Title: State v. Harrison

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

588 N.W.2d 556 (1999) 255 Neb. 990 STATE of Nebraska, appellant, v. Verma J. HARRISON, appellee. No. S-97-1152. Supreme Court of Nebraska. January 22, 1999. *558 Paul B. Schaub, Cheyenne County Attorney, Sidney, for appellant. James R. Mowbray, of Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy, and, on brief, Robin W. Hadfield, Lincoln, for appellee. HENDRY, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ., and WITTHOFF, District Judge. CONNOLLY, J. The appellee, Verma J. Harrison, was convicted of two counts of motor vehicle homicide and sentenced to consecutive terms of probation by the district court. The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed Harrison's sentences as excessively lenient, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2322 (Reissue 1995), and imposed consecutive sentences of imprisonment. State v. Harrison, 7 Neb.App. 350, 583 N.W.2d 62 (1998). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing probation. Harrison was driving a GMC van on Interstate 80, near Sidney, Nebraska, at approximately 7:30 a.m. when the van she was driving collided with a Chrysler Town and Country van being driven by Joseph Nicolich, age 65. Joseph Nicolich's wife, Janice, age 60, was in the front passenger seat, and their granddaughter, Robyn Griffiths, age 11, was in the rear seat. The impact of the collision killed Robyn and Janice. A Nebraska State Patrol officer determined that Harrison was intoxicated at the time of the collision. Harrison stated that she had been drinking in Ogallala until about 3 a.m., had slept a couple of hours in a motel, and was in a hurry to get to Cheyenne, Wyoming. Six motels located at the Ogallala interchange were contacted, and none had any record of Harrison's being registered on the relevant date. Joseph Nicolich stated that at the time of the collision, he was traveling on I-80 and had passed a motorist who was stopped on the side of the road. He decided to pull over to offer assistance. He had pulled onto the shoulder and slowed down to approximately 25 miles per hour, when his vehicle was struck in the rear by Harrison's vehicle. According to an accident reconstructionist, Harrison was driving on the shoulder at the time of impact at a speed of approximately 65 to 75 miles per hour. It appeared that Harrison made no attempt to avoid the collision. Harrison stated that she thought she had fallen asleep at the wheel. Harrison was charged with two counts of motor vehicle homicide, pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-306(1) (Reissue 1995), for allegedly causing the deaths of Janice and Robyn, unintentionally, while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle. Harrison pled guilty in the district court to both counts after being informed of her rights by the court. The State recited the factual basis for the charges, which Harrison admitted. The trial court found that Harrison had freely, intelligently, and voluntarily entered each plea and accepted them. The trial court then ordered a presentence investigation. Because we are faced with a sentencing issue, we will discuss the facts contained in the presentence report and those presented at the sentencing hearing in some detail. The presentence report indicates that Harrison's life had been filled with abuse. Her father, who had been a uranium miner, died from lung cancer in 1971. After her father *559 died, her mother had an affair with Harrison's married uncle, who also molested Harrison and her sister. The community later discovered her mother's adulterous relationship, and their family became outcasts. Harrison married an alcoholic in 1988 when she became pregnant, and she was divorced in 1994. Two of Harrison's children were from this marriage. The other child was the result of a relationship with a man who physically abused Harrison. Harrison was 32 years old at the time of sentencing. Harrison was convicted of public intoxication in 1994 and driving under the influence of alcohol in 1995. Harrison participated in an 8-hour alcohol abuse course as a result of her 1995 conviction, but did not complete it. She had been fined for child neglect in 1992, which was also attributable to alcohol. Harrison began drinking regularly at age 15 and was drinking twice a week by her senior year in high school. The presentence report contained numerous letters, some in support of and some in opposition to Harrison's receiving the maximum sentence. The letters in support of Harrison's receiving the maximum sentence were adequately characterized by the trial court during the pronouncement of sentence, which statement is set forth below. The letters in support of Harrison's receiving probation, particularly those from the director of the Laramie Head Start Program, the principal of the elementary school attended by Harrison's children, the pastor of Harrison's church, and a counselor and instructor for the AAA DUI Offender Program, indicated that Harrison was a responsible parent, was heavily involved in the community, and was making significant progress toward conquering her alcoholism. According to these letters, Harrison's attempt at rehabilitation was sincere and was likely to be successful. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked Harrison whether she had anything she wanted to say. Harrison stated: Joseph Nicolich testified on behalf of the State: The trial court also had before it a letter handwritten by Cindy Griffiths, Robyn's mother, at the mother's request: It's a little hard for me to know where to begin. To try to describe the agony of losing our precious daughter and mother is not something we can easily do, for the pain runs so very deep. It's beyond anything we've ever experienced. It's as though a major tidal wavea tsu namihas crashed down upon us and sent us tumbling and spinning in blacknessagonizing blackness. I described it at one Point to someone as being tortured unceasingly without the repose of death. I *560 prayed and asked God a number of times to just please, please take my entire family in our sleep so we wouldn't have to live the nightmare anymore. Obviously my prayers have gone unansweredthis timeand for good reasons, I'm confident. Early in November of `96 I wrote to her to tell her that I didn't hate her, but wanted to help her. I explained to her my reasons for my perspective and my forgiveness; for they are found in the Bible and are the fruits of a relationship with the *561 Lord, Jesus Christ, and by faith in His word. I don't claim to know all she needs right now. She broke the laws of our land and I don't know what's in store for her because of this. We want you to know that we consider her an ally and not an enemy if she is going to pursue what is good and right. If she does this, she'll be fighting *562 the true enemy with uswhich is evil itself. And that battle is won one heart at a time. Let her influence others so that perhaps even one other mother and father, daughter & son-in-law will not have to weep the bitter tears we've wept. The trial court sentenced Harrison to 5 years' probation on each count, which sentences were to be served consecutively. The conditions of her probation included random alcohol and drug testing and counseling. In rendering sentence, the trial court stated: The State appealed, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering excessively lenient sentences. State v. Harrison, 7 Neb.App. 350, 583 N.W.2d 62 (1998). The Court of Appeals stated that according to its "examination of all the factors," it was "of the opinion that a period of incarceration is required to meet the requirements of a proper sentence under the facts of this case." Id. at 359, 583 N.W.2d at 68. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the trial court had abused its discretion. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals vacated Harrison's sentences of probation and remanded the cause for imposition of two sentences of 20 months' to 5 years' incarceration, to be served consecutively. Harrison now appeals from that decision. Harrison asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to properly apply the standard of review, in finding that the sentences are excessively lenient, and in vacating the sentences and remanding the cause for imposition of two consecutive sentences of 20 months' to 5 years' incarceration. When the State appeals from a sentence, contending that it is excessively lenient, an appellate court reviews the record for an abuse of discretion, and a grant of probation will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. State v. Detweiler, 249 Neb. 485, 544 N.W.2d 83 (1996). In her petition for further review, Harrison argues that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the standard of review in evaluating her sentences, as it did not make any determination as to whether the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing sentences of probation. In State v. Jallen, 218 Neb. 882, 359 N.W.2d 816 (1984), we held that the same scope of review applies in the lenient sentence context as applies in the excessive sentence context. See, also, State v. Hoffman, 246 Neb. 265, 517 N.W.2d 618 (1994) (indicating that such is constitutionally required). Thus, regardless of whether an appellate court is reviewing a sentence for its leniency or for its excessiveness, a sentence imposed by a district court that is within the statutorily prescribed limits will not be disturbed on appeal unless there appears an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Jallen, supra. See State v. Detweiler, supra. It is not the function of an appellate court to conduct a de novo review of the *563 record to determine whether a sentence is appropriate. State v. Ellen, 243 Neb. 522, 500 N.W.2d 818 (1993). The sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. State v. Riley, 242 Neb. 887, 497 N.W.2d 23 (1993). In State v. Philipps, 242 Neb. 894, 496 N.W.2d 874 (1993), this court addressed the abuse of discretion standard in the excessive sentence context. In Philipps, the defendant had stolen approximately $10,000 from her employer and was found guilty on three misdemeanor counts. The defendant had attempted to make restitution by paying back the employer, was under financial pressure when the theft occurred, had no prior criminal record, was remorseful, and was 29 years old and pregnant at the time of sentencing. Nonetheless, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum imprisonment, 1 year on each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals concluded that the sentences were excessive and reduced the sentences to probation. This court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that the sentences did not constitute an abuse of discretion, even though a mechanical application of the statutory factors would suggest that imprisonment was unnecessary. See State v. Philipps, 242 Neb. at 904, 496 N.W.2d at 881, Shanahan, J., dissenting (noting that "6 of the 11 factors in [Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2260 (Reissue 1995) ] favoring probation over imprisonment" were present). We have long held that a judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. See, e.g., State v. Irons, 254 Neb. 18, 574 N.W.2d 144 (1998). In Pettegrew v. Pettegrew, 128 Neb. 783, 788, 260 N.W. 287, 289 (1935), we stated: "`If the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable or unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a denial of justice, if clearly against justice or conscience, reason and evidence, it has abused its discretion.'" Quoting State v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290 (1931). Accordingly, when applying the criteria enumerated in § 29-2322, which authorizes an increase of sentence on appeal, the inquiry is whether the trial court's decision was clearly untenable, unfairly deprived a litigant of a substantial right, and denied a just result. See State v. Rittenhouse, 1 Neb.App. 633, 510 N.W.2d 336 (1993). Thus, so long as the trial court's sentence is within the statutorily prescribed limits; is supported by competent evidence, see, State v. Philipps, supra; State v. Foral, 236 Neb. 597, 462 N.W.2d 626 (1990); and is not based on irrelevant considerations, see State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998) (holding trial court abused discretion by relying on personal religious views), an appellate court cannot say that a trial court has abused its discretion. Such a sentence is not untenable, does not unfairly deprive a litigant of a substantial right, and does not deny a just result. The question, then, is whether the trial court in the instant case abused its discretion by sentencing Harrison to probation. In conducting this analysis, we are mindful that "`[t]he trial court has the opportunity to observe the defendant throughout the judicial process and is in a better position than this court to determine whether the defendant is suited for probation.'" State v. Stastny, 227 Neb. 748, 751, 419 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1988), quoting State v. Dobbins, 221 Neb. 778, 380 N.W.2d 640 (1986). Moreover, a sentencing judge has broad discretion as to the source and type of information, including personal observations, which may be used as assistance in determining the kind and extent of the punishment to be imposed. State v. Pattno, supra. The Court of Appeals applied § 29-2322 in determining that Harrison's sentences were excessively lenient. Section 29-2322 states in relevant part: However, the Court of Appeals did not consider the elements contained in § 29-2260. When determining whether to impose probation, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in § 29-2260. Thus, on appeal, an appellate court must likewise consider § 29-2260 in determining whether probation may be imposed, whether reviewing a sentence for excessiveness pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 29-2308 (Reissue 1995), see State v. Philipps, 242 Neb. 894, 496 N.W.2d 874 (1993), or for leniency under § 29-2322, see, State v. Jallen, 218 Neb. 882, 359 N.W.2d 816 (1984); State v. Hoffman, 246 Neb. 265, 517 N.W.2d 618 (1994). Section 29-2260 states in relevant part: In the instant case, there was competent evidence received by the trial court during sentencing that supports the imposition of probation under § 29-2260. Harrison's testimony, the letters from her community, and the Griffiths' letter indicate that (1) Harrison is unlikely to commit another crime, (2) Harrison is likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment, and (3) imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to Harrison's children, all of which are factors that weigh in favor of probation. See § 29-2260(i), (j), and (k). The above facts *565 likewise support the imposition of probation considering § 29-2322(3)(b) and (4). The State argues that the Griffiths' letter is nothing more than a letter of forgiveness and, thus, that the trial court relied on irrelevant evidence in imposing Harrison's sentences of probation. Assuming without deciding that a victim's forgiveness is a relevant circumstance, we note that the Griffiths' letter expresses more than the Griffiths' forgiveness; it is evidence that "Harrison's rehabilitation is genuine." Thus, the letter is clearly relevant, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in considering such. The State also notes that the Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he protection of the public from further crimes by Harrison cannot be assured under the conditions of probation ... imposed...." State v. Harrison, 7 Neb.App. 350, 359, 583 N.W.2d 62, 67 (1998). This conclusion was apparently based on Harrison's prior problems with alcohol and gave little credence to the evidence concerning Harrison's subsequent progress toward rehabilitation. However, as we have already stated, an appellate court may not review sentences de novo, but, rather, is bound by the abuse of discretion standard. In light of the competent evidence indicating that Harrison was making significant progress toward rehabilitation, we cannot say that the trial court's determination in this regard was an abuse of discretion. Finally, the State notes that the Court of Appeals concluded that Harrison's sentences of probation did not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment, which factors constitute an element under § 29-2322(3)(c). Although the seriousness of the crime may weigh in favor of imprisoning Harrison, it does not, by itself, indicate that the trial court abused its discretion. Obviously, the offenses in the instant case were quite serious, and that fact should not be diminished. However, a sentence should fit the offender and not merely the crime. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949). Indeed, this court has repeatedly recognized the importance of probation to our system of criminal justice, stating that "` "[a] sentence not involving confinement is to be preferred to a sentence involving partial or total confinement in the absence of affirmative reasons to the contrary."...'" State v. Javins, 199 Neb. 38, 40-41, 255 N.W.2d 872, 874 (1977), quoting State v. Shonkwiler, 187 Neb. 747, 194 N.W.2d 172 (1972). Thus, "justice" may certainly be served by a sentence of probation. Whether justice is so served is a matter that is, in the first instance, properly left to the trial court. Were our standard of review de novo, we may have agreed with the Court of Appeals and reached a different result than the trial court. Nonetheless, based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Harrison to probation and, thus, that Harrison's sentences are not excessively lenient. Therefore, we reverse, and remand the cause with directions to reinstate the sentences of the district court. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. MILLER-LERMAN, J., not participating. WRIGHT, J., dissents.