Title: Duncan v. Laramie County Community College

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Duncan v. Laramie County Community College1989 WY 41768 P.2d 593Case Number: 88-104Decided: 02/14/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
HAROLD R. 
DUNCAN, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

 
 
v.

 
 

LARAMIE 
COUNTYCOMMUNITY COLLEGE, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

 
 
Terry J. 
Harris and Julie Nye Tiedeken of Southeast Wyoming Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ron Arnold, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant, Harold R. 
Duncan, appeals an order of the district court denying his petition for 
continued permanent total disability compensation. Appellant poses the following 
two issues for our determination:

 
 
(1) Did the 
district court err by basing its decision on a redetermination of the 
appellant's current "physical impairment" rather than basing its decision on a 
determination of the appellant's present impairment of earning 
capacity?

 
 
(2) Did the 
district court erroneously conclude that despite any continuing physical 
impairment, the appellant's present receipt of monthly retirement and social 
security benefits justified a denial of continued permanent total disability 
compensation?

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant suffered an 
injury to his cervical spine while working within the course and scope of his 
employment at Laramie County Community College (LCCC) in August 1978. On 
December 28, 1981, he was found to be permanently totally disabled and was given 
an award of $30,000 to be disbursed monthly until that sum was exhausted. When 
that sum was depleted in February of 1986, appellant petitioned the district 
court for additional permanent total disability benefits as provided in W.S. 
27-12-405 (as amended 1983). Benefits were continued several times on an interim 
basis, and he received $15,000 in additional benefits between March 1986 and 
February 1988. After taking testimony from appellant, his treating physician, 
and an independent medical examiner, the district court entered an order on 
February 25, 1988, denying further disability benefits.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant asserts as 
his first issue that the district court erred in basing its decision upon a 
redetermination of appellant's current physical impairment, rather than 
appellant's present impairment of earning capacity. This contention misconstrues 
the determination made by the district court and ignores the district court's 
broad grant of discretion in considering continued benefits under § 
27-12-405(d). Whereas § 27-12-405(b) provides that a worker shall receive certain enumerated 
benefits upon demonstrating a permanent total disability, § 27-12-405(d) clearly 
and unambiguously provides that a court may continue benefits for any continuing 
impairment of the worker's earning power.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant couches his 
argument in terms of an "entitlement" to this additional compensation. We hold 
that the clear intent of the statute is to grant to the district court a 
discretionary ability to order additional compensation where the facts and 
circumstances so warrant. Where the word "may" is used in a statute such as 
this, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion. Mayor v. Board of 
Land Commissioners, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, 411 (1948). This court 
has frequently stated its policy of liberally construing worker's compensation 
statutes in light of their beneficent purpose so that industry rather than the 
injured worker will bear the burden of industrial accident. We cannot, however, 
when so construing the act, ignore its clear statutory provisions. Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. Co., 668 P.2d 649, 652 
(Wyo. 1983). 
We perceive that a construction that continued benefits are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court is consistent with the overall intention of the 
worker's compensation statutes. Benefits are not intended as an income 
maintenance mechanism, but rather to provide an injured worker with payments in 
the nature of subsistence. W.S. 27-12-405(b) (as amended 1983); 1 Larson, Law of 
Workmen's Compensation, § 2.50 (1985); and see Matter of Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079, 
1083 (Wyo. 
1985) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).

 
 

[¶6.]     The district court 
arrived at its conclusion that these discretionary benefits should be denied 
after weighing a considerable body of evidence. Richard C. Wecker, M.D., was 
designated by the district court as an independent medical examiner. In contrast 
to the testimony of appellant's treating physician, who rated appellant as 100% 
permanently totally disabled and unable to work at any employment, Dr. Wecker's 
report concluded that appellant enjoyed a relatively normal and pain-free 
ability to move about and use his body. Further, Dr. Wecker 
found:

 
 
     (1) Appellant was 
permanently partially physically impaired to the extent of 15% for the lumbar 
spine and 20% for the cervical spine.

 
 
     (2) These percentages 
were not based on the industrial accident alone. Appellant had significant 
degenerative osteoarthritis involving the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spinal 
areas prior to the injury. This condition was consistent with the appellant's 
age (65 years of age), although the work injury served as an aggravation to that 
pre-existing condition.

 
 
     (3) Appellant's 
primary complaint, numbness and tingling in his hands, was due to a totally 
unrelated problem of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with median nerve 
compression at the wrist. Proper treatment of this condition could relieve the 
symptoms of numbness and tingling experienced by 
appellant.

 
 

[¶7.]     Moreover, appellant 
testified, and the court noted, that he was alert and demonstrated an ability to 
move about and gesture freely and with gusto. In addition, appellant related 
that after his accident he continued to work at LCCC until December of 1978 when 
he quit because he felt unsure of his ability to work around high voltage 
electricity. Appellant also worked as a maintenance man on telefax equipment for 
nine months in 1979 and quit that employment, in part because the machines were 
too heavy for him to carry, and in part because the company for which he worked 
was losing its contract to do the maintenance work. In 1980, he worked for a few 
months installing telephones, but quit that work because he felt he could not 
work fast enough due to numbness in his hands. Appellant also testified that he 
was free to move about and change jobs because he received a pension of $1,284 
per month for his 32-year career in the federal service, as well as $118 per 
month from social security. There was no testimony to the effect that appellant 
had searched for work suitable to his abilities and limitations and had been 
unable to obtain such work because of his 1978 injury.

 
 

[¶8.]     The district court 
applied these facts to the governing statute, § 27-12-405(d), and concluded that 
appellant did not suffer from a continuing impairment of his earning power 
resulting from the original injury. From the testimony of Dr. Wecker, the trial 
judge could properly infer that any impairment of appellant's earning capacity 
resulted from body impairment that did not result from the injury for which 
compensation was awarded. The trial court could properly infer from appellant's 
own testimony that his lack of employment was motivated, not by an inability to 
work because of the injury sustained at LCCC, but because he had a secure and 
steady income from his pension and social security. This later inference, we 
hold, was a proper consideration in determining appellant's motivation to return 
to work and, hence, his earning capacity. Russell v. Industrial Commission, 23 
Ariz. App. 
398, 533 P.2d 706, 711 (1975). Such a determination is similar in nature to an 
initial determination of disability, and we have held that these determinations 
are questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Rose v. Westates 
Const. Co., 703 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶9.]     Where there is 
sufficient evidence to support the factual determinations of the trial court, as 
there is in this case, we will not invade the province of the trier of fact by 
reaching a different conclusion. Schepanovich v. United States Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 529 (Wyo. 1983). Moreover, our holding that an 
award of continued compensation under § 27-12-405(d) is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court required that appellant satisfy a burden to 
clearly demonstrate an abuse of discretion. We have held that an abuse of 
discretion is that which shocks the conscience of the court and appears so 
unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. Waldrop v. 
Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1985), 
quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 
(Wyo. 1980). 
After viewing the substantial evidence which supports the trial court's findings 
and our construction of the purpose of § 27-12-405(d), we perceive no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant contends in his second issue 
that the district court erred in finding that, despite a continuing physical 
impairment, appellant's receipt of pension and social security income justified 
a denial of continued disability compensation. We need not decide today whether 
a district court could properly deny continued benefits under § 27-12-405(d) 
based solely on appellant's receipt of retirement income. The district court did 
not make such a determination. Having found no significant continuing impairment 
of appellant's earning power that resulted from the original injury, the 
district court then, assuming that such impairment existed, questioned whether 
permanent total disability compensation should be paid to one with such a 
substantial income. The statutes applicable to this claim are silent on whether 
such income may be the basis of a denial of continued benefits. We note, 
however, that under current law income from all sources is one factor that must 
be considered in deciding an application for an award of additional permanent 
total disability compensation. W.S. 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (as amended 1986). We 
conclude that the judgment of the district court was supported by sufficient 
evidence which indicated the appellant no longer suffered from any continuing 
impairment of his earning power resulting from the original injury and that such 
determination was within the sound discretion of the 
court.

 
 

[¶11.]  AFFIRMED.