Title: TAYLOR, JR. v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TAYLOR, JR. v. STATE2003 WY 9774 P.3d 1236Case Number: 02-222Decided: 08/20/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOHN 
ARTHUR TAYLOR, JR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
Arthur Taylor, Jr., pro se

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Ed Newell, Special Assistant 
Attorney General

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
John 
Arthur Taylor, Jr., appeals the district court's dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction of his pro se "Petition to Show Cause Why Judgement [sic] is Not 
Void."  Taylor had filed that 
petition to challenge his 1997 conviction and sentence for possession of a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent.  
Finding that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider 
Taylor's petition, we dismiss this appeal as well.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
In 
this pro se appeal, Taylor does not expressly state any issues in his 
brief.  We discern his issue to be 
whether his 1997 conviction and sentencing are a nullity because written oaths 
of office were allegedly not filed by the county court commissioners involved in 
the preliminary stages of his criminal case.  The State of Wyoming phrases the issues 
as follows:

 

I.  Did the district court have jurisdiction 
to consider Taylor's "Petition to Show Cause Why Judgement (sic) Is Not 
Void"?

 

II. 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider Taylor's 
appeal?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Taylor 
was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent following a 
trial to the court in Fremont County on April 7, 1997, and was sentenced to two 
to four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on June 18, 1997.  He appealed his conviction and sentence, 
which were upheld by decision of this Court on May 26, 2000, in Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶4]           
On 
June 17, 2002, Taylor filed in the district court a "Petition to Show Cause Why 
Judgement [sic] Is Not Void."  The 
Petition was filed under his criminal case caption and asserts that it was 
served on the Fremont County Attorney's Office by regular mail.  He then filed a "Motion for Summary 
Judgment" on July 19, 2002.  These 
pleadings allege defects in the arrest warrant and search procedures in 1997, 
and that his conviction is void because the county court commissioners who 
presided over his preliminary hearing and ordered him bound over to the district 
court for trial did not have written oaths of office on file.  These issues were not raised in Taylor's 
previous appeal.

 

[¶5]           
The 
Fremont County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney filed a one-page "State's Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," asserting that a motion for summary 
judgment under the rules of civil procedure does not apply to criminal 
proceedings; that a motion for new trial pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33 would have 
been due within two years of final judgment; that a motion for arrest of 
judgment for want of jurisdiction under W.R.Cr.P. 34 would have been due within 
ten days of conviction, and that a motion for post-conviction relief would be 
untimely under Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 
7-14-103(d). 

 

[¶6]           
The 
district court judge issued a decision letter on July 31, 2002, which 
stated:

 

Having 
reviewed your memos and the case of Nixon 
v. State, 2002 WY 118, I find that defendant has not stated any cause for 
relief over which this court has any authority.  Therefore, I will order that the 
applications filed by defendant be dismissed and the claims be denied. 

 

An 
order of dismissal was filed on September 3, 2002, which Taylor 
appealed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]           
The 
district court and the state are correct that this matter is controlled by our 
decision in Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 
118, 51 P.3d 851 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
facts in Nixon were procedurally 
similar.  Nixon had pled guilty 
under a plea agreement to first degree murder and aggravated assault and 
battery.  Nine months after this 
Court affirmed his judgment and sentence, he sought via motion in the district 
court to withdraw his guilty pleas.  
The district court, finding it lacked jurisdiction, dismissed the motion 
to withdraw the plea, and Nixon appealed.  
We agreed with the district court and dismissed the second appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction in this Court.

 

[¶8]           
We 
discussed at some length the finality of criminal convictions in Nixon.  We noted the specific procedures under 
the rules and statutes for post-conviction relief, acknowledged the 
constitutional and policy bases for finality in criminal cases, and concluded 
that, once the defendant's conviction has become final because of the exercise 
or forfeiture of his right to appeal from his conviction, the district court has 
no continuing authority to act in the case unless permitted by express statute 
or rule.  Id. at ¶¶11-13; 
see also Barela v. State, 2002 
WY 143, ¶¶8-9, 55 P.3d 11, 12-13 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

[¶9]           
Perhaps 
out of naivet© or perhaps to avoid the preclusive effect of the above cases, 
Taylor tried to bring his claim before this Court in the cloak of a civil 
proceeding, using a show cause petition and motion for summary judgment.  But we will not permit post-conviction 
relief to be invoked as a substitute for a direct appeal.  Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 
(Wyo. 1988).  Nor will we allow 
issues that could have been raised on appeal to be challenged by a petition for 
post-conviction relief because they are foreclosed by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  Kallas v. State, 
776 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1989).  
Likewise, we will not permit other civil proceedings to be used as an 
appeal-like proceeding to effect an end-run around the waiver and res judicata doctrines.  Nixon, 2002 WY 118, ¶19, 51 P.3d  at 
856.

 

[¶10]       
Giving 
Taylor the benefit of the doubt, even if we were to construe his petition as a 
motion for a new trial under W.R.Cr.P. 33, he is three years too late in his 
request.  And if construed as a 
motion for arrest of judgment under W.R.Cr.P. 34, he is five years too 
late.  He is likewise too late under 
the post-conviction relief statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) (LexisNexis 
2003), and a habeas corpus petition would not lie as he would have completed his 
sentence no later than 2001.

 

[¶11]       
We 
have consistently held that an unconditional guilty plea waives an appellate 
review of non-jurisdictional claims.  
Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, 
¶8, 55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002).  
The only claims that remain are those that go to the jurisdiction of the 
court or the voluntariness of the plea.  
Id. (citing Wilson v. 
United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992)).

 

Examples 
of jurisdictional defects are unconstitutionality of the statute defining the 
crime, failure of the indictment or information to state an offense, and double 
jeopardy.  Non-jurisdictional 
defects include the use of inadmissible evidence, the use of unlawfully obtained 
statements, a claim that a grand jury was improperly convened and conducted, and 
a claim of violation of the right to speedy trial.

 

Kitzke, 
¶ 9 (citations omitted).

 

[¶12]       
Taylor's 
arrest warrant and search claims are clearly waived by his plea.   Taylor argues repeatedly that the 
alleged failure of the county court commissioners to have a written oath on file 
goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction in his original criminal 
proceedings, and therefore can be raised at any time.  He cites several civil cases for the 
court's general jurisdictional requirement, but no pertinent authority or cogent 
argument for the proposition that the county court commissioner's written oath 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite in preliminary criminal proceedings.  Such a defect  the existence of which 
the record does not demonstrate  would be more akin to a claim that a grand 
jury was improperly convened than it would be to the jurisdictional defects we 
have identified, and is therefore non-jurisdictional and not subject to any kind 
of post-conviction review, even if properly pled.  

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]       
In 
light of the above considerations and precedents, the district court was correct 
in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to afford Mr. Taylor any relief from 
his 1997 conviction and sentencing.  And as we noted also in Nixon, 2002 WY 118, ¶8, 51 P.3d  at 853, 
this Court enjoys no greater jurisdiction than that of the district court in 
such matters.  We must therefore 
dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this 
Court.