Title: In re Child of Domenick B.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 158 
Docket: 
Han-18-285 
Submitted 
On Briefs: November 28, 2018 
Decided: 
December 6, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF DOMENICK B. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Domenick B. appeals from an order of the District Court (Ellsworth, 
Roberts, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child.1  He argues that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of parental unfitness.  
Alternatively, the father argues that the court abused its discretion by 
terminating his parental rights rather than imposing a permanency 
guardianship.  We affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts, all of which are supported by competent 
evidence, are drawn from the court’s judgment and the procedural record.  See 
In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 2, 187 A.3d 1.  The child was born in 
                                         
1  The mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, and we thus focus only 
on the procedural history and findings regarding the father.  
 
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December 2013, while the mother was incarcerated in Colorado.  Several 
months later, the child’s maternal grandparents brought the child to Maine to 
reside with them, and the father followed shortly afterwards.  The mother was 
released from prison on parole in early 2015 and also returned to Maine.   
[¶3]  Shortly after the mother’s return to Maine, the father was arrested 
for assaulting her with the child present.  The Department of Health and Human 
Services filed a child protection petition, alleging that the father’s substance 
abuse, anger, and domestic violence placed the child at risk of harm.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017).  The court entered a jeopardy order by agreement, 
placing the child with her maternal grandparents.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2017).  
Among other things, for a successful reunification, the jeopardy order required 
the father to participate in a substance abuse evaluation and individual therapy 
to address childhood trauma and anger issues, participate in random drug 
screening, and refrain from using any nonprescribed mood-altering 
substances.   
[¶4]  In November 2017, the Department filed a petition for termination 
of the father’s parental rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2017).  A two-day hearing 
was held on the petition in May and June 2018.  Following the hearing, the court 
entered a judgment granting the petition to terminate the father’s parental 
 
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rights after finding that he was unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take 
responsibility for her within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s 
needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) (2017); In re Thomas D., 2004 
ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.   
 
[¶5]  The court’s decision was based on the following findings, all of 
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.  See In re A.M., 
2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463. 
The court finds that [the father] has not participated in 
individual therapy to address his childhood trauma issues and how 
those may impact his parenting capability.  [The father] has not 
participated in therapy to work on his anger issues.  He began 
therapy 
with 
[a 
mental 
health 
counselor], 
participated 
sporadically, then discontinued treatment October 20, 2017, 
without completing his goals.   
 
[The father] has engaged in substance abuse therapy through 
[a] methadone program since July of 2016.  He has had negative 
tests for opiates through his treatment and reports that his opiate 
addiction has been in remission for five years.  [The father’s] 
substance abuse therapy would be considered successful were it 
not for his use of alcohol.  [The father] has been on notice since he 
began participation in the [methadone treatment] program that 
alcohol use is dangerous for him and is therefore prohibited.  [The 
father] was warned to stop his use of alcohol following a failed 
screen on March 13, 2018.  He promised to discontinue his use of 
alcohol at a subsequent family team meeting.  Unfortunately, he 
tested positive for alcohol twice since March, including the week 
before this hearing.  The [c]ourt concludes that substance abuse 
therapy has not been completed satisfactorily to this point.   
 
 
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The court recognizes that [the father] loves his [child] very 
much, and he wants very much to reunify with [her].  The court also 
has no doubt that [the child] loves [her] father.  The court finds, 
however, that [the father] has been very inconsistent in his mental 
health services, and despite the significant passage of time, he has 
made insufficient progress towards alleviating jeopardy.   
 
. . . . 
 
[The father], to his credit, has gained employment and taken 
steps toward establishing a home where he can care for [the child].  
[The father] has simply not made the effort at reunification that he 
should have made . . . .   
 
[The father’s] relationship with [the mother] was marred by 
domestic violence and substance abuse.  Both parents report a 
history of violent behaviors toward each other . . . [and the father] 
did not complete the therapy he needed to address and understand 
how his own childhood trauma and anger issues may impact his 
parenting.   
 
This is an old case, and [the child] needs permanency.  The 
child has been in the custody of DHHS since August 25, 2016.  She 
has been in the care of her maternal grandparents, with or without 
her parents’ involvement, for most of her life.  Despite the length of 
time and the numerous opportunities, father has made insufficient 
progress and is unable to take responsibility of [the child].   
 
. . . . 
 
[The maternal grandparents] have been providing excellent 
care for [the child] . . . .  Furthermore, the [maternal grandparents] 
recognize the importance of [the child] having an ongoing 
relationship with her father to whom she is bonded.  The [maternal 
grandparents] supported [the mother] and [the father] in their 
attempts at rehabilitation.  These proceedings have strained the 
relationship between the [maternal grandparents] and [the father], 
 
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but, they are willing to work to make sure that [the child] has a 
relationship going forward.   
 
. . . . 
 
 
. . . . Given the length of this case, the lack of progress by the 
father, and [the child’s] need for permanency, . . . [the guardian ad 
litem] recommends that [the father’s] parental rights be 
terminated . . . and the court agrees with her assessment.   
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Parental Unfitness 
 
[¶6]  The father’s main argument is that there is insufficient evidence to 
establish his parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.  Contrary to 
his argument, competent evidence supports the court’s determination that the 
father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the 
child within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.   
[¶7]  Throughout the entirety of this case, the father was on notice that 
addressing his mental health concerns and remaining sober were the court’s 
and the Department’s main concerns.  While the father’s continued sobriety 
from opioids is commendable, he was repeatedly warned that positive alcohol 
tests would put reunification with his child at risk.  Despite this, the father 
continued to test positive for alcohol use, including the week prior to the 
 
6 
termination hearing.  Further, the father failed to start mental health treatment 
for many months and, even then, was inconsistent in his attendance until 
ultimately ceasing all treatment in late October 2017.  Accordingly, the court 
did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father has 
failed to alleviate jeopardy or be able to take responsibility for the child despite 
an almost two-year effort at reunification.  See In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, 
¶¶ 21-22, 854 A.2d 195.   
B. 
Child’s Best Interest 
 
[¶8]  The father alternatively argues that even if the court did not err by 
determining that he was unfit as a parent, it should have ordered a permanency 
guardianship rather than termination of his parental rights.  We review the 
court’s determination regarding the appropriateness of a permanency 
guardianship for an abuse of discretion.  See In re Haylie W., 2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 
167 A.3d 576; In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 11, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Michaela 
C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 27, 809 A.2d 1245 (“The [court’s] judgment on the issue of 
best interest is entitled to substantial deference because that court is able to 
directly evaluate the testimony of the witnesses.”).  
 
[¶9]  Once a court determines that a parent is unfit, it must also determine 
whether termination of that parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best 
 
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interest.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2017); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 19, 
775 A.2d 1144.  As an alternative to termination, a court may create a 
permanency guardianship as part of a permanency plan “to establish safe, 
long-term care for a child who is the subject of a child protection proceeding.”  
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199; see 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C 
(2017).  When appropriate, “a permanency guardianship allows parents whose 
child[] cannot be returned to them to have a meaningful opportunity to 
maintain a legal relationship with their child[], and to have the court determine 
their rights to have contact with their child[].”  In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, 
¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199.   
 
[¶10]  Here, the court expressly considered the option of a permanency 
guardianship upon the request of the father, but determined that it was not in 
the child’s best interest because of substantial strain in the relationship 
between the father and the maternal grandparents.  See id. ¶ 13 (stating that 
tensions between a foster parent and the parents was an appropriate factor for 
the court to consider in denying a request for a permanency guardianship).  The 
child has been in the grandparents’ care for almost her entire life, and the 
creation of a permanency guardianship would leave the shadow of future legal 
proceedings at a time when the child needs a stable, permanent home.  See 
 
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22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(4), 4050(2)-(3), 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2017); In re Haylie W., 
2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 576.  Accordingly, the court did not err or abuse its 
discretion in terminating the father’s parental rights.  See In re Thomas H., 
2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Van Horn, Esq., Van Horn Law Office, Ellsworth, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2016-16 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY