Title: BRETT ALAN CRAMER V. POWDER RIVER COAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, f/k/a Powder River Coal Company, a Delaware Corporation, and CABALLO COAL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, acting through their agents, officers, employees and representatives

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRETT ALAN CRAMER V. POWDER RIVER COAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, f/k/a Powder River Coal Company, a Delaware Corporation, and CABALLO COAL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, acting through their agents, officers, employees and representatives2009 WY 45204 P.3d 974Case Number: S-08-0049Decided: 03/31/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
BRETT 
ALAN CRAMER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
POWDER 
RIVER COAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, f/k/a Powder River Coal 
Company, a Delaware Corporation, and CABALLO COAL COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation, acting through their agents, officers, employees and 
representatives,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C. 
John Cotton, Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Billie 
Addleman and Richard Mincer, Hirst Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Brett 
Cramer brought suit against the owner and the operator of the Caballo Mine, 
seeking to hold them liable for damages he suffered in an accident that occurred 
while he was working at the mine site.  
The trial resulted in a jury verdict against Mr. Cramer, and the 
district court entered judgment against him.  Mr. Cramer appeals, claiming that the 
district court erred in numerous pretrial and trial rulings.  We conclude that no reversible errors 
have been demonstrated, and affirm the judgment entered by the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Cramer presents a list of seven issues for our consideration.  To facilitate their discussion, we have 
placed them in this order:

 
 
1.         
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment and denying a Campen motion regarding punitive 
damages?

 
 
2.         
Did the district court err in refusing to allow evidence at trial of 
Defendants' policy of not maintaining, preparing, or inspecting mine property 
for purposes of the safety of visitors?

 
 
3.         
Did the district court err in refusing discovery regarding Defendants' 
policy of not maintaining, preparing, or inspecting mine property for purposes 
of the safety of visitors?

 
 
4.         
Did the district court err in dismissing Plaintiff's claim for damages 
for violation of duties imposed by contract?

 
 
5.         
Did the district court err in refusing to allow Plaintiff's expert to 
testify at trial regarding the applicable standard of care and Defendants' 
breach of the standard of care?

 
 
6.         
Did the district court err in refusing to allow Plaintiff's expert to 
testify at trial, following a written request from the jury, regarding 
Defendants' violation of MSHA provisions?

 
 
7.         
Did the district court violate the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming law 
by applying collateral estoppel to Plaintiff's claim of cervical 
injuries?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
The 
Caballo Mine is a large surface coal mine located in Wyoming's Powder River 
Basin.  It is owned and operated by 
two affiliated companies, Powder River Coal, LLC, and Caballo Coal Company 
(collectively "PRC").  On October 
18, 2002, Mr. Cramer, an employee of Weld Test Inspection & Service, 
went to the Caballo Mine to perform ultrasonic testing on a large coal 
shovel.  After some of the tests 
were finished, the shovel had to be moved to allow Mr. Cramer access to 
additional parts of the shovel.  One 
PRC employee operated the shovel.  
Mr. Cramer climbed up a ladder leaned against the shovel so he could tell 
when the shovel had moved into the correct position.  Another PRC employee was on the ground 
relaying Mr. Cramer's signals to the operator.  As the shovel rotated, oil leaked out, 
and the wind blew the oil over Mr. Cramer where he stood on the ladder.  He either jumped or fell from the 
ladder, and was injured.  

 
 

[¶4]        
After 
the accident, a PRC employee offered to call for emergency assistance, but 
Mr. Cramer declined, saying that he was able to drive his truck.  He drove to the hospital, where he 
received medical treatment for his injuries.  Later, he filed a worker's compensation 
claim for his medical expenses.  The 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Division awarded benefits to Mr. Cramer 
for the injuries to his foot and knee, but denied his claim for compensation for 
his neck injuries on the basis that Mr. Cramer had not proven that they 
were caused by his workplace accident.  
That decision was affirmed on appeal.  Cramer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 124, 120 P.3d 668 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Cramer then filed various claims against PRC in the district court.  The district court granted a motion to 
dismiss a claim entitled "Claim for Damages for Violation of Duties Imposed by 
Statute, Regulation and Contract," ruling that it did not state a viable cause 
of action.  It also dismissed Mr. 
Cramer's claims relating to his neck injuries on the basis that it had 
previously been determined in the worker's compensation case that the injury was 
not caused by the accident at the mine.  
Mr. Cramer appeals the dismissal of these two causes of 
action.

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Cramer's complaint also included a claim for punitive damages against PRC.  In it, he alleged that PRC required all 
visitors and contractors who entered the mine site to sign a document entitled 
"PRCC Assumption of Risk  Release of Liability and Notice of Warning  Company 
Warning Visitor that the Premises may be Dangerous and Hazardous."  The language of this Release will be 
detailed below, but in brief, it warned visitors of the possible presence of 
dangers and hazards, and contained a release of liability and waiver of claims 
against PRC.  Mr. Cramer alleged 
that the Release violated applicable laws, regulations, and public policy, and 
that its use by PRC constituted willful and wanton conduct sufficient to warrant 
the imposition of punitive damages.  
Mr. Cramer appeals various rulings by the district court relating to 
this Release and his claim for punitive damages based on it. 

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
case proceeded to trial on claims of negligence.  The jury rendered a verdict finding Mr. 
Cramer 55% at fault, Powder River Coal 25% at fault, and Caballo Coal Company 
20% at fault.  Because Mr. Cramer 
was allocated more than 50% of the fault, he was denied recovery pursuant to 
Wyoming's Comparative Fault statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 
2007).  The district court entered 
judgment in favor of the Defendants.  
Mr. Cramer appeals several decisions made by the district court on 
pretrial discovery issues and evidentiary questions that arose during the 
trial.  Additional facts will be 
discussed as they relate to the individual issues.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
The 
Release

 
 

[¶8]        
Three 
issues relating to the Release are raised in Mr. Cramer's appeal.  Before considering these individual 
issues, we begin with an overview of the Release and the proceedings relating to 
it.  PRC required visitors to the 
mine site to sign the Release.  
Contractors like Mr. Cramer were considered visitors, and Mr. Cramer 
had signed a copy of the Release before beginning his work at the mine 
site.  The Release included a 
provision by which the visitor:

 
 
waives 
and releases and (to the extent permitted by Law) agrees to indemnify, defend, 
and hold harmless [PRC], their agents, and employees from and against any and 
all claims for injury to any person (including death) or damage to any property 
(including claims for exemplary damages) and litigation expenses (including 
reasonable attorney fees) arising from or connected in any way with Visitor's 
occupation or use of the premises.

 
 
The 
Release also contained the following language:

 
 
WARNING! 
CONDITION OF PREMISES: Visitor understands that the area contains active mining 
operations and numerous hazardous conditions, such as rough and unstable 
surface, active haulage roads, open pits, blasting, operating heavy equipment 
and equipment shops, electrical lines and equipment, railroads and rail traffic, 
coal preparation and handling facilities, rattlesnakes, and other natural and 
artificial hazards.  The Company 
further warns that they have not maintained, prepared, or inspected the premises 
for purposes of Visitor.  The 
Company does not represent that the premises are safe or suitable for Visitor's 
presence on the mine property without release of liability and waiver of 
claims.

 
 

[¶9]        
In 
his initial complaint, Mr. Cramer alleged that PRC's use of the waiver and 
release to discourage and preclude workers from filing personal injury claims 
against PRC was illegal and contrary to public policy.  He appeared to anticipate that PRC would 
assert that Mr. Cramer's personal injury claims were barred by the Release 
he had signed.  That, he alleged, 
constituted willful and wanton conduct sufficient to justify a punitive damage 
claim against PRC.

 
 

[¶10]     
From 
the outset, however, PRC declined to assert the waiver and release of liability 
as a defense to Mr. Cramer's claims.  
Because it did not use the Release to discourage or preclude 
Mr. Cramer from bringing his claims, PRC asserted that it had not engaged 
in the conduct alleged to be willful and wanton, and on that basis moved to 
dismiss the punitive damages claim.  
In conjunction with its motion to dismiss, PRC also filed a motion for 
protective order, asserting that it was not required to respond to 
Mr. Cramer's discovery requests relating to his punitive damage claim. 

[¶11]     
In 
response to PRC's motions, Mr. Cramer shifted the focus of his punitive damages 
claim away from the waiver and release of liability, and toward the statement in 
the Release that "The Company further warns that they have not maintained, 
prepared, or inspected the premises for purposes of Visitor."  He insisted that this statement in the 
Release represented a written company policy not to maintain the mine site so it 
was safe for visitors.  The 
existence of this policy, Mr. Cramer asserted, was sufficiently egregious to 
warrant punitive damages.  The 
district court allowed Mr. Cramer to amend his complaint in an effort to 
reflect and clarify this new basis for the punitive damages 
claim.

 
 

[¶12]     
PRC 
consistently asserted that the Release did not reflect a company policy, but 
rather a warning that hazards existed on the mine site.  When questioned about the form, one PRC 
representative provided this explanation:

 
 
I 
think it's fair to say that when we enter into a contract with someone, we tell 
them that we are doing, with regard to the premises, that which is required by 
law; and they do what is required by them by law; and we're not undertaking any 
additional responsibilities. . . .  
I'm not sure that "policy" is the right word but [the Release] warns 
people that come on the property that the area is  contains active mining 
operations, and hazards.  And I 
think its intention likely was, when it was drafted, to tell people that we're 
not assuming any additional obligations with regard to you, other than those 
that are already imposed on us by law.

 
 

[¶13]     
Throughout 
pretrial proceedings, the parties sharply disputed the meaning and significance 
of the Release.  Their disagreements 
were raised before the district court numerous times in the context of discovery 
disputes and motion hearings.  As a 
result, the district court issued several different rulings and decisions 
regarding the Release.  Because 
these rulings are interrelated, it can be difficult to separate out for analysis 
the individual issues listed in Mr. Cramer's appeal.  However, we will consider in turn each 
of  the three issues raised by 
Mr. Cramer.

 
 
Issue 
1:  Limiting discovery concerning 
PRC's financial status and ruling that Mr. Cramer could not present his 
punitive damages claim to the jury

 
 

[¶14]     
As 
noted above, PRC filed motions for protective orders, asserting that it should 
not be forced to respond to Mr. Cramer's discovery requests for financial 
information relating to his punitive damages claim.  The district court eventually granted 
protective orders to PRC, and Mr. Cramer appeals that decision.  Because "the trial court has broad 
discretion in controlling discovery," we review decisions relating to discovery 
for abuse of discretion.  Global Shipping & Trading v. 
Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶15]     
PRC's 
motions referred to the case of Campen v. 
Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981), in which we adopted 
an "approach and procedure for the discovery and presentation of evidence of 
financial status of a defendant when punitive damages are sought."  The first two steps in that procedure 
are as follows:

 
 
1.         
The plaintiff may claim in his complaint a right to punitive damages and 
then seek pretrial discovery of a defendant's wealth.

2.         
Defendant may move for a protective order requiring the plaintiff to make 
a prima facie showing to the trial court that a viable issue exists for punitive 
damages. Upon such a showing, the pretrial discovery would be 
allowed.

 
 

Id.

[¶16]     
In 
response to PRC's motions, Mr. Cramer 
submitted a brief "in connection with the prima facia [sic] showing under Campen v. Stone," in which he claimed 
that PRC's "conduct in connection with this matter is appalling."  He asserted 
that his injuries were "not the result of mere inadvertence on the part of 
[PRC], but instead resulted from [PRC's] consistent disregard of applicable 
safety standards."  This disregard 
of safety was, he claimed, the result of the policy set forth in the Release 
against maintaining a safe mine site, and had caused or contributed to his 
injuries.  Mr. Cramer asserted 
that this disregard of safety constituted wanton and willful misconduct 
sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.  Not surprisingly, PRC disputed these 
claims.  It maintained that 
Mr. Cramer had not come forward with any facts demonstrating wanton and 
willful misconduct on the part of PRC.  
The district court ruled in favor of PRC.  

[¶17]     
We 
have explained that punitive damages "are to be awarded only for conduct 
involving some element of outrage, similar to that usually found in crime. . . 
.  We have approved punitive damages 
in circumstances involving outrageous conduct, such as intentional torts, torts 
involving malice and torts involving willful and wanton misconduct."  Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 
1369-70 (Wyo. 1986).  Willful and 
wanton misconduct is the intentional doing, or failing to do, an act in reckless 
disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a 
reasonable person would know that such conduct would, in a high degree of 
probability, result in harm to another.  
Mayflower Rest. Co. v. Griego, 
741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987).  
"The aggravating factor which distinguishes willful misconduct from 
ordinary negligence is the actor's state of mind.  In order to prove that an actor has 
engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state 
of mind that approaches intent to do harm."  Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 
1136 (Wyo. 1986) (internal citation omitted).  

 
 

[¶18]     
Our 
gleaning of the record yielded, in addition to the language of the Release, the 
following list of facts asserted by Mr. Cramer in support of his punitive 
damages claim:  (1)  PRC 
violated federal regulations by failing to designate a representative to inspect 
for hazardous conditions once per shift; (2)  PRC violated federal 
regulations by operating the shovel "in the presence of any person exposed to a 
hazard from its operation," i.e. Mr. Cramer; (3)  PRC 
provided inadequate safety training to its employees; (4)  the PRC 
employees involved in Mr. Cramer's injury did not have an immediate supervisor 
that day; (5)  PRC's employees had done work on the shovel that 
allowed the oil to spill out, and knew or should have known that it could happen 
again; (6)  the PRC employees directed Mr. Cramer to climb up the 
ladder to help reposition the shovel; (7)  oil spilled on 
Mr. Cramer while he was on the ladder; and (8)  Mr. Cramer 
fell or slipped off of the ladder and was injured as a result.

 
 

[¶19]     
If 
proven, these facts could be sufficient to support a claim of ordinary 
negligence, the claim ultimately rejected by the jury.  But even if proven, and even in 
conjunction with the Release language, these facts do not demonstrate outrageous 
conduct, willful and wanton misconduct, or a state of mind approaching intent to 
do harm.  The facts are insufficient 
to justify punitive damages, and so we agree with the district court that 
Mr. Cramer failed to make a prima 
facie showing of a viable punitive damages claim.  On that basis, we affirm the district 
court's decision to deny Mr. Cramer's efforts to obtain discovery 
concerning PRC's financial status.  

 
 

[¶20]     
At 
the same hearing in which the district court heard argument pursuant to the Campen procedures, it also considered 
PRC's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Cramer's punitive damages 
claim.  On the basis that Mr. Cramer 
did not make a prima facie showing 
that he was entitled to punitive damages, the district court also granted PRC's 
motion.  The facts asserted by 
Mr. Cramer, even if proven, would not be sufficient to support an award of 
punitive damages, so it follows that Mr. Cramer did not raise genuine 
issues of material fact with regard to his punitive damages claim.  PRC was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on this claim, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that Mr. Cramer could not present his punitive damages claim to the 
jury.  

 
 
Issue 
2:  Exclusion of the Release from 
evidence

 
 

[¶21]     
As 
stated above, the Release was the subject of numerous disputes.  At one point, the district court had 
before it PRC's motion for a protective order and Mr. Cramer's contrary 
motion to compel discovery of information relating to the punitive damages 
claim.  The district court ruled 
that the Release "does not amount to a declaration of policy on the part of 
Defendants or an admission that they do not maintain a safe mine site.  Nor is it evidence of same."  (Footnote omitted.)  As the district court further 
explained:

 
 
At 
best, the release form is a misguided effort to facially insulate Defendants 
from liability for damages to non-employee third parties.  At worst, it is an undisguised attempt 
to forestall and even perhaps intimidate such individuals against filing suit 
for damages sustained on mine property.  In either event, the release form does 
not bespeak a policy to maintain an unsafe mine site.  Other language in the release 
form tends to this conclusion.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  On this same basis, the 
district court later issued its Memorandum of Pretrial Conference, expressly 
limiting Mr. Cramer's use of the Release as evidence at 
trial:

 
 
[T]he 
court determines the release form may not be used in Plaintiff's case-in-chief 
because it is of marginal relevance and has the potential to mislead and confuse 
the jury  even if otherwise admissible.  
See W.R.E. 403.  However, Plaintiff may be entitled to 
use the release form in cross-examination.  
On this question the court RESERVES RULING.

 
 
On 
appeal, Mr. Cramer challenges the district court's refusal to allow the Release 
into evidence in his case-in-chief.

 
 

[¶22]     
We 
review a district court's decisions regarding evidence for abuse of 
discretion:

 
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. . . .  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.

 
 

Teniente 
v. State, 
2007 WY 165, ¶ 54, 169 P.3d 512, 529 (Wyo. 2007) (internal citations and 
punctuation omitted).

 
 

[¶23]     
We 
begin by considering the district court's conclusion that the Release was "of 
marginal relevance."  W.R.E. 
401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Evenson v. State, 2008 WY 24, ¶ 26, 177 P.3d 819, 
827 (Wyo. 2008).  Regardless of 
whether the Release reflected a company policy against maintaining a safe mine 
site, it was a statement made by PRC that, when considered by the jury, could 
tend to make it more likely that PRC had breached 
its duty of taking reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable 
hazards.  On this basis, the Release 
does appear to have been relevant evidence.

 
 

[¶24]     
But 
not all relevant evidence is admissible.  
W.R.E. 403 provides that, "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."  The district court excluded the Release 
from evidence on the basis that it was potentially misleading and confusing to 
the jury.  Like the issue of 
relevance, "the 
balancing of prejudice against probative worth is ordinarily a discretionary 
matter for the trial court."  Miller v. State, 784 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1989).  

 
 

[¶25]     
We 
have reviewed the parties' numerous pretrial arguments about the Release, and 
observe that the arguments themselves suggest that the Release had the potential 
to confuse and mislead the jury.  
For example, Mr. Cramer often asserted that the Release was 
"illegal."  The jury could have been 
misled into speculation about whether PRC had been or should be subject to civil 
penalties, or even criminal sanctions.  
The jury might also have been confused about why Mr. Cramer was 
bringing a negligence claim against PRC when he had signed the Release with an 
explicit waiver and release of liability.  
In either example, the jury's attention would have been diverted from the 
negligence claim it was asked to decide.  
The district court might have tried to overcome the confusion with jury 
instructions, but given its conclusion that the Release was only marginally 
relevant, it was not unreasonable for the district court instead to exclude the 
Release from evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 403. 

 
 
Issue 
3:  Limiting discovery regarding the 
Release

 
 

[¶26]     
Before 
ruling that the Release was not admissible, the district court had granted a 
number of PRC's motions for protective orders, and denied some of 
Mr. Cramer's motions to compel discovery regarding the Release.  On appeal, Mr. Cramer challenges 
these limitations on his discovery.  
Again, we review the district court's discovery decisions for abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶27]     
The 
district court's decision that the Release was inadmissible does not, by itself, 
mean that Mr. Cramer could not attempt to discover information about the 
Release.  Discovery is allowed not 
only for admissible information, but also for information "reasonably calculated 
to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."  W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1).  For the most part, however, Mr. Cramer 
has not specified the discovery information he was unable to obtain, and so has 
not explained how that information was reasonably calculated to lead to 
discovery of admissible evidence.  

 
 

[¶28]     
The 
district court ruled that PRC would not be required to answer a number of 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of 
documents relating to the Release.  
Nowhere in Mr. Cramer's brief does he specify which of those discovery 
requests he claims PRC should have been required to answer, nor does he suggest 
how discovering that information might have helped his case.  We combed though the record, and learned 
that several of the discovery requests not answered by PRC related to PRC's 
financial status.  As previously 
reviewed, Mr. Cramer was not entitled to discover this information because he 
did not make a prima facie showing of 
a viable punitive damages claim.  

 
 

[¶29]     
Other 
discovery requests not answered by PRC included questions about who drafted the 
language and when, how many visitors had signed the Release over the years, what 
their names were, how many of them had been injured, and how many of them filed 
or failed to file claims against PRC.  
The information sought by these discovery requests may have been relevant 
to Mr. Cramer's punitive damages claim as first presented  that is, to his 
claim that PRC's use of the Release to discourage and prevent personal injury 
claims was illegal.  But in 
connection with the punitive damages claim set forth in his amended complaints  
that is, that the Release represented company policy that caused or contributed 
to Mr. Cramer's injuries  he does not explain how the answers might have led to 
admissible evidence.  The 
information would not have helped Mr. Cramer establish that the actions of 
PRC's employees conformed to the statements in the Release, so that the Release 
caused or contributed to the injuries suffered by 
Mr. Cramer.

 
 

[¶30]     
Mr. Cramer 
does specify certain deposition questions that he claims should have been 
answered.  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
30(b)(6), PRC designated a witness to testify "regarding punitive damage 
issues."  Early in the deposition, 
the parties renewed their disagreement about what discovery was appropriate 
concerning the Release.  They 
telephoned the district court, who ruled that Mr. Cramer was "entitled to 
inquire about what you believe is the policy reflected by that form," but that 
he could not ask questions about the "history of the form."  More specifically, the district court 
allowed Mr. Cramer's counsel to ask, with regard to the Release, "Is this 
your policy?"  In response to that 
question, the witness indicated that it was not a policy.  

 
 

[¶31]     
Counsel 
for Mr. Cramer attempted to follow up with questions such as "[W]as the form and 
the statements in it reviewed by Powder River Coal management before 
implementation of the form?" and "Do you know why PRC adopted the statements in 
the form that they would not, quote, Maintain, prepare, or inspect the premises 
for purposes of the safety of employees of third parties'?"  These questions relate directly to the 
"history of the form," and the district court had already ruled that PRC did not 
have to respond to such questions.  
In another telephone conference held while the deposition was in 
progress, the district court reaffirmed that the PRC witness was not required to 
answer these questions.  

 
 

[¶32]     
Mr. 
Cramer has not shown that the district court erred in this ruling, because he 
has not shown how the answers to questions about the history of the Release 
might have yielded or led to admissible evidence.  On the other hand, Mr. Cramer was 
able to depose the PRC employees involved with the incident, but did not 
discover any evidence connecting the Release to their actions on the day of the 
accident.  He conducted considerable 
discovery relating to PRC's policies and practices on inspecting and maintaining 
the mine site, dealing with oil spills and slipping hazards, compliance with 
MSHA regulations, and the like, but did not discover any evidence that the 
statements in the Release had influenced the actions of PRC employees.  Under those circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that PRC was not required to 
respond to Mr. Cramer's discovery requests about the history of the 
Release.

 
 
Issue 
4:   Claim for "damages for 
violation of duties imposed by contract"

 
 

[¶33]     
In 
his amended complaint, Mr. Cramer pleaded a third cause of action he entitled 
"Claim for Damages for Violation of Duties Imposed by Statute, Regulation and 
Contract."  In it, he alleged that 
PRC's policies, practices, and procedures violated the federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 (MSHA), and regulations promulgated under that 
Act.  He also alleged that PRC's 
conduct violated duties imposed "by statute, law, regulation, contract, as well 
as by the Wyoming Constitution."  
While no particular contract was identified in this cause of action, it 
appears from later pleadings that Mr. Cramer's claim related to alleged 
violations of duties imposed by PRC's federal coal leases.  There are several such leases covering 
the Caballo Mine, and within them are various provisions setting forth 
obligations such as a duty to "maintain a safe working environment" and to 
"carry on all operations . . . having due regard for the prevention of 
injury to life, health, or property." 

 
 

[¶34]     
PRC 
moved to dismiss this cause of action.  
The district court granted the motion, explaining that it was "unable to 
locate anywhere a recognized claim such as the one listed as Plaintiff's Third 
Cause of Action."  Upon dismissing 
this as a "stand alone" claim, the district court also stated 
that:

 
 
Evidence 
of the Defendants' alleged implementation of what the Plaintiff feels are 
illegal policies, practices and procedures may go to demonstrating the standard 
of care, as the MSHA regulations may be used to demonstrate that the 
Defendant[s] owed some duty of care to this Plaintiff.  Therefore, the court is not foreclosing 
use of the evidence . . . for purposes of establishing a duty and/or standard of 
care.

 
 
In 
his appeal brief, Mr. Cramer indicates that he is not appealing the district 
court's decision with regard to duties imposed by statute or regulation.  That is because, at trial, the district 
court allowed Mr. Cramer to present evidence concerning certain MSHA 
regulations, and instructed the jury that regulatory violations could be used as 
evidence in support of Mr. Cramer's negligence claim.  What Mr. Cramer does challenge on appeal 
is the district court's decision to dismiss his cause of action relating to 
duties imposed by contract.

 
 

[¶35]     
We 
review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss using this 
standard:

 
 
When 
reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in 
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  We will sustain such a 
dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff 
cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.

 
 

Ballinger 
v. Thompson, 
2005 WY 101, ¶ 9, 118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citation 
omitted).

 
 

[¶36]     
"It 
is hornbook law," Mr. Cramer contends in his brief, "that a duty may arise by 
contract."  In support of that 
contention, he cites three Wyoming cases, all of which contain language very 
much like this:

 
 
There 
are four elements to a negligence cause of action:  (1) the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the 
defendant breached the duty of care; (3) the defendant's breach of the duty 
of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury 
sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages.  Whether a duty exists is a question of 
law for the court and may arise based upon common law, contract or 
statute.

 
 

Downtown 
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, 
2004 WY 67, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 917, 919 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citation omitted); 
see also Becker v. Mason, 2006 WY 
143, ¶ 6, 145 P.3d 1268, 1270 (Wyo. 2006); Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 
¶ 6, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003).  
All three cases support the proposition that a contract may give rise to 
a duty, and that duty is one of the elements of a negligence claim.  They do not support Mr. Cramer's 
contention that PRC's alleged breach of contract provided him a basis for 
pursuing a separate tort claim against PRC apart from the negligence claims he 
pursued at trial.  The cases cited 
by Mr. Cramer do not establish that the district court erred in dismissing 
this claim as a separate cause of action.

 
 

[¶37]     
What 
these cases do support is the district court's decision that a contractual 
breach may be used as evidence to support a negligence claim.  The district court had explicitly stated 
that it was not foreclosing the use of such evidence for purposes of 
establishing a duty or standard of care.  
As noted above, Mr. Cramer did present evidence at trial suggesting 
that PRC had violated certain regulations, and used that as evidence to support 
his negligence claim against PRC.  
In contrast, he never attempted to offer into evidence any contract or 
lease that might have established PRC's duty or standard of care, nor did he 
offer any evidence that PRC had breached any contractual obligations.  The district court's ruling did not 
preclude Mr. Cramer from introducing evidence that PRC may have violated duties 
imposed by contract, and accordingly, we cannot conclude that the ruling was in 
error.

 
 
Issue 
5:  Expert testimony regarding 
whether PRC violated applicable regulations

 
 

[¶38]     
In 
his pretrial memorandum, Mr. Cramer designated an expert witness to testify 
about applicable safety standards, chiefly the MSHA regulations at 30 CFR 
§§ 77.1713 and 77.409.  The 
expert was also designated to offer his opinion that PRC had violated those 
standards.  PRC designated counter 
experts to offer opinions that PRC had not violated the MSHA standards.  On the parties' cross motions to limit 
the experts' testimony, the district court allowed the experts to testify about 
the safety standards.  It did not 
allow the experts for either side to present opinions on whether PRC had 
violated or complied with those standards.  
Mr. Cramer appeals that decision.  
As noted above, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶39]     
Mr. 
Cramer claims that the district court improperly limited his expert's testimony 
on the regulations and the applicable standard of care.  That claim is not borne out by the 
record.  The district court allowed 
the expert to testify about the general regulatory framework of MSHA, and about 
the specific regulations pertinent to the case.  It allowed the expert to explain the 
regulations, if necessary, and to indicate their application to PRC.  The record establishes that the district 
court allowed all of the expert testimony offered by Mr. Cramer dealing with the 
regulations and the standard of care.

 
 

[¶40]     
The 
district court did, however, exclude the expert's opinion on whether PRC 
violated the MSHA regulations.  In 
excluding this testimony, the district court commented that it "invades the 
province of the jury."  Mr. Cramer 
correctly points out that, under W.R.E. 704, expert testimony "is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact."  On that basis, he claims 
that the district court erred in limiting the testimony of his expert 
witness.

 

[¶41]     
When 
the district court's comments are placed in context, however, they indicate a 
different basis for limiting the expert's testimony.  The district court said it had 
"considered the several motions to strike in connection with . . . Daubert."  This is a reference to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 
113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), "a seminal case involving the proper 
foundation for admission of expert testimony."  Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, ¶ 8 
n.1, 197 P.3d 1273, 1276 n.1 (Wyo. 2008).  
The district court further explained that "there are a couple of factors 
that aid in determining 
the propriety of expert testimony, even before the Daubert factors come into play.  And it is really on the basis of one of 
those factors that the Court is going to issue its ruling here."  As the district court's comments 
suggest, Daubert is well-known for 
establishing four factors to be used in determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony pursuant to F.R.E. 702.1  Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 593-94, 
113 S. Ct.  at 2796-97.  But as the 
district court's comments also indicated, the Daubert opinion stated that, even before 
applying those four factors, a "trial judge must determine at the outset" 
whether the expert opinion offered "will assist the trier of fact to understand 
or determine a fact in issue."  Id., 509 U.S.  at 592, 113 S. Ct.  at 2796. 

 
 

[¶42]     
The 
district court noted that the regulations in question "appear pretty 
straightforward" and not difficult to understand.  The accuracy of that comment is apparent 
from the text of the regulations, as quoted in the jury instructions.  Instruction No. 35 read as 
follows:

 
 
You 
are instructed that MSHA Regulation codified at 30 CFR Chapter 1, Section 
77.409, states as follows:  
"(a) shovels . . . shall not be operated in the presence of any 
person exposed to a hazard from its operation . . . ."

 
 
It 
was followed by Instruction No. 36:

 
 
You 
are instructed that MSHA Regulation codified at 30 CFR Chapter 1, Section 
77.1713, states as follows:  
"(a) At least once during each working shift, or more often if 
necessary for safety, each active working area and each active surface 
installation shall be examined by a certified person designated by the operator 
to conduct such examinations for hazardous conditions and any hazardous 
conditions noted during such examinations shall be reported to the operator and 
shall be corrected by the operator." 

 
 

[¶43]     
When 
a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard of care with 
reasonable clarity, "expert testimony as to that standard and its breach are 
unnecessary."  Hulse v. First American Title Co., 2001 
WY 95, ¶ 60 n.9, 33 P.3d 122, 141 n.9 (Wyo. 2001).  In a case presenting a similar issue, we 
affirmed a district court's ruling that an expert could not give his opinion 
that a landlord had violated applicable building code regulations:  

 
 
A 
district court is vested with discretion to exclude expert testimony if it is 
deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of the factual 
issues. . . .  
Whether in any given case expert testimony is necessary to aid the 
jury in its search for the truth depends upon a variety of factors readily 
apparent only to a trial court, and we must depend heavily upon its 
judgment.We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow Lyden to present expert testimony.  The proposed expert testimony involved 
matters that the average juror could understand.  The safety of stairs, including handrails 
and headroom, is not so beyond an average person's experience and understanding 
that expert testimony is required to explain it.  The district court reasonably concluded 
that the testimony should not be allowed, and no abuse of discretion 
occurred.

Lyden 
ex rel. Lyden v. Winer, 
913 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Wyo. 1996) (internal citations omitted).  In Mr. Cramer's case, it was not 
unreasonable for the district court to determine that 
the jury could understand the regulations, and that the jury was capable of 
determining whether PRC's actions had violated the regulations without the need 
of expert opinion.  Depending 
heavily on the district court's judgment, as exercised under the particular 
circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it determined that the expert opinion testimony was 
unnecessary and not helpful to the jury.  

Issue 
6:  Response to jury question

 
 

[¶44]     
As 
discussed above, Mr. Cramer's expert testified at trial about applicable MSHA 
regulations, but was precluded from offering an opinion that PRC had violated 
those regulations.  At the end of 
the expert's testimony, the district court asked the jury if they had any 
questions for the witness.  One 
juror submitted this written question:  
"In your expert opinion, did the mine violate any MSHA rules that 
day?"  Outside the hearing of the 
jury, the parties repeated their positions on whether this opinion was 
admissible evidence.  The district 
court also repeated its previous decision:  
"The Court already ruled.  He 
is not going to testify whether or not that was a violation."  The jury was then informed as 
follows:

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, there was one question propounded by a juror, but as I think the 
instructions that I read to you [said], there are occasions when questions are 
put by jurors that cannot be asked for a legal reason, and this question falls 
into that category and will not be asked.

 
 

[¶45]     
Mr. 
Cramer challenges that ruling on appeal, and reprises his argument that the 
expert should have been allowed to testify that PRC had violated the MSHA 
regulations.  We have already 
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 
the expert's opinion on this issue was inadmissible.  Considering the circumstances, it was 
not unreasonable for the district court to maintain that position even after a 
juror asked the question.  The 
district court had ruled that neither of the party's experts would be allowed to 
answer that question.  It had said 
that the regulations were understandable to a jury.  It knew, as the jury did not, that the 
regulations would be quoted in the jury instructions.  The district court also knew that the 
jury had heard, or would hear, extensive testimony about the actions of PRC's 
employees relating to the accident.  
There was a reasonable basis for the district court to conclude that the 
jury was capable of determining whether PRC had violated the applicable 
regulations without expert opinion testimony on that issue.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's decision to remain consistent with its prior ruling that the 
expert's opinion was not admissible because it was not helpful to the 
jury.

 
 
Issue 
7:  Applying collateral estoppel to claims involving cervical 
injuries

 
 

[¶46]     
After 
his accident at the Caballo Mine, Mr. Cramer filed a worker's compensation claim 
to recover medical costs associated with his injuries.  The Workers' Safety & Compensation 
Division allowed the claims for the injuries to his foot and knee, but denied 
his claim for neck injuries on the basis that Mr. Cramer failed to prove that it 
was caused by or related to his workplace accident.  On appeal, we affirmed that 
decision.  Cramer, 120 P.3d 668.

 
 

[¶47]     
In 
his suit against PRC, Mr. Cramer included claims for damages relating to his 
neck injury.  PRC moved for partial 
summary judgment, asserting that the claims relating to his neck injury were 
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The district court granted PRC's motion 
for partial summary judgment, and Mr. Cramer appeals.

 
 

[¶48]     
On 
appeal, PRC contends that the issue is moot.  Because the jury found against 
Mr. Cramer on the issue of liability, PRC maintains, it never reached the 
question of damages.  It does not 
matter, then, if evidence about damages from the neck injury was excluded.  We agree.  The 
jury found that PRC was not liable for any of Mr. Cramer's damages, and 
"therefore, any issue relating solely to damages is moot."  McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, ¶ 8, 
120 P.3d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 

[¶49]     
Mr. 
Cramer claims that the issue is not moot, however, because the jury "clearly 
knew that Mr. Cramer was not telling the whole story about what happened with 
the cervical spine," and that "could only have had a negative impact on the 
jury's view of his credibility."  In 
support of this position, Mr. Cramer cites two portions of the record.  The first is from pretrial proceedings 
in which the district court decided to instruct the jury that it "may hear 
evidence related to a cervical spine condition suffered by the plaintiff," but 
that "this condition is unrelated to the incident in which the plaintiff was 
involved on October 18, 2002, at the Caballo Mine."  This proceeding was held outside of the 
jury's presence, and Mr. Cramer has not explained how it might have 
affected the jury's perception of his credibility.

 
 

[¶50]     
The 
second portion of the record is from the trial transcript of PRC's cross 
examination of Mr. Cramer.  
Counsel for PRC questioned him to clarify that he took medication in 2005 
because of his neck condition, and that he had not worked during 2005 because he 
was concerned about his neck condition.  
Mr. Cramer suggests that this was a general attack on his credibility, 
but that is not reflected in the record.  
Mr. Cramer provides no further explanation of how the cross examination 
about his neck condition had an impact on the jury's perception of his overall 
credibility.  Unable to perceive how 
the district court's limitation on evidence relating to his neck injury could 
have affected Mr. Cramer's overall credibility, we continue to agree that the 
issue of whether such evidence should have been allowed is 
moot.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶51]     
We 
have considered each of Mr. Cramer's 
appeal issues, and conclude that the district court committed no error that 
would justify reversing the jury's verdict.  We affirm the 
judgment.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This 
federal rule is nearly identical to W.R.E. 702, and we have expressly adopted 
the Daubert analysis for use under 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471 
(Wyo. 1999).