Title: Rosencrans Et Ux. v. Bennett Et Ux.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed with directions October 24, 1951.
Ramstead & Huey, of Eugene, filed a brief for appellants.
Day T. Bayly, of Eugene, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
*46 Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and HAY, LUSK, LATOURETTE and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.
LATOURETTE, J.
On April 18, 1950, after a jury trial, a judgment based on the verdict was entered of record in favor of plaintiffs against defendant, Fay M. Bennett, in the sum of $500. Thereafter, on April 24, 1950, said defendant moved to set aside the judgment and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, said motion being as follows:
On June 2, 1950, the court entered the following order:
Plaintiffs, on appeal, assign error as follows:
Section 5-806, O.C.L.A., reads as follows:
It is contended by appellants that the order granting a new trial to the defendant was on the court's own motion and was made 42 days after entry of judgment in contravention of the above statute and, therefore, was erroneous and void.
Turning to the order in question, we find that the court set aside the verdict of the jury and the judgment based thereon because "* * * this cause was tried on the theory of false and fraudulent misrepresentations," and "* * * plaintiffs' complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action based upon fraud," and thereupon ordered a new trial.
To determine whether or not such an order was made upon the court's own motion or was based upon the motion of defendants hereinbefore set out, it is necessary to ascertain if there was anything in the motion sustaining the court's reason for setting aside *50 the verdict and judgment, to-wit: whether the complaint stated "* * * facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action based upon fraud."
1, 2. The first ground of the motion was insufficiency of evidence; the second ground was that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the instructions of the court; the third ground was that the court erred in law at the trial in the following particulars: (a) that the court should have granted a nonsuit predicated upon the evidence adduced at the trial, and (b) that the court erred in not giving a requested instruction. It will thus be seen that defendant's motion for a new trial was wholly devoid of anything remotely connected with the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint.
It is obvious from reading the order of the trial court that the whole of such order was based on the insufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint, and, not being in response to defendant's motion, it was an order granted on its own motion, and, not having been entered within 30 days after the filing of the judgment, the same was void and of no effect.
In the case of Bean v. Hostettler, 182 Or. 510, 188 P.2d 636, a motion for a new trial was based upon four grounds. The trial court, in granting a new trial, did not base its ruling upon any of the grounds specified in the motion but wholly upon other grounds. We there held that the new trial was granted by the court on its own motion.
The order setting aside the verdict and judgment and the granting of a new trial is reversed with directions to reinstate the verdict of the jury and the judgment based thereon with legal interest from the date of the original entry of the judgment, to-wit: April 18, 1950.