Title: McCloud v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1150 
____________ 
 
STANLEY MCCLOUD,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[January 19, 2017] 
 
LABARGA, C.J.  
Stanley McCloud seeks review of the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s 
decision in McCloud v. State, 139 So. 3d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), which the 
district court issued on remand in light of this Court’s decision in Haygood v. 
State, 109 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 2013).  McCloud cites as authority Daugherty v. State, 
96 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. granted, 143 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 2014) 
(table), a decision of another district court of appeal pending in this Court.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 
421 (Fla. 1981).  As explained below, we approve the holding of the Fifth District, 
but not the reasoning. 
 
 
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As we begin, we note that this case involves a jury instruction consistent 
with that deemed to be fundamentally erroneous in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 
252 (Fla. 2010).  The petitioner, Stanley McCloud, was convicted of second-degree 
murder.  He initially challenged his conviction because the jury instruction on the 
required lesser included offense of manslaughter by act erroneously required the 
jury to find that he intended to cause the death of the victim.  At that time, 
McCloud’s conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the jury also received a 
jury instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence.  See McCloud v. State, 
53 So. 3d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).   
McCloud sought review of that decision in this Court.  We granted 
jurisdiction, quashed, and remanded in light of our decision in Haygood, which 
held 
that giving the manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction does 
not cure the fundamental error in giving the erroneous manslaughter 
by act instruction where the defendant is convicted of an offense not 
more than one step removed from manslaughter and the evidence 
supports a finding of manslaughter by act, but does not reasonably 
support a finding that the death occurred due to the culpable 
negligence of the defendant. 
 
109 So. 3d at 743; McCloud v. State, 137 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 2014) (table).   
On remand, the district court again affirmed McCloud’s conviction, this time 
concluding that the order of the lesser included offenses as presented to the jury 
dictates the number of steps removed from the offense of conviction, and thus, 
 
 
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whether a fundamental error or harmless error analysis applies.  The decision of 
the district court on remand is the decision currently before this Court.   
We have contemporaneously issued our opinion in Daugherty v. State, No. 
SC14-860 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2017), which raises the same question of law as the 
present case; that is, how to properly determine the number of steps that the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter is removed from second-degree murder, the 
offense of conviction.  In Daugherty, we quashed the decision of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal and held that 
where a defendant is convicted of second-degree murder after the jury 
is erroneously instructed on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter by act, the one step removed analysis to determine 
fundamental error is not based on the order of the offenses on the 
verdict form.  Rather, because manslaughter as a matter of degree is a 
next lesser offense of second-degree murder, giving an erroneous 
instruction on manslaughter by act constitutes fundamental error even 
if manslaughter is not listed immediately below second-degree murder 
on the verdict form. 
 
Id. at 2.   
Because the Fifth District in McCloud employed the same reasoning as the 
Fourth District in Daugherty and applied an erroneous steps removed analysis, we 
disapprove of the reasoning in McCloud.  However, because we conclude that the 
error caused by the incorrect instruction was cured by the jury’s consideration of 
other offenses also one step removed from the offense of conviction, we approve 
the ultimate holding of the district court.  
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
McCloud was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, 
Sandra McCloud.  McCloud shot Sandra with a .357 magnum in her bedroom and 
in the presence of their two small children.  Sandra died from a single gunshot 
wound to the chest.  One of the children sustained a grazing wound from the same 
gunshot.  Both McCloud and Sandra had been drinking for hours before the 
murder.  Sandra’s blood alcohol level was .16.   
In a 911 call that he made shortly after the shooting and after leaving the 
Ocala home where he shot Sandra, a distressed McCloud stated that after retrieving 
his .357 magnum from his truck, he shot his wife in the chest and wanted to turn 
himself in.  McCloud drove to a convenience store, where he was taken into 
custody.  McCloud said during the 911 call: 
She—she told me she went with the roo[f] man.  And I—we’ve been 
separated for eight months.  And I come back and she went with the 
roo[f] man.  I was on my job making good money, and she told me 
that, and I could have been still there with my job.  I’m going to turn 
myself in. 
 
McCloud repeatedly made comments such as “I didn’t mean to do it, but she made 
me do it,” and “I—I’m sick and tired of this.”   
 
In an interview at the police station during the hours after the shooting, 
McCloud continued to repeat that he shot Sandra because she relentlessly talked to 
him about having another man in her life.  During this interview, McCloud stated 
 
 
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that he pointed the gun at her to scare her, but did not intend to shoot and kill her.  
He suggested that he shot her in the dark at a point when the lights blinked in the 
bedroom and, in contrast to the 911 call, said he thought he shot Sandra in the 
shoulder.  During this interview, McCloud first stated that the gun was in the truck, 
but then he quickly changed his statement and said that the gun was in the bedroom 
closet.   
The bullet that killed Sandra entered the right side of her chest between the 
ribs, traveled through her right lung, and entered into the pericardial sac 
surrounding her heart.  The bullet tore the upper part of her esophagus in half and 
lacerated her aorta.  The bullet then grazed her left lung and exited her back.  The 
medical examiner suggested that Sandra may have been sitting on the edge of the 
bed when she was shot, with McCloud standing one to two feet away.  McCloud’s 
children were in bed with his wife when McCloud fired the shots, and the bullet 
grazed one of the children in the arm.1  Sandra was transported to the hospital with 
no obvious signs of life and was pronounced dead. 
McCloud was convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree 
murder.  The jury was also instructed on the lesser included offenses of third-
                                          
 
 
1.  McCloud entered no contest pleas to culpable negligence resulting in 
injury to one of the children, and culpable negligence in exposing another child to 
injury.   
 
 
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degree felony murder and manslaughter by act.  On the verdict form, third-degree 
felony murder appeared between second-degree murder and manslaughter.  On 
appeal, the district court concluded that, as a result of the order in which the 
offenses were instructed to the jury and listed on the verdict form, the erroneously 
instructed offense of manslaughter by act was two steps removed from second-
degree murder, the offense of conviction.  The district court stated: 
In this case, the lesser included offense of manslaughter by act was 
two steps removed from the second-degree murder conviction due to 
the inclusion of the felony murder charge in the jury instructions and 
on the verdict form. 
 
McCloud, 139 So. 3d at 474-75.  Relying on Pena v. State, the district court 
determined that a harmless error analysis was appropriate.  901 So. 2d 781, 787 
(Fla. 2005) (“However, when the trial court fails to properly instruct on a crime 
two or more degrees removed from the crime for which the defendant is convicted, 
the error is not per se reversible, but instead is subject to a harmless error 
analysis.”).   
The district court concluded that the use of the erroneous manslaughter by 
act instruction constituted harmless error and affirmed McCloud’s conviction and 
sentence.  McCloud, 139 So. 3d at 475.  The district court also cited to Daugherty, 
96 So. 3d 1076, which applied the same steps-removed analysis on similar facts 
and concluded that the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction constituted 
 
 
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harmless error.  McCloud, 139 So. 3d at 475.  At the time, this Court had granted 
belated review in Daugherty, and we subsequently granted review in McCloud. 
ANALYSIS 
McCloud, who was convicted of second-degree murder, maintains that he is 
entitled to relief because the jury received an instruction on the lesser included 
offense of manslaughter by act that was consistent with the instruction held to be 
fundamentally erroneous under the facts and instructions given in Montgomery, 39 
So. 3d at 259.  At trial, McCloud’s jury was instructed as follows: 
Manslaughter, to prove the crime of manslaughter, the State 
must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  
One, Sandra McCloud is dead.  Two, A, Stanley McCloud 
intentionally caused the death of Sandra Gail McCloud or B, the death 
of Sandra McCloud was caused by the culpable negligence of Stanley 
McCloud. 
 
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the 
killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have 
previously explained those terms. 
 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated 
intent to cause death. 
 
I will now define culpable negligence for you.  Each of us has a 
duty to act reasonably toward others.  If there is a violation of that 
duty without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is 
negligence, but culpable negligence is more than a failure to use 
ordinary care toward others. 
 
In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and 
flagrant.  Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless 
disregard of human life or the safety of persons exposed to its 
dangerous effects or such an entire want of care as to raise a 
presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which 
shows wantonness or recklessness or a grossly careless disregard of 
the safety and welfare of the public or such an indifference to the 
 
 
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rights of others as is equivalent to an intention—intentional violation 
of such rights. 
 
The negligent act or omission must have been committed with 
an utter disregard for the safety of others.  Culpable negligence is 
consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the 
defendant must have known or reasonably should have known was 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 
 
 
The district court acknowledged that McCloud’s jury received a faulty jury 
instruction on manslaughter by act.  McCloud, 139 So. 3d at 474.  However, the 
court concluded that because manslaughter was not placed immediately below 
second-degree murder but was preceded by third-degree felony murder, a harmless 
error analysis applied to the faulty instruction.  In sum, the layout of the verdict 
form and the jury instructions rendered manslaughter two steps removed from 
second-degree murder because the lesser included offense of third-degree felony 
murder was placed between them.  However, as we held in Daugherty, this was 
error.  We explained: 
This Court has consistently observed that manslaughter, a next 
lesser included offense of second-degree murder, is one step removed 
from second-degree murder.  It is this relationship between the two 
offenses that undergirds this Court’s conclusion that the erroneous 
manslaughter instruction in Montgomery constituted fundamental 
error.  However, this Court has previously concluded that third-degree 
felony murder—which, like manslaughter, is also a second-degree 
felony—is also one step removed from second-degree murder.  See 
Herrington v. State, 538 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 1989).  “Although 
third-degree felony murder is not a necessarily included offense of 
first-degree murder, it is, under certain circumstances and evidence, a 
proper permissive lesser included offense of first-degree murder, 
requiring a jury instruction to that effect.”  Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 
235, 236 (Fla. 1985).   
 
 
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No. SC14-860, at 14-15 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2017).  We continued: 
The district court’s interpretation of what constitutes a step removed 
improperly focused on the appearance of the verdict form and based a 
defendant’s entitlement to relief on an arbitrary set of 
circumstances—which lesser included offense is listed first when 
drafting the verdict form.  We conclude that the determination of what 
constitutes a step removed is not based on the layout of the verdict 
form, but rather, the relationship between the offense of conviction 
and the erroneous lesser included offense instruction.   
Manslaughter, a second-degree felony, is a next lesser offense 
of second-degree murder.  However, as we previously observed in 
Herrington, so is third-degree felony murder (also a second-degree 
felony).  Daugherty’s jury was instructed on multiple next lesser 
included offenses of the same degree of severity, and Daugherty was 
entitled to a proper instruction on each.  The placement of third-
degree felony murder on the verdict form did not, by mere virtue of its 
location between second-degree murder and manslaughter, remedy the 
error caused by the faulty manslaughter instruction.  To conclude 
otherwise would leave to mere chance a defendant’s entitlement to 
relief based on how the verdict form is fashioned. 
 
Id. at 16-17.  Our analysis in Daugherty applies here.  
Curing the Manslaughter by Act Error 
In this case, the issue of intent was pertinent and material to what the jury 
had to consider to convict McCloud, who was charged with premeditated first-
degree murder.  Thus, the giving of an erroneous instruction on manslaughter by 
act, an offense one step removed from second-degree murder, constituted 
fundamental error where it required the jury to find that McCloud intended to 
cause the victim’s death.  However, in Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 743, we held that 
fundamental error caused by the then-erroneous standard jury instruction on 
 
 
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manslaughter by act is not cured by the mere giving of an instruction on 
manslaughter by culpable negligence unless the evidence in the case reasonably 
supports a conviction of that offense.  Thus, we now turn to whether the error in 
this case was cured because the jury was also instructed on third-degree felony 
murder, or because the jury was given the instruction on manslaughter by culpable 
negligence.  Both lesser included offenses are second-degree felonies which, like 
manslaughter by act, are one step removed from second-degree murder. 
Third-Degree Felony Murder 
“Although third-degree felony murder is not a necessarily included offense 
of first-degree murder, it is, under certain circumstances and evidence, a proper 
permissive lesser included offense of first-degree murder, requiring a jury 
instruction to that effect.”  Green, 475 So. 2d at 236.  Thus, similar to 
manslaughter by culpable negligence, the giving of the third-degree felony murder 
instruction is subject to a trial court’s determination that the evidence presented 
supports giving the instruction.  In this case, the jury could reasonably have found 
McCloud guilty of third-degree felony murder based on the underlying crime of 
attempted aggravated assault with a firearm.  McCloud’s jury received the 
following instruction on third-degree felony murder, with the underlying felonies 
 
 
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of aggravated assault with a firearm and, alternatively, attempted aggravated 
assault with a firearm: 
Third degree felony murder, before you can find the defendant 
guilty of third degree felony murder, the State must prove the 
following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  One, Sandra 
McCloud is dead.  Two, A, the death occurred as a consequence of 
and while Stanley McCloud was engaged in the commission of 
aggravated assault with a firearm, or B, the death occurred as a 
consequence of and while Stanley McCloud was attempting to 
commit aggravated assault with a firearm.  Three, Stanley McCloud 
was the person who actually killed Sandra McCloud. 
It is not necessary for the State to prove the killing was 
perpetrated with a design to affect death. 
If you find that Stanley McCloud committed murder in the third 
degree and you also find that during the commission of the crime he 
possessed and/or discharged and/or caused death or great bodily harm 
with a firearm, your verdict should indicate such possession and/or 
discharge of a firearm and/or caused death or great bodily harm with a 
firearm. 
 
The jury was instructed on aggravated assault and attempted aggravated assault as 
follows: 
 
Aggravated assault with a firearm, the crime of aggravated 
assault with a firearm consist [sic] of the following four elements.  
One, Stanley McCloud intentionally and unlawfully threatened either 
by word or act to do violence to Sandra McCloud. 
 
Two, at the time Stanley McCloud appeared to have the ability 
to carry out the threat.  Three, the act of Stanley McCloud created in 
the mind of Sandra McCloud a well-founded fear that the violence 
was about to take place.  Four, the assault was made with a firearm.  
 
It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had 
an intent to kill. 
 
Attempt to commit crime, in order to prove that the defendant 
attempted to commit the crime of aggravated assault with a firearm, 
the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt.  One, 
Stanley McCloud did some act toward committing the crime of 
 
 
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aggravate [sic] assault with a firearm that went beyond just thinking 
or talking about it.  Two, he would have committed the crime except 
that he failed.  
 
It is not an attempt to commit aggravated assault with a firearm 
if the defendant abandoned his attempt to commit the offense or 
otherwise prevented its commission under circumstances indicating a 
complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 
 
The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of third-degree 
felony murder, that Sandra McCloud is dead, and the third element, that Stanley 
McCloud killed her.  However, the remaining inquiry is whether the second 
element of third-degree felony murder was satisfied, which is based on whether the 
underlying felony was proven. 
The jury had to find as to the second element that Sandra McCloud’s death 
occurred as a consequence of and while McCloud was either engaged in the 
commission of aggravated assault with a firearm or an attempt to commit 
aggravated assault with a firearm.2  While the evidence may not support a finding 
                                          
 
 
2.  We conclude that the evidence does not reasonably support a finding of a 
completed aggravated assault.  We acknowledge that McCloud pointed a gun at 
Sandra and, by being in possession of the gun at that time, he appeared to be able 
to carry out a threat of violence using the firearm.  However, the record does not 
reveal whether Sandra was actually threatened, nor does it reveal a well-founded 
fear on Sandra’s part.  In fact, the State emphasized that Sandra’s twenty-year-old 
son, who was at the home at the time of the shooting, did not hear yelling or 
fighting that night, and came to Sandra’s bedroom upon hearing a “thud.”  
Moreover, McCloud’s statement that the lights went off when he shot her raises the 
question whether Sandra saw McCloud with the gun. 
 
 
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of a completed aggravated assault, it does reasonably support a finding of 
attempted aggravated assault. 
During his interview with law enforcement after the shooting, McCloud 
stated that he wanted to scare Sandra with the gun.  To that end, the jury could 
have found that McCloud attempted to commit aggravated assault but was unable 
to complete his attempt because Sandra was unaware of the gun.  The jury could 
have reasonably convicted McCloud of third-degree felony murder based on the 
underlying felony of attempted aggravated assault. 
Culpable Negligence 
Moreover, the jury could have reasonably convicted McCloud of 
manslaughter by culpable negligence.  Although the decision below was on 
remand from this Court post-Haygood, the district court failed to expressly 
evaluate under a fundamental error analysis whether the evidence supported a 
finding of manslaughter by culpable negligence, thus remedying the fundamental 
error caused by the erroneous instruction on manslaughter by act.  Rather, the 
district court applied a harmless error analysis to the faulty manslaughter 
instruction in McCloud because, in its view, manslaughter by act was two steps 
removed from second-degree murder, the offense of conviction.   
In Haygood, we concluded that fundamental error caused by the faulty 
instruction on manslaughter by act could be remedied where the jury was also 
 
