Title: P. v. Wright

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 11/27/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S128442 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4 G031061 
SHAUN ERIC WRIGHT, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 01WF2416 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (the CUA) ensures that Californians 
who obtain and use marijuana for specified medical purposes upon the 
recommendation of a physician are not subject to certain criminal sanctions.  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.)1  Specifically, the CUA provides an affirmative 
defense to the crimes of possessing marijuana (§ 11357) and cultivating marijuana 
(§ 11358) for physician-approved personal medical purposes.  (§ 11362.5, subd. 
(d).)  However, the CUA does not provide a defense to the crime of transporting 
marijuana.  A conflict arose in the Court of Appeal regarding whether and under 
what circumstances an implied defense to this offense existed under the statute.  
(Compare People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532 with People v. Young 
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 229.)  In this case, defendant Shaun Eric Wright was 
convicted of transporting marijuana after the trial court declined to instruct the 
                                              
1  All further undesignated statutory references are to this code. 
 
 
2
jury that the CUA provided a defense to that charge.  The Court of Appeal, 
concluding the refusal was prejudicial error, reversed.  We granted review to 
resolve the issue. 
While this case was pending, however, the Legislature enacted the Medical 
Marijuana Program (MMP), one purpose of which was to address issues not 
included in the CUA so as to promote the fair and orderly implementation of the 
CUA.  (§ 11362.7 et seq.)  Among its provisions, the MMP specifically provides 
an affirmative defense to the crime of transporting marijuana by individuals 
entitled to the protections of the CUA.  (§ 11362.765.)  The MMP has been held to 
apply retroactively to cases pending at the time of its enactment.  (People v. 
Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747; People v. Frazier (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 
807.) 
Defendant contends that the MMP applies in this case and provides an 
alternative ground to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  We agree that 
the MMP applies retroactively to cases pending at the time of its enactment and, 
therefore, to the present case.  We conclude, moreover, that, because defendant 
presented sufficient evidence to entitle him to an instruction on the CUA as an 
affirmative defense to the transportation charge, it was error for the trial court to 
have refused this instruction.  Nonetheless, contrary to the Court of Appeal, for the 
reasons set forth below, we conclude further that the instructional error was 
harmless. 
FACTS 
On September 20, 2001, Huntington Beach police officers received a tip 
that a vehicle at a car wash smelled as if it contained marijuana and that, 
specifically, a backpack in the vehicle “reeked of marijuana.”  Officer Mark 
Armando and two other officers, including Sergeant Henry Cuadras, responded to 
the call.  Officer Armando stopped defendant near the car wash as defendant was 
 
 
3
driving away in his black Toyota pickup truck.  The driver’s side window was 
rolled down.  As he approached the truck, Armando noticed a strong odor of 
marijuana coming from within the truck and observed a backpack on the seat next 
to defendant.  Armando told defendant about the tip and asked him if there was 
marijuana in his truck.  Defendant said no.  Armando had defendant step outside 
the truck.  Defendant got out of the truck holding the backpack.  Armando again 
asked defendant whether there was any marijuana in the truck and defendant again 
said no. 
Sergeant Cuadras conducted a patdown search of defendant that yielded a 
small baggie of marijuana in defendant’s pants pocket.  Armando searched 
defendant’s backpack and found six small baggies of marijuana, two large bags of 
marijuana and an electronic scale.  The small baggies ranged in weight from 4.8 
grams to 9.7 grams while the large bags of marijuana each weighted 30.6 grams, 
or slightly more than an ounce.  A search of defendant’s truck yielded a large bag 
of marijuana concealed in a storage compartment behind the passenger seat.  The 
bag weighed 469.4 grams, or slightly more than a pound.  No devices for smoking 
marijuana were found in the truck or on defendant’s person. 
Defendant was charged by information with possessing marijuana for sale 
(§ 11359), transporting marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a)), and driving on a suspended 
or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a).)2 
Defendant’s trial commenced on May 1, 2002.  Both Officer Armando and 
Sergeant Cuadras testified that in their opinion defendant possessed the marijuana 
to sell, not for his personal use.  They based their opinions on the quantity of 
                                              
2  Defendant pled guilty to the Vehicle Code charge before trial. 
 
 
4
marijuana in defendant’s possession, the manner in which it was packaged and 
concealed in his vehicle, and the presence of the scale in his backpack. 
Following Officer Armando’s testimony, the trial court conducted a hearing 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 on defendant’s request for a jury 
instruction based on the CUA.3  Dr. William Eidelman testified on defendant’s 
behalf that he had recommended that defendant use marijuana to alleviate his 
medical problems.  Eidelman testified that defendant first consulted him on June 7, 
2001.  At the consultation, defendant brought medical records that pertained to a 
shoulder injury he had suffered as the result of a bicycle accident in 1994.  He 
complained of chronic pain in his legs and shoulder, abdominal problems from a 
stomach parasite, and emotional distress.  After performing a physical examination 
of defendant,  Dr. Eidelman wrote a letter approving a self-regulating dose of 
marijuana to relieve defendant’s chronic pain and to treat the decreased appetite he 
                                              
3  The instruction defendant requested was CALJIC No. 12.14.1 (1999 rev.) which 
stated:  “A person is not guilty of the unlawful [possession] [or] [cultivation] [or] 
[transportation] of marijuana when the acts of [defendant] [a primary caregiver] 
are authorized by law for compassionate use.  [¶]  [A ‘primary caregiver’ means 
the individual designated by [the person exempted] . . . who is consistently 
assigned responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.]  [¶]  The 
defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all the 
facts necessary to establish the elements of this defense, namely:  [¶]  1. [The 
defendant] . . . suffered from a medical condition where use of marijuana as a 
treatment was medically appropriate;  [¶]  2.  [The defendant’s] . . . use of 
marijuana was recommended by a physician who had determined orally or in 
writing that the [defendant’s] [patient’s] health would benefit from the use of 
marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, 
glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana promotes 
relief; and [¶]  [[3.]  [¶]  The amount of marijuana [possessed] [or] [cultivated] was 
reasonably related to [the defendant’s] . . . then current medical needs [.]] [; or]  
[¶]  [[3.]  [¶]  The amount of marijuana transported at the time of defendant’s 
arrest was, considering the quantity, method, timing and distance of the 
transportation, reasonably related to [the defendant’s] . . . then medical needs.]” 
 
 
5
experienced as a result of his stomach problems.  Defendant told Dr. Eidelman 
that he preferred eating marijuana to smoking it. 
Dr. Eidelman saw defendant again on November 30, 2001, following 
defendant’s arrest.  He and Dr. Eidelman discussed the fact that defendant 
preferred to eat marijuana, a practice that required a larger amount of marijuana 
than smoking it to achieve the same effect.  Defendant told Dr. Eidelman that, 
when he ate marijuana, a pound of it usually lasted him two to three months.  At 
defendant’s request, Dr. Eidelman wrote a letter on his behalf approving 
defendant’s use of a pound of marijuana every two to three months.  At the 
hearing, Eidelman testified that a pound every two or three months was consistent 
with the manner in which defendant stated that he ingested marijuana. 
Defendant also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Defendant described 
injuries to his leg, collarbone and shoulder and a stomach ailment that caused him 
severe chronic pain.  His shoulder injury prevented him from sleeping through the 
night and had forced him to give up his employment as a carpenter.  Defendant 
also testified that his stomach ailment caused him to suffer nausea and chronic 
diarrhea and had also affected his appetite. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the 
CUA did not apply “in a transportation case where we have one pound, three 
ounces of marijuana.”  The trial court also rejected defendant’s request for a CUA 
instruction with regard to the possession for sale count.  However, the court 
allowed the defense to present evidence of medical use as proof that defendant 
possessed the marijuana for personal medical use and not to sell. 
At the resumed trial, Dr. Eidelman testified that defendant’s use of a pound 
of marijuana over a two- or three-month period was reasonable.  Dr. Eidelman 
based his approval of defendant’s use of marijuana on defendant’s medical 
 
 
6
records, a physical examination of defendant and conversations with defendant 
regarding his preference to eat marijuana. 
Defendant testified that the marijuana he possessed was for his own 
personal medical use and not to sell.  He testified that he had been smoking 
marijuana since 1991 to alleviate the chronic pain he experienced as a result of his 
various injuries.  He explained that, while he smoked about an eighth of an ounce 
of marijuana a day, he preferred to eat it, and that the pound of marijuana found in 
his vehicle was for cooking.  He also testified that the pound of marijuana would 
yield eight ounces for cooking. 
Defendant testified further that, on the morning of his arrest, he had 
purchased the marijuana found by the police packaged in the manner in which 
they found it.  He explained that he had not purchased the marijuana in a single 
large bag because it had different potencies and was used for different purposes, 
like cooking as opposed to smoking.  Defendant testified that after purchasing the 
marijuana, he went to get the oil in his truck changed and his truck washed and 
was on his way home when the police stopped and arrested him.  Defendant did 
not explain why he had a scale in his possession when he was arrested. 
Before closing arguments, the defense renewed its request to give a 
compassionate use defense jury instruction.  The trial court again declined to give 
the instruction. 
After the jury was instructed, but before closing arguments, the judge 
received several questions from individual members of the jury.  Among those 
questions was “Is marijuana for medicinal purposes acceptable with the law?” and 
“Can a doctor legally prescribe marijuana?” The court declined to answer these 
questions, but instead told the jury to listen to closing arguments of both counsel 
and “if you still have questions after argument, you can submit the questions again 
 
 
7
and I’ll go ahead and do my very best to answer your questions.  But . . . it may 
very well be that the attorneys will answer these questions in their argument.”   
At the outset of his closing argument, the prosecutor stated:  “[I]s a medical 
recommendation from some sort of doctor a defense to any of these charges?  No, 
it is not.  No defense.”  Toward the end of his argument, he returned to this point:  
“Is that a defense?  Because any type of doctor recommends that he use it?  No, 
it’s not, not for any of those charges.  So, don’t fall for that either.” 
Defense counsel argued that the marijuana found in defendant’s vehicle 
was for his personal use to alleviate the pain he experienced from his various 
ailments, thus negating any intent to sell marijuana.  “When you look at the 
circumstances overall, you will find that he was not intending to sell that 
marijuana.  He had certain conditions.  Whether you agree with the treatment or 
whether it was really necessary or not is really not the point.  The point is that he 
felt that way.  The doctor felt that way.  And that’s what he was using it for.”  
Defense counsel also argued further that Dr. Eidelman’s testimony regarding the 
efficacy of marijuana for medical use, and the defendant’s use of it to alleviate his 
various ailments, was uncontroverted by other expert testimony.  “We don’t have 
any opposing expert saying that the doctor’s opinion or testimony is just 
completely out of whack or in violation of some law.  We have no opposing expert 
testimony on that issue.” 
The jury was instructed, among other things, that to convict defendant of 
possession for sale of marijuana it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
possessed the marijuana with the specific intent to sell the drug.  The jury was 
further instructed that, if it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
possessed the marijuana to sell, it could nonetheless convict him of the lesser 
included offense of simple possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. 
 
 
8
The jury convicted defendant of both possessing marijuana for sale and 
transporting marijuana. 
At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that “we 
should have had a compassionate use instruction.”4  Defendant appealed.  A 
divided panel of the Court of Appeal reversed his conviction on both the 
transportation and possession for sale counts based on the trial court’s failure to 
give a CUA instruction. 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Adopted by the voters on November 5, 1996, the purpose of the CUA is 
three-fold:  “(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain 
and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed 
appropriate and has been recommended by a physician . . . .  [¶]  (B) To ensure 
that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for 
medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to 
criminal prosecution or sanction.   [¶] (C) To encourage the federal and state 
governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable 
distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”  
(§ 11362.5, subd. (b)(1).)5 
                                              
4  The particular instruction that defendant requested was later disapproved by this 
court to the extent that it required the defendant to establish the defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Instead, the defendant need only raise a 
reasonable doubt as to facts that would support a CUA defense.  (People v. Mower 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 464.) 
5  Both sides agree that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 
545 U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. Rptr. 2195, 162 L.Ed. 1] wherein the court held that 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
9
The CUA provides a defense for physician-approved possession and 
cultivation of marijuana: “Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, 
and section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a 
patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana 
for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral 
recommendation or approval of a physician.”  (§ 11362.5, subd. (d).) 
Almost immediately after the CUA became effective, questions arose about 
whether it provided a defense to marijuana-related offenses not specified in its 
text, including the crime of transporting marijuana.  (§ 11360.)  In People v. 
Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 1550, the reviewing court squarely 
confronted this question.  In that case, the defendant was convicted of transporting 
marijuana and possessing marijuana.  While her appeal was pending, the voters 
adopted the CUA.  The defendant argued that the CUA applied retroactively and, 
as such, provided a defense to both charges of which she was convicted.  (Id. at 
p. 1544.) 
Preliminarily, the court found that the CUA applied retroactively, a point 
the Attorney General conceded.  “As the Attorney General concedes, absent 
contrary indicia, ‘the Legislature is presumed to have extended to defendants 
whose appeals are pending the benefits of intervening statutory amendments 
which decriminalize formerly illicit conduct [citation], or reduce the punishment 
for acts which remain unlawful.  [Citations.]  No different rule applies to an 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
federal criminal sanctions may be applied to individuals with respect to the 
cultivation and possession of marijuana notwithstanding the CUA is not 
implicated in this case because it involves the applicability of the CUA to state 
criminal charges only. 
 
 
10
affirmative defense to the crime for which a defendant was convicted, which 
defense was enacted during the pendency of her appeal.’  Proposition 215 contains 
no savings clause and so, as the Attorney General further concedes, ‘it may 
operate retrospectively to defend against criminal liability, in whole or part, for 
some who are appealing convictions for possessing, cultivating and using 
marijuana.’  [¶]  We agree with this assessment.”  (Id. at pp. 1544-1545.) 
But Trippet concluded that the voters did not intend for the CUA to provide 
a defense to any marijuana-related offense not specifically named in the initiative, 
including transporting marijuana.  (People v. Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1550.)  Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that “practical realities dictate that 
there be some leeway in applying section 11360 in cases where a Proposition 215 
defense is asserted to companion charges.  The results might otherwise be absurd.”  
(Ibid.) 
As the court pointed out, “the voters could not have intended that a dying 
cancer patient’s ‘primary caregiver’ could be subject to criminal sanctions for 
carrying otherwise legally cultivated and possessed marijuana down a hallway to 
the patient’s room.”  (People v. Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550.)  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court declined the defendant’s invitation “to interpret 
the statute as a sort of ‘open sesame’ regarding the possession, transportation and 
sale of marijuana” whereby “transportation by any means and in any quantity 
desired is now also completely protected.”  (Id. at p. 1546 & fn. 8.)  Instead, the 
court held that an implied defense to a section 11360 charge should apply where 
“the quantity transported and the method, timing and distance of the transportation 
are reasonably related to the patient’s current medical needs.”  (56 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1550-1551.)  Concluding that there was a “remote” possibility that the 
defendant could meet this test, notwithstanding the fact that she had been arrested 
with two pounds of marijuana in her car, the court remanded the case to the trial 
 
 
11
court to determine if an implied defense applied to the transportation charge.  (Id. 
at p. 1551.) 
People v. Young, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 229, revisited the issue of whether 
the CUA provides an implied defense to a charge of transporting marijuana.  In 
Young, the defendant was stopped in his car and found to be in possession of less 
than five ounces of marijuana.  He provided the police officer who stopped him 
with a written recommendation from his physician authorizing his use of 
marijuana for arthritis.  (Id. at p. 232.)  Nonetheless, he was charged with and 
convicted of transporting marijuana.  On appeal, he argued that the trial court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury on a mistake of fact defense, that is, that he 
mistakenly believed the marijuana he was transporting was medicine.  The Court 
of Appeal “rejected[ed] this argument because defendant was under an 
inexcusable mistake of law that the Compassionate Use Act provided him with a 
defense to transportation of marijuana.”  (Id. at p. 233.) 
Young agreed with Trippet that the CUA did not provide a defense to a 
charge of transporting marijuana but noted, somewhat critically, that “[d]espite the 
plain language of the statute” Trippet had found a limited implied defense to that 
offense.  (People v. Young, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 236.)  The court asserted 
that it “need not decide whether we agree with the Trippet court that incidental 
transportation of marijuana from the garden to a qualifying patient may implicitly 
fall within the safe haven created by the Compassionate Use Act.  This case 
[involves] . . . the transportation of marijuana in a vehicle.  That kind of 
transportation is not made lawful by the Compassionate Use Act.”  (Id. at p. 237.) 
While, ostensibly, Young found it was unnecessary for it to explicitly agree 
or disagree with Trippet, its categorical conclusion that transporting marijuana in a 
vehicle is not protected by the CUA was directly contrary to Trippet.  In Trippet, 
the court held  that the defendant, who was arrested while transporting two pounds 
 
 
12
of marijuana in her car, might nonetheless be able to establish a CUA defense to 
transportation if she could meet the test set out in Trippet that the “quantity 
transported and the method, timing and distance of the transportation are 
reasonably related to the patient’s current medical needs.”  (People v. Trippet, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551.)  That broad test itself is irreconcilable with the 
categorical statement in Young that transporting marijuana in a vehicle “is not 
made lawful by the Compassionate Use Act.”  (People v. Young, supra, 92 
Cal.App.4th at p. 237.) 
In the case before us, the Court of Appeal concluded that Trippet, and not 
Young, was the better reasoned decision.6  Applying Trippet’s quantity, method, 
timing, and distance standard, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant had 
introduced sufficient evidence to support a CUA instruction and that the failure of 
the trial court to have granted his request for the instruction was reversible error. 
While the case was pending before this court, however, the Legislature 
stepped in and addressed this issue directly by enacting the MMP in which it 
extended a CUA defense to a charge of transporting marijuana where certain 
conditions are met.   (§ 11362.765 et seq.)  Because we conclude that the MMP 
applies to this case and requires reversal, it is unnecessary to resolve the split of 
authority between Trippet and Young.  In any event, enactment of the MMP has 
rendered moot the conflict between these decisions as to whether the CUA 
provides a defense to a charge of transportation of marijuana.7  We now turn to the 
                                              
6  Notably, in the Court of Appeal the Attorney General also agreed that Trippet 
was correct, a position he reiterates here.  The Attorney General simply disagrees 
that the application of the Trippet standard in this case requires reversal. 
7  As both sides acknowledged at argument, however, Trippet’s test for whether 
the defense applies in a particular case survived the enactment of the MMP and 
remains a useful analytic tool to the extent it is consistent with the statute. 
 
 
13
question of whether defendant has met the conditions set forth in the MMP to 
assert a CUA defense to a charge of transporting marijuana. 
II. 
We begin by examining the provisions of the MMP relevant to the issue 
presented in this case.  “Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of 
the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  [Citation.]  Because the 
statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look 
first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.”  
(Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040.)  In construing the MMP, 
we are also aided by the Legislature’s extensive declaration of intent. 
The MMP was introduced in 2003 as Senate Bill No. 420 (2003-2004 Reg. 
Sess.).  In uncodifed portions of the bill the Legislature declared that, among its 
purposes in enacting the statute, was to “[c]larify the scope of the application of 
the act and facilitate the prompt identification of qualified patients and their 
designated primary caregivers in order to avoid unnecessary arrest and prosecution 
of these individuals and provide needed guidance to law enforcement officers.”  
(Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (b)(1).)  Additionally, the Legislature declared that 
a further purpose of the legislation was to “address additional issues that were not 
included within the act, and that must be resolved in order to promote the fair and 
orderly implementation of the act.”  (Id., § 1, subd. (c).) 
To achieve the goal of “facilitat[ing] the prompt identification of qualified 
patients and their designated primary caregivers,” the Legislature established a 
voluntary program for the issuance of identification cards to such qualified 
patients.  (§ 11362.71 et seq.)  The Legislature extended certain protections to 
individuals who elected to participate in the identification card program.  Those 
protections included immunity from prosecution for a number of marijuana-related 
offenses that had not been specified in the CUA, among them transporting 
 
 
14
marijuana.  “Subject to the requirements of this article, the individuals specified in 
subdivision (b) shall not be subject, on that sole basis, to criminal liability under 
Section 11357 [possession of marijuana], 11358 [cultivation of marijuana], 11359 
[possession for sale], 11360 [transportation], 11366 [maintaining a place for the 
sale, giving away or use of marijuana], 11366.5 [making available premises for the 
manufacture, storage or distribution of controlled substances], or 11570 
[abatement of nuisance created by premises used for manufacture, storage or 
distribution of controlled substance].”  (§ 11362.765, subd. (a).)  By authorizing a 
CUA defense to these other marijuana-related offenses, the Legislature furthered 
its goal of “address[ing] additional issues that were not included within the act, 
and that must be resolved in order to promote the fair and orderly implementation 
of the act.”  (Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (c).) 
The Legislature did not limit the availability of a CUA defense to these 
other marijuana-related offenses only to individuals who chose to participate in the 
card identification program.  Rather, in subdivision (b) of section 11362.765, the 
Legislature defined the individuals exempt from criminal liability for the offenses 
designated in subdivision (a) as including “(1) A qualified patient or a person with 
an identification card who transports or processes marijuana for his or her own 
personal medical use.”  (§ 11362.765, subd. (b); italics added.) 
The MMP defines the term “qualified patient” as “a person who is entitled 
to the protections of Section 11362.5, but who does not have an identification card 
issued pursuant to this article.”  (§ 11362.7, subd. (f); see also § 11362.71, subd. 
(f) [“It shall not be necessary for a person to obtain an identification card in order 
to claim the protections of section 11362.5”].)  Section 1136.5 is, of course, the 
CUA.  A person is entitled to the protections of the CUA if that person is a 
“seriously ill” Californian whose use of marijuana “has been recommended by a 
physician who has determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use 
 
 
15
of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, 
glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides 
relief.”  (§ 11362.5, subd. (b)(1)(A).)8  
Thus, under the MMP, either the holder of an identification card holder or a 
“qualified patient” – someone entitled to the protections of the CUA, but who does 
not have an identification card – may assert the CUA as a defense to a charge of 
transporting marijuana.  Defendant maintains that he is a “qualified patient” for 
purposes of the MMP and should be given the benefit of the defense it provides to 
a charge of transporting marijuana.  To reach his claim, however, we must first 
determine whether the MMP applies retroactively to pending cases.  We conclude 
that it does. 
The retroactivity of the CUA itself was, as previously noted, firmly 
established by People v. Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1532.  As the court there 
explained, the new defenses to possessing and cultivating marijuana extended by 
the CUA to individuals who use marijuana for medicinal purposes applied to cases 
pending on appeal.  Trippet based its analysis on decisions from this court:  “The 
clearest precedent on point is People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-302 [134 
Cal.Rptr. 64, 555 P.2d 1313].  The defendant in that case had been convicted of 
violating the pre-1976 version of Penal Code section 288a by committing various 
sexual acts during the filming of what the court euphemistically termed ‘low-
budget movies.’ (18 Cal.3d at p. 298.)  After her conviction, and during the period 
that conviction was on appeal, the Legislature amended section 288a to 
decriminalize the acts performed by the defendant. The Supreme Court, relying 
                                              
8  The MMP contains its own definition of “serious medical condition” that is 
somewhat broader than that set forth in the CUA.  (§ 11362.7, subd. (h).) 
 
 
16
heavily on its decade-earlier decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 
Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948], ruled that the amendment could be applied to 
preclude criminal sanctions for the defendant’s acts.  The precise holding in 
Estrada was that a superseding reduction in the punishment accorded a particular 
violation could be applied retroactively; the Rossi court, however, had no 
difficulty applying that principle to the slightly different facts before it.  It held 
that ‘. . . the common law principles reiterated in Estrada apply a fortiori when 
criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal conviction 
becomes final.’  (People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 301; see also People v. 
Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [216 Cal.Rptr. 123, 702 P.2d 205] [‘. . . absent 
a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the 
law during the pendency of his appeal . . .’].)  [¶] This authority makes clear that 
Proposition 215 may be applied retroactively to provide, if its terms and the 
applicable facts permit, a defense to appellant.”  (People v. Trippet, supra, 56 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1545.) 
Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal have similarly and unanimously 
concluded that the MMP should be retroactively applied.  In People v. Urziceanu, 
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 747, the court considered whether the MMP’s extension of 
a CUA defense to the charge of cultivating marijuana provided the defendant in 
that case with a defense to a charge of conspiracy to possess marijuana.  The 
defendant claimed that the conspiracy count arose out of his involvement in the 
collective cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana.  The court observed 
that the MMP “represents a dramatic change in the prohibitions on the use, 
distribution, and cultivation of marijuana for persons who are qualified patients or 
their primary caregivers and fits the defense defendant attempted to present at 
trial.  Its specific itemization of the marijuana sales law indicates it contemplates 
the formation and operation of medicinal marijuana cooperatives that would 
 
 
17
receive reimbursement for marijuana and the services provided in conjunction 
with the provision of that marijuana.”  (Id. at p. 785.) 
On the issue of retroactivity of the MMP, the court, after citing Trippet’s 
conclusion regarding the retroactivity of the CUA declared:  “The same reasoning 
applies here. . . .  [T]he Medical Marijuana Program Act sets forth the new 
affirmative defense allowing collective cultivation of marijuana, expands the 
defense to penal sections not identified by the Compassionate Use Act, and 
contains no saving clause.  These facts lead us to the conclusion that this law must 
also be retroactively applied.”  (People v. Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 
786; accord, People v. Frazier, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 826 [“To the extent 
that the Medical Marijuana Program sets forth new affirmative defenses, expands 
the defense identified by the Compassionate Use Act, and contains no savings 
clause, that law must be retroactively applied”].)  We agree with the analysis set 
forth in Trippet, Urziceanu and Frazier and conclude, therefore, that the MMP 
must be retroactively applied. 
“That, however, does not end the inquiry.  Retroactive application of a 
defense is only required ‘if its terms and the applicable facts permit a defense to’ 
defendant.”  (People v. Frazier, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, quoting People 
v. Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1545.)  Here, the preliminary question is 
whether there was substantial evidence that defendant is “a qualified patient” as 
that term is defined in section 11362.7, subdivision (f) as “a person who is entitled 
to the protections of Section 11362.5, but who does not have an identification card 
issued pursuant to this article.”  Only upon such an evidentiary showing would 
defendant be entitled to a CUA defense instruction.  (People v. Trippet, supra, 56 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1551, fn. 17 [“Because the statute provides a limited affirmative 
defense, the burden is, of course, on the defendant to raise the defense and prove 
its elements”]; cf. People v. Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 475 [trial court’s 
 
 
18
failure to instruct that defendant was primary caregiver under section 11362.5, 
subd. (d) was not error because “such an instruction would not have been 
supported by substantial evidence”].)  The evidence presented by defendant at his 
trial was sufficient to warrant the instruction of the defense.  Chronic pain is one 
of the conditions for which the CUA authorizes use of marijuana.  (§ 11362.5, 
subd. (b)(1)(A).)  The testimony of Dr. Eidelman, if believed, would satisfy the 
statutory requirement of a physician recommendation. 
The next question is whether a defense set forth in the MMP was available 
to defendant.  As noted, the MMP specifically provides that a qualified patient 
shall not be criminally liable for transporting marijuana “for his or her own 
personal medical use.”  (§ 11362.765, subd. (b)(1).)  In this case, defendant was 
charged with transporting marijuana.  He presented evidence at trial that he had 
purchased the marijuana found in his car on the morning of his arrest for his own 
personal medical use and was in the process of transporting the marijuana to his 
home when he was arrested.  This testimony was sufficient to merit instruction on 
the defense to a charge of  transporting marijuana set forth in the MMP. 
Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s concession in Trippet that the 
CUA, because it extended a new affirmative defense, applied retroactively (People 
v. Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1544-1545), the Attorney General rejects 
retroactive application of the MMP here for three reasons; first, defendant failed to 
identify himself to police as a medicinal user of marijuana; second, the amount in 
his possession, slightly over a pound, was in excess of the eight ounces permitted 
to a qualified patient under section 11362.77, subdivision (a); and, third, the jury’s 
implied finding that defendant possessed the marijuana for sale negates a claim 
that he was transporting it for his personal use only.  These arguments, however, 
confuse the retroactive application of the defense with its efficacy under the 
 
 
19
particular facts of this case, and on the retroactivity question they are not 
persuasive. 
The Attorney General fails to cite any provision of the MMP that supports 
his assertion that a defendant must identify himself as a medical user of marijuana 
before he or she can assert a CUA defense to a charge of transporting marijuana.  
To the contrary, the relevant provisions of the MMP contain no such requirement.  
Section 11362.7 defines a qualified patient as “a person who is entitled to the 
protections of [the CUA], but who does not have an identification card issued 
pursuant to this article.”  (§ 11362.7, subd. (f).)  Section 11362.765 provides that a 
“qualified patient . . . who transports . . . marijuana for his or her own medical 
use” shall not be criminally liable for transporting marijuana.  (§ 11362.765, subd. 
(b)(1).)  Neither of these provisions requires a qualified patient to identify himself 
or herself to police as a medicinal user of marijuana as a condition to asserting any 
defenses extended to such person by the MMP.  Thus, the Attorney General’s 
argument has no basis in the statute, nor does he cite any other authority to support 
it.  No doubt evidence that a defendant failed to identify himself or herself to 
police as a medicinal user of marijuana may have some bearing on whether a jury 
believes his or her CUA defense, but this is a different question than whether the 
defendant is  entitled to assert the defense at all. 
The Attorney General’s claim that defendant’s possession of a greater 
amount of marijuana than that specified in the MMP negates his entitlement to its 
defense against a transportation charge fares no better.  The Attorney General 
relies on section 11362.77, subdivision (a), under which a qualified patient is 
limited to no more than eight ounces of dried marijuana and no more than six 
mature or 12 immature marijuana plants.  Subdivision (b), however, provides that 
a qualified patient may, pursuant to a doctor’s recommendation that a greater 
amount is required for the patient’s medical needs, “possess an amount of 
 
 
20
marijuana consistent with the patient’s needs.”  (§ 11362.77, subd. (b).)  
Moreover, the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 420 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) made clear 
that, although couched in mandatory terms, the amounts set forth in section 
11362.77, subdivision (a) were intended “to be the threshold, not the ceiling.”  
(Historical and Statutory Notes, 40 pt. 1 West’s Ann. Health & Saf. Code (2006 
supp.) foll. § 11362.7, p. 192); Gonzalez v. Raich, supra, 545 U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 
at p. 2215, fn. 41, 162 L.Ed 1] [noting that “the quantity limitations [set forth in 
§ 11362.77, subdivision (a)] serve only as a floor”].)  In this case, defendant 
presented testimony at trial by his doctor that the amount of marijuana found in his 
possession at the time of his arrest was appropriate in light of his medical needs 
and the manner in which he used the marijuana, e.g., eating it for the most part, 
rather than smoking it.  Again, the possibility that a properly instructed jury might 
ultimately have disbelieved a CUA defense to the transportation charge is a 
different matter than whether the jury should have been given the instruction in the 
first instance. 
Finally, the Attorney General argues that defendant is not entitled to a CUA 
defense to the charge of transporting marijuana because the jury “after considering 
all the testimony regarding [defendant’s] medical use [found] that [defendant] 
possessed the marijuana with intent to sell rather than for his own personal use.”  
The jury’s finding goes not to whether defendant was entitled to advance a CUA 
defense, or whether the MMP is retroactive, but, as we discuss in the next part, 
whether the failure of the trial court to have given the instruction prejudiced 
defendant. 
We therefore conclude that the MMP applies retroactively to this case and 
that, in light of the MMP and the evidence he presented at trial, defendant was 
entitled to a compassionate use instruction on the transportation count.  The only 
 
 
21
remaining question is whether the error was prejudicial.  We now turn to that 
issue. 
III. 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s failure to have given a CUA 
instruction on the transportation count violated his due process right to present a 
defense and the error must, therefore, be assessed under the federal standard of 
prejudice which asks whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,24.)  He maintains that the 
instructional error was prejudicial under this standard. 
In People v. Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th 457, however, we “left open the 
question of whether an instructional error [involving a CUA defense] is of federal 
constitutional dimension or only of state law import [citation]” because “the error 
requires reversal even under the less rigorous [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818] standard.”  (Mower, supra, at p. 484.)  Under that standard, reversal is 
required if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing 
party would have been reached in the absence of error.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Watson, 
supra, at p. 837.)  We again need not decide which standard applies because in this 
case we conclude that the instructional error was harmless under either standard. 
In People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, disapproved on other grounds in 
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165, we held that the failure of the 
trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser included offense was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt under circumstances in which “the factual question 
posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the 
defendant under other, properly given instructions.  In such cases the issue should 
not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has 
been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant 
since the evidence that would support a finding that only the lesser offense was 
 
 
22
committed has been rejected by the jury.”  (Sedeno, supra, at p. 721.)  We have 
applied this principle in evaluating the prejudicial effect of other instructional 
errors.  (See, e.g., People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778-779 [where, by 
finding true a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, the jury found the 
victim was killed in the course of a robbery and any error in burglary-murder 
special-circumstance instruction was rendered harmless]; cf. People v. Mayberry 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157-158 [finding by jury that victim did not consent to 
sexual encounter with defendant did not mean that jury necessarily rejected factual 
predicate to defendant’s affirmative defense of good faith belief in consent].) 
This analysis applies to the Attorney General’s argument that the jury 
necessarily rejected the factual predicate of the omitted CUA defense – that 
defendant possessed and, by extension, transported marijuana for his personal 
medicinal use – when, under other, properly given instructions, it found that he 
possessed the drug with the specific intent to sell it.  We agree with this 
contention.  Under the instructions it was given, the jury had the option of 
convicting defendant for simple possession had it been convinced by his claim that 
the marijuana found in his possession was for his personal medicinal use.  Instead, 
it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the drug with the specific 
intent to sell it.  Accordingly, “the jury necessarily resolved, although in a 
different setting, the same factual question that would have been presented by the 
missing instruction” (People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 158), in a manner 
adverse to defendant.  We conclude, therefore, that the instructional error was 
harmless under any standard of prejudice.9  As this analysis applies to both of the 
                                              
9  Defendant asserts that the Attorney General’s argument “ignores the fact that 
medical use is completely intertwined with personal use.”  But the question is 
whether the jury understood defendant’s argument was that he possessed the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
23
charges of which defendant was convicted, we reverse the Court of Appeal and 
reinstate defendant’s convictions for possession for sale of marijuana and 
transportation.10 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
marijuana for personal medicinal use and necessarily rejected it.  Given the 
explicitness of defense counsel’s argument — “When you look at the 
circumstances overall, you will find that he was not intending to sell that 
marijuana.  He had certain [medical] conditions . . . .  And that’s what he was 
using it for” — the jury could hardly have missed the point. 
10  Defendant asserts that the question of whether the Court of Appeal correctly 
reversed his conviction for possession for sale is not before us because the 
Attorney General only “sought review of the Court of Appeal decision as it 
applied to the transportation charge.”  This is not accurate.  The Attorney 
General’s petition for review and his opening brief specifically argued that the 
jury’s finding that defendant possessed the marijuana with intent to sell precluded 
a finding of prejudice arising from the trial court’s failure to give a CUA 
instruction.  The Attorney General did not limit that analysis to the transportation 
charge and he requested that we reinstate defendant’s conviction of both counts.  
Defendant’s response to this argument similarly was not limited to the 
transportation count.  Moreover, our order granting review did not limit the issues 
and under rule 29(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court we are empowered to 
“decide any issues that are raised or fairly included in the petition or answer.”  
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).)  In his brief, defendant requests that, if we 
reverse the Court of Appeal, we remand the case for that court to consider 
additional claims of instructional error it did not reach once it concluded that the 
trial court’s failure to give a CUA instruction required reversal.  This request 
further underscores defendant’s understanding that the Attorney General’s 
prejudice argument potentially affected both counts.  In light of our reversal of the 
Court of Appeal, we will remand the case to allow the court to consider 
defendant’s further claims of error. 
 
 
24
DISPOSITION 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s judgment, but I disagree sharply with certain of 
its intermediate conclusions.  To place my views in context, I briefly review the 
facts and procedural background. 
In 2001, defendant was arrested while transporting one pound three ounces 
of marijuana in his pickup truck.  Officers stopped the truck on a tip and 
confirmed that it “reeked” of marijuana.  Defendant twice denied there was 
marijuana in the truck.  Yet a search of his backpack, which had been located on 
the passenger seat, revealed numerous baggies containing premeasured amounts of 
marijuana.  The backpack also contained an electronic scale.  Further searching 
revealed a one-pound brick of marijuana concealed in a storage compartment 
behind the passenger seat.1  The truck contained no paraphernalia for personal use. 
Defendant was charged with transporting marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11360, subd. (a))2 and possession of marijuana for sale (§ 11359).  During his 
                                              
1  
According to an August 30, 2006, press release by the White House Office 
of National Drug Control, the current street value of a pound of marijuana is about 
$4,000.  (White House Off. of Nat. Drug Control, Press Release (Aug. 30, 2006) 
online at  [as of Nov. 27, 
2006)  On that assumption, defendant was arrested while transporting marijuana 
with a street value of about $4,750. 
 
2  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to that code. 
 
2 
2002 trial, at a hearing under Evidence Code section 402, he sought an instruction 
asserting, as to both charges, a defense authorized by the Compassionate Use Act 
of 1996 (CUA; § 11362.5).  At the time of defendant’s trial, this defense expressly 
applied only to medical patients who possessed or cultivated marijuana “for [their] 
personal medical purposes” upon a physician’s recommendation or approval.  (Id., 
subd. (d).)  However, Courts of Appeal had split on the issue whether the defense 
implicitly extended to an eligible patient’s transportation of marijuana for 
personal medical use. 
At the hearing, defendant offered testimony that he was an eligible patient 
who was transporting amounts necessary and reasonable for his particular needs.  
He also testified that he actually was transporting the marijuana for his personal 
medical use.  The court nonetheless refused the instruction.  It ruled that the CUA 
defense did not apply to a charge of possession for sale, and was also not 
appropriate for the transportation of “one pound, three ounces of marijuana.”  
However, the court permitted defendant to put on evidence that the marijuana was 
for his personal use as proof he did not possess it with intent to sell.  After the 
defense presented its case at trial, defendant renewed his request for CUA defense 
instructions.  The request was again denied. 
Defendant was convicted on both counts.  The Court of Appeal reversed, 
concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct on the CUA defense was 
prejudicial error as to both convictions.  We granted the People’s petition for 
review.  Our initial aim was to resolve the Court of Appeal conflict on the 
application of the CUA defense to a charge of transporting marijuana.  While 
review was pending, however, the Legislature adopted the Medical Marijuana 
Program (MMP; § 11362.7 et seq.), which expressly extends a CUA defense to the 
marijuana crimes of transportation, and possession for sale, insofar as the 
 
3 
marijuana was possessed and/or transported by an eligible patient for his or her 
personal medical purposes.  (§ 11362.765, subds. (a), (b)(1).) 
The majority holds that the MMP applies retroactively to defendant’s case.  
It further determines that the trial court “erred” by failing to instruct on the CUA 
defense now authorized by the MMP, because defendant adduced evidence 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt concerning both his medical eligibility to use 
the quantity of marijuana with which he was arrested, and his actual intent to use it 
only for his personal medical purposes.  However, the majority concludes, this 
“error” was harmless, because the jury necessarily rejected any CUA defense 
when, under proper instructions defining the offense of possession for sale, it 
convicted him of that charge. 
I acknowledge that the MMP extends a limited CUA defense to the 
particular charges defendant faced.  I also concur in the majority’s holding that the 
MMP applies retroactively to defendant’s case.  I further agree that, even if the 
MMP technically would have warranted a CUA defense instruction on either or 
both the charged offenses, no retrial is necessary.  As the majority indicates, 
defendant’s conviction of possession for sale, upon instructions that correctly 
defined all the elements of that offense, proves that the absence of a CUA defense 
instruction did not affect the trial outcome.3  Additionally, however, I conclude, 
contrary to the majority, that defendant did not produce enough evidence to justify 
an instruction on the CUA defense pursuant to the MMP. 
                                              
3  
Indeed, the jury found defendant possessed the marijuana with intent to sell 
it despite hearing defendant’s evidence that the marijuana was for his personal 
medical use, as approved by a physician. 
 
 
4 
As the majority concedes, the CUA defense authorized by the MMP has 
three prongs, and defendant would not have been entitled to an MMP instruction 
on the defense unless he raised a reasonable doubt with respect to all three.  Upon 
his failure to do so, the trial court, in the exercise of its “gatekeeping” function 
(see People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 475-476; People v. Jones (2003) 
112 Cal.App.4th 341, 350 (Jones); see also People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 
466), could and should have ruled that the evidence was insufficient to allow the 
defense to go to the jury. 
Thus, to justify a CUA defense instruction under the MMP, defendant must 
have adduced creditable evidence, first, that he was a “qualified patient,” in that a 
licensed physician had recommended or approved his personal use of marijuana to 
treat a condition specified in the CUA (see §§ 11362.715, 11362.765, subds. (a), 
(b)(1)), second, that the quantity possessed or transported, to the extent it exceeded 
eight ounces of dried marijuana, was consistent with his particular medical needs, 
as approved by a physician (§ 11362.77, subds. (a), (b)), and third, that the 
marijuana on which the charges are based actually was “for his . . . own personal 
medical use” (§ 11362.765, subd. (b)(1)). 
I am persuaded defendant did not satisfy this minimal burden as to any of 
the prongs of the defense.  Defendant’s proffered evidence that he was a qualified 
medical marijuana patient at the time of his arrest was extremely weak.  At the 
Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Dr. Eidelman testified he had twice given 
written approval for defendant’s medical use of marijuana.  At trial, both 
defendant and Dr. Eidelman reiterated this claim.4  However, these writings were 
                                              
4  
The majority notes defense counsel argued that the testimonial evidence 
that Dr. Eidelman approved defendant’s medical use of marijuana was 
“uncontroverted.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  However, both at the Evidence Code 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
5 
not produced.  Though written approval is not required, this lapse undermines the 
credibility of the ”qualified patient” claim.  Moreover, as the officers had testified, 
defendant, when arrested, did not identify himself as a medical marijuana patient, 
and he denied the presence of marijuana in his truck, thereby suggesting 
consciousness of guilt. 
Under proper circumstances, bare testimonial assertions of a physician’s 
approval may be sufficient evidence of the defendant’s status as a qualified 
patient.  (Jones, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 341, 350-351.)  Here, however, such 
claims simply evaporate in light of the powerful contrary indicia that defendant 
was not a qualified user who was transporting marijuana for legitimate purposes. 
Even more deficient was defendant’s evidence that he had medical approval 
to possess quantities in excess of eight dried ounces.  Both defendant and Dr. 
Eidelman testified that the first of Dr. Eidelman’s two written approvals, issued 
prior to defendant’s arrest, was for an unspecified “self-regulating dosage.”  In my 
view, such a vague and open-ended authorization fails, as a matter of law, to 
constitute the specific determination the MMP requires—i.e., “a doctor’s 
recommendation that [eight dried ounces] does not meet the qualified patient’s 
medical needs.”  (§ 11362.77, subd. (b), italics added.) 
As defendant and Dr. Eidelman further testified, it was only after the arrest 
that defendant obtained Dr. Eidelman’s second approval, which conveniently 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
section 402 hearing, and at trial, the court allowed the prosecution to impeach Dr. 
Eidelman’s credibility with evidence that he was then under investigation by the 
California Medical Board for numerous alleged violations of the Business and 
Professions Code in connection with his license to practice medicine in this state. 
 
 
6 
endorsed the specific amount of marijuana that already had been found in 
defendant’s backpack and truck.  But, for obvious reasons, absent “ ‘exigent 
circumstances’ ” not present here, the CUA defense cannot apply to a physician’s 
postarrest ratification of self-medication on marijuana.  (People v. Rigo (1999) 
69 Cal.App.4th 409, 412; see also People v. Trippett (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1542, 
1548, fn. 13.) 
Finally, I conclude, the overwhelming evidence that defendant possessed 
the marijuana with the intent of selling it precluded a reasonable doubt as to its 
personal medical purpose.  This evidence prominently included the electronic 
scale, the presence of which defendant never explained. 
Moreover, as Justice Sills aptly observed in his dissent below, the 
marijuana at issue here was not found in “one large bag . . . , as one would expect 
. . . if it was for a single individual’s personal use.  [On the contrary], it was found 
in nine different portions:  Two very large baggies, each containing 30.6 grams of 
marijuana, seven small baggies in approximately equal amounts[,] and a large 
‘brick’ of [marijuana] wrapped in a shirt which weighed about a pound.  Six of the 
small baggies were located in a black bag along with [the] electronic scale.  The 
brick was found [secreted under] the truck’s back seat; the large baggies were 
found in [defendant’s] backpack but not in the same section with the scales and the 
small baggies of marijuana.  It is particularly noteworthy that [defendant] was 
carrying a single small baggie of marijuana in his pocket, separate from all the 
other parcels, as if that were his personal property as distinct from the large supply 
available for distribution.” 
Sergeant Cuadras, an experienced narcotics officer who participated in the 
search and arrest, gave his expert opinion that the marijuana was for sale, not for 
personal use.  He based this opinion, inter alia, on the way the marijuana was 
 
7 
packaged, the large amount of marijuana concealed in the truck’s storage 
compartment, and the presence of the electronic scale. 
The MMP recognizes the possibility that, with specific medical approval, 
qualified patients may be entitled to handle significant amounts of dried marijuana 
for their personal medical use.  (See § 11362.77.)  Yet the overwhelming evidence 
detailed above essentially negates an inference that defendant was transporting this 
very large quantity of marijuana under such circumstances.5  In sum, his evidence 
of personal medical use failed to establish, for purposes of entitlement to a CUA 
instruction, a reasonable doubt that he possessed and transported the marijuana 
with intent to sell it. 
Accordingly, I conclude, an instruction on the CUA defense was not 
warranted under the MMP, and the trial court’s ruling to that effect would have 
been correct.  On this basis alone, I would reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
and reinstate defendant’s convictions. 
One additional point warrants comment.  The majority consistently applies 
the term “error” to the trial court’s instructional rulings, even though the majority 
relies solely on statutory law that was not in effect when the trial court acted.  Of 
course, we do not expect clairvoyance from our courts.  Indeed, a judicial ruling 
that departed from then-current law would itself be error.  Thus, even assuming a 
CUA instruction was warranted, nunc pro tunc, by virtue of the later-enacted 
MMP, I would not imply criticism of a diligent and hard-pressed trial court by 
labeling its failure to anticipate this statute as “error.” 
                                              
5  
The majority notes defendant testified that the large quantity was necessary 
and reasonable because he preferred to eat, rather than smoke, marijuana.  
However, Sergeant Cuadras testified that in his experience he had never 
encountered someone transporting a pound and three ounces of marijuana for the 
purpose of eating it. 
 
8 
Instead, it is sufficient to determine, in hindsight, whether the MMP, as 
retroactively applied, justified a CUA instruction in defendant’s case, and, if so, 
whether the absence of the instruction influenced the outcome, thus rendering the 
trial unfair by current standards.  If the answer is “yes,” we can and should simply 
remand for a new trial, without citing trial court “error” as the reason. 
As indicated, I, unlike the majority, do not believe the MMP would justify a 
CUA instruction on the facts of this case.  Assuming, however, that the majority is  
correct on that point, I agree, for the reasons expressed in its “harmless error” 
analysis, that omission of the instruction did not affect the trial outcome, thus 
rendering the trial unfair.  I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Wright 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 121 Cal.App.4th 1356 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S128442 
Date Filed:  November 27, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: James A. Stotler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Maureen J. Shanahan, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Donald E. de Nicola, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck, Marc J. Nolan, Ana R. Duarte and Erika Hiramatsu, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Maureen J. Shanahan 
P.O. Box 789 
Pacific Palisades, CA  90272 
(800) 541-2802 
 
Erika Hiramatsu 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92186-5266 
(619) 645-2224