Title: Bacon v. Carey Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bacon v. Carey Co.1983 WY 94669 P.2d 533Case Number: 83-73Case Number: 83-73Decided: 09/14/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
THEODORE S. BACON, III, 
JAMES A. ELLER AND RONALD S. WEDGLE, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

CAREY COMPANY, A 
PARTNERSHIP, CAMPUS MALL, A PARTNERSHIP, V. FLORY MENDICINO, RODERICK CHISHOLM, 
JOHN E. WHITE, D. KENT BOSWELL AND V. FRANK MENDICINO, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
J.

John W. Pattno, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

David H. 
Carmichael of Carmichael, McNiff & Patton, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants (defendants 
in an action to enforce personal guarantees of a lease agreement) discharged 
their attorney the morning before trial. On the morning the trial was scheduled 
to begin, the trial judge granted counsel for the appellant's motion to withdraw 
and denied appellants' motion for a continuance. The subsequent verdict was 
against the pro-se appellants. Appellants ask this court to remand the case for 
a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
allowing appellants' counsel to withdraw and again in denying a motion for a 
continuance. We will affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellants claim that 
the trial judge twice abused his discretion - once when he allowed the attorney 
to withdraw and again when he refused the continuance. The question presented by 
this appeal is more correctly stated in this way:

Did the trial judge abuse 
his discretion in denying a continuance after he properly granted the discharged 
attorney's motion to withdraw?

[¶3.]     We hardly need to cite 
authority for the proposition that it is proper for an attorney who has been 
fired in a civil suit to be permitted to withdraw from the 
case.

[¶4.]     At trial, those matters 
that are left to the sound discretion of the trial court will not be upset on 
appeal absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion. The standard for determining 
whether the trial judge has abused his discretion is set out in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980):

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 
(1910) * * *."

[¶5.]     The granting of a 
continuance is among those matters within the trial judge's discretion: 

"The granting or refusing 
of a request for continuance is `ordinarily a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court under the circumstances of each case.' Glover v. Berger, 72 
Wyo. 221, 263 P.2d 498, 507 (1953)."

Armed Forces Cooperative 
Insuring Association v. Department of Insurance, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1318, 1326 
(1981).

"The trial court has 
discretion to grant or deny a continuance. Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, 
Wyo., 508 P.2d 595, 599 (1973). See, also, 
Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 
157 P.2d 280, 283 (1945); Glover v. 
Berger, 72 Wyo. 221, 263 P.2d 498, 507 
(1953), and Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 
Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101, 102 (1929)." Craver v. 
Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999, 1000 
(1979).

[¶6.]     Rule 7, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, states that a continuance may be 
granted only upon a showing of good cause. In criminal cases, the withdrawal of 
counsel, particularly on the eve of trial, may implicate due-process 
considerations and defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Epperson v. State, Wyo., 637 P.2d 671 (1981); Adger v. State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1056 
(1978). However, in civil cases, withdrawal of counsel does not always provide 
grounds for the granting of a continuance. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1155, 
1157.

"`The withdrawal, on the 
eve of trial, of the attorney for one of the parties to an action, leaving such 
party unprepared for trial, is not ipso facto a ground for continuance * * *.'" 
Benson v. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316, 318 
(1949).

[¶7.]     Particularly relevant 
to the matters with which we are concerned in this appeal is this court's 
holding

"* * * that the trial 
court may deny a continuance if the problem which gives rise to the request for 
a continuance is the fault of the party moving for the continuance." Craver v. 
Craver, supra, 601 P.2d  at 1000.

In the case at 
bar, the appellants' motion for continuance was based on the fact that their 
counsel had withdrawn. Whether the attorney withdrew because he was fired (a 
fact that appellants dispute on appeal) or because it was impossible for him to 
work with his clients is not the salient point. Whatever the reason, it is clear 
that the request for the continuance was necessitated by the difficulties that 
the appellants were experiencing with their attorney. This alone is sufficient 
to justify the court's denial of the continuance, but in this case there are 
additional reasons for denying the motion to continue the trial 
setting.

[¶8.]     In the first place, we 
accept the statement of counsel that he was fired. Nowhere in the record do 
appellants directly deny this fact. No jurisdiction has held it to be an abuse 
of discretion to deny a continuance under such 
circumstances.

"There is not a single 
case involving the discharge of an 
attorney in which it was held that a continuance should have been granted for 
this reason * * *." 48 A.L.R.2d, supra, at 1159.

In addition, 
before the trial judge granted counsel's motion to withdraw, he informed counsel 
and the appellants that he would not grant the continuance. In such cases, it is 
not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance.

"It is fairly clear that 
no continuation can reasonably be expected after the court expressly states that 
in the case of a withdrawal it will not grant a motion for continuance." 48 
A.L.R.2d, supra, at 1163.

The trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance after withdrawal of 
counsel in the case at bar.

[¶9.]     Appellees also urge 
that this court is without authority to hear this appeal because the judgment 
contains a defect under Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P. The applicable aspects of Rule 
54(b), W.R.C.P., provide:

"* * * In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims or parties * * *."

The provisions 
of Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P. have been satisfied in that all of the claims and rights 
and liabilities of all the original parties have been adjudicated. The March 17, 
1983 order dismissing original parties not party to this litigation corrects any 
defects which may have existed in the November 9, 1982 judgment. As we said in 
Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 714 (1979), where a similar order corrected a defective judgment, this 
court

"* * * can now entertain 
proper jurisdiction over the merits of the plaintiff's appeal * * 
*."

[¶10.]  Appellees request this court to determine 
that there is no reasonable cause for this appeal and, pursuant to Rule 10.05, 
W.R.A.P., tax a fee of $500 to appellees' counsel and additional interest to 
appellees. Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P., provides in pertinent 
part:

"* * * Unless the court 
certifies that there was reasonable cause for the appeal, there shall also be 
taxed as part of the costs in the case, a reasonable fee * * not * * * more than 
five hundred dollars ($500.00), to the counsel of the appellee, and to the 
appellee damages * * * unless the judgment * * * was stayed, when in lieu of 
such penalty, it shall bear additional interest * * *."

[¶11.]  Such tax was assessed by this court in Perry v. Vaught, Wyo., 624 P.2d 776, 783 
(1981), where we said,

"* * * In fact, we cannot 
see how the court could have arrived at any other 
conclusion."

In Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 155 (1981), we again awarded the 
penalty, reasoning:

"The disposition made by 
the district judge was faultless on the basis of prevailing law; there was no 
room for dispute. We have strained to find any law favorable to appellant but 
could find none. The elastic quality of our credulity has been stretched beyond 
its limit. We hold there is no reasonable cause for 
appeal."

The instant 
appeal differs from these two cases in that it concerns a review of 
discretionary rulings. Because of the myriad situations in which 
abuse-of-discretion questions arise, the standards for review of discretionary 
exercise cannot readily be reduced to black-letter principles. Therefore, Chief 
Justice Rooney's remarks in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part in Reno Livestock Corporation, 
supra, 638 P.2d  at 155-156, are especially pertinent to abuse-of-discretion 
cases:

"* * * Even reasonable 
minds differ on relative matters. I do not want to discourage appeals. They 
should be available when an attorney believes he has a potential error, or when he has 
evaluated his chance for success to be of a low percentage but his client 
directs him to proceed nonetheless."

[¶12.]  The judgment of the district court 
awarding substantial damages against appellants is affirmed and the appellees' 
request for fees and interest is denied.