Title: Raul J. Walters v. National Properties, LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 87 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP862 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Raul J. Walters, d/b/a Lake Geneva Centre,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
National Properties, LLC,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Horizon Properties, Inc., and Horizon  
Convenience Stores, Inc.,  
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 890, 675 N.W.2d 810 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 14, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
Thomas B. Burke, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas B. 
Burke. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Joseph M. 
Cardamone III and Gagliardi, O’Brien, Braden, Olson & Capelli, 
Salem, and Martin B. Carroll and Fox, Hefter, Swibel, Levin & 
Carroll, LLP, Chicago, IL, and oral argument by Martin B. 
Carroll. 
 
 
2005 WI 87 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP862   
(L.C. No. 
02 SC 2040) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Raul J. Walters, d/b/a Lake Geneva  
Centre,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
National Properties, LLC,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Horizon Properties, Inc., and Horizon  
Convenience Stores, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a decision 
of the court of appeals, Walters v. National Properties, LLC, 
No. 2003AP862, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 
2004).  In this small claims landlord-tenant dispute, we are 
asked to decide whether the landlord, Raul J. Walters (Walters), 
lawfully 
evicted 
his 
tenant, 
National 
Properties, 
LLC 
(National).  National points to differences between the terms in 
its lease and the allegedly ambiguous and arguably more lenient 
No. 2003AP862 
2 
 
terms in the default notice it received.  National contends that 
because of these ambiguities and inconsistencies, it is entitled 
to rely on the default notice.  We agree.  However, even though 
we adopt National's ambiguity argument and permit it to rely on 
the default notice, National still did not timely cure its 
default.  We therefore conclude that the eviction was lawful, 
and we affirm the court of appeals.   
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶2 
The facts are not in dispute.  Walters, d/b/a Lake 
Geneva Shopping Centre, operates a shopping mall in Lake Geneva.  
On December 23, 1993, Walters entered a ten-year renewable lease 
agreement with Horizon Convenience Stores, Inc. (Horizon).  The 
leased space consisted of a gasoline station and convenience 
store.  On August 15, 1997, Horizon assigned its interest in the 
lease to National.  The lease requires National to pay a fixed 
rent in equal monthly installments, due on the first day of each 
month.  Additionally, National must pay a variable amount based 
on its monthly and yearly sales.  National must also pay 
property taxes.  To allow Walters to verify the amount of 
variable rent due, the lease requires National to report its 
total monthly sales as part of each month's rent payment; 
National also must annually report its yearly sales.  Two other 
paragraphs——¶18 
and 
¶22——in 
the 
lease 
are 
of 
particular 
importance to this case: 
18. DEFAULT AND BANKRUPTCY.  If LESSEE should 
default in the payment of any rental or monies due 
hereunder, when due, or be in default of any covenant, 
agreement or condition herein . . . then upon the 
No. 2003AP862 
3 
 
occurrence of any one or more of such contingencies 
and after the LESSEE has been given notice by 
certified mail of such default, LESSEE has thirty (30) 
days after the date of such notice to correct such 
default or defaults.  If no such corrections are made, 
this lease is canceled and all rights of the LESSEE 
are terminated. 
. . . .  
22. NOTICE.  All notices to be given to either 
party by the other shall be by Certified or Registered 
Mail, return receipt requested, whether or not it is 
specifically 
designated 
as 
such 
in 
this 
lease 
agreement.   . . .  The time of any such notice shall 
begin to run with the date of the mailing of such 
notice.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶3 
National did not submit the rent payment due September 
1, 2002.  Consequently, Walters mailed a default notice on 
September 13, 2002.  He sent the notice by certified mail, 
pursuant to the lease.  The date "September 13, 2002" was 
typewritten on the notice.  National received the notice on 
September 16, 2002.  The notice alleged that National was in 
default in four ways: (1) Past due rent in the amount of 
$3421.42; (2) Failure to provide copies of all monthly sales 
receipts on a monthly basis; (3) Failure to provide annual sales 
information; and (4) Failure to pay real estate taxes for 2001.  
The notice also stated: 
[U]nless such defaults are resolved on or before the 
expiration of thirty (30) days after service of this 
Notice, Landlord will exercise its remedies under the 
Lease, including . . . the right to terminate your 
right to possession of the premises.   
Only FULL PAYMENT of the rent demanded in this 
Notice will waive the Landlord's right to terminate 
possession under this Notice, unless Landlord agrees 
No. 2003AP862 
4 
 
in writing to continue possession in exchange for 
receiving partial payment.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶4 
On October 15, 2002, National mailed a check for the 
overdue rent to Walters.  This payment covered only the non-
variable portion of the rent.  Walters received the payment on 
October 17, 2002. 
¶5 
Believing that National's response was untimely and 
incomplete, Walters attempted to evict National.  On November 1, 
2002, Walters filed suit in Walworth County Circuit Court 
seeking National's eviction for failure to timely cure the 
"fixed monthly rent" part of the default and failure to cure the 
other parts of the default, including the payment of the 
variable part of the rent and the submission of monthly and 
annual receipts.  On March 14, 2003, the circuit court entered 
judgment for Walters, evicting National.  Circuit Judge John R. 
Race held that the language in the lease controlled: "My 
decision is that the landlord by mailing had accomplished the 
notice requirements and he used the word service, a verb.  And I 
believe that he complied with the lease by putting it in the 
mail."  The court of appeals affirmed on the same grounds and we 
subsequently granted review. 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶6 
When we apply undisputed facts to the terms of a 
commercial lease, and determine the parties' rights under that 
lease, we exercise de novo review.  Westhaven Assoc., Ltd. v. 
C.C. of Madison, Inc., 2002 WI App 230, ¶16, 257 Wis. 2d 789, 
No. 2003AP862 
5 
 
652 N.W.2d 819; Bence v. Spinato, 196 Wis. 2d 398, 408, 538 
N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1995).   
¶7 
State statutes govern procedures for evicting a tenant 
who fails to pay rent or otherwise breaches the lease.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 704.17(3)(a) (2001-02)1 describes the default 
notice that a landlord must provide to a tenant holding a lease 
of duration longer than one year.  However, the statute allows a 
lease for more than one year to contain contrary termination 
provisions 
that 
will 
override 
subsection 
(3).  
Wis. Stat. § 704.17(5).  The lease at issue covered more than 
one year and included specific provisions on termination.  
Therefore, in this case, we review the lease provisions, not the 
statute. 
¶8 
This case is unusual because the language in the 
default notice is not precisely the same as the language in the 
lease.  As a result, we must resolve the threshold question of 
whether the "date of service" provision in the notice supersedes 
the "date of mailing" provision in the lease, in determining 
when the thirty-day cure period begins, if we deem the two 
provisions inconsistent. 
¶9 
This question is further complicated by paragraph 18 
of the lease.  Paragraph 18 states that the tenant shall have 
thirty days "after the date of such notice," while paragraph 22 
provides that the thirty-day period begins to run with the "date 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP862 
6 
 
of the mailing of such notice."  Both of these dates may be 
different from the "date of service" referenced in the default 
notice, depending upon the definition of "service." 
¶10 National admits that under the lease, Walters could 
have demanded payment within thirty days from the date of 
mailing of the default notice.  Clearly, the lease directs that 
the date of mailing of the notice, September 13, is effectively 
the beginning of the thirty-day cure period.  National's 
strategy is different.  It does not attack the lease provisions 
in any way; it argues that we should ignore the lease provisions 
because Walters worded his notice differently.  The default 
notice stated on its face that National had to make payment 
before "the expiration of thirty (30) days after service of this 
Notice."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶11 For his part, Walters claims that the language in the 
notice, "thirty (30) days after service of this Notice," simply 
mirrors the language in the lease, "thirty (30) days after the 
date of such notice."  As we see it, "notice" could be 
interpreted 
to 
mean 
the 
same 
thing 
as 
"service," 
an 
interpretation favorable to the tenant.  It is more difficult to 
interpret "mailing" to mean the same thing as "service," an 
interpretation desired by the landlord.  With perfect hindsight, 
we observe that if the landlord wanted his notice to accurately 
mirror his lease, he should have used identical language in the 
two documents.  That would have produced clarity and ensured the 
unquestioned primacy of the lease.  Here, Walters did not copy 
No. 2003AP862 
7 
 
the lease language in the notice; instead, he chose alternative 
wording.2 
¶12 We conclude that 
Walters' 
choice 
of 
alternative 
wording rendered the notice ambiguous.  A reasonable tenant 
evaluating his options might have perceived the following: (1) 
Paragraph 18 of the lease states that the lessee has thirty days 
after "the date of such notice;" (2) Paragraph 22 of the lease 
states that the lessee has thirty days from "the date of the 
mailing of such notice;" (3) the notice states that the lessee 
must resolve the defaults within "thirty days after service of 
this Notice;" (4) both the lease and the notice are silent on 
the definition of "service."  There is no way for the lessee to 
                                                 
2 In some cases, equitable estoppel might bar a landlord in 
Walters' position from subsequently relying on the lease 
provisions. 
Three elements are required to support application of 
equitable estoppel: (1) an action or inaction; (2) that induces 
reliance by another; (3) to his detriment.  Randy A.J. v. Norma 
I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶26, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630.  
Equitable estoppel is not limited to claims brought in equity; 
it may also apply to "preclude the assertion of rights and 
liabilities under a note or contract."  Gabriel v. Gabriel, 57 
Wis. 2d 424, 428, 204 N.W.2d 494 (1973) (citing 31 C.J.S. 
Estoppel § 151). 
National does not argue that it relied on the notice to its 
detriment.  In fact, it does not invoke the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel at all.  Thus, we disregard the theory.  We 
note, however, that even if we had considered it, the result in 
this case would be the same.  Equitable estoppel would allow 
National to rely on the language of the default notice, but it 
failed to comply with the terms of the notice. 
No. 2003AP862 
8 
 
determine what "service" means without reference to extraneous 
sources.3 
¶13 In situations like these, this court has traditionally 
adhered to the deeply rooted doctrine of contra proferentem, a 
universally accepted legal maxim that any ambiguities in a 
document are to be construed unfavorably to the drafter.  
Black's Law Dictionary 328 (7th ed. 1999).4  Since this court's 
earliest days, we have recognized its validity.  See, e.g., Lawe 
v. Hyde, 39 Wis. 345, 359 (1876).  Although the rule is most 
often used to interpret the terms of a contract, see, e.g., 
Seitzinger v. Community Health Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶22, 270 
Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426, it has also been applied to documents 
such as settlement offers, Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 2003 WI App 120, 
¶39, 265 Wis. 2d 631, 666 N.W.2d 88; Stan's Lumber, Inc. v. 
Fleming, 196 Wis. 2d 554, 576, 538 N.W.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1995), 
and exculpatory clauses, Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210-
11, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982).  We see no reason why it should not 
also apply to the ancillary notice of eviction that Walters 
drafted pursuant to the termination procedure spelled out in the 
lease contract. 
                                                 
3 For example, a tenant familiar with the legal system might 
refer to Wis. Stat. § 801.14, which governs "Service and filing 
of pleadings and other papers," or even Wis. Stat. § 801.11, 
"Personal jurisdiction, manner of serving summons for."   
4 For a recent discussion, see State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶44, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 
683 N.W.2d 75.   
No. 2003AP862 
9 
 
¶14 Under this canon of interpretation, courts construe 
ambiguous language "most strongly" against the drafter.  Moran 
v. Shern, 60 Wis. 2d 39, 49, 208 N.W.2d 348 (1973); accord 
Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 
N.W.2d 832.  The rule is often applied to "aid a party whose 
bargaining power was less than that of the draftsperson."  5 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.27, at 292 (Kniffen & Perillo 
ed. 1998).  The Restatement of Contracts contains a similar 
provision: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party who 
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1979).  The comments to 
Section 206 explain that the drafting party is more likely to 
perceive areas of ambiguity, or even to intentionally create 
ambiguity, intending to put forth a particular interpretation at 
a later date.  Id., cmt. a.   
¶15 Using these principles, we note that Walters drafted 
both the lease and the notice.  He had every opportunity to 
ensure clarity by employing consistency, both internally within 
the lease and between the lease and the notice.  He did not.  
Walters urges that the notice's language, "service of this 
notice," is functionally equivalent to the lease term, "the date 
of such notice," and therefore the mailing date still marks the 
beginning of the thirty-day time period.  We reject this 
argument because, applying the rule that ambiguity is construed 
against the drafter, we cannot allow Walters to mechanically 
No. 2003AP862 
10 
 
equate the lease language with the default notice language.  
Rather, we must analyze what the language in the notice required 
of National in order to cure its default.  
¶16 National relies on Hotel Hay Corp. v. Milner Hotels, 
Inc., 255 Wis. 482, 39 N.W.2d 363 (1949), and Boeck v. State 
Highway Commission, 36 Wis. 2d 440, 153 N.W.2d 610 (1967), to 
support its argument that the notice is not effective until the 
date of service.  In Hotel Hay, this court held that, absent 
anything to the contrary in the lease, a default notice became 
effective at the time of delivery.  The court stated: 
The nature of notice required by contract depends, of 
course, upon the provisions of the contract. . . .  In 
the absence of custom, statute, estoppel, or express 
contract stipulation, when a notice, affecting a 
right, is sought to be served by mail, the service is 
not effected until the notice comes into the hands of 
the one to be served, and he acquires knowledge of its 
contents.   
Hotel Hay, 255 Wis. at 486 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted).   
¶17 In Boeck, the court reiterated the Hotel Hay rule that 
in the absence of more specific provision in a statute or a 
contract, a notice does not become effective until it is served 
on a party.  Boeck, 36 Wis. 2d at 444.  In Boeck, though, a 
statutory provision clearly governed service of the notice at 
issue.  Id.  Hence, far from making any sort of statement that 
the date of service of the notice always governs, the court in 
that case relied upon a statute.   
No. 2003AP862 
11 
 
¶18 If the terms of the lease are to control, superseding 
Wis. Stat. § 704.17(3)(a), the principles in the Hotel Hay case, 
and any other document, they must be clear and consistent 
internally and not be undermined by a subsequent Lessor-drafted 
document. 
¶19 In this case, we need not decide whether the notice is 
functionally equivalent to the lease.  There is sufficient 
ambiguity in the two documents that National is entitled to rely 
on the notice, interpreted to require receipt.  This is a hollow 
victory, however, because National did not comply with the 
notice either.   
¶20 Walters mailed the default notice on September 13.  
National received it on September 16.  National mailed its 
response, including a check to cure the monetary part of the 
default, on October 15.  Walters received the response on 
October 17.  Therefore, while 32 days elapsed between the two 
mailing dates, 31 days elapsed between the two dates of receipt.   
¶21 The only way National can prevail is if we measure the 
time period between National's receipt of the notice on 
September 16 and the mailing date of its response on October 15 
(29 days).  We decline to accept such a convoluted combination 
of the notice and the lease.  National cannot have it both ways; 
either the dates of receipt control, or the dates of mailing 
control.  National wants to hold Walters to one standard (the 
date of receipt, as expressed in the default notice) while it 
obeys another (the date of mailing, as expressed in the lease).  
As we have noted, under the doctrine of contra proferentem, the 
No. 2003AP862 
12 
 
language in the notice must be interpreted favorably to 
National.  But the doctrine has its limits.  While the doctrine 
allows us to construe the ambiguity in National's favor, so that 
it can rely on the notice, the doctrine does not allow us to 
completely ignore language within the notice.  It would be 
fundamentally 
unfair 
to 
allow 
National 
to 
rely 
on 
some 
provisions in the notice while effectively deleting others. 
¶22 The notice states that "such defaults" (presumably, 
the four defaults mentioned in the notice) must be "resolved" 
within thirty days.5  By mailing the past due rent, National 
attempted to cure only one of the four parts of its default.  It 
also did not cure timely its failure to provide monthly or 
annual sales figures, or its failure to pay property taxes.  It 
was in default long past thirty days, and we cannot say that it 
"resolved" all the defaults.  Accordingly, Walters was entitled 
to eviction of National. 
 
 
                                                 
5 National argues that later in the notice, Walters stated 
that "[o]nly FULL PAYMENT of the rent demanded in this Notice 
will waive the Landlord's right to terminate possession under 
this Notice."  National argues that we should interpret this 
clause to mean that it only had to cure one of the four 
defaults——namely, the fixed rent.  It fails to realize, however, 
that it may have had to pay additional "rent" based on its 
monthly or annual sales receipts, and it did not submit those in 
a timely manner.  Therefore, without submitting the receipts as 
required, it cannot show that it submitted the "rent" necessary 
to cure its default.  Moreover, looking at the entire provision, 
we think National is attempting to take the "FULL PAYMENT" 
clause out of context. 
No. 2003AP862 
13 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶23 We conclude that because of the ambiguous nature of 
the default notice and the lease, National had the right to rely 
on the terms in the default notice.  In general, landlords 
should be held to the language in the notices they send.  We 
have no doubt that ordinarily, landlords will fully exercise 
their rights under the lease——indeed, the wisest course would be 
to copy the lease language in the notice, and we have been 
presented with no explanation why the landlord did not do that 
here.  In any event, National did not comply with the default 
notice's terms, and accordingly Walters lawfully evicted it.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶24 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the majority opinion on several issues: 
1. Both the default notice and the lease in the 
instant case are ambiguous about curing a default, whether 
the documents are read independently or together.  
2. When provisions in a default notice differ from 
those in a lease, the terms of the default notice control 
if the terms of the default notice are more favorable to 
the tenant.  Accordingly, the default notice provision 
controls as to the calculation of the 30-day period in the 
instant case. 
3. 
The 
general 
interpretive 
rule 
applicable 
to 
ambiguous documents is to construe them against the 
drafter.  The Landlord drafted the lease and default notice 
in the instant case; therefore, those documents are 
construed against the Landlord.   
¶25 I disagree with 
the 
majority 
opinion's ultimate 
conclusion because it is inconsistent with this applicable 
interpretive rule.   
¶26 The default notice——the governing instrument here——
provides that "unless [the specified] defaults are resolved on 
or before the expiration of thirty (30) days after service of 
this 
Notice, 
Landlord 
will 
exercise 
its 
remedies . . . including . . . the 
right 
to 
terminate 
[the 
Tenant's] right to possession."  The Landlord is exercising its 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
2 
 
right to terminate the Tenant's possession under the default 
notice. 
¶27 The 
Landlord 
mailed 
the 
default 
notice 
(dated 
September 13, 2002) by certified mail on September 13, 2002.  
The Tenant received the notice on September 16, 2002.     
¶28 What 
is 
the 
date 
of 
"service" 
of 
the 
notice?  
September 13 or September 16?  The calculation of the date of 
"service" of the notice is not set forth in the default notice 
or the lease.6  Apparently relying on the Hotel Hay case7 (which 
is factually distinguishable), but without fully explaining its 
interpretation, the majority opinion interprets the date of 
"service" of the notice as the date the Tenant received the 
notice.   
¶29 Applying the governing interpretive rule, I would 
interpret the default notice against the Landlord, the drafter, 
and would conclude that service of the notice starting the 30-
day period means the date the Tenant received the notice.  By 
using this date the Tenant will have more time to cure the 
default than if service of the notice were interpreted as the 
date of mailing. 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶8.  The lease does not use the word 
"service"; it addresses the date of the notice (apparently 
September 13 here) and the date of the mailing of the notice 
(apparently September 13 here) as beginning the 30-day cure 
period. 
7 Hotel Hay Corp. v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 255 Wis. 482, 486-
87, 39 N.W.2d 363 (1949) (relying on the terms of the lease and 
Corpus Juris for the principle that service of a notice is not 
effected until receipt). 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶30 I now turn to calculating the date by which the Tenant 
must "resolve[]" the default under the default notice.  Although 
it is clear that the Tenant may resolve the default by paying 
the rent, the notice is silent about calculating the date rent 
was paid for purposes of calculating the end of the 30-day 
period.  Must the Tenant personally hand over the money to the 
Landlord within the 30-day period after receipt of the default 
notice?  Or may the Tenant merely place the payment in the mail 
properly addressed to the Landlord within the 30-day period?  
Or, if the Tenant mails the payment, must the Landlord actually 
receive the mailing within the 30-day period? 
¶31 The majority opinion concludes that because it defines 
service of the notice as the date the Tenant receives the 
notice, it must define the date of resolution of the default as 
the date the Landlord receives the rent payment.  "Why so?" I 
ask.  Because, responds the majority, the date of receipt of 
service is derived from the default notice, while the date of 
mailing of payment is derived from the lease.8  The majority will 
not allow the Tenant to "have it both ways,"9 to have a 
"convoluted combination of the notice and the lease,"10 that is, 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶21. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
4 
 
the Tenant cannot mix and match provisions from the notice and 
the lease.11  
 
¶32 Assuming for the sake of argument that the majority 
opinion's principle against mixing and matching is sound, the 
principle has no application to the instant case.  The Tenant's 
practice has been to mail the rent payment to the Landlord.  The 
lease provides that the rent is due on the first of the month 
but that interest will not begin to accrue unless the Landlord 
receives the payment after the seventh of the month.12  These 
provisions simply do not specify whether mailing or receipt of 
payment was to occur by the first of the month.  Therefore, the 
lease itself refutes the majority opinion's conclusion that the 
Tenant's definition of "payment" derives from the lease. 
¶33 The majority opinion goes on to state that the 
Tenant's interpretation would require the court to "completely 
ignore language within the notice" and would allow the Tenant 
"to rely on some provisions in the notice while effectively 
deleting others."13  Yet the majority fails to cite any such 
                                                 
11 The Tenant does argue that the language of the lease 
implies that rent is paid upon mailing to support its argument 
that the language of the notice implies the same.  I do not rely 
on this argument. 
12 Paragraph 3 of the lease provides, "LESSEE agrees and 
covenants to pay LESSOR . . . an annual fixed rent . . . payable 
in advance in equal monthly installments on the first day of 
each and every calendar month during the term of this Lease and 
any extension thereof.  If any payment of rent is not received 
by the seventh (7th) day of the month in which it is due and 
LESSOR notifies LESSEE of the same, it is agreed that a one and 
one half percent (1.5%) penalty per month shall be due LESSOR." 
13 Majority op., ¶21. 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
5 
 
provisions.  Thus, the majority opinion implies that the default 
notice provides that the Landlord must receive the payment of 
rent by the end of the 30-day period.   
¶34 The majority opinion adopts the arbitrary rule that 
"either the dates of receipt control, or the dates of mailing 
control."14  The majority opinion ultimately justifies this rule 
by claiming that any other interpretation of the time period 
would be "fundamentally unfair,"15 but it fails to identify any 
fundamental unfairness.  Furthermore, the majority opinion does 
not clarify whether its rule of construction applies in all 
cases or only in the instant case. 
¶35 Faced with two ambiguous documents, I would in the 
instant case interpret the 30-day period examining only the 
default notice, which sets forth the 30-day period.  Given that 
the default notice is unclear as to both the date of service and 
the date of payment, I would adhere to the rule that an 
ambiguous document should be interpreted against the drafter.  
Accordingly, 
I 
would 
give 
the 
Tenant 
the 
advantage 
in 
calculating both the date of service and the date of payment.  I 
would say that the service of the notice is the date of receipt 
by the Tenant and that the date of payment of the rent is the 
date the Tenant mails the payment.   
¶36 Unlike in many eviction actions, in the instant case 
the parties were represented by counsel.  A typical tenant 
facing eviction and a typical landlord seeking eviction often 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
6 
 
appear in a busy small claims court without representation.  
Because of the press of business, the court usually has a very 
limited time in which to make a decision and does not have the 
benefit of written or oral argument by counsel or the parties.  
¶37 The majority opinion today passes up an opportunity to 
provide guidance to circuit courts in eviction cases.  The 
majority opinion states the interpretive rule correctly but 
inexplicably never applies it either in defining the date of 
service on the Tenant or in defining the Tenant's date of 
payment to the Landlord.  I would have had this court state that 
in an eviction action in which both the lease and the default 
notice were drafted by the landlord and are ambiguous, the 
tenant is entitled to rely on the interpretation of the document 
most favorable to the tenant.16  
¶38 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Another issue is not sufficiently addressed in the briefs 
or the majority opinion, see majority op., ¶22, namely whether 
the Tenant loses anyway because it did not timely cure the non-
monetary defaults specified in the notice.  I therefore do not 
address that issue.   
No.  2003AP862.ssa 
 
 
 
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