Title: Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County School Dist. No. 1,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County School Dist. No. 1,1993 WY 158865 P.2d 618Case Number: 93-14Decided: 12/17/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Bill 
WARD, individually and as next friend of Jeff Ward; Robert Ward, individually 
and as next friend of Kelly Ward; Lester Carberry, individually and as next 
friend of Laura Carberry; and Alvin Gwin, individually and as next friend of 
Corey Gwin,

 Appellants 
(Petitioners/Plaintiffs),

v.

BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES OF GOSHEN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, 

Appellee 
(Respondent/Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Goshen County, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Walter 
C. Urbigkit (argued), and Harold F. Buck of Buck Law Offices, Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

Tracy 
J. Copenhaver (argued), Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, and Michael 
Warren, Torrington, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
brought by the parents of LaGrange, Wyoming students challenging a decision by 
the Board of Trustees of Goshen County School District No. 1 to close the junior 
and senior high schools in that town. In the district court they asserted that 
the closing was improper because (1) the process used in making the decision 
violated the open meeting laws and (2) the decision was arbitrary and capricious 
and not supported by substantial evidence. The district court ruled in favor of 
the board of trustees, and the parents appealed to this court. 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The parents raise 
three issues for review:

1. 
Belated filing of documents and written material in district court does not 
provide relevant evidence for judicial review on a petition for review in 
district court or for consideration on appeal by the supreme 
court.

2. 
Denial of an open meeting pursuant to Wyoming statute and rejection of a 
citizen's right to legal representation and appearance before a governmental 
agency at a public meeting denies due process and violates state law mandating 
reversal of the agency action consequently taken.

3. 
The action of school board in discontinuing education at the LaGrange school for 
grades 7 & 8 (Jr. High) and 9-12 (Senior High) was taken without the support 
of substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious in 
result.

[¶4]      The Board 
rephrases the issues somewhat:

1. 
Was the designation of record on appeal filed by the defendant/appellee on 
August 10, 1992 a "belated filing" as alleged by appellants, or was the 
designation of record on appeal filed in accordance with Rule 12.07 and within 
the time allowed by the reviewing court?

2. 
Were there any denials or violations of the open meeting laws of the State of 
Wyoming which nullify the school board's decision to consolidate LaGrange grades 
7-12 with Southeast?

(a) 
Is there a citizens' right to legal representation before a governmental agency 
at a work session, and if so, was any such right denied?

3. 
Was the action taken by the Board of Trustees of Goshen County School District 
No. 1 arbitrary and capricious or without support of substantial 
evidence?

FACTS

[¶5]      The Board of 
Trustees of Goshen County School District No. 1 (Board) had been aware for some 
time that the school district was faced with budget problems. While the Board 
considered ways to alleviate those problems, one of the options that arose was 
the possibility of closing LaGrange grades 7-12 
(LaGrange).

[¶6]      Beginning in 
early March 1992, rumors began to circulate that the Board was considering 
closing LaGrange. On March 10, 1992, at a regularly scheduled Board meeting, a 
petition was presented by LaGrange residents which requested that the Board not 
close the LaGrange schools.

[¶7]      In response to 
these concerns, Paul Novak (Novak), the superintendent of schools for Goshen 
County School District No. 1, arranged a meeting between the Board and the 
residents of LaGrange. That meeting was held on April 2, 1992, and was attended 
by Novak and three members of the Board. At this meeting, the parents of 
LaGrange students (Ward) were accompanied by their attorney. The chairwoman of 
the Board, Donna Duncan (Duncan), declined to hold the meeting if Ward's 
attorney was going to be present. The attorney left, and the meeting was held. 
The discussion during the meeting centered around the budget problems and the 
effects that closing the school would have on those 
problems.

[¶8]      A second meeting 
was held on April 6 in LaGrange with the full board in attendance. Again, Ward's 
attorney attempted to attend the meeting. Duncan stated that she thought 
attorneys were not necessary for this meeting. She suggested that if Ward's 
attorney was going to be present, the Board should also have its attorney there 
and Ward should pay for the cost. Rather than agree to that, Ward had their 
attorney leave the meeting. The meeting then proceeded with a discussion on the 
school district's finances, the possible closing of LaGrange and its effects, 
and any alternatives to closing that may be available.

[¶9]      A special meeting 
was held on April 13, where the possible closing was again discussed. Ward's 
attorney attended and participated in this meeting. On April 14 a regularly 
scheduled Board meeting was held. At this meeting the Board voted to close the 
LaGrange 7-12 grades. The parents as representatives of LaGrange school 
children, have brought this action challenging that decision. 

DISCUSSION

A. 
THE RECORD

[¶10]   The first issue raised by Ward is 
whether the Board properly filed the record on appeal with the district court. 
The petition for review was filed by Ward on May 7, 1992, and the Board's 
designation of the record was filed on August 10, 1992. Ward asserts that by 
filing their designation of the record more than 60 days after the petition for 
review was filed, the Board failed to comply with the time requirement of 
W.R.A.P. 12.07. Consequently, Ward argues that the record as designated by the 
Board is not properly before this court.

[¶11]   Rule 12.07 provides in 
part:

     Within 60 days after 
the service of petition, or within the time allowed by the reviewing 
court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing court the 
original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceedings under 
review and a separate letter of transmittal marked for the personal attention of 
the judge or judges of the reviewing court. [emphasis 
added]

There 
is no dispute that the Board is an agency within the meaning of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. W.S. 16-3-101(b)(i) (1990).

[¶12]   Determinative to this issue is a 
passage in the district court's order:

     At the close of the 
hearing on July 30, 1992, the parties agreed that there need be no further 
evidentiary hearing and that the Defendant-Respondent [Board] would file the 
complete record on appeal after which each side would be entitled to 
file a brief regarding the issue of the Petition for Review or for Injunctive or 
Declaratory Relief. Respondent did, in accordance with the Court's Order, 
file the Record on Appeal and Plaintiffs and Defendant each timely filed 
Briefs in support of or in opposition to the Petition for Review. [emphasis 
added]

The 
Board filed the record within the time allowed by the reviewing court. W.R.A.P. 
12.07. Ward did not object to the filing of the record at that time. In fact, 
from the language of the district court's order, it appears that Ward explicitly 
agreed to the filing of the record. Accordingly, Ward's argument is without 
merit, and the record is properly before this court.

B. 
OPEN MEETINGS

1. 
APRIL 2 AND APRIL 6 MEETINGS

[¶13]   Ward challenges the propriety of 
the April 2 and 6 meetings. Ward asserts that the meetings violated W.S. 
16-4-403 because the Board took "action." Essentially, Ward claims that although 
the formal vote to close the schools took place at the April 14 meeting, for all 
intents and purposes, the decision was made at, or sometime in between, the 
earlier informal meetings. This, Ward claims, violates the statute and requires 
this court to invalidate the closing.

[¶14]   We begin by looking at the relevant 
statute, W.S. 16-4-403 (1990), which states:

     (a) All meetings of 
the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the public at all 
times, except as otherwise provided. No action of a governing body of an agency 
shall be taken except during a public meeting following notice of the meeting in 
accordance with this act. Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this 
act is null and void and not merely voidable.

"Action" 
and "meeting" are defined in W.S. 16-4-402(a) (1990) as:

     (i) "Action" means the 
transaction of official business of an agency including a collective decision of 
a governing body, a collective commitment or promise by a governing body to make 
a positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a governing body upon a 
motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, rule, order or 
ordinance;

* 
* * * * *

     (iii) "Meeting" means 
an assembly of the governing body of an agency at which action is 
taken[.]

[¶15]   It is undisputed that the April 2 
and 6 meetings do not satisfy the notice requirements of W.S. 16-4-404 (1990). 
Thus we are confronted with the question: What action, if any, taken at those 
meetings is void as provided in W.S. 16-4-403(a). We have held that agencies may 
hold informal meetings for informational purposes so long as no action is taken 
at them. Emery v. City of Rawlins, 596 P.2d 675, 679 (Wyo. 1979). That case 
involved a city council not a school board. However, both are subject to the 
same open meeting laws. Therefore, the logic of that case is equally applicable 
to this one. So long as no action is taken, a governmental entity, which is 
subject to the open meeting requirements, can hold sessions for the purpose of 
obtaining or disseminating information.

[¶16]   The key to this issue is whether 
the Board took action at these meetings. There is no transcript, so it 
impossible to determine what exactly happened at the meetings. However, Ward 
points to no evidence that shows a collective decision was made or a vote was 
taken. See Emery, at 679-80. Ward's argument is based solely on conjecture and 
speculation. Without any evidence to the contrary, we cannot say that these 
meetings violated the statute. Id.

[¶17]   On the other hand, there is 
sufficient evidence that the Board did comply with the statute. Transcripts of 
the special meeting on April 13 and the regular meeting on April 14 are in the 
record. There is no dispute about the propriety of these meetings. The record 
shows that all of the relevant issues to the school closing were discussed at 
the April 13 meeting. The Board explained the problem to the citizens of 
LaGrange, and they were allowed ample opportunity to speak and offer 
alternatives. The vote to close the school occurred at the April 14 meeting. 
Since these meetings met the requirements of W.S. 16-4-403 and -404, the actions 
taken were proper.

2. 
EXCLUSION OF ATTORNEY

[¶18]   We now turn to the second issue 
raised by Ward, the exclusion of their lawyer from the April 2 and 6 meetings. 
Ward contends that the exclusion denied them due process and violated the open 
meeting law as provided in W.S. 16-4-403(b) (1990):

     A member of the public 
is not required as a condition of attendance at any meeting to register his 
name, to supply information, to complete a questionnaire, or fulfill any other 
condition precedent to his attendance. A person seeking recognition at the 
meeting may be required to give his name and affiliation.

There 
was no violation of this statute because it is inapplicable to the informational 
meetings of April 2 and 6. As we have already pointed out, there was no action 
at these meetings. The definition of "meetings" under the act requires an 
assembly of the agency at which action is taken. W.S. 16-4-402(a)(iii). Since 
there was no action at the April 2 and 6 assemblies, there was no "meeting" 
under the act. Thus the act is not applicable, and the exclusion of Ward's 
attorney did not violate the statute.

[¶19]   Ward also asserts that the Board 
had no authority to require Ward to pay for the Board's attorney as a condition 
for the presence of their attorney and that the exclusion violated the due 
process clause of the Wyoming Constitution. Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 6. Ward 
contends that since there is a constitutional right to an education in Wyoming, 
the students have a property interest. Therefore, they argue, the exclusion of 
their lawyer from the public meetings violated due 
process.

[¶20]   In order for due process to attach, 
the party claiming a violation of due process must show that it has a protected 
interest in life, liberty or property. Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 
1989). The party must then demonstrate that the interest has been infringed in 
an impermissible way. Id. A public education is a property right which cannot be 
taken away from a student without some measure of procedural due process. 
Clements v. Bd. of Trustees, 585 P.2d 197, 204 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶21]   Ward's argument that exclusion of 
their lawyer violated due process fails for two reasons. First, the April 2 and 
6 "meetings" were informational gatherings not covered by the Wyoming statutes. 
The Board did not have to hold the meetings but did so as a courtesy to the 
citizens of LaGrange. Only when there is action by a state actor to deprive a 
person of life, liberty or property, is due process required. Hatfield v. 
Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wyo. 1991). Since the "meetings" were 
not held under the open meeting statute, no process was due because there was no 
state action which deprived Ward of any property. The April 13 and 14 meetings 
were held pursuant to the open meeting statute, and Ward's attorney was afforded 
an opportunity to participate. The propriety of those meetings is not 
questioned, therefore whatever process was due to Ward under the statute was 
satisfied by those two meetings.

[¶22]   Second, Ward cites no cases in his 
brief, nor can we find any, where a student has a property interest in attending 
a specific school. Under Wyoming law, a student has a property interest in 
obtaining a public education. Clements, at 204. However, a student does not have 
a property interest in where he receives that education. See O'Neal v. School 
District No. 15 School Board, 451 P.2d 791, 793 (Wyo. 1969) (sole prerogative of 
school board to determine whether to maintain school or to transport children); 
W.S. 21-3-110(a)(x) (Cum.Supp. 1993) (duty of the board of trustees to fix the 
site of each schoolhouse considering the needs of the people, the district, and 
the standards of the state board). Since Ward has not shown a property interest, 
their due process claim fails.

[¶23]   Since we have found no due process 
violation, we need not determine whether the Board has the authority to require 
citizens to pay for the Board's attorney as a condition for the presence of the 
citizens' attorney.

C. 
THE SCHOOL CLOSING DECISION

[¶24]   Ward asserts that the Board's 
decision to close the LaGrange school must be reversed because the decision was 
not based on substantial evidence. The parties do not dispute that the main 
reason for closing the school is financial. What the parties do dispute is the 
amount of savings the closing will bring to the district. Ward asserts that the 
Board's numbers do not add up to the claimed projected savings. Ward also claims 
that the Board ignored certain closing costs and cost saving alternatives to 
closing that the town had said it would implement if the school was kept open. 
Consequently, Ward argues that the record does not support the Board's decision 
and, as a result, its decision to close the school was arbitrary and 
capricious.

[¶25]   This court has consistently stated 
that we will interfere with school board decisions only if they are arbitrary 
and capricious or fraudulent. Roberts v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. One, 676 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 1984); Hyatt v. Big Horn Sch. Dist. No. 4, 636 P.2d 525, 529 
(Wyo. 1981). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the school board 
unless abuse is shown. Roberts, at 580.

[¶26]   One way abuse can be shown is if 
the agency failed to follow particular factors which are required by statute. 
Holding's Little America v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 670 P.2d 699, 704 (Wyo. 
1983). The applicable statute in this case is W.S. 21-3-110(a)(x) which allows 
the Board to "[f]ix the site of each schoolhouse considering the needs of the 
people of each portion of the district and the standards of the state board." So 
long as there is evidence in the record to support the decision in light of the 
factors in the statute, we must affirm. Holding's, at 704.

[¶27]   The amount of evidence that is 
required is substantial evidence, which we have defined as

such 
relevant evidence as reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. In determining whether that quantum of evidence is present, all of 
the evidence on the record, both that which supports and that which conflicts 
with the agency's decision must be reviewed, and the Court must determine 
whether the agency could reasonably conclude what it did. The standard requires 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence, more than a mere suspicion that a 
certain fact exists. However, once that measure of evidence has been found to 
exist, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from a body of 
evidence does not prevent a finding that the conclusion drawn by the 
administrative agency was supported by substantial 
evidence.

Knight 
v. Environmental Quality Council, 805 P.2d 268, 274 (Wyo. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 

[¶28]   After a careful review of the 
record, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision to close the LaGrange school. The record clearly demonstrates that the 
Board considered all options and information relating to the closing of the 
LaGrange schools. The record shows that the following information was before the 
Board when it made its decision: (1) projected revenues and expenses for the 
district for the next school year; (2) projected budget deficit for the district 
for the next year; (3) a report of the projected state budget deficit; (4) the 
cost of education per pupil throughout the district, which was highest at 
LaGrange; (5) actual and projected enrollments for each school within the 
district; (6) the diversity of classes offered at each school; (7) 
transportation costs; (8) teacher salaries and status (tenured versus 
non-tenured); and, finally, (9) various alternatives to closing LaGrange 
including a possible mill levy increase in LaGrange. The record shows that the 
Board looked at all the information, in the context of the district as a whole, 
to determine whether closing LaGrange was the best option. Of course, the 
closing of the school is not supported by every factor. However, based on the 
record as a whole, the Board could reasonably conclude that closing LaGrange was 
the best option, and its decision is supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶29]   Ward strenuously argues that the 
Board made mathematical errors in its calculations of projected budget savings 
and that the Board completely ignored alternatives suggested by them. Once we 
have found an agency's decision to be supported by substantial evidence, we will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983). We are required to affirm 
the agency's decision. Id; see also Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game 
& Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1066 (Wyo. 1993). The Board was charged with 
that decision, and it acted within its discretion based on the facts available 
to it. Therefore, the Board's decision must be affirmed because it was based 
upon substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or 
capricious.

CONCLUSION

[¶30]   Closing a school is always a 
painful and traumatic experience, both to the residents and those who have to 
make that decision. The Board of Trustees is charged by law with the sometimes 
difficult job of running the education system. It cannot please everyone. While 
we sympathize with the residents of LaGrange, the Board's decision did not 
violate the open meeting laws nor was it arbitrary or 
capricious.

[¶31]   For the foregoing reasons, the 
district court is affirmed.