Title: In re McCree (Opinion - Leave Granted)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

In re McCREE 
 
Docket No. 146826.  Argued December 11, 2013 (Calendar No. 1).  Decided March 26, 2014. 
 
 
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) petitioned for the interim suspension of Wayne 
Circuit Court Judge Wade H. McCree without pay.  The Supreme Court granted the petition.  
493 Mich 935 (2013).  The JTC subsequently filed a formal complaint against respondent, 
alleging five counts of misconduct: that respondent had engaged in improper conduct in two 
criminal cases before him, falsely reported a felony, exhibited improper bench conduct and 
demeanor, and made misrepresentations to the JTC.  The Supreme Court appointed retired 
Jackson Circuit Court Judge Charles A. Nelson to act as master.  After a hearing, the master 
concluded that respondent had committed misconduct as alleged in Counts I through III of the 
complaint.  With respect to Count I, the master concluded that respondent should have 
disqualified himself from a felony nonsupport case as soon as he began a sexual relationship 
with Geniene LaShay Mott, who was the complaining witness in the case.  With respect to Count 
II, Judge Nelson found that respondent had lied to the prosecuting attorney’s office when he 
reported that Mott was stalking him and trying to extort money from him.  With respect to Count 
III, the master concluded that respondent had improperly acted in another criminal case, one that 
involved Mott’s uncle.  With respect to Count IV, the master found that although many of the 
text messages that respondent exchanged with Mott while he was on the bench were 
inappropriate, they were used in a private context and did not rise to the level of judicial 
misconduct.  Finally, the master found that the misrepresentations alleged in Count V did not 
warrant action by the JTC.  The JTC concluded that respondent had engaged in judicial 
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as alleged in Counts I through 
III.  With respect to Count V, the JTC did not adopt the master’s findings and found instead that 
respondent had engaged in a pervasive pattern of dishonesty that included lying under oath to the 
commission and to the master.  The JTC recommended that respondent be removed from office, 
conditionally suspended without pay for six years beginning on January 1, 2015 (with the 
suspension becoming effective only if he is reelected to judicial office in November 2014), and 
ordered to pay $11,645.17 in costs. 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice MARKMAN, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices KELLY, 
ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The cumulative effect of respondent’s misconduct required his removal from judicial 
office and imposition of a conditional suspension. 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
 
1.  The evidence established that respondent had a sexual relationship with a complaining 
witness in a case pending before him without recusing himself for several months and engaged in 
numerous ex parte communications with her concerning the case, as well as concerning another 
case in which her uncle was a party.  Respondent violated various courthouse policies by 
permitting Mott to enter the facility through an employee entrance without going through 
security, allowing her to remain alone in his chambers while he was on the bench, arranging for 
her to park her vehicle in an area reserved for judges, and sneaking her cell phone into the 
courthouse for her.  While he was on the bench, respondent sent Mott numerous text messages 
that contained inappropriate and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses 
appearing before him.  Respondent lied about when and why he finally did recuse himself from 
the case in which his mistress was the complaining witness and sought to use the prosecuting 
attorney’s office as leverage against Mott by concocting the stalking and extortion charges.  He 
also lied under oath during the JTC proceedings. 
 
 
2.  Respondent’s actions constituted misconduct in office and conduct clearly prejudicial 
to the administration of justice within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 30 and MCR 9.205.  
He violated MCR 9.104(1) through (4) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the proper 
administration of justice; conduct that exposed the legal profession or the court to obloquy, 
contempt, censure, or reproach; conduct that was contrary to justice, ethics, honesty, or good 
morals; and conduct that violated the standards or rules of professional conduct adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  Respondent violated MCR 2.003 by failing to disqualify himself in the criminal 
cases and violated MCL 750.423 by testifying falsely under oath.  He violated Canon 1 of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to maintain high standards of conduct so that the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.  He violated Canon 2 by failing to avoid all 
impropriety and appearance of impropriety, failing to promote public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary, and allowing a social relationship to influence his judicial 
conduct or judgment.  He violated Canon 3 by failing to be faithful to the law, engaging in ex 
parte communications, and failing to raise the issue of disqualification. 
 
 
3.  In In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), the Supreme Court set forth seven 
considerations to guide the formation of judicial-discipline recommendations.  The JTC properly 
concluded that six of the Brown factors weighed in favor of a more serious sanction.  Removing 
respondent from office and conditionally suspending him without pay for six years beginning on 
January 1, 2015 (with the suspension becoming effective only if respondent is reelected to 
judicial office in November 2014) was necessary to sufficiently redress the harm done to the 
integrity and reputation of the judiciary.  Lying under oath is entirely incompatible with judicial 
office and warrants removal, but respondent did far more than lie under oath and committed most 
of his misconduct while the JTC was investigating him for other misconduct for which he has 
since been sanctioned. 
 
 
4.  Const 1963, art 6, §§ 4 and 30 grant the Supreme Court authority to sanction a judge.  
Section 4 gives the Supreme Court general superintending authority over courts and the power to 
determine that a person is unfit for judicial office and prevent the person from exercising judicial 
power in this state for as long as the person is, in the Court’s judgment, judicially unfit.  Const 
1963, art 6, § 30(2) authorizes removal and suspension as sanctions.  The power to suspend is not 
limited to cases in which the judge currently holds office.  The Supreme Court has constitutional 
authority to issue conditional suspensions that foreclose the exercise of the prerogatives inhering 
in any judicial office to which the disciplined person might be elected or appointed in the future, 
the condition being reelection or appointment to judicial office.  A conditional suspension 
disengages the disciplined person from judicial power only if the person occupies judicial office 
again during the term of the suspension and do not permanently enjoin the person from holding 
judicial office.  The Supreme Court has issued conditional suspensions when other sanctions 
could not fully and adequately address the effect of particular misconduct on the integrity of the 
judicial system.  In this case, removal of respondent alone would be an insufficient sanction.  If 
he were to be reelected in 2014, his total period of suspension would be less than two years 
(including his interim suspension), which would be insufficient given the seriousness of his 
misconduct.   
 
 
5.  Because respondent engaged in conduct involving deceit or intentional 
misrepresentation, he was ordered to pay the JTC costs of $11,645.17 under MCR 9.205(B). 
 
 
Removal from office, conditional suspension, and payment of costs ordered. 
 
 
Justice CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority’s 
factual findings and analysis of the factors from Brown, but disagreed with the decision to 
conditionally suspend respondent.  Const 1963, art 6, § 30 provides four possible sanctions, 
allowing the Supreme Court to censure, suspend with or without salary, retire, or remove a 
judge.  Removal is the most serious sanction and is, therefore, the means by which judges guilty 
of serious misconduct are divested of office.  Because respondent’s misconduct was of a grave 
and serious nature, Justice CAVANAGH agreed with removing respondent from office, but 
disagreed that removal alone would not sufficiently address the seriousness of respondent’s 
conduct.  The majority overlooked the fact that other institutions, such as the press, serve the 
public’s interest in being informed and may be expected to do so in this case.  In any event, the 
Supreme Court always retains the power to determine that a person is unfit for judicial office and 
prevent that person from exercising judicial power in this state for as long as he or she is in the 
Court’s judgment judicially unfit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2014 State of Michigan 
FILED MARCH 26, 2014 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
In re WADE H. McCREE, Judge, Wayne 
Circuit Court 
 
 
No. 146826 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARKMAN, J.  
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) has recommended that respondent, Wayne 
Circuit Judge Wade H. McCree, be removed from office and conditionally suspended 
without pay for six years beginning on January 1, 2015-- with the suspension becoming 
effective only if respondent is reelected to judicial office in November 2014-- and that he 
be ordered to pay costs in the amount of $11,645.17.  Respondent has filed a petition 
asking this Court to reject that recommendation.  We affirm almost all of the JTC’s 
factual findings and conclusions of law, and we adopt its recommendation.  The evidence 
establishes that respondent (a) had a sexual relationship with a complaining witness in a 
case pending before him without recusing himself for several months, (b) engaged in 
numerous ex parte communications with her concerning the case, as well as concerning 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
 
 
2
another case in which one of her relatives was a party, (c) violated various policies of the 
courthouse by permitting his mistress to enter the facility through an employee entrance 
without going through security, allowing her to remain alone in his chambers while he 
was on the bench, arranging for her to park her vehicle in an area reserved for judges, and 
sneaking her cell phone into the courthouse for her, (d) transmitted numerous text 
messages to her while he was on the bench that contained inappropriate and derogatory 
references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses appearing before him, (e) lied about 
when and why he finally did recuse himself from the case in which his mistress was the 
complaining witness, (f) sought to use the prosecuting attorney’s office as leverage 
against his then ex-mistress by concocting charges of stalking and extortion against her, 
and (g) lied under oath during the JTC proceedings.  The cumulative effect of 
respondent’s misconduct convinces this Court that respondent should not remain in 
judicial office, and we therefore remove him from office and conditionally suspend him 
without pay for six years beginning on January 1, 2015, with the suspension becoming 
effective only if respondent is reelected to judicial office in November 2014.  In addition, 
because 
respondent 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
“deceit, 
or 
intentional 
misrepresentation,” pursuant to MCR 9.205(B) we order respondent to pay costs of 
$11,645.17 to the JTC. 
In respondent’s words in his own defense, “Wade should have recused himself,” 
but the failure to do so resulted in “no harm no foul.”  We disagree.  The “harm” done 
was to the parties’ rights to a fair legal process and the public’s right to an impartial 
judiciary, and the “foul” committed was the resulting violation of Michigan’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
 
 
 
3
I.  FACTS AND HISTORY 
On January 7, 2013, pursuant to MCR 9.219(A)(2), the JTC filed a petition for the 
interim suspension without pay of respondent.  By order of February 8, 2013, this Court 
granted the petition, effective immediately.  In re McCree, 493 Mich 935 (2013).1  On 
March 12, 2013, the JTC filed Formal Complaint No. 93 against respondent, alleging five 
counts of misconduct.  It asserted that respondent had engaged in (a) “improper conduct 
[in] People v King” (Wayne Circuit Court Case No. 12-003141-01-FH); (b) the “false 
report of a felony”; (c) “improper conduct [in] People v Tillman” (Wayne Circuit Court 
Case No. 12-000686-01-FH); (d) “improper bench conduct and demeanor”; and (e) 
“misrepresentations to the Commission.”   
With regard to Count I, the complaint alleged that between May and November 
2012, respondent had a sexual relationship with Geniene LaShay Mott, who was the 
complaining witness in People v King.  Robert King, the father of one of Mott’s children, 
was the defendant in that case, which pertained to his failure to pay Mott child support.  
Respondent and Mott repeatedly engaged in ex parte communications about the King 
case.  For example, in response to Mott’s texted suggestion to impose a jail sentence until 
King paid $2,500, respondent texted back: 
I figured if [he] hasn’t come current by his courtdate, he gets jail 2 
pay.  If he says he can bring me the $$, I’ll put him on a tether till he brings 
the receipt 2 FOC or do ‘double time’.[2] 
                                              
1 This Court ordered “respondent’s salary [to] be held in escrow pending the final 
resolution of these disciplinary proceedings.”  McCree, 493 Mich at 935. 
2 Presumably, “FOC” means “Friend of the Court.”  
 
 
 
4
Respondent asked Mott to keep their relationship confidential because of the then-
pending JTC investigation regarding respondent’s previous conduct of having texted a 
photograph of himself without a shirt to a female deputy sheriff and telling a reporter in 
response to questions about his actions that “there is no shame in my game.”3  For 
example, on June 20, 2012, respondent included the following in an email to Mott: 
My Judicial Tenure Commission matter has me nervous, as you 
might expect.  I have to be real careful until this matter is put to rest.  I can 
only ask humbly for your indulgence.  Sorry.  Second, you are the 
complaining witness on a case that is before me.  Naturally if it got out that 
we were seeing each other before your B.D.’s[4] case closed, everybody 
could be in deep shit.[5] 
Respondent did not transfer the King case to another judge until September 18, 2012, at 
which point respondent sent the following text message to Mott: 
DONE DEAL!!!!:-)  I told a story so well, I had me believing it!!  
Brother King is on his way 2 ‘hangin’ Judge [James A.] Callahan.  He fuck 
up ONCE & he’s through!![6] 
With regard to Count II, the complaint alleged that respondent later made a false 
stalking/extortion complaint against Mott with the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney’s 
Office.  He also falsely told the prosecutor’s office that he had transferred the King case 
immediately upon starting his relationship with Mott and that Mott had demanded 
                                              
3 As a result of that JTC investigation, this Court adopted the JTC’s recommendation to 
publicly censure respondent.  In re McCree, 493 Mich 873 (2012). 
4 Presumably, “B.D.” means “baby’s daddy.” 
 
5 This e-mail message demonstrates that respondent was clearly cognizant that he should 
have recused himself from the King case well before he did.   
 
6 This text message appears to suggest that respondent was untruthful about his reasons 
for recusing himself from the King case. 
 
 
 
5
$10,000 in return for terminating her pregnancy and not revealing respondent’s affair 
with her to respondent’s wife.   
With regard to Count III, the complaint alleged that respondent was involved in 
another failure-to-pay-child-support case in which Mott had an interest-- People v 
Tillman.  The defendant in that case was a relative of Mott’s.  Respondent and Mott 
engaged in ex parte communications regarding this case as well.  Off the record, and in 
the absence of any motion being filed, respondent signed an order for the reduction of 
bond relating to Mott’s relative. 
With regard to Count IV, the complaint alleged that respondent transmitted 
numerous text messages to Mott while he was on the bench.  Many of these text 
messages contained inappropriate and sexually explicit comments.  For example, 
respondent texted Mott: 
Oh yeah, I text from the bench.  After last nite, its all I can do not 2 
jerk off ‘under’ the bench:-).  U know U have a magnificent pair of legs! 
Numerous text messages respondent transmitted from the bench contained inappropriate 
and derogatory personal references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses appearing 
before him.  For example, he texted: 
C’mon, U’r talking about the ‘docket from Hell’; filled w/tatted up, 
overweight, half-ass English speaking, gap tooth skank hoes....and then U 
walk N. 
He also texted: 
2 funny, I just had Monica Conyers’[7] nephew B4 me (ignorant 
shit...as usual). 
                                              
7 Monica Conyers is a former Detroit City Council member. 
 
 
 
6
Finally, with regard to Count V, the complaint alleged that respondent made 
several misrepresentations to the JTC.  For example, respondent told the JTC that he had 
irrevocably terminated his relationship with Mott on October 31, 2012, although he 
actually continued his affair with Mott into November 2012.  Respondent also told the 
JTC that he did not take any action on the Tillman case in November 2012, but he 
actually signed an order for reduction of bond in that month.  In addition, respondent told 
the JTC that he did not know of any familial relationship between Tillman and Mott, but 
he did, in fact, know that they were relatives.8 
Also on March 12, 2013, the JTC filed a request for the appointment of a master.  
Three days later, on March 15, 2013, this Court appointed the Honorable Charles A. 
Nelson, a former circuit judge in Jackson County, as the master, and hearings began on 
May 20, 2013, and concluded on May 29, 2013.  On June 23, 2013, the master filed his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with the JTC.   
With regard to Count I, the master found that respondent should have disqualified 
himself from the King case as soon as he started a relationship with Mott and that “[f]or 
McCree to claim in sworn testimony during these proceedings that it was an 
OVERSIGHT or it didn’[t] DAWN on him that he should recuse himself is not credible.  
                                              
8 The complaint also alleged that “[t]he sexual acts between Respondent and Mott took 
place at various locations, including Respondent’s judicial chambers”; “[o]n numerous 
occasions, Respondent escorted Mott into the courthouse through the building’s back 
entrance, reserved for judges, court employees and members of the Wayne County 
Sheriff’s Department”; “[o]n numerous occasions between May and mid-November of 
2012, Respondent permitted Mott to remain in his judicial chambers while he was on the 
bench adjudicating his criminal docket”; and “Respondent assisted Mott in bringing her 
cell phone into his courtroom, in violation of a ‘no cell phones’ security policy of the 
Frank Murphy Hall of Justice.”  
 
 
 
7
In short he lied to the JTC.”  Respondent intentionally used his judicial position to 
advance his own interests by holding on to the King case in order to keep Mott interested 
in him.  According to the master, “He had a hot young lady who was in his words ‘eye 
candy’ and a way to keep her interested was to keep her case and be of assistance in the 
collection of money.”9  Respondent also continuously engaged in ex parte 
communications with Mott about the case, which led her to believe that she could 
influence his judicial decisions.  “Mott was providing input, without objection by 
McCree, as to how King should be dealt with,” and this “social relationship gave Mott 
the belief that she was able to influence his judicial duties.”     
With regard to Count II, the master found that respondent lied to the prosecutor’s 
office when he told them that Mott was stalking him and trying to extort money from him 
and that he had recused himself from the King case when he found out that a child of 
Mott’s had interacted with one of his children.10  “It is clear that he was improperly 
seeking to get the prosecutor and her office involved with alleged crimes that were not 
existent.”11   
                                              
9 The defendant in the King case owed Mott about $15,000 in child support, and the 
master found that “the Examiner’s theory that some of [respondent’s] motivation in 
having looked after this case and transferring it to a judge of his choice so it would ensure 
payment of the support and, thus, take off some of the financial pressure that was 
building for McCree in looking after two families is, by a preponderance, true” as 
respondent had “advanced money to Mott possibly as much as $6,000.” 
10 Respondent also told the prosecutor’s office that there was no way that he could have 
gotten Mott pregnant because he was the “king of latex” and that “Wade was being 
played.” 
11 Although the JTC found that respondent failed to tell the Wayne County Prosecuting 
Attorney that Mott had been a complaining witness in a case before him and that he 
 
 
 
 
8
With regard to Count III, the master found that when respondent signed the order 
reducing Tillman’s bond, he was just “confirming in the order what had already been 
done by [Judge Kevin F.] Robbins.”  However, the master further concluded: 
[Respondent and Mott] were communicating with texts.  He was 
advising what had to be done when the order was signed and how they 
would get Tillman out of jail. 
The main import of the matter to me is that he again had a case in 
which Mott had an interest.  He was ethically not to be involved and should 
not have been signing any orders pertaining to the case.  McCree’s actions 
were beyond an appearance of impropriety - they were in violation of the 
ethical standards.     
With regard to Count IV, the master found that although many of the text 
messages that respondent sent while he was on the bench were inappropriate, they were 
“used in a private context and when used there was no reason to believe that the 
statements would become public”12 and “[t]he fact that he may have sent some messages 
                                              
falsely told the investigators that he had immediately recused himself from the case once 
he realized the conflict, the JTC did not otherwise address Count II.  We agree with the 
master that respondent’s claims regarding stalking and extortion are not credible given 
the communications between respondent and Mott during this period.  For example, on 
November 6, 2012, which according to respondent was during the period that Mott was 
stalking and extorting him, Mott sent the following text message to McCree: “being held 
in ur arms this afternoon meant so much to me[.]”  In addition, although there is evidence 
of numerous communications between respondent and Mott during this period, none of 
the communications in any way suggest that Mott was stalking or extorting respondent.  
For instance, none of the messages refers to Mott’s alleged demand for $10,000 in order 
to keep their affair a secret and obtain an abortion. 
12 This finding seems to be inconsistent with the master’s earlier finding that “[o]f all 
people who should have known how allegedly private matters (the photo to the deputy) 
can get into the public domain it would be McCree.” 
 
 
 
9
from the bench (as in Tillman) does not mean that he was not performing as a judge.”  
Therefore, the master concluded that 
[t]here is no showing that the sending of the texts in any way interfered 
with his duties as a judge.  I do not believe that this count rises to the level 
of judicial misconduct.[13] 
Finally, with regard to Count V, the master found that respondent did not falsely 
tell the JTC that he had irrevocably terminated his relationship with Mott on October 31, 
2012, because “there is no indication that a sexual relationship continued after that 
date.”14  And although respondent lied to the JTC about not knowing that Mott and 
                                              
13 Although the JTC, for reasons not known, did not address Count IV, we feel compelled 
to note that we respectfully disagree with the master’s conclusion that respondent’s 
transmission of numerous text messages to Mott while he was on the bench that 
contained inappropriate and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses 
appearing before him did not constitute judicial misconduct.  Canon 2 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part: 
A. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or 
improper conduct by judges.  A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety.  A judge must expect to be the subject of 
constant public scrutiny.  A judge must therefore accept restrictions on 
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and 
should do so freely and willingly. 
B. A judge should respect and observe the law.  At all times, the 
conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  Without regard to a person’s 
race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat 
every person fairly, with courtesy and respect. 
It can fairly be said that at least several of respondent’s text messages to Mott did not 
“promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and did not 
treat the subjects of those messages with “courtesy and respect.” 
14 To the contrary, we find that the evidence does indicate that respondent lied to the JTC 
about irrevocably terminating his relationship with Mott on October 31, 2012, because 
 
 
 
 
10
Tillman were relatives and not taking any action on the Tillman case, this “does not 
appear to be a material misrepresentation as the Examiner had all of the texts and had an 
accurate picture when the answer was filed.”15  Therefore, the master concluded that 
“these allegations are not such as to warrant action by the JTC.”  In conclusion, the 
master stated: 
In final summary there is Shame in the McCree game: shame to the 
good name of McCree and shame brought upon the judiciary of the State of 
Michigan.[16] 
                                              
there is evidence of communications between respondent and Mott after October 31, 
2010, that indicate that they were still romantically involved.  For example, on 
November 6, 2012, Mott sent the following text message to McCree, “being held in ur 
arms this afternoon meant so much to me” and, on November 8, 2012, respondent sent 
the following text message to Mott, “I’ll C U 2morrow, & WE’LL ‘HAVE FUN”:-)”  We 
note that this finding is consistent with the JTC’s finding that “Respondent’s relationship 
with Mott began on May 21, 2012, and lasted approximately through mid-November, 
2012.” 
15 Contrary to the master’s conclusion, whether the JTC had sufficient evidence before it 
to know that respondent was lying when he said that he did not know that Mott and 
Tillman were relatives and that he did not take any action on the Tillman case is 
irrelevant to whether respondent committed judicial misconduct when he lied to the JTC.  
Lying to the JTC is judicial misconduct regardless of whether the JTC knows that you are 
lying or not. 
16 The master made the following additional findings of fact: (1) respondent and Mott had 
sexual relations in respondent’s judicial chambers; (2) “Mott was allowed on a number of 
occasions to use the judicial parking lot and to use the judges’ entry door”; (3) “McCree 
assisted Mott in bringing a cell phone into court so that she could communicate with him 
while King’s case was reviewed” and “[t]his was accomplished by Mott putting her cell 
phone in McCree’s truck, him bringing it into the court-house and then McCree putting it 
into an envelope so that a deputy could deliver it to Mott in the courtroom”; (4) Mott told 
McCree that she was pregnant with his child; (5) McCree told Mott that he would divorce 
his wife if Mott obtained an abortion; and (6) Mott told McCree that she would obtain an 
abortion if he divorced his wife.  Finally, the master noted: 
 
 
 
