Title: State v. Brantner

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 24140
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 135
September Term, 1999
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
JOHN E. BRANTNER, JR.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Filed:   August 23, 2000
1
 That statute provides, in part:
“(a) Definitions. — For the purposes of this section, the following words
have the meanings indicated.
“(1) ‘Public record’ includes all official books, papers, or
records whether kept on a manual or automated basis,
which are created, received, or used by the State or any
agency thereof, a bicounty or multicounty agency, and
county, municipality, or other political subdivision.
“(2) ‘Access’ means to instruct, communicate with, store data in,
retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of equipment including,
but not limited to, computers and other data processing equipment
or resources connected therewith.
“(b) Prohibited conduct. — It is unlawful for a person to do or attempt
to do the following:
“(1) Wilfully make a false entry in any public records;
“(2) Except under proper authority, wilfully alter, deface, destroy,
remove, or conceal any public record; or
“(3) Except under proper authority, wilfully and intentionally access
public records.
“(c) Penalty. — Any person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and may be imprisoned up to 3 years or fined up to $1,000,
or both.”
The issue this case presents is whether a photocopy of a letter, written by a judge and sent
to the parties to the case over which the judge was presiding, is, while in the possession, lawfully
obtained, of the defendant, a public record, the willful and unauthorized alteration of which is
proscribed by Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.)  Art. 27, §45 A (b).    Concluding that it is
1
not, the Circuit Court for Washington County  dismissed that charge against John E. Brantner, the
appellee, who had altered such a letter, and the State noted its appeal.   We granted certiorari on
our own motion while the case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. We agree with the
Circuit Court and, therefore,  affirm the judgment of that court.
I.
On August 21, 1997, the appellee was a defendant in the case of State v. Brantner, No.
2
19914, a criminal case which was then pending in the Circuit Court for Washington County.  By
letter of that date, the Honorable John H. McDowell, a judge of that court, wrote to Gordon A.
Lynn, the attorney representing appellee in the case, with respect to scheduling in that case, sending
copies of the letter to the State’s Attorney’s Office, the appellee, the Sheriff’s Department, the
Assignment Clerk, and the Clerk of the Court.   As written by Judge McDowell, the  letter read:
“Please note that the Court has scheduled a modification hearing on
September 8, 1997, at 9:00 a.m., for the above-captioned case.  Please make
arrangements to be in court on that date and time.  Thank you for your
cooperation.”
         On the copy he received, appellee deleted the date and the text of the letter, replacing
the text with the following:  
“As per the case scheduled for September 1997, a Stay was placed on the
charges, and the probation, due to extenuating circumstances.  As of
October 15, 1998, Mr. John E. Brantner, Jr. was completely exonerated of
all charges, pertaining to case No: 19914 CT.”
As a result, the appellee subsequently was charged with violation of Article 27, § 45A. (b). That
section prohibits any wilful alteration, defacement, destruction, removal, or concealment of any
public record.    
Following trial, the Circuit Court expressed dismay that the appellee “presumably altered
one of its colleague’s letters for his own personal benefit” and found that the appellee’s actions
were “immoral, fraudulent and downright childish in nature.”   Nevertheless, the court agreed with
appellee that a photocopy of a judge’s letter did not constitute a “public record” within  the ambit of
§ 45A (a) (1) and, thus, its alteration “simply [does] not constitute a violation of Article 27, section
45A.”   It reasoned:
2
See  Va Code Ann. § 18.2-168 (Michie 1999).   That statute provides:  
“If any person forge a public record, or certificate, return, or
attestation, of any public officer or public employee, in relation to
any matter wherein such certificate, return, or attestation may be
received as legal proof, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such
forged record, certificate, return, or attestation, knowing the same
to be forged, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.”
Intent to defraud is an element of the offense.   Campbell v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d
652, 654 (Va. App. 1992), aff’d, 431 S.E. 2d 648 (Va. 1993).
E.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 831.02 (West 1999), which provides:
3
“ Whoever utters and publishes as true a false, forged or altered record, deed,
instrument or other writing mentioned in s. 831.01 knowing the same to be false,
altered, forged or counterfeited, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, §
775.083, or § 775.084.”
See Parker v. State, 658 So.2d 1105, 1106  (Fla. App. 1995).   See also Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 750.248 (West 1999), which provides:
“(1) Any person who shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit any public
record, or any certificate, return, or attestation of any clerk of a court, public
register, notary public,  township clerk, or any other public officer, in relation to any
matter wherein such certificate, return, or attestation may be received as legal
proof, or any charter, deed, will, testament, bond,  writing obligatory, letter of
attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange, promissory note, or any
order, acquittance of discharge for money or other property, or any waiver,
3
“The definition of public record in Article 27, section 45A is somewhat
modified and limited by the adjective ‘official’.   It says ‘official books, papers or
records.’   And the term ‘official’ relates to someone holding office.   In this case,
the official public record is the copy of Judge McDowell’s letter maintained by the
clerk of court.    Interestingly, the definition of public record in Article 27, section
45A does not include photocopies.    However, in section 10-611 (f) of the State
Government Article, the General Assembly specifically included photocopies in the
definition of public record in that article.     In Article 27, section 45A, the
legislature chose not to include ‘photocopy’ within the definition of public record.  
In this case, if the allegations are true, the defendant would presumably be guilty of
uttering a willfully altered or defaced public record if such a crime existed in
Maryland.    The term uttering means to circulate as if authentic or genuine.  
However there is no such crime as uttering forged public records in Maryland,
althoughthere is such a crime  in Virginia  and some other jurisdictions. ”
[2]
[3]
release, claim or demand, or any acceptance of a bill of exchange, or indorsement,
or assignment of a bill of exchange or promissory note for the payment of money,
or any accountable receipt for money, goods, or other property, with intent to
injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 14 years.”
4
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 45A (a) (1) provides:
“all official books, papers, or records whether kept on a manual or
automated basis, which are created, received, or used by the State
or any agency thereof, a bicounty or a multicounty agency, any
county, municipality, or other political subdivision.” 
The relevant portion of the statute reads:
5
“(f) Public record. — (1) “Public record” means the original or
any copy of any documentary material that:
(i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State
Government or of a political subdivision or received by
the unit or instrumentality in connection with the
transaction of public business; and
(ii) is in any form, including:
1. a card;
2. a computerized record;
3. correspondence;
4. a drawing;
4
II
 The State challenges the Circuit Court’s premise, that §45A (a) (1)   does not include
4
within its reach copies or photocopies of official documents.   It argues that the statute is not under-
inclusive, as it clearly covers “all” official papers, “whether kept on a manual or automated basis,”
thus including copies.  The only limitation § 45A (a) (1) imposes, the State asserts, is  that the
public records be “created, received, or used by the State or any agency thereof....”  Therefore, it
submits, unlike Md. Code  (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) §10-611 (f) of the State Government Article,5
5. film or microfiche;
6. a form;
7. a map;
8. a photograph or photostat;
9. a recording; or
10. a tape ...”
5
upon which the court and the appellee rely and which specifically includes the term “copy” in its
definition of “public record,” given the use of the term “all,”encompassing both categories, there
was no need to specify in § 45A (a) (1) that it covered originals as well as copies.   Contrary to the
appellee’s argument, the State argues that if the Legislature had wanted to limit § 45A (a) (1) to the
originals of public records, it would have so stated explicitly or, at least, more clearly.
Noting the purpose of the statute,  to criminalize the alteration, defacement, removal, or
destruction of any public record and the necessity for the court, in the fulfillment of its duties, to
communicate with all parties, the accomplishment of which frequently requires that copies or
photocopies of official documents be sent to those parties, the State maintains that the appellee’s
removal of the official text of the letter, replacing it with his own, was an attempt to pass off as
official a false statement exonerating himself.  Thus, it asserts, though quickly found out, the
appellee’s use of the official letterhead, found on the court generated document, as well as his
misappropriation of Judge McDowell’s signature, illustrates an intent, i.e. a wilfulness, to: make a
false entry in a public record; alter a public record; and intentionally access a public record. 
Consequently, as the State sees it, the appellee’s actions violated not some, but all three of the
actions prohibited by § 45A.(a) (1).   It also urges that, if the Court were to hold that the appellee
6
was immune from punishment because the document he altered was a copy and not an original,
anyone who would alter a document created and issued by the State would simply copy it before
making the alterations and, thereby, avoid the reach and the penalties of §45A.
