Title: St. Augustine School v. Taylor

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP265-CQ 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
St. Augustine School, Joseph Forro and Amy 
Forro, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Carolyn Stanford Taylor, in her official 
capacity as Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Tony Evers, in his official 
capacity as Superintendent of Public Education,  
terminated 2/14/20 and Friess Lake School 
District, 
          Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 4, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion. HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Richard 
M. 
Esenberg, 
Brian 
McGrath, 
Anthony 
LoCoco, 
and 
Wisconsin Institute for law & Liberty, Milwaukee. There was an 
oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellees Friess Lake School District, 
there was a brief filed by Lori M. Lubinsky, Danielle B. Tierney 
and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison.  
 
For the defendant-appellee Superintendent Carolyn Stanford 
Taylor, there was a brief filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant 
attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Hanna S. Jurss. 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 70 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP265-CQ 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
St. Augustine School, Joseph Forro and Amy 
Forro, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Carolyn Stanford Taylor in her official 
capacity as Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and Friess Lake School District, 
 
          Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of question of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified question 
answered and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
2 
 
for the Seventh Circuit.  See Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (2019-20).1  
Explaining that the question boils down to one of methodology, 
it certified the following question: 
For purposes of determining whether two or more 
schools are "private schools affiliated with the same 
religious denomination" for purposes of Wis. Stat. [§] 
121.51, must the state superintendent rely exclusively 
on neutral criteria such as ownership, control, and 
articles of incorporation, or may the superintendent 
also 
take 
into 
account 
the 
school's 
self-
identification in sources such as its website or 
filings with the state. 
¶2 
 This question arises in the context of St. Augustine 
School's (St. Augustine) application for transportation benefits 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 121.51 and 121.54.  Pursuant to these 
statutes, private schools are entitled to receive public funding 
to transport children to their schools, but only one affiliated 
school per "religious denomination" can receive the funding in 
each "attendance area." 
¶3 
St. 
Augustine's 
application 
was 
denied 
by 
the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction on the ground that another 
school of the same religious denomination within the same 
attendance 
area 
was 
already 
receiving 
the 
benefit.  
Specifically, the Superintendent determined that St. Gabriel, a 
Catholic school affiliated with the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
was already established in the same attendance area as St. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
3 
 
Augustine, and St. Augustine also represented itself as a Roman 
Catholic school.   
¶4 
The certified question asks us only what information 
the Superintendent may consider in making a determination 
regarding whether two schools are "affiliated with the same 
religious denomination."  It does not ask us to resolve whether 
St. Gabriel and St. Augustine are actually of the same religious 
denomination.  The application of the facts to the law remains 
with the federal courts upon remand. 
¶5 
We conclude that, in determining whether schools are 
"affiliated with the same religious denomination" pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 121.51, the Superintendent is not limited to 
consideration of a school's corporate documents exclusively.  In 
conducting a neutral and secular inquiry, the Superintendent may 
also consider the professions of the school with regard to the 
school's 
self-identification 
and 
affiliation, 
but 
the 
Superintendent may not conduct any investigation or surveillance 
with respect to the school's religious beliefs, practices, or 
teachings. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we answer the certified question and 
remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit for further proceedings. 
I 
¶7 
St. Augustine is a private, religious school located 
within the boundaries of the Friess Lake School District (the 
School District).  On its website, St. Augustine describes 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
4 
 
itself as "an independent and private traditional Roman Catholic 
School."   
¶8 
Plaintiffs Joseph and Amy Forro are parents whose 
children attend St. Augustine.  Seeking transportation for their 
children to and from school, the Forros along with St. Augustine 
made a request for a busing contract from the School District 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 121.54.2   
¶9 
In the request, St. Augustine asserted that it is 
unaffiliated with the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  It stated:  
"Our governing body is our Board of Directors and we receive no 
funding from nor communicate with the Diocese on matters of 
education."  As such, St. Augustine distinguished itself from 
St. Gabriel Catholic School, a diocesan Catholic school also 
located within the boundaries of the School District. 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.54 provides in relevant part: 
Except as provided in sub. (1) or otherwise provided 
in this subsection, the school board of each district 
operating 
high 
school 
grades 
shall 
provide 
transportation to and from the school a pupil attends 
for each pupil residing in the school district who 
attends any elementary grade, including kindergarten, 
or high school grade at a private school located 2 
miles or more from the pupil's residence, if such 
private school is a school within whose attendance 
area the pupil resides and is situated within the 
school district or not more than 5 miles beyond the 
boundaries of the school district measured along the 
usually traveled route. 
§ 121.54(2)(b)1. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
5 
 
¶10 The School District denied St. Augustine's request.  
In doing so, it noted that the Forros' address "is within the 
boundaries already approved for a Catholic School."  Because the 
School District already bused students to St. Gabriel, it 
determined that it could not approve St. Augustine's request as 
it would constitute an overlapping attendance area. 
¶11 With St. Augustine and the School District at odds, 
they sought a determination from the Superintendent.3  As it did 
before the School District, St. Augustine argued that it is not 
affiliated with the same religious denomination as St. Gabriel 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  In support of 
this argument, it asserted: 
Neither St. Augustine School, Inc., nor the school 
operated by the corporation, has ever been affiliated 
by 
control, 
membership, 
or 
funding 
with 
the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  No representative of the 
Archdiocese or a parish church of the Archdiocese has 
ever been a director or officer of St. Augustine 
School, Inc.  No employees of St. Augustine School 
have ever been hired or compensated by the Archdiocese 
or a parish church of the Archdiocese.  None of the 
religious instructors at St. Augustine School have 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51 outlines a procedure by which a 
private school's attendance area is proposed by the private 
school's governing body and then considered by the public school 
district's school board.  Providence Cath. Sch. v. Bristol Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 231 Wis. 2d 159, 176, 605 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The statute further provides that in the event of a 
disagreement 
between 
the 
private 
and 
public 
school, 
the 
determination will be made by the Superintendent.  Id.; 
§ 121.51(1) ("If the private school and the school board cannot 
agree on the attendance area, the state superintendent shall, 
upon the request of the private school and the board, make a 
final determination of the attendance area."). 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
6 
 
ever been employed, assigned, or compensated for their 
work at St. Augustine School by the Archdiocese or a 
parish church of the Archdiocese. 
¶12 Then-Superintendent Tony Evers4 agreed with the School 
District 
and 
denied 
St. 
Augustine's 
request 
for 
the 
transportation benefit.  He concluded that "St. Augustine 
School, Inc. is a private, religious school affiliated with the 
Roman Catholic denomination."  Further, he determined that 
"[t]he District already provides transportation to students 
attending St. Gabriel School, another private, religious school 
affiliated with the Roman Catholic denomination, the attendance 
area of which is co-extensive with the attendance area of the 
District."  As a result, the Superintendent concluded that St. 
Augustine's attendance area overlaps that of St. Gabriel and 
thus "the Friess Lake School District is not required to provide 
transportation to students attending St. Augustine School, Inc." 
¶13 The Superintendent's written decision reflects that he 
examined all of the parties' filings, St. Augustine's website, 
and the law in reaching his decision.  He commented specifically 
on the school's bylaws and determined that nothing in that 
document "even hints that the School is a private religious 
school or a private, religious non-denominational school."  The 
Superintendent also made specific comments on an amendment to 
St. Augustine's articles of incorporation changing its name from 
                     
4 Then-Superintendent Evers has since been elected Governor, 
and has been replaced as a party to this case by the current 
Superintendent, Carolyn Stanford Taylor. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
7 
 
Neosho Country Christian School Inc. to its current moniker.  As 
with the bylaws, the Superintendent concluded that "there is 
nothing in the School's name change amendment to its Articles of 
Incorporation that reveals anything about the School's nature, 
i.e., religious or non-religious, or its affiliation with a 
religious denomination."5 
¶14 Finding these sources unhelpful in determining St. 
Augustine's "affiliation with a religious denomination" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 121.51, the Superintendent looked to 
St. Augustine's publicly available website.  Such a procedure 
was 
permissible, 
in 
the 
Superintendent's 
view, 
because 
"[r]eviewing a public website that is created and maintained by 
or on behalf of the School, and accepting the School's 
description of itself as set forth in that website, does not 
create an excessive entanglement of state authority in religious 
affairs."  The Superintendent supported such a determination 
with the premise that "a public website, by its very nature, 
invites, and even wants persons to review it." 
                     
5 In previous proceedings, disputes arose as to whether St. 
Augustine submitted the original articles of incorporation to 
either the School District or the Superintendent and whether the 
Superintendent actually considered St. Augustine's original 
articles of incorporation.  The Seventh Circuit determined that 
"plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of producing 
evidence to support their assertion that the defendants looked 
at the document.  Without any evidence that they did so, a 
secondary dispute over whether St. Augustine submitted the 
original articles of incorporation to the state is immaterial."  
St. Augustine Sch. v. Evers (St. Augustine II), 906 F.3d 591, 
595-96 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).   
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
8 
 
¶15 Relying on statements on St. Augustine's website, the 
Superintendent 
agreed 
with 
the 
School 
District 
that 
St. 
Augustine is affiliated with the Roman Catholic denomination.  
He cited in his decision "two of a number of statements in the 
website pages from which any reasonable person would conclude 
the School is a religious school affiliated with the Roman 
Catholic denomination."  The first of these statements sets 
forth that St. Augustine is "an independent and private 
traditional 
Roman 
Catholic 
School . . . [that 
is] 
an 
incorporation of dedicated families, who believing that all good 
things are of God, have joined together to provide the children 
of 
our 
Catholic 
community 
with 
an 
exceptional 
classical 
education." 
 
Additionally, 
the 
website 
provides: 
 
"[St. 
Augustine] loves and praises all the traditional practices of 
the Catholic faith." 
¶16 St. Augustine responded to the adverse determination 
by filing suit in Washington County circuit court against the 
Superintendent and the School District, asserting a claim 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that its rights under Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment were violated, 
as well as a claim that the Superintendent and School District 
contravened Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  The Superintendent and 
School District removed the case to federal court. 
¶17 After the parties filed competing summary judgment 
motions, the District Court granted the Superintendent and the 
School District's motion with respect to the federal claims.  
St. Augustine Sch. v. Evers (St. Augustine I), 276 F. Supp. 3d 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
9 
 
890 (E.D. Wis. 2017).  As relevant to the certified question, 
the District Court determined that the Superintendent and the 
School District did not engage in an excessive entanglement with 
religion in reaching their conclusion that St. Augustine is 
affiliated with the Catholic denomination.  Id. at 902.  It 
concluded that "because St. Augustine was obviously a religious 
school and did not submit any articles of incorporation or 
bylaws that identified or disclaimed its affiliation with a 
religious denomination," the Superintendent permissibly looked 
elsewhere to surmise what St. Augustine purported to be.  Id. 
The defendants then turned to the statement on St. 
Augustine's website describing it as a "Roman Catholic 
School," and they accepted this statement at face 
value and concluded that St. Augustine was affiliated 
with the Roman Catholic denomination.  These actions 
did not involve any participation in, supervision of, 
or intrusive inquiry into religious affairs. 
Id. 
¶18 St. Augustine appealed, and the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's decision over Judge Ripple's 
dissent.  St. Augustine Sch. v. Evers (St. Augustine II), 906 
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2018).  The Seventh Circuit majority saw no 
free exercise problem with the Superintendent and School 
District's application of Wis. Stat. § 121.51, determining that 
"[t]he reason why St. Augustine cannot demand services within 
its desired attendance zone is not because it is a Catholic 
school; it is because——by its own choice——it professes to be 
affiliated with a group that already has a school in that zone."  
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
10 
 
Id. at 597.  "The problem for St. Augustine is not that it is 
Catholic; it is that it is second in line."  Id. 
¶19 The Seventh Circuit further determined that there was 
no entanglement problem.  "[T]he school district and state 
superintendent did not consider St. Augustine's theology or its 
religious practices."  Id. at 598.  Instead, in the Seventh 
Circuit's view, "[t]aking a party's repeated chosen label at 
face value hardly constitutes a deep-dive into the nuances of 
religious affiliation."  Id. at 599. 
¶20 In contrast, Judge Ripple dissented, concluding that 
the Superintendent failed to follow precedent when he went 
beyond St. Augustine's articles of incorporation and bylaws to 
make the determination at issue.  Id. at 603 (Ripple, J., 
dissenting).  In Judge Ripple's view, "[r]ather than grounding 
his decision in the articles of incorporation and by-laws as he 
was required to do under state law, [the Superintendent] decided 
to undertake an independent investigation and rested his 
decision on statements he found on St. Augustine's website."  
Id.   
¶21 Judge 
Ripple 
further 
criticized 
the 
majority's 
approach for taking the term "Catholic" out of context.  Id. at 
604.  He cautioned:  "the court's selective use of the term 
'Catholic' rests on the assumption that, for purposes of our 
Free Exercise analysis, a single term, even when culled from its 
context, can describe accurately the religious values and 
aspirations of an individual or a group of individuals."  Id. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
11 
 
