Title: Richard Henyard, Jr. v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC02-1105
____________
RICHARD HENYARD, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC02-2538
____________
RICHARD HENYARD, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., ETC.,
Respondent.
[May 27, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Richard Henyard, Jr. appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and
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petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's
denial of Henyard's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are set out in detail in our previous opinion.  See
Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996).  Richard Henyard (Henyard), at the
age of eighteen, took a gun that belonged to a family friend and decided he was
going to steal a car, kill the owner, and put the victim in the trunk so he could go
see his father.  Henyard convinced a younger, fourteen-year-old friend, Alfonza
Smalls, to help him rob someone.  On January 30, 1993, Henyard and Smalls
waited outside of a Winn-Dixie store in Eustis, Florida.  Their victims were Mrs.
Dorothy Lewis and her daughters, Jasmine, age three, and Jamilya, age seven, who
were shopping at the Winn-Dixie.  As the three left the store and returned to their
car, Smalls approached Lewis with a gun and ordered her and her daughters in the
back of the car.  Henyard drove the car out of town.  
Henyard stopped the car at a deserted location where the two boys raped
Lewis on the trunk of the car while her daughters remained in the back seat. 
Afterward, Henyard shot Lewis four times, wounding her in the leg, neck, mouth,
1.  The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) the defendant
had been convicted of a prior violent felony; (2) the murder was committed in the
course of a felony; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. 
2.  The trial court found the following statutory mitigating factors: (1)
Henyard's age of eighteen at the time of the crime; (2) evidence that Henyard was
acting under an extreme emotional disturbance; and (3) Henyard's capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
3.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:
(1) the defendant functions at the emotional level of a thirteen-year-old and is of low
intelligence; (2) the defendant had an impoverished upbringing; (3) the defendant
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and the middle of the forehead between her eyes.  Henyard and Smalls rolled
Lewis's unconscious body off to the side of the road and got back in the car. 
Jamilya and Jasmine were then driven to a separate location and taken from the car
into a grassy area where they were each shot in the head and killed.  Lewis survived
and was able to make it to a nearby house where the police were called.
At trial, Richard Henyard, Jr. was convicted of three counts of armed
kidnapping, one count of sexual battery with the use of a firearm, one count of
attempted first-degree murder, one count of robbery with a firearm, and two counts
of first-degree murder.  After the penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended the
death sentence for each of the murder counts by a vote of twelve to zero.  The
court found four aggravating factors,1 three statutory mitigating factors,2 and six
nonstatutory mitigating factors.3  The court found that the mitigating circumstances
was born into a dysfunctional family; (4) the defendant can adjust to prison life; (5)
the defendant could have received eight consecutive life sentences with a minimum
mandatory of fifty years; and (6) Henyard's codefendant, Smalls, could not receive
the death penalty as a matter of law. 
4.  The eleven claims were: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
grant Henyard's motions for a change of venue; (2) the trial court erred when it (a)
granted the State's challenge for cause of one prospective juror (who stated he
could not, under any circumstances, recommend a death sentence for Henyard
because of his youth), and (b) refused to excuse three prospective jurors Henyard
challenged for cause; (3) the trial court erred in denying Henyard's motions to
suppress his statement to the police because the interrogating officers failed to
honor Henyard's request to cease questioning in violation of his right to remain
silent under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution; (4) the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting DNA evidence which was not supported by a proper
predicate of reliability; (5) the trial court erred by (a) allowing the State, during voir
dire, to tell prospective jurors that if the evidence of aggravators outweighed the
evidence of mitigators then the jury's sentence recommendation must be for death
as a matter of law, and (b) suggesting during closing argument that Henyard never
admitted to raping Lewis when, in fact, he did confess to raping her in his third
confession to police on the day after the murders; (6) the trial court erred in
allowing a police officer to testify as to hearsay statements Lewis made to him
when he came to her aid after the offense; (7) the trial court erred by giving the
standard jury instructions on premeditated murder and reasonable doubt, and by
failing to give the jury a special verdict form on the theory of guilt; (8) the trial court
erred during the penalty phase by (a) instructing the jury on the avoid arrest
aggravator, (b) expressly considering as an aggravator, and allowing the jury to
hear, evidence of Henyard's prior juvenile adjudication for robbery with a weapon,
and (c) allowing Lewis and Leroy Parker to testify at the penalty phase because
their testimony did not tend to prove any statutory aggravating circumstance; (9)
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Henyard's specially requested
penalty-phase jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating
circumstance, which instructed on "tortuous [sic] intent," and further erred by
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did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentenced Henyard to death.  
This Court rejected all eleven4 of Henyard's claims on direct appeal and
giving the standard heinous, atrocious or cruel instruction, which is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (10) the trial court erred by relying upon
two aggravating circumstances--pecuniary gain and heinous, atrocious or cruel--as
support for Henyard's death sentences because they were not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (11) the death penalty is not proportionally warranted in this
case.
5.  The nine claims raised in Henyard's motion were: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel during penalty phase because trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence and to adequately challenge
the State's case; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview the jurors
about any changes in their penalty phase voting; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to ask jurors various questions; (4) the jury instructions violated Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (5) the Florida death penalty statute is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (6) electrocution is unconstitutional; (7)
entitlement to relief because of "cumulative error;" (8) the death sentence rests on
an unconstitutionally automatic aggravating circumstance; (9) the death sentence is
unconstitutional because Henyard has the intellectual capacity of a thirteen-year-old
child.
6.  The evidentiary hearing was held only as to portions of Henyard's first
claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
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affirmed his conviction and sentence.  Henyard then filed the postconviction
motion that is the subject of this appeal, wherein he made nine claims.5  After
holding a hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), the trial
court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Henyard's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.6  Both Henyard and the State introduced the testimony of a number
of witnesses.  Subsequently, the trial court entered an order denying relief. 
Henyard now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying him relief on his
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postconviction motion.
ANALYSIS
3.850 APPEAL
Henyard's claims on appeal are rooted in his claim from his postconviction
motion that trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting different
types of mitigating evidence.  On appeal, Henyard divided his claim on ineffective
assistance of counsel into six subclaims, alleging that his trial counsel did not
adequately investigate or present the following nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances: (1) Henyard's lack of stable parental contact and supervision; (2)
Henyard suffered physical abuse at the hands of his father's common law wife,
Edith Ewing; (3) Henyard's pattern of seeking out younger children as companions
due to his lower IQ and "mental" age and to avoid harassment from children his
own age; (4) Henyard suffered sexual abuse as a child; (5) Henyard's chronic use
of alcohol; (6) Henyard's mental state as characterized by his suicidal feelings. 
Additionally, Henyard argues that counsel was deficient in preparing one of
Henyard's mental health experts for trial.  We consider each of Henyard's
subclaims in turn.
Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation
In order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
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must establish two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Wike v. State, 813
So. 2d 12, 17 (Fla. 2002); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 219-20 (Fla. 1998);
Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1996).  To establish prejudice, "[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the
Strickland test.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  This
requires an independent review of the trial court’s legal conclusions, while giving
deference to the trial court’s factual findings.  See id.
Henyard alleges that trial counsel's performance was deficient in investigating
7.  Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.
Ct. 2527 (2003), applied the Strickland standard with regard to the adequacy of
counsel's investigation into mitigating evidence.  The Court reiterated:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
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potential nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Under Strickland, "counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  However,
"[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially
influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions."  Id.  While trial counsel
has a duty to investigate, "when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe
that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's
failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." 
Id.
Following this standard from Strickland, this Court has held that "[a]n
attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an investigation
of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence." Rose, 675 So. 2d
at 571.  Moreover, this Court has also recognized that "[t]he failure to investigate
and present available mitigating evidence is a relevant concern along with the
reasons for not doing so."  Id.7
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support
the limitations on investigation.  In other words, counsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed
for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure
of deference to counsel's judgments.
Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). The Court
determined that the principal concern about whether the attorneys in the case
exercised reasonable professional judgment hinged on whether the investigation
supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence was itself
reasonable.  Id. at 2536.  The Court concluded that the attorneys' investigation,
which was limited to obtaining two documents that indicated that the defendant had
a troubled social and family history, fell short of the prevailing standards in place at
the time of the trial.  Id. at 2536.
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Parental Contact and Supervision
First, Henyard argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting four
witnesses to show Henyard suffered from a lack of parental contact and
supervision.  Initially, we would note that this specific claim was not made in
Henyard's postconviction motion, and therefore it is procedurally barred. 
However, even if we were to address the merits, we would conclude that Henyard
has not demonstrated a basis for relief.  These four witnesses testified at the
evidentiary hearing and, in general, their testimony demonstrated that Henyard had a
difficult childhood.  It was not clear from the evidentiary hearing whether the names
of each of these individuals was given to Henyard's defense counsel.  Although
8.  At the evidentiary hearing, the four witnesses testified that Henyard had to
live with people in the neighborhood because his mother did not take good care of
him.  They also testified that Henyard's mother was promiscuous and was addicted
to drugs and alcohol.  Although these witnesses may have provided some evidence
as to Henyard's difficult childhood, this evidence would have been cumulative with
the evidence that was presented during the penalty phase.  At the penalty phase of
the trial, Jacqueline Turner, Henyard's godmother, who also testified at the
evidentiary hearing, testified in some detail about Henyard's upbringing and
childhood.  She testified that Henyard's mother had a chronic problem with alcohol
and drug abuse during Henyard's entire life.  Henyard's mother also testified that
she constantly drank heavily and did other drugs while Henyard was young.  She
also testified that Henyard lived with his godmother and his father most of the time
while he was young and she rarely stayed in contact with him when he was not
staying with her.  Henyard's father also testified that he had to take custody of
Henyard because Henyard's mother was not taking care of him.  Henyard's father
testified that he could not spend much time with his son either because of his work
schedule.  During the penalty phase of the trial, Henyard's godsister also testified
that Henyard had to stay with her mother because his mother was not taking care of
him.  This testimony was stressed in some detail in the defense's closing argument.
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there was some dispute over trial counsel's attempts to contact one of the
witnesses, all four testified that no one from Henyard's defense team had talked to
them at the time of Henyard's trial.
Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that Henyard's attorneys performed
deficiently by failing to track down these four witnesses and present their testimony
at the penalty phase, pursuant to the second prong of the Strickland test, Henyard
did not suffer any prejudice because the testimony of the four witnesses was
substantially similar to and cumulative with testimony that was actually presented
during the penalty phase.8  See Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002)
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(finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence in
mitigation that was cumulative to evidence already presented in mitigation).  The
various witnesses at both proceedings testified to the fact that Henyard had a
difficult childhood, often living in multiple households because his mother was not
an adequate caregiver.  Thus, even assuming that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to locate the additional witnesses that could have provided additional
confirmation to the testimony that was presented at the penalty phase, Henyard has
failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, and hence is not entitled to relief
on this subclaim.  See, e.g., Sweet v. State, 810 So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002)
(noting that the Court did not need to reach the issue of whether trial counsel was
deficient in failing to have additional penalty phase witnesses testify, because the
testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing did not establish prejudice
where the majority of the testimony was cumulative with other witnesses' trial
testimony).
Physical Abuse
Second, Henyard alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting
evidence that Henyard's stepmother, Edith Ewing, physically abused him as a
youth.  Initially, any evidence of physical abuse presented at the hearing was
extremely limited.  The allegations of any significant amount of physical abuse came
9.  Although they were not biologically related, Lenon testified that she and
Henyard were raised in the same household for a time and she referred to him as a
brother.
10.  For example, T. Michael Johnson, Henyard's lead trial counsel, in
explaining that there were strategic decisions not to have certain witnesses testify
stated, "His stepmother and he did not get along.  And she was of the opinion that
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during the testimony of Henyard's "sister," Trena Lenon.9  All of Lenon's testimony
was confined to information that Henyard told her on the phone.  She admitted that
she was never present for any physical abuse, and that she had no knowledge of
whether what Henyard told her was true or not.  Other than this, the only other
testimony or evidence that might support Henyard's claim was Ewing's own
testimony that she spanked Henyard on one or two occasions on the legs with a
belt.  However, she testified that she did so after Henyard stole a pistol and a VCR. 
The trial court rejected Henyard's claim, in part stating that "Ms. Ewing
provided a loving and stable home for the defendant, and treated him as one of her
own" and that counsel made a strategic decision not to introduce any evidence of
the spankings.  Notably, the trial court cites Ewing's own testimony from the
penalty phase of trial in support of the statement that she provided a loving and
stable home.  However, there was other testimony from the evidentiary hearing that
the relationship between Henyard and Ewing may have been strained.10  
she had been a great stepmom and he was a little thief when he came down there so
we did not want that to come in."  Dr. Russell Bauers, an expert witness in the field
of neuropsychology and clinical psychology, testified that Henyard felt his
stepmother treated her own son preferentially and would get things for her son that
would be denied to Henyard.  Henyard told Dr. Bauers that he decided that if he
really wanted something he would have to go out and get in on his own by stealing
it. 
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Nevertheless, even if Henyard's relationship with his stepmother may not
have been ideal, his lead counsel, T. Michael Johnson, stated that the defense team
did not want to present any evidence that Henyard was abused by Ewing because
that would have opened the door to other evidence that Henyard had been involved
in various thefts.  Moreover, Mark Nacke, another member of Henyard's trial team,
specifically testified that the defense looked into Henyard's claims of Ewing's
physical abuse and had asked both Henyard's stepmother and his father about
these allegations.  Nacke said both denied any such abuse and that ultimately the
defense team decided not to call Ewing because of evidence that Henyard had
stolen money from her.
Therefore, trial counsel made a tactical choice not to discuss the spankings,
alleged abuse, or strained relationship with Ewing at the penalty phase in order to
prevent evidence of any thefts from being introduced.  Henyard's collateral
counsel's claim that this evidence should have been introduced despite trial
counsel's fears about negative repercussions does not amount to ineffective
11.  For example, at trial, Nyoka specifically testified that most of Henyard's
friends were younger than he was and she recounted an incident where Henyard did
not want to go to the ninth grade because he wanted to return to middle school to
be with younger people.  At the evidentiary hearing, Angellette Wiley and Jacqueline
Turner testified regarding the same incident, and this was the only indication that
Henyard preferred the company of younger children.   
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assistance of counsel in this case, and we find no error in the trial court's rejection
of this claim.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)
("Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees
with trial counsel's strategic decisions.").
Mental Age 
Third, Henyard contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
Angellette Wiley to testify at the penalty phase of the trial because she would have
given a clear account of incidences where Henyard's behavior proved he preferred
to be around younger children.  The trial court rejected this claim correctly noting
that this evidence was presented to the jury.
Specifically, to the extent any testimony from Angellette Wiley was helpful in
showing Henyard's "mental" age, it was cumulative with the statements of her
mother, Jacqueline Turner, and her sister, Nyoka Wiley, both of whom testified
during the penalty phase of trial. 11  Moreover, the trial testimony of Dr. Jethro
Toomer, the psychologist who testified for the defense in the penalty phase, that
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Henyard was functioning on the level of a thirteen-year-old would have indicated
Henyard's mental age to the jury.  In fact, the trial court specifically found that
Henyard "functions at the emotional level of a thirteen year old and is of low
intelligence" as a nonstatutory mitigating factor.  See Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 244. 
Because Wiley's evidentiary hearing testimony was cumulative with the arguably
more extensive evidence and testimony that trial counsel did present at the penalty
phase, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Henyard has not satisfied
either prong of Strickland.
Alleged Sexual Abuse
Fourth, Henyard claims that trial counsel was ineffective because the defense
conducted no investigation and presented no testimony regarding childhood sexual
abuse during the penalty phase.  Several witnesses at the evidentiary hearing
testified that Henyard told them he was molested.  However, none of these
individuals said they informed defense counsel of Henyard's allegations. 
Additionally, there is some question about the extent to which Henyard relayed this
information to his defense team.  J.T. Williams, an investigator for the Public
Defender's Office, testified that he asked Henyard in a questionnaire soon after the
arrest if he had ever been sexually abused and Henyard wrote that he did not
remember ever being sexually abused.  According to lead counsel T. Michael
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Johnson's notes, Henyard also denied ever being sexually abused to a jail
psychiatrist.  However, although Johnson could not recall what effort he made in
investigating the alleged sexual abuse, the notes also indicated that Henyard had
told him that he had been fondled by an older man when he was eight or nine,
roughly a decade before the murders.
Initially, we would note that the evidence of abuse introduced at the
evidentiary hearing came from witnesses who were repeating what Henyard had told
them and there was no indication that these witnesses shared this information with
Henyard's trial counsel.  Moreover, defense counsel was aware of at least two
instances where Henyard had specifically said that he was not sexually abused.  As
noted above, according to Strickland, the reasonableness of counsel's actions may
be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or
actions.  466 U.S. at 691.  Strickland further states, "[W]hen a defendant has given
counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or
even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be
challenged as unreasonable."  Id.  When determining reasonableness, there is a
"heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments."  Id.  Although we recognize
the difficulty individuals may have in reporting such abuse, in this situation where
Henyard had specifically denied on at least two occasions that he had been sexually
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abused, it is not clear that trial counsel's failure to investigate the conflicting
evidence that Henyard may have been molested amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Of course, Henyard was able to introduce evidence that at least one member
of his defense team was aware that Henyard claimed he had been abused. 
Nevertheless, even if we were to determine that trial counsel should have conducted
further investigations into the allegations of molestation, the evidence that Henyard
introduced at the evidentiary hearing does not demonstrate that he was prejudiced
in this case.  The only information introduced at the hearing consisted of brief,
second-hand accounts by witnesses of what Henyard had told them.  There was no
additional evidence that the alleged molestation had in fact occurred.  Likewise,
there was no testimony from mental health experts as to how the alleged
molestation, which occurred a decade before the crime, had affected Henyard. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that Henyard has not demonstrated
prejudice on this claim.
Use of Alcohol and Drugs
Fifth, Henyard alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate or present evidence to the jury regarding his "chronic use of alcohol." 
The trial court in its order noted that the only germane evidence at the evidentiary
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hearing came from the testimony of Henyard's expert witness, Dr. Bauers. 
Moreover, the trial court concluded that the first prong of Strickland had not been
met because Henyard had not shown that the failure to present the alleged evidence
of his history of chronic alcohol and marijuana use was based on trial counsel's
deficient performance.
We agree with the trial court's assessment of this claim.  During the
evidentiary hearing, Dr. Bauers testified that Henyard told him he started drinking
beer and smoking marijuana between the ages of eight and ten, but he denied ever
being seriously intoxicated or using hard drugs.  He also told Dr. Bauers that his
use of alcohol and marijuana decreased when he went to live with his father at the
age of eleven.  There was no other evidence presented during the evidentiary
hearing regarding Henyard's chronic use of alcohol.  Therefore, based on the fact
that this issue was not addressed in any detail at the evidentiary hearing, Henyard
has not demonstrated error in the trial court's conclusion that he has not shown his
counsel's performance was deficient.
Suicide Attempt
Sixth, Henyard contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting
evidence to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial of his mental state as
characterized by his suicidal ideations.  Although Jacqueline Turner, Henyard's
12.  Pincus also did not believe Henyard's suicide attempt was legitimate
because the method Henyard used was a difficult and rare way to attempt suicide.
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godmother, testified that Henyard told her he did not want to live after he had been
arrested, the primary evidence related to suicidal tendencies that came out at the
evidentiary hearing centered on an alleged suicide attempt in the Lake County Jail
after Henyard had been arrested for the murders.  Trial counsel was made aware of
Henyard's suicide attempt by the medical department supervisor from the Lake
County Jail, Dan Pincus.  Pincus also advised trial counsel that Henyard was placed
on suicide watch because it was possible that Henyard would try to commit suicide
again.  However, Pincus also informed Henyard's trial counsel that he did not
believe the suicide attempt to be legitimate because Henyard was purposely keeping
his eyes shut as Pincus was trying to examine him.12  Additionally, although
Henyard was placed on suicide watch, the standard procedure when there was any
threat of suicide, whether legitimate or not, was to place the prisoner on suicide
watch.  When trial counsel, T. Michael Johnson, asked Henyard about the suicide
attempt, Henyard indicated that he wanted to go back in the medical wing of the jail.
The circuit court found that Henyard's suicide attempt could have potentially
been viewed as manipulative.  We agree with the trial court's finding that trial
counsel was not deficient in not introducing this evidence.  Rather, the decision not
13.  Henyard argues that Dr. Toomer was not prepared because he did not
speak with Richard Henyard, Sr., Edith Ewing, or Jacqueline Turner's husband or
review any of Henyard's hospital records. 
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to present evidence of this suicide attempt to the jury was a reasonable strategic
decision by Henyard's counsel given what counsel knew about the attempt, and
therefore Henyard's claim does not satisfy the first prong of Strickland.
Preparation of Mental Health Expert
Finally, Henyard claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
prepare one of his mental health experts, Dr. Jethro Toomer, for his testimony at
the penalty phase.13  Henyard attempted to prove Dr. Toomer was not adequately
prepared by comparing Dr. Toomer's results with the evidentiary hearing testimony
of Dr. Bauers' results.
We find Henyard's claim to be without merit.  The trial court found nothing
in Dr. Bauers' testimony that was any more favorable to Henyard than the testimony
Dr. Toomer provided at trial and also rejected this claim as legally insufficient
because Henyard did not specify the mitigation that trial counsel failed to call to Dr.
Toomer's attention.  Moreover, the trial court noted that the defense team consulted
two mental health experts and that there was no evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing that Dr. Toomer was inadequately prepared. 
We agree with the trial court's decision on this claim.  At the evidentiary
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hearing, Dr. Bauers testified that he did not believe that Dr. Toomer did anything
improper or that he in any way mishandled his examination or testimony.  In fact,
Dr. Bauers characterized Henyard's neuropsychological abilities as exhibiting some
strengths and some weaknesses, but indicated that the weaknesses were relatively
mild and that they were consistent with what Dr. Bauers knew about Henyard's
educational, occupational, and sociocultural background.  Therefore, we conclude
the trial court did not err in finding that Henyard was not entitled to relief on this
issue.
HABEAS PETITION
Henyard's petition for writ of habeas corpus raises three claims: (1) appellate
counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not raising on direct appeal the improper
ruling on trial counsel's motion to withdraw; (2) under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Florida's capital
sentencing statute violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida
Constitution; and (3) Henyard's right preventing cruel and unusual punishment will
be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of his execution.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Henyard argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
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trial court's denial of his public defender's motion to withdraw.  Claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately raised in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000). 
Consistent with the Strickland standard, in order to grant habeas relief based on
ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court must determine:
[W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute
a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the
range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether
the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the
result.
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So.
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  "The defendant
has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based."  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at
1069.  Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
pursue a meritless claim.  See Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla.
1996).
The facts underlying this claim are as follows.  Before trial, Henyard's public
defender filed a motion to withdraw on the grounds that the State had listed a
former client as a witness in the case.  The motion stated that the public defender's
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office had represented the witness a number of times in the past and if Henyard was
represented by the office of the public defender it would put the public defender's
office in the "untenable position of having to cross-examine a former client." 
Subsequently, the public defender filed an addendum to the motion to withdraw. 
No additional argument was offered, but the addendum listed nine additional
witnesses that had previously been represented.  Of these nine individuals, only one
ultimately testified at trial.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the State argued that the witness
listed on the original motion to withdraw had not been represented recently because
all of her cases had been closed.  The State had not checked each of the witnesses
on the addendum, but opined that based on the case numbers other witnesses'
cases were also closed.  After defense counsel volunteered that none of the
witnesses were being represented the trial court denied the motion.
In his reply brief, Henyard argues that the governing law at the time of trial,
notably section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), as interpreted by Guzman v.
State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994), presumed that a conflict existed upon the filing
of the motion to withdraw and that the trial court judge had no discretion other than
to grant the motion.  In other words, Henyard is arguing that the trial court's
questioning surrounding the motion was inappropriate.  In relevant part, section
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27.53(3) stated:
If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the
public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are
so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public
defender or his staff without conflict of interest, or that none can be
counseled by the public defender or his staff because of conflict of
interest, it shall be his duty to move the court to appoint other counsel.
§ 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1993).  Notably, trial counsel's motion to withdraw made no
reference to section 27.53(3).  Moreover, the motion did not allege that the public
defender had determined that Henyard and the potential witnesses had interests that
were so adverse or hostile that they could not be counseled by the public
defender's office, as required by Guzman.  See 644 So. 2d at 999.  Rather, the
motion stated, as to potential witness Neal, that the public defender's office would
be placed "in the untenable position of having to cross-examine a former client." 
The addendum in which the only witness that actually testified at trial was listed
contained no reference to section 27.53(3) or additional legal argument either. 
Under these specific circumstances, we conclude that the motion did not satisfy the
requirements of section 27.53(3), and therefore appellate counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.  See Johnson v. Singletary, 695
So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla. 1996).
Ring Claim
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Next, Henyard asserts that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the
United States and Florida Constitutions.  This Court addressed similar contentions
in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002),
and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002), and,
while there was no single majority view expressed, we denied relief.  We have since
rejected similar claims on other occasions and find that Henyard is likewise not
entitled to relief on this claim.  See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
2003); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 2d
1031, 1034 n.4 (Fla. 2003).
Moreover, we note that the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty
in this case, and respective to each murder the trial court found the aggravating
circumstances of previous conviction of seven prior violent felonies, six of which
included the contemporaneous convictions for crimes against the victims in this
case, and that the commission of the murders was in the course of an enumerated
felony (kidnapping).  These two aggravating circumstances were charged in the
indictment and found by the jury, and therefore Henyard is not entitled to relief on
this claim.  See Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla. 2003).
Incompetence to be Executed
Finally, Henyard argues that it would violate the Eighth Amendment's
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to execute him since he may be
incompetent at the time of execution.  Because this issue is being raised to preserve
federal claims, Henyard concedes that it is premature and that he cannot legally
raise the issue of his competency to be executed until after a death warrant is
issued.  See Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.811(c).  As no death warrant for Henyard has been signed, Henyard's claim is not
yet ripe for review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the lower court's denial of
Henyard's motion for postconviction relief and we also deny his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered.  
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, C.J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for its discussion of
the decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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CANTERO, J., concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion.  Moreover, regarding Henyard’s claim that
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
I also would hold, for the reasons stated in my specially concurring opinion in
Windom v. State, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S191, S197-203 (Fla. May 6, 2004), that Ring
does not apply retroactively.
BELL, J., concurs.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County, 
Mark J. Hill, Judge - Case No. 93-159-CF-A-MH, and
an Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Robert T.
Strain, Assistant CCRC, and Frank Lester Adams, III, Assistant CCRC, Tampa,
Florida, 
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent