Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John J. Balistrieri

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
1984AP970-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John J. Balistrieri, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
John J. Balistrieri, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BALISTRIERI 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 12, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., withdrew from participation.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  1984AP970-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John J. Balistrieri, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
John J. Balistrieri, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 12, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement denied. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, Attorney Richard C. Ninneman, that the license 
of Attorney John J. Balistrieri to practice law in Wisconsin 
should be reinstated.  Although the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) strenuously opposed Attorney Balistrieri's reinstatement 
petition before the referee, it did not appeal the referee's 
recommendation.  We therefore review the referee's report and 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
2 
 
recommendation pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.33(3).1  
After fully reviewing this matter, we conclude that Attorney 
Balistrieri has not satisfied the criteria required to resume 
the practice of law in this state, and we therefore deny his 
petition for reinstatement.  We also determine that Attorney 
Balistrieri should be required to pay the costs of this 
reinstatement 
proceeding, 
which 
were 
$41,459.40 
as 
of 
February 4, 2013. 
¶2 
The 
standards 
that 
apply 
to 
all 
petitions 
for 
reinstatement after a disciplinary suspension or revocation are 
set forth in SCR 22.31(1).2  In particular, the petitioning 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.33(3) provides that "[i]f no appeal is timely 
filed, the supreme court shall review the referee's report, 
order 
reinstatement, 
with 
or 
without 
conditions, 
deny 
reinstatement, or order the parties to file briefs in the 
matter." 
2 SCR 22.31(1) states: 
The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating, 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, all 
of the following: 
(a) That he or she has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin. 
(b) That his or her resumption of the practice of 
law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest. 
(c) That his or her representations in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
[(4m)] 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated. 
(continued) 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
3 
 
attorney must demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that he or she has the moral character necessary to 
practice law in this state, that his or her resumption of the 
practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest, and that the 
attorney has complied fully with the terms of the suspension or 
revocation order and the requirements of SCR 22.26.  In 
addition, SCR 22.31(1)(c) incorporates the statements that a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
must 
contain 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 22.29(4)(a)-[(4m)].3  Thus, the petitioning attorney must 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) That he or she has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
3 SCR 22.29(4)(a) through (4m) provides that a petition for 
reinstatement shall show all of the following: 
(a) The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
(continued) 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
4 
 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
required 
representations 
in 
the 
reinstatement petition are substantiated. 
¶3 
When 
reviewing 
referee 
reports 
in 
reinstatement 
proceedings, we utilize standards of review similar to those we 
use for reviewing referee reports in disciplinary proceedings.  
We do not overturn a referee's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  On the other hand, we review a referee's 
legal conclusions, including whether the attorney has satisfied 
the criteria for reinstatement, on a de novo basis.  In re 
                                                                                                                                                             
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation. 
(4m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection for 
all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the 
petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability 
to do so. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
5 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jennings, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 
334 Wis. 2d 335, 801 N.W.2d 304; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gral, 2010 WI 14, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 280, 779 N.W.2d 168. 
¶4 
Attorney Balistrieri was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin 
in 
August 
1973, 
following 
his 
graduation 
from 
Valparaiso University Law School.  He and his brother, Joseph 
Balistrieri (Joseph), subsequently engaged in a private law 
practice in Milwaukee.   
¶5 
In 1981 a federal grand jury indicted Attorney 
Balistrieri, along with his brother Joseph and his father Frank.4  
Following a six-week trial in 1984, a jury found Attorney 
Balistrieri guilty of conspiracy to obstruct commerce by 
extortion.  The conviction was affirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  United States v. 
Balistrieri, 778 F.2d 1226, 1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985).  The 
referee downplays Attorney Balistrieri's role in the crime, 
laying most of the blame at the feet of his father Frank.  He 
describes 
the 
facts 
underlying 
the 
convictions 
as 
Frank 
threatening an undercover FBI agent with physical violence for 
starting a vending machine business in Milwaukee without his 
permission and then forcing the undercover agent to give him a 
hidden ownership interest in the new business.  The referee 
                                                 
4 The referee describes Frank Balistrieri as "the reputed 
head of the Mafia in Milwaukee" at that time.  According to the 
referee, the Shorecrest Hotel in Milwaukee, which was held in 
ownership under Joseph Balistrieri's name, "allegedly was the 
headquarters of the 'mob' in Wisconsin."   
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
6 
 
states that the role of Attorney Balistrieri and his brother 
Joseph was limited to drafting the legal documents that gave 
their father a legally enforceable interest in the vending 
business.   
¶6 
In its decision on the direct appeal filed by the 
Balistrieris, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit did not so limit the role of the Balistrieri sons in its 
description of the facts underlying the charges: 
The essential facts in this extortion scheme are 
that 
between 
May 
1978 
and 
February 
1979 
the 
Balistrieris, 
Ruggiero, 
and 
allegedly 
SaBella 
conspired to extort sums of money and a one-half 
partnership interest in the Best Vending Company. FBI 
Agent Gail Cobb, using the alias Tony Conte, operated 
the Best Vending Company. Between 1976 and 1981, FBI 
Special Agent Joseph Pistone was operating under the 
alias 
Donnie 
Brasco 
as 
an 
undercover 
agent 
investigating organized crime activities in New York 
City. During this time he developed a close working 
relationship with Ruggiero, who described himself as a 
member of the Bonanno crime family of New York. 
Pistone mentioned to Ruggiero that Cobb had moved to 
Milwaukee and was trying to open a vending machine 
business there. 
Subsequently Ruggiero told Cobb that the vending 
business in Milwaukee was controlled by "the mob" and 
that Cobb could not enter that business without 
"protection" from the mob figures who controlled that 
business. After inducing Cobb to pay money to him, 
Ruggiero 
arranged 
for 
Cobb 
to 
meet 
with 
Frank 
Balistrieri, so that Cobb could obtain permission from 
Balistrieri to do business in Milwaukee. 
On July 29, 1978, Cobb had a meeting with Frank 
Balistrieri and others in Milwaukee during which Frank 
Balistrieri made threats against Cobb because Cobb had 
attempted to start a vending machine business in 
Milwaukee without his permission. Later, in the 
presence 
of 
John 
and 
Joseph 
Balistrieri, 
Frank 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
7 
 
Balistrieri told Cobb that he was to share his vending 
business with the Balistrieris. Cobb agreed to permit 
the Balistrieris to become secret partners in his 
business, and the Balistrieris began directing Cobb in 
his conduct of the business. 
Balistrieri, 778 F.2d at 1228. 
¶7 
The 
federal 
district 
court 
initially 
sentenced 
Attorney Balistrieri to eight years of imprisonment and imposed 
a $20,000 fine.5  The prison term was subsequently reduced to 
five 
years. 
 
Attorney 
Balistrieri 
ultimately 
served 
approximately 39 months in a federal prison.  He was released in 
April 1989.   
¶8 
As a result of Attorney Balistrieri's conviction, this 
court summarily suspended his license to practice law on June 6, 
1984.  As shown by documents in this court's public files in the 
original disciplinary proceeding, Attorney Balistrieri reached 
an 
agreement 
with 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility (BAPR), the predecessor to the OLR, that he would 
not challenge the summary suspension and that the summary 
suspension would remain in effect while any direct appeal of his 
conviction was still pending.  The agreement further provided 
that if Attorney Balistrieri's conviction were affirmed, his law 
license would be revoked at that time.  Following the issuance 
of the Seventh Circuit's decision affirming his conviction, this 
court revoked Attorney Balistrieri's license to practice law in 
                                                 
5 Frank 
Balistrieri 
was 
sentenced 
to 
13 
years 
of 
imprisonment and fined $5,000.  Joseph Balistrieri received the 
same sentence as his brother. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
8 
 
this state on January 21, 1987, pursuant to his agreement with 
BAPR.   
¶9 
Following his 1989 release from prison, Attorney 
Balistrieri returned to Milwaukee to live and work at the 
Shorecrest Hotel (Shorecrest),6 where he served as the on-site 
operations manager7 until his brother Joseph’s death in 2010, 
when Attorney Balistrieri inherited ownership of the property 
and took over sole control of the property and business.  Within 
a relatively short time after inheriting the hotel, Attorney 
Balistrieri 
sold 
the 
property 
in 
2011 
for 
approximately 
$8 million.8  In addition, during the time that he worked for or 
owned the property, Attorney Balistrieri owned and operated a 
separate small business that offered laundry services at the 
Shorecrest.   
                                                 
6 Attorney Balistrieri described the Shorecrest as primarily 
a high-rise apartment complex that contained a few overnight 
hotel rooms so that the hotel license could be maintained.   
7 At 
the 
reinstatement 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
Attorney 
Balistrieri likened his brother's role in the Shorecrest to 
being the chairman of the board, overseeing policy decisions, 
while he fulfilled the role of chief operating officer.  More 
specifically, Attorney Balistrieri testified that he oversaw the 
daily operation of the property/business.  He supervised the 
maintenance 
department, 
the 
housekeeping 
department, 
the 
administrative department, and the front desk.  He also was 
responsible for maintaining the books and records of the 
business.  He stated that he was on call seven days a week and 
365 days a year to handle issues that arose with the operation 
of the property.   
8 The referee notes that the sale of the Shorecrest was 
designated as the 2011 outstanding business transaction of the 
greater Milwaukee area by the Milwaukee edition of The Business 
Journal.   
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
9 
 
¶10 In 1995 Attorney Balistrieri filed a petition for the 
reinstatement of his license to practice law.  In the course of 
that reinstatement proceeding, the then United States Attorney 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Thomas P. Schneider, the 
then Wisconsin Attorney General, James E. Doyle, and the then 
Milwaukee County District Attorney, E. Michael McCann, all 
submitted letters opposing Attorney Balistrieri's reinstatement 
petition.  Ultimately, after an evidentiary reinstatement 
hearing, BAPR recommended to this court that the petition be 
denied, finding that Attorney Balistrieri had not met his burden 
to prove that he had a proper understanding of and attitude 
toward the standards imposed on lawyers and that he could not be 
recommended as a person fit to act as an officer of the court.  
¶11 Shortly 
after 
BAPR's 
recommendation, 
Attorney 
Balistrieri attempted to withdraw his petition.  In an affidavit 
supporting his withdrawal request, he alleged that BAPR's report 
and recommendation "clearly demonstrate[d] a hostile bias 
against [Attorney Balistrieri] which affiant believes to be the 
product of political expedience and ethnic prejudice against 
Italian-Americans in general and affiant in particular."    The 
court denied the request to withdraw, and after a period of 
inactivity in the matter, dismissed the petition in March 2001.   
¶12 In 2012 Attorney Balistrieri filed a second petition 
for the reinstatement of his license to practice law in this 
state.  The referee conducted a three-day reinstatement hearing, 
at which 14 witnesses testified.  In addition, the referee 
received a substantial number of letters in support of Attorney 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
10 
 
Balistrieri's reinstatement.  He also received two letters from 
Attorney Balistrieri's sister, who did not explicitly express a 
desire that the petition for reinstatement be denied but clearly 
criticized her brother's character and alleged improper actions 
by him.   
¶13 The referee ultimately recommended reinstatement.  He 
concluded that Attorney Balistrieri had proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that he sincerely desires to have his 
license reinstated, that he has not practiced law during the 
period of his suspension and revocation, that he has complied 
with the terms of the suspension and revocation orders, and that 
he has maintained competence and learning in the law.  We accept 
the referee's findings and conclusions on these requirements for 
reinstatement.   
¶14 The issues in this reinstatement proceeding, however, 
relate to other requirements for reinstatement, namely whether 
the petitioning attorney has demonstrated that he has the moral 
character to practice law in this state, that his conduct since 
the suspension and revocation of his license has been exemplary 
and above reproach, that he has a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar and will act in conformity with them, and that he can be 
safely recommended as a person fit to represent clients and to 
aid 
in 
the 
administration 
of 
justice 
in 
this 
state.  
SCRs 22.29(e)-(g) and 22.31(a). 
¶15 The referee's report addresses a number of issues that 
relate to these requirements, which admittedly are interrelated 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
11 
 
and overlapping.  The referee concludes that despite these 
issues, Attorney Balistrieri has met his burden on all of these 
requirements by clear and convincing evidence.  We are not 
persuaded. 
¶16 The referee begins with the impact of Attorney 
Balistrieri's conduct while previously licensed and of his 1984 
conviction on his current petition for reinstatement.  Although 
the referee acknowledged the conviction and even described it at 
one point in his report as "clearly serious," he did not think 
that the misconduct committed by Attorney Balistrieri in the 
1970s and 1980s showed a moral character that should prevent 
Attorney Balistrieri from returning to the practice of law at 
this time.   
¶17 The 
OLR 
has 
offered 
into 
evidence 
in 
this 
reinstatement proceeding the letter that then U.S. Attorney 
Thomas Schneider filed in response to Attorney Balistrieri's 
1995 reinstatement petition.  The lengthy letter provides a 
fairly detailed description of the events that underlay the 
criminal convictions of the Balistrieris.  Attached to that 
letter are a sizeable number of documents, including newspaper 
articles from the time and a copy of a transcript of a 
conversation among Frank, Joseph, and John Balistrieri that was 
secretly recorded by federal authorities.   
¶18 Although 
the 
referee 
acknowledged 
Attorney 
Balistrieri's 1984 conviction, he essentially disregarded the 
letter submitted by then U.S. Attorney Schneider.  The referee's 
stated reasons for giving "no great weight" to Attorney 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
12 
 
Schneider's letter were that there was no evidence that Attorney 
Schneider was in the U.S. Attorney's office at the time of the 
prosecution of the Balistrieris in the 1980s and that the 
letter's references to the "mob," "La Cosa Nostra," and the 
"Mafia" 
were 
inflammatory 
and 
really 
directed 
at 
Frank 
Balistrieri, not Attorney Balistrieri.   
¶19 On the other hand, the referee gave "great weight" to 
the fact that Attorney Balistrieri apparently had not been 
present at the time that his father had threatened the FBI 
undercover agent with physical harm if the agent did not give 
him a secret interest in the vending machine business.  He also 
was apparently moved by the fact that Frank Balistrieri had 
rejected a plea agreement in which the federal government would 
have dismissed the charges against the Balistrieri sons in 
exchange for Frank Balistrieri's guilty plea.  The referee 
commented that "[a]pparently loyalty in the Balistrieri family 
was a one-way street."   
¶20 This court recognizes that the events of the 1980s and 
the crime of which Attorney Balistrieri was convicted are now 
several decades old.  We are not averse to providing a second 
chance to hold a law license to individuals who clearly accept 
responsibility for their wrongdoing and demonstrate that they 
have a different attitude toward complying with both our 
society's general laws and the ethical rules that apply to 
attorneys who are licensed to practice law in this state. 
¶21 The record in this instance, however, does not 
demonstrate 
that 
Attorney 
Balistrieri 
has 
clearly 
and 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
13 
 
convincingly proven that he has the required moral character to 
practice law, that he has a proper attitude toward society's 
laws and the standards imposed on members of bar, and that he is 
fit to represent clients and to aid in the administration of 
justice as a member of this state's bar.  See SCR 22.29(4)(f) 
and (g). 
¶22 The record reveals a pattern of a lack of acceptance 
of responsibility over the years that have passed since Attorney 
Balistrieri's conviction.  When BAPR recommended against the 
reinstatement of his license in 1995, in large part based on its 
conclusion that he had not accepted responsibility for his 
criminal conduct, Attorney Balistrieri ultimately responded by 
claiming that BAPR was biased against him because of his Italian 
heritage.  He attacked the integrity of the reinstatement 
process with a completely unsupported charge of ethnic bias 
rather than demonstrate how his words and actions showed that he 
now understood that he needed to obey both the letter and the 
spirit of the law and the ethical rules governing attorneys. 
¶23 In 2002 Attorney Balistrieri was deposed as part of a 
lawsuit that he and his brother filed against a distant 
relative, Jennie Alioto, the substance of which will be 
discussed in more detail below.  A portion of the deposition 
transcript, however, demonstrates how Attorney Balistrieri's 
attitude toward his convictions and government agencies that 
enforce the law had not changed.  When opposing counsel asked 
for his work history, Attorney Balistrieri described the period 
from 1984 to 1989 as a time when he had been "employed by the 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
14 
 
United States government."  The opposing counsel subsequently 
asked for some clarification, and the following exchange ensued: 
Q 
Now, from '84 to '89 when you were working for 
the government, could you be more specific? 
A 
I was in charge of the Recreation Department at 
the FCI9 Latuna Penitentiary. 
Q 
What were you convicted of? 
A 
I was convicted of a conspiracy to attempt to 
commit an extortion.  Pretty esoteric stuff. 
. . . . 
Q 
Is that the only conviction on your record? 
A 
Let's see.  These indictments were brought by a 
homosexual child molester with a cocaine habit who 
admitted having bad decision-making processes during 
the time.  So two indictments were dismissed.  Then I 
went to trial after six weeks.  I was acquitted, then 
we went to Kansas City for six months and the judge 
threw that out on a Rule 29 motion.  So, yes, that's 
the only time I was convicted.   
¶24  Even assuming that Attorney Balistrieri was being 
sarcastic, his answer demonstrates either a refusal to take his 
conviction 
seriously 
or 
a 
contempt 
for 
the 
federal 
law 
enforcement officials who investigated and prosecuted the case 
against him.  His response also indicates that he did not view 
the deposition that was being taken of him as a matter worthy of 
being treated with the seriousness that a legal proceeding 
warrants. 
                                                 
9 "FCI" 
is 
an 
abbreviation 
for 
"Federal 
Correctional 
Institution." 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
15 
 
¶25 In the present reinstatement proceeding, Attorney 
Balistrieri has asserted that he has now come to accept the 
judgment of the federal court that convicted him.  He is very 
clear, however, to specify only that he is accepting the fact 
that the federal court convicted him and that he should no 
longer be angry or resentful about his conviction.  He even goes 
so far as to say that he "made a mistake," although he does not 
explain what that mistake was, and that he broke the criminal 
law.  While he is now willing to say that his attitude has 
changed and he accepts that there was a conviction, he also 
explicitly testified yet in this proceeding that he did nothing 
wrong, 
which 
means 
that 
the 
conviction 
must 
still 
be 
illegitimate to some degree in his view: 
Q 
So I have read the indictment, and you submitted 
a 
response 
to 
questionnaire 
in 
terms 
of 
an 
explanation.  Can you -- this is what I want you to 
explain.  I don't want to lead you.  This is your 
chance to explain, if you can.  Can you explain what 
you did that caused you to be charged with the 
conspiracy to extort in Count 1? 
The Witness:  According to the indictment now, not 
according to my perspective -- from my perspective, I 
really didn't do anything -- but according to the 
indictment, there was allegedly a threat made by my 
father to an undercover FBI agent who was sent here to 
initiate a sting operation on the theory that we 
controlled the vending and amusement game business in 
the City of Milwaukee.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶26 We are not making a full and unconditional confession 
of one's crime a prerequisite to the reinstatement of a law 
license for everyone who has committed a crime.  What Attorney 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
16 
 
Balistrieri was obligated to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence, however, was that he has a good moral character, that 
he possesses a proper attitude toward the standards that are 
imposed upon members of the bar of this state, which includes 
both the general law and the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, and that he will act in conformity with them.  His 
grudging acceptance of the fact of his conviction after decades 
of 
besmirching 
the 
individuals 
who 
did 
their 
job 
in 
investigating and prosecuting him or who acted within their 
proper role in the lawyer regulation system is not enough to 
meet that standard. 
¶27 We are also troubled by Attorney Balistrieri's failure 
to report as income for tax purposes significant amounts of 
money he received from his brother or the Shorecrest operations 
and his failure to provide an adequate explanation for those 
monies when responding to the OLR's inquiries.10  In the 2002 
deposition described above, Attorney Balistrieri said that from 
1989 to the time of that deposition he had "been in partnership 
with my brother Joseph."  When asked what that meant, Attorney 
Balistrieri responded, "That means what we do we do together."  
After initially refusing to explain what he did in that 
                                                 
10 Because the referee downplayed the significance of the 
tax issue, he did not make detailed findings of fact on this 
subject.  The facts set forth in the following paragraphs of 
this opinion, however, were not in dispute.  We are not 
therefore usurping the role of the referee as the fact-finder.  
The undisputed facts regarding this issue are sufficient to 
demonstrate our point below. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
17 
 
partnership, Attorney Balistrieri stated, "My business is right 
now we operate the Shorecrest Hotel.  You know that.  We're in 
partnership together."   
¶28 In the present reinstatement proceeding, Attorney 
Balistrieri asserted that during his brother's lifetime he had 
no ownership interest in the Shorecrest Hotel, that the hotel 
was owned solely by his brother, and that his brother made all 
of 
the 
final 
decisions 
regarding 
business 
policy 
and 
disbursements.  He described himself as the "operations manager" 
or "chief operating officer."  This meant that he handled the 
daily operations of the building, including, inter alia, dealing 
with rent collections, bank deposits, personnel issues, tenant 
issues, license applications, city inspections, and maintenance 
of the property (both major and minor repairs).  He asserted 
that he had to be available at all hours of the day and night to 
take care of whatever problems arose.   
¶29 In 
exchange 
for 
his 
work 
overseeing 
the 
daily 
operations of the Shorecrest, Attorney Balistrieri received a 
substantial number of benefits.  For example, he acknowledged 
that he received the ability to live rent-free in one of the 
Shorecrest's apartments, and the Shorecrest or his brother paid 
for his telephone, electricity, heat, health insurance, laundry, 
cable television, and certain other living expenses.  At some 
point, the hotel or his brother also provided him with a car.   
¶30 Attorney Balistrieri did not receive a regular salary 
or wage in exchange for his work at the Shorecrest.  He did, 
however, receive a significant number of what both he and the 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
18 
 
referee referred to as "draws" or "owner's draws" that Joseph 
Balistrieri took from the Shorecrest's revenues or accumulated 
assets and shared with Attorney Balistrieri in equal amounts.  
The yearly amount of these draws, according to documents 
provided by Attorney Balistrieri, varied from year to year and 
ranged during the period of 1997 to 2007 from $5,000 to $31,000.  
The total amount for that eleven-year period was approximately 
$200,000.   
¶31 Attorney Balistrieri described at the evidentiary 
hearing the process for determining when these "draws" were 
taken and in what amounts as follows: 
Well, Joe would call me in and he'd say, "What's our 
cash situation?  Can we take a draw?" And I'd run it 
down for him what our cash position was, and then he 
would decide whether or not we should take a draw and 
if we took a draw, how much we should take.   
¶32 In 
his 
response 
to 
the 
OLR's 
reinstatement 
questionnaire, Attorney Balistrieri similarly stated that his 
brother and he would draw money from the business and share that 
on a 50/50 basis, just as they shared "other income [Attorney 
Balistrieri] brought in from the non-hotel business projects 
that [he] worked on."  Thus, he acknowledges that, while his 
brother may have signed the checks to him that were his portion 
of the "draws", the money he received, like the money his 
brother received, came from drawing money out of the business.  
Further, he acknowledges that the draws he received out of the 
revenue or assets of the business were in exchange for the work 
that he performed at the hotel:  "For my work at the hotel, my 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
19 
 
brother and I would draw money to the business account as an 
owner's draw."   
¶33 In a letter submitted by Attorney 
Balistrieri's 
counsel on his behalf prior to the evidentiary hearing, Attorney 
Balistrieri asserted that the benefits he received from the 
hotel business and his brother were frequently treated as 
"loans" or "loan repayments."  Although Attorney Balistrieri 
provided copies of the checks for these "draws" and those copies 
were admitted as an exhibit, he did not submit into evidence any 
exhibit that substantiated the loans or the fact that the money 
he received as "draws" was really the repayment of loans he had 
previously made to the Shorecrest or his brother. 
¶34 At the reinstatement evidentiary hearing, Attorney 
Balistrieri's accountant stated that none of the money Attorney 
Balistrieri received from the draws on the Shorecrest accounts 
was recognized or reported as income to Attorney Balistrieri.  
He did not say that the money was not income because it was 
considered the repayment of loans.  Instead, he essentially gave 
an expert opinion that the money was not income to Attorney 
Balistrieri because Joseph Balistrieri, as the owner of the 
Shorecrest, had been under no legal obligation to give the money 
to Attorney Balistrieri, thereby making the thousands of dollars 
mere gifts to Attorney Balistrieri.  When Attorney Balistrieri 
subsequently resumed his testimony at the hearing and was 
questioned about these payments, he now claimed that he had made 
a mistake about the nature of those payments and that they had 
really just been gifts from his brother to him.   
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
20 
 
¶35 The OLR presented the testimony of an expert witness 
on the tax issue, an attorney and tax practitioner with a large 
accounting firm, who had previously worked for the Chief Counsel 
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  The OLR's witness opined 
that he did not see how the "draws" paid to Attorney Balistrieri 
could be considered "gifts" for income tax purposes.  He stated 
that the determination of whether money paid to an employee was 
a gift would require an analysis of all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the payment, not merely an assertion 
that someone intended to characterize the payment as a gift.  He 
further stated that, other than the accountant's assertion that 
Joseph Balistrieri had been under no legal obligation to make 
payments to Attorney Balistrieri, there was no evidence to 
support characterizing those payments as gifts.  Indeed, he 
stated his view on this quite emphatically:  "I can't imagine 
that anyone in this room honestly thinks those were gifts."  
Further, to the extent that Attorney Balistrieri claimed that 
the 
characterization 
of 
the 
payments 
as 
gifts 
was 
the 
accountant's determination on which he had relied, the OLR's 
expert witness stated that Attorney Balistrieri would need to 
demonstrate that he had relied on his accountant's advice in 
good faith.  The OLR's expert opined that given the lack of 
evidence to support a gift, there was no possibility to have 
relied in good faith on any determination by the accountant that 
the payments were gifts.   
¶36 During the evidentiary hearing, the referee expressed 
concern with the OLR's pursuit of questioning about the tax 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
21 
 
implications of the payments and benefits provided to Attorney 
Balistrieri and whether pursuing the line of questioning would 
make this a tax case as opposed to a reinstatement proceeding.  
In response to the referee's request for clarification as to 
what the OLR was attempting to demonstrate, the OLR's counsel 
responded that the OLR was primarily concerned with whether 
Attorney Balistrieri's disclosures about the benefits and 
payments he received were accurate and sufficient and not really 
concerned with the issue of whether the payments had been 
treated properly for income tax purposes.   
¶37 In 
his 
report, 
the 
referee 
spent 
little 
time 
addressing 
these 
issues. 
 
Although 
he 
acknowledged 
the 
difference between the testimony of Attorney Balistrieri's 
accountant and the OLR's witness, he did not attempt to resolve 
the dispute.  Essentially, he concluded that the tax issues 
should not be the focus of this proceeding, and that since the 
IRS had never challenged Attorney Balistrieri's income tax 
returns, the issue of the payments to Attorney Balistrieri and 
the tax ramifications of those payments should be disregarded.   
¶38 We do not share the view that these matters are 
unimportant to the question of whether Attorney Balistrieri's 
license to practice law should be reinstated.  As the 
petitioning attorney, he is obligated under the rule to prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that his conduct since the 
revocation of his license has been "exemplary and above 
reproach."  SCR 22.29(4)(e).  Whether an attorney has properly 
reported income on the attorney's income tax returns and whether 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
22 
 
the attorney has properly disclosed the nature and sources of 
income to the OLR in the reinstatement process are both matters 
that clearly bear on the attorney's post-suspension or post-
revocation conduct and whether he or she has a good moral 
character and is fit to regain the privilege of acting as an 
attorney and officer of the court in this state.11  Indeed, the 
failure to report income on one's tax returns has been a basis 
for the imposition of a range of public discipline by this 
court.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Washington, 2007 WI 65, 301 Wis. 2d 47, 732 N.W.2d 24 (18-month 
suspension imposed on attorney convicted of attempting to evade 
payment of federal income taxes for underreporting her income); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman, 2008 WI 28, 
308 Wis. 2d 524, 746 N.W.2d 793 (nine-month suspension imposed; 
distinction drawn between forgetting to report income over three 
years, which would have made the court more inclined to impose 
                                                 
11 Attorney Balistrieri's accountant also expressed the view 
that the federal and state governments were not really harmed 
because Joseph Balistrieri had not claimed these payments to his 
brother as an expense of the business and therefore had paid 
income taxes on the money he shared with Attorney Balistrieri.  
Whether or not the federal and state governments ultimately 
received the same amount of tax revenues, which has not been 
proven, is not the issue.  The issue for purposes of this 
reinstatement proceeding is whether Attorney Balistrieri, the 
person petitioning for reinstatement, was obligated under the 
law to report those payments as income on his tax returns and 
followed the law.  Whether Joseph Balistrieri may also have been 
able to reduce his reportable income if the payments had been 
characterized as income to Attorney Balistrieri is not at issue 
in this proceeding. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
23 
 
public reprimand, and deliberately choosing not to report income 
for two years, which supported the nine-month suspension); In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
McKinley, 
2014 
WI 
48, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 
848 N.W.2d 295 
(accepting 
stipulation 
and 
imposing 60-day suspension on attorney convicted of filing tax 
returns she believed to be not true or accurate because of 
underreporting of income).  Thus, the presence of questions 
about an attorney's proper reporting of income is a relevant 
part of the reinstatement calculus. 
¶39 Although we acknowledge that there is a difference of 
opinion between the OLR's expert and Attorney Balistrieri's 
accountant/expert, that acknowledgement does not mean that we 
are obligated to resolve the dispute and render a definitive 
ruling on whether Attorney Balistrieri's tax returns were 
improper.  We conclude, however, that there is, at a minimum, a 
real question about the propriety of Attorney Balistrieri 
failing to report as income the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
that he received out of draws from the Shorecrest's accounts.  
Simply stating the conclusion that the payments should be 
treated as gifts because Joseph Balistrieri had no legal 
obligation to make the payments to Attorney Balistrieri begs the 
question.  Had these payments been made simply because Attorney 
Balistrieri was a family member, that would be one thing.  By 
Attorney Balistrieri's own admission, however, these payments 
were made to him "[f]or my work at the hotel."  Generally, 
payments made to an employee as a result of the employee's work 
are income to the employee subject to the payment of all 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
24 
 
applicable 
taxes, 
including 
income 
taxes. 
 
Attorney 
Balistrieri's accountant, however, clearly stated that these 
payments were not reported as income.  If these periodic 
payments over two decades did not need to be reported as income 
because they were mere gifts from his brother, Attorney 
Balistrieri needed to prove that fact by clear and convincing 
evidence.  In the absence of such proof, it appears that he 
received income due to his employment that he did not report as 
income.   
¶40 The fact that the IRS has not challenged Attorney 
Balistrieri's tax returns does not prove that these payments 
were actually gifts or that this issue should be disregarded in 
this reinstatement proceeding.  Who knows why the IRS has not 
audited or challenged the tax returns?  Perhaps it is not aware 
of these payments.  Perhaps it has chosen to focus its limited 
resources on other matters.  In any event, it is this court, not 
the IRS, that ultimately determines whether a petitioning 
attorney has met the standards required for the reinstatement of 
the attorney's license. 
¶41 As noted above, we need not decide whether or not the 
"draws" paid to Attorney Balistrieri or the other benefits 
provided to him were income that needed to be reported on his 
tax returns.  The evidence in the record raises a serious 
question regarding whether Attorney Balistrieri's conduct since 
the revocation of his license has been "exemplary and above 
reproach."  He bore the burden to demonstrate that he has met 
that standard.  He has failed to meet his burden on this issue. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
25 
 
¶42 There are two other issues, which are related to each 
other, that were greatly downplayed by the referee.  These 
issues relate to an answer that Attorney Balistrieri gave to 
questions from the OLR about lawsuits to which he had been a 
party and to his conduct in connection with a specific lawsuit 
against his maternal relative, Jennie Alioto. 
¶43 The OLR's reinstatement questionnaire asked Attorney 
Balistrieri to "[s]ubmit a statement showing the dates, general 
nature, current status, or final disposition of every civil 
action, commenced or pending in any jurisdiction during the 
period of your revocation or suspension, wherein you were either 
a party, plaintiff or defendant, or in which you had or claimed 
an 
interest."12 
 
The 
question 
further 
required 
Attorney 
Balistrieri to provide case names and numbers, as well as the 
court in which the case was pending.  Attorney Balistrieri's 
response did not identify any civil action.  Although the 
question asked for an identification of any civil action in 
which he had been or was a party, regardless of the disposition, 
Attorney Balistrieri responded only that "I have no present 
recollection of any judgment ever being taken against me for any 
purpose."  When asked about this response in multiple questions 
at his deposition, he again failed to identify any civil action.  
After taking a break and conferring with his counsel, he stated 
                                                 
12 This question is a standard part of the reinstatement 
questionnaire that the OLR sends to attorneys who petition for 
reinstatement following a disciplinary revocation or suspension. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
26 
 
for the first time that he had been involved in a lawsuit with 
Alioto and in two pieces of litigation involving his sisters, 
although Attorney Balistrieri claimed that these matters were 
really his brother's actions and not his and that his brother 
Joseph had merely added his name to the actions.  At the 
subsequent evidentiary hearing, Attorney Balistrieri claimed 
that he had no independent recollection of the Alioto litigation 
until the questions at the deposition had "jogged" his memory.   
¶44 At 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
Attorney 
Balistrieri 
admitted that he had been involved in six lawsuits since the 
time of his first reinstatement petition.  There were actually 
two lawsuits in which Attorney Balistrieri was a plaintiff suing 
Jennie Alioto.  In the first, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, both Attorney Balistrieri and his brother Joseph 
were the plaintiffs.  After Attorney Balistrieri and his brother 
lost that lawsuit, a second lawsuit was filed.  This time 
Attorney Balistrieri was the sole plaintiff.  In another action, 
one of his sisters sued both Attorney Balistrieri and his 
brother Joseph, as well as their other sister.   
¶45 The OLR argued that Attorney Balistrieri's failure to 
identify 
any 
of 
these 
actions 
in 
his 
response 
to 
the 
reinstatement questionnaire or in his initial deposition answers 
showed that his conduct in the reinstatement proceeding had not 
been exemplary and above reproach.  After acknowledging that he 
had been initially troubled by the failure to provide accurate 
information in response to the OLR's questions, the referee 
found, 
based 
on 
Attorney 
Balistrieri's 
testimony 
at 
the 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
27 
 
evidentiary hearing, that he had really forgotten about these 
various lawsuits in which he had been a party, thereby 
concluding that his responses, while inaccurate, had not been 
deliberately false.     
¶46 Given the clearly erroneous standard for reviewing the 
referee's finding of fact on this subject, especially where the 
factual issue involves a determination of what was in someone's 
mind, we accept the referee's finding that Attorney Balistrieri 
could not recall any of the lawsuits in which he had been 
involved until the middle of his deposition.  We therefore 
conclude that the inaccurate answers are not a basis to conclude 
that Attorney Balistrieri has failed to show that his post-
revocation conduct has been exemplary and above reproach. 
¶47 The failure to recall the Alioto litigation, however, 
is not the only issue raised by that litigation.  The first 
action in which Attorney Balistrieri and his brother sued Jennie 
Alioto presents a troubling situation. 
¶48 The facts of that litigation are set forth in the 
decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment dismissing the Balistrieris' claim to enforce a 
purchase 
option 
and 
awarding 
costs 
in 
favor 
of 
Alioto.  
Balistrieri 
v. 
Alioto, 
No. 
2004AP929 
(December 
1, 
2005 
unpublished opinion).  Alioto worked for Attorney Balistrieri's 
father as a bookkeeper for many years.  Both Attorney 
Balistrieri and his brother had a long personal relationship 
with her.  Indeed, both brothers performed legal work for her 
without charge, and Attorney Balistrieri often helped her with 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
28 
 
her business affairs.  In 1978, Attorney Balistrieri helped 
Alioto purchase a building on North Jackson Street in Milwaukee, 
and he thereafter quite often assisted her in maintaining or 
managing the property.  The trial court found that Alioto relied 
on Attorney Balistrieri's assistance and his advice in her 
business affairs. 
¶49 In 1991 Attorney Balistrieri discussed the future of 
the Jackson Street property with Alioto.  She told Attorney 
Balistrieri that she did not wish to sell the property because 
she needed the rental income from the property for her 
retirement, but that she would be willing to give him and his 
brother a right of first refusal to purchase the property before 
anyone else if she ever sold it.  In 1992, Alioto and the two 
Balistrieri brothers signed an agreement regarding the property.  
The agreement, however, did not provide a right of first 
refusal, but rather gave the brothers an option to purchase the 
property for a set price ($125,000) within the next ten years.  
Alioto testified in the subsequent lawsuit that she did not read 
the agreement before signing it.   
¶50 Three months later, Alioto read the agreement and came 
to understand that it provided for a straight option to purchase 
at a set price.  She then called Attorney Balistrieri and 
expressed concern that the contract was not what they had 
previously talked about.  In particular, she expressed surprise 
that the agreement contained a specific purchase price and a 
specific date by which the option could be exercised by the 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
29 
 
brothers.  Attorney Balistrieri told her not to worry about what 
was in the agreement and that he would do right by her.   
¶51 In 2002, as the 10-year period came to a close, the 
Balistrieri brothers both served letters on Alioto that stated 
that they were exercising their option to purchase the Jackson 
Street property.  When Alioto refused to sell the property to 
them at the price set forth in the contract, Attorney 
Balistrieri and his brother sued her for specific performance of 
the option agreement.   
¶52 The case was tried to the bench.  The circuit court 
found that there had been a fiduciary relationship between 
Attorney Balistrieri and Alioto, that Attorney Balistrieri had 
engaged in intentional misrepresentation in connection with 
obtaining the option agreement, that Alioto was justified in 
relying on Attorney Balistrieri's statement that she had nothing 
to worry about, and that Attorney Balistrieri and his brother 
were 
joint 
venturers 
such 
that 
Attorney 
Balistrieri's 
misrepresentations could be imputed to his brother.  The circuit 
court 
therefore 
ruled 
that 
the 
option 
contract 
was 
unenforceable.  It dismissed the Balistrieris' claims and 
awarded costs to Alioto.   
¶53 Attorney Balistrieri and his brother appealed.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.  This court 
denied the Balistrieris' petition for review.   
¶54 The referee also did not view this matter as anything 
that should prevent the reinstatement of Attorney Balistrieri's 
license.  While the referee said it was not his role to second 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
30 
 
guess the circuit court's findings or legal conclusions or to 
re-try the civil action, he specifically said that he questioned 
the credibility of Alioto's testimony, which the circuit court 
in the civil action had accepted as credible.  He also 
questioned the circuit court's admission of the recording that 
Alioto 
made 
of 
her 
telephone 
conversation 
with 
Attorney 
Balistrieri, in which he told her not to worry about the fact 
that the agreement was different than she had initially 
discussed with him.13  In the end, the referee found it 
significant that the attorney who had represented Alioto in the 
civil action had testified at the reinstatement hearing that the 
Alioto 
litigation 
should 
not 
affect 
this 
reinstatement 
proceeding.  The referee agreed that the circuit court's 
findings in the Alioto civil litigation should not "be a 
barrier" to the reinstatement of Attorney Balistrieri's license. 
¶55 We do not think this matter should be disregarded so 
lightly.  The circuit court specifically found, and the court of 
                                                 
13 The 
Balistrieris 
challenged 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
recording on appeal and argued that the recording provided the 
sole evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.  The court 
of appeals did not rule on whether the recording had been 
properly admitted.  It did conclude that, even if the recording 
had been improperly admitted, its admission had not prejudiced 
the outcome of the trial because Alioto had testified at trial 
based on her independent recollection of her conversations with 
Attorney Balistrieri.  Thus, the admission or exclusion of the 
tape recording cannot undermine the circuit court's and the 
court of appeals' conclusions or affect the relevance of those 
conclusions to the present reinstatement proceeding.  Moreover, 
even the referee acknowledges that Attorney Balistrieri denied 
having any conversation until the tape recording was produced.   
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
31 
 
appeals affirmed, that Attorney Balistrieri and his brother had 
a fiduciary duty to Alioto because of the inequality of 
sophistication in business matters, the fact that Alioto had 
been a client of both Balistrieri brothers when they had been 
practicing lawyers, and the fact that she had continued to rely 
on Attorney Balistrieri's business advice and support after he 
was no longer practicing law.  The circuit court further found 
that Attorney Balistrieri had violated this fiduciary duty and 
had 
obtained 
the 
option 
contract 
by 
intentional 
misrepresentation.  The court of appeals agreed that, in light 
of Alioto's statements to Attorney Balistrieri that she would be 
willing to give him and his brother a right of first refusal, 
his failure to disclose to Alioto that the agreement actually 
gave them an option to purchase the Jackson Street property for 
a specific price to be exercised at their sole discretion 
constituted an actionable failure to speak when disclosure was 
required and "fulfill[ed] the elements of misrepresentation."  
In essence, the courts in the Alioto litigation concluded that 
Attorney Balistrieri took advantage of his superior knowledge of 
business and the law to obtain an agreement from an older 
relative that would have benefitted him and his brother 
financially and then sued her to enforce that agreement.  There 
is no basis to attack and relitigate those conclusions in this 
proceeding.   
¶56 We conclude that engaging in misrepresentation in 
order to take advantage of a less sophisticated person, 
especially one with whom there is a fiduciary relationship, does 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
32 
 
not show a moral character of the type needed to practice law in 
this state, SCR 22.31(1)(a), does not constitute conduct that is 
exemplary and above reproach, SCR 22.29(4)(e), and does not 
demonstrate that Attorney Balistrieri has a proper attitude 
toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar 
and 
will 
act 
in 
conformity 
with 
those 
standards, 
SCR 22.29(4)(f).  Such conduct also does not befit a person who 
"can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts 
and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to 
represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence."  SCR 22.29(4)(g). 
¶57 We recognize that, unlike the 1995 reinstatement 
proceeding, Attorney Balistrieri did present testimony and 
letters from a significant number of individuals in support of 
this reinstatement petition.  We also acknowledge that the 
record contains evidence that Attorney Balistrieri has engaged 
in some charitable activities, including serving as a director 
and president of a golf tournament that raises money for high 
school scholarships to private schools.   
¶58 In the end, however, this reinstatement proceeding is 
governed by the rules and standards contained in this court's 
rules.  Those rules require Attorney Balistrieri to prove that 
he has satisfied all of the requisite standards by clear and 
convincing evidence.  For the reasons described above, we 
conclude that he has failed to meet his burden to prove that he 
possesses the requisite moral character to practice law in this 
state, that his conduct since the revocation of his license has 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
33 
 
been exemplary and above reproach, that he has a proper 
understanding of and attitude toward the standards imposed upon 
members of the bar, that he will act in conformity with those 
standards, and that he can be safely recommended as a person fit 
to be consulted by others, to represent them, and to otherwise 
act in matters of trust and confidence. 
¶59 The final issue to be addressed is the matter of the 
costs of this proceeding.  The OLR submitted a statement of 
costs indicating that the total costs of the proceeding, as of 
February 4, 2013, were $41,459.40.  It recommended that Attorney 
Balistrieri be required to pay the full costs of the proceeding, 
consistent with the court's general policy of imposing the costs 
of reinstatement proceedings on the petitioning attorney.  It 
noted that this proceeding involved a large amount of discovery 
and a highly contentious evidentiary hearing.   
¶60 Attorney Balistrieri objected to the imposition of 
costs.  He first argued that he should not be required to pay 
any of the costs of this reinstatement proceeding because the 
referee had recommended that his license should be reinstated.  
Attorney Balistrieri analogized this reinstatement proceeding to 
a disciplinary proceeding where no misconduct is found.  Since 
SCR 22.24(1m) states that this court's general policy is to 
impose costs "upon a finding of misconduct," costs are not 
imposed where no misconduct is found and a disciplinary 
complaint is dismissed.  Attorney Balistrieri reasoned that 
receiving a recommendation for the reinstatement of his license 
was similar to a finding of no misconduct, and therefore he 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
34 
 
should not be required to pay any costs.  Moreover, he noted 
that while the OLR had opposed his petition before the referee, 
it 
did 
not 
appeal 
the 
referee's 
recommendation 
for 
reinstatement, making it inequitable to impose costs on him. 
¶61 The referee does not agree with Attorney Balistrieri's 
argument that no costs should be imposed, noting that this court 
has imposed costs in cases where referees had recommended denial 
and this court has nonetheless ultimately granted reinstatement. 
¶62 This argument by Attorney Balistrieri is easily 
dispatched.  It is this court that makes the final determination 
on a reinstatement petition, and we have determined that 
Attorney Balistrieri's petition must be denied.  Thus, his 
argument is no longer supported by the facts.  Moreover, this 
court's general policy has been to impose full costs on the 
attorney petitioning for reinstatement even where the referee 
recommends reinstatement and this court grants reinstatement.  
See SCR 22.24(1m); see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Ouchakof, 
2013 
WI 
48, 
¶16, 
347 
Wis. 
2d 
604, 
830 N.W.2d 677; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 
2012 WI 41, ¶37, 340 Wis. 2d 248, 812 N.W.2d 511.  The 
reinstatement 
proceeding 
is 
a 
result 
of 
the 
attorney's 
misconduct that required the imposition of a suspension or 
revocation in the first place.  It is therefore generally proper 
to impose the costs of a formal reinstatement proceeding upon 
the attorney seeking reinstatement. 
¶63 Alternatively, Attorney Balistrieri argues that the 
OLR's requested cost amount that is assessed against him should 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
35 
 
be "significantly less than the full costs claimed" because the 
OLR's costs are excessive.  Again, Attorney Balistrieri bases 
his argument for a reduction in costs on the fact that a 
significant portion of the OLR's time was spent in investigating 
and litigating issues that the referee found to be of minimal 
significance or found unpersuasive.   
¶64 The 
referee 
agrees 
with 
this 
part 
of 
Attorney 
Balistrieri's argument.  The referee notes that the applicable 
rule now in effect envisions a procedure whereby the referee 
considers the parties' submissions on costs and makes a 
recommendation. 
 
He 
therefore 
concludes 
that 
under 
the 
appropriate circumstances, it is proper to reduce the amount of 
costs requested by the OLR.  He believes that the OLR "treated 
this matter as some sort of tax court hearing rather than a 
reinstatement proceeding," which resulted in substantial amounts 
of time and money being spent on document requests, expert 
witness preparation, depositions of expert witnesses, and 
hearing testimony regarding the tax issues.  Since the referee 
concluded that the tax issues were not of any real importance 
because the IRS had not challenged Attorney Balistrieri's tax 
returns, he recommends that the OLR's fees and costs related to 
tax issues should be eliminated from any cost assessment.  
Specifically, he recommends that the court not impose any of the 
fees paid to the OLR's expert witness or any of the court-
reporting fees for discovery depositions.  To avoid going 
through the invoices of the OLR's counsel, he recommends that 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
36 
 
OLR's counsel fees simply be reduced by one-half.  This results 
in a recommended cost total of $19,215.51.   
¶65 As demonstrated above, however, we have disagreed with 
the referee's view that certain issues, including the tax 
issues, were of little significance in determining whether 
Attorney Balistrieri met his burden of satisfying the standards 
for reinstatement.  We therefore will not reduce the cost amount 
for this reason. 
¶66 With respect to whether the OLR's costs were simply 
excessive, Attorney Balistrieri does make reference to a few 
specific numbers in his objection, both hours expended by the 
OLR's 
counsel 
and 
its 
expert 
witness 
as 
well 
as 
the 
corresponding cost amounts.  He does not, however, provide any 
specific reasons why those amounts are too high, except to 
assert that they related to issues that the referee found to 
have little significance, which we have already rejected as a 
reason to reduce the costs.  SCR 22.24(2) ("A respondent [or an 
attorney petitioning for reinstatement] who objects to a 
statement of costs must explain, with specificity, the reasons 
for the objection . . . .").  He also does not state what he 
would consider a reasonable amount of time or fees spent on 
those issues or tasks.  Id. (a respondent attorney in a 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
or 
an 
attorney 
petitioning 
for 
reinstatement who objects to costs "must state what he or she 
considers to be a reasonable amount of costs").  Consequently, 
we will not reduce the cost assessment on this ground. 
No. 
1984AP970-D 
 
37 
 
¶67 Finally, Attorney Balistrieri asks for a reduction in 
the costs because of the financial burden it will impose on him 
and his family.  He contends that the testimony received at the 
evidentiary hearing shows that he is not a wealthy man.  Plus, 
he notes that he has already incurred a substantial amount of 
attorney fees for his own counsel in this reinstatement 
proceeding.  In situations where an attorney has limited 
financial 
resources 
to 
pay 
the 
costs 
associated 
with 
a 
disciplinary 
or 
reinstatement 
proceeding, 
this 
court 
has 
generally not reduced the cost award simply for that reason.  
Doing so shifts the burden for those costs to all of the other 
lawyers in the state who must pay an annual cost assessment for 
the lawyer regulatory system in order to maintain their law 
licenses.  The court's general policy in such situations is to 
direct the attorney to provide financial information to the OLR 
and to try to negotiate a payment plan for the payment of the 
costs over time.  We follow that policy here. 
¶68 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reinstatement of 
the license of John J. Balistrieri to practice law in Wisconsin 
is denied. 
¶69 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 120 days of the date 
of this order, John J. Balistrieri shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
this 
reinstatement 
proceeding. 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶70 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In an attorney 
reinstatement proceeding, the referee is the finder of fact.  It 
is the responsibility of the referee to scrutinize and to weigh 
the testimony of the witnesses and to determine the effect of 
the evidence as a whole.  We are to defer to the referee's 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against David V. Jennings, III, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 
334 Wis. 2d 335, 801 N.W.2d 304. 
¶71 The majority correctly sets forth the standard of 
review in reinstatement proceedings:  we do not overturn a 
referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Per curiam, ¶3.   Nevertheless, the majority seems to ignore it.  
In 
rejecting 
the 
referee's 
"strong" 
recommendation 
that 
Balistrieri's license be reinstated, the majority fails to 
adequately explain why the referee's findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Instead, it retries the case and reassesses 
credibility. 
¶72 In giving the requisite deference to the role of the 
referee as the trier of fact and in correctly applying the 
standard of review, I conclude that the referee's findings are 
not clearly erroneous.  I would accept the referee's findings 
and grant Balistrieri's reinstatement petition.  
¶73 During the three days of the evidentiary hearing, the 
referee listened to live testimony from 13 "distinguished 
lawyer[] and non-lawyer[]" witnesses who supported Attorney 
Balistrieri's reinstatement.  Referee Report, ¶27.  The OLR 
examined Balistrieri adversely and called just one witness.  In 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
2 
 
addition to the live testimony, the referee received seven 
letters in support of reinstatement from people who did not 
testify at the hearing.  Balistrieri's sister wrote two letters 
opposing reinstatement.  After hearing all of the testimony and 
reading all of the letters, the referee "strongly" recommended 
that Balistrieri's petition for reinstatement be granted.  
Referee report, ¶47.  The OLR did not appeal the referee's 
recommendation.   
¶74 The referee found that Balistrieri had proven by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he had met the 
criteria for reinstatement set forth in SCRs 22.29(4)(a)-(g) and 
22.31(1)(a).  The referee found that (1) he sincerely desires to 
have his license reinstated, (2) he has not practiced law during 
the period of his suspension and revocation, (3) he has complied 
with the terms of the suspension and revocation orders, (4) he 
has maintained competence and learning in the law, (5) he has 
demonstrated that he has the moral character to practice law in 
this state, (6) his conduct since the revocation of his license 
has been exemplary and above reproach, (7) he has a proper 
understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are 
imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with 
them, and (8) he can be safely recommended as a person fit to 
represent clients and to aid in the administration of justice in 
this state.   
¶75 The 
majority, 
however, 
states 
that 
it 
is 
"not 
persuaded." 
In reassessing credibility, the majority asserts 
that the "record reveals a pattern of a lack of acceptance of 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
3 
 
responsibility over the years that have passed since Attorney 
Balistrieri's 
conviction." 
Per 
curiam, 
¶22. 
 
It 
cites 
Balistrieri's 
response 
to 
BAPR's 
recommendation 
against 
reinstatement in 1995 and his answer to a question in a 2002 
deposition.  Id., ¶¶22-23.  The majority grudgingly notes that 
Balistrieri testified he "made a mistake," but then quotes 
Balistrieri's testimony that "from my perspective, I really 
didn't do anything."  Id., ¶25. 
¶76 The referee wrote that in the 1996 reinstatement 
proceeding, "one sees a man who by his own admission 'was angry 
and felt cheated and felt [he] had been handed a raw deal.'"  
The 
referee 
quoted 
Balistrieri's 
testimony 
to 
show 
that 
"[t]oday, Balistrieri sees things differently:   
You know, the judgment of the court was the judgment 
of the court, which I accept, you know.  I was 
sentenced to a prison term which I served.  I don't 
have that hostility or that feeling of being cheated 
or of being treated unfairly.  I accept all that.  And 
I made a promise to myself two years ago to drop all 
the anger, to drop all the resentment, and to accept 
things as they are, to recognize that if the court 
found that, then that was a justified determination, 
and I must bear the penalty for it.  You know, it was 
nobody's fault but my own.  I made a mistake – people 
are not perfect – and I paid for it.  And now I hope 
to rehabilitate in the last years of my life my 
career, and my reputation.   
Referee report, ¶26, quoting Tr. p. 476.   
¶77 The referee further explained that the record in this 
reinstatement proceeding was profoundly different than the 
record 
in 
a 
prior 
reinstatement 
proceeding. 
 
Thirteen 
"distinguished lawyers and non-lawyers" testified in support of 
Balistrieri's 
reinstatement 
and 
seven 
more 
wrote 
letters 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
4 
 
supporting reinstatement.  They all believed he had the moral 
character necessary to practice law and that he met the criteria 
for reinstatement.  The referee wrote:   
"[T]he record in this 2012 proceeding stands in stark 
contrast to the record in the 1996 reinstatement 
proceeding.  In 1996, Balistrieri and his brother were 
the 
only 
live 
witnesses. 
 
In 
2012, 
thirteen 
distinguished lawyers and non-lawyers testified live 
in support of Balistrieri's petition.  In 1996, the 
U.S. Attorney, the Wisconsin Attorney General and the 
Milwaukee District Attorney all wrote letters opposing 
reinstatement.  In 2012, only Balistrieri's estranged 
sister wrote two letters in opposition.  Besides the 
thirteen attorneys who testified, seven more wrote 
letters in support of Balistrieri's current petition.  
In short, the record in 2012 is most impressive and 
overwhelmingly supports reinstatement." 
Referee Report, ¶27.     
¶78 In finding that Balistrieri had demonstrated by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he met the criteria 
for reinstatement set forth in SCR 22.31, the referee summarized 
the oral and written statements made in support of Balistrieri's 
reinstatement.  Below is a mere sampling of some of those 
statements.  They represent statements from some of the most 
distinguished attorneys in this state. 
 Attorney 
1: 
"Since 
[Balistrieri's] 
criminal 
conviction, he has led an exemplary life without any 
further involvement or any negative influence. . . .  
Without reservation, I completely and fully endorse 
and recommend his reinstatement of his law license." 
 Attorney 2:  "I strongly recommend that [Balistrieri] 
be admitted to the State Bar of Wisconsin.  He is 
intelligent, trustworthy and honest.  He works hard at 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
5 
 
every task he assumes and, even though not practicing 
law, continues to recognize lawyers' duties to clients 
and to the profession." 
 Attorney 3:  "I highly recommend that you allow for 
[Balistrieri's] reinstatement.  I am 100% confident 
that he will practice law in an utmost ethical manner 
. . . ." 
 Attorney 4: "I sincerely believe that it was a 
privilege for me to meet and work with Mr. Balistrieri 
and I highly recommend that he be reinstated.  He is 
truly an asset to the legal profession."   
¶79 Based upon the referee's credibility determinations 
and the weight he gave the witnesses' testimony, together with 
his findings of fact, I conclude there is only one proper result 
here:  granting Balistrieri's petition for reinstatement.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
No.  1984AP970-D.awb 
 
 
 
1