Title: Waker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 28
September Term, 2011
__________________________________________
CALVIN MONTGOMERY WAKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
        Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
         Opinion by Eldridge, J.                             
                                            
_________________________________________
Filed:   March 26, 2013
The General Assembly, at its 2009 session, amended the Maryland theft statute
to provide, inter alia, that the theft of property with a value of less than $1,000 is a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 18 months.  The statute was
also amended to provide that the theft of property with a value of at least $1,000 but
less than $10,000 is a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding ten years.   See
Ch. 655 of the Acts of 2009; Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 7-104(g)(1)(i)
and (2)(i) of the Criminal Law Article.  Prior to these 2009 amendments, the theft
statute’s dividing line between a misdemeanor punishable by 18 months imprisonment
and a felony punishable by a greater period of imprisonment was $500.  The bill, which
became Ch. 655 and which contained the 2009 amendments to the theft statute, was
signed by the Governor on May 19, 2009, and had an effective date of October 1, 2009.
The petitioner, Calvin Waker, on March 30, 2009, committed a theft of property
valued at $615.  After one postponement, his trial was held on December 11, 2009.
Waker was found guilty of the theft of property having a value of $615, and he was
sentenced to ten years in prison.  This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari
to decide whether the penalty provisions of the 2009 theft statute amendments were
applicable to Waker’s sentencing.
I.
The facts in this case are not disputed by the parties.  Calvin Waker was charged
in the District Court of Maryland, Baltimore County, with four counts of theft and one
count of making a false statement to a police officer. Pursuant to Waker’s request for
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a jury trial, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  Waker
thereafter waived his right to a jury trial, and, on December 11, 2009, he was tried on
a “agreed not guilty statement of facts.”  The Court found Waker guilty of theft of
property having a value of $615, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed. As
previously mentioned, Waker was sentenced to ten years incarceration.
According to the agreed statement of facts, Waker made a purchase at the Wal-
Mart store at Putty Hill Avenue in Baltimore County on March 30, 2009, using a
fraudulent credit card.  Included in his purchase were four CDs, a pair of jeans, and a
television set.  The total cost of the items was $615.60.  He was apprehended later the
same day when he attempted to use the same fraudulent credit card at another Wal-Mart
store in Cockeysville.  Waker was charged, inter alia, with “steal[ing] property of [a]
Wal-mart Store . . . having a value of $615.60 . . . in violation of” § 7-104 of the
Criminal Law Article.
At the time of Waker’s offense on March 30, 2009, the penalty provisions of § 7-
104(g) of the Criminal Law Article read as follows:
“§ 7-104. General theft provisions.
* * *
(g) Penalty. – (1) A person convicted of theft of property or
services with a value of $500 or more is guilty of a felony and:
(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or
a fine not exceeding $25,000 or both; and
(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay
the owner the value of the property or services.”
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Ch. 655 of the Acts of 2009, which became effective more than two months before
Waker’s trial and sentencing, modified the penalty provisions of § 7-104(g).  The
amended provisions of § 7-104(g) provided, in relevant part, as follows:
“(g) Penalty. – (1) A person convicted of theft of property or
services with a value of:
(i) at least $1,000 but less than $10,000 is guilty of a
felony and:
1. is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years
or a fine not exceeding $10,000 or both; and
2. shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay
the owner the value of the property or services;
***
“(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this
subsection, a person convicted of theft of property or services with
a value of less than $1,000, is guilty of a misdemeanor and:
(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 18 months
or a fine not exceeding $500 or both; and
(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay
the owner the value of the property or services.”
* * *
Subsection (3) covers the theft of property or services with a value of less than  $100,
and subsection (4) addresses penalties for individuals with two or more prior theft
convictions.
To reiterate, at the time when Waker’s theft was committed, the theft of goods
with a value of $615.60 was a felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison, a $25,000
fine or both.  By the time Waker was tried, found guilty, and sentenced, a theft of
$615.60 was a misdemeanor punishable by no more than 18 months in prison, a $500
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fine, or both.
Waker noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment in an unreported opinion.  He then petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted. Waker v. State, 420 Md. 81, 21 A.3d 1063 (2011).
In his petition, Waker posed the following question:
“Where the General Assembly reduces the penalty for an
offense after a defendant committed the offense but before he is
tried and sentenced, and where the Act is silent as to its application
in such a situation, is the defendant subject to the harsher penalty
in effect at the time of the offense or the reduced penalty in effect
at the time of the trial and sentencing?”
The State filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which was also granted.  Ibid.
The cross-petition presented the following question:
“Did Waker fail to preserve his appellate claim regarding his
conviction and sentence for felony theft, where Waker did not state
a claim of sentence illegality?”
