Title: State v. Bates

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Bates, 118 Ohio St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BATES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Bates, 118 Ohio St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983.] 
Criminal law — Consecutive and concurrent sentences — Trial court has 
discretion and authority to impose prison sentence consecutively to prison 
sentence imposed by another Ohio court — Judgment affirmed. 
(Nos. 2007-0293 and 2007-0304 — Submitted January 9, 2008 — Decided  
May 1, 2008.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Miami County,  
No. 06-CA-08, 2006-Ohio-7086. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this certified-conflict case and discretionary appeal, we hold that 
the trial court has the authority to order a prison sentence to be served 
consecutively to a prison sentence previously imposed on the same offender by 
another Ohio court.  The court of appeals held accordingly, and we affirm. 
I 
{¶ 2} Sometime before 2005, the Montgomery County Common Pleas 
Court sentenced Robert Bates to a ten-year sentence of incarceration.  State v. 
Bates, Miami App. No. 06-CA-08, 2006-Ohio-7086, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 3} In 2005, Bates pleaded no contest to other felonies, this time in the 
Miami County Common Pleas Court.  Pursuant to the joint recommendation from 
the state and Bates, the Miami County Common Pleas court sentenced Bates to 
three three-year prison terms, to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to the ten-year prison term imposed by the Montgomery County 
Common Pleas Court.  Bates’s sentences were within the statutory range for his 
offenses. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 4} The Court of Appeals for Miami County affirmed Bates’s 
sentence, Bates, 2006-Ohio-7086, and thereafter certified its decision as being in 
conflict with State v. Thompson, 5th Dist. No. 01CA62, 2002-Ohio-4717.  We 
determined that a conflict exists regarding whether a trial court has the authority, 
generally, to order a prison sentence imposed by it to be served consecutively to a 
prison sentence previously imposed by another Ohio court.  State v. Bates, 113 
Ohio St.3d 1486, 2007-Ohio-1986, 865 N.E.2d 911.  We also accepted Bates’s 
discretionary appeal and consolidated the cases.  113 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2007-
Ohio-1986, 865 N.E.2d 913. 
II 
{¶ 5} On August, 10, 1995, the governor signed into law Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 2 (“S.B. 2”).  146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136.  This legislation reflected the 
state’s first comprehensive revision of Ohio’s criminal code since 1974, and it 
altered both the definitions of criminal offenses and the sentencing system.  State 
v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 34; Woods v. Telb 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 507-508, 733 N.E.2d 1103.  S.B. 2 provided guidance 
to the sentencing court in its selection of sentences’ maximum and minimum 
ranges and made sentences subject to a new kind of appellate review.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 2929.13(D), 2929.14(C), and 2953.08(A)(1); Diroll, A Decade of Sentencing 
Reform, A Sentencing Commission Staff Report (Mar.2007) No. 7, 11-12.  S.B. 2 
also eliminated the cap on prison time served through consecutive sentences.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 2967.13(F) and (I), effective until July 1, 1996; A Plan for Felony 
Sentencing in Ohio: A Formal Report of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission (July 1, 1993) 29, 44.  Further, S.B.2 provided that sentences of 
imprisonment were to be served concurrently unless circumstances consistent 
with other statutory directives made consecutive terms appropriate.  See former 
R.C. 2929.14(E), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4620, 4665; former R.C. 2929.41(A), 
January Term, 2008 
3 
149 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9484, 9691.  See also Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-
Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 66, 67. 
{¶ 6} In 2006, this court reviewed the sentencing components of S.B. 2 
in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, in light of 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington (2004), 
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.  We concluded in Foster that to 
the extent S.B. 2 required “judicial fact-finding before imposition of a sentence 
greater than the maximum term authorized by a jury verdict or admission of the 
defendant,” the right to a jury trial was violated.  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  See also id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  As a result, we excised 
several provisions from the sentencing statute.  Id. at paragraphs two and four of 
the syllabus.  Specifically, this court held that R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) 
were “severed and excised” in their entirety.  Id. at ¶ 97. 
{¶ 7} Because of the severance remedy, we further held, “Trial courts 
have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are 
no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, 
consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.”  Id. at paragraph seven of the 
syllabus.  We acknowledged that although the severance of the sentencing statutes 
may arguably vitiate some of the goals of S.B. 2, the severance remedy preserved 
other fundamental goals of S.B. 2 and, without judicial findings, allowed courts 
full discretion to impose prison terms within the basic ranges when based on a 
jury verdict or admission of the defendant.  Id. at ¶ 100, 102.  In doing so, courts 
were still to consider the basic purposes and principles of sentencing, and to 
“determine the most effective way to comply with [such] purposes and 
principles.”  See R.C. 2929.11(A) and (B) (the overriding purposes of felony 
sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others 
and to punish the offender through reasonable and proportionate sentences); R.C. 
2929.12 (granting the trial court discretion in sentencing and guiding that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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discretion with a nonexclusive list of seriousness factors to consider except where 
a mandatory sentence is required); Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 
N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36-37. 
III 
{¶ 8} In this appeal, the parties recognize that a trial court may impose 
consecutive prison sentences for multiple felony convictions adjudicated in the 
same proceeding.  But the question remains whether, after Foster, a trial court 
imposing a sentence for a new felony conviction may order that sentence to be 
served consecutively to a sentence previously imposed for a separate felony 
conviction in a different Ohio court.  The question is further complicated by the 
statutory presumption created within S.B. 2, yet altered after Foster, that 
sentences of imprisonment are to be served concurrently.  Former R.C. 
2929.41(A), 149 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9484, 9691; Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-
Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 66. 
{¶ 9} In its resolution of the matter, the Court of Appeals for Miami 
County aptly observed that the issue is not without difficulty.  It concluded, 
however, that “R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) authorizes a trial court imposing a felony 
sentence to order that sentence to be served consecutively with a felony sentence 
imposed by another court.”  State v. Bates, Miami App. No. 06-CA-08, 2006-
Ohio-7086, at ¶ 9.  The appellate court interpreted Foster to have affected R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4) by severing only that portion of the statute that pertained to judicial 
fact-finding.  Id. at ¶ 13- 14. 
{¶ 10} Before this court, the parties have argued extensively the meaning 
and extent of former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), focusing on the trial court’s ability to 
impose a consecutive prison sentence when the conduct for which the defendant is 
sentenced arises from separate proceedings in different courts.  Specifically, Bates 
asserts that the appellate court’s interpretation of what remains of former R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4) post-Foster was correct, but that the trial court reached the wrong 
January Term, 2008 
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result regarding its authority to impose a sentence consecutively to a conviction 
and sentence in a separate proceeding.  Conversely, the state contends that R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4) was excised in full and that the trial court possessed inherent 
authority, in its discretion, to impose consecutive sentences under these 
circumstances. 
{¶ 11} After considering what remains of R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) after Foster 
and the role of trial court discretion in the sentencing process, we conclude that 
the trial court had the authority to impose a prison sentence to be served 
consecutively to a prison sentence previously imposed on the same offender by 
another Ohio court.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, but we do so 
using a different rationale. 1 
IV 
{¶ 12} A long-standing principle of constitutional law is that the authority 
for a trial court to impose sentences derives from the statutes enacted by the 
General Assembly.  See State v. Jones (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 550 N.E.2d 
469 (the trial court’s authority to set conditions of probation derives from statute, 
and the conditions imposed “cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily 
impinge upon the probationer’s liberty”); State v. Morris (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 
101, 112, 9 O.O.3d 92, 378 N.E.2d 708 (“the General Assembly has the plenary 
power to prescribe crimes and fix penalties”); State v. O’Mara (1922), 105 Ohio 
St. 94, 136 N.E.2d 885, paragraph one of the syllabus (“[t]he power to define and 
classify and prescribe punishment for felonies committed within the state is 
lodged in the General Assembly * * *”). 
                                                 
1.  Because the conflict case, State v. Thompson, 5th Dist. No. 01CA62, 2002-Ohio-4717, predates 
Foster, its holding, that a court cannot impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising from 
different proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), is no longer precedent.  Consequently, no 
conflict exists between these appellate districts; however, we review Bates’s appeal under 
discretionary jurisdiction.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} Once the legislature has defined the crime and has established the 
punishment that the trial court is to impose through its sentencing authority, the 
foregoing constitutional-law principle further holds that “in the absence of statute 
[stating otherwise], it is a matter solely within the discretion of the sentencing 
court as to whether sentences shall run consecutively or concurrently.”  Stewart v. 
Maxwell (1963), 174 Ohio St. 180, 181, 22 O.O.2d 116, 187 N.E.2d 888.  See 
also State ex rel. Stratton v. Maxwell (1963), 175 Ohio St. 65, 67, 23 O.O.2d 357, 
191 N.E.2d 549; Henderson v. James (1895), 52 Ohio St. 242, 254-255; 39 N.E. 
805.  As stated in Stewart, 174 Ohio St. at 181, “Inasmuch as making sentences 
for different crimes run concurrently is in the nature of a reward to the convict, * 
* * it follows that a positive act is required on the part of the sentencing court to 
cause sentences to run concurrently; and * * * if the entry is silent as to how 
sentences shall run, it is presumed such sentences will run consecutively.”  See 
also 21A American Jurisprudence 2d (2007) Criminal Law, Section 886 (a court 
has power derived from common law to impose cumulative or consecutive 
sentences on conviction of several offenses charged in separate indictments, citing 
cases from Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, New Jersey, and Wyoming). 
{¶ 14} Before the Foster severance, former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 
former R.C. 2929.41(A) did not appear to permit a trial court to order a prison 
sentence to be served consecutively to a prison sentence previously imposed by a 
different court.  Neither of these provisions referred to any prison term 
“previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender,” unlike in other 
provisions of R.C. 2929.14(E).  Similarly, before severance by Foster, former 
R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) was permissive, advising that the court “may require the 
offender to serve the prison terms consecutively,” and the statute was written in 
the present tense, implying that it was applicable only to the sentencing court’s 
present proceeding.  In contrast, when the circumstances articulated in former 
R.C. 2929.14(E)(1), (2), and (3) were present, the statute required that the 
January Term, 2008 
7 
offender serve prison terms consecutively, thereby altering the general 
presumption in R.C. 2929.41(A) that sentences of imprisonment shall run 
concurrently. 
{¶ 15} The recommendations made by the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission prior to the passage of S.B. 2 also evince an intent that trial courts be 
permitted to impose consecutive sentences only in certain specified 
circumstances.  Diroll, Felony Sentencing Manual (Aug. 1, 1996) 24, ¶ 7a and b; 
former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(a), (b), and (c).  The recommendation was in contrast 
to the law then in effect, which allowed judges to impose consecutive terms on 
any multiple offender.  A Plan for Felony Sentencing in Ohio: A Formal Report 
of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission (July 1, 1993) 29. 
{¶ 16} We rely on the General Assembly’s expertise in writing statutes 
that express its intended results.  The legislature’s expression of its intentions 
through S.B.2 appears to evidence a policy decision to limit a trial court’s ability 
to impose consecutive sentences to specific situations.  If the foregoing analysis is 
correct, it does not appear that a trial court possessed the authority to order a 
prison sentence to be served consecutively to a prison sentence previously 
imposed on the same offender by another court, unless those specific statutory 
requirements were met.  As former R.C. 2929.14(E) indicated, “when the 
legislature intends a sentencing court to impose multiple sentences consecutively, 
it explicitly states that intention.”  State v. Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 541, 2008-
Ohio-69, 880 N.E.2d 896, ¶ 17.  The provisions of S.B. 2, therefore, appear to 
have altered the common-law presumption that unless a sentencing judge orders 
otherwise, sentences run consecutively in the absence of a controlling statute.  
Former R.C. 2929.14(E); former R.C. 2929.41(A); Stratton, 175 Ohio St. at 67, 
23 O.O.2d 357, 191 N.E.2d 549; Stewart, 174 Ohio St. at 181, 22 O.O.2d 116, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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187 N.E.2d 888; Henderson, 52 Ohio St. at 254-255, 39 N.E. 805.  See also 
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 65-66.2 
{¶ 17} Because the case at bar arose post-Foster, however, we need not – 
and therefore do not – decide whether the sentencing court would have lacked the 
authority to impose a consecutive sentence under the facts presented in this case if 
former R.C. 2929.14(E) existed as the legislature enacted it.  The consequence of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, which spawned this 
court’s Foster decision, has altered Ohio’s sentencing dynamics. 
{¶ 18} The severance and excision of former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 
former R.C. 2929.41(A) in their entirety by Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-
856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph four of the syllabus, leaves no statute to establish 
in the circumstances before us presumptions for concurrent and consecutive 
sentencing or to limit trial court discretion beyond the basic “purposes and 
principles of sentencing” provision articulated and set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 
2929.12.  As a result, the common-law presumptions are reinstated.  73 American 
Jurisprudence 2d (2007), Statutes, Section 271 (the repeal of a statute that 
abrogates the common law operates to reinstate the common-law rule).  Such a 
conclusion is also consistent with the perspective of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission, which opined that after Foster, judges have broader discretion 
within felony ranges to impose definite and consecutive sentences.  Diroll, A 
Decade of Sentencing Reform, A Sentencing Commission Staff Report 
(Mar.2007) 19.  In particular, “[j]udges are no longer guided to give concurrent 
sentences unless circumstances argue that consecutive sentences are more 
appropriate.”  Id. 
                                                 
2.  We note that R.C. 5145.01, which addresses the duration of sentences, provides a presumption 
of concurrent sentences unless the consecutive-sentences provisions of R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.41 
apply.  The effect of the severance of R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) on R.C. 5145.01, 
however, is an issue that neither Bates nor the state has raised.  Because this issue is not before us, 
we decline to address it. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, the trial court now has the discretion and inherent 
authority to determine whether a prison sentence within the statutory range shall 
run consecutively or concurrently, and we hold that the trial court may impose a 
prison sentence to be served consecutively to a prison sentence imposed on the 
same offender by another Ohio court.  Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 
845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of the syllabus; Stewart, 174 Ohio St. at 181, 22 
O.O.2d 116, 187 N.E.2d 888. 
V 
{¶ 20} No statutory or common-law impediment exists to preclude the 
Miami County Common Pleas Court from adopting, as it did, the joint sentencing 
recommendation of Bates and the state and ordering the three concurrent prison 
terms to run consecutively to the sentence previously imposed by the 
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.  The judgment of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
_______________ 
 
Gary A. Nasal, Miami County Prosecuting Attorney, and James D. 
Bennett, First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Jones Day, Chad Readler, Michael R. Gladman, and Grant W. Garber, for 
appellant. 
______________________