Title: Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-
4543.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4543 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE DUBLIN CITY SCHOOLS, APPELLEE, v. 
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES;  
EAST BANK CONDOMINIUMS II, L.L.C., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4543.] 
Taxation—Valuation of real property—Burden of proof—Burden to present 
competent and probative evidence—Board of Tax Appeals acted 
unreasonably and unlawfully in reinstating county auditor’s valuation. 
(No. 2012-1432—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided October 16, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2009-Q-1282  
through 2009-Q-1301 and 2009-Q-1408. 
____________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} East Bank Condominiums II, L.L.C. (“East Bank”) appeals from a 
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) reversing the property valuation of 
the Franklin County Board of Revision regarding 21 condominium units and 
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reinstating the county auditor’s valuation of those condominium units as 
requested by the countercomplaints filed by the Dublin City Schools Board of 
Education.  Many of the 21 units remained unfinished to varying degrees as of the 
2008 tax lien date.  Specifically, we are concerned with whether the BTA 
properly utilized the auditor’s valuation of the 21 units when the only evidence in 
the record appears to negate the auditor’s determination.  Because the property 
owner presented expert evidence of valuation and because the board of education 
failed to present any evidence, we reverse the determination of the BTA and 
establish the 2008 valuation in accordance with the property owner’s evidence of 
$3,100,000. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} East Bank began construction of the East Bank II condominium 
complex in 2006.  The business plan involved first completing the construction of 
the building’s infrastructure and then completing each of its 28 condominium 
units to suit the buyer.  According to East Bank, as of January 1, 2008, the tax lien 
date, three of the 28 units were completed and sold, four units were finished but 
unsold, and 21 units remained unsold and unfinished. 
{¶ 3} The Franklin County auditor assessed the true value of each parcel 
individually for the tax year 2008 and determined that the aggregate true value of 
the 21 units was $8,139,300.  East Bank objected and filed complaints for each of 
the unfinished and unsold units, challenging the valuation of the property with the 
board of revision.  Subsequently, the school board filed countercomplaints 
seeking to retain the auditor’s valuation of the condominium units. 
{¶ 4} At the board of revision hearing, East Bank presented the 
testimony of East Bank managing partner George Babyak, as well as the appraisal 
report and testimony of Thomas Horner.  Although an attorney representing the 
board of education appeared at the board of revision hearing and cross-examined 
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3 
 
Babyak, the board of education did not present any witnesses or additional 
information regarding the valuation of the property. 
{¶ 5} Thus, the only evidence of value presented at the hearing came 
from Horner’s appraisal and testimony.  Using a “condominium analysis,” Horner 
opined that the 21 units had a “net present market value” or “as-is value” of 
$3,100,000.  Horner testified that he considered the 21 units as a “single economic 
unit” because they are “owned by one owner” and “[t]hat owner can only sell all 
units at one time to one investor.”  He utilized a comparable sales analysis using 
condominium sales and marketing activity of East Bank I and East Bank II, and 
then made reductions based on the estimated cost to finish the remaining units.  
This analysis yielded “gross sale proceeds” of $6,492,294.  Considering the units 
to be a “single economic unit,” Horner applied what he called a “bulk discount” to 
arrive at an estimated value of $3,100,000, which is approximately 48 percent of 
$6,492,294. 
{¶ 6} After its review, the board of revision accepted Horner’s valuation 
of $3,100,000 as the total fair market value for the 21 units, stating, “We were 
given no additional information on behalf of the county complainant school board 
in this matter, and * * * we recognize Mr. Horner as being an expert in the area of 
real estate appraisal.”  The school board then appealed the board of revision’s 
decision to the BTA. 
{¶ 7} At the BTA hearing, East Bank once again presented Babyak and 
Horner as witnesses.  At that time, Horner had additional data from condominium 
sales occurring in the four-year period after the tax lien date.  He testified to a 
revised cash flow analysis using the actual historical sales, which included 
investor discounts for some units ranging from $75,000 to $105,800.  Taking into 
account the various investor discounts and the construction costs to complete the 
units, he retrospectively concluded that the cash flow analysis resulted in a value 
of $2,900,000. 
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{¶ 8} Although the board of education’s attorney cross-examined 
Babyak and Horner during the BTA hearing, the school board did not present any 
witnesses, evidence of its own valuation, or evidence in support of the auditor’s 
valuation. 
{¶ 9} After reviewing the evidence, the BTA concluded that East Bank 
“failed to present competent and probative evidence to either this board or the 
BOR in support of its requested decreases in value.”  Bd. of Edn. of the Dublin 
City Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA Nos. 2009-Q-1282 through 
2009-Q-1301 and 2009-Q-1408, 2012 WL 3166815, *6 (July 24, 2012).  
Specifically, the BTA found that Horner’s use of the bulk discount was improper 
under M/I Homes of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 
2009-V-3796, 2010 WL 3724159 (Sept. 21, 2010).  Id. at *5.  It further 
determined that it could not rely on the rest of Horner’s appraisal report for 
multiple reasons.  Id.  First, the BTA took issue with the fact that Horner’s 
calculation of each parcel’s value was based on comparable sales of units within 
East Bank I and East Bank II, but the report contained withdrawn listings and 
listing prices—not sale prices—of the East Bank I units.  Id.  Second, it found no 
evidence that the “cost to finish,” which Horner deducted from each unit’s 
estimated retail price, conformed to market costs.  Id.  And third, in response to 
East Bank’s argument that the auditor had assessed the units as finished units as 
opposed to unfinished units, the BTA held that it could not make the appropriate 
adjustments to the valuation since there was no evidence as to the completion 
percentage of each unit.  Id. at *6.  It therefore reversed the board of revision’s 
adjustments and reinstated the auditor’s valuation of the 21 units.  Id. 
{¶ 10} East Bank appealed the BTA’s decision to this court, contending 
first that the BTA’s decision is unlawful and unreasonable because it reverted to 
the auditor’s value when the board of education had introduced no evidence in 
support of the auditor’s valuation.  Second, East Bank argues that the BTA did not 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
hold the board of education to its burden of proof and that it improperly shifted 
the burden of proof to East Bank.  Third, East Bank asserts that the BTA erred as 
a matter of law by precluding the use of bulk discount factors in East Bank’s 
valuation and that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully by not valuing the 
21 units as a single economic unit.  Next, East Bank maintains that the record 
demonstrates that the units were unfinished on the tax lien date and also 
establishes the costs to complete the units, and it urges that the BTA acted 
unreasonably and unlawfully in not applying a discount based upon unfinished 
property.  Finally, East Bank argues that the BTA abused its discretion in 
rejecting the board of revision’s determination that East Bank presented the 
requisite evidence of value. 
{¶ 11} In response, the board of education asserts that Horner’s appraisal 
is an “investment value appraisal,” which “does not constitute competent and 
probative evidence of the true value of real property.”  The board of education 
further argues that because East Bank did not satisfy its initial burden to prove 
that Horner’s appraisal evidenced the true value of the property, the BTA did not 
improperly shift the burden of proof to East Bank.  The board of education also 
maintains that “[t]he BTA is not required to accept the opinion of an appraiser 
concerning the cost to finish a condominium unit without any facts or figures to 
support that opinion or that the true value of the unit must be reduced on a dollar-
for-dollar basis by the amount of the costs to finish the unit.” 
{¶ 12} Thus, we must decide whether the BTA properly reinstated the 
auditor’s valuation of the condominium units at issue. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 5717.04, this court reviews decisions of the BTA 
to determine whether they are “reasonable and lawful.”  Our review of a question 
of law is not deferential but de novo.  Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10.  
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This court will affirm a decision of the BTA only if the BTA correctly applies the 
law.  HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-
Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 13.  And, we will uphold the BTA’s determination 
of fact if the record contains reliable and probative evidence supporting the 
BTA’s determination.  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 
856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14. 
Burdens of Proof 
{¶ 14} We have established that the taxpayer bears the burden to establish 
the right to a deduction and a taxpayer is “ ‘not entitled to the deduction claimed 
merely because no evidence is adduced contra his claim.’ ”  Dayton-Montgomery 
Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-
Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 15, quoting W. Industries, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 170 Ohio St. 340, 342, 164 N.E.2d 741 (1960). 
{¶ 15} When a party appeals a board of revision’s decision to the BTA, 
the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of education, has the burden to 
prove its right to a reduction or increase in the board of revision’s determination 
of value.  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 90 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 740 N.E.2d 276 (2001).  To prevail on appeal 
before the BTA, the appellant must present “competent and probative evidence” 
supporting the value the appellant asserts.  Id. 
{¶ 16} In this case, East Bank had the burden to prove its right to a 
reduction when it challenged the auditor’s valuation of the 21 units before the 
board of revision.  See Dayton-Montgomery at ¶ 15.  To meet this burden, East 
Bank presented testimony from its managing partner and an appraiser.  The board 
of revision adopted East Bank’s valuation, thereby shifting the burden of going 
forward with evidence to the board of education on appeal to the BTA to present 
“competent and probative evidence to make its case.”  Columbus City School 
Dist. at 566.  However, the board of education did not present any evidence to 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
support its own valuation or the auditor’s valuation and instead chose to attack 
Horner’s valuation through cross-examination.  The board of education thereby 
failed to sustain its burden.  Since the board of education failed to meet its burden 
on appeal and the only evidence in the record—the testimony of Babyak and 
Horner—negates the auditor’s determination, we now turn to the question of 
whether the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully by reinstating the auditor’s 
valuation. 
Reinstatement of the Auditor’s Valuation 
{¶ 17} In FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 31, we 
explained:  “[T]he auditor’s initial determination of value for a given tax year 
possesses an increment of prima-facie probative force.”  But, when a taxpayer 
presents evidence contrary to the auditor’s valuation and no evidence is offered to 
support the auditor’s valuation, the BTA may not simply reinstate the auditor’s 
determination.  Dayton-Montgomery, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 
N.E.2d 22, at ¶ 27; Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 
Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 11-12.  Instead, “once the 
BTA had determined that the record contained evidence tending to negate the 
county’s original valuation, the BTA’s duty was to ‘determine whether the record 
as developed by the parties contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit an 
independent valuation of the property.’ ”  Vandalia-Butler City Schools Bd. of 
Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 
958 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 26, quoting Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial 
Village I”), ¶ 25.  Here, the board of education produced no evidence to support 
its valuation or the auditor’s valuation of the units, nor did it identify the 
procedures or methods the auditor used in valuing those units. 
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{¶ 18} In Dayton-Montgomery, the port authority challenged the auditor’s 
valuation before the board of revision, which slightly decreased the value of the 
property.  After rejecting the port authority’s valuation as “incomplete” and the 
board of revision’s adjustment as lacking a “credible explanation,” the BTA had 
reinstated the auditor’s valuation.  Id. at ¶ 9.  In reversing, we held that  
 
when the evidence presented to the board of revision or the BTA 
contradicts the auditor’s determination in whole or in part, and 
when no evidence has been adduced to support the auditor’s 
valuation, the BTA may not simply revert to the auditor’s 
determination.  Whenever it does so, the BTA is acting unlawfully 
by making a finding of value that is affirmatively contradicted by 
the only evidence in the record. 
 
Id. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 19} We reaffirmed this principle in Bedford.  Relying on our holding in 
Dayton-Montgomery, we found that the BTA’s reinstatement of the auditor’s 
determination of value as the default value was “not justified, because the 
taxpayer had presented evidence contrary to the auditor’s determination to the 
board of revision.”  Bedford at ¶ 12.  We found that the evidence the board of 
education presented on appeal to the BTA, which simply consisted of testimony 
suggesting that the parcel at issue should be valued not individually but instead in 
conjunction with other parcels, “did not amount to independent evidence of value 
that would undermine the BOR’s determination” and “did not support reinstating 
the auditor’s valuation, because the auditor did not value the property in 
conjunction with other parcels any more than the BOR did.”  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 20} During oral argument, the board of education directed the court to 
our decision in Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196 (“Colonial Village II”), to 
assert that if the evidence presented is not reliable and is not probative, then the 
BTA should revert to the auditor’s valuation as the default value.  The board of 
education’s application of Colonial Village II to this case is misplaced.  First, the 
facts of Colonial Village II are distinguishable from the facts of this case because 
there, the board of revision initially adopted the auditor’s valuation.  Id. at ¶ 18.  
Thus, after finding that the taxpayer had not met its burden on appeal, the BTA 
affirmed the conclusion of the board of revision in reinstating the auditor’s 
valuation.  In contrast, here, the board of revision adopted the taxpayer’s 
valuation.  Since East Bank presented competent, credible evidence of valuation 
and other evidence negating the auditor’s valuation and the board of education did 
not present any evidence to support its valuation or the auditor’s valuation, the 
BTA abused its discretion in reinstating the auditor’s valuation.  Second, the 
board of education fails to recognize that while we stated in Colonial Village II 
that “the BTA is justified in retaining the county’s valuation of the property when 
an appellant fails to sustain its burden of proof at the BTA,” id. at ¶ 23, we then 
acknowledged that an exception to this general rule arises when the record 
affirmatively negates the validity of the county’s valuation.  Id. at ¶ 24.  This case 
falls under that exception as well because East Bank established a different 
valuation and the board of education offered no evidence to support its valuation 
or the auditor’s valuation. 
{¶ 21} As in Dayton-Montgomery and Bedford, the BTA’s reinstatement 
of the auditor’s valuation was “not justified, because the taxpayer had presented 
evidence contrary to the auditor’s determination to the board of revision.”  
Bedford, 115 Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913, at ¶ 12.  In 
Vandalia-Butler, we clarified our holding in Bedford and explained:  “Even if 
some evidence tends to negate the auditor’s valuation, it is proper to revert to that 
valuation when the BTA finds that the owner has not proved a lower value and 
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there is otherwise ‘no evidence from which the BTA can independently determine 
value.’ ”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Id., 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 
N.E.2d 131, at ¶ 24, quoting Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 47, 49, 689 N.E.2d 22 (1998).  But here, evidence existed from which the 
BTA could independently determine value.  It is clear from a review of the record 
that the auditor’s valuation of the property was too high.  Specifically, there is no 
evidence indicating that the auditor accounted for the unfinished state of the units 
or the units’ depreciation in value due to market conditions, and the historical 
sales evidence provided by East Bank further contradicts the auditor’s valuation. 
{¶ 22} Under Ohio law, “[i]f a building, structure, fixture or other 
improvement to land is under construction on January first of any year, its 
valuation shall be based upon its value or percentage of completion as it existed 
on January first.” (Emphasis added).  Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-06(G).  East 
Bank asserts that the majority of the 21 units were 50 percent complete, two units 
were 60 percent complete, and two units were 80 percent complete. 
{¶ 23} In response to East Bank’s argument that the auditor assessed the 
units based on the full finished retail value of the unit, the BTA held that “no 
evidence has been provided as to the completion percentage of each unit to allow 
this board to make appropriate adjustments to the properties’ values.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Bd. of Edn. of the Dublin City Schools, 2012 WL 3166815, at *6.  But 
this finding of the BTA contradicts the record, which contains evidence of 
completion percentages of the units.  East Bank provided competent evidence as 
to the completion percentages.  Horner accounted for these in his appraisal and 
both Horner and Babyak testified regarding the unfinished state of the units.  In 
addition, a review of the property record cards indicates that the auditor 
considered 16 of the units to be only 85 percent complete as of the tax lien date.  
However, the record is unclear as to whether the auditor made adjustments for the 
costs for completion in his valuation.  Since the record contains evidence 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
regarding the completion percentages and there is no evidence to demonstrate that 
the auditor actually factored the completion percentages into the assessed 
valuation, the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in reinstating that 
valuation. 
{¶ 24} There is also no indication that the auditor considered the 
property’s depreciation in value due to the downturn in the economy.  Horner’s 
appraisal provides a “Residential Market Summary,” which explains the 
substantial drop in “residential activity” for condominiums and single family 
homes between 2006 and 2007.  Horner also testified that “[b]etween the time that 
this building was proposed, planned and built, the market dropped significantly.”  
Further demonstrating the difficult market, East Bank in 2008 considered selling 
the entire building, including the 21 condominium units at issue, because of the 
downturn in the economy.  East Bank did not pursue the informal offers it 
received ranging from $1.5 million to $3 million, because these amounts would 
not have covered the loan value.  Considering the market conditions presented 
before the board of revision and the BTA and the absence of any evidence in the 
record addressing whether the auditor took those market conditions into account, 
additional grounds exist for determining that the BTA unreasonably adopted the 
auditor’s valuation. 
{¶ 25} Lastly, the actual historical sales raise doubt as to the accuracy of 
the auditor’s valuation.  Many of the sales of East Bank II condominiums 
occurring after the tax lien date involved investor discounts ranging from $75,000 
to $105,800.  Using these sales figures and the actual construction costs to 
complete the units, Horner opined at the BTA hearing that the cash flow analysis 
resulted in a value of $2,900,000.  This evidence further demonstrates that the 
auditor’s valuation does not reflect the true market value. 
{¶ 26} When confronted with such clear evidence negating the auditor’s 
valuation, the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in adopting the auditor’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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valuation rather than determining the taxable value of the property.  It acted 
“unlawfully by making a finding of value that is affirmatively contradicted by the 
only evidence in the record.”  Dayton-Montgomery, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-
Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, at ¶ 27. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} When a board of revision adopts the valuation of property 
presented by the taxpayer over the auditor’s valuation, the burden shifts to the 
contesting party on appeal to demonstrate the true value of the property.  When 
the party challenging a board of revision’s determination fails to present any 
evidence supporting its valuation or the auditor’s valuation and the only evidence 
in the record negates the auditor’s valuation, the BTA must determine if there is 
sufficient evidence in the entire record for the BTA to perform an independent 
analysis.  Here, the board of education did not present any evidence before the 
board of revision or the BTA.  Thus, it failed to meet its burden.  Because the 
evidence in the record negated the auditor’s valuation of the East Bank property 
and because evidence existed from which the BTA could have conducted its own 
independent valuation, it acted unreasonably and unlawfully in failing to do so 
and in instead reinstating the auditor’s valuation.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
determination of the BTA and adopt the only evidence of valuation contained in 
the record presented by East Bank through its expert, resulting in a valuation of 
$3,100,000. 1 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part.  
                                                 
1 We need not consider whether the bulk sale approach was appropriate in this instance because 
we determine that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in not conducting its own 
independent valuation of the property taking into account the unfinished state of some, if not all, 
of the units, the depreciation in value, and the sales history.   
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 28} Although I agree with the majority that the Board of Tax Appeals 
erred by reinstating the Franklin County auditor’s valuation of the 21 
condominiums at issue in this case (at an aggregate value of $8,139,300 for tax 
year 2008), I do not agree that the case law compels us to order reinstatement of 
the decision of the county board of revision.  I therefore concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 29} Appellant, East Bank Condominiums II, L.L.C., at the hearing 
before the board of revision presented the appraisal report and testimony of 
Thomas Horner.  The board of revision adopted Horner’s appraisal’s aggregate 
valuation of $3,100,000, which reflected not only an adjustment for the unfinished 
state of the condominiums, but also a decrease to 48 percent of what Horner 
termed the “gross sale proceeds” (sometimes called the “gross sale price”) of the 
unfinished units.  The BTA correctly found that although Horner’s “bulk 
discount” is an appropriate appraisal method for financial institutions that lend to 
condominium development projects, it does not apply to appraisals of real 
property for tax purposes under Ohio law.  Bd. of Edn. of Dublin City Schools v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA Nos. 2009-Q-1282 through 2009-Q-1301 and 
2009-Q-1408, 2012 WL 3166815, *5 (July 24, 2012) (“We believe East Bank’s 
reliance on * * * FIRREA guidance is misplaced; while it may be true that, for 
purposes of appraising properties for financing purposes, it is appropriate to apply 
a bulk discount, the present matter concerns appraisal for tax valuation 
purposes”).2  Moreover, the BTA has a duty to independently weigh evidence.  
                                                 
2 FIRREA is short for the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 
an act of Congress that in the wake of the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s enacted measures 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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That duty is critically important here because the deficiency in the Horner 
appraisal that the BTA identified is a legal flaw rather than a factual one, and 
therefore there was no necessity that the board of education present additional 
evidence to substantiate that flaw. 
{¶ 30} I would affirm the BTA’s decision to the extent that it rejected the 
bulk-sale approach to valuing the condominiums and thus dissent from the 
majority’s acceptance of that method of valuation.  However, I concur in the 
majority’s conclusion that the BTA should have determined a discount for the 
unfinished states of the condominiums on the tax-lien date.  To remedy that 
defect, I would reverse the BTA’s reinstatement of the auditor’s valuation and 
remand this cause to the BTA for determination of a proper percentage discount 
as required by Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-06(G). 
The Horner appraisal’s bulk-discount approach runs afoul of the  
well-established economic-unit doctrine 
{¶ 31} Because this case involves the valuation of 21 condominium units 
as of January 1, 2008, the analysis must begin with the recognition that each unit 
constitutes a separate parcel, in spite of the fact that they all are contained in a 
common building.  The division into separate parcels for property-taxation 
purposes is a requirement imposed by law.  “Each unit of a condominium 
property * * * is deemed a separate parcel for all purposes of taxation and 
assessment of real property.”  R.C. 5311.11. 
{¶ 32} In a county auditor’s capacity as assessor of the real estate tax, the 
auditor is charged with the duty to “view and appraise or cause to be viewed and 
appraised at its true value in money, each lot or parcel of real estate.”  R.C. 
5713.01(B).  Read together, Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution and 
R.C. 5713.03 require the auditor, when determining the true value of each parcel, 
                                                                                                                                     
designed in part to improve the integrity of lending practices.  Herbst v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
66 Ohio St.3d 8, 9, 607 N.E.2d 440 (1993). 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
to use either an actual arm’s-length sale price showing the value of the property or 
an appraisal determining what that sale price would be.  Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 50 Ohio St.2d 129, 363 N.E.2d 722 (1977), paragraph one of 
the syllabus; State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 
410, 412, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964); see also Berea City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979, 834 N.E.2d 
782, ¶ 9-10.  The Horner appraisal did not comply with this constitutional and 
statutory framework. 
{¶ 33} In the valuation section of the appraisal report, Horner stated that 
his appraisal aimed at determining “a bulk purchase value [that] represents what 
the owner would sell all of the units to a single purchaser [for].”  The report 
proceeded to explain that “[t]he investor,” i.e., the bulk purchaser, would then be 
“entitled to the future profit from the individual sales, but would also incur the 
cost of holding and selling the units during the absorption period.”  Given this 
premise for the appraisal, the BTA here justifiably relied on its earlier decision in 
M/I Homes of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2009-
V-3796, 2010 WL 3724159 (Sept. 21, 2010), to characterize Horner’s approach as 
“an analysis [that] arrives at an investment value, rather than real market value,” 
of the condominiums as parcels of real property.  2012 WL 3166815, at *4.  
Simply stated, the Horner appraisal did not value the individual condominiums in 
terms of what they would ultimately have sold for in the market.  Instead, the 
appraisal projected a bulk-sale price that a developer-buyer or an investor would 
have paid for all the units together.  That bulk price would inevitably have been 
less that the ultimate sale price of the individual units, because a bulk purchaser 
would have paid only an amount that would have yielded a profit once the 
condominiums were sold individually.  Thus, the actual sale prices were 
discounted to a current investment value, but our precedent is clear that it is the 
sale prices themselves that must be the properties’ values for tax purposes. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
{¶ 34} This discounting process becomes graphically visible later in the 
valuation section of the appraisal report, which shows the allocation of the “as-is 
price” to each condominium on a per-square-foot basis and then shows the 
discount taken for each condominium to 48 percent of that price.  In addressing a 
similar type of appraisal, the Oregon Supreme Court cogently stated that because 
a developer’s discount “reduces the market price of the properties by a rate of 
return based on expected profit, taking into account the expected time necessary 
to sell the lots,” it does not “assess the value of the properties if put to their 
highest and best use, but reduces their value to arrive at the value of the properties 
considered as an investment.”  First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. v. Dept. of 
Revenue, 306 Or. 450, 454-455, 760 P.2d 880 (1988). 
{¶ 35} Additional evidence that the bulk-discount analysis does not 
indicate the tax value of the individual units is found in Horner’s reliance on the 
FIRREA exhibit introduced at the BTA hearing.  That exhibit includes a 
statement that for a condominium building with five units or more, a financing 
institution “may not use the aggregate retail sales prices of the individual units as 
the market value to calculate the [loan-to-value] ratio.”  That is the rule on which 
Horner’s bulk discount is based.  It states in so many words that the bulk-discount 
valuation is not equivalent to the sale price of the condominiums.  However, the 
sale price must be the proper measure of value for tax purposes. 
{¶ 36} Under certain circumstances, Ohio law may permit multiple 
parcels to be valued as a single economic unit.  But those circumstances are not 
present here. 
{¶ 37} For example, in Park Ridge Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
29 Ohio St.3d 12, 504 N.E.2d 1116 (1987), this court noted that an “economic 
unit” for tax-valuation purposes may in some situations comprise multiple parcels 
or a portion of a larger parcel, and stated the test for determining a property’s 
status as an economic unit:  “For tax valuation purposes, property with a single 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
owner, for which the highest and best use is a single unit, constitutes a tract, lot, 
or parcel.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  See also 
Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 77 Ohio St.3d 402, 
404-406, 674 N.E.2d 696 (1997) (citing and applying the Park Ridge syllabus).  A 
determination to value a property as an economic unit therefore depends, as a 
matter of law, on a finding that the highest and best use of the parcels at issue 
consists of continued use under common ownership.  On this record, the BTA was 
justified in not making such a finding.  Indeed, no evidence in the record would 
have supported it. 
{¶ 38} Far from furnishing support for such a finding, Horner’s appraisal 
negates it.  Several statements in the appraisal indicate that the ultimate sales of 
the condominiums were anticipated to be as individual units.  Moreover, the 
section of Horner’s appraisal specifically discussing highest and best use states 
that “[b]ased on those uses that are legally permissible, physically possible and 
financially feasible, the maximally productive use of the site involves 28 total 
living units.”  Although this part of the appraisal does not explicitly state that the 
“living units” will be individually owned, the statement certainly does not assert 
that the highest and best use constitutes continued common ownership.  This case 
does not involve an apartment building, in which a single landlord owns the entire 
building and rents out individual units; this case involves condominiums.  Taken 
in context, the “highest and best use” determination must be that the 
condominiums will ultimately be individually owned and are not an economic 
unit. 
{¶ 39} In addition to Horner’s original appraisal, the majority refers to 
Horner’s analysis of actual subsequent sales that he later offered at the BTA 
hearing as though that analysis somehow corroborates the propriety of the bulk 
discount in the original appraisal.  It does not. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
{¶ 40} The majority fails to recognize that the subsequent-sale analysis 
merely repeats the very same flaw that the BTA identified in the original 
appraisal.  Once again, Horner does not value the individual units according to the 
price at which they would sell (or the price at which they did, in fact, sell).  
Rather, Horner for a second time discounts from that “retail” sale price to 
determine what an investor would have paid in bulk on January 1, 2008, with a 
view to making a profit.  The bulk-sale price of $2,900,000 that Horner presented 
to the BTA turned out to be lower than the $3,100,000 projected in the original 
appraisal because the sale prices turned out to be lower than projected. 
{¶ 41} On redirect examination during the BTA hearing, Horner 
confirmed this point.  He was asked whether the revised $2,900,000 figure 
“reduced lower the net present value [i.e., the bulk-discount valuation of 
$3,100,000] you came up with in your original appraisal.”  Horner answered:  
“Correct.”  Moreover, Horner testified that the subsequent sales indicated “an 
average of $146 per square foot.”  That number, projected over the 42,627 total 
square feet of the 21 units still to be sold as of January 1, 2008, would have 
amounted to gross sale proceeds for all 21 units of $6,223,542 (as opposed to the 
gross sale proceeds of $6,492,294 projected in the original appraisal).  Horner’s 
revised “net present value” of $2,900,000 was about 47 percent of the gross sale 
proceeds of $6,223,542, just as the original appraisal’s net present value of 
$3,100,000 was about 48 percent of $6,492,294.  Thus, the flawed methodology 
did not change, even though subsequent sales were used. 
{¶ 42} The BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in determining that the 
board of revision had erred by relying on the Horner appraisal’s bulk-discount 
approach.  I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion to the contrary. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
Because the BTA’s duty is to independently weigh the evidence, 
it may reverse a decision of a board of revision even if 
no new evidence is presented before the BTA 
{¶ 43} I also disagree with the majority’s view that because the board of 
education presented no new evidence at the BTA hearing to controvert the Horner 
appraisal, the BTA was required to affirm the board of revision’s decision to 
adopt that appraisal.  This reasoning cannot be reconciled with the BTA’s duty to 
perform a fully independent weighing of the evidence presented at all levels when 
determining the value of real property. 
{¶ 44} Although the majority opinion cites Vandalia-Butler City Schools 
Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-
5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, the holding in that case does not support the majority’s 
analysis. 
{¶ 45} In Vandalia-Butler, the property owner filed a complaint and 
presented evidence before the board of revision, just as in the present case.  Id. at 
¶ 3-4.  The board of revision adopted a lower valuation based on the owner’s 
evidence, just as in the present case.  Id. at ¶ 6.  At the BTA hearing, the board of 
education argued that the owner’s evidence was insufficient, but it presented no 
new evidence, just as in the present case.  Id. at ¶ 8-9. 
{¶ 46} Although the BTA expressed reservations about the quality of the 
evidence the owner had presented to the board of revision, the BTA stated the 
issue as whether there was sufficient evidence to support the board of revision’s 
determination.  Id. at ¶ 9.  The BTA ultimately adopted the board of revision’s 
valuation in spite of its explicit reservations.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 47} On appeal, we unanimously found error as a matter of law, vacated 
the BTA’s decision, and remanded to the BTA for further proceedings.  We stated 
that “the BTA’s crucial error in this case lay in its exclusive reliance on the 
BOR’s evaluation of the evidence rather than its own.”  Id. at ¶ 14.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
specifically faulted the BTA for exercising excessive deference to the board of 
revision’s decision.  Id. at ¶ 19.  On remand, we ordered the BTA to determine 
whether sufficient evidence permitted it to perform an independent valuation; if 
there was sufficient evidence, the BTA was to perform that valuation.  If there 
was not, the BTA was to revert to the auditor’s determination.  Id. at ¶ 26-28. 
{¶ 48} Our discussion in Vandalia-Butler of the independent role of the 
BTA should apply equally to the situation here.  Although the unfinished state of 
the condominiums had to be taken into account when valuing them, the majority 
fails to recognize the validity of the BTA’s reasonable and lawful rejection of the 
Horner appraisal’s bulk-discount approach.  The BTA’s duty to independently 
weigh evidence permitted it to reject that bulk-discount approach regardless of 
whether the school board presented further evidence before the BTA, and its 
decision should be affirmed to that extent.  Our precedent is clear and should be 
followed here. 
The BTA should have performed an independent determination of the 
discounted value of the condominiums because of their unfinished state 
{¶ 49} Finally, I concur with the majority that the BTA erred by failing to 
ensure that the value assigned to the condominiums reflected a discount based on 
their unfinished state as of January 1, 2008, the tax-lien date.  But instead of 
requiring reinstatement of the board of revision’s decision, which relied on the 
erroneous bulk-sale approach, this error calls for a remand to the BTA for a 
proper determination of the percentage discount required by Ohio Adm.Code 
5703-25-06(G), which provides that “[i]f a building, structure, fixture or other 
improvement to land is under construction on January first of any year, its 
valuation shall be based upon its value or percentage of completion as it existed 
on January first.” 
{¶ 50} The property-record cards in this case set forth percentage-of-
completion figures, but do not evidence whether the auditor properly applied a 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
discount.  Additionally, the Horner appraisal took into account the percentage of 
completion.  I would remand to the BTA with the instruction that the BTA 
perform an appropriate reduction to account for the unfinished state of the 
condominiums, basing its finding on the entire record or, if need be, on additional 
evidence adduced pursuant to the BTA’s authority to “make * * * investigation 
concerning the appeal” under R.C. 5717.01. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 51} I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the auditor’s valuation 
was too high, but dissent from the remainder of the majority’s opinion and its 
order that the board of revision’s valuation must be reinstated. 
LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 52} I join the separate opinion of Chief Justice O’Connor concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.  I also write to address additional concerns I have with 
the majority opinion. 
{¶ 53} I agree with the majority that the Dublin City Schools Board of 
Education failed to meet its burden of proof before the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”).  I also agree that the BTA erred when it adopted the auditor’s valuation.  
I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis as to why the board 
of education failed to meet its burden of proof.  The majority opinion implies that 
an auditor’s appraisal can never, by itself, constitute probative evidence of value.  
Because this holding contradicts our case law, I cannot endorse it. 
{¶ 54} I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to adopt 
East Bank’s valuation of the property, rather than remand this case to the BTA for 
an independent determination of value.  The majority accepts East Bank’s 
valuation without reason or analysis, and our case law requires a remand. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
ANALYSIS 
Burdens of Proof 
{¶ 55} In this case, the board of education sought retention of the 
auditor’s property valuation.  This valuation was based on the auditor’s separate 
appraisals for the condominium units.  All 21 appraisals were in the record before 
the BTA.  When the board of education appealed to the BTA, however, it 
produced no additional evidence supporting the auditor’s appraisals.  Based solely 
on the fact that the board of education produced no new evidence, the majority 
concludes that the board of education failed to meet its burden of proof before the 
BTA. 
{¶ 56} The majority’s conclusion assumes, incorrectly, that a BTA 
appellant seeking retention of an auditor’s valuation must necessarily support the 
auditor’s valuation with additional proof.  This assumption contradicts our 
precedent.  A party need not, as a matter of course in every case, confirm an 
auditor’s appraisal with further evidence in order to meet its burden of proof.  
Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 
2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196 (“Colonial Village II”), ¶ 30-31 (“we reiterate 
that the county does not have the affirmative burden to establish as a general 
matter the accuracy of any appraisals that underlie its valuation of the property” 
[emphasis sic]); Vandalia-Butler City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 24, fn. 3; 
Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 689 N.E.2d 22 
(1998).  To the contrary, an auditor’s appraisal can stand alone as probative 
evidence of value.  FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 31 (“the 
auditor’s initial determination of value for a given tax year possesses an increment 
of prima-facie probative force”). 
January Term, 2013 
23 
 
{¶ 57} We unanimously endorsed this principle in Vandalia-Butler.  
There, we explained that an appellant need not always affirmatively prove the 
accuracy of an auditor’s valuation to the BTA; the appellant’s burden may be 
merely to show that the board of revision erred.  Id. at ¶ 24, fn. 3.  Vandalia-
Butler dealt with a nearly identical set of facts:  a local school board sought 
retention of the auditor’s valuation, lost at the board of revision, appealed to the 
BTA, and produced no new supporting evidence to the BTA.  Id. at ¶ 3, 8-9.  On 
appeal to this court, the county-appellee advanced the same argument the majority 
accepts now—that the school board failed to meet its burden of proof at the BTA 
because it did not put forth any additional support for the auditor’s valuation.  Id. 
at ¶ 24, fn. 3.  We dismissed this argument, stating: 
 
[We] reject the county’s contention that the school board had the 
burden to prove the validity of the auditor’s valuation at the BTA.  
While it is true that the party that appeals to the BTA in a valuation 
case typically does bear the burden of showing a different value, 
* * * the school board’s appeal in this case rested upon a claim of 
legal error.  In prosecuting such a claim, the appellant’s burden is 
to show the presence of reversible error, and proof of a new value 
may not be necessary when the appeal seeks a return to the 
auditor’s valuation. 
 
(Citation omitted.)  Id.  Our precedent is clear.  A party need not always offer 
additional support for an auditor’s appraisal.3  The appraisal can, by itself, 
constitute probative evidence of value.4 
                                                 
3 During oral argument, East Bank’s counsel conceded that an auditor’s appraisal can be valid on 
its face, without supporting evidence. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
{¶ 58} There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.  See, e.g., Dayton-
Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 
281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 24.  This case presents one such 
exception:  an auditor’s valuation cannot stand alone when the record 
affirmatively negates the validity of the auditor’s appraisal.  Id. at ¶ 27; Colonial 
Village II, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, at ¶ 24.  In 
that scenario, a party must produce proof beyond the auditor’s appraisal.  Dayton-
Montgomery at ¶ 27, 30.  Here, we need not even consider East Bank’s evidence 
to determine that the auditor’s appraisal is invalid.  The appraisal is deficient on 
its face.  Specifically, the property-record cards do not indicate whether the 
auditor applied the percentage-of-completion discounts required by Ohio 
Adm.Code 5703-25-06(G).  Because of this deficiency, the board of education 
had to produce additional support for the auditor’s valuation.  It did not, thereby 
failing to meet its burden of proof. 
{¶ 59} I therefore concur with the majority in two respects:  (1) the board 
of education had to produce additional support for the auditor’s appraisal, and (2) 
because the board of education did not produce this support, it did not meet its 
burden of proof.  I cannot, however, join the majority’s analysis as to why the 
board of education had to produce more evidence.  The majority opinion suggests 
that a party must always produce additional support for an auditor’s appraisal.  
This approach contradicts our precedent.  I would hold that the board of education 
                                                                                                                                     
4 I also stress that an auditor’s appraisal does not lose probative value merely because a board of 
revision rejects it.  A board of revision’s decision “lack[s] * * * any presumption of validity.”  
Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 665 N.E.2d 1098 
(1996).  The decision does not, therefore, set a baseline that the parties start from once they reach 
the BTA.  Nor does it impose a handicap that the BTA appellant must overcome with new 
evidence.  The BTA reviews cases de novo, without giving any deference to what the board of 
revision decided.  Id. at 15; Vandalia-Butler, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 N.E.2d 
131, at ¶ 13-14, 19.   
 
January Term, 2013 
25 
 
had to produce more evidence in this case only because the auditor’s appraisal 
was deficient on its face. 
Remand Is the Proper Remedy 
{¶ 60} Because the auditor’s appraisal was deficient on its face and the 
board of education presented no evidence to cure the deficiency, the BTA erred in 
adopting the auditor’s valuation.  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 90 Ohio St.3d 564, 567, 740 N.E.2d 276 (2001) 
(the BTA cannot adopt a value that is unsupported by the record); Dayton-
Montgomery at ¶ 27 (“when the evidence * * * contradicts the auditor’s 
determination in whole or in part, and when no evidence has been adduced to 
support the auditor’s valuation, the BTA may not simply revert to the auditor’s 
determination”).  Instead, the BTA should have conducted its own analysis of the 
evidence and independently determined the taxable value of the property.  
Vandalia-Butler, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, at ¶ 26 
(“When there is sufficient evidence to permit the BTA to perform an independent 
valuation * * * the BTA must do so”); Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial 
Village I”), ¶ 23-25.  As the majority points out, at ¶ 23 of the opinion, the record 
appears to contain enough evidence for the BTA to independently determine 
value.  And as the chief justice notes in her separate opinion at ¶ 50, the BTA may 
always order the presentation of additional evidence if necessary.  R.C. 5717.01; 
Columbus City School Dist. at 567 (remanding to the BTA for an independent 
determination of value and noting that under R.C. 5717.01, the BTA “ ‘may order 
the hearing of additional evidence, and may make such investigation concerning 
the appeal as it deems proper’ ”). 
{¶ 61} The appropriate remedy for the BTA’s failure to conduct an 
independent valuation is, not surprisingly, a remand for the BTA to conduct an 
independent valuation.  Colonial Village I at ¶ 1 (ordering remand for the BTA to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
conduct an independent valuation of the property after the BTA had unlawfully 
upheld the auditor’s valuation); Vandalia-Butler at ¶ 27 (remanding because the 
BTA did not conduct an independent analysis of value); Dayton-Montgomery, 
113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, at ¶ 28 (remanding for the 
BTA to independently determine value).  Instead of ordering this remand, though, 
the majority summarily resolves this case by adopting the same valuation the 
board of revision adopted—East Bank’s $3,100,000 appraisal.  But the majority 
opinion offers no explanation as to why East Bank’s valuation is correct or as to 
how the majority arrived at this conclusion. 
{¶ 62} The majority could not have accepted East Bank’s valuation 
simply out of deference to the board of revision.  Decisions of boards of revision 
“lack * * * any presumption of validity.”  Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 665 N.E.2d 1098 (1996); see also Dayton-
Montgomery at ¶ 24.  This court would commit serious error if it accepted East 
Bank’s evidence “on the grounds that the board of revision was persuaded” by 
that evidence.  Vandalia-Butler at ¶ 14.  Doing so would constitute “the very 
deference that the case law prohibits.”  Id. 
{¶ 63} East Bank asserts that automatic deference to the board of revision 
is appropriate here because the board of education did not meet its burden of 
proof at the BTA.  This argument is unpersuasive.  The mere fact that the board of 
education failed to prove the legitimacy of its preferred value tells us only that the 
board of education’s value loses.  It does not tell us that the board of revision’s 
value wins.  In every case, the BTA must conduct a de novo review of the 
evidence and independently determine the taxable value of the property.  
Columbus Bd. of Edn. at 15; Vandalia-Butler, 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-
5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, at ¶ 13-14, 19. 
{¶ 64} Although the board of revision is not entitled to automatic 
deference, this court could still adopt the board of revision’s valuation if the court 
January Term, 2013 
27 
 
independently found that the record supports the board of revision’s decision.  
Vandalia-Butler at ¶ 21 (the board of revision’s value may be adopted “if and only 
if” the evidence is independently found to support the board of education’s value 
[emphasis sic]); Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 15.  But the majority does not 
make any such finding.  To the contrary, it openly declines to consider whether 
East Bank’s appraisal methods were appropriate.  Majority opinion at ¶ 27, fn. 1.  
The end result is puzzling:  the majority refuses to analyze whether East Bank’s 
appraisal was valid, but then—without explanation—accepts the appraisal as 
valid. 
{¶ 65} Ultimately, the majority could not adopt East Bank’s valuation 
based on deference to the board of revision, and it did not adopt East Bank’s 
valuation based on its own analysis of the evidence.  Furthermore, I agree with the 
chief justice that if the majority had reviewed the evidence, it would find that East 
Bank’s appraisal method was not valid.  Accordingly, our precedent compels a 
remand to the BTA. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 66} I concur in the majority’s holding that the board of education had 
to support the auditor’s valuation with additional evidence.  I also agree that 
because the board of education did not produce more evidence, it did not meet its 
burden of proof.  I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that 
it holds that the board of education was required to produce more evidence as a 
general rule.  The additional support is required in this case only because the 
auditor’s appraisal was deficient on its face.  I also respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s adoption of East Bank’s valuation.  There is no basis for adopting East 
Bank’s valuation, and the majority offers none.  We should vacate the BTA’s 
decision and remand for the BTA to conduct an independent determination of 
value. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Jeffrey A. Rich, and 
Karol C. Fox., for appellee Board of Education of the Dublin City Schools. 
 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and Matthew S. 
Zeiger, for appellant. 
________________________