Title: Bruce Muller v. Society Insurance

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP976 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Bruce Muller and Karen Muller d/b/a B & K Sports 
and Liquors, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Society Insurance, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
George Jerrick, United Fire and Casualty and 
Robert Sorenson d/b/a Community Insurance, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 44 
Reported at: 300 Wis. 2d 463, 730 N.W.2d 668 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Polk   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Rasmussen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, Jr., JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by William L. Norine and Norine Law Firm, 
Grantsburg, and oral argument by William L. Norine. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent there was a 
brief by Joe Thrasher and Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish & Franti, 
Ltd., Rice Lake, and oral argument by Joe Thrasher. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance, Property Casualty Insurers Association of 
America, 
Civil 
Trial 
Council 
of 
Wisconsin 
and 
National 
 
 
2 
Association of Subrogation Professionals by James A. Friedman 
and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers by Mark L. Thomsen, Edward E. Robinson, 
Brett A. Eckstein, and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield. 
 
 
 
2008 WI 50
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP976   
(L.C. No. 
2001CV525) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Bruce Muller and Karen Muller d/b/a B & K 
Sports and Liquors, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Society Insurance, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
George Jerrick, United Fire and Casualty and 
Robert Sorenson d/b/a Community Insurance, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Muller v. Society Ins., 2007 
WI App 44, 300 Wis. 2d 463, 730 N.W.2d 668, reversing a judgment 
of the circuit court for Polk County, Robert H. Rasmussen, 
Judge. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The question presented is whether an insurer may 
retain in full a subrogation settlement with a tortfeasor and a 
tortfeasor's insurer after its insureds have settled with the 
tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer for an amount less than 
necessary to make the insureds "whole," even though the 
tortfeasor's insurance policy limits were sufficient to cover 
all claims, including those of both the insureds and the 
insurer. 
¶3 
The plaintiff insureds, Bruce and Karen Muller (the 
Mullers), claim that their property insurer, Society Insurance 
(Society), may not retain its subrogation settlement with a 
tortfeasor, George Jerrick (Jerrick), and his insurer, United 
Fire and Casualty (United), because the Mullers have not been 
"made whole" under the rule of Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance 
Company, 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977), Rimes v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 
N.W.2d 348 (1982), and their progeny.  To resolve this case, we 
must evaluate our subrogation and "made whole" jurisprudence in 
light of the equitable considerations surrounding settlements.   
¶4 
We hold that the made whole doctrine is not implicated 
in this case.  Specifically, the doctrine does not apply when an 
insurer has fully satisfied its obligations under an insurance 
contract, given its insureds the opportunity to settle their 
claim with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer, the pool 
of settlement funds available to the insureds exceeds the total 
claims of both the insureds and the insurer, and the insureds 
settle their claim, even though the insureds' settlement, 
No. 2006AP976 
 
3 
 
together with the insurer's policy payments, does not satisfy 
the insureds' total claim.  In these circumstances, the 
inequitable prospect of an insurer competing with its insureds 
for an inadequate pool of funds is not present, and the equities 
favor the insurer.  Thus, we conclude that Society is entitled 
to retain its entire subrogation settlement with United and 
Jerrick and that the Mullers have no right to a portion of 
Society's subrogation settlement.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Bruce and Karen Muller owned a sporting goods store in 
Milltown, Wisconsin.  On August 11, 2001, a fire destroyed the 
store, resulting in a claimed total loss of $697,981.58.  The 
Mullers believed and alleged that the fire was caused by the 
negligence of George Jerrick, an electrical contractor hired to 
install wiring during a remodeling project at the store.  
Jerrick carried liability insurance with United Fire and 
Casualty, with policy limits of $1,000,000. 
¶6 
The Mullers carried property insurance with Society 
Insurance, but their coverage did not equal their total loss.  
Society paid the Mullers their policy limits ($407,378.88), but 
this payment left the Mullers with a claimed uninsured loss of 
$290,602.70.   
No. 2006AP976 
 
4 
 
¶7 
On December 17, 2001, the Mullers sued Jerrick and 
United to recover their uninsured loss.1  The Mullers named 
Society 
as 
a 
defendant, 
claiming 
additional 
business 
interruption coverage.  This issue later dropped out of the 
case.  The Mullers did not name Society as a subrogated party 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.03(2),2 but Society cross-claimed 
against Jerrick and United for subrogation.  
¶8 
On March 4, 2003, the parties attended a mediation 
session in Eau Claire.3  Prior to this session, the Mullers and 
Society had been working together to prepare for a May 19, 2003, 
trial.  At the session, the Mullers and Society met separately 
with Jerrick and United.  Society reached a tentative settlement 
with Jerrick and United on Society's subrogation claim.  It did 
not sign a formal agreement.  Society's tentative settlement for 
$190,000 was conditioned upon the Mullers settling with Jerrick 
and United or resolving the case at trial. 
¶9 
The Mullers, however, did not reach a settlement with 
Jerrick and United and were disheartened by the prospect of 
                                                 
1 The Mullers' complaint also included one count related to 
the 
alleged 
negligence 
of 
their 
insurance 
agent, 
Robert 
Sorenson.  Sorenson allegedly failed to recommend that the 
Mullers secure sufficient insurance coverage for their property.  
The Mullers settled with Sorenson for $30,000. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Of course, the mediation sessions are not part of the 
record.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.085. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
5 
 
going to trial against Jerrick and United without Society's 
assistance. 
¶10 Almost immediately, the Mullers' attorney called Judge 
Rasmussen's office to seek the court's direct help in additional 
mediation.  In a March 28, 2003, letter to the court, the 
Mullers' 
attorney 
made 
a 
formal 
request 
for 
additional 
mediation, explaining that there had been a "settlement, the 
amount and terms of which remain undisclosed," and that Society 
would be withdrawing from the case.  The letter stated that 
"there were unfortunately some basic miscommunications at the 
mediation held on March 4, 2003, which may have prevented a 
global settlement at that time."  The letter raised the prospect 
of the Mullers pursuing "any claims they might have against 
Society under the Rimes doctrine."  The letter was copied to all 
parties. 
¶11 On May 19, 2003, a second mediation session was 
conducted, this time with Judge Rasmussen.  Only the Mullers, 
Jerrick, and United were involved in the Rasmussen mediation.  
At this session, the Mullers voluntarily settled their claim 
against Jerrick and United for $120,000, which was $170,602.70 
less than their claimed uninsured loss.  As stated, Jerrick's 
liability insurance policy had a limit of $1,000,000. 
¶12 The Mullers' settlement did not include an agreement 
to indemnify Jerrick or United from the subrogation claim by 
Society.  Thus, Society later settled with Jerrick and United 
for $190,000. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
6 
 
¶13 Following these two settlements, the Mullers and 
Society briefed the issue of whether the Rimes made whole 
doctrine applied to allow the Mullers to recover the remainder 
of their claimed uninsured loss from Society's subrogation 
settlement with Jerrick and United. 
¶14 On September 30, 2004, the circuit court issued a 
written decision that concluded that the combination of the 
Mullers' $120,000 settlement with Jerrick and United and the 
$407,378.88 indemnity payment the Mullers received from Society 
did not make the Mullers whole for their fire casualty loss.  
Focusing on the "longstanding legal, equitable and public policy 
principles which [underlie] the decision in Rimes and its 
progeny," the circuit court determined that "United defined what 
constituted the 'limited pool'" of funds available to pay both 
Society's and the Mullers' claims.  The court said that because 
Society and the Mullers were in competition for this limited 
pool of $310,000,4 Society was "not entitled to retain any of 
those funds unless and until the plaintiffs have been 'made 
whole.'"  The circuit court determined that the Mullers were 
entitled to a hearing regarding the amount that would make them 
whole, and that amount was to be recovered from Society's 
$190,000 subrogation settlement with Jerrick and United. 
¶15 Before such a hearing took place, the Mullers and 
Society held a third mediation session.  After this session, the 
                                                 
4 This $310,000 sum reflected United's combined settlements 
of $120,000 with the Mullers and $190,000 with Society. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
7 
 
Mullers and Society signed a written stipulation that the 
Mullers' "total unreimbursed loss" for their fire casualty was 
$59,725.60. 
¶16 With 
this 
amount ascertained, the circuit court 
entered judgment in favor of the Mullers and against Society for 
$59,725.60. 
¶17 Society appealed, and the Mullers cross-appealed, 
seeking to recover the entire amount ($190,000) of Society's 
subrogation settlement with Jerrick and United.   
¶18 On February 20, 2007, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court, holding that Society was entitled to retain 
its entire subrogation settlement with Jerrick and United.  The 
court of appeals noted the general rule that "an insurer is not 
allowed to recover its subrogation interest until its insured 
has been made whole."  Muller, 300 Wis. 2d 463, ¶14 (citing 
Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 541-42).  However, the court of appeals 
observed that: (1) the $1,000,000 limit of Jerrick's policy with 
United was "far more than adequate to cover all the claims"; and 
(2) the amount to be recovered was not limited by either Society 
or the Mullers.  Muller, 300 Wis. 2d 463, ¶¶16-17.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that, given these facts, "the Mullers made a 
conscious 
choice 
to 
accept 
less 
than 
their 
losses . . . [that] . . . cannot 
plausibly 
be 
tied 
to 
any 
limited funds."  Id., ¶18.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
determined that the Mullers had the first opportunity to recover 
their losses and failed to do so, and it reversed in favor of 
Society.  Id.   
No. 2006AP976 
 
8 
 
¶19 The Mullers petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 12, 2007.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 This case focuses on the respective rights of an 
insurer and its insureds when: (1) the insureds have settled 
with a tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer for an amount 
that is less than necessary to satisfy all the insureds' claims; 
but (2) the tortfeasor's insurance policy limit was sufficient 
to cover all claims, including those of the insureds and their 
subrogated insurer.  These facts require us to determine the 
applicability of the made whole doctrine to a given set of 
undisputed facts, a question of law that we review de novo.  
Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 628, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993); 
Oakley v. Fireman's Fund of Wis., 162 Wis. 2d 821, 826, 470 
N.W.2d 882 (1991). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶21 We begin our analysis with a general discussion of 
subrogation and the made whole doctrine and then delve into our 
made whole doctrine jurisprudence. 
¶22 Subrogation is a legal doctrine that provides for the 
substitution of one party, the subrogee, in place of another, 
the creditor (or subrogor), to whose rights the substituted 
party succeeds in relation to a debt.  See 16 Lee R. Russ & 
Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 222:5 (3d ed. 2000) 
(hereinafter Couch).  In the insurance context, subrogation is a 
purely derivative right that permits an insurer who has been 
contractually obligated to satisfy a loss created by a third 
No. 2006AP976 
 
