Title: Lawrence v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DORIS LAWRENCE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 365, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Case No. 0508007261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 4, 2007 
Decided:  May 8, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 8th day of May 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
The defendant-below appellant, Doris Lawrence, appeals from her 
conviction and sentence entered after a bench trial in the Family Court on June 12, 
2006.  Lawrence contends that the Family Court judge deprived her of her right to 
a fair trial, in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution1 when 
                                                 
1  
Article I, § 7 Procedural rights in criminal prosecutions; jury trial; self-incrimination; 
deprivation of life, liberty or property of the Delaware Constitution provides: 
 
 
Section 7. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by 
himself or herself and his or her counsel, to be plainly and fully informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him or her, to meet the witnesses in 
their examination face to face, to have compulsory process in due time, on 
application by himself or herself, his or her friends or counsel, for obtaining 
witnesses in his or her favor, and a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; he 
 
2
the judge questioned a State witness.  For the following reasons, we affirm the 
Family Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
In July 2005, four year old J.P. visited with her father, Anthony 
Parker.  According to J.P., Parker took J.P. to her cousin Nyida’s home.  There, 
Lawrence, J.P’s 12-year-old aunt, entered the bathroom while J.P. was taking a 
bath and inserted a small plastic toy into J.P.’s vagina without J.P.’s consent.  
Police arrested Lawrence in August 2005, and charged her with fourth degree 
rape.2 
 
(3) 
At the bench trial, the State called J.P.’s mother, Karrisn Herald, as a 
witness.  During the State’s direct examination of Herald, the following exchange 
took place: 
Prosecutor: And this two or three year old [cousin,] what was the 
address that they lived at? 
 
Herald: I’m not even sure.   
 
Prosecutor: Do you know what development it’s in? 
 
Herald: No. 
 
Prosecutor: Okay.  Is it in New Castle County? 
 
Herald: I’m not even sure about that.  I never been there. 
                                                                                                                                                             
or she shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself, nor shall 
he or she be deprived of life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his or 
her peers or by the law of the land. 
 
DEL. CONST. Art. I, § 7.  
 
2  
  A person is guilty of rape in the fourth degree when the person: 
(3) Intentionally engages in sexual penetration with another person [and] 
[t]he sexual penetration occurs without the victim’s consent. 
11 Del. C. § 770(a)(3) (2006). 
 
3
 
Prosecutor: Is it local? 
 
Herald: Yes. 
 
Prosecutor: Okay.  Is it do you know what area it’s in? 
 
Herald: No. 
 
Prosecutor: Where was [Doris] and Anthony living at the time of this? 
 
Herald: With their mom. 
 
Prosecutor: And where is that at? 
 
Herald: In Village of Crofton. 
 
Prosecutor: I’m sorry? 
 
Herald: Village of Crofton. 
 
Prosecutor: Is that in New Castle County? 
 
Herald: No it’s in Glasgow or Bear. 
 
Prosecutor: I’m sorry. 
Judge: I don’t think she understands where New Castle Country i[s] 
Mr. [Prosecutor]. 
 
Prosecutor: Yeah I’m getting that. 
Judge: Do you know where the canal is? 
Herald: Yeah. 
Judge: Is it above the canal? 
Herald: Yes. 
Prosecutor: In Delaware? 
Herald: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  And how about Nyida are they above the canal? 
Herald: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Yes. 
 
* * * 
 
Judge: So you did go back to Dr. Light? 
Herald: Yes, we were there while she set it up.  She set the 
appointment up she wanted me to go over [t]o the Children’s 
Advocacy center to get checked out by a doctor there. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  You’re aware that the Children’s Advocacy Center 
is not at the St. Francis Hospital? 
Herald: Yeah I mean at AI, it’s AI. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  And you took her to AI? 
Herald: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Did you go there voluntarily? 
Herald: No I went there I had to be there by two. 
Prosecutor: No, no I mean did anybody force you to take her there? 
 
4
Herald: No just the doctor told me that it would be nice to take her 
there. 
Prosecutor: Okay.  My point is nobody held a gun to your head and 
said you have to take your daughter there right? 
Herald: No, no, nobody did. 
Prosecutor: Okay, alright. 
Judge: Mr. [Prosecutor] can explain [t]o you later on why he’s asking 
you that question.  It seems a bizarre question most people ask.  
Prosecutor: It what’s known as a dumb lawyer question. 
Judge: But necessary. 
Prosecutor: But necessary. 
Judge: It’s just like asking whether something happened in New Castle 
County right. 3 
 
(4) 
The judge sentenced Lawrence to level 5 for an indefinite 
commitment, suspended for level three until Lawrence turns 18, no contact with 
J.P., no contact with children under the age of ten, a psychological evaluation with 
follow up recommendations, 50 hours of community service, regular school 
attendance and to exert best efforts, obey any curfew set by her parents and 
probation officer, and required her to register as a tier two sex offender. 
(5) 
Lawrence appeals from her conviction and sentence.  The sole issue 
on appeal is whether the Family Court judge denied Lawrence a fair trial when she 
commented on Herald’s testimony and prompted the witness regarding where the 
alleged act took place.  
(6) 
In Delaware, “it is elemental and fundamental that the State must 
prove as part of the prosecution that the conduct constituting the crime occurred in 
                                                 
3  
App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B-9-13 (emphasis added). 
 
 
5
Delaware.”4  As Herald tried to explain the location of the accident, the Family 
Court judge remarked that “I don’t think [Herald] understands where New Castle 
County i[s]….”5  On appeal, Lawrence claims that the judge no longer sat as an 
objective fact finder when she remarked on the testimony and elicited information 
from Herald, and that, without the judge’s intervention, the State would not have 
established jurisdiction and venue. 
(7) 
Because Lawrence did not advance this claim below, we review the 
judge’s intervention for plain error:6 
Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must 
be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
fairness and integrity of the trial process.  Furthermore, the doctrine of 
plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the 
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their 
character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, 
or which clearly show manifest injustice.7 
 
(8) 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 614(b) permits a trial judge to interrogate 
witnesses “whether called by itself or a party.”8  Thus, there is no general bar 
preventing trial judges from questioning witnesses, sua sponte.  The question here 
                                                 
4  
James v. State, 377 A.2d 15 (Del. 1977) (citing 11 Del. C. § 204(a)(1)). 
 
5  
App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B-10. 
 
6  
Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 1217, 1219 (Del. 2003).  
 
7  
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 
8  
D. R. E. 614(b). 
 
 
6
is whether the trial judge’s questioning of Herald in an effort to determine where 
the crime occurred constituted an abuse of discretion that deprived Lawrence of a 
fair trial.  Indeed, we have held that “a trial judge is required to exercise self-
restraint and preserve an atmosphere of impartiality when questioning witnesses.  
This requirement ‘arises from the judge’s absolute duty of neutrality.’ ‘Departure 
from that rule may be grounds for reversal on the basis of plain error.’”9  But when 
“it is evident that a witness does not understand a question the judge may explain 
to him the nature of the answer or information called for.  The trial court may also 
advise counsel of the witness’ lack of understanding.”10  We conclude that, here, 
the judge’s comment and inquiry merely fairly and impartially drew attention to 
and resolved the witness’ confusion over an otherwise obvious question.  
Moreover, Herald testified clearly that Nyida’s home was located in Glasgow or 
Bear Delaware and any reasonable person reviewing the record would conclude 
that the crime occurred in Delaware. 
(9) 
Alternatively, Lawrence claims that the trial judge revealed her bias 
when she told Herald that the prosecutor could “explain [t]o you later . . . why he’s 
                                                 
9  
Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891, 898 (Del. 2005) (citing Price v. Blood Bank of 
Delaware, Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1210 (Del. 2002)). 
 
10  
State v. Garcia, 673 P.2d 955, 960 (Ariz. App. 1983) (citations omitted); see also 
Saunders v. State, 401 A.2d 629, 632-33 (Del. 1979) (holding that the trial judge’s action in 
questioning witnesses and advising the prosecutor on the requirements necessary to establish 
admissibility into evidence of statements and other documentary evidence did not cause the court 
to lose its “cloak of impartiality” and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial). 
 
 
7
asking you that question.  It seems a bizarre question most people ask.”11  This 
argument is similarly without merit.  The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that 
“[a]ttempts by a judge to facilitate a witness’ understanding of a question are not 
improper.”12  Here, the judge’s remarks did not comment on any portion of 
Herald’s testimony and did not manifest any support of the prosecution’s position, 
but merely helped Herald understand the nature and extent of the question.  Thus, 
the trial record does not support Lawrence’s claim that the trial judge exhibited 
pro-prosecution bias in her comments and questions during the trial.    
(10)  Because the trial judge’s remarks did not prejudicially affect any of 
Lawrence’s substantial rights, the Family Court judge committed no error, let alone 
plain error.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the Family Court’s judgment 
is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
11  
App. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B-13. 
 
12  
State v. Robertson, 760 A.2d 82, 104 (Conn. 2000).