Title: Attorney Grievance v. McCoy

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 14
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
THOMAS J. MCCOY
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
File: May 16, 2002 
1Until July 1, 2001, Maryland Rule 16-709, as relevant, provided:
“a. Who may file.  Charges against an attorney shall be filed by the Bar
Counsel acting at the direction of the Review Board.”
Adopted November 30, 2000, effective July 1, 2001, Maryland Rule 16-741 now governs
the filing of  statements of charges.   It provides:
“(a) Filing of Statement of Charges.
“(1) Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel shall
file with the Commission a Statement of Charges if Bar
Counsel determines that:
“(A) the attorney either engaged in conduct
constituting professional misconduct or is
incapacitated;
“(B) the professional misconduct or the
incapacity does not warrant an immediate
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action;
“(C) a Conditional Diversion Agreement is
either not appropriate under the circumstances
or the parties were unable to agree on one;  and
“(D) a reprimand is either not appropriate under
the circumstances or (i) one was offered and
rejected by the attorney, or (ii) a proposed
reprimand was disapproved by the Commission
and Bar Counsel was directed to file a
Statement of Charges.”
 
In this case, Bar Counsel, acting at the direction of the Review Board,  see Maryland
Rule 16-709,1  and prompted by a complaint filed with his office and the disbarment of
Thomas J. McCoy, the respondent, a member of the Delaware bar, by the Supreme Court of
Delaware, pursuant to a complaint filed by clients, whom the respondent represented in  a
medical malpractice action, and with one of whom he had financial dealings, filed a Petition
For Disciplinary Action against the respondent, charging the respondent with various, and
2Pursuant to Maryland Rule 1.3,  “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.” 
3Maryland Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to “keep a client reasonably informed about
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”
4Maryland Rule 1.16 (a) provides:
“(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client
or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if:
“(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law;
“(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially
impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or
“(3) the lawyer is discharged.”
5Under Maryland Rule 3.2, “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
2
multiple, violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland
Rule 16-812, seeking reciprocal and other sanctions.    Based on the complaint of the clients,
the petition alleged that the respondent violated Rules 1.3, Diligence,2 1.4, Communication,3
1.16 (a), Declining or Terminating Representation,4 3.2, Expediting Litigation,5 8.1 (b), Bar
6Maryland Rule 8.1 (b) provides:
“An applicant for admission to or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6 [pertaining to the confidentiality of information].”
7Rule 8.4 (d) provides that “[i]t is professional  misconduct for  a lawyer to: 
“(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
8The one exception related to Maryland Rule 1.15.   The Supreme Court of
Delaware found a violation of subsections (a), (b) and (d) of that Rule.   The Petition For
Disciplinary Action filed against the respondent by Bar Counsel did not charge a violation
of subsection (d).
9(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c) [pertaining to client consent], (d) [pertaining to
criminal or fraudulent conduct], and (e) [pertaining to assistance not permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct], and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
 
10Maryland Rule 1.15, as relevant, provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
3
Admission and Disciplinary Matters,6 and 8.4 (d), Misconduct. 7  He was charged, in
connection with the reciprocal proceedings, with virtually the same violations that the
Supreme Court of Delaware sustained,8 i.e, Rules 1.2 (a), Scope of Representation,9 1.3,  1.15,
Safekeeping Property,10 1.16 (d), 3.4, Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,11 8.1 (b), and
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer's own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account
maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other
property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. 
Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
“(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
person.  Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
  
11Maryland Rule 3.4 (c) admonishes a lawyer not to “knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion
that no valid obligation exists.” 
12Personal service could not be obtained on the respondent.   Consequently, upon
motion of the petitioner, the Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(d), authorized
service by delivery of the Court’s order and the pleadings on the Treasurer of the Client’s
Security Trust Fund.    When the respondent did not file a timely answer after the
petitioner filed its affidavit of service and the Treasurer of the Clients’ Security Trust
Fund filed a certificate of compliance, the hearing court entered an order of default,
which was mailed to the respondent’s last known address.    The respondent did not
move, and to date has not moved, to vacate the order.
13Maryland Rule 16-711.a provides:
“a. Findings.  A written statement of the findings of facts and conclusions
of law shall be filed in the record of the proceedings and copies sent to all
parties.”
4
8.4 (d).
We referred the case to the Honorable Thomas E. Noel, of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, for hearing.12  See 16-711.a.13  Following the hearing, the hearing court made
See Rule 16-757, effective July 1, 2001.
14The respondent was decertified, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-811.g, for failure
to pay annual assessments to the Clients’ Security Trust Fund.  
5
findings of fact, as follows:
“BC Docket No. 2000-472-00-3
Complaint of Jane and Wayne Nock
“On or about June 24, 1999, the Respondent filed a civil action in the Circuit court for
Baltimore City on behalf of his clients, Jane C. and Wayne E. Nock (hereafter “the Nocks”).
 The Nocks, residents of Delaware, were suing Walker L. Robinson, M.D.    Dr. Robinson
practiced medicine in Baltimore, Maryland.    On or about December 8, 1999, Dr. Robinson
filed an Answer to the Complaint.    Thereafter, the Respondent failed to pursue the litigation
on behalf of the Nocks.
“The Respondent failed to comply with the Circuit Court’s Scheduling Order with
regard to the designation of expert witnesses and failed to communicate with the Nocks
concerning the status of their litigation.    The Respondent abandoned the Nocks without
explanation or advice, failed to notify the Nocks of his decertification by the Court of Appeals
on April 12, 2000,[14] failed to withdraw his appearance and failed to appear at hearings set
by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
*     *     *     *
“BC Docket No. 2001-269-00-3
Complaint of Bar Counsel
“By Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware dated January
6
17, 2001, Respondent was found to have violated the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (DLRPC), specifically, DLRPC 1.2 (a), failing to abide by a client’s
decision, DLRPC 1.3, failing to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client,
DLRPC 1.15 (a), commingling funds, DLRPC 1.15 (b), failing to promptly deliver funds to
a client upon request, DLRPC 1.15 (d), failing to maintain proper books and records, DLRPC
1.16 (d), failing to take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interest upon termination of
representation, DLRPC 3.4 (c), knowingly disobeying the Court of Chancery’s Order to
cooperate with the Receivers and knowingly refusing to fulfill his annual registration
obligations, DLRPC 8.1 (b), willfully failing to respond to the office of Disciplinary
Counsel’s request for information, and DLRPC 8.4 (d), engaging in conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
“The facts underlying the findings of the Delaware Court are as follows.   On or about
July 1998, the Respondent began giving Jane Nock advice with regard to her business,
Delaware Heritage Basket Company (hereafter “DHB”).    In return for his legal services, Ms.
Nock offered to give the Respondent twenty-five percent (25%) of the business.    In August
1998, Ms. Nock’s business checking account was closed by her bank due to a series of checks
having been written with insufficient funds.   Respondent allowed checks and deposits
relating to DHB to be processed through one of his bank accounts.   Client funds were
commingled with the Respondent’s own funds and transactions.
“In September 1998, Ms. Nock’s financial difficulties became acute as the police
7
seized her records and her arrest was imminent.   She apparently had a falling out with
Respondent and retained new counsel, John Sandy.   Mr. Sandy then sought return from
Respondent of all funds being held in his possession on behalf of Ms. Nock.
“Although Respondent recognized that he owed Ms. Nock money in December 1998,
the Respondent did not pay these funds until June 1999 when the Delaware Office of
Disciplinary Counsel instructed him to do so.   Because Respondent did not maintain adequate
records relating to Ms. Nock’s business, the amount that Respondent calculated he owed Ms.
Nock could not be substantiated.
“In another matter, the Respondent represented Joseph Mascelli during the period
November1997 to April 1999 in the matter of a judgment entered against Mr. Mascelli in
connection with a debt on a lease of commercial real estate.   Respondent failed to carry out
his client’s instructions to resolve the matter and, as a result, subjected his client to actions by
the sheriff against his assets.    Respondent failed to return promptly the seven hundred fifty
dollar ($750) retainer paid by Mr. Mascelli.
“The Respondent failed to respond in a timely manner to requests by the Delaware
Office of Disciplinary Counsel with regard to both the Nock and the Mascelli matters and
failed to provide the Supreme Court of Delaware with the required 1999 annual registration
statement or to pay the required registration assessment.    On July 13, 1999, the Supreme
Court held a hearing on a rule to show cause why the Respondent should not be suspended
from practice.   The Respondent failed to appear and the Supreme Court of Delaware issued
8
an Order suspending Respondent indefinitely.
“Thereafter, Respondent failed to communicate with the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel and, on July 16, 1999, two Receivers were appointed by the Court of Chancery.   The
Order specifically obliged Respondent to cooperate with and assist the Receivers in notifying
and protecting the interests of his clients.   Respondent failed to cooperate with or assist the
Receivers, failed to respond to repeated attempts by the Receivers to communicate with him
about receivership matters, failed to promptly provide the Receivers, upon their repeated
requests, with his active client files and related information about pending client matters or
with certain accounting records for his law practice, and failed to provide the Receivers with
access to his law office so that the Receivers could readily obtain client files and other
information needed to carry out their obligations pursuant to the Court of Chancery’s Order.
 Respondent also failed to assist the Receivers in their efforts to deal with his non-compliant
real estate escrow account.
“The Respondent’s conduct resulted in a great burden to the Receivers and was
prejudicial to the interests of his clients, many of whom were in bankruptcy, in their active
legal matters.    The Respondent’s lack of cooperation and failure to turn over account ledgers
made it difficult for the Receivers to make a determination as to refunds owed to clients.”
On these findings, the hearing court concluded, as to the Nocks’ complaint, that the
respondent violated each of the rules charged, except 1.16 and 8.1, as to which it made no
findings at all.    As to Bar Counsel’s complaint, noting that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-
15Maryland Rule 8.4 (a) prohibits a lawyer from “violat[ing] or attempt[ing] to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, [or] knowingly assist[ing] or induc[ing]
another to do so, or do so through acts of another.”
 
9
710.e, a final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a judicial tribunal as to an attorney’s
guilt of misconduct is conclusive proof of that misconduct, and thus clear and convincing
evidence of its commission, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated the
Maryland Rules corresponding to those that the Delaware Supreme Court had determined that
the respondent had violated.
No exceptions have been taken to the hearing court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law.  The petitioner has, however, recommended a sanction, that the respondent be
disbarred.  This sanction is justified, the petitioner submits, by the findings of the hearing
court in the Nocks’ matter, as well as by the findings of the Delaware Supreme Court in the
reciprocal discipline case.  In addition, the petitioner informs us that the respondent has a prior
history of disciplinary action, this Court, in 1998,  having previously  reprimanded the
respondent, who consented to that sanction after he had been found by the Supreme Court of
Delaware to have violated that State’s counterparts of Maryland Rules 1.3, 1.4 and 8.4 (a)15
and (d).
The  findings of fact made by the hearing court are reviewed to determine if they are
based on clear and convincing evidence,  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276,
287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572
10
A.2d 174, 179 (1990).  Indeed, the “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct
and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Griev.
Comm'n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Griev.
Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)).     Moreover, in
reciprocal discipline  cases, as the hearing court noted, “[a] final adjudication in a disciplinary
proceeding by a judicial tribunal ... that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct is
conclusive proof of the misconduct in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.”  Rule
16-710(e).  See Attorney Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 365-66, 712
A.2d 525, 530-31 (1998); Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d
83, 87 (1997);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-22, 665 A.2d 1059,
1061 (1995);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68, 653 A.2d 430, 434
(1995);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Hopp, 330 Md. 177, 185-86, 623 A.2d 193, 197 (1993);
 Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 425-26, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1987);
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142-43, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987); 
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Haupt, 306 Md. 612, 614-15, 510 A.2d 590, 591-92 (1986);
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Bettis, 305 Md. 452, 455, 505 A.2d [712 A.2d 531] 492, 493
(1986);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 171, 482 A.2d 497, 498 (1984);
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Rosen, 301 Md. 37, 39, 481 A.2d 799, 800 (1984).  
There is
sufficient evidence to support the hearing court’s findings with respect to the Nocks’ matter.
 Consequently, those findings are not clearly erroneous.    In addition, that the respondent was
11
found, by the Supreme Court of Delaware, to have engaged in misconduct  conclusively
establishes that he engaged in that misconduct.  
This brings us to the determination of the appropriate sanction to be imposed.   To be
sure, the Nocks’ complaint is not a reciprocal discipline matter and is separate from the
reciprocal discipline complaint.    Nevertheless, we will address the latter first because the
Delaware Supreme Court imposed the ultimate sanction of disbarment and if we, as we often
do, impose the same sanction, there will be no need further to consider another sanction for
the misconduct in which the respondent engaged in the  Nocks’ matter.
This Court has often imposed sanctions, in reciprocal discipline cases, of facially equal
severity to those imposed by a sister state, see, e.g., Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 83, 710 A.2d 926,
934(1998); Richardson, 350 Md. at 365-66, 712 A.2d at 530-31; Gittens, 346 Md. at 324, 697
A.2d at 87; Bettis, 305 Md. 452, 505 A.2d 492;  Moore, 301 Md. 169, 482 A.2d 497;
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. James, 300 Md. 297, 305-06, 477 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1984);
Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Hines, 304 Md. 625, 500 A.2d 646 (1985);   Rosen, 301 Md. 37,
481 A.2d 799.   We have pointed out, however, that there is no requirement that this should
be done, that we need not impose the same sanction as that imposed by the jurisdiction in
which the misconduct occurred.  See Gittens, 346 Md. at 324,697  A.2d at 87.    In fact, we
have instructed that this Court is duty-bound to assess for itself the propriety of the sanction
imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the petitioner.   Gittens, 346 Md.
at 326, 697 A.2d at 88.   Indeed,  
12
“When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal
discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction
but to our own cases as well.  The sanction will depend on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for
similar misconduct.”
 Willcher, 340 Md. at 222, 665 A.2d at 1061 (1995) (quoting Parsons, 310 Md. at 142, 527
A.2d at 330).  We have deferred to the action taken by the jurisdiction in which the
misconduct occurred where the purpose of attorney discipline is the same in both jurisdictions.
Gittens, 346 Md. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88.   In any event, the burden is on the respondent to
demonstrate - in Maryland, the burden of establishing factual matters in defense  must be
carried by a “preponderance of the evidence,”  Powell, 328 Md. at 288, 614 A.2d at 109;
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 605, 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991) -  that less
severe discipline than that imposed in the other jurisdiction, or no discipline, should be
imposed in this State.  People v. Calder, 897 P.2d 831, 832 (Colo.1995);  The Florida Bar v.
Friedman, 646 So.2d 188, 190 (Fla.1994). 
In the reciprocal discipline case, the misconduct occurred in Delaware.  There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the purpose of attorney discipline in Delaware differs
from that in Maryland.    Indeed, Delaware authority demonstrates that it is, in fact, the same.
See In re Kevin M. Howard, 765 A.2d 39, 45 (Dela. 2000) (“The goals of lawyer discipline
are to protect the public, to protect the administration of justice, and to preserve confidence
in the legal profession. ...  Furthermore, the punishment imposed by the Court also must deter
other lawyers from similar misconduct.) (Footnote omitted). See also In re Figliola, 652 A.2d
13
1071, 1076 (Dela.1995).  And the respondent, who, as we have seen, did not appear in these
proceedings, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a less severe sanction
should be imposed in these proceedings than that imposed in the proceedings in the State of
Delaware.    Considering the particular facts and circumstances of this reciprocal discipline
case, with a view toward consistent dispositions in such cases, as we must, including the
seriousness of the misconduct found to have been engaged in, we conclude that deferring to
the jurisdiction where the misconduct occurred is appropriate in this case and that the
appropriate sanction in this case is that imposed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, namely
disbarment..
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(c), FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED
IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
OF
MARYLAND AGAINST  THOMAS J.
MCCOY.