Title: LEASEAMERICA CORP OF WISCONSIN v

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 80-269 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 LEASEAMERICA CORPORATION O F WISCONSIN, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, VS . STATE O F M O N T A N A , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Richard Larson argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana For Respondents: J a r d i n e , Stephenson, B l e w e t t and Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana Jack Lewis argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: February 17, 1981 Decided : MAR 1 6 1 9 8 9 F i l e d : MAR 1 6 9. y - 4 Clerk Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the opinion of the Court. The State appeals a Lewis & Clark County District Court decision awarding plaintiff, Leaseamerica, a summary judgment. Leaseamerica cross-appeals for prejudgment and post-judgment interest. In 1967 the Legislature authorized the state attorney general to establish a law enforcement teletypewriter communi- cations system (LETS) and to acquire the necessary equipment by'lease, purchase or other means. In March 1973, then Attorney General Robert Woodahl entered into a lease arrange- ment with Action Communications Systems, Leaseamerica's assignor, whereby the State agreed to lease the necessary equipment for a period of six years, paying $2,388 in 72 monthly payments. Immediately thereafter, Action assigned the lease to Leaseamerica, together with all rights to the lease payments. The State made the lease payments from May 1973 to May 1977, when Attorney General Mike Greely notified Leaseamerica that it was unilaterally terminating the lease. Notice of Action's sale, assignment, and transfer of all interest in the lease to Leaseamerica was not filed with the state auditor until shortly before this lawsuit was instituted. At the end of the 72-month period, Leaseamerica took possession of the equipment. On February 9, 1978, Leaseamerica commenced an action seeking: (1) specific performance of the State's obligation to pay under the lease; (2) attorney fees pursuant to an indemnity provision in the lease; (3) prejudgment and post- judgment interest. The District Court entered judgment in favor of Leaseamerica for the lease payments and attorney fees but denied ~easeamerica's claim for interest. The following i s s u e s a r e presented i n t h i s appeal: 1. Is a six-year l e a s e of a law enforcement communica- t i o n s system entered i n t o by the a t t o r n e y general of t h e S t a t e of Montana i n March 1973 unenforceable a s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, which then limited t h e t e r m of those s t a t e c o n t r a c t s covered by t h e s t a t u t e t o t h r e e years? 2. Is an assignee of t h e l e s s o r of a law enforcement communications system prohibited by s e c t i o n 17-8-211(1), MCA, from f i l i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e f o r s p e c i f i c performance of t h e l e a s e agreement where n o t i c e of t h e assignment of t h e l e s s o r ' s i n t e r e s t t o t h e assignee was n o t f i l e d with t h e s t a t e a u d i t o r u n t i l j u s t p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e action? 3 . Is the S t a t e obligated t o pay a t t o r n e y f e e s where a l e a s e provided f o r indemnification of l e s s o r , and t h e l e s s o r ' s successors, f o r f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o perform o r comply with any of the terms of t h e agreement? 4 . A f t e r adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution, i s t h e S t a t e obligated t o pay prejudgment and post-judgment i n t e r e s t on l e a s e payments from t h e due d a t e of each payment? The l e a s e here i n d i s p u t e was executed i n March of 1973. A t t h a t t i m e , Ch. 19, of T i t l e 82, e n t i t l e d Purchasing Department and Agent, s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, provided: "Contracts l i m i t e d t o t h r e e years. N o c o n t r a c t s s h a l l be made f o r a longer period than t h r e e (3) years and such c o n t r a c t s h a l l provide f o r t h e -- d e l i v e r y of such a r t i c l e s a t such t i m e s and i n - such q u a n t i t i e s a s -- t h e purchasing agent may de- termine." (Emphasis supplied.) The s u b j e c t l e a s e was executed by t h e a t t o r n e y general pursuant t o power derived from s e c t i o n s 44-2-301, MCA, and 44-2-302, MCA. The former authorized establishment of a law enforcement telecommunications system while t h e l a t t e r a u t h o r i z e d t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o l e a s e equipment necessary f o r accomplishing t h e o b j e c t i v e . I n Holtz v. Babcock (1963), 143 Mont. 341, 389 P.2d 869, t h i s Court held t h a t lease--purchase c o n t r a c t s executed by t h e state purchasing a g e n t were s u b j e c t t o competitive bidding requirements of t h e s t a t e purchasing s t a t u t e s . Here t h e i s s u e s are whether those same s t a t u t e s and i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, l i m i t i n g c o n t r a c t s t o t h r e e y e a r s , a p p l i e d (1) t o l e a s e s which have no o p t i o n ,and t o purchase ( 2 ) t o l e a s e s executed by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l . The q u e s t i o n s have n o t previously been decided by t h i s Court. Applicable r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e : (1) Both t h e con- t e x t of a s t a t u t e and t h e p l a i n meaning of i t s t e r m s can be considered i n determining l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . I n Matter of Adoption of Smigaj (1977), 171 Mont. 537, 540, 560 P.2d 1 4 1 . (2) The t i t l e t o an a c t may be looked t o i n construing t h e a c t . I n re Coleman's E s t a t e (1957), 132 Mont. 339, 343, 317 P.2d 880. ( 3 ) Zn determining l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t a c o u r t can r e s o r t t o h i s t o r y of t h e s t a t u t e . Dept. of Rev. v. Puget Mont. Sound Power & L i g h t (1978), , 587 P.2d 1282, 35 St.Rep. 1368. When passed i n 1923, s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, l i m i t e d c o n t r a c t s t o one year. This s t a t u t e was i n e f f e c t when, i n 1967, s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n empowered t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o l e a s e telecommunications equipment. The one-year l i m i t a t i o n was changed t o t h r e e y e a r s by amendment i n 1971. S e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, a s it e x i s t e d when t h e p r e s e n t l e a s e was executed, was s i l e n t regarding l e a s e s . When t h e L e g i s l a t u r e granted l e a s i n g power t o t h e a t t o r n e y general, a l i m i t a t i o n of years was n o t provided e i t h e r by reference t o the chapter covering purchasing agent o r l i m i t e d i n Ch. 2, T i t l e 4 4 , which e s t a b l i s h e d the system. The L e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 82-1918, i n 1971, four years a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y general was authorized t o l e a s e telecommuni- c a t i o n s equipment; t h e r e was no l e g i s l a t i v e attempt t o apply t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 82-1918 t o T i t l e 44. P r i o r t o t h e 1971 l e g i s l a t i v e session, t h e a t t o r n e y general had, on J u l y 1 4 , 1969, issued a formal opinion s t a t i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, d i d n o t apply t o s t a t e l e a s e s . The l e a s e i s s u e was being discussed and was a s u b j e c t of an a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s opinion when s e c t i o n 82-1918 was amended i n 1971; y e t t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s w e r e n o t applied t o l e a s e s . W e a r e persuaded by t h e following f a c t o r s : (1) Section 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, r e f e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e purchasing agent, b u t it does n o t r e f e r t o any o t h e r agents of s t a t e government. ( 2 ) Eection 82-1918 i s a s e c t i o n under Ch. 19, e n t i t l e d Purchasing Department Agent. (3) T i t l e 4 4 , giving t h e a t t o r n e y general power t o l e a s e telecommunications equipment, does n o t l i m i t t h a t power a s t o t i m e . ( 4 ) Section 82-1918 was amended i n 1971, four years a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y general w a s authorized t o l e a s e without l i m i t a t i o n and two years a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y general gave an opinion t h a t s e c t i o n 82-1918 d i d not apply t o l e a s e s ; y e t no attempt was made by t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o apply s e c t i o n 82-1918 t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s l e a s i n g power. W e f i n d s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o l e a s e s executed by t h e a t t o r n e y general pursuant t o s e c t i o n 44-2-302, MCA. The S t a t e contends t h a t f a i l u r e of Leaseamerica o r i t s assignor t o record t h e l e a s e assignment with t h e s t a t e a u d i t o r p r i o r t o February of 1978 f o r e c l o s e s t h i s a c t i o n which was n o t i n s t i t u t e d u n t i l February 9, 1978. Section 17-8-211 ( I ) , MCA, provides: "All t r a n s f e r s and assignments made of any claim a g a i n s t the s t a t e , o r any p a r t thereof o r i n t e r e s t thereon, except a s h e r e i n a f t e r provided, s h a l l be absolutely n u l l and void and unenforceable a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e unless t h e assignee thereof f i l e s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e assignment on such forms a s may be required by t h e s t a t e a u d i t o r , together with a t r u e copy of t h e instrument of assignment." (Emphasis supplied.) Paragraph No. 13 of t h e s u b j e c t l e a s e s t a t e d : "Lessor may, without l e s s e e ' s consent, a s s i g n t h i s l e a s e o r any i n t e r e s t therein." The S t a t e knew of t h e assignment and made payments t o t h e assignee Leaseamerica f o r a period of four years. The S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n must f a i l f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e reasons. F i r s t , t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o assignments of "claim" r a t h e r than assignments of c o n t r a c t . Anti-assignment s t a t u t e s have h i s t o r i c a l l y been l i m i t e d t o l i q u i d a t e d debts. Explosive Chemical Co. v. William S. Gray & Co. (1925), 207 N.Y.Supp. 638. Secondly, t h e s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e f i l i n g within a t i m e c e r t a i n and a f i l i n g was eventually made with t h e a u d i t o r p r i o r t o i n s t i t u t i n g s u i t on February 9, 1978. F i n a l l y , t h e S t a t e can claim no prejudice a s it had a c t u a l n o t i c e of t h e assignment and made l e a s e payments t o Leaseamerica f o r four years. Leaseamerica claims a t t o r n e y f e e s pursuant t o a c o n t r a c t u a l provision with t h e S t a t e . The S t a t e was t o indemnify t h e l e s s o r f o r " l e g a l expenses'' incurred a s t h e r e s u l t of any d e f a u l t upon t h e p a r t of l e s s e e , S t a t e of Montana. Section 18-1-404, MCA, provides: " L i a b i l i t y of state--1imi tation--costs. (1) The S t a t e of Montana s h a l l be l i a b l e i n r e s p e c t t o any c o n t r a c t entered i n t o i n t h e same manner and t o t h e same e x t e n t a s a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l under l i k e circumstances, except t h e S t a t e of Montana s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e f o r i n t e r e s t p r i o r t o o r a f t e r judgment o r f o r p u n i t i v e damages. "C2)Costs may be allowed a s provided i n 25-10-711. I n a l l o t h e r cases, c o s t s s h a l l be allowed i n a l l c o u r t s t o t h e successful claimant t o t h e same ex- t e n t a s i f t h e s t a t e of Montana were a p r i v a t e l i t i g a n t , except t h a t such c o s t s s h a l l n o t include a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . " Section 25-10-711, MCA, r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e above-quoted s t a t u t e , provides f o r an award of reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e event t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s l i t i g a t i o n i s deemed t o be f r i v o l o u s o r is pursued i n bad f a i t h . Neither of those f a c t o r s e x i s t here. A reading of t h e s e s t a t u t e s compels t h e conclusion t h a t l i a b i l i t y f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s can a r i s e from c o n t r a c t but cannot be awarded a s " c o s t s " absent bad f a i t h on t h e S t a t e ' s p a r t . The S t a t e has r e l i e d on Tomten v. Thomas (1951), 125 Mont. 159, 232 P.2d 723, wherein t h i s Court held t h a t t h e word "expensen w a s synonymous with "costs". Therefore, argues t h e S t a t e , " l e g a l expense" a s denoted i n t h e l e a s e i s a c o s t and cannot be awarded a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e unless t h e S t a t e l i t i g a t e s i n bad f a i t h . Tomten v. Thomas, supra, was overruled by C a l l a n t v. Mont. Federal Land Bank of Spokane (1979), , 593 P.2d 1036, 36 St.Rep. 824. Legal "expenses" a r e not synonymous with "costs" b u t r a t h e r , when provided c o n t r a c t u a l l y , a r e t r e a t e d a s a s p e c i a l damage recoverable i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p r i n c i p a l sum. Bovee v. Helland (1916), 52 Mont. 151, 156 W e f i n d the S t a t e l i a b l e f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s under its l e a s e indemnity provision. Leaseamerica a s s e r t s t h a t it i s e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t on i t s judgment d e s p i t e t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 18-1-404(1), MCA, quoted above, which p r o h i b i t s an award of i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . Leaseamerica argues t h a t s e c t i o n 18-1-404(1), MCA, i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with A r t i c l e 2 , Section 18 of t h e 1972 S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n which provides t h a t a governmental e n t i t y s h a l l have "no immunity from s u i t o r i n j u r y t o a person o r property." The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h i s language was intended t o apply t o t o r t b u t n o t c o n t r a c t a c t i o n s . W e have reviewed t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate p r i o r t o t h e adoption of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r section. The o r i g i n a l d r a f t of Section 18, Non-immunity -- from S u i t , provided: "The S t a t e and i t s subdivision s h a l l have no s p e c i a l immunity from s u i t . " Delegate Habedank i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention moved t o support an amendment which would add, following t h e words s u i t , t h e language " f o r i n j u r y t o a person o r property." Delegate Habedank, t h e sponsor of t h e amendment, revealed i t s i n t e n t i n t h e debate: "Limited a s it is, f o r i n j u r y t o a person o r property, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s s t i l l f r e e t o make it more open i f they d e s i r e t o do s o i n t h e f u t u r e . B u t we a t l e a s t have assured t h e people of t h e S t a t e of Montana t h a t they can sue f o r negligent i n j u r y . " Con.Con. T r a n s c r i p t TR. P. 5430, l i n e s 10-14. W e agree with t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l e g a t e s was t o l i m i t nonimmunity t o t o r t s committed by t h e S t a t e . W e f i n d t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t i n s e c t i o n 18-1-404(1), MCA, t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The S t a t e of Montana i s n o t l i a b l e f o r prejudgment o r post-judgment i n t e r e s t . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: v J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea w i l l f i l e a s e p a r a t e opinion l a t e r . M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . The r e s u l t reached by t h e m a j o r i t y may be an e q u i t a b l e accommodation, b u t i n my view it is n o t t h e l a w . A t t h e t i m e t h e s i x - y e a r lease of t h e equipment was e n t e r e d i n t o between Leaseamerica and t h e S t a t e of Montana, o u r s t a t u t e provided: " C o n t r a c t s l i m i t e d t o t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s . No c o n t r a c t s s h a l l be made f o r a p e r i o d l o n q e r t h a n t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s , and such c o n t k a c t s h a l l - p r o v i d e f o r t h e d e l i v e r y of such a r t i c l e s a t such times and i n such q u a n t i t i e s as t h e p u r c h a s i n g a g e n t may determine." Laws of Montana ( 1 9 7 1 ) , Ch. 301, S 2. A lease is a c o n t r a c t . Here it w a s made f o r a p e r i o d of s i x y e a r s . Such a c o n t r a c t was p r o h i b i t e d by t h e clear, unam- b i g u o u s language of t h e s t a t u t e . I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e , t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e is c o n t r o l l i n g . S e c t i o n 1-2-102, MCA; Haker v. Southwestern Railway Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 364, 369, 578 P.2d 724, 727, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ; Dunphy v. Anaconda C o . ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 80, 438 P.2d 660, 662, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . The i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words used i n t h e s t a t u t e , and i f t h e meaning of t h e sta- t u t e can be so determined, c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y a n y o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Haker, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ; Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . Thus where t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e is p l a i n , unambiguous, d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e speaks f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e is nothing l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o c o n s t r u e . Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . I n such case, t h e f u n c t i o n of t h i s Court is s i m p l y to a s c e r t a i n what i n terms or i n s u b s t a n c e is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e sta- t u t e and n o t to i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d . S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA; S t a t e ex r e l . Zander v. District Court ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 5 9 1 P.2d 656, 662, 36 S t . Rep. 489, 496; Dunphy, s u p r a , and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . I n sum, it is s i m p l y t h e duty of t h e Court t o c o n s t r u e t h e l a w as it f i n d s it. Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . -10 - Here t h e D i s t r i c t Court c r e a t e d an ambiguity i n t h e act by r e f e r r i n g t o its t i t l e and t h e n proceeding to a p p l y a v a r i e t y of e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t was n o t void. T h i s it cannot do. The t i t l e of a l e g i s l a t i v e act c a n n o t be used to create an ambiguity i n t h e t e x t of t h e act s o as t o a u t h o r i z e r e c o u r s e to e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n . S t a t e ex rel. P a l a g i v. Regan ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 343, 351-352, 126 P.2d 818, 824; S t a t e ex rel. J o n e s v. Erikson ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 75 Mont. 429, 453, 244 P. 287, 296. The District C o u r t ' s r e c o u r s e to e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n is bottomed on its view t h a t o t h e r w i s e t h e scope of t h e s t a t u t e would be "stupendousn and would o u t l a w a l l c o n t r a c t s i n e x c e s s of t h r e e y e a r s throughout t h e state, which is n o t r a t i o n a l . T h i s r a t i o n a l i t y approach is s i m p l y an e x t r i n s i c a i d t o c o n s t r u c t i o n a v a i l a b l e o n l y where t h e s t a t u t e is ambiguous. It c a n n o t be used to d e f e a t t h e p l a i n and unambiguous language of t h e s t a t u t e . Our f u n c t i o n h e r e is n o t t o "improve" t h e s t a t u t e by r e s o r t to e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , b u t s i m p l y t o d e c l a r e what its language p l a i n l y states. The m a j o r i t y a p p e a r s to have t a k e n t h e same c o u r s e as t h e District Court. They, t o o , have gone beyond t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e s t a t u t e . I n a t t e m p t i n g to a s c e r t a i n t h e i n t e n - t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e m a j o r i t y p o i n t s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e as it e x i s t e d a t t h e time t h e s t a t e lease was executed was s i l e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o leases. Y e t t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r s to " c o n t r a c t s , " and t h e r e is no d i s p u t e t h a t a lease is a c o n t r a c t . The s t a t u t o r y words c l e a r l y t e l l us t h a t a lease is included i n t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n . Next t h e m a j o r i t y n o t e s t h a t when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e gave t h e A t t o r n e y General t h e power t o e s t a b l i s h t h e LETS system by lease or p u r c h a s e of equipment, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not p r o v i d e a t i m e l i m i t a t i o n f o r t h o s e c o n t r a c t s , n o r d i d it e x p l i c i t l y make t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-1918 a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e leases or p u r c h a s e s . I n m y view, it is clear why t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t d o t h i s . S e c t i o n 82-1918 p r o v i d e s a t h r e e - y e a r l i m i t a t i o n on - 11- state c o n t r a c t s ; a n a d d i t i o n a l s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n was unnecessary. I n r e s o r t i n g t o t h e s e s u r m i s e s about l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h e m a j o r i t y is i g n o r i n g t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n as set o u t i n Department of Revenue v. Puget Sound Power & L i g h t Co., s u p r a . There we s a i d t h a t t h e c o u r t s should f i r s t a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e s t a t u t o r y meaning from t h e p l a i n words of t h e s t a t u t e . Following t h a t i n q u i r y , t h e c o u r t can resort to t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y . Dept. of Revenue, s u p r a , Mont. a t I 587 P.2d 1287, 35 St.Rep. a t 1373. I n my view, t h e r e is no need t o resort to l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y . The s t a t u t e is c l e a r on its f a c e . I would d e c l a r e t h e c o n t r a c t p r o h i b i t e d by t h e t h r e e - y e a r l i m i t a t i o n and remand t h e case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r r e f o r - m a t i o n on a t h r e e - y e a r b a s i s . Chief J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n c o n c u r r i n g : I h e a r t i l y concur i n t h e above d i s s e n t .