Title: People v. Edwards

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86408-Agenda 7-March 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DANIEL J. EDWARDS, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 29, 2001.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Daniel J. Edwards, brings this appeal from an
order of the circuit court of Kankakee County dismissing, without
an evidentiary hearing, his amended post-conviction petition.
Because the defendant received the death sentence for the
underlying first degree murder conviction, the present appeal lies
directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kankakee County,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated
kidnapping. The same jury found the defendant eligible for the
death penalty because of his commission of first degree murder
during the course of another felony, aggravated kidnapping. See
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6). At the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the jury determined that there were no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude a sentence of
death, and the trial court therefore imposed the death sentence for
the conviction for first degree murder. On direct appeal, this court
affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentence. People
v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108 (1991). The United States Supreme
Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Edwards v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 942, 119 L. Ed. 2d 204, 112 S. Ct. 2278 (1992).
	The defendant commenced the present action for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Kankakee County in
November 1992. With the assistance of counsel, the defendant
filed an initial and later an amended post-conviction petition,
raising a number of challenges to the trial and sentencing
proceedings. The State moved to dismiss the defendant's amended
petition. The circuit court granted the State's motion and
dismissed the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing.
This appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	We will briefly summarize the evidence presented at trial. The
defendant was charged with first degree murder and aggravated
kidnapping for the abduction and death of Stephen Small of
Kankakee. Small had been buried alive in a wooden box, where he
was being held for payment of a $1 million ransom.
	Around 12:30 a.m. on September 2, 1987, someone claiming
to be a Kankakee police officer called the Small home and told
Stephen Small that a burglary had occurred at his office. Small got
dressed and left the house. Around 3:30 that morning someone
called the Small residence and told Stephen's wife, Nancy, "We
have your husband." Nancy then heard her husband say that he had
been handcuffed inside a box underground. Small told his wife to
obtain $1 million in cash. The caller directed Mrs. Small not to
report the matter to the police.
	The matter was reported to the authorities, however, and
devices were connected to the Smalls' telephone line to record
incoming calls and to determine their origins. At 5:03 that
afternoon, the same person called again, asking Mrs. Small how
much money had been collected. This call was placed from a
telephone located at a Phillips 66 gas station in Aroma Park. The
defendant was seen there at that time, in the company of a blonde-haired woman.
	At 5:40 p.m., Jean Alice Small, Stephen Small's aunt,
telephoned the Small residence to tell them of a call she had just
received. Jean said that the caller had told her that he knew that
Nancy Small's telephone was tapped. After telling Jean that the
victim was buried, the caller threatened to kill Jean's husband.
	Nancy Small received another telephone call from the
kidnapper at 11:28 that night. This call originated from a
telephone at a Sunoco station in Aroma Park, where an FBI agent
saw a white male at a telephone, and a blonde-haired woman in a
car that was later identified as belonging to Nancy Rish, the
defendant's girlfriend; Rish had blonde hair. The caller played a
tape recording of Stephen Small's voice. On the tape, Stephen
provided instructions for delivering the ransom. After audio
enhancement, a voice in the background could be heard
threatening Small.
	Nancy Small received one more telephone call from the
kidnapper, at 11:46 that night. The call was placed from a
Marathon service station in Kankakee. The caller accused Nancy
of having notified the police and refused her offer of the ransom.
Minutes later, at 11:50 p.m., an Illinois state police officer saw
Rish's car, with its trunk partly open, driving from Kankakee
toward Aroma Park.
	Law enforcement officers then placed the defendant's home
under surveillance. They saw a dark-colored Buick, with its trunk
partly open, arrive at the house in Bourbonnais where the
defendant and Rish lived. The defendant and a white woman with
blonde hair left the car and went inside.
	Officers carried out a search of the residence later that
morning, on September 3, and the defendant was arrested at that
time. Later that day, the defendant led law enforcement officers to
the site where the victim was buried. There, officers dug up a
wooden box and found the victim's body inside. The box
measured about six feet long and three feet wide, and was
constructed of plywood.
	A medical examiner later determined that the victim died of
asphyxiation caused by suffocation. The medical examiner
believed that the victim would not have survived more than three
or four hours inside the enclosed box. The medical examiner noted
that the pipe extending from the box into the open air was too long
for its diameter to serve as an adequate air-exchange system.
	The State presented other evidence connecting the defendant
to these offenses. On the night of the victim's disappearance,
around midnight, a neighbor of the defendant heard the defendant
say, "Let's go, let's hit it," get into his car, and drive off. Also, two
neighbors of the Small family saw the defendant's van, or one
similar to it, parked in their neighborhood after midnight on
September 2. One neighbor also noticed a mid-sized car at that
time, heard two car doors slam, and saw the car and the
defendant's van drive away with their lights off.
	Several witnesses saw the defendant constructing a wooden
box in his garage during summer 1987, preceding the offenses
here. The defendant gave various explanations for the project,
saying that it would be used for a lemonade stand, or by his
brother for transporting things, or at his brother's pool in Florida.
A neighbor of the Smalls had seen a white van similar to the
defendant's van driving through an alley next to the Small's home
about 10 times that summer. While the defendant and Rish were
visiting a boat store that summer, the defendant saw Stephen
Small leaving the store in a sports car; the defendant was heard to
say, "Boy, it sure would be nice to afford stuff like that."
	The search of the defendant's residence at the time of his
arrest turned up a Kankakee telephone book with the name
"Small" circled. The defendant's boots were found behind a
washer and dryer at the residence, and soil on the boots matched
a sample from the location where the box was buried. Soil in the
defendant's van also matched the sample. White caulking material
on gloves found in the defendant's trash had the same chemical
composition as the caulking material used to fill in the seams of
the wooden box in which the victim had been buried. The
defendant's fingerprints were found on PVC pipe and duct tape
recovered from the box.
	A person who owed the defendant money had had a pair of
handcuffs stolen from him, and the same pair was later discovered
on the victim. Another person who owed the defendant money had
had a gun stolen, and it was found by investigators in the
countryside near Aroma Park. The defendant purchased a battery
that was found in the wooden box. Bolt cutters belonging to a
company owned by the defendant's brother were found at a point
between where the box was uncovered and where the victim's car
was found, and they could have been the implement used to cut the
chain connecting the handcuffs on the victim's wrists.
	At the close of evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty
of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. A capital
sentencing hearing was then conducted. At the first stage of the
hearing, the jury found the defendant eligible for the death penalty
because of his commission of murder during the course of another
felony, aggravated kidnapping. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(6). At the second stage of the hearing, the parties presented
evidence in aggravation and mitigation. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the jury determined that there were no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The trial
judge accordingly sentenced the defendant to death for the
conviction for first degree murder.
I
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through
122-7 (West 1994)) provides a method by which a defendant may
challenge a conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state
constitutional rights. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377
(1997); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 157 (1994). An
action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding rather
than an appeal from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams,
186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief,
a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal
or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that led to the
judgment being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994);
People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Principles of res
judicata and waiver narrow the range of issues available to a post-conviction petitioner "to constitutional matters which have not
been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated." People v.
Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly, rulings on
issues that were previously raised at trial or on direct appeal are
res judicata, and issues that could have been raised in the earlier
proceedings, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived.
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Coleman,
168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995).
	The defendant raises a number of contentions in this appeal,
arguing generally that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing
the petition without an evidentiary hearing. A court considering a
post-conviction appeal will conduct a de novo review of a petition
that has been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389 (1998). With several exceptions, we
will discuss these issues in the same sequence in which the
defendant has presented them in his brief before this court.
II
	The defendant argues that the affidavit submitted by Master
Sergeant William Willis of the Illinois State Police in support of
the search warrant was defective in various respects. On direct
appeal, this court considered a number of the same or related
contentions involving the affidavit and the issuance of the search
warrant. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 129-33. At that time, the court
held that various misstatements in the affidavit would not have
affected the judge's decision to issue the requested warrant. The
defendant renews here a number of the same allegations, and
supplements them with an additional circumstance that he believes
entitles him to an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the defendant
argues that Willis should have stated in the affidavit that Mrs.
Small heard a tape recording of her husband's voice, rather than
his actual voice, during the kidnapper's first call to her; that the
victim said that "he was handcuffed, instead of being handcuffed";
that the 11:50 telephone call originated from a Marathon gas
station in Kankakee, not from a Sunoco station in Aroma Park;
and that FBI agents did not see a white male go to Rish's home
after leaving the pay telephone at 11:40.
	On direct appeal, the defendant also raised the discrepancy in
the origin of the 11:50 telephone call, and a number of other issues
concerning the affidavit. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 129-33. Despite
those matters, this court concluded that the warrant was valid and
that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing into the accuracy
of the affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). We adhere to that decision. Even
with the changes urged by the defendant, the Willis affidavit
would still have provided sufficient information to justify the
issuance of the search warrant.
	In renewing his challenge to the affidavit in this appeal, the
defendant places special emphasis on a comment made by Officer
Willis that appears in a transcript of remarks by Officer Willis for
a television program called "Top Cops." According to the
defendant, on that occasion, in May 1990, after the trial, Willis
told the reporter on the program:
			"Wanted the warrant to stand up in case we're right. We
know Edwards is it. We have no proof, but we know by
cop instinct this guy is involved. He made the second
phone call. Got to know where he's at. Small might be at
the house. So we made the decision to get the search
warrant."
	The defendant argues that the comment "We have no proof"
shows that Willis intentionally made material misstatements in the
affidavit he submitted in support of the warrant. Rejecting this
argument, the post-conviction judge characterized the officer's
comment as "theatrics." We agree with the judge's assessment.
The remark "We have no proof" is belied by the extensive
discussion preceding it in the transcript, in which Willis detailed
the steps in the investigation and the events leading to the decision
to focus on the defendant as a suspect in the case.
	In addition, we question the relevance of the comment. The
officer made the remark several years after the issuance of the
warrant. We do not believe that Officer Willis' later
characterization of the case is relevant to the determination of
probable cause made earlier by the judge who issued the warrant.
Even without the items criticized by the defendant, the affidavit
contained sufficient grounds to justify the issuance of the warrant.
III
	The defendant next argues that the prosecution presented
hypnotically refreshed testimony at trial, in violation of state law,
without first disclosing the nature of the evidence to the defense.
According to the defendant, the evidence in question was
introduced during the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Jan Krizik,
which, the defendant alleges, was enhanced through hypnosis. The
defendant complains specifically that Krizik's identification of the
defendant's van was the product of hypnosis the witness
underwent before trial. At trial, Krizik testified that she identified
the defendant's van as having been on the street near the Small
residence, and outside her own home, in the early morning hours
of September 2 by the presence of decals on one of its rear
windows. The defendant argues that Krizik acquired this
detail-the presence of the decals-as a result of hypnosis. The
defendant maintains that the State's failure to disclose the
occurrence of the hypnosis denied him his right to confront the
witness. Apparently, the defense did not become aware of the
hypnosis until Krizik testified at the trial of codefendant Rish.
	Assuming that the hypnotically induced portion of a witness'
testimony should have been excluded from evidence at the time of
the defendant's trial (see People v. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d 284 (1989);
People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987)), we do not believe that the
defendant has shown what portion of Krizik's testimony was
affected by hypnosis. The defendant has not established in what
respect the hypnosis altered or influenced Krizik's recollection of
the events in question. In support of this contention, the defendant
submitted to the post-conviction court an affidavit from the person
who performed the hypnosis, Joseph Tremonti, a priest. Father
Tremonti stated in his affidavit that during hypnosis Krizik
"related further facts [ ] not related initially." The affidavit does
not specify, however, what the new information consisted of.
	As further proof that the witness' description of the decals
was enhanced through hypnosis, the defendant points to a report
of an interview of Krizik conducted by another law enforcement
officer, Officer Hancock. In relating what Krizik said, the report
does not mention the presence of decals on the van's windows.
The defendant believes that the absence of this information from
the report shows that the decals were a detail that the witness did
not describe initially but mentioned later only as a consequence of
hypnosis.
	In testimony at trial, however, Krizik said that she told
Hancock about the decals when he questioned her on September
2. In the absence of evidence that it was in fact the presence of the
decals that Krizik recalled through hypnosis, we are unable to
conclude that the testimony was altered in a material way.
	Even if Krizik's testimony on this point should have been
barred because it was hypnotically induced or refreshed, exclusion
of the testimony would not have made a difference in the case.
There existed other, substantial evidence connecting the defendant
to the offenses charged here. As noted earlier, in the summary of
evidence presented at trial, the defendant led law enforcement
officers to the site where the box was buried. The defendant had
been seen constructing a similar box in the weeks preceding the
victim's abduction, and the defendant's fingerprints were found on
materials in the box. The defendant was seen in the places from
which telephone calls were made to the victim's family. Assuming
that Deputy Krizik's testimony was erroneously admitted, we do
not believe that the error had any effect on the outcome of the trial,
given the strong evidence establishing the defendant's guilt for
these offenses.
IV
	The defendant next argues that the State failed to disclose
before trial certain information that it was required to reveal to the
defense under the principles announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its progeny.
The defendant contends that the information would have supported
the defendant's theory that other persons also took part in the
commission of these offenses and that the defendant's own role in
the crimes was the product of compulsion. The defendant's brief
and amended post-conviction petition refer to a number of items
of evidence, and we will briefly consider these.
	The defendant first refers to a statement by Officer Willis that
is included in the transcript of remarks made by Willis for the
television program "Top Cops," discussed earlier. The defendant
cites Willis' comment, "Danny built the box with a ventilation
system, candy bars and water, to keep this guy alive." The
defendant believes that this remark was favorable to the defense,
showing that he made efforts to assist the victim. The cited
remark, however, was made by Willis after, rather than before, the
defendant's trial on these charges, and thus was not a matter
withheld from the defense.
	The defendant also cites a report showing that the federal
government declined to prosecute, in an unrelated case, a person
about whom the defendant was supplying information. According
to the report, the prosecution was dropped because the defendant's
credibility would be seriously undermined by his involvement in
the present offenses. The defendant contends, however, that
disclosure of this report would have lent weight to his theory that
the federal suspect arranged the commission of these crimes as a
way of discrediting the defendant.
	The defendant offers no credible evidence in support of his
theory that the present offenses were the work of the suspect in the
federal investigation. Relief is not available under Brady unless
the defendant can establish that the evidence improperly withheld
was material to the defense. In this context, favorable evidence is
material " 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 393 (1998), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). We
fail to see how the report regarding the decision not to bring the
federal prosecution was material to the present case.
	The defendant also mentions the destruction of a "drug list,"
apparently referring to items of evidence seized following the
arrest of the defendant for a drug-related offense. The defendant
does not explain the relevance of that inculpatory evidence to the
present case or how its suppression would be a violation of Brady.
	The defendant's other Brady-related claims are also
unavailing. An FBI report stated that nothing of known value was
found in a search of the defendant's home, even though at that
time investigators found a telephone book with the name "Small"
circled. The report merely states one writer's opinion, however,
and does not amount to a violation. See People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 247-48 (1989). The defendant says that he did not perform
many of the acts the prosecution attributed to him at trial, but he
does not elaborate on that point. He contends further that the
prosecution did not provide information about a witness named
Thad Wells, who testified at codefendant Rish's trial that he saw
two white males and one black male in a light-colored van in the
vicinity of St. Anne around the time the box was buried in the
ground. The defendant fails to allege, however, how that bit of
information is favorable to him. The defendant also says that the
State did not provide records showing that someone named Kathy
Goodrich called his home in Bourbonnais at the same time the
kidnapper placed one of the calls. The prosecution did not allege
that the defendant made the calls from his own home, however,
and therefore we question how this information would have
assisted the defendant. The defendant also refers to flights made
over the area, during the investigation of these offenses, by an FBI
reconnaissance airplane known as "Night Stalker." The defendant
does not explain what information might have been revealed, or
how that would have assisted the defense. Finally, the defendant
alleges that the prosecution altered a store receipt by adding the
names "Edwards and Rish" so that it would identify the purchasers
of a quantity of wire ties. The State was not allowed to introduce
the wire ties into evidence at the defendant's trial, however
(Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d at 170-71), and therefore we fail to see the
significance of the allegedly altered receipt. In sum, the defendant
has not established, whether through the record or affidavits, his
entitlement to a hearing on this claim.
V
	The defendant next argues that trial counsel and appellate
counsel were ineffective in numerous ways. The competence of
counsel is measured against the standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both a deficiency in
counsel's performance and prejudice resulting from the alleged
deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	To show a deficiency in counsel's performance, a defendant
must establish "that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance is highly deferential, and a court
considering a claim of ineffective assistance "must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065.
	To demonstrate prejudice resulting from an alleged deficiency
in counsel's performance,"[t]he defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	Because a defendant's failure to satisfy either part of the
Strickland test will defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, a court
is not required to "address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. Accordingly,
a court considering a claim of ineffective assistance "need not
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	Allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are
resolved under the same standard that governs the performance of
trial counsel. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999). Thus, a
defendant who alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective must
establish both a deficiency in counsel's performance and prejudice
resulting from the asserted deficiency. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283 (1992). Appellate counsel is not required to brief every
conceivable issue on appeal, however, and it is not incompetence
for counsel to refrain from raising issues that counsel believes are
without merit. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 236 (1993). For
these reasons, unless the underlying issue is meritorious, a
defendant cannot be said to have incurred any prejudice from
counsel's failure to raise the particular issue on appeal. People v.
Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000).
A
	The defendant complains of several acts and omissions by
counsel during the pretrial proceedings. The defendant first argues
that counsel was ineffective for failing to examine more closely
the affidavit submitted by Officer Willis in support of the request
for a search warrant. The defendant believes that closer inspection
of the affidavit would have brought to counsel's attention the
alleged alterations to the document and would have enabled
counsel to successfully challenge the issuance of the warrant on
the basis of the alterations. There is no evidence that the
alterations were made after the warrant was issued. As we have
already concluded in this opinion, however, as well as in the
opinion on direct appeal, we do not believe that the deficiencies
alleged by the defendant, even if they had been called to the
attention of the judge who issued the warrant, would have
precluded its issuance.
	The defendant next argues that trial counsel erred in failing to
seek the suppression of tape recordings of calls made to Nancy
Small by the kidnapper and by Jean Small. The defendant
contends that the calls to the Small residence were recorded in
violation of the state eavesdropping statute, section 108A-1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
par. 108A-1). On direct appeal, this court found that the
defendant's objection to the introduction of the evidence was
waived by his failure to raise the issue in the trial court. Edwards,
144 Ill. 2d  at 163-64. The defendant now argues that counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly preserve the question.
	We do not agree with the defendant that the calls were
recorded in violation of the statute. In People v. Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d 47 (1986), and People v. Herrington, 163 Ill. 2d 507 (1994),
this court determined that authorization is not required under that
provision when recordings are made with the consent of one of the
persons taking part in the conversation. In the present case, the
calls were recorded with Nancy Small's consent. Thus, we must
conclude that no statutory violation occurred in these
circumstances. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for
failing to make or pursue what would have been a meritless
objection.
	In a further challenge to his lawyer's pretrial actions, the
defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to
limit the times when the wooden box in which the victim had been
buried was present in the courtroom. Apparently it was there
throughout the defendant's trial. The defendant notes that a motion
to that effect was made and granted in the prosecution of his
codefendant, Nancy Rish. The defendant contends that trial
counsel should have made a similar motion in his case.
	Even if the defendant's motion had been granted, the
defendant still could not have been able to exclude the box
entirely. It still would have been present at various times during
trial, for identification by witnesses who saw the defendant
building it, and for identification by officers who were present
when it was discovered in the ground. Moreover, the presence of
the box does not appear to have been an element in the jury's
determination of guilt. As the State observes, Rish was also
convicted of these offenses, though the wooden box was not in the
courtroom during every moment of her trial. Thus, it does not
appear that the presence of the box was an influential
consideration in the jury's guilty verdicts here.
	The defendant also argues that the first lawyer appointed to
represent him in this case was ineffective for failing to obtain, in
a timely manner, the appointment of another lawyer to assist him
in the case.
	Before trial, the defendant's appointed attorney asked for the
appointment of co-counsel. The trial court at first denied the
request, but when the motion was raised again, the court
authorized the appointment of another lawyer. After that person
withdrew from the case, the court appointed another person,
several weeks before the beginning of trial. Thus, the defendant
was represented by two lawyers at both the guilt phase and the
sentencing phase of the proceedings.
	We find no merit in the defendant's complaint. First, it
appears that counsel did all that could have been expected of him
in seeking the appointment of a second lawyer in the case. Counsel
persisted in his requests for the appointment of co-counsel and was
ultimately successful, obtaining the services of a second lawyer
before trial. Moreover, the defendant has failed to show that the
appointment of co-counsel was necessary at an earlier point in the
proceedings, that the court's delay in authorizing the appointment
of another lawyer was prejudicial in any manner, or that co-counsel's earlier appearance in the case would have been helpful
or beneficial to the defendant.
B
	The defendant next raises a series of challenges to counsel's
performance during the guilt phase of the proceedings. The
defendant first argues that trial counsel should have presented to
the jury evidence that would have supported a defense of
compulsion. With respect to that defense, section 7-11(a) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
			"A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an
offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct
which he performs under the compulsion of threat or
menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily
harm, if he reasonably believes death or great bodily harm
will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such
conduct." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 7-11(a).
The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present this defense to the jury. The defendant
acknowledges that compulsion is not a defense to a felony
punishable by death, but he asserts that it would have been a
defense to the charges of aggravated kidnapping.
	In support of this claim, the defendant's petition mentions that
the sheriff believed that a "hit" had been placed on the defendant,
and that after his arrest in this case the defendant told Rish and law
enforcement officers that this had been something he had had to do
or Rish and her son would have been killed. We do not see the
connection between the supposed "hit" and the defendant's
conduct in this case. Moreover, the defendant's fears regarding
Rish and her son, even if supported by the record or by affidavit,
would not establish the defense of compulsion, which by
definition is shown only by threats of harm to the actor.
	The defendant next refers to this court's statement on direct
appeal that the defendant waived his right to ask for an instruction
limiting the jury's consideration of what have been referred to as
"the house tape" and "the road tape." These were the tape
recording of calls made by the kidnapper to the Small residence
("the house tape"), and a tape recording made by the kidnapper of
the victim's voice, played during calls to the Small residence and
later found along a country roadside ("the road tape"). Edwards,
144 Ill. 2d  at 163. In this post-conviction appeal, the defendant
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for waiving an objection
to the State's use of this evidence, and that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel's performance.
	The trial court ruled that the tapes were admissible as
evidence of the corpus delicti in this case. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at
166. On direct appeal, this court found that there was sufficient
proof for the admission of the tapes as evidence of the defendant's
guilt in this case. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 168. Regarding the house
tape, this court noted that the defendant was seen at places where
two of the kidnapper's calls were made, at the times when they
were made. With respect to the road tape, the court cited Mrs.
Small's testimony that the voice that can be heard speaking to her
husband on that tape was the same voice that she spoke with on all
four ransom calls. Given this court's determination of the proper
use of this evidence, we believe that any effort by the defense
counsel to exclude the tapes or limit their use would have been
unsuccessful.
	The defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the prosecutor's suggestion during trial that
the defendant was trying to keep damaging information from the
jury. This occurred during the direct examination of a prosecution
witness, when, in response to an objection by the defendant, the
prosecutor stated, "Well, judge, you know, he opens this up and
then when I clarify it everything is objectionable. He doesn't want
it to come out."
	Contrary to the defendant's argument, defense counsel
objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection and instructed
the jury to disregard the line of questioning. The judge's favorable
ruling striking the entire line of questioning included within its
scope the particular comment made by the prosecutor. Generally,
a ruling sustaining a defense objection is sufficient to cure any
prejudice (People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30 (1979)), and we see
no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case.
	The defendant also contends that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to point out on cross-examination of a State
witness the presence of 12 unidentified fingerprints in the wooden
box in which the victim was buried.
	The defendant does not dispute that his fingerprints were
found on materials inside the box. The unidentified prints could
have belonged to any number of persons who had been in contact
with the box and its materials while it was being constructed or
after it was discovered. We do not see how the introduction of
evidence of the unidentified prints would have assisted the
defendant. As we have previously noted, the defendant can
marshal only vague assertions in support of a compulsion defense;
the existence of unidentified prints on the box, of unknown age
and provenance, is too remote to be of help here.
	The defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective at trial
for failing to impeach several witnesses with certain information.
First, the defendant cites an FBI report that an employee of the
service station where the 5 p.m. call originated believed that a
black male made a telephone call at that time, after getting out of
a car that contained another black male and a black female. Next,
the defendant refers to FBI reports describing the interview with
Deputy Jan Krizik, which do not mention the decals that she
claimed to see in the van's windows. Finally, the defendant cites
an FBI report that said that a search of the defendant's home did
not turn up anything of value, even though other evidence showed
that officers found a local telephone book with name "Small."
	In response to these contentions in the circuit court, the State
argued that the defendant had failed to develop them with the
required specificity. The defendant's amended petition presented
this issue in summary fashion, stating only that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to impeach witnesses with information that
counsel knew or should have known. The petition then cited a
lengthy summary of the police investigation. We agree with the
State that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on these
allegations, for the materials submitted by the defendant fail to
make a substantial showing of a violation of his constitutional
rights. See People v. Maxwell, 173 Ill. 2d 102, 107 (1996); People
v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 308 (1989). In any event, we do not
believe that the impeachment value of this material was great.
	Finally, the defendant challenges trial counsel's failure to
preserve objections to certain comments made by the prosecutor
during closing argument at the guilt phase of the proceedings. The
defendant first cites the prosecutor's statement, "He-by his own
words, he has said 48 hours of air existed if you believe him and
I don't for a second." The prosecutor was referring to one of the
kidnapper's calls to Mrs. Small, in which the kidnapper said that
her husband would be able to breathe for 48 hours. The defendant
argues that the prosecutor improperly stated his own opinion
regarding the evidence in this case.
	Defense counsel objected to that comment, and the trial judge
sustained the defense objection and instructed the jury to disregard
the remark. We believe that any error in the prosecutor's comment
was cured by the trial judge's action in sustaining the objection
and instructing the jury to disregard the comment. This should
have been sufficient to cure any prejudice.
	The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's argument that
a neighbor said that the defendant looked proud when he built the
wooden box. Even if this comment was not supported by the
evidence, we do not believe that it denied the defendant a fair trial.
This was a brief comment, and we do not believe that it would
have affected the jury's determination here.
	The defendant next takes issue with the prosecutor's
statement in closing argument that the victim scratched, clawed,
and pulled in an effort to escape from the wooden box in which he
had been placed. The defendant contends that there was no
evidence to support the prosecutor's comment.
	Contrary to the defendant's view, we believe that the
comment finds support in the evidence. Chemical analysis of the
wood inside the box showed contact with human skin. Also, the
medical examiner reported finding abrasions on the victim's
forehead, right hand, and elbow. This was sufficient to support the
inference that the victim struggled while inside the box, in an
effort to free himself.
	The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's remark that the
kidnapper, in his call to Jean Small, told Jean that he would kill
Jean's husband "too"; the defendant contends that the evidence
showed that the kidnapper said only that he would kill Jean's
husband, without using the word "too." Given the defendant's
conduct in causing the victim's death, we do not see how the
defendant could have incurred any prejudice as a result of the
prosecutor's paraphrase of the testimony.
C
	The defendant also argues that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance at the capital sentencing hearing conducted in this case.
In this context, the inquiry into prejudice under Strickland requires
an examination of the effect of counsel's error on the sentencer's
decision. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1997); People v.
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1996); People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494, 505 (1995); People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 536
(1995). The relevant question here, then, is "whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer-including an appellate court, to the extent that it
independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel
sought to introduce into evidence videotapes of the defendant's
two children, in which they spoke of their feelings for their father.
The State objected to the evidence, arguing that the children might
not be competent to testify and observing that their videotaped
comments were not made under oath and were not subject to
cross-examination. The trial judge sustained the State's objection
to the evidence. On direct appeal, this court upheld the judge's
ruling. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 174-75. This court also noted that
the defendant had declined an offer by the prosecution to stipulate
to the substance of the children's statements on the tapes. The
defendant now argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to accept the State's offer to stipulate to the evidence.
	We believe that defense counsel's decision not to stipulate to
the evidence was essentially a matter of trial strategy and therefore
will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the
sentencing hearing, in refusing the State's offer to stipulate to the
children's statements, defense counsel explained that he believed
that the tapes were admissible and that the stipulation was not an
adequate substitute for their contents. The decision whether to
accept the State's offer was in essence a matter of trial strategy,
and a reviewing court generally will not second-guess a decision
of that nature. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984); People v.
Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1995); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 479 (1994). We see no reason to do so here.
	The defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to offer, as mitigation, evidence that the defendant had
previously cooperated with police following his arrest in a prior
drug-related case. Counsel might have believed that the evidence
would have focused more attention on the defendant's prior
misconduct, and also that the jury would simply think that the
defendant had been acting out of self-interest at that time. We
believe that this was essentially a question of strategy, and we will
not further consider counsel's decision here.
	The defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective for
failing to have a police officer testify at the sentencing hearing
about the defendant's reaction at the site where the victim's body
was found. The defendant suggests that Detective Robert
Anderson would have testified that the defendant was frantic and
started digging in the ground with his hands.
	We do not believe that counsel can be deemed ineffective for
failing to offer this evidence. The additional testimony proposed
by the defendant would have been cumulative of testimony already
admitted into evidence. Counsel had already presented similar
testimony from two other law enforcement officers. Officer John
Gerard testified that the defendant cried, "Oh, no, oh, no," when
told that the victim was dead. Sergeant Maurice Mietzner testified
that the defendant got down on his knees to help dig up the victim
and cried out, "Oh, no, oh, no, he can't be dead," when informed
of the victim's death. The witnesses also said that the defendant
seemed to quickly resume his prior behavior shortly after that.
Defense counsel was not required to present a third witness to
testify about what two other witnesses had already described to the
jury, and we do not believe that any particular advantage would
have been gained by offering this additional testimony.
	The defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective
at the sentencing hearing because he failed to call as a witness
Mary DeSloover, who had prepared a report about the defendant
that was admitted into evidence as mitigation. The defendant
argues that the witness' testimony could have helped establish, as
mitigation in this case, the defendant's history of psychological
problems. In the report, DeSloover provided information about the
defendant's history of drug abuse and cited evidence that heavy
drug use can lead to psychological problems.
	We believe that counsel's failure to present DeSloover as a
witness was essentially a matter of trial strategy. DeSloover's
report was admitted into evidence over the State's objection. In
objecting to the report, the State challenged both the witness'
qualifications and her conclusions. Although the trial court
admitted the report into evidence, the defendant chose not to
present her live testimony also. Defense counsel could have
viewed this arrangement as advantageous to the defendant, for the
report was admitted into evidence, but its author was not subjected
to cross-examination by the State. Defense counsel's decision not
to call DeSloover to testify was essentially a question of strategy,
and we will not attempt to second-guess that choice here.
	The defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise compulsion at the capital sentencing hearing
conducted in this case. The defendant notes that although
compulsion is not a defense to a crime punishable by death, it may
qualify as a mitigating circumstance at a capital sentencing
hearing. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c)(4).
	As we noted earlier in this opinion, in rejecting the companion
argument that counsel should have presented a compulsion
defense during the guilt phase of the proceedings, the defendant
has failed to provide any evidence in support of this theory of the
case. The defendant, in his brief, refers only to the defendant's
own statement that he told Rish that he had to do what he was
doing to protect his family, her, and her son from some undefined
harm. In addition, the defendant makes vague references to the
possible involvement of others in these offenses. We do not
believe that the defendant has presented sufficient grounds that
would warrant a hearing or other relief on these allegations.
	The defendant also complains that trial counsel and appellate
counsel failed to preserve objections to certain comments in the
prosecutor's closing argument at the second stage of the capital
sentencing hearing. On direct appeal, this court found a number of
objections waived. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 175-76. The defendant
first cites the prosecutor's comment that evidence of the
defendant's good family background, offered by the defense in
mitigation, was actually aggravating. We consider this to be a fair
comment on the evidence, and therefore counsel cannot be
considered ineffective for failing to object to the remark. The State
is not required to accept the defendant's characterization of
evidence offered in mitigation. In this case, one could argue that
the defendant's later criminal conduct shows that he rejected his
upbringing, and that he turned to crime despite his favorable
background.
	The defendant also complains of the prosecutor's comment
that the jury should not consider sympathy in making its decision.
We find no error in this remark, and therefore counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to object to it. The prosecutor's
statement was entirely consistent with a jury instruction,
previously approved by this court, advising jurors that sympathy
should not influence their sentencing decision. See People v.
Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 507 (1985); People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 493-94 (1984).
	The defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor's argument
urging the jury to imagine the feelings of the victim as he was
placed in the wooden box. A defense objection to this comment
was overruled. The State concedes that the comment was improper
(see People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 321-22 (1990); People
v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 37-38 (1988)) but contends that
appellate counsel's apparent failure to preserve the issue does not
constitute ineffective assistance. We agree. The remark was
isolated and fleeting, and we do not believe that it affected the
outcome of the sentencing hearing.
	Finally, the defendant contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to comments by the prosecutor that
called his actions here less than human. The prosecutor stated,
"What Danny Edwards did was not the actions of a human being,
a civilized human being. They are the actions of something less."
The defendant asserts that the prosecutor's argument was improper
because it effectively equated him with an animal, and that counsel
was ineffective when he did not preserve an objection to this part
of the State's closing argument.
	Even if the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant was
improper, we do not believe that the comment was prejudicial to
the defendant, or that counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve an objection to it. Comments like the one challenged here
do not warrant reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice
to the defendant. People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 347 (1989).
The prosecutor's remark here was brief and isolated, and we do
not believe that it could have denied the defendant a fair
sentencing hearing.
VI
	The defendant also challenges, on two separate grounds, the
manner in which the jury was selected for trial and sentencing. The
defendant first argues that the prosecutor improperly exercised
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who expressed
reservations about the death penalty but who were not removable
for cause under the principles announced in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968),
and its progeny. The defendant contends that the State may not
exercise a challenge against a prospective juror because of his or
her views regarding capital punishment. Rejecting the same
argument, this court has previously held that the Witherspoon line
of authority does not limit the prosecution's power to exercise
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors whose views
about the death penalty would not support a challenge for cause.
See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 548-49 (1995); People v.
Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1994); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 136-38 (1991); People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 481-82
(1984). The defendant has presented no reason to depart from
those decisions, and therefore we must reject the defendant's
argument here.
	The defendant next challenges the State's exercise of
peremptory challenges against four black members of the venire,
arguing that the prosecutor's actions violated the rule announced
in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Although this court addressed the identical issue on
direct appeal, finding no violation of Batson, the defendant
contends that the question must now be reconsidered in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), which held that defendants
of any race have standing to challenge the race-based exclusion of
jurors. Contrary to the defendant's contention, however, this court
did discuss Powers in the course of resolving the Batson question
on direct appeal. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d  at 150-54. We see no reason
to revisit this issue, and we adhere to our earlier decision.
VII
	The defendant, in his final post-conviction argument,
contends that his death sentence is the product of an impermissible
double enhancement of his conviction for aggravated kidnapping.
The State contends that the defendant has waived consideration of
this issue because he failed to include the point in his post-conviction petitions. We agree. See People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1993); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1994). In any event, the
argument is without merit. First, it is not clear that double
enhancement occurred in this case. The defendant was charged
with first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping under multiple
theories, and the jury returned general verdicts of guilty for each
offense. Multiple theories of aggravated kidnapping would have
supported both conviction on that offense and the establishment of
a statutory aggravating circumstance for the death penalty. See
People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 221 (1989).
	Second, this court has held that double enhancement is
permitted under the statutory aggravating circumstance used to
establish the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty in this
case. This court has explained that section 9-1(b)(6) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(6)), murder in the course of another felony, contemplates
that the enhancement of certain felonies may also result in a
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 392 (1995). In this case, then, the defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty may stand, even if one assumes
that it was the product of a double enhancement.
*   *   *
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Kankakee County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to
enter an order setting Wednesday, May  16, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death, entered in the circuit court of
Kankakee County, is to be carried out. The defendant shall be
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West
1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the
mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden
of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution
where the defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Edwards' convictions should not be disturbed. In
my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to
stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). Edwards' sentence of death should therefore be
vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.
38, par.  9-1(j).