Title: Michaels v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER'S LICENSE ACTION INVOLVING: BRADY L. MICHAELS, LICENSEE v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2012 WY 33Case Number: S-11-0156Decided: 03/06/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER’S LICENSE ACTION 
INVOLVING:BRADY L. MICHAELS, LICENSEE,Appellant 
(Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee (Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donna A. Murray, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General. 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  Brady L. Michaels was arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  The 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (the State) notified him that it was 
suspending his driver’s license for ninety days.  Mr. Michaels requested an administrative 
hearing.  After the hearing, the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension.  
 
[¶2]  Mr. Michaels appealed the suspension to 
the district court, which affirmed the OAH decision.  He then appealed to this Court, claiming 
§ 31-5-233(b) prohibits drinking and driving, his condition at the time of his 
arrest was the result of a diabetic ketoacidosis state not the result of 
drinking alcohol, therefore, the State did not meet its burden of proving that 
probable cause existed to believe he violated the statute.  
 
[¶3]  We hold as a matter of law that § 
31-5-233(b) was intended to apply when a person drives or is in actual control 
of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol beyond the legal limit or to a degree 
rendering him incapable of safely driving.  
Therefore, the OAH’s ruling that § 31-5-233(b) does not distinguish 
between alcohol concentration caused by consuming alcoholic beverages and 
alcohol concentration caused by some other factor is incorrect.  However, we also hold that the State met 
its burden of proving that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest to 
believe that Mr. Michaels had violated § 31-5-233(b), and we affirm  the OAH’s order upholding the suspension 
of his driver’s license.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶4]  The issues Mr. Michaels presents for 
this Court’s determination are whether the OAH decision is in accordance with 
the law and, if so, whether it was supported by substantial 
evidence.
FACTS
 
[¶5]  On the evening of April 16, 2010, 
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Rodney Miears was patrolling on U.S. Highway 20 
in Big Horn County, Wyoming.  At 
approximately 6 p.m., he observed a vehicle approaching him at a high rate of 
speed.  His radar showed the vehicle 
was traveling 96 miles per hour in the posted 65 mile per hour zone.  Trooper Miears pursued the vehicle, 
activating his flashing lights as he approached, and the vehicle pulled 
over.  Trooper Miears pulled up 
behind the vehicle, got out of his patrol car and approached the driver’s side 
window.  He informed the occupant 
that he had stopped him for speeding.  
He requested a driver’s license, proof of insurance and 
registration.  According to the 
trooper’s report, the occupant, Mr. Michaels, was difficult to understand, 
slurred his words and had watery, blood-shot eyes.  
 
[¶6]  Trooper Miears returned to his patrol 
car to fill out a citation for speeding.  
Mr. Michaels got out of his vehicle and approached the patrol car 
twice.  The second time, Trooper 
Miears asked him if he had been drinking.  
Mr. Michaels responded, “no.”  
Trooper Miears asked, “You haven’t?” and Mr. Michaels again said, 
“no.”  Trooper Miears told him to 
get back in his vehicle.  A few 
minutes later, Mr. Michaels got out of his vehicle again.  A second trooper who arrived at the 
scene asked Mr. Michaels to stay in his vehicle, but Mr. Michaels continued to 
walk toward Trooper Miears’ patrol car.  

 
[¶7]  The second trooper advised Mr. Michaels 
that Trooper Miears was going to have him perform field sobriety tests.  Trooper Miears told Mr. Michaels that he 
could smell the odor of alcohol coming from him.  He then had Mr. Michaels perform the 
sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn and one 
leg stand.  Mr. Michaels failed the 
tests.  The trooper administered a 
portable breath test which showed an alcohol concentration of .17%.  A second test showed a .16% alcohol 
concentration.  Trooper Miears 
arrested Mr. Michaels for driving while under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of § 31-5-233(b), which prohibits a person from driving if he has an 
alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more.  
He placed Mr. Michaels in the patrol car, gave him the implied consent 
advisement required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2009) and 
transported him to the Big Horn County jail.  A third breath test given at the jail 
still showed a .16% alcohol concentration.  
Upon being advised of his right to have additional tests performed at his 
own expense, Mr. Michaels requested to be taken to the hospital for a blood 
test.1  Trooper Miears also provided Mr. 
Michaels with written notice that his driver’s license was being suspended for 
ninety days. 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Michaels subsequently made a written 
request for a contested case hearing before the OAH.  A hearing was convened.  As a preliminary matter, Mr. Michaels 
stated he would stipulate that Trooper Miears had probable cause to stop him for 
speeding, but contested whether probable cause existed to arrest him for 
violating § 31-5-233(b).  For its 
case, the State relied on the certified record.  Mr. Michaels called three 
witnesses:  his physician, Dr. Joel 
Pull, who testified that Mr. Michaels suffered from Type I Diabetes and he 
believed Mr. Michaels was in a ketoacidosis2 state on the night of his arrest, 
not under the influence of alcohol; his wife, Kristy Michaels, who testified 
that her husband quit drinking alcohol after he was diagnosed with Diabetes in 
2009 and she did not observe him drinking nor did he smell like alcohol on the 
day of his arrest; and a co-worker, Nate Mattison, who also testified that Mr. 
Michaels had quit drinking and did not appear to be intoxicated on the day he 
was arrested.  Mr. Michaels also 
testified that he had not consumed alcohol on the day he was arrested. 

 
[¶9]  After the hearing, the OAH issued its 
order upholding the suspension of Mr. Michaels’ driver’s license.  In pertinent part, the OAH found and 
concluded as follows:
 
17.  The evidence in this case clearly 
established Michaels was stopped for speeding 96 mph in a 65 mph zone.  This is a traffic violation and provided 
probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.
18.  The evidence in this case established 
Trooper Miears observed that Michaels had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred 
speech, poor balance, the smell of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person 
and that Michaels was behaving erratically.  This is probable cause to continue 
detention and determine if Michaels was under the influence.  The record is clear that Michaels was 
not asked the preliminary questions concerning medical and physical conditions 
prior to submitting to field sobriety maneuvers.  As such, Trooper Miears was not aware 
Michaels was a diabetic until after Michaels had been arrested, booked into jail 
and submitted to a breath test.  The 
evidence is also clear that Michaels was in a ketoacidosis state at the time the 
field sobriety maneuvers were administered and at the time chemical testing was 
performed.  A person in a 
ketoacidosis state may exhibit signs of poor balance and slurred speech.  This raises questions as to the validity 
of the Walk and Turn and One Leg Stand maneuvers and the results of those two 
maneuvers will not be considered by this Office.  At the time Trooper Miears arrested 
Michaels he was aware Michaels smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery 
eyes, had exhibited erratic behavior, had been speeding, showed six signs of 
impairment on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and that Michaels had submitted to 
portable breath tests with results of 0.17 and 0.16.  Based upon the information available to 
Trooper Miears, at the time of the arrest, he had probable cause to arrest 
Michaels for DWUI. 
* 
* * *
21.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §31-6-102(e)(LEXIS 2009) 
provides for a ninety day suspension if a person submits to a chemical test with 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater.
22.  Alcohol concentration is defined by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (a)(i)(LEXIS 2009) as the number of grams of alcohol per 
two hundred ten liters of breath.
23.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §31-5-233(d)(LEXIS 2009) 
in part, provides that the fact a person is entitled to use controlled 
substances is not a defense to a charge of DWUI.
24. 
* * *   The evidence in this 
case clearly established Michaels submitted to a properly administered breath 
test and the result was 0.16 percent [alcohol concentration].  The evidence reflected Michaels’ 
[alcohol concentration] may have been the result of his ketoacidosis state 
caused by this diabetes.  The 
statutes do not provide a distinction between [alcohol concentration] caused by 
consumption of alcoholic beverages and [alcohol concentration] caused by some 
other factor.  Michaels submitted to 
a chemical test with a result of 0.08 percent or greater [alcohol concentration] 
and the proposed suspension action should be upheld.                       

 
Mr. 
Michaels appealed the OAH order to the district court, which affirmed.  From the district court’s order, he 
timely appealed to this Court.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]  When an appeal is taken from a district court’s 
review of an administrative agency’s decision, we consider the case as if it had 
come directly from the agency, giving no deference to the district court’s 
decision.  Middlemass v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 118, ¶ 10, 259 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 2011); 
Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 
WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  
Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2011):
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:
            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:
            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;
            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;
            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.
 
[¶11] 
In applying § 16-3-114(c), we have said:
 
[W]e 
review the agency’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard.  Substantial evidence 
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”  “Findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in 
the record, we can discern a rational premise for those findings.”  
. 
. . .
            
“We review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo, and will affirm only if the 
agency’s conclusions are in accordance with the law.”  [citations 
omitted]
 
Middlemass, 
¶¶ 11, 13,  259 P.3d  at 1164.          

 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]  In his first claim, Mr. Michaels 
contends the OAH’s findings and conclusions are not in accordance with the 
law.  Specifically, he asserts the 
OAH incorrectly concluded the driving under the influence statutes do not 
distinguish between alcohol concentration created by consuming alcohol and 
alcohol concentration caused by some other factor.  Mr. Michaels maintains the statutes were 
clearly intended to prohibit a person from driving after consuming substances 
containing alcohol and not to cover alcohol produced by the human body as occurs 
in a diabetic ketoacidosis state.  
Because the undisputed evidence showed that he was in a diabetic 
ketoacidosis state caused by his diabetes, he asserts, the State did not meet 
its burden of proving that probable cause existed to believe he violated § 
31-5-233(b).
 
[¶13]  Resolution of the issue Mr. Michaels 
raises requires us to interpret the driving under the influence statute.  We apply the following principles when 
interpreting statutory language:
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
Our paramount consideration is the legislature’s intent as reflected in 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.  Initially, we determine whether the 
statute is clear or ambiguous.  

 
            
A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable 
persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability.  Conversely, a 
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations.  If we 
determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain 
language of the statute.  

 
In 
interpreting a statute, we will not ignore other statutory provisions pertaining 
to the same subject but will, instead, consider all such provisions in pari 
materia.  
 
J&T 
Properties, LLC v. Gallagher, 
2011 WY 112, ¶ 10, 256 P.3d 522, 524 (Wyo. 2009) (citations 
omitted).
 
[¶14]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(b) 
(LexisNexis 2009), the provision pursuant to which Mr. Michaels made his request 
for a hearing, provides in relevant part:
 
(b) 
The scope of a hearing for the purposes 
of this act shall cover the issues of whether a peace officer had probable cause 
to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state in 
violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) . . . , whether the person was placed under 
arrest, whether he refused to submit to a test upon request of the peace officer 
or if he submitted to a test whether the test results indicated that the person 
had an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or 
more, and whether . . . he had been given the advisements required by W.S. 
31-6-102(a)(ii).
 
(emphasis 
added.)  Mr. Michaels contends the 
State failed to prove the highlighted portion of § 31-6-103(b), that is, that 
Trooper Miears had probable cause to believe he had been driving in violation of 
§ 31-5-233(b).  That section 
provides in relevant part as follows:
 
§ 
31-5-233. Driving or having control of vehicle while under influence of 
intoxicating liquor or controlled substances[.]
. 
. . .
            
(b) No person shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state if the person:
            
(i) Has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent 
(0.08%) or more; or
            
(ii) To a degree which renders him incapable of safely 
driving:
            
            
(A) Is under the influence of alcohol;
            
            
(B) Is under the influence of a controlled substance; 
or
            
            
(C) Is under the influence of a combination of any of the elements named 
in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph.
 
[¶15]  Reading the two provisions together, Mr. 
Michaels asserts the State had to prove that probable cause existed to believe 
that he was driving in violation of § 31-5-233(b) which he contends was intended 
to prohibit driving after consuming sufficient alcohol to have an alcohol 
concentration over the legal limit or be incapable of safely driving.  Because the evidence showed that his 
diabetic condition created the alcohol in his system, and no evidence was 
presented that he drank any alcohol on the day of his arrest, he contends the 
State did not meet its burden of proving that probable cause existed to believe 
he was driving in violation of § 31-5-233(b).  In support of his argument, he points to 
the title of the statute which clearly prohibits driving while under the 
influence of “intoxicating liquor.”3 
 
[¶16]  The plain and ordinary meaning of the 
word “liquor” is “a 
: a 
usually distilled rather than fermented alcoholic beverage.”  Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 
679 (10th ed. 1999).  “Intoxicate” means “a 
: to 
excite or stupefy by alcohol . . . especially to the point where physical and 
mental control is markedly diminished.”  Id. at 614.  Looking at the phrase “intoxicating 
liquor” in the title, it appears § 31-5-233(b) was intended to make it unlawful 
for a person to drive or be in physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage to the point of diminished physical and 
mental control.  

 
[¶17]  Looking beyond the title, we note that 
the phrase “intoxicating liquor” is not used in the statute itself.  Instead, the body of the statute uses 
the word “alcohol.”  The plain and 
ordinary meaning of the word “alcohol” is:  
“a: ethanol especially when 
considered as the intoxicating agent in fermented and distilled liquors 
b 
: 
drink (as whiskey or beer) containing ethanol.”  Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 27. 
 Ethanol is defined as:  “a 
colorless volatile flammable liquid C2H5OH that is the 
intoxicating agent in liquors and is also used as a solvent and in fuel.”  Id. at 398.  Applying 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the word alcohol, § 31-5-233(b) makes it 
unlawful to drive or be in physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of fermented or distilled liquors or liquids containing ethanol.  As Mr. Michaels maintains, in order to 
be convicted of violating the statute there must be proof that a person consumed 
or ingested liquor or liquid containing alcohol.
 
[¶18]  This interpretation of § 31-5-233(b) 
finds support in our prior case law.  
In Goich v. State, 80 Wyo. 
179, 339 P.2d 119, 120 (1959), we considered W.S. 1957 § 31-129 (the driving 
under the influence statute then in effect), which provided in relevant part as 
follows:
 
            
§ 31-129.  Driving or in control of motor vehicle 
while under the influence of liquor prohibited[.] – (a) It is unlawful . . . 
for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree 
which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive any 
motor vehicle within this state.
            
(b)  In any criminal 
prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a) of this section relating to driving 
a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of 
alcohol in the defendant’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical 
analysis of the defendant’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall 
give rise to the following presumptions: 
            
1.  If there was at that time 
0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be 
presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.
            
2.  If there was at that time 
in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.15 percent by weight of alcohol in the 
defendant’s blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the 
defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such 
fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant;
            
3.  If there was at the time 
0.15 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be 
presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a 
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.  
 
We 
said the trial court had properly instructed the jury that the phrase “under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor” meant “that a person had taken into his 
stomach a sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the 
normal control of his bodily or mental faculties.”  Goich, 339 P.2d  at 120 (citation 
omitted).  

 
[¶19]  More recently, in Crum v. City of Rock Springs, 652 P.2d 27, 28 (Wyo. 1982) we considered a conviction under a municipal ordinance which 
provided:
 
It 
is unlawful * * * for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor 
vehicle, to drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within the City 
of Rock Springs.  

 
The 
evidence presented was that Mr. Crum was driving a vehicle in the city, he drove 
through two red lights and, when stopped by law enforcement, his face was 
flushed, his speech was slurred, he had trouble maintaining his balance and he 
did not perform the field sobriety tests “too well.”  Id.  We concluded a person could not do well 
on sobriety tests for a number of reasons having nothing to do with intoxicating 
liquor.  We quoted the following 
from People v. Butts, 201 N.Y.S.2d 926, 932, 21 Misc.2d 799 (1960):
 
            
There are approximately 60 pathological conditions that have symptoms 
similar to those of alcoholism.  An 
apparent alcoholic condition might not be due to alcohol at all.  It may be merely the result of injury or 
sickness.  People taking medicines 
often act as if they had been imbibing too freely.  The diabetic in need of, or with an 
overdose of, insulin may act as if he were intoxicated.  Injuries to the nervous system or a 
concussion of the brain may create alcoholic symptoms.       
 
Id. 
at 28-29.  Citing Goich, we said that to support a 
conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, “there must 
be some evidence of ingestion of alcohol.”  
Id. at 29.  Because there was no evidence linking 
the accused with intoxicating liquor, we held the prosecution did not meet its 
burden of proving that he was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
and reversed the conviction.  

 
[¶20]  In Walston v. State, 704 P.2d 696, 698 
(Wyo. 1985), we reaffirmed that in order to establish a violation of § 
31-5-233(a) there must be some evidence that the accused consumed alcohol.  There, the evidence 
showed:
 
The 
deputy observed Mr. Walston in a bar where he appeared to have a drink in front 
of him, and he followed the appellant because he felt that he was too drunk to 
drive.  When Walston was stopped, 
the deputy smelled alcohol, and Mr. Walston himself admitted that he had been 
drinking.  Furthermore, there is 
ample evidence that alcohol had been ingested by Walston.  In fact, there is evidence that 
appellant was drinking just before he left the bar, and he admits he had been 
drinking that afternoon.  Once such 
evidence is introduced, there is a reasonable inference that the driving 
behavior of appellant was affected by alcohol.  The rational relationship between the 
bloodshot eyes, poor balance and difficulty communicating with police and the 
ingestion of alcohol is clearly established.  Appellant offered no alternative 
explanation for his condition and appearance.
 
[¶21]  These cases were decided under older 
versions of the driving under the influence statute.  However, as of the time of Mr. Michaels’ 
arrest in April of 2010, the statutory language defining the offense was 
substantially similar to the language in the older versions.  None of the amendments to the statute 
that had been made up to that point indicated a legislative intent to broaden 
the offense to include anything other than alcohol that is ingested or 
consumed.4  We hold the OAH incorrectly interpreted 
the law when it ruled § 31-5-233(b) makes no distinction between alcohol that is 
consumed and alcohol that appears in the body by some other means.  Giving the words in the statute their 
plain and ordinary meaning, we hold the version of § 31-5-233(b) in effect at 
the time of Mr. Michael’s arrest prohibited a person from driving after 
consuming or ingesting alcohol over the legal limit or to a degree rendering him 
incapable of safely driving.  There 
simply is nothing in the unambiguous language of the statue to indicate it was 
meant to cover alcohol that was not consumed or somehow ingested.  Our conclusion in this regard, however, 
does not end the inquiry.
 
[¶22]  For purposes of the license suspension 
hearing, the State was required to prove that probable cause existed to believe Mr. 
Michaels was driving in violation of § 31-5-233(b).  The State was not required to prove for 
purposes of suspending his license for ninety days that Mr. Michaels in fact had 
violated or was guilty of violating § 31-5-233(b).  Those were matters for determination in 
a separate criminal proceeding.  As 
reflected in § 31-6-103(b) set out more fully in paragraph 14 above, the issue 
for determination by the OAH in these proceedings as it relates to this appeal 
is whether probable cause existed to believe Mr. Michaels was driving in 
violation of § 31-5-233(b).   

[¶23]  To support an arrest for a violation of 
§ 31-5-233, a peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the 
individual was driving or had actual physical control of a motorized vehicle 
while his BAC was 0.08% or more or while he was under the influence of alcohol 
to an extent rendering him incapable of safely driving.  Probable cause is shown when the facts 
and circumstances within the peace officer’s knowledge and of which he had 
reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a reasonably cautious or 
prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed an offense.  Mascarenas v. State, 2003 WY 124, ¶ 10, 
76 P.3d 1258, 1261 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
standard is an objective one which is not subject to police discretion.  Id.  Whether probable cause existed is 
determined from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious peace 
officer on the scene at the time of the arrest.  Mickelson v. State, 2008 WY 29, ¶ 19, 
178 P.3d 1080, 1086 (Wyo. 2008).  
Its existence depends upon the facts as they apparently existed at the 
time, and not upon the ultimate determination of the facts.  Id. 
 
[¶24]  In this case, the State presented 
evidence that Trooper Miears clocked Mr. Michaels’ vehicle at 96 miles per 
hour.  Trooper Miears’ report stated 
that Mr. Michael’s eyes were blood shot and watery, his speech was slurred, his 
balance was poor and he smelled like alcohol.  The report also stated Mr. Michaels did 
not comply with directives to stay in his vehicle and that Trooper Miears did 
not ask the normal preliminary questions about any medical conditions because of 
Mr. Michaels’ “severe mood swings” and because he “did not want to upset [Mr. 
Michaels] and set him off” as occurred throughout their exchange.  The report also describes in some detail 
the field sobriety tests Mr. Michaels attempted and was unable to perform 
satisfactorily, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn and one 
leg stand.  Additionally, the report 
stated that three breath tests were given all showing Mr. Michaels’ alcohol 
concentration was above the legal limit of 0.08%.  From these facts, we conclude Trooper 
Miears had probable cause to believe Mr. Michaels was driving in violation of § 
31-5-233(b).  The fact that evidence 
may have come forth later, after the arrest, indicating Mr. Michaels was in a 
diabetic ketoacidosis state does not change the conclusion that Trooper Miears 
had probable cause at the time to believe he was driving in violation of § 
31-5-233(b).  Given that probable 
cause existed for the arrest, we affirm the district court’s order upholding the 
license suspension.  

 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Mr. Michaels testified that he thought the blood drawn at the hospital 
would be tested and the results provided.  
When he attempted to obtain the results later for purposes of the license 
suspension hearing, he was incorrectly informed that the results had been 
destroyed.  After the hearing, the 
State obtained a hospital laboratory report showing the blood test results and 
moved to re-open and supplement the record with the report.  The OAH denied the motion on the ground 
that the State had an opportunity to supplement the record with additional 
evidence after Mr. Michaels’ testimony and declined to do so.   
2Diabetic 
ketoacidosis is described as follows:
People 
with type 1 diabetes do not have enough insulin, a hormone the body uses to 
break down sugar (glucose) in the blood for energy. When glucose is not 
available, fat is broken down instead.  

As 
fats are broken down, acids called ketones build up in the blood and urine. In 
high levels, ketones are poisonous. This condition is known as 
ketoacidosis.  

Blood 
glucose levels rise (usually higher than 300 mg/dL) because the liver makes 
glucose to try to combat the problem. However the cells cannot pull in that 
glucose without insulin.
Diabetic 
ketoacidosis is often the first sign of type 1 diabetes in people who do not yet 
have other symptoms. It can also occur in someone who has already been diagnosed 
with type 1 diabetes. Infection, injury, a serious illness, or surgery can lead 
to diabetic ketoacidosis in people with type 1 diabetes. Missing doses of 
insulin can also lead to ketoacidosis in people with diabetes.  
Symptoms 
can include:  deep, rapid breathing, 
dry skin and mouth, flushed face, fruity smelling breath, decreased 
consciousness, and dulled senses.
http://medlineplus.gov
3Mr. Michaels also points to subsection (a)(vii) to support his 
contention.  That subsection 
provides:
 
            
(vii)  “Alcohol” means any 
substance or substances containing any form of 
alcohol.
 
Whether or not this provision actually supports his argument, it is not 
relevant to the discussion.  
Subsection (b)(vii) was added to § 31-5-233 by an amendment effective 
July 1, 2010 – more than two months after Mr. Michaels’ arrest.  As provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-101(b) (LexisNexis 2011), prosecutions are governed by the law in effect at 
the time the offense was committed.

4The Driver’s License Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-7-101 through -405 
(LexisNexis 2009), was amended in 1993 to define alcohol as “any substance 
containing any form of alcohol, including but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, 
propanol and isopropanol.”  § 
31-7-102(a)(i).  This amendment 
suggests a legislative intent to include liquids containing other forms of 
alcohol, such as solvents, that are consumed or ingested.   It does not suggest the 
legislature intended to broaden the definition to include alcohol that is 
neither consumed nor ingested but created inside the body.