Title: Miller v. Estate of Sperling

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Zazzali, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff's failure to timely file a medical malpractice claim precludes a later wrongful death action arising out of the alleged malpractice. Plaintiff's wife, Ann, was treated by Dr. Sperling from the early 1960s until 1985. In 1972, Dr. Sperling began prescribing a birth control medication for Ann, Ovulen 28, that was later taken off the market because of adverse side effects. According to plaintiff, Dr. Sperling did not inform Ann or the plaintiff that Ovulen 28 was birth control medication, but instead stated that it was a tranquilizer for Ann's nerves. Although there is some dispute in the record as to the length of time Ann took this medication, plaintiff contends that Ann continued treatment with Ovulen 28 until approximately 1985 when Dr. Sperling allegedly advised her of its true nature. Plaintiff and Ann attempted, unsuccessfully, to have Dr. Sperling criminally prosecuted. Neither plaintiff nor Ann initiated a malpractice action or any other civil claim against Dr. Sperling during Ann's lifetime. On March 30, 1996, Ann died at age sixty-six of suspected acute myocardial infarction accompanied by chronic interstitial lung disease. Dr. Sperling died in 1997 and his wife, who served as executrix of his estate, also died during the pendency of this appeal. On March 17, 1998, thirteen days before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim, plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in survivorship, medical malpractice and wrongful death against Dr. Sperling's estate alleging that his improper prescription proximately caused Ann's myocardial infarction and her death. Defendant's motion for summary judgment argued that plaintiff's claims were barred because he failed to comply with the two-year statute of limitations that governs medical malpractice claims, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. The Law Division granted the motion, finding that plaintiff knew or should have known about his claims in 1985. The court did not address plaintiff's claim for wrongful death. On appeal, plaintiff's counsel argued that the wrongful death claim was not barred because it was filed within two years of Ann's death, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3. Although the court noted that the issue had not been raised below, it decided to address the issue in the interest of justice. Relying on Knabe v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 111 N.J.L. 333 (E. & A. 1933), the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding that even though the wrongful death claim had not accrued until Ann died, plaintiff's failure to bring a timely personal injury action barred the wrongful death action due to the death claim's derivative nature. The Appellate Division further found that the application of Knabe to this case obviated the need to determine whether the Affidavit of Merit statute also required dismissal of the complaint. HELD: Decedent's failure to file a personal injury action in her lifetime does not bar the plaintiff's wrongful death action, since a claim for wrongful death is independent of a claim for malpractice. Knabe is overruled. 1. New Jersey's Wrongful Death Act provides that a claim for wrongful death may be pursued when the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury . . . . The Act further provides that [e]very action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the decedent, and not thereafter. In Knabe, the decedent was injured on January 12, 1927 and died on July 3, 1930. A wrongful death action was filed on June 29, 1932. The Court of Errors & Appeals held that where any right of action by the living party injured was barred by the statute of limitations before his death, the Wrongful Death Act does not create a right of action in the personal representative. Subsequent court opinions, however, strongly intimated, but did not determine, that the Wrongful Death Act does not require a viable personal injury action as a prerequisite to the filing of a wrongful death cause of action. (Pp. 7-16). 2. The Court overrules Knabe. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 reflects a legislative intent to use the personal injury cause of action as an example of the type of injuries compensable under the Wrongful Death Act. The such as would language in this provision refers to the character of the injury, and the provision does not require a viable personal injury cause of action as a prerequisite to maintaining a wrongful death claim. Instead, the Act prevents recovery for death where the decedent could never at any time have maintained an action, as, for example, where there was simply no tortious conduct toward him. Furthermore, an interpretation of the Act that bars a wrongful death claim if the injured person failed to file a timely personal injury claim would conflict with N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3, which provides that [e]very action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the decedent, and would result in a limitations period of two years from the date of the injury. (Pp. 16-23). 3. The Court declines to address the applicability of the Affidavit of Merit statute and other procedural and substantive arguments concerning plaintiff's claims. However, in respect of proximate cause, the Court advises that there are occasions when a court may resolve that issue without submitting it to a jury for determination. The Court urges the motion court to fully examine the record on the issue of proximate causation, as well as any other substantive and procedural questions presented, and determine whether plaintiff's claim may be considered by a jury. (Pp. 24-25). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO concurs in the Court's Opinion and writes separately to emphasize that nothing in the language of the Wrongful Death Act prevents the trial court from applying principles of causation and other tenets to this or any similar case. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO has also filed a separate concurring opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 90 September Term 1999 CLETIS MILLER, Individually and as Executor under the Last Will and Testament of ANN F. MILLER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF WALTER SPERLING, COLLETTA SPERLING, Executrix, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 25, 2000 -- Decided January 22, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 326 N.J. Super. 572 (1999). Willard E. Byer, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. Michael J. Lunga argued the cause for respondent (Lunga, Evers & Johnson, attorneys). Alan Y. Medvin argued the cause for amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (Medvin & Elberg, attorneys). I. B. Graf and Lawlor Knabe prevailed for the next thirty years until a subtle modification occurred in Graf v. Taggert, supra, 43 N.J. 303, and Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Mem. Park, Inc., supra, 56 N.J. 326. The issue in Graf was whether the parents of a stillborn child, who suffered injuries while in the mother's womb, could recover under the Death Act. Graf, supra, 43 N.J. at 304. The ultimate holding in Graf, precluding recovery for injuries to the unborn child, is irrelevant to our analysis. We look instead to the Graf discussion of when a wrongful death action can be brought and, also, the Court's scrutiny of the statute. Id. at 305-06. The Graf Court observed in dicta that the language in N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, more particularly, the phrase, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages, was not intended to preclude recovery when an injured party failed to bring a malpractice action. Rather, the statute should be read only to preclude recovery where the injured person could not have recovered because the defendant did not commit a wrongful act or the deceased's own conduct would have barred his right to recover. Ibid. (citations omitted). Lawlor reached the same conclusion. Lawlor, supra, 56 N.J. 326. In that case, the decedent, while placing flowers on her mother's grave, fell into a hole and was injured. Id. at 329. She filed a complaint against the cemetery charging negligence. Twenty-six months after the accident, she died from the injuries. After she died, the cemetery filed a third-party complaint against the hospital and the doctors who treated her. The plaintiff's representatives subsequently filed an amendment to plaintiff's original complaint to include the doctor and the hospital. Because the Court allowed the amended complaint to relate back to the time of filing, the discussion whether a wrongful-death action could be filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice was dictum. Nonetheless, Justice Jacobs, writing for the Court, examined the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, which provided: When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages. Id. at 344 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1). He then commented favorably on out-of-state authority that adopted the persuasive position that the statutory terminology 'relates to the character of the injury, without regard to the question of time of suit or death.' Id. at 344-45 (citation omitted). Graf and Lawlor thus shifted the focus from speculation about the Legislature's intent to the language of the Act itself, which Knabe had not explicitly addressed, and noted that many out-of-state decisions had interpreted that language contrary to the holding of Knabe. Graf and Lawlor strongly intimated, but did not determine, that the wrongful death statute does not require a viable personal injury action as a prerequisite to the filing of a wrongful death cause of action C. Alfone and Silverman That view was embraced by the Appellate Division in Alfone v. Sarno, supra, 168 N.J. Super. 315. In Alfone, the decedent sued Dr. Sarno for malpractice in 1968. She died in 1974. Within two years of her death, her father commenced a wrongful death action, alleging that the malpractice caused her death. Judge King asked whether the [wrongful-death] cause of action is, in view of the [statutory] language, totally derivative from the rights possessed by decedent as of the time of death or is independent of decedent's rights[,] a separate cause of action inhering in the beneficiaries. Id. at 321. He concluded that beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act have a cause of action separate from and independent of the decedent's malpractice action. Id. at 323. That conclusion found its source in Lawlor: The continued validity in this jurisdiction of the derivative-dependent character of the [wrongful-death] cause of action is most questionable in light of [d]ictum in the unanimous opinion of our Supreme Court in Lawlor. The Supreme Court's reference to the persuasive position of the many out-of- state cases, contrary to the Knabe view, which hold that the statutory terminology 'relates to the character of the injury, without regard to the question of time of suit or death,' though dictum, convinces us that Knabe has been discredited and would not now be followed by the Supreme Court. We therefore accept the view that the statutory terminology means nothing more than that where a person has been injured by a tortious act which later causes his death, the beneficiaries under the wrongful death act have a separate and independent right to action, qualified only by the strong policy against the recovery of duplicate damages. The Alfone panel thus anticipated a ruling by this Court overturning Knabe. Upon review, however, the Court allowed the wrongful death action but on a narrower ground. We began by stating that Lawlor did not overrule prior case law, nor did it decide the issue presented by this case. It left that decision to future determination. Alfone, supra, 87 N.J. at 106 n.5. We then determined that maintaining a wrongful death action does not require the availability of an action for damages at the time of death. Id. at 102. In observing that the wrongful death action creates separate rights in the beneficiaries, the Court agree[d] with the suggestion in Lawlor and the holding of other authorities that maintenance of the action is not barred by a judgment in a suit brought by the decedent while alive and that a wrongful death action is not contingent upon the continuing availability of an action for decedent's personal injuries. Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although the Alfone decision appeared to resolve the issue, the facts differ from the matter before us because the Alfone decedent pursued a malpractice case to judgment prior to her death. Id. at 102. The Court also stressed that Lawlor did not overrule prior case law, presumably referring to Knabe. Id. at 106 n.5. Thus, Alfone is not a factual analogue to the case at bar; nor did it fully address the precise issue before us. Silverman v. Lathrop, supra, 168 N.J. Super. at 340, decided on the same day that the Appellate Division decided Alfone and by the same panel, also rejected a [d]efendant's contention that the wrongful death action is barred . . . based on the allegedly dependent-derivative character of the action. The decedent in Silverman filed a personal injury claim during his lifetime, but after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 336. After the decedent passed away, his executrix amended the complaint to include a wrongful death claim. The trial court granted summary judgment on the personal injury-survival claim, holding that it was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Judge King succinctly identified the issue as whether the time-bar of the personal injury-survival action operates also to bar the wrongful death action. Id. at 340. The Appellate Division noted that the defendant relied upon the Knabe analysis to assert that the Death Act did not create a right of action in the personal representative after death if the right of action by the decedent was barred by the statute of limitations before his death. Id. at 340-41. Defendant's contention that the wrongful death action is barred is based on the allegedly dependent- derivative character of the action, a theory which we have rejected this day in Alfone v. Sarno. Id. at 340. The Silverman court also concluded that that reasoning conflicts with the statute of limitations contained in the Wrongful Death Act. Id. at 341. For those reasons, the Appellate Division allowed the action to be brought within two years after the death of the decedent. Id. at 342. In so doing, Silverman set aside concerns about requiring defendants to litigate stale claims and recognized that wrongful- death actions serve a different purpose than malpractice actions. Silverman concluded that the statutory language at issue referred to the character of the injury, not to timing of the injury or decedent's attempts at redress. [Prosser & Keeton, supra at 957.] Speiser suggests that the argument that the tortfeasor's liability . . . should be established within a reasonable period of time . . . is equally convincing. Speiser, supra at 11:10. Nevertheless, he concludes that barring such wrongful death claims is unjust. Ibid. It is understandable that some victims may be disinclined to pursue a malpractice action, either because their focus is on survival, or for a host of other reasons, and the heirs then decide to pursue a wrongful death claim after the injured party's death. Ibid. We hold that the limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 do not speak to jurisdictional or procedural matters that might prevent a decedent from instituting an action at death. Rather, they pertain solely to the character of the injury. Alfone, supra, 87 N.J. at 106-07; Lawlor, supra, 56 N.J. at 344-45. The statutory language is designed to prevent recovery for death where the decedent could never at any time have maintained an action, as, for example, where there was simply no tortious conduct toward him. Prosser & Keeton, supra at 954. Our conclusion is in accordance with the majority rule, as well as the views of well- known commentators. That conclusion does not suggest indifference to principles of repose, stability, and finality. We are mindful that statutes of limitations should provide a party freedom from the burden of defending stale claims. Greco v. Valley Fair Enterprises, 105 N.J. Super. 582, 584 (App. Div. 1969). However, our allowance of the filing of such wrongful death claims, notwithstanding a given plaintiff's years of inadvertent inaction or purposeful delay, is not draconian. By comparison, children born today can file a personal injury complaint up to two years after reaching the age of majority. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. For representatives of birth- injured children to defer their claims for ten to fifteen years is not unusual. They do so at their peril and such plaintiffs assume the risk that there may be problems of proof or other obstacles when they postpone the exercise of their statutory right. But their right to sue remains extant despite deferral. In the matter before us, the hiatus between the last alleged act of malpractice in 1985 and the filing of the 1998 wrongful death claim may prevent adjudication of the merits of that claim. However, that delay does not justify precluding plaintiff's wrongful death claim on the grounds urged here. CLETIS MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ANN F. MILLER, DECEASED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF WALTER SPERLING, COLETTA SPERLING, EXECUTRIX, Defendant-Respondent. VERNIERO, J., concurring. In its careful analysis, the Court correctly concludes that a death action and a malpractice action are independent claims. Thus, plaintiff filed this lawsuit within the limitations period contained in the wrongful death statute. I write separately to emphasize that nothing in the language of that statute prevents the trial court from applying principles of causation and other tenets to this or any similar case. Proximate or legal causation is that combination of 'logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent' that fixes a point in a chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond which the law will bar recovery. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 264 (1985) (citation and internal quotation omitted). [T]he limit of proximate cause is, ultimately, an issue of law and . . . entails a consideration of public policy and fairness. Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 245 (1997). Ordinarily, issues of proximate cause are considered jury questions. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 27 (1999). On occasion, however, a court may resolve that issue itself. Ibid. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that courts may resolve for themselves the question of legal or proximate causation if they believe that a reasonable jury could not find such causation on the facts presented. The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts 435(2) (1965). There is ample precedent in New Jersey authorizing courts to resolve the issue of proximate cause in any case in which reasonable minds could not differ on whether that element of the plaintiff's case has been established. See, e.g., Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 78-79 (1966) (discussing case law and other authority in support of rule). In a recent case, Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496 (1998), this Court invoked that authority in dismissing the plaintiff's case on causation grounds. In Vega, a fourteen-year-old boy trespassed on the roof of the defendant's apartment building and fell into an air shaft, suffering tragic injuries. Id. at 499-500. The plaintiff advanced numerous allegations of negligence, including the defendant's failure to prevent access to the roof for security purposes. Id. at 509. In upholding the summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the Court explained: We do not believe that a fair-minded jury could find that the lack of security measures was the cause of the fall. The cause of the accident and injuries was the plaintiff's unsuccessful effort to leap this divide. Even when parties have a special relationship to others requiring them to act to prevent foreseeable harm, the issue of proximate cause is always present. See Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 545 A.2d 159 (1988) (holding that causation would be issue in case of incompetent patient leaping from hospital window). In the present case, Mrs. Miller died on March 30, 1996. Dr. Sperling's alleged tortious conduct occurred twenty years prior to decedent's death. According to the undisputed pharmacy logs, Ovulen 28, the drug in question, was prescribed by Dr. Sperling in 1974 and last renewed in 1976, some twenty years before decedent's death. Other than those logs, which merely confirm the prescription dates, there are no available charts, journals, physician notes, or medical records of any kind to support plaintiff's claim. Moreover, both the doctor and his patient have never been deposed and are now deceased, making it impossible to consider testimonial evidence from the central fact witnesses. Against that backdrop, the question for the motion court will be whether a reasonable jury could find that the doctor's alleged conduct caused the complained-of injury. I do not diminish the distress and sense of sadness that inevitably occur whenever a person loses a spouse or loved one. This may be a rare case in which, given the lack of medical records and unavailability of witnesses, there is no issue capable of legitimate resolution. In a different context, the Appellate Division has observed that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. DeDisto v. Linden, 80 N.J. Super. 398, 406 (App. Div. 1963) (quoting 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 1(b)(1) n.19 (1948)). Once memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is lost, courts no longer possess the capacity to distinguish valid claims from those which are frivolous or vexatious. Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192 (1980). NO. A-90 CLETIS MILLER, Individually and as Executor under the Last Will and Testament of ANN F. MILLER, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF WALTER SPERLING, COLLETTA SPERLING, Executrix, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 22, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz