Title: State v. Coleman

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC94554 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
GARY LELAND COLEMAN, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
)  
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CALLAWAY COUNTY 
Honorable Kevin M.J. Crane, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 16, 2015 
 
 
Gary Coleman appeals from his conviction of one count of second-degree robbery, 
section 569.030,1 on grounds that there was insufficient evidence that he forcibly stole 
money from a bank.  The judgment is affirmed. 
Facts 
 
In October 2012, Mr. Coleman walked into a bank, rested his forearm on the 
counter, handed the bank teller a plastic grocery sack, and said, “I need you to do me a 
favor.  Put the money in this bag.”  The teller placed $1,472 in the bag.  An assistant 
manager approached Mr. Coleman.  Mr. Coleman told her, “Ma’am, stop where you are 
and don’t move any farther.”  The assistant manager complied.  Mr. Coleman took the 
                                                 
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000. 
 
bag of money and ran out of the bank.  The entire encounter lasted approximately 45 
seconds.  Mr. Coleman was arrested in Texas and extradited to Missouri.  Mr. Coleman 
admitted to police that he was the man in the bank surveillance photographs and that he 
had taken the money from the bank.  
 
Mr. Coleman was charged as a persistent offender with one count of second-
degree robbery pursuant to section 569.030.1.   Mr. Coleman waived his right to a jury 
trial.  He was tried by the court and found guilty as charged.  The court sentenced  
Mr. Coleman as a persistent offender to a term of ten years imprisonment.   
 
Mr. Coleman appeals.  In his only point on appeal, Mr. Coleman argues that there 
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second-degree robbery because he 
did not forcibly steal the money through the use or threatened use of force.  
Standard of Review 
 
Appellate review of a claim that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction “is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Oliver, 
293 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Mo. banc 2009)).  In applying this standard, “the Court accepts as 
true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn 
from the evidence and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.”  Id. 
Analysis 
 
Section 569.030 provides in pertinent part: “A person commits the crime of 
robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property.”  A person “forcibly 
3 
 
steals” if “in the course of stealing … he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical 
force upon another person for the purpose of” either defeating resistance to the theft or 
compelling the surrender of the property.  Section 569.010(1).  Therefore, to support a 
second-degree robbery conviction, there must be evidence establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant used physical force or threatened someone with the 
immediate use of physical force to accomplish the theft.  
 
Mr. Coleman argues that there is insufficient evidence that he forcibly stole the 
money because he neither threatened nor attempted to threaten the bank teller or the 
assistant manager.  Mr. Coleman asserts that he simply walked into the bank, asked for 
money and then left the bank once the teller gave him the bag of money.   
 
In State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 676-77 (Mo. banc 2014), this Court held that 
there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for second-degree robbery because 
the defendant walked into a bank wearing sunglasses, slammed his hand on the counter, 
demanded money and told the teller to “get back here” when she went to retrieve money 
from a drawer at the drive-through window.  Mr. Coleman asserts that his case is 
distinguishable from Brooks because, unlike the defendant in Brooks, Mr. Coleman did 
not make any threatening physical gestures or raise his voice in a threatening manner.  
Mr. Coleman accurately describes the factual distinctions between this case and Brooks, 
but these distinctions do not dictate a different result.    
 
First, as this Court recognized in Brooks, determining the existence of a threat is 
an objective test that depends on whether a reasonable person would believe the 
defendant’s conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical force.  Id. at 676.    
4 
 
Banks are regular targets of robberies, and bank employees have a heightened awareness 
of security threats.  Id.  A demand for money in that context is an implicit threat of the 
use of force in and of itself.  Id., citing United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402–03 
(6th Cir. 2002) (stating that oral or written demands for money in a bank “carry with 
them an implicit threat: if the money is not produced, harm to the teller or other bank 
employee may result”). 
 
Second, whether such an implicit threat would itself be sufficient depends on the 
facts of the case.  Here, when viewed in context, they provide further evidence that  
Mr. Coleman forcibly stole the money by means of an actual or attempted threat.   
Mr. Coleman approached the bank teller, kept one hand concealed, demanded money to 
which he had no lawful right, and directed the branch manager not to move any farther 
when she approached to investigate the situation.  These facts and the inferences from 
those facts support the conclusion that a reasonable person would perceive  
Mr. Coleman’s actions as threatening and, as a result, would comply with his directive to 
place the money in the bag.  To hold otherwise, this Court would have to hold that the 
only reasonable inference that could be drawn was that Mr. Coleman’s actions were 
nothing more than a mere request for some of the bank’s money.  There was sufficient 
evidence to support the conviction. 
 
Mr. Coleman also argues that Brooks should be overruled because the case stands 
for the proposition the every theft of money from a bank constitutes second-degree 
robbery.  Neither Brooks nor this case holds that all thefts of money from a bank 
necessarily involve forcible stealing and, therefore, constitute robbery.  Instead, these 
5 
 
cases recognize that context matters.  The objective circumstances attending the unlawful 
demand of money from a bank are often such that there is a strong implication of a threat.  
As in Brooks, the fundamental problem with Mr. Coleman’s version of events is that it 
contradicts the facts and inferences from those facts that were found by the trial court 
acting in its capacity as the finder of fact.  To adopt Mr. Coleman’s version of events, this 
Court would have to hold that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Coleman forcibly stole the 
money by means of an actual or attempted threat is unsupported by the record and rests 
on forced or speculative inferences.  This Court declines to do so.  
Conclusion 
 
There was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that  
Mr. Coleman committed the crime of robbery in the second-degree because he forcibly 
stole the money by threatening the immediate use of physical force for the purpose of 
both defeating resistance to the theft of the money and compelling its surrender.   
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Draper, and 
Wilson, JJ., concur; Breckenridge, J. 
dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Stith, J., concurs in opinion of  
Breckenridge, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC94554 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
GARY LELAND COLEMAN, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority opinion that there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that Gary Coleman forcibly stole money from a bank.  He is 
charged with committing the class B felony of robbery in the second degree in violation 
of section 569.030,1 which provides that “[a] person commits the crime of robbery in the 
second degree when he forcibly steals property.”  The element of that crime at issue in 
this case is the term “forcibly steals.”  The definition of “forcibly steals” is found in 
section 569.010(1): 
[A] person “forcibly steals”, and thereby commits robbery, when, in the 
course of stealing, . . . he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical 
force upon another person for the purpose of: 
 
(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to 
the retention therefore immediately after the taking; or 
 
                                              
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
2 
 
(b) Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up 
the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of 
the theft[.] 
 
  
There is no claim that Mr. Coleman actually used physical force on another person 
to effectuate the stealing of money from the bank.  Rather, the majority opinion finds that 
Mr. Coleman’s conduct of keeping one hand concealed,2 demanding money to which he 
had no lawful right, and directing the branch manager not to move any farther is 
sufficient evidence that his conduct was an actual or attempted threat that he would use 
physical force.  In so holding, it finds that “a reasonable person would perceive his 
actions as threatening and, as a result, would comply with his directive to place the 
money in the bag.”    
 
I agree that any victim of a bank robbery would reasonably be in fear that the 
victim is in danger and, while the bank robbery is in progress, there was an ongoing, 
inherent threat that Mr. Coleman would decide to use force.  That reasonable perception 
is supported by reports of countless crimes in which the perpetrators needlessly decide to 
injure or kill victims and bystanders during the commission of robberies.  The reasonable 
perception that a victim is in danger of the use of force during a robbery is not sufficient, 
however, to meet the requirement of section 569.010(1) that the defendant “uses or 
threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
The dictionary defines “physical” as “of or relating to the body,” Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 1706 (1993), and “force” as “power, violence, compulsion, 
                                              
2 When asked at trial where Mr. Coleman’s hands were, the bank teller stated, “The one 
was above the counter and the other was below.”  The majority opinion characterizes this 
evidence as Mr. Coleman keeping his hand “concealed.” 
3 
 
or constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing,” id. at 887.  The dictionary 
definition of “immediate” is “occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss of time: 
made or done at once: INSTANT.” Id. at 1129.  Mr. Coleman’s conduct of having his 
hand below the counter, demanding money to which he has no lawful right, and directing 
the branch manager not to move any farther is insufficient to prove that he threatened 
immediate use of power, violence, compulsion or constraint [against the bank teller or 
branch manager].  Therefore, there was insufficient evidence that he threatened the 
“immediate” use of “physical force,” which was required to convict him.3   
 
The effect of finding that there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Coleman forcibly 
stole the money from the bank is that he would be guilty of only the lesser-included crime 
of stealing.  See section 570.030, RSMo Supp. 2012.  While it seems unlikely that the 
legislature would intend that a bank robber be guilty only of stealing, this Court must 
determine the intent of the legislature from the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
the legislature used in the statute.  State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. banc 2010).  
In other words, this Court must enforce the laws as the legislature writes them and cannot 
                                              
3 In State v. Brooks, this Court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction of 
robbery in the second degree when the defendant walked into a bank wearing a disguise, 
handed the teller a note that read “50 & 100’s, No Bait Bills, Bottom Drawer,” and 
slammed his hand down on the bank counter while telling the teller to “get back here.”  
446 S.W.3d 673, 676-77 (Mo. banc 2014).  Specifically, the Court found the defendant’s 
slamming his hand forcefully on the counter “could be considered a threat of immediate 
physical force to [the teller] should she refuse to comply.”  Id. at 677.  Unlike in Brooks, 
there is no evidence supporting a finding that there was a threat of immediate physical 
force.  While the majority opinion states that the sufficiency of a threat depends on the 
facts of a particular case, its finding of sufficient evidence in this case would essentially 
lead to a finding of forcible stealing in any theft of money from a bank without requiring 
evidence of a threat of the immediate use of physical force. 
4 
 
rewrite a law based on the Court’s belief of the legislature’s intent that is contrary to the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the law.  State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. banc 
2002).  Accordingly, I would find that Mr. Coleman’s conviction for the class B felony of 
robbery in the second degree should be reversed for insufficient evidence.  I would 
further hold that Mr. Coleman is guilty of the lesser-included offense of the class B 
felony of stealing and remand his case for sentencing on that crime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE