Title: Rude v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Rude v. State1993 WY 63851 P.2d 15Case Number: 92-76Decided: 04/26/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jack Stanley RUDE, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Micheal K. 
Shoumaker, Sheridan, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Jack 
Stanley Rude, appeals from the district court's decision to accept his pleas of 
guilty to the crimes of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder. Appellant raises one issue for our review by asking whether 
an adequate factual basis was established during re-arraignment to sustain his 
pleas of guilty to the crimes of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder. We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

[¶2]      Mary Elizabeth 
Rude was found dead in her Cheyenne, Wyoming apartment on the morning of March 
20, 1991. She had been shot three times at close range with a small caliber 
weapon, twice to the head and once to the back. The investigation of the murder 
centered upon appellant and his son. A complaint was filed on April 12, 1991, 
leading to the arrest of appellant in Ohio on April 17, 1991. He was extradited 
to Wyoming and appeared in county court on June 10, 1991. Counsel was appointed 
to represent appellant and he was bound over to the district court. He was 
arraigned in district court on August 9, 1991, and the district court entered a 
plea of not guilty on his behalf.

[¶3]      Appellant was 
re-arraigned on March 6, 1992, and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty 
to first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In exchange 
for appellant's guilty pleas, the prosecution agreed to recommend that he be 
sentenced to life terms for each count, with the terms to run concurrently. The 
district court accepted the guilty pleas and sentenced appellant to two 
concurrent life sentences.

I.

[¶4]      Appellant 
contends that the district court judge did not adequately establish a factual 
basis for each charge as required by W.R.Cr.P. 15(f) (Rule 11 under the present 
rules). W.R.Cr.P. 15(f) provided:

Determining accuracy of 
plea. - Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not 
enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it 
that there is a factual basis for the plea.

[¶5]      During 
re-arraignment, after the district court established that the pleas were 
voluntary and had placed appellant under oath, the following colloquy 
occurred:

THE COURT: Okay. With 
regard to - let's go to count two first. I think that might be a little easier 
to get a factual basis.

     What happened on March 
19, 1991? First of all, did it happen here in Cheyenne?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it 
did.

THE COURT: What did you 
do?

THE DEFENDANT: Beth was - 
my daughter-in-law was getting in my face and threatening legal action against 
my son. I was getting very angry. And she stooped down in front of me - was 
getting cat food or whatever - and she turned her head sideways and said, 
"You're nothing but a" - or "He's nothing but a damned liar." That's when I shot 
her.

* * * * * 
*

THE COURT: Okay. So, now, 
you came to Cheyenne then with the pistol, you came with the intent to kill your 
daughter-in-law, I take it. Is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, it 
was not a dyed-in-the-wool decision. It was a decision that I think I reached a 
few seconds before I actually shot her.

* * * * * 
*

THE COURT: * * * Tell me 
about the actual shooting. What happened? How many shots did you 
shoot?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, the 
first two shots were, I would say, instantaneous, together, and the third shot 
followed it by - I have no concept of time - but some interval of 
time.

THE COURT: How much 
interval? What's your best testimony in that regard?

THE DEFENDANT: My guess 
would be just a few seconds.

[¶6]      The prosecution 
provided the following additional information:

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, 
the premeditation, Mr. Rude, I believe, was laying a factual basis for the shot. 
He described first the first shot to the head of Ms. Rude. I believe we still 
have shots two and three. There was a pause between the second shot, a pause 
between the third shot. And I would submit upon completion of that statement, 
there would be sufficient evidence to support 
premeditation.

[¶7]      Appellant asserts 
that the factual basis which was provided to the district court did not 
establish premeditation, an element of the crime of first-degree murder. Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-101(a) (Cum.Supp. 1992) provides:

Whoever purposely and 
with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest or 
kidnapping, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

[¶8]      This court has 
consistently held that no specific period of time is required for premeditation 
to occur. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981, 77 S. Ct. 384, 1 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1957). We have concluded that 
premeditation requires only a brief interval between the formation of the intent 
or design and the commission of the act. Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1292 
(1979).

The word "premeditated" 
when used in reference to first-degree murder implies an interval, however 
brief, between the formation of the intent or design and the commission of the 
act.

Id. at 1292. 
Premeditation need not have existed for any given length of time before the act. 
It is sufficient that premeditation existed at the time of the act, and the 
intent and the act may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts. Riggle, 298 P.2d  at 367; Cloman v. State, 574 P.2d 410, 418 (Wyo. 1978). We agree with the 
definition of premeditation outlined by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado:

It matters not how short 
the interval, if it was sufficient for one thought to follow another, and the 
defendant actually formed the design to kill, and deliberated and premeditated 
upon such design before firing the fatal shot, this was sufficient to raise the 
crime to the highest grade known to the law.

Sandoval v. 
People, 117 Colo. 588, 192 P.2d 423, 424-25 (1948). See also Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶9]      We have held 
that, when a conviction for first-degree murder is reviewed on appeal, 
"[d]eliberation and premeditation as the basis for conviction of murder may be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing." Buckles v. 
State, 500 P.2d 518, 521 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1026, 93 S. Ct. 475, 34 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1972). While Buckles involved a jury's finding of deliberation and 
premeditation, we hold that this same rule applies to a judge's determination of 
the factual basis for a plea of guilty to first-degree murder. 

[¶10]   We find support for this rule in 
the plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 15(f) (Rule 11 under the present rules). The 
rule requires the court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the 
guilty plea before accepting such plea. The rule does not mandate that the 
factual basis be established solely from the defendant's 
admissions.

[¶11]   In their treatise on criminal 
procedure, LaFave and Israel outline the following purposes of inquiry into the 
factual basis:

Most importantly, it 
should protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with 
an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his 
conduct does not actually fall within the charge. * * * In addition, the inquiry 
into the factual basis of the plea provides the court with a better assessment 
of defendant's competency and willingness to plead guilty and his understanding 
of the charges, increases the visibility of charge reduction practices, provides 
a more adequate record and thus minimizes the likelihood of the plea being 
successfully challenged later, and aids correctional agencies in the performance 
of their functions.

Wayne R. LaFave 
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 938 (2d ed. 1992). These purposes are 
served if the record discloses a factual basis composed of the defendant's 
testimony and admissions and/or the state's presentation of evidence. The trial 
judge may properly draw inferences from the defendant's admissions or the 
evidence presented by the state to satisfy all elements of the crime to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty.

[¶12]   We find further support for a rule 
allowing the trial judge to infer the elements of first-degree murder from the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). In that case, the defendant, 
indicted for first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, but 
then testified he had not committed the murder and was pleading guilty to avoid 
the risk of the death penalty. Id. at 25, 91 S. Ct.  at 162-63. However, because 
the defendant persisted in his guilty plea and because the state presented 
evidence indicating the defendant had taken a gun from his house with the stated 
intention of killing the victim and had later returned declaring he had carried 
out the killing, the judge accepted his plea. Id. The United States Supreme 
Court upheld the plea, reasoning that:

[W]hile most pleas of 
guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the 
latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal 
penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is 
unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime.

* * * When [defendant's] 
plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated 
his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge 
could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered * * *, its validity 
cannot be seriously questioned. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea 
demonstrated by the State and [defendant's] clearly expressed desire to enter it 
despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did 
not commit constitutional error in accepting it.

Id. at 36-38, 91 S. Ct.  at 167-68 (emphasis added).

[¶13]   Appellant's testimony, together 
with the offer of proof submitted by the prosecution, provided a sufficient 
factual basis to support the element of premeditation. Appellant admitted 
purchasing an airline ticket under an assumed name, concealing a disassembled 
gun in his baggage, stopping at a rest area to assemble the gun and, finally, 
traveling to the victim's home and shooting her three times. We find ample 
evidence from which the district court judge could infer deliberation and 
premeditation.

[¶14]   We find further evidence supporting 
the district court judge's inference of deliberation and premeditation in the 
passage of time between the second and third shots fired by appellant. As we 
noted above, premeditation requires only a brief interval between the formation 
of the intent or design and the commission of the act. The State presented 
evidence, which appellant acknowledged and could not deny, establishing that 
approximately one minute passed between the second and third shots, that the 
victim had been moved prior to the third shot and that she was still alive prior 
to the third shot. The district court judge clearly based his acceptance of 
appellant's plea of guilty to first-degree murder on an adequate factual 
basis.

[¶15]   We affirm the district court's 
decision to accept appellant's plea of guilty to the charge of first-degree 
murder.

II.

[¶16]   Appellant also entered a plea of 
guilty to the charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The district 
court, in its preliminary remarks to appellant, quoted Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1989); Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 (Wyo. 1987); and W. 
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, § 61 at 460-61 (1972) in defining the 
elements of conspiracy, and said:

"A conspiracy is an 
agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The crime of 
conspiracy is complete when an agreement has been made and overt acts performed 
to further the unlawful design."

* * * * * 
*

"One might suppose that 
the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the agreement or 
`meeting of the minds' which is critical to a contract, but this is not 
the case. A mere tacit understanding will suffice, and there need not be any 
written statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates 
agreement."

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶17]  The plea agreement 
provided:

The Defendant, Jack 
Stanley Rude, in conjunction with and with the advice and counsel of his 
attorneys formally offers to enter pleas of guilty to one count of first degree 
murder and to conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

The Defendant further 
offers to set a factual basis for the charge of first degree murder in that he 
shot Mary Elizabeth Rude three times and that he deliberated for a time between 
the first and second shots.

The Defendant also agrees 
to admit that he knew his son, Robert, wanted Mary Elizabeth Rude dead and that 
he then killed her. Further, the Defendant would not contest or dispute any of 
the evidence that the state would proffer in support of the charge of 
conspiracy.

The Defendant understands 
that in return for his pleas of guilty the state would recommend that he be 
sentenced to life terms for each count, said terms to run 
concurrently.

The Defendant further 
states that this offer is made voluntarily and intelligently after consultation 
and advice from competent counsel. The Defendant states that this offer 
represents an intelligent choice among the alternatives which have been 
explained and that the Defendant is satisfied with counsels['] representation 
and that the plea is not coerced.

[¶18]   Appellant's factual basis to the 
conspiracy charge was memorialized on the record by the following exchange 
between the district court and appellant:

THE COURT: Well, let me 
go back a minute. Let's go to count one. It says there was a conspiracy. Was 
there a conspiracy between you and your son?

     THE DEFENDANT: I 
understood from overhearing statements from him that he wanted her 
dead.

     THE COURT: When did 
you hear these statements?

     THE DEFENDANT: Well, 
many times over the previous, I'd say, two months.

     THE COURT: Very well. 
And so based on your son's statements to you, what did you 
do?

      THE DEFENDANT: 
Well, I took it upon myself to come out here.

     THE COURT: So did you 
leave Ohio?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

     THE COURT: Did you 
purchase an airline ticket?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
did.

     THE COURT: With United 
Airlines?

                 THE DEFENDANT: I 
don't even remember the airlines.

      THE COURT: Did 
you use an assumed name?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
did.

     THE COURT: And did you 
take a pistol with you?

    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
did.

    THE COURT: How did you move 
the pistol through the metal detector?

     THE DEFENDANT: I 
didn't.

     THE COURT: What 
happened?

      THE DEFENDANT: 
The previous day I disassembled the pistol and put it in a tool box, and put the 
tool box in a duffle bag which I carried out to checked 
baggage.

                THE COURT: Well, let's 
see, the pistol was in a tool box?

      THE DEFENDANT: 
It was checked baggage. I did not carry it with me.

     THE COURT: Okay. I 
see. So you checked it on the plane. It was disassembled.

     THE DEFENDANT: 
Right.

The prosecution 
did not produce any further evidence on the conspiracy charge. We agree with 
appellant that the district court failed to establish an adequate factual basis 
to support appellant's plea of guilty to the conspiracy 
charge.

One person cannot by 
himself conspire. It takes at least 2 persons to conspire. To conspire is to 
agree to share an unlawful purpose. Two people may share an unlawful purpose 
without entering a formal or written agreement. It is sufficient if their 
agreement is shown by conduct, by a wink or a nod, by a silent understanding to 
share a purpose to violate the law.

United States v. 
Palladino, 203 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D.Mass. 1962).

[¶19]   From the record before us, we can 
find no evidence that an agreement, tacit, oral or otherwise, was ever 
established. The record discloses only that appellant overheard statements by 
his son that he wished the victim was dead. From this we are unable to discern 
any actual agreement between appellant and his son. Evidence showing a person 
overheard another person's desires and acted on those desires, without more, 
will not suffice to prove an understanding between those persons. Without 
evidence of an agreement, the district court could not properly accept a plea of 
guilty to the charge of conspiracy.

[¶20]   We reverse the district court's 
decision to accept appellant's plea of guilty to the conspiracy charge and 
remand the case to allow appellant to replead to the conspiracy charge and for 
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.