Title: Montgomery Co. v. Bradford

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Nos. 31 & 56
September Term, 1996
_____________________________________
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
v.
KEITH A. BRADFORD et al.
------------------------------------
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
  v.
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS 
        OF BALTIMORE CITY et al.
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.   
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker,
Murphy, Robert C.
   (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, J.
 ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, and RAKER, JJ, 
 DISSENT.
____________________________________
       Filed:  April 4, 1997
1
I
We consider in these consolidated cases whether the Court of
Special Appeals erred in affirming judgments of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City which denied motions filed by Montgomery County
to intervene (1) in a class action suit filed on behalf of present
and future students of the Baltimore City Public School System by
attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Keith and
Stephanie Bradford, and a number of other individuals (collectively
the Bradford plaintiffs or the Bradford case); named as defendants
were the State Board of Education and several State officials; and
(2) a declaratory judgment action filed by the Board of School
Commissioners of Baltimore City against the State Board of
Education (the City case).  The main thrust of each action was to
obtain a declaratory decree that the Baltimore City public school
students were deprived of their rights to at least the minimum
quality of education mandated by Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland
Constitution which provides:
    The General Assembly, at its First Session
after the adoption of this Constitution, shall
by Law establish throughout the State a
thorough and efficient System of Free Public
Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or
otherwise, for their maintenance.
A
2
The Bradford complaint alleged that the State was responsible
for a number of educational deficiencies in the Baltimore public
school system due to various economic, social, and educational
factors peculiar to Baltimore City, as a result of which the public
school students in the City will be unable to obtain an adequate
education as guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution.  In this
regard, the complaint referred to the high incidence of Baltimore
City public school students who live in poverty, many of whom live
in households with fewer than two parents; that many of the
students' parents are not high school graduates and they are
unemployed, and are homeless or pregnant; live under the threat of
violence; have been held back in school; score more than one year
below grade level on standardized testing measures; or have
otherwise been determined to be in need of remedial education.  
According to the allegations of the complaint, these children
are most susceptible to the harmful effects of an inadequate
education and are thus "at-risk" students.  The complaint
emphasized the lack of adequate education that these students are
receiving by citing unsatisfactory compliance with State Board of
Education standards as codified in the Code of Maryland Regulations
(COMAR), Title 13A.  In particular, the complaint focuses attention
on the poor performance of these students on State outcome tests,
low student attendance resulting from an inordinately excessive
absenteeism, and extremely high dropout rates (six times higher
than the State Board's "satisfactory standard").  The complaint
3
also referred to a lack of preparation for higher education (only
30% of the students who graduate from Baltimore City high schools
had completed minimum course requirements that would qualify them
for admission to the University of Maryland system). It also
referred to inadequate educational resources far short of the
standard for an adequate education and to a far greater extent than
any other school district in Maryland.
As to these allegations of inadequate educational resources,
the complaint referred to "standards" promulgated by the State
Board of Education relative to the resources that a school district
should provide to students to satisfy the requirement of receiving
a constitutionally adequate education.  Specifically, the complaint
averred that Baltimore City public schools had one of the highest
student-to-teacher ratios in Maryland and that fewer than 1% of the
Baltimore City public schools had the required number of libraries
staffed to adequately serve the students.
In its prayers for relief, the complaint disavowed seeking to
reduce or reallocate educational resources currently provided to
any other school district in Maryland; rather it sought to secure
access to an adequate education for the children attending the
public schools in Baltimore City.  The complaint sought a
declaration that the State had failed to fulfill its constitutional
obligation to provide a system of public schools adequate to meet
the needs of school children in Baltimore City public schools.  The
Bradford plaintiffs sought a court order requiring the State to
4
work with the plaintiffs and Baltimore City to improve the City's
public schools so that they provide an adequate education in
conformance with contemporary educational standards; and to further
order the State to take all steps necessary to implement an
educational improvement plan which would result in providing an
adequate education to the public school children in Baltimore City.
On January 25, 1995, Montgomery County, Maryland, pursuant to
Maryland Rule 2-214, moved to intervene in the class action suit
either as a matter of right or permissively.  That rule provides as
follows:
(a) Of Right. - Upon timely motion, a person
shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when the person has an unconditional right
to intervene as a matter of law; or (2) when
the person claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of
the action, and the person is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the ability
to 
protect 
that 
interest 
unless 
it 
is
adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive. -
(1) Generally. - Upon timely motion a
person may be permitted to intervene in an
action when the person's claim or defense has
a question of law or fact in common with the
action.
In its motion, Montgomery County acknowledged that the
Bradford complaint did not directly attack the constitutionality of
the system of public school funding which we upheld in Hornbeck v.
Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).  That
5
case involved a challenge by several fiscally distressed school
districts, including Baltimore City, to the constitutionality of
Maryland statutes under both the Maryland Constitution (Article
VIII, §1) and the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution with respect to the system of financing public
elementary and secondary schools in Maryland's twenty-four school
districts.  We there noted that the Maryland public school system
is primarily financed by a combination of State and local tax
revenues under a per pupil equalization formula whereby the State,
in its distribution of financial aid to local public school
systems, provides greater amounts to jurisdictions having more
limited local resources than to those having greater local
resources.  Hornbeck thus focused in particular upon the existence
of wide disparities in taxable wealth among the various school
districts, and the effect of those differences upon the fiscal
capacity of the poorer districts to provide their students with
educational offerings and resources comparable to those of the more
affluent school districts.  While Hornbeck teaches that the
Maryland constitutional provision does not mandate uniformity in
per pupil funding or require that the system operate uniformly in
every school district, it does require that the General Assembly
establish a Statewide system to provide an adequate public school
education to the children in every school district.  As Hornbeck
recognizes, 295 Md. at 639, Maryland has established "comprehensive
Statewide qualitative standards governing all facets of the
6
educational process in the State's public elementary and secondary
schools."  Where, however, these standards "failed to make
provision for an adequate education," or the State's school
financing system "did not provide all school districts with the
means essential to provide the basic education contemplated by §1
of Article VIII, when measured by contemporary educational
standards, a constitutional violation may be evident.  But
"[s]imply to show that the educational resources available in the
poorer school districts are inferior to those in the rich districts
does not mean that there is insufficient funding provided by the
State's financing system for all students to obtain an adequate
education."  Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639.
Montgomery County's motion to intervene in the Bradford case
asserted that if there were to be a finding of a violation of
Article VIII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, the plaintiffs
would view the remedy "as being a vast increase in the commitment
of State financial resources to the Baltimore City Public School
System, a commitment which already is in excess of that which is
made by the State to most other school systems in the State,
including that in Montgomery County."  The County further stated in
its motion to intervene that "the diversion of still additional
State resources to Baltimore City would cause a diminution in the
resources available to other jurisdictions in the State, including
Montgomery County, in the absence of an increase in State taxes
which, at the present time, appears unlikely."  Continuing,
7
Montgomery County's motion to intervene stated that if the
plaintiffs were to prevail, Montgomery County, which is responsible
for the local funding of its public schools, would be called upon
to devote still more revenues from local tax sources for support of
its public school system.  As a result, Montgomery County urged
that it has a "strong interest" in the subject of the suit and is
so situated "that disposition of the action may, as a practical
matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest
unless it is allowed to participate as a party, since it is not
adequately represented by existing parties" in the sense
contemplated by Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2).  In this regard,
Montgomery County alleged that it has a fundamental interest in
participating in defining the parameters and components of a
constitutionally adequate education in Maryland school districts in
a manner that does not adversely affect Montgomery County or its
public school system.  The case raised other issues which,
according to Montgomery County, if decided adversely to it could
profoundly affect its own public school system which is largely
funded by the County. 
The County relied primarily on the provisions of Rule 2-214
and this Court's decision in Citizens Coordinating Comm. v. TKU,
276 Md 705, 351 A.2d 133 (1976), a case in which we concluded that
under Maryland Rule 2-208, the predecessor to Rule 2-214,
intervention as a matter of right should have been granted.
On February 13, 1995, the Bradford plaintiffs opposed the
8
County's motion to intervene, stating that the fundamental
prerequisite to intervention of right under Rule 2-214 was not
satisfied, namely  "a direct, substantial, legally protectable
interest in the subject matter of the action," i.e., whether the
public schoolchildren of Baltimore City are receiving the "thorough
and efficient" education guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution.
As to this, the plaintiffs asserted that Montgomery County
impermissibly seeks to intervene by connecting the subject matter
of this action with a speculative impact on the County's local tax
burden . . . by a leap of faith, not by principles of law." In
arguing that Montgomery County does not qualify for intervention as
of right under Rule 2-214(a)(2), they relied primarily on Shenk v.
MD. Savings & Loan, 235 Md. 326, 201 A.2d 498 (1964) and Hartford
Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md.App. 615, 519 A.2d 219 (1987) for the
proposition that the interest asserted by the would-be intervenor
may be neither speculative nor contingent. 
The defendant State Board of Education also opposed the
County's motion on the ground that the primary issue presented
concerns the adequacy of the education of the children of Baltimore
City. It says that Montgomery County has no constitutional or
statutory obligation with respect to the quality of education that
the children of Baltimore City receive and, therefore, have no
legal interest in whether that education is constitutionally
adequate.  Moreover, it posits that Montgomery County's allegations
present "an extremely narrow and hypothetical interest in this
9
case: i.e., money," which is not the primary subject of the
litigation.  According to the State Board's motion:
[T]he primary subject [of the suit] is the
adequacy of the education received by the
children of Baltimore City, and Montgomery
County cannot, and does not, claim any legal
interest relating to that subject.  Further
with respect to money, Montgomery County is
not 'so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the ability to protect' its interests.
Montgomery County, by a further memorandum filed on March 29,
1995, undertook to counter the allegations in opposition to its
motion to intervene.  In support of its position, it placed
reliance on the TKU case, supra, 276 Md. 705, which it says holds
that the intervention rule "merely requires the applicant for
intervention [as of right] to show that it might be disadvantaged
by the disposition of the action in which it seeks to intervene and
that it have an interest for the protection of which intervention
is essential and not otherwise protected." (Emphasis in original)
On April 11, 1995, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
(Kaplan, J.) denied Montgomery County's motion to intervene both as
of right or on a permissive basis.  It said that the sole
controversy was whether the children in Baltimore City "were
obtaining an adequate education within the meaning of the Maryland
Constitution, Article VIII, §1.  As to this, the trial court said:
Whether the children in Montgomery County
are getting an appropriate education is not
involved in this lawsuit.  The only thing that
[Montgomery County] . . . could be in here for
is some prospective loss of funds because
      That denial of a motion to intervene is an appealable final
1
order is well settled.  See e.g. Citizens Coordinating Comm. v.
TKU, 276 Md. 705, 709-710, 351 A.2d 133 (1976).
10
there's only so much in the State pot and if
Baltimore City gets more of that State pot,
then Montgomery County will get less and so
will Kent County and so will Garrett County
and so will all of the rest of the twenty
three other jurisdictions than Baltimore City.
. . . I don't see that as an interest in
this 
particular 
litigation. 
 
It's 
some
speculative thing that may never occur way
down the line.
It said that there are four separate prongs to Rule 2-214: "(1) the
application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must
have an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3)
disposition of the action would at least potentially impair the
applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4) the
applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by existing
parties," citing Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, supra, 69 Md. App.
at 622. It said that failure to satisfy any prong warrants denial
of a motion to intervene as of right.  It said that Montgomery
County failed to satisfy the second prong of the test. Montgomery
County appealed to the Court of Special Appeals from the trial
court's denial of its motion to intervene in the Bradford case.1
 B
On September 15, 1995, prior to the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals on Montgomery County's motion to intervene, a
      The complaint in the City case was amended on January 31,
2
1996, mostly without substantive change.  
11
second complaint for declaratory judgment was filed in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City (the City case).  It was filed by the
Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City against the State
Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Schools,
alleging, as in the Bradford case, that students in the Baltimore
City public schools (not limited to "at-risk" students) were being
deprived of their right to an adequate education in violation of
the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1, and sought by way of
relief that the State provide a constitutionally adequate education
to these students.   Montgomery County moved to intervene in this
2
case on the same grounds as it set forth in the Bradford case.
C
On October 20, 1995, a Third Party Complaint was filed in the
Bradford case by the State Board of Education, members of the Board
in their official capacities, and the State Superintendent of
Schools against the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City
and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Baltimore City.
This complaint alleged that the public schools of Baltimore City
were grossly mismanaged in that, among other things, the defendants
refused to implement the recommendations of various study groups,
failed to access and expend funds available to it, and refused to
avail itself of fiscal and technical assistance offered by the
12
State to meet State standards and rectify other deficiencies.  The
Third Party Complaint sought an order directing the City school
management to substantially restructure the Baltimore City Public
School System to correct the claimed deficiencies.
D
On February 14, 1996, the Court of Special Appeals, in an
unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City denying the County's motion to intervene in the
Bradford case. In doing so, it rejected Montgomery County's
argument that to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 2-
214(a), it simply needed to show an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action and aver
that, absent intervention, it "may be disadvantaged" in that the
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair its
ability to protect its interest.  The court said that the "may be
disadvantaged" prong was "just one aspect to the rule governing
intervening as a matter of right."  To otherwise conclude, the
court said, would be "an extremely myopic reading of the rule and
relevant case law."  Noting that the cases relied upon by
Montgomery County -- TKU and Board of Trustees v. City of
Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989) -- did not support the
County's position, it stated that the mere finding that a party
"may be disadvantaged" does not automatically give rise to a right
13
to intervene.
In making the determination whether the trial court properly
concluded that Montgomery County has no legal interest in the
subject matter of the present case, the intermediate appellate
court looked to its decision in Birdsong, supra, where it said that
"in order to be a ground for intervention, the interest asserted
must be one which it is essential to protect and which is not
otherwise protected"; and thus, the interest asserted could not be
"merely speculative [but] rather it must be a 'direct, significant
legally protectable interest' to support the claim of intervention
as of right."  69 Md. App. at 626-628. (Emphasis added.)
     The court rejected the contention that because Montgomery
County also has children "at-risk" it must be allowed to
participate in a trial that determines the level of education that
should be supplied to an "at-risk" child.  It reasoned that if
Montgomery County is concerned with its "at-risk" children and
believes 
that 
the 
State 
is 
not 
supplying 
them 
with 
a
constitutionally guaranteed adequate education, it can bring its
own suit against the State.  In this regard, it recognized that the
Bradford complaint is extremely fact-specific and focuses solely on
the children in the Baltimore City public school system.
Responsive to another Montgomery County contention, the court
said that the resolution of this case will not necessarily
establish a mandated level of education that must be supplied to
children throughout the State, as that is a matter for the
14
legislature which must give content to the term "adequate."
Because of this, the court concluded that the simple contention
that the County has "at-risk" children does not reach the necessary
threshold level to permit it to intervene as a matter of right.
Nor did the court find any merit in the County's contention
that it is entitled to intervene as a matter of right where the
relief requested, if granted, is likely to require increased
Montgomery County resources and taxes.  It said that the Bradford
plaintiffs are not seeking a redistribution of State assets as was
true in Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., supra, nor is it
asking for a restructuring of its finance system as the plaintiffs
in Hornbeck were asserting.  None of the Montgomery County prayers
for relief, the court said, rose to the level required to satisfy
the County's request for intervention as of right.  The court
explained that it was pure speculation that should the relief
requested be given, it would place any burden on Montgomery County,
noting that suppositions and innuendo do not form a basis to
support a party seeking to intervene in a case as a matter of
right.
The court found no merit in the County's further assertion
that it was entitled to intervention as of right because of its
interest in protecting  State and local shared responsibility for
funding and managing public education in the State.  As to this,
the court said that there are no allegations in the complaint that
challenged the statewide system of local control.  It simply
      The court considered but denied Montgomery County's request
3
to intervene on a permissive basis under Rule 2-214(b).
15
alleges that the children in the Baltimore City public schools are
not afforded their right to a constitutionally guaranteed adequate
education.  Continuing the court said that a resolution of that
issue will not result in an overhaul of the entire State system of
local management.  By way of further explanation, the court said
that the only system that could possibly be affected and is in
danger of losing management control is Baltimore City.  The court
continued by stating that because Montgomery County has no
significant legal interest in whether the children of Baltimore
City are receiving an adequate education, Montgomery County's
motion to intervene as a matter of right was properly denied in the
Bradford case.3
E
After Montgomery County's motion to intervene in the City case
was denied for the same reasons as in the Bradford case, we were
presented with two questions for appellate review common to both
the Bradford and City cases, namely:
1.
Whether the "essentiality of interest" test 
for intervening as of right adopted by the
Court of Special Appeals in Birdsong should
be overruled or its application to the case
be reversed on the basis that it is inconsistent
16
with this Court's ruling in the TKU case.
2.
Whether Montgomery County should have been 
permitted to intervene in both cases where the relief
requested, if granted, would result in substantial
additional financial burdens on the County in the 
funding of its local education system and the 
possible elimination of shared State and local
responsibility for public education in Maryland.
F
Subsequently, on October 18, 1996, prior to oral argument of
the cases before us, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted
the motion of the Bradford plaintiffs for partial summary judgment,
concluding that the Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1,
requires the State to provide a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools in order that all students in Maryland public
schools be provided with a constitutionally adequate education.  In
its order, the circuit court said that "based on the evidence
submitted by the parties, there was no genuine material factual
dispute that the public schoolchildren in Baltimore City were not
being provided with an education that is adequate when measured by
contemporary educational standards.  The court stated in its order,
however, that there is "a genuine dispute regarding the cause of
the inadequate education provided to students in Baltimore City
17
public schools and the liability therefor."
G
On November 12, 1996, in a "Joint News Release," the parties
announced that they had reached a written agreement to settle the
cases without trial.  The Release stated that the agreement
included a commitment to provide "substantial additional State
funding in the amount of $254,000,000 over a five-year period for
the City public schools through the year 2002, the funding being
combined with management and additional reforms [to include] a
consent decree" entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by
agreement of the parties, all for the purpose of improving student
achievement.  First year State funding required a $30,000,000 State
appropriation in fiscal 1998, $50,000,000 in each of fiscal years
1999 and 2000, and at least $50,000,000 each in years 2001 and
2002, as well as $24,000,000 for school construction.  The
agreement called for a "New," Board of School Commissioners of
Baltimore City, selected jointly by the Mayor and the Governor from
a list of names proposed by the State Board of Education.  The new
School Commissioners would select a Chief Executive Officer for the
City schools who would select a management team, including a Chief
Academic Officer and a Chief Fiscal Officer.  The new Board, under
the agreement, would be required to forge a master plan for
improvement of the City schools, to include protecting the rights
      The federal case is entitled Vaughan G. et al. v. Mayor et
4
al., Civil Action No. NJG - 84 - 1911 in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland.
18
of City schoolchildren receiving special education under federal
court orders by integrating the special education service into the
new management structure of the City school system.   The Release
4
characterized the parties' agreement as a "partnership" between the
State and the City to create new management with increased
resources.  The agreement noted the entry of the partial summary
judgment in the Bradford case based on the violation of the
Maryland Constitution, Article VIII, § 1 as to the Baltimore City
public schools.  At the same time, it pointed out that the cause
for the failure of the City Public School System to provide the
required constitutionally adequate education remained undetermined.
Consistent with the Joint News Release, a twenty-five-page
Consent Decree was entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
on November 26, 1996, signed by each of the parties in the Bradford
and City cases.  It noted the parties' agreement that $254,000,000
of State funds "shall be provided" to the Baltimore City public
schools over a five-year period.  The Consent Decree, by its terms,
specified that it would not become fully effective until "(a) the
Governor signs the partnership legislation in a form that does not
affect the substantive rights of the parties established by this
Decree, and (b) the State Budget for FY 1998 is approved with the
additional funds for FY 1998 . . . ."  The Consent Decree further
19
specified that if these contingencies have not occurred by May 1,
1997, the Consent Decree "shall be null and void" and trial of the
cases would proceed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on May
7, 1997.  The Consent Decree incorporated a proposed twenty-page
legislative enactment conforming with and in implementation of the
provisions of the Joint News Release.  It provided that if the
"partnership legislation" is enacted with any variance from the
proposed measures, the parties may waive the variances in writing.
It further provided that if any variance is not waived in writing,
any party may file a motion with the court, within a specified time
limit, "seeking a determination whether the variance affects the
party's substantive rights under the [Consent] Decree."  It was
also specified that if the General Assembly revises or modifies the
"partnership legislation after the 1997 Legislative Session and
before the expiration of the Consent Decree, all parties reserve
the right to challenge any variance."
By its further terms, the consent Decree "shall be in effect
through June 30, 2002 unless the Court extends the term upon timely
motion of one of the parties and upon a showing of good cause to
extend the Decree."  Finally, the Consent Decree provided that the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City would retain "continuing
jurisdiction during the term of this Decree to monitor and to
enforce compliance" with its provisions; and that any party to the
Decree may seek to enforce its terms but that notwithstanding
termination of the Decree, the circuit court would retain
20
jurisdiction to resolve any dispute that may have arisen during the
terms of this Decree.
On December 9, 1996, after full briefing by the parties, we
heard oral argument of Montgomery County's challenge to the denial
of its intervention motions in the Bradford and City cases.
II
The parties disagree as to the correct legal standard
governing the applicability of the provisions of Rule 2-214(a),
(which as amended we adopted in 1984) to the cases now before us.
It is, therefore, necessary that we carefully consider the import
of the cases relied upon by each side.  In this regard, we again
note that the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in Birdsong,
upon which the plaintiffs place primary reliance, was decided in
1987 under present Rule 2-214(a); while Montgomery County places
principal reliance upon TKU, decided in 1976 under the provisions
of former Maryland Rule 208(a).  That Rule provided that upon
timely application a person shall be permitted to intervene as a
matter of right in an action "(a) where the representation of the
applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate
and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action."
(Emphasis added.)  In TKU, we observed that the language of then
governing Rule 208(a) was identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24
(hereafter, the Federal Rule) as it stood prior to 1966.  276 Md.
at 710-711.  We observed in TKU that by that time "a division of
      The cases representing the competing holdings on this issue
5
are collected at footnotes 4 and 5 in TKU, 276 Md. at 711.
21
authority had emerged in the reported federal decision regarding
the requirement that the applicant for intervention "is or may be
bound by a judgment in the action." Id.  We noted that most cases
deciding the question interpreted the word "bound," as used in the
Federal Rule, narrowly in requiring a showing that the judgment
would have a res judicata effect upon the would-be intervenor. Id.
But we recognized that a "stubborn minority" clung to the view
"that a more utilitarian and realistic interpretation should be
applied, permitting intervention whenever a judgment would put the
applicant at a practical disadvantage in his own litigation or
would substantially affect the would-be intervenor's ability to
protect his interest." Id.   We further observed in TKU that with
5
"an obvious view to the minority position, the 1966 amendment to
Federal Rule 24 changed the intervention as of right test to permit
intervention "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties." Id.  We also opined that the primary purpose
of the 1966 amendment to the provisions of then Federal Rule 24
"was to relax the test for intervention of right by replacing the
'res judicata rule' with the less onerous one requiring the
22
applicant merely to show that he might be disadvantaged by the
disposition of the action in which he had sought to intervene." Id.
at 711. (Emphasis added.)  We next said that "the requirement which
we imposed upon the applicant for intervention under [then] Rule
208(a) is that he have an interest for the protection of which
intervention is essential and which is not otherwise protected,"
citing our 1964 one-page opinion in Shenk, supra, 235 Md. at 327.
Id. at 712.  We added the further statement that "[T]his standard
is wholly compatible with the current language of Federal Rule 24,"
and that the federal cases defining Rule 24 "continue to serve as
a guide to our interpretation of Rule 208(a)." Id. at 712.  In sum,
we concluded in TKU that whether the applicant for intervention
"has an interest which it is essential to protect may be equated
with the requirement of Rule 208(a) that he 'is or may be bound by
a judgment in the action.'" Id.   We concluded on the facts in TKU,
in permitting intervention as of right, that the case was one
dealing "with a transaction in which appellants claim an interest
[which] may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to
protect that interest." Id. at 713.
In Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562
A.2d 720 (1989), an intervention of right case decided under
present Rule 2-214(a), we pointed out that "to show that the
disposition of an action may as a practical matter impair or impede
. . . [the applicant's] ability to protect his interest" requires
that the applicant "merely show that he might be disadvantaged by
23
the disposition of the action in which he sought to intervene . .
. [and] need not make the additional showing that the disposition
of that action would be res judicata as to him." Id. at 89, n. 19.
In Shenk, decided in 1964 under former Rule 208(a), the would-
be intervener was a free shareholder in a savings and loan
association which was placed in receivership; she sought to
intervene as a matter of right in the receivership proceedings in
order to be "kept informed" in the event that "some future aspect
of the proceedings affect[ed] her interests adversely." Id.  We
there said that under Maryland law "a person not a party will not
be permitted to intervene in litigation unless he has an interest
which it is essential to protect and which is not otherwise
protected."  235 Md. at 327.  In denying intervention, we said that
her interest was "merely speculative and affords no present basis
upon which to become a party to the proceedings" under then Rule
208(a).
The Birdsong intervention case focused on the provisions of
Rule 2-214(a) that a person seeking to intervene as of right must
claim "an interest relating to the property or transaction that is
the subject of the action."  69 Md. App. at 626. The court said
that in order to be a ground for intervention, "the interest
asserted must be one which it is essential to protect and which is
not otherwise protected," citing TKU, 276 Md. at 712, (Emphasis
added.); Shenk, 235 Md. at 327, and Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517, 581, 91 S.Ct. 584, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971), the latter case
24
holding that the interest contemplated by the Federal intervention
rule, which was virtually identical to Maryland Rule 2-214(a), is
a "significantly protectable interest." Id. at 626.  The court in
Birdsong found that the asserted interest was insufficient to
warrant intervention.  The argument in favor of intervention, the
court said, was "predicated on the possible occurrence of two
events": an award of damages against a defendant and an attempt to
enforce such an award against an insurance company. Id. at 628.
The court recognized that while there may be some substance to the
insurer's fears concerning these events, they were "merely
speculative" and afforded no present basis upon which to become a
party to the proceedings. Id.  The insurer's interest in the
outcome of the trial on the issue of damages was said by the court
to be "a contingent interest rather then the 'direct, significant
legally practicable interest' required for intervention as of
right." Id.
III
In undertaking to convince us that both the trial court and
Court of Special Appeals erred in rejecting its motions to
intervene in the Bradford and City cases, Montgomery County asserts
that it is the most populous county in Maryland and ranks behind
only Baltimore City and Prince George's County in the number of
"at-risk" students within its borders.  It says that it serves as
25
the principal source of funding for the Montgomery County public
school system and that because of the impact of existing
"equalization" of State funding, it provides 77% of the operating
revenues of its school system, while Baltimore City provides
approximately 29% to operate its school system.  The County
suggests that any significant increase in overall State education
funds being unlikely, the only realistic way to devote substantial
additional financial resources to the Baltimore City public school
system would be by the use of a still steeper equalization formula
which would further reduce already scarce State funds for the
Montgomery County schools, and thereby cause an increase in the
County's local support obligations.
At stake in these cases, according to the County, is a
determination of what constitutes an adequate education, not merely
in Baltimore City, but in every school district in the State.  It
therefore claims a direct interest in a court ruling that
potentially could affect the nature, extent and costs of the
instructional program which it is required to fund, particularly so
in connection with "at-risk" children.
 As to these "at-risk"
children, Montgomery County posits that they generally create a
greater demand for social, medical and police services than do
other children, and their circumstances outside the classroom may
impede their ability to benefit fully from a basic or adequate
education.  Moreover, the County maintains that any court decision
that construed Article VIII, §1 of the Maryland Constitution to
26
obligate boards of education to provide otherwise discretionary
social, medical or police services to "at-risk" children would have
immense financial consequences to Montgomery County.  These
burdens, the County suggests, would result not only from the
indirect impact that such costs would have in Montgomery County,
but also directly in Montgomery County due to its large population
of "at-risk" children.
The County next refers to its long history of supporting
public education and describes how it has provided more than a
basic or adequate education to its students in accordance with its
"local policy prerogative that it desires to preserve."  As to
this, it says that its ability to fulfill its role as the largest
source of funding for an adequate education, or for any
enhancements thereof, could be threatened if it were required to
enhance substantially its local contribution in order that other
jurisdictions might have greater State funds or dramatically
increase services provided directly to the large number of "at-
risk" children presently within its school system.
The County argues that both lower courts applied an overly
restrictive standard for intervention which is inconsistent with
this Court's TKU case.  But, says the County, under either the TKU
standard or the more restrictive Birdsong standard, the County's
interests were sufficient to entitle it to intervene as a matter of
right.
The County argues that it has satisfied all the requirements
27
of Rule 2-214(a), including that it has claimed an interest
relating to the subject of the action and has demonstrated that
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the ability to protect that interest.
Montgomery County further maintains that with its own high
number of "at-risk" students, it has obvious concerns and interest
over the impact upon its local funding obligations that would ensue
if steeper equalization were required to fund increased revenue
requirements of other school systems.  Moreover, the County
expresses concern that if minimum constitutional standards for the
education of "at-risk" children were set at an unnecessarily high
level, there would be a direct and immediate impact on Montgomery
County, not just due to increased costs in Baltimore City but also
due to increased costs of its own in the furnishing of an adequate
education to the large population of "at-risk" children within its
own borders.  In this regard, Montgomery County sees as a
fundamental issue "the degree to which the command for a 'thorough
and efficient system of free public schools' encompasses the
furnishing of social and other services."  In this connection, the
County poses the question whether an adequate education becomes
constitutionally inadequate if there is a failure of other agencies
to provide discretionary social, medical or police services.
The County thus claims that a decision in the Bradford and
City cases could seriously impact funding requirements of the
public school system that Montgomery County is required by law to
28
support.  The County contends that its financial obligation for the
support of its local public school system has increased
dramatically over the past decade while the State's share has
declined.  As a result, the County says that it has a vital
interest in preserving State funding levels and avoiding further
unnecessary erosion.  Accordingly, the County takes the position
that it has a direct interest in any court decision that would
establish the level of resources that constitutionally must be
devoted to a large segment of the student population within its own
borders.  And should the court find a constitutional violation, the
County contends that it would have a concrete interest in the
remedies that the court might fashion; these remedies could include
elimination or alteration of the traditional shared responsibility
for the funding and operating of local public school systems.
In sum, Montgomery County urges that its intervention motions
should have been granted under Rule 2-214(a) in that (1) they were
timely filed, (2) the County had a clear interest in the subject of
the actions, i.e., determination of the level of education
constitutionally required for children generally, including "at-
risk" children, and that (3) disposition of the actions, as a
practical matter, might impair or impede its ability to protect
that interest, and (4) the representation by existing parties was
not adequate.
IV
29
The 
phrases 
"essential 
to 
protect," 
"essentiality of
interest," and "might be disadvantaged," used in some of our cases
in describing components of the provisions of Rule 2-214(a), do not
of themselves constitute the legal standard to be applied in
determining whether intervention of right was properly denied in
these cases; it thus bears emphasis that Montgomery County's
motions to intervene as of right in these cases as a party
defendant under Rule 2-214(a) requires that it carry the burden of
establishing "an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action," and further establish that it
is "so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the ability to protect that
interest."  The "transaction" in these cases, i.e. the two
lawsuits, is limited in scope to the plaintiffs' claim that the
State has failed to provide the requisite resources and services to
the Baltimore City public schoolchildren necessary to fulfill its
constitutional obligation to provide these students with an
adequate education in conformity with contemporary educational
standards.  While the plaintiffs acknowledge that mismanagement of
the available resources by the City's public schools may be
partially to blame, they say that the State is legally responsible
as well for any such mismanagement.
We are in basic agreement with the Bradford and City cases
plaintiffs' conclusion that Montgomery County's "concerns" with the
relief prayed in their cases is insufficient to bring its
30
intervention motions within the ambit of Rule 2-214(a)(2).  We find
no basis for Montgomery County's intervention on the ground that
should the plaintiffs prevail in their lawsuits, the State will
reduce the County's share of State funding for its own schools in
order to finance ordered improvements to the Baltimore City school
system.  The County's further concern that it will also be
compelled to increase local property taxes to make up the shortfall
is both remote and speculative and affords no ground for
intervention as of right.  Indeed, any impact on the County is
contingent upon the happening of those uncertain and speculative
events, and none would follow automatically from a judgment for the
plaintiffs in these cases.  In this regard, we share the
plaintiffs' view that a judgment in their favor will not
automatically or necessarily result in any of Maryland's current
public school funding resources being diverted from their current
uses to provide additional funding for the City's public schools.
Moreover, the concern expressed by the County in this regard,
namely that it may at some time in the future have an effect on its
share of the State's education budget, or its tax burden, is far
too remote and indefinite to justify intervention under Rule 2-
214(a).
Nor is there any merit in Montgomery County's further
contention that it has a protectable legal interest in avoiding the
potential impact that a ruling in plaintiffs' favor would have on
its own population of "at-risk" schoolchildren.  In this
31
connection, the County maintains that should the plaintiffs be
successful in persuading the court that "at-risk" children in
Baltimore City public schools require enhanced educational
resources and services pursuant to Article VIII, §1 of the Maryland
Constitution, then at some later time the County, at considerable
additional expense, may be required to supplement the resources
which it currently provides to its own "at-risk" schoolchildren.
