Title: Benik v. Hatcher

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Appeal from Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND   
         
NO. 20
        
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1998
JOSEPH BENIK, et.al.
     v.
BRANDON HATCHER, a minor, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
        Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
     
JJ.
            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
  Rodowsky,  Raker,  and Cathell, JJ. dissent
FILED:   April 19, 2000
Unless otherwise indicated, all Code references are to Title 13 of the Commercial
1 
Law Article, Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl. Vol.). 
 No issue with regard to the measure of damages has been raised by the parties or
2
decided by the Court, see Maryland Rule 8-131(a), and, accordingly, we will not address
it.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether, under the Consumer Protection Act
(“CPA”), Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl. Vol.) Title 13 of the Commercial Law Article,
specifically § 13-301(1), (2) and (3),  proof of scienter is a prerequisite to holding a landlord
1
liable for breach of warranty for injuries resulting from a child’s ingestion of lead-based
paint, when the child’s dwelling, at the inception of the lease, contained chipping and flaking
paint, in violation of the local housing code.    The Court of Special Appeals held that
2
scienter is not required and, so, reversed the judgment of the trial court.  We shall affirm the
intermediate appellate court, but on a somewhat different analysis.
I.
The genesis of this case was a complaint that alleged that five year-old Brandon
Hatcher, the respondent, suffered lead poisoning while living in apartment #310 in an
apartment building located at 1411 Division Street, owned by Joseph Benik, the petitioner.
Brandon and his family moved into the apartment in January 1990 and in December 1990,
an inspection of the apartment revealed that lead paint was present in several areas
throughout the apartment. After the discovery of the lead paint, the family moved to another
apartment in the same building. 
Section 8 is a federal program whereby the United States Department of Housing
3 
and Urban Development subsidizes a tenant’s rental of housing by paying the landlord 
the difference between what the tenant has been determined to be able to pay and the fair
rental value of the premises.   See, § 8 of United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (1994).
2
Brandon’s mother received Section 8  assistance to subsidize her rental payments
3
while she and her family lived at 1411 Division Street.  Thus, consistent with Section 8
procedures, on January 2, 1990,  prior to the family moving into the apartment, an inspection
of the unit was conducted by a Section 8 housing inspector.  That inspector testified at trial
that the apartment passed the Section 8 inspection, which included inspecting each room in
the unit for the presence of chipping or flaking paint.  Confirming the inspector’s testimony,
the petitioner testified that he had painted the apartment several weeks before the inspection.
He also testified that Mrs. Hatcher was in the apartment and inspected it herself before
entering into the lease.  Further, the petitioner stated that, several months earlier, when she
rented another apartment in the same building, Mrs. Hatcher signed a statement that she had
received a booklet regarding the hazards of lead-based paint.
The testimony of both the Section 8 inspector and the petitioner was contradicted by
the testimony of Chakeda Hatcher, Brandon’s sister.  Twelve years old when the Hatcher’s
moved into the unit, Chakeda stated that the apartment was not freshly painted when the
family moved in.  She described chipping paint on the wall, ceiling, around the door frame,
and the windowsills.  She also stated that she saw chipping paint in the bathroom and in two
bedrooms.  Chakeda further testified that she witnessed Brandon with a chalky substance
3
around his hands and mouth after he had been playing near holes located at the baseboard
of the apartment.  She specifically stated that the holes were present when they moved into
the apartment.  Finally, Chakeda testified that the petitioner was in the apartment before the
lease began, talking to her mother.
Chakeda’s testimony was corroborated by Brandon’s aunt, Eileen Hatcher, who
testified that she resided in apartment #214 the entire time her sister and nephew lived in
apartment #310.  Ms. Eileen Hatcher testified that she visited her sister within the first month
of her moving into apartment #310 and observed, at that time, that the unit was not freshly
painted.  She further stated that, on different occasions, when she visited the apartment, the
paint on the windowsill of the middle room and kitchen was peeling and flaking.
On October 17, 1990, Brandon was diagnosed with lead poisoning, having been found
to have an elevated blood lead level.  At that point, the family moved out of their apartment
and into another unit.  Brandon’s blood lead level began to decline once the family moved
out of apartment #310.  On December 3, 1990, the Baltimore City Health Department
conducted an investigation at the residence, finding lead paint nuisances in sixteen areas
throughout the apartment,  around the frames, baseboards, and windows.  That inspection
and its findings resulted in the issuance to the petitioner of an emergency violation notice and
an order to remove the lead paint nuisance.
 The suit was originally filed on Brandon’s behalf by his mother as next friend. 
4
When she died, his aunt was substituted as Brandon’s next friend. 
 The petitioner’s wife was also named as a defendant, as was Orchid Street
5
Garden Associates.   The petitioner’s wife was dismissed from the case on motion for
judgment at the end of the plaintiff’s case.  The claims against Orchid Street Garden
Associates were voluntarily dismissed.
4
Suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City  against the petitioner.
4
5
Although the complaint contained five counts, only two of them, those alleging negligence
and violation of the Consumer Protection Act, survived the pre-trial practice.  Those counts
proceeded to trial before a jury.  At the end of the case,  the trial court gave the following
instruction as to the Consumer Protection Act:
“Plaintiff has made a claim under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.  In
order to recover damages under this act, the Plaintiff must prove more likely
than not the following: One, that at the beginning of the lease of Apartment
310, there was chipping and flaking lead-based paint; and two that Mr. Benik
was aware of the chipping and flaking lead-based paint, and also aware that
its condition may constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to the tenants.  And
three, that despite the above, the Defendant, Mr. Benik failed to disclose the
hazardous condition to Linda Hatcher at the beginning of the lease.  And Four,
that Brandon Hatcher was injured as a direct, proximate result of the alleged
hazardous condition that existed at the time of the lease; that is chipping or
flaking lead based paint.  If any of the above elements are missing, the claim
hereunder should be decided in favor of the defendant.”(emphasis added).
The respondent excepted to this instruction, asking the court to give his proposed
instruction instead.  The respondent’s proposed instruction did not require the jury to find
scienter on the part of the petitioner, that the petitioner be aware that the chipping and flaking
paint was lead-based paint or that the condition was an unreasonable risk to the respondent.
Underlying this reasoning is the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals in
6 
Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership, 109
Md.App. 217, 279 n.16, 674 A.2d 106, 136 (1996), adopted by that court in its decision
in this case, distinguishing the factual scenario in  Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson,
335 Md. 661,  645 A.2d 1147 (1994), from one arising under the CPA:
“The Golt [v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986)] rule
imposing liability in the absence of scienter should be distinguished from
the Court of Appeals's decisions in two lead paint cases: Scroggins v.
Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994), and Richwind Joint Venture 4
v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994). In both of those cases, the
Court held that the leasing of a dwelling with lead-based paint that was not
chipped or peeling was not, in itself, a violation of the CPA. Scroggins, 335
Md. at 696; Richwind, 335 Md. at 661. In Richwind, the Court reached this
conclusion by reasoning that a rule imposing CPA liability for lead paint
hazards that occurred during the term of the lease would in effect "impose
strict liability on landlords throughout the term of the lease." 335 Md. at
684. 
“The Court's avoidance of "strict liability" must be read in context.
The basis of the Court's decision in both cases was that the CPA only
governs "deceptive trade practices which induce the prospective tenant to
enter into...a lease." Id., 335 Md. at 683; Scroggins, 335 Md. at 698. The
CPA does not, however, govern "statements or omissions concerning the
leased premises during the term of the lease." Richwind, 335 Md. at 683;
Scroggins, 335 Md. at 696. Thus, leasing a dwelling with "intact"
lead-based paint was not a CPA violation because the lead-paint hazard did
not exist at the time the lease was created. 
“In the case at bar, the Council has alleged that the defendants made
false statements in the purchase agreements to induce purchasers to buy
Condominium units. As such, the statements would be governed by Golt
5
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the petitioner on all counts.  The respondent
noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unpublished opinion, that court
affirmed the trial courts evidentiary rulings, but reversed its judgment with respect to the
Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”).  The intermediate appellate court  reasoned:6
and not by Richwind or Scroggins.” 
   
6
“Golt [v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986)] holds that these
subsections do not require scienter.  Richwind [Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson,
335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994)] and Scroggins [v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688,
645 A.2d 1160 (1994)] hold that with lead-paint issues as between a landlord
and a tenant, the CPA only applies at the inception of the lease and a landlord
cannot be held strictly liable throughout the term of the lease.  Reading the
cases and the CPA together, we find no prohibition against finding a landlord
strictly liable for acts or omissions at the beginning of the lease.  Indeed, at the
beginning of a lease, landlords are in a better position than tenants to know of
any defects within a rental property.  We, therefore, hold that the CPA does
not always require scienter. Whether there is a viable strict liability cause of
action under the CPA in this case can be determined by a two-pronged test: 1)
Did the landlord commit an act or omission that falls under one of the CPA’s
subsections that does not require knowledge, and 2)Was the act or omission
of the landlord at the inception of the lease?” 
The petitioner timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted to consider the
important issue this case presents.
II.
The petitioner’s primary argument is that, where the landlord does not have actual
knowledge or reason to know of the condition,  the CPA does not  impose strict liability on
a landlord in lead-based paint cases for failing to inform tenants at the inception of the lease
that the premises contain chipping or flaking lead-based paint.  Relying on Scroggins v.
Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994); Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md.
661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) and Hayes v. Hambruch, 841 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1994), aff’d,
 The respondent points out that the date of the lease in Hayes v. Hambruch, 64
7
F.3d 657 (4  Cir. 1995) predated the amendment of the CPA to include consumer realty
th
and, thus, that case could only have addressed the applicability of the CPA during the
term of the tenancy.   It should also be noted that the decision quotes extensively from the
discussion of the negligence count in Richwind, 335 Md. at 670-82, 645 A.2d at 1151-57,
but does not give the same attention to the CPA count.  Even in its discussion of the
negligence count, the court failed to recognize that Richwind noted the CPA’s
applicability to conditions at the inception of the lease, perhaps because the factual
situation with which it was faced was mid-lease.  Moreover, Richwind’s reliance on the
District Court opinion in Hayes was limited to its consideration of the negligence count.
See 335 Md. at 678, 645 A.2d at 1155.
The petitioner cites a number of out of State cases, Felton v. Spatley, 640 A.2d
1358 (Pa. Super. 1994); Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1963); Garcia
v. Jiminez, 545 N.E.2d 109 (ILL. 1989); Tilman v. Johnson, 612 So.2d 70 (La. 1993);
Hardy v. Griffith, 569 A.2d 49 (Conn. 1989); Norwood v. Lazarus, 6634 S.W.2d 584
(Mo. App. 1982); Underwood v. Risman, 605 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 1993), which he says
have rejected a rule that would impose an affirmative duty on landlords to inspect
premises for lead-based paint.  In none of those cases was the issue the applicability of a
consumer protection statute, as in this case, although one of the cases, Hardy v. Griffith,
rests on a similar rationale as, and is consistent with, Golt.  In another, Tillman v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the intermediate appellate court’s
affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the landlord, ruling that “a genuine dispute
as to whether the lead-based paint on the defendants’ respective properties presented an
unreasonable risk of harm to the petitioner’s minor child for purposes of strict liability
under La. Civ. Code art. 2317.”
Only Felton v. Spratley stands for the proposition for which it was cited.  Indeed,
that case distinguished the other cases on which the petitioner relies. 640 A.2d at 1364
n.2.  It is interesting to note, however, that, in that case, the lack of actual knowledge on
the part of the defendant was conceded, the basis for liability being premised on  
“the novel argument that the level of knowledge relating to the hazards
associated with the use or presence of lead-based paint proliferated to the
stage that ‘[b]y 1987 ... it was commonly known to the general public and
certainly should have been known [constructive notice] to one who rents
low income housing, such as the defendants who rents low income housing,
such as the defendants ... [so as to] create] an affirmative duty to inspect for
7
64 F.3d 657 (4  Cir.1995),  he contends that “a required element of any claim for personal
th
7
and remove lead paint.’”
Id. at 1361.  Moreover, the court acknowledged that no legislation similar to that in Hardy
v. Griffith and Tillman was in existence in Pennsylvania.
In Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., the court found that the landlord had knowledge
of the condition of the apartment, which contained lead-based paint, rented to the
plaintiff’s parents and, therefore, was negligent in failing to keep the premises in proper
repair. 238 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15.   The question of the landlord’s negligence was
determined to be a jury issue in Garcia v. Jiminez, 545 N.E.2d at 1359.  The court in
Norwood v. Lazarus found in favor of the plaintiff, noting the knowledge of one landlord
and that the other either knew or should have known of the presence of lead-based paint.
634 S.W. 2d at 588.   In Underwood v. Risman, the landlord did not own the premises
when the injured child resided in the premises or when the child’s injuries occurred and,
therefore, had no statutory duty to disclose. 605 N.E.2d at 835.  Moreover, in that case,
there was no evidence of flaking, loose or peeling paint or of any other Housing Code
violation. Id. 
Section 13-301, “Proscribed practices,” provides as relevant:
8 
8
injury under the CPA based on an alleged omission is scienter, or that the landlord know, or
have reason to know, of the alleged hazard or condition.”    That is consistent, he maintains,
with the common law requirement that a landlord have notice of a defect and the opportunity
to correct it before being held liable.  Therefore, the petitioner asserts:
“The Court of Special Appeals’ ruling misinterprets prior decisions of this
Court, directly contradicts a federal court decision on the same issue, and fails
to acknowledge that its decision reverses many years of common law
precedent on the issue of notice, without any clear proof of an intent on the
part of the legislature to make such a sweeping change... [and] effectively
reverses this Court’s holding in Richwind that a landlord is under no duty to
inspect premises to determine whether a defective condition exists.”
Further, the petitioner argues that § 13-301 (9) of the CPA, by its terms, applies to
omissions and expressly requires proof of scienter.    He maintains that  “[a]n omission is the
8
“Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any:
“(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement,
visual description, or other representation of any kind which has the
capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;
“(2) Representation that:
“(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services
have a sponsorship, approval, accessory, characteristic,
ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity which they do not have;
“(ii) A merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status,
affiliation, or connection which he does not have;
“(iii) Deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or
secondhand consumer goods are original or new;  or
“(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services
are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model
which they are not;
“(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive;
*     *     *     *
“(9) Deception, fraud, false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or
knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with
the intent that a consumer rely on the same in connection with:
“(i) The promotion or sale of any consumer goods, consumer
realty, or consumer service;  or
“(ii) A contract or other agreement for the evaluation,
perfection, marketing, brokering or promotion of an
invention;  or
“(iii) The subsequent performance of a merchant with respect
to an agreement of sale, lease, or rental....”
 
9
nature of the alleged landlord liability in this case” and, therefore, that § 13-301 (9) controls,
and is dispositive of this case.  Unlike § 13-301 (9), the petitioner contends, § 13-301 (1) and
(2) of the CPA, in addition to being much less specific, only apply to affirmative
misrepresentations.  While conceding that § 13-301 (3) does apply to omissions, the
10
petitioner believes that it is too non-specific to be read as eliminating the scienter
requirement.
The petitioner argues, alternatively, that any error that the trial court may have
committed in instructing the jury with respect to scienter was harmless.   Pointing out that
the jury found for the petitioner on the negligence count, he submits that, necessarily having
weighed the evidence in deciding that count, “[t]he jury could not have found for defendant
on the negligence claim without deciding that the paint was in good condition  at the
inception of the lease.” 
As could be expected, the respondent sees it quite differently.   He contends that,
properly read,  Richwind and Scroggins are distinguishable from the case sub judice.   Those
cases, he asserts, were concerned with conditions arising during the tenancy and not, as in
this case, a condition in existence at the inception of the lease.  Not only does the Consumer
Protection Act draw that distinction and accord cases in each category different treatment,
the respondent argues, but so too does  the common law draw the same distinction.   He also
agrees with the intermediate appellate court, thus disputing the petitioner, that §13-301 (1),
(2) and (3) are  applicable in the instant case and, as Golt explained,  do not contain a
scienter requirement.   Consequently, the respondent maintains that the Court of Special
Appeals got it right. 
III.
The issue in this case arises in the context of a jury instruction, the correctness of
which this Court must determine.   Maryland Rule 2-520(c) provides:
11
“The court may instruct the jury, orally or in writing or both, by granting
requested instructions, by giving instructions of its own, or by combining any
of these methods.  The court need not grant a requested instruction if the
matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.”  
In Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651, 655 (1979), we had this
to say about the giving of jury instructions:
“‘A litigant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury, but
only if that theory of the case is a correct exposition of the law and there is
testimony in the case which supports it.’  Levine v. Rendler,  272 Md. 1, 13,
320 A.2d 258, 265 (1974); Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md. 540, 548-549, 226 A.2d
556, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851, 88 S.Ct. 42, 19 L.Ed.2d 119 (1967); Dorough
v. Lockman, 224 Md. 168, 171, 167 A.2d 129 (1961).  Thus, the general rule
regarding instructions to the jury has two aspects: (1) the instruction must
correctly state the law, and (2) that law must be applicable in light of the
evidence before the jury.”
Stated differently, a proposed instruction that is “a correct exposition of the law,” that is
“applicable in light of the evidence before the jury,” and is not “fairly covered by the
instructions actually given,”  Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc., 334 Md. 480, 495-96, 639 A.2d
701, 709 (1994) (quoting Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 326 Md. 409, 414, 605 A.2d
123, 126 (1992)), must be given.  Thus, “[i]t is well settled that if, when read as a whole, the
court's instructions to the jury clearly set forth the applicable law, there is no reversible
error.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 343 Md. 216, 240, 680 A.2d 1082, 1094
(1996), citing Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185, 202-03, 249 A.2d 112, 122 (1969);  Alston v.
Forsythe, 226 Md. 121, 135, 172 A.2d 474, 481 (1961). 
The instruction in this case required that, in order for the landlord to be liable for
breach of warranty under the CPA for the tenant’s injuries, there must have existed in the
12
apartment at the inception of the lease, chipping and flaking lead-based paint, of which the
landlord was aware and did not inform the tenant, even though he was aware that the
condition may constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to the tenant, and that the chipping
and flaking lead-based paint was the proximate cause of the tenant’s injuries.   The
correctness of that instruction -  the determination whether it sets forth the applicable law -
requires analysis of sections of the Baltimore City Code, the CPA and our cases elucidating
those enactments. 
