Title: Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 67 v. Columbus

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 67 v. Columbus, 95 Ohio St.3d 101, 2002-Ohio-
1936.] 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 67, APPELLANT, v. 
CITY OF COLUMBUS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 67 v. Columbus (2002), 95 Ohio 
St.3d 101.] 
Employer and employee — Arbitration — Arbitrator exceeded his authority by 
relying on rules extraneous to the collective bargaining agreement to 
determine the eligibility of union employees to receive paid injury leave 
for carpal tunnel syndrome, when — Arbitration award vacated, when — 
R.C. 2711.10(D), applied. 
(No. 01-178 — Submitted January 8, 2002 — Decided April 24, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-283. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  Donald Sherrod and William Russell, two 
Columbus firefighters, developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome during the 
course of their duties.  As a result, both men missed work to receive medical 
treatment.  The firefighters applied for paid injury leave as provided for in Article 
24, Section 24.2, of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered into on 
their behalf by Local 67, International Association of Firefighters, appellant, with 
the city of Columbus, appellee.  According to this provision, paid injury leave 
“shall be granted to any such employee only for injuries or other disabilities 
determined by the Finance Department Director or designee as caused or induced 
by the actual performance of his or her position.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The firefighters’ request for paid injury leave was denied by the finance 
director and the Board of Industrial Relations on the ground that carpal tunnel 
syndrome was not a disability.  The union filed grievances on the firefighters’ 
behalf, contesting the denial of benefits.  The grievances were denied. 
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Pursuant to the CBA, the parties then submitted the grievances to 
arbitration.  The arbitrator denied the grievances, also finding that the firefighters 
did not sustain a disability.  In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator relied upon 
rules promulgated by the city’s Board of Industrial Relations that defined the 
terms “injury” and “disability” as physical damage or a physically restrictive 
medical condition “caused by an incident in the actual performance of the duties 
of the position.”  (Emphasis added.)  Since carpal tunnel syndrome is not caused 
by a single traumatic incident, the arbitrator concluded that it was not a disability 
for purposes of entitlement to paid injury leave. 
 
The union filed a complaint and an application to vacate the arbitration 
decision in Franklin County Common Pleas Court.  The trial court denied the 
union’s application to vacate the arbitration decision.  The court of appeals, in a 
two-to-one decision, affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding that the arbitrator’s 
decision drew its essence from the CBA.  The cause is now before this court upon 
the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
The issue in this case is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by 
relying on rules extraneous to the CBA to determine the eligibility of union 
employees to receive paid injury leave. 
 
A reviewing court’s role in evaluating an arbitration decision is limited to 
determining whether the award is unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious and whether it 
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.  Southwest Ohio 
Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627 (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 110, 742 N.E.2d 630.  For an award to draw its essence from the CBA, 
there must be a rational nexus between the agreement and the award.  Mahoning 
Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. 
TMR Edn. Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
The union asks us to vacate the arbitration decision.  R.C. 2711.10(D) 
provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if “[t]he arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”  The union maintains 
that by ignoring the plain meaning of the CBA, and instead relying on a definition 
of “disability” extraneous to the contract, the arbitrator exceeded his powers. 
 
In particular, the union argues that under the plain language of Article 24, 
Section 24.2 of the CBA, paid injury leave is to be granted whenever an employee 
suffers a work-related injury or disability, which would include carpal tunnel 
syndrome.  However, under the board’s definition of “disability,” employees 
seeking paid injury leave must demonstrate an additional element, i.e., that their 
injuries or disabilities were caused by an incident in performance of work-related 
duties.  Since this additional requirement was not bargained for, or made part of 
the CBA, the union maintains that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that 
the award does not draw its essence from the CBA. 
 
In contrast, appellee city contends, as the majority of the court of appeals 
held, that the arbitration award draws its essence from the CBA.  The city argues 
that there is a rational nexus between the CBA and the award in that Section 24.8 
of the CBA authorizes the director of finance to “make necessary rules, devise 
forms, keep records, investigate cases, and make decisions on allowance of pay 
for time off duty as provided by this Article, subject to the approval of the Board 
of Industrial Relations.”  (Emphasis added.)  Since Section 24.8 authorizes the 
finance director to “make necessary rules” regarding injury leave, the city 
believes that the arbitrator was warranted in looking at those rules, promulgated 
by the Board of Industrial Relations, to better understand what is meant by the 
terms “injuries” or “other disabilities” for purposes of paid injury leave. 
 
We disagree with the city’s position.  An arbitrator is confined to 
interpreting the provisions of a CBA as written and to construe the terms used in 
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the agreement according to their plain and ordinary meaning.  Ohio Office of 
Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 572 N.E.2d 71.  Even though the CBA does 
not define what is meant by the term “other disabilities,” this does not give the 
arbitrator the authority to rely on the city’s own definition of that term.  Instead, 
since the CBA is silent on this point, the term “other disabilities” must be given 
its ordinary meaning.  Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 474 defines 
“disability” as “[t]he inability to perform some function; an objectively 
measurable condition of impairment, physical or mental.”  It further defines 
“physical disability” as “[a]n incapacity caused by a physical defect or infirmity, 
or by bodily imperfection or mental illness.”  It is clear that the firefighters’ carpal 
tunnel syndrome falls within the ordinary definition of a disability. 
 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the CBA’s injury-
leave provision (Section 24.2) expressly provides that certain disabilities 
(cardiovascular, respiratory, and pulmonary) are presumed to be service-related.  
These disabilities, like carpal tunnel syndrome, are not necessarily caused by a 
single incident.  Instead, firefighters may develop these disabilities, particularly 
respiratory or pulmonary ailments, after they have sustained repeated exposure to 
smoke.  The inclusion of these disabilities strengthens the union’s position that 
the term “disability” was never intended to include the requirement that the 
condition was caused by an incident.  As Judge Tyack stated in his dissenting 
opinion in the court of appeals, “The presumption set forth in Section 24.2 clearly 
conflicts with the definition utilized by the Director of the Finance Department * 
* *.  I do not believe that the city can agree to one thing at the bargaining table 
and then take the benefits away with rules and regulations which are narrowly 
construed.” 
 
Moreover, contrary to the city’s position, Section 24.8 of the CBA does 
not give the arbitrator the right to rely on rules promulgated by the city itself to 
January Term, 2002 
5 
redefine terms used within the CBA.  Although Section 24.8 authorizes the 
finance director to “make rules” relating to injury leave, we believe this provision 
simply authorizes the city to develop the procedural mechanism for determining 
injury-leave claims.  It should not be read to authorize the director to unilaterally 
change the terms of the injury-leave provision of the CBA or redefine what is 
meant by the terms “injury” and “other disability.”  As this court has previously 
emphasized, an arbitrator may not create a contract of his own by imposing 
additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement.  Ohio Office 
of Collective Bargaining, 59 Ohio St.3d at 183, 572 N.E.2d 71.  Nevertheless, this 
is precisely what the arbitrator did in this case.  By ignoring the plain language of 
Section 24.2 and by relying on rules of the city’s Board of Industrial Relations, 
the arbitrator went outside the scope of the CBA and unilaterally abrogated the 
bargained-for provision. 
 
In Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth., supra, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 742 
N.E.2d 630, we reiterated the point that a CBA is limited to the provisions 
bargained for and that an arbitrator may not apply extraneous rules to the 
agreement, where those rules were not bargained for and are contrary to the plain 
terms of the agreement itself.  In SORTA, a union employee was terminated based 
upon the employer’s “zero-tolerance” drug policy, which called for automatic 
discharge.  The union filed a grievance on the employee’s behalf.  The arbitrator 
found that SORTA’s drug policy conflicted with the terms of the CBA, which 
provided that employees could be terminated only with “sufficient cause.”  In 
upholding the arbitrator’s award, we stated: 
 
“While SORTA’s drug policy may be facially valid, we find that SORTA 
did not have the right to unilaterally adopt automatic termination without 
possibility of reinstatement as a sanction for testing positive, because such a 
sanction conflicts with the ‘sufficient-cause’ requirement for dismissal found in 
Section 3(b) of the CBA.  * * *  [A]llowing SORTA to enforce automatic 
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termination would allow an employer to unilaterally adopt a sanction that 
conflicts with the sufficient-cause requirement for dismissal that was negotiated 
into the CBA, thereby undermining the integrity of the entire collective 
bargaining process.  The proper avenue for SORTA to adopt such a sanction 
would be through the collective bargaining process, not through a unilateral 
decision.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 91 Ohio St.3d at 108, 742 N.E.2d 630. 
 
Just as the employer in SORTA attempted to unilaterally adopt a rule 
contrary to the terms of the CBA, the city’s rules were applied even though the 
definition contained in those rules contravened the plain language of the CBA’s 
injury-leave provision.  We find that by applying the extraneous definition of 
“disability,” the arbitrator imposed an additional requirement on employees 
seeking paid injury leave, thereby violating the plain terms expressed in the 
agreement.  As a result, we conclude that the decision is not rationally derived 
from the terms of the agreement and that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and vacate the arbitration decision. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Thompson, Hine & Flory, L.L.P., William C. Moul and Bonnie I. O’Neil, 
for appellant. 
 
Janet E. Jackson, Columbus City Attorney, and Alan P. Varhus, Assistant 
City Attorney, for appellee. 
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