Title: STATE, EX REL. v. Ancient Order of United Workmen

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

178 Kan. 69 (1955)
283 P.2d 461
STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. HAROLD R. FATZER, Attorney General of the State of Kansas, Appellant,
v.
ANCIENT ORDER OF UNITED WORKMEN OF KANSAS, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 39,688

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 7, 1955.
Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General, argued the cause, and Paul E. Wilson, Charles C. McCarter, Thomas M. Evans, Robert E. Hoffman, Fred W. Rausch, Jr. and James L. Galle, Assistant Attorneys General, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Harry W. Colmery, of Topeka, argued the cause, and James E. Smith, of Topeka, Kenneth G. Speir, of Newton, and A.C. Bokelman, of Washington, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
Earl H. Hatcher, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Topeka, and Everett E. Steerman, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Emporia, of counsel.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is an action by the state, upon the relation of the attorney general, to recover the sum of $110,000 from the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Kansas, a corporation, a fraternal benefit insurance society (hereinafter referred to as defendant), which sum was appropriated by the 1951 legislature and paid to defendant from the general revenue fund of the state for a hospital building located on land owned by the state identified as the State Sanatorium for Tuberculosis, near Norton.
Defendant's demurrer to the second amended petition, on the ground that pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was sustained.
This appeal by the state is from that ruling.
Because of the nature of the case, and in the interest of accuracy, we consider it advisable to set out the material portions of the second amended petition (hereinafter referred to as petition), despite *71 the fact they are lengthy, rather than attempt to summarize its allegations. They are as follow:
As alleged, a copy of the contract referred to was attached to the petition as an exhibit. It was entered into on January 17, 1928, between defendant, as party of the first part, and the State of Kansas, by its State Board of Administration, as party of the second part. The body of this contract reads:
It was signed by officers of defendant, and was signed and approved by the then attorney general of this state generally, not as to form only as alleged in the petition.
The deed of conveyance referred to in paragraph 7 of the petition, a copy of which was attached as an exhibit, requires no mention other than to say that it is dated July 1, 1951, defendant is party of the first part, the State of Kansas is party of the second part, and the body of the instrument recites:
From an examination and study of the exhaustive briefs totalling some three hundred pages, it would appear that the parties have overlooked nothing with respect to the question whether the petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. However, despite the many questions raised, we think that what is true as to most lawsuits may be said of this one  that is, once the fundamental and decisive point is reached and decided, discussion of other questions becomes purely academic and thus immaterial to the ultimate decision. With this thought in mind, we go directly to the controlling issue in the case  ownership of the building which was erected pursuant to the contract of January 17, 1928.
The crux of the state's argument is that title to the building was at all times in the state  therefore defendant had nothing to sell, the state thus bought nothing, and the "purchase price" paid constituted *75 an unlawful and unconstitutional expenditure of public funds. The facts and reasons upon which this conclusion is based are enumerated in the petition and will not be repeated except as they are referred to in our discussion.
Although for purposes of our decision there is considerable doubt as to the necessity for deciding the question whether the State Board of Administration had power and authority to enter into the contract, we nevertheless will touch on the subject briefly.
Article 7, Section 1, of our Constitution makes provision for such benevolent institutions as the public good may require. For many years the public policy of this state, as declared by the legislature, has been to protect the people from the ravages of tuberculosis. (See R.S. 1923, 65-105, et seq., and corresponding sections in G.S. 1949.) Reference to other sections found in R.S. 1923 establishes that at the time this contract was entered into the State Board of Administration had authority to manage and control state institutions such as the State Sanatorium for Tuberculosis (74-101, 76-1503) and was empowered to "... control and manage said institutions, including the erection of all buildings, ..." (74-105.)
It is clear that the basic subject matter of the contract is tuberculosis, treatment of which was at that time, and still is, a public purpose. In cooperating with the state in meeting the problem defendant agreed to erect a suitable building on the grounds of the State Sanatorium for the treatment of tubercular patients. Other provisions of the contract speak for themselves and will not be repeated. The mere fact defendant may have derived some private benefit from the erection and maintenance of the building does not render the contract illegal. The agreement had a public purpose and by its very terms conferred a public benefit  cooperation with and assistance to the state in the treatment of tuberculosis.
The state, through its Board of Administration, had authority to permit the erection of the building by defendant on the grounds of the State Sanatorium for Tuberculosis, and the contract was not invalid for any of the constitutional or statutory reasons urged.
This brings us directly to the question of ownership of the building, but first we pause to mention a contention by the state that the allegation in the petition "that title to the building was and has been at all times in the State of Kansas," is admitted by the demurrer. *76 We do not agree. In Preston v. Shields, 159 Kan. 575, 156 P.2d 543, it was held:
Here the state has set out in detail the facts upon which it bases its claim of ownership, and the general allegation of title amounts to nothing more than a conclusion, and as such is not admitted by the demurrer. (See also Pierce v. Schroeder, 171 Kan. 259, 264, 232 P.2d 460.)
