Title: Jacoby v. Bell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

370 So. 2d 278 (1979)
Samuel Myer JACOBY, etc.
v.
E. P. BELL, et al.
78-20.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 27, 1979.
*279 Taylor D. Wilkins, Jr., of Wilkins & Bankester, Bay Minette, for appellant.
James R. Owen, of Owen, Ball & Wills, Bay Minette, for appellee, E. P. Bell.
Michael J. Salmon, Gulf Shores, for appellee, First Southern Federal Savings and Loan Assn. of Mobile.
BEATTY, Justice.
This was an action to set aside a 1971 deed on the ground of forgery. The lower court entered an order 1) dismissing the complaint and 2) dismissing the counterclaim and cross-claim as moot. We reverse and remand.
Samuel Myer Jacoby, by and through his mother and next friend, Mary F. Jacoby, brought this action to set aside an allegedly forged deed. The warranty deed, purportedly executed in 1971 by his parents, Sam and Mary F. Jacoby, and his uncle, Rudolph Jacoby, gave title in certain valuable real estate to defendant, E. P. Bell.
In 1973 Sam and Mary F. Jacoby were divorced. In the preceding litigation the deed's validity was disputed but, at least between those parties, put to rest in favor of the document's authenticity.
Sam Jacoby died in 1976 leaving the minor plaintiff as his heir. The mongoloid child is in the custody of his mother and next friend, Mary F. Jacoby.
After this action was instituted against defendant Bell, First Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association (First Southern) intervened as Bell's mortgagee of the property. The plaintiff amended his complaint to add as defendants First Southern and also Christine W. Hammonds, Administratrix of Sam Jacoby's estate. Thereafter First Southern filed a counterclaim and cross-claim praying that the plaintiff and cross-defendant, Hammonds, be made to execute conveyances of the subject property.
After discovery the case was tried and on September 20, 1978 the complaint was dismissed and the plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal.
The dismissal with prejudice of this plaintiff's complaint operated under Rule 41(b), ARCP as an adjudication upon the merits. Therefore in reviewing the trial court's disposition of this case we must determine, as in any other non-jury judgment, whether the dismissal was supported by the evidence. See Strickland v. Nat'l. Gypsum Co., Ala.Civ.App., 348 So. 2d 496 (1977); Long v. Cone, 542 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1976).
The defendants/appellees argue that our determination must be governed by two very substantial presumptions. The first presumption is that in favor of the validity of an acknowledged instrument. In Thompson v. Mitchell, Ala., 337 So. 2d 1317 (1976), this Court citing Chapman v. Turner, 255 Ala. 423, 51 So. 2d 867 (1951), stated that
Although the trial court did not make written findings of fact which Rule 41(b), ARCP hints would be helpful in such a case, it is apparent that the trial court was not convinced the plaintiff met this burden. The defendants argue that this conclusion is bolstered by the second presumption they urge upon us, that of Hill v. Delchamps Food Stores, 294 Ala. 14, 310 So. 2d 871 (1975):
From a review of the record we hold that the evidence presented by the plaintiff did indeed overcome the first presumption and show forgery with the required clarity. So too the second presumption must fall. The *280 rule of Hill, supra is not irrebuttable. Where the conclusion of the trial court is so opposed to the weight of the evidence that the variable factor of witness demeanor could not reasonably substantiate it, then the conclusion is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. This, as the evidence below will illustrate, is the case sub judice:
The plaintiff's next friend, Mrs. Mary F. Jacoby, testified that she had not signed, nor had she authorized anyone to sign her name to, the alleged deed or any other deed when she was married to Sam Jacoby, although the deed was dated while they were married. Further, she testified that she was familiar with the signature of Sam Jacoby having seen it hundreds of times, and the signature on the deed was not that of Sam Jacoby.
Mr. Lamar Miller was then brought to the stand as a handwriting expert. He testified that his training in handwriting identification and questioned documents was obtained at a one-year training school in Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. and that he had done considerable work in handwriting identification for law enforcement as well as testifying in state and federal court for some five years. Mr. Lamar stated that by comparing known samples of handwriting with handwriting under question a trained examiner of questioned documents could determine the authenticity of the questioned signatures. He further testified:
On cross-examination, Mr. Lamar admitted that all of the known signatures of Mrs. Jacoby were signed Mary F. Jacoby and that these were compared with the questioned signature of Frances Jacoby.
On redirect-examination Lamar was asked his opinion based upon his education and background and experience and work on this particular deed on whether the signatures of Sam Jacoby and Frances Jacoby are the actual signatures of these people?:
On re-cross the witness was shown for the first time a check purportedly endorsed by Sam and Rudolph Jacoby and asked to examine it:
At this point Mrs. Jacoby was recalled to the stand by the plaintiff and testified that she signs her name, Mary F. Jacoby, not Frances Jacoby. On cross Mrs. Jacoby agreed with counsel that the name on the deed was "Francis" but she does not spell her name with an "i."
The defendants then presented their case:
*282 Appellee Bell, the grantee, testified that he was present and witnessed Sam Jacoby sign the deed in question. He, however, could not identify the appellant's next friend Mary F. Jacoby as the woman who signed the deed with Sam Jacoby.
Rudolph Jacoby, the brother of the deceased Sam Jacoby, when asked whether the signature, "Sam Jacoby," written on the deed appeared to be that of his dead brother, stated "I imagine so." On cross-examination, however, the following exchange took place:
The attorney in whose office the closing took place stated his belief that the persons present at the execution of the deed were the signatories, Mary Steirs (now Mrs. Mary McGuff) who was his secretary, Mr. E. P. Bell and himself. When asked however if he saw each of the gentlemen (Rudolph and Sam Jacoby) sign the deed, he answered "Mr. Owen, I don't have an independent recollection where I can say I saw Mr. WhoeverMr. Sam Jacoby or Mr. Rudolph Jacoby sign it at that time at that place." Still later on direct examination the following exchange took place:
Mrs. Mary C. McGuff (formerly Mary C. Steirs) testified that she worked for the lawyer at the time of this transaction and identified her signature as that of the Notary Public on the deed in question. She testified that it was office procedure that the signatories be there for her to acknowledge it. She stated thereafter however that she had no personal recollection of the transaction. On cross-examination the record shows the following:
Because of our holding above we need not discuss the plaintiff's contentions of further error.
Defendant First Southern argues in effect that the 1973 divorce action between Sam and Mary F. Jacoby put to rest the issue of the deed's validity and thus the bar of res judicata supports the trial court's action in dismissing the complaint independent of the weight of other evidence. We disagree. In Quinnelly v. City of Prichard, 292 Ala. 178, 291 So. 2d 295 (1974), this Court stated the elements which must be met to establish such a bar:
In this case the threshold requirement of same parties is missing. Therefore this argument is untenable.
Pursuant to our holdings above the judgment must be reversed and remanded for *283 further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.