Title: Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 10/28/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
 
1140645
____________________
Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: In the Matter of the Estate of Kathryn Marie Lange)
(Jefferson Probate Court, No. 206962)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Joan McCullough Scott ("Scott"), an Alabama resident,
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Jefferson Probate Court to vacate its order requiring all
beneficiaries of the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange ("Lange"),
deceased ("the estate"), who are residents of Alabama to pay
1140645
into the probate court distributions they receive from a
concurrent administration of the estate in London, England. 
We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
Lange was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1930.  In 1953
she married a Danish citizen and moved to Copenhagen.  She
divorced her husband in 1961, and in 1962 she became a
resident of London, England, where she resided until her death
on January 4, 2010.  Despite living overseas for the majority
of her adult life, Lange retained her United States
citizenship, and she never became a British citizen.
During Lange's life, she purchased several parcels of
real property in London and a parcel of property in the
English countryside.  At her death, Lange owned the
aforementioned parcels of real property in England, a small
sum in an English bank account, some personal property located
in England, and approximately $350,000 in personal property
located in Alabama.  
The Estate Administrations
On January 11, 2010, Lange's nephew, Charles Lange Clark,
filed a petition for letters of administration as to the 
2
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estate in the Jefferson Probate Court.  The petition alleged
that Lange was domiciled in Jefferson County when she died,
that she had no last will and testament, that she left assets
in Jefferson County that consisted of approximately $350,000
in personal property and no real property, and that Lange was
survived by Clark and his mother (Lange's sister), Adrienne
O'Brien ("O'Brien"), both of whom are residents of Mountain
Brook.  
The probate court granted Clark's petition on the day it
was filed and issued him letters of administration.  All
references hereinafter to "Clark" are to Clark in his capacity
as administrator.  All references hereinafter to the
"Jefferson County administration" shall mean the estate
administration in the Jefferson Probate Court.
A 
few 
days 
after 
Clark 
received 
letters 
of
administration, he was informed that Lange had a last will and
testament ("the will") and that the will was in the possession
of an attorney in England.  Clark attempted to obtain a copy
of the will, but his attempt was unsuccessful.  On January 29,
2010, Clark filed a "Motion for Approval of Expenses" in the
probate court seeking funds to hire counsel in London and
3
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disclosed the fact that he had received 
information 
indicating
that Lange had a will.  Thereafter, see discussion infra, the
probate court entered an order authorizing Clark to hire
counsel in London to advise him as to whether an ancillary
estate should be opened there and as to questions concerning
the validity of the will.
The will was dated December 19, 1985.  The will includes
several specific bequests of personal property and 
a 
residuary
devise of Lange's remaining property, including the 
parcels 
of
real property noted above, to the trustees of a testamentary
trust.  The trustees were directed to sell such property or
otherwise to convert it into cash for purposes of distribution
among 
14 
individual 
beneficiaries 
("the 
individual
beneficiaries"), one of whom is Scott, and 9 charitable
beneficiaries ("the charitable beneficiaries").  Neither
O'Brien nor Clark is named as a beneficiary, personal
representative, or trustee in the will. 
 After Clark received information as to the existence of
the will, he filed a "caveat" in the relevant court in London,
England, preventing the admission of the will to probate
pending a determination as to its validity. 
4
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On August 6, 2010, Simon Winston, one of the persons
named as co-personal representative and cotrustee in 
the 
will,
filed a motion to intervene in the Jefferson County
administration.  Winston requested that the Jefferson Probate
Court stay further proceedings until the will was properly
offered for probate in England.  Scott also filed a motion to
intervene in the Jefferson County administration, likewise
requesting a stay of further proceedings in the probate court.
On August 24, 2010, Clark filed a motion in the probate
court requesting that it declare that Lange's domicile at her
death was Jefferson County, Alabama.  
On October 1, 2010, the charitable beneficiaries
initiated proceedings to establish the validity of the will in
the London High Court of Justice, Chancery Division ("the
Chancery Court"); it was assigned claim no. HC10C02799.  In
that proceeding, the charitable beneficiaries named a number
of defendants, including O'Brien, who the Chancery Court
described as Lange's "intestacy beneficiary," and Clark, who
the Chancery Court described as Lange's "administrator under
an Alabama grant of letters of administration."  The
charitable beneficiaries also named as defendants the
5
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individual beneficiaries, Winston, and the other person whom
the 
will 
nominated 
as 
co-personal 
representative 
and
cotrustee.  The Chancery Court appointed Helen Freely, an
English 
solicitor, 
as 
"interim" 
personal 
representative 
of 
the
estate in England pending a determination as to the validity
of the will.1
Clark retained a London law firm, Macfarlanes, LLP
("Macfarlanes"), to represent him in the Chancery Court
proceeding.  Clark sought to defend against any declaration by
the Chancery Court as to the validity of the purported will;
he asserted that Lange lacked testamentary capacity when she
executed the will. 
 
On October 15, 2010, Winston filed an amendment to his
motion to intervene in the probate court.  The amendment
disclosed that the will had been offered for probate in
London, that Clark had appeared in the Chancery Court
proceedings to contest the validity of the will, and that the
Chancery Court had appointed Freely as interim personal
Apparently, an "interim" personal representative is
1
analogous to an administrator ad colligendum, i.e., a
temporary personal representative appointed to collect and
preserve the decedent's estate until a permanent personal
representative can be appointed.
6
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representative as to the estate in England.  Winston requested
that the probate court stay further proceedings pending the
Chancery Court's determination as to the validity of the will.
Clark also filed a motion in the probate court to which
he attached a copy of the will.  The motion asserted that
Lange was domiciled in Jefferson County at her death and that
the will should be offered for probate in the probate court
for purposes of determining whether the will was valid.  Clark
also filed a response to Winston's and Scott's respective
motions to intervene.
On November 17, 2010, the probate court entered an order 
in response to Clark's petition for a declaration as to
Lange's domicile.  The order states that Lange's domicile "was
Birmingham, Alabama."  Scott appealed that order to the
circuit court.2
Eventually, the parties to the Chancery Court proceeding
entered into a settlement agreement.  On July 12, 2012, the
Chancery Court entered an order determining that the will was
valid and approving the settlement agreement.  Pursuant to the
Our statement that Scott appealed to the circuit court
2
should not be construed as an affirmation that the order of
the probate court as to Lange's domicile was a final,
appealable order.
7
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terms of the settlement agreement, the July 2012 order further
directed that Freely was to serve as personal representative
for purposes of administering the estate in England.  Also,
the July 2012 order notes that Scott agreed to dismiss her
appeal of the probate court's order as to Lange's domicile,
which Scott subsequently did.  
As to Clark, the July 2012 order provided:
"6.  There be paid out of the Estate in due course
of the administration to [Clark] (1) his costs of
and occasioned by the [will contest] in the agreed
sum of £265,500, and (2) his accrued and further
legal costs of the proceedings pending in Alabama
described in the Schedule (insofar as they exceed
those already discharged out of the Deceased's
Estate in the USA), up to a maximum sum of £75,000." 
In part, the "Schedule" referred to in the preceding quote
describes the Jefferson County administration, "in which the
[probate court] has made orders in relation to the domicile of
the Deceased."  
As to the distribution of the estate assets that were in
dispute between O'Brien and the individual beneficiaries and
the 
charitable 
beneficiaries, 
the 
settlement 
agreement 
and 
the
July 2012 order provided that O'Brien was to receive 27.5% of
the net residuary estate 
and that the individual 
beneficiaries
and the charitable 
beneficiaries 
were to receive the remaining
8
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72.5% of the net residuary estate.  The net residuary estate
was defined as
"the net distributable residuary estate of the
Deceased in England and the USA[,] that is to say
after the payment of all liabilities, taxes, the
costs of the proceedings in the USA and of these
proceedings to the extent agreed above, together
with the costs of administration of the Estate ...
and after payment of the pecuniary and specific
legacies setout in the Will."
As to O'Brien and Clark, the July 2012 order further
provides, "[f]or the avoidance of doubt," that "[t]he
percentage sum referred to [as to O'Brien], ... is inclusive
of any and all further entitlements that [Clark] or
Mrs. O'Brien have or may have in relation to the Estate under
Alabama law."  And, the order states:
"The parties agree that it is intended that all such
chattels, jewelry and shares as are mentioned in the
'statement of assets received by [Clark] from the
estate of Kathryn Marie Lange Deceased or which are
in the US' dated 8 December 2011 and attached
documents shall be retained by Mr. Clark (as agent
for Mrs. O'Brien) and appropriated towards Mrs.
O'Brien's entitlement under this agreement."
Finally, the July 2012 order states:
"These terms shall be in full and final settlement
of any and all claims that the parties and the
Trustee [of the testamentary trust established under
Lange's will] have or may have against each other or
the Estate, whether arising out of or in relation to
9
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the Estate or the death of the Deceased or
otherwise, including:
"(1)
the Claim [the Chancery Court
proceeding]; [and]
"(2)
the US proceedings [the Jefferson
County administration]."
On August 23, 2012, Freely filed a document in the High
Court of Justice, Family Division, averring that Lange was
domiciled "in England and Wales" at her death and that the
Chancery Court had entered an order determining that the will
was valid and that letters of administration with the will
annexed were to be issued to her.  Freely also avowed that she
would "collect, get in and administer according to law the
real and personal estate of [Lange]."
On September 7, 2012, Clark, O'Brien, Scott, and Winston
filed a joint motion in the probate court as to the July 2012
order.  The joint motion included a copy of the July 2012
order and requested that the probate court enter an order
approving the terms of the July 2012 order and "enforcing its
terms regarding the property, assets and proceedings in
[England]" and "adopting its terms and conditions insofar as
applicable to the property, assets, costs, accounting and
proceedings in the State of Alabama."
10
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On October 12, 2012, the probate court entered an order
approving and adopting the July 2012 order and the terms of
the settlement agreement.  The probate court's order further
states that the court "retains jurisdiction of this matter and
all parties hereto to ensure compliance with the aforesaid
[July 2012] order ... and to take such remedial, equitable and
other relief necessary if said [o]rder is not complied with."
On December 13, 2012, the District Registrar of the High
Court of Justice, Family Division, issued an order stating
that Lange was domiciled in "England and Wales" at her death,
that her will had been "proved and registered," and that
"[a]dministration of all the estate which by law devolves to
and vests in the personal representative of the said deceased
was granted by the said Court on this date to" Freely ("the
English administration").  The order further states that "it
appears from the information supplied on the application for
this grant that the gross value the said estate in the United
Kingdom amounts to £2,393,666 and the net value of such estate
amounts to £1,977,534."
11
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The Macfarlanes Debt
As noted above, Clark retained Macfarlanes to represent
him in the Chancery Court proceedings.  Their relationship,
however, became the source of additional litigation.  See
Macfarlanes, LLP v. Clark, No. 2:13-CV-01519-MHH (N.D. Ala.
Dec. 
24, 
2014) 
(not 
reported 
in 
F. 
Supp. 
3d)
("Macfarlanes I").   As the Macfarlanes I court noted: 
3
"On March 2, 2010, the Jefferson County Probate
Court entered an 'Order to Pay Expenses, Hire
Counsel and Manage Real Property'• that included the
following provision:
"'[T]he Administrator, [Charles] Lange
Clark is authorized to hire counsel in
London, England to advise him of any and
all 
rights, 
responsibilities 
and
obligations of [Kathryn Marie Lange's]
estate.  He may pay any and all cost to
said counsel for managing the estate in
London, England from the funds currently in
the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange.  Also,
should 
any 
legal 
documentation 
be 
presented
in the courts in England, the Administrator
is advised to get legal counsel in England
to 
question 
the 
validity 
of 
said
documentation since it has been brought to
the attention of this court that the
deceased had numerous issues that could
have diminished her capacity to make said
will or legal documents.  It is FURTHER
ORDERED 
that 
the 
Administrator 
is
In 
Macfarlanes 
I, 
Macfarlanes 
filed 
a 
petition 
to 
enforce
3
its English judgment against Clark.  The decision addresses
and denies Clark's motion to dismiss Macfarlanes's petition.
12
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authorized, within reason, to pay any and
all expenses for the burial of the
deceased, [and] legal fees for the estate
in both Birmingham and London.  ...'
"After 
Mr. 
Clark 
contacted 
Macfarlanes, 
the 
firm
sent Mr. Clark an engagement letter.  The letter
states:  
"'We have identified you as our client for
professional purposes and we will only
address our bills to you.  
"'[B]ased 
on 
our 
current 
limited 
knowledge,
we would envisage that our fees for
[working on the matter of Kathryn Marie
Lange's estate in England] will be in the
region of £40,000 to £70,000 plus any VAT
and expenses. It is at this early stage
impossible to provide an estimate of the
eventual costs if this matter were to
proceed to a full trial.  
"'However, we will write to you separately
once the scope of the work required becomes
clear.  ...
"'Our services are provided to you solely
and exclusively by Macfarlanes LLP.'
"The letter references 'Terms of Business'• which
Mr. Clark acknowledges that he received.  The Terms
of Business include the following provision:
"'3.6  You will remain responsible for our
costs and expenses and we will bill you
even if there is an agreement with a third
party to pay them on your behalf.' 
"Sometime after Macfarlanes began working on the
estate issues, Mr. Clark returned a copy of the
engagement letter to Macfarlanes.  Mr. Clark signed
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the letter as follows: 'Lange Clark, Administrator
of the estate of Kathryn M. Lange.'  
"Macfarlanes billed Mr. Clark for the fees,
costs, and expenses associated with the work that
the firm performed for the Alabama estate in London. 
Mr. Clark paid invoices totaling $46,000.  He
stopped paying Macfarlanes in October of 2010,
primarily 
because 
the 
legal 
fees 
exceeded
Macfarlanes's original estimates.  Clark terminated
his relationship with Macfarlanes in December 2010. 
That same month, Macfarlanes sent him a final
invoice for $138,913.70.  Mr. Clark did not pay the
invoice.
"On February 3, 2012, Macfarlanes filed a claim
against Mr. Clark personally in the High Court of
Justice, Queen's Bench Division, in London to
recover unpaid legal fees, expenses, and interest. 
Mr. Clark was served with a copy of that claim
personally at his place of business in Alabama on
March 2, 2012.  On May 17, 2012, Clark, with new
counsel, appeared in the collection proceeding. 
Eventually, 
the 
English 
Court 
granted 
the
application of Clark's new counsel to withdraw as
solicitors of record because they ... 'had not
received further instructions from their client.' 
Mr. Clark did not respond to orders from the English
Court 
or 
to 
correspondence 
from 
Macfarlanes
regarding the proceeding.  In short, Mr. Clark did
not participate.
"After Mr. Clark failed to respond to an 'unless
order' from the High Court of Justice, Chancery
Division ..., the English court found that Mr. Clark
had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of England
and Wales and entered judgment against Mr. Clark for
£126,611.21.  On April 2, 2013, Macfarlanes notified
Clark of the judgment by letter and e-mail and
demanded payment.  Mr. Clark has not satisfied the
judgment.  Mr. Clark did not appeal the decision of
the High Court of Justice."
14
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(References to record, headings, and footnotes omitted.) 
In addition to the foregoing facts that are pertinent to
Clark's dispute with Macfarlanes, we note that on August 28,
2013, Clark sent Freely a letter that states: "As you know, I
have been sued by Macfarlanes, LLP for my acts as the duly
appointed administrator of my aunt's estate.  I hereby demand
that the you, as the administrator of the estate in England,
indemnify me for all costs and liability."
On October 9, 2013, Clark filed a "Motion for
Indemnification" in the probate court.  Clark requested that
the probate court issue an order indemnifying him as to costs
incurred in defending against Macfarlanes's claim and against
any judgment issued against him and in favor of Macfarlanes. 
On November 3, 2013, the probate court issued an order
granting Clark's "Motion for Indemnification."  The order
states that the estate "shall indemnify ... Clark for any and
all costs incurred in defending" against Macfarlanes's claim
and against any judgment in favor of Macfarlanes and against
Clark.  We note that, when Clark filed his motion for
indemnification, he had already distributed all but $68.99 of
the assets in the estate that were subject to his control in
15
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the Jefferson County administration.  Scott did not object to
Clark's motion for indemnification or to the probate court's
order granting that motion.  
4
On November 21, 2013, Freely, who was not a party to the
indemnification proceedings in the probate court, sought
instructions from the Chancery Court as to, among other
issues, "a claim by Mr. Clark for an indemnity with respect to
a claim made against him by his former English solicitors,
Macfarlanes, LLP."  Freely's request for instructions states: 
"On 28 August 2013 I received a letter from Mr.
Clark claiming an indemnity from the Estate with
respect to a claim being made against him for
payment of fees by his former English solicitors,
Macfarlanes, LLP ('Macfarlanes'), incurred prior to
December 2010.  Applications filed by Macfarlanes
and Mr. Clark in courts in Alabama ... indicate that
on 18 March 2013 Macfarlanes obtained judgment
against Mr. Clark for £126,611.21 with respect to
legal fees, interest and costs in proceedings in the
English High Court.  It appears that Mr. Clark
submitted to the jurisdiction with respect to
Macfarlanes' claim but that in his application to
the Alabama court Mr. Clark disputes liability on
the basis that he retained Macfarlanes in a
representative capacity."
Freely further avers that she informed the individual
beneficiaries and the charitable beneficiaries that Clark
Scott states that she had no reason to object to the
4
motion because she had no interest in the $68.99 that remained
in the Jefferson County administration.
16
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sought indemnity "for all costs and liabilities" as to
Macfarlanes's claim against him.  Further, Freely noted that
the Chancery Court's July 2012 order approving the settlement
agreement appeared to address Clark's indemnity claim 
but 
that
she was seeking directions "as to whether [Clark's] claims or
any part of them are to be treated as administration expenses
or otherwise paid out of the assets of the Estate."  Counsel
for 
the 
individual 
beneficiaries 
and 
the 
charitable
beneficiaries responded to Freely's request for instructions,
arguing that Clark's indemnity claim should be denied based on
the terms of the July 2012 order adopting the settlement
agreement. 
On February 5, 2014, Clark filed a "Witness Statement" in
the Chancery Court responding to Freely's request for
instructions and to the opposition of his claim by the
individual beneficiaries and charitable beneficiaries.  Clark
stated:  "I am advised that, although [the indemnity] claim
[is] good under American law, [that claim] will not be upheld
under English law in respect of the English assets and
therefore I will not pursue [that claim]." 
17
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On May 20, 2014, during proceedings as to Freely's
request for instructions, the Chancery Court noted that Clark
had "abandoned his claim" for indemnity as to the English
administration and that the claim was "an opportunistic claim
which was wholly without merit."  Thereafter the Chancery
Court entered an order declaring that Clark "is not entitled
to payment for costs allegedly incurred in relation to his
administration of the Deceased's estate in the US ... or any
sum as administration expenses."
On November 11, 2014, Clark filed a "Motion for Escrow"
in the probate court.  Clark's motion alleged that "there is
only a de minimis amount of funds held in the estate account
in Jefferson County, Alabama."  Nevertheless, Clark noted,
"there remains (despite a substantial prior distribution by
the administrator of the assets held by the English
administrator) funds remaining to be distributed by the
English administrator."  Clark further stated that "the most
practical means to enforce this Honorable Court's Order on
Indemnification ... is to have any and all funds payable to
beneficiaries in the State of Alabama paid into this Court
18
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pending determination of the costs of indemnification" of
Clark.  
On November 14, 2014, Scott filed an opposition to
Clark's motion for escrow.  Scott argued (1) that the probate
court had no jurisdiction to order the escrow of funds paid to
Scott from the English administration  and (2) that, based on
5
the terms of the settlement agreement, Clark had no claim to
such funds.   We note that when Scott filed her opposition to
6
Clark's motion for escrow, Scott already had received
distributions from the English administration totaling
£54,009.26.
The probate court heard oral arguments as to Clark's
motion for escrow, and, on February 19, 2015, the probate
court entered an "Order of Escrow" ("the escrow order")
requiring all beneficiaries of the estate who resided in
Scott notes that she is not challenging the probate
5
court's indemnification order as to Clark.  Instead, she is
challenging the purported use of estate assets that are not
the subject of the Jefferson County administration to fund
Clark's indemnification.    
Scott further argued that, if "Clark's escrow theory"
6
were correct, any order must "apply equally to any payment to
... O'Brien."  Indeed, if Clark's theory were correct, it
would appear that the only equitable way to fund his indemnity
claim would be on a pro rata basis as to all the beneficiaries
of the estate, wherever located. 
19
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Alabama to pay into the probate court "the monies due" such
beneficiaries.  The escrow order further provided that "the
disbursement of said funds will be ordered by this Court upon
a final settlement in this case or by a consent settlement
entered into by all parties and heirs."
Scott then filed the present petition for a writ of
mandamus, requesting that this Court direct the probate court
to vacate the escrow order.  Thereafter, Scott received an
additional 
£11,842.16 
distribution 
from 
the 
English
administration.
On July 29, 2016, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama entered a summary judgment in
favor of Macfarlanes and against Clark as to Macfarlanes's
claim that the judgment it obtained in England was enforceable
against Clark in Alabama.  See Macfarlanes, LLP v. Clark,
No. 2:13-CV-01519-MHH (N.D. Ala. July 29, 2016) (not reported
in F. Supp. 3d) ("Macfarlanes II").
Standard of Review
Scott argues that the probate court has no jurisdiction
as to the estate assets that come into her possession from the
English administration, particularly because such assets
20
1140645
derive from real property in England.  It is well settled that
questions of jurisdiction -- whether lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction over the person or thing
at issue -- are reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus.  See, e.g., Ex parte PinnOak Res., LLC, 26 So. 3d
1190, 1198 (Ala. 2009) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Elliott
v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002) (personal
jurisdiction).  As to such questions, this Court's review is
de novo.  See, e.g. PinnOak Res., 26 So. 3d at 1198; Elliott,
830 So. 2d at 729.  
7
As this Court has stated: 
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."
Scott articulates the question before us in terms of
7
subject-matter jurisdiction, but the cases she cites and
quotes in support of her argument involve concepts of personal
jurisdiction,  see Ex parte Trust Co. of Virginia, 96 So. 3d
67, 69 (Ala.  2012), and in rem jurisdiction, see Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-50 (1958).  Also Scott's arguments
are couched in terms of a lack of jurisdiction or authority
"to seize property not belonging to or in possession of the
Jefferson County Estate," i.e., in rem jurisdiction.  Clark
has not been prejudiced by Scott's lack of precision in her
argument; Clark's brief in answer to the petition responds to
Scott's in rem jurisdiction argument.    
21
1140645
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).
 
Analysis
Although the parties disagree over whether Lange was
domiciled in England or in Jefferson County at the time of her
death, under the facts before us we need not resolve that
issue in order to decide whether Scott's petition is due to be
granted.  As Scott notes, the assets in which she has an
interest, and that are the subject of the escrow order, derive
from real property that was located in England and that was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Jefferson Probate
Court.  It is well settled that
"wills to lands are governed by the lex loci rei
sitae.  This rule extends not only to manner of
execution, but to the construction and legal effect
of such devises.
"The rule is founded upon the inherent right of
every sovereign state, for its own security and in
keeping with its dignity and independence, to
regulate the alienation, devise, or descent of real
estate within its borders."
Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, 29, 104 So. 234, 236 (1925)
(emphasis added).   It is true that
8
Based on the orders we have been provided from the
8
Chancery Court proceedings, England likewise follows the rule
of lex loci rei sitae. 
22
1140645
"[t]he estate of a decedent, wherever he may reside
at the time of his death, and in however many
different States portions of the property and assets
may be situate, is one estate.  Notwithstanding this
unity of estate, if administrations are granted in
the different States where the property is located,
there is not unity of administration -– they are
separate and independent of each other. ... Each
administrator is accountable in the courts of the
State of his appointment, and each administration
must be settled where it is granted."  
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Vogel's Ex'x, 76 Ala. 441,
446-47 (1884) (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that the assets that are the subject of
the escrow order are part of the English administration.  It
is also undisputed that the court with jurisdiction over the
English administration has issued no order directing Freely 
to
distribute assets from that administration directly to Clark
or to the probate court for purposes of Clark's indemnity
claim.  Indeed, Clark abandoned any such claim after Freely
sought instructions from the Chancery Court regarding the
claim.   Absent such an order, however, the assets of the
estate that are the subject of the English administration are
not subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court as part
of the Jefferson County administration.  See Allen v. Estate
of Juddine, 60 So. 3d 852, 857 (Ala. 2010) (Bolin, J.,
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concurring specially) (noting that the administration of an
estate is an exercise of in rem jurisdiction and that only the
court having jurisdiction over the res may exercise
jurisdiction as to that res); 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and
Administrators § 1 (2012) ("The administration of 
a 
decedent's
estate is purely statutory and is in rem, not in personam, in
that it conclusively determines the interests of all persons
in the property of a decedent within the jurisdiction of the
court."); cf. Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935)
(discussing the general principles that where "two suits are
in rem or quasi in rem, requiring that the court or its
officer have possession or control of the property which is
the subject of the suit in order to proceed with the cause and
to grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of one court must
of necessity yield to that of the other" and that "the court
first assuming jurisdiction over the property may 
maintain and
exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other").9
Although not discussed by Scott, it also appears that
9
those assets derive from her interest in an English
testamentary trust, over which the Jefferson Probate 
Court 
has
no jurisdiction.
24
1140645
  
In Johnson v. McKinnon, 129 Ala. 223, 226, 29 So. 696,
697 (1901), this Court acknowledged that an administrator's
"representation of the estate [is] a qualified one" and
"[does] not extend beyond the assets of which the court ...
appointing him had jurisdiction."  The Court continued: 
"In Ela v. Edwards, 13 Allen, 48 [(Mass. 1866)],
the court held that, if ancillary administration is
taken out in another state upon the estate there of
a deceased citizen of Massachusetts, a decree of the
judge of probate there allowing a claim of the
administrator against the estate, and finding a
balance due to him over and above the assets then
coming to his hands, is not conclusive upon the
court of Massachusetts, and will not entitle the
administrator to charge for such balance upon his
settlement of the estate in that state. ...  [T]he
two administrations are entirely independent of each
other, and there is no privity between the two
administrators."
Johnson, 129 Ala. at 227, 29 So. at 697.  See generally 34
C.J.S. Executors and 
Administrators 
§ 1100 (2009)("There is no
privity between administrators of 
the same estate appointed in
different jurisdictions, or between an executor in one
jurisdiction and an ancillary administrator in another. ... 
Several administrations granted in different jurisdictions on
the same estate are each several and distinct, and have no
common liability for expense incurred by each.").  And, in
25
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Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1898), this Court
stated:
"The accepted theory of administration is that
the right and liability is purely representative,
and exists only by force of the official character,
and so cannot pass beyond the jurisdiction which
grants it, and reserves to itself full and exclusive
authority over all the assets of the estate within
its limits. ...
"...   [I]n this class of cases the defendant is
not personally a party, otherwise than as a
commissioned representative of the court making the
appointment, and for the limits of its jurisdiction;
so that beyond that jurisdiction he can exercise no
authority or do or omit any act which will affect
the due administration of the trust by the local
authorities.
"The objection thus goes to the power or
jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of
the administration of assets in a foreign State, in
the control of foreign administrators, and to the
capacity of the defendant to do any act to the
prejudice of the domestic administration.  Consent
cannot give such jurisdiction, or extend the limited
authority of the administration to extra-territorial
acts resulting in judgments against the assets of
the estate."•
117 Ala. at 439-40, 23 So. at 44-45 (emphasis added).  
We find the foregoing principles supportive of our
conclusion that Clark may not assert his claim for indemnity
against estate assets that are not part of the Jefferson
County administration.  The probate court has jurisdiction
26
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only over the estate assets that are part of the Jefferson
County administration.10
Further, we note that, even assuming for the sake of
argument that Lange was domiciled in Jefferson County at the
time of her death and that the English administration is an
ancillary administration, Clark abandoned any claim he may
have had against the assets from that administration.   
"Although, 
under 
the 
law 
of 
the 
ancillary
jurisdiction all claims against decedent's estate
may be barred, a proceeding lies in the ancillary
jurisdiction for the transfer of assets to the
domiciliary jurisdiction for the payment of debts. 
However, the assets will not be transmitted to the
domicile simply for the purpose of subjecting them
to certain taxes.
"While there is no question as to the authority
of the court in the ancillary jurisdiction to order
a residue of assets in that jurisdiction transmitted
to the domiciliary representative, the court of one
jurisdiction 
has 
no 
authority 
over 
the
representative of the other to compel him or her to
Clark argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision
10
in Leonard v. Woodruff, [Ms. 2140822, March 25, 2016] ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), supports the probate court's
escrow order.  Leonard addresses whether a personal
representative may recover attorney fees from a beneficiary
who filed a civil action in another jurisdiction in an effort
to unravel a property disposition that occurred before the
decedent's death.  Leonard does not address whether a
beneficiary must surrender to an Alabama probate court assets
he or she receives from an estate administration in another
jurisdiction.
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bring in such assets whether it is the court of the
domiciliary or of the ancillary jurisdiction.  
"As to the proceeds of real estate which still
retain the character of that species of property,
the ordinary rule with regard to transmitting assets
to the domicile of decedent usually does not apply,
because the right of succession to real estate is
governed by the lex loci rei sitae.  However, in
some cases where land was ordered sold to pay debts
the 
court 
having 
control 
of 
the 
ancillary
administration has ordered the surplus proceeds,
after payment of local creditors, to be transmitted
to the domiciliary representative for the payment of
debts." 
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 1104 (2009) 
(headings
omitted; emphasis added). 
By virtue of its escrow order, the Jefferson Probate
Court has attempted to exercise control over payments made to
Scott from the English administration.  Those payments to
Scott do not derive from the res over which the Jefferson
Probate Court has jurisdiction, i.e., the property that is the
subject of the Jefferson County administration, and the
probate court has no power to compel Scott to pay into escrow
the property she receives or has received from the English
administration as such.  Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
250 (1958) (noting that, just as "a State is forbidden to
enter a judgment attempting to bind a person over whom it has
28
1140645
no jurisdiction, it has even less right to enter a judgment
purporting to extinguish the interest of such a person in
property over which the court has no jurisdiction").  The
escrow order is due to be vacated.
Because the probate court had no jurisdiction to require
Scott to place into escrow in the Jefferson County
administration property she received from the English
administration, we grant the petition, issue the writ, and
direct the probate court to vacate the escrow order.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
29