Title: State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1176.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1176 
THE STATE EX REL. STEWART v. CLINTON COUNTY BOARD  
OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1176.] 
Expedited election cases — Mandamus and prohibition — Completion of 
declaration of candidacy — Substantial compliance with R.C. 3513.07 
found — Writs denied. 
(No. 2010-0434 — Submitted March 22, 2010 — Decided March 24, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for writs of mandamus and 
prohibition to prevent respondents, the Clinton County Board of Elections and its 
members, from placing Patrick Haley’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the 
office of Clinton County Commissioner at the May 4, 2010 Republican Party 
primary election.  We dismiss the mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction.  In 
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addition, we deny the writ of prohibition because the board of elections and its 
members neither abused their discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 3513.07 by 
placing Haley’s name on the ballot. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} On February 5, 2010, Patrick Haley filed his declaration of 
candidacy and petition for the Republican Party nomination at the May 4, 2010 
primary election for the office of Clinton County Commissioner.  Haley’s petition 
consisted of six part-petitions on forms prescribed by the Secretary of State of 
Ohio, with blanks to be completed by the candidate.  See R.C. 3513.07.  Haley 
completed the declaration of candidacy on the part-petitions, which was entitled 
in bold capital letters as “Declaration of Candidacy Party Primary Election,” 
as follows: 
{¶ 3} “I, Patrick Haley, the undersigned, hereby declare under penalty of 
election falsification that my voting residence is 185 Woods Edge Court, 
Wilmington, Ohio 45177, and I am a qualified elector. 
{¶ 4} “I hereby declare that I desire to be a candidate for nomination to 
the office of County Commissioner as a member of the Republican Party for the:  
(check one box and fill in the appropriate date) 
 full term commencing 1-1-11, 
or □ unexpired term ending ____-____, at the primary election to be held on the 
__-__ day of ______-_______, ___-___. 
{¶ 5} “I further declare that, if elected to this office or position, I will 
qualify therefor, and I will support and abide by the principals enunciated by the 
Republican Party. 
{¶ 6} “Dated this 25th day of January, 2010.” 
{¶ 7} Relator, Dave Stewart, is a Clinton County resident and a 
registered Republican.  On February 22, Stewart filed a protest pursuant to R.C. 
3513.05 challenging Haley’s petition.  Stewart claimed that the petition had left 
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3 
 
blank the May 4, 2010 primary election date that the form requested.  Haley had 
instead placed dashes in the blanks for the primary election date. 
{¶ 8} On March 5, respondent Clinton County Board of Elections held a 
hearing on Stewart’s protest.  Haley testified that he had left the primary election 
date blank on the declaration of candidacy part of the petition based on the advice 
of the deputy director of the board of elections.  Haley further testified that for the 
five part-petitions he circulated, he told everyone who signed the petition the date 
of the primary election.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the board unanimously 
found that Haley had substantially complied with the applicable law and denied 
the protest. 
{¶ 9} Three days later, Stewart filed this expedited action for writs of 
mandamus and/or prohibition to prevent the respondents from placing Haley’s 
name on the May 4, 2010 primary ballot.  Respondents filed an answer, and we 
granted Haley’s motion to intervene as an additional respondent.  The parties 
submitted evidence and briefs pursuant to the expedited schedule for election 
cases in S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court for its consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 11} Stewart initially requests a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondents to sustain his protest and to prevent them from submitting Haley’s 
candidacy to the electorate at the May 4, 2010 primary election. 
{¶ 12} “It is axiomatic that ‘if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Obojski 
v. Perciak, 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 1070, ¶ 13, quoting 
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State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 
704.  “We have applied this jurisdictional rule to expedited election cases by 
examining the complaint to determine whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather 
than compel, official action.”  State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 
437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 13} Although some of the allegations or requests contained in 
Stewart’s complaint are couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, he 
actually seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the board’s denial of his protest was 
erroneous and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing Haley from appearing on 
the primary election ballot.  The relief sought by Stewart is comparable to the 
relief sought by relators in other election cases in which we held that we lacked 
jurisdiction over mandamus claims to remove candidates’ names from the ballot.  
See generally State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 14, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 14} Therefore, because Stewart actually requests relief in the nature of 
a declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, we lack jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of his mandamus claim, and we dismiss it.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 15} Stewart also requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of 
elections and its members from placing Haley’s name on the May 4, 2010 primary 
election ballot.  To be entitled to the writ, Stewart must establish that (1) 
respondents are about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that 
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for 
which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. 
Miller Diversified Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 
260, 2009-Ohio-4980, 915 N.E.2d 1187, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 16} Stewart has met the first criterion because R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) and 
3513.05 require that the board of elections conduct a quasi-judicial hearing on his 
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5 
 
protest.  “[A] board of elections * * * is a quasi-judicial body when it considers 
protests.”  State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 306, 686 N.E.2d 238.  “[E]ven if the board 
[has] already exercised its quasi-judicial power by denying [the] protest, relief in 
prohibition is still available to prevent the placement of names or issues on a 
ballot, as long as the election has not yet been held.”  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 17} Stewart also established the third requirement for the writ – the 
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law – because the election 
was imminent at the time the board denied his protest and when he filed this writ 
action.  See State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 
462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 18} For the remaining prohibition requirement that the board’s exercise 
of its quasi-judicial power is unauthorized by law, “we must determine whether 
the board [of elections] acted fraudulently or corruptly, abused its discretion, or 
clearly disregarded applicable law.”  State ex rel. Brown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 23.  “An abuse of 
discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.”  Cooker 
Restaurant, 80 Ohio St.3d at 305, 686 N.E.2d 238. 
{¶ 19} Stewart claims that the board and its members abused their 
discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 3513.07 by denying his protest and 
certifying Haley’s candidacy for the May 4, 2010 primary election.  R.C. 3513.07 
provides: 
{¶ 20} “The form of declaration of candidacy and petition of a person 
desiring to be a candidate for a party nomination or a candidate for election to an 
office or position to be voted for at a primary election shall be substantially as 
follows: 
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{¶ 21} “DECLARATION 
OF 
CANDIDACY 
PARTY 
PRIMARY 
ELECTION  
{¶ 22} “I, ........................... (Name of Candidate), the undersigned, hereby 
declare under penalty of election falsification that my voting residence is in 
............... precinct of the ............................. (Township) or (Ward and City or 
Village) in the county of ................, Ohio; that my voting residence is ............... 
(Street and Number, if any, or Rural Route and Number) of the ............................. 
(City or Village) of ................., Ohio; and that I am a qualified elector in the 
precinct in which my voting residence is located. I am a member of the ........ 
Party. I hereby declare that I desire to be ................... (a candidate for nomination 
as a candidate of the Party for election to the office of .............) (a candidate for 
election to the office or position of ..............) for the ............ in the state, district, 
(Full term or unexpired term ending ...............) county, city, or village of 
..................., at the primary election to be held on the ............. day of ........., ...., 
and I hereby request that my name be printed upon the official primary election 
ballot of the said .......... Party as a candidate for ......... (such nomination) or (such 
election) as provided by law. 
{¶ 23} “I further declare that, if elected to said office or position, I will 
qualify therefor, and that I will support and abide by the principles enunciated by 
the ............ Party. 
{¶ 24} “Dated this .......... day of ................., ......... 
{¶ 25} “............................. 
{¶ 26} “(Signature of candidate)”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 27} “[T]he general rule is that unless there is language allowing 
substantial compliance, election statutes are mandatory and must be strictly 
complied with.”  State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-
5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 15.  R.C. 3513.07, however, expressly permits 
substantial compliance with the form of the declaration of candidacy and petition.  
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7 
 
State ex rel. Wilson v. Hisrich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 630 N.E.2d 319 
(“R.C. 3513.07 may be satisfied by substantial compliance with the form of a 
declaration of candidacy and petition”); see also State ex rel. Wolson v. Kelly 
(1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 67, 69, 35 O.O.2d 85, 215 N.E.2d 719.  Therefore, Haley 
needed only to substantially comply with the form of the declaration of candidacy 
and petition set forth in R.C. 3513.07. 
{¶ 28} As we have previously held in an election case in which 
compliance with the form requirements of R.C. 3513.07 was at issue, “[a]bsolute 
compliance with every technicality should not be required in order to constitute 
substantial compliance, unless such complete and absolute conformance to each 
technical requirement of the printed form serves a public interest and a public 
purpose.”  Stern v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 
180, 43 O.O.2d 286, 237 N.E.2d 313.  “The public policy which favors free 
competitive elections, in which the electorate has the opportunity to make a 
choice between candidates, outweighs the arguments for absolute compliance 
with each technical requirement in the petition form, where the statute requires 
only substantial compliance, where, in fact, the only omission cannot possibly 
mislead any petition signer or elector, where there is no claim of fraud or 
deception, and where there is sufficient substantial compliance to permit the board 
of elections, based upon prima facie evidence appearing on the face of the jurat 
which is part of the petition paper, to determine the petition to be valid.”  Id. at 
184; State ex rel. Osborn v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
194, 196, 602 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 29} Stewart primarily relies on Hill v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 39, 22 O.O.3d 179, 428 N.E.2d 402, in support of his claim 
that Haley’s incomplete declaration of candidacy and petition did not substantially 
comply with R.C. 3513.07.  In Hill, we reversed a court of appeals judgment and 
granted a writ of mandamus to compel a board of elections and its members to 
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place a person’s name on a general election ballot for city council.  Id. at 42.  The 
Cleveland City Charter provided that if no more than two persons filed 
nominating petitions for the office at a primary election, no primary election 
would be held, and the persons would be candidates at the regular municipal 
election. Id. at 41.  The appellant was one of two persons to file a nominating 
petition for the office of city council member for the primary.  Id. at 39.  The 
board of elections refused, however, to certify appellant’s petition because he had 
inserted an incorrect date for the primary election in the blanks on the form.  Id. 
{¶ 30} We held that under the specific facts presented, appellant’s 
misstatement of the primary election date was insufficient to render the petition 
invalid and to prevent his candidacy: 
{¶ 31} “Had appellant failed to place any date in the space provided, it is 
clear that the part-petitions would be invalid. * * * 
{¶ 32} “Where, however, as in this case, appellant has not omitted the 
date for the primary election, but, rather, misstated the same, it is not 
inappropriate, in determining whether such defect invalidates the part-petitions, to 
consider the public purpose served by the requirement. * * *It appears that the 
purpose for requiring the date of the primary election to appear upon the part-
petition is to inform the electors who sign the part-petitions as to which election is 
at issue. That purpose has not been frustrated in this case. 
{¶ 33} “* * * There being no primary election required, it is unlikely that 
the part-petitions' signers were misled by inclusion of the erroneous date. 
Moreover, the date provided in the part-petitions was sufficient, in this case, to 
inform the signers thereof of which election or office was in issue.”  Hill, 68 Ohio 
St.2d at 40-41, 22 O.O.3d 179, 428 N.E.2d 402. 
{¶ 34} Stewart cites the portion of the foregoing discussion in Hill that 
opines that if the candidate there had omitted the date of the primary election 
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9 
 
rather than misstating it, the petition would have been invalid, and the candidacy 
would have been rejected. 
{¶ 35} Stewart’s reliance on Hill, however, is misplaced because the 
portion of the opinion he cites is dicta.  That is, in Hill, we were not resolving a 
claim involving a prospective candidate who had failed to place any election date 
in the nominating petition.  Moreover, Hill involved a municipal charter 
requirement rather than R.C. 3513.07.  Further, the charter provision, as quoted in 
that case, did not include any date on the petition besides the date of the primary 
election.  Id. at 40.  By contrast, in Haley’s petition, he specified that he wants to 
be a candidate for the Republican Party nomination to the office of county 
commissioner for the “full term commencing 1-1-11.”  And the petition heading 
specifies that it is for a primary election. 
{¶ 36} Nevertheless, Hill is instructive in that it explains the purpose of 
requiring a primary election date on a nominating petition – “to inform the 
electors who sign the part-petitions as to which election is at issue.”  Id. at 41.  
Because Haley’s declaration of candidacy and petition expressly states that he is 
seeking to be the party nominee for the office of county commissioner for the 
term commencing January 1, 2011, it is manifest that the applicable primary 
election is the May 4, 2010 primary election. 
{¶ 37} In fact, the date of the applicable primary election is set by law.  
See R.C. 3513.01(A) (“on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of 
2000 and every fourth year thereafter, and on the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in May of every other year, primary elections shall be held for the 
purpose of nominating persons as candidates of political parties for election to 
offices to be voted for at the succeeding general election.” (Emphasis added.)); cf. 
State ex rel. Baur v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 165, 168, 
736 N.E.2d 1, quoting Nunneker v. Murdock (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 73, 77, 9 
OBR 93, 458 N.E.2d 431 (in municipal referendum petition, error in the election 
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date is not a fatal defect because the “ ‘actual designation of the date of election is 
a matter to be determined by operation of law, and cannot be altered by the 
circulators of a petition’ ”). 
{¶ 38} Nor does our decision in State ex rel. Allen v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1959), 170 Ohio St. 19, 9 O.O.2d 337, 161 N.E.2d 896, support 
Stewart’s prohibition claim.  In that case, we denied a writ of mandamus to 
compel a board of elections to place a candidate’s name on an election ballot 
because “substantial compliance [with the statutory requirements of R.C. 
3513.261] would not warrant complete omission of the jurat of the circulator,” 
which “is a vital and material part of the nominating petition paper, and its 
inclusion is a condition precedent to the acceptance and validation of a 
candidate’s nominating petition by a board of elections.”  Id. at 20.  As noted 
previously, the omission of the primary election date on Haley’s declaration of 
candidacy and petition is not a “vital and material” defect when a signer would 
not be misled by the omission.  Other cases cited by Stewart are similarly 
distinguishable because they involve different requirements and different 
circumstances from those here. 
{¶ 39} In Moreno v. Jones (2006), 213 Ariz. 94, 139 P.3d 612, the 
Arizona Supreme Court denied a comparable challenge to a candidate’s 
nominating petition, which under the applicable Arizona statute was required to 
substantially comply with a form including language stating the date of the 
primary election.  The court held that a petition that left blank the particular day 
and month of that year’s primary election substantially complied with the 
statutory requirement because “electors would ‘automatically know’ for which 
primary election they were signing because the petition specified the year and 
there is only one primary that year for state legislative office.”  Id. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, the facts of this case meet the test set forth in Stern, 14 
Ohio St.2d at 184, 43 O.O.2d 286, 237 N.E.2d 313.  R.C. 3513.07 requires only 
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11 
 
substantial compliance with the form of the declaration of candidacy and petition. 
The omission of the date of the primary election in Haley’s declaration and 
petition would not mislead any petition signer or elector, and there is no claim of 
fraud or deception.  Haley’s petition therefore adequately informs electors that the 
May 4, 2010 primary election is the one at issue.  Hill, 68 Ohio St.2d at 41, 22 
O.O.3d 179, 428 N.E.2d 402.  No vital public purpose or public interest would 
have been served by rejecting Haley’s petition. 
{¶ 41} Consequently, we deny Stewart’s claim for extraordinary relief in 
prohibition because the board of elections and its members acted properly in 
denying his protest to Haley’s candidacy.  This result comports with our duty to     
“ ‘avoid unduly technical interpretations that impede the public policy favoring 
free, competitive elections.’ ”  State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 
2008-Ohio-5097, 899 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 598 N.E.2d 1149. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, we dismiss Stewart’s mandamus claim for 
lack of jurisdiction and deny his prohibition claim because he failed to establish 
that the board of elections and its members abused their discretion or clearly 
disregarded applicable law by denying his protest against Haley’s candidacy. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, Mark A. McGinnis, 
and J. Corey Colombo, for relator. 
 
Richard W. Moyer, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew 
McCoy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
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Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Donald C. Brey, Elizabeth J. Watters, 
and Deborah A. Scott, for intervening respondent. 
 
Michael O. Eshleman, urging denial of the writs for amicus curiae, Robert 
E. Waters. 
______________________