Title: People v. Johnson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE,  
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CEDRIC JEROME JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S075727 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
TA037977 
 
 
December 27, 2018 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Raye* concurred.   
 
 
                                        
*  
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Thirds Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
S075727 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
On November 25, 1998, a Los Angeles County jury 
convicted defendant Cedric Jerome Johnson of the first degree 
murders of Gregory Hightower and Lawrence Faggins, and 
found true the multiple-murder special circumstance, arming, 
and personal use of a firearm allegations.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
subd. (a), 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3); id., former §§ 12022, subd. 
(a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a); all further undesignated statutory 
references are to this code.)  Following the penalty phase trial, 
the jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
Many of defendant’s claims in this appeal relate to the 
consequences of his disruptive behavior during the proceedings.  
One such consequence was his absence from the trial.  As 
described in detail below, defendant’s conduct conveyed a 
disregard for courtroom norms as persistent as it was severe.  
Beginning with his first trial on these charges, which ended in 
a hung jury, defendant unleashed profanity-laced tirades and 
accusations of racism against a number of different judges.  He 
also expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney, Steven K. 
Hauser, by repeatedly spitting on him and threatening to kill 
him and his family.  Based on his own observations of 
defendant’s behavior and reports of defendant’s behavior in 
prior proceedings, Judge Jack W. Morgan ordered defendant to 
wear a stun belt in the courtroom.  During jury selection at the 
first trial, defendant called Hauser names and threatened to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
beat him up.  He also repeatedly interrupted the proceedings.  
Because the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to either count 
of murder — the jury was evenly divided as to the Hightower 
murder, and voted 11 to 1 for guilt of the Faggins murder — the 
court declared a mistrial.     
When proceedings resumed, so did defendant’s disruptive 
behavior.  Once again, defendant interrupted the court, spouted 
profanity, and spit on Hauser.  Then, as the court, counsel, and 
defendant convened in the jury assembly room with the venire 
for the retrial, defendant suddenly attacked Hauser, striking 
him on the head and knocking him out of his chair.  Defendant 
could not be controlled with the stun belt and was subdued only 
with the assistance of several deputy sheriffs.  After dismissing 
the venire, the trial court barred defendant from the courtroom 
for the rest of the proceedings.  Defendant declined to listen to 
the proceedings from his lockup cell using a speaker.  When 
defendant returned to the courtroom for sentencing, defendant 
taunted and threatened the court and the attorneys:  “What you 
gon’ do when I get out?  [¶]  You and I both all know I’m getting 
out.  [¶]  All you lawyers.”  
At various points, the judges presiding over the 
proceedings expressed concern that defendant sought to inject 
error into the trial through his disruptive behavior.  Not 
surprisingly, defendant now alleges error arising from the trial 
court’s efforts to manage his behavior, including the decision to 
bar him from trial and the finding that he forfeited his right to 
testify.  What we conclude is that defendant’s repeated efforts to 
compromise the integrity of a capital trial were unsuccessful.  In 
each instance where the trial court made decisions now 
challenged by the defendant, the court acted within the 
permissible scope of its discretion.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
With respect to defendant’s other claims, we find the trial 
court either did not err or did not cause prejudice to defendant.  
So we affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
I. 
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged 
defendant Johnson and codefendant Terry Betton with the 
murders of Hightower and Faggins.  The first trial ended in a 
mistrial after the jury deadlocked on all charges.  At the second 
trial, the jury convicted defendant of both murders and 
sentenced him to death.  The jury also convicted codefendant 
Betton of Faggins’s murder but deadlocked as to Hightower’s.  
Betton was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for the 
murder, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal 
(People v. Betton (July 12, 2000, B130960) [nonpub. opn.].)   
A.  Guilt Phase 
On the night of September 26, 1996, Shetema White threw 
a party at her Jordan Downs apartment in Watts to celebrate 
her brother’s release from custody.  Faggins and Hightower 
attended the party.  But Faggins had reportedly “snitched” on 
someone known as “Mo-C.”  Many people at the party warned 
Faggins he was in danger and suggested he leave.   
Their advice was sound.  Defendant was in a nearby 
apartment with codefendant and Tyrone Newton.  They had a 
view of Hightower and Faggins at the party.  Defendant said, 
“You know we can do them right here and right now.”  When 
defendant asked Newton whether he would kill Hightower, 
Newton said, “he ain’t did nothing to me.”  “It ain’t the fact he 
did something to you,” defendant explained, “we’re getting rid of 
all the snitches.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
Sometime before 10:00 p.m., after being at the party for 20 
to 30 minutes, Charles “Pirate” Lewis told Hightower 
“something just doesn’t feel right” and suggested they leave.  
Hightower got into the driver’s seat of his girlfriend’s car; Lewis 
got in the passenger seat.  Robert Huggins (Hightower’s half-
brother) got into his own car; he was going to join them at 
Hightower’s house.  Faggins left the party around the same 
time.  Around 40 to 50 people from the party were outside. 
Newton went outside to smoke a cigarette.  As he saw 
defendant come out of the apartment, Newton felt his own heart 
racing and wondered whether defendant could “really do this.”  
Defendant approached Faggins with a gun and fired, hitting him 
in the shoulder.  Faggins took off running.  As Faggins ran 
between Huggins’s car and a van, defendant continued shooting.  
When defendant stopped shooting, codefendant started 
shooting; defendant then resumed shooting.  Defendant had a 
handgun (perhaps a Beretta) and a fully automatic Uzi.  
Codefendant had a handgun in each hand.  Faggins fell when 
defendant sprayed him with bullets from the Uzi.     
Lewis had already exited Hightower’s girlfriend’s car.  As 
defendant and codefendant were walking back to the party, 
Lewis was moving a bicycle that happened to be in the car’s way.  
According to Huggins and Newton, defendant approached the 
driver’s side of the car and fired several times.  Newton reported 
that defendant reached into the car with his gun; Huggins, on 
the other hand, said that defendant and the gun remained 
outside the car the whole time.  Neither one saw codefendant 
fire at Hightower.     
Leonard Greer was a few apartment buildings away when 
he heard the gunfire.  He ran to see what had happened and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
came upon defendant and codefendant, who were running away.  
Defendant had what appeared to be a gun in his hand.  A short 
time later, Greer saw his sister, Rochelle Johnson (no relation 
to defendant), walking towards him.  She was crying and 
covered in blood.  She said, “They didn’t have to kill him.  C.J. 
[defendant] didn’t have to kill him.”  Together they walked to 
Rochelle’s apartment.  Their mother, Annette Johnson, arrived 
about 10 minutes later.   
The foregoing account of the homicides came primarily 
from the statements of Greer, Huggins, and Newton.  But each 
had also made statements tending to undermine their accounts 
of what happened.   
 At trial, Newton denied hearing defendant talk about 
killing snitches in general or these victims in particular.  He 
likewise denied knowing about any disagreements between 
defendant (or codefendant) and the victims.  Newton’s contrary 
statements came from a videotaped interview with Los Angeles 
Police Detective Chris Waters while Newton was in custody for 
possessing cocaine.  The videotaped interview, which occurred 
two weeks after the murders, was shown to the jury.  At trial 
Newton disavowed his prior statements.  He testified initially 
that he was intoxicated during the interview and did not know 
why he supplied the false information.  He subsequently 
testified that he made those statements because he “got caught 
with something”; the arresting officer offered to “drop my case” 
in exchange for information about the murders; and he just 
“followed along with” what the officer was saying.  Both victims 
were friends of his, as were defendant and codefendant.     
During the videotaped interview with Waters, Newton 
identified defendant as the shooter of both victims and said 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
defendant had used the same gun for each murder.  At trial, 
though, Newton denied being at White’s party and claimed he 
had been at home in Hawthorne with family the whole time.  He 
denied talking about the incident with Huggins or Greer when 
he saw them about a week later, or with defendant and 
codefendant at any time.  Newton insisted at trial that he did 
not know where or when the victims were shot; he had told 
Waters the shootings occurred around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. on 
September 25, the day before they actually occurred.  During the 
interview, he told Detective Waters that he had previously 
provided information to the police and had received benefits for 
his information.  At trial, Newton admitted that he was released 
a short time after making his videotaped statement and was 
never prosecuted for the cocaine possession.  Detective Waters 
confirmed that Newton said something like “the more y’all get 
me off y’all line, the happier I will be,” but testified that she had 
not promised Newton anything in exchange for his statements.   
During the interview, Newton also expressed reluctance to 
testify at any future trial.  He stated that he had “too many 
family in the projects” and did not want them to “die[] over me, 
man.”  He also claimed he himself would “be a dead victim if I 
get on that stand and tell you everything I’m telling you, and 
he’s sitting there watching me.”  Newton added, “I’ll be dead.  I’ll 
be a dead man walking.  I might as well just go on and blow my 
head off.  Once I get through telling everybody about him, I 
might as well go home and kill myself, ’cause I ain’t gonna 
survive. . . .  I don’t want to be on no stand on nobody.  That’s 
the one thing I don’t want to do. . . .  I will not — never be — I 
will never get in court on this thing, ’cause I know his people be 
in the courtroom.”  At trial, Newton explained that he wouldn’t 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
be labeled a “snitch” because his prior statement inculpating 
defendant and codefendant “was a lie.”  
Huggins, for his part, spoke with Detective James Vena 
about defendant’s role in these murders during an in-custody 
interview in December 1996.  He addressed defendant’s role in 
the murders again at trial.  Huggins believed defendant had 
used an Uzi and a nine-millimeter Beretta, and that 
codefendant had used one or two nine millimeters.  Huggins had 
earlier told Vena that Faggins dropped his gun — possibly a .380 
or an Uzi — while running from defendant, and that defendant 
picked it up and used it to shoot at Faggins.  But at the 
preliminary hearing in this case, he said he could not see the 
shootings because it was dark.  At trial, Huggins explained the 
discrepancy by pointing out that at the time of the preliminary 
hearing he had been placed in a lockup cell with defendant and 
codefendant; that defendant had asked him, in front of 
codefendant and two dozen other inmates, “why’d I [Huggins] 
say all the stuff I said about him”; that Huggins became afraid 
for his safety; that he had asked to see the deputy district 
attorney before court that day, where he stated that he did not 
want to testify until he got out of jail; and that he did not testify 
truthfully at the preliminary hearing because he feared being 
labeled a “snitch.”  Huggins said he did not volunteer the 
information about defendant’s involvement in the shootings 
earlier because defendant “was still running around on the 
streets.”  Indeed, defendant asked Huggins the morning after 
the murders whether he believed defendant had shot Huggins’s 
brother.  Huggins said nothing and walked away.  Huggins did 
not see Newton or Greer that night, but noted there were a lot 
of people at the party.       
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
Greer had previously been convicted of numerous felonies. 
He admitted that during a conversation with Detective Vena in 
March 1997 he had falsely claimed to have witnessed the 
shooting himself.  He also falsely stated that the shootings were 
in retaliation for codefendant having been “beaten out of” some 
cocaine.  Greer admitted that he “wanted to do something about 
this case.”  But after he learned that Detective Vena had played 
a recording of their conversation in court, he “feared for [his] 
life”:  “[O]n the street, I mean they already got me as a snitch.  
So that’s being said in court that I’m testifying, when I told on 
C.J., that don’t do nothing but put my life in danger.”  Greer 
testified at trial that he had told Officer Christian Mrakich what 
Rochelle said to him about the shooting, but Mrakich denied any 
such conversation occurred.      
Other witnesses also offered testimony about the events 
that evening.   
Lewis testified that he heard gunshots as he neared the 
bicycle blocking Hightower’s girlfriend’s car and immediately 
ducked down.  He then heard more shots as he was about to get 
in the car, and instead took off running.  He said he did not know 
who did the shooting.  But Huggins testified at trial that he had 
spoken with Lewis shortly after the shooting.  In that 
conversation, Lewis had said he heard Hightower ask defendant 
why he “was doing him [Faggins] like that out there in front of 
all them people” before defendant shot Hightower.  Lewis 
testified at trial, though, that he did not see Huggins at all on 
the night of the shooting.  While Lewis did see Huggins the next 
morning, he denied talking about what happened the night 
before.              
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
Greer’s sister, Rochelle, offered testimony favorable to the 
defense.  So did their mother, Annette.  Rochelle testified that 
she had been at the party, along with Hightower and Lewis.  She 
did not see defendant or Faggins there.  She said that 
codefendant, who was her boyfriend, stayed at home all evening 
with her four-year-old child.  Rochelle testified that she had 
returned home, which was a couple of buildings away, when she 
heard screaming and then a pounding on her door.  A woman 
told her there had been an accident.  Rochelle, a nursing 
student, ran to offer help.  She claimed codefendant stayed 
behind.    
Rochelle found Hightower bleeding heavily. She tried to 
offer aid, but Hightower was unresponsive.  Two other people 
put him in a car to take him to the hospital.  When she got home, 
codefendant noticed the blood on her clothes and asked her what 
happened.  Rochelle said there must have been a drive-by 
shooting, and called her mother to seek comfort.  Annette 
arrived with Rochelle’s brother, Leonard Greer.  When Greer 
learned who had been shot, he said, “Oh, my God.”  Rochelle 
denied walking back with Greer to her apartment after the 
shooting, denied ever discussing with him what she saw or knew 
about the shooting, and denied saying anything to him about 
why it happened.  Rochelle was aware that Greer was lying 
when he claimed to have seen the shootings and admitted that 
they had argued about his statements.  Detective Vena heard 
Rochelle call Greer a “snitch” outside a courtroom during a prior 
proceeding in this case.  Greer, too, testified that Rochelle had 
called him a “snitch” on that occasion.  But Rochelle denied 
calling her brother that word.           
Annette said she had wanted to go and comfort her 
daughter right away, yet it had taken her son over two hours to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
come pick her up.  Annette thought she heard codefendant’s 
voice when she arrived at Rochelle’s apartment, but did not see 
him.  Rochelle did not tell Annette she had seen the shooting or 
knew who had done it.  According to Huggins, Rochelle and 
Annette each told him, during the trial, something like, “They 
know who did it; why they still calling [me] to court?”  Rochelle 
denied this.   
A pathologist testified that Hightower suffered five 
gunshot wounds, all from a large caliber weapon such as a .45.  
He did not find any soot or stippling on Hightower’s head or face.  
(One would expect to find stippling if the barrel of the gun had 
been as close to the victim as Newton described it.)  Another 
pathologist testified that Faggins suffered four gunshot wounds 
from a .25-caliber weapon.   
Police found 33 discharged cartridge cases at the scene 
from a variety of firearms.  These included cases from a .380 (all 
fired from the same gun), a .45 (all fired from the same gun), and 
a nine millimeter (all fired from the same gun), as well as a lone 
cartridge case from a .25.  A firearm examiner testified that an 
Uzi can fire nine-millimeter or .45-caliber bullets.  But an Uzi 
(like most fully automatic weapons) typically leaves a 
characteristic mark in the shape of a quarter moon at the top of 
the shell — and no such markings appeared on the shells here.  
No guns related to the shooting were ever recovered.  
Shetema White, the party’s host, denied seeing defendant 
or codefendant that night.  She did not recall hearing gunfire, 
either.  Jocelyn Smith, who married defendant while he was 
awaiting trial, testified that defendant was home asleep around 
7:30 or 8:00 p.m. on the night of the murders and that he was 
still asleep when she woke him and informed him that 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
Hightower and another person had been shot.  He did not leave 
the apartment that night, to her knowledge.  Jocelyn said that 
she visits defendant often and discusses the case with him.  Her 
mother, Joyce Tolliver, testified that she saw two men walking 
by her door shortly after the shooting.  The shorter one had a 
gun (“like a[n] Uzi”) in his hand.  Neither of the men was 
defendant or codefendant.  Maureen Wallace, a neighbor, saw a 
couple of men running her way a minute or two after she heard 
the gunshots.  One had a gun and the other had a dog on a leash, 
but neither was defendant or codefendant.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
The jury convicted defendant of both murders.  The jury 
also found true the multiple-murder special circumstance as 
well as the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm 
and that a principal was armed with a firearm.  At the penalty 
phase, the prosecution offered as evidence in aggravation two 
incidents:  (1) defendant’s conviction for selling marijuana in 
1993; and (2) defendant’s assault against his attorney on 
September 17, 1998, which occurred in the jury assembly room 
in front of 400 prospective jurors.   
During the latter incident, defendant and codefendant 
were wearing remotely activated control technology (REACT) 
stun belts underneath their clothing.  There were no visible 
restraints.  The judge had just taken the podium to address the 
prospective 
jurors 
“when 
suddenly, 
and 
without 
any 
forewarning, defendant Johnson struck his attorney in the 
head.”  As defendant continued the attack, a sergeant in the 
deputy sheriff’s department activated the REACT belt.  When it 
did not appear to work, deputies attempted to restrain 
defendant directly.  But defendant continued kicking at counsel 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
and spit at him.  Defendant was ultimately subdued and 
handcuffed.     
Hightower’s father, Larry Hightower, testified that 
Hightower had managed to overcome his early criminal history.  
He 
graduated 
from 
high 
school, 
joined 
the 
staff 
of 
Congresswoman Maxine Waters, and ultimately opened his own 
business with the help of Waters, Jim Brown, and the Reverend 
Jesse Jackson.  The business, The Playground, garnered 
national attention, and Hightower once hosted President 
Clinton there.  Hightower also helped create a truce between 
gangs after the 1992 Watts riots.   
Psychiatrist Marshall Cherkas testified that defendant 
was uncooperative when Cherkas sought to meet with 
defendant in jail.  Even with a cursory (five-minute) 
examination, Cherkas could tell defendant suffered from 
psychosis with “some kind of a thinking disorder.”  Defendant’s 
records indicated that he was violent and had problems with 
brain functioning.     
II. 
A.  Barring Defendant from Trial Based on His 
Misconduct 
Defendant had a long history of disruptive behavior 
during judicial proceedings and a fraught relationship with his 
attorney, Steven Hauser.  In a previous prosecution for a 
different double homicide, the trial court eventually excluded 
defendant from the courtroom, and his attorneys “proceeded in 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
his absence.”1  On February 19, 1998, before the first trial in this 
prosecution (and while defendant was representing himself), 
Judge John J. Cheroske removed defendant from the courtroom 
because of his repeated outbursts.  The proceedings resumed, 
with defendant present, a short time later.  On March 5, 1998, 
after defendant’s pro se status was revoked, he warned Judge 
Cheroske, “You can’t stand up to me.  My collateral attack 
against you will be unholy in this trial.  Remember that.”  
Defendant was again removed from the courtroom.  On the way 
out, he called the court a “fucking racist” and “a Polack.”  After 
a brief recess, the court announced it had learned, through the 
bailiff, that defendant did not wish to return to court and had 
declined to listen to an audio feed of the proceedings.  Defendant 
similarly refused to attend or listen to the proceedings at the 
next three hearings on April 7, 8, and 20, 1998, “if Mr. Hauser 
is his attorney.”  Defendant also refused to appear at a hearing 
before Judge Hom on April 22.   
Later that day, with Judge Morgan presiding, Hauser 
announced that defendant was refusing to appear at trial until 
his pro se rights were restored.  At a subsequent hearing on May 
13, 1998, Hauser reported that defendant “cursed and spit” at 
him the last time they spoke, so Hauser requested that the 
bailiff be reassigned the task of inquiring whether defendant 
wanted to attend or listen to the proceedings.  Defendant then 
agreed to return to court and was shackled.  After the bailiff 
warned that defendant “may have a plan to do something” and 
the court ordered defendant wear a stun belt, defendant 
                                        
1  
According to the prosecutor below — who had also 
prosecuted defendant on these earlier charges — the jury 
acquitted defendant of one count and deadlocked on the other.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
vociferously objected, called Judge Morgan a racist, and cursed 
at the court.  Defendant was again removed from the courtroom.  
Defendant later returned to court wearing a stun belt.  He 
announced that “[m]y record will reflect that I do not use profane 
language in a court.”   
After the first jury trial ended in a deadlock, the parties 
convened for a status conference.  Defendant began the hearing 
by spitting twice on his attorney and interrupting the court.  
When instructed not to speak “unless you raise your hand and I 
acknowledge you,” defendant responded, “Fuck you and the 
staff.  Fuck you and suck my dick.”  Defendant tried to exit the 
courtroom, but the court instructed the bailiff, “As many people 
you need, we’ll keep him here.  If you need more people here, 
that is fine.”  Defendant spit twice more on his attorney.  As the 
court set forth its reasons for declining to reinstate defendant’s 
pro se status — which included the observation that “this man 
is not capable of conducting his own trial.  He would turn the 
trial into a total circus” — defendant warned the court, “I told 
you to suck my dick.  Remove yourself from my court.  Fuck 
yourself.  Suck my dick.  Suck my dick. Fuck your momma.  
You’s a racist.”  
On August 25, 1998, when the parties convened to discuss 
the juror questionnaire, defendant reiterated his lack of faith in 
Hauser and claimed to be looking for private counsel.  Jury 
selection was scheduled to begin on September 17, 1998. 
Hauser 
was 
still 
representing 
defendant 
at 
the 
proceedings on September 17, 1998, which began in the 
courtroom.  The plan was for everyone to go down to the jury 
assembly room, where the court would introduce the parties to 
the 400 prospective jurors, provide a time estimate and hand out 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
hardship questionnaires, and then proceed to a full introduction 
of the case and distribution of the general questionnaires.  After 
Hauser objected to the bailiff’s plan to place defendant in leg 
chains, Judge Cheroske ruled that defendant and codefendant 
would instead wear stun belts. 
In the jury room shortly thereafter, as the clerk was 
asking the prospective jurors to rise and be sworn, defendant 
suddenly and violently attacked Hauser, striking him on the 
head.  Defendant exclaimed, “That mother fucker.  I don’t want 
him.  Mother fucker.  Fucking ho (sic).”  Deputy sheriffs rushed 
to restrain defendant, and Sergeant McLin instructed him to sit 
down.  The stun belt was activated twice, but it had little or no 
effect.  Defendant refused to cooperate, and it “took any number 
of deputy sheriffs to attempt to subdue him.”  Defendant 
complained, “Mother-fucker.  Tried to dump me in trial.  [¶]  I 
don’t want you.  I do not want this man.  He do not represent my 
interest, ladies and gentlemen.  I’m qualified to represent 
myself.  This man has intentionally dumped me in trial.”  The 
court adjourned, but defendant interjected, “They do a lot of 
illegal shit in these courtrooms” and attacked Hauser a second 
time.  A deputy suffered a finger injury in the melee.  Hauser 
suffered visible facial injuries and swelling.  Afterwards, 
defendant bragged to the bailiff that he would attack Hauser 
again if given the opportunity.   
Back in the courtroom, outside the presence of defendant 
and the prospective jurors, the court made a finding that 
defendant’s actions were intentional and designed “for one more 
time to disrupt the proceedings and delay it.”  The court added, 
“He is out of control.  I will not allow him back in this 
courtroom.”  The court allowed defendant to listen to the 
proceedings by way of a speaker in his cell if he so chose — and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
defendant did not choose to do so — but concluded “there is no 
other possible solution to prevent such outbursts again.”  Back 
in the jury assembly room, over half of the prospective jurors 
indicated that defendant’s unprovoked attack would prevent 
them from being fair jurors.  The court accordingly dismissed 
the venire.  
On September 21, 1998, defendant stated in no uncertain 
terms that he did not want to listen to the trial.  Sergeant McLin 
also overheard defendant threaten Hauser:  “I’m going to kill 
you and your family, you punk mother-fucker.”  The court noted 
for the record that defendant had repeatedly disrupted the 
hearing by banging or kicking on the bars of the adjacent lockup 
cell and making “extremely loud” noises.   
At the hearing on October 2, 1998, the court noted that 
defendant, who was in the court building, had chosen not to 
listen to the proceedings and that he was no longer in the lockup 
cell “because of his repeated disruptions in the last proceeding 
by continually banging against the lockup door to the point 
where we could barely conduct court here.”   
At the next hearing, on October 19, 1998, the court found 
it “clear” that “despite any promises to the contrary, Mr. 
Johnson will continue to do any and everything possible to 
prevent the trial from proceeding.”  The court identified the 
following incidents as proof of defendant’s unwillingness to 
correct his behavior:  defendant’s spitting on Hauser; defendant 
attacking Hauser in front of 400 prospective jurors; defendant 
continuing to attack Hauser despite activation of the stun belt, 
requiring six bailiffs to subdue him; defendant threatening to 
kill Hauser and his family upon learning that Hauser would not 
be relieved as counsel and that trial would not be delayed; and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
defendant slamming the lockup doors and creating such a 
disturbance that it was difficult to hear in the courtroom.  The 
court concluded, “I’m not going to have him in this courtroom no 
matter what he promises,” since any promise to behave “would 
be simply a subterfuge to gain access to the courtroom and allow 
him to continue his offensive, violent and outrageous conduct.”  
The court reiterated that defendant could choose to listen to an 
audio feed of the proceedings.  It also ordered daily transcripts 
of the trial be made available to defendant.     
Prior to voir dire, the court instructed the new venire that 
defendant “will not be present for these proceedings.  The court 
is instructing [] that you are not to speculate as to the reasons 
for his absence, nor is this a matter which in any way can affect 
you or your verdict in this case.”  Over the course of the trial, 
defendant consistently declined to listen to the proceedings.  
Hauser sought to communicate with defendant “almost on a 
daily basis,” but defendant refused to talk (or sometimes even to 
come to the attorney-client meeting room) and instead 
continued trying to spit on him.  The bailiff once overheard 
defendant tell Hauser that he should have taken the 
opportunity “to slit your throat” in front of the 400 prospective 
jurors.  The jury panel was instructed about defendant’s absence 
as follows:  “Defendant Cedric Johnson has voluntarily absented 
himself from these proceedings.  This is a matter which must 
not in any way affect you in this case.  [¶]  In your deliberations, 
do not discuss or consider this subject.  It must not in any way 
affect your verdict or findings you may be asked to make in 
connection with your verdicts.”  Neither side mentioned 
defendant’s absence during argument.   
After the jury found defendant guilty as charged, 
defendant continued “refus[ing] to leave his confinement cell.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
During the penalty phase, defendant was asked to talk with 
Hauser about testifying.  Defendant told jail personnel he didn’t 
want anything to do with Hauser or the trial.  Indeed, defendant 
refused to participate “in any way” when the jury returned its 
penalty verdict, even to watch the proceedings on closed-circuit 
television.  
For sentencing, defendant came to court “in full 
restraints.”  Defendant addressed the court at some length.  His 
contention was that he had tried to conduct himself “courteously 
and strictly by the law,” but “[i]n return” had been “disrespected 
and penalized because of my abilities to comprehend and 
articulate the law.”  He claimed that the only reason Hauser 
refused to withdraw as counsel was “because his purpose on this 
case was to subvert and undermine.  [¶]  It got so, I started 
spitting in this man’s face.  I then physically attacked him, 
which never should have occurred.  The court would like to 
switch the problem on me.”  After sentence was pronounced, 
defendant wondered aloud, “What you gon’ do when I get out?  
[¶]  You and I both all know I’m getting out.  [¶]  All you lawyers.  
[¶]  Yeah.” 
1.  The adequacy of the October 19, 1998, hearing 
barring defendant from the trial 
At the hearing on October 19, 1998, the trial court 
described defendant’s attack on Hauser in the jury assembly 
room, defendant’s threats against Hauser and his family and his 
repeatedly spitting on Hauser, and defendant’s disruptive 
behavior while in the lockup cell adjacent to the courtroom.  
Based on those incidents of misconduct, the court concluded that 
defendant –– who was not present at the hearing –– should be 
barred from the courtroom.  The court conveyed that it would 
view any promise of good behavior by defendant as “a subterfuge 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
to gain access to the courtroom and allow him to continue his 
offensive, violent and outrageous conduct.”  At the same 
hearing, the court ordered that defendant be offered an audio 
feed of the proceedings and daily transcripts of the trial.  
Defendant claims the trial court erred in deciding to bar him 
from trial during a hearing at which he was not present.   
A capital defendant has a federal constitutional right “to 
be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical 
to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of 
the procedure” (see Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745) 
and a state statutory right to be present at “ ‘critical 
proceedings.’ ”  (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 311; see 
§§ 977, 1043.)  Under federal law, a capital defendant may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive the right to be 
present.  (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531.)  Under 
California law, a capital defendant may be absent from the 
courtroom for only two reasons:  “(1) when he has been removed 
by the court for disruptive behavior under section 1043, 
subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily waives his rights 
pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).”  (People v. Jackson 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210.)2  The Attorney General does not 
claim defendant waived his right to be present, nor does any 
waiver appear in the record.  But he does assert that defendant 
forfeited his state and federal right to be present by physically 
attacking his counsel and disrupting the proceedings.     
