Title: Branham v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette and Mims, JJ., 
and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
CURTIS WAYNE BRANHAM 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 110263 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
January 13, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal presents questions involving the Fourth 
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  It also presents a question of the sufficiency of 
chain of custody evidence. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The first two assignments of error question the circuit 
court's denial of a motion to suppress the Commonwealth's 
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.  The material facts 
presented on that motion, heard in advance of trial, are 
undisputed but the parties disagree as to their legal 
consequences. 
 
Shortly after midnight on July 13, 2009, Deputy J. E. 
Begley, Investigator Mac Bridgewater and Sheriff L. J. Ayers, 
all of the Sheriff's Department of Amherst County, were driving 
to the residence of Jesse Ford, located in a rural area of the 
 
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county,1 to serve felony warrants on Ford for offenses involving 
cocaine.  Access to the Ford residence was by a driveway that 
also served a second residence.  The Ford residence lay about a 
quarter of a mile up the driveway from the public road.  The 
officers were in two marked police cars.  Begley drove the 
leading car and the other two officers were in the second car, 
following Begley. 
 
Turning into the driveway that leads to the Ford residence, 
the officers found the driveway blocked by a green Nissan parked 
in the driveway about 15 feet from the public road.  Seated in 
the Nissan, alone, was Curtis Wayne Branham.  Begley turned his 
spotlight on the Nissan but neither he nor the officers in the 
car behind him activated any emergency equipment.  Begley walked 
to the Nissan and asked Branham for his driver's license.  
Branham handed the license to Begley who noted that Branham's 
hands were shaking and that he seemed unusually nervous.  Begley 
entered Branham's driver's license information into the 
electronic record system and, while waiting for results from the 
license check, spoke to Branham again, asking him "what was 
going on."  Begley had noted from the driver's license that 
                     
 
1 A witness testified that Ford's nearest neighbor lived 
about a quarter of a mile away. 
 
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Branham's address was "about five [or] six miles" away from the 
place where he was parked. 
 
Begley asked Branham if he had "anything illegal in the 
vehicle, such as weapons."  Branham said "No."  Still waiting 
for a response to the license check, Begley asked Branham "if he 
would mind stepping out of the vehicle so I could pat him down 
for weapons."  Branham stepped out of car.  Begley then asked 
Branham if he could search him rather than pat him down, and 
Branham consented to the search.  At some point during this 
procedure, the other two officers appeared at the scene.  None 
of the officers drew their weapons.  Begley asked Branham why he 
was at this particular location and Branham responded that he 
had been "out looking for somebody up there [but] couldn't find 
the residence."  He did not give the name or address of the 
person for whom he was looking. 
 
Begley testified that during these events Branham was 
cooperative and never indicated any hesitation or reluctance to 
comply with Begley's several requests.  Begley testified that 
these requests were made in a conversational, not a demanding or 
threatening, tone and that the officers' cars were parked behind 
the Nissan but in such a way as not to obstruct its departure if 
Branham had desired to leave.  Begley could not recall when, 
during these events, he received the results of the license 
check but confirmed that he still had Branham's license in his 
 
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possession when asking permission to search him.  There is no 
evidence that Branham ever asked for the return of his license. 
 
While Begley and Branham were talking, a car came down the 
driveway and stopped ahead of the Nissan.  The sole occupant was 
Jesse Ford, the subject of the arrest warrants the officers were 
there to serve.  Investigator Bridgewater went to Ford's car 
while Begley searched Branham. 
 
In searching Branham's person, Begley reached into his 
right front jeans pocket and removed a plastic baggie containing 
an off-white powder that appeared to Begley to be cocaine.  At 
that point, Begley handcuffed Branham and gave him Miranda 
warnings.  He then asked Branham if there was anything in the 
car.  Branham said "No" and told Begley he could search the car 
if he wanted to.  A search of the Nissan revealed two sets of 
digital scales in the center console.  Both showed a residue of 
white powder that Begley, based on his experience, thought to be 
cocaine.  The contents of the baggie taken from Branham's pocket 
proved, on later examination, to be cocaine. 
 
Indicted in the Circuit Court of Amherst County for 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 
Code § 18.2-248, Branham moved the court to suppress the 
evidence on the ground that it represented the fruits of his 
illegal seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  
The court denied the motion and, at a bench trial, found Branham 
 
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guilty.  His appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied by a per 
curiam order and then reviewed by a three-judge panel which 
again denied it by an order entered on December 27, 2010.  We 
awarded Branham an appeal. 
Analysis 
A.  Search and Seizure 
 
Branham contends that he was seized, within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, as soon as Deputy Begley took his driver's 
license to make a record check, that Begley had no basis for a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that crime was then afoot, 
much less probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest, and 
that the results of the search were therefore the fruits of an 
unlawful seizure.  The Commonwealth concedes that Branham was 
seized when cocaine was discovered on his person, but contends 
that all the events leading up to the discovery of the cocaine 
were incidents of a purely consensual encounter.  In any event, 
the Commonwealth argues, Begley had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based upon the time, 
the place, the surrounding circumstances, Branham's demeanor and 
his evasive answers to questions. 
 
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, 
an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth and will accord the Commonwealth 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from 
 
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that evidence.  Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 520, 702 
S.E.2d 124, 126 (2010).  The defendant has the burden of showing 
that even when the evidence is reviewed in that light, denying 
the motion to suppress was reversible error.  Id. at 522, 702 
S.E.2d at 127.  We review de novo the trial court's application 
of the law to the particular facts of the case.  Glenn v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130, 654 S.E.2d 910, 913, (2008). 
 
A succinct summary by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit is helpful: 
The Supreme Court has recognized three 
distinct types of police-citizen interactions:  
(1) arrest, which must be supported by 
probable cause, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590 (1975); (2) brief investigatory 
stops, which must be supported by reasonable 
articulable suspicion, see [Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968)]; and (3) brief encounters 
between police and citizens, which require no 
objective justification, see Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 
United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not require any level of 
suspicion to justify non-coercive questioning by officers, 
including a request for identification.  United States v. 
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002); Montague v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 532, 538, 684 S.E.2d 583, 587 (2009). 
 
"A police officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."  Bass v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 474-75, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).  An officer may briefly detain 
a person in those circumstances while the officer questions him, 
tries to identify him and attempts to gather additional 
information to either dispel or confirm his suspicions.  Hayes 
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). 
 
A "reasonable suspicion" requires only "some minimal level 
of objective justification" for making such a stop.  I.N.S. v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).  Whether an officer has a 
reasonable suspicion to justify such a detention is "based on an 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances."  Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008).  
That assessment "allows officers to draw on their own experience 
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 
about the cumulative information available to them that 'might 
well elude an untrained person.' "  United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 418 (1981)). 
 
Applying those principles to the present case, we hold that 
the initial encounter between Deputy Begley and Branham was 
entirely consensual.  Branham was not required by law to 
surrender his driver's license for a record check because Code 
§ 46.2-104, requiring the owner or operator of a motor vehicle 
to exhibit his driver's license to an officer for 
 
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identification, applies only when such a driver has received a 
signal to stop from a law-enforcement officer.  Thus, Begley's 
request to see his driver's license was no more than a request, 
and Branham's compliance was voluntary and not coerced.  The 
other officers did not say anything to Branham until after the 
cocaine was discovered, there was no display of weapons or 
emergency lights, Branham's car was not blocked and no 
threatening or coercive tone of voice was used. 
 
Further, as the chain of events unfolded, Begley developed 
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot.  When he examined Branham's driver's license, he could 
infer that Branham was probably familiar with the sparsely  
populated rural area because he lived only five or six miles 
away.  Branham was notably nervous and his hands were shaking.2 
He obviously did not live where he was found and his explanation 
of his presence there was most unlikely.  He claimed to be lost 
and unable to find the residence he was looking for but did not 
provide the name of the person he was seeking or give the 
address he was trying to locate.  The driveway in which he was 
parked led to the residence of Jesse Ford, whom the officers 
were seeking in order to serve felony warrants involving 
                     
 
2 "Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion."  Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 
265 Va. 358, 362, 576 S.E.2d 463, 465 (2003). 
 
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cocaine.  From these circumstances, Begley could reasonably 
suspect that Branham had not parked in Ford's driveway at nearly 
one o'clock in the morning because he was lost. 
 
We hold that Deputy Begley had a reasonable articulable 
basis for a suspicion sufficient to justify detaining Branham 
while he attempted to gather information to either dispel or 
confirm his suspicions.  His search of Branham's person and 
vehicle and the results of those searches were not, therefore, 
the fruits of an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  We agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the 
circuit court correctly denied Branham's motion to suppress. 
B.  Chain of Custody 
 
Branham also assigns error to the circuit court's ruling 
admitting in evidence a certificate of analysis of the cocaine 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-187.1.  He contends that he was denied 
his right of confrontation because the Commonwealth did not call 
as witnesses all persons who were involved in the chain of 
custody of the cocaine samples from the time they left the hands 
of Deputy Begley until they were received by the laboratory 
technician who analyzed them.  
 
We review the decision of a circuit court with regard to 
the admission of evidence according to an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Herndon v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 138, 143, 694 S.E.2d 
618, 620 (2010). 
 
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Prior to trial, Branham filed a notice pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 asserting his right, if the Commonwealth intended 
to introduce a certificate of analysis at trial, to confront as 
a witness "any person performing such analysis or examination or 
involved in the chain of custody."  
 
Three witnesses testified at trial to the chain of custody.  
Deputy Begley testified that he retained the items to be 
analyzed in his possession from the time he seized them until he 
deposited them in the evidence locker in the Sheriff's 
Department.  Belinda Gaines, an evidence technician in the 
Sheriff's Department, testified that on July 16, 2009, she 
opened the locker, removed the items, logged them into the 
sheriff's computer system, packaged them and sent them by 
certified mail to the Virginia Department of Forensic Science 
regional laboratory in Roanoke.  She recorded the certified mail 
certificate number.  She testified that the only other person 
who possessed a key to the evidence locker was her supervisor, 
Captain Doss, but said that he only opened the locker when she 
was not working.  Steven E. Hopridge, Jr., a chemical analyst 
with the regional laboratory in Roanoke, testified that he had 
received the package containing the items by certified mail at 
his Roanoke laboratory, that the package was intact, that the 
seal was unbroken, that he opened the package, analyzed the 
 
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contents, found them to contain cocaine, and signed the 
certificate of analysis offered in evidence. 
 
Branham argues that, in addition to those witnesses, he had 
a right to cross-examine Captain Doss, and any postal workers 
who might have handled the certified mail package, to ascertain 
whether the contents had been subject to tampering, alteration 
or substitution while in transit, as well as any unknown 
employees of the laboratory who took the package from the mail 
and brought it to Hopridge for analysis. 
 
Branham's contentions have no merit.  The Commonwealth was 
required to "show with reasonable certainty that there has been 
no alteration or substitution of the item[s]," Herndon, 280 Va. 
at 143, 694 S.E.2d at 620, but it was "not required to exclude 
every conceivable possibility of substitution, alteration, or 
tampering."  Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121, 360 S.E.2d 
352, 357 (1987).  The Commonwealth must establish only the vital 
links in the chain of custody.  Other gaps in the chain go to 
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.  
Aguilar v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 322, 332-33, 699 S.E.2d 215, 
220 (2010), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 3089 (2011).   
Neither Captain Doss nor the postal workers were "vital links" 
in the chain of custody.  See Herndon, 280 Va. at 143, 694 
S.E.2d at 620.  No contention was made at trial that Captain 
Doss ever had any contact with the evidence and he was not shown 
 
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to be a link in the chain.  In the absence of clear evidence to 
the contrary, postal workers are entitled to a presumption of 
regularity in the performance of their duties.  United States v. 
Cook, 580 F. Supp. 948, 955 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), aff'd, 782 F.2d 
1037 (4th Cir. 1986).  We extend the same presumption to any 
unidentified employee at the laboratory in Roanoke who retrieved 
the package from the mail and delivered it in an intact 
condition to Hopridge for examination.  See O'Bannon v. 
Saunders, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 138, 142 (1873) (until the contrary 
is shown, there is a presumption that everyone performs his 
official duties) accord United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 
272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). 
Conclusion 
 
We find no error in the circuit court's ruling denying 
Branham's motion to suppress and we find no abuse of that 
court's discretion in admitting the certificate of analysis in 
evidence.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.