Title: Ware v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ware v. Converse County School Dist. No. 21990 WY 38789 P.2d 872Case Number: 89-69Decided: 04/06/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JUDITH WARE, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

CONVERSE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 2, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Converse County, William A. Taylor, J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Alan B. Minier 
of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Judith 
Ware sued Appellee Converse County School District No. 2, seeking damages for 
breach of her employment contract and breach of the School District's duty to 
follow its policies and regulations. Ware alleged that those breaches were the 
result of the School District's failure to follow its intra-district transfer 
policy, which required notification of vacant positions. The district court 
granted the School District's motion for summary judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Ware presents the 
following issues:

I

     Was there a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding Appellant's breach of contract 
claim?

II

     Was there a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the claim for breach of the contractual duty of 
good faith and fair dealing?

[¶4]      Ware signed an 
employment contract with the School District to work as a custodian at the 
Glenrock Middle School from July 1, 1985, to May 31, 1986. The contract provided 
that either Ware or the School District could terminate the contract at any time 
for sufficient cause and that:

[T]he District agrees to 
re-employ the employee for the succeeding fiscal and/or school year at a rate 
not less than the amount listed above unless it gives notice to the contrary on 
or before June 1st; provided the employee is re-employed for the same duties and 
provided the employee meets any new or changed qualifications[.]

The contract 
also stated:

[T]his contract is 
subject to laws of the State of Wyoming; to all rules and regulations of the 
State Board of Education including necessary licensing or certification; to the 
District Board of Education policies and to all amendments and revisions 
thereof[.]

[¶5]      During the term 
of Ware's employment, the School District maintained an intra-district transfer 
policy which stated:

     When a classified 
position vacancy occurs within the staff, notice of such vacancy will be posted 
in each school building of the district for a period of five working days. 
Employees of the district who qualify for the vacancy and who wish to transfer 
to that position and building must complete the "Request for Intra-District 
Transfer" form; have the form signed by the Principals; and submit the form to 
the Assistant Superintendent's office by the end of the fifth working day from 
the date of posting.

(Emphasis 
added.) The School District also utilized a reduction in force (RIF) policy 
which provided in pertinent part:

     When, in the sole, 
exclusive, and final judgment of the Board, decline in enrollment, reduction of 
program, or any other reason requires reduction in classified staff, the 
administration will attempt to accomplish that by attrition. In the event that 
necessary reduction in staff cannot be adequately accomplished by attrition and 
given the necessity to hire or maintain the most competent and qualified staff 
available in the interests of perpetuating the highest quality program possible, 
the administration will base its decision as to resulting contract renewals on 
the relative skill, ability, competence, and qualifications of available staff 
to do the available work.

[¶6]      Sometime before 
May 8, 1986, the School District learned that Kathleen Williams, a high school 
custodian, intended to vacate her position at the end of the 1985-86 school 
year. The School District planned to authorize the transfer of Tom Hoyt, an 
elementary school custodian, to that position because the School District was 
eliminating his position under its RIF policy. Hoyt was the son of the assistant 
superintendent.

[¶7]      On May 8, 1986, 
the School District's board accepted Williams' resignation and approved Hoyt's 
contract for the following year. On that date, the board also decided to 
eliminate Ware's position under the RIF policy. The superintendent subsequently 
ordered that Ware be given an opportunity to compete for the high school 
position and instructed Hoyt's father to remove himself from the hiring process. 
The School District did not post notice of the vacancy in accordance with its 
transfer policy.

[¶8]      Through a letter 
dated May 12, 1986, Ware received notice that her position was being terminated 
and that she could apply for the vacant position. Two School District employees 
interviewed Hoyt and Ware, and they recommended that Hoyt be offered the vacant 
position. Hoyt received the job.

[¶9]      On January 20, 
1988, Ware filed a lawsuit, alleging that the School District had failed to 
follow its transfer policy which required the School District to post notice of 
a classified position vacancy in each school building for five working days. 
Ware asserted that the School District filled a vacant position in violation of 
its policy and caused her incidental and consequential damages. Ware sought 
recovery on the following theories: breach of contract, negligence, tort, and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

[¶10]   The School District moved for a 
summary judgment, which the district court granted on February 8, 1989. In its 
decision letter, the court stated that Ware had an equal opportunity to apply 
for the vacant position and that she was not prejudiced by the School District's 
failure to comply with the transfer policy.

[¶11]   The grant of a summary judgment is 
proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and if the prevailing party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Co. v. Albany County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988); Teton 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District 
Number One, 763 P.2d 843 (Wyo. 1988). In this case, the parties do not dispute 
the fact that the School District failed to follow its intra-district transfer 
policy. The question is whether that omission constituted an actionable breach 
of contract or an actionable breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.

[¶12]   Ware argues that her contract 
incorporated the School District's intra-district transfer policy and that the 
School District breached her contract when it failed to post notice of the 
vacancy in accordance with that policy. The facts in this case are analogous to 
the facts in Leonard v. Converse County School District No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 
(Wyo. 1990). In that case, we held that the school district's failure to follow 
its policy and regulation, which required written evaluations of initial 
contract teachers, did not constitute an actionable breach of contract because, 
"`[a]lthough the contract is specifically subject to the "policies, rules, and 
regulations of the school district," these particular provisions did not operate 
to afford appellant any contractual right of employment.'" Id. at 1122 (quoting 
Roberts v. Lincoln County School District Number One, 676 P.2d 577, 582 (Wyo. 
1984)). The school district's failure to evaluate Leonard did not affect its 
authority to terminate her employment. Leonard, 788 P.2d 1119.

[¶13]   In this case, Ware, like an initial 
contract teacher, did not have a contractual right to employment after the 
expiration of her contract. Ware's contract provided that the School District 
agreed to reemploy Ware unless it gave notice to the contrary on or before June 
1st. Timely notice was the only contractual constraint on the School District's 
power to terminate Ware's employment after her contract expired.

[¶14]   In addition, the intra-district 
transfer policy contained the following provision: "Nothing in this policy 
alters administratively determined transfers which are implemented in 
consideration of the best interests of students and the needs of the district." 
This provision gave the School District the discretion to make transfer 
decisions notwithstanding the remainder of the intra-district transfer policy. 
Absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion, we will not interfere with the 
School District's decision. Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, 636 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1981). Ware has failed to present us with any evidence indicating such 
an abuse. We hold that the School District's failure to post notice in 
accordance with its intra-district transfer policy did not constitute an 
actionable breach of contract.

[¶15]   Ware also asserts that the School 
District breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not 
following its intra-district transfer policy. See generally Nelson v. Crimson 
Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989) (discussing the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing). We have previously held that this covenant does 
not apply to the termination of at-will employment relationships, Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985), or to the termination of 
contracts between school districts and initial contract teachers. Leonard, 788 P.2d 1119. This Court, however, has adopted and recently utilized the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981) in response to a claim for 
wrongful discharge of an employee. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990). Section 90(1) provides:

     A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

We held that an 
employee's expectation of employment could be altered by an employer's 
representation if: (1) the employer should have reasonably expected the employee 
to consider the representation as a commitment from the employer; (2) the 
employee reasonably relied upon the representation to his detriment; and (3) 
injustice could be avoided only by enforcement of the representation. McDonald, 
789 P.2d 866.

[¶16]   The record in this case, examined 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Baros v. 
Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989), fails to reveal a genuine issue of material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment under the McDonald standard. 
Notwithstanding a determination of whether the School District reasonably 
expected Ware to consider its policy as a commitment, the record indicates that 
the School District's failure to follow the policy was neither detrimental nor 
unjust to Ware. The School District provided Ware with actual notice of the 
vacant position. She interviewed for the position and was evaluated according to 
the same standards as was the other applicant. The School District had no duty 
to reemploy Ware because it properly notified her of its decision to terminate 
her employment. Thus, we hold that the School District's failure to follow its 
intra-district transfer policy did not alter Ware's expectation of reemployment, 
and, therefore, the School District is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

[¶17]   Affirmed.

URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ., 
filed dissenting opinions. 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting

[¶18]   I dissent. This court should 
reverse the summary judgment granted by the district court by acknowledging that 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing accompanies this employment 
contract and that under such covenant, a question of material fact exists to 
preclude summary judgment. Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155 
(Alaska 1989). The violation by the Converse County School District No. 2 
(School District) of its own policy and the imprimatur of nepotism combine to 
present a question whether Judith Ware (Ware) was treated in good faith and fair 
dealing during her contract term as a school district employee.

[¶19]   This court should recognize that 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing accompany those public 
employment contracts which are not merely at-will. Public employment contracts 
should at least align with general contract law. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 205 at 99 (1981).1 In Reese v. Dow Chemical Co., 728 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 1986), this court harmonized jury findings after a trial 
court instructed the jury how to calculate damages for "breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing" despite the fact the court did "not 
address" appellee's cross-appeal issue that such a covenant is not recognized in 
Wyoming. But that harmonization seems to require tacit recognition of such a 
covenant. This court would presumably correct, under W.R.A.P. 7.05, a jury 
instruction which informed a jury how to calculate damages for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if no such covenant operated in 
Wyoming. See Baird v. School Dist. No. 25, Fremont County, 41 Wyo. 451, 458, 287 P. 308, 310 (1930).

[¶20]   Beyond Reese, my conclusion that 
such a covenant exists is reinforced by cases which narrowly hold that at-will 
contracts are not accompanied by any implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. See Nelson v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73, 76 n. 3 (Wyo. 
1989); Chasson v. Community Action of Laramie County, Inc., 768 P.2d 572, 575 n. 
1 (Wyo. 1989); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Wyo. 
1986); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985); and 
Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 28 (Wyo. 1984) (specifically 
reserving the question).

[¶21]   Based on such an inference and case 
law from other states,2 I would hold there is a question of 
material fact, see Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639-40 (Wyo. 1986), whether 
Ware was treated fairly during the time her contract was in effect - 
despite the possibility that such a breach could be detected only after the 
contract had terminated. As such, I would hold that the summary judgment was 
premature. A jury trial should be provided to resolve whether or not the facts 
support the complaint that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
was breached. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158, 161 (Wyo. 1989); 
Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶22]   Viewing the record in the light 
most favorable to Ware, we can infer the following scenario. Ware became aware 
of a prospective vacancy due to a colleague's expected resignation at the end of 
the year. Knowing her own position was in jeopardy by a district RIF decision, 
she went to the assistant superintendent for personnel to find out how she might 
apply to fill that vacancy. School personnel gave the assistant superintendent's 
son the right to transfer to the soon-to-be-vacated position without giving Ware 
any opportunity to apply for the position even though Ware had seniority. The 
son had not even applied for the position nor had the school personnel complied 
with established school district policies when that decision was made. Although 
the school district attempted to soften the appearance of unfairness by later 
staging a formal interview for both the son and Ware, it is possible to infer 
from the record that a nepotic benefit occurred.3

[¶23]   Ware's employment contract, drafted 
by the School Board and school administrators, stated that the terms of the 
contract were subject to the policies of the School Board. School Board policy 
required that notice of a job vacancy within the staff be posted for five days. 
No notice was posted for the job eventually awarded to the son of the assistant 
superintendent (personnel officer). On May 8, 1986, the School Board accepted 
the resignation of Kathy Williams after the decision had already been made by 
school district personnel to transfer the assistant superintendent's son to the 
high school once Williams' resignation was accepted. While the son was given 
representations that he would have the job at the high school, that 
representation was later "withdrawn" to allow Ware to interview for the job. On 
May 9, Ware was notified her position was being terminated. Both Ware and the 
son formally applied for Williams' old position and both were interviewed by 
people subordinate to the assistant superintendent. Not very surprisingly, based 
on their recommendation, the son of the assistant superintendent was rewarded 
the vacated position.

[¶24]   While the decision to employ the 
son of the assistant superintendent may have been unaffected by nepotism after 
Ware was provided a formal opportunity to apply for the new position, the 
appearance of unfairness and the fact that the hiring decision occurred after 
the school district violated its own policy creates a question of material fact 
regarding a possible breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Reasonable inferences from the record preclude summary judgment being 
used to absolve the employer without establishing the facts in a jury trial. A 
jury may or may not conclude that school district administrators violated Ware's 
contractual rights under an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 704 P.2d 702; Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 
(Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487 
(1984); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987). Cf. Morriss 
v. Coleman Co., Inc., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) and cases cited 
therein.

[¶25]   In rejecting majority opinion 
impalement of rights of the employee on first horn by denial of any employee 
right or benefit from school district policies and employment regulations, I 
similarly challenge hanging the decision on the second horn by asseveration of 
at-will employment. This case involves a female career custodian with the 
Converse County School District who had a written contract and, within its 
provisions, was denied an application opportunity. That opportunity was sought 
in light of the prospective reduction in force. Nothing whatsoever was provided 
by school district policy or direction or other advice given the employee which 
would suggest a transfer policy only to be effective for transfers within the 
current employment year. Likewise, the reduction in force policy was written in 
similar language and obviously related to a future year as well as present year 
staffing.

[¶26]   I believe that the summary judgment 
disposition should be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Wagenseller, 710 P.2d 1025.

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27]   I respectfully dissent.

[¶28]   In violation of our immutable 
principles of summary judgment law, the majority opinion has failed to examine 
the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Ware, and has failed to give her 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence submitted. The majority opinion also fails to recognize that the school 
district failed to meet its summary judgment burden of producing sufficient 
evidence to establish the nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact. There 
are obvious questions of material fact that stem from the crucial issue here: 
whether the school district breached its employment contract with Ms. Ware by 
its failure to follow an express school district vacancy-filling policy, which 
by law was incorporated into and became a binding term of that employment 
contract. See Keslar v. Police Civil Service Commission, 665 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 
1983); and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S. Ct. 968, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 
(1959).

[¶29]   After carefully studying the record 
and applying this court's summary judgment principles, I am satisfied that the 
school district failed to prove that it followed its express policy governing 
the procedure for filling the custodian vacancy at its high school. That 
vacancy-filling policy and procedure required the school district to post 
the notice of the vacancy for five days; this was not done. Further, the policy 
required that interested employees complete a transfer form, have a 
principal sign the form, and submit the form to the assistant superintendent. 
Tom Hoyt, the assistant superintendent's son, who was ultimately given the job, 
failed to meet any of these requirements. In contrast, Ms. Ware faithfully met 
those simple, express requirements; however, she was not chosen and the 
selection process was contrary to policy. This policy was clearly intended to 
protect the interest of a classified staff employee like Ware. Cf. Roberts v. 
Lincoln County School District, No. 1, 676 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 
1984).

[¶30]   Let us be clear about the facts as 
I fear the majority opinion has glossed over them. Ms. Ware was employed under a 
written employment contract as a custodian at the middle school. Tom Hoyt, son 
of Jim Hoyt who is the assistant superintendent for personnel, was similarly 
employed as a custodian at the elementary school. Incorporated into both of 
these employment contracts was a school district policy that governed the 
procedure under which custodian vacancies would be filled.

[¶31]   In August, 1985, Ware learned that 
Ms. Williams, a custodian at the high school, would be resigning from that 
position in May, 1986, thus creating a vacancy. Ware also believed her own 
position might be eliminated. Predictably, she was interested in the upcoming 
vacancy and asked Jim Hoyt if she could apply. He did not know about Williams' 
plan to resign, but he told Ware that when and if the vacancy became a reality, 
the vacancy would be posted and interested persons could apply in accordance 
with the express policy and procedure. As this low drama unfolded, Tom Hoyt, the 
assistant superintendent's son, did not know until nearly a year later in June, 
1986, that Williams' custodian position at the high school would be vacant or 
that his elementary school custodian position was, like Ware's, on the chopping 
block. The junior Mr. Hoyt states this in his deposition testimony.

[¶32]   During the 1985-86 school year the 
school district superintendent Scheer learned of Williams' probable resignation 
and of the planned elimination of Tom Hoyt's custodian position at the 
elementary school. The record is unclear as to an exact date Scheer came to know 
this information. The record is also unclear about what discussions were held; 
there was some talk but no action at the administrative level about transferring 
Tom Hoyt to fill the high school custodian's vacancy after Williams resigned. 
The record does not show that such a transfer ever officially or unofficially 
occurred before June, 1986.

[¶33]   At the school board's meeting on 
May 8, 1986, the board accepted Williams' resignation as a high school 
custodian. The board then eliminated Ware's custodian position at the middle 
school and Tom Hoyt's custodian position at the elementary school, effective at 
the end of their contract periods. In Ware's case, the contract would expire May 
31, 1986.

[¶34]   On May 9, 1986, the day after the 
board meeting, Mr. Dodd, the middle school principal, told Ware that the board 
did not renew her contract, but that she could apply for a transfer to the high 
school custodian vacancy created by Williams' resignation. Dodd then called Jim 
Hoyt, the assistant superintendent for personnel, and also Tom Hoyt's father, 
and told the senior Mr. Hoyt that Ware was coming over to see him and apply for 
that position.

[¶35]   On May 9, 1986, at Jim Hoyt's 
office, Ware told him she wanted to apply for the high school custodian vacancy. 
Jim Hoyt told her she could not because it had already been filled. He would 
not tell her who had filled it. According to his deposition testimony, Tom 
Hoyt did not know that his elementary custodian position had been eliminated; 
did not know that Williams had resigned, leaving a vacancy; had not applied for 
a transfer so that he might fill the high school custodian position; and had not 
been told by anyone that he was going to be transferred to that now vacant 
position.

[¶36]   In response to Jim Hoyt's telling 
Ware that the high school custodian vacancy had been filled, Ware asked him how 
that could be since Williams had only resigned as of the night before. Ware knew 
that school district policy and procedure required vacancies to be posted 
for five days and that interested persons had to apply, and complete a transfer 
form, and have that form signed by a principal and delivered to Jim Hoyt. In 
terse reply, Jim Hoyt told her, "This administration runs this school district, 
and we'll do what we want to do."

[¶37]   Wanting to know who was filling the 
vacancy, Ware next talked to Betty Simon, head custodian at the elementary 
school. Simon told her the vacancy had been filled by Tom Hoyt. Remember, Tom 
Hoyt still did not know about any of this. According to his deposition 
testimony, he did not know about the vacant position until the end of the school 
year in June when Betty Simon, his head custodian, and his father, Jim Hoyt, 
told him to get over to the high school and tell the principal and head 
custodian there that he was interested in applying. Tom Hoyt further testified 
that he never filled out and submitted a transfer form as required by 
school district policy and procedure. 

[¶38]   On May 10, 1986, superintendent 
Scheer called Ware to his office. He told her there had been some confusion 
about the vacant custodian position and she would be interviewed for the vacancy 
after all by the high school principal, Christain, and the head custodian, 
Roumell. On May 12, superintendent Scheer wrote a letter to Ware (which she 
received May 13) which stated her contract had not been renewed. He also 
informed her that she could apply for the vacancy at the high school by 
completing the required transfer form available at her principal's office. 
Ware completed the transfer form and applied for the vacancy.

[¶39]   According to superintendent 
Scheer's deposition testimony, when he learned that both Tom Hoyt's position and 
Ware's position were being eliminated and that Williams' resignation would 
create a vacancy in which Tom Hoyt and Ware would be interested, he told Jim 
Hoyt to remove himself from the selection process. Although the record is not 
clear as to when Scheer told this to Jim Hoyt, one would reasonably infer that 
surely the school superintendent, of all people, would have known about these 
position eliminations and the vacancy before the board meeting on May 8 
and before Jim Hoyt's telling Ware that the vacancy had been filled on 
May 9. These facts and inferences raise glaring questions that go to the heart 
of Ware's claim that the school district did not follow its policy and did not 
treat her fairly.

[¶40]   Additionally, Scheer's testimony 
indicates that Christain and Roumell were to interview Ware and Hoyt and inform 
Scheer of their evaluations. Next, he would review their evaluations, make a 
recommendation to the board, which would decide who filled the vacancy. Again 
the record is not clear, but apparently Christain and Roumell interviewed Ware 
first, then Tom Hoyt. According to Tom Hoyt's deposition testimony, right after 
his June interview with Christain and Roumell, they told him he had the job. How 
could this be if the selection had to go through Scheer and then to the board 
for the decision? Ware is entitled to a trial to sort this out. There is no 
record evidence that the board, acting on Scheer's recommendation, decided in 
favor of Tom Hoyt.

[¶41]   According to Jim Hoyt's deposition 
testimony, he failed to post the notice of the vacancy created by Williams' 
resignation; he failed to follow school district policy and procedure. According 
to his son's deposition testimony, the son never filled out a transfer form and 
never submitted the required transfer form. Like father like son - neither one 
complied with the required school district policy and procedure, and yet 
Tom Hoyt got the job. Ware, who did comply with the policy in every respect, did 
not get the job.

[¶42]   The majority opinion concludes that 
Ware was given an equal opportunity to be selected to fill the vacancy. I fail 
to find anything in the record to support this conclusion; what I do find in the 
record is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Ware was not given 
an equal opportunity. Since the school district failed in its summary judgment 
burden as the moving party, I would reverse the trial court and remand for 
trial.

 FOOTNOTES

1 Most recently in Nelson 
v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73, 76 n. 3 (Wyo. 1989), this court 
declined to decide whether at-will employment arrangements contained an implied 
contract of good faith and fair dealing. Cf. Chasson v. Community Action of 
Laramie County, Inc., 768 P.2d 572, 575 n. 1 (Wyo. 1989). Despite the 
perspective of this majority, this case does not appear to be an at-will 
personal service contract. Ware had an employment contract which incorporated by 
reference a transfer policy and reduction in force (RIF) arrangement. Ware's 
complaint centers on events which occurred while her contract was in effect. K 
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987).

2 See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, supra, at § 205, which states "[e]very contract imposes upon each 
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement." See also Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); 
Bodenhamer v. Superior Court (St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.), 192 Cal. App. 3d 1472, 238 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1987); Perkins v. Thompson, 551 So. 2d 204, 
209 (Miss. 1989); UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 757 (1987), reh'g dismissed 525 So. 2d 758 (Miss. 1988); and Mahan v. 
Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, Inc., 768 P.2d 850, 856 (Mont. 1989).

3 Ware summarizes her 
critique of events by statement in appellate brief:

Early in the year, it 
became known in the District that there were to be cutbacks in staffing and 
appellant was concerned about the continuation of her job. * * * A fellow 
custodian, Kathy Williams, informed Mrs. Ware that she would be resigning her 
position at the high school at the end of the year and suggested appellant apply 
for the vacated position. * * *

Mrs. Ware's supervisors 
recommended that she contact Jim Hoyt, the Assistant Superintendant [sic] and 
father of Tom Hoyt, another custodian in the District. * * * Appellant called 
Mr. Hoyt and inquired as to how she could apply for the anticipated vacancy. Mr. 
Hoyt was not then aware of the planned Williams resignation, but informed Mrs. 
Ware that the vacancy had to be posted for five days and that she should apply 
for an intra-district transfer as provided in the School District Policies. * * 
*

In May, 1986, some eight 
months later, the Board of Trustees met and the resignation of Kathy Williams 
occurred as anticipated by Mrs. Ware. * * * Also as anticipated by Mrs. Ware, 
her position was eliminated. * * *

However, the Board, 
without posting the required notice or allowing other employees to apply for 
transfer, and upon the recommendation of Jim Hoyt, approved the hiring of Tom 
Hoyt, his son, whose previous custodial job with the District was also 
eliminated, to fill the position vacated by Kathy Williams. * * *

After the meeting, 
appellant's supervisor informed her that her position had been eliminated and 
that Kathy Williams had resigned. * * * The next day, he helped her contact Jim 
Hoyt with the expectation that she could apply for the vacated position in the 
manner provided in the rules incorporated in Mrs. Ware's contract. * * 
*

Upon meeting with Jim 
Hoyt that afternoon, appellant was informed by him that the position was already 
filled and that she could not apply for it. * * * She queried as to why this was 
the case since the position had only been vacated the night before. Appellant 
was informed by Mr. Hoyt that the administration ran the district and that ". . 
. we'll do what we want to do."