Title: ROBERT L. FOSTER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT L. FOSTER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 135Case Number: No. S-09-0232Decided: 10/07/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

ROBERT 
L. FOSTER,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Robert L. Foster 
challenges the order of the district court revoking his probation and 
reinstating his original prison sentence.  
We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Foster presents 
the following issues:

 
 
I.          
Were all of the violations of probation proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court consider unproven violations in the dispositional 
phase of the revocation hearing?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In March 2007, 
Foster was charged with two counts of felony property destruction under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(LexisNexis 2009)1 for his part in a vandalism 
spree.  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Foster pled no contest to one count of property destruction on 
October 22, 2007, in exchange for dismissal of the other charge.  In accordance with the terms of that 
agreement, the district court sentenced Foster on January 3, 2008, to a 
suspended term of imprisonment of four to seven years, placed him on four years 
of supervised probation under specified terms and conditions, and ordered him to 
pay restitution in the amount of $8,570.47.2  

 
 
[¶4]      At the sentencing 
hearing, the district court made clear that restitution was the integral 
component of Foster's probation.  
Foster indicated that he could pay restitution at the rate of $1,000.00 
per month, starting on the 15th of January.  Despite that representation, Foster 
never paid anything toward his restitution obligation in January or 
February.  

 
 
[¶5]      Foster eventually 
entered into a restitution payment plan, which the district court approved on 
March 4, 2008, that stated:

 
 
I, 
Robert L. Foster, agree to pay within the term of probation, minimum monthly 
payments of $200.00 per month beginning March 2008, until total due is 
paid in full.  I further agree that 
if I am struggling on a particular month, I will pay no less than $25.00 per 
month.  [Emphasis in original.]  

 
 
Thereafter, 
Foster made a restitution payment of $100.00 on March 10 (an amount authorized 
by his probation agent) but did not make another payment until June 2, at which 
time he paid only $25.00.3  That minimal payment was followed by a 
payment of $100.00 on July 2.  

 
 
[¶6]      On July 18, 2008, 
the State filed a petition to revoke Foster's probation, alleging that Foster 
had failed to make regular restitution payments as required.  The petition also alleged the following 
probation violations: Foster failed to attend Pretreatment Group at Southwest 
Counseling Services; he failed to obtain steady employment in a timely manner; 
he violated the law by committing the offense of "hit and run;" he failed to be 
honest and compliant with law enforcement; he refused to cooperate with his 
probation agent and therapist in order to attend recommended counseling at 
Southwest Counseling Services; and he refused to apply for the Intensive 
Supervision Program (ISP) as directed by his probation agent.  The State subsequently amended the 
petition to include the allegation that Foster failed to inform his probation 
agent about a vehicle he possessed and used.  Foster denied the allegations.  

 
 
[¶7]      After several 
continuances, the district court conducted a revocation hearing on October 23, 
2008.  At the conclusion of that 
hearing, the district court eliminated the failure to attend counseling at 
Southwest Counseling Services and the failure to notify his probation agent 
about the vehicle as grounds for revocation of probation.  The district court, however, found 
sufficient evidence proving the other allegations and concluded that Foster had 
violated the terms of his probation.  
The court revoked Foster's probation and ordered him to serve the 
underlying four-to-seven-year prison sentence.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Revocation 
proceedings are largely governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39 and consist of a two-part 
process.  The first part, the 
adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether or not a condition of probation has been violated.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5).  This determination must be based on 
verified facts and must be made in accordance with constitutional due process 
requirements and the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Wyo. 1996). 
The second part, the dispositional phase, is triggered only upon a finding that 
a condition of probation was violated.  
Id.  During this phase, the district court 
must determine the appropriate consequences of the probation violation.  In making this determination, the 
district court must consider not only the violation, but also the reasons the 
condition was originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the 
violation.  Id.; Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 891-92 (Wyo. 1994); 
Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 32 
(Wyo. 1984).

   

[¶9]      We review 
probation revocation proceedings under our abuse of discretion 
standard:

 
 
A 
district court's decision to revoke probation and impose a sentence is 
discretionary and will not be disturbed unless the record demonstrates a clear 
abuse of discretion.  Mapp v. 
State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Wyo. 1996). We review the district court's decision to determine whether the 
court could reasonably conclude as it did.  
Id.  "Upon review, all that is necessary to 
uphold a district court's decision to revoke probation is evidence that it made 
a conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that a condition of probation 
had been violated."  Sweets v. 
State, 2003 WY 64, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Forbes 
v. State, 
2009 WY 146, ¶ 6, 220 P.3d 510, 512-13 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
[¶10]   During the adjudicatory phase of 
the revocation proceeding in this case, the district court found Foster had 
committed six different probation violations.  Foster challenges each of these findings 
on a variety of grounds, including insufficient proof and alleged due process 
violations, and asserts the district court erred in reaching these 
conclusions.  He further claims that 
error was exacerbated when the district court relied on these violations as a 
basis for revoking his probation and reinstating the original prison 
sentence.  In essence, Foster 
contends that if one of the violations was unsubstantiated, then the district 
court's consideration of that violation tainted its dispositional decision, 
necessitating a new dispositional hearing.

 
 
[¶11]   This is not the law.  A single proven violation is all that is 
necessary to revoke probation.  See, e.g., Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 225 (Wyo. 1991).  Thus, no matter how many violations are 
allegedly proven, a district court can either consider each violation 
individually or consider them as a whole.  
Should a district court single out one violation, what is then required 
of the district court is that, in deciding whether to revoke probation based on 
the one violation, it must conscientiously consider the violation, the reasons 
for the defendant's failure to comply with the terms and conditions and the 
reason those terms and conditions were imposed.

 
 
[¶12]   Applying these principles to the 
instant case, it is clear the district court complied with its duties.  Even though Foster disputes the findings 
of other violations, it is indisputable that Foster violated the terms of his 
probation by failing to pay restitution for the month of May 2008.4  In the dispositional phase, the district 
court unambiguously stated that the reason it was revoking probation and 
reinstating the original sentence was because of his failure to pay 
restitution.  The district court 
reasoned:

 
 
You 
have not taken responsibility for your actions, and I think it's a little too 
late to say, well, give me another chance, and I'll do what I said I would do a 
year ago . . . .

 
 
As 
I told you back in October a year ago, the only reason I was accepting that plea 
agreement was for you to make restitution to those victims because I felt at 
that time that you deserved to go to prison . . . based on your record and your 
actions with 53 victims.  

 
 
The 
district court did not mention any of the other alleged 
violations.

 
 
[¶13]   Under the specific facts and 
circumstances of this case, we are comfortable determining that the existence of 
the other alleged violations did not taint the district court's dispositional 
decision.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the decision of the district court to revoke Foster's probation 
and impose the prison sentence on the sole ground of his failure to pay 
restitution.  
Affirmed.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1§ 6-3-201 
provides in pertinent part:

(a) A 
person is guilty of property destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, 
injures or destroys property of another without the owner's 
consent.

            
                        
(b) Property destruction and defacement is:

                                    

                                                
* * * *

(iii) A 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the cost of 
restoring injured property or the value of the property if destroyed is one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more.

(c) If a 
series of injuries results from a single continuing course of conduct, a single 
violation of this section may be charged and penalties imposed based upon the 
aggregate cost or value of the property injured or 
destroyed.

 
 

2As part of 
the plea agreement, Foster had agreed to pay the amount of restitution ordered, 
which included both charged and uncharged acts of property destruction.  

 
 

3The April 
payment was expressly waived by his probation agent so he could pay for a 
counseling-related evaluation and polygraph.  

 
 

4Foster did 
not present any evidence at the hearing establishing an inability to pay 
restitution.  See Ramsdell v. State, 2006 WY 159, ¶ 21, 149 P.3d 459, 464 (Wyo. 2006) (once 
the State demonstrates a failure to pay restitution, the burden shifts to the 
probationer to establish an inability to pay).