Title: State v. Lawrence A. Brown[NOTE:This is a companion case toState v. TuckerandState v.Elkwisni , also decided today.]

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 7 September Term 2006 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE A. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 14, 2006 Decided April 17, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Alan Dexter Bowman argued the cause for appellant. Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Appellate Division held that defendant s right to remain silent was not violated when the prosecutor questioned defendant about his pre-arrest silence. Following a violent physical altercation with another man, defendant fled. He was arrested ten months later and charged with assault, robbery, and weapons offenses. At his trial, defendant claimed he was not the aggressor, but merely defended himself when the other man pulled out a knife. The State cross-examined defendant on his pre-arrest conduct in order to challenge defendant s self-defense testimony. The jury found defendant guilty and the Appellate Division affirmed. We now affirm. We hold that when there is no governmental compulsion involved, the State may fairly cross-examine the defendant concerning pre-arrest conduct or silence to challenge his self-defense testimony. We also conclude that the trial court should give a jury instruction that limits the use of that evidence in assessing a defendant s credibility. No, I did not, sir. Q. Did the Phillipsburg Police Department get contacted by [defendant]? No, they did not, sir. Were any charges filed by [defendant] as a victim during that time? Not that I m aware of, sir. Defendant testified in his defense and presented a different set of facts. He stated that he was living in Ohio at the time and was visiting friends on September 12, 2002, when he attended a party in front of Russell s apartment. At some point, he joined Russell and two other men in a card game in the backyard. Russell became agitated upon losing money in the card game and continued to be upset when defendant refused to lend him money. After they stopped playing cards, Russell approached him with a knife in his hand and grabbed his shirt. Defendant asked Russell what he was doing and Russell threatened him with the knife. Defendant testified that he reacted in self-defense by striking Russell with a beer bottle. He denied removing money from Russell s person and claimed to have struck Russell only once with a beer bottle. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that a week after the altercation, he learned that the incident had been reported in the newspaper. The prosecutor asked the following questions: Q: [L]et s say someone has hit someone with a bottle and cut someone. Would you say they d know they d be charged with aggravated assault or some kind of crime? Yes. If you just walk up to - yes. So unless you come forward and say, he cut me, he tried to cut me first, Phillipsburg police, unless you do that, didn t you realize that you would very possibly be charged with aggravated assault by the Phillipsburg police department? Defendant responded that he did not know the extent of any injury or whether Russell would report it or file charges. The prosecutor then engaged defendant in the following exchanges: You got a brother who is looking for you, right? His brother. Right. You got it in the papers. Lawrence Brown does something that caused blood. Only a week after the incident, right? Right. And what do you do, Mr. Brown? Do you call the Phillipsburg police, say, hold on a minute? Do you do that? A. No. Do you call the Phillipsburg police and say, wait a minute, this is not how it is, he tried to stab me? Did you do that? A. I didn t know what it said. . . . . Did you ever at any time after September 12th, 2002 call the Phillipsburg police department? No, I did not. Did you ever, since September 12th, 2002, sign a complaint? No, I did not. Q. Did you at any time since September 12th, 2002 try to contact the prosecutor s office to explain your side of the story? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you ever at any time, between September 12th, 2002 and August of 03, decide to come into Phillipsburg, either the police station or to the prosecutor s office or anywhere, and find out if there were any charges against you or anything? A. No, I did not. During summation, defense counsel advanced self-defense evidence and criticized the police investigation. He asked the jury to consider why the police did not try to locate defendant sooner to obtain his side of the story. In response, the prosecutor told the jury that Russell s version was credible, defendant s version was not, and that the logical thing would have been for defendant to call the police. The prosecutor stated that defendant knew what he did. [Defendant] knew what he did. He hit the guy with a bottle, slashed him, took his money out and ran. That s what he did. And a year and a half later files a motion for self defense because the law says you re allowed to do that and I have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that s not self defense. I m happy to do that. That s my burden. That s the law. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree aggravated assault, third-degree aggravated assault, first-degree robbery, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of ten years in prison with eighty-five percent to be served without parole. In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel held that because there was no governmental compulsion involved, defendant s pre-arrest silence during that ten-month period was properly admitted for impeachment purposes, from which the jury could have inferred that his silence was indicative of prevarication when measured against his testimonial version of the incident. (Citation omitted). The panel also held that the trial court s failure to give an instruction limiting the use of defendant s silence to impeachment was not plain error. We granted defendant s petition for certification. 187 N.J. 81 (2006). [Id. at 619 n.11, 96 S. Ct. at 2245, 49 L. Ed 2d at 98 (citation omitted).] We do not have a provision in our State Constitution similar to the Fifth Amendment, but our privilege against self-incrimination . . . is deeply rooted in this State s common law and codified in both statute and an evidence rule. Muhammad, supra, 182 N.J. at 567; see also State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 113-14 (1976). Both N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503 provide that every natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him or expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate. Recently, in Muhammad, supra, we held that a defendant s silence while in custody, under interrogation, or at or near the time of his arrest cannot be used against him in a criminal trial. 182 N.J. at 558. In Muhammad, the defendant, who was a police officer, drove M.M. to the police station and reported to the desk sergeant that M.M. had been harassing his brother and sister. Id. at 560. At that point, M.M. called the defendant a liar, accused him of raping her, and produced a condom. Ibid. The defendant sought to leave, but the desk sergeant prevented him from doing so and effectively placed him in custody. Id. at 561. Thereafter, the defendant remained silent. Id. at 562-63. At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony and commented on the defendant s silence both at or near the time of his arrest and when he was in police custody. Id. at 573. The defendant did not testify. Id. at 562. We reversed his conviction, holding that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant s silence which arises at or near the time of arrest, during official interrogation, or while in police custody. Id. at 569 (citations omitted). We reasoned that [b]arring the use of silence at or near the time of arrest avoids the often murky inquiry into pinpointing the precise moment a suspect is placed in custody or under arrest. Ibid. In the present appeal, we must determine whether that same reasoning pertains to pre-arrest silence that does not involve government compulsion at or near the time of arrest, and in cases in which the defendant testifies at trial. The United States Supreme Court has approved the admission of such evidence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-38, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2127-29, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86, 92-95 (1980). In Jenkins, the defendant was arrested for murder two weeks after the death of the victim. Id. at 232, 100 S. Ct. at 2126, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 90. At his trial, the defendant testified that he committed the murder in self-defense. Ibid. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant s credibility by questioning why the defendant did not speak out immediately if he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 235, 100 S. Ct. at 2127, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 92. Following the defendant s conviction, the defendant appealed, asserting that his right to remain silent was violated. Id. at 234, 100 S. Ct. at 2127, 65 L. Ed 2d at 92. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant s credibility. Id. at 238, 100 S. Ct. at 2129, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 94-95. The Court reasoned that because impeachment follows the defendant s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial, there is no constitutional violation. Ibid., 100 S. Ct. at 2129, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 94. Nevertheless, the Court noted that state courts need not follow its decision to allow impeachment through the use of pre-arrest silence and that [e]ach jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative then [sic] prejudicial. Id. at 240, 100 S. Ct. at 2130, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 96. [Id. at 613-14.] Based on the surrounding circumstances, the Court found that the probative worth of Emm s pre-arrest silence, whether that entailed a consciousness of guilt, a desire not to become involved, a feeling that it was simply unnecessary, or a belief that he had already fulfilled whatever duty he had, should be left to the jury in assessing Emm s credibility. Id. at 615. Prior to Brown, this Court approved the admissibility of pre-arrest silence to impeach the defendant s testimony at trial in State v. Burt, 59 N.J. 156 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S. Ct. 728, 30 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1972). The Court summarily affirmed the defendant s conviction for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division decision. Id. at 157. In the Appellate Division decision, the panel explained that the defendant was arrested for the murder of his friend. State v. Burt, 107 N.J. Super. 390, 391-92 (App. Div. 1969). At trial, the State made no reference to the defendant s silence in its case-in-chief. Id. at 393. The defendant testified that he had been drinking with the victim, the victim pointed a gun at him, a struggle ensued, and the gun accidentally discharged, striking the victim. Id. at 392. On cross-examination the State was able to establish that the defendant never told the police that the shooting was accidental. Ibid. The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant s conviction, declaring that when the defendant testified, he waived his right to remain silent and thereby subjected himself to cross-examination as to the credibility of his story. Id. at 393. The panel found that the testimony was relevant to the credibility of his courtroom testimony. Ibid.; see also Deatore, supra, 70 N.J. at 118 (explaining that Burt was not a true case of silence in police custody as to an exculpatory story, but rather one of conduct, albeit non-action, after the charged crime inconsistent with defendant s story at trial ). We recognize that other jurisdictions are split on whether the use of pre-arrest silence violates a defendant s state constitutional rights. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 101, 129-30 (2001). Compare Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Ga. 1991) (declaring that comment on pre-arrest silence will not be allowed even where the defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his own defense ), with State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 90 (Wis. 1988) (noting that comment on pre-Miranda silence is allowed once defendant testifies). To be sure, Brown and Burt are the established law in New Jersey. Regardless of whether we would agree with those cases that pre-arrest silence may be admitted for impeachment purposes when no governmental compulsion is involved if we were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to follow them under principles of stare decisis. [E]ven in constitutional cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405, 419 (2000) (quoting United States v. Int l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1801, 135 L. Ed. 2d 124, 137 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). In light of the established history of Brown and Burt, we find no such special justification to overrule those cases. We continue to adhere to the view that when a defendant testifies, pre-arrest silence may be admitted for impeachment purposes provided no governmental compulsion is involved. Brown, supra, 118 N.J. at 613. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE A. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. New Jersey s common law privilege against self-incrimination guarantees every person the right to refuse to disclose . . . to a police officer . . . any matter that will incriminate him. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503. Today s ruling renders that long-standing privilege a hollow right unless one is in police custody or under official interrogation. The majority s opinion instructs a person facing an impending criminal charge that he first must give his exculpatory account to the police -- the very people likely to make a case against him -- or else be condemned at trial for not doing so if he testifies at his trial. Under the regime affirmed by the majority, the prosecutor is allowed to argue at trial that a testifying defendant should not be believed because he did not speak to the police at the earliest opportunity before his arrest -- in other words, a testifying defendant should be convicted because of his earlier silence. Because this paradigm makes a sham of the right to remain silent and runs contrary to the plain language and intent of our State privilege against self-incrimination, I respectfully dissent. To force persons to make this kind of choice between two fundamental rights places an intolerable burden on the exercise of those rights. [Id. at 253-54, 100 S. Ct. at 2137, 65 L. Ed 2d at 104.] ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE A. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED April 17, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace, Jr. CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin