Title: State v. Foster

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 17, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner
on Review,
v.
ROBERT LYNN FOSTER,
Respondent
on Review.
(CC
CM0520170; CA A129929; SC S056299)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
May 12, 2009.
Douglas F. Zier,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Rolf C. Moan, Acting Solicitor General.
Bronson D. James,
Chief Deputy Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent on review.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy
Public Defender, Appellate Division, Office of Public Defender Services.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Benton
County Circuit Court, Janet Schoenhard
Holcomb, Judge. 219 Or App 276, 182
P3d 262 (2008).
GILLETTE,
J.
In this criminal case, we are asked
to consider whether evidence seized as a result of observations by an officer who
looked into an open, lighted window of a residence at night, before serving a
restraining order at that residence, should be suppressed under either the
state or federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures.  The trial court refused to do so, concluding, on the facts of this
case, that the actions of the officer were justified by officer safety
concerns.  The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the evidence should
have been suppressed.  State v. Foster, 219 Or App 276, 182 P3d 262
(2008).  We allowed the state's petition for review and now reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
We take the following facts from the
trial court record and the findings of the trial court.  See State v. Ehly,
317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993) ("A trial court's findings of historical
fact are binding on appellate courts if there is constitutionally sufficient
evidence in the record to support those findings.").  
The Benton County Sheriff's Office
was engaged to serve a restraining order on Aaron Mathews Spinney.  On
Saturday, January 15, 2004, the Sheriff's Office received information that
Spinney was staying at defendant's residence near Philomath.  Defendant and his
residence both were well known to the members of the Sheriff's Office.  Deputy
Hardison, one of the officers sent to serve the restraining order, stated that
he had been to the residence "numerous times" -- "I couldn't
even begin to tell you how many times I've been to th[at] residence."  In
Hardison's experience, the number of people at the residence at any particular
time varied from two to as many as 10 or more.  On several occasions, persons
at the residence had fled the police.  On at least two occasions, deputies had
been required to use force and fight with people at the residence.  Defendant
and his father had both been known to have weapons in the past.  Firearms had
been recovered from the residence, and Hardison had seen a fully automatic
weapon that the police had seized there.  According to Hardison, because of
past problems with people at the residence, "[i]t's usually four or more
[deputies] go up there."
In this case, it was four deputies. 
They arrived at approximately 11:35 p.m.(1) 
According to Hardison, when the deputies arrived they were deployed to meet two
concerns:
"[W]e wanted to make sure that we didn't have people
running out of the back and people circling around on us, as well as keeping an
eye on the residen[ts] inside the house * * *."
One deputy went up the path to the front door, while another
deputy was sent around to the back door.  Hardison went 20 feet past the front
door to look into a lighted bedroom window.  In looking in, Hardison stood in a
flower or dirt bed directly beneath the window.  The window was open, and
Hardison did not use any device to help him look inside.(2)
Almost immediately after first looking
in the window, Hardison saw defendant enter the room, remove an off-white
substance from a sandwich bag, and place it into a pipe.  Based on his training
and experience, Hardison believed that defendant was loading methamphetamine
into the pipe.  From prior contacts, Hardison was aware that defendant had used
methamphetamine.  Hardison reported what he had seen to the officer in charge
at approximately the same time that Spinney came out of the residence to be
served with the restraining order.  The deputies were concerned that defendant
would destroy the drugs, either by consuming them or by flushing them down the
toilet.  Hardison then entered the residence, arrested defendant, and seized
the bag, the pipe, and a set of scales.
Defendant was indicted for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).  He moved to suppress
the evidence that Hardison had seized as having been obtained in violation of his
state and federal constitutional rights to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures.  The trial court held a hearing and, on July 11, 2005, sent a
letter to the parties setting out its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Although the trial court agreed that defendant had a privacy interest in the
curtilage of the residence,(3)
the court nonetheless concluded that Hardison had taken up the position near
the window for valid officer safety reasons and that the evidence that Hardison
saw and later seized was in plain view from that position.  The trial court
therefore denied defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant subsequently entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling
on the motion to suppress.  See ORS 135.335(3) (authorizing such a
procedure).  The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence. 
Defendant appealed.
As noted, the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, concluding that Hardison's observations through the
window constituted an illegal search under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.  The court began its analysis by noting that the privacy
protections of the Oregon Constitution are particularly applicable to a
person's home and the area immediately surrounding it.  Foster, 219 Or
at 281.  The court noted, however, that there would be no search if "a
police officer makes an 'unaided observation' from a 'lawful vantage
point.'"  Id. at 281 (quoting State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or
613, 617, 801 P2d 749 (1990)).  The issue thus was whether Hardison was at a
lawful vantage point when he looked in the window.  The Court of Appeals concluded
that the deputies could approach the front door, because there was an implied
consent for visitors to contact the residents of a house in that way.  Hardison's
viewpoint, however, was not from the driveway or from a path to the front or
back door.  Indeed, Hardison had walked past the front door to look in the
window.  Id. at 282.  
The state argued to the Court of
Appeals that "officer safety" concerns permitted Hardison to position
himself outside the window.(4) 
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of argument, that the officer safety
doctrine could extend to "the invasion of the curtilage of a residence
beyond the boundaries of driveways or pathways to an exterior door," id.
at 284, but nevertheless concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden
of proof under the doctrine.  That was so because it had 
"failed to identify sufficient, articulable facts to
show that officer-safety concerns required Deputy Hardison to position himself
20 feet away from the front door, immediately next to defendant's bedroom
window, at a location that is not on a path to the front door, back door,
garage, or driveway as distinguished from a different location that could
ensure officer safety."
Id. at 284 (emphasis added).  Having determined that
Hardison had not been standing at a lawful vantage point when he observed
defendant's conduct, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hardison's
observations were an unconstitutional search under Article I, section 9, and
therefore reversed defendant's conviction.  Id. at 284-85.  As noted, we
allowed the state's petition for review.
On review, the state asserts that
Deputy Hardison's act of positioning himself under, and looking into, the
window fell within the officer safety doctrine and, thus, did not violate
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The state contends that the
Court of Appeals applied the officer safety doctrine in too narrow a fashion.  For
his part, defendant contends that Court of Appeals correctly held that the
evidence must be suppressed under Article I, section 9.  Alternatively,
defendant argues that the evidence should be suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We begin our analysis under the state
constitution.  Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in
part:
"No law shall violate the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure * * *."
This court has held that certain actions taken by police officers
to protect the safety of the officers (or others present) do not violate
Article I, section 9.  The most comprehensive discussion of the officer safety
doctrine is found in State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 747 P2d 991 (1987). 
Although the facts in Bates do not parallel those in this case, an
explanation of the officer safety doctrine that this court identified in Bates
will illuminate our analysis here.  We therefore discuss Bates in some
detail.
In Bates, an officer had
stopped the defendant's car for excessive emissions.  It was night, the stop
occurred in a "high crime" area, and the car had out-of-state license
plates.  When officers approached the car, they saw that it contained a
television and a videocassette recorder.  One of the officers noticed an object
on the floorboard between the defendant's feet; he could not identify it, so he
asked the defendant to pull it out.  The defendant did not pull the object out,
but instead reached under the seat and remained in that position.  The officer
drew his service revolver, ordered the defendant from the car, and pulled a
closed black bag from under the seat.  On opening the bag, the officer
discovered drugs (among other things).  Id. at 521-22.  In the
defendant's subsequent prosecution on drug and weapons charges, the trial court
rejected a defense motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of
the bag.  In its review of that ruling, this court considered whether the
warrantless search was justified by officer safety concerns.
The Bates court began its
analysis by observing that, generally, officers are entitled to take reasonably
necessary steps to protect their safety during an encounter with a citizen,
provided certain requirements are met.  Specifically, the court held that:
"Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, does
not forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if,
during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a
reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the
citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the
officer or to others then present."
Id. at 524.  This court added that police must be
given some discretion in the officer safety context:
"[I]t is not our function to uncharitably second-guess
an officer's judgment.  A police officer in the field frequently must make
life-or-death decisions in a matter of seconds.  There may be little or no time
in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the
intrusiveness of protective measures.  An officer must be allowed considerable
latitude to take safety precautions in such situations.  Our inquiry therefore
is limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the decision was
made."
Id. at 524-25.
Under the facts found in Bates,
however, the court concluded that the requirements of the officer safety
doctrine had not been met.  The officer had identified five facts that caused
him to be concerned for his safety: the out-of-state license plates, the time
of day, the high crime area, the defendant's appearance, and the presence of a
videocassette recorder and television on the back seat of the vehicle.  Id.
at 525.  The court concluded that none of those facts "either individually
or collectively justified a suspicion on [the officer's] part that this
defendant posed an immediate threat [of physical harm]."  Id. at
526.  
The court separately addressed
whether the bag under the driver's seat justified the officer's conclusion that
the defendant was such a threat and concluded that it did not:  "In light
of defendant's cooperative attitude, his lack of aggressive or threatening
behavior[,] and the absence of any apparent weapon, the mere possibility that
he might have committed a crime and the presence of what appeared to be a bag
are not sufficient."  Id. at 527.  The court explained that, although
police officers "are entitled to some leeway in taking protective
measures," the facts articulated by the officer were not sufficient to
show a reasonable belief that the defendant was an immediate threat, and the
motion to suppress the evidence should have been granted.  Id.
