Title: Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
WELLMORE COAL CORPORATION 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
v.  Record No. 011755 
September 13, 2002 
 
 
 
 
HARMAN MINING CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY 
Keary R. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a notice of appeal that 
was signed only by a foreign attorney, in violation of Rule 1A:4 
of the Rules of this Court, requires granting a motion to 
dismiss. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
We recite only those facts relevant to the issue of 
dismissal of this appeal.  Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. 
(“Sovereign”), Harman Mining Corporation (“Harman”), and 
Wellmore Coal Corporation (“Wellmore”) entered into a coal 
supply agreement in 1997.  Sovereign and Harman subsequently 
filed a motion for judgment against Wellmore, alleging bad faith 
and breach of the 1997 agreement.  Sovereign, Harman, and 
Wellmore were each represented by foreign counsel, in 
association with members of the Virginia State Bar, pursuant to 
Rule 1A:4 of the Rules of this Court.  David B. Fawcett, III 
(“Fawcett”), an attorney licensed in Pennsylvania, was admitted, 
pro hac vice, to represent Harman and Sovereign.  Jeff A. Woods 
(“Woods”), an attorney licensed in Kentucky, was admitted, pro 
hac vice, to represent Wellmore. 
 
After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of Harman and Sovereign and awarded damages in the amount of $6 
million.  On May 1, 2001, the trial court sent a letter to 
Fawcett and Woods, informing them that “[a]s a result of 
Counsels’ inability to agree to terms of the Final Judgment 
Order . . . the [c]ourt has constructed an Order of its own for 
entry which will be entered effective May 7, 2001.” 
 
On May 7, 2001, Pamela J. Fleming (“Fleming”), secretary to 
the trial judge, mailed the final order to Fawcett with a cover 
letter stating, “[p]ursuant to Judge Williams’ letter of May 1, 
2001, enclosed herewith is the Final Judgment Order entered May 
7, 2001.”  The order had been signed by the trial judge, and the 
face of the order instructed: “Enter this Final Judgment Order 
this 7th day of May, 2001.”  In her letter, Fleming instructed 
Fawcett to endorse the order and forward it to Woods for his 
signature.  Fawcett endorsed and forwarded the order to Woods on 
May 14, 2001, and on June 1, 2001, Woods’ paralegal hand-
delivered the fully endorsed order to Fleming. 
 
Wellmore filed a notice of appeal, signed only by Woods.  
It was received and filed in the office of the Clerk for the 
Circuit Court for Buchanan County on June 5, 2001.  On June 28, 
2001, Wellmore filed a notice of entry of appearance of Wayne T. 
 
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Horne (“Horne”), an attorney from Grundy, Virginia, for 
Wellmore.  Also on June 28, Wellmore filed an amended notice of 
appeal “to add additional counsel.”  Horne signed the amended 
notice of appeal. 
 
This Court granted Wellmore’s petition for appeal by order 
dated February 21, 2002, and the parties submitted briefs on the 
merits of their arguments.  On April 30, 2002, Harman and 
Sovereign filed a motion to dismiss Wellmore’s appeal based upon 
Wellmore’s failure to comply with Rule 1A:4 and untimely filing 
pursuant to Rule 5:9(a).  Harman and Sovereign maintain that 
because Wellmore’s June 5, 2001 notice of appeal was signed only 
by foreign counsel, the notice was invalid.  They further argue 
that the amended notice of appeal, which complied with Rule 
1A:4, was untimely because it was filed beyond the 30-day time 
period required by Rule 5:9(a).  Harman and Sovereign argue that 
a valid and timely notice of appeal was not filed; consequently, 
this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
 
Wellmore argues that the May 7, 2001 order was 
“conditional” and did not become a final order until it was 
fully endorsed by all parties, which occurred no earlier than 
June 1, 2001.  Therefore, Wellmore maintains that the amended 
notice of appeal was timely filed on June 28, 2001.  In the 
alternative, Wellmore argues that even if the order was final on 
May 7, 2001, and the June 5, 2001 notice of appeal was “invalid” 
 
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pursuant to Rule 1A:4, the original notice was not “void.”  
Accordingly, Wellmore maintains that the defect in signature was 
curable pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B). 
II. Analysis 
 
Rule 5:9(a) provides that “[n]o appeal shall be allowed 
unless, within 30 days after the entry of final judgment . . . 
counsel for the appellant files with the clerk of the trial 
court a notice of appeal. . . .”  Rule 5:1(b)(13) clarifies that 
the “date of entry” of any final judgment “shall be the date the 
judgment . . . is signed by the judge.”  In the present case, 
the face of the final order plainly indicates that it was signed 
by the trial judge on May 7, 2001.  Contrary to the assertion 
made by Wellmore, there was nothing “conditional” about the 
entry of final judgment. 
 
Wellmore filed a notice of appeal on June 5, 2001, within 
the 30-day period required by Rule 5:9(a).  However, the notice 
of appeal was signed only by Woods, Wellmore’s foreign counsel.  
Rule 1A:4 governs the practice of law by foreign attorneys in 
Virginia.  In pertinent part, the Rule states:  “Except where a 
party conducts his own case, a pleading, or other paper required 
to be served (whether relating to discovery or otherwise) shall 
be invalid unless it is signed by a member of the Virginia State 
Bar.” 
 
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The term “invalid” is defined as “[n]ot legally binding.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 829 (7th ed. 1999).  Accordingly, 
pursuant to Rule 1A:4, the notice of appeal, filed on June 5, 
2001, was not legally binding; therefore, it had no legal 
effect.  The June 28, 2001 amended notice was filed beyond the 
30-day period contained in Rule 5:9(a).  While titled “amended 
notice,” an amendment presupposes a valid instrument as its 
object.  Because the June 5, 2001 notice of appeal was invalid, 
there was nothing to amend. 
 
Wellmore maintains that the invalidity of the June 5, 2001 
instrument was curable pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B), which 
provides: “Clerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or from an 
inadvertent omission may be corrected by the court at any time 
on its own initiative or upon the motion of any party . . .”  
Wellmore asserts that the purpose of Code § 8.01-428(B) is to 
allow for correction of defects in form.  According to Wellmore, 
the lack of the required signature on its notice of appeal 
constitutes such a defect.  Therefore, Wellmore maintains that 
the amended notice of appeal served to correct the defect in 
form in the original notice, pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B). 
 
We recognize that Code § 8.01-428(B) provides for the 
correction of clerical errors; however, the signature defect at 
issue in the present case is not a “clerical error” as 
 
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contemplated by the Code.  “Scrivener’s or similar errors in the 
record, which are demonstrably contradicted by all other 
documents, are clerical mistakes.”  Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 
126, 133, 562 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2002).  Such errors cause the 
court’s record to fail to “speak the truth.”  Id. (citing School 
Bd. of the City of Lynchburg v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 
Va. 550, 555, 379 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1989)).  Examples of clerical 
errors include a typographical error made by a court reporter 
while transcribing a court proceeding, Lamb v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 161, 165, 279 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1981), or an unintended error 
in the drafting of a divorce decree, Dorn v. Dorn, 222 Va. 288, 
291, 279 S.E.2d 393, 394 (1981).  The failure of Wellmore’s 
Virginia counsel to append his signature to the notice of 
appeal, as required by Rule 1A:4, does not constitute a clerical 
error contemplated by Code § 8.01-418(B); accordingly, Code 
§ 8.01-428(B) provides Wellmore no relief in the present case. 
Based upon the failure of the notice of appeal to comply 
with Rule 1A:4 and the filing of the amended notice outside the 
30-day requirement of Rule 5:9(a), we will grant Harman’s and 
Sovereign’s motion to dismiss Wellmore’s appeal.  See School Bd. 
of the City of Lynchburg, 237 Va. at 556-57, 379 S.E.2d at 323. 
Dismissed.
 
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