Title: State ex rel. Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 96 Ohio St.3d 400, 2002-
Ohio-4906.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VILLAGE OF CHAGRIN FALLS, APPELLANT, v. GEAUGA 
COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 96 Ohio 
St.3d 400, 2002-Ohio-4906.] 
Mandamus sought to compel Geauga County Board of Commissioners to 
conduct a hearing on village of Chagrin Falls’s second petition to annex 
land from Bainbridge Township that the board previously denied — 
Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed, when. 
(No. 2001-2082 — Submitted June 26, 2002 — Decided October 2, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No. 2001-G-2384. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On July 22, 1998, appellant, village of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, filed a 
petition to annex 182.264 acres of land from Bainbridge Township, Ohio.  On 
January 21, 1999, following a hearing, the Geauga County Board of 
Commissioners denied the village’s petition.  The village did not appeal the 
board’s decision. 
{¶2} 
On March 15, 2001, the village filed a second petition to annex the 
same property from Bainbridge Township.  On August 23, 2001, the board denied 
the second petition based on res judicata.  The board did not conduct a hearing 
under former R.C. 709.031(A)1 on the village’s second annexation petition. 
{¶3} 
On September 24, 2001, the village filed a complaint in the Court 
of Appeals for Geauga County for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to 
                                                 
1. 
1984 Sub.H.B. No. 175, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2196.  Effective October 26, 2001, the 
provisions relating to the time for a hearing on an annexation petition are contained in R.C. 
709.03(A).  2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5. 
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conduct a hearing on the village’s second annexation petition pursuant to former 
R.C. 709.031(A).  The village did not allege in its petition that the board’s denial 
of a hearing on the second annexation petition contravened the Ohio Constitution.  
The village also did not move for the disqualification of any of the appellate court 
judges.  On August 31, 2001, the village filed an administrative appeal in the 
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas from the board’s August 23, 2001 denial 
of the second annexation petition. 
{¶4} 
On October 9, 2001, the court of appeals entered a judgment sua 
sponte dismissing the village’s complaint for a writ of mandamus.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the village had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law by way of its R.C. Chapter 2506 appeal from the board’s denial of the 
second annexation petition. 
{¶5} 
This cause is now before us upon the village’s appeal as of right.  
The Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees filed an amicus curiae brief urging 
affirmance of the court of appeals’ judgment. 
{¶6} 
In its appeal as of right, the village asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in not granting its requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  R.C. 
2731.05 provides that a “writ of mandamus must not be issued when there is a 
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”  See, also, State ex 
rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 578, 757 N.E.2d 357.  “In 
order for an alternative remedy to constitute an adequate remedy at law, it must be 
complete, beneficial, and speedy.”  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio 
Conference  v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 
N.E.2d 64. 
{¶7} 
The village claims that an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal 
from the board’s decision denying its second annexation petition is inadequate 
because it is not complete, beneficial, and speedy.  The village specifically asserts 
that its administrative appeal would not permit the common pleas court to remand 
January Term, 2002 
3 
the matter to the board and that the common pleas court’s potential consideration 
of additional evidence is inadequate. 
{¶8} 
Under R.C. 2506.04, in an appeal from the board’s decision, the 
common pleas court “may affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order, 
adjudication, or decision, or remand the cause to the officer or body appealed 
from with instructions to enter an order, adjudication, or decision consistent with 
findings or opinion of the court.”  In Superior Metal Products, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of 
Emp. Serv. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 143, 146, 70 O.O.2d 263, 324 N.E.2d 179, we 
held that “a court’s remand effectuates a revival of jurisdiction over a cause which 
may enable the subordinate tribunal or administrative body to conduct further 
proceedings and to render a new decision.”  Although Superior Metal did not 
involve an R.C. Chapter 2506 appeal, appellate courts have applied it and held 
that common pleas courts have authority in R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative 
appeals to remand for further proceedings, including a new hearing.  See, e.g., 
Neary v. Moraine Bd. of Zoning Appeals (July 30, 1999), 2d Dist. No. 17428, 
1999 WL 960777; Hensel v. Lake Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 5th Dist. No. 
2001-CA-00046, 2001-Ohio-1377, 2001 WL 1131058; Perez v. Cleveland Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals (Jan. 13, 2000), 8th Dist. No. 75166, 2000 WL 23123; In re 
Rocky Point Plaza Corp. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 486, 496-497, 621 N.E.2d 566. 
{¶9} 
Although some appellate cases have held otherwise, see, e.g., 
Zannieri v. Norwalk Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 
737, 740, 656 N.E.2d 711, and Mad River Sportsman’s Club, Inc. v. Jefferson 
Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 273, 277, 634 N.E.2d 1046, 
we find that the cases applying Superior Metal are more persuasive. 
{¶10} As the court of appeals in Neary cogently observed, the additional 
language in R.C. 2506.04 regarding remanding the cause with instructions to 
“enter an order, adjudication, or decision consistent with the findings or opinion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of the court” does not prohibit the administrative tribunal or officer to which a 
cause is remanded from conducting further proceedings: 
{¶11} “[W]e note that the statute at issue in Superior Metal [i.e., R.C. 
4141.28(O)] is more restrictive of the trial court’s power to remand than the 
statute applicable in Rocky Point Plaza and the present case [i.e., R.C. 2506.04] in 
that it does not expressly provide for remand to the agency, but instead limits the 
court’s authority to reversal, vacation, or modification of the agency’s decision.  
See R.C. 4141.28(O).  In contrast, R.C. 2506.04 explicitly allows for remand from 
the trial court to the agency so long as the court also instructs the agency to enter 
a decision consistent with the court’s opinion.  This power is bestowed upon the 
common pleas court in addition to the power to reverse and vacate or modify an 
administrative decision under the statute.  For this reason, the common pleas 
court’s power to remand a case to the administrative agency should be read as 
being no more restricted, and perhaps even less restricted, under R.C. 2506.04 
than it is under R.C. 4141.28(O).  Moreover, the language of R.C. 2506.04 does 
not, in our view, require the common pleas court to dictate to the agency precisely 
what the decision pursuant to remand must be, nor does Superior Metal support 
that proposition.  Once a court remands to the administrative agency, the agency’s 
jurisdiction over the matter is revived.  Superior Metal, supra [41 Ohio St.2d] at 
146 [70 O.O.2d 263, 324 N.E.2d 179].  That being so, the agency may conduct 
further proceedings and render a new decision.”  Neary, 2d Dist. No. 17428, at 
12-13. 
{¶12} Under Superior Metal and the foregoing appellate cases, common 
pleas courts are authorized under R.C. 2506.04 to reverse an administrative 
decision and remand the cause to the administrative body to conduct further 
proceedings on the matter. 
{¶13} Moreover, the common pleas court could consider additional 
evidence in the administrative appeal if any of the circumstances in R.C. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
2506.03(A)(1) to (5) applies.  In other words, R.C. 2506.03 “ ‘contains a liberal 
provision for the introduction of new or additional evidence to be heard by a 
reviewing court.’ ”  Elbert v. Bexley Planning Comm. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 
59, 72, 670 N.E.2d 245, quoting In re Annexation of Certain Territory (1992), 82 
Ohio App.3d 377, 381, 612 N.E.2d 477. 
{¶14} Therefore, the village has an adequate remedy by way of its R.C. 
Chapter 2506 appeal from the board’s denial of its second annexation petition to 
raise its claims.  See Heiney v. Sylvania Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 126 Ohio 
App.3d 391, 397, 710 N.E.2d 725, where a court of appeals remanded a cause to 
the common pleas court with instructions either to remand the cause to a board of 
zoning appeals for an appropriate hearing as defined in the court of appeals 
opinion or to conduct an evidentiary hearing itself in accordance with R.C. 
2506.03.  This remedy is complete, beneficial, and speedy.  Any claims of delay 
or inconvenience from pursuing its administrative appeal do not prevent the 
village’s appeal from constituting a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., 83 Ohio St.3d at 183, 
699 N.E.2d 64; State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 6 OBR 
225, 451 N.E.2d 1200, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶15} The village next contends that the board’s failure to conduct a 
hearing on its second annexation petition denied the village its inalienable 
constitutional right under Section 1, Article X of the Ohio Constitution to expand 
its territory and also violated Section 18, Article I of the Ohio Constitution by in 
effect suspending former R.C. 709.031(A).  The village, however, waived these 
claims by failing to raise them in the court of appeals.  See State ex rel. Porter v. 
Cleveland Dept. of Pub. Safety (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 258, 259, 703 N.E.2d 308; 
State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 345, 699 
N.E.2d 1271.  Moreover, the village can raise these claims in its administrative 
appeal. 
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{¶16} The village finally asserts that the judgment of the court of appeals 
should be reversed because the court of appeals judge who authored the 
unanimous decision dismissing the village’s mandamus action was biased.  
According to the village, that judge had previously served as a state representative 
and sponsored legislation that would have denied the right of property owners to 
freely annex their property from a township to a municipality.  But the village’s 
contentions concerning bias are not supported by evidence in the record 
transmitted by the court of appeals, and we cannot add matter to the record before 
us and decide this appeal based upon that new matter.  See State ex rel. Vickers v. 
Summit Cty. Council (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 526, 529, 757 N.E.2d 310, where we 
rejected a comparable assertion that a court of appeals judge should have recused 
himself from a case when the record failed to contain any evidence supporting the 
assertion.  In addition, “a judge is not automatically disqualified from a case on 
the basis of having sponsored or voted upon a law in the state legislature that he is 
later called upon to review as a judge.”  Buell v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2001), 274 F.3d 
337, 346. 
{¶17} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly denied the 
village’s action for extraordinary relief in mandamus.  The village has an 
adequate legal remedy by way of its pending administrative appeal.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph W. Diemert Jr., Director of Law, and Diane A. Calta, Assistant  
Director of Law, for appellant. 
 
Laura A. LaChapelle, Geauga County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellee. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
 
Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., Charles T. Riehl and Frederick W. Whatley, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees. 
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