We shall hold that the issue concerning the legality of Waker’s sentence was not
waived by the failure to raise the issue in the trial court and that, therefore, it was
preserved for appellate review.  Furthermore, we shall hold that the sentence imposed
by the Circuit Court was illegal.
II.
As an initial matter, we address the State’s argument that Waker failed to
preserve for appellate review the issue regarding the legality of his sentence because
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1
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides:
“Rule 8-131. Scope of review.
(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and
decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court.
Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the
Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or
to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”
In addition to jurisdictional issues, there are a few other exceptions to Rule 8-131(a).  As to issues
covered by the Rule, where a claim of error is not raised in the trial court, both the Court of Special
Appeals and this Court have “independent discretion . . . [to] recognize the existence of the error in
the trial court’s” ruling.  Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 134, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020 (1977).  Moreover,
the Court of Special Appeals’ exercise of discretion in this regard is reviewable by this Court for
abuse of discretion if the issue is raised in a certiorari petition or a cross-petition such as the State
filed in this case at bar.  See Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 141-143, 355 A.2d 455, 459 (1976).
he did not raise the issue in the Circuit Court.  The State contends that, because
Waker’s illegal sentence argument was made for the first time on appeal, it was waived,
and that the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion by deciding the case on its
merits.1  Waker’s argument, however, does not involve the discretion of the Court of
Special Appeals or the discretion of this Court to excuse the waiver of an issue.
Instead, the sentencing issue was not waived by Waker’s failure to raise it in the trial
court.
Waker contends that his trial and sentencing, which took place after the effective
date of Ch. 655 of the Acts of 2009, was governed by Ch. 655.  Because the sentence
imposed by the trial court exceeded the maximum allowed by Ch. 655 for his offense,
Waker claims that his sentence was not authorized by the controlling statutory
provisions.  Consequently, Waker argues, his sentence was illegal and, under Maryland
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Rule 4-345(a), may be challenged on appeal even if the issue was not raised in the trial
court.
It is axiomatic that, when a court imposes a sentence, and the sentence itself is
not authorized by law, the sentence is illegal.  See, e.g., Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477,
508, 48 A.3d 816, 834 (2012) (“[A]n illegal sentence [is] a sentence not permitted by
law”) (quoting prior cases, and with internal quotation marks omitted); Alston v. State,
425 Md. 326, 339-340, 40 A.3d 1028, 1036 (2012); Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503,
514, 36 A.3d 499, 505 (2012) (“We have deemed sentences inherently ‘illegal’ . . .
when the sentences exceeded the limits imposed by law, be it statute or rule”);
Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67, 74, 950 A.2d 77, 81-82 (2008) (Because the sentence
was not authorized by statutes or rules, “it constituted an illegal sentence”); Walczak
v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 950-951 (1985).
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) states as follows:
“(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.”
It has been settled since the 1985 opinion in Walczak v. State, supra, 302 Md. 422, 488
A.2d 949, that an illegal sentence claim “under Rule 4-345(a) . . . is not subject to
waiver.”  Johnson v. State, 427 Md. 356, 371, 47 A.3d 1002, 1011 (2012).
In Walczak, the defendant was accused, inter alia, of robbery and stealing
property worth several thousand dollars.  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State,
the defendant Walczak “pleaded not guilty, elected a nonjury trial, and was tried on an
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agreed statement of facts,” 302 Md. at 424, 488 A.2d at 950.  Walczak was found guilty
on one count, and the State nol prossed the remaining charges against him.  Walczak
signed a probation order which required that he pay restitution “to the victim of a crime
of which he was not convicted.”  302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954.  Although he did not
object to this order in the trial court, he later raised an objection to the probation order
in the Court of Special Appeals and in this Court.  This Court held as follows (302 Md.
at 427, 488 A.2d at 951):
“We hold that when the trial court has allegedly imposed a
sentence not permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be
reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial
court.  Such review and correction of an illegal sentence is
especially appropriate in light of the fact that Rule 4-345(a) . . .
provides that ‘[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.’  Thus, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of an
illegal sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that
sentence.”
The principle set forth in Walczak has been applied in cases on direct appeal, in
post conviction actions, and in separate actions under Rule 4-345(a) to correct an illegal
sentence. See, e.g., Greco v. State, supra, 427 Md. at 503 n.7, 48 A.2d at 831 n.7
(“[W]e have held consistently that waiver principles do not apply to allegations of
substantively illegal sentences.  See . . . Walczak v. State, . . .”); Montgomery v. State,
supra, 405 Md. at 75, 950 A.2d at 82 (“[F]ailure to object to an allegedly illegal
sentence at the time it was imposed does not preclude a defendant from later raising the
issue or later filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence”); Chaney v. State, 397 Md.
460, 466, 918 A.2d 506, 509 (2007) (“[i]f a sentence is ‘illegal’ within the meaning of
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[Rule 4-345(a)], the defendant may” challenge “it, notwithstanding that (1) no objection
was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the defendant purported to consent to
it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-filed direct appeal”).  This Court
has gone so far as to vacate, sua sponte, a sentence which was, according to the Court,
“illegal” within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) even though no party, at any time,
complained about the particular sentence.  See State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496-497,
659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995).  See also Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 73 n.2, 581 A.2d 1, 3
n.2 (1990).
If Waker’s argument is correct, that Ch. 655 of the Acts of 2009 was applicable
to his sentence, then the sentence actually imposed by the Circuit Court exceeded
statutory limits and was illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).  Consequently,
Waker is entitled to make that argument on appeal despite his failure to raise it in the
trial court.
III.
Waker contends that, when the General Assembly has reduced the penalty for an
offense after the offense has been committed, but before the defendant’s trial and
sentencing has occurred, the trial court should apply the statute as it existed at the time
of the trial and sentencing rather than the statute at the time of the offense.  The State,
however, argues that the law at the time when the offense was committed should be
applicable.  The State relies upon the so-called “General Saving Clause,” codified in
the Maryland Code’s “Rules  of Interpretation,” Code (1957, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1,
§ 3, which states: 
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“The repeal, or the repeal and reenactment, or the revision,
amendment or consolidation of any statute, or of any section or part
of a section of any statute, civil or criminal, shall not have the
effect to release, extinguish, alter, modify or change, in whole or
in part, any penalty, forfeiture or liability, either civil or criminal,
which shall have been incurred under such statute, section or part
thereof, unless the repealing, repealing and reenacting, revising,
amending or consolidating act shall expressly so provide; and such
statute, section or part thereof, so repealed, repealed and reenacted,
revised, amended or consolidated, shall be treated and held as still
remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any and all proper
actions, suits, proceedings or prosecutions, civil or criminal, for the
enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability, as well as for
the purpose of sustaining any judgment, decree or order which can
or may be rendered, entered or made in such actions, suits,
proceedings or prosecutions imposing, inflicting or declaring such
penalty, forfeiture or liability.” 
Under the common law, whenever a statute was repealed or amended after an
alleged offense or after an event giving rise to some alleged liability, a court, including
an appellate court, would generally apply the law as it existed when the court was
considering the case and not the law in effect when the alleged offense or event
occurred.  See, e.g., Miles v. State, 349 Md. 215, 230, 707 A.2d 841, 849 (1998); State
v. American Bonding Co., 128 Md. 268, 272-273, 97 A. 529, 531 (1916); Keller v.
State, 12 Md. 322, 325-327 (1858).  The general saving clause, quoted above, modified
the common law principle in some types of cases.
The only opinion of this Court relied upon by the State, which involved the
general saving clause, is State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 402 A.2d 876 (1979).  In fact,
both the State and Waker rely upon language in Johnson.  While there is language in
Johnson which might seem favorable to the State’s argument, and other language in the
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case favorable to Waker’s argument, the holding in Johnson clearly does not support
the State’s position that, under the general saving clause, Waker was properly
sentenced in accordance with the law prior to Ch. 655 of the Acts of 2009.
In Johnson, unlike the situation in the present case, the defendant was tried for
violating probation, found guilty, and sentenced in accordance with the probation
revocation law in effect during his violation of probation trial and sentencing.  The
change in the probation revocation sentencing law which was more favorable to the
defendant occurred while the case was on appeal.  This Court, in the opening sentence
of the opinion, set forth the issue before the Court (Johnson, 285 Md. at 340, 402 A.2d
at 876-877):
“The issue in this appeal from the judgment imposing sentence
to be served following a revocation of probation is whether under
the circumstances of this case the law existing at the time of the
appeal is decided or the law existing at the time of trial is
controlling.”
The Johnson opinion held that, in light of the general saving clause, the law at the time
of the trial and sentencing is controlling.  The State’s argument in Johnson, 285 Md.
at 343, 402 A.2d at 878, accepted by this Court, was that, under the general saving
clause, the former statute should “be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any judgment imposed thereunder,” and that the new statute, effective during
the appeal, should not be applied so as to “modify the penalty already incurred and
imposed under the prior law” (emphasis added).  The Court in Johnson, 285 Md. at 344,
402 Md. at 879, later stated: “Thus, a general savings statute preserves penalties
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2
Another opinion, not cited by the State, but, like Johnson, containing some language arguably
favorable to the State’s position, is Bell v. Maryland, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964).  In Bell, like
Johnson but unlike the case at bar, the change in Maryland statutory law favorable to the defendant
occurred while the case was on appeal.  Moreover, a rehearing petition in Bell was granted on
November 23, 1964, and, by order on April 9, 1965, the trial court’s judgment of conviction was
reversed by this Court. 
imposed under prior law . . . .”  (Emphasis added).
 In the present case, unlike in Johnson, the change in the statute favorable to
Waker occurred prior to Waker’s trial and sentencing.  In contrast to Johnson, the
penalties “incurred and imposed” on Waker were not those in effect at the time the trial
court imposed sentence.  The actual holding in Johnson, rather than supporting the
State’s argument in the case at bar, actually supports Waker’s position that the trial
court should have imposed the sentence in effect at the time of trial and sentencing.2
This Court has held that the general saving clause “is merely an aid to
interpretation, stating the general rule against repeals by implication in more specific
form.”  State v. Kennerly, 204 Md. 412, 417, 104 A.2d 632, 634 (1954).  Accordingly,
there are cases in which this Court has held that the statute does not apply.  In Miles v.
State, supra, 349 Md. at 230-232, 707 A.2d at 849, the Court held that the general
saving clause does not apply to municipal ordinances.  See also State v. American
Bonding Co., supra, 128 Md. at 272-273, 97 A. at 531, decided four years after the
enactment of the general savings clause in its present form, but the Court applied the
common law principle to the repeal of an earlier statute.  We are not aware of any
decision by this Court applying the general saving clause to circumstances like those
in the present case.
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3
Of course, where the new law enacted after the offense is less favorable to the defendant, the
ex post facto prohibition in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights would require the
application of the law at the time of the offense.
Moreover, some of the wording of the general saving clause, like the wording in
the Johnson opinion previously discussed, suggests that the general saving clause is
inapplicable in criminal cases where the trial and sentencing occur after the effective
date of the new law which is more favorable to the defendant.3  Thus, the language of
the general saving clause preserves “any penalty, forfeiture or liability, either civil or
criminal, which shall have been incurred under such [repealed or amended] statute
. . . .”  (Emphasis added).  In light of the presumption of innocence, it is reasonable to
conclude that Waker did not incur criminal liability and a criminal penalty until the
conclusion of his trial in December 2009.  Therefore, what the general saving clause
should preserve was Waker’s criminal liability and sentence under the law as it existed
in December 2009.
Cases in other jurisdictions support the view that a general saving clause should
not be applied to enforce criminal penalties which have been repealed and replaced
with a less severe punishment.  Several state courts have deemed the legislature’s
reduction in the penalty for certain crimes as a signal that the legislature has determined
that the earlier, harsher penalty is no longer appropriate.  The Court of Appeals of New
York in People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 159, 134 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1956), like this
Court in State v. Kennerly, supra, 204 Md. 412, 104 A.2d 632, pointed out that general
saving clauses “have been read by this court to ‘provide merely a principle of
construction.’”  With regard to the statutory reduction of penalties for criminal
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offenses, the Court of Appeals of New York Court held that,
“where an ameliorative statute takes the form of a reduction of
punishment for a particular crime, the law is settled that the lesser
penalty may be meted out in all cases decided after the effective
date of the enactment, even though the underlying act may have
been committed before that date . . . .”  1 N.Y.2d at 159-160, 134
N.E.2d at 201.
When the Rhode Island Legislature reduced the criminal penalties available for
the crime of conspiracy, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the “more lenient
treatment” was applicable, explaining that (State v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 947 (R.I.
1977))
“[I]t is apparent that the Legislature thought it inequitable to
punish a conspiracy to commit a crime more harshly than the
underlying substantive offense itself.  Therefore, in light of the
legislative decision to mitigate penalties associated with the crime
charged, we believe that all those whose cases have not been
reduced to final judgment prior to the enactment of the
ameliorative statute should be accorded the more lenient treatment
provided therein.  To hold otherwise, we believe, would amount to
nothing more than arbitrary retribution in contravention of the
obvious legislative purpose behind the mitigation of the penalty.
In such instances, the purpose for applying the general savings
statute vanishes.”
Many other state courts have similarly held, despite the existence of general
saving clauses, that when the legislature lessens a penalty, it is appropriate to enforce
the lighter punishment.  See, e.g., State v. Stafford, 129 P.3d 927, 932-933 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2006); In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965); State v. Wilson, 926 P.2d
712, 715-716 (Mont. 1996); State v. Randolph, 183 N.W.2d 225, 228-229 (Neb. 1971),
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cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909, 91 S.Ct. 2217, 29 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971); State v. Pardon, 157
S.E.2d 698, 702 (N.C. 1967); State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 472 (N.D. 1986).
In sum, we hold that the sentence imposed upon Waker was illegal because it was
not authorized by the statute in effect at the time of his trial and sentencing.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
REVERSED 
AND 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REMAND
THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW
SENTENCING PROCEEDING CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE
COUNTY.