                                        
2  
Even so, a capital defendant may not waive the right to be 
present at certain proceedings, including those portions of a trial 
in which evidence is taken before the trier of fact.  (People v. 
Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-1211.)  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
We agree.  In Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337 (Allen), 
the high court “explicitly” held “that a defendant can lose his 
right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the 
judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive 
behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a 
manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court 
that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”  
(Id. at p. 343.)  Defendant complains he received no such 
warning from the judge prior to attacking counsel.  But even if 
this is so, a warning is not a constitutional prerequisite to a 
forfeiture of the right to be present.  Some misconduct, such as 
a violent assault in court, is so dangerous as to justify a 
defendant’s removal even without a prior warning.  (See King v. 
Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 929, 943 [“We read . . . 
Allen . . . to permit loss of a constitutional right in certain 
circumstances based on misconduct, even without a prior 
warning”]; accord, Gilchrist v. O’Keefe (2d Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 
87, 97; People v. Wilkins (N.Y.App.Div. 2006) 822 N.Y.S.2d 271, 
272-273.)  Because “dignity, order, and decorum” are essential 
to the administration of criminal justice, a trial court “must be 
given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each 
case.”  (Allen, at p. 343.)   
In this case, defendant physically assaulted counsel in full 
view of hundreds of witnesses.  He refused to let up even when 
he was set upon by deputy sheriffs and his stun belt was 
activated, and managed to launch a second attack on counsel 
while swarmed by deputy sheriffs.  Defendant visibly injured 
counsel and a deputy sheriff, and at no point in the proceedings 
expressed any contrition or remorse stemming from these 
attacks.  The trial court could reasonably conclude that 
defendant’s attack justified his exclusion from the courtroom, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
even though he had not specifically been warned about the 
consequences of such conduct.  (See People v. Staffney 
(Mich.Ct.App. 1990) 468 N.W.2d 238, 240 [“Defendant should 
not be permitted ‘one free swing’ at his attorney”].)   
Nor was the trial court required to undertake a full 
evidentiary hearing, with notice to the defendant, an 
opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the 
appointment of new counsel, before making any ruling at the 
October 19 proceeding.  Defendant’s assault took place in open 
court, albeit while the court was convening in the jury assembly 
room, and was accompanied by profanity that was transcribed 
by the court reporter.  (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1032 [“The court properly found, based on its own 
observations, that Oliver was dangerous in the courtroom.  It 
did not need to summon outside witnesses to resolve the 
shackling question”].)  The trial court could, and in this case did, 
rely on its own observations of the events to determine that 
defendant was “out of control,” that “his actions were 
intentional,” and that “they were planned for one more time to 
try to disrupt the proceedings and delay [the trial].”  (See People 
v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 202; cf. U.S. v. Leggett (3d Cir. 
1998) 162 F.3d 237, 250 [upholding forfeiture of the right to 
counsel without an evidentiary hearing; “An evidentiary 
hearing was not necessary because Leggett assaulted [counsel] 
in full view of the district court”]; State v. Lehman 
(Minn.Ct.App. 2008) 749 N.W.2d 76, 81 [upholding forfeiture of 
the right to counsel, without an evidentiary hearing, where the 
defendant attacked counsel and punched him repeatedly; 
“various federal and state courts have . . . determined that the 
right to counsel can be summarily forfeited for extremely serious 
misconduct similar to that which occurred here”].)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
Defendant contends an evidentiary hearing was required 
here because the trial court’s ruling relied in part on defendant’s 
threats against counsel and his family, which were uttered 
outside the court’s presence.  We disagree.  Defendant’s physical 
assault against counsel, followed by his repeated disruption of 
the subsequent hearing by banging on the metal door of his 
lockup cell, were sufficient in themselves to justify his exclusion 
from the courtroom.  And defendant himself concedes that his 
attack on Hauser was “clearly the primary reason” for excluding 
him from the trial.  Even if the trial court erred by considering 
defendant’s threats against Hauser and his family in addition to 
the other instances of misconduct, the error was harmless under 
any standard.  Before defendant ever uttered those threats, the 
court had already indicated that defendant would be excluded 
from the courtroom.  Its ruling at that time was based on the 
attack and “the record,” which was “replete with the outrageous 
conduct of Mr. Johnson.”  The court determined that defendant 
“is out of control.  I will not allow him back in this courtroom.”  
(See State v. Lehman, supra, 749 N.W.2d at pp. 85-86.)  
Moreover, nothing in the record tends to justify or mitigate any 
of defendant’s misconduct, suggest that it did not occur, or 
indicate that a hearing would otherwise have been beneficial to 
defendant.  (See People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th 510, 533; 
People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 518; accord, Jones v. 
Murphy (2d Cir. 2012) 694 F.3d 225, 239 [“Any argument that 
Jones had a right to be present during the discussion of the 
consequences of his own violent and disruptive behavior would 
be circular, and would imply that a court could never exclude a 
defendant under Allen”]; Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir. 2005) 408 
F.3d 1166, 1169, fn. 1, 1172-1173; Diaz v. Castalan (C.D.Cal. 
2008) 625 F.Supp.2d 903, 921.)  Indeed, the trial court 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
reasonably believed “that despite any promises to the contrary, 
Mr. Johnson will continue to do any and everything possible to 
prevent the trial from proceeding.”      
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that the trial court 
was obligated to appoint new counsel to represent him at the 
October 19 hearing.  Defendant relies on King v. Superior Court, 
supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 929, but that case is different in key 
respects.  In King, the defendant had uttered threats and 
committed violence against a succession of appointed attorneys, 
culminating in a hearing at which the trial court determined 
that he had thereby forfeited his right to counsel.  (Id. at pp. 934-
936.)  The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by allowing 
the most recently appointed defense attorney, who had likewise 
been threatened by the defendant, to continue representing the 
defendant at the forfeiture hearing — but only because that 
attorney “violated the duty of loyalty by offering evidence of 
King’s other violent behavior, evidence . . . obtained in his 
position as King’s attorney” and “actively argued against him.”  
(Id. at pp. 950, 949.)  In this case, by contrast, Hauser did not 
disclose or volunteer any threats or misconduct by defendant, 
nor did he disclose privileged information he acquired in the 
course of the representation.  To the contrary:  Hauser 
consistently 
represented 
defendant’s 
interests, 
despite 
defendant’s hostility towards him.  Even after defendant 
repeatedly spit on counsel in court, Hauser successfully objected 
to the proposal to bring defendant to the jury room in shackles.  
Following the attack, Hauser sought to minimize what had 
occurred and pledged that he could “represent Mr. Johnson with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
equal vigor as if this had never happened.”3  Because the trial 
court had no reason or basis to conclude that Hauser was unable 
to fulfill his duty of loyalty — and had no other indication that 
Hauser’s ability to represent defendant was in any way 
impaired — the trial court could reasonably conclude that no 
actual conflict existed.  (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
646, 675; cf. King, at p. 950.) 
2.  The decision to exclude defendant from the trial 
The exclusion of a capital defendant from his own trial is 
unusual, but not unprecedented.  We have previously upheld 
death judgments where the trial court excluded the defendant 
from part or most of a trial because of the defendant’s disruption 
of the proceedings.  (See, e.g., People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
1113, 1178-1181 [defendant was excluded from the entire 
penalty trial]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 773 
[defendant was excluded “on a number of occasions”]; People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 735-740 [defendant was excluded 
from voir dire, presentation of the evidence, counsel’s 
                                        
3  
Defendant contends that counsel acted against his 
interests when counsel opined in court that defendant’s attack 
and his other outbursts were “merely a tool to either delay the 
trial or to eventually wind up defending himself, which I believe 
is what his goal is.”  But counsel’s statement was made at a 
subsequent hearing, after the court had already decided to 
exclude defendant from the trial.  Moreover, Hauser made the 
statement in the course of explaining why he was not declaring 
a conflict with his client, despite the prosecutor’s intention to 
use the assault as evidence in aggravation in a potential penalty 
trial, and not to disparage defendant.  Finally, Hauser’s 
characterization merely echoed the finding the court itself had 
made at the earlier hearing:  “I suspect that [defendant’s 
actions] were planned for one more time to try to disrupt the 
proceedings and delay it.”     
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
arguments, and reading of the jury instructions].)  A disruptive 
defendant forfeits any constitutional and statutory rights to be 
present at trial.  (Medina, at p. 738.)  In egregious 
circumstances, that forfeiture may encompass the remainder of 
the trial.   
What justifies barring a defendant from the trial, after all, 
is the defendant’s insistence on misconduct “so disorderly, 
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be 
carried on with him in the courtroom.”  (Allen, supra, 397 U.S. 
at p. 343.)  Whether it makes sense to expect a defendant in a 
given case, once removed from the trial, to actually abandon a 
strategy of disruption and conform to courtroom decorum if 
allowed to return depends to a large extent on nuanced 
assessment of the severity and persistence of the disruptive 
conduct.  The trial court is best situated to evaluate the 
defendant’s conduct and the likelihood of further disruption.  
Which is why it makes sense for the decision to bar a defendant 
from the remainder of a trial to rest within the broad discretion 
of the trial court.  (See People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 
773 [“appellate courts must give considerable deference to the 
trial court’s judgment as to when disruption has occurred or may 
reasonably be anticipated”].)    
The defendant in this case violently attacked his attorney, 
in full view of the court and the prospective jurors.  He did so 
while wearing a stun belt meant to control him in case it was 
needed.  The attack was preceded by regular, repeated, and 
vulgar disparagement of his attorney, including cursing and 
spitting, as well as numerous epithets directed at the court and 
other outbursts.  At subsequent hearings, when defendant was 
in the lockup adjacent to the courtroom, he continued his efforts 
to disrupt the proceedings by banging or kicking the cell door.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
So by the time the trial court barred defendant from the 
remainder of the trial during the October 19, 1988, hearing, it 
had ample reason to believe that defendant’s desire to disrupt 
and delay the proceedings would not abate:  “I’m not going to 
have him in this courtroom no matter what he promises,” since 
any promise to behave “would be simply a subterfuge to gain 
access to the courtroom and allow him to continue his offensive, 
violent and outrageous conduct.”     
Defendant faults the court for failing to warn him that an 
assault against his attorney could specifically lead to his 
permanent expulsion from the trial.  We disagree.  Defendant 
was already aware that continued misconduct could result in his 
removal, given that the trial court had removed him from the 
courtroom based on his outbursts during his first trial.  (See 
People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1240; cf. People v. Medina, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 731 [defendant’s outburst in a prior trial 
in a different county justified shackling].)  Defendant had no 
statutory or constitutional right to an estimate of how long he 
might be barred from the courtroom if his misconduct were to 
escalate.  After all, the duration of his removal from the 
courtroom depended on the trial court’s assessment of whether 
and when he would no longer pose a threat to the court or the 
proceedings.  In any event, defendant cites no authority 
suggesting that a court must explicitly put a defendant on notice 
that violence against an attorney — or anyone else in the 
courtroom — could result in his removal.  (See Com. v. Scionti 
(Mass.App.Ct. 
2012) 
962 
N.E.2d 
190, 
200 
[upholding 
defendant’s removal without a warning where the defendant 
threatened violence if brought into the courtroom]; People v. 
Staffney, supra, 468 N.W.2d at p. 240; People v. Wilkins¸ supra, 
822 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 272-273.)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
The trial court in this case found that defendant posed a 
continuing threat.  Defendant’s conduct at trial leaves no doubt 
about why the court made this decision.  A court need not engage 
in the empty ritual of periodically inquiring whether a 
defendant is willing to correct his behavior once it has 
reasonably determined that the defendant cannot be trusted to 
do so.  (See Com. v. Scionti, supra, 962 N.E.2d at p. 200 [“If, in 
the alternative, she had ordered the defendant to be brought 
into court to receive an express warning, the safety of the 
defendant as well as court staff would have been at risk”].)  
Defendant cites no authority to suggest that a trial court lacks 
the power to deploy tools useful in confronting violent conduct.  
Nor does he explain why the court is bound to offer a dangerous 
defendant repeated — indeed, effectively unlimited — 
opportunities to inflict physical injury on counsel or others in 
the courtroom.  (See People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 415 
[“ ‘The trial court’s ability to remove a disruptive or potentially 
disruptive defendant follows not only from section 1043, 
subdivision (b)(1), but also from the trial court’s inherent power 
to establish order in its courtroom’ ”].)            
In any event, defendant repeatedly manifested his lack of 
interest in the trial itself.  He refused daily invitations to listen 
to the proceedings,4 and demonstrated his unwillingness to 
conform to courtroom decorum by his continued misbehavior.  
On November 9, 1998, defendant attempted to spit on Hauser, 
and three days later, he refused all contact with Hauser and said 
                                        
4  
The trial court declined to offer defendant a video feed of 
the entire proceedings, observing that “we have no facilities for 
doing that.”  (Cf. People v. Mayham (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 847, 
856-857.)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
if given the chance, “he would spit all over Mr. Hauser again.”  
Later in the trial, defendant reportedly stated that he should 
have taken the opportunity in the jury assembly room to slit 
counsel’s throat.  And when the court conducted a video 
simulation to determine whether defendant would follow the 
ordinary rules for a witness’s examination by counsel, defendant 
refused to follow the question-and-answer format.  Instead, he 
accused the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel of illegal 
conduct — including the presentation of false evidence, the 
withholding of exculpatory evidence, and “a concerted effort to 
intentionally dump me” — and was about to launch into 
profanity when the court cut off the audio.  Defendant’s 
assertion that he could have been trusted to correct his behavior 
is not supported by the record.   
What defendant argues next is that the trial court should 
have considered alternatives to excluding him from the 
courtroom, such as allowing him to be present while bound and 
gagged.  Not once did defendant ask the court to consider this 
alternative, so he has forfeited the claim.  (See People v. Banks, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)  Even if the claim had been 
preserved, we held in Banks that “a trial court does not commit 
constitutional error when it opts to exclude a defendant from the 
courtroom in response to ‘extreme and aggravated’ conduct, 
even when options such as shackling are also available.”  (Ibid.)  
Indeed, because defendant’s assault on counsel had occurred 
while he was wearing a stun belt, the trial court lacked 
assurance that restraints would be effective.  (See Allen, supra, 
397 U.S. at p. 344; State v. Jones (Conn. 2007) 916 A.2d 17, 35-
36.) 
Defendant’s final challenge to the court’s removal order is 
a technical one.  He contends the trial court overstepped its 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
bounds by barring him before his trial had even begun.  He relies 
on section 1043, subdivision (b), which creates an exception to 
the requirement that a defendant be personally present at the 
trial only “after the trial has commenced in his presence.”  (Cf. 
Smith v. Mann (2d Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 73, 76 [“nothing in the 
Constitution prohibits a trial from being commenced in the 
defendant’s absence so long as the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his right to be present”].)  He then points to 
dicta in People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 80, footnote 
4, where we observed in passing that commencement of trial 
under section 1043 begins at least as early as jury selection.  
Defendant reasons that because jury selection did not begin 
until November 5, 1998, the trial court acted prematurely when 
it barred him from the trial.  
Defendant misunderstands the timeline.  The parties 
convened in the jury assembly room for jury selection on 
September 17, 1998.  The court would have proceeded to 
consider hardships and pass out the general questionnaires, but 
was disrupted by defendant’s attack on Hauser.  When the court 
discovered that the prospective jurors were irrevocably tainted 
by defendant’s misconduct, it dismissed the venire.  (See People 
v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 372-373; People v. Mayfield 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 722, fn. 7.)  Because it would take at least 
three weeks to assemble another panel of 400 prospective jurors 
and the prosecutor declared a scheduling conflict thereafter, the 
trial court found good cause to continue the trial until 
November.  Consequently, the proceedings on November 5, 
1998, were merely a continuation of the trial that had begun, for 
purposes of section 1043, on September 17, 1998.  (See People v. 
Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703, 707.)  In any event, the 
evident purpose of section 1043’s requirement that trial have 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
commenced in the defendant’s presence is to ensure that the 
defendant is aware of the right to be present and that the trial 
will continue in the defendant’s absence.  (See People v. Ruiz 
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 162, 168; accord, Taylor v. United States 
(1973) 414 U.S. 17, 20.)  The record shows that defendant was 
assuredly aware of these things.   
In short, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 
defendant would not conform his conduct to the norms of a 
criminal trial.  We therefore find, under the unusual 
circumstances presented, that the trial court did not err in 
excluding defendant from the courtroom for the entirety of his 
capital trial.   
B.  Defendant’s Forfeiture and Waiver of His Right 
To Testify 
Defendant challenges the trial court’s findings that he 
forfeited his right to testify at the guilt phase and waived that 
right at the penalty phase.  The challenges lack merit.   
1.  Guilt phase 
On November 17, 1998, during the guilt phase trial, the 
court discussed preparations for defendant’s testimony.  
Defendant would not be allowed in the courtroom because of the 
security risks he posed, but would be allowed to testify “through 
a live TV audio transmission setup” from a secure interview 
room in the courthouse.  Before granting defense counsel an 
opportunity to confer with defendant, the court directed counsel 
to tell his client “that he is to conform with the rules concerning 
testimony as any other witness”; that “[h]e will not be allowed 
to disregard such rules and use the opportunity to again attempt 
to disrupt the proceedings, delay the trial, or otherwise attempt 
to inject possible error into the proceedings”; and “that should 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
he fail to comply with these rules, it may be necessary, 
depending on the seriousness of his disruptions, to terminate 
the audio-video arrangement entirely, in which event his 
testimony will of course terminate.”  Counsel reported back that 
when asked whether he wanted to testify, defendant said he 
would refuse to answer counsel’s questions.  So the court asked 
defendant, through the live video feed, whether he wanted to 
testify.  Defendant said that he did.   
The court then reviewed the conditions for defendant’s 
testimony:  “You understand that if you testify, it’s going to be a 
question and answer procedure.  Mr. Hauser will ask the 
questions, and then you’ll respond.  [¶]  Do you understand and 
agree?”  Defendant replied, “Oh yes, we understand it.  We know 
how the proceedings supposed to work, but it don’t seem to be 
functioning well in this courthouse.”  To emphasize the point, 
the court reiterated that “[i]f we use this procedure tomorrow 
morning, once again, it will be question and answer by the 
lawyers; and you will simply follow the rules as any witness 
would in any other trial.  [¶]  Do you understand how that 
works?”  The colloquy proceeded as follows: 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I think it’s already error been 
injected into these proceedings.  Lots of them.  Lots of errors. 
“THE COURT:  Do you understand what I’m saying to you, 
sir? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I hear what you saying.   
“THE COURT:  All right.  Now, in the event that you don’t 
follow the rules, if you try to use the opportunity to do the things 
I’ve just mentioned or engage in profanity, which you have done 
that enough times, I will then — I have here a master switch in 
front of me.  I will kill both the audio and video portion.  At that 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
point in time, you will be given a chance to reconsider your 
behavior.   
“In the event that you don’t want to conform, or if you say 
that you will and we reinstitute your testimony and you once 
again violate the rules, I want you to know right now that I 
would terminate any further testimony.  You will have then 
voluntarily given up your right to testify in this trial by your 
own actions.   
“Do you understand how this is going to work, sir? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I understand y’all been 
violating rules in there.   
“When did y’all start following rules in there? 
“THE COURT:  Do you understand what I’m saying, Mr. 
Johnson? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I hear what you saying. 
“THE COURT:  Are you going to follow those rules? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I’m going to do what I think 
is best on my own behalf.   
“You know, if I write the rules — I understand you trying 
to set up criteria how you want me to operate.   
“THE COURT:  Do you understand what I said to you, sir?   
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I understand what you would 
like me to do.   
“THE COURT: It’s not what I’d like you to do.  It’s what 
you will do, Mr. Johnson.   
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  I understand what you would 
like me to do, and there is no need for further discussion.  Let’s 
wait until tomorrow and see what’s going to happen.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
The court remained concerned whether defendant 
understood the ground rules for his testimony, so it tried once 
more:   
“THE COURT:  I want to know if you have any questions 
about what the rules are. 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  No.  No.  There ain’t no rules.  
Everything open in the courtroom.  It ain’t gonna get no rules 
until we get some attention to what’s going on here.   
“THE COURT:  And will you be able to talk with Mr. 
Hauser tomorrow? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  “It ain’t nothing to discuss 
with us.   
“THE COURT:  Well, you understand he’s the one who is 
going to be asking you the questions?”   
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  It doesn’t matter.   
“THE COURT:  Will you be able to answer his questions? 
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  It’s irrelevant.  We’ll see 
what goes on tomorrow.  Let’s talk about it tomorrow. 
“[¶] . . . . [¶]  
“THE COURT:  No, you listen to me once more.  I don’t 
want any questions about this.  You will testify tomorrow and 
follow the rules as any other witness.  If you violate those rules, 
you know right now I will terminate your testimony; and you 
will never have an opportunity to testify before the jury.   
“It’s your choice.  You can testify or not testify.  That’s how 
it’s going to work.   
“And you have a nice day, Mr. Johnson.   
“DEFENDANT JOHNSON:  You, too.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
Following this colloquy, counsel and the court remained 
concerned that defendant was not going to follow the rules.  
Counsel, who was opposed to defendant’s decision to testify and 
feared the effect of his potential misbehavior on the jury, 
suggested “prior to him actually testifying, that we have a little 
test run, out of the presence of the jury, just to see if he is going 
to cooperate.”  The court agreed to do so.  The next morning, the 
court made the following statement for the record:  “Based on 
his disruptive record and upon yesterday’s comments, ‘we’ll wait 
and see what will happen,’ also based on Mr. Hauser’s request 
for some sort of a test on how Mr. Johnson will behave in front 
of this jury, and also based on my concern as to what sort of 
damage, irreparable damage, Mr. Johnson might be able to 
cause at this, the end of our second jury trial, I’m going to do the 
following:   
“The jury will not be present. 
“The bailiffs will tell Mr. Johnson that he’s about to be on 
the hookup. 
“I will activate the TV audio system.   
“I will then tell Mr. Hauser to call his next witness.  He 
will call Mr. Johnson.   
“I will administer the oath.  And I will then tell Mr. 
Johnson that the attorneys will be questioning him.   
“I’ll ask each attorney to introduce themselves by their 
names so that he becomes familiar with the voice.   
“And I will tell him then that Mr. Hauser is going to be 
then questioning him as his attorney.   
“And then, Mr. Hauser, I’ll ask you to pose the first 
question to him, which would be what?   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
“MR. HAUSER:  I’ll probably ask him where he was living 
on the date of September 26th.   
“THE COURT:  Based on whatever happens at that point 
in time, we’ll make the decision as to whether the jury is going 
to be brought out and hear his testimony.”   
The clerk activated the video feed.  After counsel called 
defendant, and defendant was sworn, the court asked counsel to 
begin questioning defendant.  The exchange proceeded as 
follows:   
“Q.  Mr. Johnson, back on September 26th of 1996, where 
were you living?   
“A.  First of all, I wish to greet the jury.   
“Good morning to y’all. 
“And I apologize for not being able to be present at my own 
so-called trial, but it’s beyond my control.   
“First of all, you do not represent my interests and never 
have.   
“And all three of you attorneys work together.  Everything 
you got going is totally illegal, and I’m totally opposed to it.   
“Q.  Is that where you live? 
“THE COURT:  Did you hear the question? 
“THE WITNESS:  Excuse me? 
“Q.  BY MR. HAUSER:  Where do you live? 
“A.  You do not represent my interests and never have.   
“What y’all doing is illegal.  
“You have never tried to do nothing to benefit me.   
“Y’all all working together.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
“I oppose what’s going on.   
“I’m not illiterate, neither am I dyfunctional (sic).  It 
shouldn’t be conducted this way.   
“This is reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, what’s 
going on in this trial.   
“Q.  So you don’t want to testify.  Is that you’re saying?   
“A.  You do not represent my — I would appreciate if y’all 
read that letter I filed to the court Monday as a form of protest 
to what’s going on to the jury to let them know that I’m not fooled 
or blind to what’s going on. 
“This is a concerted effort to intentionally dump me in that 
courtroom, ladies and gentlemen.  Consider that. 
“Q.  Mr. Johnson, this is your chance.  Now, are you going 
to testify or not? 
“A.  You do not represent my interest and never have, Mr. 
Hauser.  I do not need to talk to you.   
“Q.  Does that mean ‘no’?   
“A.  You have not — what about the tapes and everything 
y’all have to show that these witnesses was lying.   
“Y’all knew they was lying and tried to withhold that 
evidence.  That’s discriminatory in nature, and what y’all doing 
is a crime.   
“Q.  Are you going to answer my questions? 
“A.  Do you understand that you are committing a crime?   
“You do not represent my interests and never have. 
“THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Johnson, I take it then by 
your comments that you do not intend to follow the normal 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
witness rules of question and answer, and you will continue to 
make these kind of comments.   
“Is that what you’re going to do? 
“THE WITNESS: Yes, Judge Cheroske.   
“THE COURT:  Well, I have a little surprise for you, Mr. 
Johnson.  The jury is not present.  This was a test [to] see what 
kind of person you would be.   
“You have proven by your conduct that you’re not going to 
be able to testify in this case.   
“THE WITNESS:  That’s right.”   
At that point, the court deactivated defendant’s audio 
“because the profanity was about to begin” — and the trial judge 
had already witnessed the depth and breadth of defendant’s 
distinctive talents in this area.  The court reiterated that 
defendant had forfeited his right to testify by his conduct:  “I 
don’t know how we could have had any more conduct that would 
have been disruptive to these proceedings than what we’ve just 
witnessed.”  
We agree with the trial court:  defendant forfeited his right 
to testify by his misconduct.  The right to testify, like other 
constitutional rights such as the right to be present or the right 
to confront witnesses, can be forfeited by disorderly or 
disruptive behavior that causes the defendant to be barred from 
the courtroom.  (People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1226, 
1233-1234; accord, U.S. v. Nunez (10th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 1475, 
1478; People v. Menner (N.Y.App.Div. 2003) 769 N.Y.S.2d 569, 
570; State v. Mosley (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005) 200 S.W.3d 624, 
633-634; State v. Chapple (Wn. 2001) 36 P.3d 1025, 1033-1034; 
State v. Anthony (Wis. 2015) 860 N.W.2d 10, 22-25.)  We 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
explained in part II.A., ante, that the trial court did not err in 
excluding defendant from the trial. 
In this case, though, the trial court did more than simply 
rely on its prior determination that the trial could not proceed 
in defendant’s presence.  The trial court sought to accommodate 
its substantial and documented security concerns with 
defendant’s constitutional right to testify by proposing that 
defendant testify via closed-circuit television.  Defendant was 
informed repeatedly his testimony would proceed in a question 
and answer format.  He was warned at length that his refusal 
to comply with that (and other) courtroom procedures would 
lead to termination of his testimony and forfeiture of his right to 
testify.  The court did not succeed in securing defendant’s 
agreement to abide by these ground rules –– despite the court’s 
best efforts.  Instead of promising to behave, defendant candidly 
admitted, “I’m going to do what I think is best on my own behalf” 
and proposed everyone else “wait until tomorrow and see what’s 
going to happen.”  When the court tried to probe further into 
defendant’s willingness to follow the rules, defendant shot back, 
“There ain’t no rules.”   
These responses proved unsettling to defense counsel, who 
feared that defendant’s behavior would prejudice his chances 
with the jury.  They were also unsettling to the court, who feared 
defendant was attempting to force a mistrial.  Even though 
defendant had already forfeited his right to appear at trial — 
and even though defendant had failed to reassure the court that 
he would cooperate if granted the chance to testify remotely 
through video — the court agreed to offer defendant one more 
chance to show himself capable of testifying in an appropriate 
manner.  It was defendant’s own counsel who suggested the 
plan, which called for a dry run with the preliminaries of 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
defendant’s testimony, outside the presence of the jury, to see 
how defendant was going to behave.  Defendant immediately 
demonstrated his refusal to abide by the question and answer 
format.  He purported to offer unsupported legal conclusions, 
referred to alleged facts not in evidence, and declined to actually 
answer any questions — save the court’s inquiry whether 
defendant intended to continue disregarding the question and 
answer format and to continue offering improper and 
inadmissible opinions about the proceedings.  To that question, 
defendant 
replied, 
“Yes, 
Judge 
Cheroske.” 
 
Together, 
defendant’s actions impelled the trial court to conclude that 
defendant had forfeited his right to testify by his misconduct.  
The trial court did not err in this conclusion.  (See State v. 
Anthony, supra, 860 N.W.2d at pp. 24-29.)  Defendant’s claim to 
the contrary –– that the trial court “should have given [him] 
another warning and chance to conform his behavior” –– ignores 
the numerous warnings and chances he had already been given.     
Defendant 
complains 
next 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
“misrepresented” whether the jury was present, thereby 
improperly inducing him to waive his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  We find that defendant 
suffered no Fifth Amendment violation.  None of the questions 
at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing sought answers that 
might tend to incriminate him (see Hoffman v. United States 
(1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486-487), nor were any of his nonresponsive 
statements ever used against him in the trial (see Maldonado v. 
Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1128).  We likewise reject 
defendant’s claim that defendant was denied due process by the 
trial court’s failure to inform him of the jury’s absence.  Had the 
court allowed defendant to begin his testimony in front of the 
jury, the events all but certainly would have unfolded exactly as 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
they did:  Defendant would have offered incompetent and 
unsupported legal conclusions, referred to alleged facts not in 
evidence, and declined to actually answer any questions — save 
the one in which he manifested his unwillingness to abide by the 
question and answer format — and the court would have 
terminated his testimony.  The only difference is that the jury 
would have been witnesses to his disruptive conduct.  It was not 
fundamentally unfair to prevent defendant from prejudicing his 
defense in this manner.  
Nor can we embrace defendant’s contention that new 
counsel ought to have been appointed because Hauser 
undermined his interests by cooperating with the “dry run” 
procedure.  Hauser was legitimately concerned that defendant’s 
antics would prejudice him in the jury’s eyes — and defendant’s 
scattershot accusations at the Evidence Code section 402 
hearing, had they occurred before the jury, might well have done 
so.  Hauser’s efforts to protect defendant’s right to a fair trial 
cannot reasonably be characterized as a breach of his duty of 
loyalty.   
We disagree, too, that the trial court had an obligation to 
suggest that defendant’s testimony from the prior trial be 
offered in lieu of defendant’s live testimony.  Defendant forfeited 
any claim about his prior testimony by failing to offer it in 
evidence below.  (See Evid. Code, § 354.)  Moreover, whether 
defendant’s prior testimony would have been helpful to 
defendant was a question of strategy reserved to the defense.  
Even assuming that defendant’s prior testimony would have 
been admissible, it was not a choice the trial court was required 
to make or speculate about.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
2.  Penalty phase 
Near the end of the penalty phase, the prosecution asked 
whether the parties should revisit the issue of defendant’s 
potential testimony via closed-circuit television.  Counsel 
reiterated his desire that defendant not testify, and the court 
wondered whether there would be “the same type of reaction 
that we had from him when he thought a jury was here once 
before.”  The next day, the prosecutor asked for “some kind of 
statement, either on the record or through Mr. Hauser, with Mr. 
Johnson saying he would rather not testify or something to that 
effect.”  The court responded that “the only thing I can do is what 
I’ve done throughout the whole trial, is have the deputy take Mr. 
Hauser down to the holding area and see if . . . Mr. Johnson will 
come out of his cell and go into the interview room so he could 
communicate.”  The court refused to require Mr. Hauser “to 
approach Mr. Johnson in a noninterviewing area where there is 
[no] glass to protect him from whatever evils Mr. Johnson has 
intended for Mr. Hauser.  I don’t think he needs to go through 
that that many times.”  (The court was evidently referring to 
defendant’s regular practice of spitting on his attorney.)   
During a pause in the proceedings, defendant was asked 
whether he would be willing to talk with counsel about 
testifying.  According to the bailiff, defendant told the sergeant 
that he did not want “anything to do with Mr. Hauser or 
anything to do with the trial.”  The trial court concluded, “Well, 
that answers that then.”   
We find no error.  Because the record contained nothing to 
suggest that defendant disagreed with counsel’s decision not to 
call him as a witness, the trial court had no obligation to advise 
defendant of his right to testify or elicit an express statement 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
42 
confirming counsel’s waiver of that right.  (See People v. 
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332-1333.)  
C.  Denial of Requests for New Counsel 
On numerous occasions during defendant’s first trial, the 
court facilitated discussions between defendant and Hauser 
about their relationship and encouraged defendant to talk with 
and listen to counsel.  On a couple of those occasions, defendant 
requested new counsel be appointed on the ground that Hauser’s 
performance was inadequate or that he and Hauser were in 
irreconcilable conflict, but those motions were denied.  (See 
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).)  Defendant 
concedes that any error in failing to remove Hauser in those 
instances “was arguably rendered moot by the mistrial,” and he 
does not challenge those rulings here.  He claims instead that 
the trial court erred in denying what he characterizes as three 
separate Marsden motions following the declaration of a 
mistrial:  on July 7, 1998; on July 14, 1998; and on September 
17, 1998, when he attacked Hauser in the jury assembly room.  
We find no error because the record does not demonstrate that 
defendant ever made a Marsden motion on those dates.   
The legal principles governing a Marsden motion are well 
settled.  “ ‘ “When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed 
counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate 
representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to 
explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific 
instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 878, italics added; cf. People v. 
Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 580 [“When the basis of a 
defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel is set forth in a letter of 
sufficient detail, however, a full-blown hearing is not 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
43 
required”].)  But the trial court has no sua sponte duty to inquire 
whether the defendant’s desire to substitute another attorney is 
based on inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict.  
(See People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89-90 [“a trial court 
is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing on whether to 
discharge counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel 
when a criminal defendant indicates after conviction a desire to 
withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel 
provided ineffective assistance [and] there is ‘at least some clear 
indication by defendant’ . . . that defendant ‘wants a substitute 
attorney’ ” (italics added)].)  So when a defendant asks for new 
counsel, a trial court’s duty to undertake the Marsden inquiry 
“arises ‘only when the defendant asserts directly or by 
implication that his counsel’s performance has been so 
inadequate as to deny him his constitutional right to effective 
counsel.’ ”  (People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 787; 
see People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 421 [“we agree 
with the decisions of the Courts of Appeal holding specifically 
that the trial court is not required to conduct a Marsden hearing 
on its own motion” (citing Leonard)].)   
Defendant did not assert inadequate performance, nor did 
he claim an irreconcilable conflict existed, as the basis for 
requesting new counsel directly or by implication at the 
proceedings on July 7 or July 14, 1998.  At the hearing on July 
7, which began with defendant spitting on his attorney and 
included his repeated outbursts and copious profanity and 
insults directed at the court, defendant said “Fuck you” and then 
said, “I ask that I be allowed another attorney.”  When the court 
responded, “I am not getting you another attorney,” defendant 
replied, “I’ll get me one.”  At another status conference the 
following week, defendant interrupted the court to announce he 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
44 
“would like a continuance and another counsel.  Under the Sixth 
Amendment —.”  The court said, “Denied,” without specifying 
whether it was denying the motion on the ground that defendant 
had interrupted the court or was denying it as insufficient.  In 
any event, though defendant did in the latter instance refer to a 
constitutional provision, he still failed to link his request to 
counsel’s performance at that point or any earlier point in the 
proceedings. 
Nor do we discern a valid request for substitute counsel on 
September 17, 1998, when defendant attacked Hauser in the 
jury assembly room.  While defendant was being restrained by 
the deputies, defendant said, “That mother fucker.  [¶]  I don’t 
want him.  [¶]  Mother fucker.  [¶]  Fucking ho (sic).”  He also 
added:  “I don’t want you.  [¶]  I do not want this man.  He do 
not represent my interest, ladies and gentlemen.  [¶]  I’m 
qualified to represent myself.  [¶]  This man has intentionally 
dumped me in trial.”  It does not appear that defendant was 
addressing the court; rather, he directed his comments at 
counsel and at the 400 prospective jurors in the room.  Even if 
construed as a motion directed at the court, defendant never 
requested the appointment of substitute counsel.  (See People v. 
Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 103 (Clark) [“He never asked for 
appointment of substitute counsel, but only to discharge 
Keith”].)  
Defendant, moreover, was well aware of how to trigger the 
Marsden inquiry.  On May 13, 1998, during his first trial, 
defendant said, “I would ask for a Marsden,” noting the “obvious 
conflict between Mr. Hauser and myself.”  On May 26, 1998, 
defendant complained of “irreceiveable [sic] differences.  And 
nothing I can do could change this.  [¶]  I’d like him removed if 
possible” — although defendant conceded the very next day that 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
45 
Hauser was competent.  Defendant’s comments in the three 
proceedings he has identified on appeal, by contrast, merely 
evidenced his displeasure with Hauser.  (See Clark, supra, 3 
Cal.4th at p. 103 [“Defendant’s diatribes about Keith did not . . . 
constitute a Marsden motion”].)  So even assuming defendant’s 
violent conduct did not relieve the court of its duty to consider 
his comments, nothing he said triggered the court’s obligation to 
undertake a Marsden inquiry.   
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that the trial court 
ought to have appointed new counsel on its own — 
notwithstanding defendant’s failure to request new counsel or 
to justify such an appointment — on the ground that defendant 
could no longer get along with his attorney.  (See People v. Gay 
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1065, 1070 [“unless requested to do so by 
[the] defendant, the trial court has no statutory or inherent 
power to substitute appointed counsel, sua sponte, based on the 
judge’s subjective opinion the attorney is incompetent”].)  Nor 
may a defendant argue on appeal that the trial court ought to 
have discharged counsel for reasons that the defendant failed to 
make known to the trial court at the time of the proceedings.  
(See People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 489.)  A court would 
risk interfering with the attorney-client relationship if its 
responsibility to substitute counsel could be triggered by such a 
meager showing.  (See People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 
p. 420.) 
Moreover, a defendant may not force the substitution of 
counsel by manufacturing a conflict or a breakdown in the 
relationship through his own conduct.  (People v. Hardy (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 86, 138; cf. Daniels v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2005) 428 
F.3d 1181, 1197 [noting that “the conflict was not one created by 
Daniels or by his counsel”].)  Here, it was defendant who 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
46 
repeatedly spit on and unilaterally refused to cooperate or even 
speak with counsel — and who ultimately assaulted counsel in 
open court.  A defendant cannot take such steps and then rely 
on that same behavior to assert an irreconcilable conflict with 
counsel.  (See People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860.)  
As it turned out, defendant’s behavior at this trial 
confirmed the observation made by the trial court prior to the 
first trial, in addressing defendant’s criticism of his attorney:  “I 
have carefully observed this particular subject matter.  And it is 
my considered opinion, after an extensive evaluation, that your 
only purpose is to try to build up a ground for appeal if you 
should be convicted in this case.  And that is your entire purpose 
for carrying on this way.  You have a competent, effective 
counsel.  You have even acknowledged he was competent.  I 
think you are simply trying to play games with this court.  And 
I want that placed clearly in the record because I carefully 
observed that.  And that is my considered evaluation of the 
matter.  This is nothing more than gamesmanship by your 
trying to develop a ground or grounds for appellate lawyers and 
nothing else.  And there is no substance, basis, or truth to it.”   
D.  Trial Court’s Failure To Commence 
Competency Proceedings 
Relying largely on the disruptive behavior outlined above, 
defendant contends the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to 
suspend the proceedings and hold a competency hearing.  We 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
failing to declare a doubt as to whether defendant was 
competent to stand trial.     
A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he or she 
lacks the ability to consult with defense counsel with a 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
47 
reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings.  (Dusky v. United 
States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
181, 195; see § 1367, subd. (a).)  A trial judge must suspend 
proceedings and hold a hearing “whenever the court is presented 
with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that 
raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.”  (People v. Rogers (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 826, 847; see § 1368.)  Unless the record contains 
substantial evidence of present mental incompetence, we review 
a trial court’s failure to initiate the competency inquiry only for 
abuse of discretion.  (Mickel, at p. 195.)   
As defendant concedes, at no point did any mental health 
expert ever opine that defendant was unable to assist his 
attorney or understand the proceedings against him.  Nor did 
counsel or the court ever suggest that was so.  To the contrary:  
counsel believed that defendant was not incompetent.  So 
defendant points instead to his repeated outbursts in court, his 
rocky relationship with counsel, and his eventual attack on 
counsel in the jury room.  He asks us to infer that this 
misconduct must have been triggered by a mental disorder so 
severe that it disabled him from assisting counsel or aiding in 
his own defense.  The record belies defendant’s proffered 
inference.   
Defendant’s misconduct in court and his antipathy 
towards counsel began well before “the date the trial court 
barred [him] from the courtroom for the duration of his retrial” 
— which is the date defendant identifies as the trigger for his 
competency claim.  In an earlier prosecution for a different 
crime, defendant was so disruptive that he was removed from 
the courtroom.  He was again removed from the courtroom 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
48 
before the first trial in this case.  He repeatedly cursed both the 
court and his attorney and made threats against them.  In 
addition to spitting on his attorney, he declared that he and his 
attorney were in irreconcilable conflict and several times 
demanded, without any basis, that new counsel be appointed.  
All of this misconduct — which prefigured the more aggravated 
misconduct that ultimately led to defendant’s removal from the 
courtroom at his second trial — occurred at a time when 
defendant was nonetheless able to cooperate with counsel and, 
as defendant concedes on appeal, “testify effectively.”  And all of 
it occurred prior to the point at which defendant contends the 
trial court should have declared a doubt about his competency.   
Defendant’s 
disruptive 
and 
self-defeating 
behavior 
coexisted with his ability to assist counsel and participate 
effectively at the first trial.  This fact strongly supports the 
conclusion that defendant’s continued misconduct during the 
second trial was not evidence of incompetence.  Rather, it was 
evidence that — in the words of one of the judges who “carefully 
observed this particular subject matter” at the first trial — he 
was “simply trying to play games with this court” and his “only 
purpose [was] to try to build up a ground for appeal if [he] should 
be convicted in this case.”  At the second trial, Judge Cheroske 
similarly believed that defendant wanted to return to the 
courtroom “for the sole purpose of engaging in more disruptive 
behavior.”  Because the trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the cause of such misconduct, we generally give “great 
deference” to the judge’s decision whether to hold a competency 
hearing.  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33.)     
Defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate with counsel does 
not demonstrate incompetence.  (See People v. Mendoza (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 856, 879.)  Nor were defendant’s courtroom outbursts 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
49 
or other disruptive conduct necessarily an indicator that he was 
unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense.  
(See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1033.)  And defendant’s 
belief — even if sincere — that counsel was “in league with the 
prosecution” does not establish that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to order a competency hearing, either.  
(People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 742.)   
Defendant directs our attention to a handful of federal 
appellate cases.  We can distinguish them all.  In each of them, 
evidence of the defendant’s outbursts and disturbances was 
merely one factor among many that led to the conclusion that 
the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the defendant’s 
competence.  (See U.S. v. Cornejo-Sandoval (10th Cir. 2009) 564 
F.3d 1225, 1235 [“certain extreme behavioral manifestations 
may, along with other factors, raise reasonable cause to doubt a 
defendant’s competency”].)  In Torres v. Prunty (9th Cir. 2000) 
223 F.3d 1103, for example, a psychologist opined that Torres 
had a “severe” delusional disorder and “registered ‘one of the 
most disturbed profiles . . . seen by this evaluator.’ ”  (Id. at p. 
1105.)  After Torres withdrew his insanity plea over counsel’s 
objection, counsel advised the court that Torres’s paranoid 
delusions had expanded to include an elaborate conspiracy 
involving himself and the court.  But, unlike here, counsel stated 
that he consequently had a doubt as to Torres’s competency.  (Id. 
at pp. 1106, 1108.)  True:  There is a slight similarity between 
the conspiracy described in Torres and defendant’s asserted 
belief that counsel, the court, and the prosecutor were 
conspiring against him.  But Torres had already been diagnosed 
as suffering from a severe psychiatric disorder, and the 
psychologist had in addition reported that Torres “was ‘fully 
credible and not seeking consciously to deceive in any way.’ ”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
50 
(Id. at p. 1106; see id. at p. 1109 [“In light of the previous medical 
evaluation . . . , it was unreasonable for the court not to make a 
more complete inquiry into the nature of defense counsel’s 
statement . . . .” (italics added)]; Maxwell v. Roe (9th Cir. 2010) 
606 F.3d 561, 565 [the defendant “had a history of mental 
illness, frequently refused to take his prescribed antipsychotic 
medications, was unable to verbally or physically control 
himself in the courtroom, and exhibited increasingly paranoid 
and psychotic behavior that impaired his communication with 
defense counsel and reasoning regarding his defense”]; id. at p. 
573 [the trial court failed to examine psychological reports at the 
time of trial stating that the defendant “ ‘is unable to function 
at this time because of his poor mental state’ ” and “ ‘is not 
oriented to time or place’ ”]; U.S. v. Williams (10th Cir. 1997) 
113 F.3d 1155, 1160 [the defendant, who had a history of drug 
addiction, was alternately taking or refusing to take a 
psychotropic drug during trial, and was crying uncontrollably, 
“misapprehended her attorney’s role”; in addition, she 
“cryptically answered” whether her medication interfered with 
her ability to communicate with counsel, and counsel wondered 
aloud “whether his client understood the proceedings”]; Lafferty 
v. Cook (10th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 1546, 1552-1556 [finding error 
where the four examiners employed by the state all agreed that 
the 
defendant 
was 
incompetent 
and 
the 
trial 
court 
misunderstood the applicable legal standard].)   
By contrast, no evidence in the record here supports the 
conclusion that defendant’s disruptive behavior was the product 
of a mental disorder.  What ample evidence suggests instead is 
that he was malingering:  Defendant selectively refused to 
cooperate with counsel before his first trial — and claimed that 
counsel and the court were part of a conspiracy against him — 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
51 
before abruptly shifting strategies, cooperating with counsel, 
taking the stand in his own defense, and achieving the favorable 
outcome of a hung jury.  (See People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 849.)  Because the record showed that defendant could 
communicate with and assist counsel when it suited him, the 
trial court was not obligated to institute competency 
proceedings when defendant resumed and escalated his 
oppositional behavior at the second trial. 
Finally, we disagree that the trial court was obligated to 
suspend proceedings based on Dr. Cherkas’s testimony at the 
penalty phase about defendant’s “thinking disorder.”  The 
expert did not testify that defendant was unable to understand 
the proceedings or rationally assist in his defense.  Nor did the 
expert’s testimony, when considered with the aggregate 
evidence before the court, raise a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  (See People v. Ghobrial 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 268-274; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 379, 403.)   
E.  Trial Court’s Failure To Discharge Counsel 
Because of Alleged Conflicts 
Defendant contends that his attorney labored under three 
actual conflicts of interest, any one of which obligated the trial 
court to discharge Hauser and appoint him new counsel.  We 
disagree.   
The state and federal Constitutions guarantee a criminal 
defendant the right to representation free from “conflicts of 
interest that may compromise the attorney’s loyalty to the client 
and impair counsel’s efforts on the client’s behalf.”  (People v. 
Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)  To establish a denial of that 
right, the defendant must show that counsel labored under an 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
52 
actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance and 
that, absent counsel’s deficiencies, there is a reasonable 
probability the result would have been different.  (People v. 
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417.)  In determining whether an 
actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance, we ask 
“ ‘whether counsel “pulled his punches,” i.e., whether counsel 
failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, 
had there been no conflict.  [Citation.]  In undertaking such an 
inquiry, we are . . . bound by the record.  But where a conflict of 
interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may 
not reflect such an omission.  We must therefore examine the 
record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted 
would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a 
conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a 
tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that 
might have caused any such omission.’ ”  (Id. at p. 418.)   
Defendant claims Hauser suffered from three disabling 
conflicts.  He fails to demonstrate that any actual conflict 
existed.   
The first alleged conflict arose from defendant’s attack on 
Hauser and subsequent threats against Hauser’s family.  Yet 
the court inquired about this potential conflict, and Hauser 
noted that he had represented difficult clients before.  Hauser 
then assured the court the attack would not impair his ability to 
represent defendant:  “I honestly believe that I can represent 
Mr. Johnson with equal vigor as if this had never happened.”  In 
concluding that no conflict existed, the trial court could 
reasonably have credited Hauser’s representations.  (See People 
v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 137.)     
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
53 
The second alleged conflict occurred when the prosecutor 
decided to rely on evidence of the assault as aggravating 
evidence at the penalty phase.  Defendant claims that Hauser 
ought to have realized that he needed to withdraw as counsel so 
that he could testify as a witness to the assault on defendant’s 
behalf.  But an attorney must withdraw only when he or she 
knows or should know that he or she is or ought to be a material 
witness.  (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 915.)  
Hauser’s testimony was not necessary to establish the assault 
itself — and, indeed, the prosecution promised not to call Hauser 
to testify.  Defendant suggests that Hauser, if called as a 
witness, might have testified that he did not fear defendant or 
that defendant was perhaps overcome by the emotion of 
beginning the trial at the time of the attack.  But the latter is 
raw speculation:  There is no evidence in the record that 
defendant was in emotional turmoil at the time he attacked 
Hauser, or that Hauser believed he was.  As to the former, it is 
possible that Hauser, if called, might have testified that he did 
not fear defendant.  But he could also reasonably believe that 
appearing as defendant’s counsel, notwithstanding the attack, 
was a more effective way of making the same point.  Indeed, 
Hauser told the court, “I can’t think of a better advocate for Mr. 
Johnson than the victim of his own misdeed.”  And Hauser also 
sought to minimize the attack in his argument to the jury.     
Defendant alleges the existence of a third conflict.  This 
arose, according to defendant, from Hauser’s acquiescence to the 
court’s ruling requiring him –– if he remained defendant’s 
counsel –– to refrain from arguing, “in the form of testimony or 
any other manner,” certain mitigating aspects concerning the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
54 
assault.5  Defendant contends that Hauser thereby “sold” the 
right to argue mitigating circumstances relating to the assault 
“for the lucrative opportunity to continue to represent 
[defendant].”  On this record, though, there is no indication that 
Hauser saw his discharge as a “threat to [his] livelihood[], nor is 
there the slightest hint that thoughts of compensation, rather 
than sincere concern about protecting defendant’s interest in 
avoiding a death judgment,” influenced Hauser’s decision to 
remain as counsel.  (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 
1009-1010, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  Indeed, despite the court’s 
ruling, Hauser showed the jury that he was able to continue as 
defendant’s advocate.  He then argued that the incident was not 
a serious factor in aggravation and demonstrated merely 
defendant’s frustration and mental impairment.  And, as 
explained in the preceding paragraph, Hauser would not have 
been a material witness for defendant at the penalty phase — 
so his inability to testify or otherwise offer more specific 
comment about the incident did not impair his ability to 
represent defendant.   
Even if defendant had established a conflict, he has not 
shown 
that 
the 
conflict 
adversely 
affected 
counsel’s 
performance.  To the contrary, counsel’s decisions may have 
                                        
5  
The court singled out “one, your lack of fear of Mr. 
Johnson; two, the fact that you have elected to continue to 
represent Mr. Johnson despite the prior incidents; or, three, to 
refer to the attack in any way in argument such as the defendant 
must have just been overcome by emotion, having sat before the 
400 people and realizing his jury trial was about to start, or it 
was his attempt to delay the proceedings and/or get another 
lawyer, or anything like that.”    
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
55 
been the result of legitimate strategic and tactical choices.  (See 
People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 437.)  For example, Hauser 
could reasonably have believed that any objection to defendant’s 
exclusion from the trial would have been futile; that defendant 
would have been unable to behave in front of the jury, to his 
detriment, if called to testify; that defendant’s testimony from 
the prior trial, if read into the record, would not have been 
helpful or credible; and that he could be more effective as 
defendant’s advocate rather than as a witness on what was only 
a minor piece of the evidence in aggravation in comparison to 
the murders themselves.  (See People v. Doolin, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 418.)   
Finally, defendant was not denied any constitutional or 
statutory right when the court inquired into Hauser’s potential 
conflict in defendant’s absence.  As discussed earlier, defendant 
forfeited his right to be in the courtroom by his own misconduct.  
Defendant could have listened to the proceedings with a 
speaker, but he repeatedly declined to do so.  Defendant cannot 
fairly complain that he lacked input into the discussions 
surrounding counsel’s alleged conflicts, when it was defendant’s 
own decision to separate himself from the proceedings that 
deprived him of the opportunity.   
F.  Huggins’s Volunteered Statement That 
Defendant “Had Already Beat Two Cases Like 
This” 
Hightower’s half-brother, Robert Huggins, was the only 
witness who testified at trial that defendant shot Faggins and 
Hightower.  Huggins did not report to the police what he had 
seen until a few months after the murders, when he was 
arrested on an unrelated charge.  Near the end of Huggins’s 
direct examination, the prosecutor asked why Huggins had 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
56 
allegedly told his girlfriend and his stepfather what he saw but 
did not tell police.  Huggins replied, “ ’Cause he [defendant] was 
still running around on the streets.”  When the prosecutor asked 
why Huggins was worried about that, Huggins explained, “He 
had already beat two cases like this already.”     
The defense immediately objected to this last response 
and, at sidebar, asked for a mistrial.  Hauser added that 
Huggins’s statement would also have prejudicial effects at any 
penalty trial.  The trial court denied the request for a mistrial 
and proposed to admonish the jury to disregard Huggins’s 
response.  The trial court rejected codefendant’s request to voir 
dire the jury to determine their ability to disregard the 
comment, reasoning that such questioning “would be creating a 
bigger problem for Mr. Hauser’s client.”  Hauser agreed.  
Because some new witnesses had just arrived at court, the trial 
court took them out of order.  Later that same day, after those 
witnesses had testified, the trial court reminded the jury about 
the pending objection to Huggins’s testimony.  The court stated 
that it was sustaining the objection and striking the response:  
“So you will disregard that answer.”6  The last remaining 
question and answer, the court reminded the jury, was 
“something to the effect of why hadn’t he contacted the police, 
and he said because C.J. was still on the streets.”     
                                        
6  
Immediately prior to this admonition, the trial court 
referred to its earlier instruction that “whenever I order 
anything stricken by way of testimony, it’s not in evidence; and 
you’re not to consider it for any purpose.  As a matter of fact, 
you’re to treat it as though you never even heard it.”  The jury 
collectively responded that it remembered that instruction and 
would have no difficulty following it.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
57 
Defendant contends the court’s remedy was insufficient to 
dispel the prejudice from Huggins’s response.  He believes the 
trial court instead should have granted a mistrial.  A court 
should grant a mistrial “ ‘only when a party’s chances of 
receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ”  (People 
v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 802.)  This generally occurs 
when “ ‘ “ ‘the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges 
incurable by admonition or instruction.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Harris 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 848.)  We review the trial court’s refusal 
to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Williams 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1187.) 
No abuse of discretion appears.  Huggins testified, without 
objection, that his reluctance to implicate defendant earlier was 
due to the circumstance that defendant “was still running 
around on the streets.”  The unstated (but self-evident) 
implication was that Huggins was afraid that defendant — who 
had already killed Faggins and Hightower — might retaliate if 
Huggins were to snitch to police, and that defendant was in a 
position to carry out such retaliation.  Huggins continued to rely 
on his fear of defendant, even after defendant had been arrested, 
to explain why he declined to inculpate defendant at the 
preliminary hearing:  Huggins had been placed in a lockup cell 
with defendant and codefendant on a regular basis, at which 
time defendant had asked him, in front of codefendant and two 
dozen other inmates, “why’d I [Huggins] say all the stuff I said 
about him.”  Consequently, the evidence that Huggins feared 
defendant was quite strong, even leaving aside the reference to 
defendant having beaten “two cases like this already.”  (See 
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 211-212.)     
Moreover, Huggins’s volunteered statement was brief and 
unaccompanied by anything that might have tended to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
58 
corroborate it or otherwise demonstrate its truth.  Nor did the 
prosecutor mention it in the guilt or penalty phases.  At most, 
the jury might have concluded that Huggins believed what he 
said.  But that inference could easily have been — and was — 
dispelled by the admonition the jury received.  To the extent the 
jury — despite the instruction to disregard Huggins’s statement 
— might have relied on it to infer that Huggins had been 
reluctant to testify against defendant out of fear, it was 
cumulative of the other evidence that Huggins was afraid.  
Accordingly, the potential prejudice at both the guilt and 
penalty phases from Huggins’s volunteered statement was not 
of the sort that could not be cured by an admonition or 
instruction.  (See People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 211 
[rejecting a claim of incurable prejudice where a witness 
testified she had received telephone calls “ ‘that if I testified I 
would be killed,’ ” the statement was stricken, and the jury 
admonished]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 675.) 
G.  Rochelle Johnson’s Hearsay Statement That 
“C.J. Didn’t Have To Kill Him” 
Codefendant’s 
girlfriend 
Rochelle 
Johnson 
gave 
conflicting statements as to whether she had been at the party 
at the time of the shooting and whether she knew who 
committed the shootings.  She told Detective Vena at the scene 
that the music stopped when Hightower left the party, that 
everybody went outside, and that she saw Hightower lying in 
the front seat of his girlfriend’s vehicle only after he had been 
shot.  At trial, though, she testified that the party was still going 
on when she left around 11:30 p.m., that after she got home she 
heard a lot of screaming, and that someone came to her door 
seeking her nursing skills because of an “accident.”  She then 
ran out and found Hightower sitting in a car, “full of blood.”   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
59 
Rochelle told Detective Vena that she did not know who 
the shooter was.  But her brother, Leonard Greer, testified that 
she had told him as she was leaving the scene, “They didn’t have 
to kill him.  They didn’t have to kill him,” and then revised it, 
over defendant’s hearsay objection, as “C.J. didn’t have to kill 
him.”  Defendant renews his hearsay objection here.  We find 
that the statement was admissible as a prior inconsistent 
statement.  (Evid. Code, § 1235.)   
An out-of-court statement by a witness that is inconsistent 
with his or her trial testimony is admissible to establish the 
truth of the matter asserted, so long as the witness has been 
given an opportunity while testifying to explain or deny the 
statement or is still subject to recall.  (Evid. Code, § 1235; see 
People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1294.)  Rochelle’s 
statement to her brother near the scene of the murder that “C.J. 
didn’t have to kill him” was inconsistent with her trial testimony 
that she never told anyone that defendant was involved in the 
shootings and that she did not see Greer on her way back home 
after the shootings or talk to him about what had happened.   
Defendant argues that even if the hearsay statement was 
inconsistent with Rochelle’s trial testimony, it should not have 
been admitted because there was insufficient evidence that she 
had personal knowledge of the shooter’s identity.  (See Evid. 
Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2) [proponent of evidence has the burden 
of establishing a witness’s personal knowledge], 702; see 
generally People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 123-124 
[“California courts have extended this personal knowledge 
requirement to statements of hearsay declarants”].)  A trial 
court may exclude a witness’s testimony for lack of knowledge 
“ ‘only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has 
such knowledge.’ ”  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
60 
573.)  Once that low threshold is satisfied, “ ‘it is for the jury to 
decide whether the witness’s perceptions and recollections are 
credible.’ ”  (Cortez, at p. 124.)  Although the evidence supporting 
an inference of Rochelle’s personal knowledge may have been 
thin, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her 
hearsay statement. 
Rochelle’s statements about whether she was present at 
the time of the shooting were vague and inconsistent.  She 
testified that she arrived at the party around 7:30 p.m.  It was 
general knowledge that Faggins was in danger, which was why 
“[e]verybody at the party was trying to get [him] to leave.”  
Faggins, Hightower, and Lewis left the party around the same 
time.  Rochelle told Detective Vena that at that point, the music 
stopped and “everybody went outside.”  According to Newton, 
defendant and Betton walked down to the sidewalk “where 
everybody else at” to attack and then shoot Faggins.  Rochelle 
told Vena she ran down to 99th Place from the party to find 
Hightower had been shot.  At trial, though, Rochelle provided a 
different account.  She denied being at the party at the time of 
the shooting and claimed instead that she had been at home, 
two buildings away, in her bathroom, until somebody knocked 
on her door and told her what had happened.  She did not recall 
giving Vena a different account of her whereabouts.  
Other witnesses, however, placed Rochelle right at the 
murder scene.  Lewis reportedly told Huggins that Rochelle was 
“near” the car at the time Hightower was shot.  Lewis also told 
him that Rochelle “knew more about the incident than she was 
talking about.”  This evidence, if credited, supported an 
inference that Rochelle’s statement about the shooting was 
based on personal knowledge.              
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
61 
Greer’s testimony likewise tended to show that she was at 
the murder scene.  Greer testified that he was walking towards 
Rochelle’s apartment when he heard gunfire and ran to see what 
the shooting was about.  It took him less than a minute to notice 
the crowd gathered at 99th Place.  About 30 seconds to a minute 
after defendant and Betton ran off, he saw Rochelle walking 
towards him from the murder scene.  She was crying and 
covered in blood.  When she said, “They didn’t have to kill him.  
C.J. didn’t have to kill him,” the two embraced.  Now perhaps it 
was possible that someone left the scene immediately after the 
shootings, ran to Rochelle’s apartment, got her attention and 
explained what happened — and Rochelle then came out of her 
bathroom, made it to the murder scene, began and completed an 
unsuccessful attempt to administer CPR to Hightower, 
collapsed on the sidewalk in tears for several minutes, and 
started walking back home — all within the brief period it took 
Greer to approach the scene after hearing gunshots.  But the 
record did not compel that conclusion.  A reasonable juror could 
instead have concluded that Rochelle went outside along with 
everyone else at the party, witnessed the murders, offered aid 
immediately to Hightower, and met up with Greer as she left 
the scene.  
It is true that each of these alleged eyewitnesses suffered 
from substantial attacks on their credibility.  Greer was 
impeached with numerous felonies.  He lied to police about a 
number of facts, including whether he had been at the party, 
whether he witnessed the murders, and what motivated the 
murders.  Huggins had given inconsistent accounts to police and 
under oath, in addition to being impeached with his prior 
misdemeanor spousal abuse.  And at trial, both Lewis and 
Newton repudiated their prior statements.  But it was for the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
62 
jury to decide which account to believe.  (See People v. Zilbauer 
(1955) 44 Cal.2d 43, 48-49.)  A reasonable juror could have 
credited the testimony tending to show that Rochelle had 
witnessed the murders.  Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to 
the admission of Rochelle’s hearsay statement must fail.            
H.  Asserted Exclusion of Evidence That Tyrone 
Newton Expected a Benefit from Making 
Statements Inculpating Defendant  
Tyrone Newton told police in a videotaped interview that 
defendant planned and committed the murders of Faggins and 
Hightower.  At trial, though, Newton insisted that his 
videotaped statement, which was taken while he was in custody 
for cocaine possession, was a lie.  According to Newton’s trial 
testimony, an officer promised to “drop” the cocaine charge in 
exchange for information about the murders.  Newton claimed 
not to know anything about the murders, but had just “followed 
along” with the story provided to him by police during the time 
he was in custody for cocaine possession.  Newton explained 
that, on prior occasions, he had offered information to the police 
in exchange for release from custody.   
Detective Waters had conducted the videotaped interview. 
She denied promising Newton anything in exchange for his 
statements.     
To 
corroborate 
Newton’s 
expectation 
of 
favorable 
treatment in exchange for statements about the murders, 
codefendant’s counsel pointed out that Newton had been 
released a short time after the videotaped interview and was 
never prosecuted for cocaine possession.  Counsel also elicited 
admissions from Detective Waters that, during their interview, 
Newton said something to the effect of “the more y’all get me off 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
63 
y’all line, the happier I will be” and talked about the fact that he 
had previously been an informant for a detective named Barber.  
But when counsel sought to follow up on this line of questioning 
— by asking Detective Waters whether Newton had said “that 
he supplied information to Detective Barber on other occasions” 
— the trial court sustained the People’s relevance objection.  At 
sidebar, codefendant’s counsel explained that Newton’s history 
of involvement with Detective Barber would support the 
inference that Newton was hoping to make a deal with Detective 
Waters:  “In the tape, Your Honor, Mr. Newton tells this 
detective that he provided Detective Barber with information 
whenever he wanted to and that Detective Barber, on the other 
hand, would help him.  And he talks about the fact that he got 
caught with a lot of drugs on one occasion and how Detective 
Barber helps him.  [¶]  So clearly it goes to the fact that Mr. 
Newton is talking to this detective — at least the inference is 
that he’s hoping to get some kind of deal, because he was in 
custody at the time that he spoke to this detective.”  Defendant’s 
counsel joined in the offer of proof.  The trial court suggested 
that this new line of inquiry would be confusing to the jury, 
because it referred to a part of the videotape they had not seen 
and for which they had not been given a transcript.  When 
codefendant’s counsel said he intended to call Newton as his own 
witness to address those parts of the interview, the court 
responded, “Well, for right now, the objection is going to be 
sustained.”  Codefendant’s counsel did subsequently recall 
Newton to the stand — and played portions of the videotape — 
yet did not further explore Newton’s relationship with Detective 
Barber or his expectation of similar favors from Detective 
Waters.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
64 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in barring the 
defense from offering certain evidence of Newton’s motivation in 
making the videotaped statement and thereby violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights.  But it is not clear the trial court actually 
prevented either defendant from presenting the desired excerpts 
of the interview.  True, the trial court expressed skepticism 
about piecemeal presentation of new videotaped excerpts during 
Detective Waters’s testimony, when the videotape had not been 
cued to the relevant portion and a transcript had not been 
provided to the jury.  Based on that concern, the court sustained 
the objection “for right now.”  Codefendant then offered 
additional videotaped excerpts (and a transcript) when Newton 
was recalled to the stand, but never tried to include the excerpts 
concerning Detective Barber.  By failing to press for a final 
ruling, defendant forfeited the claim.  (See People v. Holloway 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133; People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 
Cal.App.4th 1148, 1181.) 
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the evidence described in codefendant’s offer of proof.  
Additional evidence of Newton’s history with Detective Barber 
would have been cumulative of what the defense had already 
elicited from Newton and Detective Waters.  (See People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999.)  And by confirming 
that Newton told her “the more y’all get me off y’all line, the 
happier I will be,” Waters’s testimony tended to show that 
Newton was indeed interested in making a deal with her.  So 
defendant already had what he needed for “making real to the 
jury that the atmosphere under which Newton’s statements 
were made was a barter situation.”  Indeed, the prosecutor 
conceded in argument that Newton “probably was expecting 
something.”  Because the jury had a full understanding of 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
65 
Newton’s potential motivation, the trial court’s ruling did not 
violate defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights.  (See 
People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 624.)  
I.  Error in Failing To Instruct the Jury To View 
Defendant’s Out-of-court Oral Statements with 
Caution  
Newton claimed during his videotaped police interview 
that he was present when defendant “was talking about killing” 
Faggins and Hightower.  According to Newton, defendant 
announced, “[W]e’re getting rid of all the snitches” and, pointing 
at the victims, said, “[W]e can do them right here and right now.”  
At trial, Newton repudiated his videotaped statements and 
testified that he had been elsewhere at the time of the shootings.  
It was left to the jury to decide which version of Newton’s 
testimony to believe and whether defendant ever made these 
statements.     
Until recently, we had imposed on trial courts a sua sponte 
duty to instruct the jury that a defendant’s oral admissions 
should be viewed with caution.  (See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1, 19; CALJIC No. 2.71.7.)  In People v. Diaz (2015) 60 
Cal.4th 1176 (Diaz), though, we determined that the instruction 
need be given only on request.  (Id. at p. 1189.)  Because jurors 
must now be instructed — and were instructed here — with the 
“general instructions on witness credibility” (id. at p. 1189; see 
CALJIC No. 2.20), the cautionary instruction for oral 
admissions no longer qualified as “one of the general principles 
of law upon which a court is required to instruct the jury in the 
absence of a request” (Diaz, at p. 1189).  We also concluded that 
defendants should be allowed to decide whether the instruction 
would be in their interests, rather than require the trial judge 
to give the instruction in every case, since such oral statements 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
66 
may sometimes include “both incriminating and exculpatory 
elements.”  (Id. at p. 1193.)  In rejecting the People’s argument 
that the instruction never be given, even on request, we 
observed that “the [cautionary] instruction may be useful to the 
defense in highlighting for the jury the need for care and caution 
in evaluating evidence of the defendant’s statements.”  (Id. at p. 
1189.)  
The trial court here failed to instruct the jury that it 
should consider defendant’s oral statements with caution.  The 
Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.71.77 or some 
equivalent instruction.  Yet his concession predated our decision 
in Diaz, which declared that the instruction need be given only 
on request.  We therefore consider whether our Diaz decision, 
which was issued well after the trial in this case, should be given 
retroactive effect — and whether defendant was therefore 
obligated to request a cautionary instruction if he desired one.  
We conclude the answer to both questions is no.  The law in 
effect at the time of trial was clear:  A trial court had the duty 
to instruct the jury sua sponte to view a defendant’s oral 
admissions with caution.  The required instruction dated from 
1872 and was codified in the Code of Civil Procedure, former 
section 2061, subdivision 4.  (See Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 
1184.)  Although the Legislature repealed that provision when 
                                        
7  
At the time of trial, CALJIC No. 2.71.7, as given, provided:  
“Evidence has been received from which you may find that an 
oral statement of intent, plan, and motive was made by the 
defendant before the offense with which he is charged was 
committed.  [¶]  It is for you to decide whether the statement 
was made by the defendant.  [¶]  Evidence of an oral statement 
ought to be viewed with caution.”   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
67 
it adopted the Evidence Code in 1965, we subsequently held that 
the repeal had no effect on a court’s obligation to give the 
instruction contained in the former statute.  (People v. Beagle 
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455, fn. 4.)  And this court reaffirmed a trial 
court’s sua sponte duty to give the cautionary instruction just a 
year before the trial in this case.  (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 392-393.)  Because defendant would have had no 
reason to anticipate that the burden was on him to request the 
instruction, we conclude that the Diaz rule should be applied 
only prospectively.  (See People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 
1108 [new rule requiring a defendant to object to venue before 
trial “should be applied only prospectively”].)  Accordingly, we 
accept the Attorney General’s concession that the trial court 
erred under state law in failing to give the instruction.  (See 
Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 [“We apply the standard for 
state law error . . . .  Failure to give the cautionary instruction 
is not a violation of federal due process . . . .” (citation omitted)].) 
But ultimately, the error was harmless.  The jury was fully 
aware of its duty to resolve whether defendant made these 
statements.  After viewing Newton’s videotaped statement 
purporting to describe what defendant said, the jury saw 
Newton testify under oath that he had falsely inculpated 
defendant and Betton in an effort to secure a favorable 
resolution of a pending drug charge.  Moreover, Newton’s 
videotaped statement was riddled with factual errors:  He told 
Waters that the murders occurred during the daytime, around 
4:00 or 5:00 p.m., on September 25, 1996 — but they actually 
occurred around 10:00 p.m., well after dark, the next day.  He 
said the shootings took place on 97th Street, but they actually 
happened on 99th Place.  He said that defendant shot both 
victims with the same gun — but the forensic analysis showed 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
68 
they had been shot with different guns.  He said that the shooter 
reached inside the car to shoot Hightower, but that was 
contradicted by the medical examiner and by Detective Vena.  
At trial, Newton attributed the discrepancies in his videotaped 
statement to his failure to attend the party.  Accordingly, before 
the jury could credit Newton’s videotaped account of defendant’s 
statements, it necessarily had to decide which version of 
Newton’s account should be believed.    
So we do not dispute that the jury needed to determine 
whether defendant made the statements described by Newton.  
But the other jury instructions made that reasonably apparent, 
and alerted the jury of the need to carefully consider Newton’s 
account.  In particular, the jury was instructed about the 
significance of a witness’s prior consistent and inconsistent 
statements (CALJIC No. 2.13), discrepancies in a witness’s 
testimony or between the witness’s testimony and that of others 
(CALJIC No. 2.21.1), a witness’s willfully false statement in 
material part (CALJIC No. 2.21.2), conflicting testimony 
(CALJIC No. 2.22), the believability of a witness convicted of a 
felony (CALJIC No. 2.23), and a witness’s credibility in general 
(CALJIC No. 2.20).  Under these circumstances, it is not 
reasonably likely or possible that the error in omitting a 
cautionary instruction affected the outcome at the guilt or 
penalty phases.  (See Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1196-1197; 
People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 906-907.)      
J.  Challenge to the Instruction That Defendant 
Voluntarily Absented Himself from the 
Proceedings  
The trial court instructed the venire not to consider 
defendant’s absence from the trial:  “[T]he defendant Johnson 
will not be present for these proceedings.  The court is 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
69 
instructing [] that you are not to speculate as to the reasons for 
his absence, nor is this a matter which in any way can affect you 
or your verdict in this case.”  No one raised a hand in response 
to the court’s inquiry whether anyone would be unable to follow 
this instruction.  At the end of trial, the court instructed the jury 
that defendant “has voluntarily absented himself from these 
proceedings.  This is a matter which must not in any way affect 
you in this case.  [¶]  In your deliberations, do not discuss or 
consider this subject.  It must not in any way affect your verdicts 
or findings you may be asked to make in connection with your 
verdicts.”  The trial court overruled the defense objection to the 
word “voluntarily,” reasoning that “it’s been his choice on a daily 
basis to never even listen to this case” and that “he, by his 
conduct, waived his right to testify” and to be present in court.  
Defendant renews his claim that the word “voluntarily” 
injected an untrue and unnecessary concept into the instruction.  
He relies on the trial court’s acknowledgement that defendant 
probably would want to be present in the courtroom.  We need 
not decide whether a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily 
disrupts the proceedings such that the trial cannot continue in 
his presence has voluntarily absented himself.  (But see 
Maxwell v. Roe, supra, 606 F.3d at p. 570; U.S. v. Hemsi (2d Cir. 
1990) 901 F.2d 293, 296.)  We find instead that even if the word 
should have been omitted, the jury did not construe the 
instruction to his detriment.  The jurors were instructed — twice 
— that defendant’s absence must not “in any way” affect their 
consideration of the case or their verdicts.  The jury was also 
warned not to consider or discuss the topic in its deliberations.  
We presume the jury followed those instructions.  (See People v. 
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214.)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
70 
We also reject defendant’s claim that the court’s 
instruction to disregard defendant’s absence was undermined by 
the standard flight instruction (CALJIC No. 2.52), which, as 
given, provided:  “The flight of a person immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after he’s accused of a crime is not 
sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if 
proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved 
facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.  The 
weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you 
to decide.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant proposes that the jury, in 
reliance on the italicized language and his voluntary absence 
from trial, may have inferred (1) that he fled to escape trial, and 
(2) that they could consider that flight in deciding his guilt.  But 
there was no evidence that defendant fled after being accused — 
nor did the prosecutor make any such argument to the jury.  So 
any claim that the jury might have thought he fled would be 
entirely speculative.  After all, the jury would have understood 
that it could consider such flight only “if proved” — and it was 
not proved here.   
Defendant is correct that the italicized phrase in CALJIC 
No. 2.52 was unnecessary in this case and could have been 
deleted.  But the jury was instructed to “[d]isregard any 
instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist” 
and warned “not [to] conclude that because an instruction has 
been given that I’m expressing an opinion as to the facts.”  So 
there was little risk that the jury misapplied the instruction to 
defendant’s detriment.  (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
1044, 1153-1154; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 314.) 
Commonwealth v. Muckle (Mass.App.Ct. 2003) 797 N.E.2d 
456, on which defendant relies to suggest that the standard 
instruction may lead a jury to infer flight from the defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
71 
absence in some circumstances, is distinguishable.  In that case, 
the defendant failed to appear at trial following the second day’s 
lunch break.  (Id. at p. 459.)  The trial court gave the standard 
instruction on flight for the sole purpose of enabling the 
prosecution to argue that his absence from the trial “reflected a 
consciousness of guilt” — even though the evidence before the 
jury did not establish the voluntariness of the defendant’s 
absence or any other type of flight.  (Id. at p. 461; cf. People v. 
Snyder (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 195, 199 [upholding the flight 
instruction where the defendant, who was free on bail, 
absconded after the first day of trial].)  In fact, the Muckle court 
determined that “the consciousness of guilt instruction should 
not have been given at all.”  (Muckle, at p. 462.)  Here, by 
contrast, the flight instruction was justified by evidence that 
defendant fled the murder scene:  Greer testified that he saw 
defendant and codefendant running from the area where the 
murders occurred.  Moreover, the prosecution in this case never 
argued that defendant’s absence from the trial constituted flight 
or reflected a consciousness of guilt, and the jury was instructed 
not to consider defendant’s absence from trial “in any way.”  We 
therefore see no reasonable likelihood that the jury considered 
defendant’s absence from trial as evidence of his guilt.   
K.  Failure To Instruct the Jury That It Could 
Consider Huggins’s Misdemeanor Conduct in 
Evaluating His Credibility  
At trial, Huggins admitted he had been convicted of 
misdemeanor spousal abuse in 1997.  The trial court instructed 
the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.20 that “[i]n 
determining the believability of a witness, you may consider 
anything that has a tendency to prove or disprove the 
truthfulness of the testimony, including, but not limited to . . . a 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
72 
witness’s prior conviction of a felony.”  But the court did not 
append the standard language allowing the jury also to consider 
“[p]ast criminal conduct of a witness amounting to a 
misdemeanor.”  (CALJIC No. 2.20 (6th ed. 1996).)   
Even assuming that the trial court had a sua sponte duty 
to include the reference to misdemeanor conduct (see People v. 
Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 157), the instructions, viewed 
as a whole, nonetheless allowed the jury to consider any 
evidence 
of 
Huggins’s 
moral 
turpitude, 
including 
his 
misdemeanor spousal abuse.  CALJIC No. 2.20, quoted above, 
instructed the jury to consider everything that has a bearing on 
a witness’s credibility, and its list of suggested factors explicitly 
stated it was not exhaustive.  (See People v. Horning (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 871, 911.)  So it is not reasonably likely that the jury 
believed it was precluded from considering Huggins’s 
misdemeanor conduct in evaluating his credibility. 
L.  Instruction Concerning Juror Misconduct 
(CALJIC Former No. 17.41.1)        
The trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he integrity of 
a trial requires that jurors at all times during their deliberations 
conduct themselves as required by these instructions.  
Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate 
or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the 
case based on penalty or punishment or any other improper 
basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately 
advise the court of the situation.”  (CALJIC former No. 17.41.1)  
Although we disapproved of this instruction as an exercise of our 
supervisory power in People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 
we acknowledged that the instruction does not infringe on a 
defendant’s right to a jury trial, a unanimous verdict, or due 
process.  (Id. at pp. 439-440.)  Defendant cites nothing in the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
73 
record indicating that the instruction nonetheless affected the 
deliberations in the guilt or penalty phases, nor does he offer a 
persuasive reason to reconsider our conclusion in Engelman.  
(See People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1171; People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 400-401.)  Accordingly, we reject 
the claim.   
M.  Instructions Concerning Reasonable Doubt  
Defendant contends that certain instructions — CALJIC 
Nos. 2.01, 2.02, and 8.83.1 — undermined the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that certain other 
instructions — CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, and 8.20 — 
individually and collectively diluted the reasonable doubt 
standard.  Defendant acknowledges that we have repeatedly 
rejected similar challenges.  (See People v. Cage (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 256, 286; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 53.)  We 
reject his claim too.   
N.  Judicial Bias 
Defendant contends that the trial court was biased against 
him.  As evidence, he submits a “grab bag” of the court’s rulings.  
Yet defendant never objected to the vast majority of these 
rulings — and not once on the ground of bias — nor did he ever 
move to disqualify the court on the ground of bias.  A defendant 
may not go to trial before a judge, betting on a favorable result 
and failing to raise objections of bias, and then argue on appeal 
that the judge was biased.  (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 
966, 978-979, quoting People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 
626.)  So we deem the claim of judicial bias to be forfeited.  (See 
Johnson, at pp. 978-979; Rodriguez, at p. 626; People v. Farley 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
1067, 1111, overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
74 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)8  Even if the court’s rulings were 
erroneous — a question we do not reach — it would not in itself 
establish that the court was biased.  (See People v. Pearson 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 447.)  We likewise note that defendant’s 
willingness to let the entire trial pass without articulating an 
appropriate objection “strongly suggests” his claim is without 
merit.  (Guerra, at p. 1112.)   
O.  Penalty Phase Instructions  
The trial court declined to give defendant’s requested 
instruction informing the jury that it “was permitted to consider 
pity, sympathy or mercy for the defendant in deciding whether 
to give life without parole or death.”  The court pointed out that 
CALJIC No. 8.85 adequately covered the topic.  Factor (k) in 
that instruction, as it was given in this case, directed the jury to 
consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity 
of the crime . . . and any sympathetic or other aspect of the 
defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 
the offense for which he is on trial.”  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not err.  (See People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 801; 
People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1098.) 
The court also denied defendant’s request to instruct the 
jury that “the sentence of death is to be considered a worse 
sentence than that of life without the possibility of parole, even 
though you may personally disagree.”  As we have previously 
held, the other jury instructions, particularly CALJIC No. 8.88, 
as well as the penalty trial itself make clear that death is the 
                                        
8  
Defendant was well aware of the procedure to disqualify a 
judge for bias.  He had filed a motion to disqualify a different 
judge prior to his first trial, but the motion was denied.     
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
75 
most severe penalty.  (See People v. Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 170.)  Once again, the trial court did not err. 
P.  Cumulative Error  
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the 
errors in this case was so prejudicial as to require reversal of the 
judgment.  But the only fact finder-related issues we have 
resolved on harmless error grounds are the trial court’s failure 
to instruct the jury to view Newton’s account of defendant’s out-
of-court statements with caution, and its passing assertion that 
defendant had “voluntarily absented” himself in the course of 
instructing the jury not to allow his absence to affect their 
decisionmaking in any way.  Neither of these errors or potential 
errors, nor their cumulative effect, warrants reversal.  (See 
People v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 466.)  Nor does the trial 
court’s asserted error in considering defendant’s threats against 
Hauser and his family in deciding whether to exclude defendant 
from the courtroom. 
Q.  California’s Death Penalty Statute  
Defendant 
articulates 
several 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s capital sentencing scheme, but 
concedes these have each been “consistently rejected” by this 
court.  Defendant’s arguments do not persuade us to reconsider 
our precedent.  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488.)  
The state’s death penalty scheme does not violate the federal 
Constitution by failing to adequately narrow the class of 
offenders eligible for the death penalty (see, e.g., Winbush, at 
p. 488); apply a limiting construction to section 190.3, factor (a) 
(see, e.g., People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 630-631); 
require jurors to find aggravating factors (other than § 190.3, 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) beyond a reasonable doubt (see, e.g., 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
76 
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235); assign the 
burden of proof to the prosecution or inform the jury there was 
no burden of proof (see, e.g., Bennett, at pp. 631-632); require 
jurors to find unadjudicated criminal activity or other 
aggravating factors unanimously (see, e.g., Winbush, at p. 489; 
see also People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1130); define 
what it means for the aggravating factors to be “so substantial” 
in comparison to the mitigating factors (Thompson, at p. 1128); 
instruct the jury to select the “appropriate” penalty (People v. 
Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1133), to return a verdict of life if 
the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors (see, 
e.g. People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 199), and to 
presume that the appropriate penalty is life (see, e.g., People v. 
Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 46); instruct the jury that there 
was no burden of proof as to mitigating factors and that such 
factors need not be found unanimously (see, e.g., Winbush, at p. 
490); require written findings from the jury as to aggravating 
and mitigating factors (see, e.g., ibid.); or require either 
“intercase proportionality review” or “the disparate sentence 
review that is afforded under the determinate sentence law” 
(People v. Williams, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1205).  Nor did the 
trial court err by instructing the jury about the aggravating and 
mitigating factors using a unitary list (see, e.g., People v. Myles 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222), by using the word “extreme” in 
CALJIC No. 8.85 (see, e.g., Myles, at p. 1223); or by telling jurors 
to consider section 190.3 factors “if applicable” (see, e.g., People 
v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439).   
Defendant also concedes that we have repeatedly held that 
certain procedural distinctions between capital and noncapital 
sentences are sufficiently justified (see, e.g., People v. Virgil 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1290 [“ ‘[C]apital and noncapital 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
77 
defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be 
treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees 
of equal protection of the laws’ ”]), and that arguments based on 
international law along the lines of what defendant advances in 
this case are not a basis to invalidate death sentences that are 
lawful under domestic law.  (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 616, 690.)  We do the same today. 
III. 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur:         
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
RAYE, J.* 
                                        
*  
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Johnson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S075727 
Date Filed: December 27, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: John J. Cheroske 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, Joseph E. Chabot, Mai Linh Spencer and Nina Wilder, Deputy State Public Defenders, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorneys 
General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, Jaime L. Fuster and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nina Wilder 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
  
Marc A. Kohm 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6175