Title: Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5366.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5366 
LANG ET AL., APPELLEES, v. DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY 
SERVICES, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5366.] 
Unemployment compensation—Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance for 
Older Workers—19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B)—Deference to agency’s 
interpretation of statute. 
(No. 2011-1740—Submitted June 5, 2012—Decided November 21, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Seneca County,  
Nos. 13-10-33, 13-10-34, and 13-10-35, 196 Ohio App.3d 80, 2011-Ohio-4327. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we must determine whether appellant, Ohio 
Department of Jobs and Family Services (“ODJFS”), properly denied applications 
for federal wage subsidies filed by appellees, three former employees of 
American Standard who later were reemployed at a lower wage before they 
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2 
 
reached the age of 50.  Because ODJFS offered a reasonable interpretation of 
ambiguous language in the federal statute that established the wage subsidies, we 
conclude that ODJFS did not improperly deny the applications. 
I. Facts 
A. Statutory Background 
{¶ 2} In 2002, Congress created a program called Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Assistance for Older Workers (“ATAA”), which provided wage 
supplements for certain unemployed workers who became reemployed at lower 
wage-rates.  19 U.S.C. 2318.  As enacted in 2002 and relevant to this case, the 
statute provided: 
 
 
A worker in the group that the Secretary has certified as 
eligible for the alternative trade adjustment assistance program 
may elect to receive benefits under the alternative trade adjustment 
assistance program if the worker— 
(i) is covered by a certification under subchapter A of this 
chapter; 
(ii) obtains reemployment not more than 26 weeks after the 
date of separation from the adversely affected employment; 
(iii) is at least 50 years of age; 
(iv) earns not more than $50,000 a year in wages from 
reemployment; 
(v) is employed on a full-time basis as defined by State law 
in the State in which the worker is employed; and 
(vi) does not return to the employment from which the 
worker was separated. 
 
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3 
 
Trade Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-210, section 124, 116 Stat. 933, 945, amended 
by Pub.L. No. 108-429, section 2004, 118 Stat. 2434, 2590. 
{¶ 3} Ohio has entered into a contract with the United States Department 
of Labor to facilitate the distribution of ATAA funds in the state.  Pursuant to this 
contract, Ohio has agreed to follow federal statutes, regulations, and program 
directives in expending the ATAA funds.  One directive is Training and Guidance 
letter (“TEGL”) 2-03, issued by the United States Department of Labor 
Employment and Training Administration, which provided interim operating 
instructions for implementing ATAA.  69 Fed.Reg. 60904.  In the portion setting 
forth eligibility requirements, the letter provides, 
 
 
To be eligible for ATAA, an individual must meet the 
following conditions at the time of reemployment: 
 
1. Be at least age 50 at time of reemployment. The 
individual’s age can be verified with a driver’s license or other 
appropriate documentation. 
 
Id. at 60907. 
B. The Denial of ATAA Funds to the Applicants 
{¶ 4} In December 2007, appellees James Lang, Mark Laibe, and Teddy 
Sharp (“the applicants”) were dismissed from their jobs at American Standard.  
They eventually found new employment and applied for ATAA.  Each application 
was denied by ODJFS because none of the applicants was at least 50 years old at 
the time of reemployment.  The applicants filed requests for redetermination, 
which were also denied by ODJFS. 
{¶ 5} Lang appealed, and the matter was transferred to the Ohio 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, where a hearing officer 
reversed the determination and concluded that Lang’s application for ATAA 
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should be allowed because 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) does not require that an 
applicant be at least 50 years old on the date of reemployment.  ODJFS requested 
review of the decision on Lang’s application, and the Ohio Unemployment 
Review Commission reversed the hearing officer’s decision and disallowed 
Lang’s claim because he was not 50 years old when he became reemployed. 
{¶ 6} Laibe and Sharp also appealed, but a hearing officer affirmed the 
determinations that the two were ineligible for ATAA.  The Ohio Unemployment 
Review Commission then disallowed Laibe’s and Sharp’s requests for review of 
the hearing officer’s decisions. 
{¶ 7} The three applicants each appealed the commission’s decisions 
denying their ATAA eligibility to the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, 
which consolidated the cases and reversed the commission’s decisions.  After 
recognizing that the statute is ambiguous because it did not address when an 
applicant must be at least 50 years of age—whether at the time of reemployment 
or at the time the application was filed—the trial court found that the 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission was not compelled to follow 
TEGL 2-03.  The trial court stated that the statute was intended to help workers 
and that awarding ATAA benefits to the applicants adhered to the clear intent of 
Congress in passing the act. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, ODJFS argued that the trial court had erred by ignoring 
the United States Department of Labor’s interpretation that the statute required 
those who apply for ATAA to be 50 years old at the time of their reemployment.  
Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 196 Ohio App.3d 80, 2011-
Ohio-4327, 962 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 16.  The Third District Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 36.  A majority 
of the court of appeals panel concluded that 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) is 
unambiguous, reasoning that the language providing that a worker “may elect to 
receive benefits” if the worker “is at least 50 years of age” indicates that an 
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5 
 
individual must be at least 50 years old at the time the individual elects to receive 
ATAA benefits.  Id. at ¶ 25.  The majority reasoned that the requirement set forth 
in TEGL 2-03 that the applicant be 50 years old at the time of reemployment is 
not only unnecessary to carry out the ATAA provisions, but is also manifestly 
contrary to the language of the statute.  Id. at ¶ 28.  The dissenting judge 
concluded that the overall language of the statute compels a conclusion that the 
statute requires a worker to be 50 years old at the time of reemployment.  Id. at 
¶ 39-41. 
{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address ODJFS’s proposition of law:  
“An applicant cannot receive an ATAA wage subsidy unless he has reached 50 
years of age at the time of reemployment.”  See Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & 
Family Servs., 131 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2012-Ohio-136, 959 N.E.2d 1056. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 10} ODJFS argues that because of its contractual obligation to the 
United States Department of Labor, it was obligated to follow TEGL 2-03.  
ODJFS also argues that the letter reasonably interprets the ambiguity in the age 
requirement in the federal statute.  Because of this ambiguity, the Department of 
Labor’s expertise in the area, and the reasonableness of the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation, ODJFS concludes that we should defer to the Department 
of Labor’s interpretation.  The applicants counter that the requirement in TEGL 2-
03 that an applicant be 50 years old at the time of reemployment is unlawful and 
unreasonable and that neither the contractual obligations of ODJFS nor the 
principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations warrants reversal of the 
appellate court’s decision. 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶ 11} R.C. 4141.282(H) sets forth the standard of review for a decision 
made by the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission:  “If the court 
finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against 
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the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the 
decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall 
affirm the decision of the commission.”  This limited standard of review applies 
to all appellate courts.  Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 
482 N.E.2d 587 (1985).  “[A] reviewing court may not reverse the commission’s 
decision simply because ‘reasonable minds might reach different conclusions.’ ”  
Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-
2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 20, quoting Irvine at 18. 
{¶ 12} The parties offer conflicting interpretations of 19 U.S.C. 
2318(a)(3)(B), and thus this case involves a question of statutory interpretation.  
A question of statutory construction presents an issue of law that we determine de 
novo on appeal.  Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 
N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8, citing State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 
871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8.  We accordingly review the statute to determine whether its 
meaning is clear.  “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1984).  If the statute’s meaning is unclear, our next task is to determine whether 
the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference.  “[I]f the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 
843. 
B. The Requirement of 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) that Applicants Be “at 
least 50 years of age” Is Ambiguous 
{¶ 13} The crux of the dispute between ODJFS and the applicants is 
whether the language of 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B), which requires that those who 
apply for ATAA be at least 50 years of age, is ambiguous.  ODJFS argues that the 
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7 
 
language is ambiguous and that the interpretation presented in TEGL 2-03 is 
reasonable.  The applicants agree with the court of appeals that Congress clearly 
stated that an applicant must be 50 years old at the time he or she elects to receive 
ATAA benefits and that the statute is unambiguous. 
{¶ 14} “A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation.”  Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 274, 744 
N.E.2d 719 (2001).  We agree with ODJFS that 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) is 
ambiguous, because it leaves open the question whether an applicant must be 50 
years old at the time of reemployment or at the time application is made for 
benefits.  To see the statutory ambiguity, one need look no further than the fact 
that both ODJFS and the applicants offer reasonable and conflicting 
interpretations of the statute.  On one hand, it is reasonable to read the statute as 
requiring applicants to be 50 years old at the time of reemployment.  Applicants 
must have already obtained employment to satisfy 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B)(ii), 
(iv), (v), and (vi), and thus it would be consistent to read subsection (a)(3)(B)(iii) 
to set the date of reemployment as the date upon which an applicant must be 50 
years old.  On the other hand, the applicants’ interpretation of the statute is also 
reasonable, in that subsection (a)(3)(B)(iii) could be read as saying that a worker 
must be at least 50 years of age at the time the worker elects to receive the 
benefits.  Given that there are two reasonable readings of the statute, we hold that 
19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) is ambiguous. 
C. ODJFS’s Reasonable Interpretation of the Ambiguous Statute Is 
Entitled to Deference 
{¶ 15} As noted above, our standard of review in this case is deferential, 
and we do not agree with the applicants’ argument that the decision of the 
commission was unlawful and unreasonable.  The statute is ambiguous, and the 
interpretation by ODJFS is reasonable and not contrary to law.  Regardless of 
whether ODJFS was contractually bound to follow TEGL 2-03, the agency chose 
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to adopt the United States Department of Labor’s reading of the statute as its own.  
In adopting this reasonable reading of the statute, ODJFS exercised its expertise 
and discretion, and we will not interfere with its reasonable and lawful decision. 
{¶ 16} To be clear, we do not hold today that ODJFS was bound to follow 
TEGL 2-03.  We merely conclude that ODJFS’s interpretation is reasonable and 
entitled to deference given the ambiguity found in 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(b).  R.C. 
4141.282(H) sets forth a highly deferential standard for reviewing decisions of the 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, and this court will not reject 
a decision that is lawful and reasonable. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 17} The Unemployment Compensation Review Commission’s decision 
in this case that the applicants are not entitled to ATAA benefits is reasonable and 
entitled to deference.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
 
CUPP, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 18} The majority opinion states that “19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) is 
ambiguous, because it leaves open the question whether an applicant must be 50 
years old at the time of reemployment or at the time application is made for 
benefits.”  In doing so, the majority opinion confuses a statute’s lack of 
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9 
 
comprehensiveness with ambiguity.  There is no question that the statute is not 
comprehensive.  That should surprise nobody; it is exceedingly difficult to draft a 
statute that covers every single potentiality.  But failing to do so is not the 
standard for ambiguity. 
{¶ 19} With respect to the issue before us, the statute reads:  “A worker in 
the group that the Secretary has certified as eligible for the alternative trade 
adjustment assistance program may elect to receive benefits * * * if the worker 
* * * is at least 50 years of age.”  Trade Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-210, section 
124, 116 Stat. 933, 945, amended by Pub.L. No. 108-429, section 2004, 118 Stat. 
2434, 2590.  No term or word in that sentence is ambiguous; neither is the 
sentence as a whole.  The sentence is understandable, reasonable, and fits within 
the scheme of the statute.  It is not susceptible of more than one meaning.  Yet, 
the majority opinion analyzes the sentence as if is ambiguous.  It compounds that 
mistake by granting undue deference to an agency interpretation.  Such deference 
is due only when a statute is ambiguous.  
{¶ 20} The majority opinion violates some of our most common precepts.  
In Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 58 Ohio St. 2d 1, 4, 
387 N.E.2d 1222 (1979), we stated that where language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the statute as written.  In Crowl 
v. Deluca, 29 Ohio St.2d 53, 58-59, 278 N.E.2d 352 (1972), we stated that absent 
ambiguity or doubt, a statute “is not subject to judicial modification in the guise 
of interpretation.”  In Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 254 N.E.2d 8 (1969), we stated that that this court has a 
duty “to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to 
insert words not used.”  Today, the majority opinion does not “enforce the statute 
as written,” modifies the statute under the guise of interpretation, and adds words 
to the statute.  That an agency had already done so does not excuse this court from 
its obligation to enforce the statute as written. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
{¶ 21} Congress could have stated that applicants are not eligible unless 
they are 50 years old at the time of reemployment.  It did not.  Instead, Congress 
enacted a statute that states that applicants may elect to receive benefits if, among 
other things, they are at least 50 years old.  The plain meaning of the statute is not 
ambiguous.  Accordingly, I would analyze it without according deference to the 
letter issued by the United States Department of Labor Employment and Training 
Administration or the decision made by the Ohio Unemployment Review 
Commission. 
{¶ 22} Because the applicants were 50 years old when they elected to 
receive benefits, I conclude that the applicants fit within the standard set forth in 
19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B)(iii).  I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
or declare that the case was improvidently allowed.  I dissent. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jason E. Dawicke; and Kenneth J. Kowalski, Employment Law Clinic, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, for appellees. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Peter K. Glenn-
Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, and Eric A. Baum, Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellant. 
______________________