Title: State v. Charles Rumblin

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal requires the Court to decide whether the No Early Release Act (NERA or the Act) may be applied to a defendant convicted of a first- or second-degree offense as an accomplice rather than as a principal. A Bergen County Grand Jury indicted defendant and his co-defendants, Everton Watts and Raheam Goosby, of first-degree robbery, second-degree aggravated assault, third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, weapons offenses, and other charges. Defendant negotiated a plea agreement with the State in which he would pled guilty to first-degree robbery, third degree aggravated assault on a police officer, and other crimes. Defendant was informed that his plea to first-degree robbery would invoke the sentencing provisions of NERA. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended a maximum base term of twenty years. Defendant provided a factual basis to support his plea, admitting that his role was to assist in planning a robbery of the Radisson Inn hotel in Paramus and in providing transportation by driving a stolen vehicle to and from the scene on October 20, 1997. Defendant helped plan the robbery, knowing that the two co-defendants would be armed with guns when they entered the hotel to commit the robbery. As planned, defendant drove Watts and Goosby to the Radisson Inn and waited outside while they entered the lobby and robbed Thomas Patterson, the hotel clerk. Defendant knew that Watts and Goosby were armed when they entered the hotel. After they robbed Patterson at gunpoint, they injured him by pistol-whipping him. When police officers arrived at the scene, Watts and Goosby pointed their weapons at the officers before they were arrested. Defendant was arrested while attempting to flee in the stolen vehicle. He later admitted he was an accomplice to the robbery and that he shared the intent and purpose of his co-defendants. Based on those facts, the court sentenced defendant for the first-degree robbery to a base term of thirteen years and, pursuant to NERA, a minimum term of 85 percent, or eleven years and six months, before parole eligibility. Concurrent terms were imposed on the remaining counts. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division held that NERA may be applied to accomplices. 326 N.J. Super. 296 (1999). The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification. HELD: NERA may be applied to defendants who are guilty as accomplices. 1. NERA provides for defendants convicted of first- and second-degree violent crimes to serve 85 percent of their sentences before becoming eligible for parole. The Act defines violent crime to mean a crime in which the actor causes death or serious bodily injury; uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon; and any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force. Defendant argues that NERA applies only to principals and not to accomplices because it limits its scope to the actor. (Pp. 5-6) 2. The statute that establishes accomplice liability provides that a person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable; a person is legally accountable for another if he is an accomplice of the other; and a person is an accomplice if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the offense, he aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the act. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. For defendant to be guilty of first-degree robbery as an accomplice, he must have intended that the principals engage in the armed robbery and defendant must have acted purposely in planning, promoting, or facilitating the robbery. That defendant acted in such a manner is beyond dispute given the factual basis of his guilty pleas. (Pp. 6-8) 3. The Code of Criminal Justice uses the word actor in at least eighty-seven subsections and at least seventy additional subparts. In examining the statutory definition of the word actor as well as viewing the term in its proper syntax, it becomes clear that actor is intended as a synonym for a defendant regardless of whether he or she acts as a principal or an accomplice. Here, defendant was an actor when he helped to plan the robbery and when he drove the principals to the scene of the robbery. (Pp. 8-9) 4. The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Appellate Division that the Legislature would not have intended that the mastermind of an armed robbery could avoid the consequences of NERA sentencing by having a confederate carry out the crime. Although an accomplice may be found guilty of a lower degree of a violent offense than a principal if the two did not share the same mental culpability, for NERA purposes principals and accomplices are treated the same. The Court has previously held that the Graves Act's minimum terms of imprisonment for defendants who use a firearm to commit a crime applied to an unarmed defendant who acted as an accomplice. The Court reasoned that the accomplice has committed the same crime as the individual who possessed or used the gun if the accomplice had the purpose to promote or facilitate that crime - namely, robbery with the use of a firearm. If the Legislature had a contrary intent, it could have said so, as it did in creating an exception to felony-murder - providing that a defendant who had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant was armed is not responsible for felony-murder committed by that other. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3). (Pp. 9-10) 5. Defendant also argues that NERA violates State and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. As in State v. Johnson, __ N.J. __ (2000), also decided today, this Court concludes that NERA is not unconstitutional. (P. 11) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHARLES RUMBLIN, a/k/a DAWUD M. McGHEE and JAMAL JONES, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 11, 2000 -- Decided February 28, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 326 N.J. Super. 296 (1999). Alison S. Perrone, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Perrone and Claire Drugach, on the letter briefs). John J. Scaliti, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney). Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by . . . . d. For the purposes of this section, violent crime means any crime in which the actor causes death, causes serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:11-1, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. Violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses, or threatens the immediate use of, physical force. Accomplice liability is based on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. That statute, in pertinent part, provides: a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person. c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, accomplice liability attaches when a defendant shares the purpose of the principal who commits the offense charged, State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 32 (1997), and the defendant actually foresee[s] and intend[s] the result of his or her acts. State v. Bridges, 133 N.J. 447, 456 (1993). Here, to be guilty of robbery in the first degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b requires that principals Watts and Goosby purposely attempted to inflict serious bodily harm, or were armed with, or used, or threatened to use a deadly weapon while committing the theft. For defendant to be guilty of first-degree robbery as an accomplice, he, too, must have intended that the principals engage in the armed robbery and defendant must have acted purposely in planning, promoting, or facilitating that robbery. See State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 403 (1987). That defendant acted in such a manner is beyond dispute given the factual basis for his guilty pleas. We reject defendant's contention that because NERA uses the word actor, NERA does not apply to accomplices. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9, uses the word actor in at least eighty-seven subsections and in at least seventy additional subparts.See footnote 11 In examining the statutory definition of the word actor, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14e, g, j, and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1a, as well as viewing the term in its proper syntax, it becomes clear that actor is intended as a synonym for a defendant regardless of whether he or she acts as a principal or an accomplice. Here, defendant was an actor when he helped to plan the robbery and when he drove the principals to the scene of the robbery. Furthermore, there is no evidence in any of NERA's legislative history that the Legislature intended the word actor to apply solely to principals. NERA intends to impose greater punishment upon violent criminals. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2d. The Act does not differentiate among perpetrators of violent crimes based upon principal and accomplice classifications. In construing NERA, the Appellate Division reasoned that the Legislature would not have intended that the mastermind of an armed robbery could avoid the consequences of [NERA] sentencing by having a confederate carry out the crime. Rumblin, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 302. We agree that the word actor refers to a defendant-perpetrator of an offense and includes both principals and accomplices. We hold, therefore, that although an accomplice may be found guilty of a lower degree of a violent offense than a principal if the two did not share the same mental culpability, Weeks, supra, 107 N.J. at 400-03; State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 533-34 (App. Div. 1993), for NERA purposes principals and accomplices are treated the same. State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 259-60 (1991). What we said in holding that the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6c, applies to unarmed accomplices, is applicable here. In State v. White, 98 N.J. 122, 126-27 (1984), the unarmed defendant who acted as an accomplice in two armed robberies was sentenced pursuant to the Graves Act. In holding that the Graves Act applied to unarmed accomplices, we observed: An accomplice may be guilty of armed robbery even though he did not personally possess or use the firearm in the course of the commission of the robbery. The accomplice has committed the same crime as the individual who possessed or used the gun if the accomplice had the purpose to promote or facilitate that crime, namely, robbery with the use of a firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b; N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b; State v. Gantt, 195 N.J. Super. 114, 118 (App. Div. 1984), certif. granted, [101] N.J. [220] (1985). One is the alter ego of the other. Surely, the Legislature intended that when an accomplice is guilty of a robbery that is held to be a crime of the first degree because one perpetrator used or possessed a firearm, the Graves Act would apply in sentencing the accomplice. If the Legislature had a contrary intent, it could have said so. Cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (defendant who had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed is not responsible for felony-murder committed by another). The Legislature created no exception from the Graves Act. Where an accomplice has been found guilty of armed robbery, he is subject to the minimum imprisonment terms of the Graves Act. Similarly, we hold that NERA applies to unarmed accomplices. NO. A-89 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHARLES RUMBLIN, a/k/a DAWUD M. McGHEE and JAMAL JONES, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED February 28, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz