Title: Grissom v. Dade County

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

293 So. 2d 59 (1974)
Helen GRISSOM et al., Appellants,
v.
DADE COUNTY, Florida, and the State of Florida, Appellees.
No. 44178.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 27, 1974.
*60 Robert F. Williams, Miami, for appellants.
Stuart Simon, County Atty., Jon I. Gordon, Asst. County Atty., and Richard M. Sepler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
Don Peters, Gainesville, Asst. Professor of Law, University of Fla., and Larry Turner, Gainesville, Storefront Legal Aid Organization of Alachua County, for amicus curiae.
McCAIN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which initially passed upon the validity of Florida Statutes Sections 49.011(10) and 49.10 (1971) F.S.A. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3(b)(1) F.S.A.
The appellant, Helen Grissom, is an indigent widow receiving $140 per month in Social Security benefits. Mrs. Grissom has been using these benefits for her own support and for the support of her adopted daughter, Helen. The appellant now desires to adopt Helen's sister Sarah. Sarah was born in Mrs. Grissom's home in 1959, and Mrs. Grissom obtained legal custody of the child and has cared for and acted in the parental capacity since the child's birth.
Since the whereabouts of the natural mother of Sarah is unknown, the appellant is required to publish a notice of suit directed to the natural mother pursuant to Section 49.011(10) Florida Statutes F.S.A. (1971). In Dade County, the publication of such a notice of suit costs between twenty-five and thirty dollars. The appellant contends that because of her indigency she is unable to pay this cost and is thus precluded from having her petition for adoption heard by the court solely on the basis of her lack of wealth.
She brought a class action for declaratory relief seeking either to have Dade County pay the cost of publication pursuant to Florida Statutes § 57.081 F.S.A. because she was indigent or a declaration that the statute was unconsitutional in its application.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the Intervenor State, which the circuit court granted with prejudice. The District *61 Court, in affirming the order of the trial court, 279 So. 2d 899, stated:
The question raised by this appeal is whether the provisions of Section 49.011(10) and 49.10, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., which require publication to obtain jurisdiction over the natural mother in an adoption proceeding when her whereabouts is unknown, are unconstitutional as applied to indigent persons, under the due process and equal protection provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions.
In Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So. 2d 60 (1948), Mr. Justice Terrell, in speaking for this Court, stated:
Under the facts of this case, the appellant has been precluded from court because she cannot afford the publication fee necessary to obtain jurisdiction over the errant natural mother. Considering the herculean endeavor this woman has accomplished over the last fourteen years in raising two children on the minimal income provided by Social Security, it is no wonder that she is unable to pay the publication cost. To a sense then, the appellant is precluded from our courts because she cannot "purchase jurisdiction" over the wayward natural mother.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 113 (1971) the appellant, Gladys Boddie brought a class action on behalf of all female welfare recipients residing in Connecticut and seeking divorces, but prevented from bringing divorce suits by the Connecticut statutes requiring payment of court fees and costs for service of process as a condition precedent to access to the courts. A three-judge court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim (D.C., 286 F. Supp. 968) but the Supreme Court reversed, holding:
However, as the appellees argue in this case, the decision in Boddie is restricted only to the facts in that case, i.e. the marriage-divorce situation. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 93 S. Ct. 631, 34 L. *62 Ed.2d 626 (1973), the Supreme Court refused to hold a statute unconstitutional in its application when it denied access to the courts for an indigent who filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy seeking discharge without payment of the fees as a precondition to such proceedings. In distinguishing Boddie from the facts in Kras, the Court stated:
In reading Boddie and its apparent restrictive language especially in light of the pronouncement in Kras, it becomes obvious that Boddie is limited to a class of actions where the State has exclusively made judicial process the only method of altering a fundamental human relationship; excepting financial and economic relationships.
The question therefore is whether adoption is exclusively a state created right which could be considered a fundamental human relationship.
To answer the first part of this question, Florida Statutes Section 63.021 F.S.A. provides:
There is no need for citing authorities for the mandatory language of this statute. The statute on its face shows the exclusiveness of the adoptive proceeding being vested in the state court and existing only by statute. In re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937). The State in its brief admits to the fact that adoption is exclusively a state created right.
The right to legally have children and the right of marriage, although both statutorily created, have been held to be "basic civil rights of man". Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 at 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942). The fundamental right to have children either through procreation or adoption is so basic as to be inseparable from the rights to "enjoy and defend life and liberty, [and] to pursue happiness, ..." Florida Constitution, Article I, § 2 F.S.A. (1968).
The purpose of adoption proceedings is to extinguish certain rights of the natural parents and to establish such rights in the adoptive parents. Petition of Gaban, 158 Fla. 597, 30 So. 2d 176 (1947). In such cases there is no distinction between the dissolution of a marriage and a dissolution of a parent-child relationship. Society's need for a procedure to terminate a marriage is certainly no greater than society's need for a procedure whereby homes with parental relationships are provided for parentless children.
The merits of the appellant's right to adopt this child is clearly not the issue. What is at issue is her right of access to the courts to see if she is a fit person to adopt this child.
She is clearly challenging the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court through the only method available statutorily. Fla. Stat. § 49.011(10), 49.10 (1971). The appellees cite Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 P.2d 1262 (1972) as holding that Boddie does not require the state to pay the cost of publication. *63 However the facts alone in Lloyd clearly distinguish it from the case at bar. In Lloyd, the state paid all costs incumbent upon an indigent person seeking a divorce in order to obtain jurisdiction over the spouse whose whereabouts was unknown. In such cases the state provided an alternative means of obtaining jurisdiction, other than through publication. The appellants in Lloyd sought to create a new method of obtaining jurisdiction, that is by publication of a summons. The court there specifically held:
Clearly the same cannot be said of Florida. The appellants herein cannot obtain jurisdiction and are being denied access to the courts in matters where fundamental human rights are involved. Even though the classification promotes a governmental interest, the state cannot choose a method of meeting the interest that unnecessarily burdens or restricts the exercise of fundamental rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).
Her ability to raise these children properly when in fact she cannot afford a $25-$30 publication cost goes to the merits but it is worthy to note that the appellant here has supported and raised these two children for at least fourteen years on a minimal income. Certainly her inability to pay for publication is, to say the least, an economically justifiable maternal decision.
The publication statutes are therefore unconstitutional as applied and the State should be required to pay the costs of publication in such cases as these. If, however, the cost in cases of this nature becomes excessive upon the treasury of this State, the Legislature should provide a less costly alternative method of obtaining jurisdiction.
For these reasons the decision of the District Court is reversed and remanded with directions to proceed consistently with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, DEKLE and CARLTON (Retired), JJ., concur.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, J., dissent.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
BOYD, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The Florida Legislature has provided for payment of costs of filing suits and makes no provision for free filing by indigents. If the law is to be changed, it must be done by the Legislature as this Court has not been vested with Legislative powers.
It amazes me that Legal services of Greater Miami would spend hundreds of dollars of taxpayers' money to litigate this matter through Circuit, District and the Supreme Court fighting over a thirty dollar filing fee. It would seem to me more *64 logical to have raised the thirty dollars from a governmental or private charity than to have spent the time and money for same as shown by the record. Thousands of citizens, including this writer, would gladly have paid such cost if requested.