Title: Weaver v. Laundon

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

186 Kan. 551 (1960)
352 P.2d 412
MATTIE WEAVER, Appellant,
v.
T.C. LAUNDON and W.E. LAUNDON, Co-Partners d/b/a The Copes, Appellees.
No. 41,570

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 14, 1960.
Raymond Briman, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Lester M. Goodell, Margaret McGurnaghan, Marlin S. Casey, Thomas R. Sewell, Gerald L. Goodell, Charles Rooney, Sr., and Charles Rooney, Jr., all of Topeka, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Harold E. Doherty, of Topeka, argued the cause, and James E. Benfer and William B. McElhenny, both of Topeka, were with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she slipped and fell to the floor in the defendants' business premises. Appeal has been perfected to this court from an order of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence.
The questions presented are whether, at the time the plaintiff's (appellant's) fall to the floor of the defendants' (appellees') business premises, there was any evidence from which a jury could find that (1) the plaintiff was a business invitee; (2) the defendants were guilty of any act or acts of negligence; and (3) the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.
On the 23rd day of November, 1955, at approximately 10:00 a.m., the appellant, Mattie Weaver, and her husband took eighteen live turkeys to the appellees' business establishment, a poultry processing business known as The Copes in Topeka, Kansas. Arrangements *552 for the processing had previously been made. The appellees agreed to dress and process the turkeys and put them in plastic bags.
After accepting the appellant's turkeys, the appellees gave the appellant and her husband a bill for their services which included charges for the dressing, processing and packaging of the turkeys, as well as a charge for the plastic bags in which the turkeys were to have been packaged by the appellees. The appellees promised to have the appellant's turkeys processed and packaged in the plastic bags by 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., that same day.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., on November 23, 1955, the appellees' employees finished dressing the appellant's turkeys and placed them in appellees' cooling vat which was situated in the rear portion of the appellees' business building in a room called the "killing room." The appellant's husband, who had waited at the appellees' premises all afternoon, then testified as follows:
The appellant's husband then drove his automobile to his daughter's home in Topeka, picked up the appellant and returned to the appellees' business premises. The appellant and her husband then entered the appellees' "killing room" through an unlocked door situated in the rear portion of the appellees' business building. The appellant's husband had previously seen other customers enter the `appellees' "killing room" through the same door that day.
Only one of the appellees' employees was in the "killing room" at this time. His name was Royce Vaughn and he testified by deposition that all processing and dressing of poultry at the appellees' business building was performed in the "killing room," and that there was an outside entrance into this room for customers to use to bring in poultry for the purpose of having it processed. *553 He further testified that as a result of killing the poultry there would be large quantities of blood on the floor which was cleaned with a broom and water. The room was washed down with water pressure from a hose, and it was his job to do this cleaning.
Mr. Vaughn then testified:
"Q. Is that T.C. Laundon?
"Q. Did you leave her there with him?
The appellant's husband testified that he went from the "killing room" to the office of the appellees, in the front portion of the building, to get the plastic bags, and that he told Mr. Laundon, one of the appellees who was present in the office, that "we were going to bag the turkeys." He testified that after picking up the plastic bags from the appellees' office, he took them back to the "killing room." He testified:
When the appellant's husband returned from his car to the "killing room" he saw his wife lying on the cement floor of the "killing room."
Concerning the accident Mr. Vaughn testified that at the time he was wearing rubber boots and the appellant was wearing street *554 shoes, and that the floor of the "killing room," made of concrete, was definitely wet at the time she fell. He testified:
The appellant testified that Mr. Vaughn:
The appellant was immediately taken to Stormont-Vail Hospital and upon removal of her clothes it was noticed that she had blood on the outside of her skirt and hose although she herself was not bleeding. The appellant testified:
"Q. Torn?
..............
"Q. Were you bleeding?
"A. I was not."
Upon interrogation Mr. Vaughn testified that:
Mr. Vaughn further testified:
"Q. And for what purpose did they do that?
*555 There is no evidence in the record to indicate that either of the appellees told the appellant to leave the "killing room" at any time. Nor does the record disclose that the appellant was given a direct warning at any time of the slippery condition of the floor. No signs were posted either prohibiting the customers from entering the "killing room" or warning them of the dangerous condition of the floor.
As a result of the appellant's fall she underwent surgery the following day and was physically unable to return to her work for approximately nine months.
At the conclusion of the appellant's evidence the trial court sustained the appellees' demurrer to the evidence, holding that the appellant was a mere licensee and that the evidence failed to show any negligence on the part of the appellees. By reason of the demurrer the appellant's evidence has heretofore been related most favorably to her.
We shall first consider whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the appellant was a business invitee at the time of her fall to the floor on the appellees' business premises.
The parties concede that ordinarily the only duty a business proprietor owes to a mere licensee is the duty to refrain from willfully, intentionally or recklessly injuring him. (Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236.) It is also conceded to be a well-established rule that a business proprietor owes a duty to business invitees to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and to safeguard such invitees by warning them of dangerous places in the premises. (Bessette v. Ernsting, 155 Kan. 540, 127 P.2d 438; Steinmeyer v. McPherson, supra; Little v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P.2d 1022, and cases cited therein.)
Viewing the appellant's evidence as on demurrer, by applying the well-recognized rules of construction for purposes of demurrer (See, Bessette v. Ernsting, supra) to which further reference is unnecessary, we find little difficulty upon the foregoing evidence in concluding there was abundant evidence from which a jury could find the appellant was a business invitee on the premises of the appellees at the time and place where she fell.
In Thompson v. Beard and Gabelman, Inc., 169 Kan. 75, 216 P.2d 798, this court stated:
On the evidence presented by the record the appellees agreed to perform the work of packaging the turkeys for a stated consideration, which was paid. The business was for the economic benefit of the appellees as well as the appellant. (See, Bessette v. Ernsting, supra.) The appellant and her husband were led by the acts or conduct of the appellees to believe that the use of the premises for the purpose of packaging their turkeys was in accordance with the design for which the place was adapted and for which they permitted it to be used in mutuality of interest. Under these circumstances the appellant's invitation to use the "killing room" is implied. (See, De Soto Auto Hotel v. McDonough, 219 F.2d 253.)
We hold there was ample evidence from which a jury could find that the appellees expressly or impliedly invited or induced the appellant to enter the "killing room" and that the appellant was a business invitee.
Does the appellant's evidence, as viewed on demurrer, establish negligence on the part of the appellees?
The appellant in her petition alleges that she was injured as a result of the appellees' negligence:
The discussion on this point will be confined to whether the appellees owed a duty to the appellant to warn her of the dangers created by the wet and slippery floor in the "killing room."
From the evidence heretofore related it is apparent the appellant fell on a pool of blood and water on the floor of the "killing room." outside the entrance to the cloak room, which had been allowed to remain on the floor by the appellees and their employees. By reason of the appellant's fall she severely injured herself. It is also apparent the appellees and their agents had actual knowledge of the fact that blood was splattered on the floor of the "killing room" and that, even though water had been used to clean the floor, it remained slippery. The employee, Mr. Vaughn, testified he was wearing rubber boots and that he purposely let the appellant "walk *557 next to the wall, where I felt, you know, under the circumstances, the wet floor, she wouldn't be apt to slip." Mr. Vaughn also testified that "on dozens of previous occasions" other customers had walked across the floor of the "killing room" to the closet where the appellant fell, and that he had first cautioned some of them that the floor was slick and might cause a fall because of the blood on the floor.
The court is of the opinion that the question of the appellees' negligence in failing to warn the appellant of the slippery condition of the floor in the "killing room" is one to be determined by the jury upon all the evidence presented. (Thogmartin v. Koppel, 145 Kan. 347, 65 P.2d 571; Walker v. S.H. Kress & Co., 147 Kan. 48, 75 P.2d 820; Little v. Butner, supra; and see, Bury v. Woolworth Co., 129 Kan. 514, 283 Pac. 917.)
