Title: Lucas v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEVEN J. LUCAS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 183, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 9605020926  
§                      9604013921 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  May 26, 2010 
Decided:  August 2, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 2nd day of August 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Steven J. Lucas, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s October 29, 2009 order adopting the October 2, 2009 
report of the Superior Court Commissioner, which recommended that Lucas’ 
third motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61 be denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62.  Lucas also appeals the 
Superior Court’s March 8, 2010 denial of his motion for reconsideration. 
 
2
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  
We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 1997, Lucas pleaded guilty to 
Attempted Assault in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony, Assault in the Second Degree, and Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to a 
total of 43 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 37 years for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Lucas did not file a direct appeal from his 
convictions.  He subsequently filed two motions for postconviction relief, 
both of which were unsuccessful. 
 
(3) 
 In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his third 
postconviction motion, Lucas claims that a) his defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty to an offense that had 
been dismissed; b) his guilty plea was involuntary; and c) his sentence for 
possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony is illegal. 
 
(4) 
Before addressing the merits of claims raised in postconviction 
motions, the Superior Court must first determine whether the procedural 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3
requirements of Rule 61 have been met.3  The record reflects that Lucas’ 
convictions became final in August 1997.4  His latest motion, filed in August 
2009, is clearly time-barred.5  Moreover, Lucas’ claims were previously 
adjudicated in his first postconviction motion.6  In order to overcome the 
time and procedural bars, Lucas must demonstrate the existence of a 
retroactively applicable right that is newly-recognized after the judgment of 
conviction becomes final or a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice.7  
Lucas does neither.  In the absence of any factual or legal support for 
overcoming the time and procedural bars of Rule 61, we conclude that the 
Superior Court correctly denied Lucas’ motion for postconviction relief.8       
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4); Lucas v. State, Del. Supr., No. 91, 2003, Holland, J. (Aug. 
20, 2003). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
8 Moreover, we conclude that the Superior Court properly denied Lucas’ motion for 
reconsideration.       
 
4
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a) is GRANTED.  The judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice