Title: Dolan Darling A/K/A Sean Smith v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-2379 
____________ 
 
DOLAN DARLING A/K/A SEAN SMITH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-2020 
____________ 
 
DOLAN DARLING A/K/A SEAN SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Dolan Darling seeks review of an order entered in the circuit court denying 
his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death 
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the denial of the rule 3.851 motion for 
postconviction relief and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Dolan Darling was convicted of the first-degree murder of Grazyna 
Mlynarczyk (“Grace”) and armed sexual battery.  See Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 
145, 153 (Fla. 2002).  The jury, by a vote of eleven to one, recommended a 
sentence of death.  See id. at 154.  Following that recommendation, the trial judge 
sentenced Darling to death for the murder and to 256.5 months for the armed 
sexual battery.  See id.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Darling’s convictions 
and death sentence.  See id. at 166.  In its opinion affirming the conviction, this 
Court detailed the facts surrounding the murder of Grace as follows: 
The victim in this case, Grazyna Mlynarczyk (“Grace”), was a 
thirty-three-year-old Polish female living illegally in the United 
States.  The State’s first witness, Zdzislaw Raminski (known as 
“Jesse”), had met the victim in Poland in 1990 or 1991.  Grace and 
Jesse developed a personal relationship, which continued when Grace 
moved to Orlando on September 28, 1992. 
Jesse owned and operated Able Transportation, which provided 
shuttle service to and from the airport, and Grace was employed part-
time with this enterprise.  The last time Jesse saw Grace alive was on 
the morning of October 29, 1996, at around 9:30 [a.m].  At that time 
she was wearing shorts and a small shirt, as she was doing laundry in 
a facility at her apartment complex.  Jesse did not exit his vehicle 
when talking with Grace only briefly that morning.  She told Jesse 
that she had an appointment with a gynecologist later that day.  Jesse 
gave Grace an AmSouth Bank envelope containing three hundred 
dollars cash in payment for work she had performed for the company 
 
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during the prior week.  Jesse drove away from the apartment complex 
and proceeded to work.  Jesse again spoke with Grace around 10:15 
a.m. by phone, and she indicated that she was still doing laundry, and 
would call him after she returned from her doctor’s appointment.  
Although Jesse continued to telephone Grace throughout the day, he 
was unable to reach her again.  Around 4:10 p.m., Jesse called again 
and was still unable to reach Grace.  He became concerned that she 
had not telephoned him after her doctor’s appointment, so he returned 
to her apartment complex. 
Upon arriving there, he was surprised to find that the blinds to 
Grace’s apartment—which she never closed during the daytime—
were closed.  He used his key to enter the apartment, where he found a 
basket with laundry in the living room, and the door to the bedroom 
closed.  He recalled seeing no disturbed objects in the apartment.  
Upon entering the bedroom, however, he found Grace.  She was on 
her back on the floor, naked from the waist down, with her face near 
the bed and her legs inside the closet.  When she did not respond to 
him, Jesse moved Grace to the bed, and discovered that she was cold, 
and had blood on her.  He proceeded to call 911 for assistance and 
members of the fire department arrived shortly thereafter.  They soon 
determined that Grace was dead. 
Officers from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office responded to 
the scene and secured items of evidence found in the bathroom, which 
included a lotion bottle, a pair of panties, and a pink throw pillow.  
The pillow had a blackened area and a gunshot hole through the sides.  
There was blood spatter on the door of the closet, and blood present in 
the closet area.  Two AmSouth Bank envelopes were found which 
contained cash totaling approximately twelve hundred dollars and a 
shoe box was discovered which contained one thousand dollars.  
There was also a wallet which held fifty-eight dollars.  Jewelry 
located in boxes appeared to be undisturbed. 
An officer who had canvassed Grace’s neighborhood to 
determine whether there were witnesses with information regarding 
the murder testified that he had contacted Darling on October 30, the 
day after the murder.  Darling’s apartment was located just north of 
Grace’s apartment.  In response to the investigating officer’s inquiry, 
Darling had said that “he was working and didn’t know anything of 
the incident.” 
Id. at 148-49. 
 
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The Guilt Phase 
 
 
During the guilt phase, the State presented the testimony of a number of 
forensic experts.  See id. at 149-53.  Dr. William Robert Anderson of the Orlando 
Medical Examiner’s Office testified with regard to the cause of death and the 
evidence of sexual assault.  See id. at 149-50.  Dr. Anderson testified that both the 
defects in the pillow recovered from the crime scene and the victim’s gunshot 
injury to the head were consistent with the weapon being discharged in close range 
of the victim with the gun pressed tightly against the pillow.  See id. at 149.  He 
also testified that death would have been nearly instantaneous with consciousness 
lasting for not more than a few seconds after impact.  See id.  Dr. Anderson further 
testified that the condition of the victim’s vaginal and rectal injuries were 
consistent with nonconsensual penetration.  See id. at 150.  He concluded that the 
encounter was not consensual because the degree of pain that these injuries would 
have caused the victim was “not consistent with consensual sex.”  Id.   
The doctor also noted that there were seminal fluids present in the victim’s 
vaginal area.  See id.  Additionally, a fingerprint analysis expert testified that the 
fingerprint found on the lotion bottle recovered from the crime scene was less than 
one year old, and matched fingerprints obtained from Darling.  See id.  Finally, 
David Baer, a DNA expert and analyst employed at the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (“FDLE”) DNA crime laboratory in Orlando, testified, based on his 
 
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personal testing of the DNA samples from Darling’s blood sample and the vaginal 
swabs containing sperm taken from the victim, that Darling’s DNA matched the 
male DNA contained in the vaginal swabs.  See id. at 152.  The defense did not 
present any evidence.  See id. at 153. 
The Penalty Phase 
 
During the penalty phase, Gerald Paul Daigneault testified that Darling had 
shot him in the back of the head after robbing him at gunpoint and carjacking his 
taxi.  The testimony of Joanne Reed, a friend of victim Grace Mlynarczyk, was 
presented as victim impact evidence.  
 
The defense presented four witnesses during the penalty phase.  Deshane 
Clear testified that Darling had provided emotional support during her pregnancy 
with their daughter, and subsequently had expressed concern for their daughter and 
sent cards for various holidays.  Verneki Butler, Darling’s sister, testified with 
regard to the emotional and physical abuse Darling suffered at the hands of their 
alcoholic father as a child.  Eleanor Bessie Smith, Darling’s mother, testified that 
although Darling’s father had provided for the children financially, he drank 
excessively and was physically and verbally abusive to both her and Darling.  
Psychiatrist Michael Hercov testified at length with regard to the abuse Darling 
suffered at the hands of his father, Darling’s low IQ, and his difficulties in school.  
 
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Dr. Hercov stressed the direct correlation found in psychiatric research between 
childhood abuse and the later commission of crimes of violence. 
After deliberation, the jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one.  
In sentencing Darling to death, the trial judge found two aggravating factors: (1) 
Darling’s previous conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
the person; i.e., the taxi-carjacking case that occurred about a week after the 
murder in the instant matter; and (2) that the capital felony was committed while 
the defendant was engaged in an armed sexual battery.  In mitigation, the trial 
court found only one statutory mitigator, the defendant’s age of twenty, and 
nineteen nonstatutory mitigators relating mostly to Darling’s relationship with his 
family and his background as an abused child.1  In sentencing Darling to death, the 
                                          
 
 
1.  The nineteen nonstatutory mitigating facts were: (1) defendant’s behavior 
at trial was acceptable (little weight); (2) defendant has an IQ of 85 (some weight); 
(3) defendant believes in God (slight weight); (4) defendant was and is a caring son 
to his mother (some weight); (5) defendant is a caring father to his daughter, and 
she will need his love and encouragement in her life (moderate weight); (6) 
defendant was an abused child (most weighty of the mitigating factors—due 
consideration); (7) defendant has an alcoholic father (considered with factor 6); (8) 
defendant was never violent toward his mother or girlfriend (considered with factor 
4); (9) defendant had no father figure or male role model (considered with factor 
6); (10) defendant sent cards for holidays and birthdays to his family members 
(slight weight); (11) defendant was and is a concerned brother (slight weight); (12) 
defendant has a child who will not have a father if defendant is executed 
(considered with factor 5); (13) defendant has a good employment history (slight 
weight); (14) defendant was not exposed to a normal mother/father relationship as 
a result of his father’s philandering (considered with factor 6); (15) defendant’s 
mother and father were never married, and this caused defendant embarrassment 
during his childhood (considered with factor 6); (16) defendant is a human being 
 
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trial court noted that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances. 
Direct Appeal 
 
 
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Darling’s murder conviction and death 
sentence, denying all of Darling’s claims,2 none of which are relevant to the instant 
postconviction appeal.  See Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 153 (Fla. 2002).  In 
                                                                                                                                        
(not recognized as a separate mitigating factor); (17) defendant has the love and 
support of his family (slight weight); (18) defendant has been unwavering in his 
declaration of innocence (slight weight); and (19) if defendant is sentenced to life 
in prison, he will be isolated from his friends and family who reside in a foreign 
country (moderate weight). 
 
 
2.  On direct appeal, Darling asserted:  
 
[T]he trial court reversibly erred in (1) denying Darling’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal; (2) admitting DNA evidence; (3) not allowing 
defense counsel to comment on the State’s failure to exclude other 
suspects; (4) limiting Darling’s voir dire examination during jury 
selection; (5) denying Darling’s requested instruction regarding 
circumstantial evidence; (6) precluding defense counsel’s rebuttal 
closing argument where the State had waived its closing argument; (7) 
refusing to allow Darling to argue residual doubt as a mitigator; and 
(8) denying Darling’s requested special penalty phase jury 
instructions.  Additionally, Darling asserted that (9) the absence of a 
complete record on appeal deprived him of adequate appellate review; 
(10) his death sentence is disproportionate; and (11) his death 
sentence violates the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 (Dec. 24, 1969) (the “Vienna Convention”). 
Darling, 808 So. 2d at 155 n.10. 
 
 
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October 2002, certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.  See 
Darling v. Florida, 537 U.S. 848 (2002). 
Rule 3.851 Proceedings 
 
On September 22, 2003, Darling filed a motion to vacate judgment of 
conviction and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
alleging thirty-eight claims.3  The trial court issued an order granting the State’s 
                                          
 
 
3.  The claims, as stated in the motion, were: (1) Darling was denied due 
process and equal protection because access to certain records pertaining to 
Darling’s case, which are in the possession of State agencies, have been withheld; 
(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have a biased juror excused for cause 
or through the use of a preemptory strike; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the admission at trial of a photograph of a latent fingerprint 
found on a lotion bottle obtained from the victim’s apartment; (4) trial counsel was 
ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to present evidence with regard to 
Darling’s mental state; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
improper comments, questions, and instructions that unconstitutionally diluted the 
jury’s sense of responsibility towards sentencing; (6) trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to erroneous jury instructions that limited the mitigation that 
could be considered by the jury; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to improper closing argument and erroneous jury instructions that caused the 
jury to presume that anything but a recommendation of death would be unlawful; 
(8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper prosecutorial 
comments that a recommendation of death was legally required under certain 
circumstances; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an adequate 
mental health evaluation; (10) Darling’s convictions are materially unreliable due 
to cumulative ineffective assistance of counsel, the withholding of exculpatory or 
impeachment material, newly discovered evidence, or improper rulings of the trial 
court; (11) Darling’s convictions are constitutionally unreliable based on newly 
discovered evidence; (12) Darling was deprived his right to due process because 
the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence; (13) trial counsel was 
ineffective during voir dire; (14) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to improper prosecutorial comments that denied Darling an individualized and 
reliable sentencing; (15) trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for 
 
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failing to adequately investigate and present mitigation, for failing to provide 
mental health experts with the mitigation, and for failing to adequately challenge 
the State’s case; (16) Darling is innocent of the death penalty; (17) Darling was 
absent from critical stages of the trial; (18) trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to improper penalty phase jury instructions which impermissibly shifted 
the burden of proof; (19) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the 
standard by which they should judge expert testimony; (20) Darling’s sentence is 
premised on fundamental error because the jury received inadequate guidance with 
regard to how to consider the aggravating circumstances; (21) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of nonstatutory aggravators and 
the State’s arguments upon such aggravators; (22) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to comments, questions, and instructions that inaccurately and 
unconstitutionally diluted the jury’s sense of responsibility towards sentencing; 
(23) Darling was denied effective assistance of postconviction counsel because of 
rules prohibiting counsel from interviewing jurors to determine if constitutional 
error was present; (24) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
overbroad and vaguely argued aggravating circumstances; (25) execution by 
electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; (26) Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute is unconstitutional because it fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty; (27) Darling was denied the right to a fair and 
impartial jury by pretrial publicity and the lack of a change of venue; (28) the 
Eighth Amendment was violated by the trial court’s refusal to consider mitigating 
circumstances clearly set out in the record; (29) the sentencing order does not 
reflect an independent weighing or reasoned judgment; (30) Darling was denied a 
proper direct appeal due to omissions in the record; (31) excessive security 
measures and shackling denied Darling of a fair trial; (32) the jury and judge were 
provided with and relied on misinformation with regard to the constitutional 
magnitude of sentencing Darling to death; (33) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to jury instructions that misled the jury to believe that a majority 
vote is required to recommend life or death; (34) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue that Darling’s death sentence was predicated on an automatic 
aggravator; (35) the judgments and sentence must be vacated in light of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (36) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request an instruction pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 
(1994), and for failing to investigate and present evidence of practical parole 
ineligibility; (37) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire the necessary 
experts to challenge the State’s DNA evidence; and (38) the combination of 
procedural and substantive errors deprived Darling of a fair trial. 
 
 
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motion to strike and summarily denied claims 11, 12, 14-34, and 36 as shell 
claims.  The trial court issued a separate order summarily denying certain claims 
and set other claims for an evidentiary hearing.  The claims set for evidentiary 
hearing were: 1, 2, 3, 4 (merged with 15), 10 (merged with 38), and 37. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing held April 26 through April 29, 2004, and May 3 
and 7, 2004, Darling presented the testimony of six witnesses.  Carlton Darling, 
Darling’s father, testified to the degree, frequency, and results of the abuse he 
inflicted on Darling throughout most of Darling’s childhood.  Mario Smith, a 
cousin of Darling who was previously employed as a guard at Foxhill prison in the 
Bahamas, testified with regard to the deplorable conditions at the prison during the 
time Darling was incarcerated there.  Marjorie Hammock, a clinical social worker 
with experience in conducting biopsychosocial histories and assessments, testified 
that there were many mitigating themes in Darling’s background which were not 
fully explored during the penalty phase.  These included mental health issues, 
significant learning disabilities, a corruptive and abusive home environment, lack 
of emotional support, physical problems that were not addressed, and a lack of 
sustaining relationships.   
Dr. Mark Douglas Cunningham, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
discussed additional mitigating factors that were not presented during the penalty 
phase.  He divided this additional mitigation into four colorfully named categories 
 
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as follows: (1) faulty wiring (mitigating factors which pointed to neurological 
dysfunction); (2) parental poisoning (aspects of Darling’s family functioning that 
were psychologically destructive); (3) sexual poisoning (factors that were corrosive 
to the development of a healthy sexuality); and (4) community poisoning 
(inadequate community guidance and intervention).  Dr. Henry Dee, a clinical 
psychologist and clinical neuropsychologist, expressed the opinion that Darling 
suffered from impaired frontal lobe functioning, which would cause him to behave 
in uninhibited and socially unacceptable ways.   
Janine Arvizu, a quality assurance consultant, testified that the FDLE DNA 
lab which had performed the DNA testing in the instant matter had inadequate 
quality control and documentation procedures.  The depositions of Lance McIntosh 
and Montico Rahming, two childhood friends of Darling, were also submitted 
which addressed that Darling was a good person and the abuse Darling had 
suffered at the hands of the Bahamian police and the prison guards at Foxhill 
prison.  As a rebuttal witness, Christopher Smith, counsel for Darling in the prior 
offense (i.e. the taxi-carjacking) which was considered as an aggravating factor in 
the instant matter, testified that he would have handled the carjacking matter 
differently had he known Darling was under investigation for first-degree murder 
charges.   
 
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Dr. David Frank, a psychiatrist employed by the Florida Department of 
Corrections for the purpose of diagnosing and treating mentally ill inmates, 
testified, based on his examination of Darling and review of Darling’s records, that 
Darling had a conduct disorder as a child which developed into antisocial 
personality disorder as an adult.  Dr. Frank explained that the factors discussed by 
the defense psychiatric experts at trial as resulting from Darling’s abuse as a child 
were consistent with this diagnosis. 
Darling’s trial counsel Francis Iennaco testified that the DNA evidence 
presented by the State was not challenged because Darling maintained that he was 
having a love affair with the victim and, therefore, there was no reason to believe 
that the test results were inaccurate.  Iennaco also addressed, in the form of a 
proffer, that he had looked into Darling’s prior conviction and could not find any 
valid basis to set aside Darling’s plea in that case.   
Another trial counsel for Darling testified that an investigation was 
conducted and that extensive mitigation with regard to Darling’s background was 
presented during the penalty phase.  This attorney also confirmed that the DNA 
and fingerprint evidence was not challenged because Darling asserted that he was 
having a love affair with the victim which would cause the presence of that 
evidence in the apartment.  Additionally, the attorney did not order 
neuropsychological testing because there was absolutely no history that indicated a 
 
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need for such testing.  The state fingerprint expert again testified, as he did at trial, 
that the fingerprint found on the lotion bottle in the victim’s apartment matched 
prints taken from Darling.4  Finally, David Baer testified in rebuttal to the 
testimony of Darling’s witness that the DNA results admitted at trial were reliable 
and valid, and addressed the concerns asserted with regard to the FDLE lab’s 
protocol. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Darling’s claims 
for postconviction relief.  This appeal followed. 
Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
 
 
On November 1, 2005, Darling submitted a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging four claims, as follows: (1) Darling was denied effective assistance 
of counsel and access to the courts in the taxi-carjacking matter; (2) Darling’s 
counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for abandoning claims which had been 
raised and preserved during trial; (3) execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment; and (4) Darling’s execution will constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment because he may be incompetent at the time of execution. 
                                          
 
 
4.  In response to an inquiry by the court, it was determined that a discovery 
violation may have occurred in a failure to produce certain evidence with regard to 
the fingerprint evidence requested by the defense.  The court ordered the evidence 
produced so that defense fingerprint expert Melvin Smith could examine the items.  
However, after the evidence was produced and Mr. Smith examined the items, the 
defense indicated that they no longer wished to present any testimony with regard 
to the fingerprint evidence introduced at trial. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Investigation and Presentation of Mitigating Evidence 
Darling asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in the investigation and 
presentation of mitigation during the penalty phase. 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that 
[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered 
meritorious, must include two general components.  First, the claimant 
must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown 
to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance 
under prevailing professional standards.  Second, the clear, substantial 
deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the 
fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome 
is undermined.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984); Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 
1984).  A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need 
not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test 
when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  The alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to plenary 
review based on Strickland.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 
1999).  Under this standard, the Court conducts an independent review of the trial 
court’s legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings.  See id. at 1032-33. 
 
Related to the deference given to the trial court’s factual findings when 
undertaking an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is the idea that the trial 
 
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court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded to 
evidence will similarly be given deference.  This Court recently explained that 
“[s]o long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on 
questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 
be given to the evidence.”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005) 
(quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)).  This deference is a 
recognition of “the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility 
of witnesses and in making findings of fact.”  Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 
(Fla. 2001).   
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel “rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.   See id. at 689.  The 
defendant bears the burden to overcome the presumption “that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  
Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101(1955)).  “Judicial 
 
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scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689. 
Darling has failed to establish that the presentation of mitigation by trial 
counsel during the penalty phase was deficient.  The testimony presented during 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing may generally be described as only a more 
detailed presentation of the mitigation that was actually presented during the 
penalty phase.  Nonetheless, the investigation and presentation of mitigation by 
trial counsel here was not legally deficient under the Strickland standard. 
Darling argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to order a 
neuropsychological assessment when there was a clear indication in the records 
relating to Darling’s life and from interviews with various witnesses that Darling 
may suffer from brain damage.  During the evidentiary hearing, Marjorie 
Hammock stated that although she was admittedly not qualified to diagnose brain 
damage, the multiple head injuries, severe beatings, nosebleeds, headaches, and 
stuttering experienced by Darling as a child might give some indication of 
neurological damage.  Dr. Henry Dee was of the view that Darling did suffer from 
frontal lobe damage.  However, in preparing for the penalty phase, trial counsel 
relied on the evaluation of psychiatric expert Dr. Michael Hercov.  Darling’s trial 
counsel confirmed that he relied on the evaluation performed by his expert, Dr. 
Hercov, and would not have ordered a neuropsychological evaluation absent a 
 
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recommendation by Dr. Hercov.  Also, Dr. David Frank established during the 
evidentiary hearing that Darling’s irritability and changed behavior was the result 
of being abused rather than organic brain damage.  Dr. Frank added that stuttering 
after being abused is a normal response produced by fear and anxiety.  Dr. Frank 
also added that Darling’s impulsivity, frequent fights, and poor planning were all 
indicative of the diagnosis that Darling had antisocial personality disorder.   
This Court has established that defense counsel is entitled to rely on the 
evaluations conducted by qualified mental health experts, even if, in retrospect, 
those evaluations may not have been as complete as others may desire.  See State 
v. Sireci, 502 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1987).  Even if the evaluation by Dr. Hercov, 
which found no indication of brain damage to warrant a neuropsychological 
workup, was somehow incomplete or deficient in the opinion of others, trial 
counsel would not be rendered ineffective for relying on Dr. Hercov’s qualified 
expert evaluation.  See id.  Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
order a neuropsychological evaluation.  
Although Darling further asserts that trial counsel was also ineffective for 
failing to present the testimony of Darling’s father, Carlton, during the penalty 
phase, as noted by the trial court, the substance of Carlton’s testimony was actually 
presented through other witnesses during the penalty phase.  Dr. Hercov and 
Darling’s mother and sister testified during the penalty phase with regard to the 
 
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abuse Darling suffered at the hands of Carlton.  Although as an afterthought 
Carlton provided a more detailed account with regard to the abuse, this Court has 
held that even if alternate witnesses could provide more detailed testimony, trial 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.  See Gudinas 
v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002); Sweet v. State, 810 So. 2d 854, 863-64 
(Fla. 2002).  Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Carlton 
as a witness during the penalty phase to present evidence which was generally 
presented by others. 
The trial court noted in the order denying postconviction relief that the 
testimony of Mario Smith, Lance McIntosh, Montico Rahming, and Marjorie 
Hammock with regard to the conditions at Foxhill prison “was really a general 
comment on existing conditions, and did not conclusively establish that Defendant 
was beaten while incarcerated there.”  Although trial counsel failed to locate and 
present the testimony of three of these witnesses at the penalty phase, trial counsel 
cannot be deemed deficient for failing to present mitigation not supported by the 
record.  Additionally, even if trial counsel could be deemed deficient for failing to 
attempt to establish this mitigation, Darling cannot establish prejudice on this point 
because the trial court found that the evidentiary hearing testimony in this regard 
was inconclusive. 
 
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With regard to the testimony of psychiatric expert Dr. Mark Cunningham, 
contrary to Darling’s assertions, the trial court did not dismiss or discount Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony.  Instead, the trial court simply held that “Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony added little or nothing new; instead, it was merely a 
‘cumulative analysis’ of the testimony previously presented at the penalty phase.”  
A review of both the penalty phase and evidentiary hearing transcripts reveals that 
the trial court has accurately characterized Dr. Cunningham’s testimony.  Although 
Dr. Cunningham presented various elements from Darling’s background in four 
colorfully named categories, a review of his testimony reveals that many of the 
individually identified mitigating factors discussed by Dr. Cunningham were 
redundant and cumulative of evidence presented during the penalty phase.  For 
example, Dr. Cunningham listed mitigating factors relating to Carlton Darling’s 
emotional and physical abuse of both Darling and his mother as six different 
factors listed under three of the four broad categories of mitigation identified by 
Dr. Cunningham.  The trial court accurately identified this evidence as cumulative.  
In addition to being cumulative, as discussed above, the testimony of Dr. 
Cunningham was also redundant, and Dr. Cunningham simply restated the same 
mitigation numerous times in slightly varying manners.  As noted, trial counsel is 
not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.  See Gudinas, 816 So. 2d 
at 1106; Sweet, 810 So. 2d at 863-64.  To the extent that anything presented by Dr. 
 
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Cunningham may not have been cumulative of evidence presented during the 
penalty phase, this Court has stated that “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective . . 
. simply because he relied on what may have been a less than complete pretrial 
psychiatric evaluations.”  Sireci, 502 So. 2d at 1223.  Trial counsel was not 
deficient by relying on the psychiatric evaluation of a qualified expert, Dr. Hercov.   
Therefore, although Darling did present additional witnesses during the 
evidentiary hearing who testified with regard to his background with somewhat 
greater specificity than that presented during the penalty phase, trial counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to present this largely cumulative evidence.  
Additionally, to the extent that any of the evidence relating to Darling’s mental 
health and brain functions was not cumulative, trial counsel was not ineffective for 
relying on the evaluation by a qualified expert.  Darling has failed with regard to 
this claim to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty 
phase under the Strickland analysis.        
The Taxi-Carjacking Case 
In sentencing Darling to death, the trial court found as an aggravating factor 
that Darling had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use of 
violence to the person with regard to a taxi-carjacking committed by Darling about 
a week after the murder in the instant matter during which Darling shot a taxi 
 
- 20 -
driver in the head before stealing his vehicle.  Darling raises several postconviction 
claims and one habeas claim with regard to this prior conviction.   
In the first claim, Darling essentially asserts that trial counsel LeBlanc and 
Iennaco provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase by 
failing to adequately investigate Darling’s prior violent felony conviction and by 
failing to intervene in the then-pending postconviction proceedings in that other 
case.  In the order denying postconviction relief in the instant case, the trial judge 
denied this claim because it was insufficiently pled in the 3.851 motion and was 
only raised in written closing arguments after the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing.  As the trial court stated in the order denying postconviction relief, 
defense counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this claim was not 
specifically pled in the 3.851 motion, as is required under the rule.  Therefore, the 
trial court properly summarily denied this claim. 
Notwithstanding the failure of pleadings, this claim is also meritless.  
Darling’s assertions with regard to the ineffectiveness of counsel in the instant case 
due to a failure to investigate his prior violent felony conviction and for a failure to 
intervene in the postconviction proceedings in the taxi-carjacking case largely 
hinge on an argument that Christopher Smith, trial counsel in that taxi-carjacking 
case, provided ineffective assistance.  However, a review of the 3.850 evidentiary 
hearing in the taxi-carjacking matter, as well as the proffered testimony of 
 
- 21 -
Christopher Smith at the evidentiary hearing in this case, reveal that Smith’s 
representation was not ineffective.  In his 3.850 motion and at the evidentiary 
hearing addressing the taxi-carjacking matter, Darling alleged three bases for 
Smith’s ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) Smith failed to investigate and 
prepare a voluntary intoxication defense; (2) Smith badgered Darling into 
accepting the plea; and (3) Smith failed to investigate the facts of the case which 
would have revealed that the victim could not identify Darling.  With regard to the 
voluntary intoxication defense, Smith testified that he did not recall discussing it 
with Darling, and that even if he had, there would be a problem with claiming such 
a defense because even if the attempted first-degree murder charge, the only 
specific intent charge involved, was reduced downward to attempted second-
degree murder, Darling still would have been facing a far greater sentence than 
was acquired under the plea deal.  With regard to the allegation that Darling was 
badgered into accepting the plea, Darling’s own testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing revealed that this allegation stemmed only from the fact that Smith 
correctly informed him that he would be facing twenty-two years to life if he 
proceeded to trial on the taxi-carjacking charges and was convicted.  As to the 
allegation that the victim could not identify Darling, Smith confirmed this fact and 
said that the evidence against Darling consisted of the fact that Darling was caught 
with the weapon used in the crime, that a witness who knew Darling identified him 
 
- 22 -
as the perpetrator, and that Darling confessed to the crime.  Although the trial court 
stated at the conclusion of the hearing that the motion would be considered as a 
request for mitigation of sentence, because Darling indicated that all he was asking 
for was a reduction in sentence, the trial court did address the merits of Darling’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The trial court noted that Darling had 
failed to prove such a claim because counsel Smith was able to acquire a plea deal 
for 10.5 years in the face of overwhelming evidence of Darling’s guilt on charges 
that would have carried a sentence of twenty-two years to life. 
Darling simply cannot meet his burden on either prong of the test announced 
in Strickland.  Based on Smith’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing in the taxi-
carjacking case, his representation was not deficient on any of the points raised in 
Darling’s 3.850 motion.  Smith had a legally valid strategic reason for not asserting 
a voluntary intoxication defense; the defense would only have potentially reduced 
one of the three charges and ultimately would not have resulted in a sentence less 
severe than that provided by the plea bargain.  Darling admitted under questioning 
by both the trial court and the State that his claim that Smith badgered him into 
accepting the plea was based only on the fact that Smith honestly informed him 
that he was facing twenty-two years to life if he was convicted at trial.  With regard 
to the claim that investigation would have revealed that the victim could not 
identify him, Darling admitted during cross-examination that a witness who knew 
 
- 23 -
him prior to the crime had identified him.  Even if, however, Darling had proven 
that Smith was deficient on any of these points, he still would have failed the 
prejudice prong because, as noted by the trial court during the evidentiary hearing, 
the evidence against Darling in the taxi-carjacking matter was overwhelming. 
The appellant failed to allege any deficiency in Christopher Smith’s direct 
representation in the taxi-carjacking case, and, therefore, there is no basis to 
support an argument that trial counsel in this case were ineffective for failing to 
intervene in the taxi-carjacking matter.  Darling asserts that Smith’s proffered 
testimony during the evidentiary hearing establishes that he was ineffective in the 
taxi-carjacking case.  However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a 
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Smith’s testimony that 
had he known about the murder charge, he would have handled the case differently 
does not establish any deficiency in his performance because that statement was 
made only in hindsight and discounts Smith’s perspective at the time of his 
representation of Darling.  See id.  Trial counsel here, Iennaco and LeBlanc, could 
not have been deficient for failing to intervene in a meritless 3.850 motion.  
Further, even if they could somehow have been deemed deficient on that basis, 
 
- 24 -
Darling cannot show prejudice because he has not alleged any valid avenue for 
attacking the plea in the taxi-carjacking case.   
Darling additionally asserts that either Christopher Smith or trial counsel in 
this case should have filed a motion to set aside his plea on the basis that his plea 
form did not inform him that his conviction in the taxi-carjacking matter could be 
used as an aggravating factor in the subsequent murder charge.  However, the plea 
in the taxi-carjacking matter was entered on April 3, 1997, and Darling was not 
even indicted in the instant case until two months later on June 12, 1997.  Neither 
the trial court nor counsel would have had reason to know that first-degree murder 
charges against Darling were imminent at the time of his plea colloquy.  
Additionally, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172, which governs the 
acceptance of pleas, does not mention a required notice to defendants entering 
pleas that a conviction for a violent felony may be used as an aggravator in any 
subsequent capital murder trial.   
Darling also alleges that the trial court in the taxi-carjacking matter erred in 
refusing his request for postconviction counsel.  Claims as to trial court error in the 
taxi-carjacking case are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court in the present case.  
Darling had opportunity to appeal the trial court’s determination of his rule 3.850 
motion in the taxi-carjacking case to the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 
 
- 25 -
In an additional postconviction claim here, Darling asserts that the trial court 
erred in refusing during the evidentiary hearing to accept the proffered testimony 
of Christopher Smith with regard to the his representation of Darling in the taxi-
carjacking matter.  As with the first postconviction claim with regard to the taxi-
carjacking matter, this claim is procedurally barred because it was not sufficiently 
pled.  Contrary to Darling’s assertions in the instant appeal, postconviction counsel 
agreed that this claim was not specifically pled in the 3.851 motion.  Therefore, as 
discussed, the trial court properly summarily denied this claim.  Additionally, and 
as also discussed, Christopher Smith’s proffered testimony did not support the 
assertion that trial counsel in the instant case was ineffective for failing to 
investigate or intervene in the meritless rule 3.850 postconviction proceedings in 
the taxi-carjacking case. 
Lastly, Darling asserts that this Court should exercise its habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to address the postconviction claims raised in the rule 3.850 motion 
filed in the taxi-carjacking case because Darling has not had an opportunity to have 
those claims addressed by a court.  However, contrary to Darling’s assertions, his 
postconviction claims in the taxi-carjacking matter were addressed by the trial 
court during the evidentiary hearing in that matter.  As discussed, a review of both 
the evidentiary hearing in the taxi-carjacking case and the proffered testimony of 
Christopher Smith during the evidentiary hearing in the instant matter reveal that 
 
- 26 -
Darling’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Smith were meritless, 
and their lack of merit was addressed by Judge MacKinnon during the evidentiary 
hearing in the taxi-carjacking matter.  Therefore, there is no reason for this Court 
to exercise its jurisdiction under the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus on this 
matter.   
Additionally, this Court has held that “it is well settled that habeas corpus 
cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to quash or for an appeal.”  Adams v. 
Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1959).  Darling is attempting to appeal the 
decision of the trial court on his postconviction motion in the taxi-carjacking case 
through the instant habeas petition.  This is an improper basis for this Court’s 
habeas jurisdiction.  Therefore, relief on this claim is denied because the claim is 
both meritless and inappropriate for habeas review. 
DNA Evidence Discovery Violation 
 
After a discovery violation with regard to the DNA evidence was revealed, 
the trial court directed Ms. Arvizu, Darling’s DNA expert, to conduct an on-site 
audit of the FDLE lab that had conducted the DNA testing in the instant case.  
During this audit, Ms. Arvizu obtained many documents pertinent to her analysis 
of the DNA testing procedures in this case.  Subsequent to the audit, Ms. Arvizu 
testified briefly during the evidentiary hearing the following day, after which the 
 
- 27 -
trial court permitted her time during which to submit a final written report on her 
conclusions.  
Although Darling acknowledges that Ms. Arvizu was eventually given all 
the materials necessary to her analysis and was provided with an opportunity to 
fully review those materials and submit a final report to the trial court, Darling now 
alleges that the trial court erred in not allowing postconviction counsel an 
opportunity to review those additional materials to determine if they supported any 
additional claims.  A review of the postconviction record reveals that 
postconviction counsel did not request leave to amend the 3.851 motion in light of 
these additional materials.  Additionally, Darling does not allege any specific 
additional claim arising from these materials in the instant appeal.  Therefore, this 
claim is denied as procedurally barred because postconviction counsel did not raise 
the issue of the need for additional time to review the additional materials from the 
FDLE crime lab in the trial court below.  See Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 
1095, 1096 (Fla. 1987) (“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the 
specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the 
trial court.”).  Additionally, this claim is denied as insufficiently pled because 
Darling alleges no additional facts or circumstances revealed by these additional 
materials that would require leave to amend the 3.851 motion.  
Failure to Challenge DNA Evidence  
 
- 28 -
Darling asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
DNA evidence offered by the State during trial, noting that the testimony of Ms. 
Arvizu during the evidentiary hearing revealed that the FDLE laboratory did not 
follow proper quality assurance procedures. 
Darling can prove neither the deficiency nor the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test with regard to this issue.  During the evidentiary hearing, trial 
counsel Iennaco and LeBlanc testified that although they had considered 
challenging the DNA results in this case, they decided not to do so after Darling 
informed counsel LeBlanc that he was having an affair with the victim.  They 
reasoned that it would be a waste of resources to challenge the DNA results when 
Darling admitted that his DNA would be in the victim.  Therefore, trial counsel’s 
decision not to challenge the DNA test results constitutes trial strategy.  This Court 
has established that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  Howell v. 
State, 877 So. 2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 
1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)).  The defendant carries the burden to overcome the 
presumption of effective assistance:  “[T]he defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel, 
 
- 29 -
350 U.S. at 101).  Given Darling’s statements that he and the victim were having a 
love affair at the time of the murder, it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel not 
to challenge forensic evidence that was consistent with this position.  Additionally, 
performance by trial counsel cannot be viewed as deficient on this point because, 
despite this valid strategic reason for not challenging the DNA results, trial counsel 
did challenge the DNA test results from a statistical standpoint with regard to the 
statistical validity of using various population subset databases which were not 
specifically developed using the DNA of people of Bahamian origin.  See Darling, 
808 So. 2d at 159-60.   
Ms. Arvizu’s quality assurance protocol testimony does not change the fact 
that trial counsel had a valid strategic basis for not challenging the DNA results.  
Additionally, as noted by the trial court in the order denying postconviction relief, 
Ms. Arvizu admitted that she was only qualified to critique the laboratory protocol 
used in this case and was not at all qualified to challenge the actual test results.  
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that Ms. Arvizu’s testimony would 
not have excluded or undermined the reliability of the DNA test results. 
 
Additionally, even if trial counsel were deficient for failing to challenge the 
DNA evidence, Darling cannot satisfy the prejudice prong.  The trial court 
concluded that Ms. Arvizu’s conclusions that the FDLE laboratory utilized 
inadequate quality assurance measures would not have undermined the DNA 
 
- 30 -
results admitted at trial.  Darling has not and cannot establish that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to mount such an attack.   
 
Therefore, relief on this claim is denied. 
Failure to Challenge Fingerprint Evidence 
Contrary to Darling’s assertion, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to object on the basis of the best evidence rule with regard to the admission of a 
photograph of a latent fingerprint on the lotion bottle that was found in the victim’s 
apartment because such an objection would have been meritless.  “The best 
evidence rule, codified in section 90.952, Florida Statutes (2005), provides that 
‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, an original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required in order to prove the contents of the writing, recording, or 
photograph.’ ”  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 400 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 1916 (2007).  A Florida court has explained that 
Most of the time the best evidence rule is not applicable to 
photographs because the contents of the photograph are not being 
proved.  Photographs are commonly used to explain the testimony of 
the witness.  The photographs are not offered to prove their contents.  
The contents of a photograph are proved only in cases involving such 
matters as copyright and defamation. 
Harris v. State, 755 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Charles W. 
Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 951.2 (1995 ed.)).  In the instant case, the photograph 
of the latent fingerprint found on the lotion bottle was offered to explain the 
testimony of a fingerprint analysis expert, who testified that the fingerprint found 
 
- 31 -
on the lotion bottle recovered from the crime scene was less than one year old and 
matched fingerprints obtained from Darling.  The admission of the photograph did 
not violate the best evidence rule because the photograph was used to aid in the 
testimony of the fingerprint analysis expert, and not to prove its contents.  
Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless best 
evidence objection, see Raleigh v. State, 932 So. 2d 1054, 1064 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 183 (2006), and relief on this claim is denied.  
Individualized Sentencing 
Contrary to the assertions of Darling, trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to object to permissible prosecutorial and judicial comments.  As the trial 
court noted in the order summarily denying certain postconviction claims, the 
prosecutorial comments that Darling challenges in the instant appeal were merely 
intended to convey to the jury that the mitigation alleged by the defense had no 
relationship to the crime charged.  The prosecutorial comment at issue with regard 
to this claim was made during closing argument at the penalty phase and was 
argued as follows: 
In the instructions in a little bit the judge is going to give you a 
definition you can use in deciding whether something is mitigating.  
As I said, it’s up to you, mitigating circumstances are up to you to 
decide whether they’re mitigating or not. 
The judge is going to tell you that these mitigating circumstances are 
these factors, including any aspect of the defendant’s life which may 
be considered as attenuating or reducing the degree of moral 
 
- 32 -
culpability for the offense.  That’s what you have to think of in terms 
of is there anything mitigating about the defendant’s age that 
attenuates or reduces the degree of mental or emotional culpability for 
the offense?  No, there just isn’t.  That’s not a mitigating 
circumstance. I submit that you should disregard it. 
The second area is basically allows you to consider any aspect of the 
defendant’s character, record, background, or any circumstance of the 
offense as possible mitigation. 
First of all, there is no circumstance of this offense, I submit, that is 
remotely mitigating or which remotely attenuates or reduces the 
degree of moral culpability.  Nothing.   
 
This Court has established that the weight to be assigned mitigating circumstances 
is related to whether the mitigator reduces the defendant’s degree of moral 
culpability for the crime.  See Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 225, 277 (Fla. 1999).  
During the trial in this case, the prosecutor simply asserted, consistent with this 
precedent, that the mitigation advanced did not reduce Darling’s degree of moral 
culpability for the murder at issue.  As mentioned above, counsel is not ineffective 
for failing to raise a meritless objection.  See Raleigh, 932 So. 2d at 1064.  
Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to these 
prosecutorial comments. 
Similarly, the jury instruction and the passage from the sentencing order 
quoted by Darling in the instant appeal do not demonstrate that the trial court 
improperly held that mitigation not related to the offense should be given no 
weight.  The instruction that “mitigating circumstances are those factors . . . which 
 
- 33 -
may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability for 
the offense” is consistent with precedent from this Court characterizing mitigation 
in this manner.  See Hall, 742 So. 2d at 277.  Similarly, the statement in the 
sentencing order that Darling’s childhood abuse did not diminish his moral 
culpability for the murder was also consistent with this precedent.  Neither of these 
examples indicates that the mitigation was given no weight.  On the contrary, the 
sentencing order clearly indicates that the trial court found the mitigation advanced 
by the defense to exist and simply assigned most of that mitigation slight or little 
weight.  The trial court did consider all mitigation advanced.  Additionally, these 
claims of judicial error could and should have been raised on direct appeal and are 
therefore procedurally barred.  See Robinson v. State, 913 So. 2d 514, 524 n.9 (Fla. 
2005) (holding that a claim of trial court error is procedurally barred on a 
postconviction appeal because it should have been raised on direct appeal).   
Therefore, relief on this claim is denied both as to the ineffective assistance 
of counsel aspect and as to the trial court error. 
Comments With Regard to Sentencing Recommendation 
 During voir dire, in response to a statement by the prosecutor that, “under 
some circumstances to follow the law, the [sic] death is the appropriate vote you 
should make,” venireperson Adams responded that “it sounds like I would either 
vote for the death penalty or I would break the law.  I don’t think I should be put in 
 
- 34 -
that position.”  As the prosecutor began to repeat his statement implying that the 
law sometimes required the death penalty, defense counsel objected on the basis 
that the prosecutor was misstating the law.  At that point, the trial court sustained 
the objection, informed the jury that the penalty phase only occurs if it first 
unanimously finds the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and noted with 
regard to the penalty phase that  
the jury will hear evidence and would be given a series of factors to 
weigh.  And the jury’s decision would be whether the mitigating 
factors outweigh the aggravating factors.  And then to recommend to 
the court whether the sentence should be a sentence of death or a 
sentence of life in prison.  That decision does not have to be a 
unanimous decision, and the vote is not binding on the judge, 
although it is [sic] carries great weight. 
At this point the court gave both parties the opportunity to object to this 
characterization of the penalty phase, and neither party objected.  The prosecutor 
subsequently stated: 
In order to be a juror in any kind of case you have to take an oath in 
the beginning to follow the law, wherever it leads you. 
In a case of this type, the law might lead as you analyze it to vote for 
death.  Question for you is, could you take an oath to follow the law, 
knowing that it might result in your voting to impose the death 
penalty? 
Trial counsel did not object further at this point.  Neither did trial counsel object 
later during voir dire when the prosecutor, in response to a statement by 
venireperson Ramos that she could not vote for the death penalty, asked: 
 
- 35 -
Could you take an oath to follow the law if it meant that you might be 
compelled to vote to impose death, if that’s what the law called for?  
Darling alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these two 
comments which followed the court’s curative instruction.   
Darling states an arguable basis for a finding of deficiency of trial counsel 
with regard to these prosecutorial comments.  This Court has repeatedly held that 
comments to the effect that if the aggravators outweigh the mitigators, a 
recommendation of a death sentence is mandatory, misstate the law.  See Franqui 
v. State, 804 So. 2d 1185, 1192-93 (Fla. 2001); Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 
903 (Fla. 2000); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 250 (Fla. 1996); Garron v. 
State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 n.7 (Fla. 1988).  Therefore, it is arguable that trial 
counsel was deficient in failing to object to the two prosecutorial statements that 
death is sometimes required by the law, which followed the initial objection and 
the court’s curative instruction.   
However, the cases cited by Darling do not support a finding of prejudice 
resulting from this deficiency.  In Henyard, this Court held that improper 
prosecutorial comments such as the comments in this case constituted harmless 
error because the comments occurred only three times during a lengthy voir dire, 
and the trial court did not repeat the misstatements of the law during the jury 
instructions given just prior to deliberations.  See Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 250.  
Similarly, in Franqui, this Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by trial 
 
- 36 -
court comments which misstated the law as requiring a recommended sentence of 
death if the aggravators outweighed the mitigators because the jury instructions 
prior to deliberations properly stated the law, and the jurors were given an 
additional instruction that the weighing process was not a simple counting process, 
but instead a reasoned judgment of the appropriate sentence in light of the nature 
of the aggravating and mitigating factors.  See Franqui, 804 So. 2d at 1193.  The 
facts in the instant case are less egregious but somehwat analogous to those in both 
Henyard and Franqui.  As in those cases, following the improper prosecutorial 
comments during voir dire, the court here properly instructed the jury with regard 
to the weighing process involved in deciding what sentence to recommend, as 
follows: 
The sentence that you recommend to the court must be based on 
the facts as you find from the evidence and the law.  You should 
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
circumstances, and your advisory sentence must be based on these 
considerations. 
 
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is 
not just a counting process.  You are free to assign whatever weight 
you find appropriate to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
which are proved, and then make you own judgment about the 
appropriate penalty in light of the weighing process.   
These instructions are analogous with those that this Court determined to be 
sufficient to preclude a finding of prejudice based on an earlier misstatement of the 
law in Franqui.  The cases in which this Court has found that statements similar to 
those at issue in this case constituted reversible error are clearly distinguishable 
 
- 37 -
because those cases addressed the cumulative effects of numerous improper 
prosecutorial comments.  See Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 898-905 (holding that 
numerous instances of improper prosecutorial comment, including improper 
arguments with regard to merged aggravators; improper statements referring to 
mitigation as “flimsy” and “phantom”; and a personal attack on the credibility of 
defense counsel, constituted reversible error when “[v]iewed in totality”); Garron, 
528 So. 2d at 358-59 (finding reversible error for egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct which included impermissible statements in violation of the rule 
against placing the jury in the position of the victim, statements that the death 
penalty was required, and statements that the victim was screaming out for 
punishment).  The frequency and type of improper prosecutorial comments in the 
instant case are far more analogous to the cases in which this Court has not found 
reversible error.  Therefore, although trial counsel may have been deficient in 
failing to object to the improper prosecutorial comments here, Darling was not 
prejudiced by this deficiency, and the second prong of Strickland is not satisfied. 
Abandoned Claims 
 
Darling asserts in his habeas petition that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel on direct appeal because counsel abandoned claims which had been 
raised and preserved during the trial.  Darling also asserts that although appellate 
counsel claimed that the incomplete record on appeal violated due process and 
 
- 38 -
equal protection because the case could not be adequately reviewed, appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to argue the substance of several claims for 
appellate relief.  These claims include: (1) that the aggravating circumstance of the 
crime committed during the commission of a felony was an inherent element of a 
conviction and, therefore, constituted an “automatic” aggravator; (2) that Florida’s 
capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it only requires a bare 
majority vote to recommend a death sentence; (3) that the penalty jury should have 
been required to furnish findings of fact; (4) that Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute is unconstitutional for failing to provide adequate guidance to the jury in the 
finding of sentencing circumstances; and (5) that the State should have been 
compelled to notify the defendant of what aggravating factors the State intended to 
prove at the penalty phase. 
Darling’s claim that the absence of a complete record on direct appeal 
precluded the meaningful consideration of his appellate claims was raised and 
rejected by this Court on direct appeal.  See Darling, 808 So. 2d at 163.  To the 
extent that Darling now alleges that he received ineffective assistance of direct 
appeal counsel because counsel on direct appeal failed to argue the substance of 
the motions that were addressed in the missing portions of the appellate record, 
Darling does not allege a sufficient claim for ineffectiveness under the Strickland 
standard.  Four of the claims Darling alleges his counsel was ineffective for not 
 
- 39 -
raising are premised on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
This Court has repeatedly and consistently rejected claims that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring and Apprendi.  See Jones v. 
State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143, 144-45 (Fla. 
2002); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. 2002).  Darling’s claim with 
regard to the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed during the 
course of a specified felony constitutes an unconstitutional “automatic” aggravator 
has been repeatedly rejected by this Court.  See Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 
1132 (Fla. 2005) (citing Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 2003); Hitchcock 
v. State, 755 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 2000); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 
1997)), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 1649, and cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 206 (2006).  
This Court has repeatedly held that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise a meritless claim.  See Jones, 845 So. 2d at 73-74 (citing Johnson v. 
Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla. 1996)).  Therefore, appellate counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to raise these claims. 
Claims Raised for Preservation Purposes Only 
 
Darling raises four claims in the instant appeal which he concedes are being 
presented for preservation purposes only, as follows: (1) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to comments by the trial court that diminished the 
 
- 40 -
jury’s sense of responsibility towards sentencing in violation of Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (2) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates 
Darling’s Sixth Amendment right and his right to due process under the holding of 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (3) a habeas claim that execution by lethal 
injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;5 and (4) a habeas claim that 
Darling’s execution will constitute cruel and unusual punishment because he may 
be incompetent at the time of the execution.  This Court has considered and denied 
claims identical to these on numerous occasions.  See, e.g., Brown v. State, 721 So. 
2d 274, 283 (Fla. 1998) (holding that the standard jury instructions fully advise the 
jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role 
of the jury, and do not violate Caldwell); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 
(Fla. 2005) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida); Hill v. 
State, 921 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting a claim that execution by lethal 
injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 
2d 650, 667 n.12 (Fla. 2000) (citing Provenzano v. State, 751 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 
1999)) (holding that a postconviction claim that the defendant is not competent to 
be executed is not ripe for review).  Therefore, these claims are summarily denied. 
CONCLUSION 
                                          
 
 
5.  This habeas claim was presented to the Court in connection with facts 
existing prior to the execution of Angel Diaz on December 13, 2006.  No events 
that may have occurred in connection with the Diaz execution have been 
considered as part of this proceeding. 
 
- 41 -
 
- 42 -
For the reasons stated above, the denial of Darling’s rule 3.851 motion is 
affirmed and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
John H. Adams, Sr., Judge - Case No. CR97-7497 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, David Dixon Hendry and Mark 
S. Gruber, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent