Title: People v. Richardson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88670Agenda 5November 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. HAROLD
RICHARDSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Harold Richardson, was convicted of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/91(a)(1) (West 1994)) and aggravated criminal sexual
assault (720 ILCS 5/1214(a)(2) (West 1994)) following a bench trial in the
circuit court of Cook County, and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 34
and 6 years respectively. On direct appeal, defendant sought a new sentencing
hearing, arguing that the trial court improperly considered multiple victim
impact statements in violation of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and that the provision of the
Act prohibiting its use as a ground for appellate relief was unconstitutional.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No. 1981348
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
The evidence adduced at trial established that defendant and
several others participated in the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of
Nina Glover. At sentencing, the State presented the written victim impact
statements of Glover's two daughters and of her mother. Defendant argues
before this court that the trial court's consideration of three victim impact
statements violates the plain language of the Act. We agree.
"In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary
task is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." People
v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). The most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. People v. Robinson,
172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). The language of the statute must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and where the language is clear and unambiguous, we have
no occasion to resort to aids of statutory construction. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d  at 42. Further, a statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is
rendered superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our
review is de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 457.
Section 6(a) of the Act sets forth the right of the victim to
present a victim impact statement for the court's consideration at the
sentencing of a defendant convicted of a violent crime. 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West
1998). The statutory definition of "crime victim," for purposes of
section 6(a), includes "a single representative who may be the spouse,
parent, child or sibling of a person killed as a result of a violent crime
perpetrated against the person killed." 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998).
It is therefore clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
that, while Nina Glover's parent or either of her two children could have
qualified as the "crime victim" under section 3(a)(3), the trial court
did not comply with the Act where it accepted and considered the victim impact
statements of all three persons rather than of "a single
representative" of the deceased. 720 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998); see People
v. Benford, 295 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700 (1998).
Having found a violation of the statute, the issue before
this court becomes whether the trial court's improper consideration of
multiple victim impact statements entitles defendant to a new sentencing
hearing. Defendant acknowledges section 9 of the Act, which states:
"Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a
ground for appellate relief in any criminal case." 725 ILCS 120/9 (West
1998). Defendant contends that section 9 is unconstitutional because it violates
two provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the separation of powers
clause set forth in article II, section 1 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1), and
the right to appellate review guaranteed by article VI, section 6 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §6). However, it is unnecessary to address these arguments
because we find another provision of our state constitution dispositive of this
issue.
Article I, section 8.1, of the Illinois Constitution (the
Amendment), an amendment adopted November 3, 1992, is entitled "Crime
Victim's Rights" and states, in part, that "[c]rime victims, as
defined by law, shall have the following rights as provided by law: *** [t]he
right to make a statement to the court at sentencing." (Emphasis added.)
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(a)(4). Thus, here, because section 3(a)(3) of
the Act defines "crime victim" to mean "a single representative
*** of a person killed," the Amendment would allow for only one victim
impact statement to be made to the court at sentencing. 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3)
(West 1998). However, like the Act, the Amendment further provides:
"Nothing in this Section or in any law enacted under this Section shall be
construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for
appellate relief in any criminal case." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(d).
Thus, defendant is prohibited by our constitution from seeking appellate relief
on the ground that more than one victim impact statement was presented and
considered at his sentencing.
The United States Constitution does not require the states to
grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review alleged trial
court errors. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 827,
105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985). Illinois, however, has granted criminal defendants
the right to appeal "final judgments of a Circuit Court," in article
VI, section 6, of our state constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Thus,
it is incumbent upon this court to harmonize, if practicable, article I, section
8.1(d), and article VI, section 6, which initially appear to be in conflict. See
Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200, 203 (1973).
All parts of the constitution must be construed together and,
although one article or section is entitled to the same weight as any other
article or section, the whole must be construed so that the general intent will
prevail. People ex rel. Wellman v. Washburn, 410 Ill. 322, 328 (1951);
see also Herget National Bank v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2d 405, 410 (1985).
Additionally, while one clause will not be allowed to defeat another if by any
reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together (Oak Park,
54 Ill. 2d at 203), a specific constitutional provision will prevail over a
general section if the two are incompatible (Walker v. State Board of
Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543, 556 (1976)). Further, as this court stated in Wellman:
"The bill of rights incorporated in our constitution
  is a restatement and adoption of the very principles upon which our freedom is
  based and is generally admitted to be our greatest heritage. Where any act of
  the legislature or other provision of the constitution, in a particular case,
  tends to infringe upon the rights thus preserved, we must assume that it was
  the intent of the framers thereof that there should be no curtailment of such
  rights." Wellman, 410 Ill.  at 328-29.
Considering the above stated principles, we find that article
I, section 8.1(d), as part of the bill of rights and as the more specific
provision, must be read as a limitation on the appellate jurisdiction granted by
article VI, section 6. See In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192
(1999). As the titles of the Amendment and the Act suggest, their drafters
intended them to serve "as a shield to protect the rights of victims,"
and expressly delineated that their provisions "not be used as a sword by
criminal defendants seeking appellate relief." See Benford, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 700. We therefore hold, based on its plain and explicit language,
that article I, section 8.1(d), specifically removes victims' rights from the
spectrum of issues which a criminal defendant may appeal.
Defendant agrees that section 8.1(d) operates to restrict
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases if the basis for relief is "any
law enacted under" the Amendment. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(d).
However, defendant contends that section 3(a)(3) of the Act is not a law enacted
"under" the Amendment because the statutory restriction on who
constitutes a crime victim set forth in section 3(a)(3) precludes it from being
a law that "enforce[s]" the Amendment, as required by section 8.1(b).
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§8.1(b), (d). We disagree. While section 8.1(b)
states that "[t]he General Assembly may provide by law for the enforcement
of this [Amendment]," this language does not establish a test for
determining which pieces of legislation trigger the protections of section
8.1(d). Although section 3(a)(3) of the Act was amended effective January 1,
1994, to limit the definition of crime victim to "a single
representative" of the deceased, section 3(a)(3) is still a law which
enforces the Amendment. See 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1994). As we have noted,
section 8.1(a) states that crime victims, "as defined by law," are
entitled to the rights set forth in the Amendment "as provided by
law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1(a). Thus, defendant cannot avoid the
constitutional preclusion of appellate relief by claiming that section 3(a)(3),
a law defining "crime victim" as contemplated by section 8.1(a), was
not enacted to enforce the Amendment.
Finally, we believe it important to note that the prohibition
on appellate relief for violations of the Act or the Amendment does not
alleviate the trial court's responsibility to exercise appropriate discretion
at sentencing. This court has found that the Act does not require the
consideration at sentencing of any and all victim impact evidence without regard
for its relevance or materiality. See People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 49,
53 (1998) (the Act "does not contemplate, and we will not condone, an
expansion of victim impact statements to include evidence from victims other
than the victims of the offense on trial"; such evidence is irrelevant and
therefore inadmissable). Indeed, the portion of the Act which provides that
"[t]he court shall consider any statements made by the victim" is not
mandatory in nature and does nothing to indicate what weight should be given to
victim impact evidence, nor does it indicate what sentence should be imposed.
725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1998); People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 539
(1989).
This court has further warned that Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), which established the
admissibility of victim impact evidence at sentencing, "  "does
not give the prosecution a free rein to introduce and argue anything it
wants." ' " Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 48, quoting People
v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 338 (1992). " In the event that
evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a mechanism for relief.' " Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at
338, quoting Payne, 501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 735, 111 S. Ct.  at
2608.
In the instant case, however, defendant has not made a
substantial showing that his right to due process was violated by the
introduction of multiple victim impact statements at his sentencing. It is well
established that where a sentencing hearing is conducted before the trial court
rather than a jury, the court is presumed to consider only competent and
relevant evidence in determining sentence. People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494, 508 (1995). As the appellate court observed, the State herein did not argue
the content of the three victim impact statements as a factor in aggravation
and, although the trial court stated that it had read the same statements at a
codefendant's sentencing hearing, the court did not mention the statements
when imposing defendant's sentence. Therefore, we hold that while the trial
court erred in admitting and considering multiple victim impact statements,
defendant has offered nothing to support a finding that the statements unduly
prejudiced the trial court such that defendant's sentencing hearing was
rendered fundamentally unfair. See Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d  at 508.
Accordingly and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
 
Affirmed.
JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
Although I agree with the majority that the judgment of the
appellate court should be affirmed, I disagree with the majority's conclusion
that the trial court improperly considered three victim impact statements in
violation of the plain language of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)). As the majority recognizes,
this court must look to the language of the statute itself to determine
legislative intent, and must give the language of the statute its plain and
ordinary meaning. Slip op. at 1. In finding that the trial court improperly
considered three victim impact statements, the majority focuses on section
3(a)(3) of the Act, which defines a crime victim as a "single
representative" of the deceased. 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). Based
upon that definition, the majority then concludes that the trial court "did
not comply with the Act where it accepted and considered the victim impact
statements of all three persons rather than of a single representative' of
the deceased." Slip op. at 2, quoting 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998).
I believe that a plain reading of the statute compels a
different conclusion in this case. Section 6(a) of the Act provides that where
"a victim of [a] violent crime is present in the courtroom at the time of
the sentencing ***, the victim upon his or her request shall have the
right to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant's criminal
conduct *** has had upon the victim." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 120/6(a)
(West 1998). Reading section 3(a)(3) of the Act together with section 6 of the
Act, then, only a single representative of Nina Glover could have requested an
opportunity to address the court at sentencing regarding the impact of defendant's
crime. Such a situation, however, was not presented in this case.
Here, it was the State that presented the written victim
impact statements of Nina Glover's two daughters and her mother. Slip op. at
1. I agree with Justice Miller, writing separately in a prior decision of this
court, that section 6 of the Act "applies when the victim, on his or her
own initiative, wishes to address the sentencing court; section 6 does not
purport to limit the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise introduce in
aggravation." People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 55 (1998) (Miller, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). During the aggravation and
mitigation phase of a sentencing hearing, a sentencing judge has wide discretion
concerning the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). The only limitation on the admission of evidence is
that the evidence must be reliable and relevant. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at
322.
Because the three victim impact statements at issue in this case were
introduced by the State in aggravation, section 6 of the Act did not limit the
trial court's consideration of those statements. To hold otherwise
"threatens to severely limit the prosecution's ability to present
relevant, reliable evidence in aggravation" and "transforms what was
designed to provide a benefit to victims and witnesses into a shield for their
offenders." Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 56 (Miller, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The trial court's decision to admit multiple victim
impact statements in this case was a matter of discretion. Of course, the trial
court must exercise appropriate discretion at sentencing and must consider the
relevance and materiality of victim impact evidence. Slip op. at 5. There is no
evidence in this case, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in
considering the victim impact statements. Consequently, I believe that the trial
court did not violate the Act when it considered multiple victim impact
statements, and I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it holds
to the contrary.