Title: State v. Clay

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Clay, 120 Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325.] 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CLAY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Clay, 120 Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325.] 
Criminal law — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) — Having a firearm while under indictment 
— Offense is not a strict-liability offense — Accused must be aware of 
indictment to be convicted of having firearm while under indictment — 
Mental state of recklessness applies in determining defendant’s awareness 
of indictment. 
(Nos. 2007-1802 and 2007-1852—Submitted September 17, 2008—Decided 
December 11, 2008.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for  
Cuyahoga County, No. 88823, 2007-Ohio-4295. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For purposes of proving the offense of having a weapon while under a disability 
pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), the mental state of recklessness applies in 
determining whether the defendant was aware that he or she was “under 
indictment.”  (R.C. 2901.21(B), applied.) 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} The appellant was convicted of having a weapon while under a 
disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) because he was “under indictment” on drug 
charges at the time he possessed a weapon.  The question before this court is 
“[w]hether knowledge of the pending indictment is required for a conviction for 
having a weapon under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) when the 
disability is based on a pending indictment.”  We answer that question in the 
negative.  But we also find that the General Assembly did not intend R.C. 
2923.13(A)(3) to impose strict liability.  Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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we hold that the mental state of recklessness applies in determining whether a 
defendant is aware that he or she is “under indictment.”  Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
II. Facts 
{¶ 2} On March 5, 2006, at approximately 1:00 a.m. outside the Gin-Gin 
bar in Cleveland, appellant, Howard Clay, shot and wounded Christopher 
Graham.  At the time of the shooting, Clay was under indictment for possession 
and trafficking of drugs.  For the 2006 shooting, a grand jury indicted Clay on 
charges of felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11, firearm specifications under R.C. 
2941.141 and 2941.145, and having a weapon under a disability under R.C. 
2923.13, i.e., using a weapon while under indictment for possession and 
trafficking of drugs under R.C.  2923.13(A)(3). 
{¶ 3} Clay waived his right to have his case decided by a jury and tried 
his case to a judge.  Clay argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict 
him of having a weapon while under a disability because he was unaware that he 
was under indictment at the time of the shooting.  The court disagreed, holding 
that R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) does not require a defendant to have knowledge of the 
indictment.  Thus, the trial judge found Clay guilty. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment of 
conviction, holding that R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) is a strict-liability offense.  The court 
of appeals certified that its judgment conflicted with State v. Burks (June 22, 
1990), Sandusky App. No. S-89-13, 1990 WL 85126, in which the court held that 
a defendant must have notice of a prior indictment before he or she can be 
convicted of having a weapon while under a disability.  R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). 
{¶ 5} We determined that a conflict existed.  We also accepted Clay’s 
discretionary appeal1 and sua sponte consolidated the two appeals. 
                                                          
 
1.  Clay asserted two propositions of law in his discretionary appeal: (1) whether knowledge of the 
disabling condition (e.g., a pending indictment for a drug offense) is an essential element of 
January Term, 2008 
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III. Analysis 
{¶ 6} Clay was convicted of having a weapon while under a disability.  
Therefore, we first examine R.C. 2923.13, which provides: 
{¶ 7} “(A) Unless relieved from disability as provided in section 2923.14 
of the Revised Code, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any 
firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply: 
{¶ 8} “ * * * 
{¶ 9} “(3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of 
any offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, 
or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for 
the commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been an 
offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or 
trafficking in any drug of abuse.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 10} 
It can be seen from the above language that the General 
Assembly did not provide a specific mental state in R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).  Thus, 
we must examine R.C. 2901.21(B), which addresses the treatment of criminal 
statutes that have no culpable mental state.  R.C. 2901.21(B) provides: 
{¶ 11} 
“When the section defining an offense does not specify any 
degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal 
liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required 
for a person to be guilty of the offense.  When the section neither specifies 
culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is 
sufficient culpability to commit the offense.” 
{¶ 12} 
“Thus, recklessness is the catchall culpable mental state for 
criminal statutes that fail to mention any degree of culpability, except for strict 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
having a weapon while under a disability and (2) as a matter of due process, a criminal defendant 
may not be convicted of having a weapon while under a disability unless he or she has received 
notice of the disabling condition.  We find that the questions presented in these propositions are 
resolved when we answer the certified question. 
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liability statutes, where the accused’s mental state is irrelevant.”  State v. Lozier, 
101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 13} 
Clay argues that the word “knowingly” within R.C. 2923.13(A) 
modifies the phrase “under indictment” within R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).  Therefore, 
Clay argues, the state must prove that he was aware of the indictment at the time 
that he possessed the gun in order to convict him of having a weapon while under 
a disability. 
{¶ 14} 
In examining the structure of R.C. 2923.13, we find that the 
General Assembly intended the word “knowingly” within R.C. 2923.13(A) to 
modify only the phrase “acquire, have, carry or use any firearm or dangerous 
ordnance.”  Thus, “knowingly” does not provide a culpable mental state for the 
phrase “under indictment” in R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).  See generally State v. 
Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 29 (in 
examining a statute structured similarly to the one herein, the court determined 
that “knowledge is a requirement only for the discrete clause within which it 
resides”). 
{¶ 15} 
Because R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) has no culpable mental state, the 
question now becomes whether the General Assembly plainly intended R.C. 
2923.13(A)(3) to impose strict liability or whether R.C. 2901.21(B) supplies the 
culpable mental state of recklessness. 
{¶ 16} 
In the past, legislative silence as to a culpable mental state was 
interpreted as imposing strict liability.  State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co. (1964), 176 
Ohio St. 482, 27 O.O.2d 443, 200 N.E.2d 590, paragraph two of the syllabus.  But 
that changed in 1974, when the legislature repealed former R.C. 2901.21 and 
enacted a new version of that statute, which imposes the culpable mental state of 
recklessness when no culpable mental state is specified, unless the legislature 
“plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1897-1898.  See also State v. Buehler Food 
January Term, 2008 
5 
Markets, Inc. (1989), 50 Ohio App.3d 29, 30, 552 N.E.2d 680.  Thus, “[i]t is not 
enough that the General Assembly in fact intended imposition of liability without 
proof of mental culpability.  Rather, the General Assembly must plainly indicate 
that intention in the language of the statute.”  State v. Collins (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 524, 530, 733 N.E.2d 1118. 
{¶ 17} 
The General Assembly knows how to define a strict-liability 
offense when it so desires, as evidenced in State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770.  In Lozier, we considered whether R.C. 
2925.03(C)(5)(b), which elevates trafficking in LSD to a fourth-degree felony if 
the offense is committed “in the vicinity of a school,” imposes strict criminal 
liability.  This subsection does not assign a culpable mental state.  We looked to 
R.C. 2925.01, the definitional section for R.C. Chapter 2925.  R.C. 2925.01(BB) 
provides:  
{¶ 18} 
“An offense is ‘committed in the vicinity of a juvenile’ if the 
offender commits the offense within one hundred feet of a juvenile or within view 
of a juvenile, regardless of whether the offender knows the age of the juvenile, 
whether the offender knows the offense is being committed within one hundred 
feet of or within view of the juvenile, or whether the juvenile actually views the 
commission of the offense.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 19} 
We stated that “R.C. 2925.01(BB) makes it abundantly clear that 
the offender’s mental state is irrelevant in determining whether an offender has 
committed an offense ‘in the vicinity of a juvenile,’ ” and therefore it imposes 
strict liability.  Id. at ¶ 36.  In the instant case, we find no similar language in R.C. 
2913.13(A)(3), or elsewhere in the Revised Code, that the General Assembly 
plainly intended to impose strict liability for this offense.  Thus, we hold that R.C. 
2923.13(A)(3) has no culpable mental state, nor does it contain any language that 
plainly indicates an intent to impose strict liability. 
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{¶ 20} 
Nevertheless, the state argues that R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) imposes 
strict liability pursuant to State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 
767 N.E.2d 242.  In Maxwell, the defendant was convicted of pandering obscenity 
involving a minor under R.C. 2907.321(A)(6).  The issue was whether R.C. 
2907.321(A)(6) imposed strict liability with regard to the importing of obscene 
material into the state. 
{¶ 21} 
R.C. 2907.321 provides: 
{¶ 22} 
“(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material 
or performance involved, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ 23} 
“  *  *  * 
{¶ 24} 
“ (6) Bring or cause to be brought into this state any obscene 
material that has a minor as one of its participants or portrayed observers.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 25} 
In Maxwell, we reasoned that the inclusion of a culpable mental 
state in R.C. 2907.321(A) and the absence of one in R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) meant 
that the General Assembly intended R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) to be a strict-liability 
offense.  Id. at ¶ 23-29.  However, we also reasoned that other “indications 
outside the statute” supported the conclusion that R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) imposed 
strict liability.  Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 
30.  The “other indications” included the General Assembly’s “strong stance 
against sex-related acts involving minors, as evidenced by the numerous statutes 
in the Ohio Revised Code providing for criminal liability for those acts.”  Id. 
{¶ 26} 
While the statutory structure at issue in Maxwell is similar to the 
structure of the statute herein, Maxwell is distinguishable from the instant case.  
The crime in Maxwell, possession of obscene material involving a minor, is not 
protected by the Constitution.  But possessing a weapon, when the weapon is a 
firearm, is a constitutionally protected right subject only to limited restrictions.  
Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (the Ohio 
January Term, 2008 
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Constitution confers the right to bear arms, but that right may be limited through 
use of the police power).  And in the instant case, it is only the additional fact of 
being “under indictment” that made possessing the firearm a crime under R.C. 
2923.13.  Thus, the acts addressed in Maxwell are very different from the act 
addressed in the instant case. 
{¶ 27} 
Further, unlike in Maxwell, there are no “other indications 
outside” the language of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) that plainly indicate an intent to 
impose strict liability.  Specifically, we find no “strong stance” by the General 
Assembly against possession of firearms per se, as we found in Maxwell with 
regard to possession of child pornography.  Accordingly, we find that Maxwell is 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} 
We find that R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) contains no culpable mental 
state and that the General Assembly did not plainly intend to impose strict 
liability.  Where a statute lacks a mental state and the General Assembly did not 
intend strict liability, the mental state of recklessness applies under R.C. 
2901.21(B).  Accordingly, for purposes of proving the offense of having a 
weapon while under a disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), the mental state 
of recklessness applies in determining whether the defendant was aware that he or 
she was “under indictment.” 
{¶ 29} 
Because the trial court never determined whether Clay acted 
recklessly with regard to being aware that he was “under indictment,” we remand 
the cause to the trial court to determine that issue.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs separately. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
O'DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 30} 
I believe that it is important to emphasize that a defendant’s 
awareness of the possibility of an existing indictment is a necessary element in 
proving recklessness pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) when the disability alleged 
is based on a pending indictment. 
{¶ 31} 
The definitions of the mental states of “knowingly” and 
“recklessly” are somewhat blurred.  “A person acts recklessly when, with 
heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk 
that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain 
nature.  A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless 
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such 
circumstances are likely to exist.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2901.22(C).  In other 
words, because a person who acts with recklessness acts with indifference to a 
known risk, some knowledge is required to satisfy the definition of recklessness. 
{¶ 32} 
With respect to the mental state of ‘knowingly,” “[a] person acts 
knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will 
probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.  A person 
has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances 
probably exist.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2901.22(B).  Awareness, then, is key to 
both definitions.  It is the level of awareness, however, that separates the two 
levels:  “ ‘If the result is probable, the person acts “knowingly”; if it is not 
probable, but only possible, the person acts “recklessly” if he chooses to ignore 
the risk.’ ” In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Emrich (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 1517, 1519, 665 N.E.2d 1133, quoting State v. Edwards (1992), 83 Ohio 
App.3d 357, 361, 614 N.E.2d 1123. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 33} 
By virtue of the mental state required, as applied to this case, the 
trial court may convict Clay under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) only if he acted with 
heedless indifference, perversely disregarding a known risk that he may have had 
an indictment pending. 
____________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thorin 
Freeman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Cullen Sweeney, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________