Title: ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON v. EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS; EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS v. ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON v. EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS; EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS v. ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON1985 WY 95703 P.2d 327Case Number: 84-137, 84-138Decided: 07/16/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM 
PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS 
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON, 
APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., 
AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR., 
AND EDITH M. WILLIAMS, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

ALICE T. GREASER, WILLIAM 
PAUL GREASER AND KERRY JOHN GREASER TRUSTEES OF THE GERALD J. GREASER TRUST, AS 
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST OF G.J. GREASER, EDITH B. CHASE AND JACK PATTON, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Rehearing Denied August 
15, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Philip Nicholas 
of Corthell & King, Laramie, for appellants (plaintiffs) in 

No. 84-137 and 
appellees (defendants) in No. 84-138.

Earl L. 
Williams, Jr., Barkley R. Bonine, Laramie, for appellees (plaintiffs) in No. 
84-137 and appellants (defendants) in No. 84-138.

Before* THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,** ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral arguments.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case arose as an 
action by the trustees of the Gerald J. Greaser trust, Edith B. Chase, and Jack 
Patton to enforce a promissory note executed by Earl L. Williams, Jr. and Edith 
M. Williams in the sum of $23,085. The Williamses answered that they had given 
the note in payment of the interest due on a conditional contract for the sale 
of real property and that the subsequent forfeiture of that contract by the 
plaintiffs/sellers caused the note to fail for lack of consideration. The 
defendants counterclaimed for a partial refund of the interest paid under the 
conditional sales contract and for restitution of the down payment and other 
benefits conferred upon the plaintiffs/sellers under the 
contract.

[¶2.]     The trial court 
dismissed the Williamses' claim for a refund of excess interest and entered 
summary judgment against them with respect to their counterclaims for 
restitution. The court agreed with the defendants concerning the enforceability 
of the promissory note and entered summary judgment in their favor. Both sides 
have appealed the trial court's rulings.

[¶3.]     Our review of the 
record reveals that questions of fact exist which are material to the 
plaintiffs' right to recover on the promissory note. We will, therefore, reverse 
the summary judgment entered against them. We will affirm the trial court's 
rulings in all other respects.

FACTS

[¶4.]     On November 29, 1978, 
G.J. Greaser, Alice T. Greaser, Edith B. Chase and Jack Patton, as sellers, 
entered into a Real Estate Sales Contract with Earl L. Williams, Jr. and Edith 
M. Williams, as buyers. The contract described, in terms of lots and blocks, a 
parcel of land in Albany 
County, Wyoming, 
"containing 15 acres more or less." The contract specified a total sale price of 
$300,000, with $15,000 to be paid initially and the balance to be paid in ten 
annual installments beginning November 29, 1979. Interest was payable annually 
at the rate of nine percent on the unpaid balance. Paragraph (5) of the contract 
provided that the buyers would receive an acre of land for each $20,000 paid on 
the principal: 

"That BUYERS shall 
receive the Deed to any of the above acreage of their choice from time to time 
by paying to the escrow agent the sum of $20,000.00 per acre, which sum is to be 
credited to the reduction of the principal, plus interest upon the unpaid 
balance from date of last payment on the contract. Deeds containing said acreage 
tracts pursuant to this provision shall always involve contiguous descriptions 
with the borders of the above tract. The $15,000.00 initial payment cannot be 
applied toward releasing acreage under this 
sub-paragraph."

The buyers 
agreed to contribute one-half of the land necessary for streets on the east and 
west sides of the subject property and to pay for their share of street 
improvements at the time of installation. The sellers had the right to declare a 
forfeiture of the contract upon the buyers' default:

"IT IS FURTHER EXPRESSLY 
AGREED that time is of the essence of this agreement and the failure on the part 
of the BUYERS to keep and perform any of the conditions herein provided for, 
shall work a forfeiture of this agreement at the option of the SELLERS, and the 
SELLERS shall have the right to take immediate possession of said remaining 
premises or to institute legal proceedings to recover for the breach of the 
terms hereof and for the unpaid balance in full remaining unpaid on this 
contract, and the BUYERS agree in case of such default and upon written demand 
of the SELLERS, either in person or by registered letter, that the BUYERS will 
deliver up possession of said premises and all sums paid by the BUYERS hereunder 
shall be forfeited to the SELLERS."

[¶5.]     The parties 
subsequently entered into an agreement to correct an error in the property 
description in the Real Estate Sales Contract. The new agreement expressly 
provided that all other terms and conditions of the original contract would 
remain unchanged.

[¶6.]     The Williamses made the 
down payment of $15,000 in November, 1978, and paid the first installment of 
$28,500 toward the principal and $25,650 in interest in November, 1979. In 
exchange for their payment of $28,500 on the principal, the Williamses received 
a deed to 1.425 acres of the land.

[¶7.]     The following year, 
instead of paying the second installment, the buyers executed the promissory 
note which is the subject of this lawsuit. The note was issued for the amount of 
accrued interest under the Real Estate Sales Contract and was made payable to 
the sellers on November 29, 1981, one year after the date of the note. The 
parties disagree as to whether the note was given in partial payment of the 
amount due under the sales contract or to induce the sellers to forbear 
declaring a forfeiture.

[¶8.]     In any event, the 
sellers did not exercise their rights to terminate the Real Estate Sales 
Contract, although the buyers failed to pay the 1980 and 1981 installments. On 
August 3, 1982, the sellers, acting through their agent, Paul Greaser, sent a 
letter to Mr. Williams, proposing a means by which the buyers could cure their 
default. The sellers offered to maintain the contract in effect if the buyers 
would agree to an increase in the annual rate of interest to 15 1/2 percent on 
the amounts due under the sales contract and the promissory note and would pay 
all sums due under both agreements by August 31, 1982. The letter stated that 
the sellers intended to give notice of default and to declare the sales contract 
null and void if the Williamses failed to accept the proposal or failed to bring 
their payments current by August 31, 1982. The letter further informed the 
buyers that in the event of forfeiture of the contract,

"* * * the personal note 
you signed would still be outstanding."

The Williamses 
accepted the terms of the proposal by signing the letter on August 9, 1982. They 
expressly noted that their acceptance of the proposal did not constitute a 
waiver of any rights they had or would have under the sales 
contract.

[¶9.]     The buyers failed to 
abide by the terms of the August, 1982, letter agreement. Accordingly, on 
November 3, 1982, Paul Greaser, acting on behalf of "Chase, Patton and Greaser, 
Sellers," sent written notice to the Williamses, declaring the Real Estate Sales 
Contract to be in default and demanding possession of the 
property:

"Please be advised that 
the above referenced contract [Real Estate Sales Contract, dated November 29, 
1978, Chase, Patton and Greaser, Sellers] is in default and pursuant to the 
terms of the contract, this letter is formal notice to you of your default under 
the terms and conditions of said contract and our written demand for you to 
deliver up possession of the premises immediately. We intend to terminate the 
escrow account located at the First Wyoming Bank and obtain possession of all 
documents contained therein."

The notice also 
demanded payment of all sums due under the promissory 
note:

"You should also be 
advised that we are in possession of your Promissory Note dated November 29, 
1980 in the original principal amount of $23,085.00, which note bears interest 
at the rate of 10% from said date. Demand is hereby made of all sums due 
pursuant to said note, the interest due thereon being approximately $4,600.00 
together with the original principal amount of $23,085.00, making the total 
amount due approximately $27,685.00."

[¶10.]  The sellers subsequently withdrew from 
escrow all documents pertaining to the sale and retained the $15,000 initial 
payment plus the value of various improvements to the land as liquidated 
damages. The improvements consist of a street and a water line installed by the 
Williamses at a total cost of $92,586.33. Notwithstanding their formal 
declaration of forfeiture, the sellers have offered to accept full performance 
of the contract by the buyers.

[¶11.]  When the Williamses failed to pay the 
amounts due under the promissory note, the trustees of the Gerald J. Greaser 
trust, successor in interest to payee G.J. Greaser, deceased, and payees Chase 
and Patton initiated this action. The Williamses counterclaimed for restitution 
and adjustment of interest payments under the terminated Real Estate Sales 
Contract. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim for a refund of excess 
interest, as failing to state a basis for relief. The plaintiffs then filed a 
motion for summary judgment, but did not file a supporting affidavit until 
approximately one week later. The district court denied the motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that the supporting affidavit was untimely and could not be 
considered under this court's holding in DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979). The plaintiffs filed a second motion for 
summary judgment, supported by the pleadings and the previously filed affidavits 
of Paul Greaser and Earl Williams. The trial court entered summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs with respect to their claim on the promissory note and 
against the Williamses on their counterclaims for restitution. All parties have 
appealed.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12.]  The trustees of the Gerald J. Greaser 
trust, Edith B. Chase and Jack Patton present the following issue for 
review:

"[Defendants/Buyers] 
executed a promissory note to [Plaintiffs/Sellers] in the amount of interest 
accrued on a contract for sale of real property to induce [the 
Plaintiffs/Sellers] not to declare a default. Was that note supported by 
consideration?"

[¶13.]  The Williamses question the factual and 
legal bases for summary judgment on their counterclaims:

"1. The first issue 
presented for review is whether the facts averred to in the affidavits are 
material to the causes of action named in the [Defendants/Buyers'] Counterclaim 
for return of the Fifteen Thousand Dollars paid for the purchase of land, which 
was misdescribed by the [Plaintiffs/Sellers]; for return of money spent by 
[Defendants/Buyers] for permanent improvements on the land for which 
[Plaintiffs/Sellers] control documents of ownership; and for return of interest 
overpaid because of [Plaintiffs/Sellers'] misdescription of the tract of 
land.

"2. The second issue 
presented for review is whether, as a matter of law, the [Plaintiffs/Sellers] 
are entitled to summary judgment and retain moneys under their contract which 
misdescribed the tract of land to be conveyed, which provided for the conveyance 
of portions of the land upon payment and which was never terminated by a party 
to the contract."

[¶14.]  Our review of these questions is governed 
by the fundamental rule that summary judgment properly issues only upon the dual 
findings that no genuine question of material fact exists and that the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984); Matter of Estate of Brosius, Wyo., 
683 P.2d 663 (1984). To determine the propriety of a summary judgment, we must 
examine the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
summary judgment was entered and give to that party the benefit of all 
inferences which properly can be drawn from the available evidence. Rompf 
v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., supra. If we find that an inquiry into the 
facts was necessary for the proper application of the law, we must overturn the 
summary judgment. Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 443, 446 (1982).

[¶15.]  With these standards in mind, we will 
consider first the facts and law which control the plaintiffs' rights to enforce 
the promissory note. We will then examine the defendants' rights upon 
termination of the Real Estate Sales Contract to recover (1) the $15,000 initial 
payment, (2) the value of improvements to the land, and (3) $969.93 in interest 
allegedly overpaid as a result of a mistake in the property description set out 
in the contract. Finally, we will consider the defendants' contention that the 
district court had no authority to grant the plaintiffs' second motion for 
summary judgment following denial of their first motion.

ENFORCEABILITY OF THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE

[¶16.]  The district court concluded that the 
promissory note was given "in lieu of required cash payments" under the Real 
Estate Sales Contract. Citing this court's holding in Portner v. Tanner, 30 Wyo. 85, 216 P. 1069, 30 A.L.R. 624 (1923), the trial court reasoned that the plaintiffs could 
not forfeit the sales contract and then, at a later date, attempt to collect 
payments owed under that contract. The district court judge entered summary 
judgment in favor of the makers of the note, holding

"* * * the plaintiff 
cannot forfeit the contract at one time and then sue for recovery of payments 
not made at a later date. * * * [W]hen the plaintiffs terminate the contract, 
they abandon all rights to recover any money due which has not actually been 
paid."

[¶17.]  In Portner v. Tanner, supra, the buyer had 
given the seller two checks as initial payment on an installment contract for 
the deed to real property. The buyer stopped payment on the checks and failed to 
make any of the monthly payments under the contract. The seller sold the 
property to another individual and brought an action on the countermanded 
checks. This court held that the seller could not disaffirm the contract and 
then maintain an action to recover the unpaid purchase money. The court reasoned 
that the checks, like a note given in pursuance of an agreement, were merely 
evidence of an indebtedness stemming directly from the agreement. Since 
execution of the contract provided consideration for the checks, forfeiture of 
the contract rendered the checks null and void.

[¶18.]  The plaintiffs in the instant case 
contend that the holding in Portner v. 
Tanner does not apply since the promissory note at issue here was given not 
as payment toward the purchase price, but to induce the sellers to refrain from 
terminating the contract. Plaintiffs urge that their forbearance constituted 
valid consideration for the note, independent of the conditional sales contract. 

[¶19.]  We recognize that a promise to forbear 
exercising one's rights can supply the consideration necessary to support a 
contract. Laibly v. Halseth, Wyo., 345 P.2d 796, 799 (1959); Horvath v. 
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315, 331 (1942). We also 
recognize that the sellers cannot terminate a conditional sales contract and 
then recover a past-due payment evidenced by a promissory note. Portner v. Tanner, supra. Thus, the 
plaintiffs' right to recovery in the case at bar depends upon whether the note 
was given in exchange for an extension of time within which to perform the 
installment contract or was given in partial payment of the contract. The 
affidavits filed by the parties contradict one another with respect to this 
crucial factual question.1

[¶20.]  The Williamses urge this court to ignore 
the affidavit submitted for the plaintiffs by Paul Greaser, on the ground that 
Greaser lacks personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding execution of 
the note and sales contract. The defendants point out that Paul Greaser was not 
a party to either agreement, whereas Earl Williams based his affidavit for the 
defendants on his personal knowledge as a buyer under the sales contract and a 
maker of the note.

[¶21.]  We have refused in the past to consider 
for summary-judgment purposes an affidavit made without personal knowledge of 
the facts by one who would not be competent to testify to such matter. Apperson v. Kay, Wyo., 
546 P.2d 995, 996 (1976); Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.2 However, Paul Greaser appears to 
possess direct knowledge of the information provided in his affidavit. He states 
that he is familiar with the facts relevant to the execution of the Real Estate 
Sales Contract and that he keeps the records of the transaction. The documents 
attached to the affidavits of both parties establish that Greaser acted as the 
sellers' agent in negotiations with the buyers concerning matters pertinent to 
the contract and note. Since Greaser would be competent to testify at trial as 
to facts within his knowledge as the agent for the sellers, his affidavit 
provides evidence of such matters for purposes of summary 
judgment.

[¶22.]  Evidence in addition to the plaintiffs' 
affidavit suggests that the buyers may have given the note in exchange for an 
extension of time within which to perform the sales contract. For example, the 
promissory note was made payable one year from the date of execution; the letter 
agreement of August, 1982, refers to the note as independent of the sales 
contract; and the sellers actually delayed declaring a forfeiture of the 
contract for two years after execution of the note. These facts all bear on the 
extent and meaning of the transaction involving the promissory note and, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, suggest a different 
conclusion from that reached by the district court.

[¶23.]  Summary judgment is not available where 
the parties dispute the facts which explain and give meaning to their agreement. 
Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 989 (1980). Where, as 
here, the affidavits of the parties set forth conflicting facts and resolution 
of the issues depends, at least in part, on the credibility of the witnesses, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. Osborn 
v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1984). We hold, 
therefore, that the district court erred in entering summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs' claim to enforce the promissory note.

RIGHTS OF THE BUYERS IN 
DEFAULT UPON FORFEITURE OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT

Restitution

[¶24.]  As a result of the buyers' failure to pay 
the annual installments as they came due under the Real Estate Sales Contract, 
the sellers terminated the contract and retained as liquidated damages the 
$15,000 initial payment plus the street and water line installed by the buyers. 
The contract specifically gives the sellers the right to retain "all sums paid 
by the buyers hereunder" in the event of forfeiture. The buyers' obligations 
under the contract included payments for street 
improvements.

[¶25.]  In the past, we have upheld the right of 
a seller to terminate an installment land contract and to retain all payments 
and improvements made by the defaulting buyer. Lawrence v. Demos, 70 Wyo. 56, 244 P.2d 793 (1952); Quinlan v. St. John, 28 Wyo. 91, 201 P. 149 
(1921), reh. denied 28 Wyo. 91, 203 P. 1088 (1922). More recently, 
however, we have said that the buyer in breach of such a contract may, in an 
appropriate case, be entitled to the equitable remedy of restitution. Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. REB, Inc., 
Wyo., 577 P.2d 645, 649 (1978). The Williamses contend that circumstances in this case 
warrant restitution of the $15,000 initial payment and the value of improvements 
made to the land.3

[¶26.]  First, the defendants assert that the 
Real Estate Sales Contract contains a mistake in the property description which 
permits them to rescind the agreement and obtain appropriate equitable relief. 
The Williamses raise this issue for the first time on appeal, contrary to our 
firmly established rule that questions not asserted in the trial court are not 
properly before this court. Valentine v. 
Ormsbee Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 462 (1983). We have 
repeatedly refused to consider an issue raised for the first time here unless it 
concerns the court's jurisdiction or a fundamental right. Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805, 809 (1984); Pine Creek Canal No. 1 
v. Stadler, Wyo., 
685 P.2d 13 (1984). Therefore, we will not address the Williamses' right to 
rescind the Real Estate Sales Contract following the declaration of forfeiture 
by the sellers.

[¶27.]  The Williamses make a parallel argument 
that the sellers wrongfully secured the benefits of the land improvements upon 
termination of the contract, because they misrepresented the boundaries of the 
land conveyed. Regardless of any right of rescission, the buyers contend that 
the sellers should not be permitted to misdescribe the property, terminate the 
contract, and then retain the improvements placed there by the buyers in good 
faith.

[¶28.]  The undisputed facts do not support this 
contention. While the original Real Estate Sales Contract contains an error in 
the property description, the parties entered into an agreement, designated Real 
Estate Sales Contract Correction, which purports to correct the erroneous 
description. The revised contract precisely describes the property in terms of 
metes and bounds and provides that all other terms and conditions in the 
original contract shall remain in force. Both the original contract and the 
revision specify that the tract of land contains 15 acres, more or less. Since 
the parties corrected any error in the original property description to their 
apparent satisfaction, the Williamses cannot assert misrepresentation or mistake 
as grounds for restitution upon forfeiture of the 
contract.

[¶29.]  The Williamses also take the position 
that the sellers have no right to retain the initial payment and improvements 
because the notice of default signed by Paul Greaser was not effective to 
terminate the Real Estate Sales Contract. The buyers contend that the contract 
requires the sellers to issue the 
notice of forfeiture and that Paul Greaser, as "a stranger to the contract" has 
shown no authority to act on behalf of the sellers. Furthermore, the buyers 
argue, the actions of Paul Greaser terminated only the escrow account and had no 
effect on the underlying sales contract.

[¶30.]  The buyers correctly assert that a 
conditional sales contract remains in force absent appropriate notice to the 
non-performing party of intent to declare a forfeiture. Kost v. First National Bank of Greybull, Wyo., 684 P.2d 819 (1984). However, the letter of 
November 3, 1982, sent by Paul Greaser to the buyers fully satisfies the notice 
requirement and effectively terminated the sales contract. The letter advises 
the Williamses of their default under the terms and conditions of the Real 
Estate Sales Contract, demands that they deliver possession of the premises, and 
indicates the sellers' intent to terminate the escrow account. Nothing more 
needed to be said to terminate the parties' contractual 
relationship.

[¶31.]  The sellers were free to appoint Paul 
Greaser as their agent to issue the notice terminating the installment contract. 
See North American Uranium, Inc. v. 
Johnston, 77 Wyo. 332, 316 P.2d 325 (1957). If, as the 
Williamses suggest, Greaser exceeded the scope of his authority in issuing the 
notice of forfeiture, the sellers, as principal, might state a cause of action 
against Greaser. See Snearly v. Hockett, Wyo., 352 P.2d 230 (1960); Thompson v. Searl, 
76 Wyo. 264, 
301 P.2d 804 (1956). The Williamses, however, have no standing to question 
Greaser's authority as an agent because they can show no harm caused by his 
alleged abuse of authority. See Spratt v. 
Security Bank of Buffalo, Wyo., 654 P.2d 130, 134 (1982); Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 
Wyo., 347, 100 P.2d 124, 140, reh. denied 55 Wyo., 347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940). Moreover, the 
buyers recognized Greaser's authority to act for the sellers in these matters 
when they negotiated with him in August, 1982, to cure their default under the 
conditional sales contract. We hold that the notice of default and demand for 
release of possession, issued by Paul Greaser on behalf of the sellers in this 
case, complied with the terms of the Real Estate Sales Contract and effectively 
terminated that contract.

[¶32.]  Finally, the Williamses contend that, if 
the Real Estate Sales Contract was terminated, the sellers must convey 
three-quarters of an acre of land in exchange for retention of the $15,000 
initial payment. This argument conflicts with the express terms of the 
contract.

[¶33.]  Paragraph (5) of the Real Estate Sales 
Contract provides for the transfer of acreage to the buyers upon each payment of 
$20,000 toward the principal and specifies:

"* * * The $15,000.00 
initial payment cannot be applied toward releasing acreage under this 
sub-paragraph."

Paragraph (3) 
obligates the sellers to deliver possession of the property "upon execution of 
this contract." The buyers did not execute the contract, but defaulted in their 
payments and caused the sellers to declare the forfeiture. The forfeiture clause 
permits the sellers to retain "all sums paid by the BUYERS" under the contract. 
The plain language of the parties' agreement contemplates that the sellers will 
retain the initial payment in the event of the buyers' default, with no 
obligation to transfer additional acreage to the buyers.

Reimbursement of Interest 
Overpayment4

[¶34.]  The buyers contend that as a result of 
the erroneous property description in the Real Estate Sales Contract, they 
overpaid the amount of interest due at the time of the first installment. The 
Williamses interpret the sales contract as an agreement to purchase 15 acres of 
land at $20,000 per acre, for a total sale price of $300,000. The contract 
contained an error in the property description, however, and the parties 
actually intended to transfer approximately 14 1/2 acres. Applying the rate of 
$20,000 per acre to 14 1/2 acres, the Williamses reason that they were 
overcharged $10,777 for the property and that in November, 1979, they paid 
$969.93 in excess interest.

[¶35.]  The Williamses' claim to recover this 
alleged interest overpayment fails for three reasons. First, the Real Estate 
Sales Contract specifies a "total sale price" of $300,000 for a tract of land 
"containing 15 acres more or less." Nowhere does the contract describe the sale 
price as $20,000 per acre, and the fact that the parcel contained approximately 
14 1/2 acres has no effect on the balance due from the buyers. Second, the 
parties corrected the error in the property description and agreed that "[a]ll 
other terms and conditions" of the original contract would remain unchanged. 
Presumably, "[a]ll other terms and conditions" includes the $300,000 sale price. 
Finally, when the sellers terminated the contract in 1982, the buyers owed 
approximately $46,170 in interest and will not be heard to complain about an 
overpayment of $969.93 in 1979.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROCEDURE

[¶36.]  The district court denied the plaintiffs' 
first motion for summary judgment because the supporting affidavit was filed 
late and could not be considered. The plaintiffs then filed a second motion for 
summary judgment, supported by their earlier filed affidavit. The Williamses 
contend that the district court erred in granting this motion with respect to 
their counterclaims, because Rule 56, W.R.C.P., does not permit the filing of a 
second summary judgment motion following denial of the first 
motion.

[¶37.]  While the rule does not deal specifically 
with multiple motions by a single litigant, Rule 56(a), W.R.C.P., provides that 
a party may move for summary judgment at 
any time after a specified period:

"(a) For claimant. - A 
party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain 
a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof."

