Title: Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1481.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1481 
SCHWERING ET AL. v. TRW VEHICLE SAFETY SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1481.] 
Civil Procedure—Voluntary dismissal—A plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a 
claim without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court 
declares a mistrial after the jury has been empaneled and the trial has 
commenced. 
(No. 2011-0438—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided April 4, 2012.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. 1:10-CV-679. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has 
been empaneled and the trial has commenced. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we decide whether a plaintiff is permitted to unilaterally 
dismiss a lawsuit without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) after a 
declaration of mistrial. 
{¶ 2} Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII, we have accepted an issue certified 
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western 
Division: “Where a jury has been empaneled and sworn and the trial has 
commenced for purposes of Ohio Civ.R.41(A)(1)(a), and the trial court 
subsequently declares a mistrial, does Rule 41(A)(1)(a) permit the plaintiff to 
unilaterally voluntarily dismiss his or her claims without prejudice?” 
{¶ 3} We answer the certified question in the negative. 
I. Complaint Filed 
{¶ 4} Kenneth Schwering was a passenger in a 2001 Ford Explorer Sport 
driven by his wife, Beverly Schwering.  On December 28, 2002, the couple was 
involved in a traffic accident and the vehicle rolled over.  Schwering and his wife 
were wearing seatbelts at the time of the accident, but she was killed, and he 
sustained injuries. 
{¶ 5} On October 17, 2003, Schwering filed a complaint on his own 
behalf and as personal representative of his wife’s estate in the Hamilton County 
Court of Common Pleas against Ford Motor Company and TRW Safety Systems, 
Inc., asserting products-liability and negligence claims.  The complaint alleged 
that the design of the seatbelt system in the Explorer was unreasonably dangerous 
and that the system was defective, creating an unsafe condition that caused 
Schwering’s wife’s death and his own injuries. 
{¶ 6} Over five years later, the case proceeded to trial.  A jury was sworn 
in on May 28, 2009.  Schwering called Steven Meyer, during his case-in-chief, as 
an expert witness on safety-restraint systems.  Meyer testified that he had tested 
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an alternative design of the restraint system that would have prevented Beverly 
Schwering’s death. 
{¶ 7} Ford objected and moved to strike this testimony, arguing that 
Schwering had not disclosed that Meyer had tested an alternative design on the 
same model of car involved in the accident.  Ford also argued that Meyer had 
deceived it and the court during earlier depositions by denying any recollection of 
having performed tests on a vehicle like the Schwerings’ Explorer.  The trial 
judge initially granted Ford’s motion to strike and instructed the jury to disregard 
Meyer’s testimony.  Ford moved for a mistrial, contending surprise, undue 
prejudice, and discovery violations of Civ.R. 26(D) and (E).  Schwering also 
moved for a mistrial, on the basis that the court’s exclusion of the proffered 
testimony prevented him from receiving a fair trial.  On June 8, 2009, after the 
trial judge had reversed his ruling granting Ford’s motion to strike, he declared a 
mistrial and scheduled preliminary proceedings for a retrial of the case.  Before 
the second trial began, Schwering filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
{¶ 8} In September 2010, Schwering filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, asserting the same products-
liability and negligence claims against TRW and Ford on behalf of himself and 
his wife’s estate. 
{¶ 9} Ford and TRW filed motions to dismiss the federal action, arguing 
that Schwering’s voluntary dismissal in the Hamilton County action did not occur 
“before the commencement of trial” as required by Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), and thus 
the dismissal could not have been “without prejudice.”  Schwering objected to the 
motions to dismiss, arguing that the mistrial rendered the first trial a nullity, 
permitting him to unilaterally dismiss the case without prejudice under Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a) because trial had not yet “commenced.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} The federal court found no state law on whether the declaration of 
a mistrial reinstated the right to voluntarily dismiss claims without prejudice.  As 
a result, the district court certified its question to this court, asking whether a 
plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss claims without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has been 
empaneled and sworn and the trial has commenced for purposes of Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a).  We hold that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without 
prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial 
after the jury has been empaneled and trial has commenced. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Ohio and Federal Rules Differ. 
{¶ 11} Since the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
dismissal of actions has been governed by Civ.R. 41.  Civ.R. 41(A) provides for 
three types of voluntary dismissals:  (1) by notice before the commencement of 
trial, (2) by stipulation of all parties, and (3) by court order.  Chadwick v. Barba 
Lou, 69 Ohio St.2d 222, 225, 431 N.E. 2d 660 (1982).  The provision at issue in 
this case, Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim 
without an order of the court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the 
commencement of trial. 
{¶ 12} Civ.R. 41 reads: 
 
(A) Voluntary dismissal: effect thereof 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of 
Civ.R. 23(E), Civ.R. 23.1, and Civ.R. 66, a plaintiff, without order 
of court, may dismiss all claims asserted by that plaintiff against a 
defendant by doing either of the following: 
(a) filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the 
commencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot remain 
January Term, 2012 
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pending for independent adjudication by the court has been served 
by that defendant; 
(b) filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties 
who have appeared in the action. 
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or 
stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice 
of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits of any 
claim that the plaintiff has once dismissed in any court. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in division (A)(1) 
of this rule, a claim shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance 
except upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon that defendant of the plaintiff's 
motion to dismiss, a claim shall not be dismissed against the 
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under division (A)(2) of this rule 
is without prejudice. 
 
{¶ 13} In contrast, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) states that a plaintiff may 
dismiss an action without prejudice “by filing a notice of dismissal before the 
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”  
Thus, a party who wishes to dismiss a federal  case voluntarily must do so earlier 
in the proceedings than in an Ohio court.  Under the federal rules, once the 
defendant files an answer or a motion for summary judgment, an action may be 
dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 
41(a)(2)(A)(1)(a).  In Ohio, a plaintiff has the ability to file a notice of dismissal 
at any time “before the commencement of trial.”  Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). By allowing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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plaintiffs to dismiss, without prejudice to refiling at any point before the 
commencement of trial, Ohio’s rule is more liberal than its federal counterpart. 
{¶ 14} But Ford and TRW assert that because trial had already 
commenced in state court, Schwering could not have voluntarily dismissed his 
claims without prejudice without a court order pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  
According to Ford and TRW, Schwering’s voluntary dismissal of the claims 
against them operated as an adjudication on the merits, thus barring further action 
in federal court. 
{¶ 15} Schwering, on the other hand, contends that the state court’s 
declaration of a mistrial rendered the trial a nullity, thereby reviving his right to 
voluntarily dismiss his claims without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
{¶ 16} Although we have not yet resolved this question, several Ohio 
courts of appeals have addressed the definition of “commencement of trial” and 
have held that “a civil trial commences when the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, 
in a bench trial, at opening statements.”  Frazee v. Ellis Bros. Inc., 113 Ohio 
App.3d 828, 831, 682 N.E.2d 676 (1996).  Accord Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio 
App.3d 254, 256, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (1981); Great Seneca Fin. Corp. v. Emler, 5th 
Dist. No. 05CA000030, 2005-Ohio-6465, ¶ 30, quoting Frazee. We agree and 
now hold that a civil trial commences when the jury is empaneled. 
{¶ 17} Courts from other jurisdictions construing similar rules or statutes 
have examined the effect of a mistrial when a plaintiff attempts to voluntarily 
dismiss an action.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a “dismissal after 
a mistrial is ‘before the trial begins,’ because a mistrial is in legal effect no trial at 
all.”  Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166, 168, 9 N.W.2d 346 (1943).  
Similarly, after a trial court granted a mistrial and the plaintiff moved for 
voluntary dismissal, an Illinois appellate court interpreting that state’s statute 
determined that if “a trial is set and commenced but, for some reason is cancelled, 
the right to absolute dismissal is still available.”  Kilpatrick v. First Church of the 
January Term, 2012 
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Nazarene, 177 Ill.App.3d 83, 87, 531 N.E.2d 1135 (1988).  See also Phelps v. 
Winona & St. Peter Ry. Co., 37 Minn. 485, 489, 35 N.W. 273 (1887) (when a new 
trial has been granted and the verdict set aside, a plaintiff has the right to dismiss 
his action as if no trial had occurred). 
{¶ 18} Ford argues, however, that evidentiary rulings established in a trial 
in which a mistrial was declared are routinely applied by Ohio courts in a second 
trial.  See State v. Harris, 6th Dist. No. L-83-223 (May 11, 1984) ("When a 
mistrial is granted the defendant is only entitled to a new trial. The mistrial had no 
effect on the prior motion to suppress. The appellant was not entitled to refile a 
motion to suppress"); State v. Anderson, 7th Dist. No. 03MA252, 2006-Ohio-
4618, ¶ 46 (after a mistrial was granted because of the violation of a ruling on a 
motion in limine, a defendant should have been allowed to rely on a consistent 
evidentiary ruling on that same issue at the second trial); Cleveland v. Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co., 538 F.Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D.Ohio 1981) (after a mistrial, a trial 
court determined that based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, several dispositive 
rulings of the court issued prior to and during the first trial governed in the 
subsequent retrial). 
{¶ 19} We agree that it would be incongruous to recognize evidentiary 
rulings established during a first trial, while at the same time holding that the first 
trial never "commenced" for purposes of Civ.R. 41(A). 
B. Policy reasons behind the Rule. 
{¶ 20} This 
court 
has 
explained 
that 
Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a)’s 
“commencement of trial” language was adopted to prevent a situation in which 
parties could  try and retry their causes indefinitely until the most favorable 
circumstances for submission were finally achieved.  Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 42, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987), quoting Beckner v. Stover, 18 Ohio St.2d 36, 
40, 247 N.E.2d 300 (1969).  In Beckner, we expressly cautioned against a rule 
whereby the plaintiffs “could substitute a voluntary dismissal without prejudice 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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for an appeal from claimed errors occurring during trial.”  18 Ohio St.2d at 40.  
Further elaborating on the purpose of Civ.R. 41, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals has noted that “Civ.R. 41 was written to abolish the broad liberty given 
to plaintiffs under R.C. 2323.05(A), which allowed plaintiffs to dismiss any 
number of times so long as the statute of limitations had not run.”  Olynyk v. 
Andrish, 8th Dist. No. 86009, 2005-Ohio-6632, 2005 WL 3436343, ¶ 14.  Ohio’s 
rule is more liberal than the federal rule, because it gives a plaintiff more time to 
voluntarily dismiss without prejudice.  The federal rule allows voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice only before the opposing party serves either an answer or a 
motion for summary judgment.  Ohio’s rule, however, still has its limitations. 
C. Express Language of Ohio’s Rule. 
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) does not refer to a mistrial, and there is no 
authority to insert a mistrial exception into the voluntary-dismissal rule. The 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed and applied to effect just results by 
eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the 
expeditious administration of justice,” Civ.R. 1(B), and liberal construction rather 
than technical interpretation is to be emphasized.  1970 Staff Notes, Civ.R. 1(B).  
The commencement of trial cuts off a plaintiff’s ability to unilaterally dismiss 
claims without prejudice.  After trial has commenced, a plaintiff may dismiss 
without prejudice only by stipulation of all parties (Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b)) or by 
order of the trial court (Civ.R. 41(A)(2)).  Adherence to these rules results in the 
orderly administration of justice by preventing plaintiffs from dismissing multiple 
times without prejudice. 
{¶ 22} We have described the combination of Civ.R. 41(A)(1) and (A)(2) 
as a mechanism that prevents the possibility of plaintiffs’ abusing the system by 
trying and retrying their cases indefinitely.  Chadwick, 69 Ohio St.2d at 229, 431 
N.E.2d 660.  If a plaintiff can unilaterally dismiss an action and start over after 
trial commences, other parties will be prejudiced.  A plaintiff may still request a 
January Term, 2012 
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dismissal during trial but may not do so unilaterally.  As we have observed, “After 
commencement of trial the plaintiff must have the concurrence to the withdrawal 
of all other parties (dismissal by stipulation), or subject himself to the court’s 
discretion by moving for a court-ordered dismissal pursuant to Civ.R.41(A)(2).”  
Id.  Once trial begins, the trial court is the gatekeeper, ensuring that dismissal 
does not prejudice other parties and occurs “upon such terms and conditions as 
the court deems proper.”  Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  This rule allows the trial court to 
determine the conditions to impose to protect the other parties and to ensure that 
they are not prejudiced upon refiling.  Therefore, while Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) does 
not permit a unilateral voluntary dismissal without prejudice once trial has begun, 
the trial court, in its discretion, may allow a plaintiff to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(2). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 23} We, therefore, answer the certified question with a no.  A plaintiff 
may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has been 
empaneled and the trial has commenced. 
So answered. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Barron, Peck, Bennie, & Schlemmer, Arthur H. Schlemmer, Michael S. 
Barron, and Charles L. Hinegardner; Denney & Barrett, P.C., Richard L. Denney, 
and Lydia JoAnn Barrett; and Eynon Law Group, P.C., Richard S. Eynon, and 
David M. Brinley, for respondents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Gary M. Glass, and Elizabeth B. Wright; and 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Kevin C. Schiferl, for petitioner Ford Motor 
Company. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Damond R. Mace, and Aaron T. 
Brogdon, for petitioner TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. 
______________________