Title: Commonwealth v. Mulgrave

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11569 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CRAIG MULGRAVE. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 6, 2015. - July 13, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Spontaneous utterance, Expert opinion, 
Impeachment of credibility, Cumulative evidence, Relevancy 
and materiality.  Witness, Expert, Impeachment.  Mental 
Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions 
to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 2, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Robert S. Sinsheimer (Lisa Parlagreco with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In March, 2012, a Superior Court jury convicted 
the defendant, Craig Mulgrave, of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty in the stabbing death 
2 
 
of his wife, Christina Mulgrave.1  On appeal the defendant 
asserts that the judge erred in certain evidentiary rulings that 
violated his right to due process under the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights:  
(1) admitting in evidence as an excited utterance a cellular 
telephone text message sent by the victim; (2) granting the 
Commonwealth leave to present general evidence that the 
defendant made statements, which previously were suppressed, to 
impeach proffered evidence that he was noncommunicative; and (3) 
excluding the proffered testimony of a defense expert witness.  
The defendant also argues error in the jury instructions on 
diminished capacity.  We discern no error in the judge's 
evidentiary rulings or instructions to the jury.  We decline to 
exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  The Commonwealth's case.  The jury 
could have found the following facts.  The defendant and the 
victim were married in Jamaica in July, 2008.  The two had met 
while the victim was on vacation in Jamaica, where the defendant 
had lived.  In October, 2009, the defendant obtained a visa and 
moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, to join the victim.  The couple 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth also had proceeded under a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, but the jury did not find the 
defendant guilty under that theory. 
 
3 
 
moved to Haverhill one or two months later, where they would be 
closer to the victim's two children and her sister. 
 
The victim's sister and son testified that the defendant 
was depressed and frustrated that he was unable to find 
employment.  In February, 2010, the victim told her sister that 
there were problems in the marriage and that she had asked the 
defendant to go back to Jamaica, but he would not leave.  Two 
letters were read in evidence, one from the victim to the 
defendant and the other his response.  The victim's letter 
expressed her difficulties with the marriage and asked the 
defendant either to make the marriage work or to separate.  The 
defendant responded by also expressing his unhappiness in the 
marriage and telling her he felt "unhappy, depressed, without a 
job, unemployed, dependent on [her] for everything."  The 
defendant expressed his love for her and said that he wanted to 
"make this right." 
 
On February 7, 2010, the day of the National Football 
League's Super Bowl, the couple hosted the victim's family for 
dinner at their apartment.  The victim's son, Evan McCain, 
testified that the defendant left the house during the party and 
went out walking "all day."  The next evening, the victim came 
home to find the defendant unconscious and lying on the floor 
with a string tied into a noose around his neck, a knife tucked 
into the waistband of his pants, and a bottle of alcohol nearby.  
4 
 
The victim, a nurse, took a photograph of the defendant but did 
not call for medical care.  She sent Evan a text message, which 
prompted him to come over about ten minutes later.  The victim 
and Evan stood over the defendant talking for about ten minutes, 
during which time the defendant never responded or acknowledged 
their presence.  Evan testified that the defendant "drank a 
bunch of liquor" that evening.  He left the defendant a 
handwritten note expressing his disapproval. 
 
The following day, on February 9, the victim had an 
interview at Lowell General Hospital and, thereafter, went to 
her sister's house.  During this visit, the victim told her 
sister about the incident the prior evening.  The sister asked 
the victim to stay at the sister's home that evening.  The 
victim, however, "was adamant about going home to handle her 
business" and left at about 1 P.M. for the forty-minute drive to 
her home.  Two hours later, at 3:03 P.M., the victim sent a text 
message to Evan stating, "He is threatening to kill me I am 
scared he said if I pick up the phone he will kill me."  Six 
minutes after that, at 3:09 P.M., she telephoned 911 and 
frantically reported that her husband was stabbing her. 
 
A sergeant with the Haverhill police department arrived at 
the couple's apartment within two minutes of the 911 call.  As 
the sergeant entered the walkway to the apartment building, he 
heard a female screaming from one of the upstairs apartments.  
5 
 
He ran up the stairs and entered the apartment on the left side 
of the hallway.  A few seconds later, a man came out of the 
apartment on the right side of the hallway.  The sergeant asked 
him if he heard anything, and the man, later identified as the 
defendant, responded, "It's in here.  I just killed my wife." 
 
The defendant was standing at the door to the apartment he 
shared with the victim; he was covered in blood and holding a 
knife.  The defendant complied with the sergeant's requests to 
drop the knife and get down on the floor.  After the defendant 
was handcuffed, the sergeant asked him, "Where is she?," and he 
motioned toward the office in the front of the apartment. 
 
Inside the office, the victim was lying on her left side on 
the floor in a pool of blood.  Emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) arrived and found the victim with a weak pulse and barely 
breathing.  The first attempt to ventilate the victim was 
unsuccessful because air from a breathing tube placed through 
the victim's mouth escaped from a stab wound in her neck.  A 
second tube was inserted directly into the stab wound and down 
into the lungs.  As the EMTs continued to render aid to the 
victim, they transported her to Merrimack Hospital, where she 
was pronounced dead shortly after arrival. 
 
An autopsy revealed twelve stab wounds, twelve incise 
wounds, and miscellaneous blunt force injuries.  Of the stab 
wounds, nine were to her torso, one to her left arm, one to her 
6 
 
right arm, and one to her right shin.  Three of the stab wounds 
penetrated her lungs, two penetrated her liver, and a stab wound 
in her neck penetrated her trachea.  The medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy testified that the specific cause of death 
was blood loss and puncture injuries to the lung and trachea, 
which inhibited the body's ability to oxygenate.  The crime 
scene analyst who inspected the apartment testified that the 
location of the blood inside the office demonstrated that the 
victim was upright when some of the stab wounds were inflicted 
and was lying down or very low to the ground when other stab 
wounds were inflicted.  The knife that the defendant was holding 
when the sergeant arrived had the victim's blood on it and the 
defendant's fingerprint on the handle. 
 
The defendant was arrested at the scene and taken to the 
Haverhill police station.  He was wearing the same clothes as 
during the incident the prior evening and the string was still 
tied around his neck as a noose.  The patrolman who transported 
the defendant testified that the defendant had no alcohol odor, 
no difficulty walking, and no difficulty getting into or out of 
the cruiser.  A bottle of rum, approximately two-thirds full, 
and several prescription medication bottles containing pills 
were seized from the apartment after the stabbing. 
 
b.  The defendant's case.  The defendant conceded guilt as 
to murder in the second degree but argued that depression 
7 
 
rendered him incapable of the elevated mental state required for 
murder in the first degree.  He introduced the testimony of 
three mental health experts and his cousin.  The experts all had 
experience working with depression and explained the various 
stressors that could worsen depression symptoms.  Specifically, 
the experts noted that unemployment, cultural transition, and 
breakdown of a marriage can intensify depression.  The 
defendant's cousin testified that she talked to him about once a 
week while he was in Las Vegas, but hardly at all once he was in 
Massachusetts.  She stated that it was a big opportunity for the 
defendant to go to the United States and that he would have 
looked like a failure if he had returned to Jamaica. 
 
The defendant's first expert, Ronald P. Winfield, a 
psychiatrist, did not interview the defendant but explained that 
depression is an imbalance in brain chemicals that can cause 
unusual brain function, especially when triggered by stressors.  
Two additional experts interviewed the defendant multiple times 
and diagnosed him with a major depressive disorder at the time 
of the stabbing.  Both experts, Robert H. Joss, a forensic 
psychologist, and Elizabeth Davis, a psychiatrist, opined that 
the defendant lacked the capacity to deliberately premeditate or 
to act with extreme atrocity or cruelty because of his 
depression. 
8 
 
 
Doctors Joss and Davis reviewed the defendant's medical 
records from before the stabbing, which showed that the 
defendant was diagnosed on December 22, 2009, with depression 
with anxiety, and was prescribed Celexa, an antidepressant.  The 
record of the appointment references tearfulness, suicidal 
ideation, and anxiety on the part of the defendant.  Based on 
the number of pills remaining in the Celexa bottle found in the 
apartment, the defendant was not taking this medication as 
directed, rendering the drug ineffective in ameliorating his 
symptoms.  During his interviews of the defendant, Dr. Joss 
observed that the defendant appeared depressed, weary, and 
without much energy.  Doctor Joss opined that the defendant was 
not faking depression because his prearrest medical records were 
consistent with his symptoms after the stabbing. 
 
Doctors Joss and Davis testified that they would have 
considered immediate psychiatric hospitalization of the 
defendant if they had found him in the state he was in the 
evening before the stabbing.  The defendant told the experts 
that, on the night before the stabbing, he consumed an excessive 
amount of alcohol and ingested pills.2  Doctor Davis opined that 
the defendant's actions on the night before the stabbing 
                     
 
2 These statements were not admitted for their truth but 
only as information on which the experts based their opinions. 
 
9 
 
indicated that he was in the "throes of making a suicide 
attempt." 
 
c.  The Commonwealth's expert.  In rebuttal, the 
Commonwealth called Martin Kelly, a psychiatrist who evaluated 
the defendant and reviewed medical records, including the 
reports from Drs. Joss and Davis.  Doctor Kelly opined that the 
defendant did not suffer from any mental defect or disease at 
the time of the stabbing; instead, he had situational or 
reactive depression.  He described situational or reactive 
depression as a psychological condition, not a mental disease.  
He further explained that this condition is time limited and 
occurs after some sort of loss, such as a breakup of a 
relationship, unemployment, or cultural adjustment. 
 
d.  Excluded evidence.  Prior to trial, a motion judge 
granted the defendant's motion to suppress statements made to 
police shortly after booking.  The motion judge concluded that 
the statements were made in violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  At trial, however, the defendant sought 
to introduce evidence, through cross-examination of a police 
officer, that he was silent and noncommunicative during booking 
as a factor demonstrating diminished capacity.  The Commonwealth 
argued that such testimony would open the door to allow the 
suppressed statements to be admitted.  The trial judge noted 
10 
 
that the purpose of the rebuttal would be to show the 
defendant's capacity to answer questions, not the content or 
truth of the statements, and indicated that he would be 
inclined, if the defendant elicited such testimony, to allow the 
Commonwealth to introduce evidence about the number of questions 
asked and the defendant's manner and demeanor in answering the 
questions.  The fact that the statements were made, but not the 
content of the statements, would be admitted.  The defendant 
declined to introduce the evidence in light of that ruling. 
 
The defendant also sought to introduce the testimony of a 
fourth medical expert, William Alan Stuart, an emergency 
medicine physician.  The defendant intended to have Dr. Stuart 
testify to the effects of combining Celexa and alcohol and that 
the defendant's actions the night before the stabbing 
constituted a suicide attempt.  Further, this proposed testimony 
would have included the witness's opinion that he too would have 
commenced an involuntary commitment if he had been aware of the 
events occurring the evening before the stabbing. 
 
After conducting a voir dire, the judge denied the 
defendant's request to introduce testimony from this expert.  
The judge excluded the testimony on the following grounds:  (1) 
the proposed testimony was cumulative, as Dr. Davis already had 
opined that the defendant made a suicide attempt; (2) the 
proposed testimony had only limited relevancy, because the jury 
11 
 
could infer that the defendant was suicidal without expert 
testimony; (3) the jury likely would be confused as to the 
relevant time frame (the night before the stabbing or the day of 
the stabbing) in which to consider the defendant's mental state; 
and (4) the testimony, to the extent that it focused on what 
Evan and the victim should or should not have done on finding 
the defendant on the evening before the stabbing, would cause 
undue prejudice. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Evidentiary issues.  i.  Text message.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting the 
content of the text message sent by the victim to her son 
approximately six minutes before she telephoned 911.  The judge 
reasoned that the written statement, although hearsay, was 
admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule.  Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) (2015).  The defendant 
objected to the admission of the text message, so we review for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 435 Mass. 581, 590 
(2002). 
 
Under our rules, admissibility under the spontaneous 
utterance exception requires that (1) "there is an occurrence or 
event 'sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal 
reflective thought processes of the observer'"; and (2) the 
statement was "a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event 
and not the result of reflective thought."  Commonwealth v. 
12 
 
Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 606-607, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 487 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 623 
(2002).  The defendant argues that the text message sent by the 
victim fails to meet either requirement for admissibility.3  We 
disagree and conclude that the judge committed no error in 
admitting the victim's cellular telephone text message in 
evidence. 
 
While Massachusetts appellate courts have yet to approve 
admission of text messages or any other writing under the 
spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, this 
exception does not categorically exclude written statements from 
its scope.  We have acknowledged that a written statement may be 
considered a spontaneous utterance if it satisfies a heightened 
indicia of reliability.  See Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 
233, 237-240 (1998).  There we explained that "[b]ecause a 
writing is more suspect as a spontaneous exclamation than is an 
oral statement, the circumstances of the writing would have to 
include indicia of reliability even more persuasive than those 
required for an oral statement before we could conclude that the 
                     
 
3 The defendant also argues that the message was not 
sufficiently authenticated as being sent by the victim.  In the 
circumstances of this case, where the defendant did not contest 
the authenticity of the text message during the trial, the 
authenticity requirement was satisfied by Evan's testimony and 
his cellular telephone records showing a message originating 
from the victim at 3:03 P.M. 
 
13 
 
writing qualified as a spontaneous exclamation."  Id. at 239.  
The heightened indicia of reliability requirement, however, does 
not impose an additional test in the spontaneous utterance 
analysis.  Rather, it is intended only to ensure that a writing, 
which generally is a product of reflection, meets the 
spontaneity requirement.  Thus, although we examine a writing 
more closely on the element of spontaneity, the analysis is the 
same as for an oral statement. 
 
The first requirement, that there be an exciting event 
giving rise to the exception, is clearly satisfied by the 
statement itself, the 911 telephone call, and the victim's 
condition approximately ten minutes later.4  See Commonwealth v. 
Nunes, 430 Mass. 1, 4 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. Whelton, 
428 Mass. 24, 27 (1998) ("The statement itself may be taken as 
proof of the exciting event").  The victim stated in her text 
message, "He is threatening to kill me I am scared he said if I 
pick up the phone he will kill me."  Although the record 
                     
 
4 The defendant acknowledges that the content of the text 
message statement itself satisfies this requirement, but 
asserts, without citation to any cases, that the confrontation 
clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that there be additional evidence of the event besides 
the statement.  Regardless of whether the defendant's argument 
has any basis in law, the occurrence of an exciting event having 
very recently occurred was confirmed by the condition of the 
victim and apartment when the police arrived minutes later.  See 
Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 26-27 (1998). 
 
14 
 
contains no further information about the events occurring at 
that moment, it is established that six minutes later the victim 
frantically telephoned 911 to report that her husband was 
stabbing her and, only a few minutes after that, she was found 
barely breathing and lying in a pool of blood. 
 
In determining the second element of spontaneity, we 
consider the circumstances of the statement, including the 
temporal relation between the event and the statement, and the 
tone and manner of the declarant.  Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 
Mass. 280, 296, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010); Santiago, 437 
Mass. at 623, 625; DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 239.  Because the 
statement at issue here is a writing, we also consider whether 
and to what extent the requisite spontaneity is compromised by 
this method of communication. 
 
Here, the circumstances of the statement, although in the 
form of a cellular telephone text message, are entirely 
consistent with spontaneity.  As described above, the victim 
telephoned 911 to report that the defendant was stabbing her six 
minutes after the text message to her son reporting that the 
defendant was "threatening to kill" her.  This sequence of 
events closely resembles a scenario mentioned in DiMonte, 427 
Mass. at 239, where we observed that a writing may be admissible 
"when a victim is held hostage and is unable to communicate in 
15 
 
any way other than writing or when a person's vocalization is 
impaired" (footnote omitted). 
 
The circumstances under which the text message was sent 
adequately compensate for the limitations inherent in a writing 
and meet the spontaneity test.  Cellular telephone text messages 
are a unique form of written communications in that they allow 
for instant communication in much the same way as oral 
communications.  The cellular technology that allows for the 
sending and receiving of a text message instantly, often as a 
substitute for oral expression, diminishes the concern about 
spontaneity that might arise with other more deliberative modes 
of written communication.  Further, the growth of cellular 
telephones has made text messaging and other types of written 
electronic statements ubiquitous forms of rapid communication.5  
For a person proficient in the use of the cellular telephone 
technology, sending a text message may involve no more effort 
                     
 
5 In Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 
2007), a judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland reviewed case law interpreting evidentiary 
rules for application to electronic communications.  The judge 
concluded that electronically stored communications may be 
admissible under the Federal rule governing spontaneous 
utterances, Fed. R. Evid. § 803(2), noting the "prevalence of 
electronic communication devices, and the fact that many are 
portable and small, means that people always seem to have their 
laptops, [personal digital assistants], and [cellular 
telephones] with them, and available for use to send [electronic 
mail messages] or text messages describing events as they are 
happening."  Id. at 569. 
 
16 
 
than verbalizing a thought, feeling, or emotion in response to 
an event.  A cellular telephone user may choose between verbal 
and written communication without sacrificing immediacy in the 
communication of the message.6  This opportunity for instant 
communication by way of cellular telephone technology elevates 
text messages, at least on the spontaneity scale, beyond the 
level of an ordinary writing.  See DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 239.  
Thus, we conclude that the spontaneity requirement is not 
undermined in this case by the fact that the statement is a 
writing in the form of a cellular telephone text message. 
 
Although the temporal relation requires no definite and 
fixed limit of time for spontaneity, "the further the statement 
from the event, the more difficult it becomes to determine 
whether the statement is the result of reflection, influenced by 
other factors."  DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 239, citing Commonwealth 
v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 223 (1973).  The rationale behind 
the temporal relation is that statements made before the 
                     
 
6 More text messages are sent and received by cellular 
telephone users than voice minutes are expended.  According to a 
Nielsen study conducted in 2012, ninety-four per cent of United 
States consumers age sixteen years and older use a cellular 
telephone, and the average United States cellular contract user 
sent or received 764.2 text messages and used 644.1 voice 
minutes per month.  See The Nielsen Company, The Mobile 
Consumer:  A Global Snapshot 7, 19 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/uk/en/documents/Mob
ile-Consumer-Report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/VYX5-WCL8], citing 
Nielsen Consumer Value Metrics (2012). 
 
17 
 
declarant has time to "contrive and misrepresent" would be 
admitted, while others made after the "exciting influence [has 
lost] its sway" would be inadmissible.  McLaughlin, supra, 
quoting 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1750 (3d ed. 1940).  In this 
case, the statement occurred within a reasonable temporal 
proximity to the exciting event because the victim's subsequent 
911 telephone call and death shortly thereafter demonstrate that 
the event was in progress when she sent the text message. 
 
Likewise, the tone and manner of the declarant, as 
evidenced by the writing itself, supports a determination that 
this statement was spontaneous, and thus reliable.  See Simon, 
456 Mass. at 296.  The message was one sentence without any 
punctuation.  The message related only to the circumstances of 
the threat to the victim's safety and her reaction (fear) to 
that threat.  In contrast, the facsimile transmission in 
DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 234 n.4, which we said was not 
spontaneous, was much longer and related to arrangements for an 
upcoming concert at which the victim was to sing in addition to 
the prior assault. 
 
For all the reasons explained above, we are persuaded that 
the circumstances of the statement, the tone and manner of the 
statement and its timing, establish the second requirement of 
the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  The 
judge's decision to admit the statement was sound. 
18 
 
 
Last, statements admissible as spontaneous utterances must 
also satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See Irene, 462 Mass. at 609.  
"The confrontation clause bars the admission of testimonial out-
of-court statements by a witness who does not appear at trial 
unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant 
had an earlier opportunity for cross-examination."  Id. at 617, 
citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).  
"Whether a particular statement is 'testimonial' lies at the 
core of this analysis."  Irene, supra, citing Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-824 (2006).  The defendant asserts 
that the statement was testimonial in fact because the victim 
did not ask for help or describe an earlier event and that she 
instead intended to establish the identity of her potential 
perpetrator.  We disagree with the defendant's characterization 
of the statement. 
 
