Title: State v. Codeluppi

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Codeluppi, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1574.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1574 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CODELUPPI, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Codeluppi, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1574.] 
Criminal procedure—Motion to suppress—Particularity of grounds for 
suppression of field sobriety tests—Crim.R. 47. 
(No. 2013-0186—Submitted November 20, 2013—Decided April 17, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 11CA010133,  
2012-Ohio-5812. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A highly detailed pleading of the facts and law is not required to satisfy the notice 
requirements of State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319 
(1994), and to trigger the right to a hearing on a motion to suppress. 
____________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we apply the holding of State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319 (1994), and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand this case. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} On August 3, 2011, Corrine Codeluppi was charged by citation 
with speeding, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.21, and with 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor in 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A).  There was no video recording of the traffic stop 
and the field sobriety tests conducted.  The only discovery evidence provided to 
Codeluppi was the police report of the arrest.  The report indicated that the law-
enforcement officer administered the three field sobriety tests that are 
standardized by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
guidelines: (1) horizontal-gaze nystagmus, (2) walk and turn, and (3) one-leg 
stand.  The report described Codeluppi’s actions and the law-enforcement 
officer’s findings, but did not describe the instructions and demonstrations given 
by the officer prior to each test. 
{¶ 3} Codeluppi filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during 
the traffic stop, for which the court set a hearing and pretrial conference.  The day 
before the hearing, the state filed its response to the motion, requesting that the 
motion be denied pursuant to Crim.R. 47 as lacking sufficient particularity on the 
issue of alleged improper administration of field sobriety tests.  The trial court 
denied the suppression motion that same day, stating that the motion lacked 
sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues 
to be decided.  The court ordered the pretrial conference to proceed as scheduled. 
{¶ 4} The next day, Codeluppi filed a motion for leave to file a 
supplemental brief in support of her motion to suppress and a motion for 
reconsideration.  But at the pretrial, she pled no contest.  The trial court found her 
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guilty of OVI, dismissed the speeding charge, and sentenced her to 30 days in jail 
and a $1,000 fine.  Twenty-seven days of the sentence and $400 of the fine were 
suspended, and she was placed on probation for one year with a 180-day license 
suspension allowing occupational driving privileges. 
{¶ 5} Codeluppi appealed the denial of her motion to suppress to the 
Ninth District Court of Appeals.  In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals 
affirmed.  The lead opinion agreed that the motion to suppress had “generally set 
forth numerous legal issues regarding probable cause, substantial compliance with 
NHTSA guidelines in field sobriety testing, and possible constitutional 
violations.”  (Emphasis sic.)  2012-Ohio-5812 at ¶ 24.  Nevertheless, it found the 
motion deficient in that it failed  
 
to state with particularity any factual allegations as to (1) how 
Officer Young allegedly lacked probable cause to further detain 
Ms. Codeluppi after initiating the traffic stop, and (2) the respects 
in which Officer Young allegedly violated provisions of the 
NHTSA guidelines in administering the Field Sobriety Tests. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id.  The dissenting judge did not agree that more factual detail 
was needed, because Codeluppi had specifically identified the code section and 
NHTSA standards that had not been met as well as the specific tests being 
challenged.  The dissent concluded, “The State could have had no doubt what the 
basis for Ms. Codeluppi’s motion to suppress was.”  Id. at ¶ 44 (Belfance, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 6} Codeluppi appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on 
the first proposition of law: “When a defendant files a Motion to Suppress, a 
highly detailed pleading of facts and law is not required to satisfy the Shindler 
notice requirements and to trigger the right to a hearing[;] thus the trial court errs 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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in dismissing the Motion without a hearing.”  135 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2013-Ohio-
1857, 986 N.E.2d 1021. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 7} The lead opinion of the court of appeals was mistaken in 
employing the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in this matter.  Normally, 
appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and 
fact.  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 
 
When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the 
role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve 
factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.  State v. 
Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972.  
Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 
evidence.  State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 1 OBR 57, 
437 N.E.2d 583.  Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court 
must then independently determine, without deference to the 
conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 
applicable legal standard.  State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio 
App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 8} Here, the trial court never acted as the trier of fact, because the 
motion to suppress was denied without a hearing.  Whether the motion to suppress 
satisfied Crim.R. 47’s minimum standards is a legal question.  Crim.R. 47 states: 
 
January Term, 2014 
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An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. 
A motion, other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be in 
writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state 
with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by a 
memorandum containing citations of authority, and may also be 
supported by an affidavit. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 9} A trial court must hold a suppression hearing if the motion meets 
Crim.R. 47’s minimum standards.  Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319, at 
syllabus.  The lead opinion of the court of appeals reasoned that Traf.R. 11(E), 
like Crim.R. 12(F), does not mandate a hearing on every suppression motion.  It 
determined that the trial court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing would 
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  2012-Ohio-5812, ¶ 23.  But 
questions of law are to be reviewed de novo.  State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 
295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8. 
Particularity in a Motion to Suppress 
{¶ 10} We have held that “[i]n order to require a hearing on a motion to 
suppress evidence, the accused must state the motion’s legal and factual bases 
with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the 
issues to be decided.”  Shindler, syllabus.  Failure to include or particularly state 
the factual and legal basis for a motion to suppress waives that issue.  See 
Defiance v. Katz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 573 N.E.2d 32 (1991). 
{¶ 11} Codeluppi challenged the traffic stop, the officer’s probable cause 
to arrest, his failure to conduct field sobriety tests in substantial compliance with 
NHTSA guidelines, and statements obtained in violation of her Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The state’s response complained only about the specificity of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the motion regarding the alleged improper administration of the field sobriety 
tests.  The admissibility of results of field sobriety tests is governed by R.C. 
4511.19(D)(4)(b).  That subdivision provides: 
 
In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division 
(A) or (B) of this section, * * * if a law enforcement officer has 
administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle 
involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial 
compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, 
and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the 
time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any 
testing standards then in effect that were set by the national 
highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply: 
(i)  The officer may testify concerning the results of the 
field sobriety test so administered. 
(ii)  The prosecution may introduce the results of the field 
sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the 
criminal prosecution * * *. 
(iii) * * * [I]f the testimony or evidence is admissible under 
the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or 
evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier 
of fact considers to be appropriate. 
 
In other words, the results of the field sobriety tests are not admissible at trial 
unless the state shows by clear and convincing evidence that the officer 
administered the test in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines.  A 
January Term, 2014 
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motion to suppress is an appropriate pretrial proceeding designed to determine the 
admissibility of this evidence. 
{¶ 12} Codeluppi’s motion to suppress requested the exclusion of 
 
1.  Any and all evidence obtained by the State of Ohio 
subsequent to the unlawful and unconstitutional traffic stop and 
seizure of the Defendant herein; 
2.  Any and all evidence obtained by the State of Ohio as 
the fruit of the unconstitutional arrest of the Defendant;  
3.  Any and all standardized field sobriety test observations 
and/or results as said field tests were not performed in substantial 
compliance with NHTSA guidelines; and/or  
4.  Any and all oral or written custodial statements obtained 
from or made by the Defendant. 
 
The memorandum in support also asked the court to consider the following 
specific claims in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest: 
 
1)  The tests were administered under duress resulting in 
the Defendant’s emotional and/or physical condition (independent 
of alcohol) affecting the Defendant’s ability to perform the field 
sobriety tests; 
2)  The tests were administered under difficult 
environmental conditions; 
3)  The officer’s analysis of the Defendant’s performance 
on these tests was biased resulting in inaccurate recording at the 
police station. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The memorandum continued: “It is the Defendant’s contention, and the State is 
hereby put on notice, that the testing law enforcement officer failed to instruct, 
conduct, evaluate, administer, and/or record the standardized field sobriety tests 
used in the within matter in substantial compliance with [NHTSA] Guidelines.” 
{¶ 13} Shindler does not require that a defendant set forth the basis for 
suppression in excruciating detail.  Instead, the question is whether the language 
used provides sufficient notice to the state.  After all, “[t]he motion to suppress is 
merely a procedural vehicle to ‘put the ball into play’ and serve notice that the 
defendant intends to have the state meet its legislatively mandated burden of 
demonstrating compliance with any and all challenged regulations and 
requirements.”  Weiler & Weiler, Baldwin’s Ohio Driving Under the Influence 
Law, 2012-2013, Section 9:13, at 265 (2012).  Codeluppi’s motion meets this 
standard.  She alleged that the officer had not conducted the field sobriety tests in 
substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines as required by R.C. 
4511.19(D)(4)(b).  This statement was sufficient to identify the issues Codeluppi 
was raising. We agree with the dissenting judge below that the state could have no 
doubt about the basis for the motion to suppress. 
{¶ 14} The primary source of evidence normally available to an OVI 
defendant—a video recording of the field sobriety tests—was not available in this 
case.  Defense counsel had no readily available reliable evidence from which 
counsel could formulate more particularized grounds regarding the police 
officer’s failure to substantially comply with NHTSA guidelines.  Codeluppi 
therefore provided notice of legally significant facts to the extent that the facts 
were available, rendering her motion more than a mere fishing expedition. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 15} We hold that a highly detailed pleading of the facts and law is not 
required to satisfy the Shindler notice requirements and to trigger the right to a 
hearing on a motion to suppress.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the court 
January Term, 2014 
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of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for a hearing on the motion to 
suppress. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
____________________ 
 
Toni L. Morgan, North Ridgeville City Prosecutor, for appellee. 
 
Polito, Paulozzi, Rodstrom & Burke, L.L.P., and Joseph T. Burke, for 
appellant. 
Gregg Marx, Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jocelyn S. Kelly, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
 
John T. Forristal, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cuyahoga Criminal 
Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
Paul A. Griffin Co., L.P.A., and Paul A. Griffin, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________________