Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1485.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1485 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. CARR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1485.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to provide competent representation—Charging 
clearly excessive fee—Engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration 
of justice—Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law—Engaging in conduct involving deceit or dishonesty—Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2012-1699—Submitted January 23, 2013—Decided April 17, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-101. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jeffrey Alan Carr, of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0081745, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2007.  In 
February 2012, we suspended his license for six months, with the entire 
suspension stayed on conditions, for charging a clearly excessive fee.  Akron Bar 
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Assn. v. Carr, 131 Ohio St.3d 210, 2012-Ohio-610, 963 N.E.2d 802.  At that time, 
Carr was registered with the Office of Attorney Services as inactive, and we 
ordered that his stayed suspension shall take effect upon his being restored to 
active status.  Id. at ¶ 19.  We also ordered that Carr make restitution and pay the 
costs associated with that disciplinary proceeding before being restored to active 
status.  Id.  On March 14, 2013, we found Carr in contempt for failing to comply 
with this court’s order to pay costs, revoked the stay of his six-month suspension, 
and ordered Carr to serve the entire six months as an actual suspension.  134 Ohio 
St.3d 1490, 2013-Ohio-924, 984 N.E.2d 32. 
{¶ 2} In December 2011, relator, Akron Bar Association, charged Carr 
with professional misconduct in a three-count complaint involving a different 
client.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline attempted 
service of the complaint by certified mail, but service was returned as “refused.”  
The board then served the complaint on the clerk of this court, pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B).  Even though Carr had earlier appeared for a deposition 
during relator’s investigation of the grievance filed against him, he did not answer 
the complaint, and relator thereafter moved for an entry of default.  The board 
appointed a master commissioner, who made findings of fact and misconduct and 
recommended an indefinite suspension.  The board adopted the master 
commissioner’s findings and recommended sanction.  We, in turn, adopt the 
board’s findings and hereby indefinitely suspend Carr from the practice of law in 
Ohio. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Based on Carr’s deposition testimony and the sworn affidavits in 
the record, the board found that Carr acted incompetently, charged clearly 
excessive fees, made false statements to relator, and prejudiced his clients’ 
interests. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
{¶ 4} Specifically, in March 2009, Carol Shelly retained Carr, through 
relator’s lawyer-referral service, to represent her and her husband in a case filed 
against them by the United States government for unpaid federal taxes.  At that 
time, Carr did not have experience litigating tax issues in federal court. 
{¶ 5} In December 2009, the United States filed a motion for summary 
judgment against the Shellys and, along with its 23-page brief, submitted 21 
exhibits to support its motion, including deposition transcripts, discovery 
responses, and various tax documents.  In response, Carr filed an eight-page brief, 
without any exhibits or supporting materials—despite the fact that Shelly had 
given him the relevant tax returns prepared by her accountant and reports from 
Internal Revenue Service agents showing that the Shellys owed less than the 
amount claimed by the government in its lawsuit.  In January 2010, the federal 
court granted summary judgment against the Shellys, found them liable for 
$520,810.35 in unpaid taxes, and ordered that tax liens be foreclosed on their 
home.  In the district court opinion, the judge explained that the Shellys’ legal 
argument suffered from “one significant, fatal flaw”:  “they offered no evidence 
of any kind.” 
{¶ 6} Despite this result, between March 2009 and January 2010, Carr 
billed Shelly $70,272 in fees relating to the federal tax lawsuit, and she paid him a 
total of $65,190.  The board found that these fees were excessive—mostly 
because Carr’s billing invoices did not match his work product.  For example, in 
his April 2009 invoice, Carr billed four hours for a client conference that 
according to Shelly, lasted about 45 minutes.  Similarly, in his May 2009 invoice, 
Carr billed 16 hours for document review, but according to Shelly, he later 
seemed unfamiliar with the documents at a deposition.  And Carr billed 14.5 
hours for preparation of his memorandum in opposition to the government’s 
summary judgment motion, even though the document was only eight pages and 
did not include any supporting materials. 
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{¶ 7} The board also found that Carr failed to honor his agreement with 
relator’s lawyer-referral service.  As a participant, Carr agreed that in the event he 
obtained a client through the service, he would remit 15 percent of any fees over 
$200 from that client to the service within ten days of receiving the fee.  While 
Carr remitted fees in May, June, and July 2009 relating to his representation of the 
Shellys, he did not pay any percentage in the months of September through 
December, even though he received additional money from Carol Shelly during 
this time period.  Moreover, on December 17, 2009, Carr reported to the service 
that the Shellys’ case had closed and no additional fees had been paid to him.  The 
record shows, however, that Carr filed his opposition to the government’s motion 
four days later, on December 21, 2009.  Further, Carr continued to work on and 
bill for the Shellys’ case through January 2010, and he received a payment of 
$4,650 from Carol Shelly on January 6, 2010.  Ultimately, based on the amount 
that Shelly paid him less the $200 deductible, Carr should have remitted 
$9,748.50 to the service, but he paid only $1,430.  And at his deposition, Carr 
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct by testifying that he 
had met his obligations under the referral-service agreement. 
{¶ 8} Based on these findings, the board found that Carr’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation 
to a client), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, 
or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 4.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law), 8.4(a) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  We agree. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 9} We also agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss the 
charge under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) (requiring an attorney to communicate the 
nature and scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and 
expenses within a reasonable time after commencing the representation) for 
insufficient evidence.  And we also dismiss the charge under Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) 
(requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust 
account, separate from the lawyer’s own property), because neither the master 
commissioner nor the board made any findings with respect to this allegation. 
Sanction 
{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 
caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg., and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  
{¶ 11} We have already identified Carr’s ethical breaches to his clients 
and the legal profession.  The board found no mitigating factors but found five of 
the aggravating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1), including a prior 
disciplinary offense, dishonest or selfish motive, lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, submission of false statements or other deceptive practices 
during the disciplinary process, and a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of his conduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (b), (e), (f), and (g). 
{¶ 12} For precedent, the board cited Columbus Bar Assn. v. Torian, 106 
Ohio St.3d 14, 2005-Ohio-3216, 829 N.E.2d 1210, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009-Ohio-1249, 905 N.E.2d 184, to support its 
recommendation of an indefinite suspension.  Both cases reiterate our consistent 
holding that neglect of legal matters and the failure to cooperate in the ensuing 
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disciplinary investigation warrant an indefinite suspension from the practice of 
law.  Torian at ¶ 17; Brown at ¶ 9. 
 
An indefinite suspension is an appropriate sanction when a 
lawyer violates the standards of professional competence, 
diligence, and integrity by neglecting to complete promised legal 
services, misappropriating client funds, and failing to promptly 
return client funds and other property to which the client is 
entitled. 
 
Id.  See also Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gottehrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-
Ohio-929, 924 N.E.2d 825 (indefinite suspension warranted in a default 
proceeding for neglect of client matters, charging a clearly excessive fee, and 
failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary proceeding).  In addition, we have 
previously noted that when neglect of client matters and failure to cooperate “are 
coupled with dishonesty in any form, an indefinite suspension is all but 
guaranteed.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002-Ohio-
5934, 778 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 13} Having considered Carr’s conduct, the profusion of aggravating 
factors, the absence of any mitigating factors, and the sanctions previously 
imposed for comparable conduct, we agree with the board that the appropriate 
sanction is an indefinite suspension.  Accordingly, Jeffrey Alan Carr is hereby 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio.  Costs are 
taxed to Carr. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
William G. Chris, Bar Counsel, and Milton C. Rankins, Vincent J. Alfera, 
and Linda Chugh Ulinski, for relator. 
______________________