Title: Matter of Estate of Hite

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Hite1992 WY 44829 P.2d 1173Case Number: 91-112Decided: 04/17/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Carl HITE, Deceased.

 Everette E. WOODRAL, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

CREDIT BUREAU OF 
GILLETTE, a Division of Professional Credit Services, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, 
individually and in its capacity as personal representative of the Estate of 
Carl Hite, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Dan R. Price, II, 
J.

William Curley 
(argued), Gillette, for appellant.

Peggy Taylor 
Pfau and Wendy M. Martin (argued) of Daly, Anderson & Taylor, Gillette, 
for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The question here 
presented is whether a judgment, claimed to have not been properly indexed, is a 
lien against real property which has priority over a bona fide purchaser for 
value. Although not specifically raised as issues by appellant, Everette E. 
Woodral (Woodral), we conclude it is necessary to address such additional 
matters as whether the judgment which resulted in the lien was in a proper form, 
signed by the district court, and the potential effect of Wyoming's homestead 
exemption law.1

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand with directions that the district court grant Woodral's motion to set 
aside the default judgment and further that the district court declare Woodral's 
quitclaim deed to have priority over the judgment lien of appellee the Credit 
Bureau of Gillette (Credit Bureau).

[¶3]      Woodral proposes 
these issues:

A. The District Court 
Erred in Finding Appellee's Judgment Lien Superior to Appellant's Ownership Interest in 
Certain Real Property Absent Proper Indexing.

B. Due Process Requires 
Notice to the World Where Lien Arises by Operation of Statute to Diminish 
Protected Property Rights.

[¶4]      The Credit Bureau 
provides this summary of the controversy:

I. The Credit Bureau of 
Gillette (Appellee) possesses a valid judgment lien that is superior to Everette 
Woodral's (Appellant) ownership interest in certain real 
property.

(a) Appellee's judgment 
lien attached to all real property of Mr. Hite within Campbell County on the 
date it was rendered pursuant to W.S. § 1-17-302.

(b) The District Court 
Clerk satisfied the requirements of W.S. § 1-16-307 when she entered the 
judgment against Carl Hite on her computer index.

(c) Appellant has no 
standing to argue that failure by the Clerk of Court to indicate page numbers on 
the physical judgment index causes a judgment lien to be invalid. The Appellant 
made no effort to check the District Court Clerk's judgment records and 
therefore was not damaged in any way by the manner in which the District Court 
Clerk entered the judgment against Mr. Hite.

[¶5]      The Credit Bureau 
sought to collect a debt of Carl Hite (Hite) assigned to it by CampbellCountyMemorialHospital. The debt had been reduced to 
judgment on June 20, 1988. Woodral lived with Hite on the property in question 
during Hite's long bout with cancer, and it was during this time that CampbellCountyMemorialHospital assigned Hite's unpaid hospital 
bill to the Credit Bureau for collection. On February 22, 1990, the Credit 
Bureau petitioned, and an order was granted, authorizing it to probate Hite's 
estate. Initially, Woodral filed a pro se creditor's claim against the Hite 
estate, asserting Hite had transferred all of his property to Woodral. The 
Credit Bureau rejected Woodral's claim by notice dated June 6, 1990. When it 
became evident that Woodral had received from Hite and recorded, on July 18, 
1988, a quitclaim deed to the real property, the Credit Bureau filed a complaint 
seeking a declaration that its judgment, filed June 20, 1988, was a lien 
superior to Woodral's quitclaim deed.

[¶6]      Upon application 
of the Credit Bureau, default was entered against Woodral by the Clerk of the 
District Court because of Woodral's failure to answer the complaint. Woodral 
sought relief from the entry of default, and the Credit Bureau applied for 
default judgment.

[¶7]      The district 
court determined the entry of default should not be set aside. The district 
court also found the Credit Bureau had obtained a judgment against Hite on June 
20, 1988, and that the judgment attached as a lien on Hite's real property on 
that date pursuant to W.S. 1-17-302 (1988).2 In addition, the district court 
found Woodral had received and recorded a quitclaim deed to the real property of 
Hite on July 18, 1988, and that prior to that date Woodral had examined the 
records of the county clerk and did not note therein the lien at issue here. 
Further, the district court rejected Woodral's assertion that the county clerk's 
indexing system did not comply with W.S. 1-16-307 (1988)3 and that the district court had not 
signed the judgment which effected the lien (see appendix A). Hite was not 
represented by counsel in the proceedings which led to the Credit Bureau's 
judgment against him, and Woodral was either not represented or was represented 
by counsel who were providing him pro bono services.

[¶8]      We first address 
the issue of whether the judgment was signed and, if it was not signed, what 
effect that had on the Credit Bureau's lien. Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 58 
provides:

(a) Form and 
entry. - In all cases, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form 
of the judgment or order and direct that it be entered by the clerk. All 
judgments and orders must be entered on the journal of the court and specify 
clearly the relief granted or order made in the action.

(b) Time of entry. 
- A judgment or final order in any case shall be deemed to be entered whenever a 
form of such judgment or final order, signed by the trial judge, is filed in the 
office of the clerk of the court in which the case is pending. If no such form 
of judgment or final order is signed by such trial judge in any case, then the 
actual entry of the judgment or final order on the journal of the proper court 
shall govern.

[¶9]      It is apparent 
from the face of the judgment that it was not signed. Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure 58(b) does contemplate entry of an unsigned judgment. The judgment in 
this case does not have a date line or signature line. Absent the signature line 
or date line, it is difficult to determine that the document is, in fact, 
complete. The revised Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted December 20, 
1991 (effective March 24, 1992), no longer include a provision for entry of an 
unsigned judgment (W.R.C.P. 58(c)). Moreover, the only certification on the 
two-page (but not page-numbered) document, which includes the purported 
judgment, is on the second page which is a notice of a right to a hearing and 
not a part of the judgment itself. Wyoming Statute 1-16-301 (1988)4 requires more. The better practice 
would be that only signed judgments be entered; but where unsigned judgments are 
entered, as here, compliance with the rules and statutes is especially 
significant because they are in derogation of common law rights. See Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 713 P.2d 766, 770 
(Wyo. 1986). 
The burden was on the Credit Bureau to ensure that its judgment was effective 
for its purpose of obtaining a lien on Hite's real property. With our decision 
here resting upon other grounds, we do not decide whether the Credit Bureau 
satisfied its burdens. Nor do we hold that, absent a signature, judgments are 
void; but we note this judgment provided an opportunity for spurious additions 
to it, since it has no natural ending point (see appendix). Trusting that we 
shall not again have occasion to review the validity of an unsigned judgment 
such as that at issue here (now that the revised Rules of Civil Procedure are in 
effect) and because another issue is dispositive, we simply recognize that each 
such case must be evaluated on the totality of its 
circumstances.

[¶10]   We next review the district court's 
finding that the clerk's index complied with W.S. 1-16-307. The district court 
conducted its own inquiry and determined the index card was only part of the 
information. The rest of the index was in the clerk's computer. We are in favor 
of modern methods of keeping records, such as the computer index at issue here. 
However, variation from the statutory requirements of indexing must meet the 
minimum requirements of the statute unless the legislature authorizes 
alternative methods for maintaining the index, or the method actually in use 
(e.g., computer storage) is made readily and plainly available to the public and 
operates in such a manner as to fully comply with the governing 
statutes.

[¶11]   The record does not establish that 
the computer information was available to the public in general or, 
specifically, to Woodral. The district court did take judicial notice that the 
index card itself, the document to which the public has immediate access, 
contained only the page of the journal where the judgment is entered and a 
reference to the civil action which resulted in that judgment. The district 
court also researched the clerk's computer file and found the statutorily 
required information to be available in the computer. However, this judicially 
noticed "evidence" does not satisfy the obvious concern as to whether Woodral 
had meaningful access to this same data. We are not informed by the record what 
efforts are made to assist a lay person to further research the computer index. 
Absent such record information, we can only conclude that Woodral looked in the 
right place but the statutorily required information was not available. Had the 
clerk testified that all members of the public who make inquiry about the index 
(not just attorneys) are informed how the index works and that statutorily 
required information is available upon simple request, we would reach a 
different result. In essence, we place the burden of satisfying the information 
supplying requirements of W.S. 1-16-307 upon the clerk and not upon the 
citizenry. For example, if the index card contained a notation that the clerk 
will, upon request, provide the complete data by computer printout meeting the 
requirements of W.S. 1-16-307, that would be sufficient.

[¶12]   Recognizing that strict compliance 
with these statutes is required, we hold that, under the peculiar circumstances 
of this case, Woodral became a bona fide purchaser without notice of the Credit 
Bureau's lien when he recorded his deed to Hite's property. See Kimbel v. 
Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279, 287, 158 
A.L.R. 1079 (1945); 10A George W. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of 
Real Property § 5307 (1957).

[¶13]   The record reflects Woodral was 
represented by counsel who was serving him on a pro bono basis in the latter 
stages of this case. The issue of Woodral's homestead rights was not raised by 
counsel or the district court. It is an issue of significant concern in this 
case (see fn. 1). Because we have held the Credit Bureau's judgment lien does 
not have priority over Woodral's quitclaim deed from Hite, we need not discuss 
this issue further.

[¶14]   We hold the district court erred in 
denying Woodral's motion to set aside the entry of default and remand to the 
district court with directions to set aside the default and enter judgment 
reflecting that Woodral's quitclaim deed to the Hite real property has priority 
over the Credit Bureau's judgment.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

FOOTNOTES

1  § 
1-20-101. Homestead exemption; right and amount.

Every resident of the state 
is entitled to a homestead not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in 
value, exempt from execution and attachment arising from any debt, contract or 
civil obligation entered into or incurred.

Also see Wambeke v. Hopkin, 
372 P.2d 470 
(Wyo. 1962) and Altman v. Schuneman, 39 
Wyo. 414, 273 P. 173, 175 
(1929).

2  § 
1-17-302. When lien attaches to property; generally.

The lands and tenements 
within the county in which judgment is entered are bound for the satisfaction 
thereof from the first day of the term at which judgment is rendered, but 
judgments by confession and judgments rendered at the same term in which the 
action is commenced shall bind the lands only from the day on which the 
judgments are rendered. All other lands as well as goods and chattels of the 
debtor are bound from the time they are seized in 
execution.

3  § 
1-16-307. Index to judgments.

(a) The clerk shall keep an 
index, direct and reverse, of all judgments, by the names of parties 
alphabetically arranged showing in separate columns the 
following:

(i) The name of the 
judgment debtor;

(ii) The name of the 
judgment creditor;

(iii) The amount of the 
judgment and the year and term when it was rendered;

(iv) The page of the 
journal on which it is entered;

(v) The volume and page of 
the final record;

(vi) The number of the 
suit;

(vii) The number and time 
of issue of the execution and satisfaction thereof when satisfaction has been 
made.

[NOTE: This statute has 
been subsequently amended.]

4  § 
1-16-301. Judgments and orders to be entered in journal; recordation where real 
property affected.

All judgments and orders 
must be entered in the journal of the court and specify clearly the relief 
granted or order made in the action. When a judgment or order is made 
determining any matter affecting the title to real property, a certified copy of 
the judgment or order shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the 
county in which the property is situate.

[NOTE: This statute has 
been subsequently amended.]