Title: State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. LaRose

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. One Person One Vote v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1992.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1992 
THE STATE EX REL. ONE PERSON ONE VOTE ET AL. v. LAROSE, SECY. OF 
STATE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 
2023-Ohio-1992.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel secretary of state to remove 
proposed constitutional amendment from August 8, 2023 special-election 
ballot—Writ denied. 
(No. 2023-0630—Submitted May 31, 2023—Decided June 16, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam Opinion announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} Relators, One Person One Vote, Jeniece Brock, Brent Edwards, and 
Christopher Tavenor, seek a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Secretary of 
State Frank LaRose, to remove the proposed constitutional amendment in Amended 
Substitute Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 (“S.J.R. 2”) from the August 8, 2023 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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special-election ballot.  Because Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution 
authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe a special election on a specific date 
by joint resolution, we deny the writ. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 2} Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution empowers the 
General Assembly to submit legislatively proposed constitutional amendments to a 
vote of the people when three-fifths of both houses of the General Assembly pass 
a resolution calling for such a vote.  The provision states in part: 
 
Either branch of the General Assembly may propose 
amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed 
to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such 
proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the 
yeas and nays, and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least 
ninety days before the date of the election at which they are to be 
submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection. They shall 
be submitted on a separate ballot without party designation of any 
kind, at either a special or a general election as the General 
Assembly may prescribe. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 3} This case concerns whether the General Assembly may call for a 
special election on a legislatively-initiated constitutional amendment on any date, 
or whether it is bound by the statutes establishing when special elections may 
generally be held. 
{¶ 4} The General Assembly recently passed legislation regarding the 
scheduling of special elections.  The effect of that legislation on the General 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
3 
Assembly’s authority to set a special-election date for a constitutional amendment 
proposed by a General Assembly resolution is the focus of this case. 
B.  House Bill No. 458 
{¶ 5} On January 6, 2023, the governor signed 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 458 
(“H.B. 458”) into law.  Effective April 23, 2023, H.B. 458 amended R.C. 
3501.01(D) as follows to provide that special elections be held “only” on certain 
days specified in the statute: 
 
A special election may be held only on the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday in May or November, on the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday in August in accordance with section 3501.022 of the 
Revised Code, or on the day authorized by a particular municipal or 
county charter for the holding of a primary election, except that in 
any year in which a presidential primary election is held, no special 
election shall be held in May, except as authorized by a municipal 
or county charter, but may be held on the third Tuesday after the 
first Monday in March. 
 
H.B. 458 also enacted R.C. 3501.022, a new statute that specifies the types of 
special elections that can be held in August.  That statute provides: 
 
A political subdivision or taxing authority may hold a special 
election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in August for an 
office, question, or issue if the political subdivision is under a fiscal 
emergency under section 118.03 of the Revised Code, or the taxing 
authority that is a school district is under a fiscal emergency under 
division (B) of section 3316.03 of the Revised Code, at the time the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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board of elections certifies the office, question, or issue for 
placement on the ballot for that special election. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3501.022(A).  H.B. 458 did not contain a similar provision 
authorizing an August special election for a statewide office, question, or issue.  
Rather, R.C. 3501.02(E), which was not amended by H.B. 458, remains as follows: 
 
Proposed constitutional amendments submitted by the general 
assembly to the voters of the state at large may be submitted at a 
special election occurring on the day in any year specified by 
division (E) of section 3501.01 of the Revised Code for the holding 
of a primary election, when a special election on that date is 
designated by the general assembly in the resolution adopting the 
proposed constitutional amendment. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In turn, R.C. 3501.01(E) provides that primary elections be held 
on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May in non-presidential-election years 
and on the third Tuesday after the first Monday in March in presidential-election 
years. 
C.  Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 
{¶ 6} On May 10, 2023, the General Assembly adopted S.J.R. 2 as a joint 
resolution of the House of Representatives and Senate.  S.J.R. 2 proposes to amend 
the Ohio Constitution to (1) require a vote of at least 60 percent of Ohio electors to 
approve any constitutional amendment and (2) modify the procedures for an 
initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment.  As adopted, S.J.R. 2 calls 
for a special election to be held on August 8, 2023, “such election being prescribed 
pursuant to the authority provided by Section 1 of Article XVI of the Constitution 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
5 
of the State of Ohio” for the purpose of submitting the proposed constitutional 
amendment to voters. 
{¶ 7} On the day of its adoption, the General Assembly filed S.J.R. 2 with 
the secretary.  That same day, the secretary issued Directive 2023-07 to all county 
boards of elections, instructing them to prepare to hold a special election on August 
8.  Secretary of State Directive 2023-07, August 8, 2023 Special Election for 
Statewide Ballot Issue, available at https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/elections-
officials/rules/#manual (accessed June 7, 2023) [https://perma.cc/B5BS-QZZR]. 
D.  Relators File this Action 
{¶ 8} Relators commenced this action on May 12 as an expedited election 
matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, invoking this court’s original jurisdiction in 
mandamus under Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(b) of the Ohio Constitution and as 
provided in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  Relator One Person 
One Vote, an Ohio corporation, asserts that it is composed of Ohio electors and 
taxpayers who oppose the constitutional amendment proposed in S.J.R. 2.  Relators 
Brock, Edwards, and Tavenor are Ohio residents and qualified electors who 
likewise oppose S.J.R. 2’s proposed amendment.  All relators allege that they will 
be injured if the proposed amendment is allowed to be submitted to voters at a 
special election on August 8, because the special-election date will add expense and 
difficulty to their efforts to motivate voters to turn out in opposition to the proposed 
amendment. 
{¶ 9} Relators allege that the special election scheduled for August 8 
violates the Ohio Constitution and Ohio law.  They ask this court to issue a writ of 
mandamus directing the secretary to (1) remove S.J.R. 2 from the August 8 special-
election ballot, (2) rescind Directive 2023-07, and (3) instruct the county boards of 
elections not to proceed with the special election.  The secretary timely answered 
the complaint, and the parties have submitted their evidence and merit briefs under 
the expedited schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 10} To obtain a writ of mandamus, relators must establish a clear legal 
right to their requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the secretary to 
provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
See State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 
608, ¶ 18.  Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the secretary to strike 
from the ballot a constitutional amendment proposed by a joint resolution of the 
General Assembly.  See State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-
Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 25-26, citing State ex rel. Minus v. Brown, 30 Ohio 
St.2d 75, 283 N.E.2d 131 (1972) and State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 30 Ohio St.2d 
82, 282 N.E.2d 584 (1972).  As to the third element, relators lack an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law given the proximity of the special election, 
which is less than two months away.  See State ex rel. Clark v. Twinsburg, 169 Ohio 
St.3d 380, 2022-Ohio-3089, 205 N.E.3d 454, ¶ 16. 
A.  The Special Election is Authorized by the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 11} Relators argue that since the amendments to the election statutes 
were enacted in H.B. 458, the General Assembly may call a special election to be 
held only (1) on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, (2) on the 
first Tuesday after the first Monday in May, or (3) in presidential-election years, on 
the third Tuesday after the first Monday in March.  See R.C. 3501.01(D) and 
3501.02(E).  Relators therefore assert that the August 8 special election called by 
the General Assembly in S.J.R. 2 is not authorized by law. 
{¶ 12} Regardless of what the Revised Code provides with respect to 
special elections, however, Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution controls 
the matter before us.  That provision authorizes the General Assembly to submit 
the issue “at either a special or a general election as the General Assembly may 
prescribe.”  Id. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
7 
{¶ 13} “In construing our state Constitution, we look first to the text of the 
document as understood in light of our history and traditions,” State v. Smith, 162 
Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 29, so that “ ‘[w]here the 
meaning of a provision is clear on its face, we will not look beyond the provision 
in an attempt to divine what the drafters intended it to mean,’ ” Toledo City School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 146 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016-Ohio-2806, 56 
N.E.3d 950, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 520-
521, 644 N.E.2d 369 (1994).  See also Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 
2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 14} “We give undefined words in the Constitution their usual, normal, 
or customary meaning.”  Cleveland at ¶ 17, citing Toledo City School Dist. at ¶ 16.  
Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes the General Assembly to “prescribe” a special 
election on a proposed constitutional amendment without requiring that it do so by 
statute.  What is the meaning of “prescribe?” Article XVI, Section 1 was voted on 
directly by the people in 1912.  This court’s role is to view the language as a voter 
in the 1912 election would have seen it. 
 
[W]e are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were 
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.”  United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 
220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, [22. U.S. 1,] 
9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).  Normal meaning may of course 
include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in 
the founding generation. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8 
(Second brackets added in Heller.)  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
576-577, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). 
{¶ 15} A contemporary dictionary defined “prescribe” as follows: “Lay 
down or impose authoritatively.”  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English 650 (1912). 
{¶ 16} Black’s Law Dictionary 933 (2d Ed.1910) contained this definition: 
 
To direct; define; mark out.  In modern statutes relating to 
matters of an administrative nature, such as procedure, registration, 
etc., it is usual to indicate in general terms the nature of the 
proceedings to be adopted, and to leave the details to be prescribed 
or regulated by rules or orders to be made for that purpose in 
pursuance of an authority contained in the act. 
 
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 17} Therefore, the use of the word “prescribe” in Article XVI, Section 1 
authorizes the General Assembly to impose or direct a special election in 
furtherance of a proposed constitutional amendment.  It leaves to the General 
Assembly the details—like the date of the special election—to be established in 
pursuance of its authority to call for a vote of citizens on the amendment. 
{¶ 18} Article XVI, Section 1 imposes no limitation on the General 
Assembly’s ability to call for a special election on a proposed constitutional 
amendment.  In other parts of the Ohio Constitution, when the General Assembly’s 
exercise of a constitutional power requires the action to be taken “by law” (i.e., 
pursuant to a statute), the constitutional language has so specified.  See, e.g., Article 
II, Section 21 (“The general assembly shall determine, by law, before what 
authority, and in what manner, the trial of contested elections shall be conducted”); 
Article II, Section 22 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
9 
pursuance of a specific appropriation, made by law”); Article II, Section 27 
(election and appointment of certain officers “shall be made in such manner as may 
be directed by law”); Article XVI, Section 2 (General Assembly’s calling of a 
constitutional convention shall be provided for “by law”); see also State ex rel. 
Foreman v. Brown, 10 Ohio St.2d 139, 141, 226 N.E.2d 116 (1967) (citing 
numerous constitutional provisions specifying actions to be taken “by law”).  And 
even elsewhere in Article XVI, Section 1, it is specified that certain action be taken 
“by law,” but without the same qualification in the clause providing that the General 
Assembly may “prescribe” a special election.  See Article XVI, Section 1 (fifth 
paragraph) (“The General Assembly shall provide by law for other dissemination 
of information in order to inform the electors concerning proposed amendments”). 
{¶ 19} This court cannot impose a similar “by law” limitation on the 
General Assembly’s power to prescribe a special election in Article XVI, Section 
1 when the constitutional language does not include one.  “[A] court cannot read 
words into a statute but must give effect to the words used.”  State ex rel. Butler 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 124 Ohio St.3d 390, 
2010-Ohio-169, 922 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 21; see also Wilson v. Kasich, 134 Ohio St.3d 
221, 2012-Ohio-5367, 981 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 26 (“we apply the same rules of 
construction that we apply in construing statutes to interpret the meaning of 
constitutional provisions”).  Accordingly, the General Assembly may prescribe that 
a special election take place on a certain date specified in the joint resolution itself, 
as it did here in S.J.R. 2.  See Foreman at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 20} Despite the language in Article XVI, Section 1, relators argue that 
the election statutes restricting the date of special elections must govern the 
submission of the proposed constitutional amendment to the voters.  They argue 
that nothing in Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes the General Assembly “to choose 
whatever date it wishes for such an election, in violation of the Revised Code.”  But 
this argument is contrary to the language used in the Constitution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 21} Article III, Section 1 and Article XVII, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution specify exactly when a general election must take place: “the first 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November.”  Accordingly, the General Assembly 
would not be free to prescribe that a general election take place on a certain date if 
that date is contrary to what is specified in the Constitution.  Nonetheless, there is 
no similar specification in the Constitution about exactly when special elections 
may take place.  Therefore, the General Assembly is acting within constitutional 
boundaries when it prescribes that a special election take place on a certain date. 
{¶ 22} Relators also argue that the election statutes in the Revised Code 
should apply because those statutes are simply the means by which the General 
Assembly has exercised its Article XVI, Section 1 power to submit a proposed 
constitutional amendment to the electors.  Therefore, according to relators, the 
General Assembly has chosen to limit by statute its power to “prescribe” a special 
election on a proposed amendment.  And relators posit that the Ohio Constitution 
does not forbid the General Assembly from prescribing by statute the date on which 
a proposed constitutional amendment is to be submitted to Ohio voters. 
{¶ 23} But even if relators are correct that the General Assembly may 
prescribe by statute a special election on a constitutional amendment proposed by 
joint resolution, it is not required to do so.  Regardless of what the Revised Code 
may provide for the holding of elections generally, Article XVI, Section 1 of the 
Ohio Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to call for a special election on 
a constitutional amendment proposed by a joint resolution and to specify the date 
of the special election in that joint resolution, subject only to the limitations 
contained in the constitutional provision itself.  See Foreman, 10 Ohio St.2d at 141, 
226 N.E.2d 116.  “The Constitution is the supreme law; it is the expression of the 
will of the people, subject to amendment only by the people, and neither the 
Legislature by legislative enactment, nor the courts by judicial interpretation, can 
repeal or modify such expression or destroy the plain language and meaning of the 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
11 
Constitution, otherwise there would be no purpose in having a Constitution.”  
Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St. 170, 181, 20 N.E.2d 221 (1939). 
{¶ 24} Also in support of this point, relators assert that the joint resolution 
calling for a special election on August 8, 2023, functionally amends the Revised 
Code.  They point to Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution: “No law 
shall be * * * amended unless the new act contains * * * the section or sections 
amended, and the section or sections amended shall be repealed.”  Accordingly, 
they argue that the special election must be prescribed by statute.  However, the 
provision of the Constitution that relators cite is a general rule relating to how bills 
are passed, while Article XVI, Section 1 is a specific provision that authorizes the 
legislature to call for a special election and specify the date of that special election 
by joint resolution.  Under these circumstances, “the specific provision is treated as 
an exception to the general rule.”  See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012).  Thus, even if we were to accept relators’ 
premise, Article XVI, Section 1 would be an exception to the general provision 
found in Article II, Section 15(D).  “[S]pecial [constitutional] provisions relating to 
a subject will control general provisions in which, but for such special provisions, 
the subject might be regarded as embraced.”  Akron v. Roth, 88 Ohio St. 456, 461, 
103 N.E. 465 (1913); see also State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 
2018-Ohio-4035, 122 N.E.3d 1165, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 25} This understanding of the Constitution is supported by this court’s 
decision in Foreman.  In Foreman, the General Assembly proposed a constitutional 
amendment by joint resolution, specifically calling for a special election on May 2, 
1967.  Foreman at 139-140.  The relators in Foreman sought a writ of mandamus 
ordering the secretary of state to instruct the county boards of elections not to 
proceed with the special election called for by the General Assembly’s joint 
resolution.  Id. at 139.  Similar to what relators contend here, the Foreman relators 
argued (1) that a special election must be authorized by statute, (2) that no statute 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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provided for a special election on a proposed constitutional amendment on the date 
specified by the General Assembly’s joint resolution, and (3) that the only statute 
providing for submission of a constitutional amendment called for such submission 
at a different election (in that case, a general election).  Id. at 140-141. 
{¶ 26} This court rejected the relators’ argument and denied the writ, 
relying on the  language of Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. “These 
words clearly authorize the General Assembly to prescribe that an amendment to 
the Constitution, proposed by the General Assembly pursuant to that section, be 
submitted at a special election on a certain date.” Id. at 141.  This court observed 
that Article XVI, Section 1 did not require that the specified action be taken “ ‘by 
law,’ i.e., by enactment of a statute.”  Id.  Absent a constitutional requirement that 
the General Assembly authorize a special election by statute, this court held that 
the General Assembly could, consistent with Article XVI, Section 1, “authorize 
such special election on a certain date by a joint resolution.”  Id.; see also id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} For these reasons, the August 8, 2023 special election called by the 
General Assembly in S.J.R. 2 is constitutionally valid.  The General Assembly’s 
valid exercise of its constitutional power granted in Article XVI, Section 1 of the 
Ohio Constitution overrides any election statute that would otherwise prohibit the 
special election called for in the General Assembly’s joint resolution proposing a 
constitutional amendment for submission to the state’s electors. 
B.  R.C. 3501.40 Does Not Limit the Secretary’s Ability to Conduct an 
Election Authorized by Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 28} Relators also argue that the secretary is prohibited under R.C. 
3501.40 from conducting the August 8 special election.  R.C. 3501.40 states: 
 
Except as permitted under section 161.09 of the Revised 
Code [emergency postponement of elections], and notwithstanding 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
13 
any other contrary provision of the Revised Code, no public official 
shall cause an election to be conducted other than in the time, place, 
and manner prescribed by the Revised Code. 
As used in this section, “public official” means any elected 
or appointed officer, employee, or agent of the state or any political 
subdivision, board, commission, bureau, or other public body 
established by law. 
 
{¶ 29} Based on this statute, relators contend that the secretary lacks the 
power to conduct the August 8 special election.  Therefore, notwithstanding what 
the General Assembly prescribed in S.J.R. 2, relators contend that the secretary 
cannot proceed with a special election that is not authorized by statute. 
{¶ 30} As we have noted above, however, the August 8 special election is 
constitutionally authorized by Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  The 
General Assembly may call a special election on a constitutional amendment 
proposed by joint resolution and may specify a date for the special election in the 
joint resolution itself.  Foreman, 10 Ohio St.2d at 141, 226 N.E.2d 116.  And when 
the General Assembly has submitted to the secretary a joint resolution proposing a 
constitutional amendment, Article XVI, Section 1 contemplates that the secretary 
place the proposed amendment on the ballot.  See Article XVI, Section 1 (second 
and fourth paragraphs), Ohio Constitution (specifying duties of the Ohio Ballot 
Board and the secretary of state upon the General Assembly’s submission of a joint 
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment). 
{¶ 31} Therefore, R.C. 3501.40 cannot restrain the secretary from 
proceeding with a special election that the General Assembly has validly prescribed 
under the Ohio Constitution.  A statute that conflicts with the General Assembly’s 
constitutional power under Article XVI, Section 1 to authorize a special election on 
a certain day is unenforceable to prevent the special election.  See Foreman at 142.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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“Constitutional provisions are not the kin of statutes; they are the paramount law of 
Ohio.  Constitutional provisions are superior to statutes because they derive from 
the people, the fount of all political power, whereas statutes derive from the General 
Assembly, which has only the authority delegated to it by the people.” Ohio 
Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio St.3d 303, 2009-Ohio-4872, 916 N.E.2d 446,  
¶ 74 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); see also Foreman at 142; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (“Certainly all those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of 
the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an 
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void”). 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, relators are not entitled to their requested mandamus 
relief against the secretary.  The special election is authorized by Article XVI, 
Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and the secretary is therefore authorized to 
proceed with it. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, the August 8, 2023 special election called 
by the General Assembly in S.J.R. 2 is authorized by Article XVI, Section 1 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  We therefore deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART and BRUNNER, 
JJ. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY and STEWART, 
JJ. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
15 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} Respectfully, I dissent.  What happened leading up to this mandamus 
action did not have to be a big deal.  Before last year, this case would have been a 
nonissue.  But at the end of 2022, the General Assembly passed a law that prohibits 
statewide special elections in August.  2022 Sub.H.B. No. 458.  Now it wants to 
have a statewide special election in August.  The General Assembly could have 
easily made any number of changes to Ohio election laws to allow for its proposed 
special election.  But rather than changing the law, the General Assembly and 
respondent, Secretary of State Frank LaRose, want to be told that the Ohio 
Constitution allows the General Assembly to break its own laws.  Rather than doing 
the work themselves, they want this court to fix their mess and do their work for 
them.  Sadly, a majority of this court obliges. 
{¶ 35} Together, various provisions in Articles II, V, and XVI of the Ohio 
Constitution allow the General Assembly to prescribe practically whatever rules it 
wants regarding how elections are conducted.  And the General Assembly has 
prescribed rules about the dates on which special elections can be held, see R.C. 
3501.01, the way it normally does—by passing legislation that became law.  Even 
if the lead opinion is correct that Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution 
does not require the General Assembly to prescribe its special-election rules the 
way it did in R.C. 3501.01, the fact of the matter is that it did.  Now it has to follow 
them. 
{¶ 36} Contrary to what the lead opinion states, Article XVI, Section 1 does 
not give the General Assembly the power to violate the rules that it has prescribed 
by law, even when it tries to violate them in a formal pronouncement like Amended 
Substitute Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 (“S.J.R. 2”).  Because the secretary of state 
would have to violate Ohio law to comply with the directive in S.J.R. 2 to present 
a proposed constitutional amendment at a special election on August 8, 2023, it is 
the secretary’s clear legal duty to strike the proposed constitutional amendment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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from the special-election ballot.  I would grant the writ of mandamus sought by 
relators, One Person One Vote, Jeniece Brock, Brent Edwards, and Christopher 
Tavenor, and I therefore dissent from the majority’s refusal to compel the secretary 
to faithfully execute the laws of Ohio. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 37} On May 10, 2023, the Ohio General Assembly filed S.J.R. 2 with the 
secretary, instructing him to ask the people of Ohio to approve the General 
Assembly’s proposed changes to Articles II and XVI of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 38} The proposed changes to Article II, Sections 1b and 1e, and Article 
XVI, Sections 1 and 3 would, among other things, require a supermajority vote of 
60 percent to adopt amendments to the Ohio Constitution.  A simple majority of 
greater than 50 percent has been required for over a century for citizen-initiated 
proposed amendments, and a simple majority has been required for almost two 
centuries for legislatively proposed amendments.  See former Article II, Section 1, 
Ohio Constitution (1912); former Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio Constitution (1851).  
The proposed changes to Article II, Section 1g, would significantly increase the 
burden of gathering the necessary signatures for citizen-initiated proposed 
amendments to qualify for the ballot, and they would eliminate the possibility of 
curing certain deficits in signatures. 
{¶ 39} In S.J.R. 2, the General Assembly declared that “a special election is 
hereby called to be held on August 8, 2023” for the purpose of presenting the 
proposed amendments, and it commanded that the election be “conducted pursuant 
to all applicable laws.”  S.J.R. 2 is the very first legislative resolution in the history 
of the state of Ohio to ask for a statewide election on a constitutional-amendment 
proposal that is not on the date of a general election in November, or on the same 
date that is set by statute for primary elections.  Though there have been elections 
on constitutional-amendment proposals in various months throughout Ohio’s 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
17 
history,1 each non-November election occurred on the date reserved for primary 
elections.2 
{¶ 40} The secretary argues that the General Assembly’s action in S.J.R. 2 
is permitted because the framers of the 1912 amendments to the Ohio Constitution 
intended to arm the General Assembly, through Article XVI, Section 1, with the 
unrestricted power to call for special elections on its proposed constitutional 
amendments whenever it desired.  In other words, by joint resolution, the General 
Assembly is attempting to inspire a historically unprecedented impediment to the 
ability of Ohio citizens to amend their Constitution.  To add insult to injury, the 
General Assembly seeks to do so in August through a historically unprecedented 
expansion of one of the very same constitutional provisions that it wants to 
eviscerate. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 41} The controversy in this case centers on the following language in 
Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution: 
 
 
1. See Am.S.J.R. No. 9, 111 Ohio Laws 537 (August 1926); Am.S.J.R. No. 52, 130 Ohio Laws 1886 
(May 1964); Am.S.J.R. No. 1, 130 Ohio Laws, Special Session, 379-380 (May 1965); 
Am.Sub.H.J.R. No. 22, 132 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2865 (May 1967); Am.Sub.H.J.R. No. 42, 132 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 2878 (May 1968); Am.Sub.S.J.R. No. 3, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2488 (May 1972); 
Am.S.J.R. No. 15, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2022 (May 1974); Am.S.J.R. No. 4, 136 Ohio Laws, Part 
II, 3957 (June 1976); Am.Sub.H.J.R. No. 12, 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4046 (June 1978); Am.H.J.R. 
No. 42, 138 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4975 (June 1980); Am.Sub.H.J.R. No. 22, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
9020 (May 1998); 2010 Am.S.J.R. No. 8 (May 2010); 2014 S.J.R. No. 6 (May 2014); 2018 
Sub.S.J.R. No. 5 (May 2018); see also Baldwin’s Ohio Revised Code Annotated, Table of Proposed 
Amendments to Ohio Constitution, 651 (2004). 
 
2. The law in effect in 1926 provided for primary elections to be held in August.  G.C. 4963; H.B. 
No. 40, 110 Ohio Laws, 143.  As early as 1930, some primaries were to be held in May.  See G.C. 
4785-67, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 113 Ohio Laws 307, 337; see also former R.C. 3501.01(E), Am.H.B. 
1, 125 Ohio Laws, 7.  The date for primary elections was changed to June starting in 1974.  Former 
R.C. 3501.01(E), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 662, 135 Ohio Laws, Part II, 784, 792-793.  In 1983, the date 
was changed back to May.  R.C. 3501.01(E), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 213, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 630, 
637. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
Either branch of the general assembly may propose 
amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to 
by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed 
amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, 
and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days 
before the date of the election at which they are to be submitted to 
the electors, for their approval or rejection.  They shall be submitted 
on a separate ballot without party designation of any kind, at either 
a special or a general election as the general assembly may 
prescribe. 
 
{¶ 42} The General Assembly, the secretary of state, and the lead opinion 
seem to think that there are only two steps in the analysis leading to the General 
Assembly’s power to set the August 2023 election: Step 1, the General Assembly 
is constitutionally empowered to “prescribe” whether proposed constitutional 
amendments are presented at special or general elections; Step 2, the General 
Assembly gets to schedule special elections whenever it wants, even when contrary 
to the rules it has prescribed by law.  Those two short steps seem simple enough.  
But if you skip a few steps, you can infer the power to do just about anything from 
the Constitution.  A fundamental purpose of the judicial branch is to stop anyone 
from skipping those steps—particularly branches of the government seeking to 
increase their power.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) 
(“To what purpose are [legislative] powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained?”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 
L.Ed. 205 (1887) (“The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be 
misled by mere pretenses.  They are at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
19 
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the 
legislature has transcended the limits of its authority”). 
{¶ 43} If we are to serve our purpose as an independent branch of 
government that interprets the law, we cannot allow this.  There are more analytical 
steps required than the General Assembly and the lead opinion have taken here.  
The analysis does not begin with Article XVI, and it does not end with a dictionary 
definition of the word “prescribe.”  If we follow all of the proper steps to understand 
the meaning of “prescribe” as well as “special election” in the context of the 
relevant constitutional provisions and the history of Article XVI, and if we use 
standard rules of grammar, it is clear that the General Assembly’s attempt to 
prescribe new special-election rules in S.J.R. 2 cannot supersede conflicting rules 
that it has already prescribed by law. 
Skipped steps: enumerated constitutional powers and restrictions 
{¶ 44} The lead opinion concludes that the General Assembly can violate 
its own laws through a joint resolution and create ad hoc election dates whenever it 
has a constitutional amendment burning a hole in its pocket.  In doing so, the lead 
opinion has failed to evaluate the first step in a proper constitutional analysis, which 
is to consider the source of the General Assembly’s power to act in the first place, 
as well as pertinent restrictions on that power. 
{¶ 45} The primary source of the General Assembly’s power is Article II, 
Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution: “The legislative power of the state shall be 
vested in [the] general assembly.”  It is a comprehensive power, but the General 
Assembly’s power to legislate is not an unlimited power; it is subordinate to the 
will of the people of Ohio.  See Article I, Section 2 (“All political power is inherent 
in the people”); Article I, Section 20 (“all powers, not herein delegated, remain with 
the people”); accord State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 94 Ohio St. 154, 114 N.E. 
55 (1916), syllabus (the legislative power in Ohio includes “not only the two 
branches of the general assembly but the popular will as expressed in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
referendum provided for in Sections 1 and 1c of Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution”). 
{¶ 46} An important restriction on the General Assembly’s legislative 
power is that “[t]he general assembly shall enact no law except by bill.”  Article II, 
Section 15(A), Ohio Constitution.  The laws that govern the citizens of Ohio cannot 
come into existence unless the General Assembly complies with the requirements 
of Article II, Section 15, including the requirement to pass the bill in both houses, 
to style the law with specific language, to consider the bill for a minimum amount 
of time in each of the two houses, to limit the bill to one subject, and to officially 
present the bill to the governor for approval.  Article II, Section 15(A) through (E).  
With some exceptions not relevant to this discussion, a bill does not become law 
until the governor approves it and files it with the secretary of state.  Article II, 
Section 16, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 47} Second, we need to consider the basis of the General Assembly’s 
more specific constitutional authority to govern elections and election procedures, 
as well as the limitations on that authority.  The General Assembly has the express 
power and duty to pass laws governing the election of officials as well as primary 
elections.  See Article II, Section 27 (“[t]he election and appointment of all officers 
* * * shall be made in such manner as may be directed by law”); Article V, Section 
7 (“All nominations for elective state, district, county and municipal offices shall 
be made at direct primary elections or by petition as provided by law”). 
{¶ 48} The General Assembly’s discretion regarding elections is expressly 
limited by other portions of the Ohio Constitution, particularly its authority 
regarding the dates on which general elections are held.  See Article III, Section 1 
(elections for state executive officers must be held in November); Article XVII, 
Section 1 (elections for state and county officers must be held in November of even-
numbered years, and elections for all other elected officers must be held in 
November of odd-numbered years).  The General Assembly has provided by law 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
21 
that general elections shall be held in November, R.C. 3501.01(A), in accordance 
with these constitutional mandates.  The General Assembly’s actions must also not 
conflict with other constitutional powers and rights, including those found in 
Articles V and XVII, which, unlike Article XVI, govern the elective franchise and 
elections in general. 
{¶ 49} Third, we need to consider the General Assembly’s ability under the 
Ohio Constitution to act in certain scenarios without being limited by the formal 
process required for enacting laws, namely, the General Assembly’s ability to 
conduct certain business by passing joint resolutions.  To be clear, resolutions are 
not bills and they are not law.  Joint resolutions are not subject to the scrutiny and 
formal processes that apply to bills; they are simply filed with the secretary of state 
without review or approval by the governor.  See Article II, Section 15(F), Ohio 
Constitution.  Thus, the General Assembly cannot prescribe laws in a joint 
resolution, and it cannot change laws that have been prescribed by statute.  See 
Article II, Section 15, Ohio Constitution; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Kinney, 56 Ohio 
St. 721, 724, 47 N.E. 569 (1897) (“The statute law of the state can neither be 
repealed nor amended by a joint resolution of the general assembly”).  Instead, joint 
legislative resolutions are generally used under the Ohio Constitution to trigger 
some other already-existing process.  For example, the General Assembly can, by 
resolution, compel the secretary of state to issue a certificate of election in special 
cases involving vacancies.  Article II, Section 11.  The General Assembly can 
trigger this court’s jurisdiction over an allegation that the governor is unable to 
serve due to disability.  Article III, Section 22.  In these examples, the General 
Assembly would be triggering another branch of government to act.  And in Article 
XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, the General Assembly can trigger the 
secretary of state to, in turn, trigger the public to take action by voting on a proposed 
constitutional amendment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
{¶ 50} That brings us to the fourth step, which is the express but very 
specific power granted to the General Assembly in Article XVI, Section 1 of the 
Ohio Constitution to propose constitutional amendments by joint resolution.  
Again, the power to use a joint resolution is not the power to make law.  In the 
context of Article XVI, Section 1, it is the power to ask a question.  The General 
Assembly gets to ask the public, through the secretary of state, “Do you want to 
make this proposed amendment a part of the Ohio Constitution?”  An even more 
specific power granted to the General Assembly under Article XVI, Section 1 is the 
power to have the secretary of state submit the proposed constitutional amendment 
“at either a special or a general election as the general assembly may prescribe.”  
Keeping in mind that the General Assembly derives its power and duty to make 
rules governing elections from Article II of the Ohio Constitution, we know that 
the words “may prescribe” in Article XVI, Section 1 do not create or confer the 
General Assembly’s power over election procedures.  The words “may prescribe” 
refer generally to the legislature’s Article II election-rulemaking powers and 
specifically to its choice between two election categories—special or general—in 
its directive to the secretary of state. 
{¶ 51} The lead opinion disagrees and supports its position with a couple of 
context-free dictionary definitions of the word “prescribe.”  Lead opinion, ¶ 17.  
The lead opinion concludes that “prescribe” means to “impose or direct.”  Id. at  
¶ 17.  No kidding.  I think we can all agree to that generic understanding of the 
General Assembly’s power of prescription.  But the pertinent question the lead 
opinion is supposed to answer is whether a rule about special elections that the 
General Assembly prescribed in a joint resolution can prevail over the rules about 
special elections that it already prescribed in a state law.  Does the General 
Assembly’s power to “prescribe” in relation to “a special or a general election” in 
Article XVI, Section 1 pertain to already-existing powers and election procedures, 
or is it a uniquely derived power to prescribe rules of election procedure that prevail 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
23 
over all others when it comes to proposing amendments to the Ohio Constitution?  
The lead opinion infers the latter, but it skips over some context clues to get to its 
conclusion. 
Skipped clues: plain language 
{¶ 52} The plain meaning of “prescribe,” when read in the context of the 
first paragraph of Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution does not mean 
what the lead opinion contends.  When determining the intended meaning behind 
the words written into a law, we must read the words and phrases in context and 
construe them “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  State ex 
rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107,  
¶ 21.  We must also “interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with 
reference to the statutory context, ‘structure, history, and purpose.’ ”  Abramski v. 
United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014), quoting 
Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013).  To 
do otherwise leaves the choice of meaning to the personal inclinations of individual 
justices.  Thus, we should look at the term “prescribe” again, but this time within 
the context of the entire first paragraph of Article XVI, Section 1:  
 
Either branch of the general assembly may propose 
amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to 
by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed 
amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, 
and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days 
before the date of the election at which they are to be submitted to 
the electors, for their approval or rejection.  They shall be submitted 
on a separate ballot without party designation of any kind, at either 
a special or a general election as the general assembly may 
prescribe. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
 
{¶ 53} The lead opinion shifts the context of “prescribe” in the final 
sentence above by concluding that the “provision authorizes the General Assembly 
to submit the issue ‘at either a special or a general election as the general assembly 
may prescribe.’ ”  Lead opinion at ¶ 12, quoting Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio 
Constitution.  The actual phrasing of the constitutional language indicates that the 
secretary of state is the subject of the final sentence, since he is the one submitting 
the issue to the electors after the General Assembly has filed its proposed 
amendments with his office.  The first half of the sentence is an independent clause 
that contains the action: submitting issues on a ballot.  The secretary does the 
submitting.  The second half of the sentence after the comma is not a statement that 
can exist on its own, which means it is a dependent clause that exists only to modify 
or add detail to the first half of the sentence.  The second half of the sentence 
explains where the secretary of state submits the ballot: “at” one of two types of 
elections.  Thus, applying standard rules of grammar to Article XVI, Section 1 
reveals that the thing the General Assembly prescribes is the secretary’s submission 
of the ballot at one of two possible settings: a special election or a general election. 
{¶ 54} Even if we look at the final sentence according to the lead opinion’s 
understanding of grammar, the plain meaning still does not support the lead 
opinion’s conclusion that the General Assembly can create election rules by joint 
resolution that supersede any rules set by law.  The word “prescribe” as used in 
Article XVI, Section 1 relates to both special and general elections.  The General 
Assembly is categorically forbidden from prescribing, either by law or by joint 
resolution, that a general election take place on any date it chooses, because doing 
so would violate Article III, Section 1 and Article XVII, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Given this prohibition, it is clear that the word “prescribe,” when 
referring to “a special or a general election” in Article XVI, Section 1, does not 
mean “prescribe ad hoc rules regarding the date for a special or a general election.” 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
25 
{¶ 55} Because Article XVI, Section 1 lists two options for election 
categories, one of which has dates that the General Assembly cannot alter, the word 
“prescribe” indicates that the General Assembly has the power to choose between 
the two options, but it does not have the power to create new rules for those options.  
If the lead opinion were correct that the General Assembly has the power to choose 
any date it wants using a joint resolution under Article XVI, then the language 
would only need to specify that the General Assembly’s proposal be submitted “at 
an election as the general assembly may prescribe.”  The lead opinion’s 
interpretation renders the words “general” and “special” superfluous, contrary to 
elementary rules of construction.  See Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 
N.E.2d 370 (1948), paragraph five of the syllabus (“significance and effect should, 
if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part”); State ex rel. 
Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 
N.E. 516 (1917) (“No part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly 
required, and the court should avoid that construction which renders a provision 
meaningless or inoperative”). 
{¶ 56} It appears that the lead opinion gets out of this dead end by assuming 
that the meaning of “special election” inherently requires ad hoc rules.  From the 
words “prescribe” and “special election,” the lead opinion comes up with the phrase 
“prescribe that a special election take place on a certain date specified in the joint 
resolution itself.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 19.  Of course, this language does not appear 
in Article XVI, although it is necessary to the lead opinion’s conclusion.  Strangely 
enough, the lead opinion recites its conjectured extra language immediately after it 
lectures that we must not “ ‘read words into’ ” the provision and should instead 
“ ‘give effect to the words used.’ ”  Lead opinion at ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. Butler 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 124 Ohio St.3d 390, 
2010-Ohio-169, 922 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 21.  With nothing in the plain language of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
constitutional provision to support its added verbiage, the lead opinion creates 
rather than interprets the law. 
{¶ 57} To its credit, the lead opinion correctly notes: “ ‘In construing our 
state Constitution, we look first to the text of the document as understood in light 
of our history and traditions.’ ”  Lead opinion at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Smith, 162 
Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 29.  However, the lead 
opinion does not actually perform this first step, apart from looking up the word 
“prescribe” in a couple of old dictionaries.  Understanding the meaning of a word 
or phrase in a venerable text sometimes requires “recourse to something more than 
the pages of a dictionary.  The word to be defined, in common with words generally, 
will have a color and a content that will vary with the setting.”  Hawks v. Hamill, 
288 U.S. 52, 57, 53 S.Ct. 240, 77 L.Ed. 610 (1933).  We need to go over some more 
skipped steps, then, and read the text in light of our history and traditions, 
particularly the framers’ intent regarding Article XVI, Section 1, and the meaning 
of a “special election.”  With that necessary context, this court can understand the 
meaning of “may prescribe” in relation to “either a special or a general election.” 
Skipped steps: the framers’ intent 
{¶ 58} The disputed language in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution first appeared in the document in 1913.  A bit of history reveals that 
the purpose of changing the rules regarding the General Assembly’s power to 
propose constitutional amendments in Article XVI, Section 1 was directed against 
concerns at the time about the difficulty of passing proposed amendments rather 
than any concerns about the specific timing of elections at which those proposals 
would be considered. 
{¶ 59} Constitutional scholar and judge Thomas Cooley once wrote that 
“[e]very constitution has a history of its own which is likely to be more or less 
peculiar; and unless interpreted in the light of this history is liable to be made to 
express purposes which were never within the minds of the people in agreeing to 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
27 
it.”  People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481, 485, 19 N.W. 155 (1884).  Part of the peculiar 
history of Ohio is that it was notoriously difficult to amend the Ohio Constitution 
in the 1800s and leading up to the 1912 Constitutional Convention.  2 Proceedings 
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 1371 (1912) (“It 
was a mistake in the framers of the constitution of 1851, that they made that 
constitution too difficult to amend, and we have had to resort to various devices to 
get it amended”). 
{¶ 60} In 1851, Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution provided 
the following: 
 
Either branch of the general assembly may propose 
amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to, 
by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed 
amendments * * * shall be published in at least one newspaper in 
each county of the state, where a newspaper is published, for six 
months preceding the next election for senators and representatives, 
at which time the same shall be submitted to the electors, for their 
approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors, voting at such 
election, shall adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part 
of the constitution. 
 
(Emphasis added).  The General Assembly had the same ability to propose 
amendments to the Constitution through joint resolution that it has today, but the 
subsequent procedures were challenging.  In particular, a majority of all of the 
people who voted at the election had to vote to approve the amendment in order for 
it to pass.  See State ex rel. Sheets v. Laylin, 68 Ohio St. 1, 68 N.E. 574 (1903).  At 
a general election, that meant that “every blank [was] counted [as] a negative vote.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 
651 (1912).  However, such was not the case at a “special election.”  Id. 
{¶ 61} Because voters are not required to vote on every single candidate and 
issue presented in a general election, the voters’ failure to vote on down-ballot 
issues was easily fatal to proposed constitutional amendments prior to 1912.  See 2 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 
1366 (1912) (describing amendments proposed in 1908 that were overwhelmingly 
approved by those who voted on the issues, but nonetheless failed because they 
received the votes of only about one-third of all electors).  If special elections were 
held on individual matters, though, there was no risk of abstentions. 
{¶ 62} The proposed new language for Article XVI, Section 1 that became 
part of the Ohio Constitution in 1913 allowed the General Assembly to choose 
whether the proposed constitutional amendment should be presented at a special 
election or a general election and also provided that “if a majority of the electors 
voting on the same shall adopt such amendments the same shall become a part of 
the constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 1371.  A delegate advocating for the 
proposed new language explained that the change would bring Ohio in line with 
the approach adopted by a majority of the other states, which either “provide that a 
majority voting on the amendment shall make it a part of the constitution” or 
“provide that an amendment shall be submitted at a separate election, which 
amounts to the same thing.”  Id. at 1366. 
{¶ 63} Thus, the current language in Article XVI, Section 1 was not chosen 
for the purpose of allowing the legislature to be able to set ad hoc special-election 
dates whenever it wanted.  Instead, the decision to allow the General Assembly the 
option to use special elections, as well as the decision to change the voting-
tabulation language, was intended to combat the effect of vote abstentions and, 
importantly, to make it easier to amend the Ohio Constitution. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
29 
Election law: historical legislative practices and judicial interpretations 
{¶ 64} Undoubtedly, the term “special election” is not defined in the Ohio 
Constitution.  This court has historically referred to the statutory definition of the 
term in order to derive its meaning, including in the case on which the lead opinion 
heavily relies: State ex rel. Foreman v. Brown, 10 Ohio St.2d 139, 226 N.E.2d 116 
(1967). 
{¶ 65} When Foreman was decided in 1967, the version of R.C. 3501.02(E) 
that was in effect provided that all proposed constitutional amendments “may” be 
submitted at a “general election,” but the law did not mention special elections.  See 
Foreman at 143.  The General Assembly proposed constitutional amendments at 
elections held in May 1964, May 1965, and May 1967.  See Am.S.J.R. No. 52, 130 
Ohio Laws 1886; Am.S.J.R. No. 1, 130 Ohio Laws, Special Session, 379-380; 
Am.Sub.H.J.R. No. 22, 132 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2865.  The third of those three 
proposed amendments was challenged in Foreman as being improperly held at a 
special election.  This court noted that the word “may” in R.C. 3501.02(E) indicated 
discretion rather than a restriction on the General Assembly’s power to call for a 
special election on its proposed constitutional amendments under Article XVI, 
Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  Foreman at 142-143. 
{¶ 66} In 1968, shortly after Foreman was decided, the General Assembly 
amended R.C. 3501.02(E) and specified that constitutional proposals could occur 
at the general election in November or at a “special election” occurring in May, 
which was also when the primary elections were held as provided in R.C. 
3501.01(E).  See Am.H.B.  No. 934, 132 Ohio Laws, Part I, 5, 1178-1179.  The 
current version of R.C. 3501.02(E) continues to allow the same choice of 
submitting constitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly at a 
general election or at a special election occurring on the same date as a primary 
election. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
{¶ 67} Meanwhile, the statute governing the definition and dates of “special 
elections,” R.C. 3501.01(D), underwent its own changes.  From the 1940s to the 
1980s, a special election was defined as “any election other than the elections 
required by law to be regularly held on the day of a general or primary election, 
provided, however, that a special election may also be held on the day of a general 
or primary election.”  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3, 122 Ohio Laws, 325.  In 1981, the 
General Assembly changed R.C. 3501.01(D) to specify that special elections could 
be held only in February, March, June, August, and November.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
235, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2112, 2128.  In 1983, the General Assembly replaced 
June with May and eliminated March.  Am.S.B. No. 213, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
630, 637.  In 2015, the General Assembly eliminated February special elections 
from R.C. 3501.01(D).  2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64.  And finally, effective April 7, 
2023, the General Assembly eliminated August special elections from R.C. 
3501.01(D).3  2022 Sub.H.B. No. 458.  R.C. 3501.01(D) currently provides, with 
certain exceptions not applicable here, that special elections “may be held only * * * 
in May or November.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 68} The General Assembly’s current joint resolution, to the extent that it 
sets a special-election date that is not provided in R.C. 3501.02(E) and is prohibited 
by R.C. 3501.01(D), orders the secretary of state to violate special-election 
 
3. Despite the unprecedented nature of the General Assembly’s current attempt to set an ad hoc 
special-election date in violation of the law, the General Assembly believes the power to “prescribe” 
in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution has always imbued it with the inherent right to 
do so and that any statute that says otherwise is null and void.  So why is the General Assembly, 
after having removed August from R.C. 3501.01(D) as an option for special elections, choosing 
August 8 as the special-election date for the constitutional amendments proposed in S.J.R. 2?  If, by 
the lead opinion’s interpretation of Article XVI, the General Assembly does not have to follow the 
law at all, why is it trying to follow its old law governing special elections?  If the General Assembly 
truly has the unfettered power to prescribe special-election rules as the lead opinion apparently 
believes, the General Assembly could choose to set the special election from midnight to 3:00 a.m. 
on December 24.  The fact that the General Assembly feels compelled to follow its old rules is 
telling.  See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 369, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932) (“General 
acquiescence cannot justify departure from the law, but long and continuous interpretation in the 
course of official action under the law may aid in removing doubts as to its meaning”). 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
31 
requirements that are prescribed by law.  Notwithstanding this court’s holding in 
Foreman regarding legislative action under Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution in the absence of statutory restrictions, this court has held that when a 
joint resolution regarding a proposed constitutional amendment prescribes an 
election date that would prevent the secretary of state from complying with statutes 
governing election procedure, the proposed amendments must be stricken from the 
ballot.  See State ex rel. Minus v. Brown, 30 Ohio St.2d 75, 283 N.E.2d 131 (1972). 
{¶ 69} In Minus, the General Assembly submitted to the secretary of state a 
joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment with instructions that the 
secretary place it on the ballot at the election scheduled for May 2, 1972.  Id. at 77-
78.  The General Assembly’s submission was so close to the date of the election 
that it would have prevented the secretary and the county boards of elections from 
complying with various statutes governing their election duties and procedures.4  
Id. at 79.  This court held that the General Assembly’s power to propose 
amendments to the Constitution “is not an inherent legislative prerogative—it ‘is 
the exercise of a special power granted to the General Assembly, which must be 
strictly complied with.’ ”  Minus at 79-80, quoting Leach v. Brown, 167 Ohio St. 1, 
5, 145 N.E.2d 525 (1957).  Citing Foreman, this court held that when the manner 
of submitting a joint resolution pursuant to Article XVI, Section 1 would make 
executive-branch actors unable to comply with applicable election statutes, “it 
becomes the clear legal duty of the Secretary of State to strike such proposed 
constitutional amendment from the ballot, and this court will exercise its 
jurisdiction and allow a writ of mandamus.”  Minus at 81. 
{¶ 70} Under the reasoning in Minus, the General Assembly’s proposed 
constitutional amendments in S.J.R. 2 should be stricken from the ballot because 
 
4. The 1974 amendments to the Ohio Constitution added a requirement in Article XVI, Section 1 
that the General Assembly file its proposed constitutional amendments with the secretary of state at 
least 90 days before the election date. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
the General Assembly’s directives not only prevent the secretary from complying 
with the election laws of Ohio but require him to violate those laws.  In addition to 
violating the mandates of R.C. 3501.01(D) regarding the dates on which special 
elections may be held and failing to conform to the special-election dates set forth 
in R.C. 3501.02(E), the secretary will violate election statutes that are tied to the 
dates set in R.C. 3501.01(D) and 3501.02(E), such as R.C. 3505.01(A) 
(certification of ballots by the secretary of state for special elections governed by 
R.C. 3501.02(E)), R.C. 3509.01 (provision of absentee ballots for special elections 
governed by R.C. 3501.02(E)), and R.C. 3511.02(A)(2) (application for uniformed 
services or overseas absentee ballot for special elections governed by R.C. 
3501.02(E)). 
{¶ 71} The lead opinion does not dispute that the General Assembly will 
cause the secretary to violate state law by its directive in S.J.R. 2 to set a special 
election on August 8, 2023, and rather glibly says that the Ohio Constitution 
authorizes the General Assembly’s actions regardless of what the Revised Code 
requires.  Lead opinion at ¶ 30.  In other words, without being asked to do so, and 
without saying they are doing so, the lead opinion declares R.C. 3501.01(D) and all 
other relevant statutes to be unconstitutional.  Again, it ignores some necessary 
steps to do so. 
Skipped steps: declaring a statute to be unconstitutional. 
{¶ 72} This court must never declare a statute to be actually or 
hypothetically invalid unless the matter is placed before the court and the 
unconstitutionality is fully and soundly proven.  Cincinnati, Wilmington, & 
Zanesville RR. Co. v. Clinton Cty. Commrs., 1 Ohio St. 77, 84 (1852).  And if the 
matter is placed before the court, “before any legislative power, as expressed in a 
statute, can be held invalid, it must appear that such power is clearly denied by 
some constitutional provision.”  Williams v. Scudder, 102 Ohio St. 305, 307, 131 
N.E. 481 (1921). 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
33 
{¶ 73} Because the legislative power in Ohio is vested in the General 
Assembly, any alleged constitutional prohibition against its ability to enact a 
particular law “must either be found in express terms, or be clearly inferable, by 
necessary implication, from the language of the instrument, when fairly construed 
according to its manifest spirit and meaning.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Lehman v. McBride, 
15 Ohio St. 573, 592 (1863).  Thus, if we are to question the constitutionality of 
R.C. 3501.01(D), we must determine if it either directly conflicts with any express 
constitutional provisions or if it necessarily frustrates the operability of any express 
or implied constitutional powers. 
{¶ 74} The constitutional language at issue, again, is that the General 
Assembly’s joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Ohio Constitution 
“shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days before the date of the 
election at which [it is] to be submitted to the electors,” and the proposed 
amendment “shall be submitted on a separate ballot * * * at either a special or a 
general election as the general assembly may prescribe.”  Article XVI, Section 1, 
Ohio Constitution.  There is no express limitation on how the General Assembly 
“may prescribe,” and given that the legislature’s primary role and duty under 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution is to prescribe rules by law, there is no express 
or implied constitutional prohibition against prescribing rules that govern “a special 
or a general election” by law.  Although the General Assembly is prohibited from 
filing its joint resolution fewer than 90 days before an election, there is otherwise 
no limitation on when the General Assembly must prescribe rules that govern 
special or general elections, and thus, there is no express or implied constitutional 
prohibition against prescribing its rules well ahead of time by law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
{¶ 75} No one has shown or even alleged that the General Assembly is 
prohibited from regulating the dates of special elections by law.5  The most 
generous prohibition we could glean from Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution, and the one gleaned in Foreman, is that the General Assembly cannot 
legislate away its ability to choose between the two options of having its proposed 
constitutional amendment submitted on a ballot “at either a special or a general 
election.”  Foreman, 10 Ohio St.2d at 142, 226 N.E.2d 116.  The General 
Assembly’s rules in R.C. 3501.01(D) and 3501.02(E) do not legislate away its 
ability to so choose.  Those laws are in fact a proper exercise of the General 
Assembly’s powers derived from Article II and contemplated in Article XVI, and 
those duly enacted laws facilitate the General Assembly’s ability to call for special 
elections under Article XVI, Section 1 in a way that is orderly, transparent, and 
fiscally responsible. 
{¶ 76} To the extent that the lead opinion infers that Article XVI, Section 1 
requires that the General Assembly retain the unfettered discretion to override the 
law by using a joint resolution in order to set any date that it wants for a special 
election, the lead opinion’s reasoning is plainly erroneous.  When a power is not 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution, we may infer power only to the extent 
that it is “ancillary or incidental to the power granted.”  Marshall v. Gordon, 243 
U.S. 521, 537, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881 (1917); see also Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 
108 Ohio St. 245, 253-254, 140 N.E. 595 (1923) (“The delegation of political power 
is either expressed or implied; but it must always be remembered that implied 
powers delegated must be such as are naturally or necessarily incidental or auxiliary 
to the express power, and, as such, the implied power cannot be in any wise 
destructive of, or in conflict with, an express delegation of power”). 
 
5. Secretary LaRose argues that the term “prescribe” “does not require that the General Assembly 
pass a law,” and he does not contend that the term “prescribe” prohibits the General Assembly from 
passing a law.  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
35 
{¶ 77} The ability to choose absolutely any ad hoc special-election date in 
a joint resolution is not necessary for the General Assembly to exercise its express 
power provided in Article XVI, Section 1.  Currently enacted law already enables 
the General Assembly to exercise its power to have its constitutional-amendment 
proposals placed on the ballot at special elections.  Although R.C. 3501.01(D) 
frustrates the General Assembly’s current desire to eviscerate the direct democratic 
process in Ohio as soon as possible, the law does not conflict with the General 
Assembly’s express or implied powers under Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Accordingly, R.C. 3501.01(D) and its related statutes are not 
unconstitutional. 
{¶ 78} The General Assembly cannot repeal or invalidate R.C. 3501.01(D) 
in S.J.R. 2.  See Kinney, 56 Ohio St. at 724, 47 N.E. 569; Article II, Section 15, 
Ohio Constitution.  It must conform to the restrictions of R.C. 3501.01(D), even 
when calling for a special election as contemplated by Article XVI, Section 1 of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 79} The General Assembly is not above the laws that its own body has 
duly enacted.  It is constrained by Article II, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution to 
amend or repeal laws such as R.C. 3501.01(D) by bill, and it cannot do so by joint 
resolution.  The General Assembly’s decision to regulate election procedures by 
law is not unconstitutional, and its regulation of special elections by law in fact 
promotes the democratic process and maximizes the chance for elections to truly 
reflect the will of the people.  The General Assembly must now have its proposed 
amendments put to a vote through the rules it has chosen to prescribe in statutes 
such as R.C. 3501.01. 
{¶ 80} Although the General Assembly may trigger the secretary of state to 
act through a joint resolution under Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, 
the secretary has the duty to faithfully execute the laws of Ohio.  See Article III, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
36 
Section 6, Ohio Constitution.  The General Assembly cannot command the 
secretary of state to violate the laws he is bound to follow.  As was the case in 
Minus, S.J.R. 2 orders the secretary to perform acts that violate the law, and it is 
therefore the secretary’s clear legal duty to strike the proposed constitutional 
amendment from the special-election ballot.  I would grant the writ of mandamus.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 81} I join Justice Donnelly’s dissenting opinion, and I separately dissent 
to make clear for the members of the majority and the public the long reach of the 
ramifications of this court’s judgment today. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 82} The lead opinion’s latching on to the word “prescribe,” as set forth 
in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, is a harmful basis for its 
decision.  Article XVI, Section 1 allows for proposed constitutional amendments 
that are adopted by a super majority of both chambers of the General Assembly by 
joint resolution to be placed before the electors of this state. 
 
Either branch of the General Assembly may propose 
amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to 
by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed 
amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, 
and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days 
before the date of the election at which they are to be submitted to 
the electors, for their approval or rejection. 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
37 
Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio Constitution.  Submission of such proposed 
constitutional amendments must be by “a separate ballot without party designation 
of any kind, at either a special or a general election as the General Assembly may 
prescribe.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 83} In reaching its decision, the lead opinion defers to the legislature, 
which determined that its proposed constitutional amendments would be presented 
at a special election on a date that is specifically not authorized by law.  See R.C. 
3501.01(A) and (D), 3501.022, and 3501.40.  The lead opinion has allowed for this 
by finding that the constitutional phrase “at either a special or a general election as 
the General Assembly may prescribe” means that the legislature, in selecting a 
special-election date for voting on the proposal, may choose a date that is not 
authorized by law—i.e., that the General Assembly is not limited to choosing 
between the current definition of “special election” set forth in R.C. 3501.01(D) 
and the date of the next general election. 
{¶ 84} The verb “prescribe” means “[t]o write or lay down as a rule or 
direction to be followed; to impose authoritatively; to ordain, decree; to assign.”  
Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/150644?redirected 
From=prescribe (accessed May 31, 2023) [https://perma.cc/535V-HVRU].  Yet it 
does not stand alone in the constitutional text.  “Prescribe” relates to the 
legislature’s choice to “submit[] to the electors, for their approval or rejection” the 
proposed constitutional amendment, “at either a special or a general election.”  
Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio Constitution.  Nothing about that text allows the 
General Assembly to create a new special-election date without regard to other 
statutory and constitutional election provisions; rather, the text permits the 
legislature to simply prescribe a choice between “either a special or a general 
election.”  Id.  Were the provision to mean that any date could be selected, the 
phrase “at either a special or a general election” would be mere surplusage and the 
provision could simply read: “They shall be submitted on a separate ballot without 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
38 
party designation of any kind, at [an] election as the General Assembly may 
prescribe.”  This is not a permissible interpretation.  See Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 
161 Ohio St.3d 160, 2020-Ohio-3832, 161 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 10 (observing that  
“ ‘[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules 
of grammar and common usage,’ R.C. 1.42, and the court must give effect to all of 
the statute’s words” [brackets added in Buddenberg]); Centerville v. Knab, 162 
Ohio St.3d 623, 2020-Ohio-5219, 166 N.E.3d 1167, ¶ 22 (“The court generally 
applies the same rules when construing the Constitution as it does when it construes 
a statutory provision”). 
{¶ 85} It is true, as the lead opinion notes, that this court has stated that the 
language at issue means that “Section 1 of Article XVI empowers the General 
Assembly to provide for submission of a constitutional amendment, proposed by 
the General Assembly pursuant to that section, at a special election on a certain day; 
and the General Assembly may authorize such election by a joint resolution without 
enacting a statute.”  State ex rel. Foreman v. Brown, 10 Ohio St.2d 139, 226 N.E.2d 
116 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.  We also stated that “if action, taken by 
the General Assembly pursuant to Section 1 of Article XVI and authorizing a 
special election on a certain day, does conflict with an unrepealed existing statute, 
the action so taken pursuant to specific constitutional authority would require a 
holding that the statute was unconstitutional so far as it conflicted with such action.”  
Foreman at 142.  Foreman, however, was decided at a time when the Revised Code 
did “not prohibit[] the submission of such a proposed constitutional amendment at 
a special election.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Thus, we also observed, 
“In the instant case, it is not necessary for us to make such a holding of 
unconstitutionality because there is no conflict between any statute and the action 
taken by the General Assembly in Amended Substitute House Joint Resolution No. 
22 in calling a special election.”  Id. at 142.  But now, Ohio statutory law prohibits 
August elections.  See R.C. 3501.01(A) and (D), 3501.022, and 3501.40.  In other 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
39 
words, Foreman is not on all fours with the situation in this case; the statement 
regarding constitutional authority made in Foreman was merely dicta. 
{¶ 86} Moreover, even if, arguendo, we were to accept the lead opinion’s 
premise that “prescribe” means that the General Assembly may select any date for 
an election rather than choosing only between “either a special or general election,” 
it still does not follow that the General Assembly’s duly enacted statutes forbidding 
August special elections must yield to a subsequent joint resolution.  Constitutional 
rights and provisions are supreme over statutory provisions; nevertheless, 
constitutional provisions are not absolute.  People have the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech and assembly, but these rights are subject to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions.  See Cleveland v. McCardle, 139 Ohio St.3d 414, 
2014-Ohio-2140, 12 N.E.3d 1169, ¶ 10, quoting Heffron v. Internatl. Soc. for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 
(1981) (“even expression ‘protected by the First Amendment [is] subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions’ ” [brackets added in McCardle]).  
People have the right to bear arms, but the United States Supreme Court has 
routinely made clear that some reasonable restrictions on guns are nevertheless 
constitutionally permissible.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 626-27, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), fn. 26.  There is a 
constitutional right to freedom from bodily restraint, yet we have a vast system of 
criminal offenses and incarceration.  See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445, 131 
S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011).  In short, many of our statutory laws burden 
some constitutional right in some way, and yet they are presumed to be 
constitutional when enacted and are not struck down unless they are found to have 
impermissibly burdened a constitutional right. 
 
The question of the constitutionality of every law being first 
determined by the General Assembly, every presumption is in favor 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
40 
of its constitutionality, and it must clearly appear that the law is in 
direct conflict with inhibitions of the Constitution before a court will 
declare it unconstitutional. 
 
Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 331 
N.E.2d 730 (1975), paragraph four of the syllabus.  Here, there has been no showing 
that the General Assembly directly violated the Ohio Constitution when it decided 
to enact statutes forbidding August elections, thereby enshrining the laudable 
purposes behind those prohibitions—i.e., curtailing elections that are unduly 
expensive and that result in depressed voter turnout. 
{¶ 87} Instead, what the General Assembly has done is ignore the law.  
This, it cannot do.  While the legislature could have repealed the prohibition on 
August special elections via legislation, it attempted to do so but failed.  See 2023 
Sub.S.B. No. 92 (as introduced) and 2023 H.B. No. 144 (as introduced).  That 
failure speaks volumes.  So instead, it simply adopted a joint resolution in direct 
violation of the law.  But we have long held that “[t]he statute law of the state can 
neither be repealed nor amended by a joint resolution of the general assembly.”  
State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Kinney, 56 Ohio St. 721, 724, 47 N.E. 569 (1897).  Nor 
is the General Assembly or its members above the law.  Legislators, for example, 
have the constitutional “right to protest against any act, or resolution,” Article II, 
Section 10, Ohio Constitution, but not by setting the capitol building on fire, 
because arson is prohibited by R.C. 2909.03.  Unless the prohibition on August 
elections is first shown to be unconstitutional, the joint resolution ordering an 
August special election is an impermissible violation of statute and cannot stand. 
{¶ 88} Furthermore, the very section of the Ohio Constitution granting 
power to the legislature to propose constitutional amendments, Article XVI, 
Section 1, also provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive, original 
jurisdiction in all cases challenging the adoption or submission of a proposed 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
41 
constitutional amendment to the electors,” id.  There is no proviso or presumption 
that what the legislature proposes to do to the very document to which it and all 
Ohio elected officials must submit, must be given deference over what the people 
have reserved to themselves in Article II, Section 1, which states, “The legislative 
power of the state shall be vested in a general assembly consisting of a senate and 
house of representatives but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose 
to the general assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or 
reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as hereinafter provided.”  There is 
no basis for deferring to the legislature on the question of whether the General 
Assembly can decree that an election occur on a date that is no longer authorized 
by statute.  And it is this court that is empowered and commanded to make that 
determination.  See Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 89} The General Assembly has specifically abolished special elections 
that are held on a date other than the date of a primary election (with minor 
exceptions not applicable here) via 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 458, which took effect April 
23, 2023.  The General Assembly’s choices are thus limited to deciding whether 
Amended Substitute Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 (“S.J.R. 2”) is to be voted on 
this November or at a primary election to be held in 2024.  S.J.R. 2 prescribes an 
election date not permitted by statute, and it is our duty to strike from the proposed 
constitutional amendment that portion of its language that is not authorized by 
Article XVI, Section 1 or by state law. Our jurisdiction to do this is exclusive and 
provided by the very section under which the legislature purports to act. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 90} The judicial power in Ohio is vested in the courts.  Article IV, 
Section 1, Ohio Constitution.  Each of the three branches of this state’s government 
is coequal with the others.  When out of balance, our very purpose for existing, 
including the protection of inalienable rights as provided in Article I, Section 1, is 
ominously undercut, affecting the essential truth that “[a]ll men are, by nature, free 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
42 
and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety,” id.  A government out 
of balance, whereby one branch inexplicably and without basis to do so accedes to 
another—especially in the interpretation of rights reserved to the people—taints the 
very stewardship to which we, as the people’s servants, must give ourselves 
completely.  As the judiciary, we are the institution in which the people have 
invested the power to carefully determine what is the law for their very benefit.  
Our judgment is relied on to best understand when we must exercise deference and 
restraint and when we must step forward to defend individual rights so elemental 
that they are at the heart of the power most basic to our duty. 
{¶ 91} Today, we should be holding that the legislature may not “prescribe” 
what is not provided by law.  We must strike from S.J.R. 2 that provision that sets 
the date for a “special” election for August 8, 2023, and order the secretary of state 
to instruct the boards of elections of this state not to hold such an election, as it can 
neither exist nor proceed under the law of this state.  Because the majority does not, 
I respectfully dissent. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, and 
Katie I. Street; and Elias Law Group, L.L.P., David R. Fox, Emma Olson Sharkey, 
Jyoti Jasrasaria, and Samuel T. Ward-Packard, for relators. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Julie M. Pfeiffer, Amanda L. Narog, 
Michael A. Walton, Elizabeth H. Smith, and Phillip T. Kelly, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for respondent. 
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, and Richard N. Coglianese and Aaron 
D. Epstein, Assistant City Attorneys, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae 
City of Columbus. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
43 
Muskovitz & Lemmerbrock, L.L.C., Susannah Muskovitz, and Thomas M. 
Steffas, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Federation of Teachers, 
AFT, AFL-CIO. 
ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Amy R. Gilbert, Freda J. Levenson, David J. 
Carey, and Carlen Zhang-D’Souza, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae 
League of Women Voters of Ohio. 
Hubay Dougherty, L.L.C., and Trent Dougherty, urging granting of the writ 
for amicus curiae Ohio Citizen Action. 
Brian J. Eastman and Kelly L. Phillips, urging granting of the writ for 
amicus curiae Ohio Education Association. 
O’Connor, Haseley & Wilhelm, L.L.C., and John M. Haseley, urging 
granting of the writ for amicus curiae We Are Ohio. 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, urging denial of 
the writ for amicus curiae Joseph Platt. 
_________________