III
The issue this Court must resolve involves statutory interpretation.   We approach that task
by seeking to discern the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Handy v. State, 357 Md.
685, 704, 745 A.2d 1107, 1117 (2000) (Court’s paramount objective is to ascertain and
effectuate intent of legislature when it enacted statute.)   This requires reading and interpreting the
entire statute, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident
by the words actually used.   Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993);  Bd.
of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982); Smelser v.
Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389, 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982).    The search for legislative
intent begins  by looking first at the words of the statute. Williams v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000) ( Legislative intent must be sought first in
actual language of statute.).  If, giving the words used by the Legislature their ordinary and common
meaning, see Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000) ( As a rule, the Court
of Appeals views the words of a statute in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner in
which they are most commonly understood), the statute is clear, we need look no further. Adamson
v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 359 Md. 238, 251, 753 A.2d 501, 508 (2000) (If the
Legislature’s intentions are evident from the text of the statute, a court’s inquiry will normally cease
and the plain meaning of the statute will govern); Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
7
359 Md. at 116, 753 A.2d at 49 (2000) (Where statutory  language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, court normally does not look beyond
words of statute to determine legislative intent)  Only if the words of the statute are ambiguous need
we seek the Legislature”s intent in the legislative history or other extraneous sources. Marsheck v.
Board of Trustees of Fire & Police Employees’ Retirement System of City of Baltimore, 358 Md.
393, 403, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000) (If statute’s language is ambiguous, court will look towards
other sources, such as relevant case law and legislative history, to aid in determining legislature’s
intentions); Resper v. State, 354 Md. 611, 619, 732 A.2d 863, 867 (1999) (If a statute contains
an ambiguity, the court must look to not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their
meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment in order to
find a construction that best realizes the legislative intent)  Moreover, construction requires that the
statute be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common
sense.  D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v.
State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 304 Md. 302, 315, 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).
Section 45A (a) (1) is clear and unambiguous in the statement of the requirements of a
public record.  To be a public record as defined by that section, the “official books, papers, or
records” must have been “created , received, or used by the State or any agency thereof” and
kept, “whether ... on a manual or automated basis,” by the State or the governmental agency
creating, receiving or using them.   The latter requirement is not stated as directly as the former, but
it is nevertheless clear beyond cavil that it is prescribed by the statute.   The reference to “manual or
 It is likely that, as the trial court indicated, the file copy of the judge’s letter is a public
6
record, having been created by an agent of the State and, because explanatory of a portion of the
8
automated basis,” addressing the manner in which the governmental entity retains the official
document, not the manner in which it is generated, a meaning that is confirmed by the Legislature’s
use of the term, “kept,” in connection with the phrase, is necessary only if the keeping or retention
of the records is an essential requirement of the definition.   This is further confirmed by the fact
that, to read the statute as the State proposes would render the phrase, “whether kept on a manual
or automated basis,” meaningless and mere surplusage. 
Moreover, under the State’s interpretation, not only the record retained by the official or
agency, but all copies generated and disbursed by the official or agency pursuant to the official’s or
agency’s official duties would be “public records.”  Taking that interpretation to its logical
conclusion, any copy of any public record in the hands of the recipient would be subject to the
proscriptions of § 45A (b), so that any such recipient who wilfully alters the copy in possession
would be guilty of a violation of that section, notwithstanding that the copy in the hands of the
governmental agency remains fully intact and in no way compromised.     This is so because,
logically, the violation would occur at the moment the alteration is made and notwithstanding the
intent with which the alteration was made or whether the altered document is published or
circulated.    There simply is no requirement in § 45A (a) (1) that the accused have an intent to
defraud by means of the alteration or even that the altered document be circulated or published.   
Recognizing, apparently, that an interpretation of the statute to mean that the mere alteration
of a copy of a public record in the hands of a third party is actionable  defies common sense, the
6
proceedings, required to be kept, by the State.  
 
In addition to a copy of Reese, (with the portions pertinent to the subject of the proposed
7
bill and notations on file copies of the proposed bills to the effect, “37 Md. App. 450”) and “Reese
case Ct of Spec Apps 2 yrs ago,” there is in the bill file a hand written memorandum as follows:
“This Bill provides ... a fine of $1000 or imprisonment up to 3 years or both for
conviction of doing certain acts to public records.   There are various penalties
provided throughout the Code for specific records.  This Bill responds to the result
in the Reese Case where the Defendant admittedly altered County records for
personal gain but whose conviction was set aside by the Appellate Court because
her actions did not fall within the statutory definition of forgery.... There are 2
Committee Amendments to this Bill.   Amend. No. 1 combines [can’t make out]
definition of Public Records & Political Subdivision.   Amend. No. 2 added
“Duplicate” to the offensive acts.”
9
State at oral argument made clear that its argument is not so limited.  Rather, acknowledging the
importance to the proper functioning of the government of having accurate copies of government-
related records, it maintained that it is the manner in which the altered record is used or attempted
to be used that is dispositive.   That argument was rejected by the Circuit Court.   We do, as well.  
By its very terms, which, as we have seen, are not ambiguous, § 45A (a) (1), as we have also
observed, prohibits the wilful alteration of a public document.   It does not prescribe the purpose
for which the alteration must be made to be actionable or the manner in which the altered document
must be used.   We shall not add an element to the statute to make criminal what otherwise would
not be, or to give to the statute a meaning that it does not have. 
The legislative history of section 45A and the interpretation other courts have given similar,
although admittedly not identical, statutes confirm our interpretation.   Section 45A was enacted in
1979, in response to the decision by the Court of Special Appeals  in  Reese v. State, 37 Md.
App. 450, 378 A.2d 4 (1977).    At  issue in that case was the sufficiency of the evidence to
7
10
sustain the conviction of the accused  pursuant to Maryland Code (1951, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,
§ 44 of forgery of an "acquittance or receipt for money or property," which that section proscribed.
Although it was clear that accused was shown to have been responsible for some of the false
entries made in the tax rolls, the court reversed the accused's conviction, holding that, 
"The actions imputable to the [accused], even if fraudulent, did not
constitute forgery generally and did not constitute forgery of acquittances or
receipts specifically.  
Forgery, in its most fundamental character, is not an offense involving false
and fraudulent writing generally but is a very specific offense in the nature of
counterfeiting.  It involves not the making of false entries for fraudulent purposes in
an otherwise genuine document but the very manufacturing of a false or spurious
document itself." 
Reese, 37 Md. App. at 454, 374 A.2d at 6, citing Clark and Marshall, The Law of Crimes (Sixth
Wingersky Edition) at 845-846, noting, LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law (1972) at 671 and
Perkins, Criminal Law (2nd Ed., 1969) at 345.   Thus, the court reasoned:
"that in this case the making of false entries in the tax rolls may well have been
fraudulent but was not a forgery.  There was no manufacturing or counterfeiting
of a spurious or non-genuine tax roll; there was merely the making of false
statements in a genuine document."
Reese at 458, 374 A.2d at 8.  Section 45A fills the gap which Reese identified.  It is significant that
in Reese the documents altered were clearly public records, tax rolls.  Thus, there is no indication
that the General Assembly was intending to do more than that, fill that gap, or that it intended to
broaden the definition of public records.  In that regard, it is also interesting that one of the states to
which the court looked in reaching its decision was Colorado.   That State was also mentioned in
the legislative history file, in the context of  indicating that the Colorado statute was similar to what
On the copy of the proposed bill containing the citation to Reese, i.e. “37 Md. App. 450,”
8
immediately following Section 2, are the handwritten words, “similar to Colorado.”
11
was proposed by § 45A.8
The Colorado statute that is similar to § 45A is Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-114. 
Captioned "Abuse of public records,"  it provides:
"(1) A person commits a class 1 misdemeanor if:
"(a) The person knowingly makes a false entry in or falsely alters
any public record;  or
 
"(b) Knowing the person lacks the authority to do so, the person
knowingly destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or impairs the
availability of any public record;  or
 
"(c) Knowing the person lacks the authority to retain the record, the
person refuses to deliver up a public record in the person's
possession upon proper request of any person lawfully entitled to
receive such record;  or
"(d) Knowing the person has not been authorized by the custodian
of the public record to do so, the person knowingly alters any
public record.
"(2) As used in this section, the term "public record" includes all official books,
papers, or records created, received, or used by or in any governmental office or
agency."  
Although not involving this statute, the Supreme Court of Colorado has addressed the issue of what
constitutes a public record.   In People v. Trujillo, 521 P.2d 769,770 (Colo.1974), the court
construed the phrase, "of or belonging to any public office within this state."    In that case, a
probation officer who submitted an application for chief probation officer containing two material
misrepresentations, was charged with violating 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40--7--9, which
provided:
"Officer purloining records--penalty.  If any judge, sheriff, coroner, clerk, recorder,
or other public officer, or any person whatsoever, shall steal, fraudulently convert,
12
alter, corrupt, withdraw, falsity, or avoid, any record, process, charter, gift, grant,
conveyance, bond, or contract, or shall knowingly and willfully take off, discharge,
or conceal any issue, forfeited recognizance, or other forfeiture, or shall forge,
deface, or falsify any document or instrument recorded, or any registry,
acknowledgment, or certificate, or shall alter, deface, of falsify any minute,
document, book, or proceeding whatever, Of or belonging to any public office
within this state, the person so offending upon conviction shall be punished by
confinement in the state penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than
seven years."
Affirming the dismissal of the charges, the court  held:
"that a violation of Section 40--7--9 occurs only where a person falsifies or
otherwise corrupts a record which is in, or is required by law to be in, the custody
on control of a  public agency at the time of falsification.  The statute does not apply
to a situation like that present here, where, when falsified, the application for the
position sought did not belong to any public office within this state."
This interpretation was supported by the two cases that previously had addressed the issue:
Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 571 (1877) and Shimmel v. People, 121 P. 2d 491 (1942).  In,
Downing, the court determined that a personal book kept by a probate judge “for his own
information and convenience which contained records not germane to his office was not a public
record.” Trujillo, 521 P. 2d at 770.  Citing Shimmel, the Trujillo court held that unused civil service
examinations were not public records, reasoning that “the statute was designed to inhibit the
alteration of records which were prepared by, and in, the custody of a public agency.” Id. at 770.
The Colorado “Abuse of public records statute,” § 18-8-114 (2) is  consistent; its definition
of public records as “official books, papers, or records created, received, or used by or in any
governmental office or agency” evidences the same focus and rationale.   Section 45A's definition
of public records is quite similar.   In fact, by referencing the manner in which the records are kept,
The reason for the reference is perhaps provided in the letter from Delegate
9
Hargreaves , then Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, to Senator J. Joseph
Curran, then Chairman of the Senate Judicial proceedings Committee, in which the
Appropriations Committee asked the Judicial Proceedings Committee to address the matter
of the “insufficient criminal penalties to deter individuals from: 1) fraud by use of a computer;
2) making or attempting to make false entries; and 3) altering or destroying public records.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13-2407(A) (West 1999) provides:
10
“A. A person commits tampering with a public record if, with the intent to defraud
or deceive, such person knowingly:
“1. Makes or completes a written instrument, knowing that it has
been falsely made, which purports to be a public record or true
copy thereof or alters or makes a false entry in a written instrument
which is a public record or a true copy of a public record.”
The contexts of other statutes indicate that they require a 
11
consistent interpretation.   See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 267 § 1 (West 2000),
providing: 
“1. False or forged records, certificates, returns, attestations and other
writings -
 
“Whoever, with intent to injure or defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges or
counterfeits a public record, or a certificate, return or attestation of a clerk
or register of a court, public register, notary public, justice of the peace,
town clerk or any other public officer, in relation to a matter wherein such
13
it is more precise in that regard than the Colorado law.    This confirms the interpretation we have
9
given § 45A.   See also  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2407(B) (West 1999), defining "public
record," as used in subsection (A) of that statute,  to mean “all official books, papers, written
10
instruments or records created, issued, received or kept by any governmental office or agency or
required by law to be kept by others for the information of the government;” Mo. Ann. Stat.
575.010 (8) (West 1999), limiting "public record" to "any document which a public servant is
required by law to keep;" Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-911(2) (1999), defining “public record” to include
“all official books, papers, or records created, received, or used by or in any governmental office
or agency.”11
certificate, return or attestation may be received as legal proof;  or a
charter, deed, will, testament, bond or writing obligatory, power of
attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange or promissory
note;  or an order, acquittance or discharge for money or other property or
a credit card or an instrument described as a United States Dollar
Traveller's Check or Cheque, purchased from a bank or other financially
responsible institution, the purpose of which is a source of ready money on
cashing the instrument without identification other than the signature of the
purchaser;  or an acceptance of a bill of exchange, or an endorsement or
assignment of a bill of exchange or promissory note for the payment of
money;  or an accountable receipt for money, goods or other property;  or
a stock certificate, or any evidence or muniment of title to property;  or a
certificate of title, duplicate certificate of title, certificate issued in place of a
duplicate certificate, the registration book, entry book, or any indexes
provided for by chapter one hundred and eighty-five, or the docket of the
recorder;  shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not
more than ten years or in jail for not more than two years.;” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:3-29 (West 1999):
“Any person who, without the consent of the person authorized to have
custody thereof, removes an official record or paper from the files of any
public agency or body, or who alters any map, plat, or other paper signed
and approved by a public official without permission, or who alters,
defaces, mutilates or destroys with malicious intent any public record shall
be guilty of a high misdemeanor;”
N.Y. Penal Law § 175.20 (McKinney 2000):  
 “A person is guilty of tampering with public records in the second degree
when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to
grant it, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false
entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with,
deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public
servant...;”
Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.305 (1999):
“(1) A person commits the crime of tampering with public records if,
without lawful authority, the person knowingly destroys, mutilates, conceals,
removes, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any public record, including
records relating to the Oregon State Lottery;”
Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18  § 4911 (West 1999):
“(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he:
 
“(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of,
14
any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or
kept by, the government for information or record, or
required by law to be kept by others for information of the
government;
 
“(2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing
knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be taken as a
genuine part of information or records referred to in
paragraph (1) of this subsection;”
S.C. Code Ann. § 30-1-30 (Law Co-op 2000):  
“A person who unlawfully removes a public record from the office where it
usually is kept or alters, defaces, mutilates, secretes, or destroys it is guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not less than five
hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more
than thirty days.  Magistrates and municipal courts have jurisdiction to try
violations of this section.”
Ca. Gov’t Code § 6201 provides:
12
“Every person not an officer referred to in Section 6200, who is guilty of any of the
acts specified in that section, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or in
a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.” 
Section 6200, in turn, provides:
“Every officer having the custody of any record, map, or book, or of any paper or
proceeding of any court, filed or deposited in any public office, or placed in his or
her hands for any purpose, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
two, three, or four years if, as to the whole or any part of the record, map, book,
paper, or proceeding, the officer willfully does or permits any person to do any of
he following:
“(a) Steal, remove, or secrete.
“(b) Destroy, mutilate, or deface.
“(c) Alter or falsify.”   
15
That interpretation is also shared by other courts that have confronted the issue.   In People
v. Parks, 7 Cal. App.4th 883,  9 Cal. Rptr.2d 450 (1992), for example, the issue was whether a
falsified temporary restraining order was, at the time the defendant altered it, a "public record,”
within the meaning of Cal. Gov’t Code § 6201,  proscribing a non custodian’s alteration or
12
16
destruction of public records.   Acknowledging, citing People v. Garfield, 707 P.2d 258, 260
(Ca.1985) (holding  with respect to a will altered before it was offered for filing, that "[a] will is not
a public document before it is filed for probate."), the accuracy of the defendant’s observation that
a document requires to be filed does not become a public record until it is filed, the court rejected
the defendant’s argument in that case “because the signed genuine TRO Parks obtained from Judge
Mason was, when obtained, part of a court file.” Parks at 888.  It explained:
“In this case Parks altered an original court record which had been stamped with a
case number and the day and date and signed by a judge, although thereafter it was
to be returned to the clerk's office for filing and obtaining of conformed copies of
the original for further use.   Under prior case authority, "there can be no doubt that
court records are public records" (Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 777,
782, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821) and the documents in a court file are "public records."
(People v. McKenna (1953) 116 Cal. App.2d 207, 211, 255 P.2d 452.)  When
Parks obtained and then falsified this public record he committed the offense
proscribed by Government Code sections 6200-6201.”
Id. at 888 (footnote omitted). 
Injuring public records is a crime in Louisiana.   As defined in La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:132
(West 1999), it is “the intentional removal, mutilation, destruction, alteration, falsification, or
concealment of any record, document, or other thing, filed or deposited, by authority of law, in any
public office or with any public officer.”   In State v. Shows, 508 So.2d 991 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987), the court delineated the elements of the crime:
“(1) intentional removal or concealment;  (2) of a public record;  (3) the public
record has been filed or deposited;  (4) the filing or depositing was by authority of
law;  and (5) the filing or depositing is in a public office or with a public officer.”   
18 U.S.C. § 2071(a) provides: 
13
"Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or
destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any
17
Id. at 994, citing State v. Gomez, 433 So.2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir.1983), writs denied 440 So.2d
730 and 441 So.2d 747 (La.1983).    The court commented specifically on the 4  element: 
th
“We conclude that the element "filed or deposited, by authority of law," requires
more than a mere physical placing or keeping in storage in a public office or with a
public officer.  LSA-R.S. 14:132 contemplates either that the law expressly
mandate or permit the filing or depositing of the record in question and that there be
in addition some official act of filing or depositing.   Unless these requirements are
met, there is no violation of the statute;  consequently we have focused directly on
these requirements”.
Of significance to the case sub judice, the Shows court was clear and emphatic in its statement that
that element applied equally to the duplicate of a document, even when “the record tends to
establish that the duplicate would be retained in the normal course of ... business and would serve
as a record of the transaction.”  Id. at 994.
  The Military courts are in agreement.    In United States v. McCoy, 47 M.J. 653, 656
(1997),  the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, construing  Article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934, held that “the mere completion of a blank form indicating
graduation from an Army school and presentment of that document to military officials as proof of
such schooling does not constitute the offense of wrongfully altering a public record.”   In reaching
its conclusion, the court pointed out, citing United States v. Spain, 17 U. S. C. M.A. 347, 38 C.
M. R. 145, 146-47, 1968 WL 5352 (1968), and United States v. Oglivie, 29 M. J. 1069, 1071
(A. C. M. R. 1990), that the article 134 offense was derived from 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a)  , the
13
record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed, or  deposited
with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or
with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”
“Public record” was defined as:
14
“includ[ing] records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth the activities of the office or agency, or matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report [and] classified matters.” 
18
intent of which is to ‘"prevent any conduct which deprives the government of the use of its
documents."’  Id. at 664, quoting Oglivie, 29 M. J. at 1071 (citing United States v. Rosner, 352 F.
Supp. 915, 919 (S. D. N. Y. 1972), petition denied, 497 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.1974)).   Thus, it
opined, “[t]he essence of the Article 134, UCMJ, offense is whether the charged misconduct
disturbs the integrity of the public record itself.”  Id. at 654-55.   To like effect is United States v.
Isler, 36 M. J. 1061 (1993).   In that case the issue was whether the alteration of the personal
copy of a permanent change of station order constituted the wrongful alteration of a public
record,  in violation of Article 134.   Concluding that it did not, but acknowledging that the
14
definition of "public records" envisions documents in possession of an “official function,” id. at
1064,  the court explained: 
“Although the level where a public record may be maintained is appropriately low for
the military offense, i.e., unit or staff function, we do not construe the definition to
lower it to the individual ownership level. ...   To hold every personal copy of one's
PCS orders is a public record would, in effect, make every airman an official
custodian of those copies, for we believe that is the only means for imposing
individual criminality for not protecting one's personal copies as a public record. 
Plainly, as currently drafted, there is insufficient notice in the offense to do so. 
Because MCM, Part IV, paragraph 99 prescribes a criminal offense, in the absence
19
of clear proscriptions, we must restrict its applications to reasonable parameters.”
In so concluding, the court rejected arguments quite similar to those made by the State in this case.
Id. at 1064.  See United States v. Osborn, 32 M. J. 854 (N. M. C. M. R. 1991) (alteration of
officially authenticated copy of divorce decree in possession of the service person not a public
record); United States v. Oglivie, 29 M. J. 1069 (A. C. M. R. 1990) (alteration of personal copy
of divorce decree not a public record).  
         Given the legislative history of the statute, as well as the reasoning behind similar statutes, it is
thus clear that the purpose of the § 45A (a) (1) is protection of those public records in official
custody, and not the protection of personal, officially generated copies of public records.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.