Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Medina

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Medina1989 WY 78770 P.2d 1104Case Number: 88-308Decided: 03/23/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF 
WYOMING EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, PETITIONER (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHIRLEY B. 
MEDINA, RESPONDENT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT).

 
 
AT Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
petitioner.

 
 
George 
Santini of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for respondent.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation coverage for a motel maid who injured her back in moving a false 
headboard bed for the daily clean-up and linen change is addressed by this 
appeal.

 
 

[¶2.]     Shirley Medina 
(Medina) was 
employed by Motel 6 where she sustained lower back injuries as described in her 
testimony:

 
 
Q. How big 
were the beds that you had to move?

 
 
A. Uh, the 
beds were double wide; they - they're double beds is what they 
are.

 
 
Q. Could 
you describe to me physically what was required to move those 
beds.

 
 
A. Okay. 
Uh, the beds are against the wall. They have * * * headboards that are attached 
to the wall to make them look like if the bed has a headboard with the bed 
together. Okay. What, uh, I have to do is I have to pull the bed away from the 
wall to get the linen off and to put clean linen and make the bed and push the 
bed back where it belongs.

 
 
Q. 
Physically, how far would you have to move that?

 
 
A. Um, 
geez, I'd say a couple of feet.

 
 
Q. Do you 
have any idea how much it would weigh?

 
 
A. No, I - 
it's more than, well, like the day that it happened - I'm not used to having 
heavy things being, you know, pulling heavy things and, uh, it's a lot more 
heavier than I can, I can safely (inaudible). I, uh, I'd say about 50 pounds to 
me because they don't have any rollers on the legs. The, uh, - all it is is it's 
flat on the, on the carpet.

 
 
Q. Do you 
move both the mattress and the box spring at the same time 
then?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Q. You 
can't tell us how much it weighed but you can tell us it was hard to 
move.

 
 
A. Yes. 
Because there's no rollers on the, on the legs.

 
 
Q. Let's 
talk about that morning of May 4th. How were you hurt?

 
 
A. Well, I, 
uh, had gotten my things that I usually do for, with the start of the day: my 
cart, my bags and everything. To start with my first rental and, uh, I pulled 
the first bed out and nothing happened.

 
 
Q. It's not 
going to pull.

 
 
A. The 
second one, right the minute I pulled it, I had a big back pain - it's a - in my 
leg, the whole leg gave out and the back also. Uh, I had a heck of a time trying 
to, uh, proceed working. I told my supervisor and, uh, she told me that, uh, I 
had to stay and work for the rest of the day.

 
 

[¶3.]     Following institution 
of a claim for work related injuries by Medina, objection was taken by the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division (Workers' Compensation), contending that her 
occupation was not enumerated extrahazardous and the employer had not elected 
coverage under a voluntary coverage opportunity. An administrative hearing was 
held by a hearing officer of the Office of Independent Hearing Officers as a 
contest between Workers' Compensation and Medina. Coverage was found and the claim 
approved as a decision from which this appeal is pursued by Workers' 
Compensation. The administrative decision was first appealed to the district 
court by a petition for review by Workers' Compensation and certified to this 
court without district court decision by W.R.A.P. 12.09 pursuant to the request 
of Medina.

 
 

[¶4.]     The single issue 
presented is whether the work activities performed by Medina come within the coverage provisions of Wyoming statutes and 
constitutional provisions.1

 
 

[¶5.]     Following hearing, the 
hearing officer concluded:

 
 
     3. One of the 
statutorily enumerated extrahazardous occupations at the time of the injury to 
the Employee/Claimant was "building service." § 27-14-103(a)(xxxvi) W.S. 1977 
(1987 cum.supp.). As defined by statute, "building service" includes "janitors, 
elevator operators, and maintenance workers employed in and about. . . . 
motels." § 27-14-103(f)(i), W.S. 1977 (1987 cum. supp.).

 
 
     4. The terms "janitor" 
and "maintenance worker" are not specifically defined by statute. Reference to 
standard reference texts including the American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd College 
Edition, and Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary define the term 
"janitor" as "one who tends to the maintenance or cleaning of a building" and 
"one that keeps the premises of an apartment, office building, or other building 
clean or free of refuse, tends to the heating system and makes minor 
repairs."

 
 
     5. "Maids" are not 
statutorily defined and reference to standard reference texts indicate that such 
term is commonly defined as a "virgin", a "lady-in-waiting", or a "female 
servant". The common definitions do not accurately reflect Employee/Claimant's 
actual work.

 
 
     6. The Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in light of it's beneficent 
purpose. Although this rule of liberal construction does not allow the extending 
of benefits to injuries which do not reasonably fall within the language 
employed by the legislature, a reasonable construction of the term "building 
service" and it's statutory definition leads to the conclusion that 
Employee/Claimant's duties fairly fall within this statutorily enumerated 
extrahazardous occupation of "building service."

 
 

[¶6.]     Workers' Compensation 
now attacks this legal conclusion. A strict construction of the enumerated 
categories is requested. The appeal presents no issue of services performed, 
doubt of job requirements or denial of work-related injury. A decision is 
consequently presented for statutory interpretation as a matter of law.2 The Wyoming statutory job title differentiation 
system provides problems in increasing complexity of application. A motel maid 
is neither stated to be included nor excluded. The hearing officer found 
coverage from moving beds to janitorial responsibilities. To analyze further, it 
would appear that identical services performed at a dude ranch would be covered, 
since dude ranching is included without exception. Maid services are likewise 
included for hospital personnel by the lack of any exclusion. Laundry workers 
doing apparently similar tasks would also be covered. Female bartenders who wash 
glasses and mix drinks are covered, as are kitchen employees and waiters. State 
institution employees who would perform similar or identical services to those 
of Medina would 
also be covered. These employees including "matrons" who provide daily cleaning 
services in state office buildings, with worker's compensation protection with 
any on the job injury, appear in job responsibility and activity to be identical 
to the maids providing clean-up services in motels, except that moving and 
making beds is not required for the state employee.

 
 

[¶7.]     Wyoming has a long 
history of statutory construction to benefit the worker and favor coverage. 
Lerch v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div., 714 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986); 
Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. Co., 668 P.2d 649 
(Wyo. 1983); In re Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178 
(Wyo. 1965); In re Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557, 563 (1941). This case is confined to the facts presented where an injury was 
sustained in moving a bed to perform job responsibilities. We observe that 
moving that bed is as hazardous for a motel maid as it would be for a janitor, a 
moving company employee or a hospital attendant. Lacking inclusion or exclusion 
by named category which would define legislative intent to the contrary, we 
affirm the decision of the hearing officer in finding coverage and granting 
benefits within his stated basis for decision.

 
 

[¶8.]     
Affirmed.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.

 
 

GOLDEN, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion, with whom BROWN, J., Retired, 
joined.

 
 

BROWN, J., 
Retired, filed a dissenting opinion, with whom GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyoming has an enumerated 
category hazardous occupation statute of seventy-five separate provisions and 
eleven definitional sections which add further enumeration complexity. One 
occupation that is clearly not designated by name is that of a private 
employment motel/hotel room maid. W.S. 27-14-103.

 
 
     As this court is 
called to analyze the diverse structure that has been built by some forty-five 
or more separate sessions of the Wyoming legislature, the observed difficulty 
is finding constitutionally appropriate differentiations between similar 
employment activities. Lerch v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 714 P.2d 754 
(Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
     The present text of 
the constitutional section as last amended in 1986 and as originally adopted by 
vote of the people in 1913 provides:

 
 
     No law shall be 
enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or 
death of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any 
right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall 
be void. As to all extrahazardous 
employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and 
maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as may be 
fixed by law according to proper 
classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the 
dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case 
of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such 
fund or funds shall be accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained 
in such manner as may be provided by law. The right of each employee to 
compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any 
and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to 
the fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of the injuries or 
death.

 
 

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 
(emphasis added).

 
 

2 Neither party has 
briefed the constitutional issue of equal protection, due process, and special 
legislation that pervades the continued process of categorization by name, but 
not necessarily by function, within the Workers' Compensation statutory 
structure derived from the "proper classifications" requirement of Wyo. Const. 
art. 10, § 4. This court will continue to seek a constitutional construction in 
avoiding unjustified or unrealistic differentiations in interpretation as 
recognizing the province of the legislature to establish extrahazardous 
occupations when involving extrahazardous tasks. Lerch, n. 1, 714 P.2d 754; 
Rocky Mountain Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, 423 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1967); In re Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 
1965).

 
 
     This court, in 
recognition of legislative intent, has a singular responsibility to provide a 
statutory application which, if possible, will provide a constitutional validity 
to the legislative action. Hamilton v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 131 
(1873); Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D.Wyo. 1964); Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheaton) 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819); Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611, 10 L. Ed. 1060 (1842).

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶9.]     I agree with the result 
reached by the majority opinion in its interpretation of the statutory 
provisions in this case. I do not, however, see any need to invoke the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming. Our usual rule is that the court will 
not consider constitutional questions if the controversy can be resolved on any 
other basis. E.g., K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 
1988); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 
1978); Schoeller v. Board of CountyCommissioners, 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1977); Stambaugh v. State, 566 P.2d 993 (Wyo. 1977); Bowers v. Getter Trucking Company, 514 P.2d 837 (Wyo. 
1973). It is obvious that this case can be resolved on the basis of 
interpretation of the statute, because this court did so. Consequently, the 
invocation and the suggested application of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 by the 
court on its own motion is not appropriate. Neither the hearing examiner nor 
either of the parties perceived any necessity for invoking or applying the 
constitution to this case.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting, with whom BROWN, 
Justice, Retired, joins.

 
 

[¶10.]  "`If there is no meaning in it,' said 
Alice's King, 
`that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any.'" 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 Columbia L.Rev. 527, 533-34 
(1947).

 
 

[¶11.]  I think the majority opinion is wrong for 
several reasons. First, it affirms the hearing officer's wrong decision. Second, 
the majority opinion is neither based upon nor true to this court's time-honored 
principles of disciplined appellate review. And, third, the majority opinion 
impermissibly trespasses into the legislative domain. What is remarkable is that 
the majority has managed to do all of this in such a simple, straightforward 
case. Before explaining my reasons for disagreeing with the majority, I will put 
the procedure and the facts of this case in proper 
perspective.

 
 

[¶12.]  The Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division is the agency statutorily charged with administering the worker's 
compensation law. W.S. 27-14-201 through -203, -506, -508, -801 through -804 
(June 1987 Repl.);1 Randell v. WyomingState 
Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 671 P.2d 303, 308 (Wyo. 1983). Under that law the Wyoming legislature 
recently created the office of independent hearing officers. W.S. 27-14-602(a). 
When an injured employee, such as Mrs. Medina, files an application for an award 
because of injuries suffered during her employment and her employer or the 
division objects, an independent hearing officer conducts a contested case 
hearing. Id. 
That hearing officer has exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative 
determination of the validity and amount of compensation payable under the 
compensation law. W.S. 27-14-602(c). By following the contested case procedures 
of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), the hearing officer 
determines the contested case. W.S. 27-14-602(b). The hearing officer's 
decision, including the award, is an administrative determination of the 
employer's rights, the employee's rights, and the disposition of money within 
the worker's compensation account as to all matters involved. W.S. 27-14-606. 
The director of the Worker's Compensation Division may appear, as she did here, 
before the hearing officer and defend against the employee's claim, having the 
same rights of defense as the employer. W.S. 27-14-607. The director may appeal 
from the hearing officers' decision. W.S. 27-14-614. That appeal is as provided 
by WAPA. W.S. 27-14-602(b); and W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 
12.12.

 
 

[¶13.]  Under WAPA, a party appealing from a 
final administrative determination in a contested case, like Mrs. Medina's, may 
do so on the following terms:

 
 
[T]he 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record * * *. The reviewing 
court shall:

 
 
(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
W.S. 
16-3-114(c) (Oct. 1982 Repl.).

 
 

[¶14.]  Mrs. Medina's claim for an award has been 
litigated under these statutory and administrative procedures. We are at the 
stage where this court is reviewing the division director's appeal from the 
hearing officer's decision which awarded Mrs. Medina compensation benefits for a 
back injury she suffered when, as a maid employed by Motel 6, she pulled a bed 
away from the wall in order change the bed linen. We are informed that only Mrs. 
Medina, the maid, testified at the hearing. Based upon her testimony and his 
statutory interpretation of W.S. 27-14-103(a)(xxxvi), and W.S. 27-14-103(f)(i) 
(Cum.Supp. 1987), the hearing officer decided that the maid was engaged in an 
extrahazardous occupation and employment when she hurt her back. Specifically, 
he determined she was engaged in the extrahazardous occupation and employment of 
"building service" as designated by W.S. 27-14-103(a)(xxxvi), and which is 
statutorily defined as "janitors, elevator operators and maintenance workers 
employed in and about office buildings, hotels, motels, apartment houses, school 
houses, courthouses and public buildings, excluding employees of the 
United 
States." W.S. 
27-14-103(f)(i).

 
 

[¶15.]  Hastily and perfunctorily deciding the 
division director's appeal from the hearing officer's decision, the majority 
abandons all semblance of disciplined appellate review. We see neither structure 
nor methodology nor analysis in its decision-making 
process.

 
 

[¶16.]  In this appeal, the division's director 
asserts the hearing officer's decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, and not in accordance with the law. I agree, and I would also find 
that decision to be lacking statutory right and unsupported by substantial 
evidence. W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C) and (E). In reviewing this appeal I have 
followed this court's long-established precepts in worker's compensation cases. 
"The burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence in worker's compensation 
cases is assigned to the claimant. Matter of Van Matre, [657 P.2d 815 
(Wyo. 1983)]; Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, [651 P.2d 266 (Wyo. 1982)]; and Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, [474 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 
1970)]." Randell, 671 P.2d  at 307. In reviewing the division director's appeal, 
I "will not invade the province of the factfinder and reach a different factual 
conclusion * * * if there is substantial evidence to support the findings made 
below." Id. at 
307-08. I am not bound, however, by the hearing officer's answers to questions 
of law or interpretations of statutory provisions. W.S. 16-3-114(c). My review 
has been guided by the rule "that if the employer does not engage in 
extrahazardous activities, then whether the individual employee's activities are 
hazardous in nature is not material to [the determination whether the employee 
was involved in an extrahazardous occupation]." Baskin v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151, 154 (Wyo. 
1986). In other words, our decision whether the occupation in question is within 
the extrahazardous classification turns on the employer's activities, not that of the 
individual employee. Cf. Randell, 671 P.2d  at 308, where this court based its 
analysis on the employer's statutory functions, not the individual employee's 
own perception as having been involved in an extrahazardous 
occupation.

 
 

[¶17.]  Mindful of these rules which I must 
faithfully apply, I read Mrs. Medina's testimony before the hearing officer 
since that was the basis for the latter's findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and final administrative decision. I find Mrs. Medina testified that her 
employer, Motel 6, was engaged in the business of operating "a motel for people 
who rent a room for the day or couple of days, whatever." With that piece of 
evidence in hand, I turn to the classifications of extrahazardous occupations 
which our legislators established and then published in W.S. 
27-14-103(a)(i)-(iv), (b)(i)-(xi), (c), (d)(i)-(v), and (e)(i)-(iv). I read the 
lengthy list of legislatively declared extrahazardous occupations. I do not see 
in that lengthy list the statutory function of a motel or hotel operator. I do 
see, however, the mention of "building service." W.S. 27-14-103(a)(xxxvi). But, 
I quickly remember that Mrs. Medina's employer, Motel 6, is not engaged in the 
extrahazardous occupation of "building service." Her employer operates "a motel 
for people who rent a room for the day or a couple of days, 
whatever."

 
 

[¶18.]  Having conducted my appellate review in 
this fashion, I am satisfied that the division's director is correct in her 
assertion that the hearing officer's decision is wrong. I, too, am satisfied 
that I am correct in thinking the hearing officer's decision is wrong. 
Considering the division director's position, and the results of my own 
analysis, I also find comfort in yet another of this court's basic 
precepts:

 
 
It has long 
been recognized in Wyoming that the construction placed upon a 
statute by those charged with its execution is entitled to some deference. Demos 
v. Board of CountyCommissioners of Natrona County, Wyo., 571 P.2d 980 (1977). This court, when 
construing a statute, is bound to consider the interpretation of a statute made 
by the agency administering it. Langdon v. Lutheran Brotherhood, Wyo., 625 P.2d 209 
(1981).

 
 
Matter of 
Hasser, 647 P.2d 66, 69 (Wyo. 1982); accord Randell, 671 P.2d  at 
308.

 
 

[¶19.]  As I ponder the results of my appellate 
labors, my thoughts light upon the strange statutory interpretation which the 
hearing officer and then the majority have given the statutory definition of 
"building service," stated in W.S. 27-14-103(f)(i). The hearing officer and this 
court's majority found the word "maids" in that definition. In the course of my 
appellate review of this case, I have read that statutory definition many times. 
But each time I read it, the result is the same. I cannot find the word "maids" 
in the plain language of that statute. I see only these words, "janitors, 
elevator operators and maintenance workers employed in and about office 
buildings, hotels, motels, apartment houses, school houses, courthouses and 
public buildings, excluding employees of the United States." 
Each time I have read those words, I have kept in my mind yet another of this 
court's precepts: "In construing a statute, words must be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning. The result in this case becomes obvious when the plain words 
of the statute are applied to the facts of the case." Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 
660 P.2d 361, 365 (Wyo. 1983) (citations omitted); accord, Baskin v. State of 
Wyoming, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151, 154 (Wyo. 1986). 
Each time I give the unambiguous definitional words of "building service" their 
plain and ordinary meaning, as written by our plain and ordinary citizen 
legislators, I do not see the word "maids."

 
 

[¶20.]  In common experience we have seen 
janitors, elevator operators and maintenance workers working in each one of 
these described buildings or structures. We have seen "maids" working only in 
hotels and motels, but not in the other described buildings or structures. This 
observation points out a meaningful distinction, one which reasonably explains 
why the legislature omitted the word "maids" from those persons in "building 
service" occupations. All members of this occupation have something in common; 
all members of this occupation are found working in all of these buildings. 
"Maids" are not members of this occupation because they do not work in all of 
these buildings; they only work in hotels and motels, not in office buildings, 
apartment houses, school houses, courthouses, and public 
buildings.

 
 

[¶21.]  The majority does rely on one precept, 
which is that the compensation statute must be liberally construed to provide 
protection for the injured worker. I whole-heartedly agree with that principle. 
But, it has no application here. "[T]hat legal proposition * * * is tempered by 
a requirement that a construction not be afforded which results in an extension 
of the coverage to situations which are not reasonably within the language of 
the statute. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker [651 P.2d 266 (Wyo. 1982)]; In re Hardison, [429 P.2d 320 
(Wyo. 1967)]." 
Randell, 671 P.2d  at 309.

 
 

[¶22.]  Is there significance in my not seeing 
the word "maids" in the statutory definition of "building service"? This court 
has given me reason to believe there is. In Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 
1976), this court listed rules of construction which here, as they did there, 
force the court "into a corner from which we have little hope of escape." We 
said:

 
 
The 
omission of words from a statute must be considered intentional on the part of 
the legislature. Words may not be supplied in a statute where the statute is 
intelligible without the addition of the alleged omission. Words may not be 
inserted in a statutory provision under the guise of interpretation. The Supreme 
Court will not read into laws what is not there. This court will not supply 
omissions in a statute as redress is with the legislature. We are alerted by all 
this to the result that it is just as important to recognize what a statute does 
not say as it is to recognize what it does say.

 
 

Id. (citations 
omitted).

 
 

