Title: State v. Cain

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1599-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lee Roy Cain, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 427, 805 N.W.2d 734 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marquette   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard O. Wright   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Patrick R. Donnelly and Faun M. Moses, and oral argument by 
Faun M. Moses, assistant state public defender.   
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas 
Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2012 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1599-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF133) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lee Roy Cain, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the 
Marquette County Circuit Court, Richard O. Wright, Judge. 
¶2 
The question before us is whether Lee Roy Cain 
("Cain") should be allowed to withdraw his plea of no contest to 
correct a manifest injustice.  Cain argues that this court 
should review whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, and if it was not, determine that he is entitled to 
                                                 
1 State v. Cain, No. 2010AP1599-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2011). 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
2 
 
automatic withdrawal of his plea in order to correct a manifest 
injustice. 
¶3 
We conclude that the record, when viewed in its 
totality, 
does 
not 
support 
withdrawal 
of 
Cain's 
plea.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Cain has not met his burden of 
showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing the 
withdrawal of his no contest plea is necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
Cain, a sixty-five year old resident of Montello, 
Wisconsin, makes his living by creating and marketing ceramic 
lawn ornaments and garden art.  On November 26, 2007, law 
enforcement officers executed a search warrant issued for Cain's 
property.  While searching Cain's residence and workshop, they 
discovered a hidden room.  According to the resulting report 
from law enforcement, the hidden room contained a marijuana 
growing operation, complete with gymnasium-style lighting, a 
ventilation system, and 16 healthy, adult marijuana plants that 
were capable of yielding a substantial quantity of marijuana. 
¶5 
Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed on 
December 7, 2007, charging Cain with four separate crimes:  1) 
maintaining a drug trafficking place in violation of Wisconsin 
Statutes section 961.42(1); 2) possession with intent to deliver 
tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC")2 in an amount of more than 200 grams 
                                                 
2 THC is the main psychoactive ingredient in marijuana.  
State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, ¶6, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 
N.W.2d 775. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
3 
 
but not more than 1,000 grams, or more than four plants 
containing THC but not more than twenty plants containing THC in 
violation of § 961.41(1m)(h)2.; 3) manufacturing THC in an 
amount of more than 200 grams but not more than 1,000 grams, or 
more than four plants containing THC but not more than twenty 
plants containing THC, in violation of § 961.41(1)(h)2.;3 and 4) 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of § 961.573(1).  
The criminal complaint accurately reflected that a violation of 
§ 961.41(1)(h)2. is a Class H felony, punishable by a fine in an 
amount up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to six years, or both.  
See § 939.50(3)(h). 
¶6 
Cain waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and 
the State filed an information alleging the four charges set 
forth in the criminal complaint.  At the arraignment, Cain 
entered a plea of not guilty as to all counts, and the case was 
set for jury trial.  However, the morning that the case was 
scheduled for trial, Cain entered into a plea agreement with the 
State.  In exchange for Cain's plea of no contest on Count III, 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Statutes section 961.41(1)(h)2. states: 
If the person violates this subsection with respect to 
[THC], included under s. 961.14 (4) (t), or a 
controlled substance analog of [THC], and the amount 
manufactured, distributed or delivered is: 
. . . . 
2. More than 200 grams but not more than 1,000 grams, 
or more than 4 plants containing [THC] but not more 
than 20 plants containing [THC], the person is guilty 
of a Class H felony. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
4 
 
the manufacturing charge, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining three counts recited in the information. 
¶7 
The record reflects that at the plea hearing, Cain was 
actively engaged, sometimes in response to questioning from the 
circuit court, and sometimes on his own initiative.  During the 
course of the hearing, Cain stated, inter alia, that he did not 
believe that he "would have a fair trial," that the only person 
in "the system" that he had any respect for was the circuit 
court judge, that "everyone . . . is a buncha liars," and that 
his current situation was a result of "having a dispute with a 
little rich horse guy."  As part of the lengthy plea colloquy 
(13 pages of transcript), the following exchange took place 
between the circuit court and Cain and his attorney: 
THE COURT:  Before I can accept that plea I need to 
determine whether or not it's being entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  [Defense counsel], 
you have had enough contact with him [Cain] that you 
believe that he is making this plea freely and 
voluntarily? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.  We've discussed 
all the various counts, the consequences, what we 
would plan to do, the procedure, and so on, yes. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Is that true, Mr. Cain? 
MR. CAIN:  Somewhat. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We've discussed the evidence in 
the case and the benefits of entering a plea, the 
risks of going to trial. 
THE COURT:  And you understand what you're doing? 
MR. CAIN:  I had four plants in my house[,] okay?  
That's it.  And I -- whatever this guy is -- I have no 
other choice. . . . 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
5 
 
THE COURT:  Well, that's -- might be your wise choice, 
but that's -- 
MR. CAIN:  Yup. 
THE COURT:  You know there's different reasons for 
entering a plea? 
MR. CAIN:  Right. 
THE COURT:  The most basic reason is whether or not 
you think you're gonna win or lose.  That's the way I 
look at it. 
(emphasis added). 
¶8 
Regarding what the State would be required to prove to 
convict him of manufacture of THC, the circuit court held the 
following exchange with Cain: 
THE COURT:  On this charge they would have to show 
that -- you know, "manufacture" sounds like a funny 
word, but growing would be manufacture.  Controlled 
substance in this case containing the [THC].  They 
would also have to show in this particular case that 
it was more than four plants.  And they would have to 
show that you were doing that intentionally.  Well, 
not like it was weeds growing somewhere or anywhere, 
but that you were doing it intentionally.  You 
understand that you're waiving the right to have those 
things proved beyond a reasonable doubt? 
MR. CAIN: Yup. . . . 
¶9 
Based 
on 
the 
plea 
colloquy, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined that "the plea [was] entered knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently." 
¶10 The circuit court next turned to a discussion of the 
factual basis for the plea.  Cain, through his attorney, 
stipulated that the criminal complaint, which states that law 
enforcement officers discovered 16 marijuana plants in Cain's 
residence, sufficed as the factual basis for the plea.  However, 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
6 
 
the circuit court insisted that the State reiterate on the 
record, for Cain's benefit, the factual basis for the plea.  
Complying with the circuit court's instruction, the prosecutor 
restated the factual basis contained in the criminal complaint——
that law enforcement officers discovered 16 marijuana plants in 
Cain's workshop——and the circuit court determined that there was 
a factual basis for the plea. 
¶11 At the close of the plea hearing, the circuit court 
accepted Cain's plea and ordered the preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation report ("PSI").  The PSI described the 
facts surrounding Cain's offense in much the same manner as the 
criminal complaint: that law enforcement officers discovered 16 
marijuana plants in Cain's workshop.  The PSI outlined that Cain 
is a Vietnam War veteran, and that he receives 100% disability 
because he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder resultant 
from his military service.  This disability, according to Cain, 
was the reason that he used marijuana. 
¶12 The PSI also related a summary of the probation 
agent's discussion with Cain.  In that discussion, Cain told the 
agent that he had begun growing marijuana "six months prior" and 
that it was for his own personal use.  Additionally, he related 
to the probation agent that the plants found were not even in 
the "flowering stage."  Cain told the agent that "he made a 
mistake" and that "the law is the law," but that he had made 
that mistake "within his own home" and that he did not need to 
be told what to do. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 At the sentencing hearing, the court offered Cain the 
opportunity to contest the accuracy of the PSI.  Cain's 
attorney, speaking on his behalf, declined to do so, stating 
that he and Cain had reviewed the report, believed it to be 
accurate, and had nothing to add.  At the conclusion of 
testimony, the State sought a withheld sentence, placement on 
probation for a period of three years, and four to six months of 
conditional jail time. 
¶14 Cain's attorney argued, based on Cain's military 
service, 
prior 
record, 
self-employment, 
and 
"positive 
character," that he should receive a lesser sentence.  In 
addressing the court, he stated: "I would ask you to consider 
this particular infraction, even with the 16 plants, as on the 
lower 
end 
of 
[the] 
continuum 
of 
[C]lass 
H 
felonies."  
Accordingly, Cain's attorney requested "straight probation[,] 
with no jail." 
¶15 When the circuit court provided Cain the opportunity 
to speak at the sentencing hearing, Cain stated that he was not 
a marijuana dealer, but that he smokes marijuana to help himself 
deal with post-traumatic stress disorder and to get to sleep.  
While concluding his statements, Cain related the following to 
the court: 
This last thing, I say, there wasn't no quantity of 
marijuana in my house.  It was a joint.  And those 
five plants which got excavated.  That's what was in 
my house.  I have no reason to lie about this[,] okay?  
And -- it -- it -- I didn't have a whole -- you know, 
like this.  And that's what it sounds like: That I had 
this great amount. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
8 
 
¶16 After listening to Cain's statement and summarizing 
the factors4 it considered in regard to sentencing, the circuit 
court withheld sentence, and placed Cain on probation for a 
period of two years. 
¶17 Six months after the sentencing hearing, Cain filed a 
motion for post-conviction relief, requesting that the circuit 
court allow him to withdraw his plea.  This motion alleged that 
at the time Cain entered his plea, "the court failed to 
determine in a personal colloquy whether Cain admitted to facts 
that would sustain a conviction for the charged offense."  
Specifically, the motion stated that Cain did not admit to 
having more than four marijuana plants at the time of the plea 
colloquy; instead, the motion asserted that he admitted to 
having only four plants.  Therefore, Cain argued, he was 
entitled to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. 
¶18 The circuit court held a hearing on Cain's post-
conviction motion.  At the hearing, Cain's attorney argued that 
a circuit court may accept a defendant's plea only where the 
defendant admits to each part of the offense that the State 
would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cain's 
attorney noted that Cain had been charged with manufacture of 
more than four but less than twenty marijuana plants, but argued 
that because Cain admitted at the plea hearing to manufacture of 
                                                 
4 These factors included the seriousness of the offense, the 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 
need to protect the public.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 
¶42, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
9 
 
only four plants, he did not plead guilty to the charged 
offense.  The circuit court denied Cain's post-conviction 
motion, determining that Cain's plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. 
¶19 Cain 
appealed, arguing that plea withdrawal was 
required to avoid manifest injustice.  State v. Cain, No. 
2010AP1599-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 
2011).  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
circuit court, concluding that Cain had "not carried his burden 
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing him to 
withdraw his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice."  
Id., ¶2.  Cain petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 Cain asks this court to review the circuit court's 
denial of his post-conviction motion to withdraw his plea of no 
contest.  A circuit court's decision to permit the withdrawal of 
a plea is ordinarily a matter of the circuit court’s discretion, 
and we therefore review the circuit court's determination under 
an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  State v. Thomas, 
2000 WI 13, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836 (citing State 
ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, ¶32, 579 N.W.2d 698 
(1998)); see State v. Spears, 147 Wis. 2d 429, 434, 433 
N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988).  Further, we recognize that in 
accepting a plea, the circuit court must make findings of fact.  
We do not disturb a circuit court's findings of fact, except in 
situations where those findings are contrary to the great weight 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
10 
 
and clear preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 283-84, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) (citing State v. 
Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984)).  Therefore, 
"we must ensure that the circuit court's determination was made 
upon the facts of record and in reliance on the appropriate and 
applicable law."  Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, ¶32 (citing Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 289); see State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶52, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771 (citing State v. Shillcutt, 116 
Wis. 2d 227, 238, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that 
appellate courts "will uphold a discretionary decision if there 
are facts in the record which would support the trial court's 
decision . . . .")). 
¶21 However, where "a defendant establishes a denial of a 
relevant constitutional right . . .  withdrawal of the plea is a 
matter of right."  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 
N.W.2d 577 (1997) (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283; State v. 
Bartelt, 
112 
Wis. 2d 467, 
480, 
334 
N.W.2d 91 
(1983)).  
Therefore, if the defendant demonstrates that the plea is 
constitutionally infirm, "[t]he trial court reviewing the motion 
to withdraw in such instance has no discretion in the matter."  
Id. (citation omitted).  In such cases, this court independently 
reviews the trial court's determination.  See State v. Cross, 
2010 WI 70, ¶14, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, cert. denied, 
562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1044 (2011). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
¶22 The issue presented by this case is whether Cain 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea of no contest to correct 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
11 
 
a manifest injustice.  To resolve this issue, we first review 
the requirements for a valid plea, as well as the manifest 
injustice test.  We turn to the requirements for a proper plea. 
A. 
Requirements for a Valid Plea 
¶23 The 
due 
process 
protections 
contained 
in 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution require 
that in order for a trial court to accept a defendant's plea, 
the court must find that the defendant's plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶16 (citing State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
716 N.W.2d 906); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
748 (1970).  In addition to determining that the plea is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the circuit court must find 
a factual basis for the plea or it cannot accept it.  Thomas, 
232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶14; see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 467 (1969). 
B. 
Plea Withdrawal and Manifest Injustice 
¶24 Withdrawal 
of 
a 
plea 
may 
occur 
either 
before 
sentencing, or after sentencing.  When a defendant moves to 
withdraw a plea before sentencing, "a circuit court should 
'freely allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing for any fair and just reason, unless the prosecution 
[would] be substantially prejudiced.'"  State v. Jenkins, 2007 
WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (quoting State v. 
Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199); see 
id., ¶29 ("[T]he court has consistently articulated a liberal 
rule for plea withdrawal before sentencing . . . .").  However, 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
12 
 
this rule should not be confused "'with the rule for post-
sentence withdrawal where the defendant must show the withdrawal 
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.'"  Id., ¶2 n.2 
(citing Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 483, 247 N.W.2d 105 
(1976) (citing State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 
(1967))).  Here, Cain did not seek to withdraw his plea before 
sentencing, so the latter rule applies. 
¶25 When a defendant moves to withdraw a plea after 
sentencing, 
the 
defendant 
"carries 
the 
heavy 
burden 
of 
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the trial 
court should permit the defendant to withdraw the plea to 
correct a 'manifest injustice.'"  Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶16 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Washington, 
176 
Wis. 2d 205, 
213, 
500 
N.W.2d 331 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993)); 
see 
State 
v. 
Bentley, 
201 
Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  Here, the burden is on 
Cain to prove that plea withdrawal is warranted because "the 
state's interest in finality of convictions requires a high 
standard 
of proof 
to disturb that plea."  Thomas, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶16 (quoting Washington, 176 Wis. 2d at 213) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, 
¶9, 242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363.  Therefore, in order to 
disturb the finality of an accepted plea, the defendant must 
show "'a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the 
plea.'" Id. (citing State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379, 534 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
13 
 
N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995)); State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶71, 
315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775.5 
¶26 The manifest injustice test was first adopted by this 
court in Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 390.  In that case and 
others that have succeeded it, Wisconsin courts delineated when 
a "manifest injustice" occurs, and established the situations in 
which a defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea.  State v. 
                                                 
5 The burden of proving that post-sentencing plea withdrawal 
is not warranted rests with the State in other circumstances.  
See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶¶36-39, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906.  The burden shifts to the State when the defendant, 
in a post-conviction motion, "(1) make[s] a prima facie showing 
of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated 
duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea hearing 
transcript; and (2) allege[s] that the defendant did not know or 
understand the information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing."  Id., ¶39 (citing State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).  Such a motion is 
commonly referred to as a "Bangert motion."  See id., ¶40.  No 
such motion was filed in this case; Cain's post-sentencing 
motion alleged only that that "the court failed to determine in 
a personal colloquy whether Cain admitted facts that would 
sustain a conviction for the charged offense."  Cain has never 
alleged that he did not know or understand the information that 
was provided by the circuit court at the plea hearing, and thus 
never alleged enough to shift the burden to the State.  
Therefore, the burden to prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the trial court should have permitted him to 
withdraw the plea to correct a manifest injustice remains with 
Cain.  See State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 
605 N.W.2d 836. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
14 
 
Daley sets out the following list of circumstances where 
manifest injustice occurs:6  
1. ineffective assistance of counsel;  
2. the defendant did not personally enter or ratify 
the plea;  
3. the plea was involuntary;  
4. 
the 
prosecutor 
failed 
to 
fulfill 
the 
plea 
agreement;  
5. the defendant did not receive the concessions 
tentatively or fully concurred in by the court, and 
the defendant did not reaffirm the plea after being 
told that the court no longer concurred in the 
agreement; [or], 
6. the court had agreed that the defendant could 
withdraw the plea if the court deviated from the plea 
agreement. 
2006 WI App 81, ¶20 n.3, 292 Wis. 2d 517, 716 N.W.2d 146 
(quoting State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 251 n.6, 471 
                                                 
6 The list provided by State v. Daley, 2006 WI App 81, ¶20 
n.3, 292 Wis. 2d 517, 716 N.W.2d 146 is non-exhaustive.  This 
list derives from State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86 & n.2, 
151 N.W.2d 9 (1967), which provided four examples of situations 
where manifest injustice occurs.  These examples were adapted 
directly from the then-tentative 1967 draft of the American Bar 
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice.  
See 
Reppin, 
35 
Wis. 2d 377, 
385; 
see 
also 
Thomas, 
232 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶17.  Later, when the American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice were altered to include two 
additional criteria, Wisconsin courts added those criteria to 
the non-exhaustive list of situations where manifest injustice 
occurs.  See State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 252 n.6, 471 
N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991); accord Daley, 292 Wis. 2d 517, ¶20 
n.3.  Other criteria have been added by later cases.  See, e.g., 
State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 
N.W.2d 23 ("Where undisputed facts cannot constitute the crime 
charged as a matter of law, the defendant is allowed to withdraw 
her plea to prevent a manifest injustice.") (citation omitted). 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
15 
 
N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v. Lee, 88 
Wis. 2d 239, 249, 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979); Ernst v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d 661, 666, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969). 
C. 
Cain's Claim is Properly Understood to Allege a Failure to 
Personally Enter or Ratify the Plea, Not to Allege a Failure to 
Enter the Plea Knowingly, Intelligently, and Voluntarily   
¶27 Cain argues that because he admitted to manufacturing 
only four marijuana plants at the plea hearing, he did not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead to the offense 
charged——manufacturing more than four but less than twenty 
marijuana plants.  Despite Cain's claims to the contrary, he is 
not in substance making the argument that he pled without the 
requisite knowledge, intelligence, or voluntariness.  Rather, he 
is essentially contending that he did not plead at all, in the 
sense that he did not admit to the manufacture of more than four 
marijuana plans, as charged in the indictment.  
¶28 Consequently, Cain's claim that he never admitted that 
he possessed more than four marijuana plants is for all intents 
and purposes a claim that he did not "personally enter or ratify 
the plea."  Daley, 292 Wis. 2d 517, ¶20 n.3.  Cain does not 
suggest that he admitted to possessing more than four marijuana 
plants, but did so while laboring under some misapprehension, or 
while suffering coercion, or for any other reason that could be 
fairly described as going to his knowledge, intelligence, or 
voluntariness.  On the contrary, he concedes, as he must, that 
there is nothing in the record to indicate any such infirmity.  
Instead, he argues that he did not admit to possessing more than 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
16 
 
four marijuana plants, as charged in the indictment.  As a 
result, his claim is best understood as alleging a failure to 
personally enter or ratify the plea.   
D. 
The Proper Scope of Review Includes the Entire Record, Not 
Just the Plea Hearing   
¶29 Because Cain submits that the circuit court erred in 
accepting his plea, he believes our review of the record should 
be limited to the plea hearing alone.  He therefore asks us to 
disregard the balance of the proceedings before the circuit 
court, most importantly the sentencing hearing, where he 
admitted that five plants were in his house.  We disagree, and 
conclude that our review properly considers the entire record, 
including the sentencing hearing.  Our holding is based on well-
established legal principles and well-reasoned precedent. 
¶30 First, it has long been clear that when a reviewing 
court applies the manifest injustice test, "the issue is no 
longer whether the . . . plea should have been accepted," but 
rather whether the plea should be withdrawn.  White v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978); see also Spears, 147 
Wis. 2d at 434; Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶23.  Therefore, when 
applying the manifest injustice test, it is our role not to 
determine whether the circuit court should have accepted the 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
17 
 
plea in the first instance,7 but rather to determine whether the 
defendant should be permitted to withdraw the plea.  This is so 
because while the plea may have been invalid at the time it was 
entered, it may be inappropriate, in light of later events, to 
allow withdrawal of the plea. 
¶31 In light of that principle, Wisconsin courts have 
uniformly held that when applying the manifest injustice test, 
"a reviewing court may look beyond the plea hearing transcript" 
to the totality of the circumstances.  See State v. Shegrud, 131 
Wis. 2d 133, 138, 389 N.W.2d 7 (1986) (citing Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 274); see also State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶60, 
301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23; Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶18; 
White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491.  "The totality of the circumstances 
includes the plea hearing record, the sentencing hearing record, 
as well the defense counsel's statements . . . among other 
portions of the record."  Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶18.  The 
reviewing court looks at the entirety of the record to determine 
whether, considered as a whole, the record supports the 
assertion that manifest injustice will occur if the plea is not 
withdrawn.  We see no compelling reason to depart from our well-
                                                 
7 In fact, the State conceded on appeal that if Cain had not 
admitted at sentencing that five plants were found in his house, 
his conviction could not stand.  Cain, No. 2010AP1599-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶29.  It is clear that the circuit court 
erred at the time of the plea hearing, because Cain then 
admitted to having only four plants.  See Johnson v. State, 53 
Wis. 2d 787, 790, 193 N.W.2d 659 (1972).  However, the issue 
presented to this court is not whether the circuit court erred 
at the time it accepted the plea, but whether Cain should be 
allowed to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
18 
 
established rule that appellate courts may review the entirety 
of the record when applying the manifest injustice test.  See 
Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶18; White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491.  Indeed, 
as our analysis below demonstrates, this case presents a good 
illustration of the rule's virtues.  In a word, it would simply 
not make sense to vacate a conviction as the result of an error 
at 
a 
plea 
hearing 
when 
later 
proceedings 
unambiguously 
demonstrate that the error did not give rise to a manifest 
injustice and that the plea was valid.   
¶32 Cain resists this conclusion, arguing, on the basis of 
a single sentence from Van Camp, that we should review the plea 
hearing alone.  Van Camp, however, does not stand for that 
proposition.  The question there was whether the defendant 
understood his rights at the plea hearing. In addressing that 
question, we held that "the reviewing court may look to the 
record as a whole to show that the defendant understood the 
waiver 
of 
his 
constitutional 
rights" 
even 
though 
"the 
defendant's understanding must be measured at the time the plea 
is entered."  Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 149.  In other words, far 
from cabining judicial review to the plea hearing, the Van Camp 
court explicitly recognized the permissibility of scrutinizing 
the whole record in order to answer the ultimate question of 
what the defendant's understanding was at the time the plea was 
entered.  And, in any event, Van Camp is inapposite to Cain's 
claim, no matter how the case is read. For Cain does not assert 
that he did not understand his rights at the time he plead, as 
was the issue in Van Camp; instead, he asserts that his plea was 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
19 
 
not properly entered.8  Accordingly, we conclude that our review 
properly includes the entire record, not just the plea hearing.  
E. 
Application of the Manifest Injustice Test 
¶33 With these principles in mind, we now evaluate the 
totality of the record to determine whether Cain personally 
entered or ratified his plea of no contest. 
¶34 At the plea hearing, Cain stated, inter alia, that he 
had only four marijuana plants in his workshop.  Yet Cain's 
attorney stipulated to the facts contained in the criminal 
complaint, which stated that law enforcement officers found 16 
marijuana plants in Cain's workshop.  After so stipulating, 
Cain's 
attorney 
listened 
without 
objection 
as 
the 
State 
reiterated, at the request of the court, the facts contained in 
the criminal complaint, including that law enforcement had 
discovered 16 marijuana plants in Cain's workshop. 
¶35 At the sentencing hearing, Cain, again with his 
attorney present, was given the opportunity to contest the PSI, 
which stated that law enforcement had discovered 16 marijuana 
plants in Cain's workshop.  However, he did not contest the 
                                                 
8 It is also worth noting that Van Camp is procedurally 
distinct from the case at bar.  There, the defendant made a 
Bangert motion, shifting the burden to the State, and triggering 
the State's duty to prove that the defendant's plea was 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  Id. at 140-
41; see supra note 5 (explaining Bangert motions).  Both parties 
acknowledge, and we agree, that this, unlike Van Camp, is not a 
Bangert case; therefore, the burden remains with Cain to prove 
that withdrawal of his plea is required to avoid manifest 
injustice.  As we show below, that is a burden that Cain has not 
carried. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
20 
 
accuracy of the report.  In fact, later at the sentencing 
hearing, Cain's attorney asked the court to "consider this 
particular infraction, even with the 16 plants, as on the lower 
end of this continuum of [C]lass H felonies."  (emphasis added).  
This statement was not qualified as being merely what the State 
alleged, but rather constitutes an endorsement of what was 
recited both in the criminal complaint as well as in the PSI.  
The record indicates no objection from Cain. 
¶36 Finally, we agree with the court of appeals that it is 
clear that Cain admitted at the sentencing hearing that law 
enforcement officers found more than four marijuana plants when 
he referred to "those five plants which got excavated" from his 
house.9  Although Cain's comments are difficult to follow at 
times, his statement regarding the number of plants is clear and 
unequivocal. 
¶37 Cain's statements and actions, when viewed in the 
totality of the circumstances, demonstrate that he personally 
entered and ratified his plea of no contest.  The facts 
contained in the record indicate that Cain was well aware that 
                                                 
9 Cain now asserts that his statement at the sentencing 
hearing regarding five marijuana plants was a mere "off-hand" 
statement.  We infer from this that he argues that his statement 
was not meant to be taken seriously.  He further argues that 
because of its "off-hand" nature, we should give less weight to 
his admission regarding five plants, and more weight to his 
statement at the plea hearing that he had only four plants.  
Nothing about the timing, location, or other circumstances of 
Cain's statements leads us to believe that his statement that 
his house contained five plants was anything other than a direct 
admission to the charged offense and a ratification of his plea. 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
21 
 
he was pleading to the offense of manufacturing more than four 
marijuana plants, and that he did not maintain that he had four 
or fewer marijuana plants.10  Accordingly, we conclude that given 
the totality of the circumstances, Cain has not met the burden 
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing the 
withdrawal of his no contest plea is necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice.11 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶38 We conclude that the record, when viewed in its 
totality, 
does 
not 
support 
withdrawal 
of 
Cain's 
plea.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Cain has not met his burden of 
                                                 
10 We recognize that when the circuit court denied Cain's 
post-conviction motion, it gave no indication that it was 
relying upon the statements Cain made at the sentencing hearing.  
However, to affirm the circuit court, appellate courts are not 
required to use the exact same reasoning that the circuit court 
used in reaching its decision.  State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶52, 
263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771. 
11 Both Cain and the State have argued at length over 
whether the number of plants is an element of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1)(h)2.  However, we need not answer that question 
because it relates only to whether Cain's underlying plea was 
valid when received, a separate issue from whether a manifest 
injustice warrants the withdrawal of the plea.  See White v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).  In conformity 
with our prior practice, we choose to decide this case on the 
narrowest grounds possible, and not reach the question of 
whether the number of plants is an element of the charged 
offense.  See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 
326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("[A]n appellate court should 
decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.") (citation 
omitted); Ehlinger v. Hauser, 2010 WI 54, ¶66, 325 Wis. 2d 287, 
785 N.W.2d 328 (citation omitted) (same); Jenkins v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 41 Wis. 112, 117 (1876) ("Our 
decision must go upon rather narrow grounds, and rest upon the 
facts of this case."). 
 
No. 
2010AP1599-CR   
 
22 
 
showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing the 
withdrawal of his no contest plea is necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice. 
¶By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately to make a few brief points.   
¶40 I question the majority's decision to recast the 
defendant's central argument.  Majority op., ¶¶27-28.  The 
defendant repeatedly asserts in his briefs that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the circuit court 
accepted the plea even though the defendant denied an element of 
the offense at the plea hearing.  The majority, on the other 
hand, 
determines 
that 
because 
there 
was 
no 
"misapprehension, . . . coercion, or . . . any other reason that 
could 
be 
fairly 
described 
as 
going 
to 
his 
knowledge, 
intelligence, 
or voluntariness," the defendant is instead 
arguing that he did not "personally enter or ratify the plea."  
Majority op., ¶28. 
¶41 I am perplexed by how the majority reframes the 
defendant's argument.1  The requirement that a defendant 
"personally enter or ratify the plea"2 was satisfied in the 
                                                 
1 I acknowledge that the majority followed the lead of the 
court of appeals.  See State v. Cain, No. 2010AP1599-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2011). 
2 The majority explains the origin of the rule that it is 
manifest injustice if a plea is not "personally entered or 
ratified" at ¶26 n.6.  The rule appeared in the then-tentative 
1967 draft of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to 
Pleas of Guilty.  See State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385 & 
n.2, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  The American Bar Association standard 
now provides that "Withdrawal may be necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice when the defendant proves, for example, 
that: . . . (B) the plea was not entered or ratified by the 
defendant or a person authorized to so act in the defendant's 
behalf."  3 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice 
14-2.1 
(3d 
ed. 
1999), 
available 
at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section
_archive/crimjust_standards_guiltypleas_blk.html#2.1. 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
present case at the plea hearing when the following interaction 
took place: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Cain would enter a plea of no 
contest, judge. 
THE COURT: Is that your plea, Mr. Cain? 
LEE ROY CAIN: Yes it is. 
¶42 The plea hearing transcript in the present case 
clearly shows that the defendant personally entered the plea.  
The defendant never argued otherwise, and how could he?  Defense 
counsel stated the nature of the plea, the court asked the 
defendant if the defendant was making the plea, and the 
defendant personally said that he was.  The majority's decision 
to recast the defendant's argument along such ill-fitting lines 
is puzzling.   
¶43 In State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 594 N.W.2d 799 
(1999), the court described a scenario in which a defendant 
actually did not personally enter a plea, and the scenario 
looked nothing like what occurred in the present case.  The 
court explained: 
The circuit court never mentioned in this plea 
colloquy that the proposed plea was a plea of no 
contest and never asked the defendant for his plea.  
At no time did the circuit court ask the defendant how 
he pleads to the charge, whether his plea to the 
charge is no contest, or whether his attorney's 
statement that the defendant 'is prepared today to 
change his plea' of not guilty to that of no contest 
is correct.  It is beyond dispute that neither the 
defendant nor the defense counsel nor the circuit 
court ever said on the record that the defendant was 
in fact then and there pleading no contest to the 
charged offense.  Therefore, it is beyond dispute that 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the defendant did not expressly and personally plead 
to the charged offense on the record in open court.3 
¶44 The excerpt from the plea hearing transcript above 
demonstrates that the present case is of a different nature than 
Burns.  
¶45 Beyond my concern that the majority improperly recasts 
the defendant's argument as something that it is not, I question 
why the majority feels the need to recast the defendant's 
argument at all.  As far as I can tell, the outcome of this 
review does not hinge on the majority's reconstruction of the 
defendant's argument.  
¶46 "When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in 'manifest injustice.'"4  There are many ways a 
defendant can meet this burden.  One is to show that a plea was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when entered.5  Another 
is to show that the plea was not personally entered or ratified.6   
                                                 
3 State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 769, 594 N.W.2d 799 
(1999). 
4 State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906 (citations omitted). 
5 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18.  See also State v. Van Camp, 
213 Wis. 2d 131, 149, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997) ("[T]he defendant's 
understanding must be measured at the time the plea is 
entered."). 
6 State v. Daley, 2006 WI App 81, ¶20 n.3, 292 Wis. 2d 517, 
716 N.W.2d 146. 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶47 The majority's recasting of the defendant's argument 
does not appear to change the standard of review or the scope of 
the court's review in the present case.   
¶48 Had the defendant alleged that he did not know or 
understand the information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing in addition to pointing out the error on the face 
of the plea hearing transcript, the court would be required to 
remand for an evidentiary hearing without considering the 
entirety of the record.7  The defendant in the present case has 
not made such an allegation and does not request an evidentiary 
hearing.  Rather, the defendant asks this court to make the 
final determination that because of the error at the plea 
hearing, he must be allowed to withdraw his plea to prevent a 
manifest injustice.   
¶49 While I have not located a case in which a defendant 
sought plea withdrawal for the exact reason the defendant in the 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶25 n.5.  See also State v. Howell, 2007 
WI 75, ¶70, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48 (quoting Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶40): 
The State cannot circumvent a defendant's right to an 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert by arguing that 
based on the record as a whole the defendant, despite 
the 
defective 
plea 
colloquy, 
entered 
a 
constitutionally 
sound 
plea. 
 
"If 
the 
motion 
establishes a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 or other court-mandated duties and makes the 
requisite 
allegations, 
the 
court 
must 
hold 
a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing at which the state 
is 
given 
an 
opportunity 
to 
show 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
despite 
the 
identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy." (Emphasis 
in original.) 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
present case seeks plea withdrawal, the general rule seems to be 
that the court deciding whether plea withdrawal is necessary to 
prevent a manifest injustice may review the entire record to 
make that determination.8  Thus, in a manifest injustice case, 
whether a defendant's contention is that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when entered, or that his 
plea was not personally entered and ratified, I believe the 
court may assess the entire record. 
¶50 Because 
the 
majority's 
decision 
to 
recast 
the 
defendant's argument is erroneous and does not seem to drive the 
outcome of the present case, I write separately. 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶¶54-55, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 ("[The defendant] contends that his 
pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered because the 
circuit court did not warn him that the maximum penalty was not 
merely a life sentence, but a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole. . . . [A]n appellate court may look to 
the entire record in the course of its review."); State v. 
Shegrud, 131 Wis. 2d 133, 138, 389 N.W.2d 7 (1986) ("[A] 
reviewing court may look beyond the plea hearing transcript in 
reviewing a circuit court's determination that a defendant is 
not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea."); State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 283, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) ("Although a defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge must be measured at 
the time the plea is entered, the reviewing court may look to 
the entire record to make such measurement. Similarly, case law 
prior to this decision states that a reviewing court may 
consider the record as a whole to show that the defendant 
understood the waiver of his constitutional rights.") (Citations 
omitted.); White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 
(1978) ("In applying the manifest injustice test on review, this 
court may consider the whole record . . . ."). 
No.  2010AP1599-CR.ssa 
 
1