Title: EDWARD OLYNN TAYLOR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDWARD OLYNN TAYLOR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 31203 P.3d 408Case Number: S-08-0158Decided: 03/06/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
EDWARD 
OLYNN TAYLOR,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, 
and Charles F. Pelkey, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance 
Program.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals his conviction on numerous criminal charges, including first-degree 
premeditated murder, on the ground that the district court abused its discretion 
by admitting certain uncharged misconduct evidence.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior 
instances in which the appellant threatened someone?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      We will recite 
the facts underlying the crimes charged in this case in some detail because they 
provide the context for the issue presented.  To avoid unwarranted publicity, we will 
refer to the participants by their first name only, or by an identifier such as 
"the appellant" or "the victim."

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant met 
Beth in 1992, at a time that she was in the process of obtaining a divorce from 
her first husband, Troy.  Beth and 
the appellant were married in 1994.  That marriage ended in divorce in 2004. 
 Prior to the divorce, Beth had 
entered into a relationship with John.  Beth's relationship with John did not 
endure, however, and she reconciled with the appellant in 2005.  They remarried in 2006.  That road became equally rocky, and the 
appellant filed for divorce on March 20, 2007, after learning that Beth was 
involved in a sexual relationship with the eventual murder 
victim.

 
 
[¶5]      During the 
weekend of March 29-April 1, 2007, Beth went from her home in Casper to Cheyenne 
to visit her daughter.  The 
appellant telephoned Beth repeatedly.  Early in the afternoon of Sunday, April 
1, Beth's daughter told the appellant when he called again that Beth had 
returned to Casper.  At about the 
same time, the appellant's neighbor saw him loading "long guns" into his 
pickup.

 
 
[¶6]      At about 2:30 or 
3:00 p.m., the appellant drove over to the victim's house looking for Beth.  She was not there, but the appellant saw 
the victim standing outside his residence.  According to the appellant's trial 
testimony, the victim looked at him "with disdain" as he passed.  This angered the appellant, who returned 
home, where he consumed beer and tequila.

 
 
[¶7]      Upon returning to 
Casper, Beth went to the victim's house, where the two of them and a friend 
watched television.  She left the 
house before 6:30 p.m., at which time she was accosted by the appellant, who had 
been parked out of sight in a nearby alley.  During the ensuing argument, the 
appellant reached into Beth's vehicle, grabbed her by the hair, and slammed her 
head against the window.  He then 
declared that, though he had not carried through with his earlier threat to kill 
John, he would "kill somebody this time."

 
 
[¶8]      Taking this 
threat seriously, Beth drove to the police station, with the appellant following 
her. When they arrived at the police station, the appellant again approached 
Beth, this time pointing a .45 caliber pistol at her.  He told her he would not kill her if she 
returned home with him.  Fearing she 
would be killed, Beth slumped against the side of her vehicle.  The appellant shoved the gun back into 
his pants while stating that he would "kill somebody."  Beth went into the police station as the 
appellant drove away.

 
 
[¶9]      Immediately upon 
entering the police station, Beth telephoned the victim to warn him.  The victim told her to hang up and call 
911, and that he would watch for the appellant.  Beth did as she was told, her call to 911 
being logged in at 6:25 p.m.  Beth 
described the encounter and told the dispatcher that she had seen a shotgun in 
the appellant's truck.  Three 
minutes later, the dispatcher received a "hang up" 911 call from the victim's 
residence.  Officers responding to 
the call found the victim dead on his kitchen floor.  He was lying on his back, with a shotgun 
across his knee and a cordless telephone on the floor next to his hand.  Pellets from a shotgun blast had made 
divots in the floor under his head.

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant's own trial testimony 
and the testimony of a friend established what had happened:  The victim had closed and locked his 
front door when he saw the appellant arrive.  The appellant blasted his way through 
the front door with his 12-gauge shotgun.  
The victim then fired his own shotgun at the appellant, inflicting only 
minor injuries.  The appellant 
returned fire, hitting the victim in the chest with a disabling blow.  He then walked up to the wounded victim 
and fired a second shot directly at his head.  The appellant fled the scene, driving to 
a friend's house north of Casper.  
When the appellant confessed the murder to his friend, the latter 
contacted the police and arranged for the appellant's 
surrender.

 
 
[¶11]   After the appellant's arrest, a 
preliminary hearing, and a district court arraignment, the charges against him 
were finalized in an Amended Information filed on October 8, 2007:  one count of first-degree premeditated 
murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 2007); one 
count of felony murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 
2007); one count of aggravated burglary, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-301(a) and (c)(i)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); one count of threatening to use a 
drawn deadly weapon on another, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007); one count of possessing or transporting a 
deadly weapon with the unlawful intent to threaten the life or physical 
well-being of another, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 
2007); and one count of battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) 
and (d) (LexisNexis 2007).  He was 
convicted by a jury on all six counts.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   We recently reiterated both the 
accepted trial court process for determining whether to admit uncharged 
misconduct evidence and this Court's standard for reviewing such 
determinations:

 
 
            
We review a district court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
including uncharged misconduct evidence, for an abuse of discretion, and we will 
not reverse absent a clear abuse of such discretion.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206 (Wyo. 2007).  "A 
trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably 
concluded as it did."  Id. at ¶ 8, at 1206-1207.  The admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence is governed by W.R.E. 404(b):

 
 
            
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
            
The district court is to determine the admission of proffered evidence 
under this rule by applying the following test:

 
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility:  (1) the evidence must be offered for a 
proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of 
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the 
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which 
it was admitted.

 
 

Gleason 
v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002).  "Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is 
not limited to the purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal 
approach toward admitting uncharged misconduct evidence."  Id.

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 
2008 WY 23, ¶¶ 5-6, 177 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant filed a pre-trial 
demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b).  In its response, the State 
noted that the appellant's defense "most likely" would be "self-defense or lack 
of the requisite mental state for first or second-degree murder."  The State then proffered testimony in 
regard to three previous instances to show that the appellant "has a long 
history of threats with and without guns and it is unlikely he was motivated by 
self-defense in this case."  In 
addition, the State contended that the evidence of the earlier threats 
"illustrate[s] the [appellant's] motive and intent . . . 
."

 
 
[¶14]   The first instance of which 
evidence was proffered occurred in 1989 or 1990.  The appellant had allegedly approached a 
vehicle containing two men, Rick and Dean.  
The appellant suspected Dean of "pursuing" his girlfriend.  The appellant was angry, and he 
approached the vehicle with a pistol in his hand.  When the appellant shoved the pistol 
under Dean's chin, Rick disarmed him and took the pistol.  The incident was not reported to the 
police.

 
 
[¶15]   The second incident of alleged 
uncharged misconduct occurred in 1997 at the home of Beth's first husband, 
Troy.  Beth and the appellant, who 
were married at the time, had gone to Troy's house for some purpose involving 
Beth's and Troy's daughter.  A 
disagreement arose between Troy and the appellant as to whether the girl could 
go inside Troy's house.  The 
appellant pulled a .45 caliber pistol, pointed it at Troy, and then drove 
off.  The appellant was later 
charged with reckless endangerment, to which he entered a plea of nolo contendere, with the case 
eventually being dismissed via deferred prosecution under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-301 (Michie 1997).

 
 
[¶16]   The third incident occurred in 
2005.  Beth and the appellant had 
separated, and Beth had been living with John.  The latter two had then separated.  John called Beth's house to discuss a 
television set.  The appellant 
answered the telephone and, during the ensuing conversation, threatened to go to 
John's house and kill him.  John 
reported the threat to the police, but no action was 
taken.

 
 
[¶17]   In its memorandum submitted in 
support of admission of the proffered testimony, the State indicated that the 
evidence was probative of such concepts as intent, motive, knowledge, malice, 
premeditation, identity, continuing course of conduct, and corroboration.  Specifically, the State contended that 
the evidence was relevant to prove intent and motive, and to rebut any claim of 
self-defense.  The appellant filed a 
lengthy objection to the State's uncharged misconduct evidence.  While conceding that the question of 
intent was at issue, the appellant contended that identity was not at issue and 
that he did not intend to argue self-defense.  The bulk of the appellant's memorandum 
addressed this Court's recent jurisprudence in regard to uncharged misconduct 
evidence, including Howard v. State, 
2002 WY 40, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo. 2002); Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002); Williams v. State, 
2004 WY 117, 99 P.3d 432 (Wyo. 2004); and Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, 106 P.3d 879 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶18]   The question of the admissibility 
of the uncharged misconduct evidence was heard at a general motion hearing on 
September 21, 2007.  As it did in 
its written submission, the State argued that the prior threats were relevant 
because they were probative of motive and intent, which went to the appellant's 
position that his crime was manslaughter, not murder.  The State contended that the evidence 
countered the "defense" of "sudden heat of passion," and that it tended to 
establish malice.1

 
 
[¶19]   The appellant presented a 
four-pronged argument at the motion hearing:  first, he contended that all three 
incidents were more prejudicial than probative; second, he decried the State's 
alleged "laundry list" of justifications for admission of the evidence; third, 
he argued that the evidence was merely being offered as propensity or character 
evidence; and fourth, he contended that the 1989-90 incident was too remote in 
time to be relevant or probative.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court took the matter 
under advisement, issuing a decision letter on October 1, 2007.  In its decision letter, the district 
court meticulously reviewed and applied this Court's precedent setting forth the 
standards for the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b).  The district court's 
analysis is too lengthy for us to repeat here, but we will note some of the 
central findings and conclusions.

 
 
[¶21]   After reviewing the known facts, 
and setting forth the three instances of uncharged misconduct, the district 
court quoted the evidentiary rule and reviewed its purpose.  Specifically, citing Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 734 (Wyo. 
1996) and Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 1992), the district court prefaced its analysis by noting that, 
while uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible to prove or disprove 
"consequential fact[s]" such as intent, knowledge, motive, preparation, or plan, 
it is not admissible to show that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. 
 The district court then applied the 
mandatory four-part test this Court has adopted for testing the admissibility of 
uncharged misconduct evidence:

 
 
(1) 
the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the [uncharged misconduct] evidence is 
to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.

 
 

Gleason, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 340.

 
 
[¶22]   As to the first questionwhether 
the evidence was offered for a proper purposethe district court agreed with the 
State that the evidence was properly offered to prove motive and intent, 
especially as those concepts helped to establish the element of malice.  The district court concluded that 
evidence of the three prior instances was probative, in particular, of the 
concept of jealousy as motive.  We 
have previously quoted noted evidence scholar Edward J. Imwinkelried's 
explanation of the part played by motive and intent where jealousy or a similar 
emotion is involved:

 
 
Motive 
is not an ultimate fact or element of the crime; rather it is an intermediate, 
evidentiary fact.  The courts have 
variously described the concept of motive as the "reason that nudges the will 
and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent," an "inducement or state of 
feeling that impels and tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act," and "the 
moving force which impels to action for a definite result."  While intent accompanies the actus reus, 
the motive comes into play before the actus reus.  The motive is a cause, and the actus 
reus is the effect.

 
 

Mitchell 
v. State, 
865 P.2d 591, 597 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3.15 at 
35-36 (1992 & Supp. 1993)).  We 
have applied this reasoning in marital homicide cases, and we see no reason why 
it should not also apply in cases where the victim is not the spouse, but the 
spouse's consort.  See, e.g., Smizer v. State, 752 P.2d 406, 410 (Wyo. 1988); Ortega v. 
State, 669 P.2d 935, 944 (Wyo. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. 
State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1995); and Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 455 (Wyo. 
1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 997 
(1972).

 
 
[¶23]   We cannot say that the district 
court abused its discretion in determining that all three instances of prior 
misconduct were being offered for a proper purpose.  For all intents and purposes, the only 
question facing the jury in this case was whether the appellant acted in a 
sudden heat of passion, or acted with malice.  It was appropriate for the State in 
these circumstances to produce evidence of motive and 
intent.

 
 
[¶24]   The second question a trial court 
must answer in deciding whether to admit uncharged misconduct evidence is 
whether the evidence is relevant.  
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.  This question is usually answered, at 
least in part, by an affirmative response to the first question.  It should nearly go without saying that 
any proper purpose for admission of the evidence is a purpose that is 
relevant.  In the foregoing 
discussion, for instance, if intent and malice were not relevant, they would not 
be proper purposes for admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence.  The district court correctly concluded 
that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant in this case because it went 
to the heart of the matterin effect, it tended to rebut the appellant's "heat 
of passion" argument.  Stated in 
terms of the rule, the evidence made it less likely that the appellant acted 
suddenly and without malice, motivated only by the "heat of 
passion."

 
 
[¶25]   In Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 24, 114 P.3d 1252, 1263 (Wyo. 2005), we found evidence of prior threats and assaults to 
be admissible to prove motive and intent, to help the jury understand the 
relationship between the parties, and to counter a defense, such as accident or 
lack of intent.  Although that 
holding was in the context of the first questionwhether the evidence was 
offered for a proper purposethe conclusion follows that if evidence is 
admissible to prove such concepts, it is, ipso facto, relevant to those 
issues.  In the instant case, the 
appellant contended that the killing resulted from extreme provocation and a 
sudden heat of passionthe hallmarks of voluntary manslaughter.  The State's proffered evidence directly 
rebutted that contention by showing the appellant engaging in threatened 
violence even when not under extreme provocation.  The district court rested its conclusion 
that the evidence was relevant in this history of purposeful and intended 
responses to situations arousing jealousy over Beth's interactions with other 
men.  That conclusion was not an 
abuse of discretion because it was a reasonable conclusion given the facts.  "When evidence is offered under the 
provisions of W.R.E. 404(b), there is no abuse of discretion so long as there is 
a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling."  Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 22, 80 P.3d 191, 197 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶26]   The third question to be asked in a 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct 
evidence is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.  This part of the test to be applied 
under W.R.E. 404(b) is consistent with W.R.E. 403, which applies the same 
general rule to all evidence.  In Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 
342-43, we set out the process to be followed in balancing probative value 
against unfairly prejudicial effect:

 
 
            
In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial 
court should consider the following factors:

 
 
1.   How clear is it that the defendant 
committed the prior bad act?

 
 
2.   Does the defendant dispute the 
issue on which the state is offering the prior bad acts 
evidence?

 
 
3.   Is other evidence 
available?

 
 
4.   Is the evidence unnecessarily 
cumulative?

 
 
5.   How much time has elapsed between 
the charged crime and the prior bad act?

 
 
            
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case 
on an improper basis.  In balancing 
against its probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the 
trial court should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury 
from the central question whether the defendant committed the charged 
crime.  The trial court should weigh 
these additional factors against the probative value of the 
evidence:

 
 
1.   The reprehensible nature of the 
prior bad act.  The more 
reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the 
defendant for the prior act.

 
 
2.   The sympathetic character of the 
alleged victim of the prior bad act.  
Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act 
if the victim was especially vulnerable.

 
 
3.   The similarity between the charged 
crime and the prior bad act.  The 
more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw the 
improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it 
again.

 
 
4.   The comparative enormity of the 
charged crime and the prior bad act.  
When the prior act is a more serious offense than the charged crime, the 
introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in a different and 
unfavorable light.

 
 
5.   The comparable relevance of the 
prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences.  Evidence of the prior bad act may be 
much more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference 
permitted by Rule 404(b).

 
 
6.   Whether the prior act resulted in a 
conviction.  The jury may be tempted 
to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment for the prior bad 
act.

 
 
[¶27]   The record reveals that the 
district court scrupulously complied with the guidelines set forth above, 
devoting a separate section of its decision letter to each of the four general 
issues, and discussing, in turn, each of the eleven factors directed 
specifically to balancing probative value against the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Rather than repeat that 
lengthy analysis herean analysis we find to have been thorough and 
thoughtfulwe will mention only the three factors upon which the appellant 
focuses in arguing that the district court was incorrect in its conclusions.2

 
 
[¶28]   The appellant contends that the 
district court erred in the following particulars:  (1) the district court's conclusion that 
the prior acts were sufficiently similar to the charged act to be probative of 
the appellant's reaction to jealousy and conflict; (2) the district court's 
conclusion that the prior acts were sufficiently dissimilar to the charged act, 
in that the appellant maintained some level of self-control in the former, that 
the jury would not be swayed toward making the improper inference of bad 
character; and (3) the district court's conclusion that, because the prior acts 
were less serious than the charged act, the jury would likewise not be inclined 
to draw that same improper inference.  In short, the appellant argues that the 
uncharged misconduct evidence was probative of nothing more than bad character, 
and should not have been admitted.

 
 
[¶29]   We do not agree with the 
appellant.  An abuse of discretion 
is not proven by a showing that a different decision could have been made.  Our job is not to second-guess the 
findings of the district court, especially where those findings are based upon a 
thorough review of the proffered testimony and a detailed application of the 
appropriate law.  The existence of 
W.R.E. 404(b) presupposes that some uncharged misconduct evidence is 
admissible.  In the instant case, 
taking cognizance of the nature of the charges and the nature of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence, the district court determined that evidence of two of the 
prior acts was offered for a proper purposeto prove motive and intent as those 
concepts relate to malicethat it was relevant because it tended to make the 
existence of those consequential facts more likely than not, and that it was 
more probative than unfairly prejudicial because it met the tests set forth in 
Gleason and similar cases.  We see no abuse of discretion in the 
process or in the conclusions.

 
 
[¶30]   For the sake of completeness, we 
will mention the fourth element of the mandatory four-part test for the 
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence:  whether a limiting instruction was 
given, if requested.  The district 
court's order admitting the evidence stated that "a limiting instruction is 
appropriate in the case and [the court] will consider any limiting instruction 
submitted by the Defendant."  We 
could not locate a limiting instruction in the record, and the parties have not 
indicated that one was ever offered or given.  Consequently, we conclude that the 
fourth factor is inapplicable.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶31]   The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of two of 
three incidents proffered by the State.  
The evidence was offered for a proper purpose, it was relevant, and its 
probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.

 
 
[¶32]   We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1"Sudden 
heat of passion" is not, of course, technically a "defense" to a murder charge, 
but is the statutory language that distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from 
first- and second-degree murder.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2007) and Yung v. State, 
906 P.2d 1028, 1035 (Wyo. 1995).  
For a discussion of the conceptual distinctions between manslaughter and 
second-degree murder, see Eric A. 
Johnson, The Crime That Wasn't 
There:  Wyoming's Elusive 
Second-Degree Murder Statute, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2007).

 
 

2The 
discussion that follows will be better understood if we note at this point that, 
in an earlier portion of its decision letter, the district court had concluded 
that the 1989-90 incident was too remote in time to be relevant.  Thus, the district court's balancing of 
probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice addressed only the second 
and third incidents.