Title: Grayson v. State; Jackson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Nos. 25 & 26
September Term, 1997
___________________________________________
JAMES W. GRAYSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
---------------------
MICHAEL JAMES JACKSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________________
        Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Karwacki, Robert L.
                          (Retired, specially assigned),
                                             
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
        
Filed: May 7, 1999
We granted petitions for writs of certiorari in these two cases to decide issues relating
to the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.),
Art. 27, § 645A.  The questions raised in the petitions and briefs include the following:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Court of Special
Appeals in these two cases; (2) whether petitioner Grayson’s petition for post conviction
relief should be reviewed under the provisions of the Post Conviction Procedure Act that
were in effect before the 1995 amendments, Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.),
Art. 27, §  645A, as interpreted by this Court in Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 522 A.2d 1344
(1987); (3) whether the circuit court reopened a prior post conviction proceeding when
reviewing petitioner Jackson’s most recent petition for post conviction relief; and (4) whether
the circuit court’s decision regarding Jackson’s petition can be reviewed by the Court of
Special Appeals.  We shall hold that this Court has jurisdiction, shall reverse the Court of
Special Appeals in both cases, shall direct that Grayson’s case be remanded to the circuit
court, and shall direct that Jackson’s case be further considered by the Court of Special
Appeals.
I.
The Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, “[a]s originally enacted in 1958 . . .
did not place any limit on the number of post conviction petitions which a petitioner was
entitled to file.”  Mason v. State, supra, 309 Md. at 217-218, 522 A.2d at 1345.
Nevertheless, “by Chapter 647 of the Act of 1986, the General Assembly amended § 645A
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[the Post Conviction Procedure Act] by adding new Subsection (a)(2) which provided that
‘[a] person may not file more than two petitions, arising out of each trial, for relief under this
Subtitle.’  Section 2 of Chapter 647 provided ‘That this Act shall take effect July 1, 1986.’”
309 Md. at 218, 522 A.2d at 1345.  This Court in Mason held that the 1986 amendments to
the Post Conviction Procedure Act, imposing the two petition limit, were not intended to be
applied retroactively, and that, regardless of the number of petitions filed by a petitioner
prior to the 1986 amendments, all petitioners had the right to file two petitions under the Act
after July 1, 1986.
The General Assembly in 1995 once again addressed the number of petitions under
the Post Conviction Procedure Act which could be filed to challenge a particular conviction.
By Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, which was captioned “Death Penalty Reform” and which
primarily amended statutory provisions relating to capital punishment, the General Assembly
also amended subsection (a)(2) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act to provide as follows:
“(2)(I) A person may file only one petition, arising out of
each trial, for relief under this subtitle.
“(II) The court may in its discretion reopen a
postconviction proceeding that was previously concluded if the
court determines that such action is in the interests of justice.”
The first of the above-quoted paragraphs was subsequently codified as Art. 27,
 645A(a)(2)(i) and the second as Art. 27, § 645(a)(2)(iii).  Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Ch. 110 of
the Acts of 1995 stated as follows:
“SECTION 2.  AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That,
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subject to Section 3 below, the provisions of this Act shall apply
to all criminal cases, regardless of whether the case arises out of
an offense that is committed before or after the effective date of
this Act or whether the trial or sentencing of the defendant
occurs before or after the effective date of this Act.
“SECTION 3.  AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the
provisions of this Act that amend Article 27, § 645A of the
Code do not apply to a case in which a second postconviction
petition was filed prior to the effective date of this Act.  In such
a case, the court shall process the case in due course as required
under Article 27, § 645A prior to the effective date of this Act.”
* * *
“SECTION 5.  AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That
this Act shall take effect October 1, 1995.”
The effect of these provisions upon § 645A(a)(2) was that a petitioner, who had previously
filed a petition relating to a particular trial, had until September 30, 1995, to file another
petition under the statute relating to the same trial.  Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 was signed
into law by the Governor on April 11, 1995.  
Subsection (a)(2) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act was also amended by Ch. 258
of the Acts of 1995, which was signed into law by the Governor on May 9, 1995.  Section
1 of Ch. 258 provided as follows:
“SECTION 1.  BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland
read as follows:
Article 27 - Crimes and Punishments
645A.
(a)(2)(I) A person may not file more than 2 petitions, arising
out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle.
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   (II) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in
which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition
under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from the
imposition of sentence.”
The above-quoted first paragraph of § 645A(a)(2) represented no change in the wording that
had been enacted by Ch. 647 of the Acts of 1986.  The second paragraph was entirely new
language, and is now codified as Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(ii).  Sections 2 and 3 of Ch. 258 of
the Acts of 1995 stated as follows:
“SECTION 2.  AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That
this Act shall be construed prospectively to apply only to
postconviction proceedings for sentences imposed on or after
the effective date of this Act and may not be applied or
interpreted to have any effect on or application to postconviction
petitions for sentences imposed before the effective date of this
Act.
“SECTION 3. AND IT BE FURTHER ENACTED, That this
Act shall take effect October 1, 1995.”
II.
The underlying facts in the two cases before us are as follows.
A.
In 1965 James W. Grayson was found guilty by a Baltimore City jury of first degree
murder, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment on January 17, 1966.  Grayson,
represented by his court-appointed lawyer, took an appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the judgment.  Grayson v. State, 1 Md. App. 548, 232 A.2d 284 (1967).  In 1968,
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the same attorney filed the first of Grayson’s petitions for post conviction relief, raising the
identical issues in the post conviction petition that had been raised on direct appeal.  The
court denied relief on the ground that the issues raised in the post conviction petition had
been fully and finally litigated on direct appeal.  An application for leave to appeal was
denied by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion.  Thereafter Grayson filed,
pro se, a second petition for post conviction relief, asserting, inter alia, ineffective assistance
of counsel.  In 1969, the trial court denied relief, and the Court of Special Appeals again
denied Grayson’s application for leave to appeal. 
Grayson’s third petition for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, also filed
pro se, commenced the present litigation.  According to the record, the petition was given to
the prison officials to mail to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on Thursday, September
28, 1995.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City marked the petition as filed on Monday,
October 2, 1995.  The circuit court declined to consider the merits of the petition and denied
relief, stating that it was precluded from considering Grayson’s petition because “‘a person
may file only one petition, arising out of each trial, for relief under [Art. 27, § 645A(2)(i)].’”
Additionally, the circuit court stated that it was precluded from considering the petition
because Art. 27, § 645A(2)(ii), “states ‘unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in
which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be
filed later than 10 years from the imposition of sentence.’”  The court stated that “Petitioner
was sentenced thirty (30) years ago . . . [and] this Court finds that ‘extraordinary cause’ is
not shown in Petitioner’s allegations.”  
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Grayson applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court, in an unreported opinion, stated:
“James Walker Grayson has filed an application for leave to
appeal from a denial of post conviction relief.  The petition that
initiated this case was filed after October 1, 1995, and is the
third post conviction petition the applicant has filed seeking
review of this case.  Because the law, Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i),
allows only one petition to be filed per case, we must dismiss
the instant application.
“Application For Leave To Appeal Denied.  Any costs to be
paid by applicant.”
Grayson filed in this Court, pro se, a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the circuit
court erroneously applied Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 retroactively, that, in any event, his
petition should be treated as filed when he delivered it to the state prison officials on
September 28, 1995, that under the Maryland Rules his petition should be treated as filed
before the October 1 statutory deadline, and that the circuit court erred in applying Ch. 258
of the Acts of 1995 retroactively.  We granted the petition, Grayson v. State, 345 Md. 459,
693 A.2d 356 (1997), and requested the Office of the Public Defender to represent Grayson
in this Court. 
B.
On January 30, 1991, Michael James Jackson was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County of first degree sex offense, burglary, and assault with intent to rape.
Jackson was sentenced to life imprisonment plus two fifteen year terms to run consecutive
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to the life sentence but concurrent to each other.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
judgments, Jackson v. State, 92 Md.App. 304, 608 A.2d 782 (1992), and this Court denied
a petition for a writ of certiorari.  Jackson v. State, 328 Md. 238, 614 A.2d 84 (1992).
Jackson filed, pro se, a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act on July 19,
1993.  Relief was denied by the circuit court on September 14, 1994.  The Court of Special
Appeals, in an unreported opinion, granted Jackson’s application for leave to appeal and
remanded the case for further proceedings.  We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Jackson v. State, 339 Md. 354, 663 A.2d 72 (1995).  On December 5, 1995, upon remand,
the circuit court once again denied relief.  The Court of Special Appeals denied Jackson’s
application for leave to appeal, and we denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.  Jackson v.
State, 342 Md. 473, 677 A.2d 566 (1996).
Jackson initiated the present case on June 20, 1996, by filing in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County another petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.  Jackson
argued, inter alia, that the circuit court should revisit some of the issues raised in his first
petition for post conviction relief in light of a then recently filed opinion by this Court,
Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996).  The circuit court, in a memorandum
opinion, considered on their merits Jackson’s various challenges to his 1991 convictions,
rejected Jackson’s arguments on their merits, and denied relief.  Jackson filed an application
for leave to appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, stated:
“Michael James Jackson has filed an application for leave to
appeal from a denial of post conviction relief.  The petition that
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initiated this case was filed after October 1, 1995, and is the
second post conviction petition the applicant has filed seeking
review of this case.  Because the law, Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i),
allows only one petition to be filed per case, we must dismiss
the instant application.
“Application For Leave To Appeal Denied.  Any costs to be
paid by applicant.”
Jackson filed in this Court, pro se, a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the issues of
whether “Art. 27, § 645(a)(2), as amended [in] 1995, bar[s] a person sentenced prior to
October 1, 1995, from filing a second petition for post conviction relief,” whether, when “a
post conviction court accepts a second petition and issues an opinion” on the merits,
“§ 645(a)(2)(i) bar[s] that person from appellate review,” and whether the Court of Special
Appeals erred in dismissing Jackson’s application for leave to appeal.  This Court granted
Jackson’s certiorari petition, Jackson v. State, 345 Md. 459, 693 A.2d 356 (1997), and
requested that the Office of the Public Defender represent Jackson in this Court.
C.
With regard to the first issue raised in Grayson’s and Jackson’s certiorari petitions,
the Public Defender’s Office, in its briefs on behalf of Grayson and Jackson, appears to
concede that the “one petition” limitation under Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 is viable and
applies retroactively to bar the filing, after September 30, 1995, of a new petition under the
Post Conviction Procedure Act challenging a trial if the petitioner had earlier filed one or
more petitions under the Act challenging the same trial.  We shall accept, for purposes of
these cases, this concession.
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 While the Public Defender’s Office makes no argument that Grayson’s petition was timely, it
1
does not expressly abandon the arguments made in Grayson’s pro se certiorari petition that his
petition was timely filed.  In a case decided by the Court of Special Appeals, ordinarily the issues
before this Court are those set forth in the certiorari petition, not the briefs.  See Maryland Rule 8-
131(b).
The Public Defender’s Office nevertheless argues that if Grayson’s petition was
untimely,  the circuit court should have treated it as a reopening, under Art. 27,
1
§ 645A(a)(2)(iii), of his earlier petitions because “Mr. Grayson never had a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel in 1969 when
he had his post-conviction hearing.”  (Grayson’s brief at 11).  The Public Defender’s Office
points out that the circuit court clearly erred in applying the ten-year limitation in
§ 645(a)(2)(ii) retroactively to Grayson.  
The Office of the Public Defender further argues that, in Jackson’s case, the circuit
court in effect treated his petition as a reopening under § 645A(a)(2)(iii), and that the Court
of Special Appeals should have exercised its discretion to grant or deny leave to appeal
instead of dismissing the application under the “one petition” provision of Ch. 110 of the
Acts of 1995.
The State, in addition to arguing that the Court of Special Appeals properly dismissed
both applications for leave to appeal, suggests that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
Court of Special Appeals’ decisions in these cases.  The State relies on Code (1974, 1998
Repl. Vol.), § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
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“§ 12-202.  Exceptions.
A review by way of certiorari may not be granted by the
Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of
Special Appeals has denied or granted:
(1) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction
proceeding . . . .”
III.
We shall first address the State’s suggestion that § 12-202(1) deprives this Court of
jurisdiction to review the Court of Special Appeals’ decisions in these cases.
The history and purpose of the limitation in § 12-202 upon this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction was considered in detail by us in Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 205-211, 438
A.2d 1301, 1302-1305 (1981).  We pointed out in Williams, 292 Md. at 206, 438 A.2d at
1303, that the language was taken from former Code (1957, 1973 Cum. Supp.), Art. 5,
§ 21A, which gave the Court of Appeals broad jurisdiction to review by certiorari decisions
of the Court of Special Appeals, with the only exception being that “no such [certiorari]
petition shall be entertained by the Court of Appeals from the denying or granting by the
Court of Special Appeals of an application for leave to prosecute an appeal in post
conviction” proceedings.  (Emphasis added).  The Court stated in Williams that this
exception to our certiorari jurisdiction related only to the Court of Special Appeals’
discretionary ruling denying or granting an application for leave to appeal and did not relate
to any other action by the Court of Special Appeals in such a case.  We further pointed out
in Williams that, when the wording of Art. 5, § 21A, was changed by § 12-202 of the Courts
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and Judicial Proceedings Article, no change in the nature of this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction had been intended by the General Assembly.  The Williams opinion noted that
this Court had previously construed the language in § 12-202 to have the same meaning as
former Art. 5, § 21A.  See Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 369 A.2d 1011 (1977); Jourdan
v. State, 275 Md. 495, 506 n.4, 341 A.2d 388, 394-395 n.4 (1975).  The Court in Williams
thus concluded as follows (292 Md. at 210-211, 438 A.2d at 1305):
“Consequently, we reaffirm the holdings in Jourdan and
Moss that the limitation upon this Court’s jurisdiction set forth
in § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
relates only to the action of the Court of Special Appeals in
granting or denying an application for leave to appeal.  Except
for the nonreviewability of that specific action, we have
jurisdiction over the type of cases listed in § 12-202 to the
extent that such jurisdiction is conferred by § 12-201 or other
statutory pro-visions.  Therefore, in the present case, although
we may not review the Court of Special Appeals’ exercise of
discretion in granting the State’s application for leave to appeal,
we are authorized to review that court’s decision on the merits
remanding the case to the trial court.”