¶22 St. Augustine petitioned for certiorari with the 
United States Supreme Court.  The Court granted certiorari but 
did not issue a full opinion.  Instead, it simply vacated the 
judgment and remanded to the Seventh Circuit for consideration 
in light of its recent decision in Espinoza v. Montana 
Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).6  St. 
Augustine Sch. v. Taylor (St. Augustine III), 141 S. Ct. 186 
(2020).  After remand, the Seventh Circuit certified to this 
court the question now before us. 
II 
¶23 The certified question asks us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law we 
review independently.  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 
Inc., 2018 WI 60, ¶23, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631.  We are 
not bound by the interpretations of the federal courts, but they 
may aid in our analysis.  See id. (citation omitted).   
¶24 Our 
review 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
informed 
by 
the 
Constitution and precedent.  The application of constitutional 
                     
6 In Espinoza, the Court addressed a Montana program that 
provides tuition assistance to parents who send their children 
to private schools.  Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 
U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).  When the petitioners 
sought to use the program for scholarships at religious schools, 
the Montana supreme court struck down the program on the basis 
of a "no-aid" provision in the Montana Constitution, which 
prohibits any aid to a school controlled by a "church, sect, or 
denomination."  Id.  The Court determined that the no-aid 
provision violates the Free Exercise clause, writing that "[a] 
State need not subsidize private education.  But once a State 
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools 
solely because they are religious."  Id. at 2261. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
12 
 
principles likewise presents a question of law.  State v. 
Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶12, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.   
III 
¶25 We begin by setting the foundation for our analysis, 
detailing the history of this court's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 121.51.  With that necessary history and context in 
hand, we then turn to examine the certified question. 
A 
¶26 In 
1967, 
the 
people 
of 
Wisconsin 
adopted 
a 
constitutional provision setting forth:  "Nothing in this 
constitution shall prohibit the legislature from providing for 
the safety and welfare of children by providing for the 
transportation of children to and from any parochial or private 
school or institution of learning."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 23.  
Several provisions in ch. 121 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
operationalize this guarantee. 
¶27 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 121.54(2)(b) 
sets 
forth 
the 
conditions under which a student attending a private school can 
receive publicly funded transportation.  It provides:   
Except as provided in sub. (1) or otherwise provided 
in this subsection, the school board of each district 
operating 
high 
school 
grades 
shall 
provide 
transportation to and from the school a pupil attends 
for each pupil residing in the school district who 
attends any elementary grade, including kindergarten, 
or high school grade at a private school located 2 
miles or more from the pupil's residence, if such 
private school is a school within whose attendance 
area the pupil resides and is situated within the 
school district or not more than 5 miles beyond the 
boundaries of the school district measured along the 
usually traveled route. 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
13 
 
§ 121.54(2)(b)1. 
¶28 "Attendance area" is a defined term that sits at the 
center of the instant case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51(1) defines 
"attendance area" as follows: 
[T]he geographic area designated by the governing body 
of a private school as the area from which its pupils 
attend and approved by the school board of the 
district in which the private school is located.  If 
the private school and the school board cannot agree 
on the attendance area, the state superintendent 
shall, upon the request of the private school and the 
board, make a final determination of the attendance 
area.  The attendance areas of private schools 
affiliated with the same religious denomination shall 
not overlap unless one school limits its enrollment to 
pupils of the same sex and the other school limits its 
enrollment to pupils of the opposite sex or admits 
pupils of both sexes. 
¶29 The natural question that arises from the definition 
of "attendance area" is what it means for private schools to be 
"affiliated with the same religious denomination."  After all, 
assuming that schools are co-educational and not single-sex, 
only one school of each "religious denomination" may receive the 
transportation benefit in a single attendance area. 
¶30 This court first addressed this language in 1971 in 
State ex rel. Vanko v. Kahl, 52 Wis. 2d 206, 188 N.W.2d 460 
(1971).  In Vanko, the court addressed a constitutional 
challenge to the attendance area statute.   
¶31 The 
court 
acknowledged 
that 
there 
would 
be 
a 
constitutional problem if the statute were interpreted to 
include "a restriction placed upon children attending religious 
schools and not placed upon those attending private, secular 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
14 
 
schools."  Id. at 214.  This problem would arise because 
"[r]eligious affiliation would be the sole basis of the 
classification."  Id.  Accordingly, the court engaged in a 
saving construction to avoid the constitutional infirmity, 
interpreting the statute to apply to both religious and non-
religious schools:  "We read the statute as not authorizing or 
permitting overlapping in attendance area boundary lines as to 
all 
private 
schools 
affiliated 
or 
operated 
by 
a 
single 
sponsoring group, whether such school operating agency or 
corporation is secular or religious."  Id. at 215. 
¶32 Building on its decision in Vanko, the court seven 
years later decided Holy Trinity Community School, Inc. v. Kahl, 
82 Wis. 2d 139, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978).  In Holy Trinity, the 
plaintiff school was previously a Catholic school affiliated 
with the Archdiocese.  It responded to the Vanko decision by 
reorganizing as a "community school" with no legal ties to the 
Roman Catholic Church or any other religious organization.  Id. 
at 146.  However, the new community school took over all the 
employment contracts of the old Catholic school, accepted all 
students who attended the school's previous iteration, and 
utilized the same building as the old Catholic school, owned by 
the Holy Trinity Congregation, which leased the building to the 
community school for one dollar annually.  Id.   
¶33 The community school no longer required Catholic 
instruction, but instead instituted a release time for religious 
programming of the students' parents' choice.  Id. at 146-47.  
However, in practice only the Catholic religion was taught 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
15 
 
during the release time.  Id. at 147.  Based on these facts, the 
Superintendent found that Holy Trinity Community School was 
affiliated with the Catholic denomination, even though it was 
not controlled by the Archdiocese or the Roman Catholic Church.  
Id. 
¶34 Pinpointing a constitutional infirmity in the manner 
the Superintendent went about making his determination, the Holy 
Trinity court concluded:  
[W]here a religious school demonstrates by a corporate 
charter and bylaws that it is independent of, and 
unaffiliated with, a religious denomination, that in 
the absence of fraud or collusion the inquiry stops 
there.  To make the further inquiry, as attempted by 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, is to 
involve the state in religious affairs and to make it 
the adjudicator of faith.   
Id. at 157-58.   
¶35 The court explained that the "continuing surveillance 
of [the] school to determine whether its practices comport with 
those of the Catholic Church" causes an excessive entanglement 
of the government in purely religious matters.  Id. at 150.  It 
is not for the government to decide "who or what is Catholic," 
and accordingly the inquiry undertaken by the Superintendent in 
Holy Trinity was deemed unconstitutional.  Id.  The court 
continued, discussing the sources of information at play under 
the facts of Holy Trinity: 
For this court or for the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction to determine, in the light of the prima 
facie showing of the articles of incorporation to the 
contrary, that this school corporation is or is not 
affiliated with the Catholic denomination is to meddle 
into what is forbidden by the Constitution the 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
16 
 
determination of matters of faith and religious 
allegiance. 
Id.  Thus, it concluded that "[w]e are obliged to accept the 
professions of the school and to accord them validity without 
further inquiry."  Id. at 155. 
¶36 At the time we granted the certification in this case, 
we asked the parties to address a question in addition to that 
certified by the Seventh Circuit: 
The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
of 
the 
First 
Amendment 
may 
bear 
upon 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
121.51 
and 
its 
inclusion of "private schools affiliated with the same 
religious denomination."  In meeting the query of the 
certified question, should we revisit this court's 
decisions 
in 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Vanko 
v. 
Kahl, 
52 
Wis. 2d 206, 188 N.W.2d 210 (1971) and Holy Trinity 
Community School, Inc. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 262 
N.W.2d 210 (1978) . . . . 
¶37 In briefing, no party asked us to overrule either 
Vanko or Holy Trinity, and in fact St. Augustine, the 
Superintendent, and the School District all affirmatively stated 
that we need not and should not overrule or revisit the holdings 
of those cases.  When pressed at oral argument, the discussion 
focused on Vanko, and both parties reiterated their positions 
that we not upset that case.7  Accordingly, we decline to 
                     
7 At oral argument, St. Augustine's counsel stated:  "Here 
today, no one is asking this court to overrule Vanko."  See 
State ex rel. Vanko v. Kahl, 52 Wis. 2d 206, 188 N.W.2d 460 
(1971).  Later, the same counsel suggested that Vanko's status 
of remaining unchallenged for over 50 years is some indication 
that its statutory interpretation has been workable and relied 
upon for decades: 
(continued) 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
17 
 
overrule or revisit either case on our own initiative.  See 
Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (explaining that "[w]e do not step out 
of our neutral role to develop or construct arguments for 
parties; it is up to them to make their case"). 
B 
¶38 With this foundation in hand, we turn now to address 
the certified question. 
¶39 The Seventh Circuit's certification order puts a fine 
point on the issue before us and assists in focusing on the 
distinct and narrow question.  After summarizing the lengthy 
history of this litigation, the Seventh Circuit relates that 
"[a]t this juncture . . . the issue has boiled down to one 
dispositive question of state law:  what methodology for 
determining affiliation is required under the relevant Wisconsin 
statutes?"  St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor (St. Augustine IV), No. 
17-2333 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (order certifying question to 
Wisconsin Supreme Court) at 2.   
                                                                  
[This court] could certainly come to the conclusion 
that Vanko is a 50-year-old decision and the fact that 
we haven't been before the court for 50 years and are 
here only because the [Superintendent] did something 
so extraordinary that it resulted in a grant of cert 
and a [vacating of the Seventh Circuit's decision] is 
some indication that [the statute] is workable given 
the reliance that schools and families have had on the 
statutory interpretation that sticking to precedent 
might be the best thing to do. 
Counsel for the Superintendent similarly argued that "the 
court got it right in Vanko." 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
18 
 
¶40 Prior to proceeding with our analysis, we offer an 
observation regarding what is before us and what is not.  The 
Seventh Circuit has certified to us a pure question of law 
pertaining only to the sources of information the Superintendent 
may consider in determining whether two schools are "affiliated 
with the same religious denomination" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1).  In essence, it is an inquiry of methodology. 
¶41 We do not apply our determination to the facts of this 
case.  That is, we do not determine whether St. Augustine is 
affiliated with the same religious denomination as St. Gabriel.  
That is a question for the federal court on remand.  With this 
clarification, we proceed to our analysis. 
¶42 Both the Constitution and our precedent interpreting 
the statute provide relevant guardrails around the world of 
information a Superintendent may consider.  The Constitution 
prohibits the excessive entanglement of the state in religious 
matters. 
 
L.L.N. 
v. 
Clauder, 
209 
Wis. 2d 674, 
686, 
563 
N.W.2d 434 
(1997). 
 
Such 
a 
proposition, 
known 
as 
the 
entanglement doctrine, springs from the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.8  Id.  
¶43 Excessive entanglement occurs "if a court is required 
to interpret church law, policies, or practices."  Id. at 687.  
                     
8 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides:  
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  It is applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  L.L.N. v. Clauder, 
209 Wis. 2d 674, 686, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997). 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
19 
 
Thus, the First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry.  Id.  On 
the other hand, it is well-settled that "a court may hear an 
action 
if 
it 
will 
involve 
the 
consideration 
of 
neutral 
principles of law."  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶44 The certified question requires us to determine 
whether 
the 
consideration 
of 
certain 
matters 
in 
the 
determination of whether two schools are "affiliated with the 
same religious denomination" would rely on an unconstitutional 
religious inquiry and thus cause an impermissible excessive 
entanglement, or whether such consideration would merely involve 
the application of neutral principles of law.  We are asked to 
address specifically a school's self-identification as set forth 
on its publicly available website or in its filings with the 
state. 
¶45 St. Augustine argues that the manner in which the 
Superintendent considered such information impermissibly places 
the Superintendent in the position to decide "what is Catholic" 
and thus constitutes an excessive entanglement with religion.  
In contrast, the Superintendent and the School District advance 
that simply accepting St. Augustine's self-identification does 
not require any investigation at all or any determination of 
whether St. Augustine is Catholic——they are simply taking St. 
Augustine at its word. 
¶46 Because we refrain from developing arguments not 
advanced by either party and determine that our precedent should 
be maintained rather than overruled, our inquiry is framed by 
Vanko and Holy Trinity.  Vanko established that "affiliated with 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
20 
 
the same religious denomination" is "the test of affiliation in 
a single school system rather than operation by a single agency 
or set of trustees or religious order within a particular 
religious denomination."  Vanko, 52 Wis. 2d at 215.  It further 
establishes that the statute applies to both religious and 
secular schools "affiliated or operated by a single sponsoring 
group."  Id. 
¶47 Holy Trinity is particularly apt in guiding our 
approach to the certified question.  There, the court engaged in 
a similar exercise of line-drawing to that which we undertake in 
the instant case.  The line the Holy Trinity court drew between 
the 
constitutional 
and 
the 
unconstitutional 
was 
at 
the 
investigation 
and 
surveillance 
of 
a 
school's 
religious 
practices.  Holy Trinity, 82 Wis. 2d at 150.  With regard to 
statements made by a school, the court set forth:  "We are 
obliged to accept the professions of the school and to accord 
them validity without further inquiry."  Id. at 155. 
¶48 Just 
as 
in 
Holy 
Trinity, 
accepting 
a 
school's 
professions that are published on its public website or set 
forth in filings with the state does not necessarily require any 
investigation or surveillance into the practices of the school.  
It need not require any religious inquiry at all.   
¶49 As long as the Superintendent considers the school's 
professions and not its practices, the Superintendent remains on 
the correct side of the line.  In other words, a superintendent 
attempting to determine that a school is affiliated with a 
specific religious denomination may rely on any evidence of 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
21 
 
affiliation between the school and a denomination that does not 
violate the First Amendment and that does not inquire into the 
religious beliefs of the school or the denomination. 
¶50 The wording of the certified question implies that 
corporate documents represent neutral criteria while a school's 
self-identification in sources such as its website and filings 
with the state does not.  But this appears to be a false 
dichotomy.  Indeed, simply accepting a school's profession of 
what it claims to be or with whom it is affiliated constitutes a 
neutral undertaking, as does the acceptance of a school's 
professions of affiliation in documents filed with the state.  
Here St. Augustine professes that while it is Roman Catholic, it 
is independent of and unaffiliated with the Archdiocese.  
Neither accepting corporate documents nor accepting a school's 
professions necessarily requires any investigation of the type 
prohibited by Holy Trinity or even any religious inquiry 
whatsoever.  
¶51 Our conclusion is further supported with a look to a 
related 
statute. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 187.01(7) 
addresses 
amendments to the articles of incorporation of a religious 
society.  It provides in relevant part:   
Such 
corporation 
may 
amend 
its 
articles 
of 
organization or constitution at a regular meeting of 
said corporation by the majority vote of the members 
present so that such corporation has the right to 
merge with and transfer all of its real estate and 
personal property to another corporation of the same 
religious denomination.   
§ 187.01(7) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
22 
 
¶52 An important principle can be gleaned from this 
statutory text.  The phrasing "another corporation of the same 
religious denomination" indicates that "religious denomination" 
is a broader category than "corporation."  In other words, there 
can be multiple corporations that fit under the umbrella of a 
single religious denomination.  If the legislature wanted to 
limit the Superintendent's consideration to corporate documents 
in an inquiry of whether the schools are affiliated with the 
same corporate body, it would not have used the broader term 
"religious denomination" in Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  Indeed, a 
single corporate charter may not fully answer whether a school 
is affiliated with a religious denomination. 
¶53 Vanko also supports such a premise.  To explain, Vanko 
highlighted 
that 
"affiliated 
with 
the 
same 
religious 
denomination" is the test to be used within a school system 
"rather than operation by a single agency or set of trustees or 
religious order within a particular religious denomination."  
Vanko, 52 Wis. 2d at 215 (emphasis added).  Thus, Vanko 
explicitly disclaimed an assertion that "operation by a single 
agency" is a necessary condition to establish that two schools 
are of the same religious denomination.  To limit the inquiry to 
exclusively corporate documents would elevate this assertion 
that the Vanko court rejected. 
¶54 However, it is important to keep in mind an additional 
principle arising from Vanko——the focus on a "single sponsoring 
group."  Id. at 215.  Although the Superintendent is not limited 
to corporate documents exclusively, corporate documents may 
No. 
2021AP265-CQ   
 
23 
 
often be determinative.  Indeed, as Holy Trinity explains, 
"where a religious school demonstrates by a corporate charter 
and bylaws that it is independent of, and unaffiliated with, a 
religious denomination, that in the absence of fraud or 
collusion the inquiry stops there."  Holy Trinity, 82 Wis. 2d at 
157-58.  But where corporate documents alone do not resolve the 
inquiry, the Superintendent is permitted to consider other 
neutral sources of information. 
¶55 We 
thus 
conclude 
this 
methodological 
inquiry, 
determining that in examining whether schools are "affiliated 
with the same religious denomination" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
121.51, the Superintendent is not limited to consideration of a 
school's corporate documents exclusively.  In conducting a 
neutral and secular inquiry, the Superintendent may also 
consider the professions of the school with regard to the 
school's 
self-identification 
and 
affiliation, 
but 
the 
Superintendent may not conduct any investigation or surveillance 
with respect to the school's religious beliefs, practices, or 
teachings. 
¶56 Accordingly, we answer the certified question and 
remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit for further proceedings. 
By 
the 
Court.—Certified 
question 
answered 
and 
cause 
remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit.  
 
 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.  (concurring).  The 
question before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is whether 
St. 
Augustine 
is 
"affiliated 
with 
the 
same 
religious 
denomination" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) as is 
St. Gabriel, a Catholic school, whom all agree is "affiliated 
with" the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  The answer to this question 
turns on the meaning of "affiliated with."  There is no need to 
become involved in a factual examination of the religious 
teachings of the private schools that are being compared or the 
religious teachings of the organization with which they are 
claimed to be affiliated.  
¶58 Rather, I agree with Justice Hagedorn that to be 
"affiliated with" in a way that will result in overlapping 
attendance areas of St. Augustine's and St. Gabriel's schools 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) 
requires 
a 
"mutual 
organizational relationship" between St. Augustine and the 
religious denomination with which St. Gabriel is affiliated.1  
That is, St. Augustine and the religious denomination, here the 
Archdioceses of Milwaukee, must mutually agree to be affiliated 
with one another.  Because the majority opinion overlooks the 
dispositive legal issue of mutuality in the phrase "affiliated 
with" from § 121.51(1), and instead focuses on a variety of 
factual inquiries that will not assist the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals move forward in its decisional process, I do not join 
the majority opinion, but respectfully concur.   
                     
1 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶¶71, 85.   
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶59 The 
historic 
background 
underlying 
the 
certified 
question from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is ably set 
out in the majority opinion and in the concurrence of Justice 
Hagedorn.2  The certification invited us "to re-formulate" the 
certified question, indicating that the Seventh Circuit realized 
there may be more that would underlie compliance with their 
request than might be apparent in the words chosen for the 
certified question.3  In response, we asked the parties to 
address First Amendment concerns that may bear on our assisting 
the Seventh Circuit in addition to the certified question.  
However, no party did so.4    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶60 The dispositive issue in this case is the meaning of 
"affiliated with," as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1).  Statutory interpretation presents a question of 
law that we decide independently.  State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 
72, ¶12, 363 Wis. 2d 857, 867 N.W.2d 400.   
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶61 Our interpretation of the meaning of the phrase, 
"affiliated with" in Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1), begins with the 
                     
2 Majority op., ¶¶7-11; Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, 
¶¶76-84.  
3 St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor (St. Augustine IV), No. 17-
2333, 6 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021).   
4 Majority op., ¶¶37, 38.   
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
3 
 
words chosen by the legislature.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 
75, ¶17, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. Context also is 
important when determining the plain meaning of a statute.  
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51(1) provides in relevant part:   
The attendance areas of private schools affiliated 
with the same religious denomination shall not overlap 
unless one school limits its enrollment to pupils of 
the 
same 
sex 
and 
the 
other 
school 
limits 
its 
enrollment to pupils of the opposite sex or admits 
pupils of both sexes.   
(Emphasis added).  Affiliated is not a defined term; therefore, 
we employ its "common, ordinary and accepted meaning."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  
¶63 We often determine common meanings by consulting a 
dictionary.  Guarnero, 363 Wis. 2d 857, ¶16.  When I do so here, 
I note that an "Affiliate [is] an organization that is connected 
with or controlled by another, usually larger, organization.  
[For example] Our college is an affiliate of the university."  
Affiliate, 
Cambridge 
Dictionary, 
dictionary.cambridge.org, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/affiliate?q=
Affiliate (last visited June 21, 2021).  To be "affiliated with" 
requires a mutuality of connection between the "affiliate" and 
the entity with which there is an affiliation.  That is, to be 
affiliated 
with 
is 
"to 
be 
officially 
connected 
with 
or 
controlled by another."  Id.  From a common meaning perspective, 
one cannot be affiliated with another organization if there is 
no mutual connection between the two organizations.     
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶64 "Affiliated with" is a phrase used in decisions that 
occur in other contexts, sometimes frequently.  For example, 
cases involving union activities or union employees may arise 
when there is a question about whether workers on a particular 
job are affiliated with a particular union, e.g., with the AFL-
CIO, such that picketing can or cannot occur.  Upper Lakes 
Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of Canada, 18 Wis. 2d 
646, 659, 119 N.W.2d 426 (1963).  Workers join a union and the 
union accepts their membership when it appears to be to their 
mutual benefit to do so.  Id.   
¶65 In 
Cape 
v. 
Plymouth 
Congregational 
Church, 
130 
Wis. 174, 109 N.W. 928 (1906), we discussed criteria that were 
considered in determining whether a congregation had withdrawn 
from affiliation with the Primitive Methodist denomination when 
the congregation chose to become a Congregational denomination.  
Id. at 179.  We explained that to be a member of a synodical 
organization, "at least two things are essential:  A profession 
of the accepted faith and a submission to its government."  Id. 
at 181.  We reasoned that because the deed of trust for the land 
on which the church building stood said that the church property 
was to be used by a Methodist denomination, the Primitive 
Methodist congregation could not be excluded from use of the 
church facility.  Id. at 186.  Again, there was a mutuality in 
the affiliation between the Primitive Methodist denomination and 
Cape et al that was not present with a Congregational 
denomination that challenged the Primitive Methodist's right to 
use the church building.    
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶66 As Justice Hagedorn notes, the phrase, "affiliated 
with," has been used in several statutes.5  One such statute 
deals 
with 
cemeteries 
and 
religious 
societies 
that 
are 
affiliated with cemeteries.  Wisconsin Stat. § 157.63(6) creates 
potential liability for damages for a religious society with 
whom a cemetery is affiliated when the cemetery or cemetery 
authority 
fails 
to 
comply 
with 
statutory 
requirements.  
Section 157.63(6) provides:   
The religious society that is affiliated with a 
cemetery to which a certification under this section 
applies is liable for the damages of any person that 
result from the failure of the cemetery or cemetery 
authority to fully comply wit s. 157.11(9g) or 
157.12(3) 
during 
the 
reporting 
period 
under 
s. 157.62(2) for which such compliance has been 
certified under this section. 
The obligations that arise by virtue of § 157.63(6) imply that a 
religious society could not be affiliated with a cemetery absent 
mutual agreement to affiliate because such an affiliation comes 
with obligations that the religious society must meet if the 
cemetery does not comply with statutory requirements.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶67 In sum, my review shows that the common dictionary 
definition of "affiliate," the way in which we have interpreted 
"affiliation" in matters relating to unions, our interpretation 
of "affiliate" in other legal contexts and our interpretation of 
"affiliated with" in other statutes have been consistent with 
one another.  All require express or implied mutual agreement to 
                     
5 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶¶96, 97.   
No.  2021AP265-CQ.pdr 
 
6 
 
connection between the persons and entities that are affiliated.  
Therefore, in regard to the case before us, I conclude that 
"affiliated with" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) requires a 
mutual organizational relationship between St. Augustine and the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the religious denomination with which 
St. Gabriel is affiliated.  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals should consider those facts presented to it 
that bear on whether St. Augustine and the Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee have mutually agreed that their organizations are 
affiliated with each other.   
¶68 Because the majority opinion does not address the 
dispositive legal issue presented by this controversy, I 
respectfully concur.   
 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
1 
 
