Title: HEATHER MARIE CURETON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HEATHER MARIE CURETON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 168169 P.3d 549Case Number: S-07-0001Decided: 10/24/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
HEATHER 
MARIE CURETON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel, WyomingState Public Defender Program, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After trial, a 
jury convicted Appellant Heather Cureton on two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance and one count of possessing a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver.  Cureton 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions and 
asserts reversible error in the admission of testimony allegedly expressing an 
opinion as to her guilt.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Cureton presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did plain error occur when the district court permitted Officer Wenberg 
to give opinion testimony as to Appellant's guilt?

 
 
II.         
Was there sufficient evidence to support Appellant's 
convictions?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 1, 
2006, an anonymous caller reported to Casper police that Cureton was selling drugs 
out of a maroon pickup truck parked behind a local bingo parlor.  Within minutes Officer Chris Wenberg 
arrived at the location.  Officer 
Wenberg noticed Cureton sitting in the front passenger seat of the truck talking 
to an unidentified female and a male, later identified as Cureton's boyfriend 
Dean Scoggin, seated on the driver's side, apparently attempting to fix the 
truck's stereo.  

 
 
[¶4]      Officer Wenberg 
approached the vehicle and asked the unidentified female to leave while he 
talked with Cureton and Scoggin.  
The officer then told Cureton and Scoggin why he was there and asked for 
permission to search the truck.  
Both consented to the search.  
At Officer Wenberg's request, the pair exited the truck and walked toward 
the back of the vehicle.  As Cureton 
did so, she paused for a moment near the rear passenger wheel.  Once Cureton and Scoggin were at the 
back of the truck, Officer Wenberg asked and was granted permission to conduct a 
pat down.  The officer discovered a 
syringe and a "wad" of cash in Cureton's coat pocket.  

 
 
[¶5]      By that time, 
Officer Andy Ready had arrived at the scene and stood by Cureton and Scoggin 
while Officer Wenberg conducted a search of the truck.  Officer Wenberg discovered a bag 
containing forty-seven smaller baggies of the type commonly used to package 
controlled substances for resale inside the passenger door's pocket.  He also found an Altoids tin near the 
passenger side of the front seat that contained women's jewelry, several empty 
baggies and two small baggies containing approximately 3.99 grams of 
methamphetamine collectively.    

 
 
[¶6]      Cureton and 
Scoggin were placed under arrest.  A 
search of Cureton's person revealed $970.00 in cash.  A search of Scoggin's person disclosed 
$700.00 in cash, along with .74 grams of methamphetamine.  After the duo was secured in the patrol 
cars, the officers conducted another search of the vehicle and discovered a 
small scale covered with methamphetamine residue resting on top of the rear 
passenger tire.  

 
 
[¶7]      Cureton was 
charged with three felony drug offenses:  
(1) possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a powder or 
crystalline form in an amount greater than three grams as proscribed by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); (2) possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine) or, in the alternative, aiding 
and abetting another in the commission of such offense in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-201 and 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); and (3) possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), third offense, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007). At trial, Officer Wenberg 
testified, without objection, about some of the common characteristics of both 
the distribution and use of methamphetamine and the significance of the items 
seized from the pickup truck.  
Scoggin also testified against Cureton, connecting her to the drug items 
discovered by police.  The jury 
found Cureton guilty on the charged offenses, and the district court sentenced 
her to a single term of imprisonment of six to twelve years.1  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Opinion 
testimony

 
 
[¶8]      At trial, in 
addition to testifying about the events surrounding Cureton's arrest and the 
items seized, Officer Wenberg testified as an expert with over sixteen years of 
experience about the common characteristics of methamphetamine use and 
trafficking, including its different forms and methods of ingestion, the various 
quantities in which the drug is sold and its street value.  Officer Wenberg testified that most 
people who sell methamphetamine often use it, and that a large quantity of the 
drug, as found in this case, could be possessed for either personal use or for 
resale.  Officer Wenberg stated 
that, in order to determine if a person intended to resell methamphetamine, one 
had to consider other factors such as the presence of packaging materials, 
scales, large amounts of cash or other items of value, and pay/owe sheets upon 
which drug transactions are recorded.  
Officer Wenberg opined that the presence of several factors suggested 
that methamphetamine was being sold. 

 
 
[¶9]      Cureton contends 
that reversible error occurred in the admission of Officer Wenberg's testimony 
that certain facts in this case tended to indicate that methamphetamine was 
being sold rather than simply used.  
Cureton claims that such testimony relayed an impermissible opinion that 
she was a drug dealer and thus guilty of the charged offenses.  Cureton acknowledges she did not object 
to the challenged testimony and, consequently, bears the burden of establishing 
plain error.  To demonstrate plain 
error, Cureton must show in the record an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious manner resulting in material 
prejudice to a substantial right.  
Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, 
¶ 14, 158 P.3d 698, 702 (Wyo. 2007); Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1216 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶10]   The rule is well established that a 
witness, lay or expert, may not express an opinion as to the guilt of the 
accused.  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 21, 34 P.3d 271, 276 (Wyo. 2001); Whiteplume v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Wyo. 1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 
(Wyo. 1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 
(Wyo. 
1989).  This rule ensures that it is 
the jury that resolves the factual issues and determines the guilt or innocence 
of the accused.  Ogden, ¶ 21, 34 P.3d  at 276.  Opinion testimony, 
however, is not improper simply because it "embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact."  
W.R.E. 704.  "An 
interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may 
be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the 
inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional 
statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party."  Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 616 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Thus, error occurs only 
where the testimony constitutes a direct opinion about the accused's guilt 
rather than relates information to assist the jury in resolving the factual 
issues placed before it.

 

[¶11]   In this case, Officer Wenberg never 
testified or offered a conclusion about whether Cureton was a drug dealer or 
that she was guilty of any particular offense.  The officer's testimony merely informed 
the jury about the meaning and significance of certain items of physical 
evidence collected at the scene, and left the ultimate conclusion for the 
jury.  We do not perceive Officer 
Wenberg's testimony as impermissible comments on Cureton's guilt but, rather, as 
opinion evidence offered to aid the jury in understanding and resolving the 
factual issues of the case.  In our 
view, Officer Wenberg's testimony does not rise to the same level of impropriety 
that the rule on opinion testimony guards against.  See Whiteplume, 841 P.3d  at 1337-41 
(officer's testimony that "I listened to her story and made a determination that 
she had been raped" constituted an improper opinion as to the credibility of the 
victim and the guilt of the defendant); Bennett, 794 P.2d  at 883 (officer gave 
his opinion that the defendant was a drug dealer and specifically linked the 
facts from his investigation to his conclusion that the defendant was a drug 
dealer); Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 64-66 
(three expert witnesses gave their opinion that the child had been sexually 
abused and that the defendant had done it).  Its admission therefore did not violate 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
[¶12]   Even assuming Officer Wenberg's 
testimony constituted error, Cureton has failed to establish that the error 
adversely affected a substantial right.   The State's evidence against 
Cureton was strong.  The jury's 
determination therefore did not hinge solely upon the challenged testimony of 
Officer Wenberg.  We cannot conclude 
from our review of the record that, in the absence of the officer's testimony, 
the outcome of the trial might have been more favorable to Cureton.  Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1179-80 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Under the facts of this 
case, we find no plain error to warrant reversal.

 
 

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶13]   Cureton contends that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her convictions.  Specifically, she claims the State did 
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt she possessed the methamphetamine in the 
Altoids tin in Scoggin's truck and on the scale found on the truck's 
tire.

 
 
[¶14]   When reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, this Court views the evidence, and any applicable inferences 
that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the 
State.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 376, 383 (Wyo. 2007); Grissom v. 
State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo. 2005).   We have consistently held that it 
is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 
evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, 
¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  
It is not our task, let alone our place, to reweigh the evidence or 
reexamine the credibility of the witnesses.  Pacheco v. State, 2004 WY 160, ¶ 6, 102 P.3d 887, 889 (Wyo. 2004).  Our duty 
is to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; see also Grissom, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d  at 136; Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d  at 
689.

 
 
[¶15]   Before beginning our review, we 
feel compelled to point out two glaring problems with Cureton's argument.  First, Cureton essentially ignores the 
standard employed for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, basing her 
argument on the evidence most favorable to her and disregarding the evidence and 
rational inferences which would support the jury's determination.  Second, Cureton does not cite to any 
Wyoming cases 
to support her contention that the evidence of possession presented to the jury 
was legally insufficient.  Instead, 
she relies on cases from other jurisdictions that are both factually and legally 
distinguishable from this case.  
While we could summarily reject Cureton's insufficiency claim based on 
these deficiencies, we chose not to employ such a drastic step in this instance 
and will address the merits of her claim.  
See generally Marshall v. 
State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 12, 125 P.3d 269, 274 (Wyo. 2005); In re KD, 2001 WY 61, 26 P.3d 1035 (Wyo. 
2001); W.R.A.P. 1.03 and 7.01.

 
 
[¶16]   Possession of a controlled 
substance is proved when the evidence establishes that the accused either 
individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control over the 
substance, had knowledge of its presence, and knowledge that the substance was a 
controlled substance.  Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶ 12, 60 P.3d  at 689; 
Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 
(Wyo. 
1982).  Direct evidence of the 
defendant's actual possession of the substance is not required.  Rather, constructive possession is all 
that is necessary and such may be proved by circumstantial evidence linking 
together a series of facts allowing a reasonable inference that the defendant 
had the requisite knowledge and control of the substance.  Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶12, 60 P.3d  at 689; 
Wise, 654 P.2d  at 119.  

 
 
[¶17]   After a careful review of the 
record in this case, we find ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could 
infer that Cureton possessed the methamphetamine.  Officer Wenberg's testimony reveals that 
the Altoids tin containing two small baggies of methamphetamine and women's 
jewelry, as well as forty-seven baggies of the type used to package the drug, 
were found in the area where Cureton had been situated in Scoggin's pickup 
truck.  The scale covered with 
methamphetamine residue was located on top of the passenger rear tire where 
Cureton had briefly stopped before stepping to the back of the truck.  The officer had not observed another 
person around the rear tire prior to the discovery of the scale.  Finally, Cureton had a syringe and 
$970.00 in cash on her person.  The 
State's evidence indicates that, at the time of her arrest, Cureton was 
unemployed and had no known source of income.  

 
 
[¶18]   There is also evidence that Cureton 
had exclusive possession of Scoggin's truck for a period of time immediately 
preceding the discovery of the methamphetamine and other drug items.  Scoggin testified that Cureton had 
borrowed his truck the night before so she could obtain methamphetamine.  When she did not return, he went looking 
for his truck the next day and found it in the parking lot of the bingo hall 
minutes before Officer Wenberg's arrival at the scene.  Scoggin testified that as he was 
attempting to drive away in the truck, Cureton exited the bingo hall and asked 
him to "weigh out a teener of dope."  
According to Scoggin, he parked the truck in the back of the bingo hall 
and waited for Cureton.  After a few 
minutes, Cureton arrived at the truck with another woman.  Cureton asked Scoggin if he had measured 
out the methamphetamine.  When he 
replied that he did not know where the drug was located, Cureton told him the 
methamphetamine was in the Altoids tin in the cubby hole next to the steering 
wheel.  Scoggin grabbed the tin, 
tossed it to Cureton and told her that she would have to measure the drug 
herself.  A few minutes later, 
Officer Wenberg arrived and discovered the methamphetamine and other items.  In addition to this testimony, Scoggin 
denied ownership of the scale found on the rear tire of his truck.  

 
 
[¶19]   From the evidence presented, a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that Cureton knew what was in the Altoids tin 
and had exerted control over it.  A 
reasonable inference can also be drawn that Cureton exercised dominion and 
control over the scale, knew that the residue on the scale was methamphetamine 
and that she placed it on the truck's tire to avoid its detection.  Additionally, a reasonable inference can 
be made from the quantity of methamphetamine, the scale, the baggies and the 
amount of cash Cureton was carrying that she possessed the methamphetamine with 
the intent to deliver it to others.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving 
it all reasonable inferences, as we must, we hold the evidence is sufficient to 
sustain Cureton's convictions.2

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   Our review of the record convinces 
us that Cureton's convictions are not tainted by improper opinion testimony as 
to her guilt.  We also find 
sufficient evidence in the record to sustain Cureton's convictions.  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Relying on 
Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 76 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2003), Bilderback v. 
State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000); Rouse 
v. State, 966 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1998), the district court determined that 
the convictions on each count merged for sentencing 
purposes.

 

2In reaching 
this conclusion, we have considered and rejected Cureton's argument concerning 
Scoggin's credibility and the reliability of his testimony.  As stated previously, it is the jury's 
role, and not this Court's, to determine issues of credibility and the weight to 
be accorded the evidence.