Title: White v. City of Watertown

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2259 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Dr. Stuart White and Janet White, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
City of Watertown, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Township of Watertown and Township of Watertown 
Chairman Richard Gimbler, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 592, 904 N.W.2d 374  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 78 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 10, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
Jennifer L. Weston 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Matthew L. Granitz, Joseph M. Wirth, and Piper, Schmidt 
& Wirth, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Joseph M. 
Wirth. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Scott B. Rasmussen and Rasmussen Law Offices, Beaver Dam.  There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Scott 
B. 
Rasmussen.
 
 
2019 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2259 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV29) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dr. Stuart White and Janet White, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Watertown, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Township of Watertown and Township of Watertown 
Chairman  
 
Richard Gimbler, 
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Some adjoining landowners in the 
City of Watertown have a long-standing dispute over who must pay 
to construct and maintain partition fencing between their 
properties.  This case, however, is not about the neighbors' 
dispute, at least not directly.  It is instead about the 
mechanism by which that dispute is addressed.  The Whites say 
the 
City 
of 
Watertown 
is 
responsible 
for 
conducting 
a 
statutorily-prescribed procedure for resolving fence-related 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
2 
 
disputes.  The City of Watertown, on the other hand, says the 
statutes authorize only towns——not cities——to conduct such 
proceedings.  For the reasons we describe below, we agree with 
the Whites and so affirm the court of appeals.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Dr. Stuart and Janet White (the "Whites") own property 
in the City of Watertown (the "City") that they (and prior 
owners) have continuously farmed or grazed since 1839.  Farms 
previously surrounded the Whites' property, but over time the 
farms became residential neighborhoods.  The Whites, however, 
continue to graze their property, which means they——and the 
adjoining landowners——must keep and maintain partition fences 
between their respective properties:  "[T]he respective owners 
of adjoining lands when the lands of one of such owners is used 
and occupied for farming or grazing purposes, shall keep and 
maintain partition fences between their own and the adjoining 
premises . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 90.03 (2015-16).2  The statute 
assigns responsibility for the fence to all adjoining property 
owners, each of whom must bear maintenance expenses "in equal 
shares." Id.   
                                                 
1 This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion, 
White v. City of Watertown, 2017 WI App 78, 378 Wis. 2d 592, 904 
N.W.2d 374, which affirmed the Jefferson County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable Jennifer L. Weston, presiding. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Since at least 2010, the Whites and their neighbors 
have 
disagreed 
over 
their 
financial 
obligations 
for 
the 
partition fence between their properties.  The legislature 
anticipated that such disagreements might arise from time to 
time, so Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 90 ("Chapter 90") contains a 
detailed procedure for quantifying those costs and allocating 
them amongst the adjoining owners.  We will refer to these 
provisions as the "Enforcement Procedures," which include Wis. 
Stat. §§ 90.10-90.12.  The Whites have asked the City, on more 
than one occasion, to engage Chapter 90's Enforcement Procedures 
to 
determine 
and 
allocate 
the 
cost 
of 
constructing 
and 
maintaining the fencing.  Pursuant to several of the Whites' 
requests, a city alderman went to the Whites' property to view 
the partition fences.  However, because the City does not 
believe Chapter 90 allows cities to authoritatively determine 
and allocate fencing costs, the City's efforts never went beyond 
physically viewing the Whites' fencing. 
¶4 
The Whites and the City reached an impasse over their 
divergent readings of Chapter 90, and eventually the city 
attorney invited the Whites to test their interpretation in 
court.  They obliged.  Their complaint sought:  (1) a 
declaration of rights and duties under Chapter 90; and (2) a 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
4 
 
writ of mandamus or injunctive relief.3  Specifically, the Whites 
say they "need to have their fences repaired and new fenc[ing] 
put in," and that "[t]here will always be a need in the future 
to maintain said fencing."  They asserted that Chapter 90 gives 
them the right "to have the appropriate governmental body under 
Chapter 90, Wis. Stats, partition fencing, and to apportion the 
cost of erecting and maintaining fences on the boundaries of the 
plaintiffs' land."  Based on its prior responses, the Whites 
believe the City will refuse to administer the Enforcement 
Procedures without an authoritative declaration of rights. 
¶5 
The City moved to dismiss, arguing (inter alia) that 
the Whites failed to state a cause of action because Chapter 90 
does 
not 
authorize 
cities 
to 
administer 
the 
Enforcement 
Procedures.  The circuit court denied the City's motion and 
simultaneously granted the Whites' requested declaratory relief.4  
It held that "all provisions of Chapter 90 apply to the City, 
despite a failure of specific reference therein to 'cities.'" 
                                                 
3 In addition to the City of Watertown, the complaint also 
named City of Watertown Mayor John David, City of Watertown 
Alderman Kenneth Berg, the Town of Watertown, and Town of 
Watertown Chairman Richard Gimbler as defendants.  The circuit 
court dismissed these parties for various reasons, which 
dismissals the Whites do not challenge. 
4 The circuit court dismissed the Whites' request for relief 
in the form of mandamus or an injunction, holding that the 
case's posture was not ripe for such relief.  The Whites do not 
challenge that determination. 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The City appealed the circuit court's grant of 
declaratory relief and the court of appeals affirmed.5  Like the 
circuit court, the court of appeals' analysis centered on the 
perceived 
ambiguity 
of 
Chapter 
90's 
apparently 
exclusive 
references to towns when describing the Enforcement Procedures.  
After consulting legislative history, however, the court of 
appeals concluded that Chapter 90 authorizes cities as well as 
towns to conduct those proceedings.  White v. City of Watertown, 
2017 WI App 78, ¶¶2-4, 378 Wis. 2d 592, 904 N.W.2d 374. 
¶7 
We granted the City's petition for review and now 
conclude that Chapter 90 unambiguously authorizes cities to 
administer the Enforcement Procedures.  Consequently, we affirm 
the court of appeals, but for different reasons. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
The Whites' request for a declaration of rights 
pursuant to the terms of Chapter 90 presents a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  See CED Props., LLC v. City of 
Oshkosh, 2018 WI 24, ¶20, 380 Wis. 2d 399, 909 N.W.2d 136.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶9 
The City urges us to declare that Chapter 90 does not 
authorize cities to administer the Enforcement Procedures 
                                                 
5 The City did not argue that the circuit court erred in 
denying any of the procedural grounds for dismissal, and so we 
consider them abandoned.  See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. 
Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. 
App. 1998) ("[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not 
raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned."). 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
6 
 
because the constitutive statutes explicitly empower only towns 
to do so while not mentioning cities at all.  Consequently, the 
City argues, we would be unfaithful to the statutory text if we 
nonetheless concluded that cities, too, have authority to 
administer the Enforcement Procedures.  It says we could not 
reach such a conclusion without adding new text to Chapter 90 
for the express purpose of enlarging its remit. 
¶10 The principle behind the City's argument is well-
received——it is not for us to change statutory text.  Instead, 
our responsibility is to ascertain and apply the plain meaning 
of the statutes as adopted by the legislature.  To do so, we 
focus on their text, context, and structure.  "[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute[,]'" and 
we give that language its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning[.]"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Context 
is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the 
statute in which the operative language appears.  Therefore, 
statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . .").  In performing this analysis, we carefully 
avoid ascribing an unreasonable or absurd meaning to the text.  
Id., ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.").  We may also look to 
the statute's history where, as here, there has been a 
significant revision to the language in which we are interested.  
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
7 
 
Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571 ("'A review of statutory history is part of a plain 
meaning analysis' because it is part of the context in which we 
interpret statutory terms." (citation omitted)).  That history 
"encompasses the previously enacted and repealed provisions of a 
statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 
309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  "By analyzing the changes the 
legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be 
assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute."  Id.  If we 
determine the statute's plain meaning through this methodology, 
we go no further.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("If the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." 
(internal marks and citation omitted)). See generally Daniel R. 
Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 
(2017). 
¶11 The City's argument, therefore, requires that we 
review the statutes relevant to the Enforcement Procedures to 
determine whether their plain meaning empowers cities, as well 
as towns, to resolve fencing disputes.6  The parties tell us we 
may find the answer in Wis. Stat. §§ 90.01 (Fence viewers), 
90.03 (Partition fences; when required), 90.05 (How partition 
made), 90.07 (Division of partition fence), 90.10 (Compulsory 
repair 
of 
fence), 
90.11 
(Cost 
of 
repairs), 
and 
90.12 
                                                 
6 The purpose of our review is, however, very limited.  We 
express no opinion on whether the Whites have complied with the 
requirements of Chapter 90 or, more specifically, the procedural 
aspects of the Enforcement Proceedings. 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
8 
 
(Apportionment of cost of fence).  We will consider each of 
these statutes with a specific focus on what they say about the 
type of municipality to which they apply.  Following that 
analysis, we will address an additional statutory provision that 
neither party mentioned, but which is nonetheless critical to 
the question before us. 
¶12 The parties do not contest the necessity for partition 
fencing between the Whites' land and adjoining properties.  We 
have no doubt of its necessity because the statutory command is 
unequivocal:  "[T]he respective owners of adjoining lands when 
the lands of one of such owners is used and occupied for farming 
or grazing purposes, shall keep and maintain partition fences 
between their own and the adjoining premises in equal shares so 
long as either party continues to so occupy the lands . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 90.03.  Nothing in this statute suggests its 
requirements apply only when the land is located outside of city 
limits.  Because the Whites graze their property, we take it as 
established that partition fences must separate their land from 
adjoining properties.  
¶13 However, we encounter municipality-specific statutory 
references almost immediately upon commencing our inquiry into 
the landowners' respective responsibilities for the fencing.  
Although all property owners along the fence line must share in 
its cost, Chapter 90 contains a mechanism for apportioning the 
responsibility for actually building and maintaining the fence.  
This partitioning of responsibility can occur either before the 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
9 
 
fence's construction (Wis. Stat. § 90.05), or afterwards (Wis. 
Stat. § 90.07).  The pre-construction statute provides that  
[e]very partition of a fence or of the line upon which 
partition fences are to be built between owners of 
adjoining lands, after being recorded in the town 
clerk's office, obligates the owners, their heirs and 
assigns to build and maintain the fence in accordance 
with the partition, if any of the following conditions 
is met:  . . . The partition is made by fence viewers 
in the manner provided under this chapter and is in 
writing under their hands. 
§ 90.05(1)(a)2. (emphasis added).  The post-construction statute 
is, seemingly, similarly specific with respect to the type of 
municipality 
in 
which 
the 
construction 
and 
maintenance 
obligations may arise.  A property owner who wishes to partition 
responsibility for a pre-existing fence may apply "to 2 or more 
fence viewers of the town where the lands lie or to 2 or more 
fence viewers of 2 towns, if the lands lie in 2 towns . . . ."  
§ 90.07(2) (emphasis added).  Once the fence viewers assign 
responsibility to the respective owners, they "shall file such 
decision in the town clerk's office, who shall record the same."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶14 As we turn to the statutes comprising the Enforcement 
Procedures, 
we 
continue 
encountering 
municipality-specific 
references.  The parties identify three circumstances in which 
Chapter 90 allows a landowner to engage these proceedings.  In 
each of them, the City says, the applicable statute assigns 
enforcement responsibilities to towns, not cities.  The first 
circumstance involves a landowner who has failed in his 
responsibility to maintain or repair a partition fence.  The 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
10 
 
applicable statute provides that, "[i]f any person neglects to 
repair or rebuild any partition fence that by law that person is 
required to maintain, the aggrieved party may complain to 2 or 
more fence viewers of the town, who, after giving notice as 
provided in s. 90.07, shall examine the fence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 90.10 (emphasis added).  The second circumstance arises when a 
landowner shoulders the burden of building, repairing, or 
rebuilding a partition fence for which an adjoining landowner is 
actually responsible.  The Enforcement Procedures allow the 
landowner to recover his fence-related expenses from the 
responsible owner, a process that begins with a complaint to the 
fence viewers:   
Whenever any owner or occupant of land has built, 
repaired or rebuilt any fence, pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter, that the adjoining owner 
or occupant has been lawfully directed by fence 
viewers to build, repair or rebuild but has failed to 
do within the time prescribed, the owner or occupant 
who built, repaired or rebuilt the fence may complain 
to any 2 or more fence viewers of the town. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 90.11(1)(a) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
final 
circumstance identified by the parties involves landowners who 
refuse to contribute to the maintenance of a partition fence 
built at the expense of an adjoining landowner: 
When, in any controversy that may arise between 
occupants of adjoining lands as to their respective 
rights in any partition fence, it shall appear to the 
fence viewers that either of the occupants had, before 
any complaint made to them, voluntarily erected the 
whole fence, or more than that occupant's just share 
of the same, or otherwise become proprietor thereof, 
the other occupant shall pay for so much as may be 
assigned to him or her to repair or maintain; the just 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
11 
 
value thereof which the other occupant ought to pay 
shall be ascertained by proceeding as prescribed in s. 
90.11. 
Wis. Stat. § 90.12.  Although this provision does not have a 
municipality-specific reference, it directs the complaining 
landowner back to § 90.11, which requires a complaint to "any 2 
or more fence viewers of the town."  § 90.11(1)(a). 
¶15 Out of all the Chapter 90 provisions cited by the 
parties, only one mentions municipalities other than towns.  But 
it is a provision without which neither of the partition 
statutes nor any of the Enforcement Procedure statutes could 
operate.  In each of these statutes, the officials through whom 
the municipality acts are "fence viewers."  The corps of these 
officials 
is 
established 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 90.01: 
 
"The 
supervisors in their respective towns, the alderpersons of 
cities in their respective aldermanic districts, and the 
trustees of villages in their respective villages shall be fence 
viewers." 
¶16 Taking these statutes together, the City concludes it 
is without authority to resolve the Whites' dispute with their 
neighbors. 
 
The 
City 
believes 
that 
Chapter 
90 
creates 
obligations amongst neighboring landowners that can arise (or be 
enforced) only in towns.  So it maintains that the Whites can 
have no dispute with their neighbors cognizable under Chapter 90 
because their property all lies within Watertown's city limits, 
not that of a town.  And, it argues, Chapter 90 gives the City 
no authority to enforce those obligations because each of the 
Enforcement Procedure statutes requires the proceeding to 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
12 
 
commence with a complaint to "fence viewers of the town."  The 
City is nonplussed by the fact that Chapter 90 allows an 
alderperson to serve as a fence viewer.  This, it says, simply 
expands the corps of potential fence viewers; it does not confer 
any 
substantive 
authority 
on 
cities 
to 
administer 
the 
Enforcement Procedures.   
¶17 In any event, the City says, even if the statutes 
allowed it to resolve the dispute between the Whites and their 
neighbors, 
their 
ultimate 
remedy 
under 
Chapter 
90 
is 
administered through a town, not a city.  When an adjoining 
landowner fails to pay the amount directed by the fence viewers' 
certificate, the complaining owner files the certificate with 
the "clerk of the town" in which the adjoining owner's property 
is located.7  The clerk then "issue[s] a warrant for the amount 
of the listed expenses and fees upon the town treasurer payable 
to the person to whom the certificate was executed and 
delivered."  Wis. Stat. § 90.11(2)(a).  But there is no 
statutory authority for a city clerk to issue a warrant upon a 
city treasurer, the City says, so Chapter 90 gives the Whites no 
remedy even if it had the authority to decide the fencing 
dispute. 
                                                 
7 "The complaining party may file the certificate executed 
and delivered to him or her under sub. (1) (b) with the clerk of 
the town in which the lands charged with the expense and fees 
set forth in the certificate are located."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 90.11(2)(a). 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
13 
 
¶18 The City's position is plausible, but ultimately 
unsustainable.  There is a discordant note in its reasoning, a 
harrying insistence that some of the statutory pieces are not 
assembled quite right.  The dissonance that finds no resolution 
in the City's explanation relates to the corps of fence viewers.  
The City says Wis. Stat. § 90.01 does nothing but identify who 
may serve in that capacity.  But its express terms do more than 
that——they also identify where the fence viewers may perform 
their official functions.  That is, town supervisors are not 
fence viewers wherever they may roam, they are fence viewers 
only "in their respective towns[.]"  § 90.01.8  The same is true 
of village trustees——they are fence viewers "in their respective 
villages[.]"  Id.  And city alderpersons are fence viewers only 
"in their respective aldermanic districts[.]"  Id. 
¶19 That means an alderperson who crosses from his city to 
a neighboring town loses the authority to perform the functions 
of a fence viewer.  Indeed, he loses that authority even if he 
merely steps into an adjacent aldermanic district.  So if 
Chapter 
90 
does 
not 
authorize 
cities 
to 
administer 
the 
Enforcement Procedures, then it left alderpersons with nothing 
                                                 
8 However, when a fence tracks the line dividing towns, or it lies partly in one town and 
partly in another, alderpersons from the affected towns serve as fence viewers.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 90.14. 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
14 
 
to do even as it constituted them as fence viewers.9  By itself, 
this is at least a curiosity, and perhaps at most an invitation 
to read the chapter as ambiguous with respect to whether it 
grants any fence-related authority to cities and villages.  But 
this statutory provision does not exist on its own, and when 
placed amongst all the relevant statutes, the dissonance 
suggested by the City's argument resolves to a harmonious whole. 
¶20 The key to the proper understanding of Chapter 90 is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01, 
which 
instructs 
us 
on 
the 
proper 
construction of statutes.  The City noted, correctly, that this 
statute directs that "[i]n the construction of Wisconsin laws 
the words and phrases which follow shall be construed as 
indicated unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature[.]"  
§ 990.01.  But somehow both the City and the Whites overlooked 
the statute's sixtieth rule, which tells us that "'Town' may be 
construed to include cities, villages, wards or districts."  
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(42).  Because these rules are mandatory 
("shall be construed") we must consider, when applying Chapter 
                                                 
9 Reading Wis. Stat. § 90.01 as creating an undifferentiated 
pool of fence viewers who are free to enter towns across the 
state to resolve fencing disputes would require that we overlook 
the statute's geographical limitations.  We try not to ignore 
statutory text.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."). 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
15 
 
90, whether we should understand "town" to also mean "city."  On 
the answer to that question there can be no doubt. 
¶21 Applying this rule to the question before us entirely 
eliminates the ambiguity that the parties, the circuit court, 
and the court of appeals all saw in Chapter 90.  Each of the 
statutes we have considered makes perfect sense when we read 
"town" to include "city."  For instance, the pre-construction 
partition statute (Wis. Stat. § 90.05) works seamlessly within 
city limits because where it says that the partition shall be 
recorded with the "town clerk's office," we may read that 
provision as the "city clerk's office."  Similarly, we may read 
the post-construction partition statute (Wis. Stat. § 90.07(2)) 
as applying within the "city where the lands lie."  The same is 
true of the statutes addressing the three circumstances in which 
a landowner may wish to engage the Enforcement Procedures.  In 
the first——that is, when a landowner has failed in his 
responsibility to maintain or repair a partition fence——an 
adjoining landowner "may complain to 2 or more fence viewers of 
the [city] town, who, after giving notice as provided in s. 
90.07, shall examine the fence."  Wis. Stat. § 90.10.  The rule 
allows the same substitution when a landowner performs fencing 
duties 
that 
lawfully 
belong 
to 
another 
(the 
second 
circumstance).  Wis. Stat. § 90.11(1)(a) ("[T]he owner or 
occupant who built, repaired or rebuilt the fence may complain 
to any 2 or more fence viewers of the [city] town.").  And 
because 
the 
statute 
addressing 
the 
third 
circumstance 
(landowners who refuse to contribute to the maintenance of a 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
16 
 
