Title: DENNIS K. PRYOR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DENNIS K. PRYOR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 95212 P.3d 635Case Number: S-08-0230Decided: 07/30/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DENNIS 
K. PRYOR,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Converse County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk 
A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Affie Ellis, 
Assistant Attorney General 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Dennis 
K. Pryor, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree sexual 
assault.  On appeal, Pryor seeks 
reversal of one of his convictions, claiming there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain that conviction.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The only issue 
presented for our review is whether or not sufficient evidence is present to 
sustain Pryor's conviction as to Count I of the charging document, although the 
issue is couched in terms of a possible abuse of discretion by the district 
court in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal that was made at the close 
of the State's case-in-chief.1

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the evening of 
September 7, 2007, the victim was enjoying a beer at the La Bonte Bar in 
Douglas, Wyoming, when she engaged in a conversation with Pryor.  A short time later, the victim went to 
the College Inn to meet her daughter and some friends, and Pryor accompanied 
her.  After consuming a few drinks 
at the College Inn, the victim indicated she was going home.  Pryor offered to walk her home.  The victim agreed.  When they reached her apartment, the 
victim invited Pryor in for a beer.  

 
 
[¶4]      At some point, 
Pryor made a verbal sexual advance, which the victim rebuffed.  Pryor then attempted to kiss her.  When the victim pushed him away, Pryor's 
sexual advance became more forceful.  
Pryor pushed the victim down and covered her mouth to prevent her from 
screaming.  He then pulled the 
victim's pants down and tried to have sexual intercourse with her.  The victim continued to resist, and 
Pryor was unable to complete vaginal penetration.  Pryor then attempted to force the victim 
into performing fellatio.  That 
attempt also failed when the victim refused to cooperate and, instead, bit his 
penis.  Pryor then struck the victim 
in the face and left the apartment.  

 
 
[¶5]      The victim 
reported the incident to the police.  
A subsequent examination at the hospital revealed bruising on the 
victim's face, neck, arms, and torso, and injuries to the inner portions of the 
genitalia, specifically bruising on the labia majora, a tear in the labia 
minora-majora crease, and blood on the posterior fourchette.  In an interview with police, Pryor 
admitted to having contact with the victim on the night in question and 
attempting to have consensual sexual intercourse with her but denied placing his 
penis in her mouth.  

 
 
[¶6]      Pryor was 
arrested and charged with two counts of first degree sexual assault in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009).2  Specifically, the State charged Pryor 
with inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim by causing her, through the 
application of physical force, to submit to sexual intercourse (Count I), and to 
perform fellatio on him (Count II).  
The matter went to trial before a jury on April 10, 2008.  At the conclusion of the State's 
case-in-chief, Pryor moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the element of sexual intrusion as to both counts.  The district court denied the motion, 
concluding the evidence was sufficient for the trial to continue.  In the end, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty on both counts.  The 
district court sentenced Pryor to concurrent prison terms of eighteen to 
twenty-five years on each count.  
This appeal followed.  

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The benchmark for 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is adequate to permit a 
reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo. 2001).  We will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury.  Instead, we will determine whether a 
quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found 
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      As charged, Count 
I required the State to prove that Pryor inflicted sexual intrusion on the 
victim by causing her, through the application of physical force, to submit to 
sexual intercourse.  Pryor's sole 
complaint concerns what he perceives is a lack of evidence establishing 
penetration of the victim's genital organs, a necessary prerequisite to the 
jury's finding that sexual intercourse, and thus sexual intrusion, 
occurred.  The problem with Pryor's 
argument is that it disregards the evidence and rational inferences which would 
support the jury's determination.

 
 
[¶9]      This Court has 
repeatedly stated that sexual intercourse is accomplished in a legal sense if 
there is the slightest penetration of the genital organs of the female by the 
sexual organ of the male.  LP v. Natrona Cty. Dep't of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, 679 P.2d 976, 993-94 (Wyo. 1984); Rhodes v. State, 462 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 
1969); State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 
74-75, 331 P.2d 605, 607-08 (1958).  
To sustain a conviction for unlawful sexual intrusion, it is not 
necessary that the vaginal cavity be fully entered.  Rather, it is sufficient if there is 
entry of the male organ into the labia or vulva.  LP, 679 P.2d  at 994; Rhodes, 462 P.2d  at 726.  

 
 
[¶10]   In light of these legal principles, 
we have no trouble concluding the evidence in this case amply supports the 
jury's finding of sexual intrusion.3  The victim testified that Pryor 
attempted to have sexual intercourse with her.  She stated that, although Pryor was 
unsuccessful in his efforts to enter her vagina, his attempts at penetration 
resulted in a tear by her vagina.  
The sexual assault nursing examiner ("SANE nurse") who examined the 
victim testified that she observed a tear in the victim's labia minora-majora 
crease, blood on the victim's posterior fourchette, and bruising on the victim's 
labia majora at the crease with her thigh.4  She described the labia minora and the 
posterior fourchette as internal structures of the female genitalia or vulva and 
the labia majora as the outer lips of the vulva.  The SANE nurse also testified the 
victim's injuries were caused by non-accidental blunt-force trauma, that the 
injuries were consistent with penetration, and that they were consistent with 
the victim's statements about the alleged sexual assault.  When viewed as a whole, the evidence 
provided a sufficient basis from which a rational jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Pryor penetrated the victim's labia or vulva and, therefore, a 
sexual intrusion occurred.  

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   We hold the evidence is sufficient 
to sustain Pryor's conviction on Count I.  
The judgment and sentence of the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The salient portion of W.R.Cr.P. 29(a) 
states:

 
 
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the 
entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the 
indictment, information or citation after the evidence on either side is closed 
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 
offenses.

2§ 
6-2-302(a)(i) states:

 
 

(a)      
Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the 
first degree if:

(i)  The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement[.]

 
 
"Sexual intrusion" is defined in relevant part by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(vii)(B) (LexisNexis 2009) as "[s]exual intercourse, cunnilingus, 
fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without 
emission."

 
 

3We note the jury was instructed that "sexual intercourse" required a 
finding of "some penetration of the female genital organs, which includes the 
labia or vulva."  

 
 

4The SANE nurse photographed the injuries and those photographs were 
introduced into evidence.