Title: Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc.1991 WY 141820 P.2d 553Case Number: 90-174Decided: 11/13/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
PATRICK F. DOUGHERTY, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

 J.W. WILLIAMS, INC., 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

 Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 Mark W. Gifford of Brown 
& Drew, Casper, for appellant.

 Lawrence E. Middaugh, 
Casper, for 
appellee.

 Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 

 OPINION

 MACY, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Appellant Patrick F. 
Dougherty filed a worker's compensation claim, alleging he injured his back 
while he was working for Appellee J.W. Williams, Inc. Williams objected to the 
claim.1 The hearing examiner determined 
that Dougherty failed to prove his condition arose out of and in the course of 
his employment and was not a recurrence of a preexisting condition, and she 
denied Dougherty's claim. Dougherty appealed the hearing examiner's decision to 
the district court, and the district court affirmed the decision.

 [¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 [¶3.]     Dougherty poses these 
issues:

      1. Were the findings 
and conclusions of the administrative law judge in the underlying Worker's 
Compensation contested case proceeding lacking in statutory right, and thus 
unlawful under W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C)?

      2. Were the findings 
and conclusions of the administrative law judge unsupported by substantial 
evidence, and thus unlawful under W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E)?

      3. Were the findings 
and conclusions of the administrative law judge arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law, and thus unlawful 
under W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A)?

 [¶4.]     At the hearing held 
before the hearing examiner, the parties focused on the following issues: (1) 
Did an on-the-job injury occur; (2) was a preexisting injury aggravated; and (3) 
did the employee fail to give notice to the employer as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-502 (1991). Dougherty performed strenuous physical labor for Williams. He 
testified he had never been diagnosed as having a back injury and he did not 
experience any problems with his back before July 28, 1989. He did have a 
motorcycle accident in 1987 in which he suffered a massive hematoma to the right 
hip but no injury to his back, and he did not receive any treatment to his back. 
On the morning of July 28, 1989, about three weeks after he began working for 
Williams, Dougherty was unable to bend over to tie his shoes. He went to work 
and reported his condition to his supervisor, telling his supervisor that he was 
going to see a doctor. Dougherty also told his supervisor he had a sore back at 
times but nothing like the pain he encountered that morning. During 
cross-examination, Dougherty identified slippage of pipe wrenches as one of the 
events which may have injured his back.

 [¶5.]     John M. Tooke, M.D., 
examined Dougherty and entered his diagnosis of Dougherty's condition, "Back 
m.m. spasm," onto an itemized statement. Dougherty testified the doctor told him 
to rest over the weekend and to go to the hospital for physical therapy because 
he had obviously suffered a muscle spasm to the right lower back. Dougherty 
began therapy with a physical therapist and returned to work on August 1, 1989. 
Later, at the insistence of Williams, Dougherty obtained an authorization from 
Dr. Tooke allowing him to return to work.

 [¶6.]     Gail Brown, the 
licensed physical therapist who treated Dougherty, also testified. Although 
Brown admitted that she could not make a diagnosis (as Dr. Tooke had already 
done), she described Dougherty's condition as an acute (recent onset as opposed 
to a chronic condition) musculoskeletal strain resulting from a postural trauma 
which was caused by his recent activities at work. Brown also reviewed the 
medical records pertaining to Dougherty's 1987 motorcycle accident and stated 
the records did not reveal the occurrence of any back injury. When she was asked 
during cross-examination whether the injury was a usual type, she responded, 
"yes, based on his history, the activity he performed the day before, a lot of 
times it won't come out until you rest it."

 [¶7.]     The first of two 
witnesses called by Williams was Tom Covert, a service manager for Williams. He 
related that Dougherty did not report an on-the-job injury to him but that 
Dougherty merely told him he was having trouble with his back and was going to 
see a doctor. However, the record shows Covert did sign an employer's report of 
injury which stated Dougherty had reported the injury on July 28, 1989. Covert 
also stated Dougherty told him that, ever since his motorcycle accident, 
Dougherty had occasional problems with his back. Covert agreed Dougherty's work 
did involve hard physical labor and heavy lifting. In addition, he testified 
Williams had a policy of taking a very close look at back injury claims because 
Williams had been "stung" once on a back injury claim.

 [¶8.]     Arthur Hibbler, an 
assembly hand for Williams, was also called as a witness for Williams. He worked 
with Dougherty almost every day and related that they did heavy lifting. He also 
testified that Dougherty complained about his back hurting one day and said he 
was going to see a doctor. Hibbler did not recall Dougherty saying anything 
about his back hurting as a result of a motorcycle accident, and he stated 
Dougherty had not complained about his back hurting either before or after the 
occurrence of the injury which caused him to see a doctor. Hibbler explained 
that some of the pipe wrenches which they used in their work were worn, causing 
the wrenches to slip, and that, when the wrenches slipped, the workers would get 
quite a "jolt."

 [¶9.]     The hearing examiner 
determined that the injury occurred over a substantial period of time; that Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-603 (1987)2 was the controlling statute; that 
Dougherty had the burden to prove by competent medical authority that his claim 
arose out of and in the course of his employment; that the testimony of a 
licensed physical therapist did not satisfy the burden placed upon Dougherty 
because the testimony did not fulfill the requirement of "competent medical 
authority"; and that Dougherty failed to prove his condition arose out of and in 
the course of his employment and was not a recurrence of a preexisting 
condition.

 [¶10.]  In resolving this case, we employ the 
following test:

      We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the 
agency.

 Trout v. Wyoming Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986) (citation omitted), 
quoted in State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Hollister, 794 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1990), and Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1989).

 [¶11.]  We agree with Dougherty that his claim 
was not governed by § 27-14-603. The evidence is uncontradicted that Dougherty 
was able to perform hard physical labor both before and after receiving the 
injury in question. The injury was the result of a single brief occurrence 
(muscle spasm). Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-503 (1991); 
Grindle v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 166 (Wyo. 
1986); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427 
(1943); 1B Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 39 (1991). The 
hearing examiner erred in applying § 27-14-603 and in denying Dougherty's claim 
on the basis of his failure to meet the "competent medical authority" standard. 
The hearing examiner's determination that Dougherty failed to prove his 
condition arose out of and in the course of his employment and was not a 
recurrence of a preexisting condition is also erroneous. The record contains 
only a scintilla of evidence that Dougherty's back injury was a recurrence of a 
preexisting condition. With the exception of Covert's testimony that Dougherty 
told him his back had occasionally acted up since his motorcycle accident, which 
Dougherty essentially denied, all the other evidence presented belied the 
existence of a preexisting condition. Giving the maximum possible credence to 
Covert's testimony, we observe the record shows Dougherty might have believed 
his back pain was a recurrence from the motorcycle injury. If he did believe 
that at the time he talked to Covert, he was wrong in so believing. We are 
compelled to reverse the hearing examiner's determination.

 [¶12.]  Reversed and remanded to the district 
court with directions that the case be further remanded to the hearing examiner 
and that Dougherty receive all worker's compensation benefits documented in his 
claim.

 [¶13.]  THOMAS and CARDINE, JJ., 
dissent.

 FOOTNOTES

 1 The claim was in the 
amount of $1,424.88 for the services of a physical therapist, prescription 
medications, and a physician's fee. Dougherty made no claim for lost wages or 
for temporary or permanent disability.

 2 Section 27-14-603(a) 
provides in pertinent part:

      (a) The burden of 
proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial 
period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that 
his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment. . . .

 Subsection (e) was added 
to § 27-14-603 by 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 90, § 1 effective July 1, 
1991.

 THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶14.]  Like Justice Cardine, I must dissent from 
the opinion of the court in this case. I agree with the perceptive comments of 
Justice Cardine with respect to the burden of proof. However, I have some 
additional concerns with the majority decision in this instance.

 [¶15.]  Even though Section 27-14-603, W.S. 1977 
(June 1991 Repl.), is not applicable, as the majority holds, we still have an 
historic requirement that there be medical testimony to establish a causal 
relationship between an occurrence on the job and the claimed injury. Black 
Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1970). Other cases suggest the necessity 
for establishing the nexus between the employment and the injury. Hampton v. All Field 
Service, Inc., 726 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1986); Matter 
of Jones, 702 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1985); 
Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1984). I am unable to find the evidence 
introduced by Dougherty in this case that would establish the relationship 
between his job and the injury. The case is very like Hampton in the sense that 
even Dougherty cannot describe any event on the job that seemed significant. His 
problem was that he had difficulty in the morning in attempting to tie his 
shoes. There was no expert medical testimony and, even if it were in evidence, 
the diagnosis on the receipt from John M. Tooke, M.D. has no reference to any 
event that may have induced a "Back m.m. spasm."

 [¶16.]  While exceptional instances may occur in 
which it is not necessary to invoke medical testimony to establish the causal 
relationship, In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427 (1943), it is also clear 
that the finder of fact need not accept the statements of the claimant as to the 
causal relationship. Parkel v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 69 Wyo. 122, 237 P.2d 634 
(1951). It is obvious from the record that Dougherty wanted to rely upon the 
testimony of Gail Brown to fill this gap and establish the causal relationship. 
Gail Brown is a licensed physical therapist, but she does not come within the 
statutory definition of a "health care provider." The statute is limited in a 
rather precise way:

 "`Health care provider' 
means doctor of medicine, chiropractic or osteopathy, dentist, optometrist, 
podiatrist or psychologist, acting within the scope of his license, licensed to 
practice in this state or in good standing in his home state; . . . ." § 
27-14-102(a)(x), W.S. 1977 (June 1991 Repl.).

 In determining whether a 
causal relationship is supported by competent medical authority, I would limit 
that class of witnesses to those who are identified as health care providers in 
the statutory definition. Absent the expertise to draw the conclusion of a 
nexus, the testimony of Gail Brown becomes hardly more than sheer conjecture 
and, certainly, nothing upon which the hearing officer was required to rely, 
even if it was admitted.

 [¶17.]  Reduced to salient matters, this record 
demonstrates that Dougherty worked at a job that involved strenuous physical 
labor. One morning he was unable to bend over to tie his shoes. He was unable to 
identify any event on the job that caused his injury, although he speculated 
about that. There is a diagnosis in the file made by a medical doctor, but it 
does not relate to any event that may have caused the injury. A physical 
therapist testified that she could not make a diagnosis, but she ventured an 
opinion that Dougherty's injury was caused by his recent activities at work. 
That witness also stated that, "Based on my previous experience with low back 
injuries, they can be a chronic thing." This testimony presents an interesting 
contrast with the assumptions of fact in the majority opinion. Even if the 
witness could be considered a "competent medical authority," can such 
contradictory testimony really sustain a conclusion contrary to that of the 
hearing examiner that Dougherty met his burden of proof?

 [¶18.]  Apparently, because no specific event 
could be identified, and because Dougherty had told his supervisor that he had a 
sore back at times, the hearing examiner identified the injury as one that had 
occurred over a period of time, which was subject to the provisions of Section 
27-14-603, W.S. 1977 (June 1991 Repl.). As I have indicated, even if that were 
an erroneous ruling, this still is a case in which the nexus appropriately 
should be established by competent medical authority. I do not find that demand 
to have been satisfied.

 [¶19.]  I would affirm the decision of the 
district court in which the decision of the hearing examiner was 
affirmed.

 CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶20.]  I dissent. The majority, with limited 
discussion, dismisses the hearing examiner's factual finding that Dougherty 
failed to link his injury to his employment with J.W. Williams, Inc. (Williams). 
Under the Worker's Compensation Act, an injury "means any harmful change in the 
human organism * * *." W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi). The burden is on the injured 
claimant to establish every essential element of his claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op., 784 P.2d 233, 235 
(Wyo. 1989). 
Dougherty, as the claimant, therefore had the burden to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his "injury" arose out of and during the course of his 
employment. See Hohnholt.

 [¶21.]  After a review of the evidence, the 
hearing examiner found that Dougherty failed to meet this burden. The majority 
conducts its own review of the evidence and finds that Dougherty's injury did 
arise out of and during the course of his employment with Williams.

 [¶22.]  The role of the court is not to 
substitute its findings for those of the hearing examiner. Our role is to 
determine whether there is "substantial evidence" to support the factual 
findings of the hearing examiner. Here, the record contains substantial evidence 
to support the finding that Dougherty did not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his injury arose from his employment with Williams. During 
cross-examination, Dougherty acknowledged that he was not able to point to any 
"activity" at work that "actually did it [injury]." Covert, the service manager 
for Williams, testified that Dougherty told him "that ever since that 
[motorcycle] accident, he had had problems with his back flaring up on 
occasion."

 [¶23.]  The majority dismisses this testimony as 
mistaken and finds that Dougherty was "wrong in believing" that his 
injury was a reoccurrence of his motorcycle accident. Based on its own 
independent evaluation of the evidence before the hearing examiner, the majority 
concludes that "[t]he injury was the result of a single brief occurrence (muscle 
spasm)," maj. op. at 555, and, therefore, not the result of a chronic condition. 
But a chronic condition may be one that ebbs and flows. Some days a chronic back 
may hurt, other days it may be symptomless. When it does hurt, there may be 
muscle spasm which is a cause of pain. The fact that the muscle spasm may have 
been the result of a single brief occurrence does not mean, therefore, that the 
hearing examiner erred. That single brief occurrence may - as the hearing 
examiner apparently concluded - date back to the motorcycle accident and may not 
be due to his employment with Williams.

 [¶24.]  The point is that it is not the role of 
this court to second-guess the fact finder - and if we are going to start making 
our own factual findings and conclusions, perhaps it would be helpful to amend 
the current standard of review to reflect our new role. The evidence presented, 
when analyzed under the appropriate standard of review, is sufficient to affirm 
the findings and conclusions of the hearing examiner.

 [¶25.]  I would affirm.