Title: Shaikh v. Johnson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee,1 JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
AHMER SHAIKH 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 072097  
        September 12, 2008 
 
GENE M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
David T. Stitt, Judge 
 
 
This appeal from an order dismissing a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus presents two issues questioning whether 
the petitioner was denied his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  First, the petitioner contends that 
his trial counsel failed in his duty to make a draft jury 
instruction, rejected by the trial court, a part of the record 
for the purpose of appeal.  Petitioner’s second contention is 
that his counsel at trial rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to call as a witness a co-defendant who was the 
immediate perpetrator of the crime for which the petitioner 
was on trial.  He further argues that the habeas court erred 
in denying him an evidentiary hearing.  For the reasons stated 
below, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s 
judgment. 
                     
1 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 
2008. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
Applying familiar principles of appellate review, we will 
state the facts leading to the petitioner’s conviction in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 
in the underlying criminal case.  The essential facts relating 
to the habeas corpus proceeding are undisputed. 
 
Ahmer Shaikh (Ahmer), the petitioner, lived in an 
apartment in Fairfax County with his father, Altaf Shaikh, his 
sister, Humaira, his younger brother, Furqan Altaf, and 
Humaira’s husband, Faisal Rehman, as well as two younger 
sisters.  Humaira had been having an adulterous affair with 
another man, Zahid Ali (Zahid).  The affair eventually became 
known to the family, all of whom expressed their angry 
disapproval.  On September 9, 2002, Zahid went to the family’s 
apartment to discuss the situation with Humaira’s father.  A 
commotion ensued.  Ahmer was not present, but his younger 
brother called him on his cellular telephone and he arrived 
soon thereafter.  Family members had to restrain Ahmer from 
attacking Zahid.  Rehman then came into the room with a 
kitchen knife and stabbed Zahid repeatedly.  Ahmer broke free 
from his relatives and joined in the attack, hitting Zahid on 
the head with a stick.  Humaira tried to cover Zahid’s head 
wounds with a scarf as Ahmer and Rehman continued to attack 
him.  Zahid dove off a second-story balcony to escape his 
 
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attackers, falling to a concrete patio below.  Ahmer picked up 
the knife, threw it into a pot of water, and called 911, 
giving a false report that an unknown intruder “came to my 
house [t]o attack us . . . with a knife.”  Zahid died later 
that night of multiple stab wounds to the head, neck and upper 
body. 
 
Ahmer and Rehman were each indicted for the murder of 
Zahid.  In separate jury trials, each was convicted of second-
degree murder.  Rehman was tried first, and at the time of 
Ahmer’s trial had been convicted but was awaiting sentencing.  
Ahmer’s counsel interviewed Rehman and discussed the case with 
his counsel before Ahmer’s trial, but decided not to call 
Rehman as a witness. 
 
At Ahmer’s trial, the court asked counsel whether they 
had agreed on a final set of jury instructions.  Counsel 
informed the court that they were in agreement as to all but 
one instruction, that which related to “concert of action.”  
The Commonwealth proposed an instruction in the form set forth 
in 1 Virginia Model Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 3.160, at 
3-11 (repl. ed. 2007): 
The court instructs the jury that if there is 
concert of action with the resulting crime one of 
its incidental probable consequences, then whether 
such crime was originally contemplated or not, all 
who participate in any way in bringing it about are 
equally answerable and bound by the acts of every 
 
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other person connected with the consummation of such 
resulting crime. 
 
Defense counsel stated that the model instruction was accurate 
but incomplete because it lacked language defining “concert of 
action.”  The defense proposed “Instruction R,” which is not 
contained in the record.  The only indication of its content 
is contained in counsel’s oral argument, apparently quoting 
the initial phrase of the proposed instruction: “Concert of 
action is an action that’s been planned, arranged, adjusted, 
agreed on or settled between the parties acting together, et 
cetera.”2 The Commonwealth objected that if such definitional 
language were to be added, additional language would also be 
necessary. 
 
The court refused Instruction R, observing that the 
appellate courts had frequently “cautioned against pulling 
language out of particular cases” in framing jury 
instructions.  The court indicated, however, that if counsel 
could agree on an amended version, it would be considered.  
Counsel were unable to agree on language and the court granted 
the model instruction quoted above as Instruction No. 8.  The 
court stated that refused Instruction R was a part of the 
record but, for reasons unknown, that instruction was omitted 
                     
2 Ahmer points out on brief that this language was taken 
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Berkeley v. 
Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 279, 283, 451 S.E.2d 41, 43 (1994). 
 
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from the record and has never appeared in subsequent 
proceedings. 
 
