Title: Ives v. Kansas Turnpike Authority

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

184 Kan. 134 (1959)
334 P.2d 399
NELSON IVES and ROBERT IVES, Appellees,
v.
KANSAS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant.
No. 41,178

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 24, 1959.
Ernest J. Rice, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Robert M. Cowger, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Philip H. Lewis, of Topeka, argued the cause, and T.M. Lillard, O.B. Eidson, James W. Porter and Charles S. Fisher, Jr., all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
*136 The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
Two tracts of land  one of 80 acres and the other of 160 acres  lying one mile apart, were owned by the same person. The Kansas Turnpike Authority took, by condemnation, some 45 acres from the 80-acre tract. None was taken from the 160-acre tract. An award was made solely with reference to the 80-acre tract. The owner, and his son, who operated both tracts, appealed from the award, contending that as the two tracts were, and had been, operated as a single farm unit, the assessment of damages should be based upon the entire unit rather than limited to the 80-acre tract from which the actual taking was had.
By agreement of the parties, and under the authority of G.S. 1949, 60-2704 and 60-2902, the court, in advance of trial as to the amount of damages, proceeded to determine the question:
There is no dispute as to the facts, most of which were stipulated. Included in the "basic stipulation" is the statement that for more than seventeen years the two tracts in question had been farmed as "one 240 acre farm unit." At the conclusion of the hearing the court held:
The Kansas Turnpike Authority has appealed, and the sole question is whether two physically separated tracts of land, owned by the same person, and operated as a single farm unit, may be joined for the purpose of assessing damages in condemnation when the *137 actual taking is from only one tract. In other words  is the award to be limited to the tract from which the actual taking was had  or is it to be based upon damage to the two tracts considered as a single unit?
Despite the stipulation of the parties that for more than seventeen years the two tracts had been operated as one 240-acre farm unit, it is felt that in order to convey the full picture of this matter the facts should be set out in some detail. As there is no dispute concerning them, we quote from the "factual analysis" contained in the brief of the landowner and his son who operated the farm:
In the contract, the landowner agreed to:
1. Farm all terraced land on the contour.
c. Cash crops for sale.
For convenience, appellee landowner, and his son who operated the farm, will be referred to as plaintiffs, and the Kansas Turnpike Authority as defendant.
In this appeal we are not concerned with the amount of damages to be awarded. That question has not been tried out in the court below. The only question presented is, as previously stated, whether, for the purpose of assessing damages, the award is to be limited to the 80-acre tract from which the actual taking was had, or is to be based upon damage to the two tracts considered as a single farm unit.
Defendant concedes that where two tracts under the same ownership are actually contiguous, or are contiguous "but for" a public road, railroad or stream, and are used and operated as a unit, it is proper to assess damage based on both tracts as a unit, but contends that where, as here, the tracts are physically separated (by one mile) they cannot be considered together for the assessment *140 of damage where a part of only one of such tracts is taken. It is further contended that if the trial court's ruling is correct, then the distance separating tracts would be immaterial, and that the owner of a Texas ranch, for example, would be permitted to join, for the purpose of assessment of damages, his land in the Kansas flint-hills on which he summer-pastures his cattle, thus leading to an obviously absurd result.
Narrowed down, defendant's contention is that contiguity is essential, and that when two tracts under the same ownership are actually physically separated by whatever distance, and a portion of only one is taken, the award must be limited to that tract even though it is used and operated in connection with the other tract as a single unit, and in support thereof cites L.N. & S. Rly. Co. v. Wilkins, 45 Kan. 674, 26 Pac. 16, in which it was held:
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, while recognizing the soundness of the general principle that the taking of all or part of a particular tract does not entitle the owner to damages for other separate and independent tracts belonging to him, and that the law does not permit a landowner to inject farfetched and speculative claims of damages to independently used lands merely because a part or all of other independently used lands is taken, contend that where, as here, it is definitely established that the tracts are so integrated into one unitary operation that each tract is interdependent upon the other and that the taking from one of the integrated tracts definitely affects the other, speculation ceases to exist, and that under such circumstances refusal to permit consideration of the entire integrated unitary farm denies to the landowner the right to secure compensation for the damages done by such appropriation.
Textbook authorities and the decisions dealing with the question indicate that as a general proposition, ordinarily actual contiguity or physical connection of tracts is essential in order to create a "unit" as a basis of awarding damages where a part or all of only one of the tracts is taken  but it is not necessarily a conclusive test.
*141 In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, § 14.31 [1], pp. 432, 433, it is said:
In 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 140, pp. 982 and 983, appears the following:
In 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 270, pp. 910 and 911, it is said:
The annotation at 6 A.L.R.2d 1197, at p. 1225, while stating that where the lands of the condemnee are separated from one another by the land of another private owner there is great difficulty in supporting a claim that one of the tracts is remaining land in relation to a location upon one of the others even though the tracts *142 are used for a common agricultural purpose, nevertheless recognizes that the rule is not absolute.
We mention but a few of the decisions from other jurisdictions which are cited in the above authorities:
In Morris v. Commonwealth, Appellant, 367 Pa. 410, 80 A.2d 762 (1951), it was held:
And in the course of the opinion it was said:
In Essex Stor. Elec. Co., Inc. v. Victory Lumb. Co., 93 Vt. 437, 108 A. 426, it was said:
In United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550 (Tenth Circuit) (1953), it was said:
From the foregoing authorities and the numerous decisions cited therein, the following rules appear to be well established:
Ordinarily, and as a general proposition, actual contiguity or physical connection of tracts is essential in order to create a unit as a basis of awarding damages in condemnation where a part or all of only one of the tracts is taken.
Actual contiguity or physical connection, however, is not a conclusive test. While actual contiguity or, if physically separated, the distance between the tracts, is an important element to be considered on the question of unity of use, nevertheless, in many instances, depending upon the facts of the particular case, integrated use becomes the test whether two or more tracts are to be considered as a unit. In other words, separation of the tracts is an evidentiary fact bearing upon, but not necessarily determinative of, the ultimate issue.
Where two or more tracts of and in proximity and under the same ownership are not contiguous or physically connected, even though separated by privately-owned land of another, they may be considered as a unit for the purpose of assessment of damages despite the taking is from only one of the tracts, provided the use to which they are applied is so inseparably connected that the taking from one necessarily and in fact injures the other.
The question of unity of use of two or more tracts is a question of fact to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and is not to be based upon fanciful claims, speculation or conjecture, and in such cases the burden of proof is upon the landowner to prove his claim.
Application of these rules to the situation before us makes it clear the trial court was correct in ruling that the fact the two tracts were not contiguous does not, as a matter of law, prevent the entire farm unit of 240 acres from being considered in the assessment of *144 damages. The facts have been set out and will not be repeated. They are undisputed and speak for themselves. To hold otherwise would, under the facts of this case, deny to the landowner his right to be compensated for damage done by the appropriation, and we believe the rule is founded on logic and common everyday justice. Our decision in this matter, however, is by no means to be construed as "opening the doors" to farfetched and unfounded claims on the part of condemnees in all cases where they happen to own other nearby tracts which it may be said are incidentally or remotely affected by the taking  rather it is confined to the facts before us which conclusively establish the integrated use of the two tracts to be such that in the eyes of the law they are considered as "one 240-acre "farm unit" for the purpose of assessment of damages.
With respect to the Wilkins case, mentioned earlier in this opinion, and on which defendant places reliance, it is conceded that the use of the word "contiguous" in the quoted paragraph of the syllabus lends support to its contention. On the other hand, what is said in an opinion or the syllabus thereof always is to be read and interpreted in the light of the facts and questions involved in the case. (Steck v. City of Wichita, 182 Kan. 206, 209, 319 P.2d 852.) In McIntyre v. Board of County Comm'rs of Doniphan County, 168 Kan. 115, 211 P.2d 59, where it was held that tracts owned by different persons cannot be considered as a whole where it is claimed that one is incidentally injured by the taking of the other for a public use, it was said (p. 119) that close analysis of the Wilkins case indicates that the court merely decided that a cause of action for injuries to land owned by one party could not be joined with an action for injuries to land owned by him and another jointly.
Be that as it may, the Wilkins case was decided in 1891, and the condemnation in the case before us was in 1955. Courts take judicial notice of the fact that in the intervening sixty-four years revolutionary changes in the economics and practices of farming have taken place. If the Wilkins case be construed as authority for the proposition that contiguity of tracts is essential in every case where the question now before us is involved  we are of the opinion that it is outmoded and not in harmony with the modern rule, and to that extent is hereby disapproved and overruled.
The judgment of the trial court was correct and is affirmed.