Title: JOHN W. MAUPIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN W. MAUPIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 17694 P.2d 720Case Number: 84-54Decided: 01/30/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN W. MAUPIN, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, and Martin 
J. McClain (argued), Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank (argued), Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant is appealing 
from his conviction of aggravated assault and battery. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.

[¶2.]     The issues we must 
determine on this appeal are these:

1. Did appellant 
voluntarily absent himself from his trial?

2. If such absence was 
not voluntary, was it prejudicial to continue the trial in appellant's 
absence?

[¶3.]     The relationship 
between appellant and his brothers and sister has been strained since the death 
of their father in November of 1978. In the summer of 1983, appellant suffered a 
heart attack and received medical care first locally and later in the state of 
Arizona. He 
returned to Wyoming August 8, 1983. On August 9, 1983, 
appellant drove his pickup truck to his brother James' house. James walked over 
to the truck, there was an argument, and appellant reached for a .22 caliber 
pistol laying in an open briefcase. James grabbed appellant's arm. There was a 
struggle, and the gun dropped to the floor of the pickup. James backed away, 
appellant got out of the truck, and an argument ensued. The gun remained on the 
floor of the pickup where it had fallen. Appellant returned to the pickup and 
drove away. James contacted the sheriff and, as a result, appellant was charged 
with aggravated assault and battery pursuant to § 6-2-502(a)(iii), W.S. 1977.1

[¶4.]     At the conclusion of 
the defendant's case, before closing arguments, appellant complained of chest 
pains and was hospitalized. The trial was adjourned for the balance of the day. 
The next morning appellant's counsel presented a doctor's written statement 
advising that appellant would require hospitalization and at least 24 hours of 
testing and treatment. Appellant's counsel moved for a continuance. This motion 
was denied. Appellant moved for a mistrial which was also denied. The attorneys 
then, without appellant being present, proceeded with the trial and presented 
closing arguments. The jury retired and, during deliberations, asked the court 
the following question:

"If we feel the defendant 
drew the gun in self-defense knowing he did have the gun in his hand, 
threatening his brother with it, must we find him guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery?"

[¶5.]     The court's response 
was:

"§ 6-2-502 of the Wyoming 
Statutes provides in part that a person is guilty of aggravated assault and 
battery if he threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless 
reasonably necessary in defense of his person."

The jury, after 
approximately eight hours of deliberation, returned a guilty 
verdict.

[¶6.]     The Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States is held to guarantee an 
accused the right to be present during every stage of his trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970). Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming is even more explicit in its guarantee 
to an accused of the right of presence at trial in providing 
that,

"In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to defend in person and by counsel, * * * to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, * * * and to [have] a speedy trial by an impartial jury * 
* *." (Emphasis added.)

This right is 
incorporated into Rule 42, W.R.Cr.P., which provides:

"The defendant shall be 
present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial, including the 
impaneling of the jury, and the return of the verdict and at the imposition of 
sentence except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecution for 
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the 
trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial 
to and including the return of the verdict."

The voluntary 
absence of defendant may properly be construed as an effective waiver of his 
constitutional right to be present. Taylor v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S. Ct. 194, 38 L. Ed. 2d 174 
(1973). When the defendant voluntarily absents himself, the trial may be 
continued in his absence. The waiver of the right to be present, however, must 
be knowingly and voluntarily made. Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 (1984); Weddle v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 
(1980).

[¶7.]     A defendant must have a 
compelling reason to stay away from the trial. If his absence is deliberate 
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence. United 
States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2nd Cir. 
1972). Where defendant's failure to appear on the date set for his trial 
occurred voluntarily, knowingly, and without justification, his conviction in 
absentia was affirmed. United 
States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 64 A.L.R.Fed. 
276 (2nd Cir. 1981). And where the trial has begun and the defendant fails to 
appear for the second day of the proceedings, United States v. Martinez, 604 F.2d 361 
(5th Cir. 1979), or upon the date the trial was to resume, United States v. Powell, 611 F.2d 41 
(4th Cir. 1979), the trial may proceed because the defendant's absence was held 
voluntary or the result of his deliberate act. United 
States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 
1982).

[¶8.]     The State, relying upon 
United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 
(2nd Cir. 1977), contends that appellant voluntarily absented himself from this 
trial and, therefore, knowingly waived his right to be present. The defendant in 
United States v. Pastor suffered a 
heart attack in 1966 and was hospitalized in subsequent years. His trial was set 
for May of 1976 after several adjournments. Trial time was limited to four hours 
a day because of the defendant's heart condition. The defendant complained of 
chest pains on the second day of trial and did not appear. There was no effort 
to call his doctor for two hours, and defendant failed to produce any medical 
evidence or justification or other reason for his failure to appear. Defendant 
reappeared at trial the next day and continued to be present throughout the 
balance of the trial. Defendant's absence was held voluntary and, therefore, a 
waiver of his right to be present at that portion of the trial. United States v. Pastor, supra, does not 
support the State in its contention for, unlike the instant case, defendant in 
United States v. Pastor presented no 
evidence, medical or otherwise, explaining or justifying his failure to 
appear.

[¶9.]     The record here shows 
that appellant became ill at the close of his case. His attorney informed the 
court that appellant had been experiencing pains, was feeling ill, and that 

"[h]e was on oxygen for a 
period of time after the defense closed its case, becoming further ill, and was 
transported to the hospital for examination by Dr. Harner.

"It's my understanding 
that at this time an EKG has been run by Dr. Harner revealing that he's had a 
mild coronary and that he has been admitted to the Crook County Memorial 
Hospital."

At this time, 
upon request of the defense, court was adjourned until the next morning, the 
court stating:

"If he's not available 
tomorrow then we would be faced with the problem [of] what should be done at 
that time.

"It would be my opinion 
that probably a mistrial would have to be declared, but that it wouldn't be 
double jeopardy under those circumstances because it isn't the fault of the 
State."

[¶10.]  The next morning appellant's counsel 
presented a report from appellant's doctor which stated that at least 24 hours 
hospitalization for testing would be required. Counsel then moved for a 
continuance. The State resisted the motion claiming that defendant's absence was 
voluntary since he had refused a medical examination before trial and his 
brother and sister testified that they did not believe appellant had ever had a 
heart attack. There is no evidence nor does the State contend that a medical 
examination before trial would have or could have prevented the heart attack 
that occurred. It is immaterial that appellant's brother and sister did not 
believe that appellant ever had a heart attack. The court, nevertheless, denied 
the motion for continuance and the trial continued.

[¶11.]  The record discloses that appellant had 
suffered a heart attack during trial and that because of his persistent chest 
pain, there was a risk of a major heart attack or cardiac complications 
occurring in the future. Upon these undisputed facts, the reason and 
justification for appellant's absence was sufficiently established and cannot be 
held voluntary.

[¶12.]  The State next contends that should we 
conclude that appellant's absence was not voluntary, the conviction should 
nevertheless be affirmed because prejudice did not result from continuing the 
trial in his absence. Before a constitutional error can be considered harmless, 
the court must be able to declare that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Krucheck v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1222 (1983); Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935 
(1983). We are unable to say in this case that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Appellant was not present to assist and consult with his 
attorney when instructions on the law were submitted and during closing 
arguments. During deliberations, the jury inquired of the court concerning the 
applicability of self-defense. Appellant was not able to consult or advise with 
his attorney concerning the appropriate means for responding to the jury's 
inquiry. He was deprived of his right to be present at the trial and to be 
involved in the decisions being made.

"The right to be present 
at trial stems in part from the fact that by his physical presence the defendant 
can hear and see the proceedings, can be seen by the jury, and can participate 
in the presentation of his rights. * * * The defendant's right to be present at 
all proceedings of the tribunal which may take his life or liberty is designed 
to safeguard the public's interest in a fair and orderly judicial system. The 
presence of counsel alone at trial can never be harmless per se." Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 
274-275 (9th Cir. 1972).

[¶13.]  When the jury assembled to hear argument, 
appellant's chair at counsel table was vacant. The court informed the jury that 
appellant was hospitalized and would require twenty-four hours of treatment and 
observation, and that his absence should have no bearing on their 
deliberations.

[¶14.]  We do not know the effect of appellant's 
absence or the court's comments upon the jury. We do know that this was a close 
case. The jury deliberated approximately eight hours, returning once to inquire 
concerning the law of self-defense. Did appellant benefit from the natural 
sympathy for one who is ill or did the jury conclude that appellant was feigning 
illness or that he did not care?

[¶15.]  Here, the apparent difficulty encountered 
in arriving at a verdict supports the notion that appellant's presence during 
the latter crucial parts of the trial may have been critical. For the reason 
stated, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 Section 6-2-502(a)(iii), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of aggravated assault and battery if he:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) Threatens to use a 
drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his 
person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another * * 
*."

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶16.]  The constitutional provisions cited in 
the majority opinion and Rule 42, W.R.Cr.P., set forth a strong policy in favor 
of the right of an accused to be present at all stages of the trial. Concededly, 
that right may be waived by the voluntary absence of the accused. Here, even 
though one could argue that the appellant was voluntarily absent from his trial, 
the district court did not make any finding to that effect. Consequently, while 
I have some subjective feeling with respect to the impact of that absence upon 
the trial which is similar to that of the dissenting justice, I cannot identify 
any objective factors which would justify a conclusion of voluntary absence. I 
am satisfied that harmless error in a case such as this is foreclosed by the 
strong policy in favor of the right of the accused to be 
present.

[¶17.]  I do offer a defense for proceeding as 
the trial court did in the face of the appellant's absence. Indeed this was a 
close case, and if the jury had acquitted the appellant then I am sure there 
would have been no complaint about his absence. I believe that the district 
judge proceeded with that possibility in mind, and of course the case would have 
been over if an acquittal had resulted. When that prospect did not materialize, 
however, I am satisfied that the trial judge then should have recognized the 
error in proceeding in the absence of the appellant, and should have directed a 
new trial.

[¶18.]  The case as presented to us then must 
result in a reversal and remand.

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶19.]  I dissent. As noted in the majority 
opinion, this is a close case. The majority opinion properly sets forth the law 
applicable to it. Two questions are presented: One, was appellant's absence due 
to a bona fide health problem or was he using a contrived health complaint to 
manipulate the court thus voluntarily absenting himself? Two, if the absence was 
due to a bona fide health problem, was appellant 
prejudiced?

[¶20.]  I believe the first issue is one of fact 
to be decided by the court in its discretion. Perhaps another judge would have 
continued the case for another day or two and would have secured additional 
medical opinions before making the decision, but the question here is not 
whether additional or different methods could have been used to fortify the 
decision, but whether or not the decision itself was accurate. In other words, 
the question is: Did the court abuse its discretion in deciding that appellant's 
absence was contrived and thus not voluntary?

[¶21.]  Rule 42, W.R.Cr.P., provides in 
part:

"* * * In prosecution for 
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the 
trial has commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to 
and including the return of the verdict. * * *"

"The decision as to 
whether the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial amounts to a waiver is 
thus vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is usually in a 
superior position to evaluate the evidence, including witnesses' credibility, 
because of familiarity with the background and circumstances. * * *" 
United 
States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 934 (2nd Cir. 
1977).

[¶22.]  We defined "abuse of discretion" in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980):

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910); DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 303 A.2d 709 
(1972); In re Estate of Horman, 265 Cal. App. 2d 796, 71 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968). * * *"

[¶23.]  In this case, appellant was present at 
all stages of the trial until after the evidence was closed and the jury 
instructions prepared. The trial judge observed him during this period. 
Appellant's counsel had contacted the judge before the trial concerning 
appellant's condition to stand trial. They agreed to have appellant examined by 
a local physician, but appellant refused to have the examination. Appellant's 
brother and sister testified that they did not believe appellant had ever had a 
heart attack. The court continued the matter until the next day, but refused an 
additional continuance when the physician said another twenty-four hours would 
be needed for testing. The presentence report contained a letter from Dr. Dale 
A. Hogan which stated in part:

"Throughout May during 
the period of this patient's hospitalization it was felt that he did use 
symptoms of chest pain in a manipulative manner. During this time he had at 
least two court appearances scheduled for hearings on various matters and these 
were cancelled or postponed due to his physical complaints. The timing of his 
complaints seemed to be coincident with the scheduling of these 
hearings.

* * * * * 
*

"It is my belief that 
this patient uses his physical problems, which are indeed very real, to 
manipulate those people around him and that he will use his physical complaints 
to manipulate legal and social difficulties in which he may be 
involved."

The record does 
not reflect that Dr. Hogan's medical opinion was known to the court at the time 
the motion for continuance was denied, but, as noted supra, the question here is 
whether the judge's decision was accurate.

[¶24.]  I would hold that the decision of the 
trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The 
court could reasonably conclude that the appellant contrived the absence and 
thus waived his right to be present. In other words the court did not commit an 
error of law under the circumstances. It did not abuse its 
discretion.

[¶25.]  I would affirm this case on that basis, 
but I also do not believe that appellant was prejudiced even if the absence was 
due to a bona fide health problem. The instructions were "ready to go" before 
appellant left. As a practical matter, lawyers do not customarily consult with 
their clients while making a closing argument. The court's answer to the jury 
questions was a simple reference to the statute. Judges do not customarily 
accept advice from the parties themselves in formulating answers to jury 
questions. I cannot see a single place at which appellant's presence would have 
been of any moment in the result of this case.

[¶26.]  The majority opinion inquires as to the 
effect of his absence on the jury. The court explained the reason for his 
absence to the jury. The most probable effect, if any, on the jury would be to 
evoke sympathy. The result would be favorable to appellant. It would explain the 
fact that the jury deliberated for a long period. I see no 
prejudice.

[¶27.]  I would affirm.