Title: State v. Wheelock

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 89-475


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 William F. Wheelock III                      September Term, 1991



 Robert Grussing III, J.

 M. Patricia Zimmerman, Windsor County State's Attorney, White River
   Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.   Defendant appeals his conviction of second-degree murder
 for shooting and killing James Brillon during  a drug and alcohol binge.
 Defendant claimed he shot the victim because the victim was attacking him
 with a knife.  He raises three issues, all concerning the trial court's
 instructions to the jury.  Defendant first contends that the trial court
 erred in its self-defense charge when it instructed the jury to assess the
 reasonableness of his belief without taking into account his intoxication.
 Second, he assigns error to the court's refusal to instruct the jury on the
 theory of "imperfect self-defense."  Third, he claims error based on the
 trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could draw inferences,
 favorable to the defense, from the state's failure to dust for fingerprints
 on knives in the kitchen at the crime scene and to test defendant for
 intoxication when he was arrested.  We affirm.
      Defendant killed Brillon with a single round from a shotgun fired at
 close range.  The shooting occurred in the early morning at the apartment of
 the victim's girlfriend.  Both defendant and the victim had ingested
 alcohol, cocaine, valium and marijuana prior to the shooting.  Confronta-
 tions between the two punctuated the night.  The killing occurred when the
 victim entered the living room; defendant, who testified he believed the
 victim had a knife, shot him in the chest.  During the investigation, police
 found no knife near the body, and did not search for one in the apartment.
 When defendant was apprehended, he possessed a bottle of partially consumed
 scotch.  Police did not administer a test to determine the level of alcohol
 or presence of drugs in defendant's blood.
                                     I.
      Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury on self-defense, in
 relevant part:
         [O]ne may use deadly force in defense of his life, limb,
         or in fear of bodily injury if it reasonably appeared to
         the accused that it was necessary to use the force which
         he did use.

      The trial court's instruction on self-defense was as follows:

           [T]he defendant must have a reasonable expectation of
           immediate harm.  That is, the expectation of harm must
           be based upon reason and not upon fancied or unfounded
           fear.  Also it must be such an expectation as a reason-
           able person might entertain under the prevailing circum-
           stances. Therefore, you should measure the expectation
           of harm by a standard of what a hypothetical reasonable
           ordinary person might expect in the same situation as
           you find existed and which the defendant was in.  You
           should determine again taking into account all of those
           circumstances if such a person would have a reasonable
           expectation of harm.

             In doing so you should take into consideration such
           factors as shown by the evidence as a reasonable person
           in the defendant's shoes -- such as what he knew with
           the victim, what their relationship was or had been,
           what their prior interaction had been, including hostile
           or aggressive conduct, if any, by the victim and any
           other factors supported by the evidence that you con-
           sider relevant.  You should not measure the expectation
           of harm by a standard of what a drug or alcohol-impaired
           person might expect.  You should measure the expectation
           by what a non-impaired -- that is a reasonable person --
           might expect, not however, by what such a person in the
           defendant's shoes and position might expect.

 During a lengthy charge conference, defendant expressed dissatisfaction with
 the instruction as proposed, saying in part that
         there is no reasonable person standard in Vermont in
         terms of self-defense.  And that's our primary objection
         I would say.  There's a secondary problem here that I
         think we need to discuss. . . .  I think that the intent
         of this charge here is that you are saying you can't
         consider someone's state of intoxication in determining
         the reasonableness of their expectation.  I think what
         you're saying here, basically, [is] "If I'm drunk, I am
         still charged with the responsibility of accurately
         perceiving events in order to invoke self-defense."

      According to V.R.Cr.P. 30, as interpreted in our cases, failure to
 object to an instruction after it is given to the jury is considered a
 waiver of any error even if the substance of the objection is made known
 before the jury charge.  State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 71-72, 574 A.2d 1248,
 1253-54 (1990); State v. Hoadley, 147 Vt. 49, 53,