Title: Acevedo v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1873 
____________ 
 
CARLOS J. ACEVEDO,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 18, 2017] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Acevedo v. State, 174 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Durant v. State, 94 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2012).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
that follow, we approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and 
disapprove of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal to the extent that it 
is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Carlos Acevedo was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery, three counts 
of lewd and lascivious molestation, and lewd and lascivious conduct.  The trial 
court found him to be a sexual predator and sentenced him to life in prison on each 
count, to run concurrently.  The trial court declared him to be a dangerous sexual 
felony offender (DSFO), pursuant to section 794.0115(2), Florida Statutes, and 
imposed a mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentence.  Acevedo, 174 So. 3d 
at 437.  Acevedo’s sentence was affirmed on direct appeal and, after the denial of 
his 3.850 motion, Acevedo filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that the predicate conviction used was insufficient to 
qualify him as a DSFO.  Id.  Specifically, Acevedo argued that the prior conviction 
under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1981), did not contain elements similar to 
section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2005), or section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes.  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed and certified conflict with the Fifth 
District’s decision in Durant.  Id. at 439.  This review follows. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The issue before this Court is whether, under the Dangerous Sexual Felony 
Offender Act, section 794.0115(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2005), a conviction for an 
offense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1981), constitutes a “similar offense 
under a former designation” to those offenses enumerated in the Act.  Because we 
 
 
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find that a “similar offense” for the purposes of the Act need not be an identical 
offense, we approve the Fourth District’s decision below.    
 
Because this is an issue of statutory interpretation, this Court’s review is de 
novo.  Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2014).   
 
The DSFO Act provides: 
Any person who is convicted of a violation of section 787.025; 
section 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); section 800.04(4) or (5); 
section 825.1025(2) or (3); section 827.071(2), (3), or (4); or section 
847.0145; or of any similar offense under a former designation, which 
offense the person committed when he or she was 18 years of age or 
older, and the person: . . .  
Has been previously convicted of a violation of section 
787.025; section 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); section 
800.04(4) or (5); section 825.1025(2) or (3); section 827.071(2), (3), 
or (4); section 847.0145; of any offense under a former statutory 
designation which is similar in elements to an offense described in 
this paragraph; or of any offense that is a felony in another 
jurisdiction, or would be a felony if that offense were committed in 
this state, and which is similar in elements to an offense described in 
this paragraph,  
is a dangerous sexual felony offender, who must be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and 
including, life imprisonment.   
§ 794.0115(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005).  In short, the DSFO Act states that anyone 
previously convicted of one of the enumerated felonies or “of any offense under a 
former statutory designation which is similar in elements to an offense described in 
this paragraph” is a dangerous sexual felony offender.  In 2005, those enumerated 
felonies were: 
 Luring or enticing a child, section 787.025, Florida Statutes (2005); 
 
 
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 Sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (2005); 
 Lewd or lascivious battery or molestation committed upon or in the 
presence of persons less than 16 years of age, section 800.04(4) and (5), 
Florida Statutes (2005); 
 Lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of an 
elderly person or disabled person, section 825.1025, Florida Statutes 
(2005); 
 Sexual performance by a child, section 827.071, Florida Statutes (2005); 
and 
 Selling or buying of minors, section 847.0145, Florida Statutes (2005). 
In 1982, Acevedo was convicted of violating section 800.04, Florida Statutes 
(1981).  In 1981, section 800.04, Florida Statutes, provided:  
Any person who shall handle, fondle, or make an assault upon any 
child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent 
manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in 
the presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery 
shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree . . . . 
§ 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1981).  The 1981 statute therefore prohibited molestation of, 
assault of, or lewd or lascivious conduct in the presence of a minor.  
 
In 2005, section 800.04, Florida Statutes, provided the following: 
(4) Lewd or lascivious battery.--A person who: 
(a) Engages in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or 
older but less than 16 years of age; or 
(b) Encourages, forces, or entices any person less than 16 years 
of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality, 
prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity 
commits lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
(5) Lewd or lascivious molestation.-- 
(a) A person who intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious 
manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing 
covering them, of a person less than 16 years of age, or forces or 
 
 
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entices a person under 16 years of age to so touch the perpetrator, 
commits lewd or lascivious molestation. 
(b) An offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or 
lascivious molestation against a victim less than 12 years of age 
commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
(c)1. An offender less than 18 years of age who commits lewd 
or lascivious molestation against a victim less than 12 years of age; or 
2. An offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or 
lascivious molestation against a victim 12 years of age or older but 
less than 16 years of age 
commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided 
in s. 775.082(3)(a)4. 
(d) An offender less than 18 years of age who commits lewd or 
lascivious molestation against a victim 12 years of age or older but 
less than 16 years of age commits a felony of the third degree, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
(6) Lewd or lascivious conduct.-- 
(a) A person who: 
1. Intentionally touches a person under 16 years of age in a 
lewd or lascivious manner; or 
2. Solicits a person under 16 years of age to commit a lewd or 
lascivious act 
commits lewd or lascivious conduct. 
(b) An offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or 
lascivious conduct commits a felony of the second degree, punishable 
as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
(c) An offender less than 18 years of age who commits lewd or 
lascivious conduct commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as 
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
§ 800.04(4)-(6), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The provisions of the 2005 version of the statute 
that are enumerated in the DSFO Act therefore prohibited both lewd and lascivious 
battery and lewd or lascivious molestation of a minor. 
Acevedo argues that because the 1981 statute includes “without the intent to 
commit sexual battery” it cannot be found similar to the offenses defined in section 
 
 
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800.04, subsections (4) or (5), Florida Statutes (2005).  We, like the Fourth 
District, are not persuaded by this argument. 
 
Determining whether Acevedo met the requirements under the Act, the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal opined that the Act “requires similar elements, not 
identical elements.”  Acevedo, 174 So. 3d at 438.  We agree.  As the Fourth 
District noted,1 “[b]oth statutes proscribe the lewd and lascivious touching of a 
child[,] . . . require the victim to be under a certain similar age [and] are second 
degree felonies.”  Id.   
 
In Durant, the Fifth District determined that section 800.04(1), Florida 
Statutes (1995)2 was not similar to section 800.04(4)-(5), Florida Statutes, for the 
purposes of DSFO designation pursuant to section 794.0115(2)(e), Florida 
Statutes.  Durant, 94 So. 3d at 671.  Specifically, the Fifth District stated: 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Fourth District also considered the underlying facts of Acevedo’s 
conviction, noting that Acevedo was charged with coercing an eleven year old boy 
to allow Acevedo to fellate him, conduct that “is proscribed by subsection (4)(b) of 
the 2005 statute.”  The district court thus found that the trial court did not err in 
finding Acevedo a DSFO.  Id.  We find that there was no need for the district court 
to perform such an analysis because the elements, themselves, are sufficiently 
similar.  See Dautel v. State, 658 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 1995) (“[T]he elements of a 
crime are the surest way to trace that crime.” (quoting Forehand v. State, 537 So. 
2d 103, 104 (Fla. 1989))). 
 
2.  In 1995, section 800.04(1) read: “A person who: (1) handles, fondles, or 
assaults any child under the age of 16 in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner . . .  
without committing the crime of sexual battery, commits a felony of the second 
degree . . . .” § 800.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).  
 
 
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[W]e do not believe that the 1995 version of section 800.04(1) is 
similar in elements to sections 800.04(4) and (5).  In particular, 
section 800.04(4) requires evidence of sexual activity, whereas there 
is no sexual activity requirement contained in section 800.04(1), 
Florida Statutes (1995).  Likewise, section 800.04(5) requires 
evidence that the perpetrator intentionally touched “the breasts, 
genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them” of 
the minor.  Section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes (1995), contains no 
such requirement.  Although section 800.04(5) and the 1995 version 
of section 800.04(1) contain other elements that are the same, we 
conclude they do not have similar elements for purposes of section 
794.0115(2)(e). 
Id. (footnote omitted).  The district court continued, “Further, section 800.04(1), 
Florida Statutes (1995), shares similar elements with section 800.04(6), Florida 
Statutes [(2012]),[3] which is not a qualifying felony in the DSFO statute.”  Id. 
(citing § 794.0115(2)(e), Fla. Stat.; Abrams v. State, 971 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2008)).  While we agree with the Fifth District that subsection (6) is 
closer to the 1981 statute, we disagree that the DSFO Act requires the courts to 
find the most similar statute to determine whether a prior offense is a qualifying 
felony.   
 
Acevedo argues that the Fourth District incorrectly looked only to the 
similarities between his prior conviction under section 800.04, Florida Statutes 
(1981), and his current conviction pursuant to section 800.04, Florida Statutes 
                                          
 
 
3.  The 2012 version of section 800.04(6) is the same as the 2005 version 
quoted above. 
 
 
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(2005).  He therefore asserts that this Court must decide the appropriate test for 
determining when a prior statute is similar in elements to an offense identified in 
section 794.0115, Florida Statutes.  Acevedo further argues that his prior 
conviction under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1981), does not contain similar 
elements to section 800.04(4) or (5), Florida Statutes (2005).  We disagree. 
 
The conduct prohibited in the 1981 version of section 800.04 is nearly 
identical to that prohibited in subsection (5) of the 2005 version of the statute.  
Compare § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1981) (“Any person who shall handle, fondle, or 
make an assault upon any child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or 
indecent manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the 
presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery shall be guilty 
of a felony of the second degree . . . .”) with § 800.04(5)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) 
(“A person who: [i]ntentionally touches a person under 16 years of age in a lewd or 
lascivious manner; or . . . solicits a person under 16 years of age to commit a lewd 
or lascivious act commits lewd or lascivious conduct [and] commits a felony of the 
second degree.”).  There are very few differences between the 1981 statute and 
subsection (5) of the 2005 statute:  
800.04 (1981) 
800.04(5) (2005) 
handles, fondles, assaults 
intentionally touches 
in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner  
in a lewd or lascivious manner the 
 breasts, 
 genitals, 
 
 
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OR 
 genital area, 
 buttocks, or 
 clothing covering those 
areas 
commits any lewd or lascivious act in the 
presence of 
 
a child under age 14 
of a child under age 16 
without the intent to commit sexual 
battery 
 
 
As demonstrated by the chart, the elements of the 1981 version of 800.04 and 
subsection (5) of the 2005 statute are remarkably similar.  There are few 
dissimilarities.  First, the 2005 version lists specific areas of the body.  Second, the 
2005 statute removes the language referring to committing a lewd act in the 
presence of a child, which was moved to subsection (7) of the statute.  Third, the 
statutes protect children of similar ages, but differ on children between the ages of 
fourteen and fifteen.  The 2005 statute protects all children under the age of 
sixteen, whereas the 1981 statute limits its application to children under the age of 
fourteen.  Last, the 1981 statute excludes conduct committed with intent to commit 
sexual battery. 
It is difficult to imagine an offense that would meet all the criteria of the 
1981 statute but fail to meet the criteria of the 2005 statute.  To “handle, fondle, or 
assault, in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner” necessarily requires an 
intentional touching that is sexual in nature.  However, the DSFO Act does not 
preclude this Court’s consideration of even that imaginary act because the statute 
 
 
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requires only that the previous offense be similar, not identical.  Because any 
offense that would have qualified for a conviction under the 1981 statute would 
necessarily have characteristics in common with an offense proscribed by the 2005 
statute, the Fourth District did not err in affirming Acevedo’s designation as a 
DSFO offender. 
We therefore approve the Fourth District’s decision and disapprove of the 
Fifth District’s opinion to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I concur in result because I would follow the well-reasoned opinion of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Durant v. State, 94 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2012), which properly analyzes whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as 
an “offense under a former statutory designation which is similar in elements” for 
the purposes of the Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act, section 
794.0115(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2005).  Id. at 670.  Contrary to the Fourth 
District’s decision below, I would conclude that Acevedo was improperly 
designated as a dangerous sexual felony offender (DSFO), based upon his prior 
 
 
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conviction under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1981).  See Acevedo v. State, 
174 So. 3d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).  Nevertheless, because the trial court 
could have sentenced Acevedo to life in prison without the DSFO designation, this 
error was harmless under the applicable standard of review for motions filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).  Therefore, I concur in 
the majority’s result that Acevedo is not entitled to relief on his motion. 
 
In Acevedo’s rule 3.800(a) motion under review, Acevedo argued “that he 
did not qualify as a DSFO because his prior conviction under section 800.04, 
Florida Statutes (1981), did not contain elements similar to section 800.04(4), 
Florida Statutes (2005) (lewd or lascivious battery), or section 800.04(5), Florida 
Statutes (2005) (lewd or lascivious molestation).”  Id. at 437-38.  Looking first to 
the DSFO statute, explaining which prior convictions count toward DSFO status, 
the pertinent language provides: 
(2)  Any person who is convicted of a violation of s. 
787.025(2)(c); s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); s. 800.04(4) or (5); s. 
825.1025(2) or (3); s. 827.071(2), (3), or (4); or s. 847.0145; or of any 
similar offense under a former designation, which offense the person 
committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older, and the 
person: 
 . . . . 
(e)  Has previously been convicted of a violation of s. 
787.025(2)(c); s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); s. 800.04(4) or (5); s. 
825.1025(2) or (3); s. 827.071(2), (3), or (4); s. 847.0145; of any 
offense under a former statutory designation which is similar in 
elements to an offense described in this paragraph; or of any offense 
that is a felony in another jurisdiction, or would be a felony if that 
 
 
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offense were committed in this state, and which is similar in elements 
to an offense described in this paragraph, 
 
is a dangerous sexual felony offender, who must be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and 
including, life imprisonment. 
 
§ 794.0115, Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). 
 
Of critical importance to this case, this Court must determine whether courts 
are permitted to consider the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior conviction in 
deciding whether that prior offense is “similar in elements” to a qualifying offense 
enumerated in the statute.  Majority op. at 8.  However, the majority, sidestepping 
this issue in a footnote, concludes “that there was no need for the district court to 
perform such an analysis because the elements [of the 1981 statute], themselves, 
are sufficiently similar [to the 2005 statute].”  Id. at 6 n.1.  By contrast, I would 
contend that examining the underlying facts of an individual’s crime to determine 
whether the prior conviction is sufficiently similar is not only unnecessary, it is 
impermissible.  See Dautel v. State, 658 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. 1995). 
In Dautel, this Court addressed whether “the trial court [may] consider the 
underlying facts in determining whether an out-of-state conviction is analogous to 
a Florida statute for the purpose of calculating points for a sentencing guidelines 
score sheet.”  Id. at 89.  In answering this question in the negative—holding that 
“only the elements of the out-of-state crime should be considered”—this Court 
stated that “[a] conviction establishes only the elements of the crime, and does not 
 
 
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include underlying facts or conduct which are not elements of the offense.”  Id. at 
89-90.  Therefore, despite the fact that the conduct leading to Acevedo’s prior 
conviction would currently fall within one of the enumerated offenses, which the 
Fourth District considered, Acevedo, 174 So. 3d at 438, the underlying conduct is 
outside the scope of our analysis of whether the prior conviction is sufficiently 
similar. 
 
Turning now to the similarities between the enumerated offenses and the 
statute under which Acevedo was previously convicted, it is evident that 
Acevedo’s prior conviction is more similar in elements to subsections (6) and (7) 
of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (2005), than it is to subsection (4) or (5) of the 
same section.  In 1982, Acevedo was convicted of violating section 800.04, Florida 
Statutes, which read in relevant part: 
Any person who shall handle, fondle, or make an assault upon any 
child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent 
manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in 
the presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery 
shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree . . . .  
 
The Fifth District, comparing a nearly identical statute to sections 800.04(4) and 
800.04(5), correctly noted two key differences: (1) “section 800.04(4) requires 
 
 
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evidence of sexual activity,[4] whereas there is no sexual activity requirement 
contained in [the older statutory language;] and (2) “section 800.04(5) requires 
evidence that the perpetrator intentionally touched ‘the breasts, genitals, genital 
area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them’ of the minor[, while the older 
statute] contains no such requirement.”  Durant, 94 So. 3d at 671.  The Fifth 
District held that the older statute “shares similar elements with section 800.04(6), 
Florida Statutes, which is not a qualifying felony in the DSFO statute.”  Id. 
 
The majority’s conclusion posits that “[i]t is difficult to imagine an offense 
that would meet all the criteria of the 1981 statute but fail to meet the criteria of the 
2005 statute.”  Majority op. at 9.  Assuming that the majority means an offense that 
would meet the criteria of subsection (4) or (5) of the 2005 statute—those offenses 
that would qualify as a prior conviction under the DSFO statute—its statement is 
belied by the very language in the 1981 statute.  Under the 1981 statute, a person 
who “knowingly commit[s] any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such 
child, without the intent to commit sexual battery” would clearly commit a 
punishable offense.  § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1981).  Conversely, under the 2005 
statutory scheme, a person performing those same actions would squarely commit 
                                          
 
 
4.  “Sexual activity” is defined as “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or 
union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of 
another by any other object.”  § 800.04 (1)(a), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
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a violation of subsection (7) (Lewd or Lascivious Exhibition), which is not an 
enumerated offense pursuant to the DSFO statute.  See § 794.0115(2)(e), Fla. Stat. 
(2005). 
 
When the Legislature enacted the DSFO statute, it clearly did not intend to 
include the conduct proscribed by subsections (6) and (7) in the types of offenses 
that would qualify an offender as a DSFO because it specifically excluded these 
subsections from the enumerated offenses.  Id.  Accordingly, because the elements 
of the crime that Acevedo was previously convicted under are most similar to 
subsections (6) and (7), I would conclude that the 1981 statute does not qualify as 
an “offense under a former statutory designation which is similar in elements to an 
offense described in this paragraph.”  Id.   
 
Despite my conclusion that Acevedo was improperly designated a DSFO, I 
agree with the majority that his motion for relief under rule 3.800(a) does not merit 
relief.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a).  Under the “could-have-been-imposed” harmless 
error standard that this Court adopted for motions filed under rule 3.800(a) in 
Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 238 (Fla. 2007), a defendant “does not require 
resentencing if the sentence legally could have been imposed (absent a departure) 
using a correct scoresheet.”  Id.  The record reflects that Acevedo’s scoresheet 
totaled 458.1 points; therefore, the trial court could have imposed a life sentence 
without the DSFO designation, and any error from Acevedo being improperly 
 
 
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designated a DSFO is harmless.  For these reasons, I agree with the majority’s 
conclusion that Acevedo is not entitled to relief on his rule 3.800 motion.  
However, I cannot agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District’s decision 
approved by the majority and, instead, would approve of the Fifth District’s 
holding in Durant. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D14-3124 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Peter D. Webster, Christine Davis Graves, and James Parker-Flynn of Carlton 
Fields, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Celia Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent