Title: Minnich v. Administrative Director of the Courts. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 01/05/2006 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 01/17/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘***FOR PUBLICATION**

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

---000:

 

DAVID C. MINNICH, Petitioner-Appellant

 

vs, 3
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, ==> =
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent Appellee S

=
&
c

No. 27068

60:01h

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. JRO4~0027)

DECEMBER 19, 2005

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
We hold, in this appeal by Petitioner-Appellant David
C. Minnich (Petitioner), from the December 20, 2004 judgment of
the district court of the first circuit’ (the court) affirming
the October 4, 2004 decision of Respondent-Appellee
State of Hawai'i

Administrative Director of the Court:

(Respondent),* that (1) Freitas v. Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108

 

5 The Honorable David C. Low presi

 

Hawai" Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2918-1 (Supp. 2004) states that,
“ipirector’ means the administrative director of the courts or any other
Person within the judiciary appointed by the director to conduct
honinistrative reviews of hearings or carry out other functions relating to
(cont inved.

 
‘***FOR PUBLICATION**

Hawai'i 31, 116 P.3d 673 (2005) (hereinafter, Freitas IL), and
Dunaway v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i 78, 117 P.3d

109 (2005) apply, and as to issues not decided by those cases,
(2) the provisions under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2918-
3(a) and (c) (Supp. 2004)? apply to administrative revocation of
driver's License proceedings, (3) evidence of a defendant's
blood-alcohol level obtained from a blood alcohol chemical (BAC)
test more than three hours after an alleged violation is relevant
but must be offered in compliance with the Hawai'i Rules of
Evidence (IHRE) as prescribed under HRS § 291E-3(c), and (4) the
Director was right in concluding that irrespective of
Petitioner's BAC test result, the remainder of the evidence
supported the conclusion that Petitioner was operating his
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). In
Light of our holding, we vacate the Director's finding that the
three-hour time frame for drawing a blood sample under ARS
§ 2918-3 applies only to criminal prosecutions, but affirm the
court’s judgment.
1.
on Septenber 5, 2004, Petitioner was arrested in

Honolulu, Hawai'i, for DUI, in violation of HRS § 291E~61(a)

 

+1. .continued)
Administrative revocation under part III (entitled ‘Administrative Revocation
Process']." See Adin, Dir of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i 114, 115

el, 26 Pi3d 1214, 1215 nt (2001), Hereinafter, “Respondent” is used
interchangeably to designate the adninistrative review officer and the he
officer.

 

ring

>The texts of those provisions are produced intza.
2
‘**FOR PUBLICATION*®

OE"
(Supp. 2004)," after a motor vehicle he was driving collided with
a median guard rail and after he failed the field sobriety tests.
Subsequently, Petitioner consented to and failed a BAC test.
Petitioner’s driver’s license was revoked and the revocation was
sustained for a period of three months by @ review officer of the
Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO) on
September 10, 2004. Petitioner requested a hearing within six
days of the revocation pursuant to HRS § 2916-37 (Supp. 2004)*
and the hearing was scheduled on September 29, 2004.

on the day of and prior to the hearing, two wonen came

into the ADLRO and asked to attend Petiticner’s hearing. The

‘HRS § 2918-61 (a) (Supp. 2004) provides in pertinent part:

Operating a vehicle under the infivence of an
Antoxicant. (a) A person commits the offense of operating
Vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person
operates oF assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:

(1) hie’ under the influence of alcohol in an
anount sufficient to inpair the person's normal
ental faculties or ability to care for the
Person and guard against casvaltys

 

a) | With .08 or more grams of alcohol per one
hundred miliiiiters or cuble centimeters of
Bloods

HRS § 2916-37 (Supp. 2004) provides in pertinent part:

Adainistrative review; procedures; decision. (a) the
director automatically shali review the issuance of notice
of administrative revocation and shall issue a written
decision adsinistratively revoking the license and privilege
to operate a vehicle, and motor vehicle registrarion tf
applicable, or rescinding the notice of administrative
Fevocat ion.

{i the respondent shail have the opportunity to
demonstrate in writing Why the respondent's License and
privilege to operate a vehicle  . . should not be
Sdninistratively revoked and, within three days of receiving
the notice of administrative revocation... . shell submit
any written infornation . .-. to the director's office er to
any Office or aadress designated by the cirecter for that

purpose.
3
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION**
women refused to follow the ADLRO’s sign-in and identification

procedures, stating that to do so would violate their privacy.
‘The women offered to be searched instead, but were not granted
entry.

During the hearing, Petitioner, through his counsel,
contended that, under this court’s decision in Freitas v. Admin.
Dix. of the Courts, 104 Hawai'i 483, 489, 92 P.3d 993, 999 (2004)
{hereinafter Freitas I), he was entitled to a hearing on the
validity of the ADLRO security procedures.

over Petitioner’s objections, the hearing officer

ceived most of the ADLRO file into evidence, including the

 

Honolulu Police Department (HPD) 396B Implied Consent Form (HPD
3968 form), the arrest report, the Standardized Field Sobriety
Test (SFST) results, and the sworn statements of the arresting
officer and BAC test technician. The arrest report indicated
that Arresting Officer Miya Brouwer (Officer Brouwer) was sent by
dispatch at approximately 10:35 p.m. and that she arrived at the
scene at about 10:40 p.m.

‘The hearing officer then advised Petitioner that he
could begin his presentation and that the hearing was conducted
de nove, to which Petitioner objected.

Petitioner requested that a particular procedure be
followed.‘ The hearing officer stated that she was not required
to follow Petitioner's requested procedure.

+ the written procedure proposed by Petitioner is identical to the

hearing procedure requested in Dunaway v, Admin. Dir
Mewai's 78, 61 9.5, 117 P34 103, 112 9.5 (2005)

 
S*8FOR PUBLICATION*® =
Officer Brouwer was then called to testify. officer

Brouwer testified that she was personally supervised by her
training officer, Officer Mei King (officer King). Officer
Brouwer related that this was the third arrest she had made for
DUI. When they arrived at the scene of Petitioners accident,
another police officer, Officer Eric Lorica (Officer Lorica), was
already present. Officer Brouwer noted that Petitioner's vehicle
had sustained front end damage from having hit a guardrail of an
on-ramp from Kamehameha Highway to the H-1 freeway and that the
damage to the vehicle was severe. Officer Brouwer did not know
how much time had elapsed between the time of the accident and
her arrival.

After questioning Petitioner for approximate ten

 

minutes, at approximately 10:50 p.m., Officer Brouwer jan to
administer the SFSTs because of Petitioner's appearar-» and the
‘odor of alcohol on his breath. While Petitioner’s eves were not
red or bloodshot, Officer Brouwer observed the to be glassy and
Officer Lorica reported then to be “watery and jlassy.” Officer
Brouwer conceded that a driver would be “shaken up” in an
accident such as this one.

Officer Brouwer administered the SFSTs on the freeway.
The ground was level and the street was damp as it had begun to
drizzle, The three SFSTs are (1) the walk-and-turn (WAT),
(2) the one-leg stand (OLS), and (3) the horizontal gaze

nystagmus (HGN). Officer Brouwer administered all three tests to

Petitioner. Officer Brouwer admitted to not knowing how the
5
++#*P0R PUBLICATION**

 

accident affected Petitioner's performance on the SFSTs, although
Petitioner was observed to be, and clained that, he was fine.

During his cross examination of Officer Brouwer,

Petitioner's counsel referred to a manual entitled pI Detection

4 Su riety 1 nt Manual, 2002
ed., published by the National Highway Traffic safety
Administration (NHTSA). The manual provides instructions for
adninistering SFSTs. The WAT instructions state, that the “[w]alk
and [turn test requires a designated straight line and should be
conducted on a reasonably dry, hard, level, nonslippery surface.”
officer Brouwer was not trained at the police academy to
administer the WAT on an actual line and she did not do so with
Petitioner. Officer Brouwer also admitted that the surface
“might” have been slightly slippery fron the drizzle, but not
wet. The OLS test instructions in the manual provide that the
*fo]ne-leg-stand requires a reasonably dry, hard, level and non-
slippery surface, suspect's safety should be considered at all
times.” Officer Brouwer noted that the ground was level and that
it had started to drizzle at the tine she administered the OLS to
Petitioner.

In connection with the HGN test, the manual contained
an illustration of a protractor device which aids a police
officer to estimate a forty-five degree angle required for the
test's accuracy. Officer Brouwer had never seen the device
before and had not used it in her training. Officer Brouver was
taught it was important to be able to identify a forty-five

6
‘**#FOR PUBLICATION**

SSS

degree angle when administering the HGN, and although she did not
use a protractor to do so, she employed an alternative
technique.” Petitioner asserted that all three SFST results wer
inadmissible because the tests were not administered in
accordance with NHSTA standards.

‘The record indicated that Petitioner was arrested and
consented to a BAC test. The BAC test registered .23 grams of
alcohol per hundred milliliters or cubic centimeters of blood.
Between the time of his arrest and the time a blood sample was

taken, Petitioner did not consume any food or beverage.

 

* nar lefice® Brouwer explained the technique she was trained to perform
for estimating the required forty-five degree angle for an HON test:

 

If T walk up to the person and 1 place my hands on
their shoulders and I position myself so that the maddie of
ny body is lefe ‘sige ang T extend ay
hhand, if 1 step back and extend ay hand to the fullest
Jength that it'can go, thse is approximately fal forey-five
gree angle.

   
 

 

 

 

* Rs § 2926-3 (supp. 2004) provides, in relevant part

Evidence of intoxication. (2) In any criminal
Prosecution fora violation of section 2918-61 or 291E-61.5

or in-anv proceeding under part JIT:
(0) 08 or sore arans of alcohol per one hundred
z ore ent one
bloods
hin three’ hours a

‘shown by chemical analysis or other approved analytical
Eechaiques gf the person's blood, breath, or urine shal) be

 

saucer ei eat olatien

om in ction be cos 2
iti i, in any criminal proceeding for a
Wolation under section 2516-61 or 291E-61.5 or in ae

proceeding under part IIL, of relevant evidence ofa

three hours after an alleged viclations oreeiies she
SPiceigengs Oeste in comoldance-adsh the aavali rules

(Bmphases added).
‘**FOR PUBLICATION**

 

Betitioner objected when Respondent adnitted the BAC test results
into evidence, arguing that under HRS § 2916-3, such results are
adnissible without further evidence only if the blood 4s drawn
within three hours of the alleged violation, Petitioner clained
that Because there was no evidence to indicate the time at what
any alcoholic beverage was consuned and the time of the
collision, the SAC test results vere inadmissible. The hearing
officer found that the three-hour Limitation pertained to
criminal prosecutions and that because the ADLRO process is a
civil adninistrative proceeding, the three-hour Limit did not
apply.

Petitioner then made the following objections: (1) he
vas denied his own hearing on the ADLRO security procedures:
(2) a valid breath or BAC test is a jurisdictional requizenent
for administrative revocation and, given the absence of a tine
frame for the accident, the AUIRO does not have jurisdiction;
(3) the Notice of Administrative Revocation (Notice) ie voi
because the arresting officer failed to properly inform
Petitioner of the implied consent laws (4) while Petitioner was
informed that he had consented to a BAC test by driving, he was
not informed that he had a legal right to refuse such a test;
(5) the Notice fails to explain the distinction between
administrative revocation and criminal suspension pursuant to HRS
§ 2918-34 (a) (2) (Supp. 2004); (6) the HPD 396B form

(a) erroneously notified him that the only igeue in an
‘**FOR PUBLICATION**

ee a

administrative revocation was whether the result of the BAC test

 

was .08 or over or the test was refused, and (b) erroneously
advised him that the minimum length of revocation {s three months
when HRS § 286-104(1) (Supp. 2004) mandates a minimum revocation
of one years and (7) that the form misled him to believe that the
State of Hawai'i could revoke his New York driver's license.
I

By a decision dated October 4, 2004, the hearing
officer sustained the three-nonth revocation of Petitioner's
deiver’s License. The hearing officer made the following

relevant findings and conclusions:
4. Validity of the sesr.

‘he Arresting Officer testified that: she could not

igentify the manual proferred by Counsel;

 

 

tgaduioieter the SrSt, she adninistered the test in

ance with her training, and, 2
Snr gataeamare a patentee oe cor ie 2d net auaaeas
Les. This hearing officer finds that the IPetitionet s
SPST was properly adninistered,

 

given with consideration given to Counsel's arguments

about the administration of the SFSS, the remainder of she’
‘SEST and the evidentiary record contain anificient

information ude a ie
Antoxicant.
7. Blood Test

he Tecord reflects that the Arresting Officer was
dispatched to the scene of the MVC on SEPTEMBER 5, 2004
30:38 P.M., the [Petitioner] was arrested at 11:10 Pelle, and
that the (Petitioner]'s blood sample was drawn at 12/35 A-M.
fon SEPTEMNER 6, 2004, “If the MVC had occurred close to an
hour prior to dispatch, the Blood sample nevertheless would
have been timely drawn,
ret noe en er on

 

FORTHER FINDINGS OF FACT RELATING TO LICENSE REVOCATION
9. Wni1e Speaking to the [Petitioner], the Arresting
9
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20

16.

n

18

30!

‘Beversue coming fron the [Petitioner]’s breath.
Fhe Arresting Officer further observed other physical
Signe of possible intoxication: The {petitionerl*s.

ool and slurred bie worda.
Tne (petitioner) adaitted that he had consumed ,
alcoholic beveracse

ne (Petitioner) showed signs of immaizment opal
rental Gane HG)
Phase of the FST.
During the walk-and-turn phase of the SPST, the
sera

‘ampaizment
Baring the one-leg-stend phase of the SFST, the

Een -eeconds, and that phase of the test was
Siecontinued for the (Petitioner]"s safety.
[Petitioner] showed significant signs of impairment on
the Srst

Pot an sleoholic

‘Petitionerl's breath. and noted that the [petitioner]
ues unsteady, is eves mere Groopy, and Nis speech was
‘low and deliberate.

She Aasiating Officer observed that the [Petitioner
gs very unsteady on his feat, that he stumbled twice

‘seunbles

‘incst falling, and continued te almeat (ai) uring
‘fhe sduinteteation of the SPST

he testing equipment used to conduct the blood test
functioned in accordance with operating procedures,
and the test result showed 8

‘Sonsentzation of .23on thet test.

‘CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO LICENSE REVOCATION

2

“

‘Ihe Director concludes there existed erobable cause to
believe shat the (fetitioneri operated the vehicle

aisle under the Influence of an intexicant:
The Director concludes, by a preponderance of the
evisence, that

The Olrector concludes that the [Petitioner] had an
Bleohol concentration, as defined by HRS S291E-1, of

08 or wore.

‘he Dizector separately and independently concludes,

by 2 preponderance of the evidence, that irrespective

of the (Petitionsri"s lorizontal Gaze vstaamis Test
C'WoN"y test result, the cenainder of the record

‘the
“hile under the infloence of an intoricant.
The Oirector separately and independently concludes,
by 2 preponderance of the evidence, that irrespective
of the petitioneri's blood test cesuit, She remainder

piele

 

10
+*#FOR PUBLICATION**

 

(Emphases added.) Petitioner sought Judicial review and the
court affirmed the hearing officer in a judgment filed on
December 20, 2004.

mt.

On appeal, Petitioner essentially argues that (1) the
court erred in holding that Petitioner's state and federal
constitutional rights to 2 public hearing were not violated with
respect to (a) restrictions on public access to his ADLRO hearing
and (b) his right to his own hearing on the validity of those
restrictions; (2) the court erred in upholding the hearing
officer's findings that (a) HRS § 2916-3, which states that a BAC
test taken within three hours of the alleged violation is
competent evidence of DUI, has no application to administrative
revocation proceedings and that (b) Petitioner had driven his car
within three hours of his BAC test when there is no evidence in
the record to support this finding; (3) the court erred in
upholding the admission of the SFST results when (a) the SFTSs
were not administered in accordance with NHTSA requirements and
(b) the SFSTs were administered after Petitioner had been
involved in a major car accident; (4) the court erred in ruling
that Petitioner had not been denied due process of law based on
(a) a seeming contradiction in HRS § 291E-38(a) which declares
the revocation hearing will “review the (administrative review)
decision” yet allows motorists to call witnesses and offer

evidence, suggesting that the hearing is de nove, (b) the lack of

a
‘**FOR PUBLICATION*#

a uniform hearing procedure, (c) the admission of Respondent’ s
entire file, (d) Respondent's adherence to Desmond v. Admin. Dir.
of the Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 219, 982 P.2d 346, 353 (App. 1998)
(hereinafter, Desmond I) (holding that hearing officers should
inform the parties of the procedures at the beginning of the
hearing), rev'd on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301, 978 P.2d 739
(1999), and (e) the apparent disregard of 2 HRS § 291E, Part IIT
procedure which, according to Petitioner, requires a valid
chemical test result or refusal to confer jurisdiction on
Respondent; (5) the court erroneously upheld the revocation
because HPD 3968 form (a) informed Petitioner that operating a
vehicle on a public street meant that he had consented to a blood
or breath test, but failed to tell him he had a right to withdraw
that consent, (b) implied that the only issue in an
administrative revocation is whether a test is over .08 BAC or is
refused, and (c) misled Petitioner into believing that the State
of Hawai'i had jurisdiction to revoke Petitioner's New York
driver's license; and (6) Respondent reversibly erred in citing
to unpublished district court decisions to justify her decision.
wv.

At the outset, we note that several of Petitioner's
arguments have been raised before. Arguments 4(a), 4(b), 4(c),
4(d), 4(e), S(a), (5) (b), and 6 have been disposed of contrary to
his position. See Freitas Il, supra, and Dunaway, supra.

Accordingly, we consider Petitioner's remaining arguments.

2
‘***POR PUBLICATION*®
Ss
ve

‘This court has established the scope of appellate

review of a decision by the ADLRO:

Judicial review of a decision of the DLrector
regarding the revocation of a driver's license ia governed
Dy HRS 266-260, and is linited to the record of the
adainistrative hearing and the questions whether the
Director exceeded constitutional of statutory authority,
erroneously interpreted the law, acted in en arbitrary oF
Capricious manner, committed an abuse of discretion, or made
a Getermination thet was unsupported by the evidence in the
recors.

 

 

leview of a decision made by (a) court upon its review
of an [administrative] decision iz 2 secondary appeal. The
Stondard of review is one in which this court must determine
nether the court (under review] was right or wrong in its
decision!.1”

Famer v. Adnin, Dir, of the Court, State of Hawai'i, 94 Hawai'i

232, 236, 11 P.3d 457, 461 (2000) (internal quotation marks and

   

 

 

 

citations omitted).
vr.

‘As to argument (1) (a), we have held that restrictions

 

fon the right to a public hearing must comport with the three-part
test adopted by this court in Freitas 1.’ Following our holding
in Exeitas I, a majority of this court affirmed the validity of
the Respondent's sign-in and identification requirement for

members of the public who wish to attend a license revocation

 

proceeding. Freitas II, supra.
+ ___.The three-part test is as follows: (1) that the regulation serve

fan important governsental interest; (2] that this interest be unrelated to the
Content of the information to be disclosed in the proceedings and [3] thet
there be no less restrictive way to meet that goal,” fraitas

104 Hawai'i 483, 489, 52 P.34 995, 999 (2008) {adopting the
Test as outlines in Brow amse, Corp rage Comm'n, 710

F.2g 116, 1179 (6tn cir. 1583) (citing United States Votre See,

367, 377 {1968))) (emphasis emitted).

  

 

 

13
‘+*#FOR PUBLICATION**

 

As to Petitioner's argument (1) (b) that under Freitas 1.
he is entitled to his own hearing on the validity of the
restrictions, we have held that under the déctrine of stare
decisis a new hearing on the sane issue is unnecessary in a case
involving similar circumstances, noting that Freitas II acted as
precedent. Dunaway, 108 Hawai'i at 83, 117 P.3d at 114. Here,
Petitioner argues that he was entitled to, but denied, @ hearing
fon the ADLRO security procedures. Wwe hold, however, that the
consent of @ member of the public to be searched in these
circunstances does not obviate the Freitas II requirenents.

In Exeitas II, a majority concluded *(1) that the
ADLRO’s identification and sign-in procedure serves an important
government interest in securing ADLRO hearings, (2) that the
security procedure is unrelated to the content of the information
disclosed at ADLRO hearings, and (3) that there is no less
restrictive way to meet the goal of securing ADLRO’s hearings.”
Exeitas Il, 108 Hawai'i at 37, 116 P.3d at 679. The basis for
the majority's holding in Freitas II stemmed from the
Respondent's findings in that case that the measures were
instituted as a deterrent to people engaging in “unlawful,
disruptive, or otherwise inappropriate behavior while within the
hearing and inner-office area,” id, at 34, 116 P.3d at 676, and
that the measures were established to “provide a deterrent to
inappropriate behavior(,]” dd. at 37, 126 P.3d at 679. The

Exeitas Ii majority found that the procedures in question were

4
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*+

the least restrictive means of securing hearings. Id, at 40, 116

 

P.3d at 682. Petitioner does not raise any arguments to warrant

 

deviation from that finding. A consensual search would not be
less restrictive than the current sign-in and identification
procedure.

vir.