"A statement is testimonial in fact if 'a reasonable person 
in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement's 
being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting 
the crime.'"7  Simon, 456 Mass. at 297, quoting Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
7 Whether a statement is testimonial in fact is the second 
step in determining whether a statement was testimonial.  
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 297, cert. denied, 562 
U.S. 874 (2010).  The statement was not testimonial per se, 
which is the subject of the inquiry in the first step, because 
 
19 
 
Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 12-13 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 
(2006). Although the victim did not explicitly ask for help, she 
wrote, "He is threatening to kill me I am scared he said if I 
pick up the phone he will kill me."  Further, she did not name 
the defendant, a fact likely to be communicated by a declarant 
attempting to establish her perpetrator's identity.  Rather, the 
statement is more properly characterized as one made in the 
context of an ongoing emergency for which the victim sought 
assistance.  Thus, the judge did not err in admitting the text 
message. 
 
ii.  Availability of suppressed statement for impeachment.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in ruling that the 
Commonwealth would be permitted to rebut evidence of the 
defendant's mental capacity insofar as it rested on the claim 
that he was noncommunicative during booking and during his 
receipt of Miranda and telephone rights.  Although the judge 
explicitly ordered that the content of the statements would not 
be admitted, he ruled that the Commonwealth would be allowed to 
ask certain questions, such as, "Were there other questions 
asked . . . [h]ow many other questions were asked . . . what was 
his manner and demeanor in answering those questions and what 
were the general areas of conversation."  The defendant argues 
                                                                  
the statement was not made in a "formal or solemnized form" or 
"in response to law enforcement interrogation."  Id. 
20 
 
that this ruling was error for two reasons:  (1) the statements 
were involuntary and thus inadmissible for any reason; and (2) 
even if the statements were allowed to impeach the defendant's 
testimony, they could not be used to impeach his experts' 
testimony. 
 
Both of these arguments are unavailing.  The trial judge, 
after reviewing the transcript from the hearing on the motion to 
suppress and the video recording of the interrogation, concluded 
that the defendant's statements were voluntary because the 
defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, reported that he physically felt good, was tuned into 
subtleties, and responded to the police officer directly on the 
issues.8  The judge's conclusion is well supported by the record.  
See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549, 554 (2001).  
Accordingly, the rule cited by the defendant, that "any criminal 
trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a 
denial of due process of law," is not applicable here (emphasis 
in original).  Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 591-592 
(2010), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). 
 
The defendant's argument fails for the additional reason 
that the judge precluded the admission of the content of the 
                     
 
8 The motion judge, suppressing the statements on other 
grounds, did not decide the issue of voluntariness. 
 
21 
 
statements.  The judge ruled that only evidence of the 
defendant's ability to communicate would be admitted and only 
for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's claim that he was 
noncommunicative in the aftermath of the killing.  Evidence of 
the defendant's ability to answer questions, offered only to 
rebut evidence of the defendant's noncommunicability, is not 
barred by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, or by art. 12.9 
 
The defendant next argues that this ability to communicate, 
as established by the existence of (the subsequently suppressed) 
statements to the police, was not admissible to impeach his 
expert witnesses even if such statements would have been 
admissible against him.  The defendant's argument stems from the 
limitations on the impeachment exception to the exclusionary 
rule as set forth in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 
(1990).  The exclusionary rule bars the prosecution's use of 
statements, even if voluntary, that were obtained in violation 
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), unless an 
exception applies.  James, supra at 312, citing Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
                     
 
9 The defendant's silence in response to Miranda warnings 
and booking questions, sought at trial to demonstrate mental 
impairment, was considered by the motion judge as evidence that 
the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and was 
accordingly used to support suppression. 
 
22 
 
714, 722 (1975).  Under the impeachment exception, "prosecutors 
[may] introduce illegally[10] obtained evidence for the limited 
purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant's own 
testimony."  James, supra at 312.  In James, the United States 
Supreme Court declined to extend the impeachment exception to 
allow impeachment of "all defense witnesses" because doing so 
"would not further the truth-seeking value with equal force but 
would appreciably undermine the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule."  Id. at 320.  We have yet to interpret the 
meaning of "all defense witnesses," and we decline to do so now.  
Suffice it to say, evidence that the defendant answered a number 
of questions, without relating the content of the statements, 
that is offered for the purpose of showing communicability is 
not an impermissible use of illegally obtained statements and, 
therefore, does not offend the rule in James. 
 
iii.  Exclusion of expert witness testimony.  The defendant 
argues that the judge violated his right to present a defense 
and call witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and under art. 12 
by excluding the testimony of Dr. Stuart, whose testimony would 
review the effects of combining Celexa and alcohol and was 
                     
 
10 The statements suppressed in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 
307, 313 (1990), were obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, not the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as applicable in 
this case. 
 
23 
 
proffered to show that the defendant's conduct the night before 
the stabbing was a legitimate suicide attempt.  The judge 
excluded the testimony as cumulative, of limited relevancy, and 
unduly prejudicial, and because it could confuse the jury as to 
the relevant time frame in which to consider the defendant's 
mental state.  "[A] trial judge has the discretion to control 
the scope of the examination of witnesses . . . and can exclude 
witnesses whose testimony is cumulative, repetitive, or 
confusing."  Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 711 
(2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 552-553 
(2003).  "In addition, questions of relevancy 'are entrusted to 
the trial judge's discretion and will not be disturbed except 
for palpable error.'"  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 
349 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 
300 (1992). 
 
Although Dr. Stuart was to be the only expert testifying 
about the effects of Celexa and alcohol in combination, there 
was no evidence about the quantity of alcohol or drugs ingested 
at or near the time of the stabbing.11  While the expert intended 
                     
 
11 A defense expert witness testified that the defendant 
told him he consumed an excessive amount of alcohol and took 
pills on the evening before the stabbing, but these statements 
were not admitted for their truth.  The jury also heard evidence 
that a bottle of rum two-thirds full and several prescription 
bottles of pills were located in the apartment after the 
stabbing. 
 
24 
 
to testify about the drug and alcohol combination to demonstrate 
that the defendant actually attempted suicide and not to show 
that the combination directly affected his state of mind the day 
of the stabbing, another expert had already testified that the 
defendant's actions were a suicide attempt.  The judge did not 
abuse his discretion in excluding Dr. Stuart's testimony. 
 
b.  Diminished capacity instruction.  The defendant argues 
that the judge committed reversible error by failing to instruct 
the jury that they could consider evidence of diminished 
capacity as it related to the defendant's ability to act with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, as required by Commonwealth v. 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 798 (2011).  Instead of giving the 
form of instruction approved in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 
672, 686 n.16 (1980), as proposed by defense counsel, the judge 
gave the model jury instruction.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 61-62 (1999).  The defendant's argument is unavailing 
because the judge instructed the jury in accordance with 
Rutkowski, supra.12  A judge is not required to give the precise 
                                                                  
 
 
12 The relevant portion of the jury instructions are as 
follows: 
 
"More particularly, you may consider any credible evidence 
of the defendant’s mental impairment, and/or the use of 
drugs, in determining whether the defendant deliberately 
premeditated the killing of the deceased, that is whether 
the defendant thought before he acted, and whether the 
 
25 
 
instruction proposed by the defendant or as set forth in Gould.  
See Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 48-49 (2012), citing 
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 300 (2008), and 
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 848 (2006).  There was 
no error. 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record and see no reason to exercise our power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt as requested 
by the defendant or to grant other relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                                                                  
defendant reached the decision to kill after reflection, at 
least for a short period of time, and whether the defendant 
acted in a cruel or atrocious manner, in causing the death 
of the deceased" (emphases added).