Title: State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CRAIG v. SCIOTO COUNTY 
BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706.] 
Elections – Prohibition – R.C. 311.01(B) – Qualifications for office of  sheriff —
Board of elections abused its discretion by disregarding R.C. 311.01(B) in 
denying protest challenging candidacy – Relator lacks adequate remedy at 
law – Laches no bar – Writ granted. 
(No. 2008-0265 ─ Submitted February 19, 2008 ─ Decided February 21, 2008.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent respondents, the Scioto County Board of Elections and its members, from 
placing Kenneth Ray Reed’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the office of 
Scioto County Sheriff in the March 4, 2008 Democratic Party primary election.  
Because the board of elections concedes that it abused its discretion by clearly 
disregarding R.C. 311.01(B) and relator lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law, we grant the writ. 
Prior Work Experience 
{¶ 2} Relator, Kenneth Ray Reed, seeks to be a candidate for Scioto 
County Sheriff at the March 4, 2008 Democratic Party primary election.  Before 
the qualification date for this election, Reed worked as a deputy sheriff for the 
Scioto County Sheriff’s Department from January 1, 2001, to April 2003, and as a 
patrolman for the New Boston Police Department from April 2003 to the present.  
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Reed’s work as a deputy sheriff and as a patrolman was not as a peace officer at 
the rank of corporal or above or in a supervisory capacity. 
{¶ 3} From April 2001 to February 2006, Reed also was an organizer, 
member, and chief of Cincinnati Special Police, L.L.C., a private, limited liability 
company that had a private-investigator license with Cincinnati.  Reed, however, 
was not employed with Cincinnati or commissioned as a peace officer or licensed 
as a private police officer by Cincinnati.  Reed supervised individuals acting as 
private police during his tenure with the company. 
Application of Candidacy, Findings, and Protest 
{¶ 4} On January 4, 2008, Reed filed a verified application to be a 
candidate for sheriff with the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas.  On that 
date, the administrative judge of the common pleas court certified his findings and 
Reed’s application to respondent Scioto County Board of Elections.  On January 
11, the board of elections first met to consider Reed’s declaration of candidacy 
and nominating petition. 
{¶ 5} On January 15, 2008, relator, Jeffery L. Craig, a registered 
Democrat and Scioto County resident, filed a timely protest challenging Reed’s 
candidacy for sheriff.  Craig claimed that Reed did not meet the requirements of 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate for sheriff. 
Board Hearing and Decision 
{¶ 6} On January 23, the board of elections held a hearing on Craig’s 
protest.  At the hearing, Reed claimed that he met the qualifications to be an 
eligible sheriff’s candidate by serving in a supervisory capacity for Cincinnati 
Special Police, L.L.C.  Nevertheless, Reed admitted that he had never been 
commissioned by Cincinnati as a peace officer or as a private police officer when 
he worked for the private company. 
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3 
{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the board voted three-to-one to 
deny Craig’s protest.  Reed is the only Democratic Party candidate for the 2008 
election year. 
Expedited Election Case 
{¶ 8} Nine days after the board’s vote, on February 1, Craig filed this 
expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the 
board of elections and its members, from certifying Reed’s candidacy for Scioto 
County Sheriff.  The board submitted an answer in which it denied only two of 
the averments of the complaint.  The parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to 
the accelerated schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Buckeye State Sheriffs Association 
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of granting the writ. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court for our consideration. 
Laches 
{¶ 10} The elections board and its members assert that this election case is 
barred by laches because of Craig’s 11-day delay in submitting his protest to 
Reed’s candidacy. 
{¶ 11} If relators in election cases do not exercise the utmost diligence, 
laches may bar an action for extraordinary relief.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Fishman 
v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 116 Ohio St.3d 19, 2007-Ohio-5583, 876 N.E.2d 
517, ¶ 6.  “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in 
asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State ex 
rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 12} The board of elections and its members are correct that an 
unjustified delay in submitting a protest in an election case can result in laches.  
See Mason City School Dist. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 Ohio St.3d 373, 
2005-Ohio-5363, 840 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 14.  In Mason, however, there was a 90-day 
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delay in submitting a protest.  By contrast, any delay by Craig in submitting his 
protest here was minimal. 
{¶ 13} In fact, the board and its members admitted that Craig’s protest 
was timely.  Craig also introduced unrebutted evidence that he exercised extreme 
diligence in filing his protest. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, “we generally require a showing of prejudice before we 
apply laches to bar a consideration of the merits of an election case.”  State ex rel. 
Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 
N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 11.  “Normally, this prejudice in expedited election cases occurs 
because relators’ delay prejudices respondents by making the case an expedited 
election case under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), which restricts respondents’ time to 
prepare and defend against relators’ claims, or impairs boards of elections’ ability 
to prepare, print, and distribute appropriate ballots because of the expiration of the 
time for providing absentee ballots.”  State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 15} Any delay by Craig in filing his protest did not prejudice the board 
and its members.  The board does not assert any prejudice.  And even if Craig had 
filed his protest within a week after Reed filed his declaration of candidacy and 
nominating petition, this case would still have been an expedited election case, 
and the absentee-ballot deadline would still have passed before this case had been 
fully briefed.  Brinda, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 
12-13; R.C. 3509.01.  Therefore, neither the elections board’s ability to prepare 
and defend against Craig’s prohibition claim nor its duty to make election ballots 
available to the electorate has been compromised by Craig.  “This is thus a case in 
which the statutory time limits would have expired even ‘under the best of 
circumstances.’ ”  State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City Schools v. 
Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 28, quoting State 
ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 16} Finally, the board and its members do not argue that Craig’s action 
is barred by any delay in filing this case after the board denied his protest.  Much 
of the nine-day period after the board’s denial of the protest here resulted from 
Craig’s diligent efforts to secure legal counsel to review the merits of a possible 
legal challenge to the decision.  See State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, laches does not bar our consideration of the merits of 
Craig’s prohibition claim. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 18} Craig requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of 
elections and its members from placing the name of Kenneth Ray Reed on the 
March 4, 2008 Democratic Party primary election ballot as a candidate for Scioto 
County Sheriff.  To be entitled to the writ, Craig must establish that (1) the board 
of elections and its members are about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the 
exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result 
in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  
State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-
Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 16. 
Admission by Failure to Deny 
{¶ 19} For the first two requirements, “[a]verments in a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, 
are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.”  Civ.R. 8(D); 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2) (“The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure shall supplement these 
rules unless clearly inapplicable”); see also State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 587, 593, 639 N.E.2d 1189 (applying Civ.R. 8(D) in a 
mandamus case to establish a clear legal right and clear legal duty). 
{¶ 20} In his complaint, Craig specifically alleged that the board had 
exercised quasi-judicial power by denying his protest, that the exercise of this 
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power was unauthorized by law, that the board abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable legal provisions, and that Reed’s name should not be on 
the ballot because he is not qualified under R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be a candidate 
for county sheriff.  In its answer, the board did not specifically deny these 
averments and thus admitted them.  Civ.R. 8(D); Howard, 70 Ohio St.3d at 593, 
639 N.E.2d 1189. 
{¶ 21} Moreover, even if the board had not admitted these allegations, 
Craig proved the first two requirements for the writ.  Craig established the first 
requirement by proving that the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial 
authority by denying his protest after conducting a hearing that included sworn 
testimony.  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-
Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 14 (“even if the board [has] already exercised its 
quasi-judicial power by denying [the] protest, relief in prohibition is still available 
to prevent the placement of names or issues on a ballot, as long as the election has 
not yet been held”). 
{¶ 22} Craig established the second requirement for the writ by showing 
that Reed did not meet the supervisory-experience requirement of R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(a).  Notwithstanding his claim, Reed never served “as a peace 
officer at the rank of corporal or above” in the five-year period before the 
qualification date for the primary election.  His employment as a peace officer 
during this period for the New Boston Police Department and the Scioto County 
Sheriff’s Department was never at the rank of corporal or above.  Reed’s 
additional employment with the private security company he co-founded was not 
as a peace officer.  See Cincinnati ex rel. Cincinnati Private Police Assn. Co., 
Watchmen’s Local No. 13130 v. Cincinnati (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 188, 532 
N.E.2d 175 (private police officers are not considered peace officers when they 
are not both commissioned and employed by a political subdivision); State v. 
Sinclair, Delaware App. No. 04CAA11073, 2005-Ohio-4497, ¶ 12 (“Ohio law 
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distinguishes between private police officers such as security guards and private 
detectives, and peace officers employed by governmental entities”). 
{¶ 23} The board’s reliance on the axiom of liberal construction of 
statutory limitations on the right to be an eligible candidate is misplaced because 
we must apply the plain language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9), which has an unequivocal 
and definite meaning.  Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio 
St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 48, citing State ex rel. Wolfe v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 186, 724 N.E.2d 771; 
State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 
241-242, 725 N.E.2d 255. 
Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 24} In its response to Craig’s complaint, the board claimed that Craig 
has an adequate remedy at law.  The board and its members also raise this point in 
their merit brief. 
{¶ 25} This contention lacks merit.  Given the closeness of the election 
date in this expedited election case, Craig lacks an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Brown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 
Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 22; State ex rel. Thurn v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 291-292, 649 N.E.2d 
1205, quoting State ex rel. Smart v. McKinley (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 5, 6, 18 
O.O.3d 128, 412 N.E.2d 393 (“Concerning the third prerequisite for a writ * * *, 
given the proximity of the election, an injunction would arguably not constitute an 
adequate remedy because any ‘appellate process would last well past the election’ 
”); see also State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 95 Ohio 
St.3d 73, 75, 765 N.E.2d 854. 
{¶ 26} The board and its members cite Tatman, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 
2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, in support of their contention that Craig has 
an adequate remedy.  In Tatman, at ¶ 18, we held that an action for a prohibitory 
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injunction in common pleas court provided an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law that prevented a prohibition action because the pertinent election 
was almost seven months away when the elections board denied a protest to a 
sheriff’s candidate’s qualifications. 
{¶ 27} Tatman, moreover, is inapplicable here because the pertinent 
election ─ the March 4, 2008 primary election ─ was only about a month and a 
half away when the board of elections denied Craig’s protest challenging Reed’s 
qualifications to be a candidate for county sheriff.  The board requests that we 
create an exception for primary elections in which the challenged candidate is the 
only candidate, but we have never recognized such an exception.  Such an 
adoption would leave prospective relators in the position of defending against 
claims that their actions have been rendered moot when the primary election has 
passed.  Cf. State ex rel. Hills Communities, Inc. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 465, 467, 746 N.E.2d 1115 (“When the election has passed, 
as it has here, the action for extraordinary relief or an appeal from a judgment in 
the extraordinary-writ action is moot”). 
{¶ 28} If ─ as the board and its members concede ─ Reed is not a 
qualified sheriff’s candidate, then they have a duty to remove his name from the 
primary election ballot now, and the proximity of that election renders injunction 
an inadequate remedy.  See, e.g., Brown, Thurn, and Smart. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, Craig has established his entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief.  Therefore, we grant a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the board of elections and its members from placing the name of Kenneth 
Ray Reed on the ballot as a candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for 
Scioto County Sheriff at the March 4, 2008 primary election. 
Writ granted. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would deny the writ. 
__________________ 
 
Downes, Hurst & Fishel, Marc A. Fishel, and David A. Riepenhoff, for 
relator. 
 
Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Chadwick K. 
Sayre, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
 
Robert L. Berry Co., L.P.A., and Robert L. Berry, urging granting of the 
writ for amicus curiae, Buckeye State Sheriffs Association. 
______________________