Title: CHRISTOPHER ROBERT HICKS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT HICKS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 831487 P.3d 877Case Number: S-07-0086Decided: 07/16/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
ROBERT HICKS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, Wyoming;* Michael H. Reese of Michael Henry Reese, P.C., 
Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.**  Argument by Ms. 
Hackl.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw entered March 13, 2008.

**Entry 
of Appearance entered March 13, 2008.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Christopher Hicks was tried on 
charges relating to two homicides that occurred in Gillette, Wyoming, in the fall of 2005.  He was convicted on one count of first 
degree murder, and on two counts of conspiracy to commit murder.  He was acquitted on another count of 
first degree murder.  He was 
sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  On appeal, 
Mr. Hicks contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence of statements he made to law enforcement officials after his 
arrest, and that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
on the grounds that the prosecution improperly withheld exculpatory 
evidence.  After careful 
consideration, we affirm the district court's rulings.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. Hicks 
presents the following two issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred in denying Appellant's motions to 
suppress his post-arrest statements made to law 
enforcement.

 
 
II.         
Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial because the State suppressed 
exculpatory evidence in violation of his right to due 
process.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
During 
the summer and fall of 2005, several men shared a trailer home in Gillette.  One of them, Kent Proffit, Sr., was 
approximately forty years of age.  
Also living there were his son, Kent Proffit, Jr., Christopher Hicks, 
Jacob Martinez, and Jeremy Forquer, all of whom were eighteen or nineteen years 
old.  One frequent visitor to the 
home was fifteen year old Michael Seiser.1  The 
facts related here are based largely on the trial testimony of Mr. Martinez 
and Mr. Seiser.

 
 

[¶4]           
Near the 
end of September, Mr. Hicks told Mr. Martinez about a plan to bring a large 
amount of marijuana to Gillette, and asked Mr. Martinez to help sell it.  When that plan "went bad," 
Mr. Hicks told Mr. Martinez that the two of them were being blamed, and 
that their lives had been threatened, by persons not identified in the 
record.  When Mr. Hicks related 
these difficulties, Mr. Proffit, Sr., said that he was "connected" and 
could take care of their problems.  
After making some telephone calls, he led Mr. Hicks and 
Mr. Martinez to believe that he had resolved their problems, and he 
informed Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez that they "owed him 
favors."

 
 

[¶5]           
During 
this time, Mr. Proffit, Sr., was awaiting trial on charges that he had sexually 
assaulted his sixteen year old stepson, BC.2  Mr. Proffit, Sr., often complained about 
BC and called him insulting names.  
At least two people overheard him saying that BC should be killed.  As one witness testified, Mr. Proffit, 
Sr., said that BC "would be dead before he went to jail again."  Mr. Proffit, Sr., let Mr. Hicks and Mr. 
Martinez know that one of the favors he expected of them was the killing of 
BC.

 
 

[¶6]           
In the 
meantime, Mr. Proffit, Sr., also told Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez that 
Mr. Forquer was "working for the cops."  He said that Mr. Forquer could tell 
law enforcement officials of their discussions about killing BC, and that if 
they did not get "rid of" Mr. Forquer, he might also inform the authorities 
about their involvement with illegal drugs.  Mr. Proffit, Sr., helped them formulate 
a plan for killing Mr. Forquer.  
The plan was that Mr. Proffit, Sr., would ask Mr. Hicks how to 
perform a certain "chokehold."  Mr. 
Hicks would agree to show him, and they would get Mr. Forquer to volunteer for 
the demonstration.  Rather than 
simply demonstrating the chokehold, however, Mr. Hicks would continue 
strangling Mr. Forquer until he was dead.  

 
 

[¶7]           
They 
implemented the plan late one evening in the kitchen of the trailer home.  Mr. Proffit, Sr., Mr. Hicks, 
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Seiser, and Mr. Forquer were all present.  As requested by Mr. Proffit, Sr., 
Mr. Hicks demonstrated the chokehold on Mr. Forquer, then maintained 
it until Mr. Forquer lost consciousness.  Mr. Hicks then indicated that he 
was getting tired, however, and based on concerns that Mr. Forquer might 
still be alive, Mr. Proffit, Sr., directed Mr. Martinez to get a rope, 
which was tightened around Mr. Forquer's neck and left there until they 
were certain he was dead. 

 
 

[¶8]           
Again as 
directed by Mr. Proffit, Sr., they used diluted bleach to clean the body of Mr. 
Forquer, and around the kitchen where he had been killed.  They lined the trunk of Mr. Hicks's 
car with plastic bags, and put the body of Mr. Forquer inside.  They also put Mr. Forquer's personal 
belongings into the car.  They drove 
west on the interstate highway, throwing out Mr. Forquer's belongings at 
various places along the highway.  
They concealed Mr. Forquer's body under a tree about fifty yards away 
from the road.  

 
 

[¶9]           
With 
Mr. Forquer gone, Mr. Proffit, Sr., again started talking about killing 
BC.  Mr. Proffit, Sr., said he would 
have Mr. Hicks, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Seiser all killed if they 
did not kill BC.  Mr. Proffit, 
Sr., helped them develop a plan for shooting BC, which included efforts to 
modify the bullet so the gunshot would make less noise.  At Thanksgiving time, Mr. Proffit, 
Sr., left to spend time in Sheridan, and ordered that BC must be killed 
while he was gone so that he would have an alibi.

 
 

[¶10]       
In the 
early morning hours on the day after Thanksgiving, Mr. Seiser, Mr. Hicks, 
and Mr. Martinez drove to BC's home.  
They drove around the subdivision to make sure no one was around.  Mr. Seiser stopped the car and 
remained inside the vehicle, while Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez walked 
up to the house.  Mr. Hicks helped 
Mr. Martinez open the door, and then Mr. Hicks returned to the car while 
Mr. Martinez went inside and shot BC.  
Afterwards, the three men hid the empty bullet casing in the garage of a 
man they hoped would become a suspect in the murder.  They disposed of the gun in a septic 
tank near Mr. Seiser's home.  
The three then returned to where Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez lived, 
smoked marijuana, and went to bed.  
BC's mother later discovered his body. 

 
 

[¶11]       
At trial, 
Mr. Hicks was acquitted on the charge of first degree murder of 
Mr. Forquer.  He was convicted 
of conspiracy to commit first degree murder for the killing of Mr. Forquer, 
and of both first degree murder and conspiracy for the killing of BC.  Additional facts relating to analysis of 
the issues raised by Mr. Hicks are set forth in the discussion 
below.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

I.          
Motions to Suppress

 
 

[¶12]       
Prior to 
trial, Mr. Hicks filed motions to suppress statements he had made to law 
enforcement officials on the two days following his arrest.  He asserted that the statements were 
made involuntarily, and after he had invoked his rights to remain silent and to 
consult with counsel.  The district 
court held a hearing on the motions to suppress.  The district court denied the motions, 
finding that Mr. Hicks's statements were made after a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his rights.  The 
statements challenged by Mr. Hicks were admitted into evidence at the 
trial.  On appeal, Mr. Hicks 
challenges the district court's denial of his motions to 
suppress.

 
 
A.        
Standard of Review

 
 

[¶13]       
When we 
review a district court's decision to deny motions to suppress, we defer to the 
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  The evidence is viewed in a light 
favorable to the district court's determination, because that court 
had the opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the credibility of the 
witnesses.  Monroe v. State, 2006 WY 5, ¶ 10, 126 P.3d 97, 
99 (Wyo. 2006); Hadden v. State, 2002 
WY 41, ¶ 17, 42 P.3d 495, 499 (Wyo. 2002).  Voluntariness "is a legal question; 
thus, we review the ultimate issue, whether a defendant's statements were 
voluntary, de novo."  Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 7, 98 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting 
Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 ( Wyo. 1999)). 

 
 

B.        
Background

 
 

[¶14]       
For the 
factual background of this issue, we turn to the record of the district court's 
hearing on the motions to suppress, and in particular to the testimony of the 
lead investigator.  On December 19, 
2005, the investigation of the murder of BC led to the arrest of both 
Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez.  
The two were arrested at the same time and the same place, so each knew 
that the other had been arrested.  
The investigator informed Mr. Hicks that he was charged with the murder 
of BC, and advised Mr. Hicks of his rights to remain silent and to be 
represented by an attorney.  These 
are the rights commonly referred to as Miranda rights, based on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  
Mr. Hicks invoked his right to remain silent, and was booked into 
jail without being interrogated.  

 
 

[¶15]       
The 
following morning, however, the investigator was told by staff from the jail 
that Mr. Hicks wanted to talk with him.  
The investigator met with Mr. Hicks at about 8:45 a.m., and again 
advised him of his Miranda rights. 
 Mr. Hicks indicated that he was 
willing to talk because he wanted to "work a deal."  He told the investigator that he was not 
involved in the murder of BC, but he knew who was, naming Mr. Proffit, Sr., and 
Mr. Martinez.  The interview 
lasted approximately thirty minutes, and at its conclusion, the investigator 
said he would talk to the prosecuting attorney's office and "find out what 
information would be relevant and see what could be done."

 
 

[¶16]       
While the 
investigator was still meeting with the prosecuting attorney, he learned that 
Mr. Hicks had asked to talk with him again.  Before the investigator could get back 
to the jail, Mr. Hicks told another law enforcement officer that he knew 
the location of the gun used to shoot BC, and wanted to tell the investigator 
where it was.  The record indicates 
that the conversation with the other officer took place at approximately 10:10 
a.m.  It does not indicate whether 
Mr. Hicks was again advised of his Miranda rights during his brief 
conversation with the other officer.

 
 

[¶17]       
The lead 
investigator met with Mr. Hicks again at approximately 11:30 a.m.  Once again, the investigator reminded 
Mr. Hicks of his Miranda rights, 
and once again Mr. Hicks confirmed that he wanted to talk.  This time, Mr. Hicks said that he, 
Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Seiser had disposed of the gun used to shoot BC 
in a septic tank near Mr. Seiser's home.  
They had done so at the direction of Mr. Proffit, Sr., who told them that 
"if they dropped it into a sewer drain, the firearm would never [be] 
found."  Law enforcement officials 
soon found the gun at the location Mr. Hicks had indicated.

 
 

[¶18]       
While 
law enforcement officials were recovering the gun, the investigator was told 
that Mr. Hicks once again wanted to talk with him.  At approximately 1:00 p.m., the 
investigator met with Mr. Hicks, and again advised him of his Miranda rights.  Mr. Hicks again indicated that he 
wanted to talk.  This time he said 
that he and Mr. Martinez had driven to BC's home on the night he was 
shot.  Mr. Hicks said that he 
stayed in the vehicle while Mr. Martinez went into the home and shot 
BC.

 
 

[¶19]       
The next 
day, Mr. Hicks made his initial appearance before the circuit court judge, and 
told the court that he would be hiring a private attorney to conduct his 
defense.  Approximately an hour 
after this initial appearance, however, Mr. Hicks once again asked to talk 
to the lead investigator.  The 
investigator met with Mr. Hicks again, with no defense counsel 
present.  The investigator reminded 
Mr. Hicks that he had said he was hiring counsel, and told him, "you are hiring 
an attorney, talk to your attorney, if you've got anything else your attorney 
can talk to me."  Mr. Hicks said 
that he still wanted to talk to the investigator.  Even so, the investigator again reminded 
Mr. Hicks of his Miranda 
rights.  This time, Mr. Hicks 
recanted his previous statements about the night BC was shot, saying that he had 
loaned his car to Mr. Martinez that night, but that he had not accompanied 
him to BC's home.  This was 
apparently the investigator's last interview with Mr. Hicks. 

 
 

C.        
Analysis

 
 

[¶20]       
Under 
Article 1, §§ 6 and 11 of the Wyoming Constitution, as under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, "A defendant is 
deprived of the right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is 
admitted at his trial."  Goulart v. State, 2003 WY 108, ¶ 6, 
76 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Wyo. 2003); see also 
State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Wyo. 1997).  "[T]he State has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, 
that a confession, admission, or statement was given voluntarily."  Id. 
at 1125.

 
 

[¶21]       
Mr. 
Hicks accurately points out that he did not sign any written acknowledgements or 
waivers of his Miranda rights.  None of his statements to the 
investigator were recorded, although video and audio recording equipment was 
available at the time.  After 
preparing written reports, the investigator destroyed any notes he had made 
during the meetings with Mr. Hicks.  
Thus, the State presented no documentary evidence that Mr. Hicks's 
statements were voluntary.  
Mr. Hicks asserts that the investigator's testimony, without 
documentary support, was insufficient to sustain the State's burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were voluntary. 

 
 

[¶22]       
It may 
well be that a written waiver of Miranda rights "constitutes better' 
evidence" than oral testimony alone.  
Goulart, ¶ 8 n.3, 76 P.3d  
at 1233 n.3.  However, Mr. Hicks has 
cited no cases, and we have found none, holding that the State is required to 
present written evidence to prove that a defendant's statements to law 
enforcement officials were voluntary.  
We have indicated, to the contrary, that the State may satisfy its burden 
with "recording or witness evidence," (emphasis 
added) and there is "no requirement that interviews and interrogations must be 
electronically recorded."  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1128.  In Mr. Hicks's case, the investigator 
provided clear and unequivocal testimony, which was thoroughly tested through 
cross examination.  This testimony, 
if believed by the district court, was sufficient evidence for the State to meet 
its burden of proving that Mr. Hicks's statements were 
voluntary.

 
 

[¶23]       
The 
district court did believe the testimony, and found that Mr. Hicks had been 
advised of his Miranda rights at 
least three of the four times he talked to law enforcement officials on the 
first day after his arrest.  The 
record of the investigator's testimony supports this finding, and we cannot 
conclude that it is clearly erroneous.  
The district court correctly concluded, in addition, that "satisfying Miranda does not resolve the question of 
voluntariness," Evans, 944 P.2d  at 
1125, because the State must further prove that the statements were voluntary, 
that is, that they resulted from "free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception."  
Pena, ¶ 7, 98 P.3d  at 
862.  On this question, the district 
court found that Mr. Hicks had initiated each of the conversations, and that 
there was a complete absence of "evidence of threats or promises from any source 
surrounding the interrogation."  
Again, these factual findings are supported by the record and are not 
clearly erroneous.  Based on these 
facts, we agree with the district court's legal conclusion that the statements 
were "in all respects voluntary."  

 
 

[¶24]       
Mr. 
Hicks's statements to the investigator on the second day after his arrest are 
subject to additional analysis, because they were made after he invoked his 
right to counsel.  We have 
recognized that when a defendant asserts his right to counsel, "any subsequent 
waiver of the right to counsel during police-initiated interrogation is 
invalid."  Houghton v. State, 6 P.3d 643, 648 (Wyo. 
2000).  This rule does not apply, 
however, when "the accused himself initiates further communication."  Id.  The burden is on the State to prove that 
the defendant initiated the contact, and that the waiver of his right to counsel 
was knowing and voluntary.  
Id.; Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 593-94 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

[¶25]       
The 
investigator's testimony is clear that Mr. Hicks asked to see him soon after the 
initial appearance in the circuit court.  
The investigator again advised Mr. Hicks of his Miranda rights.  The investigator reminded Mr. Hicks 
that he had asked for an attorney, and actually discouraged Mr. Hicks from 
talking to him again.  Nevertheless, 
Mr. Hicks said that he still wanted to talk to the investigator.  This evidence fully supports the 
district court's findings that these communications were initiated by 
Mr. Hicks, and while he had previously invoked his right to counsel, he 
knowingly and voluntarily waived that right.  The district court's findings of fact are 
not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law are correct.  We affirm its denial of Mr. Hicks's 
motions to suppress evidence of his statements to the 
investigator.

 
 
II.         
Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence

 
 

[¶26]       
Mr. Hicks 
contends that the prosecution improperly suppressed evidence that would have 
been favorable to his defense.  
After trial, but before sentencing, Mr. Hicks moved the district court 
for a new trial on that basis.  The 
district court denied the motion.  
On appeal, Mr. Hicks challenges the district court's 
decision.

 
 
A.        
Background

 
 

[¶27]       
On the 
first day of trial, Mr. Martinez testified that, approximately two weeks before 
Mr. Forquer was killed, there was a discussion among Mr. Proffit, Sr., Mr. 
Proffit, Jr., Mr. Hicks, and Mr. Martinez about digging a grave for Mr. 
Forquer's body.  Mr. Martinez 
testified that he, Mr. Hicks, and Mr. Proffit, Jr., had dug the grave somewhere 
west of Gillette.  At the direction 
of Mr. Proffit, Sr., however, Mr. Forquer's body was not left in the grave they 
had dug.

 
 

[¶28]       
Mr. 
Proffit, Jr., was not a witness in Mr. Hicks's trial.  The prosecution had issued him a 
subpoena, however, and on the fourth day of the trial, they interviewed him for 
the purpose of determining whether to call him as a witness.  During that interview, Mr. Proffit, 
Jr., confirmed that he, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Hicks had dug a hole somewhere 
west of Gillette.  However, he said 
that it was not intended as a grave for Mr. Forquer, but as a hunting 
blind.  The hole, according to Mr. 
Proffit, Jr., was not big enough to be used as a grave.  The prosecution did not call Mr. 
Proffit, Jr., as a witness, and it did not disclose his statements to 
Mr. Hicks's defense counsel.

 
 

[¶29]       
After 
Mr. Hicks was convicted, but before he was sentenced, his defense counsel 
learned about Mr. Proffit's statements.  
Mr. Hicks moved for a new trial, asserting that this information had 
been improperly suppressed, and that pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), he was entitled to a new trial.  After a hearing in which Mr. Proffit, 
Jr., was a witness, the district court denied the motion for a new 
trial.

 
 
B.        
Standard of Review

 
 

[¶30]       
We 
generally review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse 
of discretion.  Chauncey 
v. State, 2006 
WY 18, ¶ 13, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2006).  However, an improper suppression of 
exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's constitutional rights, and 
constitutional issues are usually subject to de novo review.  Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, 
¶ 6, 172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo. 2007).  
Accordingly, we will review de 
novo the district court's decision to deny Mr. Hicks's motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that the State improperly suppressed exculpatory 
evidence.

 
 
C.        
Analysis

 
 

[¶31]       
It is a 
violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence that is 
favorable to a defendant, and material to the defendant's guilt or 
punishment.  Wilkening, ¶ 7, 172 P.3d at 386-87; 
Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97.  Accordingly, to 
establish a Brady violation, Mr. 
Hicks has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was favorable, that it 
was suppressed, and that it was material.  
Wilkening, ¶ 7, 172 P.3d  
at 387.

 
 

[¶32]       
The 
district court ruled that the evidence was favorable to Mr. Hicks, because 
it could have been used to impeach Mr. Martinez, one of the main witnesses 
against Mr. Hicks.  The State 
does not contest this ruling.  It is 
well established that impeachment evidence may be favorable evidence for 
purposes of a Brady analysis.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 14, 
47 P.3d 981, 985 (Wyo. 2002); United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 
87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985).  The district 
court ruled correctly on this question.

 
 

[¶33]       
The 
district court wrote that it was "not entirely convinced" that the evidence had 
been suppressed.  It noted, on the 
one hand, that "[e]vidence is not suppressed' if the defendant either knew or 
should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any 
exculpatory evidence."  Chauncey, ¶ 25, 127 P.3d  at 24 
(quoting United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982)).  Mr. 
Hicks was present when the hole was dug, and if it had been meant for a hunting 
blind, he knew or should have known that fact.  Mr. Hicks had "enjoyed unfettered 
access" to Mr. Proffit, Jr., and his counsel could have asked Mr. Proffit, 
Jr., about his version of why the hole was dug.  On the other hand, the district court 
noted this statement from Chauncey, 
¶ 27, 127 P.3d at 25:

 

The 
State has presented us with no authority to suggest that the content of a 
witness' interview with law enforcement officers is equally available to a 
defendant when the defendant is acquainted with that witness.  Absent such an argument, this interview 
appears to be suppressed under Brady.

 
 
To 
resolve this uncertainty, the district court in effect gave Mr. Hicks the 
benefit of the doubt, and assumed that the State had suppressed the 
statements.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we will employ the same assumption.  

 
 

[¶34]       
The 
district court concluded, however, that the evidence was not material.  The district court provided a thorough 
and thoughtful explanation for its conclusion, and we quote at length from the 
written order denying the motion for a new trial:

 
 
[T]he 
Defendant vigorously assaulted Martinez' credibility on two independent 
grounds:  1) he plea-bargained 
his way out of a possible death sentence in return for his testimony and 2) he 
admitted to having previously perjured himself . . . in related 
proceedings.  In this context, 
Proffit, Jr.'s rebuttal to Martinez' account of the reason for digging the 
hole/grave is of relatively light account.  
Furthermore, given the evidence in the record as to Proffit, Jr.'s own 
alleged involvement in both murders, it is as likely as not the jury would have 
entirely disregarded his account of the hole/grave digging as 
self-serving.

 
 
Finally, 
the court weighs in the balance other evidence adduced at trial indicating the 
Defendant's guilt on the three (3) counts of which he was convicted, including 
the testimony of Michael Seiser . . . who was eyewitness to the Forquer murder 
and participated in the planning and execution of [BC's] murder.  Seiser's account of the killings 
mirrored that of Martinez insofar as implicating the 
Defendant.  Also included in the 
damning evidence against the Defendant were his own statements to law 
enforcement, his statement of admission to his girlfriend, . . . and his writing 
to a fellow inmate at the Campbell County Detention Center in which he sought to 
develop an alibi for himself with respect to both murders.

 
 
Reviewing 
the record as a whole, the court concludes there is not a reasonable probability 
the result of the proceeding (guilty verdicts on three of four counts; life 
without parole as punishment on the two capital counts) would have been 
different had Proffit, Jr.'s statement been disclosed to the Defendant in a 
timely manner.  Nor did its 
non-disclosure to the Defendant undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial 
in either the guilt or penalty phases.

 
 

[¶35]       
In a Brady analysis, evidence is material 
"only when a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed."  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 15, 
131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006).  
There is a reasonable probability of a different result "when the 
suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."  Id.  The district court's order demonstrates 
that it applied the correct legal standard in determining whether the evidence 
was material.  

 
 

[¶36]       
We also 
find no fault in the district court's application of that law to the facts of 
this case.  It is true that 
"evidence that could be used to discredit such an important witness or cast 
doubt on [his] veracity is usually material."  Davis, ¶ 22, 
47 P.3d  at 987.  It is not always 
material, however, and Mr. Hicks presents the unusual case in which it is 
not.  Upon our review of the record, 
we agree that the credibility of Mr. Martinez was "vigorously assaulted," 
to borrow the district court's language.  
There is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would 
have been different if Mr. Martinez had been discredited on another point 
that was, at most, tangentially related to the main evidence.  The suppression of "one additional piece 
of cumulative information" does not render a "verdict unworthy of 
confidence."  Chauncey, ¶ 21, 127 P.3d  at 
24.

 
 

[¶37]       
The 
record also fully supports the district court's conclusion that similarities in 
the testimony of Mr. Martinez and Mr. Seiser convincingly implicated Mr. Hicks 
in both murders.  The two witnesses 
provided nearly identical testimony not only about the main events of the 
murders, but also, notably, on minor details such as the use of diluted bleach 
to clean Mr. Forquer's body, and the names of the several persons who had been 
at the trailer on the evening before BC's murder.  The jury may have considered it unlikely 
that the two witnesses could successfully fabricate such details.  Given the extensive and mutually 
supportive testimony from Mr. Martinez and Mr. Seiser, we agree with the 
district court that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been changed if Mr. Hicks had presented evidence about a 
disagreement between Mr. Martinez and Mr. Proffit, Jr.  For these reasons, we agree with the 
trial court's conclusion that the evidence was not material, and we affirm the 
trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶38]       
We affirm 
the district court's denial of Mr. Hicks's motion to suppress evidence of his 
statements to law enforcement officials following his arrest, and of his motion 
for a new trial on the grounds that exculpatory evidence was improperly 
suppressed.  We therefore affirm in 
all respects the district court's conviction and sentencing of Mr. 
Hicks.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Because 
Mr. Seiser was a minor, we would generally refer to him only by his 
initials.  However, by the time of 
Mr. Hicks's trial, Mr. Seiser had been charged, as an adult, in connection with 
his involvement in the two homicides.  
He had agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder, conspiracy to 
commit second degree murder, and accessory after the fact.  Given these circumstances, we will refer 
to Mr. Seiser by his name. 

2We will 
conform to our usual practice, and refer to this minor by his 
initials.