Title: Thar v. Edwin N. Moran Revocable Trust

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Thar v. Edwin N. Moran Revocable Trust1995 WY 180905 P.2d 413Case Number: 94-234Decided: 10/31/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Gary THAR and Greg 
Lindbloom, 

Appellants (Defendants), 

and Francis Thar and 
Elvira Thar, 

Appellants 
(Intervenors),

v.

EDWIN N. MORAN REVOCABLE 
TRUST and Ted Gassin, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Barton R. Voigt, J.

John M. Daly of 
Daly & Anderson, P.C., Gillette, for Appellants.

Robert W. Brown 
of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for Appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      We are asked to 
determine whether, in Wyoming, a commercial easement in gross is freely 
assignable. Declining the request to answer so broad a question, we affirm the 
decision of the district court on other grounds.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants state 
the issues on appeal:

1. Is a commercial 
easement in gross an assignable easement?

2. Is the grantee of an 
easement in gross judicially estopped to deny its assignability when he signs a 
stipulation in a prior proceeding which conveys to the heirs, executors and 
assigns?

[¶3]      Appellees restate 
the issue:

A. Whether the easement 
granted to Francis and Elvira Thar in 1976 is assignable.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      In 1976, Edwin N. 
Moran (Moran),1 granted an easement across his land 
to Francis and Elvira Thar (the Thars). The easement provided access to a 
landlocked parcel that the Thars were leasing from the State of Wyoming. In 
1993, the Thars purchased the parcel from the state, acquiring title in fee 
simple, and leased it to Gary Thar. This case arises out of an action for 
trespass brought by the Edwin N. Moran Revocable Family Trust against the Thars' 
lessee. Moran maintains that the easement granted in 1976 is an easement in 
gross that is personal to the Thars and cannot be transferred to their lessee. 
The Thars insist that the easement is a commercial easement in gross and, as 
such, is an alienable property interest. Following a bench trial, the district 
court held that the easement is an easement in gross but that it was not 
assignable.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶5]      We choose not to 
answer the question of whether commercial easements in gross are freely 
alienable in Wyoming since more specific and appropriate grounds exist upon 
which to decide this case. Despite our refusal to fully consider this issue, we 
note research which indicates that questions regarding the assignability of 
easements in gross may be more readily resolved if counsel addresses the 
question of assignability within the four corners of the granting instrument. 
Farmer's Marine Copper Works, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 757 S.W.2d 148, 151 
(Tex. App. 1988) (noting that parties may create an assignable easement in gross 
through an express assignment provision).

[¶6]      Turning our 
attention to the resolution of the case at hand, we observe that an easement 
cannot extend beyond the life of the estate it serves. Hoffman v. Savage, 15 
Mass. 130, 131 (1818) (holding that an easement appurtenant to a freehold estate 
of a dowager expired with that estate); Leuthold v. John A. Stees Co., 141 Minn. 
213, 169 N.W. 709, 710-11 (1918) (holding that an easement cannot be created in 
favor of an estate for years extending beyond the life of the estate); Ludwig v. 
Gosline, 191 N.J. Super. 188, 465 A.2d 946, 947 (1983) (holding that an easement 
by prescription may be obtained against the holder of a present interest, but 
that that prescriptive easement is subject to divestment if and when the 
property passes to the holder of a future interest); Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 N.J. 
Eq. 619, 23 A. 265, 267 (1891) (noting that when the dominant estate is a 
terminable estate, the right of passage ceases when that estate is terminated). 
In light of this rule, we hold that the easement serving the Thars' leased lands 
expired with the leasehold estate.

[¶7]      Moran granted an 
easement to serve leased lands, not an easement to serve lands held in fee. When 
Elvira Thar acquired the leased lands in fee, the leasehold estate expired and 
the easement serving that estate was terminated. Unlike the district court, 
which did not decide the issue, we hold that the Thars' easement expired with 
their leasehold interest in the state lands.

[¶8]      The Thars also 
argue that Moran is judicially estopped from denying the assignability of the 
easement. We need not consider this argument since the question of assignability 
is not reached in our decision.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶9]      The district 
court's decision denying the use of the expired easement by the Thars' lessee is 
affirmed. Since the easement has expired, the Thars must consider some other 
means of acquiring access to their landlocked parcel.

THOMAS, 
J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶10]   I cannot agree with the resolution 
of this case by the majority. It leaves the owners of a landlocked tract with no 
choice other than to pursue the statutory process for the creation of a private 
road. The majority chooses to evade the issues posed by the parties by 
concluding that an easement does not extend beyond the life of the estate it 
serves. In reaching that conclusion, the majority cites cases involving 
appurtenant easements, not easements in gross. Additional facts make these cases 
inapposite. Hoffman specifically found the estate was appurtenant and a building 
constructed on the easement twenty-four years before the action produced a 
presumption of extinguishment which could be rebutted, but was a question of 
fact for the jury. Leuthold is not applicable in the present instance because 
the easement was for years and by the terms of the lease expired on a specific 
date. Ludwig specifically stated that the defendants who were lessees of the 
same lessor as the plaintiffs had acquired an easement by prescription against 
the plaintiffs and their successors in interest. That court refused to decide if 
the easement should operate against the lessor if the property should ever 
revert to it. Newhoff affords interesting language regarding life estates and 
estates for years, but again it is applied to an appurtenant easement. 

[¶11]   In this instance, the trial court 
found this easement to be an easement in gross, but ruled against its 
assignability. I would adopt the rule articulated in the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
OF PROPERTY § 489 (1944), "Easements in gross, if of a commercial character, 
are alienable property interests." I agree with the district court that this 
easement is an easement in gross, and it seems clearly to have been of a 
commercial nature. Not only that, but the parties spoke to assignability in the 
document and said, "This Stipulation is binding upon the heirs, executors and 
assigns of the parties hereto."

[¶12]   I quote only in part from the 
Comment to this section of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY. There, it is 
said:

Comment:

a. 
Rationale. Property interests are, 
in general, alienable. If a particular property interest is not alienable, this 
result must be due to some policy against the alienability of such an interest. 
The policy of the law has been, in general, in favor of a high degree of 
alienability of property interests. This policy arises from a belief that the 
social interest is promoted by the greater utilization of the subject matter of 
property resulting from the freedom of alienation of interests in 
it.

[¶13]   I would reverse the trial court and 
hold that this easement was alienable as a matter of law. 

Footnote

1 The stipulation in which 
the easement was granted to Francis and Elvira Thar was executed by Edwin N. 
Moran, Nita C. Brennan, Ted Gassin and Edwin N. Moran as Administrator of the 
Estate of Blanche E. Moran. For convenience, we will identify Edwin N. Moran as 
the primary party.