Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KUNTZ-DEXTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: KUNTZ-DEXTER2002 WY 10149 P.3d 190Case Number: 01-101Decided: 07/03/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

LORRAINE 
M. KUNTZ-DEXTER, 

Appellant(Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

                                                           Appellee(Objector-Defendant).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09 Certification from the District Court of Sheridan 
County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

Rene 
Botten, Sheridan, Wyoming. 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General.

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
In this 
appeal, we consider whether the hearing examiner properly denied worker's 
compensation benefits to Appellant Lorraine M. Kuntz-Dexter (Kuntz-Dexter).  After Appellee Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division (Division) denied benefits for medical and temporary 
total disability claims and a hearing was held, Kuntz-Dexter provided testimony 
from her treating physician that her injury was work-related.  Benefits were again denied by the 
hearing examiner after it found that the basis for the medical testimony was 
information provided by Kuntz-Dexter, and the hearing examiner concluded that 
the evidence showed her testimony that the injury was work-related was not 
credible.  

[¶2]           
We hold 
that the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
supported by substantial evidence.  
The order denying benefits is affirmed.

ISSUES

[¶3]           
Kuntz-Dexter 
presents the following issue for our review:

I. The 
Order Denying Benefits, dated February 26, 2001, is arbitrary, capricious, and 
an abuse of discretion in that the findings of fact proffered by the Hearing 
Examiner were factually incorrect and not supported by substantial 
evidence.

The 
Division presents two issues for our review:

I. Does 
substantial evidence support the Hearing Examiner's finding that Appellant did 
not initially indicate to her health care providers that she believed her 
condition was work-related?

II. Did 
the Hearing Examiner correctly conclude, under the appropriate burden of proof, 
that Appellant failed to prove that a work injury caused her herniated 
disc?

FACTS

[¶4]           
Kuntz-Dexter 
has worked in various positions for the Sheridan County Memorial Hospital since 
1991.  On June 1, 2000, she worked 
as a filing clerk in the records department and moved files of medical records 
from one shelf to another in a storage area.  She testified that she moved about 800 
files weighing twenty to thirty pounds each for an entire day and experienced 
shoulder pain.  She did not report 
an injury to her employer and continued to work until June 8 when she called in 
a sick leave absence because her pain symptoms had progressed.  On June 9, she again called in a sick 
leave absence, called a doctor she had been seeing for pain symptoms associated 
with an injury suffered in February of 2000, and obtained a prescription for 
physical therapy.  Her pain symptoms 
became severe, and she reported to the emergency room for treatment on June 10 
and 11, 2000.  After seeing several 
doctors, she was ultimately diagnosed with a disc herniation at C7-T1 and 
underwent surgery. 

[¶5]           
Kuntz-Dexter 
filed a report of injury with the Division on June 19, 2000, which did not 
include the date that the employer was notified; however, her supervisor 
testified that Kuntz-Dexter notified her of the injury on June 19, 2000.  Upon receiving the claimant's medical 
records, the Division denied benefits, and the matter was set for hearing.  In its disclosure statement, the 
Division contended that benefits must be denied for late filing in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c), and because the injury was not 
work-related.   At the hearing, 
the Division contended that Kuntz-Dexter's present symptoms resulted from 
preexisting injuries and that no injury occurred on June 1, 2000.  The hearing examiner made a specific 
finding that Kuntz-Dexter had shown by clear and convincing evidence that no 
prejudice was suffered by the late filing, and the Division does not challenge 
that determination in this appeal.  The hearing examiner did find that 
Kuntz-Dexter had begun experiencing symptoms associated with a herniated disc, 
and the issue to be resolved was whether those symptoms were caused by the 
claimed work-related injury of June 1, 2000. 

            

[¶6]           
The 
hearing examiner found that years earlier, Kuntz-Dexter suffered a broken neck, 
had cervical surgery, had since then experienced a long history of neck, back 
and shoulder pain, and in February of 2000 had suffered chest and neck pain when 
she frontally collided with a door jamb.  
The findings of fact stated that although Kuntz-Dexter discussed her pain 
symptoms with several different doctors or nurses between June 9 and June 15, 
the medical records from these visits did not include any mention that the 
injury was caused by lifting 800 very heavy files a week earlier.  The hearing examiner determined that on 
June 30, Kuntz-Dexter's surgeon indicated she had suffered a work-related 
injury; however, in his deposition, the doctor testified that this determination 
was based on the history provided by the claimant. 

[¶7]           
The 
hearing examiner found that Kuntz-Dexter's supervisor testified that files are 
moved by handfuls at most and do not weigh more than four to six pounds, she had 
seen claimant move files by the handful on other occasions, Kuntz-Dexter did not 
tell anyone at work that she was injured, and had missed work on June 8 and 9 to 
attend a wedding. 

[¶8]           
Benefits 
were denied after the hearing examiner examined the conflicting evidence and 
concluded that the evidence did not prove the claim that moving medical files 
caused the injury.  After the 
district court certified the petition for review pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09, 
this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard 
of Review

  

[¶9]           
The 
claimant has the burden of proving every essential element of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Waggener, 946 P.2d 808, 814 (Wyo. 1997); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996).  Under 
the statutory definition of injury, he must prove that his injury arose out of 
and in the course of his employment.    Id.  Whether an employee's injury occurred in 
the course of his employment is a question of fact.  Id.  

[¶10]      
We 
recently held that the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of 
review in appeals from Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act contested case 
proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence. 
Newman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, 
¶22 (Wyo. 2002).   We further 
held, that when only the party with the burden of proof submits evidence in the 
contested case proceeding and that party does not ultimately prevail, the 
arbitrary or capricious standard governs the judicial review of that agency 
decision.  Id.  Even if the factual findings are found 
to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may be 
found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Id. at ¶23.  We do not examine the record only to 
determine if there is substantial evidence to support the board's decision, but 
we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the hearing 
examiner could have reasonably made its finding and order upon all of the 
evidence before it.  Id. at 
¶24, ¶25.  Because both parties 
presented cases-in-chief, we apply the substantial evidence standard.  We afford respect and deference to a 
hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Haagensen v. State ex 
rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997).  Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
findings.  Waggener, 946 P.2d  
at 814.  We will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his 
decision.  Id.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  Id.  A hearing examiner's conclusions of law 
are afforded no special deference and will be affirmed only if truly in accord 
with law.  State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wyo. 1999).  

Medical Testimony

[¶11]      
Claimant's 
primary contention in this appeal is that the hearing examiner's finding that 
she had not reported lifting as the cause of her injury to various treating 
medical doctors until June 30 is not supported by the evidence.  The Division concedes that the hearing 
examiner's findings of fact contain minor mistakes, such as naming a doctor 
instead of the physical therapist, but insists that a review of the medical 
records supports the hearing examiner's basic conclusion that claimant did not 
describe lifting files at work as the cause of her injury until the end of June, 
and further contends that those records would have justified the hearing 
examiner's concluding that claimant was actually injured on June 6, 2000, a date 
when she was not at work. 

[¶12]      
Our 
review of the record indicates that the Division's argument is supported by the 
medical testimony.  On June 11, 
claimant reported that she had injured herself by "lifting/twisting 4 days ago," 
which would put the date of injury as June 7 and mentions nothing about a 
work-related injury.  The next day, 
June 12, claimaint is documented as having said that she "can't recall an 
incident that preceded the pain," but also noted that claimant "is employed as a 
clerk at Sheridan Memorial Hospital and her job requires prolonged sitting and 
repetitive motions with data entry."  
Claimant relies upon her testimony at trial to argue that these notes 
omitted her explanations that she had been injured while lifting for an entire 
day files that weighed in excess of twenty pounds.  The hearing examiner was entitled to 
disbelieve claimant's testimony, and it appears that the hearing examiner did 
disbelieve her after finding her testimony of her activities on June 1, 2000, 
was inconsistent with her co-workers' testimony about file handling and weight, 
and inconsistent with medical records of her statements.  As the finder of fact, the hearing 
examiner must weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts.  The hearing examiner did exactly that, 
and its conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  

[¶13]      
Claimant 
argues that by June 30, the medical evidence did state that she had suffered a 
work-related injury on June 1, 2000, and because her injury presented a complex 
medical question, this expert testimony should not be ignored.  The hearing examiner's findings of fact 
indicate that it did examine this evidence but determined that the expert 
conclusion was based upon the history provided by claimant and was, therefore, 
not credible.  A hearing examiner is 
entitled to reject claimant's testimony about events and dates if other evidence 
indicates that it is not credible.  
Credibility determinations are the unique province of the hearing 
examiner, and we eschew re-weighing those conclusions.  Rice v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2001 WY 21, ¶17, 19 P.3d 508, ¶17 (Wyo. 2001).  Because claimant failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she suffered a work-related injury, the 
hearing examiner's decision is affirmed.