Title: In the Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13183 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF AN ATTORNEY. 
 
 
May 9, 2022. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Admonition. 
 
 
 
Bar counsel appeals from an order of a single justice of 
this court, acting on an information filed by the Board of Bar 
Overseers (board), ordering that the respondent attorney be 
privately admonished for violation of multiple rules of 
professional conduct.  We affirm.1 
 
 
1.  Background.  Bar counsel filed a two-count petition for 
discipline against the respondent, alleging multiple acts of 
misconduct arising out the respondent's several roles as special 
personal representative for the estate of an elderly client 
(grandmother), guardian and coguardian for her disabled grandson 
(ward), and cotrustee of a special needs trust established for 
the ward's benefit.  A hearing committee of the board conducted 
an evidentiary hearing and thereafter issued a report of its 
findings, concluding that bar counsel had established some of 
the misconduct -- primarily a lack of diligence -- alleged in 
count one, but none of the violations alleged in count two.  It 
recommended that the respondent be admonished.  One member filed 
a substantial dissent; that member would have found additional 
misconduct and recommended that the respondent be suspended from 
the practice of law for six months and a day. 
 
 
 
1 This bar discipline appeal is subject to the court's 
standing order governing such appeals.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 
471 Mass. 1303 (2015).  We have reviewed the materials filed.  
Pursuant to our standing order, we dispense with oral argument. 
2 
 
 
Both the respondent and bar counsel appealed to the board.  
After a nonevidentiary hearing, the board adopted the hearing 
committee's report "in part," and "correct[ed]" certain findings 
"as indicated," essentially accepting many of the dissenting 
committee member's findings and making additional findings of 
its own, including that the respondent acted without competence 
and charged and collected an excessive fee.  Considering matters 
in aggravation and the cumulative effect of the misconduct, the 
board voted to recommend to the court that the respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for three months. 
 
 
When the matter came before a single justice of this court, 
she reviewed the information and record of proceedings and 
concluded, as the hearing committee had previously, that bar 
counsel established violations of some of the allegations 
contained in count one but none of the violations in count two, 
and that the misconduct warranted a private admonition.  She 
concluded that the differences between the hearing committee and 
the board as to misconduct largely revolved around disputes of 
fact, which in turn rested substantially on witness credibility.  
She also reasoned that the differences in the recommended 
sanctions rested principally on the weight given to certain 
aggravating factors and the extent to which the individual 
violations were treated as part of the same misconduct.  We 
agree that the substantial evidence supports the single 
justice's findings and that an admonition is the appropriate 
sanction. 
 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence of misconduct.  The single 
justice reviewed the record and concluded that, in amending the 
hearing committee's findings and making certain additional 
findings of misconduct, the board failed to accept the hearing 
committee's role as the "sole judge of the credibility of the 
testimony presented at the hearing," as S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 8 (5) (a), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009), requires.  
See Matter of Dasent, 446 Mass. 1010, 1012 (2006); Matter of 
Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 85-86 (1994); Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 
315, 328 (1989).  She agreed with the board, however, that there 
was substantial evidence to support the misconduct that the 
hearing committee did find.  See Matter of Abbott, 437 Mass. 
384, 393-394 (2002), and cases cited.  See also Matter of Segal, 
430 Mass. 359, 364 (1999) ("as long as there is substantial 
evidence, we do not disturb the board's finding, even if we 
would have come to a different conclusion if considering the 
matter de novo").  On appeal, "[w]e review the single justice's 
decision (on issues other than the initial choice of a sanction 
at the disciplinary stage) to determine whether there has been 
3 
 
an abuse of discretion or clear error of law."  Matter of Weiss, 
474 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2016). 
 
 
We agree with the single justice that the hearing 
committee's findings of misconduct are supported by the record 
and the evidence the hearing committee found credible. 
 
 
a.  Count one.  Count one concerned the respondent's role 
as a coguardian and guardian for the ward and trustee of the 
ward's special needs trust.  It alleged that the respondent 
handled a matter when he was not competent to do so, failed to 
familiarize himself with procedures and law applicable to his 
role as coguardian, engaged in a conflict of interest, and 
failed to represent the ward's interests competently and 
diligently and to seek the client's objectives in violation of 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1311 (2005); 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 
(2015); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 
(2015); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1335 (2015); that he paid himself his legal fees as guardian 
without obtaining approval from the Probate and Family Court, in 
violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as amended, 480 Mass. 
1315 (2018); and that he failed promptly to release retirement 
funds that he was holding in his Interest on Lawyers' Trust 
Account (IOLTA account) on the ward's behalf after a conservator 
had been appointed, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), 
as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015). 
 
