Title: Glenn Higginbotham v. Junction City School District, Alvin Kelly, Leon Hines, Randall J. Lyons, Stan Owens, John Sims, and Kevin Hux

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Glenn HIGGINBOTHAM v. JUNCTION CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Alvin Kelly, Leon Hines, Randall J.
Lyons, Stan Owens, John Sims, and Kevin Hux

97-749                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 16, 1998


1.   Schools & school districts -- school board decisions -- standard of review.
     -- Regarding the review of school board decisions, it is not
     the appellate court's function to substitute its judgment on
     renewal matters for either that of the circuit court or that
     of the school board; when, however, the issue is whether
     procedures under the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act have been
     strictly complied with, that is clearly a matter for the
     appellate court's review.

2.   Appeal & error -- failure to obtain ruling barred review of issue. --
     Where the trial court specifically found that appellant had
     resigned and expressly declined to rule on the involuntary
     termination procedures provided in Ark. Code Ann. section 6-
     17-1507 (Repl. 1993), appellant's failure to obtain a ruling
     below barred review of the issue on appeal.

3.   Schools & school districts -- evidence supported trial court's conclusion
     that appellant had resigned. -- Where appellant principal testified
     that he resigned, reported in writing that he resigned when
     applying for unemployment benefits, and wrote and signed his
     resignation across a prepared by appellee superintendent;
     where appellee superintendent testified that appellant stated
     that "if you don't want me here, I don't want to be here"; and
     where an assistant elementary principal testified that
     appellant told her he had resigned, the supreme court could
     not say that the trial court's conclusion that appellant had
     resigned was clearly erroneous, and it affirmed on the issue.

4.   Schools & school districts -- Teacher Fair Dismissal Act -- strict
     compliance required. -- Ark. Code Ann. section 6-17-1503 (Repl.
     1993) requires strict compliance with the termination
     procedures set forth in Ark. Code Ann. section 6-17-1507
     (Repl. 1993); the substantial-compliance standard no longer
     controls proceedings under the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act; the
     strict-compliance standard did not, however, aid appellant in
     his argument on appeal as he was not involuntarily terminated
     from his position but, instead, resigned.

5.   Schools & school districts -- resignation -- receipt by superintendent
     satisfies statutory delivery requirement. -- Receipt of a resignation
     by the superintendent satisfies the requirement of delivery
     under Ark. Code Ann. section 6-17-1506 (Repl. 1993) and
     constitutes strict compliance under the Teacher Fair Dismissal
     Act.

6.   Schools & school districts -- superintendent is agent for board --
     appellant's resignation was effective when delivered to superintendent. --
     Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-12-108(b) (1987) defines the
     superintendent of schools "as the executive officer of a
     school district board of directors directing the affairs of
     the school district"; it follows that the superintendent
     serves as the agent for the board; thus, appellant's
     resignation was effective when delivered to appellee
     superintendent in writing.

7.   Schools & school districts -- resignation -- request for does not render
     involuntary. -- A resignation made in order to avoid termination
     proceedings is not necessarily involuntary; similarly, a
     school official's request to a teacher for that teacher's
     resignation, as in this case, does not render a resignation
     involuntary.

8.   Contracts -- duress -- proof required. -- To establish duress, the
     plaintiff must prove that he involuntarily accepted the
     defendant's terms, that there were no alternatives, and that
     the defendant created the circumstances by coercion.

9.   Contracts -- duress -- appellant failed to establish. -- Appellant
     principal failed to establish duress where he voluntarily
     chose to resign rather than be fired and was fully aware of
     his alternatives and where appellee superintendent not only
     verbally gave appellant his alternatives but also presented
     them in writing in a letter on which appellant wrote and
     signed his resignation; appellee superintendent did not use
     wrongful or oppressive conduct; rather, he presented
     appellant's options to him. 

10.  Schools & school districts -- finding that appellant resigned not clearly
     erroneous. -- The supreme court concluded that the trial court's
     finding that appellant resigned was not clearly erroneous, nor
     was appellee school district's vote formally to accept
     appellant's resignation.  

11.  Schools & school districts -- board's decision to accept resignation not
     arbitrary or capricious. -- The supreme court determined that the
     board's decision to accept appellant's resignation was not
     arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory; a cause for
     termination is arbitrary and capricious if it has no rational
     basis.

12.  Schools & school districts -- Teacher Fair Dismissal Act -- district
     strictly complied with in voting to accept resignation. -- Under the
     facts of the case, appellee district strictly complied with
     the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act when it voted to accept
     appellant's resignation, which was effective upon delivery to
     appellee superintendent.

13.  Schools & school districts -- Teacher Fair Dismissal Act -- presentation
     of options of resignation and involuntary termination not prohibited. --
     Nothing in the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act prohibits a school
     district from presenting the options of resignation or
     involuntary dismissal to a teacher before initiating
     termination procedures.

14.  Schools & school districts -- Teacher Fair Dismissal Act -- departures from
     plain language deferred to legislature. -- The supreme court
     construed the General Assembly's silence as tacit approval of
     its interpretation of the delivery requirement of Ark. Code
     Ann. section 6-17-1506; the court deferred any departures from
     the plain language of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act to the
     legislature.


     Appeal from Union Circuit Court, Second Division; David F.
Guthrie, Judge; affirmed.
     Pat Hall, for appellant.
     William C. Brazil, for appellees.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Glenn Higginbotham raises two issues against
Appellee Junction City School District (the District), for whom
Appellant was formerly employed as a high school principal, and the
individual Appellees, the District's superintendent and school
board members.  The Union County Circuit Court upheld the
District's decision to refuse Appellant's attempted withdrawal of
his resignation.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(a)(17), as this appeal involves a significant public interest
and interpretation of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (the Act),
codified at Ark. Code Ann.  6-17-1501 to -1510 (Repl. 1993).  We
affirm. 
     In July 1994, the District hired Appellant as the high school
principal for the 1994-95 school year.  Appellant served as
principal for the District until December 19, 1994, when
Superintendent Alvin Kelly asked him to resign. 
    Kelly had conferenced with Appellant on both September 30,
1994, and October 24, 1994, about Appellant's performance of his
duties.  A memo dated September 30, 1994, from Kelly directed
Appellant to allow Dale Hux, another teacher and dean of students, 
to handle discipline matters in order for Appellant to "supervise
the instructional program, interact with the students and teachers
in order to get to know them and their needs."  The memo further
set forth procedures for written announcements, intercom usage,
lunch detention, and organizing "items of importance."  After
discussing these issues with Appellant, Kelly placed the memo in
Appellant's personnel file.
     Another memo from Kelly, dated October 25, 1994, followed the
October 24, 1994 conference between Kelly and Appellant.  In that
memo, Kelly cited six concerns regarding discipline and gave
suggestions for improvement.  The issues in the October 25, 1994
memo were similar to those in the September 30, 1994 memo.     
      On December 19, 1994, Kelly presented a letter to Appellant,
detailing ten serious concerns about Appellant's "effective and
efficient operation" of the school.  The concerns included
Appellant's calling students "yard apes" over the intercom; failing
to remember names of students and teachers; failing to maintain
necessary materials for operating the school; paddling students
without witnesses; "[e]xcessive cross-examination of teachers on
routine referrals of students to the office"; poor written and oral
communications skills; his monitoring activities, which were viewed
as a "joke" by students; poor leadership; teachers' resentment of
Appellant's evaluations of them; using profanity in the classroom;
and failing to maintain professional rapport with teachers.  The
letter further stated:
     I am hereby requesting that you resign immediately.  If
     you feel a resignation is not in order, I will begin
     termination procedures immediately. 
     Appellant wrote, "As of today, I resign," and signed his name
across the letter.  He then cleaned out his office and turned in
his keys the same day.  Kelly notified the board members of
Appellant's resignation that night by telephone.  Appellant later
alleged that he wrote those words of resignation because he did not
want a termination on his resume.  Appellant also alleged that
Kelly promised to pay him his salary for January if he resigned
immediately.
     On December 20, 1994, Appellant attempted to retract his
resignation through letters written by his attorney to Kelly and
the school's attorney, Bill Prewett.  Appellant reported back to
work on December 22, 1994, although no one else was there because
of the holidays.  The District responded that Appellant's
resignation had already been accepted.  The District further
advised Appellant to request a hearing no later than January 5,
1995.  Additionally, Prewett wrote:
     [T]he Superintendent of Schools will recommend to the
     Board at its meeting on January 10 that Mr. Higginbotham
     be terminated as of December 19, the day of his
     resignation.  The recommendation for termination is based
     upon the reasons set forth in Mr. Kelly's letter of
     December 19 which was delivered to Mr. Higginbotham on
     that date.  A copy of the letter is enclosed for your
     information.
    Appellant requested a hearing, a transcript of the hearing,
names of witnesses expected to testify at the hearing, and exhibits
expected to be presented.  Although the District made the exhibits
and other discovery available for Appellant to copy, Appellant did
not go to Prewett's office to copy them before the hearing.       
      The hearing occurred on February 1, 1995.  Prewett presided
as the hearing officer at the board's request.  The board did not
provide a court reporter, but tape recorded the hearing and had it
transcribed.  Prewett read statements against Higginbotham by
parties who were not present at the hearing.  Superintendent Kelly
testified about the facts leading up to the resignation.  Appellant
and his attorney voluntarily left the hearing before it was over
without making a statement or introducing evidence.  After finding
that Appellant had reported his resignation to the Missouri
Unemployment Commission in writing, the board, upon motion, voted
to formally accept Appellant's resignation. 
     On April 21, 1995, Appellant appealed the board's decision to
the Union County Circuit Court.  Appellant's complaint alleged
claims for violation of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, breach of
contract, misrepresentation, outrage, mental distress, and duress. 
In the alternative, Appellant alleged that he was constructively
discharged.  The trial court conducted the hearings on November 1
and November 19, 1996.  Appellant testified that he thought Kelly
was just helping him by issuing the September 30, 1994 and
October 25, 1994 directives because he had walked into a bad
situation in the school, which had employed four principals within
four years.  Appellant further testified that he was not formally
evaluated during his employment with the Junction City Public
Schools; he admitted, however, that he was aware of the concerns
notated in the two prior memos and was also aware of his options
when he wrote and signed his resignation on the December 19, 1994
letter.  During cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he
intended for his resignation to be effective immediately. 
Appellant further admitted that in his application for Missouri
unemployment benefits that he completed on December 20, 1994, he
wrote "because I didn't fulfill job as told and then asked to
resign, resigned."  When questioned about why he left the
February 1, 1995 school board hearing before it was over, Appellant
testified that he left because he had heard enough accusations and
realized he was not going to get anything accomplished and was not
allowed to present his side at what he had referred to as the
"kangaroo court." 
     Superintendent Kelly testified about the problems he discussed
with Appellant in their two 1994 conferences.  Kelly stated that he
did not ask Appellant to sign either the September 30, 1994 memo or
the October 25, 1994 memo, nor was Appellant told he could disagree
or that the memos would be put into his file.  Kelly also stated
that Appellant told him that "if you don't want me here, I don't
want to be here[.]"  Kelly testified that he informed the board
members of Appellant's resignation by telephone the night of
December 19, 1994.  Kelly further testified he would have suspended
Appellant on December 19, 1994, if Appellant had not resigned. 
Kelly admitted that he promised to pay Appellant his January
salary, but stated that he did not do so because Appellant later
tried to withdraw his resignation.     
     Margaret McGaha, assistant elementary principal at Junction
City, testified that Appellant told her over the telephone "that he
thought it was best that he resigned because he knew that Mr.
Kelly, or we were unhappy with his work."  
      High school secretary Diana Dove testified that she often had
to rewrite Appellant's announcements because they did not make any
sense.  Dove further testified that Appellant also kept shorter
hours than the other administrators and had frequent memory
problems.  
     Board members testified that they accepted Appellant's
resignation over the telephone on December 19, 1994, when Kelly
communicated it to them.  Board member Randall Lyons testified that
the board first accepted Appellant's resignation before terminating
him.        
     In a letter opinion dated February 13, 1997, and judgment
filed on March 12, 1997, the trial court concluded that Appellant
properly resigned, that the board accepted the resignation when
delivered to Kelly as the board's agent, and that the board denied
Appellant's attempt to withdraw his resignation at the February 1,
1995 hearing.  The trial court found that there was sufficient
cause for the denial of Appellant's attempted withdrawal of his
resignation and that the board did not act in an arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory manner.  The trial court also found
that Appellant was not under duress when he resigned.  The trial
court dismissed all of the claims but the Act violations on the
basis that an appeal under the Act cannot be expanded to include
tort and contract actions.  The trial court did not rule on the
issue of whether the District conducted a proper termination
proceeding due to its finding that Appellant had resigned. 
     Additionally, the trial court found that there was
insufficient evidence to substantiate Appellant's alternative claim
for constructive discharge.  Given that two board members worked at
the school on a part-time basis, the trial court had concerns that
the board was not completely impartial.  The trial court concluded,
however, that there was sufficient evidence to support the board's
actions.  The trial court further found that the record of the
February 1, 1995 hearing was properly preserved and that the
twenty-seven gaps in the transcript did not affect its substance or
overall accuracy.  On April 7, 1997, Appellant filed notice of this
appeal. 
     This court addressed the standard of review for school board
decisions in Hamilton v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 321
Ark. 261,