Title: Marlin D. Willis et al. v. Bernard Kincaid, in his official ( 333 ) capacity as mayor of the City of Birmingham

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/14/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1061154
_________________________
Marlin D. Willis et al.
v.
Bernard Kincaid, in his official capacity as mayor of the
City of Birmingham
_________________________
1061184
_________________________
The Birmingham City Council and the City of Birmingham
v.
Bernard Kincaid, in his official capacity as mayor of the
City of Birmingham
2
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-06-6768)
WOODALL, Justice.
The City of Birmingham ("Birmingham"); the Birmingham
City Council ("the City Council"); and employees of the
Birmingham fire and rescue service, namely, Marlin D. Willis,
Donald R. Baker, and Roger D. Wyatt, along with employees of
the Birmingham Police Department, namely, Dexter Cunningham,
Scott Morro, and Daphanie Horton (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the employees"), appeal from a summary
judgment in favor of Bernard Kincaid, in his official capacity
as mayor of Birmingham, declaring void and unenforceable City
Council resolution no. 2013-06, as amended.  We reverse and
remand.
This dispute began on September 26, 2006, when the City
Council passed resolution no. 2013-06, contemplating a 5%
salary 
increase 
for 
certain 
classes 
of 
employees 
of
Birmingham.  The resolution stated, in pertinent part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council
of the City of Birmingham as follows:
"....
"2.
That the City of Birmingham will
increase the rate of pay for each City
of Birmingham police officer who meets
the Alabama Peace Officers Training
1061154; 1061184
3
Commission minimum standards, each
City of Birmingham jail correctional
specialist 
who 
has 
successfully
completed 
the 
required 
course 
of
training for such position through the
City of Birmingham Police Academy,
each City of Birmingham firefighter
who 
meets 
the 
State 
firefighters
minimum standards, and each City of
Birmingham Fire Prevention Inspector,
Senior Fire Prevention Inspector, and
Chief Fire Prevention Inspector. ...
"....
"4.
The Mayor is requested to reply to
this resolution in the fiscal 2008
budget."
(Emphasis added.)
Mayor Kincaid vetoed resolution no. 2013-06, but the City
Council overrode his veto and submitted resolution no. 2013-06
to the Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the Board"), which
approved it on November 16, 2006.  On December 19, 2006, the
City Council passed resolution no. 2851-06, which amended
resolution no. 2013-06 to clarify that the salary increases
authorized by resolution no. 2013-06 were to "be effective in
the fiscal 2008 budget."  More specifically, the pertinent
amendment stated: "The Mayor is directed to apply the
provisions of Resolution 2013-06 in the fiscal 2008 budget."
Mayor Kincaid also vetoed that resolution, but his veto was
1061154; 1061184
4
overridden and the amendment was approved by the Board.
Resolution no. 2013-06, as amended, is hereinafter referred to
as "the resolution." 
Mayor Kincaid filed a complaint for a declaratory
judgment against Birmingham, the Board, and the City Council.
The complaint alleged that the resolution, by which the City
Council sought to "alter, on its own initiative, the Pay Plan
for [certain Birmingham] employees[,] is not authorized by
state or local statute, [and operates] to usurp powers granted
[solely] to the Mayor by the Mayor-Council Act of 1955," i.e.,
Act No. 452, Ala. Acts 1955, as supplemented by Act No. 1168,
Ala. Acts 1973.  The complaint sought a judgment declaring the
resolution "null and void." 
Birmingham and the City Council answered the complaint
with defenses and a counterclaim, averring that "[t]he
Resolution's increase of salaries for certain employee classes
... is expressly authorized by Section 12 of Act No. [248] of
the Legislature of Alabama (Regular Session, 1945) as amended"
("the Civil Service Act").  The counterclaim sought a judgment
declaring that the resolution is valid and effective and that
the City Council is "the governing body for purposes of the
[Civil Service Act]" with authority to implement the salary
1061154; 1061184
5
increases at issue in this action.  The employees, who are
subject to the Civil Service Act and would be affected by the
proposed salary increase, were allowed to intervene in the
case.
All parties moved for summary judgments.  On April 30,
2007, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Mayor Kincaid, holding that the resolution was "invalid and
unenforceable under the provisions of the Mayor-Council Act of
1955 and the [Civil Service Act]."  The trial court
essentially held that, consistent with the Mayor-Council Act,
the City Council could initiate a salary increase only as
incidental to a resolution adopting a budget proposal
submitted by Mayor Kincaid for the ensuing budgetary year.
Subsequently, appeals were filed by Birmingham and the City
Council 
(hereinafter 
referred to collectively as "the
City")(case no. 1061184) and by the employees (case no.
1061154).  We  consolidated these appeals and must now find
the proper balance between the Mayor-Council Act and the Civil
Service Act in the context of salary increases for employees
subject to the Civil Service Act.
In so doing, we are guided by well-established principles
of statutory construction.  First and foremost, "[m]atters of
1061154; 1061184
6
policy are for the Legislature and, whether wise or unwise,
legislative policies are of no concern to the courts."   Marsh
v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 231 (Ala. 2000).   "[I]t is not the
duty of this Court to question the wisdom, or the lack
thereof, used by the Legislature in enacting the laws of this
State."  Ex parte T.D.T., 745 So. 2d 899, 904 (Ala. 1999).
"[T]his Court is not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute or to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature."  Gowens
v. Tys. S., 948 So. 2d 513, 522 n.1 (Ala. 2006); see also Ex
parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003).
"[S]tatutes must be construed in pari materia in light of
their application to the same general subject matter. ... Our
obligation is to construe [the] provisions 'in favor of each
other to form one harmonious plan,' if it is possible to do
so." Opinion of the Justices No. 334, 599 So. 2d 1166, 1168
(Ala. 1992) (quoting Ex parte Coffee County Comm'n, 583 So. 2d
985, 988 (Ala. 1991)).  Because our review turns on statutory
construction, that review is de novo.  Scott Bridge Co. v.
Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003).
The Civil Service Act created the Board and "[t]he civil
service 
system 
applicable 
to 
Jefferson 
County 
and
municipalities located therein."  Henderson v. Arrington, 392
1061154; 1061184
7
So. 2d 806, 808 (Ala. 1980).  Section 12 of the Civil Service
Act, as amended by § 4 of Act No. 684, Ala. Acts 1977, states,
in pertinent part:
"The 
director 
of 
personnel 
... 
shall 
....
[e]stablish after consultation with the governing
bodies affected, a pay plan and salary schedule for
all positions which shall contain a minimum rate, a
maximum rate and such intermediate and premium rates
as are deemed necessary by the personnel board,
which shall become effective within thirty days
after submission to the governing body concerned,
provided that the governing body of each county and
municipality affected hereby may raise or lower such
schedule by applying the same percentage of increase
or decrease to the entire schedule, provided,
however, no governing body shall raise such entire
schedule within twelve months after the adoption of
a new salary schedule, nor within twelve months
immediately 
preceding 
any 
primary 
or 
general
elections in which the members of the said governing
body are to be elected, except upon the approval of
the personnel board, provided further that any
office or position created by an Act of the
Legislature, or by a municipality, or county
authority, subsequent to the passage of [the Civil
Service Act], the personnel director shall survey
the duties and responsibilities of such office or
position, and submit his findings to the personnel
board; and the salary for such office or position
shall be fixed by the personnel board.  Provided
further, that the personnel board shall advise the
governing body of the county or municipality of the
salary fixed for such office or position.  Changes
in the salary schedule of one class or a number of
classes less than all may also be made by order or
resolution of a governing body as follows: A
certified copy of such order or resolution shall be
filed with the personnel board, and unless the said
resolution or order be disapproved by said personnel
board within thirty days after the date of filing of
1061154; 1061184
8
such certified copy the same shall be valid and
operative according to its terms."
(Emphasis added.)  
All parties concede that the "[City] Council [is] the
Governing Body, for all purposes and under all laws pertaining
to [this] declaratory judgment action."  Mayor Kincaid's
brief, at 5 (emphasis added).  The City and the employees
contend that, pursuant to § 12 of the Civil Service Act, the
City Council -- as the "governing body" -- has the right to
initiate "[c]hanges in the salary schedule of ... less than
all" of Birmingham's civil-service  employees in the manner it
did so in this case.  
Mayor Kincaid, on the other hand, contends that the
manner in which the City Council may participate in the salary
process is governed by provisions of the Mayor-Council Act and
that, absent compliance with the specific provisions of that
act, the City Council lacks such authority.  Regarding the
powers of the City Council, the Mayor-Council Act provides, in
pertinent part:
"[§ 3.08] Neither the council nor any of its members
shall direct or request the appointment of any
person to, or his removal from, office or position
by the mayor or by any of his subordinates, or in
any manner take part in the appointment or removal
1061154; 1061184
9
of officers and employees in the administrative
service of the city.  Except for the purpose of
inquiry, the council and its members shall deal with
the administrative service solely through the mayor
and neither the council nor any member thereof shall
give orders to any subordinates of the mayor, either
publicly or privately."
Act No. 452, Ala. Acts 1955, as supplemented (unofficially
codified in the Code of General Ordinances, City of Birmingham
(hereinafter referred to as "City Code")). 
Mayor Kincaid's powers are defined in the Mayor-Council
Act, in pertinent part, as follows:
"[§ 4.06] The mayor shall be the head of the
administrative branch of the city government. ... He
shall be responsible for the proper administration
of all affairs of the city and, subject to the
provisions of any civil service or merit system law
applicable to such city and except as otherwise
provided herein, he shall have power and shall be
required to:
"(1) Enforce all law and ordinances;
"(2) Appoint and, when necessary for the
good of the service, remove all officers
and employees of the city except as
otherwise provided by this act ...;
"....
"(4) Keep the council fully advised as to
the financial conditions and needs of the
city; 
prepare 
and 
submit 
the 
budget
annually to the council and be responsible
for its administration after its adoption;
prepare and submit, as of the end of the
fiscal year, a complete report on the
1061154; 1061184
10
financial and administrative activities of
the city for such year.
"....
"(8) Fix the salaries or compensation of
all officers and employees of the city who
are appointable by him, subject, however,
to the provisions of any civil service or
merit law applicable to the city.
"(9) Employ as members of his staff such
employees as the mayor may deem necessary
for and on behalf of said city to assist
the mayor and perform such duties relating
to the mayor as the mayor may assign.  Each
such employee shall serve at the pleasure
of the mayor [at] such compensation as the
mayor may set.  Such staff members shall
not be under any merit or civil service
system, but, should a member of the
classified service under any merit or civil
service system applicable to the city be
appointed hereunder, the provisions of this
section notwithstanding, he may be paid at
the 
salary 
established 
for 
his
classification at the time of appointment;
and such person shall not lose any rights
under such merit or civil service system by
reason of his appointment hereunder and
shall, upon termination of service on the
mayor's staff, have the right to return to
the classified service, with full credit
for time served on the mayor's staff, at
the same or higher classification as that
held upon appointment hereunder."
City Code (emphasis added).
The Mayor-Council Act contains the following relevant
budgetary provisions:
1061154; 1061184
11
"[§ 5.01] The fiscal year of the city government
shall begin on the first day of July and shall end
on the last day of June of each calendar year.  Such
fiscal year shall also constitute the budget and
accounting year.  As used in this act, the term
'budget year' shall mean the fiscal year for which
any particular budget is adopted and in which it is
administered. ...
"[§ 5.02] On a day to be fixed by the council but in
no case later than the 20th day of May in each year,
the mayor shall submit to the council:
"(a) a separate current revenue and expense
budget for the general operation of the
city government, to be known as the
'general fund budget';
"(b) a budget for each public utility owned
and operated by such city;
"(c) a capital budget; and
"(d) a budget message.
"....
"[§ 5.08] At the meeting of the council at which the
budget and budget message are submitted, the council
shall determine the place and time of the public
hearing on the budget, and shall cause to be
published a notice of the place and time, not less
than seven (7) days after the date of publication,
at which the council will hold a public hearing. ...
"[§ 5.09] After the conclusion of the public hearing
the council may insert new items of expenditures or
may increase ... items of expenditure in the general
fund budget .... The council shall not ... cause the
total of expenditures as recommended by the mayor to
be increased without a public hearing on such
increase ....
1061154; 1061184
12
"[§ 5.10] Not later than the 20th day of June of the
current fiscal year, the council by a majority vote
shall adopt the general fund budget, and such
ordinances providing for additional revenue as may
be necessary to put the budget in balance.  If for
any reason the council fails to adopt the general
fund budget on or before such day, the general fund
budget of the current fiscal year shall be the
general fund budget for the ensuing year, until such
time as a newly revised budget shall be adopted by
the council, and, until such time, shall have full
force and effect to the same extent as if the same
had been adopted by the council, notwithstanding any
thing to the contrary in this act. ...
"....
"[§ 5.15] Appropriations in addition to those
contained in the original general fund budget
ordinance, may be made by the council by not less
than five (5) affirmative votes, but only on the
recommendation of the mayor and only if the Director
of Finance certifies in writing that there is
available in the general fund a sum unencumbered and
unappropriated 
sufficient 
to 
meet 
such
appropriation. ...
"[§ 5.16] At any time in any budget year, the
council 
may, 
pursuant 
to 
this 
Section, 
make
emergency appropriations to meet a pressing need for
public expenditures, for other than a regular or
recurring requirement, to protect the public health,
safety or welfare.  Such appropriation may be made
by the council, ... but only on the recommendation
of the mayor."
City Code (emphasis added).
According to Mayor Kincaid, the Mayor-Council Act
provides only one method by which the City Council may
initiate a salary adjustment.  That method is set forth in §§
1061154; 1061184
13
5.09 and 5.10, which Mayor Kincaid defines as the "normal
budgetary process."  Mayor Kincaid's brief, at 41-42.  This
process begins, the argument goes, when, pursuant to § 5.02,
the mayor presents to the City Council his proposed "general
fund budget."  "After the conclusion of the public hearing
[mandated by § 5.08] the council may ... increase ... items of
expenditure in the [proposed] general fund budget," but not
without an additional "public hearing on the increase." §
5.09.  This budgetary process is concluded when, "[n]ot later
than the 20th day of June of the current fiscal year, the
council by a majority vote [adopts] the general fund budget."
§ 5.10.  Outside this normal budgetary process, Mayor Kincaid
argues, he is the exclusive  impetus for salary adjustments.
See § 5.15 ("Appropriations in addition to those contained in
the original general fund budget ordinance, may be made by the
council ..., but only on the recommendation of the mayor
...."); and § 5.16 ("the council may ... make emergency
appropriations 
to 
meet 
a 
pressing 
need 
for 
public
expenditures, ... but only on the recommendation of the
mayor").  It is undisputed that the City Council did not
follow this formula in adopting the resolution.
1061154; 1061184
14
The City contends that the trial court interpreted these
budgetary 
provisions 
too 
broadly 
and, 
consequently,
improperly restricted the City Council from participation in
adjusting salaries as the "governing body" under the Civil
Service Act.  According to the City, the Mayor-Council Act
contains no provision "limiting the power of the City Council
to adjust a salary pay plan to only after the Mayor has
presented the budget."  The City's brief, at 25 (emphasis
added).  "Nowhere in the Mayor-Council Act," says the City,
"is the City Council constrained from participating in
establishing pay plans for an upcoming budget cycle."  Id.
(some emphasis added).  We agree with the City. 
Mayor Kincaid construes § 12 of the Civil Service Act as
essentially repugnant to § 4.06(4) and (8) of the City Code,
at least to the extent that § 12 purports to allow the City
Council to initiate a salary increase outside the normal
budgetary process, and argues that, to that extent, § 12 was
repealed by implication by the Mayor-Council Act.  We reject
this argument for two reasons.
First, "'"'[r]epeal by implication is not favored.'"'"
Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 312 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Fletcher v. Tuscaloosa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 294
1061154; 1061184
15
Ala. 173, 177, 314 So. 2d 51, 55 (1975), quoting in turn State
v. Bay Towing & Dredging Co., 265 Ala. 282, 289, 90 So. 2d
743, 749 (1956)).  "A later statute may repeal an earlier
statute by implication only under certain circumstances, such
as when the two statutes, taken together, are so repugnant to
each other that they become irreconcilable."  Hurley v.
Marshall County Comm'n, 614 So. 2d 427, 430 (Ala. 1993).
"'"Implied repeal is essentially a question of determining the
legislative intent as expressed in the statutes."'" Shiv-Ram,
892 So. 2d at 312 (quoting Fletcher, 294 Ala. at 177, 314 So.
2d at 55 (emphasis added)).
To be sure, the Civil Service Act predated the Mayor-
Council Act by 10 years.  However, the current version of § 12
was enacted in 1977, see Act No. 684, Ala. Acts 1977, at which
time the section was substantially expanded.  Indeed, both
acts have been revisited numerous times and amended relatively
recently.  See, e.g., Act No. 94-564, Ala. Acts 1994 (amending
the Civil Service Act); Act No. 89-739, Ala. Acts 1989
(amending the Civil Service Act); Act No. 85-919, Ala. Acts
1985 (amending the Mayor-Council Act).  Thus, reference to the
temporal relation of the Civil Service Act and the Mayor-
1061154; 1061184
16
Council Act yields no particular insight into the relevant
legislative intent.
Second, and more material to our analysis, is reference
to the only provision in the Mayor-Council Act dealing
specifically with mayoral authority over the salary schedules
of 
civil-service 
employees. 
 
Specifically, 
§ 
4.06(8)
authorizes the mayor to "[f]ix the salaries or compensation of
all officers and employees of the city who are appointable by
him."  (Emphasis added.)  In so doing, however, the mayor is
specifically "subject ... to the provisions of any civil
service or merit law applicable to the city." § 4.06(8)
(emphasis added).
Indeed, § 4.06, which defines all mayoral duties and
authority, in a prefatory clause subordinates all mayoral
authority to applicable provisions of the Civil Service Act.
In particular, the prefatory clause declares that the mayor
"shall be responsible for the proper administration of all
affairs of the city ..., subject to the provisions of any
civil service or merit system law applicable to such city."
Then, apparently for the sake of clarity or emphasis, the
legislature reiterated the qualifying language in § 4.06(8),
1061154; 1061184
17
which deals specifically with mayoral authority over "salaries
or compensation."   
Section 12 of the Civil Service Act states that
"[c]hanges in the salary schedule of one class or a number of
classes less than all may ... be made by ... resolution of a
governing body."  It is undisputed that the City Council is
the "governing body" contemplated by § 12.  Simply stated, the
text of the Mayor-Council Act negates any notion that the
legislature intended to repeal § 12 as it relates to the City
Council's role in initiating a salary increase, at least to
the extent that it does not conflict with § 5.09 and the
normal budgetary process.
That budgetary process begins when the mayor, not "later
than May 20 of the [current budget year]," "submit[s] to the
council" a proposed budget for the ensuing budget year. §
5.02, Mayor-Council Act.  Although § 5.09 of the Mayor-Council
Act prevents the council from "insert[ing] new items of
expenditures ... in the general fund budget .... without a
public hearing on such increase," it does so only within the
time frame set forth in the normal budgetary process, that is,
the process begun pursuant to § 5.02.  The Mayor-Council Act
does not contain a provision stating that the council may not
1061154; 1061184
18
introduce a salary resolution in the current budget year to
take effect in the ensuing budget year, months before
commencement of the procedures outlined in §§ 5.02 and 5.09,
and we may not add such a provision under the guise of
statutory construction.  Parker v. Hilliard, 567 So. 2d 1343,
1346 (Ala. 1990) ("Courts are supposed to interpret statutes,
not to amend or repeal them under the guise of judicial
interpretation.").  Instead, the Mayor-Council Act refers to
the Civil Service Act, which states that the City Council may
make "[c]hanges in the salary schedule of one class or a
number of classes less than all" by filing a certified copy of
such resolution with the Board, which automatically becomes
"valid 
and 
operative 
according 
to 
its 
terms" 
unless
disapproved by the Board within 30 days. The resolution was
passed and amended in September 2006 and December 2006,
respectively, of the 2007 budget year, and was to take effect
in the 2008 budget year, which would not begin until July 1,
2007.  See § 5.01, Mayor-Council Act.  The resolution was
adopted clearly outside the time frame for the operation of
the normal budgetary process contained in the Mayor-Council
Act.  
1061154; 1061184
This case involves no issue regarding the procedural
1
sufficiency of the enactment process of the Mayor-Council Act
and of the Civil Service Act.
19
Construing the Mayor-Council Act and the Civil Service
Act as contemplating more than one method by which the City
Council can initiate a salary increase does not present an
irreconcilable conflict.  The Civil Service Act contains no
timing provisions relating to the council's power to initiate
a change in salary schedules, and the only timing provisions
in the Mayor-Council Act relate to the normal budgetary
process, which was unaffected by the resolution.  Thus, the
qualifications of the mayor's power by reference to the Civil
Service 
Act 
are 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
mayor's
responsibility for the proper administration of the city's
affairs, at least insofar as the council's action does not
interfere with the normal budgetary process.
In short, Mayor Kincaid's authority over the salaries and
compensation of the civil-service employees granted in §
4.06(8) of the Mayor-Council Act is qualified by § 12 of the
Civil Service Act.   This qualification stands in stark
1
contrast to the authority over the salaries of employees
described in § 4.06(9), who are expressly excluded from the
1061154; 1061184
This case does not involve § 3.08 of the Mayor-Council
2
Act, which prohibits the City Council from  "tak[ing] part in
the appointment or removal of ... employees."  Nor does it
involve § 4.06(2), which invests Mayor Kincaid with the
authority to "[a]ppoint and ... remove ... employees of the
city."  In other words, this case does not implicate Mayor
Kincaid's appointment authority; it is about setting salaries,
not about making appointments. 
20
Civil Service Act.  In § 4.06(9), the legislature authorized
the mayor to "[e]mploy as members of his staff such employees
as the mayor may deem necessary," and at "such compensation as
the mayor may set."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the legislature
knew how to grant unqualified mayoral authority over salaries
and compensation for certain employees.  It clearly did so in
§ 4.06(9), and just as clearly did not do so in § 4.06(8).
In conclusion, the trial court erred in holding the
resolution void and unenforceable.   For these reasons, the
2
summary judgment in favor of Mayor Kincaid is reversed, and
the case is remanded for the entry of a judgment in favor of
the City and the employees.
1061154 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1061184 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.