[¶23.]  As the majority informs us in footnote 1 
at of the majority opinion, the Wyoming legislature over the course of "some 
forty-five or more separate sessions" has established in deliberate fashion 
seventy-five categories and eleven definitional provisions specifically listing 
extrahazardous occupations to which the beneficent coverage of the compensation 
scheme applies. Carefully reading this detailed and specific classification of 
extrahazardous occupations, which was carefully and deliberately built by our 
elected representatives and senators over such a long period of this state's 
history, I am satisfied that that distinguished deliberative body could have 
quite easily and most effortlessly, had 
it intended to do so, included the rather specific word "maids" along with 
the equally rather specific words "janitors," "elevator operators," and 
"maintenance workers" when it wrote the definition of "building service." My 
satisfaction derives not only from the plain and ordinary reading which I must 
give these statutory words written by the legislators, but also from a bit of 
plain and ordinary common sense. When I think about the innumerable days and 
nights over "some forty-five or more separate sessions" that our representatives 
and senators spent in Cheyenne hotels and motels and public buildings 
as they wracked their individual and collective brains to establish the 
classification of extrahazardous employments and occupations, my mind boggles. 
And after the boggling stops, my mind is suddenly invaded by that wee bit of 
common sense I was telling you about. I bet those senators and representatives 
could tell the difference between the "janitors, elevator operators, and 
maintenance workers," on the one hand, and the "maids" on the other hand, all of 
whom were working in and around those hotels and motels where the legislators 
stayed. And, so, I think the legislators did not write the word "maids" into 
that statutory definition. We all know the legislators' job is to write words in 
and keep words out. We also know that part of the judge's job is to try not to 
do the legislators' job.

 
 

[¶24.]  In this regard I remember the wise words 
of Felix Frankfurter:

 
 
[The 
courts] are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its 
particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the 
constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a 
matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in 
construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of the words used by the 
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged 
in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their 
brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must 
not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge it nor to contract it. Whatever 
temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, 
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by 
way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or 
internal contradiction.

 
 
Frankfurter, 
supra, at 533.

 
 

[¶25.]  In Mrs. Medina's simple, straightforward 
case, the majority has, I fear, rewritten a statute to enlarge it. Having gone 
beyond the limitation, the majority has usurped a power which our democracy has 
lodged in its elected legislature.

 
 

[¶26.]  I respectfully 
dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 All references to 
Title 27, Chapter 14, are taken from the June 1987 Replacement, unless indicated 
otherwise.

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 

[¶27.]  I am in complete agreement with the 
scholarly dissent of Justice Golden and join in such 
dissent.

 
 

[¶28.]  To some, the rule of law set out in the 
majority opinion may be obscure. For the benefit of the less sophisticated, I 
have distilled the holding to be:

 
 
If an 
employee sustains an injury, he or she is engaged in extrahazardous employment, 
otherwise he or she would not have sustained the injury.

 
 

[¶29.]  It requires a flight of fancy to 
determine that a motel or hotel maid is engaged in extrahazardous employment, 
unless the term extrahazardous is given some aberrant meaning. The American 
Heritage Dictionary 465 (1969) defines extra as "something more than what is 
usual," and hazardous as "marked by danger; perilous." Id. at 
605.

 
 

[¶30.]  I suppose the several hundred maids in 
Wyoming never 
knew, until they read the majority opinion, that their work was perilous, marked 
by danger to a degree more than what is usual. Now that the majority has ruled 
that the work of a maid is extrahazardous, the wages of the several hundred 
motel and hotel maids in the state should immediately be tripled. This is only 
fair. If other employees engaged in extrahazardous jobs, such as underground 
miners, roustabouts, roughnecks and construction workers, get paid for highly 
dangerous work, so should hotel and motel maids. If a maid's job is 
extrahazardous, and it must be so because the majority said it was, then I 
cannot envision a safe job or even one that is merely hazardous.1

 
 

[¶31.]  Although the Worker's Compensation 
Division appealed this case, it is probably a case they will love to lose. Now 
that maids are classified as being engaged in extrahazardous employment, their 
employers will be required to pay premiums on these employees into the worker's 
compensation fund. This will be a big bonanza to the fund. It likely will be 
another hundred years before another maid is injured. The large amount 
accumulated because of these premiums can help subsidize payments made to 
injured oil rig workers, construction workers and miners. The legislature could 
not find a way to make the worker's compensation scheme solvent, but the Supreme 
Court may have.2

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 A truly 
extrahazardous place and circumstance is at the front door of a public building 
at quitting time.

 
 

2 In its enthusiasm to 
spend money from the Worker's Compensation Fund, the majority may want to 
include those who suffer ear strain from talking on the telephone. Another group 
might include those who suffer from chronic hypochondria, hysterical conversion 
or Munchausen's syndrome, also known as Baron Von Munchausen's 
disease.