Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2487.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2487 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SCACCIA. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2487.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Trust-account violations—Neglect of an entrusted 
legal matter—Failure to communicate effectively with a client about the 
nature and scope of representation—One-year suspension partially stayed 
on conditions, to run concurrently with sanction imposed in Dayton Bar 
Assn. v. Scaccia, 141 Ohio St.3d 35, 2014-Ohio-4278, 21 N.E.3d 290. 
(No. 2014-2143—Submitted February 4, 2015—Decided June 25, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2014-020. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Scaccia of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 022217, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.  On 
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October 2, 2014, we suspended him for one year, with six months stayed on 
conditions, for failing to competently manage a case, charging an improper 
nonrefundable fee, and violating the rules regarding the safekeeping of client 
funds.  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 141 Ohio St.3d 35, 2014-Ohio-4278, 21 
N.E.3d 290, ¶ 17-25.  We conditioned his reinstatement on the payment of 
restitution, and we ordered that within 90 days of our opinion, he submit to relator 
and this court a complete list and detailed accounting of all clients to whom he 
owed restitution.  Id. at ¶ 37-38.  Although over eight months have passed since 
our opinion, Scaccia has not yet submitted the required list and accounting, and he 
remains suspended from the practice of law. 
{¶ 2} While Scaccia’s previous case was pending in early 2014, relator, 
Dayton Bar Association, filed another complaint charging him with professional 
misconduct.  The parties entered into stipulations of fact and misconduct, which 
resolved some, but not all, of relator’s charges.  After a hearing, a three-member 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that Scaccia be 
suspended for one year, with six months stayed on conditions, and that the 
suspension run concurrently with the sanction we imposed on October 2, 2014.  
The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety, and no party has filed 
objections. 
{¶ 3} Upon our review of the record, we accept the board’s findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
The Boucha Elghouati matter 
{¶ 4} In 2007, Scaccia agreed to represent Boucha Elghouati in a personal-
injury matter pursuant to a contingent-fee arrangement.  In November 2008, 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Scaccia resolved her claims, received settlement proceeds on her behalf, and 
deposited those funds in his client trust account.  He then provided Elghouati a 
written breakdown of the purported distribution of the proceeds.  However, he 
failed to sign the written statement or have his client sign it.  Accordingly, the 
parties stipulated and the board found that Scaccia violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2) 
(requiring a lawyer entitled to compensation under a contingent-fee agreement to 
prepare a closing statement signed by the lawyer and the client). 
{¶ 5} In disbursing the settlement proceeds, Scaccia issued trust-account 
checks to his law firm for fees, to Elghouati for her share of the settlement, and to 
two of her medical providers.  However, he could not produce any records 
indicating that he had disbursed settlement funds totaling $2,304.70 in medical 
expenses to Elghouati’s other medical providers.  Additionally, during this time 
period, his trust account did not consistently contain sufficient funds to cover the 
balance owed to the remaining medical-care providers, and on one occasion, he 
had overdrawn the account. 
{¶ 6} At his disciplinary hearing, Scaccia tendered a check made payable 
to Elghouati to cover the unaccounted-for funds.  The parties stipulated and the 
board found that Scaccia violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to 
maintain records of trust-account funds disbursed on behalf of a client) and 
1.15(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly distribute all portions of client funds that 
are held in trust).  We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct.  We also 
agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence 
the remaining charges relating to Scaccia’s representation of Elghouati and to 
dismiss the charges under this count that relator withdrew prior to the hearing. 
The Darla Brewer matter 
{¶ 7} In 2012, James Buckner retained Scaccia to represent him in a then-
pending criminal investigation.  Local police had recently searched Buckner’s 
residence, which was owned by his mother, Darla Brewer.  In March 2013, both 
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Buckner and Brewer met with Scaccia at his office, and Buckner paid Scaccia 
$1,500 to also represent his mother.  Scaccia, however, failed to deposit the 
retainer check into his client trust account.  In addition, although he later verbally 
informed Brewer that he lacked professional liability insurance, he did not 
provide her with a written notice on a separate form.  Based on this conduct, the 
parties stipulated and the board found that Scaccia violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) 
(requiring a lawyer to inform the client on a separate written form that the lawyer 
does not maintain professional liability insurance) and 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer 
to deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in 
advance).  We agree with these findings of misconduct. 
{¶ 8} In April 2013, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Buckner 
and Brewer on drug-related offenses, and Scaccia thereafter met with both clients 
again.  According to Scaccia, he explained his litigation strategy to them and 
stated that if a conflict of interest later developed, such as either client deciding to 
testify against the other, he would be required to withdraw as counsel.  Brewer, 
however, testified that she did not recall Scaccia discussing either his litigation 
strategy or a potential conflict of interest with them at that meeting.  And Scaccia 
never provided Brewer with a written fee agreement, a letter of representation, or 
any other documentation explaining the nature and scope of his representation or 
the potential consequences of representing two criminal defendants in the same 
proceeding.  After her arraignment, Brewer was arrested and confined for one 
night, and she subsequently discharged Scaccia. 
{¶ 9} Relator charged Scaccia with several rule violations based on his 
brief representation of Brewer, including that his representation of both 
defendants was a conflict of interest and that he had failed to represent her 
competently.  The board, however, found that relator proved only the stipulated 
violations and a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) (requiring an attorney to 
January Term, 2015 
 
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communicate the nature and scope of the representation and the rate of the fee, 
preferably in writing). 
{¶ 10} Specifically, the board noted that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct do not expressly prohibit an attorney from representing multiple 
defendants in a felony case, although the comments discourage that practice.  See 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, Comment 15 (“The potential for conflict of interest in 
representing multiple defendants in a criminal matter is so grave that ordinarily a 
lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant”).  According to 
the board, because there was a possibility of a conflict, Scaccia should have 
provided a clear explanation to Brewer about the consequences of representing 
both her and her son in the same criminal matter.  The board acknowledged that 
Scaccia attempted to give her an oral explanation, but the board determined that 
Brewer did not understand Scaccia’s explanation and that his failure to clarify the 
scope of the representation in writing contributed to her confusion.  Thus, the 
board found that Scaccia violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) by failing to communicate 
effectively with Brewer about the nature and scope of his representation. 
{¶ 11} We concur in the board’s finding.  We also accept the board’s 
recommendation to dismiss the remaining charges relating to Scaccia’s 
representation of Brewer, and we dismiss all the counts and charges from the 
amended complaint that relator withdrew at the hearing. 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and 
the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 
Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
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listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  However, because each 
disciplinary case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B) and may take into account all relevant factors in determining 
which sanction to impose. 
Mitigating and aggravating factors 
{¶ 13} The board found the following mitigating factors:  Scaccia lacked a 
dishonest or selfish motive, he made free disclosures to the disciplinary board and 
had a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, the record included evidence of 
a good reputation, and he acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), (d), and (e).  Additionally, the board noted that 
some of Scaccia’s ethical violations occurred during a time in which he and his 
family members experienced health problems and that he has since taken 
corrective measures to reduce the likelihood of repeating his past mistakes, 
including hiring staff to ensure compliance with recordkeeping protocols. 
{¶ 14} As aggravating factors, the board found that Scaccia has prior 
discipline 
and 
that 
he 
committed 
multiple 
offenses. 
 
See 
BCGD 
Proc.Reg.10(B)(1)(a) and (d).  The board notes, however, that the ethical 
violations here and in his previous disciplinary case were caused by the “same 
inattention to detail and cover overlapping timeframes.” 
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 15} In support of its recommended sanction, the board cites Toledo Bar 
Assn. v. Royer, 133 Ohio St.3d 545, 2012-Ohio-5147, 979 N.E.2d 329, and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry, 133 Ohio St.3d 527, 2012-Ohio-5014, 979 
N.E.2d 313, both of which are cases involving attorneys who violated primarily 
the rules regarding the safekeeping of client funds.  In Royer, the attorney failed 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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to deposit client funds in his trust account, failed to maintain trust-account 
records, and neglected three matters for the same client.  Id. at ¶ 4-9.  We noted 
that his ethical violations appeared to be the result of bad time management, and 
we sanctioned him with a one-year suspension, all stayed on conditions, including 
that he retain an accountant to review his bookkeeping procedures.  Id. at ¶ 15.  In 
Dockry, the attorney used his client-trust account to pay personal and business 
expenses, failed to maintain ledgers for the account, and engaged in dishonesty by 
taking an unauthorized loan from his trust account.  Id. at ¶ 5-10.  We noted that 
since relator had commenced the disciplinary investigation, the attorney had taken 
corrective measures to ensure that he did not repeat his past mistakes.  Id. at ¶ 25.  
Accordingly, we imposed a one-year suspension, all stayed on the condition that 
he complete one year of monitored probation.  Id. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 16} Here, the board noted that unlike the attorneys in Royer and 
Dockry, Scaccia has prior discipline.  However, the board also found significant 
that most of Scaccia’s misconduct—both in the present case and in the prior 
case—was caused by his “inattention to detail, over essentially the same time 
period,” and that none of his misconduct involved a dishonest motive.  Thus, the 
board recommended that Scaccia be suspended for one year, with six months 
stayed on conditions, and that the suspension and conditions run concurrently 
with the sanction that we imposed in his prior case. 
{¶ 17} Each case of professional misconduct is an independent action.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Young, 113 Ohio St.3d 36, 2007-Ohio-975, 862 N.E.2d 
504, ¶ 31.  However, we have previously held that relatively contemporaneous 
ethical infractions prosecuted separately do not necessarily justify a harsher 
sanction.  See, e.g., Akron Bar Assn. v. Snyder, 87 Ohio St.3d 211, 212, 718 
N.E.2d 1271 (1999) (“The board properly noted that the misconduct charged in 
the complaint occurred in the same period of time as the charges involved in 
respondent’s previous disciplinary case, which resulted in an indefinite 
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suspension, and that these new charges did not require a significantly different 
sanction”).  On the other hand, we have also explained that consecutive sanctions 
are sometimes necessary “to ensure a lawyer’s rehabilitation and thereby protect 
the public from additional misconduct.”  Young at ¶ 32.  Here, the board found 
that Scaccia has taken corrective measures to reduce the likelihood of repeating 
his misconduct, and based on the testimony at the hearing, the board is convinced 
that Scaccia “is not a risk of committing conscious intentional misconduct in the 
future.”  We defer to the board’s finding and therefore agree that the new 
violations here do not require a different sanction than the sanction we imposed 
on October 2, 2014. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} For the reasons explained above, we adopt the board’s report and 
recommended sanction.  John Joseph Scaccia is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for one year, with six months stayed on the conditions that he (1) 
complete 12 hours of continuing legal education addressing law-office 
management, including trust-account maintenance, in addition to the general 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X(13), (2) submit to monitored probation pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(21) during any period of his stayed suspension and for one year 
thereafter, and (3) commit no further misconduct.  Scaccia’s suspension and 
conditions shall run concurrently to the sanction we imposed in Dayton Bar Assn. 
v. Scaccia, 141 Ohio St.3d 35, 2014-Ohio-4278, 21 N.E.3d 290.  Costs are taxed 
to Scaccia. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Brian D. Weaver, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
David P. Williamson, for respondent. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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