Title: Jason E. Bridges v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Lorraine L. Rodts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christopher C.T. Stephen 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 35S04-0406-CR-00275 
 
JASON E. BRIDGES, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court, No. 35C01-0210-FB-55  
The Honorable Mark A. McIntosh, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 35A04-0308-CR-400 
_________________________________ 
 
October 12, 2005 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
The defendant, Jason E. Bridges, seeks reversal of his conviction for aiding in armed 
robbery.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded in part, rejecting the defendant's 
claims challenging the trial court's application of the corpus delicti rule and the trial court's in-
structions regarding (a) the jury's right to decide both the law and the facts and (b) accomplice 
liability.  While affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals, in a memorandum 
decision, found the sentencing statement to be inadequate and remanded to the trial court with 
instructions.  We granted the defendant's petition for transfer, 812 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 2004), to ad-
dress the jury instruction issues.  But as to all other issues, we now summarily affirm.  Indiana 
Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
 
The defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to include among the final in-
structions his tendered instruction, drawing upon Article I, Section 19, of the Indiana Constitu-
tion, informing the jury that they have the right to decide both the law and the facts.  Citing War-
ren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 2000), and other cases, he argues that the value in instructing 
the jury of its role as finder of fact and law is not limited to preliminary instructions.   
 
In Warren we required that the jurors be given the Section 19 instruction in the habitual 
offender phase of a trial even though it had also been read to them as a final instruction in the 
guilt phase.  Id. at 837.  We emphasized that Section 19 is "firmly engrained as a fundamental 
principle in Indiana's constitutional law."  Id. (quoting Parker v. State, 698 N.E.2d 737, 743 (Ind. 
1991)).  There is no sound basis for distinguishing between the right to seek a Section 19 instruc-
tion during a habitual offender phase and the right to seek it during final instructions of a guilt 
phase.  A defendant is entitled to have a proper Section 19 instruction presented to the jury in 
both preliminary and final instructions.  The elapsed time between the guilt and habitual offender 
phases of the trial in Warren was two days, and we held it to be reversible error for the trial court 
to refuse the request.  Warren, 725 N.E.2d at 837.      
 
The present case, however, presents significant differences.  On the first day of the two-
day trial, after lunch break, the court read to the jury the preliminary instructions, one of the first 
of which was the defendant's tendered Section 19 instruction.1  Trans. at 121-22.  The evidence 
concluded about noon the following day, and court reconvened at 2:30 p.m. for final arguments 
and instructions.  The defendant specifically requested that the Section 19 instruction be included 
in the final instructions, and the trial court ruled that it would re-read the preliminary instructions 
without exception and would also give twenty-one other instructions on its own motion.  Appel-
lant's App'x. at 182.  The transcript, however, discloses that the Section 19 instruction was not 
                                                 
1 During the preliminary jury instructions, the Section 19 instruction was read immediately after 
the general instruction informing the jurors of the probable length of trial, their duties during lunch and 
other periods of separation, their obligation to avoid reading or listening to any reports of the court pro-
ceedings, and their need to keep an open mind until they heard all the evidence.  Immediately following 
the Section 19 instruction, the next instruction read to the jury advised them, "You are to consider all of 
the instructions as a whole . . . ."  Trans. at 120-122.   
 
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re-read along with the remainder of the preliminary instructions.  Compare Trans. 121-121 (pre-
liminary instructions) with Trans. 509-10 (final instructions).2  On the other hand, the Section 19 
instruction was provided in writing to the jurors for use during their deliberations.  The prelimi-
nary instructions were included in the notebooks provided to each juror by the trial court for use 
during the trial and deliberations.  Trans. at 95, 120.3   
 
Although the trial court incorrectly failed to read the Section 19 instruction among the 
other final instructions, it is very significant that this instruction was given to the jurors both 
orally and in writing among the preliminary instructions only a day before, and also provided to 
them in written form for use during deliberations.  Under these circumstances, we find that the 
trial court's omission of the Section 19 instruction when it re-read its preliminary instructions 
among the final instructions does not warrant reversal.   
 
 
The defendant also contends that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction regarding 
accomplice liability.  On appeal, he argues that the instruction "singled out [his] failure to oppose 
the crime, his companionship with the actual perpetrators, and his conduct before and after as 
circumstances warranting" jury consideration.  Br. of Appellant at 29.  He also urges that such 
circumstances "may never suffice to establish accomplice liability in the absence of proof of af-
firmative conduct to assist in the crime's commission."  Id.  The Court of Appeals rejected this 
                                                 
2 In reading its final instructions, the trial court began with "You are to consider all of the instruc-
tions as a whole . . .," apparently skipping over the Section 19 instruction along with the preliminary in-
struction that generally described the jurors duties during the trial.  Trans. at 509.   
3 We reach this conclusion from the following comments by the trial judge to the jurors at the 
commencement of the trial: 
 
[At commencement of trial] I’m going to read quite detailed instructions to you, covering those 
points that you’re talking about, and you will have a copy for yourself.  Each juror will receive a 
copy, a notebook full of instructions that I will read to you, in addition to you having the instruc-
tions, and you will have them throughout the trial.  You will have them in the jury room when 
you deliberate . . . . 
Transcript at 95. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you have received your notebooks.  Inside you’ll notice what are called 
preliminary instructions.  You’re going to receive final instructions, and you’ll each have a copy 
of those, too.  You may read along with me as I read the Court’s preliminary instructions.   
Id. at 120.   
[At conclusion of final arguments] You're given the instructions . . . Mine are numbered; yours 
are not . . . .  Read along with me and then you'll take these instructions into the jury room with 
you when you deliberate.  
Id. at 509. 
 
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claim on the grounds that it had previously affirmed the giving of an identical instruction in 
Hopkins v. State, 747 N.E.2d 598, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).    
 
On transfer, the defendant asserts that this Court "ultimately" granted transfer in Hopkins 
and "found the accomplice liability instructions to be erroneous on other grounds as Hopkins had 
claimed."  Appellant's Petition to Transfer at 3.  This assertion is incorrect.  As to the Hopkins 
opinion cited by the Court of Appeals in the present case, transfer was denied and the cause re-
manded for resentencing as mandated by the Court of Appeals.  After resentencing by the trial 
court, Hopkins appealed again, attempting to reassert his previous claim that the trial court's in-
struction on accomplice liability and attempted murder constituted fundamental error.  The Court 
of Appeals applied the "law of the case" doctrine and affirmed his conviction.  Hopkins v. State, 
769 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  As to that second appeal, we did grant transfer.  Our deci-
sion, however, was not for the reason that the accomplice liability instruction was incorrect.   
Rather, it focused on whether the jury was adequately instructed regarding the specific intent to 
kill element required for attempted murder, and whether the omission of this element was fun-
damental error under the facts of that case.  Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991-92 (Ind. 
2003).  The present case does not involve a charge of attempted murder and the omission of the 
intent to kill element in Hopkins is not relevant here.   
 
Regardless, however, at trial the defendant's only objection to the accomplice liability in-
struction was that it "is not an accurate statement of law."  Trans. at 457.  This objection was in-
sufficient.  By failing to specifically identify his claimed objection or to tender a correct instruc-
tion remedying the alleged defect, the defendant failed to preserve any question for appeal.  Indi-
ana Trial Rule 51(C) ("No party may claim as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects 
thereto . . . stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."). 
 
  
Transfer having previously been granted, we find that the challenged instructions do not 
require reversal and we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals as to all other issues.  The defen-
dant's conviction is affirmed and this cause is remanded to the trial court pursuant to the mandate 
of the Court of Appeals regarding sentencing.   
 
 
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Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.   
 
 
 
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