9 
 
party to step into the shoes of its insured and to pursue 
recovery from the responsible wrongdoer.  See 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Subrogation § 1 (2007).  As a substituted party, a subrogated 
insurer has no greater rights than its insured.  Couch, supra, 
at § 222:5.  The doctrine of subrogation enables an insurer that 
has paid an insured's loss pursuant to a policy of property 
insurance to recoup that payment from the party responsible for 
the loss.  Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between 
Insured and Insurer in a Subrogation Case, 29 Tort & Ins. L. J. 
803, 803 (1994) (citing John J. Pappas & Scott S. Katz, Insuring 
Real Property § 41.01[1] (Stephen A. Cozen ed. 1992)).   
¶23 Subrogation rests upon equitable principles.  Petta v. 
ABC Ins. Co., 2005 WI 18, ¶27, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 N.W.2d 639.  
In part, the law invokes subrogation to avoid unjust enrichment.  
Ruckel v. Gassner, 2002 WI 67, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 280, 646 
N.W.2d 11.  Once an insured has been fully compensated for his 
loss, any additional recovery by the insured would constitute 
unjust enrichment.  Couch, supra, at § 223:133. 
¶24 Subrogation effectuates an equitable adjustment among 
parties to prevent unjust enrichment in at least two ways.  See 
Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma 
Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance Subrogation, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 
723, 725-26 (2005).  First, subrogation compels payment of a 
debt by one who in equity ought to pay, namely, the tortfeasor.5  
                                                 
5 Thus, an insurer is substituted to the rights of the 
insured so that it can seek recovery for its payment from the 
party responsible for the loss. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
10 
 
Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted).  Second, subrogation precludes 
an insured from recovering twice for the same loss.  Id. 
¶25 Balancing the insurer's right to recoup benefits it 
has paid against an insured's right to obtain full compensation 
for loss is also an equitable concern in subrogation.  See 
Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶34 (citing Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 
630).  Justice Benjamin Cardozo once reflected upon this 
equitable concern in the suretyship context: 
A surety who has undertaken to pay the creditors of 
the principal, though not beyond a stated limit, may 
not share in the assets of the principal by reason of 
such payment until the debts thus partially protected 
have been satisfied in full. This is the rule where 
the right to a dividend has its basis in the principle 
of equitable subrogation. "A surety liable only for 
part of the debt does not become subrogated to 
collateral or to remedies available to the creditor 
unless he pays the whole debt or it is otherwise 
satisfied." 
Am. Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 137 
(1935) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 254 U.S. 73, 76 
(1920)).  Thus, equity provides that subrogation ordinarily does 
not arise until the underlying debt or loss has been paid in 
full.  Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶27 (citations omitted).  This 
"antisubrogation rule" is known as the made whole doctrine.  Id. 
¶26 Wisconsin's made whole doctrine attempts to balance 
all these equitable concerns.  Equity does not lend itself to 
the application of black letter rules.  Id., ¶34.  It is heavily 
influenced by particular facts.  The equitable balance can 
become tenuous when an insured settles unilaterally with the 
tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer without securing enough 
No. 2006AP976 
 
11 
 
funds to be fully compensated because someone is going to be 
disappointed.  The case before us involves a situation in which 
the Mullers voluntarily settled for considerably less than 
Jerrick's policy limits, yet were not fully compensated for 
their loss.  To close the gap, the Mullers are demanding at 
least part of their insurer's subrogation settlement. 
¶27 We have alluded to tortfeasor policy limits as a 
factor to weigh in past decisions.6  In this case it is a central 
factor.  To explain its impact, we trace the history of the made 
whole doctrine in Wisconsin, beginning with Garrity.   
¶28 In Garrity, we recognized that subrogation rests upon 
equitable principles including a rule that the insured has 
priority over his insurer when there is an inadequate pool of 
funds.  Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 541, 543.  The Garritys owned a 
dairy farm and had a fire insurance policy with Rural Mutual 
Insurance Company (Rural Mutual).  Id. at 539.  Their barn was 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 
539, 
253 
N.W.2d 
512 
(1977) 
(describing 
facts 
where 
the 
tortfeasor possessed a policy worth $25,000 when the plaintiffs' 
damages were alleged to be $110,000); Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
United of Wis. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis., 140 Wis. 2d 
544, 547, 411 N.W.2d 133 (1987) ("On December 24, 1982, Blue 
Cross learned that Kyle and Robert Adams had settled their 
personal injury claim for $60,000——$40,000 less than Fireman's 
policy limits."); Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 633, 500 
N.W.2d 305 (1993) ("[s]ettling defendants typically have limited 
policy limits"); Paulson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶27, 
263 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 744 ("The specter of an insurer 
competing with the insured for a limited amount of funds is 
simply not raised by the facts of this case.  There has been no 
discussion of policy limits or a limited pool of funds for which 
Midwest and Paulson are competing."). 
No. 2006AP976 
 
12 
 
destroyed by a fire allegedly caused by the negligent driving of 
a truck by an employee of two brothers doing business as Bowers 
Brothers Feed Mill.  Id.  The Bowers mill also held a Rural 
Mutual insurance policy with a liability limit of $25,000 on the 
truck.  Id.  The Garritys claimed the total loss of the barn was 
$110,000.  Id.  They recovered the limits on their insurance 
policy——$67,227.12——from Rural Mutual and then filed suit 
against the Bowerses and Rural Mutual for $110,000.  Id.  Rural 
Mutual denied that the Bowers truck was driven negligently, and 
it filed a third-party complaint against itself in its role as 
the Garritys' insurance carrier to determine its rights and 
liabilities as a third-party defendant.  Id. at 539-40.  The 
Garritys' insurance contract with Rural Mutual included a 
provision giving Rural a potential right of subrogation.  Id. at 
540.  Hence, the gist of Rural's move was an attempt to keep the 
$25,000 under the Bowerses' policy as subrogation for the 
$67,000 payment it had made under the Garritys' policy.   
¶29 This 
court 
noted 
the 
equitable 
principle 
that 
subrogation ensures that "one, other than a volunteer, who pays 
for the wrong of another should be permitted to look to the 
wrongdoer to the extent he has paid and be subject to the 
defenses of the wrongdoer."  Id. at 541 (citations omitted).  
The purpose of the doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment.  Id. 
(citations omitted).  The cause of action against the tortfeasor 
is viewed as an indivisible claim, and the plaintiff holds this 
claim until he is given the opportunity to fully recover his 
No. 2006AP976 
 
13 
 
loss.  Id. at 542.7  Logically, this principle establishes the 
insured's priority over his insurer in pursuing recovery, and 
"the general rule [is] that there is no subrogation until the 
insured has been made whole."  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶30 This general rule controlled in Garrity because of the 
inequity of Rural Mutual competing with its own insured for the 
Bowerses' $25,000 Rural Mutual liability policy limit.  The 
parties stipulated that the Garritys had not been made whole for 
the loss they suffered.  Id. at 543.  Given this stipulation and 
the limited funds available from the tortfeasors' policy, we 
concluded that "Rural Mutual's right to share in the $25,000 
recoverable from themselves as the insurer of the tort-feasor is 
secondary to the insured's right to recovery."  Id.   
¶31 The equities in Garrity contrast with those in the 
Mullers' case because in Garrity there was a limited pool of 
funds——the 
$25,000 
liability 
policy——that 
was 
insufficient 
either to make the Garritys whole or to reimburse Rural Mutual 
for the policy benefits it had already paid.  Both claims could 
                                                 
7 The 
court 
clarified 
the 
"indivisible 
claim" 
in 
a 
subsequent passage, saying:   
We have disapproved of the language in Patitucci 
v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 362, [240] N.W. 385 (1932) 
that a subrogee is an "owner" of the insured's claim.  
In Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 
834 (1973) we said, "It is better to think of the 
insurer as an assignee of part of the claim than to 
speak of the insured and the insurer as joint owners 
of the claim." 
Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 546. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
14 
 
not be satisfied by this $25,000 pool.  In the Mullers' case, 
the $1,000,000 liability policy held by Jerrick was more than 
sufficient to cover all claims.  In addition, in this case, the 
recovery priority rule established by Garrity was maintained.  
The Mullers settled with Jerrick and United before Society 
entered its own subrogation settlement, preserving the Mullers' 
right to be the first to tap available settlement funds. 
¶32 Five years after Garrity, we applied the subrogation 
rule of priority in a personal injury case.  The question 
presented for review in Rimes was:   
[W]hether an automobile insurer, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Company, 
which, 
under 
a 
subrogation agreement signed by its insured, Palmer H. 
Rimes, 
has 
made 
payment 
under 
the 
medical-pay 
provisions of its policy, has the right to recover 
those payments out of the monies received by its 
insured in a settlement with negligent third-party 
tortfeasors 
and 
their 
liability 
insurers, 
when, 
according to the findings and judgment of the circuit 
court, the settlement figure was less than the total 
damages sustained by the insured as the result of an 
automobile accident. 
Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 264.  The plaintiffs, Palmer and Patricia 
Rimes, sustained damages of $300,433.54 but settled with the 
tortfeasors for $125,000.  Id. at 264-65. 
¶33 Palmer Rimes was severely injured while providing aid 
at the roadside scene of a traffic accident involving the 
vehicle of Roy Langdon (Langdon).  Id. at 265.  Langdon's 
vehicle had been rear-ended by the vehicle of Peggy Stiles 
(Stiles).  Id.  While Rimes was examining the Stiles vehicle, it 
was struck by another driver, Leonard Switzer (Switzer).  Id.  
No. 2006AP976 
 
15 
 
This collision caused severe injuries to Rimes.  Id.  Rimes and 
his wife Patricia sued Switzer, Stiles, and Langdon and their 
insurers.  Id.  Switzer carried a $300,000 liability insurance 
policy with Travelers Indemnity; Stiles and Langdon each carried 
policies of $50,000 with American Family.  Id.  State Farm, the 
Rimeses' insurer, was joined as a defendant because of its 
possible subrogation rights as a result of medical payments of 
$9,649.90 made under two policies carried by the Rimeses.  Id.  
at 265-66. 
¶34 Prior to trial, Langdon and his insurer were dismissed 
by stipulation.  Id. at 266.  This left a pool of $350,000 (the 
$300,000 policy of Switzer and the $50,000 policy of Stiles) to 
cover the claims of both the Rimeses and State Farm.  The 
remaining parties entered into a stipulation, providing that 
State Farm had a subrogated interest in recovery of the medical 
expenses paid to the Rimeses.  Id. at 267.  The stipulation 
further provided that State Farm was to recover its subrogated 
interest out of any judgment rendered or settlement entered in 
favor of the Rimeses.  Id. 
¶35 The Rimeses subsequently settled all claims with the 
remaining defendants for $125,000.  Id.  American Family paid 
$50,000, its policy limit, on behalf of Stiles, and Travelers 
Indemnity paid $75,000 of its $300,000 policy limit on behalf of 
Switzer.  Id.  A new stipulation for this settlement provided 
that $9,649.90 of the $75,000 from Switzer was to be held in 
escrow by the court pending a determination of State Farm's 
subrogation rights at a "trial."  Id.  All parties, including 
No. 2006AP976 
 
16 
 
State Farm, signed this new stipulation that included the 
recitation: "This action is fully settled as to all claims for 
relief and all cross claims by all parties, except as 
specifically otherwise provided by this order."  Id.  The 
stipulation further provided that the action was to remain 
pending to determine the subrogation rights of State Farm at a 
subsequent proceeding.  Id. at 268. 
¶36 The circuit court took testimony for two days with 
regard to the damages sustained by the plaintiffs and the 
negligence aspects of the accident.  Id.  The court determined 
that total damages, including those for past and future medical 
expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, and Patricia Rimes' 
loss of consortium claim, were $300,433.54.  Id. at 269.  The 
circuit court, relying upon Garrity, found that State Farm had 
no right to subrogation because the plaintiffs' settlement of 
$125,000 left them less than whole.  Id. 
¶37 The Rimes court upheld the circuit court, reiterating 
the rule that "[s]ubrogation is to be allowed only when the 
insured is compensated in full by recovery from the tortfeasor."  
Id. at 272.  The court attempted to define "wholeness" 
generically:  "Under Wisconsin law the test of wholeness depends 
upon whether the insured has been completely compensated for all 
the elements of damages, not merely those damages for which the 
insurer has indemnified the insured."  Id. at 275.  The court 
rejected State Farm's argument that the Rimeses' settlement with 
the tortfeasors was "an affirmation by them that they have been 
made whole as required by law."  Id. at 273.  Instead, the court 
No. 2006AP976 
 
17 
 
held that their settlement, by its very nature, could not be 
viewed as an acknowledgement of full reimbursement for the wrong 
done because neither the Rimeses nor State Farm released the 
other in respect to the sum equal to the medical payments.  Id. 
at 273-74.   
¶38 Finally, 
the Rimes court reviewed the procedure 
utilized by the circuit court and endorsed what is now known as 
a Rimes hearing.  Id. at 277-79.  At this hearing, a "trial" is 
conducted before the court solely to ascertain the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff.  Id. at 277.  If the damages found 
exceed those actually recovered by the plaintiff from all 
sources, the plaintiff will be found to be less than whole and 
will not be required to disgorge any of the amounts by which he 
has been indemnified.  See id. at 275-76. 
¶39 Rimes 
is 
distinguishable from the present case.  
First, Rimes represents a case in which the subrogated insurer 
created a limited pool of funds by stipulating to the settlement 
with the tortfeasors, in the same way that the Rimeses 
stipulated with the tortfeasors.  See id. at 267-68.  The 
insurer agreed to let the tortfeasors off the hook.  The 
subrogated insurer (State Farm) also stipulated that its dispute 
with the Rimeses (the insureds) was not settled, id., and thus 
was subject to resolution by traditional equity principles.  By 
contrast, in this case Society did not stipulate to a settlement 
with Jerrick and United at the same time as the Mullers, thereby 
preserving its right to settle or pursue a subrogation claim 
against Jerrick and United at a later date and for an amount 
No. 2006AP976 
 
18 
 
greater than the Mullers' settlement.  This fact scenario 
presents different equities from the settlement in Rimes. 
¶40 Second, the personal injury claims in Rimes made 
estimation of damages much more imprecise and difficult than the 
property claims here.  In Rimes, the settling parties had to 
estimate the value of claims for lost past and future earnings, 
past and future physical disability, pain and suffering, and 
past and future medical expenses, in addition to claims for loss 
of consortium, to determine total damages.  Id. at 268-69.  The 
value of these types of damages can be difficult to ascertain, 
making settlement talks more combative and less likely to 
accurately reflect the amount necessary to fully compensate the 
plaintiff.  By contrast, in this case, the value of the 
plaintiffs' 
property 
loss 
was 
largely 
undisputed, 
making 
settlement 
negotiations 
between 
the 
plaintiffs 
and 
the 
tortfeasor hinge solely on the issue of the tortfeasor's 
liability.  Normally, in a case like this one, settlement is 
likely to approach the plaintiff's actual damages if insurance 
is available and if liability is clear.  This equitable factor 
helps inform our decision.   
¶41 Third, Rimes involved an insurer's efforts to recover 
in subrogation against its own insured, not against the 
tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer.  Id. at 264.  By 
contrast, the Mullers brought Society into this action as a 
defendant; Society then cross-claimed against Jerrick and United 
to protect its own interests.  Society participated in the 
litigation, providing experts and its own attorneys to assist 
No. 2006AP976 
 
19 
 
the Mullers in pursuing their settlement.  This situation is 
different from the antagonistic posture of the parties in Rimes, 
where the insurer was seeking subrogation out of the settlement 
negotiated by its own insured.8 
¶42 Following 
Rimes, 
we 
explored 
the 
equitable 
considerations that determine the applicability of the Garrity-
Rimes made whole doctrine.  Vogt v. Schroeder, 129 Wis. 2d 3, 
383 N.W.2d 876 (1986), involved the question of whether an 
underinsurer has a right of subrogation against an underinsured 
tortfeasor when the underinsurer makes a partial payment of its 
insured's damages.  Id. at 7.  A passenger (Vogt) in his own 
automobile was injured when the vehicle, driven by his son, 
collided with a vehicle driven by the defendant (Schroeder).  
Id.  Schroeder's vehicle carried only $15,000 in liability 
coverage, and the personal injuries sustained by Vogt exceeded 
$15,000.  Id.  The Vogt vehicle, in addition to the usual 
liability coverage, was covered by an underinsured motorist 
rider of $50,000.  Id.  Because the liability prediction with 
respect to Schroeder was highly unfavorable, Schroeder's insurer 
                                                 
8 We observe that the means the Mullers utilized to be "made 
whole"——pursuing the proceeds of Society's settlement with 
Jerrick and United——operated as a sort of reverse-subrogation.  
By "reverse-subrogation," we mean that the typical positions are 
reversed; instead of the insurer pursuing the insured or 
tortfeasor for reimbursement, the insured is pursuing its own 
property insurer to be made whole.   
By employing this strategy, the Mullers are attempting to 
receive more from Society by recovering part of Society's 
subrogation settlement than they would have under the limits of 
their insurance policy. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
20 
 
offered to pay its policy limits of $15,000 in exchange for its 
release and the release of its insured.  Id. at 8. 
¶43 Vogt commenced an action against Schroeder.  Id. at 
10.  Subsequently, as a part of that underlying action, 
Schroeder and his insurer filed a motion for a declaration of 
the right of the insurer to pay the policy limits to Vogt and 
the right of Vogt to release Schroeder and the insurer from any 
further liability.  Id. 
¶44 When the case reached this court on certification, the 
Vogt court reiterated that the made whole doctrine, as stated in 
Garrity and Rimes, rests upon equitable principles.  Id. at 13.  
However, the court cautioned that some statements in Rimes and 
Garrity could not be applied literally because subrogation is an 
equitable doctrine that depends upon a just resolution of a 
dispute under a particular set of facts.  Id.  at 12 (citing 6A 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 4051, at 110).  "Hence, 
only under fact situations where an equitable result will follow 
should the statements quoted above [e.g., "the conventionally 
subrogated or contractual insurer has no share in the recovery 
from the tort-feasor if the total amount recovered by the 
insured from the insurer does not cover his loss," Garrity, 77 
Wis. 2d at 544] be applied literally."  Vogt, 129 Wis. 2d at 12 
(emphasis added).  "Garrity recognizes that there are equitable 
principles to support subrogation other than those concerned 
with whether the injured or indemnified party is made whole or 
unjustly enriched."  Id. at 13.    
No. 2006AP976 
 
21 
 
¶45 The Vogt court stated that "the wrongdoer should be 
responsible for his conduct and not be allowed to go scot-free 
by failing to respond in damages while another, an indemnitor 
for the injured party, is required to do so."  Id.  The court 
said that "in both Garrity and Rimes the court knew from the 
record that the funds available were insufficient to satisfy the 
damages of the injured party——i.e., to make him whole," 
therefore, equity did not permit the insurer to take these funds 
in subrogation.  Id. at 14.  We characterized both Garrity and 
Rimes as dealing with the issue of priority between the insured 
and his own insurer, saying that equity pointed to the 
conclusion that the insured, left less than whole in both cases, 
was to be afforded first priority in recovery.  Id. at 14-15.  
We also pointed out the impact of State Farm joining the 
plaintiffs' settlement in Rimes as a factor weighing against 
granting State Farm priority.  See id. at 15 n.5. 
¶46 In sum, the holding in Vogt stands for the proposition 
that the made whole doctrine of Garrity and Rimes is not a 
simplistic or absolute rule.  Id. at 15.  Subrogation depends 
upon the application of equitable principles to the facts of 
each case, and those principles are concerned with preserving 
the rights of both the insured and subrogated insurer.  Id.  In 
short, sometimes, the made whole doctrine does not apply. 
¶47 Consistent with Vogt, our holdings in Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin, 140 Wis. 2d 544, 411 N.W.2d 133 (1987), 
and Mutual Service Casualty Company v. American Family Insurance 
No. 2006AP976 
 
22 
 
Group, 140 Wis. 2d 555, 410 N.W.2d 582 (1987), repeated the fact 
that Garrity and Rimes should not control where the insured 
plaintiff and the subrogated insurer are not competing for a 
limited pool of funds. 
¶48 In Blue Cross, we reviewed the issue of whether a 
subrogated insurer must allege that its insured was made whole 
to properly state a claim for relief when its insured has 
settled with a tortfeasor.  Blue Cross, 140 Wis. 2d at 546.  
Although the case focused on this limited issue, the Blue Cross 
court had occasion to comment on the equities surrounding our 
decisions in Garrity and Rimes.   
¶49 In Blue Cross, the plaintiff, Kyle Adams, was injured 
in a motor vehicle accident.  Id. at 547.  He was hospitalized, 
and his hospital bill of $10,202.50 was covered by Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield United of Wisconsin (Blue Cross).  Id.  After paying 
these expenses, Blue Cross became subrogated to the extent of 
the payments, and it notified the tortfeasor's insurance 
company, 
Fireman's 
Fund 
Insurance 
Company 
of 
Wisconsin 
(Fireman's), of its subrogation rights.  Id.  Thereafter, Adams 
settled separately with Fireman's for $60,000, which was $40,000 
less than Fireman's' limits for his personal injury claim.  Id.  
The settlement did not resolve Blue Cross's subrogation claim, 
but it did provide Fireman's with indemnity against Blue Cross's 
subrogation claim.  Id. at 547, 553.  Blue Cross then initiated 
an action against Fireman's and the tortfeasor to recover the 
$10,202.50 it had paid on behalf of Adams.  Id. at 547.  In 
doing so, Blue Cross did not allege in its complaint that Adams 
No. 2006AP976 
 
23 
 
had been "made whole."  Id.  This court concluded that an 
insured who has settled his claim against the tortfeasor does 
not have to be made whole before a subrogated insurer may bring 
a subrogation claim against a tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's 
insurer.  Id. at 546, 549. 
¶50 First, we reiterated our holding in Vogt that there is 
no absolute rule that the insured must be made whole before an 
insurer can recover in subrogation.  Id. at 550 (citing Vogt, 
129 Wis. 2d at 11-13).  Instead, the equities of a particular 
case should control.  See id.  Second, we held that the 
compelling equitable factor that defeated the subrogation right 
asserted in both Garrity and Rimes (namely, the prospect of an 
insurer competing with its own insured for funds which are 
insufficient to make the insured whole) was not present in Blue 
Cross.  Id. at 551.  Third, we distinguished Rimes and Garrity 
on the grounds that both of those cases involved an insurer 
suing its own insured in subrogation; whereas, Blue Cross 
involved a subrogated insurer pursuing the tortfeasor and his 
insurer separately.  Id.  Because the facts presented no 
competition for a limited set of funds, Blue Cross was free to 
pursue 
subrogation. 
 
Id. 
 
Finally, 
we 
held 
that 
the 
indemnification agreement entered into when Adams settled with 
Fireman's 
could 
not 
be 
used 
to 
circumvent 
Blue 
Cross's 
subrogation right.  Id. at 553-54. 
¶51 It must be noted that in Schulte v. Frazin, the court 
overruled the language of Blue Cross that disapproved the use of 
indemnification agreements by settling plaintiffs.  Schulte, 176 
No. 2006AP976 
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d at 634.  The court distinguished the equities in Schulte 
from the equities in Blue Cross, but it did not completely 
overrule the latter.  Id. at 635 ("We do not completely overrule 
Blue Cross, however.  Blue Cross still applies when a plaintiff 
and tortfeasor settle without involving the subrogated insurer 
and without submitting the issue of the subrogated insurer's 
rights to the circuit court."). 
¶52 The Mutual Service decision was released the same day 
as Blue Cross.  In Mutual Service we determined that an 
insurer's subrogated interest was not satisfied when the insured 
settled with the tortfeasor's insurance company, and, pursuant 
to the settlement, the tortfeasor's insurance company issued a 
check made payable to the insurer, its insured, and the 
insured's attorney.  Mutual Service, 140 Wis. 2d at 557.  We 
held that the trial court was in error when it dismissed the 
insurer's claim against the tortfeasor's insurer and found that 
the insurer's subrogation rights were extinguished by the check.  
Id. at 562. 
¶53 One interesting aspect of Mutual Service is the 
court's treatment of the insured's and subrogated insurer's 
interests as separate "claims" against the tortfeasor.  We noted 
that an insurer whose policy with an insured includes a right to 
subrogation possesses an independent "cause of action against 
the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer for its subrogated 
interest."  Id. at 561.  The interests of the insurer and 
insured exist as "each owning separately a part of the claim 
against the tortfeasor."  Id. (citing Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 
No. 2006AP976 
 
25 
 
Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973); Wilmot v. Racine 
County, 136 Wis. 2d 57, 63-64, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987)).9   
¶54 Mutual Service also reiterated the fact that neither 
Garrity nor Rimes is applicable in an action brought by a 
subrogated insurer against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's 
insurer "where the subrogated insurer's insured has previously 
settled with the tortfeasor."  Id. at 563-64.  This holding 
appears to be directly on point in this case. 
¶55 Schulte followed Blue Cross and Mutual Service and 
distinguished both cases while identifying the role that 
indemnification agreements play in establishing a "limited pool" 
of funds that creates competition between the insured and his 
insurer.   
                                                 
9 Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973), 
provides some discussion of the appropriate way to frame the 
subrogated insurer's interest and contrast it with the insured's 
interest.  Heifetz viewed the subrogated interest as an 
assignment of rights: 
However, it can be seen that [insured and 
insurer] are not really joint owners in the same sense 
as the joint payees of a note.  Each actually owns 
separately a part of the liability of the tort-feasor.  
The insurer has a claim only for the money he paid to 
his insured and the insured by accepting payment has 
lost his right to demand payment of that sum from the 
tort-feasor.  The insured can claim all other damages 
over and above that amount and the insurer has no 
claim to those damages.  Thus it is better to think of 
the insurer as an assignee of part of the claim than 
to speak of the insured and the insurer as joint 
owners of the claim. 
Id. at 120.  See also Ives v. Coopertools, 208 Wis. 2d 55, 85 
n.1, 559 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (Steinmetz, J., concurring).   
No. 2006AP976 
 
26 
 
¶56 In Schulte, the court reviewed the case of Barbara 
Schulte, a surgery patient who was injured when a surgical drill 
came in contact with her spinal cord.  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 
625.  Schulte's medical insurer, Compcare, paid $90,000 for her 
medical treatment.  Id. at 625-26.  When Schulte filed a medical 
malpractice suit against her surgeon, Dr. Frazin, and his 
insurer, Compcare was joined as a party and filed both a 
counterclaim against Schulte and a cross-claim in subrogation 
against Dr. Frazin.  Id. at 626. 
¶57 Schulte settled with Dr. Frazin and his insurer for 
$2,460,000.  Id.  The settlement indemnified both defendants 
against further liability arising from the incident.  Id. at 
626-27.  Schulte then requested a Rimes hearing to resolve 
Compcare's right of subrogation, and it moved to extinguish that 
right.  Id. at 627.  Compcare participated in the Rimes hearing, 
and Schulte presented evidence that her injuries amounted to 
between $2,950,000 and $4,790,000.  Id.  The circuit court 
determined that Schulte had not been made whole by her 
settlement and entered an order dismissing Compcare's counter 
and cross-claims.  Id. 
¶58 The Schulte court likened the case to Rimes and 
concluded that the made whole doctrine precluded Compcare's 
subrogation recovery.  Id. at 630.  The court distinguished Blue 
Cross and Mutual Service on the grounds that the insurers' 
rights in those cases were not resolved in a Rimes hearing, 
thereby emphasizing the need for insurer participation.  Id. at 
631, 636.  In discussing Blue Cross, the Schulte court noted 
No. 2006AP976 
 
27 
 
that competition for limited funds between the insured and his 
insurer arises when the tortfeasor's assets are limited.  Id. at 
632 (citing Blue Cross, 140 Wis. 2d at 552 n.3).  The court 
recognized that subrogated insurers and insureds often compete 
for limited settlement funds and that "[s]ettling defendants 
typically have limited policy limits and assets and typically 
want to pay as little as possible."  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 
633.  Likewise, "[s]ettling plaintiffs typically want as much as 
possible."  Id.  This creates competition, "an equitable factor 
we cannot ignore."  Id.   
¶59 Resolution of the Schulte case hinged on the indemnity 
agreement granted by Schulte to Dr. Frazin and his insurer and 
the fact that Compcare was able to represent its interests at 
the Rimes hearing.  The court noted that the existence of an 
indemnification agreement by the insured "indirectly creates the 
prospect that the insurer will be competing with its own 
insured."  Id. at 634.  The insurer's ability to participate in 
both the settlement process10 and the Rimes hearing is also 
crucial to judging whether subrogation can be maintained.  Full 
participation in settlement and the hearing, combined with a 
finding that the insured is less than whole, shifts the 
                                                 
10 The dissenting justice in Schulte focused on the fact 
that Compcare was notified of Schulte's settlement for less than 
policy limits after the settlement had occurred.  Schulte, 176 
Wis. 2d at 638 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
concluded that Schulte could not claim that the made whole 
doctrine applied to bar subrogation when she agreed to accept a 
settlement for less than policy limits.  Id. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
28 
 
equitable balance away from the insurer.  Id. at 636.  Finally, 
the Schulte court attempted to lay out a step-by-step procedure 
to determine the insurer's subrogation rights when the insured 
settles first.11  
¶60 There are several lessons we can take from the cases 
following Garrity and Rimes that are helpful in resolving the 
Mullers' case.  First, the made whole doctrine is not applicable 
in all situations, and thus the test of "wholeness" stated in 
Rimes is not the sole criterion for determining whether an 
insurer may pursue its subrogation interest.  See Blue Cross, 
140 Wis. 2d at 550.  Second, the made whole doctrine, as stated 
in Garrity and Rimes, does not apply when the inequitable 
prospect of an insurer competing with its own insured for 
                                                 
11 We later summarized this settlement procedure in Petta v. 
ABC Ins. Co., 2005 WI 18, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 N.W.2d 639: 
[The 
Schulte 
settlement 
procedure] 
requires 
the 
plaintiff to (1) settle with the tortfeasor without 
resolving the subrogated insurer's claim; (2) request 
a Rimes hearing to determine if the settlement made 
the insured whole; and (3) provide the insurer an 
opportunity to participate in that hearing. If the 
circuit court determines that the settlement did not 
make the settling plaintiff whole, then the insurer's 
subrogation rights are extinguished. 
Id., ¶29 (internal citations omitted).   
Although the three-step procedure outlined in Petta is 
straightforward, this summary is an oversimplification.  Neither 
Schulte nor Petta provide guidance with regard to the impact of 
the insured settling for less than policy limits in step (1), or 
the weight of this factor in steps (2) and (3).  This equitable 
factor should not be ignored and is a factor we are now pressed 
to evaluate in the instant case.   
No. 2006AP976 
 
29 
 
limited settlement funds is absent.  Mutual Service, 140 
Wis. 2d at 563-64.  Third, the existence of an indemnification 
agreement 
between 
the plaintiff and tortfeasor indirectly 
creates a limited pool of settlement funds between the plaintiff 
and his insurer.  See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634.  Finally, 
subrogation rests on several equitable principles including, but 
not limited to: (1) ensuring that the plaintiff is fully 
compensated for loss; (2) preventing unjust enrichment; and (3) 
ensuring that the wrongdoer is held responsible for his conduct 
and not allowed to go scot-free by failing to respond to damages 
while another, the plaintiff's insurer, is required to do so.  
Vogt, 129 Wis. 2d at 13.   
¶61 Following Schulte, our decisions in Sorge v. National 
Car Rental System, Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 52, 512 N.W.2d 505 (1994), 
and Ives v. Coopertools, 208 Wis. 2d 55, 559 N.W.2d 571 (1997) 
(per curiam), dealt with the issue of the applicability of the 
made 
whole 
doctrine 
when 
the 
insured 
plaintiff 
was 
contributorily negligent, thereby eliminating entitlement to 
full "made whole" damages.  Contributory negligence is not at 
issue in the Mullers' case, so these cases have little impact on 
our analysis.   
¶62 However, one of the concurring opinions in Ives, a 3-3 
decision with no precedential value, does offer some analysis on 
point.  Justice Donald W. Steinmetz's concurrence in Ives 
cautioned against placing the keys to the insurer's subrogation 
rights solely in the settling insured's hands.  See id. at 89-90 
(Steinmetz, J., concurring).  The opinion notes that a made 
No. 2006AP976 
 
30 
 
whole doctrine premised upon only a literal definition of 
"wholeness," i.e., that the plaintiff must be fully reimbursed 
for all losses before the insured may pursue subrogation, would 
have two effects: (1) "the injured plaintiff can settle with the 
alleged 
tortfeasors, 
thereby 
extinguishing 
the 
subrogated 
insurer's right of action against the tortfeasor," id. at 89-90 
(citing Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634-35); and (2) "the plaintiff 
can settle with the tortfeasor for a little less than his or her 
total damages and then claim to have not been made whole or 
compensated for all of the elements of damages."  Id. at 90 
(citing Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 275).   
¶63 Unlike the preceding cases, Ruckel v. Gassner did not 
involve a settlement between a plaintiff and a tortfeasor, or 
between the plaintiff's insurer and the tortfeasor.  The case is 
important, however, because it clarified that the common law 
made whole doctrine cannot be circumvented by contract.  Ruckel, 
253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶4, 40-43.  Ruckel did not address a situation 
in which the insured's being made whole is not a condition 
precedent to the insurer's right to seek subrogation. 
¶64 Paulson v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2003 WI 99, 263 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 744, followed on the heels of Ruckel.  
The facts of Paulson involved several settlements between a 
plaintiff (Paulson) injured in a car collision, her auto insurer 
(Midwest), 
the 
tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's liability 
insurer.  Id., ¶2.  Paulson argued that the damages she 
recovered from her insurer did not accurately reflect the extent 
of total property damages to her vehicle.  Id., ¶9.  Paulson was 
No. 2006AP976 
 
31 
 
estimated to be 30 percent comparatively negligent in the 
accident when her insurer settled with the tortfeasor's insurer.  
Id., ¶6.   
¶65 The 
question presented was "whether Paulson may 
recover the amount of money representing the difference between 
the amount Paulson's insurer paid [$7,042.44, for car repairs, 
pursuant to Paulson's insurance contract] and what her insurer 
settled for in negotiations with the tortfeasor's insurer upon 
its subrogation claim [$4,929.71, reflecting a 70-30 split of 
the 
indemnity 
to 
account 
for 
Paulson's 
contributory 
negligence]."  Id., ¶18.  We answered that question "no" and 
found that allowing Paulson to recover the difference between 
these sums would result in a double recovery.  Id. 
¶66 We rejected Paulson's argument that the made whole 
doctrine of Garrity and Rimes applied to her claim.  We 
distinguished these precedents on grounds that, unlike Paulson's 
case, the facts of those cases "deal[t] with the situation of 
competition between an insured and his or her insurer for a 
limited pool of money."  Id., ¶23 (citing Schulte, 176 
Wis. 2d at 631-32).  We concluded that the title of a University 
of Chicago Law Review article by Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, When the 
Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337 
(1997), "illustrates the exact situation in which we find that 
the Rimes/Garrity cases apply; [however,] if there is no doubt 
that the 'pie' is big enough, we find that the Rimes/Garrity 
issue does not arise." Id., ¶26 n.3.  There had been no "specter 
of an insurer competing with the insured for a limited amount of 
No. 2006AP976 
 
32 
 
funds" because there was "no discussion of policy limits or a 
limited pool of funds for which Midwest and Paulson [were] 
competing."  Id., ¶27.   
¶67 The final case for discussion is Petta v. ABC 
Insurance Co..  Petta involved a wrongful death claim in which 
the court applied the made whole doctrine outside the confines 
of the insurer/insured relationship.  Id., ¶13.  In Petta, the 
subrogation right of the subrogee was not premised upon an 
insurance contract but upon the common law principle of "legal 
(equitable)" 
subrogation. 
 
Id., 
¶26 
n.14. 
 
These 
facts 
distinguish Petta from the Mullers' case, where a contractual 
right to subrogation existed. 
¶68 Petta emphasized that subrogation rests upon equitable 
principles.  See id., ¶27, n.15 (quoting cases).  As noted in 
footnote 11 above, the Petta court also summarized the three-
step settlement procedure plaintiffs are to use to determine the 
respective rights of insured and insurer in light of the made 
whole doctrine.  Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶29 (citing Schulte, 
176 Wis. 2d at 637).   
¶69 Against this background, we will attempt to apply our 
precedents to this case.  The Petta court's emphasis on the 
equitable principles behind subrogation influences us to hone in 
on the unique facts and timing of the settlements.  See Petta, 
278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶27.  We also find it necessary to clarify the 
impact 
that 
the 
tortfeasor's 
policy 
limits 
have 
on 
the 
applicability of the made whole doctrine when the plaintiff 
No. 2006AP976 
 
33 
 
settles, a factor not alluded to in the settlement procedure 
outlined in Petta.  Id., ¶29. 
¶70 The Mullers had property that was destroyed by fire, 
resulting in a claimed loss of $697,981.58.  They turned to 
their property insurer, Society, and Society paid $407,378.88 to 
the Mullers, which was every dollar they were entitled to under 
their insurance policy.  The Mullers could have purchased more 
casualty insurance to protect themselves against loss.  Here, 
they settled a claim with their insurance agent for his alleged 
failure to increase their insurance coverage.  In any event, 
Society itself fulfilled every contractual obligation it had to 
the Mullers.   
¶71 Society had a subrogation provision in the insurance 
contract.  Part of the Mullers' claim was "assigned" to Society 
after Society fulfilled its obligations under the insurance 
contract. 
 
See 
Heifetz, 
61 
Wis. 2d at 
120; 
Garrity, 
77 
Wis. 2d at 546. 
¶72 Society was entitled to act on its subrogation rights 
so long as it recognized the priority of its insured to compete 
for available funds.  See Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 543.  If there 
were an insufficient pool of funds, so that the Mullers could 
not have satisfied their claim, then Society would have been out 
of luck.  Under those circumstances, the made whole doctrine 
would have applied in full force. 
¶73 If Society had agreed to limit the pool of available 
funds, it could not have proceeded against its insured to take 
No. 2006AP976 
 
34 
 
part of their settlement unless the insured was made whole.  
Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 272.   
¶74 The import of Schulte is that an insured can negotiate 
an indemnification agreement with the tortfeasors as part of a 
settlement.  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634-35.  It can negotiate 
that agreement without the approval of the insurer because the 
court has recognized that a tortfeasor and a tortfeasor's 
insurer will always attempt to limit damages and will be more 
willing to settle with the insured if they can eliminate the 
subrogee's rights.  Id. at 634.  An indemnification agreement 
limits available funds.  If the insured is not made whole by a 
settlement that includes an indemnification agreement, the 
insured has claimed the available pool, and again the insurer is 
out of luck. 
¶75 To date this court has set no conditions on an 
insured's 
agreement 
to 
a 
settlement 
that 
effectively 
extinguishes the rights of the subrogee insurer.  This means 
that to date we have not explicitly addressed a situation where 
an insured has voluntarily signed an indemnification agreement 
with the tortfeasor without being made whole, even though there 
were ample funds available to satisfy the claim.  This 
contingency is disturbing because it could permit the tortfeasor 
to escape full liability while it extinguished the contractual 
rights of the subrogee without the subrogee's consent, or, 
possibly, even the subrogee's knowledge.   
No. 2006AP976 
 
35 
 
¶76 The present case does not involve an indemnification 
agreement.  Consequently, the insurer is free to exercise its 
subrogation rights against the tortfeasor. 
¶77 There is no dispute that Jerrick's liability policy 
with United had a $1,000,000 limit, which was more than 
sufficient to satisfy the independent claims of the Mullers and 
Society.12  Where policy limits are sufficient to cover all 
related claims, the insured cannot settle for less than policy 
limits and then argue that "the pie was not big enough" to make 
him whole.  See Paulson, 263 Wis. 2d 520, ¶26 n.3.  The made 
whole doctrine simply does not apply in these circumstances, 
inasmuch as the inequitable prospect of an insurer competing 
with its insured for a limited pool of funds is not present.  
Id.; see also Mutual Service, 140 Wis. 2d at 563-64; Schulte, 
176 Wis. 2d at 631-32. 
¶78 The Mullers settled with the tortfeasor, and their 
right to priority was preserved.  See Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 
541.  Their settlement avoided both the cost of further 
litigation and any concerns they may have had about proving 
Jerrick's liability or the amount of their property damages.  
The Mullers got their money promptly without having to take the 
                                                 
12 One treatise notes that "the question of the tortfeasor's 
ability to pay" may cause an insured to settle for less than an 
amount necessary to make him whole.  2 Allan D. Windt, Insurance 
Claims & Disputes § 10:6, at 10-32 (5th ed. 2007).  This 
observation is apt, but in the Mullers' case there is no 
question of Jerrick's ability to pay because his liability 
policy limit of $1,000,000 was more than sufficient to satisfy 
all claims.   
No. 2006AP976 
 
36 
 
risk of going to a jury.  It would be inequitable now to allow 
them to reap the benefits of their settlement and then try to 
capture all or part of Society's settlement, in view of the fact 
that the Mullers were permitted to settle first. 
¶79 The Mullers disagree, contending that "psychological 
factors" were in play here, thereby limiting the pool of 
available settlement funds to $310,000.  This argument is based 
on Society's tentative, unwritten agreement to settle with 
United for $190,000 before the Mullers reached their $120,000 
settlement agreement.13   
¶80 In this case, the tortfeasor's liability limits were 
$1,000,000.  United tentatively agreed to reimburse Society 
$190,000, leaving liability limits of $810,000.  The Mullers 
claimed total damages of $697,951.58.  They had already received 
payment of $407,378.88 from Society.  If they had demanded a 
payment of $500,000 and offered an indemnity agreement, they 
would have been made whole (recovering their $290,602.70 
unreimbursed loss), and they would have captured about the same 
                                                 
13 We agree with the non-party brief for Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, 
Civil Trial Council of Wisconsin, and the National Association 
of Subrogation Professionals when it stated that "[t]here simply 
was nothing wrong with Society attempting to reach a resolution 
of its subrogation claim while the Mullers did the same with 
their primary claim."  This is true since subrogated insurers 
have the right to actively participate in litigation with an 
"equal voice" where their subrogation interests are implicated.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 803.03(2)(a), (2)(b)2. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
37 
 
subrogation money for their insurer (approximately $210,000, 
less expenses) as the insurer negotiated for itself.14 
¶81 In addition to an indemnity agreement, the law gives 
plaintiffs tools to effect this sort of settlement.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 628.46, as interpreted in Kontowicz v. American Standard 
Ins. Co. of Wis., 2006 WI 48, 290 Wis. 2d 302, 714 N.W.2d 105, 
and Wis. Stat. §§ 807.01(3) and (4) (providing for double the 
amount of taxable costs and 12 percent interest, respectively, 
when an offer of settlement is rejected and a judgment larger 
than that settlement is awarded to the plaintiff).  Plaintiffs, 
therefore, hold both a carrot and a stick. 
¶82 Psychology 
does 
play 
a 
part 
in 
settlement 
negotiations.  See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633.  A party cannot 
go into settlement negotiations waving a white flag and expect 
to emerge a victor.   
¶83 We have no record of the settlement negotiations.  
However, the Mullers' attorney's March 28, 2003, letter to all 
parties signaled the Mullers' reluctance to proceed to trial.  
The letter reads in part:   
This case is set for trial on May 19, 2003.  I am 
writing on behalf of all the parties to advise the 
Court of recent developments that we believe impact 
upon the current scheduling order. . . .   
First, since Society and plaintiffs Muller had 
been sharing both the cost of litigation and the 
workload in preparing the case for trial, [counsel for 
Society]'s 
withdrawal 
means 
that 
my 
co-counsel 
                                                 
14 If the Mullers could not prove liability for $697,981.58, 
then their proof problems put the case in a different light. 
No. 2006AP976 
 
38 
 
. . . and I will be solely responsible for the 
entirety of the trial, whereas before, pursuant to 
tacit agreement with [counsel for Society], we were 
mainly handling the damages aspect of the case.  This 
basically doubles the strain on both our financial and 
personnel 
resources, 
with 
less 
than 
six 
weeks 
remaining 
before trial.  Second, the unexpected 
settlement, which raises complex issues under Rimes 
and its progeny, renders an overall resolution of this 
case more likely than before.  To put it simply, 
Society's absence from the case renders it much easier 
to 
arrive 
at 
a 
settlement, 
at 
least 
from 
the 
plaintiffs' standpoint.  Because of this "sea-change," 
the parties have been expending most of their recent 
effort 
toward 
settlement, 
rather 
than 
toward 
litigation. . . .  Third, and finally, there were 
unfortunately some basic miscommunications at the 
mediation held on March 4, 2003, which may have 
prevented a global settlement at that time.  The 
parties now believe, with Society Insurance and its 
subrogated interest out of the case, that another 
round of mediation, whether formal or informal, might 
very well resolve the case as between the two 
remaining defendants and the Mullers, which would 
leave the Mullers free to pursue any claims they might 
have against Society under the Rimes doctrine. 
¶84 This letter reveals that the Mullers were not willing 
to pull their own weight in litigation.  They expected to ride 
free on the labors of their insurer.  They expected to skim off 
the first $170,000, or at least $59,725.60, of any settlement 
made by their insurer.   
¶85 We are unable to adopt the Mullers' position on these 
facts.  It is too speculative, and it is inequitable.  It would 
completely change the dynamics of settlement negotiations, 
rewrite insurance contracts, and increase the likelihood that 
tortfeasors will escape their responsibilities.   
¶86 The court of appeals observed that "had Society 
chose[n] not to pursue its subrogation claim against Jerrick and 
No. 2006AP976 
 
39 
 
United, the Mullers would not be able to recover any more 
monies."  Muller, 300 Wis. 2d 463, ¶18.  We agree.  If Society 
had (1) removed itself from the case entirely after the Mullers 
entered their $120,000 settlement; or (2) pursued its claim to 
trial and lost, the Mullers would have been left with their 
$120,000 settlement and no remaining right to pursue recompense 
against Society, Jerrick, or United.  Allowing the Mullers to 
benefit from Society's subsequent $190,000 settlement with 
Jerrick and United, when the Mullers were unable or unwilling to 
secure an amount necessary to satisfy their claim in their own 
settlement, would be unfair to Society and would discourage 
subrogees from pursuing their subrogation rights.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶87 We hold that the made whole doctrine is not implicated 
in this case.  Specifically, the doctrine does not apply when an 
insurer has fully satisfied its obligations under an insurance 
contract, given its insureds the opportunity to settle their 
claim with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer, the pool 
of settlement funds available to the insureds exceeds the total 
claims of both the insureds and the insurer, and the insureds 
settle their claim, even though the insureds' settlement, 
together with the insurer's policy payments, does not satisfy 
the insureds' total claim.  In these circumstances, the 
inequitable prospect of an insurer competing with its insureds 
for an inadequate pool of funds is not present, and the equities 
favor the insurer.  Thus, we conclude that Society is entitled 
to retain its entire subrogation settlement with Jerrick and 
No. 2006AP976 
 
40 
 
United and that the Mullers have no right to a portion of 
Society's subrogation settlement.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶88 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Here is 
the issue: Did the circuit court err in requiring Society 
Insurance to pay the Mullers their $59,725.60 unreimbursed loss 
before 
retaining 
the 
rest 
of 
its 
settlement 
with 
the 
tortfeasor's liability insurance company?  My answer is No.     
¶89 Here are the facts: A fire destroyed the Mullers' 
sporting goods store.  Society Insurance, the Mullers' insurance 
company, paid the Mullers their policy limit under the fire 
policy of $407,378.88.  The Mullers' damages exceeded this sum, 
and the Mullers sought to collect additional funds from an 
alleged tortfeasor 
and his insurance company, hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the tortfeasor's insurance company.      
¶90 Society Insurance also pursued its subrogation claim 
against the tortfeasor's insurance company.1  The Mullers and 
Society Insurance initially worked together in pursuing their 
claims against the tortfeasor's insurance company but, for 
reasons unclear from the record, settled their claims separately 
with the tortfeasor's insurance company.   
¶91 Before the Mullers settled with the tortfeasor's 
insurance company, Society Insurance reached a "tentative" 
settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance company, pending 
                                                 
1 "[O]n paying a loss, an insurer is subrogated in a 
corresponding amount to the insured's right of action against 
any other person responsible for the loss, such that the insurer 
is entitled to bring an action against this third party whose 
negligent or other tortious or wrongful conduct caused the loss, 
regardless of whether the insurer would have been entitled to 
bring such an action in its own right."  16 Lee R. Russ & Thomas 
F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance, § 222:5 (3d ed. 2005) (footnotes 
omitted). 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
2 
 
resolution of the Mullers' claim.  The terms of this tentative 
settlement apparently were not known to the Mullers. 
¶92 After Society Insurance made its "tentative" deal with 
the tortfeasor's insurance company, the Mullers settled with the 
tortfeasor's insurance company for $120,000.  Thereafter Society 
Insurance "finalized" its "tentative" settlement of its own 
subrogation rights with the tortfeasor's insurance company for 
$190,000.   
¶93 Although the tortfeasor's liability policy had a limit 
of $1,000,000, neither Society Insurance nor the Mullers were 
able to recover in full from the tortfeasor's insurance company.  
The Mullers and Society Insurance stipulated in mediation that 
the Mullers' settlement of $120,000, when added to Society 
Insurance's payments to the Mullers, left the Mullers with an 
unreimbursed loss of $59,725.60.   
¶94 The 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
the 
tortfeasor's 
insurance company was prepared to pay only $310,000 (the total 
sum of the Mullers' and Society Insurance's settlement awards) 
to settle both the Mullers' and Society Insurance's claims 
against the tortfeasor.  The circuit court held that the Mullers 
and Society Insurance were in competition for this limited pool 
of $310,000.  Applying the made whole doctrine, the circuit 
court concluded that Society Insurance had to make the Mullers 
whole.  The circuit court required Society Insurance to pay the 
Mullers their $59,725.60 unreimbursed loss out of the proceeds 
of Society Insurance's $190,000 settlement with the tortfeasor's 
insurance company.            
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶95 Here is the law on the doctrine of subrogation and the 
made 
whole doctrine: Many cases over a long time have 
interpreted the doctrine of subrogation and the made whole 
doctrine in a great variety of fact situations.  The case law is 
not easy to follow, but certain principles are very clear:  
Subrogation and the made whole doctrine are equitable doctrines.  
An insured must be made whole before the insurer may recover 
based on its subrogation claim.  Subrogated insurance companies 
should not compete with their insureds for limited settlement 
funds.2    
¶96 This court has declared that "the cause of action 
(against the tort-feasor) is indivisible and the owner of the 
policy should be first to make good his own loss; where either 
the insurer or the insured must to some extent go unpaid, the 
loss should be borne by the insurer for that is a risk the 
insured has paid it to assume. . . . [T]here is no subrogation 
until the insured has been made whole."3   
¶97 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Prosser stated 
the Wisconsin law on subrogation as follows: "Ordinarily, 
subrogation does not arise until . . . the insured's loss has 
been fully paid. . . . [T]he burden of loss should rest on the 
party paid to assume the risk, and not on the inadequately 
compensated 
insured. . . . [U]nder 
basic 
principles 
of 
                                                 
2 Paulson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶27, 263 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 744. 
3 Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 542, 253 
N.W.2d 512 (1977).  
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
4 
 
subrogation . . . the insurer is not entitled to recoup anything 
until the insured has been made whole. . . . Subrogation in 
[circumstances 
where 
the 
insured 
had 
not 
been 
made 
whole] . . . would turn 'the entire doctrine of subrogation on 
its head.'"4 
¶98 The insured and the subrogated insurance company 
cannot 
override 
by 
contract 
the 
equitable 
principles 
of 
subrogation and the made whole doctrine.  When faced with the 
question whether parties to an insurance contract may override 
or 
negate 
the 
made 
whole 
doctrine 
by 
writing 
specific, 
unambiguous contractual language stating that the insurer's 
rights to subrogation are superior to the insured's right to be 
made whole, the court (with Justice Prosser writing) unanimously 
answered No!5      
¶99 The circuit court's judgment in the present case is 
consistent with this case law, with the equitable principles 
stated therein, and with sound public policy.  The majority 
opinion is not.  I therefore dissent. 
                                                 
4 Ruckel v. Gassner, 2002 WI 67, ¶¶16, 17, 27, 41, 253 
Wis. 2d 280, 646 N.W.2d 11 (citations omitted).  See also 
Drinkwater v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 56, ¶¶20-23, 290 
Wis. 2d 642, 714 N.W.2d 568 (quoting Ruckel with approval). 
In Wisconsin the "insurer may not recover from a tortfeasor 
until the insured has been made whole."  Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, 
Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who 
Eats Last?, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337, 1342 (1997).  
5 Ruckel, 253 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶2, 4. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
5 
 
     
¶100 Here is my reasoning:  
¶101 (I) I agree with the circuit court's reasoning, which 
rests on case law and equitable principles.  The Schulte6 and 
Petta7 cases, as well as the equitable principles that are the 
basis of both the made whole doctrine and the doctrine of 
subrogation,8 support the circuit court's judgment requiring 
Society Insurance to pay the Mullers their unreimbursed loss 
before 
retaining 
the 
rest 
of 
its 
settlement 
with 
the 
tortfeasor's insurance company.  
¶102 (II) The premises upon which the majority opinion 
decides the present case are incorrect.  The majority opinion 
rests on two central premises:  
¶103 The first (and primary) premise is that the made whole 
doctrine applies only when the tortfeasor's policy limits are 
less than the total damages the victim suffers.  In the words of 
the majority opinion, "Where policy limits are sufficient to 
cover all related claims . . . [t]he made whole doctrine simply 
does not apply . . . inasmuch as the inequitable prospect of an 
                                                 
6 Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993). 
7 Petta v. ABC Ins. Co., 2005 WI 18, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 
N.W.2d 639. 
8 "Subrogation rests upon the equitable principle that one, 
other than a volunteer, who pays for the wrong of another should 
be permitted to look to the wrongdoer to the extent he has paid 
and be subject to the defenses of the wrongdoer."  Garrity, 77 
Wis. 2d at 541.    
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
6 
 
insurer competing with its insured for a limited pool of funds 
is not present."9 
¶104 The second premise, which serves as support for the 
first, is that the tortfeasor's insurance company in the present 
case would have been prepared to pay any amount up to the 
tortfeasor's policy limit of $1,000,000 in order to settle the 
Mullers' and Society Insurance's claims against the tortfeasor's 
insurance company.  With this premise firmly in mind, the 
majority opinion concludes that the pool of settlement funds 
available to the Mullers was the tortfeasor's $1,000,000 policy 
limit, not the $310,000 that the tortfeasor's insurance company 
actually paid to settle the Mullers' and Society Insurance's 
claims.  The majority opinion concludes that the Mullers may 
blame only themselves, not any competition provided by Society 
Insurance, for their failure to be compensated fully in their 
settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance company.  
¶105 Both premises are factually unsupported and contrary 
to this court's case law.  The circuit court got it right: "In 
this case, the limited pool became $310,000. . . . Pursuant to 
Rimes and its well established principles, Society is not 
entitled to retain any of those funds unless and until the 
plaintiffs have been 'made whole'."    
¶106 In contrast to the majority opinion, this court has 
often 
explicitly 
recognized 
that 
given 
the 
realities 
of 
settlements, settling plaintiffs and subrogated insurers compete 
in 
a 
practical 
sense 
for 
limited 
settlement 
funds.  
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶77.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
7 
 
"[S]ettlement funds may be either practically or psychologically 
limited. . . . The practical competition between an insured and 
the subrogated insurer is an equitable factor we cannot 
ignore."10 
¶107 Here that competition is clear.  Society Insurance was 
an adversary of the Mullers, competing with the Mullers for the 
limited funds that the tortfeasor's insurance company was 
prepared to pay to settle the Mullers' and Society Insurance's 
claims against it.     
¶108 (III) The majority opinion contravenes sound public 
policy by effectively requiring a plaintiff in the Mullers' 
position to structure his or her settlement agreement to include 
a clause indemnifying the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's 
insurance company against any claim brought by the plaintiff's 
subrogated insurance carrier.     
I 
¶109 The Schulte and Petta cases, as well as the equitable 
principles underlying the doctrine of subrogation and the made 
whole doctrine, support the circuit court's judgment requiring 
Society Insurance to pay the Mullers their unreimbursed loss 
before 
retaining 
the 
rest 
of 
its 
settlement 
with 
the 
tortfeasor's insurance company. 
¶110 The made whole doctrine is "the general rule that 
there is no subrogation until the insured has been made whole."11  
                                                 
10 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633. 
11 Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 542.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
8 
 
The made whole doctrine exists to combat "the inequitable 
prospect of [an insurer] competing with [its insured] for funds 
which indisputably fail to make the [insured] whole."12  It rests 
upon the equitable principle that "[w]here either the insurer or 
the insured must to some extent go unpaid, the loss should be 
borne by the insurer for that is a risk the insured has paid it 
to assume."13  The more general doctrine of subrogation, whether 
conventional subrogation or legal subrogation, is also applied 
according to the rule of equity.14 
¶111 Applying the made whole doctrine, this court has 
outlined a three-step "settlement procedure plaintiffs [are] to 
utilize to determine how a settlement impact[s] an insurer's 
subrogation rights."15  The key cases in which this settlement 
procedure is set forth are Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 
500 N.W.2d 305 (1993), and Petta v. ABC Ins. Co., 2005 WI 18, 
278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 N.W.2d 639.  The present case is a 
Schulte/Petta case.   
¶112 The Schulte/Petta procedure requires the following 
three 
steps: 
(1) 
The 
plaintiff-insured 
settles 
with 
the 
tortfeasor 
and 
the 
tortfeasor's insurance company without 
                                                                                                                                                             
Garrity, a seminal case on the made whole doctrine, also 
involved a fire loss and fire insurance.  See Garrity, 77 
Wis. 2d at 539.     
12 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 625.   
13 Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 
276, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982) (quoting Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 542). 
14 Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 270-71. 
15 Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶29. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
9 
 
resolving the subrogated insurer's part of the claim; (2) The 
settling parties ask the circuit court to determine whether the 
injured party has been made whole; and (3) The subrogated 
insurer has an opportunity to participate in the hearing 
(commonly called a Rimes hearing) that the circuit court holds 
to decide whether the injured party has been made whole.16  If 
the circuit court determines at the Rimes hearing that the 
settlement 
does 
not 
make 
the 
plaintiff 
whole, 
then 
the 
subrogated insurer has no right of subrogation.17    
¶113 The Schulte/Petta procedure implicitly requires the 
insured to settle its claim before the subrogated insurance 
company settles its claim.  This order fits the court's rule 
that 
"the 
cause 
of 
action 
(against 
the 
tort-feasor) 
is 
indivisible and the owner of the policy should be first to make 
good his own loss . . . ."18   
                                                 
16 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 637; Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶29.   
17 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 637; Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶29. 
When the settling parties do not ask the circuit court to 
determine whether the injured party has been made whole, thus 
preventing the circuit court from making a finding on the issue, 
the 
subrogated 
insurer's 
right 
of 
subrogation 
is 
not 
extinguished.  See Mut. Serv. Cas. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 140 Wis. 2d 555, 563-64, 410 N.W.2d 582 (1987) (stating 
that the made whole doctrine is not "applicable in an action 
brought by a subrogated insurer against the tortfeasor or the 
tortfeasor's insurer where the subrogated insurer's insured has 
previously 
settled 
with 
the 
tortfeasor."); 
Schulte, 
176 
Wis. 2d 635-36 (holding that the rule stated in Mutual Service 
does not apply when the settling parties request a Rimes 
hearing, 
the 
subrogated 
insurer 
has 
an 
opportunity 
to 
participate in the hearing, and the circuit court determines 
that the injured party has not been made whole). 
18 Garrity, 77 Wis. 2d at 542.  
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶114 The Mullers and the circuit court followed the three-
step Schulte/Petta procedure.  The Mullers settled with the 
tortfeasor 
and 
the 
tortfeasor's insurance company without 
resolving Society Insurance's part of the claim.  In Schulte and 
Petta, the plaintiff-victim agreed to indemnify the tortfeasor 
against any liability to the subrogated insurance company.  In 
the instant case the Mullers and the tortfeasor's liability 
insurance company did not include this type of "indemnification 
agreement."19  In any event the subrogated insurance company's 
(Society Insurance's) part of the claim was not resolved, and 
Society Insurance's subrogated right was protected.   
¶115 The settling parties, the Mullers and the tortfeasor's 
insurance company, asked the circuit court to determine whether 
the injured party had been made whole.  Society Insurance 
objected to the hearing.  The circuit court decided that the 
Mullers were entitled to a hearing to determine whether they had 
been made whole.  Thus the Schulte/Petta three-step procedure 
was followed in the present case.     
¶116 The Mullers and Society Insurance waived the Rimes 
hearing, stipulating that the Mullers' settlement with the 
tortfeasor 
and 
his 
insurer 
left 
the 
Mullers 
with 
an 
uncompensated loss of $59,725.60.  The circuit court then 
determined upon the parties' stipulation that the Mullers had 
not been made whole and that Society Insurance consequently 
could claim no right of subrogation.   
                                                 
19 See Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633; Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 
¶¶29, 35, 42. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶117 If any party disregarded the Schulte/Petta procedure 
in the present case, it was Society Insurance.  At the same time 
as the Mullers were negotiating with the tortfeasor's insurance 
company, Society Insurance was engaging in its own negotiations.  
It 
chose 
to 
settle 
its 
subrogation 
claim 
against 
the 
tortfeasor's insurance company tentatively before the Mullers 
reached their settlement and before permitting the circuit court 
an opportunity to determine whether Society Insurance could 
claim a right of subrogation in the first place.  In settling 
its claim in this manner, Society Insurance assumed the risk 
that it would need to hand over some portion of its settlement 
award to the Mullers in order to make the Mullers whole.    
¶118 To be sure, the bottom line in the present case must 
accord with equitable considerations, not the black letter of 
this court's decisions in Schulte or Petta.  "The doctrine of 
subrogation is based upon equitable principles,"20 and "[e]quity 
does not lend itself to the application of black letter rules."21   
¶119 I agree with the majority opinion that the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation exists (1) to ensure that the plaintiff 
is fully compensated for loss; (2) to prevent unjust enrichment; 
and (3) to ensure that the wrongdoer is held responsible for his 
                                                 
20 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 628 (citing Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 
271).  See also Petta, 278 Wis. 2d 251, ¶27.   
21 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 628 (quoting Vogt v. Schroeder, 
129 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 383 Wis. 2d 876 (1986)).  See also Petta, 278 
Wis. 2d 251, ¶34.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
12 
 
conduct and not allowed to go scot-free by failing to respond to 
damages while the plaintiff's insurer is required to do so.22   
¶120 The first equitable principle obviously weighs in 
favor of affirming the circuit's judgment requiring Society to 
pay the Mullers their $59,725.60 uncompensated loss.  
¶121 The second and third equitable principles have no 
application to the present case.  The circuit court's judgment 
did not overcompensate the Mullers for their loss and thus did 
not result in unjust enrichment.23  In addition, the circuit 
court's judgment of course did not require Society Insurance to 
send any of its settlement proceeds back to the tortfeasor or 
the tortfeasor's insurance company. 
¶122 The circuit court's judgment in the present case was 
precisely what the equitable principles required.  The judgment 
made the Mullers whole and permitted Society Insurance to retain 
the $130,274.40 that was left of its $190,000 settlement with 
the tortfeasor's insurance company.  The injured Mullers were 
given 
priority 
over 
their 
insurance 
company.24 
 
Society 
Insurance, the Mullers' insurance company, was given priority 
over the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurance company.       
                                                 
22 See majority op., ¶60.   
23 See majority op., ¶23 ("Once an insured has been fully 
compensated for his loss, any additional recovery by the insured 
would 
constitute 
unjust 
enrichment.") 
(citing 
Couch 
on 
Insurance, § 223:133).   
24 See majority op., ¶28 ("[T]he insured has priority over 
his insurer when there is an inadequate pool of funds.").   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶123 Applying Schulte and Petta, as well as the equitable 
principles underlying the made whole doctrine and the doctrine 
of subrogation, I would affirm the circuit court's judgment 
requiring 
Society 
Insurance 
to 
pay 
the 
Mullers 
their 
unreimbursed loss before retaining the rest of its settlement 
with the tortfeasor's insurance company.  At the same time as 
the Mullers were negotiating with the tortfeasor's insurance 
company for payment, Society Insurance was trying to cut its own 
deal with the tortfeasor's insurance company.  Society Insurance 
was in direct competition with its insured for the limited 
amount of money the tortfeasor's insurance company was prepared 
to pay.  The issue in the instant case is whether there was 
competition between the Mullers and Society Insurance for the 
limited funds from the tortfeasor's insurance company.  There 
was.  The reality of settlements and competition between an 
insured and insurer are equitable factors that the court has 
considered very important in past cases.   
II 
¶124 In contrast to the circuit court's well-reasoned 
decision, the majority opinion decides the present case on the 
incorrect premise of law that the made whole doctrine does not 
apply when the tortfeasor's policy limits are, as in the present 
case, greater than the total damages the victim suffers.25   
¶125 This incorrect premise of law rests on an equally 
incorrect premise of fact.  The majority opinion assumes that 
the tortfeasor's liability insurance company would have been 
                                                 
25 Majority op., ¶76.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
14 
 
prepared to pay much more than the $310,000 it actually paid to 
settle the Mullers' and Society Insurance's claims.  Indeed, the 
majority 
opinion blithely concludes that the tortfeasor's 
insurance company would have been prepared to pay any amount not 
exceeding 
the 
tortfeasor's 
policy 
limit 
of 
$1,000,000.  
According to the majority opinion, the Mullers were unable to 
obtain more money from the tortfeasor's insurance company only 
because the Mullers went into settlement negotiations "waving a 
white flag" and because they were "not willing to pull their own 
weight in litigation."26  According to the majority opinion, the 
inequitable prospect of an insurer competing with its insured 
for a limited pool of funds is not present in this case.27   
¶126 The 
majority 
opinion's 
tale 
about 
the 
parties' 
settlement negotiations makes little sense.  The $310,000 that 
the tortfeasor's insurer agreed to pay is the sole available 
estimate of the amount that the tortfeasor's liability insurance 
company was prepared to pay to settle the Mullers' and Society 
Insurance's claims against the tortfeasor.  The tortfeasor's 
$1,000,000 policy limit is not an estimate of the amount the 
insurer was prepared to pay to settle the Mullers' and Society 
Insurance's claims, as the majority opinion states.  The policy 
limit represents only the maximum that the insurer would have 
ordinarily been required to pay under the law.  A defendant 
insurer's decision whether to settle (and for how much) is based 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶¶82, 84.   
27 Majority op., ¶76.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
15 
 
on calculations far more complex than a simple comparison of the 
plaintiff's request to the tortfeasor's policy limit.        
¶127 Indeed, the facts show that Society Insurance——whom 
the majority opinion does not accuse of waving a white flag——
apparently fared worse in settlement negotiations with the 
tortfeasor's insurance company than the Mullers did.  The 
Mullers fell only $59,725.60 short of full compensation for 
their loss.  Society Insurance settled for $217,378.88 less than 
the full value of its $407,378.88 subrogation claim against the 
tortfeasor's insurance company.  Given the lack of any criticism 
directed at Society Insurance, the majority opinion's caustic 
remarks about the Mullers are simply baffling.  The majority 
opinion has no cause to conclude that the Mullers' efforts were 
less than vigilant.     
¶128 The simple truth is that we have no idea why the 
Mullers and Society Insurance were collectively unable to get 
more than $310,000 from the tortfeasor's insurance company.  
Perhaps the amount of the Mullers' damages was uncertain.28  Or 
perhaps it was uncertain whether the Mullers could prove the 
tortfeasor's liability for their damages.  In any case, the 
                                                 
28 Although the majority opinion assumes (at ¶40) that "the 
value of the plaintiff's property loss was largely undisputed," 
the basis of this assumption is unclear.  The parties required 
mediation to resolve the issue of damages.  Furthermore, the 
Mullers initially claimed a loss of $697,981.58 and accordingly 
argued before the circuit court that they were entitled to 
recover an unreimbursed loss of $170,602.70 from Society 
Insurance.  The parties' stipulation to an unreimbursed loss of 
$59,725.60 implies that the Mullers agreed in their mediation 
with Society Insurance to subtract $110,877.10 from their claim 
for total damages.     
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
16 
 
bottom line is the same: The tortfeasor's insurance company 
agreed to pay only $310,000 to settle the Mullers' and Society 
Insurance's claims against the tortfeasor, and the Mullers and 
Society Insurance were necessarily in competition over this 
limited pool of funds.       
¶129 The 
majority 
opinion's 
narrow 
focus 
on 
the 
tortfeasor's policy limits not only flies in the face of the 
facts but also flies in the face of this court's precedent.  The 
court has repeatedly stated that "[g]iven the realities of 
settlements, settling plaintiffs and subrogated insurers usually 
compete in a practical sense for limited settlement funds. 
Settling defendants typically have limited policy limits and 
assets 
and 
typically 
want 
to 
pay 
as 
little 
as 
possible. . . . The practical competition between an insured and 
the subrogated insurer is an equitable factor we cannot 
ignore."29    
¶130 In the present case, the practical realities are that 
the Mullers and Society Insurance were in competition for a pool 
that the tortfeasor's insurance company limited to $310,000, 
                                                 
29 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633.  See also Petta, 278 
Wis. 2d 251, ¶¶29, 35.  
The plaintiff's recovery is constrained by the subrogated 
insurer's cause of action, because "[a] tortfeasor who wishes to 
settle must inevitably address the insurer's separate rights in 
some way."  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
The Schulte court put the matter concisely: "[W]e question 
why a defendant would offer as much to settle with only the 
plaintiff as to settle with both the plaintiff and the 
subrogated insurer."  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 633.   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
17 
 
which is less money than was needed both to make the Mullers 
whole and to repay Society Insurance.            
¶131 The present case is not the first involving a 
plaintiff-victim who agreed to settle below the tortfeasor's 
policy limit.  Like the Mullers, the plaintiffs in both Rimes v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 
N.W.2d 348 (1982), and Schulte settled for well below the 
tortfeasor's 
policy 
limits. 
 
In 
both 
cases 
the 
court 
nevertheless applied the made whole rule.   
¶132 The Rimeses settled for $125,000.30  The combined 
policy limits of the tortfeasors were $375,000.31  The total 
medical payment made by the subrogated insurance company in 
Rimes was $9,649.90.  The sum of $9,649.90 was paid from the 
settlement amount into the circuit court to be held in escrow 
pending the outcome of a "trial" to the circuit court concerning 
the subrogated insurance company's claimed subrogation rights 
for the medical payment made on behalf of the Rimeses.  In Rimes 
no indemnification agreement had been reached between the 
Rimeses and the tortfeasors; the issue before the circuit court 
was how much the insurance company should recover from the total 
settlement under its subrogation rights.  This court applied the 
                                                 
30 Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 267.   
In Rimes, the dissenting opinion stated that the made whole 
doctrine should not apply because "the plaintiffs voluntarily 
settled their entire claim for an amount less than the total 
limits of the available insurance monies . . . ."  Rimes, 106 
Wis. 2d at 280 (Coffey, J., dissenting).  The majority opinion 
rejected the dissent's position.   
31 Rimes, 106 Wis. 2d at 267. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
18 
 
made whole doctrine in the Rimes case, held that the subrogated 
insurance company could not recover any of the $9,649.90, and 
did not fault the Rimeses for failing to garner a larger 
settlement award even though they had not tapped the combined 
policy limits of the tortfeasors.       
¶133 In Schulte, the plaintiffs settled for less than 
policy limits and agreed to indemnify the tortfeasor for the 
claims of the subrogated insurance company.  Justice Steinmetz 
wrote in dissent that "[f]or tactical reasons, the plaintiffs 
settled their claim for less than the defendants' insurance 
policy limits."32  The basis of Justice Steinmetz's dissenting 
opinion was that "[b]ecause the plaintiffs agreed to accept less 
than the defendants' insurance policy limits, it cannot be said 
that the plaintiffs have not been made whole."33  The majority 
opinion in Schulte did not accept Justice Steinmetz's reasoning.  
The majority opinion in the present case is little more than a 
repackaging of Justice Steinmetz's dissenting opinion that the 
six justices in the Schulte majority rejected.  
                                                 
32 Schulte, 
176 
Wis. 2d at 
637-38 
(Steinmetz, 
J., 
dissenting).     
33 Id. at 638 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). 
The dissent in Schulte took the same position as the 
dissent in Rimes, namely that the made whole doctrine should not 
apply because the plaintiffs voluntarily settled their claim for 
less than the tortfeasor's policy limits.     
Although 
the 
Schultes 
settled 
for 
well 
below 
the 
tortfeasor's policy limits, the majority opinion inexplicably 
asserts that Schulte provides no guidance on how the three-step 
Schulte/Petta procedure should be applied when the insured 
settles for less than the tortfeasor's policy limits.  Majority 
op., ¶59 n.11. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶134 The majority opinion's analysis lacks a basis in the 
facts or the case law.  The majority opinion errs in treating 
the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy limits as the amount 
that the tortfeasor's insurance company was prepared to pay to 
settle claims brought by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 
subrogated insurer.  The majority opinion errs in failing to 
recognize that as a practical matter the funds available from 
the tortfeasor's insurance company were limited to $310,000 and 
were less than the Mullers' damages, as the circuit court found.     
III 
¶135 The majority opinion likely will have a troubling 
effect upon settlements in future cases.  As a practical matter, 
the majority opinion writes a fourth step into the Schulte/Petta 
procedure that plaintiffs are to utilize to determine how a 
settlement affects an insurer's subrogation rights.  The 
majority opinion effectively requires a plaintiff following the 
Schulte/Petta procedure to structure his or her settlement 
agreement to include a clause indemnifying the tortfeasor and 
the tortfeasor's insurance company against any claim brought by 
the plaintiff's subrogated insurer. 
¶136 According to the majority opinion, the made whole 
doctrine would apply in the present case if the Mullers had 
structured their settlement agreement to include a clause 
indemnifying the tortfeasor and his insurer against any claim 
brought by the plaintiff's subrogated insurer.  The absence of 
such an indemnification clause is all that prevents the present 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
20 
 
case from being on all fours with Schulte,34 in which this court 
applied the made whole doctrine and determined that the 
subrogated insurer's right of subrogation had been extinguished.  
Relying on Schulte, the majority opinion in the present case 
concludes as follows: "An indemnification agreement limits 
available funds.  If the insured is not made whole by a 
settlement that includes an indemnification agreement, the 
insured has claimed the available pool, and . . . the insurer is 
out of luck."35   
¶137 This 
requirement 
of 
an 
indemnification 
provision 
represents 
a 
curious 
development 
in 
our 
made-whole 
jurisprudence. 
 
Some 
20 
years 
ago, 
this 
court 
strongly 
disfavored 
agreements 
obligating 
the 
victim-plaintiff 
to 
indemnify a defendant-tortfeasor against claims brought by a 
subrogated insurer.  In Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 544, 411 N.W.2d 133 (1987), 
the 
court 
criticized 
such 
indemnification 
agreements 
as 
"attempt[ing] to circumvent an insurer's subrogation rights by 
placing the responsibility for the tortfeasor's wrong on the 
                                                 
34 The Schultes' settlement agreement with the tortfeasor 
and his insurer provided that the Schultes would indemnify the 
tortfeasor and his insurer for any liability arising from the 
tortfeasor's conduct.  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 626-27.   
35 Majority op., ¶74. 
See also majority op., ¶76 ("The present case does not 
involve an indemnification agreement.  Consequently, the insurer 
is 
free 
to 
exercise 
its 
subrogation 
rights 
against 
the 
tortfeasor.").   
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
21 
 
victim . . . ."36  We even suggested that such agreements might 
be 
void, 
declining 
to 
"reach 
the 
issue 
of 
whether . . . indemnification clauses are enforceable between 
the tortfeasor and the injured party" but noting that "at least 
one 
jurisdiction 
has 
determined 
that 
this 
type 
of 
indemnification agreement is void as against public policy."37   
¶138 Schulte 
overruled 
the 
language 
in 
Blue 
Cross 
disapproving of indemnification agreements, on the ground that 
this language constrained a plaintiff's ability to settle with 
the defendant.38  The Schulte court reasoned that "the injured 
party should have the right to settle on its own terms" and that 
"refusing to recognize indemnification agreements could hamper 
plaintiffs' settlement attempts."39     
                                                 
36 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co., 140 Wis. 2d 544, 554, 411 N.W.2d 133 (1987). 
37 Id. at 554 n.6.   
38 Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 634.   
39 Id. at 634-35. 
Schulte did not completely overrule Blue Cross, however.  
"Blue Cross still applies when a plaintiff and tortfeasor settle 
without involving the subrogated insurer and without submitting 
the issue of the subrogated insurer's rights to the circuit 
court."  Schulte, 176 Wis. 2d at 635.  In the instant case the 
Mullers and Society Insurance did submit the issue of the 
subrogated insurer's (Society Insurance's) rights to the circuit 
court.  
In Blue Cross the subrogated insurance company sued the 
tortfeasor after the plaintiff had settled with the tortfeasor.  
The narrow holding of Blue Cross is that if the subrogated 
insurance company sues the tortfeasor after the plaintiff has 
settled with the tortfeasor, the subrogated insurance company 
need not plead that the insured had been made whole. 
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶139 In the present case, the majority opinion takes an 
unwarranted step.  The majority opinion all but requires the 
very 
sort 
of 
indemnification 
agreements 
that 
this 
court 
initially all but prohibited.   
¶140 Our decision in Schulte recognizing indemnification 
agreements 
properly 
furthered 
the 
policy 
of 
promoting 
settlement.  In contrast, the majority opinion's de facto 
requirement that a plaintiff wanting to take advantage of the 
made 
whole 
doctrine 
utilize 
an 
indemnification 
agreement 
constrains 
both the plaintiff-victim's and the defendant-
tortfeasor's ability to settle on their own preferred terms.  
This constraint does not seem to offer any benefits that might 
offset its obvious cost.  The majority opinion provides no 
rationale 
for 
its 
apparent preference for indemnification 
agreements.   
¶141 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶142 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the present case the Mullers and Society Insurance were 
negotiating with the tortfeasor's insurance company at the same 
time.  
No.  2006AP976.ssa 
 
 
 
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