Title: BRAULICK v HATHWAY MEATS INC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA TIMOTHY SCOTT BRAULICK, Plalntiff and Respondent, V. HATHAEAY MEATS, INC., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Kenneth R. Ne~ll, Judge presiding. COLWSEL OF RECORD: For z4ppellant: Jeffrey T. McAllister, Conklin, Nybo, Le-veque & Lanning, P.C.; Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: J. Kim Schulke; Linnell. Newhall. Martin & Schulke, P C ; Great Falls, Montana Filed: Submitted on Briefs: January 23, 1999 Decided: Mruch 23. 1999 Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion ofthe Court. 71 Hathaway !Meats9 Inc., appeals from the S3l$M judgment entered against it after a jury in the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, found for Hathaway's former employee, 'I'imorhy Scott Braulick, in this wrongful discharge action. We affirm. 72 ,I The i s s ~ ~ e is whether the District Court ened in denying Hathaway's motions for judgment as a matter of law and submitting the case to the jury. ' 1 3 In October 1994, Hathaway, a wholesale meat distributing business in Spokane, Washington, purchased the Great Falls, Montana, wholesale meat distributing business for which Braulick worked as a warehouseman and delivery truck driver. Braulick was dischatgcd from Hathas-ayes empioy in February 1996, ostensibly as part of downsizing of the business. Braulick filed this action approximately one year later, in January 1997. 74 At trial, Braulick's theory was that he was discharged not because of downsizing, but because he was resented for his absence froin work due to a December 1905 nonwork-related injury to his hand, and for the costs to Hathaway of providing health insurance for himself and his family. Following Braulick's presentation of his case, Hathaway moved for judgment as a matter of iaw pursuant to Rule SO1 1M.K.Civ.P. Hathaway argued that Braulick had failed to provide evidence establishing that he ;vas not terminated for good cawc. The court dcnicd the motion, as it did Hathaway's second motion for judgment as a inatter of law at the close of trial. The jury reached a verdict for Brauliclc. awarding him about half the amount of damages he requested. Hathaway appeals. 51d the District Court crr in denying Hathanay's motion forjudgment as a matter of lam and suhmitr~ng the case to the jury? 36 k motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if it appears as a matter of Ian that 3 party could not preva~l upon any view of thc ewdence, including the leg~timate infeiences to be drawn therefrom. Km,oIaizd v. Luzerrac Amencn, Inc , 1998 itlT 130.7 53, 961 P 2d 725,T 53.55 St Rep. 531.11 53 In other words, a motion for judgment as a matter of law 1s properly granted only when there IS a complete absence of any ecidence to uarrant submission to a jury. Kneeland, at 7 53. Conflicts in the evidence, including witness credibility, arc properly resolved by the finder of fact. Cumemit v. Mercer, !998 MT 134, 7 18, 960 P.2d 302,T 18. 55 St. Rep. 531.1 18. 77 A discharge is wrongful under Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act if it uas not for good cause and the employee has completed the employer's probationary per~od. Section 39-2-904(2), MCA. if the discharge mas for a legit~mate business reason, it docs not amount to wrongful discharge. In Buck Y. Billings hlorztmza Clzew.olet, Itrr. (i90l), 248 Mont. 270. 81 i P.2d 537, we stared: A !egitimate business reason is a reason that is neither false, whimsjcal, arbitrary [nlor capricious, and it must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business. In applying this definition, one must take into account the right of an employer to exercise discretion over who it u-ill employ and keep in employment. Of equal importance to this right, however, is the legitimate interest[] of the employee to secure employment. Buck, 248 Mont. at 281-82,8i 1 P.2d at 540 qS Hathaway gave several justifications for raulick's tcnninatian. Onc was that a reduction in the amount of stock it warehoused in Great Falls reduced the neec! for warehousemen in Great Falls, According to Braufick's testimony on direct examination, however, tl~e majority of his time was spent as a delivery driver. 9 Randy Bogden, the manager of I-latllaway's Great Falls operation, testified during Braulick's presentation of his case-in-chief that business was siow at the time Hail~away terminated Braulick's employment. However, Braulick testified that Bogden called him several times to ask him to work in January, saying that they were "really busy." Bogden acknowledged that after Braulick was terminated, Hathaway contracted \vith another company to do some of the deliveries Braulick had done and hired part-time and temporary employees to do others. Braulick elicited evidence that Hathaway thereby incurred expenses totaling Sl,P78 per month as compared with Braulick's salary and benefits of $2,244 per month. 710 On several points, the jury had to decide whether to believe testimony by Braulick or testimony by Bogden or Hathaway's ownerl Mike Hathaway. As another example, Braulick tcstitied that Bogden told him when he was discharged that it would be cheaper to pay son1ec;ne else to do his work. Bogden denied saying that. Determining witness credibility is a classic jury function. Cmzeron, at . / 18. 1 1 1 1 Hathaway contended it made sense to get rid of Braulick because he was not cel-tified to drive the large truck the company used to make twice-weekly delivery runs to Missouia, Montana. However, Braulick testified that at Hathaway's request he used the smaller truck 4 to make the Missoula run t'itice at the end ofJanuary 1996. Thus. thcrc was cvidencc that the truck which Braulick was certified to drive could be used for the Missoula runs. C 1 1 2 On cross-examination during Hathaway's case-in-chief; Mike Hathaway admitted that the deliveries znd customers which the business had before the Great Falls warehouse reduction were similar after the warehouse reduction. This, again, supported Braulick's position that the reduction in warehouse inventory in Great Falls did not reduce the need for drivers. 113 Hathaway asserted that the Great Falls operation made a net protit of only $1,977 for the fiscal year May 1995 to April 1996 and that this provided a legitimate business reason to terminate BrauIick. However, as Brauiick pointed out, he was terminated in February 1996, at least two months before those fiscal year figures were available. Braulick fitrther demonstrated from Hathaway's financial records that the bulk of Hathaway's business loss was attributable to its larger Spokane, Washington, operation. Braulick argued that it would have been more logical to make larger cutbacks in Spokane than to fire him. r 1 4 The record includes evidence supporting Hathaway's position that its termination of Braulick's e~nplo}~ was justified by legitimate business reasons. However: that is not a sufficient basis for a judgment as a matter of law. The standard is whether Branlick failed to introduce any evidence at all in support of his contentions. Weighing of the evidence is, again, a classic jury function. Cutrteron, at 7 18. 1 1 5 Based upon the record, we conclude that both after presei~tation of his case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence, Braulick met the minimal standard set forth in Kneeland that 5 unless there is a complete absence of evidence to support a verdict for the nonmoving party, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate. We therefore affirm the District Court's denial of Hathaway's motions for judgment as a matter of law. '1 6 in his ansxver brief and by separare motion, Branlick asks that this Court award him damages under Rule 32, M.K.App.P., on the basis that Hathaway has taken this appeal without merir. Such damages are only proper when there is evidence that the appeal was taken without substantial reason or grounds or that the arguments were not made in good faith. Sorenson v. hfassev-Fergusen, fnc. (19961, 279 Wont. 527, 531, 927 P.2d 1030, 1032-33. There is no such evidence in this case. We therefore decline to award damages under Rule 32, 34.R.App.P. $1 17 Affirmed. We Concur: