Title: Human Rights Defense Center v. Maine County Commissioners Ass'n Self-Funded Risk Management Pool

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 56 
Docket: 
Ken-22-420 
Argued: 
June 8, 2023 
Decided: 
 August 22, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER 
 
v. 
 
MAINE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION 
SELF-FUNDED RISK MANAGEMENT POOL 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
 
[¶1]  The Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk 
Management Pool (Risk Pool) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Billings, J.) awarding attorney fees to the Human Rights 
Defense Center (HRDC), based on the court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing 
that the Risk Pool had refused in bad faith to comply with HRDC’s request for 
records pursuant to the Maine Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S. 
§§ 400-414 (2023). 
 
[¶2]  This case presents the first occasion for us to consider what 
 
2 
constitutes “bad faith” for purposes of FOAA’s fee-shifting provision.1  1 M.R.S. 
§ 409(4).  Because the Risk Pool never denied or explicitly refused to comply 
with HRDC’s request, we must consider the circumstances under which a public 
entity’s failure to comply with a FOAA request rises to the level of a bad-faith 
refusal to comply.  See id.  Here, the Risk Pool’s failure to produce any of its 
records in response to HRDC’s FOAA request, despite HRDC’s repeated efforts 
to clarify what should already have been clear, can only be viewed as, in the 
court’s words, “deceptive and abusive of the FOAA process.”  We agree with the 
court that the Risk Pool’s response constituted a bad-faith refusal and we affirm 
the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Factual Background 
 
[¶3]  “The following facts are drawn from the court’s findings, which are 
supported by the record . . . .” Dubois v. Dep’t of Agric., Conservation and Forestry, 
2018 ME 68, ¶ 2, 185 A.3d 743. 
 
[¶4]  HRDC is a non-profit organization that collects information from law 
enforcement and corrections agencies and other public entities in furtherance 
 
1  Based on the novel-for-us issue presented, we granted a motion by the Maine Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Maine Freedom of Information Coalition, Maine Press Association, 
New England First Amendment Coalition, and Public Justice, for leave to file a joint amicus brief.  
Their joint brief supports an affirmance of the judgment. 
 
3 
of its mission to advocate for change in the criminal justice system.  The Risk 
Pool is an unincorporated, public, self-funded pool that provides risk 
management services to Maine counties under a contract with the Maine 
County Commissioners Association.  See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 2251-2256 (2023) 
(authorizing public, self-funded pools).  Malcolm Ulmer, the Risk Pool’s director 
of operations, maintains a claim file on each claim handled by the Risk Pool. 
 
[¶5]  At some point before June 18, 2021, HRDC became aware, through 
a Portland Press Herald article, of the settlement of a federal lawsuit against 
Kennebec County alleging maltreatment of a prisoner at the Kennebec County 
Jail.  The article indicated that the action was settled by the County’s payment 
of $30,000 to the plaintiff.  HRDC submitted a FOAA request to Kennebec 
County for documents showing payments related to the action and settlement.  
The County’s attorney responded by sending HRDC copies of pleadings filed in 
the matter and a copy of a settlement agreement.  However, the settlement 
agreement indicated only that the settlement was in consideration of “One 
Dollar and Other Good and Valuable Consideration” and did not mention the 
$30,000 payment cited in the article. 
 
[¶6]  On June 18, 2021, HRDC submitted via email to the Risk Pool what 
it designated as a FOAA request for “any documents showing payments 
 
4 
disbursed 
to 
Jonathan 
Afanador 
and/or 
attorney 
John 
Wall[] 
by 
Kennebec County, Nathan Willhoite, and/or the Maine County Commissioners 
Association Self-Funded Risk Management Pool from January 1, 2021 to 
present.  This includes but is not limited to payment documentation related to 
the following case: Afanador v. Kennebec County Case No: 1:20-cv-00235-JDL.” 
 
[¶7]  Ulmer, on behalf of the Risk Pool, responded via email the same day, 
stating that he understood that the County’s attorney had already provided a 
copy of the settlement agreement to HRDC and noting that the settlement 
amount was $30,000.  HRDC replied promptly to point out that the settlement 
agreement did not indicate the dollar amount of the settlement and asked, “[d]o 
you have any documentation that shows the $30,000 amount?”  The Risk Pool 
responded with a message saying only, “See attached,” attaching the Portland 
Press Herald article stating that the case settled for $30,000, and not any Risk 
Pool document from his claim file.  On June 21, 2021, HRDC sent another 
follow-up email asking for “a copy of the actual agreement that shows $30,000.”  
On the same day, the Risk Pool replied that the release that HRDC received from 
the attorney for Kennebec County was the “actual agreement” and that “I have 
already advised you that the settlement amount is $30,000.” 
 
5 
 
[¶8]  On July 2, 2021, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Maine (ACLU of Maine) sent a letter via email to the Risk Pool and the attorney 
for Kennebec County indicating that the ACLU of Maine was representing HRDC 
in connection with its FOAA request and stating that “Kennebec County’s FOAA 
response thus far is not in compliance with the FOAA.”  The letter pointed out 
that the settlement agreement produced by Kennebec County’s attorney did not 
contain the dollar amount paid in settlement and that “[n]o documents were 
produced that show that $30,000 was paid to Mr. Afanador, nor were any 
documents produced showing payment to any attorneys involved in the case.”  
The letter pointed out that “documents that are potentially responsive to the 
FOAA request include accounting records, a copy of a cover letter that was sent 
with payment, emails between individuals in county government and officials 
in the sheriff’s office, or memoranda suggesting that officers not engage in 
whatever conduct led to the filing of the litigation in the first place.”  The letter 
concluded by noting that HRDC would treat a failure to provide all responsive 
documents as a final denial or refusal pursuant to 1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  The Risk 
Pool responded by stating that “it is [its] understanding that the signed release 
provided to [HRDC] by [Kennebec County] is the only settlement release 
 
6 
document.”  The Risk Pool’s reply did not indicate whether the Risk Pool 
possessed what HRDC had requested—“payment documentation.” 
B. 
Procedural History 
 
[¶9]  Pursuant to FOAA’s appeal procedure, HRDC filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court on July 27, 2021, against Kennebec County and the Maine 
County Commissioners Association.  See 1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  Kennebec County 
responded on September 7, 2021, by asserting that it had provided HRDC with 
all responsive documents in its possession.  See id. (“The agency or official shall 
file a statement of position explaining the basis for denial . . . .”).  The Maine 
County Commissioners Association filed its statement of position on 
September 27, 2021, asserting that HRDC should have named the Risk Pool as 
a party instead of the Maine County Commissioners Association.  See 1 M.R.S. 
§ 409(1).  HRDC filed a motion to amend its complaint on October 4, 2021, to 
add the Risk Pool as a party.  HRDC’s motion explained that it did not initially 
name the Risk Pool as a party because it believed that the Risk Pool was part of 
the Maine County Commissioners Association.  On October 25, 2021, the court 
granted HRDC’s motion to amend.  The order did not address Kennebec 
County’s or the Maine County Commissioners Association’s statements of 
positions.  On November 15, 2021, the Risk Pool filed an answer and affirmative 
 
7 
defenses to HRDC’s amended complaint, asserting that HRDC’s appeal was 
untimely, that all responsive documents were produced, and that any 
documents withheld are privileged.  On January 24, 2022, HRDC moved to 
dismiss its appeal as to Kennebec County and the Maine County Commissioners 
Association.  The court granted the motion on February 1, 2022, leaving the 
Risk Pool as the only defendant.  See M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 
 
[¶10]  On March 1, 2022, the Risk Pool filed a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that HRDC had failed to meet the FOAA 
requirement that an appeal be filed within thirty calendar days of the agency’s 
“refusal, denial, or failure” to comply with a FOAA request.  1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  
HRDC’s memorandum in response to the Risk Pool’s motion contended that its 
joinder of the Risk Pool related back to its timely initial complaint because 
HRDC would have named the Risk Pool initially but for a mistake, and the 
mistake caused no prejudice because the Risk Pool was aware of the action 
from its outset.  See M.R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) (relation back of the joinder of a party).  
HRDC included an affidavit of counsel explaining why HRDC had not initially 
joined the Risk Pool in its appeal.  The court denied the motion to dismiss, 
agreeing with HRDC that “there was good reason for [HRDC’s] confusion” about 
 
8 
whether the Risk Pool was a distinct legal entity, and ruled that HRDC’s joinder 
of the Risk Pool in its amended complaint related back to its initial complaint. 
[¶11]  The court held a bench trial on September 29, 2022.  The court 
heard testimony from the executive director of HRDC and Ulmer.  During the 
trial, the Risk Pool acknowledged that it did in fact have “payment 
documentation” (the same term used in HRDC’s FOAA request) for the 
settlement and had still not provided it to HRDC.  When pressed on why 
documents showing the amount of payment had still not been provided, the 
Risk Pool claimed that HRDC had not requested them. 
[¶12]  After the hearing, HRDC and the Risk Pool filed written closing 
arguments.  By its decision, dated December 1, 2022, the court noted that Ulmer 
had testified “that he was in possession of a claim file and financial records that 
contained documentation that showed the Risk Pool had paid $30,000 to settle 
[the] claim, but did not release those documents because he did not believe that 
HRDC had specifically requested them.”  The court found that the Risk Pool “is 
in possession of responsive documents and wrongfully refused to release them” 
and ordered that the Risk Pool disclose all responsive documents “showing that 
it paid $30,000 to settle the case.”  The court granted HRDC’s request for 
attorney fees based on what it found was the Risk Pool’s bad-faith response to 
 
9 
HRDC’s request, because “the Risk Pool’s behavior was so deceptive and 
abusive of the FOAA process.”  See 1 M.R.S. § 409(4).  The court found that 
[a]t every stage of the FOAA process, the Risk Pool and Mr. Ulmer 
adopted bizarre interpretations of HRDC’s request to avoid 
disclosure, despite knowing from the beginning that they were in 
possession of responsive documents.  This type of obfuscation and 
prevarication undermines the basic purpose of the FOAA, which is 
to enable the public to be informed about what their government is 
up to. 
 
[¶13]  The Risk Pool filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment 
on December 15, 2022.  M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  On February 6, 2023, the court 
denied the Risk Pool’s motion for amended findings of fact without comment.  
The Risk Pool timely appealed from the final judgment.  M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1); 
14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2023). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶14]  “[W]e review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and 
its interpretation of FOAA de novo.”  Fairfield v. Me. State Police, 2023 ME 12, 
¶ 9, 288 A.3d 1220.  The Risk Pool raises two arguments on appeal.  It contends 
that HRDC’s appeal was untimely and that the court erred in awarding attorney 
fees to HRDC. 
 
10 
A. 
Timeliness of HRDC’s Appeal 
 
[¶15]  Under FOAA “[a]ny person aggrieved by a refusal or denial to inspect 
or copy a record or the failure to allow the inspection or copying of a record . . . may 
appeal . . . within 30 calendar days of the receipt of the written notice of refusal, denial, 
or failure . . . .”  1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  The thirty-day period runs from the date on 
which the requesting party learns of an agency’s violation of FOAA in the form 
of a wrongful refusal, denial, or failure to comply with FOAA.  See Palmer v. 
Portland Sch. Comm., 652 A.2d 86, 89 (Me. 1995) (“A Freedom of Access claim 
must be filed within thirty days of discovering a possible violation.”). 
 
[¶16]  The Risk Pool asserts that HRDC’s appeal was untimely for two 
alternate reasons.  First, the Risk Pool argues that the thirty-day period began 
to run on June 21, 2021, because “the undisputed evidence is that [Ulmer] had 
responded to the request as much as he was going to by June 21, 2021,” and 
HRDC’s filing of its original complaint on July 27, 2021, was therefore untimely.  
Second, the Risk Pool argues that even if HRDC’s initial complaint were deemed 
timely, it failed to name the Risk Pool as a defendant, and the court erred in 
deciding that the addition of the Risk Pool as a defendant in HRDC’s amended 
complaint related back to the filing of the initial complaint.  See M.R. Civ. P. 15.  
We disagree on both points. 
 
11 
[¶17]  The Risk Pool’s contention that its June 21, 2021, response to 
HRDC’s request triggered the appeal period because HRDC should have taken 
it as the Risk Pool’s final response is unfounded.  HRDC’s initial June 18, 2021, 
request was for “any documents showing payments” made to settle the case, 
and its clarification sought “documentation that shows the $30,000 amount.”  
The Risk Pool’s June 21, 2021, reply did not indicate whether the Risk Pool 
possessed such documents.  HRDC was fully justified in attempting to ensure, 
through its counsel’s July 2, 2021, follow-up letter, that the Risk Pool 
understood what HRDC was requesting. 
 
[¶18]  Moreover, as a matter of FOAA procedure, when an agency plainly 
is not interpreting a request to mean what the requester intends, further efforts 
to clarify both the scope of the request and the completeness of the response 
are to be encouraged before judicial remedies are invoked.  To accept the Risk 
Pool’s argument would likely spawn avoidable litigation by causing requesters 
to file appeals prematurely when further dialogue might resolve 
disagreements.  Here, HRDC’s counsel’s July 2 letter pointing out that 
“Kennebec County’s FOAA response thus far is not in compliance with the 
FOAA” shows that HRDC did not interpret Ulmer’s June 21, 2021, message as a 
final response.  (Emphasis added.)  The Risk Pool’s July 6, 2021, response to 
 
12 
that letter stated that there were no other documents responsive to HRDC’s 
request.  It was that response that triggered the appeal deadline, and HRDC’s 
complaint, filed on July 27, 2021, was therefore timely. 
 
[¶19]  The Risk Pool’s contention that HRDC’s amended complaint adding 
the Risk Pool as a party should not relate back to the initial complaint is equally 
unpersuasive.  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows for changes of parties 
or the naming of parties.  “An amended pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading where the claim asserted in the amended pleading ‘arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleading.’”  Frame v. Millinocket Reg’l Hosp., 2013 ME 104, ¶ 13, 
82 A.3d 137 (quoting M.R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)).  The “relation back” provision of 
Rule 15(c)(3) further provides: 
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original 
pleading when . . . (3) the amendment changes the party or the 
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if . . . the party 
to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the 
institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against the party. 
 
 
[¶20]  The Risk Pool does not deny that it was aware of the action almost 
as soon as it was brought and does not contend that the delay in its joinder 
resulted in any prejudice.  Instead, the Risk Pool argues that HRDC’s failure to 
 
13 
name the Risk Pool was not a mistake and that HRDC unduly delayed moving 
to amend its complaint to add the Risk Pool as a defendant.  However, the Risk 
Pool does not contend that HRDC knew, as of when it filed its initial complaint, 
that the Risk Pool was separate from Kennebec County and the Maine County 
Commissioners Association, and it does not proffer any reason other than a 
mistake for HRDC’s initial failure to include the Risk Pool as a defendant.  As to 
delay, we have indicated that a party seeking leave to amend must act without 
unreasonable delay once the party becomes aware of grounds for a motion to 
amend.  See John W. Goodwin, Inc. v. Fox, 642 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Me. 1994).  Here, 
HRDC filed its motion to add the Risk Pool as a defendant a week after the Maine 
County Commissioners Association filed its answer identifying the Risk Pool as 
a separate entity.  The court did not err in concluding that the joinder related 
back to HRDC’s timely initial filing. 
B. 
The Award of Attorney Fees Based on a Finding of Bad Faith 
 
[¶21]  On appeal, the Risk Pool argues that the court erred in awarding 
HRDC attorney fees based on the court’s finding that the Risk Pool acted in bad 
faith in responding to HRDC’s FOAA request.2  See 1 M.R.S. § 409(4) (stating that 
 
2  To be awarded attorney fees under FOAA, HRDC must have also been a “substantially prevailing 
plaintiff.”  1 M.R.S. § 409(4) (2023).  The Risk Pool has not appealed the court’s finding that it violated 
FOAA or the order requiring the Risk Pool to disclose all the responsive documents in its possession.  
 
 
14 
in an appeal from an agency’s refusal of a records request or failure to allow 
inspection or copying of a record, “the court may award reasonable attorney’s 
fees and litigation expenses to the substantially prevailing plaintiff . . . if the 
court determines that the refusal . . . was committed in bad faith”).  We review 
de novo the court’s interpretation of the statute, and “we review the court’s 
factual findings for clear error.”  Blue Sky W., LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 
ME 137, ¶ 24, 215 A.3d 812.  “We review a court’s award of attorney fees for an 
abuse of discretion, mindful that the trial court is in the best position to observe 
the unique nature and tenor of the litigation as it relates to a request for 
attorney fees.”  Wilmington Tr., N.A. v. Berry, 2020 ME 95, ¶ 21, 237 A.3d 167 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶22]  In interpreting a statute, this Court “look[s] to the plain meaning 
of the statute, interpreting its language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent 
results and attempting to give all of its words meaning.”  Jackson Lumber & 
Millwork Co. v. Rockwell Homes, LLC, 2022 ME 4, ¶ 10, 266 A.3d 288.  The plain 
meaning of the language may be determined by its dictionary definition.  Id.  
 
See Citizens for a Strong N.H., Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 14-cv-487-LM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128118, at *8-10, 2016 WL 5108035, at *3 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 2016).  We conclude that HRDC is a 
substantially prevailing plaintiff, because HRDC demonstrated that the litigation was “necessary and 
had a causative effect on the disclosure of the requested information.”  Maynard v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 
986 F.2d 547, 568 (1st Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).  Without court intervention, HRDC 
would not have been able to obtain access to the documents it requested.  See id. at 568-69. 
 
15 
¶ 13.  If a statute is ambiguous, this Court may look to legislative intent and 
legislative history.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 
[¶23]  We have not previously construed the FOAA attorney fee 
provision.  Our starting point is in the purposes and framework of the statute.  
In enacting FOAA, the Legislature mandated that the statute “shall be liberally 
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes.”  1 M.R.S. § 401.  
“FOAA’s central purpose [is to ensure] the public’s right to hold the government 
accountable.”  Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ¶ 32, 871 A.2d 
523.  In furtherance of that purpose, FOAA “establishes a general right of the 
public to inspect and copy public records.”  Doyle v. Town of Falmouth, 2014 
ME 151, ¶ 8, 106 A.3d 1145; see 1 M.R.S. § 408-A.  When an agency denies or 
refuses a request or fails to allow access to a requested record, an aggrieved 
party may “appeal” to the Superior Court.  1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  Because a FOAA 
“appeal” can include the taking of evidence, “although the process is described 
statutorily as an appeal, the trial court actually conducts a trial de novo and 
does not act in an appellate capacity.”  Blue Sky W., LLC, 2019 ME 137, ¶ 24, 
215 A.3d 812 (quotation marks omitted).  “On such a challenge, the burden of 
proof to demonstrate just and proper cause is on the agency that denied 
inspection of the records.”  Id.  “If a court, after a review, with taking of 
 
16 
testimony and other evidence as determined necessary, determines such 
refusal, denial, or failure was not for just and proper cause, the court shall enter 
an order for disclosure.” 1 M.R.S. § 409(1). 
 
[¶24]  The Legislature did not include a definition of “bad faith” in the 
FOAA statute,3 and we have not been previously called on to define the term for 
purposes of FOAA.  A legal dictionary defines the term as “[d]ishonesty of belief, 
purpose, or motive.”  Bad faith, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Our 
jurisprudence on attorney fee awards provides guidance on what can 
constitute bad faith.  In general, “attorney fees may not be awarded as a 
sanction in the absence of significant bad faith on the part of a litigant or his 
agents,” Linscott v. Foy, 1998 ME 206, ¶ 17, 716 A.2d 1017.  In Linscott, we 
upheld a fee award, noting that a litigant’s “obstinate refusal to comply with a 
valid order” of court was “undertaken in bad faith” and was “abusive of the 
court and other parties.”  Id. ¶ 18.  In Cimenian v. Lumb, we upheld a fee award, 
 
3  Likewise, the legislation that preceded the statute did not provide any definition for bad faith 
but noted that the Superior Court had discretion to award attorney fees.  J. Standing Comm. on 
Judiciary, Legis. Doc. 679, 124th Leg., 1st Sess., at 21 (Me. 2009).  Although we look to the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for guidance in interpreting the Maine FOAA, Campbell v. Town 
of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me. 1995), the term “bad faith” does not appear in the federal 
statute.  FOIA permits courts to award attorney fees against the Government if the requesting party 
“has substantially prevailed.”  5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2023) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
118-10) (“The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other 
litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has 
substantially prevailed.”). 
 
17 
observing that “bringing an action without ‘even the slightest merit,’ [and] 
testifying untruthfully about matters relevant to the issues being litigated is bad 
faith.”  2008 ME 107, ¶ 13, 951 A.2d 817; cf. Aubuchon v. Blaisdell, 2023 ME 5, 
¶¶ 16-20, 288 A.3d 805 (awarding attorney fees as a sanction for a “frivolous 
and contumacious appeal”).  These decisions convey that bad faith in litigation 
can consist of dishonest conduct, but it can also include intentional acts or 
omissions that thwart the legal process and cause harm to other parties to the 
action. 
 
[¶25]  A similar analysis applies to identifying bad faith in the context of 
FOAA.  The legislative mandate for the FOAA to be “liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes,” 1 M.R.S. § 401, applies as 
forcefully to responding agencies as it does to courts.  An agency’s duty to apply 
FOAA in a manner that promotes the Act’s purposes calls for the agency to 
respond to a FOAA request with the purpose of facilitating the requester’s 
timely access to the requested records unless the agency has a good-faith basis 
for withholding or delaying access.  An agency’s failure to respond does not in 
itself establish bad faith.  See Campbell v. Town of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1135 
(Me. 1995) (“[T]he failure to respond to a Maine Freedom of Access request 
within the time frame set forth in the statute does not constitute a waiver of the 
 
18 
right to withhold the documents at issue.  Such a failure to respond is deemed 
a denial of the request for the documents.”).  On the other hand, proof that an 
agency has acted in the opposite manner to facilitating access to its public 
records—by responding to a request dishonestly, for example, or by 
deliberately and affirmatively impeding or thwarting valid requests for 
access—may be sufficient to prove bad faith. 
 
[¶26]  Here, HRDC’s June 18, 2021, FOAA request was quite specific: 
[A]ny documents showing payments disbursed to Jonathan 
Afanador and/or attorney John Wall[] by Kennebec County, Nathan 
Willhoite, and/or the Maine County Commissioners Association 
Self-Funded Risk Management Pool from January 1, 2021 to 
present.  This includes but is not limited to payment 
documentation related to the following case: Afanador v. Kennebec 
County Case No: 1:20-cv-00235-JDL. 
 
 
[¶27]  At the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Ulmer on 
behalf of the Risk Pool and HRDC’s counsel: 
Q : You have a claim file for the Afanador matter? 
A: That’s correct. 
Q: And the claim file has material related to the settlement of the 
Afanador matter? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Including the amount that was paid to Mr. Afanador? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you didn’t turn over any of those documents in that claim 
file, did you? 
A: Those documents were not requested in the context of this 
case. 
 
 
19 
 
[¶28]  In a previous series of questions, Ulmer was asked whether the 
Risk Pool had ever provided HRDC with copies of cancelled checks, payment 
receipts, ledgers, or “any documents showing how much money was paid to 
Mr. Afanador,” and he answered each question by saying that such documents 
had never been requested.  When HRDC asked, “You have documents like that 
in your possession, though, don’t you?” Ulmer answered, “I have documents 
that would reflect the payment.” 
 
[¶29]  The Risk Pool appears to proffer two reasons for failing to provide 
the documents in its possession reflecting payment of the settlement, neither 
of which withstands even cursory examination.  First, the Risk Pool claims that 
it thought HRDC wanted a settlement agreement that showed the dollar amount 
of the settlement and that it did not produce anything because there is no such 
document.  HRDC’s FOAA request, however, was not for a settlement 
agreement; it sought “any documents showing payments.”  When the Risk Pool 
initially responded by mentioning the settlement agreement that HRDC had 
already obtained, HRDC reiterated its original request by asking, “Do you have 
any documentation that shows the $30,000 amount?”  The Risk Pool ignored 
this reiteration of HRDC’s already clear request and then ignored a subsequent 
reiteration in the ACLU of Maine’s July 2, 2021, letter, which asked for 
 
20 
documents reflecting the settlement amount, such as “accounting records, a 
copy of a cover letter that was sent with payment, emails between individuals 
in county government and officials in the sheriff’s office, or memoranda 
suggesting that officers not engage in whatever conduct led to the filing of the 
litigation in the first place.”  Instead of providing the “documents that would 
reflect the payment” that Ulmer testified were in his claim file, the Risk Pool’s 
July 6, 2021, response to HRDC’s letter mischaracterized HRDC’s FOAA request 
as being for a release or agreement: “[I]t is my understanding that the signed 
release provided to [HRDC] by [Kennebec County] is the only settlement 
release document and I also advised [HRDC] of the settlement amount.” 
 
[¶30]  The Risk Pool’s second explanation for producing nothing in 
response to HRDC’s request appears to be that HRDC did not request the 
payment documents in Ulmer’s claim file in terms specific enough to suit the 
Risk Pool.  Ulmer testified that his claim file included documents reflecting 
payment, yet he testified that cancelled checks, payment receipts, and 
“documents showing how much money was paid to Mr. Afanador” were never 
requested.  HRDC obviously had no way to know whether the settlement 
amount was paid by check, wire transfer, credit or debit card, an online 
payment platform, or some other method of payment.  HRDC’s request for “any 
 
21 
documents showing payments disbursed to Jonathan Afanador” and “any 
documentation” clearly covered documents in the various categories that the 
Risk Pool claims were not requested. 
 
[¶31]  Instead of facilitating HRDC’s access to the responsive material in 
the Risk Pool’s possession, the Risk Pool did the very opposite, while 
pretending to facilitate: it mischaracterized HRDC’s FOAA request as being 
different and narrower than it was, ignored HRDC’s efforts to correct the 
mischaracterization, and deliberately withheld access to documents in its 
possession that clearly were responsive to the request and should have been 
disclosed.  As we learned at oral argument, although the court ordered the Risk 
Pool to provide HRDC with the responsive documents, it still has not done so 
because it continues to maintain that they were not requested.  We agree with 
the court that “the Risk Pool’s behavior was so deceptive and abusive of the 
FOAA process” that an award of attorney fees based on bad faith is warranted. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
Jeffrey T. Edwards, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP, 
Portland, for appellant Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded 
Risk Management Pool 
 
Carol J. Garvan, Esq. (orally), Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Anahita D. Sotoohi, 
Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland; and Loree 
Stark, Esq., Human Rights Defense Center, Boynton Beach, Florida, for appellee 
Human Rights Defense Center 
 
Shelby Leighton, Esq., and Jaqueline Aranda Osorno, Esq., Public Justice, 
Washington, D.C., for amici curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, Maine Freedom of Information Coalition, Maine Press Association, 
New England First Amendment Coalition, and Public Justice 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2021-131 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY