Title: SCHOOL DISTRICTS v HUMAN RIGHTS CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

/3&4 No. ft36%F IN TKE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, BOZEMAN, MONTANA; OPHIR SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 72, GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA ; WILLOW CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 15, GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA; THREE FORKS SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 24, GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA, Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, STATE OF MONTANA, AND RAYMOND D. BROWN, Administrator thereof, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Rosemary B . Zion, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Donald E. White County Attorney's Office, Bozeman, Montana Brian Sullivan, argued, Bozeman, Montana d L 1 4 1 ' " " Filed: Submitted: June 7, 1977 Decided : a 2 - I d . Clerk. Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendants appeal from an order of the district court, Gallatin County, denying their motion for change of venue to Lewis and Clark County. Plaintiffs are four school districts in Gallatin County. They brought an action against the defendants, Human Rights Commission, State of Montana, and Raymond D . Brown, its adminis- trator, seeking a writ of prohibition, or in the alternative to quash defendants' interrogatories. The action sought to halt proceedings of the defendants in investigating complaints filed with the Commission concerning alleged discriminatory practices of the school districts in violation of what we will call the anti-discrimination act, section 64-301, et.seq., R . C . M . 1947. The petition alleges defendants' submission of interrogatories and attempted interrogation of administrators of plaintiff school districts violates plaintiffs' constit~tional rights against self- incrimination under the federal and state constitutions. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art.11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution. The district court entered an order prohibiting defendants from compelling plaintiffs to answer the interrogatories sent to them and quashing the interrogatories during the pendency of the action, and set a hearing on making the order permanent. Thereafter, among other things, defendants filed a motion for change of venue to Lewis and Clark County. Following sub- mission of briefs, the district court denied defendants' motion for change of venue. Defendants appeal from that order. The issue on appeal i s whether venue is properly i n Gallatin County or Lewis and Clark County. Defendants contend that venue properly l i e s i n Lewis and Clark County under section 93-2902(2), R.C.M. 1947, because that is where "the cause, o r some part thereof, arose". They claim the s i t u s of o f f i c i a l acts of a public agency or o f f i c i a l i s i n the county of o f f i c i a l residence which is the decision-making hub from which a l l o f f i c i a l a c t s emanate, here Lewis and Clark County. Defendants view p l a i n t i f f s ' petition a s an action t o l i m i t or extinguish t h e i r statutory investigative powers; thus they contend that the underlying question i s whether they may exercise t h e i r investigative powers a t a l l and not whether the effects of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are f e l t i n Gallatin County. They c i t e Lunt v. Division of Workmen's Compensation (1975), 167 Mont. 251, 537 P.2d 1080, i n support of their venue claim, and contend that Guthrie v. Department of Health and Environ- mental Sciences, e t a l . (1977), Mont . , 561 P.2d 913, 34 St.Rep. 155, does not require a contrary result. Additionally, they claim that public policy against dissipating the time and resources of s t a t e agencies i n defending t h e i r actions a t far- flung locations throughout the s t a t e of Montana supports their position on venue. They deny that p l a i n t i f f s ' right against self- incrimination i s involved i n determining venue; they say such constitutional right can only be asserted by a natural person and not a governmental entity [United Sta tes v: White (1944), 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L ed 15421 and the right cannot be invoked a s a general bar t o inquiry, but can only be asserted t o specific disclosures sought [Kastigar v. United States (1972), 406 U.S. 441, 92A S.Ct. 1653, 32 L ed 2d 2121. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, agree that section 93-2902 governs venue i n t h i s action, but disagree as to the nature of their action and where it arises. They view their action as fundamentally one t o establish and give effect to their constitu- tional right against self-incrimination. They assert that a l l of the conduct of defendants which they seek t o prohibit occurred i n Gallatin County; that is where the cause of action arose, and that is where venue lies. They c i t e Guthrie v. Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, supra; and the California case Cecil v. Superior Court (1943), 59 C.A.2d 793, 140 P.2d 125, i n support of their position. The statute controlling venue i n t h i s case i s section 93- 2902, which provides i n pertinent part: "Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose * * *. "2. Against a public officer, or a person specially appointed to execute h i s duties, for an act done by him i n virtue of h i s office; or against a person who, by h i s command or i n h i s aid, does anything touching the duties of such officer." A "public officer" within the meaning of t h i s statute encompasses a governmental agency which can only act through its public officers and employees. Lunt v. Division of Workmen's Compensa- tion, supra. Thus defendant Human Rights Commission, as well a s defendant Brown its administrator, is a public officer within the meaning of t h i s statute. The crux of venue i n t h i s case is where "the cause, or some part thereof, arose" within the meaning of section 93-2902. Prior decisions of t h i s Court have a l l turned upon t h i s question with varying results, depending upon our view of the nature of the action involved i n each case. In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v . Public Service Commission (1940), 111 Mont. 78, 107 P . 2 d 533, an action to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Commission reducing utility rates for natural gas service in Valley and Phillips Counties, this Court held that venue was properly in Valley County where the action was originally filed, rather than Lewis and Clark County the official residence of the Commission and the place where the order was issued. Venue was determined-under the statutory predecessor of section 93-2902 on the basis that plaintiff sought relief from operation of the order which would occur in Valley and Phillips Counties where the cause of action arose. State ex rel. Fulton v . District Court ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 573, 366 P.2d 435, an original petition seeking a writ of prohibi- tion to restrain the district court of Cascade County from further proceeding with an action against the State Board of Equaliza- tion relating to its regulations concerning the corporation license tax, contains dictum to the effect that section 93-2902 requires the action to be filed in Lewis and Clark County, the official residence of the Board and the place where the regulations were issued. Gildroy v. Anderson (1972), 159 Mont. 325, 497 P.2d 688, was an action for injunction to prevent the governor of Montana from implementing an executive order establishing multi-county planning and administration districts and changing the composition of existing districts. We held venue properly belonged in Lewis and Clark County, the county of the governor's official residence, rather than Musselshell County, one of the affected counties. We construed the objective of plaintiff's complaint as a challenge to an official act of the governor, allegedly exceeding his power and authority vis-a-vis the s t a t e legislature, rather than a challenge t o the merits of the operation of the executive order i n redistricting the affected counties. I n Lunt v. Division of workmen's Compensation, supra, an action for a w r i t of mandate t o compel the s t a t e agency t o s e t a hearing on petitioner's claim for worker's compensation bene- f i t s , we held venue property belonged i n Lewis and Clark County, the s i t u s of the agency's office, rather than Yellowstone County where the action was f i l e d , because the action only involved a function of the agency's offices i n Lewis and Clark County. Finally, in Guthrie v. Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences e t a l . , surpa, w e again looked t o the nature of the action i n holding that venue properly lay i n Teton County rather than Lewis and Clark County. This was an action by recreational and business users of land i n Teton County near a subdivision development against the State Department of Health, the Teton County Commissioners and the subdivision developers. The action sought an injunction against the defendants t o restrain further action that would physically a l t e r the land i n the sub- division u n t i l sanitary restrictions were properly l i f t e d and p l a t approval properly secured. W e construed the nature of the action a s seeking t o restrain alleged irreparable harm t o Teton County land. Accordingly, we held Teton County was where the action arose and where venue was proper. The root of the venue issue i n the instant case i s the con- f l i c t i n g view of the parties a s t o the nature of the action. P l a i n t i f f s contend their action fundamentally involves t h e i r con- s t i t u t i o n a l right against self-incrimination being denied them by conduct of defendants i n Gallatin County. Defendants claim plaintiffs' action is basically an attack seeking destruction or at least limitation of their statutory powers and authority to investigate complaints of discrimination under the act. The merits of plaintiff&' action are not before us. Conway v . Fabian, 103 Mont. 574, 63 P . 2 d 1022. Venue must be deter- mined on the basis of the allegations in plaintiffs' petition. Johnson v . Clark, 131Mont. 454, 311 P.2d 772. In our view, the gist of plaintiffs' petition is that their constitutional right against self-incrimination is allegedly being infringed upon by defendants' investigatory activities and conduct in Gallatin County which they seek to arrest by a writ of prohibi- tion. Plaintiffs' attack is not upon the statutory power and authority of the Commission to investigate complaints under the anti-discrimination act. Rather it is an attack on the Comis- sion's method or manner of exercising those powers in conducting its investigation in Gallatin County, in alleged violation of constitutional guarantees. The attack is not upon the statutory powers of the Commission, but upon the conduct of defendants in Gallatin County in the exercise or operation of those powers. The cause of action arose in Gallatin County because the conduct of defendants there allegedly violated constitutional rights of Gallatin County residents and entities. Thus venue properly lies in Gallatin County under section 93-2902. Public policy considera- tions do not change our view. We have considred the remaining contentions of defendants but consider them irrelevant to venue. They attack the merits of plaintiffs' petition, which is not before us on this appeal The order of the district court denying a change of venue to Lewis and Clark County is af f irmed. Justice. We Concur: Justices. M r . Justice Daniel J . Shea specially concurring : I concur i n the venue decision and the Court's refusal t o consider the merits of defendants' claim that p l a i n t i f f s a s e n t i t i e s , were asserting constitutional rights t h a t belonged only t o individuals. The d i s t r i c t court has not yet ruled on that question. However, the d i s t r i c t court and t h i s Court should have considered the obvious conflict of interest which the attorney county/has i n asserting self-incrimination rights for h i s clients. The conflict i s between h i s function as prosecuting attorney of Gallatin County and h i s function a s c i v i l legal advisor t o the school d i s t r i c t s and trustees. One of those functions must prevail, and since the county would be without a prosecutor i f he chose h i s duty t o be c i v i l advisor t o the school d i s t r i c t s and trustees, the duty t o prosecute must prevail. The school d i s t r i c t s involved should h i r e an independent lawyer. Under section 16-3101, R.C.M. 1947, it is the function of each county attorney to "conduct on behalf of the s t a t e , a l l prosecutions for public offenses * * *." The anti-discrimina- tion a c t , section 64-312, R.C.M. 1947, provides that a w i l l f u l violation of the a c t , whether in committing a prohibited act or i n interfering with the a c t i v i t i e s of the Human Rights Commis- sion, is a misdemeanor for which one can be fined and jailed. Therefore, any violation of t h i s a c t may ultimately f a l l i n the lap of the county attorney t o prosecute. I n fact, there i s no other o f f i c i a l who can bring a criminal prosecution under the anti-discrimination act. Under these circumstances the county attorney has no right t o prevent the disclosure of evidence which may be incriminating. Rather, it is h i s duty t o obtain the evidence and to prosecute if he determines there is a criminal violation. To allow him to proceed in this case is to strip the people of Montana of a prosecutor in Gallatin County for criminal proceedings under the anti-discrimination act. Section 75-8305.1, R.C.M. 1947, expressly provides school districts may hire independent counsel in the event of a conflict of interest. The county attorney should advise the school boards they should retain independent counsel if they desire to raise the privilege against self-incrimination as a defense to the interrogatories propounded by the Human Rights Commission. If the county attorney will not voluntarily withdraw from the case, the district court should order that he withdraw and that plaintiffs hire independent counsel. 2 - - Justice.