Title: Smith v. Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45674 
 
KEVIN R. SMITH, 
 
           Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
 
           Defendant-Respondent. 
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Lewiston, April 2019 Term 
 
Filed: June 7, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The Industrial Commission’s order is affirmed.  
 
Starr Kelso Law Office, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant. Starr Kelso argued. 
 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC, Lewiston, for respondent. Thomas W. Callery 
argued.  
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
Kevin Smith appeals from an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission that concluded 
the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was not liable to him for worker’s 
compensation benefits. The Commission determined that Smith failed to prove he was totally 
and permanently disabled under both the 100% method and the odd-lot worker method. He also 
appeals from a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the Commission, where he alleged 
that the Commission determined disability at a future date rather than the date of the hearing, that 
it improperly interpreted a report, and that it improperly considered an excluded exhibit. We 
affirm the Commission’s order.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In July 1997, a second-story balcony railing Kevin Smith was leaning on gave way, 
plunging him towards the ground and fracturing both his heels. Dr. Edward Tapper performed 
surgery on Smith’s left heel and put casts on both feet. Smith could not walk for over a year, nor 
 
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could he work in general construction as he was doing before the accident. A few months after 
the injury, Smith was evicted from his apartment and was forced to live in a car with his wife and 
infant. 
After his injuries healed he continued experiencing pain in his heels, leading him to 
realize that he would be unable to work at a job that required copious amounts of standing and 
walking, so he set out to become a plumber. He obtained employment as an apprentice and 
eventually become a skilled plumber. Smith discontinued follow-up appointments for his heels 
with Dr. Tapper in 1998 upon moving to Reno, Nevada, where he continued working as a 
plumber. While working in Reno, Smith consistently worked as a plumber but changed 
employers frequently.  
Not wanting to raise a family in Reno, Smith moved his wife and two children to Coeur 
d’Alene, Idaho, in 2006, and began working as a service manager for a plumbing company. A 
couple months into employment, Smith slipped on ice while working and injured his left wrist. 
Dr. Richard Mattis with North Idaho Physicians diagnosed Smith with a left wrist sprain 
accompanied by a possible fracture, treating him with pain medications and a splint. Smith 
returned to work on light duty but continued having pain in his left wrist and fingers. After 
physical therapy failed to relieve the pain, he was referred to Dr. Peter Jones, a hand and wrist 
surgeon, who opined that exploratory surgery of the wrist was needed. Dr. Joseph Welch, a 
plastic surgeon, conducted a review of Smith’s injury and suggested that surgery not be 
undertaken until the wrist had a longer time to heal. Nevertheless, in July of 2007, Dr. Jones 
performed surgery on Smith’s wrist and removed a fracture fragment.  
After Smith’s surgery, his employer no longer had a need for his position and fired him. 
Smith attempted a small plumbing repair in his own home after recovering and discovered that 
he could hardly use a screwdriver without pain in his wrist. Dr. Jones noted that Smith was 
struggling with depression after his wrist injury because of apparent concerns of future 
employability. Smith underwent an independent evaluation with Dr. Brinkman, a plastic surgeon, 
who recommended that Smith see a psychologist for treatment of depression. Smith was 
authorized by the employer’s insurance for five psychiatric visits with Dr. David Wait, who 
diagnosed Smith with “major depression, single episode, severe.” Dr. Wait noted that it appeared 
Smith’s depression stemmed from “his current inability to work,” and suggested individual 
 
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therapy and antidepressants as treatment. Smith was prescribed Celexa and referred to a licensed 
clinical professional counselor, Emily Hart, meeting with her three times.  
On December 12, 2007, Dr. Welch conducted an independent medical examination on 
Smith and determined that his wrist was now fixed and stable, and that his left upper extremity 
had a 9% permanent impairment. Dr. Welch also observed that Smith’s severe depression was 
likely a result of his wrist injury, and that he would not be able to return to work without his 
psychiatric issues first being addressed. After this examination, Smith’s worker’s compensation 
benefits exhausted and he was referred to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Regional 
Mental Health Services for psychiatric care. He began treatment with Regional Mental Health 
Services in February 2008 for major depression disorder. He began receiving counseling and 
treatment for depression by Dr. Rhodes and other licensed counselors.  
In May 2008, still unemployed and being treated for depression, Smith became violently 
angry with his wife during a marital dispute. He was arrested and taken to the hospital on a 
police hold. Dr. Eric Heidenreich performed a psychiatric evaluation, determined he was 
depressed, and released him after a day. Smith denied any use of illegal substances when asked, 
but tested positive for marijuana while in the care of the hospital.  
Smith continued treatment with Regional Mental Health Services after this incident, but 
he began harboring significant resentment and anger towards his wife for calling the police 
during their dispute, and for not working at a job that paid well through his unemployment. He 
was also not satisfied with the medicine the psychiatrist was prescribing, trying five different 
medications and rejecting them all. In August 2008, Dr. Marie Parkman, a psychologist, prepared 
a report concerning Smith’s treatment at Regional Mental Health Services and concluded that he 
had not progressed very far in his treatment. She opined that he was having difficulties with 
major depression and ongoing panic attacks because of difficulties in personality functioning. 
She also stated that he would be a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation because of his 
above-average intelligence, but his ongoing litigation was complicating his recovery from 
depression. In her report, Dr. Parkman also noted that Smith was untruthful about his marijuana 
use because he reported only smoking marijuana as a teenager, but tested positive for marijuana 
in his urine twice and thereafter confessed that he received a ticket in Oregon for possession of 
marijuana. She believed that marijuana use was probably exacerbating Smith’s mood difficulties.  
 
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On October 27, 2008, a hearing was held before Referee Alan Taylor with the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho to determine whether Smith was entitled to benefits for 
psychological injuries from his wrist accident pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-451. Kevin 
Smith testified at the hearing, and a June 25, 2008 deposition was introduced as an exhibit. 
Through Smith’s testimony, it was revealed that he had been untruthful towards many of his 
health care providers. Specifically, he failed to tell providers—and lied during his deposition—
that he had served in the U.S. Army and had been dishonorably discharged due to marijuana use. 
Smith also admitted that he told providers that he had done drugs in Holland, when he has never 
actually been to Holland. He also had been untruthful to Dr. Wait about substance abuse because 
he “didn’t open up fully to him.” He also admitted that he was not being honest at all with his 
counselor Emily Hart because he thought her attractive and wanted to impress her with a fantasy 
alter-ego, telling her that he had changed his name, that he had done exciting things in Holland, 
and that he had a history of committing crimes.  
After the hearing, a deposition was conducted of the Employer/Surety’s psychologist, Dr. 
Ronald Klein. The deposition was thereafter admitted, along with a psychological evaluation of 
Kevin Smith. In Dr. Klein’s report, he concluded that “[t]he depressive symptomatology noted 
by treaters and IME evaluators alike is not a product of his wrist injury . . . They have been 
characteristic of his functioning for the past 20 years.” Instead of diagnosing him with major 
depression like most other treaters, Dr. Klein diagnosed Smith with adjustment disorder and 
mixed personality disorder with emotionally dependent and narcissistic features. He explained 
that Smith functions like a maladjusted child and is “impulsive, self-focused, oblivious to other’s 
needs, and irritated at being held accountable for his actions.” Dr. Klein further explained that 
Smith tells falsehoods because he reacts to the impulse of the moment. Smith’s self-perception in 
life centers around four main failure experiences: (1) his dishonorable discharge from the Army; 
(2) his heel injury in 1997; (3) his wrist injury in 2007; and, (4) his arrest in 2008 wherein he tore 
up his home. In Dr. Klein’s opinion, the reason Smith was suffering from depression and not 
working was because he “has something to pin his failure in life on.” Ultimately, Dr. Klein 
concluded that “[t]he ‘therapy’ for [Smith] is to get him back to work, either by re-offering 
vocational assistance or by closing his claim and thereby creating an incentive to resume work.”  
Dr. Tim Rehnberg, a psychologist hired by Smith, also reviewed medical records and 
conducted interviews with Smith, diagnosing him with adjustment disorder with anxiety and 
 
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chronic depressed mood, pain disorder, and mixed personality disorder. His opinion was that 
Smith’s wrist injury had a causal relationship with his psychological condition, and that he had 
no substance abuse issues at the time of testing. During his deposition, Dr. Rehnberg admitted 
that he did not review the entirety of Smith’s medical records. While he thought Smith was 
definitely immature, he thought that Dr. Klein’s use of the term “maladjusted child” was harsh. 
Dr. Rehnberg also stated that he thought Smith was young and smart enough that he should be in 
vocational rehabilitation, and that returning to work would alleviate a number of Smith’s 
problems.  
On April 27, 2009, Referee Alan Taylor recommended to the Commission that Smith had 
failed to prove an entitlement to benefits for psychological injuries stemming from his wrist 
accident, and the Industrial Commission adopted his findings and recommendation the same day.  
In his findings, Referee Taylor determined that Smith was not a credible witness because of his 
tendency to be intentionally untruthful, but corroborating evidence persuaded him that Smith’s 
psychological conditions were real and genuine. Benefits were ultimately denied because, while 
Smith’s wrist injury was a contributing factor to his psychological condition, it was not the 
predominate cause as required by Idaho Code section 72-451(3). The Commission denied a 
motion for reconsideration, wherein Smith contended that the Commission erred in discounting 
Dr. Rehnberg’s opinion and placing more weight in Dr. Klein’s. Smith was then granted a 
motion to dismiss his case without prejudice.  
Early in 2007, Smith was referred to the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division 
(ICRD), where he was found eligible for services. Dr. Welch performed a job site evaluation of 
his previous plumbing job on behalf of ICRD in December 2007, and concluded that Smith could 
not return to his same occupation as a plumber due to psychiatric issues, but medical stability 
was expected within six months. In December 2008, Smith stated he was applying for a position 
with Check ‘N Go, and ICRD gave him a list of job leads and some example resume formats. In 
June 2008, Smith cancelled services with ICRD because he did not wish to pursue employment 
at that time, reporting that he planned to admit himself to an inpatient mental hospital. The final 
outcome of his ICRD case detailed Smith as being medically stable with a 9% left upper 
extremity permanent partial impairment with no permanent restrictions or limitations.  
In December 2008, Smith was awarded social security disability benefits, backdated to 
April 2008. In August 2009, Smith registered for classes with North Idaho College in Coeur 
 
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d’Alene with the assistance of the Idaho Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (IDVR). He was 
given a dictation program and a computer to assist him in college due to his self-reported wrist 
pain. He was able to complete 47 college credits towards an associate’s degree and only needs 13 
additional credits to obtain it. Smith cancelled treatment with Regional Mental Health Services 
on October 31, 2009, because he thought that there was nothing more mental-health therapy 
could accomplish for him.  
 
In February of 2011, Smith sought counseling from North Idaho College for grieving and 
marital problems, where he was seen four times by a counselor. He also went to the emergency 
department and was prescribed anti-anxiety medication after finding out that his wife had been 
having an extra-marital affair. During his last meeting with the counselor in March of 2011, 
Smith was encouraged to go to a hospital. His wife abandoned him soon thereafter, leaving him 
to fend for himself with his two children. During this time, he withdrew from his English class 
and failed his Algebra and Chemistry classes. Stricken with grief, he relocated with his two 
children in early 2012, to Apple Valley, California, to live with his mother and siblings. 
 
Upon moving to California, Smith was voluntarily committed to a San Bernardino 
Mental Hospital at the suggestion of his family. Dr. Geetha Puri, M.D., diagnosed Smith with 
major depression caused largely by the stress of being separated from his wife. Another M.D. in 
San Bernardino, Dr. Trilok Shah, diagnosed him with major depressive disorder due to chronic 
pain from a previous fall injury and marital conflict. Smith was treated with medications and 
released three days later. He was thereafter counseled by Dr. Puri and a psychiatrist with Desert 
Behavioral Health with regular counseling sessions.  
 
In January 2012, Smith filed a worker’s compensation complaint against the Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for being totally and permanently disabled due to a combination 
of his 1997 bilateral broken heels, his 2007 left wrist injury, and his pre-existing psychological 
issues, education level, and age. Smith’s lawyer scheduled a functional capacity evaluation 
(FCE) for Smith with a company in California called Safety Works, in an attempt to find out 
what physical limitations Smith currently suffered from. The FCE report featured raw data from 
tests conducted on Smith’s grip strength, lifting strength, and standing and walking ability, 
among other things. The report also had an unsigned Physician’s Return-to-Work Voucher 
Report that concluded Smith could return to work with certain restrictions: (1) he could only 
grasp with his left hand for a total of 4 to 6 hours a day, and (2) he could not lift or carry at a 
 
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height of 3 to 6 feet of an undisclosed weight for more than 1 hour a day. The FCE report also 
concluded that Smith could return to his regular plumbing occupation with the limitations listed 
above.  
 
A hearing was held before Referee Brian Harper on May 17, 2016, to determine whether 
Smith was totally and permanently disabled, and whether ISIF was liable under Idaho Code 
section 72-332. At the beginning of the hearing, exhibits were admitted, including the 
employability reports of both Dan Brownell, the vocational expert for Smith, and William 
Jordan, the vocational expert for ISIF. However, a dispute arose over the admission of ISIF’s 
proposed Exhibit 17 that was handed to the Referee the morning of the hearing and was not 
disclosed to Smith during discovery. Smith objected to the admission of Exhibit 17 on the 
grounds that he had never seen the document before. Referee Harper suggested the possibility 
that Smith’s lawyer had sent the document to ISIF’s lawyer at some point, but Smith’s lawyer 
responded that he would have to investigate if that were true (there was a possibility that the 
document came from the employer/surety). Smith’s lawyer objected and stated that he would 
have attempted to track down the author of the report, Dr. Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara, an M.D., 
board-eligible psychiatrist, and attempt to get a copy of her notes, a copy of her education and 
training, and speak with other psychologists and counselors that Smith has interacted with to 
obtain their opinions of the reliability of the contents of Exhibit 17. Referee Harper excluded 
Exhibit 17, but kept a physical copy of it in case of an appeal, stating, “I will not consider it, I 
haven’t read it, I don’t intend to.”  
 
At the hearing, Smith testified about his life in California. He explained that he lives in 
solitude and isolation over the fear of being asked about what he “does for a living.” His days are 
spent taking his children to school, going to the library, and people watching. He lives in a 
duplex in Apple Valley, living only off the income from his Social Security Disability. Smith 
also explained that he was not at Safety Works for the 7.5 hours as reported on the FCE report, 
but was actually at the location for less than an hour. He also testified that he was not actually 
tested for his standing, walking, or climbing abilities. However, he also testified that he had not 
applied for a job since residing in California, had only been to the community college in the area 
once, and had only contacted the California Vocational Rehabilitation Department a few weeks 
before the hearing. He also had stopped attending mental health treatment because of a change in 
his health insurance, but was smoking medical marijuana that was prescribed to him by a doctor 
 
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for chronic pain, insomnia, situational stress, and other ailments. Smith stated that he was very 
hopeful that he could return to the work force with the help of a vocational rehabilitation 
specialist in California.  
 
Dan Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation specialist, was deposed post-hearing regarding 
his admitted employability report. Brownell was of the opinion that it was futile for Smith to 
attempt to even look for work because of his pre-existing physical limitations combined with his 
psychological condition. He explained that but-for these psychological and physical limitations 
caused and exacerbated by Smith’s industrial work injury, he could “once again tap into his 
ambition and strong work ethic once again and obtain employment.” Brownell stated that the 
wrist and grip testing on the FCE seem consistent with Smith’s past medical history, but he did 
not rely on the FCE in making his determination because he was not familiar with California 
FCEs and Smith’s FCE appeared inconsistent. He did admit that if the FCE were valid, Smith 
would be able to perform medium duty work, and that the medical records he was relying on in 
his report were almost ten years old.  
William Jordan, a vocational rehabilitation specialist hired by ISIF, came to the opposite 
conclusion: “there is no combination of pre-existing impairment with the subsequent injury to 
cause total disability.” Jordan’s report stated that no doctors had given any permanent restrictions 
limiting his ability to work physically, and his counselors had suggested that employment would 
alleviate many of his psychological issues. In his report, Jordan explained that if he were to rely 
on Smith’s self-reported disabilities, he would likely be incapable of any type of employment; 
however, due to Smith’s “fidelity issues” with providers and others, Jordan discounted Smith’s 
perceptions and attempted to “sort out the issues.” Jordan also used the FCE report to conclude 
that Smith’s ability to use his wrist had worsened, but overall the FCE reflected that Smith did 
not have any physical limitations that would render him incapable of work. Jordan’s opinion was 
that employment-wise, Smith is young enough for re-training, that he is close to an associate’s 
degree and intelligent enough to obtain it, that he is personable, and that he has demonstrated an 
ability to learn a skilled trade. With these skills and the size of the Apple Valley, California job 
market, Jordan reported that it would not be futile for Smith to seek employment.  
At the beginning of Jordan’s post-hearing deposition, Smith’s attorney objected to Jordan 
making any references to his employability report—admitted Exhibit 16—that referenced any 
portion of excluded Exhibit 17. Exhibit 16, Jordan’s Employability Report, provided detailed 
 
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summaries of Smith’s medical history, including (as Smith’s attorney details in his objection) the 
contents of the report of Dr. Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara, M.D., in Exhibit 17. Jordan utilized 
Dr. Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara’s report as evidence that Smith was employable, because she 
concluded that “[Smith] would have no difficulties to be able to perform work activities on a 
consistent basis without special or additional supervision.” Jordan used her findings to conclude 
that, “The most recent psychiatric evaluation outlines the Evaluee is capable of working with 
respect to his psychological condition.”  
Referee Brian Harper issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation on July 7, 2017, and the Industrial Commission adopted it the same day. 
Referee Harper considered the findings and exhibits from the previous hearing, and also 
overruled all objections made during the depositions. After considering all the evidence before 
him, Referee Harper concluded that Smith failed to prove he is totally and permanently disabled 
under both the 100% method and the odd-lot worker method because he is not totally disabled 
due to his wrist and ankle injuries alone, and his psychological problems appear to be a treatable, 
temporary condition. In arriving at this conclusion, Referee Harper relied on Jordan’s 
Employability Report and stated, “Claimant’s most recent psychiatric evaluation shows that from 
a psychological standpoint Claimant is able to work without limitations.” A footnote was affixed 
to this statement, wherein Referee Harper distinguished properly considering Exhibit 16—
Jordan’s Employability Report—from excluded Exhibit 17: 
The report referenced was prepared by Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara, M.D., on 
April 22, 2014. ISIF inadvertently failed to include this report with its exhibits, 
and discovered the mistake shortly before hearing. Claimant objected to the 
report’s inclusion as part of ISIF’s exhibits, since it was not disclosed as an 
exhibit in a timely fashion. The objection was sustained and the document was not 
admitted as a stand-along exhibit. However, Mr. Jordan, as a qualified expert, is 
entitled to rely upon the report, and the undersigned is entitled to rely on Mr. 
Jordan’s findings, even with regard to the report in question. Experts may rely on 
inadmissible materials if they are of a type typically relied upon by experts in 
their field of expertise. IRE 703. This report so qualified and the undersigned 
finds the probative value of the report in the context of Mr. Jordan’s analysis 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. The report is not considered or relied 
upon by the undersigned independently of Mr. Jordan’s analysis, but Mr. Jordan’s 
analysis will be considered in its entirety.  
 
Referee Harper also addressed the disputed FCE and outlined Smith’s contentions with 
its accuracy and validity. Due to Smith’s fabrications and falsehoods, Referee Harper 
disregarded Smith’s testimony about the testing behind the FCE. However, he did find that “[t]he 
 
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FCE appears to be internally inconsistent, or if it is not inconsistent, its unfamiliar form makes it 
difficult to accurately interpret.” He concluded that he would only consider the raw data in the 
report: 
Since no one familiar with the report was deposed, the Referee is left to interpret 
it to the best of his ability. 
. . . 
The unsigned voucher will not be considered, nor will conclusions in the report 
which show Claimant’s predicted abilities over a six to eight hour workday. The 
raw data, including grip strength, lifting ability, shoulder and back movement 
ranges, and ankle range of movements, will be considered as that data carries 
more weight than Claimant’s subjective comments to the contrary. 
Later in his findings, Referee Harper noted that Smith’s major impediment to employment is his 
temporary psychological condition because “Mr. Jordan notes that physically [Smith] has the 
ability to work, as borne out by the medical, psychological, and FCE raw data records.”  
 
On July 27, 2017, Smith filed a motion to reconsider with the Industrial Commission, 
arguing that Referee Harper erred in considering the contents of excluded Exhibit 17 and perhaps 
violated the canons of judicial conduct, that he exceeded his authority by interpreting the raw 
data found in the FCE report, and that the evidence presented showed Smith was totally and 
permanently disabled. The Industrial Commission denied the motion. The Commission began its 
reasoning by explaining that the only reason Exhibit 17 was excluded was because of a 
possibility that Smith had not been provided the document during discovery; but, “it seems quite 
possible that the document did in fact originate in a discovery response by Claimant” because of 
Smith’s failure to challenge ISIF’s statement in a response brief claiming the exhibit had in fact 
been provided by Smith through discovery. However, the exclusion and admissibility of Exhibit 
17 was “much ado about very little” because Referee Harper was relying on the contents of 
Exhibit 16, which was admitted without objection at the May 17, 2016 hearing. Even if the 
reliance on Exhibit 16 and Referee Harper’s overruling of Smith’s objections during Jordan’s 
deposition were error, the Commission determined it would be harmless error because of the 
overwhelming amount of evidence supporting Jordan’s conclusions.  
 
The Commission next addressed Referee Harper’s reliance on, and interpretation of, the 
disputed FCE. It discussed its puzzlement at why Smith would challenge the Referee’s reliance 
on this report since it is the only medical evidence that arguably supported any permanent 
restrictions or limitations in Smith’s working capacity. However, the Commission concluded that 
 
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it did not believe Referee Harper erred in deciding to rely on the raw data to inform his judgment 
of Smith’s limitations and restrictions. In regards to Referee Harper’s impartiality, the 
Commission stated that, “Having thoroughly considered the Referee’s original proposed 
decision, we discern nothing in his analysis or tone to permit the inference that the Referee was 
arbitrary or capricious.”  
 
Smith timely appealed.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Commission erred in determining Smith was not totally and permanently 
disabled under Idaho Code section 72-332. 
B. Whether the Referee improperly utilized an excluded exhibit. 
C. Whether the Referee improperly interpreted an FCE. 
D. Whether the Referee properly determined disability at the time of the hearing. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free 
review over the Commission’s conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission’s factual 
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Aguilar v. Indus. Special 
Indem. Fund, No. 45581, 2019 WL 1187120, at *4 (Idaho Mar. 14, 2019) (citing Green v. 
Green, 160 Idaho 275, 280, 371 P.3d 329, 334 (2016)).  
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
may accept to support a conclusion. Substantial and competent evidence is more 
than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance. [This Court] will not 
disturb the Commission’s conclusions on the weight and credibility of the 
evidence unless those conclusions are clearly erroneous. 
Id. (citing Hope v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 157 Idaho 567, 570–71, 338 P.3d 546, 549–50 
(2014)). “This Court freely reviews the Commission’s interpretation of the workers’ 
compensation statutes.” Id. All facts and inferences are viewed “in the light most favorable to the 
party who prevailed before the Commission and liberally construes the provisions of the 
worker’s compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for 
which the law was promulgated.” Hamilton v. Alpha Servs., LLC, 158 Idaho 683, 688, 351 P.3d 
611, 616 (2015) (internal citations omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence or consider 
whether we would have reached a different conclusion than the Commission from the evidence 
presented. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002).  
 
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IV. 
ANALYSIS 
Smith’s overall contention with the Commission’s order is that it is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. However, a number of other issues are raised in how the 
Commission arrived at its determination that must first be addressed: (1) whether the Referee 
improperly utilized an excluded exhibit in making its findings of fact, and whether the Referee 
acted impartially and the Commission casted aspersions towards Smith; (2) whether the Referee 
improperly interpreted an FCE; and (3) whether the Referee properly determined disability at the 
time of the hearing. We hold that the Referee and Commission acted properly, and the 
Commission’s order was supported by substantial and competent evidence.  
1. 
The Referee and Commission did not improperly utilize an excluded exhibit 
or cast aspersions. 
Smith argues that the Referee considered the contents of proposed Exhibit 17, and his 
doing so constituted prejudicial error that tainted the hearing and his recommendations. He also 
argues that the Referee, ISIF, and the Commission resorted to matters outside of the record and 
attacked the integrity of Smith’s lawyer to cover up their misdeeds. ISIF responds that no error 
occurred because proposed Exhibit 17 should have been admitted, the Referee specifically noted 
that he did not rely on it in making his determination, and that even without the references to 
Exhibit 17 in Exhibit 16, Jordan’s opinion would still remain the same.  
During the May 17, 2016 hearing, after the introduction of both party’s exhibits, ISIF 
attempted to introduce a report by Dr. Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara, M.D., dated April 22, 2012. 
Smith’s lawyer objected to the admission of the document because he personally had never seen 
the document before and it was not disclosed within 10 days of the hearing as required by 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 10. The Referee suggested that if it was sent by 
Smith’s lawyer to ISIF, then it must have been compiled by someone in Smith’s lawyer’s office. 
Both lawyers represented to the Referee that they were unsure of where the document originated, 
but Smith’s lawyer stated that if he had known of the report being admitted, he would have 
attempted to obtain a copy of Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s notes and her education and training, and 
would have spoken “with the numerous other psychologists and counselors that Mr. Smith has 
interacted with subsequent to this time in April of 2012 to vet the statements and reliability of 
this report.” Referee Harper then excluded proposed Exhibit 17 and explained that he would not 
rely on it or even read it, but that he would keep a copy of it in case of appeal.  
 
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While proposed Exhibit 17 was excluded, Exhibit 16—William Jordan’s Employability 
Report—was admitted without objection. In Jordan’s report, he summarizes the contents of Dr. 
Rathana-Nakintara’s report as he does with many other reports. He also outlines Smith’s 
placeability assets and states that the “[m]ost recent psychological exam” revealed no limitations 
to working a regular job, and he quotes extensively from his summary of Dr. Rathana-
Nakintara’s report. Under a section entitled Access to Labor Market and Potential Wage Loss 
Calculations, Jordan states: 
The most recent psychiatric evaluation completed on 4/22/14 (sic) by Thaworn 
Rathana-Nakintara, M.D. for the Department of Social Services Disability and 
Adult Programs, San Diego CA.): reflect that ‘based on objective findings 
presented during interview, the Claimant [would have no limitations handling 
gainful employment as outlined in the first summary] . . . Based on his statements 
during the vocational interview, he once again appears to be in the continuing the 
pattern of perceived helplessness with an inability to get out of the cycle of non-
movement.  
In the Analysis of Permanent Disability Opinion(s) section, he states in the middle of a lengthy 
paragraph that, “The most recent psychiatric evaluation outlines the Evaluee is capable of 
working with respect to his psychological condition.” Attached at the end of the report, Jordan 
provides a chronological outline of all the records he relied upon and what their contents 
entailed. He provides a bolded paragraph, dated 04/22/12, where he again outlines the contents 
of Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s report.  
 
At the post-hearing deposition, Smith’s lawyer objects to any references to admitted 
Exhibit 16: 
With regards to Mr. Jordan’s report, which is May 12, 2016, I object to the 
references that I’ve been able to specifically identify at page 11, page 25, and two 
references at page 27 to a psychiatric evaluation of 4/22/14 and that was objected 
to at hearing and excluded, and so I would object to this witness utilizing any 
information gleaned, received from that report and any of his opinions and so to 
those portions contained in his report. So, that’s my objection. 
Later in the deposition, Jordan was asked whether he had any recommendations to make Smith 
more employable than he currently was at the time. He began to answer the question, but Smith’s 
lawyer objected: 
 
Jordan: I think that he should follow the advice of his counselors. Dr. Alexander 
who worked with him in 2013 and continually indicated that he wanted him to go 
out and work with Voc Rehab and work the One-Step Program and get going in a 
job. And so those – that makes sense to me from what I’ve seen and from what I 
 
14 
 
have read from the other psychologists. It would be therapy for him to get back to 
work. It would help  him - - 
 
Smith’s lawyer: Objection to the extent other psychologists includes the 
excluded report and information. 
 
Jordan: I’m not referring to that report when I say that. I’m not referring to the 
one that has been excluded. . . . but I can say that Dr. Kline said it would be 
therapy for the claimant to get back to work. Also Dr. Parkman said he feels 
helpless to proceed with any actions until his Work Comp case gets settled. He’s 
paralyzed by litigation.  
 
Referee Harper overruled Smith’s lawyer’s objections made during the deposition. 
During a detailed discussion of Jordan’s report, Referee Harper stated that “Mr. Jordan also 
noted Claimant’s most recent psychiatric evaluation shows that from a psychological standpoint 
Claimant is able to work without limitations . . . .” He further explained that the report Mr. 
Jordan relies on to make his opinion was proposed Exhibit 17, which was excluded from being 
an admitted exhibit due to untimeliness. However, the Referee stated that he was entitled to rely 
on Jordan’s findings and opinions as a qualified expert, even for inadmissible materials under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703. After stating that the report’s probative value in the context of 
Jordan’s analysis substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, Referee Harper explained, “The 
report is not considered or relied upon . . . independently of Mr. Jordan’s analysis, but Mr. 
Jordan’s analysis will be considered in its entirety.”  
  
Smith contends that Referee Harper, in stating that Jordan notes the report of Dr. 
Rathana-Nakintara along with the conclusions the Referee drew from that report, was essentially 
the Referee using Exhibit 16 as a “‘conduit’ for his consideration of and reliancy (sic) on the 
contents of Exhibit 17.” While Smith argues multiple times in his brief that the Referee was 
actually relying on proposed Exhibit 17 to conclude that Smith was employable—all while using 
Exhibit 16 as a cover—he fails to point to a specific occurrence in the findings. Referee Harper 
only makes mention of Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s report during his overview of both vocational 
rehabilitation experts’ reports. Additionally, the Referee incorrectly stated in a footnote that the 
report is dated 4/22/14, which is a typo carried over from Jordan’s report because proposed 
Exhibit 17 is dated 2012. The Referee also represents that Jordan stated that Dr. Rathana-
Nakintara’s report is the most recent psychological evaluation, which is only drawn from 
Jordan’s report, not from proposed Exhibit 17. The Referee did not utilize the excluded exhibit, 
but rather only used Jordan’s report, admitted Exhibit 16, to render a conclusion: “Mr. Jordan 
 
15 
 
notes that physically Claimant has the ability to work, as borne out by the medical, 
psychological, and FCE raw data records.”  
 
Smith also argues that the Referee incorrectly exploited Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 to 
consider inadmissible evidence. Smith cites to State v. Watkins, where this Court held that an 
“amendment to I.R.E. 703 serves to prevent an expert witness from serving as a conduit for the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.” 148 Idaho 418, 427, 244 P.3d 485, 494 (2009). 
However, as ISIF points out, Exhibit 16 containing the summary of Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s 
report was already in evidence, admitted without any objections, when proposed Exhibit 17 was 
being discussed. But nonetheless, it appears the Referee correctly applied Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 703, which states: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has 
been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field 
would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion or 
inference on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be 
admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent 
of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in 
helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial 
effect. 
Jordan stated that he relied on “the usual and customary references, methods, and 
protocols” in making his conclusions in his employability report. Brownell, the other vocational 
rehabilitation specialist, also relied on medical and psychiatric reports to form an opinion on 
Smith’s employability. The Referee, either to cover all bases or because he considered the 
contents of the report inherently inadmissible, weighed the report’s probative value against the 
possible prejudicial effect and determined that Jordan could rely on it to make his conclusions. 
Contrary to Smith’s assertion, Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 does not require Dr. Rathana-
Nakintara, M.D., to be qualified as an expert for Jordan to rely upon her report; all that is 
required is that Jordan have been made aware of the report, and the report must be one that 
experts in the vocational rehabilitation field reasonably rely upon to form opinions. Thus, the 
Referee properly considered Jordan’s employability report in his findings and conclusions. 
With the following analysis, it is important to address other issues Smith raises in his 
briefings in regards to proposed Exhibit 17. Smith argues that Jordan was rendering a 
psychological opinion in his report, but nothing in Jordan’s report or testimony indicates that he 
was rendering anything other than an opinion on Smith’s employability. It also does not appear 
to be error for the Referee to “sua sponte utilize Rule 703,” because he was doing so in response 
 
16 
 
to objections made during the post-hearing deposition of Jordan. Furthermore, Smith argues that 
the Referee’s error in relying on the excluded exhibit, “and asserting that Mr. Jordan had also, 
was compounded by the fact that Mr. Jordan testified that he was not referring [to] Exhibit 17 in 
his opinions and testimony.” This assertion misrepresents the facts; during Jordan’s deposition, 
he stated that he was not relying on Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s report in forming a specific opinion 
that past psychiatrists and counselors have suggested it would be therapeutic for Smith to return 
to work. Therefore, the Referee did not err—and was certainly not partial or unethical—in using 
Jordan’s Employability Report and testimony to find that Smith had failed to prove he was 
totally and permanently disabled.  
 
Smith also complains of the Commission casting aspersions and inappropriately 
chastising him in its order denying his motion for reconsideration. After describing the confusion 
at the hearing regarding the source of proposed Exhibit 17, the Commission stated that ISIF, in 
its reply brief to the Commission, represented that a subsequent investigation showed proposed 
Exhibit 17 had originated from Smith’s lawyer’s office during discovery. The Commission 
speculated that it was possible the document had originated from Smith because he did not 
challenge or dispute ISIF’s claim. The Commission further speculated that the Referee would 
have admitted the document, and that doing so would not have been inappropriate. Without 
commenting on the wisdom of the Commission’s tangential speculation, it did not err in its 
ultimate conclusion that Exhibit 16 was properly used by both the Referee and Jordan, and 
proposed Exhibit 17 was not used by the Referee in making his findings.  
 
The last contention in regards to Exhibit 17 is Smith’s argument that the Commission and 
the ISIF were conspiring against him. In its reply brief, ISIF stated that “It was Claimant who 
initially located and produced the exhibit and obviously knew about it but chose not to include 
the exhibit as part of its set of exhibits.” Because ISIF did not address the Commission’s 
statement that ISIF affirmatively represented that a subsequent investigation took place—but 
instead “leveled [an] unfounded allegation” that Smith violated a rule of professional conduct—
Smith asserts that “It could reasonably be hypothesized that ISIF would have preferred that the 
Commission not have made it appear that an ex parte communication had taken place at which 
the facts asserted by the Commission were relayed to it.”  
 
When this issue is examined purely in a legal light—with the speculative affrays set 
aside—the Commission did not err in adopting the Referee’s findings and recommendation. At 
 
17 
 
the hearing, Exhibit 16 was admitted without objection. Exhibit 16 contained summaries of 
reports Jordan properly relied upon in rendering an opinion on Smith’s employability. The 
Referee properly discussed Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 in overruling Smith’s objection to 
Jordan’s prior reliance in Exhibit 16 with Dr. Rathana-Nakintara’s report that happened to 
corroborate what was found in proposed Exhibit 17. Therefore, the Referee did not err in 
considering Jordan’s reliance on the report, and the Commission did not err in adopting the 
Referee’s findings.  
2. 
The Referee did not improperly consider the FCE. 
Smith contends that the Referee exceeded his authority as fact-finder by interpreting a 
Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) report. However, ISIF argues that the Referee merely 
reviewed the report as an admitted exhibit, as he had the right to do as a fact-finder. Both parties 
cite to Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse to support their position. 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718 
(2013). 
In Mazzone, this Court explained that a fact-finder may not use his own expertise to 
render unqualified opinions. Id. at 759, 302 P.3d at 727. A referee in Mazzone used a DSM-IV-
TR manual not in evidence to make unqualified medical opinions and to exclude from evidence 
opinions she disagreed with. Id. This Court clarified the line between properly relying on a 
manual to weigh the opinions of experts, and using a manual to render unqualified opinions: 
The referee did not merely use the manual to weigh the methodologies of 
two qualified doctors. Rather, she used her own understanding of the manual and 
its requirements to determine that [two experts] had improperly diagnosed 
[Claimant]. Where there is both a positive and negative diagnosis between two 
qualified doctors, the fact finder may examine the methodologies of both 
physicians to determine which physician is more credible. However, to use one's 
own lay understanding of a medical document, which requires specialized 
expertise to understand and interpret, to conclude that a person with that 
specialized knowledge improperly made a medical diagnosis is improper. 
Id. at 759–60, 302 P.3d at 727–28. A referee may not use a manual to construct unqualified 
opinions, but a referee may look at a “manual to weigh the methodology of conflicting medical 
experts.” Id. at 759, 302 P.3d at 727.  
 
In this case, Mazzone appears to offer little guidance in determining whether the Referee 
improperly interpreted the FCE. Here, the Referee noted that the FCE appeared to be internally 
inconsistent because of the conclusions reached in the report when compared with the raw data, 
but then attempts to interpret the FCE: 
 
18 
 
 
It does appear the document is inconsistent to the extent that the 
conclusions are not entirely supported by the raw data. Most notably, the lifting 
invalidity conclusion appears to conflict substantially with the testing data. The 
data itself appears legitimate, but when the data is incorporated into conclusions 
inconsistencies emerge. For example, the “validity testing” data in the report 
shows a zero percent coefficient of variation, and thus a valid effort designation, 
DE 14, p. 0164, but the conclusion somehow morphs the lifting test results into 
being “invalid.” Other notations in the raw data section of the report are detailed 
and support the proposition that the testing was actually performed . . . The 
unsigned voucher will not be considered, nor will the conclusions in the report 
which show Claimant’s predicted abilities over a six to eight hour workday. The 
raw data, including grip strength, lifting ability, shoulder and back movement 
ranges, and ankle range movements, will be considered as that data carries more 
weight than Claimant’s subjective comments to the contrary. 
His “interpretation” of the report is merely a review of the document and a rejection of almost its 
entirety. Brownell—Smith’s vocational rehabilitation specialist—discounted the FCE, but stated 
that the wrist measurements seem valid, and Jordan—ISIF’s specialist—utilized the FCE results 
in his employability report to discount Smith’s self-reported abilities. The Referee’s statement at 
the end of his “interpretation” suggests that he is considering the raw data as evidence to 
discount Smith’s subjective complaints of his physical abilities (“as that data carries more weight 
than Claimant’s subjective comments to the contrary.”). The only other conclusion that he makes 
with the FCE raw data scores is adopting Jordan’s opinion that Smith’s major impediment is his 
psychological condition, not his physical conditions (“Mr. Jordan notes that physically claimant 
has the ability to work, as borne out by the medical, psychological, and FCE raw data records.”). 
Thus, the Referee reviewed the report, as he has the right to do as fact-finder, and used it to adopt 
Jordan’s expert opinion on Smith’s employability. He did not use it to make unqualified medical 
opinions.   
3. 
The Commission properly determined disability at the time of the hearing. 
 
Smith argues that the Commission determined his disability in the future, rather than at 
the time of the hearing. He also argues that the Commission did not consider his psychological 
impairments as a personal circumstance in determining disability.  
 
An evaluation of permanent disability “is an appraisal of the injured employee’s present 
and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of 
permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho 
Code.” I.C. § 72-425. Smith’s contention is that the Commission ignored the fact that he was 
permanently disabled at the time of the hearing when it concluded, “Claimant’s psychological 
 
19 
 
overlay is a significant disability, which if not treated would make it difficult for Claimant to 
pursue employment.” However, the Commission was determining that Smith had failed to prove 
he was totally disabled at the time of hearing by considering the evidence brought before it at the 
time of hearing. Specifically, the Commission concluded: “While the record contains more than 
one expert opinion that Claimant will have a difficult time finding employment unless and until 
his psychological issues are treated, no expert has opined that Claimant’s psychological 
condition is not treatable, and therefore a stable, permanent barrier to employment.” Said 
differently, Smith did not present any evidence that his psychological condition was more 
probable than not a permanent condition. If this Court were to adopt Smith’s contention that 
present disability must be considered in a vacuum at the date of the hearing, a claimant could 
sprain both ankles while walking into a hearing and be considered totally and permanently 
disabled, even though his ankles would heal in due course. The Commission properly determined 
disability at the time of the hearing.  
 
Next, Smith argues that the Commission did not consider his psychological impairment 
as a personal circumstance. The Commission concluded that Smith’s psychological impairment 
was a temporary, treatable condition, and therefore, it could not be considered as one of the 
combining factors under Idaho Code section 72-332. Idaho Code section 72-322(2) states that an 
impairment must be a permanent condition. Smith cites to Mapusaga v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 
for the proposition that, “[w]here a psychological condition is not compensable as a result of an 
industrial accident, it is to be treated as a personal circumstance which is correctly included in 
allocating responsibility between the ISIF and the employer/surety.” 113 Idaho 842, 849, 748 
P.2d 1372, 1380 (1987) (overruled on other grounds).  
 
Mapusaga stands for the proposition that a psychological disorder lacking physical 
manifestations can be treated as a nonmedical factor under Idaho Code section 72-425. Id. at 
850, 748 P.2d at 1380. Idaho Code section 72-425 mandates an appraisal of a claimant’s present 
and probable future ability to engage in employment “as it is affected by the medical factor of 
permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors [as] provided in section 72-430, 
Idaho Code.” Idaho code section 72-430(1) lists certain nonmedical factors to consider in 
determining percentages of permanent disabilities: 
account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement 
if of a kind likely to limit the employee in procuring or holding employment, the 
cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his age 
 
20 
 
at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational 
disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the afflicted 
employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical 
area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, 
and other factors as the commission may deem relevant, provided that when a 
scheduled or unscheduled income benefit is paid or payable for the permanent 
partial or total loss or loss of use of a member or organ of the body no additional 
benefit shall be payable for disfigurement. 
(emphasis added).  
 
Smith’s contention that the Commission failed to consider his psychological impairment 
is misplaced. The Commission properly understood that Smith’s psychological impairment could 
not be used to determine liability under Idaho Code section 72-332(2), or Idaho Code section 72-
425, because it found that Smith presented no evidence that his condition was permanent. Since 
Smith failed to show he is totally and permanently disabled, the Commission properly 
disregarded his temporary and treatable psychological impairment in determining his permanent 
impairment. 
4. 
The Commission did not err in determining Smith failed to prove that he is 
totally and permanently disabled. 
 
Smith appeals from the Commission’s determination that he failed to prove total and 
permanent disability. Whether a claimant is totally and permanently disabled is a question of fact 
that may be proven by one of two ways. Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 
764, 133 P.3d 1226, 1229 (2006). The first way is the 100% method, which requires a claimant 
to prove that his medical impairment and non-medical factors caused him to become 100% 
disabled. Sevy v. SVL Analytical, Inc., 159 Idaho 578, 585, 364 P.3d 279, 286 (2015). The second 
way is the odd-lot worker method, which requires a claimant to prove that they “are so injured 
that they can perform no services other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or 
quantity that a reasonable stable market for them does not exist.” Rodriguez v. Consol. Farms, 
LLC, 161 Idaho 735, 740, 390 P.3d 856, 861 (2017) (internal citation omitted).  
i. 
The Commission’s determination that Smith failed to prove he was totally and 
permanently disabled under the 100% method is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence.  
 
Smith argues that the Commission’s determination that he failed to prove he was 100% 
disabled is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. ISIF responds that Claimant is 
clearly not 100% disabled because no medical provider has indicated Smith cannot return to the 
workforce.  
 
21 
 
 
The Commission determined that Smith was not 100% disabled because the physical 
injuries to his wrists and heels were medically stable at the time of hearing, with permanent 
impairment of his upper left extremity rated at 9%, and his heel fractures being rated at 22% 
impairment for the left lower extremity, and 10% impairment for the right lower extremity. It 
also noted that “No physician has opined [Smith] is permanently incapable of employment . . . 
no expert has opined that [Smith’s] psychological condition is not treatable, and therefore a 
stable, permanent barrier to employment.” Smith himself even testified that he was very hopeful 
he could return to employment with vocational rehabilitation assistance, and that he would likely 
be able to finish obtaining his college degree. The Commission concluded that Smith failed to 
prove total and permanent disability under the 100% method because, “With proper 
psychological treatment, it is more likely than not that Claimant would or should be able to find 
employment in the Apple Valley, California labor market.”  
 
The Commission’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. “Substantial and competent evidence is ‘relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion.’” Huff v. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 1244, 
1246 (2006) (citing Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217 (2000)). 
Dr. McNulty gave Smith a permanent rating of 22% for his lower-left extremity impairment and 
a rating of 10% for his lower right extremity in 2015, after reviewing his medical records and 
depositions. In 2007, Dr. Welch rated Smith’s wrist at 9% permanent impairment and opined that 
he was fixed and stable.  
 
In regards to Smith’s psychological issues, there exists substantial and competent 
evidence in the record to support the Commission’s determination that with proper psychological 
treatment it is more likely than not that Smith would or should be able to find employment in the 
Apple Valley, CA, labor market: 
 Dr. Welch stated, that Smith would not be able to return to work until his psychiatric 
issues were addressed, but he expected them to be remediated within six months.  
 Dr. Klein concluded that no ratable permanent impairment exists for Smith’s 
psychological issues, and they could be treated by returning to work. 
 Dr. Rehnberg opined that Smith could be treated with counseling or therapy, and that he 
is young and smart enough to go through a vocational rehabilitation program and return 
 
22 
 
to the workforce. Additionally, he suggested that Smith’s psychological health could be 
remediated through vocational rehabilitation.  
 Dr. Parkman opined that Smith’s mental health recovery was being complicated by 
ongoing litigation and marijuana use.  
 Smith testified that he was very hopeful that he could return to the workforce with the 
assistance of California vocational rehabilitation, and that he would finish obtaining his 
college degree if a vocational rehabilitation specialist instructed him to do so. 
 
Smith argues that he is 100% disabled because the Idaho Department of Vocational 
Rehabilitation determined that Smith’s work history and educational background prevented him 
from obtaining employment without the assistance of vocational rehabilitation, and that Smith is 
significantly disabled. He also argues that Brownell’s testimony that Smith needed treatment to 
return to work, combined with Smith’s subjective outlook on life and the fact that Smith had not 
yet received adequate treatment at the time of the hearing, should have led the Commission to 
determine Smith was 100% disabled. However, Smith is asking this Court to disturb the 
Commission’s conclusions by reweighing the evidence; this Court will uphold the Commission’s 
conclusions as long as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence and not clearly 
erroneous. Therefore, we affirm the Commission’s determination that Smith failed to prove he 
was 100% disabled.   
ii. 
The Commission’s determination that Smith failed to prove he was totally and 
permanently disabled under the odd-lot worker method is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence 
 
Claimants may prove that they are totally and permanently disabled by 
demonstrating that they fit within the definition of an odd-lot worker. The odd-lot 
category is for those workers who are so injured that they can perform no services 
other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a 
reasonably stable market for them does not exist. Such workers need not be 
physically unable to perform any work at all. They are simply not regularly 
employable in any well-known branch of the labor market absent a business 
boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a 
superhuman effort on their part. If the evidence of the medical and nonmedical 
factors places a claimant prima facie in the odd-lot category, the burden is then on 
the employer or surety to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and 
continuously available to the claimant. 
 
23 
 
Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 83, 29 P.3d 390, 394 (2001) (citing Lyons v. 
Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977)). A prima facie case may be 
made by establishing: 
(1) A claimant has attempted other types of employment without success; or 
(2) A claimant or vocational counselors or employment agencies have searched for other 
work and other work is unavailable; or 
(3) That it would be futile to attempt to find suitable work. 
Id. (citing Dehlbom v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 579, 930 P.2d 1021 (1997)).  
 
 
Smith argues that he made a prima facie case that he was an odd-lot worker under the 
second and third odd-lot worker prongs, and that the burden should have shifted to ISIF to rebut 
his showings. He does not argue that he is an odd-lot worker under the first prong.  
a. Smith did not establish a prima facie odd-lot worker case under the second 
prong. 
 
Smith contends that he established a prima facie case under the second prong of the odd-
lot worker method, but the Commission inexplicably and erroneously asserted that Smith only 
attempted to meet his burden under the third prong. In his briefing for the 2016 hearing, Smith 
argued that he satisfied the second prong of the odd-lot worker method. However, in his reply 
brief to the Commission, he seems to narrow his argument to only the third prong when he states: 
“As to the Odd-Lot Doctrine category, the opinions of Mr. Brownell and Mr. Jordan that it 
would be futile for Claimant to find work ‘is sufficient to establish Claimant’s status as an odd-
lot worker under the third prong.’” Additionally, in both his motion to reconsider and in his reply 
brief for his motion for reconsideration, he fails to argue that the Commission erred by only 
considering the third prong of the odd-lot worker method, even though he discussed the odd-lot 
worker doctrine in depth.  
 
Nevertheless, Smith argues on appeal that he established a prima facie case for the 
second prong of the odd-lot worker method because his wife testified at the 2008 hearing that 
Smith had “gone up and down the boulevard and filled out applications, to no avail.” He also 
argues that the Idaho Department of Vocational Rehabilitation found that Smith had a substantial 
impediment to employment, and they sought out jobs on his behalf. Because no employment was 
ever found for him, he contends that he met his prima facie case and the burden to rebut his case 
should have shifted to ISIF. 
 
24 
 
 
However, as ISIF argues, Smith failed to present any substantial evidence that work was 
actually sought for him and that it was unavailable. Smith had assistance writing a resume, but he 
testified he never actually submitted it to any employers. He also testified that he did not fill out 
applications at jobs in the area because of anxiety and depression surrounding questions 
regarding his lifting ability. In his interview with Jordan, Smith stated that the nearest he has 
come to finding a job was sitting down with a pest control company, but leaving in tears when 
asked about his last employer. Additionally, since moving to California in 2012, Smith has 
testified that he has not looked for employment and that he signed up for vocational rehab only a 
couple weeks before the 2016 hearing.  The Commission noted in the findings of fact that “For 
years, Claimant has not attempted to find work to any significant degree.”  
 
It seems the only evidence that nears a prima facie case is Smith’s wife’s testimony 
concerning his search for work after the 2008 hearing. However, her solitary statement does not 
establish a prima facie case. In examining the entirety of the record, Smith failed to meet the 
burden of establishing a prima facie odd-lot worker case under the second prong.  
b. Smith did not establish a prima facie odd-lot worker case under the third 
prong. 
 
The last prong—whether it would be futile for Smith to seek employment—is where the 
primary contention lies between the parties. Smith argues that through his vocational 
rehabilitation specialist, Brownell, and through the Idaho Department of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, he made a prima facie showing that it would be futile for him to seek 
employment. ISIF replies that Smith is the epitome of someone who is not an odd-lot worker 
under the third prong because he is 44 years of age, almost has a college degree, has 
demonstrated an ability to learn a skilled trade, and he is in a good labor market in Apple Valley, 
California.  
 
Brownell, who was directly involved in Smith’s vocational rehabilitation case, opined 
that it would be futile for Smith to seek employment: 
It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of vocational probability that Mr. Smith’s 
physical limitations caused by his traumatic industrial wrist injury, when 
combined with his pre-existing physical limitations due to his heel injuries and his 
pre-existing psychological condition as impacted by his industrial injury, are of 
such a disabling nature that he has no reliable access to jobs in either Coeur 
d’Alene or the Apple Valley labor markets. Given the combined magnitude of Mr. 
Smith’s physical limitations and psychological condition, it is my opinion to a 
reasonable degree of vocational probability that there is no reasonable likelihood 
 
25 
 
that Mr. Smith would be able to obtain employment in any labor market that may 
be considered. It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability that 
Mr. Smith’s attempts to find employment were, and will continue to be (barring 
the occurrence of some unforeseen resolution of his psychological condition) 
futile in the absence of sheer luck in discovering an extraordinarily sympathetic 
employer.  
Additionally, Smith points to vocational rehabilitation documents that were of the opinion he 
could not find suitable employment without vocational rehabilitation assistance.  
 
Jordan, on the other hand, opined that it would not be futile for Smith to continue seeking 
work: 
 
Certainly, if one relies on the Evaluee’s perception of his capacity and his 
psychological status, it is not likely he would be capable of any forms of 
employment . . . That said, there are no medical opinions in the file information 
that reflects the Evaluee is incapable of working . . . The Evaluee himself has 
indicated that he felt he could do the Service Manager work (if he did not have to 
go out into the field.) Those types of opportunities exist, especially in the 
Evaluee’s current California labor market. In addition, there are a number of other 
types of occupations for which he would be qualified to perform such as 
plumbing and construction material supply sales, customer service work, etc. 
Additionally, at the 2016 hearing, Smith testified that he was very hopeful he would obtain 
employment with the assistance of vocational rehabilitation services.  
 
In the Commission’s findings, it notes that “[n]o physician imposed restrictions of such 
magnitude that it would be futile for Claimant to even attempt to find work.” The Commission 
then overviewed how Dr. Klein opined that it would be therapeutic for Smith to return to work, 
and how Dr. Parkman discussed how ongoing litigation and marijuana use were complicating 
Smith’s psychological recovery—his only significant barrier to employment. After discussing 
how both vocational rehabilitation experts opined that Smith’s largest hurdle to employment was 
his psychological condition, the Commission concluded that Smith had failed to meet the burden 
of proving that it would be futile for him to seek employment under the odd-lot worker method.  
 
The Commission’s conclusions are supported by substantial and competent evidence. As 
such, its conclusion that Smith failed to meet the third prong of the odd-lot worker method will 
not be disturbed.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission’s order is affirmed.  
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER and MOELLER CONCUR.