Title: Board of County Com'rs of County of Platte v. State ex rel. Yeadon

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Board of County Com'rs of County of Platte v. State ex rel. Yeadon1998 WY 166971 P.2d 129Case Number: 97-167, 97-166Decided: 12/22/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF PLATTE, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex 
rel., Donna YEADON, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 State of Wyoming, ex rel., Donna Yeadon, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), 

v. 

Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Platte, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Platte County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Rex E. Johnson 
of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, for Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Platte.

Eric M. Alden, 
Wheatland, for Donna Yeadon.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited case conference; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Prior to the 1994 
elections, the Board of County Commissioners of Platte County (Board) adopted a 
resolution by which it could, funds permitting, grant elected county officials 
cost of living adjustment (COLA) raises of up to 8 percent per year. In 1996, 
the Board voted to grant 5 percent COLA raises to all elected officials except 
the sheriff. Donna Yeadon, a Platte County citizen, sought a writ of mandamus 
against the Board, arguing that the COLA raises violated the Wyoming 
Constitution's prohibition against mid-term salary increases for elected 
officials. The district court agreed with Yeadon and granted her motion for 
summary judgment. From this decision, the Board appeals. Yeadon also appeals, 
claiming the district court erred in refusing to order reimbursement of attorney 
fees she incurred in prosecuting her action.

[¶2]      In both cases, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The Board 
presents the following issues for our review in Case No. 
97-166:

1. Is the 
Board's April 19, 1994 salary resolution, which provides for a mid-term cost of 
living salary adjustment, if budgetarily feasible, constitutional (Art. 3, § 32) 
and in compliance with W.S. 18-3-107?

2. If the April 
19, 1994 salary resolution is constitutional, did the Board properly implement 
the terms of the salary resolution in 1996 when they allowed a cost of living 
salary increase?

[¶4]      Appellee Donna 
Yeadon (Yeadon) couches the issue in these terms:

1. Can a board 
of county commissioners repeal the Constitution and amend the statutes of 
Wyoming to give themselves powers specifically denied to them by adopting a 
resolution to that effect?

[¶5]      In Case No. 
97-167, Yeadon, as appellant, asserts the following issue:

1. If a taxpayer 
successfully prosecutes an action to compel a governmental entity to discontinue 
an illegal expenditure with a resulting benefit to all taxpayers, may the Court 
award the successful taxpayer-Plaintiff attorneys fees from the monies saved by 
his efforts?

The Board, as 
appellee, counters:

1. Should this 
Court consider an issue that is first raised on appeal?

2. Does the 
record reflect sufficient evidence to justify an award of attorney 
fees?

FACTS

[¶6]      In April of 1994, 
the Board of Platte County Commissioners established elected county official 
salaries for the upcoming term. In addition to setting base salaries, the Board 
adopted a resolution whereby it could grant cost of living adjustment (COLA) 
raises not to exceed 8 percent of each official's annual salary. The resolution 
provided:

BE IT FURTHERMORE 
RESOLVED: That a provision is 
hereby included for a cost of living allowance, not to exceed eight percent 
(8%), annually, if found to be budgetarily feasible at any time during the term 
of each official, for whom a salary is determined, and providing that no salary 
shall exceed the limits set by statute for each respective 
office.

[¶7]      Although the 
Board recognized the need for salary increases, revenue for the raises was not 
immediately available and future tax revenue was uncertain. As a result of the 
continuing litigation over the assessed valuation of the Laramie River Station, 
substantial amounts of taxes have been paid under protest, rendering these funds 
unavailable for distribution. See W.S. 39-1-311. Thus, the Board finds it 
difficult to budget the salaries of county officials, three and four years in 
advance, without having a provision for a flexible cost of living increase. In 
adopting the resolution, the Board relied on Attorney General opinion 
78-12.

[¶8]      In 1996, the 
Board voted to grant 5 percent COLA raises to all county officials, except the 
sheriff.1 In November of 1996, Donna Yeadon 
filed a petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition to, inter alia, invalidate 
the COLA raises. Yeadon's complaint alleged that she was "acting in the capacity 
of a private attorney general for the benefit of the people of Platte County and 
the State of Wyoming whose funds are being expended for which reason she should 
be awarded attorneys fees as well as costs in the pursuit of this 
matter."

[¶9]      The district 
court granted Yeadon's motion for summary judgment on the COLA raise issue. The 
Board was granted summary judgment on the remaining issues, from which Yeadon 
has not taken an appeal. The Board timely filed its notice of appeal on the COLA 
raise issue, creating Case No. 97-166. Yeadon also sought to recover attorney 
fees, which the district court denied. Her appeal from this ruling comprises 
Case No. 97-167.

DISCUSSION

Mid-Term COLA 
Raises

[¶10]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Terry v. Pioneer Press, 
Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997). Since both parties agree that no facts are 
in dispute, the COLA raise issue presents only a question of law. In such cases, 
this court conducts a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law. 
Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996). Here, we are asked to 
interpret Wyo. Const. Article 3, Section 32. When interpreting a constitutional 
provision, "[w]e are charged with discerning the intent of the Constitutional 
Convention, and we look first to the plain and unambiguous language to discern 
that intent." Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998). "In the case of a constitution, it must be presumed the 
people have intended whatever has been plainly expressed and that intent must be 
given effect and enforced." Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1257 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 
821 (1897)). Thus, "[i]f the constitutional language is clear and unambiguous, 
we must accept and apply the plain meaning of that language." Management Council 
of Wyoming Legislature, 953 P.2d  at 843.

[¶11]   Article 3, Section 32 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part:

Changing terms and 
salaries of public officers.

Except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, no law shall extend the term of any public 
officer or increase or diminish his salary or emolument after his election or 
appointment; . . .

[¶12]   The Board contends this section 
should not be interpreted to prohibit the Board from granting mid-term COLA 
raises because the raises are a practical and efficient solution to Platte 
county's funding problem. Also, the Board contends, Platte county officials are 
otherwise underpaid and the COLA raises are "in proportion to the value of 
services rendered and the dut[ies] performed."2 Finally, the Board asserts that its 
members have approached the COLA raise issue in a responsible manner; therefore, 
none of the evils meant to be prevented by Article 3, Section 32 are present. 
Yeadon counters that Article 3, Section 32 and the case law interpreting that 
section clearly prohibit such mid-term salary increases. Further, Yeadon argues 
that the Board's retained discretion makes possible the very evil meant to be 
eradicated by the provision.

[¶13]   In interpreting the relevant 
language of Article 3, Section 32, this court, in Nickerson v. Winslow, 22 Wyo. 
259, 268-269, 138 P. 184, 186, reh'g denied 22 Wyo. 259, 140 P. 834 (1914), 
wrote:

The meaning of this 
section is clear. There is no ambiguity about it. The words are pointed and 
direct. They mean just what they say, and construe themselves. When it says that 
the salary of a public officer shall not be increased or diminished after his 
election, it means that the salary or compensation for the term to which he was 
elected shall not be changed after, but becomes fixed as of the date of the 
election. . ..

[¶14]   In a more recent case interpreting 
this provision, Barber v. Board of County Comm'rs of Uinta County, 73 Wyo. 222, 
233, 277 P.2d 977, 980-981 (Wyo. 1954), this court 
summarized:

The simple facts are 
these: When county officials are elected or enter upon their duties there should 
be a definite basis according to which their salary is fixed. It should not be 
left to surmise or conjecture. The board of county commissioners should know 
what they must pay and the officials are entitled to know what they will 
receive.

[¶15]   The Board, relying on an Attorney 
General Opinion 78-12, argues that the COLA raises do not offend the 
constitution. In that opinion, Wyoming's Attorney General concluded that stepped 
salary increases for elected officials do not violate Wyoming Constitution 
Article 3, Section 32. Without deciding the question whether stepped salary 
increases are permissible, we find that the situation presented here is clearly 
distinguishable from the question presented in Opinion 78-12. In the case of 
stepped salary increases, the salaries are fixed at the time the salaries are 
established (prior to June 1 of an election year). Although the amount of an 
official's monthly paycheck increases over time, the stepped increases are fixed 
before election, and payment of the stepped increases is not 
discretionary.

[¶16]   In Platte County, the county 
officials' base salaries were fixed prior to the 1994 election.3 However, the Board retained 
discretion whether to grant the COLA raises. This discretion included not only 
whether the raises would be granted, but also when to grant the raises, to whom 
(as evidenced by the exclusion of the sheriff from the COLA raise), and in what 
amounts (between zero and eight percent). This retained discretion evokes the 
concerns discussed in Board of Comm'rs of Converse County v. Burns, 3 Wyo. 691, 
702, 29 P. 894, 899 (1892):

The purpose of the 
constitutional provision inhibiting a change in the compensation of a public 
officer during his term of office was to protect the individual officer against 
legislative oppression, and to guard the legislature from the gainful schemes of 
officials. State v. Kelsey, 44 N.J. Law, 31. Party rancor, personal spleen, 
enmity, or grudge, might work to harass and cripple the officer by reducing his 
compensation during his term of service; while, on the other hand, partisan 
feeling, blood or business relations, might sway the members of the legislature, 
and cause the bestowal of an unmerited increase, without this wise 
restriction.

[¶17]   Although there is no evidence that 
these evils tainted either the Board's decision to grant raises or the actions 
of any Platte county official, the discretion retained by the Board makes such 
evil a possibility. Because of this retained discretion, the salaries of Platte 
county officials were not fixed, but subject to an increase after election. To 
allow the Board to pay the COLA raises would allow it to perform an 
unconstitutional act. Under these circumstances, we hold that the COLA raises 
violate Article 3, Section 32 of the Wyoming Constitution and that summary 
judgment in favor of Yeadon was proper.

Attorney 
Fees

[¶18]   Recently, in Hamilton v. Town of 
Greybull, 942 P.2d 410, 411 (Wyo. 1997), this court 
reiterated:

Wyoming follows the 
American rule that each party is normally responsible for his or her own 
attorney fees. There are two exceptions to this rule: when there is an express 
statutory authorization or a contractual provision that allows for an award of 
attorney fees to a party. We have denied attorney fees where neither exception 
is applicable.

Quoting 
Snodgrass v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 903 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Wyo. 1995) 
(citations omitted); see also McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶19]   Unable to rely on a contractual or 
statutory provision that permits attorney fees, Yeadon invites this court to 
adopt any of three doctrines discussed in her brief: the common fund doctrine, 
the substantial benefit doctrine, or the private attorney general doctrine. The 
Board counters that this issue is not properly preserved for our review, 
contending that Yeadon did not raise the issue below and did not submit a 
statement of fees. Yeadon also asks us to award attorney fees she has incurred 
in defending the Board's appeal.

[¶20]   In her complaint, Yeadon alleged 
that she was "acting in the capacity of a private attorney general for the 
benefit of the people of Platte County and the State of Wyoming," and, as such, 
"she should be awarded attorneys fees as well as costs in the pursuit of this 
matter." Her prayer for relief also requested attorney fees. A month after the 
district court entered its order on the parties' respective motions for summary 
judgment, Yeadon petitioned the district court to certify the question of 
attorney fees to this court. The Board filed a response, arguing that Yeadon was 
not timely in asserting her claim for attorney fees. The district court then 
entered an order which denied attorney fees.

[¶21]   Although the district court did not 
specify the grounds for the denial of attorney fees, the record reveals that 
Yeadon did not make a timely motion for the fees. The applicable rule, W.R.C.P. 
54(d), provides:

(2) Attorney's 
Fees.

(A) When allowed by law, 
claims for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by 
motion unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the recovery 
of such fees as an element of damages to be proved at 
trial.

(B) Unless otherwise 
provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must be filed and served 
no later than 14 days after entry of judgment; must specify the judgment and the 
statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award; and 
must state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the amount 
sought.

[¶22]   Here, subsection (A) is 
inapplicable because attorney fees were not an element of damages to be proved 
in Yeadon's case. Yeadon did not seek damages in her complaint, instead choosing 
to pursue only the writs of mandamus and prohibition. Since attorney fees were 
not an element of Yeadon's damage claim, 54(d)(2)(B) governs our 
analysis.

[¶23]   Under 54(d)(2)(B), Yeadon had 14 
days from final judgment to make a motion for attorney fees. The record is clear 
that she did not do so. The district court's order on the parties' respective 
motions for summary judgment was entered March 25, 1997. On April 25, 1997, 
Yeadon filed a petition to certify the attorney fees question to the supreme 
court. Even if we assume this petition served to place the issue of attorney 
fees before the district court, it was filed well after the 14 day limit 
mandated by Rule 54(d)(2)(B). Yeadon's request was further deficient in that it 
did not state the amount or a fair estimate of the fees 
sought.

[¶24]   Yeadon argues that as a result of 
the district court staying the effect of the order pending appeal, the order was 
not a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54. By Yeadon's way of thinking, the 
judgment would become final only after an appeal had been taken and decided. We 
cannot agree with this analysis. All substantive issues raised in Yeadon's 
complaint were decided by the district court's order: Yeadon was granted summary 
judgment on the mid-term COLA raise issue, and the Board was granted summary 
judgment on the remaining issues. Yeadon recognized this in her petition to 
certify the attorney fees issue to this court, which stated, "This Court has 
granted partial summary judgments on all other issues in this case." With no 
issues left to be resolved, the district court's order served as a judgment 
under Rule 54(a), as it was the final determination of the rights of the parties 
in the action.

[¶25]   Rule 54 clearly requires that a 
party move for attorney fees within 14 days of entry of judgment. Since Yeadon 
did not timely file a Rule 54 motion for attorney fees, the district court 
properly denied Yeadon's request for fees. See Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 
1047 (1st Cir. 1997). Because we base our ruling on Yeadon's failure to timely 
file a motion for attorney fees, we do not reach the issue whether any of 
Yeadon's theories for recovery of attorney fees should be 
adopted.

[¶26]   Yeadon also asks this court to 
order the Board to award her attorney fees she incurred in responding to the 
Board's appeal. This court is generally "reluctant to grant sanctions and will 
do so only in those rare circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent argument, 
where there is an absence of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, 
and/or where there is a failure to adequately cite to the record." Amen, Inc. v. 
Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 
965 (Wyo. 1996) and Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 1993)). The issue 
presented by the Board is novel in that we have never determined the propriety 
of mid-term COLA raises as implemented by the Board in this case. See Townsend 
v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Wyo. 1997). 
Furthermore, the Board's arguments are not frivolous, and it appears to be 
acting in good faith in attempting to preserve the COLA raises. Given these 
circumstances, we cannot certify that there was no reasonable cause for appeal 
under W.R.A.P. 10.05.

CONCLUSION

[¶27]   The district court properly ruled 
that the COLA raises were an unconstitutional midterm salary increase. The court 
also properly denied Yeadon's request for attorney fees, as she failed to make a 
timely motion as required by Rule 54. Both cases are, therefore, 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 The Board 
did not give the sheriff a COLA raise because he is not POST (Police Officer's 
Standards and Training) certified and has been enjoined from acting as a peace 
officer. See W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv)(A) and 7-2-102.

2 Article 14, 
Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent 
part:

All 
. . . county . . . officers . . . shall be paid fixed and definite salaries. The 
legislature shall, from time to time, fix the amount of such salaries as are not 
already fixed by this constitution, which shall in all cases be in proportion to 
the value of the services rendered and the duty 
performed.

3 Wyoming 
Statute 18-3-107(a) (1997) provides that:

The 
board of county commissioners of each county shall meet not later than June 1, 
1978, and on or before the same date each four (4) years thereafter, for the 
purpose of setting salaries, which shall not be changed during the term of each 
official for whom a salary is determined.

Yeadon does not challenge the propriety of the legislature's delegation 
of authority to fix salaries within a set range to the county commissioners of 
each county. In May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 264-65, 131 P.2d 300, 309 
(1942), this court decided that the delegation of such authority to municipal 
councils does not violate Article 14, Section 1. The delegation of this 
authority to county commissioner boards has never been 
challenged.