Was the appellant guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law?
It was at the direction of the appellees' employee, Mr. Vaughn, that the appellant walked across the floor of the "killing room" to the closet where she hung her coat. Following his directions she placed her coat in the closet, turned, took one step outside the closet and fell on the dangerously slick floor. Conceding the appellant knew that the floor in the "killing room" was wet and that there was blood on the floor, it does not follow that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In Nave v. Hixenbaugh, 180 Kan. 370, 304 P.2d 482, the plaintiff brought an action for damages sustained when her skirt ignited while she was standing in front of a stove in the defendant's filling station. In answer to special questions, the jury found that the unsafe condition of the defendant's stove would have been visible to the plaintiff had she looked before backing near it, but that plaintiff exercised reasonable care for her own safety. The defendant contended that the court erred in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant for the reason that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because she would have seen the dangerous condition had she looked. In denying the defendant's contention it was stated:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that the question of a plaintiff's contributory negligence must be submitted to the jury if the facts are such that reasonable minds in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions thereon. (Cane v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909; and Thompson v. Barnette, 170 Kan. 384, 227 P.2d 120.) On the evidence presented by the record herein reasonable minds might reach different conclusions on the question of the appellant's contributory negligence.
In conclusion it is held the trial court erred in sustaining the appellees' demurrer to the appellant's evidence.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.
SCHROEDER, J., (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds there was evidence from which a jury could find that the appellees were guilty of negligence. In my opinion there was no evidence from which a jury could find that the appellees were negligent.
The only allegation of negligence in the appellant's petition, concerning which the evidence might be considered debatable, is the allegation that the appellees failed to warn the appellant of the dangers created by the wet and slippery floor.
The evidence indicates that the appellant was told that her coat would be splattered with blood and water if she left it in the "killing room," and that the employee in the "killing room" was not through cleaning at the time she entered. This was a normal *559 condition in the "killing room." This was the place where poultry was killed and blood as a matter of course splattered on the floor. She had taken her turkeys to the appellees for the purpose of having them dressed, and being from a farm near Carbondale where she and her husband raised chickens and turkeys which they sold to stores and individuals, it may be fairly assumed she was fully aware that dressing poultry was a messy affair.
When the appellant was asked what kind of a dress she was wearing, she answered:
On cross examination the appellant testified:
There is no evidence whatever that there were any defects in the floor of the "killing room" on the appellees' premises, nor does the appellant so contend.
In Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236, the court said:
The proprietor of a store is not an insurer of his customers against injury, but is chargeable only with such care as is reasonable under the circumstances. (Thompson v. Beard and Gabelman, Inc., 169 Kan. 75, 216 P.2d 798.)
The duty of care owed to business invitees who used the appellees' "killing room" is not equivalent to, or the same as, the duty of care owed to business invitees who enter a grocery store for the purpose of buying groceries as illustrated in Little v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P.2d 1022. A case in point is George v. Ayesh, 179 Kan. 324, 295 P.2d 660, where a salesman called on the defendant, a liquor dealer, for the purpose of selling him merchandise. He went into the back room where the liquor was stored and fell, tripping over *560 a cardboard filler. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence and this court affirmed, saying:
In my opinion the appellees owed no duty to the appellant to keep their floor in the "killing room" dry and free from blood and water. It was a normal condition to have blood and water on the floor of the "killing room." The appellant knew the floor was wet. She was told by the employee in charge that he had not completed cleaning the floor, and that her coat would become splattered with blood and water if she hung it in the "killing room." Knowing the condition of the room and the purpose for which it was used, any further warning to the appellant by the appellees would have been superfluous. She therefore entered this room at her own risk and the appellees had no further duty to warn the appellant of the condition of the floor in the "killing room."
It is respectfully submitted the trial court did not err in sustaining the appellees' demurrer to the appellant's evidence.
PARKER, C.J., and PRICE, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.