Title: ERRINGTON v. ZOLESSI

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ERRINGTON v. ZOLESSI2000 WY 1569 P.3d 966Case Number: 99-67Decided: 07/25/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DIANNA M. ERRINGTON and 
CHARLES E. ERRINGTON, Appellants (Plaintiffs),v. LEONEL 
ZOLESSI, M.D., Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, The Honorable Hunter Patrick, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellants: Walter Urbigkit of 
Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: Jeffrey 
C. Brinkerhoff and Hampton K. O'Neill of Brown, Drew & Massey, Casper, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] Dianna and 
Charles Errington (the Erringtons) appeal to this Court, seeking the reversal of 
a partial summary judgment, on the issue of punitive damages, entered in favor 
of Dr. Leonel Zolessi (Zolessi). The Erringtons seek to recover damages, 
including punitive damages, for medical malpractice. The district court granted 
Zolessi a partial summary judgment, ruling that punitive damages were not 
available. We hold that our rules of civil procedure do not authorize partial 
summary judgment on an issue, and the district court was without authority to 
enter a final and appealable judgment. We consider the merits of the case, 
however, by treating the Erringtons' appeal as a petition for a writ of review. 
We conclude that genuine issues of material fact are present, and we reverse and 
remand this case for determination of those issues by the district 
court.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is contained in the Erringtons' Brief of 
Appellants:

1. Whether Trial Court 
summary judgment denial of jury issue for claim of punitive damages was in error 
as involving action of the surgeon who deliberately misinformed his patient, 
Dianna Errington, Appellants as well as her family, after the surgery about a 
surgery created serious bladder vaginal injury complication and also misinformed 
a home health care service about the condition of the patient's actual health, 
which agency was employed to medically assist the post-surgery seriously ill 
Mrs. Errington.

2. Whether expert witness 
testimony is required or appropriate to express an opinion that conduct of a 
physician in lying to a patient does or does not meet the legal criteria for the 
assessment of punitive damages where the issue of medical negligence is not at 
issue or involved in the opinion requested.

3. Whether the Trial 
Court erred in striking the witness affidavit as filed to oppose summary 
judgment even though the affidavit was entirely consistent with the deposition 
testimony except contendably as to a requested opinion on a principle of law or 
providing a state of mind hypotheses.

[¶3] The 
Appellee's Brief, filed on behalf of Zolessi, sets forth the issues in this 
way:

1. Whether the trial 
court properly granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, because plaintiffs failed to present 
admissible evidence of willful and wanton misconduct?

2. Whether, under these 
particular facts, expert medical testimony was required to prove willful and 
wanton misconduct, including the required causal link between the alleged 
misconduct and damages?

3. Whether the trial 
court properly excluded the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Oliphant, as a 
sham affidavit because it contradicted his earlier deposition 
testimony?

[¶4] On October 
20, 1992, Zolessi performed a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy on 
Dianna Errington. The operation required the surgical separation of the cervix 
from the bladder. During this phase of the procedure, Zolessi caused a small 
tear or nick in Dianna Errington's bladder, which he repaired with sutures. He 
then installed a catheter in her bladder, and left it in place to drain the 
bladder while the tear healed. Upon her recovery from the anesthesia, Zolessi 
informed Dianna Errington of the tear and repair.

[¶5] The tear, 
however, did not heal fully, and a fistula1 developed that allowed urine to 
seep out. On October 30, 1992, Zolessi ordered a cystogram, or X-ray, of the 
bladder, which revealed the possibility of a fistula. After seeing the results 
of the cystogram, Zolessi informed Dianna Errington that she was healing slowly, 
but normally. Because she was in severe pain, a second cystogram was conducted 
on November 4, 1992, which confirmed the possibility of a fistula. Zolessi 
advised Dianna Errington again that she was healing normally, but might need to 
consult a specialist if the tear did not fully heal. A urologist examined Dianna 
Errington on November 8, 1992, and a third test confirmed the presence of a 
fistula along with a second rupture of the bladder. At the urologist's 
recommendation, Dianna Errington underwent corrective surgery on November 20, 
1992. That surgery corrected the fistula and the other rupture, but the 
Erringtons contend that Dianna Errington's health has never fully 
recovered.

[¶6] The 
Erringtons filed suit against Zolessi on August 1, 1994. Their complaint sounded 
in negligence and medical malpractice, and the Erringtons sought to recover both 
compensatory and punitive damages. After extensive discovery, Zolessi filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Punitive Damages on October 
27, 1998. In a flurry of motion practice following the filing of that motion, 
each side sought to strike evidence relied on by the other. The district court 
held a motion hearing on January 15, 1999. An Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment Concerning Punitive Damages and Order Granting and Denying Motions to 
Strike and Motions in Limine was entered by the district court on February 16, 
1999, in which the district court ruled: 

1. Defendant Zolessi's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Punitive Damages is 
GRANTED;

2. Defendant Zolessi's 
Motion to Strike (affidavit of Dr. Oliphant as a sham affidavit) is 
GRANTED;

11. Upon verbal motion of 
plaintiffs made during the hearing and pursuant to Rule 54(b) W.R.C.P. the Court 
FINDS that NO JUST REASON FOR DELAY EXISTS and hereby DIRECTS ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES in favor of Defendant Zolessi and 
against plaintiffs and the Court hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

[¶7] The 
district court, however, denied the Erringtons' motion to strike the deposition 
testimony of the same witness whose affidavit was stricken. The Erringtons 
timely filed this appeal.

[¶8] The major 
issue in this case calls for review of not only the particular grant of a 
partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, but also the nature 
and extent of any authority on the part of a district court to grant partial 
summary judgment on less than an entire claim. Fundamental to our decision is 
the proposition that a claim for punitive damages is a particular element of a 
cause of action, and it does not constitute a separate claim or cause of action. 
Uema v. Nippon Exp. Hawaii, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1250 (D.Hawaii 1998) 
("[w]ell settled is the notion that punitive damages does not, in and of itself, 
state a separate cause of action in tort, but is incidental to a separate cause 
of action."). See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 741 at 794-95 (1988) and cases cited 
therein (the rule is summarized, "[a] claim for punitive damages cannot stand as 
a separate cause of action, since it merely constitutes an element of recovery 
on the underlying cause of action.").

[¶9] This Court 
historically has treated the term "claim" as interchangeable with "cause of 
action." See, e.g., Kirby v. NMC/Continue Care, 993 P.2d 951, 954 (Wyo. 1999) 
(used both "claim" and "cause of action" in connection with the elements of a 
negligence cause of action); Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, 674 P.2d 232, 
238 (Wyo. 1984) (elements of a cause of action for fraud); Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1983) (elements of a claim for 
negligence); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) 
(elements of a cause of action for contract); Reynolds v. Tice, 595 P.2d 1318, 
1323 (Wyo. 1979) (elements of a contract claim and elements of a fraud claim); 
and Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979) 
(elements of a cause of action for negligence). Many years ago, we 
said:

[¶10] Inasmuch 
as the plaintiffs are not entitled to any actual damages, they are not, 
according to the general rule, entitled to any punitive damages. Sutherland on 
Damages (4th Ed.) § 406; Sedgwick on Damages (9th Ed.) § 361; 17 C.J. 
974.

[¶11] Martel v. 
Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 186, 253 P. 862, 867 (1927). The obvious inference is 
that in Wyoming, punitive damages are an element of a claim or cause of action 
and are not a separate claim.

[¶12] Summary 
judgment in Wyoming is authorized and governed by W.R.C.P. 56. The portions of 
that rule relevant to this discussion are:

(a) For claimant. ~ A 
party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain 
a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part 
thereof.

(b) For defending party. 
~ A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part 
thereof.

(c) Motion and 
proceedings thereon. - * * * A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages.

(d) Cause not fully 
adjudicated on motion. - If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence 
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what 
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall 
be conducted accordingly.

[¶13] (Emphasis 
added.) Also important to this discussion is W.R.C.P. 
54(b):

(b) Judgment upon 
multiple claims or involving multiple parties. - When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third- party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶14] The 
question here suggests a tension between paragraphs (a) and (b) of W.R.C.P. 56 
on the one hand and paragraph (d) on the other. Paragraphs (a) and (b) purport 
to allow parties to move for summary judgment on "all or any part" of a "claim." 
Paragraph (d) directs that when "judgment is not rendered on the whole case or 
for all the relief asked" (i.e., when summary judgment is denied in whole or in 
part), the district court may "make an order" specifying the facts not in 
controversy. Paragraph (d) appears to prescribe a very different outcome than 
paragraphs (a) and (b) appear to permit the parties to seek. W.R.C.P. 56(c), 
however, demonstrates that a partial summary judgment on less than the entire 
claim must be specifically authorized. In its last sentence, this paragraph 
permits an interlocutory summary judgment on liability, leaving the 
determination of damages to the finder of fact. W.R.C.P. 54(b) speaks to the 
entry of judgment on entire individual claims. To dissipate any uncertainty, we 
hold that the district court may not grant a final, appealable summary judgment 
on part of a claim, other than a determination of 
liability.

[¶15] This Court 
has never squarely addressed the question of a partial summary judgment on an 
element of a claim or cause of action, but we may have created an assumption 
that such a judgment could be entered. Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 1293, 1301-02 (Wyo. 1995). In Verschoor, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on four theories of recovery, 
including punitive damages. In that case, however, the language suggests that 
actually the court was addressing a claim for willful and wanton 
misrepresentation, which could have included an element of punitive damages. Id. 
at 1301. Similarly, in Petty-Ray Geophysical, Div. of Geosource, Inc. v. Ludvik, 
718 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Wyo. 1986), this Court displayed no aversion to a grant of 
partial summary judgment for a defendant on the question of punitive damages. 
That decision is not inconsistent with the reconciliation of the paragraphs of 
W.R.C.P. 56 that we reach here.

[¶16] W.R.C.P. 
56 mirrors the federal rule on summary judgment, F.R.C.P. 56. Federal decisions 
interpreting F.R.C.P. 56, therefore, are highly persuasive. Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 445 (Wyo. 1982). Federal authority on partial summary 
judgment is concentrated at the district court level, and is mixed. In the 
federal context also, the diversity of opinion arises from a perceived tension 
between paragraphs (a) and (b), which authorize summary judgment on "all or any 
part" of a claim, and paragraph (d), which directs the district court to merely 
"make an order" when a motion for summary judgment is denied in whole or in 
part.

[¶17] Some 
federal courts, relying on the "all or any part" language, have ruled that 
partial summary judgment is available on any portion of a claim. In France Stone 
Co., Inc. v. Charter Tp. Of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 708-09 (E.D.Mich. 1992), 
the plaintiff sued for a variance from a zoning ordinance forbidding mining. To 
obtain the variance, the plaintiff had to show that (1) valuable natural 
resources were present; and (2) no serious consequences would result from the 
mining. The plaintiff requested a partial summary judgment declaring that a 
large deposit of dolomite was a valuable natural resource. The court granted the 
partial summary judgment over the defendant's protest, stating F.R.C.P. 56(a) 
"clearly states that a motion for summary judgment may be brought on a claim `or 
any part thereof." France Stone Co., Inc., 790 F. Supp.  at 710. Another federal 
opinion strongly in support of allowing partial summary judgment on portions of 
claims is Blackford v. Action Products Co., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 79 (W.D.Mo. 1981). 
An extended quotation from Blackford is warranted here:

[¶18] The award 
of summary judgment on a portion of a claim is clearly covered by the words of 
Rule 56(a). It is a not uncommon occurrence, and has been the practice since 
early decisions applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. * * * The cases 
concluding that Rule 56(a) does not allow summary judgment on a portion of a 
claim have relied on the following excerpt from Rule 
56(d):

"If on motion under this 
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked 
and a trial is necessary, the court . . . shall, if practicable ascertain what 
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy . . 
. ."

[¶19] The duty 
to sift the issues under Rule 56(d) is in no way inconsistent with the duty to 
award judgment on "all or part" of a claim under Rule 56(a). A Rule 56(d) order 
may be issued as part of a summary judgment determination under Rule 56(a), or 
in cases in which no judgment is warranted, but certain material issues have 
been decided.

Blackford, 92 F.R.D.  at 
79-80.

[¶20] Other 
federal courts have expressed the view that judgment cannot be entered on less 
than an entire count or claim. See In re Randy, 189 B.R. 425, 436 
(Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1995). One court has even held that courts cannot use Rule 56(d) 
to narrow the issues for trial by issuing orders that certain damage elements 
cannot be asserted or have not been proven. Oberweis Dairy, Inc. v. Associated 
Milk Producers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 962, 970-71 (N.D.Ill. 1982). Those cases do 
not resolve the tension with the W.R.C.P. 56(a) and (b) "all or any part" 
language. However, the definition of "judgment" in W.R.C.P. 54(a)2 suggests that a motion under 
W.R.C.P. 56(a) or (b) for a summary judgment on any part of a claim is not a 
demand for "judgment" at all, and is correctly identified as a submission 
seeking the relief provided in W.R.C.P. 56(d).

[¶21] That view 
is reflected in In re Grabill Corp., 135 B.R. 101, 106 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1991) 
(Rule 56(d) provides a method by which a court can narrow issues and facts for 
trial after denying in whole or in part a motion properly brought under Rule 
56). A federal district court in Pennsylvania said: "The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not authorize partial summary judgment for a portion of a single 
claim. * * * However, Rule 56(d) empowers a district court to withdraw issues 
from a case where a genuine issue of fact is absent." Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 204 (W.D.Pa. 1980). Another court held that when a defendant admitted 
liability on part of a debt, a Rule 56(a) judgment was not appropriate, but a 
Rule 56(d) order was. Bonda's Veevoederfabriek Provimi, B.V. v. Provimi, Inc., 
425 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (E.D.Wis. 1976).

[¶22] We also 
look for guidance in the decisions of Oregon, a state with the same language in 
its summary judgment rule. Oregon's courts have reversed entries of summary 
judgments on individual categories of damages. The rationale adopted is that the 
partial summary judgment rule does not allow "judgment" at all. Rather, it 
allows only interlocutory orders that become law in the case, but are not ripe 
for entry of judgment or appeal until the entire case has been adjudicated. The 
Oregon courts, asserting a lack of jurisdiction, have refused to hear appeals of 
partial summary judgments. Instead, they have vacated those judgments and 
remanded. McKechnie v. Stanke, 124 Or. App. 405, 862 P.2d 507, 508 (1993); 
Chelson v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 71 Or. App. 645, 694 P.2d 981, 982 (1985), 
modified, 85 Or. App. 84, 735 P.2d 659 (1987). The Oregon approach allows 
district courts to avoid litigation on baseless claims, and saves the appellate 
courts from piecemeal appeals.

[¶23] We 
perceive that the correct reading is found in those opinions holding that when 
summary judgment cannot be granted as to an entire claim, the district court may 
only issue a W.R.C.P. 56(d) order specifying the facts that are not reasonably 
in dispute. That order then becomes the law of the case and is changeable, but 
not appealable, until it is incorporated into a final judgment on the entire 
case. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn 
River System, 803 P.2d 61, 69 (Wyo. 1990). That interpretation is true to 
W.R.C.P. 54(b), which allows entry of final judgment on claims, and to W.R.C.P. 
56(d), which prescribes orders rather than judgments when the entire claim is 
not resolved.

[¶24] Although 
we hold the district court was without authority to issue a final, appealable 
summary judgment on the question of punitive damages, we proceed to review the 
case on its merits. We will treat the case as one in which a petition for a writ 
of review had been properly sought. Our usual standard of review for summary 
judgments is applicable. That standard is found in W.R.C.P. 56. Cities Service 
Oil and Gas Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146, 150 (Wyo. 1992). In accordance with 
the cited rule, we will affirm a summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record from the point of view 
most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, and give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that we may fairly draw from the record. 
Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶25] The first 
issue we address is the district court's decision to strike the affidavit of the 
Erringtons' expert witness. Zolessi moved to strike the affidavit on the ground 
that it contradicted the expert's previous deposition testimony. Specifically, 
Zolessi claimed the expert testified that Zolessi's failure to fully inform the 
Erringtons after the operation did not amount to a breach of the standard of 
care; that he had no evidence that Zolessi intended to harm Dianna Errington; 
and that he had no evidence that Zolessi acted so recklessly and with such 
wanton and willful misconduct as to approach intent to harm. Zolessi argues the 
expert changed this opinion in his affidavit in which he said Zolessi's conduct 
was intentional, willful, and wanton. The district court struck the affidavit as 
a sham, without explaining its rationale.

[¶26] The 
Erringtons argue on appeal that the expert's affidavit was consistent with his 
deposition, although it used some different terminology. An opinion letter by 
the expert and a pleading filed by the Erringtons prior to the expert's 
deposition both said he would testify that Zolessi's treatment of Dianna 
Errington fell below the standard of care. Several times during his deposition, 
the expert testified to that same point. The expert never retracted his written 
opinions. During the deposition, defense counsel read to the expert extensive 
definitions of "willful and wanton" and "gross negligence" and asked the expert 
whether Zolessi's conduct met those definitions. The expert said that he was not 
familiar with those definitions and was not prepared to answer. The question was 
not raised again.

[¶27] The only 
real disparity between the expert's deposition testimony and his affidavit is 
the repeated use of the words "willfully," "wrongfully," and "falsely." Because 
the expert had not indicated that he would testify as to those terms and was not 
an experienced witness, it was reasonable for him to be unfamiliar with them and 
reluctant to use them. Further, it may fairly be inferred that because he was 
unable to answer the question in his deposition, the expert became familiar with 
the legal terminology in order to address the definitional language in his 
affidavit. His affidavit is consistent with his opinion letter and his 
deposition testimony in all material aspects, and we hold the district court 
erred in striking it.

[¶28] This Court 
has repeatedly treated the question of whether conduct was willful and wanton as 
a question of fact. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 837 
(Wyo. 1994); Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 1051 (Wyo. 1992). Once the affidavit of the Erringtons' expert 
witness is in the record, it is apparent that a material issue of fact exists as 
to whether Zolessi's conduct was so willful and wanton as to support an award of 
punitive damages. That being the case, a summary judgment, or even an order 
under W.R.C.P. 56(d), was not appropriate.

[¶29] The 
district court's partial summary judgment is vacated; its order striking the 
affidavit of the Erringtons' expert witness is reversed; and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 A fistula 
is "an abnormal passage leading from an abscess or hollow organ to the body 
surface or from one hollow organ to another and permitting the passage of fluids 
or secretions." Merriam-Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 467 
(1986).

2 W.R.C.P. 
54(a) reads, in relevant part: "[a] judgment is the final determination of the 
rights of the parties in action."