In argument (2) (a), Petitioner asserts that the court
erred in upholding the hearing officer's ruling that HRS § 291E-
3(a) (1) does not apply to administrative driver's license
revocation proceedings. Part III of HRS chapter 291E is entitled
“Administrative Revocation Process.” Hence, a plain reading of
the statute indicates that the phrase “any proceeding under Part
III” refers to administrative license revocations. State vs
Tovomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995) (stating
that “where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous,
our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious
meaning”). We hold, then, that the court erred in upholding the

hearing officer's ruling that HRS § 291£-3(c) applies only to

 

criminal prosecutions and has no application to ADLRO cases.
vant.
Petitioner next asserts in argument (2) (b) that because
there was no evidence that the BAC test was taken within three

hours of his driving, the BAC test was not competent evidence

 

and, thus, was inadmissible under HRS § 291£-3(a) (1). He argues

1s
‘+##F0R PUBLICATION**

 

that because the hearing officer relied on this BAC test result,
his revocation should be reversed."

As indicated, see supra note 8, HRS § 291E-3(c)
provides that “{nJothing in this section shall be construed as
Limiting the introduction . . . in any proceeding under Part 111,
of relevant evidence of a person’s alcohol concentration . .
obtained more than three hours after an alleged violation;

.d that the evidence is of a wi
Hawaii mules of evidence.” (fmphases added.) Hence, HRS § 2918-
3(c) permits a BAC test result taken more than three hours after
an alleged violation to be introduced as evidence so long as it
is relevant and not excluded by the Hawai'i Rules of Svidence.
However, we need not decide this issue.
mK.

For, irrespective of Petitioner’s 0.23 BAC test result,
the record contains substantial evidence to support the
conclusion by the hearing officer that Petitioner was DUI. See
State v, Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992)
(defining “substantial evidence” as “credible evidence which is
of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a man of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion”). The accident took
place on a highway at the entrance to a major freeway. Officer

Brouwer arrived at the scene at 10:45 p.m., within five minutes

 

Respondent contends, however, that under HRS $ 2916-3(a) (1)

(Supp. 2004), "2 BAC test taken “within three hours; .". shall be competent
euigencs.” (Emphases added.) the parties co not challenge the admission of
the BAC test ‘on this ground.

 

16
‘***FOR PUBLICATION**

SSS

of being dispatched. There is no evidence of any significant
delay between the time of dispatch and the time of the accident.
The SFSTs were administered within ten minutes of Officer
Brouver’s arrival. Petitioner does not contend that he consumed
alcohol after the car accident.

Petitioner admitted that he had consumed alcoholic

beverages. Petitioner also had glassy eyes, @ strong odor of

 

alcoholic beverage on his breath, and slow and slurred speech.
Officer Brouwer asked Petitioner if he was injured, and
Petitioner replied that he was not, and that he was fine. This
forecloses Petitioner’s suggestions that the accident had an
effect on the SFSTs. During the SFSTs Officer King observed
Petitioner to be unsteady on his feet, and that he stumbled twice
and almost fell. Officer Brouwer had to discontinue the OLS for
Petitioner’s safety.

Petitioner's objections to the WAT stems from his claim
that the test was not administered on an actual straight line and
that the ground was wet. His objections to the OLS also relates
to his contention that the ground was wet. Officer Brouwer,
however, disclaimed that the ground was wet but did admit that it
had started to drizzle. Petitioner's objection to the
administration of the HGN test was that the police failed to use
a protractor. However, Officer Brouwer testified that she was
trained to identify the same forty-five degree angle in an

alternative manner.

v7
‘+##F0R PUBLICATION**

The hearing officer further found that Officer Brouwer
was qualified to administer the SFSTs, that she administered the
test in accordance with her training, and that she had the
benefit of the oversight of Officer King, her training
supervisor. Under the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that
the hearing officer abused her discretion in receiving evidence
regarding the SFSTs. Miller v. Tanaka, 80 Hawai'i 358, 366, 910
P.2d 129, 137 (1995) (holding that “the Director's decision to
receive evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion”).

Petitioner argues that many other jurisdictions have
rejected such circumstantial evidence as insufficient to prove
that the driver was intoxicated at the time he or she was
operating the vehicle. See Abelson v. State, 604 S.£.2d 647 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2004); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 652 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994); State v. Clark, 296 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1972). However,
Respondent stresses that the cases cited by Petitioner are
criminal cases which are subject to a “beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.” In contrast, HRS § 91-10 (1993) titled
“Administrative Procedure, Rules of Evidence; official notice,”
Provides that “(5) [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the
party initiating the proceeding shall have the burden of proof,
including the burden of producing evidence as well as the burden
of persuasion. The degree or quantum of proof shall be a

preponderance of the evidence.”

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Respondent emphasizes that the preponderance of the
evidence standard merely requires that it be demonstrated that it
was “more likely than not” that Petitioner was operating his
vehicle at the time he was intoxicated. This court has held that
“the preponderance standard directs the factfinder to decide
whether the existence of the contested fact is more probable than
its nonexistence." Masaki v. Gen, Motors Corp,, 71 Haw. 1, 14,
780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the evidence adduced outside of the BAC test result, ve
conclude that the hearing officer and the court did not err in
finding that it was more probable than not that Petitioner was
intoxicated during the relevant time period. Castro v. Admin,
Dix. of the Courts, 97 Hawai'i 463, 40 P.34 865 (2002) (holding
that a driving under the influence charge may be proved or an
administrative license revocation may be sustained by relevant
evidence of intoxication, even though a driver’s blood alcohol
concentration level is not considered).

x.
In argument (5) (c) Petitioner contends that HPD 3968

form misled him into believing that the State of Hawai'i had

 

jurisdiction to revoke Petitioner's New York driver's lice
He maintains that because he believed a refusal to take the test
would lead to a revocation of his New York license, his consent

to the blood test was not informed consent. Petitioner claims

1s
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that his license revocation should be reversed as a remedy.
However, Petitioner must demonstrate how HPD 396B form
suggested that his New York’s driver's license would be revoked

Af he refused to take 2 test or if he took a test and failed it.

 

In State v. Rodgers, 99 Hawai'i 70, 70-71, 53 P.3d 209, 209-10
(2002), we rejected a motorist’s argument that her consent to the
chemical alcohol test was not knowing or intelligent because the
form did not define “prior alcohol enforcement contact.” We
noted that nothing before the court “explains why or how .

[the petitioner] could have been misled into attributing the
various interpretations she offers to the relevant term.” Id. at
75, $3 P.3d at 214. That proposition applies here.

The form does state the consequences for refusing to
take a test if his or her driving record shows prior alcohol or
drug enforcement contacts. The forn’s definition of “alcohol
enforcement contact” or “drug enforcement contact” includes “(al
conviction in any other state . . . for an offense that is
comparable” in its definition of “alcohol enforcement contact.”
But the record does not indicate that Respondent has any prior

alcohol enforcement contacts that would lead him reasonably to

 

u  Bubsee Yoslimy v, Sroderick, 91
999, 1003-04 (App. 1998) (holding that an arr
indicate that the notice of adeinistrative revocation shall 2%
temporary driving permit ae mandated by statute does not neces
reversal of 8 license revocation)

 
  
 

 

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a SSSSSSSSSSsSSsSSSSSSSSS

believe that the provision applied to him and, hence, that his
New York license could be revoked.

Respondent correctly notes the form does not mention
New York, but states only that the motorist’s “license and
privilege to operate a vehicle will be revoked.” As Respondent
maintains, “the form states at the outset that the information
on the form is provided ‘{pJursuant to chapter 2918, Hawai'i
Revised Statutes,/” in bolded letters. Hence, as Respondent
contends, “[bJecause the events occurred in Hawas"i,” “the
‘License and privilege’ that will be revoked can reasonably be
interpreted to reference only the motorist’s license and
privilege in Hawai'i, not in other states.” Moreover, the
language of the form focuses on this state. Under a reasonable
interpretation, then, HPD 3965 form applies only to revocation of
the right to operate a vehicle in Hawai'i and does not convey a
different meaning, as Petitioner contends. As such, we are not

persuaded by Petitioner’s argument (5) (c).

the form states in part:

1, Any person who operates a vehicle upon @ public way

a (It is untawfut for you to operate a vehicle
on or in the waters of the state
8.”  Fatcohol enforcement contact” or “drug enforcement
id} ” Any conviction in this state
(Emphases added.)

 

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on tne beiate 2

Attorney General, state Recut Cretan a7 oo
of Hawa, for

respondent-appellee. a <

Conc. Dettar te