Title: Giles v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

P
 
resent: All the Justices 
CHRISTOPHER LEE GILES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 080906 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  February 27, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal from a defendant’s conviction for burglary, 
we consider the meaning of dwelling house as a required element 
of Code § 18.2-89. 
BACKGROUND 
On the night of September 28, 2005, Christopher Lee Giles 
participated in the breaking and entering of a house located in 
Martinsville.  The owner of the house, Oscar Thornton, Jr. 
(Thornton), inherited it from his mother, who had died on June 
28, 2005. 
Thornton, whose primary residence is in Baltimore, 
Maryland, went to the house at least once or twice per month 
after his mother’s death.  Thornton stayed at the house the 
entire weekend of September 17, 2005, which was just ten days 
prior to the break in. 
The house had furniture in the three bedrooms, living 
room, family room, and kitchen.  Thornton had his own sleeping 
quarters in the house, and he kept food in the pantry, 
cabinets, and refrigerator.  The house had operational utility 
services, including electricity and water.  During the break 
in, Giles took food, quilts, blankets, sheets, towels, bathroom 
supplies, two televisions, and a videocassette recorder from 
the house. 
Giles’ participation in the break in is not in dispute.  
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Giles moved 
to strike on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to 
establish a prima facie case.  Giles argued that the 
Commonwealth failed to establish the house was a dwelling 
house, required as an element of Code § 18.2-89, because no one 
was living there at the time and it was not being regularly 
used for sleeping.  The circuit court denied the motion to 
strike, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion 
that the house was a dwelling house.  The circuit court 
inferred that Thornton intended to return to the house, and 
that while he did not spend every night there because he 
resided in Baltimore, his intent to return was sufficient to 
find that the house was a dwelling house.  At the close of all 
the evidence, Giles renewed his motion to strike.  The circuit 
court again denied the motion and found Giles guilty of 
burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-89.  The circuit court 
sentenced Giles to a term of imprisonment of 20 years, with 13 
years and 8 months suspended. 
 
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Giles appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in a 
published opinion, stating that if an occupant of a house 
maintains it “for immediate or rapid habitation;” inhabits it 
“on a usual or periodic basis;” and, in periods of absence, 
“intend[s] to return to the house within a usual or periodic 
time,” the house is a dwelling house under Code § 18.2-89.  
Giles v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 449, 458-59, 658 S.E.2d 703, 
708 (2008).  The Court of Appeals concluded that a person may 
have multiple dwelling houses so long as each house has “humans 
sleep in it and engage in other functions typically associated 
with habitation.”  Id. at 458-59, 658 S.E.2d at 707-08.  We 
granted Giles this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Giles argues that the Court of Appeals erred in approving 
the circuit court’s ruling that the house satisfied the 
dwelling house requirement of Code § 18.2-89.  Giles contends 
that in order to be a dwelling house, a house must be regularly 
used for sleeping and other “dwelling-related” activities, such 
as preparing meals and bathing.  According to Giles, the 
character and content of a structure do not determine whether 
it is a dwelling; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
structure is in fact used as a dwelling.  Giles argues that the 
analysis must focus on what takes place in the house as opposed 
 
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to what is kept in the house and that the issue whether a 
structure is a dwelling must not be subject to case-by-case 
factual analysis. 
Giles asserts Thornton’s testimony was insufficient to 
prove the house was a dwelling.  Giles points out that Thornton 
testified that he had visited the house twice between June 29, 
2005 and September 17, 2005, when he stayed the entire weekend.  
However, Thornton did not testify that anyone slept in the 
house, nor that he prepared food, bathed, or engaged in other 
normal household activity.  Giles also contends there is 
nothing in Thornton’s testimony that shows he intended to 
return to the house. 
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that whether a house 
is used for sleeping is just one among a number of factors a 
court must consider when determining whether the house is a 
dwelling house as contemplated by Code § 18.2-89.  The 
Commonwealth contends the court must consider other indicia of 
habitation, as the circuit court did in this case when it noted 
the presence of furnishings, food, and operating electricity 
and water at the house.  The Commonwealth argues that from 
these facts the circuit court properly found that Thornton 
intended to return to the house.  According to the 
Commonwealth, consideration of the “regular use” of a structure 
pertains not to the time period in which the structure is used 
 
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as a habitation, but simply to its use as a habitation as 
opposed to other uses.  The Commonwealth further asserts that 
“activities of day-to-day life” must take place in the 
structure for it to be a dwelling house, but need not occur on 
a day-to-day basis.  The Commonwealth argues that the contents 
of a structure serve as indicia of habitation.  For these 
reasons, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals 
applied the proper analysis and did not err in holding that the 
house was a dwelling house. 
Code § 18.2-89 provides, in pertinent part, “[i]f any 
person break and enter the dwelling house of another in the 
nighttime with intent to commit a felony or any larceny 
therein, he shall be guilty of burglary.”  The limited issue of 
statutory interpretation raised in this appeal is the meaning 
of “dwelling house.”  A matter of statutory interpretation such 
as this presents a pure question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528, 533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 
493 (2007); Budd v. Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 591, 643 S.E.2d 
180, 184 (2007); Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 
246, 248 (2003). 
The Court of Appeals framed the issue before it as 
follows: “The issue we consider here . . . is the extent to 
which a person must inhabit a house for it to constitute a 
‘dwelling house’ under the statute,”  Giles, 51 Va. App. at 
 
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451, 658 S.E.2d at 704; and “the issue is the extent to which a 
house must be ‘regularly use[d]’ to qualify as a ‘dwelling 
house.’ ”  Id. at 455, 658 S.E.2d at 706.  By employing the 
phrase “extent to which” a house must be inhabited or regularly 
used, the Court of Appeals suggested the temporal aspect of 
habitation is a significant factor in the analysis whether a 
structure is a dwelling house.  Although we agree with the 
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the house was a dwelling 
house as contemplated by Code § 18.2-89, we disagree with the 
Court of Appeals’ analysis.  Esteban v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 
605, 610, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003) (Supreme Court may affirm 
Court of Appeals’ judgment when the Court of Appeals reaches 
the correct result based on a different or an incorrect 
reason).  The focal point of our analysis is the character or 
use of the place being inhabited. 
“[A]t common law, [burglary was] primarily an offense 
against the security of the habitation, and that is still the 
general conception of it.”  Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 
121, 140, 410 S.E.2d 254, 266 (1991) (quoting Compton v. 
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 55, 55 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1949)).  We 
have previously described a person’s “home” or “habitation” as 
being a place “usually occupied for the purposes of the 
dwelling.”  Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 795, 94 S.E. 
168, 172 (1917).  The focus has been and remains on the manner 
 
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in which the place is used.  At oral argument, Giles 
acknowledged that, historically, “[t]he emphasis [has been] on 
how the structure was used.”  Moreover, Giles recognized that, 
in the present case, the circuit court must consider “what 
[Thornton’s] primary purpose for [the house] was,” “what he was 
using it for . . . whether he was using it for storage” or for 
some other purpose.  We agree. 
Giles’ argument fails, however, when he asserts the 
Commonwealth must prove the regularity of use in a temporal 
sense to establish that a structure constitutes a dwelling 
house.  There is no such frequency requirement.  A structure 
does not have to be physically inhabited every day or week or 
month to be a dwelling house.  “Burglary laws are based 
primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety 
created by the usual burglary situation -- the danger that the 
intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate 
the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the 
occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the 
invasion, thereby inciting more violence.”  Yeatts, 242 Va. at 
140, 410 S.E.2d at 266 (quoting Rash v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. 
App. 22, 25, 383 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1989)).  The danger to 
personal safety that is sought to be protected does not 
dissipate simply because the structure is not occupied on a 
regular basis.  The danger continues irrespective of frequency 
 
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of habitation so long as when the structure is used, it is used 
for the purpose of habitation.  A dwelling house does not lose 
its character as such simply because a person is absent for 
either a regular or irregular period of time. 
This house is analogous to a vacation home.  Although this 
is an issue of first impression in Virginia, other states have 
long held that vacation homes are dwelling houses even when 
unoccupied at the time of the break in.  E.g., Gillum v. State, 
468 So.2d 856, 859 (Miss. 1985) (a weekend house, which was 
usually occupied every other weekend and contained food, 
clothing, and other necessities, was a dwelling and “[t]he 
seasonal or intermittent use of a residence . . . does not 
prevent it from becoming a dwelling”); State v. Albert, 426 
A.2d 1370, 1374 (Me. 1981) (a summer cottage that was adapted 
for overnight accommodation was a dwelling even in the winter 
when it was uninhabited). 
We hold that a house is a dwelling house pursuant to Code 
§ 18.2-89 when the house is used for habitation, including 
periodic habitation.  Periodic habitation does not require that 
the house be used at regular intervals.  Rather, periodic 
habitation requires that when the house is used, it is used for 
the purpose of habitation.  Thus, a dwelling house is a house 
that one uses for habitation, as opposed to another purpose. 
 
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Although the Commonwealth is not required to prove a 
structure is inhabited at regular intervals, it must provide 
sufficient evidence that the structure is used as a habitation 
to satisfy the “dwelling house” requirement of Code § 18.2-89.  
The circuit court must analyze the evidence presented to 
ascertain if there are sufficient indicia of habitation and 
actual use as a place of habitation for the structure to be 
deemed a dwelling house.  
In applying this analysis, the Commonwealth satisfied its 
burden in this case.  Upon review, we consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party below, and we accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.  Britt v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008); Jay 
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); 
Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 
(2008).  The house contained furniture in three bedrooms, a 
living room, family room, and kitchen, as well as quilts, 
blankets, sheets, towels, and bathroom supplies.  The house had 
active electricity and water services, and the kitchen was 
stocked with food in the pantry, cabinets, and refrigerator.  
Thornton had sleeping quarters in the house, and spent at least 
one night there over a weekend ten days prior to the break in on 
September 28, 2005.  Thornton had also stayed in the house at 
least once or twice per month in the three months following his 
 
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mother’s death on June 28, 2005.  It is reasonable to infer 
from the evidence that Thornton slept in the house and prepared 
food, bathed, and engaged in other activities typically 
associated with habitation.  The contents of the house and 
evidence of Thornton’s behavior in relation to the house are 
probative of whether it was used periodically for the purpose 
of habitation. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient 
to prove Thornton’s habitation of the house.  The Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court’s ruling 
that the house satisfied the dwelling house requirement of Code 
§ 18.2-89.  Thus, Giles was properly convicted of burglary.  We 
will therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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