Title: SIMMONS, JR. v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SIMMONS, JR. v. STATE2003 WY 8472 P.3d 803Case Number: 01-250Decided: 07/15/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JAMES 
LYNN SIMMONS, JR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sean W. Scoggin, Special 
Assistant Attorney General

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
James Simmons, Jr. of child abuse and intimidating a witness.  Mr. Simmons appeals, claiming 
prosecutorial misconduct, insufficiency of the evidence, and denial of a fair 
trial because of remarks made by a spectator during a witness' testimony and 
because the jury saw him in shackles.  
We hold the prosecutor's repeated attempts to introduce evidence of prior 
bad acts combined with his repetition of the inaudible testimony from the 
state's prime witness constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal 
and remand for a new trial.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Simmons 
raises the following issues:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court err in forcing [Mr. Simmons] to walk to 
the witness stand, in front of the jury, while shackled, after defense counsel 
had requested a brief recess to unshackle [him], when the crux of the trial 
court's "reason" for doing so was that the trial was moving too slowly and [Mr. 
Simmons'] trial counsel should have made the request 
sooner?

 

            
II.  Was [Mr. Simmons] denied a fair trial, and therefore due 
process of law, when a courtroom spectator audibly called one of the defense 
witnesses a "liar" as the defense witness testified, and the trial court did 
nothing to cure the problem?

 

            
III.  Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by violating the 
trial court's pretrial order, referencing juvenile conduct of [Mr. Simmons], 
questioning the alleged victim . . . about unnoticed prior 
bad acts of [Mr. Simmons], arguing [Mr. Simmons'] character as a reason to 
convict and repeatedly leading the alleged 
victim-witness . . . throughout the course of her testimony 
(and repeating her answers to the jury)?

 

            
IV.  Was there insufficient evidence to convict [Mr. Simmons], 
given the manner in which the jury was instructed?

 

The 
state restates the issues as follows:

 

            
I.  Whether [Mr. Simmons] was prejudiced by walking to the 
witness stand in front of the jury while shackled?

 

            
II.  Whether [Mr. Simmons] was denied a fair trial when a 
courtroom spectator whispered "liar" to her husband as a defense witness 
testified?

 

            
III.  Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial misconduct when he 
asked questions regarding [Mr. Simmons'] prior bad acts and when he repeated the 
answers of a witness during direct examination?

 

            
IV.  Was there sufficient evidence to convict [Mr. Simmons], in 
light of the manner in which the jury was instructed on the elements of the 
crimes with which he was charged?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Mr. Simmons and 
his girlfriend, Natalia Bradford, are the parents of two young children: a boy, 
B.S.; and a girl, A.S.  At the time 
of the events giving rise to this case, B.S. was twenty months old, and A.S. was 
three years old.  In the late 
morning of March 29, 2001, a neighbor came to Mr. Simmons' apartment in 
Casper.  B.S. met her at the 
door.  The neighbor noticed bruises 
on B.S.'s face and dried blood around his lips and ear.  She asked Ms. Bradford what 
happened.  Receiving no response, 
the neighbor took the children upstairs to her apartment.  Once upstairs, she and her husband 
noticed more bruising on B.S.'s body.  
They telephoned the Department of Family Services (DFS).  Sometime later, two police officers 
arrived along with Joanne Robinson, an investigator from DFS.  In the meantime, Ms. Bradford had 
retrieved the children and taken them back downstairs.

 

[¶4]      The officers and 
Ms. Robinson went to Mr. Simmons' apartment, observed B.S., and questioned Mr. 
Simmons about the bruises on the boy's forehead and back.  The testimony concerning Mr. Simmons' 
response was somewhat inconsistent.  
Ms. Robinson testified Mr. Simmons told her B.S. fell down a lot, hitting 
his head and back.  John Hatcher, a 
Casper police officer, testified Mr. Simmons said B.S. threw a fit the night 
before in which he flung himself down onto the floor and hit his head on a 
toy.  Law enforcement took the boy 
into protective custody and turned him over to DFS.  Ms. Robinson took him to the hospital 
where he was examined by Mel Meyer, the emergency room physician.  Dr. Meyer's report reflected the 
following assessment of B.S.'s condition: dehydration, multiple 
contusions/abrasions, prominent subarachnoid space, and neglect/abuse.  Dr. Meyer testified B.S. had suffered 
nonaccidental trauma, meaning the bruises were not the result of falling 
down.  He also testified the 
subarachnoid space was consistent with previous trauma.

 

[¶5]      Patrick Carr, the 
lead detective on the case, arrived at the hospital while B.S. was being 
examined.  Officer Carr spoke to Mr. 
Simmons, who was in the hospital waiting room.  Mr. Simmons told Officer Carr that B.S. 
fell down a lot and had tantrums in which he banged his head against the 
wall.  Officer Carr asked Mr. 
Simmons if he would come down to the police station for a more thorough 
interview.  Mr. Simmons agreed.  An interview was conducted at the police 
station, and Mr. Simmons again denied causing B.S.'s injuries.  

 

[¶6]      The next morning, 
Officer Carr interviewed Ms. Bradford, who initially told him the same story as 
Mr. Simmons.  Toward the end of the 
interview, however, she said Mr. Simmons had on occasion put B.S. in the corner 
and held his head against the wall and had done so on March 28, 2001.  In addition, after initially denying 
that Mr. Simmons ever spanked the boy, she changed her story and said he had 
spanked B.S. in the past.  She also 
advised the officer that she was planning to leave Mr. Simmons.  

 

[¶7]      Officer Carr then 
interviewed Mr. Simmons again who was initially cooperative and willing to 
answer questions.  During this 
interview, Officer Carr confronted Mr. Simmons with the new information obtained 
from Ms. Bradford.  Mr. Simmons said 
he did put B.S. in the corner but did not do so forcefully and he held him by 
his shoulders, not his head.  He 
also admitted spanking B.S. on his diaper.  
When Officer Carr asked him about Ms. Bradford's plans to leave him, Mr. 
Simmons said he did not wish to speak anymore and requested an attorney.  Officer Carr concluded the interview and 
placed Mr. Simmons under arrest.  

 

[¶8]      The following 
Monday, Ms. Bradford came back to the station and asked to speak with Officer 
Carr.  During this interview, she 
told him she lied during the previous interview because Mr. Simmons had 
threatened to kill her if she told the truth.  Now that he was in jail, she said she 
felt safe in coming forward with the truth.  She said Mr. Simmons was coming down 
from "cranking" on March 28, 2001, they got into a fight, and he began hurting 
B.S.  She said Mr. Simmons forced 
B.S. into the corner and, whenever the boy turned or tried to walk away, Mr. 
Simmons grabbed him by the head and forced him back, holding his forehead 
against the walls.  She further 
reported Mr. Simmons repeatedly grabbed B.S., picked him up, and threw him on 
the bed.  She also said he kicked 
the boy in the stomach when he was down on the floor.  She told Officer Carr that, when she 
tried to intervene, Mr. Simmons hit her and pulled out a clump of her 
hair.

 

[¶9]      Mr. Simmons was 
charged with child abuse, intimidating a witness, and battery.  The latter two charges were based upon 
Ms. Bradford's allegations that Mr. Simmons threatened to kill her if she told 
the truth and hit her when she attempted to intervene in his abuse of B.S.  Mr. Simmons was tried before a jury 
beginning July 30, 2001.  On August 
1, 2001, the jury found Mr. Simmons guilty of child abuse and witness 
intimidation and acquitted him of battery.  
The trial court sentenced him to serve two consecutive terms of not less 
than forty-eight months nor more than sixty months in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 

[¶10]   Mr. Simmons contends prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred at several stages during the trial.  He claims the prosecutor repeatedly 
solicited prohibited testimony concerning prior bad acts, improperly referred to 
prior bad acts during his closing argument, and committed misconduct by 
repeating Ms. Bradford's testimony in response to his questions.  Mr. Simmons asserts the cumulative 
effect of these instances of misconduct denied him a fair 
trial.

 

[¶11]   Looking first to the assertion that 
the prosecutor solicited testimony of prior bad acts, we find the following 
relevant facts in the record.  Prior 
to trial, defense counsel filed a motion asking the state to provide notice of 
its intent to introduce evidence of prior bad acts under W.R.E. 404(b).  The record contains no such notice, 
leaving us to conclude the state did not notify the court or the defense that it 
intended to introduce such evidence.  
Although there are references by the trial court to pretrial rulings 
prohibiting evidence of prior bad acts, we have been unable to locate any such 
ruling in the record before us.

 

[¶12]   At trial, during the state's 
redirect examination of Ms. Bradford, the following exchange 
occurred:

 

Q   Was 
he on probation in Texas?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your Honor, I 
don't know how this is relevant.

 

THE 
COURT:  I'll sustain on 
relevancy.

 

            
. . . .

 

Q   Now, 
had you related the incident that occurred on March 28th, was there 
any other incident where the Defendant had attacked you in that 
manner?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.  We're once again going 
beyond the scope of the original direct and now we're going into matters that 
could be 404(b) evidence of prior bad acts that hadn't been 
noticed.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I think I made the same 
objection, her ability as a parent, her mother is relevant, but now the 
Defendant's ability to be a father and what he's doing is not 
relevant?

 

THE 
COURT:  I'll sustain.  We 
have a battery claim in this case and I think that charge and that incident 
needs to stand on its own.  I do 
think that balancing out 404(b) and also relevancy and 403 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence that we have been going into an area I think we need to stay out 
of.  So I'll sustain the 
objection.

 

Then, 
during the state's cross-examination of Mr. Simmons' mother, the following 
discussion occurred:

 

Q   . . . . 
When your son was in trouble in Texas, he was also placed on probation, wasn't 
he?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.  We're getting to 404(b) 
material here and we've already discussed that and had a ruling on 
it.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, she's testified, they opened 
the door to his character and they opened the door all the way back to 1997 in 
Texas and what a good father he was and how much time he spent with the kids and 
they opened the door to his character in regard to this.  It's not 404(b) now, Your Honor.  It's character evidence of the 
Defendant.

 

THE 
COURT:  I'll sustain the 
objection.  I think that consistent 
with the pretrial rulings and with my feeling there needs to be some bounds to 
inquiry in this area.  I'll 
sustain.

 

Despite 
the trial court's ruling, the prosecutor later asked the witness again whether 
Mr. Simmons was on probation in Texas.  
He also raised the issue of prior bad acts in the following 
exchange:

 

Q   Correct 
me if I'm wrong, but wasn't he placed in the Wyoming Boys 
School?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I object to 
that as a juvenile record but beyond the scope.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  This doesn't go to criminal conduct, 
Your Honor.  This goes to raising 
her son --

 

THE 
COURT:  Please approach, if you 
would, counsel.

 

(Proceedings 
held at the bench.)

 

THE 
COURT:  I'm inclined to come down 
very hard on the prosecution.  
You've been tap dancing around other bad acts, conduct, convictions.  I know perhaps the door has been opened 
to part of it, but I think this inquiry, as I see it, is in violation of the 
pretrial order and I think you're trying to continue to beat in every way and 
every angle you can the Defendant's prior criminal record.

 

I 
have to agree that juvenile court matters are confidential and I think perhaps 
there was some discussion and some general opinions from this witness that may 
relate to her son's background, but I think attempting to impeach or inquire in 
this area is completely improper.  
But I'll allow you to convince me and tell me why I'm wrong, giving your 
view of why you need to inquire about juvenile convictions and juvenile 
dispositions.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I'm not going to go into 
that area any further.  I think the 
Court has made your position clear.  
It's just, Your Honor, that they can come in and put the Defendant's 
character into issue by indicating what a great son he was and father, and I'm 
trying to establish that's certainly not the case.  I, as the prosecution, can't do that in 
the case in chief.

 

They 
opened the door to that both in their opening statement and in numerous 
questions they have been asking that witness and I believe it's relevant because 
they have opened the door.

 

THE 
COURT:  Anything else, [defense 
counsel]?

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  I agree with the Court 
and say that we certainly admitted to the warrant and the charges in Casper that 
he was serving in October, and I have no objection to the discussion of that 
felony, which is the only felony on his record, and would ask that he be 
restrained, limited only to that particular matter.

 

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Well, I'll rule that I'll sustain the 
objection and I'm going to instruct the prosecution that I do not want any more 
questioning in this area.  I feel 
it's improper.  It's beyond the 
scope of the rulings I made pretrial in this case as to other bad 
acts.

 

If 
you want to go into other areas, let's do it outside the presence of the jury 
and you make an offer of proof as to what other criminal conduct and bad acts 
you specifically want to inquire of this witness.  Thank you.

 

(Proceedings 
held in open court.)

 

THE 
COURT:  After conference at this 
bench, the Court sustains the pending objection.  I strike the last question asked by [the 
prosecutor] and instruct the jury to disregard it 
completely.

 

[¶13]   Mr. Simmons also claims 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor used inadmissible 
character evidence during closing argument:

 

            
Now, you have to also look at the character of the Defendant and one way 
to do that is to, I guess, look at his past.  He is a convicted felon.  I'm not going to sit here and say 
because he's a convicted felon means he's automatically guilty of this offense 
because that's not the case, but it does indicate a lot about his character and 
what he's all about, what he's into.

 

Defense 
counsel did not object to this argument.  

 

[¶14]   Finally, Mr. Simmons asserts 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when, during direct examination of Ms. 
Bradford, the prosecutor began a number of his questions by repeating the 
witness' response to his last question.  

 

Q   Where 
have you been for the last couple of days?

 

A   In 
Colorado.

 

Q   In 
Colorado?

 

A   Yes.

 

Q   When 
did you get here?

 

A   About 
3:00 this morning.

 

Q    
3:00 this morning?

 

A   Yes.

 

 (Emphasis added.)  The record reflects this type of 
questioningMs. Bradford answering inaudibly and the prosecutor repeating her 
answer for the juryoccurred with some frequency throughout the direct 
examination.1  The following excerpt further 
illustrates the problem:

 

Q   . . . . Was 
James home the day before on Wednesday, March 8th?

 

A   For 
a while he was.

 

Q   For 
a while.  What time of the 
day was he home?

 

A   A 
little before noon maybe.

 

Q   Before 
noon?

 

A   And 
then he left.  He was in and out 
pretty much.

 

Q 
  He was in and out throughout the day on 
Wednesday?

 

A   Right.

 

Q   Okay.  Now, did anything unusual happen that 
day?

 

A   Yes.

 

Q   What 
happened that was unusual?

 

A   We 
were fighting and James was arguing throughout the day.

 

Q   You 
and James were fighting and arguing throughout the day.  What was -- what were you arguing about, 
fighting about?

 

A   I 
had told him that I was leaving with my kids.

 

Q   Speak 
up.

 

A   I 
told him that I was leaving and taking the kids.

 

Q   You 
told him that you were leaving --

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, counsel keeps 
repeating the answer.

 

THE 
COURT:  I'll sustain.  You have been repeating questions from 
the outset.

 

JUROR:  We can't hear, Your Honor.  If he doesn't repeat it, we wouldn't be 
able to understand.  We can't hear 
her so when he says what she says it helps.

 

THE 
COURT:  Yeah.  It's an improper questioning, 
though.  I'll stand by my 
ruling.  The witness needs to speak 
up.  

 

 (Emphasis added.)  Despite the trial court's ruling, the 
prosecutor continued to repeat the witness' answers for the jury on a recurring 
basis. Defense counsel reiterated her objection.  After the lunch recess, the trial court 
offered the following remarks in open court:

 

[T]he 
jury has advised the bailiff that they are having a difficult time hearing Ms. 
Bradford and I think I've spoken out on that a couple times.  I would ask that you speak directly into 
the microphone, that you speak up.

 

To 
the extent the jury cannot hear testimony they obviously can't consider 
that.  There's only so much the 
Court can do and I leave it up to counsel to emphasize upon the witness the need 
to speak up and to present testimony that the jury can, in fact, hear and 
consider. 

 

Thereafter, 
the frequency of repeated answers diminished.

 

[¶15]   In reviewing claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we have said:

 

Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state.'"  Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1974)).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected the accused's 
"substantial rights."  The accused's 
right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  "Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Earll, ¶9.

 

Williams 
v. State, 
2002 WY 136, ¶21, 54 P.3d 248, ¶21 (Wyo. 2002) 
(some citations omitted).  From our 
review of the record, we conclude the case against Mr. Simmons was not without 
difficulty.  The only witness 
against him with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to B.S.'s injuries 
was Ms. Bradford.  The testimony at 
trial was that she gave inconsistent accounts of what happened, first confirming 
Mr. Simmons' statement that he did not inflict the injuries upon B.S. and then 
recanting and accusing Mr. Simmons of abusing the boy.  Mr. Simmons also gave inconsistent 
statements, first telling law enforcement and DFS officials that B.S.'s injuries 
resulted from falls or tantrums and later testifying Ms. Bradford inflicted the 
injuries. 

 

[¶16]   Other evidence presented at trial 
also raised questions about Ms. Bradford's credibility, including letters she 
wrote to Mr. Simmons after he was arrested and DFS records indicating B.S. was 
removed from her care while Mr. Simmons was incarcerated.  A significant portion of her testimony 
on direct examination likely would have gone unheard by the jury but for the 
prosecutor's practice of repeating her inaudible responses.  The trial court admonished the 
prosecutor about this mode of questioning but it continued with some regularity 
throughout the direct examination.  

 

[¶17]   While the prosecutor's manner of 
questioning Ms. Bradford is somewhat troubling, it is not sufficient, by itself, 
to warrant reversal.  However, that 
questioning, when combined with the prosecutor's improper and repeated attempts 
to insert prior bad acts and Mr. Simmons' character into the jury's 
determinationattempts made over defense counsel's objections and the trial 
court's rulings prohibiting such evidenceconvinces us a reasonable probability 
exists that Mr. Simmons' right to a fair trial was 
affected.

 

[¶18]   Despite having provided no notice 
of intent to raise prior bad acts, the prosecutor asked questions not once but 
on three separate occasions during trial about Mr. Simmons having been on 
probation in Texas.  The prosecutor 
raised the issue a second and a third time even after the trial court sustained 
a defense objection to such questions.  
Again without notice, the prosecutor raised the specter of prior bad acts 
by asking Ms. Bradford about other incidents where Mr. Simmons had attacked 
her.  The trial court sustained an 
objection as to that question.  
Undaunted, the prosecutor persisted in his efforts to apprise the jury of 
Mr. Simmons' prior criminal record by asking about his juvenile record and 
whether he had been placed in the Wyoming Boys' School.  This time, the trial court called 
counsel to the bench, sharply admonished the prosecutor, sustained the defense 
objection, struck the question, and instructed the jury not to consider it.  Nevertheless, in closing argument, the 
prosecutor asked the jury to look at Mr. Simmons' character and suggested one 
way to do that was by looking at his past.

 

[¶19]   W.R.E. 404(b) clearly prohibits 
evidence of prior bad acts to prove character disposed to criminal conduct.  Under this subsection, evidence is 
inadmissible if the thrust of the evidence is only to demonstrate that the 
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶17, 57 P.3d 332, ¶17 (Wyo. 
2002).  No other purpose for 
the prosecutor's repeated references to prior bad acts appears in the record, 
nor was any identified by the prosecutor.  
We conclude, based upon the entire record, a reasonable probability 
exists that, absent the prosecutor's conduct, the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the accused.  The 
prosecutor's conduct, therefore, affected a substantial right, requiring 
reversal of the conviction and remand of the case for a new 
trial.

 

[¶20]   On remand, the state will be 
required to comply with Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo. 
2002), if it intends to reference prior bad acts.  In Howard, a case decided after 
Mr. Simmons' 2001 trial, we held that the filing of a pretrial demand for notice 
of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) shall be treated the same as 
an objection and requires the state to justify the evidence as proper under 
W.R.E. 404(b), relevant, and more probative than unfairly prejudicial.  In reaching this result, we 
said:

 

Not 
only will such a rule enhance the defendant's prospects of receiving due process 
and a fair trial, it will also enhance the district court's ability to reflect 
and rule upon a significant evidentiary issue.  Rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence 
are too important to be made in the heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury 
twiddling its thumbs in the next room.

 

2002 
WY 40, ¶23.

 

B.        
Shackling

 

[¶21]   During its case in chief, the 
defense informed the trial court that Mr. Simmons would be its next 
witness.  Defense counsel then asked 
to approach the bench, and the following discussion took 
place:

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  The Defendant is in 
shackles.  I would just as soon he 
not go to the witness stand in shackles.  
I apologize for not anticipating this beforehand, but we would ask for 
just a short recess so that he can make that trip and then come right 
back.

 

THE 
COURT:  
[Prosecutor]?

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  No objection, Your Honor.  I know this has happened before and 
sometimes we've taken the shackles off underneath the table.  It's whatever the Court 
wants.

 

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Well, my thought is if a request to free 
him from shackles was made earlier, I would go ahead and grant that.  In the context of this case, it's 
already been indicated that he is in custody and while he has been in street 
clothes I don't think the fact that he may be subject to restrain[t]s is -- 
would be a surprise to the jurors, so I don't want to delay these proceedings 
any further.

 

It 
seems like things have really bogged down and ARE going slow.  So I'll deny the request, and as I said, 
I'll allow him to testify, but he can just walk to the witness stand as any 
other witness would do.

 

The 
defense then called Mr. Simmons who came forward in shackles, was sworn, and 
proceeded to testify.

 

[¶22]   Mr. Simmons claims he was denied 
his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court required him to 
appear before the jury in shackles.  
We recently addressed this same issue in Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶62, 62 P.3d 945, ¶62 (Wyo. 
2003), and Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶16, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶16 
(Wyo. 2003), wherein we said it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to 
require a defendant to be shackled or otherwise physically restrained in the 
courtroom during a jury trial unless:  
(1) the state moves for such measures, (2) the court hears the state's 
motion, (3) the defendant has an opportunity to contest the motion, and (4) the 
court states on the record compelling reasons justifying the measures.  Because we reverse and remand for a new 
trial on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, we do not decide whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in requiring Mr. Simmons to appear before the 
jury in shackles.  However, on 
remand, the procedures outlined in Asch must be followed.  Under Asch, the use of restraints 
was clearly not appropriate where, as here, the state did not object to removing 
the shackles and the only reasons appearing in the record for not removing them 
were Mr. Simmons' failure to raise the matter earlier and the court's concern 
that the trial was proceeding too slowly and should not be delayed 
further.

 

C.        
Spectator Calling Witness a "Liar"

 

[¶23]   Mr. Simmons asserts he was denied a 
fair trial because a spectator called a defense witness a liar during her 
testimony.  He claims plain error 
occurred because the remark was prejudicial on its face and the trial court took 
no steps to determine whether the jury heard the remark and to correct any 
unfair prejudice.  While asserting 
there are no Wyoming cases directly on point, Mr. Simmons cites Gallup v. 
State, 559 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1977) (per curiam), and Miller v. State, 
904 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1995), for the proposition that the trial court must at least 
take steps under these circumstances to cure any unfair prejudice.  

 

[¶24]   The record reflects the following 
occurred with respect to this claim.  
During the state's cross-examination of Mr. Simmons' mother, defense 
counsel asked to approach the bench.  
A bench conference was held during which defense counsel informed the 
court that, during Ms. Simmons' testimony, he heard someone behind him say, 
"she's a liar."  Apparently, the 
court reporter also overheard the remark.  
The trial court excused the jury and asked the woman seated behind 
defense counsel, who was later identified as Ms. Bradford's grandmother, to come 
forward.  The trial court admonished 
the woman and her husband against making statements intended to influence the 
jury or detract from the proceedings and threatened to oust them from the 
courtroom if they made further such statements.  The couple apparently left the 
courtroom.  After a recess, the jury 
was brought back in, and the trial continued.  The trial court did not inquire of the 
jury whether it heard the remark, nor did it take other corrective action.  Defense counsel, however, did not object 
to the manner in which the trial court handled the situation.  He did not, for example, ask the trial 
court to question the jurors about whether they heard the remark, nor did he ask 
for an instruction reminding the jury that it was to consider only the evidence 
presented.  Defense counsel also did 
not move for a mistrial.  

 

[¶25]   Because no objection was made, Mr. 
Simmons must show plain error occurred.  
Under our plain error standard of review, Mr. Simmons must show a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation clearly appeared in the 
record, and the violation resulted in denial of a substantial right to his 
material prejudice.  
Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57, ¶51.  
Pursuant to the United States and Wyoming Constitutions, there is no 
question that a criminal defendant is guaranteed a right to a jury trial, and 
impartiality of the jury is an essential element of the guarantee.  Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 963 (Wyo. 2000); Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 607-08 (Wyo. 
1989).  When jurors consider 
extrinsic evidence, a new trial is required if the evidence poses a reasonable 
possibility of prejudice to the defendant.  
Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 608.  
However, a new trial is not required every time a juror is placed in a 
potentially compromising situation.  
Id.  

 

"[I]t 
is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that 
might theoretically affect their vote.  
Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on 
the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they 
happen."

 

Id. 
at 609 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).  Thus, we have said the trial judge is 
responsible for maintaining the decorum in the courtroom and has a large measure 
of discretion in responding to potentially prejudicial occurrences.  Gallup, 559 P.2d  at 1026.   This is so because the trial judge 
is in a far better position to assess the effect of potentially prejudicial 
occurrences upon the jury.  
Id.  

 

[¶26]   At the same time, defense counsel 
also bears a burden to ensure such potential prejudice is adequately 
addressed.  Where counsel has failed 
to ask the trial court to admonish the jury, move for a mistrial, or raise an 
objection to the trial court's response, we have declined to reverse.  See Clegg v. State, 655 P.2d 1240, 1241-42 (Wyo. 1982) (upholding trial court's response when victim 
called the defendant a goddamn liar during his testimony); Tryon v. 
State, 567 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Wyo. 1977) (upholding trial court's response 
to report that juror received anonymous telephone call concerning prior acts of 
defendant where defense counsel did not move for mistrial or object); 
Gallup, 559 P.2d  at 1026 (upholding trial court's response to courtroom 
altercation between victim's father and defendant during victim's testimony 
where defense counsel failed to object, ask for further admonition, or move for 
mistrial).  In such cases, we 
inferred defense counsel considered the trial court's response sufficient.  Gallup, 559 P.2d  at 1026; 
Tryon, 567 P.2d  at 293.  
These cases illustrate the point that defense counsel bears a substantial 
burden to ensure such error is adequately addressed at the time it occurs.  Where, as here, defense counsel stood 
silent while the proceedings were allowed to continue without asking the trial 
court to admonish the jury, give a corrective instruction, or even inquire of 
the jury whether it heard any comment from the audience, we hold that no 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law occurred.  

 

[¶27]   Mr. Simmons has also failed to show 
he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Error is prejudicial only if the 
defendant can establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the 
error, the verdict might have been more favorable.  Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶16, 56 P.3d 626, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2002).  Absent evidence that 
the jury heard the remark made by the spectator, Mr. Simmons cannot establish a 
reasonable probability that, in the absence of the remark, the verdict might 
have been more favorable, and his claim must fail.2

 

D.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶28]   We review sufficiency of the 
evidence claims in criminal cases according to the following 
standard:

 

[W] 
e must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential 
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  "We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum 
of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the 
same result as the jury actually did."  
[Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 
1996)].

 

Williams 
v. State, 
986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); see also 
Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57, ¶44.   

 

[¶29]   Pointing to Instruction No. 8, 
which sets forth the elements necessary for the crime of child abuse, Mr. 
Simmons contends sufficient evidence was not presented for the jury to convict 
him of both intentionally and recklessly inflicting bodily injury upon 
B.S. and, without sufficient evidence of both, the verdict must be set 
aside.  Instruction No. 8 stated in 
relevant part:

 

The 
elements of the crime of Child Abuse, as charged in Count I, 
are:

 

1.  On 
or between March 28, 2001 and March 29, 2001

 

2.  In 
the County of Natrona and State of Wyoming 

 

3.  The 
Defendant, James Simmons, Jr.

 

4.  As 
a person responsible for the child's welfare

 

5.  Intentionally 
or recklessly

 

6.  Inflicted 
physical injury, excluding reasonable corporal punishment

 

7.  Upon 
[B.S.], a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Mr. Simmons cites Bush 
v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), in support of his argument, wherein 
we held a verdict must be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on 
one ground but not on another and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury 
selected.  Bush and the line 
of cases following it involved charging documents and jury instructions 
containing alternative elements constituting the crime.  See Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57; 
May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. 
State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002).  Because in those cases the evidence was 
insufficient to prove both of the alternative elements and it was impossible to 
tell which alternative the jury relied upon for conviction, we reversed.  Relying on these cases, Mr. Simmons 
claims his conviction for child abuse must be reversed because the state proved 
only that he intentionally injured B.S. and not that he recklessly injured 
him.  Mr. Simmons asserts there is 
no evidence to sustain a conviction based on recklessly inflicting injury and 
so, under the Bush line of cases, his conviction must be 
reversed.

 

[¶30]   In O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 
63, ¶20, 45 P.3d 225, ¶20 (Wyo. 2002) (citation omitted), we 
said:

 

The 
Model Penal Code provides that when recklessness suffices to establish an 
element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or 
knowingly.  The Explanatory Note to 
this Code explains that this rule makes it unnecessary to state in the 
definition of an offense that the defendant can be convicted if it is proved 
that he was more culpable than the definition of the offense 
requires.  Thus, if the crime can be 
committed recklessly, it is no less committed if the actor acted 
purposely.

 

Under 
this reasoning, if the evidence supports a finding that a reasonable jury could 
conclude Mr. Simmons intentionally inflicted physical injury upon B.S., 
recklessness is established.  We 
hold, therefore, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that 
it could find Mr. Simmons guilty of child abuse if it found he intentionally or 
recklessly inflicted the injuries.

 

            
  

CONCLUSION

 

[¶31]   Even though no error occurred on 
the claims of insufficiency of the evidence and denial of a fair trial because 
of a spectator's remarks, we reverse and remand because prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly referred to prior bad acts over defense 
counsel's objections and the trial court's rulings.  On remand for a new trial, the state 
must justify the evidence of prior bad acts as proper under W.R.E. 404(b), 
relevant, and more probative than prejudicial.  Additionally, on remand, the trial court 
must ensure compliance with the procedures outlined in Asch if the use of 
physical restraints is at issue.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The prosecutor's direct examination of Ms. Bradford consists of forty-two 
pages in the trial transcript.  Of 
those forty-two pages, sixteen (or more than one-third) contain this type of 
questioning.

 

2Prior to oral arguments, Mr. Simmons filed a motion asking this Court to 
remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to establish that the layout of 
the courtroom was such that jurors could have overheard the spectator's 
remark.  We denied the motion 
because, even if Mr. Simmons established the layout of the courtroom, that would 
not show whether jurors in fact heard the spectator's 
remark.