Title: Yeagle v. Collegiate Times

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SHARON D. YEAGLE 
 
v. 
Record No. 971304  OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
       February 27, 1998  
COLLEGIATE TIMES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
correctly dismissed a defamation action because the phrase at 
issue could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual 
facts about the plaintiff as a matter of law. 
Sharon D. Yeagle is employed as an assistant to the Vice 
President of Student Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University.  As part of her responsibilities, she 
facilitated the participation of students in the 1996 
Governor's Fellows Program.  The Collegiate Times, the 
University's student newspaper, published an article 
describing the University's successful placement of students 
in the program.  The text of the article surrounded a block 
quotation in larger print attributed to Yeagle.  Beneath the 
quotation, the phrase "Director of Butt Licking" was printed 
under Yeagle's name. 
Yeagle filed a motion for judgment against the Collegiate 
Times, alleging that the phrase "Director of Butt Licking" 
constituted common law defamation, defamation per se, and use 
of insulting words under Code § 8.01-45.  The trial court 
sustained the Collegiate Times' demurrer on all counts and 
dismissed the case.  The trial court held that the phrase at 
issue was "void of any literal meaning," and that it would be 
unreasonable to interpret the phrase as conveying any factual 
information about Yeagle. 
We awarded Yeagle an appeal limited to the question 
whether the trial court erred in holding that, as a matter of 
law, the phrase "Director of Butt Licking" cannot convey a 
defamatory meaning.  We conclude that the trial court did not 
err in sustaining the demurrer because the offending phrase 
cannot support an action for defamation -- an issue properly 
determined by the court as a matter of law. 
Causes of action for defamation have their basis in state 
common law but are subject to principles of freedom of speech 
arising under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The United States Supreme Court has identified 
constitutional limits on the type of speech that may be the 
subject of common law defamation actions.  Thus, speech which 
 
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does not contain a provably false factual connotation,1 or 
statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about a person cannot form the basis of a common 
law defamation action.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
U.S. 1, 16-17, 20 (1990). 
In considering the type of speech that falls beyond that 
which can support a defamation action, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that speakers may use language 
that is insulting, offensive, or otherwise inappropriate, but 
constitutes no more than "rhetorical hyperbole."  Examples 
include referring to the negotiating position of a real estate 
developer as "blackmail," Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970), defining a labor union 
"scab" to be a "traitor," Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 
264, 284-86 (1974), or publishing a parody of an advertisement 
referring to a public figure, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).  In each of these instances, 
no reasonable inference could be drawn that the individual 
                     
1 Speech which does not contain a provably false factual 
connotation is sometimes referred to as "pure expressions of 
opinion," see, e.g., Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233, 
455 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1995), although the Supreme Court has 
specifically declined to hold that statements of opinion are 
categorically excluded as the basis for a common law 
defamation cause of action.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
497 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1990).  
 
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identified in the statements, as a matter of fact, engaged in 
the conduct described.  The statements could not reasonably be 
understood to convey a false representation of fact.  See 
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17. 
Similarly, we have recognized that words used to describe 
a member of a labor union in the course of a labor dispute, 
while "disgusting, abusive, [and] repulsive," will not support 
a cause of action for defamation for the same reason –- they 
could not "reasonably be understood . . . to convey a false 
representation of fact."  Crawford v. United Steel Workers, 
AFL-CIO, 230 Va. 217, 234-35, 335 S.E.2d 828, 839 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986).  While Crawford involved 
statements made in the context of a labor dispute which, under 
federal law, requires a wider tolerance of rhetoric which 
might otherwise support an action for defamation, the case 
nevertheless reaffirms that, to be actionable, the alleged 
defamatory statements must still be understood to convey a 
false representation of fact.  See also Freedlander v. Edens 
Broadcasting, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 221, 225-27 (E.D. Va. 1990); 
Polish Am. Immigration Relief Comm., Inc. v. Relax, 189 A.D.2d 
370, 373-74, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758-59 (1993). 
Whether statements complained of in a defamation action 
fall within the type of speech which will support a state 
 
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defamation action is a matter for the trial judge to determine 
as a matter of law, just as the trial judge, not the finder of 
fact, must determine whether a statement is defamatory per se 
because it imputes the commission of a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 335 S.E.2d 
97, 102 (1985); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 
Va. 142, 148, 334 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1985).  
Yeagle argues that the demurrer should have been 
overruled and the case resolved by a jury because the phrase 
at issue conveys factual information and thus can support her 
action for defamation.  Yeagle argues that a literal 
interpretation of the phrase imputes to her a criminal offense 
involving moral turpitude under the sodomy statute, § 18.2-
361(A), and the phrase, therefore, is defamatory per se.2  She 
also asserts that the phrase carries with it the implication 
that she curries favor with others by disingenuous behavior or 
directs others to do so.  According to Yeagle, such an 
implication is defamatory per se because it suggests that she 
                     
2 A statement is defamatory per se if it (1) imputes the 
commission of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude for 
which a party may be convicted; (2) imputes that the person is 
infected with a contagious disease which would exclude the 
party from society; (3) imputes an unfitness to perform the 
duties of a job or a lack of integrity in the performance of 
the duties; or (4) prejudices the party in her profession or 
 
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performs the duties of her job in an artificial, shallow, or 
other manner that generally lacks integrity, and it prejudices 
her in her career.  Finally, she argues that, even if the 
phrase is not defamatory per se, it is actionable defamation 
because it injures her reputation and holds her up to 
ridicule, citing Adams v. Lawson, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 250, 255-
56 (1867).  We disagree. 
The threshold issue, whether the complained of phrase 
including inferences fairly attributable to it could 
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about Yeagle 
and, therefore, be actionable defamation, is a matter of law 
to be resolved by the trial court.  In this case, the phrase 
"Director of Butt Licking" is no more than "rhetorical 
hyperbole."  The phrase is disgusting, offensive, and in 
extremely bad taste, but it cannot reasonably be understood as 
stating an actual fact about Yeagle's job title or her 
conduct, or that she committed a crime of moral turpitude.  
Yeagle's assertion that the phrase connotes a lack of 
integrity in the performance of her duties also fails and, 
therefore, cannot properly be considered as the basis for a 
defamation action.  While "every fair inference" in a pleading 
                                                                
trade.  Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 
635 (1981).  
 
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may be used to determine whether the words complained of are 
capable of a meaning ascribed by innuendo, inferences cannot 
extend the statements, by innuendo, beyond what would be the 
ordinary and common acceptance of the statement.  Carwile v. 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 8, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 
(1954).  Applying this principle, a statement that an attorney 
did not report certain payments cannot be extended by 
inference to mean that the attorney acted improperly, for 
purposes of a defamation action.  Perk v. Vector Resources 
Group, Ltd., 253 Va. 310, 316-17, 485 S.E.2d 140, 143-44 
(1997).  In this case, as we have said, the litigated phrase 
itself cannot be taken as asserting actual facts about Yeagle.  
Furthermore, considering the phrase at issue in the context of 
the entire article, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 
234 Va. 277, 297-98, 362 S.E.2d 32, 43 (1987); The Gazette v. 
Harris, 229 Va. 1, 22-23, 305 S.E.2d 713, 729 (1985), we find 
nothing which supports an inference that Yeagle performed her 
job with a lack of integrity or that she directed others to do 
so.  The article was complimentary of Yeagle and the program 
with which she was associated.  
Accordingly, because the phrase at issue could not 
reasonably be considered as conveying factual information 
about Yeagle, and therefore could not support a cause of 
 
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action for defamation, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
 
 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether the phrase “Director 
of Butt Licking” conveys any defamatory factual information 
about Yeagle.  While the trial court must determine as a 
matter of law whether this phrase is defamatory per se, Chaves 
v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985), in 
ruling on a demurrer, the trial court is “confined to the 
legal sufficiency of a pleading, and [must not consider] 
disputed facts.”  Hop-In Food Stores, Inc. v. Serv-N-Save, 
Inc., 237 Va. 206, 209, 375 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1989) (citing 
Bellamy v. Gates and Gill, 214 Va. 314, 315-16, 200 S.E.2d 
533, 534 (1973)).  “A demurrer admits the truth of all 
properly pleaded material facts.  ‘All reasonable factual 
inferences fairly and justly drawn from the facts alleged must 
be considered in aid of the pleading.’”  Ward’s Equipment v. 
New Holland North America, 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 
518 (1997) (quoting Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 71, 372 S.E.2d 
373, 374 (1988)). 
 
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Collegiate Times acknowledges that the phrase “Director 
of Butt Licking” implies that a person either curries favors 
with others by disingenuous behavior such as fawning or 
directs others to do so.  In fact, the trial court recognized 
that this title conveys the inference that Yeagle “cultivates 
favors from others or directs those who do.”  “In order to 
render words defamatory and actionable it is not necessary 
that the defamatory charge be in direct terms but it may be 
made indirectly, and it matters not how artful or disguised 
the modes in which the meaning is concealed if it is in fact 
defamatory.”  Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, 196 Va. 1, 7, 82 
S.E.2d 588, 592 (1954).  
The phrase is a factual assertion regarding Yeagle’s job 
performance and imputes to her an unfitness to perform the 
duties of her job or lack of integrity in the performance of 
such duties.  Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 
632, 635 (1981).  The phrase also prejudices Yeagle in her 
profession.  Id.  At common law, defamatory words are 
actionable per se if they satisfy either of these criteria.  
Id.
For these reasons, I dissent and would reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 
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