Title: State v. Orr

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 2001-Ohio-50.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ORR, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Orr (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 389.] 
Constitutional law — Search and seizure — Motor vehicles — Criteria for 
determining constitutionality of a driver’s license checkpoint. 
(No. 00-408 — Submitted January 10, 2001 — Decided May 2, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Nos. 17476 and 
17477. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In determining the constitutionality of a driver’s license checkpoint, a court must 
evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, the checkpoint’s intrusion on privacy, 
the state’s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and the extent to which 
the checkpoint advances the state interest. 
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FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  From June 8, 1998 through June 20, 1998, 
the city of Dayton operated a system of driver’s license checkpoints designed to 
identify and remove unlicensed drivers and drivers with suspended licenses from 
the roads. The checkpoints were set up at various locations in Dayton, including 
major thoroughfares and “target enforcement areas”—districts characterized by 
problems of traffic and crime. Upon arrival at a checkpoint site, the police would 
set up reflective signs that warned drivers of the upcoming checkpoint. The 
checkpoints were staffed by anywhere between eleven and thirteen officers. 
Several police cruisers were also present at the checkpoints. 
 
As cars entered the checkpoints, they would be stopped according to some 
pattern that varied according to the amount of traffic on the road. If traffic was 
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particularly light, every car would be stopped. Drivers who were stopped at these 
checkpoints were immediately advised of the purpose of the checkpoint and were 
asked to produce their driver’s licenses. Drivers who produced a valid license 
would have their licenses returned to them along with a pamphlet explaining the 
checkpoint program and thanking them for their cooperation. The length of 
detention for those possessing a valid driver’s license was usually about forty-five 
seconds. 
 
Drivers who were unable to produce a valid driver’s license had their 
names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers entered into the officers’ 
computers to check whether they possessed a valid license. If the computer 
showed that a driver was properly licensed and was not wanted by the police for 
any reason, the driver would be given the pamphlet, thanked, and released back 
into traffic. This entire process would take an additional two minutes or so to 
complete. Drivers without a valid license were cited for the violation, which 
added approximately ten minutes to the overall length of detention. 
 
On June 17, 1998, appellant Magus Orr was stopped at a driver’s license 
checkpoint and cited for driving without a license in violation of R.C. 
4507.02(A)(1). That same night, appellant Andre Smith was stopped at a driver’s 
license checkpoint at another location. Smith was cited for driving without a 
license in violation of R.C. 4507.02(A)(1), operating a motorcycle without the 
required endorsement in violation of R.C. 4507.02(A)(3), driving with expired 
license plates in violation of R.C. 4503.21, and operating a motorcycle without a 
helmet—required for novice riders—in violation of R.C. 4511.53. 
 
Both of the appellants pleaded not guilty. Each appellant also filed a 
motion to suppress, claiming that his seizure was unconstitutional under the Ohio 
and United States Constitutions and that all evidence obtained as a result of his 
seizure should be suppressed. The trial court granted appellants’ motions to 
suppress. The court concluded that because the state had offered no evidence to 
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3 
suggest that the driver’s license checkpoints were a necessary or effective means 
of promoting roadway safety, they constituted an unreasonable search and seizure 
under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The state appealed the trial 
court’s decisions to the Second District Court of Appeals. In a consolidated case, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that driver’s license 
checkpoints are a reasonable method by which to deal with the public danger 
posed by unlicensed drivers. Orr and Smith filed a joint notice of appeal. The 
cause is now before this court upon our allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
We are asked to decide whether Dayton’s driver’s license checkpoint 
program violated the search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we sustain the program’s 
constitutionality. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, “The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Section 14, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution, which contains language nearly identical to its federal 
counterpart, also prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.1  Because Section 
14, Article I and the Fourth Amendment contain virtually identical language, we 
have interpreted the two provisions as affording the same protection. See State v. 
Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767. The search 
and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions are implicated 
                                                          
 
1.  Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person and things to be seized.” 
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in this case because a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint constitutes a “seizure” 
within the meaning of the Ohio and United States Constitutions even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief. Delaware v. 
Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667. 
 
A number of federal and state courts have upheld the seizure of motorists 
at driver’s license checkpoints. See, e.g., United States v. McFayden 
(C.A.D.C.1989), 865 F.2d 1306; United States v. Prichard (C.A.10, 1981), 645 
F.2d 854; LaFontaine v. State (1998), 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367; State v. 
Cloukey (Me.1985), 486 A.2d 143; State v. Grooms (1997), 126 N.C.App. 88, 483 
S.E.2d 445. Although the United States Supreme Court has never fully considered 
the constitutionality of a driver’s license checkpoint, it has repeatedly suggested 
in dicta that it would uphold properly administered driver’s license checkpoints. 
For instance, in Prouse, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits a police officer from arbitrarily stopping an automobile for 
the sole purpose of checking the driver’s license and registration. The court 
stressed, however, that this holding did not preclude states from developing 
methods for spot checks, including the “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at 
roadblock-type stops.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d at 
673-674. Similarly, in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000), 531 U.S. 32, ___, 121 
S.Ct. 447, 457, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 347, the Supreme Court invalidated drug 
interdiction checkpoints implemented primarily to uncover evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing but cautioned that its decision did nothing to alter the constitutional 
status of driver’s license checkpoints. 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s cases generally accord more Fourth 
Amendment protection to persons who are subjected to roving-patrol stops than to 
those who are stopped at roadblock, or checkpoint-type, stops like that involved in 
the case at bar. The different treatment of checkpoint and roving-patrol stops 
makes sense, given the essential purpose underlying the Fourth Amendment. The 
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Fourth Amendment “impose[s] a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise 
of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order 
‘ “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions.” ’ ”  (Footnote omitted.) Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 
59 L.Ed.2d at 667, quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco (1967), 387 
U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 935. The crucial distinction 
between roving-patrol stops and checkpoint stops is the degree to which they 
intrude upon motorists’ privacy and sense of security. “[T]he subjective 
intrusion—the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful 
travelers—is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.” United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1116, 1128. “At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much 
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.” United States v. Ortiz 
(1975), 422 U.S. 891, 894-895, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 628. Many 
motorists accept checkpoint stops as incidental to highway use. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. at 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1130, fn. 14. 
 
In determining the constitutionality of a police checkpoint, courts evaluate 
the following three factors: (1) the particular checkpoint’s intrusion on privacy, 
(2) the state’s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and (3) the extent to which 
the checkpoint advances the state interest. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz 
(1990), 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412. The United States 
Supreme Court has relied upon this analysis in upholding sobriety checkpoints—
roadblocks at which drivers are checked for being under the influence of alcohol 
or mind-altering drugs—and roadblocks designed to intercept illegal immigrants. 
See id. (sobriety checkpoints); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 
L.Ed.2d 1116 (immigration checkpoints). The courts of several jurisdictions have 
extended the analysis to cases involving driver’s license checkpoints. See, e.g., 
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McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306; Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143. We agree with those 
jurisdictions that have concluded that the analysis employed by the United States 
Supreme Court in its cases on sobriety and immigration checkpoints is 
appropriate for review of driver’s license checkpoints. Therefore, we hold that in 
determining the constitutionality of a driver’s license checkpoint, a court must 
evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, the checkpoint’s intrusion on privacy, the 
state’s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and the extent to which the 
checkpoint advances the state interest. Applying this three-pronged analysis, we 
find that Dayton’s driver’s license checkpoints were consistent with the search 
and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
 
Like most checkpoint stops, Dayton’s driver’s license checkpoints did not 
greatly intrude upon travelers’ sense of privacy. Drivers approaching these 
checkpoints were warned in advance of their presence. At the checkpoint, drivers 
could see that they were not the only ones being stopped. Visible signs of the 
officers’ authority were everywhere. Each checkpoint was manned by at least 
eleven officers, with police cruisers present. Drivers who were stopped were 
immediately advised of the purpose of the stop. Most of those possessing a valid 
license were sent on their way after only about forty-five seconds. Those who had 
a valid license but could not produce it at the checkpoint were dispatched after 
only a few minutes. Even those driving without a valid license were detained for 
only ten minutes or so. Every driver stopped at one of Dayton’s driver’s license 
checkpoints was given a pamphlet explaining the checkpoint program and 
thanking him or her for cooperating. Clearly, these checkpoints constituted a very 
limited intrusion into travelers’ privacy and sense of security. 
 
Weighing against this minimal intrusion on privacy is the state’s vital 
interest in using driver’s license checkpoints to identify unlicensed drivers. The 
state has an interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to 
operate motor vehicles and hence that licensing requirements are being observed. 
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Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, 99 S.Ct. at 1398, 59 L.Ed.2d at 670. “Automobile 
licenses are issued periodically to evidence that the drivers holding them are 
sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified to 
operate a motor vehicle.” Id. See, also, R.C. 4507.11.2  As the court of appeals 
noted, “Persons who are too young or too old to drive pose a threat to the public 
safety.” State v. Smith (Jan. 14, 2000), Montgomery App. Nos. 17475, 17476 and 
17477, unreported, at 24, 2000 WL 20882. “Persons who have had their licenses 
suspended for convictions of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol often disregard their suspensions and drive anyway, endangering the 
public.” Id. In short, the state has a critical interest in protecting its citizens from 
drivers who either are not qualified to drive or have been forbidden to drive 
because of a record of driving offenses.3 
 
Compounding the danger to the public from unlicensed drivers is the fact 
that much of the danger is hidden from plain view. While many types of 
dangerous motorists—drunk drivers, for example—exhibit erratic driving, the 
unlicensed driver often displays no observable characteristics. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 
at 147. Police officers on roving patrol cannot pull over a vehicle for the sole 
purpose of checking the driver’s license and registration. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. Therefore, without checkpoints, the only way in 
which police can identify an unlicensed driver is by waiting for the driver to 
                                                          
 
2.  R.C. 4507.11 provides: 
 
“The registrar of motor vehicles shall conduct all necessary examinations of applicants 
for temporary instruction permits, drivers’ licenses, or motorcycle operators’ endorsements. The 
examination shall include a test of the applicant’s knowledge of motor vehicle laws, including the 
laws on stopping for school buses, a test of the applicant’s physical fitness to drive, and a test of 
the applicant’s ability to understand highway traffic control devices.” 
3.  According to Dayton’s Police Driver’s License Checkpoint Guidelines, adopted in 1998, of the 
almost 3.2 million drivers in the state of Ohio, approximately 800,000 had their licenses under 
some form of suspension. The introduction to the guidelines states that, in 1998, when the city of 
Dayton established its checkpoint program, approximately thirty percent of the traffic citations 
issued by the Dayton Police Department were for driver’s license violations. It also reports that an 
estimated one in eight drivers on the streets of Dayton either did not have a driver’s license or 
were driving under suspension. 
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commit a driving offense. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 147. In at least some instances, 
the offense would not even have occurred had the offending driver been detected 
earlier and been removed from the roadways. 
 
The final consideration in our three-pronged analysis is the extent to 
which the driver’s license checkpoints advanced the state interest. This requires us 
to consider the Dayton program’s effectiveness in identifying unlicensed drivers. 
 
In one two-week period, the Dayton police stopped 2,110 motorists and 
issued 224 traffic citations, resulting in a citation rate of approximately 10.6 
percent. By constitutional standards, this effectiveness rate of 10.6 percent is quite 
substantial. Although there was no evidence of how many of these citations were 
related to licensing, even if only a fraction of the citations were issued for driving 
without a valid license, the effectiveness rate in the case sub judice would still 
exceed rates sustained by the United States Supreme Court in analogous 
checkpoint cases. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2487, 110 L.Ed.2d at 423 
(1.6 percent arrest rate for drunk drivers); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554, 96 
S.Ct. at 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1126 (apprehension of illegal aliens in 0.12 percent 
of vehicles passing through checkpoint). 
 
In sum, assessing the checkpoints’ intrusion on privacy, the state’s interest 
in maintaining driver’s license checkpoints, and the extent to which Dayton’s 
checkpoint program advanced the state interest, we find that Dayton’s driver’s 
license checkpoint program was consistent with the search and seizure provisions 
of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. We affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
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January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Julia L. McNeil, Dayton Director of Law, John J. Scaccia, Chief 
Administrative Counsel, and Deirdre Logan, Acting Chief Prosecutor, for 
appellee. 
 
Carl G. Goraleski and Anthony R. Cicero, Assistant Public Defenders, for 
appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, Associate 
Solicitor, and David V. Patton, Assistant Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association. 
 
Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim and Richard Hempfling, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation. 
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