IV.
A.
The purpose of the Baltimore City Housing Code is to:
“establish and maintain basic requirements, standards and conditions essential
for the protection of the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
public ... in the City of Baltimore; to establish minimum standards governing
the condition, use, operation, occupancy and maintenance of dwellings...in
order to make the dwelling safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation”  
See, Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13 § 103.  To achieve that purpose, the
landlord has been required by law to deliver premises to a tenant in a safe and habitable
condition.  Thus, Article 13, § 702 of the Baltimore City Housing Code provides:  
“Every building and all parts thereof used or occupied as a dwelling shall,
while in use ...  be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human
habitation....”
Section 703 addresses the standards for the good repair and safe condition of  interior walls,
ceilings, woodwork, doors, and windows.  It defines that standard as requiring that they be
13
kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint. § 703 (2)(c).  Section 706 similarly
provides as to interior wall covering and paint:
“All interior loose or peeling wall covering or paint shall be removed and the
exposed surface shall be placed in a smooth and sanitary condition.  No paint
shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling, dwelling unit, or rooming
unit unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.
The Code prohibits an owner from “leas[ing] or permitt[ing] the subletting to another for
occupancy any vacant or vacated dwelling or dwelling unit which does not comply with [its]
provisions....”  §1001.  Finally, § 9-14.1 of the Baltimore City Code of Public Local Laws
(1980) provides:
“In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling intended for
human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that
a dwelling is fit for human habitation.” 
After examining the foregoing provisions of the Baltimore City Code in Brown v.
Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000), this Court concluded:
 “[I]t is clear that it is unlawful to lease a dwelling with flaking, loose or
peeling paint and that no premises are to be leased for human habitation,
except those that are fit for human habitation, i.e., those that are kept in good
repair and safe condition as defined in the Baltimore City Code.  To be sure,
§ 706 prohibits the use of lead-based paint for interior painting in a dwelling
unit; however, neither it nor §§ 702 or 703 limits the prohibition of flaking,
loose or peeling paint to lead-based paint.  To be a violation, all that must be
shown is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint, without any further
showing as to the content of the paint.   Moreover, none of the provisions of
the Housing Code premises violation on the landlord’s knowledge of the
hazards of lead-based paint.”
Id. at 361, 744 A.2d at 56-57.
B. 
 That section provides:
9
“A person may not engage in any unfair or deceptive trade practice, as defined
in this subtitle or as further defined by the Division, in :
“(1) The sale, lease, rental, loan, or bailment of any consumer
goods, consumer realty, or consumer services;
“(2) The offer for sale, lease, rental loan, loan, or bailment of
consumer goods, consumer realty or consumer services;
“(3) The extension of consumer credit; or
“(4) The collection of consumer debts.
 
As originally enacted, see Chapter 49 of the Acts of 1975, the Consumer
10 
Protection Act did not apply to the sale or lease of real property.  By amendment in 1976,
however, the General Assembly made it apply to "certain real property transactions,
certain activities related to these transactions, and certain leases and rentals...."  Ch. 907
of the Acts of 1976.  See CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 150, 613 A.2d 964, 968
(1992).   
14
The CPA prohibits a person from engaging in "any unfair or deceptive trade practice"
in connection with certain enumerated activities. § 13-303.   Among the activities subject to
9
that proscription are the lease or rental, and the offer for lease or rental, of consumer realty.10
§ 13-303 (1) and (2). See Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. at 8, 517 A.2d at 331; § 13-301.
Section 13-301 is relevant to the resolution of this case.  As pertinent to the facts of
this case, it provides:
“Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any:
“(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written
statement, visual description, or other representation of any kind
which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or
misleading consumers;
“(2) Representation that:
“(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or
consumer services have a sponsorship, approval,
15
accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit,
or quantity which they do not have;
*     *     *     *
“(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or
consumer services are of a particular standard,
quality, grade, style, or model which they are not;
          “(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to             
                     deceive;
*     *     *     *
“(9) Deception, fraud, false pretense, false premise,
misrepresentation, or knowing concealment, suppression, or
omission of any material fact with the intent that a consumer
rely on the same in connection with:
“(i) The promotion or sale of any consumer
goods, consumer realty, or consumer service;  or
“(ii) A contract or other agreement for the
evaluation, perfection, marketing, brokering or
promotion of an invention;  or
“(iii) The subsequent performance of a merchant
with respect to an agreement of sale, lease, or
rental. ...”
C. 
One of the issues presented in Golt was "whether the leasing of an unlicensed
dwelling unit constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under Maryland's Consumer Protection
Act (CPA).” 308 Md. at 1, 517 A.2d at 329.   There, an elderly, disabled retiree responded
to an advertisement for the rental of a furnished apartment.  Upon inspecting of the apartment
and finding it in need of cleaning and repairing, and receiving assurances that the necessary
work would be done, he signed a month-to-month lease, paid a month’s rent and a security
deposit and moved into the apartment.   Having learned after moving in that the toilet
facilities were located outside of his apartment and that he would have to share them with
16
another tenant and after getting no response to repeated requests for repairs, he called the
Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development, which inspected the
premises, discovering, among other code violations, that the landlord did not have the
necessary license or inspection to operate the building as a multiple dwelling. Id. at 5-6, 517
A.2d at 330.  To resolve that issue, this Court interpreted § 13-301 (1), (2) and (3), in light,
however, of the applicable provision of the Baltimore City Code, concluding ( id. at 9, 517
A.2d at 332), "[i]n our view, advertising and renting an unlicensed dwelling violates  §
13-301(1), (2), and (3) [of the CPA]": 
“Implicit in any advertisement and rental of an apartment is the representation
that the leasing of the apartment is lawful.   Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, §
1101 (1983 Repl.  Vol.), expressly prohibits the operation of any multiple
family dwelling without a license or temporary certificate.   As Phillips
Brothers had neither a license nor a temporary certificate, it violated the City
Code.   Phillips Brothers could not provide Golt with the unimpeded right to
possession during the lease term.   Consequently, Phillips Brothers
advertisement and rental of the apartment was a ‘misleading ... statement ... or
other representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of
deceiving or misleading consumers.’   Maryland Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), §
13-301(1) of the Commercial Law Article.
“ Furthermore, such a representation is in essence a representation that
the ‘realty ... [has] a sponsorship, approval ... [or] characteristic ... which [it
does] not have,’ id.  § 13-301(2)--namely, licensing for operation as a multiple
family dwelling.   It makes no difference that Appellees did not expressly state
that the premises were properly licensed;  such a basic prerequisite to any
lease agreement is implied.   For consumer protection purposes, the meaning
of any statement or representation is determined not only by what is explicitly
stated, but also by what is reasonably implied. Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 411 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir.1969);    Aronberg v. Federal Trade
Commission, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir.1942):  In the Matter of Seekonk
Freezer Meats, Inc., 82 F.T C. 1025, 1054 (1973). 
17
“Finally, Phillips Brothers also violated  § 13-301(3) of the CPA, which
states that the failure to disclose a material fact, which deceives or tends to
deceive, is an unfair or deceptive trade practice.   The lack of proper licensing
is a material fact that Phillips Brothers failed to state.   In addition, failure to
disclose this fact deceived Golt or at least had the tendency to deceive
consumers.   An omission is considered material if a significant number of
unsophisticated consumers would attach importance to the information in
determining a choice of action.   See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distributors
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir.1944);  
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th
Cir.1945);  cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 538 (1977) (Under common
law fraud, a fact is deemed material if a reasonable person would attach
importance to its existence in determining his choice of action.).   In our view,
the lack of proper licensing for an apartment under most circumstances is a
material fact that any tenant would find important in his determination of
whether to sign a lease agreement and move into the premises. (Footnote
omitted).
Id. at 9-10, 517 A.2d at 332.
In Richwind, this Court again interpreted the CPA and considered, albeit in a
somewhat different context, the very provisions of the Baltimore City Code at issue in this
case.  At issue in Richwind were the extent to which provisions of Baltimore City ordinances
and Public Local Laws supersede the common law rule that, before being held liable for
negligence, a landlord must have notice of a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity
to correct it and whether the CPA imposes strict breach of warranty liability for personal
injury upon a landlord without requiring proof of knowledge, deception, reliance, or
causation. 335 Md. at 666, 645 A.2d at 1149.  There, at the invitation of the owner’s
management company, the tenant, who resided in the premises prior to their acquisition by
the landlord, forwarded a series of complaints about the disrepair of her apartment, including
“[chipping and flaking] paint and plaster from the walls.” Id. at 668, 645 A.2d at 1150.  The
18
president of the management company dispatched workers to correct the problems, but did
not inspect the work to determine whether the repairs had been made adequately.  Id.  After
her two children were diagnosed with elevated blood lead levels, the Baltimore City Health
Department inspected the property and served the owner and the management company with
notice of violations and required removal of the lead hazards.  Id. at 668-69, 645 A.2d at
1150.  Evidence developed at trial indicated that, although he had no specific knowledge
about the presence of lead-based paint in the defendant’s building,  the president of the
management company knew that buildings like it often contained lead-based paint.   The trial
court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the CPA count and submitted the
negligence count to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.   The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the jury verdict, but reversed as to the CPA.  We did likewise -
affirmed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court as to negligence, but reversed as
to the CPA. 
As to the negligence verdict, we accepted the defendants’ concession that certain
provisions of the Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), i.e., Art. 13, §§ 702, 703 and 706,
impact the common law requisites of liability and may impose a duty on a landlord to protect
a tenant from injury, 335 Md. at 670-71, 645 A.2d at 1151, and, thus, agreed that their
violation by a defendant could provide the basis for a negligence action. Id. at 671-72, 645
A.2d at 1152 (citing Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 17.6
 Section 17.6 provides as follows:
11
"A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and
others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his
subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the
tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to
repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of:
“(1) an implied warranty of habitability;  or
“(2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation."  
That section provides:
12 
"Whenever the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development
determines that there has been a violation of any provision of this Code or
of any rule or regulation adopted pursuant hereto, he shall give notice of
such alleged violation to the person or persons responsible therefor as
hereinafter provided."  
 
 That section similarly required the Commissioner to "order the necessary
13
corrections by notice and service" as therein provided.   
19
(1977)).   Concluding that “the relevant issues in the instant case are ... whether the city
11
code's notice provisions expand common law liability, and whether Richwind or its agent had
adequate notice and/or knowledge of this hazardous lead paint condition,” id. (citing
Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13, §§ 301, 302 and 303), we held that there
was sufficient evidence both of notice to the landlord and of the landlord’s breach of the duty
to correct the dangerous condition.  The Baltimore City Code provisions we referenced were
Art. 13, §§ 301  and 303,  however, rather than §§ 702 and 703, both of which established
12
13
an implied warranty of habitability. 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1152.   Concerning the City
Code’s effect on a landlord’s common law liability, we held that they did not supercede the
20
common law’s notice requirement. Id. at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153.  As to that, we
explained:
“the common law and the city code appear consistent with each other as they
apply to the prerequisite of knowledge and/or notice. Both require that a
landlord have notice of the dangerous condition on the property and a
reasonable opportunity to correct it. Neither impose upon Richwind a duty to
periodically inspect the premises during the leased period for dangerous
conditions to determine if repairs are necessary. To hold otherwise would
circumvent years of unbroken precedent concerning such a duty, and might
force landlords to become the "insurers" of their tenants, a policy which has
been repeatedly rejected by the courts of this State. See Scott, 278 Md. at 165,
359 A.2d at 552 (reiterating that "mere ownership of buildings does not render
the owner liable for injuries sustained by tenants since the landlord is not an
insurer of such persons"); Ramsey, 265 Md. at 321, 289 A.2d at 323 (asserting
that "the owner is not an insurer of the safety" of those rightfully on the
premises); Elmar Gardens, Inc., 227 Md. at 457, 177 A.2d at 265 (stating that
"mere ownership of land or buildings does not render the owner liable for
injuries sustained by tenants or invitees rightfully on the premises, for the
owner is not an insurer of such persons but owes them the duty only to
exercise ordinary care").” (Footnote omitted).
Id. 
Turning to the CPA, the Court made clear that its non-applicability was due to the fact
that the defective condition arose during the term of the lease, rather than at its inception. 
After reviewing the history of the CPA’s applicability to landlord-tenant matters, and noting
that the only times that this Court has applied the CPA in landlord/tenant cases have been
where the unfair or deceptive practice occurred during the establishment of the
landlord/tenant relationship between the parties, see Golt, 308 Md. at 11, 517 A.2d at 333;
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 149 n. 3, 613 A.2d at 967 n. 3; Galola v. Snyder, 328 Md. 182, 185,
613 A.2d 983, 985 (1992), the Court held:
21
“The CPA applies to a lease at the time the consumer enters into it, and the
Act is intended to govern deceptive trade practices which induce the
prospective tenant to enter into such a lease.”
Id. at 683, 645 A.2d 1158.  Continuing with that theme, having acknowledged that
comprehensive landlord and tenant statutes, as well as the common law, regulates a
landlord's acts or omissions during the term of the lease, we stated our doubt that “the
legislature intended the CPA to be applicable to statements or omissions concerning the
leased premises occurring during the term of the lease.” 335 Md. 661, 683, 645 A.2d 1147,
1158.  Finally, concerned that the Court of Special Appeals’s interpretation of the CPA
would hold a landlord liable for the nondisclosure of a condition arising during the term of
the lease, of which the landlord has no knowledge, and would impose strict liability on
landlords throughout the term of the lease, the Court opined, on the subject, as follows:
“It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit
application of the CPA to material misstatements and omissions at the
inception of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease. At the time
the lease is entered into, a landlord has superior knowledge as to the condition
of the premises. During the term of the lease, however, when the tenant is in
exclusive possession and control of the premises, it is the tenant who has
superior knowledge of the property's condition. If we were to hold otherwise,
a landlord conceivably could be found liable under the CPA for a dangerous
condition created by a tenant during the term of the lease without any notice
from the tenant to the landlord or any opportunity for the landlord to correct
it. Such a decision could impose a standard amounting to strict liability for any
defect arising on the premises during the term of the lease. We do not believe
the legislature intended to extend the scope of the CPA to impose such a
standard on landlords. 
“Although the premises leased in the instant case obviously contained
lead-based paint, that alone would not have rendered them uninhabitable or in
violation of the CPA.  Renting a premises with intact, lead-based paint is not
in itself a violation of the CPA. The plaintiff's CPA claims were based on the
 Richwind does not stand for the proposition for which the petitioner cites it.  
14
What has always to be kept in mind is the context of the Richwind decision; what was at
issue there was the viability, under the CPA , of a complaint based on a landlord’s acts or
omissions during the course of the lease.  To be sure, the Court stated its concern that the
effect of the intermediate appellate court’s decision to apply the CPA under the facts of
that case could be to impose strict liability throughout the term of the lease, but that
statement was in response to the posture of the case, in mid-lease, rather than at the
beginning.   Prior to making that statement, the Court had traced the application of the
CPA to landlord/tenant cases in Maryland and noted how comprehensively the acts and
omissions of landlords are regulated even without the application of the CPA.. 335 Md. at
683-84, 645 A.2d at 1157.
22
landlords' failure to disclose that there was peeling, chipping, or flaking
lead-based paint which constituted an unsafe condition. There was no evidence
that at the time the lease was entered into there was any peeling or chipping
paint. As we have indicated, mere silence about a condition that arises during
the term of this lease, rather than prior to or at the time the lease is entered
into, is not a violation of the CPA. Cf. Miles v. Shauntee, 664 S.W.2d 512,
518-19 (Ky. 1983) (holding that failure of a landlord to make repairs required
by the housing code is not a violation of the consumer protection act). 
“In the instant case, the tenants had exclusive possession and control of
the premises for two years prior to Richwind taking title. If there was any false
or deceptive trade practice involved in leasing these premises, it would have
been engaged in by Richwind’s predecessor in title, the Baitches, who settled
the claims made against them. Consequently, Richwind’s post-lease silence
does not give rise to a CPA cause of action.”
Id. at 685-86, 645 A.2d at 1159 (footnote omitted).14
V.
To be sure, the condition about which the respondent complained was the existence
of flaking and chipping paint.  The petitioner’s negligence in the maintenance of the
respondent’s apartment or in failing to correct the condition after the lease began is not at
issue in this case.  That aspect of the case was resolved by a jury verdict in favor of the
23
petitioner.  As we have seen, the respondent also alleged, supported by proof, that the
apartment contained chipping and flaking paint when the lease was entered into.   It is the
correctness of the jury instruction given in connection with this aspect of the case and the
proper application of the CPA that are at issue.
As we have seen, a landlord leasing or agreeing to rent a dwelling intended for human
habitation is deemed to covenant and warrant that it is fit for human habitation.   § 9-14.1,
Baltimore City Code of Public Local Laws.   Thus, the provisions of the City Code, i.e., §§
702, 703, and 706, setting minimum standards and thereby giving meaning to the implied
warranty, rather than §§ 301 and 303, the notice provisions, are the ones that are relevant.
To prove a violation of the CPA premised on the breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, it must be shown that, at the inception of the lease, the landlord made material
misstatements or omissions, which either had the tendency to or, in fact, did, mislead the
tenant.   Thus, the landlord must have knowledge, constructive or actual, of the condition of
the premises at the time of the lease.
The implied warranty provisions establish a threshold for the lease of premises and
that threshold is based on the purpose of the Baltimore City Housing Code, to “make
dwellings safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation,” for the benefit of “the health and
safety of the people.”   These provisions, like the Code of which it is a part, are applications
of the police power of the City of Baltimore.  See McBriety v.City of Baltimore, 219 Md.
223, 231, 148 A.2d 408, 414 (1959);  Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 208, 107
A.2d 99, 102, (1954); Maryland Mortg. & Inv. Co. v. State, 25 Md.App. 8, 11, 332 A.2d
24
675, 678-79 (1975); Section 6 (24) of the Baltimore City Charter.  They are examples of
public health and safety regulations.  See Golt, 308 Md. at 13, 517 A.2d at 334.  The City
has a vital interest and public purpose in ensuring the habitability of its housing stock and
in the health and safety of its people. See Maryland Mortg. & Inv. Co., 25 Md.App. at 12,
332 A.2d at 678. 
Ordinarily in the case of police regulations, violation gives rise to penalty, irrespective
of the motive or knowledge of the violating party, “for the law, in those cases, seems to bind
the party to know the facts, and to obey the law at his peril.”  Carroll v. State, 63 Md. 551,
551,  3 A. 29, 30 (1885).  That is not the case here, however.  The City Code provides, as
we have seen, for notice and prescribes a time in which any violation may be corrected.
Nevertheless, ignorance of the law is no defense.  Golt, 308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332;
Samson v. State, 27 Md.App. 326, 334, 341 A.2d 817, 823 (1975); it will not relieve one
who commits a wrongful act from the legal consequences of that act.  Flohr v. Coleman, 245
Md. 254, 267, 225 A.2d 868, 875 (1967).   Indeed, everyone is  “presumed to know the law
regardless of conscious knowledge or lack thereof, and are presumed to intend the necessary
and legitimate consequences of their actions in its light.” Samson, 27 Md.App. at 334, 341
A.2d at 823 ( citing Grumbine v. State, 60 Md. 355, 356).
Just as a motorist is presumed to know the law regulating the use of motor vehicles,
Flohr, 245 Md. at 267, 225 A.2d at 875, so too is a landlord presumed to know the
requirements of the City Code pertaining to the habitability of leased premises.  In either
case, it is the actions and omissions that have the  legal effect the law prescribes, and thus
25
must be evaluated, not the actor’s knowledge or ignorance. Id.; Glenn L. Martin Co. to Use
of American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 218 Md.
28, 37, 145 A.2d 267, 272 (1958).
Here, sections 702, 703 and 706 of the City Code prescribe the standard for the lease
of premises for human habitability and § 9-14.1 deems every lease of premises for that
purpose to contain a warrant of their fitness for that purpose.  In his pre-lease
communications with the respondent’s mother, the petitioner did not disclose that there was
chipping and flaking paint, as the respondent’s evidence showed, and may have, impliedly
or expressly, represented the opposite.   The petitioner’s statement or omission must be
viewed in light of the City Code and Public Local Law requirements, whether or not the
petitioner was aware of them.  He argues, however, that he neither had actual knowledge of
the chipping or flaking paint or reason to know of the condition.  The petitioner supports that
argument by pointing to our holding in Richwind that a landlord is under no duty to inspect
premises for defective conditions.
As the owner of the premises and the landlord, on whom the law imposes specific
duties and obligations in connection with the lease of the premises, including implying a
representation as to the premises’ condition at the time of the lease, the law imputes the
requisite knowledge to the petitioner. See James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195, 204-205,
46 A. 386, 388 (1900) (holding that, despite their denials, the officers of a bank, conceded
to have been insolvent for years, must have known, or ought to have known, of its insolvency
when payments determined to be unlawful and fraudulent preferences were made.)
It is true that we recognized in Richwind that “a landlord is under no duty to
15 
inspect the premises in order to determine whether [hazardous] conditions exist.” 335
Md. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1155.   It is significant, however, that the statement was made
during the discussion of the negligence count and not the CPA count.   Also of
significance is the fact that we acknowledged that  “[a]t the time the lease is entered into,
a landlord has superior knowledge as to the condition of the premises.”   Id. at 685, 645
A.2d at 1159.  Because it is during the term of the lease, when the tenant has exclusive
possession, that the tenant has superior knowledge of the property's condition, it follows,
logically, that it is  during the term of the lease that the landlord does not have a duty to
inspect.
 
Although there was no viable CPA claim in Scroggins, the CPA analysis in
Richwind applies to its companion case, Davis v. Stollof.   In Scroggins, the plaintiffs
moved out of the apartment prior to the CPA becoming effective as to rental properties.
335 Md. at 694, 645 A.2d at 1163.   In Davis v. Stollof, the Court commented on the CPA
claim, as follows:  
“At the time the lease in the present case was entered into, there was no
chipping or peeling paint on the premises.  As the chipping or peeling paint
did not exist at the time the lease was entered into the landlord cannot be
said to have engaged in a deceptive trade practice under the CPA.  As a
matter of law, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of
their alleged violation of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act.”
Id. at 696, 645 A.2d. at 1164.   
Thus, the petitioner’s argument that the decision in this case conflicts with
Scroggins is simply not persuasive.   Although our statement of what Richwind decided
was not tempered, 335 Md. at 696, 645 A.2d at 1164, we did point out, as the petitioner
conceded, that the complaint in that case concerned a condition occurring after the
beginning of the lease. Id. at 694, 645 A.2d at 1163.    In any event, Richwind has always
to be interpreted in its factual context.
26
Assuming that the Richwind holding applies even to the inception of the lease,  the law
15
presumes the existence of a condition that a reasonable inspection, had it been conducted
would have uncovered.   In other words, the landlord need not inspect the premises before
leasing, but because of the implied representation that accompanies the making of the lease,
27
he or she fails to do so at his or her peril.  This recognizes, as we noted in Richwind, 335
Md. at 685, 645 A.2d at 1159, that “[a]t the time the lease is entered into, a landlord has
superior knowledge as to the condition of the premises.”  Moreover, to hold otherwise would
be to encourage landlords not to take seriously the obligations imposed upon them by the
City Code; they would be placed in a better position due to their willful ignorance than they
would have been in if they had performed their duties. Id.  
It is not disputed that the petitioner never informed the respondent of the presence of
chipping and flaking paint on the premises at the time the premises were let, maintaining to
the contrary, that no such condition existed at that time.  Nevertheless, although disputed -
there being testimony that the apartment was freshly painted, passed a Section 8 inspection
and the respondent inspected the premises before renting it - there was evidence from which
the jury could have found that there was chipping and flaking paint in the apartment at the
inception of the lease.  Which of the various factual scenarios to accept was for the jury to
determine.
The presence of chipping and flaking paint in the apartment at the inception of the
lease, like the lack of a license in Golt, both being questions of fact, in addition to being a
Housing Code violation, could be the predicate for the jury to find a violation of the CPA:
implicit in the rental of an apartment is the representation that the rental is lawful, Golt, 308
Md. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332, and that the apartment is in good repair, in safe condition and fit
for human habitation, § 9-14.1; an apartment with flaking, loose and peeling paint has not
been maintained “in good repair and safe condition” and, therefore, is in violation of the
28
Housing Code; § 1001 makes it illegal to rent a dwelling unit containing Housing Code
violations.  Had the jury credited the testimony of the respondent’s sister, it could then have
found that the rental of the apartment in this case violated §13-301 (9) of the CPA, as well
as the same provisions as the rental of the apartment in Golt.
The rental of the apartment without disclosing the flaking, loose or peeling paint
would  violate § 13-301 (1) in that it would be a "misleading ... statement ... or other
representation,” having the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading the
respondent.   The implicit  representation that the apartment "... [has] a sponsorship, approval
... [or] characteristic ... which [it does] not have," namely, it was in good repair and safe
condition and, thus fit for human habitation, would violate  § 13-301(2), because whether
an apartment is in good repair and safe condition, which, as the Housing Code defines the
terms, include being free of flaking, loose and peeling paint, is, to one looking for an
apartment, a material fact.  Moreover, the failure to disclose it could be found by a jury to
deceive or to have the tendency to deceive.   Accordingly, the jury could have found that the
petitioner’s failure to inform the respondent of the condition of the premises violated § 13-
301 (3). 
The petitioner argues that the applicable section of the CPA is § 13-301 (9), which,
by its terms, requires the proof of “knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any
material fact” and of scienter - “the intent that a consumer rely on the same.”  For this
subsection to be applicable, the omission must have been in connection with at least one of
three circumstances, only one of which, “(i) [t]he promotion or sale of any consumer goods,
The petitioner offers another reason for its conclusion that the Legislature
16 
intended § 13-301 (9) to apply to landlord/ tenant transactions:
“In 1976, when the legislature amended the CPA to include unfair and
deceptive procedures specifically in the rental and offer for rental of
consumer realty, the General Assembly did so by adding words concerning
realty and leases, but only to certain specific subsections, rather than by an
inclusive change to the entirety of § 13-301.   The only change in the 1976
Act that is relevant to an alleged omission, as opposed to an affirmative
misrepresentation, by a landlord is in subsection (9)(i) and (ii), where the
Act added the words ‘consumer realty,’ ‘lease,’ and ‘rental.’”
While the petitioner correctly details the 1976 amendments to § 13-301, that was not the
only section of the CPA that was amended.   Significantly, § 13-303, defining unfair and
deceptive trade practices, was amended to insert the phrase, “consumer realty.”
 
29
consumer realty, or consumer service,” is offered by the petitioner in support of his
argument.    As we have indicated, in Baltimore City, the rental of an apartment with
16
flaking, loose and peeling paint is like renting an apartment in an apartment building without
a license for the operation of that building; both are violations of the Housing Code.  To be
sure, a reasonable inspection of the apartment may have revealed the existence of the flaking,
loose and peeling paint, but not the lack of a license.   That distinction is not critical to the
resolution of this case, however.   The instructions in this case are erroneous in two respects:
they hinge liability on the landlord’s knowledge that the chipping and flaking paint was lead-
based and they do not take account of any presumption of knowledge.   We have determined
that the landlord who leases premises for human habitation is presumed to have knowledge
of any defective condition that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed and, as
30
previously indicated, the factual dispute that the former situation presents is a matter for the
jury to determine after proper instructions.
VI.     
Finally, the petitioner maintains that the jury necessarily found, by its verdict, that the
apartment did not have flaking, loose and peeling paint at the inception of the lease, any error
that the trial court may have committed instructing the jury was harmless.  He reasons:
“the jury decided the negligence count in favor of Benik by weighing the
evidence and finding that, at the beginning of the lease there was no flaking
paint.   There was substantial evidence, as shown by the testimony of housing
inspector William Lohr, that there was no flaking paint. ... Mr. Benik and his
assistant also testified that the paint was fresh and intact, when they were in
the unit prior to commencement of the lease. ... moreover, Ms. Hatcher did not
note any flaking paint on her pre-lease inspection. ... the Hatchers relied
entirely on the testimony of twelve year old Chekeda Hatcher, sister of
Brandon Hatcher, that she recalled flaking paint throughout the apartment at
the beginning of the lease. ... In order to decide the negligence issue, the jury
had to weigh this evidence, and must have decided that there was no flaking
paint at the inception of the lease.   Otherwise, the jury would have found for
the plaintiff.”  
It is well settled that a civil judgment will not be reversed unless the complaining
party shows both error and prejudice.  See, e.g.,  Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc.,
337 Md. 1, 15, 650 A.2d 705, 711-12 (1994); Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319, 529 A.2d
356 (1987).  See State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman,   321 Md. 3, 16-18, 580
A.2d 1044, 1051-52 (1990).   There is prejudice when the error influenced the outcome of
the case.  Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 330-31, 368 A.2d 1005, 1018 (1977); State Roads
Comm. v. Kuenne, 240 Md. 232, 235, 213 A.2d 567, 568 (1965). 
31
We agree with the respondent.  The jury was instructed that, to find a violation of the
CPA, there must have been, at the beginning of the lease, “chipping and flaking lead-based
paint” and that the petitioner “was aware of the chipping and flaking lead-based paint.”  As
we have seen, what the Housing Code proscribes is “flaking, loose and peeling paint,” not
flaking, loose and peeling lead-based paint.  Moreover, the jury was not asked specifically
whether there was flaking, loose or peeling paint, lead-based or otherwise, and the special
verdict sheet does not reflect any such finding.  It is thus quite conceivable that the jury
determined that there was flaking and chipped paint in the apartment at the inception of the
lease, but that the petitioner was not aware that it was lead-based.   As the respondent notes,
the petitioner testified that he believed that if there was lead-based paint in the premises, it
was covered up, encapsulated by new walls and sheet rock installed during renovation. 
From this, we can plausibly surmise, as the respondent contends, that “[t]he jury simply
found that the Defendant was not negligent (under the ‘reason to know’ standard of
Richwind) and did not violate the CPA (under the flawed instructions given by the court
below).”
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED,
WITH COSTS.
  
 
32
Two dissenting opinions follow next page:
Dissenting opinion by Cathell, J.
I respectfully dissent.  
I.
In my view, the majority has misconstrued its holding in Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1,
517 A.2d 328 (1986).  Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147
 Richwind and Scroggins, though not companion cases, involved the same legal issue, and both opinions were
1
filed on the same day.
 The majority holds that “[a]s the owner of the premises and the landlord . . . the law imputes the requisite
2
knowledge to the petitioner.”  In my view, the majority, by its use of such language, imposes “strict liability” on a
landlord under the CPA.
33
(1994), and Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994)concerned whether a
landlord had knowledge of the fact that a dangerous condition had come into being in the
leased premises after the commencement of the leased term.   Golt imposed strict liability
1
on landlords to know what the statutory law was, i.e., that a license was required to operate
a rental unit.  Golt did not create strict liability in respect to the factual requirements of
negligence actions or actions under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).  We merely noted
in Golt that: “Ignorance of the law . . . is no defense.”  308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332. 
The instant case does not involve ignorance of the law.  It involves knowledge of a
fact.  It is clearly distinguishable.  CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964
(1992), and Galola v. Snyder, 328 Md. 182, 613 A.2d 983 (1992), relevant portions of which
were cited in Richwind as support for the Court’s interpretation of Golt, were, like Richwind,
cases generally involving the CPA.  But the portions of CitaraManis and Galola cited by the
Court in Richwind and Scroggins to support the decisions therein dealt with the holding in
Golt that a landlord is charged under the CPA with knowledge of the law at the inception of
the lease.  Richwind, Scroggins, and Golt, in my view, should not be interpreted as holding
that landlords are charged with knowledge of facts.  Golt, CitaraManis, Galola, Richwind
and Scroggins do not support the majority’s creation of strict liability,  in respect to
2
knowledge of facts, in CPA cases based on alleged violations of the Baltimore City Housing
 The Court in Scroggins, 335 Md. at 694 n.2, 645 A.2d at 1163 n.2, expressly noted: “As set out in Richwind . . .
3
the CPA does not create a new remedy in strict liability for lead paint poisoning cases.”
1
Code or similar provisions.   Landlords are presumed to know the law, but are not charged
3
with automatic knowledge of the existence of facts that, if actually known, would constitute
violations of the law. 
Moreover, neither Golt, CitaraManis nor Galola involved actions for alleged
negligent conduct.  All three cases arose out of a rental contract, alleging actions for
restitution or for rent, in circumstances in which there was no dispute that the landlord had
failed to obtain the required licenses.  CitaraManis presented two issues: (1) whether a
tenant was entitled under the CPA to restitution for rent paid during a period when the leased
premises were unlicensed; and (2) whether a tenant is entitled to restitution of voluntary
rental payments made on an unenforceable lease.  Accordingly, CitaraManis was  a
restitution case.  Similarly, Galola involved rental units for which the required license had
not been obtained.  The tenant, after being sued for possession and back rent, countersued
for restitution of all the rent he had paid during the term that the premises had been
unlicensed.  Galola was also resolved on restitution issues.  As I perceive the cases, neither
Golt, CitaraManis nor Galola have anything to do with the case at bar.  The comment in
Richwind that “[t]o date, this Court has only applied the CPA in landlord/tenant cases where
the unfair or deceptive practice occurred during the establishment of the landlord/tenant
relationship between the parties,”  335 Md. at 683, 645 A.2d at 1157 (citing Golt, 308 Md.
at 11, 517 A.2d at 333; CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 149 n.3, 613 A.2d at 967 n.3; Galola, 328
2
Md. at 185, 613 A.2d at 985), is, as I perceive it, being interpreted much too broadly.  The
crucial determinant in those cases was that they both involved the inception of the leases and
premises that were unlicensed.  The landlords were thus held to have knowledge that the law
required them to have licenses.  See Golt, 308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332 (“Ignorance of the
law . . . is no defense.”).  Under the common law applicable to this case, ignorance of facts
can be a defense.  There is nothing in any of the cases, except the overly-broad language in
Richwind, that indicates otherwise.
If the holdings of Golt and its progeny are considered in light of the narrowness in
which the Court framed those opinions, there is nothing in those cases supporting the
creation of strict liability, even under the CPA, for landlords in negligence cases brought
against them by their tenants.  The prior cases of this Court have held that a landlord is liable
only if he knows, or has reason to know, of the defective condition or should realize the risk
involved.  See Hayes v. Hambruch, No. 94-1271, 1995 WL 479892 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1995)
(citing Richwind, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147; Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34,
651 A.2d 908 (1994)), aff’g, 841 F. Supp. 706 (Md. 1994).  
The United States District Court for Maryland noted in Hayes, 841 F. Supp. at 713,
that this Court had observed in Golt that “ignorance of the law . . . is no defense.  A landlord
must be held to be aware of all laws concerning the validity of leasing its premises.”  The
District Court continued: “It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals in essence imputed
knowledge to the landlord of the fact that the premises were unlicensed.”  Hayes, 841 F.
Supp. at 713.  That court proceeded to discuss the issue of knowledge of the law as if it was
 Richwind was decided after the District Court’s decision in Hayes, but prior to the  Fourth Circuit’s review of
4
Hayes.  The Fourth Circuit’s affirmance was by way of an unpublished opinion.  Because I believe that the
appellate court’s affirmance modified the language of the District Court’s opinion, and because the District Court’s
opinion is cited  by the majority in this case, I have included portions of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in this
dissent.
3
knowledge of a fact.  In that discussion, the District Court mistakenly interpreted Golt as
distinguishing between the type of facts which a landlord would be more likely than the
tenant to know, i.e., whether the premises were licensed.  See id. at 713-14.
In its affirmance of Hayes,  the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
4
modified the District Court’s findings, stating:
Hayes cites Golt, in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland found a CPA
violation where a landlord rented premises without first having a license to do
so.  When the defendant claimed that it did not know that the dwelling unit
was not properly licensed, the court replied,
[i]gnorance of the law, however, is no defense.  A landlord must be held
to be aware of all laws concerning the validity of leasing its premises. . .
. In other words, § 13-301(1), (2), and (3) does not require scienter on the
part of the landlord; the subsections require only a false or deceptive
statement that has the capacity to mislead the consumer tenant.
In essence, the court held the defendant liable because the landlord should
have known of the relevant law.
4
The instant case differs somewhat from Golt, because Hambruch claims
that she was unaware of the existence of a factual matter, not of the law.
However, under the reasoning of Golt, we find that a landlord must have
reason to know of the material facts underlying an allegedly false or
misleading representation before he or she can be held liable for a violation
of the Maryland CPA.  As we pointed out above, Hayes has failed to produce
any evidence tending to show that Hambruch had reason to know of the
dangerous condition in the residence on North Caroline Street.  She thus
cannot sustain a claim under the Maryland CPA.
Our conclusion . . . is bolstered by the Maryland Court of Appeals’
reluctance to impose a standard of strict liability on landlords.  As the Court
of Appeals has stated, “the CPA does not create a new remedy in strict liability
for lead paint poisoning cases.”  Scroggins, 335 Md. at 694 n.2, 645 A.2d at
1163 n.2.
Id. at *4 (some citations omitted) (emphasis added).  The majority is no longer reluctant.
II.
Additionally, I believe that the majority is expanding the language of Golt beyond
what was being considered in that case.  Contrasting sections 13-301(1), (2), and (3) of the
CPA with section 13-301(9), the case before us more appropriately falls under subsection
5
(9), which requires a “knowing concealment [of facts] . . . with the intent that a consumer
rely on the same . . . .”  Initially, I note that, if subsections (1), (2), and (3) are as broad as
the dicta in Golt and Richwind seem to indicate and as broad as the majority in this case
indicates, the quoted language from subsection (9) would be surplusage.  There is no factual
situation I can conceive of which involves alleged negligent acts by landlords that would not
be covered by the majority’s broad interpretation of Golt and subsections (1), (2), and (3) of
section 13-301. 
Golt was a limited holding in respect to the general assumption that a landlord is
presumed to know the law, an issue not in controversy in the instant case.  By overstating the
reach of Golt in Richwind, the Court set the stage for the position it now takes.  In doing so,
however, it renders subsection (9) meaningless. 
We said in Prince George’s County v. White, 275 Md. 314, 319, 340 A.2d 236, 239-
40 (1975):
To sustain the contention advanced by the county would necessarily
lead to one of two possible consequences, both of which are regarded with
disfavor by this Court.  To ignore subsection (r) entirely would either mean its
repeal by implication, a construction which should be avoided, see Bd. of Fire
Comm’rs v. Potter, supra; Planning Comm. v. Silkor Corp., 246 Md. 516,
524-25, 229 A.2d 135 (1967); Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank, 205 Md.
48, 55-56, 106 A.2d 103 (1954); or that it be regarded as superfluous.  Absent
a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read
so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase, let alone an entire subsection, shall
be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.  St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 275 Md. 130, 339 A.2d 291
(1975); A. H. Smith Sand & Gravel v. Dep’t, supra, 270 Md. at 659 [, 313
A.2d 820]; Baltimore City v. United Stores, 250 Md. 361, 368-69, 243 A.2d
521 (1968).  
6
 See also Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387-89, 614 A.2d 590, 594-95 (1992).Subsequent
Injury Fund v. Teneyck, 317 Md. 626, 632, 566 A.2d 94, 97 (1989); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319
Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990) (“[W]e look first to its language, . . . we assume
that the words of the statute are intended to have their natural, ordinary and generally
understood meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” 
I have found no indication in the finite legislative history of the CPA that it was
intended to supplant, in its entirety, the long-established common law relating to negligence
actions brought by tenants against landlords.  It is, I respectfully suggest, the better view that
section 13-301(9) codified, as a statutory violation, what was already part of the common
law relating to negligence actions between tenants and landlords.  In that respect, the
common law requirement that, in order to be liable, a landlord had to have knowledge of the
defect or should have had such knowledge is preserved by the subsection (9) requirement
that the concealment must be knowing.   
The majority’s position, and its interpretation of Golt (and Richwind’s interpretation
of Golt) are contrary to the long-established common law relating to tenant/landlord
negligence actions.  We noted a firmly-established principle in Bradshaw v. Prince George’s
County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979), overruled in part  by James v. Prince
George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980), and Cox v. Prince George’s County,
296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), when we said: “It is presumed that the legislative body
did not intend to make any alteration of the common law other than what is plainly stated.”
7
See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131, 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984); Lutz v. State, 167 Md.
12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).
There is no plainly-stated intention expressed anywhere in the CPA that the common
law principles applicable to actions such as the instant case are to be repealed and substituted
with the strict liability cause of action the majority now bootstraps onto Golt, a decision that
merely held that a landlord is presumed to know the law.  To now hold that it makes no
difference whether a landlord actually knows the facts, or should know the facts, because the
CPA and Golt’s holding as to presumptions of law have turned tenant actions into strict
liability offenses, stretches Richwind’s misinterpretation of Golt to completely abrogate the
common law.  I see nothing in the statute, or its legislative history, supporting such a drastic
change in Maryland law.  Given the inclusion of subsection (9) in section 13-301 specifically
to create the offense of “knowing concealment,” such an intent, in my view, cannot be
implied from the general language of the statute.  
Judges Rodowsky and Raker have authorized me to state that they join in Part I of the
dissent.
Additional dissent follows next page:
8
Rodowsky, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  In addition to the unwarranted extension of Golt v. Phillips,
308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986), as described in Part I of Judge Cathell's dissenting opinion,
I believe that the Court, by superimposing the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) on a
negligence action for personal injuries, has created a hybrid that imposes liability without
fault--a result under the CPA that never could have been intended by the General Assembly
to apply to claims for personal injuries.
I
A legal premise of the majority opinion is that a cause of action lies under the CPA
if the deceptive trade practice occurred before the lease, when the practice had the "capacity,
tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading" the consumer, here, respondent's mother.
Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl. Vol.), § 13-301(1) of the Commercial Law Article (CL).
In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), the claim that
The larger question--whether the CPA applies at all to personal injury claims--was not argued or directly
1
addressed in Richwind.  In Berg v. Byrd, 124 Md. App. 208, 720 A.2d 1283 (1998), a landlord-tenant lead paint
case, the only issue was whether the injury, for which noneconomic damages were sought, arose after the effective
date of the cap on noneconomic damages.  Again, the larger question was not argued to, or directly addressed by,
the Court of Special Appeals. 
9
was asserted under the CPA was for personal injuries.  We held that a claim under the CPA
did not lie in that case because the Legislature did not intend "the CPA to be applicable to
statements or omissions concerning the leased premises occurring during the term of the
lease."  Id. at 683-84, 645 A.2d at 1158.  From this the majority assumes that Richwind
stands for the opposite result in the converse factual situation, that is, that the CPA applies
to personal injury claims if the deceptive trade practice occurs before the transaction has
been consummated, and the practice misleads the consumer into entering into the
transaction.   Under the majority's analysis, the critical time for a cause of action under the
1
CPA in the circumstances involved here was before the respondent's mother committed to
lease the apartment.
The factual foundation for the majority's CPA cause of action consists entirely of the
following passage from the direct examination of respondent's sister, Chekeda Hatcher (Ms.
Hatcher).  The background of the testimony is that Ms. Hatcher, her mother, the infant
plaintiff, and another brother had been living in Apartment 205 at 1411 Division Street in
Baltimore City.  In January 1990, the family moved to Apartment 310 in the same building
because Apartment 205 was too small.  
"Q
Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what was the
condition of Apartment 310 when you first moved in?
The majority opinion [slip op. at 3] states that Ms. Hatcher testified "that the petitioner was in the apartment
2
before the lease began, talking to her mother."  (Emphasis added).  I cannot conclude that the testimony, quoted
above, is susceptible of that interpretation.  Further, if the majority's interpretation were correct, and the
respondent's mother, the consumer here, had this conversation with petitioner in Apartment 310 before the lease
began, then the consumer would have seen the flaking paint prior to the lease as easily as did her daughter, Ms.
Hatcher, and the consumer would not have been misled. 
1
"A
It wasn't freshly painted.  It was paint like paint chips all--the
wall, the ceiling and around the door frame and in the windowsills and stuff.
"Q
Can you tell us specifically in what rooms did you see this
condition?
"A
It wasn't in the bathroom.  It was like in that first room and
then--mainly in the middle room.
"Q
Did you ever see [the petitioner] in Apartment 310?
"A
Yes.
"Q
Did you ever see [the petitioner] in Apartment 310 when you
first moved in?
"A
Uh-huh.
"Q
Okay, can you tell us about that?
"A
He had came up there, I guess, how my mother was talking, I
guess, I don't know.  But he was up there with my mother.
"Q
That was when you first moved into the apartment?
"A
Uh-huh."
In my opinion "when [the family] first moved in" refers to a time after the tenancy
began.   Under Ms. Hatcher's testimony the jury could infer that the petitioner had notice of
2
chipping paint at that time.  The circuit court instructed on the negligence count that, if the
petitioner had actual notice of chipping paint (not limited to lead-based), and if the jury
2
further found that the petitioner "had reason to know that any peeling paint in these premises
may contain lead-based paint," and if the other elements of a negligence action were present,
then the jury could find for the respondent.  This instruction was predicated on standard
landlord-tenant law under which the landlord, once having received notice of a defect, and,
having reason to know that it is dangerous, has a duty to repair.  The jury found for the
landlord on the negligence count.
In instructing on the CPA count, the court told the jury that it must find "that at the
beginning of the lease of Apartment 310" the petitioner "was aware of the [presence of]
chipping and flaking lead-based paint."  From Ms. Hatcher's testimony that there was flaking
paint in the apartment, observable to her while the petitioner was in Apartment 310 when the
family "first moved in," it is a fair inference that the flaking paint was also present prior to
the beginning of the lease.  But, evidence of notice after the family moved in is not evidence
that the landlord had notice prior to the beginning of the tenancy.  
Because the respondent failed to produce any evidence that the petitioner had notice
of flaking paint as of the critical time for CPA purposes, there could be no cause of action
under the CPA; consequently, the circuit court's inclusion in the CPA instruction of a
requirement for notice of flaking lead-based paint would be immaterial, unless no pre-lease
notice of flaking paint is required.  Even assuming that a CPA action lies for personal
injuries, this case does not involve whether a landlord must know that flaking paint is lead-
based paint in order for the action to lie.  Rather, the issue is whether the landlord must have
pre-lease notice of flaking paint for a CPA action to lie.
3
Inasmuch as there is no evidence that the petitioner was on pre-lease notice of flaking
paint, the only way in which an action under the CPA could lie, under the majority's view
of a CPA action and under the facts of this case, is if notice is not required for a CPA action.
The majority glosses over this substantial problem by creating a presumption that the
landlord is on pre-lease notice of any condition that a reasonable inspection of the apartment
would have revealed.  Further, the majority uses that fiction to create a deceptive trade
practice by holding that there is an implied misrepresentation resting on the landlord's silence
in not having advised the tenant prior to the lease about flaking paint on the premises.  In
short, the CPA action created by the majority rests on non-disclosure of that of which the
landlord had no notice at the critical time.  That is, to my mind, liability without fault, and
I do not believe that the General Assembly intended the CPA to have that effect in personal
injury actions.
II
Creating a presumption that a landlord knows of conditions that would be revealed
by a reasonable pre-occupancy inspection of the premises is indistinguishable from declaring
that there is a general tort duty to make a pre-occupancy inspection, even in the absence of
a contractual requirement.  As recently as 1994, this Court said that 
"a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises in order to determine
whether such conditions exist.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 cmt.
b (stating that a lessor 'is under no duty to his lessee ... to make such an
inspection').  See also Kleiman v. Mono of Maryland, Inc., 254 Md. 548,
553-55, 255 A.2d 393, 396-97 (1969) (adopting § 357 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and stating that a landlord is under no duty to inspect the
property unless a contract so provides); [State ex rel. Bohon v.] Feldstein, 207
4
Md. [20,] 33, 113 A.2d [100,] 106 [(1955)]; New Summit Associates v. Nistle,
73 Md. App. 351, 361, 533 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1987)."
Richwind, 335 Md. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1155.  In enacting the CPA, the General Assembly
could not have intended to overturn several centuries of landlord-tenant law concerning the
absence of a duty to inspect.  
Golt, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328, on which the majority relies, does not support
creating the duty.  As Judge Cathell points out in his dissenting opinion, Golt rests on the
principle that the landlord was chargeable with knowledge of the applicable legal
requirement that the premises be licensed.  That decision is not precedent for imputing to the
landlord knowledge of facts of which there is no notice.  
Further, the majority's combination of presumed knowledge and implied
misrepresentation creates, in effect, a warranty of habitability.  The General Assembly has
never enacted a warranty of habitability on a statewide basis for the market in previously-
occupied, residential-rental properties, and this Court should not use the CPA to create one.
By Chapter 481 of the Acts of 1971, the General Assembly did enact an implied
warranty of fitness for human habitation applicable to rental dwellings in Baltimore City.
See Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1980 ed., 1997 Cum. Supp.), § 9-14.1.
That enactment requires notice and, if notice is given, the remedies available and the time
within which to seek those remedies are restricted.  In relevant part § 9-14.1 provides:
"(a)
In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling
intended for human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and
warrant that the dwelling is fit for human habitation.  If the dwelling is not fit
for human habitation, the tenant, in addition to any remedies which he
5
otherwise has, is entitled to the following remedies that shall be exercised
within thirty (30) days of occupancy:
"(1)
An action or proceeding for breach of contract or
warranty which may include a prayer for rescission of the contract.
"(2)
Rescission of the contract including the return of all
deposits and money towards rent paid during the period of the breach of the
warranty of habitability and within the thirty (30) days of occupancy period.
Provided, however, that no action or proceeding for breach of the warranty of
habitability shall be instituted by any tenant unless the landlord has notice of
the conditions on the premises which constitute the breach of the warranty of
habitability.
"(b)
Definitions.
   
....
"(2)
For the purpose of this section 'notice' shall mean (a) a
violation notice from the Department of Housing and Community
Development or any other municipal or governmental agency, (b) a letter sent
by the tenant or his agent to the landlord by certified mail, or (c) actual notice
of the defects or conditions."
Nothing in the CPA undertakes to eliminate the notice requirement under the Baltimore City
Local Law.  Indeed, the CPA could not do so because any conflict between the CPA and § 9-
14.1 must be resolved in favor of the Public Local Law.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1998
Repl. Vol.), Art. 1, § 13.
It is true that the Baltimore City Housing Code establishes standards for the
maintenance of property, including that it be kept "in safe condition, and fit for human
habitation."  See Baltimore City Code (1976, 1983 Repl. Vol.), Art. 13, § 702.  In addition
to administrative enforcement, that statute creates a duty enforceable in a negligence action.
But, both the administrative enforcement and the private remedy for damages are subject to
The notice need not be that the flaking paint is lead-based.  We have recently so held in Brown v. Dermer, 357
3
Md. 344, 361, 744 A.2d 47, 56-57 (2000), a negligence action.  My disagreement with the majority is directed to
eliminating--by the device of putting a CPA label on a personal injury action--the requirement in personal injury
actions that the landlord have notice of flaking paint on the premises, whether lead-based or not.
6
the requirement that the landlord have notice of the violation.  See Richwind, 335 Md. at 673-
75, 645 A.2d at 1152-54.
At one point in the Richwind opinion, this Court referred to Article 13, §§ 702 and
703 of the Baltimore City Code as establishing an implied warranty of habitability.  Id. at
671, 645 A.2d at 1151.  We said that the warranty "necessarily includes flaking, loose or
peeling lead-based paint within the scope of hazardous conditions."  Id.  It is perhaps this
passage that led the circuit court in the instant matter to include lead-based paint specifically
in its instruction on the CPA.  As the majority notes, Baltimore City Code, Article 13,
§ 703(2)(c) requires the interior of premises to be "kept clean and free of any flaking, loose
or peeling paint and paper" without limitation to lead-based paint.  Nevertheless, even though
Richwind refers to Baltimore City Code §§ 702 and 703 as creating warranties, it is clear that
Richwind holds that an element of any action based on those warranties is notice.  
3
III
Implied misrepresentation is the device that the majority uses to get this action under
the CPA label in an attempt to justify eliminating any notice requirement from what is
otherwise a personal injury negligence action.  The argument runs this way.  The Baltimore
City Code requires rental premises to be free from flaking paint.  When the landlord rents
without telling the tenant about flaking paint, which the landlord is presumed to know, the
Whether the majority's personal injury action under the CPA is subject to a contributory negligence defense is for
4
another day.  
7
landlord misrepresents the condition of the premises.  If the paint, in fact, is flaking lead-
based paint, and injury is proximately caused, tort damages for personal injury may be
obtained under the consumer protection mantel.  
4
I, on the other hand, submit that if the overlay of the CPA and of the Housing Code
on the pre-lease negotiations in the instant matter results in an implied representation, any
implied representation is, under Golt, simply that the landlord will comply with the law and
repair an unsafe condition that is known to him or of which he has reason to know.
Further, the majority should not authorize converting negligence actions into implied
misrepresentation actions because of the great incentive that claimants have to use a CPA
action for as many negligence and products liability cases as the ingenuity of counsel can
conceive.  This is because the CPA changes the ordinary American rule and authorizes the
court to award reasonable attorney's fees.  CL § 13-408(b).  An anomalous and unfair result
of the majority's holding, whereby an ordinary negligence action is converted into a
misrepresentation violative of the CPA, is that a consumer who is injured by the negligence
of a merchant may recover counsel fees on top of tort damages, but, when two motor
vehicles, driven by strangers, collide, the party who is not at fault must pay counsel fees out
of the tort recovery.   
I would not transform the CPA into the basis for an omnibus claim that eliminates any
of the elements of recognized causes of action for personal injuries.  Here the respondent lost
8
his negligence claim by the verdict of a properly instructed jury.  The additional cause of
action that the majority today creates under the CPA is landlord tort liability, but without the
element of notice. 
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judges Raker and Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed
herein.
9