Title: TONGUE RIVER ELECTRIC COOP INC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 8 1 - 2 3 3 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA TONGUE RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, I N C . , a M o n t a n a corporation, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , MONTANA POWER COMPANY, a M o n t a n a corporation, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Sixteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of R o s e b u d H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : C r o w l e y , H a u g h e y , H a n s o n , T o o l e & D i e t r i c h , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a J a c k R a m i r e z argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana John W. R o s s , B u t t e , M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : C h a r l e s W. Jardine argued, M i l e s C i t y , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : O c t o b e r 20, 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : N o v e m b e r 25, 1 9 8 1 Filed: N O V 2, 5 1981 V C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Rosebud County, where judgment w a s entered a g a i n s t Montana Power Company t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t Tongue River E l e c t r i c Cooperative had t h e r i g h t t o provide e l e c t r i c a l s e r v i c e s t o a subdivision located i n Rosebud County, Montana, under s e c t i o n 69-5-105, MCA, and t h a t Montana Power d i d n o t q u a l i f y t o provide such e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e s under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 69-5-107, MCA. W e r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t Court. .The subdivision i s located i n Section 33, Township 2 North, Range 4 1 East, Rosebud County, Montana, where housing i s being developed by t h e Montana Power Company a s a p a r t of t h e townsite expansion of C o l s t r i p . A t t h e t i m e of t h e hearing, Montana Power owned 80 a c r e s located i n s e c t i o n 33, and was i n t h e process of purchasing from Burlington Northern, Inc. an a d d i t i o n a l 504.75 a c r e s i n t h e s a m e s e c t i o n . Montana Power was already developing housing i n t h e 80 a c r e s f i r s t purchased, and e l e c t r i c a l s e r v i c e had been i n s t a l l e d . The subdivision i s r e l a t e d t o t h e C o l s t r i p power production p r o j e c t s , and was undertaken f o r t h e purpose of providing housing f o r Montana Power employees and o t h e r s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e development of t h e C o l s t r i p power complex. Montana Power eclployees receive a discount on e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e s provided by t h e i r employer. A s of t h e d a t e of t h e hearing, 4 2 townhouses and 13 single-family dwellings had been completed. The evidence i n d i c a t e d t h a t it would t a k e Tongue River 6 months t o 1 year t o provide t h e electric service. Tongue River contends t h a t Montana Power is s t a r t i n g t h e subdivision and placing residences and townhouses thereon f o r t h e purpose of s e l l i n g and r e n t i n g them. -2- The District Court found that Tongue River had the closest line to the subdivision, crossing a portion of section 33, which now provides service to a business estab- blished on that section, outside the town limits of Colstrip, and that the same line extends north to supply services to other customers. It found that Montana Power owns the unincorporated town of Colstrip, coal mines, lands containing coal around the town, the generating plants, and is in the process of constructing additional plants and other property necessary for its generating operation. The District Court found that Colstrip is a rural area that does not have sufficient housing for Montana Power employees and construction workers and for that reason, the company started the construction of a subdivision to provide additional housing for its employees and construction workers on section 33. The subdivision is separated from Colstrip by a state highway. The Territorial Integrity Act of 1971, section 69-5- 101, et seq., MCA, was the result of a settlement of long- standing disputes between the investor-owned utilities and the electrical cooperatives over which electrical supplier would have the right to provide electrical service to new consumers and customers. Succinctly stated, under the act, the electric supplier having a line nearest the "premises" of nonindustrial or noncommercial new consumers has the right to provide the electric service. Section 69-5-105(1), MCA. The nearest electric supplier to such new consumers is determined on the shortest straight line which can be drawn from the conductor nearest the "premises" to the nearest permanent portion of the premises to be served. Montana- Dakota Util. v. Lower Yellowstone (1978), 178 Mont. 427, 433, 585 P.2d 626, 630; section 69-5-105(2), MCA. The act contains an exception, however, with regard t o i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, o r o t h e r consumers, t h a t "nothing . . . s h a l l r e s t r i c t t h e r i g h t of an e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r t o furnish e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e t o any property owned by t h e e l e c t r i c supplier." Section 69-5-107, MCA. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 69-5-107, MCA, t h e D i s t r i c t Court concluded: ". . . This Court holds t h a t 'premises' and 'property' do n o t have t h e same meaning. 'Premises,' a s used i n t h i s A c t , does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean property owned by an e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r . I t means property which i s owned o r used by an e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r f o r commercial o r i n d u s t r i a l usage as defined by t h e A c t i n s e c t i o n 69-5-102(7), MCA, 1979, which provides: "'(7)"Premises" means a building, residence, s t r u c t u r e , o r f a c i l i t y t o which e l e c t r i c i t y is being o r i s t o be furnished; provided, t h a t two o r more buildings, s t r u c t u r e s , o r f a c i l i t i e s which are located on one t r a c t o r contiguous t r a c t s of land and are u t i l i z e d by one e l e c t r i c consumer f o r farming, business, commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l , governmental, o r trailer c o u r t purposes s h a l l together c o n s t i t u t e one premises, except t h a t any such building, s t r u c t u r e , o r f a c i l i t y , o t h e r than a t r a i l e r c o u r t , s h a l l not, together with any o t h e r building, s t r u c t u r e , o r f a c i l i t y , c o n s t i t u t e one premises i f t h e e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e t o it is s e p a r a t e l y metered and t h e charges f o r such s e r v i c e are c a l c u l a t e d independently of charges f o r s e r v i c e t o any o t h e r building, s t r u c t u r e , o r f a c i l i t y . ' "To hold t h a t s e c t i o n 69-5-107 be given its l i t e r a l e f f e c t would destroy t h e purpose of t h e a c t i n t h i s case." Thus, t h e D i s t r i c t Court, i n i n t e r p r e t i n g s e c t i o n 69-5- 107, which s t a t e s t h a t an e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o f u r n i s h e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e t o "any property" owned by t h e e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r , l i m i t e d t h e t e r m "any property" t o commercial o r i n d u s t r i a l usage by t h e e l e c t r i c s u p p l i e r . The i n s e r t i o n of t h a t limited meaning t o t h e t e r m "any property" contravenes t h e r o l e of c o u r t s i n i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s . That r o l e i s defined i n s e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA, which s t a t e s : " I n t h e construction of a s t a t u t e , t h e o f f i c e of t h e judge is simply t o a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what i s i n t e r m s o r i n substance contained t h e r e i n , n o t t o i n s e r t what has been omitted o r t o omit what has been i n s e r t e d . . ." The t e r m "any property" i s n o t ambiguous. I t i s p l a i n and c e r t a i n . Where t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e can be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, t h e c o u r t s may not go f u r t h e r and apply any o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (1978), 176 Mont. 364, 369, 578 P.2d 724, 727; S t a t e ex rel. Huffman v. D i s t r i c t Court (1969), 154 Mont. 201, 204, 461 P.2d 847, 849. By s t a t u t e , when t h e t e r m "property" is used, it means r e a l and personal property. Section 1-1-205(3), MCA. That code d e f i n i t i o n i s binding on t h e D i s t r i c t Court and on us: "Whenever t h e meaning of a word o r phrase i s defined i n any p a r t of t h i s code, such d e f i n i t i o n i s applicable t o t h e same word o r phrase wherever it occurs, except where a contrary i n t e n t i o n p l a i n l y appears." Section 1-2-107, MCA. W e f i n d and hold under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case t h a t Montana Power i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t of t h e exception contained i n s e c t i o n 69-5-107, MCA, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t it may supply "any property" owned by it. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is reversed. W e Concur: J u s t i c e Chief J u s t i c e