Title: David S. Ide v. Labor and Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1649 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
David S. Ide,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
MacFarlane Pheasant Farm, Inc., and Rural Mutual 
Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  216 Wis. 2d 116, 573 N.W.2d 901 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 26, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 2, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Angela B. Bartell 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Mark W. Andrews, Kim I. Moermond and Winner, 
Wixson & Pernitz, Madison and oral argument by Mark W. Andrews. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Kenneth T. McCormick, Jr., and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, 
Madison and oral argument by Richard L. Bolton. 
 
 
 
No. 
97-1649 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1649 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David S. Ide,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
MacFarlane Pheasant Farm, Inc., and Rural  
Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.    MacFarlane Pheasant Farm, Inc., 
and its insurer, Rural Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter 
“MacFarlane Farm”) appeal from an unpublished court of appeals 
decision reversing a circuit court judgment which upheld the 
Labor and Industry Review Commission’s (LIRC) determination that 
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, David S. Ide, were not 
compensable under the Wisconsin Worker’s Compensation Act (WCA). 
 MacFarlane Farm contends that while the court of appeals 
correctly found that Ide, a previous employee who injured his 
back while changing the tire on a van he borrowed from 
MacFarlane Farm, had finished work for the day and had embarked 
on a personal errand, it erroneously concluded that Ide’s 
No. 
97-1649 
 
2 
changing of the tire was a “benefit to the employer,” and as 
such, was compensable under Wis. Stat. § 102.03 (1993-94).1  We 
conclude that there is credible and substantial evidence 
supporting LIRC’s determination that Ide’s back injury was not 
compensable under the WCA because he was not performing a 
service growing out of or incidental to his employment; rather, 
he was finished working for the day and had begun a purely 
personal errand when he was injured.  We also conclude that the 
court of appeals should have deferred to LIRC’s reasonable 
interpretation.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
I. 
¶2 
The record reveals that Ide, a Massachusetts resident, 
began working for MacFarlane Farm in January 1989 as part of an 
agricultural internship from Sterling College in Vermont.  Ide 
testified that his job originally involved crating and loading 
birds onto trucks to be shipped to hunting preserves, as well as 
cleaning vehicles and watering birds at the breeder barn.  Soon 
after Ide started work, he complained of back pain.2  As a 
result, he was given jobs that did not require as much lifting.  
¶3 
On February 15, 1989, Ide asked for and was given 
permission by William MacFarlane, the president, to take the 
                     
1  All statutory references are to the 1993-94 version of 
the WI Statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
2  Ide’s medical records, including the emergency room 
reports dated February 15 and 16, 1989, disclose that he had a 
history of back pain two years prior to coming to Wisconsin for 
the internship.   
No. 
97-1649 
 
3 
company van to go grocery shopping after work.  Ide did not have 
a vehicle; instead he would get to and from work (about one 
mile) by either riding with co-workers, or by bicycle.  On 
February 15, Ide’s time card had a hand-written notation, 
instead of a time clock stamp, indicating that he finished work 
at 5:30 p.m.  Similar hand-written notations had been made on 
his time cards on 22 other occasions in the time that he had 
worked at the farm.  At approximately 6:00 p.m., while leaving 
but still on MacFarlane Farm’s property, Ide was driving the van 
when the tire went flat.  As Ide was changing the tire, he 
injured his lower back.  
¶4 
In February 1995, Ide filed a worker’s compensation 
claim.3  At the hearing before the administrative law judge 
(ALJ), Ide’s supervisor, who finished changing the tire after 
Ide injured his back, confirmed that Ide had asked to use the 
van to go grocery shopping that night and that Ide had discussed 
those plans with other employees.  His supervisor stated, 
somewhat equivocally, that Ide told him he had to change the 
tire to take the van grocery shopping that evening.  MacFarlane 
also testified at the hearing.  He affirmed that Ide had asked 
to use the van to go grocery shopping and that he was not 
                     
3  This was Ide’s second application for benefits.  The 
first application, approved in January 1993, was resolved by a 
Limited Compromise Agreement between the parties.  Under the 
agreement, MacFarlane Farm denied liability and denied that the 
injury was work-related, but agreed to pay $17,000.00 to resolve 
the dispute.  The agreement only settled claims through February 
1992, and it did not make any provision for future claims.   
No. 
97-1649 
 
4 
running errands for the farm.  He indicated that he would not 
have had Ide change the tire because of his back trouble.  
Rather, MacFarlane stated that the farm had a maintenance person 
whose responsibility it was to change the tire if there was a 
flat. 
¶5 
The ALJ, while not explicitly finding that Ide’s 
original injury was work-related, did grant him a partial award. 
 LIRC reversed the ALJ.  In its memorandum opinion, LIRC found 
that at the time of the injury, Ide was not performing services 
growing out of and incidental to his employment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(c)2.  Rather, LIRC concluded that Ide had completed 
work at the time of the injury and that his injury occurred 
after he began a purely personal errand—going to the grocery 
store.  LIRC also determined that using MacFarlane Farm’s 
vehicle was not the usual or ordinary method by which Ide left 
work each day.   
¶6 
Ide sought judicial review, and Dane County Circuit 
Court Judge Angela Bartell affirmed LIRC’s decision.  Ide 
appealed and the court of appeals reversed.  While the court of 
appeals agreed that there was sufficient credible evidence to 
support 
virtually 
all 
of 
LIRC’s 
findings 
of 
fact, 
it 
nevertheless reversed, concluding that because someone had to 
change the tire, Ide’s attempting to do so constituted a benefit 
for 
his 
employer—a 
compensable 
event. 
 
MacFarlane 
Farm 
petitioned this court for review.   
 
 
No. 
97-1649 
 
5 
 
II. 
¶7 
Whether an employee is acting within the course of his 
or her employment under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  Nottelson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 
114-15, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980); Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. 
LIRC, 197 Wis. 2d 927, 931, 541 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Questions concerning the conduct of the employee and employer 
are questions of fact.  Nottelson, 94 Wis. 2d at 115.  The 
application of a statutory concept to those facts is a question 
of law subject to independent review.  Id.       
III. 
¶8 
Ide renews his claim that several factual findings 
made by LIRC, and affirmed by the circuit and appellate courts, 
are unsupported by the evidence.  Ide challenges the following 
findings: (1) that he had punched out from work at the time of 
the injury; (2) that he had completed his work for the day at 
the time of the injury; (3) that he was leaving the employer’s 
property when the flat tire occurred; (4) that he had started on 
a personal errand before he was injured; and (5) that he did not 
regularly use the van as part of his employment.  Ide insists 
his testimony raises questions about those findings. 
¶9 
LIRC’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal so 
long as they are supported by credible and substantial evidence. 
 Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6); Nottelson, 94 Wis. 2d at 114.  The 
evidence need only be sufficient to exclude speculation or 
conjecture.  Bumpas v. ILHR Dept., 95 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 290 
No. 
97-1649 
 
6 
N.W.2d 504 (1980).  This court does not weigh the evidence or 
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses; rather, the weight 
and credibility of evidence is to be determined by LIRC.  
Brakebush Bros., Inc. v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 623, 630, 563 N.W.2d 
512 (1997).  Our role on review is to search the record to 
locate credible evidence that supports LIRC’s factual findings. 
 Id.  We conclude that the record contains credible and 
substantial evidence supporting all but one of LIRC’s findings. 
 LIRC’s finding that Ide did not use the van in his work on a 
regular basis is unsupported.  Both Ide and MacFarlane testified 
that Ide used the farm vehicles regularly.  Except for this 
unsupported statement, we affirm LIRC’s findings. 
IV. 
¶10 Whether the facts, as found by LIRC, fulfill a 
particular legal standard is a question of law which we review 
de novo.  Nottelson, 94 Wis. 2d at 115-16.  Thus, we 
independently determine whether Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(c)2 which 
conditions worker’s compensation liability on the employe “going 
to and from his or her employment in the ordinary and usual way, 
while 
on 
the 
premises 
of 
the 
employer . . . [and 
while] 
performing service growing out of and incidental to employment” 
provides coverage for Ide’s injuries.  When reviewing questions 
of law, we apply one of three levels of deference to the 
agency’s interpretation: “great weight,” “due weight” or “de 
novo.”  Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 563 N.W.2d 454 
(1997); Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis.2d 234, 244-45, 
493 N.W.2d 68 (1992). 
No. 
97-1649 
 
7 
¶11 The “great weight” standard is the highest level of 
deference given to an agency conclusion of law or statutory 
interpretation, and is accorded if the administrative agency’s 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid 
the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute. 
 Kelley Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 244.  We conclude that LIRC’s 
determination on this issue is entitled to great weight because 
LIRC has gained experience and expertise in determining when an 
employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment.  
Nigbor v. DILHR, 120 Wis. 2d 375, 384, 355 N.W.2d 532 (1984).  
¶12 Under the great weight standard, a reviewing court 
must uphold the agency interpretation if it is reasonable.  
Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 20.  An agency’s interpretation of a 
statute is unreasonable if it “directly contravenes the words of 
the statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is 
otherwise . . . without rational basis.”  Lisney v. LIRC, 171 
Wis. 2d 499, 506, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992).   
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1)(a)-(e) sets forth the 
conditions of liability under the WCA.4  The provision at issue 
here, § 102.03(1)(c)2, provides in part: 
                     
4  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1) provides: 
(1)  Liability under this chapter shall exist against 
an employer only where the following conditions occur: 
 
 
(a) Where the employe sustains an injury. 
(b) Where, at the time of the injury, both the 
employer and employe are subject to the 
provisions of this chapter. 
 
 . . . . 
No. 
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(1) Liability under this chapter shall exist against 
an employer only where the following conditions occur: 
 
 
(c)2.  Any employe going to and from his or her 
employment in the ordinary and usual way, while on the 
premises of the employer . . . is performing service 
growing out of and incidental to employment.  
¶14 The statutory clause “in the ordinary and usual way” 
refers to the mode and route of transportation.  Cmelak v. 
Industrial Comm’n, 27 Wis. 2d 552, 556, 135 N.W.2d 304 (1965) 
(claimant 
going to 
work 
by 
precisely 
the 
same mode of 
transportation, following the same route, and arriving at the 
same destination as she had done during the whole course of her 
employment).  LIRC determined that using his employer’s vehicle 
was not the usual and ordinary method by which Ide left for work 
each day; he biked or hitched rides. 
¶15 As noted by the court of appeals, whether borrowing 
his employer’s van was the equivalent to hitching rides with 
others depends on whether mode is defined as broadly as 
traveling by car or as narrowly as using a particular vehicle.  
LIRC determined that driving a vehicle was a qualitatively 
                                                                  
(c)2. Any employe going to and from his or her 
employment in the ordinary and usual way, 
while 
on 
the 
premises 
of 
the 
employer . . . is performing service growing 
out of and incidental to employment. 
 
 . . . . 
(d) Where the injury is not intentionally self-
inflicted. 
(e) Where the accident or disease causing injury 
arises out of the employe’s employment. 
 
(f) [Relating to traveling employes.] 
(g) [Relating 
to 
members 
of 
the 
state 
legislature.] 
No. 
97-1649 
 
9 
different mode of coming and going from work than riding as a 
passenger 
in 
a 
co-worker’s 
vehicle. 
 
Because 
LIRC’s 
determination that Ide was not traveling from work in the 
ordinary and usual way when he was injured is reasonable, we 
defer to the agency’s resolution of the issue.   
¶16 As to the premises clause of the statute, it is clear 
Ide was on MacFarlane Farm’s property when he sustained the 
injury.  This fact alone does not bring about liability for the 
employer.  Rather, Ide must also be engaged in his usual duties 
prior to the injury.  Bruns Volkswagen, Inc. v. DILHR, 110 Wis. 
2d 319, 322, 328 N.W.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1982).  However, Ide’s 
employment did not include maintenance of the farm’s vehicles; 
the farm had a maintenance person whose job it was to maintain 
the vehicles and equipment.  In addition, he was physically 
limited in the tasks he could perform because of his complained-
of back problems.  
¶17 The last clause, “performing service growing out of 
and 
incidental 
to 
his 
or 
her 
employment,” 
is 
used 
interchangeably with the phrase “course of employment.”  Weiss 
v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 95, 104, 559 N.W.2d 588 
(1997).  
“Both phrases 
refer to 
the 
‘time, 
place, and 
circumstances’ under which the injury occurred.”  Id. at 104-05 
(quoting Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 549, 289 N.W.2d 270 
(1980)).   
 
An injury is said to arise in the course of the 
employment when it takes place within the period of 
the 
employment, 
at 
a 
place 
where 
the 
employee 
reasonably may be, and while he [or she] is fulfilling 
No. 
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10
his [or her] duties or engaged in doing something 
incidental thereto. 
Weiss, 208 Wis. 2d at 105 (quoting 1 The Law of Worker’s 
Compensation § 14.00).   
¶18 LIRC concluded that Ide was not performing services 
growing out of and incidental to his employment, i.e, not within 
the time, place, and circumstances of employment when the injury 
occurred.  LIRC determined that Ide had completed work at the 
time of the injury, that he was injured after he began a purely 
personal errand, and that he was not responsible for the 
maintenance of the van as part of his employment.  These 
conclusions are reasonable.   
¶19 The record shows that:  Ide had asked permission to 
use the van for a personal errand that night, he had discussed 
those plans with other employees that day, his time card had a 
sign-out time of 5:30 p.m., he had left the breeder barn where 
he performed many of his duties, the injury occurred at 6:00 
p.m., and Ide did not seek additional compensation beyond 5:30 
p.m. for the extra time he took to change the tire (repairing 
the vehicle).  In fact, Ide told his supervisor, who finished 
changing the tire, that he had to change the tire to go shopping 
that evening.  On the basis of these facts, it was reasonable 
for LIRC to conclude that by changing the tire to the van, Ide 
was not performing a service growing out of and incidental to 
his employment, but rather opted to change the tire to complete 
his personal errand of going to the grocery store.  The injury 
did not occur within the period of employment (Ide was signed 
No. 
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11
out), nor was changing a vehicle tire part of Ide’s duties or 
incidental to his employment (he was in the process of running a 
personal errand, he was limited in the physical labor he could 
perform, and a person was on the staff who was responsible for 
vehicle maintenance).  
¶20 Even though the court of appeals found LIRC’s factual 
findings to be supported by credible evidence, it determined 
that (1) Ide’s employment placed him in the position where 
changing a tire might occur because he used the vehicle to bring 
feed and water to the birds and he was given permission for 
after hours use; and (2) the tire had to be changed in order for 
the van to be used the next day.  For these reasons, the court 
concluded that the changing of the tire occurred while Ide was 
providing a benefit to his employer, and therefore, his injury 
occurred while he was performing a service growing out of and 
incidental to his employment.  We disagree. 
¶21 First, 
the 
fact 
that 
Ide’s 
employer 
gave 
him 
permission to drive the van after hours does not support a 
finding that he was acting within the scope of his employment.  
See e.g., Sadler v. Western Moulding Co., 6 Wis. 2d 278, 281, 94 
N.W.2d 602 (1959) (employee who was using employer’s car while 
engaged in a personal errand does not mean acting within scope 
of his employment); Adams v. Quality Serv. Laundry & Dry 
Cleaners, 253 Wis. 334, 336, 34 N.W.2d 148 (1948) (because 
employee was using company truck for personal errand, had 
finished work for the day, and no duty connected with employment 
furnished the occasion for the trip, employee not acting within 
No. 
97-1649 
 
12
the scope of his employment); and Gewanski v. Ellsworth, 166 
Wis. 250, 254, 164 N.W. 996 (1917) (effort of master to 
accommodate and assist the servant does not bring within the 
scope of the master’s employment acts of the servant otherwise 
without such scope).  
¶22 In addition, the question of whether an employer 
received a “benefit” from its employee is a question of fact, 
Schwab v. ILHR Dept., 40 Wis. 2d 686, 693, 162 N.W.2d 548 
(1968), which is conclusive so long as it is supported by 
credible and substantial evidence, Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).  Our 
role on review is to search the record to locate credible 
evidence to support LIRC’s factual findings.  Brakebush Bros., 
210 Wis. 2d at 630.   
¶23 The facts in this case support LIRC’s findings.  Ide 
was not on duty; he was, at the time of the flat, on a personal 
errand which he stated could only be completed if he changed the 
flat tire.  Nor was he engaged in an activity his employer 
required or asked of him; Ide was not responsible for changing 
tires on vehicles or maintenance of vehicles as part of his 
employment.  In fact, his employer tried to limit the amount Ide 
lifted after he complained of back problems.   
¶24 Lastly, it appears that the court of appeals combined 
the conditions that Ide’s injury must arise out of his 
employment, Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(e), and that it must occur 
while he was performing a service growing out of and incidental 
to his employment, § 102.03(1)(c)2.  While both conditions must 
be satisfied, the phrase “arising out of” employment refers to 
No. 
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13
the causal origin of the injury, whereas the phrase “performing 
service growing out of and incidental to” employment refers to 
the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury 
occurred.  Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 549.  In interpreting the 
former, § 102.03(1)(e), we have adopted the “positional risk” 
doctrine: 
 
[A]ll that is required is that the obligations or 
conditions of employment create the zone of special 
danger out of which the injury arose.  Butler v. 
Industrial Comm., 265 Wis. 380, 385, 61 N.W.2d 490 
[,492 (1953)].  In other words, there is a causal 
connection between the employment and the injury where 
the employee is obligated by his employment to be 
present at the place where he encounters injury 
through the instrumentality of a third person or an 
outside force. . . .  
Bruns Volkswagen, 110 Wis. 2d at 326 (quotations omitted).   
 
¶25 We disagree with the court of appeals’ determination 
that Ide’s employment placed him in a position where changing a 
tire might occur.  Ide simply was not obligated by his 
employment to be present on the farm in the circumstances in 
which he was injured.  As Ide testified, his duties did not 
include vehicle maintenance.  If the flat had occurred during 
the work hours, the farm’s maintenance man would have been 
responsible for changing the tire, not Ide.  He was also in the 
process of running a personal errand after hours when the flat 
occurred, which Ide admitted could not have been completed 
without changing the tire. 
¶26 Unlike the injured employees in Employers Mutual 
Liability Insurance Co. v. ILHR Deptartment, 52 Wis. 2d 515, 190 
No. 
97-1649 
 
14
N.W.2d 907 (1971) and Fels v. Industrial Commission, 269 Wis. 
294, 69 N.W.2d 225 (1955), the activity Ide engaged in was not 
reasonably 
required 
by 
the 
terms 
and 
conditions 
of 
his 
employment.  Employers Mutual, 52 Wis. 2d at 521.  In both 
Employers Mutual and Fels, the injured employees were required 
to maintain their vehicles and keep them in good operating 
condition as a condition of their employment.  Employers Mutual, 
52 Wis. 2d at 522; Fels, 269 Wis. at 298.  Such is not the case 
here; Ide was not responsible for changing tires on vehicles or 
maintenance 
of 
vehicles 
as 
part 
of 
his 
employment, 
the 
maintenance person was.   
¶27 There must be some connection with the employer’s work 
in which the employee was engaged or permitted to perform.  
Bruns Volkswagen, 110 Wis. 2d at 326-27; Brienen v. PSC, 166 
Wis. 24, 27, 163 N.W. 182 (1917).  Ide’s changing of the tire 
does not have any such connection.  Because we conclude that the 
facts support LIRC’s determination that by changing the tire, 
Ide was not performing a service growing out of and incidental 
to his employment, we reverse the court of appeals' decision to 
the contrary.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
1