Title: MVA v. Iliano

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Carmelina Illiano, No. 28, September Term, 2005.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – REASONABLE GROUNDS TO DETAIN:
Petitioner challenged the Circuit Court of Carroll County’s reversal of the Administrative
Law Judge’s decision that the police officer who administered the breath test to Respondent
possessed reasonable grounds to justify the detention of Respondent and the suspension of
Respondent’s driver’s license.  The Court of Appeals determined that under the applicable
statute, after having made what may be characterized as a routine stop, it is reasonable for
a police officer to further detain the driver for the purpose of administering a chemical breath
test based upon facts developed after the initial stop.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals held
that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge upholding the suspension of Respondent’s
license was supported by substantial evidence and was not premised upon an error of law.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 28 
September Term, 2005
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
CARMELINA ILLIANO
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   December 16, 2005
1
Respondent Illiano did not submit a brief to this Court or participate at oral argument.
2
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol. ), Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation
Article states, in relevant part:
(a)(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor
vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by
the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented,
subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309,
inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take
a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while
impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely,
while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation
of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.
(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a
person may not be compelled to take a test.  However, the
detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a
sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged
and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result indicated
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, the Administration
shall:
(i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
1.  For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more at the time of testing:
A.  For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 45 days; or
B.  For a second or subsequent offense, suspend
the driver’s license for 90 days; or
2.  For a test refusal:
A.  For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
Following a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) on March 9,
2004, Administrative Law Judge Robert Barry suspended the driver’s license of Respondent,
Carmelina Illiano,1 for one year under Maryland Code ( 1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-
205.1(b)(1)(i)(2)(B) of the Transportation Article,2 for refusing to submit to a chemical
license for 120 days; or
B.  For a second or subsequent offense, suspend
the driver’s license for 1 year.
3
A breath test is “[a] test of a person’s breath . . . to determine alcohol concentration.”
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(a)(1)(iv)(1) of the Transportation
Article.
4
This Court has certiorari jurisdiction over this action because, pursuant to Maryland
Code (1993, 2002 Repl. Vol), Section 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
the Circuit Court has rendered a final judgment in this case on judicial review of an
administrative decision under Title 16 of the Transportation Article.
5
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(1) of the
Transportation Article, states:
At a hearing under this section, the person has the rights
described in § 12-206 of this article, but at the hearing the only
issues shall be:
1.  Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had
reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while
impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, or
while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation
-2-
breath test.3  The Circuit Court for Carroll County subsequently found that the police officer
who administered the breath test did not possess reasonable grounds to justify the detention
of Illiano and reversed the decision to suspend her driver’s license.4  Petitioner, the Motor
Vehicle Administration, now presents us with the following question for review:
In determining the sufficiency of an officer’s sworn certification
of reasonable grounds to request a chemical breath test under
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1
(f)(7)(i)(1) of the Transportation Article,[5] did the administrative
of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.
-3-
law judge err in considering evidence obtained by the officer
after the motorist was initially detained, where the officer
smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the motorist’s
automobile, the motorist told the officer that she had been
drinking and she should not be driving, and, after the initial
detention, her performance in field sobriety tests exhibited
further evidence of impairment?
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 387 Md. 465, 875 A.2d 769 (2005).   We hold that,
pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(b)(2) of the
Transportation Article, the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that the police officer
had reasonable grounds to detain Illiano and request a breath test was supported by
substantial evidence and was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court.
I.  Background
At approximately two o’clock in the morning on October 30, 2003, Maryland
Transportation Authority Police Officer J. Marll was in a marked patrol car parked on the
shoulder of Route 170 in Anne Arundel County operating a stationary radar unit when a
Saturn pulled up approximately ten feet behind him and sat idling for a few minutes.  Officer
Marll decided to check on the well-being of the driver and backed his car alongside the
Saturn, at which time the driver, Carmelina Illiano, rolled down her window.  Officer Marll
detected the smell of alcohol coming from the Saturn and decided to park  behind it.  While
Officer Marll was moving the police car, Ms. Illiano alighted from the Saturn and switched
positions with the passenger.  After approaching the passenger side window, Officer Marll
6
Officer Marll administered three tests:  the horizontal gaze nystagmus test; the walk
and turn test and the one leg stand test:
 
The horizontal gaze nystagmus test is an evaluation of the
natural moving of the human eye as it follows a horizontally
moving point of reference. The presence of alcohol in the body
causes the eyes to take on a jerking movement. The walk and
turn test requires a person to walk toe-to-heel in a straight line
for approximately nine to ten steps. The one leg stand test
requires a person to stand on one leg and count out loud for
approximately five to ten seconds.
Lowry v. State, 363 Md. 357, 362 n.6, 768 A.2d 688, 690-91 n.6 (2002).
7
We explored the DR-15 Form in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Atterbeary, 368 Md.
480, 485-86 n.1, 796 A.2d 75, 78-79 n.1 (2002), where we stated:
The DR-15 Form, sometimes referred to as The Advice of
Rights and Administrative Penalties for Refusal to Submit to a
Chemical Test statement, is derived from Section 16-205.1(b) of
-4-
asked Ms. Illiano why she had stopped on the shoulder to which she replied that she should
not be driving because she had consumed one beer and one mixed drink.  Observing that her
eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that her speech was slurred, the officer requested Ms.
Illiano’s driver’s license and asked her to perform various field sobriety tests.  While she was
getting out of her car, Ms. Illiano disclosed to Officer Marll that she was coming from
Cancun Cantina and that her friend was taking over because Ms. Illiano realized that she
should not be driving; Officer Marll further observed that Ms. Illiano leaned on the Saturn
for balance while walking.  
After Ms. Illiano failed the field sobriety tests,6 Officer Marll placed her under arrest
for Driving Under the Influence and read to her from the DR-15 Form.7   Initially, Ms. Illiano
the Maryland Transportation Article; it provides in part: 
You have been stopped or detained and reasonable grounds exist
to believe that you have been driving or attempting to drive a
motor vehicle while intoxicated; under the influence of alcohol;
so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of
drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or
under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance that you
could not drive a vehicle safely; or in violation of an Alcohol
Restriction. 
In this state, any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor
vehicle, including a commercial motor vehicle, on a highway or
on any private property that is used by the public in general, is
deemed to have consented to take a chemical test to determine
the alcohol concentration, or a blood test to determine the drug
or controlled dangerous substance content of the person. The
chemical test shall be at no cost to you. A test of blood shall be
administered if the breath test equipment is unavailable, a test is
required to determine the drug or controlled dangerous
substance content, or if your injuries require medical treatment.
The results of such test or a refusal of such test may be
admissible as evidence in any criminal prosecution. 
* * *
You have the right to refuse to submit to the test. If you refuse:
The Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) will be notified of
your chemical test refusal; your Maryland (MD) driver's license
shall be confiscated; an Order of Suspension issued, and if
eligible, a temporary license issued, valid for 45 days. An
Administrative suspension shall be imposed by the MVA against
your MD driver's license or driving privilege if you are a
nonresident. The suspension shall be 120 days for a first offense
and 1 year for a second or subsequent offense. You will be
ineligible for modification of the suspension or issuance of a
restrictive license; except in certain circumstances, a test refusal
suspension may be modified and a restrictive license issued, if
you agree to participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for at
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least 1 year.
8
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(b)(3) of the Transportation
Article provides in relevant part:
If the person refuses to take the test or takes a test which results
in an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of the
testing, the police officer shall:
(i) Confiscate the person’s driver’s license issued
by this State;
(ii) Acting on behalf of the Administration,
personally serve an order of suspension on the
person;
(iii) Issue a temporary license to drive;
(iv) Inform the person that the temporary license
allows the person to continue driving for 45 days
if the person is licensed under this title;
(v) Inform the person that:
1.  The person has a right to request, at that time
or within 10 days, a hearing to show cause why
the driver’s license should not be suspended
concerning the refusal to take the test or for test
results indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more at the time of testing, and the hearing will
be scheduled within 45 days; 
* * * 
(vi) Advise the person of the administrative
sanctions that shall be imposed in the event of
failure to request a hearing, failure to attend a
requested hearing, or upon an adverse finding by
the hearing officer. . . .
-6-
agreed to take a chemical breath test; she was taken to the Maryland State Police Barracks
in Glen Burnie where the test was to be administered.  When Ms. Illiano arrived, however,
she changed her mind, refused to submit to the test and, thereafter, pursuant to Section 16-
205.1(b)(3),8 Officer Marll confiscated Ms. Illiano’s driver’s license, served her with an
9
Because this was Illiano’s second violation of Section 16-205.1 within five years,
Section 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(2)(B) requires that her license be suspended for one year.
-7-
order of suspension for one year,9 issued her a temporary license, and informed her of her
right to a hearing and the required administrative sanctions. 
At the administrative show cause hearing held on March 9, 2004, Ms. Illiano,
represented by counsel, contended that the officer never drove abreast of her car, but instead
made a U-turn and immediately parked behind her; that she never told Officer Marll that she
should not have been driving; that her difficulty performing the field sobriety tests was due
to her poor grasp of the English language and her inability to understand Officer Marll’s
directions  and that she switched seats with the passenger because she was having difficulty
driving due to a damaged tendon on the top of her foot.  In his findings of fact, ALJ Barry
stated:
I do find by a preponderance of the evidence in this record that
the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
while impaired by alcohol. . . .  I don’t have any problems
finding Ms. Illiano in violation of Section 16-205.1.  Frankly, I
find Ms. Illiano’s version of events to be totally not credible, not
even a close call in this matter.  There’s a total – I mean as far
as basically from the beginning, she admits that she’s out with
her friend at a club.  She’s indicated she only had this half a
glass of bitter wine and a rum and Coke, and wants me to
believe that all the problems here were not – the problems with
the test didn’t have to do with the consumption of alcohol, but
with this foot problem.  The evidence that I have on the foot
problem is that the injury actually goes back to August of 2002,
and the podiatrist, Dr. Seider, has indicated the nerve damage
and [sic] may cause difficulty with ambulation and balance.  But
the evidence of the impairment in this case goes beyond that.
We have the bloodshot, glassy eyes, the slurred speech, and I
-8-
believe the licensee made the admissions to the officer.  People
driving up behind police when they’re intoxicated doesn’t shock
me.  I’ve had cases where people have driven into the police
station drunk to pick up their friend, who had been arrested
earlier in the night, drunk.  People do things when they’re
intoxicated they wouldn’t ordinarily do when sober.  I believe
that Ms. Illiano was quite intoxicated that night, pulled over,
decided not to drive for whatever reason, performed – couldn’t
even stand up, basically.  I believe very little of what Ms. Illiano
said here today, so I do find her in violation of Section 16-205.1.
Accordingly, ALJ Barry upheld the one-year suspension of Ms. Illiano’s driver’s license.
Ms. Illiano filed a Petition for Judicial Review of ALJ Barry’s decision in the Circuit
Court for Carroll County pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), Section 10-
222 of the State Government Article.  Finding that Section 16-205.1 (b)(2) “clearly requires
that an officer have reasonable grounds for detaining someone for driving under the influence
of alcohol,” the judge held that “any results of the field sobriety tests would be irrelevant in
determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner to perform these
tests,” and concluded:
In reviewing the record, the transcript, and specifically the
ALJ’s decision, the . . . decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The fact that Petitioner admitted to attending a club and that she
had one or two drinks is not sufficient to conclude that she was
driving under the influence.  Nor is the fact that there was a
strong odor of alcohol being emitted from the car, not any
particular passenger, conclusive. . . .  The Court further finds
that there was no substantial evidence to conclude that the
officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner.  The issue
is not fairly debatable and must be reversed.
In so doing, the court reversed ALJ Barry’s decision to suspend Ms. Illiano’s license and
remanded the matter to the Motor Vehicle Administration for further proceedings in
10
As we noted in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 56 n.5, 821 A.2d
62, 73 n.5 (2003), “[t]he MVA has delegated to the [Office of Administrative Hearings] in
cases such as the present one [which is contested] the responsibility to conduct the
evidentiary hearing and render the final administrative decision of the agency.”  
See COMAR
11.11.02.07.
-9-
compliance with the order. 
II.  Standard of Review
Section 10-222 of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 2002
Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article, delineates that a court, upon judicial
review of an administrative agency’s decision, may decide to:10
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the
petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding,
conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the final decision-maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law; 
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as
submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary and capricious.
In Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145,
1154 (2005), Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court, thoroughly examined the standard of
review of an adjudicatory decision by an administrative agency, stating:
A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency
adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People’s
Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it ‘is
limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the
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record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is
premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’  United Parcel,
336 Md. at 577, 650 A.2d at 230.  See also Code (1984, 1995
Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article;
District Council v. Brandywine Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339,
349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998); Catonsville Nursing v.
Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568-69, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).
In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court
decides ‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’  Bulluck v.
Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123
(1978).  See Anderson v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187,
213, 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993).  A reviewing court should defer
to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they
are supported by the record.  CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687,
698, 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990).  A reviewing court ‘“ must
review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; .
. . the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed
valid, and . . . it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting
evidence” and to draw inferences from that evidence.’  CBS v.
Comptroller, supra, 319 Md. at 698, 575 A.2d at 329, quoting
Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834-35,
490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985).  See Catonsville Nursing v.
Loveman, supra, 349 Md. at 569, 709 A.2d at 753 (final agency
decisions ‘are prima facie correct and carry with them the
presumption of validity’).
Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of
our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to ‘substitute its
judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the
administrative agency,’  United Parcel v. People’s Counsel,
supra, 336 Md. at 576-77, 650 A.2d at 230, quoting Bulluck v.
Pelham Wood Apts., supra, 283 Md. at 513, 390 A.2d at 1124.
Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference
should often be accorded the position of the administrative
agency.  Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and
application of the statute which the agency administers should
ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.
Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-97, 684
-11-
A.2d 804, 811-12 (1996), and cases there cited; McCullough v.
Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (‘The
interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with
administering the statute is . . . entitled to weight’).
Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should
be respected.  Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. 441, 455,
654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); Christ v. Department of Natural
Resources, 335 Md. 427, 445, 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994)
(legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies
will often include the authority to make ‘significant
discretionary policy determinations’); Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester
Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 792, 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986)
(‘application of the State Board of Education’s expertise would
clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the legal
issues’).
Id. at 571-72, 873 A.2d at 1154-55, quoting Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks,
354 Md. 59, 67-69, 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
III.  Discussion
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, also known as Maryland’s Implied
Consent Law, which provides for the suspension of driving privileges when a driver refuses
to submit to a chemical breath test for intoxication, states in part:
(a)(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor
vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by
the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented,
subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309,
inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take
a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while
impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely,
while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation
of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.
11
All references hereinafter to Section 16-205.1 are to the Transportation Article of the
Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.).
-12-
(emphasis added).  Section 16-205.1(b)(2)11 defines the process an officer is to follow before
requesting that a driver submit to a chemical breath test:
[I]f a police officer stops or detains any person who the police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving
or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by
any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in
violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of
this title, and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of
refusing to take a test, the police officer shall:
(i) Detain the person;
(ii) Request that the person permit a test to be
taken;
(iii) Advise the person of the administrative
sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take
the test, including ineligibility for modification of
a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license
under subsection (n)(1) or (2) of this section.
The MVA contends that ALJ Barry was correct in concluding that Officer Marll acted
on reasonable grounds in requesting that Ms. Illiano take a chemical breath test based upon
his observations made after the initial stop and that the Circuit Court was incorrect in
superimposing a requirement upon the officer that he have reasonable grounds to suspect Ms.
Illiano of driving under the influence at the time of the initial stop.  The Circuit Court’s
interpretation of Section 16-205.1(b)(2), the M VA submits, prohibits the consideration of any
subsequent events, such as the results of field sobriety tests, that the officer may observe,
after the initial detention in determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to detain
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the driver for the purpose of administering a chemical breath test.  The MVA asserts that the
Circuit Court conflates the statutory criteria of Section 16-205.1(b)(2) from “stop or detain”
to “stop and detain,” whereas the statute in fact incorporates a two-part process whereby the
officer initially stops the driver, then acquires reasonable grounds to believe a drunk driving
offense has occurred and thereafter continues to detain the driver for the purpose of
requesting a chemical breath test.  Based on this interpretation, the MVA argues, there was
more than sufficient evidence to establish that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect
Ms. Illiano of driving while under the influence and to request that she take a chemical breath
test.  According to the MVA, the ALJ’s decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
The Circuit Court, in its opinion, stated that “the reviewing court may substitute its
own judgment, if the decision was based solely on an error of law.”  As a preliminary matter,
we have previously disapproved of the use of the language that the reviewing court may
“substitute the court’s judgment” to describe the analysis undertaken in judicial review of
legal issues.  See Noland, 386 Md. at 573 n.3, 873 A.2d at 1155 n.3, citing Banks, 354 Md.
at 68-69, 729 A.2d at 381.  As we have noted:
The ‘substituted judgment’ language is misleading and
inaccurate for several reasons.  It suggests, with respect to legal
issues, that no deference whatsoever is owed to the agency’s
decision.  That is not the law . . . . [T]he agency’s interpretations
and applications of the statutory or regulatory provisions ‘which
the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable
weight by reviewing courts.’
Noland, 386 Md. at 573 n.3, 873 A.2d at 1155 n.3, quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d
at 381.  
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Even after giving that deference, it is ultimately for the court to determine whether an
error of law was made.  We still must decide, therefore, whether ALJ Barry’s determination
that, under Section 16-205.1, an officer  may stop a driver for any legitimate reason and then
detain that individual to administer chemical breath tests, after developing reasonable
grounds to believe that the driver was driving under the influence of alcohol was premised
on an erroneous conclusion of law, because although we generally imbue the statutory
interpretation of the agency with considerable weight, “when a statutory provision is entirely
clear, with no ambiguity whatsoever, ‘administrative constructions, no matter how well
entrenched, are not given weight.’” Noland, 386 Md. at 572, 873 A.2d at 1155, quoting
Banks, 354 Md. at 69 n.2, 729 A.2d at 381 n.2.  To determine whether ALJ Barry’s
interpretation of Section 16-205.1 is erroneous, we must address the issue of whether, after
having made what may be characterized as a routine stop, it is reasonable for the police
officer to further detain the driver for the purpose of administering a chemical breath test
based upon facts developed after the initial stop.  The answer clearly is “yes” based on the
plain language of the statute.
Section 16-205.1 (b)(2) provides that if a police officer “stops or detains” an
individual who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is driving under the influence,
the officer may request that the person submit to a breath test.  Md. Code (1977, 2002 Repl.
Vol.), § 16-205.1 (b)(1) of the Transportation Article.  The use of the conjunction “or”
indicates that the officer may have reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is under the
influence either at the time of the stop or, due to events occurring after the stop, when the
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stop transforms into a detention during which the breath test is administered.  The decision
to utilize the phrase “stop or detain” serves to disjoin the stop from the detention and permits
reasonable grounds to arise post-stop to justify the detention and request for a breath test. 
We repeatedly have stated that a police officer  may stop a driver for a myriad of
reasons, such as “to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner
of driving with intent to issue a citation or warning.”  State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 609, 826
A.2d 486, 494 (2003), quoting Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491, 497-98
(1999).  Some examples of permissible traffic stops, other than for driving under the
influence, include:  failure to properly display registration plates on the vehicle, Maryland
Code, (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 13-411 of the Transportation Article; failure to drive
on the right side of the roadway, Maryland Code, (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 21-309
of the Transportation Article; failure to yield the right of way upon entering onto a highway,
Maryland Code, (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 21-403 of the Transportation Article;
failure to yield the right of way to an emergency vehicle, Maryland Code, (1977, 2002 Repl.
Vol.), Section 21-405 of the Transportation Article; and, failure to come to a complete stop
at a stop sign, Maryland Code, (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 21-707 of the Transportation
Article, among others.  A police officer also may stop a motor vehicle where the officer has
a “reasonable belief that ‘criminal activity is afoot.’” Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 433, 769
A.2d 879, 884 (2001).  Moreover, a police officer may stop or detain a driver in what is
known as a “consensual encounter,” where the officer approaches a driver on the street, or
in another public place, and the driver cooperates in responding to the officer’s non-coercive
-16-
questioning.  See Green, 375 Md. at 609, 826 A.2d at 494, quoting United States v. Werking,
915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990);  Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 373 n.4, 735 A.2d 491,
500 n.4 (1999). 
This Court has affirmed numerous ALJ decisions permitting the administration of
chemical breath tests in situations where the initial stop was not for driving under the
influence of alcohol, but for any number of related reasons.  In MVA v. Jones, 380 Md. 164,
844 A.2d 388 (2004), the officer initially stopped a driver because his vehicle was facing
sideways across the northbound traffic lanes of Interstate 95 and, when the officer pulled up
behind the vehicle, the driver made a U-turn on Interstate 95 and began driving southbound
into oncoming traffic.  The police officer stopped Jones for his multiple traffic violations.
After he was stopped, the officer observed that Jones had difficulty standing, smelled of
alcohol, and performed poorly on the administered field sobriety tests.  We upheld the ALJ’s
determination that there was sufficient evidence to believe that the police officer had acted
upon reasonable grounds in requesting a chemical breath test based upon the officer’s
observation made after the initial stop.  Id. at 168, 844 A.2d at 390.   
In MVA v. McDorman, 364 Md. 253, 772 A.2d 309 (2001), the police officer initially
stopped a driver after observing that the driver’s truck was parked alongside a curb facing
the wrong direction of the street.  Subsequent to the stop, the officer noted that McDorman
smelled of alcohol and failed a field sobriety test.  We upheld the ALJ’s finding that there
was sufficient evidence to believe that the officer had reasonable grounds to request a
chemical breath test where the indicia of alcohol use arose after the initial stop.  Id. at 262,
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772 A.2d at 315.  Likewise in MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739 A.2d 58 (1999), the police
officer, while patrolling an area that had recently experienced a rash of vehicle thefts and
burglaries, initially stopped a vehicle at 12:30 a.m. after it had driven down a dead-end street
and turned around without stopping at any of the homes on the street which, in light of the
recent automobile thefts, aroused the officer’s suspicion.  When speaking to the driver, the
police officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol and asked Richards to perform field sobriety
tests, which he failed.  We upheld the ALJ’s determination that the officer had reasonable
grounds to request a chemical breath test based upon the circumstances observed after the
initial stop.  Id. at 378, 739 A.2d at 71.  See also MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 46-47, 821 A.2d
62, 67 (2003) (upholding suspension where officer’s initial stop was because driver was
speeding, then officer detected a strong scent of alcohol, that driver’s eyes were bloodshot
and glassy, speech was slurred, and the driver failed field sobriety tests);  Lowry v. State, 363
Md. 357, 768 A.2d 688 (2001) (upholding conviction where officer stopped driver for failing
to obey a proper traffic control device and subsequently administered a breath test); Embrey
v. MVA, 339 Md. 691, 692-93, 664 A.2d 911, 912 (1995) (upholding suspension of driver’s
license where officer stopped driver after observing defendant driving at a high rate of speed,
then noted strong scent of alcohol coming from driver and that the driver performed poorly
on field sobriety tests, which provided grounds for breath test). 
Based on the plain meaning of Section 16-205.1 (b)(2) and this Court’s jurisprudence,
we conclude that ALJ Barry’s determination that “stop or detain” permits  police officers to
develop a reasonable belief that a driver was driving under the influence after making the
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initial stop is not “premised on an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Noland, 386 Md. at 574
n.3, 873 A.2d at 1156 n.3, quoting United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650
A.2d 226, 230 (1994). 
Having concluded that ALJ Barry’s interpretation of Section 16-205.1 was clearly
correct, we turn to our review of his factual finding that Officer Marll had reasonable
grounds to detain Ms. Illiano for driving under the influence of alcohol and to ask that Ms.
Illiano take a chemical breath test.  The substantial evidence test, set forth in Section 10-222
(h)(3)(v) of the Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222
(h)(3)(v) of the State Government Article, requires that an agency’s factual determination be
supported by “competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as
submitted.”  We have further explicated the concept of substantial evidence:
In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court
decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.  A reviewing
court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of
inferences if they are supported by the record.  A reviewing
court must review the agency’s decision in the light most
favorable to it[, and] the agency’s decision is prima facie correct
and presumed valid.
Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 172, 848 A.2d 642, 651
(2004), quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 380-81 (citations omitted).  
The record in the instant case indicates that Officer Marll detected a strong odor of
alcohol emanating from Ms. Illiano’s vehicle, that Ms. Illiano stated that she stopped because
she should not be driving, and that she admitted to having consumed two alcoholic drinks.
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Officer Marll, according to the record, asked her to perform field sobriety tests and observed
that Ms. Illiano’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that her speech was slurred.  The
record also states that Ms. Illiano failed the field sobriety tests.  At the hearing Ms. Illiano
testified and denied that she had consumed two alcoholic drinks earlier in the evening.  She
also explained that her stop behind Officer Marll’s car and her inability to pass the field
sobriety tests were caused by an injury to her foot and her inability to fully understand spoken
English.
Based on the evidence in the record, a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached
the factual conclusion of ALJ Barry.  Indeed, “‘not only is it the province of the agency to
resolve conflicting evidence, but where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can
be drawn, it is for the agency to draw the inferences.’”  Gigeous v. ECI, 363 Md. 481, 504,
769 A.2d 912, 926 (2001), quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 513, 390
A.2d 1119, 1124 (1978).  We give great deference to the agency's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses.  Schwartz v. Md. Dept. of Natural Resources, 385 Md. 534, 554,
870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005).  Thus, we conclude that ALJ Barry’s determination that Officer
Marll had reasonable grounds to detain Ms. Illiano for driving under the influence of alcohol
and to request that she submit to a breath test is supported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and direct that court
to affirm ALJ Barry’s decision upholding the one-year suspension of Ms. Illiano’s driver’s
license.
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JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR CARROLL COUNTY REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
DECISION OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
ADMINISTRATION.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY RESPONDENT.