Title: State ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2118.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2118 
THE STATE EX REL. C.V. v. ADOPTION LINK, INC., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2118.] 
Prohibition 
and 
habeas 
corpus—R.C. 
5103.15(B)—Permanent-surrender 
agreement—Writ of prohibition against juvenile-court judge granted—Writ 
of prohibition against probate-court judge denied—Writ of habeas corpus 
denied. 
(No. 2018-1857—Submitted March 26, 2019—Decided May 30, 2019.) 
IN PROHIBITION and HABEAS CORPUS. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, C.V., is the biological mother of N.V., born August 10, 2018.  
In this original action, she seeks writs of prohibition and habeas corpus to (1) vacate 
a Greene County Juvenile Court judge’s approval of her agreement to permanently 
surrender N.V. to the custody of Adoption Link, Inc., (2) halt adoption proceedings 
in the Greene County Probate Court, and (3) compel the return of N.V. to her care 
and custody.  For the reasons explained below, we grant C.V.’s request for a writ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge, we deny her request 
for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge, and we 
deny her request for a writ of habeas corpus.  In addition, we deny the motion for 
oral argument and deny as moot the motion for leave to file a surreply brief. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} The essential facts of this case are not in dispute.  On the afternoon of 
August 10, 2018, C.V. gave birth to a baby girl in the bathroom of her residence.  
C.V. has a history of substance abuse and addiction, including heroin use, and 
before going into labor, she did not know she was pregnant.  Fire-department 
personnel transported C.V. and the baby to Good Samaritan Hospital in Cincinnati. 
{¶ 3} At 11:00 a.m. the next morning, C.V. met with a Good Samaritan 
Hospital social worker, who showed her adoption-agency pamphlets.  C.V. selected 
Adoption Link.  Within an hour, Naomi Ewald, the director of Adoption Link, sent 
profiles of four prospective adoptive families, and C.V. selected K.B. 
{¶ 4} That afternoon, C.V. met with Adoption Link’s adoption assessor, 
Melissa Manzi.  During that meeting, which took place in C.V.’s hospital room, 
C.V. executed a temporary-custody agreement, transferring temporary custody to 
Adoption Link for a period of 61 days.  In addition, she signed a form titled “Ohio 
Law and Adoption Materials,” acknowledging that she had been provided with 
written materials on adoption and was fully aware of the ramifications of 
surrendering custody of her child, and she answered questions so that Manzi could 
fill out the “Social and Medical History” form required by R.C. 3107.09(A) and 
(B). 
{¶ 5} C.V. was discharged from the hospital the following day, and later 
that evening, she began her treatment regimen for heroin addiction.  Two days later, 
on August 14, she had her first assessment meeting for admission to an inpatient 
addiction-treatment facility. 
January Term, 2019 
3 
 
{¶ 6} Also on August 14, C.V. executed a permanent-surrender-of-child 
agreement, assigning permanent custody of N.V. to Adoption Link. 
{¶ 7} The next day, August 15, Adoption Link filed the permanent-
surrender agreement, along with the “Ohio Law and Adoption Materials” and 
“Social and Medical History” forms, with the clerk of the Greene County Juvenile 
Court.  On August 16, the Greene County Juvenile Court judge signed the bottom 
of the surrender agreement, below preprinted text that stated, “I hereby approve the 
transfer of permanent custody,” and “I find that continuation in the home is contrary 
to the best interest of the child and that the placement is in the best interest of the 
child.”  The juvenile-court judge also signed a judgment entry, which, along with 
the court-approved surrender agreement, was filed the next day, August 17, finding 
that the surrender agreement was in N.V.’s best interest, finding that C.V. had 
entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, granting Adoption Link 
permanent custody, and terminating C.V.’s parental rights. 
{¶ 8} Prior to filing the present action, C.V. made two attempts to revoke 
the surrender agreement based on an alleged change of circumstances: she filed a 
“Motion to Withdraw Consent of Adoption” in the Hamilton County Probate Court 
and a “Motion to Withdraw Consent of the Permanent Surrender & Appeal to 
Petition of Adoption” in the Greene County Juvenile Court.  Both motions were 
denied. 
{¶ 9} On December 31, 2018, C.V. commenced the present suit for writs of 
prohibition and habeas corpus.  In addition to the Greene County Juvenile Court 
judge and Adoption Link, she named as respondents the Greene County Probate 
Court judge, whom she believes is presiding over adoption proceedings involving 
N.V., and the prospective adoptive mother, K.B.  All four respondents filed motions 
to dismiss, which we denied, 154 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2019-Ohio-695, 118 N.E.3d 
254.  On February 12, 2019, we issued an order staying all adoption proceedings.  
154 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2019-Ohio-489, 116 N.E.3d 1285. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} On March 5, 2019, C.V. filed an unopposed motion for oral 
argument.  And at the close of briefing on the merits, K.B. filed a motion for leave 
to file a surreply brief to respond to arguments raised in C.V.’s reply brief. 
II. Analysis 
A.  Motion for oral argument 
{¶ 11} We have discretion to grant oral argument in an original action, 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02, and in exercising that discretion, we consider whether the case 
involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a 
substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals, State ex rel. 
Sands v. Court of Common Pleas Judge, 155 Ohio St.3d 238, 2018-Ohio-4245, 120 
N.E.3d 799, ¶ 6.  In this case, we conclude that none of those factors is present and 
that the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve the issues raised.  We therefore deny 
the motion. 
B.  C.V.’s request for a writ of prohibition against 
the Greene County Juvenile Court judge 
{¶ 12} Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the 
exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and 
the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Elder v. 
Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  However, 
if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator need not establish 
the third prong, the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin 
Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 13} C.V.’s complaint seeks a writ of prohibition against the Greene 
County Juvenile Court judge on the ground that he had no legal authority to approve 
the surrender agreement or terminate her parental rights.  There is no dispute that 
the juvenile-court judge’s approval of the surrender agreement was an exercise of 
judicial authority.  The question we must resolve is whether he patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue that approval. 
January Term, 2019 
5 
 
{¶ 14} Ohio’s juvenile courts have limited jurisdiction: they can exercise 
only the authority conferred on them by the General Assembly.  In re Z.R., 144 
Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, 44 N.E.3d 239, ¶ 14.  In certain situations, an 
adoption agency is required to seek and a juvenile court is authorized to provide 
approval of a permanent-surrender agreement.  R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) (“(B)(1) 
surrenders”).  But for a limited class of surrender agreements—agreements with 
private child-placing agencies for the placement of children under six months of 
age for the sole purpose of adoption—the agency is not required to seek and the 
juvenile court has no authority to grant approval of the agreement.  R.C. 
5103.15(B)(2) (“(B)(2) surrenders”).  With respect to (B)(2) surrenders, the agency 
is required only to “notify” the court of the agreement within two business days and 
the juvenile court is authorized only to journalize the notification.  Id.; see also 
Juv.R. 38(B)(2) (“An agreement for the surrender of permanent custody of a child 
to a private service agency is not required to be approved by the court if the 
agreement is executed solely for the purpose of obtaining an adoption of a child 
who is less than six months of age on the date of the execution of the agreement”).  
The role of the juvenile court in a (B)(2) surrender is purely ministerial.  See, e.g., 
In re E.B., 9th Dist. Summit No. 23850, 2008-Ohio-784, ¶ 15 (holding that juvenile 
court had no jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a previously filed (B)(2) surrender 
agreement because the court under R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) had “merely journalize[d]” 
the agreement and had lacked authority to “approve” it). 
{¶ 15} The precise language of the statute conferring jurisdiction upon a 
juvenile court regarding surrender agreements is as follows: “The juvenile court 
has exclusive original jurisdiction * * * [t]o hear and determine * * * requests for 
court approval of permanent custody agreements that are filed pursuant to section 
5103.15 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2151.23(A)(9).  A (B)(2) surrender does not 
involve a “request[] for court approval.”  It is therefore outside the scope of a 
juvenile court’s statutory authority to approve. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 16} It is plain from the record that Adoption Link did not believe that it 
was operating under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1). Although Adoption Link filed the 
agreement with the Greene County Juvenile Court clerk’s office, there is no 
evidence in the record to suggest that it filed a motion or other pleading requesting 
court approval of the surrender agreement.  In addition, there is no evidence 
indicating that it filed a case plan with the juvenile court, as it would have been 
required to do for a (B)(1) surrender but not for a (B)(2) surrender.  Furthermore, 
the juvenile-court judge’s judgment entry that purported to approve the surrender 
agreement expressly stated that the court had been “notified” of the agreement “as 
required by Ohio Revised Code Section 5103.15(B)(2),” thus indicating that this 
was not a (B)(1) surrender even though he made findings and supposedly approved 
the agreement. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 5103.151(C) does not provide a jurisdictional basis for the 
juvenile-court judge to approve the Adoption Link surrender agreement.  That 
statute provides that if certain conditions are met, then 
 
[a] juvenile court may approve an agreement entered into under 
division (B)(1) of section 5103.15 of the Revised Code between a 
* * * private child placing agency and the parents of a child who is 
less than six months of age and will be, if adopted, an adopted person 
* * * without the parents both appearing before the court. 
 
Based on this language, it is correct to say that some permanent surrenders 
involving children six months of age and younger fall under the terms of R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1). 
{¶ 18} But a child’s young age alone does not make a surrender agreement 
subject to R.C. 5103.15(B)(2); rather, a surrender agreement is subject to R.C. 
5103.15(B)(2), and not R.C. 5103.15(B)(1), when “the child is less than six months 
January Term, 2019 
7 
 
of age and the parents are entering the agreement with a private child-placing 
agency for the sole purpose of adoption.”  (Emphasis added.)  Notably, this phrase 
does not appear in R.C. 5103.151(C)’s description of a (B)(1) surrender agreement.  
The difference between a (B)(1) surrender and a (B)(2) surrender is not in how the 
agency characterizes the surrender or elects to proceed in the juvenile court—the 
fundamental difference is in whether the surrender is for the sole purpose of 
adoption.  A surrender agreement, by definition, cannot be subject to both R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1) and (B)(2). 
{¶ 19} The evidence is overwhelming that C.V. and Adoption Link 
executed the surrender agreement for the sole purpose of adoption.  Adoption Link 
is, after all, an adoption agency, not a general social-services organization.  Naomi 
Ewald, the director of Adoption Link, attested that C.V. “signed the Permanent 
Surrender of Child for the placement and adoption of [N.V.] with Adoption Link, 
Inc.”  (Emphasis added.)  And when contacted about C.V., Ewald immediately 
dispatched Melisa Manzi, who describes her position with Adoption Link as “an 
adoption assessor,” to C.V.’s hospital room.  (Emphasis added.)  And the surrender 
agreement itself notes that C.V. “has chosen an adoptive parent to raise this child.” 
{¶ 20} In short, any attempt to recharacterize the juvenile-court judge’s 
judgment entry as involving a proceeding under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) in order to 
justify his general jurisdiction over the matter fails to acknowledge the plain 
language of R.C. 5103.15(B) and the undisputed evidence.  “A juvenile court may 
exercise jurisdiction only if expressly granted the authority to do so by statute.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Rowell v. Smith, 133 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012-Ohio-4313, 978 
N.E.2d 146, ¶ 13.  The juvenile-court judge’s purported approval of the (B)(2) 
surrender agreement between C.V. and Adoption Link was a legal nullity and must 
be voided.  State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 164, 656 N.E.2d 1288 
(1995) (holding that judgment entry issued by court lacking jurisdiction was a 
nullity and vacating the entry). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 21} Moreover, by treating this as a (B)(1) surrender even though he cited 
R.C. 5103.15(B)(2), the juvenile-court judge made factual findings concerning 
N.V.’s best interest and C.V.’s state of mind, and he terminated C.V.’s parental 
rights—all without conducting a hearing or allowing C.V. any opportunity to 
present her case. 
{¶ 22} The facts presented by C.V. are egregious.  Some of the most 
troubling are that C.V. was not aware that she was pregnant until she gave birth, so 
she certainly had no opportunity to consider in advance what to do with the baby.  
But Adoption Link rushed the surrender process.  Within 24 hours of N.V.’s birth, 
as C.V. was beginning to experience heroin withdrawal, Adoption Link employees 
were already in her hospital room, collecting signatures on various legal documents 
and conducting the mandatory adoption assessment.  R.C. 5103.152 requires a 
waiting period of at least 72 hours after the assessment before a parent can sign a 
permanent-surrender agreement.  At Adoption Link’s instigation, C.V. signed the 
surrender agreement, at most, 76 hours after the assessment.1  When she signed, 
C.V. was still suffering from heroin withdrawal as well as from drastic blood loss 
and anemia, the product of an undiagnosed postpartum hemorrhage that would 
require surgery three days later. 
{¶ 23} Other circumstances of the surrender suggest the possibility of fraud, 
duress, or undue influence.  For example, during the assessment meeting, Manzi 
offered to pay C.V., a heroin addict, $1,000 for her expenses when an adoption 
match was made, plus an additional $2,000 upon execution of the surrender 
agreement.  And Adoption Link provided a lawyer to counsel C.V. about signing 
the agreement without disclosing that the attorney, Darlene Rogers, was an 
undisclosed agent working for Adoption Link. 
                                                 
1  Ewald’s notes indicate that she assigned Manzi, the assessor, to meet with C.V. “on Saturday, 
August 11 at 3 p.m.”  The permanent-surrender agreement was executed on August 14 at 7:14 p.m. 
January Term, 2019 
9 
 
{¶ 24} Fortunately, as a consequence of our judgment today, C.V. will have 
an opportunity to present her arguments for revoking the surrender agreement 
before the probate court can determine whether to terminate her parental rights, an 
opportunity she was not afforded prior to the juvenile-court judge’s decision   
{¶ 25} We grant the writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile 
Court judge and vacate his judgment entry approving the surrender agreement. 
C.  C.V.’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
{¶ 26} To obtain a writ of habeas corpus in a child-custody case, the 
petitioner must establish that (1) the child is being unlawfully detained and (2) the 
petitioner has a superior legal right to custody of the child.  State ex rel. Bruggeman 
v. Auglaize Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 87 Ohio St.3d 257, 719 N.E.2d 543 
(1999).  Habeas corpus relief “is the exception rather than the general rule in child 
custody actions.”  Evans v. Klaeger, 87 Ohio St.3d 260, 261, 719 N.E.2d 546 
(1999). 
{¶ 27} A writ of habeas corpus will not issue if the petitioner has an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Rammage v. Saros, 97 Ohio St.3d 
430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 9.  C.V. has an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law by which to contest the validity of the Adoption Link 
surrender agreement: she can intervene in the probate-court adoption proceedings.  
See Barnebey v. Zschach, 71 Ohio St.3d 588, 646 N.E.2d 162 (1995) (ability to file 
a motion in adoption proceedings in probate court was available adequate remedy, 
and thus, relief in habeas corpus was unavailable).  If she does intervene, the 
probate court should determine whether the required consents have been obtained. 
{¶ 28} Because we conclude that C.V. has an adequate remedy available to 
her in the ordinary course of law, we deny her request for a writ of habeas corpus.  
It is therefore unnecessary to consider the substantive legal arguments she presents 
in favor of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in proposition of law Nos. 1 
through 8.  And because K.B.’s motion for leave to file a surreply brief seeks to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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supplement the legal arguments in opposition to proposition of law No. 5, that 
motion is denied as moot. 
D.  C.V.’s request for a writ of prohibition against 
the Greene County Probate Court judge 
{¶ 29} C.V. seeks a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate 
Court judge to prevent him from exercising power over N.V.’s adoption 
proceedings.  In Ohio, probate courts are vested with “original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.”  In re Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 
332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 9.  As a general rule, a probate court may 
grant a petition for the adoption of a minor only when written consent to the 
adoption has been executed by the mother of the minor, the father of the minor (in 
certain circumstances), and “[a]ny person or agency having permanent custody of 
the minor or authorized by court order to consent.”  R.C. 3107.06.  However, 
parental consent to the adoption is not required, and the consent of the agency 
having permanent custody of the child is sufficient for the adoption to proceed, if 
the parent “has entered into a voluntary permanent custody surrender agreement” 
under R.C. 5103.15(B) and the requirements of R.C. 3107.071 have been met.  R.C. 
3107.07(C). 
{¶ 30} Before entering a final decree of adoption, the probate court has an 
affirmative duty to determine whether the required consents have been obtained.  
R.C. 3107.14(C).  To satisfy that duty in this case, the probate court must grant 
C.V. leave to intervene if she seeks leave and then determine whether the surrender 
agreement is valid.  If the probate court determines that the surrender agreement is 
valid, then the adoption may proceed without her consent.  But if the probate court 
determines that the agreement is not valid, then the adoption may not proceed 
without C.V.’s consent. 
{¶ 31} It follows from this discussion that we will not issue a writ of 
prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge.  The determination 
January Term, 2019 
11 
 
whether the requisite consents have been obtained falls squarely within the statutory 
jurisdiction of the probate court.  We therefore reject proposition of law Nos. 9 and 
10, which challenge the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the validity 
of the surrender agreement. 
{¶ 32} We also reject proposition of law No. 11, which attempts to invoke 
the jurisdictional-priority rule.  The jurisdictional-priority rule provides that, “ ‘[a]s 
between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first 
invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the 
exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and settle the 
rights of the parties.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  State ex rel. Dunlap v. Sarko, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 171, 2013-Ohio-67, 985 N.E.2d 450, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. 
Polcar, 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33 (1977), syllabus.  The date on which the 
adoption petition was filed in Greene County Probate Court is not in the record, and 
therefore, we cannot determine whether C.V.’s filing in the Hamilton County 
Probate Court was first in time. 
{¶ 33} We deny the request for a writ of prohibition against the Greene 
County Probate Court judge. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 34} For the reasons stated above, we grant the request for a writ of 
prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge, deny the request for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and deny the request for a writ of prohibition against the 
Greene County Probate Court judge.  We also deny K.B.’s motion for leave to file 
a surreply brief and C.V.’s motion for oral argument. 
Writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge granted, 
writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge denied, 
and writ of habeas corpus denied. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment only in part, with an 
opinion. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in 
part. 
{¶ 35} I agree with the per curiam opinion that we should deny C.V.’s 
requests for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge 
and for a writ of habeas corpus.  I also agree that a writ of prohibition against the 
Greene County Juvenile Court judge should issue.  Nevertheless, I concur only in 
the judgment with regard to the writ against the juvenile-court judge because I 
would issue the writ for reasons different than those expressed in the per curiam 
opinion. 
{¶ 36} C.V. seeks a writ of prohibition against the juvenile-court judge to 
both prohibit future action by the juvenile court and to relieve her from its holding 
that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into the surrender agreement with 
Adoption Link, Inc.  C.V.’s remedy in the form of intervention in the adoption 
proceedings is adequate only if the probate court is allowed to review the 
voluntariness of the surrender agreement in the first instance, without giving any 
consideration or preclusive effect to the juvenile court’s determination.  Although 
the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part notes that the juvenile court’s 
determination should not be given preclusive effect, the opinion fails to explain 
how this court has the authority to limit the juvenile court’s determination in this 
way without issuing a writ of prohibition or reviewing the matter through a 
discretionary appeal and reversing it. 
January Term, 2019 
13 
 
{¶ 37} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, C.V. must establish: (1) the 
exercise of judicial power, (2) the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, 
and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex 
rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  
The general understanding in Ohio is that a writ of prohibition may issue to prohibit 
future judicial action but not to remediate prior unauthorized actions by a court.  
State ex rel. Stefanick v. Marietta Mun. Court, 21 Ohio St.2d 102, 104, 255 N.E.2d 
634 (1970) (holding that prohibition cannot be used “to review the regularity of an 
act already performed”).  Nevertheless, this court has recognized an exception to 
the general principle that prohibition is prospective rather than remedial, stating 
that when an “ ‘inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over 
the cause, a writ of prohibition will be issued to prevent the unauthorized exercise 
of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized 
actions.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Gains v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 254, 
2004-Ohio-2658, 809 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 
Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 38} The per curiam opinion correctly notes that Adoption Link submitted 
the surrender agreement signed by C.V. to the juvenile-court judge for 
journalization in accord with R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) and did not request approval 
under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1).  R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) states: “The parents of a child less 
than six months of age may enter into an agreement with a private child placing 
agency surrendering the child into the permanent custody of the agency without 
juvenile court approval if the agreement is executed solely for the purpose of 
obtaining the adoption of the child.”  Unlike a surrender agreement under R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1), an R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) surrender agreement does not require court 
approval—the juvenile court’s role under R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) is to “journalize the 
notices it receives.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 39} The juvenile-court judge issued a judgment entry stating that he had 
been “properly notified by Adoption Link, Inc., that the Permanent Surrender of 
Child Form 1666 was executed by” C.V. and that he had been “duly notified of the 
executed agreement and the placement of the child for adoption as required by Ohio 
Revised Code Section 5103.15(B)(2).”  This suffices to show that C.V. signed an 
R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) surrender agreement. 
{¶ 40} As the juvenile court stated in its judgment entry, C.V. executed 
Ohio Department of Job and Family Services Form 1666 (“Form 1666”), which is 
titled “Permanent Surrender of Child.”  That form allows for the private child-
placing agency (“PCPA”) to assume, and retain, permanent custody of a child.  See 
Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-04(B)(3).  “When a PCPA executes a [Form 1666] 
involving a child under six months of age where the agreement is executed solely 
for obtaining the adoption of the child and the parents(s) [sic] consent to the 
permanent surrender, approval by the juvenile court is not required.”  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5101:2-42-09(F).  The Form 1666 signed by C.V. explicitly states when 
the juvenile court’s approval is required: “Under Ohio law, Ohio Revised Code 
Section 5103.15(B), approval of the juvenile court is required if this agreement is 
entered into by a public children service agency or is executed by a private child 
placing agency for a child six months of age or older.” 
{¶ 41} Because this was an R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) surrender agreement, the 
juvenile court had no statutory authority to approve the agreement, it should not 
have made findings regarding whether the agreement was in the best interest of the 
child under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1), and it had no basis for making his finding that “the 
birthmother was notified of her respective rights and entered into the Permanent 
Surrender Agreement knowingly and voluntarily.”  Those findings would have 
been required only if the surrender agreement had been submitted under R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1). 
January Term, 2019 
15 
 
{¶ 42} However, contrary to the view of the opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, even if Adoption Link had requested R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) 
approval (again the facts in this case clearly show that Adoption Link was 
proceeding under R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) and simply asking the court to journalize the 
agreement), the surrender agreement in this case could not have been approved 
under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1), because C.V. did not personally appear before the 
juvenile court before the judge issued the findings and entered the approval.  
Although R.C. 5103.151(C) explicitly states that a juvenile-court judge may 
approve an R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) surrender agreement without the parents having 
personally appeared before the court, for a judge to have authority to do this, both 
parents must have signed the permanent-surrender agreement.  See R.C. 
5103.151(C).  It is undisputed that C.V. was the only parent who signed the 
surrender agreement in this case.  Furthermore, R.C. 5103.151(C) is an exception 
to the general rule contained in R.C. 5103.151(B), which states:  
 
Except as provided in division (C) of this section, a parent of 
a minor who will be, if adopted, an adopted person as defined in 
section 3107.45 of the Revised Code shall do all of the following as 
a condition of a juvenile court approving the parent’s agreement 
with a public children services agency or private child placing 
agency under division (B)(1) of section 5103.15 of the Revised 
Code: 
(1) Appear personally before the court. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, the juvenile court was without authority to 
approve the agreement under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) without C.V.’s having appeared 
before it.  The per curiam opinion agrees that this was a legal error. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 43} Where I disagree with the per curiam opinion is in its assertion that 
the juvenile court acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.  R.C. 2151.23(A)(9) 
vests juvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction “[t]o hear and determine 
requests for the extension of temporary custody agreements, and requests for court 
approval of permanent custody agreements, that are filed pursuant to section 
5103.15 of the Revised Code.”  Although the per curiam opinion interprets this 
provision to mean that the filing of an R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) surrender agreement do 
not invoke a juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction—because the filing does 
not involve a “request” for approval under R.C. 5103.15 but is, rather, a request for 
the purely ministerial act of journalizing the agreement—this interpretation is 
logically inconsistent with other provisions of R.C. Chapter 5103. 
{¶ 44} For instance, R.C. 5103.153(A)(2) requires a juvenile court to 
review an R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) agreement every six months in the absence of 
notification that the child has been placed for adoption: 
 
A juvenile court shall conduct a review hearing of an 
agreement entered into under division (B)(2) of section 5103.15 of 
the Revised Code once every six months after the court is notified 
of the agreement if the agreement is still in effect and the court has 
not been notified that the child who is the subject of the agreement 
has been placed for adoption.  The private child placing agency that 
entered into the agreement shall file a case plan, prepared pursuant 
to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code, with the court at the review 
hearing. 
 
{¶ 45} A juvenile court could not have continuing jurisdiction to conduct a 
hearing to review an R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) agreement if the filing of the agreement 
did not invoke the court’s original jurisdiction.  A review hearing is clearly not 
January Term, 2019 
17 
 
ministerial.  Therefore, I believe that the better understanding of a juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(9) is that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over 
both R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) and (B)(2) surrender agreements.  Accordingly, in my 
view, the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 
2151.23(A)(9) because this case involved the filing of an R.C. 5103.15 surrender 
agreement. 
{¶ 46} Despite his having subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge’s authority 
to approve the surrender agreement in this case was limited by R.C. 5103.151(B) 
and (C).  There is no question that the juvenile-court judge acted outside his 
authority under the statute by approving the surrender agreement under R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1) without C.V.’s having appeared before the court.  Nevertheless, 
errors like these render that part of the journal entry voidable, not void ab initio for 
want of subject-matter jurisdiction.  State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-
1059, 2007-Ohio-2873, ¶ 10 (“When a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 
its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the 
judgment voidable”); see In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 
125, 2015-Ohio-4797, 47 N.E.3d 786, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 47} Although C.V. cannot show that the juvenile court patently and 
unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to act in this case, she has 
nevertheless met her burden of proving that she is entitled to a writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 48} First, the juvenile-court judge’s purported approval of the surrender 
agreement under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) was an exercise of judicial power, and second, 
pursuant to R.C. 5103.151(C), that purported approval was not authorized by law.  
Third, C.V. has no adequate remedy at law by way of appeal from the juvenile 
court’s decision. 
{¶ 49} “[I]n order for there to be an adequate remedy at law, a remedy must 
be complete, beneficial, and speedy.” Marich v. Knox Cty. Dept. of Human 
Servs./Children Servs. Unit, 45 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 543 N.E.2d 776 (1989), citing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State ex rel. Liberty Mills v. Locker, 22 Ohio St.3d 102, 488 N.E.2d 883 (1986).  In 
Marich, this court held that a biological mother could proceed with her claim in 
habeas corpus because the appeal process would not provide her an adequate 
remedy at law due to the time delay it would involve.  Specifically, we noted: 
 
In this case, an appeal would not be adequate because it 
would not be speedy.  Before the natural mother could appeal, she 
would have to move to vacate the juvenile court’s entry consenting 
to her permanent surrender agreement.  Since the natural mother has 
already informally requested this vacation and it has been denied, a 
more formal motion would be futile and time-consuming.  After the 
denial of the motion, the natural mother would have to appeal to the 
court of appeals and the losing party would doubtlessly appeal to 
this court.  On the other hand, the court of appeals and this court 
expedite habeas corpus matters. 
 
Id. at 165. 
{¶ 50} As was true in Marich, C.V.’s remedy by way of an appeal from the 
juvenile court’s order is inadequate.  Like the mother in Marich, C.V. has already 
asked for and been denied relief from judgment by the juvenile court.  If C.V. were 
required to appeal from that judgment, not only would there be a time delay as she 
prepared for argument and awaited a decision but that decision could result in a 
remand to the juvenile court for a determination whether it should proceed under 
R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) or (B)(2).  Delay associated with the appeal and potential 
remand would also interfere in the adoption proceedings in probate court, causing 
further delay.  Meanwhile, N.V., the infant child, would be growing older each day 
without any final determination with regard to permanent custody.  Simply put, 
under the facts of this case, an appeal is not an adequate remedy. 
January Term, 2019 
19 
 
{¶ 51} Therefore, I vote to grant C.V.’s request for a writ of prohibition 
against the juvenile-court judge both to prevent the judge from taking any further 
action in this matter and to remediate the erroneous judgment entry that purported 
to make findings and declarations that the juvenile court had no authority to make 
under the facts of this case.  Although I realize that in taking this position I depart 
from the general rule that a writ of prohibition will not issue to remediate prior 
unauthorized actions unless there is a patent and unambiguous lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, I believe that this case warrants such a departure and I believe 
that the principles behind this court’s case law support it. 
{¶ 52} In State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, the first case in which this court 
departed from its earlier longstanding precedent that “prohibition may be invoked 
only to prevent a future act and not to undo an act already performed,” we noted 
that “strict adherence to that rule exalts form over substance.”  30 Ohio St.2d 326, 
329, 285 N.E.2d 22 (1972).  We also noted in that case that “a court which has 
jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibition as well as the writs of procedendo and 
mandamus has plenary power, not only to prevent excesses of lower tribunals, but 
to correct the results thereof and to restore the parties to the same position they 
occupied before the excesses occurred.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 330. 
{¶ 53} In a case such as this, a case in which every justice of the court agrees 
that the juvenile court’s findings and decision should not be considered or given 
preclusive effect in the adoption proceedings either because they were made in error 
or because they were rendered without subject-matter jurisdiction and in which the 
custody of an infant needing a permanent home hangs in the balance, it would be 
unconscionable not to issue the writ.  I therefore agree that the writ of prohibition 
that C.V. seeks should be granted. 
{¶ 54} The fact that the juvenile-court judge erroneously made findings 
under R.C. 5103.15(B)(1), however, did not affect the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 
to journalize the notice provided in Form 1666 pursuant to R.C. 5103.15(B)(2).  By 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
granting the writ to remove from the journal entry all language relating to R.C. 
5103.15(B)(1), we would leave intact a journal entry that satisfies R.C. 
5103.15(B)(2) and C.V. would have the opportunity to contest the validity of the 
surrender agreement by intervention in the probate-court proceedings. 
{¶ 55} Since the probate court is in the best position to act as the finder of 
fact when determining the issue of the validity of the surrender agreement and since 
this court has instructed the probate court to do just that with the grant of a writ of 
prohibition against the juvenile court, I see no reason why the per curiam opinion 
addresses facts that may be relevant in the probate-court case but are not relevant 
to the issues before us. 
__________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 56} I join the per curiam opinion except with regard to its grant of a writ 
of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge.  I would deny the 
writ of prohibition because the Greene County Juvenile Court did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to approve the surrender agreement. 
{¶ 57} R.C. 5103.15(B) sets forth the procedures by which a private child-
placing agency may obtain permanent custody of a child.  With a narrow exception 
set forth in subsection (B)(2), those procedures require the juvenile court to approve 
the agreement.  Subsection (B)(1) states that the “court may approve the permanent 
surrender agreement if it determines that the agreement is in the best interest of the 
child and, in the case of an agreement between a parent and an agency, the 
requirements of section 5103.151 of the Revised Code are met.”  Hence, under 
subsection (B)(1), a juvenile court plainly has jurisdiction to approve permanent-
surrender agreements.  And nothing in that subsection limits the jurisdiction of the 
court over such agreements based on the age of the child or the purpose of the 
agreement. 
January Term, 2019 
21 
 
{¶ 58} Contrary to the per curiam opinion’s reading, subsection (B)(2) 
merely creates a narrow exception to the juvenile-court-approval requirement.  It 
states that the parents of a child may enter into a permanent-custody agreement 
without juvenile-court approval if the child is under six months of age and the 
agreement is for the sole purpose of adoption.  But nothing in that provision takes 
away the jurisdiction that (B)(1) provides.  Thus, the Greene County Juvenile Court 
judge plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the permanent-custody 
agreement; whether he exercised that jurisdiction appropriately in approving the 
agreement is a different issue.  The mere fact that under R.C. 5103.15(B)(2) the 
judge may not have been required to approve the agreement does not mean that he 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to do so.  Accordingly, I would reject C.V.’s 14th 
proposition of law. 
{¶ 59} C.V.’s 12th and 13th propositions of law go to whether the Greene 
County Juvenile Court judge properly exercised his jurisdiction.  C.V. has an 
adequate remedy at law by intervening in the probate-court case to raise these 
arguments; thus, the arguments raised under these propositions provide no basis for 
issuing a writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 60} I agree that C.V.’s remedy is to intervene in the Greene County 
Probate Court proceedings.  If she does so properly and in a timely manner, the 
probate court will first need to determine whether the required consents to surrender 
the child were obtained.  In those proceedings, no preclusive effect should be given 
to the Greene County Juvenile Court’s August 17, 2018 judgment entry.  C.V. was 
not a party to the proceeding before the court, she was not notified of it, and she did 
not appear.  Accordingly, she has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
validity of the surrender agreement.  See Hicks v. De La Cruz, 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 
74, 369 N.E.2d 776 (1977). 
KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Kuhn Limited and Ryan D. Kuhn, for relator. 
Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for respondent 
Adoption Link, Inc. 
Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth A. 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents the Greene County Juvenile 
Court and Probate Court judges. 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., and Daniel P. Mead, for respondent K.B. 
_________________________