Title: Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13355 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MELISSA PFEIFFER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 6, 2023. - July 17, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Burning a Dwelling House.  Fire 
Fighter.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, 
Sentence, Judicial discretion, State of mind, Verdict, 
Instructions to jury, Retroactivity of judicial holding.  
Estoppel.  Evidence, Expert opinion, State of mind, Intent.  
Mental Impairment.  Intent.  Retroactivity of Judicial 
Holding. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 8, 2011. 
 
Following review by this court, 482 Mass. 110 (2019), a 
motion for postconviction relief was heard by Janet L. Sanders, 
J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
2 
 
Merritt Schnipper, Radha Natarajan, Stephanie Hartung, 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell, & Audrey Murillo, for New England 
Innocence Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
David J. Nathanson & Eva G. Jellison, for Daniel Rogers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  At issue in this appeal is whether the trial 
judge abused her discretion by reducing the defendant's verdict 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 
1502 (1995).  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
second degree on a theory of felony-murder, with arson as the 
predicate felony.  We affirmed the defendant's conviction on 
direct review, as there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 
122, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 498 (2019).  Following this, the 
trial judge reduced the verdict to involuntary manslaughter in 
response to the defendant's rule 25 (b) (2) motion.  With the 
verdict reduced, the judge resentenced the defendant to from 
eight to ten years' incarceration, which, given time served, 
resulted in the defendant being eligible for release.  The 
Commonwealth appealed from the verdict reduction on the ground 
that the judge abused her discretion. 
 
Under rule 25 (b) (2), a judge may reduce a verdict on the 
basis that it is "against the weight of the evidence, or not 
consonant with justice."  See Commonwealth v. Arias, 488 Mass. 
1004, 1007 (2021).  A judge may exercise this discretionary 
3 
 
authority even where the evidence is sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict.  However, because rule 25 (b) (2) allows a judge 
to undo the work of the jury, this power is to be used 
sparingly.  A judge may not reduce a verdict if the evidence 
does not point to a lesser offense. 
 
Here, the judge reduced the defendant's conviction because, 
among other reasons, the weight of the evidence suggested that 
the defendant had not had the requisite intent when she set the 
fire that formed the basis for the arson conviction.  The judge 
also took into account mitigating circumstances constituted by 
the defendant's severe cognitive limitations and mental 
disorder.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion by reducing the jury's verdict.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judge's order reducing the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the second degree to involuntary manslaughter.1 
 
1.  Background.  On December 24, 2010, the defendant was 
living on the first floor of a two-unit apartment building with 
her boyfriend and their two year old son.  At around 9 P.M., 
after dropping off their son with a relative, the defendant 
returned to the apartment, where an argument ensued with her 
boyfriend, who then left for a nearby bar.  About an hour later, 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Innocence Project, the Criminal Justice Institute at 
Harvard Law School, and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; and by Daniel Rogers. 
4 
 
while her boyfriend was gone, the defendant set afire a piece of 
paper and tossed it onto a duffel bag of clothing that was on 
the floor in a corner of the apartment.  The defendant then left 
the building, the exterior door of the building locking behind 
her.  Her boyfriend returned to find the defendant outside the 
building, at which point she told him that his clothes were on 
fire.  The defendant remained on the scene arguing with her 
boyfriend as flames became visible through the apartment 
windows.  The defendant did not call for help or alert other 
occupants.  The blaze quickly engulfed the building, killing one 
second-floor occupant and severely injuring another.  Two 
firefighters also were injured. 
 
The defendant was charged with arson of a dwelling house, 
G. L. c. 266, § 1; murder in the second degree, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1; assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A; and two counts of injuring a firefighter, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13D 1/2. 
At trial, which commenced in 2016, the defendant argued 
that there was insufficient evidence that she intended to burn 
the building when she lit her boyfriend's clothing on fire.  The 
defense emphasized the defendant's cognitive limitations, as 
well as her mental disorder.  The defense called as a witness 
Dr. Frank DiCataldo, who testified that when the defendant was a 
child, she was abused sexually and physically by her biological 
5 
 
parents, placed in a series of foster homes, and admitted to 
several hospitals for psychiatric treatment.  He further 
testified that the defendant's history supported a diagnosis of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
DiCataldo also testified about the defendant's cognitive 
abilities.  Based on testing he had conducted, DiCataldo 
determined that the defendant had extremely limited intellectual 
functioning and that she possessed an over-all intelligence 
quotient of seventy-one, which placed her in the third 
percentile of adults.  DiCataldo testified that the defendant's 
perceptual reasoning abilities were extremely weak, such that 
"it [took] her a long time to process information."  He 
concluded that, although the defendant's deficits did not mean 
that she was not criminally responsible, she nonetheless was 
impaired in her ability to understand fully the consequences 
that could flow from her actions, including when she set afire 
her boyfriend's clothing. 
DiCataldo wrote a report on his examination of the 
defendant, which was not presented to the jury, that provided 
greater detail on the defendant's history of abuse and neglect.  
The report stated that the defendant's mental disorder "likely 
constituted a significant mental impairment that substantially 
compromised her ability to formulate the requisite intention to 
act with deliberation and forethought regarding the reasonable 
6 
 
likely outcome of her actions."  The report also stated that, at 
the time of the offense, the defendant was substantially 
impaired in "her ability to contemplate the consequences of her 
actions and control her behavior." 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed notice with the court 
of her intent to introduce evidence of her mental condition.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A), as appearing in 463 Mass. 
1501 (2012).  In response, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
require the defendant to submit to an examination by an 
independent evaluator.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B).  
The motion was allowed, and the Commonwealth filed notice that 
the chosen evaluator would be Dr. Alison Fife. 
Fife wrote a report on the defendant, which was filed with 
the court.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii).  In the 
report, Fife concluded that the defendant's "capacities to 
conform her behavior to the requirements of the law [on the 
night of the incident], specifically to maintain behavioral 
control, were impaired by her cognitive limitations and PTSD as 
evidenced by her concrete thinking and poor analytical skills, 
impaired ability to weigh the consequences of her emotions and 
resultant behaviors before acting on them[,] and poor impulse 
control and coping skills."  Fife's report was viewed by defense 
counsel, who then provided a copy of the report with redactions 
7 
 
to the Commonwealth.  Fife did not testify at trial, and her 
report was not presented to the jury. 
 
During trial, the Commonwealth requested jury instructions 
that characterized arson as a crime of specific intent.  Under 
the proposed instructions, to convict the defendant of arson the 
jury would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant "acted with the specific intent to willfully and 
maliciously set fire to or cause to be burned a dwelling."  The 
judge granted the Commonwealth's request and instructed the jury 
that a person commits arson only "if she intends both her 
conduct, for example, lighting a paper, and the resulting harm, 
the burning of the building or some part of it."  This language 
reflected the model jury instructions on arson at the time of 
the defendant's trial.  See Massachusetts Superior Court 
Criminal Practice Jury Instructions, Crimes Against Property and 
Other Crimes § 4.3.1 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013). 
The judge instructed the jury that they could convict the 
defendant of murder in the second degree under either a theory 
of felony-murder or a theory of unlawful killing with malice.  
The judge also instructed the jury on the lesser included 
offense of involuntary manslaughter. 
 
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree 
on a theory of felony-murder with arson as the predicate felony, 
as well as two counts of injuring a firefighter.  She was 
8 
 
sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison on the murder 
charge, with concurrent sentences of from three to five years on 
the other two counts.  The jury did not reach unanimous 
agreement on the theory that the defendant had committed an 
unlawful killing with malice. 
The defendant appealed from those verdicts, and this court 
affirmed them.  See Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 112.  We concluded, 
however, that the judge had erred in instructing the jury that 
an arson conviction requires specific intent to burn a dwelling.  
See id. at 120.  We held, rather, that arson is a crime of 
general intent.  See id. at 120-121.2 
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial or, in the 
alternative, for a reduction in the verdict, pursuant to rule 
25 (b) (2) and Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  In 2021, the trial judge held a 
nonevidentiary hearing on that motion.  The judge denied so much 
of the motion as requested a new trial, but she concluded that 
the defendant had met her burden of showing that justice was not 
done and accordingly reduced the jury's verdict of murder in the 
second degree to involuntary manslaughter.  The judge based her 
conclusion on four factors:  the weakness of the evidence 
 
2 We affirmed the conviction despite the erroneous 
instruction because the error was "[t]o the defendant's 
benefit."  See Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 121, 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 498 (2019). 
9 
 
supporting the defendant's intent to burn a dwelling; the 
mitigating circumstances constituted by the defendant's personal 
characteristics; an erroneous supplemental instruction she had 
provided the jury during trial;3 and this court's decision in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 825 (2017) (Gants, C.J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), issued eighteen 
months after the defendant's trial, establishing that felony-
murder cannot be an independent theory of liability for murder.  
The judge, in her memorandum of decision and order, relied on 
the reports written by DiCataldo and Fife. 
The Commonwealth appealed, and the defendant filed a cross 
appeal.  We granted the defendant's request for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge 
abused her discretion and committed clear error of law when she 
 
3 The judge had instructed the jury that, with regard to the 
intent required to prove arson, the Commonwealth could satisfy 
its burden of proof by showing that the defendant, having 
accidentally or negligently caused the fire, then willfully and 
maliciously had failed either to extinguish or to report it.  
This reflected the model jury instructions on arson at the time 
of the defendant's trial.  See Massachusetts Superior Court 
Criminal Practice Jury Instructions, Crimes Against Property and 
Other Crimes § 4.3.3 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013).  We 
held that this instruction was erroneous because "accidentally 
or negligently set fires cannot form the basis for arson under 
G. L. c. 266, § 1."  Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 125.  We further 
held that the error did not require a new trial, because it did 
not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
id. at 128-129. 
10 
 
reduced the defendant's conviction.  In particular, the 
Commonwealth contends that the judge was directly estopped from 
analyzing the weight of the evidence; the judge erred in 
considering evidence that was not presented at trial; the judge 
applied an incorrect legal standard to her analysis of the 
evidence; and the judge erred by considering our holding in 
Brown, 477 Mass. at 825 (Gants, C.J., concurring).4 
a.  Rule 25 (b) (2).  Rule 25 (b) (2) "provides trial 
judges with the flexibility to fashion appropriate relief after 
a verdict has been returned" if justice so requires.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 167 (2006).  In 
particular, rule 25 (b) (2) empowers a judge to reduce a verdict 
to a lesser included charge, "despite the presence of sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict."  See Commonwealth v. 
Pagan, 471 Mass. 537, 542, cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1013 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 381 
(2006).  See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 504 
(2020).  A judge appropriately exercises this power "where the 
weight of the evidence in the case . . . points to a lesser 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 821 (2003).  
Under rule 25 (b) (2) review, the judge "may review all the 
 
4 The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying her 
motion for a new trial, but she waives her cross appeal in the 
event that this court affirms the verdict reduction. 
11 
 
evidence, including the defendant's version of the facts," even 
if this requires the judge to substitute her "view of the 
evidence for that of the jury."  Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 
Mass. 659, 668-669 (1998).  Generally, a "trial judge's decision 
on a rule 25 (b) (2) motion 'should be guided by the same 
considerations'" as those that drive G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
review.  See Rolon, supra at 820, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 555 (1981). 
Because rule 25 (b) (2) vests in a judge the power to undo 
the work of the jury, this postconviction authority "should be 
exercised only sparingly."5  See Commonwealth v. Grassie, 482 
Mass. 1017, 1018 (2019).  The judge "is not to sit as a 'second 
jury.'"  Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 381, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 321 (1982).  See Woodward, 427 Mass. 
at 672, quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970) 
("The importance that our system attaches to trial by jury 
derives from the special confidence we repose in a body of one's 
peers to determine guilt or innocence as a safeguard against 
arbitrary law enforcement" [quotation omitted]).  Nonetheless, a 
judge should reduce a verdict where the result would be more 
"consonant with justice."  Rolon, 438 Mass. at 820, quoting 
Woodward, supra at 666. 
 
5 Here, for example, this was the first case in the judge's 
twenty-seven year career in which she reduced a verdict. 
12 
 
In reviewing a judge's order to reduce a verdict, "[o]ur 
role is not to decide whether we would have acted as the trial 
judge did."  Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 381.  "We defer to the 
trial judge because [she] has the advantage of face to face 
evaluation of the witnesses and the evidence at trial.  [She] is 
in a far better position than we are to make the judgment 
required by the rule."  Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 
891 (2013), quoting Woodward, 427 Mass. at 668.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse a verdict reduction only if "the judge abused his 
[or her] discretion or committed an error of law."  Rolon, 438 
Mass. at 821.  "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes 
an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear 
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. 
v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
In Commonwealth v. Lyons, 444 Mass. 289, 290 (2005), for 
example, the defendant was convicted of murder in the second 
degree for the shaking death of his two week old son.  The trial 
judge reduced the defendant's conviction to involuntary 
manslaughter, which, unlike murder in the second degree, does 
not require a finding of malice.  See id. at 290, 293.  Among 
the judge's reasons for reducing the verdict were the absence of 
evidence of prior abuse by the defendant, that the defendant's 
13 
 
crime was a "momentary act of 'extraordinarily poor judgment,'" 
and the defendant's history of being "a steady worker with no 
prior criminal record."  See id. at 292-293.  We held that the 
judge's decision was an abuse of discretion because none of the 
aforementioned factors indicated an absence of malice.  See id. 
at 293-297.  See also Pagan, 471 Mass. at 544 ("personal 
circumstances alone cannot warrant a reduction of the verdict"). 
 
b.  Direct estoppel.  The Commonwealth contends that, 
because this court previously assessed the evidence against the 
defendant in its decision in Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 121, the 
judge was directly estopped from analyzing the weight of the 
evidence. 
Under the principle of direct estoppel, a judge is 
precluded from reviewing an issue that previously was "litigated 
and determined," if "such determination was essential to 
the . . . conviction, and . . . the defendant had an opportunity 
to obtain review of the determination."  See Arias, 488 Mass. 
at 1006, quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 
806 (2021).  Accordingly, a judge may not reduce a verdict 
pursuant to a rule 25 (b) (2) motion "solely based on the 
assertion that the direct appeal was decided wrongly" 
(quotation, citation, and alterations omitted).  See Sanchez, 
485 Mass. at 498. 
14 
 
