Title: STATE v HUBBARD

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-482 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 STATE OF MONTBATA, Plaintiff and Respondent, JOHN ALDIN HUBBARD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judiciai District, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable Jack Shanstrom, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Sandra K. Watts argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Dorothy McCarter arqued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: June 23, 1982 Decided: August 25, 1982 Piled: Clerk Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Pursuant t o a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement, d e f e n d a n t plead g u i l t y t o t h e crime of n e g l i g e n t homicide. The D i s t r i c t Court sentenced d e f e n d a n t t o c o n s e c u t i v e terms of t e n y e a r s imprisonment f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide and f i v e y e a r s f o r t h e use of a weapon i n committing t h a t crime. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e s e n t e n c e . T h i s is t h e second t i m e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e h a s come b e f o r e t h i s Court. Following an e a r l y morning s h o o t o u t i n a G r e a t F a l l s t r a i l e r c o u r t i n which two men were k i l l e d , defendant Hubbard and a n o t h e r were t r i e d and c o n v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and b u r g l a r y , r e s p e c t i v e l y . W e r e v e r s e d Hubbard's c o n v i c t i o n and remanded f o r a new t r i a l . S t a t e v. F i s h e t a l . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mon t . - , 621 P.2d 1072, 37 St-Rep. 2065, O n remand, t h e Honorable J a c k D. Shanstrom was sub- s t i t u t e d a s t h e p r e s i d i n g judge. An amended i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d charging Hubbard w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide. A w r i t t e n p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e m e n t was s i g n e d and f i l e d w h e r e i n d e f e n d a n t agreed t o plead g u i l t y t o t h e crime of n e g l i g e n t I~omicide and acknowledged t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s t a t u t e enhancing t h e p e n a l t y f o r use of a weapon i n t h a t crime might be a p p l i e d t o him. O n May 14, 1981, a h e a r i n g was h e l d wherein defendant t e s t i f i e d t o h i s s t a t e of mind a t t h e time of t h e crime; e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was under some d u r e s s a t t h a t time; and f r i e n d s and a deputy s h e r i f f t e s t i f i e d concerning e v e n t s t h a t occurred on t h e n i g h t of t h e crime. A d d i t i o n a l l y , a p s y c h i a t r i s t a t t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s 1979 d i a g n o s i s of d e f e n d a n t a s a n t i s o c i a l was i n a c c u r a t e . The following day a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g was h e l d which included testimony by t h e d i s t r i c t p r o b a t i o n and p a r o l e o f f i c e r , a c l i n i c a l p s y c h o l o g i s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s mother and t h e defendant himself. Following t h i s h e a r i n g Judge Shanstrom r u l e d t h a t t h e enhancement s t a t u t e a p p l i e d t o n e g l i g e n t homicide and t h a t none of t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e d . He sentenced t h e defendant t o c o n s e c u t i v e terms of t e n y e a r s imprisonment f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide and f i v e y e a r s f o r t h e use of a weapon i n t h a t crime. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h i s s e n t e n c e r a i s i n g t h e following s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r : (1) Does t h e s t a t u t e enhancing t h e p e n a l t y f o r use of a weapon i n t h e commission of a crime a p p l y t o n e g l i g e n t homicide? ( 2 ) Was d e f e n d a n t denied due p r o c e s s by i n c l u s i o n of n e g l i g e n t homicide i n t h e enhancement s t a t u t e ? ( 3 ) Does t h e record show t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c t i n g under unusual and s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s p r e c l u d i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e enhancement s t a t u t e ? ( 4 ) Was e r r o r committed by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge i n a d m i t t i n g testimony amounting t o r e t r i a l of t h e o r i g i n a l charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and i n s e n t e n c i n g d e f e n d a n t on an incomplete reading of t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t ? ( 5 ) Was d e f e n d a n t p r e j u d i c e d by t h e 1979 d i a g n o s i s of defendant a s a n t i s o c i a l which was l a t e r r e t r a c t e d ? ( 6 ) Does j u s t i c e r e q u i r e t h e f ive-year enhancement t o be served c o n s e c u t i v e l y r a t h e r than c o n c u r r e n t l y ? The s t a t u t e s a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e a r e s e t o u t below: "46-18-221. A d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e f o r o f f e n s e s committed w i t h a dangerous weapon. (1) A per- son who h a s been found g u i l t y of any o f f e n s e and who, w h i l e engaged i n t h e commission o f t h e o f f e n s e , knowingly d i s p l a y e d , brandished, o r o t h e r w i s e u s e d a f i r e a r m , d e s t r u c t i v e d e v i c e , a s d e f i n e d i n 45-8-332(1), o r o t h e r dangerous weapon s h a l l , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e punishment provided f o r t h e commission of such o f f e n s e , be sentenced t o a term of imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n of n o t l e s s than 2 y e a r s o r more than 10 y e a r s , e x c e p t a s provided i n 46-18-222. " ( 4 ) An a d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l run c o n s e c u t i v e l y t o t h e s e n t e n c e provided f o r t h e o f f e n s e . "46-18-222. - - - - - Exceptions t o mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s and r e s t r i c t i o n s on d e f e r r e d impos- t i o n and s u s ~ e n d e d e x e c u t i o n of sentence. A l l mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s p r e s c r i b e d by t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e and t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on d e f e r r e d imposition and suspended e x e c u t i o n of s e n t e n c e . . . do n o t apply i f : " ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t , a t t h e time of t h e com- mission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he is t o be s e n t e n c e d , was a c t i n g under unusual and sub- s t a n t i a l d u r e s s , although n o t such d u r e s s a s would c o n s t i t u t e a d e f e n s e t o t h e prosecu- t i o n ; I' W e w i l l combine our d i s c u s s i o n of t h e f i r s t and second i s s u e s because of t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . A p p e l l a n t contends t h a t (1) t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of t h e above s t a t u t e s d e m o n s t r a t e s a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o i n c l u d e v i o l e n t c r i m e s ( n o t n e g l i g e n t homicide) w i t h i n t h e ambit of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n , ( 2 ) t h e r e is l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o exclude r e s u l t - o r i e n t e d c r i m e s n o t c o m m i t t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y l i k e n e g l i g e n t homicide, and ( 3 ) t h a t s i n c e s e c t i o n 46-18-221 (1) r e q u i r e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t knowingly used a f i r e a r m , i t cannot be used t o enhance a s e n t e n c e f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide where no s p e c i f i c i n t e n t is r e q u i r e d and t o do so v i o l a t e s d e f e n d a n t ' s procedural due p r o c e s s r i g h t s . I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e , t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a - t u r e is c o n t r o l l i n g . S e c t i o n 1-2-102, MCA; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 668, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . The i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, and i f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e can be so determined, t h e c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y any o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., s u p r a , and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . Where, a s h e r e , t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e is p l a i n , unambiguous, d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e speaks f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e is nothing l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o c o n s t r u e . S t a t e v. Roberts ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. , 633 P.2d 1214, 38 St.Rep. 1551. The s t a t u t e p l a i n l y s a y s t h a t "a person who has been found g u i l t y of any o f f e n s e " and while engaged i n t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e knowingly u s e s a f i r e a r m is s u b j e c t t o an enhanced p e n a l t y of two t o t e n y e a r s . There is simply no reason f o r t h e use of l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y t o c o n s t r u e a s t a t u t e where t h e language is c l e a r and unambiguous on its f a c e . Nor do we s e e any c o n f l i c t between t h e "knowingly" mental s t a t e r e q u i r e d by t h e enhancement s t a t u t e and t h e " n e g l i g e n t l y " m e n t a l s t a t e a s i t a p p l i e s t o n e g l i g e n t homicide. Negligent homicide is d e f i n e d a s follows: "Negligent homicide. (1) C r i m i n a l homicide c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n t homicide when i t is committed n e g l i g e n t l y . " S e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA. "Negligently" is d e f i n e d a s : " (37) 'Negligently1--a person a c t s n e g l i g e n t - l y with r e s p e c t t o a r e s u l t o r t o a circum- s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he c o n s c i o u s l y d i s r e g a r d s a r i s k t h a t t h e r e s u l t w i l l o c c u r o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s o r when he d i s r e g a r d s a r i s k of which he should be aware t h a t t h e r e s u l t w i l l occur o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s . The r i s k must be of such a n a t u r e and degree t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d i t i n v o l v e s a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d of conduct t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e person would o b s e r v e i n t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . 'Gross d e v i a t i o n ' means a d e v i a t i o n t h a t is c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n l a c k of o r d i n a r y c a r e . Relevant terms such a s ' n e g l i g e n t ' and ' w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ' have t h e same meaning ." S e c t i o n 45-2-101 (37) , MCA. "Knowingly" is d e f i n e d a s : " (33) 'Knowingly'--a person a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o conduct o r t o a circumstance d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he is aware of h i s conduct o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s , A person a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of conduct de- s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he is aware t h a t it is h i g h l y probable t h a t such r e s u l t w i l l be caused by h i s conduct. When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u - l a r f a c t is an element of an o f f e n s e , such knowledge is e s t a b l i s h e d i f a person is aware of a high p r o b a b i l i t y of its e x i s t e n c e . Equi- v a l e n t t e r m s s u c h a s ' k n o w i n g ' o r ' w i t h knowledge' have t h e same meaning ." S e c t i o n 45-2-101 (33) , MCA. A person can knowingly use a f i r e a r m and s t i l l be n e g l i g e n t by g r o s s l y d e v i a t i n g from t h e conduct of a reason- a b l e person i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n with regard t o t h e r e s u l t s of h i s a c t i o n s . See, S t a t e v. P i e r c e (No. 81-343, decided J u l y 7, 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mont, -' - P,2d - 1 - S t .Rep. There is no c o n f l i c t between t h e s e two s t a t u t e s . W e do n o t f i n d a p p e l l a n t ' s due p r o c e s s arguments per- s u a s i v e and much of what was s a i d above a p p l i e s t o t h i s c o n t e n t i o n a l s o . W e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does n o t offend due p r o c e s s r i g h t s . S t a t e v , Davison ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. - - , 614 P.2d 489, 37 St.Rep. 1135. A p p e l l a n t has c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y i n p o i n t f o r h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e . W e d e c l i n e t o hold t h e enhancement s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on t h i s b a s i s . With regard t o t h e t h i r d i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t t h e f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t defendant was under unusual and s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-18- 2 2 2 ( 3 ) , MCA, an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e enhancement s t a t u t e . Appel- l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ( w h i c h r e q u i r e s " e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l s t r e s s , " s e c t i o n 45-5-103, MCA) b e a r s t h i s o u t . A p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e following f a c t s i n d i c a t e d e f e n d a n t was under t h e r e q u i s i t e amount of d u r e s s : defendant had j u s t seen h i s f r i e n d s h o t , had been s h o t a t h i m s e l f , had had a gun pointed i n h i s f a c e , and had w r e s t l e d t h e gun away from its owner. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e was "a c e r t a i n amount of d u r e s s " i n t h i s c a s e , it was n o t "unusual o r s u b s t a n t i a l , " t r i g g e r i n g s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA. There was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and we uphold i t h e r e . The D i s t r i c t Court made t h e following s t a t e m e n t s i n t h i s r e g a r d , addressed t o t h e defendant: "By your own admission you o n l y intended t o 'wing' him. You s a i d , 'He s h o t Dale, so I s h o t him.' And then t h e s t a t e m e n t was made t h a t you o n l y s h o t t o wound him. Then you made t h e s t a t e m e n t , 'Nobody s t i c k s a gun i n m y f a c e and g e t s away with it.' And, 'He d e s e r v e s t o die--he d o e s n ' t d e s e r v e t o l i v e . ' 'He k i l l e d m y f r i e n d , so I k i l l e d him.' I t h i n k t h a t a l l of t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s , among o t h e r s , i n d i c a t e an i n t e n t t o g e t even by t h e use of d i r e c t , p h y s i c a l f o r c e , a weapon." The defendant a l s o had t h e presence of mind t o tem- p o r a r i l y i n c a p a c i t a t e t h e owner of t h e gun by kicking him i n t h e g r o i n . F i n a l l y , defendant s h o t and k i l l e d a man running away from him who posed no immediate t h r e a t t o him. These f a c t s do n o t i n d i c a t e unusual o r s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s b u t r a t h e r a revengeful a t t i t u d e on d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r t , seeking t o make t h e k i l l e r "pay" f o r shooting h i s f r i e n d . There was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e District Court i n s o r u l i n g , S t a t e v. Metz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. - , 604 P.2d 102, 36 S t .Rep. 2261. Next, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g testimony which amounted t o a r e t r i a l on t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge and by f a i l i n g t o read t h e e n t i r e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t . W e w i l l a d d r e s s t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n f i r s t . The D i s t r i c t Court judges of t h i s s t a t e a r e burdened with heavy c a s e l o a d s a s it is. W e a r e l o a t h e t o hold t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of a D i s t r i c t Court judge t o read every word of a t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t mandates a r e v e r s a l , Nor do we f i n d any e r r o r i n t h e admission of t e s t i - mony by t h e District Court. Such a h e a r i n g a s was h e l d h e r e is r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-223, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : "Hearing t o d e t e r m i n e - - - a p p l i c a t i o n o f - - excep- t i o n s . (1) When t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of an excep- t i o n provided f o r i n 46-18-222 is an i s s u e , t h e c o u r t s h a l l g r a n t t h e defendant a h e a r i n g p r i o r t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e t o d e t e r - mine t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e e x c e p t i o n ." To determine whether t h e d e f e n d a n t was o p e r a t i n g under sub- s t a n t i a l o r unusual d u r e s s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court must neces- s a r i l y c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t s l e a d i n g up t o t h e f a t a l s h o o t i n g s . T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y t r u e h e r e s i n c e t h e t r i a l judge was n o t t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge. A p p e l l a n t ' s £ i f t h i s s u e i n v o l v e s whether t h e defen- d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d with r e s p e c t t o a wrongful d i a g n o s i s by Montana S t a t e P r i s o n o f f i c i a l s on t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t . T h i s p o i n t is r a i s e d because t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t who prepared t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t i n 1979 (wherein he diagnosed t h e d e f e n d a n t a s being a n t i s o c i a l ) t e s t i f i e d a t t h e May 1 4 , 1981 h e a r i n g t h a t h i s d i a g n o s i s was i n a c c u r a t e . A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s e r r o r because t h e D i s t r i c t Court considered t h i s r e p o r t i n s e n t e n c i n g t h e defendant. A p p e l l a n t r e f e r s u s t o t h e following language i n t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r of May 27, 1981: "The Court, having heard and c o n s i d e r e d o r a l arguments t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l of t h e testimony and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e v a r i o u s p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t s , t h e d i a g n o s t i c e v a l u a t i o n from t h e Montana state P r i s o n a n 5 t h e t r a n s c r i p t s , and being f u l l y advised . . ." (Emphasis added.) Appellant h a s c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s novel a s s e r t i o n , and we r e j e c t it. The s e n t e n c i n g judge heard t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t t e s t i f y regarding h i s mistaken d i a g n o s i s , and t h e r e is no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he d i d n o t a b i d e by t h i s testimony. T1-ke mere r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e p o r t i n t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t ground f o r r e v e r s a l . A p p e l l a n t ' s f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n a l l e g e s e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s s e n t e n c e r e q u i r i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i v e y e a r s t o r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y , r a t h e r t h a n c o n c u r r e n t l y . Although t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e run c o n s e c u t i v e l y ( s e c t i o n 46-18-221(4), MCA, s u p r a ) , a t t h e time t h i s d e f e n d a n t was sentenced t h e c o u r t had d i s c r e t i o n t o r e q u i r e t h e e n h a n c e d s e n t e n c e t o r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y . However, t h i s g o e s t o t h e e q u i t y of t h e s e n t e n c e r a t h e r t h a n i t s l e g a l i t y and should be d i r e c t e d t o t h e Sentence Review Board and n o t t h i s C o u r t , S t a t e v. Metz, supra. A p p e l l a n t s h o u l d t a k e up t h e s e c o n c e r n s w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y . Affirmed. T ~ u * e . d i t w m e Chief J u s t i c e We concur: Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g : I a m not e a s i l y moved t o d i s s e n t b u t , "Qui f o r t i t e r emungit, e l i c i t sanguinem" -- "He who wrings t h e nose s t r o n g l y brings blood." Proverbs XXX, 33. M y nose has been s t r o n g l y wrung. I a m not unmindful of t h e c l o s e and c o n s t a n t i n t e r a c t i o n between " f a c t s " and "law." However, any j u d i c i a l deception t h a t e x i s t s is more l i k e l y t o apply t o t h e f a c t s r a t h e r than the law. I have labored with t h e f a c t s of t h i s case s i n c e 1978 when I received t h e assignment t o examine a D i s t r i c t Court d e n i a l of b a i l t o defendant Hubbard. M y examination produced a normal young man, employed, e t c . , no previous record. I n s h o r t , nothing i n t h e personal record would m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t a reasonable b a i l . This Court agreed, and we s e t b a i l . T h e r e a f t e r , i n 1980, I was assigned S t a t e v. Fish and Hubbard on appeal a £ t e r t r i a l . S t a t e v. F i s h and Hubbard ( 1 9 8 o ) t - Mont . , 621 P.2d 1072, 37 St.Kep. 2065. The a u t h o r i t i e s a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court l e v e l took an unusually s t r o n q s t a n d a g a i n s t t h e s e defendants which was not supported by t h e t r i a l record. I authored an opinion w i t h a unanimous C o u r t a n d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , s e t t h e f a c t s s t r a i g h t based on t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t . A person g e t s a f e e l i n g reading a t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t , where t h e r e is insuf- f i c i e n t evidence t o s u s t a i n a conviction, t h a t perhaps t h i n g s a r e done t h a t a r e not compatible with due process or f a i r play. T h i s moved t h e Court i n its r e v e r s a l t o q u i e t l y admonish t h e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , " d o n ' t do it again." The handling of t h i s matter i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court c r e a t e d a s o r d i d mess w i t h the appearance of an e f f o r t t o r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e s t a t u s quo t h a t e x i s t e d p r i o r t o our r e v e r s a l on a p p e a l . So, t h e s e n t e n c e p r o c e d u r e t h a t r e s u l t e d from a broken p l e a b a r g a i n and t h e unusual s e n t e n c e h a s been appealed a g a i n t o t h i s Court. The f a c t s i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n t h a t presume t o have examined t h i s m a t t e r a r e o u t r a g e o u s l y i n a c c u r a t e . They a r e s l a n t e d and l i m i t e d i n such a manner a s t o produce an appearance of extreme c r i m i n a l i t y and p u r p o s e f u l g u i l t upon t h e d e f e n d a n t . T h i s is a l l i n d i r e c t d e f i a n c e of t h e f a c t s a s t h e y were found t o be from t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d of t h e t r i a l ! I w i l l q u o t e a s m a l l p o r t i o n of t h e a p p e a l d e c i s i o n found r e p o r t e d 621 P.2d a t 1078. T h i s was p a r t of t h e d i s - c u s s i o n on t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y c h a r g e s which were r e v e r s e d : " I n f u r t h e r s u p p o r t of t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h e o r y , t h e S t a t e draws on t h e time F i s h , Hubbard and Lodge were t o g e t h e r e a r l i e r i n t h e evening and on i s o l a t e d remarks overheard from them, a l l e g e d l y of an e x c e e d i n g l y v i o - l e n t n a t u r e and t h a t a l l t h r e e were a g a i n p r e s e n t a t M i l l e r ' s t r a i l e r when Lodge ap- proached t h e t r a i l e r door. Yet, t h e record is b a r e of any evidence of any p r e p a r a t i o n by any of t h e t h r e e t o c a r r y o u t t h e s e a l l e g e d t h r e a t s ; no one was armed, n o t even w i t h a s t i c k o r rock. The r e c o r d is more compatible w i t h a n i n t e n t by F i s h t o e n g a g e i n a f i s t f i g h t - - t o which he admits. The S t a t e admits i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t no weapons were found when t h e v e h i c l e s were s e a r c h e d . Miller was t h e o n l y p e r s o n armed. W e acknowledge t h a t t h e r e was a n uncommon amount o f a c t i v i t y t h a t evening t h a t made its way i n t o t h e r e c o r d , b u t we a r e compelled t o r e j e c t t h e c o n c l u s i o n reached from t h i s by t h e S t a t e . " (Emphasis added. ) The j u r y a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e t h e o r y o f f e r e d by t h e S t a t e . The e n t i r e second i s s u e i n t h e a p p e a l c a s e had t o do w i t h Hubbard's s t a t e of mind, y e t t h e t r i a l judge on sen- t e n c e h e l d a new h e a r i n g and r e c e i v e d evidence WE HELD ON THE APPEAL WAS NOT RELEVANT. The problem t h a t Judge Shanstrom h a s is t h a t he is t r y i n g t o give t h e defendant the maximum i n terms of sen- tence on a minimum record and refused t o c o n s u l t or be guided by our appeal opinion which I i n s i s t is t h e law of t h e case. The f a c t s simply s t a t e d a r e t h a t defendant Hubbard's judgment may have been f a u l t y i n i t i a l l y by p e r m i t t i n g h i s s i s t e r t o persuade him t o j o i n t h e group, " t o make s u r e t h e r e is a f a i r f i g h t . " This e v e n t u a l l y l e d him t o t h e t r a i l e r park and t h e problems found t h e r e . Nevertheless, he was by t h e t r i a l record a "bystander." A s t h e t r i a l record i n d ~ c a t e s , none of t h e young people were armed, not even with a s t i c k . M i l l e r s h o t through t h e door and wounded a l l t h r e e persons standing there--one f a t a l l y . A l l r e t r e a t e d except t h e dead person. Miller came o u t and f i r e d two rounds i n Hubbard's d i r e c t i o n , appeared a t t h e s i d e of h i s car i n t h e dark, put a gun i n h i s f a c e , and profanely threatened t o k i l l Hubbard. Hubbard wrested the gun from M i l l e r and t h e r e s t is h i s t o r y . The p o i n t of a l l t h i s is, i n t h e judge's opinion, t h a t Hubbard a t t h i s p o i n t was n o t under unusual o r substan- t i a l duress. This is c o n t r a r y t o our f i n d i n g s on t h e o r i g i n a l appeal. I would l i k e t o move away from t h e f a c t s and i n t o t h e law applied a g a i n s t t h e defendant by t h e lower c o u r t , t h a t r e s u l t e d i n an i n c r e a s e of p e n a l t y t o f i f t e e n years. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o apply t h e enhance- ment s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 46-18-221, PICA, and add an e x t r a f i v e y e a r s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s sentence f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide should be reversled on t h r e e grounds. F i r s t , because t h e enhance- ment s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t , "knowingly," it is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms t o a p p l y it t o a s i t u a t i o n where a d m i t t e d l y d e f e n d a n t a c t e d o n l y " n e g l i g e n t l y . " To s a y t h a t a p e r s o n may a c t "knowingly" and " n e g l i g e n t l y " a t t h e same t i m e and d u r i n g t h e same act c r e a t e s a vague, c o n f u s i n g and a r b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d of conduct. Secondly, and more i m p o r t a n t t o due p r o c e s s , t h e District Court d i s r u p t e d t h e p l e a bar- g a i n i n g p r o c e s s by a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e n e g o t i a - t i o n s . Such a c t i o n s by a t r i a l c o u r t have been condemned i n numerous cases. See, Annot., 10 ALR4th 689, e t s e q . L a s t l y , even i f t h e enhancement s t a t u t e is a p p l i e d t o t h i s case, t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t a c t i n g under s u f f i c i e n t d u r e s s t o meet t h e s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s of t h e enhancement s t a t u t e . See, s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA. The c o n t r o l l i n g language h e r e is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e enhancement s t a t u t e which p r o v i d e s i n p a r t t h a t a p e r s o n is s u b j e c t t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i f he ". . . knowingly d i s p l a y e d , b r a n d i s h e d , o r o t h e r w i s e used a f i r e a r m . . ." T h i s Court h a s h e l d t h a t when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d t h e new c r i m i n a l code i n 1973, it s u b s t i t u t e d t h e words " p u r p o s e l y " and "knowingly" f o r t h e words " f e l o n i o u s l y " and " i n t e n t i o n a l l y . " S t a t e v. K l e i n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75. By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e n , s t a t u t e s c o n t a i n i n g t h e word "knowingly" c o n t a i n a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t . Also by d e f i n i t i o n , a c t i n g "knowingly" is n o t a c t i n g a c c i d e n t l y . S t a t e v. S e i t z i n g e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 136, 589 P.2d 655. I n c o n t r a s t , " n e g l i g e n t l y , " by d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r s t o t h e commission of an act w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t o r knowledge. See d e f i n i t i o n i n s e c t i o n 45-2-101(37), MCA. N e v e r t h e l e s s , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g t h e i n t e n t of d e f e n d a n t was r e p e a t e d l y brought i n t o e v i d e n c e over t h e o b j e c t i o n of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . The S t a t e w i t h t h e encourage- m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n e f f e c t r e t r i e d d e f e n d a n t f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide. See comment, s u p r a . The District Court r a t i o n a l i z e d t h e use of such e v i - dence by t r y i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e knowing use of t h e f i r e - arm from t h e crime committed. T h i s c a n n o t be done s i m p l y because it s u b j e c t s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o proof of a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t where a d m i t t e d l y no s p e c i f i c i n t e n t is p r e s e n t . I n e s s e n c e , n e g l i g e n t homicide h a s been r e d e f i n e d as an act committed " knowingly," d e p r i v i n g d e f e n d a n t of h i s r i g h t t o e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n and due p r o c e s s and c r e a t i n g a vague s t a t u t e . A s t h e Washington Supreme Court s t a t e d : ". . . S t a t u t e s which d e f i n e c r i m e s must b e s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e i r words t o a s s u r e t h a t c i t i - z e n s have a d e q u a t e n o t i c e of t h e terms of t h e law, as r e q u i r e d by due p r o c e s s . 'Men of common i n t e l l i g e n c e cannot be r e q u i r e d t o g u e s s a t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e e n a c t m e n t . ' W i n t e r s v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed.2d 840 ( 1 9 4 7 ) ; S e a t t l e v. Pullman, 82 Wash.2d 794, 797, 514 P.2d 1059 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . The word 'knowledge' h a s a n o r d i n a r y and a c c e p t e d meaning. A s t a t u t o r y r e d e f i n i t i o n of knowledge t o mean n e g l i g e n t i g n o r a n c e would c o m p l e t e l y c o n t r a d i c t t h e a c c e p t e d meaning. . ." S t a t e v. S h i p p ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 93 Wash.2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322, 1326. Moreover, t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t e r p r e t e d t h e enhance- ment s t a t u t e i n such a way t h a t a p e n a l t y is imposed f o r acts and an i n t e n t d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . I n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court h a s c r e a t e d a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e o u t of t h e enhancement s t a t u t e , i.e., knowingly u s i n g a f i r e a r m o r o t h e r d e s t r u c t i v e d e v i c e . The d e f e n d a n t was t h e n t r i e d f o r t h i s o f f e n s e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . W e s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Davison ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont . - I 614 P.2d 489, 37 St.Rep. 1135, t h a t t h e enhancement s t a t u t e n e i t h e r c r e a t e s nor p e n a l i z e s a d e f e n d a n t w i t h a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e . The District C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e enhance- ment s t a t u t e , h e r e , is n o t r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h t h e h o l d i n g i n Davison. I f t h e enhancement s t a t u t e is t o be used, as its name s u g g e s t s , t o "enhancen t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e , it cannot impose an element of i n t e n t s e p a r a t e from t h e under- l y i n g o f f e n s e . A s w e l l a s m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e enhancement s t a t u t e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court o b s t r u c t e d t h e purpose of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a b a r g a i n by imposing a f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e on t o p of t h e ten-year s e n t e n c e f o r which d e f e n d a n t o r i g i n a l l y b a r g a i n e d . Such a c t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court is i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n t o s t a n d a r d s set by t h e American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n S t a n d a r d s f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e which l i m i t s t h e t r i a l judge t o t h e r o l e of an impassive moderator. ABA S t a n d a r d s f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e 14-3.3 (2d ea. 1 9 8 0 ) . When a p l e a is i n f l u e n c e d by t h e a c t i o n s of a judge it c a n n o t be s a i d t o be v o l u n t a r y . S t a t e v. C r o s s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514. P l e a n e g o t i a - t i o n s s h o u l d be between a d v e r s a r i e s , and t h e t r i a l judge s h o u l d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e f o r e i t h e r s i d e s i n c e it is h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e u n b i a s e d l y t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e p l e a . Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court broke t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement i n its b a s t a r d i z a t i o n of t h e enhancement s t a t u t e . Defendant o r i g i n a l l y bargained up t o t h e ten-year maximum s e n t e n c e f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide. Only through a c t i v e p a r t i - c i p a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s t h i s maximum s e n t e n c e increased by f i v e years. Even i f t h e enhancement s t a t u t e could be s a i d t o apply t o t h i s c a s e and i f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s could be considered proper, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t n e v e r t h e l e s s abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by concluding t h a t defendant did not come under t h e s t a t u t o r y exceptions t o t h e enhancement s t a t u t e . The record simply d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t ------------------- a c t i n g under unusual and s u b s t a n t i a l duress. See, S t a t e v. Fish and Hubbard, supra. A s r e l a t e d i n t h e f a c t s acknowledged by t h i s Court on appeal, t h e owner of t h e r i f l e , M i l l e r , s h o t two times a t defendant moments before defendant himself came i n t o posses- s i o n of t h e r i f l e . M i l l e r had shoved t h e r i f l e i n defen- d a n t ' s f a c e , t h r e a t e n i n g t o blow h i s head o f f . Defendant wrested t h e r i f l e away from M i l l e r . Defendant then walked over t o h i s f r i e n d who had j u s t been f a t a l l y s t r u c k i n t h e neck with shrapnel from M i l l e r ' s p r i o r s h o t s . M i l l e r began t o run away and defendant s h o t a t him t o prevent h i s escape. C l e a r l y , t h i s e v i d e n c e of t h e s i t u a t i o n p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t defendant was not under s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s a t t h e t i m e of t h e shooting. The D i s t r i c t Court, t h e r e f o r e , abused its d i s c r e t i o n . The s t a t u t o r y exception found i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222(3), MCA, should apply, and t h e e x t r a five-year sentence should be s e t a s i d e . I have made some broad s t a t e m e n t s and a m mindful of m y own f r a i l t i e s . However, it has been m y purpose t o d e a l with t h e f a c t s i n an impersonal and o b j e c t i v e manner. I have perhaps been too c r i t i c a l of t h e lower c o u r t personnel. I would like it understood that I do not speak in terms of conscious partiality or prejudgment, as no judge worthy of his office would knowingly permit any cloud of prejudice to darken his understanding or influence his decision. Justice I fl Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I join in the dissent of Justice Daly. It is refreshing on occasion to see an opinion no longer bathed in judicial language, but instead addressing the fundamental issues underlying the surface issues. We don't know precisely why the trial court gave the sentence to defendant. In State v. Stumpf (1980), Mont . - , 609 P.2d 298, we held that "a trial court's right to exercise its discretion does not mean that a trial court should not disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absenti-reasons, the appellate court can only guess as to why the trial court made a particular decision." Here, the broad statement of the trial court that it relied on the sentencing report, without disclaiming that report's inaccuracy, places an appellate court in the impossible situation of not knowing whether the trial court relied on erroneous parts of the report. A sentence in that situation should not be upheld. In United States v. Latimer (Ohio 1969), 415 F.2d 1288, the Court held that error in a presentence investigation report, if relied on, is a ground for remanding for resentencing. The case was remanded for resentencing because the record - did not disclose whether the trial court had relied on erroneous or improper information. An eloquent argument in favor of a requirement that judges give reasons for their sentences, has been made in United States v. Bazzano (1977), 521 F.2d 1122, 1132. Fundamental fairness requires that the reasons for a sentence be set out with precision. The defendant has a right to assurance that a judge was not relying on erroneous information. The record here is demonstrably lacking in that assurance. " ' " t ' ! $ & * r-"? T 8 : % < : r , " ?' ; ' & . @ " r ' 1 1 . 1 . '