Title: Macy v. Macy

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Macy v. Macy1986 WY 48714 P.2d 774Case Number: 85-58, 85-59Decided: 02/25/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
VICKY L. MACY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v. 

 
 
DOUGLAS K. MACY, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). DOUGLAS K. MACY, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
VICKY L. MACY, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representation:

 
 
Rex O. Arney of Redle, 
Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant in case No. 85-58 and appellee in 
case No. 85-59.

 
 
Robert W. Connor, Jr., 
Sheridan, for 
appellee in case No. 85-58 and appellant in case No. 
85-59.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY,* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER, 
J., Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985. Decided by the majority prior to the retirement of Justice 
Rooney.

 
 

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     These are companion 
appeals. Both arise out of proceedings and a petition for modification of a 
decree of divorce entered on June 24, 1983, in which proceedings Douglas K. Macy 
(plaintiff) was the plaintiff and Vicky L. Macy (defendant) was the defendant. 
Following a hearing on November 28, 1984, on December 24, 1984, an amended order 
modifying the decree of divorce was entered. Both parties appeal from that 
order. Defendant is the appellant in Case No. 85-58. Plaintiff is the appellant 
in Case No. 85-59.

 
 

[¶2.]     Defendant, in Case No. 
85-58, states the questions to be:

 
 
1. "Did the lower court 
improperly give Plaintiff judgment against Defendant for payments of debts which 
had been discharged in Defendant's bankruptcy?"

 
 
2. "Did the lower court 
err in not awarding Defendant her attorney fees and court costs which she 
incurred as a result of initiating an action as a result of Plaintiff's failure 
to make his child support payments?"

 
 
Plaintiff, in Case No. 
85-59, states the issue to be:

 
 
"Whether The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying The Appellant's [plaintiff's] Motion For 
Modification Of The Divorce Decree."

 
 

[¶3.]     We will reverse the 
district court's amended order which gave judgment to plaintiff for debts he was 
and will be required to pay as a result of defendant's discharge from such debts 
in bankruptcy and remand for a further hearing and reconsideration by the 
district court on all other issues.

 
 

[¶4.]     The 1983 decree of 
divorce, with respect to child support, provided that:

 
 
 
 
"6. The Plaintiff shall 
pay Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month per child as child support, 
commencing July 1, 1983 and continuing until each child reaches the age of 
nineteen, becomes self-supporting or married, whichever shall occur 
first.

 
 
"The child support 
payments of $250.00 per month per child shall be increased [or decreased] each 
year, if the total year's earnings of the Plaintiff increase [or decrease] based 
upon the immediate previous year's total earnings, effective [May] 1, upon the 
ratio of $250.00 to $20,000.00. [The Plaintiff shall provide a copy of his 
income tax return to the Defendant by April 15 of each 
year.]

 
 
"All child support 
payments shall be made through the Clerk of District Court of Sheridan County, 
Wyoming. The Defendant shall keep the Clerk of District Court informed of her 
address at all times." (Bracketed material added in original and initialed by 
plaintiff.)

 
 

[¶5.]     In applying that escalation 
clause of the 1984 amended order of modification, the trial judge held that, 
based on the formula of $250 to $20,000 and that a "total year's earnings" meant 
earned income each year, effective May 1, 1984, the child support payments 
should be increased to $293.14 per month per child or $586.28 for both children. 
The court, in order to arrive at such figure, found from the evidence that in 
1983 plaintiff's "total wages, salary, tips, etc." came to $29,367 less moving 
expenses from Wyoming to Texas of $5,916, making his "earned income" for such 
year the sum of $23,451. In percent, $250 to $20,000 is .0125 (.0125 X $23,451 =   
            
               
            
             
               
            
             
               
    $293.1375). Plaintiff, by the divorce decree, was also to 
maintain health insurance for the children and to pay for any medical, dental, 
optometric, orthodontic and prescription drug expenses not covered by the 
insurance.

 
 

[¶6.]     By further provisions 
of the 1983 divorce decree, defendant received a 1981 Ford Econoline Van subject 
to the indebtedness against it which she was to assume and pay, the family home 
subject to the mortgage against it which she was to assume and pay, and a 
business known as Macy's Floral, also subject to its indebtedness which she was 
to assume and pay. The decree further provided that plaintiff was to be held 
harmless from all such indebtedness. Defendant was also required to pay some 
$13,648.64 in other itemized debts. It is noted that about $4,000 of that 
indebtedness was for medical, hospital and dental expenses of which part was to 
be paid from health insurance.

 
 

[¶7.]     After the divorce, 
defendant operated the floral business but discovered that the cash flow was not 
as anticipated, and the business debts were far more than as represented by 
plaintiff and more than she expected. The business was subject to a security 
agreement. It was necessary that the creditor bank take its security, which 
included the van set over to defendant but used in the business, and liquidate 
the same. Defendant was unable to meet the mortgage payments on the family home 
and, under threat of foreclosure, turned it over to the creditor bank. Plaintiff 
is signatory to the bank indebtedness which on July 11, 1984, was $125,623.32 
plus interest and expenses. The home at best will probably not bring over 
$110,000. Plaintiff is responsible for the deficiency.

 
 

[¶8.]     Acting upon the advice 
of bank official(s), defendant, in April 1984, filed a petition commencing 
bankruptcy proceedings under Title 11, United States Code. Plaintiff was named 
as a creditor in the proceedings. The bankruptcy petition named the creditor 
bank, but the bank obtained a release of its security. Defendant would be 
discharged as to any deficiency. On September 12, 1984, defendant, as the 
petitioning debtor, was released from all dischargeable debts. The order of the 
bankruptcy judge specifically provided:

 
 
"3. All creditors whose 
debts are discharged by this order and all creditors whose judgments are 
declared null and void by paragraph 2 above are enjoined from commencing, 
continuing or employing any action, process or act to collect, recover or offset 
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the 
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived."1

 
 

[¶9.]     The amended order of 
the trial judge contained the following findings and judgment for plaintiff 
against defendant: 

 
 
"XI.

 
 
"That pursuant to the 
decree of divorce defendant was made responsible for paying all indebtedness 
associated with Macy's Floral as well as certain debts itemized in the decree of 
divorce; that the defendant filed for bankruptcy and was discharged in 
bankruptcy resulting in a discharge of all the debts for which she was 
originally made responsible under the terms of the decree of divorce, and that 
the plaintiff may have been required to pay certain of those debts and may be 
required to pay certain of those debts in the future.

 
 
"XII.

 
 
"That the plaintiff 
should have judgment against the defendant for any sums he was legally required 
previously to pay or may hereafter be legally required to pay on those debts 
which were the defendant's obligation under the decree of 
divorce.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that plaintiff shall have judgment against defendant for payments actually made 
by him and for which he was legally required to pay or may be required to pay in 
the future to creditors of defendant which are set forth in the decree of 
divorce or referred to therein and which were discharged in Defendant's 
bankruptcy."

 
 
By the same order, the 
trial judge gave judgment to defendant in a sum certain for unpaid child 
support:

 
 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that defendant shall have judgment against plaintiff for child support 
arrearages totaling $3,153.31 for child support owing by plaintiff to defendant 
through November, 1984."

 
 

[¶10.]  Most of the child support arrearages 
arose as a result of plaintiff being called upon by VISA and MasterCard to pay 
debts which by the 1983 decree of divorce defendant was required to pay but from 
which she has now been discharged in bankruptcy. Plaintiff deducted such 
payments from child support he was required to pay to defendant by virtue of the 
same decree. It will be recalled that defendant was discharged in bankruptcy 
from any debt she owed plaintiff. Plaintiff was a creditor as to other amounts 
he deducted, including air fare of $508.46 he had to pay for return of the 
children from a visitation but which defendant was to pay under the custody and 
child support terms of the divorce decree.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶11.]  The foregoing sequence of events gives 
rise to defendant's first issue: Was the bankruptcy release of defendant from 
debts she was to pay under the divorce decree properly chargeable back to her by 
the subsequent judgment for plaintiff against defendant?

 
 

[¶12.]  Before going further, it should be 
mentioned that child support is for the benefit of the children as plaintiff's 
obligation to contribute to the upbringing of his children. A support payment is 
the children's money administered in trust by defendant for their benefit. When 
plaintiff withholds support for the children, he is depriving them. We do not 
have an alimony question where, under some situations not present here, the 
former husband could possibly withhold alimony payments from a former wife where 
he has been required by some creditor to pay a debt, the obligation of which was 
the former wife's under the divorce decree. We do not decide such an issue of 
alimony but set it out only to illustrate a difference between child support and 
alimony. Plaintiff and the trial judge seem to have lost sight of the real 
purpose of child support. As an observation on reality, however, there are no 
doubt cases where a mother uses child support for her own benefit to the 
disadvantage of the children, and, having that in mind, a trial judge sometimes 
looks with skepticism at some claims for child support and becomes wary. The 
trial judge may have detected something like that here, but it certainly does 
not appear in the record. As is the usual case, the original 1983 divorce 
proceedings were probably not reported and so cannot be part of the 
record.

 
 

[¶13.]  While the issue of discharge in 
bankruptcy was raised in the district court and strongly argued in generalities, 
we cannot see from the files and transcript before us that the trial judge was 
ever furnished with the applicable federal statutes and case law on bankruptcy 
under the circumstances, as we have been favored. If he had been accommodated 
with that clear-cut authority, he may not have ruled as he did. It may not be 
uncommon that lawyers sometimes make a larger effort on the law in this Court 
than at the trial level.

 
 

[¶14.]  The bankruptcy court must grant a debtor 
a discharge except in certain stated instances not present here. 11 U.S.C. § 
727(b) (1982) provides:

 
 
"Except as provided in 
section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this section 
discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for 
relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined under 
section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of 
the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on any such debt or liability is 
filed under section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim based on any 
such debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this 
title."

 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) 
(1982)2 would apply to defendant as a 
bankrupt. Plaintiff is not the bankrupt. While a bankrupt debtor is discharged 
from many types of debt, child support is not discharged. There was no provision 
for defendant paying child support to plaintiff. The pertinent section is 11 
U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982):

 
 
"(a) A discharge in a 
case under this title -

 
 
"(1) voids any judgment 
at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the 
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under 
section 727, 944, 1141, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such 
debt is waived;

 
 
"(2) operates as an 
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment 
of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor, whether or not 
discharge of such debt is waived; and

 
 
"(3) operates as an 
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment 
of process, or any act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property 
of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is 
acquired after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowable 
community claim, except a community claim that is excepted from discharge under 
section 523 or 1328(c)(1) of this title, or that would be so excepted, 
determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of 
this title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date of 
the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not 
discharge of the debt based on such community claim is 
waived."

 
 

[¶15.]  The clear language of this section is 
dispositive of the case. All of the debts defendant was required to pay under 
the decree of divorce have been discharged, including the payments made by 
plaintiff on the MasterCard and VISA accounts, as are the debts upon which he 
has made no payments. Plaintiff was named as a creditor in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, and whether the debt is determined to be for those debts listed in 
the divorce decree or defendant's debt to plaintiff because he had to pay them 
is immaterial; defendant is discharged in any event for debts arising prior to 
September 12, 1984, the date of the bankruptcy order entitled Discharge of 
Debtor.

 
 

[¶16.]  The order of discharge of debtor appears 
in the district court file and was stamped as filed on September 13, 1984. There 
is no indication as to how it was received for filing, but it probably was sent 
by the bankruptcy court for the district of Wyoming because plaintiff was named 
as a possible creditor by virtue of the decree of divorce. The order of 
discharge declares that:

 
 
"All creditors whose 
debts are discharged by this order * * * are enjoined from commencing, 
continuing or employing any action, process or act to collect, recover or offset 
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the 
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived."

 
 
Plaintiff is thus 
specifically enjoined from claiming any offset. Claim of nondischargeability 
should have been made by plaintiff to the bankruptcy court. There is no 
indication that was done. This Court and the district court are bound by the 
bankruptcy laws of the United 
States, regardless of failure of plaintiff to 
make his claim to the bankruptcy court.

 
 

[¶17.]  We must, therefore, conclude that 
plaintiff must make no effort or do no act to enforce in any way that part of 
the amended order granting him a judgment for debts of defendant, as listed in 
the divorce decree, which have been discharged. Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), 
supra, that part of the amended order is also void. The district court judgment 
in his favor is not only void but plaintiff is enjoined from trying in any 
fashion to offset the discharged debts against defendant.

 
 

[¶18.]  This position has judicial sanction 
unless in some way the payment of debts required of defendant in the divorce 
decree can be construed to be alimony or child support which are 
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), supra note 2. Here, that is 
unlikely. A most informative case is Egan 
v. Lang, 11 B.R. 428 (Bkrtcy.W.D.N.Y. 1981). The bankruptcy judge quoted 
from house and senate reports explaining that § 523(a)(5)

 
 
"`. . . excepts from 
discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony 
to, maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or child. This language, in 
combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security Act (43 
U.S.C. § 656(b)) by section 327 of the bill, will apply to make nondischargeable 
only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent. 
See Hearings, pt. 2, at 942. What 
constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the 
bankruptcy laws,  not State law. Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 
1974); Hearings, pt. 3, at 1308-10, are overruled, and the result in cases such 
as Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 
(1952) is followed. This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any 
debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse 
harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of 
alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy 
law considerations that are similar to considerations of whether a particular 
agreement to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement. 
See Hearings, pt. 3, at 1287-1290. [Emphasis added.]" (Footnote omitted.) 11 B.R.  at 430.

 
 

Fife v. 
Fife, 1 
Utah 2d 281, 
265 P.2d 642 (1954), referred to and cited in the report, dealt with property 
settlement. In Fife, the plaintiff was awarded certain 
jointly acquired property. At the same time, the defendant was ordered to pay 
designated creditors having claims against the property, which he failed to pay. 
The defendant filed in bankruptcy and listed the debts he had been ordered to 
pay. The state trial court entered judgment for the amount of such debts against 
him in favor of the plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court held that since the debts 
forming the basis for the judgment were not within the accepted definition of 
alimony or support, the judgment was dischargeable in bankruptcy and was 
vacated.

 
 

[¶19.]  Obviously, there is no concept of alimony 
or child support with respect to the debts in the case before us except as to 
air fare of $508.46. There was no evidence to that effect in the transcript. The 
debts were no more than part of the property division. Plaintiff received his 
pension equity worth $20,000 which he cashed in to make a payment on his new 
home in Texas, 
a buckle business, not explained in the proceedings, and a car. Defendant 
received the home, a van, and a business, all saddled with 
debt.

 
 

[¶20.]  Plaintiff's income as a pharmacist is 
somewhere between $20,000 and $30,000 per annum, whereas defendant's income is 
now near a poverty level. Plaintiff's only remnant of marital obligation at the 
time of divorce was child support. Because of defendant's bankruptcy, he is now 
in the position of having to pay a deficiency on joint obligations related to 
the home, van, and floral shop, plus other joint debts. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) 
(1982) provides that the liability of a co-debtor is not discharged by the 
bankrupt's discharge. There are now new equities to be 
considered.

 
 

[¶21.]  A somewhat similar situation appears in 
In re Marriage of Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1982). The trial judge divided up the marital 
assets and debts. The wife was awarded some debts from which she was ordered to 
hold the husband harmless. She was separately awarded alimony and support for 
the children. She ran into financial trouble and was adjudicated bankrupt. Some 
of the debts were joint with her former husband so he became exposed to payment. 
The trial court authorized reduction of spousal support. Part of the property, 
subject to debt, divided in the divorce action remained jointly owned and was 
sold after the divorce and the adjudication of the wife in bankruptcy. One-half 
of the proceeds of the sale to which the wife was entitled was delivered to her 
and, before she could be enjoined, she quickly spent a portion leaving about 
$6,000 under the trial court's control. The husband sought and obtained an order 
from the state court requiring that she use the funds to pay toward her share of 
the debt for which the husband was liable. She obtained an ex parte order from 
the bankruptcy court to the state court mandating release of the money which she 
then received and hastened to spend. The state appellate court, while somewhat 
disturbed by that turn of events, nevertheless acknowledged that the funds and 
debt were part of the property distribution between the parties dischargeable in 
bankruptcy not in any way "alimony, maintenance or support" for a spouse or 
child under the exception, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), supra note 2, though the 
husband did have custody of one child. Left at issue, then, was whether spousal 
support could be reduced because of the added debt burden the husband was 
required to assume. The court held that, in such case, the obligation of support 
is a question which must be decided under state law using the usual tests to 
determine whether the economic situation of the parties had materially changed. 
The court thereupon affirmed the family court's adjudication of reduced spousal 
support based on the proposition that an order modifying an award for support 
constitutes an abuse of discretion only where it must be concluded no judge 
reasonably could have made such an order.

 
 

[¶22.]  We have spent considerable space 
reviewing the California case of In re Marriage of Clements because it 
gives us a clue to the solution of the issues. The views of Egan v. Lang, supra, Fife v. Fife, supra, and In re Marriage of Clements, supra, do 
not stand alone. See also Nitz v. 
Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977).

 
 

[¶23.]  Since we cannot conceive anything in the 
nature of alimony or child support with respect to the division of property and 
debts, we must conclude and hold that defendant's discharge in bankruptcy 
prohibits the trial judge from entering judgment for plaintiff against defendant 
for debts discharged in bankruptcy which plaintiff was and will be required to 
pay. We must accept the supremacy of the United States in 
the enactment of its bankruptcy laws, the purpose of which is to afford "a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, 54 S. Ct. 695, 699, 78 L. Ed. 1230, 93 A.L.R. 195 (1934). However, the $508.46 air fare for return of 
the children which plaintiff was required to pay was properly chargeable to 
defendant as an item of support under the express support and visitation 
provisions of the divorce decree.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶24.]  We now consider plaintiff's claim of 
error during the hearing when the trial judge denied his oral motion for 
modification of the divorce decree for a reduction of child support. At the same 
time, we will deal with defendant's issue of the trial court's denial of 
attorney's fees to her.

 
 

[¶25.]  By our action in holding void the 
district court's granting of a judgment to plaintiff against defendant for debts 
he has been required to pay by reason of the inability of defendant to meet 
those obligations and her bankruptcy prohibiting plaintiff from pursuing a 
recovery from her, we have upset the balance of the court's amended order of 
modification. We are unable to weigh the correctness of the other determinations 
of the trial judge when there is missing a substantial and vital part of the 
trial court's total determination.

 
 

[¶26.]  There are other problems we see. The 
"judgment" against plaintiff was open-ended. At the time of the hearing, 
plaintiff was paying on the charge card debts. We do not know what other debts 
he may have paid. At that time, the bank deficiency seemed to be around $15,000 
if the property could be sold at the estimated price. Interest has been running 
- probably at a high rate. We do not know how the "judgment" plaintiff has is 
being satisfied, if at all; whether it has been treated as a setoff to 
defendant's judgment for unpaid child support and whether support for the 
children is once again being reduced by further payments he may have made on 
other debts he is being required to make. We wonder whether his financial 
capabilities are such that he can meet the increased child support decreed by 
the trial court in face of what may be other heavy debt burdens. We neither 
decide this question nor suggest that the child support must be reduced or 
increased, but it deserves reconsideration.

 
 

[¶27.]  There is no question but what the trial 
judge can change the provisions in a divorce decree with respect to the 
children. W.S. 20-2-113(a):

 
 
"(a) * * * On the 
petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning 
the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires."

 
 
This Court has many times 
said that whether or not to modify a divorce decree rests in the sound 
discretion of the court, and the court's determination will not be disturbed 
except for a grave abuse of that discretion or violation of some legal 
principle. Manners v. Manners, 
Wyo., 706 P.2d 671 (1985), and cases there cited. Here, we have the case of a violation of a 
legal principle, so the modification must be disturbed. It is not, however, our 
function to in the first instance modify a divorce decree, nor is there adequate 
information in the record, even if we could modify the divorce decree or modify 
the modification. The matter, because of what appears to us to be a decree 
requiring modification as to support because of radically changed circumstances, 
necessitates reconsideration at the trial level as though it was a new 
proceeding.

 
 

[¶28.]  In child custody and support proceedings, 
the paramount concern of the court is the child's welfare. Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 
645 P.2d 1155 (1982). The court is required to consider all its aspects and 
surrounding circumstances in order to make provision for adequate support. 
Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); Rose v. Rose, Wyo., 
576 P.2d 458 (1978).

 
 

[¶29.]  The oral motion of plaintiff for 
modification of the divorce decree, made on the date of hearing of the formal 
and properly filed petition for modification of decree of divorce by defendant, 
was an improper way to assert the claim of plaintiff. While a proceeding to 
modify a divorce decree is filed under the same docket assigned in the original 
proceeding, it is a separate and distinct case involving new issues and new 
facts. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, Wyo., 
402 P.2d 713 (1965). The proper procedure in such case was for plaintiff to file 
an answer and counterclaim for modification to the petition for modification, in 
accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereafter the case 
would have been handled in the same fashion as any other civil case. The reason 
for pleadings is to give notice in order that the opposing party may properly 
defend. Since the time for answer and counterclaim has passed, it is suggested 
that plaintiff file a petition for modification and that, on the rehearing of 
this case which this Court will require, it be consolidated with defendant's 
petition for modification for trial.

 
 

[¶30.]  The judgment for plaintiff is reversed, 
except for the $508.46 air fare item, and the modification of support issue and 
question of attorney's fees are remanded for further hearing and reconsideration 
of all other issues.

 
 

1 The bankruptcy court's 
discharge-of-debtor order provides in paragraph 2 that:

 
 
"2. Any judgment 
heretofore or hereafter obtained in any court other than this court is null and 
void as a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to 
any of the following:

 
 
"(a) debts dischargeable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523;

 
 
"(b) unless heretofore or 
hereafter determined by order of this court to be nondischargeable, debts 
alleged to be excepted from discharge under clauses (2), (4) and (6) of 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a);

 
 
"(c) debts determined by 
this court to be discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 523."

 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523 covers 
debt discharge exceptions. Plaintiff does not qualify for such exceptions other 
than an air fare item. This will be covered later in this 
opinion.

2 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) 
(1982):

 
 
"(a) A discharge under 
section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt -

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(5) to a spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of 
such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, 
or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that 
-

 
 
"(A) such debt is 
assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise * * 
*; or

 
 
"(B) such debt includes a 
liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability 
is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; * * 
*"

 
 
We consider the $508.46 
paid by plaintiff for the return of the children to defendant following 
visitation with plaintiff to be a part of the obligation of defendant to share 
the expense of support provided by the divorce decree by which plaintiff was 
required to pay costs of transportation of the children to him, and defendant 
was to pay the expense of their return.

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶31.]  I agree with that said in Part I of the 
majority opinion, but I do not agree with the result reached in Part II 
thereof.

 
 

[¶32.]  In Part II, the majority opinion 
recognizes the impropriety of plaintiff's oral motion for modification, but, 
instead of affirming the denial thereof, the matter is reversed for the purpose 
of correcting the error made by plaintiff and not for the correction of any 
error made by the trial court. I believe this is a new and dangerous method of 
appellate disposition of cases. The finding against plaintiff by the trial court 
was proper on this basis, regardless of the reason given by the trial court for 
such finding. If there exists any legally valid ground appearing in the record 
supporting the judgment, it should be affirmed. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983); Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 
628 P.2d 1350 (1981).

 
 

[¶33.]  Of course, either party may petition for 
modification of the child support provisions of a divorce decree premised on a 
change in circumstances. Plaintiff may do so in this instance. If he shows a 
financial inability to make the ordered contribution to the welfare of his 
children, the court could grant his petition. Likewise, defendant may file a 
like petition. If she can show that the failure of her business or other 
financial difficulties on her side make it necessary for an increase of child 
support by plaintiff for the welfare of the children, the court could grant her 
petition.

 
 

[¶34.]  Aside from the propriety of affirming the 
trial court on the basis of the use of improper procedure by plaintiff, there is 
no indication that the trial court did not properly consider the present 
circumstances of the parties in relation to the amount of child support due when 
it denied modification thereof. Certainly plaintiff should not be able to take 
it upon himself - without court sanction - to stop paying child support through 
the clerk of the district court as ordered. The judgment for arrearages in child 
support was proper.

 
 

[¶35.]  Although § 20-2-116, W.S. 1977, permits 
modification of a divorce decree with reference to alimony and child support 
payments, it does not do so with reference to a property settlement. See Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 616 P.2d 707 (1980); Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 
554 P.2d 1244 (1976). That property (including the value thereof in relation to 
the debts assumed) involved in the property distribution under the divorce 
decree and which subsequently became involved in defendant's bankruptcy should 
not be considered "weighed," "balanced," or "setoff" in the decision relative to 
proper child support. To do so would be doing indirectly that which Part I of 
the majority opinion says cannot be done directly, 
i.e.:

 
 
"* * * Plaintiff was 
named as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, and whether the debt is 
determined to be for those debts listed in the divorce decree or defendant's 
debt to plaintiff because he had to pay them is immaterial; defendant is 
discharged in any event for debts arising prior to September 12, 1984, the date 
of the bankruptcy order entitled Discharge of Debtor.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"Plaintiff is thus 
specifically enjoined from claiming any 
offset. * * *

 
 
"* * * [P]laintiff must 
make no effort or do no act to 
enforce in any way that part of the 
amended order granting him a judgment for debts of defendant, as listed in the 
divorce decree, which have been discharged. * * * The district court judgment in 
his favor is not only void but plaintiff 
is enjoined from trying in any fashion to offset the discharged debts against 
defendant.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * [W]e cannot 
conceive anything in the nature of alimony or child support with respect to the 
division of property and debts * * *." (Emphasis added.) 714 P.2d  at 
779-781.

 
 
 
 

[¶36.]  I would reverse Case No. 85-58 (as does 
the majority opinion in Part I thereof), and I would affirm Case No. 85-59 
(contrary to that done in the majority opinion in Part II 
thereof).