Title: Clark v. Leeman

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 170 
Docket: 
Yor-16-115 
Submitted  
  On Briefs: 
September 29, 2016 
Decided: 
November 29, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
TAYLOR CLARK 
 
v. 
 
MORGAN A. LEEMAN 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Taylor Clark appeals from the District Court’s (York, Janelle, J.) 
judgment granting Morgan Leeman’s motion to modify a parental rights and 
responsibilities order pertaining to their daughter, a minor child.  Because the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the modification, we 
affirm.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The court made the following findings, which are supported by the 
record.  On February 8, 2011, the District Court issued a parental rights and 
responsibilities judgment pertaining to Clark and Leeman’s minor child.  The 
judgment allocated parental rights and responsibilities to the parties, granted 
 
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primary physical residence to Clark, and made specific provisions for Leeman’s 
contact with the child.  
 
[¶3]  In the summer of 2014, Clark expressed his desire to relocate with 
the child from Massachusetts—where he resided at the time of the action—to 
Illinois.  Because the parties would be living a considerable distance apart, they 
sought and obtained a modification of the order to reflect this change in 
circumstances.  Clark, however, never took the child with him to Illinois.  
Instead, the child remained in Massachusetts, where she resided with her 
grandmother and attended the local elementary school.  Clark never told 
Leeman that the child had not moved, and he purposefully misled her about the 
child’s location.  As a result of Clark’s course of conduct, Leeman was unable to 
see the child for over five months.  
 
[¶4]  Upon learning that the child was living in Massachusetts, Leeman 
petitioned the court to modify the order.  After a hearing, the court granted 
Leeman’s motion and changed the child’s primary residence from being with 
Clark to being with Leeman.  In its order, the court concluded that Clark’s 
actions “were clearly not in the best interests of [the child] and, in fact, were 
detrimental to her.”  Specifically, the court determined that Clark’s dishonest 
acts “disrupted [the child’s] relationship with [Leeman] and required her to be 
 
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a part of this subterfuge from her mother.”  Clark has timely appealed.  See M.R. 
App. P. 2(b)(3).  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶5]  On appeal, Clark argues that the court erred in granting the 
modification, arguing that the change in her primary residence was not in the 
child’s best interest.  We review the trial court’s ultimate decision to modify a 
parental rights and responsibilities order for abuse of discretion or an error of 
law.  Pearson v. Ellis-Gross, 2015 ME 118, ¶ 4, 123 A.3d 223. 
B. 
The Child’s Best Interest 
 
[¶6]  In determining whether a proposed modification is in a child’s best 
interest, the trial court must analyze the evidence presented in light of the 
nineteen best interest factors enumerated in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2015).  
However, when deciding if a modification is in the child’s best interest, the court 
need not “robotically address[] every statutory factor.”  Nadeau v. Nadeau, 
2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108.  Rather, we will uphold the trial court’s 
conclusions regarding the child’s best interest “so long as it is otherwise evident 
that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest factors in mind.”  
Id.  Further, in the absence of a motion for additional findings of fact and 
 
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conclusions of law, it is well settled that we will “assume that there was 
competent evidence in the record, which the court considered, to support . . . the 
judgment.”  Coppola v. Coppola, 2007 ME 147, ¶ 25, 938 A.2d 786.  
 
[¶7]  Here, it is evident from the court’s order that it considered the 
relevant best interest factors in granting Leeman’s motion to modify.  The court 
found that Clark engaged in an ongoing pattern of deceitful conduct for the 
purpose of preventing the mother from having contact with the child for a 
period of over five months.  Clark’s dishonest behavior not only restricted 
Leeman’s access to the child, but it also required the child to be a part of this 
“subterfuge.”  Given these findings, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that a modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order 
was in the child’s best interest.  
 
[¶8]  Further, because Clark failed to request additional findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, we must assume that the court made all necessary 
findings to support the judgment.  See id.  
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Matthew W. Howell, Esq., Clark & Howell, LLC, York, for 
appellant Taylor Clark 
 
Kenneth P. Altshuler, Esq., Childs, Rundlett, Fifield & 
Altshuler, LLC, Portland, for appellee Morgan A. Leeman 
 
 
 
York District Court docket number FM-2009-119 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY