Title: Thompson v. Kyo-Ya Company, Ltd. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Amending Concurring Opinion, filed 11/20/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

‘104 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

00 ---

 

 

 

LETIZIA THOMPSON, Plaintitf-Appellant,

{ 8

ve. “8:

Ba
KYO-YA COMPANY, LTD., dba SHERATON-MAUI HOTER|S’ = +
Defendant-Appellee, rE! =
BE Re

and Ee
eB Fo

 

3}
som ors oy ame sos 2.104 on peecsne 1, som

PROFIT ENTITIES 1
Defendants.

  

 

No. 26040

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 02-31-0208) "

NOVEMBER 8, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.z AND
> CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM DUFFY,.J., JOINS

 

 

 

ACOBA,
OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J,

, ‘The plaintiff-appellant Letizia Thompson appeals from

the August 18, 2003 judgment of the circuit court of the second

circuit, the Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto presiding, in favor

of the defendant-appellee Kyo-Ya Company, itd. dba Sheraton-Maui
and against Thompson.

ques that the circuit

   

(hereinafter, “the Sheraton’

On appeal, Thompson essentially

court erred in concluding that the Hawai'i Recreational Use
(RS) ch. $20 (1993 &

Hotel

 

Statute (HRUS), Hawai'i Revised Statutes
Supp. 1927), applied to her presence on the Sheraton’s grounds

and thereby immunized the hotel from her negligence claims.
 

FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAI'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***
For the reasons discussed infza in section III, the
Appellants arguments are unavailing. Accordingly, this court

affirms the circuit court’s judgment.

1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Backoround

‘The present matter arose out of an incident occurring
on the island of Maui on September 26, 2000, when Thompson, a

certified scuba instructor working as an independent contractor
for Pacific Dive, a business located in Lahaina, led three

students on a nighttime dive near the Sheraton at a location

 

known as Black Rock.’ Neither she nor her students had any
affiliation with the hotel as employees or guests, nor had they
any plans to visit the hotel during the evening in question.
The group entered the water north of the hotel and'dove south
around Black Rock, exiting the water on the beach in front of the
Sheraton. Upon exiting the water, the group, still fully élad in
their scuba equipment but carrying their masks, fins, and
snorkels, used the Hotel's unlit beach-access path to return to
their vehicles, which were parked in a lot on the hotel grounds
provided free of charge for menbers of the public using the
beach.

In her answer to interrogatories, Thompson described

what occurred nex

 

He were welking down the pathway te the parking cersce
srepped into a nole in the cement

  

 

te surrounding the 4
19} bacagrosnd ie crawn fren Thonpecn’ ewer
forsee ane ner Jenvary ¢, 2003 aepesitien.

cident are not cispoted,

 

     

 
‘46 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HANAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ++
pathway. 1 fell with full scubs gear on and my head
Rit the concrete.” I renenber the cracking sound of my
Skull. After that, 2 renenber being Unable to speak

B. Procedural Backeround
on April 30, 2002, Thompson filed a complaint against

the Sheraton and, on May 17, 2002, amended the complaint to
allege premises lisbility negligence claims. ' On June 30, 2003,
the Sheraton filed @ motion for summary judoment, asserting that,
as Thompson was not on the hotel's property for any commercial
purpose pertaining to the hotel, the HRUS immunized it from
Liability for her claims. In response, on July 23, 2003,
‘Thompson filed @ memorandum in opposition, arguing that the HRUS
did not apply to her claims because she did not have s+
recreational purpose for being on the property but rather was on
‘the land for vocational purposes as @ scuba-diving instructor.
Following a July 30, 2003 hearing, the circuit court granted the
Sheraton’s motion for summary judgment, issuing the following
oral conclusion cf law (COL): “The [clourt views this as coming
under HRS [§] $20-4(b) [*] and finds that because whatever
commercial interest ‘there was here . . . was related in no way to

On August 6,

 

the landowner . . . the statute applies . .

2003, the circuit court issued a written order granting the

 

RS § $20-6(6) (Supp. 1987) provides in relevent part:

An owner of land who is required or compelled to provide
access cr parking fer such access through or serces the cwner’s
Property because of state of county land use, sehing, er planning

te reach property vec fer recresticn purpcecs =.
i be’efferdes the same protection toch access, ncicding
1g for euch secess, sean owner cf land whe persite any
‘couuee thet cwner's property fcr recreational purposes

gee Antes section f11-8 Tne forth

sonstiet grantee Unger the BRUS)

 

    
 
  

 

  

    

       

 

the general
*1¥ FOR PUBLICATION sn WEST’S HAWAI'S REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER #4
Sheraton’s motion and, on August 18, 2003, iseued its: final

judgnent in favor of the Sheraton and against Thompson on all
claims. On August 21, 2003, Thompson filed a timely notice of

appeal with this court.

TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A, Sonclusions of Law

“*A COL is not binding upen an
appellate court and se freely reviewable
for ite correctness."

 

2 nay Tt Hae O20,
2b Sr Paze 822, 26 (3993) (quot ing

      

TP Haw. 5, 115, B35 F.26 10, 26

[findings of fect) and that reflecte an

application of the correct rule of 1
Sill not be cverturned.”* Estate of
Gersang, 74 Haw. at e26-25, 681 Pod at
326 (qucting antec, Inc, 74 Haw. at 119,
835 Poze at 281. — ‘Wewever, 2 COL that
presents mixed Guestione of fact ano law
Es reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standara because the court’: conclusions
fare dependent upon the facts and
Civeanttances of each ingiviceal cage.”
Ha, st €25, #51 F026 at 326 \guotsns
fnfec, tne, 8, 638 Ped at
23)" interna n marks emitted) -

 
   

 

     

 

State v. furutani, 76 Hewes't 272, [160], 673 P.2d $2, [59]
(187

Allstate Ins. Co, v, Fonce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.3d 96, 104
(2004

 

(Some brackets and internal citations omitted.) (Sone
bracketed material altered.)
Interpretation of statutes

‘The interpretation of 2 statute is @ question of law

 

ewable ge nove. State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 926 F.2d

 
FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

843, 852 (1996).

Furthermore

ss. statutory construction is guided by
establishes! rules

 

when construing @ statute, our foremost
celigatien ie to escertain ane give effect
fo the intention of the legieisture, which
JE te'pe obtaines primarily fem the
Langvage contained in the statute itself.
And we must read statutory language in the
Content ef the entire statute and construe
fe"ih's manner consistent with ite
purpose.

Tihen there Se doubt, doubleress of
nesning, or indistinetiveness or
Gncergainey of an expression used in &
Statute, an smbiguity exists. ss

Yh construing en ambiguous statute,
nityne meaning of the ambiguous words may
be sought by examining the context, with
hich the ambiguose werde, phrases, and
Sentences nay De compared, in orger to

(certain their true meaning.” BRS
S*IISU) 111998) ]- Moreover, the courte
ay reeort to extrineic a:de. in
Setermining legisiative intent. One
Svenue ic the use of legislative history

fan interpretive tool

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 
 

Grex {ys Admin, Dir, of the Court, 6¢ mawas'!'(138,7 148, 9:
Pres Te80-1 890 TUSSI] {footnote omitted

State v. Koch, 107 Hawai'i 215, 220, 112 P,3d 69, 74 (2008)
(quoting State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 2, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-60
(2003)). Nevertheless, absent an absurd or unjust result, see

State v, Haugen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 77, @5 P.3d 178, 184 (2004),

this court is bound to give effect to the plain meaning of
unambiguous statutory language and may only resort to the use of
legislative history when interpreting an ambiguous statute.
ate v. via, 95 Hawai'i 465, 472, 24 F.3d 661, 668 (2002).
c. Summary Judanent

[This court] reviews
or denial of summary jucgne

the circuit court's grant
as Doe.

  

Islomnery judonent
tne pleadings, depeestions, &

 

spprepriate if

 
 

¢9 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

interrogatories, and adnissions on file,
together with the afficavite, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any.
Raterial fact and that the moving perty is
fentitied te judgment ss 2 matter of ew

R fact is material if proof of that fact
would have the effect 6f establishing oF
Fefuting one of the ecrential elements of
o"cause of action or defense asserted by
the parties. The evidence must be viewed
In'the Light most favorable to the
non-meving party. In other words, (this
Court] must sien ali of the evidence and
the inferences drawn therefrom in the
Mgnt nest favorable to the party opposing

 

 

 

 

the notion
Hawat't cacy. red za Keke, $4 Hawas's 213, 221, 12
Feat, 9 (2000)) Teitetione and interns] quotation marke
omitted

Quexubin v. Thronas, 107 Hawai'i 48, 56, 109 P.3d 689, 697 (2005)

(qucting Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recveling, inc., 105 Hawas't

490, $01, 100 F.3d 60, 71 (2004): (internal citation omitted)

(some brackets in original).

TIT. PISCUSSION
On appeal, ‘Thompson asserts that the circuit court

(2) erred by implicitly concluding that, under Crichfield v.
Grand Wailea, 93 Hawai'i 477, 6 P.3¢ 349 (2000), absent evidence

 

of a conmercial purpose related to the landowner for entering the
hotel's property, any presence by Thompeon on the property was
presumptively recreational: and, hence, (2) erred in concluding
that the HRUS inmunized the Sheraton from Thonpscn’s negligence
claims. She contends thet, under Crichfield, the determining
factor as to whether an entrant is engaged in s “recreational
use” and, hence, barred by the HRUS from pureving negligence

claims against the landowner is the subjective intent of the

  

entrant, not the intent of the owner in holding open the land for

é
 

e+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEEE’ JAMAI'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER +
public use. She maintains that, inasmuch as her purpose at the
Sheraton that evening was “occupational or vocational” as a paid
diving instructor, she was not @ recreational user under the
HRS.

The Sheraton argues that, inasmuch as ‘Thompson concedes
that che had no comercial purpose with the hotel, end that,
under the plein language of HRS ch. $20, she was engagéd in 2
recreational activity -- regardless of her motivation for doing
her presence falls under the HRUS.?

A. The HRUS
1. Bmbiguity in the meaning of “recreaticnal_usex”

andr onal

 

 

It is undisputed that Thompson's injury.occurred on the
Sheraton’s land, and nowhere does Thompson argue that her
students were not engaged in a recreational activity. The crux

of the matter, therefore, is whether Thompson was on the

 

Sheraton’s property as a “recreational user” for “recreational

purposes” under the HRUS when she was engaged in 2 traditionally

uch access path as she and her
strictly speaking,
activity ef diving when she wae injured.
Feguired te provide beach access and free

  
   
  
 
 
 

students recur
engages in th

Nevertreless,
Parking a port ef the
Eoileing and use permits
therefore, the feet thet Thonpecn was.
dctusiiy Giving er veing the Sheraten’ «
Guelysite sether the FRUS defences ore

 

 

 

 
s+ OR PUBLICATION in WEST’ 8 HAWAI'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER #9
recreational activity' but with the subjective intent of doing so
for vocational or occupational reasons.

As with any statutory inguiry, we begin by analyzing
the plain language of HRS ch. $20.

2. The language of HRS ch. $20

HRS § 520-1 (1993) states that “[t]he purpose of this
chapter is to encourage ouners of land to make land and water
areas available to the public for recreational porposes by
Limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such
purposes.” To achieve that goal, HRS § 520-3 (Supp. 1997) limits

the duty of care owed by a landowner to menbers of the public

 

entering the land for recreational purpose:

Except ae specifically recognized by or provided in
[HRS §) £20°6{, 11993] (relating to duties af persons
entering the, proper i}\an owner of Land owes no
Guty of care fo keep the premises safe for entry or
Sse by others for rect’ forte giv
Sry swarming of » conse! structure,
oF activity on tuch premises te persons entering for
such purposes.

Furthermore, HRS § $20-4(2) (Supp. 1997) limits the liability of

   

 

    

 

 

an owner to any recreational entran

Except as specifically recognized by or provided
an (WRS'§) 520-6, | see gumca note §,) en owner of land
who either directly e incirectly invites cr permite

 

«Thompson concedes thet “scat diving can be recreational and is
similar te ther ‘recrestional” activities listed [in HRS § 520-2], €.9.,
fishing, seinming and water skiing.”

 

 

 

HES § 520-6 in fact exphesizes the duty of the entrant
Nothing in this chapter shail be construed to:
i) Greate a osty of care cr ground of liability for injury te persons
cr property
2} Relieve any persen ues snd ef ancther fer recreation

 
  

‘ch the person nay have in the
Io txercise cere in the person's vee of
or from the

Purposes from any cbt

  
 
 

+4 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAMAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +1

without charge any person to use the property for
Feereational purposes does not
(i) Extend sny ssevrance thet the premises are
safe for any purpose

 

  

sa nthe legel status of
fe towhom a duty of
o we responsibility fer, oF incur

ianility fer, any injury’ te person or
property caused by an act of omission or
Eonaissicn of such persons; and

(4) Resume. responsibility for; oF incur
Llability for, any anjury'to person or
perecne whe enter the premises. in response
Fo an insured recreational user-(*)

 

Finally, by its plain language, HRS § 520-4(b), see supra note 2,
extends the liability limitations set forth in HRS § 520-4(a) to
any public access or parking area an owner is compélled by state
or county officials to provide for recreational entrants.
Nevertheless, while HRS § $20-4(b) establishes that the
protections of HRS § 520-4(a) apply equally to public access
areas such as the pathway in the present matter, it does not
elaborate on the nature or scope of the protections afforded by
HRS § 520-4 (a).

In Grichfield, this court summarized the overall effect

of the HRUS on land owner liability:

[the] HRUS confers upon the owner of the land inmunity
fron negligence Liebility to any person ~~ who ie
neither charges fer the right to be present nor a
heosequest |, see gunka note 6) -- injured on the Land
hile thet persen ie ueing the owner's land fora
Fecrestione! purpose. In cther words, if = person is
ingures on an cuner™ on was not on
}"aRUS does

 

   
 
 
 
 
 
   

  

not, by ite plein
tert lability.

RUS y three exceptions te the Limitations to
Landowner exty ane HRS §§ $20-3 and S206: 12) willfad
nelsciove {eilures te wai sdeuner (2| entrance te the lend being
premised cn payment of # fe iy claim snvelving @ hevseguest of the
Sener se plein ‘See BRS g's70-2| (1993). Thompson concedes that none of

exceptions opply in the present matter, Ae noted supra, the
proviees public perkine fer Reschecers #ree of cherge

    

 

     

 

  
 

“94 FOR PUBLICATION An WEST'S WAMAL'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *

93 Hawai'i st 485, 6 P.3d at 357. (Internal quotations omitted.)
In most suits where @ HRUS defense has been invoked, the question
whether a party is a recreational user has been outcone-
dispositive. See, e.c., Howard v. United States, 161 F.3¢ 1064
(9th Cir. 1999); Palmer v, United States, 945 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir.
1951); Brown v, United States, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (Ds Haw.
2001).

Resorting to the plain language of HRS ch. 520 for a
definition of recreational user is of limited value. HRS § 520-2
(Supp. 1997) defines “recreational user” to mean “any person who
4s on or about the premises that the owner of the land. .
indirectly . . . permits, without charge, entry onto the property
for recreational purposes.” “Recreational purpode,” in turn, ie
defined as including “but not limited to any of the following(:]

+ + fishing, swimming, boating, . . . and viewing or enjoying

: scenic or scientific sites.” HRS § 520-2.

 

As noted, the Sheraton contends thet Thompson, as @
person using the beach path te return to her car after diving,
falls within the plain language of HRS § $20-2 and, hence, that
the HRUS operates to ber her negligence cleims. The hotel
asserts that the mere fact that she engaged in the activity as
part of @ paid arrangement with her students “does not transform
the ‘recreational purpose’ [] to a ‘non-recreational’ one.”
Thompson, on the cther hand, insists that, under
Gxichtield, her subjective intent to enter the property for a
vocations) pursuit, even one unrelated to the landowner, is

sufficient te establish 2 non-recreational use of the land.

 

‘Thompson's argument is unavailing.
FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAZ'S REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***

b.  Crichtield
‘This court concluded in Crichfield that neither the
subjective intent of the landowner in holding open the property

 

nor the subjective intent of the entrant in visiting the’ property
were necessarily dispositive as to whether the plaintiff was a
recreational user for the purposes of the HRUS. 93 Hewai'i at
487-86, 6 P.3d at 359-60 (noting, “as a preliminary matter, ‘that
the subjective intent of an ouner of land is obviously relevant
to whether he or she has directly or indirectly invited or
permitted an injured party to use the land without charge for

recreational purpose” but concluding that the entrant's

 

subjective intent is also material)’ (internal quotations
omitted) -

In Crichfield, the plaintiffs alleged that they had
leilea’s grounds both to enjey, the gardens and

 

entered the Grand
for the comercial purpose of having lunch at ‘one of the hotel's
restaurants, 93 Hewai‘i at 481, 6 P.3d at 383. This court
concluded that the commercial purpose of having lunch at the
hotel was a non-recreational use of the property and, in vacating
the grant of summary judgnent in favor of the hotel, weighed the
intent of the landowner end the intent of the entrant and
concluded thet the plaintiffs’ allegations of @ conmerciel
purpose with the hotel raised 8 genuine issue of material fact.
93 Hawai's at 467-88, 6 P.3d at 389-€0. The result in Crichfield

 

 
  
   
   

 

fer an entrant qualifies ee =
Unites Staves Court of

1S in Howerg, 161 F.3d at
for Beane on the lene
Ty € Fe30 at 356-55.

Appeals for the Nii

      

 
 

YOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ++4

 

was based on the legislative history underlying HRS ch, $20 that
expressly stated that the HRUS would not affect landowners’
common law liability toward business invitees of the landowner,
93 Hawai'i at 486, 6 P.3d at 360 (quoting Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep.
No. $34, in 1969 Senate Journal, at 1075), and a recognized need
to, prevent commercial establishments from exploiting the HRUS to
escape well-settled landowner duties to non-recreational
entrants, 93 Hawai'i at 489, € P. 34 at 362.
c. Palmer and Brown

Research reveals only two other cases that have
construed the terms “recreational purpose” and “recreational
user” as set out in the HRUS. In Palmer, 945 F.2d 1134, decided
before Crichfield, the United States Court of Appeals’ for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision of the district court holding ©
that the HRUS shielded a military recreational facility from
negligence liability clains asserted by a grendfather who slipped
and fell at a swimming pool while watching over his
granddaughters. Id. at 1135. Palmer was only allowed access to
the pool area to watch his granddaughters as favor to his
stepdaughter and was not himself allowed in the pool, which was
restricted to military personnel and their dependents. Id. at

  

1136-37.
pool, he was not a recreational entrant and, hence, the HRUS did

almer argued that, because he was denied access to the

not shield the facility from his claims. Id. st 1136. The court
first considered the intent of the landowner, concluding thet,

because “[t]he United States has chosen to make the pool .

 

available for recreational use free of charge . . . (,therefore,]

the HRUS is applicable to the pool under the plain, unambiguous
 

1+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

language of the statute." Id, Addressing next Palmer’s
contentions that, because his subjective intent in being at the

pool was allegedly as @ pseudo-lifeguard and therefore not

recréational, the court reasoned:

Even assuming thet watching over one's own
grendchileren is not @ recreational activity, Palmer's

Services conferred no benefit upon the (recreational

facility]. He wes net there fer the [fscilities]"

Purposes, but rather to facilitate hie grandchildren’ s

Euthorszec use of the pool... He was allowed on

the property. for his granddaughters" recreational

purposes, which is the type of permissive use the HAUS

Seeks to encourage. Morever, Palmer's behavior was

Consistent with relaxation and recreation... We

Therefore conclude that he was engaged in

Fecreational activity for purposes of the HAUS. By

affording snmurity in this situation, the purpose of

the HRUE ce encourage landowners to make their .
Tecreationel property available for use is served.

 

 

dda at 1136-37. The Belmer court, therefore, considered the
intent of the landowner in holding the lané open for use, ‘the
subjective intent of the entrant, as well as the nature of the :
entrant's activity while on the property and whether the activity
conferred any benefit upon the landowner such that it would be
equitable to impose’a corresponding duty of care upon the

landowner.
‘The United States District Court for the District of

Hawai'i, in Brown, focused primarily on the subjective intent of
the entrant. The court concluded that 2 genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was on a
bicycle path on military land for recreational or non-
recreaticnal purposes, given the evidence that he was commuting

to work! on the day he swerved to avoid a runner and suffered

 

fe riding that cay wes

     

uncontested that the bicycle Brow
Conmuting, with marrere, 1igh

ae we
iy equipped £

 

spect

   

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION im WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

injuries. 160 F, Supp. 2d at 1140. The Brown court concluded
that “(t]he Howard end Crichfield courts agree that the
‘subjective intent of an owner of lend is obviously relevant to
whether he or she has directly or indirectly invited or
permitted’ a person to use the land for recreational purposes,”
but nevertheless interpreted Crichfield te mean that testimeny by
the plaintiff that entry was for a non-recreational purpose wa

sufficient in itself to avoid sunmary judgment on a HRUS defens

 

180 F. Supp. 2¢ at 1139-40 (some internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Crichfield, 93 Hewai"i at 487, € P.3d at 359)
(citing Howard, 181 F.3d at 1072-73).

In Crichfield, this court noted that the “HRUS is
ambiguous . . . regarding the standpoint or perspective from
Which ‘recreationgl purpose’ is ascertained.” 93 Hawai't at 487,
ot 359. Palmer, Howard, Crichfield, and Brown struggled
“recreations! purpose” and “recreational user” under

6P

 

to define
the HRUS, but there remains indistinctiveness and uncertainty
surrounding the terms. An anbiguity exists in the present matter
as to whether an activity that (1) is unrelated to the owner of

‘the land and (2) generally falls within the definition of a

 

recreational activity as set forth in BRS § 520-2, see supra,

 

section III.A.1.a, can be transfermed from a recreational use
into @ non-recreational one solely by virtue of the plaintiff's
subjective reasons for engaging in the activity. Inasmuch as an
ambiguity existe, thie court may examine the legislative history

for guidance. Koch, 107 Hawai'i at 220, 112 F.3d at 74.

 
WAMAY' REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER #**

 

ec vat
1 cal ‘openin: ce

brs hi efi a7

‘access to Hawaii's scenic beauty.

In 1968, the Senate Committee on Lands and Natural
Resources, in reporting on Senate Bill 96, the origins of the
HRUS, stated that “(t]he purpose of this bill is to limit the
liability of landowners who permit persons to use their property
for recreational purposes without charge.” Sen. Stand. Comm.
Rep. No. $34, in 1969 Senate Journal, at 1075. The House
Committee on the Judiciary expressed similar sentiments. See
ise. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 760, in 1969 House Journal, at 914.
‘The Senate committee, however, also noted that it had “amended
this bill by deleting section 6 which provided] that an owner
ino provides @ public right-of-way through his land to beach
areas shall maintain euch right-of-way, because it creates an
undue burden on landowners.” Sen. Stand. Com. Rep. Wo. $34, in
1969 Senate Journal, at 1075. The legislature in 1996 further
Limited the duties of the onners of properties like the Sheraton
that maintain beach right-of-ways. Effective June 12, 1996, the
legislature amended HRS § 520-4 by adding subsection (b), see
supra note 2, to ensure that properties required to provide
public access paths to recreational areas would benefit from the
seme protections afforded onners of the actual recreational lands
themselves.

In Crichfield, this court summarized the legislature's

intent in enacting and, in 1996, amending the HRUS:

     

enacted [the] HRUS to encourage
Skor"state'e rescorees Ey
Slebuisty te recrestional users

the recreations:

 

 

 

 
#4 FOR PUBLICATION in WES’ S MAWAI'S REPORSS and PACIFIC REPORTER **¥

Hayaiits resources. Indeed, in amending [the] RUS in
1596, the legislature reaffirmed its original intent!

= The legislature finds that
sing the pobls in
‘[asreational activities makes for
hegithier citizens snd ilousevervene to
‘niu Hawaii's patorel resources. 1
ISeS,uhen the leaislature enacted chapte:
420, Nawal Revised statute

1.
iccurace wider access to lands snd waters
sr hunting. fans ner :

‘Ackivitiee, “the intent was to make access
easier and‘ Tinit-lancowners” Tisesliny
93 Hawai'i at 488-89, 6 P.3d at 360-61 (emphasis in Crichfield)
(quoting 1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 151, § 1 at 328). Nevertheless,

 

this court also noted that the “HRUS was not intended . . . to
have created out of whole cloth a universal defense available to
@ commercial establishment . . . against any and all liability
for personal injury” and that the general rule regarding

ional entrants remained intact:

 

landowner liability to non-recr:

  

Ye possesser of Lend, whe knows oF should have how
of sp unreasonable risk of hare posed to persens using
the’ land, sy 2 condition on the Landy eves ¢ duty to
Percore Using the land to take reasonable steps to
Eliminate the unressoneble risk, or warn the veers

agsine: it.”
93 Hawai'i at 489, 6 P.3d at 361 (quoting Richardson v, Sports
Shinko (Waikiki Corp.J, 76 Hawai'i 494, 503, 880 P.2d 169, 178
(1984).

‘This court should, therefore, approach the analysis of

 

 

 

whether 2 HRUS defense is available to the Sheraton in the
present matter by seeking an cutcome that “encourage(s] the
recreational use of our state’s rescurces by limiting landowners’

liability to recreational users and, thereby, promot [es] the use

  

and enjoyment of Hawaii's resources” by “encourag[ing] wider

access to lends and weters for . . . fishing and other

 

16
sie+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S IAWAI'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER +¥
activities,” while respecting traditional duties owed by

landowners to non-recreaticnal entrants.

B. .
aa? suit ise Prot
Summary Judgment For The Sherston

‘Thonpson’s position would encourage land closures® and
fails to address the inequities that would result. By her oun
argument, Thompson directly benefitted economically from the
availability of the path, which enabled her to use the Black Rock
beach to guide recreational diving groups." Thompson’ s use of
the path that evening as 2 paid scuba diver would not have
occurred were it not for the recreational use of the ocean and
the beach by her clients. Yet Thompson would bite the hand that
feeds her by stripping the protections of the HRUS from the
landowner, contrary to the legislature’s intent to, encourage
Jendowners to allow entry to individuals wishing to “use .
ues, the
recreational enjoyment of the natural resources that are an
inextricable part of Hawaii's land end waters.” Cxichfield, 99

  

the owner’s land fer recreational purpose:

Hawai'i at 489, 6 P.3d at 361.
our research reveals only one case nationally that
considers an argument similar to Thompson's, and the court

being enact

   
 
 
  

would also arguably run counter to the legislature's purposes
ig HRE § £20615), see supra note Z, i.e.) extending BROS
ch paths ike the ene in question, #2 well ae the legislative
Rep. Now S34, sn 1969 Senate cournal, et
Ove, gee gugca tection I]1.A.2, thet requiring “an cnner who provides &
puriichticftttt-ney through hie lane te Beach ereas .- . [to] maintain such
CYimocis’ creetel! an undve burden on’ landewners|

   

    

   

   

capecs 6) er depceition that,
i nevid net trespese ch private land sn order to reach the dive
y she used the peach ccese Pa"

 

 
 

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reached a result antithetical to Thompson's position.» In Hafford
va Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 687 2.26 967 (Me. 1996), the
plaintiff, @ tecreational outfitter supplying canceing and
camping enthusiasts on the Allagash Waterway in Maine, was
injured in an auto.accident on 2 private road owned by Great
Northern while transporting his staff to pick up his clients’
vehicles. Id, at 968. Hafford asserted that the recreational

use statute" did not apply to him because he was on the property

 

oon the court based its analysis on Me. Rev. Stet. Ann,
tit. 14, § 188A; a recreational gee statute #inilar te the HRS, which
provided in pertinent pare

unless the context indicates
SLlowing mesnings:

1. Definitions. Ae used in this sectier
otherwise, the following tere have the

 

 

 

 

B.” Ssecreational . . . activities” means recreational activities
conducted ovt=of-ccors, including, but not limited to, hunting,
Eishing, ... camping, enviromental eauestion anc research,
hiking, sight“seeing, . .. hang-gliding,. . . equine activities,

 

boating, sailing, canecing, rafting, biking, picnicking, swinning
or activities inveivins the harvesting or. gathering of forest,
Held of marine products, It includes entry of, velonteer
reintenance and inprovencnt of, use ef and passage ver preniges
Ih order to pursue there activities.

 

 

2. Limited duty.” An ower . . . or cccupent of premises does not have
2 guty of care U5 keep the prenises safe for entry cr Ges by ethers fer
Fecreationel « «.. activities or to give warning cf any hatargous
condition, use, structure cr activity on these Premisey te persone
entering for these porpeses
Si pernianive use. An concr”.'.”, oF occupant who gives persission to
ahother to pareve recresticnal ..', activities cn the prenises does net
thereby:
KX: extenc any atsurance thet the prenises ere safe for those
Bo"Fhate the person to whee permission is granted an invites or
Teentee to'whon e sbty"of core is cnecs oF
ei Shavune responsibility of incur Liability for any snsory to
Person or property caused by any act ef persone te whom the
Permission is granted
4. Lamitationa on section. This section does not init the Liabslity
thet would sherniee exist
TReSrer a wilifol er Relicious ta{iure to guard or to warn against
2 eangereut condition, eee, strectare Sy:
Fer an injury sofvered sp any cote where permission to purave
icefation

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

        
 

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for vocational reasons. Id, at 969. The Maine Supreme Judicial”
Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of Great Northern, concluding that

trial court correctly concluded that Hafferd’s
{revel over Great Northern's lend ws an action in
pursuit of the vse of the property fer recreation even
jh Hafford was pais by his cugtosers te provide
essing over Great

 

 

 
 
    

Fecreational pursuits; nis s ‘commercial
Outfitter coee not change the fact thet ne was using
the land fer recrestional purpose!

 

Id. As the Hafford court reasoned, an individual whose purpose
for being on the land is unrelated to the owner and is predicated
upon the land being available to the public for recreational use
at no charge by the landowner due to a recreational use statute
As a “recreational user” for the purposes of the statute. The
veasoning is sound: without such a rule, entrants who took

advantage of open'lands to participate in nature walks, scuba

 

4 (,. continued)
(2) The landowner or the landowner’ agent by the State; or
(2) the landowner or the lancouner’s egent for use of the
premises cn which the injory wee suffered, as long se the
Premises are not used prinarily for commercial recreational
Purposes and ss long ae the user has net been granted the
exclusive right to ake use of the prenises for recreational
sceivieiee; or
c._ Foran injury caused, by acts of persens to whom permission to
pursue any recreational activities was granted, to other
Persone £0 whom the persct
Sr occupant ef the premis
or to usen cf canger
5, No duty crested, Nothing in thir section creates # duty ef ca
giound of Lisslity for injury tos person or property.

 

   

 

 

 

   

The Maine statute does net contain an eguivelent to HRS § $20-4(b), see supe
Rete 2, which epplies the Jiabsiity limte eet forth in BRS § 820-4(e), ge
a access areas provided by cuners under state
fenvch ae HRS § £20-4(p) merely expance
Sfferded by HRS S £20410)

   

 

‘BUEL

   
  

     

ns + Shevertheles
the geograpsie reach of the provect
such © BRE § 220"4(8) (2 Substantially similar to Me. Rev.
st. 14, € 3884 ytical power cf the dafterd coure’s
speli€e te Thespsén's arguments rensine undininithes:

 
   

       

 

   

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FOR PUBLICATION Sn WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ++4
dives, or archeological studies free of charge or benefit to the
landowner would be divided into two classes of plaintiffs -- the
bulk of the entrants would be barred from pursuing negligence
claims against the landowner, while a member of the croup paid to
guide or instruct the others would not -- despite the fact that,
fron the viewpoint of the landowner, the two classes were
indistinguishable. Such disparate treatment would be
inequitable, particularly inasmuch as the favored individual
benefits economically from the opening of the land, and such a
policy would, no doubt, discourage landowners from allowing any
entrants onto their lend for fear that one of then might be .
earning money from the visit. :

Rather, = more just result is reached under the
reasoning in Hafford, concluding that where the plaintif#’s
presence on the land is closely associated with the presence of
individuals whose purpose on the land is purely recreational, the
recreational purpose attaches to the plaintiff. We find the
reasoning in Hafford persuasive.

In the present case, in which Thompson's presence on
the land would not have occurred but for the recreational
activity undertaken by her students and in which she derived a
benefit from the policies underlying HRS

direct financial

 

ch. $20, to allow her to benefit financially while concluding
that the landowner is sfforded no protection by HRS ch. $20 would
be unfair and contrary to the intent of the leislature

ww

therefore, held that the circuit court correctly

 

concluded that Thonpscn’s status on the Sheraton’s property fel)

as a matter of law within the ambit of HRS ch. 520 as @

 

recreational user, inasmuch as she was engaged in “an activity in

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porsvit of the use of the property for recreationel purposes”
and, therefore, that the Sheraton was inmunized from her
negligence clains under the HRUS. We further hold that, inasmuch
as there were no genuine issues of material fact-in dispute, the
circuit court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the
Sheraton and against Thompson. ;

Our holding accords with legislative Intent and with
this court's holding in Crichfield.” Moreover, unlike —
Geichtield, there is no danger in the present matter that this
ruling will allow owners to exploit the HRUS to avoid 1iability

for activities related to then or from which they benefit."

IV. CONCLUSION
In light ef the foregoing, this court affizms the
cizcust court’s August 16, 2003 judgment in favor of the Sheraton

and against Thompson

on the briefs: Gir

an 2. Mattoch and Daniel Blevins
Padiiey of the law Offices <

of Ian L. Mattoch for the Bauer C1 WAAAY 8
fleintifi-appetiont

Teitia tonpson

Brenda Morris Hoernig of the
Law Offices cf Dean E. Ochiai
for the defendant-appellee
Kyo-Ya Company, Ltd. dba
Sheraton-Maui Hotel

 

 

characterized “permitting public

Indeed, in Guichfield, the cou
fons porpeee. 98 Hewai's at 667,

the Beach ane cceen” ae & rec;

     
  
 
 
 
    
 
 

 

opinion ae to whether commercial purposes
je entivery cf possible non-recreational
te eveie appiicetion ef HRS ch, £20- In
{the pleinifie’ allegations @
chrents cows ebuse
Jes ue te thet nelaing.