Title: Brown v. Gatti

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: October 12, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TIMOTHY M. BROWN, M.D.,
and TIMOTHY M. BROWN, M.D., P.C.,
An Oregon professional corporation,
Respondents on Review,
v.
DANIEL J. GATTI;
GATTI, GATTI, MAIER, KRUEGER & ASSOCIATES,
an Oregon partnership;
GATTI, GATTI, MAIER, KRUEGER, SAYER & ASSOCIATES,
an Oregon partnership;
GATTI & GATTI, P.C.,
an Oregon professional corporation,
Petitioners on Review,
and
MARIE NOLAN
and JANE DOES 1-5,
Defendants,
and
OREGONIAN PUBLISHING COMPANY
and DAVID R. ANDERSON,
Intervenors.
(CC 0002-01586; CA A115927; SC S51981)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 11, 2005.
J. Philip Parks, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioners on review.  With him on the brief were Parks,
Bauer, Sime, Winkler & Fernety.
Montgomery W. Cobb, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review Brown.  With him on the brief were
Cobb & Bossé, LLP.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham,
Riggs***, De Muniz,**** and Balmer, Justices.*****
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Henry Kantor, Judge. 195 Or App 695, 99 P3d 299 (2004).
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Riggs, J., retired effective September 30, 2006, and did
not participate in the decision of this case.
****Chief Justice when case was decided.
*****Kistler and Walters, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
Plaintiffs, Timothy M. Brown, M.D. (Brown), and Timothy
M. Brown, M.D., P.C. (collectively, Brown plaintiffs), filed a
defamation action against the following defendants:  (1) Daniel
J. Gatti (Gatti), who is a lawyer; (2) Gatti, Gatti, Maier,
Krueger & Associates; Gatti, Gatti, Maier, Krueger, Sayer &
Associates; and Gatti & Gatti, P.C. (we refer to Gatti and his
firms collectively as Gatti defendants) (1)
; and (3) Marie
Nolan. (2)
  The trial court granted summary judgment for Gatti
defendants.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.  Brown v.
Gatti, 195 Or App 695, 99 P3d 299 (2004).  We allowed the Gatti
defendants' petition for review and now hold that none of the
allegedly defamatory statements attributed to them, when read in
context, is defamatory.  We therefore reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Gatti defendants.   
The parties do not contest the following facts.  Nolan
sued Brown for medical malpractice respecting the manner in which
Brown had performed a liposuction operation on her.  Nolan
asserted claims for negligence, fraud, and unlawful trade
practices, specifically alleging (among other things) that Brown
had misled Nolan about his qualifications to perform such
surgery.  Gatti represented Nolan in that malpractice case. 
At trial, Nolan agreed to dismiss her claims for fraud
and unlawful trade practices, in exchange for which Brown paid
her $10,000 and conceded negligence.  On the only remaining
issue, damages, a jury awarded Nolan $183,625. 
After that trial, Gatti spoke to with a reporter from
The Oregonian.  The Oregonian then published an article related
to the Nolan litigation, headlined "Botched Liposuction Yields
$180,000-plus in Damages."  Afterward, Gatti appeared in a news
story broadcast on KATU, a Portland television station.  The KATU
broadcast dealt with what its reporter described as "a first of
its kind lawsuit against USWestDex" based on an alleged
connection between Brown's advertisements in the US West Direct
"Yellow Pages" and Nolan's injuries. (3)
 
Brown plaintiffs then brought the present action for
defamation, among other things.  (Brown plaintiffs did not name
either The Oregonian or KATU as defendants.)  In their complaint,
Brown plaintiffs alleged that The Oregonian article contained
three statements that were defamatory.  Only one of those
statements purported to quote Gatti directly:  
"'It [the Nolan verdict] sends notice to doctors
who aren't board-certified to notify the public about
their true qualifications,' said attorney Daniel
Gatti."
Brown plaintiffs' complaint alleged that that statement was
defamatory by implication, because it implied "that Dr. Brown is
not a board certified physician."  Although he is not board
certified in plastic surgery, Brown is board certified in
dermatology, clinical pathology, and anatomic pathology. 
Brown plaintiffs separately alleged in their complaint
that four statements in the KATU broadcast were defamatory by
implication.  Only two of those statements involved Gatti
speaking on camera.  (The other two statements were made by the
KATU reporter.)  In the two statements that he made on camera,
Gatti said:
"You can't put a value on the psychological trauma
that these women are going through when they are
already embarrassed by even having to be in front of a
jury and they've made a mistake and then they've been
betrayed.
"* * * * *
"USWEST Direct is negligent in not at least
requiring doctors to somehow certify that they are
indeed certified in the area in which they are wanting
to advertise [or] to do some sort of minuscule
investigation as to whether or not the doctor is
qualified."
Brown plaintiffs' complaint alleged that both statements were
defamatory by implication.  Brown plaintiffs contended that the
first statement implied that "Dr. Brown had 'betrayed' Nolan's
trust by misrepresenting himself as [a] plastic surgeon," while
the second statement implied that "Dr. Brown misrepresented
himself as a plastic surgeon in his advertisement in the US West
Direct Yellow Pages."
After certain pretrial proceedings that are not
relevant to this case as it comes to us, Gatti defendants moved
for summary judgment against Brown plaintiffs.  In their motion,
Gatti defendants contended (among other things) that Gatti never
made some of the statements attributed to him, that some of
Gatti's statements were not defamatory, and that some of Gatti's
statements were constitutionally protected expressions of
opinion.  As noted, the trial court granted Gatti defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim, and it
entered a judgment in their favor on the defamation claim
pursuant to ORCP 67 B. 
On the Brown plaintiffs' appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  First, the court agreed
with the trial court that summary judgment was appropriate
against Brown plaintiffs as to two statements in the KATU
broadcast that had been made by the KATU reporter, rather than
Gatti.  195 Or App at 705.  The Court of Appeals further
concluded that the trial court had erred in granting summary
judgment as to two statements in The Oregonian that Brown
plaintiffs claimed were defamatory, but that did not directly
quote Gatti.  Id. at 708-14.  Neither side challenges those
rulings on review.
This case thus boils down to the question whether the
remaining three statements -- all involving direct quotes of
Gatti -- could be found by a jury to be defamatory.  The Court of
Appeals agreed with Brown plaintiffs that the statements could be
defamatory and therefore reversed summary judgment for Gatti
defendants.  As to all three statements, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the statements could be defamatory by implication
and that they were not constitutionally protected opinion.  Id.
at 705-08 (KATU statements); id. at 714-15 (The Oregonian
statement).  We allowed Gatti defendants' petition for review to
address that question.
This is a defamation case.  A defamatory communication
is one that "'tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him.'"  King v.
Menolascino, 276 Or 501, 503, 555 P2d 442 (1976) (quoting
Restatement (First) of Torts § 559).  A defamatory communication
"would subject another to ' * * * hatred, contempt or
ridicule * * * [or] tend to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which [the other] is held or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
[the other].'"  Reesman v. Highfill, 327 Or 597, 603, 965 P2d
1030 (1998) (alterations in original; quoting King, 276 Or at
504; further quotation marks and internal citations omitted). 
In the professional context, a statement is defamatory
if it is false and "'ascribes to another conduct, characteristics
or a condition incompatible with the proper conduct of his lawful
business, trade, [or] profession.'"  Fowler v. Stradley, 238 Or
606, 611, 395 P2d 867 (1964) (quoting Restatement (First) of
Torts § 573).  Indeed, if a defendant has defamed a plaintiff by
falsely "accus[ing] him of misconduct or dishonesty in the
performance of his profession or employment," then the matter "is
actionable without proof of specific harm."  Wheeler v. Green,
286 Or 99, 124, 593 P2d 777 (1979).
Here, Brown plaintiffs allege that Gatti's three
statements, while admittedly not directly defamatory, are
defamatory "by implication."
"Defamation by implication is the label commonly
given to a claim that requires drawing a defamatory
inference from a facially nondefamatory communication. 
When defamation by implication is alleged, this court
has held that the link between the communication and
the defamatory inference must not be 'too tenuous.'  In
other words, when a claim for defamation requires the
drawing of a defamatory inference, the inference that
the plaintiff seeks to draw from the facially
nondefamatory communication must be reasonable."
Reesman, 327 Or at 604 (citations omitted).
In defamation cases, the court and the jury perform a
shared task.
"The court determines whether a communication is
capable of a defamatory meaning.  If the court
determines that it is, the matter is then submitted to
the jury for a determination of whether a defamatory
meaning was understood by the recipients."
Beecher v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 267 Or 496, 500, 517 P2d 667
(1973) (emphases in original; citations omitted); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614 (1977) (court determines
whether communication is capable of bearing particular meaning
and whether that meaning is defamatory; jury determines whether
recipients of communication actually understood it in defamatory
way).
The meaning of an allegedly defamatory statement or
publication focuses on how a recipient would understand it.  The
meaning is determined by
"look[ing] to the general purport and intent of the
article published and not to isolated sentences.  Words
are to be construed in their ordinary acceptance and
meaning.  The test is:  What sense will be given to
them by a reader of ordinary intelligence?  Will the
natural and proximate consequence be to injure the
person about whom they have been published?  Will such
words tend to bring a person into public hatred,
contempt or ridicule?"
Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co. et al., 122 Or 408, 418, 259 P
307 (1927).  In performing its gatekeeping function, a court
considers not just the correct meaning of the publication, but
also any mistaken meanings that are reasonable.  Fowler, 238 Or
at 617 ("the meaning of a publication is that which the reader
correctly or mistakenly, but reasonably, understands it to
have"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 (1977) (same).
In determining whether a statement is capable of a
defamatory meaning, moreover, courts must be careful not to tread
on the jury's role as the finder of fact:
"'In many cases imputations are so clearly innocent
that the court is justified in determining the question
without submission to the jury.  On the other hand, if
in the opinion of the court, the question is one as to
which reasonable men might differ, it is for the jury
to determine which of the two permissible views they
will take.'"
Hinkle v. Alexander, 244 Or 267, 279, 417 P2d 586 (1966) (quoting
Restatement (First) of Torts § 614 comment c).
Here, we must decide whether the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment for Gatti defendants.  Under ORCP 47, we
examine the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on
file, and construe all facts in the light most favorable to Brown
plaintiffs, the parties opposing summary judgment.  See ORCP 47 C
(2000) (so stating). (4)
  If "no objectively reasonable juror
could return a verdict for" Brown plaintiffs, and if Gatti
defendants were "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," then
summary judgment was appropriate.  Id. 
As noted, Gatti defendants challenge only the Court of
Appeals' ruling on three statements.  As to those statements,
Gatti defendants contend two things:  either (1) any defamatory
inference to be drawn from the statement is too tenuous; or (2)
the statement, even if defamatory, was a statement of opinion and
therefore not actionable.  We consider the three statements in
order.
As noted, Brown plaintiffs alleged that Brown was
defamed by implication by the following sentence in The Oregonian
article:
"'It [the Nolan verdict] sends notice to doctors
who aren't board-certified to notify the public about
their true qualifications,' said attorney Daniel
Gatti."
Brown plaintiffs assert that Gatti's statements imply
an assertion about Brown, viz., "that Dr. Brown is not a board
certified physician."  To evaluate that assertion, we consider
Gatti's quote in its context, i.e., the "general purport and
intent of the article."  Peck, 122 Or at 418. (5)
  The article
describes a malpractice verdict against Brown.  Thus, if that
verdict "sends notice to doctors who aren't board certified," it
must be because other doctors share a characteristic with Brown
that makes them vulnerable to such legal actions as the one
brought against Brown.  As to that, the only such characteristic
is not being board certified. (6)

Having identified the implied assertion, however, we
disagree that the assertion was or could be defamatory.  We first
note just how narrow the defamatory inference that Brown
plaintiffs claim can be drawn from that sentence actually is. 
Brown plaintiffs specifically argue that Gatti's quote contains
the defamatory inference that Brown is not board certified in any
area of medicine.  That narrow inference is not accidental. 
Brown is not board certified in plastic or reconstructive
surgery, although he is board certified in dermatology, clinical
pathology, and anatomic pathology.  If Gatti's quote implied only
that Brown was not board certified in plastic or reconstructive
surgery, then the implication would be true.  To be capable of a
defamatory meaning, then, Gatti's quote must be capable of being
understood to imply that Brown is not board certified in any area
of medicine at all.
It is true that Gatti's quote, taken by itself, refers
broadly to "doctors who aren't board certified," without in any
direct way limiting the scope of the words "board certified." 
Again, however, we do not consider "isolated sentences" but the
"general purport and intent of the article."  Peck, 122 Or at
418.  And, in context, the article only discusses Brown's
credentials to perform plastic surgery, not his general
qualification to practice any other types of medicine.  In
particular, the immediately preceding sentence appears to us to
establish that Gatti meant only that Brown was not board
certified as a plastic surgeon:
"The award disappointed the woman's lawyer, who
was seeking more than $2 million, but he said it still
should send a message to doctors who portray themselves
as plastic surgeons when they're not.
"'It sends notice to doctors who aren't board-certified to notify the public about their true
qualifications,' said attorney Daniel Gatti."
(Emphasis added.)  In summary, we hold that no reasonable juror
could read Gatti's statement, when read in context, to refer to
anything beyond the fact that Brown is not board certified as a
plastic surgeon. 
The second statement at issue here comes from the KATU
broadcast.  As noted, Gatti stated in that broadcast:
"You can't put a value on the psychological trauma
that these women are going through when they are
already embarrassed by even having to be in front of a
jury and they've made a mistake and then they've been
betrayed."
Brown plaintiffs alleged that that statement falsely implies that
Brown "had 'betrayed' Nolan's trust by misrepresenting himself as
a plastic surgeon."
Gatti defendants argue that the statement refers to
Nolan being betrayed by USWEST Direct, not by Brown.  We
disagree.  Again, we consider the statement in context. (7)
  
The KATU broadcast began by noting Nolan's claim that
the Yellow Pages had some legal responsibility for Nolan's
injuries.  The broadcast then outlined the circumstances leading
to Nolan's injury.  That part of the broadcast focused on Brown's
culpability, and it ended with Gatti making the disputed
statement:
"[Reporter]:  When Marie Nolan recovered from a
three[-]year illness[,] she thought plastic surgery on
her neck and arms might renew her self-image.  She
turned to the yellow pages to find a plastic surgeon
who specialized in liposuction.  Under the heading
'plastic and reconstructive surgery,' she found the
name 'Dr. Timothy Brown.'
"[Nolan]:  No matter what the procedure is that
you are looking for * * *, you know you are trusting
that information is true and that's not necessarily
true.
"[Reporter]:  But Brown was no plastic surgeon and
he wasn't certified in plastic surgery.  He was a
dermatologist practicing liposuction and other types of
cosmetic surgery.
"[Nolan]:  I basically put my life in his hands
and [in] hindsight if I had done that to my child, um
you know, I'd be responsible.
"[Reporter]:  And in the hands of Dr. Brown Marie
suffered irreparable harm.  Here is a picture of her
arms before.  Here, after.  And look at the damage the
liposuction did to her neck.
"[Nolan]:  * * *  It was very apparent that it was
um I felt a negligent procedure.
"[Reporter]:  Attorney Dan Gatti knew of Dr.
Brown's work.  He has now sued him six times for
medical negligence in liposuction procedures.
"[Gatti]:  You can't put a value on the
psychological trauma that these women are going through
when they are already embarrassed by even having to be
in front of a jury and they've made a mistake and then
they've been betrayed."
Only then does the broadcast return to USWEST Direct's alleged
role and explain why it, too, allegedly was liable for the harm:
"[Reporter]:  Gatti won Marie's case against Dr.
Brown and is now going after the pages where Brown
advertised.
"[Gatti]:  USWEST Direct is negligent in not at
least requiring doctors to somehow certify that they
are indeed certified in the area in which they are
wanting to advertise [or] to do some sort of minuscule
investigation as to whether or not the doctor is
qualified."
In context, we cannot agree with Gatti defendants'
claim that a reasonable viewer would conclude that "these women"
had been "betrayed" by USWEST Direct, not by Brown.  Although the
broadcast had asserted earlier that USWEST Direct allegedly had
some culpability for Nolan's injury, that reference was so
distant that "betrayed" cannot reasonably be understood to refer
to it. 
That said, however, we cannot see how a reasonable
juror could find Gatti's specific statement to be defamatory,
even when it is read in context.  Gatti's characterization of
Brown's actions as a "betrayal" of Nolan arose from Brown's
failure to perform competently the liposuction that he had been
trusted to do.  (If the result had been satisfatory, then Brown's
lack of certification would have been irrelevant.)  Thus, when
read in context, the statement referred to the reasons why Nolan
and others had sued Brown, viz., his professional negligence. 
The contrary series of inferences that Brown plaintiffs wish to
have a jury draw are not supportable.  The trial court thus
correctly granted summary judgment to Gatti defendants as to the
"betrayal" statement, and the Court of Appeals erred in
overturning that ruling.
In his second statement from the KATU broadcast at
issue here, Gatti said:
"USWEST Direct is negligent in not at least
requiring doctors to somehow certify that they are
indeed certified in the area in which they are wanting
to advertise [or] to do some sort of minuscule
investigation as to whether or not the doctor is
qualified."
Given that the broadcast had identified the USWEST Direct Yellow
Pages as "the pages where Brown advertised," Brown plaintiffs
argue that that statement falsely implies that Brown
"misrepresented himself as a plastic surgeon in his advertisement
in the US West Direct Yellow Pages." 
As with the other KATU broadcast statement, Gatti
defendants argue that the statement "is nothing more than an
indictment of USWEST Direct."  We agree that a viewer would
understand the statement to indict USWEST Direct, but it does
more than that.  It specifically charges that USWEST Direct
failed to investigate whether doctors are "qualified" "in the
area in which they [doctors] are wanting to advertise."  Gatti's
statement came after the broadcast had discussed in some detail
how Brown had injured Nolan, and in particular how Brown had
allegedly misrepresented his qualifications in the Yellow Pages. 
A reasonable viewer certainly would consider that discussion to
be a specific example of the larger problem complained about by
Gatti.  In other words, Gatti's complaint that USWEST Direct
should require some proof of credentials when it sells
advertising, considered in context, plainly implied that Brown
had misrepresented his credentials in his advertising.
That does not end the matter, however.  On this record,
it appears that the implied fact -- that Brown was not a board
certified plastic surgeon -- is true.  And, because it is true,
Gatti's statement loses its defamatory content.  It follows that
the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Gatti
defendants respecting the statement, and the Court of Appeals'
contrary ruling again was error.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment to Gatti defendants respecting Brown
plaintiffs' defamation claim.  We reverse the contrary opinion of
the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
APPENDIX 1:  OREGONIAN ARTICLE
Botched liposuction yields $180,000-plus in damages
The Multnomah County jury award to a Vancouver, Wash., woman
disappoints her lawyer, who was seeking $2 million
By David R. Anderson of the Oregonian Staff
A Multnomah County jury awarded more than $180,000 on Friday
to a woman who was scarred by a botched liposuction procedure.
The award disappointed the woman's lawyer, who was seeking
more than $2 million, but he said it still should send a message
to doctors who portray themselves as plastic surgeons when
they're not.
"It sends notice to doctors who aren't board-certified to
notify the public about their true qualifications," said attorney
Daniel Gatti.
Bertha "Marie" Nolan, 47, of Vancouver, Wash., went to Dr.
Timothy M. Brown, a dermatologist, in December 1995 to fix a
double chin and flabby upper arms, Gatti said.
But Brown removed too much fat in some areas and none at all
in other areas, Gatti said.  That caused grooving, gouging and
dimpling on Nolan's skin.  In areas where Brown removed all the
fat, there was no layer of lubrication left and her skin was
attached to muscle and nerves.  The procedure also caused
neurological damage, leaving her neck and arms numb in some
places and painful in others, Gatti said.
It will take at least three plastic surgeries to repair the
damage, but even that won't stop the pain or completely fix
Nolan's appearance, Gatti said.
Brown's attorney, Mark Wagner, declined to comment after the
verdict.
Brown portrayed himself as a plastic and reconstructive
surgeon in telephone book ads and literature he gave to potential
patients.  But he had only the two days of training needed to
become certified by the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgeons,
which is not recognized by the American Medical Association,
Gatti said.
In addition to the negligence claim, Gatti also initially
included accusations of intentional fraud and unlawful trade
practices against Brown.  But during the trial, Gatti agreed to
drop those claims and the punitive damages he was seeking against
Brown in exchange for Brown admitting he was negligent.
The only questions the jury had to answer were whether Nolan
suffered damages and how much she should be compensated.  The
jury awarded Nolan $33,625 for future medical costs and $150,000
for pain, suffering and humiliation.
Gatti said he has represented two other patients of Brown's,
both of whom settled out of court.  One settlement is
confidential and the other was for $300,000, Gatti said.
Gatti also criticized US West Dex, which publishes the
Yellow Pages, for allowing Brown to list himself under plastic
and reconstructive surgery.  Gatti said he plans to sue US West
Dex.
In a prepared statement, US West Dex said it offers a
disclaimer at the top of each page listing doctors by type of
practice that suggests readers contact state agencies for
information on doctor qualifications.  
"As a publisher, US West Dex has neither the knowledge nor
the authority to administer law, but we must rely on each
advertiser to know and comply with all regulations impacting
their business," said Wendy Carver-Herbert, a company
spokeswoman.
APPENDIX 2:  KATU BROADCAST TRANSCRIPT
CM - Cathy Marshall - KATU Reporter
JM - John Marler - KATU Reporter
SH - Sheila Hamilton - KATU Reporter
DG - Dan Gatti
MN - Marie Nolan
CM:  Millions turn to these pages for help and guidance but a
Washington woman says an ad cost her her health and she is
heading to court.  Good evening and thank you for joining us.  I
am Cathy Marshall.
JM:  And I am John Marler.
JM:  It was a botched plastic surgery.  There is no dispute now
about that.  Still to be resolved though, does part of the blame
lie with the yellow pages?  Sheila Hamilton brings us an
exclusive report on a first of its kind lawsuit against
Uswestdex.
SH:  When Marie Nolan recovered from a three year illness she
thought plastic surgery on her neck and arms might help renew her
self-image.  She turned to the yellow pages to find a plastic
surgeon who specialized in liposuction.  Under the heading
"plastic and reconstructive surgery", she found the name "Dr.
Timothy Brown".
MN:  No matter what the procedure is that you are looking for
whether it is you know a child with cancer and you are looking
for an oncologist or whether it's you know a serious procedure,
or not, you know you are trusting that information is true and
that's not necessarily true.
SH:  But Brown was no plastic surgeon and he wasn't certified in
plastic surgery.  He was a dermatologist practicing liposuction
and other types of cosmetic surgery.
MN:  I basically put my life in his hands and hindsight if I had
done that to my child, um you know, I'd be responsible.
SH:  And in the hands of Dr. Brown Marie suffered irreparable
harm.  Here is a picture of her arms before.  Here, after.  And
look at the damage the liposuction did to her neck.
MN: There was areas where my skin was adhering to the bone. 
There was gouges and grooves.  It was very apparent that it was
um I felt a negligent procedure.
SH: Attorney Dan Gatti knew of Dr. Brown's work.  He has now sued
him six times for medical negligence in liposuction procedures.
DG: You can't put a value on the psychological trauma that these
women are going through when they are already embarrassed by even
having to be in front of a jury and they've made a mistake and
then they've been betrayed. 
SH: Gatti won Marie's case against Dr. Brown and is now going
after the pages where Brown advertised.
DG: USWEST Direct is negligent in not at least requiring doctors
to somehow certify that they are indeed certified in the area in
which they are wanting to advertise to do some sort of minuscule
investigation as to whether or not the doctor is qualified.
SH: Brown still advertises for cosmetic surgery.  He has attended
four or five two-day workshops on liposuction but Marie Nolan's
arms and neck will never look the same and her hope for a
positive life change became instead a painful life's lesson.
SH: Now Gatti is also suing the American Academy of Cosmetic
Surgery which trains doctors in brief weekend sessions to perform
liposuction and other techniques.  John, Cathy.
JM: Sheila, does USWest have any sort of policy about plastic
surgeons and advertising in the yellow pages?
SH: Actually in this trial USWest testified that all you need to
advertise in this section is to be an M.D. so conceivably, a
podiatrist could be performing plastic surgery.
JM: I wonder if that would change now.  We'll wait and see.
SH: I think there may be some changes.
JM: Shirley, thank you.
CM: With all that in mind if you are considering plastic surgery
here is some important things to keep in mind when selecting a
doctor:
CM: First look for the words "board certified" as a plastic and
reconstructive surgeon.  They have at least six years of
additional educational requirements.  Cosmetic surgeons are often
certified in brief weekend seminars such as those presented by
the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery.
1. The allegedly defamatory statements were made by defendant
Gatti.  It therefore is necessary to distinguish him as an actor
from the various iterations of his law firm, which are
codefendants.
2. Plaintiffs' claim against Nolan, who was a client of the
Gatti defendants, was settled.  It is not involved in this
appeal.
3. The parties and the documents on file are not consistent in
the name that they use to refer to the publisher of the telephone
Yellow Pages at issue.  For example, the KATU broadcast
transcript uses both "Uswestdex" and "USWEST Direct," the
Oregonian article uses "US West Dex," the complaint uses "US West
Direct," and the petition for review uses "USWEST Direct."  There
is no basis in the record that we have been able to identify that
enables us to determine which of those titles (if any) accurately
reflects the publisher's name.  We have used "USWEST Direct" in
the text above, but we cannot warrant its accuracy, and we have
not attempted to conform quotations to that usage.
4. ORCP 47 has since been amended.  Those amendments do not
apply to this case.
5. We reprint the article in full in an appendix.  For
purposes of argument, we presume here that the article accurately
reflects the context of Gatti's statements to the reporter, and
so it serves as appropriate context. 
6. One may doubt the substantive truth of Gatti's statement. 
Because of the partial settlement between Brown and Nolan, Brown
admitted negligence, and the jury only considered damages.  Brown
did not admit, and the jury did not decide, that Brown had made
any misrepresentations.  Thus, the verdict was about negligence,
not about whether doctors should "'notify the public about their
true qualifications.'"  But, as we will discuss, Brown alleged
that that statement defamed him only by implying that Brown was
not board certified in any area of medicine.
7. We reprint the transcript of the full broadcast in an
appendix.  We again presume that the broadcast accurately
reflects the context of Gatti's statements to the reporter.