Title: Berry v. F&S Financial Marketing, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
DENISE S. BERRY 
v.  Record No. 050702  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   March 3, 2006 
F&S FINANCIAL MARKETING, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we once again address the interplay 
between a plaintiff’s right to a voluntary nonsuit under 
Code § 8.01-380 and the bar against judgment in former Rule 
3:3(c).1  Because the plaintiff in this case requested a 
nonsuit prior to the defendant’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to satisfy the one-year service of process 
requirement set forth in Rule 3:3(c) and Code § 8.01-275.1, 
we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting 
the nonsuit. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
F&S Financial Marketing, Inc. (F&S), commenced this 
action to obtain a judgment against Denise S. Strother, now 
                     
1 In relevant part, former Rule 3:3(c) stated that 
“[n]o judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was 
served with process more than one year after the 
commencement of the action against him unless the court 
finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence 
to have timely service on him.”  Part Three of the Rules 
were repealed and replaced with new rules which became 
effective on January 1, 2006.  The substance of the quoted 
language is now set forth in Rule 3:5(e).  All references 
in this opinion to Rule 3:3(c) are to former Rule 3:3(c). 
 
2
Denise S. Berry (Berry), for the balance due under a 
contract to finance the purchase of a motor vehicle.2  On 
June 27, 2002, F&S filed a warrant in debt against Berry in 
the General District Court of Albemarle County.  F&S 
effected service of process through the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.3  The general district court subsequently 
entered a default judgment against Berry.4  F&S then filed a 
suggestion for summons in garnishment, and a garnishment 
summons was issued against Berry and her employer. 
After receiving the garnishment summons, which was the 
first time Berry became aware of F&S’s judgment against 
her, Berry filed a motion in the general district court to 
set aside the default judgment, claiming that the service 
of process through the Secretary of the Commonwealth was 
invalid.  The general district court granted Berry’s motion 
and vacated the default judgment, finding that it “was void 
for lack of jurisdiction.”  The general district court 
concluded that F&S did not exercise due diligence to locate 
                     
2 After payments due under the financing contract were 
not timely made, F&S repossessed and sold the motor 
vehicle. 
3 Prior to filing the warrant in debt on June 27, 2002, 
F&S had filed two other warrants in debt against Berry.  
They were both returned without being served on Berry and 
contained the notation “not found.” 
4 In the same proceeding, F&S also obtained a default 
judgment against Berry’s now former spouse.  That judgment 
is not before the Court in this appeal. 
 
3
Berry and service of process through the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, therefore, was not effective.  See Code 
§ 8.01-329. 
Immediately following the general district court’s 
oral ruling setting aside the default judgment, F&S orally 
moved for a nonsuit.  After F&S requested the nonsuit, 
Berry filed a written motion to dismiss the action with 
prejudice, asserting that the “warrants and other pleadings 
and papers contained in the file of this case show that no 
legal service of process was had on said Denise S. 
(Strother) Berry within one year . . . as required by law.” 
The general district court granted F&S a nonsuit.  
Berry subsequently appealed from that judgment to the 
Circuit Court for Albemarle County.  See Code § 16.1-106.  
In the circuit court, the parties stipulated the relevant 
facts and agreed that the sole issue before the circuit 
court was whether F&S was entitled to a voluntary nonsuit 
or whether Berry was entitled to a dismissal with 
prejudice. 
 
By letter opinion, the circuit court concluded that 
F&S was entitled to a voluntary nonsuit because F&S had not 
previously taken a nonsuit and there was no counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim pending that would 
prevent the taking of a nonsuit.  The circuit court further 
 
4
held that, contrary to Berry’s argument, a defendant has no 
vested right in a Rule 3:3(c) defense.  The circuit court 
entered a final order granting F&S a nonsuit.5  We awarded 
Berry this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Berry contends that the circuit court erred 
in granting F&S a nonsuit and refusing to dismiss the 
action with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
3:3(c).6  Berry argues that the one-year service of process 
requirement set out in Rule 3:3(c) and Code § 8.01-275.17 
mandates a dismissal of the action against her because she 
was not served with process within that time period and the 
general district court found that F&S had not exercised due 
diligence to locate Berry.  Consequently, according to 
Berry, she has a “vested property right” in a dismissal of 
this action.  Relying on the decision in Dennis v. Jones, 
                     
5 The circuit court’s final order also denied Berry’s 
motion for reconsideration. 
6 For the text of Rule 3:3(c), see supra note 1. 
7 Code § 8.01-275.1 provides that 
[s]ervice of process in an action or suit 
within twelve months of commencement of the 
action or suit against a defendant shall be 
timely as to that defendant.  Service of 
process on a defendant more than twelve 
months after the suit or action was 
commenced shall be timely upon a finding by 
the court that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service made on the 
defendant. 
 
5
240 Va. 12, 393 S.E.2d 390 (1990), Berry argues that the 
circuit court, therefore, erred in granting F&S a nonsuit.  
We do not agree. 
 
The provisions of Code § 8.01-380 permit a plaintiff 
to take one nonsuit as a matter of right provided that the 
plaintiff “does so before a motion to strike the evidence 
has been sustained or before the jury retires from the bar 
or before the action has been submitted to the court for 
decision.”  Code § 8.01-380(A); accord Ford Motor Co. v. 
Jones, 266 Va. 404, 406, 587 S.E.2d 579, 580 (2003); 
Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 514, 499 S.E.2d 279, 281 
(1998).  When F&S moved for a nonsuit, none of the 
specified statutory events that would preclude a nonsuit 
had occurred.  After the general district court announced 
its ruling that the default judgment was void for lack of 
jurisdiction over Berry, see Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 
51, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001) (“[a]n order is void ab 
initio if entered by a court in the absence of jurisdiction 
. . . over the parties”), the parties were restored to 
their original positions as though the default judgment had 
never been entered, cf. Ford Motor Co., 266 Va. at 407, 587 
S.E.2d at 581 (“[a]fter a reversal of a circuit court’s 
judgment and remand for a new trial, the litigants are 
restored to their original rights as though no previous 
 
6
trial had occurred, including the right to . . . nonsuit a 
case”).  F&S then immediately moved for a nonsuit.  At that 
point in the proceedings, Berry had neither filed her 
motion to dismiss under Rule 3:3(c) nor yielded it to the 
trial court for decision.  In fact, both parties submitted 
memoranda to the trial court after Berry filed her motion 
to dismiss.  See Liddle v. Phipps, 263 Va. 391, 394, 559 
S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002) (“when further submissions from the 
parties are contemplated, a matter has not been finally 
yielded for decision or finally determined”); compare 
Atkins v. Rice, 266 Va. 328, 331-32, 585 S.E.2d 550, 551-52 
(2003) (motion to dismiss under the one-year service rule 
bars the taking of a nonsuit after submission of the 
parties’ briefs to the court and completion of oral 
argument on the motion).  Thus, there was no statutory 
impediment to preclude F&S from exercising its right to a 
voluntary nonsuit. 
 
Contrary to Berry’s argument, this Court has 
consistently held that a plaintiff has a right to a 
voluntary nonsuit even though proper service of process has 
not been made upon the defendant.  Waterman v. Halverson, 
261 Va. 203, 208, 540 S.E.2d 867, 869 (2001); McManama v. 
Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32, 458 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1995); Clark v. 
Butler Aviation-Washington Nat’l, Inc., 238 Va. 506, 511, 
 
7
385 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1989).  Berry, nevertheless, argues on 
brief that her “appearance and motion to set aside the 
default judgment constituted personal service of process 
for the purpose of moving for dismissal under Rule 3:3.”  
This Court, however, held in Clark that the plaintiff there 
was entitled to a nonsuit, as well as a tolling of the 
statute of limitations under Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), even 
though the defendant had been served with process more than 
one year after commencement of the action.  238 Va. at 511-
12, 385 S.E.2d at 849-50.  Similarly, in McManama, we 
concluded that 
the trial court erroneously placed limitations on 
the plaintiff’s right to the voluntary nonsuit 
when it ruled that defendant “must first had to 
have been served with process, must have been 
before a court with jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s person, and the defendant must have 
been given notice of hearing and an opportunity 
to be heard.” 
 
250 Va. at 32, 458 S.E.2d at 762.  Thus, despite the fact 
that service of process upon Berry was not effected within 
one year of the commencement of the action against her, F&S 
was entitled to a nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380. 
 
Berry also contends that she had a “vested right” to a 
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 3:3(c) and Code § 8.01-
275.1 because the general district court had already 
concluded, in ruling on the motion to set aside the default 
 
8
judgment, that F&S failed to exercise due diligence to 
serve Berry with process.8  We do not agree.  The granting 
of a nonsuit did not deprive Berry of “any valid or vested 
defense . . . of the time limits of Rule 3:3.”  McManama, 
250 Va. at 34, 458 S.E.2d at 763; see also Clark, 238 Va. 
at 512 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 850 n.5.  Furthermore, when the 
general district court made its finding regarding the lack 
of due diligence by F&S, Berry had only moved to set aside 
the default judgment on the basis that service of process 
through the Secretary of the Commonwealth was not valid; 
she had not asserted any right to a dismissal under Rule 
3:3(c).  Therefore, Berry “had no justifiable expectation 
of a Rule 3:3 . . . defense under Virginia law that was 
entitled to protection under the due process clause of the 
Constitution.”  McManama, 250 Va. at 35, 458 S.E.2d at 763. 
 
Finally, Berry’s reliance on this Court’s decision in 
Dennis is misplaced.  There, we held that the trial court 
erred in refusing to set aside a default judgment because 
the attempt to serve the defendant was ineffective and the 
trial court thus never obtained personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.  240 Va. at 19, 393 S.E.2d at 394.  We then 
                     
8 We do not decide in this appeal whether Berry was 
entitled to move for dismissal under Rule 3:3(c) since she 
was never actually served with process.  See Gilpin v. 
Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 582, 515 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1999). 
 
9
dismissed the action under Rule 3:3(c).  Id. at 19-20, 393 
S.E.2d at 394.  In Dennis, however, the interplay between a 
plaintiff’s right to a voluntary nonsuit and the provisions 
of Rule 3:3(c) was not at issue because the plaintiff there 
never moved for a nonsuit at any time during the 
proceedings.  That fact alone makes the decision in Dennis 
inapposite. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court holding that F&S was entitled to a voluntary 
nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380. 
Affirmed.