Title: Boles v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

303 N.E.2d 645 (1973)
Turner Lee BOLES, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1072S130.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
November 26, 1973.
Ferdinand Samper, Ferd Samper, Jr., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John Carmody, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
*646 HUNTER, Justice.
This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief wherein the appellant sought to withdraw a plea of guilty to second degree murder. The appellant was originally indicted for first degree murder in 1967. He entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on November 22, 1967. On December 11, 1967, the appellant and two co-defendants appeared in Marion Criminal Court with counsel and indicated to the trial court that they wished to withdraw their previously entered pleas and plead guilty to lesser charges. The appellant wished to withdraw his plea of not guilty to first degree murder and enter a plea of guilty to second degree murder.
At the post-conviction relief hearing, the State introduced the transcript of the appellant's guilty plea. The transcript shows unequivocably that the appellant was advised of the constitutional rights deemed waived by the guilty plea. The trial court carefully instructed the appellant as to the consequences of a guilty plea. This is the transcript:
"COURT MET PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT AND THE TRIAL OF THIS CAUSE WAS COMMENCED
"QUESTIONS BY THE COURT:
"QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO SERGEANT UBERTA BY THE COURT
"AND THAT WAS ALL OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED AND INTRODUCED IN THE FOREGOING PROCEEDING.
* * * * *"
The appellant first contends that his plea was given under duress, because he feared that if he did not plead guilty he would be returned to prison in Arkansas where he allegedly had received harsh treatment at the hands of prison officials. Yet, at his post-conviction hearing, the appellant testified as follows:
Thus, the appellant's contention that his plea of guilty was entered under duress is not supported by the record. Pleading guilty in Indiana was not a condition precedent to a pardon in Arkansas. The Arkansas authorities merely released the appellant and commuted his sentence on the condition that he stand trial in Indiana.
The record discloses that the appellant was faced with a possible death sentence under a charge of first degree murder (Burns § 10-3401, IC 1971, XX-XX-X-X), that through the process of "plea bargaining" such charge was reduced to second degree murder in exchange for a plea of guilty, that the appellant had admitted the killing in a signed confession, that the appellant's trial attorney testified that he had never pleaded a person guilty to a charge of murder without first informing him that the court had no power to suspend a murder conviction:
We agree with the trial court that the appellant wholly failed in his burden of showing that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. We find nothing herein to overcome the presumption that the trial court acted properly in denying *653 appellant's petition. Lockhart v. State (1971), Ind., 274 N.E.2d 523. As stated by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747;
Furthermore, the voluntariness of a guilty plea is not rendered constitutionally defective merely because a criminal defendant denies commission of the crime charged. North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162. The factors which motivated the appellant to plead guilty are not material, so long as we can ascertain from the record that his guilty plea was entered freely, voluntarily and knowingly. Brady v. United States, supra; Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274. In Alford, supra, the Court stated:
We agree with the rationale hereinabove quoted, but we do not imply that Indiana courts should depart from close judicial scrutiny of guilty pleas. A guilty plea amounts to an admission of the crime charged. Batchelor v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773. Therefore, where a guilty plea is accompanied with a protestation of innocence and unaccompanied by evidence showing a factual basis for guilt, the trial court should never accept it. But where, as in the case at bar, the plea is accompanied with overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the defendant is judicially advised of all the rights he is waiving, and the plea is voluntarily, freely, and knowingly given, then the subjective motivation behind such plea shall not render it defective. Subsequent contentions of innocence arising during post-conviction relief proceedings are not sufficient, nothing more appearing, to attack a previously entered plea of guilty.
Appellant further asserts error in that the indictment returned by the grand jury charged him with a murder committed on December 17, 1967, a date in the future. The trial court permitted the indictment to be amended to change the date of the alleged murder to December 17, 1966. No motion to quash the indictment was filed, nor was any objection forthcoming when the State filed its motion to amend by interlineation. Appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced in the least by the trial court's action. The indictment was corrected prior to the entering of appellant's guilty plea and was a correction of form, not substance. Appellant's contention is without merit. Johnson v. State (1972), Ind., 281 N.E.2d 473. Likewise meritless is the contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed after the faulty indictment was filed. IC 1971, XX-X-XX-XX, 35-4-4-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-1127, 9-1133 (1956 Repl.); cf., Robbins v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 313, 241 N.E.2d 148.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., concurs.
GIVAN, J., not participating.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion in which PRENTICE, J., concurs.
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
Appellant's appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition is based on two separate and distinct contentions: (1) That his guilty plea was entered into under coercion because of alleged abusive treatment in prison, and (2) that it was entered into without adequate knowledge of its consequences because appellant was not fully aware of the special sentencing provisions to which his plea exposed him.
The majority opinion has extensively dealt with the first of these issues and I agree with the conclusion reached with respect to it. The opinion does not deal so specifically with the second issue, but apparently the majority has decided either that appellant need not have been aware of the sentencing provisions when he entered his plea or that there exists evidence in the record which creates a reasonable inference that he was aware of the provisions. I cannot agree with this resolution of appellant's second contention and I therefore dissent.
*655 A defendant's decision to plead guilty to a criminal charge lodged against him is the most sweeping and encompassing step he may make in our criminal system.
It is estimated that pleas of guilty now account for over 90% of the criminal convictions every year in this country.[1] I believe that because of the increasingly widespread use of this method to dispose of the important issues and questions more traditionally and thoroughly treated at trials we must be particularly careful that the plea entered has been done so in accordance with constitutional standards.
It has long been established that in order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid it must be made, "voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences." (Emphasis added.) Machibroda v. U.S. (1962), 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473; Kercheval v. U.S. (1927), 274 U.S. 220, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009; Brown v. State (1973), Ind., 300 N.E.2d 83. It is axiomatic that the possible sentences a defendant subjects himself to, through his plea, is contemplated as a "consequence" in the meaning of this constitutional rule. Marvel v. U.S. (1965), 380 U.S. 262, 85 S. Ct. 953, 13 L. Ed. 2d 960 (Per Curiam).
Appellant alleges that he entered his plea on the offense with the belief that the sentencing judge would subsequently hear appellant's version of the offense, which appellant believed would disclose mitigating circumstances, and that the judge might then sentence him to a lesser sentence than the maximum of which he had been informed. At the post-conviction hearing the court itself inquired of appellant's understanding of the sentencing procedures which were to be employed after his plea of guilty.
Appellant contends that it was not until after he was sentenced that he discovered that there existed certain sentencing provisions for a second degree murder conviction which made a life sentence mandatory.
It is agreed that the penalty for second degree murder at the time appellant was sentenced was a mandatory life term. Burns § 10-3404, IC 1971, XX-X-XX-X.[2] In addition to the murder statute itself, another statute (I.C. 1971, 35-7-1-1, being Burns § 9-2209) listed second degree murder as one of only a few crimes in this State where the sentencing judge was prohibited from exercising his usual discretion in matters of sentencing. Unlike the judge's power in most situations the judge under a § 9-2209 conviction had no power to suspend the sentence or parole the defendant; the imposition of a life sentence was mandatory. State ex rel. Palmer v. Cir. Court of Hendricks Co. (1963), 244 Ind. 297, 192 N.E.2d 625; O'Neil v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 21, 22 N.E.2d 825.
The initial question, therefore, is whether it was necessary for appellant to be apprised of the somewhat unique sentencing provisions of the 1967 second degree murder statute, by which he was barred from receiving a suspended sentence and imposition of a life sentence was statutorily mandated, in order to have a complete and full understanding of the sentencing consequences of this plea as required by the Constitution. I believe that it would be.
These special sentencing provisions have a direct effect on appellant's right to parole and a possible suspension of sentence. Appellant's post-conviction testimony indicates that at least part of his decision to enter his plea, and thereby waive several significant rights, was grounded on the mistaken belief that the judge was empowered to sentence him to less than the maximum. This belief was fostered by his previous pleas of guilty after which he apparently had been afforded an opportunity to explain his version of the offense which, he felt, resulted in a less severe sentence. It could also be argued that the judge's use of the term "maximum penalty" when informing the appellant of the sentence he could receive might enforce, however unintentionally, appellant's belief that there did indeed exist a minimum sentence or at least an alternative to the "maximum" about which he had been informed. Appellant entered his plea with the expectation that the judge would exercise discretion in sentencing. In order for appellant to make a fully informed choice on the decision to plead guilty he should have been informed that the judge had no such discretion.
The principle that a full understanding of the consequences requires that a defendant should be fully informed of all relevant facts concerning the possible sentences he may receive upon his plea has received wide recognition. The Indiana General Assembly in its past session enacted the Indiana Code of Criminal Procedure which sets out the type of information which a defendant must be aware of in order for his plea of guilty to be properly accepted. At § 3 of that Code it requires the defendant to be informed of "the maximum possible sentences and minimum sentences of the offense charged and of any possible increase sentences by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences." PL. 325, Art. 4.1, § 3(d). In addition the ABA standards relating to pleas of guilty require that a defendant be advised of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, and the "mandatory minimum *657 sentence" if any. Standards, Pleas of Guilty, § 1.4(c).
I want to emphasize that my position here does not require that a defendant seeking to enter a plea of guilty to a charge must be told of the exact sentence a judge would impose upon him if the plea was accepted. Nor does it mean that a defendant who had been properly and fully informed of the possible sentences which could be imposed on him should be allowed to withdraw his plea merely because he was disappointed in the severity of the sentence he was ultimately given. It merely recognizes that in order for a plea to be made with knowledge of its consequences a defendant should be made aware of the "range of sentences" to which the plea exposes him.
Moreover this does not require that an accused need be informed prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea about every conceivable collateral effect the conviction entered on the plea might have. See Bye v. U.S., 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir., 1970). However when there exists a condition imposed by a statute such as here which has a direct and definite consequence on a disposition of a defendant's plea I believe he must be apprised of it in order that he be allowed to exercise an informed choice on his decision to waive the important constitutional rights afforded to him. Bye v. U.S., supra; Jenkins v. U.S., 420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir., 1970); Berry v. U.S., 412 F.2d 189 (3rd Cir., 1969); Durant v. U.S., 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir., 1969); Munich v. U.S., 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir., 1964). The knowledge of the mandatory nature of this sentence is as necessary to a full understanding of the consequences as is the knowledge of the maximum sentence itself.
The extent of the guilty plea transcript set out in the majority opinion is impressive in bulk and it is beyond question that the trial judge properly informed appellant of his right to trial by a jury, his right to remain silent at the trial if he so desired, his right to cross examine the State's witnesses, his right to call witnesses and introduce evidence on his own behalf, his right to appeal an unfavorable decision and his right to have counsel throughout the course of these proceedings. However, I do not believe that compliance with some, or even most, of the requirements for a constitutionally valid guilty plea should excuse us from requiring compliance with all of them, and a full understanding of the sentence to which a plea will expose a defendant is clearly constitutionally necessary.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with the apparent implication in the majority opinion that the testimony of appellant's trial attorney to the effect that, "he had never pleaded a person guilty to a charge of murder without first informing him that the court had no power to suspend a murder conviction" can be sufficient to show that appellant was indeed aware of the unique sentencing provisions. That same attorney also testified in conjunction with appellant's particular case that he could not remember what he told appellant, and that he honestly could not tell whether appellant was aware of the mandatory sentence when he entered his plea. The broad generalization of the first statement, which apparently pertains to every guilty plea proceeding this attorney ever appeared in, cannot reasonably be construed to establish what is specifically denied in the later testimony directed to appellant's particular plea proceeding. Campbell v. State, supra.
Since I believe a full understanding of the sentencing consequences of his plea is required for a constitutionally valid plea, and since appellant has presented a prima facie case establishing that he was not so informed, which the State has failed to reasonably rebut, I would vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.
[1]  Erickson, "The Finality of a Plea of Guilty", 48 N. Dame Lawyer 835 (1973).
[2]  In 1969 the Indiana General Assembly amended the statute to provide an alternative sentence of 15-25 years.