Title: DeRolph v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DEROLPH v. THE STATE OF OHIO. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
(No. 95-2066 — Submitted March 24, 1998 — Decided August 21, 1998.) 
ON MOTION OF APPELLANTS from the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, No. 
22043. 
 
This matter is before the court on the motion of appellants filed March 23, 
1998.  The court, having remanded the cause to the trial court for further 
proceedings, is now without jurisdiction to decide this motion. 
 
When the court reasserted jurisdiction over DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, and 78 Ohio St.3d 419, 678 N.E.2d 886, it was 
for the sole purpose of resolving “* * * any election-related challenge to the May 
5, 1998 election * * *.”  State ex rel. Taft v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1244, 691 N.E.2d 677. 
 
Accordingly, the motion of appellants is ordered stricken from the court’s 
records. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent. Today’s decision that the court 
lacks jurisdiction to rule on the pending motion cannot be squared with the court’s 
previous assertion of jurisdiction over State ex rel. Taft v. Franklin Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1244, 691 N.E.2d 677.  In Taft, the court 
determined that it could assert exclusive jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment 
action pending in Franklin County Common Pleas Court based on the authority of 
DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”) and 
 
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DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 419, 424-426, 678 N.E.2d 886, 890-891 
(“DeRolph II”).  Although I will not restate my dissenting view in Taft, a key 
factor in that dissent was that the Taft case did not even involve the DeRolph 
parties or the DeRolph issues. 
 
The court today strikes the pending motion even though that motion relates 
directly to mandates issued by the DeRolph court.  Thus, the majority holds that it 
lacks the authority to enforce its own DeRolph mandates despite having previously 
reached out on the strength of DeRolph to take jurisdiction in Taft on issues that 
were only collateral to the DeRolph proceedings. 
 
As part of the stricken motion, appellants ask the court to allocate to the 
state both the burden of production and the burden of proof in the remanded 
proceedings.  Justices Douglas and Resnick have already expressed their view that 
it is the “state’s burden of showing the constitutionality of all remedial legislation 
in the DeRolph litigation” (State ex rel. Taft v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas [1998], 81 Ohio St.3d 480, 486, 692 N.E.2d 560, 565 [Douglas, J., 
concurring in judgment only]).  Given that the trial court is to hold hearings 
pursuant to this court’s unusual remand and that the decision of that court is to be 
appealed directly to this court, the questions on burdens of proof and production 
should be answered, by a majority decision, before the trial court begins its 
proceedings.  Since that is not to be, a dissenting analysis to contrast with the 
existing published viewpoint follows. 
 
We have consistently expressed that “[a]n enactment of the General 
Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it 
unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and 
constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” E.g., State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph 
 
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one of the syllabus.  The Ohio Constitution vests the legislative authority of this 
state in the General Assembly.  Section 1, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  Although 
the legislative power is subject to the express limitations found in the Constitution 
and the implied limitation that it must fall within the scope of legislative authority, 
the legislative and judicial branches are coequal, and neither can be subordinated 
or made answerable to the other. 
 
That the court once found the legislature’s treatment of school funding 
unconstitutional cannot create a presumption that its later efforts will also be 
constitutionally infirm.  Nor can this court alter the balance of constitutional 
power by ordering the legislature to pass new laws as part of a “remedy.”   In 
DeRolph I this court was presented only with a challenge to the school funding 
scheme as it existed in 1992.  Id. at 199, 677 N.E.2d at 738, fn. 1.  We did not pass 
on the myriad of changes to the school funding scheme that have since intervened.  
The case on remand involves this new legislation. 
 
Displacing the judicial deference normally accorded the General Assembly 
in exercising its constitutional authority jeopardizes the separation of powers.  It 
threatens to subordinate the legislative branch to the judiciary by forcing the 
General Assembly, albeit by proxy, to placate a common pleas judge and, 
eventually, a majority of this court by affirmatively demonstrating that it exercised 
its constitutionally prescribed function within the confines vaguely set forth by 
this court in DeRolph I.  In essence, such a standard forces the General Assembly 
to seek court approval regarding the wisdom of its enactments, since there is no 
track record of the legislation’s effect.  On remand, the Attorney General would be 
forced to affirmatively prove by theory and projection that the General Assembly’s 
latest allocation scheme will satisfy aspirations that the DeRolph I majority itself 
was either unwilling or unable to define. 
 
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In support of their motion to shift the burden of proof, appellants cite 
footnote 2 of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Hull v. Albrecht (1997), 
190 Ariz. 520, 522, 950 P.2d 1141, 1143.  That footnote, however, cited no legal 
authority for its conclusion.  Furthermore, as demonstrated below,  appellants’ 
citation of United States v. Fordice (1992), 505 U.S. 717, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 120 
L.Ed.2d 575, does not support its request to shift the burden of proving 
constitutionality on remand. 
 
Initially, it is important to identify the different constitutional authorities 
that distinguish the United States Supreme Court’s exercise of remedial power in 
Brown v. Bd. of Edn. (1955), 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083, 
1106 (“Brown II”), from this court’s order in DeRolph II.  The federal judiciary 
derives its power from the United States Constitution.  The Supremacy Clause of 
the federal Constitution “makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions 
of state officials; the power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus 
presupposes some authority to order state officials to comply.” New York v. United 
States (1992), 505 U.S. 144, 179, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 152.  
Accordingly, based on notions of federal supremacy, the federal authority may, at 
times, justify retaining a direct supervisory or overruling power over state officials 
to enforce compliance with federal law.  The federal judiciary’s power to 
supervise state officials involves questions of federalism, while the Ohio 
judiciary’s interaction with its coequal branches of government involves the 
separation of powers. 
 
Brown II and its progeny have also developed a burden-shifting 
presumption that distinguishes those cases.  Under the Brown II line of authority, 
state school officials bear the burden of demonstrating compliance with the Brown 
mandate with respect to policies and practices traceable to de jure segregation.  
 
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Once it is established that school officials have operated a school system with a 
history of intentional segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, continuing racial imbalance is considered prima facie 
proof of a continuing violation and requires school officials to come forward with 
sufficient countervailing evidence demonstrating that segregative intent did not 
motivate their actions. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. (1973), 413 U.S. 
189, 207-210, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2697-2698, 37 L.Ed.2d 548, 562-564; Dayton Bd. of 
Edn. v. Brinkman (1979), 443 U.S. 526, 536-537, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2978-2979, 61 
L.Ed.2d 720, 732-733.  In this case, there is no similar justification for assuming 
that the General Assembly will attempt to maintain or revive aspects of former 
legislation that the DeRolph I court declared unconstitutional.  Moreover, the 
mandate of Brown II applied to school officials, and the court was “not content * * 
* to leave [the] task in the unsupervised hands of local school authorities, trained 
as most would be under the old laws and practices, with loyalties to the system of 
separate white and Negro schools.” United States v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Edn. 
(1969), 395 U.S. 225, 227, 89 S.Ct. 1670, 1671, 23 L.Ed.2d 263, 268.  There is no 
legitimate justification for having a similar suspicion of the General Assembly in 
this case. 
 
Finally, Brown II and its progeny involved invidious discrimination based 
on race.  Classifications based on race receive strict constitutional scrutiny.  
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995), 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 
2113, 132 L.Ed.2d 158, 182.  Under Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 96 
S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, an initial showing of discriminatory purpose is 
necessary to impose strict scrutiny on facially neutral classifications having 
discriminatory impact.  After discriminatory purpose is established, the 
governmental actor must defend against strict scrutiny and prevails only if it can 
 
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demonstrate that its legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest.  Miller v. Johnson (1995), 515 U.S. 900, 920, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490, 132 
L.Ed.2d 762, 782.  Accordingly, the burden-shifting rationale developed in Brown 
II and its progeny is consistent with the allocation of burdens regularly employed 
in equal protection cases based on race.  Racial motivation is presumed from the 
combination of a presently existing racial imbalance and a history of intentional 
segregation, shifting the burden to school officials to defend the imbalance.  In 
contrast, this case involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right 
that would require strict scrutiny, nor has there been any presumption identified 
that justifies shifting the burden of proof to the Attorney General. 
 
The idea that the judiciary must begin with a presumption that all statutes 
are constitutional until it is proven otherwise is deeply rooted in our Constitution 
and its framework, which implicitly requires the separation of powers. See S. 
Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136.  The 
novel procedure employed in this case cannot change this essential presumption.