[.]

 

We 
agree with the State that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is unambiguous.  

 

[¶14]   It is undisputed that Lloyd offered 
to deliver the truck for Sage if the drop-off location could be changed to 
Frannie because Lloyd needed to retrieve his personal vehicle in Cody.  Sage then approved Lloyd's delivery of 
the truck based on the condition that Lloyd would be able to retrieve his 
personal vehicle and return to Casper in that vehicle.  Thus, Lloyd was required to deliver the 
truck for his employer, Sage.

 

[¶15]   At the time of approval, Lloyd 
understood that he would be reimbursed for mileage concerning his return trip in 
his personal vehicle pursuant to established Sage policy.3  Lloyd believed this policy applied to 
him based, in part, on communications with his supervisor, James Roach, the 
director of Sage's Casper facility until January 31, 2002.  In addition, Mr. Roach testified that 
Sage's mileage reimbursement policy was in effect during the dates of Lloyd's 
trip and that he believed that Lloyd's return trip in his personal vehicle 
qualified for such reimbursement under the policy.  Moreover, although Don Washburn had 
assumed the position of director of Sage's Casper facility on February 1, 2002, 
Lloyd had no conversations with Washburn concerning the mileage reimbursement 
policy.  

 

[¶16]   Following the accident, Lloyd's 
physical condition did not allow him to submit a request for reimbursement.  Mr. Washburn agreed to submit the 
request for reimbursement.  However, 
following the accident, corporate counsel located in Sage's main office in 
Pennsylvania decided that Lloyd would not be reimbursed by Sage for the return 
trip made in his personal vehicle.  
It is obvious that the denial of benefits for the return trip was solely 
motivated by Sage's desire to exclude Lloyd from receiving worker's compensation 
benefits.4

 

[¶17]   In taking the same position 
espoused by Sage, the State argues that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) requires that 
actual reimbursement for mileage be paid before the exception to the "coming and 
going" rule is applicable.  As 
pointed out by the State, § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) provides that no compensable 
injury shall be deemed to have occurred "unless the employee is 
reimbursed for travel expenses."  
Thus, the State argues that because Lloyd was not actually reimbursed by 
Sage, he cannot now be awarded worker's compensation benefits.  

 

[¶18]   We find the State's argument to be 
disingenuous.  In essence, the State 
asks this court to allow an employer to manipulate the process through the 
subsequent denial of mandated reimbursement with the clear intention that such 
denial would preclude the award of worker's compensation benefits.  In this case, Lloyd's transport of the 
vehicle was directly within his scope of employment and in furtherance of Sage's 
business purpose. Sage authorized the trip with the express condition that Lloyd 
would leave the truck at Frannie and collect his personal vehicle in Cody.  The evidence presented substantiates 
that, given this arrangement and Sages' policies, Lloyd had a reasonable 
expectation that he would be reimbursed travel expenses for his return trip to 
Casper in his personal vehicle. 

 

[¶19]   Moreover, the State's argument that 
Lloyd's employment duties ended when he dropped off Sage's truck in Frannie is 
unpersuasive.  Again, Sage agreed to 
the arrangement that allowed Lloyd to collect his personal vehicle in Cody and 
then return to Casper in that vehicle.  
Had Sage required Lloyd to transfer the truck without allowing Lloyd to 
return to Casper in his personal vehicle, Sage would have had to arrange and pay 
for some other transport to return Lloyd.  
In other words, but for the work assignment, Lloyd would not have made 
the trip to Frannie requiring his return trip to Casper.  Alternatively had Sage not assigned 
Lloyd to transport its vehicle, other arrangements would have been necessary to 
accomplish Sage's business venture.  
Obviously, Sage benefited through its arrangement with Lloyd.5  Therefore, Sage cannot now be allowed to 
renege on its arrangement after the fact when it learned that Lloyd was involved 
in an accident.  

 

[¶20]   The State also attempts to argue 
that because Sage believed that Lloyd would be spending the weekend with a 
friend, Lloyd's trip after dropping off the truck must be categorized as a 
personal excursion.  However, this 
simply did not occur.  Lloyd 
testified that he understood his trip was to be accomplished expeditiously so 
that he could be back in Casper over the weekend to begin implementing numerous 
policy changes adopted by Sage's new Casper location leadership.  Indeed, Sage often required Lloyd to 
work over the weekends even though he was not technically scheduled to work 
these hours.  Given this 
understanding, Lloyd at once collected his personal vehicle after he dropped off 
Sage's truck, directly returned to the drop-off site to ensure the truck's 
well-being, and then began his return trip using the same route of travel.  Under these facts, Lloyd was clearly 
within his scope of employment when he had the accident.

 

[¶21]   The State also attempts to argue 
that Lloyd never actually submitted an application for reimbursement of his 
travel expenses.  This argument is 
specious, given that Lloyd's supervisor advised that he would complete the 
necessary reimbursement documentation for Lloyd because Lloyd was 
incapacitated.  As indicated, before 
the supervisor filled out such paperwork, he was informed that Sage had already 
determined that Lloyd would not be paid any reimbursement for his return trip 
made in his personal vehicle.  
Additionally, the State's complaint that Lloyd set an unreasonable 
schedule for his travel is superfluous.  
As his employer, Sage could have set a schedule for Lloyd's travel, yet 
failed to do so. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶22]   The district court's order 
affirming the OAH is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district court 
with directions that an order be entered reversing the hearing officer's 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, and that the OAH be directed to 
enter an order awarding Lloyd benefits consistent with this court's 
opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003):

 

(c)   To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 

(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute. 

 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101(b) (LexisNexis 2003) states:

 

            
(b) It is the intent of the legislature in creating the Wyoming worker's 
compensation division that the laws administered by it to provide a worker's 
benefit system be interpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery of 
indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable 
cost to the employers who are subject to the Worker's Compensation Act.  It is the specific intent of the 
legislature that benefit claims cases be decided on their merits and that the 
common law rule of "liberal construction" based on the supposed "remedial" basis 
of workers' benefits legislation shall not apply in these cases. The worker's 
benefit system in Wyoming is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights 
and defenses by employers and employees alike. Accordingly, the legislature 
declares that the Worker's Compensation Act is not remedial in any sense and is 
not to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of any 
party.

 

3Sage's 
policy called for the reimbursement of either mileage at $.21 per mile or actual 
gasoline expenses incurred when an employee used his personal vehicle for 
business travel. 

 

4Sage 
specifically objected to Lloyd receiving worker's compensation benefits based on 
its position that Lloyd was purely on personal time after delivering the Sage 
truck to Frannie. 

 

5Testimony 
was received that Sage contemplated other potential arrangements in transporting 
its truck as required.  However, 
because of a one-on-one-student-to-instructor ratio established by Sage policy 
and the added expense of using multiple instructors and students along with 
additional Sage or employee personal vehicles, these alternatives were 
dismissed.