Title: Special Release--Order in Recinos v. Escobar

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11986 
 
LILIANA MARIBEL RIVERA RECINOS  vs.  MARIA ISABEL RECINOS 
ESCOBAR. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 5, 2015. - March 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Probate Court, Jurisdiction, General equity power.  
Jurisdiction, Probate Court. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint in equity filed in the Middlesex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on April 14, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Patricia A. Gorman, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Badger for the plaintiff. 
 
Mary K. Ryan, Cynthia M. Guizzetti, & Mara O'Malley, for 
American Immigration Lawyers Association & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, we are asked to determine whether 
the Probate and Family Court Department has jurisdiction over 
youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to make 
2 
 
special findings that are necessary to apply for special 
immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
(2012).  Congress created the SIJ classification to permit 
immigrant children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned 
by one or both of their parents to apply for lawful permanent 
residence while remaining in the United States.  See id.; 8 
C.F.R. § 204.11 (2009).  "[C]hild" under the Federal statute is 
defined as an unmarried person under the age of twenty-one.  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).  Before an immigrant child can apply for 
SIJ status, she must receive the following predicate findings 
from a "juvenile court":1  (1) she is dependent on the juvenile 
court; (2) her reunification with one or both parents is not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3) it is not 
in her best interests to return to her country of origin.  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).  Once these special findings are 
made, an application and supporting documents may be submitted 
to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) agency.2  An application for SIJ status must be submitted 
before the immigrant's twenty-first birthday.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11. 
                     
 
1 As explained later in this opinion, a "juvenile court" 
includes the Probate and Family Court for purposes of the 
Federal statute. 
 
 
2 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services is the 
Federal agency responsible for lawful immigration to the United 
States. 
3 
 
 
Liliana Recinos, the plaintiff, was a twenty year old,3 
unmarried immigrant attempting to apply for SIJ status.  She 
filed a complaint in equity in April, 2014, in the Middlesex 
County Division of the Probate and Family Court Department.  The 
plaintiff requested equitable and declaratory relief in the form 
of a decree of special findings and rulings of law concerning 
the findings necessary to apply for SIJ status.  She also filed 
various motions, including a motion for special findings.  A 
pretrial conference was held in January, 2015, at which the 
plaintiff submitted a stipulation signed by both herself and her 
mother, the defendant.4  In March, 2015, a judge in the Probate 
and Family Court dismissed the complaint, explaining that the 
plaintiff was over the age of eighteen and that, therefore, the 
court did not have jurisdiction over her.  The plaintiff filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  At the plaintiff's request, the 
Appeals Court stayed the proceedings so that she could pursue an 
asylum application; however, in late September, 2015, her asylum 
application remained unadjudicated.  The plaintiff informed the 
Appeals Court that she would like to pursue her appeal as 
expeditiously as possible because her twenty-first birthday 
                     
 
3 The plaintiff was twenty years old at the time of oral 
argument.  She turned twenty-one on December 5, 2015. 
 
 
4 The parties stipulated that the defendant did not oppose 
an entry of the proposed decree and to facts included in the 
plaintiff's affidavit. 
4 
 
would occur on December 5, 2015.  We took this appeal on our own 
motion and expedited the proceedings to preserve the plaintiff's 
opportunity to apply for SIJ status.  This court heard oral 
arguments on November 5, 2015. 
 
The primary issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal is 
whether the Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to its broad equity powers under G. L. c. 215, § 6, over 
immigrant youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to 
entertain a request to make the necessary predicate special 
findings under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).  On November 9, 2015, 
we issued the following order to the Middlesex County Division 
of the Probate and Family Court Department: 
 
"The judgment of the Probate and Family Court dated 
March 13, 2015, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is 
reversed.  The Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction to 
entertain the plaintiff's case, and the plaintiff is 
dependent on the court for these purposes.  The court shall 
conduct proceedings forthwith on the plaintiff's complaint 
and shall act on her requests for relief expeditiously, 
such that, if the requested findings are made, she will 
have time to apply to the Federal authorities for special 
immigrant juvenile status before her twenty-first birthday 
on December 5, 2015.  This order will serve as the rescript 
of this court for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 1 (c), and 
shall issue to the trial court immediately.  Opinion or 
opinions to follow.  By the Court." 
 
This opinion states the reasons for that order.5 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New 
England Chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
and twenty-four others who are legal services providers, 
professional associations, and attorneys who advocate and 
5 
 
 
1.  Facts.  The plaintiff was born on December 5, 1994, in 
El Salvador.  In her complaint and affidavit, the plaintiff 
chronicles a childhood riddled with instances of physical and 
emotional abuse by her father.  She also described her mother's 
failure to protect her and her siblings from their father's 
abuse and the chronic gang violence in their neighborhood.  She 
came to the United States in 2012, at the age of seventeen, to 
escape the threats from her father and the gang violence that 
overwhelmed her neighborhood.6  At first, she settled in the area 
of Baltimore, Maryland, with her brother.  While residing in 
Maryland, she was assigned a volunteer attorney.  For 
unexplained reasons, the attorney did not take any action in 
helping the plaintiff obtain the findings she now seeks from the 
Probate and Family Court.  At the end of 2012, the plaintiff 
relocated to Massachusetts and moved in with a family friend 
with whom she still currently lives.  While living in the United 
States, the plaintiff has had two children.  Preliminarily, the 
plaintiff and her experiences seem to be of the type 
contemplated by the Federal statute. 
 
2. Special immigrant juvenile status.  In 1990, Congress 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include the 
                                                                  
represent immigrant youth in removal proceedings in various 
courts. 
 
 
6 The plaintiff's father died on June 25, 2013. 
6 
 
SIJ classification to create a pathway to citizenship for 
immigrant children.  Pub. L. 101-649, § 153, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1990).  When the SIJ classification was first included, 
the statute required a State court to issue an order finding 
that (1) the child was dependent on a juvenile court and was 
eligible for long-term foster care, and (2) it was not in the 
child's best interests to return to his or her country of 
origin.  Id.  Since then, the provision of the INA concerning 
SIJs has been amended several times.  Matter of Marcelina M.-G. 
v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 107-108 (N.Y. 2013) (Marcelina M.-
G.) (explaining various amendments to INA concerning SIJ 
status).  In 1997, Congress modified the definition of SIJ to 
include a child who was "legally committed to, or placed under 
the custody of, an agency or department of a State" and added 
the requirement that eligibility for long-term foster care be 
"due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment."  Pub. L. 105-119, 
§ 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).  In 2008, the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) 
further amended the INA to expand eligibility for SIJ status to 
include immigrant children who were placed in the custody of an 
"individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court" 
and eliminated the requirement of long-term foster care 
eligibility.  Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044 
(2008).  The amendment added the requirement that the 
7 
 
reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to 
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 
State law.  Id.  In its present form, the Federal statute 
requires a juvenile court to issue an order finding that (1) the 
immigrant child is dependent on a juvenile court, or placed in 
the custody of a department or agency of the State, or placed in 
the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the State or 
court; (2) the immigrant child cannot be reunified with one or 
both of his or her parents due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment, or other similar basis under State law; and (3) it 
would not be in the child's best interests to return to his or 
her parents' previous country of nationality or country of last 
habitual residence.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii). 
 
The Federal statute requires a juvenile court to make 
special findings before an immigrant youth can apply for SIJ 
status and lawful permanent residence.  Id.  The State and 
Federal proceedings are distinct from each other.  "The process 
for obtaining SIJ status is 'a unique hybrid procedure that 
directs the collaboration of state and federal systems.'"  
H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 209 (2015), quoting Matter of 
Marisol N.H., 115 A.D.3d 185, 188 (N.Y. 2013).  Pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 204.11, "[j]uvenile court" is defined as "a court 
located in the United States having jurisdiction under State law 
to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of 
8 
 
juveniles."7  When determining which court qualifies as a 
juvenile court under the Federal statute, it is the function of 
the State court and not the designation that is determinative.  
R.G. Settlage, E.A. Campbell, V.T. Thronson, Immigration Relief:  
Legal Assistance for Noncitizen Crime Victims 70 (2014) 
(Settlage).  In Massachusetts, the Juvenile Court and the 
Probate and Family Court both have jurisdiction to make judicial 
determinations about the care and custody of juveniles despite 
only one court being designated as a juvenile court.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 1; G. L. c. 208, §§ 19, 28, 28A, 31, 31A.  Therefore, 
in Massachusetts, an immigrant child may petition for special 
findings in either the Juvenile Court or the Probate and Family 
Court.  Because of the distinct expertise State courts possess 
in the area of child welfare and abuse, Congress has entrusted 
them with the responsibility to perform a best interest analysis 
and to make factual determinations about child welfare for 
purposes of SIJ eligibility.  See H.S.P., supra at 211; Matter 
of Hei Ting C., 109 A.D.3d 100, 104 (N.Y. 2013).  Therefore, the 
special findings a juvenile court makes should be limited to 
                     
 
7 The Federal regulations have not been updated to reflect 
the amendments to the special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) statute 
by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 
Stat. 5044 (TVPRA).  See 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978 (2011), to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. parts 204, 205, and 245.  See also Matter 
of Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 109 n.3 (N.Y. 
2013). 
9 
 
child welfare determinations.  Immigration is exclusively a 
Federal power.  See In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 
(2012).  It is not the juvenile court's role to engage in an 
immigration analysis or decision.  Settlage, supra at 72.  
Special findings by a State court that determine that the child 
meets the eligibility requirements for SIJ status are not a 
final determination.  See Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 109.  
It is only the first step in the process to achieve SIJ status.  
Id.  Once the child obtains the required special findings from a 
qualifying State court, the child may file an application with 
USCIS.  This application must be submitted before the child's 
twenty-first birthday.  8 C.F.R. § 204.11.  The child will not 
"age-out" of SIJ status on account of turning twenty-one while 
his or her application is under consideration with USCIS.  See 
TVPRA, Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(6), 122 Stat. 5044.  An 
application for SIJ status consists of a variety of forms, and a 
certified copy of the juvenile court order must be included.  
See SIJ:  Forms You May Need, http://www.uscis.gov/green-
card/special-immigrant-juveniles/sij-forms-you-may-need 
[http://perma.cc/H8TV-UTWH].  In order to provide USCIS with 
sufficient information concerning the applicant's eligibility 
for SIJ status, State courts should provide sufficient detail 
about how they came to their conclusions in their order of 
special findings.  H.S.P., 223 N.J. at 213-214.  An applicant 
10 
 
should include the supporting evidence used in the State court 
proceeding to aid USCIS in its decision-making process.  See 
SIJ: Forms You May Need, supra.  Doing so may result in a 
quicker decision.  See id.  Once a child has filed the necessary 
paperwork, an interview between the applicant and a USCIS 
official will be conducted.  See SIJ:  After You File, 
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/sij-
after-you-file [http://perma.cc/4H77-YF3K].  A decision will be 
issued within 180 days from the official filing date.  See id.  
See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
 
3.  Jurisdiction.   The Probate and Family Court judge 
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the 
plaintiff was over the age of eighteen.  We conclude that the 
Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction, under its broad 
equity power, over youth between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-one for the specific purpose of making the special 
findings necessary to apply for SIJ status pursuant to the INA. 
 
In most circumstances, the Probate and Family Court has 
jurisdiction over children who are under the age of eighteen.  
See generally G. L. cc. 119, 190B, 210.  The portion of the INA 
concerning SIJ status provides relief for immigrant children 
until age twenty-one, consequently creating a gap between access 
to our State court and the Federal statutory relief.  There are 
some instances where the Probate and Family Court has 
11 
 
jurisdiction over "adult children," namely, individuals between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-three.  See G. L. c. 208, § 28.  
However, these instances involve the maintenance and support of 
children and are not applicable to the present case.  See id.  
See also Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428, 434-435 (2003) 
(explaining expansion of jurisdiction over "adult children" in 
matters of maintenance and support).  This gap is not unique to 
the Commonwealth.  Many States have a jurisdictional age limit 
of eighteen for access to their juvenile courts.  In response to 
this gap, some States have enacted legislation to extend the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction to children up to the age of 
twenty-one for certain proceedings.8  Massachusetts has not yet 
passed legislation to extend the Probate and Family Court's 
                     
 
8 For example, the Maryland Legislature amended a statute 
concerning the jurisdiction of that State's equity courts to 
include "custody or guardianship of an immigrant child pursuant 
to a motion for Special Immigrant Juvenile factual findings" 
within the equity court's jurisdiction.  Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law 
§ 1-201 (LexisNexis 2012).  Under the subsection, "child" is 
defined as an unmarried individual under the age of twenty-one.  
Id.  The New York Legislature passed a similar amendment to 
address this gap.  The statute governing guardianship 
proceedings was amended to extend jurisdiction over an 
individual "who is less than twenty-one years old who consents 
to the appointment or continuation of a guardian after the age 
of eighteen."  N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 661(a) (McKinney 2008).  
Previously, that statute was only applicable to children under 
the age of eighteen.  Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 73 
A.D.3d 793, 794 (N.Y. 2010). 
 
12 
 
jurisdiction over these individuals.9  The Probate and Family 
Court does, however, have broad equity powers pursuant to G. L. 
c. 215, § 6, and the court may invoke its equity power to fill 
in this gap. 
 
General Laws c. 215, § 6, grants the Probate and Family 
Court equitable jurisdiction, stating in relevant part: 
 
"The probate and family court department shall have 
original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme 
judicial court and the superior court department of all 
cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general 
principles of equity jurisprudence and, with reference 
thereto, shall be courts of general equity 
jurisdiction . . . ." 
 
"A court with equity jurisdiction has broad and flexible powers 
to fashion remedies."  Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 424 
Mass. 430, 463 (1997).  "These powers are broad and flexible, 
and extend to actions necessary to afford any relief in the best 
interests of a person under their jurisdiction."  Matter of Moe, 
385 Mass. 555, 561 (1982).  We turn our attention to general 
principles of equity. 
                     
 
9 Although legislation has not been enacted in 
Massachusetts, there has been pending legislation attempting to 
bridge the gap between our State courts and the Federal statute.  
A House bill would confer jurisdiction over persons between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-one seeking findings in order to 
apply for SIJ status.  2015 House Doc. No. 1418.  The bill also 
defines the term "dependent on the court" to mean "subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court for the findings, orders, and 
referrals enumerated in this section but shall not constitute a 
finding of legal incompetence."  Id. 
13 
 
 
A fundamental maxim of general equity jurisprudence is that 
equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.  2 J.N. 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 363 (5th ed. 1941).  In this 
case, the wrong is the abuse, neglect, or abandonment immigrant 
children under the age of twenty-one suffer as a result of one 
or both of their parents' actions.  As a policy, the 
Commonwealth seeks to protect children from wrongs that result 
"from the absence, inability, inadequacy or destructive behavior 
of parents."  G. L. c. 119, § 1.  The wrongs from which this 
policy seeks to protect the Commonwealth's children are the same 
as the wrongs that SIJ status attempts to remedy.  Congress 
created this remedy by amending the INA to create a pathway to 
citizenship for immigrant children under the age of twenty-one 
who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment by one or both 
of their parents.  In order to obtain this remedy, a State court 
must make the necessary findings before the immigrant youth can 
apply for SIJ status.  According to general principles of 
equity, if the Probate and Family Court does not exercise 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff, she, as well as any other 
immigrant child between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one in 
the Commonwealth, will have suffered a wrong with no available 
remedy.  Such claims fall within the general principles of 
equity, and therefore, the Probate and Family Court may, for 
purposes of the Federal statute, exercise jurisdiction over 
14 
 
immigrant children up to the age of twenty-one who claim to have 
been abused, abandoned, or neglected. 
 
This is not the first time this court has said that the 
general equity powers of the Probate and Family Court reach 
children who are over the age of eighteen.  In Eccleston, 438 
Mass. at 438, we concluded that the Probate and Family Court's 
equity jurisdiction extended to adult children until the age of 
twenty-three, even in the absence of statutory authority.  
Similar to the plaintiff in this case, the postminority child in 
Eccleston, due to her unfit parents, was financially dependent 
on an adult and needed a remedy from the Probate and Family 
Court to aid her in her path to self-sufficiency.  Id. at 437.  
Despite the absence of specific relief under any statute, we 
recognized that the Probate and Family Court had equitable 
powers to provide a remedy for the postminority child.  Id. at 
437-438.  As there is also no specific relief afforded by 
statute in this case, the Probate and Family Court may invoke 
its broad equity power under G. L. c. 215, § 6, to provide 
relief to the plaintiff in the form of special findings 
necessary for her to make application for SIJ status. 
 
The plaintiff also argues that the Probate and Family Court 
has jurisdiction to enter declaratory relief under G. L. 
c. 231A, § 9, and that it is an appropriate method to enter the 
special findings for SIJ status.  We need not decide this 
15 
 
question in light of our conclusion that relief is available 
under the general equity jurisdiction of the Probate and Family 
Court. 
 
4.  Dependency.  The plaintiff argues that she is dependent 
on the Probate and Family Court by virtue of the Federal 
statute.  During the pretrial conference, a Probate and Family 
Court judge equated exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff 
with a custody determination.  The plaintiff contends that the 
Federal statute does not limit the dependency requirement to a 
custody determination.  We agree. 
 
One of the three findings that a judge in the juvenile 
court must make includes either a custody determination or a 
declaration that the child is dependent on a juvenile court.  
Specifically, the child must be 
"an immigrant who is present in the United States . . . who 
has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in 
the United States or whom such a court has legally 
committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or 
department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed 
by a State or juvenile court located in the United States" 
(emphasis added). 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).  The presence of the word "or" 
within the subsection indicates that there are three separate 
and distinct alternatives by which a child may satisfy this 
particular eligibility requirement.  It follows, then, that the 
subsection must extend beyond a sole custody determination to 
satisfy the language of the Federal statute.  If the word 
16 
 
"dependent" was to be equated with custody, the first part of 
the subsection would be mere surplusage.  "It is an elementary 
rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to 
every word, clause and sentence of a statute."  2A N.J. Singer & 
J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.6 
(7th ed. rev. 2014).  "A statute should be construed so as to 
give effect to each word, and no word shall be regarded as 
surplusage."  Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412 
(2009).  The word "dependent" must mean something other than 
custody and should be broadly construed because of the 
beneficent and remedial purpose behind the Federal statute. 
 
The question now is whether the plaintiff can be considered 
"dependent" on the Probate and Family Court.  The Commonwealth's 
policy is to ensure "that the children of the commonwealth are 
protected against the harmful effects resulting from the 
absence, inability, inadequacy or destructive behavior of 
parents or parent substitutes."10  G. L. c. 119, § 1.  We have 
often recognized that attaining the age of majority does not 
necessarily mean that one is self-sufficient.  See, e.g., 
Eccleston, 438 Mass. at 436.  The plaintiff here, who was age 
twenty at the time of oral argument in this appeal, was not 
                     
 
10 In States that define the word "dependent" by statute, 
the term is commonly defined as a child who has been abused, 
abandoned, or neglected.  See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 
(West 2015); Fla. Stat. § 39.01 (2015). 
17 
 
necessarily self-sufficient.  In order to attain self-
sufficiency, the plaintiff and other youth in her situation need 
the assistance of the Probate and Family Court in the form of 
special findings applicable to SIJ status.  If an immigrant 
child is able to show, for purposes of SIJ status eligibility, 
that he or she experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment by one 
or both parents, it follows that the child is dependent on the 
Probate and Family Court for the opportunity to obtain relief.  
The child would be "dependent" on the Probate and Family Court 
for the assistance that is available in applying successfully 
for the Federal relief, i.e., SIJ status. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, on November 9, 
2015, we issued an order reversing the dismissal of the 
plaintiff's complaint and remanding the matter to the Probate 
and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with that 
order.  The Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff is deemed dependent on the Probate 
and Family Court for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).  We 
express no view as to what the other predicate findings should 
be. 
 
 
CORDY, J. (concurring, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  I 
concur in the court's conclusion that in this case the Probate 
and Family Court may undertake to make findings necessary to 
enable the plaintiff to apply for special immigrant status under 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).  I do so because of our strong 
State policies aimed at protecting children from the effects of 
abuse and neglect, and the apparent gap between the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court and the benefits 
available under Federal law for immigrant children (between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-one) who can establish that they 
have been abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both of 
their parents in their native countries.  I do so reluctantly, 
however, because this opinion stretches our equity jurisprudence 
to its outer edge, beyond what the court majority concluded was 
appropriate in Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428 (2003), a 
markedly different case.1 
                     
 
1 In Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428, 431-433 (2003), 
the Probate and Family Court had placed the child in the custody 
of the Department of Social Services at the age of eleven 
because of the unfitness of her parents, subsequently appointed 
a guardian with whom the child lived, and ordered her father to 
pay support.  Id. at 431-433.  The question was whether the 
father could be ordered to continue to provide support for the 
child after she attained the age of eighteen and continued to 
live with her guardian, where she could not live with either 
parent because of abuse, yet had no means of support and was 
plainly "unemancipated."  Id. at 428-429, 432.  This court 
concluded that where a comprehensive State legislative scheme 
provided for postminority support of a child who was 
unemancipated and who lived with one of her parents, the Probate 
2 
 
 
In my view, it would have been far preferable if the 
Legislature had, as other State Legislatures have, acted on 
legislation that would have explicitly provided for expanded 
State court jurisdiction to address claims like that of the 
plaintiff.  Without such legislation, the court is left to 
engage in gymnastics of logic and circular reasoning to conclude 
that the plaintiff is "dependent" on the court solely because 
she needs the court to declare that she is "dependent" on the 
court in order to meet one of the requirements of the Federal 
statute, and in no other respect. 
                                                                  
and Family Court could use its equitable powers in order to 
"close an unintended gap" in the scheme and provide for similar 
support for unemancipated children of families disrupted by 
abuse such as the one in that case.  Id. at 437.  Here, the 
plaintiff was not the subject of court proceedings while she was 
properly within its jurisdiction and is not seeking a guardian 
or order of support, and the gap is between the State courts' 
jurisdictional limits and Federal immigration law.