 
The hearing committee determined that bar counsel proved a 
subset of the charged misconduct, conduct that it found 
manifested a lack of diligence but not incompetence.  In 
particular, the hearing committee found, and the board agreed, 
that the respondent failed to act diligently as guardian and 
coguardian for the ward, in violation of Mass R. Prof. C. 1.3 
(diligence), in two respects:  by failing to file annual care 
plans, see G. L. c. 190B, § 5-309 (b); and failing to secure a 
home for the ward that was not "unclean, littered with clutter, 
and had dog and rodent feces in it."2  In addition, the 
respondent deposited the ward's income and benefits into his 
IOLTA account rather than a special needs trust or other 
individual interest bearing account, in violation of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (5), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) 
(prior to July 1, 2015), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (6) 
 
 
2 A majority of the hearing committee determined that bar 
counsel had not proved violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (lack 
of competence) for the same conduct. 
4 
 
(after July 1, 2015).  Finally, after conservators were 
appointed for the ward, the respondent delayed remitting to the 
conservators funds that the respondent held on the ward's 
behalf, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), and Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (c).3,4 
 
 
The board, however, disagreed with the hearing committee's 
findings in several respects, concluding in particular that the 
respondent's conduct also reflected a lack of competence.  As 
the single justice correctly observed, however, factual findings 
predicated on the credibility of witnesses are the province of 
the hearing committee.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a); 
Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. at 328, quoting Salem v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 404 Mass. 170, 174 (1989) ("[a] 
mere reading of the transcript is not an adequate substitute for 
actually observing and hearing the witnesses in determining 
credibility").  See also Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 460 
(2006).  They "will not be rejected unless it can be 'said with 
certainty' that [a] finding was 'wholly inconsistent with 
another implicit finding.'"  Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 
880 (2010), quoting Matter of Barrett, supra.  Although the 
board may have accorded weight to certain testimony that the 
committee did not, that "does not render the evidence supporting 
 
 
3 A majority of the hearing committee concluded that the 
respondent did not violate Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) by 
continuing to receive income on the ward's behalf into his IOLTA 
account after successor fiduciaries were appointed because it 
was not the respondent's obligation to notify the payor 
retirement board to send the funds elsewhere.  It also 
determined that the respondent did not fail to seek the lawful 
objectives of his client in refusing to assent to a petition for 
partition, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a); engage in 
a conflict of interest, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 
(b), as amended, 430 Mass. 1301 (1999) (prior to July 1, 2015), 
and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) (2) (after July 1, 2015); or 
charge a "clearly excessive" or "illegal" fee, in violation of 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a). 
 
 
4 The respondent alleged that the dissenting member of the 
hearing committee had a conflict of interest, arising out of his 
representation of the spouse of a witness called by bar counsel, 
who was an adult child of the grandmother.  The board considered 
the claim on appeal, noted that the respondent was aware of the 
connection before the hearing, and waived his objection based on 
the member's disclosure and representations.  It stated that the 
board "discern[s] no bias in the dissent." 
5 
 
the committee's findings 'not substantial,'" Matter of Dasent, 
446 Mass. at 1012, or inconsistent. 
 
 
We acknowledge that, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5), 
the board "may revise[] the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and recommendation of the hearing committee."  That said, 
the single justice determined that the board's "corrections" in 
this case failed to "accord the committee's findings appropriate 
deference."  Matter of Dasent, 446 Mass. at 1012.  The board was 
not free, for example, to reject the hearing committee's 
findings concerning the credibility of witnesses who testified 
about the condition of the grandmother's home, the respondent's 
testimony concerning the relationship between the ward and a 
relative who provided care for the ward, or the respondent's 
explanation as to why he did not join the petition to partition 
the grandmother's home or act with respect to the mortgage on 
it.  The board similarly was not free to reject the respondent's 
explanation for retaining certain funds in his IOLTA account.  
Although the hearing committee did find that the respondent 
"concealed" from (by failing to disclose to) the conservator 
that he withheld funds from which he planned to take his legal 
fees, it credited his testimony that he reasonably believed 
that, had he sought payment from the conservator, she would not 
have paid the bill.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.  Because the 
hearing committee credited the respondent's testimony concerning 
the remaining funds in his IOLTA account, the single justice's 
determination that the length of the delay was "minimal" is not 
clearly wrong. 
 
 
With respect to the respondent's failure to file an annual 
"care plan" for the ward, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-309 (b), the hearing committee credited the respondent's 
testimony in support of its finding that the respondent's 
failure constituted a lack of diligence, in violation of Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.3, but not a lack of competence, in violation of 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1.  Although not specifically referenced in 
the hearing committee's findings, for example, there was 
testimony that the respondent attended at least one annual 
meeting to determine an individual education plan for the ward, 
which the respondent testified were more detailed that the 
general care plan required by statute. 
 
 
With respect to the issue of excessive or illegal fees and 
the respondent's withholding of funds to pay his fees, the 
hearing committee determined that an attorney does not violate 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) by retaining funds to pay a fee if 
the attorney has a reasonable belief that the fee otherwise 
6 
 
would not be paid.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 comment 3.  The 
hearing committee also determined that the respondent was not 
required to obtain court approval before retaining a reasonable 
fee for his services.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-413 (providing for 
reasonable compensation for attorneys, guardians, and others 
without prior court order); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a).  We agree 
with the single justice that the fact of withholding the fee, 
without obtaining an initial court order, did not itself 
establish a violation of the rules of professional conduct, and 
that where there is a reasonable "risk that the client may 
divert the funds [from which the lawyer's fees will be paid] 
without paying the fee," a "lawyer is not required to remit the 
portion from which the fee is to be paid," provided that any 
disputed portion must be kept in trust until the dispute is 
resolved.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 comment 3. 
 
 
b.  Count two.  The second count of the petition charged 
misconduct associated with the respondent's temporary role as 
special personal representative of the grandmother's estate.  It 
alleged that the respondent failed to exercise his duties and 
obligations to preserve assets and administer the estate, and 
failed to take action on certain lawsuits and claims filed 
against the estate, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 
(competence), 1.2 (a) (seeking lawful objectives of client), and 
1.3 (diligence); that he failed promptly to deliver $6,064.20 of 
estate funds that he was holding in his IOLTA account to a 
successor personal representative, in violation of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (c); and that he performed few services for the 
estate and paid himself a clearly excessive fee, in violation of 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a). 
 
 
A majority of the hearing committee determined that bar 
counsel did not prove the charged violations.  It credited the 
respondent's explanations for his actions as special personal 
representative.  With respect to the delivery of estate funds in 
particular, the hearing committee concluded that the respondent 
did not violate Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) by failing promptly 
to deliver a portion of the funds to a successor representative.  
Citing comment 3 to the rule, the hearing committee reasoned 
that the respondent was not required to remit the portion of the 
funds from which he would be paid, considering his testimony 
that there was a risk that his fees would not be paid.5  It also 
 
 
5 Comment 3 to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 provides: 
 
"Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which 
the lawyer's fee will be paid.  If there is risk that the 
7 
 
determined there was no intent to defraud or misappropriate 
client funds, but only a lack of promptness in accounting.  
Finally, the hearing committee found that bar counsel did not 
establish that the respondent's fee was illegal or excessive. 
 
 
The board generally declined to accept the hearing 
committee's findings as to this count.  It concluded that the 
evidence established that the respondent failed to marshal the 
grandmother's estate assets and failed to respond to litigation 
involving a nursing facility and a foreclosure notice on the 
grandmother's home, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 
(competence) and 1.2 (a) (seeking lawful objectives of client), 
and failed promptly to deliver to a successor fiduciary relevant 
funds held in his IOLTA account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.15 (c).  It concluded that comment 3 to Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (c) did not apply in these circumstances, because the 
comment concerns a "client" who may divert a fee, and not third 
parties such as a conservator or personal representative.  We 
disagree.  For purposes of comment 3, the term "client" includes 
a fiduciary who acts on behalf of the client.  The board also 
found that the fee charged by the respondent, more than $6,000, 
was excessive, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), and 
that it was "illegal" because he collected the fee without court 
approval, at a time after he had resigned as special personal 
representative.  Although the single justice did not separately 
address this point, the hearing committee considered the 
evidence and the respondent's testimony.  It concluded that 
although the respondent was "sloppy" in his record keeping and 
lacked diligence in his accounting, the "services performed and 
the amounts charged appear to be reasonable."  Although the 
respondent did not seek court approval for the fees, they were 
not "illegal."  Cf. G. L. c. 190B, § 5-413.  When the hearing 
committee's determination is accorded due deference, we cannot 
say there was error in its conclusion. 
 
 
Finally, we note that the board made certain additional 
findings concerning uncharged misconduct.  We agree with the 
single justice that, to the extent that any determination was 
 
client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the 
lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the 
fee is to be paid.  However, a layer may not hold funds to 
coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention.  
The disputed portion of the funds must be kept in trust and 
the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of 
the dispute, such as arbitration.  The undisputed portion 
of the funds shall be promptly distributed." 
8 
 
made that the respondent used funds from the grandmother's 
estate to pay expenses for various services at her home solely 
to benefit one of her family members, it was not charged in the 
petition for discipline.  See Matter of the Discipline of an 
Attorney, 448 Mass. 819, 825 n.6 (2007) ("The petition did not 
charge the respondent with deceiving bar counsel.  To the extent 
that the hearing committee determined that the respondent 
violated disciplinary rules for [the deceptive act], we 
determine this to be error"); Matter of Orfanello, 411 Mass 551, 
556 (1992) (error to rule that attorney violated disciplinary 
rule that was not charged). 
 
3. Appropriate sanction.  The findings adopted by the board 
amply support the conclusion that the respondent violated 
multiple rules of professional conduct.  Turning to the question 
of sanction, we consider whether the sanction imposed by the 
single justice is "markedly disparate from those ordinarily 
entered by the various single justices in similar cases."  
Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156 (1983).  Considering the 
"cumulative effect of the several violations committed by the 
respondent," Matter of Palmer, 413 Mass. 33, 38 (1992), we 
conclude that an admonition is appropriate.  See Matter of 
Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 58 (1982) (although board's recommendation 
as to sanction is entitled to substantial deference, "the 
ultimate duty of decision rests with this court").  Although we 
give "substantial deference" to the board's recommendation, 
ultimately, we "decide every case on its own merits such that 
every offending attorney receives the disposition most 
appropriate in the circumstances" (alterations and citation 
omitted).  Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. 1016, 1021 (2018). 
 
 
a.  Respondent's conduct.  In the main, the facts establish 
that the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence in 
his role as guardian, coguardian, and trustee.  The hearing 
committee did not, however, find that the conduct constituted a 
pattern or repeated failure, nor that there was either serious 
harm or a potential for serious harm an issue here:  among other 
things, although not excusing the misconduct, the hearing 
committee considered that the conduct occurred in the context of 
the respondent's undertaking multiple roles at the behest of his 
long-standing client, the grandmother, and that he was placed in 
the "unenviable position between family members who were hostile 
to each other." 
 
 
Absent aggravating factors, similar misconduct has 
typically resulted in either a private admonition or a public 
reprimand.  See Matter of Kirby, 29 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
9 
 
366 (2013) (public reprimand for neglect of one matter, with 
aggravating factors); Matter of Berkland, 26 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 40 (2010) (public reprimand for failure of 
diligence, failure to seek client's lawful objectives, and 
failure to communicate adequately, in one matter); Admonition 
No. 05-20, 21 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 712 (2005) (admonition 
for neglect of one matter, without actual harm); Matter of Kane, 
13 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 321 (1997).  In this case, the 
hearing committee expressly did not find that the respondent's 
lack of diligence constituted a pattern, nor were repeated 
failure, serious harm, or potential for serious harm at issue.  
Because the misconduct was limited to one ward and the period 
surrounding the grandmother's death, the respondent's lack of 
diligence is not as egregious as the conduct involved in Matter 
of Kane, 13 Mass. Att'y Discipline R. at 328 (absent aggravating 
and mitigating factors, suspension is warranted for "misconduct 
involving repeated failures to act with reasonable diligence, or 
when a lawyer has engaged in a pattern of neglect, and the 
lawyer's misconduct causes serious injury or potentially serious 
injury to a client or others"). 
 
 
Likewise, failing to place the ward's funds in a trust or 
separate interest-bearing account, in violation of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15 (e), would typically warrant a private admonition 
or a public reprimand, as would the respondent's multiple 
violations of accounting requirements.  See Admonition No. 15-
19, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 779 (2015); Admonition No. 
15-25, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 791 (2015).  Although he 
retained third-party funds and failed promptly to remit the 
funds to the client's fiduciary, he kept the funds in an IOLTA 
account under the client's name, without commingling, without an 
intention to convert the funds, and without deprivation to the 
client.  In the circumstances, an admonition is warranted. 
 
 
b.  Aggravating and mitigating factors.  Like the hearing 
committee, the board weighed in aggravation the respondent's 
substantial experience in the practice of law, his having 
engaged in multiple violations of the rules of professional 
conduct (albeit over the course of related matters), and his 
failure to disclose that he was withholding funds to pay himself 
for services that had not been billed.  See Matter of Gillis, 5 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 136, 141 (1987) (substantial 
experience in practice of law weighed in aggravation). 
 
 
Although the hearing committee found no explicit factors to 
weigh in mitigation of sanction, implicit in its recommendation 
of an admonition was its acknowledgement that the respondent 
10 
 
"found himself in the middle of a squabble between a 
dysfunctional family," and its recognition that his "several 
lapses, other than failure to promptly account for and remit 
monies, were the result of a combination of a very difficult 
family situation and his lack of diligence, not a result of any 
malfeasance."  Although we agree with the board that neither a 
difficult assignment nor lack of harm is considered a special 
mitigating factor, it does serve to provide context for the 
misconduct.  Considering all the circumstances, we agree with 
the single justice that an admonition is most appropriate in 
these circumstances, and we accordingly affirm her order. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Christine A. Helsel, Assistant Bar Counsel.