Title: State v. Stewart

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–1113 
 
Filed January 9, 2015 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
JILLIAN JANE STEWART, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 
James D. Scott, Judge. 
 
Defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 
affirming her conviction and holding the offense of possession of a 
controlled substance does not merge with the offense of introduction of a 
controlled substance into a detention facility.  DECISION OF COURT OF 
APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN 
PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant 
Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Amy Klocke, 
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
APPEL, Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the offense of possession of a 
controlled substance merges with the offense of introduction of a 
controlled substance into a detention facility by operation of Iowa’s 
merger statute and principles of double jeopardy.  For the reasons 
expressed below, we conclude the crimes do not merge and may be 
simultaneously charged in one criminal prosecution.  We therefore affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.    
 
As this case raises purely legal issues, the facts need not be recited 
in detail.  Jillian Stewart was arrested by Sioux City police.  She was 
subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2011), introduction of a 
controlled substance into a detention facility in violation of Iowa Code 
section 719.8, and unlawful possession of a prescription drug in violation 
of Iowa Code section 155A.21(1).  The State dismissed the possession-of-
a-prescription-drug offense prior to trial.  After a jury trial, Stewart was 
convicted of the two remaining offenses.  The district court entered 
judgment against Stewart for both crimes and sentenced her to a five-
year indeterminate term of incarceration on the introduction charge and 
a one-year term of incarceration on the possession charge, to be served 
concurrently.    
 
Stewart appealed.  She claimed the district court entered an illegal 
sentence because the offenses of introduction and possession merged 
into a single offense under Iowa Code section 701.9.  She also asserted 
the district court erred in assessing court costs for a charge which was 
dismissed by the district court.  The court of appeals held the offenses 
did not merge, but agreed with Stewart that costs should not have been 
3 
assessed to her related to the dismissed charge.  See State v. Petrie, 478 
N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1991) (“Iowa Code section 815.13 and section 
910.2 clearly require . . . that only such fees and costs attributable to the 
charge on which a criminal defendant is convicted should be recoverable 
under a restitution plan.”). 
 
We granted further review.  We allow the decision of the court of 
appeals to stand with respect to the cost issue.  See Hills Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Converse, 772 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 2009) (“When we take a case 
on further review, we have the discretion to review any issue raised on 
appeal . . . .  As to the other issues raised in the briefs, we will let the 
court of appeals opinion stand as the final decision of this court.”).  We 
consider only the question of whether the remaining criminal offenses 
should have been merged. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
 
Alleged violations of the merger statute are reviewed for corrections 
of errors at law.  State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994).  Double 
jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo.  Id.  
III.  Discussion of Merger and Double Jeopardy Issues. 
 
A.  Positions of the Parties.  Stewart raises two challenges to her 
conviction for possession.  First, she asserts that to convict her of both 
introduction and possession of a controlled substance violates the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.1  See U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that no person shall 
“be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
1She makes no claim under the double jeopardy clause of the Iowa Constitution 
which utilizes different language than the federal counterpart.  Article I, section 12 of 
the Iowa Constitution provides: “[n]o person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same 
offence.”  This case does not involve successive prosecutions, but prosecutions for 
multiple crimes in a single case.  
                                      
 
4 
limb”).  Second, she asserts that her conviction of both crimes violates 
the merger statute found in Iowa Code section 701.9 (providing that “[n]o 
person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily 
included in another public offense of which the person is convicted”).  
The sum and substance of her argument under both her constitutional 
and statutory theories is that under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309 
(1932) (“[T]he test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not.”), it is legally impossible to be convicted of 
introduction of a controlled substance without also possessing that 
controlled substance.  Further, she asserts the legislature did not intend 
for two separate crimes to arise when it is impossible to commit the 
greater crime without also committing the lesser crime.  As a result, she 
argues her conviction of the lesser offense, possession, must be reversed. 
 
In her analysis, Stewart focuses on the language of several Iowa 
statutes.  She notes Iowa Code section 719.8 prohibits the introduction 
of controlled substances into detention facilities, Iowa Code section 706.3 
prohibits a conspiracy alternative, Iowa Code section 703.1 presents an 
aiding and abetting alternative, and Iowa Code section 703.2 creates a 
joint criminal conduct crime.  She asserts that because she was only 
charged under Iowa Code section 719.8, we must analyze legal 
impossibility solely under the terms of this statute.  According to 
Stewart, we cannot consider the possibility of liability on a conspiracy, 
aiding and abetting, or joint criminal conduct theory because Stewart 
was not charged under these statutes, but only under Iowa Code section 
719.8, which she labels “the direct commission alternative.”  She notes 
that under our caselaw where a statute provides alternative methods of 
5 
committing a crime, “it does not matter that some alternatives of [the 
greater offense] can be committed without necessarily committing [the 
lesser included offense] because those alternatives were not charged by 
the State.”  State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 594 (Iowa 2014).   
 
Stewart recognizes that in State v. Caquelin, 702 N.W.2d 510, 512–
13 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005), the court of appeals held introduction and 
possession of a controlled substance were two separate crimes.  Stewart 
argues Caquelin was wrongly decided and should be reversed by this 
court. 
 
Stewart also recognizes that even where legal impossibility may 
possibly be present, our precedent suggests that dual convictions might 
nonetheless be affirmed if there is clear evidence the legislature intended 
two punishments to apply to the same acts or omissions.  See State v. 
Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Iowa 2002) (noting that “[e]ven though a 
crime may meet the so-called Blockburger test for lesser-included 
offenses, it may still be separately punished if legislative intent for 
multiple punishments is otherwise indicated”); State v. Perez, 563 
N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 1997) (holding if the legislature intends double 
punishment, section 701.9 is not applicable and merger is not required); 
State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 1995) (stating even if the 
crimes meet the legal impossibility test, we must “study whether the 
legislature intended multiple punishments for both offenses”).  Stewart 
asserts there is no evidence the legislature intended dual punishments 
under the statutes involved in this case.  
 
In the alternative, Stewart contends we should abandon the 
approach in our cases and instead follow Justice Carter’s special 
concurrence in State v. Daniels, 588 N.W.2d 682, 685–86 (Iowa 1998) 
(Carter, J., concurring specially).  Justice Carter noted “[s]ection 701.9 is 
6 
a general statute that governs all crimes . . . .  Consequently, all included 
offenses meeting the Blockburger analysis must be merged within the 
greater offense because this is the intent of the legislature as expressed 
in [section 701.9].”  Id.  Stewart asserts that under Iowa Code section 
701.9, the only requirement for merger is legal impossibility, period.  
According to Stewart, there is no suggestion in the statute that once legal 
impossibility is established, a court should engage in an exploration of 
legislative intent.  Although the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and Iowa Code section 701.9 address the same subject, 
Stewart essentially asserts that we have improperly imported the round 
federal constitutional peg into the square hole of state statutory 
interpretation.     
 
The State counters it is legally possible to commit the crime of 
introduction without also committing the crime of possession of a 
controlled substance.  For example, the State asserts a defendant could 
cause a controlled substance to be introduced into a detention facility 
through a third party but not possess the contraband.  The State argues 
the very issue in the case was decided in Caquelin, a decision supported 
in Iowa and federal precedent.  See, e.g., State v. Grady, 215 N.W.2d 213, 
214 (Iowa 1974); United States v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 760, 762–63 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (per curiam).  Further, the State emphasizes the test for 
determining whether merger occurs is one based on legal impossibility 
(whether it is theoretically possible in any case for the defendant to 
commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser) and not 
impossibility based upon the facts of a specific case.  See State v. 
Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 2001) (explaining the test is purely 
a review of the legal elements and does not consider the facts of a 
particular case); State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737–39 (Iowa 1988) 
7 
(noting the impossibility test adopted by the court eliminated “the 
troublesome problem posed by the manner in which we applied our 
previous factual test to lesser-included offenses”).  In the alternative, the 
State argues that even if Stewart has demonstrated legal impossibility, 
the legislature clearly intended multiple punishments for introduction 
and possession of a controlled substance and, as a result, the conviction 
for both offenses is valid.  
 
B.  Analysis.  We begin our analysis by outlining several principles 
that guide our decision.  To begin with, both our state and federal 
precedents endorse the notion that in the merger and double jeopardy 
context, the threshold question is whether it is legally impossible to 
commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser.  See Miller, 
841 N.W.2d at 588; State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Iowa 1990); 
see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690–91, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 
1437–38, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715, 722–23 (1980); Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 
52 S. Ct. at 182, 76 L. Ed. at 309.  In other words, under both statutory 
questions of merger and under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, we have rejected a factual impossibility test which 
turns on the specific facts of the case in favor of a more general analysis 
based on the relationship between the two crimes.  See Hickman, 623 
N.W.2d at 850; Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d at 737–39.  No party directly 
challenges this basic proposition. 
 
We now apply the legal impossibility test.  In looking at the two 
statutes involved in this case, we find the reasoning of the court of 
appeals in Caquelin persuasive.  We do not believe it is legally impossible 
to be convicted of introduction without also being convicted of possession 
of a controlled substance.  A defendant could, for instance, instruct a 
third party to cause illegal drugs to be smuggled into a detention facility 
8 
without ever possessing them.  See Caquelin, 702 N.W.2d at 512; see 
also State v. Welch, 507 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1993) (holding 
possession with intent to deliver does not merge with distribution of a 
controlled substance to a minor because possession is not a necessary 
element of distribution); Grady, 215 N.W.2d at 214 (noting that a 
“constructive transfer” which would amount to illegal delivery does not 
require possession); Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 1995) 
(holding that “taking or passing controlled substances into a jail may be 
proven 
without 
necessarily 
proving 
possession 
of 
a 
controlled 
substance”); see also Campbell, 652 F.2d at 762–63 (holding possession 
of contraband was not necessarily included in the offense of attempting 
to introduce contraband into a federal correctional institution).2 
 
In 
considering 
impossibility, 
our 
cases 
indicate 
that 
our 
determination of legal possibility should be guided not only by analysis of 
the statute, but also by examining the marshalling instructions given by 
the district court.  See Miller, 841 N.W.2d at 590.  In this case, the 
marshalling instructions largely mirror the statutory elements of each 
crime as described in the statute.3  They do not assist Stewart in 
showing legal impossibility. 
2The Campbell court cited other cases where courts “have approved conviction 
on multiple counts of introduction of contraband into a federal correctional facility and 
possession of a controlled substance.”  652 F.2d at 762 (citing United States v. Corral, 
578 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1978), United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 
1974), United States v. Jiminez, 454 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Tenn. 1978), and United States 
v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). 
3Jury instruction number 15 stated:  
To prove the Defendant guilty of Introduction of a Controlled 
Substance Into a Detention Facility, the State must prove all of the 
following elements: 
1. The Woodbury County Jail was a detention facility. 
                                      
 
 
9 
 
Stewart has introduced a new twist by arguing that several 
criminal statutes located in various provisions of the Code should be 
considered in the alternative; as if there was one statute with several 
statutory alternatives.  This is an interesting argument, but does not 
carry the day for Stewart.  It is not unusual for a defendant’s conduct to 
give rise to potential liability under several alternatives of a singular 
criminal statute or, as argued by Stewart here, under multiple criminal 
statutes.  In this circumstance, the statutes are not mutually exclusive, 
but merely overlapping.  Where the facts support criminal liability under 
several statutory alternatives, the fact the State only charges a defendant 
under one alternative does not preclude the State from offering evidence 
that would also support conviction under an uncharged offense.  In other 
words, the sole focus for merger or double jeopardy purposes is on the 
crimes charged in the trial information and for which the jury was 
instructed.  See State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa 1997) 
(holding that “when a statute provides alternative ways of committing the 
offense, the alternative submitted to the jury controls”).   
 
Here, for the reasons previously stated and examples previously 
given, it is simply not legally impossible to commit the greater crime 
actually charged without also committing the lesser crime as charged.  
2. On or about the 7th day of December, 2012, in Woodbury 
County, Iowa, the Defendant introduced a controlled substance into that 
place. 
3. The Defendant was not authorized to do so. 
Jury instruction number 20 stated in relevant part: 
The State must prove each of the following elements of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance: 
1. On or about the 7th day of December, 2012, the Defendant 
knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine. 
2. The Defendant knew the substance she possessed was 
methamphetamine. 
___________________________ 
10 
As a result, neither the merger statute in Iowa Code section 701.9 nor 
double jeopardy principles under the Fifth Amendment form a basis for 
reversal of Stewart’s possession conviction.  The district court’s judgment 
in this case must be affirmed. 
 
In light of our disposition, it is not necessary to consider whether 
the statutory legal analysis under Iowa Code section 701.9 differs from 
the analysis contained in cases interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment as suggested in Justice Carter’s special 
concurrence in Daniels.  See 588 N.W.2d at 685 (Carter, J., concurring 
specially); see also Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 732 (noting the court was 
upon to “rethink our interpretation of section 701.9” based on Justice 
Carter’s special concurrence in Daniels, but the court found it 
unnecessary to resolve such issue, as it determined the crimes in the 
case did not share a greater and lesser included offense relationship).  
We leave this issue for another day.   
IV.  Conclusion. 
 
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court affirming 
Stewart’s conviction is affirmed.  With respect to the issue of costs, the 
case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings as required 
by the decision of the court of appeals.  
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED.