Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DONNA ALICE YOST

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 23, 2003  
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119889  
DONNA ALICE YOST,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
TAYLOR, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine  
whether the examining magistrate 
abused 
his 
discretion 
when he  
refused to bind defendant over for trial in the circuit court.  
Finding such an abuse occurred, we affirm the circuit court  
judgment that reinstated the charges.  
I. Proceedings below  
Donna 
Yost 
was 
charged 
with 
open 
murder, 
MCL  
750.316(1)(a), and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b),1 of her  
1“Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate . . . child abuse in the first degree . . . .”  
seven-year-old daughter Monique, who died of an overdose of a  
prescription medication called Imipramine on Sunday, October  
10, 1999.  
The preliminary examination lasted seven days.  The  
prosecution called several lay witnesses and two expert  
witnesses, Dr. Kanu Virani, a forensic pathologist who  
performed an autopsy, and Dr. Michael Evans, a toxicologist  
who analyzed a blood sample obtained during the autopsy.  The  
defense also called several lay witnesses and three experts,  
Dr. David Fleisher, an expert in pharmocology; Dr. Laurence  
Simson, a forensic pathologist; and Dr. Alan Berman, a  
clinical psychologist.  The district judge, in his role as  
examining 
magistrate, 
refused 
to bind defendant over for 
trial  
for lack of credible evidence of a homicide.  
The prosecution appealed to the circuit court.  That  
court 
reviewed 
the 
lengthy transcripts and determined that 
the  
record established a sufficient basis for finding that a  
homicide was committed and probable cause to believe that  
defendant committed it, and that the magistrate therefore had  
abused his discretion in refusing to bind defendant over.  
Defendant appealed the circuit court’s decision to the  
Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal  
“for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate  
2  
  
appellate review.”2  The Court of Appeals subsequently denied  
defendant’s motion for rehearing.3  
Defendant next filed an application for leave to appeal  
with this Court.  We granted leave to appeal limited to the  
issues  
(1) whether the refusal of the magistrate to bind 
the defendant over for trial was an abuse of  
discretion, (2) what is the appropriate role of the 
magistrate 
at 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
in  
assessing the credibility of witnesses and how does 
that assessment affect the bindover decision, and 
(3) whether the reviewing court applied the correct 
standard of review in this case?[4]  
II. Preliminary examinations  
Preliminary 
examinations 
are 
not 
constitutionally  
required. 
Hall, supra at 603. 
Rather, the preliminary  
examination is solely a creation of the Legislature, i.e., it  
2Unpublished order, entered June 6, 2001 (Docket No. 
234065). If the Court of Appeals had denied leave to appeal 
“for lack of merit,” we would comment no further.  However, 
the ground cited by the Court of Appeals for denying leave to 
appeal was “failure to persuade the Court of the need for 
immediate review.”  This reason was flawed. If defendant went  
to trial and were found guilty, any subsequent appeal would 
not consider whether the evidence adduced at the preliminary 
examination was sufficient to warrant a bindover.  People v  
Hall, 435 Mich 599, 601-603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990) (an 
evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary examination is not 
a ground for vacating or reversing a subsequent conviction 
where the defendant received a fair trial and was not  
otherwise prejudiced by the error).  
3Unpublished order, entered July 24, 2001 (Docket No. 
234065).  
4465 Mich 966 (2002).  
3  
 
is a statutory right.5  
MCL 766.13 provides:  
If it shall appear to the magistrate at the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination either 
that an offense has not been committed or that  
there is not probable cause for charging the  
defendant therewith, he shall discharge such  
defendant. If it shall appear to the magistrate at 
the conclusion of the preliminary examination that 
a felony has been committed and there is probable 
cause for charging the defendant therewith, the 
magistrate shall forthwith bind the defendant to 
appear before the circuit court of such county, or 
other court having jurisdiction of the cause, for 
trial.  
As 
the 
statute 
indicates, 
the 
preliminary 
examination 
has  
a dual function, i.e., to determine whether a felony was  
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the  
defendant committed it.  At the examination, evidence from  
which at least an inference may be drawn establishing the  
elements of the crime charged must be presented.  People v  
Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).  The probable-cause  
standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt­
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.  Id. at 103.  
Probable cause requires a quantum of evidence “sufficient to  
cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to  
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief” of the  
accused’s guilt.  People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich  
5However, as explained in People v Glass (After Remand), 
464 Mich 266, 271; 627 NW2d 261 (2001), the right to a 
preliminary examination does not apply if a defendant is 
indicted by a grand jury.  
4  
 
 
 
 
334, 344; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Yet, to find probable cause,  
a magistrate need not be without doubts regarding guilt.  The  
reason is that the gap between probable cause and guilt beyond  
a reasonable doubt is broad, id. at 344, and finding guilt  
beyond a reasonable doubt is the province of the jury. People  
v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 469-470; 579 NW2d 868 (1998).  
III. Standard of Review  
Our case law has sometimes indicated that a reviewing  
court may not reverse a magistrate’s bindover decision absent  
a “clear abuse of discretion,” e.g., People v Dellabonda, 265  
Mich 486, 491; 251 NW 594 (1933); Doss, supra at 101. 
At  
other times our case law has omitted the word “clear” and has  
simply required a reviewing court find an “abuse of  
discretion,” 
e.g., 
Genesee 
Prosecutor 
v 
Genesee 
Circuit 
Judge,  
391 Mich 115, 121; 215 NW2d 145 (1974); Justice, supra at 344.  
In defining what an “abuse of discretion” is, this Court  
has frequently invoked the test adopted in Spalding v  
Spalding, 355 Mich 382; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).  As Spalding  
stated the test, an abuse of discretion occurs when the lower  
court’s decision is “so palpably and grossly violative of fact  
and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but  
perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance  
thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or  
5  
 
 
 
  
 
  
bias.” Id. at 384-385.6  
IV. Magistrate’s consideration of credibility  
Our prior case law recognizes the propriety of an  
examining 
magistrate’s 
considering 
the 
credibility 
of  
witnesses.  In People v Paille #2, 383 Mich 621, 627; 178 NW2d  
465 (1970), the examining magistrate, when faced with several  
collusive witnesses, was struck with their inability to  
coordinate their testimony.  
He 
concluded 
that 
their testimony  
was 
incredible 
and 
“could 
not 
possibly 
convince 
a  
disinterested arbiter of facts of their good faith or their  
truthfulness.” Id. at 624.  They were, as he described it,  
engaged in “calculated prevarication to the point of  
perjury . . . .”  Id. This Court, in reviewing the matter,  
indicated that a magistrate in determining whether a crime has  
been committed has not only the right, but the duty, to pass  
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses.7 
Id. at 627.  
6While the propriety of utilizing the Spalding test in  
criminal cases has been questioned, People v Williams, 386 
Mich 565, 573; 194 NW2d 337 (1972), and People v Talley, 410 
Mich 378, 393-397; 301 NW2d 809 (1981) (Levin, J., concurring) 
overruled in part on other grounds, People v Kaufman, 457 Mich 
266, 276; 577 NW2d 466 (1998), we have continued to utilize 
the Spalding test, People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 250; 650 NW2d  
659 (2002); People v Jackson, 467 Mich 272, 277; 650 NW2d 665 
(2002), and find no occasion to revisit this question today.  
7Similar statements authorizing the examining magistrate 
to assess the credibility of witnesses are found in Talley,  
supra at 386, People v King, 412 Mich 145, 152-154; 312 NW2d 
629 (1981), and Justice, supra at 343 n 14 (citing King with  
(continued...)  
6  
 
   
 
While this holding clearly allows a magistrate authority  
to consider the credibility of witnesses,  we have also  
instructed examining magistrates to not refuse to bind a  
defendant over for trial when the evidence conflicts or raises  
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.  Yaner v People, 34  
Mich 286, 289 (1876), Doss, supra at 103, and Goecke, supra at  
469-470.8  
With regard to expert testimony, after the expert has  
been 
properly 
qualified 
by 
the 
court,9 
credibility  
determinations are generally handled in the same manner as for  
lay witnesses.  
V. The magistrate’s decision  
Analysis of a blood sample by a laboratory revealed  
Monique died from an overdose of Imipramine.10  Dr. Virani  
testified that he did not find any pill residue or granular  
material in Monique’s stomach during the autopsy.  He used  
7(...continued) 
approval).  
8There is some tension between these two principles. 
However, we find no need to clarify the interplay between 
these two principles in this opinion.  
9As we stated in People v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 587; 
537 NW2d 194 (1995), before permitting expert testimony, the 
court “must find that the evidence is from a recognized 
discipline, as well as relevant and helpful to the trier of 
fact, and presented by a witness qualified by ‘knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education . . . .’ MRE 702[.]”  
10This medication had been prescribed to Monique to help 
prevent bedwetting.  
7  
this fact as the basis for his opinion that Monique had not  
taken the pills intact, i.e., the pills probably had been  
liquified and then ingested.  Dr. Virani also opined that  
children at the age of seven do not commit suicide. Putting  
these propositions together, Dr. Virani concluded that a  
crime, homicide, had taken place.  
Defendant 
called 
several 
expert 
witnesses.  
Dr. 
Fleisher,  
a pharmacology expert, calculated that Monique had taken  
eighty-nine 
Imipramine 
pills 
and, because he was familiar 
with  
the 
dissolution 
characteristics 
of 
Imipramine, 
concluded 
there  
was no reason to expect to find pill residue in Monique’s  
stomach even if she had taken the pills whole. A forensic  
pathologist, 
Dr. 
Simson, 
testified 
that, 
having 
considered 
Dr.  
Fleisher’s 
dissolution 
testimony, 
he was not surprised that 
no  
pill residue was found and he could not conclude that a  
homicide had occurred.  Finally, Dr. Berman, an expert in  
suicidology, testified that while rare, children as young as  
seven have been known to commit suicide.  
The magistrate in stating his ruling indicated that Dr.  
Virani’s two major premises were rejected as “not credible.”  
First, he disregarded Dr. Virani’s opinion that there would  
have been pill residue in Monique’s stomach if the pills had  
been taken intact because Dr. Virani was not qualified in  
pharmacology or pharmaceutics and because this conclusion was  
8  
“completely refuted” by qualified defense expert testimony.  
Second, he disregarded Dr. Virani’s conclusion that children  
as young as seven do not commit suicide because Dr. Virani had  
limited training in psychiatry or psychology and because this  
conclusion was refuted by Dr. Berman.  The gist of this was  
that the magistrate thought Dr. Virani was simply not  
qualified as an expert in these two areas.  Having rejected  
these two points of Dr. Virani’s testimony, the magistrate  
concluded that one would have to speculate to conclude that a  
homicide had occurred.  Moreover, if a homicide did occur,  
there was little to link the defendant to it.  Thus, the  
magistrate refused to bind defendant over.  
VI. The circuit court’s opinion  
The circuit court found that there was credible expert  
testimony on both sides and, thus, the magistrate had exceeded  
his authority by comparing the credibility of the experts.  
The court stated that Dr. Virani’s expert opinion was not  
inherently 
incredible 
or 
unbelievable 
and, 
given 
the  
conflicting expert opinions, it was the responsibility of the  
fact-finder, not the magistrate, to resolve them.  
The circuit court further indicated that, leaving aside  
Dr. Virani’s two premises, there was enough other credible  
circumstantial evidence from which one could conclude that  
Monique’s death was a homicide and that defendant killed her.  
9  
Circumstantial evidence included that (1) defendant had the  
opportunity to give Monique the pills because she was alone  
with the child during the day when the child ingested the  
pills and died, (2) there was evidence of motive in that  
defendant was angry and frustrated with Monique and had been  
punishing her (for leaving the yard without telling anyone) at  
the time Monique ingested the pills, (3) defendant initially  
told the police after Monique’s death that all the family’s  
medications were accounted for and that Monique could not have  
gotten into any of them, (4) defendant failed to tell the  
police at that time that Monique had previously been taking  
Imipramine, (5) three days after Monique died forty-six  
Imipramine pills mysteriously appeared in an upstairs room on  
the second floor, when, according to a neighbor, no pills were  
present in the room the day after Monique died, and (6) after  
the pills were “discovered,” defendant told the police the  
pills must have been what killed Monique (this was before the  
toxicology report had been completed).  
On the basis of all these, the judge concluded that these  
circumstances were sufficient to warrant a conclusion by a  
cautious person that the defendant had committed murder.  The  
judge observed that the defendant was free to argue at trial  
that 
Monique 
committed 
suicide, but the possibility of 
suicide  
did not preclude a bindover of defendant where there was  
10  
 
sufficient other proof of homicide. Thus, the circuit judge  
concluded that the magistrate had abused his discretion and  
the charges should be reinstated.  
VII. Analysis  
After carefully reviewing this matter, we agree with the  
circuit court that the examining magistrate abused his  
discretion in refusing to bind defendant over for trial.  
The magistrate rejected Dr. Virani’s opinion testimony  
that the lack of pill residue suggested the pills were not  
taken whole, but liquified first and then swallowed. It was  
the magistrate’s view that Dr. Virani was not qualified to  
render such testimony where he did not know how long it took  
Imipramine to dissolve in gastric juices. It is unnecessary  
for us to determine whether this ruling regarding Dr. Virani’s  
qualifications 
was 
correct 
because 
Dr. 
Virani’s 
conclusion 
was  
echoed in the testimony of another expert, the toxicologist,  
Dr. Evans, who, because of his own knowledge of the  
dissolution characteristics of Imipramine, concluded that,  
given the large number of pills taken, residue should have  
been present.11  
11The 
district 
court’s 
written 
opinion 
never 
mentioned 
Dr. 
Evans’s testimony, and thus it is unclear that this testimony 
was ever considered.  This omission is significant because it 
suggests that the district court, in making its bindover 
decision, 
overlooked 
significant 
evidence 
that 
was 
relevant 
to 
whether there was probable cause to bind over defendant for 
trial.  Dr. Evans’s testimony tended to support the  
(continued...)  
11  
The second opinion component of Dr. Virani’s testimony  
was that children at the age of seven do not commit suicide.  
Again, we need not deal with the ruling on Dr. Virani’s  
qualifications in this area because the bindover decision  
could be made without expert testimony on the propensity of  
children to commit suicide.  There were proofs in this case  
that would cause a cautious individual to have probable cause  
to 
believe 
that 
the 
prosecution 
had 
circumstantially  
established that defendant had committed murder.  This is not  
to say that at trial a fact-finder could not be convinced that  
the child self-administered the pills, but that the  
prosecution has no duty at the preliminary examination to  
negate that theory to get defendant bound over for trial.  It  
is enough that a reasonable person could believe that a crime  
by poisoning was shown and that defendant had motive12 and  
11(...continued) 
prosecutor’s theory of the case while Dr. Fleisher’s tended to 
support the defense’s theory. Because the testimony of both 
experts was relevant to a substantial, disputed issue in this 
case, and because each witness’s testimony was competent and 
credible, resolution of the conflict between them should have 
been left for the fact-finder at trial.  
12The 
testimony 
established 
more 
than 
one 
possible 
motive. 
As the circuit court noted, defendant was angry and frustrated 
with Monique’s behavior of leaving the yard without telling 
anyone where she was going.  However, in addition to anger and 
frustration, there were other possible motives.  Defendant  
told the police that Child Protective Services had been out to 
the house because Monique had said that defendant had 
mistreated her.  Also, there was testimony that defendant knew 
the prosecutor’s office wanted to interview Monique regarding 
(continued...)  
12  
 
 
opportunity, as well as arguably incriminating actions and  
explanations.  
In sum, we agree with the circuit court that the expert  
testimony in tandem with the circumstantial evidence, which  
included evidence relating to motive and opportunity, was  
sufficient to warrant a bindover.  We conclude that the  
magistrate failed to give any weight to Dr. Evans’s expert  
testimony when he should have, failed to give any weight to  
the lay testimony related to defendant’s possible motive13 and  
opportunity, and  gave undue weight to the testimony regarding  
the propensity of children to commit suicide.14  Thus, the  
magistrate abused his discretion when he concluded from all  
the evidence that probable cause to bind defendant over for  
trial did not exist.  
12(...continued) 
allegations that she had been molested by a teenager who had 
previously stayed at their house and that the teenager had 
indicated that Monique’s nine-year-old brother had been 
molesting Monique. 
Further, neighbor Mary Jo Sheldon  
testified that just a few days before Monique died Monique had 
told her that her brother and father had molested her.  Ms.  
Sheldon indicated that she reported this to defendant and that 
defendant slapped Monique and called her a liar.  
13While motive is not an element of the crime, evidence 
of a possible motive was relevant to the bindover decision in 
this case.  
14While a child’s propensity to commit suicide was  
potentially relevant to whether a crime was committed and to 
the defense’s theory of the case, the conflicting testimony on 
this issue amounted to the type of disputed fact that should 
normally be resolved by the trier of fact.  
13  
The fact that the magistrate may have had reasonable  
doubt that defendant committed the crime was not a sufficient  
basis for refusing to bind defendant over for trial.  As we  
stated in Justice, supra at 344, a magistrate may legitimately  
find probable cause while personally entertaining some  
reservations regarding guilt.  
For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the circuit  
court.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, WEAVER, and KELLY, JJ.  
We concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly  
14