Title: Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12355 
 
TARA DORRIAN1  vs.  LVNV FUNDING, LLC  
(and a consolidated case2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2018. - April 9, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Debt.  Collection Agency.  Consumer Protection Act, Collection 
of debt.  Words, "Debt collector." 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 22 and December 30, 2014. 
 
 
After consolidation, the case was heard by Janet L. 
Sanders, J., on motions for class certification and for summary 
judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Schultz (Andrew M. Schneiderman also present) for 
LVNV Funding, LLC. 
 
Kenneth D. Quat (Josef C. Culik also present) for Tara 
Dorrian & another. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Virginia Newton vs. LVNV Funding, LLC. 
2 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Nadine Cohen & Philip Weinberg for Greater Boston Legal 
Services & others. 
 
Merrily S. Gerrish, Special Assistant Attorney General, & 
Heather L. Bennett for division of banks of the Office of 
Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation. 
 
Donald S. Maurice, Jr., & Brady J. Hermann for Receivables 
Management Association International, Inc. 
 
Daniel S. Blynn, Meredith L. Boylan, & Benjamin E. 
Horowitz, of the District of Columbia, David L. Feinberg, Joseph 
L. Demeo, & Lawrence S. Delaney for Cavalry SPV I, LLC. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The primary issue presented is the definition 
of "debt collector" under G. L. c. 93, § 24, particularly its 
application to the statute's licensing requirement.  After being 
sued for the failure to pay debts, the plaintiffs, Tara Dorrian 
and Virginia Newton, each individually filed suit against the 
defendant, LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV), claiming unlicensed debt 
collection.  The plaintiffs also alleged violations of G. L. 
c. 93A, asserted claims of unjust enrichment,3 and sought to 
proceed against LVNV in a class action suit.  A judge in the 
Superior Court consolidated the cases and certified them as a 
class action.  On cross motions for summary judgment, the judge 
concluded that LVNV violated G. L. c. 93, § 24A, because it 
operated as a debt collector without a license and granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.  On the claim that LVNV 
violated G. L. c. 93A, the judge granted summary judgment to 
                                                          
 
 
3 The plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed the 
unjust enrichment claims. 
3 
 
LVNV because it met the exemption from liability in G. L. 
c. 93A, § 3, as the division of banks of the Office of Consumer 
Affairs and Business Regulation (division) had permitted LVNV to 
operate without a license. 
 
On appeal, LVNV argues that (1) the judge erred in 
certifying the class because neither plaintiff is a proper class 
representative; (2) the judge's remedy was improper, and at most 
the judgments should merely be voidable; and (3) the judge 
should have deferred to the division's interpretation of the 
statute concluding that LVNV did not require a license. 
 
We conclude that LVNV is not a debt collector under G. L. 
c. 93, § 24.4  The statute contains two separate definitions of 
"debt collector," neither of which applies to LVNV, a "passive 
debt buyer," which is a company that buys debt for investment 
purposes and then hires licensed debt collectors or attorneys to 
collect the debt on its behalf.  The first definition covers 
entities of which the "principal purpose" is the "collection of 
a debt."  We conclude that this definition does not apply to 
LVNV because LVNV has no contact with consumers and the 
Legislature did not intend for these entities to be treated as 
debt collectors under G. L. c. 93, § 24.  The second definition 
                                                          
 
 
4 Our conclusion that LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV), is not a 
debt collector for the purposes of G. L. c. 93, § 24, resolves 
this matter.  Consequently, we need not address the other issues 
raised on appeal. 
4 
 
covers entities that "regularly collect[] or attempt[] to 
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due" to another.  
This definition does not apply because LVNV deals only with its 
own debts, not the debts of another.  Because LVNV does not meet 
either definition, it is not a debt collector under G. L. c. 93, 
§ 24.  We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.5 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Overview of G. L. c. 93, §§ 24-28.  In 
2003, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 93, §§ 24-28.  See St. 
2003, c. 130.  These provisions, modeled after the Federal Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (FDCPA), 
are often referred to as the Massachusetts Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (MDCPA).6  Congress passed the FDCPA to combat 
abusive debt collection practices.  15 U.S.C. § 1692.  Although 
legislative history of the MDCPA is scant, it appears to share 
the same purpose as the FDCPA. 
                                                          
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Cavalry SPV 
I, LLC; Greater Boston Legal Services, Rosie's Place, and Legal 
Services Center of Harvard Law School; Receivables Management 
Association International, Inc.; and the division of banks of 
the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation. 
 
 
6 This opinion refers to the provisions in G. L. c. 93, 
§§ 24-28, as the Massachusetts Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (MDCPA).  We note that the bill that included these 
provisions did not contain this official title and that other 
names have been used, such as the "Debt Collection Law" and 
"DCL". 
5 
 
 
The MDCPA also largely follows the FDCPA's language.  The 
term relevant to this case, "debt collector," is defined 
substantively the same under both laws.  Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692a(6), with G. L. c. 93, § 24.  Under the MDCPA, an entity 
is a debt collector if (1) it is engaged in a "business the 
principal purpose of which is the collection of debt," or (2) it 
"regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or 
indirectly, a debt owed or due . . . another."  G. L. c. 93, 
§ 24. 
 
b.  Division of banks.  The division is a State agency 
responsible for financial regulation, including the regulation 
of debt collection.  See G. L. c. 93, § 24A (d).  Through its 
regulations, the division defines unlawful debt collection 
activities.  209 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 18.13-18.21 (2013).  As 
part of its regulatory oversight responsibilities, it issues 
licenses to debt collectors and advisory opinions on which 
entities meet the two-part statutory definition of "debt 
collector."  See G. L. c. 30A, § 8.  An entity that meets either 
definition of "debt collector" must be licensed by the 
commissioner of banks (commissioner) through the division.  See 
G. L. c. 93, § 24A.  To acquire a license, the applicant must 
establish to the commissioner's satisfaction that its "financial 
responsibility, character, reputation, integrity and general 
fitness . . . are such as to command the confidence of the 
6 
 
public and to warrant the belief that the business . . . will be 
operated lawfully, honestly and fairly."  G. L. c. 93, 
§ 24B (a).  The applications for licenses are processed and 
reviewed by the division and must be renewed each year.  See 
G. L. c. 93, § 24B.  There are potential civil and criminal 
penalties for operating as a debt collector in Massachusetts 
without a license.  See G. L. c. 93, § 28. 
 
Most relevant to this case, since 2006, the division has 
consistently concluded that a passive debt buyer is not included 
under the definition of "debt collector" in G. L. c. 93, § 24.  
The division has defined "passive debt buyer" as a debt buyer 
that engages only in the practice of purchasing delinquent 
consumer debts for investment purposes without undertaking any 
activities to directly collect on the debt.  Advisory Opinion 
No. O06060 (Oct. 13, 2006). 
The division's position is that a debt buyer that purchases 
debt in default but is not directly engaged in the collection of 
these purchased debts is not required to obtain a debt collector 
license provided that all collection activity performed on 
behalf of such debt buyer is done by a properly licensed debt 
collector in the Commonwealth or a licensed attorney collecting 
7 
 
a debt on behalf of a client.7  See Advisory Opinion No. O12012 
(Nov. 1, 2012); Advisory Opinion No. O06060.  A later advisory 
opinion clarified that even a passive debt buyer that was the 
named plaintiff in lawsuits did not require a license.  Advisory 
Opinion No. O13020 (Mar. 4, 2014).  In 2012, LVNV contacted the 
division to inquire whether a license was necessary for a 
company that "does not have employees or interact with consumers 
directly" but instead "contracts with licensed third party debt 
collectors and law firms to service accounts on its behalf."  
The division, referencing its earlier advisory opinions, 
responded that a license was not necessary. 
 
The division, as amicus curiae, submitted a letter in this 
case.  In the letter, the division describes its long-standing 
position that passive debt buyers do not require licensure as 
debt collectors because they are merely investors in consumer 
debts that hire another duly authorized entity to collect the 
debts.  This position is supported by the division's "practical 
perspective that many of its examination practices would be 
inapplicable to passive debt buyers" that do not interact 
directly with consumers.  Furthermore, the division stated that 
until very recently, if a passive debt buyer applied for a 
                                                          
 
 
7 The attorney must be licensed to practice law in 
Massachusetts and is therefore covered by the rules of 
professional conduct. 
8 
 
license, the division "would not process such application" and 
would notify the applicant that no license was required.  The 
division describes this practice as "essentially preventing 
licensure" based on its interpretation of the statute. 
 
c.  Parties.  LVNV is a Delaware limited liability company 
that is registered to do business in Massachusetts.  In its 
annual filings with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, LVNV 
describes the general character of its business as "purchaser of 
consumer debt and loans."  Over ninety-nine per cent of LVNV's 
revenues come from collections on the debts that it owns.  LVNV, 
however, has no employees and does not engage in any contact 
with the individuals whose debt it owns. 
 
LVNV contracts with Resurgent Capital Services LP 
(Resurgent) as the collection and servicing agent on the debts 
owed to LVNV.  Resurgent is licensed as a debt collector under 
the MDCPA and has been licensed since 2000.  LVNV authorizes 
Resurgent, through a servicing agreement, to undertake all 
collection and servicing responsibilities with regard to the 
debts owned by LVNV.  LVNV does not participate in any decisions 
regarding collection activities, including determinations of 
whether to initiate collection actions in court.  Resurgent 
retains sole discretion to hire law firms for legal collection 
actions. 
9 
 
 
LVNV is nonetheless the named plaintiff in the lawsuits 
that Resurgent files to collect on the debts owned by LVNV.  
From 2010 to 2015, over 18,000 such lawsuits were brought 
against Massachusetts residents seeking judgment on debts owned 
by LVNV, as well as 3,500 proofs of claim in bankruptcy court 
and 6,175 wage garnishment actions involving accounts owned by 
LVNV.  Furthermore, instructions sent to credit bureaus 
referenced LVNV in more than 600,000 distinct debt accounts 
involving residents of Massachusetts. 
 
The plaintiff Virginia Newton opened a credit account in 
June, 2007, with Jordan's Furniture through which HSBC Bank 
Nevada, N.A. (HSBC), extended her a line of credit.  Newton made 
a purchase on the account and subsequently defaulted on the 
debt.  LVNV acquired the debt Newton owed to HSBC in 2009.  In 
February, 2014, Resurgent filed a lawsuit on LVNV's behalf 
against Newton in the Framingham Division of the District Court 
Department and obtained a judgment against Newton.  Throughout 
these legal proceedings, Newton only had contact with the law 
firm that Resurgent hired to litigate the claims and never with 
LVNV. 
 
The plaintiff Tara Dorrian opened an account in December, 
2007, also with Jordan's Furniture on an extension of credit 
from HSBC.  Dorrian defaulted on the debt, which LVNV acquired 
from HSBC in 2010.  Resurgent brought a small claims suit on 
10 
 
behalf of LVNV against Dorrian in the Quincy Division of the 
District Court Department.  A judgment was eventually entered in 
Dorrian's favor on the collection claim.  Dorrian only had 
contact with Resurgent and the law firm that Resurgent hired to 
litigate the claim and had no contact with LVNV. 
 
Each plaintiff separately sued LVNV on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief and alleging that LVNV was operating as a debt 
collector without a license in violation of G. L. c. 93, § 24A.  
The plaintiffs also brought claims alleging unjust enrichment 
and violations of G. L. c. 93A.  As the motion judge recognized, 
however, 
"[t]hese lawsuits are notable in that the only conduct 
alleged to be unlawful here is LVNV's failure to obtain a 
license from the [division].  That is, these two cases do 
not claim that LVNV -- or any entity acting on its behalf -
- has harassed any debtor or made any misrepresentations in 
an attempt to collect on a debt.  LVNV is not accused of 
seeking to collect amounts it has no basis to believe that 
it is owed or using information about a debtor in an 
improper manner.  Instead, the lawsuits focus exclusively 
on the fact that LVNV is unlicensed." 
 
 
As explained above, the judge certified a class action and 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their claims that 
LVNV violated the MDCPA by operating as a debt collector without 
a license.  LVNV appealed, and we granted applications for 
direct appellate review filed by LVNV and the plaintiffs. 
11 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Our review of a 
motion judge's decision on summary judgment is de novo, because 
we examine the same record and decide the same questions of 
law."  Kiribati Seafood Co. v. Dechert, LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 
(2017).  "In a case like this one where both parties have moved 
for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom judgment [has entered]" 
(citation omitted).  Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 
350 (2012). 
 
b.  Interpreting G. L. c. 93, § 24.  This case presents a 
question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  
Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envt'l Protection, 455 
Mass. 740, 744 (2010).  "Where the words are 'plain and 
unambiguous' in their meaning, we view them as 'conclusive as to 
legislative intent.'"  Id., quoting Sterilite Corp. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986).  "Where the 
meaning of a statute is not plain from its language, familiar 
principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation.  
We look to the intent of the Legislature 'ascertained from all 
its words . . . considered in connection with the cause of [the 
statute's] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'"  DiFiore v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009), quoting 
12 
 
Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 
(1975).  Additionally, "[w]e give substantial deference to a 
reasonable interpretation of a statute by the administrative 
agency charged with its administration enforcement."  Commerce 
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006).  
Applying these familiar principles, we conclude, as did the 
division, that passive debt buyers -- that is, debt buyers 
engaged "only in the practice of purchasing delinquent consumer 
debts for investment purposes without undertaking any activities 
to directly collect on the debt" -- do not fall under either 
definition of "debt collector" in G. L. c. 93, § 24.  See 
Advisory Opinion No. O06060. 
i.  Whether LVNV is a debt collector under the first 
definition.  The first definition of "debt collector" in G. L. 
c. 93, § 24, encompasses entities of which the "principal 
purpose" is the "collection of a debt."  As for this definition, 
the plain language is instructive but not conclusive.  LVNV's 
business is to invest in debt, usually those in default, and 
profit from the eventual collection of the debt.  If the debt is 
not collected, LVNV has no revenue.  Nonetheless, the debt 
collection itself is entirely undertaken by third parties.  
Indeed, all aspects of the debt collection process are 
contracted out to and conducted by Resurgent, a licensed debt 
collector.  Resurgent determines the appropriate course of 
13 
 
action for each account and whether to initiate legal action.8  
In sum, the principal purpose of LVNV is not perfectly clear.  
LVNV itself is a debt buyer, not a debt collector, but the 
success of its business model is dependent on debt collection by 
its licensed contractor. 
 
Because the language of the statute is not "plain and 
unambiguous" as it applies to passive debt buyers like LVNV, we 
look to the legislative history to inform us on the 
Legislature's intent.  See Water Dep't of Fairhaven, 455 Mass. 
at 744.  There is, however, little legislative history on the 
development of the MDCPA, which was enacted in 2003.  See St. 
2003, c. 130.  The Office of Consumer Affairs and Business 
Regulation originally proposed the bill, largely incorporating 
the FDCPA's language.  In particular, the proposal used the 
FDCPA's definition of "debt collector."  The Legislature enacted 
the bill with only several minor edits to that definition.9  
                                                          
 
 
8 For example, without any input from LVNV, Resurgent 
Capital Services LP hired the law firm Kream and Kream, P.C., to 
litigate the suit against the plaintiff Tara Dorrian and the law 
firm Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, P.C., to litigate the suit against 
the plaintiff Virginia Newton. 
 
 
9 The only relevant difference between the bill as it was 
proposed by the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business 
Regulation and the bill as it was enacted was that the proposed 
language used the plural term "debts" as found in the definition 
of "debt collector" in the Federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), whereas the enacted 
statute was changed to use the singular term "debt."  See G. L. 
 
14 
 
Beyond this, there is no information that bears on the 
legislative intent.  Thus, the legislative history is 
essentially silent on the Legislature's intent with regard to 
passive debt buyers like LVNV. 
For further guidance we turn to the legislative history of 
the FDCPA, which is relevant to our consideration because the 
FDCPA was the model for the MDCPA.  Although not directly 
addressing the specific question of the status of passive debt 
buyers, the legislative history of the FDCPA clearly and 
expressly targets abusive debt collection practices, including 
"obscene or profane language, threats of violence, telephone 
calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer's 
legal rights, disclosing a consumer's personal affairs to 
friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about 
a consumer through false pretense, impersonating public 
officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process."  S. Rep. 
No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1977).  See Henson v. 
Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1720 (2017).10  To 
clarify the definition of debt collector, the legislative 
history also describes certain entities that are not intended to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
c. 93, § 24.  Additionally, the MDCPA has been amended several 
times since 2003, but none of these is relevant to the issues in 
this case. 
 
 
10 Our regulations reference the same or similar types of 
harassment and abuse.  See 209 Code Mass. Regs. § 18.15 (2013). 
15 
 
be included within the definition of "debt collector."  See H. 
Rep. No. 95-131, 95 Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1977).  These 
include banks, retailers, credit unions, and finance companies. 
Id.  Despite a careful consideration of what entities would be 
covered by the definition and what entities would be excluded, 
there is no evidence that Congress ever intended to include 
within this definition debt buyers that own the debts but use a 
third party to collect the debts and therefore have no contact 
with the debtors.  See generally S. Rep. No. 95-382; H. Rep. No. 
95-131. 
The Federal legislative history indicates that Congress's 
focus was on the regulation of improper, high pressure, 
deceptive debt collection practices, and did not consider 
passive debt buyers.  As LVNV has no employees and no contact 
whatsoever with debtors, it seems to be outside of the core 
concerns of Congress and, by implication, our Legislature when 
it adopted this Federal model.11 
                                                          
 
 
11 Several Federal courts considering the plain language of 
the first definition and the purposes of the FDCPA have 
concluded that passive debt buyers are not included within that 
definition.  In McAdory vs. M.N.S & Assocs., LLC, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 3:17-cv-00777-HZ (D. Ore. Nov. 3, 2017), a Federal 
District Court concluded that a passive debt buyer that has no 
contact with consumers and uses a third party to collect the 
debts is not a debt collector under the first definition of the 
FDCPA.  The court reasoned that entities "who have no 
interactions with debtors and merely contract with third parties 
to collect on the debts they have purchased simply do not have 
 
16 
 
 
We also consider the interpretation of the division, the 
administrative agency tasked with enforcing the MDCPA.  "[A]n 
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute within its 
charge is accorded weight and deference."  Massachusetts Med. 
Soc'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 402 Mass. 44, 62 (1988).  The 
court will approve an agency's statutory interpretation where it 
is reasonable, particularly in cases involving "interpretation 
of a complex statutory and regulatory framework."  Attorney Gen. 
v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319 (2008). 
 
The division's long-standing interpretation of G. L. c. 93, 
§ 24, is that the term "debt collector" does not apply to 
passive debt buyers like LVNV that purchase debts and use 
licensed third parties to collect the debts.  The division 
adopted this interpretation because passive debt buyers are 
investors in consumer debts that hire another duly authorized 
entity (either a Massachusetts-licensed debt collector or a 
Massachusetts attorney) to conduct the actual debt collection.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the principal purpose of collecting debts."  Id.  See Gold v. 
Midland Credit Mgt., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (holding that, as matter of law, passive debt buyer, in 
absence of "evidence showing a purpose to collect on those 
debts," is not debt collector under "principal purpose" 
definition in FDCPA); Kasalo v. Trident Asset Mgt., LLC, 53 F. 
Supp. 3d 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that passive debt 
buyer not debt collector under either definition in FDCPA).  
These decisions further the conclusion that the intent behind 
the FDCPA was to prohibit the harassing and abusive behaviors 
that characterized the contact between debt collectors and 
debtors. 
17 
 
See Advisory Opinion No. O13020 (stating that passive debt 
buyers are not debt collectors under MDCPA); Advisory Opinion 
No. O12012 (buyer of debt in default that is not directly 
engaged in collection of those debts is not required to obtain 
license so long as collection activity is performed by licensed 
debt collector); Advisory Opinion No. O06060 (same).  The 
division has held this position since at least 2006.  See 
Advisory Opinion No. O06060.  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has noted, this position is 
reasonable in light of the conduct and practices targeted by the 
MDCPA and the FDCPA.  See Pilalas v. Cadle Co., 695 F.3d 12, 16 
(1st Cir. 2012) (division's interpretation of G. L. c. 93, § 24, 
appeared consistent with aim of statute). 
We approve the division's reasonable and expert 
interpretation in this complex regulatory environment.  Attorney 
Gen., 450 Mass. at 319.  See Goldberg v. Board of Health of 
Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 634 (2005) (agency is often required to 
use its expertise to resolve issues not clearly addressed in 
statutes).  The division's interpretation helps resolve the 
ambiguity in the plain language of the statute, drawing a line 
between debt buyers and collectors based on whether they are 
involved in any collection activities with consumers.  The 
division's interpretation also reflects and respects the core 
concern of the statute, which is to prevent abusive debt 
18 
 
collection practices.  We therefore conclude that the first 
definition of "debt collector" in G. L. c. 93, § 24, does not 
apply to passive debt buyers like LVNV that have no contact with 
consumers and rely entirely on licensed third parties to collect 
their debts.12 
 
ii.  Whether LVNV is a debt collector under the second 
definition.  The second definition of "debt collector" applies 
to any entity "who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, a debt owed or due or asserted to be 
                                                          
 
12 Although we conclude that passive debt buyers are not 
debt collectors requiring a license under the MDCPA, we note 
that these companies are nonetheless regulated by the Attorney 
General as creditors and subject to many of the same 
restrictions as debt collectors regulated under the MDCPA.  
Compare 940 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.04-7.06 (2012) (regulating 
creditor contact with consumers), and 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.07 (2012) (proscribing, inter alia, false or misleading 
representations in connection with debt collection by 
creditors), with 209 Code Mass. Regs. § 18.14 (2013) (regulating 
debt collector contact with consumers), and 209 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 18.15-18.17 (2013) (prohibiting harassment, abuse, false or 
misleading representations, and unfair practices).  For example, 
a creditor cannot threaten debtors, use "profane or obscene 
language" when speaking with debtors, call or visit debtors 
during the night, or contact debtors more than twice in a seven-
day period.  940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04.  A creditor also 
cannot harass the people who reside with the debtors or who 
associate with the debtors.  Id. at §§ 7.05-7.06.  These 
regulations were amended in 2012 and explicitly target passive 
debt buyers.  See 1179 Mass. Reg. 18 (Apr. 1, 2011) (stating, in 
notice of hearing on proposed regulations, "The changes to the 
regulations expand the scope and modernize the current 
regulations to . . . ensure that both active and passive debt 
buyers are subject to debt collection laws . . .").  Thus, debt 
buyers are, at the very least, regulated as creditors because 
they own debts. 
19 
 
owed or due another."  G. L. c. 93, § 24.  This definition, by 
its plain meaning, applies only to the collection of a debt that 
is "owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another" (emphasis 
added).  See id.  Therefore, an entity cannot be a debt 
collector under the second definition if it deals with debts 
that it owns instead of debts owed to another.  The United 
States Supreme Court addressed the second definition in the 
FDCPA in Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721-1722.13  In that case, the 
Court considered whether a company that purchased debts and then 
attempted to collect on the debts was a debt collector under the 
second definition of "debt collector" in the FDCPA.  Id. at 
1721.  The Court unanimously held that a company that attempts 
to collect debts owed to it is not covered by the second 
definition because the company is not collecting or attempting 
to collect debts owed to another.  Id. at 1721-1722.  We adopt 
this plain language interpretation under the MDCPA and conclude 
that LVNV, as a matter of law, is not a debt collector under the 
second definition of the MDCPA because it does not deal with 
debts that are owed to another. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude 
that LVNV is not a debt collector under G. L. c. 93, § 24.  The 
                                                          
 
 
13 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Henson v. 
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017), was 
released after the Superior Court judge's decision in this case. 
20 
 
judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.