¶69 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals poses a methodological question to this 
court:  what evidence may be considered when determining whether 
private 
schools 
are 
"affiliated 
with 
the 
same 
religious 
denomination" under Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) (2019-20)?1  The 
parties agree the answer includes both the self-representations 
of a school as well as corporate documents.  In a narrow 
opinion, the majority reiterates this conclusion, which I agree 
with and join.  However, this answer may not be of much 
assistance 
to 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
without 
the 
requisite 
statutory analysis explaining what this information may be used 
for under the law.  Therefore, I write separately to examine 
what a "religious denomination" is under the statute and what it 
means for a school and a religious denomination to be 
"affiliated with" one another. 
¶70 In short, to obtain public transportation aid for its 
students, a private school in Wisconsin must draw an attendance 
area defining the region from which the public school district 
must 
transport 
its 
students. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 121.51(1); 
121.54(2)(b)1.  And the "attendance areas of private schools 
affiliated with the same religious denomination shall not 
overlap."  § 121.51(1).  As the subsequent analysis will show, a 
religious denomination under the law is not the same thing as a 
religious 
faith; 
rather, 
statutory 
context 
reveals 
that 
"religious denomination" is a kind of religious organization.  A 
                     
1 All subsequent reference to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
2 
 
school——itself an organizational entity——must be "affiliated 
with" this type of religious organization.  And "affiliated 
with" 
in 
this 
context 
involves 
a 
mutual 
organizational 
relationship.  Both the private school and the religious 
denomination must agree to be affiliated with each other.  This 
statutory inquiry is organizational, not theological. 
¶71 Therefore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) 
prohibits 
overlapping attendance areas only when multiple schools have a 
mutual organizational relationship with a single religious 
denomination.  In answer to the Seventh Circuit's certified 
question, a school's general description of its religious 
beliefs is unlikely to constitute relevant evidence because a 
statement of faith, even shared faith, does not demonstrate a 
mutual 
organizational 
relationship 
with 
a 
religious 
denomination.  Affiliation requires more than a shared faith.  
On the other hand, a school's statement on its website or 
elsewhere that it is or is not affiliated with a religious 
denomination is relevant evidence of a mutual organizational 
relationship.  Likewise, corporate documents, by-laws, and other 
types 
of 
organizational 
documents 
can 
also 
(oftentimes 
conclusively) demonstrate the presence or lack of a mutual 
organizational relationship between a school and a religious 
denomination. 
 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
3 
 
I.  STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
¶72 Two statutory provisions work together to provide for 
and place limits on the availability of transportation aid for 
pupils attending private schools. 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.54(2)(b)1. provides: 
[T]he school board of each district operating high 
school grades shall provide transportation to and from 
the school a pupil attends for each pupil residing in 
the school district who attends any elementary grade, 
including kindergarten, or high school grade at a 
private school located 2 miles or more from the 
pupil's residence, if such private school is a school 
within whose attendance area the pupil resides and is 
situated within the school district or not more than 5 
miles beyond the boundaries of the school district 
measured along the usually traveled route. 
This 
subdivision 
directs 
school 
districts 
to 
provide 
transportation to K-12 students attending private schools if 
four conditions are satisfied:  (1) the student lives in the 
district; (2) the student lives at least two miles away from the 
private school; (3) the student lives within the private 
school's "attendance area"; and (4) the private school is 
located in or within five miles of the district's boundaries.2 
¶74 The third condition is further informed by the 
definition of "attendance area" in Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1): 
"Attendance area" is the geographic area designated by 
the governing body of a private school as the area 
from which its pupils attend and approved by the 
                     
2 A school district has several options to satisfy its 
obligation under Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b)1., including by 
providing transportation for a pupil directly or by compensating 
the pupil's parent or guardian for the pupil's transportation 
costs.  Wis. Stat. § 121.55(1). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
4 
 
school board of the district in which the private 
school is located.  If the private school and the 
school board cannot agree on the attendance area, the 
state superintendent shall, upon the request of the 
private 
school 
and 
the 
board, 
make 
a 
final 
determination of the attendance area.  The attendance 
areas of private schools affiliated with the same 
religious denomination shall not overlap unless one 
school limits its enrollment to pupils of the same sex 
and the other school limits its enrollment to pupils 
of the opposite sex or admits pupils of both sexes. 
(Emphasis added.)  The dispute in this case concerns the 
restriction on overlapping attendance areas for "private schools 
affiliated with the same religious denomination."3  Id.  Unless 
the statute's exception for sex-specific schools applies, 
schools affiliated with the same religious denomination must 
have mutually exclusive attendance areas. 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 121.51 and 121.54 have entitled 
students attending private schools to transportation aid for 
more than fifty years.  See generally §§ 33-40, ch. 313, Laws of 
1967.  How these statutes came to be informs their meaning, so 
we begin there.4 
 
                     
3 The dissent aptly characterizes this provision as the 
"overlapping attendance area" provision, a label employed in 
this concurrence as well.  See dissent, ¶110. 
4 "By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over 
the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at 
the meaning of a statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  An inquiry 
into statutory history is part and parcel of a plain meaning 
analysis.  
Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶30 n.12, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
5 
 
A.  Historical Context 
¶76 In 
1968, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.54(2)(b), directing school districts to provide students 
attending private schools transportation directly to their 
schools.5  § 40, ch. 313, Laws of 1967.  As initially enacted, 
§ 121.54(2)(b) did not prohibit overlapping attendance areas, or 
even use the phrase "attendance area."  Instead, in addition to 
the other three conditions still found in the statute, a 
district was obligated to provide transportation to a private 
school only "if such private school [was] the nearest available 
private school which the pupil may reasonably choose to attend."  
Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b)1.-2. (1967-68). 
¶77 This "may reasonably choose to attend" language proved 
problematic almost immediately, and in short order became the 
focus of litigation before this court.  See State ex rel. 
Knudsen v. Bd. of Educ., Elmbrook Schs., Joint Common Sch. Dist. 
                     
5 This was not the legislature's first attempt to provide 
public transportation aid to private school students.  In 1962, 
the legislature passed a law entitling students attending 
private schools to receive free school transportation.  Ch. 648, 
Laws of 1961.  We struck down this law before it went into 
effect for violating Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution "which prohibits the expenditure of any public 
funds 'for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or 
theological seminaries.'"  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 
Wis. 2d 148, 165-66, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962) (quoting Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 18).  In response to that decision, the people 
ratified Article I, Section 23 of the Wisconsin Constitution in 
April 1967, providing:  "Nothing in this constitution shall 
prohibit the legislature from providing for the safety and 
welfare of children by providing for the transportation of 
children to and from any parochial or private school or 
institutions of learning."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 23. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
6 
 
No. 21, 43 Wis. 2d 58, 168 N.W.2d 295 (1969).  The Knudsen case 
arose when a school district established "service areas" 
defining which of the four Catholic schools students from each 
geographic area of the district could reasonably choose to 
attend.  Id. at 62-63.  A parent in the district requested and 
was denied transportation for his daughter to attend a Catholic 
high school that did not correspond to his daughter's district-
assigned service area.  Id. at 63.  The parent sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel the district to provide transportation to his 
daughter's preferred Catholic school.  Id. at 64.  We held that 
the statute gave the pupil the choice of which school to attend, 
but added that deciding "whether that choice is reasonable is to 
be determined in the discretion of the school board."  Id. at 
65.  And the school board's exercise of its discretion required 
"a weighing of conflicting factors which may very well vary in 
accordance with the subjective needs of the student and the 
particular problems of the school district."  Id. at 66. 
¶78 Less 
than 
three 
months 
later, 
the 
legislature 
responded to our Knudsen decision by amending Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.54(2)(b) and creating Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  §§ 304c, 
304j, ch. 154, Laws of 1969.  The new law replaced the "may 
reasonably choose to attend" language with the "attendance area" 
provision and definition described above.  Id.  In adopting this 
change, the legislature retained the "service areas" concept, 
but assigned the task of drawing what it now termed "attendance 
areas" to the private schools themselves, subject to the 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
7 
 
overlapping attendance area provision and the school board's 
approval. 
¶79 In 
the 
decade 
following 
Knudsen 
and 
the 
1969 
amendment, we decided two cases that applied Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1)'s overlapping attendance area provision:  State ex 
rel. Vanko v. Kahl, 52 Wis. 2d 206, 188 N.W.2d 460 (1971), and 
Holy Trinity Comm. Sch., Inc. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 262 
N.W.2d 210 (1978). 
¶80 Vanko involved an original action petition, filed 
shortly after the 1969 amendment, seeking a declaration that 
Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1)'s restriction on overlapping "attendance 
areas of private schools affiliated with the same religious 
denomination" was unconstitutional.  Id. at 210.  In our 
decision, we acknowledged that the most natural reading of the 
provision likely rendered it unconstitutional because it imposed 
a restriction on private religious schools and not on private 
secular schools.  Id. at 213-14.  However, the Vanko court 
devised 
a 
construction 
of 
the 
statute 
to 
avoid 
the 
constitutional 
infirmity, 
reading 
"the 
statute 
as 
not 
authorizing 
or 
permitting 
overlapping 
in 
attendance 
area 
boundary lines as to all private schools affiliated or operated 
by a single sponsoring group, whether such school operating 
agency or corporation is secular or religious."  Id. at 215. 
¶81 Dissenting, Chief Justice Hallows objected that under 
the majority's reading, "the plain language 'the same religious 
denomination' 
now 
becomes 
a 
single 
operating 
group 
and 
'religious' is read out of the classification."  Id. at 218 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
8 
 
(Hallows, C.J., dissenting).  In so doing, the court gave "a 
construction to these statutes beyond the breaking point 
and . . . construed them to mean exactly the opposite of what 
the legislature plainly said and intended."6  Id. at 217 
(Hallows, C.J., dissenting). 
¶82 The 
second 
case 
to 
interpret 
the 
overlapping 
attendance 
area 
provision 
involved 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
superintendent's 
conclusion 
that 
a 
particular 
school 
was 
unaffiliated with the Roman Catholic denomination.  Holy 
Trinity, 82 Wis. 2d at 141.  Following our decision in Vanko, 
Holy Trinity School, which until then had been operated by a 
Roman Catholic congregation, dissolved itself, and a new school 
named Holy Trinity Community School incorporated.  Id. at 145-
46.  The newly incorporated school featured the same students, 
teachers, and buildings as the prior Holy Trinity School.  
Id. at 146.  But, as its corporate documents explained, Holy 
Trinity Community School was officially an independent school, 
                     
6 Chief Justice Hallows' critique, echoed by the dissent in 
today's 
decision, 
rings 
loudly. 
 
See 
dissent, 
¶¶112-16.  
However, even if Vanko was wrongly decided, none of the parties 
in this case ask us to revisit Vanko despite our invitation to 
address this question.  I do not disagree with the dissent's 
contention that it is improper in some circumstances to accept 
unchallenged precedent as an analytical starting point.  See 
dissent, ¶¶103-04.  But while I too would welcome an opportunity 
to revisit Vanko for many of the reasons well-stated in the 
dissent, we do not need to do so to answer the question the 
Seventh Circuit asked us.  Our answer to the certified question 
does not prevent a future reconsideration of this line of cases.  
We answer a narrow state law question to assist the Seventh 
Circuit in addressing the factual and constitutional questions 
properly addressed to their judgment, not ours. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
9 
 
having "no legal ties to the Roman Catholic church" and, 
according to its bylaws, having "no affiliation with any 
religious denomination."  Id. at 146.  The superintendent 
challenged Holy Trinity Community School's claim, "contend[ing] 
that the mere separation of the school, as a legal entity, from 
the Catholic Church, of which it was previously a part, is 
insufficient to show that it is no longer affiliated with that 
denomination."  Id. at 147-48. 
¶83 We unanimously rejected the superintendent's argument, 
explaining that the First Amendment forbade the superintendent 
from 
"determin[ing] 
the 
denominational 
allegiance 
of 
the 
institution" based on it's "inspection and surveillance of the 
school."  Id. at 149.  Rather, we accorded "facial validity to 
the charter and bylaws," and observed that the school "expressly 
disavow[ed] affiliation with any church denomination."  Id. at 
154.  "[T]o inquire further," we said, "impinges on the 
religious right of citizens to make their own declaration in 
respect to their religious affiliation."  Id.  The First 
Amendment obligated us "to accept the professions of the school 
and to accord them validity without further inquiry."7  Id. at 
155.  Holy Trinity Community School was therefore "a private 
school, 
independent 
of 
any 
religious 
denomination; 
and, 
                     
7 We noted just one exception, explaining that "courts 
reserve the right to look behind such decisions where there is 
evidence of fraud or collusion."  Holy Trinity Comm. Sch., Inc. 
v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 155, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978).  If fraud 
were "alleged and proved, we would look behind a representation 
which on its face purported to demonstrate a complete lack of 
denominational affiliation."  Id. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
10 
 
accordingly, as a matter of law it [was] entitled to a district-
wide attendance area."  Id. 
¶84 Neither Vanko nor Holy Trinity conducted a full 
statutory analysis of what the overlapping attendance area 
provision means when it says "private schools affiliated with 
the same religious denomination."8  See Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  
Vanko's statutory interpretation, such as it was, was limited to 
reading "same religious denomination" as functionally analogous 
to "single sponsoring group"; it said nothing about how 
affiliation occurs.  52 Wis. 2d at 215.  And Holy Trinity relied 
primarily on the Constitution to reverse the superintendent's 
decision.  82 Wis. 2d at 154-55.  It didn't say much about what 
a "religious denomination" is or what it means for a school to 
affiliate with one.  The majority in this case limits its 
analysis to the types of evidence that could be relevant to 
affiliation, similarly declining a thoroughgoing analysis of the 
words of the statute.  Majority op., ¶¶5, 40, 55.  In my view, 
the statutory language clarifies how a court should employ the 
methodology articulated in the majority opinion, and provides 
the necessary context for our answer to the Seventh Circuit's 
certified question. 
 
                     
8 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 121.51(1) 
and 
121.54(2)(b) 
have 
undergone slight revisions since Vanko and Holy Trinity, but no 
changes since then affect our interpretation of the overlapping 
attendance area provision. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
11 
 
B.  Analyzing the Text 
¶85 A proper interpretation of "affiliated with the same 
religious denomination" requires a deeper dive into the meaning 
of two phrases:  "religious denomination" and "affiliated with."  
Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1).  As we shall see, schools are 
"affiliated with the same religious denomination" when a mutual 
organizational relationship exists between the schools and the 
same religious denomination. 
 
1.  Religious Denomination 
¶86 "Religious denomination" is not a defined phrase in 
our statutes.  Nevertheless, related statutes reveal that when a 
statute says "religious denomination," it is not referring to a 
religious faith generally, but to a particular kind of religious 
organization.9 
¶87 Apart 
from 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1), 
the 
phrase 
"religious denomination" appears in more than a dozen statutory 
sections.  Many of these are in Chapter 187, titled "Religious 
Societies," 
which 
governs 
the 
state's 
relationship 
with 
religious organizations.  These sections describe how religious 
organizations meet, incorporate, govern themselves, and own or 
manage property.  See generally Wis. Stat. §§ 187.01-.09. 
                     
9 See State ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 2021 WI 32, ¶16 & n.9, 
396 Wis. 2d 391, 957 N.W.2d 208 (illustrating that technical 
terms and phrases in the statutes need not always be statutorily 
defined); see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) ("[T]echnical words 
and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law 
shall be construed according to such meaning."). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
12 
 
¶88 Wisconsin Stat. § 187.05 is especially noteworthy 
because it explains how organizations other than churches, 
including denominations, can take on a corporate form.  It 
explains that a "body of authorized representatives of any 
church or religious denomination . . . may elect any number of 
trustees, 
not 
less 
than 
three, 
to 
be 
incorporated."  
§ 187.05(1).  Then, it provides that "[a]ny denominational body 
mentioned in sub. (1) . . . at any stated meeting may vote to 
become a corporation and designate any of its members of adult 
age, not less than 10 in number, to make, acknowledge and file 
with the department of financial institutions a certificate" 
containing its pertinent corporate details.  § 187.05(3)(a).  
Next, the section explains that a denomination that has taken 
corporate form "shall have the power and privileges and exercise 
the rights and be subject to the obligations imposed upon 
corporations organized under general law."  § 187.05(3)(c).  And 
finally, a denomination may own property and reorganize itself 
if it so chooses.  § 187.05(3)(b), (d).  All of these 
demonstrate that a "religious denomination" is a type of 
religious organization, not a generic reference to people with a 
kindred faith. 
¶89 Further, Wis. Stat. § 187.08 provides that if a 
religious society belonging to a religious denomination in this 
state is dissolved, "the title to such real estate so owned by 
such defunct society shall be vested in such corporation of the 
same religious denomination next higher in authority in such 
denomination."  Beyond property acquisition, this section 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
13 
 
demonstrates 
that 
a 
religious 
denomination 
can 
have 
a 
relationship with other organizational entities, here religious 
societies, such that the denomination and religious societies 
form something resembling a corporate structure with parent and 
subsidiary corporations.  This type of structure reveals that a 
religious denomination under Wisconsin law is a kind of 
organization, not a reference to a group's religious faith. 
¶90 Statutes outside Chapter 187 paint the same picture.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 182.030, 
for 
example, 
explains 
that 
a 
corporation 
"connected 
with[] 
any 
church 
or 
religious 
denomination or society" may provide in its articles of 
organization "that it shall be under the supervision and control 
of such church, denomination, or society."  It is an organized 
body that would supervise and control a corporation.  Likewise, 
Wis. Stat. § 101.05(4)(b) provides a tax exemption for school 
buildings that are, among other things, "operated by and for 
members of a bona fide religious denomination."  This assumes 
religious denominations can operate a school——something an 
organization, and not a religious faith, is capable of. 
¶91 The 
statutes 
also 
use 
the 
phrase 
"religious 
denomination" when referring to entities that ordain or accredit 
individuals in certain fields.  Wisconsin Stat. § 765.16(1m)(a), 
for example, authorizes an "ordained member of the clergy of any 
religious denomination" to officiate a marriage.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 455.02(2m)(i) creates a psychology licensing exemption 
for "[a]n ordained member of the clergy of any religious 
denomination."  And Wis. Stat. § 979.01(1)(g), which outlines 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
14 
 
circumstances under which a death must be reported, references 
an 
"accredited 
practitioner 
of 
a 
bona 
fide 
religious 
denomination relying on prayer or spiritual means for healing."  
A religious faith cannot ordain or accredit individuals as these 
sections contemplate; instead, there must be an organization 
that carries out those functions. 
¶92 The statutory context paints a clear picture.  When 
the legislature uses the phrase "religious denomination," it is 
referring to an organizational entity.  To be sure, a religious 
denomination need not take a specific corporate form under 
Wisconsin 
law. 
 
As 
the 
majority 
observes, 
"'religious 
denomination' 
is 
a 
broader 
category 
than 
'corporation.'"  
Majority op., ¶52.  But every single use of the phrase in the 
Wisconsin statutes demonstrates that a "religious denomination" 
is an organizational entity, not a synonym for religious faith 
generally.  Thus, when Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) asks whether two 
schools are "affiliated with the same religious denomination," 
the question is not whether both schools share the same creed, 
but whether they are both affiliated with a particular kind of 
religious organization——a religious denomination.10 
                     
10 This 
organizational 
understanding 
of 
"religious 
denomination" is also consistent with Vanko's construction of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 121.51 and 121.54(2)(b).  Regardless of whether it 
was correct to do so, its decision to read "same religious 
denomination" synonymously with "single sponsoring group" is 
telling.  See State ex rel. Vanko v. Kahl, 52 Wis. 2d 206, 215, 
188 N.W.2d 460 (1971).  If "the same religious denomination" 
meant nothing more than a common religious faith, our use of the 
"single sponsoring group" terminology would be nonsensical.  A 
denomination that shares even an identical religious faith with 
an entirely independent private school is not a "single 
(continued) 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
15 
 
 
2.  Affiliated With 
¶93 Like "religious denomination," the phrase "affiliated 
with" is not expressly defined in the statutes.  But statutory 
context reveals that it contemplates a mutual relationship 
between two organizations.11 
¶94 As an initial matter, a proper characterization of 
"religious 
denomination" 
centers 
and 
circumscribes 
the 
permissible 
readings 
of 
"affiliated 
with" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1).  It is one thing for a school to self-declare their 
allegiance to a particular religious faith.  It is quite another 
to affiliate with a particular religious organization without 
that organization's agreement.  If a private school could 
unilaterally affiliate itself with a religious organization, it 
would deprive that organization of its liberty to decide with 
                                                                  
sponsoring group" for that school.  Religious faiths cannot 
sponsor schools, but religious organizations can.  The Vanko 
court explained that a "single sponsoring group" is a "school 
operating agency or corporation."  Id.  A religious faith is 
neither an agency nor a corporation; a religious denomination 
can take on corporate form. 
Although 
Holy 
Trinity 
focused 
primarily 
on 
the 
Constitution, 
it 
also 
agreed 
with 
the 
organizational 
understanding of "religious denomination."  Summarizing Vanko, 
the Holy Trinity court explained that "the effect of the statute 
was to prohibit overlapping attendance districts in respect 
to . . . religious schools affiliated or operated by a single 
sponsoring group or denomination."  82 Wis. 2d at 145. 
11 Because it is not a technically or specially defined 
phrase, we give "affiliated with" its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
16 
 
whom and with which organizations it chooses to associate.  On 
this basis alone, the most reasonable reading of "affiliated 
with" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) 
requires 
some 
mutual 
relationship between the private school and the religious 
denomination, whereby both agree to be affiliated. 
¶95 The history that prompted the enactment of the 
overlapping attendance area provision supports this reading.  
After the Knudsen decision gave districts discretion to decide 
which private school a student could "reasonably choose to 
attend," the legislature immediately amended the statute to 
shift that discretion to the private schools in the first 
instance, subject to districts' approval.  Supra, ¶10.  But the 
legislature nevertheless directed private schools with the same 
denominational affiliation to draw non-overlapping attendance 
areas.  The most reasonable inference from this statutory 
history is that by adding the overlapping attendance area 
provision, the legislature contemplated that the drawing of non-
overlapping 
attendance 
areas 
is 
something 
that 
could 
be 
facilitated by the religious denomination——or in the words of 
Vanko, a single sponsoring group.  It makes no sense to read the 
statute as asking separate organizations with no relationship 
(other than perhaps shared religious convictions) to draw 
limited attendance areas together.  "[A]ffiliated with" must 
contemplate a mutual relationship between two organizations that 
agree to associate with one another.12 
                     
12 Our opinion in Vanko understood this in its focus on the 
"single sponsoring group" terminology.  52 Wis. 2d at 215.  A 
(continued) 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
17 
 
¶96 Context from other statutes confirms this.  Most 
notably, Chapter 157, which regulates cemeteries, routinely 
contains separate provisions for cemeteries that are "affiliated 
with a religious association." 
 Wis. Stat. § 157.07(6) provides that certain platting 
requirements do "not apply to . . . a cemetery authority of 
a 
cemetery 
that 
is 
affiliated 
with 
a 
religious 
association." 
 Wis. Stat. § 157.08(5) governs conveyances of cemetery lots 
but partially exempts cemeteries that are "affiliated with 
a religious association" from its reach. 
 Wis. Stat. § 157.11(10) governs improvement and care of 
cemetery lots but partially exempts cemeteries that are 
"affiliated with a religious association." 
 Wis. Stat. § 157.63(6) holds a "religious society that is 
affiliated with a cemetery" liable for damages "that result 
from the failure of the cemetery" to comply with certain 
statutory requirements. 
 Wis. Stat. § 157.635 permits cemeteries "affiliated with a 
religious association" to limit who may be buried in a 
cemetery. 
 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 157.637 
forbids 
cemeteries, 
other 
than 
cemeteries "organized and operated by, or affiliated with, 
a religious association" from forbidding veteran burials. 
                                                                  
single group sponsoring a school necessarily describes a mutual 
tie between two organizations that choose to be connected. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
18 
 
It would turn the cemetery statutes on their head if any 
cemetery could self-affiliate with a religious association, 
especially 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 157.63(6)'s 
provision 
extending 
liability to the religious organization the cemetery chose to 
affiliate 
with. 
 
Quite 
clearly 
then, 
Chapter 
157 
uses 
"affiliated with" to contemplate a mutual relationship between 
cemeteries and religious associations. 
¶97 Similarly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 628.92(5)(b) 
requires 
navigators "not affiliated with an entity" to furnish a bond.  
Surely a navigator cannot avoid a bond requirement simply by 
self-affiliating with another entity.  Likewise, Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.99(3p) defines a "public museum" as "a nonprofit or 
publicly owned museum located in this state that is accredited 
by the American Association of Museums or an educational center 
that is affiliated with such a museum."  Could an educational 
center merely self-affiliate with an accredited museum to 
satisfy this definition?  Certainly not. 
¶98 So 
too 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1). 
 
When 
the 
overlapping attendance area provision says "affiliated with the 
same religious denomination," it means that there must be a 
mutual relationship that ties the private school and the 
religious denomination together.13  Both entities must choose to 
affiliate with each other; neither can unilaterally self-
                     
13 Adding additional research from our cases and reference 
to dictionary definitions, Justice Roggensack's concurrence 
agrees that a mutual organizational relationship is the most 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.  Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶61-67. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
19 
 
affiliate with the other.14  This statutory inquiry is not a 
question 
of 
theological 
symmetry, 
but 
of 
organizational 
connection. 
 
II.  THE CERTIFIED QUESTION 
¶99 With this statutory background, the answer to the 
Seventh Circuit's question comes into fuller view.  The Seventh 
Circuit asks whether the Superintendent must "rely exclusively 
on neutral criteria such as ownership, control, and articles of 
incorporation, or may the superintendent also take into account 
the school's self-identification in sources such as its website 
or filings with the state."  As the majority observes, however, 
depending on what is meant by a "school's self-identification," 
this question may present "a false dichotomy."  Majority op., 
¶50. 
¶100 The Superintendent certainly must rely "exclusively on 
neutral criteria" to demonstrate a school's affiliation with a 
religious 
denomination. 
 
The 
statute's 
aim 
is 
neutral 
(organizational connection).  And as we held in Holy Trinity, 
the Constitution provides further limits.  Although "ownership, 
                     
14 To the extent the majority opinion discusses "the 
professions of the school with regard to the school's self-
identification and affiliation," majority op., ¶¶5, 55, I 
understand it to be discussing the school's self-identification 
about its mutual affiliation with a religious denomination.  A 
school may not unilaterally self-affiliate with a denomination, 
but 
its 
statements 
professing 
to 
be 
affiliated 
with 
a 
denomination 
may 
be 
evidence 
of 
a 
mutual 
organizational 
relationship between it and the religious denomination it 
professes to be affiliated with. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.bh 
 
20 
 
control, and articles of incorporation" are examples of neutral 
criteria (and often may be determinative), other types of 
evidence might permissibly be considered.  For example, a 
school's profession on its website that it is an unaffiliated 
religious school would constitute evidence that the school 
shares no mutual organizational relationship with a religious 
denomination.15 
¶101 Therefore, in answer to the certified question, I join 
the majority's conclusion that statements of affiliation by a 
school on its website, in filings with the state, or otherwise, 
along with corporate documents, may be permissible sources of 
evidence regarding whether two schools are affiliated with a 
religious denomination.  This statutory inquiry, however, is 
organizational, not theological.  A religious denomination under 
the law is a kind of religious organization, not a religious 
creed.  And a school is affiliated with a religious denomination 
if there exists a mutual organizational relationship between the 
private school and the religious denomination.  With this 
understanding, I respectfully concur. 
                     
15 The parties in this case do not disagree on whether 
statements on a website may be relevant.  They do disagree on 
what kind of statements may be relevant and how they may be 
used. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶102 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  "[A] law 
repugnant to the constitution is void."  Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).  Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51(1) is 
repugnant to the Constitution and therefore void.  In answering 
the certified question, this court should say so.  Fifty years 
ago in State ex rel. Vanko v. Kahl, 52 Wis. 2d 206, 188 
N.W.2d 460 
(1971), 
this 
court 
overstepped 
its 
judicial 
boundaries and rewrote the statute in order to save it.  Vanko 
embodies an egregious example of legislating from the bench and 
should be overturned.  Instead, the majority answers the 
certified 
question 
in 
a 
manner 
which 
unconstitutionally 
entangles state authorities in the religious affairs of private 
schools.  It is of no import that none of the parties asked us 
to overrule Vanko in this dispute.  We ordered the parties to 
address whether Vanko should be revisited, and the question is 
squarely before us notwithstanding the parties' negligible 
treatment of the subject.  Litigants do not dictate the 
decisions of this court; the law does.  As proclaimed over 160 
years ago, "[w]e sit here to decide the law as we find it, and 
not as the parties or others may have supposed it to be."  Ross 
v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty. Supervisors, 12 Wis. 26, 44 (1860) 
(Dixon, C.J., dissenting). 
¶103 The Wisconsin Supreme Court serves a law-development 
function.  State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 
Wis. 2d  429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("[I]t is this court's 
function to develop and clarify the law.").  "In a legal system 
in which appellate opinions not only establish the meaning of 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
2 
 
law, but do so through precedent that binds future litigants, 
courts cannot cede to the parties control over legal analysis."  
Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 453 
(2009).  In this case, the majority does a great disservice to 
the people of Wisconsin by letting three parties control the law 
for an entire state. 
¶104 The logical implications of the majority's reasoning 
are concerning, if not absurd.  In future cases, will the court 
refuse to follow binding precedent if no party cites it? 
Presumably, "[n]o one would argue that a court is free to ignore 
a binding precedent simply because the parties fail to cite it."  
Id. at 494.  But if we cannot reconsider our own precedent 
because the parties didn't ask us to do so, the majority's 
reasoning would also preclude us from considering any case the 
parties didn't mention.  What if a case has been cited, perhaps 
even by both parties, but we disagree with their reading of it?  
Are we now obligated to read our own prior decisions through the 
lenses of partisan litigants? 
¶105 The majority's aberrantly restrictive vision of our 
role consigns the state's highest court to selecting winners and 
losers in litigation contests rather than declaring the law.  
However, "courts do not simply resolve disputes between parties; 
they are also responsible for making pronouncements of law that 
are binding on all who come after.  When the parties fail to 
raise relevant legal claims and arguments——whether by error or 
through conscious choice——judges must do so themselves to avoid 
issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law."  Id. at 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
3 
 
447.  Doing so does not abandon our neutral role; it embraces 
it, while serving as "an essential means of protecting the 
judiciary's role in the constitutional structure."  Id. at 452. 
¶106 Read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b), 
Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) precludes public school districts from 
providing transportation to students who attend a private school 
if the school district decides that the school is "affiliated 
with the same religious denomination" as another private school 
within the same geographic attendance area whose students 
already receive such transportation.  On its face, the statute 
imposes a restriction on the receipt of public benefits 
applicable 
only 
to 
religious 
schools. 
 
Recognizing 
the 
constitutional infirmities of this statutory scheme, the Vanko 
court impermissibly excised the phrase "religious denomination" 
from 
the 
statute 
by 
applying 
§ 121.51(1)'s 
overlapping-
attendance-area exclusion to religious and secular schools 
alike. 
¶107 Prioritizing the parties' collective preference to 
preserve the statute over our duty to faithfully interpret the 
law as written, the majority declines to revisit the Vanko 
court's mangling of the statute.  However, "[t]he principle of 
stare decisis does not compel us to adhere to erroneous 
precedent or refuse to correct our own mistakes."  State v. 
Outagamie Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶31, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  Regardless of the particular 
interests of the parties in perpetuating Vanko's improper 
reworking of the statute, our duty to the Constitution is 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
4 
 
primary.  "We do more damage to the rule of law by obstinately 
refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating injustice, than 
by overturning an erroneous decision."  Johnson Controls, Inc. 
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
665 N.W.2d 257 (internal citations omitted). 
¶108 Had the majority confronted Vanko's errors, it would 
have necessarily concluded that Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  It is the duty of this court "to say what the law 
is," Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶50, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177), to 
"faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature" 
by applying the plain language of a statute, State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110, and to ensure those enacted laws are in 
conformity with our Constitution.  This court in Vanko violated 
each of these responsibilities.  The majority in this case 
repeats the error.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  Vanko should be overruled because the court  
rewrote Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1). 
¶109 In the interests of the "safety and welfare of 
children," the Wisconsin Constitution allows the legislature to 
"provid[e] for the transportation of children to and from any 
parochial or private school or institution of learning."  Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
I, 
§ 23. 
 
Following 
the 
adoption 
of 
this 
constitutional provision in 1967, the legislature enacted Wis. 
Stat. § 121.54(2)(b), which provides in relevant part: 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
5 
 
[T]he school board of each district operating high 
school grades shall provide transportation to and from 
the school a pupil attends for each pupil residing in 
the school district who attends any elementary grade, 
including kindergarten, or high school grade at a 
private school located 2 miles or more from the 
pupil's residence, if such private school is a school 
within whose attendance area the pupil resides and is 
situated within the school district or not more than 5 
miles beyond the boundaries of the school district 
measured along the usually traveled route. 
(Emphasis added.)  Under this law, school districts must provide 
students with transportation to and from private schools, so 
long as certain criteria are met.1  Specifically, the student 
must reside at least two miles from the school and within that 
school's "attendance area," and the private school must be 
within five miles of the school district's boundaries.  In turn, 
the State provides aid to the school district at specified rates 
depending upon the location of students transported by the 
district.  See Wis. Stat. § 121.58(2). 
¶110 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51(1) defines "attendance area" 
as "the geographic area designated by the governing body of a 
private school as the area from which its pupils attend and 
approved by the school board of the district in which the 
private school is located."  Any disagreement over the scope of 
the 
"attendance 
area" 
must 
be 
resolved 
by 
the 
state 
superintendent of public instruction (SPI):  "[i]f the private 
school and the school cannot agree on [an] attendance area, the 
state superintendent shall, upon the request of the private 
                     
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 121.55 
prescribes 
methods 
of 
transportation. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
6 
 
school and the board, make a final determination of the 
attendance area."  § 121.51(1).  As particularly relevant to the 
certified question before this court, § 121.51(1) also mandates 
a limitation applicable only to religious schools:  "[t]he 
attendance areas of private schools affiliated with the same 
religious denomination shall not overlap."2  (Emphasis added.) 
(hereinafter the "overlapping attendance area" provision). 
¶111 Reading Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) in conjunction with 
Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b), the provision prohibiting overlapping 
attendance 
areas 
requires 
school 
districts 
to 
deny 
transportation 
to 
students 
who 
attend 
a 
private 
school 
"affiliated with the same religious denomination" as another 
private school within the same geographic attendance area whose 
students already receive transportation.  In other words, if two 
religious schools belong to the same "religious denomination"——a 
term statutorily undefined and subject to the interpretation of 
the SPI——students attending one of the religious schools are 
denied transportation, regardless of their distance from the 
school. 
 
The 
Constitution 
prohibits 
such 
faith-based 
discrimination in conferring public benefits. 
¶112 Soon after this statute's enactment, religious schools 
and 
parents 
of 
children 
attending 
them 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
provision 
prohibiting 
overlapping 
attendance areas of private schools "affiliated with the same 
                     
2 This mandate is subject to an exception involving single-
sex schools which is not pertinent to the matter before the 
court.  Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
7 
 
religious denomination."  Instead of confronting its glaring 
unconstitutionality, 
the 
Vanko 
court 
rewrote 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) in order to cure its "apparent constitutional 
infirmity."  Vanko, 52 Wis. 2d at 214.  Although § 121.51(1) 
plainly prohibits overlapping attendance areas of only those 
schools "affiliated with the same religious denomination," the 
Vanko court "read the statute as not authorizing or permitting 
overlapping in attendance area boundary lines as to all private 
schools affiliated or operated by a single sponsoring group, 
whether such school operating agency or corporation is secular 
or religious."  Id. at 215 (emphases added).  To support its 
"reading" of § 121.51(1), the Vanko court effectively replaced 
the phrase "religious denomination" with "single sponsoring 
group" (ostensibly a secular phrase) so as to apply the 
statute's restriction to both secular and religious schools.  
Amending the law by judicial fiat, reasoned the Vanko court, 
prevents "[r]eligious affiliation [from being] the sole basis of 
the classification" and fulfills the statute's overarching 
purpose of providing "for the safety and welfare of school 
children."  Id. at 214.  As further support for taking this 
legislative 
action, 
the 
Vanko 
court 
misapplied 
the 
constitutional doubt canon of statutory construction:  "[i]f 
there were any doubt as to this being the correct construction 
of the statute, . . . [it] use[s] the statutory construction 
rule that, given two alternative constructions of a statute, 
preference is to be given to the one that saves the statute from 
being struck down as unconstitutional."  Id. at 215. 
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8 
 
¶113 The Vanko court's blatant judicial activism was not 
lost 
on 
all 
members 
of 
the 
court. 
 
Noting 
the 
unconstitutionality of the statute, dissenting Chief Justice E. 
Harold Hallows pointed out that "[i]n order to save the 
constitutionality 
of 
[the 
'overlapping 
attendance 
area' 
provision] . . . , the majority has given a construction to 
these statutes beyond the breaking point and has construed them 
to mean exactly the opposite of what the legislature plainly 
said[.]"  Id. at 217 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).  In the 
court's reconstruction of the statute, "the plain language 'the 
same religious denomination' now becomes a 'single operating 
group' and 'religious' is read out of the classification."  Id. 
at 218.  Chief Justice Hallows rightly criticized the court's 
overreach:  "We cannot take clear and unambiguous language and 
under the guise of construction or interpretation change what 
the legislature has said."  Id. at 219.  If the "overlapping 
attendance area" provision is to apply to religious and secular 
schools alike, "the legislature must say so."  Id. 
¶114 Although 
Vanko is irreconcilable with the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1),3 a majority of this court 
                     
3 At the time of the Vanko decision, the "overlapping 
attendance 
area" 
provision 
was 
codified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(4). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
9 
 
nevertheless sustains its erroneous holding.4  Because Vanko's 
construction of § 121.51(1) is unmoored from the statutory text, 
it should be overruled.  An invention of the Vanko court, the 
phrase "single sponsoring group" is nowhere to be found in the 
statute.  Nor does the statutory text apply the "overlapping 
attendance area" restriction to secular schools.  Only students 
attending private schools "affiliated with the same religious 
denomination" 
as 
another 
private 
school 
within 
the 
same 
geographic attendance area are denied a public benefit——solely 
on account of their school's religious affiliation. 
¶115 In arriving at its holding, the Vanko court trampled 
over fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, under 
which we are supposed to "'begin with the language of the 
statute,'" and when the "meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 
(quoted source omitted).  We give statutory language "its common 
ordinary, and accepted meaning," id., and we should never "read 
into the statute words the legislature did not see fit to 
write."  Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 
                     
4 The majority also errs in upholding Holy Trinity Cmty. 
Sch., Inc. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978).  In 
that case, this court refined its decision in Vanko to prescribe 
how the SPI should ascertain whether a religious private school 
is affiliated with a "sponsoring group."  In relevant part, Holy 
Trinity held that "where a religious school demonstrates by a 
corporate charter and bylaws that it is independent of, and 
unaffiliated with, a religious denomination, that in the absence 
of fraud or collusion the inquiry stops there."  Holy Trinity, 
82 Wis. 2d at 157-58.  Because Holy Trinity rests upon the 
faulty foundation laid by Vanko, it too should be overturned. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316.  "It is not up to the courts to 
rewrite the plain words of statutes," State v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 
WI App 46, ¶13, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 N.W.2d 805, nor can a court 
"add words to a statute to give it a certain meaning."  State v. 
Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 N.W.2d 521 (quoted 
source omitted).  "[R]ather, we interpret the words the 
legislature actually enacted into law."  State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.  If the law 
offends the Constitution, we are duty-bound to say so. 
¶116 The Vanko court began with the language of the 
statute, 
acknowledged 
its 
"constitutional 
infirmity," 
and 
committed a cavalcade of errors in order to avoid employing the 
only 
appropriate 
judicial 
remedy——striking 
the 
statute.  
Discarding its obvious meaning, the Vanko court invoked "the 
purpose of the transportation statute" and declared that a 
"classification solely on the basis of religious sponsorship 
would not be germane or reasonably related to the purpose of the 
statute"——so it deleted it.  Through the court's legislative 
handiwork, the phrase "same religious denomination" became 
"single sponsoring group."  In order to absolve the legislature 
of an unconstitutional act, the court committed its own, 
arrogating to itself the power to make law. 
¶117 Writing laws resides within the exclusive domain of 
the legislature, into which judges may not tread.  "Like its 
federal counterpart, '[o]ur state constitution . . . created 
three branches of government, each with distinct functions and 
powers,' and '[t]he separation of powers doctrine is implicit in 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
11 
 
this tripartite division.'"  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 
2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 (quoted source 
omitted; alterations and ellipsis in original).  "Three clauses 
of the Wisconsin Constitution embody this separation:  Article 
IV, Section 1 ('[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a 
senate and assembly'); Article V, Section 1 ('[t]he executive 
power shall be vested in a governor'); and Article VII, Section 
2 ('[t]he judicial power . . . shall be vested in a unified 
court system')."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11 (alterations and 
ellipsis in original).  "The separation of powers 'operates in a 
general way to confine legislative powers to the legislature.'"  
League of Women Voters v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 
Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 (quoting Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 
Wis. 2d 459, 467, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943)). 
¶118 "Each branch's core powers reflect 'zones of authority 
constitutionally established for each branch of government upon 
which any other branch of government is prohibited from 
intruding.  As to these areas of authority, . . . any exercise 
of 
authority 
by 
another 
branch 
of 
government 
is 
unconstitutional.'"  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 (quoting State 
ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 
N.W.2d 770 (1990) (ellipsis in original)).  "It is 'the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is[,]' 
and not what we think it should be."  Town of Wilson v. City of 
Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶51, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938 N.W.2d 493 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury, 5 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
12 
 
U.S. at 177).  "This court lacks any authority to modify, tweak 
or supplement the legislature's work."  Id. 
¶119 In addition to invading the exclusive province of the 
legislature, the Vanko court violated multiple foundational 
principles underlying the plain-meaning method of statutory 
interpretation, which this court adopted long before the Vanko 
decision.  See, e.g., W. Side Bank v. Marine Nat. Exch. Bank, 37 
Wis. 2d 661, 669-70, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968) ("It is not within 
the province of this Court to seek secondary sources of 
legislative intent where the meaning of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous."); Folschow v. Werner, 51 Wis. 85, 7 N.W. 911 
(1881) (applying the "plain meaning" of a statute to determine 
whether a creditor can reach the defendant's pension).  In 
addition to transgressing the constitutional boundaries of the 
judicial role, the methodology employed by the Vanko court in 
order to reach a statute-saving outcome contravened basic 
principles of statutory interpretation. 
¶120 The Vanko court was transparent in justifying its 
reconstruction of the statute:  doing so "save[d] the statute 
from being struck down as unconstitutional."  Vanko, 52 
Wis. 2d at 215.  Although not named by the Vanko court, this 
principle is known as the constitutional doubt canon of 
statutory construction.  The Vanko court misused it.  Properly 
applied, the constitutional doubt canon counsels that "[a] 
statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its 
constitutionality in doubt."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 241 (2012).  It 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
13 
 
may be employed only "where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions."  Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney 
General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (per 
White, J.)).  This court recently expressed the operation of the 
canon in terms of reasonableness:  "where we can reasonably 
adopt 
a 
saving 
construction 
of 
a 
statute 
to 
avoid 
a 
constitutional conflict, we do so."  State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, 
¶31, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17.  Contrary to the Vanko 
court's application of the canon, simply "avoid[ing] . . . a 
constitutional conflict does not drive our reading of the 
statute."  Id.  Instead, the constitutional doubt canon "is a 
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of 
a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that 
[the legislature] did not intend the alternative which raises 
serious constitutional doubts."  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 
371, 381 (2005) (emphases added). 
¶121 There is nothing "reasonable" nor "plausible" about 
the Vanko court's construction of Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  The 
constitutional doubt canon is not a license to rewrite a 
statute, either to better effectuate its purpose or to conform 
it to the Constitution.  Nor does it authorize a court to insert 
new words into the text or remove words from it.  "We cannot 
press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous 
evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question."  United 
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985).  Nor can we employ the 
constitutional doubt canon when the text of the statute is 
plain.  See Pennsylvania DOC v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
14 
 
(1998).  Although courts "will often strain to construe 
legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it 
must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose 
of 
a 
statute . . . or 
judicially 
rewriting 
it."  
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoted 
source omitted).  The Vanko court bent the language of 
§ 121.51(1) to the point of changing its meaning.  Secular 
schools 
cannot 
be 
classified 
by 
"religious 
denomination" 
notwithstanding the Vanko decision's lexical distortions.  It 
should be overturned. 
¶122 In 
perpetuating 
the 
judicial 
malfeasance 
Vanko 
embodies, the majority "determine[s] that our precedent should 
be maintained rather than overruled," implicitly relying on the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  Majority op., ¶46.  "While adhering 
to precedent is an important doctrine for lending stability to 
the law, not every decision deserves stare decisis effect.  
After all, the purpose of stare decisis 'is to make us say that 
what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to 
be true, all in the interest of stability.'"  State v. 
Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶86, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Court and the Law 
138-40 (1997)).  As the state's highest court, we are not 
"'constrained to follow precedent' that is 'unworkable or badly 
reasoned,' because stare decisis 'is a principle of policy and 
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decisions.'"  
Outagamie Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶31 (quoting 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
15 
 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991)) (internal 
alterations omitted). 
¶123 "Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with the 
adornment 
of 
stare 
decisis 
threatens 
the 
rule 
of 
law, 
particularly when applied to interpretations wholly unsupported 
by the statute's text."  Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 
6, ¶81 n.5, 379 Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring).  The Vanko court's construction of 
"religious denomination" to mean "single sponsoring group" is 
"wholly unsupported by the statute's text" and represents a 
revision rather than an interpretation of law.  "In evaluating 
whether to persist in upholding a decision that elevated 
judicially-imagined legislative purpose over the words the 
legislature actually enacted, '[i]t is well to keep in mind just 
how thoroughly [the court's opinion] rewrote the statute it 
purported to construe.'"  Id. (quoting Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
Because the Vanko court entirely rewrote the "overlapping 
attendance area" provision of Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1), the 
majority errs in upholding it. 
¶124 In Johnson Controls, this court enumerated factors 
justifying a decision to overturn precedent.  See Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99.  When a prior case is 
"unsound in principle" or "wrongly decided," it should be 
overturned.  Id., ¶99; see also Bartholomew v. Wisconsin 
Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 
91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  A judicial decision 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
16 
 
like Vanko, which "blatantly disregarded the text of the [] 
statute," 
is 
"both 
'unsound 
in 
principle' 
and 
'wrongly 
decided,'" and should be overruled.  Town of Wilson, 390 
Wis. 2d 266, ¶63 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  
Doing so would advance the rule of law: 
This court has no apprehension about being a solitary 
beacon in the law if our position is based on a sound 
application of this state's jurisprudence.  But when 
our light is dim and fading, then this court must be 
prepared to make correction.  Stare decisis is neither 
a straightjacket nor an immutable rule.  We do more 
damage to the rule of law by obstinately refusing to 
admit errors, thereby perpetuating injustice, than by 
overturning an erroneous decision. 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100 (internal citations 
omitted). 
¶125 The majority's refusal to correct Vanko's irrefutably 
erroneous interpretation of the law "does not comport with our 
duty [to exercise our constitutionally-vested 'judicial power'] 
because it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions——meaning 
decisions outside the realm of permissible interpretation——over 
the text of . . . duly enacted . . . law."  Gamble v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
"[J]udicial decisions may incorrectly interpret the law, and 
when they do, subsequent courts must confront the question when 
to depart from them."  Id. at 1984.  The Vanko court not only 
incorrectly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1), it also usurped 
the legislative function by rewriting the statute.  It is this 
court's duty to say so.  "Besides eternalizing bad law, 
sustaining judicial rewriting of statutes sanctions judicial 
usurpation of the legislative function."  Town of Wilson, 390 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
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Wis. 2d 266, ¶52 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  This 
court should overturn the "demonstrably erroneous decision" it 
made in Vanko. 
 
II.  The "overlapping attendance area" provision in Wis. 
Stat. § 121.51(1) is unconstitutional. 
¶126 Overturning Vanko's reconstruction of the statute 
necessitates a consideration of its constitutionality, which the 
Vanko court avoided by expanding the "overlapping attendance 
area" restriction in Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) to encompass not 
only religious schools but secular ones as well.  On its face, 
§ 121.51(1) denies a public benefit only to students attending 
religious schools in overlapping attendance areas.  Private but 
secular schools located in overlapping attendance areas are not 
disqualified from receiving benefits on this basis.  Denying an 
otherwise publicly available benefit on account of religious 
identity violates the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
¶127 As it pertains to religion, the First Amendment says 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  As recently interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), and Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of 
Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment prohibits the government from denying a public 
benefit 
solely 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
religious 
identity.  
Consequently, the "overlapping attendance area" provision must 
be struck from Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
18 
 
¶128 The Free Exercise Clause, which applies to the states 
by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 provides that 
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion]."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  "The Free Exercise 
Clause 
'protect[s] 
religious 
observers 
against 
unequal 
treatment' and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that 
target the religious for 'special disabilities' based on their 
'religious status.'"  Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 
2019 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).  "Applying that basic principle, [the 
United States Supreme Court] has repeatedly confirmed that 
denying a generally available benefit solely on account of 
religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of 
religion that can be justified only by a state interest 'of the 
highest order.'"  Id. (quoted source omitted). 
¶129 In Trinity Lutheran Church, the United States Supreme 
Court scrutinized a program under which the Missouri Department 
of Natural Resources provided grants to help public and private 
schools, as well as nonprofit organizations, purchase rubber 
playground surfaces.  Id. at 2017.  The Department "had a strict 
and express policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or 
controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity."  Id.  
Applying this policy, the Department denied a grant application 
by Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center——a preschool 
                     
5 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding 
that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause is incorporated 
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
19 
 
and daycare——solely on the basis that it was operated by a 
church.  Id. at 2017-18. 
¶130 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
the 
Department's policy violated Trinity Lutheran's rights under the 
Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 2019.  The Court explained that 
the State unconstitutionally "puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice:  
It may participate in an otherwise available benefit program or 
remain a religious institution."  Id. at 2021-22.  According to 
the Court, the State cannot "expressly require[] Trinity 
Lutheran to renounce its religious character in order to 
participate in an otherwise generally available public benefit 
program, for which it is fully qualified."  Id. at 2024.  
"[W]hen the State conditions a benefit in this way, McDaniel 
says plainly that the State has punished the free exercise of 
religion:  'To condition the availability of benefits . . . upon 
[a recipient's] willingness . . . to surrender[] his religiously 
impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his 
constitutional liberties.'"  Id. at 2022 (quoting McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)).  Choosing between "a government 
benefit program" and "having to disavow [one's] religious 
character" 
does 
not 
comport 
with 
the 
First 
Amendment's 
protection of the free exercise of religion.  Id. 
¶131 Just last year, the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed these principles in Espinoza.  The Court held that 
the Free Exercise Clause precluded Montana from striking down a 
law establishing a scholarship program for private schools on 
the basis of a state constitutional provision prohibiting the 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
20 
 
state from giving public aid to any school controlled by a 
"church, sect, or denomination."  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251-
52.  The Court held that the application of Montana's "no-aid 
provision" to the scholarship program violated the First 
Amendment by "bar[ring] religious schools from public benefits 
solely because of the religious character of the schools" as 
well as by "bar[ring] parents who wish to send their children to 
religious schools from those same benefits, again solely because 
of the religious character of the schools"——a fact "apparent 
from the plain text" of the no-aid provision.  Id. at 2255.  
Applying Trinity Lutheran Church, the Court subjected the 
state's application of the no-aid provision to the "strictest 
scrutiny" and determined that Montana failed to advance any 
"interest of the highest order" by disqualifying religious 
schools and the children who attend them from receiving the 
benefits of a scholarship program solely because of their faith.  
Id. at 2260. 
¶132 As United States Supreme Court precedent confirms, the 
Free Exercise Clause prohibits Wisconsin from denying otherwise 
generally 
available 
transportation 
benefits 
to 
students 
attending a private school "affiliated with the same religious 
denomination" 
as 
another 
private 
school 
within 
the 
same 
geographic attendance area.  Because the plain text of the 
"overlapping 
attendance 
area" 
provision 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) applies only to religious schools, the statute 
violates the First Amendment.  "The Free Exercise Clause 
'protects religious observers against unequal treatment' and 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
21 
 
against 'laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of 
religious status.'"  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254 (quoting 
Trinity Lutheran Church, 582 U.S. at 2021). 
¶133 Trinity 
Lutheran 
Church 
is 
clear: 
 
"denying 
a 
generally available benefit solely on account of religious 
identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that 
can be justified only by a state interest 'of the highest 
order.'"  Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quoted 
source 
omitted). 
 
The 
State 
rationalizes 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.51(1)'s 
discrimination 
against 
religious 
schools 
as 
"set[ting] parameters" for a religiously-affiliated school's 
attendance 
area 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
straining 
a 
"school 
district[']s . . . limited funds."  The United States Supreme 
Court already rejected this sort of justification for religious 
discrimination:  "A State need not subsidize private education.  
But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some 
private schools solely because they are religious."  Espinoza, 
140 S. Ct. at 2261.  If the financial cost of transporting 
students to school trumps our right to remain free from "unequal 
treatment" based upon our religious identity, then the Free 
Exercise Clause would have little meaning. 
¶134 Like 
Missouri's 
policy 
of 
"categorically 
disqualifying" religious organizations from receiving grants 
under its playground resurfacing program in Trinity Lutheran 
Church, Wisconsin's "overlapping attendance area" provision puts 
schools "to a choice:  [they] may participate in an otherwise 
available benefit program or remain a religious institution."  
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
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Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2021-22.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 121.51(1), if a school overlaps with another private 
religious institution of "the same religious denomination," that 
school, and its students, may either renounce their religious 
affiliation or lose their right to state-provided transportation 
benefits.  The First Amendment does not permit the government to 
"punish[] the free exercise of religion" in this manner.  
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2256 (quoted source omitted).  The 
Constitution does not countenance a religious school being 
forced to either forgo a "government benefit program" or 
"disavow its religious character."  Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 
S. Ct. at 2022; see Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 
III.  Wisconsin Stat. § 121.51 impermissibly entangles the 
government in the affairs of religious schools. 
¶135 Declaring the overlapping attendance area provision 
unconstitutional, as this court should have done 50 years ago 
when first presented with the issue, would have been dispositive 
of this matter.  Instead, the majority persists in preserving an 
unconstitutional law, necessitating a response to the certified 
question: 
For purposes of determining whether two or more 
schools are "private schools affiliated with the same 
religious denomination" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
121.51, must the state superintendent rely exclusively 
on neutral criteria such as ownership, control, and 
articles of incorporation, or may the superintendent 
also 
take 
into 
account 
the 
school's 
self-
identification in sources such as its website or 
filings with the state? 
Whether applying a faithful interpretation of the statutory text 
or Vanko's reconstruction of the statute, there is no way to 
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answer this question without requiring the SPI to violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
¶136 In this case, the SPI must decide whether a self-
described Roman Catholic school is "affiliated with the same 
religious denomination" as the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, notwithstanding the school's professions of both 
corporate and theological independence from the Archdiocese.  
The inevitable litigation ensuing from a determination by the 
SPI that results in the denial of public benefits based upon 
overlapping attendance areas between religious schools will 
require judges to engage in the same inquiry concerning the 
religious character of schools.  The Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment does not permit such entanglement between church 
and state. 
¶137 The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion."  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  In interpreting this provision, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that "[a] statute must not foster 
'an excessive entanglement with religion.'"  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).  Wisconsin Statute § 121.51(1) not 
only fosters an excessive entanglement with religion, it compels 
it.  Under the statute, the SPI is charged with conducting a 
comparative analysis to determine whether two schools belong to 
the 
same 
"religious 
denomination"——an 
exercise 
unavoidably 
requiring the government to interpret the nature of a particular 
faith.  Discerning whether one religious school is "affiliated 
with the same religious denomination" as another forces the SPI 
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24 
 
as well as the courts to delve into the meaning of "religious 
denomination" and what it means to be "affiliated" with one.  
However, it is not for the government to determine the "proper 
interpretation of [one's] faith."  United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 257 (1982).  Indeed, "[t]he prospect of church and 
state litigating in court about what does or does not have 
religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional 
guarantee against religious establishment[.]"  New York v. 
Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977). 
¶138 Where, exactly, is the SPI expected to draw the line?  
What is a "religious denomination"?  What characteristics, 
professions of faith, or doctrinal tenets render a religious 
institution part of a particular denomination?  The statute 
doesn't tell us, and it would be unconstitutional for any state 
actor, including a court, to resolve the question.  As the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
recognized 
decades 
ago, 
"[i]ntrafaith differences . . . are not uncommon among followers 
of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly 
ill equipped to resolve such difference in relation to the 
Religion Clauses."  Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).  It is not for the government to 
determine, for example, whether a Roman Catholic school and a 
Ukrainian 
Catholic 
school 
are 
"affiliated 
with 
the 
same 
religious denomination" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1) or otherwise.  "[A] single term" like "Catholic" 
cannot "describe accurately the religious values and aspirations 
of an individual or a group of individuals.  Labels work very 
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25 
 
well for identifying commodities in a supermarket, but they are 
ill fitted for protecting the religious liberty of an individual 
American."  St. Augustine v. Evers, 906 F.3d 591, 604 (7th Cir. 
2018) (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
¶139 Any governmental overriding of a religious school's 
profession of independence from the "religious denomination" of 
another school——whether made by the SPI or a court——would 
"require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand 
their own religious beliefs.  We think such an approach cannot 
be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, and 
that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that [courts] were 
never intended to play."  Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988).  The government lacks both 
constitutional authority and institutional competence to make 
these determinations. 
¶140 The majority does not address the entanglement problem 
presented by Wis. Stat. § 121.51 but mistakenly denies one 
exists at all.  The majority says:  "in determining whether 
schools are 'affiliated with the same religious denomination' 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 121.51, the Superintendent is not 
limited to consideration of a school's corporate documents 
exclusively.  In conducting a neutral and secular inquiry, the 
Superintendent may also consider the professions of the school 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
school's 
self-identification 
and 
affiliation."  Majority op., ¶5.  The majority maintains that 
"accepting a school's professions that are published on its 
public website or set forth in filings with the state does not 
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26 
 
necessarily require any investigation or surveillance into the 
practices of the school.  It need not require any religious 
inquiry at all."  Majority op., ¶48.  The majority is wrong. 
¶141 As formulated by the majority, the SPI's inquiry 
focuses on whether "a school is affiliated with a specific 
religious denomination," which obviously poses a question of a 
religious nature.  The majority's declaration that the SPI's 
determination of whether schools are "affiliated with the same 
religious denomination" does not require any religious inquiry 
"at all" reflects a manner of Orwellian newspeak by which 
"religious" means something other than "religious."  The only 
way for a Catholic school like St. Augustine to avoid a 
governmentally-decreed affiliation with the same "denomination" 
as another Catholic school is for St. Augustine to disavow its 
Catholic character. 
¶142 Aside from the entanglement problem produced by the 
majority's decision, it offers little assistance to the Seventh 
Circuit in resolving this dispute.  The majority notes that "St. 
Augustine professes that while it is Roman Catholic, it is 
independent of and unaffiliated with the Archdiocese."  Majority 
op., ¶50.  The majority then proclaims that "[n]either accepting 
corporate 
documents 
nor 
accepting 
a 
school's 
professions 
necessarily requires any investigation of the type prohibited by 
Holy Trinity or even any religious inquiry whatsoever."  Id.  
The majority misunderstands the heart of this dispute.  Although 
St. Augustine's corporate documents reveal no affiliation with 
the Archdiocese and St. Augustine explicitly disclaimed any 
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27 
 
affiliation with any other Catholic school or The Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee in its letters to Friess Lake School District and the 
SPI, it professes on its website to be "Roman Catholic," which 
prompted the SPI to declare St. Augustine affiliated with the 
Archdiocese 
by 
virtue 
of 
their 
mutual 
Roman 
Catholic 
identification.  That is a determination derived from a 
religious inquiry prohibited by the Establishment Clause.  
Regardless, the majority supplies no rule to resolve whether a 
school's corporate documents, website content, or professions of 
corporate and ecclesiastical independence controls the question 
of affiliation with a particular denomination. 
¶143 The majority should have restricted the inquiry to 
purely secular sources such as corporate documents, leaving 
religious labels and alliances beyond consideration, but instead 
directs the Seventh Circuit to apply Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1) in a 
manner which impermissibly entangles the courts in matters of 
religion.  The very precedent on which the majority relies 
prohibits this:  "For this court or for the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to determine, in the light of the prima facie 
showing of the articles of incorporation to the contrary, that 
this school corporation is or is not affiliated with the 
Catholic denomination is to meddle into what is forbidden by the 
Constitution the determination of matters of faith and religious 
allegiance."  Holy Trinity Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. Kahl, 82 
Wis. 2d 139, 150, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978).  "[T]he determination 
of who or what is Catholic . . . is an inquiry that government 
cannot make."  Id. at 150-51. 
No.  2021AP265-CQ.rgb 
 
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¶144 Because the "overlapping attendance area" provision 
violates both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
First Amendment, it must be struck from Wis. Stat. § 121.51(1).  
United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Religion 
Clauses 
"radiates 
a 
spirit 
of 
freedom 
of 
religious 
organizations, 
an 
independence 
of 
secular 
control 
or 
manipulation——in short, power to decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine."  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 186 (2012) 
(quoted source omitted).  Within the context of this case, the 
Constitution reserves decisions of religious affiliation for 
private schools themselves, and the State may not force private 
schools or their students to "choose between their religious 
beliefs and receiving a government benefit."   Trinity Lutheran 
Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (quoted source omitted). 
* * * 
¶145  "The true irony of our modern stare decisis doctrine 
lies in the fact that proponents of stare decisis tend to invoke 
it most fervently when the precedent at issue is least 
defensible."  
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1988 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  A majority of this court privileges precedent over 
text in preserving this court's indefensible decision in Vanko.  
In answering the certified question, the majority perpetuates a 
judicial reconstruction of Wis. Stat. 
§ 121.51(1), which, 
despite the court's legislative efforts to save it, nevertheless 
violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment by 
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29 
 
excluding religious schools and the students who attend them 
from a government benefit solely on the basis of their religion.  
"An odious exclusion from any of the benefits common to the rest 
of my fellow-citizens, is a persecution, differing only in 
degree, but of a nature equally unjustifiable with that, whose 
instruments are chains and torture."  Trinity Lutheran Church, 
137 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting Speech by H.M. Brackenridge, Dec. 
Sess. 1818, in H. Brackenridge, W. Worthington, & J. Tyson, 
Speeches in the House of Delegates of Maryland, 64 (1829)).  
Repeating its error from 50 years ago, this court once again 
neglects its duty to strike an unconstitutional statute.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶146 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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