Title: Toomey v. Riverside RV Resort, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: December 4, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1180521
____________________
Larry Toomey
v.
Riverside RV Resort, LLC
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-17-900203)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Larry Toomey blocked a culvert that had been installed to channel
water away from the only road providing access to his property and to the
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property of his neighbor, Riverside RV Resort, LLC ("Riverside").  He did
so with the knowledge that the blockage might damage the road and
Riverside's property.  Riverside sued and obtained an injunction against
Toomey, as well as a judgment awarding it compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and attorney fees.  Toomey now appeals.  We affirm the
judgment to the extent it enjoins Toomey from blocking the culvert and
grants Riverside compensatory and punitive damages, but we reverse it
to the extent it awards attorney fees to Riverside. 
Facts and Procedural History
Riverside is the owner and operator of a recreational-vehicle park in
Robertsdale.  When this action was  filed, Riverside possessed the park
property under a seller-financed purchase agreement with Styx, LLC
("Styx"), the developer and original owner of the park.  The purchase
agreement granted Riverside immediate management and control of the
park, with a reversionary interest in the property preserved for Styx until
the balance of the purchase price was paid.  Two days after the trial court
entered its judgment in this case, Riverside made its final payment to
Styx and became the sole owner of the property.
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Toomey owns property that shares a boundary line with Riverside. 
Water Rapids Road is on that boundary line and provides access to both
properties.  As a result, the parties are each burdened with an
ingress/egress easement for the benefit of the other party ("the
easement").  The existence of the easement is confirmed in two places –
first, a prior order of the Baldwin Circuit Court, and second, the property
description in Toomey's deed, which states that his property has a "50-foot
easement for ingress and egress along the South line and 25.0 feet along
the East line of said parcel."
 At some point before 2008, Water Rapids Road was raised and
improved, and a drainage pipe was installed under the road.  The
drainage pipe ends in a culvert located on Toomey's property but within
the easement.  The properties are located downhill from a 200-acre area
near Interstate 10, commonly referred to as the I-10 watershed, from
which water drains naturally onto both properties.  Surface water from
the I-10 watershed flows into a ditch running alongside Water Rapids
Road where the drainage pipe and culvert are located.  A portion of the
water from the I-10 watershed remains in the ditch and eventually flows
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into the Styx River.  Another portion of the water flows into the drainage
pipe under Water Rapids Road, exits out of the culvert, and then flows in
a naturally diffuse manner onto Toomey's property, as it did before the
improvements to Water Rapids Road. 
The culvert is central to the controversy between Riverside and
Toomey.  Before August 2016, Toomey placed hay bales in front of the
culvert to prevent sediment from moving with the water flowing naturally
onto his property.  But in August 2016, Toomey blocked the flow of water
exiting the culvert with a piece of tin.  After the culvert was completely
blocked, significant erosion began in the area around it, causing the
culvert to become elevated.  The blocked culvert contributed to cracking
in the pavement of Water Rapids Road, and eventually led the ditch on
Riverside's property to increase in size from 3 feet wide up to 20 feet wide
in some places.  
In January 2017, during a major rainstorm, Riverside removed the
tin blocking the culvert to reduce the force of the water coming back onto
its property.  Riverside notified Toomey that it had done so.  Toomey was
also made aware of the significant erosion that had occurred around the
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culvert after his intentional blockage.  A month later, despite seeing the
damage caused to Water Rapids Road and the Riverside property by
blocking the culvert with tin, Toomey poured concrete into the culvert to
create a new, more permanent blockage.
Riverside then sued Toomey in the Baldwin Circuit Court.  In its
complaint, Riverside brought claims of wrongful interference with the
easement, wantonness, negligence, trespass, and nuisance.1  Toomey filed
a trespass counterclaim and filed a motion to join Styx as a necessary
party under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., as holder of a reversionary interest
in the Riverside property. 
Approximately two months after the complaint was filed, Riverside
asked the trial court to enter a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Toomey.  Riverside made this request 
because, it said, there was a high likelihood that a major springtime
rainfall would further damage the Riverside property if the culvert
remained blocked.  The trial court granted Riverside's request for a
1Riverside later withdrew its negligence claim. 
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preliminary injunction, but its written order did not go into effect until
several months later, when Riverside paid the required bond.  In issuing
the preliminary injunction, the trial court ordered Toomey to remove the
concrete and to restore the culvert to its pre-blockage elevation.  Toomey
partially complied with the trial court's order by removing the concrete
but failed to return the culvert to its pre-blockage elevation.  That failure
caused the water from the I-10 watershed to continue to be blocked from
flowing through the culvert onto Toomey's property.  
The matter proceeded to a bench trial.  April Givens, a co-owner and
manager of Riverside, testified about the erosion and other harms the
blocked culvert caused to the ditch, the road, and the Riverside property. 
She also testified that Toomey and visitors to his property would park
their vehicles so that access to the Riverside property would be blocked or
impaired.  Finally, Givens testified that she saw Toomey remove the
concrete from the culvert,  then use his tractor to change the elevation of
the culvert to prevent water from flowing through it onto his property. 
Toomey also testified.  He did not deny that he had blocked the
culvert with tin and later with concrete or that the blocked culvert had
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caused erosion to the road and surrounding areas.  He acknowledged that
the ditch on the Riverside property sustained significant erosion from the
January 2017 rainfall and that it was possible for the road to "blow out"
if a large amount of water stopped at the blocked culvert.  When asked
why he did not comply with the preliminary-injunction order and return
the culvert to its pre-blockage condition, Toomey said he complied only
after Riverside paid the required bond. 
In addition to Givens's and Toomey's testimony, both sides offered
expert witnesses to testify about how water flows onto the Riverside and
Toomey properties from the I-10 watershed.  The expert offered by
Toomey to rebut Riverside's civil-engineering expert was Greg Spies, a
licensed land surveyor.  The trial court admitted expert testimony by
Spies in the areas of land surveying, topographical surveying, and wetland
delineations.   But the court did not accept Spies as an expert able to
provide opinions that required an engineering degree, such as opinions
about the cause of erosion or drainage problems caused by the blocked
culvert. 
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After receiving the evidence, testimony, and arguments, the trial
court issued its final order, finding, among other things, that Toomey
acted intentionally with knowledge that damage would occur to
Riverside's property; that the sums expended by Riverside to repair the
culvert and surrounding area were necessary to protect and preserve the
culvert and the road; and that Toomey had interfered with Riverside's use
and enjoyment of the easement by permanently placing obstacles in the
easement.  The trial court then concluded: (1) that Styx was not required
to be joined to the action under Rule 19; (2) that the culvert is a necessary
improvement for the easement to be used for its intended purpose; (3) that
Riverside met its burden of proving that Toomey had wrongfully diverted
water onto the Riverside property and that the diversion had caused
undue and unreasonable damage; (4) that Riverside met its burden of
proving its claim of wantonness by presenting sufficient evidence of
Toomey's intention to cause damage and harm to Riverside; (5) that
Toomey's actions constituted trespass; and (6) that Riverside proved
common-law nuisance.  Based on those conclusions, the trial court entered
a judgment in favor of Riverside, awarding compensatory damages of
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$49,000 and punitive damages of $50,000, and entering a permanent
injunction prohibiting Toomey from blocking, interfering with, or
impeding Riverside's use and enjoyment of the easement.  After a separate
hearing, the trial court awarded Riverside $50,000 in attorney fees. 
Toomey appealed. 
Analysis
Toomey raises several issues on appeal.  We first consider his
argument that Styx was a necessary party required to be joined under
Rule 19.  After concluding that joinder was not required, we address: (1)
whether the trial court correctly held that the easement allowed Riverside
to maintain and improve the culvert; (2) whether the trial court properly
excluded Spies's testimony about the cause of erosion and drainage
problems, and (3) whether attorney fees were properly awarded to
Riverside.2
2Toomey also argues that the trial court erred by basing its judgment
on the belief that his action in blocking the culvert violated a previous
order of the Baldwin Circuit Court.  Because the trial court had sufficient
independent evidence apart from that order to support its judgment, we
need not address that issue in detail. 
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A. Rule 19 Joinder
Toomey argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it
failed to join Styx as a necessary party because the purchase agreement
between Riverside and Styx provided Styx a reversionary interest in the
Riverside property.  This Court will not disturb a trial court's Rule 19
determination unless it exceeded its discretion, because such a
determination is based on equitable and pragmatic considerations. See
Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249, 256 (Ala. 1984). 
In support of his argument, Toomey cites Chandler v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 275 So. 3d 531 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).  In Chandler,
the Court of Civil Appeals held that both co-owners of a mortgaged
property were necessary and indispensable parties required to be sued in
an ejectment action brought by a mortgaging bank.  But this case is
different.  Unlike the mortgagees in Chandler, Riverside and Styx are not
co-owners of real property, and neither Riverside nor Styx are seeking to
eject Toomey from his property.  Therefore, Chandler is not applicable. 
A more analogous case is AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. City of Mobile, 500
So. 2d 1072 (Ala. 1986), in which the landlord of a property sought to
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bring a trespass claim against the City of Mobile for injury to the property
while the land was in possession of the tenant.  This Court held that a
landlord may not bring a trespass claim against a third party because
such a claim rests solely with the tenant.  Id. at 1074.  Like the tenant in
AmSouth, Riverside holds exclusive possession of the property and has
brought only personal claims against Toomey.  And because Styx does not
have possession of the Riverside property, it cannot seek the remedies
sought by Riverside from Toomey.  See Jeffries v. Bush, 609 So. 3d 362,
362 (holding that trespass is a wrong against the right of possession and
is a personal claim, not a real-property claim).  To the extent that
Toomey's actions might have provided Styx a basis to sue for an injury to
its reversionary  interest, Riverside completed purchasing the property
from Styx two days after the trial court entered its order, and Styx no
longer has any interest in the Riverside property.  Thus, the trial court did
not exceed its discretion when it declined to join Styx as a necessary party
under Rule 19.
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B. The Easement
We now turn to the claims based on the easement.  When evidence
is presented to the trial court ore tenus, a presumption of correctness is
accorded to the court's findings of fact, and those findings will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence,
manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence.  Weeks v.
Wolf Creek Indus., Inc., 941 So. 2d 263, 268 (Ala. 2006).  Questions of law
are reviewed de novo.  Id. at 269. 
Toomey argues that the great weight of evidence does not support
the trial court's finding that the culvert was reasonably necessary to
maintain the easement – – and that Riverside therefore trespassed when
it repaired the culvert on his property.  In response, Riverside argues that
the easement included the authority to maintain or repair the culvert and
that, regardless of the existence of the easement, Toomey wrongfully
forced storm water onto its property by blocking the culvert, causing
damage to the Riverside property and the shared roadway, Water Rapids
Road.  Therefore, Riverside argues, the actions it took after the culvert
was blocked were to protect its property from further harm.  
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There is no dispute that an easement exists along the property line
between Toomey and Riverside, that the culvert is located within the
easement, and that the culvert was installed before 2008.  Toomey argues
that, in making the repairs and improvements to the culvert, Riverside
exceeded its rights granted under the easement.  In making that
argument, Toomey cites Kratchoville v. Cloverleaf Plaza, Inc., 165 So. 2d
112 (Ala. 1964).  But that case is distinguishable.  In Kratchoville, a
landowner installed pipes under a neighboring property to divert surface
water, without an easement or any form of permission from the
neighboring landowner.  In response, the neighboring landowner sought
a preliminary injunction to remove the underground pipes.  This Court
held that no easement existed to install underground pipes because there
was no assertion or evidence of any easement by deed, prescription, or an
adverse user for the statutory period.  Here, by contrast, there is no
dispute that the easement exists.  
Whether an ingress/egress easement may include the right to
construct a culvert was addressed in Byerley v. Griffin, 512 So. 2d 91 (Ala.
1987).  In Byerley, the Griffins constructed a culvert for drainage on the
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Byerley property within an ingress/egress easement that was granted for
their benefit.  Like Toomey, the Byerleys argued that an existing
ingress/egress easement did not include the construction of a culvert near
the roadway that had been constructed for ingress and egress.  After
receiving the evidence ore tenus, however, the trial court determined that
the culvert and related improvements were "necessary and reasonable" to
provide the Griffins access to their property via the ingress/egress
easement.  This Court affirmed, holding that the construction of a culvert
by the Griffins on property owned by the Byerleys was not outside the
grant of the ingress/egress easement because the culvert was related to
the roadway for which the ingress/egress easement was provided. 
Similarly, the easement for Riverside's benefit does not preclude the
construction, maintenance, or improvement of a culvert because the
culvert is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the easement.  The
easement from Toomey to Riverside is for "ingress and egress."  Riverside
presented evidence indicating that the culvert is reasonably necessary for
that use of the easement.  And, in its order, the trial court found that the
construction of the head wall and other remedial efforts by Riverside
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around the culvert "were necessary to protect and preserve the culvert
and Water Rapids Road."
On review, we conclude that the evidence in the record is sufficient
to support the trial court's factual finding that the culvert was necessary
and that the law allows for the grant of an ingress/egress easement in this
case to reasonably include the construction, maintenance and
improvement of the culvert.  We therefore hold that Riverside did not
exceed the grant of the easement when it improved the culvert and the
surrounding area to maintain access to its property.3 
C. Expert Testimony
Toomey next argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion when
it refused to allow Spies, a land surveyor, to provide expert-witness
testimony about the cause of erosion on the properties based on his
personal observations and interpretation of topography, contours, and
water accumulation.  The standard of review applicable to whether a trial
court properly permits or excludes an expert witness is well settled. 
3This conclusion makes it unnecessary to discuss Toomey's trespass
claims against Riverside based on those actions.  
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"[T]he trial court has broad discretion over whether to consider a witness
qualified as an expert and to consider that witness's expert testimony,"
and this Court will not disturb those findings unless the trial court
exceeds its discretion.  Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milan & Co. Constr., Inc.,
901 So. 2d 84, 106 (Ala. 2004).  See also Kyser v. Harrison, 908 So. 2d 914
(Ala. 2005) (holding that a trial court did not exceed its discretion when
it excluded the testimony of a forensic pathologist who was not specialized
in the area of pediatric pathology in a case involving the death of an
infant).  
From our review of the record, it is clear that the trial court did not
exceed its discretion when it limited Spies's testimony to the area of land
surveying, topographical surveying, and wetland delineations.  Although
engineers rely on maps created by land surveyors to provide opinions and
plan engineering projects, Alabama law recognizes that the work and
expertise of an engineer is different from that of a land surveyor.  See §
34-11-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (setting forth licensing and education
requirements for engineers and land surveyors).  Spies, as a land
surveyor, is a professional specialist in the technique of measuring land. 
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But only the direction and erosive effects of the water flowing over the
properties and the water's natural drainage paths were in controversy, not
the boundaries and topography of the properties.  Thus, the trial court's
decision not to allow Spies to testify or to rebut the testimony of an
engineer on drainage and causes of erosion is not a basis for reversal. 
D. Attorney Fees
Toomey finally argues that the evidence presented by Riverside does
not support the award of attorney fees.  Although Toomey concedes that
the trial court has equitable power to award attorney fees to a prevailing
party, he says that his actions do not justify such an award.  See Reynolds
v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A., 471 So. 2d 1238, 1243 (Ala.
1985) (recognizing authority to award attorney fees "where fraud, willful
negligence or malice has been practiced").  Ordinarily, we defer to the trial
court when it makes an award of attorney fees because it " 'has presided
over the entire litigation [and] has a superior understanding of the factual
questions that must be resolved' " to make such a determination.  See Ex
parte Shinaberry, __ So. 3d __, __ [No. 1180935, July 31, 2020] (Ala. 2020)
(quoting Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 553  (Ala. 2004)). 
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Even so, where a trial court awards attorney fees, its order " 'must allow
for meaningful appellate review by articulating the decisions made, the
reasons supporting those decisions, and how it calculated the attorney
fee.' "  Id. 
In its order awarding attorney fees in this case, the trial court gave
no explanation for its decision, nor did it discuss the factors a court must
consider to determine the reasonableness of the fees.  The order simply
stated:
"This is a matter coming on for a hearing on [Riverside's]
motion to establish attorney fees. This matter being submitted
upon the pleadings, testimony taken ore tenus and argument
of counsel on February 19, 2019.  Based upon the foregoing,
the court is of the opinion that the following judgment order is
due to be entered.
"It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the
Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama, as follows:
"1. To the extent authorized by law, the court grants
[Riverside's] request for reasonable attorney fees in the
amount of $50,000.00.
"2. Any specific request for relief not specifically
addressed herein is denied."
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The record also does not indicate what evidence, if any, the trial court
relied on to award Riverside its attorney fees or to calculate the amount
awarded.  Although an attorney-fee award is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, this Court cannot provide meaningful appellate review
without the trial court providing a reasoned order of its award. 
Shinaberry, __ So. 3d at __.  We hold, therefore, that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in awarding Riverside $50,000 in attorney fees
without explaining the basis for its award, and we reverse the judgment
to the extent it awarded attorney fees and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment granting Riverside
compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as a permanent
injunction prohibiting Toomey from impeding access to the easement,
including blocking the culvert.  But we reverse the trial court's judgment
to the extent it awards attorney fees, and we remand this case for the trial
court to reconsider the attorney-fee award in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
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Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Shaw, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
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