Title: Hutchins v. Huntley

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

595 So. 2d 886 (1992)
James HUTCHINS
v.
Sam HUNTLEY and Robert Green.
1910259.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 20, 1992.
*887 W. Lee Pittman of Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton & Hollis, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Randall S. Haynes of Morris, Haynes & Ingram and John Tom Radney of Radney & Associates, Alexander City, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
On October 13, 1988, while operating a table saw during his employment with Robinson Foundry in Alexander City, Alabama, James Hutchins suffered an injury, an amputation of his left thumb. On December 19, 1989, he sued JET Equipment & Tools, Inc., the supplier of the table saw, and also 27 fictitiously named parties. After the statutory period of limitations had expired, Hutchins amended his complaint, substituting co-employee defendants Billy Watson, Sam Huntley, and Robert Green for the fictitiously named defendant previously designated as "No. 2" in the caption of the complaint: "No. 2, whether singular or plural, that person or those persons who were employees or executive officers of [Hutchins's] employer who were negligent on or before the occasion made the basis of this suit and whose negligence was a proximate cause of [Hutchins's] injuries." Hutchins also added a count expanding and specifying the wrongful conduct he was alleging on the part of Watson, Huntley, and Green. Watson, Huntley and Green filed a joint motion for summary judgment, contending the following:
(Emphasis original.) The trial court entered a summary judgment for Watson, Huntley, and Green. Hutchins did not oppose the summary judgment motion as to Watson, conceding that Watson was entitled to a judgment based on the defendants' second contention. The court based its summary judgment for Huntley and Green on a conclusion that the amendment by which Hutchins substituted Huntley and Green for fictitiously named defendant No. 2 did not relate back to the filing of the lawsuit and, therefore, that the statute of limitations barred Hutchins's action against them:
The trial court entered a Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., order making the summary *888 judgments final as to the three individuals. JET Equipment & Tools, Inc., who supplied the saw to Robinson Foundry, remains a defendant in the case below. Hutchins appealed as to Huntley and Green. We affirm.
The fictitiously named party for whom Huntley and Green were substituted was described as follows: "No. 2, whether singular or plural, that person or those persons who were employees or executive officers of [Hutchins's] employer who were negligent on or before the occasion made the basis of this suit and whose negligence was a proximate cause of [Hutchins's] injuries." (Emphasis added.)
In the body of the complaint, Hutchins alleged the following:
(Emphasis added.)
Alabama Code 1975, § 25-5-11, prohibits co-employee suits based upon negligence or wantonness and permits only suits founded upon "willful" conduct (as that conduct is defined in § 25-5-11). Therefore, the only action permitted against Huntley and Green would have been one alleging "willful" conduct. Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala.1988).
Huntley and Green argue that the description of fictitiously named defendant No. 2 contained an allegation of negligent conduct only. Therefore, they contend that *889 the amendment cannot relate back to the original complaint to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations and that the trial court properly entered a judgment in their favor.
Hutchins contends that he properly alleged a cause of action against Huntley and Green in the original complaint, and, therefore, that pursuant to Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c) the amendment substituting Huntley and Green as real parties did relate back. He argues that he "painted the `broad stroke' outlines of a cause of action against a co-employee," which, he says, under notice pleading was all that was requiredthat is, he says, § 25-5-11 is clear as to the form of misconduct that may be asserted against a co-employee and therefore the contents of the original complaint, particularly the description of the workplace accident and the reference to § 25-5-11, put any co-employee on notice that he alleged and intended to prove that that co-employee acted willfully in some manner. He further contends that his failure to use the word "willful" or "willfulness" in describing the wrongful conduct of Huntley and Green does not mean that he failed to state a cause of action against them, because, he says, he made a sufficient allegation of their wrongful conduct (which included an allegation of willful conduct of both Huntley and Green) in the original complaint. Therefore, he says, the missing word "willful" or "willfulness" could be added and was added by later amendment.
As this Court stated in Fowlkes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 803, 806 (Ala.1980):
(Emphasis added.) See, also Moorer v. Doster Construction Co., 442 So. 2d 97, 98-99 (Ala.1983), in which the Court clarified the rule of "relation back":
(Emphasis omitted.)
Did a claim that Huntley and Green were negligent on or before the occasion made the basis of this suit and that their negligence proximately caused Hutchins's injuries state a cause of action against Huntley and Green? No.
Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Huntley and Green.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.