Title: RICHARD ALAN JANSSEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD ALAN JANSSEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 123120 P.3d 1006Case Number: 04-87Decided: 09/27/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RICHARD ALAN 
JANSSEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public 
Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. 

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, 
Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Lucas E. Buckley, Student Intern.                        

 
 

            
            

Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Mr. Janssen was 
convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (LexisNexis 
2001) and was sentenced to a term of 48-60 months in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  He 
appeals 
that judgment and sentence asserting that the district court considered an 
improper statement contained in the presentence investigation report, and that 
he was denied counsel at his preliminary hearing and was deprived of his right 
to a speedy appeal.  We affirm. 

 
 

 
 

[¶2]      Mr. Janssen presents the 
following issues:

 
 
1. 
Whether [he] was denied a fair sentencing when probation and parole included 
statements in the presentence investigation which were not verified facts, nor 
facts found by a jury, and the court relied on those statements during 
sentencing.

 
 
2. 
Whether [he] was denied his right to be represented by effective assistance of 
counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings.

 
 
3. Whether [he] was 
denied his right to a speedy appeal when the court refused to allow trial 
counsel to withdraw and refused to appoint counsel for the appeal and when the 
transcripts were not timely filed.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      Mr. 
Janssen was arrested on September 28, 2001, for possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (LexisNexis 2001).  On October 4, 2001, Mr. Janssen formally 
requested appointment of counsel by filing an affidavit of indigency.  On October 5, 2001, the circuit court 
appointed the state public defender as counsel for Mr. Janssen.  On October 9, 2001, an assistant public 
defender entered a written appearance on behalf of Mr. Janssen. 

 
 

[¶4]      A 
preliminary hearing was scheduled for October 4, 2001, and Mr. Janssen was 
identified as a pro se defendant on 
the court's docket listing for that day.  
However, the order binding him over to district court reflected that the 
preliminary hearing was held on October 9, 2001, and that he was represented at 
that hearing by the public defender's office.  Mr. Janssen subsequently retained 
private counsel and was represented by such counsel through trial, sentencing 
and the initial stages of the appeal.

 
 

[¶5]      A jury 
trial was held on April 15, 2002, and Mr. Janssen was found guilty.  The district court ordered a presentence 
investigation report to be prepared prior to sentencing.  The report reflected that the 
investigating agent thought that the defendant was "choosing to violate the 
law."  At the sentencing hearing, 
Mr. Janssen sought probation.  He 
did not take exception to, object to, or offer any amendments to any statements 
contained within the presentence investigation report.  However, the district court determined 
that probation was not appropriate and sentenced Mr. Janssen to the 
penitentiary.  The judgment and 
sentence was entered on June 25, 2002.

 
 

[¶6]      On July 
3, 2002, Mr. Janssen filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and 
requested appointment of counsel to represent him.  No affidavit accompanied that motion, 
and it was denied on July 15, 2002.  
Mr. Janssen, through private counsel, filed a notice of appeal on July 
24, 2002.  The notice was 
accompanied by a certification pursuant to W.R.A.P. 2.05 and a designation of 
the record on appeal, which included all transcripts of proceedings.  On July 25, 2002, the public defender's 
office forwarded an affidavit in forma 
pauperis, signed by Mr. Janssen, to the district court for filing.1  A second order seeking in forma pauperis status and appointment 
of the public defender's office was presented to the district court.  The order was rejected on July 29, 2002, 
with instructions to request a hearing.  
On September 5, 2002, the court reporter informed Mr. Janssen's counsel 
of record that no request had been made for the production of transcripts and 
advised him how to properly obtain the transcripts. 

 
 

[¶7]      On 
January 31, 2003, Mr. Janssen's counsel of record filed a motion to 
withdraw.  The order was rejected on 
February 3, 2003, because the motion was not in compliance with U.R.D.C. 
102(c).  On June 11, 2003, another 
motion to withdraw was filed, signed by another attorney on behalf of counsel of 
record.  Finding that original 
counsel was deceased, the district court entered an order granting the motion to 
withdraw on June 18, 2003.

 
 

[¶8]      On July 
1, 2003, the district court sent a letter to the public defender's office 
explaining that Mr. Janssen must file a motion and affidavit requesting 
appointment of counsel and that a hearing would then be held pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-109(d).  In that 
letter, the district court also expressed concern that proper arrangements had 
not been made to obtain transcripts in accordance with W.R.A.P. 
3.02.

[¶9]      On July 
2, 2003, Mr. Janssen filed a pro se 
motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis.  On July 7, 2003, Mr. 
Janssen filed another affidavit of indigency requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and another pro se motion requesting appointment of 
counsel.

 
 

[¶10]   A 
hearing was held on August 5, 2003.  
Mr. Janssen's motion was granted on August 13, 2003.  Transcripts of all but one motion 
hearing were filed by the end of October, 2003.  The final transcript was not filed until 
March 22, 2004.  This appeal was 
docketed on April 28, 2004.

  

DISCUSSION

 
 
Sentencing

 
 

[¶11]   Mr. 
Janssen claims that the district court improperly relied upon a statement in the 
presentence investigation report that he was "choosing to violate the law."  Mr. Janssen asserts that this comment 
should not have appeared in the report.  
He claims that the district court relied upon this comment in determining 
an appropriate sentence.  He asserts 
that this reliance violated his due process rights.   

 
 

[¶12]   We 
review claims of this nature pursuant to the following 
standard:

 
 
            
Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court. Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1997). "A sentence will not be disturbed 
because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of 
discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play." Smith v. State, 
941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997). "An error warrants reversal only 
when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights. The 
party who is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was 
prejudicial." Candelaria v. State, 
895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 1995) (citations 
omitted); see also Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 
(Wyo. 
1996).

 
 

Trusky v. 
State, 7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 

[¶13]   Mr. Janssen relies upon 
the principle that, in sentencing, due process provides a right to be sentenced 
only on accurate information.  Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).  He claims 
that the district court's reliance upon the "choosing to violate the law" 
comment was error which contravened this right.  We disagree.  

 
 

[¶14]   Mr. Janssen's failure to 
object to the presentence investigation report at the sentencing hearing 
confines our review to a 
search for plain error.  Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Plain error occurs when the 
record shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
which adversely affected a substantial right.  Id.; Manes, ¶ 9.  

 
 

[¶15]   In 
an attempt to establish error, Mr. Janssen contends that the record clearly 
shows that the district court relied upon the agent's opinion in rendering his 
sentence.  He points to statements 
made by the district court:

 
 
            
                        
            
. . . The Court has, in reviewing the Presentence Investigation Report 
and hearing arguments today, considered probation and further treatment.  The WYSTAR program is an excellent 
program, and there are other programs that I think might do very well in Mr. 
Janssen's case.  But I have to agree 
that based upon the defendant's prior criminal record, his prior difficulties 
with successfully completing probation on at least a couple of occasions, and 
the fact that counseling and treatment have been attempted before, has basically 
disqualified him as being a candidate for probation.

            

I 
note also that the Presentence Investigation recommends a term of imprisonment 
as opposed to probation.  The prior 
record speaks for itself, and it's not good.  And it doesn't appear that Mr. Janssen's 
been getting the message of the need to comply with the law relative to 
possessing and using controlled substances.  I believe the Court has no other choice 
but to attempt to get his attention by a prison sentence. 

 
 

[¶16]   We fail 
to discern support for Mr. Janssen's claim of error in these comments.  It is apparent that the district court's 
observations related primarily to Mr. Janssen's criminal history.  There was no dispute as to the extent or 
content of that history.  As the 
district court noted, Mr. Janssen's criminal history "speaks for itself."  In 1997, Mr. Janssen was placed on 
supervised probation for six months but failed to complete that term before 
being arrested on another possession charge.  His probation was revoked and he spent 
five months in jail. Later in 1997, Mr. Janssen was convicted of his third 
offense of possession of a controlled substance and received two years 
probation.  Mr. Janssen's probation 
was revoked in 1999, in part because he again was found to be in illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, resulting in yet another charge.  He was sent to the penitentiary for a 
term of eighteen to twenty-four months.  Shortly after his release, he was charged 
with the offense at issue in this case.  
Mr. Janssen's prior convictions of illegal possession of controlled 
substances subjected him to the felony enhancement found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35 
 7  1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), allowing a prison term of up to five 
years.

 
 

[¶17]   When 
imposing sentence, the trial court has broad discretion to consider a wide 
variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Manes, ¶ 9.  Evidence of prior criminal activity is 
highly relevant to the sentencing decision and may be considered by the 
sentencing court.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117 
(Wyo. 
1993).  A trial court may consider 
information contained in a presentence report in the exercise of sentencing 
discretion, subject only to the rights of the convicted individual to deny, 
dispute or disprove it.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1115.  

 
 

[¶18]   Here, 
the "choosing to violate the law" comment merely summarized what was apparent 
elsewhere in the report and provided the rationale for the agent's sentencing 
recommendation. The district court was not bound to accept the opinion or the 
recommendation of the agent.  
Id.  The district court merely arrived at the 
same conclusion  a conclusion which was more than adequately supported by Mr. 
Janssen's uncontested criminal history.  
 The record does not support 
Mr. Janssen's claim that the district court relied upon the "choosing to violate 
the law" comment in the report.

 
 

[¶19]   Additionally, Mr. Janssen 
fails to establish that reliance on such comment constitutes a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
First, he summarily asserts that the agent's comment is not authorized by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32.2  Mr. Janssen claims this information is 
unsuitable because it is "evaluative."  
W.R.Cr.P. 32 does not require that an evaluation or a recommendation be 
included in a presentence investigation report. However, we have previously 
accepted a sentencing recommendation as a common part of such a report.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1115.3  Mr. Janssen recognizes our holding in Mehring but does not explain how a 
comment that is evaluative is contrary to that decision.  His position is not supported by cogent 
argument, or citation to pertinent authority, so we need not address it 
further.  Hernandez v. State, 2001 WY 70, ¶10, 28 P.3d 17, 20 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

[¶20]   We also find no merit in 
Mr. Janssen's claim that his sentencing violated dictates of the United States 
Supreme Court's holdings in Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) and Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  He asserts that the 
district court violated the principles of Apprendi and Blakely because the report contained 
facts, not determined by the jury, which caused his sentence to be more 
severe.  Mr. Janssen's argument 
fails because it is based upon a misunderstanding of these 
cases.

 
 

[¶21]   In Apprendi, the United States Supreme 
Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362 (emphasis added).  Mr. 
Janssen's sentence was within the 
statutory maximum of 60 months.  Apprendi does not support his 
claim.  The Blakely decision involved a determinate 
sentencing structure.  Blakely, 124 S. Ct.  at 2535.  Mr. Janssen was not sentenced pursuant to 
a determinate sentencing scheme, making Blakely inapplicable to his case.  Indeed, Blakely recognized that indeterminate 
sentencing does not infringe on the province of the jury.  Id. 
at 2540.  Under Apprendi and its progeny, the district 
court was free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider 
factors relating to Mr. Janssen and his crimes in imposing an appropriate 
sentence within the statutory range.  
Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 
37, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶22]   Based upon the foregoing, 
we find no error in the sentencing procedure utilized by the court, nor do we 
find any abuse of discretion by the district court regarding the sentence 
imposed.  

         

Representation 
at Preliminary Hearing

 
 

[¶23]   In his second claim of 
error, Mr. Janssen asserts that he was denied counsel at his preliminary 
hearing.  We must reject this claim 
because the record before us does not establish that Mr. Janssen was denied 
counsel.  Additionally, even if Mr. 
Janssen was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, he waived the 
right to now claim error by failing to raise the issue prior to 
trial.

 
 

[¶24]   On 
appeal, Mr. Janssen has the burden to affirmatively establish that error 
occurred.  Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 5, 55 P.3d 29, 31 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Gregory 
v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 801 (Wyo. 1981)).  Accordingly, with regard to this issue, 
Mr. Janssen must provide record support that he was denied counsel at his 
preliminary hearing.  He has failed 
to do so.  He requested counsel on 
October 4, 2001, and although there is some indication that a preliminary 
hearing was scheduled for that day, the record contains no transcript or tape of 
any hearing held on October 4, 2001.4  The record before us indicates that a 
preliminary hearing was held on October 9, 2001, and on that date, counsel from 
the public defender's office represented Mr. Janssen.

 
 

[¶25]   We note that Mr. Janssen 
failed to raise the issue before the district court prior to trial.  "[U]nless some 
reason is shown why counsel could not have discovered and challenged the defect 
before trial, it will generally be assumed that any objections to the 
preliminary proceedings were considered and waived, and no post-conviction 
remedies will be available."  
Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 582 - 583 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 
900-01 (D.C.Cir.1965)).  Mr. 
Janssen offers no explanation why this issue was not presented to the district 
court.  As we stated recently, "[i]t 
is only appropriate that a defendant be required to object to alleged errors in 
the preliminary hearing procedures before trial when the district court has the 
opportunity to correct them."  Coleman v. State, 2005 WY 69, ¶ 8, 115 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo. 2005).  Failure 
to do so bars review.  Id.

 
 
Speedy 
Appeal

 
 

[¶26]   Lastly, 
Mr. Janssen asserts that the delay in docketing his appeal has violated his 
right to due process.   We have 
recognized that "an excessive delay in the resolution of an appeal   . . . can give rise to a cognizable claim 
of denial of due process."  Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶ 45, 78 P.3d 205, 219 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
adopted a modified version of the speedy trial test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) for application in speedy appeal cases.  Daniel, ¶ 45.  "The four-prong test examines the length 
of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's diligence in pursuing 
the right to appeal, and the prejudice to the defendant."  Id., ¶ 43.  

 
 

[¶27]   Admittedly, the delay in 
the appeal raises concern.  However, 
a full analysis of the Barker factors 
is not necessary, because we find under the fourth prong of the test that Mr. 
Janssen has failed to demonstrate any prejudice.  We evaluate prejudice to a defendant "in 
light of the interests that the right to a speedy disposition of an appeal is 
intended to protect."  Daniel, ¶ 44. These interests 
include:  1) preventing oppressive 
incarceration pending appeal; 2) minimizing anxiety and concern of a convicted 
person awaiting the outcome of an appeal; and 3) limiting the possibility that 
the grounds for appeal or defenses in case of reversal and retrial might be 
impaired.  Id.  

 
 

[¶28]   Mr. Janssen's only 
assertion of prejudice is that he was wrongly incarcerated, based upon the first 
two issues in this appeal.  Our 
resolution, of those issues against Mr. Janssen, is conclusive that he has 
suffered no prejudice from the delay. "Incarceration is not oppressive' and 
thus does not support a claim of prejudice under Barker, if the absence of a meritorious 
appeal establishes that the defendant is rightfully incarcerated."  Daniel, ¶ 49.  Consequently, any delay in processing 
his appeal did not violate his right to due process.  Id.

 
 

[¶29]   Affirmed.        

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The affidavit was filled 
out in pencil, and was signed but not acknowledged.  

 
 

2Specifically, 
W.R.Cr.P.32(a)(2) provides:

The report 
of the presentence investigation shall contain:

(A) 
Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including 
prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances 
affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or 
in the correctional treatment of the defendant;

(B) Verified 
information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the 
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any 
individual against whom the offense has been committed and attaching a victim 
impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-103 if the victim chooses to make one 
in writing. In any event the report shall state that the victim was advised of 
the right to make such a statement orally at the defendant's sentencing or in 
writing. If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall describe the 
efforts made to contact the victim;

(C) Unless 
the court orders otherwise, information concerning the nature and extent of 
non-prison programs and resources available for the defendant; 
and

(D) Such 
other information as may be required by the court.

 
 

3In Mehring, the presentence report 
contained an evaluation section, but Mehring's challenge to facts within it was 
resolved by the trial court, resulting in no prejudice to him.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1115-1116.

 
 

4This 
Court can decide issues only on the basis of the record presented.  Doles, ¶ 5 
(citing 
Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Wyo. 1995)).