Title: IN RE JACOB KUCHARSKI MINOR

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 20, 2003  
In re JK, Minor.  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121410  
MELISSA KUCHARSKI,  
Respondent-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
A judge in the Family Division of the Kent Circuit Court  
terminated the respondent mother’s parental rights to her  
three-year-old 
son 
after 
concluding 
that 
there 
were 
attachment  
and bonding problems between the respondent and the child.  
Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeals,  
respondent filed a timely application for leave to appeal in  
this Court.  While that application was pending, unknown to  
this Court, the family division of the circuit court engaged  
 
 
 
 
in the apparently unprecedented and extraordinary action of  
allowing the foster parents to adopt the child.1
 Again,  
unaware 
of 
this 
adoption, we remanded for additional findings.  
Because 
we 
find 
the evidence supporting termination to be  
insufficient, 
we 
vacate 
the 
order 
terminating 
the 
respondent’s  
parental rights.2  We also take this opportunity to make clear  
what we believe to be obvious, that the circuit court is not  
permitted to proceed with an adoption following a termination  
of parental rights where the parent’s appeal of that decision  
remains pending.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
In April 1999, the Kent Circuit Court, Family Division,  
assumed temporary jurisdiction over the minor child on the  
basis of the respondent’s admitted marijuana use.  The child,  
who was then sixteen months old, was placed in a foster home  
by Catholic Social Services3 while the respondent entered an  
in-patient substance-abuse treatment program. For the first  
ten months of the child’s wardship, Catholic Social Services  
1 None of the members of this majority can recall having 
ever encountered this situation, in which an adoption order 
entered while a timely appeal was pending in a parental­
rights-termination case.  
2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of 
the father, Travis Englehart. He did not appeal.  
3 Catholic Social Services provided foster care for court 
wards on the basis of a contract with the Kent County Family 
Independence Agency.  
2  
 
 
planned to return the child to the respondent.  Visits between  
the respondent and the child went well, and the respondent  
actively interacted with the child.  Initially, the visits  
were weekly, but later were increased to twice weekly.  The  
child was sufficiently bonded to the respondent that he cried  
when forced to leave her.4  
Catholic 
Social 
Services 
subsequently 
placed 
the  
respondent in the same foster home.  The foster parents  
reported that the respondent did a good job with the child and  
attended to most of his needs.  
In June 2000, Catholic Social Services filed a petition5  
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights on the basis of  
allegations that the conditions that led to the adjudication  
continued to exist and there was no reasonable expectation  
that the respondent would rectify the conditions within a  
4  At the July 1999 review hearing, the social worker, 
Lora Holewinski, opined that the respondent did not require 
parenting 
classes 
or 
a psychological examination.  She praised 
the respondent for her attentiveness to the child during the 
visits, and her only negative comment was about the  
respondent’s initial defiance in the substance-abuse program, 
which had subsided by the time of the July 1999 hearing.  
5  A permanent-custody petition was filed earlier, in 
April 2000. However, the allegations in that petition refer 
to the respondent’s mother, rather than the respondent. The 
respondent’s mother was also the subject of neglect 
proceedings.  
3  
 
 
 
 
reasonable time given the child’s age.6  As a factual basis  
for the allegation against the respondent, Catholic Social  
Services alleged that the respondent failed to submit to a  
required psychological evaluation, failed to adequately  
participate in counseling at the Dakotah Family Treatment  
Center and Aftercare Process Program,7 and was continuing to  
use alcohol and marijuana.  The petition also alleged that the  
respondent was inattentive and acted inappropriately during  
agency visits with the child.  
Catholic Social Services had referred the respondent to  
therapist 
Elaine 
Hoogeboom 
for 
weekly 
substance-abuse  
therapy.8  In November 2000, Catholic Social Services, for the  
first time, expressed specific concern with the respondent’s  
bonding and attachment to the child.  The social worker asked  
the 
respondent’s 
therapist to address the newly raised concern  
in weekly therapy with the respondent.  Hoogeboom began  
meeting weekly with the respondent, her boyfriend, and the  
child to address the bonding and attachment issue. Several of  
6 This is a ground justifying permanent custody pursuant 
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).  
7 However, at the October 1999 statutory review hearing, 
the social worker testified that the respondent had completed 
the in-patient portion of the program, but did not “graduate” 
because the weekend before the “graduation” she had violated 
one of the personal-conduct rules of the program.  
8  The respondent began meeting with Hoogeboom weekly in 
July 2000.  
4  
 
 
the sessions involved only the respondent and her boyfriend  
because the foster mother failed to bring the child.  Less  
than one month after the bonding and attachment therapy began,  
Ywania Richardson, a therapist who practiced in Genesee  
County, conducted a bonding and attachment assessment of the  
respondent and her child.  She observed their interaction for  
less than one hour.  
The permanent-custody trial took two days in early 2001.  
At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated that  
only legally admissible evidence could be used to establish  
the bonding and attachment issue.  That constituted an  
acknowledgment by all parties that the bonding and attachment  
issue was not a basis supporting temporary jurisdiction.  MCR  
5.974(E)(1).  At the trial, the social worker admitted that  
the respondent completed the substance-abuse program and an  
independent-living program.  She was employed,9 had secured  
housing,10 and was able to care for herself.  Her previous  
substance abuse was no longer a problem and she had remained  
9 The 
respondent’s 
independent-living 
supervisor, 
Alejita 
Rodriguez, testified that respondent earned $1,400 a month.  
10  At the time of the permanent-custody trial, the 
respondent was living in a two-bedroom apartment, which she 
procured on her own.  It was appropriately furnished and 
contained clothes and toys for the child.  
5  
 
 
 
free of controlled substances for over one year.11  Although  
the respondent did not initially follow through with a  
psychological 
evaluation 
when 
first 
referred 
1½ 
years 
earlier,  
she did follow through with the second referral in August  
1999.12  The psychologist who conducted the evaluation found  
nothing in her intellectual and psychological profiles that  
prevented her from appropriately parenting the child.  
The social worker’s new concern about the respondent’s  
ability to parent related to her alleged lack of attachment  
and bonding with the child.  She testified that the respondent  
did not interact appropriately with the child during visits.  
According to the worker, the respondent sometimes had  
difficulty engaging the child in activities, sometimes seemed  
lethargic during portions of the visits, and sometimes  
inappropriately brought candy to visits scheduled in the  
morning.  
Hoogeboom, the respondent’s therapist, opined that the  
respondent and the child were bonded. She recommended that  
the child be placed with the respondent.  According to  
Hoogeboom, the respondent appropriately disciplined the child  
11  Despite this recognition that the respondent had 
remained substance-free for over a year, the June 2000 
permanent-custody petition erroneously alleged that the  
respondent continued to use alcohol and drugs.  
12  The respondent completed the two-part evaluation in 
August 2000 after missing a December 1999 appointment.  
6  
 
 
and interacted with him by playing and singing with him.  
Ywania Richardson, a therapist contacted by the foster  
mother and paid by Catholic Social Services for the  
respondent’s assessment, also testified at trial about the  
bonding and attachment issue.13
 Richardson met with the  
respondent and the child on one occasion for approximately one  
hour to evaluate their bonding. On the basis of this single  
meeting, which took place less than one month after Hoogeboom  
began addressing the bonding and attachment issue with the  
respondent, Richardson opined that they did not have a well­
attached, bonding relationship, but explained that this may  
have resulted from the fact that the child had been in a  
number of foster homes.14  
At the conclusion of the permanent-custody trial, the  
trial court terminated the respondent’s parental rights,  
despite recognizing that the respondent had made significant  
improvement.  
The 
respondent was drug-free, had graduated from  
high school, had completed an independent-living course, and  
obtained adequate housing and employment.  
Nonetheless, the trial court held that the respondent’s  
lack of bonding with, and attachment to, the child provided a  
13  Catholic Social Services referred the respondent to 
Richardson after the referral to Hoogeboom.  
14  The child had resided in five different foster homes  
during wardship.  
7  
 
 
basis for termination.  To reach this conclusion, the court  
gave 
greater 
weight 
to 
Holewinski’s 
and 
Richardson’s  
testimony. 
 
The 
court 
discounted 
Hoogeboom’s 
testimony 
because  
Hoogeboom did not specialize in treatment of the bonding and  
attachment issue.  
The respondent appealed by right to the Court of Appeals,  
which affirmed.15
 The respondent’s counsel filed a timely  
application for leave to appeal with this Court and filed a  
copy with the trial court the following day.  Despite this,  
and just two weeks after the respondent filed the application  
and before this Court ruled on it (even before the date on the  
notice of hearing in this Court), the trial court entered an  
order making final the adoption of the child by the foster  
parents.16  
This Court initially denied leave to appeal in October  
2002.
 The respondent subsequently filed a motion for  
reconsideration, which we granted.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review for clear error both the trial court’s decision  
that a ground for termination of parental rights has been  
15  Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 1, 2002 
(Docket No. 235602).  
16 This Court was informed of the adoption after a remand 
to the trial court in August 2002 for updated findings of 
fact. The trial court filed its findings later that month.  
8  
 
 
 
 
proved 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
and, 
where  
appropriate, the court’s decision regarding the child’s best  
interests.  MCR 5.974(I);17 In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341,  
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A circuit court’s decision to  
terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous if, although  
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the  
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction  
that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,  
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).  
III. ANALYSIS  
Parents 
have 
a 
significant 
interest 
in 
the 
companionship,  
care, custody, and management of their children, and the  
interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.  
In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). A due­
process violation occurs when a state-required breakup of a  
natural family is founded solely on a “best interests”  
analysis that is not supported by the requisite proof of  
parental unfitness. Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255; 98  
S Ct 549; 54 L Ed 2d 511 (1978).  
A  
The Legislature has enumerated specific conditions, one  
17  The rules governing proceedings regarding juveniles 
were amended and moved to new MCR subchapter 3.900, effective 
May 1, 2003.  The provisions on termination of parental rights 
are now found in MCR 3.977.  In this opinion, we will refer to 
the rules in effect at the time of the lower-court decisions.  
9  
 
 
or more of which must be proved before a court is permitted to  
terminate a parent’s rights to her child.  MCL 712A.19b(3).  
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the existence  
of at least one of those grounds by clear and convincing  
evidence.  Id.; Trejo, supra at 350. 
The circuit court in  
this case relied on the following enumerated grounds to  
terminate the respondent’s parental rights to her son:  
(c) The parent was a respondent in a  
proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more 
days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and 
convincing evidence, finds either of the following:  
* * *  
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the 
child to come within the court’s jurisdiction, the 
parent has received recommendations to rectify 
those conditions, the conditions have not been 
rectified by the parent after the parent has 
received notice and a hearing and has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, 
and there is no reasonable likelihood that the  
conditions will be rectified within a reasonable  
time considering the child’s age.  
* * *  
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, 
fails to provide proper care or custody for the 
child and there is no reasonable expectation that 
the parent will be able to provide proper care and 
custody within a reasonable time considering the 
child's age. [MCL 712A.19b(3).]  
If the petitioner establishes a statutory ground for  
termination, “the trial court must issue an order terminating  
parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the  
10  
 
 
 
whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best  
interests.” 
Trejo, 
supra 
at 
354; 
MCL 
712A.19b(5).  
“Subsection 19b(5) attempts to strike the difficult balance  
between the policy favoring the preservation of the family  
unit and that of protecting a child’s right and need for  
security and permanency.” Trejo, supra at 354.  
The decision to terminate the respondent’s parental  
rights was clearly erroneous.  Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)  
(c)(ii), 
termination 
of parental rights is justified where (1)  
the parent is the respondent in a child-neglect proceeding,  
(2) other conditions exist that cause the child to come within  
the 
court’s 
jurisdiction, 
(3) 
the 
parent 
received  
recommendations to rectify those conditions and had a  
reasonable opportunity to do so and the respondent failed to  
rectify the other conditions, and (4) there is no reasonable  
likelihood she will do so within a reasonable time given the  
age of the child. 
The “other conditions” upon which the  
trial court relied were the lack of a bond or attachment  
between the mother and the child. However, we hold that the  
petitioner did not establish the lack of such a bond or  
attachment by clear and convincing evidence.  
The respondent’s therapist met with her weekly.  After  
ample opportunity to observe the respondent and the child  
interact, she opined that they were adequately bonded.  She  
11  
 
recommended that the child be returned to the respondent’s  
care. The respondent’s supervisor in the independent-living  
program 
also 
found 
the respondent’s interaction with the child  
to be appropriate. 
The psychologist who conducted the  
respondent’s court-ordered evaluation found nothing in her  
psychological makeup that prevented her from appropriately  
parenting her child.  By contrast, the therapist hired by  
Catholic Social Services met with the child and the respondent  
only once for approximately one hour.  Her observation of the  
respondent and the child occurred less than one month after  
the respondent’s therapist began addressing the bonding and  
attachment issue.  Reliance on this one minimally informed  
source rather than on the fully knowledgeable staff of persons  
who had worked directly with the respondent over an extended  
period was an insufficient basis for severing the parental  
bond between mother and son.  
In concluding that the respondent and her child were not  
properly bonded, the trial court ignored the fact that,  
immediately after the agency filed the petition for  
termination of parental rights, visitation was automatically  
suspended for several months pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(4).  The  
counselor was then notified only two months before trial18 to  
18 The social worker first asked the counselor to address  
the bonding and attachment issue in November 2000.  The trial  
began in January 2001.  
12  
 
address the bonding and attachment issue with the respondent.  
Any suggestion that the respondent was given “a reasonable  
opportunity” to rectify the alleged bonding and attachment  
issue is unwarranted.  
By 
discounting 
the 
testimony 
of 
Hoogeboom, 
the  
respondent’s counselor, the trial court also ignored the fact  
that it was the social worker who referred the respondent to  
Hoogeboom for counseling on the bonding and attachment issue.  
If the social worker truly believed that Hoogeboom’s  
credentials 
were 
insufficient 
to 
address 
bonding and  
attachment, it was that worker’s responsibility to make an  
alternate referral.  Despite Richardson’s alleged superior  
credentials, the social worker never suggested that the  
respondent receive treatment from her.  
The fundamental right of a parent and child to maintain  
the family relationship can be overcome only by clear and  
convincing evidence, which, in this case, was not supplied by  
this single witness who observed the mother and child together  
for just one hour at a time when she had been addressing the  
bonding and attachment issue in therapy for less than one  
month.19  
19 The social worker’s testimony also failed to establish 
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to 
address her bonding and attachment issue.  Rather, the social 
worker’s testimony about the respondent’s occasional lethargy 
and bringing candy to morning visits does not, in our  
13  
 
 
  
The second basis for the trial court’s order is MCL  
712A.19b(3)(g), 
which 
permits 
termination 
where 
(1) 
the 
parent  
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and (2)  
there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be  
able to do so within a reasonable time given the child’s age.  
Again, petitioner failed to present clear and convincing  
evidence of this ground.  The social worker from Catholic  
Social Services acknowledged that the mother had appropriate  
housing and employment, was able to care for herself, had  
completed an independent-living program, and remained drug­
free for over one year.  The respondent in this case fulfilled  
every requirement of the parent-agency agreement.  Her  
compliance negated any statutory basis for termination.  
This Court has held that a parent’s failure to comply  
with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s  
failure to provide proper care and custody for the child.  
Trejo, supra at 360-363. 
By the same token, the parent’s  
compliance with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of her  
ability to provide proper care and custody.20  
judgment, rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence 
required to permanently sever the bond between a parent and 
her child.  
20  If the agency has drafted an agreement with terms so 
vague that the parent remains “unfit,” even on successful 
completion, then the agreement’s inadequacies are properly 
attributable to the agency and cannot form the basis for the 
termination of parental rights.  Even if, in some case, it can  
14  
 
