Title: State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1471.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1471 
THE STATE EX REL. N.A., APPELLANT, v. CROSS, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1471.] 
Juvenile courts — Jurisdiction over delinquency case after alleged delinquent 
child turns 21 — R.C. 2152.02 — Writ of prohibition denied. 
(No. 2009-1689 — Submitted March 31, 2010 — Decided April 8, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 08CA0045-M. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent a juvenile court judge from proceeding with an 
adjudicatory hearing in a delinquency case after the alleged delinquent child had 
turned 21 years old.  Because the juvenile court judge does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed, we affirm. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Appellant, N.A., was born on May 15, 1987.  On November 4, 
2005, the prosecuting attorney filed a complaint in the Medina County Court of 
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Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging that N.A. appeared to be a delinquent 
child for committing two acts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 
which would be felonies of the first degree if committed by an adult.  The 
complaint alleged that the rapes occurred in a specified period in 2003 when N.A. 
was 16 years old.  In March 2006, the juvenile court adjudicated N.A. to be a 
delinquent child and committed him to the Department of Youth Services for 
concurrent terms of three years with the commitment not to exceed his attainment 
of age 21. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Medina County reversed the 
judgment because the juvenile court violated Juv.R. 37(A) by not properly 
recording N.A.’s adjudicatory hearing.  In re N.A., Medina App. No. 06CA0032-
M, 2008-Ohio-1322.  The court of appeals remanded the cause to the juvenile 
court for a rehearing.  Id. at ¶ 7-8. 
{¶ 4} On remand, Judge Judith A. Cross, a judge sitting by assignment in 
the juvenile court, presided over N.A.’s delinquency case.  Judge Cross began the 
adjudicatory hearing in April 2008, before N.A. turned 21 years old, and 
scheduled a continuance of the hearing to a date after his 21st birthday. 
{¶ 5} In June 2008, N.A. filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Cross from exercising jurisdiction in the 
delinquency case.  In the complaint, as subsequently amended, N.A. claimed that 
the writ should issue because there is “no statute that authorizes a juvenile court to 
conduct a trial after a person has turned twenty-one.”  Judge Cross filed a motion 
to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  The court of appeals 
dismissed the complaint. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon N.A.’s appeal as of right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 7} N.A. claims entitlement to a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Cross from proceeding in the juvenile delinquency case.  To be entitled to the 
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requested writ, N.A. was required to establish that (1) Judge Cross is about to 
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 
adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Furnas v. 
Monnin, 120 Ohio St.3d 279, 2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 10.  Judge 
Cross has exercised judicial power by proceeding in the delinquency case. 
{¶ 8} For the remaining requirements, Judge Cross has basic statutory 
jurisdiction over the delinquency matter under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which 
provides that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction “[c]oncerning 
any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or 
information is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.”  See also R.C. 
2151.011(B)(5) (for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, “child” generally “means a 
person who is under eighteen years of age”).  The complaint alleged that N.A. 
was a delinquent child based on rapes he committed when he was less than 18 
years old. 
{¶ 9} More pertinently, the complaint alleging N.A. to be a delinquent 
child was filed in the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2152.021(A)(1) (“any person 
having knowledge of a child who appears * * * to be a delinquent child may file a 
sworn complaint with respect to that child in the juvenile court of the county in 
which the child has a residence or legal settlement or in which the * * * 
delinquent act allegedly occurred”).  “Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, effective January 1, 
2002, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, significantly revised many juvenile statutes 
and reorganized the Revised Code by moving delinquency into a new chapter, 
R.C. Chapter 2152” 1  and “Juv.R. 2(D) was amended effective July 1, 2001, to 
reflect that the definition of ‘child’ that formerly appeared in R.C. 2151.011 now 
appears in R.C. 2152.02.”  State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011, 
                                                 
1.  Both parties’ arguments  are premised on various sections of R.C. Chapter 2152, and neither 
party suggests that this chapter is inapplicable. 
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887 N.E.2d 1145, ¶ 40, fn. 6.  In turn, Juv.R. 29 and 34 provide the procedure for 
adjudicatory and dispositional hearings in the juvenile court. 
{¶ 10} Under R.C. 2152.02(C)(2), subject to a provision that is 
inapplicable here, “any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal 
ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a ‘child’ 
irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with respect to that 
violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is held.”  N.A. is alleged to have 
committed rape before he was 18.  See also Juv.R. 2(D) (“ ‘Child’ has the same 
meaning as in sections 2151.011 and 2152.02 of the Revised Code”).  Therefore, 
Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed 
with the delinquency case even though N.A. turned 21 years old before the case 
concluded.  And notwithstanding N.A.’s argument to the contrary, even though 
the latest hearing in the matter was precipitated by the court of appeals’ remand 
for a rehearing, that proceeding is still a “hearing on the complaint.” 
{¶ 11} N.A. asserts that R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) is limited by other statutory 
provisions in R.C. Chapter 2152, including R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which provides 
that the “juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a 
delinquent child * * * prior to attaining eighteen years of age until the person 
attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to 
that adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so 
adjudicated a delinquent child * * * shall be deemed a ‘child’ until the person 
attains twenty-one years of age.”  R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), however, is inapplicable 
because N.A. was not adjudicated a delinquent child before he was 18 years old.  
N.A. concedes this in his reply brief. 
{¶ 12} N.A.’s citation of other statutes is similarly misplaced.  Cf. R.C. 
2152.17(F) (“A court shall not commit a delinquent child to the legal custody of 
the department of youth services under this division for a period that exceeds the 
child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age”) and R.C. 2152.22(A) (“all other 
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dispositional orders made by the court under this chapter shall be temporary and 
shall continue for a period that is designated by the court in its order, until 
terminated or modified by the court or until the child attains twenty-one years of 
age”); see also R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(a) through (e).  These statutes restrict the 
juvenile court’s dispositional power to commit delinquent children to the custody 
of the Department of Youth Services only until they are 21 years old.  There is no 
indication here that Judge Cross intends to commit N.A. to the department’s 
custody now that he has reached 21 years of age. 
{¶ 13} Moreover, as Judge Cross notes, even though N.A. is now over 21 
years old, the delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is 
adjudicated a delinquent child based on the rape offenses, N.A. would still be 
subject to the juvenile-offender-registration provisions.  See R.C. 2152.82(C) (if 
an order classifying a child as a juvenile-offender registrant is issued, “the child’s 
attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the 
order”); see also R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction to “conduct the hearings, and to make the determinations, 
adjudications, and orders authorized or required under sections 2152.82 to 
2152.86 * * * of the Revised Code regarding a child who has been adjudicated a 
delinquent child”). 
{¶ 14} Therefore, Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to proceed in the juvenile delinquency case, and N.A. has an adequate 
remedy by appeal to raise his claim.  McGhan v. Vettel, 122 Ohio St.3d 227, 
2009-Ohio-2884, 909 N.E.2d 1279, ¶ 16. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 15} N.A. is thus unable to establish the latter two requirements for the 
requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals dismissing N.A.’s prohibition action.  We also 
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deny N.A.’s motion for oral argument because the parties’ briefs are sufficient to 
resolve this appeal. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J.,2 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Russell A. 
Hopkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________ 
                                                 
2.  The late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer participated in the deliberations in, and the final 
resolution of, this case prior to his death.