Title: State v. Heapy. Concurring Opinion by J. Levinson, with whom J. Nakayama joins [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Moon [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

#+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WES!

 

HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER#*

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'!

 

.000-

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee

Uy Hae (002

a
RAYMOND J. HEAPY, Defendant-Appeliant =
m
o

 

Wo. 27375

S22

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1:03/18/05; 04~50499)

JANUARY 11, 2007

ACOBA AND DUFFY, JJ.; WITH LEVINSON, J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY, AND WITH WHOM NAKAYANA, J., JOINS
‘AND MOON, C.J., DISSENTING
OPINION BY ACOBA, J.
We hold that the district court of the second circuit
(the court)? was wrong in denying the motion of Defendant-

Appellant Raymond J. Heapy (Defendant) to suppre:

 

“all of the

evidence and statements obtained as a result of the police stop
of (his] vehicle” because (1) the purported investigatory stop by

the police violated article 1, section 7 of the Hawai'i

‘The Honorable

 

‘relay E. Macbonald presided.

 
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Constitution? inasmuch as it was not supported by a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal
conduct and (2) the “chase car” police procedure of stopping all
vehicles that lawfully turn onto a public way in advance of a
checkpoint exceeded that statutorily authorized. Therefore, the
court’s June 7, 2005 order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress
is vacated and the case is remanded to the court with
instructions to enter an order granting Defendant's motion to
suppress and to allow Defendant to withdraw his conditional no
contest plea. See State v. Kealaiki, 98 Hawai'i 309, 314 6 n.6,
22 P.3d 588, 593 & n.6 (2001) (observing “that in the case where
the pretrial motion seeks to suppress the evidence incriminating
the defendant and the appeal is decided against the government,
the proceedings would also ordinarily come to an end, the
question appealed being the underlying predicate reason for the
conditional plea” and that Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure

(HRPP) “Rule 11(a) (2) contemplates by its terms that the case
would be remanded to allow withdrawal of the conditional plea,
after which . . . dismissal [may] follow because of the absence

of the evidence suppressed”).

2 article 1, section 7 of the Hawal't Constitution 49 identical to
the Fourth anendnent to the United States Constitution. In relevant part,
article I, section 7 provides that “(t]he Fight of the people to be secure in
their persons. . . against unreasonable... seizures and invasions of
privacy shall not be violated{.]” The Fourth Anendnent to the United States
Constitution states that "(t]he right of the people to be secure in their
Persons... against unreasonable... seizures, shall not be violated.”

 

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER‘*#
I.

It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a
stop must relate to criminal activity. See, e.a., State
Eleneki, 106 Hawai'i 177, 180, 102 P.3d 1075, 1078 (2004)

(stating that a seizure or stop based on reasonable suspicion

must be “tied to ‘some objective manifestation that the person

stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity’
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)
(emphasis added))). The criminal activity for which Defendant
was stopped was operating a vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant (OVIT or DUI), Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2916-
61(a) (Supp. 2005).? However, the officer observed no acts

indicating a violation of the statute before the stop. He

 

  

> Hawai's Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2516-61 (Supp. 2005),
“operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant,” provide
relevant part

 

(a) Q person commita the offense of operating a
vebicle uncer the Influence of an Sntocant if the ferson
Suerte or assumes actual shvaical control of a vehicle:

(I) White under the influence of alcohol _in an
anount sufficient to inpair the person's normal
ental faculties or ability to care for the
person and guard against casualty;

(3) "With .08 or more grans of alcohol per two
hundred ten liters of breath; or

(4) With’ s08 of more grans of alcohol per one
hundred miliiliters or cubic centimeters of
blood.

(Bnphasis added.) Defendant asserts that he entered a conditional plea und
HRS § 291E-€1(ai (3). Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai't (the prosecution),
however, states that Defendant was charged with viclating HRS $ 2946-61 (a) (4)
and does not specify under which section Defendant entered his conditionel
ples.

 

HRS $ 2918-61 criminalizes operating a vehicle under the influence
of the requisite ancunt of alcohol, not evading an intoxication checkpoint.
As such, an officer must have specific and articulable facts that would lead @
person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant was operating =
vehicle under the influence of alcohol:

 

 
‘seef0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

therefore lacked any objective basis ~~ specific and articulable

facts

 

that Defendant was violating HRS § 2916-61 (a) so as to
justify the stop. See, ¢.0., Terry vs Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21

(1968) (stating that “in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those

facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). Accordingly the
officer had no grounds for reasonably believing criminal activity

was afoot. See, e.c., State v, Trainor, 83 Hawai'i 250, 256, 925
P.2d 818, 824 (1996) (ruling that “the police may temporarily
detain an individual if they have @ reasonable suspicion based on
specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot”
(citation omitted)). Because such objective grounds were absent,
no legal support existed for the stop. Ses Elenski, 106 Hawai'i
at 180, 102 P.3d at 1078. The stop therefore was unlawful.
Additionally, in stopping vehicles turning in advance of the
checkpoint, the procedure exceeded the authority granted to the
police to establish roadblocks under HRS $$ 2916-19 and -20
(supp. 2005). Since the stop was unlawful all evidence derived
from the stop must be suppressed. See State v, Aguinaldo, 71
Haw. 57, 61, 782 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1989) (noting that “fruits of
an ‘unlawful seizure’ are ‘proper subjects of a suppression
order’ (quoting State v, Powell, 61 Haw. 316, 320, 603 P.2d 143,
147 (19799).

 

‘The relevant provisions of HRS §§ 2918-19 end -20 are reproduced

 
 

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m1.
In reaching today’s holding we do not ignore the
important State interest in combating drunken driving. See
Michigan Dep’t of State Police v, Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)
(stating that “[nJo one can seriously dispute the magnitude of
the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in
eradicating it"). We emphasize that our ruling does not affect
established roadblock procedures authorized by statutes. As to
the practice in issue here, however, “[w]e may not,” as the U.S.
Supreme Court has instructed, “vitiate constitutional guarantees

when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free.”

 

Davis vs Ws y o= OLS.

(citing Kyllo v. United States, $83 U.S. 27 (2001).
As was stated in the seminal case of Terry, “*{nJo

, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006)

right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
connon law, than the right of every individual to the possession
‘and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law./" 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. vs
Rotsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Today's holding reaffirms
the precepts established in Jerry and its progeny which we have
adopted, and the longstanding constitutional protections in our
Jurisdiction that have stood as a bulwark against unreasonable
seizures. See e.g, State v, Perez, 111 Hawai's 392, 397, 141
P.3d 1039, 1044 (2006); Eleneki, 106 Hawai'i at 180, 102 P.3d at
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1078; Bowell, 61 Haw. at 321, 603 P.2d at 147-48; State v. Bonds,
59 Haw. 130, 133, $77 P.2d 781, 784 (1978); State v. Ogata, 58
Haw. $14, $72 P.2d 1222 (1977); State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 568

P.2d 1207 (1977); and State v , $2 Haw. 497, 479 P.2d 800

ca971)
mr,

Defendant was charged on August 4, 2004 with violating
BRS § 2918-61 by

operating) or assun{ing) actual physical control of
Vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant meaning
That he was under the influence of aleshol in sn ancunt
Sufficient to impair his normal mental faculties or ability
fo care for himself and guard against casualty, and/or (by)
operatling] or assum(ing) actus! paysical control of a
Vehicle with -08 or nore grams of alcohol per one hundred
milliliters of cubic centinsters of blood, thereby
Committing the offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of an Intoxicant in violation of Section 2918-61
of the (HRS)

 

on August 11, 2004, Defendant filed a “Motion to
Suppress Evidence” contending that “[s]upression is required
because the stop of Defendant's vehicle lacked probable cause or
even reasonable suspicion, and therefore the nature and scope of
the intrusion into Defendant’s liberty and privacy exceeded what

was constitutionally permissible in light of the facts known to

+ tence, the dis:

   
 
  

es reference to s bright-Line rule that
in combating Intoxicated motorists i
120 to the rule of
‘Spparent, this case addresses intoxication checkpoi
Shvolvenent in [unspecified] criminal activity,” di
Gissent states. If the police have infornstion that persons are
Sintentlonally avoiding @ checkpoint because of involvenent in eriminal
activity," dissent at’ (espheais eddediy they would perforce have’ reasonable
Suspicion to make a stop. As even the police admitted, in this
Gininal activity was sbserved and the Fecord does not’ indicate the police had
any prior knowledge of any “involvement in criminal activity.” At best the
Gissent's characterization 1s 2 misunderstanding of this decision. Hence,
there is no “abrogation” of the State's interest, dissent at 1, in public
ty, as the dissent maintains,

 

 

 

 

 

 
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police at the time.” Defendant requested that “{a}11 evidence
and statement (sic) garnered as a result of the stop be
suppressed and the matter dismissed.

On February 18, 2005, the court held a hearing on
Defendant's motion to suppress. At the hearing, the prosecution
called Maui Police Department Officer Eric Correa (Officer
Correa) as a witness. At the end of the hearing, the court
orally denied the motion to suppress. That same day, Defendant
entered 2 conditional no contest plea pursuant to HRPP Rule
11(a)(2). Following Defendant’s conditional plea, the court
sentenced Defendant. On June 7, 2005, the court entered its
written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Order). On June 9,
2005, Defendant filed 2 Notice of Appeal.

Ww.

On appeal, Defendant contends “it was error for the
Gistrict court judge to find reasonable suspicion existed because
it appeared to [Officer] Correa that [Defendant] was attempting
to avoid the intoxication checkpoint.” In response, the
prosecution maintains that “appellate jurisdiction does not exist
where a notice of appeal is filed in violation of time
Limitations prescribed under (Hawai'i Rules of Appellate

Procedure (HRAP) Rule) 4(b)” and “[elven

 

juming arquende, this
court has jurisdiction in this matter, the trial court did not

err in denying [Defendant's] Motion to Suppress Evidence.” As to

 
 

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the prosecution's first response, we believe jurisdiction may be

exercised in this case.*

 

As to Defendant's appeal and the prosecution’s second

response, we vacate the court's order denying the motion to

 

suppress. The court's relevant findings are as follow:

1. On June 16, 200¢, at approximately 1830 Hours,

iaiele Bi just south of the
Entersection of Noxulele fighway and Mehaweha Loopy
2. Officer Corres has been employed with the Mau
Police Department for twelve years and 18 currently assigned
the traffic aivision;
3. Geticer Correa vas formerly a mesber for the DUI

 

 

+n district court criminal cases, “[a)ppeals upon the record shall
bbe allowed from all final decisions and finel judgnents.” ARS § 641-12

(1993). (T]he notice of appeal shall be filed in the aiserict =.
court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”
WAAP 1b) (1. °A Judguent or order 1s entered within the meaning of (HRAP
fib) (2)) when dt 4a filed with the clerk of the court.” RAP €(D) (3)

‘The “Notice of Entey of dudgnent” fled by the district court
clerk on February 18, 2008 constitutes the written judgment on Defendant’s
Conviction that is appealable pursuant to ARS § 661-12. The denial of the
Retion te suppress evidence is reviewsble on appeal from the February 1
Sodgment. pursuant to REP 11(3) (2).

‘The notice of appeal filed by counsel on June 9, 2008 was filed
nore than thirty days after entry of the February 18, 2005 judgment and vas
Untimely. However, in criminal cases governed by HRAP 4(b) (1), we have made
enceptions to the requirenent that the notice of appeal be timely filed.” One
Fecognized exception chat wo apply here excuses the failure to timely file a
hotice of appeal when untimely filing was the result of counsel's failure to
Competently pursue the defendant's first appeal from s criminal conviction
Beate v. EAsgne, 60 Hawai't 318, 323-24, 909 P.2d 1133, 1138-39 (1996) (citing
Skate. Erwin, 87 aw. 268, 584.24 236 (1976))

"The prosecution’ argues on appeal that ‘because Defendant failed to
properly perfect his notice of appeal when he indicates that he was appealing
Fron a March 18, 2005 "Notice of Entry of Judgrent and/or Order and
Plea/dudgment™ instead of the February 18, 2005 "Notice of Entry of Judgment,"
and incorrectly stated that his appeal was brought pursuant to ARS § GéI-11
(2993) whieh pertains to criminal appeals fron a circuit court, this court
lacks Jurisdiction. We have stated that "es mistake in designating the

 

‘2008

 

 

 

judgment... . should got result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent
Eo-aposa) tions specific iudonent can be fairly inverse {rom the notice and

Hie anoeliee 12 not misled by the aistake.~ State v Bohannon, 102 Hawes
22s, 235, 1¢ 2-34 560, S67 {2003} lunternal quotation marks and citation
‘nitted) (emphases in’ original). Therefore, inasmuch as the prosecst lon has
pot argued that it wos misled by Defendant's error, and Lt was evigent as to
eich Judgment Defendant was appealing from, we are not divested of appella
Jurisdiction:

   

 
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Task Force unit for four years;
4. “officer Correa has participated in approximately
50 intoxication checkpoints,
5. Officer Correa estimated that he has been assigned
car” position spproximately 20 cane:

‘Officer Corres indicated that be has effected
appcoximately 40 stops of cara that attempted to avoid the
‘Antoxication checkeoint;

 

   

 

ee Tiat in every case the individual avoiding the
Antoxication checknoint as either intcxicated or was
Siglabing she_law in sone other wav such as. not having

suranse or P havine
‘utstanding warzent;

ithe intoxication checknoint was in place to stop
vehicle's traveling southbound on Hokaiele-Hahway ince
unexical pattern to check for sions of intoxication;

Officer corres was stationed Test north-of the

I.” Brivers approaching ene intoxication checkpoint
wore made aware of the impending checkpoint by two four foot
by four foot, fluorescent orange, diancnd shaped, signe with
the words “INTOXICATION CHECKPOINT” in Black, block letters

TI, These signs were positioned approximately five
hundred feet and two Rundred and fifty fect from the
Checkpoint respectively and facing all southbound traffic;

32, The intoxication checkpoint itself was
s.luminated by a large portable lighting tower with several
high powered Halogen lights llunineting the intoxication
checkpoint

130 ‘Approaching traffic was directed by = flag
officer equipped with reflective vest, white gloves, and a
flashlight with a'red, plastic, cone over the {iluminated
portion of the flashlights

Ty Officer Correa observed a 2004, sliver, Ford,
Mustang, ‘convertible, bearing state of Hawai'i 1icense Plate
unber MLX-761 (target vehicle) traveling southbound towards
the intoxication checkpoints

15. Officer Correa observed the target vehicle to
pags the two four foot by four foot diamond shaped signs
Sescribed abover

16, “Officer Correa observed the target vehicle to
effect a right turn onto the Mehaneha Loop after it had
Passed both of the above described signs but before reaching
the flag ofticer for the Intoxication checkpoint:

1). officer Correa indicated that the above mentioned
tower Lighting and flag officer were fully visible trom the
intersection of Mokulele Highway and Mehaneha Loop;

te.

tole ie tur hat hs

signet observe a suspicious driving pattern as the tars
vehicle approached on Motulele Hlahway, or thereafter, and

15, Officer Corres. testified that Metamehs Loop is
approximately @ quarter of s mile long which tersinates with
a'bright yellow, pipe metal, gate blocking the roadway?

20." Mehaneha Loop is’ surrounded on both sides BY
sugarcane fields:

21. “Officer Correa indicated that the only structure
located on Mehaneha Loop ie the animal shelter which was not
open for business at the tine of the incident,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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RAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS

22. Officer Correa testified that after he cbserved
the target venicle turn down Mehameha Loop he inmediately
furnea down Mchansha Loop and began closing the distance
between himself and the target vehicle;

‘Bar Officer Correa indicated that he did not turn on
his energency lights and/or siren at that time;

34, ofticer Corres testified that he observed
befendant to past the entrance to che animal shelter and
Continde driving toward the metal gate

25. Officer Correa testified that he could see the
etal gate from his position behind the target vehicle, that
there are no further structures. located on the Mehameha
Loop, but that the target vehicle did not appear to be
Changing course of speed and continued driving toward the
oat

 

 

 

26. Officer Correa indicated that after the target
vehicle passed the entrance to the aninal shelter without
making any attempts to turn he activated his emergency
Lights and effected » traffic stop:

21. Upon making the stop Officer Correa observed
(Defendant) te be the operator of the vehicle;

28. Ofticer Corres testified that he did not observe

filer tothe stop,
29. Officer Corea testified that the sole reason for

ck?

SO. ofticer Correa testified that he was not
ofticially part of the roadblock as he was assigned to park
before the rosdblock and be a “chase cary” meaning thst he
aa to pursue cars which tried to avoid the rosdblock

 

(Emphases added.)

The court’s relevant conclusions of law are as follows

 

8, The atop of Defendant w:
authority of = warrant,

5
spen they [ei =

conducted without the

 

Td, Where intoxicated drivers are allowed to avold
checkpoints by turning around and returning the way they
Sane that the public's safety ia still at risk and the
purpose of the checkpoint is not set. See State v. Forman,
S27's.8.24 921 924 (N.C. 2001).

Lis When the stop occurred after Defendant passed exo
signs announcing the impending intoxicstion checkpoint,
turned down an isolated, gated, dead end road surrounded by
sugarcane, with only ong structure to be found on the road,
Just prict to reaching the fiag officer where Defendant
night be stopped, and (DJefendant passed by the only
entrance to the only structure on the roadway, and based on
Ofticer Correa’ s training and experience, that the officer
Sid have reasonably articuleble fects which would warrant a
tan of reasonable caution to harbor a reasonable suspicion.
that criminal activity was afoot. See ad. stave w Thill,
G0 NW.24'66, 87 (9-0. 1991}; Seeinbeck v, Commonwealth,

 

 

 

 

   

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BE2 S.m,26 922, 913-16 (Ky. Ce. App. 1993)

12. Based upon all’ the findings of fact, supra, the
(clourt finds that the [prosecution] has met ita burden of
proof and shown that Officer Corres’ e stop of the
Defendant's vehicle fell within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth snd... . Fourteenth

United States Constitution, and Article 1,

Hawais State Constitution,

‘ACCORDINGLY, IT 18 HERESY ORDERED that the Defendant's
Notion to Suppress Evidence is denied.

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.) (Capitalization in original.)
vt.

The subject stop of Defendant's vehicle violated
article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution which protects
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .
against unreasonable . . . seizures and invasions of privacy[.1”
This court has held that “(a] stop of a vehicle for an
investigatory purpose constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” State v. Bolosan, 78 Hawai'i 86, 92, 890 P.2d 673,
679 (1995) (citing Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 37, 856 P.2¢
1207, 1225 (1993)). “A warrantless seizure is presumed invalid
and, thus, unreasonable,) ‘unless and until the prosecution
proves that the . . . seizure falls within a well-recognized and
narrowly defined exception to the warrant requirenent./”
Eleneki, 106 Hawaii at 180, 102 P.3d at 1078 (quoting State v
Brendergast, 103 Hawai'i 451, 454, 63 P.3d 714, 717 (2004))
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). As observed in Eleneki, a
“narrowly defined exception to the warrant requirenent .. . is
that a police officer may stop an autonobile and detain its
occupants if that officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the

ae
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person stopped was engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. (quoting
Prendercast, 103 Hawai'l at 454, 83 P.3d at 717 (citation
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original) .

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979),
established that highway stop must be based, at the minimum, on
specific and articulable facts of criminal activity.

wuse to believe that 2 driver is
Violating say one of the maltitude of applicable traffse and
equipment regulations ~ or other articulable

that the driver is unlicensed oF his
‘Senicle unregistered ~ we cat

ing any other. This tine of standardiess
ind unconstrained discretion if the evil the Court has
Giscerned when in previeus cases it has insisted that the

‘retion of the official in ehe field be circumscribed, at
Yeast to sone extent,

 

(Citing Almeida-Sanchez v, United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270

(1973); Camara v. Mun, Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967).)
(Emphases added.) (Footnote omitted.) ‘Thus, it was held that a

stop without “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion”
violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
seizures:

Je nolé that except in those situations in which there Le,
that _=
Rotorist is unlicensed oF that an autonobile 1s not
Fegistered, or thet either the vehicle or an occupant is
Ctherwise subject to seisure for violation of law, stopping
an avtonebile and deteining the driver in order to check his
Griver’s license and the registration of the automobile are
Gnressonable under the Fourth Anendnent

 

 

 

Id. at 663 (emphasis added). Under Prouse, then, individualized
suspicionless stops are prohibited unless “articulable and

reasonable suspicion” exists which indicates the presence of

n12-
 

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criminal activity. Id, rouse explained that “{t]he essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose
a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order
‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions[.]'" Id, at 653-54 (quoting Marshall v.
Barlow's, Ince, 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (citation omitted) ).
Subsequently, in Terry, the Court held that in order to
justify an intrusion on the constitutionally protected interests
of a private citizen by a police officer, “the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, The Court
declared that the facts of a case must be judged against an
objective standard, ise,, “would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man

of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken w.

 

appropriate(,]" . . . (because if} simple good faith on the part
of the arresting officer . . . were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Anendnent would evaporate, and the people would be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, only in the
discretion of the police.” Id. at 21-22 (internal quotation
marks, footnote, and citations omitted) .

Exouse observed that “[a]n individual operating or

traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable

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expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use
are subject to government regulation.” 440 U.S. at 662. Thus,
the Court noted that, “[als [Terry] recognized, people are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from
their homes onto the public sidewalks . . . [, nJor are they
shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into
their automobiles.” Id, at 663 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).

Hawai'i has adopted the Jerry reasonable suspicion test
on independent state constitutional grounds and applied it to
traffic situations. See State v. Kim, 68 Haw. 286, 290, 711 P.2d
1291, 1294 (1985) (holding that “under article I, section 7 of
the Hawaii Constitution, a police officer must have at least a
reasonable basis of specific articulable facts to believe a crime
has been conmitted to order a driver out of a car after a traffic
stop”). Thus, the principles of Prouse as they apply to vehicle
stops on public ways rest on independent state constitutional
grounds afforded by article I, section 7. See Powell, 61 Haw. at
320, 603 P.2d at 147 (noting that “stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
[article 1, [section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, even though

the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is

ode
‘S*A7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*®#
brief” (footnote and citations omitted)).”

In regard to highway stops, then, “‘the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." Eleneki, 106 Hawai'i at
180, 102 P.3d at 1078 (quoting Prenderaast, 103 Hawai'i at 454,
83 P.3d at 717) (citation omitted). Accordingly, as mentioned
before, a vehicular seizure or stop based on reasonable suspicion
must be “tied to ‘some objective manifestation that the person
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity(.]/”
Ad. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417). Such a reasonable
suspicion “must be present before a stop[,]” in order for the
stop to be permissible. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418

vit.

‘The findings of the court and the evidence before it
conclusively established that Defendant was stopped without
reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was operating a
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The totality of the
circumstances, measured by an objective standard, must indicate
that criminal activity is afoot. See Prendergast, 103 Hawai'i at
454, 83 P.2d at 717 (citing United states v Arvizu, 534 U.S.

266, 273 (2002)) (“When discussing how reviewing courts should

\ Accordingly, the analysis in this opinion is grounded in article
Ty section 7 of the flawai'i Constitution. See Bichigan w. Lona, 463 ve
1032, 1039 n.4 (1983) "(stating that, "where the Judgment of a state court

upon tho grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federel in
jeter, uF jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of
the federal ground and adequate to support the Judgment” (quoting fax Film
Sore es Mudler, 296 0.8, 207, 210 (1995)))

 

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make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have

 

id repeatedly

that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of

each case to see whether the detaining officer has 2
sparticula: nd_objectiv ‘ uspecting 1
wronadoing.”); (citing Barnes, 58 Haw. at 338, $68 P.2d at 1211

("The ultimate test in these situations must be whether from
these facts, measured by an objective standard, a man of
reasonable caution would be warranted in believing that criminal
activity wa and that the action taken was appropriate.”
(emphasis added.)). Under this objective standard, Officer
Correa did not possess “specific and articulable facts” before
the stop giving rise to a “reasonable suspicion” that Defendant
was at the time breaking the law, here, operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. See Eleneki, 106 Hawai'i at 180, 102 P.3d at 1078.

‘The court’s undisputed finding no. 18 is that “Officer
Correa . . . did not observe a suspicious driving pattern as
[Defendant’s} vehicle approached [the checkpoint], or thereafter,
[or] that the turn (made by Defendant] was effected in an illegal
manner[.]” (Emphasis added.) The court's undisputed finding no.
26 is that “Officer Correa testified that he did not observe any
traffic violations with regard to [Defendant’s| vehicle prior to
the stop.” (Emphasis added.) The court's undisputed finding no.
29 is that “Officer Correa testified that the sole reason for

and experience, he felt that he had a reasonable suspicion to

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roadblock.” (Emphasis added.) In sum then, Officer Correa did
not observe Defendant driving in a suspicious manner or commit
any criminal or traffic violation in the operation of his
vehicle. Defendant made a legal right turn onto a paved roadway.
Apparently the turn was not made erratically, and his headlights
were on. Furthermore, even as Officer Correa followed Defendant,
he did not observe Defendant driving suspiciously or in an
erratic manner. Accordingly, Officer Correa had no basis to have
a reasonable suspicion thet criminal activity was afoot.*

Viewed in its best light, then, the only suspicion
officer Correa had was that Defendant was attempting to avoid a
roadblock, not that he was driving under the influence of an
intoxicant.* The mere possibility of criminal activity does not
satisfy the constitutional requirement that @ stop be based on
suspicion “that criminal activity was afoot,” Trainor, 83 Hawai'i

at 258, 925 P.2d at 826 Barnes, 58 Haw. at 338, 568 P.2d at

+ vefendant argued that he 1e not from Mavi and was driving a rental
car, and that Officer Correa testified that Defendant informed hin that
Defendant was lost.

+ Because the dissent cites to Murphy v, Commonwealth, 304 8.8.24
125 (Va. Ct. App. 1969) in support of its decision, we discuss it. Se
dissent at i9 n.3. However, in that case, the Virginia Court of Appeals
‘Soneluded that

‘the act of a _driver in making a lawful siaht turn 250 feet
before a rosdbiock dose not give tise to-a reascnable suspicion of erimina

a he ariver" duit

 

 

 

as sf erininsl activity 36¢ S-E-20 at 122
(extations omitted) emphasis accea). Likewise, in this case, Defendant's
Hight turn 250 feet before the roadblock dig not give rise toa reasonable
Suspicion of criminal activity. Gee id. Defendant's turn was not
ulth*any “behsvior which independently raise[d) suspicion of criminal
activity,” for Lt cennot be said that laxfully driving down a road

fedependently raises suspicion of efininal activity.” Id, (emphasis added)

   

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1211, or that “legal wrongdoing” was taking place or about to
take place, Prendergast, 103 Hawai'i at 454, 63 P.2d at 717
(citation omitted).

Manifestly, the fact that Defendant exhibited signs of
intoxication after the stop does not retroactively justify the
stop. See, @.0., State v. Kido, 109 Hawai'i 458, 462, 128 P.3d
340, 344 (2006) (stating thet “[iJndeed, prior decisions of this
court confirm that subsequent events can neither support nor
invalidate the existence of probable cause at the time of the
search or seizure” and that “(tJhis court has held that
subsequent events cannot justify a search or seizure if probable
cause was lacking at the time search or seizure was conducted”
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); State v. Maldonado,
108 Hawai'i 436, 445, 121 P.3d 901, 910 (2005) (noting that
“*{a]ssuming an unreasonable search or seizure, any evidence
derived therefrom is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, and
a conviction obtained thereby must be reversed’ (quoting state
YaWallace, 80 Hawai'i 382, 393, 910 P.2d 695, 706 (1996)));
State v. Phillips, 67 Haw. 535, 541, 696 P.2d 346, 351 (1985)
(adopting the rule that “{a] search is not to be made legal by
what it turns up” and that @ search “is good or bad when it
starts and does not change character from its success” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)): Kim, 68 Haw. at 290, 711

P.2d at 1294-95 (ruling that “[a]n invalid search or seizure is

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———

not subsequently validated by what it produces” (citation
omitted) ) «
vir.

The stop involved herein, then, did not fall “within a
well-recognized and narrowly defined exception to the warrant
vequirenent,” Eleneki, 106 Hawaii at 160, 102 P.3d at 1078
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and thus
violated the proscription in article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i
Constitution against unreasonable seizures. The court's ruling,
then, subverted the reasonable suspicion standard because it
authorized a stop based on non-criminal activity. Hence, the
ruling would abrogate the “reasonable and articulable” suspicion
standard by allowing stops on suspicion of conduct having nothing
to do with criminal activity.

rm.

Indeed the majority of other jurisdictions have held,
based on the facts presented, that it is not permissible to
pursue end detain drivers of motor vehicles appearing to legally

avoid sobriety checkpoints." See Howard v, Voshell, 621 A.2d

the dissent cites to state vy. Till, 474 N.W.2d 86 (S.0. 1981),
and quotes from the following past

 

Notwithstanding the general freedom to avoid police
confrontation, we find the avoidance of the police roadsiock in
this instance’ was sufficient to ereste an srticulebie and
Feasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Automobiles and their
Use on state roads are the subject of significant stare regulation
(guau(,1 licensing, registration). This fact distinguishes the
gases relied upon in [state v, Talbot, 192 P.24 489 (Uteh Ct. App.
1990) ], the majority Of which Involved pedestrians, ‘And while
people’are not shorn of their Fourth Anendment. protection when
they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles, Brouse, 440
(cont ined.

 

 

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804, 807 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that, “[a}e to the
general issue of avoiding police confrontations, [tlhe ma

of jurisdictions which have addressed the issue of flight have
held that the mere act of avoiding confrontation does not create
an articulable suspicion” (emphasis added)); People v. Bigger,
771 N.Y.8.24 826, 831 (N.Y, Just. Ce. 2004) (holding that a
police officer lacked objective articulable reason to stop
defendant's vehicle on ground that defendant turned around in
attempt to evade sobriety checkpoint, where officer was not part
of sobriety checkpoint detail, there was no written established
procedure for stopping motorists who appeared to be evading
sobriety checkpoints, and defendant was driving his vehicle in no
apparent violation of any law; Commonwealth v. Scavello, 734 A.2d
386, 388 (Pa. 1999) (noting that, where “there is no requirement

that a driver go through a roadblock[, fJailing to go through the

 

(- -eontinved)
nS. at 663, their actions on the road become subject to increased
state cegulation and restriction. Consequently, actions taken on
the Toad, the character of which would be innocent in another
context, ‘nay well give rise to an articulable snd reasonable
sospicion of 2 violation of the law respecting the use or
Gwnership of an automobile

474 W.W.24 at 88 (emphasis added); dissent at 23. However, Zroute said, “An
individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not Tose all
reasonable expectation of privacy

Sas? 440 U.8-
‘Tail sisstates grouse in attempting to distings

       

Liculable suspicion” as relating only to pedestrian traffic. 792 P.2d at
495-94 (citations omiteed). Instead, Erouse pointed out that “(n]any’people
spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets.
Ondoweedly, Se securie v snc

x7 OF other modes
Sf travel.* 440 0-5. at 662 Tenphasie added). hue, Erouse did not draw «
Gistincticn between the requirenents for pedestrian, as opposed to vehicle
seizures, that Thill seeks to make

 

 

   

 

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roadblock in and of itself . . . provides no basis for police
intervention” (footnote omitted) ); Talbot, 792 P.2d at 493-94
(recognizing that “[t]he majority of jurisdictions which have
addressed the issue of flight have held that the mere act of
avoiding confrontation does not create an articulable suspicion”

(citations omitted).
x.

Additionally, as noted previously, it has been
expressed that “(t]he majority of jurisdictions which have
addressed the issue of flight have held that the mere act of
avoiding confrontation does not create an articulable suspicion.”
Talbot, 792 P.2d at 493-94 (citing Hinton v, United States, 424
F.24 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (ruling that “flight [is not] a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make
its import less ambiguous”); People v, Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272,
1276 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (stating that “an effort to avoid
police contact, by itself, is insufficient to support a stop”):
Ince Did, 532 A.24 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that
the defendant “merely attempted to walk away, behavior indicative
simply of a desire not to talk to police” and that “(nJo adver:
inference may be drawn from such a desire”); McClain v, State,
408 So. 24 721, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that

 

defendant's “behavior which, taken for its most insidious
implications, indicated only that he wanted to avoid police,

land) could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was

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engaged in criminal activity"); Beople v. Fox, 421 N.B.2d 1082,
1086 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that “the mere fact that the
vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve
as a justifiable basis for conducting a Jerry stop"); State
Hathaway, 411 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (La. 1982) (ruling that “[e]ven
where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid
apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight” is
coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 378
W.W.2d 451, 460 (Mich. 1985) (determining that flight “does not
alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulable basis to
conclude that criminal activity [is] afoot”)). See also Little
ve State, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding intoxication checkpoints,
“[a] motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make @
u-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock”
and that “{nJo action is taken against a driver doing so unless
the motorist drives erratically”); State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d
789, 793 (Neb, 1997) (concluding that the police officers did not
have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s car solely

because she appeared to be evading an intoxication checkpoint in

 

Light of Nebraska’s adherence to “The Use of Sobriety Checkpoints
for Impaired Driving Enforcement,” (Nov. 1990) of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (hereinafter, the
Guide], which provides that “[a] motorist who wishes to avoid the

checkpoint by legally turning before (entering) the checkpoint

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area should be allowed to do so unless a traffic viclation(s) is

observed or probable cause exists to take other action").
There are a multitude of reasons for making a turn
similar to the present case as pointed out by other

jurisdictions, See Bass v, Commonwealth, 525 S.£.2d 921, 925

(va. 2000) (stating that “(t)he reasons for which a driver may

 

the dissent states that there is a “aplit on whether avoiding
roadblock or checkpoint alane creates sufficient Feason for a traffic seep.”

 

Dissent at 6 (quoting S16 S.W.2d 462, 464 no (Ho.
Ct. App. 1996})- Conversely, we observe that the view that avoidance of a
roadblock or checkpoint can provide the sole basis for 2 treftic stop appears
fo be a distinctly, In Oughton, the Missouri court of

Appeals based its conclusion that “(t]he majority position appears to be that
Such avoicance can provide the ggle basis for such a stop" on seven cases:

Sie s.w.2a at 46¢ m2 (citing 2 /788'S.We2d 873" (Ark. Cts ABB.
1988); Smith v. State, 515 So. 24 1¢9 (Ala. crim. App. 1987); Suyder v, state,
338 Nie, 26 961 find. Ce. App. 1989); Steinbeck, 862 §.W.2a 912; Boones ye
State, 506 So. 2d 254 (lise. 1987); Theil, ¢7¢ NuWe2d Be;

Commonwealth, "270 8.8.24 72i (Va. Ct. App: 1988) (emphasia in original) .
However, at ieast five of these seven cases do not support such a conclusion,
and the renaining two would not constitute @ majority.

Th Sth, Snyder, Steinbeck, ‘Phill, and Sixoud, there were facts
in addition to the avoidance of the roadblock or checkpoint which gave rise to
Feagonable suspicion for the stop. See §aith, 515 So. 2d at 180 (the officer
observed the driver avoid the roadblock, and turn rapidly into « private
driveuay, stopping fifty feet from the front dost, and turning off his Lights
bat not his engine wnile renaining in the car); Souder, S38 Nvec2d at 965266
(concluding that the officer's “experience gave him specific and articulable
fects and inferences drawn therefrom to form a reasonable suspicion that, [the
river] was committing a crine” but that "a driver who simply turns off the
Yoad before entering the roadblock may not give rise to a reascnable
suspicion, unless coupled with other articulable facts such as erratic driving
or traffic violations”); Stainback, 862 8.W.2d at 14 (concluding that the
driver's “turn away fron the sopriety checkpoint, coupled with the cepucy
sheriff's experience in similar instances, the time of day, and the nature of
the roadway onto which the appellant turned, const itute(a}’ specific,
reasonable, and articulable facts which allowed the police officer to draw an
inference sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that the driver aight have
been engaging in criminal activity"); Thill, 474 N.W.2a at 86 (concluding that
the driver's “turnabout at the entrance of the roadblock and his subsequent
circuitous route constituted a reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was in
violation of the law respecting the use or omnership of an autonobiie")?
Stroud, 370 9.£.2¢ at 723. (concluding that based on the officer's "eleven
years’ experience with the state police, [the driver's] action in avoiding the
Foadblock indicated that he was probably Unlicensed or otherwise in violavicn
of the law").

Te would be inaccurate to say that the remaining two cases cited
fo by the Quahten court, Coffman and Boches, are sufficient to support =.
“najority rule.” Accordingly, we reject the conclusion in Qughtan chat "(t}he
najority position appeers to be that such avoidance can provide the gole Haase
for such a stop.” 916 S.W.2d at 464 n.2 (eaphasis in original)

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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reverse direction other than to evade a traffic checkpoint are
legion in number and are a matter of common knowledge and
experience”). It has been observed that “citizens will avoid
contact with police for reasons other than fear of being caught
for a crime they have committed” and that “[a] completely
Annocent person may wish to avoid the delay which a discussion
with police may entail; others have a fear of police authority:
still others resent and seek to avoid the ‘hassle’ of a stop
which lacks any basis." Talbot, 792 P.2d at 494 n.11."
A.

With respect to the court’s reference to Officer
Correa's experience with forty or so previous stops, the
following has been stated:

The fact that [the officer's) observation of [the motorist]
gave rise to no nore than an unparticularized suspicion oF

basedon hin training and experience.
State v. Roberson, 592 $.£.2d 733, 737 (N.C. App. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here,

Officer Correa did not possess any reasonable or articulable
basis to support a stop based on Defendant making a lawful turn

onto Mehameha Loop.

 

4 the dissent’s totality of the circumstances analysis, sen dis
at 16, proves that, as known to the officer, no illegal activity tock place
Tt ighores the fact that the sane pre-stop clrcunstances can be explained by
Snnocent behavior av recognizes by other Jurisdictions and would net amount to
objective reasonable factors indicating criminal activity.

 

 

 

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This is not a case where erratic driving behavior or an
infraction of a traffic rule was observed prior to the stop.
Here, it is immaterial that “in every case (wherein officer
Correa effected approximately forty stops] the individual
avoiding the checkpoint was either intoxicated or was violating
the law in some other way such as{} not having a vehicle

insurance or [a] driver[")s license or having an outstanding

 

warrant[,]" as the court found in finding no. 7, Because an
objective basis for the stop was absent, no legal grounds existed
for the stop and what was subsequently discovered cannot validate
it. See, e.a., Phillips, 67 Haw. at 542, 696 P.2d at 351. The
stop therefore vas unlawful.

B.

‘The dissent proposes a multi-factor test in support of
the proposition that, taken together, “the evidence establishes
sufficient specific and articulable facts upon which to base a
reasonable suspicion that [Defendant] avoided the checkpoint to
evade arrest or detection.” Dissent at 16. The factors the
dissent points to are

(2) the motorist’ s distance from the rosdblock when the turn

or U-turn was made; (2) whether the motorist was able to see

the roadblock before he or she took evasive action; (3) the

snanner in which the motorist operated his or her vehicle in

making the evasive action; (4) the arresting officer’ s

experience; and (3) any other circumstances that would

Indicate the motorist wes intentionally avoiding the
roadblock to evade arrest oF detection:

 

 

Dissent at 6-7, However, the factors identified by the dissent
fail to provide any objective guidance as to the reasonable
suspicion standard in the context of this case.

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1
First, all of the cases that the dissent cites to in

its factor analysis acknowledge that in sone form or another, “a
legal turn [before a roadblock], by itself is not sufficient to
establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion.” State v.
Foreman, 527 $.£.2d 921, 923 (N.C. 2000)." Although the court
in Binion concluded that “where a motorist acts to avoid a
roadblock, such action may by itself constitute reasonable
suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is about to be
committed(,]" it also determined that whether reasonable
suspicion exists must be determined from a “totality of the
circumstances on a case by case basis” and that “the lawful turn
without more does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” 900
S.W.2d at 703, 705, 706 (emphasis added) .

In that case, where the driver executed a legal U-turn
1000 feet before the roadblock the court held that reasonable and

articulable suspicion did not exist. id, at 706. That court

 

also noted that “it was significant that the roadblock was not

‘controlled’ in that approaching drivers could avoid the

sen lao Pooler vs Motor Vehicles Divs, 746 P.24 716, 718 (Or, Ct
app. 1987) (holding that @ Tegal U-turn before @ Tosdblock does not by itself
Constitute reasonable suspicion) 602 A.2d 1328, 1335

 

 

‘Sommonwealth x. Meta,
(Pa. Super. Ce. 1992) (holding that a motorist™s avoidance or attempt to avoid
a police checkpoint must be coupled with other facts in order to provide s
Police officer reasonable suspicion)? State v. Binion, 900 $.w.2d 702, 703
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that “the lawful turn without more does not
give

Sehe

{o reaaonable suspicion”); Wurphy, 384 8.8.24 at 128 (stating that
of « driver aking @ lawfel right turn 350 feet before s roadblock
fot give fise tos reasonable suspicion of criminel activity unless the
Jr's turn or action is coupled with other articslable such as

jc driving, a traffic violation, or sone behavior which independently
Talses suspicion of criminal activity" (citations omitted) )~

    

     

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roadblock by making safe, legal U-turns.” Id. Like the

defendant in Binion, Defendant made a lawful turn prior to

 

reaching a roadblock that was not “controlled” and which drive
could avoid by making safe, legal turns.

Briefly, with respect to factor (1), “the distance from
the roadblock” is not really one factor. Most of the cases cited
by the dissent support @ finding of no reasonable articulable
suspicion, while the cases that do not do so are
distinguishable." The dissent quotes United States v, Lester,
which states, “Conversely, the closer a motorist is to a
roadblock when he or she turns, the more objectively reasonable
it may be to infer the turn was made out of a conscienceness of
guilt.” 148 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (D. Md. 2001); Dissent at 9.
However, in that case the court determined that “a per se rule

+ + has no place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” 148 F.
Supp. 2d at 603. Rather, the law dictates that the iclourt
should examine the specific facts of the case to determine
whether [the officer] had reasonable suspicion to justify the
vehicle stop based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id, at
602-03 (emphasis added). Neither the specific facts pointed to

* Soe State v, Powell, $91 A.24 1306, 1308 (He. 1991) (holding that
Suspicion GF crsninal activity anere « motorist corned around as much as 2100
TSttal"taen nace 1000 fest Before: rondblock aid net give fise fo" ressomble
suspicion of criminal activity); Zalbot, 792 P.2d at 489 (determining that
avoiding a roadblock dig not create articulable suspicion); Baas, S28 8.6.24

St 325 {nolaing there was no reasonable suspicion to stop a actorist’”s vehicle
here he meses legel U-turn about 500 feet from the roadblock)

    

 

 

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in Lester or the “totality of the circumstances” to support

onable articulable suspicion were present in this case

 

As to factor (2), notice of the roadblock, it is
immaterial “whether a notice was posted . . . [in order to
determine] a driver's scienter of guilt.” Dissent at 9. Signs
are meant to be seen and whether a motorist was cognizant of the
sign does not objectively indicate guilt.

As to factor (3), the motorist’s manner in operating
his or her vehicle, provides no instruction at all. If the
driver vere driving erratically or had comnitted a traffic
violation there would be 2 justifiable basis for a stop, under
established case law. If the driver was driving lawfully this
factor is irrelevant. It is undisputed that Defendant was
driving in a lawful manner prior to the stop. The dissent thus
Lists this factor without applying it.

As to factor (4), it is unclear how the arresting
officer's experience is germane to the assessment of the
reasonableness of the stop. Because the legitimacy of a stop
must be based on objective criteria, it is the circumstances
surrounding the stop that must be judged, irrespective of the
officer's experience."

‘The dissent points to Steisbeck, 962 §.H.2d at 913, where it was
every vehicle tnot tures theres". the driver has been drinking’ aleonod(.)*
ithougn'the arivers’ had Been drinking, they wefe all dafued DUI citations or
Stinaing:, aes aw.ae av S1zs “Porchers Stticer Correc’s enpertencer of

Course, wes not the same ae the officer in Steinbeck; the court's finding no.
{cont inved.

 

 

 

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The dissent’s factor (5) {s “any other circumstance()

that would indicate the motorist was intentionally avoiding [a
roadblock to evade arrest or detection.” Dissent at 7 (emphasis
added). But this factor of “any other circumstance,” inculcates
the very “kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion .
[that was} the evil the Court . . . discerned when... it .
insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at
661.
3.
Finally, as to all five factors, the dissent adopts the

view that avoiding a roadblock is a sufficient basis for a

 

stop.'* This is because all the dissent’s factors concern
conduct resting on Defendant's purported avoidance of a
roadblock.

xr.

This court has upheld DUI autonobile stops but only
upon a totality of circumstances which support a reasonable
suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. See, sau, State we
Kaleohan, 99 Hawai'i 370, 378, $6 P.3d 138, 146 (2002) (ruling

 

¥(, continued}
7 Andicates that ot every driver stopped by Officer Core
toa checkpoint hag been drinking.

for turning prior

   

“the dissent qualifies its position by characterizing Defendant! =
facts as “intentionally evading arrest or detection” and, thus, ‘the dissent
assumes the very fact in issue, See e.a., dissent at 5-6." To posit thet
Defendant was avoiding “arrest” or “detection” presupposes that Defendant wos
engaged in criminal activity. But the officers did not observe any objective
arks of criminal conduct, and what was ciscovered after the stop Would not
justity the stop.

 

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that police officer's observation that the “vehicle swerv(ed)
within its lane of travel and cross{ed] over the solid double
center line twice” was “sufficient to warrant an investigative
traffic stop to determine whether [the defendant) was driving
while impaired”); Kernan, 75 Haw. at 39, 856 P.2d at 1226
(holding that the “officer observed specific articulable facts
that formed his reasonable belief that the crime of DUI was being
committed” where the defendant was speeding and weaving out of
his traffic lane and into the oncoming traffic lanes); Powell, 61
Haw. at 322, 603 P.2d at 148 (noting that the officer was able to
articulate the basis of a stop, namely that the vehicle was
“travelling at an abnormally slow rate of speed while repeatedly
stopping and signaling prematurely at intersections[,]” and “the
automobile hesitated for unusually long periods of time before
negotiating turns in spite of a complete absence of vehicular
traffic”); State v. Barricknan, 95 Hawai'i 270, 277, 21 P.3d 475,
482 (App. 2001) (holding that the defendant’s conduct in stopping
his vehicle for three to five seconds and failing to follow the
hand signals of an officer directing traffic, combined with the

officer's observation of the defendant's glassy eyes and

 

alcoholic breath, provided reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop).

on the other hand, @ seizure and evidence therefrom
have been invalidated in the absence of objective facts

indicating that criminal activity was afoot. See, e.a., Eleneki,

30"
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To

106 Hawai's at 161, 102 P.3d at 1079 (ruling that police officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant where the officers
had no reasonable basis to infer that person they were seeking
would be an occupant of defendant’s vehicle because the subject
person had been seen boarding said vehicle, defendant had been
arrested for a drug-related offense, and officers were informed
that defendant was a drug supplier); Trainor, 83 Hawai‘i at 259,
925 P.2d at 827 (affirming court's ruling that there was no
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on a drug
courier profile where the characteristics in the profile
“described an enormous set of presumably innocent travelers”);

al Temple, 65 Haw. 261, 650 P.2d 1358 (1982) (holding that
an anonymous phone call reporting defendant for stolen firearm
offense was an insufficient basis to stop the defendant and,
therefore, the conviction of the defendant and the order denying
the motion to suppress were reversed); State v. Kupihea, 59 Haw.
386, 387, 581 P.2d 765, 766 (1978) (holding that defendant's
crouching motion, without more, was insufficient to justify a
stop, and the subsequent seizure of firearms was improper); state
Meitulihee, 87 Hawai'i 487, 491, 960 P.2d 157, 161 (App. 1998)
(holding that the evidence of defendant's DUI was illegally
obtained where the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize
the defendant).

xIz.

Assuming, arquendo, any doubt as to the application of

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the reasonable suspicion standard, this case is resolved by
article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. ‘Though that
section is like the Fourth Amendment, it has been established
that “as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable
authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution, (the
Hawai'i Supreme Court is] free to give broader privacy protection
than that given by the federal constitution.” State v. Kam, 69
Haw. 483, 491, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (1988) (citations omitted); see
also State v, Lopez, 78 Hawai'i 433, 445, 896 P.2d 889, 901
(1995) (stating that, “as the ultimate judicial tribunal in the
state, this court possesses the final and unreviewable authority
to interpret and enforce the Hawai'i Constitution” (citations
omitted))

Significantly, this court has declared that, compared
to the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i
Constitution guarantees persons in Hawai'i a “more extensive
right of privacy[.]" State v, Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113, 123, 913
P.2d 39, 49 (1996); see also State v, Dixon, 63 Hawai'i 13, 23,
924 P.2d 161, 191 (1996) (noting that “article I, section 7 of
the Hawas'l Constitution provides broader protection than the
[F]ourth [Almendment to the United States Constitution because it
also protects against unreasonable invasions of privacy”); State
va Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 661-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) (“In
our view, article I, § 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution recognizes

‘an expectation of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the

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Federal Bill of Rights.”).

Hence, it would be violative of the “extensive right to
privacy” guaranteed by the Hawai'i Constitution for this court to
permit seizures to occur on the basis of a suspicion that a
motorist was avoiding a police confrontation by making a lawful
turn. Unlike the exclusionary rule on the federal level,
Hawaii's exclusionary rule serves not only to deter illegal
police conduct, but to protect the privacy rights of our people.
See Lopez, 78 Hawai'i at 446, 896 P.2d at 902.

XIII.

The logical corollary to the dissent’s rule, which
penalizes a motorist for not going through a roadblock, is that
motorists may be coerced lawfully into passing through one -- 2
proposition inimical to our constitution’s protection of the
right of privacy ~~ to be free of individual suspicionless, and
thus, unreasonable seizures. See also State v. Endo, 83 Hawai'i
87, 93, 924 P.2d $81, 587 (1996) (holding that article I, section
7 of the Hawai'i Constitution “requires that governmental
Antiusion inte the personal privacy of citizens of this State be
noareater in intensity than absolutely necessary” (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)). The dissent relies on
citations to jurisdictions that have held that avoidance of an

intoxication checkpoint is an articulable basis upon which to

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ee

 

conduct a stop." However, not a single one of these cases
relies on constitutional provisions that afford greater
protection by way of an express right of privacy, as does
Hawaii's constitution."

The violative nature of the procedure followed by the
police becomes apparent in the consequences resulting from these
stops as evidenced by finding no. 7. As mentioned before, in
finding no. 7 the court found that in Officer Correa’s forty
stops, “the individual avoiding the checkpoint was either
intoxicated or was violating the law in some other way such ae[]
not having a vehicle insurance or [a] driver[’]s license or
having en outstanding warrant." (Emphases added.) In cases
where there was a violation “in sone other way,” such violation
would only become apparent after the stop, confirming that in

such instances the stops were made without reasonable suspicion

 

» fag Diesent at 8-16 (citing Laster, 148 F. Supp. 24 597) Snudar,
530 N.z.24 961) Gheinbeck, B62 S.w.20 912; Quanton, 916 S.W.2d 462; Foreman.
S21 Sifsod 921; Mhild, ¢74 N.w.24 86) Binion, 900 $.W.2d 2027 Stroud, 370
S2E.20 321; Commmmeaith v, Eaves, 408 S-£-24 $25 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), Mumohy,
364 8.8.24 125).

 

% the dissent quote
its proposition that "the effectivene:
Feduced if motorists abe permitted co avoid then," dissent at 24, which
Efates, in relevant part, sit is clear that the perimeters of the checkpoint
Sethe area in which checks are conducted would include the area within which
Grivers may become aware of its presence by observation of any sign marking or
Giving notice of the checkpoint [,]” 527 9.E.20 at 324.

‘The question of whether a standard based Gn when “drivers will
becone aware of a roadblock’ s presence” gives rise to unconstrained discretion
sei x Would run efoul of cur State constitutional protection against
Saressonable seizures; the requirenent that a vehicle stop be premised on
Yeasenable suspicion indicates uch stop ig not a "minimal intrusion" a2 the
Glasent contends, Dissent at 25, In any event, as Erouse and Sitz indicate,
the Sninisal intiusion" "in combating intoxicated motorists,” dx, is
Sccounted for by allowing non-discretionary enforcement at roadblocks even
though no suspicion ef c¥ininal activity exists as to the drivers stopped.

527 §.£.24 at 924-25, in support of
Of Intoxication checkpoints would be

 

 

 

 

 

 

      

 

 

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or probable cause of criminal activity, absent inculpatory pre-
stop facts. Further, based on finding 7, it is evident that in
such “other” cases, the drivers were not operating their vehicles
under the influence of an intoxicant. Yet they were subjected to
a stop that was not warranted under the constitution and under

HRS §§ 291E-19 and -20. See infra. In effect, the police in

 

this case set up an unauthorized checkpoint at which
suspicionless stops were made in advance of the statutory
roadblocks -- @ patent disregard of HRS 2916-20 (see the court's

conclusion no. 9) and the heightened right of privacy protected

 

by the Hawai'i Constitution.

ip support of Ste “minimal intrusion”
2, dissent at 25, noe of which are germane, but are cl
Unopposite: “State ve Ferseira, “968 P.2d'700 {idaho Ct, App: 1995), 12,
supportive of the poaition herein. In that case, the idaho Court Gf Appeals
Concluded that "the adainiatration of field sobriety teste following a tratfic
Stop is but an investigative detention,” ig, at 706, and affirmed the
Feasonable suspicion standard, stating, “Buch an investigative stop must be
justified by some cbjective manifestation that the person stopped is) or $2
‘about to be, engaged in criminal activityi.]" id at 705 (citations omitted)
(enphesie addeayessthat court aotea that dela sobriety teste are reasonable
nethods of conducting an investigation, based on

ial.” Id. (enphasis addea) Therefore, Ferreira comports with our
holding that the purported investigatory stop by the police violated article
T, section 7 of the Hewaii Constitution insomuch se ie wag not supported by @
Feasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal
conduct

 

egunent, the dissent cites
ay

     

 

 

 

» 15 F.3d 1233 (N.M. 2000), did not involve the
reasonableness of ah investigatory stop on a public street and, therefore, is
irrelevant. In Johnson, the Suprene Court of New Mexico considered "whether
tthe Legislature intended to place geographical Limitation on the offense of
Dur depending on the type of activity constituting the ‘driving’ of 8
venice,” di at 1295." the court held chat vthe State aay charge a person
Who is in aetuel physical control of 8 a4

 

 

STG at 1aattenphasis-sdgeal
i er Tt Haw. 368, 799. P.2d 983
(2990), upon balancing the interests involved, upheld the constitutionality of
the Honolulu Police Department's (HPO) drug testing program and ia wholly
Gistinguishable fron this case involving an alcohol checkpoint. For one, the
Snteresta at play were very different as this court noted, “HPD"s progr
serves to protect beth public and police safety and to preserve HPD's
integrity and ability to perform its police function.” Id. at $79, 799 P.2¢
(continued. «.)

 

 

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xiv.
As noted previously, the stop also violated HRS $5
2918-19 and -20, Those statutes do not authorize, as part of a
roadblock procedure, a stop of @ vehicle operated lawfully that
turns in advance of the actual checkpoint. The Prouse Court
noted that its holding, implicitly approving roadblocks, did “
preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do
not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion” and that
“{[qluestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is
one possible alternative.” 440 U.S. at 663 (emphases added).
In Sitz, the Court ruled that sobriety checkpoints
established at pre-determined sites wherein all vehicles were

stopped and the drivers examined for signs of intoxication for a

 

(...eontinved)
at 959, Further, as notes, “s police officer, by reason of the employment as
S'police officer, has a diminished expectation of privacy.” 1d-

   

 

% the dissents contention that roadblock procedures are not germane
and that it declines to address such procedures is first belied by the court's
Sun findings 11, 23, and 30, and conclusions 9, 10, and 11, see aupta, snd
Second, by the Giesent’s eltations co cases which have analyzed the
Feasonableness of the stop in conjunction with the relevant rosdblock
procedure. See ea. Steinbeck, 662 5.W.24 at 913 (stating that “a sta
bse of scbriety checkpoints does not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United states Constitution when the state is conducting euch
Checkpoints pursuant toe systematic plan” (citing
Sitz, 496.0.5. 44 (1990) [emphasis adsed) 2900S -t2d at 705
(recognizing that “[a) precondition to the constitutional acceptability of
seizure made as a result of a roadblock is “thet the seizure must be carried
ut pursuant fo a plan embodying explicit, neutral Limitations on the conduct
of individualized fficers(,]' ana that "[iJn accordance with these
Constitutional Limitations, ‘the Tennessee Highway Patrol has formulated a set
of rules for roadblocks designed to check for unlicensed drivers” (internal
citation onitted))

‘Therefore, the dissent implicitly concedes that stops in aid of
roadblocks do implicate readblock procedures such as those in HRS $5 2915-19
and 20, The deterrent value of roadblocks and atops the dissent sdvocat
fer, dissent at 25-25, is not for us to decide; our focus must be on whether
the’ roadblock procedure was legal.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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brief period were reasonable. 496 U.S. at 454. This exception
to the rule that a stop be based on reasonable suspicion is
justified on the premise that systenatic and non-discriminatory
seizures minimally intrude upon an individual's privacy. See
Davis v. Kansas Deo't of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260, 262 (Kan. 1992)
(observing that Sitz distinguishes Terry stops from “systematic
roadside checkpoint stop(s]" and that under Sitz, Michigan’ s
interest in preventing drunk driving outweighed the degree of
intrusion on an individual motorist’s privacy); Commonwealth vs
Tarbert, 535 A.24 1035, 1043 (Pa. 1987) (holding that the
objective intrusion of a roadblock, measured by the duration of
the seizure and intensity of the duration of the stop, and the
subjective intrusion’ of such roadblock, described in Sitz as “the
potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists,” can be
“reduced to a constitutionally acceptable degree by the manner in
which it is managed and conducted”).
a

In Hawai"i, the legislature has addressed the need to
reduce the intrusiveness of @ roadblock by prescribing under HRS
chapter 2918, certain procedures in effecting roadblocks. HRS
§ 2918-19 mandates that “{t}he chief of police in any county
establishing an intoxicant control roadblock . . . specify the
procedures to be followed [in the creation of such roadbleck)

rovided that the procedures shall be in

intrusive than the standards an

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‘#*0f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®

 

described in [HRS $1 2916-20.” (Emphasis added.) HRS § 291E-20
contains the “{m]inimum standards for roadblock procedures,” in
the following manner:

(a) Every intoxicant control roadblock program shall:

(0) "Requize that al] vehicles approaching roadblocks
be-utopbed of that certain vehicies be atooned
buselecting vehicles ins specified nomerical,

‘sequence of pabtesn’
(2) Require that roadblocks be located at fixed

Iocations for a maximon three-hour periods
(3) Provide for the following

Precautions at every roadblock:

(a) Proper illusination:

(B) Off"z0a0 or otherwise safe and secure holding
areas for venicies involved in any roadblock
step:

(©) Oniformed law enforcement officers
carrying proper dent ification;

(0) Adequate advance warning of the fact and
purpose of the roadblocks, either by ign
posts, flares, or other alternative
ethods.

(f) Termination of roadblocks at the
Giscretion of the law enforcement officer
Sn charge where traffic congestion would
otherwise result) and

(4) Provide for a suffiotent quantity and visibility
of uniformed officers and official vehicles to

‘ensure speedy compliance with the purpose of the

ia to move traffic with a niniaum of

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

  

‘section shail prohibit the
‘establishment of procedures to make roadblock programs
Antiusive than reouired by the einimun atandards

 

dese
provided in
this section:

(emphases added.) Hence, under HRS § 291£-20, any other
procedure established by law enforcement officials in
effectuating a roadblock must be “less intrusive than required by
the minimum standard.”
B.

It is undisputed that Defendant was stopped in relation
to a perceived evasion of a roadblock. Officer Correa vas
responsible for watching southbound vehicles that (1) “pull off

the road and shut down [their] lights on the shoulder to avoid

36+
‘s++POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
detection,” (2) “whip[] a U-turn before getting to the . . .

checkpoint [,]" and (3) “turn[) off onto Mehameha Loop or another
side [road]" “just north” of the checkpoint. HRS § 291E-20 does
not authorize law enforcement officers conducting sobriety
checkpoints to pursue and detain drivers of motor vehicles
appearing to avoid the sobriety checkpoints in a lawful manner.
Permitting officers to do so is beyond the express scope of the
statutory procedures and, therefore, “more intrusive than the
standards and guidelines described in [HRS §] 2916-20" and
violative of HRS § 291£-19.

‘Thus HRS $§ 291E-19 and -20 are directly related and
germane to the reasonableness of the sobriety checkpoint
procedures in this case. State v. Fedak, 9 Haw. App. 98, 101-02,
825 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in
State v. Claunch, 111 Hawai'i $9, 64, 137 P.3d 373, 378 (App.
2006), established that the reasonableness of a seizure and the
guidelines provided in the HRS are interrelated:

Adnerence to these guidelines . . . assures that 2 roadblock
Selsure is the result of a plan embodying explicit, neutral
Limitations on the conduct of individual officers.

Conducting readblocks io accordance with auch neutral
5 iises the risk th 9 reasonable
ihe official in the tied. Adherence to the guidelines"
Fequirenents also assures thet the surprise, fear, and
inconvenience to ~~ and therefore the intrusion on =~ the ~~
motoring public is minimized.

 

(Emphasis added.) (Internal citations, quotation marks, and

brackets omitted.)
Fedak considered the guidelines under HRS § 286-162.6
(2985 & Supp. 1991). In enacting HRS § 286-162.6, the Committee

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“++APOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY*#
on Judiciary explained that constitutional restrictions against

 

intrusion into an individual's privacy rights were recognized

‘well founded and proper” in authorizing roadblocks:

(4) 19 analysis of Legislation of this type, concern
over constitutional inplications is well-founded and proper.
a searches authori
x7 andarde iseretion any
the level of intrusion on individual canis.

(6) " The minimum standards for intoxication control

 

roadblock standards should generally be provided for by
Etatote, with specific procedures to be established by rules
Gnd regulations adopted pursuant to (HRS) (e]hapter 91.

 

Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 418-84, in 1984 House Journal, at 1033

 

(emphasis added), As observed in Claunch, 111 Hawai'i at 64 n.4,

nacted

 

137 P.3d at 378 n.4, HRS § 286-162.6 was subsequently re
as HRS § 2916-20 by Act 189, § 23 of the 2000 Hawai'i
Legislature. HRS § 2918-20 embodies identical language to HRS §
286-162.6 with respect to roadblock guidelines.

xv.

Consistent with HRS chapter 2918, the Guide,
promulgated by the NHTSA in November 1990 with the help of
numerous law enforcement officers and agencies from various
states, supports the view that @ lawful turn, in apparent
avoidance of a sobriety checkpoint, is not a valid basis for a

stop." The Guide at 1. In general, the Guide was designed “to

 

In the Guide, the NHTSA acknowledged the contributions of
indiviuels from he

Dayton Police Department, Dayton, Ohio: . . . Franklin

County Sheriff"s Department, Columbus, Ohio;. ... Indiana

State Police; Maryland state Police: . . » Metropolitan

Police Department, Washington, D.C-; |_| Michigan State
(continued...)

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‘s*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

provide law enforcement agencies with a uniform method to plan,
operate, and evaluate sobriety checkpoints(,]” id, by setting

forth

operational procedures that police adninistrators may vant
to consider in order to ensure that sobriety checkpoints are
Used legally, ‘effectively and safely. There points are
Consistent with those specified in recent court decisions,
Including the United states Supreme Court ruling in’. -
itz, ‘upholding the constitutsonslity of sobriety
‘checkpoints.

Id. at 2.
When a driver chooses to avoid a sobriety checkpoint,
the Guide specifically states that

(al potersst who wishes to avoig the checkpoint by Legally
turning before entering the checkpoint area should be

 

Slowed to do so unless 2 traffic violation(s) is observed
OF probable cause exists to take other action

 

 

Id, at 7 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions have observed
that, pursuant to similar guidelines, a motorist should not be
penalized for avoiding a sobriety checkpoint. See Little, 479
A.2d at 906 (noting that pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding
intoxication checkpoints, “[a] motorist wishing to avoid a
sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road
prior to reaching the roadblock{]” and that “[nJo action is taken
against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives
erratically”); McCleery, $60 N.W.2d at 793 (concluding that the

police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop the

 

(,,. continued)
Police; . . . New York State Police: . . . Palm Seach County
SRCELEE'? Separtnent, Neat Falm Seach, floriday
Redding Pol: wrtment, Redding, California(:] the
Eoternstional Association of Chiege of Bolles’ {IAcE}" and the
National Sheriffs’ Association.

  

  

 

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a

defendant's car solely because she appeared to be evading an
Intoxication checkpoint in light of Nebraska’s adherence to the
Guide).
XVI.

The argument that Defendant failed to raise on appeal
HRS §§ 291B-19 and -20, and the exclusion of the Guide into
evidence, is misplaced. Any exposition of the case law in our
jurisdiction and from other jurisdictions would be incomplete and
misleading without a contextual reference to the roadblock
statutes and the Guide, which have their genesis in the
constitutional text prohibiting unreasonable seizures.” See
Bitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (emphasizing that “guidelines governing
checkpoint operation minimize discretion of the officers on the
scene”); Binion, 900 S.W.2d at 705 n.2 (noting that “guidelines
governing the roadblocks held constitutionally firm in sitz and
[state vil Manuel{, no, 87-96-IIT, 1988 WL 123988, at ¥2 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Nov. 23, 1988),%) had provisions prohibiting officers

2 ence, we do not concur with the dissent's contention that
Defendant “does not challenge... the propriety of the police establishing
Fosdblocks [under the relevant statut Dissent. at 20) see intra note 24
Farther, we must respect fully disagr

dnd "beconing advocates for the appellants, ‘Diasent
eer eee fe Nocld be {il-adrieed to ignore the role of roadblocks, such as
that. proscribed in HRE $§ 2916-19 and 20 and the guidelines in the evolution
Gf tne case low nvolving OUI stops. In order to Fender an informed decision,
We must, a3 have other juriedictions, examine the roadblock statutes and
Guidelines for stops. Horeover, az noted supra, although not "officially"
Bart of the rsadbiock, the salient facts demonstrate that the stop in this

Bebe was part of the roadblock procedure. gee court's findings 1, 5, 17, 26
So.” In that respect, the dissent’s position is wrong.

 

  
  

 

 

 

 

 

2 Manuel was an unpublished dieposition by the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals upholding the constitutionality of a sobriety roadblock in
Uight"se the governmental interest served by e roadblock and the minimal
intrusion upon motorists’ privacy rights as evaluated under guidelines
(continued...)

 

 

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from apprehending motorists who made safe u-turns or turn-ofts to
avoid the roadblock”); Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 416-84, in 1984
House Journal, at 1033 (noting that statutory roadblock
procedures should provide “minimum standards which Limit officer
Giscretion and the level of intrusion on individual rights”).

A.

Tt would be disingenuous in this case to perform an
analysis of the reasonableness of the stop disengaged from
consideration of HRS $§ 2918-19 and -20. Defendant's stop arose
because of the roadblock, and that roadblock was subject to the
directives of HRS § 2916-20. Hence, the court's undisputed
conclusion no. 9 states that “[t)he Legislature had public safety
concerns in mind when [it] enacted #.R.S. § 291£-20 allowing
police to conduct intoxication checkpoints.” The court's
undisputed finding no. 8 states that “the intoxication checkpoint
was in place to stop vehicle[]s traveling southbound on Nokulele
Highway in a numerical pattern to check for signs of
intoxication.” Relatedly, the court determined in undisputed

finding no. 9, that “Officer Correa was stationed just north of

the intoxication checkpoint and was tasked with observing traftic
and making stops based upon probable causel.1” (Emphasis added.)

‘The stop, then, was clearly made in connection with the

 

(. ..continued)
Lgned by the Tennessee Highway Patrol.

 

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roadblock, and in aid of that roadblock.’
Consequently, it is indisputable that the stop in this
case would not have occurred but for the existence of the
checkpoint, and that Correa’s surveillance and stop augmented the
checkpoint. Such checkpoints are permitted only by virtue of
Brouse’s allowance of a limited intrusion as implemented under
HRS §§ 2916-19 and -20. Sitz also emphasized the importance of
“guidelines governing checkpoint operation [which] minimize
discretion of the officers on the scene.” 496 U.S. at 452.
Given the holdings of Brouse and Sitz, and the express “concern
over constitutional implications” of the legislature in enacting
HRS chapter 291E, see supra, it is illogical to sever any
analysis of the procedure employed by the police from HRS
$$ 2916-19 and -20 irrespective of whether Defendant raised the
statutes or quidelines on appeal or not. Such discussions are

% Contrary to the dissent's objection that Defendant “does not
challenge per ge the propriety of the police establishing roadblocks under #RS
55 2918-19 and =20, dissent at 20, Defendant, on appeal, has arguably
Challenged the propriety of the police establisning roadblocks under HRS $§
2816-19 and ~20. Defendant submits in his “Pointe of Error” that “(t]he trial
Court exred in denying [Defendant's] Motion to Suppress Evidence[,]" and
Sncorporstes by reference the trial court's ruling. This ruling, which
appears in the trial transcript, 1a confirsed in the court's "Findings of
Feet, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.” Indeed, as part of its decision the court acknowledged the ca
Connection to HRS § 2918°20:

     

 

 

‘The Supreme Court it’s my understanding has reviewed 291E-

 

he statute hed. that That
Isle} would be ~~ because the Legislature has found thet
there Is a danger to the public of intoxiceted drivers that
we eA Tai ted sngraction on the Constitutional rights
Of ail citizens is permitted if-a strict procedur
followed.

 

 

 

   

added.)

 

 
‘*A7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER*#+
part and parcel of the case law that cogently decides these

8,
The record indicates that the court, in determining the
relevancy of the Guide, instructed Defendant's counsel that “you
may_submit it as argument, it’s not the law.” (Emphasis added.)
Hence, although ultimately excluded, the Guide was in
the case. Also, consideration of the Guide on appeal, like HRS
$§ 2918-19 and -20, is germane to the reasonableness of the stop

in this case by virtue of the principles in Prouse and Sitz.

 

ect of the investigatory stop
at the - Dissent St 20. For following the court's ruling
Genying Defendant's motion to suppress, the court clarified its ruling,
stating that if the roadblock was in compliance with HRS § 2918-20, then
Defendant would not be able to avoid passing through it. The court
Subsequently entered conclusion no. 3 and finding nos. 8 and 9, specifically
with respect fo the rosdblock. Sea gumsa- As discussed aumca’ the roadblock
procedure implicitly spproved by the court exceeded the authority granted to
the police under HRS §§ 2916-19 and -20.

‘The dissent also cites to Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, and Murohv, 304
S.£.2d at 129'n.3, to conclude that it say "decline to consider any theories
ot advanced by’ (Defendant, 1” such as “ehe propriety of the police
establishing roadblocks under HRS §{S) 291E°19 and [-]20."" Dissent at 21, 20,
Aside for the reasons previously discussed as to why consideration of such
matters is inescapsble, Binion and MUEGhY are contrery to the dissent’ s
position.

 

 

 

In Binion, the court held “that the action of a motorist, under
the circumstances of this case, in making a lawful turn 1,000 feet before
Foadblock does not give Fise to a reasonable suspicion of’ crininal activity
Unless the driver’ s turn or action is coupled with other articulable facts,”
300 S.w. at 206. Because the stop of the motorist waa not based on reasonable
suspicion, the judgnent of the trial court was reversed, and the charges were
dismissed. Id. Sinilerly, in Mugphy, the court held that "a driver's action
in saking s Legal turn within sight af 2 rosdblock does not give a police
officer a reasonable basis to suspect that the driver is involved in criminal
wrongdoing.” 304 8.8.24 at 126, Because the officer lacked ressonsbie
Suspicion to stop the defendant, the “fruit of the illegal stop” was
‘Suppressed, and the defendant's conviction waa reversed. Id.

Accordingly, it was unnecessary for both the Binion court and the Murchy
court to reach the propriety of the roadblock procedure snasmich as the
officer's lack of reascnable suspicion was dispositive of the defendant's
Claim. ere, that Officer Correa lacked ressonsble suspicion to stop
Defendant wold be dispositive as well:

 

 

 

 

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‘S++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

 

Like HRS § 2918-20, the Guide incorporates procedures designed to
minimize the intrusion on a motorist’s privacy when conducting a
sobriety checkpoint. Indeed, with respect to motorists who
make safe turns in order to avoid roadblocks, it has been
indicated in the case law itself that @ provision prohibiting

seizure of motorists making “turn offs” may have been a

 

consideration in upholding the roadblock in Sitz.

We aust note that the auidelines covernis
xoadblocks held constitutionally tim in site and Manuel had
‘brovisions urchibitina officers Zon aporenshdina motersate

= Sofie to avoid the roadblock.
Ke-auch condition ta Tn Deparenent of Safety General Order
410, and

constitutional. ne fing it unnecessary to sddress the
Sesue tn this opinion

Binion, 900 $.W.2d at 705 n.2 (emphases added). The Guide
expressly designed procedures that were “consistent with those

specified in recent court decisions, including the [Court‘s]

3 of course, pursuant to Hawai't Rules of Evidence (HE) Rule 201,
fan appellate court may take Judicial notice of acts of an executive agency.
Seo tua., Arabruster v. tip, 5 Hew. hop. 37, 43, 67 P.20 77, 402 (1988)
(taking Judicial notice of # letter from the acting regional director of the
Nstional Labor Relations Board, made part of the record in s related
proceeding, expressing his opinion that a party, the East-West Center is not
fn Tenployer” within the meaning of the Hawail Enployment Relations Act)
Rigo, this court may consider plain error for the apparent failure of
Defendant to raise HRS S 2916-20 and the Guide on appeal. a8
Mchoig, 212 Hewel's 527, 334, 142 P.38 974, 981 (2006) (stating tnae “(A1E
the substantiel rights of the defendant have been affected adveraely, the
error will be deened plain error” (citation omitted) ). Appellate courts, in
Griminal cases, may gua sponte "notice errors to which no exception has been
taken, Lf the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the
Fairness, integrity of public reputation of judicial proceedings(,]” state ¥,
E5x, "10" haw, 48,56, 760 F-26676, 675-76 (1988), a8 in this. c

‘assuming, arquendo, that an “exception” must be “taken” with
respect to 1IRS §6 2918-19 and “20 and the court's exclusion of the Guide,
notice of plain error would be appropriate. As earlier explained, the
procedures Listed in HRS § 2916-20 and the Guide are relevant to a discussion
Sf the ressonableness of the stop. These prescribed procedures were developed
in order to minimize intrusion upen an individual’ s privacy rights and are
Eeferred to inmuch of the case law, Given the negative constitutional
implications of the court's decision, application of the plain error doctrine
would be propes

 

 

 

   

 

 

        

 

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se4poR PUBLICATION 11 WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS‘

ruling in [Sitz).” The Guide at 1. See also Binion, 900 S.W.2d
at 105 (noting that seizure “must be carried out pursuant to
plan embodying explicit, neutral Limitations on the conduct of
individualized officers” (internal quotations marks and citation
onitted)). Again, because the Guide is imbedded in the legal
doctrine concerning roadblocks, it would be untenable to ignore
the Guide in any informed discourse, irrespective of any arguable
failure on the part of Defendant to raise it on appeal.

xvir,

‘The stop in this case violated the precepts under
article 1, section 7 of the Hawas'i Constitution and the
statutory guidelines of HRS chapter 2918, For the reasons
stated, the court's June 7, 2005 order denying Defendant’s motion
o suppress is vacated and the case {e remanded to the court with
instructions to enter an order granting Defendant’s notion to
suppress and to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea pursuant to
REP Rule 12(a) (2). See Kealaiki, 98 Hawai'i at 314 6 n.6, 22
P.3d at 593 6 n.6.
on the briefs:

Michelle b. Drewyer / x
Setendant-appeliant. Vom & Resid,
beter A, Hanano, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney,

County of Maui, for
plaintiff-appellee.

oe