Title: State ex rel. Coles v. Granville

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Coles v. Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-Ohio-6057.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. COLES ET AL. v. GRANVILLE, DIR.-SECY., ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Coles v. Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-Ohio-6057.] 
Mandamus – Appropriation – Writ of mandamus will lie to compel board of park 
commissioners to commence appropriation proceedings for real property 
taken by board from private property owners – R.C. 1545.11 authorizes 
all boards of park commissioners to appropriate property regardless of 
when park district was created  — Dismissal of action because one party 
is not real party in interest is not dismissal on the merits for purposes of 
res judicata. 
(No. 2006-1259 ─ Submitted September 11, 2007 ─ Decided  
November 20, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel a park 
district’s board of commissioners to commence appropriation proceedings for 
property allegedly seized and occupied by the district.  Because relators have 
established that by constructing and using a recreational trail the board has taken 
the property, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel the board to begin an 
appropriation proceeding to compensate relators for the taking. 
The Canal Company and the Railroad Lease 
{¶ 2} In 1827, the General Assembly chartered the Milan Canal 
Company (“the canal company”) to construct and operate a canal from Milan, 
Ohio, to the Huron River.  Noncontiguous tracts of land from Ebeneser Merry and 
Kneeland Townsend were acquired by the canal company as part of the canal 
corridor.  In 1881, the canal company entered into a 99-year lease with the 
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Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company for a 150-foot-wide right of way to 
construct and operate a railroad.  The lease was renewed in 1980 for another 99 
years. 
{¶ 3} The canal company was dissolved in 1904, and its property 
interests devolved to a testamentary trust and its trustee, Key Trust Company of 
Ohio.  Rail traffic on the leased property ceased in the 1980s, and portions of the 
rail line were paved.  In 1995, the lessee’s successor quitclaimed its interests to 
respondent Board of Commissioners of Erie MetroParks, a park district created 
pursuant to R.C. 1545.01 et seq.  The board acquired the property to build a 
recreational trail. 
Coles v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., Erie C.P. No. 97-CV-296 
{¶ 4} In 1986, relators Edwin and Lisa Coles obtained a portion of the 
property upon which Erie MetroParks intended to build the recreational trail.  In 
the deed, however, the sellers excepted “a 66 foot wide parcel [of approximately 
.80 acres] now or formerly owned by” one of the successors in interest to the 
lessee of the railroad lease. 
{¶ 5} In 1997, the Coleses filed an action in the Erie County Court of 
Common Pleas for a judgment declaring that they have title to the property 
generally specified in the 1986 deed, including the 66-foot-wide parcel.  Erie 
MetroParks filed a motion to dismiss the Coleses’ action on grounds that because 
the parcel was specifically excepted from the deed, the Coleses were not real 
parties in interest.  The common pleas court granted the motion and dismissed the 
case.  No appeal was taken from the 1998 judgment. 
The Key Trust Litigation 
{¶ 6} In 1999, the Erie MetroParks Board of Commissioners initiated a 
declaratory-judgment action in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas against 
Key Trust.  While the case was pending, Key Trust conveyed the property 
formerly owned by the canal company to relators the Coleses and Buffalo Prairie, 
January Term, 2007 
3 
Ltd., a limited liability company of which Edwin Coles is the president.  The deed 
designated the parcels conveyed as “Farm Property/Milan Canal Parcel” and 
“House Lot/Milan Canal Parcel.”  The Coleses and Buffalo Prairie then conveyed 
sections of this property to the other relators ─ Isolated Ventures, Ltd., another 
limited liability company of which Edwin Coles serves as president, Vincent 
Otrusina,1 Robert C. Bickley, and Warren R. Jones. 
{¶ 7} In 2000, the board of park commissioners filed an amended 
complaint for declaratory relief, which added those relators and other property 
owners who may have received Key Trust’s interests in the former canal company 
property.  The board sought a judgment declaring that the railroad lease is in full 
force and effect, that the board is the lessee of the property, that the defendants’ 
rights are subject to the board’s rights under the lease, that the board is entitled to 
the sole and exclusive occupancy of the property, and that the lease permits the 
board to improve and use the property as a recreational trail.  The board alleged 
that it was improving the property for use as a recreational trail and that Key Trust 
had attempted to terminate the lease. 
{¶ 8} The defendant property owners submitted an answer and a 
counterclaim.  In reply, the board claimed that it has the right to possess the land 
formerly actively used by the railroad not only through the railroad lease but 
through property it acquired by the quitclaim deed from the original lessee. 
{¶ 9} In November 2000, the common pleas court entered a judgment 
finding that the canal company— predecessor in title to Key Trust and relators — 
had acquired its real property interests solely from the Merry and Townsend 
deeds, that the canal property “consisted of a roughly three mile long corridor of 
property the northern terminus being known as Lock No. 1, which was located 
where the Milan Canal joined the Huron River on property now owned by Wikel 
                                                 
1.  Otrusina later died, and the executor of his estate is a relator in this case. 
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Farms, Ltd., just north of Mason Road, in Section 2, Milan Township, Erie 
County, Ohio,” and that the only property owned by the canal company at the 
time the railroad lease was executed “lay within the boundaries of the Kneeland 
Townsend property and the Ebeneser Merry property, neither of which lay north 
of Lock No. 1.”  The court nevertheless concluded that the lease had been 
breached by a predecessor in interest to the board of park commissioners for 
nonpayment of rent and abandonment of the railroad use, which rendered the 
lease void. 
{¶ 10} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court insofar as it found that the railroad lease was limited to the land obtained by 
the canal company from Merry and Townsend.  Erie Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. 
v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 782, 787-788, 764 
N.E.2d 509.  The court of appeals further held that the trial court had erred by 
concluding that the board’s predecessor in interest had breached the railroad lease.  
Id. at 790, 764 N.E.2d 509.  The court of appeals reversed that portion of the trial 
court’s judgment invalidating the lease and remanded the cause for further 
proceedings.  Id. at 791, 764 N.E.2d 509.  We did not accept a discretionary 
appeal from the court of appeals judgment.  Erie Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. v. 
Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 1431, 761 N.E.2d 47. 
{¶ 11} On remand, the common pleas court held that the lessee had not 
abandoned the leased property, that the lease is in full force and effect, that the 
board of park commissioners is the current lessee and the holder of the lessee’s 
rights under the lease, that the board is entitled to the sole occupancy and use of 
the leased property, that the rights of the defendants ─ including relators ─ are 
subject to the board’s rights under the lease, and that the lease permitted the board 
to improve and use the leased property as a parkway or recreational trail.  The 
trial court further concluded that the extent of the leased property was limited to 
the Merry and Townsend tracts conveyed to the canal company: 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 12} “[The extent of the leased property is] [a]ll those lands within a 
one hundred fifty (150) foot wide corridor conveyed to the Milan Canal Company 
by Kneeland Townsend and Ebeneser Merry by instruments dated May 10, 1838 
and April 21, 1838, respectively * * *, which lands have a northerly boundary at 
Lock No. 1 of the old Milan Canal, which lock was located immediately north of 
Mason Road on lands now owned by Wikel Farms, Ltd. at or near the intersection 
of the Milan Canal with the Huron River, and extending southerly to the Canal’s 
turning basin in the City of Milan, Ohio.” 
{¶ 13} In an appeal from the trial court’s judgment on remand, the 
defendants, including a majority of relators, asserted that the portion of the 
judgment describing the leased property as extending from north of Mason Road 
south to the canal basin in Milan differed from the previous description, which 
restricted the leased property to the Merry and Townsend parcels.  The court of 
appeals rejected this contention by holding that the judgment on remand did not 
contradict the finding in the previous judgment entries “that the leased property 
encompassed only land obtained from Townsend and Merry.”  Erie Metroparks 
Bd. of Commrs. v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, Erie App. Nos. E-02-009 and E-02-011, 
2002-Ohio-4827, ¶ 22.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
Actions of the Board of Park Commissioners 
and the Location of Relators’ Property 
{¶ 14} Shortly after the Coleses received their farm and home parcels 
from Key Trust in 1999, they received a letter from respondent Jonathan R. 
Granville, the director-secretary of Erie MetroParks.  Granville stated that the 
board was interested in acquiring the Coleses’ ownership interests in the canal and 
railroad corridor.  In 2000, the board adopted two resolutions to authorize the 
acquisition of fee-simple title to the property by instituting appropriation 
proceedings. 
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{¶ 15} The Coleses’ home parcel and the Otrusina estate’s property lie 
north of Mason Road.  The Coleses’ farm parcel and relators’ remaining 
properties are south of Mason Road.  None of relators’ property is within the 
boundaries of the Merry or Townsend tracts. 
{¶ 16} The board of park commissioners built a recreational trail over the 
former railroad line, which relators assert is part of their property. 
Federal Litigation 
{¶ 17} In 2003, relators and Wikel Farms, Ltd. filed a civil-rights action in 
federal district court under Sections 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3), Title 42, 
U.S.Code, against the board and its director-secretary for violations of their rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
See Coles v. Granville (Jan. 24, 2005), N.D.Ohio No. 3:03 CV 7595, 2005 WL 
139137.  Relators alleged that in developing the recreational trail, respondents 
asserted entitlement to property beyond that found to be covered by the railroad 
lease in the Key Trust cases.  The federal district court dismissed the case and 
determined that as a federal court, it was barred from reviewing the state court’s 
finding that the property was covered by the lease.  Id. at * 4.  On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
relators’ causes of action for unconstitutional takings were not ripe for federal 
review when relators had not brought a state action in mandamus to compel 
appropriation proceedings.  Coles v. Granville (C.A.6, 2006), 448 F.3d 853. 
Mandamus Case 
{¶ 18} Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Coles, 448 F.3d 853, 
relators filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of park 
commissioners and its director-secretary to either (1) commence an appropriation 
proceeding to compensate relators for the board’s taking of their property or (2) 
relinquish the seized property and direct the park district not to file an eminent-
domain action to appropriate relators’ property.  This court granted an alternative 
January Term, 2007 
7 
writ on relators’ appropriation claim and dismissed relators’ alternate claim to 
compel respondents to relinquish the property.  113 Ohio St.3d 1485, 2007-Ohio-
1986, 865 N.E.2d 910.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704 (“if the allegations of a complaint for a writ 
of mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and 
a prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction”).  Relators’ alternate 
mandamus claim suggested that the real objects sought were a declaratory 
judgment ─ that park districts established after April 16, 1920, lack the power to 
acquire property by appropriation ─ and a prohibitory injunction to prevent the 
board of park commissioners from continuing to occupy relators’ property and 
from filing an appropriation action. 
{¶ 19} The parties have now presented evidence and briefs on relators’ 
remaining mandamus claim concerning appropriation.  Because they have also 
filed a notice stipulating to the dismissal of the claim against the director-
secretary under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b), the claim now solely concerns the board of 
park commissioners. 
Motions to Take Judicial Notice 
{¶ 20} On the same date that their evidence was due, the parties filed 
motions for the court to take judicial notice of certain filings in the Key Trust 
litigation, including the common pleas court and court of appeals judgments, 
which are attached to their motions.  Because the parties agree that the submitted 
documents should be part of the court’s record in this original action, we grant the 
motions.  Cf. Stutzka v. McCarville (C.A.8, 2005), 420 F.3d 757, 761, fn. 2 (court 
takes judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records on motion to enlarge 
record on appeal); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc. (C.A.2, 
1992), 969 F.2d 1384, 1388, quoting Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc. (C.A.2, 1991), 
937 F.2d 767, 774 (“A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in 
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another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but 
rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings’ ”). 
Mandamus as a Remedy to 
Compel Appropriation Proceedings 
{¶ 21} “The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”  State ex 
rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 765 N.E.2d 345, 
judgment modified in part on other grounds, 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-4905, 
775 N.E.2d 493; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution; Section 19, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  “Mandamus is the 
appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation 
proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is alleged.”  Shemo, 
95 Ohio St.3d at 63, 765 N.E.2d 345; see, also, State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor 
City Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163, 826 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 22} This case involves a classic appropriation claim alleging an actual 
physical taking of relators’ real property.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
(2005), 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (“The paradigmatic 
taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or 
physical invasion of private property”); State ex rel. OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 203, 206, 667 N.E.2d 8 (“the actual physical taking of real property” is 
a sufficient interference with a property right to constitute a compensable taking). 
Authority of Board of Park Commissioners 
to Appropriate Real Property 
{¶ 23} In their alternate mandamus claim, relators argued in part that the 
board of park commissioners lacks authority to acquire property by appropriation 
because the Erie MetroParks District was established after April 16, 1920.  
Although we dismissed that alternate claim because it sought relief in the nature 
January Term, 2007 
9 
of a declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, an analysis of this argument 
is warranted because if it is correct, relators’ appropriation claim must fail. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 1545.11 authorizes boards of park commissioners to acquire 
real property by appropriation, specifies that appropriation proceedings shall be 
conducted in the manner set forth in the general appropriation provisions of R.C. 
163.01 to 163.22, and concludes with a sentence providing, “This section applies 
to districts created prior to April 16, 1920.”  Relators contended in their alternate 
mandamus claim that because the Erie MetroParks District was established after 
April 16, 1920, the board lacks authority to appropriate property. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 
1545.11, 
however, 
authorizes 
all 
boards 
of 
park 
commissioners to appropriate property, regardless of the date of any park 
district’s creation.  As noted by the attorney general, the legislative history of 
R.C. 1545.11 supports this holding: 
{¶ 26} “From this legislative history, it is apparent that the last sentence of 
what is now R.C. 1545.11 was originally added to G.C. 2976-7 in 1920 to ensure 
that park districts created prior to the 1920 effective date of H.B. No. 387 enjoyed 
the broader powers conferred upon boards of park commissioners thereunder.  
This statutory provision was, of course, necessitated by the historic presumption 
applied by the courts of this state that the legislature intends statutes enacted by it 
to operate prospectively rather than retroactively.  It is apparent, therefore, that 
the change in language in 1953 which set forth the specific date of April 16, 1920, 
in no way altered the operation of this final provision as one which included 
districts created both before and after that date.  Thus, I am of the opinion that the 
terms of R.C. 1545.11 authorize boards of park commissioners created both 
before and after April 16, 1920, to acquire lands as specified therein.”  (Citations 
omitted.)  1978 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 78-045; see, also, 1983 Ohio 
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 83-020, syllabus (“R.C. 1545.11 applies to all park districts, 
regardless of the date of their creation”). 
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{¶ 27} A court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Clark Cty. Bd. 
of Park Commrs. v. Dunkle, Clark App. No. 2002 CA 93, 2003-Ohio-5400, ¶ 15: 
{¶ 28} “In our opinion, it is much more sensible to interpret the final 
sentence of R.C. 1545.11 to express a desire to make the provisions set forth 
therein retroactive than to create an arbitrary distinction that would give some 
park districts, but not others, the power to acquire lands through appropriation.  
We see no principled reason for such disparate treatment, and there is no evidence 
of such an intention in the legislative history.  Moreover, insofar as R.C. 1545.11 
encompasses the acquisition of land by gift or purchase as well as by eminent 
domain, the [property owners’] interpretation of the provision would deprive park 
districts created after April 16, 1920 of virtually all means of acquiring land.” 
{¶ 29} Therefore, the board of park commissioners is authorized under 
R.C. 1545.11 to appropriate property for the construction and use of a recreational 
trail, and a mandamus claim to compel the board to commence an appropriation 
proceeding is viable as long as relators establish an involuntary taking of their 
property by the board. 
Pending Civil Action Does Not Bar Mandamus Action 
{¶ 30} On the same date that relators filed this mandamus action, they 
filed a civil action for trespass and slander of title against the board of park 
commissioners and its director-secretary in the Erie County Court of Common 
Pleas.  In that case, relators allege that the board trespassed on their property and 
made slanderous claims of title to the property.  Relators sought damages and a 
permanent injunction. 
