Title: Ransom v. Bebernitz

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Ransom v. Bebernitz (2000-142); 172 Vt. 423, 782 A.2d 1155

[Filed 24-Aug-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-142

Albert L. Ransom	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Rutland Superior Court

Phyllis Bebernitz, Chester C. Anderson,	         March Term, 2001 
David Ransom, et al.

David A. Jenkins, J.

John D. Hansen, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Karl C. Anderson of Anderson & Eaton, P.C., Rutland, for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   This appeal arises from a dispute among great great
  grandchildren over  their respective rights to a certain tract of land
  conveyed by an 1882 probate decree according to the  terms of their great
  great grandfather's will.  Defendants, members of the Anderson family,
  appeal  the Rutland Superior Court's judgment that plaintiff has a 9/31
  interest in the subject land, and the  court's order to partition of the
  property.  Defendants assert that the trial court erred in concluding  that
  (1) the 1882 probate decree is not subject to collateral attack on the
  ground that the will violated  the rule against perpetuities; (2) the will
  did not violate the rule against perpetuities; (3) the  defendants and
  their predecessors in title did not establish a claim for adverse
  possession; (4)  plaintiff and his predecessors in title did not commit
  laches.  We affirm.

 

       On May 30, 1877, Albert Alanson Ransom executed a will that conveyed a
  parcel of land,  hereinafter referred to as the northern mountain lot, to
  his son.  The will provides, in pertinent part:

         I also give to my son Albert VanNess Ransom the use of one 
    half of the remainder of my land joining my home farm on the North 
    and running North to the Town of Hubbardton . . . I give to said 
    Albert that part of the same lying North of such line.  I give the
    same  to the said Albert during his natural life and after his
    decease should  children survive him I give the use of said land
    to them during their  natural lives and to the survivor of them,
    and at the decease of the  survivor of such children I direct that
    said land be divided among  their children equally share and share
    alike.

       On August 26, 1880, Albert Alanson Ransom died, and on September 20,
  1880, his will was  approved by the probate court.  On February 27, 1882,
  the probate court issued a decree of  distribution that was not appealed.

       At the time of the testator's (Albert Alansom Ransom) death, his son
  Albert VanNess  Ransom had only two children, Albert Anson Ransom, who was
  1 year old, and Lillian Ransom  Cook, who was in utero.  Subsequently,
  Albert VanNess Ransom had three additional children.   Upon his death, on
  February 9, 1909, his life estate interest in that property expired, and
  the right of  use and possession of the property passed to his five
  children: Albert Ansom Ransom, Lillian  Ransom Cook, Grace Ransom Anderson,
  Marion Ransom Levanway, and Elihu C. Ransom, who  each took a life estate
  as joint tenants with right of survivorship.  Those five children
  eventually had  thirty one children, to whom the will intended to convey
  the remainder of the life estate divided in  equal shares.  Therefore, in
  1989, when the last surviving grandchild of the testator -- Marion -- died, 
  the will conveyed an equal distribution of the northern mountain lot among
  the testator's great  grandchildren; that is, in 31 shares.

 

       Fritz Anderson married Grace Ransom and in 1915, he purchased the home
  farm that abuts  the northern mountain lot from his mother-in-law.  Their
  children, Ellis and Chester Anderson,  purchased the farm from their father
  in 1940.

       The Andersons did not use the northern mountain lot as a part of the
  farming operation,  because the land is steep and not useful for farming. 
  Other than for a small housewood logging  operation in the 1930's, the
  Andersons did not use the property except for access to other property 
  that they owned.  On July 19, 1940, Fritz Anderson, acting as the agent of
  Albert VanNess Ransom's  five children and all but two of his grandchildren
  (including defendants Chester and Ellis Anderson),  sold and conveyed a
  portion of the property, and distributed money to them from the sale.

       On January 11, 1991, Chester and Ellis Anderson conveyed the rest of
  the property to Ellis'  sons, defendants Eric and Karl Anderson, by
  warranty deed.  In this deed, defendants Chester and  Ellis Anderson
  covenanted that they were the sole owners of the premises and had good
  right and  title to convey the same.  According to deeds in possession of
  defendants, seven other great  grandchildren of the 21 who survived Marion
  Ransom Levanway, the last life tenant, had conveyed  their remainder
  interests by quitclaim deeds to defendants Eric and Karl Anderson, but did
  not record  the conveyance in the land records.

       Plaintiff, Albert L. Ransom, is the son of Lemuel Ransom, one of the
  testator's thirty-one  great grandchildren of the testator.  After hearing
  from his father that the family owned some land in  Hubbardton, he
  researched the genealogy and land records to inquire about the property. 
  In 1988, he  began approaching descendants of the testator, and offering
  them sums of money for their "share" of  the estate.  Since then, he has
  acquired 9/31 of the property.  Also in 1988, he offered to begin 

 

  paying taxes on a share of the northern mountain lot.  This offer was
  declined by Ellis and  Chester Anderson.

       Plaintiff brought a complaint in February 1995, seeking a judicial
  determination of the legal  owners of the property and the ownership
  interest in each such owner, as well as partition of the  portion to which
  the plaintiff is entitled together with an appropriate easement across the
  remaining  portion of the land to provide reasonable access.  The parties
  filed cross motions for summary  judgment and a hearing was held on
  September 11, 1997 on the merits of plaintiff's claims and on  defendants'
  motion for summary judgment. 

       The trial court found that the will did not violate the rule against
  perpetuities and that, even if  it did, the 1882 probate court's decree of
  distribution was conclusive and not subject to collateral  attack.  The
  court also found that the defendants had not acquired the land by adverse
  possession and  that the plaintiff did not commit laches.  The court ruled
  that the plaintiff was entitled to a 9/31 share  of the property, ordered
  partition of that share, and that the plaintiff was further entitled to
  access  across other lands of the Anderson farm.

       Defendants Chester, Ellis, Karl and Eric Anderson (defendants
  Anderson) appeal the trial  court rulings, claiming that the testator's
  will is subject to collateral attack because it violated the  rule against
  perpetuities.  According to defendants Anderson, the rule against
  perpetuities violation  defeats the conveyances set forth in the will, thus
  creating a tenancy in common between the children  of Albert VanNess Ranson
  at his death in 1909.  They further contend that through their occupancy, 
  they adversely possessed the land against their fellow tenants in common. 
  Finally, defendants  contend that the actions of plaintiff and his
  predecessors in title constituted laches, which bar  plaintiff's recovery.

 

                                      I

       On appeal, defendants Anderson contend that Albert Alanson Ransom's
  will violated the rule  against perpetuities, and that the probate decree
  of distribution of 1882 does not prevent the court  from addressing that
  violation.  Defendants, however, must first persuade us that In re Estate
  of  Walker, is either distinguishable from the instant case, or was wrongly
  decided.  119 Vt. 130, 120 A.2d 565 (1956).  They have done neither.

       The Walker case involved the same situation as in this case: a
  subsequent collateral attack  upon an unappealed probate decree.  Id. at
  132, 120 A.2d  at 568.  Relying on In re Wells' Estate, 69  Vt. 388, 38 A. 83 (1897), we held in Walker that an unappealed decree of the probate
  court, even if  erroneous as a matter of fact or law, is conclusive as to
  all matters covered by the decree, including  the provisions of the will
  there in issue, and is not subject to collateral attack.  119 Vt. at 136,
  120 A.2d  at 568.

       Defendants attempt to distinguish Walker arguing that, unlike the
  probate court that reviewed  Albert A. Ransom's will, the probate court in
  Walker had earlier addressed the issue of the rule  against perpetuities
  and had found that the provisions of the will establishing the trust did
  not violate  the rule.  Defendants contend that the material findings set
  forth in Walker contain reference to a  probate court's finding in 1907
  (the date of decree of distribution) that the will in question violated 
  the rule against perpetuities.  But the findings referred to in the Walker
  decision are those of the  probate court appealed in 1956.  There is no
  evidence that the rule against perpetuities was  considered by the original
  probate court when it entered a decree in accordance with the provisions 
  of the will in 1907.  Indeed, the Walker opinion assumes for purposes of
  its decision that the 

 

  determination of the probate court in 1956 that the will probated in 1907
  violated the rule  against perpetuities is correct, but concludes with a
  statement of law directly applicable to this case:

    If the provision or provisions in the will creating the trust
    estate are  now void under the rule against perpetuities they were
    so at the time  the decree was entered.  Here as there an appeal
    could have been  taken to the decree and had it corrected, if
    erroneous.

  Walker, 119 Vt. at 135, 120 A.2d  at 568.

       Defendants similarly fail to find support for their contention that a
  decree of the probate court  cannot be considered conclusive unless it can
  be shown that the probate court initially addressed the  issue of rule
  against perpetuities.  Defendant's assertion that Sparhawk v. Administrator
  of Buel, 9  Vt. 41 (1837), and In re Estate of Valiquette, 122 Vt. 350,