Title: PETITION OF MEIDINGER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 1J09b IN L'HE 5UPREN6 JOUK'I' OF THE STAfE 3P XONrJ'ANA LN THE LNAI"L'EK dh' 1:HE !'J3Tl'I'ION O F LEON 0. MEIDINGER, P e t i t i o n e r . i o u ~ l s e l of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Moses, Kampfe, Tolliver dnci Wr~ghr, 8 i l l i n g s , Pfontana Yruce Barnard argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana 'idilllam Krutzfeldt , County Attorney, argued, Miles City, Montana Submitted: August 9, 1975 ! ) a i d e d : SEP 1 1 ?9/5 > L Y l i ' i l e d : ' I J M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an original proceeding wherein p e t i t i o n e r seeks a w r i t of habeas corpus. Upon the f i l i n g of the p e t i t i o n t h i s Court ordered an adversary hearing t o be held on July 30, 1975, and t h a t copy of the p e t i t i o n , memorandum i n support, and copy of t h e order s e t t i n g the hearing be served upon the attorney general and the d i s t r i c t judge before whom t h e d i s t r i c t court proceedings were had. Such adversary hearing was held and a period of ten days granted counsel f o r submission of b r i e f s . The b r i e f s have been f i l e d and the matter i s now before the Court f o r decision. Petitioner a s s e r t s t h a t on July 9, 1973, he was con- victed of the crime of burglary i n the f i r s t degree, and sen- tenced t o eight years i n the s t a t e penitentiary, a l l but two years being suspended. The sentence commenced on November 1, 1971, and with good time earned a t the prison h i s probation was due t o expire on M a y 5 , 1979. As hereafter appears i n the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t , petitioner was previously t r i e d f o r the same crime, convicted, and sentenced but t h a t conviction was s e t aside by the federal court and on the 1973 conviction he was given c r e d i t f o r the time served on the previous conviction from November 1, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation under the supervision of the Board of Pardons and Parole and was assigned t o t h e specific supervision of M r . Philip E. Sanderson, a parole and probation o f f i c e r from Billings. O n March 17, 1975, Sanderson f i l e d a violation report alleging c e r t a i n violations of the terms and conditions of probation had been committed by petitioner. That report of violation of the terms and conditions of h i s parole were: 1) State Rule #l - Respect and obey law - O n 12/8/1974, he pled g u i l t y t o a charge of disturbing t h e peace a t Bridger, Montana, and was fined $100. 2) S t a t e Rule #3- Departure from assigned d i s t r i c t without permission - O n 1/4/1975 he was arrested i n Elko, Nevada, and did not have permission from h i s probation o f f i c e r t o leave the s t a t e . O n 2/22/1975 he was i n the c i t y of Santa Monica, California, when he was supposed t o be i n Clovis, N e w Mexico, a s s t a t e d on h i s t r a v e l permit which was issued by h i s parole o f f i c e r f o r t r a v e l by a i r , but instead he took h i s own car. (Noteworthy here, when arrested i n Santa Monica he had t h i r t y - f i v e $100 b i l l s ) . 3) State Rule #5 - Possession of burglary tools o r deadly weapons - O n 2/22/1975, when he was arrested by the Santa Monica police i n h i s room were an instrument f o r l i s t e n i n g t o police c a l l s , one handgun case, s e t of alarm jumper cables, one Ace Lock Pick and one Ace Hollow B i t . 4) State Rule #6 - Use t o excess of beer o r intoxicating liquors - O n 3/6/1975, he reported t o h i s parole o f f i c e r noticeably intoxicated, smelled of liquor on h i s breath, and h i s speech was slurred. 5) State Rule #7. - Steady employment. - He refused t o f i l l out monthly reports showing h i s sources of income. A t no time has h i s parole o f f i c e r known of h i s holding a job, but s t i l l manages t o support h i s family. Be s t a t e d t o the o f f i c e r t h a t h i s wife was the owner of a bar and she was supporting him. The parole o f f i c e r recommended p e t i t i o n e r ' s suspended sentence be revoked. The county attorney f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e imposition of f i n a l judgment and sentence based upon the foregoing report. A motion t o dismiss was f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel; a hearing was s e t f o r May 7, 1975, continued a t the request of p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel t o May 19. O n May 19 a t the request of p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel it was again continued t o June 4. O n t h a t day the hearing was held, petitioner and h i s counsel were present. A t the con- clusion of the hearing the matter was taken under advisement and t h e r e a f t e r on June 20, 1975, the court entered an order and sen- tence revoking t h e suspended sentence of s i x years, giving c r e d i t f o r 618 days thereon, and depriving him of c e r t a i n specified constitutional r i g h t s during the remaining term of h i s sentence. The court a l s o made and entered findings of f a c t and conclusions of law. The findings were: "I. Defendant was sentenced on July 9, 1973, on a g u i l t y plea t o the crime charged, burglary, t o eight years i n the State Penitentiary. The term was t o commence November 1, 1971; and s i x years of the sentence was suspended. The sentence was drafted i n t h a t fashion so t h a t the defendant would be given c r e d i t f o r time spent i n the penitentiary, on a previous conviction of the same crime which was s e t aside by the Federal D i s t r i c t Court, and would not have t o serve any prison time on t h i s conviction. "11. That said defendant violated t h e terms and conditions of said parole i n that he: "1. Forfeited 'a $100.00 bond t o a charge of disturbing t h e peace i n Bridger, Montana, on December 8, 1974. "2. Left t h e State without the prior permission of h i s parole o f f i c e r on January 4, 1975, and t h a t he drove t o California when h i s permission was t o f l y t o Clovis, N e w Mexico, on February 22, 1975. "IV. That defendant was charged with other violations of the r u l e s of parole, but proof of such technical violations a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y revocation of defendant's suspended sentence. r 1 The conclusions of law were: "I. That defendant's conduct violated the terms of h i s suspended sentence and h i s parole should be revoked. I l As a basis f o r h i s petition Meidinger contends t h a t the order revoking h i s suspended sentence should i t s e l f be revoked because : (1) H e was not afforded h i s constitutional r i g h t s t o a preliminary hearing t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause f o r the f i l i n g of the p e t i t i o n f o r imposition of f i n a l judgment and sentence. (2) That section 94-9831, R.C.M. 1947, (95-3213), i s unconstitutional a s there a r e no established guidelines f o r establishing a violation and, due t o i t s vagueness, he could not adequately defend himself. Additionally, the same s t a t u t o r y sections do not require nor afford him a preliminary hearing t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. (3) The order signed by the judge did not s e t f o r t h the reasons and findings of f a c t upon which the f i n a l revocation order was issued a s required by the United States Constitution a s s e t f o r t h i n Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L ed 2d 484 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. C t . 1756, 36 L ed 2d 656. (4) The court cannot constitutionally impose f i n a l judgment and sentence simply because he f a i l e d t o have steady employment. Petitioner a s s e r t s h i s contentions a r e based on the Fourth, F i f t h , Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments t o the United Scates Constitution; Sections 17, 24, and 27, A r t . 1 1 , 1972 Montana Constitution; Sections 94-9831, 95-3212, 95-2227 and 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947; and Morrissey and Gagnon. Petitioner c i t e s two United States Supreme Court decisions which s e t f o r t h the law t o be followed by the various s t a t e s , a s well a s by the federal j u d i c i a l system. The f i r s t is Morrissey. In t h i s decision, i n an opinion written by Chief J u s t i c e Berger, i t was held t h a t the minimum requirements of due process i n revoking paroles include: (a) written notice of t h e claimed parole violations; (b) disclosure of t h e evidence against him t o the parolee; (c) opportunity t o be heard i n person and t o present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) t h e r i g h t t o confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing o f f i c e r s p e c i f i c a l l y finds good cause f o r not allowing confrontation); (e) a n e u t r a l and detached hearing body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l parole board, members of which need not be j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s o r lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the f a c t finders a s t o the evidence r e l i e d on and reasons f o r revoking parole. The second case r e l i e d on i s Gagnon where it was held t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r was e n t i t l e d t o both a preliminary hearing t o determine whether there was probable cause t o believe t h a t he had violated h i s probation and a f i n a l hearing prior t o the ultimate decision whether h i s probation should be revoked and t h a t the s t a t e was not under a constitutional duty t o provide counsel f o r indigents i n a l l probation revocation cases. W e have no quarrel with the minimum due process re- quirements established i n the two c i t e d cases but a significant d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between those cases and t h i s case. Both Morrissey, dealing with parole revocation, and Gagnon, dealing with probation revocation, involved decisions of administrative boards such a s ~ o n t a n a ' s Board of Pardons. The i n s t a n t case however, involves a probation which was revoked by the o r i g i n a l sentencing judge a s authorized by section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947. That d i s t i n c t i o n i n i t s e l f provides an inherent s o r t of fairness which i s not achieved through a solely administrati-ve process. One of the requirements s e t out by Morrissey I I I a n e u t r a l and detached' hearing body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l parole board, members of which need not be j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s or lawyers", demonstrates t h a t t h e method used i n the present case furnishes much more than I I what the United States Supreme Court considers minimum standards of due process". P e t i t i o n e r contends t h a t he should have had n o t i c e of t h e time and place of a preliminary hearing and which conditions of probation he was alleged t o have violated and t h a t he was denied due process because of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e s t a t e t o do so. However, we do n o t believe t h a t the decisions i n Morrissey and Gagnon were intended t o be i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s t o be applied t o every revocation a c t i o n without regard t o the f a c t s a t hand. A s t h e Court s t a t e d following i t s l i s t of minimum due process, I I W e have no thought t o c r e a t e an i n f l e x i b l e s t r u c t u r e f o r parole revocation procedures. 1 l I n Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559-561, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L ed 2d 935, 953, 954, the Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s commented: I I Following t h e decision i n Morrissey, i n Ga.gnon v, S c a r p e l l i , 411 U.S. 778, 36 L Ed 2d 656, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973), t h e Court held t h e requirements of due process established f o r parole revocation were applicable t o probation revocation proceedings. "* 7 ' : * I I W e agree with n e i t h e r p e t i t i o n e r s nor t h e Court of Appeals: the Nebraska procedures a r e i n some respects c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i c i e n t but the Morrissey-Scarpelli procedures need not i n a l l respects be followed i n d i s c i p l i n a r y cases i n s t a t e prisons. " W e have o f t e n repeated t h a t ' [ t l h e very n a t u r e of due process negates any concept of i n f l e x i b l e procedures universally applicable t o every imaginable s i t u a t i o n . 1 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. a t 895, 6 L Ed 2d 1230. '[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may r e q u i r e under any given s e t of circumstances must begin with a determination of t h e precise nature of the government function involved a s w e l l a s of t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t has been a f f e c t e d by governmental t action. I b i d . ; Morrissey, 408 U.S., a t 481, 33 L Ed 2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t it i s immediately apparent t h a t one cannot automatically apply procedural r u l e s designed f o r f r e e c i t i z e n s i n an open s o c i e t y , o r f o r parolees o r probationers under only limited r e s t r a i n t s , t o t h e very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a - t i o n presented by a d i s c i p l i n a r y proceeding i n a s t a t e prison. "In s t r i k i n g t h e balance t h a t t h e Due Process Clause demands, however, we think t h e major consideration m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t adopting t h e f u l l range of procedures suggested by Yorrissey f o r alleged parole v i o l a t o r s i s the very d i f f e r e n t stake the S t a t e has i n t h e s t r u c t u r e and content of t h e prison d i s c i p l i n a r y hearing. That t h e revocation of parole be j u s t i f i e d and based on an accurate assessment of t h e f a c t s i s a c r i t i c a l matter t o the S t a t e a s w e l l a s the parolee; but t h e procedures by which it is determined whether the conditions of parole have been breached do not themselves threaten other important s t a t e i n t e r e s t s , parole o f f i c e r s , the police, o r witnesses--at l e a s t no more so than i n t h e case of t h e ordinary criminal t r i a l , I I Under t h e Montana Constitution t h e r e i s no provision requiring a preliminary hearing before proceedings f o r revocation , ~ i parole o r suspended sentence a r e i n s t i t u t e d . As t h i s Court scated i n r e P e t i t i o n of Doney, Mont . 522 P.2d 92, 3 1 St.Rep. 442, dealing with counsel a t a revocation hearing, a l l t h a t i s required i s fundamental f a i r n e s s and the record e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t here. Here, p e t i t i o n e r Meidinger was not under a r r e s t a t any rune for probation v i o l a t i o n and i n f a c t was not a r r e s t e d u n t i l a bench warrant was issued pursuant t o t h e f i n a l order of revoca- cion made by Judge Coate on June 20, 1975. The individuals in- volved i n both t h e Morrissey and Gagnon decisions had been placed under a r r e s t and detained by t h e i r respective probation o f f i c e r s ~ r i o r t o any o f f i c i a l a c t i o n taken toward revocation. I n t h a t perspective it i s apparent t h a t t h e requirement of a preliminary hearing was necessary t o insure t h a t some n e u t r a l body could hear the evidence and protect t h e r i g h t s of the accused i f the charges were patently f a l s e o r unjust. Where no detention i s in- volved, no such purpose can be served. P e t i t i o n e r next a l l e g e s t h a t section 94-9831 (95-3213), 9 . i . Y . 1947, i s unconstitutionally vague f o r not e s t a b l i s h i n g suidelines f o r "establishing a violation". The revocation hearing i s not a criminal t r i a l b u t a sunurlary hearing t o e s t a b l i s h a v i o l a t i o n of the conditions of the p r i s o n e r ' s probation. The probationer already stands convicted of a crime no matter what the grounds f o r revocation may be, whether it i s the commission of another crime o r unauthorized travel. Section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, provides: I I Any judge who has suspended the execution of a sentence o r deferred the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under t h i s section, o r h i s successor. is-authorized t h e r e a f t e r , i n h i s discretion, during the period of such suspended sentence or deferred imposition of sentence t o revoke such suspension o r impose sentence and order such person committed, o r may, i n h i s discretion, order the prisoner placed under the jurisdiction of the s t a t e board of pardons a s provided by law, or r e t a i n such jurisdiction-with t h i s court. Prior t o the revocation of an order suspending o r deferring the imposition of sentence, the person affected s h a l l be given a hearing. I' (Emphasis supplied) . W e w i l l not overturn a discretionary decision without a showing of an abuse of t h a t discretion. N o such showing has been made here, A s t o the f a i l u r e of the order suspending sentence t o enumerate the r i g h t s which petitioner would be deprived of a s required by section 95-2227, R.C.M. 1947, t h i s s t a t u t e became e f f e c t i v e January 1, 1974, a s a part of the new Montana Criminal Code. The Code provided t h a t a l l i t s provisions applied t o a l l offenses alleged t o have been committed on o r a f t e r t h a t date. The order complained of here was made on July 9, 1973. As t o the complaint that the f i n a l order did not contain the reasons and findings of f a c t , Judge Coate's f i n a l order included an attached document e n t i t l e d "Findings of Fact". In t h a t document the judge stated two reasons f o r revoking Meidin- g e r ' s probationary s t a t u s : (1) f o r f e i t u r e of a $100 bond i n Rridger, P,lontana, f o r disturbing the peace; and (2) unauthorized t r a v e l outside the s t a t e of Montana. Both findings were supported by substantial evidence produced a t the hearing i n which petitioner was represented by counsel. It i s not evident why the judge used the term "forfeited bond1' i n l i g h t of the transcript of the j u s t i c e court proceedings which makes i t c l e a r t h a t Meidinger pled g u i l t y t o t h a t charge. In any event, it i s c l e a r the judge was s a t i s f i e d a s t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s g u i l t i n t h a t action. Since the conditions of Meidinger ' s probation included the standard r u l e t h a t he "obey the laws of the United States and of the s t a t e of ~ o n t a n a " , and one of Judge Coate's reasons f o r revocation was ~ e i d i n g e r ' s proven g u i l t of a new crime, disturbing the peace, there is no doubt whatsoever a s t o what violation was charged and r e l i e d upon f o r revocation. Referring t o the lack of steady employmeqt, nowhere i n the c o u r t ' s order i s t h i s used as a ground f o r revocation. There were many alleged violations contained i n the parole o f f i c e r ' s report of violations and the court held i n Paragraph I V of i t s findings of f a c t t h a t the "proof of such technical violations a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y revocation of defendant's suspended sentence. 1 I It i s our opinion the d i s t r i c t court observed t h e requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon and t h a t petitioner had a f a i r hearing, represented by counsel a t every step. The w r i t of habeas corpus i s denied. W e Concur: - -J-y------------------..------ Hon. Jack L. Green, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly.