Title: CYNTHIA M. TAYLOR V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CYNTHIA M. TAYLOR V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2005 WY 148123 P.3d 143Case Number: 05-14Decided: 11/22/2005
OCTOBER TERM, 
A.D. 2005

 
 
CYNTHIA M. 
TAYLOR,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

P. M. "Mike" Roberts, Erickson & 
Roberts, LLC, Rawlins, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renniesen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandon W. 
Snyder, Special Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Cynthia M. 
Taylor challenges the denial of her claim for worker's compensation 
benefits.  Ms. Taylor contends that 
the decision of the office of administrative hearings (OAH) is not supported by 
substantial evidence.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]       Ms. Taylor 
presents the following issue for review:  

 
 
Whether the hearing examiner's 
decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is in 
accordance with law.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       In March 
2002, Ms. Taylor sustained a back injury as a result of a slip and fall on 
ice.  She alleged that the injury 
was incurred in the course of her employment with Wyoming Behavioral 
Institute.  She applied for, and 
received, worker's compensation benefits.  
Ms. Taylor was evaluated by Carla J. Loflin (P.A. Loflin), a physician's 
assistant, who prescribed anti-inflammatory medication and referred Ms. Taylor 
to physical therapy.  Ms. Taylor 
received physical therapy treatment for the injury from April 2002 through July 
2002.  She was discharged from 
physical therapy on July 16, 2002.

 
 
[¶4]       After her 
discharge from physical therapy, Ms. Taylor was pain free for several 
months.  She obtained new 
employment.  In the course of that 
employment, she began to experience intermittent back pain which she initially 
attributed to the large amount of standing required in her new employment.  On February 26, 2003, Ms. Taylor visited 
P.A. Loflin for complaints of lower back pain.

 

[¶5]       On March 3, 
2003, Ms. Taylor again visited P.A. Loflin.  During that visit, Ms. Taylor described 
an incident which occurred on March 1, 2003.  According to Ms. Taylor, she had injured 
her back ducking under a "water tanker" on the back of a semi-tractor.  She was not at work at the time of the 
incident.  Ms. Taylor filed a claim 
for worker's compensation benefits.  
She alleged that she was entitled to additional benefits because her 
current back complaints were causally related to her March 2002 compensable 
injury.  The Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division (Division) denied the claim.  The matter was referred to the OAH and a 
contested case hearing was held on March 2, 2004.

 
 
[¶6]       Ms. Taylor 
testified at the hearing and presented the deposition testimony of P.A. 
Loflin.  The Division presented 
evidence in the form of exhibits and cross-examination testimony.  On March 31, 2004, the OAH issued its 
Order Denying Benefits.  The 
district court affirmed the decision of the OAH.  This appeal 
followed.

            

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]       When 
reviewing administrative decisions, we are limited to a determination of the 
factors specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which 
provides:

 
 
(c)        To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 
(ii)         
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found 
to be:

 
 
(A)        
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 
 
. . .

 
 
(E)        
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 

Carabajal v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2005 WY 119, ¶ 8, 119 P.3d 947, 
950 (Wyo. 2005).   In cases 
such as this where both parties submit evidence at the contested case hearing, 
we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.  Salas v. General Chemical, 2003 WY 79, ¶ 
9, 71 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2003).  Under the substantial evidence 
test:

 
 
"We afford respect and deference to 
a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Our task is to examine the entire record to determine whether 
substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's findings. We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when substantial 
evidence supports his decision. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which 
a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions." 

 
 

Id.  (Internal citations omitted.)  

 
 
[¶8]       When a 
party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, we review 
the case under the arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law standard.  Boyce v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Compensation Div., 2005 WY 9, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
"Under the arbitrary, 
capricious and abuse of discretion standard, we are charged with examining the 
entire record.  In our examination 
and review of a hearing examiner's determination, we defer to the hearing 
examiner's findings of fact.  We 
will examine conflicting and contradictory evidence to see if the hearing 
examiner reasonably could have made its findings based on all the evidence 
before it.  The findings of fact may 
include determinations of witness credibility, as the hearing examiner is 
charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses.  In our review, we will not overturn the 
hearing examiner's determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence."

 
 

Id.  We review this case as if it had come 
directly to this Court from the agency and do not afford any deference to the 
district court's decision.  Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 145, ¶ 6, 55 P.3d 23, 25 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]       In order to 
be eligible to receive worker's compensation benefits, a claimant must have 
sustained an "injury" which is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LexisNexis 2005) as, "any harmful change in the human organism other than 
normal aging . . . arising out of and in the course of employment while at work 
. . . ."  In order to prove that her 
injury occurred in the course of employment, Ms. Taylor must establish a causal 
connection between her work-related incident and her current complaints.  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶ 
6, 16 P.3d 710, 711 (Wyo. 2001).  
Whether a causal connection exists is a question of fact.  Hurley v. PDQ Transport, Inc., 6 P.3d 134, 138 (Wyo. 2000).  

[¶10]     The OAH found that Ms. 
Taylor did not prove that her 2003 back pain was caused by her March 2, 2002, 
work-related injury.  Specifically, 
the OAH found that Ms. Taylor had prior back problems for which she was treated 
by a chiropractor monthly for approximately six years and that the March 2, 
2002, injury had completely resolved by July 2002.  The OAH also found that Ms. Taylor was 
pain free for more than six months before non-specific back pain returned and 
that she was not at work or performing any job duty when the 2003 strain 
occurred.  The OAH further found 
that the medical testimony of P.A. Loflin, was "equivocal at best" and based 
upon a questionable history.  

 
 
[¶11]     Ms. Taylor challenges 
the findings relating to her prior medical history and the rejection of the 
testimony of P.A. Loflin.  She 
contends that P.A. Loflin's testimony provides evidence of the requisite causal 
connection and notes that P.A. Loflin was the only medical expert who 
testified.  She asserts that the 
opinion of P.A. Loflin regarding causal connection is unrefuted.  Ms. Taylor also contends that the 
medical history which she provided to P.A. Loflin was adequate and 
accurate.  She refers us to her 
testimony that the prior problems, for which she received chiropractic 
treatments, related to her upper back and neck and were "different" than her 
current complaints of low back pain.  

 
 
[¶12]     Ms. Taylor's prior 
medical history is relevant to her credibility, the weight to be accorded P.A. 
Loflin's opinion testimony and the issue of causation.  P.A. Loflin testified that her opinion 
was based, in part, on the medical history provided to her by Ms. Taylor.  According to P.A. Loflin, Ms. Taylor did 
not advise her of any history of prior back problems.  However, during the hearing, Ms. Taylor 
admitted that her prior medical history included monthly chiropractic treatments 
for back problems from 1992 through 1998.  
Medical records introduced at the hearing also reflected that Ms. Taylor 
had prior back problems for which she received chiropractic 
care.

 
 
[¶13]     In support of its 
finding that the testimony of P.A. Loflin was "equivocal at best," the OAH 
stated:

 
 
On direct examination P.A. Loflin 
testified:

 
 
Q.         
Is it safe to say that but for the March 2 of 2002 compensable injury, 
that Ms. Taylor wouldn't have had her current problems?

 
 
A.         
I'm sorry.  I misunderstood 
that.

 
 
Q.         
What I asked was, is it safe to say that but for the injury that she 
received in March of 2002, that she wouldn't have had these problems, current 
problems?

 
 
A.         
You mean if she did not fall on that date and sustain a 
strain-

 
 
Q.         
Yes.

 
 
A.         
--that none of the  none of the following episodes would have 
occurred?  Is that what you're 
asking?

 
 
Q.         
Yes.

 
 
A.         
That's a hard one to answer, as I don't know what she does in her off 
time.

 
 
Q.         
But you had no information from  that it was caused by anything other 
than 

 
 
A.         
No. I'm just going  I'm going on what she reported to 
me-

 
 
Q.         
Uh-huh.

 
 
A.         
--on her history.

 
 
Q.         
And based on the information that you got from her from her history, is 
there anything that indicates that it was related to anything other than the 
March 2 of 2002 fall?

 
 
A.         
No.

 
 
Q.         
Okay.  And do you have an 
opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical probability, that  whether or 
not her current problems were directly caused by the 2002 work-related 
injury?

 
 
A.         
I assume that her continued 
problems probably do relate to that 
initial injury on the 2nd of March 2002.

 
 
On cross-examination P.A. Loflin 
admitted she did initially take a history related to whether Taylor had prior back problems and did not know Taylor had previous 
chiropractic treatment for back pain.  
. . . P.A. Loflin also admitted that Taylor had recovered from her March 2002 injury 
and the March 1, 2003 incident could be a new injury.  . . . As to the causation of Taylor's 2003 back pain, 
on cross-examination P.A. Loflin testified:

 
 
Q.         
Okay.  So based on what you 
just said, can you say that this injury was caused by the March 2002 
injury?

 
 
A.         
I can't say that it was caused by it, but I could say that it may have 
been complicated by it.

 
 
Q.         
Okay.  But you just don't 
have enough information based on the gap in time; is that  is that right?  Is that why you 
hesitate?

 
 
A.         
Correct.

 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 
[¶14]     The OAH could properly 
find this testimony to be equivocal.  
On two different occasions, P.A. Loflin admitted that she did not have 
enough information to say whether the 2003 symptoms were caused by the 2002 
injury.  In addition, under direct 
examination, P.A. Loflin stated that she assumed that the problems were related 
to the 2002 injury, but under cross examination she stated she could not say 
that the 2002 injury caused the 2003 symptoms.  

 
 
[¶15]     With respect to medical 
testimony, "[w]e do not invoke a standard of reasonable medical certainty with 
respect to such causal connection. Testimony by the medical expert to the effect 
that the injury most likely,' contributed to,' or probably' is the product of 
the workplace suffices under our established standard."  Pino v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. (In re Pino), 996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 2000) (internal 
citations removed).  There is 
testimony in the record from P.A. Loflin that Ms. Taylor's current problems 
"probably do relate to that initial injury on the 2nd of March 2002."  However, a hearing examiner is entitled 
to disregard an expert opinion if he finds the opinion unreasonable, not 
adequately supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based, or based upon 
an incomplete and inaccurate medical history provided by the claimant.  Franks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Compensation Div. (In re Franks), 2002 WY 77, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 876, 
879-80 (Wyo. 2002); Clark v. State ex 
rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wyo. 
1997).  

 
 
[¶16]     It is the obligation of 
the trier of fact to sort through and weigh the differences in evidence and 
testimony, including that obtained from medical experts.  Morgan v. Olsten Temporary Services, 975 P.2d 12, 16 (Wyo. 1999).  "The task of determining the credibility 
of the witnesses and weighing the evidence is assigned to the [hearing 
examiner], and its determination will be overturned only if it is clearly 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence."  Hurley, 6 P.3d  at 138.  

 
 
"Where the testimony of a 
disinterested witness is not directly contradicted but there are circumstances 
which controvert the testimony or explain it away, or if such testimony is 
clouded with uncertainty and improbability, or otherwise appears to be 
unreliable or unworthy of belief, the trier of fact is not bound to accept 
it.  Justice does not require a 
court or jury to accept as an absolute verity any statement of a witness merely 
because it is not directly or specifically contradicted by other testimony, and 
there are many things which may properly be considered in determining the weight 
that should be given the direct testimony of a witness even though no adverse 
verbal testimony is adduced.  If 
such testimony is evasive, equivocal, confused, or otherwise uncertain, it may 
be disregarded."

 
 

Krause v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. (Matter of Krause), 
803 P.2d 81, 83 
(Wyo. 
1990).  

 
 
[¶17]     While we recognize that 
evidentiary conflicts exist and the parties dispute the proper weight to be 
given the evidence, we find that substantial evidence exists to support the 
findings of the hearing examiner.  
Because the testimony of P.A. Loflin could properly be construed as 
equivocal and based upon an inadequate medical history, the hearing examiner was 
not required to accept it.  
Additionally, Ms. Taylor's discharge from physical therapy in July 2002 
and her admission that she was pain free for several months thereafter support 
the finding that her initial injury had resolved by July 2002.  In light of such evidence, the hearing 
examiner could reasonably have concluded that Ms. Taylor failed to establish a 
causal connection between her current medical problems and the 2002 work 
injury.  

 
 
[¶18]     The decision of the OAH 
is affirmed.