Title: Commonwealth v. Miranda

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13225 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LAZARO MIRANDA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 9, 2022. - June 26, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, State of mind, Intoxication.  Mental 
Impairment.  Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Instructions to jury, State of mind, New trial, 
Transcript of evidence, Record, Stipulation. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 12, 1998. 
 
The case was tried before Charles T. Spurlock, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 30, 2012, was heard by 
Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for the defendant. 
Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury found the defendant, Lazaro Miranda, 
guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty for the death of twenty-seven year old Lisa 
McLester (victim).  She died from multiple chop wounds from a 
2 
 
machete.  No dispute existed at trial as to the defendant's 
actions causing the victim's death.  At issue, however, was the 
defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder.  The 
defendant appeals from his conviction and from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial. 
On direct appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge 
erred by not providing two instructions to the jury regarding 
mitigating circumstances despite trial counsel's objections.  
The trial judge did not instruct on sudden combat in his 
voluntary manslaughter instruction, nor did he specifically 
instruct on the defendant's mental impairment and intoxication 
in his instruction on murder in the first degree under a theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He did, however, provide a 
general instruction on intoxication and mental impairment 
negating knowledge or intent. 
Appealing from the denial of the motion for a new trial, 
the defendant argues that the judge who heard that motion 
(motion judge) erred in not granting a new trial because the 
defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the motion judge's reliance 
on a stipulated summary of a missing trial transcript from the 
day of trial that included the jury instructions.  Finally, the 
defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial or a 
reduced conviction to either murder in the second degree or 
voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
3 
 
We conclude that the trial judge did not err by omitting 
the defendant's requested instructions on sudden combat, but 
erred when he failed to instruct on the impact of mental 
impairment and intoxication on whether the defendant acted in a 
cruel or atrocious manner.  This error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Denson, 
489 Mass. 138, 144 (2022).  See Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 
Mass. 794, 799 (2011).  We therefore vacate the conviction of 
murder in the first degree and remand for further proceedings in 
which "the Commonwealth has the option of moving to have the 
defendant sentenced on the lesser included offense of murder in 
the second degree or of retrying the defendant for murder on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Id. at 800. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that 
the jury could have found at the defendant's trial, reserving 
certain details for our discussion of the legal issues. 
 
On the evening of December 29, 1997, Anna French was 
reading the newspaper in her first-floor unit in an apartment 
complex on Seaver Street in Boston.  Between 7 P.M. and 7:15 
P.M., she overheard two loud "thumps" coming from a bedroom in 
the apartment above hers, where the victim lived with the 
defendant and a four year old child.  She heard male and female 
voices, including a man yelling repeatedly, "Who are you 
fucking?"  She also heard the child crying. 
4 
 
Shortly thereafter, French heard the same voices in the 
first-floor hallway outside her apartment.  The man said, "I'm 
going to kill you.  Bitch, you're not dead yet?  You're still 
breathing?"  French also heard a repeated "swoosh sound, like 
something was swinging."  She entered the hallway and saw the 
defendant, whom she recognized as the man who lived in the 
apartment above hers.  Seeing French, the defendant said, 
"Bitch, you'd better go back in the house before I kill you, 
too," causing her to run back inside her apartment and lock her 
door.  She called 911 at 7:45 P.M.  While she waited for police, 
she heard someone "running on the stairs" and leaving the 
building. 
Boston police arrived at 7:48 P.M and found the victim 
unresponsive at the base of the stairs on the first floor.  
Blood had pooled in the foyer and at the stairwell and spattered 
the walls and stairs.  Emergency personnel transported the 
victim to a local hospital, where she was pronounced dead, 
having suffered multiple chop wounds to the head, resulting in 
several skull fractures, as well as similar wounds to the upper 
body.  At the apartment complex, investigators recovered four 
pieces of black plastic from the building's foyer and a sheathed 
machete from behind a bedroom door in the victim's apartment.  
Police did not detect within the apartment any evidence of 
blood, a struggle, or the consumption of alcohol. 
5 
 
Later that evening, police composed a photographic array 
that included the defendant's photograph.  From that array, 
French identified the defendant as "the man she saw in the 
hallway of the apartment building" earlier in the evening, who 
"lived upstairs with" the victim.  Officers began searching for 
the defendant at various addresses throughout Boston.  At 12:20 
A.M. on December 30, 1997, police apprehended the defendant, who 
was walking down Edinboro Street, carrying a sheathed machete 
with a broken handle.  Officers recited to him the Miranda 
rights both prior to putting him in the back of a police cruiser 
and again after securing him in the vehicle. 
At first, the defendant asked the officers, "Is she dead?"  
Despite an admonishment not to talk, the defendant declared, 
"[S]he shouldn't have been fucking around.  I told her about 
fucking around.  I'm deadly."  En route to Boston police 
headquarters, the defendant continued to inquire, unprompted, 
about the victim's physical condition.  To the officers, the 
defendant seemed calm and in good physical condition and did not 
appear intoxicated or impaired. 
After arriving at police headquarters, the defendant waived 
his Miranda rights, and a homicide sergeant detective 
interviewed him, first off tape and then tape recorded.  During 
the tape recorded interview, the defendant said that he was 
suspicious that the victim had been unfaithful to him.  Although 
6 
 
he denied arguing with the victim, when asked whether "she 
ma[d]e a move for" a machete found in the bedroom, the defendant 
responded, "Yes, she did."  When asked "if he was in fear of his 
life," he also replied in the affirmative.  Nevertheless, the 
defendant "refused to enter into any specificity surrounding the 
number of times [the victim] was struck or specificity as to how 
she obtained her injuries," but did "tak[e] responsibility for 
what occurred" and told the detective that "he should have the 
death penalty" for his actions.  At no point did the 
interviewing detective have the impression that the defendant 
was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and he did 
not appear intoxicated or impaired while at the police station. 
The Boston police crime laboratory conducted forensic 
testing on the machete confiscated from the defendant at the 
time of his arrest.  The machete and its sheath tested positive 
for human blood.  Forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis 
of the blood on the machete blade, and blood from the apartment 
complex entryway, matched the victim's DNA profile.1  The pieces 
of plastic recovered from the entryway of the apartment building 
also matched the broken handle of the machete.  Furthermore, 
following an autopsy, the medical examiner determined that the 
 
1 The director of the crime laboratory testified that the 
odds of such a match occurring in randomly selected unrelated 
individuals were between one in 5.9 million and one in 190 
million. 
7 
 
victim's injuries were consistent with wounds made by a machete 
and that "she died of multiple chop wounds to the head." 
b.  Procedural history.  A grand jury indicted the 
defendant on one count of murder in the first degree.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant filed a notice of an intent to rely on a 
defense of a lack of criminal responsibility or diminished 
capacity due to mental disease or defect.  After a trial in 
November of 2000, a jury convicted the defendant of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
The judge sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole, and the defendant timely appealed.  His 
appeal stalled for several years, however, pending the filing of 
three days of trial court transcripts, one of which was never 
recovered. 
In response, in 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial or, in the alternative, for a hearing pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 Mass. 74 (1978), to address the 
missing trial transcript for the appellate record.  After 
supervising the Harris reconstruction of the missing trial 
transcript, and participating in an evidentiary hearing, the 
parties were able to stipulate to facts recreating the substance 
of the missing transcript, which included testimony from one of 
the defendant's expert psychologist witnesses, the charge 
conference, the closing arguments, the jury instructions, and 
8 
 
the verdict.  Equipped with the reconstructed record, the motion 
judge ultimately denied the defendant's motion for a new trial 
in 2015. 
The defendant's appeal from that denial was consolidated 
with his direct appeal from his conviction.  We requested 
supplemental briefing to address the reconstruction of certain 
jury instructions given at trial, particularly the general 
instruction on intoxication and mental impairment. 
2.  Discussion.  We review "a direct appeal from a 
conviction of murder in the first degree along with an appeal 
from the denial of a motion for a new trial" together under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Denson, 489 Mass. at 144.  "In so doing, 
we review 'preserved issues according to their constitutional or 
common-law standard and any unraised, unpreserved, or unargued 
errors, and other errors we discover after a comprehensive 
review of the entire record, for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 
484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020). 
The defendant argues that the trial judge committed 
reversible error by failing to give the jury two instructions on 
mitigating circumstances.  He also argues that the motion judge 
erred by denying his motion for a new trial and that he is 
entitled to a new trial because he is prejudiced on direct 
appeal by the reliance on a stipulated summary of a missing 
9 
 
trial transcript that encompasses the trial judge's errant jury 
instructions.  The defendant also asks this court to order a new 
trial or reduce the verdict pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We 
address each issue in turn. 
a.  Jury instructions.  Per the parties' stipulation to the 
trial events of November 15, 2000, the trial judge instructed 
the jury on murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, murder 
in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense.2  
The parties agree that the judge used the model jury 
instructions in operation at the time of trial.3 
The defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the trial judge erred by declining to instruct the jury 
on voluntary manslaughter under a theory of sudden combat, and 
on the combined effects of mental impairment from mental illness 
and intoxication negating the intent or knowledge required for 
murder in the first degree under a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, which would have warranted a lesser conviction of 
murder in the second degree. 
 
2 The judge also specifically instructed on third prong 
malice for murder in the first and second degrees, to which the 
defendant objected but was overruled. 
 
3 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (1999). 
10 
 
i.  Voluntary manslaughter arising from sudden combat.  The 
defendant asserts that he was entitled to a jury instruction on 
sudden combat because, considering the facts in the light most 
favorable to him, the victim reached for the machete in the 
bedroom, causing the defendant to fear for his life, given that 
"the victim had swung her machete at him on at least one prior 
occasion and . . . cut him before."  She then swung this machete 
"at him a couple times, but did not touch him with it," before 
the defendant grabbed the other machete and chased her 
downstairs with it.  After the confrontation that resulted in 
her death, he immediately left the building.  The defendant 
requested, and then objected to the omission of, the sudden 
combat instruction,4 and so we review for prejudicial error, 
Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 678 (2019), by 
"inquir[ing] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error might have contributed to the jury's verdict" (citation 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019). 
"Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing arising not 
from malice, but from . . . sudden [heat of] passion induced by 
reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive 
force in self-defense" (emphasis added; quotation and citation 
 
4 The defendant's objection to the sudden combat instruction 
appears in the stipulation, which we accept as true, thereby 
preserving the issue on appeal. 
11 
 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 918 (2020).  
"In deciding whether an instruction is warranted regarding these 
mitigating circumstances, the evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the defendant."  Id., citing 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006).  Here, the 
trial judge instructed the jury on theories of reasonable 
provocation and excessive force in self-defense but not on 
sudden combat, which the defendant had requested.5  Having viewed 
the evidence "in the light most favorable to the defendant," 
Richards, supra, we conclude that the trial judge did not err by 
not giving the sudden combat instruction. 
Consistent with more than one and one-half centuries of our 
jurisprudence, sudden combat entails two persons "meet[ing], not 
intending to quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise," leading 
to "blows . . . on both sides, without much regard to who is the 
assailant."  Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018), 
 
5 In their briefs, the parties frequently conflate 
reasonable provocation with sudden combat or merge the two into 
one instruction ("reasonable provocation by sudden combat") when 
they are two separate but related instructions, as we discuss 
infra.  "Reasonable provocation encompasses a wider range of 
circumstances likely to cause an individual to lose self-control 
in the heat of passion than does sudden combat. . . .  Thus, it 
is more accurate to view sudden combat as a form of reasonable 
provocation."  Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018).  
See Richards, 485 Mass. at 919-920 (concluding that trial judge 
erred in not offering reasonable provocation instruction when 
victim stabbed defendant in chest, and thus, not needing to 
reach question whether sudden combat instruction was also 
required). 
12 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 308 (1850).  The 
victim making physical contact with the defendant is necessary, 
but not sufficient, for a sudden combat instruction.  Howard, 
supra at 58-59 & n.7 (2018) (citing several cases).  Even when 
the victim attacks or "strike[s] a blow against the defendant," 
however, such contact is not always enough to warrant the 
instruction.  Id. at 58, quoting Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 
Mass. 687, 697 (2008). 
Regardless of the theory evoked, a voluntary "manslaughter 
instruction is not warranted when the defendant 'cooled off' and 
'regained a measure of self-control' before attacking the victim 
(citation omitted)," Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 136 
(2012), or where the defendant and victim are separated for a 
few minutes following the provocation "and then the defendant 
seeks out the victim (citation omitted)," id. at 136-137.  Both 
reasonable provocation and sudden combat instructions require 
evidence that 
"raises a reasonable doubt that something happened which 
would have been likely to produce in an ordinary person 
such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous 
excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection or 
restraint, and that what happened actually did produce such 
a state of mind in the defendant" (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 
Richards, 485 Mass. at 918 (reasonable provocation).  Accord 
Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980) (sudden 
combat). 
13 
 
First and foremost, the defendant admitted that the victim 
struck no blow against him; he had no physical injuries 
whatsoever.  Cf. Howard, 479 Mass. at 58-59 & n.7.  Secondly, 
although the conflict began in the apartment, the defendant 
chased the victim into the common hallway of the apartment 
building and downstairs into the foyer, where she was killed, 
leaving him ample time to regain a measure of self-control.  See 
Richards, 485 Mass. at 919; Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 136.  Indeed, 
the victim's machete was found sheathed behind a bedroom door.  
We therefore discern no error in rejecting a sudden combat 
instruction. 
ii.  Mental impairment and intoxication.  Our evaluation of 
the adequacy of the jury instructions on mental impairment and 
the effects of the consumption of alcohol is complicated by the 
missing transcript, which included testimony from one of the 
defendant's key mental health experts, as well as the jury 
instructions themselves.  We have at our disposal the joint 
stipulation of the parties; the proposed jury instructions 
submitted by each party, with annotations, where trial counsel 
"checked off" what the trial judge delivered and noted certain 
omissions or objections; and transcripts from the 2015 
evidentiary hearing and status conference at which appellate 
counsel discussed transcript reconstruction efforts with the 
14 
 
motion judge.  We have also requested, and have been provided, 
supplemental briefing. 
Based on this information, we know that the judge relied on 
the 1999 model jury instructions, in effect at the time of the 
defendant's 2000 trial, when he gave an instruction.  We also 
know that the trial judge properly instructed on lack of 
criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect.  
Furthermore, in his instruction on murder in the first degree 
under a theory of deliberate premeditation, he instructed as 
follows: 
"In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation and that he specifically intended to kill 
[the victim], you should consider all the credible evidence 
relevant to deliberate premeditation and intent to kill, 
including any credible evidence of the defendant's alleged 
mental impairment on the day in question" (emphasis added). 
 
There is also no dispute that the judge gave a "general 
instruction on intoxication" as it relates to proof of knowledge 
and intent. 
 
What persists are two distinct issues:  first, whether the 
judge, when he gave a "general instruction on intoxication," as 
framed in the stipulation, also instructed on mental impairment; 
and second, whether the judge gave an instruction on mental 
impairment and intoxication specific to murder in the first 
degree under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
15 
 
 
A.  Supplemental instruction on mental impairment negating 
knowledge and intent.  The 1999 model jury instructions provide 
for a supplemental instruction regarding mental impairment and 
intoxication as it applies to proof of knowledge or intent. 
"Whenever the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's 
intention to do something, you should consider any credible 
evidence of [mental impairment] [the effect on the 
defendant of his consumption of (alcohol) (drugs) (alcohol 
and other drugs)] in determining whether the Commonwealth 
has met its burden of proof.  Likewise, whenever the 
Commonwealth must prove the defendant's knowledge of any 
facts or circumstances, you should consider any credible 
evidence of [mental impairment] [the effect on the 
defendant of his consumption of (alcohol) (drugs) (alcohol 
and other drugs)] in determining whether the Commonwealth 
has met its burden of proof." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 (1999).  Based on the 
representations of the parties in their principal and 
supplemental briefs, and the record before us, we conclude that 
the trial judge properly gave the model instruction, employing 
the language on "mental impairment" and "the effect on the 
defendant of his consumption of alcohol." 
Discussing the general intent instruction, the stipulation 
notes: 
"The judge did not use the specific language as noted in 
defense counsel's motion for jury instructions, 
specifically regarding the jury's consideration of any 
credible evidence of mental impairment in conjunction with 
his consumption of alcohol and/or drugs.  Defense counsel 
had requested said language and objected when said 
instruction was not given." 
 
16 
 
Based on all this information, the Commonwealth contends 
that the judge gave the model instruction, including referencing 
both mental impairment and the consumption of alcohol, and only 
declined to incorporate the defendant's specific language about 
"mental impairment in conjunction with the consumption of 
alcohol," which sought to add to the jury's consideration the 
effects of the combination of impairment and intoxication.6  The 
defendant, although less than clear, has not challenged this 
interpretation, but instead focuses on the specific supplemental 
instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty, discussed infra.7  We 
 
 
6 The defendant requested the following instruction as 
paragraph fifty-four of his proposed jury instructions: 
 
"Whenever the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's 
intention to do something, you should consider any credible 
evidence of mental impairment, the effect on the defendant 
of his consumption of alcohol, drugs, or alcohol and other 
drugs, as well as his mental impairment in conjunction with 
the consumption of alcohol, drugs[,] or alcohol and drugs, 
in determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden 
of proof.  Likewise, whenever the Commonwealth must prove 
the defendant's knowledge of any facts or circumstances, 
you should consider any credible evidence of mental 
impairment, the effect on the defendant of his consumption 
of alcohol, drugs, or alcohol and other drugs in 
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of 
proof."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
This paragraph was not checked off, indicating that it was not 
given, and it includes a handwritten annotation about an 
objection, which was denied, next to the second sentence of the 
proposed instruction, which was underlined. 
 
7 At oral argument, the defendant clarified his position on 
asserting that the judge erred in failing to give a mental 
 
17 
 
conclude that the judge gave the general instruction, including 
the language on mental impairment, and need not have given the 
defendant's requested instruction regarding the combination of 
mental impairment and intoxication, as the defendant did not 
present evidence on such combined effects. 
"A judge is not required to give jury instructions in the 
exact manner requested by the defendant provided that the 
requested instruction is adequately covered."  Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 466 Mass. 268, 284 (2013).  Because the judge generally 
gave the model instructions, and the issue of the defendant's 
mental health was front and center at trial, we conclude that 
the Commonwealth's reading is supported by the record in the 
instant case.  We also conclude that, because the expert 
evidence primarily focused on the defendant's mental illness and 
did not address the effects of alcohol on the defendant's mental 
illness, as specifically requested by the defendant, the 
supplemental instruction on mental impairment and intoxication 
was sufficient as to general knowledge or intent. 
"To be entitled to an instruction on mental impairment, a 
defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such 
impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020), 
 
impairment and intoxication instruction to negate extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
18 
 
citing Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 680-681 (1980).  As 
to evidence of mental impairment, the defendant presented 
testimony from two expert witnesses:  a clinical psychologist, 
Dr. Stephanie Brody, who conducted four hours of cognitive and 
personality testing on him several months prior to trial, but 
more than two years after the murder; and a forensic 
psychologist, Dr. Ronald Ebert, who examined the defendant on 
five separate occasions between May of 1998 and June of 2000. 
Regarding the defendant's cognitive functioning in April of 
2000, Dr. Brody determined that he performed "at a borderline 
level of intellectual ability," with "significant impairment 
. . . in concentrating, highly concrete thought process, and 
. . . significant psycho-motor slowing."  She also thought that, 
based on indications of disorganized thinking, he may be 
suffering from major depression, but, regardless, his cognitive 
abilities had been persistently below average on these metrics 
that remained stable over time. 
With regard to the defendant's personality profile, Dr. 
Brody testified to evidence of "psychotic depression," marked by 
"intense [dysphoria], mood shifts," as well as "problems with 
concentration" and "managing and coping with intrusive 
19 
 
thoughts."8  She also noted that the defendant "ha[d] difficulty 
controlling the experience of emotion," known as "eruption of 
affect," during testing.  Nevertheless, she noted that she had 
"no knowledge . . . of how [the defendant] was functioning prior 
to" her testing him in April of 2000, or thereafter.  Dr. Brody 
also presented no testimony regarding the effects of alcohol on 
the defendant's mental illness.  In fact, she testified that she 
had "no personal knowledge as to whether the defendant abused 
alcohol," including on the night of the victim's death. 
 
It was Dr. Ebert's opinion that the defendant suffered from 
major depression with psychotic features and that such illness 
was present at the time of the murder.  As recounted in the 
stipulation, he determined that, 
"[a]lthough [the defendant] has not offered significant 
details of his mental state during the incident to his 
examiner, his description (and that of others) of his 
drinking and his depression in the time immediately 
preceding the event raises significant question concerning 
his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law at the time of the incident due to the existence of 
both a mental disease (depression) and a mental defect 
(effects of alcoholism)" (emphases added). 
 
 
8 The defendant's mother also testified that, prior to the 
killing, the defendant had problems sleeping and was "hearing 
things," and that he seemed "very depressed" to her. 
 
20 
 
The defendant also told Dr. Ebert that he had "been drinking 
heavily during the day of the killing."9  Dr. Ebert concluded 
that the defendant's "psychological state and his intoxication 
very likely interfered with the normal functioning of his mind 
at that time," including "that his ability to plan and 
premeditate his actions would have been severely impaired at 
that time."10 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
Richards, 485 Mass. at 918, this evidence described the 
defendant as suffering from mental disease -- major depression 
with psychotic features -- and mental defect -- effects of 
alcoholism -- while also drinking alcohol on the night of the 
killing but did not address how the defendant's purported 
intoxication on that day would have affected his mental disease 
or defect.  As given by the trial judge, the model supplemental 
instruction on mental impairment and intoxication as to general 
knowledge or intent tracked the evidence.  The jury were free to 
 
9 In further support of the defendant's contention that he 
was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the killing, 
the defendant called his stepfather and mother as lay witnesses.  
They testified that, at around the time of the murder, the 
defendant drank alcohol routinely.  His stepfather further 
testified that, when he saw the defendant after the killing that 
same night, the defendant's breath smelled of alcohol. 
 
10 Dr. Ebert believed that the defendant presented signs of 
"organic damage secondary to substance abuse" supporting 
"evidence of mental illness of psychotic proportions." 
21 
 
consider mental impairment or intoxication and were not 
precluded from considering both.  The trial judge was not, 
however, required to instruct on the combined effect as there 
was no expert testimony in this regard.  We discern no error. 
B.  Mental impairment and intoxication affecting extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Per the stipulation, the trial judge 
"instructed the jury on murder in the first degree on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," as well as murder in the second degree, using the 
model instructions.  Based on the Commonwealth's proposed 
instructions for murder in the first degree, all of which were 
checked off as having been given, and the parties' 
representations in their briefs, the trial judge instructed on 
mental impairment as to the defendant acting with deliberate 
premeditation: 
"In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation and that he specifically intended to kill 
[the victim], you should consider all the credible evidence 
relevant to deliberate premeditation and intent to kill, 
including any credible evidence of the defendant's alleged 
mental impairment on the day in question" (emphasis added). 
 
The supplemental instructions in effect in 1999 also included 
similar language regarding "[Whether the defendant acted in a 
cruel or atrocious manner in causing the death of the deceased]" 
(emphasis added).  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 62 
22 
 
(1999).  This instruction, we conclude, was not given, for the 
reasons stated infra. 
 
Paragraph fifty-five of the defendant's requested 
instructions included the relevant language.  Neither party 
contends that the trial judge gave this supplemental instruction 
regarding whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious 
manner, nor is there any indication, in the stipulation or 
supplemental briefing, that the defendant objected to the 
failure to give this instruction regarding murder in an 
extremely cruel or atrocious manner.11 
 
The defendant argues, in his principal and supplemental 
briefs, that the trial judge committed a reversible error by not 
instructing the jury on the defendant's alleged mental 
impairment and intoxication to negate the intent or knowledge 
required for a finding of murder in the first degree under a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  In response to this 
argument, the Commonwealth points only to the defendant's 
 
11 Where the stipulation discusses the defendant's 
objections to the omission of jury instructions, the stipulation 
cites to paragraphs fifty-four, which contains the defendant's 
requested language on the combined effects of mental impairment 
and alcohol, and fifty-six, which provides:  "I reiterate, 
whenever the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended 
to do something, or had knowledge of certain facts or 
circumstances, in order to prove the crime, you may consider any 
credible evidence of mental impairment, the consumption of 
alcohol, drugs or alcohol and drugs in determining whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the defendant's 
intent or knowledge." 
23 
 
objection, as noted in the stipulation and annotations to his 
proposed jury instructions, to the trial judge not instructing 
using the language he requested on the combined effects of 
mental impairment and intoxication, an issue we addressed supra.  
The Commonwealth provides nothing affirmatively suggesting that 
the judge gave the instruction. 
We read the record, including the stipulation, and 
supplemental briefing as demonstrating that the judge gave a 
general instruction on mental impairment and intoxication as to 
intent and knowledge, but did not give the defendant's requested 
supplemental instruction on mental impairment and intoxication 
negating whether he acted in an extremely cruel or atrocious 
manner, and that the defendant did not object to the omission of 
this supplemental instruction.  Because the defendant did not 
object, we review this unpreserved issue "for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (quotations omitted).  
Denson, 489 Mass. at 144, quoting Upton, 484 Mass. at 160.  "For 
an error to have created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, it must have been 'likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Upton, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 768 (2018).  Accord 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799. 
When warranted by the evidence, we have long required a 
mental impairment instruction specific to whether the murder was 
24 
 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty -- in addition to, or 
apart from, that given generally on intent and knowledge.  See 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 798 n.3, 799 (explaining distinction).  
We have done so even though extreme atrocity or cruelty does not 
require a finding of intent separate from the malice 
aforethought required for murder, Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 
Mass. 216, 227 (1983), modified by Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 
Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020), because mental impairment also 
relates, in this context, to the jury's function in serving as 
the "community's conscience," Cunneen, supra at 228, quoting 
Gould, 380 Mass. at 685.  To understand this requirement and its 
proper application, we must review several cases decided by this 
court, beginning with Gould and concluding with Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410 (2014). 
As the court in Gould, 380 Mass. at 685, explained:  "It is 
the teaching of our cases that the jurors 'as the repository of 
the community's conscience, [must] determine when the mode of 
inflicting death is so shocking as to amount to extreme atrocity 
or cruelty" (citation omitted).  This is because mental 
impairment "bears on personal turpitude, and the law, if it is 
to maintain the community's respect, must grade its condemnation 
according to the moral turpitude of the offender as the 
community evaluates it" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
at 686.  More specifically, "if a malicious mind may be 
25 
 
considered as evidence that a defendant committed a murder with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, then fairness requires that an 
impaired mind may also be considered as evidence" on this same 
question.  Id. at 684-685.  As they are acting as the conscience 
of the community in deciding whether a murder was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, the jury should, therefore, be 
instructed to consider evidence of mental impairment on the 
specific question of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Id. at 685-
686.12 
 
We further clarified this requirement, and the analysis 
underlying it, in Cunneen.  We began by explaining that "[w]e 
adhere to our view that proof of malice aforethought is the only 
requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder in the first 
degree based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty."  Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  Then, after 
"delineat[ing] a number of factors which a jury can consider in 
deciding whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," id.,13 we confirmed that Gould also established that "a 
 
12 We applied our reasoning on mental impairment in Gould to 
the jury's consideration of evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication as to extreme atrocity or cruelty in Commonwealth 
v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649 (1982), S.C., 424 Mass. 1019 
(1997). 
 
 
13 In Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227, we listed the factors as 
including "indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's 
suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim, 
 
26 
 
defendant's impaired mental capacity is an additional factor 
which the jury should consider in determining whether the murder 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty," id. at 228.  We 
again specifically referenced in our reasoning the jury's 
responsibility to reflect "the community's conscience, goals, 
and norms" in this determination.  Id., quoting Gould, 380 Mass. 
at 685. 
We reiterated this reasoning in Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 
445 Mass. 837, 846-847 (2006), after our approval of and 
recommendation to use the 1999 model jury instructions on 
homicide that are at issue in this case.  In so doing, we 
 
extent of physical injuries, number of blows, manner and force 
with which delivered, instrument employed, and disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed."  We 
modified the so-called Cunneen factors in our recent decision, 
Castillo, 485 Mass. at 865-866.  There, we concluded that, "[t]o 
find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a defendant caused the death of the deceased with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, future juries must consider the following 
three evidentiary factors":  "whether the defendant was 
indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering of the 
deceased"; "whether the defendant's method or means of killing 
the deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or 
prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased"; and "whether 
the means used by the defendant were excessive and out of 
proportion to what would be needed to kill a person."  Id. 
 
 
This clarification, designed to prevent a jury from finding 
"extreme atrocity or cruelty based only on the degree of a 
victim's suffering," rather than in reference to the "extreme 
nature of the defendant's conduct," id. at 865, does not change 
our historical analysis of the purpose and need for the mental 
impairment instruction for extreme atrocity or cruelty -- to 
serve as the conscience of the community, as explained supra. 
27 
 
explained that the language of the model jury instructions was 
"consistent" with Cunneen and its clarification of Gould: 
"[W]hile reduced mental capacity is relevant to the jury's 
exercise of their broad discretion as a reflection of the 
community's conscience, there is no greater mens rea 
required for murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty than 
there is for murder in the second degree, and the crime 
does not require that the defendant be aware that his acts 
were extremely cruel or atrocious." 
 
Id. at 848-849. 
 
All this sheds light on our somewhat abbreviated discussion 
in Rutkowski.  In that case, the defendant, after "present[ing] 
expert psychiatric testimony that included," in part, "a review 
of her long history of mental illness," Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 
796, and her "diagnoses that included psychotic depression," 
requested an instruction on mental impairment regarding extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, id. at 797.  The judge, however, 
"instructed on mental impairment only as it related to intent 
and knowledge."  Id.  We concluded that this was error.  Id. at 
799. 
 
As explained in Rutkowski, and more clearly in its progeny, 
"there is no greater mens rea required for murder by extreme 
atrocity or cruelty than there is for murder in the second 
degree," Oliveira, 445 Mass. at 848, as "[t]he Commonwealth need 
not prove that . . . the defendant intended to inflict 
extraordinary pain, or that [he or] she knew that [his or] her 
acts were extremely atrocious or cruel" (citation omitted), 
28 
 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 798 n.3.  Therefore, as the court in 
Rutkowski held, "It should have been made clear to the jury that 
they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the 
specific question whether the murder was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty."  Id. at 798.  As it was not, and the 
"evidence of the defendant's mental impairment [was] significant 
and . . . a critical aspect of [the] defense, the failure to 
instruct the jury that they could consider evidence of that 
impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
effectively removed what may have been [the] only viable defense 
to the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Id. at 799.  
The court, therefore, upheld the verdict, but only as to murder 
in the second degree.  Id. at 800. 
 
We found a similar error in Gonzalez.  There, "the 
defendant stabbed his girl friend multiple times" at his 
apartment "[i]n the early morning hours of February 15, 2009," 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 411, after an evening of steady drinking, 
id. at 412, and was convicted of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, id. at 411.  The jury 
received instructions on "murder in the first degree on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, as well as the lesser included offenses of murder in 
the second degree and manslaughter."  Id. at 421.  The judge 
also instructed on the impact of intoxication on the defendant's 
29 
 
intent but "did not instruct the jury that they could consider 
any credible evidence of the defendant's consumption of alcohol 
in determining whether the defendant committed the killing with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Id., citing Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 
at 798.  Because of the "strong evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication at the time of the killing," Gonzalez, supra at 
423, "[t]he absence of such an instruction was error," even 
where the jury received the instruction on intent, as "the 
judge's instructions . . . would have been understood by the 
jury to relate only to the elements of premeditation and malice, 
and not to whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," id. at 422, citing Rutkowski, supra at 797-799. 
 
Given this long line of cases, we conclude that, here, the 
judge clearly erred in failing to give an instruction on mental 
impairment as it related to extreme atrocity or cruelty, see 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 421-422; Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 797-799, 
especially considering the "strong evidence," discussed supra, 
of the defendant's mental impairment on the night of the 
killing, see Gonzalez, supra at 423. 
 
"We turn now to whether the error in the jury instructions 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 422.  There is no doubt that the victim's 
manner of death -- multiple chop wounds from a machete -- is 
horrific.  In Gonzalez, the Commonwealth argued "that there was 
30 
 
no substantial likelihood" of a miscarriage of justice based on 
"the number of stab wounds the defendant inflicted on the victim 
and her degree of suffering," but we concluded that such an 
argument "overlook[ed] the rationale for the jury instruction."  
Id.  A proper instruction ensures that the jury's verdict 
"reflect[s] the community's conscience in determining what 
constitutes an extremely cruel or atrocious killing" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 422-423.  This instruction entitles the jury 
to take into account the defendant's significant mental 
impairment, even in brutal murders, and adjust their degree of 
condemnation based on their consideration of the mental 
impairment.  See Gould, 380 Mass. at 686. 
 
Here, we have another factor to consider.  The jury did not 
convict the defendant of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of deliberate premeditation where they received a 
specific instruction to consider mental impairment, but they did 
convict him on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty where 
such an instruction was omitted.  Under these circumstances, in 
the absence of the required instruction, "we cannot say that 'we 
are substantially confident that, if the error had not been 
made, the jury verdict would have been the same'" (citation 
omitted).  Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423.  See Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 
at 799 ("We cannot say that this error did not likely influence 
the jury's verdict").  This error, therefore, created a 
31 
 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Gonzalez, supra; Rutkowski, supra. 
 
We turn now to the disposition of the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree.  "The distinction 
between the two degrees of murder is that murder in the first 
degree is a murder committed with deliberate premeditation, or 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime punishable with imprisonment for 
life," Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 296 n.4 (1992), 
whereas murder is "the killing of a human being, with malice 
aforethought," G. L. c. 277, § 39.  "Murder which does not 
appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second 
degree," G. L. c. 265, § 1, meaning murder in the second degree 
is a "lesser included offense" of murder in the first degree, 
see Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 421; Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800. 
 
"Because the error affected only the jury's finding 
regarding the element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and did 
not affect the jury's finding regarding the elements of murder 
in the second degree," Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423, "[w]e discern 
no error in the jury's verdict as to murder in the second 
degree," Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.  Similarly, in 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 649 (1982), S.C., 424 
Mass. 1019 (1997), we concluded that, while the judge erred in 
not instructing the jury on intoxication with respect to extreme 
32 
 
atrocity or cruelty, "[t]he jury's verdict [still] established 
that the defendant was guilty of murder," as "[t]here was ample 
evidence to support" it.  Here, apart from failing to instruct 
the jury to consider mental impairment for the purpose of 
atrocity or cruelty, the judge otherwise properly instructed the 
jury on intent and malice, and the other elements of murder in 
the second degree, and there was ample evidence to support such 
a verdict. 
 
In such cases, "we have the option of directing a reduction 
in the verdict to murder in the second degree rather than 
ordering a new trial."  Commonwealth v. Lennon, 399 Mass. 443, 
449 (1987).  "We will normally exercise that option where the 
Commonwealth has requested . . . that we do so, rather than 
grant a new trial at which the Commonwealth might prove murder 
in the first degree."  Id. at 450.  Because the Commonwealth has 
not made that request in this case, "on remand, the Commonwealth 
has the option of moving to have the defendant sentenced on the 
lesser included offense of murder in the second degree or of 
retrying the defendant for murder on the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty."  Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.  Accord 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423. 
b.  Motion for a new trial.  "'A motion for a new trial is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,' who may 
grant a new trial 'if it appears that justice may not have been 
33 
 
done'" (alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 Mass. 
597, 600 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 
664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).  "We review a 
decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of 
discretion," ascertaining whether the denial "resulted from 'a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives.'"  Jacobs, supra, quoting L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  "Where a judge 
conducts an evidentiary hearing, we 'accept the judge's findings 
where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record'" 
(alteration omitted).  Jacobs, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 540 (2021). 
The defendant argues that, if his claims fail on appeal, 
then the motion judge committed reversible error by not granting 
him a new trial, because the trial transcript was inadequate to 
support his appeal and he was "entitled to a per se new trial 
where the Commonwealth as responsible for loss of the 
transcript."  We address each contention in turn. 
i.  Adequacy of record.  "[A] defendant is entitled to a 
record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration 
of his claims.  However, this does not translate automatically 
into a complete verbatim transcript" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 577-578 
34 
 
(2018).  "A new trial will not be granted 'unless the trial 
proceedings cannot be reconstructed sufficiently to present the 
defendant's claims.'"  Id. at 578, quoting Harris, 376 Mass. at 
78.  As we have repeatedly held, "a statement of agreed facts" 
as an "alternative method[] of reporting the trial proceedings" 
is "constitutionally adequate if [it] bring[s] before the 
appellate court an account of the events sufficient to allow it 
to evaluate the defendant's contentions."  Imbert, supra, 
quoting Harris, supra at 77. 
As in Imbert, 479 Mass. at 579, "the defendant does not 
present a specific dispute over [the] contents [of the 
reconstruction] relating to any claim of error," other than 
claiming that not prevailing here means the stipulation has 
failed him.  But this assertion begs the question.  The 
defendant conceded at the evidentiary hearing in front of the 
motion judge that "the record has been reconstructed adequately 
to present the appellate issues," going so far as to say that 
the reconstruction efforts were "extremely successful."  From 
September of 2005 to March of 2015, appellate counsel worked 
diligently to reconstruct the record based on trial records and 
notes, as well as a joint conference with trial counsel and the 
prosecutor.  We discern no reversible error in the motion 
judge's determination that the reconstructed record was adequate 
for appeal. 
35 
 
ii.  Responsibility for loss of transcript.  The defendant 
renews an argument that he made at the evidentiary hearing on 
the reconstructed transcript:  that we should extend our ruling 
in Harris by requiring a per se new trial where the Commonwealth 
is at fault for the missing transcript and that, here, the 
Commonwealth includes a court reporter and clerk's office staff.  
We decline to do so. 
In Harris, 376 Mass. at 74, "the stenographic notes of the 
trial . . . had been stolen from the court reporter's car," and 
yet, we did not find that the Commonwealth was at fault for the 
missing transcripts.  Similarly, here, one of the court 
reporters "left her job with the Commonwealth, without having 
transcribed . . . three days of the [d]efendant's trial."  The 
trial court's administrative office intended to have this 
stenographer's tapes transcribed by a different court reporter, 
but "the tapes could not be located."  Four years after these 
inquiries, a clerk of the court found two of the three days of 
transcripts and shared them with defense appellate counsel.  
Based on these facts, we decline to extend Harris in this 
instance. 
We do not identify any abuse of discretion by the motion 
judge, and so the motion for a new trial was properly denied on 
these grounds. 
36 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no 
other basis for further relief. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the 
conviction of murder in the first degree and remand for the 
Commonwealth to move either for sentencing on a conviction of 
murder in the second degree or for a new trial on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  We affirm the denial of the 
defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial on the grounds 
presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.