Title: In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4009.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4009 
IN RE APPLICATION OF DAYTON POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TO 
ESTABLISH A STANDARD SERVICE OFFER IN THE FORM OF AN ELECTRIC 
SECURITY PLAN, ETC.; OFFICE OF OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL ET AL., 
APPELLANTS; DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INTERVENING APPELLEE; 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., Slip Opinion 
No. 2018-Ohio-4009.] 
Public utilities—Public Utilities Commission’s approval of new electric-security 
plan that replaces the electric-security plan at issue in this appeal renders 
the appeal moot—Appeal dismissed. 
(No. 2017-0241—Submitted December 6, 2017—Decided October 4, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, Nos. 12-426-EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-
ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-EL-RDR. 
____________________ 
 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellants, the Office of Ohio Consumers’ Counsel 
(“OCC”), the Kroger Company (“Kroger”), and the Ohio Manufacturers’ 
Association Energy Group (“OMAEG”), challenge appellee’s, the Public Utility 
Commission’s, decision to allow intervening appellee, Dayton Power and Light 
Company (“DP&L”), to withdraw and terminate its second electric-security plan 
(“ESP II”).  On October 27, 2017, the court sua sponte ordered the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot.  
151 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2017-Ohio-8338, 84 N.E.3d 1045.  The question was 
prompted by the commission’s approval of DP&L’s third electric-security plan 
(“ESP III”), which replaced ESP II.  Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 16-0395-EL-SSO, 16-
396-EL-ATA, and 16-397-EL-AAM, ¶ 1, 131, 141 (Oct. 20, 2017).  Because we 
determine that the approval of ESP III renders this case moot, we dismiss the 
appeal. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} In 2013, the commission issued an order that modified and approved 
DP&L’s application for ESP II.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 12-426-EL-SSO, 12-427-
EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-EL-RDR, 2013 Ohio 
PUC LEXIS 193 (Sept. 4, 2013).  Although DP&L challenged some of the 
commission’s modifications on rehearing, it ultimately accepted the modified ESP 
II and began collecting rates under the plan.  In the approved ESP II, DP&L 
included a transition charge known as the Service Stability Rider or SSR. 
{¶ 3} On June 20, 2016, this court reversed the commission’s decision 
approving ESP II.  In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., 147 Ohio St.3d 
166, 2016-Ohio-3490, 62 N.E.3d 179 (“In re DP&L”).  In a one-sentence decision, 
the court reversed on the authority of In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 
147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 N.E.3d 734, which had found a nearly 
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identical stability charge unlawful under R.C. 4928.38 because it allowed an 
electric utility to receive transition revenues after the period allowed by statute. 
{¶ 4} On July 27, 2016, DP&L moved the commission to allow it to 
withdraw its application to approve ESP II.  R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) allows an 
electric-distribution utility to withdraw and terminate an electric-security-plan 
application in the event the commission modifies and approves the application.  
DP&L argued that the commission should grant the motion to withdraw the ESP II 
application—which was filed on December 12, 2012—because the commission had 
modified and approved the application in September 2013.  DP&L also asserted 
that withdrawal of the ESP II application was warranted because this court’s 
decision reversing the commission’s approval of ESP II constituted a rejection of 
the entire electric-security plan. 
{¶ 5} On August 26, 2016, the commission granted DP&L’s motion to 
withdraw and terminate ESP II, albeit for different reasons than those advanced by 
DP&L.  First, the commission concluded that this court had rejected only the SSR.  
As a result, the commission modified ESP II to eliminate the SSR charge.  Second, 
the commission concluded that removing the SSR in response to this court’s 
decision constituted a modification to a proposed electric-security plan, under R.C. 
4928.143(C)(1) and thereby triggered DP&L’s right to withdraw and terminate its 
electric-security-plan application under R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a).  Pub. Util. Comm. 
No. 12-426-EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 
12-672-EL-RDR, ¶ 12-15 (Aug. 26, 2016); Seventh rehearing entry, ¶ 14-15, 23-
25 (Dec. 14, 2016). 
{¶ 6} In a separate case, the commission determined that DP&L could 
replace the withdrawn ESP II with the company’s first electric-security plan (“ESP 
I”).  The commission ordered that ESP I would remain in effect until the 
commission approved a new electric-security plan.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1094-
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EL-SSO, 08-1095-EL-ATA, 08-1096-EL-AAM, and 08-1097-EL-UNC, ¶ 20 
(Aug. 26, 2016). 
{¶ 7} On October 20, 2017, the commission issued an order approving ESP 
III.  ESP III replaced ESP I (and in effect ESP II) effective November 1, 2017, and 
is to remain in place for six years, through October 31, 2023.  Pub. Util. Comm. 
No. 16-0395-EL-SSO, 16-396-EL-ATA, and 16-397-EL-AAM, ¶ 1, 131, 141 (Oct. 
20, 2017). 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 8} The ESP II rate plan and its SSR charge are no longer in effect because 
they have been replaced by ESP III.  Because ESP II is no longer in effect, we 
cannot order effective relief and the appeal is moot. 
{¶ 9} This appeal is on all fours with Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604, 904 N.E.2d 853.  In Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel, we held that the expiration of a utility’s rate plan was grounds for 
dismissing the challenge to the rates charged under that plan.  Id. at ¶ 19-22.  Under 
review in that case were certain terms and charges of Duke Energy Ohio Inc.’s rate-
stabilization plan.  OCC argued that certain charges under the rate-stabilization plan 
were unlawful and unsupported by the record.  Id. at ¶ 19-20.  While the case was 
pending before us on appeal, however, the rate-stabilization plan expired and was 
replaced with a new rate plan.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Because the rate structure under appeal 
was no longer in effect, we determined that we could not remand the case to the 
commission to implement lower prospective rates under the rate-stabilization plan.  
We further held that we could not order a refund of excessive rates already collected 
by Duke Energy, because OCC did not preserve the refund issue for appeal and 
because any refund order would be contrary to our precedent against retroactive 
ratemaking.  As a result, we dismissed the rate-stabilization-plan portion of the 
appeal as moot.  Id. at ¶ 2, 21-22.  See also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466, 816 N.E.2d 238, ¶ 14-27 (dismissing 
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appeal as moot due to lack of any available remedy); Lucas Cty. Commrs. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 344, 348-349, 686 N.E.2d 501 (1997) (finding that 
there was no revenue remaining in the discontinued program against which the 
commission could order a credit or refund of the alleged overpayments and holding 
that absent such revenue, ordering a credit or a refund would essentially be ordering 
the utility to set a different future rate, and such orders are prohibited retroactive 
ratemaking). 
{¶ 10} The dissent disagrees with our conclusion that this appeal is moot, 
because, according to the dissenting opinion, in In re DP&L, 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 
2016-Ohio-3490, 62 N.E.3d 179, we “reversed the commission’s approval of ESP 
II and granted a remedy * * *, which the commission ignored.”  Dissenting opinion 
at ¶ 49.  But ESP II is no longer in effect.  And contrary to the dissenting opinion’s 
assertion that there was an implicit holding in In re DP&L, the court did not specify 
a remedy in its order reversing the commission’s approval of ESP II; we issued a 
one-sentence decision stating only that the decision approving ESP II was reversed 
on the authority of Columbus S. Power, 147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 
N.E.3d 734.1  We gave no instructions to the commission for proceedings on 
remand, let alone an order for the commission to do what the dissenting opinion 
describes: “to determine the amount of transition revenue improperly collected by 
                                                 
1. The remedy that was ordered in Columbus S. Power is not binding precedent, because only three 
justices concurred as to the proposed remedy in that appeal.  See Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 
22 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 488 N.E.2d 840 (1986) (holding that language in prior plurality opinion was 
not controlling, because it lacked four votes), overruled on other grounds, Martin v. Midwestern 
Group Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 639 N.E.2d 438 (1994).  Attempting to turn the plurality opinion 
in Columbus S. Power into controlling law, the dissent states, “Justice Pfeifer, joined by Justice 
O’Neill, expressed the view that the court did not go far enough in ordering this remedy.”  Dissenting 
opinion at ¶ 35, fn. 1, citing In re Columbus S. Power at ¶ 81 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  But I do not read Justice Pfeifer’s opinion in the same way.  In Columbus S. 
Power, Justice Pfeifer stated that he would instruct the commission on remand to allow Ohio Power 
to charge only the market price for capacity service, id. at ¶ 83, but nothing in his opinion suggests 
that he agreed with the remedy sanctioned by the plurality. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DP&L, estimated to be $285 million, and to eliminate the overcompensation by 
offsetting the balance of DP&L’s revenue by the amount of the improperly 
collected revenue.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 50.  Nonetheless, the dissenting 
opinion insists that the commission “plainly ignored our judgment” and “failed to 
comport with our reversal mandate” on remand.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 11} “The function and jurisdiction of this court in an appeal from an 
order of the commission is limited.”  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 46 Ohio St.2d 105, 108, 346 N.E.2d 778 (1976).  Specifically, “[o]ur task 
is not to set rates; it is only to [ensure] that the rates are not unlawful or 
unreasonable, and that the rate-making process itself is lawfully carried out.”  Id.  
Here, the only rates now in effect are in ESP III, which is not before us. 
{¶ 12} The opinion concurring in judgment only agrees that dismissal is 
appropriate but disagrees with the majority’s characterization of this appeal as 
being “on all fours with” Ohio Consumers’ Counsel.  According to the concurrence, 
the difference between this case and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel is that, here, our 
remand order in In re DP&L was incomplete because it did not include specific 
instructions for the commission.  Opinion concurring in judgment only at ¶ 18.  
Contrary to the concurring opinion’s suggestion, however, the lack of remand 
instructions in In re DP&L does not distinguish this appeal from Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel, because the remand instructions in Ohio Consumers’ Counsel played no 
role in our decision to dismiss that appeal as moot.  And regardless of whether the 
remand orders in either case included instructions, the material fact is that new rates 
were put into effect.  In Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, we dismissed the appeal 
because the rate plan being appealed from had expired and had been replaced by a 
new rate plan.  121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604, 904 N.E.2d 853, at ¶ 21-22.  
That exact situation is present in this appeal. 
{¶ 13} Finally, the concurring opinion implicitly places unwarranted blame 
on the court by referring to our entry in In re DP&L as “vague” and “imprecise.”  
January Term, 2018 
 
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Opinion concurring in judgment only at ¶ 20, 22.  (Notably, only one justice 
dissented from that judgment.  In re DP&L, 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 2016-Ohio-3490, 
62 N.E.3d 179 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting)).  In the end, the event that renders this 
appeal moot is not the court’s resolution of In re DP&L.  The appeal is moot 
because of events that occurred since that time; namely, the approval of ESP III, in 
a separate case, which caused the rates at issue in In re DP&L to expire and new 
rates to be put in effect.  Because ESP III is now in effect and is not being 
challenged by this appeal, we find this appeal to be moot. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 14} Because there is no remedy that this court can legally order, this 
appeal constitutes only a request for an advisory ruling.  Cincinnati Gas & Elec. 
Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466, 816 N.E.2d 238, ¶ 17 (“In the absence 
of the possibility of an effective remedy, this appeal constitutes only a request for 
an advisory ruling from the court”).  But “it is well-settled that this court does not 
indulge itself in advisory opinions.”  Armco, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 69 Ohio 
St.2d 401, 406, 433 N.E.2d 923 (1982).  As the controversy is no longer live, we 
dismiss this appeal as moot. 
Appeal dismissed. 
FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH and LASTER 
MAYS, JJ. 
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 15} I concur in judgment only.  I agree that this case is moot.  But it has 
gotten to this point for its own reasons.  Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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assertion in ¶ 9 that this case is “on all fours with” Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604, 904 N.E.2d 853 (“Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel II”); the two cases are not “squarely on point with regard to 
both facts and law,” Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 633 (3d Ed.2011) 
(defining “on all fours”).  To describe this case as on all fours with Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel II creates the inaccurate impression that this court has dealt 
with a case nearly identical to this one in the past; it has not.  I also write to respond 
to the concerns raised by the dissenting opinion. 
{¶ 16} It is true that this case and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II reached the 
same end, with this court powerless to address the disputed rate plan because the 
rate plan at issue is no longer in effect.  In Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II, the court 
dismissed the portion of the appeal related to the rate-stabilization plan because the 
disputed rates had expired.  Id. at ¶ 21-22.  While dismissal for mootness was 
appropriate in Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II and is appropriate in this case, the cases 
are different. 
{¶ 17} Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II concerned an appeal to this court that 
followed our remand of the matter to the Public Utilities Commission in Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-5789, 
856 N.E.2d 213 (“Ohio Consumers’ Counsel I”).  In Ohio Consumers’ Counsel I, 
the commission had approved a stipulation entered into among the relevant parties 
to establish a standard market-based service offer; we ordered the commission to 
compel the utility to produce, in discovery, any side agreements that the utility had 
made with the parties so that the commission could, among other things, “evaluate 
the seriousness of the bargaining that had led to the stipulation.”  Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel II at ¶ 1, 3-4.  After discovery was complete, the commission issued a 
second order, which the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel appealed to this court.  Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel II at ¶ 9-11.  We dismissed the portion of the appeal related 
to the rate-stabilization plan because before we could complete our review, the 
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challenged rates had expired and new rates were in effect that were based on a rate 
structure established by new legislation.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Therefore, the court could not 
remand the case in order to implement lower prospective rates.  Id. 
{¶ 18} In Ohio Consumers’ Counsel I, this court issued an order clearly 
describing the action the commission was to take on remand, and there was no 
dispute that the commission properly followed through in regard to the remand; in 
In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 2016-Ohio-
3490, 62 N.E.3d 179 (“DP&L I”), in contrast, our remand order did not compel any 
action but rather was incomplete, because we did not include any specific 
instructions for the commission to eliminate overcompensation obtained through 
an unlawful transition charge.  Ultimately, the commission, after modifying Dayton 
Power and Light Company’s (“DP&L’s”) second electric-security plan (“ESP II”) 
to eliminate the service-stability-rider charge, granted intervening appellee 
DP&L’s motion to withdraw ESP II.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 12-426-EL-SSO, 12-
427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-EL-RDR, ¶ 12-15 
(Aug. 26, 2016); Seventh rehearing entry, ¶ 14-15, 23-25 (Dec. 14, 2016).  But 
DP&L’s third electric-security plan is now in place, mooting our consideration of 
issues surrounding ESP II, so we are left without the ability to determine the 
important issue of whether the commission’s modification of ESP II in reaction to 
an order of this court properly created an opportunity for the utility to withdraw its 
utility plan under R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a). 
{¶ 19} Whereas in Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II, mootness kept this court 
from considering only esoteric issues regarding certain aspects of a particular rate 
plan, in this case we are kept from deciding the broader and far-reaching issue of 
whether utility companies can avoid any negative effects of our orders by 
withdrawing their rate plans after we issue our orders.  In sum, the way this case 
got to the point of mootness and the implications of the issues that are left undecided 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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are so dissimilar from Ohio Consumers’ Counsel II that I cannot agree with the 
majority opinion’s description of it being “on all fours.” 
{¶ 20} Turning to the concerns raised by the dissenting opinion, I agree that 
the result in this case is not ideal.  However, the less-than-ideal outcome is the 
upshot of this court’s vague entry in DP&L I, which merely stated that the 
commission’s decision was “reversed on the authority of In re Application of 
Columbus S. Power Co., 147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 N.E.3d 734.” 
{¶ 21} Although the dissenting opinion contends that declaring this case 
moot undermines the authority of this court and may erode public confidence in our 
decisions, the commission acted after this court’s vague entry failed to specifically 
delineate that the rider at issue in DP&L I was unlawful and failed to specify a 
remedy.  The commission could not read into our single-sentence entry the explicit 
remand instructions applicable in In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co.  
“[T]his court’s reversal and remand of an order of the commission does not change 
or replace the [rate] schedule as a matter of law, but is a mandate to the commission 
to issue a new order which replaces the reversed order,” and therefore the “rate 
schedule filed with the commission remains in effect until the commission executes 
this court’s mandate by an appropriate order.”  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., 46 Ohio St.2d 105, 117, 346 N.E.2d 778 (1976).  Absent explicit 
instructions to the commission, our mandate did not require the commission to take 
any specific course of action. 
{¶ 22} The dissenting opinion’s statement that “the commission knew of 
our remand in Columbus S. Power and in this case, ignored our remand order to 
determine the amount of transition revenue improperly collected by DP&L, 
estimated to be $285 million, and to eliminate the overcompensation by offsetting 
the balance of DP&L’s revenue by the amount of the improperly collected 
revenue,” dissenting opinion at ¶ 50, mischaracterizes what the commission did.  
January Term, 2018 
 
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Our imprecise entry, which merely reversed the commission’s decision on the 
authority of Columbus S. Power, left the commission to act when this court did not. 
{¶ 23} Even if the court had issued an explicit order to the commission, the 
amount that could have been offset against future revenue would have been limited.  
The dissent asserts that the “transition revenue improperly collected by DP&L, 
estimated to be $285 million,” would have been offset.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 50.  
However, because the appellants, the Office of Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, the 
Kroger Company, and the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group, did not 
post a bond pursuant to R.C. 4903.16, the collection of the rider was not stayed.  
When the commission approves a rate, it is presumed lawful and will be collected 
unless a party appeals from the order approving the rate and posts an appropriate 
bond.  See Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm., 170 Ohio St. 105, 163 N.E.2d 167 
(1959), paragraphs one, two, three, and four of the syllabus.  Neither the 
commission nor this court has the authority to order the refund of a charge that is 
lawfully collected but is later determined to have been unlawful. 
{¶ 24} The rider at issue in DP&L I authorized DP&L to collect $110 
million a year for three years as part of an electric-security plan approved by the 
commission for “a term beginning January 1, 2014, and terminating December 31, 
2016.”  In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 12-
426-EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-
EL-RDR, 2013 Ohio PUC LEXIS 193, *58 (Sept. 4, 2013), as modified by a 
September 6, 2013 nunc pro tunc entry.  During most of that term, the electric-
security plan was under review at the commission or at this court.  After the 
rehearing process was exhausted, review was first sought from this court on August 
29, 2014.  On June 20, 2016, we issued our entry reversing the decision and 
remanding the case.  DP&L I, 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 2016-Ohio-3490, 62 N.E.3d 
179.  The day after the release of our decision, the parties challenging the rider 
sought an order from the commission suspending the collection of the allegedly 
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unlawful charge.  The commission finally ordered the termination of the charge on 
August 26, 2016.  In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., Pub. Util. 
Comm. Nos. 08-1094-EL-SSO, 08-1095-EL-ATA, 08-1096-EL-AAM, and 08-
1097-EL-UNC (Aug. 26, 2016).  Therefore, customers paid the charge for 32 of the 
36 months that it was authorized and paid approximately $294 million. 
{¶ 25} The long slog of protracted litigation—not aided by this court’s 
unclear entry in DP&L I—has led to today’s judgment of mootness.  The clock has 
run out—now the electric-security plan at issue is no longer in force and new rates 
are in place, which means that this court cannot order any meaningful relief for 
DP&L’s customers without violating the prohibition against ordering refunds.  See 
Keco Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254, 
257, 141 N.E.2d 465 (1957). 
{¶ 26} As we recently recognized in In re Application of Columbus S. 
Power Co., Keco’s no-refund rule can be unfair and allow windfalls in cases, like 
the one before us, in which utilities collect and retain hundreds of millions of dollars 
from customers for charges that are later determined to have been unlawful.  138 
Ohio St.3d 448, 2014-Ohio-462, 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 56.  The protection provided by 
the legislature against the collection of these rates that are alleged to be unlawful is 
a stay secured by a bond in an amount sufficient to protect the utility against 
damage, id., a bond most litigants cannot afford.  Nonetheless, we have consistently 
held that the prohibition on refunds and the bond requirement are matters of statute 
and that the determination whether they are wise public policies therefore rests with 
the General Assembly, not this court.  In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 
128 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-1788, 947 N.E.2d 655, ¶ 20.  This does not mean 
that unfairness and windfalls are inevitable.  R.C. 4905.32 states: 
 
No public utility shall refund or remit directly or indirectly, 
any rate, rental, toll, or charge so specified or, any part thereof, or 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
extend to any person, firm, or corporation, any rule, regulation, 
privilege, or facility except such as are specified in such schedule 
and regularly and uniformly extended to all persons, firms, and 
corporations under like circumstances for like, or substantially 
similar, service. 
 
The commission therefore has authority to mitigate the unfairness of the no-refund 
rule and the barriers imposed by the bond requirement, because a refund is possible 
if there is refund language in the commission’s order establishing the rate charged 
by the utility, R.C. 4905.32.  “[T]he legislature gave the commission the 
discretionary authority to [order a refund].  All the commission had to do was 
require a refund clause to be part of the tariff pursuant to R.C. 4905.32.”  In re Rev. 
of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co., 153 Ohio 
St.3d 289, 2018-Ohio-229, 106 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 66 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  But here, 
there was no refund clause in the tariff, so no refund is permissible. 
{¶ 27} For the above reasons, I am compelled to concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 29} This matter is not moot.  The Public Utilities Commission ignored 
an earlier order of this court and permitted Dayton Power and Light Company to 
withdraw its application for its second electric security plan after we reversed the 
commission’s order modifying and approving that plan and remanded the case to 
the commission “on the authority of In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 
147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 N.E.3d 734” (“Columbus S. Power”), in 
which we ordered elimination of overcompensation due to improperly collected 
revenue.  See In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 
2016-Ohio-3490, 62 N.E.3d 179 (“In re DP&L”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 30} R.C. 4928.141(A) provides that “an electric distribution utility shall 
provide consumers * * * a standard service offer of all competitive retail electric 
services necessary to maintain essential electric service to consumers” and permits 
the utility to provide the offer in one of two ways—a market rate offer pursuant to 
R.C. 4928.142 or an electric security plan pursuant to R.C. 4928.143. 
{¶ 31} DP&L elected to provide its standard service offer through an 
electric security plan, and on June 24, 2009, the commission approved the 
application for its first electric security plan or ESP I.  In re Application of Dayton 
Power & Light Co., Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 08-1094-EL-SSO, 08-1095-EL-ATA, 
08-1096-EL-AAM, and 08-1097-EL-UNC, 2009 WL 1917793 (June 24, 2009). 
{¶ 32} On September 4, 2013, the commission modified and approved 
DP&L’s application for its second electric security plan or ESP II, effective January 
1, 2014.  In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 
12-426-EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-
672-EL-RDR, 2013 Ohio PUC LEXIS 193 (Sept. 4, 2013) (the “ESP II Order”).  
In the ESP II Order, the commission approved a service stability rider or SSR, 
explaining that DP&L had proposed the SSR “for the purpose of stabilizing and 
providing certainty regarding retail electric service by maintaining DP&L’s 
financial integrity,” which DP&L claimed was threatened by increased customer 
switching, declining wholesale prices, and declining capacity prices.  Id. at *36-37.  
In its order, the commission stated:  
 
Although generation, transmission, and distribution rates have been 
unbundled, DP&L is not a structurally separated utility; thus, the 
financial losses in the generation, transmission, or distribution 
business of DP&L are financial losses for the entire utility.  
Therefore, if one of the businesses suffers financial losses, it may 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
impact the entire utility, adversely affecting its ability to provide 
stable, reliable, or safe retail electric service.  The Commission finds 
that the SSR will provide stable revenue to DP&L for the purpose 
of maintaining its financial integrity. 
 
Id. at *50. 
{¶ 33} In the ESP II Order, the commission further stated that it was 
rejecting the claim of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”), the 
Kroger Company, and others that the SSR constituted an unreasonable and 
unlawful transition charge “designed to provide DP&L with generation-related 
revenue that it would otherwise lose as a result of customers shopping to obtain 
better retail generation supply prices” and “den[ied] customers the benefits of 
shopping in the competitive retail electric services market,” id. at *44-45, noting its 
determination was consistent with its approval of a retail stability rider or RSR in 
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 11-346-EL-
SSO, 11-348-EL-SSO, 11-349-EL-AAM, and 11-350-EL-AAM, 2012 WL 
3542177 (Aug. 8, 2012).  Id. at *51.  Subsequently, DP&L began collecting the 
charges approved by the commission in ESP II. 
{¶ 34} While appeals from the ESP II Order were pending in this court, we 
held in Columbus S. Power, 147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 N.E.3d 743, 
that the commission erred when it found the RSR did not recover transition revenue 
or its equivalent.  Id. at ¶ 38.  In that case, we explained that transition costs are 
generally generation costs a utility incurred before retail competition began “that 
are no longer recoverable from customers who have switched to another generation 
provider.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  The RSR was intended to “guarantee recovery of lost 
revenue resulting from certain discounted capacity prices * * * and from expected 
increases in customer shopping during the ESP,” id. at ¶ 23, and it was “designed 
to generate enough revenue for the company to achieve a certain rate of return on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
its generation assets,” id. at ¶ 23.  Thus, we concluded the RSR recovered the 
equivalent of transition revenue.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 35} In Columbus S. Power we further explained that the commission had 
previously authorized the utility company to recover its actual capacity costs, but 
because it also allowed the utility to recover “$508 million in additional revenue 
through the RSR during the ESP period, the amount of which appears to be tied in 
large part to [the utility’s] recovery of [competitive retail electric service capacity 
revenues],” the utility was “being overcompensated for providing capacity service 
through the nondeferral part of the RSR.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  We noted the utility was 
“currently collecting * * * deferred capacity costs with carrying charges through 
the RSR,” and we ordered the commission “to adjust the balance of [the utility’s] 
deferred capacity costs to eliminate the overcompensation of capacity revenue 
recovered through the nondeferral part of the RSR during the ESP,” and we 
remanded the matter to the commission to determine how much of the revenue 
recovered through the nondeferral part of the RSR was allocable to competitive 
retail electric service capacity revenues and to “offset the balance of deferred 
capacity costs by the amount determined.”  Id. at ¶ 39-40.2 
{¶ 36} Columbus S. Power is significant in the instant case because on June 
20, 2016, we reversed the commission’s order approving ESP II “on the authority 
of * * * Columbus S. Power.”  See In re DP&L. 
{¶ 37} On remand, even though it had collected revenue pursuant to the ESP 
II Order which we reversed, DP&L moved to withdraw its application for ESP II 
pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a).  The commission found that ESP II “should be 
modified to remove the SSR based upon the opinion” of this court in In re DP&L 
it then modified the ESP II Order to eliminate the SSR, and it explained that in 
                                                 
2. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Pfeifer, joined by Justice O’Neill, 
expressed the view that the court did not go far enough in ordering this remedy.  Columbus S. Power 
at ¶ 81 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
doing so, it had effectively modified the application for ESP II and therefore, 
pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a), had “no choice but to grant DP&L’s motion” 
to withdraw, terminate ESP II, and dismiss the case.  Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 12-
426-EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-
EL-RDR (Aug. 26, 2016), ¶ 12-15.  In so doing, the commission plainly ignored 
our judgment reversing its decision “on the authority of” Columbus S. Power and 
did not adjust the balance of DP&L’s revenue to eliminate the overcompensation 
of revenue recovered through the SSR or offset the balance of the overpayment 
through future rate authorizations.  This was error and failed to comport with our 
reversal mandate. 
{¶ 38} On the same day that the commission granted DP&L’s motion to 
withdraw the ESP II application, it also issued a separate order granting DP&L’s 
motion to implement the provisions, terms, and conditions of ESP I, purportedly in 
accordance with R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(b), until it authorized a subsequent standard 
service offer.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1094-EL-SSO, 08-1095-EL-ATA, 08-
1096-EL-AAM, and 08-1097-EL-UNC (Aug. 26, 2016).  The order implementing 
ESP I is the subject of a separate appeal now pending before us in Supreme Court 
case No. 2017-0204. 
{¶ 39} Thereafter, OCC, Kroger, the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association 
Energy Group (“OMAEG”), and others challenged the order granting the motion 
to withdraw the application for ESP II by filing applications for rehearing.  In an 
entry denying those applications, the commission rejected a claim that In re DP&L 
implicitly directed the commission to “initiate a proceeding to account for the 
effects of the SSR and adjust rates accordingly.”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 12-426-
EL-SSO, 12-427-EL-ATA, 12-428-EL-AAM, 12-429-EL-WVR, and 12-672-EL-
RDR, 2016 Ohio PUC LEXIS 1139 (Dec. 14, 2016), ¶ 31 and 33.  This too was 
error because when the commission removed the SSR based on our opinion, it 
failed to account for the overcompensation the utility had received and thereby 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
manipulated implementation of ESP II to purport to eliminate the necessity to adjust 
prospective rates.  But our intent in reversing was to have the commission offset 
the overcompensation.  It failed to do so. 
{¶ 40} The commission determined this claim was moot because DP&L had 
“withdr[awn] and terminated the SSR along with the rest of ESP II,” so, unlike in 
Columbus S. Power, “[t]here are no prospective rates to adjust * * *.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  
The commission also determined such an adjustment would violate precedent from 
this court prohibiting retroactive ratemaking, citing Keco Industries Inc. v. 
Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 166 Ohio St. 254, 141 N.E.2d 465 (1957).  
Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 41} Those commission determinations, however, ignore our order 
reversing “on the authority of” Columbus S. Power and fail to address the 
overcompensation issue.  The orders granting the motion to withdraw and denying 
the applications for rehearing are the subject of this appeal. 
{¶ 42} On October 20, 2017, the commission approved DP&L’s third 
electric security plan or ESP III, effective November 1, 2017.  Pub. Util. Comm. 
No. 16-0395-EL-SSO, 16-396-EL-ATA, and 16-397-EL-AAM (Oct. 20, 2017). 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 43} “R.C. 4903.13 provides that a [Public Utilities Commission] order 
shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by this court only when, upon consideration 
of the record, the court finds the order to be unlawful or unreasonable.”  In re 
Complaints of Lycourt-Donovan v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 152 Ohio St.3d 73, 
2017-Ohio-7566, 93 N.E.3d 902, ¶ 23.  “[T]his court has ‘complete and 
independent power of review as to all questions of law’ in appeals from the 
[commission].”  Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 78 Ohio 
St.3d 466, 469, 678 N.E.2d 922 (1997). 
{¶ 44} R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) governs the commission’s decision to approve, 
modify and approve, or reject an application for a proposed ESP and states: 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
 
The commission shall issue an order under this division for an initial 
application under this section not later than one hundred fifty days 
after the application’s filing date and, for any subsequent application 
* * * , not later than two hundred seventy-five days after the 
application’s filing date.  * * * [T]he commission by order shall 
approve or modify and approve an application * * * if it finds that 
the electric security plan so approved * * * is more favorable in the 
aggregate as compared to the expected results [of a market rate 
offer].  * * * Otherwise, the commission by order shall disapprove 
the application. 
 
{¶ 45} R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) provides:  
 
If the commission modifies and approves an application [for 
approval of an electric security plan] under division (C)(1) of this 
section, the electric distribution utility may withdraw the 
application, thereby terminating it, and may file a new standard 
service offer * * * . 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 46} Here, the commission concluded that its decision to remove the SSR 
from ESP II following our reversal in In re DP&L on the authority of Columbus S. 
Power effectively modified and approved the application for ESP II and therefore 
triggered DP&L’s statutory right to withdraw that application pursuant to R.C. 
4928.143(C)(2)(a).  The commission is wrong. 
{¶ 47} When the commission removed the SSR from ESP II, it was not 
exercising its discretion to modify and approve an ESP application pursuant to R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
4928.143(C)(1); rather, it was acting pursuant to a mandate from this court, and the 
commission stated that it modified the ESP II order to eliminate the SSR “based 
upon the opinion” of this court.  Notably, R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) does not permit 
a utility to withdraw an application for an ESP that has already taken effect in 
response to an adverse ruling by this court, and that is the reason for my departure 
from the majority, which declares the issue moot.  It is not. 
{¶ 48} Here, the commission removed the SSR from ESP II on remand but 
ignored our mandate to adjust the balance of DP&L’s revenue to eliminate the 
overcompensation through future rate authorizations and exceeded its statutory 
authority when it permitted DP&L to withdraw its ESP II application.  Thus, its 
order granting that motion to withdraw is unlawful. 
{¶ 49} I reject the majority’s position that the approval of ESP III renders 
this case moot “[b]ecause there is no remedy that this court can legally order.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 14.  And I reject its position that in In re DP&L, this court 
specified no remedy for the improper collection of revenue, which has been 
estimated by OCC, Kroger, and OMAEG to be $285 million.  This court reversed 
the commission’s approval of ESP II and granted a remedy in In re DP&L, which 
the commission ignored.  By reversing the decision of the commission modifying 
and approving the application for ESP II and explaining that our reversal was “on 
the authority of * * * Columbus S. Power,” In re DP&L, 147 Ohio St.3d 166, 2016-
Ohio-3490, 62 N.E.3d 179, we implicitly held that the SSR, like the RSR that was 
at issue in Columbus S. Power, provided DP&L with generation related revenue 
that it would otherwise lose as a result of customer shopping and thus improperly 
allowed DP&L to collect transition revenue or its equivalent.  See Columbus S. 
Power, 147 Ohio St.3d 439, 2016-Ohio-1608, 67 N.E.3d 734, at ¶ 15, 25. 
{¶ 50} In Columbus S. Power, we noted the utility was compensated for 
providing capacity service through the nondeferral part of the RSR and was 
collecting deferred capacity costs with carrying charges through the RSR, and we 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
ordered the commission to adjust the balance of the deferred capacity costs to 
eliminate the overcompensation and remanded the cause for the commission to 
determine how much of that revenue was allocable to competitive retail capacity 
revenues and to offset the balance by the amount determined.  Id. at ¶ 39-40.  Here, 
the commission knew of our remand in Columbus S. Power and in this case, ignored 
our remand order to determine the amount of transition revenue improperly 
collected by DP&L, estimated to be $285 million, and to eliminate the 
overcompensation by offsetting the balance of DP&L’s revenue by the amount of 
the improperly collected revenue. 
{¶ 51} The decision of the commission to modify ESP II by deleting the 
SSR, pursuant to our reversal on the authority of Columbus S. Power, only partially 
satisfied our order, because the commission did not calculate the amount of 
DP&L’s overcompensation through the SSR and did not either adjust the balance 
of DP&L’s revenue to eliminate the overcompensation or offset the balance of the 
overpayment through future rate authorizations, as in Columbus S. Power.  An 
administrative agency has no power or authority to deviate from a mandate issued 
by a reviewing court.  In re Wella A.G., 858 F.2d 725, 728 (Fed.Cir.1988).  Hence, 
the commission’s decision to modify ESP II and permit the utility to withdraw it 
fails to comply with this court’s order on remand and is neither lawful nor 
reasonable. 
{¶ 52} And here, the majority begins to take steps on a path that has the 
potential to make Ohio Supreme Court review of decisions like this one rendered 
by the commission completely meaningless.  By issuing its dismissal based on 
mootness, the majority permits the utility to keep the estimated $285 million it 
improperly collected and establishes a road map for future similar occurrences. 
{¶ 53} We already witness in this matter that our court is called upon to 
conduct a partial review of a multiyear ESP that began in 2009, with ESP II being 
approved effective January 2014.  Despite our remand due to an overcompensated 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
utility and our reversal on the authority of Columbus S. Power, in which we ordered 
an adjustment, the commission here permitted the utility to simply withdraw ESP 
II and substitute ESP I with no adjustment to account for the alleged $285 million 
collected in overcompensation.  And a majority of this court determines that the 
matter is moot because ESP II no longer exists. 
{¶ 54} The court here sets a poor precedent.  It not only fails to enforce one 
of its lawful orders, but it also telegraphs to other utilities that if this court reverses 
a matter in connection with an application approved by the commission involving 
collection of unlawful charges, on remand, they can simply follow the procedure 
here, apply to withdraw the application, and thereby render review by this court 
wholly meaningless.  This is exactly the import of today’s decision when it 
dismisses the matter as moot “[b]ecause there is no remedy that this court can 
legally order.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 55} Courts have inherent authority to enforce their judgments.  And a 
matter that potentially involves a $285 million overcompensation that this court had 
previously ordered to be accounted for and/or offset through future rate 
authorizations can be remedied by an order of this court directing the commission 
to accomplish that objective.  This is a significant case.  The majority’s decision to 
cede its lawful constitutional authority to review the commission’s orders reduces 
the jurisdiction of this court and establishes precedent that may well erode public 
confidence in our decisions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 56} The order of the commission granting DP&L’s motion to withdraw 
ignores a mandate from this court and violates R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) because the 
statute does not permit a utility to withdraw an application for an ESP that has been 
reversed and is subject to a mandate from this court.  Accordingly, I would conclude 
that the order of the commission is unlawful and unreasonable.  Thus, I would 
reverse it and once again remand the matter to the commission and order the 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
commission to calculate the amount DP&L was overcompensated through the SSR 
and either adjust the balance of DP&L’s revenue to eliminate the overcompensation 
or offset the balance of the overpayment through future rate authorizations to 
comply with our mandate in In re DP&L reversing the ESP II Order on the authority 
of Columbus S. Power. 
 
FRENCH and LASTER MAYS, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Bruce Weston, Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, Maureen R. Willis, Senior 
Regulatory Counsel, and Terry Etter, Assistant Consumers’ Counsel, for appellant 
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel. 
 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., and Angela Paul Whitfield, for appellant 
Kroger Company. 
 
Robert Brundrett, for appellant Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy 
Group. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William L. Wright, Thomas W. 
McNamee, and Werner L. Margard III, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Faruki, Ireland, Cox, Rhinehart & Dusing, P.L.L., D. Jeffrey Ireland, Jeffrey 
S. Sharkey, and Christopher C. Hollon, for intervening appellee. 
_________________