Title: State v. Smith

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1192-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
  Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
      v. 
Roshawn Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 334 Wis. 2d 808, 800 N.W.2d 958 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Sue E. Bischel   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state public 
defender.    
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Sally Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 91
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1192-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF875) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Roshawn Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the Brown County 
Circuit Court's judgment of conviction against Roshawn Smith 
("Smith").2  The State charged Smith with being a party to the 
crime of possession with intent to deliver more than 10,000 
                                                 
1 State v. Smith, No. 2010AP1192-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 26, 2011). 
2 The Honorable Sue E. Bischel presiding. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
2 
 
grams of tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC"3) in violation of Wisconsin 
Statutes section 961.41(1m)(h)5. (2005-06)4 and 939.05.5  Smith 
                                                 
3 THC is the active ingredient in marijuana.  State v. 
Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, ¶6, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 N.W.2d 775.  
4 Wisconsin Statutes section 961.41(1m) provides: 
[I]t is unlawful for any person to possess, with 
intent to 
manufacture, distribute or deliver, a 
controlled substance . . . .  Any person who violates 
this subjection is subject to the following penalties: 
(h) [THC].  If a person violates this subsection with 
respect to [THC] . . . and the amount possessed, with 
intent 
to 
manufacture, 
distribute, 
or 
deliver, 
is: . . .  
5. More than 10,000 grams . . . , the person is guilty 
of a Class E felony. 
A Class 
E felony is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment no greater than 15 years.  § 939.50(3)(e).  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05 provides: 
(1) 
Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and 
convicted of the commission of the crime although 
the person did not commit it . . . . 
(2) 
A person is concerned in the commission of the 
crime if the person: 
(a) 
Directly commits the crime; or 
(b) 
Intentionally aids and abets the commission 
of it; or 
(c) 
Is a party to a conspiracy with another to 
commit it or advises, hires, counsels or 
otherwise procures another to commit it. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
3 
 
stipulated to the fact that the packages seized by the police 
contained more than 10,000 grams of THC.  At the conclusion of 
the evidentiary portion of the jury trial but prior to the 
jury's deliberations, the circuit court answered a verdict 
question for the jury concerning the weight of the drugs.  The 
jury found Smith guilty of the offense of being a party to the 
crime of possession with intent to deliver more than 10,000 
grams of THC.  He was sentenced to a period of incarceration of 
six 
years 
initial 
confinement 
and 
five 
years 
extended 
supervision.   
¶2 
Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether 
the 
evidence 
was 
sufficient 
to 
support 
Smith's 
conviction; and 2) whether Smith waived his right to a jury 
determination on the quantity of the drugs.  Because a 
reasonable inference of Smith's guilt could have been drawn by 
the jury from the evidence presented at trial, viewed in its 
entirety, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the conviction and agree with the court of appeals' decision in 
that regard.  Second, while we determine that Smith had a 
constitutional right to a jury determination of the drug 
quantity, and although the circuit court determined that 
question without eliciting from Smith a proper waiver of that 
right, we conclude the error was harmless because it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational 
jury would have found Smith guilty of the charged offense absent 
the error.  The court of appeals therefore erred in remanding 
the cause to the circuit court.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
4 
 
court of appeals and reinstate the guilty verdict and judgment 
of conviction.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 2006, law enforcement officers in Brown County, 
Wisconsin were alerted by a police officer in California that 
suspicious 
packages 
were 
being 
sent 
via 
Federal 
Express 
("FedEx") from that state to Brown County.  As a result of that 
information, two packages were seized by local law enforcement 
officers from FedEx in Brown County and 22,477 grams of 
marijuana, testing positive for THC, were discovered therein.  
On September 20, 2006, Brown County law enforcement agents, 
dressed as FedEx employees, delivered the packages to the home 
in Brown County to which they were addressed.  Upon delivery, 
Shannon Kortbein ("Kortbein") came to the door, received the 
packages, and signed for them.  Shortly thereafter, officers 
observed a man later identified as Terri6 Thomas ("Thomas") 
approaching the residence and arrested him. 
¶4 
Further investigation led law enforcement to suspect 
Smith's involvement in the drug offense.  Pursuant to that 
investigation, the State filed a criminal information against 
Smith, alleging that on September 20, 2006 he possessed with 
intent to deliver, as a party to the offense, more than 10,000 
grams of THC, a Class E Felony punishable by up to 15 years in 
prison.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(e).    
                                                 
6 Although Thomas is occasionally referred to in the record 
as "Terry," the State and Smith both spell the name "Terri," as 
did the court of appeals. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
5 
 
¶5 
The matter was set for trial.  At a pretrial hearing 
held on March 6, 2008, defense counsel informed the circuit 
court that he believed his client "would be prepared to 
stipulate" to a chemist's report that more than 10,000 grams of 
THC were seized from the packages delivered to Kortbein's home.  
The circuit court then held the following colloquy with Smith: 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, . . . [defense counsel] says 
that you're prepared to agree that the stuff that was 
found in the boxes was marijuana, THC.  The State has 
a crime lab analyst subpoenaed to testify that the 
substance was tested and that it is in fact [THC], 
marijuana . . . .  And that [defense counsel] is 
telling me you are not going to make that person drive 
here from the crime lab to say that.  That you will 
agree to that analyst's report.  That is not your 
defense.  Your defense is not that it is not 
marijuana.  Your defense is that you had nothing to do 
with it being there.  Is that true? 
ROSHAWN SMITH:  Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT:  You don't want to have that crime lab 
person come up here? 
ROSHAWN SMITH:  No. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Any promises or threats made to you 
to get you to make that decision? 
ROSHAWN SMITH:  No, ma'am.   
THE COURT:  Okay.  You are not disputing that it's 
marijuana . . . .  [Y]our position is you didn't have 
anything to do with it, is that right? 
ROSHAWN SMITH:  Yes. 
¶6 
A similar but less extensive exchange took place at a 
subsequent pretrial hearing held on September 19, 2008: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It's my client's understanding, and 
I talked it over with him again just prior to our 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
6 
 
hearing today, that the lab tech would be stipulated 
to.  We're not contesting what was ultimately found in 
the boxes. 
THE COURT:  He just contests his involvement? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We're not contesting anything 
about the deliveries or anything about what was in the 
boxes or how the testing came out or the evidence [of] 
that nature. 
THE COURT:  Is that true, Mr. Smith?  You're not going 
to make the State prove what was in the boxes? 
MR. SMITH:  No. 
¶7 
At yet another pretrial hearing, held on September 30, 
2008, both attorneys and Smith signed a stipulation indicating 
that the seized material "was identified to have the presence of 
[THC], a substance from marijuana and weighed 22,477 grams." 
¶8 
During pretrial proceedings held on the day of trial, 
the circuit court informed Smith that it "need[ed] to ask you 
personally, you agree that the crime lab person doesn't need to 
come to testify about the fact that what's in the bag contains 
THC, which is the active ingredient in marijuana?  That is your 
agreement?" 
 
Smith 
responded, 
"I 
believe 
so." 
 
Shortly 
thereafter, the circuit court made the following comments to 
Smith: 
[I]t is my understanding that your defense is you 
didn't have anything to do with this, you knew nothing 
about 
it, 
you 
weren't 
involved . . . .  
And . . . because your defense is you didn't have 
anything to do with it, and to drag the crime lab 
person in here to testify that it was marijuana isn't 
part of your defense.  And I just wanted to be sure 
that you understand that you agreed with that.  You 
signed it.  I would fully expect that [defense 
counsel] explained it to you.  But I just wanted to be 
sure that you understood that.  Because it's not part 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
7 
 
of your defense, there is no reason to drag this crime 
lab person in here to say it was marijuana. 
Smith answered, "I agree."  Also on the day of trial, the 
prosecutor 
informed 
the 
court 
that 
"the 
State 
would 
be 
requesting that at the conclusion of the State's case, . . . the 
Court would read the stipulation to the jury and have it entered 
into the record."  Defense counsel agreed that that would be 
appropriate. 
¶9 
During the court's opening instructions to the jury, 
it related that the State intended to argue that Smith could be 
found guilty of being a party to the crime under any of the 
three alternative types of liability set forth by Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.05: direct commission, aiding and abetting, or conspiracy. 
¶10 After trial had begun, a law enforcement officer began 
testifying about testing the packages for THC and defense 
counsel objected on the grounds that it was unnecessary as a 
result of the stipulation.  The court then informed the jury 
that 
the State and the Defense have stipulated that various 
substances that you are going to hear testified to in 
this case, and this is one of them, have tested 
positive for the presence of [THC], a substance from 
marijuana.  And they have stipulated that in addition 
to the field testing that was done . . . , that it was 
tested later by a lab analyst . . . .  So, they've 
stipulated to that and I will direct you to find that 
as a fact. 
¶11 Following the testimony of several law enforcement 
officers, the State called Kortbein.  She stated that she had 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
8 
 
known Smith7 for approximately three and a half years.  Asked how 
she came to be involved in the package delivery, Kortbein 
answered that Smith introduced her to Thomas, and, she believed, 
Smith then gave Thomas her cell phone number.  Thomas called her 
in the summer of 2006 and asked if she would be willing to have 
packages sent to her home in return for $500 per package.  She 
agreed and, over the next few weeks, received three shipments 
similar to those that were later seized by law enforcement.  
After each delivery, Thomas retrieved the package from Kortbein 
within a few days and Smith paid her $4008 within a few days 
after Thomas picked up the package. 
¶12 Later in the trial, David Mehlhorn ("Mehlhorn") took 
the stand.  He testified that he had agreed to receive packages 
at his home at Smith's behest.  Mehlhorn further testified that 
he subsequently received approximately three packages from 
California during the summer and fall of 2006.  After each 
arrived, he would call Smith and Smith and Thomas would pick 
them up.  During his direct examination, the following exchange 
occurred between Mehlhorn and the attorney representing the 
State: 
                                                 
