Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES CARPENTER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 12, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 115617  
JAMES A. CARPENTER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
YOUNG, J.  
Defendant presented evidence at his bench trial that,  
although not legally insane, he lacked the mental capacity to  
form the specific intent required for the crimes of first­
degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and felonious assault,  
MCL 750.82.  The trial court found defendant guilty of both  
offenses, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
We 
originally 
granted leave to consider whether the lower  
courts properly determined that it was defendant’s burden to  
establish his diminished capacity defense by a preponderance  
of the evidence under MCL 768.21a.  However, we are now  
persuaded by the prosecution’s argument that, by enacting a  
comprehensive statutory scheme setting forth the requirements  
for and the effects of asserting a defense based on either  
mental illness or mental retardation, the Legislature has  
signified its intent not to allow a defendant to introduce  
evidence of mental abnormalities short of legal insanity to  
avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific  
intent.1  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals on that basis.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
The events giving rise to defendant’s convictions took  
place in the early morning of July 9, 1995. After attending  
a dance at a local community hall, complainants Audrey Thomas  
and Aron Blakely returned to Thomas’ home in Saginaw at  
approximately 2:00 a.m.2  
Thomas and Blakely were sitting in the family room when  
Thomas heard the doorbell ring.  Thomas discovered that  
1Defendant’s motion to strike the prosecution’s brief 
raising this issue is denied.  
2Thomas and defendant previously had a long-term 
relationship. A child was the product of that relationship.  
2  
defendant was at the door. Defendant demanded to be let in,  
yelling that Blakely should “come on out” and that Thomas was  
his “woman.”  When Thomas refused to admit him, defendant  
eventually crashed through a window.  Defendant produced a  
handgun and fired two shots in the general direction of Thomas  
and Blakely.  Neither was hit. Blakely then announced that he  
was leaving.  As defendant opened the door for him, defendant  
struck Blakely in the face with his fist.  Although defendant  
initially walked out the front door with Blakely, he  
immediately returned to the house where he confronted Thomas,  
striking her head with the butt of his gun.  The blow  
apparently caused the gun to discharge a third time.  Blakely  
heard the shot and went next door to call the police.  
Defendant eventually fled the scene and drove to his  
nearby home.  He immediately called Thomas and threatened her.  
Several police officers arrived at defendant’s home a short  
time later. 
A stand-off ensued, during which defendant  
threatened to shoot himself and any officers who attempted to  
enter the house. Saginaw Police Sergeant Terri Johnson-Wise  
established telephone contact with defendant and spoke with  
him several times. She testified that defendant was yelling  
and screaming initially, and that when he calmed down he began  
talking about demons and “money that was stolen from him.”  
At some point, defendant asked for some heart medication  
that was in his truck.  Saginaw Police Officer Daniel Kuhn  
3  
 
lured him to a window by offering to give defendant his  
medication.  When Officer Kuhn tried to grab defendant through  
the open window, defendant got free and slammed the window on  
Officer Kuhn’s fingers.  Defendant eventually allowed the  
officers to enter and he was placed under arrest.  He was  
subsequently charged with first-degree home invasion, MCL  
750.110a(2), two counts of assault with intent to commit  
murder, MCL 750.83, being a felon in possession of a firearm,  
MCL 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the commission of  
a felony, MCL 750.227b, and resisting and obstructing a police  
officer, MCL 750.479.  
At his bench trial, defendant presented a diminished  
capacity defense. In addition to several lay witnesses that  
testified that he had been drinking before the incident and  
that he appeared intoxicated, defendant presented a report  
from 
Kingswood 
Hospital, 
where 
he 
had 
been 
treated  
approximately a month after the incident. 
The report  
described him as being “delusional” and indicated that he  
suffered from organic brain damage.  The report further  
described his conduct upon admission to the hospital:  
He stated that his son had been killed in  
April 1995 and “they had broken into my computer.” 
He says that he has special forces that are 
guarding him; that people are stealing money from 
his son’s records.  He also hears voices telling 
him that people are looking and laughing at him.  
. . . 
He is afraid that someone is trying to 
poison him.  He talks of the organization that is 
manipulating him and that someone has put “voodoo  
4  
 
dolls” on him.  
Defendant also presented expert testimony from Dr.  
Michael Abramsky, a board-certified clinical and forensic  
psychologist. 
 
Dr. 
Abramsky 
testified 
that 
defendant’s 
bizarre  
behavior at the time of the shooting and ensuing standoff  
“suggests that he was mentally ill at the time” and that  
defendant’s drug-induced organic brain damage,3 combined with  
his ingestion of alcohol and various prescription drugs, was  
the likely cause not only of his behavior but his claimed loss  
of memory of the incident.  In sum, Dr. Abramsky believed that  
defendant suffered from diminished capacity and that he  
therefore could not formulate a specific intent.  
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of  
Dr. George Watson of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry.  
Although he acknowledged defendant’s apparent organic brain  
damage, Dr. Watson did not believe defendant to be obviously  
and acutely psychotic.  Instead, on the basis of his clinical  
interview, Dr. Watson believed “that the possibility of Mr.  
Carpenter exaggerating appeared to be more likely . . . .”  
In a comprehensive written opinion, the trial court  
issued its findings.  The court found defendant guilty of  
resisting and obstructing a police officer and being a felon  
in possession of a firearm.  Regarding the two counts of  
3Defendant has a history of marijuana and cocaine abuse.  
5  
assault with intent to commit murder, the court found that the  
prosecution had failed to prove that defendant intended to  
kill either victim.  Instead, the court found that the  
evidence only supported a finding of guilt on the lesser  
offense of felonious assault.  Finally, the trial court found  
defendant 
guilty 
as 
charged of both first-degree home invasion  
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  
The court proceeded to address and reject defendant’s  
diminished capacity defense:  
The [c]ourt does not find that the defendant 
has supported his burden of proof of diminished 
capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.  His  
actions seem very “goal oriented” . . . .  His  
actions in driving to Ms. Thomas’s home, his 
ringing the door bell, the epitaphs [sic] of 
displeasure, his entry into Ms. Thomas’s home, his 
aiming the gun, his shots into the ceiling and near 
the ceiling scaring the victims, his striking Mr. 
Blakely and Ms. Thomas, his departure from the 
home, and significantly, his threatening phone call 
back to [Ms.] Thomas, all suggest very goal 
oriented actions consistent with the capacity to 
form a specific intent.  
The trial court eventually sentenced defendant to the  
following prison terms: twenty-eight months to twenty years  
for the home invasion conviction, twenty-eight months to four  
years for each of the felonious assault convictions, twenty­
eight months to five years for the felon-in-possession  
conviction, and one to two years for the resisting and  
obstructing conviction.  The court further ordered that these  
sentences 
be 
served 
consecutive to the mandatory two-year term  
6  
for the felony-firearm conviction.  
In affirming defendant’s convictions and sentences, the  
Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that the trial  
court erred in shifting the burden to defendant to prove his  
claim of diminished capacity by a preponderance of the  
evidence.4  
This Court granted defendant’s application for leave to  
appeal. 462 Mich 912 (2000).  
II. Standard of Review  
The proper application of MCL 768.21a is a question of  
law subject to de novo review. People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich  
466, 471; 620 NW2d 13 (2000).  
III. The Traditional Insanity Defense  
In Michigan, use of the insanity defense has been  
governed by statute since 1975. 1975 PA 180. Legal insanity  
is an affirmative defense requiring proof that, as a result of  
mental illness or being mentally retarded as defined in the  
mental 
health 
code, 
the 
defendant 
lacked 
“substantial 
capacity  
either to appreciate the nature and quality or the  
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his or her  
conduct to the requirements of the law.”  MCL 768.21a(1).5  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 16, 1999 
(Docket No. 204051).  
5However, “[a]n individual who was under the influence of 
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol or controlled  
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
 
