Title: Stromberg v. Univ. of Maryland

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CAL02-26807
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 122
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
STROMBERG METAL WORKS, INC.
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    July 27, 2004
Appellant, Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., a subcontractor on a construction project
at the College Park Campus of the University of Maryland (UMCP), filed a request under
the Maryland Public Information Act (PIA) to inspect and copy certain public records
pertaining to the project.  The University turned over some of the records that were
requested but redacted certain information in others, claiming that the information was
privileged and therefore not subject to disclosure.  Stromberg filed suit under the Act to
obtain the information.  
Obviously crediting the University’s assertion that the requested information was
privileged, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered summary judgment in
favor of the University, and Stromberg appealed.  We granted certiorari on our own
initiative, prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, and shall affirm in part
and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND
The project in question is the renovation of the Adele H. Stamp Student Union at
the College Park Campus. The general contractor for the job was Grunley Construction
Co. Inc.  Grunley subcontracted certain mechanical work to John J. Kirlin, Inc., which, in
turn, subcontracted the fabrication and installation of ductwork to Stromberg.  The project
had initially been budgeted at $39.3 million, but that budget was increased to $44.9
1By September, 2002, the budget had been increased to $48.5 million.
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million by August, 2001.1  Construction began in July, 1999, and was due to be
completed in September, 2002.  As of December, 2001, the project was running more
than $2 million over the then-effective budget amount and was 53 weeks behind schedule.
Apparently concerned whether there was adequate funding to complete the project,
Stromberg, invoking the PIA, made requests for various documents pertaining to the
project on November 29, 2000, August 9, 2001, and September 28, 2001.  Among the
documents requested were monthly reports prepared by the University’s Department of
Architecture, Engineering and Construction with respect to the project (AEC Reports).
The AEC Reports were prepared by John Mitchell, an employee in the AEC Department
and project manager for the project.  He and Joyce Hinkle, a procurement employee in the
Department of Procurement and Supply, were the custodians of the reports.  
The AEC Report is in the form of two spread sheets detailing certain information
about all of the University’s on-going construction projects and one spread sheet for each
project that contains additional information regarding that project.  The individual project
report for the Stamp project shows such things as (1) the original funding authorization
and budget for planning, construction, equipment, and other items, (2) approved funding
and budget changes, (3) the current funding and budget for each category of expense, (4)
the amount of the budget that is encumbered and liquidated to date, (5) the estimated
amount needed to complete the project, (6) the final cost forecast, (7) any budget
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variance, and (8) the target and actual dates of the start of construction, substantial
completion, and project completion.  One of the consolidated spread sheets shows the
projected budget for the project, the final cost forecast, the amount and percentage that
the project is under or over budget, and how many weeks the project is behind or ahead of
schedule.
After a review of the requested documents by the Attorney General’s Office for
any privileged material, the University made the documents available in January, 2002.
Among the documents turned over for inspection were unredacted copies of the AEC
Reports, including the latest Report, for December, 2001.  Stromberg requested copies of
some of the documents, including the AEC Report for December, 2001; they were
delivered a week later.  The inspection and copying were supervised by the Attorney
General’s Office.  
On August 14, 2002 – some eight months later – Stromberg filed a supplemental
application for additional documents, including the monthly AEC Reports for and after
January, 2002.  The application was sent to Jennifer Forrence, the Assistant Attorney
General who had supervised the disclosure of the first round of requested documents, and
John Mitchell.  
The PIA requires the custodian of public records to grant or deny an application
within 30 days after receiving it.  See Maryland Code, §10-614(b) of the State
Government Article (SG).  On September 13, 2002, another Assistant Attorney General,
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David Chaisson, responded that the University was gathering the documents but would
need additional time to gather them all.  The parties agreed to a 30-day extension for
production of the documents.  On October 2, 2002, Mr. Chaisson advised that the
documents were ready for inspection, and that the University was entitled to $1,750 for its
search and production efforts.  A check for that amount was promptly sent to the
University.  
Inspection occurred on October 8, but a number of documents, including the
requested monthly AEC Reports for January - September, 2002, were not produced.  In
response to Stromberg’s complaint about the missing AEC Reports, Mr. Chaisson wrote,
on October 16, 2002, that “[s]ome of the information provided in those reports is
privileged under the executive privilege and, as well, may contain confidential
commercial financial information.”  Chaisson added that, to the extent the reports
contained privileged information, they would be produced in a redacted form.  
The next day, the University turned over copies of the AEC Reports from which a
great deal of information had been redacted.  On the reports pertaining to the Stamp
Project, in particular, the dollar amounts for the estimated cost to complete the project,
the final cost forecast, the estimated budget variance, forecasted surplus or shortfall, and
the current percentage of completion were redacted.  On the consolidated reports, the only
information supplied was the projected budget for the Stamp Project and the number of
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days and weeks that project was behind schedule.  All information relating to the other
projects was redacted, apparently without objection.
In November, 2002, Stromberg filed this action to enjoin the University, Mitchell,
and Hinkle from withholding the requested information, to permit Stromberg to inspect
the monthly AEC Reports, and for ancillary relief.  In its answer to the complaint, the
University admitted or denied various factual allegations but asserted no particular basis
for withholding the information.  Its defense was presented in a memorandum filed in
support of its motion for summary judgment, in which it asserted that the redacted
information was protected by “executive privilege” and by the University’s privilege for
“confidential commercial information.”  The University relied on two provisions of the
PIA – SG §§10-615(1) and 10-618(b).
Section 10-615(1) requires a custodian to deny inspection of a public record or any
part of a public record if, “by law, the public record is privileged or confidential.”
Section 10-618(b) permits a custodian to deny inspection of “any part of an interagency
or intra-agency letter or memorandum that would not be available by law to a private
party in litigation with the [governmental] unit.”  As to both sections, the University
claimed that the redacted information was “protected by executive privilege,” citing as
authority Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980), Office of the Governor
v. Washington Post, 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000), and Cranford v. Montgomery
County, 300 Md. 759, 481 A.2d 221 (1984).  
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In its argument, the University treated “executive privilege” as if it were the same
defense or doctrine as “the deliberative process privilege” recognized under the Federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5).   In that regard, it averred that
the redacted number for the forecast of final cost was not just a “simple number” but
instead represented Mitchell’s “subjective assessment of the potential final cost to the
University for the project, including the project manager’s assessment of the University’s
potential liability for claims filed by the contractor, for problems on the project that the
manager believes may result in claims, and for actual and potential change order
requests.”  That information, it contended, was provided to Mitchell’s supervisor, Carlo
Colella, so that he could make decisions regarding the amount of resources to devote to
the project and whether additional funding might be required, and an assessment of the
value of pending claims.  The University did not indicate what, if any, authority Mr.
Colella had to make or implement any of those decisions or, if he did not have that
authority, who did.
In addition to the executive/deliberative process privilege, the University claimed
that the redacted information also constituted “confidential commercial information,”
which it said was privileged under SG §10-618(b).  For that proposition, it relied on a
number of Federal cases arising under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5) – the Federal
analog to §10-618(b).
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After hearing argument on the cross-motions, the court entered a brief order
granting the University’s motion, denying Stromberg’s motion, and entering judgment for
the University.  No reasons or findings were included in the order.  
DISCUSSION
Preliminary Issues
As noted, a great deal of information was redacted from the AEC Reports.  The
focus of this appeal, however, has been on the one number for the total forecasted cost of
the Stamp project.  Although, in their briefs and oral argument, the parties sometime
spoke of the redacted information generally, their arguments addressed only that one
piece of information.  Stromberg states as its position “that the nature of the redacted data
– numbers representing the total cost of a public construction project – is such that
UMCP’s claimed privileges do not attach.”  The arguments, pro and con, focus on that
one number in the various reports.  Accordingly, we have no basis upon which to disturb
the Circuit Court’s ruling with respect to the other redacted information and shall
consider only the one item that seems still to be in contention.
The predominant question in this appeal is the substantive one of whether the
number on the AEC Reports for total cost of the Stamp project is subject to the asserted
privileges and, for that reason, is exempt from disclosure.  Stromberg has raised a
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collateral ground for denying the University’s right to assert those privileges, however –
that of timeliness in asserting them -- which we shall consider preliminarily.
Stromberg made its application for disclosure of the documents at issue here on
August 14, 2002.  SG §10-614(b)(1) requires that the custodian either grant or deny an
application promptly but, in any event, within 30 days after receiving the application.
Section 10-614(b)(4) provides that, with the consent of the applicant, that time limit may
be extended “for not more than 30 days.”  Section 10-614(b)(3) requires a custodian who
denies an application to notify the applicant immediately and, within 10 working days, to
give the applicant a written statement of the reasons and legal authority for the denial.  
As noted, Stromberg consented to a 30-day extension of the initial 30-day period,
which would have required the University to grant or deny the application by October 13,
2002 – 60 days after the August 14 application.  Although the AEC Reports were not
delivered with the other records on October 8, the University did not notify Stromberg of
its intention to redact portions of the AEC Reports until October 16, 2002, three days past
the deadline.  Stromberg argues that the executive privilege claim was thus untimely and
should be barred.  We reject that argument, for two reasons.
First, it is not at all clear that the University missed the deadline.  It had until
October 13 to comply with or reject the request and, to the extent it rejected the request,
ten additional days to inform Stromberg in writing of the rejection and the reasons for it.
The actual rejection, at least implicitly, occurred on October 8, when the AEC Reports
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were not turned over with the other records that had been requested.  Chaisson gave
written notice of the final rejection with respect to the redacted information on October
16, well within the ten days allowed by the statute.
Second, although the PIA sets time limits on a response by the Governmental unit,
it says nothing expressly about the effect of non-compliance with those limits.  The
essence of Stromberg’s position is that, if the unit fails to deny the application within the
prescribed time, it is not permitted to deny the application thereafter and must therefore
disclose even records or parts of records that the law otherwise either requires or permits
the custodian to shield.  We are unwilling to interpret the statute in that manner, as we do
not believe that the Legislature could possibly have intended such a result.
The time limits are important.  In SG §10-612, the General Assembly expressed
the view that all persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of
Government and the official acts of Government officials and that the statute should be
construed “in favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least cost and
least delay to the person or governmental unit that requests the inspection.” (Emphasis
added).
The time limits are enforceable in a number of ways under the statute.  SG §10-
623 permits a person who is denied inspection of a public record to file an action in court
and authorizes the court, in an expedited manner,  (1) to order production of the record,
(2) to assess damages against any custodian who knowingly and willfully failed to
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disclose the record, and (3) to assess reasonable counsel fees and other litigation costs
against the Governmental unit.  If the court finds that the custodian acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in withholding the document, the court must send a certified copy of its
finding to the appointing authority of the custodian, which may then take disciplinary
action against the custodian.  Failure to permit inspection of a document subject to
inspection within the prescribed time period obviously constitutes at least a temporary
denial of inspection, which, unless authorized under the PIA (see SG §10-619), may
justify immediate invocation of the judicial remedy.  Section 10-627 also makes a
knowing and willful violation of the statute a criminal offense.  Given these various
remedies for withholding records that are disclosable under the statute, requiring the
disclosure of non-disclosable records is not necessary as an enforcement mechanism.
Apart from the lack of necessity, forcing a unit to permit inspection of records that
the statute requires or permits the custodian to shield, simply because of a failure to meet
the statutory deadline for denying inspection, is not a reasonable construction of the
statute and is not a construction that the Legislature likely intended.  The presumption of
the statute is in favor of disclosure.  See Governor v. Washington Post, supra, 360 Md.
520, 544-45, 759 A.2d 249, 262-63.  The Legislature carefully carved out for non-
disclosure only those kinds or categories of records for which it necessarily found some
supervening public policy that justified their shielding.  Indeed, in SG §10-626, it created
civil liability on the part of any individual who knowingly and willfully permits
2 Stromberg also stresses that, in response to its earlier applications, the University
supplied unredacted copies of the monthly AEC Reports and thus disclosed the very
information, as contained on those reports, that it now claims is privileged and either
mandatorily or permissively non-disclosable.  The release of that information, Stromberg,
contends, was not accidental or inadvertent, but was done deliberately after careful review
by the Attorney General’s Office.  Indeed, the University charged Stromberg $4,350 for
the collection of the documents that it released for inspection.  Despite multiple
opportunities during that process, the University never asserted any privilege with respect
to the pre-January, 2002 AEC Reports.  In the section of its brief that deals with that
point, Stromberg argues only that the prior release of the same information demonstrates
the non-privileged nature of the information, which goes to the substantive question of
whether a privilege applies.  We do not construe that argument as one of waiver – that by
releasing comparable information in response to the earlier requests, the University has
waived its right to claim that the material it redacted in response to the later application is
privileged.
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inspection of a public record in violation of the statute, and in §10-627, it provided a
criminal penalty for that conduct as well.  We cannot conceive that the Legislature would
have contemplated, much less desired, that the public policy justifying the shielding of
specific kinds of records be subordinated to the mere failure of a custodian to act within
the statutory time limits – that the custodian be required to disgorge records that the
Legislature has declared should not be disclosed simply because the custodian did not
communicate his/her decision in a timely manner. 2  
Executive/Deliberative Process Privilege
  The term “executive privilege,” used by the University to justify its redaction of
the forecasted final cost number on the AEC Reports, is a broad and ill-defined term that
encompasses a number of more specific privileges.  It reaches public attention most
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dramatically when invoked to shield records made in connection with the deliberative
decision-making process used by chief or high Executive officials – Presidents,
Governors, and their immediate advisors – and, as both the Supreme Court and this Court
have pointed out, when applied in that context, the deliberative process privilege
subsumed within that term has its roots in the Constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed.2d 1039
(1974); Cheney v. U.S. District Court, ____ U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2576, ___ L. Ed.2d ___
(2004); and Hamilton v. Verdow, supra, 287 Md. 544, 553, n.3, 414 A.2d 914, 920 n.3.
The term “executive privilege” has also been used as the umbrella for shielding
diplomatic, military, and security-laden secrets that may not involve those officials.  It is
those kinds of executive privilege that are encompassed within SG §10-615(1) – the
Constitutionally-based privilege that, when invoked, must be given the most serious
attention and, when properly invoked by the person holding the privilege, require the
custodian to deny inspection.  It is, after all, not unusual for the physical custodian of the
record to be someone other than the person holding the privilege, and it cannot have been
the legislative intent – even if the legislature were competent to do it – to permit the
custodian to waive or ignore another’s Constitutionally based privilege.
We are not dealing here with that form of executive privilege.  The records at issue
do not contain any diplomatic, military, or security secrets and do not involve the
deliberative process of the President or Governor.  They were prepared by John Mitchell,
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the Stamp project manager who worked in the University’s Department of Architecture,
Engineering & Construction (AEC).  Mr. Mitchell prepared the reports for his immediate
supervisor, Carlo Colella, the Director of AEC.  Colella, in turn, reported to J. Frank
Brewer, Associate Vice President for Facilities Management, who reported to another
Associate Vice President.  That Associate Vice President reported to John D. Porcari,
Vice President of UMCP.  Mr. Porcari reported to UM CP President C. Daniel Mote, Jr.,
who reported to Donald N. Langenberg, Chancellor of the University, who reported to the
Board of Regents of the University.  Mr. Colella claimed, in an affidavit, that he used the
total forecasted cost figure supplied by Mr. Mitchell “to make a number of different
decisions regarding the projects,” including “decisions about the amount of resources
(financial and human) to commit to each project, whether or not additional funding
should be requested for the project from the University Board of Regents, and about the
likely value of outstanding claims which are pending from contractors.”
It is evident that Mr. Colella’s decision-making process, which was the sole basis
for the asserted privilege, was seven rungs down in the chain of command and
responsibility within one State agency.  There is nothing in the record before us to
indicate that Colella had authority, on his own, to make any decisions regarding
additional funding or other resources or regarding the payment of disputed claims; nor is
there anything in the record to indicate that the AEC Reports that Mitchell prepared for
Colella’s benefit were used, or even seen, by anyone up the line for their decision-
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making.  The Constitutional underpinning of any executive/deliberative process privilege
on Mr. Colella’s part, if it exists at all, is exceedingly remote and tenuous.  We find no
basis, therefore, for a mandatory denial under SG §10-615(1).
What is really at issue here is the broader deliberative process privilege that arose
from the common law, from rules of evidence, and mostly from rules governing
discovery in civil judicial proceedings – a privilege that, with the advent of disclosure
statutes, was incorporated into exemption provisions like SG §10-618(b) and 5 U.S.C.
§552(b)(5), to protect from legislatively mandated disclosure interagency or intra-agency
memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a private party in litigation
with the unit.  See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed.2d 119 (1973);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148-49, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1515-16, 44 L.
Ed.2d 29, 46-47 (1975); FTC v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S. Ct. 2209, 76 L. Ed.2d 387
(1983); Cranford v. Montgomery County, supra, 300 Md. 759, 481 A.2d 221.  See,
however, Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354-55, 99 S. Ct.
2800, 2809, 61 L. Ed.2d 587, 599-600 (1979), making clear that §552(b)(5) does not
necessarily incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery. 
The three specific issues, in terms of that aspect of the deliberative process
privilege, are (1) whether the final cost number that was redacted from the AEC Reports
is the kind of information that constitutes deliberative process material, to which an
exemption under SG §10-618(b) would apply,  (2) if so, whether the privilege applies to
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someone like Mr. Colella – the head of a sub-agency whose own ability to act on the
information in any effective way has not been established, and (3) if it does, whether Mr.
Colella effectively invoked the privilege.  Although we have some question as to issues
(2) and (3), we need not address them, as we shall answer question (1) in the negative.
The permissive denial allowed by SG §10-618(b) applies to interagency or intra-
agency letters or memoranda that would not be available by law to a private party in
litigation with the unit.  Stromberg does not contest that the redacted information in the
AEC Reports was part of an interagency or intra-agency memorandum from Mitchell to
Colella.  The question is whether that information would be available to a private party in
litigation with the University.  In that regard, we may look not only at our prior cases, but
also Federal cases construing the FOIA analog, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5), from which §10-
618(b) was derived.  See Cranford, supra, 300 Md. 759, 772-74, 481 A.2d 221, 227-29.
In EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 86-87, 93 S. Ct. at 835-36, 35 L. Ed.2d at 132,
the Supreme Court, quoting in part from Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United
States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958), concluded that the intent behind §552(b)(5),
was “to incorporate generally the recognized rule that ‘confidential intra-agency advisory
opinions . . . are privileged from inspection,” and that the public policy behind that
privilege was “the policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief
concerning administrative action.”  As further explicated in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. supra, 421 U.S. 132, 149, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1515-16, 44 L. Ed.2d 29, 46-47, §552(b)(5)
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protects only (1) those confidential advisory opinions, disclosure of which “would be
injurious to the consultative functions of government,” and (2) attorney-client and
attorney work product privileges generally available to all litigants, quoting again from
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. supra, 157 F. Supp. at 946.  The focus, said the
NLRB Court, is on documents “reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated.”  NLRB, 421 U.S. at 150, 95 S. Ct. at 1516, 44 L. Ed.2d at 47.  
Because the focus is on the decision-making process, the Federal courts have
construed §552(b)(5) as protecting only “pre-decisional” communications, not those made
after the decision is made.  The NLRB Court explained that, although “[t]he quality of a
particular agency decision will clearly be affected by the communications received . . .
prior to the time the decision is made . . . it is difficult to see how the quality of a decision
will be affected by communications with respect to the decision occurring after the
decision is finally reached.”  Id. at 151, 95 S. Ct. at 1516-17, 44 L. Ed.2d at 47.   Thus, to
shield a record under §552(b)(5), the agency ordinarily must establish that the record is
both pre-decisional and deliberative.  See Hopkins v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban
Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 84 (2nd Cir. 1991); Ann K, Wooster, What are interagency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (5 USCA §552(b)(5), 168 ALR Fed 143, 192 (2001).  The NLRB Court
cautioned, however, that the line between pre-decisional and post-decisional documents
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may not always be a bright one – that decision-making is often a continuing process and
that the privilege does not turn on the ability of the agency to identify a specific decision
to which the memorandum relates.  Id. at 151-52, n.18 and 19, 95 S. Ct. at 1517, 44 L.
Ed.2d at 48.
Given the purpose of the AEC Reports, as explained in Mr. Colella’s affidavit,
there can be little doubt that the reports, and especially the total forecasted cost of the
project, is pre-decisional in nature.  The function of the reports, and of the forecasted total
cost, is to allow the University to monitor the progress of the project, to determine, as the
affidavit states, whether additional funding or resources will be necessary and should be
requested.  The question is whether that number is deliberative in nature.
In that regard, both the Supreme Court, with respect to FOIA, and this Court, with
respect to PIA, have drawn a general distinction between purely factual data and
deliberative opinions, noting, however, that the distinction is not always a clear one and is
not rigid.  In EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S. at 87-88, 93 S. Ct. at 836, 35 L. Ed.2d at 132,
the Court observed that “memoranda consisting only of compiled factual material or
purely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from its
context would generally be available for discovery by private parties in litigation with the
Government.”   We noted in Hamilton v. Verdow, supra, 287 Md. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at
926, however, that material cannot always be neatly separated into fact-finding and
decision-making categories, and that “some factual material is entitled to a degree of
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protection under the privilege, although not to the same extent as opinions and
recommendations,” referencing, as examples, “facts obtained upon promises or
understandings of confidentiality, investigative facts underlying and intertwined with
opinions and advice, and facts the disclosure of which would impinge on the deliberative
process.”
The number is largely factual in nature.  Indeed, in his affidavit, Mr. Colella
acknowledged that “[t]he AEC Monthly Reports consist predominantly of factual
information on each project, including current and historical funding information, current
and historical budget figures, expenditures for the project, and information regarding the
project’s schedule.”  That information is objectively ascertainable and documented, and is
not at all deliberative in nature.  As Mr. Colella’s affidavit indicates, the number also
incorporates Mr. Mitchell’s estimates, predictions, or evaluations and, to that extent,
constitutes Mitchell’s views as to the validity or value of pending or possible claims or
the course of further construction.  That, indeed, is the basis for the University’s claim of
privilege.  
If we were dealing with any clear articulation of those views – if, in his report, Mr.
Mitchell set forth his analysis of pending or possible claims, or what remained to be done,
or the extent to which further construction would likely occur on schedule, or whether
additional funding was necessary or should be sought, or whether the project should be
scaled back, enhanced, or changed in some material way – we might well regard that
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information as deliberative and consultative in nature.  If the deliberative aspects could be
separated from the purely factual aspects, they might be subject to shielding.  The one
aggregate number that allegedly incorporates but does not identify or segregate Mr.
Mitchell’s consultative views does not have that status, however.  It is impossible to tell
from that number what Mr. Mitchell’s views are with respect to any particular claim,
much less whether the project should be altered or additional funding should be sought.
The redacted number does not, therefore, constitute a memorandum that would not be
available to a private party in litigation with the University and, accordingly, is not
subject to shielding under the deliberative process privilege aspect of SG §10-618(b).
Compare Hopkins v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., supra, 929 F.2d 81, 85 (staff
reports containing inspectors’ professional opinions on progress and quality of
construction work and recommendations to higher officials that various agency actions
should be taken may be protected by §552(b)(5); case remanded to determine whether
factual and privileged contents were inextricably intertwined); and Jowett, Inc. v.
Department of Navy, 729 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1989) (report of auditors hired to evaluate
applicant’s claim and containing auditor’s recommendations and opinions regarding
aspects of the claim shielded under §552(b)(5)).
Confidential Commercial Information
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Alternatively, the University relies on another privilege generally recognized under
the civil discovery rules that has been incorporated by decisional law within the ambit of
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5) and that it urges should be incorporated within the ambit of SG §10-
618(b) – that of confidential commercial information.  Because there is no definitive
Maryland law on this point, the University relies on Federal cases interpreting FOIA,
mostly Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, supra, 443 U.S. 340, 99 S. Ct. 2800,
61 L. Ed.2d 587.  At issue there, among other things, was whether Domestic Policy
Directives issued on a monthly basis by the Federal Reserve Board’s Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) were subject to immediate public inspection under §552.
Those Directives, issued immediately following the FOMC monthly meeting,
summarized the economic and monetary background of the FOMC’s deliberations and
indicated whether the Committee intended to follow an inflationary, deflationary, or
unchanged monetary policy in the month ahead.  The Directives also included specific
tolerance ranges for growth in the money supply and for the Federal Funds rate.  FOMC
withheld disclosure of the Directive for 45 days in accordance with FOMC regulations, at
which point a new Directive was in place. 
After rejecting most of FOMC’s arguments against immediate disclosure, the
Court concluded, from some of the legislative history of FOIA, that §552(b)(5)
incorporated a qualified privilege for confidential commercial information, “at least to the
extent that this information is generated by the Government itself in the process leading
3 This condition is important to note.  SG §10-617(d) requires a custodian to deny
inspection of any part of a public record that contains confidential commercial or
financial information that was obtained from another person or governmental unit.  The
University does not contend that the information at issue here is of that character and does
not assert a §10-617(d) privilege.
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up to awarding a contract.”  Id. at 360, 99 S. Ct. at 2812, 61 L. Ed.2d at 603.  (Emphasis
added).3  The Court held that the Directives were confidential and commercial in nature
and that, in a broad way, they were relevant to the process for awarding contracts – the
purchase of Government securities in the open market.  Still, the Court noted that the
privilege for such information was not complete, even under the civil discovery rules, and
it approved an exemption under §552(b)(5), for the limited period of 45 days, only to the
extent that the Directives “contain sensitive information not otherwise available, and if
immediate release of these Directives would significantly harm the Government’s
monetary functions or commercial interests.”  Id. at 363, 99 S. Ct. at 2813, 61 L. Ed.2d at
605.  The case was remanded for the trial court to make those determinations.
In conformance with Merrill, the lower Federal courts have shielded, on a
temporary basis, such information as a real estate appraisal obtained by a Federal agency
to assist in determining the price to be asked for surplus property (Government Land Bank
v. General Services Admin., 671 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1982)), data used by the Army in
preparing an in-house bid in competition with bids from private contractors and that, if
released prior to the opening of all bids, would allow other bidders to anticipate the
Army’s bid (Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Dept. of the Army of U.S., 595 F. Supp. 352
-22-
(D.D.C. 1984), aff’d., 762 F.2d 138 (D.C.Cir. 1985)), and conceptual design reports
prepared in order to fix the scope and estimate the cost of projects which, if released
prematurely, could be detrimental to the process for selecting architects and engineers for
the project (Hack v. Department of Energy, 538 F. Supp. 1098 (D.D.C. 1982)).
We agree with the University that the limited and time-sensitive exemption for
confidential commercial or financial information that has been read into FOIA,
§552(b)(5), is part of SG §10-618(b) as well.  That kind of information may be shielded
from discovery by a protective order under Maryland Rule 2-403, as it is under F.R. Civ.
Proc. 26(c).  That does not avail the University in this case, however, for two reasons.
For one thing, the University does not assert a time-limited privilege, as was recognized
in the Federal cases, but seems to assert that the number in question may never be
revealed.  That extends well beyond what the Federal courts have allowed under
§552(b)(5).  More important, for the reasons discussed with respect to the deliberative
process privilege, we fail to see how the number would disclose any time-sensitive
confidential commercial information.  As we have indicated, it is an aggregate number
that does not reveal Mr. Mitchell’s, or anyone else’s, views as to the validity or value of
claims or the future status of the project.
Conclusion
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For the reasons stated, we shall affirm the Circuit Court judgment with respect to
redacted information other than the number for forecasted total cost of the Stamp project.
As to that number, as it appears on the requested records, we shall reverse the judgment
and remand for entry of an order directing the University and the custodians of the
records to permit inspection of that information and for such ancillary relief as may be
appropriate.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART;
CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEES.