Title: Hooten v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

492 So. 2d 948 (1986) James L. HOOTEN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 55563. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 7, 1986. Rehearing Denied August 27, 1986. Merrida P. Coxwell, Jr., Stanfield, Carmody, Coxwell & Creel, Jackson, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Leyser Q. Morris, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and DAN M. LEE and SULLIVAN, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from James L. Hooten's second conviction of murder by a jury in September, 1983. We reversed and remanded Hooten's first conviction in Hooten v. State, 427 So. 2d 1388 (Miss. 1983). The facts surrounding the murder of Reuben Wood are reported in our previous opinion cited above, and need not be restated here. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the fact that a legal writing pad was found near Reuben Wood's body when he was discovered on the morning of November 4, 1977. The State sought to place Hooten at the scene of the crime by proving the legal pad found next to the body had Hooten's handwriting on it. To support their theory the State produced a special agent with the FBI assigned to the document section of the federal laboratory. He came to the conclusion the legal pad contained Hooten's handwriting. To rebut this testimony, defense counsel called Marie B. Hill to testify as an expert in handwriting analysis. After a thorough voir dire on her qualifications, the trial court determined she lacked the educational background to testify in an expert capacity. Defense counsel proffered her testimony, and the record reveals Mrs. Hill came to the opposite conclusion. As a result of this exclusion, the State's evidence establishing Hooten's presence at Reuben Wood's trailer was uncontradicted. We are of the opinion the refusal of the trial court to allow Mrs. Hill to testify as an expert was error. This issue has heretofore been decided by this Court. In Henry v. State, 484 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 1986), we reiterated our well established rules regarding expert witnesses, and stated, "It is not necessary that one offering to testify as an expert be infallible or possess the highest degree of skill; it is sufficient if that person possesses peculiar knowledge or information regarding the relevant subject matter which is not likely to be possessed by a layman. (Cites omitted.)" 484 So. 2d at 1015. In this case, as in the Henry case, Mrs. Hill's testimony was the only challenge to the State's expert placing Hooten at the scene of the crime. Her practical experience in the examination of questioned documents, and frequent court appearances to testify in similar cases places her clearly *949 within the ambit of our rules regarding experts. We emphasize that in situations such as this, attacks on the expert's qualifications and methods are better directed toward the weight of the testimony than its admissibility. Henry v. State, supra. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, dissenting: I would sustain the petition for rehearing, withdraw the original opinion in this case, and affirm. The original opinion, relying on Henry v. State, 484 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 1986), held that it was error for the circuit court to exclude Marie B. Hill as a handwriting expert qualified to express an opinion on whether or not certain handwriting was the defendant's. In my view the original opinion did not address the precise issue with which we as an appellate court are concerned. The question is not whether the circuit court "committed error," as we then stated, but whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit this witness to testify as an expert on the authenticity of handwriting. Since the determination of whether or not a particular witness possesses the necessary qualifications to qualify as an expert is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and as I hope to demonstrate there was no abuse of discretion in this case, I would affirm this case. Let us begin with some basics. First, what is an expert? In Capital Transportation Co. v. Segrest, 254 Miss. 168, 181 So. 2d 111, 120 (1965), we stated: In Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Hollingshead, 236 So. 2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1970), we stated: And, in Ludlow Corp. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 47, 50 (Miss. 1975), we added to the requirement that such witness by his special knowledge be able "to give the jury assistance and guidance in solving some problem which jurors are not able to solve because of their own inadequate knowledge." See: Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So. 2d 181, 185 (Miss. 1974); and Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 366 (Miss. 1985), where we noted Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence is consistent with our established rule regarding the qualifications of an expert. This Rule states: We have also held that the determination of whether a witness has obtained the required degree of specialized knowledge within a particular field to qualify as an expert is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Benoit Gin Co., 248 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1971); Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, supra; Gulf Ins. Co. v. Provine, 321 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1975); Parmes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 440 So. 2d 261 (Miss. 1983); Byrd v. F-S Prestress, Inc., 464 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1985); Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985). In Hardy *950 v. Brantley, supra, we gave the following caveat: 471 So. 2d at 366. Although there have been countless times when this Court has used the word "discretion" in one context or another, I have been unable to find any case in which we have attempted to give its meaning. Reflecting a moment, when we say a court has discretionary authority to say yes or no to a particular question, we must acknowledge it is a question as to which there can be honest disagreement between equally intelligent individuals. If the answer to the question is never uncertain, or never subject to any doubt, there would be no need to vest a court with discretionary authority in its answer. Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or. 247, 486 P.2d 553 (1971), makes the following observations: State v. Winne, 21 N.J. Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65, 78 (1952), states: In State Ex Rel. Simpson v. Vondrasek, 203 Neb. 693, 279 N.W.2d 860, 864 (1979), the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated: The Court then quoted the pragmatic definition given by Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia University Law School: 279 N.W.2d at 865. In People v. Craver, 174 Misc. 325, 20 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup.Ct. 1940), the New York Supreme Court stated: "This Court is careful not to substitute its own discretion for the discretion invested in the trial court." Our inquiry, then is not whether the circuit judge ruled contrary to what one of us might have ruled, not whether he was "right" or "wrong" in our view, but whether he abused his discretion. And, unless the trial court based his decision on an erroneous view of the law, Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So. 2d 657, 661 (Miss. 1985), we are not authorized to reverse for an abuse of discretion unless we find it was *951 "arbitrary and clearly erroneous." Weiss v. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. Co., 7 So. 390 (Miss. 1890). Hill's formal education went no further than high school. She had done some secretarial work in a chancery clerk and law office. While a housewife, and going to school at night studying typing, bookkeeping and secretarial work, she also took a correspondence course with the "International Graph-Analysis Society Institute" in Chicago, finishing an eighteen-month course of 20 lessons in approximately nine months to a year, she said.[1] She had also obtained a "Master's Degree" from this same institution by taking further correspondence courses, the length of which she did not state. The "Institute" teaches entirely by correspondence courses. When she finished her course, for a fee they permitted her to go a graduation in Chicago, wear a cap and gown, and attend all the festivities. There she first met her "professor." According to her, "grapho analysis" is "the art and science of handwriting analysis," and "personality characteristics are the first thing you learn." Her "Master's Degree" was in this field, not in examining questioned documents. To make character analyses, she uses two instruments, a "slant gauge" and a "perspectograph." The first instrument measures the slant in handwriting from which "physical and mental" pressure could be determined. As to the perspectograph: According to her, handwriting is a reflection of what is on a person's mind, and she analyzed this. She testified as follows: This correspondence course was all the training she had received. She completed her correspondence course approximately fifteen years prior to this trial. The only reference she uses when examining documents are her dictionary or some book published by her alma mater. She was asked: Asked if she had attempted to learn anything new about the field of handwriting examination, she replied: She knew nothing about Ardway Hilton, the author of The Scientific Examination of Questioned Documents. She knew nothing about Conway on Evidential Documents. She knew nothing about Wilson R. Harrison, the author of Suspect Documents. As to another eminent authority, Albert Osborn, Hill thought she knew him, and also believed he had gone to the grapho analysis school just as she had, and written a book about it which made him rich. But, she added, "I don't know if he knows any more about it than I do." Hill testified she had been a witness some 300 times in court around this state. At county fairs, malls and shopping centers there are "handwriting computers" which take specimens of handwriting and instantly render statements concerning the personality of the writer. As to these machines, we have the following colloquy between Hill and the state's counsel: Q. You used one. They analyze your handwriting, don't they? The state's handwriting expert was Robert B. Hallett of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hallett received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from New Jersey State College in Trenton, and thereafter was an elementary school teacher and high school coach for ten years. During this time he taught students penmanship. He had been an agent with the FBI for fifteen years. For his first five years he was a field agent, following which he was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory in Washington. He received three years' training in the discipline of examining questionable documents. This consisted of attending regular classes, reading prescribed books, articles and pamphlets, and taking regular tests. At the time of trial he was on a master's program in forensic science at Georgetown University. He had testified in over one hundred cases in forty different states. He was a member of the Mid-Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists and the Document Examiners' Association in Washington, D.C. There was no cross-examination as to his qualifications. While it is beyond dispute, it bears repeating that there is no place in the entire world which equals the FBI Laboratory in Washington in training specialists in the examination of questioned documents. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094, 80 A.L.R.2d 476, 481 (1959). *953 I will concede that we are liberal in this state in permitting a witness with only a modest amount of expertise in a particular field to qualify as an expert witness therein. There is a vast difference, however, between having only a few facts, and having wrong information, on which an opinion is based. Our discourse should begin with the definition of "grapho analysis." Unfortunately, Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary (5th Ed. 1971), which gives approximately a half million defined words, does not include this word. The 1979 college edition of American Heritage Dictionary and the 1960 edition of Webster's New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary have likewise blundered in omitting the word "grapho analysis" from their covers. Webster's 3rd New International, does define graphology: "Graph," of course, is the Greek word for "writing," and "ology" or "logia" is Greek for "the study of" or the "science of." We may conclude that "graphology" literally means the study or science of writing. One would ordinarily presume that "grapho analysis" means an analysis of writing. We need not despair for a more authoritative definition, however, because we have Professor M.N. Bunker's 1972 The Science of Determining Personality by Graphoanalysis. According to him, he is the founder both of the system known as grapho analysis and the International Graphoanalysis Society. Mr. Bunker does not tell us his educational background, whether he ever attained a college degree or not. He indicates he could have attended some business college, somewhere, and that he was in the military service in World War I. He tells us he mastered seventeen types of shorthand, and studied all types of penmanship. Quoting from his Preface: The book's jacket informs the interested that by paying $10.00 for the book, he may also send in a sample of his handwriting, any sample, and he is guaranteed that it will be analyzed by an expert at the international institute. Quoting from the table of contents: He further informs us that the handwriting of Oscar Wilde did not reveal he was a homosexual because it did not bother him. On the other hand the handwriting of Lord Alfred Douglas (whoever he was) reveals that he (page 185): Plates 127 and 128 in Professor Bunker's treatise give us samples of Wilde's and Douglas's handwriting, respectively. His observations continue on page 190: Having read this chapter you will not be immodest to declare yourself an expert on detecting homosexuality in handwriting. *955 Professor Bunker tells us in his questions and answers at the end of chapter 12 that writing with "circles closed with ink and muddy edges on lines" is the "most prominent evidence of strong sex desires." He tells us that "secrecy, muddy writing and letters cramped together" are a "combination of traits" that represent "the most signs of dangerous sex explosions." In answer to question number 4, "Would the combination of heavy muddy domineering and compressed writing be dangerous?", he gives an emphatic YES. In chapter 13 Professor Bunker discusses the handwriting of famous people. Indeed, the noted author W. Somerset Maugham sent him samples of his own handwriting for analysis. Bunkers tells us it revealed Maugham as a great lover of "color," which he demonstrated through "the pictures he painted in words that reached ten thousand times as great an audience as if he had been a Raphael." Since chapter 13 follows on the heels of chapter 12, and its illuminating dissertation on homosexuals, one can only conclude it was a commendable delicacy on Professor Bunker's part not to also tell us another "secret" he surely could discern from Maugham's handwriting, that he was one of England's most prominent homosexuals of this century. In his 230-page Grapho Analysis bible, Professor Bunker does not enlighten us as to how forgeries may be detected, although he intimates on page 220 that his book will enable one to do so. One can only gather Hill got her instruction from this portion of page 220. Bunker's book contains no bibliography, and cites no medical, psychological or scientific treatise as authority for any of his "scientific" grapho analysis pronouncements. Quoting from "Qualification of Examiner of Questioned Documents" from 16 American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts, pp. 482-483: I will give observations from two of the leading authorities on questioned documents in this country and England. Wilbur R. Harrison, Suspect Documents, Their Scientific Examination (1958), page 1: Albert S. Osborn, Disputed Documents, 2nd Ed. (1929): Hallett was asked to compare his expertise and that of a graphologist. Hallett said he was not a grapho analyst, that he had studied to some extent what they did, and it was primarily an effort to determine personality traits through the examination of handwriting. And, it was also used to determine certain disputed documents. World Book Encyclopedia makes the following comment under the heading GRAPHOLOGY: As to whether the circuit judge abused his discretion, was clearly and manifestly wrong in excluding Hill, here is what the Arkansas Supreme Court had to say in Carroll v. State, 276 Ark. 160, 634 S.W.2d 99, 102 (1982): In Minnesota v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Supreme court was faced with an exclusion of a graphoanalysis personality assessment by the trial court. Of course, it is a familiar rule in our state that a layman who has become familiar with a person's handwriting may express an opinion as to whether a certain writing is the genuine handwriting of that person. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Goodman, 166 Miss. 782, 146 So. 128 (1933); McCarty v. Love, 145 Miss. 330, 341, 110 So. 795 (1927). Counsel for Hooten did not attempt to offer her in any other capacity than as an expert. The circuit judge simply ruled Hill did not have the educational background to qualify as an expert witness, and would not permit her to express an opinion as an expert. Can this Court with this background say the lower court judge abused his discretion in so ruling, that he was clearly erroneous? If this witness has indeed testified over 300 times as an expert on discovering spurious handwriting as she claimed, it is an astonishing indictment on the gullibility of lawyers and judges. A reading of some of the recognized authorities in the detection of forged documents reveals that it is a very special skill, first requiring some natural aptitude, followed by careful, protracted training over a period of years. When one considers that the FBI requires three years training in regularly attended classes before it permits an officer of its organization to consider himself a specialist in this discipline, you want to pinch yourself to think it was ever possible for this woman to pass herself off in a court as an expert in this particular type of investigation. Indeed, it takes remarkable ignorance or gall, one or the other, for any lawyer to offer her as an expert on the subject. One lawyer did his homework and exposed her shortcomings. The circuit judge upheld his motion to exclude her testimony as an expert. They both reflected credit on the administration of justice. WALKER, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., join in this opinion. [1] Hill was not quite sure whether or not the answers to all the examination questions were given at the end of her coursebook. [2] This chapter lists the following as technical references: Conway, James V.P.: Evidential Documents. Police Science Series. Charles Thomas, 1959. Harris, John L.: Preparation for Trial From a Document Examiner's Viewpoint. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 1962, 7:351. Harrison, Wilson R.: Suspect Documents, Their Scientific Examination. Praeger, 1958. Hilton, Ordway: Education and Qualification of Examiners of Questioned Documents. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 1956, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35. Hilton, Ordway: Scientific Examination of Documents. Callaghan and Co., Chicago, 1956. * * * * * * Osborn, Albert S.: The Problem of Proof. Boyd Printing Co., 1950. Osborn, Albert S.: Questioned Documents. 2nd ed, Boyd Printing Co., 1952. [3] At least, Scott had tried to read some books on the subject. Hill never has bothered to read any books on forensic document work, said she did not intend to, and already knew all she needed to know. She thus exemplified the one sure sign of a quack: contempt for recognized authorities.