Title: Miller v. Miller

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

245 N.W.2d 501 (1976) Gloria J. MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Roger L. MILLER, Defendant and Respondent. No. 11806. Supreme Court of South Dakota. September 15, 1976. May, Johnson & Burke and Gale E. Fisher, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant. Rodney J. Steele, Wilkinson & Steele, De Smet, for defendant and respondent. COLER, Justice. On July 9, 1975, respondent filed an affidavit and application for modification of a divorce decree dated October 18, 1974, and filed December 12, 1974. Thereafter on July 14, 1975, appellant filed a like affidavit and application for modification of the decree. Both parties sought modification of that part of the decree which awarded custody of their three-year-old son to the paternal grandparents "subject to the reasonable visitation rights" of both parties to the divorce. The applications or petitions of both parties were consolidated for the purpose of hearing and, following the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with an order, maintaining the status quo. From this order the child's mother has appealed. *502 We affirm. Although RCP Rule 52(a), SDCL 15-6-52(a), does not require the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court, we are satisfied that, as in this case, where the court took testimony in support of the affidavits on file, this court's review is materially aided by their entry. This court, in Masek v. Masek, 1976, S.D., 237 N.W.2d 432, in construing SDCL 25-4-45 and 30-27-19 clearly stated the rule regarding change of custody cases as follows: Under the explicit language of RCP Rule 52(a), "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Given this scope of review, we set forth the following findings of fact and conclusions of law,[*] which accurately reflect the evidence presented as to the change of circumstances. These read, in part, as follows: The findings of the trial court are not "clearly erroneous." Indeed, they are amply supported by the record. In Wiesner v. Wiesner, 1963, 80 S.D. 114, 119 N.W.2d 920, this court, citing Taber v. Taber, 209 Cal. 755, 290 P. 36, stated: Applying this criteria, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. The record reflects that appellant's visitation rights have not been restricted nor is she foreclosed from reasserting her claim when and if she can make a satisfactory showing to the trial court that custody in her is in the best interest of the child. The order appealed from is affirmed. DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur. ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the time this case was orally argued, did not participate. [*] As stated by this court in State ex rel. Van Loh v. Prosser, 1959, 78 S.D. 35, 98 N.W.2d 329: "[T]he designation of a finding of fact as a conclusion of law is not determinative of its true nature. Slimmer v. Meade County Bank, 38 S.D. 311, 161 N.W. 325. This court has held that a fact found by the court although expressed as a conclusion of law will be treated on appeal as a finding of fact." (Citations omitted)