Title: Robinson v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

418 So. 2d 749 (1982) Stephen ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53257. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 10, 1982. Rehearing Denied July 28, 1982. Brewer, Deaton, Evans & Bowman, Billy B. Bowman, Greenwood, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Carolyn B. Mills Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BROOM and DAN M. LEE, JJ. En Banc. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Leflore County wherein Stephen Robinson, defendant/appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted for the September 16, *750 1980, burglary of Goldberg's Store located in Greenwood, Mississippi. Upon conviction, Robinson was sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved of his conviction, Robinson has appealed to this Court and assigns four errors in the trial below. 1. The verdict of the jury was contrary to the overwhelming weight of testimony and the law. 2. The court erred in not entering a directed verdict for the appellant. 3. The court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress, thus allowing the state to introduce into evidence the three pairs of shoes taken from the display window of Goldberg's Shoe Store. 4. The court erred in giving, over the appellant's objections, the state's requested Instruction No. 2. Goldberg's Shoe Store, located in Greenwood, Mississippi, was burglarized sometime between 11:05 p.m. and 12:39 a.m. on September 15 and 16, 1980. A large display window was broken out, apparently with a piece of concrete, and eight pairs of shoes removed therefrom. The owner reported the shoes taken from the store were manufactured by Pierre Cardin and Florsheim. Thomas G. Futral, detective sergeant of the Greenwood Police Department, discovered the burglary at 12:39 a.m. He was unable to obtain fingerprints from the window itself or the item used to break the glass. Futral remained on the scene for twenty or twenty-five minutes at which time he was called to investigate an automobile accident at Mabeline and Third Avenue. When Futral arrived on the scene of the accident at approximately 1:00 a.m., appellant, who stated he was driving the 1973 Monte Carlo which struck the rear of a parked pickup truck, was boisterous and smelled of alcohol. Officers investigating the accident arrested appellant for public drunkenness and summoned a wrecker to remove the Monte Carlo which was rendered inoperable by the collision. Futral, who was taking pictures of the accident, began to inventory the contents of the automobile, which was standard procedure used by the police department to avoid lawsuits. When the trunk was opened, three new pairs of shoes were discovered therein, corresponding to the brands that had been reportedly taken in the Goldberg burglary. Appellant was then advised he was also being arrested for burglary. Subsequent investigations revealed the shoes were the same as those taken in the Goldberg burglary. Appellant denied any participation in or knowledge of the burglary. According to him, he borrowed his brother's automobile after getting off work around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. He began drinking and riding around. Around 10:00 p.m., he picked up Milton Johnson, a cousin, rode around about forty-five minutes and then went to the Soul Train Lounge where he stayed for one and half or two hours. Around 1:00 a.m. defendant left the lounge to take Sylvester Hodges home and then returned to the lounge and left with Milton Johnson, who was injured in the accident. Johnson asserted it was around 11:00 p.m. when defendant took Hodges home and he was gone for about ten minutes. Hodges stated it was about 12:30 a.m. Both Johnson, a co-indictee, and Hodges denied any knowledge of or participation in the burglary. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, whereupon he was sentenced to a term of five years in the penitentiary. Although appellant complains of the overruling of his motion for a directed verdict, he waived any error thereof by adducing evidence in his own behalf. In Tubbs v. State, 402 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1981), this Court stated: As to appellant's contention concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, he avers that the jury completely ignored the overwhelming testimony of his witnesses concerning his presence except for a brief period and therefore convicted him solely on the inference arising from possession of recently-stolen property. Evidently, appellant overlooks the fact that it was the jury's prerogative to accept the testimony it deemed to be more trustworthy and reject that it deemed was not. In Tubbs, supra, this Court said: In the case at bar it is evident that the jury rejected the testimony of appellant's two witnesses. Milton Johnson, who was on parole at the time of the incident, was certainly questionable, being related to the defendant, and also charged with the same crime. Sylvester Hodges, with whom appellant left the Soul Train Lounge for a short period of time, was evidently the only other person who could have participated in the crime that night and he certainly wasn't going to implicate himself. Furthermore, appellant never asserted anyone else had control over the automobile besides himself from the time he borrowed the same until the shoes were subsequently discovered therein. In Gray v. State, 387 So. 2d 101 (Miss. 1980), this Court stated: Accepting all that was proved by the state's evidence, as well as that such evidence reasonably tended to prove, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, this Court finds the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was established that the Greenwood Police Department generally adhered *752 to an unwritten policy of inventorying the contents of automobiles where the driver of the same was arrested. The inventory was a method whereby the police department sought to avoid lawsuits involving items which were subsequently alleged missing from automobiles taken into custody by the police department. Moreover, the importance of the inventory was escalated by the fact that the cars were towed to private lots due to the fact that the city did not have a garage or lot to house impounded cars. The inventory of property lawfully seized falls into a different category from that of an automobile search incident to a lawful arrest or based on probable cause that the vehicle is being used to transport contraband. Jackson v. State, 261 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1972). Here it was undisputed that the defendant was not suspected of any crime before the inventory was conducted and the articles discovered therein. In Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970), this Court discussed inventory searches: Officer Futral conducted an inventory search of the appellant's borrowed automobile shortly after his arrest by another officer for public drunkenness while the vehicle was still located at the scene of the accident. Officer Futral referred to it as an inventory search contemporaneous with allowing the wrecker service to remove the damaged automobile to a parking lot operated by the wrecker service. Officer Futral inventoried the interior of the automobile and found nothing except two or three eight-track tapes and then opened the trunk and found two pairs of new shoes lying in the trunk in plain view, which were later identified to be the shoes taken from Goldberg's store in a burglary that was committed no more than an hour and thirty-four minutes prior thereto. Officer Futral was called to the scene of the accident directly from the investigation of the Goldberg burglary, primarily because he had possession of the camera that was used by the Greenwood Police Department for taking pictures in accidents and for other purposes. Futral had no idea there was any connection between the 1973 Monte Carlo involved in the accident and the Goldberg burglary. The inventory conducted by Futral and other officers was a routine procedure followed by the Greenwood Police Department since 1968 and no wise carried out to circumvent any search requirements of the Fourth Amendment. This was established by Officer Futral and Chief of Police James Stevens of Greenville, Mississippi. In ruling upon the motion to suppress, the trial judge stated: Appellant contends that opening the trunk without a warrant was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The appellee relies upon the rule announced in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976), and contends that the police officers here were making a routine inventory of the contents of the vehicle, a reasonable procedure not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The accused's automobile in Opperman had been impounded for multiple parking violations and the police, following standard procedure, inventoried the contents of the car. In so doing, they discovered marijuana in the glove compartment. Opperman was subsequently arrested and convicted for possession of the contraband. His motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless inventory was denied. The State Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In reversing that decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the police procedures followed there did not involve an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that the expectation of privacy in one's automobile is significantly less than that in one's own home or office. The Court further held that when vehicles are *754 impounded, police routinely follow caretaking procedures by securing an inventory of the car's contents, and such procedures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court in Opperman, supra, said: In a later case, United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.1978), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Opperman, supra, stated: Opperman has been further construed and applied by the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Roth, 305 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1981), where the Court held that a warrantless inventory of an automobile may extend into the vehicle's locked trunk, and even into a closed paper bag inside the trunk. In Roth, supra, the Court stated: This Court used the rationale of Opperman in affirming a thirty-year sentence for armed robbery in the very recent decision of Florence v. State, 397 So. 2d 1105 (Miss. 1981). In view of the facts and circumstances in the present case, the Court finds the trial judge properly denied the motion to suppress the shoes recovered from the automobile defendant was driving because it was the officer's duty to protect any valuables within the automobile at the time it was under the control of the Greenwood Police Department. The remaining question is, did the trial court err in granting the state's Instruction No. 2, which is set out in full as follows: The language that was contained in this instruction is the same that was interpreted and spelled out in Hall v. State, infra, and Fletcher v. State, infra, and was discussed by this Court when it condemned a much more lengthy instruction than was approved in Hall and Fletcher. We quote from Harper v. State, 355 So. 2d 314 (Miss. 1978), wherein this Court stated: Defendant argues the instruction was improper because it allowed the jury to infer guilt of the burglary while mere possession of recently stolen property raises no inference of a burglarious breaking and entering, which is an essential element of the crime. One fallacy in defendant's argument is that it overlooks the well-settled proposition that instructions must be read together and considered as a whole. Cowan v. State, 399 So. 2d 1346 (Miss. 1981). Appellant would have us overlook the fact that the appellant sought and obtained Instructions Nos. D-11 and D-13. Instruction D-11 is as follows: Instruction D-13 goes further and states the following: These instructions, when considered as a whole, would seem to cure the problem of which appellant complains as to what the jury must find regarding the intent of breaking and entering to commit the crime of burglary which was the charge in this case. It is further noted that Instruction S-1, as given by the court, deals with the question also and is quoted in full as follows: In disposing of a similar question before this Court in 1981, Cowan v. State, supra, this Court said: Instruction No. 2, when read together with Instructions Nos. D-11, D-13 and S-1 correctly stated the applicable law and this assignment of error is without merit. For the reasons stated, the conviction and sentence of Stephen Robinson are affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. SUGG, Presiding Justice, for the Court: On Petition For Rehearing appellant argues that Instruction No. 2[1] as given by the court violates the due process requirement of the United States Constitution. The burglary of Goldberg's Shoe Store was discovered by an officer at 12:39 a.m. and was accomplished by breaking a plate glass window in the store. Eight pairs of shoes were removed from a display inside the window of the store and three pairs of shoes were found in the possession of appellant shortly after discovery of the burglary. While investigating the burglary, Officer Futral was called to the scene of an accident 15 to 18 blocks from Goldberg's Shoe Store. Appellant had been involved in a collision between his automobile and a pickup truck. Officer Futral and other officers investigating the collision inventoried the contents of the automobile before permitting it to be towed away. The keys were removed from the ignition, the trunk of the appellant's automobile was opened, and three pairs of shoes which had been stolen from Goldberg's Shoe Store were in the trunk of the automobile. Appellant testified in his own defense that he had been in possession of the automobile since 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on the previous day and that he and two other persons had been in the automobile but had not been near and had not burglarized Goldberg's Shoe Store. Beginning with Harris v. State, 61 Miss. 304 (1883) and followed in six cases,[2] we *759 held that, in burglary cases, the State may obtain an instruction that the possession of property recently stolen is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt of burglary. Appellant relies heavily on State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976) in support of his argument that the instruction as given by the court violated due process. Searle was charged with burglary and on petition for rehearing the Louisiana Court noted that there was little, if any, evidence to explain how the property was removed from its rightful location. The case before us is factually distinguishable from Searle because in our case the fact of the burglary was proved beyond any reasonable doubt with no evidence to the contrary. La.R.S. 15:432 provides, "A legal presumption relieves him in whose favor it exists from the necessity of any proof." According to the Louisiana court, one of the traditional and common sense presumptions required by the statute is "the person in the unexplained possession of property recently stolen is the thief." The Louisiana court reversed and remanded for a new trial relying on Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973). In Barnes the district judge instructed the jury that "Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained is ordinarily a circumstance from which you can reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen." Barnes was convicted on two counts of possession of U.S. Treasury checks stolen from the mails knowing them to be stolen, two counts of forging the checks, and two counts of uttering the checks, knowing the endorsements to be forged. The United States Supreme Court affirmed and stated: In the case at bar, the state proved that Goldberg's Shoe Store was burglarized, that three pairs of shoes taken in the burglary were in the trunk of appellant's automobile, and the shoes were seized from appellant's wrecked automobile 15 to 18 blocks from the scene of the burglary. The evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to infer that it was more-likely-than-not beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the burglary from the fact that he was in possession of shoes taken in the burglary a few blocks away and provided no reasonable explanation for such possession consistent with innocence. In Engbrecht v. State, we held: We conclude that the inference submitted to the jury by the instruction accords with due process and the evidence was sufficient to satisfy both the reasonable-doubt and more-likely-than-not standard. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied. DENIED. WALKER, P.J., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, C.J., dissents. PRATHER, J., takes no part. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, dissenting: I dissent with deference from the majority opinion. It is my belief the facts of this case were not sufficient to grant an "inference without explanation instruction" thereby permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary by use of inferences to support the essentials of that crime. It should be observed the indictment was for burglary when it more properly should have been for the unlawful possession of recently stolen property. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-69 (1972). Necessarily, however, the essential elements of burglary, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (1972), must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state, i.e., breaking and entering with the intent to steal. In my humble judgment the state did not do so. The burglary occurred sometimes between 11:05 p.m. and 12:39 a.m. when an officer discovered a broken glass in the front of the victim's building. This officer remained at the burglary scene for some twenty or twenty-five minutes when he was called to investigate an automobile accident approximately 15 to 18 blocks from the burglarized store. The investigation led to the appellant's arrest for drunkenness and an inventory of his car which disclosed three of the eight pairs of shoes that were taken from the burglarized store. My concern is that we should not lend this court's approval to an instruction which permits a jury to return a verdict of guilty without proof of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The questioned instruction, "The court instructs the jury that the possession of property recently stolen is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from it, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt." The appellant's attorney objected when it was offered for the court's approval, stating "we object to the giving of that instruction. However, it appears to be the words of the supreme court on that instruction." The court responded: "Well, the only thing I have wrong with that is even though the *762 Supreme Court has approved it, and it is probably in the Form Book `may infer guilty of what' larceny, of course, is the lesser offense of burglary. Possession of recently stolen goods does that have no inference, whatsoever, of breaking. You can't draw an inference of breaking from the fact that recently stolen goods were possessed. I will give that instruction." The trial court's language portrays doubt as to the propriety of the instruction and also that it was granted because of this court's previous approval of somewhat similar instructions. Unfortunately it overlooked the rule that all instructions must be linked to the evidence in each individual case. This warrants, in my opinion, a review of our cases on burglary convictions based upon an "inference without explanation" instruction. The first we note is Belote v. State, 36 Miss. 96, 120 (72 Am.Dec. 163) (1858), a larceny conviction, wherein the following instruction was approved, "If the evidence satisfies the jury that Ephriam Strout lost bank bills, and that they, or a part of them, had been found in defendant's possession shortly after, in the absence of other evidence proving how defendant came into possession, they will find him guilty." (Emphasis added). Twenty three years later, in Stokes v. State, 58 Miss. 677, 680 (1881), another larceny case, although not expressly overruling Belote, we held as follows: These cases established the precedent for inference instructions in burglary actions. Perhaps a reference to each will portray some of the vagaries found as well as the precautions this court has suggested in approving them. In Harris v. State, 61 Miss. 304, 305 (1883), the appellant was convicted on an indictment charging him with burglary and larceny. On appeal, an inference instruction was approved in the following language, "The fourth instruction for the State conforms to the doctrine laid down in Stokes' Case, 58 Miss. 680, that the possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance from which the jury may infer guilt. This is its substance, though a little differently expressed. It was correct." Its significance is that the instruction was enlarged to include burglary albeit in conjunction with larceny. Wiley v. State, 129 Miss. 196, 205, 91 So. 906, 908 (1922), concerned a burglary conviction. It held, Although this instruction did not accord with Stokes, inasmuch as it authorized prima facie finding of guilt rather than an *763 inference from which the jury might infer guilt it was nevertheless approved although disapproved because it was not qualified by the word "recent." Regardless, the court approved an inference instruction on the charge of "burglarizing the storehouse ... and stealing therefrom one pair of shoes." In Wood v. State, 155 Miss. 298, 124 So. 353 (1929), a burglary conviction was appealed. In it, an instruction conforming to that in Harris, was sanctioned although it was a burglary case. The court did state however, that the burglary must be proved by evidence independent of mere possession. In the case subjudice there was adequate proof of the breaking and entering by someone but no evidence of identity apart from the possession of three pairs of shoes. Millette v. State, 167 Miss. 172, 186, 148 So. 788, 792 (1933), again authorized an inference instruction in a burglary case. It held, "It was not error for the court to grant the instruction to the state that the recent possession of stolen property made a prima facie case of guilt against the appellant in the absence of a reasonable explanation." The court found the explanation of Mrs. Millette to be of the "man in the moon," variety and rejected it. We observe the instruction authorized a prima facie finding of guilt if the jury found the explanation unreasonable, again contrary to Stokes and other cases. More recently in Huddleston v. State, 220 Miss. 292, 296, 70 So. 2d 621, 623 (1954), (burglary) the following instruction was granted, "The possession of recently stolen property unexplained raises a presumption of guilt of the person so in possession which presumption may be considered along with all evidence in the case by the jury." Obviously, this holding overlooked the teaching of Stokes, as well as Matthews v. State, 61 Miss. 155, 156, wherein it was stated, "The most that can be said is that the fact of such possession may and ought to be considered by the jury in determining the question of guilt, and that where no reasonable and satisfactory explanation is given of such possession, the jury may from it infer guilt." In Huddleston the evidence indicating appellant's participation in the burglary was not limited to the proof of possession by the appellant of the recently stolen pistol. Justice Kyle pointed out there was other evidence indicating the defendant's guilt sufficient to warrant the jury's finding that the appellant was guilty as charged. Engbrecht v. State, 268 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 1972), referred to unexplained possession of recently stolen goods as ranking in strength with the proverbial circumstance of finding a "trout in the milk" as pointing with great cogency to a particular conclusion. Nevertheless, the court qualified this statement by carefully detailing other facts which placed the defendant's truck, where the stolen articles were found, at the scene of the burglary just thirty minutes prior to the crime's discovery. There is no such proof in the case presently before us, a distinction of some significance in my opinion. Undoubtedly this court has approved an instruction arising from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property from which a jury may infer guilt. I think it has done so, however, without giving consideration, at least I find none expressed, to the essentials of the three different crimes which necessarily require different proof. It may well be just to uphold a conviction of the possession of property recently stolen if the possessor does not reasonably explain the possession. In my judgment this one inference can be logically argued to support a conviction on that charge. But can we add to the inference of guilty knowledge the additional inference that the possessor stole the property? Personally I have some doubt concerning the stacking of one inference upon another to come to such conclusion. I have no doubt however, that placing a third inference upon the other two to infer a breaking and entering is nothing more than a court granting a jury license to infer guilt in a burglary charge when such is not supported by the facts. In my judgment this conviction does not conform to our standards of a jury finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, *764 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973), and more recently State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976). The case of United States v. Jennewein, 580 F.2d 915, 916 (6th Cir.1978), more nearly accords with my thoughts. It involved a theft from interstate shipment of goods wherein it was held that the defendant's unexplained possession of some of the recently stolen property was not sufficient to support a conviction of theft. The court stated: In the present case, appellant admits he was drunk at the time of the accident stating that the first time he saw the shoes was when the officer opened the trunk. He emphatically denied throwing a brick or rock through the window of the shoe store or that he was with anyone who did and denied that he was present when shoes were taken from the store. Whether an outright denial of knowledge of possession of the shoes constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable explanation I do not know, but I do not think an explanation, if found to be unreasonable by the jury, rises to the dignity of factual evidence from which a jury could find a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I would sustain the petition for rehearing. [1] The Court instructs the Jury that the possession of property recently stolen is a circumstance which may be considered by the Jury and from which, the absence of a reasonable explanation, the Jury may infer guilt. [2] Harper v. State, 355 So. 2d 314 (Miss. 1978); Engbrecht v. State, 268 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 1972); Huddleston v. State, 220 Miss. 292, 70 So. 2d 621 (1954); Millette v. State, 167 Miss. 172, 148 So. 788 (1933); Wood v. State, 155 Miss. 298, 124 So. 353 (1929); Wiley v. State, 129 Miss. 196, 91 So. 906 (1922).