Title: Maxwell v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
JAYSON FRANKLIN MAXWELL 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 070831 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
February 29, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a jury trial, the defendant, Jayson Franklin Maxwell, 
was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-248, and possession of marijuana, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-250.1.  The jury fixed the defendant’s punishment at 
seven years in the penitentiary on the cocaine charge and thirty 
days in jail on the marijuana charge.  The trial court imposed 
the sentences fixed by the jury and also imposed an additional 
one-year term suspended subject to post-release supervision 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.2. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge panel of the Court 
of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed the defendant’s 
convictions.  Maxwell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2648-05-2 
(Nov. 21, 2006).  Upon rehearing en banc, a majority of the 
court vacated the panel’s mandate and, by order, affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment for the reasons stated in the panel’s 
dissenting opinion.  Maxwell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2648-
05-2 (Apr. 3, 2007).  We awarded the defendant this appeal. 
 
1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 25, 2003, Officer Bill 
Hogan of the Farmville Police Department, wearing plain clothes 
but displaying a badge, a sidearm, and handcuffs, drove in his 
unmarked vehicle to the Farmville Shopping Center, where, he had 
been told, he would find the defendant.  Upon arrival at the 
shopping center, he found the defendant standing in front of 
“The Gym.”  Officer Hogan told the defendant he wanted to talk 
to him about a check, and the two conversed briefly about that 
subject. 
 
The defendant had his hands “down the front of his pants, 
not in his pockets, but actually down the front of his pants.”  
Concerned about “officer safety,” Officer Hogan asked the 
defendant to remove his hands from his pants.  When the 
defendant refused to respond to the request, Officer Hogan told 
the defendant that they “needed to go to the police department 
and talk about” the check matter and that he, Hogan, “needed to 
check [the defendant] to see if he had anything on him, to pat 
him down.”  The defendant backed up and said several times, “I 
ain’t got nothing on me,” whereupon, “[h]e ran.” 
 
Officer Hogan pursued the defendant on foot for a short 
distance and then returned to his vehicle and drove down an 
alley behind the shopping center that bordered a lumberyard.  He 
observed the defendant walk out from behind several stacks of 
 
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plywood located between the alley and a chain-link fence that 
enclosed the lumberyard.  Officer Hogan took the defendant into 
custody, put handcuffs on him, and placed him in the vehicle of 
State Trooper Sean Givens, who had responded to a call to report 
to the scene.  The officers found $460.00 in cash on the 
defendant’s person, but no smoking device. 
 
Officer Hogan conducted a search of the area.  When he 
found nothing, he called for a “drug dog,” and Robert Leon 
Goldman, a “K-9 officer,” reported to the scene with his dog, 
Lily, about 11:15 a.m.  Lily “alerted on” a lumber pallet and 
Goldman “reached in and got . . . a plastic bag” that contained 
“eight individually wrapped off-white rocklike substances.”  
Subsequent analysis determined that the rocklike substances in 
the plastic bag were crack cocaine. 
 
Trooper Givens conversed with the defendant while the 
search was underway.  At first, the defendant was “talkative and 
cooperative” but became “less talkative and distant” after the 
plastic bag was found.  The trooper then transported the 
defendant to the police department for processing. 
 
Coy R. Sams, an employee of the lumberyard, testified that 
he unloaded fourteen units of plywood from a tractor-trailer 
about 8:30 a.m. on March 25, 2003, and placed the stacks of 
plywood alongside the alley outside the fence that enclosed the 
lumberyard.  Sams also said he spent the rest of the morning 
 
3
“going in and out of the warehouse and back and forth to the 
yard to retrieve products and materials for customers” and saw 
no one near the stacks of plywood.  He admitted, however, that 
he was not “outside guarding the plywood the entire morning.” 
 
Another lumberyard employee, Mac Robinson, Jr., testified 
that he and three to six other employees were around the 
warehouse and yard on March 25, 2003, filling orders for 
customers and that he saw no one near the plywood stacks all 
morning, although he was not near the stacks the entire time.  
Later in the day, Robinson used a forklift to move the stacks of 
plywood inside the fence where materials were “stored and 
secured.”  He testified that after moving “the top” of one of 
the units, he returned “to pick the bottom unit up” and saw “two 
bags of stuff” on top of the plywood.  He reported his find to 
Coy Sams and immediately went “back out and sat on the forklift 
. . . until authorities came.” 
 
Officer Hogan arrived on the scene at 1:45 p.m. and took 
possession of the two bags.  Subsequent analysis determined that 
one bag contained twelve individually wrapped bags of crack 
cocaine and the other bag contained marijuana. 
 
A single latent fingerprint was found on the bag containing 
crack cocaine but subsequent analysis determined that it did not 
match the defendant’s fingerprints.  A fingerprint expert 
testifying for the Commonwealth said “circumstances have to be 
 
4
just right for a print to be left on a particular surface” and 
“not everything that is touched can . . . develop a print.”  
Fingerprints are “very fragile in nature,” he stated, and may be 
destroyed “if you were to just wipe across [it] or if it comes 
into contact with your clothing or another item.”  He also 
opined that “because there is no print of someone’s on [an 
object] doesn’t mean that person didn’t touch it.” 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence and at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the defendant moved to strike 
the evidence on the ground it was insufficient to show he 
possessed the drugs.  The trial court denied both motions. 
 
The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to show he possessed the drugs 
in question.  The defendant contends that the Commonwealth’s 
case is based on circumstantial evidence, that the chain of 
circumstances is not unbroken, and that the evidence therefore 
is equally susceptible to an interpretation consistent with his 
innocence. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that it was not required to prove 
actual possession of the drugs, but that proof of the 
defendant’s constructive possession was sufficient.  The 
Commonwealth maintains that from the reasonable inferences which 
could be drawn from the facts, the jury could conclude that “the 
defendant was concealing the drugs at the time of his initial 
 
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encounter with Officer Hogan, that [the defendant] fled from the 
officer to prevent the detection of the drugs, and that the 
defendant ran to the stacks of plywood in an effort to discard 
the contraband rather than risk its being found in his 
possession.” 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“We have held in many cases that, upon appellate review, 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party in the trial court.”  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 
514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003).  “The judgment of the trial 
court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a 
showing that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.”  Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 
(2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
issue upon appellate review is “whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 
“To support a conviction based upon constructive possession 
[of drugs], the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, 
statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or 
circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of 
 
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both the presence and character of the substance and that it was 
subject to his dominion and control.”  Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 
Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  When, as here, proof of 
constructive possession rests upon circumstantial evidence, “all 
necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and 
inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence.”  Garland v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 
184, 300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  And “[w]hile a conviction may properly be 
based upon circumstantial evidence, . . . [t]here must be an 
unbroken chain of circumstances proving the guilt of the accused 
to the exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral 
certainty.”  Gordon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 298, 300, 183 
S.E.2d 735, 737 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
 
Guided by the foregoing principles and after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we are 
of opinion that no “rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime[s involved in this case] beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  The 
circumstantial evidence that the defendant kept his hands in his 
pants when initially contacted by Officer Hogan, ran from the 
 
7
scene when Hogan said he needed to pat him down, was seen 
walking between the stacks of plywood and the fence enclosing 
the lumber yard, and became less talkative and distant when 
drugs were found, may create suspicion, but it is not 
“consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and [does 
not] exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”  See 
Garland, 225 Va. at 184, 300 S.E.2d at 784.  Nor does it 
constitute “evidence of acts, statements, or conduct . . . or 
other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the 
defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the 
substance[s] and that [they were] subject to his dominion and 
control.”  See Drew, 230 Va. at 473, 338 S.E.2d at 845.  And it 
does not establish “an unbroken chain of circumstances proving 
the guilt of the [defendant].”  See Gordon, 212 Va. at 300, 183 
S.E.2d at 737. 
 
When Officer Hogan observed the defendant with his hands in 
his pants and told him he needed to pat him down, it was not 
because the officer thought the defendant was hiding drugs but 
because he feared the defendant might be concealing a weapon; 
Hogan testified he wanted the pat down for “officer safety.”  
When the defendant ran from Hogan, it could just as well have 
been because he did not want to be questioned further about the 
check matter rather than because he wanted to avoid being caught 
in possession of drugs.  When he was seen walking between the 
 
8
stacks of plywood and the fence enclosing the lumberyard, he had 
nothing in his hands and was not acting furtively.  And there is 
nothing especially incriminating in the circumstance that he 
became less talkative and distant when the first bag of drugs 
was found; indeed, it would have been surprising if his attitude 
had not changed upon that happening. 
 
Nor is the Commonwealth’s case enhanced by the testimony of 
the two lumberyard employees that they saw no one around the 
stacks of plywood on the morning of March 25, 2003.  They 
admitted they did not keep constant surveillance; indeed, 
neither one claimed to have seen the defendant when he obviously 
was present on the scene.  Furthermore, the plywood was stacked 
in an unfenced area open to the public, along an alley available 
to vehicular and pedestrian traffic and serving as access to 
dwellings and commercial buildings, providing a situation in 
which anyone so inclined could readily have placed the drugs in 
the stacks of plywood undetected and, so far as the evidence is 
concerned, even before the defendant ever arrived on the scene. 
 
While the defendant’s conduct may have been suspicious, no 
one ever saw him with the drugs, he never made any incriminating 
statements concerning the drugs, and the one fingerprint found 
on the plastic bag containing twelve rocks of crack cocaine was 
not his but someone else’s.  All the Commonwealth is really left 
with, therefore, is evidence that the defendant was seen near 
 
9
the stacks of plywood where the drugs were found.  But it was 
not shown that he was ever in such close proximity as would 
support a finding that he was aware of both the presence and the 
character of the drugs and that they were subject to his 
dominion and control.  In any event, while proximity is a factor 
to be considered along with other evidence, mere proximity is 
not sufficient to prove possession, see Lane v. Commonwealth, 
223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982), and the utter lack 
of any other evidence connecting the defendant to the drugs 
creates a wide gap in the chain of circumstances that is fatal 
to the Commonwealth’s case. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and dismiss both indictments against the 
defendant. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
“The issue upon appellate review is . . . whether a 
reasonable jury, upon consideration of all the evidence, could 
have rejected” defendant’s theories and found him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 
578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003).  The question is not whether we 
would reach the same conclusion, but whether the evidence is 
 
10
sufficient for the trier of fact to have so concluded.  As the 
majority correctly notes, “this Court reviews the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and 
considers any reasonable inferences from the facts proved.  The 
judgment of the trial court will only be reversed upon a showing 
that it ‘is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’ ”  
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 
(2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). 
Although there was no direct evidence of Jayson Maxwell’s 
(“Maxwell”) possession of the drugs, constructive possession may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence, which is not viewed in 
isolation.  Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786. “[T]he 
combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, 
each insufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind 
irresistibly to a conclusion.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  The jury heard all of the evidence in 
this case and found Maxwell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The jury heard evidence that while questioning Maxwell 
“about another matter, about a check,” Officer Hogan observed 
Maxwell’s hands not in his pockets but “down the front of his 
pants.”  When Officer Hogan asked Maxwell to remove his hands, 
he refused.  Maxwell then repeatedly stated “I ain’t got nothing 
on me.”  Officer Hogan mentioned taking him to the station to 
discuss the check matter and patting him down.  Upon hearing 
 
11
this, Maxwell ran.  The jury heard testimony that the next time 
Officer Hogan observed Maxwell, he was walking out from behind 
several stacks of plywood.  This time, when approached by 
Officer Hogan, Maxwell did not run.  In fact, he was talkative 
and cooperative. 
A “drug dog” was called to the lumberyard, and “alerted” on 
a bag later determined to contain crack cocaine in the lumber 
pallets that Maxwell had been walking behind.  Maxwell became 
less talkative with Officer Hogan after the bag was found.  
Later in the day two more bags were found under the pallets, one 
contained cocaine, the other contained marijuana.  The pallets 
in question had been placed there at 8:30 the same morning.  
Maxwell ran behind the freshly placed pallets at some time 
shortly after 11 a.m.  Two lumberyard employees testified that 
although they did not keep constant surveillance and guard the 
plywood, both were back and forth between the warehouse and the 
yard all morning and they saw no one else near the plywood 
stacks.  Additionally, while Maxwell’s fingerprints were not 
found on the bag, a fingerprint expert explained to the jury 
that fingerprints are easily destroyed, and would likely be 
destroyed when the bag was removed from Maxwell’s pants. 
Proper deference must be given to the province of the jury 
to consider the testimony, assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and reject or accept the defendant’s theories.  
 
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Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786.  The jury could have 
concluded that Maxwell was in possession of the drugs when 
approached by Officer Hogan, and that because of this he would 
not show the officer his hands and fled upon mention of a pat-
down.  Maxwell ran to the exact spot where the drugs were 
subsequently found.  The jury could have considered the 
testimony of the lumberyard employees that nobody was seen 
around the lumberyard, and interpreted Maxwell’s subsequent 
actions of walking calmly out from behind lumber pallets where 
the drugs were found and his change in demeanor once the drugs 
were found, as circumstantial evidence of his knowledge of the 
nature and character of the substance found.  Taken together, 
the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury’s 
finding.  I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.