One of the agreed instructions given to the jury was: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
 
A principal in the first degree is the person 
who actually commits the crime.  A principal in the 
second degree is a person who is present, aiding and 
abetting, by helping in some way in the commission 
of the crime.  Presence and consent alone are not 
sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.  It 
must be shown that the Defendant intended his words, 
gestures, signals or actions to in some way 
encourage, advise, or urge, or in some way help the 
person committing the crime to commit it. 
 
 
A principal in the second degree is liable for 
the same punishment as the person who actually 
committed the crime. 
 
After the jury had retired to consider its verdict, the jury 
sent the following written question to the court: 
In considering instruction #8, does the jury make a 
decision with regard to it using the criteria in 
instruction #9 for a principle [sic] in the second 
degree?  Especially the sentence:  "It must be shown 
that the defendant intended his words, questions, 
signals or actions to in some way encourage, advise, 
or urge, or in some way help the person committing 
the crime to commit it." 
 
At the suggestion of Ahmer's counsel, the court advised the 
jury to follow the instructions as written. 
 
The Court of Appeals granted Ahmer an appeal.  After 
briefing and oral argument, a divided panel affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court by an unpublished memorandum 
opinion.  Shaikh v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2614-03-4 (Jan. 
 
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25, 2005).  The majority opinion did not address the merits of 
Shaikh’s claim regarding the refusal of Instruction R because 
it was not a part of the record on appeal.  The majority 
opinion held, however, that the trial court had not "left a 
vital issue unaddressed by using the model concert of action 
instruction.”  Id., slip op. at 9.  The Court of Appeals 
thereafter denied Ahmer’s petition for a rehearing en banc, 
noting that an insufficient number of judges had voted to 
grant it.  Shaikh v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2614-03-4 (Mar. 
7, 2005).  This Court subsequently refused Ahmer’s petition 
for appeal. 
 
Ahmer filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the 
circuit court, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel:  (1) counsel’s failure to ensure that Instruction R 
was made a part of the record,3 and (2) counsel’s failure to 
call Rehman as a defense witness at Ahmer’s trial.  Ahmer also 
requested an evidentiary hearing "to resolve the factual 
disputes and to provide [him] the opportunity to prove [his] 
grounds for habeas relief." 
                     
3 The record shows that Dale M. Race, Esq., served as 
trial counsel for Ahmer.  After Ahmer was sentenced on 
September 16, 2003, Mr. Race informed the trial court that he 
would not represent Ahmer in any post-trial matters.  A final 
order was entered on September 16, 2003.  On October 23, 2003, 
the court appointed Crystal Meleen, Esq. as appellate counsel. 
James G. Connell, III, Esq. entered the case as Ahmer’s 
retained counsel on December 8, 2003. 
 
6
 
The Attorney General, for the respondent, filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition.  The circuit court4 denied the request 
for an evidentiary hearing and, on the arguments of counsel, 
briefs, exhibits and record of Ahmer’s trial and appellate 
proceedings, granted the motion to dismiss.  We awarded Ahmer 
an appeal.  
Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
 
 
A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel in his defense entitles him to 
“reasonably competent counsel who provides assistance that is 
within the range of competence required of attorneys in 
criminal cases.”  West v. Director, Dep’t of Corrs., 273 Va. 
56, 62, 639 S.E.2d 190, 194 (2007) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  The issue whether a 
defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact 
that is reviewed de novo on appeal.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
698. 
 
Strickland prescribes a two-pronged test that a habeas 
petitioner must satisfy in order to prevail in a claim of 
                     
4 Judge David T. Stitt, who had presided at the trial of 
the criminal case, also heard and decided the habeas 
proceeding. 
 
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, the “deficient performance” 
prong and the “prejudice” prong.  To satisfy the first of 
these, the petitioner must show that “counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. at 
687-88.  The court reviewing the habeas petition “must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 
689.  The second prong of the Strickland test requires the 
petitioner to show that “there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  It is 
not necessary for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 
claim to address both components of the inquiry, or to address 
them in any particular order.  If the petitioner makes an 
insufficient showing on either component of the test, the 
other need not be considered.  Id. at 697; Johnson v. Tice, 
275 Va. 18, 28, 654 S.E.2d 917, 924 (2008); see also Sheikh v. 
Buckingham Correctional Center, 264 Va. 558, 566-67, 570 
S.E.2d 785, 790 (2002) (unnecessary to address prejudice prong 
because petitioner failed to establish deficient performance); 
Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493, 493 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1997) 
(same). 
 
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B. 
 Instruction R 
 
In ruling on the respondent’s motion to dismiss Ahmer’s 
habeas petition, the circuit court held that trial counsel was 
entitled to rely on the court’s statement at trial that 
Instruction R was a part of the record, and that the 
petitioner had not established deficient performance on 
counsel’s part that would satisfy the first part of the 
Strickland test. 
 
Ahmer cites Woods v. R. D. Hunt & Son, Inc., 207 Va. 281, 
287, 148 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1966), for the proposition that “the 
onus is upon the appellant to provide [the appellate court] 
with a sufficient record from which [it] can decide whether 
the trial court erred as alleged.  A failure to furnish a 
sufficient record will result in an affirmance of the judgment 
appealed from.”  Thus, Ahmer contends, it was the duty of his 
counsel to take such steps as might be necessary to ensure 
that the record was complete in order to protect his appellate 
rights.5 
 
The question whether counsel’s performance fell below the 
standard with respect to Instruction R is subject to the 
                     
5 We held, in Miles v. Sheriff, 266 Va. 110, 115-16, 581 
S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003), that counsel’s performance was 
deficient under the first prong of Strickland by failing to 
comply with a specific instruction from his client to appeal a 
criminal conviction. 
 
 
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subsidiary question whether, as the circuit court found, 
counsel was entitled to rely on the court’s statement at trial 
that Instruction R was a part of the record.  The question is 
further complicated by the rapid succession of three attorneys 
who assumed responsibility for the defense during the crucial 
period between sentencing and appeal, when the record was 
being assembled in the clerk’s office. 
 
Ahmer’s arguments are correct as abstract statements of 
the law.  Applying them to the peculiar circumstances of this 
case, however, brings us to consideration of the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Strickland:  
The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel’s performance.  If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will 
often be so, that course should be followed.  Courts 
should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims 
not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the 
entire criminal justice system suffers as a result. 
 
466 U.S. at 697. 
 
 
That admonition is particularly appropriate to the 
present case.  However complex the question of counsel’s 
performance may have been in the circumstances, Ahmer’s 
failure to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
test is clear.  The jury was fully and fairly instructed.  All 
instructions except that relating to “concert of action” were 
agreed upon by the parties.  We agree with the majority 
 
10
opinion of the Court of Appeals in its holding that the trial 
court’s use of the model jury instruction had left no vital 
issue unaddressed. 
 
Ahmer argues that the essential content of Instruction R 
can be determined from its apparent quotation by counsel in 
oral argument.  Assuming that to be true, we think its 
language would have been more confusing than enlightening.  
The terms “planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on or settled” 
are stated in the disjunctive, so as to give the jury the 
apparent choice of any single one of them as the definition of 
“concert of action.”  In that context, “adjusted” and 
“settled” are themselves in need of definition.  There is no 
limitation of the time within which these actions must have 
occurred in order to be significant.  Ahmer asserts that the 
terms he advocates were taken from the explanatory language 
contained in an appellate decision.  We have frequently 
cautioned against “the danger of the indiscriminate use of 
language from appellate opinions in a jury instruction.” 
Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 255, 462 S.E.2d 94, 98 (1995) 
(quoting Blondel v. Hayes, 241 Va. 467, 474, 403 S.E.2d 340, 
344 (1991)).  Appellate language used to explain a ruling or 
illustrate a point must necessarily be tailored to the facts 
and circumstances of the case then before the court on appeal.  
Unless clearly intended for use as a jury instruction, such 
 
11
language is inappropriate for that purpose. See National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 208 Va. 595, 601, 159 S.E.2d 815, 820 
(1968). 
 
The burden is on the proponent of a jury instruction to 
satisfy the trial court that the proposed language is a 
correct statement of the law, applicable to the facts of the 
case on trial, and expressed in appropriate language.  If 
Instruction R was phrased as Ahmer contends, his trial counsel 
could not have met that burden.  Consequently, the trial court 
did not err in refusing the proposed instruction and its 
refusal would have been unavailing as a ground for reversal 
even if it had been contained in the record on appeal. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Ahmer suffered no prejudice 
because of the omission of Instruction R from the record and 
we do not reach the “performance” prong of Strickland in 
deciding Ahmer’s assignments of error concerning Instruction 
R. 
C. Rehman as a Witness. 
 
All but one of the eyewitnesses to the events of 
September 9, 2002 were members of Ahmer’s family.  They gave 
wildly varying accounts of those events in their initial 
statements to the police, in subsequent interviews with the 
police, in recorded statements, as witnesses in the separate 
trials of Rehman and Ahmer, and in the sentencing proceedings 
 
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thereafter.  Because of these discrepancies, most were 
impeached by their prior inconsistent statements. 
 
Rehman was no exception.  He initially told the police, 
on the night of the murder, that when he entered the 
apartment, he found Ahmer engaged in a fight with Zahid, the 
victim, and that he tried to intervene by grabbing the 
victim’s hand and trying to pull him off Ahmer, after which 
the victim pulled away and jumped off the balcony to escape. 
Later that night, Rehman changed his story and told the police 
that he was angry about the affair between Zahid and Humaira, 
that he entered the apartment, found Zahid in conversation 
with Humaira’s father and struck Zahid with his fist.  Rehman 
further stated that Ahmer joined in the fight and both of them 
started punching Zahid, after which Rehman went to the 
kitchen, picked up a knife, returned, and stabbed Zahid 
several times.  At the guilt phase of Rehman’s trial, he 
testified that after he stabbed Zahid, someone else pulled him 
away and he saw the door open, whereupon Ahmer came in and 
started hitting Zahid after Rehman had finished.  At the 
penalty phase of Rehman’s trial, he testified that the fight 
was entirely between himself and Zahid, and that Ahmer “just 
try to stop us.”  By the time of Rehman’s sentencing hearing, 
however, Ahmer had been tried and convicted.  At that point, 
Rehman’s counsel argued to the court, “Ahmer Shaikh was the 
 
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leader of this family[.]  Ahmer Shaikh was the one that wanted 
something to happen to [Zahid]. . . .  Your Honor, the jury in 
[Ahmer’s] case . . . recognized Ahmer Shaikh as the leader of 
this, recognized him for the thug that he is.” 
 
As stated above, Ahmer’s counsel interviewed both Rehman 
and his counsel before Ahmer’s trial began.  Ahmer’s counsel 
furnished an affidavit which was a part of the record in the 
habeas proceeding. In it, he stated that Rehman “was hasty to 
offer to testify in whatever way might be beneficial to 
[Ahmer] and his family” but when asked about the events that 
led up to Ahmer’s arrival at the crime scene, Rehman did not 
want to talk about them.  Rehman’s counsel, however, informed 
Ahmer’s counsel that Rehman would not testify at Ahmer’s 
trial, and, if subpoenaed, would invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
 
At Ahmer’s sentencing hearing, Ahmer’s counsel informed 
the court that he had experienced great difficulty in dealing 
with the family members.  He referred to his efforts in 
gathering the facts from them as akin to an “archaeological 
dig.”  The trial court responded:  “Well, I really felt at 
trial that you were having a very difficult time because of 
the testimony of the family. . . . every witness that got on 
the stand blew up something.”  In the habeas proceeding, the 
 
14
court recalled that at trial, the witnesses were “[a]ll over 
the place.” 
 
In these circumstances, trial counsel’s decision not to 
call Rehman as a witness may well be characterized as a sound 
tactical decision.  Counsel could have no assurance what 
Rehman’s testimony might be, but helpful or harmful, counsel 
could rest assured that it would be subject to devastating 
impeachment.  Rehman might have given testimony favorable to 
Ahmer, but in that case the jury would have heard impeachment 
evidence equally or more damaging.  In view of his prior 
statements, Rehman might also have proved directly hostile. 
Further, counsel could have no assurance that Rehman would 
testify at all.  If he refused to testify, the effect of his 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment, if the jury were aware of 
it, would be unpredictable.  Rehman’s testimony would have 
“represented a ‘two edged sword’ that counsel often confront 
when constructing the strategy most likely to assist rather 
than harm a client.”  Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I State 
Prison, 267 Va. 318, 337, 593 S.E.2d 292, 303 (2004). 
 
A habeas petitioner making a claim of ineffective 
assistance must overcome a “strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, . . . the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
 
15
trial strategy.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Ahmer has failed to overcome that 
presumption here. We hold that counsel’s decision not to call 
Rehman as a witness fell within the range of reasonable 
professional assistance.  We therefore do not reach 
consideration of the “prejudice” prong of Strickland in 
deciding Ahmer’s assignments of error concerning counsel's 
decision not to call Rehman as a witness. 
D. Evidentiary Hearing 
 
We find no merit in Ahmer's further contention that he 
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  Code § 8.01-654(B)(4) 
provides that the court may decide the merits of a habeas 
petition "on the basis of the record" if the allegations can 
be "fully determined on the basis of recorded matters."  
Friedline v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 273, 277, 576 S.E.2d 491, 
493-94 (2003).  Affidavits may be considered along with the 
record in deciding a motion to dismiss a habeas petition.  
Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 288-89, 455 S.E.2d 18, 20-21 
(1995). 
 
This is such a case.  The record contains transcripts of 
the proceedings in Ahmer's trial and sentencing, the relevant 
parts of Rehman's trial and sentencing, Ahmer's appellate 
proceedings, and affidavits furnished by both trial and 
appellate counsel in Ahmer's case.  We find that all issues 
 
16
 
17
raised by Ahmer's habeas petition can be "fully determined on 
the basis of recorded matters."  Code § 8.01-654(B)(4). 
Conclusion 
 
Because Ahmer has failed to meet the two-part Strickland 
test as to either of his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and because no evidentiary hearing was necessary, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.