Title: Doe v. Hills-Pettitt

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 140 
Docket: 
Ken-20-138 
Argued:  
October 6, 2020  
Decided: 
December 22, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
PAT DOE1 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER HILLS-PETTITT 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Pat Doe appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court 
(Augusta, Nale, J.) dismissing with prejudice a complaint for protection from 
abuse that she brought on behalf of her three minor children against their 
father, Christopher Hills-Pettitt.  Doe contends that the court erred or abused 
its discretion in dismissing her complaint with prejudice instead of granting her 
oral motion to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice.  We 
conclude, contrary to the court’s determination, that due process did not 
                                         
1  In accordance with the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2265(d)(3) (LEXIS through 
Pub. L. No. 116-214), we have employed the pseudonym “Pat Doe” for the plaintiff.  The individual 
who filed the complaint and initially appeared on behalf of the children died during the course of this 
appeal, and we granted a request to allow the trial court to order the substitution of a person who is 
now responsible for the children.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 4005(1) (2020); 22 M.R.S. § 4002(9) (2020).  On 
November 23, 2020, the trial court ordered that substitution, and we employ the pseudonym “Pat 
Doe” interchangeably to refer to both individuals who have appeared as plaintiffs in this case. 
 
 
2 
require the court to dismiss the matter with prejudice and we therefore vacate 
the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On February 19, 2020, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014 
(2020), Doe filed a complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of the 
children, alleging that Christopher was sexually abusing two of them.  The court 
granted a temporary order for protection from abuse and scheduled a final 
hearing for March 9, 2020.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 4006.   
[¶3]  After the court entered the temporary order and before the final 
hearing, Christopher was arrested and charged with unlawful sexual contact.  
See 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A (2020).  Christopher’s bail conditions prohibited 
contact between Christopher and the children.2  Both parties and their 
attorneys attended the March 9 hearing, but Doe did not bring the children 
whose reports served as the basis of the complaint.  At the outset, Doe orally 
moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, citing the need to spare the 
children the trauma of testifying given that Christopher’s bail conditions 
protected them by prohibiting any contact between him and the children.  The 
                                         
2  Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201, we take judicial notice of the bail conditions, which prohibit any 
contact between Christopher and the children.  See, e.g., Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 24, 
2 A.3d 301 (noting that a court may take judicial notice of docket records in other cases).   
 
 
3 
court responded that it was going to either hold a final hearing that day or 
dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  The court allowed the parties to confer 
briefly before Doe renewed her oral request.  The court denied Doe’s motion 
and entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice.   
[¶4]  On March 13, 2020, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), Doe moved for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that the court was 
required to allow the voluntary dismissal of the complaint without prejudice 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), and further requesting that the court find 
additional facts to support its decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  
In an order denying that motion, the court stated that Christopher “was entitled 
to have the matter adjudicated on the day the trial was scheduled.  [Doe] did 
not request a continuance.  The court did not intend this dismissal to act as a 
sanction upon [Doe] but a rendering of due process.”  Doe timely appealed.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2020); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B(c)(1), (2)(B).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)—Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff 
[¶5]  Doe argues that the court misapplied M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) when it 
dismissed her complaint with prejudice.  We review the court’s interpretation 
 
 
4 
of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure3 de novo “and look to the plain language 
of the rules to determine their meaning.”  Kline v. Burdin, 2017 ME 194, ¶ 7, 170 
A.3d 282 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶6]  Rule 41(a)(1)4 provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action 
without a court order by filing either a notice of dismissal—if the defendant has 
not served an answer or a motion for summary judgment5—or a stipulation of 
dismissal signed by all of the parties.  “Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice.”  M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the plain language of the Rule permits a plaintiff to 
specify whether or not the dismissal is with prejudice.  See e.g., In re Kaleb D., 
                                         
3  Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 4010(1) (2020), the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all 
proceedings brought under the chapter governing complaints for protection from abuse.  See also 
Shaw v. Packard, 2005 ME 122, ¶ 9, 886 A.2d 1287.   
4  Rule 41(a)(1) was amended in 1989 to allow a plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily only 
before the defendant served an answer or a motion for summary judgment.  M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) 
Advisory Committee’s Notes 1989. 
5  Maine’s protection from abuse law does not affirmatively require a defendant to file an answer 
or permit the defendant to file a motion for summary judgment.  See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001-4014 
(2020).  Similarly, the Judicial Branch’s Guide to Protection from Abuse and Harassment Cases notes 
that the defendant is not required to submit a written response to the plaintiff’s complaint.  Maine 
Judicial Branch, Administrative Office of the Courts, A Guide to Protection from Abuse & Harassment 
Cases 10 (June 2018), https://www.courts.maine.gov/help/guides/pa-ph-guide.pdf.  Importation of 
summary judgment practice would entirely defeat the purpose of what is supposed to be a system 
that allows “victims of domestic abuse to obtain expeditious and effective protection against further 
abuse so that the lives of the nonabusing family or household members are as secure and 
uninterrupted as possible.”  19-A M.R.S. § 4001(2).  We have already noted that Rule 56(a) does not 
authorize the use of summary judgment process in family law matters, Higgins v. Wood, 2018 ME 88, 
¶ 8, 189 A.3d 724, and take this opportunity to instruct litigants and the District Court that the 
process is not authorized in actions for protection from abuse or harassment.   
 
 
5 
2001 ME 55, ¶ 3 n.4, 769 A.2d 179 (“Because there was no stipulation among 
the parties indicating otherwise and because the dismissal was silent as to 
whether it was with or without prejudice, the dismissal in this case did not 
operate as an adjudication on the merits.”).   
[¶7]  However, to avail herself of Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff must file a 
written notice of the dismissal with the court or a stipulation of dismissal signed 
by all parties.  See M.R. Civ. P. 41 Advisory Committee’s Notes 1989 (stating that 
the 1989 amendment adopts the language of Federal Rule 41(a)(1)); 8 James 
W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.33(4)(a) (3d ed. 2007) (noting 
that oral notice is insufficient for a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)).  Here, the defendant did not serve an 
answer or a motion for summary judgment and Doe orally moved to dismiss 
her complaint.  Thus, in the absence of a written notice or signed stipulation, 
Doe could not implement the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1) that allowed her to 
specify that the dismissal was without prejudice.   
B. 
M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)—Voluntary Dismissal by Order of the Court 
[¶8]  Next, we examine whether the court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the case with prejudice.  M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides that a court 
may dismiss a case “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
 
 
6 
proper,” and we have recognized that this language grants a court “discretion 
to dismiss a case with or without prejudice,” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 
2017 ME 68, ¶ 16, 158 A.3d 931.  Thus, unlike Rule 41(a)(1), which allows the 
plaintiff to decide whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, Rule 
41(a)(2) gives this discretion to the court.  We review a court’s dismissal with 
prejudice for an abuse of discretion.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Curit, 2016 ME 17, 
¶ 10, 131 A.3d 903.  In doing so, we evaluate “(1) whether the court’s factual 
findings are supported by the record according to the clear error standard, (2) 
whether the court understood the law applicable to the exercise of its 
discretion, and (3) whether the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and 
choices was within the bounds of reasonableness.”  Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 
2017 ME 68, ¶ 12, 158 A.3d 931.  Here, because the court concluded that 
Christopher’s due process rights precluded it from exercising its discretion,6 we 
begin by addressing the court’s understanding of the law, which requires us to 
determine “the parameters of the court’s authority—a matter that we review 
de novo.”  Id.; see also State v. Mason, 408 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Me. 1979) (noting 
that where “the presiding Justice does not exercise judicial discretion when he 
                                         
6  The court was unequivocal that it did not intend the dismissal with prejudice “to act as a sanction 
upon [Doe].”  Instead, the court reasoned that due process required it to dismiss the complaint with 
prejudice because Christopher “was entitled to have the matter adjudicated on the day the trial was 
scheduled.”   
 
 
7 
is authorized to do so, his ruling is based upon a misconception of the applicable 
law”).   
1. 
Procedural Due Process 
[¶9]  Doe argues that the court erred in concluding that if no hearing was 
held on March 9, 2020, due process required the court to dismiss the complaint 
with prejudice.  Christopher contends that because 19-A M.R.S. § 4006(1) 
requires a hearing within twenty-one days after the filing of the complaint, due 
process dictates that the matter either be adjudicated on that exact date or be 
dismissed with prejudice.   
[¶10]  We review this issue of procedural due process de novo.  State v. 
Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.  The due process clause of the Maine 
Constitution echoes its federal counterpart: “No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law.”  Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A; U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Green v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 2000 ME 92, ¶ 21 n.4, 750 A.2d 1265.   
 
[¶11]  In determining whether a person has been deprived of a protected 
interest without due process of law, we employ two steps.  “First, we determine 
if the government has deprived a claimant of life, liberty, or property interests.  
Second, if such deprivation occurred, we then determine what process, 
 
 
8 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, is due utilizing the factors in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).”  DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Exec. Dir., Me. Revenue Serv., 2007 ME 62, ¶ 26, 922 A.2d 465 (citation 
omitted).  Those factors are as follows: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 
 
In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15, 55 A.3d 463 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).   
 
[¶12]  Pursuant to this framework, we must first determine whether any 
of Christopher’s constitutionally protected interests would have been affected 
had the court dismissed Doe’s complaint without, rather than with, prejudice.  
A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care and custody of his 
children is a fundamental liberty interest that is undoubtedly at stake in an 
action like this for protection from abuse.  See Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 
198, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291.  However, that interest is not implicated by a court’s 
dismissal of an action for protection from abuse because a dismissal with or 
without prejudice can actually restore the parental rights of the defendant by 
terminating the court’s temporary protection order.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 4006(2).  
 
 
9 
In short, a dismissal without prejudice would not deprive Christopher of his 
parental rights without due process of law.  Neither the trial court nor 
Christopher identified any legal authority to support the proposition that there 
is a protected liberty interest in being shielded from future litigation on a 
complaint for protection from abuse when the plaintiff seeks to dismiss an 
initial complaint.7  Because, in the context of this case, there is no protected 
interest that inoculates Christopher from a future civil complaint arising from 
facts that have not previously been developed at trial, there can be no 
procedural due process violation.8  See DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2007 ME 62, ¶ 26, 
922 A.2d 465. 
                                         
7  To the extent that we have opined on the procedural safeguards surrounding a dismissal with 
prejudice, we have focused on the importance of the court or the opposing party providing “the 
plaintiff with adequate notice that such a result will be considered.”  Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 
2017 ME 68, ¶ 20, 158 A.3d 931 (emphasis added). 
8  Even if we were to conclude that Christopher had a protected interest in not being subjected to 
future litigation about Doe’s allegations, we note that “the State has a compelling interest in limiting, 
restricting, or even terminating a parent’s rights when harm to the child will result from the absence 
of such governmental interference,” In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶ 23, 189 A.3d 252 
(quoting Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 14, 90 A.3d 1169), and that “[t]he Due Process Clause is not an 
impenetrable wall behind which parents may shield their children; rather, it provides heightened 
protection against state intervention in parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children,” Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291. 
 
Moreover, contrary to the court’s conclusion that Christopher’s due process rights entitled him to 
have the complaint “adjudicated on the day the trial was scheduled,” it is well settled that there is no 
due process property right in a procedure itself.  See Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304, 
1308 (Me. 1984) (holding that the failure to follow statutorily prescribed procedures was not a 
violation of due process because there is “no property interest in statutory procedures themselves”); 
Botting v. Dep’t of Behav. & Dev. Servs., 2003 ME 152, ¶ 23, 838 A.2d 1168 (holding that “[t]he interest 
in procedure itself is not an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).  As we have held, in 
an action for protection from abuse, “the court has the discretion, for good cause, to schedule the 
 
 
10 
[¶13]  Furthermore, Christopher’s contention that his due process rights 
are “inextricably tied” to a hearing, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4006(1), is accurate but 
misapplied.  See Sparks v. Sparks, 2013 ME 41, ¶ 28, 65 A.3d 1223.  Christopher 
would still be afforded an opportunity to be heard and present evidence if Doe 
files a second complaint, and we have held that, if followed correctly, the 
procedures in actions for protection from abuse adequately protect a 
defendant’s procedural due process rights.  See id. at ¶ 29 (holding that 
“[b]ecause the father was actually present at and participated in the hearing 
and was able to present evidence concerning a possible award of parental 
rights to [the mother], he received ample due process”).  We conclude that the 
court erred as a matter of law when it determined that due process and 19-A 
M.R.S. § 4006(1) required it to either hold the March 9 hearing as scheduled or 
dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), 
the court retained the authority and discretion to dismiss Doe’s complaint 
without prejudice.9   
                                         
hearing for a date later than twenty-one days after the filing of the complaint, even over the objection 
of one of the parties.”  Connolly v. Connolly, 2006 ME 17, ¶ 5, 892 A.2d 465 (citing to Shaw v. Packard, 
2005 ME 122, ¶ 11, 886 A.2d 1287); see also Hayes v. Hayes, 2009 ME 31, ¶ 6, 967 A.2d 725. 
 
9  To the extent that Christopher argues that allowing the court to dismiss Doe’s complaint without 
prejudice would permit other plaintiffs to misuse the statutes governing actions for protection from 
abuse through multiple refilings and dismissals, we note that M.R. Civ. P 41(a)(1) allows only one 
voluntary dismissal before the second dismissal acts as an adjudication on the merits.  See M.R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1) (“[A] notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff 
 
 
11 
 
2. 
Court’s Exercise of Discretion  
[¶14]  Because the court erred by concluding that it did not have the 
discretion to grant Doe’s motion, we vacate the order dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  C.f. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 23, 158 A.3d 931 (vacating 
the order and remanding the case for further proceedings because the 
plaintiff’s lack of standing did not preclude the court from exercising its 
discretion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)); see also State v. Mason, 408 A.2d 
1269, 1273 (Me. 1979) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case for 
further proceedings because the defendant was entitled “to have the trial 
Justice exercise his discretion under Rule 16(d)”).  
[¶15]  On remand, the court should consider that pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 4001(2), courts must liberally construe the statutes governing protection 
from abuse to protect victims of domestic abuse by “allow[ing] family and 
household members who are victims of domestic abuse to obtain expeditious 
and effective protection against further abuse so that the lives of the 
                                         
who has once dismissed in any court of this state or any other state or the United States an action 
based on or including the same claim.”).  Finally, should plaintiffs misuse the statutes governing 
actions for protection from abuse, courts retain the discretion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) to 
dismiss such vexatious actions with prejudice “as a sanction for misconduct.”  Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 18, 158 A.3d 931. 
 
 
12 
nonabusing family or household members are as secure and uninterrupted as 
possible.”  See also 19-A M.R.S. § 4001(4) (stating that one of the chapter’s 
purposes is to prevent domestic abuse by “expand[ing] the power of the justice 
system to respond effectively to situations of domestic abuse”); State v. Blum, 
2018 ME 78, ¶ 10, 187 A.3d 566 (noting that the directive and stated purposes 
of section 4001 “guide our interpretation” of the protection from abuse 
chapter); State v. Falcone, 2000 ME 196, ¶ 7, 760 A.2d 1046, (rejecting a narrow 
interpretation of the word “residence” because it would “contravene[] the 
express statutory purpose of protecting the victim”). 
[¶16]  Moreover, because the court incorrectly believed that it had no 
choice but to order a dismissal with prejudice, it failed to consider the merits of 
Doe’s motion and put the safeguards of Maine’s statutes providing for 
protection from abuse, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4001, beyond the children’s reach.  On 
remand, the court should also consider that the purpose of Doe’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint without prejudice was to spare her children the trauma 
of testifying about what they allegedly endured and to guard against the reality 
that, should the children lose the interim protections afforded to them by 
Christopher’s bail conditions, there might then be a pressing need to file a 
second complaint grounded in the same allegations as the first.  Finally, the 
 
 
13 
court should consider that nothing in the record suggests that Doe’s motion was 
made in bad faith or to delay the proceedings. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment of dismissal with prejudice vacated.  
Remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jade Richards, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Augusta, and Melissa L. Martin, 
Esq. (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellant Pat Doe 
 
Ashley T. Perry, Esq. (orally), Sanders, Hanstein & Carey, P.A., Farmington, for 
appellee Christopher Hills-Pettitt 
 
 
Augusta District Court docket number PA-2020-72 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY