Title: State v. Richardson

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

194 Kan. 471 (1965)
399 P.2d 799
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
RAYMOND WALTON RICHARDSON, Appellee.
No. 44,041

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1965.
Richard H. Seaton, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Charles E. Wetzler, of Prairie Village, argued the cause, and Robert F. Bennett and Robert F. Lytle, both of Prairie Village, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an appeal by the State in a proceeding initiated pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507, wherein a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claimed the right to be released upon the ground that he was denied due process of law and was unjustly, unlawfully and illegally confined in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The trial court after granting the petitioner an evidentiary hearing, vacated and set aside the sentence which it originally imposed, and ordered the petitioner's discharge from imprisonment.
The underlying question in the case is whether the petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated.
*472 The provisions of 60-1507, supra, are new to Kansas law, having been enacted as a part of the Laws of 1963, Chapter 303, commonly referred to as the new code of civil procedure, which became effective January 1, 1964. It follows the language of a federal statute, 28 U.S.C., § 2255 (originally enacted in 1948). It may therefore be said the body of federal law which has developed under § 2255, supra, should be given great weight in construing the provisions of 60-1507, supra, in the Kansas law. (See, Webb v. Comm'rs of Butler Co., 52 Kan. 375, 34 Pac. 973; and Hanson v. Hoffman, 150 Kan. 121, 91 P.2d 31.)
The provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507 (a) read:
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that a prisoner is entitled to no relief, section (b) of 60-1507, supra, directs the trial court which imposed the sentence to grant a prompt hearing upon the motion, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.
To implement proceedings under 60-1507, supra, this court on the 16th day of October, 1964, promulgated Rule No. 121 (now appearing in 194 Kan. p. XXVII). Procedurally this rule is quite extensive in that it embodies the substance of many federal decisions determined pursuant to § 2255, supra, of the federal code.
Prior to the adoption of the foregoing rule, J. Richard Foth and Arthur E. Palmer wrote an article entitled "POST CONVICTION MOTIONS UNDER THE KANSAS REVISED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE" published in 12 Kan. L. Rev. 493 (May, 1964). This article is well written and should serve to enlighten the legal practitioner coming to grips with 60-1507, supra, for the first time.
The provisions of 60-1507, supra, may be invoked only by one in custody claiming the right to be released. Section (a) authorizes the prisoner by a motion to make a collateral attack upon the judgment in the court where it was rendered. The motion to vacate is a civil remedy. It is to be noted Rule No. 121 (a) states:
While the motion attacks the judgment in the criminal case it is separate from the criminal case and is, in fact and theory, a new case. The motion should be given a separate docket number and be captioned in a manner which will describe the new case and not cause confusion with the previous criminal case.
In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407, 79 S. Ct. 451 (1959), it was said the motion under 28 U.S.C., § 2255, attacks a judgment in a criminal case, but in fact and in theory it is a new case; that since a proceeding under this section is in the nature of a civil action, regular pretrial procedure could be utilized.
In the case presently before the court the motion was filed in the original criminal action as docketed in the district court of Johnson County, Kansas, but the sentencing court considered it an independent civil action. Under the circumstances, we do not regard this variance to be fatal. We will consider the motion as having initiated an independent civil action to which the rules of civil procedure apply.
Rule No. 121 (h) of the Supreme Court regarding presence of the prisoner states:
The foregoing rule regarding the presence of the prisoner is substantially the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 96 L. Ed. 232, 72 S. Ct. 263 (1952), under § 2255, supra, of the federal code.
While the motion in this case was heard by the sentencing court prior to the promulgation of Rule No. 121 of the Supreme Court, it may be said the trial court conducted the proceeding in substantially the manner outlined by Rule No. 121. The prisoner was granted an evidentiary hearing at which he was present and testified. It was apparent the motion presented substantial questions *474 of law and triable issues of fact, by reason of which the trial court appointed counsel to assist the movant, an indigent person. (See, Rule No. 121[i]; and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770, 83 S. Ct. 745 [1963].) The appointment of counsel to represent the indigent prisoner was no doubt designed by the sentencing court to meet the standards of a "fair" hearing set out in Townsend.
On the issues raised by the prisoner in this case only a full and fair post conviction hearing in the sentencing court would render it unnecessary to relitigate the issues in full, first in a state action and again in a federal forum.
In speaking of the proceeding conducted pursuant to § 2255, supra, of the federal code, the United States Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10. L.Ed.2d 148, 83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963), said:
On this point see K.S.A. 60-1507(c) of the Kansas code and Rule No. 121(d) of this court.
We shall turn now to the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.
The petitioner alleged in his motion to vacate the sentence that he was unjustly, unlawfully and illegally detained by the superintendent at the Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas. He alleged that agents of the sheriff and county attorney of Johnson County, Kansas, told him he was guilty of forging and falsely offering numerous checks which were in the possession of the county attorney's office, and which were written and tendered in violation of the laws of the state of Kansas; that the petitioner was further advised unless he entered a plea of guilty to one of the check charges, he would undoubtedly be sentenced for a period of 30 to 50 years in the state penitentiary as an habitual by reason of two prior felony convictions. The petitioner further alleged he was additionally informed that unless he entered a plea of guilty, his wife, who was a minor at the time, would be prosecuted and imprisoned.
He alleged that after a long period of interrogation he finally agreed to plead guilty to one of the charges against him upon the *475 promise that charges would not be brought against his wife, and that the State would ask the court for a 1 to 10-year sentence against him; that during all interrogation by the officers of Johnson County and the agents of the State of Kansas, and during all negotiations with said petition, the petitioner was not afforded the assistance of legal aid or counsel. He then alleged:
*476 Petitioner further alleged that he was indigent; that he was induced to plead guilty by reason of the erroneous promises and misrepresentation made by the agents of the State of Kansas, by reason of which he has been denied due process of law and is unjustly, unlawfully and illegally confined in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Wherefore, he prayed that the sentence be vacated and set aside, and that he be discharged from sentence and imprisonment.
The information pursuant to which the petitioner was tried alleged that he forged a check in the amount of $125, constituting forgery in the second degree. (K.S.A. 21-608.)
The justiciable issues suggested by the foregoing motion under 60-1507, supra, are: (1) Was the plea of guilty entered by the petitioner in the criminal case voluntarily made and free from coercion and misrepresentation; and (2) was the petitioner adequately represented by competent counsel in the criminal case. They present triable issues of fact and substantial questions of law.
The record on appeal discloses the petitioner was not represented by counsel until he was brought before Judge Brenner in the district court of Johnson County, Kansas, for arraignment on the 28th day of June, 1963. At that time Lawrence T. Loftus, an attorney, was appointed to represent the petitioner.
At the hearing in the lower court a transcript of the proceedings at the arraignment, plea and sentencing was presented in evidence. The transcript discloses that court-appointed counsel for the petitioner waived formal reading of the information and indicated the petitioner's intention to enter a plea of guilty to the charge.
The transcript then discloses the following:
"THE COURT: How old are you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Twenty-seven.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
"THE DEFENDANT: No.
"MR. LOFTUS: Yes, Your Honor, we have.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE DEFENDANT: I don't.
The State's Exhibit No. 1, being the forged instrument, was also introduced in evidence.
Thereupon testimony of the petitioner was taken. He testified in substance that he was arrested on June 17, 1963, and arraigned in the magistrate court of Johnson County. The charges were read to him and bond was set. The date for his preliminary hearing was scheduled. He had no money to put up a bond and he was not represented by counsel. Later in the week of June 17th Mr. Ed Hays, county probation officer, talked with him while he was in jail. Mr. Hays was not the petitioner's parole officer. The nature of this conversation was essentially that if the petitioner did not plead guilty, the prosecution was going to ask for a 30-year to life sentence in the penitentiary. The petitioner was not represented by counsel during this conversation with Mr. Hays.
Also during the week of June 17, 1963, Mr. James Wheeler, assistant county attorney for Johnson County, Kansas, and Mr. Charles Lane of the sheriff's patrol conversed with the petitioner. Petitioner informed both parties that he was not guilty of the charges, and that he would therefore not plead guilty. In the conversation Mr. Wheeler indicated that he would "throw the big bitch" at the petitioner (which in more formal language means the maximum sentence *478 authorized pursuant to the habitual criminal act for a third time felony conviction) but that if the State did not have to go through the expense of trying him, Mr. Wheeler would recommend a 2 to 10-year sentence to the court. The petitioner was not represented by counsel during these conversations with the county attorney's office and its agents, and the petitioner did not have a chance to confer with counsel prior to these negotiations.
While the petitioner was incarcerated in the Johnson County jail for failure to post bond, papers were served upon him giving him notice that charges of forgery were being brought against his minor wife in the Johnson County probate court. Petitioner's wife was eighteen years of age and it was the petitioner's belief that his wife could be sent to the women's state penitentiary if found guilty of such charges.
After further negotiations with the county attorney's office and its agents, the petitioner was promised that two of the three charges would be dismissed against him and that a 1 to 10-year sentence would be recommended to the court if the petitioner would change his plea to guilty. Since the petitioner was facing a possible life imprisonment, and since he did not know what the State could or would do with respect to his minor wife, he decided to change his plea. He was told that if he would plead guilty they would not press charges in the district court on his wife. These negotiations with the county attorney's office extended over a 12-day period, and at no time during these negotiations was the petitioner represented by legal counsel, nor did he have funds with which to employ an attorney.
On the 28th day of June, 1963, the petitioner was again brought before the magistrate court. Petitioner testified that no mention was made of a preliminary hearing on this second appearance before the magistrate court, and that he never requested a preliminary hearing. He testified that he asked for a lawyer at this time and he also waived preliminary hearing. He was told he would be represented by counsel when he was arraigned in the district court.
Shortly after the petitioner was bound over to the district court on the 28th day of June, 1963, by the magistrate court, he was taken before the Hon. Clayton Brenner, judge of the district court of Johnson County, Kansas, division No. 2, where Lawrence T. Loftus, was appointed to represent him as counsel.
At this time the petitioner was in the courtroom in the presence of two other indigent defendants whom Mr. Loftus was also appointed *479 to represent. When the petitioner conferred with Mr. Loftus, all three defendants were conferring with him simultaneously or for brief periods of time individually in the presence of each other.
The petitioner testified on direct examination concerning his consultation with Mr. Loftus, his counsel, as follows:
On cross examination the petitioner stated that he did not request to plead guilty but after the conversation he had with Mr. Lane and Mr. Wheeler, he communicated through Mr. Lane to Mr. Wheeler that he desired to plead guilty after Mr. Wheeler had explained the habitual criminal act to him. He further testified he had two or three prior convictions. He admitted two of these convictions were prior felony convictions in the state of Kansas, in one of which he was sentenced to the State Industrial Reformatory and *480 in the other he was sentenced to the state penitentiary at Lansing. He further testified on cross examination:
The petitioner also denied writing the check in question on cross examination.
Upon interrogation by the court concerning his testimony at his criminal trial the petitioner testified:
Mr. Loftus testified on direct examination concerning the representation of the petitioner at the criminal trials as follows:
On cross examination Mr. Loftus testified:
On examination by the court Mr. Loftus testified:
"Cross-Examination.
"Re-Direct Examination.
"Re-Cross-Examination.
"Examination by the Court.
The trial court took the matter under advisement, and on the 3rd day of June, 1964, entered the following order vacating sentence:
*483 "ORDER VACATING SENTENCE.
"The court finds:
"The defendant is an indigent person.
"Dated this 3rd day of June, 1964."
K.S.A. 62-1304, provides that counsel should be appointed for indigent persons about to be arraigned upon an indictment or information for any offense against the laws of the state of Kansas.
The order of the trial court vacating the petitioner's sentence states that "The arraignment and preliminary hearing in the magistrate court are critical states of a criminal proceeding, and that an attorney should have been appointed [for] the defendant prior thereto." The petitioner testified that he was not represented by counsel at the time he waived preliminary hearing. He also testified that he requested counsel be appointed for him at that time. Counsel was first appointed for him prior to his arraignment in the district court upon the information filed against him in that court.
Under the law of Kansas, it is well settled that failure to appoint counsel at a preliminary examination is not error. In so holding this court said in State v. Daegele, 193 Kan. 314, 393 P.2d 978 (cert. den. January 18, 1965, 379 U.S. 981, 13 L. Ed. 2d 571, 85 S.Ct. 686):
As early as 1932, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that an accused in a capital case requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. For many years, this hard and fast rule was imposed upon federal court system, but was not held applicable to the states. State courts followed the "rule of thumb" propounded in the case of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942), which essentially held that indigent defendants were entitled to court-appointed counsel under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only under those circumstances where failure to appoint counsel would amount to a "denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice."
The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963), overruled Betts v. Brady, supra, and held that it was no longer necessary for the defendant to show that his rights had been flagrantly violated, but that an indigent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel in all criminal cases unless the right is competently and intelligently waived. The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which guaranteed the accused in a criminal case the assistance of counsel in federal courts was made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The foregoing doctrine was extended by Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), which held the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an indigent criminal defendant the assistance of counsel on appeal in a state court when he has the appeal as a matter of right. Failure to appoint counsel for the *485 indigent was held to be a discrimination between the rich and the poor which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have considered the question of when the right to appointed counsel should accrue to an indigent defendant in a criminal case. Under the Federal Constitution, the accused's right to counsel does not arise in a preliminary hearing unless that hearing constitutes a "critical stage" in the criminal proceeding. The Kansas preliminary hearing, as it is ordinarily conducted, has been held not to be a critical stage in the criminal proceeding. Thus, a waiver of the preliminary hearing may be made without the appointment of counsel. (Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120, 122 [10th Cir.1963], cert. den. 375 U.S. 959, 11 L. Ed. 2d 317, 84 S. Ct. 449 [1963]).
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that a critical stage is that point in the proceedings when there is at least a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant later at his trial. The possibility of such prejudice was the basis of four recent decisions on this point. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961), the defendant was not represented by counsel at the arraignment when vital defenses could be lost. In White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050 (1963), the defendant entered a plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing, which could be used against him at his trial, at a time when he was not represented by counsel. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964), a defendant under indictment made incriminating statements which were surreptitiously listened to by a federal agent and used against him at his trial. These statements were made in the absence of retained counsel. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), a prime suspect in a murder case made incriminating statements after he had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his retained attorney and without being warned of his right to remain silent. The court held:
The foregoing federal decisions indicate a sharp contrast with the facts in the instant case where at the preliminary hearing no defenses were lost, no plea was taken, and no incriminating statements were made in the absence of counsel.
It is therefore held under both the state and the federal law the lower court erred in holding the appointment of counsel was necessary at the preliminary hearing. It is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding under Kansas law.
In the petitioner's motion to vacate the sentence he claims he was induced to plead guilty on the false promise of the prosecution that the habitual criminal act would not be invoked and his sentence would be 1 to 10 years. This allegation is supported only by his own uncorroborated testimony. It is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to form the basis of an order releasing him. (Williams v. Crouse, 193 Kan. 526, 530, 394 P.2d 96.)
Rule No. 121 (g) of the Supreme Court reads:
Furthermore, the petitioner's claim on this point is contradicted both by the record of the criminal proceedings at which he entered a plea of guilty and by the testimony of Mr. Loftus, his counsel in the criminal proceedings, given at the hearing on the instant motion. When the State asked that the sentence be doubled to not more than 20 years for a second felony conviction under G.S. 1949, 21-107a (now K.S.A. 21-107a) both the petitioner and his counsel stated in open court they had been given prior notice this request would be made by the prosecution. These statements were made immediately after the petitioner's plea of guilty. Thus, the petitioner knew the sentence would be 20 years when he entered his plea of guilty. Mr. Loftus, his court-appointed attorney in the criminal proceedings, testified pursuant to the hearing on this motion that he had himself conveyed to the petitioner immediately before his plea the intention of the State to seek a sentence for a second felony conviction under the habitual criminal act if he would enter a plea of guilty. He further explained it was the State's position that if the petitioner did not plead guilty, and was later convicted, the State would request a sentence for a third *487 felony conviction under the habitual criminal act, providing 15 years to life imprisonment.
The lower court's order vacating the petitioner's conviction states as a second ground for the decision that the petitioner was not fully nor adequately advised of his constitutional rights at the time of his arraignment and plea of guilty. In effect, the court concluded on the basis of the record that the petitioner's court-appointed counsel did not completely represent him, thus rendering the proceedings void.
The petitioner's conviction carries a presumption of regularity. (Andrews v. Hand, 190 Kan. 109, 121, 372 P.2d 559.) The burden rests upon the petitioner to show that his counsel was so incompetent and inadequate in representing him that the total effect was that of a complete absence of counsel. (Hicks v. Hand, 189 Kan. 415, 417, 369 P.2d 250; Converse v. Hand, 185 Kan. 112, 115, 340 P.2d 874; and Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 708, 192 P.2d 147.) The burden is never sustained by the unsupported and uncorroborated statements of the petitioner. (Williams v. Crouse, supra.)
The only evidence introduced on this point was introduced by the petitioner. The petitioner testified that Mr. Loftus spoke with him only twenty to thirty seconds on four different occasions just before his plea. He said he was never shown a copy of the information and that his counsel did not inform him the prosecution intended to double the ordinary 1 to 10-year sentence if he would enter a plea of guilty.
This is contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Loftus that the petitioner was shown a copy of the information, and that he explained to the petitioner that the state intended to use the third felony conviction section of the habitual criminal act unless he would plead guilty, in which event it would use only the second felony conviction section of the act. That the petitioner understood the charge is borne out by his testimony that he had two prior convictions of second degree forgery. That counsel informed him of the State's intent to use the habitual criminal act is further shown by the statements in the transcript of the criminal proceedings. At that time both counsel and the petitioner, after entering the plea of guilty, stated they had been previously notified that the act would be invoked so as to make the sentence not more than 20 years.
Under circumstances very similar to these, this court in Miller v. *488 Hudspeth, supra, where the petitioner claimed his counsel did not advise him of the meaning of a plea of guilty nor of the possible penalties, said:
Also, in Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978, this court noted:
The court holds upon the record here presented the petitioner has not sustained his burden of proof. What the record reveals is that the petitioner agreed to plead guilty on the understanding that only one of his several prior felony convictions would be introduced. He informed his counsel of this intention. Counsel could not under these circumstances seek to change the petitioner's plan, and risk an increased sentence. Nor did counsel have to explain in detail the elements of the charge, when the petitioner had two prior felony convictions for the same crime. He could only warn his client that he did not have to plead guilty, inform him of the consequences, and ascertain whether he desired to do so. All these things counsel for the petitioner did.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed.
SCHROEDER, J., dissenting:
In my opinion the decision of the court overlooks the fact that this is a civil proceeding wherein the petitioner is required to prove the essential allegations of his motion to the satisfaction of the trial court only by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court after considering all of the evidence presented by the record found in favor of the petitioner.
It has been held a general finding by a trial court raises a presumption that it found all facts necessary to sustain and support the judgment. (Andrews v. Hand, 190 Kan. 109, 372 P.2d 559; Dryden *489 v. Rogers, 181 Kan. 154, 309 P.2d 409; and Davis v. Davis, 162 Kan. 701, 178 P.2d 1015.)
The first issue suggested by the petitioner's motion to vacate the sentence was that the plea of guilty entered by him in the criminal case was not voluntarily made and free from coercion and misrepresentation.
The petitioner contended throughout that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. Evidence both by the petitioner and his counsel at the criminal proceeding was sufficient to establish that the plea of guilty was coerced. Even if the petitioner's proof with respect to promises made concerning use of the habitual criminal act failed, the evidence was sufficient to indicate that threats were made concerning the prosecution of the petitioner's wife unless he entered a plea of guilty. This the trial court was entitled to believe constituted coercion at a time when the petitioner was not represented by counsel in the criminal proceeding. Counsel for the petitioner in the criminal proceeding acknowledged there was some discussion concerning the petitioner's wife. All of the evidence on this point was demeanor evidence and this is a significant factor in adjudging credibility. (Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770, 83 S. Ct. 745 [1963].) The court was well within its powers to find that such testimony of counsel corroborated the testimony of the petitioner.
The evidence is undisputed that the petitioner prior to his arraignment and plea in the criminal proceeding was indigent and incarcerated for a period of approximately twelve days, facing a possible life sentence. During this time numerous negotiations with the county attorney's office and its agents were held with the petitioner concerning the crimes with which he was charged and the punishment. All of these negotiations were without the aid and benefit of counsel for the petitioner. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the petitioner received the assistance of counsel for only a very short period of time before his arraignment, plea and sentencing.
Recent federal decisions, cited and discussed in the court's opinion, indicate that the critical stage of a proceeding at which an indigent defendant is entitled to the aid and assistance of counsel is that stage of the proceedings at which the accused could be prejudiced.
No hard and fast rule can be stated which will apply to all cases. Ordinarily, under Kansas law, the preliminary hearing is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. But an appraisal of the *490 totality of the undisputed facts in this case, as established at the hearing on the motion to vacate, indicates a critical stage of the proceeding with respect to the petitioner occurred prior to the preliminary hearing. On the facts a shroud of suspicion is cast upon whether or not the concept of fundamental fairness has been contravened and whether the petitioner has been denied his constitutional rights.
On this point the trial court found and held in favor of the petitioner, and in my opinion correctly held that "The arraignment and preliminary hearing in the magistrate court" was a critical stage of the criminal proceeding in this case, and that an attorney should have been appointed for the petitioner prior thereto.
Had the petitioner not been an indigent person he certainly would have had the aid and assistance of counsel and would have been advised on the facts and the law prior to the negotiations of barter conducted by the county attorney's office while the petitioner was incarcerated. The vice in the practice which permits the prosecution to bargain with the indigent accused is that it requires the accused to barter with the issue of his guilt or innocence. That is the vital issue in any criminal proceeding.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), Wigmore was quoted as follows:
Throughout the record in the instant proceeding, it is apparent counsel for the petitioner in the criminal proceeding was not given a sufficient opportunity to fulfill his duty to his client. This is indicated by the following excerpts from the testimony of Mr. Loftus:
"I remember feeling that this was all very rapid."
The foregoing is not to say that counsel who did represent the petitioner at the criminal proceeding was incompetent. It does say the petitioner did not receive the aid and assistance of counsel to which he was entitled in the criminal proceeding prior to the arraignment and his entry of a plea of guilty.
The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a plea of guilty, in order to be valid, must be freely, knowingly and understandingly made. Otherwise it is a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process and the judgment is void. (Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 705, 192 P.2d 147, and authorities cited therein.) A coerced plea of guilty is not voluntary or freely made.
In 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, § 270, p. 951, it is said:
The effective assistance of counsel, in my opinion, requires that counsel for an indigent defendant in a criminal case have at least sufficient time to consult and counsel with the accused individually and in private for a sufficient period of time to adequately apprise him of his constitutional rights.
Court-appointed counsel must perform certain functions as reported in Miller v. Hudspeth, supra:
The court there further stated that one of the most important reasons for requiring counsel is to protect the defendant from pleading guilty to a charge which the evidence does not establish.
In my opinion the lower court was correct in its order discharging the petitioner from imprisonment when it concluded and held "The defendant was not fully nor adequately advised of his constitutional rights at the time of his arraignment and plea of guilty in the district court on June 28, 1963."
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
FONTRON, J., dissenting:
I am not concerned over the failure to have counsel appointed for petitioner at the time of his preliminary examination. This court has consistently held that the preliminary hearing is not a critical stage in the trial process (see cases cited in the court's majority opinion) and I see nothing in the circumstances of this case which would warrant any deviation from our previous holdings.
Nor do I discern any infringement upon the petitioner's basic rights simply because he negotiated with the county attorney without benefit of counsel. This is a common practice, frequently employed by habitual offenders. No reason is suggested why this conviction should be set aside merely because the accused may have jockeyed with the prosecutor for a favorable position.
So far as the record discloses, the petitioner was deprived of no substantial right because of his dealings with the prosecutor's staff. This is not a case where it appears that the petitioner was prejudiced or that some fundamental or constitutionally guaranteed right was denied him because of such negotiations. Had it developed that, after petitioner was refused counsel, a confession or any incriminating statement was obtained through the negotiation process and had an attempt then been made to use that confession or statement against petitioner, a different problem might be posed.
In my judgment, a more serious question is presented in connection with the second finding of the trial court. This finding is as follows:
*493 Under our long-established and well-defined rule, we are not at liberty to disregard this finding, if there is any substantial, competent evidence on which it can be sustained. (Nichols Co. v. Meredith, 192 Kan. 648, 391 P.2d 136; Green v. Kensinger, 193 Kan. 33, 392 P.2d 122.)
From the evidence quoted by Justice Schroeder in his dissenting opinion, it appears evident that the petitioner's legal representation in district court at the time of his arraignment and plea of guilty was casual at best. This is no reflection upon the professional ability or integrity of Mr. Loftus, who was appointed to represent the petitioner, for he was provided the scantiest opportunity to advise with his client.
The record discloses that counsel was not appointed for the petitioner until he and two other prisoners were brought into court for their arraignment, and that Mr. Loftus was thereupon appointed to represent all three men. The only consultation had between Loftus and the petitioner took place in the presence of the other two prisoners while all three were seated on a bench in the courtroom. The petitioner testified that he spoke with Loftus for approximately twenty to thirty seconds at four different times, while Loftus himself testified that this "was all very rapid." As shown by the record, Mr. Loftus also testified as follows:
I cannot believe that this is the sort of representation by counsel contemplated by G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1304 (now K.S.A. 62-1304). A procedure which precludes more than a token representation of an accused by his appointed counsel clearly fails to measure up to the purpose and requirements of our statute as well as to the constitutional requirements of due process.
No attorney, appointed at the last minute to represent a defendant about to be arraigned and who has no opportunity to consult with his client fully and freely in private, can satisfactorily advise and counsel with his client, no matter how competent a lawyer he may be. A prisoner, whose counsel has been appointed only to take his client through the formalities and to give effect to a deal already made with the county attorney, can hardly be said to have been provided counsel to inform him of and to protect his constitutional rights.
*494 However, I do not approve of or agree with the action of the trial court in ordering the petitioner discharged from imprisonment. The error which I believe inhered in the proceedings leading up to and continuing through the arraignment and sentencing of the petitioner cannot be said to justify his complete exoneration, or his absolute release. In all justice, such error should require only that the sentence be set aside and the petitioner granted a trial, not that the petitioner escape trial entirely.
In Dunfee v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 524, 178 P.2d 1009, this court held:
In my view, a similar disposition should be made of this appeal.
K.S.A. 60-1507 (b) provides in part:
To me, it seems wholly inappropriate for the trial court, after vacating the sentence, to have ordered the petitioner discharged. In my judgment, the appropriate action would have been to grant him a new trial.
In my opinion, the record contains substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court's second finding. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and I would remand this case with directions that further proceedings be had, in harmony with the views herein expressed and as provided by law.