Title: Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. City of Miami

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

321 So. 2d 545 (1975)
FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Florida, Respondent.
No. 44874.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 24, 1975.
Rehearing Denied November 18, 1975.
*546 William P. Simmons, Jr. and Eric B. Meyers of Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for petitioner.
John S. Lloyd, City Atty. and Robert Orseck of Podhurst, Orseck & Park, Miami, for respondent.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Jerry E. Oxner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae.
OVERTON, Justice.
This cause is before us upon petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, reported at 286 So. 2d 247. Conflict is asserted with Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company v. State Road Department, 176 So. 2d 111 (Fla.App. 1st 1965), and City of Dania v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 134 So. 2d 848 (Fla.App.2d 1961). We agree there is conflict as herein expressed, and we have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, West's F.S.A.
This action commenced as a condemnation by the City of Miami for park purposes against certain waterfront lands owned by the petitioner herein, Florida East Coast Railway Company. The trial court, after an extensive hearing on the issue of the City's right to acquire certain railroad property by eminent domain, entered the following order:
The railroad accepted the trial court's order allowing condemnation of part of the subject property, but the City appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the trial court's order denying the City the right to take the property leased to TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., and certain submerged bay bottom-lands. The cause was ordered remanded to the trial judge to determine whether these properties "[are] necessary for the successful operation of the Railway." From this ruling the railroad filed the present petition in this Court.
The issues in this case concern the applicability of the prior public use doctrine to the TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., property and to submerged bay bottomlands. Generally, property held by an authority that has the power of condemnation cannot be taken by another authority with the same power of condemnation absent specific legislation. This is known as the prior public use doctrine. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain 2-57, § 2.2. Two prior District Court cases considered this doctrine. In Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company v. State Road Department, supra, the Road Department sought to widen a state road and to condemn parts of a railroad right-of-way for a drainage easement. The First District cited the prior public use doctrine, stating:
The court held, however, that the subject property could be taken under an exception to the public use doctrine since the proposed use was consistent with and would not materially impair the prior public use.
In City of Dania v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, supra, the Flood Control District sought to condemn land owned by the City of Dania. The Second District Court of Appeal cited with approval the following quotations from Township of Weehawken v. Erie Railroad Company, 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593, 596 (1956):
In the instant case, the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished the City of Dania case, holding that it involved two public bodies, while this cause involves a public body and a franchised public use company. We do not agree with the distinguishing characteristic as expressed by the District Court. It is not controlling.
It is unrefuted that the City could properly condemn land owned by the railroad and used as filling station or motel property; but it could not properly condemn the Dodge Island tracts and terminal because the prior public use doctrine would apply. Those lands are not in dispute. The first disputed issue is whether the prior public use doctrine is applicable to the land leased by the railroad to TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., and used for marine terminal purposes in a limited type of freight operation. TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., is a lessee of the petitioner. It operates a terminal on a portion of the land for the docking of barges on which truck-trailers are transported to and from San Juan, Puerto Rico. The truck trailers contain general cargo and sometimes carry automobiles for export. They arrive daily by truck-tractor and are stored on the land pending loading and unloading for weekly sailings. Various truck common carriers, including a wholly-owned truck common carrier of the petitioner railroad, deliver and receive the trailers at the terminal, where they are rolled on or off the barges. The lease has a thirty-day termination clause.
The second issue is whether the prior public use doctrine is applicable to certain bay bottomland, which the petitioner desires to fill to expand its port facilities.
Upon these facts, the Third District held:
In so holding, the court quoted with approval a discussion of the prior use doctrine in 26 Am.Jur.2d 756, Eminent Domain, § 99:
This is an additional criterion and limitation for railroads upon the prior use doctrine as expressed in Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company v. State Road Department, supra, and City of Dania v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, supra, and, therefore, there is conflict. We approve the additional criterion as expressed in the Third District's opinion.
We are concerned, however, that this concept of prior public use may be misapplied without a clarification of the terms "necessary" and "successful." We understand the term "necessary" in this context to mean utilitarian in furtherance of the public use for which a public franchise or *549 certificate of public convenience and necessity has been granted. It does not mean "indispensable" to the railroad operation.
We further understand the term "successful" to mean a use correlative with the railroad's public use, as opposed to a financially successful use. The application of a "financially successful" use exception to the doctrine could have results not intended. For example, under the facts of this case the revenue derived from the leases to the Holiday Inn, Standard Oil, and American Oil might be financially important to the continued survival of the railroad company. As we understand "successful," it is used in the context of the rail carriage activities of the railroad. Nothing in the new exception, however, should prevent the retention of a financially unproductive railroad public purpose activity. The courts should not intrude into the domain of management.
The doctrine of prior public use should operate as a complete bar to condemnation if the subject property is used in furtherance of the railroad's public purposes. However, if the use is principally for common carriage other than a railroad, i.e., a truck terminal unrelated to rail carriage, it does not qualify since condemnation by the railroad for a truck terminal purpose is not authorized.
We recognize that substantial testimony was taken before the trial court concerning the subject properties. Neither the parties nor the trial judge, however, had the benefit of knowing that the railroad under these circumstances bore the burden of showing that the leased premises used by TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., and the subject submerged lands must be "necessary for the successful operation of the [rail]road." The decision of the District Court to remand for that purpose is proper.
The final point in this case concerns an additional amendment to Section 360.02, Florida Statutes, occurring after the District Court decision. This section grants railroad and canal companies authority to condemn land for terminal facilities, and reads as follows, the underlined portion being the amendment effective May 17, 1974:
The respondent, City of Miami, contends that this amendment makes this cause moot, the City now having the superior power of condemnation. Petitioner-railroad, on the other hand, contends that the amendment is only applicable where railroad and governmental entities both seek to obtain title by exercising their respective powers of eminent domain, the amendment providing that the railroad may not exercise this right if the local governmental entity itself seeks to take the same property. This is a justiciable issue that must first be considered at the trial level. *550 We adhere to the rule that we will not consider an issue raised initially in this Court.
The order of the Third District Court of Appeal is affirmed as herein modified.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
McCAIN, J., dissents.