Title: CROSS v. BERG LUMBER CO.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CROSS v. BERG LUMBER CO.2000 WY 1547 P.2d 922Case Number: 99-91Decided: 07/20/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
RICHARD CROSS, Appellant 
(Defendant),v. BERG LUMBER COMPANY, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Converse County, The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: B.J. Baker of Brown, 
Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, WY.Representing Appellee: James A. 
Hardee, Douglas, WY.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] This case 
concerns a disputed piece of heavy machinery, a road grader. Berg Lumber Company 
sued Richard Cross for the tortious conversion of this grader and for replevin. 
After a bench trial, the district court awarded Berg damages in the amount of 
$83,400 and ordered that the grader be returned to Berg. Cross takes issue with 
the district court's application of the statute of limitations, findings of 
fact, and calculation of damages. Finding no error, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Appellant 
raises three issues:

1. The conclusion of the 
District Court that the claim of Appellee Berg Lumber Company, Plaintiff below, 
was not barred by statute of limitations is incorrect as a matter of law and is 
subject to being corrected by the Supreme Court.

2. The conclusion of the 
Court at of the Decision Letter that Crail took the grader without Berg's 
permission is clearly erroneous, is contrary to both the pleadings and the 
evidence, and therefore the District Court should have ruled as to whether or 
not Berg is estopped from asserting ownership to the grader, based on the 
evidence presented.

3. The Court in awarding 
damages misapplied the law of damages of the State of Wyoming and made findings 
and conclusions contrary to both law and to the undisputed 
facts.

[¶3] Appellee 
also discerns three issues:

1. Did the District Court 
properly determine that Plaintiff Berg Lumber Company's claim was not barred by 
the Statute of Limitations?

2. Did the District Court 
properly dispense with a consideration of Defendant's theory of estoppel when no 
facts were presented to support such a theory?

3. Did the District Court 
properly determine damages based upon the facts ascertained by the Court and the 
applicable law?

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶4] Because 
this case was decided after a bench trial, the factual findings of the judge are 
not entitled to the more limited review afforded a jury verdict. 9 Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2585 at 
730 (1971). "Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing 
disputed evidence." Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶5] The purpose 
of specific findings under Rule 52(a) is to inform the appellate court of the 
underlying facts supporting the trial court's conclusions of law and disposition 
of the issues. Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Wyo. 1985); 
Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 730 (Wyo. 1979); Whitefoot [v. Hanover Ins. Co.], 
561 P.2d [717] at 720 [Wyo. 1977]. While the findings are presumptively correct, 
the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 899 (Wyo. 1979); 9 Wright & Miller, 
[Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil], § 2585 at 729, 731. Deference is given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses. Shores, 591 P.2d  at 899. Because this court does not weigh the 
evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a 
different result. Shores, 591 P.2d  at 899; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 
at 732-33. The appellant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that 
the finding is erroneous. 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 
729.

[¶6] On appeal, 
findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous. Shores, 591 P.2d  at 
899; Whitefoot, 561 P.2d  at 720; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 729. 
The definitive test of when a finding is clearly erroneous was adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948). "A finding is `clearly 
erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed." Id. at 395, 68 S. Ct.  at 542. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells 
Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 670, 110 S. Ct. 2034, 2041, 109 L. Ed. 2d 677 
(1990), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S. Ct. 2990, 120 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1992) 
(reaffirming the United States Gypsum Co. test). Wyoming accepted this standard 
for Rule 52(a) in Shores, 591 P.2d  at 899. Alternatively, a determination that a 
finding is against the great weight of the evidence means a finding will be set 
aside even if supported by substantial evidence. Rocky Mountain Turbines, Inc. 
v. 660 Syndicate, Inc., 623 P.2d 758, 762 (Wyo. 1981); Shores, 591 P.2d  at 899; 
9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 735 n. 10.

[¶7] Conclusions 
of law made by the district court under Rule 52(a) are not binding upon this 
court and are reviewed de novo. Shores, 591 P.2d  at 900; 9 Wright & Miller, 
supra, § 2588 at 752. "Findings of fact of the trial judge can also lose the 
insulation of the clearly erroneous standard if they are induced by an erroneous 
view of the law, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., . . . 333 U.S.  at 
394, 68 S. Ct.  at 541; and United States v. Richberg, . . . 398 F.2d 523 ([5th 
Cir.] 1968), or contain factual and legal conclusions that reflect the 
application of an improper legal standard." Shores, 591 P.2d  at 
899-900.

Hopper v. All Pet Animal 
Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538-39 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶8] Damages are 
findings of ultimate fact. In a jury trial, the "jury's determination of the 
amount of damages is inviolate absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to 
shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that 
passion, prejudice, or other improper cause had invaded the trial." Coulthard v. 
Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 92 (Wyo. 1990). But the standard of review after a bench 
trial is less deferential. "Damages, like apportionment of fault, are reviewed 
as fact and are not reversed unless clearly erroneous." S. Childress, A 
Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 330 (1989),1 (citing Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. 
v. NCR Corp., 772 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1985); NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247 
(5th Cir. 1985); Stern v. Satra Corp., 539 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 
1976)).

FACTS

[¶9] In 1989, 
Berg Lumber Company purchased a Caterpillar 120 motor grader for $19,700. Berg 
used the grader to push dirt and snow and for road construction, grading, and 
maintenance. In 1991, Berg moved the grader to its Casper sawmill. At that time, 
Berg also contracted with Joe Crail to deliver logs to the Casper 
sawmill.

[¶10] In October 
or November, 1991, without Berg's knowledge or permission, Crail took the grader 
from Casper to Richard Cross' ranch in Converse County, where Crail used the 
grader to grade access roads to facilitate logging. Crail damaged Cross' 
property by knocking down gates, burying irrigation ditches, and marring roads. 
Crail also owed Cross $5,500.00 for logs that he had removed from the property. 
In November 1991, when he learned that Crail had taken the grader, George Berg 
telephoned Crail and requested its return. Crail promised to return it. The 
grader was not returned; and, in the spring of 1992, Berg again spoke with 
Crail. Crail said he had left the grader on the Taylor ranch and that he did not 
have the money to hire someone to bring it back. Berg then traveled to Douglas 
and to the Taylor ranch, where he was unable to find the 
grader.

[¶11] Berg later 
learned that the grader was on the Cross ranch. He went there and saw it at 
Cross' shop, with the blade down and the wheels off. He spoke with Cross, who 
told him that he wanted to use the grader to repair the damage done by Crail. 
Berg agreed with this proposal "to make it right"-meaning that, if his 
contractor Crail had caused damage to Cross, he would let Cross use the grader 
to repair that damage. Berg told Cross that the grader's clutch might not be 
working smoothly. Cross said he would fix it so that he could use it. Berg 
acquiesced and told Cross he would pick up the grader when the damage was 
repaired.

[¶12] During the 
summer of 1992, Berg sent a truck down from Montana to pick up the grader. Cross 
did not allow the driver to take the grader, saying he had not yet had time to 
repair the damage to his ranch. Berg allowed Cross to retain the grader to 
repair the damage. In 1993, Berg sent another truck to get the grader; but, for 
reasons not apparent from the record, the grader remained in Wyoming at that 
time. In June 1994, Berg again tried to reclaim his grader. Cross refused to 
allow Berg's employees onto his property to view the 
grader.

[¶13] In the 
summer of 1996, Berg's agent called Cross to reclaim the grader. Cross answered 
this demand by claiming that the grader was gone-that someone had come with a 
truck and hauled it away. On September 4, 1996, Berg's agent reported this 
alleged theft to the Converse County Sheriff's Office. Another Berg employee 
hired an airplane to fly him over the Cross ranch. From this aerial vantage, he 
located the grader concealed in an area that was not visible from the public 
road. By and through counsel, Berg formally demanded return of the grader on 
October 9, 1996. This lawsuit was filed on January 5, 
1998.

[¶14] At trial, 
both George Berg and Richard Cross testified. Among the other witnesses were 
several who established various elements of damage, including a heavy equipment 
expert from Wyoming Machinery Company who testified that the grader had a 
monthly rental value of $2,500. After hearing all the evidence, the district 
court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $83,400 and issued a Writ 
of Replevin directing Cross to return the motor grader to Berg Lumber. This 
appeal timely followed.

I. STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS

[¶15] Cross 
argues that the four-year statute of limitations in this case began to run in 
1993, not 1996, and that this action is therefore time barred. He contends that 
when Berg sent a truck to the Cross ranch in 1993 to pick up the grader, 
permissive use expired and the conversion claim accrued.

"[C]onversion occurs when 
a person treats another's property as his own, denying the true owner the 
benefits and rights of ownership." Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co., 884 P.2d 971, 
975 (Wyo. 1994). To establish a conversion claim, the plaintiff must prove 
that:

(1) he had legal title to 
the converted property; (2) he either had possession of the property or the 
right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the defendant exercised 
dominion over the property in a manner which denied the plaintiff his rights to 
use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the defendants lawfully, or 
at least without fault, obtained possession of the property, the plaintiff made 
some demand for the property's return which the defendant refused; and (5) the 
plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the property.

[¶16] Marchant 
v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551, 556 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141, 
144 (Wyo. 1981)); see also McCarthy v. James E. Simon Co., 923 P.2d 747, 750 
(Wyo. 1996).

[¶17] The 
statute of limitations for the torts of conversion and trespass to chattels is 
four years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) (Lexis 1999). The cause of 
action accrues when the forces wrongfully put in motion by the defendant produce 
injury. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 343 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86. Thus, the four-year limitations period for 
conversion begins running when the plaintiff knew or should have known that the 
property was wrongfully converted. O'Donnell v. Western Nat'l Bank, 705 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1985). A cause of action for the wrongful taking of personal 
property is not deemed to have accrued until the wrongdoer is discovered. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-106 (Lexis 1999).

[¶18] The 
district court found that permissive use was extended until 1996. This finding 
of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Although the tortured 
history of this case reveals that Berg made numerous attempts to retrieve the 
grader prior to 1996, there is no evidence that Cross engaged in fraudulent or 
tortious conduct until then. The ongoing negotiations and extensions of 
permissive use refute the contention that the tort accrued in 1993. It was not 
unreasonable for the fact finder to conclude that the tort of conversion accrued 
when Cross lied to Berg and falsely reported that the grader was not on his 
property. The district court reasoned:

[¶19] This case 
was filed on January 5, 1998, which is less than four years after both the 1994 
and 1996 attempts to get the grader back. Consequently, those incidents do not 
impact this issue. The cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations 
only if Berg knew or should have known of Cross's intentions prior to January, 
1994. The Court finds that none of the incidents described in the trial 
testimony that occurred before that date would have given Berg, or any other 
reasonable person in his position, cause to believe that Cross intended a 
wrongful detention of the grader to such extent that the statute of limitations 
for the replevin cause of action should have begun to run. Berg was told, and 
apparently believed, that Cross needed the grader to repair damage caused by 
Crail. Later, Cross either told Berg's employees that he was not yet done with 
the grader, or that it needed repairs, or that he had made repairs on it, or 
that he needed to speak directly to Berg. The fact that Berg was willing to 
continue to deal with Cross throughout this ordeal in a non-confrontational 
manner should not be found unreasonable, and should not be held against 
him.

[¶20] Cross has 
not demonstrated that this conclusion was clearly 
erroneous.

[¶21] Cross also 
argues that Berg should be precluded from arguing that Cross' possession of the 
grader was permissive because of contradictory statements in the complaint. 
Judicial estoppel is sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to 
play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings. It 
is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold in the same 
breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in 
judicial proceedings. . . .

[¶22] Allen v. 
Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976). Judicial estoppel requires that "where a 
man is successful in the position taken in the first proceeding, then that 
position rises to the dignity of conclusiveness." Erhart v. Flint Engineering 
& Const., 939 P.2d 718, 724 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Hatten Realty Co. v. 
Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 290 P. 561, 566 (1930)). There is no indication in the 
record or briefs that Berg was ever successful in the position at issue; but 
since the judicial estoppel argument is not supported by cogent argument or 
pertinent authority, we will not consider it. See May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 
1191 (Wyo. 1997).

II. APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
FACTUAL FINDINGS

[¶23] Cross 
contends that the district court was clearly erroneous when it found that Crail 
took the grader without Berg's permission. Cross then reasons that Berg is 
estopped from asserting ownership of the grader. The district court found that 
Berg did not, as a matter of fact, allow Crail to deal with the grader as if it 
was his own. The testimony was that Crail took the grader without Berg's 
permission, and that as soon as he discovered the taking, Berg began to try to 
get the grader back from Crail. There was no evidence that Berg in any way 
authorized Crail in general to treat the grader as if he owned it, or that he 
authorized Crail in particular to deal with Cross in regard to the grader. It 
would be more tempting to surmise from the evidence that Crail actually lied to 
Berg as to the whereabouts of the grader, perhaps because, as Cross claims, 
Crail had already "given" Cross the grader as payment or security on a 
debt.

[¶24] This 
factual finding is supported by ample evidence in the record. Cross argues that 
Berg admitted in the complaint that he authorized Crail to utilize the grader. 
Crail was authorized to use the grader, but not to take it. Berg never 
authorized Crail to take the grader to Cross' ranch.

[¶25] In effect, 
Cross argues that he is a bona fide purchaser, an innocent third party who was 
mislead by Crail's apparent authority to dispose of the grader. This argument, 
however, would only apply if Cross were asserting legitimate ownership of the 
grader. But Cross himself disclaimed any ownership interest in the grader. He 
asked Berg if he could borrow the grader to repair damage done by Crail. One 
does not seek to borrow that which he already owns. And under questioning from 
the bench, Cross admitted that he knew the grader was not his: "I never wanted 
the grader. I think I always made that clear to anybody that Mr. Berg sent, that 
I didn't want the grader. I just wanted to be paid." And he admitted that Berg 
did indeed claim ownership of the grader: "I didn't know that he owned the 
grader. I mean, he told me, but that didn't mean he owned it." The district 
judge, as fact finder, had the opportunity to gauge the demeanor and assess the 
credibility of live witnesses who told confusing and contradictory stories. We 
cannot determine, based on appellate review of a cold record, that these 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

III. 
DAMAGES

[¶26] Appellant 
contends the district court's damage calculation was erroneous because the court 
relied upon an improper legal standard. While damages are normally subject to 
clear error review, the underlying legal standards are pure issues of law 
subject to de novo review.

[¶27] The 
district court awarded $83,400 in incidental damages as 
follows:

1. Return of the grader. 
2. $10,000.00 to repair the engine. 3. $400.00 to replace the cutting edge and 
batteries. 4. $900.00 for tire replacement (50% depreciation). 5. $4,600.00 for 
costs of attempted recovery of the grader. 6. $67,500.00 for loss of use 
($2,500.00 x 27 months since 10/96).

[¶28] Each of 
these damage components was supported by competent nonspeculative 
evidence.

Replevin

[¶29] The proper 
remedy in a replevin action is return of the detained property plus incidental 
damages:

[¶30] Although 
the action of replevin is founded upon a tortious detention, it is not one to 
determine claims sounding in tort. It is analogous to an action of trespass, but 
is in part a proceeding in rem, to regain possession of the goods and chattels, 
and in part a proceeding in personam, to recover damages for the caption and 
detention, and is based not upon any act of the plaintiff, but upon the illegal 
acts of the defendant. It is a possessory action the gist of which is the right 
of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return 
of the property in specie; damages are merely incidental.

[¶31] 66 
Am.Jur.2d Replevin § 3 (1973) (footnotes omitted). In the case at bar, the 
plaintiff did not style the action as one for replevin, but that is how the 
district court analyzed it. Replevin, trespass, and trover (conversion) are 
concurrent remedies for a wrongful taking of goods. Id. at § 6. Appellant does 
not contest the order directing him to return the grader in his damages 
argument.

Repair 
Costs

[¶32] Wyoming 
Machinery's expert witness testified that it would cost between $4,500 and 
$12,000 to repair the grader's engine. His best estimate was between $10,000 and 
$12,000. Although there was some conflicting evidence, and a dispute over who 
caused the damage, the fact finder was certainly free to accept these figures 
and assign $10,000 in damages to repair the engine. One should note that there 
was evidence that the grader became inoperable while wrongfully detained by 
Cross. The $10,000 repair cost finding is not clearly 
erroneous.

Maintenance 
Costs

[¶33] The trial 
court assigned $400 to replace the cutting edge and batteries and $900 to 
replace worn tires. These findings were supported by expert testimony. The 
expert also testified that these costs may result from normal use. While Cross 
maintains that he only used the grader for about an hour and that Crail should 
be held responsible for this damage, the fact finder was free to disbelieve this 
testimony. These determinations are not clearly erroneous.

Special 
Damages

[¶34] One of 
Berg's employees testified that the cost of numerous attempts to retrieve the 
grader and of hiring an airplane to search for the grader amounted to $4,600. 
Appellant objects that these costs should not be recoverable because they 
preceded the date when the tort accrued in 1996.

[¶35] Berg did 
not discover the conversion until 1996 because Cross purposely misled him as to 
his true intentions. One can reasonably infer from the circumstances that Cross 
never intended to return the grader, that he lied to Berg when he promised to 
return it. Thus, the wrongful detention predates the discovery and accrual of 
the tort by several years. Under this interpretation, it is reasonable to assess 
recovery costs preceding the discovery of the conversion.

[¶36] Recovery 
costs are a species of special damages and must be specially pleaded and proved. 
General damages are those which naturally and necessarily flow from the wrongful 
act; they are implied by law and are the natural consequences of the wrongful 
act. Henderson v. Coleman, 19 Wyo. 183, 115 P. 439, 448 (1911), reh'g denied 19 
Wyo. 236, 115 P. 1136 (1911). General damages need not be pled. Western Alfalfa 
Milling Co. v. Worthington, 31 Wyo. 82, 223 P. 218, 220-221 (1924). Special 
damages are not the necessary result of the wrongful act and are not implied by 
law; they must be specially pled with a reasonable degree of particularity, 
although one need not plead a sum certain. W.R.C.P. 9(g); Melehes v. Wilson, 774 P.2d 573, 579 (Wyo. 1989); Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 
(1854).

[¶37] In the 
instant case, the plaintiff pled several elements of special damages relating to 
the recovery of the grader. There was sufficient testimony to support the 
court's allocation of $4,600 in special damages. This finding is not clearly 
erroneous.

Restitutionary 
Damages

[¶38] The court 
awarded $67,500 for loss of use, based on $2,500 per month for 27 months between 
the date of conversion (October 1996) and the date of trial (January 1999). In 
effect, this is an award of restitution requiring the tortfeasor to disgorge the 
amount by which he was unjustly enriched by his wrongdoing. Appellant complains 
that this determination is legally erroneous, as this amount exceeds the quantum 
of Berg's injury.

[¶39] Wyoming 
recognizes that there are several methods for computing conversion damages. 
"Valuation of property is a question of fact, and there is no universal standard 
for such a determination. Thus, the question is left to the trier of fact to be 
decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case." O's Gold Seed 
Co. v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc, 761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 
1988). In computing damages, "the primary objective [is] to determine the amount 
of loss, applying whatever rule is best suited to that purpose." 
Id.

[¶40] Although 
actions in replevin are "restitutionary in character, they are classified as 
tort actions." Ablah v. Eyman, 365 P.2d 181, 190 (Kan. 1961). Restitutionary 
damages may be an appropriate remedy for the tort of conversion where other 
methods of computing damages are inadequate. "For some types of tort actions and 
for certain kinds of breaches of contract, the injured party has an option of 
seeking restitutionary recovery. In these cases, damages are measured by the 
benefits received by the defendant rather than the losses sustained by the 
plaintiff." 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 34 (1988) (footnotes omitted). See also 
Restatement, Restitution, §§ 150-154.

[¶41] The 
plaintiff may "waive the tort and sue in assumpsit," meaning that the plaintiff 
can have a restitutionary recovery for the gains the defendant made by 
converting the chattel. For example, if the chattel was worth $10 when it was 
converted by the defendant, and he later sells it for $20, the plaintiff would 
choose this option.

Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 
67 (2000).

[¶42] 
Historically, there has been much confusion about assumpsit and restitutionary 
remedies. At common law, assumpsit was a form of action whereby a legal 
obligation was implied at law. See Arthur L. Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in 
Assumpsit, 19 Yale L.J. 221 (1910). One British jurist noted that "the whole 
history of this particular form of action has been what I may call a history of 
well-meaning sloppiness of thought." Holt v. Markham, 1 K.B. 504, 513 (1923). 
"Restitution based upon unjust enrichment cuts across many branches of the law, 
including contract, tort, and fiduciary relationship, but it also occupies much 
territory that is its sole preserve." G. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.1 at 2 
(1978).

[¶43] Unjust 
enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is indefinable. 
But many of the meanings of justice are derived from a sense of injustice, and 
this is true of restitution since attention is centered on the prevention of 
injustice. Not all injustice but rather one special variety: the unjust 
enrichment of one person at the expense of another. This wide and imprecise idea 
has played a creative role in the development of an important branch of modern 
law.

Id. at 5 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶44] In modern 
terms, an action of assumpsit is not technically a waiver of tort, but rather it 
is the choice of one of two alternative remedies. Ablah v. Eyman, 365 P.2d  at 
192. "One whose money or property is taken by fraud or embezzlement, or by 
conversion, is entitled to restitution measured by the defendant's gain if the 
victim prefers that remedy to the damages remedy." Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 
4.1(1) p. 553 (1993).

[¶45] In civil 
jurisprudence, Wyoming has adopted and still employs the English common law as 
modified by decision. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (Lexis 1999); see State v. 
Foster, 5 Wyo. 199, 38 P. 926 (1895). Restitutionary damages for conversion have 
been long recognized in the law:

[¶46] It is 
obvious that the owner of property, which has been wrongfully converted, should 
possess a right to institute such a suit for the injury as will afford him an 
ample indemnification. If the wrong doer hath sold, or used and then sold the 
property, the owner may waive the tort, and in assumpsit recover the net 
proceeds received both for the use and by the sale. Cowp. 371, Hambly vs. Trott; 
10 Mass. Rep. 436. The amount recoverable in assumpsit cannot, upon general 
principles, operate unfavorably to the trespasser.

[¶47] In an 
action ex contractu, nothing can be obtained from him except what has in fact 
been received for the use and by sale of the property: while in one ex delicto, 
he may be subjected vindictively to pay much more than the real value of the 
article converted. Considering him, therefore, in the words of Jackson, J., in 
Cummings et al. vs. Noyes, 10 Mass. R. 436, as "a purchaser, or agent, or a 
bailee," gives him no just cause of complaint, because it visits on him no 
actual loss; the amount recovered being merely the amount obtained as the fruits 
of the trespass.

Chauncy v. Yeaton, 1 N.H. 
151, 154-55 (1818) (emphasis supplied).

[¶48] Wyoming 
has recognized that restitutionary damages are historically related to, yet 
distinct from, the equitable cause of action termed "unjust 
enrichment":

[¶49] The 
plaintiff's claim, as set out in his complaint, is for the benefit gained by the 
joint tortfeasors' action. If a benefit is derived by the wrongdoers, recovery 
may be had on the basis of a promise implied in law and the benefit recovered. 
Ablah v. Eyman, 1961, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181, 90 A.L.R.2d 766; Creach v. 
Ralph Nichols Co., 1953, 37 Tenn. App. 586, 267 S.W.2d 132; Swope v. Pageton 
Pocahontas Coal Co., 1947, 129 W. Va. 813, 41 S.E.2d 691; Olwell v. Nye & 
Nissen Co., 1946, 26 Wn.2d 282, 173 P.2d 652, 169 A.L.R. 139; Felder v. Reeth, 9 
Cir. 1929, 34 F.2d 744. See also the discussion in Restatement of the Law, 
Restitution, on recovery of benefits tortiously acquired, beginning at p. 522, 
and Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property, 1961, § 206, p. 371, et 
seq.

[¶50] The 
touchstone of the rule is the moral obligation arising out of unjust enrichment 
to the tortfeasor. The principle is of ancient origin. It has lost its early 
common law fictions and is firmly entrenched as a cause of action with only its 
"historical echoes" remaining.

[¶51] Western 
Nat'l Bank of Casper v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 641-642 (Wyo. 1978) (footnote 
omitted).

[¶52] Thus, 
restitution is an appropriate remedy for some tortious conduct. See also, Colo. 
Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1479 (D.Wyo. 
1987), rev'd on other grounds 885 F.2d 683, 697 (10th Cir. 1989). Despite the 
historic limitation on the assertion of equity jurisdiction, the availability of 
the legal restitution remedy is not dependent upon inadequacy of alternative 
remedies. G. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.6 at 33-34 (1978).2

[¶53] The phrase 
"unjust enrichment" is used in law to characterize the result or effect of a 
failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under such 
circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account 
therefor. It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and 
remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at 
the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for 
property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and 
equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no 
violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly 
or indirectly.

[¶54] Rocky 
Mountain Turbines, Inc. v. 660 Syndicate, Inc., 623 P.2d 758, 763 (Wyo. 1981) 
(quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3, (1973) p. 945); see 
also Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 (1948), reh. denied 64 Wyo. 
433, 197 P.2d 697. Where wrongfully detained property has a value for use, the 
measure of damages is the value of such use during the detention period. 66 
Am.Jur.2d Replevin § 120 (1973) (citing, inter alia, Ablah v. Eyman, 365 P.2d 181 (Kan. 1961)).

[¶55] 
Commentators have also termed the restitutionary measure an "accounting of 
profits":

[¶56] An 
accounting of profits usually has three basic 
justifications:

(1) it represents 
compensation to plaintiff for sales that were improperly diverted from plaintiff 
to defendant because of defendant's acts; (2) it prevents unjust enrichment by a 
defendant; and (3) it deters willful violations of law. An accounting may be 
ordered even if defendant actually lost money on a prohibited transaction, or 
made no profit at all.

Cerillo, Proving Business 
Damages § 143 (2nd ed. 1991).

[¶57] The unjust 
enrichment accounting approach is more appropriate where the defendant's conduct 
is especially egregious:

[¶58] Such an 
"unjust enrichment" approach is especially appropriate where strict application 
of some other standard would not adequately compensate plaintiff in a case where 
an injustice has taken place, or to deter willful violations in the future. An 
accounting is also useful where plaintiff may have difficulty proving lost 
profits because it is a new business without an operating history. If a 
defendant's profits as a result of an improper interference exceed what 
plaintiff would have realized if there were no breach of contract, i.e., 
defendant's profits exceed plaintiff's losses, some courts still assess damages 
based on the amount of the profits defendant has obtained. The purpose of this 
is to prevent inequity. See National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 775 (Mass. 1976) (holding an accounting of defendant's profits an 
acceptable basis of damages "because an intending tortfeasor should not be 
prompted to speculate that his profits might exceed the injured party's losses, 
thus encouraging commission of the tort . . ."). Unless an accounting is made of 
defendant's profits, parties will be tempted to engage in the conduct at which 
the tort is aimed in the hope that they may profit from their own wrongdoing. 
See also Phillips Chemical Co. v. Morgan, 440 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983), petition for review denied, 450 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1984); Schechter v. 
Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (1948).

Cerillo, § 
534.

[¶59] The 
district court in this case found that Cross' conduct was "certainly egregious," 
but did not rise to "the level of misconduct necessary to support attorney's 
fees or punitive damages." Although there are some overlapping policies 
underlying the doctrines supporting punitive damages and the unjust enrichment 
remedy, they are not the same. One purpose of tort damages is to compensate the 
plaintiff for his loss, but the measurement of such loss is not always an exact 
science. Since restitution may exceed mere compensation to the plaintiff without 
exceeding the defendant's unjust gain, it is not punitive. Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies § 4.1(4). In the context of conversion, courts have recognized the 
legitimacy of restitutionary damages:

[¶60] However 
plausible, the appellant cannot be heard to say that his wrongful invasion of 
the respondent's property right to exclusive use is not a loss compensable in 
law. To hold otherwise would be subversive of all property rights since his use 
was admittedly wrongful and without claim of right. The theory of unjust 
enrichment is applicable in such a case.

[¶61] Developers 
Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ohio App. 1990) (quoting 
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 1946)). Thus, the 
unjust enrichment remedy is not punitive but is one method of compensating the 
plaintiff's loss. Id. at 1135-36. This remedy is particularly appropriate where 
the plaintiff's loss is more difficult to measure than the defendant's unjustly 
saved avoidance costs. See S. Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149, 2157 (1997). Thus, 
"while inadequacy of the damage remedy is not a prerequisite to restitution, the 
fact of inadequacy strengthens the case for restitution." G. Palmer, § 1.6 at 
39. Certainly, an award of restitution can be harsh and is not appropriate in 
all cases, but where a tortfeasor consciously and wrongfully misappropriates 
another's property, he should expect to be dealt with 
harshly:

[¶62] The remedy 
in restitution rests on the ancient principle of disgorgement. Beneath the cloak 
of restitution lies the dagger that compels the conscious wrongdoer to 
"disgorge" his gains. Disgorgement is designed to deprive the wrongdoer of all 
gains flowing from the wrong rather than to compensate the victim of the fraud. 
In modern legal usage the term has frequently been extended to include a 
dimension of deterrence. Disgorgement is said to occur when a "defendant is made 
to `cough up' what he got, neither more nor less." From centuries back equity 
has compelled a disloyal fiduciary to "disgorge" his profits. He is held 
chargeable as a constructive trustee of the ill-gotten gains in his possession. 
A constructive trustee who consciously misappropriates the property of another 
is often refused allowance even of his actual expenses. Where a wrongdoer is 
shown to have been a conscious, deliberate misappropriator of another's 
commercial values, gross profits are recoverable through a restitutionary 
remedy.

[¶63] Warren v. 
Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) (emphasis in 
original; footnotes omitted). Even Judge Posner, guru of the law and economics 
movement, has recognized that restitution has a rightful place in intentional 
tort cases: "to make the tort worthless to the tortfeasor and thereby channel 
resource allocation through the market." R. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 
194 (3rd ed. 1986).3

[¶64] In the 
case at bar, it would be difficult to calculate Berg's loss in terms of 
opportunity costs. Also, by converting and concealing the grader and then lying 
about its whereabouts, Cross engaged in willfully deceptive misconduct that 
should be discouraged. For these reasons, application of the unjust enrichment 
remedy is appropriate. The question remains, how does one measure the amount to 
be disgorged? There are five factors that assist in measuring 
restitution:

1. the increased assets 
in the hands of the defendant from the receipt of 
property;

2. the market value of 
services or intangibles provided to the defendant, without regard to whether the 
defendant's assets were actually increased; that is, the amount which it would 
cost to obtain similar services, whether those services prove to be useful or 
not;

3. the use value of any 
benefits received, as measured by (i) market indicators such as rental value or 
interest or (ii) actual gains to the defendant from using the benefits, such as 
the gains identified in item (5) below;

4. the gains realized by 
the defendant upon sale or transfer of an asset received from the 
plaintiff;

5. collateral or 
secondary profits earned by the defendant by use of an asset received from the 
plaintiff, or, what is much the same thing, the savings effected by the use of 
the asset.

Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 
4.5(1) (footnotes omitted).

[¶65] The 
damages awarded in this case are supported by the second factor, the market or 
rental value of the grader (even if the grader did not prove to be useful); the 
third factor, the use value of the grader; and the fifth factor, the savings 
effected by using the grader.

[¶66] This 
measure of damages can be termed negative unjust enrichment, i.e., the defendant 
was unjustly enriched by not having to rent a road grader. A benefit is 
conferred upon the defendant where, by tortiously using the plaintiff's 
property, he saves expense or loss that might otherwise be incurred-benefit is 
any form of advantage. Ablah, 365 P.2d  at 190. Thus, to measure negative unjust 
enrichment or recoverable profit, courts may consider saving of 
expense.

[¶67] See 
Tilgham v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146, 8 S. Ct. 894, 899, 31 L. Ed. 664 (1888); 
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 932 (10th 
Cir. 1975). "Unjust enrichment can occur when a defendant uses something 
belonging to the Plaintiff in such a way as to effectuate some kind of savings 
which results in or amounts to a business profit." Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
778 F. Supp. 35, (W.D.Okla. 1991) (citing D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of 
Remedies § 4.5 at 278 (1973); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S.  at 146, 8 S. Ct.  at 
899; Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652).

[¶68] 
Historically, tort and contract have been the primary fonts of civil liability 
at common law; yet restitution based on unjust enrichment is also a vital legal 
theory. G. Palmer § 1.1 at 1-2. Not every circumstance demands application of 
the disgorgement principal; but in certain cases, where justice so requires, the 
law empowers judges and juries with this important tool to remedy wrongdoing. 
This is such a case.

CONCLUSION

[¶69] The 
district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and its 
conclusions of law were legally correct.

[¶70] 
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This 
article provides a useful analysis of appellate standards of review and is well 
respected in the federal court system. Practitioners' Guide to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 42 (1998). Civil practitioners before 
this court may find it helpful as well.

2 The 
distinction between legal and equitable restitution is a fine one which would 
not affect the outcome of this case. The primary difference is that with legal 
restitution, the parties have a right to a trial by jury. As this case was tried 
before a judge and neither party requested a jury trial, this issue is 
inapplicable.

3 Conversion 
(pure coercive transfer) is not an acceptable substitute for purchase on the 
free market. Restitutionary damages can thus be justified by applying Learned 
Hand's renowned negligence formula, where the tortfeasor is liable if the cost 
of reasonable precautions (B) is less than the product of the probability of 
injury (P) and the magnitude of potential loss (L). (B > PL). See United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Hand's 
tort calculus can also be applied to intentional torts, where B has a negative 
value. See Posner at 193-95.