partition 
fence) 
refers 
back 
to 
§ 90.11 
for 
the 
proper 
procedure, Wis. Stat. § 90.12 makes a city competent to resolve 
the fencing dispute. 
¶22 This also resolves the City's concern that, even if 
cities could administer the Enforcement Procedures, they would 
still lack the authority to provide the remedy described by 
Chapter 90.  With the help of Wis. Stat. § 990.01(42), a 
complaining landowner in the City may file his certificate of 
fence-related expenses with the city clerk instead of a town 
clerk.  Wis. Stat. § 90.11(1)(c).  And whereas in the absence of 
§ 990.01(42) only a town clerk would have the authority to issue 
a warrant on the town treasurer in the amount of the landowner's 
fencing expenses, this statutory rule of construction allows a 
city clerk to issue such a warrant on the city treasurer.  
§ 90.11(2)(a).  
¶23 Finally, returning full circle to the statute that 
alerted us to the dissonance and ambiguity in the City's 
interpretive methodology (Wis. Stat. § 90.01), we can now 
understand it as fitting neatly into the overall statutory 
scheme.  Indeed, in light of Wis. Stat. § 990.01(42), the 
composition of the corps of fence viewers is not just logical, 
it is necessary.  Chapter 90's creation of enforceable fence-
related obligations in both cities and villages called forth a 
need for fence viewers authorized to administer the Enforcement 
Procedures in those types of municipalities.  The legislature 
satisfied that need by making alderpersons and trustees a part 
of the corps.  § 90.01.  And whereas the geographical limitation 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
17 
 
on a fence viewer's authority is a disposable oddity in the 
City's understanding of Chapter 90, in reality it creates a 
logical relationship of accountability between the fence viewer 
and the residents of the political subdivision he already 
serves.10 
¶24 We agree with the City's admonition that we must take 
the statutory text as we find it, and we honor it with this 
reading of the relevant statutes.  Any other reading would break 
faith with the principles we described in Kalal.  
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46.  We could not accept the City's argument 
without turning significant portions of Wis. Stat. § 90.01 into 
surplusage.  Nor would our textual analysis have been complete 
without 
referring 
to 
the 
statutorily-prescribed 
rule 
of 
construction that instructs us to consider construing "town" to 
also mean "city" or "village."11 
                                                 
10 We are mindful that Wis. Stat. § 990.01 says its rules of construction apply unless the 
result would be "inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature[.]"  And we are also 
mindful that § 990.01(42) says that "'[t]own' may be construed to include cities, villages, wards 
or districts." (Emphasis added.)  Both of these passages indicate that this rule of construction, 
like all rules of construction, must not be deployed mechanically.  For the reasons we described, 
supra, § 990.01(42) makes Chapter 90 applicable to cities as well as towns.  So our holding is 
limited to Chapter 90, and we express no opinion on what effect, if any, § 990.01(42) would 
have on statutory provisions outside of Chapter 90. 
 
11 We do not employ Wis. Stat. § 990.01(42) to interpret "town" to mean "city" or 
"village" in Wis. Stat. § 90.01 (the statute creating the corps of fence viewers).  The rule of 
construction that allows that inclusive reading applies "unless such construction would produce a 
result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature."  § 990.01. 
 
In adopting Wis. Stat. § 90.01, the legislature carefully distinguished between the 
officials of each type of municipality (town, city, and village) and limited the officials' service as 
fence viewers to their respective jurisdictions.  If we substituted "city" for "town" in this context, 
we would contravene the legislature's clear limitation on a fence viewer's geographical authority. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
18 
 
¶25 Perhaps not incidentally, this also answers the City's 
challenge that Chapter 90's history illustrates that it applies 
only to towns.12  The City accurately observed that, originally, 
our laws made only those who owned property in towns responsible 
for maintaining partition fences.  Consequently, the only fence 
viewers were town officials.  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 14, § 20 
(1849) ("The overseers of highways in the several towns in this 
state shall be fence viewers in their respective towns.").  
Therefore, it is true that, in 1849, cities had no authority to 
administer 
Enforcement 
Procedures. 
 
But 
then 
the 
City's 
historical analysis hit a snag. 
¶26 The City says that, in 1878, the legislature expanded 
the corps of fence viewers to include city officials, but did 
not simultaneously authorize cities or villages to enforce the 
landowners' partition fence-related obligations.  The City is 
mistaken in two material respects.  First, the legislature added 
city and village officials to the corps of fence viewers in 
1875, not 1878.  And while doing so, the legislature did 
simultaneously authorize city and village officials to enforce 
the landowners' duties within their respective jurisdictions: 
Section 1.  Chapter seventeen (17), of the Revised 
Statutes, 
entitled, 
"Of 
fences 
and 
fence-owners 
[viewers]; of pounds and the impounding of cattle, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 We do not discuss statutory history here as an aid in determining the plain meaning of 
the statutes in question, which we have already discovered without reference to it.  Instead, we 
address it out of respect for the City's argument and to demonstrate that there are no anomalies in 
our analysis.  
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2016AP2259   
 
19 
 
the acts amendatory thereto,"[13] is hereby amended so 
as to read as follows:  Section twenty-five (25).  The 
provisions of this chapter and of the acts amendatory 
thereto, shall extend to and include all out-lots 
occupied and used for agricultural purposes, and 
embraced in the plat of any incorporated city or 
village within this state, and the aldermen of the 
respective wards of such city, and the trustees of any 
such village, are hereby empowered, and it is hereby 
made their duty, to discharge the duties imposed upon 
fence-viewers of the several towns, as provided by 
this chapter, in their respective wards and villages. 
§ 1, ch. 285, Laws of 1875 (emphasis added).   
¶27 The 
City's 
second 
historical 
error 
was 
its 
misapprehension of what occurred in 1878.  The legislature did 
not alter a city's authority to enforce fencing obligations; it 
simply changed the statutory structure in a way that prefigured 
today's 
interplay 
between 
Chapter 
90 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(42).  The legislature eliminated the 1875 language that 
had explicitly referenced cities and villages within the 
statutory material describing their enforcement authority.  The 
resulting statute was evocative of (but not the same as) what 
appears in Chapter 90 today.  So, for example, it provided that:   
When any controversy shall arise about the right of 
the respective occupants in partition fences, or their 
obligation to maintain the same, either party may have 
the line divided, and the share of each assigned.  In 
either such case, application may be made to two or 
more fence viewers of the town where the 1ands 
lie . . . . 
                                                 
13 The Laws of 1871 carried forward the composition of the 
fence viewer corps as it was constituted in 1849:  "The 
overseers of highways, in the several towns in this State shall 
be fence viewers in their respective towns."  § 21, ch. 17, Laws 
of 1871. 
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2016AP2259   
 
20 
 
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 55, § 1393(3) (1878) (emphasis added).  But 
simultaneously with this change, it also adopted a rule of 
statutory construction that is nearly identical to § 990.01(42):  
"The word 'town' may be construed to include all cities, wards 
or districts, unless such construction would be repugnant to the 
provisions of any act specially relating to the same."  Wis. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 204, § 4971(17) (1878).14  And the corps of fence 
viewers in 1878 comprised "[t]he overseers of highways in their 
respective towns, the aldermen of cities in their respective 
wards, and the trustees of villages in their respective 
villages, . . . and in towns having less than three road 
districts, the supervisors shall also be fence viewers."  Wis. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 55, § 1389 (1878).  So, contrary to the City's 
assessment of Chapter 90's history, cities were authorized to 
enforce fencing obligations in 1878 just as they are now. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶28 Although we affirm the court of appeals, we have 
traveled a different analytical route.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that the legislature inadvertently eliminated a city's 
authority to administer the Enforcement Procedures in 1878.  Its 
conclusion that Chapter 90 is ambiguous probably stems chiefly 
from the parties' failure to bring Wis. Stat. § 990.01(42) to 
                                                 
14 This rule of statutory construction did not specifically 
refer to villages, so it is possible that they lost the 
authority to administer the Enforcement Procedures at that time.  
However, this is not material to the resolution of this case, so 
we do not explore it further. 
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2016AP2259   
 
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its attention.  However, as we described above, the legislature 
never eliminated a city's authority to enforce landowners' 
partition fence-related obligations, it merely restructured the 
manner in which it expressed the authorization.  That structure 
has carried forward to Chapter 90 and § 990.01(42).  So we 
conclude that Chapter 90's plain language, when read in light of 
§ 990.01(42), unambiguously authorizes the City to administer 
the Enforcement Procedures. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2016AP2259   
 
 
 
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