But the facts in Bates are not
the facts here.  In Bates, the circumstances that aroused the officer's
concerns occurred "during the course of a lawful encounter with a
citizen."  Id. at 524.  In the present case, the pertinent facts
all were historical, i.e., they all were known before the
officers' encounter.  But, in our view, the timing of the officer's knowledge
is not the point of invoking the officer safety doctrine.  Instead, it is
sufficient that the officers be able to point to specific and articulable facts
-- whether historical or contemporaneous -- that would reasonably create a fear
for the safety of the officers or others from an imminent threat to them of
serious physical injury.(5)
We have summarized the pertinent facts
above.  Deputies had been to this residence repeatedly.  The residence sometimes
had 10 or more occupants.  In some past visits, persons at the residence had
used force to fight the deputies.  Defendant and his father had both been known
to have weapons; firearms had been recovered from the residence; and a fully
automatic weapon had been seized at the residence.  Those are specific,
articulable facts.  The next question is whether those facts would justify the
required reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to the officers during the
anticipated encounter with the occupants.
Defendant contends that the foregoing
facts are "stale," because the state's witnesses did not give the
dates of the prior incidents.  That is, defendant contends that the other
incidents on which Hardison relied may have been so remote in time that it was
not reasonable to rely on them as showing that occupants of the residence might
pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury.  We disagree.  Here, the
evidence concerned the tendency of the occupants of the house to be prepared
to, or actually to resort to, violence.  Information about the presence of a
small amount of contraband at a given place (to use but one example) may grow
stale, see, e.g., State v. Ingram, 251 Or 324, 445 P2d 503
(1968) (magistrate could not find probable cause to search residence for
narcotics based solely on fact that heroin had been obtained from residence one
month before application for search warrant was filed), but human tendencies
have a longer shelf life.  Moreover, and even if "staleness" were the
pertinent inquiry, the state did offer evidence establishing at least the outer
boundary of when the incidents occurred:  Hardison testified that he had been
with the sheriff's office for six years.  That fact, coupled with Hardison's
testimony that he had been to the residence "many times," showed that
the residence and the people residing in it had a history that a reasonable officer
would believe still was applicable.  Given that history of violence and of
weaponry on the premises and in the hands of the occupants, we conclude that
the deputies had a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the residence
posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury.
We turn to the next part of the officer
safety doctrine, viz., "whether the precautions taken were
reasonable under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that
the decision was made."  Bates, 304 Or at 525.  As noted, this
court, in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular officer safety decision,
will not "uncharitably second-guess" the choice of person on the
spot, who must make difficult decisions under great pressure, often with little
or no time for reflection.  Id. at 524.
In this case, the deputies had a
reasonable suspicion that they were about to encounter circumstances in which (1)
there might be as many as 10 occupants of the residence, (2) those occupants
might be armed, and (3) the occupants might be willing to use force against the
deputies.  There was an open, lighted window some 20 feet past the front door;
Hardison went to look through that window in order to "keep[] an eye on
the residen[ts] inside the house" while the deputies served the
restraining order.  By doing so, Hardison would have been able to warn the
other deputies if an occupant either was armed or had begun arming himself when
the deputies knocked.  Under those circumstances, we agree with the trial court
that Hardison's actions were within the range of reasonable precautions that
the officers were entitled to take against the anticipated threat.  
The Court of Appeals appears to have
reached a contrary conclusion because it applied a more demanding test to the
deputies' actions.  The issue, that court stated, was whether the state had
"identif[ied] sufficient, articulable facts to show that officer-safety
concerns required Deputy Hardison to position himself [where he did,] * * *
as distinguished from a different location that could ensure officer safety." 
Foster, 219 Or App at 284 (emphasis added).  That test misreads both the
officer safety doctrine and Bates, which explained the doctrine. 
The requirement of specific, articulable facts relates only to whether an
officer reasonably suspected an immediate threat.  See Bates, 304 Or at
524 ("a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts,
that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical
injury").  Beyond that, the doctrine asks only whether safety precautions chosen
by the officer were reasonable under the perceived circumstances.  The state is
not required, as the Court of Appeals suggested, to justify the choice of one reasonable
precaution over another.  Indeed, such a post hoc weighing of
alternatives would be exactly the sort of uncharitable second-guessing that Bates
itself condemned:  It would require that an option that was chosen quickly and
under pressure be the same one that a reviewer later identifies at leisure and
after reflection.  Courts should not weigh the possible courses of action
against each other; the officer safety doctrine requires only that the choice
actually made be reasonable, even if other choices also would have been
reasonable.
Defendant argues that we should
extend to this case the rule of State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 666 P2d 802
(1983).  In Davis -- an officer safety case predating Bates --
this court held that police officers' concerns for their safety did not justify
their entry into a defendant's motel room:
"[A] remote possibility of harm to the police officers
cannot justify a warrantless entry into the private recesses of one's house. 
Absent articulable facts that evidence a compelling and urgent need for the
entry, the Oregon Constitution demands a warrant be issued.  We can require no
less where the entry, as here, is supported with less than probable
cause."
Id. at 243.  Defendant contends that we should apply the
"compelling and urgent need" requirement to the curtilage of a house as
well as to the "private recesses."
We decline to do so.  There is a significant
difference between crossing an open yard at the edge of a path that is open to
the public and leads to a residence, and breaching the physical boundary
established by the walls and doors of a residence.  We conclude that, like Bates,
Davis merely represents a particular, and correct, application of the officer
safety doctrine that we later articulated more thoroughly in Bates.  The
doctrine generally requires that an officer's response to officer safety
concerns be reasonable in light of the specifically articulated and reasonably
perceived circumstances.  Davis speaks to the reasonableness of one
particular type of officer safety response -- holding that a warrantless entry
into the interior of a residence is not a reasonable response unless
"articulable facts * * * evidence a compelling and urgent need for the
entry."  Id.  We perceive no conflict between the rule of Davis
and the officer's actions here.
We conclude that the officer safety
doctrine applied in this case.  Under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy
Hardison did not violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, when
he looked through the open window of the residence.
Defendant argues in the alternative
that the officers, even if they properly observed his illegal activity through
the window, should not have entered his house without a warrant.  Defendant does
not appear to have made that argument either to the trial court (where he
lost), or to the Court of Appeals (where he won).  We therefore decline to
address it.
Defendant also argues that Hardison's
actions violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourth
Amendment provides, in part:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated * * *."
The United States Supreme Court,
however, has recognized an officer safety doctrine similar to the one that we
articulated in Bates.  In a line of cases dating back to Terry v.
Ohio, 392 Or 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), the Court has
concluded that police may perform limited searches necessary for officer safety
when the officers have specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion
of danger to themselves or others.  See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 US 385, 394, 117 S Ct 1416, 137 L Ed 2d 615 (1997) (officers may conduct a
"no-knock" entry pursuant to warrant if they "have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous"); Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325,
327, 110 S Ct 1093, 108 L Ed 2d 276 (1990) (officers may conduct a protective
sweep of residence after arrest "if the searching officer possessed a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer
in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the
officer or others") (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations
omitted).
The situation here is analogous to
the circumstances addressed in Terry and its progeny.  For the reasons
that we already have discussed, we conclude that the state has offered specific
and articulable facts why the deputies here reasonably feared for their
safety.  We further conclude that walking 20 feet past the front door of
defendant's house to look in an open, lighted window was a reasonable response
to the perceived danger.  It follows that the deputies' actions did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. The
reason that the officers chose that hour is not altogether clear.  Obvious
reasons include the greater likelihood that the man they sought would be there,
as well as the value of darkness in concealing the officers' approach.
2. The
trial court concluded that the window was open.  Hardison testified that there
were horizontal blinds on the window, but he did not testify that the blinds
were down or closed, and his other statements implied that the blinds either
were up or open.  Thus, the trial court's inferentially based conclusion was a
permissible one.
3. "'[T]he
common-law distinguished "open fields" from the
"curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the
home.'"  State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 209, 766 P2d 1015
(1988) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 180, 104 S Ct 1735,
80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)).
4. We
describe the "officer safety" doctrine at considerable length later
in this opinion.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 6-8).
5. We
note in passing that the Court of Appeals analyzed the case as if the only
privilege that the deputies had to enter into the property was one of implied
consent for the public to go to the front door.  That, however, does not
exhaust the potentially applicable privileges to engage in what would otherwise
be a trespass.  "Where one is privileged to execute civil process on the
person * * * of another, one is also privileged to enter the other's land, by
force if necessary, to serve the process."  1 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, Harper, James and Gray on Torts § 1.19,
at 75 (2006) (footnote omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
208-09 (1965) (discussing requirements of the privilege).  In Oregon, a sheriff
is required to serve court orders.  ORS 206.030.  If resistance is anticipated,
the sheriff may even command others to assist in overcoming the resistance. 
ORS 206.050.  On the other hand, the privilege of entry to serve civil process
does not necessarily permit the server to roam at will across the property.