We believe that 
this language is broad enough to permit a party to file a second motion for 
summary judgment following the denial of his first motion for procedural 
reasons. This reading of the rule furthers the purpose of the summary-judgment 
proceeding which is to determine whether any real issue exists necessitating a 
full trial. Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, supra, 642 P.2d  at 446. By permitting a party to file more than one 
motion for summary judgment in an appropriate case, we may be able to avoid an 
unneeded trial:

"* * * A summary judgment 
proceeding allows for a prompt disposition of actions in the early stages of 
lawsuits, permitting an end to unfounded claims and avoiding the heavy expense 
of a full-fledged trial to both the litigants and the judicial machinery of the 
state, already overburdened." Bluejacket 
v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494, 496 (1976).

[¶38.]  The Williamses make a related argument 
that the second motion for summary judgment was filed without accompanying 
affidavits and that the trial court erred in considering the earlier filed, 
untimely affidavit in support of the motion. In DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County, supra, 590 P.2d  at 1344, we recognized that the rules of civil 
procedure allow for an enlargement of time within which to file a supporting 
affidavit, if a proper request or motion is made. See Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P.5 The second summary-judgment motion 
in the case at bar amounted, in effect, to a request for an extension of time 
within which to file the supporting documents. The defendants have shown no 
prejudice resulting from this procedure or otherwise established that the trial 
court abused its discretion in considering the original affidavit with the 
second motion. We hold that the court properly considered the plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment and earlier filed affidavit following denial of their first 
motion on procedural grounds.

[¶39.]  To summarize our disposition of this 
appeal, we conclude that an issue of fact exists which is determinative of the 
plaintiffs' rights to enforce the promissory note. Accordingly, we reverse the 
summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants on the promissory note. The 
material facts are not in dispute with respect to the defendants' counterclaims 
based on the forfeited installment contract, and the plaintiffs are entitled to 
prevail in these actions as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm the judgments 
entered in favor of the plaintiffs on the defendants' counterclaims for 
restitution and reimbursement of an interest overpayment.

[¶40.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for trial.

1 The affidavit filed by 
Paul Greaser on behalf of the plaintiffs describes the transaction involving the 
promissory note as follows:

"7. The second year's 
(1979) [sic] payment of principal and interest were [sic] not made by 
defendants. Defendants desired to keep their rights under the contract and 
therefore negotiated with the sellers to prevent sellers from exercising their 
rights as a result of defendants' default. As a result of these negotiations, 
defendants and sellers agreed as follows:

"a. Sellers agreed to 
postpone the 1979 [sic] payment of principal of $28,500.00, thereby extending 
the period of the contract for one year.

"b. Buyers-defendants 
agreed to execute and deliver a promissory note to G.J. Greaser, Edith B. Chase 
and Jack Patton jointly for the accrued interest for 1979, [sic] said promissory 
note bearing the date of November 29, 1980, and was in the amount of $23,085.00 
(9% interest x 256,550.00 unpaid principal)."

The affidavit 
filed by Earl Williams for the defendants provides:

"7. The promissory note 
was given towards the purchase price as the interest due on November 29, 1980 on 
the November 29, 1978 contract. Defendants did not receive a receipt for payment 
of interest nor were they given credit for the payment of interest with the 
escrow agent."

2 Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., 
sets out the requirements for affidavits submitted in support of summary 
judgment motions:

"Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."

3 The Williamses do not 
appear to claim that the retained performance was not reasonably related to the 
sellers' actual damages, and that issue is not before us on 
appeal.

4 The district court ruled 
on this counterclaim pursuant to plaintiffs' motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P. Since 
both sides presented affidavits and other documents in connection with the 
motion and since these materials were not excluded by the court, the motion 
became one for summary judgment:

"* * * If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56." Rule 12(b), W.R.C.P.

Accordingly, we 
have applied the standards applicable to summary judgments in resolving this 
issue on appeal.

5 Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"(b) Enlargement. - When by these rules or by 
a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to 
be done at or within a specified time, the court, or a commissioner thereof, for 
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or 
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the 
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous 
order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period 
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect * * *."