Title: The Florida Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz & The Florida Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2019-0983 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, 
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2021-0484 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, 
Respondent. 
 
January 18, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review two referee’s reports, by different referees, 
recommending that Respondent, Jonathan Stephen Schwartz, be 
 
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found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the 
practice of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.   
As discussed below, we approve the referees’ findings of fact 
and recommendations as to guilt.  But we disapprove in part the 
findings in aggravation and mitigation, and we disapprove each 
referee’s suspension recommendation.  Over time, Schwartz has 
engaged in increasingly inappropriate conduct under the guise of 
zealous representation.  Most notably, a three-year suspension was 
recently imposed on Schwartz for deceptive conduct in connection 
with a judicial proceeding.  See Fla. Bar v. Schwartz (Schwartz I), 
284 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2019); Fla. Bar v. Schwartz (Schwartz II), 334 
So. 3d 298, 299 (Fla. 2022).  Schwartz’s cumulative transgressions 
are egregious and will not be tolerated.  Based on Schwartz’s 
extensive disciplinary history and escalating pattern of misconduct, 
we disbar him for his misconduct in these two cases.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
Case No. SC2019-0983 
 
On October 16, 2017, Schwartz sent an unsolicited text 
message to the Bar complainant’s cell phone.  The message 
included a photo of the complainant’s police report and the text “It’s 
 
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Jonathan Schwartz.  I am a lawyer for battery cases.  If you would 
like to consult regarding the case . . . please call or text.”  The 
referee found that the text message violated the advertising rules as 
follows: (1) it did not include “Advertisement” as the first word in 
the text, as required by Rule Regulating The Florida Bar (Bar Rule) 
4-7.18(b)(2)(B); (2) it did not include any of the required information 
regarding Schwartz’s experience and qualifications, in violation of 
Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(C); (3) it did not include the sentence “If you 
have already obtained a lawyer, please disregard this text,” as 
required at the time by Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(E)1; (4) it did not state 
how Schwartz obtained the complainant’s information, in violation 
of now designated Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(G)2; and (5) it had not been 
 
1.  Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(E), as relevant to this proceeding, 
previously provided as follows: “The first sentence of any written 
communication prompted by a specific occurrence involving or 
affecting the intended recipient of the communication or a family 
member must be: ‘If you have already retained a lawyer for this 
matter, please disregard this letter.’ ”  Effective August 21, 2023, 
that requirement is no longer in place.  See In re Amends. to Rules 
Regul. Fla. Bar – Subchapter 4-7 Information About Legal Servs., 366 
So. 3d 997, 998 (Fla. 2023). 
 
 
2.  At the time of the text advertisement, the rule was 
designated Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(H). 
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filed for review by the Bar as required by Bar Rule 4-7.19(a).  The 
referee rejected Schwartz’s argument that the advertising rules, 
specifically citing Bar Rule 4-7.11 (Application of Rules), do not 
apply to text messages because the rules do not expressly identify 
them, and that he was entitled to protection under the “Safe 
Harbor” provisions of Bar Rule 4-7.16 (Presumptively Valid 
Content).3   
Turning to the issue of sanctions, the referee considered 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards) 8.1(c)(2) 
(Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or 
Similar Misconduct; Public Reprimand) and 9.2(c)(2) 
(Communications about a Lawyer’s Services; Public Reprimand).  In 
addition, the referee found three aggravating factors: (1) prior 
disciplinary offenses, (2) pattern of misconduct, and (3) substantial 
experience in the practice of law; and one mitigating factor, 
3. Bar Rule 4-7.16(a) creates a “safe harbor” for lawyers.
According to the Comment under the rule’s Editors’ Notes, “[a] 
lawyer desiring a safe harbor from discipline may choose to limit 
the content of an advertisement to the information listed in this rule 
and, if the information is true, the advertisement complies with 
these rules.” 
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character or reputation.  The referee also considered as mitigating 
the following factors, some of which are specific to advertising cases 
under Standard 9.6 (Mitigation and Aggravation): (1) Schwartz 
believed that text messages were not subject to the advertising rules 
and that the text message at issue fell under the Safe Harbor 
provisions of Bar Rule 4-7.16; (2) Schwartz ceased sending any 
other text messages seeking employment; (3) Schwartz did not send 
any other messages to the complainant; (4) Schwartz explained his 
position with respect to text messages to the complainant’s lawyer 
upon receipt of his email; and (5) Schwartz “is a hard-working 
attorney, works long hours, and is dedicated in representing his 
clients.”  The referee recommended that Schwartz receive a ten-day 
suspension to run concurrently with the suspension anticipated to 
be entered in case number SC2017-1391, where the same referee 
had recommended finding Schwartz guilty of violating Bar Rules in 
relation to his alterations to photocopies of a police lineup.4  Neither 
4. A different referee presided over case number SC2021-
0484.  The Court had not, however, imposed the three-year 
suspension in case number SC2017-1391 at the time either referee 
filed their respective reports.  See Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d 298. 
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party sought review of the referee’s report in case number SC2019-
0983.  
Case No. SC2021-0484 
Schwartz, who had filed a notice of appearance on behalf of 
the defendant in State v. Demarris Maloy, Case No. 
132016CF021853A000XX, in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, 
met with both client Maloy and Maloy’s co-defendant, Gabriel 
Antwan Johnson, on or about June 12, 2018.  Johnson was 
charged in Case No. 132016CF021853B000XX and was represented 
by the Miami-Dade County Public Defender’s Office at the time.  
While Johnson appeared at Schwartz’s office with Maloy, neither 
Johnson’s lawyer, Assistant Public Defender Kristine Del Sol, nor 
any other lawyer from the Public Defender’s Office, was present.  
Schwartz did not call Del Sol or make any effort to contact her or 
her office with respect to Johnson’s appearance at his office despite 
knowing that he was represented.   
At that time, Johnson told Schwartz that he wanted to testify 
on behalf of Schwartz’s client.  Schwartz prepared a Byrd5 Affidavit, 
5. See Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).  A
Byrd Affidavit is used to obtain a severed trial, based on a 
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executed by Johnson and notarized by Schwartz’s associate, which 
averred that Johnson wanted to testify on behalf of Maloy, 
acknowledged his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 
and sought to have his case adjudicated before that of his co-
defendant to extinguish his right to remain silent. 
Schwartz filed the Byrd Affidavit with the trial court in his 
client’s case on the same day Johnson came to Schwartz’s office.  It 
was never filed in Johnson’s case.  Schwartz also filed a motion to 
sever in Maloy’s case on or about July 9, 2018, attaching the Byrd 
Affidavit as an exhibit.  A hearing was held on Schwartz’s motion, in 
which Johnson’s public defender advised the trial court that the 
affidavit was obtained without her knowledge, that she was 
unaware that her client had visited Schwartz’s office, and that she 
was only aware of the affidavit due to notification by the assistant 
state attorney.  Under oath, Johnson acknowledged that he was 
defendant’s desire to use his co-defendant’s potentially exculpatory 
testimony, and it must show the following: “(1) a bona fide need for 
the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory 
nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if 
the cases are severed.”  Taylor v. State, 472 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1985) (citing Byrd). 
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represented by counsel at the time the affidavit was executed and 
that his lawyer was not present.  Schwartz, who proffered that 
Johnson would testify that the drugs at issue in the criminal case 
belonged to him and not to Maloy, argued that it was irrelevant for 
purposes of his motion to sever whether he acquired that 
information from Johnson.  Schwartz further proffered that he had 
recommended that Johnson call his attorney, though no such call 
was made.   
Following referral to a referee and the portion of the final 
hearing held on the issue of guilt, the referee recommended that 
Schwartz be found guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-4.2(a) 
(Communication with Person Represented by Counsel) and 4-8.4(d) 
(providing that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct in connection 
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice”). 
Specifically, the referee recommended finding that Schwartz 
violated Bar Rule 4-4.2(a) because he was aware that Johnson was 
represented by the Public Defender’s Office when he and Maloy met 
at Schwartz’s office, and while Johnson intended on firing his 
lawyer, Johnson had not done so yet.  Schwartz knew this based on 
 
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Johnson’s statement about being unhappy with the Public 
Defender’s Office, and it was evidenced by the fact that Schwartz 
recommended that Johnson call his lawyer.  The referee further 
found that the preparation of the Byrd Affidavit “in and of itself is 
the subject of the representation.”   
The referee also recommended finding that Schwartz violated 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) when he engaged in the impermissible 
communication with Johnson and had him swear out an affidavit 
without the benefit of his own lawyer’s advice.  Schwartz also 
violated the rule when he immediately filed the affidavit and sought 
to use it in court proceedings to sever his client’s case from his co-
defendant’s, also without communicating with Johnson’s lawyer. 
After a separate hearing on the matter of sanctions and 
without the benefit of this Court’s decision on discipline in case 
number SC2017-1391, the referee recommended a ninety-day 
suspension.  The referee considered the following Standards, all 
limited to imposition of a suspension, prior to recommending 
discipline: Standards 4.3(b) (Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest), 
6.1(b) (False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation), 6.2(b) 
(Abuse of the Legal Process), 7.1(b) (Deceptive Conduct or 
 
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Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees), and 8.1(b) 
(Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or 
Similar Misconduct).  The referee did not discuss the Standards 
cited or otherwise explain how a suspension was the presumptive 
sanction under the Standards. 
In addition, the referee found three aggravating factors: (1) 
prior disciplinary offenses, (2) a pattern of misconduct, and (3) 
substantial experience in the practice of law.  Regarding mitigating 
factors, the referee found: (1) absence of dishonest or selfish motive, 
(2) personal or emotional problems, (3) timely good faith effort to 
make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, 
(4) full and free disclosure to the Bar or cooperative attitude toward 
the proceedings, (5) character or reputation, (6) interim 
rehabilitation, (7) imposition of other penalties or sanctions, and (8) 
remorse. 
The Bar seeks review of the recommended discipline, while 
Schwartz seeks cross-review of the findings of fact and the guilt 
recommendations. 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt 
The Court’s review of the referee’s findings of fact as to each 
rule violation is limited, and if the referee’s findings of fact are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, this 
Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for 
that of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. Rush, 361 So. 3d 796, 801 (Fla. 
2023) (citing Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 79 (Fla. 2018)).  
“When reviewing a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the 
referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable 
rules to support the recommendations.”  Fla. Bar v. Jacobs, 370 So. 
3d 876, 883 (Fla. 2023) (citing Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 
61 (Fla. 2018)).  Ultimately, the party challenging the referee’s 
findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt has the burden to 
demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to support 
those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions.”  Fla. Bar v. Arugu, 350 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022) 
(quoting Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007)). 
 
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Case No. SC2019-0983 
 
Neither party sought review of the referee’s report in this case.  
Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are approved along with the 
referee’s recommendation that Schwartz be found guilty of the 
advertising rule violations.  Cf. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.7(c)(1) 
(providing in pertinent part that “[t]he filing of the notice or cross-
notice to seek review is jurisdictional, and the party who fails to 
timely file notice loses supreme court review as a right”).   
Case No. SC2021-0484 
In seeking cross-review in this case, Schwartz argues that the 
evidence does not support the findings of fact and that the Bar 
failed to prove a violation of Bar Rules 4-4.2(a) and 4-8.4(d). 
 
Bar Rule 4-4.2(a) prohibits a lawyer in representing his or her 
client from communicating about the subject of the representation 
with a person known to be represented by other counsel without 
consent of that counsel.  The Comment to the rule recognizes that 
“[t]he rule applies even though the represented person initiates or 
consents to the communication.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.2, 
Editors’ Notes, Comment. 
 
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Here, the record evidence—including Johnson’s testimony 
before the trial court, Schwartz’s testimony before the referee, and 
the testimony of assistant state attorney Daniel Walsh about an 
email sent to him, assistant public defender Del Sol, and Schwartz 
a month earlier pertaining to a different motion in the cases—
established that Schwartz knew that Johnson was represented by 
the Public Defender’s Office, that Johnson did not know the name 
of his attorney and was unhappy with his representation, and that 
Johnson intended to hire, but had not yet hired, private counsel.  
Despite having initially advised Johnson to contact his lawyer and 
having told Johnson he could not speak with him about the case 
since he was represented by counsel, Schwartz met with Johnson 
regarding the criminal case and had him execute an affidavit that 
would directly impact the two co-defendants’ cases.   
 
Regarding Schwartz’s argument that the affidavit was 
necessary under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b) 
(Severance of Defendants) to obtain a severance in his client’s case, 
it should go without saying that that provision does not negate the 
requirement that it be accomplished in accord with the ethics rules. 
 
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Further, Schwartz’s reliance upon In re Decker, 212 So. 3d 291 
(Fla. 2017), is misplaced.  In Decker, we found that “the evidence is 
uncontroverted that then-attorney Decker was directly and 
unequivocally informed by [an individual who was represented by 
counsel at the time] that he was no longer represented by counsel of 
record.”  Id. at 306.  Here, Schwartz received no such direct and 
unequivocal notification that Johnson was no longer represented by 
counsel.  In fact, Schwartz knew the opposite—that Johnson was 
represented by the Public Defender’s Office. 
Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the 
recommendation of guilt.  We approve the referee’s factual findings 
and we find Schwartz guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-4.2(a). 
Next, Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) states that a lawyer shall not “engage 
in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.”  Here, the evidence unequivocally 
demonstrates that Schwartz improperly communicated with a 
person he knew to be represented by another lawyer, without that 
lawyer’s consent, and pertaining to the subject of the 
representation.  That improper conduct pertained to a criminal 
 
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prosecution, and in the course thereof Schwartz was not forthright 
with the trial court as to the facts underlying his attempt to have 
his client’s case severed from that of his co-defendant.   
Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the 
recommendation of guilt.  We approve the referee’s findings of fact 
and conclude that Schwartz violated Bar Rule 4-8.4(d).  See Fla. Bar 
v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d 933, 938 (Fla. 2000) (holding that it was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice for a state prosecutor to 
meet with defendant who he knew was represented, even if the 
defendant encouraged it and the prosecutor believed he had a good 
motive); Fla. Bar v. Nunes, 661 So. 2d 1202, 1203-04 (Fla. 1995) 
(upholding violations of Bar Rules 4-4.2(a) and 4-8.4(d)). 
B. Discipline 
We now consider whether we should approve the referees’ 
recommended discipline of a ten-day suspension and a ninety-day 
suspension in these cases.  Prior to making a recommendation as to 
discipline, referees must consider the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, which discuss the presumptive sanctions in 
relation to the misconduct established and are subject to 
 
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aggravating and mitigating factors, and this Court’s existing case 
law.  See Fla. Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d 77, 90 (Fla. 2022).  The 
reason for the Court’s inquiry, even in an uncontested case, is 
because the Court’s review of a referee’s recommended discipline is 
broader than review of the referee’s findings of fact, as it is 
ultimately this Court’s responsibility to determine the appropriate 
discipline.  See Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (citing Fla. Bar v. 
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989)); see also art. V, § 15, 
Fla. Const. 
In addition, the Court “also considers prior misconduct and 
cumulative misconduct as relevant factors, and deals more severely 
with cumulative misconduct than with isolated misconduct.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Wolfe, 759 So. 2d 639, 645 (Fla. 2000) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As a matter of our discretion, we can 
impose a combined sanction for all cases and determine “the 
appropriate discipline from the totality of the conduct as though all 
of the charges had been presented to the Court in one proceeding.”6  
 
 
6.  Currently pending before the referee who presided over 
case number SC2021-0484 is the complaint filed by the Bar against 
Schwartz in case number SC2022-1488.  At oral argument 
Schwartz requested that the instant case(s) not be held for 
 
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Strems, 357 So. 3d at 90 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Greenspahn, 396 So. 
2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1981)). 
Before addressing the recommended discipline in the two 
instant cases, we must note Schwartz’s history of prior misconduct 
and that he is currently under a three-year suspension.  See 
Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d at 299.  Most recently, on February 17, 
2022, the Court disapproved a recommended ninety-day 
suspension and instead suspended Schwartz for three years based 
upon his use of two defense exhibits during a pretrial deposition 
held in February 2015: 
Schwartz created the exhibits, two black and white 
photocopies of a police lineup.  In each, Schwartz altered 
the defendant’s [his client’s] picture.  In one exhibit, he 
replaced the defendant’s face with that of an individual 
whom witnesses other than the robbery victim had 
identified as the perpetrator.  In the other exhibit, 
Schwartz changed the defendant’s hairstyle.  However, 
the altered photocopies used at the deposition retained 
the victim’s identification of the defendant, including 
both her circle around what had been the defendant’s 
picture and her signature at the bottom of the lineup, as 
well as a police officer’s signature. 
 
 
resolution of the case before the referee, and the referee in that 
unperfected case, with the agreement of both parties, sought and 
obtained extensions to file her report.  
 
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Id. at 300.  In disapproving a prior referee’s report, we explained 
that the exhibits were “deceptive on their face” and “[b]y their very 
nature, they conveyed the false message that the substituted 
photograph was the photograph that had been previously identified 
by the victim.”  Schwartz I, 284 So. 3d at 396-97.  Because 
Schwartz had previously received the longest nonrehabilitative 
suspension possible, we ultimately determined that Schwartz’s 
misconduct related to the altered exhibits warranted a rehabilitative 
suspension of three years.  Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d at 303.  
Prior to the three-year suspension, Schwartz’s disciplinary 
record resulted from consent judgments or otherwise uncontested 
reports.  In case number SC2011-2143, on May 29, 2012, the Court 
suspended Schwartz for ninety days for having filed affidavits that 
included deficient and misrepresented notarizations for a client in a 
paternity action, as well as having loaned money to his client.  On 
May 23, 2007, Schwartz received an admonishment for minor 
misconduct for the dissemination of a direct mail advertisement 
with numerous violations, including misleading statements.  In case 
number SC2002-0787, Schwartz received a public reprimand on 
June 20, 2002, for certain behavior arising from a business dispute.  
 
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There, Schwartz made numerous unsubstantiated complaints 
against his former law partners and made an additional 
misrepresentation before a judge stating that the former partners 
were under criminal investigation despite being informed by police 
that there was no such investigation.  And in case number SC1960-
90204, Schwartz received a public reprimand on April 10, 1997, for 
failure to comply with numerous court orders.  Lastly, Schwartz 
received two admonishments for minor misconduct: one, by service 
of a Grievance Committee Report of Minor Misconduct dated March 
29, 1995, in The Florida Bar File No. 1994-71,026(11B), as well as 
one in 1996 for an advertisement that had not been filed with the 
advertising section of the Bar and did not contain the word 
“advertisement” in red ink.   
As has become all too clear to this Court, Schwartz’s 
misconduct persistently involves varying degrees of dishonesty and 
deceit. 
 
Turning to case number SC2019-0983 at issue here, we 
disagree with the referee’s recommended discipline of a ten-day 
suspension.  We note that while the referee cited Schwartz’s prior 
ninety-day suspension imposed in 2012 involving dishonest 
 
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conduct and reviewed cases reflecting that the Court views 
cumulative misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of 
misconduct, the recommended ten-day suspension does not apply 
that proposition or escalate the sanction to be imposed.  Further, 
prior case law would have supported a rehabilitative suspension 
had we reviewed this case in isolation.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Dopazo, 
232 So. 3d 258, 263 (Fla. 2017) (imposing a one-year suspension 
for unethical violations of the solicitation rule); Fla. Bar v. Letwin, 
70 So. 3d 578, 584-85 (Fla. 2011) (holding that sending letters 
containing misleading statements and soliciting employment to over 
900 prospective clients violated the rule pertaining to written 
communications and warranted a one-year suspension); Wolfe, 759 
So. 2d at 640, 646 (suspending attorney for one year for in-person 
solicitation of clients in areas affected by tornadoes in violation of  
advertising rules).  
 
In addition to not assigning appropriate weight to the 
aggravating factors of prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of 
misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law, the 
referee gave undue consideration as mitigating factors to Schwartz’s 
subjective, uninformed belief that the advertising rules did not 
 
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apply to text messages, and that he has a “public defender type of 
practice” and is “dedicated in representing his clients.”  We find 
unreasonable the notion that “written communications” under the 
rules only applies to emails since it is specifically referenced.  
Rather, Standard 9.1(c) defines “direct mail communication” to 
include written or electronic communications as described in the 
Bar Rules, and Bar Rule 4-7.11(a) expressly provides that 
subchapter 4-7 (Information About Legal Services), which governs 
direct contact with prospective clients (Bar Rule 4-7.18), “applies to 
all forms of communication in any print or electronic forum” and is 
not limited to the examples listed.  And as we intimated in 
Schwartz’s defense exhibits’ disciplinary case, the requirement of 
providing zealous representation is not a sword to wield as an 
excuse to otherwise engage in misconduct.  See Schwartz II, 334 So. 
3d at 304. 
 
Turning now to case number SC2021-0484, we first 
disapprove of the portion of the referee’s report finding that the 
Standards presumptively calling for suspension apply.  Instead, we 
find that disbarment is the presumptive sanction under the 
following Standards.   
 
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Standard 5.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer . . . engages in any other intentional conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”  
Here, while Schwartz knew that Johnson was represented by the 
Public Defender’s Office, he filed the Byrd Affidavit in his client’s 
case only and did not serve that office or file a copy in Johnson’s 
case. 
Standard 6.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer . . . improperly withholds material information and 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a 
significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal 
proceeding.”  Here, Schwartz withheld from the Public Defender’s 
Office material information that could have exposed Johnson to 
additional criminal charges, and, having proffered that Johnson 
would testify that the drugs at issue in Maloy’s criminal case 
belonged to Johnson and not Maloy, argued that it was irrelevant 
for purposes of his motion to sever whether he acquired that 
information from Johnson. 
 
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Standard 7.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of 
a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for 
the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”  Here, Schwartz 
owed a duty to Johnson and his lawyer to not communicate with 
Johnson because Schwartz knew Johnson was represented by 
counsel, irrespective of Johnson’s dissatisfaction with that 
representation.  Such conduct not only could have benefitted Maloy 
to the detriment of Johnson, but also could have benefitted 
Schwartz himself, who has sought to build a reputation as a so-
called private public defender upon his own misguided 
interpretation of the ethics rules. 
We also disapprove of the portion of the referee’s report 
regarding mitigating factors.  “Like other factual findings, a referee’s 
findings in mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of 
correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without 
support in the record.”  Strems, 357 So. 3d at 91 (quoting Germain, 
957 So. 2d at 621). 
 
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Here, the evidence only supports finding Standards 3.3(b)(7) 
(character or reputation) and 3.3(b)(10) (interim rehabilitation).  
Many friends, relatives of clients, and other professionals testified in 
support of Schwartz about his character, while Schwartz testified 
concerning his therapy with Florida Lawyer’s Assistance, Inc., and 
his efforts to change the way he practices law.   
But the record evidence contradicts the referee’s findings as to 
the other mitigating factors. 
Standard 3.3(b)(2) (absence of a dishonest or selfish motive) is 
not applicable here because, while Schwartz’s motive was not 
financial, the type of motive usually contemplated under this factor, 
his overzealous representation was intended to benefit his 
professional reputation of a “private public defender office.”  
Standard 3.3(b)(3) (personal or emotional problems) does not apply 
because at issue is a life-long personality characteristic as opposed 
to an acute emotional impairment.  With respect to Standards 
3.3(b)(4) (timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct) and 3.3(b)(5) (full and free 
disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the 
proceedings), no evidence is cited in support of those mitigating 
 
- 25 - 
factors.  Regarding Standard 3.3(b)(11) (imposition of other 
penalties or sanctions), Schwartz was not otherwise disciplined and 
the delay in adjudicating this case is due to other pending Bar 
disciplinary cases brought against Schwartz.  Finally, Schwartz’s 
expression of acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct is not 
the same as being remorseful under Standard 3.3(b)(12).  To the 
contrary, the record reflects that Schwartz blamed the Bar for his 
troubles, testifying at the sanction hearing that, in the context of 
seeking help from other lawyers, he had stated that “[t]he Bar’s 
doing everything they can to take away my license.”  See Fla. Bar v. 
Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 2019) (finding of remorse was 
clearly erroneous and evidence was insufficient, where lawyer 
accused the Bar of prosecuting him like a “trophy being hunted” 
and that the proceedings were like “facing a firing squad for a traffic 
violation”). 
The Court also considers existing case law in determining the 
appropriate sanction to impose.  Here, the referee distinguished as 
factually dissimilar cases cited by the Bar in support of imposing 
disbarment, while citing a ninety-day suspension case, Florida Bar 
v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), without explanation.  The 
 
- 26 - 
referee appears to have rested her recommended sanction upon 
Schwartz’s professed intent “to provide full and effective assistance 
of counsel in a criminal case” and erroneously concluded that his 
misconduct “did not do any harm to any other person or the system 
of justice.”  As we have previously stated, a lawyer’s asserted motive 
or the purpose in acting is not determinative of whether a rule was 
violated and is not a factor in determining the appropriate sanction 
to impose.  See Schwartz I, 284 So. 3d at 396.  In addition, the 
referee here neither cited nor applied our recent case law imposing 
more severe sanctions for lawyer misconduct, see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. 
Altman, 294 So. 3d 844, 847 (Fla. 2020) (citing Fla. Bar v. Parrish, 
241 So. 3d 66, 80 (Fla. 2018), or that cumulative misconduct 
warrants more severe discipline, Fla. Bar v. Bosecker, 259 So. 3d 
689, 699 (Fla. 2018). 
Therefore, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline 
in both cases.  Instead, we conclude that the totality of Schwartz’s 
conduct in the two cases taken together, and when considering 
Schwartz’s disciplinary history, warrants disbarment.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Dupee, 160 So. 3d 838, 853 (Fla. 2015) (“The purposes of 
attorney discipline are: (1) to protect the public from unethical 
 
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conduct without undue harshness towards the attorney; (2) to 
punish misconduct while encouraging reformation and 
rehabilitation; and (3) to deter other lawyers from engaging in 
similar misconduct.”).  
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Schwartz is hereby disbarred from the practice of 
law in the State of Florida, effective immediately because he is 
currently under suspension.  Schwartz shall fully comply with Rule 
Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h) and Rule Regulating The 
Florida Bar 3-6.1, if applicable.  Prior to seeking readmission, 
Schwartz is further directed to comply with all other terms and 
conditions of the report in case number SC2021-0484. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Jonathan Stephen Schwartz in the amount of $9,795.75,7 for which 
sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
7.  The Bar’s costs include $7,507.50 in case number SC2021-
0484 and $2,288.25 in case number SC2019-0983.  
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MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, The Florida 
Bar, Miami, Florida, and Rita Florez, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Miami, Florida; and Chris Altenbernd of Banker, Lopez Gassler 
P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant 
Barry M. Wax of Law Offices of Barry M. Wax, Miami, Florida; 
Benedict P. Kuehne of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida; 
and Richard Baron of Baron, Breslin & Sarmiento, Miami, Florida, 
for Respondent