Title: The People v. Fritz Elysee

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 6  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Fritz Elysee, 
            Appellant.
Warren S. Landau, for appellant.
Diane Eisner, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
On the morning of December 25, 2003, defendant
automobile driver was involved in a four-vehicle car accident in
Brooklyn, New York.  As a result, a passenger in a pick-up truck
was killed and several other persons, including defendant, were
injured.  At approximately 5:30 a.m., defendant was taken to
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Kings County Hospital where, upon his arrival and in accordance
with the hospital's routine practice for treating trauma victims,
blood samples were drawn solely for treatment purposes ("5:30
a.m. samples"). 
Pursuant to a court order issued by Supreme Court at
approximately 1:50 p.m. that day, defendant was compelled to
submit to a chemical test of the alcohol or drug content of his
blood ("blood alcohol test") (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] §
1194 (3); CPL 690.35, 690.36).  To effect this order, a
registered nurse, in the presence of a New York City Police
Officer, drew a second set of blood samples at approximately 2:50
p.m. ("2:50 p.m. samples") (see VTL 1194 [4][a]).  On December
26, 2003, the 2:50 p.m. samples were forwarded by the New York
City Police Department to Dr. Elizabeth Marker, a forensic
toxicologist employed by the New York City Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner, to perform a court-ordered test in order to
determine defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the
accident.  On December 29, 2003, a search warrant for the seizure
of the 5:30 a.m. samples from the hospital was issued and
executed pursuant to CPL 690.10 (4).  The New York City Police
Department, in turn, submitted the 5:30 a.m. samples to Dr.
Marker.
Prior to trial, defendant brought an omnibus motion to,
among other things, controvert the search warrant and suppress
the results of the blood alcohol test performed on the 5:30 a.m.
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1 CPLR 4504 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
"Unless the patient waives the privilege, a
person authorized to practice medicine,
registered professional nursing, licensed
practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or
chiropractic shall not be allowed to disclose
any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional
capacity, and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity."
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samples, arguing that the seizure of his blood, pursuant to CPL
690.10, violated the physician-patient privilege defined by CPLR
4504.1  The court denied the motion to controvert, finding the
facts alleged in the search warrant application sufficient to
establish probable cause to believe that defendant was operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  The court
also denied that branch of the omnibus motion which sought to
suppress the results of the blood alcohol test performed on the
5:30 a.m. samples.  The court determined that CPLR 4504 "has no
application to vials of blood, which were the objects of the
search warrant."
At defendant's jury trial, Dr. Marker testified that
she tested both the 2:50 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. samples.  Regarding
the 2:50 p.m. samples, she noted that the results revealed
defendant's blood alcohol "concentration [to be] .05 gram
percent."  Dr. Marker opined that it is scientifically possible,
through reverse extrapolation, to reliably determine what a
person's blood alcohol content was at an earlier time based upon
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a later blood alcohol test when certain assumptions are made;
e.g., assuming that the alcohol in defendant's system was fully
absorbed at the time of the accident, going back a period of 10
hours from the time the 2:50 p.m. blood samples were taken,
defendant's blood alcohol level range at the time of the accident
would have been "between .20 [gram] percent and .25 [gram]
percent."  Dr. Marker further testified that the 5:30 a.m.
samples revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .23 gram
percent and .21 gram percent, respectively.  She opined that
these results were consistent with, and substantiated, the
results of the reverse extrapolation analysis of the 2:50 p.m.
samples.  Put another way, the test of the two separate blood
samples reached nearly identical results.  
At the charge conference, both the People and defense
asked the court to charge criminally negligent homicide as a
lesser included offense of second degree manslaughter.  The court
refused, concluding that there was no reasonable view of the
evidence to support the charge of criminally negligent homicide. 
The jury convicted defendant of manslaughter in the
second degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third
degree, and driving while intoxicated.  Defendant appealed from
Supreme Court's judgment of conviction.  This appeal brought up
for review that portion of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to
suppress physical evidence and the court's refusal to charge
criminally negligent homicide.
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The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding
that a blood specimen taken from a patient by a medical
professional is not “information” protected by the physician-
patient privilege as defined in CPLR 4504 (a) and, accordingly,
is subject to seizure.  The Appellate Division also held that
"the trial court properly refused to charge the jury with
criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of
manslaughter in the second degree" because there was no
reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding
that the lesser offense but not the greater offense was committed
by the defendant.  A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave
to appeal and we now affirm.
 We agree with the lower courts that defendant’s motion
to suppress the 5:30 a.m. samples was properly denied, though we
need not decide whether CPLR 4504 applies to these samples. 
Pursuant to VTL 1194[2][a], "any person who operates a motor
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a
chemical test [of] . . . breath, blood, urine or saliva, for the
purpose of determining the alcohol and/or drug content of the
blood . . ." under certain prescribed conditions.  In addition,
such chemical tests can also be compelled by court order under
VTL 1194 [3] when, among other circumstances, . . . "a person
other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical
injury . . . ; and "such person operated the vehicle in violation
of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this
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article"; and [ ] "has been placed under lawful arrest"; [ ]" has
refused to submit to a chemical test . . . or is unable to give
consent to such a test."  Therefore, even if these samples were
privileged, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the
privilege was overcome when the police officers executed the
court order issued pursuant to VTL 1194 [3].
Here, it is illogical to conclude that a blood sample
taken at 5:30 a.m. cannot be seized pursuant to a properly issued
court order, merely because the order issued after the blood was
actually drawn by an authorized person.  Furthermore, inasmuch as
the VTL authorizes a chemical test under the circumstances of
this case, and a court order issued compelling "that the
defendant shall submit to a chemical test of the alcohol or drug
content of his blood," the seizure of the earlier blood sample
was in accord with the statute.
We disagree with defendant's argument that Supreme
Court erred in not charging criminally negligent homicide as a
lesser included offense of second degree manslaughter.  A person
who fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk by
reason of his intoxication acts recklessly rather than with
criminal negligence (see People v Donahue, 123 AD2d 77, 81-82 [3d
Dept 1987]; People v Van Dusen, 89 AD2d 649 [3d Dept 1982]). 
Thus, given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's
intoxication, we agree with the lower courts that there was no
reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding
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that the defendant committed criminally negligent homicide (see
CPL 300.50 [1]; People v Barney, 99 NY2d 367, 371 [2003]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.  
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Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided February 17, 2009