{¶ 31} The board suggests that relators’ civil suit bars their entitlement to 
the requested writ of mandamus.  This suggestion is erroneous. 
{¶ 32} As noted previously, we have consistently held that mandamus is 
the appropriate action to compel public authorities to commence appropriation 
proceedings for an involuntary taking of private property.  State ex rel. Preschool 
January Term, 2007 
11 
Dev., Ltd. v. Springboro, 99 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-3999, 792 N.E.2d 721, ¶ 
12.  The pending civil action does not afford a complete remedy to relators 
because it cannot compel the board of public commissioners to commence 
appropriation proceedings for the property relators claim has been taken by the 
board.  Cf. State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 698 
N.E.2d 987 (prior declaratory judgment action did not bar mandamus action when 
it would not provide a complete remedy to relator). 
{¶ 33} Therefore, the pending civil action does not bar relators’ 
mandamus claim. 
Mandamus to Compel Appropriation Proceeding for Property South  
of Mason Road: Res Judicata Effect of Key Trust Litigation 
{¶ 34} Relators and respondents both claim that the Key Trust litigation is 
res judicata and establishes their interest in the property south of Mason Road in 
the canal corridor. 
{¶ 35} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘[a] valid, final judgment 
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous 
action.’ ”  State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 
784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 14, quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 
653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus. 
{¶ 36} In general, res judicata bars all claims that were or might have been 
litigated in the first lawsuit.  State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 
2005-Ohio-1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 14.  The parties rely on this general rule to 
support their claim that the Key Trust declaratory judgment barred all claims that 
could have been, but were not litigated in those cases. 
{¶ 37} Unlike other judgments, however, “a declaratory judgment 
determines only what it actually decides and does not preclude other claims that 
might have been advanced.”  Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 69, 765 N.E.2d 345; 1 
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Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 337, Section 33, Comment c.  
Consequently, “[f]or a previous declaratory judgment, res judicata precludes only 
claims that were actually decided.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Trafalgar Corp. 
v. Miami Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 104 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-6406, 819 N.E.2d 
1040, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 38} The board of park commissioners asserts that the trial court in the 
first Key Trust judgment decided that the lease covered the entire three-mile canal 
corridor from Milan to the area near Lock No. 1 and Mason Road and that res 
judicata bars relators from now contesting this conclusion.  The board relies on 
the following language from the common pleas court’s first judgment entry: 
{¶ 39} “Therefore, the Leased Property extends from the southern 
terminus of the old Milan Canal at or near the southerly end of the Milan Canal 
basin in the Village of Milan to its northerly terminus at the Huron River at the 
former location of Lock No. 1 on premises now owned by Wikel Farms Ltd. 
immediately north of Mason Road in Section 2, Milan Township, Erie County.” 
{¶ 40} But as relators persuasively contend, the board takes this sentence 
out of context and ignores the trial court and court of appeals judgments in Key 
Trust that followed the original judgment. 
{¶ 41} The entire paragraph from which the quoted sentence appears 
emphasizes that the leased property consists solely of the Merry and Townsend 
tracts: 
{¶ 42} “The description of the Leased Property in the Lease 
unambiguously describes it as consisting of all lands then owned by the Milan 
Canal Company within a 150 foot wide corridor from approximately the 
intersection of Maine and Union Streets in the Village of Milan northerly to the 
north of the mouth of the Huron River.  The only lands owned by the Milan Canal 
Company at the time the Lease was executed lay within the boundaries of the 
Kneeland Townsend property and the Ebeneser Merry property, neither of which 
January Term, 2007 
13 
lay north of Lock No. 1.  Therefore, the Leased Property extends from the 
southern terminus of the old Milan Canal at or near the southerly end of the Milan 
Canal basin in the Village of Milan to its northerly terminus at the Huron River at 
the former location of Lock No. 1 on premises now owned by Wikel Farms Ltd. 
immediately north of Mason Road in Section 2, Milan Township, Erie County.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 43} Evidently, most of the relators were concerned enough about the 
inclusion of the last sentence in the common pleas court’s judgment and 
comparable language in that court’s judgment on remand to assert on appeal that 
the trial court had improperly reformed the railroad lease by expanding the leased 
property beyond the Merry and Townsend tracts.  On each occasion, however, the 
court of appeals emphasized that any boundary reference contained in the trial 
court’s judgments ─ like the reference to a 150-foot-wide canal corridor ─ was 
merely a general description that was subject to the specific holding that the 
leased property consisted of only the Merry and Townsend tracts. 
{¶ 44} For example, in the first Key Trust appeal, the court of appeals 
rejected the arguments challenging the property description by holding that the 
actual metes and bounds were those of the Merry and Townsend properties: 
{¶ 45} “Although the metes and bounds description contained in the 1881 
lease describes a one-hundred-fifty-foot corridor for the full length of the canal, 
the lease limits the conveyance to property ‘owned by’ the canal company.  The 
trial record shows that the Milan Canal Company acquired property only from 
Townsend and Merry.  The trial court ruled that this property alone was the 
subject of the lease.  Consequently, the court never modified the 1881 lease.  
Since there was no reformation of the lease, appellants’ arguments concerning an 
improper reformation of the contract are without merit.  * * * 
{¶ 46} “The same holds true for [the property owners’] manifest-weight 
argument * * *. The only competent, credible evidence presented at trial was that 
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the canal company obtained property solely from Townsend and Merry. On such 
evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to limit the lease to such 
property was unsupported by the evidence.”  Erie Metroparks, 145 Ohio App.3d 
at 787-788, 764 N.E.2d 509. 
{¶ 47} Similarly, in the second appeal, the court of appeals rejected 
relators’ claim that the trial court’s lease-property description on remand 
exceeded the boundaries of the Merry and Townsend parcels by deeming it 
significant that both trial court entries emphasized that the leased property 
encompassed only land obtained from Townsend and Merry.  Erie Metroparks, 
2002-Ohio-4827, at ¶ 19, 22. 
{¶ 48} Under these circumstances, the Key Trust litigation conclusively 
determined that the property subject to the board’s interests under the railroad 
lease lay within the boundaries of the Merry and Townsend parcels; it did not 
determine ─ as the board contends ─ that those boundaries extended beyond those 
parcels.  Res judicata is “not a shield to protect the blameworthy.”  Davis v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491, 756 N.E.2d 657.  A contrary 
ruling would condone the board’s hypertechnical reading of the trial court’s entry 
language in Key Trust and ignore both the ultimate emphasis in that litigation at 
both the trial and appellate courts on the interests of the board being limited to the 
Merry and Townsend parcels as well as the uncontroverted evidence that none of 
relators’ property is within either of those parcels. 
{¶ 49} Therefore, relators have established that the board’s construction 
and use of a recreational trail over their property south of Mason Road resulted in 
a physical invasion of their property and constitute an involuntary taking entitling 
them to the requested appropriation proceeding. 
Mandamus to Compel Appropriation Proceeding 
for Property North of Mason Road: 
Res Judicata Effect of the Coleses’ Prior Declaratory-Judgment Action 
January Term, 2007 
15 
{¶ 50} For the portions of relators’ property that lie north of Mason Road, 
the board claims that the common pleas court’s 1998 dismissal of the Coleses’ 
declaratory-judgment action prevented the Coleses from relitigating their claimed 
ownership of the property.  The dismissal, which preceded the Key Trust 
litigation, was based on the court’s holding that the Coleses were not real parties 
in interest. 
{¶ 51} The board’s claim lacks merit.  In general, the dismissal of an 
action because one of the parties is not a real party in interest or does not have 
standing is not a dismissal on the merits for purposes of res judicata.  See, e.g., 
Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc. (Utah 1979), 591 P.2d 433, 434 (“the dismissal of an 
action because one of the parties is not the real party in interest is not a dismissal 
on the merits so as to bar a subsequent action”); 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure (2002) 189, Section 4438 (“Dismissal on the 
ground that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest should not preclude a later 
action by the real party in interest”); A-1 Nursing Care of Cleveland, Inc. v. 
Florence Nightingale Nursing, Inc. (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 647 N.E.2d 
222 (dismissal for lack of standing “terminates the action other than on the merits 
and affords proper parties the opportunity to refile without fear of the effects of 
res judicata”); Asher v. Cincinnati (Dec. 23, 1999), Hamilton App. No. C-
990345, 2000 WL 955617 (dismissal for lack of standing is not on the merits for 
purposes of res judicata). 
{¶ 52} Moreover, despite the somewhat contradictory nature of the 
evidence, the description of the parcel of land that is referred to in relators’ 
complaint as the Coleses’ home parcel, which is located north of Mason Road, 
corresponds to the deed description of the property conveyed by Key Trust to the 
Coleses in 1999, which was after the 1998 dismissal that the board cites in 
support of its res judicata claim.  Res judicata does not preclude a party 
previously dismissed for lack of standing as a real party in interest from becoming 
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a real party in interest through transactions occurring after the dismissal.  Wead v. 
Lutz, 161 Ohio App.3d 580, 2005-Ohio-2921, 831 N.E.2d 482, ¶ 35-37. 
{¶ 53} Therefore, the dismissal of the Coleses’ previous declaratory-
judgment action does not prevent their mandamus claim. 
Mandamus to Compel Appropriation Proceeding for Property  
North of Mason Road: Res Judicata Effect of the Key Trust Litigation 
{¶ 54} Relators, the Coleses and the Otrusina estate, assert that for their 
property north of Mason Road, the Key Trust litigation prevents the board from 
attempting to relitigate their claimed ownership of the property. 
{¶ 55} Although the focus of the Key Trust cases was on the leased 
property, the board raised, and the court considered, whether the board owned any 
of the pertinent canal corridor property in fee in addition to its interests under the 
railroad lease.  In its reply to the counterclaim filed in Key Trust, the board 
expressly claimed that it had a right to possess the land formerly used by the 
railroad through property it acquired by a quitclaim deed from a successor to the 
lessee, instead of simply through the lease itself.  In the trial court’s first 
judgment, the court specifically noted that one of the issues before it was whether 
the board of park commissioners had “acquired any ownership interest in the 
property at issue by virtue of a quitclaim deed from the Wheeling Railroad.”  The 
court ultimately resolved this issue in favor of the defendants, including relators, 
by holding that the board had no property interest in the land north of Lock No. 1.  
That judgment was not modified by the subsequent Key Trust proceedings. 
{¶ 56} The board does not really dispute this; instead, it claims that the 
dismissal of the Coleses’ earlier case preceded the Key Trust cases and thus 
barred the Coleses’ claim to the property.  But as previously discussed, that claim 
lacks merit. 
{¶ 57} Even if the Key Trust cases did not resolve the board’s alleged 
ownership in this northern portion of the property, and assuming, as the board 
January Term, 2007 
17 
claims, that its ownership derives from an 1882 deed from Oscar Meeker to 
Wheeling & Lake Erie Rail Road Company, the board’s predecessor in interest, 
the deed itself did not transfer any property rights to the railroad company 
because Oscar Meeker did not hold title to the property when it was allegedly 
conveyed..  Although relators raised Meeker’s inability to pass title in their initial 
merit brief, the board did not rebut relators’ argument. 
{¶ 58} Therefore, in regard to the portion of relators’ property north of 
Mason Road, the board’s construction and use of a recreational trail also effected 
an involuntary taking. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 59} Relators have established that by employing their private property 
for public use as a recreational trail, the board of park commissioners has taken 
their property.  Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel the board to 
commence an appropriation proceeding to compensate them for that taking.  All 
other issues raised by the parties ─ the proper construction of the Meeker deed, 
the possible abandonment of any railroad easement, and whether the recreational 
trail constituted a significantly different use than the railroad so as to require 
compensation ─ need not be addressed because they are rendered moot by our 
decision.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-
Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 33. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Brooks & Logan Co., L.P.A., and J. Anthony Logan; Ackerson, Kauffman 
Fex, P.C., and Nels J. Ackerson, for relators. 
 
Tomino & Latchney, L.L.C., and John D. Latchney, for respondents.