Title: State v. Garcia

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

457 P.2d 985 (1969) 80 N.M. 466 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bobble Gene GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 8742. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 4, 1969. Emmett C. Hart, Stanley F. Frost, Tucumcari, for appellant. James A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., Ray H. Shollenbarger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sante Fe, for appellee. OPINION TACKETT, Justice. The defendant was charged with and convicted of murder in the first degree in the District Court of Quay County, New Mexico, and upon the failure of the jury to recommend a life sentence, was sentenced to be executed. Thus this appeal. Appellant alleges six points for reversal, as follows: Points 1, 3, 4 and 5 are attacks on the death penalty. Chapter 128, N.M.S.L., 1969 at 415, which became effective June 20, 1969, abolishes the death penalty for murder, except under particular circumstances not applicable here. Points 1 and 5 are controlled by what we said in State v. Pace, N.M., 456 P.2d 197 (1969), as we there considered and disposed of these very same issues. What we said in the Pace case renders points 3 and 4 moot. It is contended under point 2 that the cross-examination of appellant by the district attorney was improper. We are reluctant to set forth testimony in an opinion; however, it becomes necessary in this case: *987 In view of the above testimony, by no stretch of the imagination could we say there was improper questioning by the district attorney. Rather, such were voluntary statements made by appellant after he had been repeatedly stopped by the court, all to no avail, and also after he had been dismissed as a witness. As a matter of fact, the record reveals that both the trial court and the district attorney admonished appellant not to volunteer statements, but he continued to do so. The voluntary statements of appellant furnish no basis for reversal. A party cannot complain of prejudice possibly resulting from a situation which he created by his own remarks during the course of the trial. People v. Musinski, 22 Ill. 2d 518, 177 N.E.2d 142 (1961). Compare, State v. Wilcoxson, 51 N.M. 501, 188 P.2d 611 (1948); State v. Edwards, 54 N.M. 189, 217 P.2d 854 (1950). Under point 6, it is contended that appellant was not capable of assisting counsel in his defense. This issue was raised in the progress of the trial. The trial judge suspended proceedings to allow a psychiatrist to examine appellant. The examination was agreed to by both the State and the defense. After the examination, Dr. Jacobson, a psychiatrist, testified that appellant was competent to intelligently assist in his defense. The trial court followed the procedure as set forth in § 41-13-3.1, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. In State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7, 419 P.2d 219 (1966), this court said: It is our considered view that appellant did not carry the necessary burden of proof in the instant case. We hold against appellant on points 2 and 6. Finding no error, the decision is affirmed. Nevertheless, since the execution could not be carried out before the effective date of Ch. 128, supra, the case is remanded to the district court so that appellant may be resentenced thereunder. It is so ordered. MOISE and COMPTON, JJ., WALDO SPIESS, C.J., Ct.App., JAMES W. MUSGROVE, D.J., concur.