As to this, the County's concerns are indirect, remote, and
speculative; they do not focus directly on the "transaction"
involved in these cases, viz, whether the plaintiffs' actions,
directed, as they are, solely to the constitutional adequacy of the
education provided to children in the Baltimore City public
schools, implicates Montgomery County's legal interest in any way
which would give it a right to intervene in these cases under Rule
2-214(a).  Were it otherwise, according to the plaintiffs, and that
was all that was needed to establish a right to intervene, then any
applicants' 
generalized 
interest 
in 
participating 
in 
the
formulation of a constitutional standard, to which the person may
be subjected, could intervene as a party from which an
interpretation of a constitutional provision might emerge.  We
share the plaintiffs' position on this issue.
The significant legally protectable interest which Montgomery
County next claims to support its intervention motions derives from
its concern that disposition of the Bradford and City cases might
result in a transformation of the current State-local educational
32
financing scheme.  As to this, the plaintiffs say, and we agree,
that the County's position is based on supposition and speculation,
and there is nothing in the relief sought in these complaints that
seeks a general overhaul of the entire system of local management.
V
The cases before us involve nothing more than Montgomery
County's motion to intervene and we do not therefore consider the
merits of the underlying cases.  At the time these motions were
decided by the trial court and by the Court of Special Appeals, the
parties had not entered into an agreement to settle the cases
without trial.  Nor at that time had a consent decree been entered
by the circuit court with the approval of all parties to the case.
The Decree incorporated a proposed legislative enactment for
approval by the General Assembly; it called for a State
appropriation of $254,000,000 over a five-year period with initial
funding in fiscal year 1998 of $30,000,000.  The Governor included
first-year funding for this project in his 1998 fiscal year
proposed budget.  The proposed legislative enactment was introduced
in the General Assembly as Emergency HB 312 in January, 1997, and
no action has yet to be taken on the measure.
The 
partial
summary judgment entered by the circuit court on October 18, 1996
to the effect that the schoolchildren in Baltimore City were in
fact denied their right to a constitutionally adequate education,
1
was not supported by any evidentiary findings by the court insofar
as the record discloses.  The lack of any opposition to the entry
of the partial summary judgment motion would thus appear to have
thereafter supported the parties' agreement to the entry of the
Consent Decree.
While Montgomery County views these subsequent events to
demonstrate that its motions to intervene were neither contingent
nor speculative, we do not take them into account in our
disposition of Montgomery County's intervention motions.  In the
posture of the cases now before us, we can only conclude that
Montgomery County's motions to intervene as of right were properly
denied, and we shall therefore affirm the judgments of the Court of
Special Appeals.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID
BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
Dissenting Opinions follow next page:
2
Eldridge, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority's opinion and decision in
two major respects.
First, the majority clearly errs in refusing to consider
the consent decree entered in the underlying cases on November 26,
1996, and in taking the position that the decree is not before us.
The majority opinion overlooks entirely the respondents' motion to
dismiss Montgomery County's appeal on the ground that the consent
decree has rendered the appeal moot.  In order for a decree to
render moot an earlier appeal from a denial of intervention,
however, the decree must be within the trial court's jurisdiction.
For the reasons discussed in Part I below, the consent decree in
these cases is undoubtedly beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.  It represents a foray into areas which, under Article 8 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, are the province of other
       Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights provides as follows:
6
"Article 8. Separation of powers.
That the Legislative, Executive and Judi-
cial powers of Government ought to be forever
separate and distinct from each other; and no
person exercising the functions of one of said
Departments shall assume or discharge the
duties of any other."
3
branches of government.6
Second, the denial of Montgomery County's motion to
intervene is, under the circumstances here, contrary to reason and
authority.  The majority's view, that this litigation simply
represents a local dispute between Baltimore City and the State,
with an impact largely confined to Baltimore City, is wholly devoid
of reality.  Considering the allegations in the complaints, the
scope and effect of the declaratory judgment sought and obtained by
the plaintiffs, the important public policy questions involved, the
collusive aspects of the litigation, and the public interest and
need for the constitutionality of the General Assembly's enactments
to be defended, the motion to intervene by the largest political
subdivision of the State should have been granted.
I.
As indicated above, all of the respondents have filed in
this Court a motion to dismiss the consolidated appeals on the
ground of mootness.  The respondents argue that the "Consent
Decree" signed by Judge Kaplan and entered on November 26, 1996,
has rendered moot Montgomery County's appeal from the order denying
4
intervention.  A copy of the consent decree, along with an
affidavit by an Assistant Attorney General attesting that the copy
is true and accurate, were filed in this Court with the motion to
dismiss.
Although not cited by the respondents, there are
decisions by this Court holding that a pending appeal from an order
denying intervention becomes moot when a decree is entered in the
underlying litigation.  Weinberg v. Fanning, 208 Md. 567, 572, 119
A.2d 383, 386-387 (1956); Bowles v. Moller, Inc., 163 Md. 670, 684-
685, 164 A. 665, 670 (1933).  Nevertheless, as indicated in
Weinberg v. Fanning, supra, 208 Md. at 570, 119 A.2d at 385, in
order to render moot the appeal from the denial of intervention,
the trial court must have had "jurisdiction to pass the decree."
Consequently, the respondents' motion to dismiss has
brought before this Court the consent decree entered on November
26, 1996.  While we do not have before us all of the issues that
might be raised in a direct appeal from the decree, we do  have
before us the question of the decree's fundamental validity.  If
the decree is invalid, it cannot render moot Montgomery County's
appeal from the denial of intervention, and the respondents' motion
to dismiss should be denied.
This Court has pointed out that, "[i]n light of the
separation of powers provision of the Maryland Constitution, set
forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, a court has no
5
jurisdiction to perform a nonjudicial function," Duffy v. Conaway,
295 Md. 242, 254, 455 A.2d 955, 960-961 (1983).  The decree entered
in the underlying litigation on November 26, 1996, is replete with
provisions that go far beyond the functions of the judiciary.  
Thus, paragraph 8 of the November 26th decree provides as
follows:
"8.  The new Board of School Commissioners for
Baltimore City (`Board') shall be established
as a City-State partnership and shall be held
directly accountable for improving the aca-
demic achievement of Baltimore City school
children as measured by the Maryland School
Performance Program (`MSPP').  The Board shall
not be deemed an agency of the State."
Paragraph 9 of the decree vests in the new Board "full control of
all functions relating to" the Baltimore City Public Schools.
Paragraphs 10 through 16 provide for the number of members of the
new Board, the matter of compensation of members, the residency of
members, the requirement that members "shall reflect the demo-
graphic composition of Baltimore City," and the qualifications of
different groups of members.  Paragraphs 17 through 20 of the
decree authorize the appointment of the Board's members by the
Mayor of Baltimore City and the Governor, set forth a method by
which the appointments are to be made, delineate the terms of the
members and the grounds for removal, provide for a chairperson, and
define a quorum.  Paragraphs 21 through 26 of the decree mandate
that the Board "shall hire a Chief Executive Officer . . . who
6
shall be a member of the Mayor's Cabinet," set forth requirements
for the chief executive officer's "employment contract," create the
position of "Chief Financial Officer," establish a "Parent and
Community Advisory Board," and contain other detailed requirements
concerning the management structure of the new Board of School
Commissioners created by the decree.  Paragraphs 27 and 28 require
the new Board to adopt a "Transition Plan," and paragraphs 29
through 34 relate to a "Master Plan to increase student achieve-
ment" which must be adopted and implemented.  Paragraphs 35 through
38 concern procurement and personnel, require that "all current
collective bargaining agreements shall expire on June 30, 1997,"
and provide for new collective bargaining agreements.  Paragraphs
39 through 42 impose various duties upon the new Board.
The financial resources and funding for the new Board are
provided for in paragraphs 43 through 54 of the decree.  The
circuit court ordered that "the State of Maryland shall provide"
the Baltimore City Public Schools "with additional funds," which
"shall be separate from established State funding . . . and other
current State funds provided to" the Baltimore City Public Schools.
The court also decreed that the "additional funds provided by the
State as described in this Decree shall not be provided by reducing
any other State funds provided to Baltimore City."  These addition-
al state funds "appropriated" by the circuit court amount to
approximately $250 million over five years, with procedures
delineated in the decree for requesting more additional funds.
7
These procedures include a provision in paragraph 53 for the appeal
of certain circuit court rulings directly to the Court of Appeals.
The remaining paragraphs of the November 26th decree
contain transition provisions and requirements concerning special
education.  The decree states that it shall be "in effect through
June 30, 2002, unless the Court extends the term," and that "[t]he
Court retains continuing jurisdiction during the term of this
Decree to monitor and to enforce compliance with the terms of this
Decree."  Finally, the decree provides that it shall not be "fully
effective" until the enactment of certain proposed legislation,
which is attached as an exhibit to the decree, and the appropria-
tion of the additional funds by the State budget bill.
The above-summarized decree signed by Judge Kaplan repre-
sents an unprecedented excursion beyond the outer limits of
judicial authority.  The decree resembles a major executive branch
reorganization statute.  Compare, e.g., Ch. 77 of the Acts 1969. 
Unless the law creating the government agency is itself
unconstitutional, a Maryland circuit court has utterly no power to
abolish an existing government agency such as a local school board.
A circuit court has no jurisdiction to create a new government
agency, to determine whether it shall be a state or local agency,
to provide for the appointments of its members by a mayor and the
Governor, to mandate the qualifications of the members and the
agency's structure, to delineate the agency's powers, duties and
       Maryland Code (1978, 1997 Repl. Vol.), §§ 2-205 and 2-206
7
of the Education Article, grants to the State Board of Education
broad supervisory authority over public schools, including the
authority to accredit schools and to order that a particular school
cease operations (§ 2-206(h)), and the State Board may institute
legal proceedings to enforce its authority (§ 2-205(d)).  Nothing
in these sections, however, authorizes the abolition of a local
school board or the creation of a new school board with specified
organization, powers and duties.
8
functions, or to do any of the other things set forth in the
numbered paragraphs of the circuit court's November 26th decree.7
To the best of my knowledge, none of the most sweeping court
decrees involving local school systems, based on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the principles set forth in Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), and
347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), has ever gone so
far as to abolish a local school board and create a new school
board in its place, with a specified membership and structure. 
Furthermore, I am unable to find in the budget and
appropriations provisions of the Maryland Constitution, Article
III, § 52, any role for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  As
this Court has admonished, "it must be remembered that public
resources are not unlimited and there are many competing demands
upon public funds."  State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 457, 470 A.2d
1269, 1287 (1984).  The weighing of those competing demands is for
the political branches of government.
This Court has taken the position that the separation of
powers requirement in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of
9
Rights prohibits conferring upon the judiciary jurisdiction to
appoint the members of the Board of Visitors responsible for
supervising a county jail (Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 657-660,
52 A. 61, 65-66 (1902)), to appoint school commissioners (Beasley
v. Ridout, supra, 94 Md. at 659-660, 52 A. at 66), to review the
accounts of certain county officials (Robey v. Prince George's
County, 92 Md. 150, 159-165, 48 A. 48, 49-52 (1900)), to issue
liquor or racetrack licenses (Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 27-
28, 52 A.2d 79, 86-89 (1947), Close v. Southern Md. Agr. Asso., 134
Md. 629, 108 A. 209,214-215 (1919)), to determine de novo whether
applicants should have permits to fill wetlands (Dep't of Nat. Res.
v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 229, 334 A.2d 514, 525-526 (1975)), or
to perform other functions appropriately within the province of the
legislative or executive branches of government.  See, e.g., Reyes
v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 295-296, 380 A.2d 12, 21-22
(1977); Planning Commissioner v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 25-27, 120
A.2d 195, 198-199 (1956); Board of Supervisors v. Todd, 97 Md. 247,
263-265, 54 A. 963, 965-966 (1903); Baltimore City v. Bonaparte, 93
Md. 156, 161-163, 48 A. 735, 736-737 (1901).  As stated in Planning
Commission v. Randall, supra, 209 Md. at 25, 120 A.2d at 199,
"[t]he judicial department ha[s] no jurisdiction or right to
interfere with the legislative process which was committed by the
constitution . . . to the Legislature itself."
