Title: AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT DER HARLANDER BUAMWOLLSPINNERIE UND ZWIRN-FABRIK v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co.

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

288 P.2d 691 (1955) 60 N.M. 154 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT DER HARLANDER BUAMWOLLSPINNERIE UND ZWIRN-FABRIK, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LAWRENCE WALKER COTTON COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5933. Supreme Court of New Mexico. October 4, 1955. *692 Garland & Sanders, Las Cruces, for appellant. Edwin Mechem, Edward E. Triviz, Las Cruces, for appellees. LUJAN, Justice. This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and defendant appeals. The record discloses that on May 12, 1949, defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, by the terms of which it was agreed that defendant would ship to plaintiff at Trieste, Italy (Free Territory), 440 bales of good middling cotton, with reimbursement by sight draft on New York bank under E.C.A. terms, and weight settlement on Edward T. Robertson's (controller for the defendant), sworn landed weights. By its answer the defendant admitted the allegations of paragraphs one, two and three of plaintiff's complaint to the effect that: The defendant denied the allegations of paragraphs four and five which declare that: Plaintiff's Exhibit D referred to in paragraph 4 of his complaint reads as follows: By way of new matter the defendant alleged: Defendant did not allege or plead as a defense that the determination of its controller was fraudulent, made in bad faith, or in such gross mistake or gross negligence as to imply bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment. On March 23, 1954, notice was given defendant of plaintiff's motion for production of Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn landing report. On March 24, 1954, defendant replied "that said landing report or a copy thereof is not in its possession, custody or control, and has not been since this action was filed and long prior thereto; hence, defendant cannot produce said landing report or a copy thereof." On March 25, 1954, on motion of plaintiff, the court ordered defendant to take the necessary steps to produce before the court by April 19, 1954, or such other place as may be agreed upon by the parties, the *694 original or copy of Edward T. Robertson & Son (defendant's controller), sworn total landing report. On January 24, 1954, the day of the trial this report had not been produced: At this stage of the trial the plaintiff renewed its motion for summary judgment and for judgment by default, pointing out that according to the contract of the parties, the defendants' controller, Edward T. Robertson, was made the arbiter and in the absence of any defense and pleading by defendant that such arbiter acted fraudulently, or through gross error, negligence, there was no genuine issue of fact, and for the further reason that plaintiff was entitled to judgment by default for failure of defendant to comply with the court's order for the production of said landing report. In this connection the court observed that due to the poor showing on the part of the defendant, he would have to admit the landing report, and further that the contract could not allow speculation as to the method of determination in that the contract shows the weights settlement were to be made by Edward T. Robertson's landed report and the contract itself gave Robertson that authority. The court found: Defendant (appellant) seeks reversal of the judgment on the following grounds: (1) That, since there were genuine and material issues of fact in the case as disclosed by the pleadings, the court erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entering a summary judgment therein; and (2) that, if title passed to the buyer when the cotton was loaded aboardship and the bill of lading issued, the court erred in granting judgment for plaintiff. We are unable to agree with counsel as to his first proposition. According to the contract the parties agreed to have a final settlement by defendant's own controller at Trieste. This was admitted by defendant's answer and, in the absence of a legally sufficient defense to attack and impeach the determination and method of its controller, the parties are bound by such determination. The statement of facts, as borne out by the record, and the pleadings themselves show that the contract provided for settlement at Trieste according to the determination of defendant's own controller, Edward T. Robertson & Son, and that payment to defendant by plaintiff on the basis of 218,054 pounds of cotton was made. The only material allegation that is denied by defendant is that according to the landing report reflecting the determination of its own controller, being Exhibit C, there was a shortage of 2,864 pounds of cotton, amounting to $1,241.26, to the reimbursement, with interest, of which the plaintiff is entitled. The plaintiff requested the defendant, pursuant to Rule 36 of District Court Rules of Civil Procedure, for an admission of the truth, for the purpose of this action, of the following facts: (1) Is it not a fact that Exhibit C attached to plaintiff's complaint is a true and correct copy of the report of defendant's controller, that is, Edward T. Robertson & Son, Sworn Total Landing Report; and (2) is it not also a fact that the original or a copy of Edward T. Robertson's Sworn Total Landing Report was received by the defendant? In answering this question, please set forth in entirety the contents of such report or attach a copy of such report to defendant's answer. In response thereto the defendant neither admitted nor expressly denied the same, but stated: (1) That defendant cannot with truth admit that Exhibit C attached to plaintiff's complaint is a true and correct copy of the report of defendant's controller, that is Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn total landing report is true, for the reason that defendant has never had it in his possession or seen what purported to be the original thereof. Therefore, defendant cannot admit that plaintiff's Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the same; and (2) that defendant states that the *696 original of said report was never received by him. Further answering, defendant states that an instrument purporting to be a copy of said Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn total landing report was received by him but that he does not now have the same in his possession and he does not admit that same was a true copy of the original of said Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn total landing report. Defendant cannot set forth in entirety or in part the contents of such report or attach a copy of the same to its answer for the reason that defendant many months prior to the commencement of this action sent what purported to be a copy of the same to the American Shippers Association and had never received the same back. Does the language employed by defendant in response to plaintiff's request for admission of facts put at issue, (1) the material fact that Exhibit C is, or is not, a true and correct sworn total landing report of Edward T. Robertson & Son, defendant's own controller; and (2) whether or not the original or a copy of such landing report was received by defendant, and if so, does it set out in entirety the contents of such report? Our answer is, it does not. The first question is answered by our holding in Bank of New Mexico v. Pinion, 57 N.M. 428, 259 P.2d 791, wherein Justice Sadler, speaking for the Court, held that an averment to the effect that "defendants neither admit nor deny the remaining allegations of the complaint but demand the strictest proof thereof, fails to put at issue any material fact alleged in the complaint." We reaffirm said pronouncement. As to the second question it is to be noted that defendant acknowledged having received what purported to be a copy of said report, which was sent by him to the American Shippers Association, and which he failed to make any effort whatever to have returned to him in order to comply with the court's order directing its production for inspection by the plaintiff. He had personal or presumptive knowledge of its contents and could have complied with plaintiff's request had he desired so to do. In Taylor v. Newton, 117 Cal. App. 2d 752, 257 P.2d 68, 73, the court said, and we quote with approval, that: In Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, Section 56.04, page 2028, it is said: And on page 2094 of the same volume it is said: *697 We recognized this rule as a method for determining the existence of genuine factual issues warranting submission of the case to a jury in Agnew v. Libby, 53 N.M. 56, 201 P.2d 775. The contract in question was for 440 bales of cotton at a fixed price of 43.34¢ per pound. The total contract price could not be ascertained at the time the contract was entered into, as by its terms, the weight was to be determined on the basis of Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn landing weights report. Defendant's invoice indicated a net weight of 218,054 pounds. On that basis the defendant himself calculated and admits receiving the total price of $94,504.60, and the invoice also by its terms contemplated settlement on Trieste landing weights supervised by Edward T. Robertson & Son. Robertson's weight report shows a weight shortage of 2864 pounds of cotton. Said contract was for no specific number of pounds of cotton but for such number of pounds as might be determined by Edward T. Robertson & Son at Trieste. In the case of Felt, for Use of United States v. Ronson Art Metal Works, D.C., 107 F. Supp. 84, 85, the court pointed out that the rule to be followed is that which is succinctly stated in Vol. 3, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, at page 88, as follows: When on the basis of established facts, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the defendant contending and arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact cannot and will not make it so. The following language is used in Morgan v. Sylvester, D.C., 125 F. Supp. 380, 390: See, also, Goldberger v. McPeak, D.C., 60 F. Supp. 498; Burger v. Social Security Board, D.C., 66 F. Supp. 619, affirmed Miller v. Burger, 9 Cir., 161 F.2d 992. Under the terms of the contract the defendant's controller, Edward T. Robertson & Son, was made the arbiter and in the absence of any defense and pleading by the defendant that such arbiter acted fraudulently or through gross error, or negligently, there was no genuine issue of fact, and his determination was conclusive and binding on the parties. In Odell v. Colmor Irrigation & Land Co., 34 N.M. 277, 280 P. 398, 400, we said: In 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 498, p. 1024, it is said: And at pages 683, 685 of the same volume, § 294, the text states: In the same volume at page 695, § 296, it is said: In the case of Perkins v. Meeker Sugar Refining Co., 163 La. 227, 111 So. 686, it was held, that: And, also, that: See, also, Hayday v. Hammermill Paper Co., 176 Minn. 315, 223 N.W. 614, 63 A.L.R. 210; Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc., v. Gammel, 8 Cir., 195 F.2d 106; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Casualty Co., 1 Cir., 142 F.2d 390. In the case at bar the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, and so acknowledged in effect by defendant's answer admitting that it provided for final settlement on Edward T. Robertson & Son sworn landing weights at Trieste, and therefore conclusive. We find no merit in defendant's second point. In dealing with a somewhat similar situation, it was said in the case of United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 28 S. Ct. 100, 104, 52 L. Ed. 185, and we quote with approval: In the case at bar the contract is clear and unambiguous. By the terms thereof the weight settlement of the cotton sold and shipped by plaintiff to defendant was to be made, not aboardship, but at its final destination (Trieste), by defendant's own controller, and such contract was binding on the parties. Other propositions are urged and discussed but we, likewise, find them without merit and will not pass upon them. Being of the view that the record discloses no reversible error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and SADLER, McGHEE, and KIKER, JJ., concur.