Title: State v. Ronald G. Sorenson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 78 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
98-3107 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Ronald G. Sorenson: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Ronald G. Sorenson,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 251 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 237, 635 N.W.2d 787 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 1, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau   
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Brady   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by T. Christopher Kelly and Kelly & Habermehl, S.C., Madison, 
and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-cross-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 78 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  98-3107  
(L.C. No. 
95 CI 1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Ronald G.  
Sorenson: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Cross Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald G. Sorenson,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Ronald Sorenson (Sorenson) 
was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of his daughter 
L.S., largely on the basis of her allegations.  Subsequently, 
Sorenson was found to be a sexually violent person by a jury 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1995-96).1  At that ch. 980 trial, 
Sorenson was not allowed to put in evidence that L.S. had 
recanted her original allegations.  The State of Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
98-3107   
 
2 
 
(State) successfully argued that Sorenson was precluded from 
putting in that evidence on the grounds of issue preclusion.  
The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for 
a determination on the question of whether application of the 
doctrine would be fundamentally unfair under the circumstances.  
Sorenson seeks review, arguing that this case should be remanded 
for a new trial and the evidence of recantation admitted.  The 
State argues that issue preclusion bars the circuit court from 
admitting this evidence of recantation.   
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals with 
some modification.  We remand this matter to the circuit court 
for hearings on whether L.S.'s recantation evidence meets the 
test for newly discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a new 
trial under the standards set forth in State v. McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).  If the recantation evidence 
meets this test, we conclude that the circuit court's exclusion 
of this evidence was fundamentally unfair to Sorenson, and issue 
preclusion, even if it could apply, must not apply as a matter 
of law under these circumstances, particularly in consideration 
of the fact that this issue was never fully resolved in post-
conviction 
proceedings 
in 
the underlying criminal matter.  
Further, if the evidence meets this test, we conclude that 
Sorenson is entitled to a new trial at which the court must 
admit this evidence.  Accordingly, with these modifications, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reversing and 
remanding the matter for additional hearings.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
No. 
98-3107   
 
3 
 
¶3 
In March 1985, Sorenson was charged with one count of 
first-degree sexual assault of his seven-year-old daughter, L.S.  
State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 233-34, 421 N.W.2d 77 
(1988).  L.S. accused both Sorenson and his brother, Donald, of 
sexually assaulting her.  Id. at 233.  Donald was also charged 
with first-degree sexual assault. See State v. Sorenson, 152 
Wis. 2d 471, 449 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1989).  A jury convicted 
Sorenson on this count in September 1985.  He was sentenced to 
17 years in prison.  We affirmed Sorenson's conviction in 1988.  
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 232-33.  
¶4 
In 1991, Sorenson filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief, seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  
He alleged that L.S. had recently recanted her trial testimony 
implicating him as her assaulter.  Her recantation was allegedly 
based on her confusion at the time of trial as to whether 
Sorenson or his brother committed the assault.  The circuit 
court did not determine the merits of this motion, although it 
did hear testimony from L.S. on her recantation.  Her testimony 
is not part of the record in Sorenson's ch. 980 case.  Instead, 
before the court ruled, the State and Sorenson reached an 
agreement.  Under the terms of the agreement, Sorenson would 
withdraw his motion for a new trial in exchange for a reduction 
of his sentence on the conviction.  This reduction resulted in 
Sorenson's release on parole less than two months later.   
¶5 
Sorenson's conditions of parole included that he 
complete a sex offender program and that he not have contact 
with children.  Sorenson failed to complete any sex offender 
No. 
98-3107   
 
4 
 
program; he maintained that, because he was innocent of 
committing the assault, he did not need to participate in the 
program.  In 1993, his parole was revoked because he had 
unauthorized contact with several minor children, because he was 
abusing alcohol, and because of allegations that he touched the 
vaginal area of a five-year-old girl, A.L.  Criminal charges 
were never brought against Sorenson for this alleged sexual 
contact with A.L.   
¶6 
In July 1995, shortly before Sorenson's scheduled 
release date, the State filed a petition seeking an order 
committing Sorenson as a sexually violent person pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Proceedings on this petition were delayed 
for various reasons, but resumed in January 1998.   
¶7 
Before his ch. 980 trial, Sorenson indicated that he 
intended to introduce testimony from L.S. to show that she 
recanted her 1985 trial testimony.  In response, the State filed 
a motion in limine to prohibit Sorenson (1) from eliciting 
evidence that would impeach his 1985 conviction and (2) from 
eliciting evidence that would show that L.S. recanted.  In 
support of its motion, the State relied on the doctrine of issue 
preclusion.   
¶8 
Following a hearing on the motion, the court in part 
granted and in part denied the motion.  The court held that 
Sorenson's criminal case had been fully tried and appealed, and 
therefore evidence could not be introduced to impeach the 
criminal conviction.  The court, however, concluded that issue 
preclusion did not bar Sorenson from introducing evidence 
No. 
98-3107   
 
5 
 
pertaining to L.S.'s recantation.  The court held that the 
factual issues surrounding the recantation were never fully 
determined by a final judgment.  The court concluded that issue 
preclusion did not apply.   
¶9 
Approximately a week before his ch. 980 trial, the 
State once again objected to Sorenson's introduction of evidence 
related to L.S.'s recantation.  The State argued that the 
evidence should be excluded from trial because it would involve 
relitigation of the conviction, it was not relevant, and because 
it would mislead the jury.  The court excluded the evidence.  It 
concluded that allowing L.S. to testify would essentially 
involve a retrial of the underlying issue of whether or not 
Sorenson committed the sexual assault in 1985.  This retrial, 
the court reasoned, would confuse the jury in a manner that 
would be prejudicial and detrimental to Sorenson's case.   
¶10 Sorenson was tried before a jury on the ch. 980 
petition.  The jury found Sorenson a sexually violent person 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  The court entered judgment and issued 
an order for Sorenson's commitment.  Sorenson appealed. 
¶11 The court of appeals reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.  State v. Sorenson, 
2001 WI App 251, ¶2, 248 Wis. 2d 237, 635 N.W.2d 787.  Although 
the court concluded that the State could use issue preclusion in 
such cases to prevent a respondent from offering evidence on the 
underlying offense, it remanded to have the circuit court 
exercise its discretion and determine whether application of the 
doctrine in this case was fundamentally unfair to Sorenson.  Id. 
No. 
98-3107   
 
6 
 
at ¶¶28, 32.  It instructed the circuit court to grant Sorenson 
a new trial if it determined that the application of issue 
preclusion would be unfair.  Id. at ¶36.   
¶12 Judge Dykman concurred in part and dissented in part.  
He agreed that circuit courts are not barred from applying issue 
preclusion in ch. 980 cases.  Id. at ¶38 (Dykman, J., 
dissenting).  He disagreed, however, that the matter should have 
been remanded to the circuit court for a determination on 
whether it was unfair to apply the doctrine.  Id. at ¶39 
(Dykman, J., dissenting).  He concluded that, under the facts of 
this particular case, the court of appeals could find that issue 
preclusion did not apply as a matter of law and that Sorenson 
was entitled to a new trial.  Id. at ¶¶39-43 (Dykman, J., 
dissenting).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶13 Sorenson seeks a new ch. 980 trial.  He argues that 
the circuit court's exclusion of the recantation evidence 
constituted a denial of his constitutional right to present a 
defense and his constitutional right to have a jury determine 
every fact at issue.  He intended to introduce the recantation 
evidence to challenge the bases of the evaluations of the 
State's psychological experts.  These experts evaluated Sorenson 
before trial and testified at trial to his mental disorder and 
his future dangerousness——two elements necessary for a ch. 980 
commitment.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.02(b) & (c).  Sorenson argues 
that the experts based their evaluations primarily on his 
commission of the underlying crime and on his failure to 
No. 
98-3107   
 
7 
 
complete several sex offender treatment programs, which were not 
completed because he refused to admit to committing the assault.  
Thus, he argues that by excluding the recantation evidence the 
court effectively left him without any means to challenge the 
expert's evaluations.  He asserts that he was denied a fair 
trial.   
¶14 Sorenson 
also 
contests 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
conclusion that offensive issue preclusion2 is available for the 
state in a ch. 980 case.  He contends, as he did at the court of 
appeals, that some courts have held that offensive issue 
preclusion 
is 
unavailable 
in 
criminal 
cases 
due 
to 
the 
constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.  
See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 889-96 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (rejecting application of issue preclusion against a 
defendant in successive criminal proceedings).  Accordingly, he 
argues that the doctrine should not apply in this case because 
ch. 980 respondents are afforded the same constitutional 
protections as criminal defendants.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
("All constitutional rights available to a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding are available to the person [who is the 
subject of the petition under s. 980.02].").   
                                                 
2 The doctrine of issue preclusion is "designed to limit the 
relitigation of issues that have been contested in a previous 
action between the same or different parties."  Michelle T. v. 
Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 687, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993).  It may be 
used offensively, as in this case, or defensively.  Offensive 
issue preclusion "occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose a 
defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously 
litigated unsuccessfully in an action with [the plaintiff or] 
another party."  Id. at 684 n.1.   
No. 
98-3107   
 
8 
 
¶15 The court of appeals refused to recognize a bar on 
offensive issue preclusion by the state in ch. 980 cases.  
Sorenson, 2001 WI App 251, ¶28.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court interpreted Wis. Stat. ch. 980 and concluded that 
prohibiting issue preclusion in such cases, and allowing the 
relitigation of the underlying conviction, is contrary to 
language in the statutes and to legislative intent and that an 
alternative interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd 
results.  Id. at ¶¶24-26.  The court also noted that there was 
no decision from the United States Supreme Court or a Wisconsin 
court holding that offensive issue preclusion is prohibited in a 
criminal context and that the "dearth of case law on the topic 
in the criminal context shows that we are dealing with an 
unusual application of a constitutional right."  Id. at ¶27.  
Thus, the court held that issue preclusion could be used in ch. 
980 cases generally.  Id. at ¶28. 
¶16 In its brief, the State regarded ch. 980 cases as 
civil actions and argued that issue preclusion is therefore 
available in ch. 980 cases.  At oral argument, however, the 
State recognized, unlike the court of appeals, that ch. 980 
respondents are afforded the same constitutional rights as 
criminal 
defendants 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
and 
acknowledged a significant number of cases that hold that issue 
preclusion is unavailable in criminal cases because of the 
constitutional rights afforded to criminal defendants.  As a 
result, the State conceded that a threshold issue in this case 
is whether issue preclusion is even available in ch. 980 cases. 
No. 
98-3107   
 
9 
 
A 
¶17 As a preliminary matter, we first review whether ch. 
980 respondents are afforded the same constitutional protections 
as criminal defendants, resulting in a potential bar on 
offensive issue preclusion.  The court of appeals regarded a ch. 
980 
respondent's 
constitutional 
protections 
as 
limited, 
primarily because of language contained in the statutes.  We 
disagree. 
¶18 A determination on the constitutional rights afforded 
to 
ch. 
980 
respondents 
requires 
an 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 
980. 
 
We 
review 
statutory 
interpretation 
questions de novo.  State v. Thiel, 2000 WI 67, ¶10, 235 
Wis. 2d 823, 828, 612 N.W.2d 94.  "If the language of the 
statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 
intent, we need not look beyond the language to determine the 
meaning of the statute."  Id.   
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
unambiguously provides 
ch. 980 respondents with the same constitutional protections 
afforded to criminal defendants.  It states: 
 
At the trial to determine whether the person who 
is the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person, all rules of evidence in 
criminal actions apply.  All constitutional rights 
available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are 
available to the person. 
§ 980.05(1m).  The court of appeals, however, questioned the 
scope of these constitutional protections in light of an 
apparent conflict or ambiguity caused by a more specific 
No. 
98-3107   
 
10 
 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 980.05(4).  Sorenson, 2001 WI App 251, 
¶23.  This statutory section provides: 
Evidence that the person who is the subject of a 
petition 
under 
s. 
980.02 
was 
convicted 
for 
or 
committed sexually violent offenses before committing 
the offense or act on which the petition is based is 
not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the person has a mental disorder. 
§ 980.05(4).  The court noted that subsection (1m) conflicted 
with subsection (4) because this latter subsection suggested 
that the state could use a conviction as evidentiary support for 
a 
finding 
of 
mental 
disorder 
necessary 
for 
commitment.  
Sorenson, 2001 WI App 251, ¶23.  Therefore, the court apparently 
questioned 
whether 
a 
ch. 
980 
respondent 
would 
have 
a 
constitutional right to have a jury reexamine the facts of his 
or her underlying conviction at his or her ch. 980 trial.    
¶20 Our review of the statutes, however, does not result 
in 
any 
finding 
of 
conflict 
or 
ambiguity 
between 
these 
subsections.  A plain reading of subsection (4) reveals that 
this section simply dismisses the state's ability to prove 
mental disorder with a judgment of conviction or evidence of the 
respondent committing a sexual offense.  This statute instead 
contemplates that the state must put forth expert evidence 
showing the respondent's mental disorder.3  Thus, because we find 
                                                 
3 Indeed, in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 306, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995), we specifically contemplated that mental 
disorder must be proven through expert examination, stating: 
[P]ersons will not fall within chapter 980's reach 
unless they are diagnosed with a disorder that has the 
specific effect of predisposing them to engage in acts 
of sexual violence.  Not all persons who commit 
No. 
98-3107   
 
11 
 
that subsection (4) does not create any conflict or ambiguity 
with subsection (1m), we conclude that ch. 980 respondents are 
afforded 
the 
same 
constitutional 
protections 
as 
criminal 
defendants.   
B 
¶21 The 
next 
issue 
is 
whether 
issue 
preclusion 
is 
unavailable considering the constitutional protections afforded 
to ch. 980 respondents.   
¶22 We recognize the application of issue preclusion in 
this context is an important issue.  However, we conclude that 
we should not reach a determination on this question at this 
time because the issue has not been fully briefed by the State.  
Instead, we conclude that, even if the doctrine would generally 
apply, application of the doctrine may be fundamentally unfair 
for Sorenson under the factors for restricting the application 
of the doctrine under Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 
495 N.W.2d 327 (1993).   
¶23 We have adopted a modern approach to issue preclusion, 
that is, one that does not depend on formalistic requirements, 
but instead depends on a "looser, equities-based interpretation 
of the doctrine."  Id. at 688.  This approach looks primarily at 
whether application of the doctrine would be fair to the party 
against whom it is applied.  Id. at 693.  The decision on 
                                                                                                                                                             
sexually violent crimes can be diagnosed as suffering 
from mental disorders, nor are all persons with a 
mental disorder predisposed to commit sexually violent 
offenses.  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
98-3107   
 
12 
 
whether this doctrine should apply in any given case is decided 
on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 693, 698.  This approach seeks 
to balance competing goals, including "judicial efficiency and 
finality, 
protection 
against 
repetitious 
or 
harassing 
litigation, and the right to litigate one's claims before a 
jury . . . ."  Id. at 688.  To this end, the Michelle T. court 
provided a list of factors for courts to consider to ensure that 
the rights of all parties were protected in seeking a full and 
fair adjudication of all issues.    
Courts may consider some or all of the following 
factors to protect the rights of all parties to a full 
and fair adjudication of all issues involved in the 
action:  (1) could the party against whom preclusion 
is sought, as a matter of law, have obtained review of 
the judgment; (2) is the question one of law that 
involves two distinct claims or intervening contextual 
shifts in the law; (3) do significant differences in 
the quality or extensiveness of proceedings between 
the two courts warrant relitigation of the issue; (4) 
have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that the 
party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; or 
(5) are matters of public policy and individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application of collateral estoppel to be fundamentally 
unfair, including inadequate opportunity or incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action. 
Id. at 688-89 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 
Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion § 28 (1980)).  
We focus on the fifth factor listed above in reaching our 
conclusion.     
¶24 Here, we are presented with recantation evidence that 
was newly discovered after trial.  Sorenson sought a new 
No. 
98-3107   
 
13 
 
criminal trial based on this evidence in a post-conviction 
motion.  In Wisconsin, recantation evidence is reviewed on such 
motions under the test set forth in McCallum.  The circuit court 
never reached a final determination on the post-conviction 
motion.  Instead, after the court heard testimony from L.S., the 
parties reached a settlement, resulting in a reduction in 
Sorenson's 17-year sentence to a 10-year sentence and in his 
almost immediate release on parole.  The record contains almost 
no evidence identifying the content or the background of L.S.'s 
recantation testimony.   
¶25 We 
conclude 
that, 
if 
the 
recantation 
evidence 
satisfies the test in McCallum, any application of issue 
preclusion to exclude this evidence from Sorenson's ch. 980 
trial would be fundamentally unfair to Sorenson under the fifth 
standard set forth in Michelle T.  Fundamental unfairness 
results because Sorenson, assuming the recantation meets the 
McCallum test, has a due process interest in gaining admission 
at trial of this newly discovered evidence to ensure accurate 
expert opinions on his mental disorder and future dangerousness 
in his ch. 980 trial.  In this case, the experts' opinions 
reveal that they were based heavily on the fact that Sorenson 
committed the underlying crime.  As a result, due process and 
fundamental fairness require the introduction of this evidence.  
See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972) 
("[D]ue 
process 
is 
an 
exact 
synonym 
for 
fundamental 
fairness . . . ."); State v. Johnson, 118 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 348 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1984) (the defendant has a right to present 
No. 
98-3107   
 
14 
 
crucial evidence to the jury if it is not overcome by 
substantial competing state interests).  In addition, there was 
never a full and fair determination on the issue of recantation 
at the circuit court.  We determine the application of issue 
preclusion in this case as a matter of law because its 
application 
directly 
implicates 
constitutional 
due 
process 
protections 
afforded 
to 
a 
ch. 
980 
respondent. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m). 
 
Due 
process 
determinations 
are 
questions of law that we decide de novo.  See State v. Littrup, 
164 Wis. 2d 120, 126, 473 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1991).   
¶26 We conclude that remand is required for the circuit 
court to make a determination on the credibility of the 
recantation evidence pursuant to McCallum.  In that case, we 
recognized the inherent unreliability of recantation evidence.  
However, we held that newly discovered recantation evidence may 
be sufficient to warrant a withdrawal of a guilty plea if the 
following criteria are proven by clear and convincing evidence:  
(1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; (4) the evidence 
is not merely cumulative; and (5) the recantation evidence is 
corroborated by other newly discovered evidence.  McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d  at 473-74.  A defendant may show corroboration under 
this fifth factor if "(1) there is a feasible motive for the 
initial false statement; and, (2) there are circumstantial 
guarantees of the trustworthiness of the recantation."  Id. at 
478.  Credibility of the witness is crucial to the application 
No. 
98-3107   
 
15 
 
of the legal standard.  If these requirements are met, "the 
circuit court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the accusation and the 
recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt.  If so, the circuit court must grant a new trial."  Id. 
at 475 (citations omitted).  None of these determinations have 
been made. 
¶27 At a hearing before Sorenson's ch. 980 trial to 
determine the admissibility of the recantation testimony, the 
prosecutor questioned whether this evidence would meet the test 
under McCallum.  The prosecutor never argued that this evidence 
did not meet the first four requirements above.  Instead, he 
questioned whether other newly discovered evidence corroborated 
this testimony.  The record in this case, however, contains 
almost no evidence to show the content or the background of 
L.S's recantation testimony.  We cannot determine from this 
record whether there is a feasible motive for the initial false 
statements nor whether there are circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness of the recantation.   
¶28 If the recantation evidence meets the test set forth 
in McCallum, a new trial is required because exclusion of this 
evidence affects fundamental fairness at trial.  The State was 
required to prove the following four elements to show that 
Sorenson was a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980:   
1.  That [the person] has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense. 
No. 
98-3107   
 
16 
 
2.  That at the time the petition was filed, [the 
person] was within 90 days of [release] from a 
sentence that was imposed for a conviction for a 
sexually violent offense.   
3.  That [the person] currently has a mental disorder. 
4.  That [the person] is dangerous to others because 
[he] has a mental disorder which creates a substantial 
probability that [he] will engage in future acts of 
sexual violence. 
Wis 
JI-Criminal 
2502 
(footnotes 
omitted); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).  Sorenson argues that his recantation 
evidence would have been introduced to undercut the State's 
burden in proving the third and fourth elements.  The testimony 
of the State's experts at Sorenson's ch. 980 trial shows that 
the experts relied heavily on Sorenson having committed the 
sexual offense in reaching their evaluation of Sorenson.   
¶29 The State presented two experts.  First, Ingo Stange, 
a psychologist with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 
testified.  Based on an interview with Sorenson and a review of 
various 
clinical 
files, 
Stange 
diagnosed 
Sorenson 
with 
pedophilia.  He stated that, during his evaluation, he applied 
several risk factors that are used in determining whether there 
is a high risk of the person committing sexual assault again.  
Stange found several risk factors present in Sorenson's case, 
including multiple victims, repeated sexual intercourse, denials 
of the underlying crime, and failure to successfully participate 
in treatment.  Based on these risk factors, Stange concluded 
that Sorenson posed a significant danger.  
No. 
98-3107   
 
17 
 
¶30 Second, psychologist Craig Monroe testified for the 
State.  Like Stange, Monroe concluded that Sorenson suffered 
from pedophilia and that he posed a high risk for future sexual 
violence.  He based his conclusions on several factors, 
including multiple sexual assaults, sexual intercourse, sexual 
contact with L.S. showing deviant sexual arousal, and denial or 
minimization of his criminal activity.  Monroe noted that 
Sorenson's disorder was particularly chronic in light of 
multiple sexual assaults against L.S. and his contact with 
children while on parole.  Monroe similarly found Sorenson to 
pose a significant danger. 
¶31 Thus, both experts relied heavily on Sorenson having 
committed the underlying sexual assault in their evaluation.  
Sorenson's ability to counter this evidence was substantially, 
if not totally, hindered by the exclusion of L.S.'s recantation 
testimony.  Indeed, before trial, Sorenson revealed that L.S.'s 
recantation had factored into his own expert's testimony.  The 
court's exclusion of this evidence, if it met the McCallum test, 
affected a fair trial.   
¶32 The State's interests in this instance are not 
sufficiently substantial to permit the exclusion of such 
evidence.  The two primary interests identified by the State are 
that such evidence will cause jury confusion and delay.  The 
court can assist to lessen any potential jury confusion by 
ensuring, 
through 
instruction 
and 
other 
means, 
that 
any 
recantation evidence introduced is appropriately applied toward 
the issues of mental disorder and future dangerousness.  Delay 
No. 
98-3107   
 
18 
 
in the proceedings may result, but this factor is insufficient 
to justify the exclusion of such compelling evidence.  Neither 
factor, 
however, 
outweighs 
the 
interest 
of 
Sorenson 
in 
introducing such compelling evidence.  This evidence constitutes 
a significant, if not the only, means for Sorenson to undercut 
the expert's evaluation of his mental disorder and future 
dangerousness. 
¶33 Based on the above, we conclude that remand to the 
circuit court is required for it to conduct a hearing on L.S.'s 
recantation testimony and determine whether it meets the test 
under McCallum.  If so, the exclusion of this evidence from 
Sorenson's ch. 980 trial was fundamentally unfair, and Sorenson 
is entitled to a new trial.  Further, if McCallum is met, issue 
preclusion cannot apply as a matter of law based on fundamental 
fairness.  This case involves matters of public policy and 
individual circumstances "that would render the application of 
collateral 
estoppel 
to 
be 
fundamentally unfair, 
including 
inadequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair 
adjudication 
in 
the 
initial 
action." 
 
Michelle 
T., 
173 
Wis. 2d at 689 (footnote omitted).  A full determination on the 
effect of the recantation issue on the underlying criminal 
conviction was never rendered.  Fundamental fairness dictates 
that Sorenson is now provided with an opportunity to present 
this evidence at his ch. 980 trial.   
C 
¶34 We specifically reject the State's characterization of 
Sorenson's argument as a collateral attack on his prior 
No. 
98-3107   
 
19 
 
conviction.  The State relies primarily on State v. Hahn, 2000 
WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, for this contention.  
In Hahn, the defendant was charged with two counts of sexual 
assault, and because he had two prior felony convictions, he was 
subject to a life sentence without parole under Wisconsin's 
persistent repeater ("three strikes") law.  Id. at ¶6.  The 
defendant sought to reopen a prior conviction, arguing that his 
plea for that conviction was not knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary and that the court failed to inform him that the 
conviction could serve as a "strike."  Id.  Following Custis v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), we concluded that, with 
limited exception, the defendant could not use the sentencing 
proceeding as the forum in which to challenge the prior 
conviction.  Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶¶4, 17-18, 29.   
¶35 The State contends that Hahn shows that criminal 
defendants 
cannot, 
with 
limited 
exception, 
challenge 
the 
validity of their prior criminal convictions in an enhanced 
sentencing 
proceeding 
that 
is 
predicated 
on 
the 
prior 
conviction.  In turn, the State asserts that Sorenson cannot 
challenge the validity of his prior criminal conviction in a ch. 
980 proceeding that is predicated on this prior conviction.  The 
State argues that Sorenson's challenge amounts to a collateral 
attack on his prior criminal conviction.  See Zrimsek v. Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959) (a 
collateral attack is "an attempt to avoid, evade, or deny the 
force and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in 
No. 
98-3107   
 
20 
 
a direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the 
purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it.").   
¶36 As the State points out, our Hahn decision was also 
grounded 
in 
policy 
considerations 
surrounding 
judicial 
administration 
and 
finality. 
 
We 
cited 
administrative 
difficulties in courts not having records of prior convictions 
or post-conviction proceedings in order to review these prior 
convictions.  Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶25.  We also cited an interest 
in requiring offenders to follow certain established procedures 
in reviewing convictions.  Id. at ¶¶25, 28.  Finally, we noted 
that concerns of delay and an interest in promoting finality of 
judgments weighed against reviewing the validity of convictions 
at an enhanced sentencing proceeding.  Id. at ¶26.  The State 
contends that these policy considerations also weigh in favor of 
prohibiting Sorenson from challenging the validity of his 
conviction at his ch. 980 trial. 
¶37 In this case, however, unlike the defendant in Hahn, 
Sorenson is not seeking to overturn, void, or otherwise 
challenge the validity of his prior conviction.  He admits that 
he was convicted and that the State can use this conviction to 
satisfy the first element for ch. 980 commitment.  Sorenson is 
seeking to introduce evidence to undercut the bases of the 
State's experts' evaluation of his mental condition.  The 
evidence is introduced to ensure that the trier of fact is 
making a fair determination as to the defendant's mental 
disorder and future dangerousness.  Sorenson's underlying sexual 
offense was an essential component of the expert's evaluations 
No. 
98-3107   
 
21 
 
and must be based on correct factual information, including 
compelling newly discovered recantation evidence.   
¶38 We agree with the State that Sorenson was required to 
follow appropriate statutory procedures if he seeks to challenge 
his conviction.  He did so in this case, but a full 
determination was never attained.  We also agree that there must 
be finality in judgments.  However, we do not regard his 
introduction of recantation evidence in this case as an effort 
to challenge his conviction.  Instead, it is introduced to 
challenge an evaluation of his mental disorder.  We do not 
regard administrative difficulties for the court in reviewing 
prior proceedings as a compelling policy reason against allowing 
review of such recantation evidence.  Thus, we conclude that 
neither Hahn nor its underlying policy considerations affects 
our holding in this case.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 In sum, we remand to the circuit court for additional 
hearings on the recantation evidence in light of McCallum.  If 
the recantation evidence meets the test in McCallum, Sorenson is 
entitled to a new trial at which this evidence must be admitted.  
Further, issue preclusion cannot apply under such circumstances.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed 
with modifications.  The cause is therefore remanded for 
additional hearings consistent with this opinion.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
98-3107   
 
 
 
1