Under the principles set forth in the above-cited cases,
10
there can be no doubt that the circuit court's November 26th decree
was far in excess of the court's jurisdiction.  Judge Kaplan, in
signing and entering the decree, has purported to perform a
multitude of nonjudicial functions.  The circuit court has assumed
a role which belongs exclusively to the legislative and executive
branches of government.
Moreover, the fact that the parties to the underlying
litigation consented to the decree cannot bring it within the
jurisdiction of the circuit court.  It is firmly settled that
parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent.  See,
e.g., Sisk v. Friendship Packers, 326 Md. 151, 158, 604 A.2d 69, 72
(1992); Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 282 n.4, 473 A.2d 438, 441
n. 4 (1984); Anthony Plumbing of Md. v. Atty. Gen., 298 Md. 11, 16,
467 A.2d 504, 506 (1983); Highfield Water Co. v. Wash. Co. San.,
295 Md. 410, 414, 456 A.2d 371, 373 (1983). 
If anything, a consent judgment involving a matter of
public policy is more vulnerable than other judgments to a
collateral challenge based upon the lack of authority underlying
the judgment.  See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Revere, 341 Md. 366,
379-382, 671 A.2d 1, 7-9 (1996); Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md.
118, 131, 656 A.2d 773, 779 (1995) (a consent adoption decree, not
authorized by the adoption statutes, "is voidable and subject to
collateral attack at any time"). 
Similarly, the conditional provisions in the November
11
26th decree do not cure the lack of jurisdiction.  If a decree
contains orders and directives beyond the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of a court, the insertion of a clause making the decree
contingent upon the passage of particular legislation or budget
bill provisions does not change the fact that the orders and
directives are beyond the court's jurisdiction.  Otherwise, a judge
could order anything he or she desired as long as the order was
made conditional.  For example, it is a common practice for the
General Assembly to enact legislation contingent upon the enactment
of other legislation or budget bill provisions.  Nevertheless, the
enactment of such contingent legislation remains a legislative and
not a judicial function.  A court does not have co-equal authority
to enact legislation contingent upon the passage of other legisla-
tion.
Furthermore, the conditional nature of the decree may
disappear.  If the conditions are met, or if the parties waive the
need for particular conditions to be met (and such waiver is
provided for in this decree), then the decree will purportedly be
fully enforceable as any other type of equitable judgment.  Parties
could be held in contempt for violating parts of the decree.  
Finally, like the factor of consent, the conditional
nature of the decree makes it more vulnerable to a collateral
challenge and not less vulnerable.  The Court of Special Appeals
recently held in Southern Four v. Parker, 81 Md. App. 85, 93, 566
12
A.2d 808, 812 (1989), with regard to conditional judgments:
"`It is a general rule that [a] judgment
must not be conditioned on any contingency,
and it has been held that a conditional judg-
ment is wholly void.'"
Later, the appellate court reiterated that a "`conditional decree,
one that does not operate in praesenti, but is to become operative
on the occurrence of some condition, is void.'"  Southern Four v.
Parker, supra, 81 Md. App. at 94, 566 A.2d at 812, quoting with
approval Burger v. Burger, 481 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo. App. 1972).
The Court of Special Appeals explained this principle as follows
(81 Md. App. at 94, 566 A.2d at 812, quoting with approval Wallace
v. Hankins, 541 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. App. 1976)):
"`A conditional judgment or decree is one
whose enforcement is dependent on the per-
formance of future acts by a litigant and is
to be annulled if default occurs.  An alterna-
tive judgment or decree is for one thing or
another but does not declare in a definitive
manner which alternative will ultimately
prevail.  Conditional and alternative judg-
ments and decrees are wholly void as they do
not perform in praesenti and leave to specula-
tion and conjecture what their final effect
may be.  In other words, under conditional or
alternative judgments and decrees, the final
resolution of the cause is consigned to the
accomplishment vel non of future acts whose
actual performance or nonperformance are
matters dehors the record.'"
This Court in Duffy v. Conaway, supra, 295 Md. at 261,
455 A.2d at 964, quoting from Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 576-
13
577, 97 A.2d 449, 452 (1953), stated "that a controversy, to be
justiciable, must be `capable of final adjudication by the judgment
or decree to be rendered.'"  We went on to hold in Duffy, 295 Md.
at 261-262, 455 A.2d at 965, that a Maryland court has no jurisdic-
tion to render a "judgment" which is "`purely tentative'" and
subject to implementing action by the General Assembly.  Under the
principles set forth in Duffy, the November 26th decree in the
instant case would be invalid even if the circuit court had
jurisdiction to abolish school boards, create new government
agencies, etc.
For all of the foregoing reasons, most of the circuit
court's November 26th decree, including all of the numbered
paragraphs, is beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the
circuit court and is void.  The respondents have brought the issue
of the decree's validity before this Court by their motion to
dismiss.  In addition, a judgment beyond the trial court's
jurisdiction is subject to a collateral challenge at any time.
Furthermore, this Court will sua sponte strike down a judgment
beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.  Duffy v. Conaway, supra,
295 Md. at 254, 455 A.2d at 961.
It should be emphasized that the parties' agreement to
recommend to the General Assembly particular legislation and
appropriations relating to the public school system is not my
concern.  From a public policy standpoint, the recommendations may
14
well be desirable.  That is a matter for the political branches of
government and not the judiciary.  Moreover, the parties are fully
entitled to settle pending litigation.  The present litigation
could have been dismissed after the parties entered a settlement
agreement.  What is objectionable in this case, from a jurispruden-
tial standpoint, is the role of the circuit court, the insertion
into the court's decree of orders which are beyond the court's
jurisdiction, and the court's usurpation of the Legislature's
function.  The various numbered paragraphs of the November 26,
1996, decree are void, and the people of Maryland are entitled to
be so informed.
II.
A.
In upholding the denial of Montgomery County's motions to
intervene in these two cases, the majority largely accepts many of
the respondents' self-serving characterizations of this litigation,
as well as some of the Court of Special Appeals' characterizations
of the Bradford case, and the majority ignores the actual allega-
tions and theories set forth in the plaintiffs' complaints.  For
purposes of intervention, the majority views this case as if it
were ordinary litigation with its impact limited to Baltimore City.
Thus, the majority opinion states that the Bradford
plaintiffs alleged that the State was constitutionally responsible
for "educational deficiencies in the Baltimore public school system
       The state constitutional provision, which the plaintiffs in
8
both cases contend has been violated, is Article VIII, § 1, of the
Maryland Constitution, which states as follows:
"Section 1.  General Assembly to establish
 system of free public schools.
"The General Assembly, at its First Session
after the adoption of this Constitution, shall
by Law establish throughout the State a thor-
ough and efficient System of Free Public
Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or
otherwise, for their maintenance."
15
due to various economic, social, and educational factors peculiar
to Baltimore City" (slip opinion at 1-2, emphasis added), that the
Bradford complaint "focuses solely on the children in the Baltimore
City public school system" (id. at 13), and that both lawsuits are
"directed . . . solely to the constitutional adequacy of the
education provided to children in the Baltimore City public
schools" (id. at 30, emphasis in original).8
In actuality, however, the Bradford complaint was brought
on behalf of an alleged class of "at risk" students which the
complaint defined as follows:
"`At-risk' students are those who experience
circumstances of economic, social and/or
educational disadvantage that substantially
increase the likelihood that they will fail to
obtain an adequate education in public school.
"8.
Students who are `at risk' include
those who:
(a
l i v e  
i n
p o v e r t y
( u s u a l l y
16
defined for
educational
purposes by
t
h
e
i
r
eligibility
for free or
r e d u c e d
price school
meals);
(b)
attend schools with a high propor-
tion of students living in poverty
(more than thirty percent eligible
for free or reduced price meals);
(c)
live with fewer than two parents;
(d)
have 
parents 
who 
did 
not
themselves 
graduate 
from 
high
school;
(e)
live with parents who are un-
employed;
(f)
are homeless;
(g)
are parents or pregnant;
(h)
live under the threat of violence
at home or at school;
(i)
have been retained in grade on at
least one occasion;
(j)
score more than one year below
grade level on standardized test-
ing measures; or
(k)
have otherwise been determined to
be in need of remedial education."
Although the Bradford plaintiffs limited their action to the "at
risk" students in Baltimore City, they acknowledged that there were
"at risk" students, under the above-quoted definition, throughout
17
the State.  The Bradford complaint went on to allege that the
"State's constitutional duty to provide for an adequate education
runs to every school-aged child throughout Maryland," and that this
duty applies to "at risk schoolchildren in Baltimore City . . .
[and] in other communities and school districts in Maryland."  In
contending that the constitutional inadequacy of the present public
school system is shown by the failure of students to meet state
prescribed performance standards, the Bradford complaint acknow-
ledged that the students in "many" Maryland school districts fail
to meet these standards.
The amended complaint in the Baltimore City case, which
asserted that the adequacy of education should be measured by
performance under standards adopted and applied by the State Board
of Education, alleged that in 1990 "none of the Maryland school
districts met satisfactory standards," and that, four years later,
"only three school districts demonstrated educational adequacy."
Montgomery County was not one of those three districts.  The
amended complaint in the Baltimore City case contained more
allegations detailing the inadequate performances of children
throughout the State measured by various tests, concluding that
"[c]ontemporary qualitative educational standards established by
. . . the State Board still are not being met in many districts,
including Baltimore City" (emphasis added), and that these failures
"present concrete evidence that Defendants have failed to fulfill
       "MSPP" stands for "Maryland School Performance Program."
9
18
their duty under Article VIII to provide for the maintenance of a
basic public school education."  Later the Baltimore City amended
complaint asserted that "[t]he qualitative standards of the MSPP
are not being met in any school district in the State."   The basic
9
theme of the Baltimore City case, set forth in paragraph 53 of the
amended complaint, was as follows (emphasis added):
"Defendants, in violation of the education
clause [Article VIII, § 1], have failed to
appropriate increases in State education
funding necessary for all school districts,
particularly Baltimore City, to provide all
students with a basic public school educa-
tion."
The majority opinion also indicates that this litigation is
not primarily about money.  The majority opinion states that the
Bradford plaintiffs "sought a court order requiring the State to
work with the plaintiffs and Baltimore City to improve the City's
public schools so that they provide an adequate education" (slip
opinion at 3), but the majority mentions nothing about the Bradford
plaintiffs' request for funds.  The majority also says that the
Bradford complaint "did not directly attack the constitutionality
of the system of public school funding which we upheld in Hornbeck
v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983)."
(Slip opinion at 4).  The majority opinion points to the state
defendants' contention that "`money' . . . is not the primary
     
  Any reader of the newspapers circulated in Maryland over
10
the past several months would also know that these cases are all
about money.
19
subject of the litigation."  (Id. at 8).  In describing the
allegations of the amended complaint in the Baltimore City case,
the majority merely says that the plaintiffs "sought by way of
relief that the State provide a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion."  (Id. at 10).
Contrary to the view of the majority, an examination of the
two complaints demonstrates that these cases are chiefly about
money from the State.   The crux of the Bradford plaintiffs' case
10
was set forth in paragraphs 41, 136, and 137 of their complaint as
follows (emphasis added):
"41.  The State of Maryland and the
defendants have failed to provide school-
children in Baltimore City with an adequate
education.  In particular, the defendants have
failed to provide resources sufficient and
appropriate to enable BCPS [Baltimore City
Public Schools] to meet or make meaningful
progress toward meeting contemporary education
standards, especially with respect to at-risk
students . . . .
* * *
"136.  Pursuant to its obligations under
the Education Clause of the Maryland Constitu-
tion, the General Assembly has established a
mechanism for funding elementary and secondary
education from a combination of State and
local appropriations.
"137.  The principal cause of the inade-
quate education available to plaintiff school-
20
children, which results in the constitutional
violation set forth above, is the lack of
adequate resources.  Under the constitution,
the State is legally responsible for ensuring
that the combination of state and local fund-
ing is adequate to meet the needs of BCPS's
school population, and the State's failure to
assure such funding adequacy violates [its]
constitutional duty."
The Bradford plaintiffs in the first paragraph of their
complaint disclaimed any intent to relitigate the issues dealt with
in Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., supra, 295 Md. 597, 458
A.2d 758, which concerned, inter alia, the differences in total per
pupil funding among the various Maryland subdivisions (295 Md. at
613-615, 458 A.2d at 766-768), and in which this Court held that
the Maryland Constitution "does not mandate uniformity in per pupil
funding and expenditures among the State's school districts" (295
Md. at 631, 458 A.2d at 776).  Nonetheless, the later paragraphs of
the Bradford complaint specifically challenged the differences in
per pupil funding between Baltimore City and other school dis-
tricts, complaining that Baltimore City 
"cannot devote as great a share of its re-
sources to regular instruction as do other
school districts.
"134.  In 1992-93, BCPS spent only $2,437
per student on current instructional expenses
(less adult education), the lowest of any
school district in Maryland.  The statewide
average for current instructional expenses was
$2,926, nearly 20% higher than that in BCPS.
As a result of BCPS's below-average spending,
a classroom of 30 students in BCPS received
21
approximately $17,000 less to spend on current
instructional needs than a similar size class-
room in an average-spending school district in
Maryland."
It is obvious from a reading of the entire Bradford
complaint that the plaintiffs' request for a court order requiring
the State to take steps to "provide an adequate education" meant
that the State should provide more funds.  As paragraph 137 of the
complaint, quoted previously, makes clear, the requested "adequacy"
in public education means "funding adequacy."
The amended complaint in the Baltimore City case made little
effort to disguise that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge
was to the present system of public school funding, and that what
the plaintiffs sought was more state money.  In their amended com-
plaint's "Preliminary Statement," the Baltimore City plaintiffs
stated that they wanted
"injunctive relief . . . directing that Defen-
dants provide `by taxation or otherwise' suf-
ficient assistance and resources to Baltimore
City Public Schools (`BCPS') so that BCPS can
make available to all school-aged children
residing in Baltimore City the opportunity for
a basic public school education."
Echoing the complaint in the Hornbeck case, the amended complaint
in the Baltimore City case alleged in paragraph 34 that "Baltimore
City students perform worse on the MSPP than those school districts
that are able to spend more funds for education" and "that in
       For examples, see paragraphs 39, 40, 45, 53, 54 and 55 of
11
the amended complaint, alleging as follows:
"39.
In 1990, when Maryland was the eighth
richest state in the United States, it
fell to 42nd in the nation in its mone-
tary contribution to public education.
Overall, in fiscal year 1992, local
government provided fifty-five (55%)
percent of the funding for public
schools.
40.
Insufficient State expenditures for
public education require that local
Boards of Education be fiscally depen-
dent on financing from the local
government through income and property
tax revenues. . . . 
* * *
45.
Under Maryland's public school finan-
cing plan, a school-aged child's oppor-
tunity to obtain adequate education,
undeniably, is dependent upon the
ability of the local political juris-
22
school districts where more money is available, students perform
better."  Paragraph 34 continued:
"The performance of Baltimore City, particu-
larly as compared to suburban districts which
have greater fiscal capacities, shows that the
financing scheme dependent upon local wealth
and ad hoc categorical State aid does not
provide school districts that have limited
fiscal capacities with the means essential to
provide a basic public school education."
The Baltimore City amended complaint repeatedly attacked the
Maryland system of shared State and local fiscal responsibility for
the public schools.11
diction, in which he or she happens to
live, to raise local taxes.  To even be
eligible to receive the State's `share'
of basic current expenses, local juris-
dictions must be able to levy taxes
sufficient to provide their local share
as 
determined 
by 
the 
foundation
formula.  § 5-202(b)(3).  Local appro-
priations also must keep pace with
enrollment and match or exceed spending
in the prior year.
* * *
53.
Defendants, in violation of the educa-
tion clause, have failed to appropriate
increases in State education funding
necessary for all school districts,
particularly Baltimore City, to provide
all students with a basic public school
education.
54.
Despite increasing evidence that the
State's public school financing plan is
insufficient to provide for the main-
tenance of adequate education that is
effective in all districts, the Defend-
ants consistently have resisted local
efforts to obtain sufficient State
funds for the maintenance of a basic
public school education.  The full
funding estimated as needed at the
local level for public education in the
State Budget for fiscal years 1994,
1995, and 1996 was not appropriated.
55.
Defendants have had ample time to pro-
vide for the maintenance of adequate
education.  Without sufficient State
funds or assistance to provide its
children with a basic public school
education, Baltimore City is impeded in
carrying out its statutory duty to
establish and maintain a system of free
public schools for its students."
23
The specific constitutional actions or inactions by state
24
officials and entities which were complained about in the Baltimore
City case appeared to be the failures of Governors to include
sufficient state funds for public schools in the annual budgets
submitted to the General Assembly (paragraph 51 of the amended
complaint) and the General Assembly's breach of its "duty to enact
a `Supplementary Appropriations Bill' or other legislation to
ensure that a thorough and efficient public school system is
provided for, even if the Governor's annual budget does not meet
that constitutional mandate."  (Paragraph 52).
In their "Prayer For Relief," the Baltimore City plaintiffs
asked the court, inter alia, to "[o]rder Defendants to design an
enhanced system of public school finance for implementation by the
General Assembly which assures that all mandates for education as
established by Defendants are properly funded" and to "[o]rder
Defendants to provide BCPS with . . . funding to the fullest extent
necessary for BCPS to provide a basic public school education to
school-aged children in BCPS as defined by contemporary qualitative
educational standards."  Consequently, the plaintiffs sought a new
and "enhanced" system of public school funding in place of the
existing system.
Article VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution makes no
reference to localities or subdivisions.  The section imposes a
duty upon the statewide legislative body to establish a thorough
and efficient public school system "throughout the State . . . ."
25
The plaintiffs in these cases requested a declaratory judgment that
the General Assembly has violated Article VIII, § 1.  The Bradford
complaint described a group of "at risk" students, based on a list
of social, personal, and economic factors, which has members in
every Maryland subdivision.  As reviewed above, the complaints in
both cases alleged that the education being received by public
school students throughout the State, and particularly "at risk"
students, was constitutionally inadequate.  The plaintiffs in each
case contended that the existing state public school financing
system and formulae, based on shared State and local fiscal
responsibility, were constitutionally deficient.  They wanted a new
financing system.  
These allegations of unconstitutionality, and the type of
declaratory judgment which might have resulted, equally concern all
Maryland counties as well as Baltimore City.  If, as alleged, the
"at risk" students throughout the State are receiving a constitu-
tionally inadequate education, this applies to Montgomery County as
well as Baltimore City.  If the failure to meet the standards of
state 
performance 
programs 
demonstrates 
a 
constitutionally
inadequate education, then, under the complaints' allegations, the
education provided in all school districts is unconstitutional.  If
the State has failed to provide the "funding necessary for all
school districts," as alleged, this failure relates to counties as
well as to Baltimore City.  The plaintiffs' challenge to the
       The majority opinion may seem to intimate that the "might
12
be disadvantaged" standard set forth in Citizens Coordinating Comm.
v. TKU, is no longer applicable since that case was decided under
a former rule, and that the Court of Special Appeals' opinion in
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. App. 615, 519 A.2d 219
26
financing system and formulae applies throughout the State.  When
the parties' self-serving characterizations of the cases are over-
looked, and when the actual allegations of the complaints are
examined, it is obvious that these cases are not very different
from Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., supra, in which
Montgomery county was allowed to intervene.
Montgomery County clearly has "an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action" within
the meaning of Maryland Rule 2-214(a) relating to intervention of
right.  The two lawsuits are attacking the statewide public school
system, provided under Article VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitu-
tion, with its principal feature being shared State and local
government responsibility.  Montgomery County is as much a part of
that system as is Baltimore City.  If a declaratory judgment
invalidating the present system and formulae for public school
financing were rendered, Montgomery County obviously "might be
disadvantaged by the disposition of the action," Board of Trustees
v. City of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 89 n.19, 562 A.2d 720, 728 n.19
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1167, 107 L.Ed.2d
1069 (1990); Citizens Coordinating Comm. v. TKU, 276 Md. 705, 711,
351 A.2d 133, 137 (1976).12
(1987), decided under present Rule 2-214(a), disapproved of TKU and
set forth a more stringent test for the interest of the applicant
to be sufficient for intervention.  I find nothing in the Birdsong
opinion disapproving of this Court's earlier TKU opinion, or
stating that the "might be disadvantaged" standard is no longer
applicable.  Moreover, the Board of Trustees case was an opinion of
this Court, decided under the present rule, and decided subsequent
to Birdsong.  In Board of Trustees, we reaffirmed the "might be
disadvantaged" standard.
       The majority also indicates that, if the plaintiffs obtain
13
the millions of dollars in additional state funds which they seek,
any financial impact upon Montgomery County would be "speculative."
I wonder where the majority believes that over 250 million dollars
of additional state funds will come from.  There is not, to the
best of my knowledge, a money tree in Annapolis supplying the state
treasury.  A large amount of additional State money for one
subdivision comes from the taxpayers in all subdivisions, and the
taxpayers in Montgomery County supply more of that money than do
the taxpayers in any other single subdivision.
27
The majority opinion holds that Montgomery County does not
have a sufficient "interest" for intervention as of right because
"[t]he `transaction' in these cases, i.e. the two lawsuits, is
limited in scope to the plaintiffs' claim that the State has failed
to provide the requisite resources and services to the Baltimore
City public schoolchildren necessary to fulfill its constitutional
obligation . . . ."  (Slip opinion at 28).  As previously demon-
strated, however, this is simply not accurate.  The allegations of
unconstitutionality are not limited in scope to Baltimore City
public school students.  
13
It is true that the plaintiffs, while attacking the
constitutionality of the public school system throughout the State,
attempt to limit the relief sought to Baltimore City.  Of course,
a declaratory judgment need not be in the form requested by the
       Maryland Code (1974, 1990 Repl. Vol.), §§ 9-101 through 9-
14
310 of the Natural Resources Article.
       Montgomery County alternatively sought permissive inter-
15
vention under Rule 2-214(b), and this was also denied by the
circuit court.  "Denial of intervention, sought either as a matter
of claimed right or by permission, is an appealable final order."
Maryland Life & Health Ins. v. Perrott, 301 Md. 78, 87, 482 A.2d 9,
13 (1984), and cases there cited.  Even if it be assumed, arguendo,
that Montgomery County was not entitled to intervene as of right,
I would hold that the circuit court abused is discretion in denying
permissive intervention. 
28
plaintiffs.  See Harford Mutual v. Woodfin, 344 Md. 399, 414-415,
687 A.2d 652, 659 (1997), and cases there cited.  More importantly,
I do not believe that plaintiffs, simply by limiting the scope of
the relief requested, can prevent intervention by an applicant with
a clear interest in the subject matter of the litigation.  For
example, could owners of wetlands in Anne Arundel County bring an
action to declare the statewide wetlands statutes  unconstitution-
14
al, on grounds that would be applicable throughout the State, but,
by merely asking that the phrase "as applied in Anne Arundel
County" be appended to the declaratory judgment, succeed in keeping
out of the lawsuit owners of wetlands in other counties with a
different point of view?  I do not believe that the principles of
intervention under Maryland law can be so easily manipulated.
Montgomery County had an "interest relating to the . . .
transaction that is the subject of the action" within the meaning
of Rule 2-214(a) and, therefore, was entitled to intervene as of
right.15
29
B.
There is another factor in these cases, which the majority
refuses to consider, but which clearly justifies intervention by an
interested person or entity willing to defend the General
Assembly's enactments relating to Maryland's public school system.
The cases have, to a degree, become collusive, with no existing
party defending the constitutionality of the public school system.
(1)
As the majority opinion points out, there was a "lack of
opposition to the entry of the partial summary judgment" declaring
that Article VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution was violated
with regard to Baltimore City public school children.  Furthermore,
the "Consent Decree" of November 26, 1996, incorporated by
reference the "partial summary judgment holding," in the words of
the decree,
"that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Maryland
Constitution requires that the General Assem-
bly provide all students in Maryland's public
schools with an education that is adequate
when measured by contemporary educational
standards and that the public school children
in Baltimore City are not being provided with
an education that is adequate when measured by
contemporary educational standards."
While the decree goes on to recite that there is some dispute
concerning the causes of this constitutional violation, the partial
summary judgment and the decree do constitute a declaratory
judgment that the State has failed to provide some public school
30
children with the minimum education constitutionally required.
Since Article VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution makes the
General Assembly responsible for providing whatever may be required
under that section, and since, under Article III, §§ 27-52, of the
Constitution, the General Assembly fulfills its responsibilities by
enacting statutes and budget bill provisions, the declaratory
judgment in these cases necessarily means that at least some of the
General Assembly's enactments concerning public education are
constitutionally infirm.
The Maryland State Superintendent of Schools and the
President of the Maryland State Board of Education, represented by
the Attorney General of Maryland, expressly consented to the entire
decree.  Thus, the State defendants and the Attorney General have
agreed with the plaintiffs' contention and the circuit court's
declaration that the public education system provided for by the
General Assembly, and the General Assembly's enactments regarding
public education, are to some extent unconstitutional.  There is no
longer any party in these cases totally defending the constitution-
ality of these legislative enactments.  The litigation has,
therefore, become collusive.
When a case involving the public interest is or may become
collusive, with no party defending the validity of statutes or
other governmental actions, and where those statutes or actions are
not clearly invalid, it is important to allow intervention in order
that the statutes or governmental actions receive a defense and
31
that both sides of the constitutional dispute be presented to the
judiciary.  Intervention has been allowed in such cases even after
the trial court's judgment, where the collusive aspect of the
litigation simply took the form of the losing governmental parties
declining to pursue appellate remedies.  See Coalition v. Annapolis
Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 368-371, 635 A.2d 412, 416-417 (1994).  See al-
so Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra, 317 Md. at 91-92,
562 A.2d at 729.
Judge J. Dudley Digges for this Court in Reyes v. Prince
George's County, supra, 281 Md. at 283, 380 A.2d at 14, emphasized
"that the American system of adjudication from
its inception has been grounded on the
principle that adversary presentation of
issues. . . plays a vital and essential role
in attaining justice."
Moreover, an adversary presentation is "`a safeguard essential to
the integrity of the judicial process,'" ibid., quoting United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305, 63 S.Ct. 1075, 87 L.Ed. 1413
(1943).  Later in its Reyes opinion, 281 Md. at 299, 380 A.2d at
23, the Court reiterated
"that it is essential to the effective func-
tioning of the adjudicatory process that
judgments, particularly those involving con-
stitutional issues, be rendered only after the
court has had the benefit of full presentation
of opposing positions on the questions upon
which it is to express an opinion."
32
The Reyes case involved a situation where statutes were challenged
by a party whose costs and counsel fees were being paid by the
government entity defending the statutes, and the Court was
concerned that this degree of collusion might lead to an insuffi-
cient adversarial presentation of the issues.  Consequently, the
Court held that, when such situations arise in the future, the
trial court should (281 Md. at 300, 380 A.2d at 24)
"name counsel, without recommendation or sug-
gestion by any party to the action, to present
in the same manner and to the same extent as
though representing a truly adverse party, a
position in opposition to that taken by the
party who initiated and for whose benefit the
action was instituted."
The instant cases involve a much greater degree of collusion
than was involved in Reyes.  Unlike Reyes, in the present cases,
from and after the partial summary judgment, there was no ad-
versarial presentation of the constitutional issues.  More
importantly, the possible insufficiency of the adversarial
presentation in Reyes related to the attack upon the statutes and
governmental action.  In the cases at bar, however, after a certain
stage in the proceedings, there was no party defending the enact-
ments of the Maryland General Assembly concerning the public
schools.  If, as held in Reyes, it is necessary to import counsel
in order to challenge the validity of statutes, it would seem even
more necessary to allow intervention by an interested and willing
33
governmental party to defend the enactments of the General
Assembly.
As Judge Marvin Smith emphasized for the Court in State v.
Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9, 36, 481 A.2d 785, 799 (1984),
"[o]ne accused of crime, presumed under our
system to be innocent, is entitled to an
advocate of his position.  A statute, with its
presumption of constitutionality, has just as
much right to an advocate of its validity."
In that case, this Court disallowed a declaratory judgment action
by the Attorney General of Maryland challenging the validity of a
state statute, even though there was another party in the case
willing to defend the statute.  In language which is directly
applicable to the Attorney General's conduct in the present cases,
we explained (State v. Burning Tree Club, supra, 301 Md. at 36, 481
A.2d at 798-799):
"Who has the duty of conducting the defense of
a challenged statute if this duty does not
rest upon the Attorney General of Maryland?
It is no answer to say, as the Attorney
General claimed at oral argument, that in this
instance Burning Tree is prepared to spirited-
ly defend the statute.  If we were to permit
the Attorney General to maintain the present
action for this reason, an anomalous result
would be reached in a future proceeding, again
brought to declare a statute unconstitutional,
where the defendant may elect not to defend
either for economic or other reasons.  In that
situation, the matter would go by default and
the statute might well be declared unconstitu-
tional, even though if properly defended a
contrary result might have been reached.
34
"The 
fact 
that 
the 
Attorney 
General
believes this or any statute to be unconstitu-
tional does not make it such."
The "future proceeding" envisioned by the Court in the above-quoted
passage came about in these cases when the Attorney General's
Office acquiesced in the declaration of unconstitutionality, and
there was no remaining party to defend the General Assembly's
enactments.  Not only did the Attorney General's Office abandon its
"duty of appearing in the courts as the defender of the validity of
enactments of the General Assembly" (Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. at
37, 481 A.2d at 799), but the Attorney General has vigorously
opposed the efforts by the largest political subdivision of the
State to intervene and defend the enactments of the General
Assembly.
The language of a three-judge federal court in Nash v.
Blunt, 140 F.R.D. 400, 403 (W.D. Mo. 1992), aff'd, 507 U.S. 1015,
113 S.Ct. 1809, 123 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993), in allowing intervention on
the same side as state defendants in a case with political over-
tones, is pertinent here:
"In addition to being necessary as a check
on the possible intrusion of partisan inter-
ests into these legal matters, the grants of
intervention were necessary to insure this
court's jurisdiction.  In arriving at the
proposed settlement, the parties necessarily
agreed on a wide variety of factual and legal
issues; for instance, the parties agreed that
the proposed settlement does not violate the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act and that
35
the court's adoption of the settlement was the
best solution to this entire lawsuit.  This
court was (and, to some extent, is still)
concerned that the parties might actually
agree on many of the central issues involved
in this case, thereby depriving the court of
`opposing 
parties 
representing 
adverse
interests' 
as 
required 
by 
Article 
III.
Financial Guar. Ins. v. City of Fayetteville,
943 F.2d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 1991).  By allow-
ing the intervenors to participate in this
case, we have insured that opposing viewpoints
will continue to be presented to the court.3
___________________________________________
 "   Even if the parties' agreement on certain
3
issues did not implicate Article III concerns,
we would still grant the motions to intervene
because the intervenors' presence will aid the
court in resolving the issues presented in
this case."
Another federal court, after reviewing numerous cases, made a
similar point (Herdman v. Town of Angelica, 163 F.R.D. 180, 190
(W.D.N.Y. 1995)):
"The cases cited above indicate that in
considering a motion to intervene as of right
on the side of a government entity in an
action in which the government entity is not
suing as parens patriae, but rather is
defending the legality of its actions or the
validity of its laws or regulations, courts
should examine both (1) whether the government
entity has demonstrated the motivation to
litigate vigorously and to present all color-
able contentions, and (2) the capacity of that
entity to defend its own interests and those
of the prospective intervenor."
See also Hopwood v. State of Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2580, 135 L.Ed.2d 1094
       Article VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution.
16
36
(1996) ("The proposed intervenors have not demonstrated that the
State will not strongly defend its affirmative action program").
I do not mean to suggest that, in ordinary litigation,
whenever a party acquiesces in a partial summary judgment in favor
of his opponent, or enters into a consent judgment, the case has
become collusive and intervention by a third party is warranted.
Obviously this is not so.  Parties should be encouraged to resolve
their differences by reaching agreements.  Nevertheless, when an
action is brought to declare unconstitutional the enactments of the
General Assembly, when those statutes are not obviously invalid,
and when at some point during the litigation there is no party
defending the legislative enactments, then, under the principles
set forth in the above-cited cases, the litigation has become
collusive and intervention is clearly in order.
(2)
The Attorney General's position in this litigation, and the
refusal by the circuit court and this Court to allow intervention
for the purpose of defending the Legislature's enactments, are
particularly puzzling when one considers the nature of the
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge and the prior decisions of
this Court.  The existing "System of Free Public Schools"  which
16
has been provided by the General Assembly, involving shared State
and local responsibility, involving comprehensive statutory
     
  As previously noted, "MSPP" stands for "Maryland School
17
Performance Program."  "MSPAP" stands for "Maryland School
Performance Assessment Program."
The complaint in the Bradford case also alleged that the
37
provisions relating to all aspects of education, and involving
large appropriations of taxpayers' dollars, is not, as applied to
"at risk" students, obviously invalid or clearly in violation of
public policy embodied in constitutional provisions.  If it were,
perhaps a plausible argument could be made to justify the position
of the circuit court and the role of the Attorney General.  Cf.
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959, 962 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938, 84 S.Ct. 793, 11 L.Ed.2d
659 (1964) (federal government attorneys, "unusually enough,"
refused to defend the validity of a racial "separate-but-equal"
provision in a federal statute, although another party in the case
defended the constitutionality of the provision).
Instead of the legislative enactments under Article VIII,
§ 1, being clearly invalid, it is the plaintiffs' constitutional
theory which seems questionable in light of Hornbeck v. Somerset
Co. Bd. of Educ., supra, 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758.  As discussed
earlier, the plaintiffs in both cases below alleged that the "at
risk" Baltimore City public school students were receiving a
constitutionally inadequate education, and that this inadequacy was
primarily shown by the students' scores on so-called "MSPP" and
"MSPAP" tests.   According to the Bradford plaintiffs, this
17
inadequacy was shown by the students' high rate of being "unlaw-
fully absent from school," the number who do not complete high
school, the number who are not qualified "for admission to the
University of Maryland system," the difficulty in "attract[ing] and
retain[ing] qualified teachers and professional staff," alleged
insufficient "quantities of `good quality' instructional materials
and supplies," the alleged inadequate condition of the school
buildings, and the alleged high "rate at which students enter,
withdraw from, or transfer between schools."  
38
inadequacy primarily results from a lack of sufficient funding,
"and the State's failure to assure such funding adequacy violates
[its] constitutional duty."  Similarly, the amended complaint in
the Baltimore City case alleged that the "[d]efendants, in
violation of the education clause [Article VIII, § 1], have failed
to appropriate increases in State education funding necessary for
all school districts, particularly Baltimore City, to provide all
students with a basic public school education."  In fact, as poin-
ted out in Part II A of this opinion, the amended complaint in the
Baltimore City case, read as a whole, appeared to be an attack upon
the basic system of shared State and local fiscal responsibility
for the schools.
Consequently, the complaints in both cases proceeded upon
the primary theory that low test scores and other alleged deficien-
cies in students' performance and conduct, together with the
State's system of public school funding, constituted a sufficient
basis for the circuit court to determine that the education
provided was constitutionally inadequate in violation of Article
VIII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution, and to afford appropriate
39
relief which was additional state funding.  
This Court in Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., supra,
295 Md. at 620-632, 458 A.2d at 770-777, however, reviewed the
history and meaning of Article VIII, § 1, and concluded as follows
(295 Md. at 632, 458 A.2d at 776):
"The development of the statewide system under
§ 1 is a matter for legislative determination;
at most, the legislature is commanded by § 1
to establish such a system, effective in all
school districts, as will provide the State's
youth with a basic public school education."
Chief Judge Murphy's opinion for the Court in Hornbeck, 295 Md. at
624, 458 A.2d at 772, pointed out that the framers of Article VIII,
§ 1, in the Constitutional Convention of 1867, rejected any
constitutional requirement of a "detailed system" of public
education, and decided "`that the constitution should not be
encumbered with the details'; and that the `best plan was to leave
the details . . . to the legislature.'"  The Hornbeck opinion
stated that "[t]he central theme emerging from the debates [at the
1867 Constitutional Convention] was . . . to permit the legislature
to adopt any system . . . and to implement it by statute."  295 Md.
at 626, 458 A.2d at 773.  The history of Article VIII, § 1, set
forth in Hornbeck is replete with the concept that "the legislature
be left free to adopt the system it deemed best," that the
Constitution "`reserv[ed] to the Legislature full authority to
provide for a system of education in each county and the city of
40
Baltimore,'" that the amount of funds necessary "`is properly
confided to the Legislature,'" and that the Constitution does not
prescribe a "`system of public schools'" which is "`perfect[].'"
295 Md. at 627, 458 A.2d at 774.  The Court in Hornbeck made it
clear that Article VIII, § 1, authorized "the principle of shared
responsibility between State and local governments for public
school education," 295 Md. at 630, 458 A.2d at 775.  
It appears somewhat difficult to reconcile the plaintiffs'
theory and the circuit court's declaratory judgment with the
Hornbeck opinion and the constitutional history therein reviewed.
Hornbeck and the history of Article VIII, § 1, indicate that it is
for the General Assembly, and not the circuit court, to determine
the nature of the public school system and the method of funding.
Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the framers of Article VIII,
§ 1, contemplated that students' scores on particular tests would
be the standard for judicially measuring the General Assembly's
compliance with its constitutional responsibility.
There is an additional aspect of the plaintiffs' theory
which would have seemed to reinforce the view that ultimate
judicial relief might be difficult to obtain and that their
complaints should have been directed to the political branches of
the Government.  As discussed earlier, the plaintiffs complained on
behalf of a "class" of "at risk" children who are disadvantaged
chiefly because they "live in poverty," "live with fewer than two
41
parents," have parents who did not graduate from high school, "live
with parents who are unemployed," "are homeless," "are parents or
pregnant," or live under threats of violence.  The plaintiffs'
argument was that such children, because of these disadvantages not
caused by the school system, "require greater or different
resources and services than others to receive an adequate education
from the public schools."  Although it is certainly desirable, from
a social standpoint, for government to take steps to rectify the
results of poverty, unemployment, etc., as a general rule govern-
ment is not constitutionally responsible for deprivations not
caused by government action.  See, e.g., National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S.Ct. 454, 461,
102 L.Ed.2d 469, 484 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-
1003, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2785, 73 L.Ed.2d 534, 545 (1982); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-840, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769-2771, 73
L.Ed.2d 418, 425-427 (1982); Waters v. State, 320 Md. 52, 57-59,
575 A.2d 1244, 1246-1247, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 989, 111 S.Ct.
529, 112 L.Ed.2d 539 (1990); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315
Md. 254, 293-294, 554 A.2d 366, 386, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816,
110 S.Ct. 66, 107 L.Ed.2d 33 (1989); Riger v. L&B Ltd. Partnership,
278 Md. 281, 288-289, 363 A.2d 481, 485-486 (1976).
Of course, the State's obligation under Article VIII, § 1,
of the Maryland Constitution to provide a free public education,
fully extends to "at risk" students, and remedial measures are
42
obviously called for.  Nevertheless, the nature of the remedial
measures, the amount of funding, etc., involves a balancing of
educational, political, social, and fiscal considerations which is
peculiarly within the province and expertise of the political
branches of government.  
By pointing to apparent difficulties in the plaintiffs'
legal theories and in their requests for judicial relief, I am not
suggesting that their lawsuits were frivolous, or that the Hornbeck
opinion cannot be reexamined, or that Hornbeck may not be dis-
tinguishable in light of evidence that might be adduced at a trial,
or that the Maryland system of public school financing, with its
significant reliance on local funding ability, is absolutely immune
from judicial challenge.  I do suggest that, in light of the
apparent uphill legal battle that was facing the plaintiffs, the
position of the Attorney General and the State defendants, as well
as the declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality without any
trial, is extremely surprising and highly unusual.  A situation is
presented which clearly calls for intervention by a truly adverse
party.
(3)
In refusing to consider the State defendants' and Attorney
General's apparent acquiescence in the plaintiffs' questionable
legal position, and their consent to a declaratory judgment that
Article VIII, § 1, has been violated, the majority opinion seems to
1
hold that "subsequent events" have no relevance to the matter of
intervention in these cases.  The majority again myopically views
the present cases as if they constituted ordinary local lawsuits.
Nevertheless, in major public interest cases involving challenges
to the validity of statutes or other governmental action, this
Court, in reviewing the matter of intervention, has considered
"subsequent events."
Thus, in Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra, 317
Md. at 88-92, 562 A.2d at 727-729, the Board of Trustees of
Baltimore City's employee pension systems challenged the validity
of city ordinances requiring that the pension systems divest their
holdings in corporations doing business in South Africa.  Prior to
trial, four pension fund beneficiaries moved to intervene on the
side of the Board, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied
the motion for intervention.  In holding that the circuit court
erred, this Court pointed to the possibility that the Board, as a
city agency, might not fully contest the position of Baltimore
City.  In this connection we noted the event, subsequent to the
circuit court's denial of intervention, "that, during Baltimore's
last mayoral election campaign, one of the issues between the
candidates concerned the propriety of permitting the Trustees to
prosecute an appeal in the present case."  317 Md. at 91, 562 A.2d
at 729.  Moreover, in our opinion upholding the right of the
beneficiaries to intervene, we pointed to the subsequent possi-
     
  It should be noted that, at the time the circuit court
18
denied intervention, there were indications of the possibility that
the litigation might become collusive.  The State defendants,
represented by the Attorney General, vigorously opposed Montgomery
County's motions to intervene on the side of the State defendants
and to support the validity of the General Assembly's enactments.
This opposition was unusual; ordinarily parties in the position of
the State defendants would have gladly welcomed the assistance of
Montgomery County and the very able attorneys representing the
County.  Moreover, the State defendants, in responding to the
motions for intervention, seem to have adopted much of the
plaintiffs' theory regarding the nature of the cases.
2
bility "that the Trustees might not ask the United States Supreme
Court to review an unfavorable ruling in this Court," ibid.  See
the discussion in Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, supra, 333 Md. at
369-371, 635 A.2d at 416-417.   See also Meek v. Metropolitan Dade
18
County, Fla., 985 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1993); Nash v. Blunt,
supra, 140 F.R.D. at 402-403; Palmer v. Nelson, 160 F.R.D. 118, 122
(D. Neb. 1994) ("intervention necessarily focuses upon potential
future harm to the non-party's interest in the subject matter of
the pending litigation") (emphasis in original).  
III.
The present cases are ones in which the public interest and
the integrity of the judicial process require intervention.  There
is no existing party either defending the constitutionality of the
public school system provided by the General Assembly under Article
VIII of the Maryland  Constitution, or challenging the circuit
court's jurisdiction to abolish a government agency and create a
new one with specified organization, powers and duties, or
       References in newspaper articles and editorials to pending
19
proposed legislation in the General Assembly, relating to Baltimore
City schools, as having the purpose "to enact the terms of a court
consent decree" or being "court-approved" have become legion during
the past several months.  See, e.g., The Sun, March 27, 1997, at
12A, 22A.  Furthermore, the view has apparently been expressed to
the General Assembly that the language of the pending legislation
cannot deviate "from the consent decree" unless the deviation is
"agreed to by all parties" to this litigation.  See The Sun, March
28, 1997, at 10B.
3
challenging the court's decree that 250 million additional dollars
be provided for the Baltimore City public school system.  The
position of the State defendants and the nature of the circuit
court's decree are so unusual that one might reasonably wonder
whether the parties and the court have incorporated a particular
political agenda into the "Consent Decree," and are using the
judicial process and the decree simply as leverage to attain their
political goals from the General Assembly.   In any event, if the
19
Circuit Court for Baltimore City is going to assume the role of a
super legislature for Maryland public education, at least the
largest Maryland political subdivision should be represented in
that legislature.
Judge Raker has authorized me to state that she concurs with
the views expressed herein.
4
Rodowsky, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  In my view the issue of intervention is
not mooted by the consent decree because the conditions to which
operation of the latter is subject have not been fulfilled, to
date.  Further, I believe that Montgomery County, Maryland, should
have been permitted to intervene for the reasons stated in Part
II.A of the dissenting opinion by Judge Eldridge. 
5