Title: State v. McFadden

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

216 S.W.3d 673 (2007)
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Vincent McFADDEN, Appellant.
No. SC 87753.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
March 20, 2007.
*674 Janet M. Thompson, Office of Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Daniel N. McPherson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted Vincent McFadden of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and witness tampering. McFadden was given the death penalty consistent with the jury's recommendation. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. Among his fourteen points of error, McFadden raises valid challenges under Batson v. Kentucky and Johnson v. Mississippi. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
The facts, which this Court reviews in the light most favorable to the verdict,[1] indicate that, on May 15, 2003, McFadden shot and killed Leslie Addison and threatened Leslie's sister, Eva, so that Eva would not testify against McFadden.
At trial, the State exercised five of its nine peremptory strikes to remove one Asian and four African-American venire-persons. The only remaining African-American was removed for hardship, leaving McFadden with an all-white jury. Defense counsel challenged the strikes under *675 Batson v. Kentucky.[2] The State attempted to justify the strikes with race-neutral explanations, which defense counsel argued were pretextual. The trial court denied McFadden's Batson claims. The jury found McFadden guilty of all charges.
During the penalty phase, the State introduced evidence of McFadden's convictions and death sentence in an unrelated case as aggravating factors supporting capital punishment in this case. The jury cited the earlier convictions as statutory aggravators and recommended a sentence of death. On May 16, 2006, this Court reversed those earlier convictions in State v. McFadden (McFadden I).[3] On May 24, 2006, the trial court in the present case sentenced McFadden to death plus 82 years imprisonment.
This Court elaborated on the principles of Batson and its progeny in McFadden I. To summarize, racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States.[4]
A defendant can establish a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by "the totality of the relevant facts" of the prosecutor's behavior during the defendant's trial.[5] When the State provides a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike that is more than an unsubstantiated denial of discriminatory purpose, the defense must show that the State's explanation is pretextual and the true reason for the strike is racial.[6] The trial court's findings on a Batson challenge will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous, meaning the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.[7] This Court has such a conviction here.
McFadden challenges on Batson grounds the State's exercise of peremptory strikes to remove two African-American women from the jury pool. The State claimed to remove venireperson D.C. because she participated in her church choir's annual Christmas concert at a local prison workhouse. The State claimed to remove venireperson S.H. because she did not have a driver's license, she had "crazy red hair," and she seemed hostile. The Court finds a clear Batson violation in the State's removal of S.H. for having red hair. This being dispositive, the Court does not opine on the removal of D.C.
The trial court rejected the State's justification for removing S.H. for not having a driver's license and for seeming hostile. The court found the lack of driver's license irrelevant and perceived that S.H. was not hostile but merely exasperated by the State's interrogation concerning the license. In response to the State's justification *676 for removal of S.H. because of her bright red hair,[8] defense counsel explained that S.H.'s hair color, though perhaps uncommon among the prosecutor's acquaintances, was quite fashionable in the African-American community. The trial court, sharing the prosecution's unfamiliarity, agreed that the look "[made] her separate from the crowd, and very individualistic" and allowed the strike.
Normally, evidence of discrimination is established when the State's reason for striking an African-American venireperson applies to an otherwise-similar member of another race who is permitted to serve.[9] It does not appear that there was a white juror with distinctive hair, but an identical comparison is not necessary. "A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable."[10] In evaluating pretext, a trial court considers whether the explanation is (1) race-neutral, (2) related to the case to be tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.[11] The trial court's "chief consideration should be the plausibility of the prosecutor's explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case."[12]
Applying the foregoing factors, first, whether the State's explanation is race-neutral to begin with is dubious. The State relies on State v. Williams,[13] where the prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike to remove an African-American venireperson whose "earrings and clothing indicated that he was `trying to be different' and was `liberal.'"[14] This Court rejected that Batson challenge, finding that "striking a prospective juror based upon clothing and attire does not reflect an inherent racial bias."[15] Here, however, defense counsel refuted the State's conclusion that S.H.'s hair color was crazy and noted that S.H. was neatly dressed. The Court acknowledges that peremptory strikes are subjective, and great reliance is placed on the trial court's assessment of the legitimacy of the State's explanation.[16] In this case, however, the record suggests that the trial judge was initially inclined to sustain McFadden's Batson challenges but then retreated. The Court's deference to the trial court is not without limits. Viewing the totality of circumstances  the prosecution's disdain for S.H.'s red hair, his scrutiny of her lack of driver's license, and his misperception of her reaction as hostile  the prosecution's subjective assumptions about S.H. are far from neutral.[17]
*677 Second, the State fails to articulate how S.H.'s red hair, even if it were as unusual as the prosecution found it, was related to the case other than another conclusional inference that S.H. was individualistic. Here again, the State and the trial court presume to identify difference from a limited cultural view. "[P]otential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters,"[18] nor should they be. Third, the State's explanation was clear and specific, to wit, "crazy-looking red hair," which renders clear the analysis of the fourth and fatal factor, legitimacy. The State's justification for removing S.H. because of her hair color is not legitimate. In light of the totality of facts and circumstances, the Court finds the prosecution's explanations implausible and merely a pretext to exercise a peremptory strike for racially discriminatory reasons. The trial court's denial of the McFadden's Batson challenge was clearly erroneous.
McFadden also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial and sentencing him to death because the jury's penalty recommendation was based partially on McFadden's convictions and death sentence in an unrelated case that this Court reversed (McFadden I). As this issue may arise on retrial because the State argues the evidence is admissible as unadjudicated prior bad acts, it is necessary to address the issue in this case.
In April 2005, McFadden was convicted of murder and armed criminal action and received the death penalty in connection with the shooting death of Todd Franklin. In the present case, tried in March 2006, the State introduced McFadden's convictions in the Franklin case as two of six aggravating factors for the jury to consider in deciding punishment. On May 16, 2006, this Court issued its opinion in McFadden I, where it reversed and remanded the Franklin case, thereby vacating McFadden's convictions for murder and armed criminal action, as a result of five Batson violations by the same prosecutor who tried the present case. Despite this Court's reversal of the Franklin convictions, which constituted one-third of the jury's basis for recommending death in the present case, on May 24, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced McFadden to death. Because the jury's recommendation in this case was based partly on factors that this Court nullified, the sentence cannot stand.
In Johnson v. Mississippi,[19] the United States Supreme Court held that the reversal of a prior conviction that the jury considered in imposing the death penalty undermines the validity of the sentence. During sentencing in that case, the prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant's prior felony conviction to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence, but the prior conviction was later vacated. The Supreme Court explained that "the reversal of the conviction deprive[d] the prosecutor's . . . evidence of any relevance to Mississippi's sentencing decision."[20] The decision to impose death cannot be based on factors irrelevant to the sentencing process.[21]
This Court examined the effect of a reversed prior conviction in State v. Storey.[22]*678 There, a prior conviction was used to impeach the defendant's credibility during the guilt phase of the trial. The conviction was subsequently reversed. The State conceded error. This Court held that the error was harmless because, among other reasons, the references were brief and not an attempt to develop a theme. Here, in contrast, the State's evidence during the penalty phase regarding McFadden's prior convictions and death sentence was voluminous, narrated in detail by witness testimony, and illustrated by over a dozen exhibits.
The State argues that Johnson does not mandate reversal here because, even if the Franklin convictions cannot now be used as statutory aggravators, the underlying Franklin facts presented by the State still carry weight as unadjudicated prior bad acts, i.e., non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The State cites Brown v. Sanders[23] in which the United States Supreme Court explained:
The Court rejects the State's implication that the Franklin convictions and death sentence were not critical to the jury's decision-making process. Of the six statutory factors on which the jury based its death penalty recommendation, only the two relating to the Franklin case involved a homicide. The other four involved assault and armed criminal action. The State implies that the jury's recommendation would have been the same based on these four weaker remaining factors. "[W]hen the sentencing body is told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of the scale."[25] In Brown, the Supreme Court cautioned that "such skewing will occur, and give rise to constitutional error, only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor."[26] The State notes that the jury is not instructed to weigh statutory aggravators more heavily than non-statutory aggravators. But even if the prosecution's evidence regarding the underlying facts of the Franklin homicide was properly admissible under the rubric of non-statutory aggravating prior bad acts, the Court cannot assume that the jury's weighing process and sense of responsibility were unaffected by its knowledge that McFadden was already sentenced to death. A sentence resting on factors this Court deems invalid is equally invalid.
Because the foregoing claims are dispositive, it is not necessary to address the remaining grounds for appeal. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH, TEITELMAN, RUSSELL and WHITE, JJ., concur; LIMBAUGH, J., *679 concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed; PRICE, J., concurs in opinion of LIMBAUGH, J.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion addressing the Batson challenge.
The record does not support the majority's holding that "the prosecutor's explanations [were] implausible and merely pretext to exercise a peremptory strike for racially discriminatory reasons." So there is no mistake or misperception about the facts, it is necessary to include a full account of the exchange that transpired among the prosecutor, defense counsel and judge. When the prosecutor struck venireperson S.H., defense counsel identified her as an African-American female and challenged the prosecutor's peremptory strike as being made on the basis of race. The prosecutor then explained his reasons for striking S.H. as follows:
The trial court then found this explanation to be race-neutral.
At that point, defense counsel questioned whether S.H.'s hair color was relevant and speculated that S.H. could have been wearing a wig after going through chemotherapy. Counsel also argued that several women in the African-American community have their hair dyed that color as a fashion statement. Counsel also argued that the lack of a driver's license is not relevant, and she noted that several of her relatives did not have licenses. Counsel also stated that the prosecutor never made a record about S.H.'s demeanor, and that the bailiffs told her that they did not see S.H. sleeping or inattentive. Counsel also said that S.H. never indicated any hesitation on the death penalty.
The prosecutor responded:
Defense counsel then argued that S.H.'s hairstyle did not set her aside from the community of African-American women, so that the prosecutor's explanation "makes it even actually more of a racial issue." Counsel also disputed the idea that not having a driver's license means you are not invested in the community, and she criticized the prosecutor for not asking S.H. why she did not have a driver's license.
The judge then explained why he was denying the Batson challenge:
Subsequently, when the Batson question was raised again at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the judge described S.H.'s hair as "fluorescent" and an assistant prosecutor stated that S.H.'s hair "looked more like Ronald McDonald's red hair. It looked like clown red hair. It tended more towards the orange side."
It is clear from the record that the prosecutor and the judge went to great lengths to follow the letter of the law regarding Batson procedures and to assure that the peremptory strike was free of racial bias. The majority's stated concern, however, is that "the State and the trial court presume to identify difference from a limited cultural view," and as claimed by defense counsel during voir dire, that red hair is "quite fashionable in the African-American community." But the record shows not simply that S.H. had red hair, but that her hair was "red  a color of red brighter than the ink that comes out of a red pen or a marker," it was "crazy red hair," "fluorescent," "like Ronald McDonald's red hair," "like clown red hair." Even defense counsel speculated that S.H. may have been wearing a wig. Her hair was distinctive, to say the least, and did indeed "[make] her separate from the crowd, and [appear] very individualistic." This is indeed a race-neutral explanation.
A juror's appearance in Batson analysis has invariably been held to be a valid basis for exercising peremptory strikes. For *684 instance, the trial court properly relied on Purkett v. Elem, in which the United States Supreme Court held that "the prosecutor's proffered explanation in this case  that he struck juror number 22 because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard  is race neutral. . . ." 514 U.S.  at 769, 115 S. Ct. 1769. Similarly, this Court in State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Mo. banc 2003), approved a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory strike "that the venireperson's earrings and clothing indicated that he was `trying to be different' and was `liberal.'" The Court explained that "[s]triking a prospective juror based upon clothing and attire does not reflect an inherent racial bias motivating the strike." Id. In my view, there is no logical way to distinguish these cases from the case at hand.
In addition, although S.H.'s appearance was the principal justification for the strike, the trial court expressly acknowledged that S.H. showed hostility toward the prosecutor. He also acknowledged that S.H.'s lack of a driver's license, though perhaps not enough in and of itself to justify the strike, was still a factor to be considered. Unfortunately, the majority dismisses these additional explanations without analysis except to say that S.H.'s hostile reaction was a "misperception."
Ultimately, the majority gives nothing but lip service to the fundamental tenets of Batson jurisprudence "that peremptory strikes are subjective, and great reliance is placed on the trial court's assessment of the legitimacy of the State's explanation." Under the totality of the circumstances, I am quite unwilling to convict the prosecutor and the judge of racial prejudice, and I would hold that the trial court's denial of the Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that defendant is entitled to a new penalty phase trial because of the admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of an earlier murder. The fact that the conviction was reversed on appeal after trial in this case mandates reversal here, too.
[1]  State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Mo. banc 2004).
[2]  476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). As this Court cautioned in McFadden I, "racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury." Citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2323, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005).
[3]  State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648 (Mo. banc 2006).
[4]  Strauder v. State, 100 U.S. [Otto] at 308, 25 L. Ed. 664; Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2324; State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 524 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Brown, 958 S.W.2d 553, 553 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. banc 1992).
[5]  Batson, 476 U.S.  at 94, 106 S. Ct. 1712. See also Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2324; Parker, 836 S.W.2d  at 933; State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. banc 1987).
[6]  Parker at 939.
[7]  Edwards, 116 S.W.3d  at 525; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d  at 66.
[8]  The State elaborated on the hair color describing it as "Ronald McDonald's hair. It looked like clown red hair. It tended more towards the orange side."
[9]  Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2325; Edwards, 116 S.W.3d  at 525; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d  at 65.
[10]  Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2329, n. 6.
[11]  Edwards, 116 S.W.3d  at 511.
[12]  Parker, 836 S.W.2d  at 939. See also Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2331; Edwards, 116 S.W.3d  at 527; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d  at 64.
[13]  97 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. banc 2003).
[14]  Williams, 97 S.W.3d  at 471.
[15]  Id.
[16]  State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Mo. banc.1998).
[17]  In further regard to the prosecution's claim that S.H. was hostile, in McFadden I this Court noted that "vague references to attributes like demeanor `are largely irrelevant to one's ability to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory strikes for no real reason except for their race.' Accordingly, such vague references are heavily scrutinized." (Citing Edwards, 116 S.W.3d  at 550 (Teitelman, J., concurring).)
[18]  Miller-El, 125 S. Ct.  at 2329, n. 6.
[19]  486 U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988).
[20]  Johnson, 486 U.S.  at 585, 108 S. Ct. 1981.
[21]  Id.
[22]  986 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. banc 1999).
[23]  546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 884, 163 L. Ed. 2d 723 (2006).
[24]  Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct.  at 892.
[25]  Id. citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 117 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1992).
[26]  Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct.  at 892.