Title: Hickman v. Carven

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Vivian Mae Hickman, Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis J. Hickman, et al. V.
Thomas J. Carven, et ux.
No. 12, Sept. Term, 2001
Statute of repose codified in Courts article, § 5-108(a) does not apply to action by owners of
residential subdivision lot against developers of the subdivision for personal and economic injury
resulting from developers’ concealment of burial ground on plaintiffs’ lot.
Circuit Court for Worcester County
Case No. 23-C-97-001502
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 12
September Term, 2001
_____________________________________
_
VIVIAN MAE HICKMAN, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
LOUIS J. HICKMAN, ET AL.
v.
THOMAS J. CARVEN, ET UX.
_____________________________________
_
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Harrell
Battaglia
Karwacki, Robert L.  (retired, specially       
                   assigned),
   JJ.
_____________________________________
_
Opinion by Wilner, J.
_____________________________________
_
Filed:   November 5, 2001
1
Maryland Code, § 5-108(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides, in
relevant part, that no cause of action for damages accrues when “personal injury, or injury to
real or personal property resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement
to real property occurs more than 20 years after the date the entire improvement first becomes
available for its intended use.”  We have regarded that statute as one of repose and not one of
limitations.  See Rose v. Fox Pool, 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906 (1994).
The general issue before us in this case is whether the statute applies to an action by the
owners of a residential subdivision lot against the developers of the subdivision for alleged
personal and economic injury accruing from the developers’ concealment of a burial ground
on the plaintiffs’ lot.  That issue hinges on whether the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs result
from the “defective and unsafe condition of an improvement” to the property.  The Circuit
Court for Worcester County answered that question in the affirmative, concluded as a result
that the statute applied, and, upon a finding that the action was not brought within the 20-year
period allowed by the statute, entered summary judgment for the defendant- developers.  The
Court of Special Appeals, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims did not involve injuries resulting
from a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, reversed.  Carven
v. Hickman, 135 Md. App. 645, 662-63, 763 A.2d 1207, 1217 (2000).  We shall affirm the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and, indeed, have been
presented to us through an agreed statement.
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In February, 1944, Louis Hickman acquired a 200-acre farm in Bishopville, on which
he created a 150-lot residential subdivision known as Holiday Harbor.  The property was
subdivided through the recording of a number of plats, the first of which was recorded in
February, 1960.  The plat which concerns us is the second one, placed on record in June, 1964.
One of the lots on that plat is Lot 96.  In furtherance of the Holiday Harbor development,
Hickman built roads and canals, installed underground electric service, and granted rights of
way for other utilities and roads.  In June, 1960, Hickman imposed a set of restrictive
covenants on the lots, included in which was a covenant prohibiting any “graveyard” from being
maintained or operated on any portion of the subdivision.  Hickman retained the right, along
with other lot owners, to enforce the covenants, and he retained the right to approve plans for
any construction on the lots.
In 1975, Hickman conveyed Lot 96 to the Tubbs.  In 1984, the Tubbs conveyed the lot
to the Bryants, and in April, 1986, the Bryants conveyed it to the Carvens, the present owners.
After acquiring the lot, the Carvens met with Hickman, who approved their plans for the
construction of a residence.  Hickman said nothing about there being a graveyard on the lot;
nor was the existence of a graveyard indicated on the recorded plat.  With their plans approved,
the Carvens built a home on the lot in 1986.  Hickman died in September, 1997.
In December, 1997, the Carvens filed suit against Hickman’s widow, Vivian Hickman,
whom they alleged was a co-owner and co-developer of Holiday Harbor with her husband.  The
complaint alleged deceit, breach of the covenant of special warranties, and negligence, all
based on the assertions that (1) the Hickmans were general partners in the development and
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sale of the lots; (2) they knew or should have known of the existence of a graveyard located on
the farm and on Lot 96 in particular; (3) during the development, memorial markers and all
other indicia of the existence of the graveyard were removed by the Hickmans or their agents;
(4) the graveyard constitutes a dangerous and hazardous condition and is a latent defect, a
defect in title, and a defect in fact; (5) although the Hickmans knew or should have known of
the existence of the graveyard, they failed to disclose its existence to persons entitled to
knowledge; (6) the Carvens discovered the existence of the graveyard on Lot 96 in January,
1995; and (7) the Carvens purchased Lot 96, built their home on it, relocated from their
previous residence, and mortgaged the property as security for loans in justifiable reliance on
the fact that the property was free of hazards and defects, and they would not have done so had
the existence of the graveyard been disclosed to them.
With respect to their claim for deceit, the Carvens asserted that the omission by the
Hickmans to disclose on the recorded plat the existence of the graveyard constituted a
knowingly false representation of a material fact, that the Hickmans intended that grantees
would rely on the plat, which failed to disclose the graveyard, and that the Carvens justifiably
relied on that plat.  The breach of warranty claim was founded on the restrictive covenant
prohibiting the maintenance of a graveyard which, the Carvens asserted, was specially
warranted in the deed to Lot 96.  The action for negligence was based on averments that the
Hickmans held themselves out to the public as professionals engaged in the development of
the farm and Lot 96, and that they breached their duty to use reasonable care in developing the
property by failing to remove the graveyard or disclose its existence.  They contended that, as
1 Much of the evidence regarding the graveyard came from the testimony of elderly
residents of the area who recalled working or playing in the vicinity of the graveyard.  It
appears that the owners of the erstwhile farm buried their relatives there, as was common
practice among farmers of an earlier day.  There was testimony that burials began there in the
1850's and may have continued through the 1940's.
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a result of the graveyard, (1) their property is “worthless,” (2) the loan secured by the property
is subject to acceleration by reason of the failure of security, (3) they will be required to incur
substantial costs in having the bodies interred on their property relocated, restoring the
surrounding yard, and obtaining other living arrangements during the restoration, and (4) they
have suffered mental anguish and emotional distress.
Ms. Hickman moved for summary judgment on a number of substantive and procedural
grounds, including a claim that the Carvens’ action was barred by § 5-108.  It is agreed in this
appeal that, based on the evidence submitted by the Carvens in opposition to the motion, a jury
could find that (1) there is a graveyard on the Carvens’ lot; (2) it may contain the graves of
members of the Beauchamp and Hickman families;1 (3) Louis Hickman knew of the existence
and location of the graveyard; (4) by reason of his prior experience as a Worcester County
Commissioner and the discovery of graves during the development of the Ocean Pines
Community, Hickman had reason to know the expense associated with the disinterment and
relocation of graveyards; (5) Hickman removed the tombstones, markers, and other surface
evidence of the graveyard with the use of a bulldozer, while leaving the graves underground; (6)
none of the documents submitted to the county by the Hickmans show any indication of the
existence of a graveyard; and (7) the county health department, which approved Plat No. 2,
2 Deposition testimony by a local funeral director indicated that the use of concrete
vaults as coffin receptacles did not become popular until the 1920's, and that, before then, it
was common just to place wooden caskets into the ground or to line the grave with bricks.  In
either event, the caskets and some of the bones deteriorated over time.  The witness said that,
at Ms. Carven’s request, he probed for graves at her home and discovered lining bricks under
the front lawn at a depth of one to two feet.  He also found some hollow spaces at a depth of
two feet, which he attributed to the disintegration of caskets.  The witness debunked the myth
that caskets are buried six feet below ground level.  He said that one digs until just above water
level, which on the Eastern Shore is quite high, and that the top of the casket is often a foot or
two under ground.
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would not have done so if it had known that any portion of Lot 96 contained a graveyard.
The Carvens acted as their own general contractor in building their home and performed
much of the labor associated with the construction.  They or persons acting for them installed
a continuous footer for the home, a septic system, and underground utility lines, they planted
trees and shrubs, and they installed other landscaping materials.  None of that digging in 1986
revealed evidence of the graveyard.  Sometime after October 15, 1994, Ms. Carven was told
by some of her business customers that her house was built on a graveyard which Mr. Hickman
confirmed.  At some later point, she dug a hole in her yard where a yucca plant had been and,
about 12 inches below the surface, discovered some bones and a piece of metal that she
believed to be a casket handle.  Two county sheriff’s deputies thereafter discovered additional
bones in the same hole.2
On this evidence, the Circuit Court initially denied the motion, but, on reconsideration,
concluded that § 5-108 applied and that it barred the action.  The court concluded that, by
creating a subdivision, preparing lots and creating streets and utilities, Hickman enhanced the
value of the property and adapted it for new and further purposes, and, as a result, created an
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“improvement” within the meaning of § 5-108.  In light of the fact that the subdivision plat was
recorded in June, 1964, and suit was not filed until December, 1997, the court concluded that
suit had not been filed within the 20 years specified in the statute.  Finally, the court found that
the alleged fraudulent concealment on the part of the Hickmans would not preclude application
of the statute.
As indicated, the Court of Special Appeals reversed.  Although acknowledging that the
digging of canals and the building of roads and installation of utilities may qualify as
improvements, the court noted that the Carvens were not contending that they suffered any
injury from the defective and unsafe condition of those improvements.  The change at issue
here was the removal of headstones from a graveyard to conceal its existence, and that, the
court held, was not an improvement.  It did not alter the status of the property but merely
concealed that status.  Even if that activity were regarded as an improvement, the court
concluded that the improvement was not a “defective and unsafe” condition.  The only possible
defective and unsafe condition, the court continued, would be the existence of the graves, but
there is nothing defective or unsafe about a graveyard containing graves.  Finally, the
intermediate appellate court found that the injuries alleged by the Carvens were not the type
intended to be covered by the statute – that “[t]he diminution in the value of a residential
property caused by the discovery of the presence of a cemetery on that property and the cost
of disinterring the bodies of that graveyard are not the injury to personal or real property, or
personal injury, contemplated by the Maryland statute of repose.”  Carven v. Hickman, supra,
135 Md. App. at 662, 763 A.2d at 1216.
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DISCUSSION
As we observed, § 5-108(a) precludes a cause of action for personal injury or injury to
real or personal property that results from the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property when the injury occurs more than 20 years after the date the
entire improvement first became available for its intended use.  In the context of this case,
three issues are presented: (1) what is the relevant improvement; (2) what evidence has been
presented that the improvement is defective and unsafe; and (3) to what extent are the injuries
claimed by the plaintiffs attributable to the defective and unsafe condition of the improvement?
The principal dispute between the parties centers on the first issue – the improvement.
The Carvens maintain that the Hickmans made no improvement to their property, and for that
reason alone the statute does not apply.  They view Hickman’s conduct as nothing more or less
than unlawful graveyard desecration – the removal of monuments and markers that served only
to conceal the undisturbed remains lying underneath.  That, they contend, is what produced the
injuries of which they complain, but it does not constitute an “improvement” to their land.
Hickman takes a somewhat broader, or extended, view of the term “improvement.”  The
removal of the monuments and markers cannot be viewed in isolation, she urges.  It was part
of the grading and development of the entire 200-acre tract.  That grading, she avers, together
with the building of roads and canals and the installation of utility lines, constitutes an
improvement that extends to Lot 96, and, because the removal of the monuments and markers
was part of that improvement, it partakes the status of an improvement itself.
In Rose v. Fox Pool, supra, 335 Md. 351, 375, 643 A.2d 906, 918, we observed that
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§ 5-108 did not define the term “improvement to real property” and that there was no clear
indication in the legislative history of what the Legislature intended the term to mean.  Citing
an analysis by the Court of Special Appeals in Allentown Plaza v. Suburban Propane, 43 Md.
App. 337, 405 A.2d 326 (1979), we noted that, in other States with similar statutes, the courts
had taken two different approaches in defining that term – the “fixture” approach, which looks
to whether the item in question has become so attached to the land that, under a common law
fixture analysis, it has become a fixture upon the land, and what the Allentown Plaza court and
we in Rose regarded as a “common sense” or “common usage” approach.  Rose, 335 Md. at
375-76, 643 A.2d at 918.  The latter, which represents the majority rule around the country,
looks to the common sense meaning of the word “improvement.”
In Allentown Plaza, the Court of Special Appeals indicated that, under the majority
view, the term “improvement” may include “‘everything that permanently enhances the value
of premises for general uses.’”  Allentown Plaza, supra, 43 Md. App. at 345, 405 A.2d at 331
(quoting 41 A
M.  JUR. 2D Improvements § 1, at 479 (1968)).  We regarded that definition as
too broad and adopted, instead, the definition given in Black’s Law Dictionary 757 (6th ed.
1990), namely:
“[a] valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an
amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere
repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to
enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further
purposes.  Generally has reference to buildings, but may also
include any permanent structure or other development, such as a
street, sidewalks, sewers, utilities, etc.  An expenditure to extend
the useful life of an asset or to improve its performance over that
of the original asset.  Such expenditures are capitalized as part of
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the asset’s cost.”
Rose, 335 Md. at 376, 643 A.2d at 918.
Under this definition, there can be no doubt but that the subdivision of the 200-acre
farm through the recording of subdivision plats, the building of streets and canals, and the
installation of utilities constituted improvements to the tract and to that part of the tract that
became Lot 96.  As noted, however, the injuries alleged by the Carvens do not arise from any
of those improvements.  They are not complaining about the roads, canals, or utilities.
Here, the Carvens complaint relates solely to the graveyard found on Lot 96.  Under our
definition, developing or using land for a graveyard may also constitute an improvement, in that
a graveyard may enhance the value, beauty, or utility of vacant land.  But the Hickmans did not
create or extend the graveyard, so it could not be regarded as an improvement they created.
The conduct at issue is the desecration of the existing graveyard – the removal of monuments,
markers, and other evidence denoting the existence of the graveyard, which effectively
concealed the existence of the graveyard.  That, the Carvens maintain, cannot constitute an
improvement to the land.
“A place for the burial of the dead,” we said in Abell v. Green Mount Cemetery, 189
Md. 363, 366, 56 A.2d 24, 25 (1947), “has characteristics differing from those of an ordinary
tract of land.  To many it is sacred ground which should not suffer intrusion from mundane
objects.”  See also Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 36, 209 A.2d 914, 915-16 (1965)
(“[T]hrough the ages, all civilized peoples have considered the final resting place of their dead
as hallowed and sacred ground.”).  In furtherance of that notion, the Legislature has enacted a
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host of laws protective of burial grounds, laws that limit what may be done with and on them.
The General Assembly has made it a crime (1) to remove or attempt to remove human remains
from a graveyard, absent permission from the local State’s Attorney,  Maryland Code, Art. 27,
§ 265, (2) willfully to destroy, mutilate, deface, injure, or remove any tomb, monument,
gravestone, or other structure placed in a cemetery, id. § 267, (3) willfully to destroy or
remove any tree, plant, or shrub in a cemetery, id., or (4) to engage in indecent or disorderly
conduct within a cemetery, id.  It has required that anyone seeking to disinter a body obtain a
permit from the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.  Maryland Code, § 4-
215(e)(1) of the Health-General Article.
The Legislature has enacted extensive regulations on the use and operation of land used
for burial, Maryland Code, §§ 5-101 through 5-1002 of the Business Regulations Article, and
has empowered the State’s municipalities to regulate the interment of bodies and control the
location and establishment of cemeteries.  Maryland Code, Art. 23A, § 2(b)(6).  As part of its
direct statutory regulation, the Legislature has precluded the opening of alleys, canals, roads,
or other public thoroughfares through the property of a cemetery if that property is used for
burial.  Maryland Code, Business Regulations Article, § 5-502(a).  It has also provided for, and
perhaps requires, a court judgment prior to the sale of a burial ground.  Section 5-505(a) of the
Business Regulations Article provides that, in an action brought pursuant to the Maryland
Rules, a court may enter a judgment for the sale of a burial ground if the ground has been
dedicated and used for burial, burial lots have been sold in the burial ground and deeds executed
or certificates issued to buyers, the ground has ceased to be used for burial, and it is desirable
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to dispose of the burial ground for another purpose.  In that event, if the court is satisfied that
it is expedient or would be in the interest of the parties to sell the burial ground, the court is
authorized to enter a judgment for the same “on the terms and notice the court sets.”  Id. § 5-
505(b)(1).  The law requires, however, that the court order “as much of the proceeds of the sale
as necessary be used to pay the expenses of removing any human remains in the burial ground,
buying burial lots in another burial ground, and reburying the remains.” Id. § 5-505(b)(2).  See
also Maryland Rule 14-401.  A judgment entered under § 5-505 passes title to the burial
ground free of the claims of the owners of the burial ground and the holders of burial lots.
Maryland Code, Business Regulations Article, § 5-505(c).  Absent such a judgment, it may
well be that a deed to land that constitutes a burial ground does not pass title free of such
claims.
In addition to these statutes, the Legislature has given interested persons – those related
by blood or marriage to a person interred in a burial site and those having a “cultural affiliation”
with such a person – the right to request access to the burial site of the owner of the site or of
the land containing the site.  Maryland Code, § 14-121(b) of the Real Property Article.
It is evident from these statutes – some or all of which may apply here – that significant
limitations have been placed on what may be done with land containing burial sites.  Although
those impediments do not  preclude the positive development of land for use as a graveyard
from being regarded as an improvement, they clearly preclude the desecration and consequent
concealment of an existing graveyard from being considered an improvement.  It hardly
comports with a common sense approach to suggest that such conduct, when undertaken as part
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of the subdivision of land for residential purposes – for the sale of relatively small lots,
approximately one-third acre in size, to persons intending to use them to construct homes –
constitutes an improvement of the land.  In that setting, such desecration and concealment do
not enhance the value of the land but detract from that value; apart from any personal reluctance
to live on top of burial sites with human remains resting barely two feet below ground, it places
limitations and potential obligations on the buyers that they would not expect, or desire, for
residential property.  Under no stretch of the imagination can Lot 96 be said to have been
improved by Hickman’s alleged concealment of the burial sites.  The concealment may have
allowed Hickman to sell the land at a higher price, or without the impediments established by
law, but that is not what we believe the Legislature intended to regard as an improvement.
We turn, then, to the thrust of Hickman’s argument, that, even if the desecration and
concealment may not be regarded, themselves, as an improvement, they were part of the overall
grading and construction work and thus constitute a component of an improvement.  Other
States, she avers, have ruled that components of an improvement to real property are
encompassed by statutes of repose.  The desecration, she contends, was part of the
construction process that resulted in the creation of the subdivision and, absent the removal
of the headstones and markers, Lot 96 could not have become a residential home site.
There are, indeed, cases holding that where construction work has occurred that suffices
as an improvement, work or items that constitute integral components of that construction
activity partake of that improvement status, and that an action based on some defect in the
component item is subject to the statute of repose.  See, for example, Lederman v. Cragun’s
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Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001).  As part of a major construction project, the
contractor built a temporary trench in which to relocate a communications cable that had to
be lowered to accommodate the new facility.  Lederman, 247 F.3d at 814.  Once the cable was
placed in the trench, the trench would be refilled.  The plaintiff, injured while walking on a path
adjoining the trench when the trench caved in, sued the owner and contractor for negligence.
The issue, for purposes of the relevant (Minnesota) six-year statute of repose, was whether the
temporary trench qualified as an improvement.  The court held that it was, because, although
temporary in nature, it was an integral part of the overall project, which clearly constituted an
improvement.  Id. at 816.
See also Two Denver Highlands Ltd. v. Dillingham Constr., 932 P.2d 827, 830 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1996) (finding concrete used to build a parking garage as an “essential” part of this
improvement); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co., 586 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998) (circuit panel box and transformer held to be integral components of electrical
system in a plant); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Kent & Assocs., 501 S.E.2d 858, 859-60 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding an interlock device on a pool’s circulating pump starter to be an integral
component and therefore a protected improvement); Kleist v. Metrick Elec. Co., 571 N.E.2d
819, 821-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (electrical box within electrical system found to be integral
part of larger improvement, and therefore protected); Hausman v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co.,
997 F.2d 351, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1993) (shear table found to be integral component of metal
coil processing system).  A rationale for this view, regarding an item as an improvement if it
is an integral component of a project that itself would qualify as an improvement, was given
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in Hilliard v. Lummus Co., 834 F.2d 1352, 1356 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Mullis v. Southern
Co. Servs., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579, 584 (Ga. 1982)):
“[T]o artificially extract each component from an improvement
to real property and view it in isolation would be an unrealistic
and impractical method of determining what is an improvement
to real property . . . . We find that if a component is an essential
or integral part of the improvement to which it belongs, then it is
itself an improvement to real property.”
For purposes of this case, we accept the doctrine of regarding items or work that are
an integral component part of a larger improvement as within the ambit of § 5-108(a).
Acceptance of that doctrine does not assist Hickman in this case, however, for the doctrine has
its own limits.  Although it may well be that Hickman removed the tombstones and other
graveyard markers contemporaneously with and during the course of grading the land or
building roads or canals, or preparing the land for utilities, the removal of those objects cannot
reasonably be said to be an integral component part of the grading, or building, or preparation.
It was not necessary to the grading, building, or preparation and was, in fact, unlawful and
prohibited.
Accordingly, we hold that the desecration and concealment of the grave sites by
Hickman does not constitute an improvement to real property for purposes of § 5-108(a).  As
the injuries claimed by the Carvens do not, therefore, result from the defective and unsafe
condition of “an improvement to real property,” § 5-108(a) does not apply and does not bar this
action.
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JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.