Title: Commonwealth v. Mason

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-09070 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL MASON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 14, 2020. - August 25, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, 
Firearm, Relevancy and materiality, Opinion.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Jury and jurors, Voir dire, 
Challenge to jurors, Argument by prosecutor, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 29, 2001. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J. 
 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Daniel Mason, of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity and cruelty, and felony-murder, 
as well as armed assault with intent to murder, animal cruelty, 
2 
 
 
and related offenses1 in connection with a shooting that killed 
Michael Lenz, injured Gene Yazgur, and killed Yazgur's dog.  The 
defendant appeals from his convictions, arguing error on the 
part of trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge requiring a 
new trial.2  In the alternative, he asks us to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial.  
After full consideration of the record, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and decline to grant extraordinary 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion. 
Shortly before 5:30 A.M. on March 2, 2000, an intruder 
entered the apartment of Michael Lenz and Gene Yazgur as they 
slept and opened fire on them.  Yazgur awoke to the sound of 
gunfire as the intruder shot at Lenz first.  Yazgur attempted to 
close his bedroom door, but the shooter partially kicked it in 
and shot Yazgur through the opening.  The shooter alternated 
between shooting at Lenz and Yazgur, as well as Yazgur's dog, 
for several minutes, then left the apartment.  Lenz, who had 
                                                     
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of home invasion, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18C, and two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
2 The defendant's motion for new trial was denied after a 
hearing in 2006.  Although the defendant asserts in his 
appellate briefs that he filed a pro se notice of appeal from 
the denial of his motion for new trial, the record does not 
reflect that such an appeal was filed. 
3 
 
 
been shot in his head, chest, and wrist, died approximately two 
hours later.  Yazgur, who sustained gunshot wounds to his face, 
back, hand and each thigh, survived after undergoing multiple 
surgeries and being placed in a medically-induced coma for two 
and one-half weeks.  Yazgur's dog was shot five times and found 
dead at the scene. 
The Commonwealth's case against the defendant was 
circumstantial.  Yazgur observed that the shooter was a short, 
stocky male, but Yazgur could not see his face.  At around the 
time of the shooting, a witness saw a man approximately five 
feet, six inches tall dressed in a long, black trench coat and 
dark hat, carrying a bag and walking on the street near the 
victims' home.  That witness testified that a hat, coat, and two 
bags seized from the defendant's apartment resembled the 
clothing worn, and a bag carried by, the man he saw on the day 
of the shooting. 
Less than one hour after the shooting, the defendant was 
driving away from the Jamaica Plain section of Boston when he 
hit a car in front of him.  The defendant refused to give the 
other driver his name or driver's license, and attempted to pay 
for the damage in cash.3  The passenger in the other vehicle 
noticed two bags in the defendant's car. 
                                                     
 
3 After ignoring two requests for his driver's license, the 
defendant handed his vehicle registration to the passenger in 
4 
 
 
Two days after the shooting, the defendant asked his 
roommate to say that the defendant had not left their apartment 
on the night of the shooting.  The defendant also asked the 
roommate to say that he had never seen any guns or explosives in 
the apartment, even though he previously had seen explosives 
there. 
 
The murder weapons were never recovered, but the 
Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant's uncle owned 
two handguns matching the bullets and shell casings recovered 
from the scene and may have stored them in the defendant's 
apartment.  Yazgur testified that the gunshots were "very 
measured," and not quick.  The jury further heard evidence that 
the defendant was a marksman who had served in the Israeli 
military. 
The day prior to the murder, the defendant had been served 
with an execution of judgment for a civil damages award of more 
than $100,000 for assaulting Yazgur with a knife in 1997.  The 
defendant vowed that Yazgur would "never see a penny," and that 
the defendant would kill Yazgur first. 
At trial, the defense focused on the lack of physical 
evidence tying the defendant to the shooting, challenged the 
defendant's alleged motive against Yazgur, and suggested that 
                                                     
 
the other vehicle; the registration included the defendant's 
name and address. 
5 
 
 
there had been insufficient investigation into people who might 
target Lenz rather than Yazgur. 
Discussion.  1.  Jury empanelment.  The defendant alleges 
two errors occurred during jury selection with respect to the 
voir dire of prospective jurors, and a peremptory challenge used 
by the Commonwealth. 
 
a.  Voir dire.  The defendant argues that as an observant 
Jew and a former member of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), he 
was entitled to have each potential juror questioned about his 
or her opinions on Judaism, the IDF, and the nation of Israel.  
In support of this contention, the defendant points to news 
coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the fall of 
2000 and the winter of 2001 which, he claims, was ubiquitous and 
polarizing.  He also asserts that news coverage of the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, which took place three months 
before his trial, caused Americans to become fearful and 
mistrusting of the Middle East, including Israel.  The defendant 
additionally raises the specter of racial prejudice due to his 
Jewish heritage.  Although the defendant did not request that 
the judge make inquiry in these areas, he claims that the 
judge's failure to do so sua sponte violated his right to a fair 
trial.  He further claims that his counsel's failure to request 
individual voir dire to root out potential juror bias in these 
areas was ineffective assistance.  There was no error. 
6 
 
 
A criminal defendant is entitled to juror voir dire to 
identify fair and unbiased jurors as a part of the right to an 
impartial jury.  Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 848, 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 127 (2018).  See G. L. c. 234A, § 67A.  
Where it appears that a substantial risk exists that an 
extraneous issue might affect the outcome of the case, a 
defendant is entitled to individual voir dire of prospective 
jurors to determine their impartiality.  See G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67A.4  See also Commonwealth v. Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736-737 
(2004).  However, it is the defendant's burden to "show that 
                                                     
 
 
4 At the time of the defendant's trial, juror voir dire was 
governed by the predecessor to G. L. c. 234A, § 67A.  General 
Laws c. 234, § 28, as amended by St. 1985, c. 463, provided in 
part: 
 
"For the purpose of determining whether a juror stands 
indifferent in the case, if it appears that, as a result of 
the impact of considerations which may cause a decision or 
decisions in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the 
case, including, but not limited to, community attitudes, 
possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material or 
possibly preconceived opinions toward the credibility of 
certain classes of persons, the juror may not stand 
indifferent, the court shall, or the parties or their 
attorneys may, with the permission and under the direction 
of the court, examine the juror specifically with respect 
to such considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or 
any other matters which may . . . cause a decision or 
decisions to be made in whole or in part upon issues 
extraneous to the case." 
 
 
Although G. L. c. 234, § 28, was repealed and replaced in 
2016 with G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, see St. 2016, c. 36, § 4, the 
pertinent language in both statutes is "virtually identical."  
Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 180 n.15 (2019). 
7 
 
 
there is some basis for finding that a substantial risk of 
extraneous influences on the jury exists, . . . and that there 
is a substantial risk that jurors would be influenced by such 
considerations" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ashman, 
430 Mass. 736, 739 (2000). 
Here, the defendant has failed to meet his burden to show 
that there was a substantial risk that jurors would be 
influenced by his being a former member of the IDF, or being an 
observant Jew, necessitating individual voir dire to assess 
juror impartiality.  In fact, he failed to raise the issue at 
all during jury selection.5 
The defendant's claim that there was an additional 
substantial risk of racial bias against Jews also fails.  We 
have required judges to conduct an individual voir dire on the 
issue of potential bias, if requested to do so, in trials for 
murder, rape, and sex offenses against children where the 
defendant and victim are of different races.  See Commonwealth 
v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 175-176 (2019) (collecting cases).  
                                                     
 
 
5 As the defendant failed to raise this issue at trial, we 
review the claim on appeal for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.   We discern no such risk.  None of the 
articles or public opinion polls cited by the defendant 
addresses American mistrust of Israel or the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) at the time of the trial.  Instead, they refer to 
an increased support of Israel by American Jews following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Americans' perception of 
Israeli-United States politics, and Israeli mistrust of the IDF. 
8 
 
 
More recently we expanded the rule prospectively to include 
potential prejudice where the defendant and victim are of 
different ethnic backgrounds.  Id. at 182.  Although we have yet 
to address whether Jewish people are members of a race, 
ethnicity, religion, or combination thereof, here the defendant 
has not asserted that he and either of the victims were of 
different races or ethnicities.  At any rate, even where it is 
established that a defendant and a victim of a qualifying crime 
are of different races, "the requirement for individual voir 
dire arises upon the defendant's request for such inquiry; it is 
not automatic."  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 
195 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. DiRusso, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 
235, 237 (2003). 
Thus, the judge did not err or abuse her discretion in 
failing to include questions on Judaism, Israel, or the IDF 
during juror voir dire.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 
536, 549 (2003) ("Unless the defendant shows that there is a 
substantial risk that the jury would be influenced by extraneous 
issues, . . . the judge need not ask questions aimed at 
discovering the existence of those factors" [quotations and 
citations omitted]). 
The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to request individual voir dire similarly lacks 
merit.  In determining whether defense counsel was ineffective 
9 
 
 
in defending a charge of murder in the first degree, we ask 
whether there was an error and, if so, whether the error was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  Commonwealth 
v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 192-193 (2017). 
Where a defendant bases a claim of ineffective of counsel 
on a nonstrategic failure to raise a certain issue, we consider 
whether the issue had any evidentiary support and, if so, 
whether its omission had any effect on the outcome of the case.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stevens, 379 Mass. 772, 774 (1980) 
("Counsel had no obligation, indeed no right, to present a 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility which could not be 
supported by evidence").  See also Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 
373 Mass. 109, 114-115 (1977) (trial counsel's failure to raise 
certain issues had no effect on outcome of case and therefore 
was not ineffective assistance). 
We cannot fault trial counsel for failing to identify, or 
to give credence to, an entirely speculative connection between 
the September 2001 attacks and Israel and to further associate 
that connection, or Middle East politics, with the defendant.  
Even if trial counsel had raised the issue, we are not convinced 
that he would have been able to demonstrate a substantial risk 
that the jury would be influenced by such extraneous issues, and 
denial of the request would have been well within the judge's 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 811 
10 
 
 
(2005) (where it was "entirely speculative" whether expert could 
have given exonerating testimony, not ineffective for counsel to 
fail to call expert); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 
557 (2003) (failure to pursue futile tactic is not ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
Finally, the defendant has failed to allege any actual 
prejudice.  As discussed in further detail infra, during jury 
selection, the judge asked whether any prospective jurors had 
any bias or prejudice toward either the defendant or the 
prosecution, and excused any jurors who had heard about and 
formed opinions about the case.6  At the conclusion of jury 
selection, the judge made a finding that the jury were impartial 
without objection from either party.  And just before jury 
deliberation, the judge gave instructions on determining the 
facts of the case without the influence of prejudice or bias.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 Mass. 572, 579 (1981) ("We 
presume, as we must, that a jury understands and follows 
limiting instructions, . . . and their use usually renders any 
error in the introduction of prejudicial evidence harmless" 
[citations omitted]).  On appeal, the defendant does not argue 
that the jury was biased or unfair.  This claim therefore fails. 
                                                     
 
 
6 The defendant identifies articles published prior to trial 
which referred to him as a "former Israeli commando" who was 
"haunted by his experiences as a sniper in the Israeli 
military." 
11 
 
 
 
b.  Peremptory challenge.  The defendant also argues that 
the prosecutor improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike 
juror no. 3-14 because she was Jewish.7  He argues that the trial 
judge's approval of the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge of 
juror no. 3-14 violated both his State and Federal 
constitutional rights, especially given the role that his 
background as an observant Jew and former member of the Israeli 
special forces played in the Commonwealth's case against him at 
trial.8 
To assess this claim of error, we examine in some detail 
how jury empanelment unfolded.  The judge began by directing a 
series of questions to the entire venire designed to flag issues 
                                                     
 
 
7 Although the defendant "presume[s]," based on the juror's 
first and last name, that she was both Israeli and Jewish, there 
is no evidence of the juror's religious affiliation or national 
origin. 
 
8 The defendant's roommate and a coworker testified that the 
defendant observed the Jewish Sabbath, which required him not to 
work, including by driving, between sunset on Friday and sunset 
on Saturday each week.  However, the defendant's roommate 
further testified that the defendant was not home after sunset 
on the night after the shooting -- a Friday -- and returned some 
time before he woke up on Saturday morning.  The Commonwealth 
also presented evidence that the defendant took a flight from 
Boston to Baltimore Washington International Airport on Saturday 
afternoon, one day after the shooting, where he met with his 
uncle for one hour before flying back to Boston.  The jury also 
heard testimony and saw the defendant's resume indicating that 
he had extensive training and experience as an expert sniper 
with the Israeli naval special forces; in his closing argument, 
the prosecutor repeatedly argued that this training enabled the 
defendant to carry out the nighttime shooting. 
12 
 
 
that potentially could affect the impartiality of the 
prospective jurors.9  The judge also asked whether any 
prospective juror had any other reason, including health issues, 
language difficulties, or scheduling conflicts caused by jury 
service that would create an "extreme" hardship. 
Prospective jurors from the venire were then called in 
order to fill the jury box.  When those who had responded in the 
affirmative to one or more of the judge's questions were called, 
they were asked to come to sidebar for an individual voir dire, 
and would either be excused or seated after being questioned by 
the judge.  Once the jury box was filled with sixteen jurors, 
both sides were invited to exercise peremptory challenges 
beginning with the Commonwealth.  As the parties exercised their 
peremptory challenges, the vacant seats were filled from the 
venire.  After trial counsel exercised his peremptory 
challenges, the prosecutor then had an additional opportunity to 
use any remaining challenges on newly seated jurors. 
Juror no. 3-14, who had not responded affirmatively to any 
of the questions asked of the venire as a group, was seated 
during the first round of empanelment.  During the first round 
                                                     
 
9 The questions included whether anyone in the venire knew 
any of the parties, attorneys, or witnesses; had heard anything 
about the case; had any opinion or bias with respect to the 
case; or had any other reason that would prevent them from being 
fair and impartial. 
13 
 
 
of peremptory challenges, the prosecutor struck two jurors:  one 
who had indicated that he had a scheduling issue during his 
individual voir dire but was not excused on that basis, and 
another who had expressed an anxious reluctance about serving.  
After those jurors were replaced, the prosecutor indicated that 
he was content with the jury.10 
Trial counsel, in turn, exercised five peremptory 
challenges.  As the vacant seats were being filled, the judge 
excused juror no. 4-13, who indicated that she would have 
trouble reaching her family in Plymouth by sundown to celebrate 
Hanukkah during the trial.  After the juror was excused, trial 
counsel stated, "I would put on the record that this case will 
be steeped in Jewish traditions and relations.  I don't think 
excusing a person of Jewish religious beliefs just based on the 
holidays is appropriate in this case.  Otherwise we are going to 
sit all non-Jewish people."  The judge responded by explaining 
that she excused the juror not because she was Jewish, but 
instead because she would be unable to perform jury service for 
religious reasons.  Trial counsel's objection was noted. 
                                                     
 
10 The prosecutor did not strike juror no. 1-10, who 
indicated that she had to take care of her mother but was not 
excused on that basis, nor did he strike juror no. 2-10, who 
indicated that he was a small business owner and that serving 
would work a hardship on his business. 
14 
 
 
After the vacant seats were filled, juror no. 3-14, who had 
not yet been challenged by either side, approached the sidebar 
to express concern about her work commitments as a medical 
resident.  The judge assured her that her employer was obligated 
to make an accommodation for jury service, and the juror 
returned to the jury box.11 
Once trial counsel exercised four additional peremptory 
challenges, and thereafter indicated that he was content, the 
Commonwealth had an opportunity to use its remaining peremptory 
challenges. 
The prosecutor sought to strike a juror who had indicated 
that jury service would create a work-related hardship but had 
not been excused on that basis, and requested to strike juror 
                                                     
 
 
11  The judge and the prospective juror had the following 
exchange at sidebar: 
 
The juror:  "I'm sorry.  Actually I should have said 
something earlier.  I actually want to serve and I'm a 
medical resident and on Monday I start my shift, my night 
rotation so I don't know -- I mean, I could -- for two 
weeks, it would be hard to find coverage to replace me." 
 
The judge:  "They'd have to.  Beth Israel, they have to." 
 
The juror:  "By law they have to but I think they would 
give me a hard time." 
 
The judge:  "Have them call the clerk and we'll talk to 
them for you.  Okay?" 
 
The juror:  "Okay." 
15 
 
 
no. 3-14.  The following exchange took place between the 
prosecutor and the judge: 
The prosecutor:  "I would like to challenge the juror in 
seat one, 4-14.  There's a juror that I was initially 
content with that raised a question and came up that I 
would now like to challenge with the [c]ourt's permission.  
That would be in seat number thirteen, juror 3-14." 
 
The judge:  "And why would you want to challenge her at 
this point?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "Because of her statement that she has 
difficulty with work, she may be working overnight.  She 
stated that she would be working nights and that she was 
concerned about that." 
 
The judge:  "That isn't what I understood.  She said it 
would be difficult to get coverage, not that she would be 
working." 
 
The prosecutor:  "My concern, Judge, is that she expressed 
a problem with being here and that's why, the reason for 
her request.  I'm reluctant to have somebody sit who has 
expressed that type of problem." 
 
The judge:  "Alright.  You may challenge her then.  Do you 
have any others?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "That's it." 
 
The judge:  "Okay." 
 
 
The prosecutor:  "Thank you, Your Honor." 
Trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenge of juror no. 3-14. 
Thereafter, the prosecution exercised two additional 
peremptory challenges, bringing his total to six; four of those 
challenged had raised concerns regarding work commitments.  Both 
16 
 
 
parties then indicated that they were content with the jury 
composition. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits 
a party from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of a 
juror's membership in certain discrete groups.  See Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 
Mass. 461, 486-488, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).  Under 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, peremptory challenges 
cannot be used on prospective jurors based on their gender, 
race, color, creed, or national origin or ethnicity.  See 
Soares, supra at 488-489. 
There is a three-step procedure used to determine whether a 
peremptory challenge properly has been made.  See Batson, 476 
U.S. at 94-95; Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-491.  We generally 
presume that peremptory challenges are made and used properly 
during jury selection.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 
593, 598 (2018).  However, a defendant may rebut that 
presumption by demonstrating that "the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."  
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass.    ,     (2020), citing 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005).  If the judge 
finds that the presumption has been rebutted, the burden shifts 
to the prosecutor to articulate a nondiscriminatory or "group-
17 
 
 
neutral" reason for the challenge (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 (2017).  The reason 
must be both adequate and genuine.   Id. It is for the judge to 
determine whether the Commonwealth has carried its burden.  Id.  
We review a judge's decision as to whether to allow a peremptory 
challenge for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 
477 Mass. 307, 319-320 (2017). 
As mentioned, there is no evidence on the record of the 
religious affiliation or national origin of juror no. 3-14.  
Assuming without deciding that the juror was Jewish, and that 
the defendant could have challenged the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenge on Batson-Soares grounds during jury selection, we 
note that he failed to do so.  However, because the judge asked 
for a reason for the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge, the 
first phase of the analysis, i.e., rebutting the presumption 
that the peremptory challenge was proper, implicitly was 
satisfied.  See Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78, 81-82 
(1997) ("By requiring . . . counsel to explain his reasons, and 
by consciously providing the record with an explanation for his 
actions, the judge implicitly recognized that a prima facie 
showing of impropriety existed"). 
The burden then shifted to the prosecutor to provide a 
group-neutral reason for the strike, which he did:  the 
prosecutor pointed to the juror's concern about her work as a 
18 
 
 
medical resident.  The question before us is whether the judge 
abused her discretion in accepting the prosecutor's reason as 
adequate and genuine.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 
460, 464-465 (2003).  We conclude that she did not. 
First, the prosecutor's group-neutral explanation for 
seeking to strike juror no. 3-14 was adequate, as it was "clear 
and reasonably specific, personal to the juror and not based on 
the juror's group affiliation" (citation omitted).  Id. at 464.  
As for whether the explanation was genuine, "an explanation is 
genuine if it is in fact the reason for the exercise of the 
challenge."  Id. at 465.  In reviewing the circumstances 
surrounding the peremptory challenge, we note that the 
prosecutor declined to use peremptory challenges on three other 
similarly situated jurors who sought to be excused due to 
scheduling issues.  However, we also note that the prosecutor 
did not challenge juror no. 3-14 during the first round of 
peremptory challenges, and in fact announced that he was content 
with the jury composition that included her.  It was only after 
the juror raised a work-related hardship, after being seated, 
that he used a peremptory challenge against her.  Further, at 
that same time he struck juror no. 4-14, who similarly voiced a 
work-related concern.  Given this timing, we cannot conclude 
that the judge abused her discretion in apparently finding that 
the neutral reason provided by the prosecutor was genuine as 
19 
 
 
well as adequate.12  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 
804, 811 (2000) ("We grant deference to a judge's ruling on 
whether a permissible ground for the peremptory challenge has 
been shown and will not disturb it so long as it is supported by 
the record").  See also L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion is "a clear error of judgment 
in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
2.  Evidentiary issues.  a.  Prior bad act evidence.  The 
defendant and Yazgur were not strangers to one another at the 
time of the shooting.  They met approximately three and one-half 
years earlier, in September 1997, when the defendant attacked 
Yazgur with a knife for blocking a street with a moving van.  
The assault resulted in injuries to Yazgur's face and right ear.  
The defendant subsequently was convicted of assault and battery, 
and received an eighteen-month suspended sentence.  Yazgur also 
sued the defendant and was awarded more than $100,000 in 
                                                     
 
12 In support of his argument that the strike of juror no. 
3-14 was not related to her work hardship, the defendant cites 
the fact that juror no. 3-14 was struck after trial counsel 
noted that the case would be "steeped in Jewish tradition and 
relations."  However, it is also true that the prosecutor 
challenged juror no. 3-14 at his first opportunity after she 
raised her potential work hardship. 
20 
 
 
damages.  As mentioned, the day prior to the shooting, the 
defendant had been served with an execution on the judgment. 
It is well settled that although not admissible to show bad 
character or propensity, evidence of a defendant's prior bad 
acts is admissible for other purposes, including to demonstrate 
motive, as long as its probative value is not outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 
249 n.27 (2014).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2020). 
The Commonwealth presented evidence of the defendant's 
prior assault on Yazgur, as well as details of the criminal and 
civil proceedings that followed.  The defendant does not deny 
that his assault on Yazgur was evidence probative of motive.  
However, he contends that the testimony from the prosecutor who 
handled the defendant's criminal prosecution and the attorney 
who represented Yazgur in the civil suit, each of which was 
offered over the defendant's objection, was excessive and unduly 
prejudicial.  We disagree. 
The contested testimony provided context for the 
defendant's hostility toward Yazgur.  The prosecutor in that 
criminal case described the criminal proceedings, including the 
fact that Yazgur testified against the defendant during trial, 
which was probative of the origin for the defendant's anger 
toward Yazgur.  Yazgur's civil attorney provided details of the 
damages hearing that occurred almost two years later.  The 
21 
 
 
attorney recounted that at the conclusion of the hearing, the 
defendant "snarled" at Yazgur, "You'll never see a penny," 
demonstrating the defendant's escalating hostility toward 
Yazgur.  It also demonstrated a pattern of the defendant 
expressing this sentiment.  The defendant's then-roommate 
testified that, during the early morning hours of the day of the 
shooting, the defendant referenced the execution on the judgment 
he had received the day before, grabbed his crotch, and said, 
"Here's their $118,000, they'll never see a penny, I'll kill 
them first."13 
Finally, we note that the judge instructed the jury that 
the testimony of these witnesses was not admissible to show that 
the defendant had bad character or a propensity to commit bad 
acts.  See Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 228-229 
(1986) (limiting instructions sufficiently diminished 
prejudicial effect of evidence).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 737 (2019) (jury presumed to follow 
limiting instructions on prior bad act evidence). 
We conclude that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of 
the prior assault and its aftermath, including the testimony 
from the attorneys involved in the prior assault on Yazgur, was 
                                                     
 
13 The roommate testified that the defendant had made a 
similar comment in the past, before the defendant began living 
with the roommate. 
22 
 
 
outweighed by its probative value; thus, the judge did not abuse 
her discretion in admitting it.  See Commonwealth v. Fordham, 
417 Mass. 10, 22 (1994). 
b.  Firearm testimony.  The Commonwealth called the 
defendant's uncle, Carl Dworman, as a witness to demonstrate 
that the defendant had access to firearms.  The defendant argues 
that the testimony was improper because it "insinuated by 
negative inference" that the defendant used firearms owned by 
Dworman in the shooting.  This argument fails. 
"Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a 
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence 
and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2020).  See Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 
Mass. 185, 199 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 
Mass. 422, 436 (2015).  To be relevant, evidence need only 
"provide a link in the chain of proof" (citation omitted).  
Scesny, supra.  A trial judge has "substantial discretion to 
decide whether evidence is relevant" (citation omitted).  Id. 
The weapons used in the shooting were never recovered.  
However, based on an examination of bullets and cartridges 
recovered from the scene, a detective testified that the shooter 
used two different types of firearms:  a nine millimeter pistol 
manufactured by Glock, and a revolver that fired either .38 
or .357 caliber ammunition.  Dworman testified that he possessed 
23 
 
 
both a nine millimeter Glock, originally purchased by the 
defendant, and a .38 caliber revolver.  According to Dworman, 
several months before the shooting, he stored the firearms in 
cardboard boxes at an airplane hangar managed by a friend.  
Dworman further testified that two months after the shooting, he 
discovered that these boxes were missing.  He did not report the 
guns as stolen to police until one month later, immediately 
after he spoke with a detective about the shooting.14  Although 
Dworman confirmed that he stored multiple boxes of his 
possessions at the defendant's apartment at the time of the 
shooting, he did not testify that he ever stored his firearms 
there. 
Dworman's testimony permitted the reasonable inference that 
the defendant had access to, and used, Dworman's guns to commit 
the shooting, thereby providing a link in the Commonwealth's 
chain of proof.  See Scesny, 472 Mass. at 199.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Buttimer, 482 Mass. 754, 761 (2019) 
("[i]nferences drawn from circumstantial evidence need only be 
reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or 
inescapable" [quotations, citation and alterations omitted]).  
Because the weapons used in the shooting were never recovered, 
and no physical or eyewitness evidence directly identified the 
                                                     
 
 
14 Carl Dworman had not recovered his firearms by the time 
of trial. 
24 
 
 
defendant as the shooter, Dworman's testimony was particularly 
probative.  See Martinez, 476 Mass. at 192.  The judge did not 
err in admitting this testimony.15 
Over the defendant's objection, in response to questioning, 
Dworman confirmed that he had refused to speak to investigators 
about the shooting until he first consulted a lawyer.  He 
explained that he wanted a lawyer to be present because of the 
seriousness of the accusations against his nephew and because he 
did not want anything he said to be misinterpreted or 
misconstrued.  As this testimony was irrelevant, the prosecutor 
should not have been permitted to elicit it. 
We have held that a defendant's decision to consult an 
attorney before arrest "is not probative in the least of guilt 
or innocence, and a prosecutor may not 'imply that only guilty 
people contact their attorneys.'"  Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 
                                                     
 
15 The defendant contends on appeal that he was prejudiced 
by Dworman's testimony because the prosecutor "portrayed Dworman 
as a suspicious, unsavory character," in part by "emphasiz[ing] 
Dworman's gun ownership."  Indeed, in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor described Dworman as "not believable" and "not 
forthright," urging the jury to conclude that Dworman had lied 
about not storing his firearms at the defendant's apartment.  
However, the prosecutor was entitled to impeach Dworman, and did 
so by reference to contradictory testimony by the manager of the 
airplane hangar, who testified that Dworman never stored 
cardboard boxes at the hangar and that nothing had gone missing 
from the hangar.  See G. L. c. 233, § 23.  Dworman's testimony 
about firearms was not unfairly prejudicial, nor did the risk of 
such prejudice outweigh its probative value.  See Commonwealth 
v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 199 (2015).  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 403 (2020). 
25 
 
 
Mass. 207, 222 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Person, 400 Mass. 
136, 141 (1987).  See Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 131 (7th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983) ("Where evidence 
that the defendant asked for a lawyer is used to prove . . . 
guilt, its probative value is slight . . ."); Martin v. State, 
364 Md. 692, 707 (2001) ("we find [the defendant's] consultation 
with an attorney equivocal at best and unable to support any 
logical inference of guilt").  This prohibition is derived from 
the recognition that such arguments violate a defendant's right 
to due process, because "[t]he right to the advice of counsel 
would be of little value if the price for its exercise is the 
risk of an inference of guilt."  Nolin, supra at 222, quoting 
Person, supra.  Because a fact witness rather than a defendant 
was asked at trial about his decision to consult counsel,16 due 
process protections are not implicated.17 
                                                     
 
16 Dworman did not invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination at trial.  See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 
827, 832 (2009). 
 
17 Although our cases are clear that a prosecutor may not 
comment on a defendant's pretrial request to consult counsel, it 
appears that we have not held that the United States 
Constitution or the Massachusetts Constitution proscribes 
comments on a nonparty witness's request for counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 222 (2007).  Our 
conclusion, infra, that the judge should not have admitted 
questions and testimony about Dworman's decision to consult 
counsel before speaking with police is based on the evidentiary 
issue of their relevance.  We do not here extend the "due 
process protection embodied in the prohibition against arguing 
26 
 
 
However, as a matter of evidentiary relevance, just as a 
defendant's decision to consult an attorney is not probative of 
the defendant's guilt, a witness's decision to do so is not 
probative of what that witness may or may not have done.  Thus, 
here, Dworman's request to consult a lawyer before speaking to 
police was not probative of whether he provided the defendant 
with access to guns (inadvertently or otherwise).  Cf. United 
States v. Zaccaria, 240 F.3d 75, 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2001), 
discussing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (as 
"evidentiary, not constitutional" matter, defendant not allowed 
to impeach witness with evidence that witness refused to speak 
to investigators, because fact of witness's silence "not 
significantly probative" of witness's innocence).  See Hale, 
supra at 176-177 (1975) ("In most circumstances silence is so 
ambiguous that it is of little probative force. . . .  
[I]nnocent and guilty alike -- perhaps particularly the innocent 
-- may find [interrogation] so intimidating that they may choose 
to stand mute").  As the fact that Dworman expressed the desire 
to consult a lawyer prior to speaking with investigators was not 
probative of any material issue in this case, we conclude that 
questions eliciting the testimony on that topic should not have 
been asked. 
                                                     
 
guilt from a defendant's decision to consult a lawyer," id., to 
a nonparty witness's request for counsel. 
27 
 
 
However, there was no prejudice, "because there is no doubt 
that it 'did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect.'"  Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 557 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  At 
most, as pointed out by defense counsel at trial, the testimony 
risked improperly suggesting to the jury that Dworman wanted to 
speak to a lawyer because he "had something to hide."  However, 
the defendant effectively mitigated this risk on cross-
examination by asking Dworman to explain why he sought legal 
advice, i.e., he felt intimidated, and he did not want anything 
he said to be misinterpreted. 
Further, although the prosecutor impeached Dworman's 
credibility by reference to contradictory testimony of other 
witnesses, he did not mention Dworman's request for counsel in 
his closing argument.  Finally, there was abundant other 
evidence that the defendant had access to firearms with which to 
commit the crime, including testimony by the defendant's 
roommate that the defendant told him that he kept a nine 
millimeter pistol in the apartment, showed him a container of 
explosives taken from Dworman's possessions stored at the 
apartment, and asked the roommate to falsely deny that there 
were firearms or explosives in the apartment the day after the 
shooting.  We are therefore confident that this testimony had, 
at most, a very slight effect on the jury.  See Hobbs, supra. 
28 
 
 
 
c.  Charred paper fragments.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
sought to introduce charred paper fragments found in the 
basement of the three-family dwelling where the defendant lived, 
and testimony relating to their discovery, as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  The judge admitted the evidence over 
the defendant's objection.  The defendant contends that the 
evidence was admitted erroneously because it was irrelevant, and 
that it led to unfair speculation regarding his guilt.  Although 
we agree with the defendant that the evidence was not relevant, 
we conclude that the error was not prejudicial. 
 
One day after the shooting, the owner of the building 
responded to a report of smoke coming from the basement.  On the 
floor and on top of the furnace he found charred fragments of 
paper that appeared to contain typescript.  A tenant living in 
one of the two other units of the building testified that he had 
not been in the basement prior to smelling the smoke that day.  
The tenant in the other unit testified that, as she attempted to 
locate the source of the smoke, she knocked on the door to the 
defendant's apartment for several minutes and received no 
response.  Soon thereafter, however, the defendant went down to 
the basement to ask the building's owner to move a vehicle that 
was blocking the driveway.  He denied knowing anything about the 
smoke. 
29 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the defendant burned the papers to destroy 
evidence linking him to the shooting.  However, the connection 
between the paper fragments found in the basement and the 
defendant was at best tenuous.  It is true that burned papers 
also were found in the ashtray of the defendant's car, including 
one that appeared to be a map printed from a mapping website 
(discussed infra); however, investigators were unable to 
determine anything about the origin of the charred paper 
fragments in the basement.  Further, the Commonwealth provided 
no evidence that the defendant had been in the basement prior to 
the appearance of the smoke.  Although a tenant from one of the 
other units testified that he did not burn anything in the 
furnace, the owner testified that the door to the building was 
sometimes unlocked, and he could not remember if the door had 
been locked that day.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417 
Mass. 830, 833 & n.5 (1994) (transmission fluid found in 
defendant's car matched fluid found on sole remnant of victim's 
shirt). 
 
Without a basis for the jury reasonably to infer that the 
defendant burned the papers found in the basement, this evidence 
was irrelevant to consciousness of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 869 (2010) (as jury had no basis to 
conclude that defendant, rather than someone with access to 
30 
 
 
defendant's social media account, sent Internet messages 
discouraging witness from testifying, messages were not relevant 
to consciousness of guilt). 
This error was not prejudicial, however, given the 
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's culpability, including 
other properly admitted evidence of the defendant's 
consciousness of guilt.  For example, the jury heard testimony 
that, approximately one hour after the shooting, while traveling 
on the Riverway from Jamaica Plain toward downtown Boston, the 
defendant hit the rear of the car in front of him at a traffic 
light.  The defendant refused to provide his name or his 
driver's license to the other driver, and offered to pay for the 
damage in cash.  In addition, one day after the shooting, the 
defendant asked his roommate to lie, saying it was "the most 
important favor he would ever need to ask" -- that is, to 
confirm that the defendant had not left their apartment on the 
night of the shooting, and that he had never seen any guns or 
explosives in the apartment. 
Thus, the effect of the erroneously admitted paper 
fragments from the basement had only a slight effect, if any, on 
the jury in light of all the properly admitted evidence, 
including the powerful other evidence of consciousness of guilt.  
See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 377 (2017). 
31 
 
 
 
d.  Opinion testimony.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
presented the expert testimony of a criminalist concerning the 
presence and likely causes of blood patterns in the victims' 
home.  The expert also described charred papers recovered from 
the ashtray of the defendant's car that she identified as a 
portion of a map originating from a mapping website.  She 
testified that the fragments contained the town names of Needham 
and Wellesley, the words "Mapquest.com", and portions of the 
website's disclaimer.  Over the defendant's objection, the 
witness further testified that when she searched on the mapping 
website for driving directions between the defendant's home in 
Malden and the victim's home in Jamaica Plain, the result was a 
map of the Boston metropolitan area including the names Needham 
and Wellesley in the same relation to each other on that map as 
they appeared on the charred map fragment.  The witness also 
recognized certain words from the website's disclaimer on one of 
the burned fragments.  The judge admitted photographs of the map 
fragments and the fragments themselves, but did not admit the 
criminalist's Internet search result. 
 
The defendant argues that it was error to admit the 
testimony regarding the results of the witness's Internet 
search.  He further contends that the judge erred in permitting 
the witness to provide both expert and lay opinion testimony 
32 
 
 
without an instruction as to how to evaluate the two types of 
testimony.  There was no error. 
As the testimony regarding the charred fragments was based 
on the witness's personal observations and her Internet search 
did not require any specialized knowledge, it was lay opinion 
rather than an expert opinion.  Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 
535, 541 (2013).  Because it was helpful for the jury to 
determine whether the defendant had burned incriminating driving 
directions, it was admissible.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2020) 
(lay opinion admissible where it is "[a] rationally based on the 
witness's perception; [b] helpful to a clear understanding of 
the witness's testimony or in determining a fact in issue; and 
[c] not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge"). 
As for an instruction explaining the difference between 
expert and lay opinion testimony, such an instruction likely 
would have helped the jury differentiate between the two types 
of testimony provided by the same witness.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 579 (1998) (when percipient 
witness also gives expert testimony, "[i]t is easy for the line 
between specific observations and expert generalizations to 
become blurred in these situations").  See also United States v. 
York, 572 F.3d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 2009) ("the jury might be 
smitten by an expert's aura of special reliability and therefore 
33 
 
 
give his factual testimony undue weight" [quotations and 
citation omitted]).  However, defense counsel did not request 
such an instruction, and the failure to provide one did not 
result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 486-487 (2017).  The 
questioning regarding the mapping website comparison was not 
extensive; the map produced by the criminalist's search was not 
admitted in evidence; and the prosecutor did not refer to the 
criminalist's comparison in closing.  Further, defense counsel 
effectively cross-examined the criminalist on this point, 
highlighting that the witness did not compare the map fragments 
to any other driving directions.  In light of the prosecutor's 
minimal use of the challenged testimony and defense counsel's 
thorough cross-examination of the witness, the lack of a 
limiting instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See id. 
 
3.  Closing argument.  During the defendant's closing 
argument, trial counsel posited that the shooter may have been 
targeting Lenz rather than Yazgur, and argued there was "no 
evidence the police ever investigated Mr. Lenz to see what he 
was involved in."  In response, the prosecutor reminded the jury 
34 
 
 
of the evidence that had been presented about Lenz, and refuted 
the idea that he had given anyone a motive to kill him.18 
 
The defendant now contends that the portion of the 
prosecutor's closing rebutting defense counsel's criticism of 
deficiencies in the Commonwealth's evidence constituted an 
improper appeal to the jurors' sympathy causing undue prejudice.  
The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements 
regarding the decedent at trial.  There was no error. 
 
A prosecutor is entitled to respond to an argument made by 
the defense at closing.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7 
(1989).  Here the prosecutor accurately pointed out that the 
defendant's theory, i.e., that the decedent was "involved in" 
something that created a motive to kill him, was not supported 
by the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 622-
623 (2015).  The prosecutor also fairly rebutted the defense's 
claim that there was a dearth of information about the decedent 
by reminding them of the evidence presented of the decedent's 
attributes.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 495 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 (1998) and 428 Mass. 39, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (prosecutor "entitled to tell the 
                                                     
 
 
18 The prosecutor said, "You heard about that man.  He is a 
poet.  He is a teacher.  He is a student.  He is a son.  He was 
a boyfriend.  He was liked by people that you heard testify 
here.  That is outrageous to suggest, based on no evidence, that 
Michael Lenz was responsible for someone coming in there and 
killing him in his sleep." 
35 
 
 
jury something of the person whose life had been lost in order 
to humanize the proceedings").  Further, it was not improper for 
the prosecutor to comment unfavorably on the theory of the 
defense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 369 
(2009); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 55–56 (2000); 
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 384-385 (1992). 
 
Finally, the judge instructed the jury that closing 
arguments were not evidence, that the jury were required to 
decide the case on the evidence, and that they were not to be 
"influenced by any sympathy or bias or emotional reaction to the 
evidence nor to the openings or closings."19  Commonwealth v. 
Richenburg, 401 Mass. 663, 675 (1988) (overreaching comments 
during prosecutor's closing statements did not require reversal 
in light of judge's charge to jury that attorneys' closing 
arguments were merely theories, not evidence). 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
contends that, even if no error requires reversal of his 
convictions, a combination of the aforementioned issues and the 
                                                     
 
19 The defendant also takes issue with the fact that the 
prosecutor alleged that defense counsel "tried to scare" the 
jury.  The reference was in connection with the defense's theory 
that an unidentified fingerprint found in Yazgur's room belonged 
to the real killer.  The defendant made a timely objection to 
the comment, but the judge declined to give a curative 
instruction, commenting that trial counsel did in fact suggest 
that the killer had not been found.  There was no error with 
respect to that ruling.  See Commonwealth v. Charles, 397 Mass. 
1, 12-13 (1986). 
36 
 
 
prejudice that resulted warrants a new trial under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Pursuant to our duty under that statute, we carefully 
have reviewed the entire record, and we discern no reason to 
grant a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.