Importantly, the statute provides that “[t]he defendant has  
the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a  
preponderance of the evidence.”  MCL 768.21a(3) (emphasis  
added).  
There are also several procedural requirements that must  
be satisfied before an insanity defense may be raised.  We  
recently summarized those requirements in People v Toma, 462  
Mich 281, 292, n 6; 613 NW2d 694 (2000):  
A defendant in a felony case who wishes to 
interpose an insanity defense, must serve written 
notice on the court and the prosecutor not less 
than thirty days before trial and submit to a 
court-ordered examination, relating to the claim of 
insanity, by personnel for the center for forensic 
psychiatry or other qualified personnel.  MCL  
768.20a(1) and (2); MSA 28.1043(1)(1) and (2).  A  
defendant or the prosecutor may also obtain  
independent 
psychiatric 
examinations. 
MCL  
768.20a(3); MSA 28.1043(1)(3). The failure by the 
defendant 
to fully 
cooperate 
in 
either 
the  
court-directed or independent examinations, bars 
the defendant from presenting testimony relating to 
insanity 
at 
trial. 
MCL 
768.20a(4); 
MSA  
28.1043(1)(4).  
Finally, MCL 768.36 sets forth the consequences of a  
jury’s finding that a defendant is guilty of an offense and  
that, although the defendant was mentally ill at the time the  
offense charged was committed, the defendant was not legally  
insane.  If a defendant is found “guilty but mentally ill,”  
5(...continued) 
substances at the time of his or her alleged offense is not 
considered to have been legally insane solely because of being 
under the influence of the alcohol or controlled substances.”  
MCL 768.21a(2).  
8  
the trial court “shall impose any sentence which could be  
imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of  
the same offense.”  MCL 768.36(3).  If incarcerated, the  
defendant must “undergo further evaluation and be given such  
treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental  
illness or retardation.” Id. If the defendant is placed on  
probation, 
“the 
trial judge, upon recommendation of the center  
for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition of  
probation.” MCL 768.36(4).  
IV. The “Diminished Capacity” Defense  
As defined by our Court of Appeals, the so-called  
“diminished capacity” defense allows a defendant, even though  
legally sane, to offer evidence of some mental abnormality to  
negate the specific intent required to commit a particular  
crime.  See, e.g., People v Jones, 151 Mich App 1, 5-6; 390  
NW2d 189 (1986). “[T]he theory is that if because of mental  
disease or defect a defendant cannot form the specific state  
of mind required as an essential element of a crime, he may be  
convicted only of a lower grade of the offense not requiring  
that particular mental element.”  Chestnut v State, 538 So 2d  
820, 822 (Fla, 1989) (citation omitted).  
This Court has several times acknowledged in passing the  
concept of the diminished capacity defense.  See, e.g., People  
v Lloyd, 459 Mich 433; 590 NW2d 738 (1999) (holding that  
defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for  
9  
presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a  
defense of legal insanity); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298;  
521 NW2d 797 (1994) (holding that the defendant was not  
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to pursue a diminished  
capacity defense); People v Griffin, 433 Mich 860; 444 NW2d  
139 (1989) (remanding for a hearing on the defendant’s claim  
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explore  
defenses of diminished capacity and insanity).  However, we  
have 
never 
specifically authorized its use in Michigan courts.  
Instead, it was our Court of Appeals, in People v Lynch,  
47 Mich App 8; 208 NW2d 656 (1973), that introduced to  
Michigan the diminished capacity defense.  The defendant in  
Lynch was charged with having murdered her baby by starvation.  
As part of her defense, the defendant sought to have admitted  
into evidence testimony from two psychiatrists supporting her  
claim that she did not possess the requisite intent to be  
convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316.  The trial  
court refused to admit the evidence on the ground that the  
defendant had never raised an insanity defense and did not  
give the required statutory notice.6  
In reversing the defendant’s jury conviction, the Court  
of Appeals rejected the prosecution’s argument that allowing  
evidence of mental illness less than insanity as bearing on  
6At the time Lynch was decided, the notice provision for 
raising an insanity defense was contained in MCL 768.20.  
10  
the defendant’s capacity to form the intent required to commit  
a particular crime would “sanction a subterfuge” avoiding the  
standards of the insanity defense enunciated by this Court in  
People v Durfee, 62 Mich 487; 29 NW 109 (1886).7  The Court  
also disagreed that recognizing a diminished capacity defense  
separate from legal insanity “would permit the defense to in  
effect sneak in the insanity defense without labeling it as  
such and without the necessity of complying with the notice  
statute as to the insanity defense.”  Lynch, supra at 20.  
While it acknowledged that some states viewed mental capacity  
as “an all or nothing matter and that only insanity . . .  
negates criminal intent,” the Court of Appeals concluded that  
proof of diminished capacity is admissible as “bearing on  
7Before the Legislature’s enactment of 1975 PA 180, the 
test for determining legal insanity was controlled by Durfee.  
The Durfee test, in turn, was based in part on the M’Naghten 
rule:  “‘[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party 
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong.’”  People v Martin, 386 Mich 
407, 415; 192 NW2d 215 (1971), quoting Daniel M’Naghten’s  
Case, (HL 1843) 10 Cl Fin 200 (8 Eng Rep 718), 722 (1843).  
In addition to the M’Naghten rule, which focuses solely 
on a defendant’s cognitive abilities, the Durfee Court added  
a volitional component asking whether the defendant’s mental 
disease or abnormality prevented him from controlling his 
actions.  This second component has commonly been referred to 
as the “irresistible impulse” test.  In Martin, supra at 418, 
we explained the “salient elements” of the Durfee test as  
follows:  “1) whether defendant knew what he was doing was 
right or wrong; and 2) if he did, did he have the power, the 
will power, to resist doing the wrongful act?”  
11  
 
  
intent generally or at least on those special states of mind  
where a specific intent is required or whether the state of  
mind by definition determines the degree of offense as here.”  
Id.  
In People v Mangiapane, 85 Mich App 379; 271 NW2d 240  
(1978), the Court of Appeals had occasion to address the  
diminished capacity concept under the current statutory  
framework established by 1975 PA 180.  In Mangiapane, the  
defendant sought to introduce psychiatric testimony on the  
issue of his capacity to form the specific intent to commit  
assault with intent to commit murder in violation of MCL  
750.83.  The trial court denied the request on the ground that  
the defendant did not raise the defense and give the  
prosecution notice under MCL 768.20a.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that, by  
enacting 1975 PA 180, the Legislature intended “to bring under  
one procedural blanket all defenses to criminal charges that  
rest upon legal insanity as defined in the statute,” and that  
“the defense known as diminished capacity comes within th[e]  
codified definition of legal insanity.”  Id. at 394-395.  
Thus, the Court held that, in order to introduce evidence  
that, 
although 
not 
legally insane, the defendant lacked mental  
capacity to form specific intent, the defendant had to fully  
comply with the statutory insanity defense provisions. Id. at  
395-396.  
12  
 
The Court of Appeals decision in Mangiapane was then  
followed by a series of decisions continuing to address  
diminished capacity defense as a form of the statutory  
insanity defense.  See, e.g., People v Denton, 138 Mich App  
568; 360 NW2d 245 (1984); People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455;  
421 NW2d 200 (1988).  
Consistent with this line of cases, the Court of Appeals  
held that a defendant seeking to present a diminished capacity  
defense bears the burden of establishing such a defense by a  
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence under MCL 768.21a(3), which took  
effect on October 1, 1994.  Defendant challenges that holding,  
arguing that nothing in the language of § 21a suggests a  
legislative intent to place on defendants the burden of  
proving diminished capacity.  
We agree with defendant that there is no indication in  
§ 21a that the Legislature intended to make diminished  
capacity an affirmative defense.  However, that is only  
because, as explained below, the Legislature’s enactment of a  
comprehensive statutory scheme concerning defenses based on  
either mental illness or mental retardation demonstrates the  
Legislature’s intent to preclude the use of any evidence of a  
defendant’s lack of mental capacity short of legal insanity to  
avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific  
intent.  
13  
 
 
V. The Continued Viability of the Diminished 
Capacity Defense in Michigan  
Since its inception in the United States, the diminished  
capacity defense has been the subject of much debate.8  At  
present, there is a wide divergence of views among the states  
concerning the admissibility of evidence of mental illness  
short of insanity. See, generally, 1 Robinson, Criminal Law  
Defenses, § 64(a), pp 272-279.  A common criticism is that the  
subtle gradations of mental illness recognized in the  
psychiatric field are of little utility in determining  
criminal responsibility:  
“[T]o the psychiatrist mental cases are a 
series of imperceptible gradations from the mild 
psychopath to the extreme psychotic, whereas  
criminal law allows for no gradations. It requires 
a final decisive moral judgment of the culpability 
of the accused. For the purposes of conviction  
there is no twilight zone between abnormality and 
insanity.  An offender is wholly sane or wholly  
insane.”
 [State v Bouwman, 328 NW2d 703, 706 
(Minn, 1982) (citations omitted).]  
In State v Wilcox, 70 Ohio St 2d 182, 192-193; 436 NE2d 523  
(1982), the court expressed a similar view:  
8It apparently is well recognized that the diminished 
capacity defense originated in Scotland in 1867.  See State v  
Wilcox, 70 Ohio St 2d 182; 436 NE2d 523 (1982); Arenella, The  
diminished capacity and diminished responsibility defenses:  
Two children of a doomed marriage, 77 Columbia L R 827, 830, 
n 16 (1977).  The state of California, in turn, is considered 
to be the jurisdiction that pioneered the defense in the 
United States.  Wilcox, supra at 187; see also State v  
Sessions, 645 P2d 643, 644, n 2 (Utah, 1982) (“[People v  
Wells, 33 Cal 2d 330; 202 P 2d 53 (1949)] is credited with 
beginning the diminished capacity in California”).  
14  
 
 
Theoretically the insanity concept operates as  
a bright line test separating the criminally 
responsible from the criminally irresponsible.  The  
diminished capacity concept on the other hand 
posits a series of rather blurry lines representing 
gradations of culpability.  
We need not join the affray because we agree with the  
prosecution 
that 
our 
Legislature, 
by 
enacting 
the  
comprehensive 
statutory 
framework 
described 
above, 
has 
already  
conclusively determined when mental incapacity can serve as a  
basis for relieving one from criminal responsibility.  We  
conclude that, through this framework, the Legislature has  
created an all or nothing insanity defense.  Central to our  
holding is the fact that the Legislature has already  
contemplated and addressed situations involving persons who  
are mentally ill or retarded yet not legally insane.  As noted  
above, such a person may be found “guilty but mentally ill”  
and must be sentenced in the same manner as any other  
defendant committing the same offense and subject to  
psychiatric 
evaluation and treatment.  MCL 768.36(3). Through  
this 
statutory 
provision, 
the 
Legislature 
has 
demonstrated 
its  
policy choice that evidence of mental incapacity short of  
insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal  
responsibility by negating specific intent.  
As a final matter, we note that even persons acquitted of  
an offense by reason of insanity may be confined and required  
to undergo evaluation and treatment.  MCL 330.2050. 
As we  
15  
 
 
explained in People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 281; 580 NW2d 884  
(1998), MCL 330.2050 is “a measure to promote public safety.  
Persons acquitted by reason of insanity, particularly where  
the facts are grave, cannot be allowed simply to walk out the  
front door of the courthouse.  The statute is clearly designed  
to establish a procedure by which it can be determined whether  
the person can safely reenter society.”  We agree with the  
Supreme Court of Wisconsin that  
[w]here . . . the statutes provide that a person 
found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be 
committed to a mental treatment facility until 
recovered and until his return to society presents 
no danger to the public, the introduction of  
evidence of mental condition on the question of 
impaired capacity to form intent during the guilt 
phase of the trial could well be required to acquit 
the defendant, sane or insane, without ever  
inquiring into the issue of sanity and without 
regard to the provisions of the statute requiring 
treatment of those pleading and establishing 
insanity.  [Steele v State, 97 Wis 2d 72, 91; 294 
NW2d 2 (1980) (citation omitted).]  
Similar sentiments were expressed in Bethea v United States,  
365 A2d 64, 90-91 (DC App, 1976), a decision that is widely  
cited for the view that the diminished capacity defense should  
be rejected:  
Under 
the 
present 
statutory 
scheme, 
a  
successful plea of insanity avoids a conviction, 
but confronts the accused with the very real 
possibility of prolonged therapeutic confinement. 
If, however, psychiatric testimony were generally 
admissible to cast a reasonable doubt upon whatever 
degree of mens rea was necessary for the charged 
offense, thus resulting in outright acquittal, 
there would be scant reason indeed for a defendant  
to risk such confinement by arguing the greater  
16  
 
 
  
form of mental deficiency. Thus, quite apart from 
the argument that the diminished capacity doctrine 
would result in a considerably greater likelihood 
of acquittal for those who by traditional standards 
would be held responsible, the future safety of the 
offender as well as the community would be  
jeopardized by the possibility that one who is 
genuinely dangerous might obtain his complete 
freedom merely by applying his psychiatric evidence 
to the threshold issue of intent.  
Like the Supreme Court of Ohio, we decline to adopt an  
alternative defense to legal insanity “that could swallow up  
the 
insanity 
defense 
and 
its 
attendant 
commitment 
provisions.”  
Wilcox, supra at 189. 
“[T]he concepts of both diminished  
capacity and insanity involve a moral choice by the community  
to withhold a finding of responsibility and its consequence of  
punishment.” 
Bethea, supra at 90, n 55.9  Accordingly, we  
hold that the insanity defense as established by the  
Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal  
responsibility 
as 
it 
relates 
to 
mental 
illness 
or  
9It is for this reason that we find to be irrelevant the  
largely 
procedural 
distinction 
between 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
of legal insanity and the use of diminished capacity evidence. 
In either case, a defendant is attempting to avoid  
responsibility for his actions.  In our view, the Legislature, 
by adopting a comprehensive framework concerning mental 
illness 
and 
retardation 
as 
it 
relates 
to 
criminal  
responsibility, 
has 
established 
that 
defendants 
suffering 
from 
mental deficiencies amounting to legal insanity “should be 
acquitted on that ground and treated for their disease. 
Persons with less serious mental deficiencies should be  
accountable for their crimes just as everyone else.”  
Chestnut, supra at 825.  
17  
retardation.10  
Defendant, however, maintains that it would violate due  
process to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence  
that, although not legally insane, he lacked the mental  
capacity to form a specific intent.  The United States Supreme  
Court’s decision in Fisher v United States, 328 US 463; 66 S  
Ct 1318; 90 L Ed 1382 (1946), dispositively answers this  
contention in the negative.  The defendant in Fisher sought an  
instruction in his District of Columbia murder trial that  
would have permitted the jury “to weigh evidence of his mental  
deficiencies, which were short of insanity in the legal sense,  
in determining the fact of and the accused’s capacity for  
premeditation and deliberation.”  Id. at 470. In upholding  
the refusal of the trial court to give such an instruction,  
the Supreme Court noted that “[f]or this Court to force the  
District of Columbia to adopt such a requirement for criminal  
trials would involve a fundamental change in the common law  
10We 
decline 
the 
dissent’s 
invitation 
to 
address 
our 
prior 
decisions recognizing voluntary intoxication as negating 
specific intent, see, e.g., People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630; 
331 NW2d 171 (1982), as the continued validity of that 
separate and distinct defense is not before us.  While  
defendant presented evidence that he had been drinking on the 
night of the offense and that he was taking various  
prescription drugs, there was no defense claim that  
intoxication 
alone 
precluded defendant from being able to form 
the requisite specific intent.  Rather, the entire defense was 
based 
upon 
defendant’s apparent organic brain damage.  Indeed, 
defendant’s own expert testified that this was not just a case 
in which “someone went out and drank.”  
18  
theory of responsibility.” Id. at 476. The Court concluded  
that  
[s]uch a radical departure from common law concepts 
is more properly a subject for the exercise of 
legislative power or at least for the discretion of 
the courts of the District. The administration of  
criminal 
law 
in 
matters 
not 
affected 
by 
Constitutional limitations or a general federal law 
is a matter peculiarly of local concern.  [Id. at  
476.]  
Given the clear message of the Court’s decision in  
Fisher, the reliance by both defendant and the dissent on  
other 
United 
States 
Supreme Court decisions not addressing the  
issue presented here is not persuasive. Indeed, the Seventh  
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Fisher to reach the same  
decision we do today:  “[A] state is not constitutionally  
compelled 
to 
recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity and  
hence a state may exclude expert testimony offered for the  
purpose of establishing that a criminal defendant lacked the  
capacity to form a specific intent.”  Muench v Israel, 715 F2d  
1124, 1144-145 (CA 7, 1982); see also Mott, supra at 541  
(“Fisher stands for the proposition that state legislatures,  
without violating the constitution, may preclude defendants  
from 
offering 
evidence 
of 
mental 
and 
psychological  
deficiencies to challenge the elements of a crime”).  
VI. Conclusion  
The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory  
scheme setting forth the requirements for and the effects of  
19  
 
 
asserting a defense based on either mental illness or mental  
retardation. We conclude that, in so doing, the Legislature  
has signified its intent not to allow evidence of a  
defendant’s lack of mental capacity short of legal insanity to  
avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific  
intent.  Rather, the insanity defense as established by the  
Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal  
responsibility 
as 
it 
relates to mental illness or retardation.  
Consequently, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals  
on this alternative basis.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
20  
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 115617  
JAMES A. CARPENTER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree that the Legislature has signified its intent  
to preclude a defendant from negating mens rea by introducing  
evidence of mental illness short of legal insanity.  
For the state to obtain a conviction of certain crimes,  
the Legislature requires that it prove beyond a reasonable  
doubt that the accused acted with specific intent.  I maintain  
that people accused of those crimes should not be prevented  
from offering evidence of mental abnormality or illness  
showing 
that 
they 
acted without the requisite specific intent.  
I believe that the majority's broad rule  excluding such  
evidence lacks sound justification. 
It violates the  
 
 
presumption of innocence and the due process rights to present  
a defense and be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable  
doubt of every element of a crime. Thus, I respectfully  
dissent.1  
I. Due Process Rights  
The state may not deprive any person "of life, liberty,  
or property, without due process of law . . . ." US Const, Am  
XIV; Const 1963, Art 1, § 17. Although an accused has no  
absolute right to present evidence relevant to his defense, a  
limitation on his ability to present a defense may, under some  
circumstances, violate due process. See Rock v Arkansas, 483  
US 44, 55; 107 S Ct 2704; 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987); Chambers v  
Mississippi, 410 US 284, 294; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297  
(1973). Rules excluding evidence contravene the due process  
right to present a defense when they infringe a weighty  
interest of an accused or significantly undermine a  
fundamental element of the defense. See United States v  
Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308; 118 S Ct 1261; 140 L Ed 2d 413  
(1998), citing Rock, supra at 58; Chambers, supra at 302.  
1Generally, mental abnormality evidence may  negate only 
specific intent. Indeed, this was the use approved in People  
v Lynch, 47 Mich App 8, 20-21; 208 NW2d 656 (1973). 
Accordingly, the focus here is on psychiatric evidence 
presented for that purpose. This opinion should not be 
construed as advocating the use of psychiatric evidence of 
mental abnormality or illness to negate the requisite mens rea 
in general intent crimes.  
2  
 
Several United States Supreme Court cases have addressed  
an accused's right to present evidence in support of his  
defense. 
In 
Chambers,2 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that  
Mississippi's evidentiary rules deprived the defendant of a  
fair trial. They prevented him from calling witnesses who  
would have testified that another witness made trustworthy,  
inculpatory statements on the night of the crime. The Court  
reasoned that "where constitutional rights directly affecting  
the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule  
may not be applied mechanically to defeat the ends of  
justice." Id. at 302.  
In Washington v Texas,3 the trial court denied the  
defendant's request to have a defense witness testify. The  
court relied on Texas statutes providing that persons charged  
or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime could testify  
for the state but not for one another.  Defendant sought to  
call a witness who would have offered relevant and material  
evidence for the defense. The Supreme Court held that the  
categorical exclusion of the witness was an unconstitutional  
and arbitrary denial of the defendant's rights. Id. at 23.  
2Supra at 302-303.  
3388 US 14; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1967).  
3  
 
Later, in Crane v Kentucky,4 the Supreme Court held that  
the defendant's right to have a fair opportunity to present a  
defense was violated by the trial court's blanket exclusion of  
evidence.  The Court found that the evidence was competent and  
reliable, that it bore on the reliability of a confession, and  
that it was central to the defendant's claim of innocence.  
The common thread of Chambers, Washington, and Crane is  
the due process requirement that an accused be permitted a  
fair opportunity to defend against any and all state  
accusations. 
A 
fair 
opportunity to defend, if meaningful, must  
entail adversarial testing of the state's case against the  
accused. It must mean that the state may not prevent an  
accused from raising an effective defense. The state may not  
impede a defendant's right to put on a defense by imposing  
either mechanical or arbitrary rules of evidence. See Montana  
v Egelhoff, 518 US 37, 63-64; 116 S Ct 2013; 135 L Ed 2d 361  
(1996) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter,  
and Breyer, JJ.).  
Today, the majority creates a rule per se prohibiting an  
accused from introducing evidence that, because of mental  
abnormality or illness, he lacked the specific intent to  
commit the crime. Under my view of controlling United States  
Supreme Court authority, this exclusion denies an accused his  
4476 US 683, 687; 106 S Ct 2142; 90 L Ed 2d 636 (1986).  
4  
 
 
due process right to present a defense.  
Although, as noted, the right is not entirely limitless,  
an essential component of procedural fairness is an  
opportunity to be heard. That opportunity becomes an empty one  
when the state is permitted to exclude competent, reliable  
evidence directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt. See  
Crane, supra at 690 (citations omitted); see also Chambers,  
supra at 302; State v Ellis, 136 Wash 2d 498, 527; 963 P2d 843  
(1998); United States v Pohlot, 827 F2d 889, 900-901 (CA 3,  
1987). Hence, by foreclosing challenges to the state's proof  
concerning an essential element of the crime charged, the  
majority's broad rule impermissibly undermines a fundamental  
element of an accused's defense. It denies defendants with  
mental abnormalities their due process right to present a  
defense.  
Moreover, the majority has impermissibly diminished the  
constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilt  
beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the charged  
offense. The United States Supreme Court held in In re  
Winship,5 that due process protects an accused against  
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of  
every element of the charged criminal offense. Where a certain  
5397 US 358, 363-364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 
(1970).  
5  
 
 
 
mental state is an element of the crime, the government must  
allege and prove that mental state. See Morissette v United  
States, 342 US 246, 275; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952).  
The case of Martin v Ohio,6 is instructive. There, the  
United States Supreme Court considered an Ohio statute that  
placed on a defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance  
of the evidence an affirmative defense like self-defense. The  
Court held that the statute did not violate due process;  
however, it noted, it would have been error to instruct the  
jury that "self-defense evidence could not be considered in  
determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the  
state's case" where Ohio's definition of the intent element  
made 
self-defense 
evidence the state's burden. Id. at 233-234.  
Such an instruction would have been improper because it would  
have relieved the State of its burden and "plainly run afoul  
of Winship's mandate." Id. at 234.  
Here, although the Legislature has required proof beyond  
a reasonable doubt of mens rea,7 the majority has rendered  
inadmissible evidence relevant to negating the mens rea. In so  
doing, it has foreclosed any meaningful challenge to the  
prosecution's proofs. With respect to specific intent crimes,  
6480 US 228; 107 S Ct 1098; 94 L Ed 2d 267 (1987).  
7Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed, defines "mens rea" as 
"criminal intent."  
6  
 
 
at least, I believe that this "cut[s] against our traditional  
concept of the adversary system" and "downgrades the  
prosecution's burden to something less than that mandated by  
due process of law." People v Hendershott, 653 P2d 385, 393  
(Colo, 1982).  
The majority asserts that Fisher v United States,8  
dispositively 
answers in the negative the question whether its  
holding today violates due process. In Fisher, the defendant  
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
premeditated 
murder 
arising 
from  
an incident inside a Washington, D.C., library. The defendant  
was the library's janitor. The evidence showed that on the  
fatal morning, the librarian told the defendant that he was  
not doing the work for which he was being paid, and in the  
course of her scolding called him a "black nigger." Id. at 479  
(Frankfurter, 
J., 
dissenting). 
In 
anger, 
the 
defendant 
slapped  
the librarian "impulsively," causing her to scream. He then  
retrieved a piece of wood and struck her with it, after which  
he seized her by the throat until she went limp.  
The defense theory was that he never wanted to kill the  
librarian, but wanted to stop her screaming, which unnerved  
him. Id. at 479-480 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At the  
close of proofs, the trial court instructed on insanity,  
irresistible 
impulse, 
malice, 
deliberation, 
and 
premeditation.  
8328 US 463; 66 S Ct 1318; 90 L Ed 1382 (1946).  
7  
 
Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court refused to  
give the following instruction:  
The jury is instructed that in considering the 
question of intent or lack of intent to kill on the 
part 
of 
the 
defendant, 
the 
question 
of  
premeditation or no premeditation, deliberation or 
no deliberation, whether or not the defendant at 
the time of the fatal acts was of sound memory and 
discretion, 
it 
should 
consider 
the 
entire  
personality of the defendant, his mental, nervous, 
emotional and physical characteristics as developed 
by the evidence in the case. [Id. at 470-471, n 6.9]  
Defendant was convicted as charged of first-degree murder.  
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It upheld the  
refusal to give the defendant's requested instruction. The  
Court noted that the defendant was challenging a local  
evidentiary rule that was long established and deeply rooted  
in the District of Columbia. Id. at 477. It declined to force  
the District of Columbia to enact the rule of responsibility  
that 
the 
defendant 
sought, labeling the request "a fundamental  
change in the common law theory of responsibility." Id. at  
9The requested instruction related to the defendant's 
claim that, in assessing whether the defendant, in fact, 
deliberated, the jury should be able to consider the following 
factors: defendant's chronic alcoholic nature, his limited 
intellect, his limited "judgment and comprehension," as well 
as his race. See Siegel, Felix Frankfurter, Charles Hamilton 
Houston and the "N-word": A case study in the evolution of 
judicial attitudes toward race, 7 S Cal Interdisciplinary L J 
317, 346-351, 355 (1998), discussing the Fisher decision in  
great depth. Given these broad proffered factors, one scholar 
considered Fisher to be arguably more of a provocation case 
than a diminished capacity case. See id. at 370, stating that 
the defendant's real defense was that racism "explained, if 
not legally caused, the crime."  
8  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
476.10  
The majority is correct that the Supreme Court in Fisher  
approved of the refusal to give an instruction bearing on  
whether a defendant acted with the requisite specific intent.  
However, I disagree that it resolves the instant defendant's  
due process challenge.  
First, while the Supreme Court has never explicitly  
overruled Fisher, it has arguably done so by implication.  
Fisher must be interpreted in light of 
subsequent Supreme  
Court decisions.  In my view, the line of cases starting with  
In re Winship and ending with Martin creates the inference  
that the rule of Fisher has been implicitly overruled.11  
10In Griffin v United States, 336 US 704; 69 S Ct 814; 93 
L Ed 993 (1949), Justice Murphy stated that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Fisher was based, in part, on the Court's 
reluctance to upset a District of Columbia evidence rule that 
existed when the case arose. That rule provided that "'mental 
deficiency which does not show legal irresponsibility' is not 
'a relevant factor in determining whether an accused is guilty 
of murder in the first or second degree.'" Id. at 722 (Murphy, 
J., dissenting); see, generally, Fisher, supra, declining the 
defendant's request to declare evidence of mental deficiency 
short of legal insanity a relevant factor in determining one's 
guilt of first-degree murder.  
11See Benjamin, The jurisdictional implications of a mens 
rea approach to insanity: Plugging the "detainment gap" after 
Foucha v Louisiana, 19 U Dayton L R 41, 61, n 114 (1993); see 
also United States v Brawner, 471 F2d 969, 1001-1002 (DC CA, 
1972) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, as 
stated in Shannon v United States, 512 US 573, 582; 114 S Ct 
2419; 129 L Ed 2d 459 (1994), rejected by Bethea v United  
States, 365 A2d 64, 83-92 (DC App, 1976), noting how  
subsequent 
cases 
have "undercut the Fisher approach," which it 
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
 
 
In addition, more recent and, in my view, persuasive  
authority exists demonstrating the constitutional infirmity  
of barring evidence of one's mental abnormalities short of  
insanity to negate specific intent. See, e.g., Pohlot, supra  
at 901,12
 stating that "a rule barring evidence [of the  
defendant's mental abnormality] on the issue of mens rea may  
be 
unconstitutional 
so long as we determine criminal liability  
in part through subjective states of mind;" See also Ellis,  
supra at 523; Hendershott, supra at 393.  
In light of the above, I believe that Fisher does not  
control the instant case. Rather, I maintain that the  
majority's rule of exclusion violates due process. As the  
Colorado Supreme Court so astutely stated:  
While it may be permissible to permit a jury 
to infer an essential ingredient of a crime from a 
proven fact so long as there is a rational  
connection between the proven fact and the inferred 
fact, e.g., Barnes v United States, 412 US 837; 93 
S Ct 2357; 37 L Ed 2d 380 (1973); Tot v United  
States, 319 US 463; 63 S Ct 1241; 87 L Ed 1519 
(1943), it is quite another matter to insulate this 
ingredient from disproof by defense evidence. A  
11(...continued) 
referred to as "draconic;" Pohlot, supra at 900-901.  
12In Pohlot, the Court was unpersuaded by either Fisher  
or 
federal 
circuit 
court decisions following Fisher. It stated  
that those cases failed to distinguish "between the use of 
evidence to negate mens rea and a broader diminished capacity 
defense. The recent circuit court opinions also focus on the 
exclusion of expert opinion evidence, not on the exclusion of 
all evidence of mental abnormality, including the defendant's 
own testimony." Pohlot, supra at 901, n 12.  
10  
 
 
 
rule precluding the defendant from contesting the 
culpability element of the charge would render the 
prosecution's evidence on that issue uncontestable 
as a matter of law, in derogation of the  
presumption of innocence and the constitutional 
requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. E.g., Sandstrom v Montana, 442 
US [510, 520-524; 99 S Ct 2450; 61 L Ed 2d 39 
(1979)]; 
Morrissette 
[supra 
at 
274-275]. 
[Hendershott, supra at 391.]  
There can be no question that the majority's holding  
affixes a heavy burden on defendants' due process rights.  
Because the majority provides no plausible justification, I  
think its holding violates due process.  
II. No Plausible Justification for the Majority's 
Broad Rule of Exclusion  
According to the majority, by enacting the insanity13 and  
guilty but mentally ill (GBMI)14  statutes, the Legislature  
created a scheme. It provided the requirements for and the  
effects of asserting a defense based on mental illness or  
retardation. The majority deduces from the scheme an intent to  
bar evidence of a defendant's lack of mental capacity short of  
insanity to negate specific intent. I disagree, and find its  
statutory interpretation analysis unpersuasive.  
The first step in statutory interpretation is to give  
effect to the intent of the Legislature. See Tryc v Michigan  
Veterans Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). To  
13MCL 768.21a.  
14MCL 768.36.  
11  
 
 
 
do so, we examine first the specific language of the statute.  
If the language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the  
Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we will enforce  
the statute as written. See In re MCI Telecommunications  
Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). This Court  
should reject an interpretation of a statute that speculates  
about Legislative intent and requires us to add language into  
the statute. See id. at 414.  
Here, importantly, neither the insanity statute nor the  
GBMI statute mentions the permissibility of using evidence of  
mental abnormality to negate specific intent. Rather, both  
statutes concern affirmative defenses available to a legally  
insane defendant.15 
These two statutes, by their plain  
language, apply only if a defendant seeks to introduce  
evidence of a mental illness to justify or excuse an otherwise  
criminal act.  
This 
clearly contrasts 
with 
the 
introduction of  
diminished capacity evidence. The use of such evidence does  
not constitute an affirmative defense. See Pohlot, supra at  
897. A defendant claiming diminished capacity does not admit  
guilt of the crime charged or assert that he is legally  
15The insanity statute provides that legal insanity "[i]s  
an affirmative defense." MCL 768.21a. The GBMI statute  
expressly 
provides 
that it applies "[i]f the defendant asserts 
a defense of insanity . . . ." MCL 768.36.  
12  
 
 
 
  
 
insane. Rather, he denies the prosecution's prima facie case  
by challenging its claim that he possessed the requisite mens  
rea at the time of the crime.16 
Hence, insanity evidence to  
prove the affirmative defense of legal insanity is distinct  
from diminished capacity evidence to disprove the requisite  
mens rea of a specific intent crime. See United States v  
Gonyea, 140 F3d 649, 651 (CA 6, 1998).17  
I 
consider 
the 
distinction 
between 
the 
two,18 coupled 
with  
the absence of language in the insanity and GBMI statutes  
addressing the use of evidence of mental abnormality to negate  
16See 
Morse, 
Undiminished 
confusion 
in 
diminished  
capacity, 75 J Crim L & Criminology 1, 6 (1984).  
17Moreover, diminished capacity represents a degree of 
mental impairment short of legal insanity. See Britton &  
Bennett, Adopt guilty but mentally ill?-No!, 15 U Tol L R 203, 
211 (1983).  
18The majority attempts to group diminished capacity 
evidence into the insanity and GBMI statutory scheme.  It does  
this by asserting that a defendant who uses diminished 
capacity evidence, like one who uses insanity evidence, is 
trying to "avoid responsibility." Slip op at 17, n 9. The 
assertion is simply inaccurate. Put most simply, one who uses 
diminished capacity evidence seeks merely to ensure that no 
conviction occurs except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every element of the offense. See Morse, supra at 6. If  
diminished capacity evidence creates a reasonable doubt 
regarding one of the elements of the crime charged, the 
defendant is not "avoiding responsibility" for that crime. 
Rather, he is attaining that to which he is constitutionally 
entitled: 
an 
acquittal of that offense. See Morrissette, 
supra 
at 275. In my view, this distinction is significant, and 
persuades me that the insanity and GBMI statues evidence no 
clear legislative intent to exclude diminished capacity 
evidence.  
13  
 
 
the mens rea.  And I cannot conclude that the Legislature  
intended to bar the use of evidence of one's mental  
abnormality short of insanity to negate specific intent when  
it enacted the insanity and GBMI statutes. See MCI  
Telecommunications, supra at 414.19  
I share the majority's concern that the accused who  
successfully show that their mental illness negated the  
requisite mens rea may be set free without treatment or  
imprisonment. However, that cannot justify reading into  
legislation a rule of exclusion per se where none exists.  
By contrast, our Legislature has made it clear that a  
person may not be punished for a crime if the prosecution is  
unable to prove the necessary mens rea.20 Indeed, as one  
scholar explained in rejecting a concern similar to the one  
the majority presents here:  
19Notably, 
this 
Court 
has 
acknowledged 
that 
the  
Legislative intent in enacting the GBMI statute was to "limit 
the number of persons who, in the eyes of the Legislature, 
were improperly being relieved of all criminal responsibility 
by way of the insanity verdict." People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 
500, 512; 375 NW2d 297 (1985) (emphasis in original). This 
militates 
against 
interpreting the GBMI statute as relating to 
the concept of diminished capacity.  
20The situation is analogous to one where a defendant is 
acquitted 
of 
first-degree 
murder 
but 
convicted 
of 
manslaughter 
on the basis of provocation. See Brawner, supra at 1001, 
stating that when one's abnormal mental condition short of 
legal insanity is material in negativing premeditation, it 
"does not set him 'at liberty' but reduces the degree of the 
criminal homicide."  
14  
 
 
Some may argue that persons who gain a failure  
of proof defense through the absence of a  
culpability requirement, through mistake or mental 
illness negating a required mental element, for 
example, 
are 
nonetheless 
dangerous. 
Special 
deterrence, then, is undercut when such failure of 
proof defenses are relied upon. The response is 
simple: if significant purposes of the criminal law 
are satisfied by a criminal conviction in this  
situation, then the offense should be redefined 
without the mental element requirements. If the 
purposes of conviction and punishment would not be 
satisfied by such an alteration, then the defense 
remains appropriate. [1 Robinson, Criminal Law 
Defenses, § 32(b), p 123, n 8.]  
Moreover, in most cases, defendants who successfully  
negate prosecutors' proofs will be convicted of a lesser,  
general intent offense. Even if lesser offenses are  
inapplicable, procedures exist for civil commitment of those  
acquitted 
of 
crimes 
who 
are 
considered 
potentially 
dangerous.21  
In any event, the proper resolution of this concern is not to  
bar relevant evidence.22  
The majority also attempts to justify its holding by  
asserting that a contrary rule would render the insanity  
21See MCL 330.1472a, providing inter alia, for the civil 
admission of mentally ill persons; MCL 330.1498a et seq., 
civil admission of emotionally disturbed minors; MCL 330.1500 
et 
seq., 
civil 
admission 
of 
developmentally 
disabled  
individuals; see also Hendershott, supra at 395.  
22See People v Wetmore, 22 Cal 3d 318, 328; 149 Cal Rptr 
265; 583 P2d 1308 (1978), superseded by 1981 Cal Stat 404, § 
4, current version at Cal Penal Code, §§ 28-29 (West 1988), 
stating that "we do not perceive how a defendant who has in 
his possession evidence which rebuts an element of the crime 
can logically be denied the right to present that evidence 
merely because it will result in his acquittal."  
15  
 
 
 
 
defense superfluous. That a defendant has the right to  
introduce psychiatric evidence to support the affirmative  
defense 
of 
insanity 
does not justify barring relevant evidence  
negating the prosecutor's case in chief. See Pohlot, supra at  
901. Also, 
because 
evidence supporting an insanity defense and  
evidence negating specific intent address distinct questions,  
the breadth of the former is irrelevant to the question of the  
latter's admissibility.  
The majority has taken the extreme step of barring  
defendants from introducing psychiatric evidence of mental  
abnormality to negate the mens rea of the crime charged.  
Because the rule it creates lacks sound justification, and  
because it renders the prosecution's proofs on the intent  
element 
essentially 
uncontestable, 
it 
violates 
defendant's 
due  
process rights. See generally Sandstrom, supra at 520-524;  
Morrissette, supra at 275; Martin, supra at 233-234.23  
III. Authority from Other Jurisdictions  
Several 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
considered 
the  
admissibility of evidence of mental abnormality to negate  
mens rea have reached a conclusion contrary to that of the  
23Given that this Court recognizes evidence of voluntary 
intoxication to negate specific intent, the majority's 
rejection of mental abnormality evidence, used for the very 
same purpose, defies explanation. See Brawner, supra at 999; 
Phipps, supra at 148; State v Correra, 430 A 2d 1251, 1253­
1254 (RI, 1981).  
16  
 
 
majority today. See Compton, Expert witness testimony and the  
diminished capacity defense, 20 Am J Trial Advoc 381, 387-388,  
n 63 (1996-1997); State v Mott, 187 Ariz 536, 555; 931 P2d  
1046 (1997) (Feldman, J., dissenting). Nearly every federal  
circuit court has concluded that the insanity defense reform  
act24 does not bar evidence of mental abnormality to negate  
mens rea. See Pohlot, supra at 900-901; United States v  
Marenghi, 893 F Supp 85, 89 (D Me, 1995) (collecting cases).  
I would follow this persuasive authority, and conclude  
that evidence of mental abnormality or illness is admissible  
to negate specific intent. Such a position merely reaffirms  
three concepts basic to our system of jurisprudence: the right  
to present a meaningful defense, the requirement that the  
state prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element  
of a charged offense, and the presumption of innocence.  
IV. Conclusion  
The 
majority 
categorically 
excludes 
relevant 
and 
material  
evidence that directly concerns an essential element of  
2418 USC 17 provides, in pertinent part:  
(a) Affirmative defense.  It is an affirmative  
defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute 
that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was 
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect 
does not otherwise constitute a defense.  
17  
 
 
specific intent crimes. This violates a defendant's due  
process right to present a defense, ignores the requirement of  
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and derogates the  
presumption of innocence. Because the majority fails to  
justify 
its 
heavy 
burdening of defendants' due process rights,  
I am unable to join its opinion.  
I write, also, because I am troubled that the majority is  
deciding this case on a ground that the prosecutor never  
argued until its brief on appeal to this Court. To the extent  
that this Court rejects arguments not raised below by criminal  
defendants, it should reject those not raised below by the  
prosecution.  Adding insult to injury, the majority has turned  
the prosecution's tardy argument into a rule of exclusion  
that, 
I 
believe, 
cannot 
withstand 
constitutional 
scrutiny. 
For  
these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
18