Title: Hobelman v. Krebs Construction Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

188 Kan. 825 (1961)
366 P.2d 270
HERMAN HOBELMAN, Appellee (Claimant),
v.
MEL KREBS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (Respondent), TRI-STATE INSURANCE COMPANY (Insurance Carrier), Appellants, and JOE KREUTZER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (Respondent), WESTERN CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY (Insurance Carrier), Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
No. 42,588

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 10, 1961.
A.M. Fleming and Bert J. Vance, both of Garden City, and Charles H. Fleming, of Scott City, were on the briefs for the appellants, Mel Krebs Construction Company and Tri-State Insurance Company.
Lloyd H. Haag, Dale E. Saffels and Clifford R. Hope, Jr., all of Garden City, were on the briefs for the appellees and cross-appellants, Joe Kreutzer Construction Company and Western Casualty and Surety Company.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is a workmen's compensation case in which the award to the employee is not in dispute. In this appeal the only questions presented to the court are (1) whether the employers, and their respective insurance carriers, are jointly liable for payment of the award and (2) if so, which of such respondents is primarily liable for the payment.
Counsel for the contesting parties have filed a joint abstract thus simplifying the statement of facts which present the legal questions. The facts, none of which are disputed, may be summarized as follows:
The claimant, Herman Hobelman, regularly worked for the respondent, Joe Kreutzer Construction Company, a general contractor. *827 This company owned a large crane and made a business of renting it to other contractors in the same area. Respondent, Mel Krebs Construction Company was also a general contractor in such area.
On the date claimant sustained his accidental injuries the Krebs Construction Company was erecting a building in Garden City, Kansas, known as the Garden Bowl. Through a telephone conversation between the involved employer respondents, hereinafter referred to in our factual statement as Kreutzer and Krebs, it was arranged for Kreutzer to furnish Krebs with the crane and a crane operator on the morning of July 9, 1960, for the purpose of setting steel beams at the Garden Bowl project. In addition to the crane operator, Kreutzer also sent along the claimant, Hobelman, to help the crane operator in assembling the boom on the crane. Hobelman's original instructions were to go to another job where Kreutzer was carrying on construction work when the boom was assembled. Sometime after the arrival of the Kreutzer employees at the Garden Bowl project Krebs' foreman requested that Hobelman be left with Krebs to help it with setting the steel beams as it was shorthanded. The Kreutzer crane operator replied that he had no authority to allow the claimant to remain with Krebs on its job. Later the Krebs foreman in a conversation with Joe Kreutzer, one of the owners of the Kreutzer Company, renewed the request he had made to the Kreutzer crane operator. Thereupon Joe Kreutzer acceded to the foreman's request and instructed Hobelman to stay on the Krebs job and assist it in setting the steel beams. In this conversation Joe Kreutzer advised the foreman that Kreutzer would charge Krebs $2.00 an hour for Hobelman's services.
After Hobelman started working for Krebs, and while engaged in assisting with the setting of the steel beams, Hobelman was injured. At that time the work was being supervised by Krebs' foreman. Hobelman remained upon the regular payroll of Kreutzer, withholding taxes and other payroll deductions were made from his wages by Kreutzer, his wages were to be paid by Kreutzer, and its workmen's compensation insurance premiums were based as though Hobelman remained on its payroll.
Following Hobelman's accidental injury he filed his claim for workmen's compensation against both Kreutzer and its insurance carrier, the Western Casualty and Surety Company, and Krebs and its insurance carrier, the Tri-State Insurance Company. Ultimately an award was rendered in his favor.
*828 On appeal the district court, in harmony with the findings and conclusions of the Examiner, as described by its journal entry of judgment concluded as follows:
Neither of the respondents question the right of the claimant to file his claim against them jointly. The respondent, Krebs, and its insurance carrier, have appealed contending that the trial court erred in finding that the relationship of the claimant to respondents was that of a general employee of Kreutzer and that of a special employee of Krebs. It further contends that the court should have found that Kreutzer was the subcontractor of Krebs within the meaning of the term "subcontractor" as used in G.S. 1949, 44-503, and that Kreutzer and its insurance carrier were primarily liable to claimant for all compensation and that no compensation was due him from Krebs or its insurance carrier, unless Kreutzer and its insurance carrier failed to pay all compensation due.
The respondent, Kreutzer and its insurance carrier have filed a cross-appeal contending that the court, having found the relationship between the respondents to be that of general employer and special employer, should have found the special employer primarily liable for the award.
We have no difficulty in concluding, under the facts of this case, that the status of the respondents is that of general employer and special employer and not that of contractor and sub-contractor. Neither do we have difficulty in concluding that the respondents *829 are jointly liable for the award to claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the case of Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 147 Kan. 719, 78 P.2d 868, under very similar facts, we stated that the relationship of the respondents to the claimant was that of general employer and special employer and there held:
The extension of this opinion to include the reasons and the authorities for our conclusion in the Mendel case would serve no useful purpose.
In Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, 264 P.2d 494, we said:
And held:
See, also, Judd v. City of Emporia, 183 Kan. 689, 331 P.2d 316, where the decision was based on the opinion in the Bright case and additional cases having a bearing on the question involved are cited.
The undisputed facts disclose that Kreutzer loaned for hire its regular employee, the claimant, to Krebs and that at the time of the injury claimant was doing work for Krebs which was part of its trade and business, and under the supervision, direction and control of its foreman. Under these circumstances we have no difficulty in concluding that relationship of the respondents to the claimant is that of general employer and special employer, and both are liable to the claimant for the compensation award.
We are asked by both respondents to determine their primary and secondary liability to the claimant. We are forced to conclude that neither the commissioner in making the award, the district court nor this court on appeal has jurisdiction to make such determination in a workman's compensation case where the relationship of the respondents to the claimant is that of general employer and special employer.
We will not prolong this opinion by presenting a lengthy discussion of applicable general principles but they should be mentioned.
The remedies and the procedure provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act are complete and exclusive from the inception of the claim to final judgment. (See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 156 Kan. 763, 137 P.2d 147; Brewington v. Western Union, 163 Kan. 534, 183 P.2d 872.) The act borrows nothing from the code of civil procedure or other statutes. (See Welden v. American Steel & Wire Co., 143 Kan. 125, 53 P.2d 1195; Dean v. Hodges Bros., 170 Kan. 333, 224 P.2d 1028.)
The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has no jurisdiction beyond that specifically provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. On appeal, neither the district court nor this court can extend its jurisdiction beyond that of the Commissioner.
We stated in Bright v. Bragg, supra, that the Workmen's Compensation *831 Act does not differentiate between special and general employers. Neither the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner nor the courts on appeal, can differentiate or attempt to fix primary or secondary liability. We must distinguish this relationship from that of principal contractor and subcontractor as the act itself differentiates between the two. (G.S. 1949, 44-503.)
The Workmen's Compensation Act has as its primary purpose an expeditious award of compensation in favor of an injured employee against all persons who may be liable therefor. The Act does not contemplate that such proceedings should be hampered or delayed by the adjudication of collateral issues relating to degrees of liability of the parties made responsible by the Act for the payment of compensation. Questions of contractual obligations or even equitable considerations may well be involved between the responsible parties which are of no concern to the injured employee. If such questions are involved, they should be resolved by a court in an independent proceeding in which the employee should not be required to participate.
Although the specific question as to whether or not the primary and secondary liability between a general employer and a special employer should be determined in a workmen's compensation case has not been determined by this court, we have established precedents which throw light on the question.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 186 Kan. 637, 352 P.2d 70, it is said:
In the above case this court was considering an action by one workmen's compensation insurance carrier against another seeking to shift liability for the payment of the award by an independent action.
*832 See, also, Attebery v. Griffin Construction Co., 181 Kan. 450, 312 P.2d 598, where it is said:
A somewhat limited independent research of cases from foreign jurisdictions dealing with the subject discloses that the general rule is in harmony with our conclusion on the point now under consideration.
The Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Colorado does not differentiate between a general contractor and a subcontractor. The Supreme Court of Colorado had before it the question as to whether or not the primary and secondary liability of a general contractor and a subcontractor could be determined in a workmen's compensation case. The court held:
In the absence of a specific statute to the contrary, such as G.S. 1949, 44-503, we are in accord with the statement made in the case of Johnson v. Mortenson, 110 Conn. 221, 147 Atl. 705, as follows:
In conclusion it may be stated that, except for its conclusion of law No. 4, the general judgment of the district court, as set out in its journal entry, which includes its conclusions of law Nos. 1 to 4 incl., as heretofore quoted, is not out of harmony with the views expressed and conclusions reached by the court in this opinion. However, with direct reference to the trial court's conclusion of law No. 4, what has been heretofore stated and held makes it clear that tribunal had no authority to determine liability of the contesting respondents as between themselves in the compensation proceeding and it erred in attempting to do so. It follows the judgment, so far as it relates to the subject last mentioned, must be reversed and that all other portions thereof should be and are affirmed. Therefore, since the judgment must be modified as herein indicated, the cause is remanded to the district court for final disposition in accordance with the views herein expressed.
It is so ordered.