Title: Bushard v. Reisman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP438 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David Bushard, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Steven A. Reisman and PressEnter, LLP, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
327 Wis. 2d 798; 788 N.W. 2d 383 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 14, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert W. Wing 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by J. Drew Ryberg and Michael J. Happe and Ryberg & Happe S.C. 
Eau Claire, and oral argument by J. Drew Ryberg. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Kay Nord 
Hunt, Thomas R. Jacobson, and Diane M. Odeen and Lomme, Abdo, 
Cole, King & Stageberg, P.A., Hudson, and oral argument by 
Thomas R. Jacobson. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 51 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP438 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV391) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David Bushard, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven A. Reisman and PressEnter, LLP, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioners, Steven A. 
Reisman and PressEnter, L.L.P., seek review of an unpublished 
opinion of the court of appeals that affirmed orders of the 
circuit court requiring the equal distribution of PressEnter's 
profits to both partners, Reisman and David Bushard.1  The 
circuit court determined that Reisman was not entitled to 
receive a salary as compensation for the services he rendered in 
                                                 
1 Bushard v. Reisman, No 2009AP438, unpublished slip. op. 
(Wis. Ct. App., June 15, 2010), affirming orders of the circuit 
court for Pierce County, Robert W. Wing, J.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
2 
 
winding up PressEnter.  It ordered that the wind-up of the 
partnership be completed. 
¶2 
Reisman argues that the circuit court erred by failing 
to apply equitable considerations when it determined that the 
partners were entitled to share equally in the partnership's 
profits and losses.  In addition, he asserts that the circuit 
court erred by ordering summary judgment without making the 
threshold determination of whether the dissolution resulted in a 
wind-up or a continuation of the partnership.  
¶3 
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, we 
conclude that the distribution of PressEnter's profits and 
losses is governed by Wis. Stat. § 178.15,2 and that Reisman's 
equitable arguments are insufficient to overcome the plain 
language of the statute.  We also determine that because there 
was no genuine dispute of material fact, the circuit court 
correctly concluded that the dissolution of PressEnter resulted 
in a wind-up, and it appropriately ordered summary judgment in 
favor of Bushard.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.    
I 
¶4 
In 1995, David Bushard and Steven Reisman formed 
PressEnter, 
a 
partnership 
dedicated 
to 
providing 
dial-up 
internet service to subscribers in western Wisconsin.3  There was 
no written partnership agreement.  Bushard and Reisman both 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 PressEnter 
filed 
articles 
of 
partnership 
with 
the 
Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions in 1998.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
3 
 
contributed $15,000 in start-up capital, and they have been 
equal partners since PressEnter's inception.    
¶5 
It appears that the relationship between the partners 
began to deteriorate in 1999.  Through his attorney, Bushard 
sent Reisman a document entitled "Notice of Dissolution of 
Partnership" on August 3, 1999: 
Please be advised that Mr. Bushard has chosen to 
exercise 
his 
right to dissolve the partnership, 
PressEnter L.L.P., effective August 31, 1999.  Mr. 
Bushard is taking this step because (1) he believes 
this is an optimal time for selling the business at 
maximum value, and (2) the relationship between the 
partners has deteriorated to the point where it is 
impracticable for the two of you to manage the 
business of the partnership jointly.     
The effect of Bushard's letter was to dissolve the partnership, 
effective August 31, 1999.4     
¶6 
The 
letter 
advised 
that 
Bushard 
thought 
the 
partnership could be sold for $3 million, and it further 
advised: "In the event you wish to continue to run the business 
either individually or with a new partner or partners, Mr. 
Bushard is willing to sell his partnership interest to you for a 
comparable amount."  The letter concluded: "Please have your 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 178.25, 
entitled 
"Dissolution 
of 
partnership defined," provides: 
(1) The dissolution of a partnership is the change in 
the relation of the partners caused by any partner 
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as 
distinguished from the winding up of the business. 
(2) On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, 
but continues until the winding up of the partnership 
affairs is completed. 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
4 
 
personal attorney contact me as soon as possible, so that we can 
arrange for an orderly wind-up or transition of the business."   
¶7 
Around that time, Bushard courted Voyager.net as a 
potential buyer.  Initially, Voyager.net expressed a willingness 
to purchase PressEnter for $3.5 million.  Nevertheless, the 
attempt to sell PressEnter to Voyager.net was unsuccessful.   
¶8 
Bushard withdrew from participation in PressEnter.  
Reisman continued to run the day-to-day operations, and he made 
further attempts to sell the business.   
¶9 
After the 1999 dissolution of the partnership and 
Bushard's withdrawal from its day-to-day operations, Reisman 
continued 
to 
direct 
PressEnter 
to 
pay 
partnership 
draws 
(distributions) to both partners.  Ultimately, PressEnter paid 
Reisman and Bushard approximately $2.3 million each in post-
dissolution distributions.     
¶10 In addition to receiving a partnership draw, Reisman 
started 
taking 
a 
"guaranteed 
draw" 
(a 
salary) 
in 
2004.  
Reisman's salary ranged from $150,000 to $160,000 annually.  In 
total, Reisman received $704,700 in salary from PressEnter 
between January 2004 and November 2008.5   
¶11 In his deposition, Reisman averred that he had 
consulted with an attorney prior to taking a salary, and that 
the attorney told Reisman that he could compensate himself for 
the work he was doing in furtherance of the business.  Reisman 
                                                 
5 In 2008, Reisman started deferring the majority of his 
salary because PressEnter was short of cash on hand. 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
5 
 
acknowledged that he had not specifically informed Bushard of 
his intention to take a salary and that he had not obtained 
Bushard's consent prior to doing so.  He explained that he did 
not believe Bushard's consent was necessary because Bushard had 
withdrawn from the business.   
¶12 Bushard first learned that Reisman had been taking a 
salary in April of 2006 when he received a letter from Reisman 
detailing the efforts made to "keep the company viable in the 
face of the demise of [its] core business," dial-up internet 
services.  The letter explained that Reisman would forego any 
increase in salary.6  The letter further explained: "[L]ooking to 
the future, to preserve partner capital and minimize the risk of 
incurring debt, each partner's draw will be reduced to $7,500.00 
per month, starting with the next distribution."     
¶13 Bushard's attorney notified Reisman by letter that 
Bushard objected to Reisman taking any salary: "As you should 
know, 
under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
no 
partner 
is 
entitled 
to 
remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except with 
the express consent of the other partners or when winding up the 
partnership affairs."7    
                                                 
6 Reisman's wife was employed as PressEnter's bookkeeper.  
The 2006 letter explained that she would also forego a salary 
increase. 
7 The letter also asserted that as a partner, Bushard was 
entitled to full physical access to the company and that he may 
be present at the company premises and will participate in the 
management and affairs of the company beginning on Wednesday, 
October 4, 2006.  According to deposition testimony, Bushard 
went to PressEnter for two days in 2006, and then he stopped 
going altogether.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
6 
 
¶14 In November of 2007, Bushard filed a complaint against 
Reisman and PressEnter, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and 
unjust enrichment.  He demanded an accounting of all partnership 
business and affairs from 1999 through present.  He further 
demanded a money judgment against Reisman "in an amount equal to 
all funds taken from the Partnership without authorization," 
including Reisman's salary.   
¶15 Reisman answered and counterclaimed with two counts of 
unjust enrichment, damage to business reputation, and breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.8  He alleged that he had 
                                                 
8 The dissent asserts that Reisman counterclaimed for "an 
assessment" which "can be accomplished by an accounting."  
Dissent, ¶63.  It is mistaken.  Neither the word "assessment" 
nor the word "accounting" appear in Reisman's counterclaim.  See 
answer and counterclaim, which is attached to this opinion as 
Exhibit A. 
In making the assertion that Reisman counterclaimed for an 
"assessment," 
the 
dissent 
appears 
to 
rely 
on 
Reisman's 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment, which asserted:  
[T]o the extent Mr. Reisman was not compensated for 
the 
valuable 
services 
he 
rendered, 
and 
because 
[Bushard] withdrew from the business and contributed 
no effort or services to it during the period at 
issue, payments to [Bushard] were disproportionately 
high and [Bushard] was thereby unjustly enriched in a 
sum to be determined by the trier-of-fact.   
Alternatively, it may be that the dissent relies on 
Reisman's counterclaim for damage to business reputation, which 
asserted:  
[Bushard] is aware that the filing of this lawuit is 
detrimental to the business interest of [PressEnter 
and Reisman]; to the extent of the damage to the 
business, [PressEnter and Reisman] are entitled to be 
compensated reasonably.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
7 
 
not been adequately compensated "for the fruits of his labor 
that produced massive sums paid to" Bushard after Bushard 
dissolved the partnership effective August 31, 1999.     
¶16 Reisman then moved for summary judgment.  He asserted 
that "Mr. Bushard's dissolution of the partnership caused the 
business to be in wind-up mode as no continuation was consented 
to."  According to Reisman's brief to the circuit court, "Press 
Enter has remained in wind-up mode since August of 1999," the 
date that Bushard "unilaterally and irrevocably caused the wind-
up and dissolution of Press Enter, L.L.P."  Reisman contended 
that he "did not need the consent of Mr. Bushard under Wisconsin 
law in order to draw compensation for his labor in winding up 
the partnership following Mr. Bushard's unilateral dissolution 
of the partnership."  "Because the business is engaged in wind-
up, not continuation," Reisman argued, "Mr. Bushard will receive 
the value of his interest at the date of liquidation or final 
settlement which has yet to occur."  
¶17 Reisman 
argued 
that 
PressEnter's 
dissolution 
"is 
analogous to a deceased partner scenario" where the surviving 
partner is compensated for his services in winding up the 
partnership:  
The rationale behind the Uniform Partnership Act and 
thus the rationale for Wis. Stat. § 178.15(6) is that 
it is just and proper that the surviving partner 
should receive a reasonable allowance for his skill 
                                                                                                                                                             
There are four counts to Reisman's counterclaim.  None can 
be 
reasonably 
interpreted 
as 
requesting 
an 
"assessment" 
accomplished by an "accounting."        
No. 
2009AP438   
 
8 
 
and industry in conducting the business, for during 
that time the business has not received the care and 
labor of the deceased partner, as an equivalent for 
such services.     
. . . .  
The 50/50 split of the partnership has been incredibly 
imbalanced 
in 
Mr. 
Bushard's 
favor 
since 
1999.  
Although Mr. Bushard is not deceased, he has abandoned 
the partnership as though he were, leaving Mr. Reisman 
with all of the work in running the business while 
simultaneously winding-up Press Enter's affairs.   
¶18 In an oral ruling, the circuit court denied Reisman's 
motion for summary judgment.  It concluded: "[T]his is a wind-up 
situation, . . . there is not a surviving partner situation.  
This isn't where one party died and the other partner survived 
and continued the business."  It further determined: "The law 
says the partner who stays in the partnership during wind-up is 
not entitled to compensation, and the law is very clear in that 
regard."  Accordingly, the court concluded that Reisman "is not 
entitled to any compensation for running the affairs of the 
partnership while the partnership is in wind-up status, pursuant 
to the Uniform Partnership Law and the law in the state of 
Wisconsin."     
¶19 The parties disagreed on the effect of the court's 
ruling.  Bushard contended that there were no issues left for 
trial, and he moved the court for summary judgment and an order 
requiring that the wind-up of PressEnter be completed.  Reisman 
contended 
that 
the 
court's 
order 
had 
not 
resolved 
his 
counterclaim 
that 
Bushard 
had 
been 
unjustly 
enriched 
by 
Reisman's efforts in support of the partnership.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
9 
 
¶20 In contrast with his earlier assertions in the circuit 
court, 
Reisman 
contended 
that 
"[a] 
fact 
question 
exists 
concerning whether PressEnter, LLP is in a wind-up mode or 
simply a continuation that has been consented to by Mr. 
Bushard."  Regardless of whether the dissolution had triggered a 
wind-up or a continuation, Reisman asserted that Bushard had 
been unjustly enriched because he had been overcompensated for 
his share of the value of the partnership.  Reisman explained 
that the 1999 offer of purchase from Voyager.net evinced that 
the value of PressEnter had been approximately $3.5 million at 
dissolution.  He argued that Bushard had been amply compensated 
for his half of the 1999 value of the partnership by the payment 
of partner draws exceeding $2.3 million over the years.     
¶21 After hearing arguments, the circuit court entered an 
amended order dismissing Reisman's counterclaims and ordering 
that the wind-up of PressEnter's affairs be completed.  The 
order directed Reisman to pay Bushard $352,350, half the amount 
that Reisman had taken in salary over the years.   
¶22 The circuit court determined that its earlier order 
foreclosed Reisman from arguing that dissolution triggered a 
continuation rather than a wind-up:  
It's my strong opinion that the Court did find that 
this is a wind-up situation . . . [I]t was, in fact, 
admitted that this was a wind-up situation.  The Court 
assumed 
it 
was 
a 
wind-up 
situation 
and 
found 
specifically it was a wind-up situation, so this isn't 
a situation where I can now find something different.  
That would be inappropriate.  So, this is a wind-up 
situation.    
No. 
2009AP438   
 
10 
 
It concluded that under the applicable law, Bushard had not been 
unjustly enriched: "[T]he arguments that are presented by 
[Reisman] really are back to arguments that say, I should be 
reimbursed, it's not fair I don't get paid for my services.  And 
I don't think it's a matter of fairness, it's a matter of law, 
and the law says you don't."  
¶23 The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
opinion.  Bushard v. Reisman, No 2009AP438, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App., June 15, 2010).   Reisman petitioned this court 
for review, setting forth several issues.9  In essence, he argued 
that equitable principles required reversal, and that the 
circuit court erred by ordering summary judgment without making 
                                                 
9 Specifically, Reisman asserted that the following four 
issues required resolution by this court: (1) whether an initial 
determination needs to be made about the manner of dissolution 
of a partnership in Wisconsin in deciding the appropriate 
measure for financial division between the partners; (2) 
whether, according to the dictates of Estate of Matteson v. 
Matteson, 2008 WI 48, 309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557, equity 
must be applied in determining the financial disposition between 
the parties; (3) whether the real controversy was determined in 
this matter where withdrawing partner allowed the continuing 
partner to work an eleven-year period, drew $2.3 million in 
partnership distributions, initially insisted that a wind-up 
occur but later consenting to a continuation and in that eleven 
years, the continuing partner tried selling the business to 
effect the wind-up, was not able to do so and continued to 
operate the business successfully for eleven years, but, for the 
last 4.8 years received a salary that was less than market value 
for work needed by the partnership; and (4) whether, in the 
circumstances where the withdrawing partner is overcompensated 
by either the measure for a wind-up or continuation, a 
counterclaim 
for 
unjust 
enrichment 
lie 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
sustaining member who has done all of the work?  
No. 
2009AP438   
 
11 
 
a determination of whether the dissolution of PressEnter 
resulted in a wind-up or a continuation of the partnership.  
II 
¶24 To resolve the issues presented by this case, we are 
required to interpret the statutes that govern the respective 
rights and obligations of partners.  Statutory interpretation is 
a question of law.  Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 2008 WI 48, 
¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557.  We interpret statutes 
independently from the interpretations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Id.    
¶25 In addition, we are required to determine whether the 
circuit court erred by ordering summary judgment without making 
a determination of whether PressEnter's dissolution resulted in 
a wind-up or a continuation of the partnership.  We review a 
grant of summary judgment independently of the determination 
rendered by the circuit court.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 
136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Whether the withdrawing 
partner elected a wind-up or consented to continuation is a 
question of fact.  Lange v. Bartlett, 121 Wis. 2d 599, 601, 360 
N.W.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1984).   
¶26 We begin by evaluating Reisman's arguments that the 
circuit court erred by failing to apply equitable considerations 
when it determined that the partners were entitled to share 
equally in the partnership's profits and losses.  We then turn 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
12 
 
to evaluating Reisman's assertion that the circuit court erred 
by ordering summary judgment without making the threshold 
determination of whether the dissolution resulted in a wind-up 
or a continuation of the partnership.   
III 
¶27 In essence, Reisman urges us to reverse the court of 
appeals because the circuit court's application of the Uniform 
Partnership Law to 
the facts of this case achieved an 
inequitable result.  Accordingly, we turn to examining the 
statutory mandates governing Wisconsin partnerships.  In the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary, the rights and 
obligations of partners are governed by Wis. Stat. Ch. 178, 
which codifies the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA).   
¶28 The UPA was enacted by the Uniform Law Commission in 
1914.  In a Prefatory Note, the Uniform Law Commission explained 
that uniformity in the law of partnership was desirable because 
"there exists an almost hopeless confusion of theory and 
practice, making the actual administration of the law difficult 
and often inequitable."  Prefatory Note, Uniform Partnership Act 
(1914).  
¶29 Wisconsin adopted the provisions of the UPA shortly 
thereafter.  See § 1, ch. 358, Laws of 1915.  These provisions, 
as amended by the Wisconsin legislature throughout the years, 
can be found in Wis. Stat. Ch. 178.  Although the Uniform Law 
Commission amended the UPA in 1997, Wisconsin has not yet 
enacted those amendments.  
No. 
2009AP438   
 
13 
 
¶30 The UPA, as currently enacted in Wisconsin, sets forth 
default 
rules 
for 
determining 
the 
rights 
and 
duties 
of 
partners.10  See Wis. Stat. § 178.15.  Subsection (1) provides 
that partners share equally in the profits and losses of the 
partnership.  Further, subsection (6) sets forth the general 
rule that no partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in 
the 
partnership 
business: 
"No 
partner 
is 
entitled 
to 
remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except that 
a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for 
his or her services in winding up the partnership affairs." 
                                                 
10 The relevant portions of Wis. Stat. § 178.15 provide: 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to 
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any 
agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner shall be repaid that partner's 
contributions, whether by way of capital or advances 
to the partnership property and share equally in the 
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, 
including those to partners, are satisfied; and, 
except as provided in s. 178.12(2), each partner must 
contribute towards the losses, whether capital or 
otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to 
that partner's share in the profits. 
 . . .  
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management 
and conduct of the partnership business. 
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting 
in the partnership business, except that a surviving 
partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his 
or her services in winding up the partnership affairs. 
 . . .  
No. 
2009AP438   
 
14 
 
¶31 Under the default rules set forth in Wisconsin's UPA, 
there is only one exception to the general rule that no partner 
is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business.  Under this exception, a partner is entitled to extra 
compensation if he is a "surviving partner."   
¶32 Wisconsin courts have strictly construed the term 
"surviving partner" to apply only to those partners who have 
survived another partner's death.  We have explained that the 
term "surviving partner" does not contemplate a partner who 
continues to work at the business after another partner retires 
or withdraws from the business.  Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶62 
(2008) ("[E]xtra compensation [may be] accorded to surviving 
partners when a partnership is dissolved due to the death of a 
partner, which is not the case here[.]"); see also Gull v. Van 
Epps, 185 Wis. 2d 609, 625, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("Section 178.15(6) allows extra compensation only when the 
partnership is dissolved due to the death of a partner and there 
is a surviving partner.  It appears to be the rule in inter 
vivos cases——those in which a partner retires or withdraws——that 
the partner who completes the work in progress is not entitled 
to any compensation beyond the fee he or she would have received 
for that work had the partnership not dissolved."). 
¶33 This interpretation of the term "surviving partner" is 
consistent with how that term is used in surrounding statutes.  
In the surrounding statutes, the term "surviving partner" 
describes a partner who has survived another partner's death.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 178.21(3)(d) ("On the death of a partner 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
15 
 
the partner's right in specific partnership property vests in 
the surviving partner or partners[.]"); Wis. Stat. § 178.18(2) 
("This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased 
partner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the 
partnership 
as 
the 
personal 
representatives 
of 
the 
last 
surviving partner."). 
¶34 Wisconsin's interpretation of the term "surviving 
partner" is likewise consistent with how that term has been 
interpreted by the majority of states that have adopted the 
UPA.11  An influential treatise explains that "[u]nless the 
partners agree otherwise, UPA § 18(f) [which has been codified 
in Wisconsin as Wis. Stat. § 178.15(6)] permits compensation of 
partners 
for 
post-dissolution 
winding-up 
services, 
when 
dissolution is caused by death, but not in other cases."  Alan 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ill. 
1983) ("Absent an agreement, courts will not attempt to equalize 
compensation commensurate with services."); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 
433 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Mass. App. 1982); Chazan v. Most, 209 
Cal. App. 2d 519, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) ("There is no merit 
in Most's contention that he is a 'surviving partner.'  That 
term refers to the partner who survives after the death of the 
other."); Maus v. Galic, 669 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. App. 2003); 
Mehl v. Mehl, 786 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Mont. 1990) ("This statute is 
clear.  In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, 
partners are not entitled to any wages unless one of the 
partners 
dies 
and 
the 
surviving 
partner 
winds 
up 
the 
partnership."); Smith v. Daub, 365 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Neb. 1985).   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
16 
 
R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein,  Bromberg and Ribstein on 
Partnership § 7.08(d) (emphasis added.)12   
¶35 The 
UPA's 
hard-and-fast 
rule 
against 
partner 
remuneration has been criticized as inequitable by commentators 
and courts alike.  One commentator has concluded that "in 
general, U.P.A. case law has been less equitable than pre-U.P.A. 
case 
law 
on 
compensation." 
 
Leonard 
Charles 
Schwartz, 
Compensation of A Partner for Services: Problems in Interpreting 
the U.P.A. and Partnership Agreements, 19 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 
                                                 
12 The dissent appears to conclude that each partner's 
respective interest in the partnership may fluctuate based on 
the comparative value of the "personal services, skill, or 
knowledge" that partner has contributed to the partnership at 
any given time.  Citing Thompson v. Beth, 14 Wis. 2d 271, 111 
N.W.2d 271 (1961), it asserts that "when one partner contributes 
personal services, skill, and knowledge to the partnership, 
these contributions can be taken into account when valuing that 
partner's share of the partnership at termination."  Dissent, 
¶85; see also id., ¶62.  It concludes that a circuit court can 
determine that the partners' shares of the partnership "may no 
longer be in the same percentages as they were when the 
partnership commenced."  Id., ¶86. 
The consequences of the dissent's assertion are unsettling.  
Imagine the amount of litigation that such a rule would foster 
between disgruntled partners.         
The dissent's assertion misreads the facts and holding of 
Thompson.  In that case, the partners formed a partnership, 
agreeing that "Beth was to pick up the option and [Thompson] was 
to do the construction work."  14 Wis. 2d at 274.  "On that 
basis," the partners agreed that Thompson would have a one-third 
share in the partnership.  Id. at 274, 275.  When Thompson sued 
for his partnership interest, he was not asking the court to 
revalue his percentage share of the partnership based on his 
labor, as the dissent suggests.  Rather, he was seeking "his 
one-third partnership interest," that is, one-third of the 
profits from the sale of partnership property.  Id. at 280.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
17 
 
(1990).  Other commentators observe that "the no-compensation 
rule leads to inequitable results whenever the division of 
partnership profits is not proportional to the work load of some 
partners during the winding-up period."  Mark H. Epstein & 
Brandon Wisoff, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-
Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1597, 1599 
(1985).  As a result, some cases have departed from the rule set 
forth in the UPA: "When the circumstances indicate that the 
partners 
would 
not 
expect 
equal 
division 
of 
work 
and 
compensation on inter vivos dissolution (for example, when a 
partner 
has 
withdrawn 
from 
further 
participation 
in 
the 
business), 
some 
courts 
have 
permitted 
post-dissolution 
compensation."  Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, 7:08(d).13    
¶36 In the 1990s, the Uniform Law Commission "spent 
significant effort" modernizing the rules governing partnership 
breakups.  Prefatory Note, Uniform Partnership Act (1997).  The 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 provides in part that a 
partner 
may 
receive 
reasonable 
compensation 
for 
services 
rendered winding up the business of the partnership: 
A partner is not entitled to remuneration for services 
performed for the partnership, except for reasonable 
compensation for services rendered in winding up the 
business of the partnership.  
                                                 
13 The dissent cites as examples cases that appear to depart 
from the rule set forth in the UPA.  Dissent, ¶¶87-88 (citing 
Essay v. Essay, 123 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1963); Vangel v. Vangel, 
291 P.2d 25 (Cal. S. Ct. 1955)).  Subsequent cases from those 
jurisdictions have followed the UPA's rule.  See supra, ¶34, 
n.11. 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
18 
 
Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 401(h) (emphasis added); see 
also Gull, 185 Wis. 2d at 626 (citing the draft of the revisions 
that had been promulgated in 1993).          
¶37 The 
Uniform 
Law 
Commission's 
prefatory 
comments 
confirm that this revision is intended to be a substantive 
change in the law: "Subsection 401(h) deletes the UPA reference 
to a 'surviving' partner.  That means any partner winding up the 
business is entitled to compensation, not just a surviving 
partner winding up after the death of another partner."  Uniform 
Partnership Act (1997) § 401 cmt. 9.      
¶38 The Wisconsin legislature has not adopted the 1997 
revisions.  Accordingly, the 1997 revisions are not applicable 
to this case.  Rather, the result is governed by Wis. Stat. § 
178.15(6) and the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), which provides 
that "[n]o partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the 
partnership business, except that a surviving partner is 
entitled to reasonable compensation for his or her services in 
winding up the partnership affairs."     
¶39 In this case, it was Bushard's election to dissolve 
the 
partnership, 
and 
not 
his 
death, 
that 
led 
to 
the 
partnership's dissolution.  Accordingly, Reisman is not a 
"surviving partner."  Under the provisions of the UPA in effect 
in Wisconsin, Reisman is not entitled to remuneration for work 
performed in furtherance of the partnership, and Bushard is 
entitled to share equally in PressEnter's profits.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 178.15(6); Wis. Stat. § 178.15(1).  The circuit court's order 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
19 
 
equally dividing PressEnter's profits between the partners is 
consistent with the statutory mandates. 
¶40 Reisman argues that "the real controversy was not fully 
tried"14 because "Mr. Bushard has been overpaid and it is unjust 
to permit Mr. Reisman to suffer so large a loss while he 
continues to be obligated to run the business while attempting 
to sell it, all without income for his efforts."  Contrary to 
Reisman's assertions, the real controversy in this case is not 
what distribution of PressEnter's profits is most equitable 
under the circumstances.  Instead, the real controversy is what 
distribution is mandated by the plain language of the statute.   
¶41 Additionally, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not err when it dismissed Reisman's counterclaim for unjust 
enrichment.  A claim for unjust enrichment requires Reisman to 
show (1) he conferred a benefit on Bushard; (2) Bushard knew of 
the benefit; and (3) Bushard accepted or retained the benefit 
under circumstances that made it inequitable for him to retain 
the benefit.  Staver v. Milwaukee County, 2006 WI App 33, ¶24, 
289 Wis. 2d 675, 712 N.W.2d 387.  Here, where the benefit that 
was conferred on Bushard is mandated by the statute, no claim 
for unjust enrichment may lie.   
¶42 We are cognizant that the result mandated by the 
statute appears to be inequitable under the facts of this case.  
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 permits this court to reverse a 
judgment of the circuit court if "the real controversy has not 
been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for 
any reason miscarried."  
No. 
2009AP438   
 
20 
 
Nevertheless, a court "may not exercise its equitable authority 
if such exercise would ignore a statutory mandate."  GMAC Mortg. 
Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 480, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998).   
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. Ch. 178 reflects the legislature's 
public policy choices about the rights and obligations of 
partners in the absence of agreements to the contrary.  As 
discussed 
above, 
the 
Uniform 
Law 
Commission 
has 
adopted 
revisions to the UPA that would ameliorate the harsh result 
reached in this case.  Nevertheless, the Wisconsin legislature 
has not adopted these revisions.  As the court of appeals 
concluded in Gull, "if the rule against extra compensation is to 
be modified, we believe the legislature must revise § 178.15(6), 
Stats."  Gull, 185 Wis. 2d at 626.   
¶44 The apparent inequity that results in this case 
underscores the value of a written partnership agreement.  
Commentators have explained that "the partnership statute is, to 
a large extent, a standard form agreement that can be varied by 
the parties.  Because the standard form often produces unwanted 
results, partners are well advised to give careful advance 
consideration to dissolution and its consequences and to draft 
explicit agreements."  Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, § 7.01(c). 
¶45 If the provisions of the UPA are unsatisfactory, 
partners can and should protect their interests by agreeing to 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
21 
 
different terms.15  In the absence of an agreement modifying the 
provisions of the UPA, a court should decline from fashioning an 
after-the-fact remedy in pursuit of an equitable result when 
that remedy contravenes the public policy choices established by 
the legislature.16         
                                                 
15 "An agreement that one partner shall receive compensation 
for personal services to the partnership must be established by 
clear and satisfactory evidence. . . . Under the terms of the 
contract and the statute no implied obligation could arise."  
Wales v. Wightman, 247 Wis. 238, 244, 19 N.W.2d 243 (1945). 
16 We recognize that some dissolution cases have discussed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretion 
to 
perform 
an 
equitable 
accounting in a partnership dissolution.  In Gull v. Van Epps, 
185 Wis. 2d 609, 626-27, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994), the 
court of appeals asserted that "the trial court has broad 
discretion to accomplish a fair accounting between the parties 
because an action for the dissolution of a partnership and the 
liquidation of its affairs is a proceeding in equity."  In Lange 
v. Bartlett, 121 Wis. 2d 599, 606, 360 N.W.2d 702 (Ct. App. 
1984), the court of appeals asserted that "a court can take into 
account the substantial labor and management services made by 
the continuing partner and deduct that amount before arriving at 
the figure of what profit is due the former partner."       
No. 
2009AP438   
 
22 
 
¶46 We conclude that the distribution of PressEnter's 
profits 
and 
losses 
is 
governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 178.15.  
Reisman's arguments about equity are insufficient to overcome 
the plain language of the statute.     
IV 
¶47 We turn next to examining Reisman's assertion that the 
circuit court erred by ordering summary judgment in favor of 
Bushard without making the threshold determination of whether 
the dissolution resulted in a wind-up or a continuation.  
Reisman contends that the dissolution of PressEnter resulted in 
a 
continuation, 
and 
that 
Bushard 
has 
already 
received 
distributions in excess of the continuation value of his 
interest in the partnership.  
                                                                                                                                                             
We 
agree 
that 
judicial 
dissolution 
proceedings 
are 
equitable in nature.  Nevertheless, a circuit court's equitable 
authority is circumscribed by the statutes, and a court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it orders relief in 
contravention of the statutes.  In Matteson, 2008 WI 48, ¶20, 
309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557, this court explained that 
judicial dissolution is a proceeding in equity in which "circuit 
courts have broad discretion in achieving a fair accounting 
between the parties involved."  The Matteson court explained 
that the circuit court's exercise of discretion would be upheld 
if it "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, arrived at a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Id.  The above 
cases should not be read as granting a court equitable powers to 
contravene the plain language of a statute.  Whatever equity may 
be injected into a dissolution proceeding, a circuit court must 
apply a proper standard of law.  Here, the applicable statute 
provides that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
"[n]o partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the 
partnership business."  Wis. Stat. § 178.15(6). 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
23 
 
¶48 Distinguishing 
in 
the 
first 
instance 
whether 
dissolution resulted in a wind-up or a continuation is critical 
because the settlement of the former partner's account differs 
depending on whether it is a wind-up or a continuation.  Lange, 
121 Wis. 2d at 602.  One significant difference between wind-up 
and continuation is the date on which each partner's interest in 
the partnership is valued.  When there is a continuation, the 
departing partner's interest in the partnership is valued on the 
date of dissolution.  When there is a wind-up, by contrast, the 
value of the partnership on the date of dissolution is less 
significant.  The important date is the date of termination, 
when the winding up of the partnership's affairs has been 
completed.  See Estate of Schaefer v. Schaefer, 91 Wis. 2d 360, 
422, 283 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1979). 
¶49 Reisman contends that since the date of dissolution, 
Bushard 
has 
received 
semi-monthly 
partner 
distributions 
amounting to $2.3 million.  He asserts that these payments have 
exceeded "the value of [Bushard's] interest in the dissolved 
partnership" on the date of dissolution.  Wis. Stat. § 178.37.  
Accordingly, Reisman asserts, if dissolution resulted in a 
continuation, the partnership dividends paid to Bushard "were 
tantamount to buying out his interest in the business."  
Further, because Bushard would no longer be a partner, he would 
have no right to complain about any remuneration Reisman 
received from PressEnter.   
¶50 Under the UPA, a partnership is generally dissolved 
when a partner chooses to leave the partnership.  Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
24 
 
§ 178.25.  "It is at this juncture, the point of dissolution, 
that the [departing] partner makes an election."  Lange, 121 
Wis. 2d at 601.  The departing partner has two primary options: 
wind-up or continuation.17  Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶25.    
¶51 "Every partnership dissolution causes a wind-up rather 
than a continuation unless the outgoing partner 'consents' to a 
continuation."  Lange, 121 Wis. 2d at 602.  This court recently 
explained that it is improper for a circuit court to conclude 
that the dissolution of a partnership resulted in a continuation 
simply because the partnership's business actually continued.18  
                                                 
17 Wind-ups are governed by Wis. Stat. §§ 178.32-.33.  A 
wind-up may involve selling the business as a going concern, or 
it 
may 
involve 
liquidation 
of 
the 
partnership's 
assets.  
Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶24.  In a wind-up, the creditors are 
paid first, and then the remaining value of the partnership on 
the date of termination is distributed to the partners.  Id. 
By contrast, continuations are governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 178.37. 
 
When 
the 
departing 
partner 
consents 
to 
a 
continuation, that partner opts to permit the business to 
continue and elects to "receive[s] as an ordinary creditor an 
amount equal to the value of the [departing] partner's interest 
in the dissolved partnership."  Wis. Stat. § 178.37.  The 
withdrawing partner is also entitled to interest or, "in lieu of 
interest, the profits attributable to the use of the retired or 
deceased partner's right in the property of the dissolved 
partnership."  Id. 
18 See Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶29 (disapproving of 
"[t]he court's interpretation of § 178.37 'continuation' as a 
default statutory scheme that applies when wind-up has not yet 
occurred rather than something requiring the exiting partner's 
affirmative consent"); see also id., ¶34 n.18 ("The parties 
appear to remain confused about continuation being something a 
court 'finds' after a business takes too long to wind up rather 
than continuation being something the exiting party must clearly 
consent to and elect in lieu of wind-up at the time of 
dissolution."). 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
25 
 
Rather, the Matteson court reaffirmed that the relevant inquiry 
is whether the departing partner consented to continuation in 
lieu of wind-up at the time of dissolution.  309 Wis. 2d 311, 
¶¶31, 34 n.18.    
¶52 Here, the circuit court twice determined that the 
dissolution of PressEnter resulted in a wind-up rather than a 
continuation. 
 
In 
both 
instances, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination was made in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).      
¶53 The 
circuit 
court 
first 
determined 
that 
the 
dissolution of PressEnter resulted in a wind-up when Reisman 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  In his brief and argument 
to the circuit court, Reisman repeatedly asserted that Bushard 
had not consented to a continuation, and therefore, the 
dissolution of PressEnter resulted in a wind-up.19  During the 
hearing, Bushard's attorney observed: "[N]either side contends 
that this is a situation where Mr. Bushard chose continuation."  
                                                 
19 Although Reisman now asserts that his statements in the 
circuit court were hypothetical, this assertion is not supported 
by the record of the actual proceedings.  In his briefs to the 
circuit court, Reisman asserted that Bushard "unilaterally and 
irrevocably caused the wind-up and dissolution of Press Enter, 
L.L.P.," that "Press Enter has remained in wind-up mode since 
August of 1999," and that "Mr. Bushard's dissolution of the 
partnership caused the business to be in wind-up mode as no 
continuation was consented to."  These statements are not 
hypothetical in nature.    
No. 
2009AP438   
 
26 
 
Because 
the 
facts 
were 
undisputed, 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately determined: "[T]his is a wind-up situation[.]"   
¶54 Several days later, Bushard filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  At that point, Reisman's view of the facts changed.  
He asserted that "a fact question exists concerning whether 
PressEnter, LLP is in a wind-up mode or simply a continuation 
that has been consented to by Mr. Bushard."20           
                                                 
20 During oral argument to this court, Reisman's attorney 
asserted that Wisconsin case law lacks clarity regarding the 
differences between wind-up and continuation: 
Counsel: I am uncertain, your honor, as to the context 
in which the case lies.  I know that the court said it 
is a wind-up. 
Court: Didn't you stipulate? 
Counsel: On summary judgment I said that.  I looked at 
those cases, the four seminal cases.  The Schaefer 
case, the Lange case, the Gull case, the Matteson 
case.  It is hard to know what happened in those cases 
because, for example in Schaefer the fellow thought 
that 
he 
was 
seeking a wind-up, but it was a 
continuation.  In the Lange case, the court concluded 
there that it was a wind-up, but then divided it up on 
a 
continuation 
basis. 
 
In 
the 
Gull 
case, 
the 
continuation occurred to wind up the partnership, and 
in the Matteson case every single argument talked 
about wind-up but the decision sounded entirely on the 
issue of continuance . . . .  
To the extent that counsel's assertion is correct and the 
guidance provided by our case law is less than clear, it 
underscores the importance of a departing partner making a clear 
election at the time of dissolution.  When the partner's 
election at the time of dissolution is known by both parties, 
the parties' rights and obligations are certain and not subject 
to after-the-fact dispute.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
27 
 
¶55 Despite his allegation that a question of fact 
remained, Reisman set forth no facts supporting his assertion 
that Bushard had consented to a continuation at the time of 
dissolution.  Reisman acknowledged that "[n]ominally, the notice 
of dissolution spoke to a wind-up[.]"  However, he asserted that 
there was an inference that Bushard had consented to a 
continuation because the partnership had, in fact, continued: 
"Mr. 
Bushard's 
practice 
has 
been . . . in 
the 
vein 
of 
continuation. . . . Mr. Bushard continued to receive partnership 
payments in the ensuing nine years . . . .  He elected to have 
this be a continuation or at least there is a strong inference 
of that."   
¶56 The circuit court rejected Reisman's bare allegation 
that the dissolution resulted in a continuation.  Our review of 
the record reveals that the circuit court was not presented with 
any evidence that Bushard consented to a continuation at the 
time of dissolution.  It appears from Reisman's argument that no 
such evidence exists.21   
¶57 Rather, the undisputed facts support the opposite 
inference, that Bushard did not consent to a continuation.  
                                                 
21 Reisman now argues that the dissolution of PressEnter has 
"turned into either a continuation or a hybrid" because the 
partners were unable to sell the business and "[o]f necessity, 
the business continued."  The dissent appears to advance the 
same argument.  Dissent, ¶98.  As we explained above, consent of 
the departing partner is necessary for dissolution to result in 
a continuation.  It is improper to conclude that there was a 
continuation simply because the business took too long to wind 
up.  Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶24. 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
28 
 
After the dissolution, Reisman persisted in paying Bushard 
partnership 
distributions. 
 
Had 
Bushard 
consented 
to 
a 
continuation, he would not have been entitled to partnership 
distributions.  Rather, his 50 percent share of PressEnter would 
have been fixed on the date of dissolution, and he would have 
received that amount as a creditor.        
¶58 Because there was no genuine dispute of material fact, 
the circuit court correctly concluded that the dissolution of 
PressEnter resulted in a wind-up.  The court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Bushard was appropriate.  
¶59 Although the circuit court ordered that the wind-up of 
the affairs of the partnership be completed, we are unable to 
determine from the record the current status of the wind-up.  If 
further action is warranted, this opinion should not be 
construed to limit the authority of the circuit court to conduct 
an accounting as long as it is consistent with the conclusions 
of this opinion and the statutory requirements for an accounting 
are met.  See Wis. Stat. § 178.15(6).      
¶60 In sum, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, we conclude that the distribution of PressEnter's 
profits and losses is governed by Wis. Stat. § 178.15, and that 
Reisman's equitable arguments are insufficient to overcome the 
plain language of the statute.  We also determine that because 
there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the circuit court 
correctly concluded that the dissolution of PressEnter resulted 
in a wind-up, and it appropriately ordered summary judgment in 
favor of Bushard.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.    
No. 
2009AP438   
 
29 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2009AP438   
 
30 
 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
31 
 
 
 
No. 
2009AP438   
 
32 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   This 
case arises from a notice of dissolution issued 11 years ago in 
a two-person partnership.  The notice requested wind-up based on 
the retiring partner's anticipation of the sale of the parties' 
business, PressEnter, L.L.C., to Voyager.net for $3.5 million.  
Due to the fault of neither partner, Voyager.net did not 
purchase PressEnter.  Although efforts to sell the business were 
ongoing for 11 years, it is undisputed that a purchaser has 
never been found.   
¶62 David Bushard (Bushard) worked for PressEnter for only 
seven days during the 11-year period subsequent to his giving 
notice of dissolution.  Steven Reisman (Reisman) worked on a 
full-time basis for PressEnter during those 11 years.  I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 178.15(1) 
(2009-10)1 
permits 
consideration of the 11 years of service that Reisman provided 
to PressEnter as a contribution from him to the value of the 
partnership.  Moreover, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 178.19 
requires an accounting to determine the interest of each partner 
in the partnership prior to liquidation so that it may be 
determined what part of the profits earned after dissolution are 
due 
to 
the 
use 
of 
each 
partner's 
contribution 
to 
the 
partnership.  Although the considerations above are not driven 
by whether the partnership was in wind-up, continuation or some 
combination thereof for the 11 years subsequent to Bushard's 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
2 
 
notice of dissolution, the determination of whether it took 11 
years 
for 
a 
wind-up 
or 
whether 
Bushard 
acquiesced 
to 
continuation when the sale to Voyager.net did not materialize is 
a fact question that cannot be determined on summary judgment.  
Accordingly, I would remand for an accounting of what is due to 
each partner, specifically, an accounting that will consider the 
relative contributions of each partner to the value of the 
partnership, in light of Thompson v. Beth, 14 Wis. 2d 271, 111 
N.W.2d 171 (1961).  I also conclude that whether PressEnter was 
in wind-up or continuation for the 11 years subsequent to 
dissolution rests on disputes of material fact and accordingly, 
it should not have been decided on summary judgment.  On remand, 
the circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing and revisit 
its conclusion that PressEnter was in wind-up for 11 years. 
¶63 I dissent from the majority opinion for at least three 
reasons:  First, the majority opinion does not correctly analyze 
Wis. Stat. § 178.15(1) in light of the claims of both Bushard 
and Reisman relative to their partnership contributions.  The 
majority opinion employs § 178.15(1) only in light of Bushard's 
claim.  Second, Reisman has counterclaimed for an assessment of 
the value that his efforts contributed to PressEnter over the 11 
years 
subsequent 
to 
Bushard's 
withdrawing 
from 
active 
participation in the business.  This can be accomplished by an 
accounting, to which Reisman has a statutory right pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 178.19.  A remand may show Reisman owes Bushard 
money, as Bushard claims, or it may show that Bushard owes 
Reisman money because Bushard has been overpaid for his 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
3 
 
partnership 
interest 
based 
on 
his 
relative 
partnership 
contributions.2  Thompson, 14 Wis. 2d at 277-79.  Third, the 
majority opinion affirms the circuit court's factual finding 
that this was an 11-year wind-up, which is a fact question that 
cannot be decided on the summary judgment record before us.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶64 The background underlying this review is ably set out 
in the majority opinion.  Therefore, I relate only what is 
necessary to understand this dissent.   
¶65 In 1995, Reisman and Bushard formed PressEnter, a 
partnership aimed at providing internet service to communities 
in western Wisconsin.  At PressEnter's inception, Reisman and 
Bushard each contributed $15,000 to the partnership.  They never 
entered into a written partnership agreement.  They ran the 
partnership as equal partners, each with a 50 percent interest.   
¶66 In August of 1999, following dissention between the 
partners, legal counsel for Bushard sent Reisman a notice of 
dissolution of partnership.  The notice advised Reisman that:  
Mr. Bushard has explored the possibility of the 
sale of the business to third parties.  He believes 
that a cash sale in the neighborhood of $3,000,000 is 
achievable, and that closing of such a sale could take 
place in a very short period of time.  In the event 
you wish to continue to run the business either 
individually or with a new partner or partners, Mr. 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion holds that the profits of PressEnter, 
L.L.C., specifically those following the August 1999 notice of 
dissolution, 
were 
rightfully 
distributed 
equally 
between  
Reisman and Bushard.  Majority op., ¶1. 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
4 
 
Bushard is willing to sell his partnership interest to 
you for a comparable amount. 
Moreover, at one point in the letter, Bushard called the post-
dissolution period the "winding up" of the partnership.  Namely, 
he stated:  "Please be assured that, during the winding up of 
the partnership, Mr. Bushard intends to cooperate fully in the 
interim management of the business." 
¶67 However, 
their 
effort 
to 
sell 
PressEnter 
to 
Voyager.net was unsuccessful.  Bushard then withdrew from 
participating in running PressEnter.  According to Bushard's 
2008 deposition testimony, in the nine-year period from August 
of 1999 to the fall of 2008, Bushard performed services for 
PressEnter on approximately seven days.3  
¶68 Despite his lack of participation in PressEnter, 
Bushard continued to receive 50 percent of the net profits in 
PressEnter.  In the initial nine-year period following the 
notice of dissolution, Bushard received at least $2.3 million in 
cash distributions, for which he worked a total of seven days.   
¶69 However, during these nine years, Reisman worked full-
time managing PressEnter.  He took very little vacation and, at 
times, worked 60-70 hours per week.  Even Bushard acknowledged 
that Reisman's technical expertise was a critical factor in 
PressEnter's success.4  Reisman continued to attempt to find a 
                                                 
3 Bushard considered his greatest contribution to PressEnter 
to be staying away and doing nothing for the partnership. 
4 During his deposition, Bushard was asked:  "From a 
technical aspect in the conduct of the technical parts of the 
business of PressEnter, has Mr. Reisman done a brilliant job?"  
Bushard answered this question affirmatively:  "To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, yes." 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
5 
 
buyer for PressEnter.  In 2004, Reisman began compensating 
himself for the work he was doing.  From 2004 to 2008, Reisman 
took a salary of between $150,000 and $160,000 per year.   
¶70 More than eight years after sending the 1999 notice of 
dissolution, Bushard commenced the present lawsuit against 
Reisman and PressEnter, requesting liquidation of PressEnter, an 
accounting from 1999 to the present and a money judgment against 
Reisman for taking a salary for four years without Bushard's 
consent.  Reisman and PressEnter counterclaimed for unjust 
enrichment based on Bushard's receipt of 50 percent of the net 
profits of PressEnter, when Reisman's contributions to the 
partnership had vastly exceeded Bushard's contributions.    
¶71 On November 21, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the parties' summary judgment motions.  At the hearing, 
neither party put forth arguments as to whether PressEnter was 
in wind-up or continuation.  Bushard's counsel simply asserted 
that "neither side contends that this is a situation where Mr. 
Bushard chose continuation."  Reisman's counsel also used the 
term "wind-up" at one point.5 
¶72 After hearing arguments from the parties, the court 
concluded that Reisman was not entitled to compensation.  The 
court stated: 
The only issue I had, as I see it, before me is:  
Given the fact this was a dissolution, that this is a 
                                                 
5 When arguing that this is a matter of equity, Reisman's 
attorney stated, "And the equities of this case allow and should 
permit that Mr. Reisman receive the salary that he does; and 
that, in fact, that wind-up should allow——or, be continued so 
that a sale can occur." 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
6 
 
wind-up situation, that the surviving——there is not a 
surviving partner situation.  This isn't where one 
party 
died 
and 
the 
other 
partner 
survived 
and 
continued the business.   
The law is very clear.  The law says the partner 
who stays in the partnership during wind-up is not 
entitled to compensation . . . . 
So the Court finds that Mr. Reisman is not 
entitled to any compensation for running the affairs 
of the partnership while the partnership is in wind-up 
status. 
¶73 Having so concluded, the court ruled in favor of 
Bushard.6  The court of appeals affirmed.  Bushard v. Reisman, 
No. 2009AP438, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 15, 
2010). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶74 Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject 
to our independent review; however, we benefit from the analyses 
in previous courts' discussions.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 
75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  
¶75 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact.  Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Social 
Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶8, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 
652.  It is fundamental that a court is not to find issues of 
fact on summary judgment.  Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 
Wis. 2d 112, 116, 334 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1983).  Rather, the 
court's job is to determine "only whether a factual issue 
                                                 
6 Following some confusion about the effect of the ruling at 
the November 21 hearing, the court held a second hearing on 
January 23, 2009, in which it reaffirmed its ruling in favor of 
Bushard. 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
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exists, resolving doubts in that regard against the party moving 
for summary judgment."  Id. 
B.  Partnership Principles 
¶76 Wisconsin has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act 
(UPA) and has made amendments to it throughout the years.  The 
UPA, as amended by the Wisconsin legislature, is found in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 178.  In the absence of a partnership agreement, ch. 
178 creates a framework for the rights and duties of partners in 
a partnership.  
¶77 This case involves the dissolution of a partnership 
that had no written partnership agreement.  Dissolution is a 
change in the relationship of the partners.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 178.25.  Dissolution can occur by an act of a partner, by 
bankruptcy of a partner, by the death of a partner or through 
judicial process.  Wis. Stat. § 178.26; Wis. Stat. § 178.27.  
¶78 Judicial decisions that address disputes subsequent to 
dissolution often discuss the "wind-up" of a partnership or the 
"continuation" of a partnership.  See, e.g., Estate of Matteson 
v. Matteson, 2008 WI 48, ¶24, 309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557; 
Lange v. Bartlett, 121 Wis. 2d 599, 601, 360 N.W.2d 702 (Ct. 
App. 1984).  Wind-up concludes when all the debts of the 
partnership are paid and all of the net assets are liquidated by 
distribution to the partners in cash or in kind.  Gull v. Van 
Epps, 185 Wis. 2d 609, 617-18, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994).  
Whether wind-up is occurring or whether the business is in 
continuation mode is a question of fact.  First Nat'l Bank of 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
8 
 
Kenosha v. Schaefer, 91 Wis. 2d 360, 378, 283 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  
¶79 Discussion of the concepts of wind-up and continuation 
subsequent 
to 
dissolution 
often 
lack 
the 
precision 
in 
terminology that would be helpful to understanding what the law 
requires and when it requires it.  Estate of Matteson, 309 
Wis. 2d 311, ¶29 (explaining the confusion that can exist when 
courts use some form of the word "continue" without determining 
whether a Wis. Stat. § 178.37 continuation has occurred).  Some 
of the problem seems to arise from Wis. Stat. § 178.25(2), which 
states, "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but 
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is 
completed."  (Emphasis added.)      
¶80 When a partnership is in wind-up, the value of the 
withdrawing partner's account is not fixed until liquidation.  
The withdrawing partner takes his share of the profits and 
losses between dissolution and liquidation based on his relative 
"contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to the 
partnership property."  Wis. Stat. § 178.15(1); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 178.33(1); Lange, 121 Wis. 2d at 601.   
¶81 If the withdrawing partner consents to continuation of 
the business, he claims as a creditor of the partnership with 
the value of the withdrawing partner's interest fixed at the 
date of dissolution.  In addition, he can obtain interest on 
that amount until termination of the partnership, or he can take 
a share of "the profits attributable to the use of [his] right 
in the property of the dissolved partnership."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
9 
 
§ 178.37.  Acquiescence in the continuation of the business is 
sufficient for consent under Wis. Stat. § 178.36(3).  Schaefer, 
91 Wis. 2d at 378. 
¶82 That consent to continuation does not have to be 
explicit was addressed in Shepherd v. Griffin, 929 S.W.2d 336 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).  There, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee 
evaluated whether the Tennessee circuit court had erred in 
finding that the departing partner "impliedly consented to the 
continuation of the business by acting inconsistent with a 
desire to wind up and liquidate."  Id. at 341 (internal 
quotation omitted).  In concluding that the circuit court did 
not err, the court of appeals highlighted the fact that the 
departing partner allowed the other partner, "without objection, 
to continue to run the business of the former partnership after 
its dissolution."  Id.  Other courts have similarly opined that 
consent to continuation can be implied.  See, e.g., Timmermann 
v. Timmermann, 538 P.2d 1254, 1261 (Or. 1975) (stating that the 
departing partner can either force a wind-up and termination or, 
alternatively, he "may allow the business to continue or accept 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
10 
 
the fact that it has continued") (emphasis added); Cauble v. 
Handler, 503 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same).7 
C.  Application 
¶83 The 
majority opinion concludes that wind-up has 
occurred, but it does not recognize that this determination does 
not address the issue presented by Reisman's counterclaim.  
Reisman has asserted that Bushard was overpaid; whether the 
partnership was in continuation or in wind-up, this contention 
must be addressed.   
¶84 Reisman asserts that Bushard was overpaid because 
Bushard does not have a 50 percent ownership in the partnership.  
Stated otherwise, Bushard and Reisman both contributed $15,000 
cash to the partnership; however, Reisman has contributed 11 
years of skilled services to PressEnter and Bushard has 
contributed only seven days of such services.  In wind-up, the 
withdrawing 
partner's 
interest 
is 
not 
determined 
until 
termination of the partnership when wind-up is complete.  A 
partner's interest that will be returned to him is described in 
Wis. Stat. § 178.15(1) as "Each partner shall be repaid that 
                                                 
7 At the time Shepherd v. Griffin, 929 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1995), Timmermann v. Timmermann, 538 P.2d 1254 (Or. 1975), 
and Cauble v. Handler, 503 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) were 
decided, the respective states had adopted and were applying 
some form of the Uniform Partnership Act.  See Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1205 (West 2002) (repealing the Uniform Partnership Act 
as previously adopted in Tennessee and replacing it with the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act); Thompson v. Coughlin, 997 P.2d 
191, 194-95 & n.7 (Or. 2000) (noting that Oregon Legislature 
adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act in 1997, thereby 
repealing the Uniform Partnership Act previously in effect); 
Cauble, 503 S.W.2d at 366.      
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
11 
 
partner's contributions, whether by way of capital or advances 
to the partnership property and share equally in the profits and 
surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to 
partners, are satisfied."    
¶85 In Thompson, Thompson asserted that the value of his 
interest in the partnership included the work that he did to 
further the partnership's business.  Thompson, 14 Wis. 2d at 
277.8  In meeting this claim, we interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 178.15(1).  Id. at 278-79.  We stated that "[t]he real issue 
in the case is whether, under the following statutes, the 
plaintiff's labor in the construction of the buildings comes 
within the definition of the words "contribution" and "capital" 
as used in [§ 178.15(1)]."  Id. at 278.  We held that in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary, when one partner 
contributes "personal services, skill, and knowledge" to the 
partnership, these contributions can be taken into account when 
valuing that partner's share of the partnership at termination.  
Id. at 279 (citation omitted).  In so holding, we distinguished 
§ 178.15(6) because we concluded that subsec. (6) did not apply 
when 
what 
was 
contributed 
increased 
the 
value 
of 
the 
partnership.  Id. at 278-79.  
¶86 In Lange, the court of appeals instructed that if, on 
remand, the circuit court finds that wind-up has occurred, the 
court should then "make its decision of the value of the former 
partner's share."  Lange, 121 Wis. 2d at 605.  This is another 
                                                 
8 At the time of Thompson v. Beth, 14 Wis. 2d 271, 111 
N.W.2d 171 (1961), the relevant statutory provisions in Wis. 
Stat. § 178.15 were found in Wis. Stat. § 123.15. 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
12 
 
way of directing courts to examine the relative contributions of 
the partners to the value of the partnership and when the 
partnership is terminated, recognizing that their interests may 
no longer be in the same percentages as they were when the 
partnership commenced.  If the partner conducting wind-up of the 
partnership business also contributes additional value to the 
partnership, then his contribution in kind must be added to any 
financial contribution he originally made.  In that regard, the 
court said, "we feel the better reasoned view is that one who 
continues 
a 
partnership 
business 
after 
dissolution 
and 
contributes 
substantial 
labor 
and 
management 
services 
is 
entitled to compensation for that effort."  Id. at 606.  
¶87 The rule set out in Thompson and Lange that when a 
partner's labor and skill subsequent to dissolution increases 
the value of the partnership business, that partner has 
increased the value of his share in the partnership, is followed 
in many jurisdictions.  For example, in Essay v. Essay, 123 
N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1963), the Nebraska Supreme Court instructed 
that although partners may have been eligible to share equally 
in profits prior to dissolution, "Where the profits earned after 
dissolution and before a final accounting are attributable in 
part to the personal skill or services of a partner, it is a 
factor to be considered in the apportioning of the shares of the 
partners."  Id. at 649.  
¶88 In Vangel v. Vangel, 291 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1955), the 
California Supreme Court explained that an equal division of 
partnership assets may not be equitable "when the contribution 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
13 
 
to profits from capital is relatively minor in comparison to the 
contribution from the skills or services of one conducting the 
business.  In such a case, the managing partner may be entitled 
to a greater share of the profits."  Id. at 28.   
¶89 In Estate of Matteson, we recognized that "the portion 
of the profits attributable to the [departing partner's] 
ownership interest must be distinguished from the portion 
attributable to the skill, time, efforts, and diligence of the 
remaining partners."  Estate of Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶59 
(citation omitted).   
¶90 In the case before us, Bushard contends that Reisman's 
efforts for 11 years counted no differently in increasing the 
worth of the partnership than did his efforts for seven days.  
Bushard so contends even though he admits that Reisman's 
technical 
skills 
and 
knowledge 
increased 
the 
value 
of 
PressEnter.  The relative values of each partner's contributions 
to the partnership should be determined on remand, valuing both 
their financial contributions and their skill and services that 
created increased value in the partnership.  Thompson, 14 
Wis. 2d at 277; Lange, 121 Wis. 2d at 605.   
¶91 Once the values of these contributions are determined, 
a 
final 
accounting 
of 
this 
partnership 
is 
necessary 
to 
accurately determine each partner's interest in the partnership 
from dissolution to liquidation.  Wis. Stat. § 178.19.  This 
accounting should take into consideration the value of each 
partner's 
contributions 
that 
increased 
the 
value 
of 
the 
partnership.  
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶92 In addition, because the question of whether wind-up 
or continuation occurred during the 11 years subsequent to 
dissolution is a question of fact on which there are material 
disputes, the circuit court should hold a fact finding hearing 
and then revisit its prior determination in regard to whether 
wind-up or continuation occurred.  
¶93 As aforementioned, summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there is no disputed genuine issue of material fact, 
and a court is not to find issues of fact on summary judgment.  
Preloznik, 113 Wis. 2d at 116.  Rather, the court's job is to 
determine "only whether a factual issue exists, resolving doubts 
in that regard against the party moving for summary judgment."  
Id.   
¶94 First, there is no denying that whether PressEnter was 
in wind-up or continuation for 11 years is a genuine issue of 
fact.  As the law set forth above underscores, this often is a 
threshold determination.  Consequently, one issue on remand is 
whether the wind-up/continuation determination was disputed at 
the circuit court.  In other words, whether a factual dispute on 
this issue existed. 
¶95 In granting summary judgment in favor of Bushard at 
the January 23, 2009 hearing, the circuit court found that 
whether PressEnter was in continuation or wind-up was not 
disputed based on the court's previous finding.  Specifically, 
the court opined that it had previously "found specifically" 
that PressEnter was in wind-up, not continuation.  Although the 
circuit court did not identify when it made this previous 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
15 
 
finding, assumedly the court is referring to its statement at 
the November 21, 2008 hearing.  At that hearing, the court, in 
its conclusion, stated: 
The only issue I had, as I see it, before me is:  
Given the fact this was a dissolution, that this is a 
wind-up situation, that the surviving——there is not a 
surviving partner situation.  This isn't where one 
party 
died 
and 
the 
other 
partner 
survived 
and 
continued the business.   
The law is very clear.  The law says the partner 
who stays in the partnership during wind-up is not 
entitled to compensation . . . . 
So the Court finds that Mr. Reisman is not 
entitled to any compensation for running the affairs 
of the partnership while the partnership is in wind-up 
status. 
¶96 Given that the November 21 hearing was a hearing on 
summary judgment, it would have been improper for the circuit 
court to make findings of fact.  Rather, the court is to decide 
whether factual issues actually exist.  Preloznik, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 116.  At the November 21 hearing, the court did not decide 
whether a factual issue existed regarding the status of 
PressEnter, namely, whether it was in wind-up or continuation.  
Instead, at the November 21 hearing, the court seems to assume 
that PressEnter is in wind-up.  However, the court did not 
explain why it so assumes or cite to any evidence in the record 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
16 
 
proving that PressEnter was in wind-up.9  To the contrary, the 
court saw "the only issue" as whether Reisman was entitled to 
take a salary. 
¶97 Moreover, my review of the record indicates that at 
the time of the summary judgment hearings, the circuit court was 
aware that PressEnter remained in operation from dissolution to 
the time of the hearing, a period spanning more than nine years.  
Moreover, the court knew that following the unsuccessful sale of 
PressEnter to Voyager.net in September of 2009, Bushard stopped 
participating in the partnership.  This included Bushard ceasing 
any efforts to sell PressEnter to potential buyers. 
¶98 The withdrawing partner can consent to continuation by 
acquiescing to the continuation of the partnership or can 
impliedly consent by acting inconsistent with a desire to wind-
up the partnership's business and liquidate its assets.  I, 
therefore, conclude that there were enough facts presented to 
the circuit court to create a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether PressEnter was in wind-up or continuation, i.e., whether 
Bushard had consented to continuation.  Therefore, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
                                                 
9 I acknowledge that there was some indication by both 
parties at the November 21 hearing that they thought PressEnter 
was in wind-up.  See supra ¶71 & n.5.  However, an entire review 
of the November 21 transcript shows that the issue being 
discussed was whether Reisman was entitled to take a salary in 
addition to his share of the profits.  Neither party focuses on 
the threshold issue of whether PressEnter was in wind-up or 
continuation.   
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
17 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶99 In conclusion, it is undisputed that Bushard worked 
for PressEnter for only seven days during the 11-year period 
subsequent to his giving notice of dissolution.  Reisman worked 
on a full-time basis for PressEnter during those 11 years.  I 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 178.15(1) permits consideration of 
the 11 years of service that Reisman provided to PressEnter as a 
contribution 
from 
him 
to 
the 
value 
of 
the 
partnership.  
Moreover, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 178.19 requires an 
accounting to determine the interest of each partner in the 
partnership prior to liquidation so that it may be determined 
what part of the profits earned after dissolution are due to the 
use of each partner's contribution to the partnership.  Although 
the 
considerations 
above 
are 
not 
driven 
by 
whether 
the 
partnership was in wind-up, continuation or some combination 
thereof for the 11 years subsequent to Bushard's notice of 
dissolution, the determination of whether it took 11 years for a 
wind-up or whether Bushard acquiesced to continuation when the 
sale to Voyager.net did not materialize is a fact question that 
cannot be determined on summary judgment.  Accordingly, I would 
remand for an accounting of what is due to each partner, 
specifically, an accounting that will consider the relative 
contributions of each partner to the partnership, in light of 
Thompson.  I also conclude that whether PressEnter was in wind-
up or continuation for the 11 years subsequent to dissolution 
rests on disputes of material fact and accordingly, it should 
not have been decided on summary judgment.  On remand, the 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
18 
 
circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing and revisit its 
conclusion that PressEnter was in wind-up for 11 years.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
 
No.  2009AP438.pdr 
 
 
 
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