Title: State ex rel. Shine v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Shine v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3624.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3624 
THE STATE EX REL. SHINE, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Shine v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip 
Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3624.] 
Mandamus—Inmate lacked a clear legal right to have his second parole hearing 
take place four years sooner than the time provided in Ohio Adm.Code 
5120:1-1-10(B)(2)—Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted affirmed. 
(No. 2022-0063—Submitted August 2, 2022—Decided October 13, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 21AP-163, 
2021-Ohio-4459. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Shine, a prison inmate, was denied parole in May 
2018.  He sought a writ of mandamus ordering appellee, the Ohio Department of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”), to reschedule his next parole hearing for a 
date four years earlier than the March 2028 date set by the parole board because, 
he claims, his first parole hearing was four years too late.  The Tenth District Court 
of Appeals dismissed Shine’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
mandamus relief can be granted.  We affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Shine pleaded guilty to federal crimes in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio and was sentenced on July 28, 1999, to 262 
months in federal prison, with credit for time served.  On August 6, 1999, Shine 
was convicted in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas of murder and 
attempted murder, and for those offenses, he was sentenced to 15 years to life in 
prison.  The state court ordered Shine’s sentence to run concurrently with his 
federal sentence.  Shine was in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons from 
September 17, 1999, until November 2, 2017, when he was transferred to DRC’s 
custody. 
{¶ 3} DRC held Shine’s first parole hearing on May 17, 2018.  Before 
scheduling the hearing, the parole board had determined that February 2018 was 
Shine’s first statutory parole-eligibility date.  The parole board denied Shine parole 
after the May 17 hearing and scheduled his next parole hearing for March 2028. 
{¶ 4} Shine commenced this mandamus action in the court of appeals in 
April 2021.  He alleges that the parole board erroneously determined that February 
2018 was the date of his first eligibility for parole.  Because his minimum term of 
incarceration for the state convictions was 15 years, Shine contends that he was 
eligible for his first parole hearing in 2014.  Thus, according to Shine, his first 
parole hearing held on May 17, 2018, was almost four years after his initial 
eligibility for parole and was therefore untimely under Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-
10(A).  Shine sought a writ of mandamus to order DRC to modify the date of his 
next parole hearing “so that it is no more than ten (10) years from the date at which 
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he was first eligible.”  In other words, Shine requested a writ compelling DRC to 
hold the second parole hearing no later than May 2024. 
{¶ 5} DRC filed a motion to dismiss Shine’s complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Shine 
opposed the motion.  The court of appeals referred the case to a magistrate, who 
recommended granting DRC’s motion to dismiss.  The magistrate determined that 
DRC did not have a legal duty to hold a parole hearing at Shine’s first eligibility 
date in 2014, because he was in federal custody at that time.  The magistrate further 
determined that Shine did not have a clear legal right to have his second parole 
hearing held sooner than ten years after the date of his first hearing. 
{¶ 6} Shine filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.  In reviewing the 
objections, the court of appeals did not find it necessary to reach the question 
whether DRC had a clear legal duty to hold Shine’s first parole hearing in 2014 
while Shine was in federal custody.  2021-Ohio-4459, ¶ 6.  Rather, the court 
overruled Shine’s objections because he had “not demonstrate[d] he has a clear 
legal right to have his next parole eligibility hearing occur less than ten years after 
the date of his first hearing.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id.  The court found that under the 
plain language of Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-10(B)(2), “the only clear legal right 
Shine has * * * is for the parole board to set a time for his next eligibility hearing 
and for that time to be not more than ten years after [his first hearing].”  2021-Ohio-
4459 at ¶ 7.  Accordingly, the court overruled Shine’s objections and granted 
DRC’s motion to dismiss.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 7} Shine has appealed to this court as of right. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 8} To obtain a writ of mandamus, Shine must establish (1) a clear legal 
right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of DRC to provide it, 
and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex 
rel. Marsh v. Tibbals, 149 Ohio St.3d 656, 2017-Ohio-829, 77 N.E.3d 909, ¶ 24.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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This court reviews de novo a court of appeals’ decision granting a motion to dismiss 
a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 161 Ohio 
St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-4777, 162 N.E.3d 773, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2967.13(A)(1) provides that an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment for murder is eligible for parole “at the expiration of the prisoner’s 
minimum term,” which in Shine’s case is 15 years.  In furtherance of the statute, 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-10(A) provides that the initial hearing for a parole-
eligible inmate “shall be held on or about the date when the prisoner becomes 
eligible for parole.”  Despite what Shine calls the “clear and compelling 
instructions” of the statute and administrative code, Shine contends that the first 
parole hearing held for him in May 2018 was nearly four years too late.  And even 
though Shine concedes that no relief could remedy the untimely parole hearing four 
years ago, he contends that relief can be granted “by deducting the four-year delay 
from the ten-year term Mr. Shine must wait until his second parole hearing.”  Thus, 
he argues that the court of appeals erroneously dismissed his mandamus complaint. 
{¶ 10} Shine’s argument is without merit.  As he acknowledges, Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120:1-1-10(B)(2) states that when parole is denied, the time until the 
next hearing “shall not be more than ten years after the date of the hearing.”  In this 
case, Shine was denied parole following a hearing held on May 17, 2018, and his 
next parole hearing has been scheduled for March 2028.  This time frame comports 
with Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-10(B)(2). 
{¶ 11} As the court of appeals correctly noted, the crux of Shine’s argument 
is that his second parole hearing should take place four years earlier than currently 
scheduled because his initial parole hearing was four years too late.  See 2021-Ohio-
4459 at ¶ 8.  But even if we assume that Shine’s first parole hearing was four years 
late—an issue we need not decide—that fact would not give him a clear legal right 
to have his second parole hearing take place four years sooner than the time 
provided in Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-10(B)(2).  Shine cites no statute or 
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administrative regulation that would compel DRC to schedule his second parole 
hearing any sooner than ten years after his first. 
{¶ 12} For these reasons, the court of appeals correctly dismissed Shine’s 
complaint for failure to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.   
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., Joseph C. Patituce, and Megan M. Patituce, 
for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Salvatore P. Messina and Kelly Becker, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
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