Title: State v. Hart

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

462 P.2d 885 (1969) The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Nell HART, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11679. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted October 27, 1969. Decided December 16, 1969. *886 Berger, Anderson & Sinclair, Arnold A. Berger argued, Billings, for appellant. Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., Robert Gannon, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Helena, John L. Adams, County Atty., Billings, for respondent. L.C. GULBRANDSON, District Judge.[*] This is an appeal by the defendant, being charged with grand larceny, from a conviction of petty larceny. The defendant makes four specifications of error: 1. The prosecuting attorney, in closing argument to the jury, violated an express statutory admonition and violated defendant's constitutional rights. 2. Allegedly stolen merchandise was displayed before the jury, marked as exhibits, but never offered as evidence because of an admitted inability to lay a foundation. 3. The absence of properly identified allegedly stolen merchandise in evidence resulted in a failure of proof sufficient to justify conviction. 4. The court refused to allow cross-examination of the witness Michael Carlin with regard to identification tags and marks on the trousers themselves, even though the same were marked as exhibits and before the jury. On December 23, 1968, the defendant Neil Hart was arrested for stealing three pair of men's trousers from the K-G Men's Store, located at West Park Plaza, a shopping center, at Billings, Montana. From outside the store, one Michael Carlin, security officer at the shopping center, observed the defendant stuffing the leg of a pair of trousers inside his overcoat and into his pants. When the defendant left the store, Carlin followed and after a short chase, with the help of Ellis Shriver, security officer, apprehended the defendant and attempted to return him to the K-G Men's Store. After several struggles in the mall area, the defendant was taken back into the K-G Men's Store and then into a dressing room where he was searched by Shriver, no other persons being in the room. The security officers then called the city police and turned over the defendant and three pair of trousers allegedly found in his possession to Officer John E. Maze, who took the defendant to the city jail. Trial was originally set for January 13, 1969, and by stipulation of counsel was continued to March 3, 1969. At the trial, Shriver testified that at the time of the search he pulled out a pair of trousers from the defendant's pants, and upon pulling the defendant's pants down, found two more pair of trousers. Other witnesses testified they observed Shriver as he came out of the dressing room and that he was holding three pair of trousers with the K-G price tags still on them, one for $30.00 and two for $25.00. The three pair of trousers were marked as proposed exhibits and it was noted that all K-G identification and price tags had been removed and that the initials "M.C." *887 and "J.E.M." were marked on the trousers. The prosecution had been unsuccessful in its attempts to subpoena Officer John E. Maze as a witness, and after the trousers had been displayed on the clerk's desk for some time in view of the jury, the witness Michael Carlin denied that he had placed his initials on the trousers. Upon cross-examination of Michael Carlin by Mr. Arnold Berger, counsel for the defendant, the prosecution objected to questions regarding the absence of the price tags until such time as the exhibits had been received in evidence, and the objection was sustained. Thereafter the deputy county attorney advised the court that he would be unable to lay a foundation for the proposed exhibits and they would not be offered as such. The defendant did not testify, and at the time of final argument before the jury, the prosecutor made the following statement: A motion for mistrial, based on the prosecution's comment, was timely made by counsel for defendant and denied by the court, and thereafter the jury returned a verdict of guilty of petty larceny. The defendant's first specification of error is that the prosecuting attorney, in making the quoted statement, violated the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and section 94-8803, R.C.M. 1947, which reads as follows: The prosecution argues the quoted comment was not a comment on the defendant's failure to testify but that it was directed at the weight of the state's evidence, and also contends that it was directed at Mr. Berger and not at the defendant. The prosecution also points out that the following instruction was given the jury: The constitutional protections of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States have been imposed upon the states. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, the court said: The exact words by the prosecutor in the Griffin case are as follows: *888 The main difference between the prosecutor's comments here and in the Griffin case is that here the prosecution stated that the "defendant's attorney" has not seen fit to offer any evidence to controvert this story. In Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225, 14 A.L.R.3d 718 (1 Cir.1965), the prosecution's comment was as follows: In analyzing this statement, the court said: This rationale is carried virtually up to the minute in Rodriguez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d 529 (1 Cir.1969). There the court said: To take the view that the prosecution may not comment on the "defendant's" failure to testify, but may properly comment on the "defendant's attorney's" failure to offer evidence, where that could only come from the defendant himself, is to make an unwarranted distinction not permissible in law. Here, the prosecution's statement alludes directly to Shriver's testimony regarding the search of the defendant in the dressing room. No other person was present and no one other than the defendant could have been called by Mr. Berger to "controvert this story." The Montana statutory ban, section 94-8803, R.C.M. 1947, on the prosecution's comment *889 with regard to defendant's failure to testify is twofold: 1. "It must not be used to his prejudice," and 2. He "must not comment to the court or jury on the same." We hold that the prosecution's comments were within the statutory ban and were also prejudicial as a violation of defendant's constitutional rights under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In his second specification of error, counsel for defendant states the defendant was prejudiced when the allegedly stolen merchandise was marked as proposed exhibits and displayed to the jury but never offered as exhibits. Here, the prosecution knew long before trial that Officer John E. Maze would not be available as a witness, and apparently did not interview the witness Michael Carlin prior to trial. In view of the decision of this Court regarding the first specification of error, we need not decide whether the acts in displaying the merchandise constituted reversible error. We do not, however, commend the practice and trust there will be no recurrence on retrial. For a discussion of basic evidentiary requirements, see State v. Wilroy, 150 Mont. 255, 434 P.2d 138. In holding, as we do, that the prosecution's comments to the jury constituted reversible error, we need not comment on the remaining specifications of error set forth by the defendant. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., and HASWELL and JOHN HARRISON, JJ., concur. CASTLES, Justice (specially concurring): I concur but only because the law as laid down obliges me to. I think the rule against any comment on an obvious fact is an arbitrary rule without any reason or connection to the constitutional right involved. A defendant need not take the stand, and if he doesn't the jury obviously knows it and a bare comment on that fact simply cannot be prejudicial standing alone. However, the United States Supreme Court in the cases cited have stated the arbitrary and flat rule so that any prosecutor should refrain from stating the obvious. [*] Sitting in place of BONNER, J.