Title: Elizabeth Sullivan v. Landon Cole Sapp

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC02-2490
____________
ELIZABETH SULLIVAN, etc.,
Appellant,
vs.
LANDON COLE SAPP,
Appellee.
[January 15, 2004]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Sullivan v. Sapp, 829 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002),
in which the First District Court of Appeal expressly declared section
61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the Florida Statutes (2001) unconstitutional as violative of the
right of privacy as articulated in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
A review of the procedural history of this case reveals that Frances Adrienne
Sullivan gave birth to a son in September 1999.  Subsequently, she filed a paternity
1.  Sapp acknowledged under oath that he is the natural father of the child. 
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action against Landon Cole Sapp, "to determine custody, parental responsibility,
and child support under chapter 742, Florida Statutes."  The final judgment of
paternity was entered on March 14, 2001, which declared Sapp to be the natural
father of the child,1 and made further provision for Sullivan and Sapp to have
shared parental responsibility.  Additionally, the court determined that primary
physical residence of the child would be with his mother, while his father would
have the right to reasonable access and would be required to provide monetary
child support.  The trial court also determined and included a provision in the final
judgment that the father would be eligible to claim the dependency exemption for
the child for federal income tax purposes in even-numbered tax years, while the
mother would be eligible to claim the exemption in odd-numbered tax years. 
On March 20, 2001, the mother filed a timely motion for rehearing in the
paternity action.  The sole issue asserted for rehearing pertained to a clarification of
the provision relating to the eligibility of each parent to claim the child as a
dependent for federal income tax purposes.  No other aspect of the final judgment
was challenged on rehearing.  Tragically, before the trial court had the opportunity
to consider and rule on the motion for rehearing, the mother, Frances Adrienne
Sullivan, was killed in an automobile accident.  Following the mother's death, the
2.  The record is silent as to when the father assumed custody of the child
following the mother's death and why it was necessary for the maternal
grandmother to request court-ordered visitation.  However, because the
grandmother's motion was filed within one week of her daughter's death, it is
assumed that the father received immediate custody of the child.  On October 2,
2001, a hearing was held on the grandmother's motion to intervene, at which time
the judge suggested the parties attempt to settle their differences amicably.  The
record is again silent as to the outcome of any negotiations between the parties, or
if they even occurred. 
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child's maternal grandmother, Elizabeth Sullivan, filed a "Motion to Intervene and
for the Award of Reasonable Visitation to Grandparent," seeking to intervene in the
paternity action that was pending on rehearing and requesting grandparent visitation
rights pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the Florida Statutes (2001).2  Notably,
in her motion to intervene and for visitation rights, the grandmother only alleged
that, "The award of visitation for the maternal grandparent in this instance is in the
child's best interest."  This statement was not explained or expanded upon, nor did
the grandmother present any claim that the child would suffer any harm due to a
lack of interaction with the maternal grandmother or for any other reason.
In response to the grandmother's motion to intervene and for visitation rights,
the father filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees." 
In his motion, the father argued that the mother's death rendered the pending
motion for rehearing in the paternity action moot because the rehearing motion did
not in any way attack the validity of the final judgment of paternity and the only
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issue on rehearing pertained to economic matters related to the dependency tax
exemption.  Subsequently, Elizabeth Sullivan filed a "Motion to Substitute Parties,"
in which she requested that the court substitute her, as personal representative of
the estate of her daughter, as the petitioner in the paternity action in which rehearing
was pending.  In that motion, she affirmatively argued that the paternity action was
not extinguished by the death of the mother, and that there were substantive issues
remaining that required judicial resolution. 
A hearing was conducted on October 2, 2001, to consider arguments on the
grandmother's motion to intervene and motion for visitation, and on the father's
motion to dismiss.  Following this hearing, the trial court entered an order granting
the father's motion to dismiss, and dismissed the motion to intervene and for
visitation.  The court held that the issue in which the grandmother sought to
intervene, which related to the custody of and personal contact with the child, was
no longer in dispute after the mother's death and was not the subject of pending
rehearing consideration.  The only question pending on rehearing was directed to
economic considerations, and therefore there was no viable pending matter at issue
in which she could intervene.  The trial court relied upon Union Central Life
Insurance Co. v. Carlisle, 566 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), aff’d, 593 So. 2d
505 (Fla. 1992), to support its holding that the grandmother was not entitled to
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intervene in the paternity action.  Additionally, the court determined that the ultimate
relief sought by the grandmother, namely visitation rights, was not available to her
based upon this Court's holdings in other grandparent visitation cases, such as Von
Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998), and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271
(Fla. 1996).
On October 26, 2001, the grandmother filed a motion for rehearing.  The trial
court held another hearing on November 27, 2001, to address all of the issues
remaining between the parties.  The trial court issued its final order on January 22,
2002, granting the grandmother's motion to substitute parties, but denying both the
motion for rehearing in the original paternity action, which had been filed before the
mother's death, and the grandmother's motion for rehearing directed to her
intervention and for the award of grandparent visitation.
On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court's ruling, and held that "the
grandmother's motion was contrary to Florida's right to privacy provision, Article I,
Section 23 of the Florida Constitution."  Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  In its
opinion, the district court did not address the issue as to whether the grandmother
even had a right to intervene in the underlying paternity action.  Instead, the court
only addressed the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of section
61.13(2)(b)2.c., which was relied upon by the grandmother in her motion for
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intervention and visitation.  The district court held that this case is controlled by
Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2000), in which this Court
determined that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), which attempted to
confer standing on grandparents to request custody based solely on the best
interests of the child, violated the natural parent's fundamental right to privacy.  See
Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  In addition to Richardson, the district court noted that
the reasoning outlined in Beagle, Von Eiff, and Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla.
2000), supported the conclusion that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. "is facially
unconstitutional in that it intrudes on the father's fundamental privacy right to raise
his child free from governmental interference."  Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  A
timely request for review by this Court followed.
Initially, we must address whether the death of the mother, after entry of the
final judgment in the paternity action, but while the mother's motion for rehearing
concerning economic issues was pending, rendered the entire action moot and
divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion for rehearing or to
render any further orders in the action.  Under the controlling authority of this
Court's decision in Gaines v. Sayne, 764 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2000), we hold that the
paternity judgment was not voided by the death of the mother and, further, the
cause of action was not rendered totally moot by the mother's death.  Therefore,
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the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider the economic matters pending in the
motion for rehearing.
In Gaines, we considered "whether the death of a party after entry of a final
decree of dissolution of marriage but prior to a decision on a timely motion for
rehearing automatically voids the dissolution, abates the dissolution proceeding,
and deprives the court of jurisdiction to render any further orders in the matter." 
764 So. 2d at 579.  There we held, "[T]he entry of a written judgment of dissolution
is not voided by the subsequent death of a party where any remaining issues
properly raised on rehearing or appeal relate solely to matters collateral to the
adjudication of dissolution."  Id. at 586.  Noting that on rehearing neither party had
contested the finding that the marriage was broken or the trial court's adjudication
of dissolution based upon that finding, this Court reasoned that, "all judicial labor
on the issue of dissolution had ended upon the entry of the final judgment.  Under
these circumstances, to void the dissolution decree on the basis that [the wife] died
while a motion for rehearing raising other issues was pending would be contrary to
the parties' undisputed intent to be divorced and could lead to unjust and
inequitable results."  Id.
Consistency of logic and jurisprudence requires that we likewise hold here
that the death of the mother after entry of the final paternity judgment, but while the
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motion for rehearing was pending as to only a single economic matter, did not void
the paternity judgment, render the motion for rehearing moot, or divest the trial
court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining issues between the parties.  As in
Gaines, the trial court below had entered the final judgment in the paternity action,
and the motion for rehearing, concerning only the tax issue, had been filed prior to
the death of the mother.  See Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  On rehearing, the mother
challenged only a collateral economic issue, namely which parent would have the
right to claim the child as a dependant for federal income tax purposes, and did not
challenge the trial court's findings regarding paternity, residency, visitation, child
support, or any other substantive issue.  See id.  In accordance with Gaines,
because the issue presented on rehearing related solely to the tax matters collateral
to the adjudication of paternity, the basic final judgment as to the substantive issues
was not voided upon the mother's death, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to
consider the collateral economic matters that were pending at the time of the
mother's death.
We next turn to the main issue presented in this case—whether a
grandmother may intervene in a paternity action to request visitation with her
grandchild.  Unquestionably, any time a party seeks to intervene in a cause of
action, a two-step process is implicated.  First, the court must address whether
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intervention is proper.  Only after the court has determined that intervention is
proper does it become necessary to move to the second step, which involves
consideration of the merits of the intervenor's claim.  This Court has promulgated
the criteria for intervention which must be satisfied before a party will be permitted
to intervene in a cause of action.  See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.
2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992).
The parties, in their respective briefs, have seemingly overlooked the first
step of the analysis, and instead have proceeded to only debate the constitutionality
of section 61.13(2)(b)2.c.  Likewise, the district court addressed the issues as
presented by the parties and did not address whether intervention was even proper
in this case, and instead focused solely upon the constitutionality of the statute. 
See Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  The trial court correctly recognized the inherent
two-step process involved here.  In the trial court's order dismissing the
grandmother's motion to intervene, the court noted that intervention was
inappropriate because the issue in which the grandmother sought to intervene,
namely visitation, was no longer a viable question upon the mother's death after
entry of the final judgment.  The only issue pending on rehearing was economic in
nature, and therefore there was no disputed substantive visitation matter in which
the grandmother could intervene.  Therefore, the trial court properly addressed the
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question presented by first analyzing whether intervention by the grandmother was
even permissible, and determined that it was not. 
In Union Central, this Court reiterated the test to determine the nature of the
interest that would entitle a party to intervene.  There, we clearly stated:
[T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene . . . must be in the
matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment.  In other words, the interest must be that
created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a
claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the
subject of litigation. 
593 So. 2d at 507 (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 78 So. 14, 15 (Fla. 1918)).  The
grandmother, attempting to intervene in the paternity action post-judgment, cannot
satisfy this standard.  As noted by the trial court, at the time the grandmother filed
her motion to intervene, the only issue remaining between the parties was economic
in nature.  The substantive dispute with regard to issues of paternity, custody, child
support, and, most importantly, visitation were no longer at issue; the mother's
motion for rehearing following the trial court's judgment in the paternity action
related only to the economic dispute as addressed through tax benefits.  The
interest—visitation—which the grandmother was attempting to assert was no longer
"the matter in litigation," as required by Union Central.  Therefore, because the
grandmother could not satisfy this Court's intervention test, the trial court properly
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denied the grandmother's motion to intervene.
Although this case may be resolved exclusively on the basis of the
grandmother's failure to satisfy the intervention test, we deem it necessary to further
address the decision of the First District, holding section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the
Florida Statutes unconstitutional, to support and maintain uniformity in Florida law. 
The First District's decision is in express and direct conflict with that of the Fourth
District in Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), wherein that
court held that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. does not violate the right of privacy and is
within constitutional parameters.  The lower courts are currently at odds with regard
to this issue of great importance to the citizens of Florida, and it is the obligation of
this Court to provide guidance to and uniformity for the lower courts as we address
this conflict.  We have noted, carefully studied, thoughtfully considered, but
ultimately conclude that we must reject the dissenting view which would counsel
that we should not address the very issues upon which the foundation of our
jurisdiction is based.  
The fundamental constitutional issues presented to this Court for review and
resolution today impact Florida's children and Florida's families.  This Court has
implemented a policy for itself and all Florida courts that we should and must
resolve these disputes involving children and families as expeditiously as possible
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to remove any doubt and uncertainty.  We must recognize that Florida's families
have neither unlimited financial resources nor unlimited emotional capital to invest in
continuing unnecessary legal proceedings.  It is our view that it would be
irresponsible and contrary to our well-established policy to decline resolution of the
very issue upon which our jurisdiction for this case is predicated under the
circumstances presented here.  
We decline to follow the dissenting view, which would force these parties to
proceed through the entire legal process a second time only to relitigate the
fundamental underlying issue which has driven these proceedings to this ultimate
result and has already been considered at each level of our judicial system.   We
choose to resolve the issue and not force these parties and other Florida families to
unnecessarily expend the financial and emotional costs associated with these
unfortunate disputes.  We are comfortable that the controlling authority upon which
we rely to address this constitutional issue fully supports our decision and that we
have in no way tarnished the formalistic doctrine upon which those in the dissent
would rely to reject resolution of the fundamental issue before us, which would,
most assuredly, have a continuing negative impact upon our children and families.
We fully recognize that when a case may be resolved on grounds other than
constitutional, the Court will ordinarily refrain from proceeding to decide the
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constitutional question.  See Metro. Dade County Transit Auth. v. State Dep't of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 283 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. 1973); In re Estate of
Sale, 227 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1969).  However, we also recognize the well-settled
principle that "once an appellate court has jurisdiction it may, if it finds it necessary
to do so, consider any item that may affect the case."  Westerheide v. State, 831
So. 2d 93, 105 (Fla. 2002); see also Cantor v. Davis, 489 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1986);
Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. 1982).  When, as here, the
constitutional conflict issue is the basis for our jurisdiction, disposition of the
constitutional question will aid the lower courts, afford guidance, serve to resolve
and eliminate a conflict between the district courts, and advance the underlying
policy of removing uncertainty for children and families, we find it necessary to
consider the constitutional issue.  See State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538, 541 (Fla.
1977) (electing to consider the constitutionality of a statute, although the question
presented could effectively be resolved on other grounds, where consideration of
the constitutionality of the statute would aid in the disposition of future proceedings
in the lower courts); Green v. State ex rel. Phipps,166 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1964)
(deciding to examine the constitutional question, even though case could be
decided on another ground, because the case involved a matter of great public
importance, namely the extent of the taxing power of the state); Ex parte Lewis, 135
3.  The portion of the statute reading, "nor do grandparents have legal
standing as 'contestants' as defined in s. 61.1306" was repealed from section
61.13(2)(b)2.c. during the 2003 Legislative session.  See ch. 2003-5, § 2, Laws of
Fla. 
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So. 147, 149-50 (Fla. 1931) (recognizing that the Supreme Court of Florida, as well
as the Supreme Court of the United States, "has at times given its opinion
concerning matters of great importance involving important principles of
constitutional law affecting the powers and duties of public officials, even though a
decision on the constitutional points in the particular case was unnecessary to
dispose of it"). 
Section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. provides:  
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights with a
minor child if it is in the child's best interest.  Grandparents have legal
standing to seek judicial enforcement of such an award.  This section
does not require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of
dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor do grandparents have legal
standing as "contestants" as defined in s. 61.1306.  A court may not
order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court
solely for the purpose of permitting visitation by the grandparents.
§ 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. (2001).3  Adopted in 1978, this subsection specifically
applies in the dissolution of marriage context.  However, in 1984, the Legislature
passed a "Grandparental Visitation Rights" statute, codified in chapter 752 Florida
Statutes (2003).  Until recent amendments, section 752.01 provided:
(1) The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a
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minor child, award reasonable rights of visitation to the grandparent
with respect to the child when it is in the best interest of the minor
child if:
(a) One or both parents of the child are deceased;
(b) The marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved;
(c) A parent of the child has deserted the child;
(d) The minor child was born out of wedlock and not later
determined to be a child born within wedlock as provided in s.
742.091; or
(e) The minor is living with both natural parents who are still
married to each other whether or not there is a broken relationship
between either or both parents of the minor child and the
grandparents, and either or both parents have used their parental
authority to prohibit a relationship between the minor child and the
grandparents.
§ 752.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).  
This Court has considered the constitutionality of section 752.01 on several
occasions, and has determined all but two of the provisions of this section to be
unconstitutional as violative of Florida's right to privacy.  In Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996), we held section 752.01(1)(e) unconstitutional.  Utilizing
the compelling state interest standard, we stated: 
The challenged paragraph does not require the State to
demonstrate a harm to the child prior to the award of grandparental
visitation rights.  Based upon the privacy provision in the Florida
Constitution, we hold that the State may not intrude upon the parents'
fundamental right to raise their children except in cases where the child
is threatened with harm. . . . Without a finding of harm, we are unable
to conclude that the State demonstrates a compelling interest.  We
hold that, in the absence of an explicit requirement of harm or
detriment, the challenged paragraph is facially flawed.  
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Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1276-77.  Subsequently, in Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1998), we adhered to the holding in Beagle, reasoning: "Neither the
legislature nor the courts may properly intervene in parental decisionmaking absent
significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from those decisions."  Id. at
514.  The Von Eiff Court declared section 752.01(1)(a) facially unconstitutional, as
it did not "require a showing of demonstrable harm to the child before the State's
intrusion upon the parent's fundamental rights."  Id.  Notably, the facts of Von Eiff
are substantially similar to those presented here.  In Von Eiff, the biological mother
of the child died shortly after the child's birth.  See id. at 511.  The father of the
child, along with his new wife, who had adopted the child, severely limited contact
between the child and her biological maternal grandparents.  See id.  The
grandparents eventually filed a petition for unsupervised visitation with the child,
pursuant to section 752.01(1)(a).  See id.  One important difference between
section 752.01(1)(a), the statute relied upon in Von Eiff, and section
61.13(2)(b)2.c., is that section 752.01(1) mandates that the court "shall" award
visitation when it is in the best interests of the child, see § 752.01(1), Fla. Stat.
(1995), while section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. holds that courts "may award the
grandparents visitation rights with a minor child if it is in the child's best interest." §
61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).  This difference is of little
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consequence, however, as both statutes require only a best interest of the child
standard, and do not necessitate the essential showing of harm to the child as a
result of a lack of grandparent visitation as a condition precedent for such
intervention.
Most recently, this Court held section 752.01(1)(d) unconstitutional in Saul v.
Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000).  Saul involved a child of an unmarried couple. 
See Saul, 753 So. 2d at 27.  As in the case presented here, the mother died shortly
after the child's birth and the father assumed full custody of the child.  See id.  A
dispute arose between the maternal grandparents and the father with regard to
visitation, and the grandparents filed an action seeking visitation.  See id.  Analyzing
that section 752.01(1)(d) "suffers from the same constitutional infirmity as
subsection (a) in Von Eiff," this Court held subsection (d) unconstitutional.  Id. at
28-29.  Importantly, in Saul we highlighted that in Von Eiff we found no difference
between the rights of privacy of a natural parent in an "intact family" and the rights
of a widowed parent.  See id. at 28.  One cannot properly distinguish Beagle and
Von Eiff on the basis that in those cases the parents had once been married, while
Saul involved an out-of-wedlock child.  See id.  Following the rationale of the
Fourth District in Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), aff’d, 753
So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000), we reasoned, "If the father of a child born into a marriage
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has a right of privacy where the biological mother is deceased, which was the
holding in Von Eiff, it follows that the father of an out-of-wedlock child has the
same right of privacy."  Saul, 753 So. 2d at 28 (quoting Brunetti, 724 So. 2d at
143). 
While the remaining provisions of section 752.01(1), namely subsections (b)
and (c), have not expressly been declared unconstitutional by this Court, this Court
did hold that a trial court order, which granted a grandmother visitation pursuant to
section 752.01(1)(b), "directly contravenes the [mother's] right to privacy and
decision-making in rearing her child."  Belair v. Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla.
2000).  On remand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized and expressly
held that section 752.01(1)(b) "fails to survive the compelling state interest test
required by Beagle and is facially unconstitutional as it impermissibly infringes on
privacy rights protected by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution."  Belair
v. Drew, 776 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Lonon v. Ferrell,
739 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (declaring section 752.01(1)(b) facially
unconstitutional).
Finally, the First District determined that the present case is controlled by this
Court's holding in Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2000).  See
Sullivan, 829 So. 2d at 952.  In Richardson, this Court held that section 61.13(7) of
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the Florida Statutes "is facially unconstitutional in vesting custody rights in others
because it violates a natural parent's fundamental right to rear his or her child."  766
So. 2d at 1037.  Section 61.13(7) provided: "In any case where the child is actually
residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded
custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as
having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are
in the best interest of the child."  § 61.13(7), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Relying upon Von
Eiff and Beagle, we held, in Richardson, that there was no compelling state interest
to justify the violation of a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child
inherent in enforcement of section 61.13(7).  See Richardson, 766 So. 2d at 1038. 
There, we concluded:
In effect, section 61.13(7) treats grandparents and natural parents alike
by giving grandparents custody rights equal to those of a parent, and
allows courts to make its custody determination between parents and
grandparents based solely on the best interest of the child standard. 
The grant of such rights to grandparents is unconstitutional under our
reasoning in Von Eiff because it also interferes with the natural parent's
fundamental right to privacy in rearing one's own child, a right this
Court found to exist under article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution.  See Von Eiff.  Hence, we find no valid basis to
distinguish the custody statute we consider here from the visitation
statute we considered in Von Eiff and Beagle, except for the fact the
custody statute is even more intrusive upon a parent's rights.
Id. at 1039-40.  Clearly, this Court has consistently held all statutes that have
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attempted to compel visitation or custody with a grandparent based solely on the
best interest of the child standard, without the required showing of harm to the
child, to be unconstitutional.  We agree with the district court below and likewise
hold that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as
violative of Florida's right of privacy because it fails to require a showing of harm
to the child prior to compelling and forcing the invasion of grandparent visitation
into the parental privacy rights.
Section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. provides that a court "may award the grandparents
visitation rights with a minor child if it is in the child's best interest."  
§ 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. (2001).  This provision does not require a showing of
the essential element of harm to the child should visitation with a grandparent be
denied.  Here, the grandmother did not claim in any pleading and has not asserted
that any harm will come to the child if visitation with her does not occur.  Under the
authority of this Court's holdings in Beagle, Von Eiff, Saul, and Richardson, we
hold that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., which fails to require a showing of harm to the
affected child, does not further a compelling state interest, and, therefore, it is
facially unconstitutional as violative of a parent's fundamental right of privacy.
The Fourth District's decision in Spence is an anomaly among decisions
from Florida courts and is outdated because it holds that a grandparent visitation
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statute does not violate the Florida Constitution.  In Spence, which was decided
prior to our decisions in Von Eiff, Saul, and Richardson, but subsequent to Beagle,
the Fourth District held that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. does not violate privacy rights
because the circumstances concerned parents who were involved in a paternity
action, and, according to the Fourth District, had thereby waived their right to
privacy.  See Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998.  The Fourth District reasoned, "Because
the parents have already abandoned their right of familial privacy by bringing their
dispute before the court, the court's further consideration of whether grandparental
visitation is in the best interest of the child is not violative of the right to privacy." 
Id.  The court's analysis pertaining to waiver of the right of privacy has, however,
been questioned in subsequent decisions.  See Lonon, 739 So. 2d at 652 n.3;
Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (Klein, J., concurring
specially).  
Additionally, the reasoning in Spence has been further completely
undermined by this Court's decisions in Von Eiff, Saul, and Richardson.  Spence
held that "matters involving custody and visitation in paternity actions should be
based on the best interest of the child, as they are in dissolution proceedings."  705
So. 2d at 998.  However, every statute considered by this Court involving visitation
or custody of a child by a grandparent has been deemed unconstitutional because
4.  We decline to address the remaining issue asserted by the petitioner,
namely whether the trial court properly denied the grandmother's motion to have a
guardian ad litem appointed for the child, as it is unrelated to the issue upon which
this Court's jurisdiction is based.
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none included harm to the child as the required standard; the best interest of the
child standard is not sufficient.  See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1276-77; Von Eiff, 720
So. 2d at 514; Saul, 753 So. 2d at 29; Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1039-40.  Most
notably, in Richardson, grandparents moved to intervene in a modification of
custody action, seeking custody of a child pursuant to section 61.13(7), and this
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional in part because the statute failed to
require evidence of demonstrable harm to the child.  See 766 So. 2d at 1039-40. 
The rationale of Spence is simply contrary to the decisions of this Court in all of
the cases considering the issue of grandparent visitation and custody in this
context, and, therefore, it is disapproved.  A father who has been a party in
paternity litigation has no lesser right to privacy under this state's constitution than a
parent who has not been before a court.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the First District to the
extent the lower court properly held section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. unconstitutional, and
disapprove the Fourth District's holding in Spence v. Stewart to the extent it
conflicts with our holding herein.4
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It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
CANTERO, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANTERO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The threshold issue in this case is whether a grandparent may properly
intervene in a paternity action after a final judgment of paternity has been entered
and the case is pending rehearing solely on an economic issue.  The majority
concludes that “because the grandmother could not satisfy this Court’s intervention
test, the trial court properly denied the grandmother’s motion to intervene.” 
Majority op. at 11.  I concur.  Having decided that dispositive issue, however, the
analysis should end.  The majority concedes that “this case may be resolved
exclusively on the basis of the grandmother’s failure to satisfy the intervention test,”
majority op. at 11, yet “deem[s] it necessary” to address the constitutional issue so
that it could “support and maintain uniformity in Florida law.”  Id.  I would not
succumb to this temptation.
Since at least 1888, this Court has subscribed to a principle of judicial
5.  Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L.
Rev. 1003, 1025 (1994) (referring to the prudential rule of avoiding constitutional
questions as the “last resort rule”).
6.  See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458, 459-60 (Fla. 2003); State v.
Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995); Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409, 412
(Fla. 1986); Floridians United for Safe Energy, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 475
So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 1985); State v. Covington, 392 So. 2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla.
1981); Briklod v. State, 365 So. 2d 1023, 1027 (Fla. 1978); Singletary v. State, 322
So. 2d 551, 552-53 (Fla. 1975); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla.
1974); Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade, 287 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 1973);
Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. 1973); Williston Highlands Dev. Corp. v.
Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1973); Metro. Dade County Transit Auth. v.
State Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 283 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. 1973);
Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857, 858 (Fla. 1971); In re Estate of Sale, 227 So.
2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1969); Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 1965); N. Am.
Co. v. Green, 120 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 1959); State v. Bruno, 104 So. 2d 588,
590 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 1951);
Peters v. Brown, 55 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1951); Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of
Sanford, Inc., 40 So. 2d 555, 559 (Fla. 1949); State ex rel. v. Crim v. Juvenal, 159
So. 663, 664 (Fla. 1935); Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, 135 So. 885, 887 (Fla.
1931); Lippman v. State, 73 So. 357, 361 (Fla. 1916); State v. Parker, 49 So. 124,
125 (Fla. 1909); Ex parte Bailey, 23 So. 552, 555 (Fla. 1897); Franklin County v.
State ex rel. Patton, 3 So. 471, 472 (Fla. 1888).
7.  See, e.g., M.Z. v. State, 747 So. 2d 978, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State
v. Burdette, 826 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Dep't of Revenue v.
Good, 398 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); In re Forfeiture of One Cessna
337H Aircraft, 475 So. 2d 1269, 1270-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Crawford v. State,
662 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
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restraint sometimes called the “last resort rule,”5 in which we avoid considering a
constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional
grounds.6  The district courts of appeal also subscribe to the rule.7  The policy
8. See Art. V, § 3(b)1, Fla. Const. (providing for review as of right to this
Court from decisions of the district courts of appeal declaring unconstitutional a
state statute).
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behind the rule stems from “respect for other branches and levels of government,
an awareness of the limitations of judicial power, sensitivity to the burdens of a
constitutional adjudication, and appreciation that others may provide a more useful
answer.”  O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n., 624 A.2d 578, 582 (N.J.
1993); see also Curless v. County of Clay, 395 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) (noting that the policy underlying the rule “emanates from the judicial
deference to the legislative branch of government”).  Because the policy
justifications for the rule are just as relevant today as they were in 1888, we should
continue to avoid constitutional questions when other grounds for decision exist.  
As the majority notes, the district court in this case decided the constitutional
issue without even considering the nonconstitutional ground.  Therefore, we should
quash the First District’s opinion and decide the case solely on the
nonconstitutional ground, as the district court should have done.  By deciding this
issue now, simply because the district court did so, however, we actually
encourage appellate courts to decide such issues.  If the only consequence of
unnecessarily declaring a statute unconstitutional is that this Court, on what will then
be mandatory review from such a decision,8 resolves the issue as well, we provide
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no disincentive for reaching such issues and we quietly but inevitably eviscerate the
last resort rule.
The majority’s main reason for reaching the constitutional issue is the need to
“support and maintain uniformity in Florida law.”  Majority op. at 11.  I am
unconvinced that such a need exists in this case.  In the decision below, the First
District held section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. unconstitutional.  See Sullivan v. Sapp, 829
So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  The Fourth District has held the same
section constitutional.  Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
No other court has decided the issue.  Therefore, by simply quashing the decision
below on the ground that the court never should have reached the issue, we remove
any conflict.  The majority’s other asserted bases for reaching the constitutional
issue—that it “will aid lower courts” and “afford guidance”—essentially would
allow us to discard the last resort rule and review constitutional issues whenever we
desire.  Majority op. at 13.  After all, any opinion we issue about the
constitutionality of a statute will always “aid lower courts” and “afford
guidance”—that is one of the main purposes of any opinion.  Those reasons
cannot, of themselves, justify a departure from the last resort rule.
In contrast to the veritable library of cases adhering to the last resort rule, the
majority cites three cases that did not: State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977),
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Green v. State ex rel. Phipps, 166 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1964), and Ex parte Lewis, 135
So. 147 (Fla. 1931).  Majority op. at 13-14.  The most recent of these cases is
twenty-six years old.  Given that we have since several times adhered to the rule, I
can only conclude that either these cases are anomalies in our jurisprudence or that
they allow an exception to the doctrine in extremely limited circumstances.  If the
former, we should adhere to the overwhelming number of other cases that counsel
restraint.  If the latter, we should at least define the parameters of the exception so
that we do not simply reach constitutional issues whenever we find a particular
statute distasteful.  In fact, in Ex parte Lewis, on which the majority relies, the
Court only reached the issue because it upheld the statute.  135 So. at 150 (noting
that “if our conclusions on the constitutionality of the statute were adverse to its
validity, we would, for the reasons just referred to, hesitate to so declare, in view of
the fact that this case might be disposed of on other grounds which would render
such declaration unnecessary”).
The majority also cites cases recognizing "the well-settled principle that 'once
an appellate court has jurisdiction it may, if it finds it necessary to do so, consider
any item that may affect the case.' "  Majority op. at 13.  I have no quarrel with that
proposition; in fact, it is the very basis for our considering the grandmother's failure
to satisfy the requirements for intervention.  That is not the point.  The last resort
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rule works as a rule of prudence, to refrain from considering a constitutional issue
even though we have the authority to do so. 
For these reasons, I cannot fully join in the majority opinion.
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal - Statutory or Constitutional Invalidity
First District - Case No. 1D02-450
George T. Reeves of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, P.A., Madison,
Florida,
for Appellant
Harvey E. Baxter, Gainesville, Florida,
for Appellee