Title: Wlodarczyk v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wlodarczyk v. State1992 WY 71836 P.2d 279Case Number: 91-20Decided: 06/24/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
WLODARCZYK v. STATE, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992) Raymond WLODARCZYK, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Donald J. 
Rissler of Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C., Casper, for appellant. 

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Larry M. Donovan, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      After pleading 
guilty to a charge of aggravated assault on his elderly father while drunk, 
appellant Raymond Wlodarczyk was sentenced in 1988 to serve nine months in 
county jail followed by three years of supervised probation. Having successfully 
completed the jail term and approximately two years and four months of the three 
year probationary period, Wlodarczyk started drinking again in violation of the 
express terms of his probation. With the resulting probation revocation, 
Wlodarczyk was sentenced to a five to six year prison term. From this sentence 
he now appeals.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

I. ISSUES

[¶3]      Wlodarczyk states 
the issues as:

I.

Whether defendant's due 
process right was violated because defendant was not properly apprised of the 
grounds on which his revocation was based, as provided in W.S. § 7-13-408 and as 
required in Rule 33, W.R.Cr.P.

II.

Whether defendant's due 
process right to cross-examine pursuant to § 7-13-408, W.S. 1977 and Rule 33, 
W.R.Cr.P. were violated by the court's refusal to allow the cross-examination of 
Officer Lien?

III.

Was defendant's right to 
a speedy sentencing violated?

[¶4]      The State 
rephrases the issues:

I. Did the district court 
commit reversible err[or] in the course of the proceedings which resulted in the 
revocation of the appellant's probation.

II. Was the appellant's 
right to speedy sentencing violated.

[¶5]      Following oral 
argument and this court's review of the appellate briefs, the parties were 
ordered to submit supplemental briefing considering the following 
questions:

     1. Was entry of the 
order o[f] revocation proper when signed by a judge other than the judge who 
conducted the hearing and, if so, should the order and record in some fashion 
document under what rule or statute authority existed and the circumstances 
which occurred so that a different judge from the one who conducted the hearing 
then signed the decisional document?

     2. Is the sentence 
rendered herein as the result of probation revocation statutorily justified and, 
if so, by what statute? This topic should include evaluation of the statute 
under which it is contended the original sentence was rendered and consequent 
consideration in brief as to what provisions of law provide what rights for 
resentencing after a possible violation of probation may have occurred during 
its term.

     3. Under what statute, 
what rule or controlling case do the litigants contend that the probation 
revocation proceeding was conducted by the district court?

     4. Is there a 
difference in revocation process for violation of probation dependent on whether 
the revocation proceeding is initiated by representatives of the Department of 
Probation and Parole or initiated and conducted by the office of the county or 
district attorney?

Both sides 
submitted supplemental briefs which addressed this court's questions.1

II. FACTS

[¶6]      Pursuant to a 
negotiated disposition, Wlodarczyk entered a guilty plea to one count of 
aggravated assault and battery on March 22, 1988. He had been charged with 
threatening his father with a butcher knife. On May 17, 1988, Wlodarczyk was 
sentenced by District Judge Spangler to serve nine months in the Natrona County, 
Wyoming jail, credited with time previously served, and ordered placed on three 
years of supervised probation following the jail sentence.2 The district court's judgment and 
sentencing order stated that Wlodarczyk was guilty of violating the Wyoming 
aggravated assault statute, but did not identify the probationary sentencing 
statute applied in the sentence rendered. Probation was conditioned in part on 
his successful completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program at the Wyoming 
State Hospital in Evanston, Wyoming, and prohibited possession or consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. Wlodarczyk did his time in county jail, completed the 
alcohol rehabilitation program and successfully served the first two-plus-years 
of his probationary period without significant incident.

[¶7]      Janeice Lynch, 
the probation officer in this case, stated that until Wlodarczyk's father passed 
away in September, 1990, Wlodarczyk "followed [the probation officer's] 
instructions and made an attempt to adhere to his Court-ordered conditions." 
Further, Lynch stated that Wlodarczyk "had made progress and that he truly was 
trying to live a law-abiding life." However, within twenty-three days of his 
father's death on September 3, 1990, Wlodarczyk was arrested on two separate 
occasions for public intoxication. Wlodarczyk admitted to Lynch he had resumed 
drinking. In citing the two arrests for public intoxication, Lynch filed a 
petition for probation revocation.3

[¶8]      Wlodarczyk 
appeared before the other resident district judge, Judge Leimback, on November 
9, 1990 for a probation revocation hearing. The Assistant District Attorney 
began the hearing by describing Wlodarczyk's recent problems with alcohol and 
public intoxication. In addition, however, the prosecutor also discussed his 
concern that Wlodarczyk was "out of control." The prosecutor premised his stated 
opinion on several allegations including claims that several weeks earlier 
Wlodarczyk had unilaterally discontinued his alcohol counseling program and that 
he had approached a 12-year-old female at the local mall the previous evening 
with offers of candy if she would return with him to his residence and view a 
number of photographs. The presiding judge overruled defense counsel's objection 
to the prosecutor's recitation of the additional factors supporting 
revocation.4 Following further discussion by the 
prosecutor and defense counsel and a statement by Wlodarczyk, the district court 
continued the hearing for time to obtain a copy of a psychiatric 
report

[¶9]      Upon 
recommencement of the hearing on November 16, 1990, the prosecutor informed the 
district court that Wlodarczyk had fallen into an additional drinking episode, 
that he had threatened his probation officer and members of her family, and 
that, on the previous day, he had been issued citations for shoplifting and 
eluding law enforcement authorities. In light of the recent events and present 
circumstances, the prosecutor stated that he felt the four-to-six year sentence 
the State had recommended at the November 9 hearing might be too lenient. After 
the testimony of Probation Officer Lynch, probation was revoked and Wlodarczyk 
was sentenced to five-to-six years in the state penitentiary. In the revocation 
discussion and decision, the district court did not identify the statutory or 
legal basis applied for revocation, nor did the district court define the 
particular facts and circumstances found to justify the decision made.5 

[¶10]   Judge Leimback was unavailable in 
Casper, Wyoming for a time after orally announcing the revocation sentence at 
the November 16, 1990 revocation hearing. As a matter of course in sequential 
activities, on November 26, 1990, Judge Spangler, as the other resident district 
judge, signed the revocation sentence order and judgment in accord with the 
prior oral pronouncement. The order provided, in part:

THIS MATTER having come 
before the Court on this 16th day of November, 1990, and the Defendant appearing 
in person and with his attorney, * * *, and the State being represented by * * 
*, Assistant District Attorney, and the Defendant having admitted to the 
allegations in the Petition of Revocation filed herein, and the Court 
finding that the probation of the Defendant, as previously established herein 
and reflected in the Judgment and Sentence filed herein on May 25, 1988, should 
be revoked;

* * * * * *

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant be remanded to the custody of the 
Sheriff of Natrona County, Wyoming, to await transfer to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary in Rawlins, Wyoming, to serve a term of not less than five (5) 
years nor more than six (6) years with credit of two hundred seventy one (271) 
days off the minimum and maximum for time previously served.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶11]   This is the sentence that is now 
appealed.

III. THE GENERAL LAW OF 
PROBATION REVOCATION

[¶12]   In Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 
1055 (Wyo. 1981), this court examined the controlling principles governing 
probation revocation:

     The law governing 
probation revocation is controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process under the law, as well as by Wyoming statute and case law. In Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a probationer be 
given a hearing before his probation may be revoked. Gagnon adopted the 
reasoning of an earlier case, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), which extended the right of a prerevocation hearing to 
parolees. In both the parole and probation settings, the Court held that parole 
and probation revocation were not criminal prosecutions and, therefore, did not 
give rise to the full panoply of rights available under the Sixth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, parole- and probation revocation proceedings may result in a loss 
of liberty, thereby triggering the fundamental protections of the due-process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gagnon, supra, and Morrissey, 
supra.

[¶13]   In addition, the Mason opinion set 
forth a two-stage process for conducting a probation revocation 
hearing:

     Due process requires 
that the defendant in revocation cases be given a two-part hearing to determine 
if (1) there are verified facts proving a violation of the release agreement; 
and (2) whether in light of a proven violation the probation should be revoked. 
This hearing must be preceded by a written notice of the claimed violations. 
Other protections that attach to this hearing include the guarantee of 
disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the right to call witnesses 
and present documentary evidence and the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S.  at 489, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2604.

     The method provided 
for by law under § 7-13-409, W.S. 1977, [now Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408] allows for * 
* * the administrative [state probation and parole] officer * * * to file a 
petition with the district court, requesting probation revocation. * * * 
[T]he district court must hold a hearing - as it did here - to determine whether 
the conditions of the probation agreement had been violated and whether 
probation should be revoked.

Mason, 631 P.2d  
at 1055 (emphasis in original).

[¶14]   It is well established that "[t]he 
decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1187-88 (Wyo. 1991); Lower v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 351 (Wyo. 1990); Gronski v. State, 700 P.2d 777, 778 (Wyo. 1985). 
Sentencing decisions, which include the revocation of probation and imposition 
of sentence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has clearly abused 
that discretion. Lower, 786 P.2d  at 351. Further, this court has said that 
probation can be revoked on the basis of non-criminal conduct, that the evidence 
used by the district court to decide to revoke need not establish the violation 
of the probation condition "beyond a reasonable doubt," and that all revocation 
requires after hearing the facts is a conscientious judgment by the court that a 
probation violation has occurred. Gronski, 700 P.2d  at 778.

IV. NATURE OF THE 
ORIGINAL SENTENCE

[¶15]   Before we can assess the probation 
revocation process, it becomes necessary to establish the character of sentence 
originally entered in 1988 when the probation term had been created. The 
separate sentencing statutes to some degree provide different revocation 
processes and distinguishable resentencing authority. Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d 1184; 
United States v. Olivares-Martinez, 767 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 
1985).

[¶16]   Our disposition of this case 
requires a careful examination of interrelated constitutional, statutory, rule 
and common law principles involved in probation revocation. We compare what has 
been done procedurally in this case with what was done in other Wyoming 
probation revocation cases. In making this comparison, one similarity between 
this case and several other Wyoming cases is obvious - because of lack of 
specificity, it is often difficult to ascertain exactly what authority (i.e., 
statute, rule or case law) was used at the district court level for the original 
sentencing, revocation, or resentencing upon finding a probation violation. See, 
e.g., Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d 1184; King v. State, 720 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1986). Because 
of the inherent flexibility in sentencing options granted the courts by the 
Wyoming State Legislature, see Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 421 (Wyo. 1990), 
and the several procedures available for probation revocation (depending on the 
type of sentence originally imposed), it is necessary to sort through a number 
of permutations to identify what may have been done in this case.

[¶17]   The 1988 judgment and sentencing 
order failed to identify the statutory authority utilized by the district court 
when it imposed sentence. The order stated, in part:

JUDGMENT AND 
SENTENCE

     THIS MATTER having 
come before this Court upon the 17th day of May, 1988, and the Defendant 
appearing in person and with his attorney, * * *, and the State of Wyoming being 
represented by * * *, Assistant District Attorney, and the Defendant having 
previously entered his plea of guilty to the charge herein, aggravated assault 
and battery, defined specifically by W.S. 1977, as amended, § 6-2-502(a) and 
(b), and the Court having before it for its consideration, the presentence 
investigation report prepared by the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole, 
and having reviewed the matter, now proceed[s] to pronounce sentence as 
follows:

     NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS 
ORDERED that the Defendant be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Natrona 
County, Wyoming, where he shall serve a term of nine (9) months in the Natrona 
County Jail, with credit for 188 day(s) served previously in the Natrona County 
Jail.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Defendant be placed on supervised probation with the Wyoming Department 
of Probation and Parole for a period of three (3) years upon the following terms 
and conditions:

     1. That the Defendant 
be under the direct supervision of the Wyoming Department of Probation and 
Parole and shall obey that Department's rules and regulations.

2. That the Defendant 
obey the law and lead a worthy life during said probation period.

     3. That upon 
Defendant's [su]ccessful completion of the said jail sentence, he shall be 
transported by the Natrona County Sheriff's Office to the Wyoming State Hospital 
where he shall enroll in and successfully complete the substance abuse program; 
upon successful completion of the substance abuse program, the Natrona County 
Sheriff's Office shall be notified and return the Defendant back to Casper, 
Natrona County, Wyoming.

     4. That the Defendant 
shall not possess or consume alcoholic beverages.

Thus, we have in 
first task to determine the original 1988 statutory sentencing authority used by 
the district court. Essentially, we resolve this question by process of 
elimination. Wyoming had seven different types of sentencing choices statutorily 
authorized6 compared, for example, to the five 
found in Florida, Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988).

[¶18]   1. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-201 (1987) - a 
period of confinement which, except for a death penalty or a life sentence, is 
an indeterminate sentence. Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1990); Duffy v. 
State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986); Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶19]   2. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 (1987)7 - a non-convicted probationary 
assessment. Utilization is subject to consent of the prosecuting attorney as 
well as the individual to be sentenced, Billis, 800 P.2d 401, and 
deferral of sentencing can be postponed for a period not to exceed five 
years. King, 720 P.2d 465.

[¶20]   3. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 (1987)8 - probation granted after 
conviction without any alternative specific confinement sentence stated. This is 
straight probation and is seldom found in the Wyoming sentencing 
system.

[¶21]   4. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 - 
probation for a stated period granted with imposition of the sentence suspended 
during the period of probation. This is probation with suspended sentencing. 
Davila v. State, 815 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶22]   5. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 - 
probation for a stated period granted with sentence entered but execution of the 
sentence suspended during the period of probation. This is suspension of the 
sentence with probation granted. Lower, 786 P.2d 346; McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 1989); Schmidt v. State, 738 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶23]   6. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 (1987) - 
split sentencing involving incarceration in the county jail for a period not to 
exceed one year with a probationary sentence to follow county jail confinement 
involving probation granted for the balance of the established sentence. This is 
the classical split sentence arrangement, see Poore, 531 So. 2d 161.

[¶24]   7. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 - split 
sentencing involving incarceration in the county jail for a period not to exceed 
one year with a probationary sentence to follow county jail confinement with 
probation granted for a stated period following jail confinement with sentencing 
postponed subject to entry if probation is revoked. Villery v. Florida Parole 
and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).

[¶25]   The district court had those seven 
dispositional choices when it originally sentenced Wlodarczyk in 1988. By 
reviewing the facts in this case in light of the statutory alternatives 
available to the district court, we eliminate all but one. Wlodarczyk's nine 
month county jail incarceration plus three years of supervised probation was not 
a straight prison sentence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502(b) (1988). Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-301 was not used since: (1) it does not provide for incarceration 
as a condition of deferred prosecution, see Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 
1987); (2) Wlodarczyk was not eligible for first offender status since he had 
previously been convicted of a felony; and (3) the district court entered a 
judgment of guilt against Wlodarczyk when it sentenced him in 1988. Finally, 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 was not used since doing so would require characterizing 
the 1988 sentence as three years of suspended prison time with the nine months 
of county jail incarceration imposed as a condition of probation. Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-401(a)(x) (Supp. 1991) defines probation as:

"Probation" means a 
sentence not involving confinement which imposes conditions and retains 
authority in the sentencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to 
resentence the offender if he violates the conditions[.]

(Emphasis 
added.) Thus, county jail incarceration could not be viewed as a "condition" of 
probation. Further, the district court did not suspend execution of the sentence 
in this case - Wlodarczyk served the nine months in county jail.

[¶26]   Thus, we are left with Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-107, entitled "Split sentence of incarceration in county jail followed by 
probation[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 stated in relevant part and was clearly the 
applied statute used for sentencing in 1988:

     (a) Following a 
defendant's conviction of, or his plea of guilty to any felony, other than a 
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may impose any 
sentence of imprisonment authorized by law and except as provided in 
subsection (g) of this section, may in addition provide:

     (i) That the defendant 
be confined in the county jail for a period of not more than one (1) year; 
and

     (ii) That the 
execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the 
defendant placed on probation.

* * * * * *

     (c) Except as provided 
in subsection (a) of this section, the court may impose a split sentence of 
incarceration followed by probation in any felony case including those in 
which the statute violated specifically provides for a sentence of imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary.

* * * * * *

     (g) No person 
convicted of a felony may be sentenced to the county jail unless the judge, 
after consultation with the sheriff, determines that adequate facilities are 
available and that the jail is not overcrowded.

     (h) A defendant 
sentenced under this section is not eligible for parole and is not subject to 
good time allowances authorized under W.S. 7-13-420. The sentencing court shall 
continue to have jurisdiction over the defendant during the entire time he is 
confined in county jail and thereafter while the defendant is serving his term 
of probation.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶27]   At first glance, Wlodarczyk's 
original sentence comports with Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107(a) and (c). The district 
court imposed a split sentence of incarceration (nine months in the Natrona 
County Jail) followed by three years of supervised probation for the aggravated 
assault - a felony which carries a sentence of imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary.9 Inquiry cannot be ended here, 
however, since statutory examination and national case law reveal a 
differentiated status of split sentencing characteristics with one designated as 
a classical split sentence and the other a probationary split sentence. Poore, 
531 So. 2d  at 164. The differences in character between the two types of split 
sentences define the residual sentencing discretion retained by the district 
court upon revocation. In the case of the classical split sentence, only the 
period remaining upon revocation can be enforced by confinement. The 
probationary split sentence permits the sentencing judge to resentence to any 
sentence which might have originally been imposed.10

[¶28]   Although the differentiation for 
this case is not without question, we apply the terms as stated, apply lenity 
for interpretation of the original sentencing order, and find a classical split 
sentence since no intent to provide a right to revoke and completely resentence 
during the probationary term is demonstrable. Ruth v. State, 574 So. 2d 225 
(Fla.App. 1991); Poore, 531 So. 2d 161. Similarly, although not resulting from a 
split sentence, see Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983); 
Barrows v. State, 155 Mont. 522, 474 P.2d 145 (1970); State ex rel. Wetzel v. 
Ellsworth, 143 Mont. 54, 387 P.2d 442 (1963); and State ex rel. Benzing v. 
Benzing, 104 N.M. 129, 717 P.2d 105 (1986).

V. NATURE OF THE 
PROBATION REVOCATION

[¶29]   Having determined the applicable 
sentencing statute, we look next at what authority the sentencing court had to 
revoke Wlodarczyk's probation in 1990. As was the case in determining the 
statutory basis for Wlodarczyk's original sentence, we are again faced with a 
record void of stated statutory citation describing the revocation process 
utilized. As before, we utilize a process of elimination to determine what was 
done and whether it was proper.

[¶30]   In our review of Wyoming probation 
revocation statutes and case law, we find that it is possible to delineate 
revocation procedures within four relatively distinct categories: (1) Wyo. Stat. 
§ 7-13-301; (2) Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-13-304 and 7-13-305 (1987); (3) Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-408 (1987) administrative revocation;11 and (4) "judicial" revocation 
defined within W.R.Cr.P. 33 which was in effect at the time of these events and 
has, since March 24, 1992, been superseded by W.R.Cr.P. 39. See, e.g., Cooney v. 
Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1308 (Wyo. 1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991). Despite some common ground 
regarding constitutional rights involved in revocation, the procedures have 
decidedly different implications depending on the type of probationary sentence 
involved. Structurally, there are two revocation processes: (1) judicial 
revocation for probation; and (2) administrative revocation for parole under the 
executive agency, Department of Probation and Parole, and the adjudicatory Board 
of Parole. The judicial revocation resentencing authority is confined by the 
statute employed by the court in entering the initial sentence.

[¶31]   It is apparent that first offender 
deferred sentencing imposed under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 is not compatible with 
traditional revocation procedures, since Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 does not use the 
term "revocation," per se. Instead, Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301(c)(i) provides that a 
defendant whose guilt has been determined and who violates a term or condition 
of his probation is subject to the court's imposition of the originally 
available sentence. This is initial sentencing upon probation 
violation.

[¶32]   A probationary sentence under Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-302, which provides either the suspended sentence with probation or 
the suspension of sentence (suspension of imposition or suspension of execution 
of sentence), is subject to revocation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-13-304 and 
7-13-305. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305(c) states:

For a violation of a 
condition of probation occurring during the probationary period, revocation 
proceedings may be commenced at any time during the period of suspension of 
sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302, or within thirty (30) days 
thereafter, in which case the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant 
to be arrested. If after hearing the court determines that the defendant 
violated any of the terms of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may 
proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of sentence or probation had 
been ordered.

Thus, Wyo. Stat. 
§ 7-13-302 probation violations are handled pursuant to a Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305 
judicial proceeding. As provided by Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305(c), if a probation 
violation is established during the revocation hearing, the sentencing court 
may, where sentence was suspended, impose any sentence available at the time 
probation was originally granted as a general resentencing authority. Where 
execution of the sentence was suspended, the court may on resentencing require 
the service of the original sentence which was suspended or any part 
thereof.

[¶33]   If a defendant is given a "split 
sentence" (incarceration followed by probation) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-107, probation violations will likewise be determined under the sentencing 
court's continued jurisdiction during the period of probation pursuant to the 
Wyoming Criminal Rules of Procedure.12 Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 
(Wyo. 1979); Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978); State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1971).

[¶34]   Conversely, Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 
provides an expansive and complex administrative agency procedure for revocation 
of parole from which rights to judicial review, or absence thereof, will be 
addressed by this court in Pisano v. State (No. 91-138). See also Heffernan v. 
State, 824 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1992).13

[¶35]   It has never been directly 
addressed by this court but there is, to put it mildly, an intrinsic anomaly and 
extrinsic confusion to be found within Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408. In essence, the 
complexity has not been identified in decisions because except for exclusionary 
reference, the aspects of Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408, which can be related to a 
nonadministrative - consequently judicial - revocation, have been ignored in 
case analysis. This has included the operational activities by the agency except 
for the "right of the probation officer" to file a petition for revocation in 
the district court, as occurred here, without the involvement or assistance of 
the county attorney. Any future utilization of that lay person probation officer 
for direct judicial filing is now foreclosed by both the practice of law 
concerns directed to parental termination cases in In Interest of SVG, 826 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1992) and In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1992) and by the 
rewritten text of W.R.Cr.P. 39 (formerly W.R.Cr.P. 33) which requires county 
attorney processing as the practice of law.

[¶36]   A review of the text of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 7-13-408 provides an understanding of what has occurred in some of the Wyoming 
probation revocation cases. It is found that the probation officer initially 
files the petition under his own signature in the district court and, probably 
by ex parte contact with the judge, obtains issuance of a warrant without 
initial county attorney involvement of any kind in representation of the public 
as its chief law enforcement officer.14 However, nothing of record in 
these judicial probation revocation cases documents a practice of conducting the 
statutorily required pre-notification hearing which is detailed to be provided 
in the administrative revocation process within the text of Wyo. Stat. § 
7-14-408(a) and (b). See King, 720 P.2d 465 and Weisser, 600 P.2d 1320.

[¶37]   Our recent case law has separately 
addressed executive agency by-pass of the county attorney representation in 
court proceedings in the parental termination cases cited above, and the present 
text of the probation revocation rule, W.R.Cr.P. 39, is definitely structured to 
intentionally require initial involvement of the county or district attorney for 
the practice of law function intrinsically involved in judicial probation 
termination proceedings. Consequently, Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 for judicial 
revocation proceedings in probation cases and its process of notice or arrest 
based on the issuance of a bench warrant is superseded by W.R.Cr.P. 
39.

VI. RESENTENCING 
ALTERNATIVES

[¶38]   Just as there are a variety of ways 
to revoke probation, there are also several resentencing alternatives available 
dependent upon the particular sentencing authority originally used by the 
district court. On one hand, a defendant who violates probation pursuant to a 
deferred sentence under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 is subject to resentencing as 
though probation had never been granted. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301(c). When a Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-302 probationary sentence is revoked pursuant to a Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-305 revocation proceeding, Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305(c) mandates that "the 
court may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of sentence or 
probation had been ordered." In other words, enforce the sentence if execution 
had been suspended or as the general alternative to enter a sentence if 
imposition of a sentence had been deferred at initial sentencing.

[¶39]   On the other hand (and unlike Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-302 probationary options just discussed), if a Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-107 "split sentence" is revoked, alternatives for the sentencing court 
depend upon the original sentence whether classical or probationary in stated 
provisions. A probation revocation of a classical Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 "split 
sentence" does not carry with it the right upon revocation to resentence for any 
originally available sentence. Ruth, 574 So. 2d 225. However, if the terminology 
of the "split sentence" was tailored to be within the probationary 
classification, then a right of full resentencing is retained by the district 
court. See Poore, 531 So. 2d 161.15

[¶40]   Jeopardy attaches at the time a 
defendant sentenced under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 begins to serve his confinement 
term and the underlying constitutional principle of double jeopardy prevents 
imposition of a longer sentence than was originally imposed. State v. Ryan, 86 
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, 336-37, cert. denied 454 U.S. 880, 102 S. Ct. 363, 70 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1981) (quoting State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 501, 231 A.2d 369 
(1967)) (holding that "jeopardy attaches once the defendant has commenced 
serving his prison term" and that "`serious double jeopardy problems'" would 
arise if a trial judge were permitted to increase a sentence once it has already 
gone into operation); but see United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773, 777 n. 6 
(3rd Cir. 1990).

[¶41]   This court's dicta in Yates v. 
State, 792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990) (a Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 probation revocation 
case) also speaks indirectly to this issue. In Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192, this 
court stated:

     The rule that we 
espouse protects important rights of the convicted defendant. It serves to 
prevent the possibility that a greater punishment than is deserved will be 
imposed because of subsequent conduct that results in a violation of the 
probation. Commonwealth v. Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1986). It also serves to 
ensure that any vagaries of memory will not interfere with the imposition of a 
sentence appropriate to the individual and the crime. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 
117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953). Although these issues are not before us, we note in 
support of our policy that the punishment for a violation of probation is the 
imposition of the sentence for which the defendant was placed on probation and, 
further, as a general rule, any sentence imposed and then suspended during a 
period of probation may not be increased because of the conduct that serves as 
the basis for the revocation. The punishment for that conduct is the revocation 
itself. If the revocation is justified by the commission of a separate crime, 
the defendant may be convicted of that crime and then sentenced to the full 
extent permitted by law for it.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶42]   Consequently, we hold as a matter 
of law that, upon revocation of a Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 "split sentence" as a 
classical "split sentence" category, the district court did not have authority 
to resentence Wlodarczyk to five-to-six years in the state penitentiary. Upon 
revocation of "split sentence" probation, the district court could not impose a 
new sentence or extend the duration of incarceration beyond the remaining 
portion of the original three year probationary period (approximately eight 
months). This is identical in result with the decision in Buck v. State, 603 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1979); although there, a "split sentence" was not involved. See 
the discussion of suspension of the imposition of sentence compared with 
imposition of sentence with suspension of execution. Id. at 879 n. 1. See also 
Lackey v. State, 731 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1987) where the probationary term expired 
before revocation was attempted. For this case, we apply the rule of North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969) and 
determine that the revocation is accomplished by confinement for the balance of 
the initially established period. Id.; Ryan, 429 A.2d 332. We reverse this 
aspect of the district court's actions in this case. 

[¶43]   To summarize and synthesize, 
revocation of probation is a judicial responsibility and jurisdiction of an 
individual granted probation remains vested in the judicial branch of government 
during any probationary period of non-incarceration. Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶44]   Except as Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 
supports the foundational supervisory responsibility of probation agents for 
probation revocation cases, the statute has been nullified and superseded by 
Wyoming case law and W.R.Cr.P. 39 for all aspects of probation revocation. See 
Weisser, 600 P.2d 1320; Smith, 598 P.2d 1389; and Knobel, 576 P.2d 941. The 
exclusive process for probation revocation is judicially handled by a filing 
through the office of the prosecuting attorney by either an order to show cause 
and summons or a petition to revoke enforced by an application and the issuance 
of a bench warrant for arrest. Reasons for immediate issuance of a warrant 
instead of utilization of the order to show cause are to be demonstrated on the 
face of the application for issuance of the bench warrant. W.R.Cr.P. 39. Cf. 
Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287.

Although the 
illegality of the district court's imposition of a five-to-six year sentence 
following revocation of the original "split sentence" requires a change of the 
sentence upon remand, United States v. Principato, 717 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1983) 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S. Ct. 1448, 79 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1984), other issues 
remain. We address Wlodarczyk's other appellate issues because of their 
constitutional significance and procedural bearing on future proceedings in this 
case.

VII. DISCUSSION OF 
FURTHER ISSUES OF THE CASE

[¶45]   Because of the complex and 
interrelated issues involved in this case, we begin by summarizing the appellate 
arguments raised by the parties. In his appellate brief, Wlodarczyk contends 
that if we decide the third issue (speedy sentencing) in his favor, then the 
five-to-six year sentence must be reversed and he should be allowed to serve the 
remainder of his original probationary term. If we do not recognize a speedy 
sentencing violation, then he argues that this case should be remanded to the 
district court for rehearing in full recognition of the due process right to 
properly confront all the revocation charges. In addressing the additional 
questions presented by this court for supplemental briefing, Wlodarczyk 
essentially responds by arguing that his case should be either remanded to the 
district court for failure to follow Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 or, in the 
alternative, he should be released because his original sentence did not comport 
with the split sentencing provisions in Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107.

[¶46]   The State counters by arguing that 
no error was committed by the district court in Wlodarczyk's probation 
revocation hearing. Further, the State contends that public policy supports the 
district court's retention of flexibility in resentencing a probationer who 
violates conditions imposed on his probation. Following the same theme, the 
State responds to this court's request for supplemental briefing by claiming the 
absence of procedural error in the revocation proceeding. The State also 
contends that the district court properly applied Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 when it 
originally imprisoned Wlodarczyk for nine months in county jail followed by 
three years of probation.

A. Due 
Process

Of these issues 
and varied contentions, one of the most significant examines a probationer's due 
process rights in a probation revocation proceeding judicially conducted 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39). In Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 1294, we 
said:

Our statutory provisions 
and our case law provide the proper due process protections to which a 
probationer faced with possible probation revocation is entitled. Among the many 
safeguards which our law affords the probationer in that circumstance are rights 
to written notice of the nature and content of the allegations, a probable-cause 
hearing before a judge, an opportunity to consult with any persons whose 
assistance he reasonably desires, confront and examine any person who has made 
allegations against him, counsel, present evidence on his own behalf, and a 
decision on the merits by the sentencing judge who makes a conscientious 
judgment after hearing the facts. See W.S. 7-13-305, 408; W.S. 7-6-104; Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); Minchew, 685 P.2d  at 31-32.

Essentially, 
Cooney restates in more expansive fashion the same procedural safeguards first 
recognized by this Court in Mason, 631 P.2d  at 1055.

[¶47]   The petition for revocation 
presented to the district court by Probation Officer Lynch suggested that 
Wlodarczyk's probation should be revoked because of two incidents of public 
intoxication and his admission to having consumed alcohol. When Wlodarczyk 
appeared at the November 9, 1990 hearing, he acknowledged the alcohol-related 
incidents in violation of his probation. This admission satisfies the first of 
the two-part Mason requirement - that the district court establish verified 
facts proving a violation of the probation agreement. The district court's 
remaining task was to determine whether probation should be revoked "in light of 
a proven violation." Id. at 1055 (emphasis added).

[¶48]   In this case, since Wlodarczyk 
admitted his alcohol-related offenses, the district court did not have to 
consider allegations of other misconduct prior to revoking his probation. This 
court has held that a probationer's voluntary admission of conduct in violation 
of a condition of probation justifies revocation. Lower, 786 P.2d 346 (probation 
revocation affirmed after probationer admitted having used marijuana in 
violation of probation conditioned upon non-use of controlled substances). The 
district court in this case could have limited its review to Wlodarczyk's 
alcohol-related offenses; the record clearly indicates that it did 
not.

[¶49]   Several aspects in this case are 
remarkably similar to the facts in Schmidt, 738 P.2d 1105.16 In Schmidt, the appellant was 
placed on probation for eight years after pleading guilty to forgery and 
receiving an eight-to-fourteen year suspended prison sentence. Approximately 
four and one-half years into the probationary sentence, a petition for 
revocation was filed in district court charging appellant with two incidents of 
intoxication, possession of firearms, and three counts of driving while under 
the influence of alcohol. After denying a motion for continuance of the 
revocation hearing sought by appellant's counsel, the court heard testimony from 
four witnesses, including appellant. The court found that the appellant had 
violated terms of his probation (i.e., that he conduct himself in a lawful 
manner at all times and that he not consume alcohol during the probationary 
term), revoked his probation, and reimposed the original prison sentence that 
had previously been suspended. Id. at 1106. On appeal with a primary question of 
the propriety of the district court's denial of a continuance, this court, with 
two justices dissenting, affirmed the revocation and reimposition of the 
sentence. Id. at 1108.

[¶50]   Schmidt is noteworthy in part 
because of what the appellant failed to do in bringing his appeal:

Appellant's brief makes 
perfunctory reference to hearsay testimony at the hearing regarding firearms, 
and testimony regarding matters not charged in the petition to revoke probation. 
We will not address these matters because appellant has not favored us with 
cogent argument nor has he cited authority in support of these alleged 
irregularities.

Id. at 
1107.

[¶51]   In the present case, Wlodarczyk has 
done precisely what Schmidt failed to do. He raised both the proper notice and 
right of confrontation issues before the district court and again in his appeal 
before this court. He presents cogent argument and cites authority to support 
his contentions. We recognize the constitutional importance of these procedural 
issues and give them their proper due. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wyo. Const. art. 
1, §§ 6 and 10.

[¶52]   We further distinguish the result 
in Schmidt on a non-constitutional level as well. In Schmidt, 738 P.2d  at 1108, 
we concluded that "[t]here was ample evidence, most of which was not denied, to 
justify revocation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 
probation and reimposing the original sentence." The difference in this case is 
that the only proven violations of which the probationer received proper 
notice were the incidents of alcohol consumption.

[¶53]   The realistic question is whether, 
under the facts of this case, the questions of due process defined in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) and adopted in Mason, 
631 P.2d 1051 require a remand for a further revocation hearing. Clearly, 
sufficient evidence for a probation revocation existed without regard for the 
unnoticed events which were overtly considered by the court including the 
relationship of the probationer to his probation officer. In view of our 
conclusion that the only action that could be taken in accord with this specific 
sentence at revocation was to require confinement for the balance of the 
probation time, we perceive no due process issue which would require further 
hearing except for the entry of an order of confinement for the period of time 
remaining on the three year probationary sentence (approximately eight months) 
as determined at the date when the petition for revocation was filed with the 
district court.17

B. Speedy 
Sentencing

[¶54]   Wlodarczyk relies on this court's 
decision in Yates, 792 P.2d 187 for the proposition that his right to speedy 
sentencing was violated. Wlodarczyk argues that since his probation revocation 
sentence of five-to-six years of imprisonment was not imposed until more than 
three years after imposition of his original sentence, then the delay exceeded 
the one calendar year limitation in Yates and is, thus, presumably 
unreasonable.

[¶55]   It appears that Wlodarczyk makes 
the same argument addressed by the court in Davila, 815 P.2d at 850:

We recognize a 
conception, that we perceive to be misplaced, * * * that could be argued by any 
defendant whose probation is revoked. * * * Davila seems to consider the 
imposition of jail time, because it was not explicitly determined at the time he 
was sentenced, to be an event separate and apart from the sentence of probation. 
That is not a correct interpretation.

Davila, after 
pleading guilty to one count of larceny as part of a plea agreement involving 
multiple charges, was originally sentenced under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 to five 
years of probation under the supervision of the Wyoming Department of Probation 
and Parole. Approximately fifteen months later, the department filed a petition 
with the district court seeking revocation of Davila's probationary status. 
Probation was revoked and the district court sentenced Davila to three-to-five 
years in the penitentiary. Citing Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-305(c) as the applicable 
statute for probation revocation in Davila, this court affirmed the district 
court's actions.

[¶56]   Although Wlodarczyk's argument is 
essentially the same as the unsuccessful argument raised by the appellant in 
Davila, the result we reach is significantly different. In the present case, we 
find no speedy sentencing issue since the structure of application we apply for 
the split sentencing is to permit confinement for the period of probation time 
remaining at revocation. We generally agree with the State that the sentencing 
process used was the Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 "split sentence" and the revocation 
proceeding was pursued under W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39). Wlodarczyk was 
subjected to a completed sentence totalling three years and nine months and not 
a nine-month sentence subject to a period of probation under which revocation 
could be reserved to the court for complete resentencing authority.

VIII. VALIDITY 
OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE

[¶57]   We concur again with the argument 
of the State and find that under the circumstances, where the original sentence 
was derived in plea bargain and then clearly stated in open court with the 
record preserved, execution of the written document was ministerially 
appropriate by another district judge from either that district or otherwise 
assigned to act in that jurisdiction. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 11; Wyo. Stat. § 
5-3-102 (Supp. 1991); W.R.Cr.P. 26(b) (now W.R.Cr.P. 25(b)); and, in particular, 
Wyo. Stat. § 5-3-106 (1977) in conjunction with the constitutional provision. 
Wyo. Stat. § 5-3-106 states:

The judges of the several 
district courts shall hold courts for each other, when from any cause, any judge 
of a district court is unable to act or to hear, try or determine any cause, or 
to hold any term or portion of a term of any district court in his district; and 
in such event the judge so disqualified or unable to act shall call upon one (1) 
of the other judges of the district court to hear, try and determine such cause, 
or to hold such term or portion of a term of court, and the said judge so called 
upon, shall try, hear or determine said cause, or hold such term or portion of a 
term, with all the jurisdiction, power and authority possessed by the judge of 
the district court of the district whereto he is called to act as 
judge.

IX. 
CONCLUSION

[¶58]   We affirm the revocation of 
probation on the basis of the charges presented and the admitted violations 
precluding use of intoxicating beverages. We reverse the sentence entered and 
authorize the district court to resentence Raymond Wlodarczyk to confinement for 
a period no longer than the term remaining on the three year probationary period 
on the day the petition for revocation was filed.

[¶59]   Remanded for further proceedings in 
accord herewith.

THOMAS, J., filed an opinion 
concurring specially.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶60]   I will agree that this case can 
lawfully be disposed of in accordance with the majority opinion. I think, 
however, that the court should be commended for its rescue of the district court 
from what seems to me to be an awkward and tenuous predicament. I am satisfied 
that Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107(a) (1991) quite plainly provides that prior to 
invocation of the split sentence alternative the defendant must be sentenced to 
a term of years. That did not happen in this case, but the Court wisely treats 
the sentence that was imposed as one for three years and nine months. In this 
unique instance, credit then is given for the time successfully served on 
probation so that the incarceration is permitted only for the balance of the 
three years and nine months.

[¶61]   The district court was flirting 
with an extension of the doctrine of Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187 (1990), 
leading to a conclusion that no legal sentence was imposed in the first 
instance, and it now is too late to resentence. This Court has avoided that 
result, but a proper initial sentence simply would have avoided the question. I 
read the split sentencing statute as permitting the incarceration in the county 
jail for up to a year followed by probation only after the predicate condition 
of imposition of a sentence is satisfied, and I have some difficulty 
understanding a different interpretation. Certainly, it is a problem that is 
easily remedied in the sentencing court. 

[¶62]   I also believe that the district 
court has dodged a bullet here that had "due process of law" written all over 
it. Had the sentence orally imposed by the district judge who held the probation 
hearing been sustainable, it would be very difficult to conclude that the 
revocation had not been ordered because of conduct extraneous to the petition to 
revoke probation. I do not understand that Wlodarczyk ever had notice of the 
matters involving the young children or the threats to the probation officer and 
members of her family. It is clear that Wlodarczyk admitted the violation that 
was charged in the petition, however, and in view of the limited sanction that 
is approved, the possible constitutional violation can be overlooked as not 
prejudicial.

[¶63]   I offer these comments in hope that 
the trial courts will pay more attention to the manner of imposing split 
sentences and to the constitutional requirements that are present in probation 
revocation proceedings. The demands are not difficult to satisfy, and the 
results would be clear and appropriate. The Supreme Court of Wyoming should not 
have to strain to reach a result such as this. The questions should not 
arise.

Footnotes

 1 Appellant's 
supplemental and amended supplemental briefs only discussed the first three 
questions raised by this court. There is no explanation offered as to whether 
counsel's failure to address this court's fourth question was either intentional 
or inadvertent.

2 Wlodarczyk raises the 
argument that it is impossible to know whether he was sentenced to nine months 
in jail followed by three years probation or whether the probationary period was 
intended to be concurrent with the jail term. Our reading of the sentencing 
order and our understanding that Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107 (1987) was the applicable 
sentencing statute used in this case directs the conclusion that the 
probationary term followed the nine-month period of county jail incarceration. A 
review of the discussion about the plea bargain in the transcript also confirms 
the nine-month jail incarceration was to be followed by three years of probation 
as the actual agreement made. See Davis v. United States, 790 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 
1986).

3 In substantive part, the 
petition for probation revocation stated:

2. That said Defendant, 
RAYMOND WLODARCZYK, by Order of Court made and entered herein on May 17, 1988, 
was placed on probation following his plea of guilty to the crime of AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY, HONORABLE DAN SPANGLER, JUDGE PRESIDING.

3. That said Defendant 
has violated conditions # 2 and # 4 of his Court Order in that he was arrested 
on September 13, 1990, for Public Intoxication and later forfeited his $60 
Bond.

4. That said Defendant 
has violated conditions # 2 and # 4 of his Court Order in that on September 26, 
1990, he was arrested for Public Intoxication and Disturbance. Said Defendant 
has pled guilty to the Public Intoxication.

5. On October 4, 1990, 
said Defendant did admit to this Agent, that he had consumed alcohol, which is 
in violation of condition # 4 of his Court Order.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

4 During the November 9, 
1990 revocation hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: All right, 
this matter comes to the Court on an application by the State for revocation of 
probation.

Mr. [Defense Counsel], do 
you resist the application?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No we 
don't, Your Honor. We would admit that there were two public intoxications and 
that is grounds for revocation, but we would argue the disposition.

THE COURT: 
[Prosecutor].

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, 
I know this Court in the past has asked what is sufficient for a revocation and 
asking what sort of offense. In other probations that I can think of has no 
alcohol condition been more so as in this case.

As the Court can see, 
[Wlodarczyk] has been convicted in the last few months of two public 
intoxications. He admitted consuming alcohol, and was convicted of a recent 
disturbance.

There have also been 
numerous other problems.

[The prosecutor proceeded 
to review Wlodarczyk's criminal history and chronic alcohol 
problems.]

With us today is [a 
Casper police investigator] who specializes in investigation of juvenile 
offenses against juveniles. As [the police investigator] can tell you, since the 
death of his father, Mr. Wlodarczyk has been something of a constant companion 
to [the police investigator], numerous reports of neighbors and other persons 
complaining of what might not be technically law-breaking behavior, but 
certainly not violations that he himself would lead a worthy life, not 
technically violations of law, but matters which indicate that once again Mr. 
Wlodarczyk is involved in a situation where alcohol and his life are out of 
control.

As recently as last 
evening, [the police investigator] received a report that Mr. Wlodarczyk 
approached a 12 year old girl in the Mall last night, offered her candy to 
return to his residence with him and view a number of photographs. The young 
lady eventually bec[a]me concerned, scared, and did not go with Mr. 
Wlodarczyk.

Neighborhood parents 
contacted [the police investigator] repeatedly about Mr. Wlodarczyk asking young 
children to enter his home, taking a number of pictures of them, including a 
young boy, 12 or 13 year old boy in a bath robe. He apparently offers 
-

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your 
Honor, I'm going to break in and object. The underlying cause that we are here 
for today is to talk about whether or not these two public intoxications are 
conditions for probation revocation. Now [the Prosecutor] wants to talk 
eloquently about all these charges and innuendos and somehow lead in to a 
sentencing argument based upon the opinion of [the police investigator]. If we 
are going to do that, I want an opportunity to cross examine the Officer on what 
exactly these charges are.

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, 
this is a disposition -

THE COURT: 
Overruled.

The police officer, who 
was present for both the November 9 and subsequent November 16 revocation 
hearings, was never called to testify.

5 The district court judge 
concluded the November 16, 1990 probation revocation hearing by 
stating:

THE COURT: Mr. 
Wlodarczyk, when you were placed on probation, you were placed out at the 
sufferance of the Court, that is to say, you had committed a crime but the Court 
let you out on your promise that you were going to adhere to the law, obey the 
law and not get in any further trouble. In doing that, we placed a probation 
officer to supervise your actions. Now if the situation gets to where people who 
we let out endanger those probation officers and threaten them and abuse them, 
you know, that is an intolerable situation and it can't be tolerated by the 
Court. To me, you have breached the opportunity that was given you by the Court 
in the most severe way.

It will be the Judgment 
and Sentence of the Court that you -

[WLODARCZYK]: May I say 
something, please?

THE COURT: - Mr. 
Wlodarczyk, be sentenced to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of not 
less that five, nor more than six years, and that the probation that was 
previously granted to you be revoked.

6 Although somewhat 
modified by the Wyoming State Legislature, the same seven statutory sentencing 
choices remain available in 1992.

7 The version of Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-301 (this had previously been Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-203 (1977), see 
Billis, 800 P.2d  at 407-08, 440), in effect at the time of Wlodarczyk's 
underlying offense and subsequent disposition stated in relevant 
part:

(a) If a person who has 
not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty 
of or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation 
of W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, 
sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second 
degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and 
without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings 
and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon 
terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall include that 
he:

(i) Report to the court 
not less than twice in each year at times and places fixed in the 
order;

(ii) Conduct himself in a 
law-abiding manner;

(iii) Not leave the state 
without the consent of the court; and

(iv) Conform his conduct 
to any other terms of probation the court finds proper.

* * * * * *

(c) 
If the defendant violates a term or condition of probation at any time before 
final discharge, the court may:

(i) 
Enter an adjudication of guilt and conviction and proceed to impose sentence 
upon the defendant if he previously pled guilty to or was found guilty of the 
original charge for which probation was granted under this section; 
or

(ii) Order that the trial 
of the original charge proceed if the defendant has not previously pled or been 
found guilty.

(d) 
Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of 
guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose.

8 Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 
(in general this statute had previously been Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 (1977) until 
the 1987 recodification of Title 7), effective at the time of this offense and 
sentencing, stated:

(a) After conviction or 
plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, and following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court 
may:

(i) Suspend the 
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation; 
or

(ii) Impose a fine 
applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation.

9 In responding to this 
court's second question requiring supplemental briefing, both Wlodarczyk and the 
State make somewhat confusing and convoluted arguments in discussing the 
applicability of Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107(a). Both seem to read portions of Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-107(a) (i.e., "the court may impose any sentence * * * may in 
addition provide") as being mandatory rather than discretionary or permissive. 
(Emphasis added.)

10 This differentiation is 
essentially the same as the difference under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 where, in one 
case, the maximum length of sentence to be served upon revocation is 
predetermined in the original sentencing order (sentencing choice five above) 
and, in the other (sentencing choice four), resentencing can occur at any time 
after revocation to a term which was originally available for the offense 
charged.

11 The issue is not 
directly presented by this appeal to question whether Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 was 
ever properly available for probation revocation in distinction to utilization 
of W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39). The issue, at least recently, has not been 
directly considered since all appellate cases involved the judicial and not the 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 administrative revocation approach. The source of initial 
filing in the court is not determinative whether initiated by a probation 
officer or through action of the prosecuting attorney. The distinction is 
defined by the source of decision comparing court ordered or administrative 
revocation decisional results. State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1971); 
Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978); Murphy v. State, 592 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 
1979); Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389 (Wyo. 1979); Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979); Buck v. State, 603 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1979); Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356 (Wyo. 1980); Mason, 631 P.2d 1051; Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30 (Wyo. 
1984); Gronski, 700 P.2d 777; Longwell v. State, 705 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1985); 
Panesenko v. State, 706 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1985); Collins v. State, 712 P.2d 368 
(Wyo. 1986); King, 720 P.2d 465; Chapman v. State, 728 P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1986); 
Lackey v. State, 731 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1987); Schmidt, 738 P.2d 1105; Mower v. 
State, 750 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1988); McFarlane, 781 P.2d 931; Lower, 786 P.2d 346; 
Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990); Craig v. State, 804 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 
1991); Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991); Jones v. State, 811 P.2d 284 (Wyo. 1991); Davila, 815 P.2d 848; Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d 1184.

The 
one case possibly different under its peculiar facts making it impossible to be 
sure as to the approach undertaken for revocation is Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991). Whether initiation of the process was 
intended to be administrative, Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408, or judicial, W.R.Cr.P. 33 
(now W.R.Cr.P. 39), the ultimate resolution ended with a judicial release based 
on the unfounded charges utilized for initiation of revocation 
action.

Before the presently 
pending case of Pisano v. State (No. 91-138) came to this court, there had been 
only one appellate case involving the right to parole and it did not consider 
revocation. Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511 (Wyo. 1983).

The 
dual questions of separation of power under Wyo. Const. art. 2 and efficacy of 
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure need not be pursued in this case for 
determination of whether a Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 process can ever be utilized to 
revoke probation. In this case, the proceeding as with the other listed 
appellate proceedings was clearly a W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39) judicial 
revocation approach.

12 W.R.Cr.P. 33 then 
effective and now replaced by W.R.Cr.P. 39 stated in total 
simplicity:

(a) Sentence.

(1) Imposition of 
Sentence. - Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending 
sentence the court may commit defendant, continue or alter the bail. Before 
imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak and 
shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a 
statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the 
punishment.

* * * * * *

(f) Revocation of 
probation. - The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at 
which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such 
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such 
hearing.

Some of the confusion in 
this area of the law should be eliminated under newly adopted Rule 39 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective March 24, 1992). As it relates to 
the particular issues in this case, W.R.Cr.P. 39 replaces former W.R.Cr.P. 33(f) 
and states in part:

(a) Revocation of 
probation. - Proceedings for revocation of probation shall be initiated by a 
petition for revocation filed by the attorney for the state, setting forth the 
conditions of probation which are alleged to have been violated by the 
probationer and the facts establishing the violation.

(1) Process. - If it 
appears from a verified petition to revoke probation, or from an affidavit or 
affidavits filed with the petition, that there is probable cause to believe the 
probationer violated the terms of probation, the court shall order the 
probationer to appear before the court on a date and time stated to answer to 
the allegations in the petition. Upon the written request of the attorney for 
the state demonstrating good cause therefor, the court may issue a warrant for 
the probationer. A copy of the petition for revocation shall be served upon the 
probationer along with the order to appear or warrant.

(2) Appearance. - A 
probationer arrested on a warrant and taken into custody shall be taken before a 
judicial officer without unnecessary delay, but in any event within 48 hours of 
arrest.

* * * * * *

(4) [Correctly 
renumbered] Plea. - The probationer shall be given a copy of the petition for 
revocation of probation before being called upon to plead. The probationer shall 
be called upon to admit or deny the allegations of the petition for revocation. 
If the probationer admits the allegations of the petition, the court may proceed 
immediately to disposition, or may set a future date for disposition. If the 
petitioner denies the allegations of the petition, or declines to admit or deny, 
the court shall set the matter for hearing.

* * * * * *

(5) [Correctly 
renumbered] Hearing. - At the hearing upon the petition for revocation of 
probation, the state must establish the violation of the conditions of probation 
alleged in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.

(A) The probationer shall 
have the right to appear in person and by counsel, and to confront and examine 
adverse witnesses.

(B) The Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence shall apply to the adjudicative phase of probation revocation hearings, 
but not to the dispositional stage.

(6) [As correctly 
renumbered] Findings. - If the court finds a violation of conditions of 
probation and revokes probation, it shall enter an order reciting the violation 
and the disposition.

13 We do not consider 
whether Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 may also authenticate judicial revocation of 
parole.

14 Davila, 815 P.2d 848; 
King, 720 P.2d 465; Weisser, 600 P.2d 1320.

15 The significant 
difference between Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-302 sentencing processes compared to at 
least the classical "split sentence" is that, in the latter case, street time 
credit is realized since the available confinement sentence is restructured for 
and limited by the remaining time of probation. The issue for the probationary 
"split sentence" where clearly stated in intent could only become material if 
the resentence time were to max-out beyond the statutory maximum permitted for 
the criminal offense.

16 This court's opinion in 
Schmidt did not recite a statutory basis for imposing probation in lieu of a 
prison sentence as well as any basis for conducting the revocation proceeding. 
It is clear, however, that Schmidt was not a "split sentence" case pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-107.

17 By this conclusion, we 
do not ignore the requirement for notice of the separate bases upon which 
revocation is pursued. If those incidents are to be included in either the 
revocation decision or a separate sentencing decision based on the facts 
established at the revocation hearing, notice of intent to provide evidence of a 
violation of the terms of probation is to be viewed as an intrinsic requirement 
of the revocation and resentencing process. See W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3), Advice to 
Probationer, and (4) [in rule reprint in error as (3)] Plea.