Title: Dickeson v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dickeson v. State1992 WY 173843 P.2d 606Case Number: 91-105Decided: 12/11/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Elizabeth 
DICKESON, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, 
Appellate Counsel, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael K. Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The dispositive issue 
in this case is whether Elizabeth Dickeson (Dickeson) was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at her trial. This issue was not raised in the trial court 
and, of course, there is no ruling by the trial court on this claim. Other 
issues are identified and argued relating to the suppression of statements made 
by Dickeson following the seizure of her diary; the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain a conviction; and the deprivation of a fair trial because of a 
plethora of evidentiary errors. We conclude that the record in this case 
demonstrates that Dickeson did not receive effective assistance from her 
attorney in the trial court as required by both the Wyoming and federal 
constitutions. We reverse her conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
Because of the premise for our decision, we do not consider the other claims of 
error presented, assuming they will not recur in the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶2.]     In her Brief of the 
Appellant, Dickeson states the issues to be:

 
 
I. Should 
the statements made by the appellant following the illegal seizure of her diary 
have been suppressed?

 
 
II. Is the 
verdict supported by sufficient evidence?

 
 
III. Was 
the appellant deprived of a fair trial because of the many evidentiary errors 
that occurred during the trial?

 
 
IV. Was the 
appellant denied the effective assistance of counsel?

 
 
The State 
of Wyoming 
restates those issues, in the Brief of Appellee, as 
follows:

 
 
I. Can 
appellant now object to the seizure of her diary when no motion to suppress the 
seizure was made prior to trial and no objection was made at 
trial?

 
 
II. Did 
sufficient evidentiary errors occur such that the cumulative effect can be said 
to have denied appellant her right to a fair trial?

 
 
III. 
Whether trial counsel's representation of appellant was 
deficient?

 
 
IV. Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the verdict?

 
 

[¶3.]     Dickeson was found 
guilty by a jury of a charge of arson in the first degree in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-3-101 (1988).1 Dickeson then was sentenced to a 
term of not less than four, nor more than six, years to be served in the Wyoming 
Women's Center. The sentence was made to run consecutively to sentences for two 
counts of credit card fraud imposed in another case. Dickeson appeals from that 
portion of the judgment and sentence relating to the conviction for arson in the 
first degree.

 
 

[¶4.]     The arson charge 
alleged setting a fire discovered in the storeroom of Noland Feed, Inc. in 
Casper, Wyoming on August 9, 1989. Kathy Flowers 
(Flowers), a store employee and the daughter of the owners, reported she arrived 
at work at 7:30 A.M. with her three children, ages one, three, and five, and 
began to work on the firm's books. She testified there were three other 
employees at the store that morning, two of whom were working in the warehouse, 
and one who was working at the front counter. The Flowers children went into the 
storeroom about 8:30 A.M. to get some popsicles and, from that time on, the 
children were either with Flowers or with her brother, one of the other 
employees, for the rest of the morning.

 
 

[¶5.]     Flowers observed only 
two customers, a male and a female, who entered the store that morning prior to 
the fire. She did not know either of those customers, but the male customer 
reported the fire, and the female customer later was identified by Flowers as 
Dickeson. Dickeson entered the store between 9:30 and 9:45 A.M., and Flowers 
looked at her for approximately twenty to thirty seconds. Flowers was unable to 
tell where the person she identified as Dickeson was going in the store. After 
finishing a deposit she had been working on, Flowers attempted to find the 
female customer to determine if she needed any assistance. She was unable to 
find her, and she then gathered up her children and returned to the store area 
so her son could try on some boots. As they were engaged in trying the boots on 
the son, the male customer ran in and said they had a fire. Flowers ran to the 
warehouse to alert her brother, called the fire department, and took her 
children outside. Two of the employees successfully extinguished the fire before 
the arrival of the fire department personnel.

 
 

[¶6.]     After a photographic 
identification of Dickeson by Flowers, an officer and a detective approached 
Dickeson at her place of employment, the El Diablo Supper Club in Glenrock, on 
February 8, 1990. The officer testified Dickeson agreed to accompany the 
investigators to the Casper police department building for 
questioning. When Dickeson attempted to leave her purse behind, locked in her 
car, the officer advised her to bring her purse, and then insisted that she do 
so.

 
 

[¶7.]     Upon arrival at the 
Casper police 
department building, Dickeson was read her Miranda rights, and she then was 
questioned for approximately three hours concerning the arson charge and an 
unrelated offense she also was suspected of committing. Dickeson first denied 
being in Casper 
on August 9, 1989 but, after she was confronted with an entry from the diary she 
carried in her purse, she changed her story. It is important to note that, 
during the course of the interview, the investigating officer took her diary, 
and it was at his suggestion that she refreshed her recollection from the diary. 
Upon refreshing her memory, Dickeson admitted that at 9:30 A.M., on August 9, 
1989, she had an interview at the Casper Job Service. The statement based upon 
the entry in the diary was the only evidence, other than Flowers' 
identification, placing Dickeson in Casper on the day of the fire. When Dickeson 
testified at trial, she denied going to the Noland Feed store August 9, 1989, 
and she also denied setting the fire. The inconsistency in her stories was used 
for impeachment purposes at trial.

 
 

[¶8.]     At the conclusion of 
the three-hour interview, Dickeson was arrested on the charge of first-degree 
arson. A criminal complaint was filed along with an affidavit from the arresting 
officer, and a criminal arrest warrant was obtained for Dickeson. On February 
14, 1990, an assistant public defender was appointed as counsel for Dickeson, 
but that attorney withdrew on April 18, 1990, and a privately employed attorney 
entered his appearance as counsel. Dickeson's trial began on December 3, 1990 
and, after two days, the jury returned the verdict of guilty of the charge of 
arson in the first degree.

 
 

[¶9.]     With respect to the 
primary and dispositive issue, the denial of the effective assistance of 
counsel, Dickeson argues she did not receive effective assistance prior to and 
during her trial and, therefore, her conviction was not constitutionally 
obtained. The right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,2 made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.3

 

 

[¶10.]  The concept of "effective" counsel was 
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). In that case, the court held the mere 
assignment of counsel does not meet the constitutional mandate, but the counsel 
must provide effective assistance in the preparation of the case for trial. The 
standard with respect to effective assistance of counsel requires the criminal 
defense to satisfy two criteria:

 
 
First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.

 
 
Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984).

 
 

[¶11.]  We adopted this standard in Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986). See also, Barron v. State, 819 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 1991); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), appeal after remand, 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

[¶12.]  We examine the conduct of defense counsel 
in light of all the circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or 
omissions fall outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing 
in mind the function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work 
in every case. Strickland; Gist. We do not evaluate the efforts of counsel from 
a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and evaluate the 
professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time. Strickland. 
"We invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable 
assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional 
judgment." Gist, 737 P.2d  at 342 (citations omitted). The burden is upon the 
defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the 
challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy. Strickland.

 
 

[¶13.]  We heretofore have reversed convictions 
in four criminal cases because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. In King 
v. State, 810 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1991), Gist, and Frias, we concluded that defense 
attorneys had failed to interview prospective eye witnesses, and no 
justification could be found in the record to explain why no interview was 
pursued. We held that, once the deficiency is demonstrated in that situation, 
the resulting prejudice will be presumed. King. In Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992), we held that, when multiple criminal defendants are represented 
by the same attorney, such dual representation constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and prejudice will be presumed in such an instance, in 
the absence of an appropriate waiver made in a prescribed 
manner.

 
 

[¶14.]  In this case, our quest for resolution 
must begin with the first prong of the Strickland test. Dickeson's burden is to 
demonstrate her attorney's performance was deficient. Her claim rests primarily 
upon the failure of trial counsel to file a suppression motion to exclude those 
statements made by Dickeson after the seizure of her diary; the failure to 
object to the admission of evidence that arguably was excludable; and the 
failure to advance an opening statement. We address these contentions 
separately.

 
 

[¶15.]  First, with respect to the failure to 
file a suppression motion to exclude those statements made after the seizure of 
Dickeson's diary, we are in accord with the conclusion of the Supreme Court of 
the United States that the failure to file a suppression motion does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986). Instead, the reasonableness of 
counsel's failure must be evaluated from the perspective of counsel at the time 
of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. Kimmelman. In this 
case, it is clear from the record no motion to suppress was filed before trial, 
and no objection was made at trial to the pre-arrest, warrantless search of 
Dickeson's purse, the seizure of her diary, or the statements she made after the 
search and seizure. The record offers minimal guidance as to any reason 
supporting the decision by counsel to not move to suppress this evidence or to 
not object to it at trial.

 
 

[¶16.]  The State concedes that, if a proper 
objection had been made attacking the search of Dickeson's purse and the seizure 
of its contents together with the subsequent incriminating statements, the 
burden of proof would have fallen to the State to show the search and seizure 
were valid, or one of the exceptions to the rule foreclosing warrantless 
searches and seizures is applicable. We have held in many instances the burden 
is on the State to justify a warrantless search and seizure as reasonable. 
Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1983); 
Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1983); 
Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982). The 
recognized exceptions that may be invoked include:

 
 
1) search 
of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search conducted 
while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of an 
automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; 
and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent 
loss of life or property.

 
 
Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 940-41 (citations omitted).

 
 

[¶17.]  On the basis of the evidence presented in 
this case, the question as to whether a legal search and seizure was conducted 
and accomplished is significant. The State contends it is not necessary to 
determine whether or not the search of Dickeson's purse was valid or whether it 
fits within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. This argument 
hinges upon the provisions of Wyo.R.Crim.P. 40(e):4

 

 
     A person aggrieved by 
an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the county in 
which the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for 
use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was 
illegally seized without warrant, or * * *. The motion to suppress evidence may 
also be made in the county where the trial is to be had. The motion shall be 
made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was 
not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may 
entertain the motion at the trial. (Emphasis added.)

 
 
The 
argument of the State is that this rule mandates compliance with its terms, and 
the failure to make the motion as required by the rule results in a waiver of 
any objection to the search alleged to be illegal. We need not decide in this 
instance whether waiver flows from failure to file the motion as required by the 
rule. The language of this rule is persuasive and, under Wyo.R.Crim.P. 41(g) and 
12(g), effective March 24, 1992, the State's argument of waiver would be even 
more persuasive.

 
 

[¶18.]  For this case, however, we need only 
determine whether the trial counsel's conduct was ineffective and if that 
ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice to the defendant. In analyzing this issue, 
a brief analysis of the lawfulness of the search and seizure is warranted. It is 
clear from the record no warrant was extant for Dickeson's arrest or for any 
search. These circumstances invoke the general rule that warrantless searches 
and seizures are per se unreasonable under both U.S. Const. amend. IV and 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 4. Ortega. The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are applicable to 
the states because of the due process clause found in U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, reh'g denied 368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23, 7 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1961).

 
 

[¶19.]  Upon trial counsel's cross-examination of 
the detective who interviewed Dickeson at the Casper Police Department, the 
following testimony was elicited:

 
 
Q. Now, 
let's see. Where did you arrest the defendant?

 
 
A. She was 
arrested at the Casper Police Department.

 
 
Q. She 
wasn't under arrest when you picked her up in Glenrock?

 
 
A. That is 
correct.

 
 
Q. She 
wasn't under arrest, why didn't you let her leave her purse wherever she wanted 
to?

 
 
A. Because 
I believed there might be evidence in the purse that had to do with a crime I 
was investigating.

 
 
Q. She 
wasn't free to leave?

 
 
A. Yes, she 
was free to leave, if she wanted.

 
 
Q. But she 
couldn't leave her purse in the car.

 
 
A. I asked 
her to bring her purse with her.

 
 
Q. Did you 
have a search warrant at that time?

 
 
A. 
No.

 
 
Q. What did 
you find in that purse?

 
 
A. The 
diary.

 
 
Q. She 
showed you the diary, didn't she?

 
 
A. 
No.

 
 
Q. She 
didn't?

 
 
A. 
No.

 
 
A logical 
inference from this testimony is that the officer took the diary, rather than a 
conclusion that it was voluntarily produced by Dickeson.

 
 

[¶20.]  A review of the enumerated exceptions 
demonstrates a clear possibility this particular search and seizure was illegal. 
Dickeson was not under arrest at the time the diary was seized, and she did not 
consent to the search of her purse and the seizure of the diary. A strong 
argument was available that an illegal search and seizure occurred under either 
the Wyoming or 
United States Constitutions. That argument would encompass the proposition that 
the search and seizure was not made pursuant to a warrant and does not fit 
within any of the recognized exceptions. We cannot decide at this time that the 
search and seizure was illegal. Since it was not challenged by trial counsel in 
the trial court, we are satisfied the State is entitled to an opportunity to 
develop a record and demonstrate, if it can, that the search of the person and 
the seizure of Dickeson's diary was permissible. We are unable to say the plain 
error doctrine is available to challenge the illegality of the search and 
seizure because of the absence of information in the record. That question must 
be pursued in the district court upon retrial. We do conclude, however, the 
failure to file a motion and raise the issue demonstrates deficient performance 
of trial counsel.

 
 

[¶21.]  We turn then to the second aspect of the 
Strickland test. Dickeson does not carry her burden by simply demonstrating the 
deficiency of her trial counsel's work. She also must demonstrate this 
deficiency resulted in some prejudice to her defense in order to obtain a 
reversal of her conviction. She must show "a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 147. If the search of Dickeson's purse and the seizure of the 
diary were found to be illegal, then Dickeson's subsequent statements which were 
the fruit of the illegal search and seizure would be subject to suppression. 
People v. Wagner, 114 Mich. App. 541, 320 N.W.2d 251 (1982). Without 
those statements, only a limited amount of evidence was available to the 
prosecution to support a conviction.

 
 

[¶22.]  Without Dickeson's statements, the State 
would have been able to show by Flowers' testimony only that she believed 
Dickeson had been present in the Noland Feed store on August 9, 1989. There 
would have been nothing available from Dickeson to demonstrate she was even in 
Casper on the 
day of the fire. The evidence of the State would have been premised upon the 
description Flowers gave of the woman customer at the Noland Feed store, and the 
fact the woman customer later was identified as Dickeson. Against that testimony 
and the fact of the fire, the jury would have been in a position of weighing 
Dickeson's absence of memory as to her exact location on a specific day six 
months earlier. Furthermore, Dickeson would have enjoyed greater freedom of 
choice about testifying at the trial and, if she elected not to testify, the 
State would not have had any opportunity to discredit her. There indeed was a 
reasonable probability that, in the absence of the statements obtained after 
examining Dickeson's diary, and the advantage gained from those statements to 
prove she was in Casper on the day of the fire and to diminish 
Dickeson's credibility, the jury might have reached a different 
verdict.

 
 

[¶23.]  Since we conclude it is reasonably likely 
the result of the trial might have been different except for the error of 
counsel in failing to move to suppress the evidence from Dickeson's diary and 
her statements that followed, the prejudice requirement of the Strickland test 
is satisfied. The significant reluctance of appellate courts to conclude there 
was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial must be acknowledged, and 
decisions reaching that conclusion are infrequent. Frias. Here, however, the 
facts and circumstances demand that we hold the failure of trial counsel to 
question the search and seizure, and to object to the evidence flowing from it, 
was a failure resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel in a manner which 
prejudiced Dickeson's rights. We conclude the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must be sustained on this basis. See also United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 
1976), appeal after remand, 552 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844, 98 S. Ct. 145, 54 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1977); State v. Douglas, 97 Idaho 878, 555 P.2d 1145 
(1976).

 
 

[¶24.]  In the usual case, ineffective assistance 
of counsel is going to be demonstrable because of a cumulation of errors with a 
determination that, in the entire context of the trial, the defendant either 
was, or was not, denied a right to a fair trial. Gist. In Dickeson's case, the 
failure to move to suppress Dickeson's statements and the diary, together with 
the failure to object at trial, were so egregious that these errors, without 
more, would demand reversal. There were other deficiencies, 
however.

 
 

[¶25.]  Dickeson raises two additional claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. She contends counsel failed to object 
to a plethora of inadmissible evidence at trial, and she points to the failure 
of trial counsel to present an opening statement. Without elaboration, we agree 
there were numerous failures to object at trial when appropriate objections to 
the introduction of evidence, the testimony of an expert witness, and hearsay 
testimony would likely have been sustained. We have held in an earlier case that 
an opening statement is a useful device, but it need not be given in every 
instance. Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1985). However, when the failure to 
deliver an opening statement is combined with other claims of ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel, it has a cumulative effect. See People v. Bell, 48 N.Y.2d 933, 
401 N.E.2d 180, 425 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. 1979), reargument denied, 49 N.Y.2d 802, 
403 N.E.2d 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1980) (reversal due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel where the attorney failed to request any pretrial hearings, conduct 
any voir dire examination of the jury, or make any opening statement); United 
States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (reversal due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel where the attorney failed to appear at the arraignment, 
conduct any voir dire examination of the jury, make any opening statement, 
cross-examine two of the government witnesses, request any jury instructions, 
make any pretrial motions, speak to the question of bond after conviction, or 
speak on accused's behalf at sentencing); Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (reversal due to ineffective assistance of counsel where the attorney 
filed two motions for suppression and discovery, had one meeting in chambers, 
failed to object to excludable portions of tape recordings and to conversations 
between the defendant and a co-conspirator). As these cases serve to illustrate, 
the failure to present an opening statement when coupled with other deficiencies 
can be cumulative and require reversal. We hold that is the result in this 
case.

 
 

[¶26.]  Our examination of the record as a whole 
compels us, applying the two-prong test for ineffectiveness of counsel 
articulated in Strickland, to conclude trial counsel was ineffective. The 
failure to attack the illegal search and seizure; the failure to move to 
suppress the statements made by Dickeson after the seizure of her diary; and the 
failure to object to the introduction of the incriminating statements at trial 
all constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The additional omissions and 
errors serve as further justification for concluding that the representation by 
trial counsel failed to reflect adequate preparation and participation in the 
trial in this case. We hold Dickeson has sustained her burden of demonstrating 
she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 

[¶27.]  The case is reversed and remanded for a 
new trial. Since we reach that result because of our conclusion with respect to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not address the other claims of error 
presented in this appeal.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-101 
(1988) provides:

 
 
(a) A person is guilty 
of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion 
with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.

 
 
(b) First-degree arson 
is a felony punishable by:

 
 
(i) Imprisonment for 
not more than twenty (20) years;

 
 
(ii) A fine of not 
more than the greater of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) or two (2) times 
the face amount of the insurance if the fire was started to cause collection of 
insurance for the loss; or

 
 
(iii) Both fine and 
imprisonment.

 
 

2 U.S. Const. amend. VI 
provides as follows:

 
 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to * * * have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.

 
 

3 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 
provides as follows:

 
 
In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by 
counsel, * * *.

 
 

4 The procedure 
relating to search and seizure now is found in Wyo.R.Crim.P. 41, effective March 
24, 1992.