Title: St. Louis County vs. River Bend Estates Homeowners' Association

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, 
      ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
      ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
      )    No.  SC92470 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ) 
RIVER BEND ESTATES   
 
      ) 
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ) 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
      )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Ellen H. Ribaudo, Judge 
 
Opinion issued September 10, 2013 
 
St. Louis County appeals a judgment that awarded the property owners damages 
for the county’s taking of their real property by eminent domain.  St. Louis County 
claims that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded because the record 
of the jury trial on the property owners’ exceptions to the condemnation commissioners’ 
report is inadequate for appellate review as portions of the trial proceedings were 
inaudible or not recorded.  It also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in its 
evidentiary rulings by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial testimony while excluding 
rebuttal testimony and evidence of an owner’s opinion as to the value of the property.  
In addition, the county claims that the jury verdict was excessive and unsupported by 
the evidence.  Lastly, the county challenges the trial court’s award of heritage value 
because it claims that the statutes authorizing and implementing an award of heritage 
value violate article I, section 26; article III, section 38(a); and, article VI, sections 23 
and 25 of the Missouri Constitution.   
The record is sufficient for this Court to rule on the claims on appeal with 
confidence.  Regarding the county’s claims, this Court finds that any errors in the trial 
court’s evidentiary rulings are either not preserved or not prejudicial.  This Court also 
finds that the jury verdict was not excessive so as to require a new trial.  Finally, this 
Court finds that the heritage value statutes are constitutionally valid.  Therefore, the 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Facts and Procedure 
 
St. Louis County determined that it was necessary to condemn 15 acres of real 
property located at 1653 Creve Coeur Mill Road in Chesterfield for the Page/Olive 
connector of the Highway 141 extension project.  The 15-acre tract was deeded to 
Arthur Novel in 1904.  While Arthur and his wife, Stella, lived on the property and 
operated it as a farm until their deaths, it had been vacant since 1968, and there is 
currently no house on the property.  On the date of the taking, the property was heavily 
wooded with a creek, steep bluff, and sloping terrain.  
 
St. Louis County filed its petition in condemnation in the circuit court of St. 
Louis County on December 22, 2009, with Arthur and Stella’s descendants and their 
spouses as defendants.1  On February 11, 2010, the trial court entered an order of 
                                             
 
1 Arthur and Stella Novel’s descendants and their spouses are defendants in this action 
because of their interest in the 15-acre tract.  They are collectively referred to as “the 
Novels.” 
 
3
                                             
condemnation, authorizing the acquisition of the property.  Because the property owners 
and the city were unable to agree on the proper compensation, the trial court appointed 
three commissioners who held a hearing and filed a report.  The condemnation 
commissioners awarded the Novels $320,000 as damages for the acquisition of the 
property.  The Novels filed exceptions to the commissioners’ award and requested a 
jury trial.   
Prior to the jury trial, the commissioners filed an amended report with the finding 
that the Novels had owned the property for more than 50 years.  The Novels then filed a 
motion for assessment of “heritage value,” pursuant to sections 523.061 and 523.039.2  
The trial court sustained the motion and awarded heritage value in the amount of 
$160,000, resulting in a total award of $480,000.   
 
The Novels’ exceptions to the commissioners’ report were tried by a jury from 
December 12 to December 15, 2011.  After hearing the evidence, the jury assessed 
damages for the Novels in the amount of $1.3 million.  The Novels then filed a motion 
for assessment of heritage value and entry of judgment.  The trial court sustained the 
Novels’ motion over the county’s objections that the statutes defining “heritage value” 
and governing its assessment were constitutionally invalid.  The court added $650,000 
for heritage value to the jury’s verdict and assessed interest under section 523.045.  The 
county filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. 
 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2012. 
 
 
4
The county appeals.  Because three of its claims challenge the constitutional 
validity of sections 523.039 and 523.061, the statutes authorizing an award of heritage 
value when the property has been owned by one family for 50 or more years, this Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.   
I. Incomplete Transcript Does not Require a New Trial 
 
In its first point, St. Louis County claims the trial court erred in failing to provide 
a complete record of the trial proceeding because the transcript of the electronic 
recording includes portions that are inaudible or omitted.   Specifically, when the county 
received the transcript it had ordered, there were nine unrecorded bench conferences 
regarding objections and 146 instances of an inaudible word or words.  St. Louis County 
argues that there cannot be meaningful review on appeal without a full and complete 
transcript of the trial proceedings.   
Without a transcript, appellate courts “lack the necessary information to rule with 
any degree of confidence in the fairness, reasonableness and accuracy of our final 
conclusion.”  Dale v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., Family Support & Children’s Div., 
285 S.W.3d 770, 772 (Mo. App. 2009).  Consequently, an incomplete record on appeal 
warrants reversal if the appellant can demonstrate that (1) due diligence was employed 
in an attempt to correct the shortcomings and (2) the incomplete nature of the record 
 
5
                                             
prejudiced him.  Skillicorn v. State, 22 S.W.3d 678, 688 (Mo. banc 2000); State v. 
Borden, 605 S.W.2d 88, 91-92 (Mo. banc 1980).3  
The county claims that it was prejudiced on appeal by the failure to record nine 
bench conferences because the recording device was not running when objections were 
raised and argued at the bench.  The trial court’s relocation of the bench microphone 
during bench conferences created the impression that the discussions at the bench were 
being recorded, and the court and the attorneys operated as if making a record of 
objections and arguments.  To ameliorate the impact of the lack of a record of the bench 
conferences, the parties have filed a stipulation reconstructing the substance of the 
bench conferences.  The parties’ stipulation eliminates any prejudice the missing record 
could have caused. 
The county also asserts that it was prejudiced by the inaudible parts in the 
transcript.  In its reply brief, the county identified the inaudible parts of the transcript 
that it claims are material to particular claims of error and hinders its ability to address 
 
3 While the requirement of due diligence to correct any shortcomings in the record 
previously has been applied by this Court in criminal cases, it is equally applicable to 
civil cases because the due diligence requirement stems from Rule 81.12(a), which 
requires an appellant to cause a transcript of proceedings to be prepared and filed with 
the clerk of the appropriate appellate court.  State v. Borden, 605 S.W.2d at 91-92 
(noting that Rule 81.12(a) was made applicable to criminal cases by Rule 28.18, 1979 
Rules, now Rule 30.04(c) and (d)).  This Court, in Borden, held that an appellant does 
not discharge the appellant’s duty by filing an incomplete transcript with the clerk but 
must “attempt to obtain by stipulation or motion the substance of the missing testimony 
or argument,” and, if unable to supply the omission or correct the record, show that the 
omissions were prejudicial. 605 S.W.2d at 91-92. 
 
 
 
6
the issues on appeal.  However, it fails to demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in 
an attempt to correct the inaudible parts.  The county also fails to show how the 
inaudible word or words are, in fact, material.  For example, the county asserts that 
inaudible words in the Novels’ closing argument precluded the county from effectively 
demonstrating the extent to which the Novels utilized improper inflammatory and 
prejudicial language.  In making that argument, it references six parts of the transcript.  
No objection was made to five statements by the Novels’ attorney that contain an 
inaudible word or words, which the county now claims were improper closing 
argument.  In the only identified instance in which a timely objection was made, the 
county claimed the Novels’ attorney improperly characterized the issues in closing 
arguments.  In that section of the transcript, there are no inaudible words.  
During oral arguments, the county clarified that there is not any specific item 
missing from the transcript that has caused it prejudice but, rather, that the “cumulative 
effect” of the inaudible portions of the transcript causes it prejudice and precludes 
meaningful review.  However, there is no cumulative effect that is sufficient to 
demonstrate prejudice.  While many words in the transcript are inaudible, the substance 
of the witnesses’ testimony and the statements made by the attorneys and trial court is 
apparent from the context of the inaudible word or words.  Contrary to the county’s 
claim, the inaudible words or phrases are not of key testimony or argument and are not 
material to the issues raised by the county’s claims of error.   
The county has failed to demonstrate how the omitted portions of the transcript – 
the unrecorded bench conferences and the inaudible words – prejudice it, either in a 
 
7
single instance or cumulatively.  Without a showing of prejudice, the omitted portions 
of the transcript do not impede this Court from ruling with confidence on the fairness, 
reasonableness, and accuracy of the trial court’s final decision concerning the points of 
the county’s appeal.  The incompleteness of the record does not warrant reversal of the 
judgment and remand for a new trial.  Skillicorn, 22 S.W.3d at 688. 
II. Evidentiary Rulings Not an Abuse of Discretion 
In four of its points relied on, St. Louis County claims error in the trial court’s 
evidentiary rulings.  Generally, a trial court has considerable discretion in admitting or 
excluding evidence.  Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Mo. banc 2011).  
This Court gives deference to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and will reverse the 
trial court’s decision about the admission or exclusion of evidence only if the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion.  Kansas City v. Keene Corp., 855 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Mo. 
banc 1993).  When reviewing for an “abuse of discretion,” this Court presumes the trial 
court’s ruling is correct and reverses only when the ruling “is clearly against the logic of 
the circumstance, is arbitrary and unreasonable, and indicates a lack of careful 
consideration.”  State ex rel. McKeage v. Cordonnier, 357 S.W.3d 597, 599 (Mo. banc 
2012) (quoting Green v. Fred Weber, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Mo. banc 2008)).  “If 
reasonable persons can differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s action, then it cannot 
be said that the trial court abused its discretion.”  In re Care and Treatment of 
Donaldson, 214 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Mo. banc 2007). 
 
 
 
8
                                             
A.  Evidence of Unwillingness to Sell and Heritage Value 
The first evidentiary error claimed by the county is that the trial court improperly 
allowed the Novels’ testimony of their personal attachment to the property and the 
forced nature of the property’s acquisition by the county, claiming this evidence 
inflamed and prejudiced the jury against it.  The county asserts that the Novels were 
entitled only to compensation for the fair market value of their property, noting that the 
legal definition of “fair market value” is “what a reasonable buyer would give who was 
willing but did not have to purchase, and what a seller would take who was willing but 
did not have to sell.”  City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Constr. Co., 394 S.W.2d 300, 
305 (Mo. 1965).  A sentimental attachment or an unwillingness to sell is not a 
consideration in determining fair market value.  See section 523.001.1 (“[T]he value of 
the property taken after considering comparable sales in the area, capitalization of 
income, and replacement cost less depreciation, singularly or in combination, as 
appropriate, and additionally considering the value of the property based upon its 
highest and best use, using generally accepted appraisal practices.”).  The county states 
that prejudice from the error in admitting evidence of the Novels’ sentimental 
attachment to and unwillingness to sell the property was exacerbated by the trial court’s 
exclusion of evidence informing the jury that heritage value would be added to the 
amount of the jury’s verdict.4  
 
4 The Novels ask this Court to deny any claim of error in this point relied on because 
they claim it is unclear whether the county is claiming error for the admission of 
evidence as to the Novels’ attachment to the property and unwillingness to sell or for 
 
9
                                                                                                                                               
The county identifies seven places in the transcript where it claims that Derek 
Novel or other witnesses inappropriately testified of the Novels’ attachment to the 
property or their unwillingness to sell.  It also references six statements in closing 
arguments when counsel for the Novels stated that the property was taken by eminent 
domain and that the Novels did not willingly sell the property but were forced to sell at 
a time when prices had not recovered from the recession.  The county claims these 
statements exacerbated the prejudice from the improper admission of evidence.  
The county failed to preserve any of its claims of error regarding the admission 
of evidence of the Novels’ attachment to the property and their unwillingness to sell.  In 
the 13 references the county makes to the transcript in this point, it only objected once, 
pertaining to the Novels’ criticism of a comparable sale used by the county’s expert to 
arrive at his value for the property.  The county did not object to any of the testimony it 
claims the trial court erroneously admitted regarding the Novels’ attachment to the 
property or unwillingness to sell.5  In fact, the county elicited some of the testimony it 
claims was erroneously admitted.6   
 
the exclusion of evidence of the heritage value statutes or for both.  The county clarified 
in its reply brief that it was claiming error only in the admission of evidence of the 
Novel’s attachment to and unwillingness to sell their property.  It clarifies that the 
discussion of the exclusion of evidence of the addition of heritage value “highlights the 
prejudice” to the county.   
5 The county claims it objected to the testimony of Ernest Demba, the Novels’ appraiser, 
because Mr. Dembra referenced the Novels’ history with the property while 
emphasizing its sentimentality.  The county claims that the trial court overruled its 
objection at an unrecorded bench conference and, thereafter, Mr. Demba was permitted 
to testify about the history of the family’s property in such a manner as to invoke 
sympathy for the Novels and bias against the county.  The transcript of Mr. Demba’s 
 
10
                                                                                                                                               
A party may not complain on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence if the complaining party was the first to admit evidence of that type.  See 
Union Elec. Co. v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 258 S.W.2d 48, 57 (Mo. banc 2008); 
see also State v. Mickle, 164 S.W.3d 33, 57 (Mo. App. 2005); Bowls v. Scarborough, 
950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo. App. 1997); Anderson v. Rojanasathit, 714 S.W.2d 894, 896 
(Mo. App. 1986). “To properly preserve a challenge to the admission of evidence, the 
objecting party must make a specific objection to the evidence at the time of its 
attempted admission.”  Mickle, 164 S.W.3d at 55; see also State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 
584, 592 (Mo. banc 1992); Bowls, 950 S.W.2d at 702 (“In order to preserve any error in 
this regard, Appellants were required to await an attempt by Respondents to introduce 
evidence of the conversation and to object at that time.”); Anderson, 714 S.W.2d at 896 
 
testimony contradicts the county’s characterization of Mr. Demba’s testimony after the 
objection.  After the unrecorded side bar, Mr. Demba testified regarding how the Novel 
family accessed their home in the back of the property.  He then was asked how long the 
property had been in the family and responded since 1904, which was more than 100 
years.  Mr. Demba merely was testifying about facts regarding the length of time the 
family owned the property, and his testimony of the history was not given in such a 
manner to generate sympathy for the Novels and bias against the county.  
6 The county attempts to excuse its failure to object by stating that some of the 
objectionable statements actually were contained in questions posed by the Novels’ 
counsel, so an objection would have done little to correct or mitigate the damage that 
was done.  This argument does not aid the county because failing to object to improper 
questions also fails to preserve anything for appeal.  See Perkins v. Kroger Co., 592 
S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Mo. App. 1979) (stating that it is the duty of the party to object to 
the form of a question and point out how it is erroneous if that party desires to preserve 
that question for appeal).  The county then seeks plain error review.  Plain error review 
rarely is granted in civil cases, and there is no circumstance warranting plain error 
review in this case.  Goltz v. Masten, 333 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Mo. App. 2011). 
 
 
 
11
(“Nor can a plaintiff claim error for the admission of his own evidence. Plaintiffs' 
remedy was to resist and preserve error on matters considered in the ruling on the 
motion in limine, if any.”).  
Additionally, the county did not object to or raise a separate claim of error for 
any of the references in closing arguments to the Novels’ forced sale of the property at 
an economically bad time.  The county’s failure to preserve its claims of error precludes 
review of any claim that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Novels’ 
attachment to the property and unwillingness to sell.  Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 
P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 97 n.14 (Mo. banc 2010) (finding that failure to object to evidence 
as it is admitted at trial does not preserve that issue for appellate review).   
Within this point, the county also asserts that the trial court compounded its error 
by refusing to let the jury know that the Novels would, in fact, be receiving additional 
compensation of 50 percent of any jury award to compensate them for the “heritage 
value” of the property.  Because this Court has found there was no error in the 
admission of the evidence, there was no exacerbation of error.  Additionally, when the 
jury has found that the property was owned by the same family for 50 or more years, the 
judge computes heritage value as 50 percent of the amount the jury found to be the fair 
market value of the condemned property.  Sections 523.001(2) and 523.061; State ex 
rel. White Family P’ship v. Roldan, 271 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Mo. banc 2008).  The 
definition of “fair market value” permits the jury to consider only the “value of the 
property . . . based upon its highest and best use . . . .”  Sections 523.001(1) & 
523.039(1).  Consequently, the heritage value statute was irrelevant to the jury’s given 
 
12
task of determining the fair market value of the property.  The trial court, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the statute. 
B.  Mr. Novel’s Previous Statement at Commissioners’ Hearing 
The county contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that, during 
the commissioners’ hearing, Mr. Novel stated his opinion that the value of the Novels’ 
15 acres was $496,000.  It claims this statement was admissible as an admission against 
a party’s interest and to impeach Mr. Novel’s testimony at trial that he never had an 
opinion about the value of the property.   
The trial court excluded evidence of the statement Mr. Novel made at the 
commissioners’ hearing, finding that Mr. Novel was not stating his opinion of the value 
of the property but, instead, was stating the amount he would have taken to settle the 
case in his settlement negotiations with the county.  Because the trial court found that 
Mr. Novel had not made a statement of his opinion about the value of the property, the 
statement was neither a statement against his interest nor a statement inconsistent with 
his trial testimony that he never had an opinion of the property’s value. 
The county points to testimony by Mr. Novel when he was cross-examined at 
trial regarding whether he had an opinion as to the value of the 15 acres.  Specifically, 
the questions asked and the answers Mr. Novel gave were as follows: 
Q: 
All right.  We started to talk about this yesterday.  Do you have 
today an opinion of the value what the property is worth? 
A: 
No, I do not.  I’m not an appraiser or an engineer, so I would have, 
from a laymen’s point of view would not have a way to determine 
the value of the property. 
Q: 
Did you at any other time have an opinion of value as to the 
property? 
 
13
                                             
A: 
No, I did not. 
 
After Mr. Novel made these statements, the county sought to cross-examine him 
regarding whether he previously had testified at the commissioners’ hearing that his 
opinion as to the value of the 15 acres was that it was worth $496,000 – $800,746 less 
than the testimony of the Novels’ appraiser at trial.  Upon the Novels’ objection to the 
question, the trial court heard counsel’s argument outside the presence of the jury.  In 
addition to the argument of counsel, the trial court considered evidence regarding 
whether Mr. Novel’s statement at the commissioners’ hearing was a statement of value 
and, if so, whether it was admissible as a party’s statement against interest or a prior 
inconsistent statement of a witness.7  In particular, the trial court reviewed the 
deposition testimony of James Herries, an employee of St. Louis County who acted as 
its negotiator with the Novels.  Mr. Herries’ testimony was that he, and possibly other 
county negotiators, came to a tentative agreement with Mr. Novel during settlement 
negotiations that the Novels would be paid $496,000 as their damages for the taking of 
 
7 Evidence of a commissioners’ award may be objectionable, ostensibly under grounds 
that it would be both irrelevant and prejudicial.  See State ex rel. Mo. Highway & 
Transp. Comm’n v. Sisk, 954 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo. App. 1997); State ex rel. County of 
St. Charles v. Latham, 868 S.W.2d 177, 181-82 (Mo. App. 1994).  Nevertheless, 
inconsistent statements made during a condemnation commissioner’s hearing are 
permissible under the general admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.    E.g., Sisk, 
954 S.W.2d at 510.  In addition, it appears that an admission against interest would be 
admissible under the same reasoning.  “Admissions against interest are those made by a 
party to the litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such 
party, and admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.”  Carpenter 
v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Mo. banc 1968). 
 
 
14
                                             
the 15 acres.8  When the county would not agree to pay the negotiated figure, no 
settlement was reached, and there was a hearing before the three commissioners 
appointed by the trial court.   
There was no official record of the commissioners’ hearing.  Consequently,       
Mr. Herries was asked about Mr. Novel’s testimony before the commissioners in his 
deposition.  After the trial court reviewed Mr. Herries’ deposition testimony and heard 
argument of counsel, the court sustained the Novels’ objection to questions to            
Mr. Novel about his statements in the commissioners’ hearing.   
Later during trial, the county made an offer of proof.  Its offer of proof was not 
Mr. Novel’s response to its questions but rather was testimony from Mr. Herries.         
Mr. Herries was asked by counsel for the county whether he ever heard an expression of 
the value of the property other than in settlement negotiations or an offer or demand.  
He responded affirmatively and then testified that Mr. Novel stated the value was 
$496,000 to non-county employees outside the context of any settlement or offer.  The 
trial court asked what words Mr. Novel used, and Mr. Herries responded, “That I’ll 
settle for 496,000,” and confirmed that this statement was made during Mr. Novel’s 
testimony at the commissioners’ hearing.   The court then asked what question elicited 
this response from Mr. Novel.  Mr. Herries answered, “What I can remember is that the 
commissioners requested a settlement or what he thought the value was worth or what 
 
8 Mr. Novel acted on behalf of the rest of his relatives during settlement negotiations 
with the county. 
  
 
15
the property was worth.”  When the court completed its questioning of Mr. Herries, 
counsel for the county asked Mr. Herries whether the commissioners specifically asked 
what Mr. Novel’s opinion of value was.  Mr. Herries answered that they did, and stated 
that Mr. Novel responded to their question with $496,000.   
When the trial reconvened the next morning, the county filed with the trial court 
its written Plaintiff’s Response to Motion in Limine, setting out cases to support its 
argument that statements made in a commissioners’ hearing may be admitted at trial for 
impeachment purposes so long as there is no reference to the commissioners’ hearing or 
the commissioners’ award.  The court then stated on the record that it found there was 
not an inconsistent statement because it did not believe that Mr. Novel stated his 
opinion of the value of the property while he was testifying before the commission.  
Rather, according to the court, it “believe[d] that the number that was given at the 
commissioner’s hearing at $496,000 was not representative as a number of what         
[Mr. Novel] believes the fair market value of the property was, but what he was willing 
to settle for after extended negotiations between the two sides with regards to numbers.”     
In light of this finding by the trial court, the county’s claim that the trial court 
erred in not admitting Mr. Novel’s prior inconsistent statement fails.  The trial court is 
free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of Mr. Herries.  Sch. Dist. of Kansas 
City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 612 (Mo. banc 2010).  The record, in the light most 
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports a finding that Mr. Novel was asked his 
opinion regarding his position on settlement and that he responded with the amount for 
which he would he would have settled during his negotiations with the county.  Because 
 
16
the trial court did not believe that Mr. Novel stated his opinion about the value of the 
property while testifying at the commissioners’ hearing, there was no prior inconsistent 
statement with which to impeach him.   
Nor did the trial court err in not admitting the evidence of Mr. Novel’s statement 
as an admission against interest.  While an out-of-court statement that is an admission 
against interest might be an exception to the hearsay rule, offers of settlement are 
inadmissible.  Negotiations for the peaceful settlement of disputes are encouraged under 
the law.  Hancock v. Shook, 100 S.W.3d 786, 799 (Mo. banc 2003); State ex rel. State 
Highway Comm’n v. Sheets, 483 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Mo. App. 1972).  “If offers of 
settlement were admitted in evidence, they would have the natural tendency with the 
jury to denigrate the defense position at trial.  No one would make such offers if the risk 
of their being before the jury were a necessary corollary of the offer.”  J.A. Tobin Const. 
Co. v. State Highway Comm’n of Missouri, 697 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Mo. App. 1985).  The 
policy rationale behind the rule excluding evidence of settlement negotiations requires 
that “statements made with a clear purpose to resolve the existing dispute . . . be 
protected, even though uttered outside the negotiating arena.”  2 C. Mueller & L. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:58 (3d ed. 2007).  The trial court was free to 
conclude that Mr. Novel’s response to the commissioners’ question was a statement of 
his position during settlement negotiations and not a statement of his opinion about the 
value of the 15 acres.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
evidence of Mr. Novel’s statement. 
  
 
17
C.  Mr. Demba’s Testimony Regarding County’s Comparable Sale and 
 Rebuttal Testimony 
 
 
In its next claim of error, the county asserts the trial court erred in admitting 
speculative testimony by Ernest Demba, the Novels’ appraiser and expert witness who 
testified regarding his opinion about the value of the 15 acres.  The county claims that 
the trial court erroneously admitted Mr. Demba’s speculative testimony regarding the 
Terra Vista subdivision, a comparable sale used by one of the county’s appraisers.  It 
further claims the prejudice resulting from Mr. Demba’s testimony was exacerbated 
when the court again erred in excluding rebuttal testimony from its appraiser, Jeff 
Gonterman, under the “project influence” doctrine.  The county argues that                
Mr. Gonterman’s testimony was admissible to rebut Mr. Demba’s testimony 
disparaging one of the comparable sales used by Mr. Gonterman.   
 
When testifying as an expert witness who appraised the 15 acres for the Novels, 
Mr. Demba stated that he utilized the comparable sales approach to determine a value 
for the property.  He testified that the highest and best use of the property was for 
residential villa development because there are villa developments on adjacent 
properties, Mill Ridge and Terra Vista.  Mr. Demba testified extensively about the Mill 
Ridge and Terra Vista properties and the history of their development as villas.  
Regarding the history of the development of Terra Vista villas, he testified that           
Mr. Walsh, the owner who sold the property to the developer, retained some property 
for his personal residence and negotiated for improvements to the property he retained 
as partial compensation for the sale.  He also testified that he talked with Mr. Walsh and 
 
18
that Mr. Walsh sold the property to the developer unaware that there were changes in 
the designation of part of the property from floodway, which cannot be developed, to 
floodplain, which may be developed if the property meets certain specifications. 
 
During further questioning by the Novels’ counsel, Mr. Demba testified that he 
did not use the sale of the Walsh property that was developed as the Terra Vista villas as 
one of his three comparable sales.  The Terra Vista property was sold by Mr. Walsh for 
a much lower price, 30 cents per square foot, than Mr. Demba’s valuation of the 15 
acres, $2 per square foot.  Mr. Demba stated that he did not consider the Terra Vista 
property a comparable sale because “the sale at 30 cents . . . was not a true money 
consideration” as Mr. Walsh received consideration other than money and, when        
Mr. Walsh sold the property, he was under the impression that it could not be 
developed.  He stated that Mr. Walsh was not a knowledgeable seller, which is a 
requirement for fair market value.    
 
During its cross-examination of Mr. Demba, the county questioned him at length 
regarding his statement that “certain information leaked out to the developer for Terra 
Vista.”  According to Mr. Demba, this information advised the developer, who was 
involved in the real estate market in the area, about the study that eventually resulted in 
changing the designation of the property from floodway to floodplain.  The county also 
questioned him about the federal government’s process of changing the designations of 
property and whether those changes had been finalized during the relevant time for the 
Walsh sale.   
 
19
 
The county did not object to any of Mr. Demba’s testimony that it now 
challenges.  In fact, as noted, the county elicited some of the testimony it challenges.  
Consequently, the county has not preserved for review any error in the admissibility of 
that testimony from Mr. Demba.  McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 830 (Mo. banc 
1995) (“A party who fails to object to testimony at trial fails to preserve the issue for 
appellate review.”); Alvey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. 1962), 
(finding that a party cannot object to the admission of evidence that is the same as 
evidence it has introduced).   
 
Regarding the county’s claim that the trial court improperly excluded testimony 
from Mr. Gonterman, the county’s appraiser, which was intended to rebut Mr. Demba’s 
testimony, the claim of error lacks merit.  During the county’s direct examination of   
Mr. Gonterman, he was questioned about Mr. Walsh’s sale of the property on which the 
Terra Vista villas were developed.  He testified that he had talked with Mr. Walsh and 
expressed his opinion that “Mr. Walsh seemed to be a very savvy or educated property 
owner.”  When asked why he had this opinion, Mr. Gonterman discussed the conditions 
under which Mr. Walsh sold the property to the developer of the Terra Vista villas.  The 
county then asked Mr. Gonterman whether Mr. Walsh still lived on the property he 
retained when he sold property to the developer of the Terra Vista villas.                    
Mr. Gonterman testified that Mr. Walsh had sold the property to another developer 
“who acquired the property hoping to get, [he guessed], bidding or be involved in the 
construction or be part of the construction for the Page/Olive connector . . . .”  
 
20
When the county inquired about the price that Mr. Walsh had received when he 
sold the property he retained for his residence, the Novels objected that the purchase 
price was irrelevant.  Counsel for the parties then were invited to approach the bench.  
The exchange between the parties and the judge was held off the record and, although 
the judge’s ruling was not in the trial transcripts, both parties agree that the judge 
sustained the Novels’ motion excluding testimony regarding that price.   
The county claims that the ground on which the trial court excluded                   
Mr. Gonterman’s testimony was the “project influence” doctrine.  This objection would 
be a different one than the relevance objection made before counsel were called to the 
bench.  Nevertheless, this evidence was properly excluded on either ground.  First, the 
evidence of the sale of Mr. Walsh’s personal residence occurred years after his sale of 
the property to the developer of the Terra Vista villas, under different circumstances that 
involved different considerations – no conditions of sale other than the payment of 
money, a different real estate market, different participants, and the potential for 
condemnation.  For the evidence of the sale price of Mr. Walsh’s residence to be 
admissible, it must have been both logically and legally relevant.  Conley v. Kaney, 250 
S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1952).  While the price Mr. Walsh negotiated for the sale of his 
residence might have some logical relevance to show his sophistication at the time he 
sold the Terra Vista villas property, the fact that years had passed between the two sales 
and that the sales occurred under different conditions make the logical relevance of the 
evidence insignificant.  Regarding legal relevance, the limited probative value of       
 
21
Mr. Walsh’s property does not outweigh the possibility that the evidence of a non-
comparable sale would be confusing to the jury.   
Additionally, under the “project influence” doctrine, juries are prohibited from 
“consider[ing] either enhancements or depreciation brought about by the construction of 
[an] improvement for which the property is being taken.  In other words, the value 
should be determined independent of [any] proposed improvement.”  St. Louis Elec. 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. MacAdaras, 166 S.W. 307, 310 (Mo. banc 1914).  Under this 
doctrine, Missouri courts may exclude evidence of sales that are influenced by the 
project for which a property is being acquired.  Quality Heights Redevelopment v. 
Urban Pioneers, 799 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. App. 1990).   
 
In this case, the record shows that the purchase price the county wished to admit 
into evidence was influenced by the same public project as the Novels’ 15 acres.  The 
county argues that “[t]here was no evidence suggesting that the purchase price and 
terms of the sale of the home had anything to do with the ‘proposed improvements,’ the 
highway, thus the project influence doctrine would simply not apply.”  This argument is 
refuted in the record by the testimony of the county’s own witness.  As noted 
previously, before Mr. Gonterman was asked the purchase price of Mr. Walsh’s sale of 
his residence, Mr. Gonterman testified that the property also was “involved in the 
eminent domain [sic]” and that its buyers hoped to “be part of the construction” of the 
highway project.  Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by excluding this portion of Mr. Gonterman’s testimony. 
  
 
22
D.  Testimony of County’s Expert Witnesses Concerning Potential 
 Development 
 
In its fourth evidentiary issue, the county claims the court erred in excluding 
testimony from two witnesses employed by the city of Chesterfield, the municipality in 
which the 15 acres is located, regarding obstacles to the development of the subject 
property.  The county claims that this testimony was needed to rebut testimony given by 
Mr. Demba and Dan Wind, a civil engineer who was retained as an expert witness by 
the Novels.  The targeted testimony dealt with the number of villas that could be 
developed on the 15 acres and Mr. Demba’s and Mr. Wind’s efforts to discount the 
complexity of the development issues and the review process for approval of a villa 
development project.     
In this claim of error, the county does not assert that the trial court erred in 
admitting the testimony of Mr. Wind and Mr. Demba.  The only error asserted is that 
the trial court erred in not permitting two witnesses it called to testify concerning the 
effect that the development challenges would have on the value of the 15 acres.  The 
witnesses were Jeff Paskiewicz, a civil engineer in the city public works department 
who managed capital improvement projects for Chesterfield, and Aimee Nassif, city 
planning and development director for Chesterfield.   
The county first claims that the trial court erroneously granted the Novels’ 
motion in limine and prohibited Mr. Paskiewicz from testifying with respect to the 
development of the 15 acres and the potential development problems associated 
therewith.  In their motion in limine, the Novels stated that, prior to trial, the county had 
 
23
identified Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif as “non-retained witnesses.”  The motion 
alleged that both witnesses were deposed, that Ms. Nassif indicated at her deposition 
that she would expect to testify as to the potential for rezoning the 15 acres, and that   
Mr. Paskiewicz stated that he may testify about the probability of whether the 15 acres 
would receive a “map revision” regarding flooding risk.  The Novels then objected to 
testimony from the two witnesses “as to how the City would or would not act with 
regard to [the 15 acres],” citing State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation 
Commission v. Gannon, for the principle that “a member of the government 
organization making rezoning decisions . . . should not give an opinion on something 
which has yet to come before that decisional body.”  898 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Mo. App. 
1995).  When addressing this motion in limine, the trial court stated that it agreed that 
these Chesterfield employees could not testify about their opinion as to what actions 
Chesterfield would take regarding the development of the 15 acres because the 
employees do not have authority to speak for the city council.   
Prior to Mr. Paskiewicz being called as a witness for the county, counsel for the 
county asked to approach the bench.  The side bar with the trial court was not recorded, 
but the county has filed with this Court a stipulation in which the parties agree that the 
trial court granted the Novels’ motion in limine to limit the testimony of the county’s 
non-retained experts, Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif.  When the county began the direct 
examination of Mr. Paskiewicz, the Novels objected to any opinion testimony regarding 
development of the subject property because Mr. Paskiewicz was a non-retained expert 
witness.  The county countered with the argument that its expert witnesses had the 
 
24
knowledge and expertise to testify as to Chesterfield’s requirements for development 
and the possible challenges to such development and that their testimony was 
admissible.  The court ruled that the testimony of such experts be limited to general 
application of Chesterfield’s development requirements, prohibiting any specific 
application to development of the subject property.   
After this ruling, Mr. Paskiewicz testified at great length.  He testified about 
levee districts and maps depicting flood risk areas as well as how the maps are created, 
drafted and maintained. He also testified as to his review and approval of the Terra 
Vista and Mill Ridge developments, the general process of approving improvements to 
a property to remove it from the limitations of a floodplain designation, challenges the 
Terra Vista and Mill Ridge developments faced, and the Chesterfield ordinances 
governing floodplain management and development in Chesterfield.  While               
Mr. Paskiewicz testified about his familiarity with the location of the Novels’ property 
on a map, no questions were asked of Mr. Paskiewicz or objections made regarding the 
specific development of the 15 acres, the potential development problems associated 
therewith, or what action Chesterfield would take regarding the development of the 
property.  
Ms. Nassif testified that she was familiar with the Terra Vista and Mill Ridge 
subdivisions and the Novels’ property.  She testified about her involvement in the 
development of the Terra Vista property.  She described the planning process generally 
and how the Terra Vista property proceeded through the planning process.  She also 
testified regarding site specific ordinances and environmental restrictions and 
 
25
conditions.  She used the Terra Vista property as an example when she described the 
process of applying for a planned environment unit, which allows a developer to have 
different uses and flexibility in the design in exchange for preservation and protection of 
natural areas and topography on the development site.  She testified as to how the shape 
and terrain of a property impacts the density of its development.  She also testified that 
it was a difficult process to remove areas out of a floodplain and that there were 
requirements for open space; landscape, creek, and stream buffers; tree preservation; 
water quality; lighting; structure setbacks; parking; and sanitary and storm water sewers.  
No questions were asked of Ms. Nassif or objections made regarding the specific 
development of the 15 acres, the potential development problems associated therewith, 
or what action Chesterfield would take regarding the development of the property.   
The county intended to present the testimony of these experts to show how 
development challenges would impact the value of the 15 acres.  While the trial court 
sustained the Novels’ objection so that Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif were prevented 
from testifying about the 15 acres, the two witnesses testified extensively regarding 
general requirements, challenges, and risks associated with the development of property 
in a floodplain and floodway.  This testimony related directly to the challenges caused 
by land conditions that previously were identified by Mr. Demba and Mr. Wind as 
present on the 15 acres, including a creek running through the property, sloping terrain, 
and being designated within a floodway, floodplain, or wetlands.  Ms. Nassif testified, 
in particular, about the rigorous requirements for city approval to develop in a 
floodplain.  This evidence was clear rebuttal to the testimony of the Novels’ experts that 
 
26
                                             
it would not be difficult to get approval of the villa development plans or to construct a 
villa development on the 15 acres.9   
Nevertheless, the issue presented by the county’s claim is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by preventing the county from specifically asking these non-
retained experts about their opinions regarding the 15 acres.  Discovery rules distinguish 
between facts and opinions held by non-retained experts from those held by experts who 
acquired facts and developed opinions in anticipation of litigation.  See Rule 
56.01(b)(4),(5).  When asked in interrogatories, a party must disclose any expert witness 
it expects to provide testimony regarding facts known and opinions developed in 
anticipation of litigation.  Id. at 56.01(b)(4)(a).  Discovery rules also permit parties to 
compel their opponents “to state the general nature of the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify.”  Rule 56.01(b)(4)(a).  On the other hand, disclosure 
requirements for a non-retained witness are limited to their identity and their field of 
expertise.  Rule 56.01(b)(5).  Otherwise, any information that they provide is 
discoverable in the same manner as other lay witnesses.  Id.   
The discovery rules treat experts differently depending on the expected scope of 
their testimony.  To give advance notice to the opposing party and avoid unfair surprise, 
 
9 The county argues the Novels deposed Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif, so they were 
on notice of the evidence these non-retained experts would have given concerning how 
zoning and development issues would have affected the value of the 15 acres.  In the 
depositions, however, neither non-retained expert provided an opinion as to how the 
development issues would affect the value of the 15 acres, even after being invited to do 
so. 
 
 
27
Rule 56.01(b)(4) requires a party to disclose more information with respect to expert 
witnesses who acquired facts and have formed opinions in preparation for litigation.  
See State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. McDonald's Corp., 872 S.W.2d 
108, 113 (Mo. App. 1994).  “The purpose of the discovery rules is to take the surprise 
out of trials of cases so that all relevant facts and information pertaining to the action 
may be ascertained in advance of trial.”  State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631, 
636 (Mo. banc 1963); State ex rel. Plank v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Mo. banc 
1992) (“[R]ules relating to discovery were designed to eliminate, as far as possible, 
concealment and surprise in the trial of lawsuits . . . .”).   
Early in the litigation, the county identified Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif as 
non-retained expert witnesses, providing to the Novels only that information required by 
Rule 51.04(b)(5), namely, their names and titles with the city of Chesterfield.  
Additionally, the county did not ask them to prepare an opinion concerning the 15 acres 
for the purpose of this litigation.  However, the expert testimony the trial court excluded 
would have been developed in anticipation of the litigation.  During the Novels’ 
depositions of each of those experts, it became apparent that they had no involvement 
with the Novels’ property prior to their contact with the county.  For example,           
Mr. Paskiewicz testified that he was "[b]riefly" familiar with the area containing the 
Novels’ property on the map, but he had no specific knowledge about the Novels’ 
property even though he had specific knowledge about two nearby subdivisions.  
Furthermore, neither experts’ job had familiarized him or her specifically with the 
 
28
difficulties of developing the Novels’ property.  Accordingly, any opinion regarding the 
15 acres would have been formed in anticipation of this litigation 
Notwithstanding the fact that the county treated Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif 
as non-retained experts during discovery, it asked the trial court to allow them to testify 
about their opinions regarding the developmental challenges to the 15 acres, opinions 
that were formed in anticipation of litigation.  Because the county did not provide an 
opinion from Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif in discovery, the Novels were not properly 
put on notice of the intended subject of their testimony.  As such, allowing                 
Mr. Paskiewicz and Ms. Nassif to testify about their opinions formed in preparation for 
this litigation would frustrate the purpose of the rules of discovery.  Therefore, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony that failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 56.01(b)(5).  
III.  Jury’s Verdict Not Grossly Excessive and Not Against the Weight of the 
Evidence 
 
St. Louis County claims that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for a 
new trial and entering judgment because the jury’s $1.3 million verdict was excessive in 
that it was against the weight of the evidence.  When the county filed its principal brief 
raising this claim of error, it asserted that the verdict exceeded the evidence by $31,000.  
In its reply brief, however, it concedes that the amount by which the verdict exceeded 
the evidence was $3,254.  Nevertheless, it continues to claim it was an excessive verdict 
that shows the jury was swayed by passion and prejudice.   
 
29
The standard of review for a trial court’s order denying a motion for a new trial is 
abuse of discretion.  Bowan v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 452, 456 
(Mo. App. 2004).  A trial court abuses its discretion when: 
[A] ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it 
and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and 
indicate a lack of careful consideration. McGuire v. Seltsam, 138 S.W.3d 
718, 720 (Mo. banc 2004). The denial of a new trial would be an abuse of 
discretion if it were based on findings not substantially supported by the 
record. Bowan, 135 S.W.3d at 456. 
 
In re H.L.L., 179 S.W.3d 894, 896-97 (Mo. banc 2005).  In reviewing a trial court’s 
order denying a motion for a new trial, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial court’s order.  Badahman v. Catering St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 29, 39-40 (Mo. 
banc 2013). 
At trial, Mr. Demba testified that the subject property was valued at $2 per 
square foot.  When asked whether his valuation of $2 per square foot multiplied by 
648,373 square feet gives a value of $1,296,746, he stated, “That’s true,”  He then was 
asked, “So that’s close to 1.3 million?” and he responded, “Yes.”   
In addition to Mr. Demba’s testimony, the $1.3 million amount was mentioned in 
the Novels’ closing argument.  Their counsel stated, “Every foot of land is worth $2 a 
square foot over the entire land.  And that is technically like $1.29, but we round it to 
$1.3 million.”  When the jury reached its verdict, it awarded the Novels $1.3 million for 
the property.  The county claims this verdict exceeded the evidence by $3,254 or 0.25 
percent. 
 
30
 
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order denying 
the motion, is that the Novels were damaged in the amount of $1,296,746, which rounds 
up to $1.3 million.  During the questioning of Mr. Demba and the closing argument of 
the Novels’ counsel, the county did not object that it was improper for $1,296,746 to be 
rounded up to $1.3 million.  From these facts, it is clear that the jury rounded up the 
amount of damages like Mr. Demba did in his testimony and the Novels’ counsel did in 
closing argument.  It is easy to understand why the jury more easily could remember 
$1.3 million than $1,296,746 when setting the damages.   
The opinion of a single qualified witness constitutes substantial evidence to 
support a jury’s verdict.  Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 
859 S.W.2d 681, 692 (Mo. banc 1993), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by 
Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. banc 2012); State ex rel. State 
Highway Comm’n v. Hamel, 404 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Mo. 1966).  Mr. Demba’s testimony 
describing the value of the 15 acres as $1.3 million provides substantial evidence to 
support the verdict.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
overruled the county’s motion for a new trial. 
IV.  Heritage Value Statutes Constitutionally Valid 
St. Louis County also asserts that sections 523.039 and 523.061, the statutes 
authorizing and implementing an award of heritage value, violate the Missouri 
Constitution in three respects: (1) the General Assembly impermissibly altered the 
judicial definition of “just compensation” by permitting the addition of heritage value to 
fair market value, in violation of article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution; (2) 
 
31
the heritage value statutes require that the county expend public funds without a public 
purpose in violation of article III, section 38(a) and article VI, sections 23 and 25 of the 
Missouri Constitution; and, (3) the statutory requirement that a judge compute heritage 
value invades the province of the jury to determine just compensation for land taken by 
eminent domain, in contravention of article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution.   
“The standard of review for constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo.”  
City of Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 2008).  Statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional.  State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d 386, 390 (Mo. banc 2012).  
“This Court will not invalidate a statute unless ‘it clearly and undoubtedly violates some 
constitutional provision and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the 
constitution.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Richard, 298 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Mo. banc 2009)).  
The county, as the party challenging the validity of the heritage value statutes, bears the 
burden of proving the statutes clearly and undoubtedly violate the constitution.  Id.   
A. Legislature Did Not Impermissibly Alter Definition of “Just Compensation” 
The Bill of Rights Preamble and article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution 
provide that, “In order to assert our rights, acknowledge our duties, and proclaim the 
principles on which our government is founded, we declare: . . .[t]hat private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”  The term 
“just compensation” is not defined in the constitution, but the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court long have interpreted it to mean “the ‘fair market value’ of the 
property at the time of the taking.”  E.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 
(1934); City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry, 394 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Mo. 1965).  “The fair 
 
32
market value of land is what a reasonable buyer would give who was willing but did not 
have to purchase, and what a seller would take who was willing but did not have to 
sell.”  Union Quarry, 394 S.W.2d at 305. 
In 2006, the Missouri General Assembly “enacted a statutory definition of just 
compensation” codifying the judicial determination that “just compensation” means 
“fair market value” and providing for additional compensation for the taking of 
homesteads and properties held within the same family for 50 or more years.  State ex 
rel. White Family P’ship, 271 S.W.3d at 572.  Section 523.039 states, in part: 
 In all condemnation proceedings filed after December 31, 2006, just 
compensation for condemned property shall be determined under one of 
the three following subdivisions, whichever yields the highest 
compensation, as applicable to the particular type of property and taking: 
(1) An amount equivalent to the fair market value of such property; 
(2) For condemnations that result in a homestead taking, an amount 
equivalent to the fair market value of such property multiplied by one 
hundred twenty-five percent; or 
(3) For condemnation of property that results in any taking that 
prevents the owner from utilizing property in substantially the same 
manner as it was currently being utilized on the day of the taking and 
involving property owned within the same family for fifty or more years, 
an amount equivalent to the sum of the fair market value and heritage 
value.   
 
Section 523.001 defines “heritage value” as 50 percent of the fair market value of a 
property that has been owned within the same family for 50 or more years.  
Accordingly, for qualifying properties that have been held within the same family for 50 
or more years, “just compensation” under section 523.039 is the fair market value plus 
an additional 50 percent for heritage value, equaling 150 percent of the fair market 
value.   
 
33
                                             
The county asserts that these statutes were ultra vires because article II of the 
Missouri Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting a law contrary to the 
Court’s interpretation of the constitution.  Specifically, the county claims that the 
General Assembly legislatively changed the meaning of “just compensation” in article I, 
section 26 to something more than “fair market value.”  Union Quarry, 394 S.W.2d at 
305.  The county is correct that “[c]onstitutional interpretation is a function of the 
judicial, and not the legislative branch.”  Poertner v. Hess, 646 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. 
banc 1983).  See also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (Congress 
may not supersede a constitutional rule legislatively); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 519 (1997) (The legislative power “to enforce” does not include altering the 
meaning of a constitutional provision because the power “to enforce” does not include 
“changing what the right is.”).  Contrary to the county’s argument, however, this 
constitutional principle is not implicated in the General Assembly’s enactment of 
sections 523.039 and 523.061.   Sections 523.039 and 523.061 do not alter this Court’s 
definition of “just compensation,” which serves as a constitutional floor below which 
the legislature cannot descend;10 the statutes instead promote the legislature’s intended 
 
10 Justice William Brennan of the Supreme Court of the United States explained the 
concept of constitutional floors in a federal setting, where state constitutions may 
provide more protections than those afforded by the federal constitution without 
contravening the federal constitution.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights 
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548 (1986). 
 
 
 
34
policy of providing additional benefits to certain property owners whose real property is 
taken for public use.  
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitchell v. United States and 
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence support the proposition that a legislature may compensate 
losses and damages beyond those traditionally included in its interpretation of “just 
compensation.”  267 U.S 341 (1925); 262 U.S. 668 (1923).  In Mitchell, the Supreme 
Court considered the validity of a property owner’s request for consequential damages 
for losses to a business when land was taken by eminent domain in Maryland.  267 U.S. 
at 344.  The Supreme Court stated: 
It does not follow that, in the absence of an agreement, the plaintiffs can 
compel payment for such losses.  To recover, they must show some 
statutory right conferred.  States have not infrequently directed the 
payment of compensation in similar situations.  The constitutions of some 
require that compensation be made for consequential damages to private 
property resulting from public improvements.  Others have, in authorizing 
specific public improvements, conferred the right to such compensation.  
Congress had, of course, the power to make like provision here. 
 
Id. at 345-46 (citations omitted).  
In Joslin Mgf. Co., the issue before the Supreme Court was the validity of 
statutes authorizing compensation for the condemnation of land, interests, and water 
rights to provide a pure water supply for a municipality.  262 U.S. at 670.  In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court addressed an equal protection challenge to a statute 
providing compensation for injury to businesses established prior to notice that the 
property would be taken but not to those businesses established after notice.  Id.at 276.  
The Supreme Court stated: 
 
35
 
In respect of the contention that the statute expends the right to 
recover compensation, so as to include these and other forms of 
consequential damages, and, thus, deprives plaintiffs in error, as taxpayers 
of the city, of their property without due process of law, we need say no 
more than that, while the Legislature was powerless to diminish the 
constitutional measure of just compensation, we are aware of no rule, 
which stands in the way of an extension of it, within the limits of equity 
and justice, so as to include rights otherwise excluded.  As stated by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 
Mass. 579, 583, 63 N. E. 10 ( 57 L.R.A. 292, 91 Am. St. Rep. 326), 
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, who was then a member of that 
court: 
 
 
“Very likely the  . . . rights were of a kind that might have been 
damaged if not destroyed without the constitutional necessity of 
compensation.  But some latitude is allowed to the Legislature.  It is not 
forbidden to be just in some cases where it is not required to be by the 
letter of the paramount law.” 
 
Id.at 676-77.    
As Mitchell and Joslin Mgf. Co. illustrate, the constitutionally required “just 
compensation” is a minimum measure that must be paid, not a maximum one.  The 
legislature has the power to provide for more than the minimum “just compensation.” 
Therefore, there is no violation of the Missouri Constitution’s provision requiring “just 
compensation” for land taken for public use by the requirement of additional 
compensation for heritage value in section 523.039.  Article I, section 26 operates as a 
constitutional minimum, and section 523.039 is an example of the legislature exercising 
its prerogative to allow additional compensation for a statutorily defined class whose 
 
36
                                             
land is subject to taking, i.e., real property owners whose land has been owned by their 
family for 50 or more years.11 
As a political subdivision of the state government, the county has been delegated 
the power of eminent domain by the legislature.  State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 
S.W.3d 472, 476 (Mo. banc 2013).  As such, the county has “no inherent powers but [is] 
confined to those expressly delegated by the sovereign and to those powers necessarily 
implied in the authority to carry out the delegated powers.”  Christian Cnty. v. Edward 
D. Jones & Co., L.P., 200 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting Premium 
Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam Cnty., 946 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Mo. 
banc 1997)).  “[T]he State, speaking through its Legislature, may . . . impose upon itself, 
and upon those to whom it delegates the right of eminent domain, an obligation to pay 
more than what the courts might consider a ‘just compensation.’”  Daniels v. State Rd. 
Dep’t., 170 So. 2d 846, 853 (Fla. 1964). 
B. Heritage Value Statutes Do Not Confer Public Funds for Private Benefit 
In its second constitutional challenge to the statute, the county asserts that the 
payment of heritage value uses public funds to confer an unconstitutional private 
benefit.  Article III, section 38(a) of the Missouri Constitution states:  
 
11 In addressing a similar constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of Kansas held 
that the Kansas legislature could increase the amount of compensation owed to a party 
to include payment of a 25 percent premium above fair market value without offending 
the requirements in the constitutions of the United States and Kansas that require 
payment of “just compensation.”  State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte 
Cnty., 962 P.2d 543, 560-61 (Kan. 1998). 
 
 
37
The general assembly shall have no power to grant public money or 
property, or lend or authorize the lending of public credit, to any private 
person, association or corporation, excepting aid in public calamity, and 
general laws providing for pensions for the blind, for old age assistance, 
for aid to dependent or crippled children or the blind, for direct relief, for 
adjusted compensation, bonus or rehabilitation for discharged members of 
the armed services of the United States who were bona fide residents of 
this state during their service, and for the rehabilitation of other persons. 
 
Accordingly, public funds may be used only for the public interest unless the situation 
allows for one of the listed exceptions.  Article VI, sections 23 and 25 similarly restrict 
local governments from providing public money for private use.   
Here, the county does not argue that its exercise of eminent domain fails to serve 
some public purpose.  Rather, it argues that any compensation it must pay beyond the 
constitutional minimum to make that acquisition serves no public purpose and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional.  To determine whether there is a sufficient purpose behind a 
grant of public money, this Court has employed the “primary effect” test.  Curchin v. 
Missouri Indus. Dev. Bd., 722 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. banc 1987).  The “primary effect” 
test states:  
If the primary object of a public expenditure is to subserve a public 
municipal purpose, the expenditure is legal, notwithstanding it also 
involves as an incident an expense, which, standing alone, would not be 
lawful.  But if the primary object is not to subserve a public municipal 
purpose, but to promote some private end, the expense is illegal, even 
though it may incidentally serve some public purpose. 
 
Id. (quoting State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Smith, 154 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. banc 
1941)).   
When considering the statutory compensation in section 523.039 for 
condemnation of property that has been owned by a family for 50 or more years, the 
 
38
                                             
public expenditure is made to acquire, through eminent domain, property for a public 
purpose.12  The primary object of the expenditure in section 523.039, then, is to 
compensate a class of persons whose property is acquired through eminent domain for 
the benefit of the public.  Therefore, the compensation authorized by section 523.039 “is 
legal, notwithstanding that it also involves as, an incident, an expense that, standing 
alone, would not be lawful.”  Curchin, 722 S.W.2d at 934.  Section 523.039 does not 
violate the constitutional prohibition against using public funds for a private benefit.  
C. Heritage Value Statutes Do Not Invade Jury’s Duty to Determine Just 
Compensation 
 
 
Article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution states that the “just 
compensation” to be paid for the acquisition of land by eminent domain “shall be 
ascertained by a jury.”  The county asserts that the heritage value statute violates this 
section of the constitution because, under section 523.061, it is the judge’s 
responsibility to determine heritage value and not the jury’s.13 
 
12 For the purpose of applying the “primary object” test, this Court assumes, without 
finding, that there is no public purpose in paying property owners additional 
compensation when the condemned property has been owned by one family 50 or more 
years. 
13 The county does not allege that section 532.061 violates its right to a jury trial 
provided by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
39
 
This assertion is incorrect.  This argument is based on the county’s claim that the 
language of section 523.060, referencing “just compensation,” mandates that all 
amounts paid under the statute are constitutional compensation that must be ascertained 
by a jury.  As previously determined, article I, section 26 requires the payment of “just 
compensation,” which has been defined by this Court as “fair market value.”  Union 
Quarry, 394 S.W.2d at 305.  The legislature has provided for payment of heritage value 
compensation in addition to the constitutionally required payment of “fair market 
value.”  Because heritage value compensation is not part of the “just compensation” 
mandated by the constitution, there is no constitutional mandate that it be ascertained by 
a jury.  
Conclusion 
 
While numerous parts of the trial transcripts were missing, none of the inaudible 
words or unrecorded side bars were material to the issues raised on appeal, so the record 
was sufficient for this Court to rule with confidence.  The trial court did not err in its 
evidentiary rulings, and the verdict was not grossly excessive so as to warrant a new 
trial.   
Furthermore, the trial court did not err in assessing and adding heritage value to 
the jury’s verdict.  The statutes providing that persons who have owned their property 
for 50 or more years, whose property is subject to taking for public use, should be 
awarded an amount of compensation greater than the fair market value of that property 
do not violate the Missouri Constitution.  Nor does compensation that is above the fair 
market value, provided in response to a taking, violate the constitution by providing a 
 
40
private benefit with public funds.  Lastly, the heritage value statutes do not give the 
judge the jury’s responsibilities in determining just compensation in violation of the 
constitution.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Stith, Draper 
and Teitelman, JJ., concur.  Wilson, J., 
not participating.