Title: Atkins v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ. and Carrico,1 S.J. 
 
DARYL RENARD ATKINS 
v.  Record No. 000395  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 6, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
This capital murder case is presently before this 
Court on remand from the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) 
(Atkins III).  The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s 
judgment in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 375, 534 S.E.2d 
312 (2000) (Atkins II), and held that “the Constitution 
‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”  Atkins 
III, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 405 (1986)). 
 
The defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted in 
the Circuit Court of York County of the capital murder of 
Eric Michael Nesbitt and was sentenced to death.  We 
affirmed his conviction but remanded the case to the 
circuit court for a new penalty proceeding.  Atkins v. 
                     
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in 
the hearing and decision of this case prior to the 
effective date of his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 180, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999) 
(Atkins I).  At re-sentencing, a different jury again fixed 
Atkins’ punishment at death, and the circuit court imposed 
the death penalty in accordance with the jury verdict.  
Atkins II, 260 Va. at 378-79, 534 S.E.2d at 314. 
 
On appeal from the second penalty proceeding, Atkins 
argued, among other things, that this Court, as part of our 
proportionality review, see Code § 17.1-313(C), should 
commute his sentence of death to life imprisonment because 
he is mentally retarded.  Atkins II, 260 Va. at 386, 534 
S.E.2d at 318.  We rejected his argument and affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court.2  Id. at 390, 534 S.E.2d at 
321.  Based on the record before us and considering “both 
the crime and the defendant,” Code § 17.1-313(C), we could 
not say that Atkins’ death sentence was “excessive or 
disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this 
Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to Atkins’ 
murder of Nesbitt.”  Atkins II, 260 Va. at 390, 534 S.E.2d 
at 321.  Nor were we willing to commute Atkins’ sentence of 
death to life imprisonment because of his IQ score.  Id.
                     
2 Atkins II was decided by a divided Court.  Atkins II, 
260 Va. at 390-96, 534 S.E.2d 321-24 (Hassell, J., joined 
by Koontz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 396-97, 534 S.E.2d at 324-25 (Koontz, J., joined by 
Hassell, J., dissenting). 
 
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Thereafter, Atkins successfully petitioned the Supreme 
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.  
Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (order granting 
writ of certiorari).  The Supreme Court concluded that a 
national legislative consensus against the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders had developed since its 
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  Atkins 
III, 536 U.S. at 316.  The Court identified two reasons 
consistent with that consensus to justify a categorical 
exclusion of the mentally retarded from execution.  Id. at 
318.  First, neither of the justifications for recognizing 
the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, applies to 
mentally retarded offenders.  Id. at 318-19. Second, the 
diminished capacity of mentally retarded offenders places 
them at greater risk of wrongful execution.  Id. at 320-21.  
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed our judgment in Atkins II 
and remanded the case to this Court for “further 
proceedings not inconsistent with” its opinion.  Atkins 
III, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 
Before addressing what further proceedings are 
necessary and would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision, we must first determine whether the Supreme Court 
decided that Atkins is, in fact, mentally retarded, thus 
requiring this Court to commute his sentence of death to 
 
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life imprisonment.  We conclude that the Supreme Court did 
not make that determination, nor has the question of 
Atkins’ mental retardation been answered at any point in 
his case. 
 
In Atkins II, after summarizing the testimony of the 
two forensic clinical psychologists who testified at the 
re-sentencing hearing, we stated that the jury “heard 
extensive, but conflicting, testimony from [the 
psychologists] regarding Atkins’ mental retardation.”  260 
Va. at 388, 534 S.E.2d at 320.  Continuing, we held that 
“[t]he question of Atkins’ mental retardation is a factual 
one, and as such, it is the function of the factfinder, not 
this Court, to determine the weight that should be accorded 
to expert testimony on that issue.”  Id.  The Supreme Court 
did not reverse that portion of our holding in Atkins II.  
Nor did the Supreme Court state whether the issue of mental 
retardation is a question of fact or law. 
 
The Supreme Court did, however, state that, “[t]o the 
extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which 
offenders are in fact retarded.”  Atkins III, 536 U.S. at 
318-19.  Acknowledging that the Commonwealth of Virginia 
disputes whether Atkins suffers from mental retardation, 
the Court noted that “[n]ot all people who claim to be 
 
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mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the 
range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a 
national consensus.”  Id. at 317.  But, the Court did not 
decide which defendants fit within that range or whether 
Atkins does, nor did it define the term “mental 
retardation.”  Instead, the Court left “ ‘to the States the 
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the 
constitutional restriction upon its execution of 
sentences.’ ”  Id. (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405). 
 
We also note that the jury at the re-sentencing 
hearing did not resolve the question of Atkins’ mental 
retardation.  Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-
264.4(B)(vi), the jury was required to consider evidence of 
mental retardation in mitigation of capital murder, but it 
was not required to make a definitive determination whether 
Atkins suffers from mental retardation.  As we pointed out 
in Atkins II, the re-sentencing jury was instructed “to 
consider any evidence in mitigation of the offense, and the 
jury obviously found that Atkins’ IQ score did not mitigate 
his culpability for the murder of Nesbitt.”  260 Va. at 
388, 534 S.E.2d at 320. 
 
Although Atkins acknowledges on brief that the Supreme 
Court did not make an explicit finding with regard to 
whether he suffers from mental retardation, he, 
 
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nevertheless, argues that the Court implicitly concluded 
that he is mentally retarded.  Otherwise, according to 
Atkins, he would not have had standing to raise the 
question whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes execution 
of a mentally retarded offender and the Supreme Court’s 
decision would be an advisory opinion.  We do not agree. 
In granting Atkins’ petition for a writ of certiorari, 
the Supreme Court decided to revisit the legal issue that 
it had previously considered in Penry and, accordingly, 
framed the issue as “[w]hether the execution of mentally 
retarded individuals convicted of capital crimes violates 
the Eighth Amendment[.]”  Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 
(2001)(amended order granting writ of certiorari).  Atkins 
had standing to raise that constitutional issue because of 
the allegations, evidence, and argument presented in the 
circuit court, and on appeal to this Court, that he is 
mentally retarded.  He demonstrated a “ ‘personal stake in 
the outcome[,]’ ” thereby “ ‘assur[ing] that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues’ 
necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional 
questions.”  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 
(1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
The Supreme Court resolved the legal issue by 
announcing a new rule of constitutional law and then 
 
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remanded Atkins’ case to this Court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with that new rule.  Since the 
controverted factual question whether Atkins suffers from 
mental retardation has never been resolved, any further 
proceeding, consistent with the Supreme Court’s remand, 
must be one in which that question is answered and the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders is applied to that factual 
determination.  Such a proceeding will not render the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins III advisory but will 
implement that decision.3
 
The Supreme Court’s remand in this case is 
procedurally similar to the remand in Ford v. Wainwright.  
There, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits a State from executing an insane prisoner.  477 
U.S. at 410.  The Court then stated that the prisoner’s 
“allegation of insanity in his habeas corpus petition, if 
proved, therefore, would bar his execution.”  Id.  Although 
the Court found that the “State’s procedures for 
                     
3 Our conclusion is not altered by the Commonwealth’s 
argument on brief in the Supreme Court that Atkins is not a 
mentally retarded individual and that, therefore, any 
decision by that Court would be an advisory opinion.  The 
Court obviously rejected the Commonwealth’s position but, 
in its role as an appellate court, did not resolve the 
underlying disputed factual issue regarding Atkins’ mental 
retardation. 
 
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determining sanity [were] inadequate to preclude federal 
redetermination of the constitutional issue[,]” it, 
nevertheless, left to “the State the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 
upon its execution of sentences.”  Id. at 416-17.  The 
Court then remanded the proceeding to a federal district 
court for a de novo evidentiary hearing on the question of 
the prisoner’s competence to be executed.  Id. at 418.  The 
Supreme Court does not “deny standing simply because the 
‘appellant, although prevailing . . . on the federal 
constitutional issue, may or may not ultimately win.’ ”  
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979) (quoting Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 18 (1975)). 
 
Turning now to consider what type of proceeding is 
necessary and consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
we note that the General Assembly, in response to the 
Supreme Court’s giving to the States the task of developing 
an appropriate way to enforce its constitutional 
restriction on the execution of the death penalty, enacted 
emergency legislation that is already effective.  See Code 
§§ 8.01-654.2, 18.2-10, 19.2-175, 19.2-264.3:1, 19.2-
264.3:1.1, 19.2-264.3:1.2, 19.2-264.3:3, and 19.2-264.4.  
In that legislation, the General Assembly, among other 
things, defined the term “mentally retarded.” 
 
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“Mentally retarded” means a disability, 
originating before the age of 18 years, 
characterized concurrently by (i) significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning as 
demonstrated by performance on a standardized 
measure of intellectual functioning administered 
in conformity with accepted professional 
practice, that is at least two standard 
deviations below the mean and (ii) significant 
limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in 
conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).  The General Assembly also 
provided that a defendant has the burden of proving mental 
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C). 
 
In light of this legislation, which is applicable to 
Atkins’ case, see Code § 8.01-654.2, the Supreme Court’s 
mandate requiring further proceedings not inconsistent with 
its opinion, and the fact that the question of Atkins’ 
mental retardation has never been answered, we conclude 
that this case must be remanded to the Circuit Court of 
York County for a hearing on the sole issue of whether 
Atkins is mentally retarded as defined in Code § 19.2-
264.3:1.1(A).  In accordance with the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-654.2, which require this Court to consider a claim 
of mental retardation presented by a person sentenced to 
death before the effective date of the emergency 
legislation and to determine whether the claim is 
frivolous, and upon reviewing the evidence of mental 
 
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retardation presented at the re-sentencing hearing in 
Atkins II, 260 Va. at 386-90, 534 S.E.2d at 319-21, we find 
that Atkins’ claim of mental retardation is not frivolous.  
Because Atkins first presented his claim to this Court on 
direct appeal from the re-sentencing hearing and the case 
is now being remanded to the circuit court where the 
sentence of death was imposed by a jury, “the circuit court 
shall empanel a new jury for the sole purpose of making a 
determination of mental retardation.”  Code § 8.01-654.2.  
The hearing should conform to the requirements of the 
General Assembly’s emergency legislation. 
 
Thus, we will remand this case to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and 
with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Atkins III. 
Remanded. 
 
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