7 Kortbein testified that she knew Smith by the name of 
"Frog," a name (in addition to "Froggy") by which other 
witnesses also knew him.  For the sake of simplicity, we will 
refer to Smith by his real name even where the record reflects 
that the names "Frog" or "Froggy" were used at trial. 
8 The record does not resolve the discrepancy between the 
promised $500 and the $400 Kortbein testified she actually 
received. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
9 
 
Q. 
Now, did [Smith] ever talk to you about being 
involved with a marijuana thing with a girl? 
A. 
After it became public, yes. 
Q. 
But did he tell you it was going to be fine? 
A. 
Yes . . . .  
 
Q. 
Why did he think it would be fine? 
 
A. 
Because it was his word against hers.                            
¶13 Sergeant David Poteat ("Sergeant Poteat") of the Brown 
County Sheriff's Department also testified for the State.  While 
on 
the stand, he 
stated that he had reviewed Smith's, 
Kortbein's, and Thomas's telephone records and found "numerous 
telephone calls" between them from July through September 2006, 
and a particularly large cluster of calls right around the days 
the parcels arrived and were picked up.  Analyzing this data, 
Sergeant Poteat opined that "the pattern of the calls [was] 
consistent with . . . the courier relationship."     
¶14 During trial, the circuit court read the stipulation 
to the jury.  It also advised the jurors that a lab report was 
attached to the stipulation and would be marked as an exhibit.  
The lab report, it added, listed all of the seized drugs, which 
"total[ed] 22,477 grams."   
¶15 The State rested and defense counsel declined to 
present any evidence.  The circuit court brought up the issue of 
jury instructions and the prosecutor reiterated that she "had 
originally requested that that stipulation be read to the jury."  
Asked for his views on the matter, defense counsel stated that 
he too "would rather . . . have [the stipulation] read" to the 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
10 
 
jury.  The circuit court then agreed with the attorneys that it 
would read the stipulation to the jury.  As the conversation 
moved to the content of the instructions, defense counsel 
remarked, "we don't really need the weight on the verdict for 
guilty, because we've already stipulated to what the weight is.  
The jury doesn't need to make a finding."  In response, the 
prosecutor told the court "[t]here is still suppose[d] to be a 
finding, Your Honor.  And the cases that I have done where we 
have a stipulation . . . all the Court does is check that for 
the jury . . . ."  After defense counsel agreed that "[t]hat 
would be fine," the circuit court said, "I would answer the 
question yes then on behalf of the jury."  The prosecutor 
assented to this plan, and, insofar as the record reflects, 
defense counsel was silent. 
¶16 The circuit court proposed that the jury be given a 
verdict form "that allows the . . . jury to find the Defendant 
guilty or not guilty of the one charge.  And then the question 
that I will answer for them regarding the weight."  The 
attorneys agreed that this was the appropriate procedure to 
follow.   
¶17 During final jury instructions, the circuit court 
stated that "[t]he District Attorney and the Attorney for Mr. 
Smith and Mr. Smith himself stipulated or agreed to the 
existence of certain facts.  And those were the facts about the 
crime lab report.  And that evidence, you must accept these 
facts as conclusively proved." 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 The circuit court concluded final jury instructions 
with the following comments: 
[T]he 
following 
two 
forms 
of 
verdicts 
will 
be 
submitted to you for your consideration concerning the 
charges against Mr. Smith.  One reading, we, the jury, 
find the Defendant, Roshawn Smith, not guilty of party 
to a crime of possession with intent to deliver THC as 
charged in the Information.  The other reading, we, 
the jury, find the Defendant, Roshawn Smith, guilty of 
party to the crime of possession with intent to 
deliver THC as charged in the Information.  If you 
find the Defendant guilty, I have answered the 
following question based on the stipulation of the 
parties.  Was the amount of THC including the weight 
of any substance or material mixed or combined with it 
more than 10,000 grams?  That is the question that you 
would normally have to answer if you found the 
Defendant guilty.  But because of the stipulation of 
the parties, I have answered it yes for you.  So, you 
don't need to answer that question.  You just need to 
decide guilty or not guilty and have your foreperson 
sign one of the two verdicts.         
¶19 Consistent with the circuit court's comments, the 
verdict form presented to the jury contained two pages: one for 
the foreperson to sign if the jury found Smith not guilty and 
one for the foreperson to sign if the jury found him guilty.  
The foreperson signed the latter.  That form read, in its 
entirety, as follows: 
We, the jury, find the defendant, Roshawn Smith, 
guilty of party to the Crime of Possession with Intent 
to Deliver THC, as charged in the Information. 
If you find the defendant, guilty, the court has 
answered 
the 
following 
question 
based 
on 
the 
[s]tipulation of the parties: 
 
Was the amount of THC including the weight of any 
other substance of material mixed or combined with it, 
more than 10,000 grams? 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
12 
 
Under that question, the circuit court typed an "X" next to 
"Yes." 
¶20 After his conviction, Smith was sentenced by the 
circuit court to a period of incarceration of eleven years, 
consisting of six years initial confinement followed by five 
years of extended supervision.   
¶21 Smith filed a motion for post-conviction relief, 
seeking vacatur of his conviction and a directed judgment of 
acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial.  In that motion, 
he argued through counsel that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction and that he was denied the right to a 
jury determination of the drug quantity.  The circuit court 
denied 
the 
motion, 
finding 
the 
evidence 
sufficient 
and 
concluding that "the colloquy, combined with the written 
[s]tipulation, was sufficient to allow [it] to conclude that the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his 
right to have the jury determine the weight of the controlled 
substance in each package."      
¶22 Smith appealed.  In an unpublished opinion, the court 
of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
conviction.  State v. Smith, No. 2010AP1192-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 26, 2011).  However, the court also 
held that Smith did not waive his right to a jury determination 
of the drug quantity.  Because the parties had not fully briefed 
the issue of the appropriate remedy, the court of appeals 
remanded the cause to the circuit court for a determination of 
the proper remedy in light of the error.  Id. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
13 
 
¶23 Both parties petitioned our court for review.  We 
granted those petitions. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 The question of whether the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain a verdict of guilt in a criminal prosecution is a 
question of law, subject to our de novo review.  State v. 
Booker, 2006 WI 79, ¶12, 292 Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 676.  When 
conducting such a review, we consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State and reverse the conviction only 
where the evidence "is so lacking in probative value and force 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt." 
 
State 
v. 
Poellinger, 
153 
Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) (citation omitted).  
Therefore, this court will uphold the conviction if there is any 
reasonable hypothesis that supports it.  State v. Blair, 164 
Wis. 2d 64, 68 n.1, 473 N.W.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1991).  Because 
there is significant dispute between the parties regarding the 
proper standard of review on the sufficiency of the evidence 
question, we will further clarify the standard in the analysis 
to follow. 
¶25 The question of whether Smith waived his right to a 
jury trial poses a constitutional issue as well as an issue of 
statutory interpretation.  Both are reviewed de novo, though we 
benefit from the analyses of the court of appeals and the 
circuit court.  State v. Lamar, 2011 WI 50, ¶24, 334 
Wis. 2d 536, 799 N.W.2d 758 (reiterating that constitutional 
issues of law are reviewed de novo); State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
14 
 
¶25, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 N.W.2d 691 (reiterating that questions 
of statutory construction are reviewed de novo). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
¶26 We first consider whether the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain Smith's conviction and hold that it was.  We next 
take up the question of whether Smith waived his right to a jury 
determination on the drug quantity and answer that he did not 
but that the error was harmless. 
A. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Smith's Conviction 
¶27 The court of appeals decided that the evidence was 
sufficient to support Smith's conviction.  We agree with that 
decision. 
1. Clarifying the Standard of Review 
¶28 Because the question of the proper standard of review 
has given rise to significant disagreement between the parties, 
we pause to clarify that question. 
a. Appellate Courts Must Defer to Reasonable Inferences Drawn 
by the Jury from the Evidence 
¶29 We understand Smith's central argument regarding the 
standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up 
in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt9 must be reversed 
                                                 
9 In defense of his proposed standard of review, Smith 
includes 
three 
full 
pages 
of 
citations 
to 
civil 
cases, 
encompassing fourteen decisions.  There are sufficient criminal 
law cases that clarify our standard of review on the evidentiary 
question that we need not draw from civil law jurisprudence.  
Indeed, we believe such a comparison would be more distracting 
and confusing than helpful.  Accordingly, we decline to address 
the standard of review that applies in civil matters. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
15 
 
on appeal if "[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the 
circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with 
guilt."  State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 452, 73 N.W.2d 585 (1955).  
That was the law once, but it no longer is. 
¶30 In 
State v. Poellinger we clarified the appropriate 
appellate framework for the review of evidentiary sufficiency 
after a jury hands down a guilty verdict.  In that case, we 
stated both unanimously and unequivocally that when "viewing 
evidence which could support contrary inferences, the trier of 
fact is free to choose among conflicting inferences of the 
evidence and may, within the bounds of reason, reject that 
inference which is consistent with the innocence of the 
accused."  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506 (emphasis altered).   
¶31 In 
Poellinger 
we 
observed 
that 
the 
court's 
jurisprudence prior to that case "often failed to maintain the 
appropriate distinction between the" jury's inquiry at trial and 
our own on appeal.  Id. at 504.  In particular, we noted that we 
had "mistakenly stated that a conviction based on circumstantial 
evidence may be sustained on appeal or review if the evidence is 
sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable theory of 
innocence" 
and 
similarly 
"mistakenly 
stated 
that 
when 
a 
conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, an appellate 
court must uphold the conviction if a reasonable trier of fact 
could be convinced that the evidence is strong enough to exclude 
to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."  
Id. at 504-05.  Poellinger corrected those errors and resolved 
that confusion, holding, we repeat, that for purposes of 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
16 
 
appellate review "the trier of fact is free to choose among 
conflicting inferences of the evidence and may, within the 
bounds of reason, reject that inference which is consistent with 
the innocence of the accused."  Id. at 506 (emphasis removed). 
¶32 Although Poellinger did not explicitly mention Hall as 
one of the sources of confusion in its prior case law, it did 
not purport to present an exhaustive list of such sources.  See 
id. at 757 n.5 ("See, e.g., . . .").  Moreover, it is apparent 
from the holding and reasoning of Poellinger that Hall did not 
survive the opinion.  For Hall required Wisconsin appellate 
courts to reverse jury verdicts of guilt if "[t]he inferences 
that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as 
consistent with innocence as with guilt."  Hall, 271 Wis. at 
452.  There is simply no way to reconcile that proposition with 
the principle enunciated in Poellinger, that "an appellate court 
must accept and follow the inference drawn by the trier of fact 
unless the evidence on which that inference is based is 
incredible as a matter of law."  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-
07.  Put simply, Hall permitted an appellate court to unsettle a 
jury verdict of guilt where a reasonable inference of guilt 
could have been rationally drawn by the jurors from the evidence 
when Poellinger forbids it.  In other words, the two cases state 
manifestly incompatible rules of law and Poellinger corrected 
the jurisprudence of which Hall was a part.  Therefore, Hall was 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
17 
 
overruled by Poellinger, it is no longer good law, and Smith may 
not rely upon it.10 
¶33 We also use this opportunity to reaffirm the soundness 
of the reasoning of Poellinger.  The rule articulated in 
Poellinger was based on the principle that it is inappropriate 
for an appellate court to "replace[] the trier of fact's overall 
evaluation of the evidence with its own."  Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d at 506.  That is a venerable principle, in this 
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 426, *434 
(1860), and every other.  See generally Shaun P. Martin, 
Rationalizing the Irrational: The Treatment of Untenable Federal 
Civil Jury Verdicts, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 683 (1995) (reviewing 
the relationship between appellate courts and juries).  The 
position staked out in Hall that a jury verdict of guilt can be 
reversed on appeal if "[t]he inferences that may be drawn from 
the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as 
with guilt," Hall, 271 Wis. at 452, contradicts this deeply 
rooted tradition of judicial deference for jury verdicts.  
Indeed, there are few legal principles more indisputable than 
                                                 
10 That Hall did not survive Poellinger is further evidenced 
by the fact that Hall has not been cited favorably by a single 
decision from any court in any jurisdiction subsequent to 
Poellinger's publication.  Poellinger, by contrast, has been 
cited favorably by appellate courts well over a thousand times, 
including hundreds of citations by the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, both published and unpublished, and several approving 
citations by our own court, including one earlier this term.  
See State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶15, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 
N.W.2d 390; State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶¶67-68, 255 
Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244.    
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
18 
 
the idea that a jury is in a far better position to evaluate the 
evidence than is a reviewing court.  See, e.g., In re Dejmal's 
Estate, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 151, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980) ("As this 
court has frequently stated, it is not our function to review 
questions 
as 
to 
weight 
of 
testimony 
and 
credibility 
of 
witnesses.  These are matters to be determined by the trier of 
fact . . . . ").  Hall and the other decisions overruled by 
Poellinger gave insufficient respect to the crucial role of the 
jury in our criminal justice system.  For they allowed an 
appellate court to disturb a jury verdict even where it was 
based on a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, simply 
because 
the 
appellate 
court 
preferred 
another 
reasonable 
inference.  Poellinger was right to correct our case law when it 
strayed from these important principles, and we reaffirm its 
correction. 
b. Viewing the Evidence Collectively 
¶34 Smith confuses the appropriate standard of review in 
another important respect.  Specifically, he criticizes the 
court of appeals for refusing to "consider pieces of evidence 
individually" and instead "view[ing] the evidence as a whole in 
order to determine whether a jury could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  In Smith's view, the court of appeals' 
determination that it is more appropriate to view the evidence 
as a whole constitutes a "novel proposition." 
¶35 Far from novel, the court of appeals' approach was in 
line with our well-settled practice.  As we explained in Hussong 
v. State, an appellate court reviews the evidence submitted at a 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
19 
 
criminal trial "as a whole, each piece of the puzzle being 
properly in place."  62 Wis. 2d 577, 587, 215 N.W.2d 390 (1974), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 
504 n.5.  It would hardly make sense to view the evidence any 
other way. 
¶36 No individual, applying his or her logic, would base 
the ultimate vote of guilt or innocence on a review that ignores 
every piece of evidence but one.  We do not, and should not, ask 
jurors to leave their common sense behind at the courthouse 
door.  See State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 648, 571 
N.W.2d 662 (1997) ("A strength of our jury system is that 
jurors . . . bring their experiences, philosophies, and common 
sense to bear in their deliberations.") (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Indeed, the jurors here were 
specifically instructed to employ their common sense.11  The 
rational juror would take into account the entire picture 
presented by the evidence in ascertaining guilt or innocence.  
Such a juror would not find any single piece of evidence 
determinative, but would rather consider the evidence in the 
aggregate.  The aggregate is, of course, composed of the 
individual pieces of evidence; nevertheless, that does not mean, 
as Smith suggests, that the juror must ignore the larger picture 
so as to focus on each piece in a vacuum and ask whether that 
                                                 
11 Quoting the pattern jury instructions, the circuit court 
told the jury, "There is no magic way for you to evaluate 
testimony.  Use your common sense and experience."  WIS JI-
CRIMINAL 50.   
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
20 
 
piece standing alone supports a finding of guilt.  That is not 
how people seek to determine the truth, whether in a jury room 
or anywhere else, and that is not how they can most reasonably 
make the grave determination as to a defendant's guilt.12  
Accordingly, we reaffirm that an appellate court must consider 
the totality of the evidence when conducting a sufficiency of 
the evidence inquiry. 
2. Application of the Sufficiency of the Evidence Test 
¶37 Applying the principles set forth above, there is no 
question that the evidence was sufficient to support Smith's 
conviction. 
¶38 To establish that Smith was culpable as a party to the 
crime, under the conspiracy prong of the statute relied upon by 
the State, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: 1) there was an agreement among two or 
                                                 
12 Smith contends that a judicial examination of the 
totality of the evidence "is fundamentally at odds" with the due 
process requirement that courts "assess the historic facts" when 
inquiring into the validity of a conviction.  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979).  It is a tautology that a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge entails a review of the 
facts: the facts for purposes of judicial review of a trial come 
in no other form than the evidence; to determine whether the 
evidence 
was 
sufficient 
therefore 
obviously 
requires 
a 
consideration of the facts.  But Jackson says nothing about how 
that assessment should take place, i.e., whether it should focus 
on each piece of evidence separately or on the entirety of the 
evidence.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
applied 
Jackson 
in 
an 
opinion 
that 
considers 
the 
facts 
collectively, without weighing each piece individually.  See 
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) (per 
curiam) (finding the evidence sufficient to support conspiracy 
guilt under the Jackson standard).      
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
21 
 
more persons to direct their conduct toward the realization of a 
criminal objective; and 2) each member of the conspiracy 
individually and consciously intended the realization of the 
particular 
criminal 
objective.13 
 
State 
v. 
Hecht, 
116 
Wis. 2d 605, 624-25, 342 N.W.2d 721 (1984) (setting forth the 
elements of party to the crime ("PTC") conspiracy).   
¶39 Testimony at trial established (in relevant part) the 
following narrative.  Smith introduced Kortbein to Thomas.  
Thomas then called Kortbein and asked her if she would be 
willing to receive packages at her home in return for $500 per 
delivery.  She agreed, and over the next few weeks received 
three shipments similar to packages that were later seized by 
law enforcement and found to contain drugs.  After each shipment 
arrived, Thomas retrieved it from Kortbein within a few days and 
Smith gave her $400 within a few more days.  During the periods 
when the packages were being delivered, Thomas, Kortbein, and 
Smith were communicating by phone in a manner that the jury 
heard from Sergeant Poteat was consistent with the "courier 
relationship."  Around the same time, Smith asked Mehlhorn to 
receive packages on his behalf, and several arrived from 
California and were picked up by Smith and Thomas.  
¶40 Smith does not argue, nor do we find a basis to 
conclude, that this testimony was "incredible as a matter of 
                                                 
13 It is important to remember that we discuss conspiracy in 
this opinion only as a subset of party to the crime culpability.  
For that reason, we will henceforth refer to the culpability as 
PTC conspiracy.  We do not analyze conspiracy as a freestanding 
offense.   
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
22 
 
law."  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-07.  Therefore, deferring 
to the jury's decision to credit this testimony, as we must, id. 
at 504, the narrative established by the State's witnesses 
provided a solid foundation from which the jury could have drawn 
an inference that Smith shared PTC conspiracy culpability for 
the drug offense.  For that narrative strongly suggested that 
Smith brought two other participants in a drug scheme together 
(Thomas and Kortbein), helped facilitate the transportation and 
receipt of the drugs by relaying payments while seeking to 
insulate himself as much as possible from potential liability, 
and 
arranged 
a 
similar 
scheme 
with 
another 
individual 
(Mehlhorn).   
¶41 From this evidence, the jury could reasonably have 
inferred that Smith was guilty as a party to the crime of 
possession with intent to deliver.  For the evidence suggested 
that Smith introduced Thomas and Kortbein and then facilitated 
the transfer of money from one to the other after Kortbein 
received the drugs and conveyed them to Thomas. Thus, the jury 
could reasonably have concluded that there was "[a]n agreement 
among two or more persons to direct their conduct toward the 
realization of a criminal objective," namely the delivery of 
marijuana.  Hecht, 116 Wis. 2d at 625. Furthermore, Smith's 
personal involvement in the acts described above——i.e., the 
introduction of Thomas to Kortbein and the delivery of the 
money——supports a rational inference that he "individually [and] 
consciously 
intend[ed] 
the 
realization 
of 
the 
particular 
criminal objective."  Id.  He thus had "an individual stake in 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
23 
 
the venture," id., and the second element of PTC conspiracy was 
satisfied.  Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find Smith guilty of being a party to the crime of 
possession with intent to deliver more than 10,000 grams of 
THC.14     
¶42 To attack the conclusion that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury verdict, Smith presents a series 
of hypotheticals: 
It is possible that Thomas already had a criminal 
scheme in mind when Smith introduced him to Kortbein, 
and it is also possible that he didn't . . . .  If 
Thomas already had a criminal scheme in mind then it 
is possible that he told Smith about it, and it is 
also possible that he didn't . . . .  It is possible 
that Smith was present with Thomas when Thomas called 
Kortbein to make his offer to her, and it is also 
possible that Smith wasn't present . . . .  If Smith 
was present when Thomas called Kortbein then it is 
possible that Smith had agreed to assist the scheme, 
and it is also possible that he was just an ambivalent 
bystander to a telephone conversation . . . .  It is 
possible that Smith had agreed to assist Thomas's 
criminal scheme, and it is also possible that Smith 
simply acquiesced in a general request by Thomas to 
deliver money to Kortbein . . . .  It is possible that 
the 
packages 
that 
had 
been 
delivered 
prior 
to 
September 20, 2006, contained marijuana or other 
unlawful contraband, and it is also possible that they 
were just "test" deliveries to ascertain Kortbein's 
trustworthiness. 
                                                 
14 We also agree with the court of appeals that the same 
evidence that substantiated Smith's PTC conspiracy guilt could 
support a reasonable determination by the jury that he was 
guilty of aiding and abetting as a party to the crime.  See 
State v. Rundle, 176 Wis. 2d 985, 990, 500 N.W.2d 916 (1993) 
(setting forth the requirements for proving aiding and abetting 
as a party to the crime).   
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
24 
 
¶43 As an initial matter, not all of these hypotheticals 
are relevant to Smith's guilt or innocence.  For instance, it is 
of no significance whether Smith "was present with Thomas when 
Thomas called Kortbein to make his offer to her."  He could just 
as easily have agreed to the scheme and not been present.  Cf. 
United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993) ("It 
is of course elementary that one may be a member of a conspiracy 
without knowing its full scope, or all its members, and without 
taking part in the full range of its activities or over the 
whole period of its existence.").   
¶44 Smith's reasoning suffers from two more serious flaws.  
First, our duty when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence 
supporting a jury verdict of guilt is not to ask what is 
"possible."  Anything, after all, is possible.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Ytem, 255 F.3d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(Posner, J.) ("Anything is possible; there are no metaphysical 
certainties 
accessible 
to 
human 
reason; 
but 
a 
merely 
metaphysical doubt (for example, doubt whether the external 
world is real, rather than being merely a dream) is not a 
reasonable doubt for purposes of the criminal law.") (emphasis 
in original) (citing, inter alia, Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 
1, 13 (1994) ("[A]bsolute certainty is unattainable in matters 
relating to human affairs.")).  Rather, our duty, consistent 
with the limitations of human knowledge and with the deference 
we owe the jury, is to decide whether "any possibility exists 
that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate 
inferences from the evidence adduced at trial."  Poellinger, 153 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
25 
 
Wis. 2d at 506.  For the reasons already stated, it is plain 
that such a possibility exists in this case. 
¶45 Relatedly, Smith's treatment of each piece of evidence 
in isolation is an apt demonstration of why appellate courts 
must reject that method.  It makes little sense to consider the 
various "possibilities" posed by Smith without taking into 
account the overall picture drawn by the witnesses.  The 
likelihood that an inference of innocence was the correct one on 
each individual piece of evidence recedes dramatically when 
those pieces are considered in juxtaposition.  That is, if the 
jury was told that Smith introduced Thomas and Kortbein, that 
Kortbein then received a shipment of drugs, and that Thomas 
retrieved them, but not told that Smith paid Kortbein $400 
shortly thereafter, it would be more plausible that Smith had no 
knowledge of the drug scheme.  But they were told about the 
payments.15  Likewise, if the jury had not heard testimony that 
Smith 
established 
a 
similar 
arrangement 
with 
Thomas 
and 
Mehlhorn, it would have been more plausible that he was 
unwittingly brought into the delivery involving Kortbein.  But 
they were told about the other arrangement.  Each piece of 
evidence gave the other pieces more context, and allowed the 
jury to more thoroughly and more accurately evaluate Smith's 
likely guilt or innocence.  That is why juries (and reviewing 
                                                 
15 Of the money that Smith gave to Kortbein, the prosecutor 
asked rhetorically during her closing argument, "Why else would 
he pay her" if not in compensation for receiving the drugs.  The 
defense never offered to the jury an alternative reason.  
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
26 
 
courts) consider the evidence in its totality, and that is why 
the evidence was sufficient to support Smith's conviction.16 
B. Smith Did Not Waive his Right to a Jury Determination of 
the Drug Quantity but the Error Was Harmless  
¶46 Turning to the next issue, we first consider whether 
Smith had a right to a jury determination of the quantity of 
drugs involved and conclude that he did.  We then consider 
whether he waived that right and conclude that he did not, but 
further conclude that the error was harmless. 
1. Smith Had a Constitutional Right to a Jury Determination of 
the Drug Quantity Involved in His Offense   
¶47 Both parties agree that Smith had a right to a jury 
determination of the drug quantity involved in his offense and 
the court of appeals so held.  We agree as well.   
¶48 The federal and state constitutions both protect a 
criminal defendant's right to a jury trial.  U.S. Const. amend. 
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right 
to 
a 
speedy 
and 
public 
trial, 
by 
an 
impartial 
                                                 
16 Smith 
makes 
much 
of 
the 
purported 
ambiguities 
in 
Mehlhorn's statement at trial that Smith acknowledged to him 
that he had been involved in "a marijuana thing with a girl" but 
was not worried about it "[b]ecause it was his word against 
hers."  As our discussion above indicates, we believe there was 
ample evidence to sustain Smith's conviction without that 
testimony.  Nevertheless, we note that while "it was possible" 
that Smith's alleged statements did not represent an admission 
of complicity in the criminal enterprise (but rather, as Smith 
essentially contends, a reference to the prosecution itself), 
the jury was entitled to draw a reasonable inference to the 
contrary, especially given the numerous other pieces of evidence 
that weighed far more strongly toward a finding of guilt. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
27 
 
jury . . . ."); Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 ("In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury . . . ."). 
¶49 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme 
Court set forth the seminal holding that the right to a criminal 
jury trial enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  530 U.S. 466, 490 
(2000).  The Apprendi court also explained that such an analysis 
is properly focused not on the sentence that is actually handed 
down, but on the punishment that becomes available as a result 
of the fact in question.  See id. ("It is unconstitutional for a 
legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal 
defendant is exposed.") (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see also United States 
v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010) (quoting 
cited language from Apprendi with approval). 
¶50 Applying Apprendi to the instant case, it is plain 
that Smith had a constitutional right to a jury determination of 
the drug quantity involved in his offense.  For if Smith were 
found guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, 
but there was no evidence as to amount, the highest sentence he 
could have received would have been three and a half years.  
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1. (stating that possession of two 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
28 
 
hundred grams or less of THC (the lowest amount mentioned in the 
statute) 
with 
intent to deliver is a Class I felony); 
§ 939.50(3)(i) (stating that the commission of a Class I felony 
is punishably by "imprisonment not to exceed 3 years and 6 
months").  Because he was found guilty of possession of more 
than 10,000 grams of THC with intent to deliver, however, Smith 
was 
subject 
to 
incarceration 
for 
up 
to 
15 
years.  
§ 961.41(1m)(h)5. (stating that possession of more than 10,000 
grams of THC with intent to deliver is a Class E felony); 
§ 939.50(3)(e) (stating that the commission of a Class E felony 
is punishable by "imprisonment not to exceed 15 years.").   
¶51 Therefore, the fact in question (whether more than 
10,000 grams of THC was involved in the offense) exposed Smith 
to a higher penalty.  Consequently, he had a constitutional 
right to a jury determination of the amount. 
2. Smith Did Not Waive his Right to a Jury Determination of 
the Drug Quantity 
¶52 The parties and the court of appeals also agree that 
Smith did not waive his right to a jury determination of the 
drug quantity.  We concur. 
¶53 As 
we 
have 
noted, 
Smith's 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
determination of the drug quantity involved in his offense was 
protected 
by 
the 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a 
criminal defendant's right to a jury trial.  The right to a 
criminal jury trial is in that class of rights considered "so 
fundamental that they are deemed to be personal rights which 
must be waived personally by the defendant."  State v. Gordon, 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
29 
 
2003 WI 69, ¶49, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765; State v. 
Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991) ("[A]ny 
waiver of the defendant's right to trial by jury must be made by 
an affirmative act of the defendant himself.  The defendant must 
act personally; he and only he has the power and authority to 
waive his right to a jury trial . . . .") (emphasis added).  As 
such, it would be error for the circuit court to have answered 
the question of drug quantity unless Smith waived his right to a 
jury determination of that question.  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 
569. 
¶54 For a defendant's action to qualify as a valid waiver 
of a constitutional right, he must waive the right knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily, with "sufficient awareness of 
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."  Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).  A judicial inquiry 
into whether a valid waiver occurred "must depend upon the 
unique circumstances of each case."  Adams v. United States ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942).  Nevertheless, the valid 
waiver of a constitutional right can never occur where the 
defendant is unaware of the right at issue.  See, e.g., State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶29, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 ("[F]or 
a plea to function as a valid waiver of constitutional rights, 
the plea must be an intentional relinquishment of known 
rights.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  As a result, for 
the State to prove that the valid waiver of a constitutional 
right occurred it would have to demonstrate that Smith knew of 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
30 
 
his constitutional right to a jury determination of the drug 
quantity.  See id.        
¶55 The State does not purport to make such a showing.  It 
declines to do so for good reason.  Of the three exchanges that 
took place between the circuit court and Smith regarding his 
stipulation to the drug quantity, none suggest that he was 
informed 
that 
he 
had a constitutional right to a jury 
determination of the drug quantity, let alone that he was 
waiving such a right.  Indeed, none of the exchanges even 
mention the jury.  Rather, to the extent that the stipulation 
and its consequences were explained to Smith at all, they were 
explained only with reference to the fact that the crime lab 
technician who measured the quantity of THC would not be 
testifying.  Nothing was said about a right to have the jury 
determine the drug quantity.  Even the prosecutor stated that 
she "had originally requested that that stipulation be read to 
the jury," not that the circuit court answer the quantity 
question itself.   
¶56 Because the circuit court failed to inform Smith that 
he had a right to a jury determination of the drug quantity, and 
failed to ask him if he intended to waive that right, the only 
reason for us to conclude that he nevertheless waived it would 
be if his stipulation were somehow equivalent to a waiver.  
However, 
such 
a 
conclusion 
would 
ignore 
an 
important 
distinction.  The right to a criminal jury trial is a crucial 
constitutional right with deep roots in our history and our 
legal philosophy as a society.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
31 
 
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is 
fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . ."); Albert 
W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal 
Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 871 (1994) 
("The framers' enthusiastic support for the jury stemmed in 
large measure from the role that juries had played in resisting 
English authority before the Revolution.").  By contrast, a 
stipulation is simply a matter of convenience and litigation 
strategy, entered into to avoid the time, expense, and potential 
prejudice of introducing unnecessary and possibly prejudicial 
evidence.17  Compare United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 
(11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that defense counsel is 
ordinarily permitted to make decisions regarding trial strategy, 
including "what stipulations should be made") with Livingston, 
159 Wis. 2d at 569 ("[A]ny waiver of the defendant's right to 
trial by jury must be made by an affirmative act of the 
defendant himself.  The defendant must act personally; he and 
only he has the power and authority to waive his right to a jury 
trial . . . .") (emphasis added).   
¶57 It is therefore a far different thing for a defendant 
to stipulate to a fact than it is for him to waive his 
constitutional right to a jury determination of that fact.  
Smith did the former but not the latter.  He was never informed 
                                                 
17 The decision to stipulate in Smith's case was clearly 
made to avoid potential prejudice.  As defense counsel remarked 
to the circuit court, there was a concern that the sight of such 
a large quantity of drugs would "arouse the jury's sense 
of . . . horror or . . . provoke its . . . instinct to punish." 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
32 
 
that he had a constitutional right to a jury determination of 
the drug quantity, nor was he ever given the opportunity to 
waive or invoke that right.  Accordingly, we hold that Smith did 
not waive his constitutional right to a jury determination of 
the drug quantity.  As a result, it was error for the circuit 
court to answer the question of quantity for the jury. 
3. The Error Was Harmless 
¶58 Unlike the preceding two questions, the parties 
diverge on the issue of the appropriate remedy to correct the 
error they agree occurred at the circuit court.  Smith contends 
that he is entitled to a new trial, arguing that "[i]n the 
absence of a valid waiver, the remedy of a new trial is 
applicable no matter how overwhelming the evidence . . . because 
the wrong fact-finding entity has adjudicated the defendant's 
guilt."  The State responds that we should apply a harmless 
error test, and that under such a test the conviction should be 
reinstated because "[t]he weight element was uncontroverted and 
by virtue of the stipulation, it was supported by overwhelming 
evidence."  We agree with the State that a harmless error 
analysis is required by our well-reasoned case law and that of 
the United States Supreme Court, and we agree that the error 
here was harmless. 
a. Constitutional Analysis   
¶59 To refute the appropriateness of a harmless error 
analysis, Smith relies heavily upon State v. Villarreal, 153 
Wis. 2d 323, 450 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1989).  It is true that 
Villarreal held that a harmless error analysis is inappropriate 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
33 
 
when a court erroneously decides a fact that should have been 
submitted to the jury.  But that proposition has been renounced 
by subsequent decisions of the United States and Wisconsin 
Supreme Courts. 
¶60 The legal landscape concerning this issue is now 
shaped by Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  In that 
case, a federal district court erroneously told a jury that to 
convict Neder of various fraud offenses it was not required to 
consider the materiality of any allegedly false statements, 
because materiality was "not a question for the jury to decide."  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 6.  The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, 
concluding that the error was harmless.  Id. at 25.  Relying on 
the proposition that where a defendant "was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any 
other constitutional errors that may have occurred are subject 
to harmless-error analysis," the Neder court held that an 
element erroneously omitted from the jury instructions does not 
"affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds" or 
"render a trial fundamentally unfair."  Id. at 8 (citations, 
internal quotation marks, and brackets removed). 
¶61 We adopted Neder's approach in State v. Harvey, 2002 
WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  Noting that Wisconsin's 
"statutory harmless error rule18 . . . is almost identical to the 
                                                 
18 In Wisconsin, the harmless error rule is codified in Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18, which provides: 
(1) 
The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
34 
 
federal rule," we held in Harvey that harmless error analysis 
applies where a court erroneously takes judicial notice of a 
fact that should have been submitted to the jury.  Id., ¶39.   
¶62 While neither Neder nor Harvey is on all-fours with 
the instant case, insofar as neither involved stipulations, 
their rationales nevertheless control the outcome here.  For 
both involved a judicial determination of a fact that the jury 
was constitutionally required to find.  And both held that an 
appellate court reviews such cases for harmless error.  Here too 
a court answered a question that, under the Sixth Amendment, 
should have gone to the jury.  Accordingly, we are bound by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
proceedings 
which 
shall 
not 
affect 
the 
substantial rights of the adverse party. 
(2) 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any trial or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, 
or the improper admission of evidence, or for 
error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, 
unless in the opinion of the court to which the 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that 
the 
error 
complained 
of 
has 
affected 
the 
substantial rights of the party seeking to 
reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a 
new trial. 
(3) 
 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
35 
 
precedent of our own prior decisions and those of the United 
States Supreme Court to apply a harmless error analysis.19 
¶63 As with the previous question regarding whether an 
error occurred, it is useful to reiterate the persuasive 
reasoning underlying the case law that we are duty-bound to 
apply.  That reasoning is, simply put, that an error does not 
"affect the framework within which the trial proceeds" or 
"render a trial fundamentally unfair" where "an impartial 
adjudicator," i.e., a judge, finds a fact rather than an 
alternative impartial adjudicator, i.e., a jury.  Neder, 527 
U.S. at 8 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets 
                                                 
19 Our 
conclusion 
that 
Neder 
and 
Harvey 
effectively 
overruled Villarreal is bolstered by the fact that Harvey 
explicitly overruled State v. Leist, 141 Wis. 2d 34, 414 
N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1987), a case relied upon by Villarreal for 
the very issue under consideration.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶35 n.10, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (overruling Leist 
in part); State v. Villarreal, 153 Wis. 2d 323, 331, 450 
N.W.2d 519 (relying on Leist).  We note that Villarreal is 
overruled only with respect to its holding that a harmless error 
analysis is inappropriate when a court erroneously finds a fact 
that should have been found by the jury.  It remains good law 
with respect to its unrelated holdings.  See Blum v. 1st Auto & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶42, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78 
("hold[ing] that when the supreme court overrules a court of 
appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer 
possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly 
states otherwise").  The State argues that State v. Livingston, 
159 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991) and State v. Hauk, 
2002 WI App 226, ¶32, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393 must be 
overruled.  However, those cases involved different factual 
circumstances than those at issue here.  We therefore decline to 
address them.  See Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case, 162 
Wis. 2d 684, 696, 470 N.W.2d 290 (1991) (reiterating that the 
court resolves the facts before it, and does not issue advisory 
opinions or address hypothetical facts).       
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
36 
 
removed).  Indeed, that reasoning is even more powerful where, 
as here, the defendant actually stipulates to the fact in 
question.  For in such a case, as we shall see below when we 
apply the harmless error analysis, it can be said with even more 
assurance that the defendant, who agrees to the very fact at 
issue, received a fundamentally fair trial and that the outcome 
would have been the same absent the error.  Simply put, a 
defendant who agrees to a fact cannot be heard to later complain 
that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when that fact 
was found, merely because the wrong neutral adjudicator found 
it.20 
b. Statutory Analysis 
¶64 Perhaps in recognition of the force and clarity of 
Neder and Harvey's constitutional jurisprudence, Smith devotes 
considerable energy to an additional or alternative statutory 
argument.  He contends that the legislature's codification of a 
jury trial waiver procedure compels us to grant him a new trial, 
even if the United States and Wisconsin constitutions do not.  
We see no such mandate in the statute, and think it unwise to 
sever 
our 
state's 
criminal 
procedure 
from 
well-reasoned 
                                                 
20 The dissent suggests that it is inconsistent of us to 
conclude both that Smith had a constitutional right to a jury 
determination of the drug quantity, and that the jury's failure 
to find that quantity was harmless error.  Dissent, ¶77 
("[A]fter setting forth its soaring language [affirming Smith's 
constitutional right], the majority does an about face" in 
finding the error harmless).  If it were inconsistent to affirm 
a constitutional right and then find a failure to observe it 
harmless, however, the harmless error test would be meaningless.    
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
37 
 
constitutional jurisprudence on the basis of legislation that 
does not require us to do so. 
¶65 Smith's statutory argument revolves around Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.02(1), which provides that "criminal cases shall be tried 
by a jury . . . unless the defendant waives a jury in writing or 
by statement in open court . . . on the record, with the 
approval of the court and the consent of the state."  As Smith 
reads it, this provision represents a legislative decision to 
extend greater protections to Wisconsin citizens than those 
afforded by the state and federal constitutions.  To his mind, 
§ 972.02(1) means that there is no remedy short of retrial for 
an error such as the one that occurred here.  We disagree. 
¶66 Beginning with the plain language of the statute, as 
we must, State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, we see nothing 
in Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) that speaks to remedy at all.  Smith 
emphasizes the "shall" in the statute, but that term provides no 
guidance on how a court should proceed if the statutory 
requirement is not satisfied.  Indeed, the constitutional 
protections of criminal jury rights include the same word.  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury . . . .") (emphasis added); Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to 
a 
speedy 
public 
trial 
by 
an 
impartial 
jury . . . .") 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Given 
that 
these 
constitutional provisions contain highly similar language to 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
38 
 
§ 972.02(1), including the very word that supposedly requires 
retrial, it would be incongruous for us to ignore the binding 
and persuasive reasoning in Neder and Harvey simply because a 
statute, rather than a constitutional provision, is at issue.  
Such a result would also create disruptive conflict and 
confusion in the criminal justice system whereby radically 
different remedies become available depending on whether a 
defendant relies upon a statutory or constitutional provision, 
despite the fact that they say nothing different with respect to 
remedy. 
¶67 Lastly, the same factors that led us to conclude that 
harmless error analysis was appropriate in the constitutional 
context carry the same weight in the statutory context.  
Regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment or Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.02(1) are at issue, the fact remains that it makes no 
sense to order a new trial or reduce a sentence when a defendant 
is 
convicted 
and 
sentenced 
by 
a 
neutral 
adjudicator 
in 
accordance with a fact he admits in open court, simply because 
the fact is formally "found" by the wrong neutral adjudicator.         
¶68 Because we are bound by the sound and well-reasoned 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Neder and our own 
court in Harvey, and because we decline to sever our statutory 
protection for jury trials from the constitutional provisions 
upon which it is based, we conclude that the circuit court's 
determination of the drug quantity involved in Smith's offense, 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
39 
 
a fact which should have been submitted to the jury, is subject 
to harmless error review.21 
c. Application of the Harmless Error Test 
¶69 With these principles in mind, there can be no doubt 
that the error in Smith's trial was harmless.  The Constitution 
and Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) require the same harmless error 
showing: that it be "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
properly 
instructed, 
rational 
jury 
would 
have 
found 
the 
defendant guilty of the . . . [charged] offense."  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶48.  The State easily satisfies that test here.  
¶70 To this day, Smith has never disputed that more than 
10,000 grams of THC were found in the packages seized from 
Kortbein.  Quite to the contrary, he expressly admitted in the 
circuit court no fewer than four times that those packages 
contained THC in an amount greater than 10,000 grams, and the 
jury was informed of that admission.  As a result, "it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational 
jury would have found [Smith] guilty of the . . . [charged] 
offense," "the error [therefore] cannot have contributed to the 
verdict," and it was consequently harmless.  Harvey, 254 
                                                 
21 One alternative to finding harmless error discussed by 
the parties and the court of appeals is a remand with 
instructions to the circuit court that Smith's sentence be 
reduced to the lowest sentence permitted by the statute. 
Villarreal is the only published decision in Wisconsin that 
found such a remedy appropriate in circumstances similar to 
these.  Villarreal, 153 Wis. 2d at 332.  Its holding in that 
regard was premised on a refusal to apply harmless error 
analysis and is therefore inapplicable here, given that we are 
compelled by precedent to conduct a harmless error analysis.  
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
40 
 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶48; see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 18 (holding that 
an error is harmless if it "did not contribute to the verdict," 
requiring a court to conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error"). 
¶71 The dissent draws an interesting distinction between 
facts that are "undisputed" and those that are "indisputable," 
reasoning that Neder and Harvey involved the latter and this 
case the former.  Dissent, ¶¶91-95.  Though we acknowledge the 
creativity of the distinction, we fail to see any authority to 
support its legal significance.  Nor do we understand why the 
distinction should make a difference.  Indeed, in making its 
case for the distinction, the dissent explicitly deemphasizes 
the facts of the case at bar.  Id., ¶95 ("Although Smith opted 
not to dispute this fact, his stipulation does not transform the 
nature of the fact from one that can be subject to reasonable 
dispute into one that is indisputable.").   We wonder who 
exactly the dissent imagines disputing the weight of the drugs, 
given that Smith himself, both attorneys, the judge, and the 
chemist agreed on it, and that no one to this day has challenged 
it.  The dissent appears to focus on the possibility that other 
defendants in other cases will dispute such facts.  Id. ("[T]his 
elemental fact [of the drug quantity] is the type of fact that 
is often disputed by defendants and could have been disputed in 
this case by Smith.") (emphasis added).  No doubt other 
defendants do often dispute such facts, and no doubt Smith could 
have done so.  But we are not dealing here with other 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
41 
 
defendants, we are dealing with Smith, and he elected not to 
dispute the drug quantity.  The dissent proves too much.  The 
very fact that another defendant might dispute the weight of the 
drugs in a similar case is what distinguishes such a case from 
Smith's.  Smith did not dispute the weight of the drugs; he 
stipulated to the weight and acknowledged it repeatedly in open 
court.     
¶72 The theoretical and pragmatic unworkability of the 
dissent's analysis is aptly illustrated by the fact that even 
where a defendant enters into a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his right to the jury's determination of a 
given fact, as the dissent insists was required here, the fact 
is still "disputable" in the same sense the dissent applies to 
the drug quantity here, i.e., someone else, in another case, 
might dispute a similar fact.  Surely there is no error there, 
though the dissent's approach implies there is. 
¶73 Finally, 
even 
accepting 
the 
unprecedented 
"undisputed/indisputable" distinction drawn by the dissent, we 
question whether it meaningfully separates Neder and Harvey from 
this case.  With respect to Neder and Harvey, the dissent's 
belief 
that 
the 
facts 
at 
issue 
in 
those 
cases 
were 
"indisputable" centers on the specific facts of those cases: 
respectively, whether Penn Park was a city park and whether the 
failure to report $5 million in income was material to a charge 
of tax fraud.  Id., ¶¶92-94.  With respect to the instant case, 
however, the dissent's analysis is focused on drug quantity in 
other cases. Id., ¶95 (remarking that drug quantity "is the type 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
42 
 
of fact that is often disputed by defendants . . . .") (emphasis 
added).  But if the question is whether the specific fact at 
issue in a case is "indisputable," e.g., Penn Park being a city 
park, then should not the question here be whether the specific 
fact 
of 
the 
drug 
quantity involved in Smith's case is 
"indisputable"?  And, if that is the question, on what grounds 
would it not be so regarded, given that no one involved in the 
case has ever disputed it?  Conversely, if the question is 
whether the type of fact at issue in a case is "indisputable," 
e.g., drug quantity in general, then should not the question in 
Neder and Harvey have been whether other defendants, in other 
cases, might challenge the status of a park or the materiality 
of a failure to report income to a charge of tax fraud?  And, if 
that is the question, how can we assume that criminal defense 
attorneys and their clients, as thorough and creative as they 
often are, will not raise such challenges?  We can think of no 
principled 
basis 
for 
the 
discrepancy 
in 
the 
dissent's 
application of its self-made test, other than that it supports 
one result here and another in Neder and Harvey. 
¶74 In 
sum, 
we 
respectfully 
decline 
the 
dissent's 
invitation to base our holding on willful blindness to the one 
fact——Smith's acknowledgment of the drug quantity——upon which 
the entire case turns. 
¶75 Because the error was harmless, we reverse the court 
of appeals and reinstate Smith's guilty verdict and judgment of 
conviction. 
No. 
2010AP1192-CR   
 
43 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION  
¶76 Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether 
the 
evidence 
was 
sufficient 
to 
support 
Smith's 
conviction; and 2) whether Smith waived his right to a jury 
determination on the quantity of the drugs.  Because a 
reasonable inference of Smith's guilt could have been drawn by 
the jury from the evidence presented at trial, viewed in its 
entirety, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the conviction and agree with the court of appeals' decision in 
that regard.  Second, while we determine that Smith had a 
constitutional right to a jury determination of the drug 
quantity, and although the circuit court determined that 
question without eliciting from Smith a proper waiver of that 
right, we conclude the error was harmless because it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational 
jury would have found Smith guilty of the charged offense absent 
the error.  The court of appeals therefore erred in remanding 
the cause to the circuit court.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and reinstate the guilty verdict and judgment 
of conviction.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶77 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting). The majority 
opinion contains strong language heralding the constitutional 
right to a trial by jury.  Yet, after setting forth its soaring 
language, the majority does an about face. 
¶78 It explains that it matters not whether Smith actually 
knew that he had a right to have a jury determine the fact of 
drug quantity.  And, it matters not whether that fact was found 
by a judge or jury.  According to the majority, it is no big 
deal because although the judge erred by violating Smith's 
constitutional right to a trial by jury, the error is harmless.   
¶79 I disagree with the majority's application of the 
harmless error doctrine here because it extends that doctrine 
beyond the limited circumstances in the cases it cites and 
further erodes the vitality of the constitutional right to a 
trial by jury.  Instead, I would remand to the circuit court for 
a determination of whether Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury determination of all 
elements of the crime.  Accordingly, although I agree with the 
majority's 
determination regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶80 The majority recognizes that Smith had a right to a 
jury determination of each and every fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum.  Majority op., 
¶¶50-51.  It agrees with the parties that the circuit court 
erred by directing an answer to the question of the weight of 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
the marijuana without securing Smith's knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of a jury determination of that fact.  Id., 
¶¶53, 55.  It acknowledges that it is "a far different thing for 
a defendant to stipulate to a fact than it is for him to waive 
his constitutional right to a jury determination of that fact."  
Id., ¶57. 
¶81 Nevertheless, relying on State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, and Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999), the majority asserts that "a harmless error 
analysis is required by our well-reasoned case law and that of 
the United States Supreme Court."  Majority op., ¶58.  Although 
the majority acknowledges that neither Harvey nor Neder involved 
a stipulation, it concludes that "their rationales nevertheless 
control the outcome here."  Id., ¶62.  It contends: "Simply put, 
a defendant who agrees to a fact cannot be heard to later 
complain that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when 
that 
fact 
was 
found, 
merely 
because 
the 
wrong 
neutral 
adjudicator found it."  Id. ¶63.     
¶82 The 
majority 
refrains 
from 
overruling 
State 
v. 
Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991), and State v. 
Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, cases in 
which the court concluded that a harmless error analysis was 
inapplicable when the circuit court failed to secure the 
defendant's personal waiver of the right to a jury trial.  
Without further explanation, the majority concludes that "those 
cases involved different factual circumstances from those at 
issue here."  Majority op., ¶62 n.19.   
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
II 
¶83 The right to a jury trial is enshrined in two places 
in the United States Constitution.  U.S. Const.  art. III, § 2 
("the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be 
by Jury"); U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury").  After the American 
Revolution, Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[t]he friends and 
adversaries of the plan of the [Constitutional] convention, if 
they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they 
set upon the trial by jury[.]"  The Federalist No. 83, p. 426 
(M. Beloff ed. 1987). 
¶84 The 
majority 
opinion 
contains 
strong 
language 
heralding the right to a jury trial.  It asserts that the right 
to a criminal jury trial is "fundamental," and that it can be 
waived only if the defendant has "sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences."  Id., ¶¶53-54.  
The majority proclaims that no valid waiver could occur if the 
defendant were unaware that he had a right to a jury 
determination of every elemental fact.  Id., ¶54.   
¶85 After setting forth this soaring language, however, 
the majority does an about face.  It explains that it matters 
not whether Smith actually knew that he had a right to a jury 
determination of drug quantity because "an error does not affect 
the framework within which the trial proceeds . . . where an 
impartial adjudicator, i.e., a judge, finds a fact rather than 
an alternative impartial adjudicator, i.e., a jury."  Id., ¶63.  
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
"Simply put," the majority asserts, "a defendant who agrees to a 
fact cannot be heard to later complain that his trial was 
rendered fundamentally unfair when that fact was found, merely 
because the wrong neutral adjudicator found it."  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
¶86 This explanation evinces a lack of appreciation of the 
reason underlying the right to a trial of one's peers.  The 
identity of the fact finder is no trifling matter.    
¶87 The point of the right to a jury trial is that the 
identity of the "neutral adjudicator" is important.  Our system 
gives the guilt determination to a jury because, "absent 
voluntary waiver of the jury right, the Constitution does not 
trust judges to make determinations of criminal guilt."  Neder, 
527 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
Further, if the majority's explanation were extended to its 
logical conclusion, the harmless error doctrine could eviscerate 
the requirement that waivers of the constitutional right to a 
jury trial be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.            
III 
¶88 Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that we are 
compelled by Harvey and Neder to apply a harmless error analysis 
in this case.  The majority's application of the harmless error 
doctrine 
here 
extends 
that 
doctrine 
beyond 
the 
limited 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
circumstances in those cases and further erodes the vitality of 
the constitutional right to a trial by jury.1    
¶89 In Harvey, the defendant was charged with selling 
narcotics within 1,000 feet of a city park.  254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶2.  One of the elements of the charged offense was that the 
park in question, Penn Park, was a state, county, city, village, 
or town park.  The circuit court took judicial notice of the 
fact that Penn Park was a city park, and it directed the jury to 
accept that fact as true.  Id., ¶3.  On review, this court 
applied a harmless error analysis, reasoning that "[t]he 
elemental fact on which the jury was improperly instructed is 
undisputed and indisputable: Penn Park is a city park, and no 
one says otherwise."  Id., ¶48.     
¶90 In Neder, the defendant was charged with tax fraud 
when he failed to report nearly $5 million in income which was 
obtained from a fraudulent real estate scheme.  527 U.S. at 6.  
The elements of the statute were that Neder made false 
statements to the IRS and that the false statements were 
material.  The jury found that Neder knowingly and falsely 
reported his income, and the district court determined that 
Neder's false statement was material.  Id.    
                                                 
1 Additionally, I note that the test for harmless error has 
been stated in at least two ways by this court.  In State v. 
Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, ¶35, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76, 
the court stated the test as follows: "whether it appears beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."  By contrast, in State v. 
Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶26, 259 Wis. 2d 484, 657 N.W.2d 374, the 
court stated the following test: "an error is harmless if it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty absent the error."     
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
 
¶91  In both Harvey and Neder, the facts that were taken 
from the jury without a valid waiver were not only undisputed;  
the nature of the facts at issue in Harvey and Neder made them 
indisputable.     
¶92 In Harvey, the court took judicial notice of the fact 
that Penn Park was a city park.  A court may take judicial 
notice of a fact only if it is "not subject to reasonable 
dispute."  See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2) ("Kinds of facts.  A 
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute . . . .")  A fact may be indisputable if it is "capable 
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy 
cannot 
reasonably 
be 
questioned." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 902.01(2)(b).2     
¶93 The kind of fact at issue in Neder was likewise 
indisputable because there can be no reasonable dispute that the 
failure to report $5 million in income is "material" to a charge 
of tax fraud.  The tax fraud statute prohibited the filing of 
any return that the taxpayer "[did] not believe to be true and 
correct as to every material matter," 527 U.S. at 16, and 
"material 
matter" 
was 
construed 
to 
mean 
any 
information 
necessary for a determination of tax liability.   
¶94 The fact of materiality was not a fact that was 
susceptible to formal proof, but rather, it was implicit in the 
                                                 
2 The fact that Penn Park was a city park could be verified 
by consulting publications of the City of Madison Parks 
Division.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶48 n.13, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
finding that Neder had falsified his income.  Once the jury 
found that Neder falsely reported his total income, the fact of 
materiality followed, ipso facto, from the fact the jury did 
find.         
¶95 By contrast, the elemental fact at issue in this case, 
the weight of the marijuana, is not the kind of fact that can be 
determined by judicial notice.  Further, it does not follow, 
ipso facto, from any of the facts that the jury did find.  
Instead, this elemental fact is the type of fact that is often 
disputed by defendants and could have been disputed in this case 
by Smith.  Although Smith opted not to dispute this fact, his 
stipulation does not transform the nature of the fact from one 
that can be subject to reasonable dispute into one that is 
indisputable. 
¶96 The majority contends that the distinction I make 
between undisputed facts and indisputable facts is unworkable.  
Majority op., ¶¶72-73.  However, contrary to the majority, this 
distinction can be found aplenty, especially in regard to 
judicial notice jurisprudence.  The long history and substantive 
case law interpreting and applying the rule of judicial notice 
reveal that this distinction has been employed by courts for 
many years.  See e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 
Harvard L. Rev. 269 (1944).     
¶97 Because the majority fails to understand the important 
distinction between a fact that is undisputed and a fact that is 
indisputable, see majority op., ¶71, it forges a new inroad on 
the right to a trial by jury.  It permits a judge to find a fact 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
in the jury's stead without first securing a knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury determination——
even though the facts found by the judge could be subject to 
dispute.3  
¶98 Rather than further eroding the right to trial by 
jury, the majority should take this opportunity to limit the 
erosion of the jury trial right.  As Blackstone explained, 
"though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase 
and spread to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the 
most momentous concern."  William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 
*350.  The majority should pay heed to the warning issued by 
Blackstone and repeated by Justice Scalia: "However convenient 
intrusions on the jury right may appear at first," it should be 
remembered "that delays and little inconveniences in the forms 
of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for 
their liberty in more substantial matters."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 
40-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackstone, supra).   
                                                 
  
3 According to the majority, my analysis implies that there 
would 
be 
a 
harmful 
error 
if 
Smith 
entered 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury 
determination of the weight of the marijuana.  Majority op., 
¶72.  To the contrary, had Smith validly waived this right, 
there would be no error at all, and his conviction would stand. 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶99 I would not expand the harmless error doctrine beyond 
the limited circumstances at issue in Harvey and Neder.4  Under 
Harvey and Neder, a harmless error analysis can be employed in 
circumstances where a trial court erroneously found a single 
indisputable 
element 
of 
the 
crime 
without 
obtaining 
the 
defendant's personal waiver.     
IV 
¶100 Here, 
Smith 
personally 
stipulated 
to 
the 
facts 
necessary to prove the weight of the marijuana.  However, he did 
not personally waive his right to a jury determination of this 
fact.  As the majority contends, a knowing waiver of a jury 
determination of an element must be personal and must be on the 
record.  I would remand this case to the circuit court for a 
determination of whether Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived the right to a jury determination of the 
weight of the marijuana.   
¶101 At first glance, this remedy appears to be at odds 
with Livingston and Hauk, cases the majority asserts it need not 
overrule.  In Livingston, the circuit court conducted a bench 
                                                 
4 As an additional limitation, I note that the Harvey and 
Neder cases both involve a situation where the trial court erred 
by removing just one element from the jury's consideration.  The 
Neder Court explained: "We have often applied harmless-error 
analysis to cases involving improper instructions on a single 
element of the offense."  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 
(1999).  In his dissent to the Neder decision, Justice Scalia 
wrote that under the Court's reasoning, "We know that all 
elements cannot be taken from the jury, and that one can."  He 
asked, "How many is too many[?]"   Without some limitation on 
the number of elements that can be taken from the jury, the 
harmless error doctrine could nullify the jury trial right.   
Id. at 33 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
trial without securing the defendant's personal, on-the-record 
jury waiver.  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 565.  Relying on the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1),5 this court concluded that it 
could not conduct a harmless error inquiry and that it would be 
inappropriate to remand for an assessment of whether Livingston 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to a 
jury trial.  Id. at 573.  Rather, the Livingston court asserted, 
the only remedy under the statute was a new trial.  Id.; see 
also Hauk, 257 Wis. 2d 579, ¶37.      
¶102 The court's rationale in Livingston was based on a 
difference between constitutional guarantee of a jury trial and 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), which provides a 
procedure for waiving that right.  Here, the majority's analysis 
casts doubt on Livingston's continued vitality.  Although it 
contends in a footnote that Livingston need not be overruled, it 
undercuts the holding of that case by concluding that a 
violation of the statutory procedure does not necessarily 
require a new trial.  Majority op., ¶62 n.19.  If Livingston's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) is no longer good law, 
a remand for an evidentiary hearing is an available remedy. 
¶103 In this case, we cannot determine from the record 
whether Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 
his right to a jury determination of the stipulated elements.  
                                                 
5 "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal 
cases shall be tried by a jury . . . unless the defendant waives 
a jury in writing or by statement in open court or under s. 
967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the state."  Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1). 
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
Id., ¶57.  There are certain parallels between this situation 
and the situation at issue in a Bangert case, where we cannot 
tell 
from 
the 
record 
whether 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to a jury 
determination of guilt when entering a guilty plea.  See State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  If the court 
cannot determine from a plea colloquy whether the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to a 
jury determination of guilt, it is appropriate to remand for a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing.  See id.    
¶104 Under 
this 
circumstance, 
I 
would 
remand 
for 
a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, the circuit 
court would assess whether Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury determination of all 
elements of the crime.     
¶105 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.   
¶106 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
   
No.  2010AP1192-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1