Title: Sherman v. Rose

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sherman v. Rose1997 WY 106943 P.2d 719Case Number: 96-125Decided: 08/28/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

JESSE JUNIOR SHERMAN and DORIS MAYE SHERMAN, Husband and 
Wife,

 Appellants (Defendants), 

 

v. 

 

P.J. 
ROSE,  

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

Georg Jensen, of Law Offices of Georg 
Jensen.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

Bruce N. Willoughby, of Brown, Drew, Massey & 
Sullivan, Casper.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, Justice. 

[¶1]      This appeal must 
be dismissed because of the failure of Jesse Junior Sherman and Doris Maye 
Sherman (Shermans) to file a notice of appeal within thirty days from the entry 
of the Order Granting Summary Judgment. In response to a contention by P.J. Rose 
(Rose) that this Court lacks jurisdiction, the Shermans rely upon a motion to 
reconsider order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, filed in the 
district court, as tolling the time within which the notice of appeal was 
required to be filed. We hold that a motion to reconsider a decision must be the 
functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend the judgment for the period 
for filing a notice of appeal to be tolled. Unless such a motion serves to 
demonstrate an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence not available 
at the time of the original hearing, or the need to correct a clear error of law 
or prevent a manifest injustice, the motion to reconsider will not serve as the 
functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The motion to 
reconsider order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, filed in this 
case, did not serve as the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment, and the appeal must be dismissed because the Notice of Appeal was 
filed more than thirty days after the entry of the Order Granting Summary 
Judgment.

 

[¶2]      The Shermans in 
the Brief of Appellant articulate these substantive 
issues:

1. Did the district court err in holding that the 
Defendant's redemption was untimely?

2. Did the district court err in concluding that the 
Plaintiff-Appellee's notice of intent to apply for a tax deed was effective even 
though such notice was void as a violation of the automatic stay of the 
Defendants' bankruptcy proceeding?

 

The Brief of Appellee P.J. 
Rose offers this counter statement of the issues presented for 
review:

1. Did the district court err in holding that the 
defendant's redemption was untimely?

2. Did the district court err in applying the 
majority rule that a bankruptcy automatic stay does not prevent the expiration 
of a redemption period?

In addition to the 
substantive issues, Rose presents as his first two 
arguments:

1. The Wyoming Supreme Court should summarily dismiss 
this appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction after an untimely 
appeal.

2. The Wyoming Supreme Court should summarily dismiss 
this appeal with prejudice for failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.

 

[¶3]      The underlying 
facts relate to a house the Shermans once owned in Casper. On July 25, 1992, the 
property was sold for delinquent taxes. The certificate of purchase, which was 
issued to the purchaser at the tax sale, later was assigned to Rose. On April 
25, 1995, Rose advertised a Notice of Intent to Apply for a Tax Deed in the 
Casper Star Tribune. The notice stated that the last day the property could be 
redeemed was August 9, 1995, and on that day Rose would apply for the tax deed. 
Rose sent the Notice of Intent to Apply for a Tax Deed by certified mail to the 
Shermans, as the record owners, at their Cheyenne address. The mailed copy was 
delivered to the Shermans on May 4, 1995. On July 21, 1994, the Shermans filed a 
petition for reorganization pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. The proceeding 
was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and ultimately was dismissed on July 
20, 1995.

 

[¶4]      On August 9, 
1995, Rose filed an application for a tax deed, and it was accepted. On that 
same day, the Shermans attempted to redeem the property by sending a cashier's 
check by Federal Express to the Natrona County Treasurer. The check was received 
on the following day, August 10, 1995. The Shermans and Rose both filed motions 
for summary judgment. They sought a determination as to whether the Shermans' 
redemption was valid; whether the Notice of Intent to Apply for a Tax Deed was 
stayed by the Shermans' bankruptcy; and whether title to the property could be 
quieted in favor of Rose. The district court ruled in favor of Rose. It 
concluded that the Shermans' bankruptcy did not inhibit the Notice of Intent to 
Apply for a Tax Deed, and that the attempted redemption of the property by the 
Shermans was not timely. On January 11, 1996, the Shermans filed a Motion to 
Reconsider Granting of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Shermans' 
position is that this motion for reconsideration was deemed denied after ninety 
days, and they filed a timely notice of appeal on April 24, 1996. That was more 
than thirty days after the entry of the Order Granting Summary Judgment, but 
less than thirty days after the time at which the Shermans deemed the Motion to 
Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to have been 
denied.

 

[¶5]      Even had Rose not 
argued the question of jurisdiction, this court would have the right to consider 
its jurisdiction on its own motion. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993); Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 44 (Wyo. 1985); Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569, 570 (Wyo. 
1979); Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wyo. 1976); Wyoming State 
Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dept. v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327, 
328 (Wyo. 1968); Big Horn Coal Co. v. 
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 224 P.2d 172, 177 (1950). Indeed, we 
have a duty to be satisfied as to the jurisdiction of this court. Niezwaag; Big Horn Coal Co. We hold that 
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed in this instance, and do not reach 
either the argued issue of failure to comply with our rules of appellate 
procedure or the substantive issues argued by the parties.

 

[¶6]      The thirty day 
period for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment in the district court is 
prescribed by WYO. R. APP. P. 2.01. A timely motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under WYO. R. CIV. P. 59 tolls the period for filing a notice of 
appeal. WYO R. APP. P. 2.02. The crux of the issue in this case is whether the 
motion to reconsider should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment 
pursuant to WYO. R. CIV. P. 59.

 

[¶7]      A motion styled 
as a motion for reconsideration, if filed within the ten day period, generally 
could be considered a motion to alter or amend a judgment under WYO. R. CIV. P. 
59(e). See Waye v. First Citizen's Nat. 
Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 313 (M.D.Pa. 1994). A determination, however, as to 
whether a motion to reconsider should be deemed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title. See Davis v. Lukhard, 106 F.R.D. 317, 
318 (E.D.Va. 1984). In order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or 
amend a judgment, the motion must articulate a new ground which could not have 
been brought before the court during the action and upon which the trial court 
should utter a different ruling. The motion to alter or amend cannot be invoked 
simply to argue matters already presented and disposed of by the trial court. See Lukhard, 106 F.R.D.  at 318; Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986). Appropriate new grounds are: 1) an intervening 
change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence not available at 
the time the case was originally heard; or 3) the need to correct a clear error 
of law or prevent manifest injustice.1 See Waye, 846 F. Supp.  at 313; Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.Miss. 1990). A motion that does not contain any of these 
new grounds is not a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the time for 
filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of the judgment. See Frito-Lay of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. 
Canas, 92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.C.Puerto Rico 1981). The filing of a motion 
that is not to be treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment will not 
stay the time for appeal. See 
Lukhard, 106 F.R.D.  at 318.

 

[¶8]      Shermans' motion 
to reconsider order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment cannot be 
considered as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under WYO. R. CIV. P. 59. 
It was filed on January 11, within ten days of the Order Granting Summary 
Judgment, and was procedurally timely. Substantively, however, the filed motion 
is not sufficient. The motion to reconsider order granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment asks the court to do nothing more than reconsider issues 
already litigated, or asks the court to consider arguments which should have 
been asserted at the original summary judgment motion hearing. The Shermans do 
quote a late December 1995 case from this Court that was not available to the 
trial court at the time the Order Granting Summary Judgment was entered, but 
they make no showing of how reliance on the new case would alter the trial 
court's decision. In any event, the language quoted from the 1995 case is taken 
directly from a 1947 opinion from this court, and can hardly be considered an 
intervening change in controlling law.

 

[¶9]      The Shermans have 
not illustrated any intervening change in controlling law; any new evidence that 
became available subsequent to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment; 
or any necessity to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. 
We hold that the motion to reconsider order granting plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment cannot be considered a motion to alter or amend the judgment 
under WYO. R. CIV. P. 59. In the absence of a properly filed motion to alter or 
amend a judgment, the thirty day period for filing a notice of appeal never was 
tolled. The Notice of Appeal filed on April 24, 1996, clearly more than thirty 
days after the judgment was entered, does not serve to invoke the jurisdiction 
of this Court. When an untimely appeal is taken, we are without jurisdiction, 
and the case should be dismissed. Bosler 
v. Morad, 555 P.2d 567, 568 (Wyo. 1976).

 

[¶10]   This appeal is dismissed for 
failure to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.

 

Footnotes

1 "With regard to the third ground, the 
Court cautions that any litigant considering bringing a motion to reconsider 
based upon that ground should evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear error 
of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the 
litigant." Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau 
Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.Miss. 1990), quoted in, Waye v. First Citizen's Nat. 
Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 313 n. 3 (M.D.Pa. 1994).