Title: JUSTIN D. WIBBELS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

 

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
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DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2016-SC-000103-MR
JUSTIN D. WIBBELS APPELLANT

‘ON APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT.
V. HONORABLE GREGORY ALLEN LAY, JUDGE,
NO. 14-CR-00287

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING

A jury in Laurel County convicted Justin Wibbels of wanton murder.
Consistent with the jury’s sentencing recommendations, the trial court fixed
his sentence at confinement for twenty years, ,

Wibbels now appeals as a matter of right, Kentucky Constitution §
110(2\(b), arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion fora
directed verdict; and (2) denying his request to introduce evidence of the
victim's family’s ill will toward him. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. BACKGROUND!

(On the morning of June 16, 2014, the Appellant, Justin Wibbels, was
traveling westbound in Laurel County on KY 30, a two-lane road with an
‘emergency lane on each side. As he traveled in his extended cab pick-up

‘Because Wibbels challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for directed

verdict, we present the facts in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth unless
otherwise noted.
truck, he approached and attempted to pass Laura Jones.? However, upon
Wibbels initiating his pass, Jones was forced to pass the vehicle in front of her,
which had unexpectedly pulled out into her path at a much slower speed from
an intersecting side road. Jones passed the car and returned to her proper
lane of travel in the westbound lane. Wibbels did not return to his ‘proper lane.
Instead, he moved to the left, into the eastbound emergency lane.?

Mark Sulfridge, a motorist driving westbound in front of Jones and
Wibbels, testified that he observed Wibbels driving in the eastbound emergency
Jane as oncoming traffic passed him. Wibbels then moved from the eastbound
emergency lane to the westbound lane behind Sulfridge. Sulftidge testified that
he was traveling about sixty miles per hour, and Wibbels passed him “like [he]
‘was sitting still.” Wibbels overtook both Sulfridge and the vehicle in front of
Sullfridge, as a line of five or six vehicles approached in the oncoming,
eastbound lane. Sulfridge testified that, upon seeing the traffic approaching,
he began to slow down so that Wibbels had space to re-enter the westbound
lane. Sulftidge also testified that Wibbels pulled into the eastbound lane to
pass Sulfridge, the vehicle in front him, and the vehicle in front of that.
However, instead of re-entering the westbound lane, Wibbels, without slowing

down, moved into the eastbound emergency lane for a second time.

2 We note, at the outset, that the entire course of events took place in a passing

2 Wibbels testified that he was “boxed in” by Jones, the slower moving vehicle
‘he was attempting to pass, and additional vehicles that had taken his place in traffic
behind the slower moving vehicle. Thus, he contends he was forced into the
eastbound emergency lane.

2
James Belt was just approaching KY 30 from an intersecting road to the
south (to Wibbels's left while he drove in the eastbound emergency lane).* Belt
testified that, as he sat at the stop sign, preparing to turn into the eastbound
lane of KY 30, he looked right and saw Wibbels approaching rapidly. Belt
testified that Wibbels's truck “came through so fast it shook [his] truck” and
“rocked it from side to side.” Belt also testified that, when Wibbels passed him,
there were no vehicles directly next to Wibbels, which would have prevented
Wibbels from returning to the westbound lane of traffic. Belt pulled into the
eastbound lane and, through his rearview mirror, observed Wibbels move into
the eastbound lane and then back into the eastbound emergency lane, while
continuing westbound. Belt testified that Wibbels could have moved into the
open westbound lane but returned to the eastbound emergency lane.

As Wibbels drove in the eastbound emergency lane, Timothy Berry was
traveling westbound on KY 30 ahead of Wibbels and Sulfridge. Through his
rearview mirror, Berry could see Wibbels driving westbound in the eastbound
emergency lane as oncoming traffic passed Wibbels. Berry testified that he was
traveling at fifty-five miles per hour, with a line of four or five cars behind him,
and Wibbels was “catching [up to him] like [he] was sitting still.” About this
time, a new line of four or five vehicles appeared around a curve, traveling in

the eastbound lane. Berry testified that he moved over to the right, partially in

$ The road Belt was exiting, Freeman Hollow Road, was approximately a quarter
of a mile from where Wibbels first passed Jones.

5 Wibbels disputed this testimony, contending that he was not able to return to
the westbound lane because of a stream of cars therein.

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the westbound emergency lane, to allow Wibbels to return to the westbound
lane, but Wibbels remained in the eastbound emergency lane.

‘The first vehicle in the line of oncoming vehicles passed Wibbels.
However, the second vehicle, a utility van driven by the victim, Jerry
‘Thompson, suddenly darted into the eastbound emergency lane. No evidence
‘was presented establishing why Thompson moved abruptly into the emergency
lane. The two vehicles collided in the grassy area to the side of the eastbound
‘emergency lane, killing Thompson instantly.

Berry testified that the collision occurred just opposite his vehicle and
that, upon seeing the collision, he returned to the scene to check on the
rivers. Berry asked Wibbels why he was passing in the emergency lane, to
which Wibbels replied that he was “late and in a hurry." Wibbels testified that
hhe never made this reply to Berry. He stated that he had to be at work by 9:00
AM. and he was not running late, evidenced by the fact that, although it took
him thirty to forty minutes to travel from his home to work, it was only 8:00
AM. at the time of the collision.

Wibbels was subsequently convicted by a Laurel County jury of wanton
murder, and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. This appeal
followed. We set forth additional facts as necessary below.

II, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the issues presented require us to apply different standards of

review, we set forth the appropriate standard as necessary when addressing

each issue.
I, ANALYSIS

A. The trial court properly denied Wibbels’s motion for a directed
verdict.

Wibbels contends that, because the Commonwealth failed to prove
wanton murder, he was entitled to a directed verdict. We note that Wibbels
properly preserved this challenge through his motions for a directed verdict at
the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief and at the close of his own case-
in-chief, Because we discern that there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to find Wibbels guilty of each element, we affirm the trial
court's decision to deny Wibbels's motions for a directed verdict.

‘On a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.24 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). In ruling on the
motion, “the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be
given to such testimony.” Id. ‘On appellate review, we determine whether,

under the evidence viewed as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a

 

jury to find the defendant guilty.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421,
424 (Ky. 2008),

In order to convict Wibbels of wanton murder, the Commonwealth must
have proven that he “operat{ed] . .. a motor vehicle under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life, and] . .. wantonly engaged] in

conduct which create(d] a grave risk of death to another person and thereby
‘cause{d] the death of another person.” Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
507.020(1)(b).

A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation,

 

'KRS 501,020(3). As we noted in Brown v. Commonwealth, “to be convicted of
wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b), Appellant must have had a more

egregious mental state than mere wantonnest

 

174 8.W.3d 421, 425 (Ky.
2008). “It is the element of ‘extreme indifference to human life’ that elevates

‘wanton homicide to the same level of culpability as intentional homicide.” Id.

 

‘There is a kind of [wanton] homicide that cannot fairly be
distinguished . . . from homicides committed {intentionally}.
[Wantonness] .. . presupposes an awareness of the creation of
substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be deemed justifiable
by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves. Since risk,
however, is a matter of degree and the motives for risk creation
may be infinite in variation, some formula is needed to identify the
case where [wantonness] should be assimilated to [intention], The
conception that the draft employs is that of extreme indifference to
the value of human life. The significance of [intention] is that . . . it
demonstrates precisely such indifference.

KRS 507.020 (1974 cmt.) quoting Model Penal Code § 201.2 cmt. 2 (Tentative
Draft No. 9, 1959)). Importantly, “whether /wantonness) is so extreme that it
demonstrates similar indifference is not a question that, in our view, can be
further clarified; it must be left directly to the trier of facts. Id. (emphasis
added)
In our analysis, we examine whether the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence to meet the requisite level of wantonness required to convict
Wibbels of murder. The Commonwealth presented evidence that Wibbels was
(1) driving at a high rate of speed (estimated at above eighty miles per hour); (2)
passing back and forth between the opposite lane of travel and the opposite
lane's emergency lane; and (3) in the vicinity of clusters of vehicles going both
directions during their morning commute. Wibbels argues that his conduct
was based on a social utility, in that he was precluded from returning to the
proper of lane of trafic; however, the Commonwealth presented testimony from
multiple witnesses who disputed his assertion. Furthermore, while in the
emergency lane, Wibbels could have simply stopped and waited for the traffic to
cleer.

{As noted above, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth when reviewing a court’s decision to deny a motion for a
directed verdict; in doing so, we discern that the court properly denied
Wibbels's motion. A reasonable juror could find, based on the
Commonwealth's evidence, that Wibbels's conduct manifested an extreme
indifference to human life.

In the time since the General Assembly enacted Kentucky's modern
Penal Code, we have visited the issue of wanton murder while operating &
‘motor vehicle on many occasions. Our sentinel case, Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 560 8.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1977), affirmed the conviction of wanton
murder where the defendant was drunk, speeding, and driving in the turn lane,

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before he ran a red light, broad-siding another vehicle and killing its driver. As
Wibbels correctly notes, the majority of our cases involve not just a violation of
traffic laws, but also the use of intoxicants.® In each of these cases, we have
held that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support a
conviction of wanton murder.

Additionally, this Court has twice affirmed wanton murder convictions
involving unintentional vehicular homicides in the absence of an intoxicated
driver. In Graves v. Commonwealth, the defendant, in an effort to recover
rugs for which he had just paid, raced through urban streets at over one
hundred miles per hour while exchanging gunfire with the occupant of another
vehicle, 17 8.W.3d 858, 863 (Ky. 2000). He then ran a red light and struck a
vehicle proceeding through the intersection, killing the driver. Id. In Brown v.
Commonwealth, the defendant was racing another vehicle; was distracted by
désh-mounted television monitors in his vehicle; and ran a red light, before

© See Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 $.W.24 102 (Ky. 1991) (defendant was
speeding and had a .0297 blood aleahol level); Keller v. Commonwealth, 719 $,W.2d 5
(ky. 1986) (defendant was drunk, speeding, and on the wrong side of the road); Renfro
», Commonwealth, 893 8.W.24 795 (Ky. 1995), overruled on other grounds (defendant
was drunk, speeding, on the wrong side of the road, and ran a red light); Estep v.
‘Commonwealth, 957 8.W.2d 191 (ky. 1997) (defendant was under the influence of five
different medications, speeding, and passing in a no-passing zone near a curve in a
‘two-lane highway); Love v. Commonwealth, 55 8.W.3d 816 (Ky. 2001) (defendant was
drunk, speeding, and, upon seeing a police vehicle blocking the road, attempted to
pass the police vehicle); Berryman v. Commonwealth, 237 8.W.3d 173 (Ky. 2007)
(defendant had trace amounts of Xanax in his system, was speeding, and was looking
at a package of prescription pills in his passenger's lap); and Stuss v. Commonwealth,
381 8.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012) (defendant was under the influence of four medications,
admitted using marijuana earlier in the day, was driving against the advice of the
doctor who prescribed the medication, and was passing vehicles in a no-passing zone).
{In addition, this Court has rendered a plethora of unpublished opinions affirming
similar cases,

 

 

8
striking a vehicle proceeding through the intersection, killing the driver. 174
S.W.3d 421 (Ky. 2005).
Wibbels contends that the above-noted casclaw indicates that a

 

conviction of wanton murder involving unintentional vehicular homicides
requires some form of aggravating conduct, such as intoxication, gun-fighting,
{gross inattentiveness, or racing. We noted in Brown that

[t]he Commentary to KRS 507.020 is instructive as to what type of

conduct might constitute aggravated wantonness: “Typical of

conduct contemplated for inclusion in ‘wanton’ murder is: shooting

into a crowd, an occupied building or an occupied automobile;

placing a time bomb in a public place; or derailing a speeding

locomotive.” KRS 507.020(1974 emt).
Id, at 426. “Each of these examples involves an activity that poses a high risk
to human life, undertaking in or directed toward a place where human beings
are present; yet none of them requires intoxication.” Id. Furthermore, none of
them require anything more than the following:

() homicidal risk that is exceptionally high; (i) circumstances

known to the actor that clearly show awareness of the magnitude

of the risk; and (ii) minimal or non-existent social utility in the

conduct. Such conduct plainly reflects more than mere awareness

and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of

death. It manifests a high disregard for life and evinces what the

‘common law chose to call a depravity of mind or heart.
Brown, 975 8.W.2d at 924 (quoting Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune,
Kentucky Criminal Law, § 8-2(c)(2), at 322 (1998).

‘The homicidal risk of driving back and forth between oncoming traffic
and the oncoming traffic’s emergency lane is extremely high. While drivers are
permitted to momentarily use the oncoming lane to overtake a slower moving

vehicle in front of them, passing in the oncoming traffic’s emergency lane is
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never permitted. In fact, the emergency lane is the one place on the road where

 

4 driver, confronted with a dangerous situation, secks safety from the other
lanes of travel. However, when the driver finds, rather than safety, another
vehicle driving head-on toward it at an excessive rate of speed, the homicidal
situation we find here is likely to occur.

‘Wibbels contends that he was not aware of the risk of driving in the
‘oncoming traffic's emergency lane. “The question of whether an actor knew or
‘Should have known the result he caused was rendered substantially more
probable by his conduct is an issue of fact.” KRS 501.060. The jury heard
testimony that, upon approaching an intersecting road while in the emergency
lane, he missed James Belt’s vehicle by feet, ‘The jury could certainly infer
from this near-miss that Wibbels, if not aware prior to this near-miss, should
have been aware that he could collide with another vehicle. The jury could also
infer that, by traveling at speeds of more than eighty miles per hour, Wibbels

 

another.

Wibbels argues that there was a social utility in his action: because he
could not return to his proper lane of travel, and traffic was oncoming, he was
forced to move to the oncoming emergency lane to avoid striking the other
vehicles head-on. However, the jury heard that: 1) Wibbels darted back and
forth more than once between the oncoming traffic lane and the oncoming
emergency lane; 2) he had multiple opportunities to return to his proper lane of
travel; 3) he did not decrease his speed but increased it to overtake additional

10
vehicles ahead of him; 4) he failed to come to a stop in the oncoming emergency
lane, despite ample opportunity to do 80; and 5) he stated to the first responder
that he drove in the emergency lane because he was “late and in a hurry.”
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a
reasonable juror could find there was minimal, if any, social utility in his
conduct.

We hold that it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find

 

bels guilty of wanton murder. For the preceding reasons, we affirm the
trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of
the Thompson family’s ill will toward Wibbels.

During his case-in-chief, Wibbels testified to being remorseful. On cross-
examination, the Commonwealth asked Wibbels about his remorsefulness:

‘Commonwealth: You said you're remorseful.

Wibbels: Yes.

Commonwealth: Real bad. Mr. Thompson has three children,
three grandchildren and a wife.

Wibbels: Yes.

Commonwealth: How many letters of remorse have you written
them?

Wibbels: None.

Commonwealth: None. How many times have you picked up the
phone and made a phone call and said, “I'm sorry"?

At this point, Wibbels objected. At the subsequent bench conference,

Wibbels’s counsel informed the trial court that it wished to introduce testimony

tT
that there was considerable animosity between Wibbels and Thompson’
family, and that members of Thompson’s family had attempted to assault
Wibbels outside the courtroom, Wibbels intended to offer this testimony to
explain why he had not written letters or made phone calls to the victim's
family. The trial court denied Wibbels’s request to introduce testimony of the
family’s animosity toward him and directed the Commonwealth to proceed:

Commonwealth: Mr. Wibbels, you ever pick up the phone and

say, “I'm sorry he’s not going to be there for Christmas or your

birthday"?

Wibbels: Excuse me?

Commonwealth: Did you ever pick up the phone and call one of,

them and say, “I'm sorry he’s not going to be there for your

birthday. He's not going to be there for Christmas”?

Wibbels: No, I have not done that.

During his redirect, Wibbels’s counsel again requested that the trial
court permit him to introduce testimony that, prior to trial, members of
‘Thompson's family surrounded Wibbels’s vehicle in the courthouse parking lot
and “beat, threw things on the truck, used profanity, and threatened to kill
him." The trial court, again, denied Wibbels's request. Wibbels then offered
testimony by avowal that he did not send letters or make phone calls to
‘Thompson's family because they had previously threatened him. Wibbels now
contends that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to present the subject-
testimony was an abuse of the court's discretion.

‘The standard for reviewing questions of the admissibility of evidence is,

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105

12
‘8.W.3d 430, 438 (Ky. 2003), “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.3d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999),

The trial court noted that the Commonwealth’s line of questions
regarding Wibbels’s remorsefulness was proper because Wibbels had testified
on direct that he was remorseful. Additionally, the trial court noted that
Wibbels’s requested testimony was more prejudicial'than probative. Under
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” However, “{alithough relevant, evidence may be
exchided if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
consideration of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
KRE 403.

‘The Thompson family’s ill will toward Wibbels was irrelevant because the
trial did not concern their state of mind. In fact, during the guilt phase of the
trial, only Wibbels’s state of mind at the time of the accident was at issue.
Whether Wibbels felt any remorse was an issue for the penalty phase. Thus,
the Thompson family’
any material fact in the matter more or less probable. Additionally, Wibbels

 

ill will toward Wibbels did not have a tendency to make

‘opened the door to that line of questioning when he testified to his

13
remorsefulness on direct examination. He cannot thereafter complain that the
‘Commonwealth walked through that door. Finally, we note that the jury
recommended the minimum sentence; therefore, evidence of Wibbels’s remorse
or lack thereof did not result in any discernable prejudice. As such, any error
by the trial court was harmless.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court in
this matter is affirmed.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Stefan Bing
Gess Mattingly & Atchison, PSC

William Gary Crabtree
Crabtree & Goforth

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

‘Andy Beshear
‘Attorney General of Kentucky

David Bryan Abner
Assistant Attorney General

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