 
There were no statutory grounds for terminating the  
respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3).21  
For that reason, we need not address the question whether  
termination was in the best interests of the child.  MCL  
712A.19b(5).  We conclude that the trial court “clearly erred”  
by terminating respondent’s parental rights.22  
be conceived that satisfaction by the parent of the parent­
agency agreement does not render the parent “fit,” in this 
case we are satisfied that the respondent’s satisfaction of 
the agreement did evidence that she was no longer an “unfit” 
parent.  
21 Several of the trial court’s written findings of fact 
on remand suggest that it may have been influenced by the 
relative advantages of the adoptive home compared to the 
mother’s home. We remind the family-division judges of what 
we said nearly fifty years ago:  
“It is totally inappropriate to weigh the 
advantages of a foster home against the home of the 
natural and legal parents. 
Their fitness as  
parents and question of neglect of their children 
must be measured by statutory standards without 
reference to any particular alternative home which 
may be offered to the [child].”  [Fritts v Krugh, 
354 Mich 97, 115; 92 NW2d 604 (1958).]  
We note the trial court’s fact-finding on remand simply 
because it suggests that improper comparisons between the 
homes of the adoptive and natural parents may have been made 
in determining whether to terminate the respondent’s parental 
rights.  This type of comparison may explain why the 
respondent’s parental rights were terminated despite what we 
believe is the lack of clear and convincing evidence in 
support of that termination.  
22  Despite the lack of evidence supporting the petition 
for 
termination 
of 
the respondent’s parental rights, the trial 
court terminated her rights and refused to return the child. 
Consequently, the child was deprived of a secure and stable 
home with his natural mother, a mother who had completed every  
15  
 
 
 
 
 
B  
A parent whose rights to her child have been terminated  
has the right to appeal that decision.  Reist v Bay Circuit  
Judge, 396 Mich 326; 241 NW2d 55 (1976).23  MCR 5.993(A)(2)  
provides an appeal of right in the Court of Appeals for an  
order terminating parental rights. 
The Adoption Code  
prohibits a trial court from ordering an adoption if a parent  
has filed an appeal of right from an order terminating her  
parental rights until the Court of Appeals affirms the order  
terminating parental rights. MCL 710.56(2).24  
term of her parent-agency agreement and who had, according to 
her own court-ordered therapist, successfully addressed her 
alleged lack of bonding with, and attachment to, her child. 
Rather than returning the child after the natural mother 
completed every task asked of her, the agency delayed the 
child’s security and stability with his own mother and sought 
the opinion of a different therapist who claimed that the 
respondent lacked the proper bonding and attachment to 
properly parent her child.  
23  In Reist, all the participating justices agreed that 
parents have the right to appeal.  The Court divided on the  
basis for that right.  Justices Levin, Kavanagh, and Williams 
found that parents have a constitutional right to appeal. 
Justices 
Coleman, 
Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, on the other hand, 
found no need to address whether parents had a constitutional 
right to appeal, as they found a basis for the appeal in the 
relevant statute and court rule.  
24  We acknowledge the accelerated pace at which circuit 
courts in this state are now required to determine whether to 
terminate the parental rights of a parent in a neglect 
proceeding.  MCL 712A.19a(1) requires a circuit court to hold 
a permanency-planning hearing within one year after the child 
is made a court ward.  The federal adoption and safe families 
act, 42 USC 675(5)(E), requires the filing of a petition for 
permanent custody when a child has remained a family court  
16  
 
While the statute refers to affirmance by the Court of  
Appeals, it must be read in conjunction with MCR 7.215(F),  
which establishes the effective date of a Court of Appeals  
opinion:  
(1) Routine Issuance. Unless otherwise ordered  
by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court or as 
otherwise provided by these rules,  
(a) the Court of Appeals judgment is effective 
after the expiration of the time for filing a timely 
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court, or, if such an application is filed, after 
the disposition of the case by the Supreme Court 
. . . .  
In this case, the respondent filed a timely application  
for leave to appeal to this Court within twenty-one days after  
the date of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR  
7.302(C)(2).  Thus, the trial court improperly allowed the  
foster parents to adopt the child before the resolution of the  
respondent’s application for leave to appeal.25  The judgment  
ward for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months unless (i) 
the child is being cared for by a relative, (ii) a state 
agency has documented in a case plan a compelling reason for 
finding that filing such a petition would not be in the best 
interests of the child, or (iii) the state has not provided to 
the child’s family such services as the state deems necessary 
for the safe return of the child.  In this case, the state did 
not provide the respondent with the proper services necessary 
for the safe return.  The state agency referred the mother to 
a therapist to deal with the bonding and attachment issue; the 
therapist’s opinion (that the respondent had no problem in 
this area) was later discounted.  
25  At oral argument it was reported that the county 
designated this as an “at risk” adoption. Apparently, this 
adoption was labeled that because the county took a “risk”  
17  
 
 
of the Court of Appeals never became effective.  
The trial court was without authority to ignore this  
Court’s appellate jurisdiction by allowing the adoption to  
take place while a timely application for leave to appeal was  
pending in this Court.  The adoption in this case was invalid  
because it violated the provisions of MCL 710.56(2) and MCR  
7.215(F).  Further, to allow such an adoption to occur would  
be to distort the nature of this Court’s review of the  
termination 
decision 
by 
requiring, 
as 
an 
effective  
precondition to reversal of the termination order of the trial  
court, that we be prepared also to undo an adoption that has  
become a fait accompli.  Parents whose rights have been  
terminated by the trial court are entitled to appellate review  
of this decision without that review being compromised by the  
specter of appellate courts having to undo an adoption as a  
concomitant act to the granting of relief for those parents.  
Such a result is simply contrary to the structure of the  
justice system established by our constitution and laws.  
The members of this Court have each reflected upon this  
case at length.  There is no ideal result. 
There is no  
outcome that will avoid the imposition of suffering upon  
that this Court might vacate the termination of parental 
rights. We explicitly disapprove of this practice. Such an  
“at risk” adoption does a disservice to all the parties 
involved.  
18  
 
 
 
either the birth parent of this child or his present adoptive  
parents.  If there is a practical reason that adoptions not be  
permitted while a parent is in the process of appealing a  
termination decision, it is that reflected in the choices now  
available to this Court in this case.  It is in the interests  
of both the natural parent and the child, as well as the  
interests of the integrity of the justice system, that the  
termination decision not be reviewed, as it has been here,  
under the specter of having to remove the child from adoptive  
parents in order to give faithful effect to the law.  To say  
the least, this Court has not taken this decision lightly.26  
Rather, we are fully cognizant that it is an imperfect  
decision and that it will have a significant effect on the  
lives of everyone connected with this case.27  We conclude,  
26 The premature adoption that occurred in this case was  
a procedural anomaly, leading the Court to proceed with 
caution.  We remanded this case for an update on the status 
and granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration after 
additional consideration. The deliberative process required 
in this unusual case caused this Court to expend a greater 
length of time than is usually necessary in appeals of 
decisions regarding the termination of parental rights.  
27  Although appeals from decisions terminating parental 
rights are already decided on an expedited basis, MCR 
5.993(C)(1), 
7.212(A)(1)(i), 
and 
7.212(A)(2)(a)(i), 
significant efforts have been ongoing in this Court to further 
expedite this process.  This Court previously opened an 
administrative file to address appellate delay and, in April 
2002, we published for comment proposed rules that would 
eliminate delayed applications for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court, effectively reducing the delay between the 
rendering of a decision by the Court of Appeals and filing of  
19  
 
 
however, that the result reached is compelled by Michigan law  
and that the values underlying this law are important in  
upholding the family relationship.  
In order to prevent this situation from recurring, we  
hold that trial courts are not permitted to allow an adoption  
of a child whose parents’ rights have been terminated while  
the parents’ appeal of that termination is pending in either  
the Court of Appeals or in this Court.28  
an application for leave to appeal in this Court.  Those  
proposals will soon be ready for final action upon the receipt 
of related proposals from the Court of Appeals, with which 
they must be coordinated.  In addition, this Court’s internal 
administrative 
processing of cases has been modified to assure 
the earliest possible Supreme Court consideration of these 
cases.  Further, in response to concerns about delay in the 
Court of Appeals and a study from the National Center for 
State Courts regarding dependency appeals, in August 2002, we 
directed the Chief Judge and the Chief Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals to convene a Dependency Appeals Task Force, including 
representatives of affected courts and groups, to devise 
methods for expediting dependency appeals. The task force’s  
report was filed May 5, 2003.  
As an offshoot of the task force on appellate-delay 
reduction, discussions have also been initiated regarding the 
need to address reducing trial-court delay in handling 
termination cases.  In response to the federal government’s 
Child and Family Service Review of the Michigan foster-care 
and 
adoption 
system, 
a work group comprised of family-division 
judges and employees of the Family Independence Agency has 
been appointed to address such delay.  
28  MCL 712A.19c requires the trial court to hold a 
posttermination review hearing, within ninety-one days of the 
termination decision and at least every ninety-one days 
thereafter.
 At these mandatory posttermination review  
hearings, the court can monitor the progress of the parent’s 
appeal and ensure that an adoption does not take place until 
the parent’s right to appellate review has been exhausted.  
20  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the  
Kent Circuit Court terminating the respondent’s parental  
rights.  Further, we vacate the order of adoption because it  
is invalid.  Finally, we order the Family Independence Agency  
to commence appropriate efforts toward reunification of the  
respondent and the child.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
21  
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re JK, Minor.  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,  
Petitioner-Appellee,  
v
 No. 121410  
MELISSA KUCHARSKI,  
Respondent-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (nonparticipation statement).  
I have decided not to participate in this case for the  
following reasons:  
•First, to expedite for the sake of the child this case,  
which has been in the Supreme Court for over a year;1  
•Second, to defer to the decisions of the respondent  
party, the biological mother, and her attorney not to  
1  After this case is completed, I will publish at my 
personally 
funded 
website, 
JusticeWeaver.com, 
a 
proposed 
court 
rule designed to shorten the appellate process and eliminate 
appellate delays in cases involving the termination of 
parental rights by ensuring that they will not be in the 
appellate system for more than eleven months (eight months in 
the Court of Appeals, three months in the Supreme Court) after 
the claim of appeal is filed.   
 
remit/waive any possible disqualification; and  
•Third, to maintain public trust and confidence in the  
judiciary.  
There are no court rules establishing the procedure for  
a Michigan Supreme Court justice’s decision whether or not to  
refrain from participation in a case.  Traditionally, 
the  
decision has been left to the discretion of the individual  
justices, and nothing has been revealed to the public.  
I propose for public comment the following amendments of  
Michigan Court Rule 2.003.  These amendments provide that when  
the issue of disqualification is raised, a justice should  
publish in the record of the case the reasons for the decision  
to participate in the case or not, and outline the procedure  
for a justice to raise his potential disqualification with the  
parties and their attorneys.  
(C)(5)Disqualification of a Justice. If a  
justice’s participation in a case is challenged by 
a written motion or if the issue of participation is 
raised by the justice or another justice, the 
challenged justice shall decide the issue and 
publish in the record of the case that justice’s 
reasons for the decision to participate or not.  
* * *  
(D)(2)Procedure for a Justice. If it appears 
that there may be grounds or possible grounds for 
disqualification, the justice may have the clerk of 
the supreme court send the parties the justice’s 
written explanation of the grounds or possible 
grounds for disqualification, and ask the parties 
and their attorneys to consider whether to waive any 
disqualification.  If, following disclosure of any  
2  
 
 
grounds or possible grounds for disqualification 
other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, the parties all notify the clerk of the 
supreme court in writing that the justice should not 
be disqualified, and the justice is then willing to 
participate, the justice may participate in the 
case.  
I have in effect followed the above procedures in this case.  
My decision not to participate in this case is based on  
a communication that I had on Monday, April 28, 2003 with the  
state’s central Family Independence Agency office in Lansing  
regarding an issue raised by a justice at oral argument on  
April 9, concerning the number of attachment and bonding  
experts in Michigan—“Do you think there are 10,000 experts in  
this field?”  
The communication occurred at the end of a telephone  
conversation with a staff person to the Governor’s Task Force  
on Juvenile Justice (Children’s Justice Task Force), which I  
chair.  This staff person is employed by the state’s central  
FIA office in Lansing with task force funds.  The conversation  
dealt with matters pertaining only to task force business  
until the end, when in passing, I asked the staff person how  
many experts on attachment and bonding there are in Michigan.  
Although he did not know, he connected me to someone whom he  
thought might know, a person who is also employed by the  
state’s central FIA office in Lansing.  After checking, this  
person informed me that there may be two such experts in  
3  
 
 
 
 
Michigan and certainly not 10,000.  Late on Monday, April 28,  
I shared that information with the justices on the Court,  
writing:  
In a preliminary contact with the Family 
Independence Agency in Lansing the agency indicated 
that it was aware of two Michigan experts on bonding 
and attachment.  Ms. Richardson is one of those two  
experts.  
Chief Justice Corrigan contacted me late on Friday, May  
2, and suggested that my communication with the state FIA  
could be considered an ex parte communication, contrary to the  
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.  Although I believed this  
communication was not an ex parte communication—that the  
state’s central FIA office in Lansing is not a party in this  
case because the Kent County division of the FIA filed the  
petition and is a party in the case—as discussed below, I  
recognized that it is a question of law and fact which has not  
been decided by this Court.  
Because the Chief Justice raised the question whether it  
was an ex parte communication, and ex parte communications can  
be grounds for disqualification, I believed the parties and  
their attorneys had a right to know of the communication.  
Late Friday, May 2, I contacted the Clerk of the Supreme Court  
for 
the 
“proper 
procedure” 
to 
raise 
my 
possible  
disqualification.  Although Michigan Court Rule 2.003(D)  
applies to trial judges and does not refer to Supreme Court  
4  
 
 
 
 
justices, this court rule sets out the procedure that seemed  
to be possibly applicable.  Pursuant to Michigan Court Rule  
2.003(D) and Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3C and D, I  
decided to contact the parties and attorneys and raise the  
issue of my possible disqualification in this case.2  
In an attempt to expeditiously resolve this issue, on  
Tuesday, May 6, in accordance with the court rule, MCR  
2.003(D), I had the Clerk of the Supreme Court send to the  
parties and attorneys a letter detailing the substance of the  
communication, stating that the information had been given to  
the other justices, informing them that it did not appear that  
the communication with the staff of the state’s central FIA in  
2  Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3C provides, “A judge 
should raise the issue of disqualification whenever the judge 
has cause to believe that grounds for disqualification may 
exist under MCR 2.003(B).”  
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3D provides, “A  
disqualification of a judge may be remitted as provided by MCR 
2.003(D).”  
Michigan Court Rule 2.003(D)provides:  
“If it appears that there may be grounds for 
disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and 
their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of 
the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If, 
following 
disclosure 
of 
any 
basis 
for  
disqualification other than personal bias or  
prejudice concerning a party, the parties without 
participation by the judge, all agree that the 
judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is 
then 
willing to 
participate, 
the 
judge 
may 
participate in the proceedings.  The agreement 
shall be in writing or placed on the record.”  
5  
 
Lansing had given or would give the Kent County FIA or their  
attorney a procedural or tactical advantage, and stating that  
I had not been prejudiced or biased by the communication or by  
the information I received.  I asked the parties and attorneys  
whether 
they 
would 
waive 
or 
remit 
any 
possible  
disqualification, and asked them to respond with that decision  
in writing to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Corbin  
Davis, by 5:00 p.m. on Friday, May 9.  
On 
Thursday 
May 
8, 
the 
Kent 
County 
prosecutor,  
representing 
the 
Kent 
County 
FIA 
office, 
and 
the  
attorney/guardian ad litem for the child both sent in their  
decision to remit any disqualification. 
Late Friday  
afternoon, May 9, the attorney for the respondent party, the  
biological mother, sent a letter stating that he had not been  
in contact with his client, and that accordingly he was  
declining to remit any disqualification.  I requested the  
Clerk of the Supreme Court to forward a copy of the attorney’s  
letter to all the justices.3  Later that same day I had the  
Clerk of the Supreme Court contact the attorney for the  
biological mother by fax, informing him that he had the time  
he needed to make contact with his client before making the  
decision on whether to remit any disqualification. On Monday,  
3 The Clerk of the Supreme Court did forward a copy of 
the attorney’s letter to all the justices on Monday, May 12, 
2003.  
6  
 
 
 
May 12, the biological mother’s attorney notified the Clerk of  
the Supreme Court by faxed memorandum that he had communicated  
with his client, and that she agreed with the decision not to  
remit or waive any disqualification.  
I continue to believe that the state’s central FIA office  
in Lansing is not a party in a termination-of-parental-rights  
case brought by a county FIA office. 
Nevertheless,  
preliminary research does not reveal any decision by this  
Court regarding whether the state central FIA office in  
Lansing is a party in a case brought by a county FIA office.  
This question is one of both law and fact.  In order to  
resolve it, this Court would need to hold an evidentiary  
hearing and make a finding on this point.  Such a hearing and  
the time needed to make the legal decision would further delay  
this case.  
Accordingly, for all the above reasons, I am not  
participating in this case.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
7