Title: Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: August 6, 1998 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ARMETTA STUPEK,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

WYLE LABORATORIES CORPORATION, dba
WYLE LABORATORIES, a California
corporation,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 9410-07491; CA A90965; SC S43973)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted April 30, 1997.

	Terrance J. Slominski, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and
filed the petition on behalf of petitioner on review.

	Charles F. Adams, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed briefs on behalf of respondent on review.  With
him on the brief on the merits was Therasa A. Healy.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.

*	Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	Eric Neiman, Judge Pro Tempore.

	144 Or App 622, 928 P2d 365 (1996).

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment in
defendant's favor on her claims for wrongful discharge,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and statutory sex
discrimination.  At issue is whether plaintiff timely filed her
common-law claims by filing her complaint on the Monday following
the weekend during which the statute of limitations ran and
whether she submitted adequate facts to support her claim to the
tolling of the limitation period for her statutory claim.  We
hold that plaintiff timely filed her common-law wrongful-discharge claim and otherwise affirm the summary judgment in
defendant's favor on plaintiff's remaining claims. 

		On review of a summary judgment, we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party (in this case,
plaintiff).  Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 408, 939
P2d 608 (1997).  We review the record to determine whether there
is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Oregon Rules
of Civil Procedure (ORCP) 47 C; Jones, 325 Or at 413-14.

  		Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant from
July 1982 until October 1992.  She alleged that she was subjected
to various hostile and sexually explicit remarks by male co-workers during working hours and that, despite her complaints,
defendant failed to take any measures to correct the situation. 
In September 1992, plaintiff's supervisor suggested that she
terminate her employment because the work environment was not
likely to change.  Thereafter, plaintiff submitted notice to
defendant that she would resign.  On October 20, 1992, plaintiff
signed a "Personnel/Payroll Action Notice," which stated that
plaintiff's "termination effective date" was October 30, 1992.  

		On Monday, October 31, 1994, plaintiff, acting pro se,
filed a complaint alleging claims of common-law wrongful
discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, both
of which have a two-year statute of limitations.  ORS 12.110(1).(1) 
She later retained counsel, who amended the complaint by adding a
statutory sex-discrimination claim, which has a one-year statute
of limitations.  ORS 659.030, ORS 659.121(3).(2)  

		Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that: (1) the two-year statute of limitations barred the common-law claims, because the two-year period ran during the weekend
before the Monday on which plaintiff filed her complaint; (2) the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress lacked
sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's allegations; and (3)
the statutory sex-discrimination claim was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations.  Plaintiff countered in part that her
common-law claims were filed timely, because the limitation
period extended until the Monday on which she filed those claims,
and that the statute of limitations on her statutory claim was
tolled by reason of her insanity.  Former ORS 12.160 (1993).(3)  

		The trial court granted defendant's motions for summary
judgment on all grounds.  Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion.  Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories
Corporation, 144 Or App 623, 928 P2d 365 (1996).  We allowed
review to consider the questions whether plaintiff's complaint
was timely filed, which requires us to determine when her
wrongful-discharge claim accrued, and whether plaintiff
established that there is a genuine issue of material fact about
whether her insanity operated to toll the limitations period for
her statutory claim.

		Plaintiff's petition for review asserts that both of
her common-law claims were timely filed.  However, before this
court, plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's alternative
basis for granting summary judgment on the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress -- insufficient evidence to
support the allegations.  Although, under ORAP 9.20(2), this
court may review an issue that properly was raised on appeal and
preserved, but not presented on review, we ordinarily will not do
so unless the issue requires resolution.  State v. Castrejon, 317
Or 202, 211-12, 856 P2d 616 (1993).  The Court of Appeals'
decision affirmed the trial court's conclusion that there is
insufficient evidence to support the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.  Because plaintiff did not ask
this court to review the Court of Appeals' decision in that
regard, and because there is no need for further resolution of
the issue, we do not address it.  

ACCRUAL OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE CLAIM

		In deciding whether plaintiff's common-law wrongful-discharge claim was timely filed, we first must determine when
that claim accrued.  If the claim accrued when plaintiff learned
of her discharge on October 20, 1994 (i.e., when she signed the
Personnel Action Notice), as defendant claims, then plaintiff's
claim is barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of how
the limitation period is calculated.  If plaintiff's claim
accrued when her termination became effective, October 30, 1992,
or on the last day she worked, then we must address the statute
of limitations issue.  

		Plaintiff brought her wrongful-discharge claim under
ORS 12.110(1), which provides that "[a]n action * * * for any
injury to the person * * * shall be commenced within two years." 
ORS 12.010 provides that actions subject to limitation periods in
ORS chapter 12 "shall only be commenced * * * after the cause of
action shall have accrued."  (Emphasis added.)  Those statutes
obligated plaintiff to commence her claim for wrongful discharge
within two years of the date on which that claim accrued.(4)

		In U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 666-67, 548
P2d 966 (1976), quoting Michael Franks, Limitation of Actions 11
(1959), this court, using the term "cause of action," explained
when a cause of action accrues:

	"In the best-known definition [a cause of action]
consists of every fact which it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to
support his right to judgment.  When these facts have
occurred and provided that there are in existence a
competent plaintiff and a competent defendant, a cause
of action is said to accrue to the plaintiff because he
can then prosecute an action effectively." 

See also Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation District, 304 Or
151, 161, 742 P2d 1176 (1987) ("[a] cause of action accrues when
the party owning it has a right to sue on it"). 

		The facts necessary to establish a claim are those
events listed as the elements of a claim.  A wrongful-discharge
claim has two elements:  "[T]here must be a discharge, and that
discharge must be 'wrongful.'"  Moustachetti v. State of Oregon,
319 Or 319, 325, 877 P2d 66 (1994), citing Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or
210, 218, 536 P2d 512 (1975).  The legal injury in a wrongful-discharge claim is the discharge.  Moustachetti, 319 Or at 325. 
Thus, there is no claim until the discharge occurs.  

		This case differs from Moustachetti in that, here, 
defendant did not actually discharge plaintiff.  Rather,
plaintiff alleges that her working conditions were such that she
was "forced" to resign; that is, she claims a "constructive"
wrongful discharge.  A forced resignation may support a claim for
wrongful discharge.  Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220, 227-28, 779
P2d 1000 (1989).  In Sheets, the employers informed the plaintiff
that, unless he resigned, they would terminate his employment. 
The plaintiff resigned and filed an action for constructive
wrongful discharge.  The court observed that, in certain
circumstances, a resignation could be considered a "discharge":

	"Where the employee unconditionally has been told
'resign today or be fired,' the employer has decided
that the employment relationship is at an end and that
the employee shall leave.  The employee merely selects
the manner in which the employer's will is
accomplished.  Under such circumstances a fact finder
may find that a 'resignation' was a discharge."  Id. at
227 (citation omitted).  

		Sheets tells us that the discharge element in an action
for constructive wrongful discharge is the resignation, but it
does not tell us when the discharge occurs.  That question is
partially answered in McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or 532, 901 P2d
841 (1995).  There, the court stated that, to establish a
constructive wrongful discharge, a plaintiff must allege and
prove:

	"(1) the employer intentionally created or
intentionally maintained specified working
condition(s); (2) those working conditions were so
intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's
position would have resigned because of them; (3) the
employer desired to cause the employee to leave
employment as a result of those working conditions or
knew that the employee was certain, or substantially
certain, to leave employment as a result of those
working conditions; and (4) the employee did leave the
employment as a result of those working conditions." 
Id. at 557 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).

Under the McGanty formulation, the discharge does not occur until
the employee "leave[s] the employment as a result of [the
wrongful] working conditions."  In other words, the discharge
occurs when the employment relationship between the employee and
the employer ends.  Before leaving the employment, the employee
is unable to establish the element of discharge.  That the
discharge occurs at the end of the employment relationship
follows as well from Sheets, because only at that point does the
employer's intent to terminate an employee cause a tortious harm.

		Here, plaintiff's employment relationship conclusively
ended when her termination became effective on October 30, 1992. 
It was not until that date that all the facts necessary for
plaintiff to prove her wrongful-discharge claim had occurred.  We
therefore hold that plaintiff's claim for constructive wrongful
discharge did not accrue until the end of the employment
relationship, that is, October 30, 1992.  In so holding, we are
mindful of the split in state and federal law on this issue, but
note that our conclusion is in accord with other states that have
similar claim-accrual standards.(5) 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS