Title: Cupola Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Cupola Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley (2005-081); 179 Vt. 427; 898 A.2d 134

2006 VT 25

[Filed 14-Apr-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 25

                                No. 2005-081


  Cupola Golf Course, Inc. and John Larkin       Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Chittenden Superior Court


  John A. Dooley III and Sandra A. Dooley        November Term, 2005


  Alan W. Cheever, J.

  Liam Murphy and Pamela Moreau, Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

  Paul S. Gillies of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for
    Defendants-Appellants.


  PRESENT:  Barney, C.J. (Ret.), and Dier (Ret.), Martin, (Ret.) and 
            Maloney (Ret.), Supr. J., and McCaffrey, D.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  PER CURIAM.   This litigation is about the protection of a
  view; in particular, the view from the living room windows of the home of
  Defendants John and Sandra Dooley ("Homeowners").  Homeowners' lot slopes
  steeply from west to east.  The street level of the residence, facing west
  on East Terrace Street, becomes the second-floor level of the residence. 
  Homeowners' living room windows, located on this second-floor level, frame
  a view toward the east.  Looking east from these windows, across the land
  owned by Plaintiffs Cupola Golf Course, Inc. and John Larkin
  ("Developers"), one can see Interstate 89, shopping malls, and on the
  horizon, a panoramic view of the mountains centering on the Mt. Mansfield
  "profile."    

       ¶  2.  Homeowners acquired this premises through a series of
  conveyances beginning with a deed from Roland and Evangeline DesLauriers to
  Borys and Frida Surawicz in 1956.  Homeowners' deed contains the following
  restrictive covenant:  No building higher than one story shall be erected
  on any land of Grantor lying easterly of the land herein conveyed and lying
  in Green Mountain Park.

       ¶  3.  Homeowners' property is part of the Green Mountain Park
  Subdivision.  The Subdivision was created by the DesLauriers from a parcel
  of land acquired by the DesLauriers from Fred C. Fisk in 1952.  From 1952
  until 1966, the DesLauriers sold lots in the subdivision.  All of these
  lots, including Homeowners' lot, were subject to general Subdivision-wide
  protective covenants.  These general covenants imposed, among other things,
  a two story height restriction on all lots in the Subdivision.  These
  covenants were recorded in Book 22, Page 444 of the South Burlington Land
  Records, and are referenced in Homeowners' chain of title.
  ¶  4.  The DesLauriers sold approximately twenty seven acres of land
  to Cupola Golf Course, Inc., one of the developers in this case. 
  Approximately ten acres of the land acquired by Cupola Golf Course, Inc.
  was later sold to John Larkin, the other developer in this case. 
  Developers' land is part of the Green Mountain Park Subdivision.
   
       ¶  5.  In 1978, Homeowners and other property owners within the
  Subdivision brought a petition for declaratory judgment against Cupola Golf
  Course, Inc., seeking to enforce the general Subdivision covenants as
  recorded in the South Burlington Land Records.  After a ten year
  "languish," a declaratory judgment order was issued in 1989.  This judgment
  specifically extinguished the general Subdivision-wide protective
  covenants. Bingham v. Cupola Golf Course, Inc. (c275 78Cnc).  Among the
  general covenants the court declared unenforceable was the two story height
  restriction on all lots in the Subdivision.   

       ¶  6.  Five years later, Developers brought an action seeking
  declaratory judgment against Homeowners to resolve the issue relating to
  the particular covenant in Homeowners' chain of title.  Developers argued
  that the declaratory judgment in the Bingham case precluded enforcement of
  Homeowners' covenant because the order contained language that "all (other)
  claims and counterclaims are dismissed with prejudice."  Specifically,
  Developers argued that this order operated to make Homeowners' particular
  covenant inoperative and void as a matter of res judicata.  Among other
  claims, Homeowners argued that the issues raised did not yet reach the
  appropriate level of "case or controversy" required by declaratory judgment
  law.  The trial court denied these and other preliminary motions to set
  aside the covenant and proceeded to a hearing on the merits. 
   
       ¶  7.  After taking evidence and conducting a site-visit to view
  Homeowners' property, the trial court made findings and issued a
  declaratory judgment determining that the particular covenant in the
  original Surawicz deed, carried forward in the deed to Homeowners, is
  effective.  The court determined that the term "easterly" in the specific
  covenant means due east.  The court also determined that "no higher than
  one story" meant that any structure on the burdened land could be no more
  than one story, and that the one-story structure could be no greater than
  twenty-six feet in height.  The declaratory judgment states that the
  covenant "impacts a strip of Developers' property east of Homeowners'
  property, as wide as Homeowners lot (approximately 100') and heading due
  east."  The judgment states that "[w]ithin this strip, no building will be
  built higher than 26 feet, and greater than one story, using the
  measurement standards set forth in the South Burlington Ordinance
  referenced in footnote 4."  We affirm.

       ¶  8.  Developers argue that Homeowners' covenant was extinguished
  by the declaratory judgment issued in Bingham in 1989.  As noted above, the
  Bingham court rendered null and void the general Subdivision covenants. 
  Developers' contention focuses upon the following provision in the order: 
  "Except as set forth above, all claims and counterclaims are dismissed with
  prejudice." 

       ¶  9.  Based upon this language, Developers moved for summary judgment
  dismissing Homeowners' claim, arguing that the particular covenant
  contained in Homeowners' deed was extinguished by the 1989 declaratory
  judgment order, and that this claim is barred by res judicata.  Developers
  raised further summary judgment issues, claiming that the covenant was
  voided by the Marketable Record Title Act, 27 V.S.A. § 601, et seq., as
  well as a change of circumstances, statute of limitations, waiver, laches
  and estoppel.  The trial court denied Developers' motions on each of these
  bases.   
   
       ¶  10.  Res judicata is a valuable doctrine of inclusion, founded
  upon the judicial economy and fairness of litigating and disposing of all
  issues involved in a legal dispute where the parties, subject matter and
  causes of action are identical or substantially identical. See Lamb v.
  Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379-380,