 
11
The JTC then held a hearing on August 5, 2013, and issued its decision and 
recommendation for discipline on September 10, 2013.  With regard to Count I, the JTC 
found that respondent had a sexual affair with Mott, who was a complaining witness in a 
case before him, and that respondent regularly engaged in ex parte communications with 
Mott regarding the case, even while he was sitting on the bench.  For example, 
respondent and Mott exchanged the following text messages regarding the case: 
Mott: Just keep in mind thur ill be in ur courtroom & need 2 bring in 
my phone so I can text U what I want done incase he makes payment that 
morning....... otherwise lock his ass up until he pays 2500 in cash directly 2 
me via FOC... u seem 2 always call his case last so ill show up late & we 
can leave 2gether. 
Respondent: Likewise, my truck will B unlocked so U can set 
anything out of sight N my car.  We’ll hold the case till U get there, or B 
sure 2 call Sharon Grier ahead of time so she’ll know U (the ‘C.P.’)[17] will 
B N the courtroom.  I figured if [he] hasn’t come current by his courtdate, 
he gets jail 2 pay.  If he says he can bring me the $$, I’ll put him on a tether 
till he brings the receipt 2 FOC or do ‘double time’. 
Mott: Huh???  Teether?  4 how long and how much?? 
*   *   * 
Respondent: Oooops, did I misspell ‘tether’.  No, some guys say if 
they get locked up they can’t bring the $$, but if let out they can.  So here’s 
the deal: go 2 jail (150 days), release upon payment of $1500.  OR, get a 
tether & bring back w/n 30 days $2500 or serve 9 months!  BONUS: pay 
w/n the 30 days, remove tether 
                                              
Whether Mott is pregnant or not and who is the baby’s father are not 
of concern, we leave that for the Jerry Springer show.  But the events over 
the October 30 through late November period show a pattern of lies and 
deception by McCree in his dealings with Mott (not to say that she was an 
innocent party in those events).   
17 Presumably, “C.P.” means “complaining party.” 
 
 
 
12
*   *   * 
Mott: He’s about 15k behind... 2500 is asking much plus YOU only 
ordered him 2 pay $50 bucks a month towards arrage . .@ that rate ill be 
getting CS[18] til Racheal is 26 
*   *   * 
Respondent: OK, the math will be based on his failures since being 
placed on probation, but if U’r righ the threat of jail will loosen his purse 
strings! 
Mott: ok so let’s go with what u proposed..... go to jail (150 days), 
release upon payment of $1500.  OR, get a tether & bring back w/n 30 days 
$2500 or serve 9 months!  BONUS: pay w/n 30 days, remove tether 
Mott: He will pay cause they won’t let him go 2 jail PLUS u sending 
him 2 jail would violate his oakland county probation and he gets 10yrs. 
Respondent: Cool.  I’ll run it by the prosecutor.  
Mott: Make sure she’s aware they already let him off by accepting 
400 for probation when they told him 1000 
*   *   * 
Respondent: Will do.  That’s good 2 know. 
Then, on the morning of the review hearing in the King case, respondent and Mott 
exchanged the following text messages: 
Respondent: I think Ur B.D. is here!! 
Mott: Did the prosecuter agree wit our deal since she cut him a break 
.last time?? 
Respondent: Look 4 ‘my girl’ Sharon Grier, she’s our prosecutor & 
she’s been ‘prepped’.   
                                              
18 Presumably, “C.S.” means “child support.” 
 
 
 
13
With regard to Count II, the JTC found that “Respondent reported to Wayne 
County Prosecuting Attorney Kym Worthy that he was being stalked and extorted by 
Mott,” but “Respondent did not tell Worthy that Mott had been a complainant in a case 
before him.”  In addition, “[w]hile Respondent did tell Worthy’s investigators that Mott 
had been a complainant in a case before him, he falsely told the investigators that he 
immediately recused himself from the case once he realized the conflict.”        
With regard to Count III, the JTC found that “Respondent’s ex parte 
communications with Mott regarding People v Tillman and Respondent’s failure to 
immediately recuse himself from People v Tillman upon learning that Tillman was Mott’s 
relative constituted judicial misconduct.” 
Finally, with regard to Count V,19 the JTC found that “Respondent engaged in a 
pervasive pattern of dishonesty that included lying under oath to the Commission and to 
the Master.”  For example, respondent testified that it did not “dawn” on him to recuse 
himself from the King case and that his failure to recuse himself was a mere “oversight.”  
However, his e-mails and text messages to Mott reveal otherwise.  Indeed, they reveal 
that respondent knew very early on that what he was doing was wrong and that he would 
be in serious trouble if anybody found out.  For example, in one e-mail he said: 
Second, you are the complaining witness on a case that is before me.  
Naturally if it got out that we were seeing each other before your B.D.’s 
case closed, everybody could be in deep shit. 
And in a text message, he said: 
                                              
19 As discussed earlier, the JTC did not address Count IV. 
 
 
 
14
Yeah, I’m DEEPLY concerned that certain levels of ‘us’ remain 
COMPLETELY UNDETECTED as long as U’r still a litigant N case B4 
me & while my nuts R still on a chopping block B4 the JTC.[20]  
The JTC finally concluded that “[a] preponderance of the evidence at the formal 
hearing shows that Respondent breached the standards of judicial conduct . . . .”  More 
specifically, the JTC concluded that respondent engaged in “[m]isconduct in office . . . 
[and] [c]onduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the 
Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30 and MCR 9.205” and 
violated MCR 9.104(1), (2), (3), and (4); MCR 2.003; MCR 2.103; MCR 2.114; and 
MCL 750.423, as well as Canons 1; 2(A), (B), and (C); and 3(A)(1) and (4) and (C) of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct.   
In determining an appropriate sanction, the JTC considered the factors that this 
Court set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293; 625 NW2d 744 (2000).  
Finding that respondent’s misconduct implicated six of the seven Brown factors and that 
his “misconduct affected not only the litigants in the King and Tillman cases, but harmed 
the integrity of the judicial system as a whole,” the JTC recommended that respondent be 
removed from office and conditionally suspended without pay for six years beginning on 
January 1, 2015, with the suspension becoming effective only if respondent is reelected 
                                              
20 The JTC also found that  
[d]uring his relationship with Mott, Respondent used his chambers to 
engage in sexual intercourse with Mott, permitted Mott to enter the 
courthouse through an employee entrance without going through security, 
allowed Mott to remain alone in his chambers while he was on the bench, 
arranged for Mott to park her vehicle in an area reserved for judges, and 
brought Mott’s cell phone into the courthouse for her, in violation of the 
court’s security policy, so that she could communicate with him while he 
was on the bench. 
 
 
 
15
to judicial office in November 2014, and that he be ordered to pay costs in the amount of 
$11,645.17.21   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo the JTC’s factual findings, conclusions of law, and 
disciplinary recommendations.  In re James, 492 Mich 553, 560; 821 NW2d 144 (2012); 
In re Halloran, 466 Mich 1219, 1219; 647 NW2d 505 (2002).  “Findings of misconduct 
must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”  In re Haley, 476 Mich 180, 189; 
720 NW2d 246 (2006).  MCR 9.225 provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall review the 
record of the proceedings and file a written opinion and judgment, which may accept or 
reject the recommendations of the commission, or modify the recommendations by 
imposing a greater, lesser, or entirely different sanction.”  “Although we review the 
JTC’s recommendations de novo, this Court generally will defer to the JTC’s 
recommendations when they are adequately supported.”  Haley, 476 Mich at 189.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  FACTUAL FINDINGS 
After reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, we agree with and adopt 
almost all the factual findings of the JTC.  Indeed, most of the JTC’s factual findings are 
                                              
21 MCR 9.205(B) provides: 
In addition to any other sanction imposed, a judge may be ordered to 
pay the costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the commission in prosecuting 
the complaint only if the judge engaged in conduct involving fraud, deceit, 
or intentional misrepresentation, or if the judge made misleading statements 
to the commission, the commission’s investigators, the master, or the 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
16
not even in dispute.  That is, respondent does not dispute that he engaged in a sexual 
relationship with Mott, who was a complaining witness in a case before him, and that he 
regularly engaged in ex parte communications with Mott regarding the case.22  
Respondent also does not dispute that when he told the Wayne County Prosecuting 
Attorney that he was being stalked and extorted by Mott, he did not tell the prosecutor 
that Mott had been a complainant in a case before him; that he falsely told investigators 
that he had immediately recused himself from the case once he realized the conflict;23 
that he knew that the defendant in the Tillman case was one of Mott’s relatives; that he 
engaged in ex parte communications with Mott about the Tillman case; and that he signed 
an order in the Tillman case.  Finally, respondent does not dispute that he testified that it 
did not “dawn” on him to recuse himself from the King case and that his failure to recuse 
himself was a mere “oversight,” nor does he dispute that his e-mails and text messages to 
Mott reveal that he had given thought to his obligation to recuse himself from the case 
long before he finally did so.  Although respondent argues about the significance of some 
                                              
22 Respondent also does not dispute that he and Mott had sexual intercourse in his judicial 
chambers, that he permitted Mott to enter the courthouse through an employee entrance 
without going through security, that he allowed Mott to remain alone in his chambers 
while he was on the bench, that he arranged for Mott to park her vehicle in an area 
reserved for judges, and that he brought Mott’s cell phone into the courthouse for her, in 
violation of the court’s security policy, so that they could communicate with one another 
while he was on the bench. 
23 Although in his brief respondent’s counsel questions why respondent would lie about 
when he recused himself from the case, he does not expressly assert that respondent did 
not tell the investigators that he had immediately recused himself, but instead argues that 
“[w]hether Judge McCree told the investigators that he ‘immediately’ recused himself 
once he realized the conflict is irrelevant . . . .” 
 
 
 
17
of these facts and what the appropriate sanction should be in light of them, he does not 
dispute the above facts.24 
In addition to the factual findings that we adopt from the JTC, we also find that 
respondent lied to the prosecutor’s office about Mott stalking and extorting him and 
about why he eventually recused himself in the King case.  In addition, we find that 
respondent lied to the JTC about irrevocably terminating his relationship with Mott on 
October 31, 2012, and about whether he knew that Mott and Tillman were related and 
whether he took any action in the Tillman case.  Finally, we find that respondent sent 
numerous text messages to Mott while he was on the bench that contained inappropriate 
and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses appearing before him.25   
                                              
24 The JTC also found that (a) “[o]n August 17, 2012, Respondent called the office of 
Wayne Circuit Judge Susan Borman to check on a landlord-tenant matter Mott had before 
Judge Borman” and (b) “[o]n October 11, 2012, in violation of MCR 2.114, Respondent 
prepared and filed a divorce complaint against his wife even though, as he admitted at the 
formal hearing, he had no intention of going through with the divorce.”  Respondent 
argues that “[b]ecause the JTC failed to give Judge McCree notice and an opportunity to 
respond to allegations concerning the phone call and filing the divorce complaint, they 
cannot be considered as a basis for discipline.”  Because we conclude that the JTC’s 
recommended sanction is appropriate even without considering these additional 
allegations, it is not necessary for us to address whether it was appropriate for the JTC in 
this matter to consider the uncharged conduct. 
25 Although we agree with the examiner that “[m]any of these text messages are in clear 
violation of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct,” we question the examiner’s 
authority to argue before this Court that we should consider this misconduct when the 
JTC itself did not consider this misconduct.  As this Court recently stated in In re Adams, 
494 Mich 162, 186 n 19; 833 NW2d 897 (2013), “after the JTC has made its findings and 
its recommendation and the respondent has filed a petition to reject or modify the [JTC’s] 
recommendation, the role of the examiner is to represent the JTC before this Court.”  See 
also MCR 9.202(G)(1) (“The commission shall employ an executive director . . . to 
perform the duties that the commission directs . . . .”) and MCR 9.202(G)(2)(a) (“The 
executive director . . . shall not be present during the deliberations of the commission or 
 
 
 
 
18
Although we believe that the sanctions recommended by the JTC, and adopted by 
this Court today, would be warranted even without considering these additional findings 
of fact, we believe that these additional findings provide relevant background and context 
and demonstrate more fully the nature and magnitude of respondent’s misconduct.  
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that, unlike the additional findings of fact made 
by the JTC and discussed in note 24 of this opinion, the additional findings of this Court 
do not relate to uncharged conduct, and thus respondent does not argue that we cannot 
consider these additional allegations. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The JTC concluded that respondent engaged in “[m]isconduct in office . . . [and] 
[c]onduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the Michigan 
Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30 and MCR 9.205” and violated 
MCR 9.104(1), (2), (3), and (4); MCR 2.003; MCR 2.103; MCR 2.114; and MCL 
750.423, as well as Canons 1; 2(A), (B), and (C); and 3(A)(1) and (4) and (C) of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct.  After reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, we agree 
with and adopt almost all of the JTC’s conclusions of law.  We agree with the JTC that 
respondent engaged in misconduct in office and conduct clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 30 and MCR 9.205.  
                                              
participate in any other manner in the decision to file formal charges or to recommend 
action by the Supreme Court . . . .”).  It does not appear that the examiner was 
“represent[ing] the JTC before this Court” when he argued that we should find that 
respondent committed misconduct by sending these inappropriate messages to Mott when 
the JTC itself did not make such a finding. 
 
 
 
19
More specifically, we agree that respondent violated MCR 9.104(1) through (4) by 
engaging in “conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice”; “conduct that 
exposes the legal profession or the court to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach”; 
“conduct that is contrary to justice, ethics, honesty, or good morals”; and “conduct that 
violates the standards or rules of professional conduct adopted by the Supreme Court[.]”  
He violated MCR 2.003 by failing to disqualify himself in both the King and Tillman 
cases.26  He violated MCL 750.423 by testifying falsely under oath.  He violated Canon 1 
by failing to maintain “high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence 
of the judiciary may be preserved.”27  He violated Canon 2 by failing to “avoid all 
impropriety and appearance of impropriety,” failing to “promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” and allowing a social relationship “to 
influence judicial conduct or judgment.”28  Finally, we agree that respondent violated 
                                              
26 The fact that respondent was aware that the defendant in the Tillman case was Mott’s 
relative and that he nonetheless engaged in ex parte communications with Mott about the 
case without recusing himself at the very least created an appearance of impropriety. 
27 Canon 1 provides: 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in 
our society.  A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and 
enforcing, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.  A judge 
should always be aware that the judicial system is for the benefit of the 
litigant and the public, not the judiciary.  The provisions of this code should 
be construed and applied to further those objectives. 
28 Canon 2 provides, in pertinent part: 
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All Activities 
 
 
 
 
20
Canon 329 by failing to “be faithful to the law,” engaging in ex parte communications, 
and failing to “raise the issue of disqualification.”30      
                                              
A.  Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or 
improper conduct by judges.  A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety.  A judge must expect to be the subject of 
constant public scrutiny.  A judge must therefore accept restrictions on 
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and 
should do so freely and willingly. 
B.  A judge should respect and observe the law.  At all times, the 
conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  Without regard to a person’s 
race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat 
every person fairly, with courtesy and respect. 
C.  A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to 
influence judicial conduct or judgment.  A judge should not use the prestige 
of office to advance personal business interests or those of others, but 
participation in activities allowed in Canon 4 is not a violation of this 
principle. 
29 Canon 3 provides, in pertinent part: 
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of Office Impartially and 
Diligently 
*   *   * 
A.  Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1)  A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it.  A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, public 
clamor, or fear of criticism. 
*   *   * 
(4)  A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding . . . . 
 
 
 
 
21
C.  SANCTIONS 
The purpose of the judicial disciplinary process is to “protect the people from 
corruption and abuse on the part of those who wield judicial power.”  In re Jenkins, 437 
Mich 15, 28; 465 NW2d 317 (1991).  “In determining appropriate sanctions, we seek to 
‘restore and maintain the dignity and impartiality of the judiciary and to protect the 
public.’ ”  James, 492 Mich at 569, quoting In re Ferrara, 458 Mich 350, 372; 582 
NW2d 817 (1998).  We agree with the JTC’s assessment of the Brown factors-- the 
considerations that this Court set forth to guide the formation of judicial-discipline 
recommendations.   
The first Brown factor states that “misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is 
more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct[.]”  Brown, 461 Mich at 1292.31  
We agree with the JTC that respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct when he 
maintained a sexual relationship with a complaining witness in a case before him for 
several months and repeatedly engaged in ex parte communications with her about the 
case as well as in another case in which her relative was a party.  Respondent also 
                                              
*   *   * 
C.  Disqualification.  A judge should raise the issue of 
disqualification whenever the judge has cause to believe that grounds for 
disqualification may exist under MCR 2.003(B).                
 
30 Given that we do not address the uncharged allegations, see note 24 of this opinion, we 
do not address the JTC’s conclusions of law that pertain to the uncharged allegations, i.e., 
the JTC’s conclusion that respondent violated MCR 2.103 and MCR 2.114. 
31 The Brown factors are nonexclusive and are prefaced by the language “everything else 
being equal[.]”  Brown, 461 Mich at 1292.  Respondent admits that consideration of the 
first Brown factor “indicates more serious misconduct.” 
 
 
 
22
engaged in a pattern of texting messages to Mott while he was on the bench that 
contained inappropriate and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses 
appearing before him.  Furthermore, respondent engaged in a practice of violating various 
security policies of the courthouse by permitting Mott to enter the courthouse through an 
employee entrance without going through security, allowing Mott to remain alone in his 
chambers while he was on the bench, arranging for Mott to park her vehicle in an area 
reserved for judges, and sneaking Mott’s cell phone into the courthouse for her.    
Finally, as the JTC explained, “the evidence revealed a pattern of dishonesty that 
included lying under oath to the Commission and to the Master.”  Respondent lied to the 
Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney’s office about, among other things, when and why 
he recused himself from the King case, and he lied to the JTC and the master about, 
among other things, why it took him so long to finally recuse himself from the King case.  
As the master explained:   
For McCree to claim in sworn testimony during these proceedings 
that it was an OVERSIGHT or it didn’[t] DAWN on him that he should 
recuse himself is not credible.  In short he lied to the JTC. . . .[32] 
*   *   * 
                                              
32 As then Justice YOUNG explained in In re Noecker: 
Where a respondent judge readily acknowledges his [or her] 
shortcomings and is completely honest and forthcoming during the course 
of the Judicial Tenure Commission investigation, . . . the sanction 
correspondingly can be less severe.  However, where a respondent is not 
repentant, but engages in deceitful behavior during the course of a Judicial 
Tenure Commission disciplinary investigation, the sanction must be 
measurably greater.  [In re Noecker, 472 Mich 1, 18; 691 NW2d 440 (2005) 
(YOUNG, J., concurring).]     
 
 
 
23
McCree’s problem with the truth is also shown in his contact with 
law enforcement officials in seeking to have pressure brought to bear on 
Mott.  He told Prosecutor Worthy that a lady with whom he had a 
relationship was stalking him.  There was no indication [made to Worthy] 
that he and his wife had been engaged in a plan of deception which resulted 
in continuing contacts between the parties, i.e., calls to secure the abortion, 
to complete negotiations for the divorce, etc. . . . 
He told [investigator] Robert Donaldson that he had recused himself 
from the King case when he found out that a child of Mott’s had interacted 
with one of his children.  A lie. 
He told Detective Timothy Matlock that Mott had been stalking him 
by showing up at Belle Isle.  He did not tell [him] that he got in the car and 
had a conversation with her.  He was also a witness to the statement as to 
the basis for the transfer of the case which was a lie. 
Sharon Greer, the prosecutor who worked in McCree’s courtroom, 
was also told the same lie as to the basis for the transfer of the King case. 
. . . [T]he events over the October 30 through late November period 
show a pattern of lies and deception by McCree . . . . 
As explained by the JTC, respondent also “falsely told the investigators that he 
immediately recused himself from the case once he realized the conflict.”  Respondent’s 
pattern of dishonesty is perhaps best summed up in a text message from Mott to 
respondent: “guess I shoulda believd u in church when u said u can’t go 1 day without 
lien[.]”  For all these reasons, we agree with the JTC that “[t]his factor weighs in favor of 
a more serious sanction.” 
The second Brown factor states that “misconduct on the bench is usually more 
serious than the same misconduct off the bench[.]”  Id.33  Again, we agree with the JTC 
that respondent engaged in misconduct on the bench when he had a sexual relationship 
                                              
33 Respondent “admits that his decision to go forward with the August 16 hearing in King 
was misconduct on the bench.” 
 
 
 
24
with a complaining witness in a case before him for several months without recusing 
himself and by engaging in ex parte communications with her about the case while he 
was on the bench.  We also find that respondent engaged in misconduct on the bench 
when he transmitted numerous text messages to Mott while he was on the bench that 
contained inappropriate and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses 
appearing before him.  For these reasons, we agree with the JTC that this factor weighs in 
favor of a more serious sanction.   
The third Brown factor states that “misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual 
administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the 
appearance of propriety[.]”  Id. at 1293.  As the JTC explained: 
A neutral and impartial judge is one of the central tenets of our 
judicial system.  Respondent wholly disregarded his duty to remain a 
detached, impartial figure by engaging in a personal relationship with a 
litigant in a case before him and by regularly engaging in ex parte 
discussions regarding the litigant’s case, as well as another case in which 
the litigant had an interest.  In addition, Respondent’s misrepresentations to 
the Commission and the Master were prejudicial to the actual 
administration of justice because they brought deceptive evidence before 
the Commission and the Master. 
We agree with the JTC that respondent’s misconduct was prejudicial to the actual 
administration of justice.  Indeed, there is not much, if anything, that is more prejudicial 
to the actual administration of justice than having a sexual relationship with a 
complaining witness without recusing oneself, engaging in ex parte communications with 
this mistress/complaining witness, attempting to use the prosecutor’s office as leverage 
against this now ex-mistress by concocting charges of stalking and extortion against her, 
 
 
 
25
and then lying under oath about these matters.34  Accordingly, we agree with the JTC that 
this factor weighs in favor of a more serious sanction.     
Similarly, the fourth Brown factor states that “misconduct that does not implicate 
the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than 
misconduct that does[.]”  Id.35  For the reasons already discussed, we agree with the JTC 
that respondent’s misconduct implicated the actual administration of justice.  Therefore, 
we agree with the JTC that this factor supports the imposition of a more serious sanction.   
The fifth Brown factor states that “misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less 
serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated[.]”  Id.36  We agree with the 
JTC that respondent’s misconduct was premeditated or deliberated.  Respondent’s sexual 
affair with Mott lasted for several months, giving respondent more than sufficient time to 
carefully reflect on his behavior.  In addition, his e-mails and text messages to Mott 
                                              
34 Respondent argues that his “failure to recuse himself in King is ‘prejudicial only to the 
appearance of propriety’ ” because “King was treated exactly the same as any other 
felony nonsupport defendant who fails to meet his payment obligations under a delayed 
sentence agreement . . . .”  No one, of course, can ever know with certainty whether 
respondent would have treated King in exactly the same manner had he not been engaged 
in an affair with the mother of King’s child.  However, even assuming that respondent’s 
relationship with Mott, including his ex parte communications with her about the case, 
had no effect on respondent’s treatment of King, and thus was somehow not prejudicial 
to the actual administration of justice, respondent’s other misconduct, including lying 
under oath and falsely accusing Mott of stalking and extorting him, was certainly 
prejudicial to the actual administration of justice. 
35 Respondent “admits that his failure to recuse himself before the August 16 hearing in 
King implicates the appearance of impropriety.” 
36 Respondent admits that his “failure to recuse himself in King cannot be considered 
‘spontaneous.’ ” 
 
 
 
26
demonstrate that he was well aware that what he was doing was unethical, and yet he 
continued to proceed with the relationship for a considerable period of time without 
recusing himself from the case in which his mistress was the complaining witness.  
Accordingly, we agree with the JTC that this factor weighs in favor of a more serious 
sanction.       
The sixth Brown factor states that “misconduct that undermines the ability of the 
justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach 
the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays 
such discovery[.]”  Id.  Lying under oath-- conduct in which respondent engaged-- is 
certainly “misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the 
truth of what occurred in a legal controversy.”  In addition, failing to recuse oneself from 
a case in which one’s mistress is the complaining witness, as respondent did in this case, 
is also misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system “to reach the most 
just result in such a case.”  As the JTC explained:  
[T]he ability of the justice system to reach the most just result in a 
case is undermined when one party has an intimate relationship with the 
judge and continually engages in ex parte communications regarding that 
party’s case while the other party is required to follow the rules and 
procedures governing the admission of evidence and the making of 
arguments to the court.   
Therefore, we agree with the JTC that this factor weighs in favor of a more serious 
sanction.   
Finally, the seventh Brown factor states that “misconduct that involves the unequal 
application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic 
background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not 
 
 
 
27
disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.”  Id.  We agree 
with the JTC that there is no evidence that respondent did anything to “disparage the 
integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship” and that this factor does not 
weigh in favor of a more serious sanction.   
Finding that six of the Brown factors weigh in favor of a more serious sanction, 
and that “Respondent’s misconduct affected not only the litigants in the King and Tillman 
cases, but harmed the integrity of the judicial system as a whole,” the JTC concluded that 
removing respondent from office and conditionally suspending him without pay for six 
years beginning on January 1, 2015, with the suspension becoming effective only if 
respondent is reelected to judicial office in November 2014, would be a sufficient 
sanction.37  We agree.  We believe that this sanction is necessary in order to sufficiently 
redress the harm done to the integrity and reputation of the judiciary.   
                                              
37 Respondent agrees “that discipline is warranted,” and he concedes that four of the 
Brown factors weigh in favor of a more serious sanction.  However, he argues that this 
Court should merely “suspend[] him for the duration of his interim suspension.”  For the 
reasons discussed throughout this opinion, we do not believe that such a suspension, 
which would amount to a little over a one-year suspension, would sufficiently address the 
harm that respondent has done to the integrity and reputation of the judiciary.  
Respondent argues that his misconduct is analogous to Judge Susan R. Chrzanowski’s 
misconduct and that Judge Chrzanowski was only suspended for 1 year and was given 
credit for 6 months of her 17-month interim suspension.  See In re Chrzanowski, 465 
Mich 468, 489; 636 NW2d 758 (2001).  However, respondent fails to acknowledge that 
his misconduct was far more extensive than Judge Chrzanowski’s misconduct.  Judge 
Chrzanowski appointed an attorney with whom she was having an affair to represent 
indigent defendants, presided over those cases without disclosing this relationship, and 
initially made false statements to the police who were investigating the death of this 
attorney’s wife.  Although there are some similarities between Judge Chrzanowski’s and 
respondent’s misconduct, respondent did far more than have an affair with an interested 
person in a case pending before him and then initially lie about it.  He also engaged in 
numerous ex parte communications, violated various security policies of the courthouse, 
 
 
 
 
28
Just last term, this Court held that lying under oath “ ‘is entirely incompatible with 
judicial office and warrants removal.’ ”  In re Adams, 494 Mich 162, 184-185; 833 
NW2d 897 (2013), quoting In re Justin, 490 Mich 394, 419; 809 NW2d 126 (2012).38  In 
the instant case, as already set forth at length, respondent has done far more than lie under 
oath.  And he committed most of this misconduct while being investigated by the JTC for 
other misconduct for which he has since been sanctioned.  As explained by the master: 
[Respondent’s] actions in the King case show, however, a gross 
dereliction of judicial duties.  His standard of conduct, for his own sexual 
gratification, has severely damaged the public’s view of the judiciary.  His 
irresponsible conduct could only lead to the public having no confidence in 
the judiciary.  He clearly knew he was especially subject to public scrutiny 
when he had a case pending before the JTC when he began his escapade 
with Mott.  He knew he was on the “chopping block”.  Yet he continued to 
engage in activities which would bring even greater scrutiny.  He was using 
his judicial position to advance his own interests by keeping the King case.  
His social relationship gave Mott the belief that she was able to influence 
his judicial duties.  He continuously engaged in ex [parte] communications 
with Mott about the case. 
Having already received substantial publicity over his photo sent to 
the deputy and his remarks to the press regarding same he should have been 
aware that when the story would break about his relationship with Mott and 
his handling of the King case all of his duplicity would be revealed.  That 
the public’s trust in an independent and honorable judiciary would be put to 
the test.   
                                              
transmitted numerous inappropriate text messages, concocted charges of stalking and 
extortion, and lied under oath during the JTC proceedings. 
38 As this Court explained in Adams, 494 Mich at 186, “[t]his Court has consistently 
imposed the most severe sanction by removing judges for testifying falsely under oath.”  
See In re Ryman, 394 Mich 637, 642-643; 232 NW2d 178 (1975); In re Loyd, 424 Mich 
514, 516, 535-536; 384 NW2d 9 (1986); Ferrara, 458 Mich at 372-373; In re Noecker, 
472 Mich 1, 12-13; 691 NW2d 440 (2005); In re Nettles-Nickerson, 481 Mich 321, 322-
323; 750 NW2d 560 (2008); Justin, 490 Mich at 396-397; James, 492 Mich at 568-570. 
 
 
 
29
That respondent was prepared to engage in this conduct while already undergoing a 
pending JTC investigation demonstrates the extent of his disregard for the rules of 
judicial conduct.  The people of this state need to know that this Court will not tolerate 
such disregard for even minimal ethical standards of conduct.   
Respondent questions this Court’s authority to remove him and conditionally 
suspend him.  This Court’s authority to sanction a judge can be found in Const 1963, art 
6, §§ 4 and 30.  Section 4 provides this Court’s general superintending authority over 
courts: 
The supreme court shall have general superintending control over all 
courts; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; 
and appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the supreme court.  The 
supreme court shall not have the power to remove a judge. 
As this Court has explained: 
“The power of superintending control is an extraordinary power.  It 
is hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise.  It is so general 
and comprehensive that its complete and full extent and use have 
practically hitherto not been fully and completely known and exemplified.  
It is unlimited, being bounded only by the exigencies which call for its 
exercise.  As new instances of these occur, it will be found able to cope 
with them.  Moreover, if required, the tribunals having authority to exercise 
it will, by virtue of it, possess the power to invent, frame, and formulate 
new and additional means, writs, and processes whereby it may be exerted.  
This power is not limited by forms of procedure or by the writ used for its 
exercise.”  [In re Huff, 352 Mich 402, 418; 91 NW2d 613 (1958) (citation 
omitted).] 
While “§ 4 does not comprehend the power to permanently enjoin a person from holding 
juridical office,” it does “invest[] this Court with the power to determine that a person is 
unfit for judicial office and to prevent him from ever exercising judicial power in this 
 
 
 
30
state for as long as he is, in our judgment, judicially unfit.”  In re Probert, 411 Mich 210, 
231, 233; 308 NW2d 773 (1981).39   
In addition, Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
On recommendation of the judicial tenure commission, the supreme 
court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge 
for conviction of a felony, physical or mental disability which prevents the 
performance of judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent failure to 
                                              
39 Contrary to respondent’s contention, this Court’s exercise of the superintending power 
is not impermissibly “at odds with the right of Michigan voters to choose their judicial 
officers,” but rather upholds the authority of that same people, as they have exercised it in 
Const 1963, art 6, to invest in this Court the obligation to define standards of judicial 
conduct and, in coordination with the JTC, impose sanctions for their violation.  Just as 
the people have chosen in their Constitution to establish standards of judicial fitness in 
terms of legal experience and age maximums, Const 1963, art 6, § 19(2) and (3), “we the 
people” have chosen to do the same with regard to ethical standards of conduct:   
[T]he elective nature of the judicial office does not relieve this Court 
of its duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary, nor does the fact of 
popular election insulate or immunize a judge from the consequences of his 
or her misconduct, any more than an elected public official is insulated or 
immunized by election to office from being held to account for criminal 
law violations.  To be sure, the elective power of the people does include 
the responsibility to ensure the qualifications of those elected, but they do 
not bear this responsibility alone.  Our Constitution provides that in 
addition to this responsibility on the part of the electorate, this Court has a 
separate and distinct duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary.  The 
people’s discharge of their duty through election does not discharge this 
Court’s separate duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.  Rather, this 
Court’s obligation to maintain the integrity of the judicial branch is 
indissoluble, and the fact of election does not dispel the harmful effects of 
judicial misconduct, either within or beyond the boundaries of the election 
district.   
 
. . . The people are entitled to a judiciary of the highest integrity, in 
both appearance and in fact, and this Court always bears the obligation 
under the constitution adopted by “we the people” to maintain and enforce 
standards of judicial fitness.  [James, 492 Mich at 573-574 (MARKMAN, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).] 
 
 
 
31
perform his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
Removal and suspension are sanctions that are expressly listed in § 30(2).  Finally,  
[t]he power to suspend is also not limited to cases in which the judge 
currently holds judicial office.  As this Court noted in Probert [411 Mich at 
224], we possess the authority under the constitution to issue conditional 
suspensions that “foreclose[] the exercise of the prerogatives inhering in 
any judicial office to which the disciplined party might have been elected or 
appointed in the future, the condition being, of course, re-election or 
appointment to judicial office.”   
Such conditional suspensions “disengage the disciplined party from 
judicial power” only if the person occupies judicial office again during the 
term of the suspension and do not permanently enjoin the person from 
holding judicial office.  This Court has historically issued conditional 
suspensions when other sanctions could not fully and adequately address 
the effect of particular misconduct on the integrity of the judicial system.  
Although often the greatest danger will pass once “an unfit or incompetent 
judge is separated from judicial power,” this Court should not refuse to 
consider other sanctions, such as conditional suspensions, when removal 
alone cannot sufficiently protect the integrity of the judiciary.  [James, 492 
Mich at 576-577 (MARKMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citations omitted).]  
In Probert, 411 Mich at 222, this Court censured and conditionally suspended 
Judge Charles V. Probert for five years, “regardless of any possible intervening election 
or appointment to judicial office.”  This Court could not remove Judge Probert because 
he had already left office as the result of his term ending and his defeat in his efforts at 
reelection.  In Probert, this Court recognized that we had on three previous occasions 
“issued conditional suspensions that would have foreclosed the exercise of the 
prerogatives inhering in any judicial office to which the disciplined party might have 
been elected or appointed in the future, the condition being, of course, re-election or 
appointment to judicial office.”  Id. at 223-224.  This Court explained that “[t]he effect of 
 
 
 
32
those suspensions would have been to disengage the disciplined party from judicial 
power, but only had that person come to occupy judicial office again during the term of 
the suspension, and only to the extent that the terms of office and suspension coincided.”  
Id. at 224.  See also In re Bennett, 403 Mich 178, 200; 267 NW2d 914 (1978), in which 
this Court suspended Judge Earl Warren Bennett for one year without pay “regardless of 
Judge Bennett’s election to another judicial office”; In In re Del Rio, 400 Mich 665, 672; 
256 NW2d 727 (1977), in which this Court suspended Judge James Del Rio for five years 
without pay “regardless of respondent’s possible intervening re-election to office or 
election to any other state court”; and In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 549; 243 NW2d 86 
(1976), in which we suspended Judge William L. Mikesell for 11/2 years without pay 
“regardless of respondent’s possible intervening reelection to office or election to any 
other state court.”     
We agree with the JTC that a removal, without more, would be an insufficient 
sanction in this case.  If we were to remove respondent and he was reelected in 2014, that 
would amount to a less than one-year suspension (less than two years including his 
interim suspension), which we believe is clearly insufficient given the seriousness of his  
misconduct.  This Court has a duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.  Allowing 
respondent to serve as a judge after only a one-year suspension will not, in our judgment, 
adequately preserve the integrity of our state’s judiciary.  Respondent was just recently 
publicly censured by this Court and yet continued to engage in misconduct, with his 
attitude toward the instant JTC investigation perhaps being best summarized by his 
remark that although “Wade should have recused himself,” “no harm no foul.”  This is 
strongly suggestive that respondent has not yet learned from his mistakes and that the 
 
 
 
33
likelihood of his continuing to commit judicial misconduct is high.  Such a cavalier 
attitude about serious misconduct is disturbing, and respondent’s apparent failure to 
comprehend fully the magnitude of his wrongdoing is equally troublesome.   
In summary, respondent had an affair with a complaining witness in a case 
pending before him, had numerous ex parte communications with that witness about the 
case, extended to her special treatment concerning the case, and caused her reasonably to 
believe that she was influencing how he was handling her case.  When their relationship 
subsequently went sour, he sought to employ the prosecuting attorney’s office as leverage 
against her by concocting charges of stalking and extortion.  And he lied repeatedly to the 
JTC and the master while under oath.  Respondent is now unfit to serve as a judge, and he 
will remain unfit to do so one year from now.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The cumulative effect of respondent’s misconduct convinces this Court that 
respondent should not remain in judicial office, and we therefore remove him from that 
office and conditionally suspend him without pay for six years beginning on January 1, 
2015, with the suspension becoming effective only if respondent is reelected to judicial 
office in November 2014.40  In addition, because respondent engaged in conduct 
involving “deceit” or “intentional misrepresentation,” pursuant to MCR 9.205(B) we 
order respondent to pay costs of $11,645.17 to the JTC.  The Clerk of the Court is 
                                              
40 Respondent is no longer a judicial officer and will not be an incumbent at the time of 
the 2014 3rd Circuit Court election.  See In re Nettles-Nickerson, 481 Mich 321, 323; 750 
NW2d 560 (2008). 
 
 
 
34
directed to issue the judgment order forthwith in accordance with this opinion and MCR 
7.317(C)(3). 
 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re WADE H. McCREE, Judge, 
Wayne Circuit Court 
 
 
No. 146826 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with the majority’s factual findings and analysis of the factors from In re 
Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (2000).  However, I disagree with the majority’s 
decision to conditionally suspend respondent.  Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) provides four 
possible sanctions: the Court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire, or 
remove a judge.  The potential sanctions are listed in order of increasing severity, 
indicating that the proper discipline should be imposed according to the severity of the 
respondent judge’s conduct.  See In re Probert, 411 Mich 210, 243; 308 NW2d 773 
(1981) (LEVIN, J., dissenting).  Under the Constitution’s scheme of increasing sanctions, 
removal is the most serious sanction and is, therefore, “the means by which judges guilty 
of serious misconduct are divested of office.”  Id. at 241 n 7; see, also, In re Callanan, 
419 Mich 376, 388-389; 355 NW2d 69 (1984) (explaining that through removal, we 
completely terminate all of a respondent’s ties to his office).     
Because respondent’s misconduct is of a grave and serious nature, I would impose 
the most serious sanction—removal.  “[I]n view of the egregiousness of [respondent’s 
misconduct], the public attention to it, and the sanctions meted out by . . . this Court,” I 
am “not so cynical about the electoral or appointive process” that I am “concerned about 
 
 
 
 
2
the respondent’s re-entry upon the judicial scene.”  Callanan, 419 Mich at 389.  The 
majority claims that respondent’s removal alone would not sufficiently address the 
seriousness of his conduct; however, the majority overlooks the fact that “[o]ther 
institutions, notably the press, serve the public’s interest in being informed and may be 
expected to do so . . . .”  Probert, 411 Mich at 250.  In any event, “we always retain the 
power to determine that a person is unfit for judicial office and to prevent him from ever 
exercising judicial power in this state for as long as he is, in our judgment, judicially 
unfit.”  In re Jenkins, 437 Mich 15, 29-30; 465 NW2d 317 (1991) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Accordingly, I would remove respondent from office and assess costs, 
but would not impose a conditional suspension. 
 
 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh