Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1858.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1858 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. VIVO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo, Slip Opinion No.  
2019-Ohio-1858.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failing to provide competent representation and to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter—Consent-to-discipline 
agreement—Six-month suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(2018-1440—Submitted January 9, 2019—Decided May 21, 2019.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2018-024. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, James S. Vivo, of Youngstown, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071891, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2000. 
{¶ 2} On December 6, 2012, we suspended Vivo for one year, with the 
entire suspension stayed on conditions, for his incompetence and neglect in relation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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to his handling of a client matter and his failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 
investigation of his misconduct.  Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo, 135 Ohio St.3d 
82, 2012-Ohio-5682, 984 N.E.2d 1010. 
{¶ 3} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct 
on May 4, 2018, relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, charged Vivo with 
professional misconduct arising from his providing incompetent representation to 
a client and his failing to reasonably communicate with the client.  A panel of the 
board considered the cause on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(16). 
{¶ 4} The parties stipulated that in early 2013, Nancy Casanta retained Vivo 
to represent her in bankruptcy proceedings and agreed to pay him $600, in addition 
to the filing fee of $306.  On April 28, 2013, Vivo filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition for Casanta.  In June 2013, at a meeting of creditors, Casanta disclosed for 
the first time to Vivo and the creditors that she had received a large signing bonus 
for an oil and gas lease in February 2012 and had gifted various amounts to her 
family members.  Based on Casanta’s disclosure of this new information, the trustee 
rescheduled the meeting of creditors and sought additional information from Vivo 
and Casanta because it seemed that relevant preferential transfers had been made 
and might need to be avoided. 
{¶ 5} Although Vivo provided the trustee with some information regarding 
the disposition of the signing bonus, the trustee did not consider the information to 
be complete, and on July 19, 2013, the trustee filed an order for Casanta to appear 
and show cause for her failure to provide additional information.  Because 
Casanta’s family members would not be able to repay the preferential transfers, 
neither Vivo nor Casanta provided additional information to the trustee.  Vivo 
stipulates that his plan was to wait for Casanta’s discharge to be denied and then to 
file a new petition “at a later date when the Trustee would no longer have 
jurisdiction over the signing bonus.”  But as a matter of law, Vivo’s strategy would 
January Term, 2019 
 
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not work as he intended, because a denial of discharge would render the debts 
scheduled permanently nondischargeable, which was contrary to Casanta’s desired 
outcome.  Nevertheless, Casanta’s recent money transfers to family members and 
her failure to advise Vivo of the transfers prior to his filing the petition were 
possibly fatal to her bankruptcy case, and thus, most of the harm to Casanta was 
self-inflicted and little to no harm was caused by Vivo. 
{¶ 6} On October 14, 2013, the trustee filed an objection to discharge, as 
well as an adversary complaint against Casanta.  Vivo did not file an answer or any 
other documents in the adversary case, and Casanta was not aware of the filings.  
The trustee filed a motion for default judgment, Vivo did not file a response, and 
the motion was granted against Casanta.  On December 23, 2013, an order denying 
discharge was entered in the bankruptcy case, which rendered the debts scheduled 
in the case permanently nondischargeable.  Vivo did not communicate these 
developments to Casanta, and she believed that her case remained pending.  Over 
the next several years, Casanta repeatedly called and met with Vivo to discuss her 
case, but she remained unaware of the disposition of the case. 
{¶ 7} On October 21, 2016, Vivo filed a new Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 
on Casanta’s behalf, and he advanced the filing fee himself.  Casanta claims not to 
have been aware of the filing of a new case on her behalf; however, her handwritten 
signature appears on the declaration of petitioner filed in the new case.  The debts 
sought to be discharged in the new case were virtually identical to the debts 
scheduled for discharge in the prior Chapter 7 case.  As a result, on November 23, 
2016, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss the new case on the basis that the listed 
debts were permanently nondischargeable because they were scheduled in the prior 
case, in which discharge had been denied.  Because the motion accurately reflected 
the law and facts at issue, Vivo did not file a response.  On December 22, 2016, the 
motion to dismiss was granted and the new Chapter 7 case was dismissed. 
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{¶ 8} The parties stipulated and the board found that the conduct set forth 
above violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence 
in representing a client), 1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to promptly inform the client 
of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent 
is required), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about 
the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3) 
(requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter), and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with 
reasonable requests for information from the client).  Relator agreed to dismiss one 
additional alleged violation. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulate that Vivo’s prior disciplinary offenses are 
aggravating factors here, see Gov.Bar R. (V)(13)(B)(1), and that his timely and 
good-faith effort to make restitution to Casanta and his full and free disclosure to 
the board and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings are the 
relevant mitigating factors, see Gov.Bar R. V (13)(C)(3) and (4). 
{¶ 10} The board recommends that we adopt the parties’ consent-to-
discipline agreement and suspend Vivo from the practice of law for six months, 
with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he complete six hours of 
continuing legal education (“CLE”) in law-office management and commit no 
further misconduct.  It further recommends that he serve one year of monitored 
probation. 
{¶ 11} The panel considered a number of cases in which we sanctioned 
attorneys for similar rule violations, and it focused on cases in which we either 
issued a public reprimand or imposed a conditionally stayed six-month suspension 
for the attorney’s misconduct involving incompetent representation and/or neglect 
of a client.  See, e.g., Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Mickens, 154 Ohio St.3d 72, 
2018-Ohio-2630, 111 N.E.3d 1125; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kluesener, 150 Ohio 
January Term, 2019 
 
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St.3d 322, 2017-Ohio-4417, 81 N.E.3d 457; Disciplinary Counsel v. Peck, 150 
Ohio St.3d 130, 2017-Ohio-2961, 79 N.E.3d 545; Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson, 
144 Ohio St.3d 414, 2015-Ohio-4337, 44 N.E.3d 268.  We find Kluesener and 
Mickens to be most instructive. 
{¶ 12} In Kluesener, we adopted a consent-to-discipline agreement and 
imposed a conditionally stayed six-month suspension for similar rule violations 
arising from the attorney’s incompetence and neglect in his handling of a client 
matter.  In Mickens, we imposed a six-month conditionally stayed suspension on 
an attorney with prior discipline who failed to reasonably communicate with a 
single client, neglected the client’s legal matter, and failed to inform the client that 
he did not maintain professional-liability insurance.  But we also required Mickens 
to make restitution to the client affected by his misconduct, complete six hours of 
CLE in law-office management, and serve a one-year period of monitored 
probation.  Because the misconduct of Vivo is sufficiently similar to the misconduct 
in these two cases, imposition of a similar sanction is warranted. 
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, we agree that Vivo’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) and that a six-month 
suspension, stayed on the recommended conditions, and one year of monitored 
probation is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.  We therefore adopt the 
parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, James S. Vivo is suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he 
complete six relator-approved hours of CLE in law-office management, in addition 
to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and engage in no further misconduct.  He 
must also serve one year of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 
V(21).  If Vivo fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted 
and he will serve the full six-month suspension.  Costs are taxes to Vivo. 
Judgment accordingly. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents and would remand the cause to the Board of 
Professional Conduct. 
________________ 
David C. Comstock Jr. and J. Michael Thompson, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
James S. Vivo, pro se. 
_________________