Title: Hanson v. Estate of Belden

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hanson v. Estate of Belden1983 WY 91668 P.2d 1331Case Number: 83-60Case Number: 83-60Decided: 09/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
KENT A. HANSON, EXECUTOR 
AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD P. HANSON, DECEASED, AND 
ANNA M. HANSON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

THE ESTATE OF CHARLES F. 
BELDEN, A/K/A CHARLES FRANKLIN BELDEN, DECEASED, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Sheridan County, Leonard McEwan, J.

John B. Scott, 
argued, Kathleen A. Hunt, and John E. Stanfield, argued, of Smith, Stanfield 
& Scott, Laramie, for 
appellants.

Thomas A. 
Fennell and Roy Stoddard, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order granting summary judgment because plaintiffs' action was not filed 
within the thirty-day period provided in the Probate Code. We reverse and 
remand.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise six 
issues of error:

"1. Did the 30 day 
limitation under § 2-7-718, Wyoming Statutes 1977, for filing suit ever become 
effective since the Appellee failed to send the notice of rejection by certified 
mail as mandated by that statute and by § 2-7-712, W.S. 
1977?

"2. Did the Trial Court 
fail to apply basic rules of equity in granting the Appellee's motion for 
Summary Judgment[?] In this regard, did the Court give proper effect to Iowa 
case law, which is the law of origin for the Wyoming Probate Code under the 
applicable decisions of this Court? Further, was summary judgment proper as to 
this issue?

"3. Does the Doctrine of 
Equitable Estoppel prevent the Appellee and/or its insurance carrier from 
relying on the Probate Code proviso that suit must be commenced within 30 days 
after denial of the claim?

"4. Did the Court err in 
its application of Rule 6 (WRCP) in its computation of time to 
file?

"5. Does § 2-14-202, W.S. 
1977, which allows 2 years in which to file a wrongful death suit, control the 
general 30 day limitation under the Probate Code?

"6. Is the Probate Code 
as it applies to this situation in violation of Article 1, Section 6 and Section 
8 and Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution?"

 

[¶3.]     Since we agree with 
appellant as to issue one, it is unnecessary to discuss the other 
five.

[¶4.]     This case arises out of 
an automobile accident in which both Mr. Hanson and Mr. Belden were killed and 
Mrs. Hanson was severely injured. The probate of Mr. Belden's estate was 
commenced in the Sheridan County District Court on November 12, 1981. The first 
publication of the notice to creditors occurred on February 1, 1982. A timely 
creditor's claim was filed on behalf of the Hanson family for the wrongful death 
of Mr. Hanson and the injuries to Mrs. Hanson. On February 23, 1982, that claim 
was rejected by the personal representative of the Belden 
estate.

[¶5.]     The notice of rejection 
of the creditor's claim was mailed regular mail (not certified) and received in 
the office of counsel for plaintiffs on February 25, 1982. On March 31, 1982, a 
civil action for wrongful death and personal injuries was filed by appellants 
against appellee's estate. This action was not filed within thirty days after 
actual receipt of notice of the rejection.

[¶6.]     Section 2-7-712(d), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"When a claim has been 
filed with the clerk and is rejected in whole or in part, the personal 
representative shall immediately upon rejection notify the claimant by certified mail." (Emphasis 
added.)

When this 
statute is complied with, it triggers § 2-7-718, W.S. 
1977:

"When a claim is rejected 
and notice given as required, the 
holder shall bring suit in the proper court against the personal representative 
within thirty (30) days after the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the 
claim is forever barred." (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, we 
must answer the question whether a claim rejection sent by regular mail and 
received by claimant's attorney fulfills the notice requirements of § 2-7-712(d) 
in order to trigger § 2-7-718 and start the running of the thirty-day period 
within which the claim must be filed.

[¶7.]     The district court 
granted summary judgment on the theory that the suit was not filed within the 
thirty-day period. The court stated that because the notice of rejection was not 
sent by certified mail as required by 
the statute, it was possible that the thirty-day period for filing did not 
commence to run until the notice was actually received on February 25, 1982. 
However, even using the date of receipt, rather than the date the letter was 
mailed, the action was not filed within the thirty days 
provided.

[¶8.]     We hold that, notice 
having not been given by certified mail as required, the thirty-day period did 
not begin to run and the action is not barred. We note the rule of law that, 
generally, actual notice is a sufficient substitute for notice by mail and that 
defects in complying with technicalities can be ignored when actual notice is 
proved. However, in this situation, the thirty-day period for filing of a claim 
is so short, that strict compliance with the requirements of notice by certified 
mail ought to be required. The statute is clear and precise. The notice of 
rejection by certified mail to the claimant is not 
burdensome.

[¶9.]     There are some 
practical reasons for requiring notice of rejection by certified mail. One is 
more likely to pay close attention to a letter that is certified than one 
received by ordinary mail. In addition, certified mail avoids any question as to 
whether or when actual notice of rejection was received.

[¶10.]  Washington has probate statutes similar 
to ours, in that notification of rejection shall be by personal service or 
certified mail addressed to the claimant and that, after rejection, one has 
thirty days for bringing actions against the estate. The Washington court of 
appeals, Marquam v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 913, 621 P.2d 190 (1980), considered the issue of whether a rejection 
notice sent to the claimant's attorney was sufficient compliance with the 
statute in order to trigger the running of a limitation period. They held that 
the statutory provision regarding to whom and the manner in which the rejection 
must be given was for the protection of the claimant; and, therefore, absent a 
showing of compliance, the limitation period did not commence to 
run.

[¶11.]  Appellee relies upon Noyes v. First National Bank of Rawlins, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 384 (1979), for the proposition that the mailing of the notice of 
rejection as required by the statute is unnecessary where the claimant has 
actual notice of rejection of the claim. Noyes is not controlling here. First, 
the decision involved a different statute - one allowing three months after 
rejection in which to file suit; second, notice of rejection was sent certified 
mail in Noyes; and third, the claimant in Noyes had been guardian of the decedent, 
had a close relationship with her, and the debt existed before death. Noyes did 
not involve a personal injury claim that arose upon decedent's 
death.

[¶12.]  The short limitation period of the 
Probate Code has always been a problem when applied to personal injury and 
wrongful death actions. The persons involved in the accident usually are not 
acquainted. They have had no business dealings and often reside in different 
towns. The claim is for persons injured, perhaps hospitalized, incapacitated, 
under medical care and treatment, or recuperating from the accident. They 
continue to incur medical bills. The claim may not mature for months. Usually, 
the claimant is looking to an insurance company for 
payment.

[¶13.]  Appellant signed a release of possible 
judgment lien against real estate in the Belden estate and also offered to 
exempt the assets of the Belden estate from any personal liability for their 
damages. Appellant offered to look only to the applicable insurance coverage and 
assets of the insurance company for satisfaction of any judgment in their action 
against the Belden estate. The probate of the Belden estate will not be held up 
or burdened by the allowance of this claim.

[¶14.]  It seems to us that a 
claim

(a) that looks only to 
the proceeds of an insurance policy for satisfaction,

(b) where that insurance 
policy is not subject to claims of other creditors of the estate, 
and

(c) is not an asset for 
distribution to heirs, or devisees

(d) and that does not 
interfere with the orderly administration and probate of the 
estate,

ought not be 
subject to the thirty-day limitation period for bringing actions as provided for 
in the Probate Code. It is suggested that consideration be given to appropriate 
legislation in this area.

[¶15.]  The order of summary judgment is vacated 
and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformance with this 
opinion.