Having determined that the contract of 1928, under which the building was constructed, was not invalid for the asserted reason the state was without authority to enter into it, provisions of the contract, or absence of them, become of paramount importance in the determination of ownership of the building down through the years. The state contends that as the contract did not specifically provide the building should remain the property of defendant it therefore, by operation of law, became the property of the state under the general proposition that if one builds a building on another's land it belongs to the latter as part of his land in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Concededly, there are situations to which the foregoing principle could apply, but in our opinion this is not one of them. As we read the contract, it gave a permissive use in the nature of a license to defendant to construct the building  that is, it created a license in defendant to use the land for the purposes set forth. The very fact that defendant secured permission to build indicates that it sought to avoid the legal consequences of building without permission.
The general rule applicable to situations such as we have here is as follows:
Detailed discussion of previous decisions of this court on the general subject matter, among them being Keeling v. Kuhn, 19 Kan. 441; Docking v. Frazell, 34 Kan. 29, 7 Pac. 618; Smyre v. Kiowa County, 89 Kan. 664, 132 Pac. 209; Lumber Co. v. Larmor, 110 Kan. 670, 205 Pac. 621; Lumber and Grain Co. v. Eaves, 114 Kan. 576, 220 Pac. 512; Farmer v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 130 Kan. 803, 287 Pac. 706, and Blankenship v. School District, 136 Kan. 313, 15 P.2d 438, cited by the parties, would be of doubtful value due to their factual dissimilarity to the situation presented here, and neither do we consider it necessary or expedient to encumber this opinion with decisions from other jurisdictions.
In the last analysis the matter simply narrows down to this:
Defendant sought and was granted lawful permission to erect a building suitable for the treatment of tubercular patients. It did so. By the terms of the contract defendant agreed to keep and maintain the building and to furnish it properly for its intended purpose. Right of possession and use remained in defendant. It was further agreed that, when available, rooms in the building were to be at the disposal of the state in the furtherance of the common purpose. The contract speaks for itself, and certainly it contains nothing to indicate the building was to become property of the state merely because it was built on state land. The application of the general rule governing such a situation is clear  that when a landowner consents to the placing of a building on his land by another, without an express agreement as to whether it shall become a part of the realty or remain the property of the person placing it there, in the absence of any other facts and circumstances tending to show a different intention, an agreement will be implied that the building is to remain the property of the one placing it there. There being no other facts and circumstances tending to show a different intention, we hold, therefore, that title to the building was at all times in defendant. Such being the case, the 1951 legislature possessed power and authority to appropriate funds for its purchase.
This opinion might very well end with what already has been said, but in view of the unusual nature of the case the court is of the opinion that it should mention another reason for its conclusion.
*78 Even if it be assumed, solely for the sake of argument, that the state, through its Board of Administration, lacked authority to enter into the contract whereby defendant was given permission to construct the building, the fact remains that it was entered into and the building was constructed pursuant thereto. Moreover, it is conceded that at all times, and by the mutual consent of all parties concerned, defendant occupied and controlled the building under a claim of right and ownership recognized by the state, notwithstanding that through the years it was used by both defendant and the state in furtherance of the common purpose. Having recognized such rights in defendant, and having accepted the benefits, the state, in good conscience and equity, and in the recognition of its moral obligation, possessed authority, through the legislature, to ratify the entire transaction and to appropriate funds for the purchase of the building.
It is elementary that in our form of government power to govern is conferred upon three coordinate branches or departments  the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each is independent and supreme within its own sphere, subject only to constitutional limitations. The legislature makes the laws, the executive administers and executes them, while the function of the judiciary is to interpret, explain and to apply the laws to controversies concerning rights, wrongs, duties and obligations arising under the laws. Except for certain constitutional limitations and restrictions, which are inapplicable to the facts presented here, the control and disbursement of funds belonging to the state are subject to the will of the legislature, unfettered by interference by the executive or the judiciary. Judicial examination of any law enacted by the legislature proceeds on the assumption that it is valid unless it contravenes an express inhibition of the constitution or one necessarily implied from some express affirmative provision of that instrument. For a discussion of the general principle involved see Hicks v. Davis, 97 Kan. 312, 154 Pac. 1030. No such showing of invalidity of the act in question which appropriated funds for the purchase of the building has been made, and it therefore stands.
Numerous other arguments which, through the industry and ingenuity of counsel, have been made in support of their respective contentions have been neither overlooked nor ignored. All have been carefully examined and considered, but, in view of our decision, require no discussion.
*79 We therefore hold:
The contract of January 17, 1928, whereby defendant was granted permission to construct the building in question, was not invalid for any of the reasons urged. Ownership of the building at all times remained in defendant, and the state had authority to purchase it. Further, even though it be assumed, solely for the sake of argument, that the state lacked authority to enter into the contract in the first instance, the action of the 1951 legislature in appropriating public funds for the purchase of the building was, for the reasons stated, not invalid.
The petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and defendant's demurrer thereto was properly sustained. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
SMITH, J., not participating.