The holding in Williams has been re-affirmed by us on several occasions.  See, e.g.,
Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 407, 659 A.2d 291, 292 (1995); McElroy v. State, 329 Md.
136, 145, 617 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1993); Sherman v. State, 323 Md. 310, 311, 593 A.2d 670
(1991) (this “Court has no certiorari jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief when the
Court of Special Appeals has simply denied an application for leave to appeal in a post-
conviction proceeding”) (emphasis added).  See also State v. Hernandez, 344 Md. 721, 728,
690 A.2d 526, 530 (1997) (distinguishing between the denial of leave to appeal which does
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 Section 12-201 provides as follows:
2
(continued...)
“no more than say ‘There shall be no appeal in this case,’” and a decision on the merits of
an issue raised by the petitioner).
The Court of Special Appeals’ decisions in the two cases at bar were not simply
discretionary determinations that there should be no appeals.  Rather, the Court of Special
Appeals decided the merits of an issue raised by both Grayson and Jackson, namely whether
the instant petitions were allowable under Art. 27, § 645(a)(2).  Despite the insertion of the
sentences stating that the applications for leave to appeal were denied, the intermediate
appellate court did not simply exercise its discretionary authority not to entertain appeals.
Instead, the Court of Special Appeals in both cases held that the post-conviction petitions
were not allowable as a matter of law.  Compare McElroy v. State, supra, 329 Md. 136, 617
A.2d 1068, where the Court of Special Appeals held that post conviction relief was not
allowable because the petitioners had waived their right to post conviction relief, and where
this Court exercised certiorari jurisdiction and affirmed the decisions of the Court of Special
Appeals.
Since the decisions of the Court of Special Appeals in these cases did not simply
amount to discretionary denials of leave to appeal, the limitation upon this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction in § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not apply.  We
have jurisdiction over these cases under § 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.2
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 (...continued)
2
“§ 12-201. Certiorari to Court of Special Appeals.
Except as provided in § 12-202 of this subtitle, in any case or
proceeding pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals
upon appeal from a circuit court or an orphans’ court . . ., any party,
including the State, may file in the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari to review the case or proceeding.  The petition may be filed
either before or after the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a
decision, but not later than the time prescribed by the Maryland Rules.
In a case or proceeding described in this section, the Court of Appeals
also may issue the writ of certiorari on its own motion.”
IV.
As previously discussed, Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 placed a deadline of
September 30, 1995, upon the filing of a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act
challenging a criminal conviction if the petitioner had earlier filed one or more petitions
under the Act relating to the same conviction.  Under the wording of Ch. 110, if such a
petitioner filed the petition on or before September 30, 1995, its allowability would be
governed by § 645A(a)(2) as it was amended by Ch. 647 of the Acts of 1986, and as
construed by this Court in Mason v. State, supra, 309 Md. 215, 522 A.2d 1344.  Under Ch.
647 of the Acts of 1986 and our holding in the Mason case, a petition by Grayson filed on
or before September 30, 1995, would have been allowable because his prior petitions were
filed before 1986.
In September 1995 Grayson was an inmate of the Maryland Correctional Institution
at Jessup, Maryland, which is not very far from Baltimore City.  As mentioned earlier, the
record indicates that Grayson on Thursday, September 28, 1995, delivered his post
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conviction petition to the appropriate state prison officials for mailing to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City.  The record also shows that the circuit court officials stamped Grayson’s
petition as filed on Monday, October 2, 1995.  The record does not show when the prison
officials actually mailed the petition or when it actually arrived at the Baltimore City
courthouse.
Under Maryland Rule 16-304, the hours when the circuit court’s clerk’s office would
have been open were from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. Consequently,
the office presumably was not open on Saturday, September 30, 1995, which was the latest
day for the filing of Grayson’s petition.
Maryland Rule 1-203(a) provides that whenever a rule, order of court, or “any
applicable statute” prescribes the latest day for the performance of an act, and if the last day
“(1) . . . is a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, in which event the
period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday; or
“(2) the act to be done is the filing of a paper in court and the
office of the clerk of that court on the last day of the period is
not open, or is closed for a part of the day, in which event the
period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, holiday, or a day on which the office is not open during
its regular hours.”
See also Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1, § 36, which is largely to the same effect.
Although the rule and the statute are most often applied to a statutorily prescribed time
-15-
 See, e.g., Ungar v. Handelsman, 325 Md. 135, 139 n.1, 599 A.2d 1159, 1161 n.1 (1992);
3
Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 450 n.1, 488 A.2d 962, 963 n.1 (1985).
period, such as within a specified number of days after a certain event,  the Attorney General
3
has expressed the view that “[w]e have no doubt that the courts would apply the same
principle to a single specified day.”  79 Opinions of the Attorney General 455 (1994).
Furthermore, section 3 of Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 in effect created a time period expiring
at the end of the day on September 30, 1995.  Consequently, we conclude that Rule 1-203
and Art. 1, § 36, are applicable under the circumstances here.
Since, under Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, September 30, 1995, was the last day for
Grayson to file the instant post conviction petition, and because September 30th fell on a
Saturday, Rule 1-203 and Art. 1, § 36, gave Grayson until the following Monday to file his
petition.  The petition was filed on Monday, and, therefore, it was timely.  Both the circuit
court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Grayson’s petition was not
allowable under Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995.
Moreover, the circuit court clearly erred in holding that Grayson’s petition was barred
by the 10-year provision enacted by Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995.  Under Section 2 of
Ch. 258, the prohibition against filing a petition later than 10 years from the imposition of
sentence, absent extraordinary cause, applied only to sentences imposed on and after
October 1, 1995.  Grayson’s sentence was imposed in 1966.
In light of our holding that Grayson’s petition was allowable under Section 3 of
Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, and section 2 of Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995, it is unnecessary
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for us to reach any of the other arguments advanced by Grayson or by the Office of the
Public Defender on Grayson’s behalf.  We shall direct that Grayson’s case be remanded to
the circuit court for that court to consider the merits of his petition under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act.
V.
In Jackson’s present petition for post conviction relief, he specifically requested, inter
alia, that the circuit court reopen his earlier post conviction proceeding pursuant to Art. 27,
§ 645(a)(2)(iii).  Although the circuit court may not have employed the word “reopen” in its
opinion, the court in detail discussed and ruled upon each one of Jackson’s challenges to his
1991 convictions and sentences.  In connection with Jackson’s argument that his trial counsel
had been ineffective, the circuit court also “weigh[ed] any cumulative effect” of the alleged
deficiencies by Jackson’s counsel at his original trial.  In addition, the circuit court held that
this court’s opinion in Armstead v. State, supra, provided no basis for post conviction relief.
The circuit court concluded that there had been no denial of Jackson’s constitutional rights
at his original trial and then, immediately thereafter, stated that, “accordingly,” Jackson’s
petition was denied.
Nothing in the circuit court’s opinion remotely suggested that the court was refusing
to entertain Jackson’s petition on the merits.  Instead, it is clear that the circuit court, in
accordance with Jackson’s express request, was reopening the prior post conviction
proceeding.
Art. 27, § 645(a)(2)(iii), specifically authorizes a circuit court to reopen a post
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conviction proceeding if the circuit court decides that such action is in the interests of justice.
When the circuit court does reopen a post conviction proceeding, and then grants or denies
post conviction relief, the losing party is entitled to file an application for leave to appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals.  In such a case, the Court of Special Appeals must exercise its
discretion to determine whether or not to grant leave to appeal.  In Jackson’s case, the Court
of Special Appeals did not exercise this discretion.  Instead, the intermediate appellate court
erroneously overlooked the decision of the circuit court reopening the matter and held that
Jackson’s petition was not allowable.  
Therefore, we shall remand Jackson’s case to the Court of Special Appeals for that
court to exercise its discretion and simply deny or grant the application for leave to appeal.
If the application is granted, the case shall proceed like any other appeal in the Court of
Special Appeals.  Williams v. State, supra, 292 Md. at 208-209, 438 A.2d at 1304-1305;
Jourdan v. State, supra, 275 Md. at 506 n.4, 341 A.2d at 394-395 n.4.
IN NO. 25, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED, AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND THE
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE 
CITY 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
IN NO. 26, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
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OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
COSTS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.