Title: State ex rel. Griffin v. Denney

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
State ex rel. Reginald Griffin, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Larry Denney, Superintendent, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
Original Proceeding in Habeas Corpus 
 
Opinion issued August 2, 2011 
 
 
Reginald Griffin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his 
murder conviction should be vacated because newly discovered evidence proves that the 
State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding material evidence 
during his trial.  Griffin has met his burden of proving entitlement to habeas relief.      
I. Facts 
On July 12, 1983, James Bausley was stabbed fatally in the chest at the Missouri 
Training Center for Men in Moberly.  Within minutes of the stabbing, prison guards 
confiscated a sharpened screwdriver from inmate Jeffrey Smith as Smith attempted to 
leave the area where Bausley was stabbed.  Smith was placed in administrative 
segregation and eventually was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon for possessing the 
screwdriver.  The State never disclosed this evidence to Griffin.   
During the investigation of Bausley’s murder, inmates Paul Curtis and Wyvonne 
Mozee told prison investigators that fellow inmate Reginald Griffin stabbed Bausley.  
Curtis and Mozee also stated that inmates Doyle Franks and Arbary Jackson assisted 
Griffin.  In 1987, the State charged Griffin with Bausley’s murder.   
At trial, the State relied primarily on testimony from Curtis and Mozee.  Curtis 
testified that he saw Griffin, Franks and Jackson arguing with Bausley over a television 
set.  According to Curtis, Griffin hit Bausley in the back and then stabbed him in the 
chest with a foot-long knife that had a yellow rag for a handle.  Griffin threw the knife on 
the roof of the prison gymnasium and fled.  Curtis admitted that he agreed to testify in 
exchange for the State’s promise to assist him on unrelated stealing charges and by 
writing a letter to the board of probation and parole noting his cooperation.  Curtis also 
testified that the State paid his rent for one month following his release on parole.  
Mozee died before trial.  The State introduced a transcript of Mozee’s preliminary 
hearing testimony.  Like Curtis, Mozee testified that Griffin and Bausley were arguing 
about a television set.  Mozee further testified that Griffin, Jackson, Franks and another 
inmate approached Bausley.  Like Curtis, Mozee testified that Griffin stabbed Bausley in 
the chest with a homemade knife.   
Griffin contested Mozee’s credibility with the testimony of inmates David Steele 
and Eddie Johnson.  Steele testified that Mozee said he had a deal with prison officials to 
testify against Griffin to secure an early release.  Steele also testified that Mozee said he 
was going to say “whatever they wanted just as part of the deal.”  Johnson testified that 
Mozee told him that he did not witness the stabbing.  
In addition to the testimony of Curtis and Mozee, the State also introduced 
evidence showing that during the investigation of Bausley’s murder, prison investigators 
found a homemade knife near the gym.  The knife was 13 inches long, three-quarters of 
an inch wide and had a yellow cloth wrapped around the handle.  The medical examiner 
concluded that the knife could have caused Bausley’s wounds.  Preliminary tests detected 
human blood and proteins on the blade.  Subsequent testing was negative for the presence 
of blood.  There was no physical evidence demonstrating that Griffin ever possessed the 
knife or that he had participated in Bausley’s murder.  
A jury found Griffin guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.  The case was 
remanded for a new penalty phase because the State introduced into evidence the record 
of conviction of another person by same name.  State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464, 471 
(Mo. banc 1993).  Griffin was re-sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.   
II. Habeas petition 
In 2005, Griffin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the State 
failed to disclose evidence that that prison guards had seized the sharpened screwdriver 
from inmate Smith.  Griffin asserted that the State’s failure to disclose the Smith 
evidence violated Brady because the evidence implicates Smith as an alternate 
perpetrator.  
 
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The circuit court denied the habeas petition.  Griffin petitions this Court for habeas 
relief.  As established below, the State’s failure to disclose this evidence, considered with 
reference to the totality of the circumstances in this case, demonstrates substantial doubt 
as to the factual validity of Griffin’s convictions.  
III. Standard for Habeas Relief 
“[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.”  State 
ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. banc 2010)(quoting State ex rel. 
Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003)).  Habeas proceedings are 
limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner’s confinement.  Engel, 304 
S.W.3d at 125.  Griffin has the burden of proving he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.  
Id.   
Griffin’s Brady claim was cognizable on direct appeal and in his Rule 29.15 
motion for post-conviction relief.  To overcome the procedural bar to review of his 
claims, Griffin must demonstrate cause and prejudice, manifest injustice, or a 
jurisdictional defect.  Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546.  As established below, the evidence in 
this case satisfies the cause and prejudice standard for habeas relief. 1    
 
To obtain relief under the “cause and prejudice” standard, Griffin first must 
establish “cause” for the procedural default by proving that the claim was not raised  
                                             
 
1 Griffin asserts that the newly discovered evidence introduced in the habeas proceedings 
satisfies both the cause and prejudice and manifest injustice tests for habeas relief.  
Because Griffin is entitled to relief under the cause and prejudice standard, there is no 
need to discuss his claims of manifest injustice.  
 
 
 
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timely because of some objective factor external to the defense.  Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 
126 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n. 24 (1999).  Griffin established 
cause.  The State was obviously aware that inmate Smith possessed a weapon while in the 
prison yard where Bausley was murdered.  The State did not disclose this evidence to 
Griffin.  The State’s failure to disclose this evidence is an objective factor external to 
Griffin’s defense that constitutes “cause” to overcome the objection that Griffin did not 
raise this issue at trial.  
To establish “prejudice,” Griffin must demonstrate that the newly discovered 
evidence resulted in a verdict not “worthy of confidence.”  Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 129 
(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995)).   The analysis of 
prejudice under the “cause and prejudice” standard for habeas review is “identical to this 
Court’s assessment of prejudice undertaken in assessing Griffin’s Brady claims.”  Engel, 
304 S.W.3d at 126.  “Consequently, so long as Griffin establishes the prejudice necessary 
to support his Brady claims, he will have shown the required prejudice to overcome the 
procedural bar for habeas relief.”  Id.  To establish prejudice, Griffin does not have to 
prove definitively that he would have received a different verdict if the Smith evidence 
had been disclosed.  The question is “whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Id. at 129.  When 
reviewing a habeas petition premised on an alleged Brady violation, this Court considers 
all available evidence uncovered following the trial.  Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126; see also 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37 (courts must consider the cumulative effect of excluded 
evidence in determining if a Brady violation occurred).    
 
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IV. Brady violation 
Griffin’s Brady argument is premised on the assertion that the State failed to 
disclose to him material evidence pertaining to inmate Smith’s possession of the 
sharpened screwdriver.  Griffin’s Brady claim requires him to show that: (1) evidence 
that Smith possessed the screwdriver is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory 
or because it is impeaching; (2) the State suppressed the evidence, either willfully or 
inadvertently;  and (3) he was prejudiced.  Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126.  
A. The evidence was favorable 
The sharpened screwdriver evidence is favorable to Griffin because it tends to 
exculpate him from the crime and further impeaches the trial testimony of Curtis and 
Mozee.  The evidence is exculpatory because it places inmate Smith in the prison yard 
with a weapon just minutes after the murder.  A search of the inmates following the 
murder revealed that Smith was the only inmate in the prison found with a weapon in his 
possession.   
The evidence also further impeaches the testimony of Curtis and Mozee.  At trial, 
inmate Leonard Rogers testified that the inmate who ran around the gymnasium 
immediately after the murder was definitely not Griffin.  Although it is apparent that the 
jury did not believe Rogers, if Griffin could have introduced the evidence that Smith was 
found with a sharpened screwdriver and was trying to leave the prison yard immediately 
after the murder, the jury may have found Roger’s testimony more credible.  This is 
particularly true given the fact that Smith and Griffin were similar in height, weight and 
 
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complexion.  Because evidence that Smith possessed a sharpened screwdriver supports a 
viable alternative perpetrator defense, the evidence is favorable to Griffin. 
B. The State suppressed the evidence 
The State suppressed the fact that prison guards confiscated a sharpened 
screwdriver from inmate Smith just minutes after Bausley was stabbed.  A prison guard 
reported that a sharpened screwdriver was confiscated from inmate Smith, Smith was 
placed in administrative segregation for possessing the sharpened screwdriver, and the 
State successfully prosecuted Smith for possessing the screwdriver.  The State was 
obviously aware of the evidence yet did not disclose it to Griffin.  Even if the prosecutor 
was subjectively unaware that a weapon was confiscated from Smith, the State is 
nonetheless under a duty to disclose the evidence because the prosecutor is “the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935)).  In this case, the murder occurred in 
prison, and the prison guards were acting on the government’s behalf.  Therefore, the 
State had a duty to discover and disclose any material evidence known to the prison 
guards.  See Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 127 (even if the prosecutor is unaware of evidence 
uncovered by investigators, the State is under a duty to disclose that evidence because the 
investigators are part of the prosecution team). 
 
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C.  Griffin was prejudiced 
Griffin has established prejudice.  The present state of the evidence in this case 
shows that there are at least five substantial post-trial developments that raise serious 
doubts regarding the factual accuracy of Griffin’s conviction.  First, if the State had 
disclosed Smith’s possession of the sharpened screwdriver, Griffin’s alternative 
perpetrator theory would have been bolstered significantly.  That evidence places Smith 
at the scene of the crime and establishes that he was the only inmate present in the prison 
yard who was found to be in possession of a weapon shortly after Bausley was stabbed. 
Additionally, as noted above, the evidence is consistent with the testimony of inmate 
Rogers, who testified that the inmate who ran around the gymnasium immediately after 
murder was not Griffin.   
 
Second, Curtis recanted his trial testimony in which he stated that Griffin stabbed 
Bausley.  Curtis testified that he did not witness the Bausley stabbing.  He also testified 
that Franks confessed to the murder.  Curtis testified that he implicated Griffin to obtain a 
transfer to another prison.   
 
Third, Franks confessed to murdering Bausley during the course of Griffin’s Rule 
29.15 proceeding for post-conviction relief.  He also testified that, in addition to himself 
and Jackson, Smith was the third perpetrator.  Franks’ admission is consistent with 
Curtis’ deposition testimony and with the screwdriver evidence the State failed to 
disclose. 
 
Fourth, at the hearing on Griffin’s habeas petition, inmate Michael Garrett testified 
that he and Mozee were in the law library when Bausley was stabbed.  This contradicts 
 
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Mozee’s deposition testimony in which he stated that he witnessed Griffin stabbing 
Bausley.  
 
Finally, Jackson, who also was charged with Bausley’s murder but acquitted, 
testified at the habeas hearing that Griffin was not involved with the murder and was not 
in the prison yard when Bausley was killed.  Instead, Jackson testified that Smith, Franks 
and Bausley were arguing and that both Franks and Smith produced weapons 
immediately before Bausley was stabbed.  
 
There is no physical evidence connecting Griffin to the weapon found in the 
gymnasium.  There is no physical evidence demonstrating any contact between Griffin 
and Bausley. Instead, Griffin’s continued incarceration for Bausley’s murder is premised 
on the recanted testimony of inmate Curtis and the impeached testimony of deceased 
inmate Mozee.  Overlaying the entire case is the revelation that the State failed to 
disclose evidence that tended to implicate Smith, impeach Curtis and Mozee, and bolster 
the trial testimony of inmate Rogers, who maintained that the inmate fleeing the crime 
scene was not Griffin.   
In light of these circumstances, Griffin’s conviction is no longer “worthy of 
confidence.”   See Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 129.  Because Griffin has shown that the 
nondisclosure of the Smith evidence was prejudicial for Brady purposes, he has also 
established the “prejudice” necessary to overcome the procedural bar to granting him 
habeas relief.  Accordingly, Griffin’s conviction for the murder of James Bausley is 
vacated. 
 
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V. Conclusion 
This Court orders Griffin discharged from the State’s custody for the murder of 
James Bausley 60 days from the date the mandate issues in this case, unless within that 
time the State files in the circuit court an election to retry him.  If the State elects to retry 
Griffin for the Bausley murder, the trial should commence as soon as practicable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice 
 
 
Wolff, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur;  
Russell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Fischer and Price, JJ., concur in opinion of  
Russell, J.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
STATE EX REL. REGINALD  
 
) 
GRIFFIN, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
LARRY DENNEY,  
 
 
 
) 
SUPERINTENDENT, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
I respectfully dissent. Because Griffin failed to meet the burden of demonstrating 
that the State suppressed evidence in violation of due process, as outlined in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), I would not grant habeas corpus relief.  
A writ of habeas corpus is available to a person who is restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the federal or state government. State ex 
rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. banc 2010). As the habeas corpus 
petitioner, Griffin bears the burden to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief 
under Brady. See id.  
 
1
 
Brady held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. To 
establish a Brady violation, the petitioner must prove the following: (1) the evidence at 
issue is favorable to the petitioner, in that it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the 
State suppressed evidence; and (3) the petitioner was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126. Contrary to the majority’s 
conclusion, Griffin failed to establish that the Brady violation occurred because he failed 
to prove the first prong.  
The evidence at issue is a sharpened screwdriver seized from another inmate, 
Jeffrey Smith, shortly after the murder. Griffin claims that Smith’s sharpened screwdriver 
is exculpatory evidence. It had a 3½-inch yellow handle and a 5¼-inch metal portion that 
was sharpened to a point. Evidence is exculpatory if it is favorable to the accused. Storey 
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 141 (Mo. banc 2005). The sharpened screwdriver is not 
favorable to Griffin.  
 
The medical examiner testified that the victim’s fatal wound was caused by a 
“knife-like instrument with sharp edges.” The size of the victim’s fatal wound was ¾ of 
an inch wide and 5½ to 6 inches deep, piercing the victim’s heart and lung. At trial, the 
State entered into evidence a homemade knife that was found 20 feet from the crime 
scene. That knife was 13 inches long and ¾ of an inch wide. The knife tested positive for 
blood, and human proteins were found on it. In contrast, the sharpened screwdriver was 
clean.  
 
2
 
The sharpened screwdriver would not be exculpatory to Griffin. According to the 
medical examiner’s testimony, the 5¼-inch metal portion of the sharpened screwdriver 
could not have created the victim’s wound, which was 5½ to 6 inches deep.1 Further, the 
screwdriver was sharpened to a point, or a “sticker,” and was not a “knife-like instrument 
with sharp edges.”  
 
Griffin’s intent is to use the sharpened screwdriver to suggest that Smith 
committed the murder. To present an alternate perpetrator theory, there must be a direct 
connection between the alternate perpetrator and the crime charged. See State v. Bowman, 
337 S.W.3d 679, 687 (Mo. banc 2011). Griffin presents no direct connection between 
Smith and the murder. Although Smith’s possession of the sharpened screwdriver 
indicates that he may have had the means to murder the victim, the medical examiner’s 
testimony contradicts that possibility. The evidence of the sharpened screwdriver does 
not establish that Smith was at the scene of the crime, nor does it remove Griffin from the 
scene of the crime. As the sharpened screwdriver does not provide a direct connection 
between Smith and the murder, it would not be admissible at trial. See State v. Butler, 951 
S.W.2d 600, 606 (Mo. banc 1997). And evidence that is inadmissible at trial cannot be 
used to establish that the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. See Wood v. 
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).  
                                             
 
1 In addition to his fatal wound, the victim also suffered a cut to his left thigh, in the form of a 
“Y.” Griffin argues that the Y-shaped wound could have been caused by the sharpened 
screwdriver. Whether the sharpened screwdriver could have caused the Y-shaped wound to the 
thigh is irrelevant because it was not the fatal wound. The medical examiner’s testimony did not 
support Griffin’s argument.  
 
3
 
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Because the sharpened screwdriver is not consistent with the victim’s wound, it 
does not establish a direct connection between Smith and the murder. This evidence is 
not favorable to Griffin in that it is not exculpatory or impeaching. Failing to meet the 
first prong to prove a Brady violation, Griffin has not met his burden as a habeas corpus 
petitioner.2  
Accordingly, I would not grant habeas corpus relief.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
2 Griffin also failed in proving the second prong of the Brady violation test as he did not show 
that the State suppressed the evidence of the sharpened screwdriver. Griffin alleges that five 
years after the trial, the information pertaining to the sharpened screwdriver was not found in the 
defense file. Prior to trial, the Department of Corrections (DOC) made all records and physical 
evidence available to defense counsel. With the help of DOC staff, Griffin’s attorneys made 
copies of certain documents. If the information pertaining to the sharpened screwdriver was not 
found in the file, it is possible that the State provided the information, but defense counsel failed 
to copy it.  
Other than the inference of suppression by the State, Griffin presented no direct evidence 
indicating that the State suppressed the information pertaining to the sharpened screwdriver. This 
mere inference is unpersuasive to establish that the State suppressed evidence in violation of 
Brady.