Title: State v. Harwood

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 375 (1974) 519 P.2d 177 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stanley C. HARWOOD, Appellant. No. 2527. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 22, 1974. Rehearing Denied March 26, 1974. *377 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Ronald L. Crismon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Lieberthal & Kashman, by Howard A. Kashman, Tucson, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. Appellant, Stanley Cecil Harwood, was charged with, tried and convicted of the murder of Wanda C. Fiak. From the conviction for second degree murder and the sentence thereon, he appeals. Appellant was a court reporter, employed by the Pima County Superior Court. Wanda C. Fiak worked for him as a part-time transcriber. On the evening of March 16, 1971, appellant went to a local bar where later Mrs. Fiak joined him. They stayed there for several hours. When they left, an argument occurred in the bar's parking lot concerning whether appellant was going directly home. Mrs. Fiak said that she would follow appellant and if he stopped or she lost him, she would go to his house and cause a commotion. When appellant left, Mrs. Fiak followed him. After a period of evasive driving with Wanda Fiak in pursuit, appellant drove up behind her at an A.J. Bayless Market and twice rammed her. He left his automobile and, with a pistol in his hand, approached her car. Mrs. Fiak laughed and appeared to be taunting him. Appellant then fired at her through the window of her automobile, striking her three times. The first question presented is whether it was error for the court to deny appellant's application for a change of judge. The application was filed one day before appellant's trial was set and it alleged bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge. By Rule 199, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1956, A.R.S. 17: Concerning this rule, we said in Hendrickson v. Superior Court, 85 Ariz. 10, 12, 330 P.2d 507, 508-509, 73 A.L.R.2d 1235, 1237 (1958): Appellant asserts that the information upon which he bases the disqualification of the trial judge became known to him only after the three-day period commenced. His information was that the trial judge had at one time experienced some trouble with two other court reporters whom appellant expected to call as witnesses in his case, and appellant felt that this would prejudice the judge against them as witnesses. An affidavit which is not timely filed may be challenged and, if so, the legal sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined by the presiding judge. A hearing should be had and an inquiry made to disclose the facts relied upon. State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. 110, 114, 425 P.2d 842, 846 (1967). The reasons for disqualification of the trial judge after the three-day period provided for by Rule 199 were not sufficient to raise any substantial question as to the bias and prejudice of the trial judge. The application was properly denied. Appellant further argues that his lawyer did not make him aware of the facts upon which he based his application *378 prior to the three-day period. We have repeatedly held, however, that a criminal defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction based upon the actions of his counsel unless the actual representation provided was so clearly inadequate and ineffective as to reduce the defense to a farce or a sham. See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 604, 503 P.2d 946 (1972). Appellant argues that this case requires reversal because at least five jurors were successfully challenged by the prosecution because of their unequivocal opposition to the death penalty. We find no merit to this position. In State v. Crow, 104 Ariz. 579, 581, 457 P.2d 256, 258-259 (1969), we held: The appellant urges that the State's chief investigator, Police Sergeant Dur-wood Weathers, who sat with the prosecutor throughout the trial at counsel table, was guilty of misconduct when he talked with several prospective jurors during the impanelment of the jury. Appellant does not argue that what was said was in any way prejudicial to his case. Hence, we think the holding in State v. Johnson, 97 Ariz. 27, 30, 396 P.2d 392, 393-394 (1964), is controlling here: We do not think that under the circumstances of this case any harm was done. Appellant argues that it was error for the court to admit two exhibits into evidence. These exhibits are color photographs. One is a picture of appellant and the deceased seated on a couch, holding hands. It lends itself to the conclusion that the friendship of appellant and deceased was upon more than a professional or business basis. To that extent it had some materiality. The second picture is of appellant seated alone on the same couch. It does not have any particular materiality that we can discern but, then, neither does it engender sympathy for the deceased thereby prejudicing the jury. The appellant urges that the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict for acquittal as to first degree murder on the grounds that the evidence failed to show a willful, premeditated crime. The facts in this case show that appellant armed himself with a revolver; that he did not fire in self-defense but, in fact, was the aggressor; that he fired more than one shot; and that three of the shots fired struck the body of the deceased. A directed verdict to a criminal offense should not be granted if the evidence is of such a character that reasonable minds may differ on the inferences to be drawn therefrom. Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, A.R.S. § 13-451. The question of malice is one for the jury and the use of a deadly weapon is sufficient evidence *379 from which the jury may find malice. State v. McIntyre, 106 Ariz. 439, 477 P.2d 529 (1970). Reasonable minds could conclude that appellant was actuated by malice. The jury could conclude that the killing was done with malice from the fact that the deceased was a woman and that it was wholly unnecessary to resort to the use of a deadly weapon. Appellant urges that the court below committed error in excluding testimony of diminished responsibility. It did not. State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 461 P.2d 677 (1969); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 1015, 86 S. Ct. 628, 15 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1966). Appellant urges that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of manslaughter. In this, we think appellant is correct and that the trial court committed reversible error. By A.R.S. § 13-455, manslaughter is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is voluntary manslaughter if the homicide occurs upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, A.R.S. § 13-456. In State v. Ramos, 108 Ariz. 36, 38, 492 P.2d 697, 699, we said: A legal presumption of malice arises from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in such a way that it is likely to and does produce death, because it is presumed that there is a deliberate, formed design existing in the mind of the accused to kill. We said, however, in State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 339, 362 P.2d 660, 662 (1961): To reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter committed on sudden heat of passion, the passion must be aroused by adequate provocation. State v. Schantz, supra. As the Supreme Court of California said: In the instant case, the evidence strongly suggests that Mrs. Fiak was jealous of appellant and did not want him to stop at another bar to drink before going home. She threatened to follow him and raise a commotion at his home if he did stop, and she did, in fact, follow him everywhere he went until the final incident in the Bayless parking lot. We think the jury could have considered from the combination of her threats and actions that the presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon was destroyed and could consider that the killing was voluntary manslaughter induced by heat of passion. The State argues that this case is controlled by our pronouncement in State v. Schroeder, 95 Ariz. 255, 389 P.2d 255 (1964), cert. den. 379 U.S. 939, 85 S. Ct. 347, 13 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1964). There, we held that when the sole defense to a charge of murder is an alibi or plea of insanity, no instruction on included crimes is necessary. While it is true that appellant's defense was insanity, still the jury might have believed that he did not have the requisite malice for murder because of the provocative circumstances here presented. As we said in State v. Schroeder, supra: Here, the state of the record was not such that defendant could only be guilty of murder or not guilty at all. We have examined the claimed errors in admission of evidence and arguments to the jury and find that they have little merit in that they are unlikely to reoccur in retrial or would not be so prejudicial as to be considered fundamental. Judgment reversed. HAYS, C.J., CAMERON, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.