To establish that direct estoppel applies, "the 
Commonwealth must show that the issue[] raised in the [rule 
25 (b) (2) motion] [was] actually litigated and determined" in 
the original proceeding.  Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 
475 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 
710 (2005).  If one proceeding "involves application of a 
different legal standard" from that applied in another 
proceeding, then the two proceedings cannot be said to have 
addressed the same issue.  See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis 
Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 154 (2015). 
Here, the judge reduced the jury's verdict because the 
weight of the evidence suggested that the verdict was not 
consonant with justice.  See Rolon, 438 Mass. at 820.  This 
court, in contrast, held that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable inference that "the defendant acted with 
the requisite specific intent [to burn a dwelling] at the time 
she set the fire."  See Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 123.  Whether a 
verdict is consonant with justice is a matter distinct from 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.  
See Pagan, 471 Mass. at 542, citing Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 
381-382.  See also Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
406, 409-410 (2013) (distinguishing sufficiency standard from 
consonance with justice standard).  While this court, as part of 
its sufficiency review, was required to view the evidence in the 
15 
 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Pfeiffer, supra at 
122, the judge could choose to give greater "weight to the 
defendant's version of the events" by crediting DiCataldo's 
testimony and report, see Keough, 385 Mass. at 319.  
Accordingly, this court's previous holding did not preclude the 
judge from concluding that the "weight of the evidence . . . 
point[ed] to a lesser crime" than the jury's verdict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 214 (2017), S.C., 482 
Mass. 1017 (2019). 
c.  Evidence outside trial record.  The Commonwealth argues 
that the judge erred by considering materials beyond the scope 
of the trial record.  The Commonwealth points to the judge's 
reliance on the written reports of DiCataldo and Fife to glean 
the defendant's likely state of mind at the time she set the 
fire. 
The authority of a judge under rule 25 (b) (2) to "reduce 
the verdict or grant new trial is identical to the power" of 
this court to conduct independent review pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. Carter, 423 Mass. 506, 513 
(1996).  Because this court, under § 33E review, may consider 
"evidence of the defendant's character to which the jury may or 
may not have had access," it follows that a judge, under rule 
25 (b) (2) review, may do so as well.  See Commonwealth v. 
Coyne, 420 Mass. 33, 35 (1995). 
16 
 
The scope of new evidence that a judge may rely on to 
reduce a verdict, however, is not unlimited.  In Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 209 (2017), we held that a judge may 
reduce a verdict on the basis of new evidence that is related to 
"evidence presented at trial and the defense's theory of the 
case," but that a judge may not consider "evidence and a defense 
that were not introduced at all."  If a judge were to consider 
the latter sort of evidence, her analysis would not be informed 
by her "familiarity with [the] case" (citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Millyan, 399 Mass. 171, 189 (1987). 
DiCataldo's written report was directly related to the 
testimony he gave at trial.  The report described the results of 
the examination that was the basis for his testimony and 
included further details about the defendant's psychological 
profile and history of abuse.  Because DiCataldo had testified 
about the subject matter of his report, the judge had an 
adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of the report's 
conclusions.  See Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 
413 Mass. 119, 131 (1992).  DiCataldo's report therefore falls 
within the scope of evidence that may be considered as part of 
rule 25 (b) (2) review.  See Pagan, 471 Mass. at 543, 545-546 
(judge may reduce defendant's verdict after considering trial 
testimony of expert witness as well as report written by same 
expert witness that was not presented at trial). 
17 
 
It is less clear whether the judge did not err in 
considering Fife's report, as Fife did not testify at trial.  
Contrast Pagan, 471 Mass. at 543.  As the judge stated, however, 
Fife's report "essentially agreed with [DiCataldo's] 
conclusions":  both reports referred to the defendant's 
cognitive limitations, her mental disorder, and her inability to 
carefully plan out her actions.  Fife's report, unlike 
DiCataldo's, stated that the defendant's "capacities to conform 
her behavior to the requirements of the law [on the night of the 
incident] . . . were impaired."  DiCataldo's report, however, 
nonetheless indicated that the defendant likely did not 
contemplate the consequences of her actions at the time she set 
the fire.  Fife's report therefore was unnecessary to support 
the judge's conclusions about the defendant's state of mind at 
the time of the offense.  Accordingly, we do not decide whether 
the judge erred in considering Fife's report.  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991) (any error in admitting 
evidence was "clearly harmless" because evidence "contain[ed] 
nothing of importance that was not also contained in" other, 
properly admitted statements). 
d.  Specific intent.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
judge applied an incorrect standard to her analysis of the 
evidence.  According to the Commonwealth, because this court 
held that arson is a crime of general intent, the judge erred in 
18 
 
reducing the verdict on the basis that there was minimal 
evidence that the defendant had the specific intent to burn a 
dwelling. 
A reduction in the verdict may not be based "solely on 
factors irrelevant to the level of offense proved."  Rolon, 438 
Mass. at 822.  For example, while evidence of provocation might 
"operate to negate malice," the presence of provocation "is not 
a proper basis on which to reduce a conviction of felony-murder" 
where malice is not an essential element of felony-murder.  See 
id. at 823.  Similarly, where a drug trafficking conviction does 
not depend on the defendant knowing the "volume of the material 
being sold," a judge may not reduce the verdict on the basis 
that the defendant did not know that he or she possessed the 
requisite volume of drugs (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth 
v. Sabetti, 411 Mass. 770, 780-781 (1992). 
This court held in Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 120, that arson 
is a crime of general intent.  Accordingly, specific intent to 
burn a dwelling is not a necessary element of arson.  See id. at 
121.  Rather, "the intent element of § 1 . . . may be satisfied 
by proof that a reasonable person in the defendant's position 
would have known that there was a plain and strong likelihood 
that some portion of a dwelling house would be set on fire or 
burned."  Id.  It would seem to follow that the defendant's 
19 
 
intent to burn a dwelling, or lack thereof, was irrelevant to 
her arson conviction.  See id. at 120-121, 143 (Appendix). 
The judge's instructions to the jury, however, complicate 
the matter.  Jury instructions, even if erroneous, may in 
certain instances become the "law of the case."  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Pinero, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 397, 399 (2000).  
Here, both the defendant and the Commonwealth tried the case 
under the impression that arson is a specific intent crime, and 
the judge erroneously instructed the jury that specific intent 
to burn a dwelling is a necessary element of arson. 
The defendant argues that the erroneous instruction became 
the law of the case and that it therefore was appropriate for 
the judge, under her rule 25 (b) (2) review, to treat arson as a 
crime of specific intent.  In support of her argument, the 
defendant cites this court's opinion on direct review of this 
case.  There, we affirmed the jury's verdict only after we had 
determined that there was sufficient evidence to "establish that 
[the defendant] had the specific intent to burn the apartment 
building."  See Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 121-122.  This was 
despite our having concluded that "the evidence was overwhelming 
that the defendant acted with general intent and malice for 
purposes of arson under G. L. c. 266, § 1."  Id. at 121.  We 
employed a specific intent theory in our sufficiency review 
because "the jury were not instructed that arson was a general 
20 
 
intent crime."  See id.  According to the defendant, this same 
reasoning also applies under rule 25 (b) (2) review. 
To address the defendant's argument, we begin by examining 
why erroneous jury instructions can affect an appellate court's 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence, as they did in 
Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 121.  The United States Supreme Court has 
held that a criminal conviction cannot be affirmed "on the basis 
of a theory not presented to the jury."  See Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980).  "To uphold a conviction on a 
charge that was . . . [not] presented to a jury at trial offends 
the most basic notions of due process."  See Dunn v. United 
States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979).  Otherwise, the defendant is 
denied "an opportunity to confront, in a fact-finding forum," 
the theory of guilt on which he or she is convicted.  See Cola 
v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681, 701 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
930 (1986).  Hence, if the jurors are instructed that they may 
convict the defendant only on the basis of a particular theory 
of the crime, the jury's verdict may not be affirmed on the 
basis that there was sufficient evidence to establish an 
alternative theory of the crime.  See Dunn, supra at 107 
("appellate courts are not free to revise the basis on which a 
defendant is convicted simply because the same result would 
likely obtain on retrial"). 
21 
 
In Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 399 (2002), for 
example, the defendant was found guilty of three counts of 
larceny.  The defendant's convictions "were based on a theory of 
traditional larceny because that was the only instruction given 
to the jury."  Id. at 397.  This court determined that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of traditional 
larceny, but that there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant of larceny by false pretenses.  See id. at 394, 397, 
399.  We held that, because the jury were instructed only on the 
elements of traditional larceny, the defendant's convictions 
could not stand.  See id. at 399.  We reasoned that a "criminal 
conviction cannot be affirmed on appeal where the jury were not 
instructed on the elements of the theory of the crime."  Id. at 
398.  See United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1152 
(1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Pagan-San-Miguel v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 1234 (1996), quoting United States v. 
Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1196-1197 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 845 (1990) ("appellate determination of sufficiency must be 
constrained by trial court's instructions; 'otherwise . . . [the 
appellate court] would be sustaining a conviction on appeal on a 
theory upon which the jury [were] not instructed below'"); 
United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728, 731 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976) (because "the case was tried on the 
theory that it was incumbent on the government to prove 
22 
 
wilfulness and intent to escape, . . . that theory became the 
law of the case").6 
As we discussed, under rule 25 (b) (2), the judge did not 
analyze whether the evidence was sufficient to support the arson 
conviction.  Nonetheless, it was the judge's role, pursuant to 
 
6 In Commonwealth v. Buttimer, 482 Mass. 754, 756 (2019), in 
which the defendant was convicted of armed assault with intent 
to murder, the jury erroneously were instructed that, to convict 
the defendant, the weapon used to assault the victim had to be 
"operational."  We affirmed the conviction even though the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that the weapon used was 
operational.  See id. at 770-771.  We held that a "jury 
instruction that 'add[s] elements to the government's burden of 
proof beyond those required by statute . . . may not become the 
law of the case' if it is 'patently incorrect.'"  Id. at 766 
n.17, quoting United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1098 (2000).  See Musacchio v. 
United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) ("when a jury 
instruction sets forth all the elements of the charged crime but 
incorrectly adds one more element, a sufficiency challenge 
should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, 
not against the erroneously heightened command in the jury 
instruction"). 
 
The circumstances in Buttimer, 482 Mass. at 766 n.17, are 
distinct from those in Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 399 
(2002).  Where the appellate court disregards an extraneous 
element in its sufficiency analysis, the jury nonetheless will 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the remaining elements 
were present.  See United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d 742, 748 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 916 (2009) ("If, for example, 
a jury is charged that it must find three statutory elements and 
a fourth element not required by applicable law, that the 
evidence is insufficient to prove the fourth non-statutory 
element does not mean that a conviction that is properly 
supported under the applicable law deprives the defendant of his 
right to due process").  In Mills, in contrast, had this court 
affirmed the conviction on the basis of larceny by false 
pretenses, it would have entertained a theory of the crime that 
the jury had not found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23 
 
rule 25 (b) (2), to determine whether the jury's verdict was 
"against the weight of the evidence."  See Commonwealth v. 
Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 456 (1990).  Had the judge analyzed the 
weight of the evidence according to a general intent theory of 
the crime, she might have denied the defendant's rule 25 (b) (2) 
motion on the basis of a theory that the defendant had not had 
an "opportunity to confront . . . in a fact-finding forum."  See 
Cola, 787 F.2d at 701.  See also Commonwealth v. Mills, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 366, 373 n.11 (2001), S.C., 436 Mass. 387 (2002), 
citing Commonwealth v. Longo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 527 (1987), 
S.C., 402 Mass. 482 (1988) (it is "manifestly unjust and 
unlawful to uphold a verdict on a basis not in the minds of the 
contending parties, the judge, or the jury").  It therefore was 
reasonable for the judge, in reviewing the evidence, to take 
into account that the jury had convicted the defendant by reason 
of specific intent.  See Commonwealth v. Kozubal, 488 Mass. 575, 
581 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2723 (2022), quoting L.L., 
470 Mass. at 185 n.27 (judge's decision is abuse of discretion 
if it "falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives").  We 
conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion by applying 
a specific intent standard as part of her rule 25 (b) (2) 
review. 
e.  Retroactive application of Brown.  In Brown, 477 Mass. 
at 825 (Gants, C.J., concurring), this court abandoned the 
24 
 
doctrine of constructive malice, whereby felony-murder is an 
independent theory of liability for murder.  Rather, a 
conviction of felony-murder now requires a "finding of actual 
malice."  Id.  We made clear in our decision that the "abolition 
of felony-murder liability from our common law of murder" 
applies "only to cases where trial [began] after our adoption of 
the change."  Id. at 834.  We reasoned that retroactive 
application of our holding would be unfair to the Commonwealth, 
because a "felony-murder case might have been tried very 
differently if the prosecutor had known that liability for 
murder would need to rest on proof of actual malice.  For 
instance, a prosecutor might have asked for an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction if he or she had known that the jury 
could not rest a finding of murder on felony-murder liability."  
Id. 
Here, the judge provided as one of her reasons for reducing 
the defendant's verdict that, if the defendant's trial had 
occurred one and one-half years later, our holding in Brown, 477 
Mass. at 825, would have applied, and a finding of malice would 
have been required to convict the defendant of felony-murder.  
The judge reasoned that the Commonwealth would not be prejudiced 
by her retroactive application of Brown because the jury had 
received instructions on involuntary manslaughter and the 
Commonwealth had been provided an opportunity to argue that the 
25 
 
defendant committed murder with malice.  The Commonwealth argues 
that, because we held in Brown that the abolition of 
constructive malice would only apply prospectively, the judge's 
consideration of Brown constituted an error of law. 
We agree with the Commonwealth.  "When announcing a new 
common-law rule, . . . there is no constitutional requirement 
that the new rule . . . be applied retroactively, and we are 
therefore free to determine whether it should be applied only 
prospectively."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 645 
(2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 (2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005).  A judge does not have the 
discretion to supersede our determination that a new rule should 
be applied prospectively only.  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 
Mass. 350, 356 (2010).  Moreover, even though the jury received 
instructions on malice and involuntary manslaughter, it is 
nonetheless possible that the Commonwealth would have tried the 
case differently had it known that the jury's failure to find 
malice would justify a reduction in the verdict.  For example, 
the Commonwealth could have focused its efforts on presenting 
evidence of malice to the jury, rather than centering its case 
around establishing that the defendant had committed arson.  See 
Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 658 n.5, 660 (2022) (Brown 
does not apply retroactively even where jury received 
26 
 
instructions on malice and involuntary manslaughter).  In 
addition, the proximity in time of the defendant's trial to our 
decision in Brown had no bearing on whether the verdict against 
the defendant was consonant with justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 613 (2008), quoting Rolon, 438 Mass. at 
820. 
The defendant maintains that the judge did not err, because 
rule 25 (b) (2) review may be informed by "postverdict 
developments" in the law.  See Millyan, 399 Mass. at 189.  The 
defendant cites cases in which this court has allowed a 
postverdict revision of common law to be considered as part of a 
posttrial review of the verdict. 
In Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020), 
this court prospectively amended the factors that a jury must 
consider to find that a murder was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty (Cunneen factors).  We held that we would 
not apply the amended Cunneen factors retroactively to the 
defendant.  See id. at 866.  Pursuant to our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, however, we reduced the defendant's verdict 
in part because our prospective revision of the Cunneen factors 
suggested that a lesser verdict would be more just.  See id. at 
867-868. 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 
720, 720, 731 (2007), a judge granted the defendant a new trial 
27 
 
pursuant to rule 30 (b).  The judge's decision was based on our 
holding in Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649 (2005).  We 
affirmed, even though Adjutant was released after the defendant 
in Pring-Wilson had been convicted and our holding in Adjutant 
was to be applied only prospectively.  See Pring-Wilson, supra 
at 736-737. 
Our decisions in Castillo, 485 Mass. at 867, and Adjutant, 
443 Mass. at 667, however, are distinct from our holding in 
Brown.7  In Brown, 477 Mass. at 834, we did not hold simply that 
the new common-law rule was a prospective change.  We went 
further and stated that the change would "have no effect on 
felony-murder cases already tried, including this case."  Id.  
We have reiterated this holding in subsequent cases.  See 
 
7 The defendant cites two additional cases, but neither 
involves the application of a prospective change in the common 
law.  In Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150, 167 n.23 (2015), 
we stated that, in reviewing the defendant's case under § 33E, 
we were "not unmindful of the concerns that prompted" a 
prospective change in the rules concerning the admissibility of 
eyewitness testimony.  We made clear in our decision, however, 
that our analysis was limited to the prevailing law at the time 
of trial.  See id. at 165.  In Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 
Mass. 155, 168 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007), we affirmed a 
judge's decision to grant a new trial, where the decision was 
based in part on the police's failure to record the defendant's 
confession.  This court had held, in a decision that followed 
the defendant's trial, that "defense counsel is entitled to 
pursue the failure of the police to record a defendant's 
statements."  See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 273 
(1996).  We did not, however, characterize our holding in Diaz 
as a change in the law.  See id.  Furthermore, we did not state 
in that decision that our holding would be applied only 
prospectively.  See id. 
28 
 
Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 663, 674 (2021); Martin, 484 
Mass. at 645-646; Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 120, 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018). 
Further, in Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 224-
225 (2022), we made clear that Brown may not be applied 
retroactively even in the context of § 33E review.  Contrast 
Castillo, 485 Mass. at 867-868.  It follows that the same is 
true in the context of rule 25 (b) (2) review.  See Reavis, 465 
Mass. at 891 ("judge considering a motion to reduce a verdict 
under [rule 25 (b) (2)] may rely on essentially the same 
considerations as does this court when deciding whether to 
reduce a verdict to a lesser degree of guilty pursuant to 
[§ 33E]"). 
f.  Sufficiency of remaining factors.  Although the judge's 
consideration of Brown was an error of law, it does not 
necessarily follow that her decision to reduce the verdict was 
an abuse of discretion.  The judge did not state expressly in 
her memorandum of decision that our holding in Brown was 
necessary to her conclusion that a lesser verdict would be more 
consonant with justice.  Rather, the judge explained that her 
decision was based on "the combination" of the four factors she 
considered. 
Ordinarily in these circumstances, we might remand to the 
judge for a reconsideration of her decision in light of our 
29 
 
holding.  See Grassie, 476 Mass. at 215-216.  This would provide 
the judge an opportunity to determine whether the remaining 
factors she considered on their own warrant a verdict reduction.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. J.F., 491 Mass. 824, 843 (2023) (remanding 
case so judge could "expand on his consideration" because he 
abused his discretion by not discussing factors relevant to his 
decision). 
Here, however, the judge has retired, so we are precluded 
from employing such a remedy.  See Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 
Mass. 150, 158 n.10 (2015).  While we could remand to another 
Superior Court judge, see Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 
290, 291 n.2 (2002), "[w]e are in as good a position to deal 
with this matter as would be some other judge," Gaulden, 383 
Mass. at 547.  We therefore take it upon ourselves to decide 
whether the judge's decision to reduce the verdict would have 
been an abuse of discretion had it been based solely on the 
other factors considered.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 
Mass. 522, 544-545 (2021). 
We conclude that, had the judge's reasoning not included 
her analysis of Brown, the verdict reduction would not have been 
an abuse of discretion.  See Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 381.  
The weakness of the evidence showing that the defendant had the 
intent to burn a dwelling, in addition to mitigating 
circumstances, constituted a reasonable basis for the judge's 
30 
 
conclusion that a verdict of involuntary manslaughter was more 
consonant with justice than a verdict of felony-murder in the 
second degree.  See Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 Mass. 498, 513 
(2019) (mitigating circumstances); Rolon, 438 Mass. at 821-822 
(weakness of evidence). 
As the judge noted, only minimal evidence was presented at 
trial to suggest that the defendant intended to burn the 
dwelling at the time she set the fire.  See Lyons, 444 Mass. 
at 292.  Indeed, there was little reason to believe that the 
defendant wanted to burn the apartment in which she lived; the 
apartment housed all of the defendant's possessions, as well as 
the defendant's two year old child, for whom the defendant was 
by all appearances an attentive and caring mother.  See Pagan, 
471 Mass. at 545 (judge may consider absence of motive under 
rule 25 [b] [2] review).  Contrast Choy v. Commonwealth, 456 
Mass. 146, 150-151, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986 (2010) (rational 
jury could find defendant had committed arson in part because 
there was evidence that defendant had motive to collect on life 
insurance policy). 
In addition, the judge found that, due to her cognitive 
limitations, the defendant likely did not comprehend the risk of 
the fire spreading to the dwelling.  See Pagan, 471 Mass. at 544 
(reduction in verdict affirmed in part because judge credited 
doctor's "testimony that the defendant lacked the cognitive 
31 
 
capacity to premeditate the killing").  DiCataldo testified that 
the defendant's cognitive limitations impaired her ability to 
comprehend fully the consequences of her actions, and 
DiCataldo's report further concluded that the defendant was 
prone to "impulsive, poorly planned and contemplated behavior."  
See Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 95, cert. denied, 
142 S. Ct. 408 (2021) (verdict reduced in part because "expert 
testimony presented at trial suggested" that defendant 
"functioned at the level of someone who was nine or ten years 
old").  The judge further found, on the basis of DiCataldo's 
report, that the defendant's mental disorder also likely 
diminished her capacity to understand the risks entailed by her 
action. 
The judge acknowledged that, once the fire had started, the 
defendant did nothing either to report or to extinguish it.  On 
direct review, this court stated that the jury reasonably could 
have inferred from this evidence "that the defendant acted with 
the requisite specific intent at the time she set the fire."  
Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 123.  As we discussed, however, the judge 
was not required to draw this same inference as part of her rule 
25 (b) (2) review.  See Reavis, 465 Mass. at 891.  Instead, the 
judge reasoned that the defendant's failure to act was evidence 
that the defendant had developed the requisite intent only after 
the fire had started. 
32 
 
Because the judge's decision to reduce the verdict was 
sufficiently supported by the weakness of the evidence and 
mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the verdict reduction 
was not an abuse of discretion.8 
g.  Timing of rule 25 (b) (2) motion.  At oral argument, 
the Commonwealth argued that rule 25 (b) (2) grants a judge the 
authority to reduce a verdict only before direct appellate 
review.  The Commonwealth "did not make this argument in its 
brief; therefore, it is waived."  Board of Registration in Med. 
v. Doe, 457 Mass. 738, 743 n.12 (2010).  Accordingly, we do not 
address the issue. 
3.  Conclusion.  Although the judge's consideration of 
Brown was an error of law, we nonetheless conclude that the 
reduction in the defendant's verdict was not an abuse of 
discretion.  We therefore affirm the order granting in part the 
defendant's motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a 
reduction in the verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
8 Because we conclude, on the basis of these two factors, 
that the reduction in the verdict was not an abuse of 
discretion, we do not address the Commonwealth's argument that 
the judge was directly estopped from considering her erroneous 
supplemental instruction to the jury.