Title: Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: January 12, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0397 
_________________________ 
 
Construction Services, LLC, d/b/a MCA Construction, Inc. 
 
v.  
 
RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, Retail Specialists, 
LLC, and Rodney Barstein 
 
 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-22-900285) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
 RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, hired Construction 
Services LLC, d/b/a MCA Construction, Inc. ("MCA"), to build the 
SC-2023-0397 
2 
 
infrastructure for a proposed housing subdivision in Robertsdale.  After 
the relationship between the two soured, RAM-Robertsdale sued MCA in 
the Baldwin Circuit Court.  MCA countersued and also asserted third-
party claims against one of RAM-Robertsdale's members, Retail 
Specialists, LLC, and Rodney Barstein, a corporate officer for Retail 
Specialists and RAM-Robertsdale.1  RAM-Robertsdale, Retail Specialists, 
and Barstein ("the RAM defendants") filed a motion for summary 
judgment on MCA's counterclaims and third-party claims, and the circuit 
court granted that motion and later certified its summary judgment as 
final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Because the circuit court exceeded 
its discretion in certifying its judgment as final, we set aside the Rule 
54(b) certification and dismiss the appeal.   
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In February 2021, MCA entered into an approximately $1 million 
contract with RAM-Robertsdale to work on, among other things, grading, 
 
1MCA styled all of its claims as "counterclaims" and referred to 
those parties it brought claims against as "counterclaim defendants."  
The circuit court and the other parties followed this nomenclature, even 
though Retail Specialists and Barstein were "not [parties] to the action" 
before MCA filed its answer and counterclaim.  Retail Specialists and 
Barstein are therefore properly viewed as third-party defendants.  See 
Rule 14, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
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roads, and utilities for a new housing subdivision in Robertsdale.  Over 
the next several months, the parties' relationship broke down and MCA 
eventually ceased work on the project.  
 
RAM-Robertsdale sued MCA for breach of statutory duty, breach of 
contract, indemnity, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation, and to 
quiet title, alleging that MCA had done subpar work and had not paid its 
subcontractors or suppliers.  MCA answered and asserted counterclaims 
against RAM-Robertsdale.  MCA also brought third-party claims against 
Retail Specialists and Barstein for breach of contract, fraud, unjust 
enrichment, and the enforcement of MCA's lien on the subdivision 
property and a third-party defamation claim against Barstein alone.  
MCA alleged that RAM-Robertsdale had failed to pay for MCA's work 
and that Retail Specialists should be liable as well because it allegedly 
dominated and controlled RAM-Robertsdale.  MCA further alleged that 
Barstein controlled RAM-Robertsdale's conduct at the time and should 
be held responsible for its failure to pay. 
The RAM defendants moved for summary judgment on all of MCA's 
claims, arguing that the contract between RAM-Robertsdale and MCA 
was void for public policy because, the RAM defendants said, MCA was 
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not properly licensed when it signed the contract.  See, e.g., Hawkins v. 
League, 398 So. 2d 232, 235 (Ala. 1981) (noting that "express or implied 
contracts" with improperly licensed contractors are void for public policy).  
The RAM defendants acknowledged that MCA had a valid general 
contractor's license under § 34-8-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, but they said 
that the license contained the incorrect classification.  In particular, MCA 
had only a "building construction" classification on its license even 
though it needed a "municipal and utility" classification to do the 
contracted-for work.  See r. 230-X-1-.27(2), (5), Ala. Admin. Code (State 
Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors).  MCA opposed the RAM defendants' 
motion, arguing that it held the proper license at the time the contract 
was formed and that, if it did not, it corrected any licensure problems 
before they became relevant.  MCA also argued that RAM-Robertsdale 
knew of any defects in MCA's licensure at the time the contract was 
formed.   
The circuit court granted the RAM defendants' motion and entered 
summary judgment in their favor on all of MCA's claims.2  As a result, 
 
2While the summary-judgment order did not detail the circuit 
court's reasoning, the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certification stated that 
the summary judgment disposed of all of MCA's counterclaims based 
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only RAM-Robertsdale's claims remained pending in the circuit court.  
With the consent of the parties, the circuit court then certified its 
summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b).  MCA appealed. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification, we must determine if the 
circuit court exceeded its discretion.  See Alabama Ins. Underwriting 
Ass'n v. Skinner, 352 So. 3d 688, 690 (Ala. 2021). 
Analysis 
 
Before we can address the merits of this appeal, we must establish 
that we have jurisdiction to do so.  Because "[a] nonfinal judgment will 
not support an appeal," we must decide whether the circuit court's Rule 
54(b) order certifying as final its summary judgment on MCA's claims 
was proper.  Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363 
(Ala. 2004).  This Court will "scrutinize the propriety of Rule 54(b) 
certifications" even though neither party has raised that issue on appeal, 
 
solely on a legal determination that MCA could not bring counterclaims 
against the RAM defendants.  That certification also stated that "MCA is 
not entitled to recover on any of the asserted claims."  As noted in footnote 
1, the circuit court referred to MCA's third-party claims as counterclaims, 
so the summary judgment disposed of all of MCA's claims, including 
those against Retail Specialists and Barstein. 
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because it is a "'fundamental issue.'"  Alabama Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 
352 So. 3d at 690 (quoting Summerlin v. Summerlin, 962 So. 2d 170, 172 
(Ala. 2007)).  In short, we have a duty to guard the jurisdiction of this 
Court no matter what the parties may think.   
Rule 54(b) states that, when there are multiple claims in a suit, "the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment."  Rule 54(b) certifications should be cabined to 
exceptional cases because of "this Court's stated policy disfavoring 
appellate review in a piecemeal fashion."  Smith v. Slack Alost Dev. 
Servs. of Alabama, LLC, 32 So. 3d 556, 562-63 (Ala. 2009).  
 
Rule 54(b) certification is improper when the claims pending below 
and those on appeal "are so closely intertwined that separate 
adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results."  
Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 
1987).  We have explained that claims are "intertwined" when "[t]he 
factual underpinnings of the adjudicated claims are the same as those of 
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the unadjudicated [claims] of [the other party]."  Fuller v. Birmingham-
Jefferson Cnty. Transit Auth., 147 So. 3d 907, 913 (Ala. 2013).   
 
Here, all the claims arise from the same transaction -- the contract 
between RAM-Robertsdale and MCA to build subdivision infrastructure 
and the parties' performance under that contract.  The RAM defendants 
argued in their summary-judgment motion that MCA was not properly 
licensed and could not recover on the contract because, they said, that 
contract violated public policy.  The circuit court agreed.  But if the 
contract is void for public policy, then neither party would be able to 
enforce it -- void means void for all parties involved.  See White-Spunner 
Constr., Inc. v. Construction Completion Co., LLC, 103 So. 3d 781, 787 
(Ala. 2012) (noting that it is a "well settled principle of law that '"a party 
to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his 
illegal objects carried out ...."'" (citations omitted)); Dream, Inc. v. 
Samuels, [Ms. SC-2022-0808, June 23, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 
2023) ("Alabama courts … will not enforce a void or illegal contract.").  
And while this Court has held that an exception to the void-for-public-
policy rule may exist if one of the parties was induced by fraud to execute 
a contract, see Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 860 (Ala. 1984), 
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MCA has argued that RAM-Robertsdale knew that MCA did not have a 
"municipal and utility" classification at the time the contract was formed.  
If that is true, RAM-Robertsdale could have unclean hands in the 
transaction, which may limit RAM-Robertsdale's recovery on the claims 
still pending below.  See § 34-8-6(a), Ala. Code 1975 (proscribing both 
general contracting without a proper license and considering bids "from 
anyone not properly licensed"). 
The upshot here is that the claims pending below and those on 
appeal have significant "factual overlap."  Clarke-Mobile Cntys. Gas Dist. 
v. Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002).  The questions before 
us -- whether MCA was properly licensed and whether it can enforce the 
contract -- bear on RAM-Robertsdale's claims pending below.  And 
deciding those issues now would create an intolerable risk of inconsistent 
results. For that reason, the circuit court exceeded its discretion by 
certifying its summary judgment on MCA's claims against the RAM 
defendants as final.  Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to resolve 
the merits of this appeal.   
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Conclusion 
 
Because the circuit court's summary judgment was improperly 
certified as final, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.   
 
APPEAL DISMISSED.   
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., 
concur. 
 
Sellers and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.