Title: People v. Covarrubias

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 9/8/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S075136 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
DANIEL SANCHEZ COVARRUBIAS, 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC942212C 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Daniel Sanchez Covarrubias of the first degree 
murders of Ramon Morales, Martha Morales, and Fernando Martinez (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1 through 3),1 attempted murder of 11-month-old 
Alejandra Morales (§§ 187, 664; count 4), assault with a firearm of Alejandra 
Morales (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count five), three counts of robbery (§ 212.5, subd. 
(a); counts 6 through 8), residential burglary (§ 459; count 9), and conspiracy to 
commit robbery and burglary (§ 182, subd. (a)(l); count 10).  The jury further 
found true the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3)) and allegations that the murders were committed while defendant was 
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of robbery and 
burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).    
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
As to counts 1 through 9, the jury found that a principal was armed with a 
firearm, a .38-caliber handgun and a .30-30 rifle, (former § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) 
and an assault weapon, an AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle, (former § 12022, 
subd. (a)(2)).  The jury found not true the allegation that defendant was personally 
armed with a knife (former § 12022, subd. (b)) and was unable to reach a verdict 
on the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun (former § 12022.5, 
subd. (a)). 
Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. 
The trial court denied defendant‘s motion for modification of the penalty to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced 
him to death on the murder counts.  On the remaining counts, the court imposed an 
aggregate determinate sentence of 32 years four months, stayed pending execution 
of the death sentence. 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We reverse the judgment of 
death because of the erroneous excusal of a prospective juror during jury selection, 
remand the matter for a new penalty determination and reconsideration of the 
question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable statute, and affirm the 
judgment in all other aspects. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
a.  Overview   
On November 16, 1994, Ramon Morales (Ramon), his wife Martha 
Morales (Martha), and her brother Fernando Martinez (Martinez), were shot and 
killed during a home invasion robbery committed by defendant and his cousins 
Antonio Sanchez (Sanchez) and Joaquin Nunez (Nunez), and his 16-year-old 
 
3 
nephew, Jose Luis Ramirez (Ramirez).2  The Moraleses‘ 11-month-old daughter, 
Alejandra Morales (Alejandra), was shot multiple times and survived.3 
After the homicides, defendant fled to Mexico.  In July 1995, he was 
captured at his home in Mexicali, Mexico, returned to the United States by bounty 
hunters, and eventually taken into custody in Monterey County to face charges in 
this case.  Sanchez and Nunez were subsequently taken into custody in Mexicali.    
Ramirez testified pursuant to a plea agreement with the Monterey County 
District Attorney‘s Office that provided he would plead guilty to three counts of 
robbery and one count of burglary and serve a sentence of 11 years eight months 
in exchange for his truthful testimony. 
b.  Background 
In early 1994, Ramon, Martha, Alejandra, and Martinez rented a house on 
Toro Street in Salinas with four other individuals.   In August 1994, Sanchez 
moved into the house. 
Ramirez frequently visited the house.  According to Ramirez, Sanchez and 
Ramon were ―good friends‖; they stole cars and sold drugs.  Sanchez ―sold a lot of 
cocaine‖ for Ramon.  At some point, Ramon and Sanchez had a dispute over drug 
                                              
2  
We will sometimes refer to defendant, Sanchez, Ramirez, and Nunez as the 
four men. 
3  
Another of defendant‘s cousins, Lorenzo Nunez (Lorenzo), was also 
prosecuted for his involvement in the crimes.  For approximately three months 
before the crimes, he lived in the house with the victims.  Two days before the 
crimes, Lorenzo gave Sanchez and Nunez two rifles that he had stolen from 
Ramon.  Lorenzo was separately tried and convicted as an aider and abettor of 
three counts of murder and related charges, and sentenced to a prison term of 40 
years to life.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions in an unpublished 
decision, and this court denied review.   
 
4 
money.  Each said they wanted to kill the other.   Ramon and Sanchez also 
quarreled over money that Ramon owed to Sanchez for repairing Ramon‘s car. 
Around September 1994, Sanchez went to Mexicali, Mexico.  Meanwhile, 
the Morales family, Martinez, and Lorenzo moved into a converted garage 
apartment on East Market Street in Salinas.  The apartment consisted of a living 
room and kitchen, each of which was 10 feet by 10 feet, and a bedroom/bathroom 
combination room. 
In November 1994, defendant was living in Southern California.  Around 
November 11, defendant arrived in his car at the home of his sister, Bertha 
Sanchez (Bertha) in Salinas.  Sanchez and Nunez accompanied defendant.  They 
all stayed at Bertha‘s house overnight.  Defendant told her he intended to return to 
Southern California the following day.  Bertha asked him to wait because she was 
going to drive to Mexicali in a couple of days to pick up her husband, and she 
wanted him to follow her in his car in case she had mechanical problems.  
Defendant agreed, and they planned to leave on Thursday, November 17.  
Defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez stayed at Bertha‘s house until November 16, the 
day of the homicides.  
On November 15, Lorenzo visited defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez at 
Bertha‘s house.  Lorenzo pulled some guns out from under a sofa.   When Bertha 
saw the guns, she told defendant to remove them from the house.  He took them to 
his car, and the four men left.  Bertha testified the guns could have been an AR-15 
and a .30-30 rifle. 
c.  The day of the homicides 
(i)  Morning hours and the drive to the trailer park 
About 10 a.m. on November 16, 1994, Sanchez, defendant, and Nunez 
arrived at Ramirez‘s house in defendant‘s car.  For a couple of hours, they ate, 
 
5 
played dominoes, and drank beer.  In the afternoon, defendant drove himself and 
Sanchez, Ramirez, and Nunez4 to a trailer in a nearby trailer park so that Sanchez 
could collect $100 on a debt owed to him.    
(ii)  JKD Shooting Sports store 
After they left the trailer park, defendant drove to JKD Shooting Sports in 
Salinas.  Defendant stayed in the car and the others went inside.  With the $100 he 
had collected at the trailer park, Sanchez purchased .223-caliber ammunition and a 
high-capacity magazine that could fit an AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle.  The 
magazine could hold 40 rounds, and the box of ammunition contained 50 rounds.  
Sanchez also purchased ammunition for the .30-30 rifle.5   
(iii)  Visits to the homes of Amy Arredondo, Amy Trejo, and 
Bertha Sanchez 
After the four men left the firearms store, defendant drove them to the 
home of Amy Arredondo, Sanchez‘s half sister, where they had dinner and drank 
more beer.  Arredondo saw Sanchez and Nunez each had a big rifle; they said one 
was an ―R-15‖ (sic) and the other was an ―M-16.‖  Arredondo informed the four 
men that they had to leave because she did not want guns in her house.  They 
departed around 5:30 p.m. and drove to the home of her daughter, Amy Trejo. 
Upon arriving at Trejo‘s house, Sanchez went to a car he stored there, 
telling Ramirez he was going to get his rifles out of the car.  Trejo saw Sanchez 
take a box from his trunk and place it in defendant‘s car trunk.  She had seen 
                                              
4  
Unless otherwise indicated, defendant drove himself, Sanchez, Ramirez, 
and Nunez in his car to various locations on the day of the homicides, including 
the Morales house.   
5  
The register receipt indicated that the ammunition was purchased on 
November 15, 1994.  A clerk at the store, James Fletcher, testified that the date 
on the receipt was correct and that the purchase occurred ―very early on during 
the day.‖   
 
6 
―guns‖ in the box on a previous occasion.  Trejo knew that there had been 
problems between Sanchez and Ramon and that Sanchez ―wanted to get‖ Ramon, 
and Ramon ―wanted to get‖ Sanchez.  The four men were at Trejo‘s house for 
about 15 minutes and then left. 
After leaving Trejo‘s house, the four men went to Bertha‘s house and fixed 
a tire on her car.  Afterward, they sat in defendant‘s car, drinking beer with 
Bertha‘s son, Jorge Acosta.  Sometime between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m., Bertha came 
home.  She became upset when she found the men drinking in the car.  Bertha 
believed defendant was drunk and testified that she would not have driven in a car 
with him that evening.  Jorge got out of the car and went inside with his mother.  
The four men left in defendant‘s car.  
(iv)  Test-firing the rifles 
After leaving Bertha‘s house, defendant drove them into the foothills 
outside Salinas.  On the way, Sanchez, who was in the front seat, talked about 
going to Ramon‘s house to rob and kill him.  Sanchez and Ramirez put 
ammunition in the high-capacity magazine Sanchez purchased at the firearms 
store.  When defendant stopped the car, all four men exited.  After defendant 
opened the trunk, Sanchez grabbed an AR-15 rifle, and Nunez grabbed a .30-30 
rifle.  The trunk contained a bag of ammunition different from that purchased at 
the firearms store.  Everyone got back into the car, and defendant slowly drove 
around as Sanchez and Nunez test-fired their rifles by shooting them into the air 
from the rolled-down window.  Ramirez test-fired the .30-30 rifle once.   
Robert Falcon, who lived three miles outside of Salinas in the foothills, 
heard three or four gunshots nearby and called 911.  Monterey County Sheriff‘s 
Deputy Greg Liskey arrived about 40 minutes later, at 8:41 p.m. but found 
nothing suspicious.  
 
7 
(v)  Guillermo Morales’s home and the motel  
After test-firing the rifles, defendant, Sanchez, Ramirez, and Nunez decided 
to go to the home of Guillermo Morales, Ramon‘s brother.  Sanchez said that 
―they also want[ed] to kill Guillermo.‖  On the way to Guillermo‘s, defendant said 
he wanted a smaller weapon and detoured to the house of one of Ramirez‘s friends 
who was known to have guns.  When they learned that the friend was not home, 
the four men headed to Guillermo‘s house.  Upon arriving there, they discovered 
no one was home.  The four men then headed toward a hotel where they 
understood that a person named ―Frank‖ was staying.  Sanchez said that he wanted 
to kill Frank because he owed Sanchez $100 or $200.  When they arrived at the 
hotel, no one got out of the car.  They left and defendant drove to the Morales 
house.  
(vi)  The shootings 
When the four men arrived at the Morales residence, defendant parked 
around the corner.  There, defendant and Sanchez came up with a plan to go in the 
house, steal ―stuff,‖ and kill whoever was inside so that there would be no 
witnesses to their crimes.  Defendant volunteered to knock on the front door 
because no one in the house knew him.   
The four men exited defendant‘s car.  Nunez had the .30-30 rifle, Sanchez 
had the AR-15, and defendant had a seven- or eight-inch knife.6  Defendant went 
to the door, knocked, and when no one answered, he opened the door and went 
inside.  Defendant grabbed Martinez, who was sleeping in the living room, held 
him at knifepoint, and told him not to look at anyone.  Sanchez, Nunez, and 
                                              
6  
As stated above, the jury found not true the allegation that defendant was 
personally armed with a knife.    
 
8 
Ramirez followed defendant inside the house.  Sanchez pointed his rifle at 
Martinez.    
Defendant and Sanchez stayed in the living room with Martinez; Ramirez 
and Nunez started to search the bedroom for items to steal.  Sanchez instructed 
Ramirez to take whatever he could from the house.  Ramirez transported various 
items, including a video cassette recorder (VCR) and stereo equipment, to 
defendant‘s car.  Ramirez also took a neck chain, a .32-caliber handgun that 
Sanchez handed him, and a hair oil product.  Ramirez made three trips to the car.  
Defendant searched boxes that were near a wall.   
About 9:00 p.m., on his last trip taking items to defendant‘s car, Ramirez 
saw Ramon drive up.  Ramirez went inside and told Sanchez that Ramon and 
Martha were coming.  Nunez hid behind the front door.  Defendant took Martinez 
into the bedroom.  Sanchez and Ramirez hid in the kitchen behind the refrigerator.  
When Martha entered the house, Nunez pointed his rifle at her and forced her into 
the bedroom.  Martha was carrying Alejandra.  When Ramon entered, Sanchez 
pointed his AR-15 rifle at him, ordered him to kneel down, and demanded Ramon 
tell him where the drugs, money, and guns were.  At some point, defendant tried to 
place a blindfold on Ramon.  Ramon told Sanchez that he had $5,000 in the bank 
and that his brother had the drugs.  Sanchez kept his rifle pointed at Ramon while 
defendant searched for guns.  Defendant then found two handguns in a box near 
the kitchen.  Ramirez testified that he thought one of the guns was a .38-caliber 
handgun, and the other he could not remember.  He thought defendant used his left 
hand to put the gun Ramirez believed to be a .38-caliber handgun in Sanchez‘s 
jacket pocket.  Defendant held the other gun in his right hand.   
As Ramon was begging for his life in the living room, Ramirez heard what 
sounded like a .30-30 gunshot from the bedroom.  Ramirez fled.  ―Fairly rapid‖ 
gunfire erupted inside the house.  Della Longoria, a neighbor, heard the gunfire 
 
9 
and saw gun smoke come through the opened front door of the Morales house.  
Longoria identified the first person she saw run from the house to be defendant 
and believed he was carrying a rifle. 
Meanwhile, Ramirez ran to the next block.  When he looked back at the 
Morales house, he saw defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez, running to defendant‘s car.  
Defendant sped away with the car‘s headlights off.   
(vii)  Events immediately following the homicides 
Around 9:00 p.m., police responded to the scene and discovered Ramon‘s 
body on the living room floor.  Martinez‘s body was found near the doorway 
leading to the bedroom and bathroom, and Martha‘s body was found in the 
bedroom at the foot of the bed.  Alejandra was lying near Martha‘s knees, crying 
and covered in blood. 
Ramirez ran to his cousin Amy Trejo‘s house.  He was dressed in dark 
clothing, wore a knit cap, and had in his possession the neck chain, the .32-caliber 
handgun, and the hair oil product that he took from the Morales‘s house.  Ramirez 
gave these items to Arturo Perez and left.  
Later that night, defendant went to the home of his sister Elvia Covarrubias 
and asked for gas money.  He left immediately after he was given $50.  Defendant 
fled to Mexico.  
The next day, Ramirez returned to Trejo‘s house with a friend, Daniel 
Barba.  Ramirez gave the handgun, which was inoperable, to Daniel.  Perez helped 
Ramirez sell the neck chain at a pawnshop for $60.     
d.  Investigation 
Salinas police investigators found the following on the bed in the bedroom:  
a box of .38-caliber ammunition (full metal jacket rounds); a box of .380-caliber 
ammunition (full metal jacket rounds); a box of baby diapers; and a cashbox.  At 
 
10 
least four cartridges were missing from the box of .38-caliber ammunition, and 
five were missing from the box of .380-caliber ammunition.  Defendant‘s 
fingerprints were on both boxes of ammunition and the box of diapers.  Ramirez‘s 
fingerprints were on the cashbox. 
Investigators found the following additional items during their search of the 
crime scene:  two boxes in the living room, one containing a .22-caliber intact 
bullet and a spent casing and the other containing a .380 semiautomatic pistol; a 
trash can in the kitchen containing a vinyl bag full of .22-caliber ammunition; a 
box of .32-caliber ammunition on top of the refrigerator; a box of .22-caliber 
ammunition, a Taser gun, and a small amount of hashish on the bedroom floor; 
and a triple-beam scale in the chicken coop outside the house.  During a separate 
search of the residence conducted more than a month after the homicides, police 
found two .380-caliber pistols in the bedroom and a .22-caliber rifle in the chicken 
coop.   
Alejandra was treated at a local hospital emergency room.  She suffered a 
.38-caliber through-and-through gunshot wound; the bullet had entered her left 
shoulder area and exited through her back.  The infant also suffered four nonfatal 
gunshot wounds to her leg that were caused by a single bullet.   
Personnel processing the victims‘ bodies at the coroner‘s office collected 
$204.37 from Ramon‘s pocket, $123 from Martinez‘s pocket, and $51 from 
Martha‘s purse. 
e.  Autopsies 
Dr. John Hain performed the autopsy on each victim.  Martinez was fatally 
shot in the back of the head, execution style and at point-blank range.  Martinez 
also suffered a .38-caliber gunshot wound to his back, which probably occurred 
postmortem.   
 
11 
Ramon died from multiple gunshot wounds.  He suffered ―massive‖ 
wounds to the face ―in that there was a 4-by-5 inch area of the face that was just 
torn apart.‖  Three entrance wounds to Ramon‘s lower chest ―virtually tore the 
heart to pieces.‖  Seven .223-caliber bullets were recovered from Ramon‘s body.  
A single .38-caliber bullet was recovered from the back of his head.  
Martha suffered two fatal ―devastating‖ gunshots to her forehead that left 
―her face … torn away by the blast of the gunshots and in front of the skull.‖  The 
bullets that caused the head wounds, a .38-caliber bullet and a .30-caliber hollow-
point bullet, traveled to and became lodged in Martha‘s right shoulder and armpit, 
respectively, and were recovered from those areas.  A .223-caliber bullet was 
recovered from her left side.  Martha probably died within minutes of being shot. 
f.  Ballistics Evidence 
Criminalist Larry Waller collected 18 .223-caliber shell casings from the 
crime scene.  Four casings were located outside the front door of the residence, but 
most of the remaining casings were discovered in the living room and kitchen 
area.  Waller also found four .30-30 casings — one in the living room, one at the 
junction of the living room and the kitchen, and two next to Martinez‘s body.  
Investigators collected a .30-caliber bullet that dislodged from between Martinez‘s 
eyes when his body was rolled over. 
Senior Criminalist Scott Armstrong analyzed 16 of the .223-caliber casings 
and concluded that all but one were fired from the same weapon, most likely a 
semiautomatic rifle like an AR-15.  He could not determine whether the remaining 
casing was fired from the same weapon.  Armstrong examined the four .30-30 
casings and concluded that all four were fired from the same rifle.  Armstrong also 
examined a .30-caliber bullet recovered from Martinez‘s body and one recovered 
 
12 
from Martha‘s body and determined that both were consistent with having been 
fired from a Martin Lever Action .30-30 rifle. 
Five expended .38-caliber bullets were recovered; two from under the bed 
and one from each of the three homicide victims.  Armstrong concluded that the 
three bullets found in the homicide victims and one of the bullets found under the 
bed were fired from the same weapon.  He could not determine whether the 
second bullet found under the bed was fired from that weapon.  The bullets found 
in the homicide victims were ―full metal jacket round nose type.‖  Armstrong 
compared tool marks on a bullet from one of the cartridges in the .38-caliber 
ammunition box found in the bedroom with marks on the .38-caliber bullets 
recovered from the homicide victims.  Based on his comparisons, the expert 
concluded all four bullets ―were manufactured on the same tool, at the same 
factory, at about the same time.‖  
Criminalist Julie Doerr examined the jacket and ―onesie‖ sleeper that 
Alejandra was wearing when she was shot, as well as one of the .38-caliber 
expended bullets found under the bed.  Holes in the upper left shoulder and mid-
back area of the sleeper corresponded with holes in the jacket.  The nose of the 
bullet contained a tuft of green fibers that were consistent with the fibers on 
Alejandra‘s jacket.  Doerr opined that it was ―highly likely‖ the bullet passed 
through the jacket.   
g.  Defendant’s videotaped statement 
As noted earlier, after the homicides, defendant fled to Mexico.  
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Nunez was arrested and prosecuted separately for his 
involvement in the homicides.  Crecencio Padilla, an investigator with the Office 
of the Monterey County Public Defender who represented Lorenzo Nunez in his 
state criminal proceedings, contacted Lorenzo‘s sister, Yolanda Nunez, and asked 
 
13 
her to contact defendant and ask for his assistance in defending Lorenzo.  
Subsequently, on July 20, 1995, defendant‘s sister, Bertha, provided a videotape to 
investigator Padilla.  
On the videotape, defendant stated that he was making a statement ―in the 
hopes it will be of some use to Lorenzo Nunez Martinez because on the 16th day 
of November of 1994 we committed a — a crime but one in which Lorenzo Nunez 
did not — did not participate at all . . . .‖  Defendant proceeded to admit the 
following:  He was at the Morales house with Sanchez, Joaquin Nunez, and 
Ramirez when the victims were shot, but went there only to help Sanchez ―pick up 
some things that were left in the house.‖  Defendant had weapons in his car that 
Lorenzo gave him the day before the homicides.  Defendant intended to sell the 
weapons in Mexico and, with the proceeds, bring Lorenzo‘s wife and daughter to 
Salinas.  The weapons were brought into the house because Sanchez told them 
Ramon had threatened to kill him.  Once inside, Sanchez asked Martinez ―about 
some things that — that he had left there,‖ but Martinez ―said that he didn‘t know 
about that.‖  Sanchez ―started to — to with his eyes, to look around and . . . didn‘t 
find them.‖  When Ramon was lying on the floor, he pulled out a weapon, and 
―out of fear, we all shot.  We fired the weapons that we had . . . we shot really like 
crazy.‖  
Defendant was subsequently brought back to the United States by bounty 
hunters.  On September 29, 1995, defendant was arraigned in Monterey County 
Superior Court. 
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant did not testify.  His attorney conceded that on the night of the 
homicides, defendant went to the Morales residence with Sanchez, Ramirez, and 
Nunez and that Sanchez and Nunez brought weapons.  Defendant‘s defense was 
 
14 
that he went to the Morales house simply to obtain property belonging to Sanchez, 
that Ramirez was untruthful, and that absent Ramirez‘s testimony, there was no 
evidence defendant was aware of any plan to burglarize, rob, or murder the 
Morales family.   
Trial counsel elicited from Ramirez on cross-examination that he lied to 
police when he told them (1) that defendant gave him one of the handguns he 
found near the kitchen and (2) that he (Ramirez) was looking through the window 
when he saw defendant with a handgun in his hand.  Ramirez testified that he was 
in the entryway when he saw defendant with a handgun, and that he never saw 
defendant load a weapon.  Ramirez also testified that on the day of the homicides, 
the four men bought four 12-packs of beer, and each drank about six beers.    
Jorge Acosta, Bertha‘s son, testified that on the evening of the homicides, 
he saw defendant, who was his uncle, and the other men drinking in defendant‘s 
car parked outside his mother‘s house.  Acosta was worried about how much 
defendant was drinking and ―concerned . . . his uncle . . . [would] be getting into 
some trouble or crashing or getting stopped.‖  
Acosta also testified that a few days before the homicides, the four men 
came to visit.  Acosta saw an ―assault weapon‖ and a ―rifle‖ but did not see 
defendant handle either weapon. 
Salinas Police Detective Joseph Gunter interviewed Ramirez on November 
18, 1994.  District Attorney investigator Richard Moore interviewed Ramirez on 
October 31, 1995.  Ramirez never mentioned to either Gunter or Moore that on the 
day of the homicides, the four men went to a friend‘s house to get defendant a 
weapon.  Nor did Ramirez mention that they went to Guillermo Morales‘s house 
to kill him. 
 
 
15 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
a.  Circumstances of the crimes 
The prosecution presented testimony of an expert in crime scene 
reconstruction who examined the crime scene photographs, police and autopsy 
reports, and evidence collected at the scene.  The expert testified concerning the 
position of each victim‘s body when shot, the nature of each victim‘s gunshot 
wounds, and the location of the shooters when the victims were shot.   
b.  Victim impact evidence 
The prosecution presented victim impact testimony from Martha‘s and 
Martinez‘s mother and father, Josephina Vasquez and Juan Martinez Gonzalez; 
their sister, Patricia Martinez Becerra; and Ramon‘s mother, Magdalena Diaz.  
Each testified concerning their loss, how the homicides had affected their lives, 
and the additional emotional pain caused by having closed caskets at the funerals 
because of the extensive injuries each victim suffered.  
Alejandra was almost five years old at the time of trial.  She had been 
diagnosed with a genetic disease that requires her to live in a special medical care 
foster home.  Her disease is unrelated to the gunshot wounds she suffered.  
Martha‘s parents, who lived in Mexico, had been unsuccessful in their efforts to 
obtain custody of Alejandra. 
c.  Evidence submitted in aggravation under section 190.3, factor 
(b) 
The prosecution presented evidence of multiple other acts of violence or 
threats of violence by defendant while in custody at the Monterey County jail prior 
to trial.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  On June 30, 1996, sheriff deputies found a 
dismantled razor blade, two pieces of wire, three buttons, and a string hidden in 
defendant‘s jail-issued deodorant stick.  Deputies also found a second dismantled 
 
16 
razor blade and a ―cut open‖ toothbrush lodged under defendant‘s bed frame.  On 
July 13, 1996, deputies found a dismantled razor in a brown paper bag in 
defendant‘s cell.  The items found could be used as weapons or to fashion a 
weapon from some of the other items. 
On August 18, 1996, defendant repeatedly punched a sheriff deputy in the 
back of his head and neck in an attempt to escape from the jail facility.  When 
deputies subsequently apprehended defendant, he was in possession of a blue 
watch cap and a pencil, and had a piece of paper in his pocket, which contained 
writing in Spanish or code.   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant‘s brother-in-law, Robert Reynoso, his brother, Luis Covarrubias, 
his sisters, Bertha Sanchez and Elvia Covarrubias, and his friend, Moises Diaz, all 
testified that defendant was a good brother and caring and generous person and 
friend.  Defendant was respectful to people and hard working.  In 1989, defendant 
volunteered his time and truck to transport food and clothing to survivors of the 
Loma Prieta earthquake.  Defendant helped Reynoso for a year when he was 
regularly on a dialysis machine.  
Defendant was married and had four children ranging in ages from 6 to 11 
years old.  He was very loving toward his family and friendly with all his 
neighbors.  Defendant‘s relatives and friends intended to continue to support and 
visit defendant in prison if he were sentenced to life without possibility of parole.   
Defendant presented the sworn statements of four individuals who were his 
neighbors in Mexico (Juan Manuel Avila Sanchez, Jose Guadalupe Espinoza 
Flores, Martina Dominguez de Castro, and Maria Guadalupe Castro de Gonzalez).   
The statements provided positive character testimony that showed defendant to be 
 
17 
a caring, generous person who was concerned about his family and was friendly, 
helpful, and respectful to other people. 
 Dr. Thomas Reidy, a forensic psychologist, was asked to evaluate 
defendant with regard to his ―life history and adverse factors and positive life 
factors that . . . shaped his life,‖ but specifically excluding information about the 
crimes and homicides.  Defendant grew up in poverty in Mexico.  His father was 
intolerant and abandoned the family when defendant was a small child.  Defendant 
was raised by his mother, who was absent for periods of up to six months at a time 
when she was working in the United States or in the fields.  When defendant‘s 
mother was absent, his sister and brother cared for him.  When defendant was 
seven or eight years old, his older brother, who was very close to him, was stabbed 
to death. 
Defendant began to work at age 10 washing cars.  He started abusing 
alcohol around age 14.  Defendant performed well in school and went on to 
secondary education.  His mother committed suicide in his early adulthood.  He 
suffered two convictions for driving under the influence and one for driving on a 
suspended license.  For a couple of years, he would give rides to family members 
and friends from Mexico to the United States, but he did not profit financially 
from this work.  Dr. Reidy explained that defendant ―expressed a great remorse 
regarding what happened in this case,‖ and that when defendant talked about this 
case, he kept his head down, ―looked very sad,‖ and ―talked about being sad.‖  
Dr. Reidy concluded that defendant did not have an antisocial personality disorder 
and was not a psychopath.  
 
18 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
1.  Excusals for Cause Based Solely on Written Questionnaires  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused for cause five 
prospective jurors (Prospective Jurors Nos. 11, 12, 16, 39, and 50) based solely on 
their written questionnaire answers concerning their personal views on capital 
punishment, in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.7  (See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412 (Witt); People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778-783 
(Riccardi).)  We conclude the trial court erred in excusing Prospective Juror 16 for 
cause based solely on his questionnaire responses.  Although this error did not 
result in the seating of an unqualified juror, it requires automatic reversal of 
defendant‘s death sentence under existing United States Supreme Court precedent.  
(Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (Gray) (opn. of the court); id., 
                                              
7  
Here, and in nearly every other claim raised in this appeal, defendant 
contends the asserted error violated various of his state and federal constitutional 
rights.  ―In most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial 
court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he 
now advances.  In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either 
(1) the appellate claim is of a kind . . . that required no trial court action by the 
defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal 
standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely 
assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons 
actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating 
the Constitution.  To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not 
forfeited on appeal.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 
17, italics omitted.)  ― ‗ ―No separate constitutional discussion is required, or 
provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection of 
any constitutional theory or ‗gloss‘ raised for the first time here.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. 
Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 890, fn. 7.) 
 
19 
at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.).)  In light of our conclusion, we need not decide 
whether the trial court erred in dismissing any of the remaining prospective jurors.   
a.  The written questionnaire  
The prospective jurors completed a 21-page questionnaire.  Questions Nos. 
50-58 sought the prospective jurors‘ general views on the death penalty.  Question 
No. 59 explained the difference between the guilt trial and penalty trial, described 
the meaning of ―special circumstance,‖ and defined aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  The question then explained that ―[t]he weighing of these factors 
is not quantitative, but qualitative, [and] in order to fix the penalty of death, the 
jury must be persuaded that the aggravating factors are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating factors that death is warranted instead of life 
imprisonment without parole.‖  The question continued in six subparts:  
―(A) Assume for the sake of this question only that, in the guilt phase, the 
prosecution has proved first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt and you 
believe the defendant is guilty of first degree murder.  Would you, because of any 
views that you may have concerning capital punishment, refuse to find the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder, even though you personally believed the 
defendant to be guilt [sic] of first degree murder, just to prevent the penalty phase 
from taking place? 
―(B)  Assume for the sake of this question only that, in the guilt phase, the 
prosecution has proven one or more special circumstances to be true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and you personally believe the special circumstance(s) to be 
true.  Would you, because of any views that you may have concerning capital 
punishment, refuse to find the special circumstance(s) true, even though you 
personally believed it (them) to be true, just to prevent the penalty phase from 
taking place?   
 
20 
―(C)  Assume for the sake of this question only that the jury has found the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and has found one or more special 
circumstances to be true and that you are in the penalty phase.  Would you, 
because of any views that you may have concerning capital punishment, 
automatically refuse to vote in favor of the penalty of death and automatically vote 
for a penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, without 
considering any of the evidence of any of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
. . . regarding the facts of the crime and the background and character of the 
defendant? 
―(D)  Assume for the sake of this question only that the jury has found the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and has found one or more of the special 
circumstances true and that you are in the penalty phase.  Would you, because of 
any views that you may have concerning capital punishment, automatically refuse 
to vote in favor of the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole and automatically vote for a penalty of death, without considering any of 
the evidence, or any of the aggravating and mitigating factors . . . regarding the 
facts of the crime and the background and character of the defendant? 
―(E)  If your answer to either question C) or question D) was yes, would 
you change your answer if you are instructed and ordered by the court that you 
must consider and weigh the evidence and the above-mentioned aggravating and 
mitigating factors regarding the facts of the crime and the background and 
character of the defendant, before voting on the issue of penalty? 
―(F)  Could you set aside your own personal feelings regarding what the 
law ought to be and follow the law as the court explains it to you?‖   
 
21 
Question No. 618 explained that there would be a ―wide spectrum of 
possible evidence‖ that the jury would be asked to consider in any penalty phase 
and that  in any such phase of trial, the jurors would determine the weight of the 
evidence presented.  The question continued:  ―Considering the above, assume a 
defendant was convicted of multiple premeditated murder during the course of 
a robbery and burglary as special circumstances[.]  [W]hich of the following 
would you do?  [¶]  __ (a)  No matter what the evidence was, always vote for 
the death penalty.  [¶]  __ (b) Always vote for life without the possibility of 
parole.  [¶]  __ (c)  I would not automatically vote for either life without 
possibility of parole or the death penalty.  I would consider all the evidence and 
vote my conscience.‖   
Question No. 62 inquired as follows:  ―If this case has a penalty phase, 
you will be instructed that you may consider factors in the defendant‘s 
background, such as his upbringing, emotional difficulties and possible 
substance abuse in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  [¶]  A.  Do you feel that those factors 
would be helpful to you in reaching a decision as to whether the death penalty 
or life in prison without the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence?  
[¶]  B.  Would you reject any of those factors automatically in deciding on a 
sentence?‖   
Question No. 63 asked the prospective juror if she or he would feel 
precluded from imposing the death penalty upon learning the defendant had 
children.  
                                              
8  
Question 60, which is not relevant to our discussion, asked whether the 
prospective juror would have difficulty refraining from discussing the case with 
anyone until it is submitted to the jury and then discuss the case only with fellow 
jurors. 
 
22 
After the prospective jurors completed their written questionnaires, the 
court and counsel discussed the qualifications of prospective jurors whom the 
court had preliminarily identified as potentially excusable based solely on their 
written questionnaire responses.  During this process, the trial court excused 
Prospective Jurors Nos. 11, 12, 16, 39, and 50 for cause under Witt.   
b.  Legal principles 
―Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, prospective jurors 
who express personal opposition to the death penalty are not automatically subject 
to excusal for cause as long as ‗they state clearly that they are willing to 
temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‘  (Lockhart 
v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176; see Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 
510, 522 (Witherspoon).)  To determine if a prospective juror is excusable for 
cause without compromising a defendant‘s constitutional rights, we inquire 
whether the prospective juror‘s views on the death penalty ‗would ―prevent or 
substantially impair the performance‖ ‘ of the juror‘s duties in accordance with the 
court‘s instructions and his or her oath.‖  (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 778.)  
― ‗It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death penalty are 
subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the 
death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as 
they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in 
deference to the rule of law.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 
591-592 (Leon); see People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 445 et seq. 
(Stewart).) 
―Before granting a challenge for cause, the ‗court must have sufficient 
information regarding the prospective juror‘s state of mind to permit a reliable 
determination as to whether the juror‘s views would ― ‗prevent or substantially 
 
23 
impair‘ ‖ ‘ performance as a capital juror.  [Citation.]  Trial courts must therefore 
make ‗a conscientious attempt to determine a prospective juror‘s views regarding 
capital punishment to ensure that any juror excused from jury service meets the 
constitutional standard . . . .‘ ‖  (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  ―Prospective 
jurors may be dismissed based on written questionnaire responses alone if the 
responses leave no doubt that their views on capital punishment would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the court‘s 
instructions and the jurors‘ oath.  [Citation.]  By contrast, if a juror‘s questionnaire 
responses are inconsistent and do not clearly reveal an inability to serve, the court 
may not grant a cause challenge without further questioning to clarify the juror‘s 
views.‖  (Ibid.)  On appeal, we independently review a trial court‘s for cause 
dismissals that were based solely on written questionnaire responses.  (Riccardi, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 779.)9 
c.  Discussion 
Defendant contends Prospective Juror No. 16 was improperly excused for 
cause under Witt based solely on his written questionnaire responses, because he 
did not unequivocally state that he would always vote against the death penalty in 
every case regardless of the evidenced presented.  Based on our independent 
review of the record, we agree that the trial court erred by excusing the 
                                              
9  
We note that defendant objected to the excusals of only Prospective Jurors 
Nos. 12, 16, and 50.  At the time of defendant‘s trial, however, the defense was not 
required to object to an excusal for cause in order to preserve a claim of error for 
appeal.  Since then, we have imposed prospectively the requirement that 
defendants ―must make either a timely objection, or the functional equivalent of an 
objection, such as a statement of opposition or disagreement, to the excusal stating 
specific grounds under Witherspoon/Witt in order to preserve the issue for appeal.‖  
(People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 643.)   
 
24 
prospective juror for cause under Witt based solely on his written questionnaire 
responses.  
Prospective Juror No. 16 was a correctional officer with the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  In response to question No. 50, a 
multipart question that asked the prospective juror about his death penalty views in 
general, Prospective Juror No. 16 indicated that he ―strongly‖ opposed the death 
penalty and wrote, ―I believe that the death penalty should be abolished as there is 
no assurance that the state may not be killing an innocent person.‖  When asked in 
another part of the same question to explain his position on capital punishment, he 
wrote, ―In addition to the above I feel the state does not have the right to take a life 
in revenge for the crime the person commits.  I also feel it is not a deterrent to 
crime.‖  In response to question No. 58, which asked the prospective juror about 
the frequency with which capital punishment is used, Prospective Juror No. 16 
wrote that he believed the death penalty was imposed ―too often‖ and ―opposed it 
completely.‖    
As set forth above, question No. 59 parts (C), (D), (E), and (F) were the 
questions most directly relevant to the Witt inquiry.  Similar to the questions we 
reviewed in Riccardi,10 these questions called for responses that could adequately 
inform the trial court whether a prospective juror was substantially impaired 
within the meaning of Witt.   
                                              
10  
In Riccardi, we identified two questions on the form that were directly 
relevant to the Witt standard:  ―Question No. 65 asked:  ‗Could you set aside your 
own personal feelings regarding what the law ought to be and follow the law as 
the court explains it to you?‘ ‖  (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 780.)  ―Question 
No. 68 asked:  ‗Do you have such an opinion concerning the death penalty that, 
regardless of the evidence that might be developed during the penalty phase of the 
trial . . . you would automatically and absolutely refuse to vote for the death 
penalty in any case?‘ ‖  (Ibid.)   
 
25 
Regarding question No. 59(C), Prospective Juror No. 16 stated that if the 
case proceeded to the penalty phase, he would ―probably‖ refuse to vote for the 
death penalty and automatically vote for life in prison without possibility of parole 
regardless of the evidence.  He wrote in response to question No. 59(E) that he 
―possibly‖ would change his answer to question No. 59(C) if the court instructed 
and ordered him to consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence before voting 
on the appropriate penalty.  When asked in question No. 59(F) whether he could 
set aside his personal feelings about the law and follow the court‘s instructions on 
the law, Prospective Juror No. 16 wrote, ―Yes — most probably.‖   
At the hearing on the challenge for cause, the trial court noted that 
―[Prospective Juror] No. 16 states that he is a CTF captain; strongly opposes the 
death penalty; probably would disregard the evidence and vote for life without 
possibility of parole under any circumstances, although the other questions were 
sufficiently within the ballpark of rationality and responsibility.‖  The prosecutor 
challenged the prospective juror for cause based on the prospective juror‘s stated 
feelings that the death penalty should be abolished and the state does not have a 
right to take a life and that the prospective juror did not commit to follow the law 
in deciding this case.  Defendant‘s counsel argued the prospective juror‘s written 
responses were equivocal and that oral, in-person voir dire was warranted.  The 
trial court dismissed Prospective Juror No. 16 for cause.  
Based on our independent review of the record, Prospective Juror No. 16‘s 
questionnaire responses to the crucial Witt inquiries were ambiguous, failed to 
provide an adequate basis to support his excusal for cause, and called for the trial 
court to conduct oral voir dire.  Granted, Prospective Juror No. 16‘s responses 
indicated intense personal opposition to the death penalty, e.g., ―the state does not 
have the right to take a life in revenge for the crime the person commits,‖ and ―I 
oppose it completely.‖  Crucially, however, his written answers to the Witt 
 
26 
inquiries under question No. 59 were equivocal and suggested his death penalty 
views were not unalterable.  
Prospective Juror No. 16 wrote in response to question No. 59(C) that he 
would ―probably‖ automatically refuse to vote for the death penalty and 
automatically vote for life in prison without possibility of parole regardless of the 
evidence, but ―possibly‖ would change that answer if the court instructed him to 
consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence before deciding penalty.  
Similarly, in response to question No. 59(F), he wrote that he ―yes — most 
probably‖ could set aside his personal feelings about the law and follow the 
court‘s instructions.  Nothing in the foregoing written responses obviated the need 
for oral voir dire or supported a finding that Prospective Juror No. 16‘s opposition 
to the death penalty was so strong that he was unwilling to set aside his personal 
views and perform the duties of a capital juror in accordance with the law.  Indeed, 
elsewhere in his questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 16 suggested that he would 
consider the evidence and was open to voting for either penalty.  He wrote that 
consideration of a defendant‘s background would be helpful in deciding penalty, 
that he would not ―automatically‖ reject such evidence in deciding penalty, and 
that the sole fact defendant may have children ―would [not] preclude [him] 
personally from imposing the penalty of death.‖  
The trial court had an obligation to resolve the uncertainties in Prospective 
Juror No. 16‘s written responses and orally examine him in person to the extent 
necessary to permit a reliable determination of whether he was disqualified under 
Witt.  (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 592; Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 782; 
Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445.)  This case is not like People v. Russell 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1263, in which we affirmed a for cause dismissal based 
on questionnaire responses alone of a prospective juror who stated that he ― would 
‗probably‘ follow the law as the judge instructed‖ but ― was ‗not absolutely certain 
 
27 
[he] would.‘ ‖  The prospective juror in that case ―clarified, ‗I am strongly 
opposed to the death penalty,‘ and stated he ‗simply would not vote for‘ death, and 
that no matter the evidence, he would ‗ALWAYS vote for life without the 
possibility of parole.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  We held that the trial court properly excused the 
prospective juror because his written questionnaire responses were clear, 
unequivocal, internally consistent, and demonstrated that he was ― ‗unwilling to 
temporarily set aside [his] own beliefs and follow the law.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1262.)  
Here, in contrast, Prospective Juror No. 16‘s questionnaire answers were 
ambiguous and did not clearly demonstrate that his death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a capital juror.  
Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in excusing the prospective juror 
based solely on his questionnaire answers and without followup questioning on 
voir dire.  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 592.)   
―The general rule is that, absent a showing of prejudice, an erroneous 
excusal of a prospective juror for cause does not mandate the reversal of judgment.  
This rule is based on the principle that a ‗[d]efendant has a right to jurors who are 
qualified and competent, not to any particular juror.‘  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 619, 656.)  But . . . under existing United States Supreme Court precedent, 
the erroneous excusal of a prospective juror for cause based on that person‘s views 
concerning the death penalty automatically compels the reversal of the penalty 
phase without any inquiry as to whether the error actually prejudiced defendant‘s 
penalty determination.  (Gray, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 659-667 (opn. of the court); 
id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at p. 672 (conc. opn. of 
Powell, J.).)‖  (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 783.) 
Accordingly, we are compelled by Gray to reverse defendant‘s penalty 
phase verdict, and we need not resolve defendant‘s remaining challenges to the 
 
28 
excusals for cause of Prospective Jurors Nos. 11, 12, 39, and 50 based solely on 
their questionnaire responses.   
2.  Adequacy of the Written Questionnaire  
Citing Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, defendant contends that by not 
specifically asking the prospective jurors whether they ―could consider voting for 
the death penalty if they were under an oath to do so,‖ the questionnaire failed to 
provide an adequate basis for excusing a prospective juror for cause based solely 
on questionnaire responses.  Because we already have concluded the trial court‘s 
error in dismissing Prospective Juror No. 16 for cause based solely on his 
questionnaire responses requires reversal of the penalty phase judgment, we 
decline to address this claim. 
3.  Jury Selection Method  
Before jury selection commenced, the trial court explained that it would use 
a variation of the ―jury box‖ method of jury selection11 in which the prospective 
jurors would be called and questioned in groups of 18 and the parties would 
exercise both for cause and peremptory challenges before a new group was called.  
Defense counsel objected to the requirement that he exercise peremptory 
challenges as each group was questioned, claiming he could not effectively 
exercise peremptory challenges until all the groups had been passed for cause.  In 
overruling the objection, the trial court noted, ―I think you‘re confusing your 
                                              
11  
In People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 537 (Avila), we explained that 
―[u]nder the ‗jury box‘ method, which is the system utilized in California, 12 
prospective jurors are questioned, subjected to challenges for cause, and replaced 
until 12 qualified jurors remain.  Both sides then exercise peremptory challenges.  
A juror removed by peremptory challenge is replaced by another juror, who is then 
questioned and challenged both for cause and peremptorily.  This process 
continues until peremptory challenges have been exhausted or waived.‖   
 
29 
ability to pick a jury of people who can give you a fair trial with your desire to 
hand pick a jury that is going to do what you want it to do.‖ 
On appeal, defendant contends that the jury selection method used at his 
trial impaired trial counsel‘s ability to effectively exercise peremptory challenges, 
in violation of his federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, and 
requires reversal of his death judgment.  Defendant‘s claim is foreclosed by our 
decision in Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 538.  There, we explained that 
―[a]lthough knowledge of the composition of the entire panel can be relevant to 
the exercise of a peremptory challenge against an individual juror, the fact that a 
particular procedure used might have made exercising initial peremptory 
challenges less informed does not in itself require reversal.  [Citation.]  [¶]  A 
court commits reversible error if its procedures deny a party‘s right of peremptory 
challenge.‖  (Id. at p. 538, italics added; see Pointer v. United States (1894) 151 
U.S. 396, 412 [―The right of peremptory challenge . . . is not of itself a right to 
select, but a right to reject, jurors‖ (italics added)].)  The trial court did not prevent 
defendant from exercising his allotted peremptory challenges.  Therefore, 
defendant cannot demonstrate a violation of his federal constitutional rights.  
(Avila, at p. 538.) 
4.  Trial Court’s Refusal to Conduct Individual Voir Dire  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to conduct sequestered 
individual death qualification voir dire.  The claim is without merit.   
In response to a pretrial writ filed by defendant in this case, the Court of 
Appeal held in essence, that under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, a trial 
court has discretion to conduct sequestered individual death qualification of 
prospective jurors, based on its determination concerning whether group voir dire 
is ― ‗practicable.‘ ‖  (Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 
 
30 
1180.)  In People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713, we endorsed this ruling 
and do so again here.  Defendant makes no persuasive case for us to reconsider the 
issue.   
5.  Asserted Unconstitutionality of Death Qualification of the Jury 
Defendant contends that the death qualification process in jury selection is 
unconstitutional under the federal and state Constitutions.  As a threshold matter, 
his failure to make a timely and specific objection on this ground in the trial court 
forfeited the issue on appeal.  (See People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 687-
688.)  In any event, the high court and this court have rejected this claim.  
(Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 176–177; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1107, 1120; see People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1066.)  Defendant 
offers no persuasive argument to revisit the issue as to our state Constitution, and 
we decline to do so. 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Use of Stun Belt  
Over defendant‘s objections, the trial court ordered that he be restrained 
with a REACT (remote electronically activated control technology) stun belt12 
during trial.  On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering him to wear the stun belt and thereby violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights.  We conclude the contention is without merit. 
                                              
12  
―[T]he remote electronically activated control technology (REACT) belt‖ is 
a ―battery-operated belt ‗ ―consist[ing] of a four-inch-wide elastic band, which is 
worn underneath the prisoner‘s clothing.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  If activated by its remote 
transmitter, the belt can deliver a brief 50,000-volt electric shock.‖  (People v. 
Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 560, fn. 8 (Lomax).) 
 
31 
a.  Background 
Before jury selection began, a deputy sheriff submitted a memorandum to 
the court suggesting that defendant wear a REACT belt during the trial.  The 
deputy also provided a packet of materials that included defendant‘s numerous 
disciplinary reports from the jail and explanatory material from the manufacturer 
concerning use of the REACT belt system. 
The disciplinary reports revealed that on December 13, 1995, defendant 
yelled at prosecution witness Jose Luis Ramirez in the booking area.  On 
February 11, 1996, defendant became argumentative and hostile, and kicked and 
banged on his cell door when he was told that he could not be moved to another 
cell.  On January 14, 1997, defendant was discovered acting suspiciously near a 
dayroom door, and was found in possession of a straightened paper clip.  
Defendant admitted that he was trying to pick the lock of the dayroom door.  The 
reports also discussed disciplinary incidents that occurred on three additional dates 
in 1996, involving defendant‘s possession of prisoner-made weapons (June 30 and 
July 13) and an assault on a deputy during an escape attempt (Aug. 18).   
Counsel objected to any requirement that defendant wear a REACT belt on 
the ground that defendant had not posed any security risk in his prior court 
appearances.  Counsel also expressed concern that there might be an accidental 
activation of the stun belt or activation triggered by nonthreatening slight or 
sudden movement.   
The trial court ordered use of the REACT belt because ―the indications of 
previous actions that . . . defendant has taken raise a serious concern as to the 
viability of having him completely unrestrained in the courtroom.‖  The trial court 
stated:  ―With respect to previous appearances in court and lack of problems, 
[defendant] has always been shackled, hand and foot, when he‘s been brought to 
court.  The problem we face with a jury format is that, in order to avoid any 
 
32 
untoward appearance of dangerousness or likelihood of fleeing, we will not be 
having [defendant] restrained.  He will be dressed in civilian clothes, and we will 
make every effort to remove any aura of a custody … from his appearance in 
court.  It seems to me that the use of the belt is [a] legitimate and reasonable 
insurance policy against him taking action towards escape or towards assaulting 
anybody or anything of that nature.  [¶]  I will specifically instruct the bailiff that 
the — and of course the bailiff knows this already — that the system is not to be 
activated unless there‘s some kind of emergency going on.  If he scratches his 
nose or makes a sudden movement, if it doesn‘t amount to something really 
serious of course, there will be no problem and no action will be taken.  [¶]… [¶]  
So tentatively at this point the Court intends, based upon the indications of the 
previous incidents, the indications of previous actions that this defendant has taken 
raise a serious concern as to the viability of having him completely unrestrained in 
the courtroom.‖  The trial court informed counsel that it would revisit the issue of 
using the stun belt if, for example, it could not be worn without being 
conspicuous. 
Before jury selection commenced, counsel raised the issue of the stun belt:  
―I have no doubts about this Court‘s judgment about the use of the react system; 
however, I just again want to note for the record . . . that I think there are less 
invasive ways to do it . . . .‖  The trial court acknowledged counsel‘s objection. 
 
b.  Discussion 
―In general, the ‗court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and 
orderly proceedings‘ (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269), and its 
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  [Citation.]  
However, the court‘s discretion to impose physical restraints is constrained by 
constitutional principles.  Under California law, ‗a defendant cannot be subjected 
 
33 
to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury‘s presence, 
unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.‘  (People v. Duran 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291.)  Similarly, the federal ‗Constitution forbids the 
use of visible shackles … unless that use is ―justified by an essential state interest‖ 
— such as the interest in courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.‘  
(Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 624, italics omitted.)  We have held that 
these principles also apply to the use of an electronic ‗stun belt,‘ even if this 
device is not visible to the jury.  (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1219.)‖  
(Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 558-559.) 
― ‗In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may ―take into 
account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential 
security problems and the risk of escape at trial.‖  (Deck v. Missouri, supra, 544 
U.S. at p. 629.)  These factors include evidence establishing that a defendant poses 
a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise 
engage in nonconforming behavior.‘  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 
367.)  Although the court need not hold a formal hearing before imposing 
restraints, ‗the record must show the court based its determination on facts, not 
rumor and innuendo.‘  [Citation.]  The imposition of physical restraints without 
evidence of violence, a threat of violence, or other nonconforming conduct is an 
abuse of discretion.‖  (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 559.)   
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the court‘s finding of a manifest 
need for restraint.  Instead, defendant argues that in deciding what restraint to 
employ, the trial court erred by failing to consider less restrictive physical 
restraints and the adverse psychological impact of the stun belt on him.  
In general, ―when physical restraints are called for, a trial court should 
impose ‗the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint‘ that will ensure effective 
security.‖  (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 562.)  Here, the trial court stated that it 
 
34 
would not use shackles to restrain defendant because it wanted to ―avoid any 
untoward appearance‖ that he was dangerous or a flight risk.  It believed the stun 
belt was a ―legitimate and reasonable insurance policy‖ against defendant taking 
any action toward escape or violence, and that the device could be used 
inconspicuously under defendant‘s clothing.  When counsel expressed concern 
that defendant feared the device might be accidentally activated, the trial court 
explained that it would specifically instruct the bailiff to avoid doing so absent 
―some kind of emergency going on.‖  Moreover, the trial court informed counsel 
that it would revisit the use of the stun belt as a restraint should any problem arise 
during trial.    
―In People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1225-1230, we examined the 
potential psychological consequences of wearing a stun belt and the physical 
effects from electric shock in subjects with certain medical conditions.  However, 
recognizing that our decision was the first to consider use of the REACT belt in 
California criminal trials, we expressly stated that our discussion of these topics 
was offered to provide guidance ‗in future trials.‘  (Id. at p. 1225, italics added.)‖  
(Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 562.)  Defendant‘s trial occurred four years before 
we decided Mar.  In ordering the use of the stun belt, the trial court addressed 
defendant‘s fear that the device would be accidentally activated, which is one of 
the risks we identified in Mar that trial courts should consider before requiring a 
defendant to wear a stun belt.  (See People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1225-
1226.)  We will not fault the trial court in this case for failing to consider the other 
potential psychological consequences subsequently identified in Mar.  (See 
Lomax, supra, at p. 562; see also People v. Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 335, 391 (Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler).)  In sum, the court did not abuse 
its discretion in ruling that use of the stun belt was appropriate in these 
circumstances.  
 
35 
2.  Instruction on Claim-of-Right Defense  
a.  Instruction on claim-of-right defense 
Defendant contends the trial court on its own motion should have instructed 
the jury concerning the claim-of-right defense based on evidence that defendant 
thought he was helping Sanchez regain his own property from the Morales 
residence.13  We disagree.   
―Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.‖  (§ 211.)  In People v. Tufunga (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 935, 950 (Tufunga), this court affirmed that, as at common law, claim 
of right remains a viable defense to a charge of robbery.  ―The claim-of-right 
defense provides that a defendant‘s good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that 
he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates the felonious 
intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.‖  (Id. at p. 938.)  A trial court, 
however, is not required to instruct on the defense ― ‗unless there is evidence to 
support an inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or she 
had a lawful claim on the property.‘‖  (Id. at p. 944.)  We concluded that the trial 
                                              
13  
The current instruction regarding a claim-of-right defense, CALJIC 
No. 9.44, provides, in relevant part:  ―An essential element of the crime of 
[robbery] [theft by larceny] [burglary, where the entry is alleged to have been 
committed with the intent to commit theft] is a specific intent permanently to 
deprive the alleged victim of his or her property.  That specific intent does not 
exist if the alleged perpetrator had a good faith claim of right to title or ownership 
of the specific property taken from the alleged victim.  In other words, if a 
perpetrator seeks to regain possession of property in which [he] [she] honestly 
believes [he] [she] has a good faith claim of ownership or title, then [he] [she] 
does not have the required criminal intent.  [¶] … [¶]  [A good faith belief by a 
defendant, tried as an accomplice, that [he] [she] was assisting [his] [her] co-
principal retake the co-principal‘s property negates the required criminal intent for 
[robbery] [theft by larceny] [burglary, where it is alleged the entry was to commit 
theft].]‖ 
 
36 
court prejudicially erred by denying the defendant‘s request to instruct on claim of 
right on the ground the evidence did not support giving the instruction.  (Id. at 
p. 957.) 
In People v. Williams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, the Court of Appeal 
extended the claim-of-right defense to an accomplice charged with burglary and 
robbery who believed in good faith that he was helping a principal, his brother, 
retake the principal‘s own property, a car and a laptop, from the victim, the 
principal‘s former girlfriend.  (Id. at pp. 1525, 1527-1529.)  The Williams court 
explained that ―[i]t would defy logic and common sense to hold that a defendant 
who absconds with goods by force under a good faith belief that he was 
repossessing his own property does not thereby commit robbery, but that his 
accomplice, who assists him in the same act and shares the same intent, may be 
found guilty.  The latter, just as surely as the former, lacks the specific intent to 
deprive another of his or her property.‖  (Id. at p. 1528.)  Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that ―a good faith belief by a defendant, tried as an accomplice, 
that he was assisting his coprincipal retake the principal‘s property negates the 
‗felonious intent‘ element of both larceny and robbery, and that an instruction on 
the claim-of-right defense must be given where substantial evidence supports such 
a belief.‖  (Id. at pp. 1528-1529.)  It held the trial court erred in refusing the 
defendant‘s request to instruct on the claim-of-right defense, because he testified 
that he believed he was assisting a coprincipal obtain the co-principal‘s own 
property and ―ample evidence,‖ including a bill of sale for the car that was in the 
principal‘s name, supported a jury finding that he had a good faith basis for that 
belief.  (Id. at p. 1529.)   
Here, in addition to Tufunga and Williams, our decision in People v. 
Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996 (Anderson) provides helpful guidance, 
particularly because unlike the defendants in Tufunga and Williams, defendant did 
 
37 
not request a claim-of-right instruction.  In Anderson, we held that a trial court 
does not have a duty to instruct on its own motion on the defense of accident, so 
long as the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the mental state 
element of the charged offense.  (Anderson, at p. 996.)  As we explained, ― ‗[i]n 
criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on 
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and 
necessary for the jury‘s understanding of the case.‘  [Citation.]  That duty extends 
to ‗ ―instructions on the defendant‘s theory of the case, including instructions ‗as 
to defenses ― ‗that the defendant is relying on … , or if there is substantial 
evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the 
defendant‘s theory of the case.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  ―But ‗ ―when a defendant presents 
evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the prosecution’s proof of an element of the 
offense, a defendant is not presenting a special defense invoking sua sponte 
instructional duties.  While a court may well have a duty to give a ‗pinpoint‘ 
instruction relating such evidence to the elements of the offense and to the jury‘s 
duty to acquit if the evidence produces a reasonable doubt, such ‗pinpoint‘ 
instructions are not required to be given sua sponte and must be given only upon 
request.‖ ‘  (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117.)‖  (Id. at pp. 996-997, 
first italics added.)   
In Anderson, because the defense of accident served only to negate the 
mental state element of the charged offense, the trial court‘s obligation to instruct 
on the defense ―extended no further than to provide [the jury] an appropriate 
pinpoint instruction upon request by the defense.‖  (Anderson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 998.)  In People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 269, the Court of 
Appeal applied Anderson’s rationale to a claim-of-right defense and held that 
because the claim-of-right defense serves only to negate the mental state required 
for grand theft, the trial court was not required to instruct on the defense on its 
 
38 
own motion.  (See also People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108, 117 [―the 
rationale of Anderson applies with equal force to the defense of mistake of fact, or 
any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state element of the 
crime‖].)  We agree with the Court of Appeal in Hussain that Anderson’s rationale 
applies to the defense of claim of right.14  Accordingly, here, because the asserted 
claim of right served only to negate the intent to steal element of the robbery 
charges and the trial court otherwise properly instructed the jury on this element, it 
was not required to instruct on the defense in the absence of a request by trial 
counsel.   
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the trial court was not obligated to 
instruct on its own on claim of right, we also conclude there was no substantial 
evidence that supported the defense.  Defendant points to the fact that he stated in 
the videotape he made after he fled to Mexico that Sanchez wanted ―to go pick up 
some things that were left in the [Morales] house.‖  The good faith belief in a 
claim of right, however, must relate to specific property (Tufunga, supra, 21 
                                              
14  
In People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431, decided before 
our decision in Anderson, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially 
erred by failing to instruct on its own motion on the defenses of claim of right and 
mistake of fact because both defenses ―were implicated by defendant‘s claim that 
he did not have the requisite knowledge that the [property] was stolen because at 
all times he held a good faith belief that it had been abandoned,‖ and the evidence 
in support was substantial.  Russell reasoned that even though the defendant did 
not request mistake of fact or claim-of-right instructions, ―the trial court had a sua 
sponte duty to instruct on both of these defenses if it appeared defendant was 
relying on the defenses, or if there was substantial evidence supportive of the 
defenses and they were not inconsistent with defendant‘s theory of the case.‖  
(Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal, however, failed to apply the exception we recognized 
in People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 1117, and subsequently applied in 
Anderson, that the trial court‘s sua sponte instructional duties do not extend to 
defenses that serve only to negate an element of the crime.  Therefore, we 
disapprove Russell to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision today.   
 
39 
Cal.4th at p. 950), and ―be something more than a vague impression‖ (People v. 
Photo (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 345, 353).  In contrast to the defendant in Williams 
who provided proof of the items he intended to reclaim for his brother, defendant 
never identified what ―things‖ in particular he intended to retrieve for Sanchez.   
In addition, by admitting in his videotaped statement that Ramirez ―was 
looting the house‖ and ―grabbing things and leaving with them,‖ defendant 
implicitly conceded that the items taken by Ramirez and placed in his 
(defendant‘s) car (e.g., VCR, stereo equipment) belonged to the victims.  Further, 
there was no evidence that Sanchez (or defendant) claimed an ownership interest 
in the two handguns defendant took from a box in the kitchen.  For these reasons, 
we conclude the record does not disclose substantial evidence that defendant 
believed in good faith that he was assisting Sanchez in obtaining Sanchez‘s own 
property from the Morales house.  Therefore, even upon request, defendant was 
not entitled to instruction on a claim-of-right defense.  (See also People v. Barnett 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145 [claim-of-right defense not available where 
defendant ―simply seized whatever items of value‖ he could get from robbery 
victims ―without any regard to whether such items came from [the individual] who 
supposedly owed him a debt, or from one of the others, who indisputably did 
not‖]; People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1022 [the trial court‘s 
refusal to give instruction on claim-of-right defense was proper where defendants 
―conducted a general ransacking of the bedroom indiscriminately taking items of 
value never specifically related to any claim of right‖].)   
 
40 
b.  Asserted robbery instruction errors 
Defendant contends that the standard robbery instruction given, CALJIC 
No. 9.40,15 was defective because it did not require the jury to find that the 
perpetrator took ―property that was not his own.‖  Defendant also contends that the 
robbery instruction erroneously omitted language conveying the idea that the 
perpetrator intended to permanently deprive ―the owner‖ of the property.  
Defendant‘s contentions fail on the merits because they incorrectly elevate the 
claim of right defense to the level of an element of the offense of robbery.   
Section 211 defines robbery as ―the felonious taking of personal property in 
the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.‖  (Cf. § 484, subd. (a) [―Every 
person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal 
property of another . . . is guilty of theft.‖].)  Tufunga affirmed this court‘s long-
standing view that ―a felonious taking, that is, a taking done with the intent to steal 
another’s property, is a required element at the core of every robbery.‖  (Tufunga, 
                                              
15  
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:  ―The defendant is accused in 
Counts 6, 7, 8 of having committed the crime of robbery, a violation of Section 
212 of the Penal Code.  [¶]  Every person who takes personal property in the 
possession of another against the will and from the person or immediate presence 
of that person accomplished by means of force or fear and with the specific intent 
to permanently deprive that person of the property is guilty of the crime of robbery 
in violation of Section Penal Code Section 212.  [¶] Immediate presence means an 
area within the alleged victim‘s reach, observation or control, so that he or she 
could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain possession of the 
subject property.  [¶]  Against the will means without consent.  [¶]  In order to 
prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved:  [¶]  One, a 
person had possession of property of some value, however slight;  [¶]  Two, the 
property was taken from that person or from his or her immediate presence.  [¶]  
Three, the property was taken against the will of that person.  [¶]  Four, the taking 
was accomplished either by force or fear.  [¶]  And five, the property was taken 
with the specific intent permanently to deprive that person of the property.‖  
 
41 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at 948, italics added.)  Crucially, as Justice Mosk observed, ―It is 
significant that the section [defining robbery] requires the taking be from the 
possession of another, and makes no reference whatever to ownership of the 
property.‖  (People v. Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 576, (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), 
second italics added, overruled on other grounds by Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
p. 956.)  ―Moreover, the person from whom the property is taken qualifies as a 
victim of larceny [or robbery] even though he does not have the right of 
possession as against the true owner.‘ (Wharton‘s Criminal Law, (15th ed.1995) 
§ 381, pp. 454-456, fns. omitted.)‖  (People v. Smith (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 
1478, 1490.)  ―It is no defense to a charge of robbery (or of theft) that the victim 
was not the true owner of the property taken.‖  (People v. Moore (1970) 4 
Cal.App.3d 668, 670; People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1143 
[―robbery may be committed against a person who is not the owner of property — 
indeed, it may be committed against a thief‖].)  Nor is ―[k]nowledge of owner 
identity . . . an element of robbery.‖  (People v. Prieto (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 
214.)   
Contrary to defendant‘s arguments, this is not a case where the instruction 
on the charged offense omitted an element of the offense.  In People v. Cummings 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1312, footnote 53, this court cited with approval a nearly 
identical version of CALJIC No. 9.40 to that given in this case, which requires in 
relevant part a finding that ― ‗the property was taken with the specific intent 
permanently to deprive that person of the property.‘ ‖  We observed that it is ―the 
instruction most often given, [and] defines the crime [of robbery] and separately 
defines the elements.‖  (Cummings, at p. 1312, fn. 53.)  Because CALJIC No. 
9.40, as given, conformed to the statutory definition under section 211 and 
 
42 
correctly included all the elements of the crime,16 it was incumbent upon 
defendant to request clarification of the instruction to the extent he deemed 
ownership of the property taken to be an issue in his case.  (See part II.B.2.a, ante; 
People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 [―A party may not argue on appeal 
that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed 
clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial.‖]; People v. Hardy 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 153 [―[B]ecause the instruction given was correct, it was 
incumbent on defendants to request clarifying language.  Their failure to do so 
waived the issue.‖]; see also People v. Jones (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1055 
[because CALJIC No. 9.40 states all the elements of robbery, it was incumbent on 
the defendant to request clarifying language regarding asportation if he deemed 
the element to be in issue at trial].)  Defendant‘s failure to request clarifying 
language forfeits the issues on appeal.   
3.  Unanimity Instruction  
The prosecution presented evidence of four takings that occurred during the 
home invasion robbery at the Morales house:  (1) the VCR and stereo equipment 
Ramirez took from the victims and placed in defendant‘s car; (2) the .32-caliber 
handgun that Sanchez gave to Ramirez, who took the gun when he fled (3) the 
necklace and hair oil product that Ramirez took from the victims and kept when he 
fled; and (4) the two handguns that defendant took from a box near the kitchen.  
Defendant contends that because the jury could have based its convictions for 
                                              
16  
Defendant asserts ―[t]he CALCRIM robbery instruction (CALCRIM 
No. 1600) implicitly repudiated CALJIC No. 9.40… ,‖ but provides no authority 
for the proposition.  We have cautioned that ―jury instructions, whether published 
or not, are not themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal 
propositions or precedent.  They should not be cited as authority for legal 
principles.‖  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.) 
 
43 
robbery on any of the four takings, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury that it must agree unanimously on the specific taking that constituted the 
robberies charged in counts 6 through 8.  As a result, defendant contends, his 
robbery convictions and ―all the robbery-based convictions‖ must be reversed.  
The claim is without merit.  
Preliminarily, defendant did not request that the trial court give a unanimity 
instruction on the robbery charges based on the assertedly discrete takings.17  The 
issue is not forfeited, however, because ―[e]ven absent a request, the court should 
give [a unanimity] instruction ‗where the circumstances of the case so dictate.‘ ‖  
(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 (Riel).)   
In a criminal case, ―the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty 
of a specific crime.  [Citation.]  Therefore, cases have long held that when the 
evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect 
among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal 
act.‖  (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.)  Yet ―where the evidence 
shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly 
how that crime was committed or what the defendant‘s precise role was, the jury 
need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‗theory‘ 
whereby the defendant is guilty.‖  (Ibid.)  ―In deciding whether to give the 
                                              
17  
CALJIC No. 17.01, the standard unanimity instruction, provides:  ―The 
defendant is accused of having committed the crime of [in Count ___].  The 
prosecution has introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that there is more 
than one [act] [or] [omission] upon which a conviction [on Count ___] may be 
based.  Defendant may be found guilty if the proof shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [he] [she] committed any one or more of the [acts] [or] [omissions].  
However, in order to return a verdict of guilty [to Count ___], all jurors must agree 
that [he] [she] committed the same [act] [or] [omission] [or] [acts] [or] 
[omissions].  It is not necessary that the particular [act] [or] [omission] agreed 
upon be stated in your verdict.‖ 
 
44 
instruction, the trial court must ask whether (1) there is a risk the jury may divide 
on two discrete crimes and not agree on any particular crime, or (2) the evidence 
merely presents the possibility the jury may divide, or be uncertain, as to the exact 
way the defendant is guilty of a single discrete crime.  In the first situation, but not 
the second, it should give the unanimity instruction.‖  (Id. at p. 1135.)  Jury 
unanimity is not required as a matter of federal due process.  (People v. Wilson 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 801-802 [the prosecution presented two theories of murder, 
direct perpetrator or aider and abettor, (citing Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 
624 (plur. opn. of Souter, J.))].) 
Defendant does not dispute that this case concerns a single home invasion 
robbery that gave rise to a separate robbery charge for each homicide victim, 
Ramon, Martha, and Martinez (counts 6–8, respectively).  (See People v. Scott 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 743, 750 (Scott).  ―[M]ultiple convictions of robbery are proper 
if force or fear is applied to multiple victims in joint possession of the property 
taken.‖  (Ibid., citing People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589.)18  Rather, 
defendant argues that a unanimity instruction was required because there was 
evidence that multiple items of property were taken and the prosecutor relied on 
several theories of liability for the taking of those items.  Ramirez testified that 
Sanchez told him to take whatever he could from the house.  Ramirez took the 
VCR, stereo equipment, neck chain, hair oil product, and a .32-caliber handgun.  
He also testified that defendant took two handguns from a box near the kitchen.  
He explained that he put the VCR and speaker equipment in the trunk of 
defendant‘s car and that Sanchez gave him the .32-caliber handgun during the 
                                              
18  
We noted in Scott that ―Ramos overruled an older line of cases, including 
People v. Guerin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 775, which held that the forcible taking of 
a single item from multiple victims could result in only a single conviction of 
robbery.‖  (Scott, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 750, fn. 4.) 
 
45 
robbery.  Ramirez also admitted that he took the hair oil product, neck chain, and 
.32-caliber handgun when he fled the house.  The prosecution argued that 
defendant was guilty of the charged offenses as a direct perpetrator or under aider 
and abettor and coconspirator theories of liability.   
Defendant argues that our decision in People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
510 (Davis), compels the conclusion the trial court erred in failing to provide a 
unanimity instruction.  In Davis, the defendant and his accomplices, some of 
whom were armed, commandeered a car occupied by the driver and a passenger.  
(Id. at p. 519.)  It was night, and the four men drove around with both victims in 
the car.  (Ibid.)  The four stopped the car near a high school, and the defendant, 
armed with a Uzi, took the passenger into a nearby field and fatally shot her.  
(Ibid.)  Defendant returned, and he and one of the accomplices took the driver into 
the field.  (Ibid.)  Defendant fatally shot the driver.  (Ibid.)  Two rings the 
passenger always wore were later found in the possession of defendant and his 
accomplices.  (Id. at p. 520.) 
On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction for robbery of the 
passenger on the ground that a unanimity instruction was required given he faced 
one charge of robbery but evidence of two robberies was presented.  (Davis, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 560.)  We reversed the robbery conviction on the ground 
that the defendant was entitled to a unanimity instruction because the evidence 
showed two distinct acts of robbery constituting the charged crime — the taking of 
the car from the driver and passenger and the taking of the rings from the 
passenger.  (Id. at pp. 561-562.)  Importantly, ―the potential defenses to the two 
acts of robbery were entirely different.‖  (Id. at p. 562, italics added; cf. People v. 
Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 [no unanimity instruction is required ―when 
the defendant offers essentially the same defense to each of the acts and there is no 
reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them‖].)  Defendant claimed 
 
46 
the passenger ―was not legally in possession of the car,‖ and the taking of the rings 
―constituted only the lesser included crime of theft‖ on the ground that there was 
evidence defendant formed the intent to steal the passenger‘s rings after he killed 
her.  (Davis, at p. 562.)  Based on the evidence, some jurors may have had a 
reasonable doubt that the intent to take the rings was formed while the passenger 
was alive; others may have had a reasonable doubt whether the passenger was in 
possession of the driver‘s car.  (Id. at p. 561.)  We concluded that because ―there 
was evidence from which the jury could have found defendant guilty of robbery 
based on the car but not the rings,‖ the trial court‘s failure to provide a unanimity 
instruction was prejudicial.  (Id. at p. 562.)  
As Davis makes clear, however, a unanimity instruction is not required if 
―the defendant offered the same defense to both acts constituting the charged 
crime, so no juror could have believed defendant committed one act but 
disbelieved that he committed the other, or because ‗there was no evidence … 
from which the jury could have found defendant was guilty of‘ the crime based on 
one act but not the other.‖  (Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 562; see, e.g., Riel, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1199 [a unanimity instruction was not required on the 
robbery charge because the defense as to each act of robbery was the same, i.e., 
―defendant was asleep in the backseat of the car and did not participate in any act 
of robbery‖].)  Even assuming that the events in this case may properly be parsed 
into multiple discrete takings, defendant did not offer ―entirely different‖ defenses 
to each taking as the defendant did in Davis.  (Davis, at p. 562.)     
Defendant‘s main argument was that Ramirez testified untruthfully about 
defendant‘s involvement in the crimes.  Defendant argued that he had no idea what 
would occur at the Morales house and was not part of a conspiracy to rob the 
Morales family.  He denied there was a plan to commit a robbery before they 
arrived at the Morales house.  Granted, defendant‘s alleged taking of the handguns 
 
47 
from a box in the kitchen does appear to differ in nature from the other three 
takings described above, because defendant was allegedly himself the perpetrator.  
Nonetheless, this difference does not translate to a meaningful difference in the 
defenses such that the jury could have found defendant guilty of personally taking 
the handguns, but not guilty of aiding and abetting the takings by Ramirez.  
Defendant‘s defense to all of the takings was to accuse Ramirez of testifying 
untruthfully.  Specifically, defendant did not deny that Ramirez took the neck 
chain, hair oil, .32-caliber handgun that Sanchez handed him, and VCR.  Instead, 
defendant argued that Ramirez was lying when he testified that defendant helped 
in taking those items and personally took the two handguns from the box in the 
kitchen.  If the jury believed defendant, it would have found him not guilty of 
robbery of either the items taken by Ramirez or the handguns taken from the 
kitchen.  ―It is inconceivable that a juror would believe [Ramirez]‘s testimony‖ 
that defendant stole the handguns from the kitchen, but ―somehow find‖ Ramirez 
was untruthful in relating defendant‘s involvement in the taking of the neck chain, 
hair oil, gun, and VCR and thus find defendant guilty of robbery based on the 
taking of the handguns, but not the other items.  (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 1200.)  Therefore, as in Riel, ―this is ‗a case where the jury‘s verdict[s] impl[y] 
that it did not believe the only defense offered.‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
Accordingly, a unanimity instruction was not required.  
4.  Burglary Instruction  
The trial court instructed the jury on three theories of burglary:  ―Every 
person who enters any building with the specific intent to [(1)] steal, take away, 
carry away the personal property of another of any value and with the further 
specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of that property or with the 
specific intent to [(2)] commit robbery or [(3)] murder is guilty of the crime of 
 
48 
burglary in violation of Penal Code Section 459.‖  (See also § 459 [―Every person 
who enters any house … with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony 
is guilty of burglary.‖].)19  The jury was also instructed under the felony-murder 
rule that ―[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human being …during the 
commission or attempted commission of burglary or robbery is guilty of the crime 
of murder in violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code.‖   
Defendant contends that the instructions erroneously permitted the jury to 
convict him of burglary felony murder based solely on entry into the Morales 
residence with an intent to kill, in violation of People v. Garrison (1989) 47 
Cal.3d 746, 778 (Garrison), which applied the merger doctrine explained in 
People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 (Ireland), and People v. Wilson (1969) 
1 Cal.3d 431 (Wilson).  He contends the instructions violated his rights under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and require 
reversal of his conviction for burglary felony murder and the burglary felony- 
murder special circumstance finding.  We agree that the instructions erroneously 
permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of felony murder based on entry into the 
Morales residence with an intent to kill, but as we explain, the error was harmless. 
In Ireland, this court held that a second degree felony-murder conviction 
cannot be premised on an assault or any ―felony which is an integral part of the 
homicide.‖  (Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539.)  We explained that to allow use 
of the felony-murder rule in cases where a homicide was committed as a result of 
                                              
19  
Specifically, the jury was instructed that it must find the following elements 
in order to convict defendant of burglary:  ―One, a person entered a building.  And 
two, at the time of the entry that person had the specific intent to steal and take 
away someone else‘s property, and intended to deprive the owner permanently of 
that property.  Or at the time of the entry, that person had the specific intent to 
commit the crime of robbery or murder.‖   
 
49 
an assault ―would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of 
malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result 
of a felonious assault — a category which includes the great majority of all 
homicides.  This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law.‖  
(Ibid.) 
In Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 442, we extended Ireland’s merger 
doctrine to first degree felony murder ―when the underlying felony is burglary 
based upon an intention to assault the victim of the homicide with a deadly 
weapon.‖  In Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 778, this court held that under the 
merger doctrine, ―an entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot 
support a [burglary] felony-murder conviction.‖ 
In People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121 (Farley), we expressly 
overruled Wilson, concluding that the opinion in Wilson ―erred in extending the 
merger doctrine to first degree felony murder.‖ (Id. at p. 1117.)  We reasoned, 
among other things, that ―[b]ecause the power to define crimes lies exclusively 
with the Legislature, our decision in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, erred in 
narrowing the Legislature‘s clear and specific definition of first degree murder.‖  
(Farley, 46 Cal.4th  at p. 1119.)  Farley’s overruling of Wilson is to be applied 
prospectively only (id. at p. 1122), and therefore, because the homicides in this 
case occurred before our decision in Farley, we apply our jurisprudence governing 
at the time of the crimes, that is, Garrison. 
Under Garrison, ―if the jury relied on entry with intent to kill as the basis‖ 
for finding defendant guilty of burglary, ―the burglary could not provide a basis 
for application of the felony-murder rule, for the burglary was an integral part of 
and included in fact within the homicide.‖  (Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 778.)  
In this case, the above instruction erroneously permitted the jury to convict 
 
50 
defendant of burglary felony murder based solely on entry into the Morales 
residence with intent to kill.   
The error is harmless, however, and reversal of the first degree murder 
convictions or burglary-murder special-circumstance finding is not required, ―[i]f 
other aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no reasonable doubt that the jury 
made the findings necessary for‖ burglary premised on entry with an intent to steal 
or commit a robbery.  (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1205 (Chun); 
Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1116, fn. 22; see Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 
U.S. 57 (per curiam) [error involving instructing the jury on multiple theories of 
guilt, one of which is invalid, is subject to harmless error review].)  Here, the 
verdicts and evidence demonstrate the error was harmless. 
The prosecution‘s evidence established that defendant, Sanchez, Ramirez, 
and Nunez went to the Morales house to steal property and to kill Ramon and 
anyone else present.  As detailed earlier, on the day of the homicides, defendant 
drove Sanchez, Nunez, and Ramirez to, among other places, the foothills east of 
Salinas to test-fire their loaded rifles.  Defendant and Sanchez talked about the 
plan to enter the house, get drugs, steal ―stuff,‖ and kill those inside so that there 
would be no witnesses.  When they arrived at the house, defendant volunteered to 
knock on the front door because no one in the house knew him.  When nobody 
answered, defendant opened the door.  Once they were inside, Sanchez held 
Martinez, who had been sleeping on the living room floor, at gunpoint, while 
Ramirez and Nunez searched the house for property to take.  Ramirez took the 
items to defendant‘s car.  After the Morales family returned and the adult victims 
were subdued by the four men, defendant searched for guns and found two 
handguns, at least one of which was a .38-caliber handgun.  He kept one gun and 
put the other in Sanchez‘s jacket.  The victims were subsequently shot inside the 
home and all were killed except for the infant. 
 
51 
Also, as observed above, defendant did not testify in his defense, but in a 
videotaped statement offered by the prosecution, defendant admitted that he went 
to the Morales house ―to pick up some things‖ Sanchez had left there.  Defendant 
also admitted that they took guns into the house, he was one of the shooters, and 
―we shot like crazy.‖   
The jury found defendant guilty of robbing each homicide victim (counts 6-
8), burglary (count 9), and conspiracy to commit burglary and robbery (count 10).   
The jury also found true the robbery felony-murder special circumstance 
allegations.  By these verdicts and findings, the evidence presented, the 
prosecution‘s theory of the case, and the instructions given, the jury necessarily 
found that that defendant entered the house with Sanchez, Ramirez, and Nunez 
with the specific intent to steal or commit robbery.  (Cf. People v. Ramirez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 398, 462-464  [although evidence that defendant entered the residence 
with the intent to commit murder or assault could not support a felony-murder 
conviction under the Ireland merger doctrine, evidence that one of defendant‘s 
purposes in entering the victims‘ residence was to steal was sufficient to uphold 
convictions for burglary and burglary felony-murder and the burglary felony-
murder special-circumstance finding].)  Thus, there is no reasonable doubt that the 
jury made the determinations necessary for a proper finding of burglary felony 
murder and burglary felony-murder special circumstance, and hence, the error in 
instructing on the invalid theory was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chun, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)  
5.  Identification of Trailer  
a.  Introduction 
Defendant was charged in count 10 with conspiracy to commit burglary, 
robbery, and murder.  As discussed below, two of the six overt acts alleged in 
 
52 
support of the conspiracy charge, overt acts numbers three and four, related to an 
arson allegedly committed by defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez, but not Ramirez, on 
or about the day before the homicides.   
The prosecution‘s arson theory was that (1) Angel Martinez (Angel) hired 
defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez to commit an arson of a truck owned by Juan 
Martinez Avalos (Avalos), because he had a business dispute with Avalos; 
(2) Angel lived in trailer No. 35 at the 101 Trailer Park in Salinas; (3) on the day 
of the homicides, the four men went to that trailer, and Sanchez collected a $100 
bill as payment for committing the arson; and (4) on the day of the homicides, the 
men drove to JKD Shooting Sports and with the $100 received for committing the 
arson, purchased ammunition for weapons used in the crimes committed at the 
Morales residence.     
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting nonverbal hearsay 
evidence through the testimony of investigator Moore concerning the out-of-court 
identifications of trailer No. 35 made by Avalos and Ramirez.  Defendant asserts 
that he was prejudiced by admission of the identifications, because it was the sole 
evidence that linked defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez to the arson of Avalos‘s 
truck.  Defendant claims that admission of the identifications violated his federal 
constitutional rights to confrontation, due process of law, and reliable guilt and 
penalty determinations.  As we explain, inclusion of the arson language in the 
allegations of overt acts numbers three and four was immaterial.  Nonetheless, the 
claim fails.  
b.  Background 
The information alleged six overt acts under count 10, which charged 
defendant with conspiracy to commit burglary, robbery, and murder.  The third 
overt act alleged was that ―[o]n or about November 15, 1994, Francisco Antonio 
 
53 
Sanchez, Daniel Sanchez Covarrubias, and Joaquin Nunez committed an arson for 
hire and received $100 for committing the arson.‖  The fourth overt act alleged 
was that ―[o]n or about November 16, 1994 Francisco Antonio Sanchez, Daniel 
Sanchez Covarrubias, Joaquin Nunez, and Jose Luis Ramirez drove to JKD 
Shooting Sports in the City of Salinas to purchase (with the $100 received from 
the arson) ammunition and supplies for the rifles to be used in the residential 
robbery, burglary and killing at the Morales residence at 1022 East Market Street 
in the City of Salinas.‖ 
Ramirez testified that, on the day of the homicides, he, defendant, Sanchez, 
and Nunez went to a trailer park to collect $100 owed to Sanchez.  Ramirez 
showed investigator Moore a trailer at the 101 Trailer Park on North Main Street 
where Sanchez collected the money.  Defendant and the others waited in or near 
defendant‘s car while Sanchez collected the payment.   
Avalos testified that in November 1994, he was a business partner with a 
man named Angel, who lived at the 101 Trailer Park in Salinas.  Avalos and Angel 
had a business disagreement.  In the early morning hours of November 16, Avalos 
discovered his truck had been set on fire.  He found a half-gallon-plastic bottle 
near the truck.  Avalos reported the incident to police, and he was subsequently 
contacted by investigator Moore.  Avalos told Moore about the disagreement with 
Angel and identified the trailer where Angel lived.   
Arturo Perez testified that he was acquainted with Angel and knew he lived 
in the same trailer park as his mother.  Perez had introduced Sanchez to Angel.   
Investigator Moore testified that he interviewed Ramirez and learned that in 
the afternoon of the day of the homicides, Sanchez collected $100 at a trailer in the 
101 Trailer Park in Salinas.  Over trial counsel‘s hearsay objection, Moore 
testified that Ramirez told him the payment was related to a vehicle burning in 
Salinas sometime during the evening prior to the homicides.  The trial court 
 
54 
admonished the jurors that the portion of Moore‘s testimony relating Ramirez‘s 
statements about the nature of the debt could not be considered for its truth but 
instead, only to explain his follow-up investigation after he contacted Ramirez.  
Moore subsequently took Ramirez to the trailer park in order to have him identify 
the trailer where Sanchez collected $100.  Over trial counsel‘s hearsay objection, 
Moore testified that Ramirez pointed to trailer No. 35.   
Investigator Moore testified further that after he interviewed Ramirez, he 
contacted the Salinas Police Department and inquired whether there had been a 
vehicle arson reported on either November 15 or 16.  Over objection by counsel, 
the trial court permitted Moore to testify that he determined that Avalos reported 
to the Salinas Police Department that his truck was burned on November 15 or 16.  
The trial court admonished the jurors that they could not consider Moore‘s 
testimony relating Avalos‘s statements in the police report as proof that Avalos‘s 
truck was burned and that it constituted arson but instead, only to explain Moore‘s 
investigation.  Moore testified that based on his findings, he contacted Avalos and 
discussed the burning of Avalos‘s truck. 
Over further objection by trial counsel, Moore testified that he took Avalos 
to the 101 Trailer Park and asked Avalos whether he knew people there.  Avalos 
pointed to a trailer marked No. 35.  The prosecutor then asked Moore, ―Was this 
the same [trailer] that Jose Luis Ramirez had pointed out to you as being where 
they collected the $l00?‖  Moore answered, ―That‘s correct.‖ 
c.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that investigator Moore‘s testimony relating Ramirez‘s 
and Avalos‘s identifications of trailer No. 35 constituted inadmissible hearsay.  He 
argues, in essence, that by pointing to a specific trailer, both Ramirez and Avalos 
were communicating to Moore, and the trial court erred by admitting their out-of-
 
55 
court communications for their truth.  We agree with defendant that Moore‘s 
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, but we conclude defendant was not 
prejudiced by admission of the trailer identifications. 
― ‗Hearsay evidence‘ is evidence of a statement that was made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of 
the matter stated.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)  A ―[s]tatement‖ includes 
―nonverbal conduct of a person intended by [the person] as a substitute for oral or 
written verbal expression.‖  (Evid. Code, § 225.)  ―For purposes of the hearsay 
rule, conduct is assertive if the actor at the time intended the conduct to convey a 
particular meaning to another person.‖  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 
129.)  
Here, Avalos pointed to trailer No. 35 in response to investigator Moore‘s 
question whether he ―knew people‖ who lived in the 101 Trailer Park.  Thus, 
Avalos‘s act of pointing was intended as a substitute for an oral expression that ―I 
know the person who lives at trailer No. 35.‖  Similarly, during his interview with 
Moore, Ramirez pointed to trailer No. 35 in response to Moore‘s question 
regarding where Sanchez collected his $100 payment.  Thus, Ramirez intended his 
act of pointing to the trailer to substitute for an oral expression that ―Sanchez was 
paid $100 at trailer No. 35.‖  In each circumstance, the prosecution offered 
Avalos‘s and Ramirez‘s act of pointing for the truth of the meaning each intended 
to convey to Moore in answer to his questions, and therefore their act of pointing 
was assertive conduct and hearsay.  (See People v. Mayfield (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 
236, 240-241 [a declarant‘s conduct of pointing to a photograph in response to a 
question is assertive conduct and constitutes hearsay].)   
On appeal, the People argue the statements did not amount to hearsay 
because they were not offered for the truth of the identifications (i.e., Avalos knew 
someone who lived at trailer No. 35, and Sanchez collected a $100 debt from 
 
56 
someone who lived at trailer No. 35) but instead, for the fact that Avalos and 
Ramirez identified the same trailer.  The People did not argue this ground for 
admission at trial.  In any event, the fact that the witnesses may have pointed to the 
same trailer would not have been relevant to any disputed factual issue, unless the 
jury also considered why they pointed to the trailers — that is, the truth of the 
hearsay identifications.  
Because the two identifications of trailer No. 35 were out-of-court 
nonverbal statements intended as substitutes for oral expression and offered for 
their truth, Moore‘s testimony relating the identifications constituted hearsay.  We 
note no other theory of admissibility was offered by the prosecution.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.20  
But the error was harmless.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [error is 
harmless under state law unless it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to defendant would have occurred absent the error]; People v. Duarte 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 618-619 [the Watson standard is applicable to state law 
error in admission of hearsay].)  The identifications made by Ramirez and Avalos 
did not directly establish that Sanchez collected the $100 payment at the trailer as 
payment for burning Avalos’s truck.  Indeed, the trial court admonished the jurors 
that they could consider Moore‘s testimony relating statements made by Ramirez 
(i.e., Sanchez was paid $100 for the vehicle burning that occurred during the 
evening prior to the homicides) and Avalos (i.e., Avalos‘s police report that his 
truck was burned on or about November 15 or 16) for the purpose of explaining 
the steps Moore took during his follow-up investigation, but not as proof that 
                                              
20  
Because we have concluded the identifications testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay, we need not address defendant‘s claims that the court should have 
excluded the testimony under Evidence Code section 352 as unduly prejudicial, a 
basis that he did not advance at trial. 
 
57 
Sanchez received $100 as payment for committing an arson, that an arson was 
committed, or that Avalos was the victim of an arson.  We presume jurors follow 
the trial court‘s instructions.‖  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1115 .)  
Hence, there was no substantive evidence admitted from any of the witnesses who 
testified regarding the trailer identifications that established the nature of the debt 
owed Sanchez was payment for arson. 
In addition, although Avalos‘s testimony established that he had a business 
dispute with Angel and that his (Avalos‘s) truck was set on fire, there was no 
evidence that established he believed Angel was responsible for the arson or 
otherwise connected Angel to the arson.  Further, contrary to what defendant 
implies in his reply brief, the prosecutor did not offer Avalos‘s identification of 
trailer No. 35 ―to prove that Avalos believed the party responsible for the arson 
resided in Trailer 35,‖ and made no such argument to the jury.  For these reasons, 
there is no reasonable probability that absent this vague evidence — that the trailer 
Ramirez identified as the one that Sanchez visited on the day of the homicides to 
collect a $100 debt was the same one that Avalos identified as the home of a 
person he knew, i.e., Angel — the jury would have reached a more favorable 
verdict. 
Next, defendant argues essentially that absent evidence of the hearsay 
trailer identifications made by Ramirez and Avalos, and given the trial court‘s 
admonitions precluding the jury‘s consideration of the statements these witnesses 
made to investigator Moore during the investigation as proof an arson occurred, 
there was insufficient evidence to prove alleged overt acts numbers three and four 
of the conspiracy charge.  As a result, defendant contends that his conspiracy 
conviction should be reversed because it may have been based on overt acts 
unsupported by legally sufficient evidence.  We disagree.   
 
58 
―A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another 
person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as 
the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of 
the commission of an overt act ‗by one or more of the parties to such agreement‘ 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.‖  (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 
§ 184.)  Although a unanimous jury must agree that an overt act was committed, it 
need not unanimously agree on the same overt act in order to convict for 
conspiracy.  (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)  Further, an immaterial variance 
in the proof at trial from the overt act alleged in the charging document does not 
vitiate a conspiracy verdict if the evidence proves the ―gist‖ of the overt act, and 
the defendant was sufficiently informed of the offense with which he was charged 
and has not been misled in making his defense.  (People v. Guerrero (1943) 22 
Cal.2d 183, 186 (Guerrero) [holding that ―[t]he taking of the prosecutrix to the 
specified places constituted the gist of the overt acts relied upon as evidencing the 
defendants‘ formation of the conspiracy, and the presence or absence of 
compulsion in effecting such removal added nothing to the sufficiency of that 
accusation‖]; People v. Rodriguez (1923) 61 Cal.App. 69, 80-81 (Rodriguez) 
[regarding charge of conspiracy to commit burglary, it was sufficient to allege as 
an overt act that the conspirators attempted ―to enter the office of [a] mining 
company‖; allegation of the means employed by them for that purpose, i.e., to 
―pick the lock of the door of the office‖ was ―unimportant and immaterial‖ and 
therefore, ―surplusage‖]; see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 427 
[rejecting the defendant‘s claim that variance between pleading and proof on a 
charge of rape under § 261, former subd. (2) (now subd. (a)(2)) violated his 
constitutional rights to notice and due process; allegation of rape ― ‗by means of 
force and fear‘ ‖ in the amended information did not describe an offense different 
from ―rape by means of violence‖ in jury instruction].) 
 
59 
Regarding alleged overt act number three, quoted above, Ramirez testified 
that on the day of the homicides, Sanchez collected $100 as payment for a debt 
while defendant, Nunez, and Ramirez waited in the car.  As explained above, there 
was no substantive evidence introduced that any arson was committed.  
Nonetheless, applying the test for materiality of the variance between the 
allegation of overt act number three and the proof introduced at trial, the absence 
of substantive evidence that defendant, Sanchez, and Nunez committed an arson 
for hire could not affect the conspiracy verdict.  (Guerrero, supra, 22 Cal.2d at 
p. 187.)  First, the gist of overt act number three was that on or about the day 
before the homicides, Sanchez obtained $100.  The means by which Sanchez 
obtained the money was immaterial.  As alleged in overt act number four, 
discussed below, Sanchez simply applied the money toward the purchase of 
ammunition for rifles the four men intended to use to commit burglary, robbery, 
and homicide at the Morales residence; again, the source of the funds had no 
bearing on the transaction.  (Id., at p. 186; Rodriguez, supra, 61 Cal.App. at p. 81.)  
Second, it cannot be said that defendant was misled in making his defense or 
otherwise prejudiced by inclusion of the immaterial arson language in the 
allegation of overt act number three.  (Guerrero, supra, at p. 187; Rodriguez, 
supra, at p. 81.)  For these reasons, the variance between the information and the 
prosecution‘s proof regarding the commission of an arson was immaterial.  
Therefore, we conclude that even absent substantive evidence of an arson, there 
was sufficient evidence to substantiate alleged overt act number three.   
Regarding the allegation of overt act number four, set forth above, the 
testimony of Ramirez and Fletcher, a clerk at JKD Shooting Sports, and 
evidence of the purchase receipt, taken together, established that on or about 
the day of the crimes, the four men went to JKD Shooting Sports and, with the 
$100 that Sanchez collected at the trailer, bought ammunition for rifles they 
 
60 
intended to use to commit the crimes at the Morales house.  For the reasons 
stated in the preceding section concerning alleged overt act number three, the 
variance between the allegation in overt act number four that the four men 
intended to purchase ammunition ―with the $100 received from the arson‖ and the 
prosecution‘s absence of proof of an arson also was immaterial.  (Guerrero, supra, 
22 Cal.2d at p. 187; Rodriguez, supra, 61 Cal.App. at p. 81.)  The gist of this 
alleged overt act was that the four men went to JDK Shooting Sports to purchase, 
with the $100 Sanchez had collected, ammunition for the weapons they planned to 
use to commit the crimes at the Morales residence.  Therefore, we conclude that 
even though the prosecution offered no substantive evidence of an arson, there 
was sufficient evidence to substantiate alleged overt act number four.    
Finally, defendant‘s confrontation clause claim lacks merit.  Even assuming 
Avalos‘s and Ramirez‘s out-of-court statements of identification to investigator 
Moore were testimonial within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
541 U.S. 36, 53, their admission did not violate defendant‘s confrontation rights 
because Avalos and Ramirez were subject to cross-examination at trial.  (Id. at 
p. 59, fn. 9 [―we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at 
trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements‖].) 
6.  Assault and Attempted Murder Convictions  
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions for attempted murder (count 4) and assault with a firearm (count 5) of 
Alejandra.  As we explain, sufficient evidence supports each conviction. 
―When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence 
 
61 
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.]…  We 
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact 
reasonably could infer from the evidence.  [Citation.]  If the circumstances 
reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings, reversal of the judgment is not 
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled 
with a contrary finding.  [Citation.]  A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence 
nor reevaluates a witness‘s credibility.‖  (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 
27.)  
―Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission 
of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.‖  (People 
v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; accord, People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 
739 (Smith).)  ―Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, ‗one 
and the same.‘ ‖  (Smith, at p. 739.)  Express malice requires a showing that the 
assailant either desires the victim‘s death or knows to a substantial certainty that 
the victim‘s death will occur.  (Ibid.)  
Concerning the crime of assault with a firearm, ―[s]ection 245, subdivision 
(a)(2), punishes ‗[a]ny person who commits an assault upon the person of another 
with a firearm.‘  Assault is defined as ‗an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present 
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.‘  (§ 240, italics 
added.)  ‗Once a defendant has attained the means and location to strike 
immediately he has the ―present ability to injure.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Licas (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 362, 366-367.) 
Defendant contends a ―personal shooting theory cannot be used to uphold 
the conviction[s] [for attempted murder and assault]‖ because the jury could not 
reach a unanimous verdict on the allegation he personally used a .38-caliber 
handgun within the meaning of former section 12022.5, subdivision (a).  
 
62 
Assertedly, the evidence is insufficient to find that he personally shot baby 
Alejandra.  We disagree. 
―[T]here is no prohibition against considering all of the evidence in the 
record to determine the sufficiency of evidence on one count merely because the 
jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on a count to which the evidence may have 
related.‖  (People v. Consuegra (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1726, 1734, fn. 6.)  The 
failure of the jury to reach a verdict on the allegation that defendant personally 
used a .38-caliber handgun ―may show no more than jury lenity, compromise, or 
mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict. ‖  (People v. Lewis 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656.)  ―The United States Supreme Court has explained: 
‗[A] criminal defendant … is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error 
by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the 
trial and appellate courts.  This review should not be confused with the problems 
caused by inconsistent verdicts.  Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves 
assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support 
any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citations.]  This 
review should be independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another 
count was insufficient.‘  (United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 67.)‖  (Ibid., 
italics added; see also § 954 [―An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be 
deemed an acquittal of any other count.‖].) 
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude there is no 
reason to reverse defendant‘s convictions for the crimes committed against 
Alejandra merely because the jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on the 
personal use of a .38-caliber handgun allegation.  The evidence is sufficient to 
support defendant‘s convictions for attempted murder of and assault with a firearm 
on Alejandra, based on the theory he was the direct perpetrator of those crimes.   
 
63 
The totality of the evidence established that Sanchez was armed with the 
AR-15 rifle, Nunez was armed with the .30-30 rifle, and defendant was armed 
with a .38-caliber handgun.  Salinas Police Officer Timothy McLaughlin testified 
that long rifles such as an AR-15 and .30-30 ordinarily require two hands to 
operate.  After defendant gave Sanchez one of the two handguns he found in a box 
in the kitchen, he went into the bedroom where Nunez had forced Martha to 
remain with her baby.  Because defendant‘s fingerprint was found on the box of 
.38-caliber ammunition in the bedroom, the jury reasonably could infer that the 
second gun defendant found was a .38-caliber handgun, that he loaded it with 
ammunition from this box, and that he used this gun to shoot the victims.21   
As defendant explained in his videotaped statement, after the first gunshot 
was fired, ―We fired the weapons that we had‖ and ―shot really like crazy.‖  The 
jury could reasonably conclude that at that point, defendant had put into action his 
plan with Sanchez to eliminate all witnesses to the burglary and robbery, that is, to 
kill everyone inside the house.  Defendant intentionally fired his handgun three 
times at close range toward Martha and Alejandra.  The jury reasonably could 
infer that Martha and Alejandra were shot at about the same time and that 
Alejandra was in her mother‘s arms when defendant shot Martha in her forehead 
and shot Alejandra in the left shoulder and leg.  ―The act of shooting a firearm 
toward a victim at close range in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal 
wound had the shot been on target is sufficient to support an inference of an intent 
to kill.‖  (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1218.)  Here, defendant 
discharged his .38-caliber handgun multiple times from close range in a manner 
                                              
21  
In the alternative, the jury reasonably could have found that because 
Ramirez testified only that he ―thought‖ the handgun defendant put in Sanchez‘s 
pocket was a .38-caliber handgun, Ramirez was mistaken in identifying the gun 
defendant gave to Sanchez and that defendant possessed a .38-caliber handgun.   
 
64 
that could have inflicted a mortal wound on Alejandra, like the mortal wounds 
actually inflicted on her mother.  Therefore, the jury could reasonably conclude 
that defendant had acted with the requisite intent to kill when he shot the baby, and 
thereby convict him of attempted murder.   
Further, because the gunfire had lasted about a half a minute, the jury 
reasonably could infer that defendant acted purposefully and without delay in 
loading his weapon and shooting Martha and Alejandra in the bedroom.  These 
additional circumstances lend further support to the jury‘s implied finding that 
defendant acted with intent to kill the baby when he shot her.  (See People v. Arias 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162 [―if the jury found defendant‘s use of a lethal weapon 
with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act 
was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary 
obstacle or annoyance‖]; see also Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742 [―even if the 
shooting was not premeditated, with the shooter merely perceiving the victim as ‗a 
momentary obstacle or annoyance,‘ the shooter‘s purposeful ‗use of a lethal 
weapon with lethal force‘ against the victim, if otherwise legally unexcused, will 
itself give rise to an inference of intent to kill‖].) 
Finally, the jury also reasonably could find that defendant completed an 
assault with a firearm of Alejandra.  (See People v. Wright (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 
762, 767 [―If a firearm is deliberately and unlawfully fired toward another person 
in a manner likely to produce great bodily injury the offense of assault with a 
deadly weapon is complete.‖].) 
 
65 
Accordingly, we conclude a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant, as a direct perpetrator, attempted to kill Alejandra and 
assaulted her with a firearm.22 
7.  Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct  
At the beginning of the closing argument at the guilt phase, the prosecutor 
stated:  ―We have laws, criminal laws, that we‘ve set up in our country, and they 
are basically the norms, the standards that we, as a civilized society, live by.  
They‘re rules that apply, not only to you and me, but they also apply to him, to the 
defendant.  And your job as jurors in this case is to conduct that litmus test to 
apply the laws that we, as a civilized society, have and determine whether or not 
the defendant has broken any of those laws.  Determine whether or not we, as a 
civilized society — you, as the jurors who are making this decision — will tolerate 
the conduct of this man.‖   
Near the conclusion of her argument, the prosecutor stated:  ―You need to 
look at this evidence.  You need to sift through it.  Every item there tells a story, 
every item of evidence.  And, you know, things like that little jumper, that little 
sleeper that [baby] Alejandra was wearing, doesn‘t lie.  All it can do is tell you the 
truth.  It is as it is.  [¶]  That green jacket, look at it.  It doesn‘t lie.  The bullets that 
went through each of these victims, each of them, tells a story.  It is incumbent 
upon you.  You are responsible to determine that story, to use the evidence that 
you‘ve received in this case and determine the charges.  [¶]  Again, as I mentioned, 
your job and your responsibility as jurors is to act as the litmus test, to apply the 
                                              
22  
Because we affirm defendant‘s conviction for attempted murder and assault 
with a firearm on the theory that he was the actual perpetrator of those crimes, we 
need not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to convict him of those crimes 
under an alternative theory of liability.    
 
66 
laws of our society, and to determine what our community will and will not 
tolerate.‖ 
Trial counsel objected that the above italicized portion of the prosecutor‘s 
closing argument was ―an improper statement of the law.‖  The trial court 
overruled the objection and admonished the jury as follows:  ―Well, counsel is 
permitted to present to you, as I‘ve said, their theory of the case.  They‘re 
permitted to comment on the facts.  They‘re permitted to comment on the law.  [¶]  
What they say is not evidence.  And what they say about the law is not the law.  
You have to follow my instructions on that.  [¶]  They‘re permitted to comment on 
both of those areas.  This particular comment is somewhat beyond the law.  But it 
is still within the realm of permissible comment.‖   
On appeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor‘s remarks about the 
jurors acting as the ―litmus test . . . to determine what our community will and will 
not tolerate‖ constituted misconduct because in advocating this approach, she 
appealed to the jurors‘ passions.  He asserts the argument deprived him of his state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and reliable guilt and 
penalty verdicts.  As we explain, there was no misconduct.   
Preliminarily, defendant‘s claim is forfeited because he did not object on 
the specific ground of prosecutorial misconduct that he now asserts on appeal. 
― ‗As a general rule, a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant 
made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.‘ ‖  (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 281, 
quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841; People v. McDowell 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 436.)  At trial, counsel objected that the prosecutor‘s 
comments constituted a misstatement of law.  For the first time on appeal, 
defendant complains that the prosecutor‘s comments constituted an improper 
 
67 
appeal to the passions of the jury.  The trial court was not presented with this 
specific argument and hence, had no opportunity to rule on the issue.  We 
therefore conclude the issue is forfeited on appeal.  In any event, defendant‘s 
claim is without merit.   
― ‗A prosecutor‘s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution when it ―infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.‖  [Citations.]  In other words, the 
misconduct must be ―of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant‘s right to a fair trial.‖  [Citation.]  A prosecutor‘s misconduct that does 
not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless violates California law if it 
involves ―the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.) ― ‗It 
is, of course, improper [for the prosecutor] to make arguments to the jury that give 
it the impression that ―emotion may reign over reason,‖ and to present ―irrelevant 
information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury‘s attention from its 
proper role, or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. 
Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 742-743.)  We consider the assertedly improper 
remarks in the context of the argument as a whole.  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1158, 1203.)  ―In conducting [our] inquiry, we ‗do not lightly infer‘ that 
the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the 
prosecutor‘s statements.‖  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970.) 
Here, the complained-of remarks simply repeated what the prosecutor 
explained at the beginning of her argument was the function of the jury, i.e., to 
determine whether defendant had broken any laws.  Defendant argues that ―[b]y 
charging the jurors with the responsibility to express the will of ‗civilized society‘ 
the prosecutor sought to incite the jurors to look beyond the legal and evidentiary 
issues and reach a verdict simply because [defendant] was part of the group that 
 
68 
committed the charged crimes.‖  To the contrary, the prosecutor informed the 
jurors that they were to apply the law in resolving the question of defendant‘s 
guilt.  In making the ―litmus test‖ and ―what our community will and will not 
tolerate‖ comments, the prosecutor permissibly reminded the jurors that they had 
to take responsibility for completing the arduous task of sifting through the 
evidence to determine the story each item told, consider the charges, and 
ultimately decide whether defendant had violated any laws.  There was nothing in 
the prosecution‘s remarks that urged the jurors to act on their passions or 
prejudice.  (See, e.g., People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 92 [―the 
prosecutor‘s argument did not urge the members of the jury to act on the basis of 
their fear of chaos and crime in the community, but to act with an understanding of 
the importance of law in the abstract‖]; see also U.S. v. Monaghan (D.C. Cir. 
1984) 741 F.2d 1434, 1442 [―a request that the jury ‗condemn‘ an accused for 
engaging in illegal activity is not constitutionally infirm, so long as it is not 
calculated to excite prejudice or passion‖].) 
8.  Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication  
Defendant requested that the trial court give a series of instructions on 
voluntary intoxication23 in support of his defense that he lacked the mental state 
required of an aider and abettor.  In denying the request, the trial court found that 
there was evidence defendant was drinking on the day of the crimes but no 
evidence of the amount of alcohol he had consumed.  The court added that ―[t]here 
is no evidence to the effect that he was inebriated to the point that his ability to 
                                              
23  
Defendant requested CALJIC Nos. 4.20 (Voluntary Intoxication — Not a 
Defense to General Intent Crimes), a modified version of 4.21 (Voluntary 
Intoxication — When Relevant to Specific Intent), 4.21.1 (Voluntary Intoxication 
— Trial With General and Specific Intent Crimes), and 4.22 (Voluntary 
Intoxication — Defined). 
 
69 
form the specific intents or mental states might be affected in his own videotaped 
statement as to the salient portions of the events of November 16th.  [¶]  He makes 
no reference to intoxication.  [¶]  He seems to have recall of the events of what 
occurred, why they occurred.‖  Trial counsel was permitted to add further to the 
record and stated that several witnesses testified regarding defendant‘s alleged 
intoxication, that is, he was ―drunk‖ and ―intoxicated.‖  Counsel submitted that the 
evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to decide whether ―he had the capacity 
to form the specific intent.‖  
Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court instructed the jury under a 
modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21.1, as follows:  ―It is the general rule that no 
act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less 
criminal by reason of this condition.  [¶]  Thus in the crimes and enhancements 
alleged, the fact that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated is not a defense and 
does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for the crime.  [¶]  However, there 
is an exception to this general rule, namely, where a specific intent is an essential 
element of a crime.  In that event, you should consider the defendant‘s voluntary 
intoxication in deciding whether the defendant possessed the required specific 
intent at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.  [¶]  Thus, in the crimes 
and enhancements alleged, where a necessary element is the existence in the mind 
of the defendant of a certain specific intent, that element will be included in the 
definition of the crimes set forth elsewhere in these instructions.  [¶]  If the 
evidence shows that a defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, 
you should consider that fact in deciding whether or not the defendant had the 
required specific intent.  [¶]  If from all evidence you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant had that specific intent, you must find that the defendant did 
not have that specific intent.‖  
 
70 
Defendant contends this voluntary intoxication instruction was erroneous 
because it told the jury that evidence of intoxication could be considered in 
determining whether he formed the required intent of a specific intent crime but 
precluded consideration of his intoxication in evaluating whether he formed the 
requisite mental state of an aider and abettor, i.e., knowledge of and intent to aid 
the perpetrator‘s unlawful purpose.  As a result, he asserts the instruction 
effectively withdrew his intoxication defense on the required mental state for 
aiding and abetting.  In addition, defendant contends, the instruction precluded the 
jury‘s consideration of intoxication evidence as it related to the special 
circumstance findings under CALJIC 8.80.1, intent to kill or reckless indifference 
to human life.  Defendant asserts the instructional error violated his federal and 
state constitutional rights to due process, to present a defense, confrontation, a jury 
trial, and a nonarbitrary capital sentencing process.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 
14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 15.) 
Defendant relies on People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133 
(Mendoza), in which we held that ―[d]efendants may present evidence of 
intoxication solely on the question whether they are liable for criminal acts as 
aiders and abettors.‖24  As we explained in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 99, 186 (Letner and Tobin), Mendoza concluded ―(1) evidence of 
voluntary intoxication is relevant to the extent it establishes whether an aider and 
abettor knew of the direct perpetrator‘s criminal purpose and intended to facilitate 
achieving that goal, even in cases in which the perpetrator intended to commit a 
‗general intent‘ crime [citation]; and (2) any instructions to the jury concerning 
voluntary intoxication should inform the jury of the possible effect of voluntary 
                                              
24  
We filed our decision in Mendoza on August 13, 1998, after defendant‘s 
trial commenced, but before the jury rendered its guilt phase verdicts.   
 
71 
intoxication upon the aider and abettor‘s mental state ([Mendoza] at p. 1134 [‗a 
trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on the relevance of intoxication, but if 
it does instruct, as the court here did, it has to do so correctly‘]).‖  
In Letner and Tobin, we assumed that the trial court‘s instructions, which 
predated Mendoza, failed to adequately explain to the jury how voluntary 
intoxication could affect the mental state of an aider and abettor.  (Letner and 
Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 187.)  Quoting Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pages 
1134-1135, we explained preliminarily that ―we ‗review the instructions as a 
whole to determine whether it is ―reasonably likely the jury misconstrued the 
instructions as precluding it from considering‖ the intoxication evidence in 
deciding aiding and abetting liability.  [Citation.]  Any error would have the effect 
of excluding defense evidence and is thus subject to the usual standard for state 
law error:  ―the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the 
error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.‖ ‘ ‖  (Letner and Tobin, at 
p. 187.)   
Applying these principles, we concluded that any error was harmless:  
―Although the voluntary intoxication instructions did not specifically mention 
aiding and abetting, they did not preclude the jury‘s use of evidence of 
intoxication in evaluating whether defendants aided and abetted, that is, whether, 
pursuant to the trial court‘s other instructions, one defendant knew of the other 
defendant‘s criminal purpose and intentionally aided the commission of the crime.  
Nor did the prosecutor argue that the jury could not consider voluntary 
intoxication in determining whether a defendant who was an aider and abettor of 
the crimes formed the mental state required for aiding and abetting.  There is 
nothing in the record to indicate the jury would not have understood that the 
mental states set forth in the voluntary intoxication instructions could apply both 
to the mental states required of a direct perpetrator and to those required of an 
 
72 
aider and abettor. . . .  For these reasons, any error in the instructions did not 
preclude the jury‘s consideration of defense evidence, nor is it reasonably probable 
that different instructions would have resulted in a verdict more favorable to 
defendants.‖  (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 187.) 
Here, the defense theory was defendant‘s denial of any knowledge of or 
intent to further the alleged plan to rob and murder.  Trial counsel argued that ―[i]t 
is not unreasonable to assume that [defendant], himself, really didn‘t believe that 
anything serious was going to happen. . . . What happens to him when he‘s had too 
much to drink?  He gets happy.  He‘s the kind of guy that, he wants to dance.  
Does that sound like a person who intended to kill the Moraleses that evening?  I 
think not.  Amy Trejo said [defendant] was a nice guy.  She said she could never, 
ever imagine that he would do anything like this.‖  
Similar to the situation in Letner and Tobin, although the trial court‘s 
alternate intoxication instruction was not clear in identifying for the jury the 
mental states that could be affected by defendant‘s intoxication, any error was 
harmless.  There is nothing in the instruction that informed the jury that the intent 
elements set forth in the specific intent crimes could apply to only the mental 
states required of a direct perpetrator but not to those required of an aider and 
abettor.  The trial court did not prohibit counsel from arguing, as he did at the 
hearing on the matter and pursuant to the instructions he requested, that evidence 
of intoxication was relevant to whether defendant had formed the requisite mental 
state as an aider and abettor to the specific intent crimes.  During argument, 
counsel expressly asserted that defendant had no knowledge of any plan to rob and 
murder because he had been drinking:  defendant ―had too much to drink‖ and did 
not think ―anything serious was going to happen.‖  Counsel himself did not limit 
the argument to the issue of defendant‘s guilt as a direct perpetrator and the jury 
reasonably would have understood it applied to the determination of defendant‘s 
 
73 
liability as an aider and abettor.  In addition, nothing prohibited trial counsel from 
arguing that the jury could consider evidence of defendant‘s intoxication in 
determining, under CALJIC No. 8.80.1, whether he intended to kill or acted with 
reckless indifference.  
Further, the record reveals that the jury necessarily resolved the factual 
issues presented by the omitted language25 adversely to defendant.  Defendant was 
found guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary and robbery as alleged in count 10.  
The jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 6.10 in relevant part that conspiracy 
requires ―the specific intent to agree to commit the crime of burglary or robbery or 
murder . . . and with the further specific intent to commit one or more of those 
crimes. . . .‖  (Italics added.)  Hence, in finding defendant had the specific intent to 
agree with the coparticipants to commit burglary and robbery and the specific 
intent to commit burglary and robbery, the jury impliedly found that 
notwithstanding the evidence of intoxication, defendant had knowledge of their 
intent to commit burglary and robbery and also formed the specific intent to 
commit these crimes.  Therefore, the jury ―found [defendant] was not so 
                                              
25  
The ―mental state‖ language omitted from the modified version of CALJIC 
No. 4.21.1 provided by the trial court appears in the bracketed portions, as 
follows:  ―However, there is an exception to this general rule, namely, where a 
specific intent [or] [mental state] is an essential element of a crime.  In that event, 
you should consider the defendant‘s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the 
defendant possessed the required specific intent [or] [mental state] at the time of 
the commission of the alleged crime.  [¶]  Thus, . . . where a necessary element is 
the existence in the mind of the defendant of a certain specific intent [or] [mental 
state], that element will be included in the definition of the crimes set forth 
elsewhere in these instructions.  [¶]  If the evidence shows that a defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in 
deciding whether or not the defendant had the required specific intent [or] [mental 
state].  [¶]  If from all evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant 
had that specific intent [or] [mental state], you must find that the defendant did not 
have that specific intent [or] [mental state].‖   
 
74 
intoxicated as to be unable to form the required mental states‖ of an aider and 
abettor to the burglary and robberies; ―consequently, a more favorable outcome 
had [the intoxication instruction been modified to expressly apply to the mental 
states of an aider and abettor] was not reasonably probable.‖  (People v. Coffman 
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 97 (Coffman and Marlow); see also People v. 
Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [error in omitting instruction on lesser included 
offense was harmless when the factual question posed by that instruction ―was 
necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given 
instructions‖].)   
For these reasons, any instructional error did not preclude the jury‘s 
consideration of defendant‘s intoxication evidence on the question of his liability 
as an aider and abettor.   We conclude it is not reasonably probable that different 
instructions would have resulted in an outcome more favorable to defendant.  
9.  Instructions Involving Accomplice Liability and the Natural and 
Probable Consequences Doctrine  
The prosecution relied on, among other theories, the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine to establish defendant‘s guilt as an aider and abettor, and/or 
a coconspirator for the charges of murder (counts 1-3), attempted murder (count 
4), and assault with a firearm (count 5).  The jury was instructed on this doctrine 
under CALJIC Nos. 3.02, 6.11, and 8.66.  Defendant contends that these 
instructions were defective because they did not include language that required the 
jury to determine the natural and probable consequences of the crimes from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant‘s position.  Defendant asserts 
that the instructional deficiencies require reversal of his convictions on the above 
charges.  As we explain, reversal of defendant‘s convictions is not required.   
 
75 
a.  The natural and probable consequence doctrine instructions 
(i)  CALJIC No. 3.02   
The trial court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.02, the pattern 
jury instruction concerning aider and abettor liability under the natural and 
probable and consequences doctrine, as follows:  ―One who aids and abets another 
in the commission of a crime or crimes is not only guilty of that crime or crimes, 
but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural 
and probably [sic] consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.  [¶]  In 
order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged in Counts 1, 2 
and 3 on this theory, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that:  [¶]  
One, the crimes of burglary or robbery were committed; [¶]  Two, . . . [¶]  That the 
defendant aided and abetted in those crimes;  [¶]  [Three,]  [t]hat a co-principal in 
one . . . or more of those crimes committed a murder.  [¶]  And four, that the crime 
of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the 
crimes of robbery or burglary.  [¶]  You are not required to unanimously agree as 
to which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as 
you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agreed that the 
defendant aided and abetted the commission of an identified target crime and that 
the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of 
that target crime.‖  (Italics added.) 
(ii)  CALJIC No. 6.11 
The trial court instructed with CALJIC No. 6.11, which explained the 
nature of joint conspiratorial responsibility, as follows:  ―Each member of a 
criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every 
other member of the conspiracy if that act or declaration is in furtherance of the 
object of the conspiracy.  [¶]…[¶]  A member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of 
the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates agreed to and did 
 
76 
commit, but is liable also for the natural and probable consequences of any crime 
or act of a co-conspirator to further the object of the conspiracy even though that 
crime or act was not intended as a part of the agreed upon objective, and even 
though he was not present at the time of the commission of that crime or act.  [¶]  
You must determine whether the defendant is guilty as a member of a conspiracy 
to commit the originally agreed upon crime or crimes, and if so, whether the crime 
or crimes alleged was or were perpetrated by a co-conspirator in furtherance of 
that conspiracy, and was or were a natural and probable consequence of the 
agreed upon criminal objective of that conspiracy.‖  (Italics added.) 
(iii)  CALJIC No. 8.66 
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted murder 
under CALJIC No. 8.66.  The instruction was modified to include the following 
instruction on aider and abettor liability for attempted murder under the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine:  ―In order to find the defendant guilty of 
attempted murder on an aiding and abetting theory, the attempted murder must be 
a natural and probable consequence of a criminal act which the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally encouraged.‖  (Italics added.) 
b.  Discussion 
As observed in the above quoted pattern instructions, under the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine, ―[a]n aider and abettor is guilty not only of the 
intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target crime 
actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence 
of the target crime.‖  (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611.)  Moreover, 
―[a] consequence that is reasonably foreseeable is a natural and probable 
consequence under this doctrine.  ‗A nontarget offense is a ― ‗natural and probable 
consequence‘ ‖ of the target offense if, judged objectively, the additional offense 
 
77 
was reasonably foreseeable.‖  (Ibid.)  ―The latter question is not whether the aider 
and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, 
it was reasonably foreseeable.‖  (Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)  The 
natural and probable consequences doctrine applies equally to aiders and abettors 
and conspirators.  (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260-261 .)   
Defendant contends on appeal for the first time that the instructions should 
have incorporated a reasonable person standard in order to guide the jurors in 
determining what constitutes natural and probable consequences.  As a 
preliminary matter, ―[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction 
correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless 
the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.‖  (People v. 
Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024.)  Because defendant did not object at trial that 
the instructions were incomplete as given, the issue is forfeited.  It is also without 
merit, as we explain.   
Defendant argues that the italicized portions of the instructions quoted in 
the preceding section did not adequately convey the jury‘s role in applying the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine because they failed to include 
language similar to that which appears in paragraph 3 of CALCRIM No. 403  
(added Jan. 2006, rev. Feb. 2015):  ―Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person in the defendant‘s position would have known that the commission of the 
___________  was a natural and probable consequence 
of the commission of the ___________ .‖  The Authority 
following CALCRIM No. 403 includes a citation to People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 
Cal.App.4th 518, 531 (Nguyen) for the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine and reasonable person standard.  (Authority to CALCRIM No. 403 (2015 
rev.) p. 167.)  In Nguyen, the Court of Appeal explained that the question whether 
a particular crime was a natural and probable consequence of another crime aided 
 
78 
and abetted by a defendant ―does not turn on the defendant‘s subjective state of 
mind, but depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a 
reasonable person in the defendant‘s position would have or should have known 
that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided 
and abetted by the defendant.‖  (Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) 
The fact that the current CALCRIM instruction includes additional 
clarifying language to better assist jurors in applying the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine does not mean that the absence of such language in the 
version of CALJIC given at defendant‘s 1998 trial makes the instruction incorrect.  
(See People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 48, fn. 7 [jury instructions are not 
the law].)  Further, this court has concluded in Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at page 107, that the term ―natural and probable consequences‖ is not a 
special legal term that requires additional definition, and that ―natural and 
probable‖ and ―reasonably foreseeable‖ are equivalent concepts.  Accordingly, the 
claim fails on the merits.26  
                                              
26  
While defendant‘s appeal was pending, this court held in People v. Chiu 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 (Chiu), that as a matter of law, an aider and abettor 
may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine.  The decision in Chiu thus governs this case.  
(See People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 685, fn. 3 [―As a matter of normal 
judicial operation, even a non-retroactive decision ordinarily governs all cases still 
pending on direct review when the decision is rendered.‖].)   
As stated, the jury here was instructed on aider and abettor liability for 
murder under CALJIC No. 3.02, as set forth above.  This instruction, when 
considered together with other instructions given to the jury (e.g., CALJIC Nos. 
8.10 , 8.11, and 8.20) permitted the jury to convict defendant of premeditated first 
degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.  This was error under Chiu.  Reversal is not required on 
this ground, however, because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
record reveals the jury based its verdicts on a legally valid theory.  (Chiu, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 167, citing Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1203-1205.)  As we 
 
 
79 
10.  CALJIC No. 2.02  
The trial court instructed the jury under a modified version of CALJIC No. 
2.02, the pattern instruction regarding the sufficiency of evidence to prove specific 
intent or mental state, as follows:  ―The specific intent with which an act is done 
may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act.  
However, you may not find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 
4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 unless the proved circumstances are not only, one, consistent 
with the theory that the defendant had the required specific intent, but two, cannot 
be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.  [¶]  Also, if the evidence as to 
any specific intent permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to 
the existence of the specific intent, and the other to its absence, you must adopt 
that interpretation which points to its absence.  If on the other hand one 
interpretation of the evidence as to the specific intent appears to you to be 
reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the 
reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.‖  As given, the modified 
version of the instruction omitted from the original form of CALJIC No. 2.02 the 
phrase ―[or] [ and ] [mental state]‖ after each instance of the phrase ―specific 
intent.‖ 
                                                                                                                                      
 
explained in Chun, one appropriate method of assessing the prejudicial effect of 
this type of error is to determine whether ―other aspects of the verdict or the 
evidence leave no reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings necessary‖ to 
support a valid theory of liability.  (Chun, supra, at p. 1205.)  The record in this 
case indicates that the jury was properly instructed on valid theories of first degree 
felony murder (§ 189), with underlying offenses of robbery and burglary.  The 
jury‘s guilty verdicts concerning robbery of each murder victim (counts 6-8), and 
burglary (count 9), and its true findings for each of the murder victims regarding 
robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances leave no doubt that the 
jury made the findings necessary to support valid guilty verdicts on the murder 
charges, and therefore we conclude the instructional error under Chiu was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
80 
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by so omitting the 
phrase in the instruction and in limiting the applicability of the instruction to the 
attempted murder, robbery, burglary, and conspiracy counts (counts 4 and 6-10).  
As a result, defendant asserts the jurors reasonably understood that the principles 
of CALJIC No. 2.02 did not apply to determining the mental state issues regarding 
aiding and abetting, that is, any mental state issues not explicitly identified as a 
―specific intent.‖  We disagree.   
In People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, the defendant advanced a similar 
complaint.  ―The court explained direct and circumstantial evidence (CALJIC No. 
2.00) and it gave the general sufficiency of circumstantial evidence instruction 
(CALJIC No. 2.01) which is required to be given by the court on its own motion 
where the case rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, as it does 
here.  [Citations.]  In an abundance of caution, in the prosecutor‘s view, or as 
required, in the defendant‘s view, the court also instructed as to circumstantial 
evidence to prove specific intent.  Its instruction was based on CALJIC No. 2.02, 
but in its reading, the trial court deleted the phrase ‗(or) (mental state).‘ ‖  (Id. at 
p. 351, fns. omitted.)  We concluded that the defendant suffered no prejudice from 
the omission of the phrase, in large part because the specific question that would 
have been posed by adding the phrase ― ‗or mental state‘ ‖ was covered by the 
general circumstantial evidence instruction that was given.  (Id. at p. 352.) 
This case is similar to Bloyd.  The circumstantial evidence offered in this 
case was not limited to proving only defendant‘s specific intent, but also, for 
example, to show that defendant loaded and used a .38-caliber handgun.  
Therefore, the more inclusive CALJIC No. 2.01 was properly given.27  In turn, the 
                                              
27  
CALJIC No. 2.01, as given, informed the jury as follows:  ―[A] finding of 
guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the 
 
 
81 
jurors would reasonably have applied that latter instruction to resolve the specific 
question that would have been posed had the ―(or) (mental state)‖ language been 
included under CALJIC No. 2.02.   
Defendant suggests that giving CALJIC No. 2.01 did not cure the alleged 
defect because CALJIC No. 2.02 was more specific than CALJIC No. 2.01 and 
presumably, the jurors would have relied on CALJIC 2.02 as governing their 
consideration of specific intent and mental state issues.  The logic is faulty.  As 
given, CALJIC No. 2.02 applied to only the ―specific intent‖ elements of counts 4 
and 6 through 10.  Therefore, the jurors reasonably would have relied on CALJIC 
No. 2.01 to resolve any questions involving other mental states with regard to the 
remaining charges and the consideration of circumstantial evidence in general.  
Further, CALJIC No. 2.02 did not suggest that the jury was precluded from 
applying the general rule of CALJIC No. 2.01 to all other issues.  For these 
reasons, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have 
understood the instruction in the manner defendant contends.  (Estelle v. McGuire 
(1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 (Estelle).)  The claim fails on the merits. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
proved circumstances are not only, one, consistent with the theory that the 
defendant is guilty of the crime, but, two, cannot be reconciled with any other 
rational conclusion.  [¶]  Furthermore, each fact which is essential to complete a 
set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant‘s guilt must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, before an inference essential to 
establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each 
fact or circumstance upon which the inference necessarily rests must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  Also, if the circumstantial evidence as to any 
particular count permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the 
defendant‘s guilt and the other to his innocence, you must adopt that interpretation 
that points to the defendant‘s innocence and reject that interpretation that points to 
his guilt.  [¶]  If on the other hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to 
you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must 
accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.‖ 
 
82 
11.  Jury Instructions on Accomplice Liability  
The trial court instructed the jury under then-existing CALJIC No. 3.00, as 
follows:  ―Persons who are involved in committing or attempting to commit a 
crime are referred to as principals in that crime.  Each principal, regardless of the 
extent or manner of participation, is equally guilty.  Principals include:  [¶]  One, 
those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act constituting 
the crime; [¶]  Or two, those who aid and abet the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime.‖ 
Defendant contends this instruction required the jurors to find that all the 
participants in the murders were ―equally guilty‖ and thus, precluded the jurors 
from finding defendant guilty of second degree murder without also finding that 
Sanchez and Nunez committed only second degree murder.  To the extent 
defendant claims the instructions affected his substantial rights, we may review his 
claim under section 1259 despite his failure to raise the issue below.  Nonetheless, 
it is without merit. 
CALJIC No. 3.01, as given, defined an aider and abettor as one who,  
―[w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator‖ and ―the intent or 
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the 
crime,‖ ―aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.‖   
― ‗It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of 
understanding and applying the court‘s instructions.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Bryant, Smith, 
and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433.)  ― ‗ ―A defendant challenging an 
instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the 
way asserted by the defendant.  [Citations.]‖  [Citation.]  ― ‗[T]he correctness of 
jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a 
 
83 
consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.‘ ‖ ‘  
(People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822 [].)‖  (Ibid.)  
To the extent defendant argues that CALJIC No. 3.00 is erroneous in all 
cases, he is incorrect.  As we stated in Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, that instruction 
―generally stated a correct rule of law.  All principals, including aiders and 
abettors, are ‗equally guilty‘ in the sense that they are all criminally liable.‖  
(Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433; see also § 31 [―All 
persons concerned in the commission of a crime, … whether they directly commit 
the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being 
present, have advised and encouraged its commission, … are principals in any 
crime so committed.‖].)28 
This court held in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122, that in 
the context of homicide, if an aider and abettor‘s ―mens rea is more culpable than 
another‘s, that person‘s guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the 
actual perpetrator.‖  (See id. p. 1122, fn. 3.)  Defendant argues that a jury should 
be permitted to find an aider and abettor less culpable than the actual perpetrator 
of the target crimes.  We need not address the issue because any instructional error 
was harmless.  The felony-murder and conspiracy verdicts completely eliminate 
the possibility that defendant could have been convicted of anything less than first 
degree murder. 
Finally, defendant contends the instruction under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, allowing the jury to find him guilty of first degree murder, 
                                              
28  
As we also noted in addressing a similar claim, ―CALJIC No. 3.00 has been 
revised to address the circumstance that aiders and abettors are not always guilty 
of the same crime as the actual perpetrators.  (See Use Note to CALJIC No. 3.00 
(Spring 2010 rev.); People v. McCoy[, supra,] 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.)‖  (Bryant, 
Smith, and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433.)   
 
84 
was erroneous because it did not permit a finding that the natural and probable 
consequence of the crime he aided and abetted was second degree murder.  We 
need not address this question.  As explained ante, at page 78, the instruction was 
erroneous because an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree 
premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine (Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167), but the error was harmless in this case.    
12.  “Acquittal First” Instruction  
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 8.75, as follows:  
―The court cannot accept a verdict of guilty of second degree murder as to Counts 
1, 2, or 3 unless the jury also unanimously finds and returns a signed verdict form 
of not guilty as to murder of the first degree in the same count.‖  Defendant 
contends the instruction is erroneous because it prevented the jury from fully 
considering the lesser included offense of second degree murder.  We have 
repeatedly rejected the contention.  (See, e.g., People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 174, 222-223; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 715; Riel, 
supra,  22 Cal.4th at pp. 1200-1201.)  Defendant provides no persuasive basis to 
revisit the issue. 
13.  Jury Instructions That Are Assertedly Argumentative or Favored 
the Prosecution  
Defendant contends several standard instructions that the trial court gave to 
the jury were argumentative and improperly favored the prosecution.  
Preliminarily, because defendant did not object to, or request amplification or 
clarification of, any of the instructions at trial, the claims are forfeited on appeal.   
(People v. Livingston, (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1165.)  The claims are also without 
merit. 
―[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction 
rises to the level of a due process violation.‖  (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
 
85 
663, 677.)  In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, we inquire whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in 
a manner that violates the Constitution.  (Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at p.  72.)  ―A 
single instruction is not viewed in isolation, and the ultimate decision on whether a 
specific jury instruction is correct and adequate is determined by consideration of 
the entire instructions given to the jury.‖  (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 
287 (Lucas).) 
As we explain, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the 
instructions as defendant suggests.   
a.  CALJIC Nos. 2.51 and 2.70  
Defendant contends the instructions on motive (CALJIC No. 2.51) and 
―confession and admission‖ (CALJIC No. 2.70)29 improperly bolstered the 
prosecution‘s case because they applied only to him and undermined the defense 
theory that Ramirez and Sanchez committed crimes based on their own 
independent motives (e.g., Sanchez had a dispute with Ramon over drugs sales, 
and Ramirez stole the hair oil product because that was the brand he used).  We 
disagree. 
                                              
29  
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 2.51 that ―[m]otive is 
not an element of the crimes charged and need not be shown.  However, you may 
consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.  Presence of 
motive may tend to establish the defendant's guilt.  Absence of motive may tend to 
show the defendant‘s innocence.‖  CALJIC No. 2.70, as given, provided that ―[a] 
confession is a statement made by a defendant … in which he has acknowledged 
his guilt of the crimes for which he is on trial.  In order to constitute a confession, 
the statement must acknowledge participation in the crimes as well as the required 
criminal intent.  [¶]  An admission is a statement made by a defendant which does 
not by itself acknowledge his guilt of the crimes for which he is on trial, but which 
statement tends to prove his guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.  
[¶]  You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made a confession or 
admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or in part.‖   
 
86 
Nothing in CALJIC No. 2.51 precluded the jurors from considering 
evidence of the motives of the coparticipants to the extent such evidence bore on 
defendant‘s guilt.  If the jurors believed defendant did not share their motives, the 
jury was permitted to consider any absence of motive as tending to show his 
innocence.   
Next, CALJIC No. 2.70 simply defined a confession and an admission.  
Defendant fails to explain how the definitions undermined his defense that the 
coparticipants acted on their own in committing the crimes.  He also fails to 
demonstrate that the instruction was improper merely because it referred to his 
out-of-court-statement and not those of the coparticipants.  ―[T]he jury‘s duty was 
to decide whether defendant’s guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The jury did not need to ascertain [Ramirez‘s, Sanchez‘s, and Nunez]‘s guilt in the 
… homicides, but needed only to ascertain whether evidence of [their] 
involvement in the homicides generated reasonable doubt as to defendant‘s 
guilt … .‖  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 286, italics added.) 
In addition, we have held that omission of instructions that ―properly 
pinpoint the theory of third party liability … is not prejudicial because the 
reasonable doubt instructions give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon 
the jury that evidence of another party‘s liability must be considered in weighing 
whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.‖  (People v. Hartsch (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 472, 504 (Hartsch).)  The jurors were instructed that they could 
consider any witness‘s prior consistent or inconsistent statements (CALJIC Nos. 
2.13, 2.20) and the existence or nonexistence of motive in evaluating each 
witness‘s credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20).  Also, the trial court instructed the jury 
on how to consider a coconspirator‘s out-of-court statement against defendant.  
(CALJIC No. 6.24.)  
 
87 
In sum, defendant has not established a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
could have misapplied CALJIC No. 2.70 in an unconstitutional manner.  (Estelle, 
supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72.)   
b.  CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.52 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 
2.52,30 standard instructions that addressed the jury‘s consideration of evidence 
regarding a defendant‘s consciousness of guilt.  He asserts the instructions were 
argumentative and unfairly failed to inform the jury that it could consider 
consciousness of guilt evidence concerning coparticipants Sanchez, Nunez, and 
Ramirez, including evidence that each fled the scene immediately after the 
shootings and that Ramirez admitted he made false statements to police.  We 
disagree. 
Preliminarily, we have explained that these instructions benefit the defense.  
―[E]ach . . . instruction[] made clear to the jury that certain types of deceptive or 
evasive behavior on a defendant‘s part could indicate consciousness of guilt, while 
also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove a defendant‘s 
guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance assigned to 
such behavior.  The cautionary nature of the instructions benefits the defense, 
                                              
30  
The trial court instructed under CALJIC No. 2.03  that ―If you find that 
before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading 
statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may 
consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a conscientiousness of 
guilt.  However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight 
and significance, if any, are for you to decide.‖  The court also instructed under 
CALJIC No. 2.52:  ―The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a 
crime or after he or she is accused of a crime is not sufficient in and of itself to 
establish guilt, but is a fact, which if proved, may be considered by you in the light 
of all other proved facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. 
The weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.‖   
 
88 
admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise 
be considered decisively inculpatory.‖  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 
1224.)  
Defendant does not explain how CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.52 hindered his 
defense merely because the instructions were inapplicable to statements made by 
the coparticipants.  As stated above, the jury in this case was tasked with 
determining whether the prosecution had proved defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Although the jury needed to ascertain whether evidence of the 
involvement of Sanchez, Ramirez, and Nunez in the crimes created a reasonable 
doubt as to defendant‘s guilt, it did not need to resolve the issue of their guilt.  
(Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 286.)  Still, nothing in either instruction prohibited 
the jurors from considering evidence that each participant fled the scene 
immediately after the shootings and that Ramirez admitted he made false 
statements to police.  With respect to the latter, the jurors were instructed that they 
could consider Ramirez‘s admission of untruthfulness in evaluating his credibility. 
For these reasons, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the 
instructions in a way that violated defendant‘s constitutional rights.  (Estelle, 
supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72; see Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 501 [concluding the 
trial court properly rejected proposed instruction that would have told the jury that 
false or misleading testimony about the charged offenses from any witness could 
be considered to prove that witness‘s guilt, because such an instruction could ―lead 
to absurd results‖].)  
 
89 
c.  CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1, 2.21.2, and 2.27 
Defendant contends CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1, 2.21.2, and 2.27,31 standard 
instructions on the credibility of witness testimony, were constitutionally deficient 
because they failed to inform the jury that the same principles apply to evaluating 
the credibility of out-of-court statements of individuals who did not testify.  We 
have rejected these arguments, and defendant provides no persuasive reason to 
reconsider our prior decision.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 293.) 
d.  CALJIC No. 2.13 
Defendant claims CALJIC No. 2.13,32 which addresses the consideration of 
prior consistent and inconsistent statements, ―unfairly skewed‖ the jury‘s 
                                              
31 
CALJIC No. 2.21.1, as given, provided:  ―Discrepancies in a witness‘s 
testimony or between one witness‘s testimony and that of other witnesses, if there 
were any, do not necessarily mean that any witness should be discredited.  Failure 
of recollection is common.  Innocent misrecollection is not uncommon.  Two 
persons witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it differently.  
Whether a discrepancy pertains to an important matter or only to something trivial 
should be considered by you.‖ 
 
CALJIC No. 2.21.2, as given, provided:  ―A witness who was willfully 
false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others.  You 
may reject the entire testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to 
a material point, unless from all the evidence you believe the probability of truth 
favors his or her testimony in other particulars.‖ 
 
CALJIC No. 2.27, as given, provided:  ―You should give the 
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness whatever weight you think it 
deserves.  Testimony by one witness which you believe concerning any fact whose 
testimony about that fact does not require corroboration is sufficient for the proof 
of that fact.  You should carefully review all of the evidence upon which the proof 
of that fact depends.‖  
32  
CALJIC No. 2.13, as given, provided:  ―Evidence that at some other time a 
witness made a statement or statements that is or are consistent or inconsistent 
with testimony given before — with his or her testimony in this trial, may be 
considered by you not only for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness, 
but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on that former 
occasion.‖ 
 
90 
credibility determination in favor of prosecution witnesses because it instructed 
that the jurors may consider a prior consistent or inconsistent statement as 
evidence of the truth of the prior statement, but not its falsity.  We have previously 
rejected a similar claim, and we do so again here.  (Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 438; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 41-42.)   
e.  Cumulative Instructional Error 
Finally, defendant claims the cumulative effect of the asserted instructional 
errors described in this claim requires reversal of his conviction.  Because 
defendant has failed to demonstrate any error, there is no prejudicial cumulative 
effect. 
14.  Adequacy of the Burden of Proof Instruction  
Defendant claims on numerous grounds that the standard instruction on 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90) fails to adequately 
explain the burden of proof.33  Defendant complains specifically that the 
instruction fails to (1) explain that a defendant has no obligation to present or 
refute evidence; (2) inform the jury that a defendant‘s presentation of evidence 
does not shift the burden of proof; (3) explain that a conflict in the evidence or a 
lack of evidence could leave jurors with reasonable doubt; (4) explain that the 
presumption of innocence continues throughout the entire trial; (5) state that a 
                                              
33  
CALJIC No. 2.90, as given, provided:  ―A defendant in a criminal action is 
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable 
doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not 
guilty.  This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not a 
mere possible doubt because every relating to human affairs is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case which after the entire 
comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in 
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of 
the charge.‖ 
 
91 
defendant is presumed innocent ―unless,‖ instead of ―until,‖ the contrary is 
proved; and (6) define the term ―burden.‖   
Preliminarily, defendant did not object to or request amplification of 
CALJIC No. 2.90 as given.  Therefore, with the exception of the first two claims 
of error, defendant forfeited these issues on appeal.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 295.)  In any event, we have rejected similar claims.  (Id. at pp. 294-296.)  
Defendant offers no persuasive ground to revisit the issues. 
Next, defendant contends CALJIC No. 2.90 is inadequate because it fails to 
inform jurors that ―every element‖ of the charges must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Again, defendant‘s failure to seek amplification or further 
clarification of the standard instruction forfeits this issue on appeal.  (Lucas, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  In any event, we have previously rejected a similar 
claim.  (E.g., People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356.)  Defendant offers no 
persuasive reason warranting reconsideration of our prior decisions. 
15.  Additional Challenges to the Burden of Proof Instruction 
Defendant complains that the standard instruction on burden of proof, 
CALJIC No. 2.90 was erroneous on several additional grounds.  He specifically 
claims that (1) the terms ―abiding conviction‖ requires definition and any 
definition should distinguish ―abiding conviction‖ from the lesser standard of clear 
and convincing evidence; (2) by requiring more than ―mere possible or imaginary 
doubt‖ the standard instruction implies that jurors must articulate reasons for their 
doubt; (3) the instruction incorrectly stated that ―possible‖ doubt could not 
constitute ―reasonable‖ doubt; (4) CALJIC Nos. 2.01  and 2.02  impermissibly 
lightened the prosecution‘s burden of proof and created a mandatory conclusive 
presumption of guilt upon a preliminary finding that evidence of guilt merely 
―appears reasonable‖; and (5) the standard circumstantial evidence instructions, 
 
92 
CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02, should have been supplemented with an instruction 
informing the jury that ―if direct evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the defendant‘s guilt and the other to his 
innocence, you must adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant‘s 
innocence, and reject that interpretation which points to his guilt.‖ 
Preliminarily, because defendant failed to seek modification or further 
clarification of the standard instruction on these grounds, the issues are forfeited 
on appeal.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  In any event, we have previously 
rejected the claims and do so again.  (Id. at pp. 296-299.)  Accordingly, the 
contentions are without merit.   
16.  Challenges to Other Instructions that Assertedly Diluted the 
Reasonable Doubt Standard  
Defendant contends that several jury instructions unconstitutionally diluted 
the prosecution‘s burden of proof.  The claims are not cognizable, however, 
because defendant was obligated to seek amplification or clarification of the 
instructions and failed to do so.  (See Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  In 
addition, each claim is without merit.   
First, defendant complains that CALJIC No. 2.27, the instruction that 
concerns the sufficiency of testimony of one witness, erroneously suggested that 
both the prosecution and defense had the burden of proving facts.  The instruction 
as given stated as follows:  ―You should give the uncorroborated testimony of a 
single witness whatever weight you think it deserves.  Testimony by one witness 
which you believe concerning any fact whose testimony about that fact does not 
require corroboration is sufficient for the proof of that fact.  You should carefully 
review all of the evidence upon which the proof of that fact depends.‖  (Ibid.) 
We have previously rejected the claim.  (People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
109, 131.)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decision.   
 
93 
Next, defendant contends that instructing the jury under CALJIC No. 2.27 
violated his right to due process because the ―which you believe‖ language 
allowed for proof based on mere ―belief‖ that a single witness was telling the 
truth, rather than the constitutionally required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The claim does not survive analysis.  The jury is informed that evidence comes in 
a myriad of forms, including witness testimony, and that each juror is to determine 
the believability of a witness‘s testimony.  (CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.20.)  Defendant 
does not explain how believing a witness‘s testimony about a fact would or could 
be different from finding that fact proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, 
considering the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
jury understood CALJIC No. 2.27 to operate in the convoluted manner defendant 
suggests.  (See Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72.)  Therefore, the claim fails on the 
merits. 
Defendant additionally contends that CALJIC No. 2.51, which informed the 
jurors that motive is not an element of an offense,34 conflicted with the standard 
instruction on felony murder, CALJIC No. 8.21, by improperly suggesting to the 
jurors that they need not find that defendant intended to commit robbery in order 
to convict him of first degree murder.  We disagree.  The court instructed the jury 
that a finding of felony-murder required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had the specific intent to commit burglary or robbery.  Nothing in 
CALJIC No. 2.51 conflicted with that instruction.  In addition, ―[m]otive describes 
the reason a person chooses to commit a crime.  The reason, however, is different 
                                              
34  
The jurors were instructed under CALJIC No. 2.51, as follows:  ―Motive is 
not an element of the crimes charged and need not be shown.  However, you may 
consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.  Presence of 
motive may tend to establish the defendant‘s guilt.  Absence of motive may tend 
to show the defendant‘s innocence.‖   
 
94 
than a required mental state such as intent or malice.‖  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 504.)  The instructions consistently referred to the requisite 
―intents‖ for all the charged crimes.  There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
construed the motive instruction as defendant suggests.  (Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. 
at p. 72; Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th 504.)  The claim therefore is without merit.   
Finally, defendant claims that CALJIC No. 8.20, which states in part that 
premeditation and deliberation ―must have been formed upon preexisting 
reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the 
idea of deliberation,‖ could be interpreted to require defendant to disprove the 
possibility of premeditation, thereby shifting the burden of proof.  We have 
previously rejected the claim.  (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 506.)  Defendant 
provides no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decision. 
17.  Equal Protection Challenge to the Reasonable Doubt Instruction   
Defendant perfunctorily contends that CALJIC No. 2.90 denied him equal 
protection of law because it fails to provide an ―adequate and uniform standard for 
determining the level of certainty to which the jury must be persuaded in order to 
assess whether the People have carried their burden of proof.‖  He asserts that 
―each and every jury and each and every juror sitting in California (including [the 
jurors] in [his] case) were and are free to apply a different standard in assessing 
the critical reasonable doubt issue in violation of the 14th Amendment of the 
federal [C]onstitution.‖   
Defense counsel‘s failure to seek amplification or further clarification of 
the standard instruction forfeited the issue on appeal.   (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 295.)   
 
95 
18.  Request to Record the Testimony of the Spanish-speaking 
Witnesses  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to have 
his entire trial audio-recorded on the ground that there exists a ―possibility‖ that 
the Spanish translator may not have accurately translated the testimony of 
Spanish-speaking witnesses.  As a result, defendant asserts that he was deprived of 
a complete and accurate record of the trial proceedings, in violation of his federal 
constitutional rights to due process, assistance of counsel, and meaningful 
appellate review under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and the corollary state constitutional rights (Cal. 
Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17).  The claim lacks merit. 
― ‗ ―[S]tate law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record ‗adequate to 
permit [him or her] to argue‘ the points raised in the appeal.  [Citation.]  Federal 
constitutional requirements are similar.  The due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent 
defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate 
review.  [Citations.]  Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only 
where the record is so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is 
being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  [Citation.]  The defendant 
has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate 
review.‖ ‘ ‖  (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 195.) 
Defendant complains that because there is no memorialized record of the 
original testimony of the Spanish-speaking witnesses, he is unable to verify the 
accuracy and reliability of the interpreted testimony that appears in the record.  He 
asserts there are numerous examples in the record in which the English translation 
of a Spanish-speaking witness does not convey ―a clear and understandable 
thought.‖  As an example, defendant points to the following colloquy that occurred 
 
96 
during the prosecutor‘s direct examination of Ramirez:  ―Q.  [THE 
PROSECUTOR]  Was there — when you shot that 30/30 rifle, was there anything 
that was ejected from the gun, from the side of the gun?  [¶]  A.  [RAMIREZ]  
Yes.  [¶]  Q.  [THE PROSECUTOR]  What?  [¶]  A.  [RAMIREZ]  The casket.‖  
Defendant speculates that any lack of clarity in the testimony reflects error in the 
Spanish to English translation of the witness‘s testimony.  Speculation, however, 
is insufficient to demonstrate that the record is inadequate to permit effective 
appellate review.  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170.)  For example, 
witness testimony such as the example mentioned above may be caused by the 
witness‘s own word choice and not any translation error.35  Defendant does not 
maintain that there is any unclear or unintelligible testimony of a Spanish-
speaking witness that can be attributed to translation error and that also is relevant 
to an issue he raises on appeal.  
Because defendant has not demonstrated that the denial of his request to 
audio record the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses has ― ‗ ―prevented 
adequate and effective appellate review or created a substantial risk the judgment 
was arbitrary and capricious,‖ ‘ ‖ his claim fails.  (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 195.)  
19.  Instruction on Defendant’s Videotaped Statement  
As stated, the prosecution played for the jury a videotaped statement by 
defendant in which he denied any intent to steal from the victims but admitted, 
among other things, ―the crime took place out of fear‖ and ―we shot like crazy.‖  
Defendant spoke in Spanish, and the prosecutor provided a certified translation for 
                                              
35  
Immediately following the exchange, the prosecutor asked Ramirez, 
―Casing?‖  Ramirez answered, ―Casing.‖  
 
97 
the jury.  The parties stipulated that the videotaped statement was translated 
accurately into a written document by a certified interpreter. 
Prior to the playing of the videotape, the court instructed the jury:  ―We‘re 
going to play a videotape.  And you have in your hands a translation of that tape.  
Some of you — again, some of you may have some proficiency in Spanish.  
Others of you may have no proficiency in Spanish.  You should rely on the 
transcription, and you should not — none of you, if you happen to have some 
proficiency in Spanish, should anoint yourselves as any kind of an expert so as to 
provide aid independently of the evidence to other jurors as to what is or is not 
being said on the tape.  That comports with the general rule that the jury is to rely 
upon the evidence that is presented in court and not upon evidence from outside 
sources.  So please keep that in mind if there are some of you who do have some 
proficiency in Spanish.‖ 
Defendant contends that the court erred because ―although the judge‘s 
instruction admonished Spanish speaking jurors not to talk ‗to other jurors‘ about 
their own translation of the recording, the admonition did not preclude Spanish 
speakers from themselves considering their own translations of the Spanish in the 
recording.‖  At this stage, the relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated 
the Constitution.  (Estelle, supra 502 U.S. at p. 72; People v. Avila (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 496, 508.)  In addition, ― ‗ ―we must assume that jurors are intelligent 
persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which 
are given.‖  [Citation.]‘  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028.)‖  
(People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1321.) 
Preliminarily, if defendant did not believe the instruction given was 
adequate to cover this subject, then he was required to seek modification or 
clarification of the instruction in the trial court.  (See Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
 
98 
p. 295.)  Defendant‘s failure to do so forfeited the claim on appeal.  In any event, 
the claim falls on the merits. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
misinterpreted the instruction in a way potentially unfavorable to the defense.  The 
trial court admonished the jurors that they were to ―rely on the transcription‖ it 
provided them.  The court also told the jurors not to share their own translations of 
what was said on the videotape with other jurors.  Therefore, the essence of the 
instruction was that the English translation that appeared in the transcription 
constituted the evidence.  It is difficult to perceive how a reasonable juror could 
construe this admonition to permit any juror to rely on any translation other than 
the one provided by the trial court.   
Moreover, before commencement of the guilt phase deliberations, the court 
reminded the jurors that ―you must decide all questions of fact from the evidence 
received in this trial and not from any other source.‖  It then instructed the jury 
that ―[w]hen a witness has testified through a certified court interpreter, you must 
accept the English interpretation of that testimony even if you would have 
translated the foreign language differently.‖  For these reasons, we conclude there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the instruction in 
the manner defendant now contends. 
20.  Readback of Testimony During Deliberations  
For the first time on appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in 
allowing the court reporter to read requested portions of the trial transcripts to the 
jurors in the jury room during the guilt trial deliberations.  Defendant argues that 
the asserted error violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a public 
trial, to be personally present, to counsel, and to the presence of a trial judge.  The 
claims are without merit. 
 
99 
a.  Factual and procedural background 
During guilt phase deliberations, the jury requested readback of the 
testimony of prosecution witnesses Ramirez, Bertha, and Trejo.  In proceedings 
held in open court and in the presence of the jury, the trial court confirmed with 
the jury foreperson the testimony to be covered.  The foreperson also requested 
readback of the testimony of the sales clerk at the ammunition store.  The trial 
court responded:  ―All right.  Okay.  Then we‘ll have somebody come in and read 
after you go back and start deliberating.  The attorneys and I will satisfy ourselves 
that we have located the testimony that you are interested in.  And we‘ll provide 
that for you probably in the form of having the reporter join you in the jury room 
and read that testimony to you.  [¶]  Now, please keep in mind, when the reporter 
comes in to read, that‘s all she is there to do is just to read.  She cannot respond to 
questions.‖ 
After the jury was excused, counsel informed the trial court that there were 
two sales clerks from the ammunition store who testified, and the prosecutor 
agreed.  The court stated it would provide readback of the testimony of both 
clerks.  The following colloquy occurred:  ―THE COURT:  Is it agreeable then 
between counsel that we proceed in that manner?  [¶]  And would you like to 
review the areas of testimony that the reporter finds as bearing on the questions 
that the jury has asked?  [¶]  [THE PROSECUTOR]:  I would like to only because 
we may be able to help the reporter as well to locate that.  [¶]  THE COURT:  All 
right.  So you, [TRIAL COUNSEL], I understand you have a prelim to go to?  [¶]  
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  Oh, no.  I can — apparently, that may not be the situation.  
[¶]  THE COURT:  All right.  [¶]  [TRIAL COUNSEL]:  I can assist in that as 
well.  [¶]  THE COURT:  Good.  Then that will be the plan as to how the reporter 
gets to the information she needs.  Okay.  Court‘s in recess.‖ 
 
100 
b.  Discussion 
(i)  Right to a public trial 
Defendant contends that the court violated his right to a public trial by 
conducting the readback in the jury room and not in open court.  The contention 
lacks merit. 
― ‗Every person charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to 
a public trial, that is, a trial which is open to the general public at all times.‘  
(People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 382.)  However, the scope of that 
right is not absolute.  ‗The right to public trial may be waived [citation], the 
waiver may be implied from failure to object [citations], and the waiver may be 
made by defense counsel on defendant‘s behalf.‘ ‖  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 301 quoting People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1028.)   
Here, counsel did not object to the court‘s proposed procedures for 
readback of the testimony and  remained silent when the court asked if the parties 
agreed to the procedures.  In addition, when the court discussed the procedures 
with the parties, counsel understood that the readback of testimony would be 
conducted in the jury deliberation room and not in open court.  Under these 
circumstances, ―[a]ssuming the right to public trial extends to the reading of 
testimony during jury deliberations,‖ counsel effectively waived defendant‘s right.  
(People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1028.) 
(ii)  Right to personal presence 
Defendant contends that because he did not waive his right to be present at 
trial, he was entitled to be present at the readback of testimony because a readback 
of testimony ―is not less important than the original taking of the testimony.‖  
Assuming the claim is not forfeited, it is one we previously have rejected.  (See 
Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 299 [―regardless of whether defendant waived his 
 
101 
right to be present, the rereading of testimony is not considered a critical stage of 
trial in which the defendant has a constitutional right to personal presence‖].) 
In any event, ―[a]bsent a showing of prejudice, a defendant‘s ‗absence from 
a rereading of testimony does not raise due process concerns.‘ ‖  (Lucas, supra, 60 
Cal.4th at p. 300.)  Nothing in the record suggests that defendant‘s personal 
presence would have assisted the defense in any manner.  Defendant‘s suggestion 
that the reporter may have given undue emphasis to certain portions of the 
transcript (e.g., by emphasis of voice) or read from the wrong transcript, or that a 
portion of the testimony may have been inadvertently omitted is entirely 
speculative.   
(iii)  Right to presence of counsel  
Defendant contends that his state and federal constitutional right to counsel 
was violated when the readback of testimony was conducted in counsel‘s absence.  
Defendant‘s claim is forfeited because he did not object to the plan proposed by 
the trial court in accommodating the jury‘s request for testimony.  (Lucas, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 300.)  In any event, we previously have rejected the claim.  (Ibid.)  
(iv)  Right to personal presence of the trial judge 
Defendant contends the readback procedures used in this case, described 
above, violated his statutory rights under section 1138 and his Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury, because the trial judge did not supervise the reading 
back of testimony.  Once again, defendant forfeited the issue by counsel‘s failure 
to object to the procedures that were employed to provide the jury with the 
requested readback of testimony.  (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 
728-729 (Roldan) [by failing to object, defendant forfeited claim that the trial 
court erred under section 1138 and violated his constitutional rights by acceding to 
the jury request to read the four questions asked of each jury during jury selection 
 
102 
without inquiring about the jury‘s reason for the request].)  In any event, we 
previously have rejected the claim.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 300-301.)   
21.  Reference to the Prosecution as “the People” 
Defendant contends the trial court‘s reference to the prosecution in his case 
as ―the People‖ was fundamentally unfair and violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.  As he acknowledges, we have 
previously rejected this claim.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 289; People v. 
Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 816; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
970, 1068.)  We do so again. 
22.  Instruction on the Murder Counts  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by limiting the instruction on 
concurrence of act and specific intent, CALJIC No. 3.31, to the nonmurder counts 
and by failing to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 3.31.5 on the concurrence of 
act and mental state concerning the murder counts.  Defendant did not raise this 
issue at trial.  Even assuming his failure to object did not forfeit the issue (§ 1259), 
the claim lacks merit. 
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 3.31, as follows:  ―In 
the crimes and allegations charged in Counts 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, namely, 
attempted murder, robbery, three counts, burglary and conspiracy, there must exist 
a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind 
of the perpetrator.  Unless this specific intent exists, the crime to which it relates is 
not committed.  [¶]  The specific intent required is included in the definitions of 
the crimes set forth elsewhere in these instructions.‖  The trial court did not 
 
103 
instruct the jury regarding the required concurrence of act and mental state under 
CALJIC No. 3.31.5.36   
We apply the independent standard of review to claims of this nature.  
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220.)  Doing so, we conclude any 
instructional error was harmless.  Other instructions adequately conveyed the 
requirement, and there is no reasonable probability that a more explicit instruction 
would have affected the outcome of the trial.  (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 826, 875 [applying Watson ―reasonable probability‖ standard to error in 
failing to instruct on the concurrence requirement for implied malice murder].)  
The trial court informed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of first 
degree murder on Counts 1 through 3 under four theories:  (1) premeditated and 
deliberate murder; (2) felony murder; (3) conspiracy murder; and (4) aiding and 
abetting liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.37  It then 
instructed the jury on each of these theories.   
Pursuant to the instructions defining murder and malice aforethought, 
CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11, the trial court informed the jury that ―[e]very person 
                                              
36  
CALJIC No. 3.31.5 (6th ed 1996) provides as follows:  ―In the crime[s] 
charged in Count[s] _____, _____, and _____ [or which [is a] [are] lesser crime[s] 
thereto], [namely, _____, _____ and _____,] there must exist a union or joint 
operation of act or conduct and a certain mental state in the mind of the 
perpetrator.  Unless this mental state exists the crime to which it relates is not 
committed.  [¶]  [The mental state[s] required [is] [are] included in the 
definition[s] of the crime[s] set forth elsewhere in these instructions.]‖ 
 
37  
As discussed ante, page 77, as a matter of law, defendant could not have 
been properly convicted of premeditated and deliberate murder based on aider and 
abettor liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.  (Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  As we explained, however, the error in instructing 
the jury on that theory was harmless.  We need not consider whether the 
instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of concurrence of act and intent 
with regard to that erroneous theory of liability. 
 
104 
who unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought . . .  is guilty of the 
crime of murder in violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code.  [¶] . . . [I]n order 
to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved:  [¶]  One, that 
a human being was killed.  [¶]  Two, that the killing was unlawful.  [¶]  And three, 
that the killing was done with malice aforethought . . . .  [¶]  Malice may be either 
express or implied.  [¶]  Malice is express when there is manifested an intention 
unlawfully to kill a human being.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Malice is implied when:  [¶]  One, 
the killing resulted from an intentional act.  [¶]  Two, the natural consequence[s] 
of the act are dangerous to human life.  [¶]  And three, the act was deliberately 
performed with knowledge of the danger to and with conscious disregard for 
human life.‖  In addition, under CALJIC No. 8.20, the jury was informed that ―[i]f 
you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate 
intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and 
premeditation so that it must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not 
under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of 
deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.‖  The same instruction further 
informed the jury that ―to constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the 
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and 
against such a choice and having in mind the consequences he decides to and does 
kill.‖  (Italics added.) 
Under the felony-murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.21), the jury was 
informed, in relevant part, that ―[t]he unlawful killing of a human being whether 
intentional, unintentional, or accidental, which occurs during the commission or 
attempted commission of the crime of burglary or robbery is murder of the first 
degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit either of those 
crimes.‖  The instruction on felony murder for an aider and abettor (CALJIC 
No. 8.27) told the jury that ―[i]f a human being is killed by any one of several 
 
105 
persons engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of 
burglary or robbery, all persons who either directly and actively commit the act 
constituting those crimes or who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 
perpetrator of the crime and with the intent or purpose of committing, 
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, promote, 
encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty of murder in the 
first degree whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or accidental.‖  (Italics 
added.) 
Finally, the jury was told, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.26, in relevant part, 
that ―[i]f a number of persons conspire together to commit burglary or robbery, 
and if the life of another person is taken by one or more of them in furtherance of 
the common design, and if the killing is done to further that common purpose or is 
an ordinary and probable result of the pursuit of that purpose, all of the co-
conspirators are equally guilty of murder of the first degree whether the killing is 
intentional, unintentional, or accidental.‖  (Italics added.) 
We are satisfied that the italicized language in the above instructions, when 
considered in light of the trial court‘s instruction under CALJIC No. 3.31 (ante, at 
p. 101) on the necessity of concurrence of act and specific intent on the robbery, 
burglary, and conspiracy charges, ―substantially covered‖ the concurrence 
requirement.  (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 220.)  Further, we 
disagree with defendant that CALJIC No. 3.31 effectively told the jurors that there 
was no need to find concurrence as to the murder counts.  As given, CALJIC 
No. 3.31 did not reference the crimes and allegations charged in the murder counts 
(counts 1-3) and given the jury received more specific instruction that referred to 
those counts, we presume that the jury did not draw any conclusion about the 
murder counts from that instruction.  (See People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 
1212; People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 391, 440.)  For these reasons, we 
 
106 
conclude there is no reasonable probability the error in failing to separately 
instruct the jury on the concurrence of act and specific intent or mental state on the 
first degree murder charges affected the outcome.  Certainly, counsel does not 
articulate how a more favorable result would have been reasonably possible had 
the court instructed otherwise.  Accordingly, the claim fails on the merits. 
23.  Whether the Trial Court Was Required to Define “Material” 
The court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 2.21.2 as follows:  ―A 
witness who was willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be 
distrusted in others.  You may reject the entire testimony of a witness who 
willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless from all the evidence 
you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other 
particulars.‖ 
Defendant contends the trial court was required to define the term 
―material,‖ but he is mistaken.  ―[C]ommonly used words that have no technical 
meaning peculiar to the law impose no obligation on the court to provide 
definition in the absence of a request.  [Citation.]  Because the word ‗material,‘ as 
used in CALJIC No. 2.21.2, is within its ordinary meaning of ‗ ―substantial, 
essential, relevant or pertinent,‖ ‘ the court did not err by failing to define it.‖  
(Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 292-293.)   
24.  Consciousness of Guilt and Flight Instructions  
Defendant claims that the consciousness of guilt instructions given, 
CALJIC Nos. 2.03 (Consciousness of Guilt — Falsehood) and CALJIC No. 2.52 
(Flight After Crime),38 were unnecessary, argumentative, circular, and invited the 
                                              
38  
As given here, CALJIC No. 2.03 provided:  ―If you find before this trial the 
defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning 
the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider that statement as a 
circumstance tending to prove consciousness of guilt.  However, that conduct is 
 
 
107 
jury to draw irrational inferences.  We have rejected these claims.  (Bryant, Smith, 
and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 438 & fn. 56; People v. Lopez (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 1028, 1075; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1108; People v. 
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 [―The inference of consciousness of guilt 
from willful falsehood or fabrication or suppression of evidence is one supported 
by common sense, which many jurors are likely to indulge even without an 
instruction‖].)  Defendant‘s arguments do not persuade us to reconsider our prior 
decisions. 
25.  CALJIC No. 3.02  
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 3.02 that pursuant to 
the natural and probable consequences doctrine it could find defendant guilty of 
murder as an aider and abettor to robbery or burglary if it found the murder was a 
natural and probable consequence of those target crimes.  (See People v. Gonzales 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 296 [―under the ‗natural and probable consequences‘ 
doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he or she intended to 
facilitate or encourage, but also any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by 
the person he or she aids and abets‖].)   
Defendant contends the instruction creates an improper mandatory 
presumption of ―intent to encourage or facilitate a murder.‖  We need not consider 
this claim.  The jury here was also instructed on felony murder based on burglary 
and robbery and found true the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special-
                                                                                                                                      
 
not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are for 
you to decide.‖  CALJIC No. 2.52  provided, as follows:  ―The flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime or after he or she is accused of a 
crime is not sufficient in and of itself to establish guilt, but is a fact, which if 
proved, may be considered by you in the light of all the other proved facts in 
deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.  The weight to which this 
circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.‖  
 
108 
circumstance allegations as to all three murders.  We can infer from these special 
circumstance findings that the jury relied unanimously on a legally valid and 
independent theory of first degree felony murder under section 189 as to each 
murder victim.  (See People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 41, citing 
People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1019; see also Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 166 [affirming that ―[a]n aider and abettor‘s liability for murder under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine operates independently of the felony-
murder rule‖].)  ―Under the felony-murder rule those who commit enumerated 
felonies are ‗ ―strictly responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether 
intentional, negligent, or accidental, during the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of the felony.‖ ‘ ‖  (Romero and Self, at p. 41.)  ―Thus, there was no 
need for the jury to find . . . an ‗intent to encourage or facilitate a murder.‘ ‖ (Id. at 
p. 42.)39  Consequently, any error was harmless.  (People v. Flood (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 470, 505 (Flood) [―in view of the actual verdict[s] returned by the jury . . . 
there is no reasonable or plausible basis for finding that the instructional error 
affected the jury‘s verdict[s]‖].)  
26.  Murder Charges 
The information charged defendant with malice murder under section 187 
but did not charge him with first degree murder in violation of section 189, i.e., 
premeditated murder and murder committed in the course of committing an 
enumerated felony.  As a result, defendant contends the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to try him for first degree murder.   
                                              
39  
We concluded ante, that under Chiu, supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 167, the trial 
court‘s instructions erroneously permitted the jury to find defendant guilty as an 
aider and abettor for first degree premeditated murder under a natural and probable 
consequence theory, but further concluded the error was harmless.   
 
109 
We have repeatedly rejected similar claims — ―whether framed in terms of 
a lack of jurisdiction, inadequate notice, erroneous instruction, insufficient proof, 
or the absence of jury unanimity.‖  (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 
147; id. at pp. 147-149; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 625; People v. 
Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 54; People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 222.)  ― ‗[I]f the charging document charges the offense in the language of the 
statute defining murder (§ 187), the offense charged includes murder in the first 
degree and murder in the second degree.‘ ‖  (Taylor at p. 625.)   
In addition, we have rejected defendant‘s argument that insofar as we have 
recognized a single statutory offense of first degree murder, that offense is defined 
by section 189.  (People v. Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 148.)  Finally, we 
have previously rejected defendant‘s argument that the information‘s failure to 
separately allege a violation of section 189 violates Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
530 U.S. 466.  (Contreras at pp. 148-149.)  ―[T]his court does not violate 
Apprendi by continuing to apply the traditional California rule that a murder 
charge under section 187 places the defense on notice of, and allows trial and 
conviction on, all degrees and theories of murder, including first degree felony 
murder under section 189.‖  (Id. at p. 149.)  We decline to reconsider our 
precedent. 
27.  Asserted Need for Special Instructions to Jury Foreperson  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
concerning the duties of the foreperson at the guilt phase deliberations.  As a 
result, defendant suggests, the foreperson was permitted to exercise undue 
influence over the other jurors, thus undermining the fairness and reliability of the 
guilt and penalty deliberations.  The claim is without merit. 
 
110 
Preliminarily, because defendant failed to request such an instruction, the 
claim is forfeited.  In any event, the trial court instructed the jurors that ―[b]oth the 
People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror,‖ that 
each juror ―must decide the case for yourself,‖ and that no juror should ―decide 
any question in any particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them 
favor that decision.‖  These instructions were sufficient to negate defendant‘s 
speculative concerns.  (See Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 299.)   
28.  Delay in Appointing Appellate Counsel  
Defendant contends that the more than five-and-one-half-year delay in 
appointing appellate counsel violated his constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection.  We have previously rejected similar claims.  (People v. Bennett 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 629; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942; People 
v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 708-709.)  Defendant advances no persuasive 
reason to reconsider our prior decisions. 
29.  General Understandability of the Instructions 
Defendant contends that the CALJIC jury instructions given in his trial 
were confusing, difficult, and not ―sufficiently understandable‖ by lay jurors to 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirement of heightened reliability in capital 
cases.  In support, he asserts that because the Judicial Council established a 
commission that recommended the standard CALJIC jury instructions, including 
those given in this case, be rewritten, the commission necessarily found those 
instructions to be defective in conveying the necessary legal principles to the jury.  
We have rejected this argument.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 294.)  Defendant 
offers no persuasive reason to reconsider that decision and otherwise fails to 
advance any reason why we should conclude that the jurors in his case did not 
understand any particular instruction.  Accordingly, the claim fails on the merits. 
 
111 
30.  Challenges to CALJIC No. 8.80.1 
CALJIC No. 8.80.1, as given, provided:   
―If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree as 
to Counts 1, 2 or 3, you must then determine if one or more of the following 
special circumstances is true:   
―The first special circumstance is multiple murders [sic].  The second 
special circumstance is murder during the commission of burglary.  The third 
special circumstance is murder while in the commission of robbery. 
―The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance.  
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you 
must find it to be not true. 
―Unless an intent to kill is an element of a special circumstance, if you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human 
being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the 
special circumstance to be true. 
―If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or 
if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider 
or abettor or a co-conspirator, you cannot find the special circumstance to be true 
as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such 
defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, and counseled, commanded, 
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any act during the commission of the 
murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a 
major participant who aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested or assisted in the commission of the crime of burglary or robbery which 
resulted in the death of a human being, namely, Ramon Morales, Martha Morales 
or Fernando Martinez. 
 
112 
―A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life when that 
defendant knows or is aware that his acts involve a grave risk of death to an 
innocent human being.‖  
Defendant contends that because the jurors found that he was a 
coconspirator, as shown by its guilty verdict in count 10 with respect to the target 
crimes of burglary and robbery, they were not required by the instructions to find 
he intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life as a major 
participant as is required under Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison) and 
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) in order to find the special 
circumstance allegation true.  In other words, defendant asserts, the jurors would 
not have made the requisite findings because the instructions as given required 
them to do so only if they were ―unable to decide whether the defendant was the 
actual killer or an aider or abettor or a coconspirator.‖  Defendant asserts the 
alleged instructional error violated his rights under state law and the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Even assuming 
that defendant did not forfeit the issue on appeal by failing to object below 
(§ 1259), the claim fails. 
―The felony-based special circumstances do not require that the defendant 
intend to kill.  It is sufficient if the defendant is the actual killer or either intends to 
kill or ‗with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the 
commission‘ of the felony.‖  (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 854, 
quoting § 190.2, subd. (d); see also Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [―major 
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to 
human life, is sufficient to satisfy the . . . culpability requirement‖ in Enmund]; 
Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797 [the Eighth Amendment does not ―permit[] 
imposition of the death penalty on one . . . who aids and abets a felony in the 
 
113 
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be 
employed‖].) 
―It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of 
understanding and applying the court‘s instructions.‖  (People v. Gonzales (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 894, 940.)  When a defendant claims an instruction was subject to 
erroneous interpretation by the jury, he must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instruction in the manner asserted.  
(Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433.)  In determining the 
correctness of jury instructions, we consider the entire charge of the court, in light 
of the trial record.  (Ibid.) 
Here, defendant quarrels with the following language from the fifth 
paragraph quoted above:  ―If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of 
a human being, or if you were unable to decide whether the defendant was the 
actual killer or an aider or abettor or a co-conspirator, you cannot find the 
special circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, . . . or 
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant who aided, 
abetted, . . . or assisted in the commission of the crime of burglary or robbery 
which resulted in the death of . . . Ramon Morales, Martha Morales or Fernando 
Martinez.‖  (Italics added.)  Defendant asserts that because the jury found he was a 
coconspirator, it would not have followed the provisions of this paragraph and 
made the requisite intent to kill or reckless indifference findings.  Defendant 
misreads the instruction.   
Under the fourth paragraph above, if the jury found that defendant was an 
actual killer, it was not required to make additional findings.  Under the fifth 
paragraph, the jurors were told that if they had found that defendant was not the 
 
114 
actual killer or if they were unsure whether defendant was ―the actual killer or an 
aider or abettor or a co-conspirator,‖ they were required to find intent to kill or 
reckless indifference.  The instruction would have been more complete if it had 
explicitly told the jury that a finding of intent to kill or reckless indifference was 
required if the defendant was not the actual killer and was liable for first degree 
murder as an aider and abettor or a coconspirator.  (See Letner and Tobin, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at pp. 181-182; see also CALCRIM Nos. 702, 703.)  Nonetheless, the 
jurors would have reasonably understood that unless they found defendant was the 
actual killer, they were required to find intent to kill or reckless indifference.   
Despite defendant‘s position on appeal, the fact that the jury also found that 
defendant was guilty of criminal conspiracy was of no consequence with regard to 
the issue under discussion.  The jurors would have understood that the terms 
―actual killer,‖ ―not the actual killer,‖ ―aider and abettor,‖ and ―coconspirator‖ 
were not mutually exclusive.  The jury may have believed that defendant was the 
actual killer and a coconspirator, in which case it learned from the instruction that 
it was not required to find intent to kill or reckless indifference.  If the jury 
believed that defendant was not the actual killer and had also determined he was 
guilty of first degree murder as a coconspirator, it learned from the instruction that 
it was required to find intent to kill or reckless indifference.  If the jury was unsure 
whether defendant was the actual killer but decided he was guilty of first degree 
murder as a coconspirator, it learned from the instruction that it had to find intent 
to kill or reckless indifference.  We also note that the prosecutor‘s argument 
concerning the special circumstance allegations was consistent with the law, and 
she never argued that the jury was not required to find intent to kill or reckless 
indifference if it found defendant was a nonkiller coconspirator, or if it could not 
decide whether he was an actual killer.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable 
 
115 
likelihood that the jury was confused or misapplied the instruction in the manner 
suggested by defendant. 
31.  Instruction on Multiple-murder Special Circumstance 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that 
it could not find the multiple-murder special-circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) 
allegation to be true unless it found he was an actual killer or intended to kill.  As 
a result, he asserts this special-circumstance true finding must be vacated.  As we 
explain, we agree the instruction on this special-circumstance allegation was 
erroneous, but conclude the error does not require reversal.   
―When there is evidence from which a jury could base its convictions for 
multiple counts of murder on the theory that the defendant was guilty as an aider 
and abettor, and not as the actual perpetrator, the trial court must instruct the jury 
that to find true a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation as to that 
defendant, it must find that the defendant intended to kill the murder victims.  
(§ 190.2, subds. (b)-(c); People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 192 (Hardy).)  A 
murderer who was not the actual killer and who lacked the intent to kill, but acted 
‗with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant,‘ can be 
subject to a punishment of either death or life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole only when the prosecution alleges, as a special circumstance, that the 
murder occurred in the commission of certain felonies specified in section 190.2‘s 
subdivision (a)(17).  (§ 190.2, subd. (d).)‖  (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 1, 45 (Nunez and Satele), italics added.)  This rule is inapplicable to the 
multiple-murder special circumstance.  (Ibid.)  ―An erroneous instruction on the 
intent to kill element of a special circumstance, however, ‗does not require 
reversal if a reviewing court concludes … that the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Applying the harmless error rule of Chapman v. 
 
116 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, ―a court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks 
whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary 
finding with respect to the omitted element.  If the answer to that question is 
‗no,‘ ‖ the error is harmless and reversal is not required.  (Neder v. United States 
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 (Neder); id. at pp. 8-15; see also People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [―when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a 
special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be 
measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California‖].) 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the multiple-murder special 
circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.81.3) as follows:  ―To find the special circumstance 
referred to in these instructions as multiple murder convictions, is true, it must be 
proved that:  [¶]  A defendant in this case has been convicted of at least one crime 
of murder in the first degree, and one or more crimes of murder in the first or  
second degree.‖ 
In addition, the fourth paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (ante, pp. 109-110), 
informed the jury that ―if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant 
intended to kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true.‖  (Italics 
added.)  Thus, the instruction correctly told the jury if it found defendant actually 
killed, it did not have to find he intended to kill in order to find a burglary, 
robbery, or multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation true.  (See People v. 
Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 516 [―when the defendant is the actual killer, intent 
to kill is not an element of either the felony-murder special circumstance or the 
multiple-murder special circumstance‖]; see also People v. Anderson (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1147, 1149-1150.)   
If, however, the jury found defendant was not the actual killer or could not 
decide as between actual killer and aider and abettor or coconspirator the fifth 
 
117 
paragraph of the instruction (ante, pp. 109-110) informed the jury that it could not 
find a burglary, robbery, or multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation true 
unless ―you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant [1] with 
the intent to kill aided, abetted, and counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested, or assisted any act during the commission of the murder in the first 
degree, or [2] with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant 
who aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or 
assisted in the commission of the crime of burglary or robbery which resulted in 
the death of a human being, namely, Ramon Morales, Martha Morales or 
Fernando Martinez.‖  (Italics added.)  This was error.  (Nunez and Satele, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at p. 45.)  In effect, this portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 permitted the 
jury to find the multiple-murder special circumstance true without finding 
defendant intended to kill a human being.  An instructional error in this context is 
harmless under Chapman however, ―when, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not 
contribute to the verdict.‖  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689.)  As 
we observed in Williams, this standard may be met when we are able to conclude 
that the jury necessarily found an intent to kill under other properly given 
instructions, or when evidence of the defendant‘s intent to kill is overwhelming 
and the jury ― ‗could have had no reasonable doubt‘ that the defendant had the 
intent to kill.‖  (Ibid.)  Here, as we explain, the error was harmless because 
overwhelming evidence established, and the jury could have had no reasonable 
doubt, that defendant intended to kill, and that he was an actual killer.  
Defendant relies heavily on the fact that the jury did not reach a unanimous 
verdict on the allegation he personally used a .38-caliber handgun within the 
meaning of former section 12022.5, subdivision (a), to argue the instructional error 
concerning the multiple-murder special circumstance was prejudicial.  On the 
contrary, the evidence fairly considered here offers no other reasonable scenario 
 
118 
than defendant being the individual who shot Martha in the head with the 
.38-caliber handgun in the bedroom and that he did so with the clear intent to kill, 
rendering the instructional error harmless.   
Defendant admitted in his videotaped statement that he was such shooter.  
(―[W]e all shot.  We fired the weapons that we had … we shot really like crazy.‖  
―[W]e  shouldn’t have done anything … to the lady.‖ (Italics added.))  Defendant‘s 
admission is entirely consistent with the physical evidence of the murders (the 
location of the victims, defendant, and his coparticipants, ballistics, defendant‘s 
fingerprint on the box of .38-caliber ammunition used, and the manner of Martha‘s 
killing, as described below), and the evidence of the group‘s planning activities 
and conversations before the home invasion.   
It is undisputed that Sanchez was armed with and shot the victims with the 
AR-15 rifle, a weapon that ordinarily requires two hands to fire.  It is undisputed 
that Nunez shot the victims with the .30-30 rifle, a weapon that ordinarily requires 
two hands to fire.  It is undisputed that in addition to suffering gunshot wounds 
from one or both of these rifles, each victim was shot with a .38-caliber handgun.  
There was evidence of only two possible handguns that could have been that gun.  
Both were found by defendant in the kitchen.  Defendant kept at least one of the 
guns.  The box of .38-caliber ammunition used to shoot the victims was found in 
the bedroom and defendant‘s fingerprint was on it.   
All three calibers of bullets were found in Martha‘s body, which was found 
in the bedroom.  The .38-caliber handgun and .30-30 rifle bullets that caused 
Martha‘s fatal head wounds were recovered from her shoulder and armpit, 
respectively.  The AR-15 rifle bullet was recovered from her side.  The two fatal 
head wounds caused by the .38-caliber handgun and .30-30 rifle essentially blew 
off her face.  That is, ballistics establishes that the shooter of the .38 handgun was 
in the bedroom with Martha and Alejandra.  The .38 shot to Martha‘s head reflects 
 
119 
a clear intent to kill.  (See, ante at pp. 62-63, discussing defendant‘s shooting of 
baby Alejandra; see e.g., People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 768 [―The 
shot was fired at Sergeant Wolfley‘s face, which is consistent with a preexisting 
intent to kill.‖].)   
The body of Martinez was found between the bedroom and the living room, 
consistent with Nunez shooting him as he tried to escape.  The body of Ramon 
was found in the living room, where Sanchez had been holding him at gunpoint 
throughout the home invasion robbery.  There is no rational way that the jury 
could have found that defendant handled the .38-caliber ammunition in the 
bedroom, but did not load and shoot his handgun (despite his admission to having 
fired a weapon) and rather, found Sanchez — the only other person who 
potentially had a handgun (possibly another .38) in his pocket — (1) used both 
hands to fire his AR-15 rifle at the victims, (2) somehow obtained the .38-caliber  
ammunition from the box defendant handled in the bedroom in order to load the 
handgun from his pocket, and (3) switched from using the AR-15 rifle to using the 
.38-caliber handgun to shoot the victims again with the smaller weapon.   
There is simply no plausible explanation based on the evidence why 
Sanchez would have wanted to change weapons and go into the bedroom to shoot 
Martha with the small handgun after shooting her with the rifle.  Such a scenario 
also would likely have taken longer than the 30 seconds of ―fairly rapid‖ gunfire 
heard by the witnesses.  Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a scenario 
of Sanchez shooting the victims with the AR-15 rifle, Nunez shooting the victims 
with the .30-30 rifle, and defendant shooting the victims with the .38-caliber 
handgun, which he loaded with ammunition he found in the bedroom, all in a 
flurry of gunfire.  The physical evidence does not depend in any way on Ramirez‘s 
testimony.  The overwhelming evidence thus reflects that defendant intentionally 
and fatally shot Martha with a .38-caliber handgun.  Therefore, the record compels 
 
120 
the conclusion that the instructional error regarding the multiple-murder special 
circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See also People v. Maciel 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 521 [multiple-murder special circumstance does not require 
a finding of intent to kill every murder victim].) 
32.  Robbery and Burglary Special-circumstance Instructions 
Defendant presents several claims of instructional error regarding the 
robbery and burglary special circumstances.  He asserts the alleged errors 
individually and cumulatively violated his rights under state law and the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  As we explain, each 
claim is without merit. 
a.  Failure to instruct on the definition of “actual killer” and 
causation 
Defendant contends that the term ―actual killer‖ should have been defined 
with regard to the use of that phrase in CALJIC No. 8.80.1  and that the jurors 
should have been instructed on the law of causation, ―because there were multiple 
shooters and unresolved factual questions as to which shooters actually caused the 
victims‘ death.‖  The claim is without merit. 
Even assuming that instruction on the term ―actual killer‖ and on causation 
should have been given, we do not believe it was reasonably probable that such 
omissions affected the verdicts.  (See Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 490.)  The 
evidence was overwhelming that each victim was shot multiple times and by more 
than one of the coparticipants.  The evidence was undisputed that Martha suffered 
two fatal gunshot wounds to her forehead, one of which was caused by a .38-
caliber bullet.  As discussed ante, no reasonable juror could have failed to find that 
defendant intentionally and fatally shot Martha with a .38-caliber handgun.  To the 
extent the jury would not have been able to conclude defendant or any other 
coparticipant was the actual killer of the other victims, as a practical matter, the 
 
121 
jurors would have known that they needed to find intent to kill or reckless 
indifference in order to find the burglary or robbery-murder special-circumstance 
allegations true.  Under these circumstances, any failure to instruct on causation 
could only have inured to defendant‘s benefit.  The claim fails on the merits.   
b.  Burden of proof 
Defendant contends the following portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 
improperly shifted the burden of proof:  ―If you find that a defendant was not the 
actual killer of a human being . . . .‖  He asserts the phrase ―[i]f you find‖ 
unconstitutionally implied that he was obligated to prove he was not the actual 
killer.  We disagree.   
There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the phrase to 
shift the burden of proof.  The instruction explicitly informed the jury that the 
prosecution bore the burden of proving the truth of the special circumstance 
allegations and explained the findings that it was required to make based on the 
evidence.  In considering the truth of the special circumstance allegations, the jury 
necessarily would have already found defendant guilty of murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In considering the remaining inquiries posed by the instruction, 
the jury logically would have understood that if it found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant was the actual killer, then it was not required to find intent to 
kill or reckless indifference.  Otherwise, if the jury could not find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer, then it was required to make 
a finding regarding whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
intent to kill or reckless indifference as a major participant.  Nothing in the 
instruction suggested that defendant was required to provide any proof that he was 
not the actual killer. 
 
122 
Defendant next complains that the following portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 
unconstitutionally defined the burden of proof:  ―you cannot find the special 
circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill.‖  Defendant contends 
that the phrase ―unless you are satisfied‖ improperly defined the burden of proof 
and allowed consideration of the jurors‘ subjective opinions.  We disagree.   
The instruction informed the jury that ―[t]he People have the burden of 
proving the truth of a special circumstance.  If you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.‖  There is 
no reasonable likelihood that any juror interpreted the word ―satisfied‖ to mean 
anything other than he or she had to be convinced that the prosecution had carried 
its burden.   
c.  Consciousness of guilt instructions 
Defendant contends the jury was erroneously permitted to consider the 
consciousness of guilt, CALJIC No. 2.03, and flight, CALJIC No. 2.52, 
instructions (see fn. 38, ante), in determining the special circumstances 
allegations.  Defendant asserts it was error to permit the jury‘s consideration of 
these instructions because, even though consciousness of guilt evidence such as 
flight and false statements is probative concerning whether a defendant committed 
a crime, it does not bear on the nature of the crime or a defendant‘s state of mind 
at the time of the crime.   
The claim is without merit.  The consciousness of guilt instructions 
expressly informed the jurors that evidence such as flight and false statements may 
be considered on the question of guilt, and that each juror much decide the weight 
and significance to accord the evidence.    Moreover, the trial court explained to 
the jury under CALJIC 17.31 that ―[w]hether some instructions apply will depend 
 
123 
upon what you find to be the facts.  Disregard any instruction which applies to 
facts which you determine do not exist.‖  (See People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 
671, 684 [although CALJIC No. 17.31 ―does not render an otherwise improper 
instruction proper, it may be considered in assessing the prejudicial effect of an 
improper instruction‖].)  We presume the jury followed the trial court‘s 
instructions.  (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1299.)  Therefore, if, as 
defendant asserts, the consciousness of guilt evidence was not relevant to the 
special circumstance allegations, then the jury would have disregarded the 
instructions.  Consequently, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied 
the consciousness of guilt instructions in a manner that violates the Constitution.  
(Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72.)  Accordingly, the instructions did not violate 
defendant‘s federal constitutional right to reliable verdicts.   
Finally, because defendant fails to demonstrate that the above instructions 
were erroneous, we reject his claim that the asserted errors, individually or 
cumulatively, violated his state and federal constitutional rights. 
33.  Constitutionality of the Felony-murder and Multiple-murder 
Special Circumstances 
Defendant argues the felony-murder and multiple-murder special 
circumstances are unconstitutional, as follows.  First, he asserts the felony-murder 
special circumstance is unconstitutional because it fails to narrow the class of 
death-eligible murders, fails to require the prosecution to prove mens rea, fails to 
require an intentional killing, violates equal protection, and diminishes the 
relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability.  Second, defendant 
contends the multiple-murder special circumstance too broadly makes defendants 
death eligible.  Finally, defendant contends the felony-murder special 
circumstance is not a validly enacted statute.  
 
124 
Defendant concedes that this court has rejected these claims.  (See e.g., 
People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 700 [the felony-murder special 
circumstance is constitutional]; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 968 
[same]; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1265-1266 [same]; People 
v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945-946 [same]; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 
Cal.3d at pp. 1146-1147 [same]; People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 843 
[the multiple-murder special circumstance is constitutional]; People v. Lucero 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 740 [same]; Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
978, 991 [―the various modifications and amendments made by Proposition 115 to 
paragraph (17) of section 190.2, subdivision (a) . . . are . . . effective‖]; see also 
People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 890 [―Yoshisato held that Proposition 
115‘s amendments to section 190.2 were operative, and went into effect the day of 
Proposition 115‘s passage in June 1990.‖].)  Defendant provides no persuasive 
reason for revisiting this court‘s prior decisions.   
34.  Asserted Cumulative Prejudice  
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of his asserted guilt phase errors 
requires reversal of his convictions.  As discussed above, we will reverse the 
penalty judgment due to the trial court‘s erroneous excusal of a prospective juror 
for cause under Witherspoon/Witt.  Otherwise, to the extent there are instances in 
which we have found error or assumed its existence, we have concluded defendant 
suffered no prejudice.  Even when considered cumulatively, the errors did not 
render defendant‘s trial fundamentally unfair.  For these reasons, the claim of 
cumulative prejudice fails.   
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
Defendant raises several claims of error at the penalty phase.  Given the 
penalty judgment must be reversed for Witherspoon/Witt error, we need not reach 
 
125 
these claims, with the exception of defendant‘s claim concerning the restitution 
fine imposed.  (See Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 839.)   
Defendant requests reconsideration of the $10,000 restitution fine the trial 
court imposed pursuant to Government Code former section 13967.40  That 
section, which did not authorize a trial court to consider a defendant‘s ability to 
pay in setting the amount of restitution, was subsequently repealed in its entirety in 
2003.  Section 1202.4 now ―provides detailed guidance to the trial court in setting 
a restitution fine, including consideration of a defendant‘s ability to pay.‖  (People 
v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 (Vieira).)  In pertinent part, section 1202.4, 
subdivision (c), now provides that ―[a] defendant‘s inability to pay shall not be 
considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine[] 
. . . [but] may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in 
excess of the [statutory] minimum.‖   
We explained in Vieira, 35 Cal.4th at page 305, that ― ‗[i]f the amendatory 
statute lessening punishment [(here, § 1202.4)] becomes effective prior to the date 
the judgment of conviction becomes final then, in our opinion, it, and not the old 
statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.‘ ‖  ― ‗[F]or the 
purpose of determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal 
statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari 
in the United States Supreme Court has passed.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 306.)  Therefore, the 
                                              
40  
At the time of defendant‘s sentencing in 1998, Government Code section 
13967 read:  ―Notwithstanding Section 13340, the proceeds in the Restitution 
Fund are hereby continuously appropriated to the board for the purpose of 
indemnifying persons filing claims pursuant to this article.  However, the funds 
appropriated pursuant to this section for administrative costs of the State Board of 
Control shall be subject to annual review through the state budget process.‖  (Gov. 
Code, § 13967, added by Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 2, p. 6548 and repealed by Stats. 
2002, ch. 1141, § 10, p. 7390.) 
 
126 
question of defendant‘s restitution fine must be remanded for reconsideration 
under the currently applicable statute. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of death is reversed and the matter remanded for a new 
penalty determination and reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine 
under the currently applicable statute.  If the People choose not to contest the 
question of restitution on remand, defendant‘s restitution fine shall be reduced to 
the statutory minimum.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Covarrubias 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S075136 
Date Filed: September 8, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Robert Moody 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Thomas Lundy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre, Glenn R. Pruden and 
Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas Lundy 
2777 Yulupa Avenue, PMB 179 
Santa Rosa, CA  95405 
(707) 538-0175 
 
Bridget Billeter 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1340