Title: Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Education of Chicago

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 87644-Agenda 19-November 1999.
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of section 2-3.25g of the 
Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/2-3.25g (West 1996)), which allows school 
districts to petition the State Board of Education for waiver or modification of 
the School Code's mandates. The circuit court held that the statute constituted 
an impermissible delegation of legislative authority and could not serve as the 
basis for excusing the board of education of the City of Chicago from having to 
comply with certain mandates pertaining to physical education classes. On the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court declared the 
statute invalid and enjoined the Chicago board of education from waiving daily 
physical education classes for students in eleventh and twelfth grade. The 
Chicago board of education and the State Board of Education appealed directly to 
our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1). We reverse.
Section 2-3.25g provides:
Pursuant to this legislation, the Chicago board of education applied for a 
waiver from the mandate in section 27-6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/27-6 
(West 1996)) requiring pupils to engage in daily courses of physical education. 
The waiver pertained only to students in the eleventh and twelfth grades. It was 
submitted in connection with a program instituted by the Chicago board of 
education to improve academic performance in the City's high schools following 
the General Assembly's determination that the public schools were suffering an 
"educational crisis" (105 ILCS 5/34-3.3 (West 1996)).
Under the Chicago board of education's plan, physical education requirements 
were reduced while mathematics, science and foreign language requirements were 
substantially increased. Physical education courses were still offered, but were 
only mandatory for the first two years of high school. After that, they were 
elective and were not necessary for graduation. By contrast, the mathematics 
requirement was raised from two years to three, the science requirement from one 
year to three, and the foreign language requirement from nothing to two 
years.
The Chicago board of education pursued the requested waiver in accordance 
with the procedural requirements of the statute, including the requirements for 
notice and a public hearing. The State Board subsequently determined that the 
waiver application was complete and compiled it with requests for waivers from 
other school districts in a report it filed with the General Assembly. The 
General Assembly did not disapprove the waiver following receipt and 
consideration of the State Board's report. In accordance with the statute, the 
waiver was therefore deemed to have been granted.
When the Chicago Board of Education was about to implement its plan following 
approval of the waiver, plaintiffs initiated this action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. As the litigation proceeded, the list of plaintiffs came to 
include two physical education teachers employed by the Chicago board of 
education; Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, the union representing physical 
education teachers employed by the Chicago board; parents of two students who 
attended public high school in Chicago; and several individuals who alleged that 
they were taxpayers and parents of elementary school students.
As grounds for their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that section 2-3.25g of 
the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/2-3.25g (West 1996)) violated the principle 
of separation of powers and "encroached upon the power of the General Assembly 
and the Governor to enact and approve amendatory legislation." Plaintiffs sought 
a declaratory judgment that the law was invalid and that the waiver obtained by 
the Chicago board of education pursuant to the statute was "void and without 
legal effect." Plaintiffs further asked that the court enjoin defendants from 
"approving, adopting, or enforcing" waiver of the physical education requirement 
for "students in grades 9 through 12."
Defendants each moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that 
plaintiffs lacked standing. Plaintiffs and the defendant State Board also filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motions to 
dismiss as to the Chicago Teachers Union and the plaintiffs who claimed standing 
based on their status as parents of students. It ruled, however, that the two 
physical education teachers did have standing to challenge the statute, as did 
the plaintiffs who asserted standing based on their status as taxpayers. The 
court further ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment and that 
summary judgment should be entered against the State Board of Education. The 
court declared section 2-3.25g to be invalid and held that the waiver sought by 
the Chicago board and approved by the General Assembly pursuant to that statute 
had no legal effect. In accordance with that determination, the court enjoined 
the Chicago board from waiving daily physical education requirements for 
eleventh and twelfth grade students.
Defendants now appeal the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the circuit 
court erred in declaring the statute invalid. Defendants also contend that the 
remaining plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the statute and that the circuit 
court should therefore have dismissed the case based on lack of standing as to 
all of the plaintiffs, including the physical education teachers and the 
individuals claiming standing as taxpayers.
A fundamental rule of constitutional law is that a court will not determine 
the constitutionality of a provision of a statute which does not affect the 
parties to the cause under consideration. People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 214 (1992). Accordingly, in addressing defendants' arguments, we shall 
begin with the issue of standing.
Under Illinois law, lack of standing is an affirmative defense. Greer v. 
Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 494 (1988). A 
plaintiff need not allege facts establishing standing. Rather, it is the 
defendant's burden to plead and prove lack of standing. People v. $1,124,905 
U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 329-30 
(1997).
The defendants in this case challenged plaintiffs' standing by way of motions 
for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1996)). Because the lack of standing is 
an affirmative defense, that was a proper way for defendants to raise the issue. 
Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999).
In ruling on a section 2-619 motion, a court must accept as true all 
well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and all inferences that can 
reasonably be drawn in plaintiff's favor. Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors 
Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 2d 72, 85 (1995). The court should grant the 
motion only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support a 
cause of action. Our review of a trial court's disposition of a section 2-619 
motion is de novo. Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554, 557 
(1999).
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure that issues are raised only by 
those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. 
Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d  at 221. To have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute, one must have sustained or be in immediate 
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the 
challenged statute. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171 (1993). 
The claimed injury must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to 
defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed 
by the grant of the requested relief. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d  at 221.
In the case before us, there are only two remaining categories of plaintiffs. 
The first group, consisting of the two physical education teachers, alleged that 
the challenged statute harms them because a waiver obtained pursuant to the law 
diminishes the need for physical education teachers, thereby reducing their job 
security and career opportunities. As defendants point out, however, any such 
adverse consequences are purely speculative. The waiver does not mean that 
physical education classes cannot be offered or will not be offered. Physical 
education classes will be available for eleventh and twelfth grade students, 
just as they were before. The difference is that after the waiver, they will be 
elective rather than compulsory.
Because the classes will be elective, students need not take them in order to 
satisfy the requirements for graduation. While that may lead to a reduction in 
registrations for physical education classes, the scope and effect of any such 
reduction is purely conjectural. We note, moreover, that the law already allows 
school boards to excuse eleventh and twelfth graders from engaging in physical 
education courses, regardless of any statutory waiver, if the pupils so request 
for any of several enumerated reasons, including the need to enroll in academic 
classes required for graduation. 105 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1996). Because school 
boards have the power to excuse pupils from physical education courses on a 
case-by-case basis, the Chicago board could accomplish its same objectives, with 
the same potential impact on physical education class enrollment, even without 
securing a waiver under section 2-3.25g.
To the extent that a waiver under section 2-3.25g might yield a diminution in 
the size or number of physical education classes, that change would not 
necessarily harm the teachers who have brought this suit. Both are tenured 
teachers who chair the physical education departments at their respective 
schools. If their services were not needed to teach eleventh and twelfth grade 
pupils, they would still have the opportunity to provide instruction to ninth 
and tenth grade students, for whom there has been no waiver of the daily 
physical education course requirement. Under these circumstances, the teachers 
cannot be said to have sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a 
direct injury as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute that is 
distinct and palpable and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by 
the grant of the requested relief. The circuit court therefore erred in refusing 
to dismiss the teachers from the litigation based on lack of standing.
Because the teachers lack standing, and because no appeal was taken from the 
circuit court's dismissal, for lack of standing, of the Chicago Teachers Union 
and the plaintiffs who asserted standing in their capacity as parents, the 
viability of this action turns on the standing of the only other category of 
plaintiffs remaining in the litigation: the individuals who asserted standing as 
taxpayers. There are three such individuals: Cathy Sheffer, Curtis Davis, and 
Connie Jane Thorps. Although none of those individuals pay property tax to fund 
the Chicago public school system, the circuit court believed they had standing 
to challenge the Chicago board's actions under section 11-301 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/11-301 (West 1996)). That statute provides that "any 
citizen and taxpayer of the State" may bring an action "to restrain and enjoin 
the disbursement of public funds by any officer or officers of the State 
government."
By its terms, section 11-301 is inapplicable to this case. The only 
injunctive relief awarded here was directed to the Chicago board and pertained 
to its waiver of the daily physical education classes for eleventh and twelfth 
graders. Without reaching the question of whether implementation of the waiver 
can be construed as "the disbursement of public funds," we note simply that the 
Chicago board is not an officer of state government. In addition, taxpayer 
actions under section 11-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must follow certain 
procedural requirements, which are set out in section 11-303 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/11-303 (West 1996)). Plaintiffs here made no attempt 
to proceed in accordance with those provisions. The circuit court therefore 
erred in holding that they could bring a taxpayer action under the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and 
plaintiffs' cause of action is dismissed.
Reversed.