 
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instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence, but only where the evidence 
reasonably supported that finding.  109 So. 3d at 743.  We explained that where the 
manslaughter by act instruction erroneously requires intent to kill, and “the only 
non-intentional homicide offense remaining for the jury’s consideration” is second-
degree murder, fundamental error results.  Id.  However, if the jury is also 
instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence, and there is evidence upon 
which the jury could reasonably find that non-intentional offense, the error caused 
by the manslaughter by act instruction is cured.  Id. 
In the present case, McCloud’s jury was instructed on the offense of 
manslaughter by culpable negligence as follows: 
I will now define culpable negligence for you.  Each of us has a 
duty to act reasonably towards others.  If there is a violation of that 
duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is 
negligence, but culpable negligence is more than a failure to use 
ordinary care towards others. 
In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and 
flagrant.  Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless 
disregard of human life or the safety of persons exposed to its 
dangerous effects, or such an entire want of care as to raise a 
presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which 
shows wantonness or recklessness or a grossly careless disregard of 
the safety and welfare of the public or such an indifference to the 
rights of others as is equivalent to an intention—intentional violation 
of such rights. 
The negligent act or omission must have been committed with 
an utter disregard for the safety of others.  Culpable negligence is 
consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the 
defendant must have known or reasonably should have known was 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 
 
 
 
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“Every case of manslaughter by culpable negligence must be determined upon the 
facts and circumstances peculiar to it.”  Scarborough v. State, 188 So. 2d 877, 877 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (citing Fulton v. State, 108 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1959)).  “There is 
nothing mystical about culpability.  It comprehends blame, censure or some aspect 
of erratic conduct.”  Fulton, 108 So. 2d at 475. 
During his interview, McCloud stated that he did not intend to shoot Sandra 
and only intended to scare her after she continued to talk to him about her 
relationship with another man.  Both McCloud and Sandra had been drinking.  The 
jury could have reasonably concluded that the act of pointing a gun at Sandra while 
under the influence of alcohol, and in the presence of two young children, revealed 
a reckless or grossly careless disregard for her safety, and that he shot her in the 
course of such reckless or grossly careless behavior.  Thus, there was evidence in 
the record from which a jury could reasonably find McCloud guilty of 
manslaughter by culpable negligence. 
Heat of Passion Instruction 
The State argues that fundamental error did not occur because the jury was 
instructed that it could convict McCloud of manslaughter if it concluded that he 
shot Sandra in the heat of passion.  As a part of the instruction on second-degree 
murder, the jury was instructed as follows: 
 
Heat of passion, heat of passion is a valid theory of defense to 
the—to the depraved mind element of second degree murder.  Passion 
 
 
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is the state of mind when it is powerfully acted on and influenced by 
something external to itself.  It is one of the emotions of the mind 
known as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror. 
 
Pursuant to Florida law, if you believe defendant’s passion 
resulted in a state of mind where depravity, which characterized 
murder in the second degree is absent, you may return a verdict of 
manslaughter. 
 
While this instruction gave the jury an alternative method of convicting McCloud 
of manslaughter, if the jury referred to the actual manslaughter instruction when 
deciding whether McCloud acted in the heat of passion, the faulty intent language 
would still have prevented it from convicting McCloud of manslaughter by act.  
Thus, we do not agree with the State that the heat of passion instruction, by itself, 
remedied the fundamental error caused by the instruction on manslaughter by act. 
However, the heat of passion instruction informed the jury that it could 
convict McCloud of the broader crime of manslaughter.  If the jury had referred 
back to the manslaughter instruction, that instruction referred to not only 
manslaughter by act, but also to manslaughter by culpable negligence, an offense 
which was supported by the record.  Moreover, the jury could reasonably have 
found McCloud guilty of third-degree felony murder based on the underlying 
felony of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court engaged in an erroneous “steps removed” analysis and 
improperly applied a harmless error analysis to evaluate the error caused by the 
 
 
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erroneous instruction on manslaughter by act.  Because the erroneously instructed 
lesser included offense of manslaughter by act was one step removed from the 
offense of conviction, a fundamental error analysis applies.  However, with respect 
to lesser included offenses, the jury was properly instructed on two comparable and 
viable alternatives to manslaughter by act, both one step removed from the offense 
of conviction and supported by the evidence.  Moreover, as to the issue of intent, 
the jury had for consideration the non-intentional lesser included offense of 
manslaughter by culpable negligence, which was reasonably supported by the 
evidence.  Therefore, the jurors were not left with second-degree murder as the 
only other non-intentional lesser included offense for which they could convict 
McCloud.  For these reasons, McCloud is not entitled to relief.  Thus, we approve 
the ultimate holding in McCloud, but not the reasoning of the Fifth District. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and PERRY, Senior Justice, concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D09-3179 
 
 
(Marion County) 
 
 
 
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James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nancy Jean Ryan, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt, 
Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent