Title: State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-135.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-135 
THE STATE EX REL. JONES, APPELLANT, v. PASCHKE, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-135.] 
Prohibition—General division of common pleas court has jurisdiction over 
appellant’s former mother-in-law’s complaint seeking companionship and 
visitation with appellant’s child under R.C. 3109.11—Appellant has 
adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by appeal to challenge 
appointment of guardian ad litem in former mother-in-law’s case—Court 
of appeals’ judgment denying petition affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0611—Submitted December 12, 2023—Decided January 18, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, 
No. 22-G-0037, 2023-Ohio-1536. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jeremy J. Jones, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in 
the Eleventh District Court of Appeals against appellee, Judge Carolyn J. Paschke 
of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division.  Jones argues 
that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction over a case filed by Jones’s former mother-
in-law for grandparent companionship and visitation rights with Jones’s child.  He 
also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem in 
the case.  The Eleventh District granted Judge Paschke’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied Jones’s petition, and Jones has appealed.  We affirm the 
Eleventh District’s judgment denying the petition. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas consists of two 
divisions: (1) the General Division, which hears domestic-relations cases (“the 
general division”), and (2) a combined Probate and Juvenile Division (“the juvenile 
division”).  See R.C. 2151.011(A)(1)(c) (“juvenile court” means the probate 
division of the court of common pleas unless another statutory provision applies); 
R.C. 2301.03 (no separate domestic-relations judge for Geauga County); Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(C) (“Unless otherwise provided by law, there 
shall be a probate division and such other divisions of the courts of common pleas 
as may be provided by law”). 
{¶ 3} Jeremy Jones married Molly Jones in April 2015, and in December 
2015, Molly gave birth to their son, B.J.  In 2019, Molly filed for divorce in the 
general division.  On July 2, 2022, while the divorce proceedings were pending, 
Molly passed away.  The divorce case was dismissed on July 6. 
{¶ 4} On July 12, 2022, B.J.’s maternal grandmother, Heidi O’Neill, filed a 
complaint 
against 
Jones 
in 
the 
general 
division 
for 
“grandparent 
companionship/visitation time” with B.J.  Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that the general division lacks jurisdiction over the complaint; Judge Paschke 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
3 
denied the motion.  O’Neill filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, 
which Judge Paschke granted. 
{¶ 5} In September 2022, Jones filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in 
the Eleventh District.  Jones argued that the general division lacks jurisdiction over 
complaints for grandparent companionship and visitation rights and that O’Neill’s 
complaint should have been filed in the juvenile division.  He also argued that Judge 
Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem.  Judge Paschke filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  The Eleventh District granted the motion and 
denied Jones’s petition.  Jones appeals as of right. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Legal standards 
{¶ 6} We review de novo a court of appeals’ order granting summary 
judgment in a prohibition action.  State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8.  “Summary judgment is 
appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  Id., 
quoting Civ.R. 56(C). 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Jones must show that (1) Judge 
Paschke exercised or is going to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that 
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for 
which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  Id. at ¶ 9.  
If Judge Paschke patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 
Jones need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy.  Schlegel v. Sweeney, 
171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6.  Here, the parties do not 
dispute that Judge Paschke is exercising judicial power in the companionship-and-
visitation case. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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B.  The general division has jurisdiction over O’Neill’s case 
{¶ 8} Jones argues that Judge Paschke—a judge of the general division—
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over O’Neill’s companionship-and-visitation case 
and that only the juvenile division has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 3105.011(A) provides that the “court of common pleas[,] 
including divisions of courts of domestic relations, has full equitable powers and 
jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters,” and 
R.C. 3105.11(B)(2) defines “domestic relations matters” as including actions and 
proceedings under R.C. Chapter 3109.  R.C. Chapter 3109—specifically, R.C. 
3109.11—authorizes the filing of complaints for grandparent companionship and 
visitation if a parent of the child is deceased.  The procedures authorized by R.C. 
3109.11 therefore fall within the terms of R.C. 3105.011.  The Geauga County 
Court of Common Pleas does not have a separate domestic-relations division, but 
R.C. 3105.011 grants jurisdiction to general divisions of courts of common pleas 
as well.  See also State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler, 169 Ohio St.3d 424, 2022-Ohio-
3937, 205 N.E.3d 494, ¶ 14-15.  Therefore, the general division has jurisdiction 
over O’Neill’s complaint pursuant to R.C. 3105.011. 
{¶ 10} In addition, R.C. 3109.11 gives general divisions of courts of 
common 
pleas 
jurisdiction 
over 
grandparents’ 
complaints 
requesting 
companionship or visitation.  It provides:  
 
If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is 
deceased, the court of common pleas of the county in which the 
minor child resides may grant the parents and other relatives of the 
deceased father or mother reasonable companionship or visitation 
rights with respect to the minor child during the child’s minority if 
the parent or other relative files a complaint requesting reasonable 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
5 
companionship or visitation rights and if the court determines that the 
granting of the companionship or visitation rights is in the best 
interest of the minor child. 
 
{¶ 11} The statute requires that the complaint be brought in “the court of 
common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides.”  Id.  It does not 
specify that the complaint must be brought in a juvenile court or any other particular 
division of the court of common pleas.  The legislature knows how to specify that 
a complaint must be brought in juvenile court, and many other statutes so require.  
See, e.g., R.C. 2151.85 (complaint of minor seeking to have abortion without 
parental notification); R.C. 2152.021 (complaint alleging that child is delinquent); 
R.C. 3109.76 (complaint of grandparent seeking custody); R.C. 3321.19(D)(2) 
(school-attendance officer’s complaint alleging that minor is a habitual truant).  It 
did not do so in R.C. 3109.11. 
{¶ 12} The general division has jurisdiction over O’Neill’s complaint 
pursuant to R.C. 3105.011 and 3109.11. 
{¶ 13} Jones argues that R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) divests the general division of 
jurisdiction over O’Neill’s complaint and gives the juvenile division exclusive 
jurisdiction.  R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides that with certain exceptions not relevant 
here, juvenile courts shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction “to determine the 
custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.” 
{¶ 14} O’Neill’s complaint, however, seeks companionship and visitation 
with B.J.—not custody.  Visitation and custody are distinct legal concepts.  In re 
Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991).  “ ‘Custody’ resides in 
the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of a 
child.  ‘Visitation’ resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s 
right to visit the child.”  Id.; see also R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) (defining “legal 
custody”).  A grandparent’s complaint for visitation with a grandchild is therefore 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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not a matter involving the determination of custody.  See Gibson at 171.  Although 
Gibson does not explicitly discuss complaints seeking companionship, 
companionship is also distinct from custody and is generally treated similarly to 
visitation.  See, e.g., In re A.G., 2020-Ohio-2762, 154 N.E.3d 439, ¶ 44 (6th Dist.); 
Murray v. Welch, 11th Dist. Portage No. 98-P-0030, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4657, 
*11 (Sept. 30, 1999) (“companionship and visitation rights * * * are not issues of 
custody”); see also Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 41-42, 706 N.E.2d 1218 
(1999) (referring to a trial-court order that granted “companionship” as granting 
“visitation”).  R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) is not applicable to O’Neill’s complaint. 
{¶ 15} Because the general division has jurisdiction to decide complaints 
seeking grandparent companionship and visitation filed under R.C. 3109.11, Jones 
is not entitled to a writ of prohibition precluding Judge Paschke from exercising 
jurisdiction over the case. 
C.  Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to contest 
Judge Paschke’s appointment of a guardian ad litem 
{¶ 16} Jones also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a 
guardian ad litem, and he seeks a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment in 
O’Neill’s case.  Jones is correct that R.C. 3109.11 does not explicitly authorize a 
court to appoint a guardian ad litem in grandparent companionship and visitation 
cases.  Nor do divisions (C), (D), (K), or (L) of R.C. 3109.051, which apply to such 
cases.  See R.C. 3109.11.  Judge Paschke’s order appointing the guardian ad litem 
in O’Neill’s case does not cite a particular statute as authorizing the appointment, 
and neither do the Eleventh District’s opinion nor Judge Paschke’s merit brief filed 
here.  Rather, Judge Paschke argues—and the Eleventh District held—that Jones 
has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge the 
appointment through appeal.  We agree. 
{¶ 17} Because Judge Paschke does not patently and unambiguously lack 
subject-matter jurisdiction over O’Neill’s case, Jones is entitled to a writ of 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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prohibition only if the appointment of the guardian ad litem was not authorized by 
law and Jones lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See 
Gray, 169 Ohio St.3d 424, 2022-Ohio-3937, 205 N.E.3d 494, at ¶ 9.  For an 
alternate remedy to constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, 
it must be “complete, beneficial, and speedy.”  State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. 
Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 2008-Ohio-3181, 891 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14.  Jones 
cites cases for the proposition that an appeal is not an adequate remedy in cases 
involving parenting time.  See State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 138 Ohio St.3d 84, 
2013-Ohio-5477, 3 N.E.3d 1184; Kallet v. Wilgus, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021 
AP 01 0004, 2021-Ohio-1637.  These cases, however, involved determinations of 
custody, not companionship and visitation.  The danger we identified in V.K.B.—
that a child could be removed from his or her parent for several years pending an 
appellate decision, see V.K.B. at ¶ 23—is not present here. 
{¶ 18} And even if the logic of these cases applied to companionship and 
visitation cases, Jones is challenging only Judge Paschke’s appointment of a 
guardian ad litem.  A guardian ad litem makes recommendations to the court, see 
Sup.R. 48.03(A)(1), and the guardian’s report “shall not be considered 
determinative,” Sup.R. 48.06(A)(3).  Judge Paschke, when determining whether to 
grant companionship and/or visitation to O’Neill, must consider numerous factors, 
see R.C. 3109.051(D)(1) through (16), and Jones will have the opportunity to file 
his own evidence and briefs regarding these factors.  Jones can appeal the 
appointment of the guardian ad litem as part of any appeal he brings from Judge 
Paschke’s final judgment granting or denying grandparent companionship and/or 
visitation, and this constitutes an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 
{¶ 19} Because Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law to challenge Judge Paschke’s appointment of the guardian ad litem in O’Neill’s 
case, he is not entitled to a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 20} Judge Paschke does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over 
O’Neill’s complaint for grandparent companionship and visitation.  In addition, 
Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge Judge 
Paschke’s appointment of a guardian ad litem.  We therefore affirm the Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting Judge Paschke’s motion for summary 
judgment and denying Jones’s petition for a writ of prohibition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley 
R. Tauring, for appellant. 
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Linda M. 
Applebaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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