Title: Matthews v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-9 
____________ 
 
DOUGLAS BLAINE MATTHEWS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
December 12, 2019 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Douglas Blaine Matthews appeals the denial of the guilt phase claims in his 
initial postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.1  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
denial of Matthews’ guilt phase claims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Matthews was convicted of the first-degree premeditated and felony murder 
of Kirk Zoeller, manslaughter of Donna Trujillo, and burglary while armed.  
                                          
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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Matthews v. State, 124 So. 3d 811, 814 (Fla. 2013).  We set forth the following 
facts on direct appeal: 
On the evening of February 20, 2008, Daytona Beach Police 
Department officers responded to a call that a man was outside an 
apartment building asking for help.  When they arrived on the scene, 
officers discovered Kirk Zoeller sitting in front of an open apartment 
door, nonresponsive, covered in blood, and gasping for air with blood 
pulsing from his neck.  The officers entered the apartment and found 
blood covering the floor and walls.  While clearing the apartment, 
officers discovered Donna Trujillo’s body on the bed in the bedroom.  
The officer who found Trujillo testified that she could not see her 
body from the main room of the apartment, which consisted of an 
open kitchen and living room, and that she stood in the bedroom 
doorway for 10 to 15 seconds before noticing the body because most 
of it was covered with a pillow.  Zoeller and Trujillo were pronounced 
dead at the scene.  According to the medical examiner, both victims 
had been stabbed to death. 
Later that evening, acting on a tip, officers went to the home of 
Theresa Teague.  Teague allowed the officers into her home and 
consented to a search.  Inside, officers saw bloody sneakers and jeans 
in plain view on the floor and found Matthews, dressed only in boxers 
and socks, hiding under a pile of clothes in the bedroom.  Officers 
obtained and executed a search warrant for Teague’s home and found 
a bloody shirt in a clear plastic bag and Kirk Zoeller’s wallet together 
inside a different bag. 
Matthews made a statement to police detectives outside of 
Teague’s house, which Matthews’ trial counsel admitted into evidence 
at trial.  Matthews told detectives that Kirk Zoeller killed Donna 
Trujillo and attacked him over drugs.  Once detectives informed 
Matthews that Zoeller was dead, Matthews stated that he killed 
Zoeller in self-defense. 
Matthews was indicted for the first-degree premeditated and 
felony murders of Kirk Zoeller and Donna Trujillo and for burglary 
while armed. 
During the guilt phase, Justin Wagner, who sold drugs from and 
was present in Trujillo’s apartment when she and Kirk Zoeller were 
killed, testified.  Wagner explained that Matthews, Zoeller, and 
Trujillo went into the bedroom of Trujillo’s apartment together.  A 
 
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few minutes later, Wagner said that he heard everyone “freaking out” 
and screaming and saw Matthews chase Zoeller out of the bedroom 
with a knife.  Wagner testified that Matthews was clearly the 
aggressor.  Before Wagner fled the apartment in fear for his life, he 
testified that he saw Matthews on top of Zoeller, repeatedly stabbing 
Zoeller and pulling him back as Zoeller, who was begging for help, 
tried to flee the apartment.  Wagner also testified that he saw 
Matthews with a big buck knife on the day Zoeller and Trujillo were 
killed and that they had used Matthews’ knife to cut crack cocaine 
together earlier that day.  Wagner further testified that, after 
witnessing Matthews attack Zoeller, he fled to Theresa Teague’s 
home but hid outside when he heard Matthews arrive.  While hiding, 
Wagner said he saw Matthews remove his shirt and put it in a clear 
plastic bag outside of Teague’s house. 
Theresa Teague also testified to incriminating statements that 
Matthews made to her on the night Kirk Zoeller and Donna Trujillo 
were killed.  Teague said that, before the police arrived at her home 
looking for Matthews, she and Matthews went outside after they saw 
police and helicopter search lights and Matthews said, “That’s for 
me.”  When Teague pressed him for details, she said that Matthews 
told her that he “ran into a couple of people that probably wish they 
had not run into him that evening” and that he “just eliminated a 
couple of problems.”  In addition, Teague testified that she had given 
Matthews a knife about nine to twelve inches long days before Zoeller 
and Trujillo were killed. 
The crime scene investigator testified that he collected the 
bloody sneakers, bloody jeans, bloody shirt, and Kirk Zoeller’s wallet 
from Theresa Teague’s home and that he found a traffic citation with 
Matthews’ name on it inside the pocket of the jeans.  He also testified 
that he took pictures of Matthews the day of his arrest and that 
Matthews did not have any knife cuts or fresh injuries on his body. 
Testimony linked the bloody clothes and shoes to Matthews.  
The DNA analyst testified that “wearer” DNA on the bloody shirt and 
sneakers matched Matthews’ DNA and that the blood on the shirt, 
jeans, and sneakers matched Kirk Zoeller’s.  She also testified that 
swabs from four of Matthews’ fingers revealed blood that matched 
Zoeller’s and that one of the swabs also contained blood that was a 
possible match to Donna Trujillo’s.  The police officer who issued the 
traffic citation found in the pocket of the bloody jeans identified 
Matthews as the person to whom he had issued the citation. 
 
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The medical examiner testified that Kirk Zoeller had been 
stabbed to death and that he had 24 stab wounds to the head, neck, 
chest, and back and two defensive wounds on his forearms.  She 
testified that Zoeller’s stab wounds were up to six inches deep and 
that one wound was inflicted with such force that the tip of the knife 
broke off in his skull.  The medical examiner also testified that Donna 
Trujillo had been similarly stabbed to death and that she had 11 stab 
wounds to the head, neck, and chest.  The medical examiner testified 
that, in her experience, it was unusual for stabbing victims to have 
stab wounds to their heads.  She also testified that both victims would 
have felt pain as they were being stabbed and would have remained 
conscious for a period of minutes before passing out due to blood loss 
and then would have remained alive for an additional period of 
minutes before their deaths. 
Matthews testified that he acted in self-defense.  He admitted to 
doing drugs on the day Donna Trujillo and Kirk Zoeller were killed 
and stated that he went to Trujillo’s apartment with Justin Wagner to 
trade cocaine for morphine pills.  However, Matthews testified that 
Zoeller and Trujillo were arguing and went into the bedroom together 
while he stayed in the living area of the apartment’s main room with 
Wagner.  Matthews said it then got quiet and Zoeller came out of the 
bedroom into the main room of the apartment and started a fight with 
him over drugs.  Matthews denied having a knife and denied that 
Theresa Teague ever gave him a knife.  Matthews testified that 
Zoeller had the knife and that he took it away from Zoeller while they 
were fighting.  At some point during their fight, Matthews said that he 
pinned Zoeller against the wall and saw Donna Trujillo’s body on the 
bed.  At that point, Matthews testified that he became afraid for his 
life because he saw what Kirk Zoeller did to Donna Trujillo.  Then, 
Matthews testified that Zoeller kicked him and he “blacked out,” 
“snapped,” and started swinging at, but not stabbing, Zoeller.  
Matthews also claimed that several of the photographs in evidence 
taken by the crime scene investigator showed injuries he suffered 
during his fight with Zoeller, including a cut on his abdomen. 
In addition, Matthews testified that he dropped the knife inside 
the front door of Donna Trujillo’s apartment and fled to Theresa 
Teague’s home, where he washed the blood off of his body in her 
bathroom.  On cross-examination, Matthews acknowledged that he 
failed to include in his statement to detectives that he was injured 
during his fight with Kirk Zoeller and that he had “blacked out.”  But 
 
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he denied taking Kirk Zoeller’s wallet and testified that he did not 
know how his bloody shirt ended up in a bag with Zoeller’s wallet 
inside Teague’s home.  Matthews also admitted to removing his 
clothes, hiding from police, and telling Teague that the police and 
helicopter lights were for him.  However, he denied that he made the 
statements to Teague about “run[ning] into a couple of people” and 
“eliminat[ing] a couple of problems.” 
 
Id. at 812-14 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).   
“The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 10–2, and a Spencer2 
hearing was held.”  Id. at 815.  The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation.  
Id.  On direct appeal, we affirmed Matthews’ conviction for first-degree murder 
and death sentence.  Id. at 812.3  Matthews’ death sentence became final in 2013.  
Matthews v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013). 
 
Matthews filed an initial motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Matthews amended his postconviction motion 
                                          
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
3.  Matthews raised the following issues on direct appeal: whether the death 
qualification of his jury violated his constitutional rights because the death penalty 
cannot lawfully be imposed in his case under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), as the statutory aggravating circumstances authorizing imposition of the 
death penalty were not alleged in the indictment and determined by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt; whether Florida’s death penalty statute and procedure 
are unconstitutional under Ring; and whether the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC) and in the course of a felony aggravators and jury instructions are 
constitutional.  Matthews, 124 So. 3d at 816. 
 
 
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several times, including once to add a claim pursuant to Hurst.4  After holding two 
evidentiary hearings on certain claims and summarily denying other claims, the 
postconviction court granted Matthews a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst, but 
denied relief as to his guilt phase claims. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Matthews now appeals the denial of relief as to his guilt phase claims, 
arguing that the postconviction court erred in denying nine claims in his initial 
postconviction motion,5 including (A) a claim alleging newly discovered evidence, 
(B) six claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, (C) a claim alleging 
cumulative error, and (D) a claim alleging that he may be incompetent at the time 
of execution.  We address each claim in turn. 
A. 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
Matthews first argues the postconviction court erred when it denied his 
newly discovered evidence claim relating to fingerprint evidence.  Specifically, 
fingerprint testing was conducted during postconviction, and two latent prints were 
                                          
 
4.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 
(Fla. 2016). 
 
5.  In a footnote in its answer brief, the State questions whether this Court 
has jurisdiction over an appeal of the order granting in part and denying in part 
postconviction relief because the State did not appeal the granting of a new penalty 
phase.  However, this Court rejected this argument in Merck v. State, 260 So. 3d 
184, 188 n.1 (Fla. 2018) (“[T]he pending resentencing does not affect our 
exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal.”). 
 
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developed from the Post-It note found inside the victim Kirk Zoeller’s wallet, and 
the prints belonged to Justin Wagner, the sole eyewitness to the crime.  Matthews 
argues that this fingerprint evidence impeaches Wagner’s trial testimony and 
undermines that State’s theory of the case.  However, we affirm the denial of this 
claim. 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  First, the 
evidence “must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel 
at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or his counsel could not 
have known [of it] by the use of diligence.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994)).  “Second, the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial.”  Id. 
Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it 
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 
1996)).  In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the 
postconviction court must “consider all newly discovered evidence which would 
be admissible” and must “evaluate the ‘weight of both the newly discovered 
 
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evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.’ ”  Id. at 521 (quoting 
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991)).  This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
The State does not dispute that the fingerprint evidence is newly discovered 
evidence within the meaning of the first prong of the Jones test.  Therefore, the 
question is whether this evidence satisfies the second prong.  Because the 
fingerprint evidence would probably not produce an acquittal on retrial as it does 
not weaken the case so as to give rise to reasonable doubt regarding his culpability, 
the second prong of the Jones test is not satisfied.   
First, the fingerprint evidence does not undermine the fact that the wallet 
was never found to be in Wagner’s actual or constructive possession at any time.  
Specifically, “Zoeller’s wallet was found in a bag with Matthews’ bloody shirt 
inside of [Theresa] Teague’s home.”  Matthews, 124 So. 3d at 817.  Second, at the 
evidentiary hearing, Wagner provided a plausible explanation as to why his 
fingerprints were on the Post-It note, including that Zoeller handed it to him to 
write down a phone number or possibly to put drugs on it.  Third, when the newly 
discovered fingerprint evidence is considered cumulatively with all of the evidence 
 
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presented at trial, it does not so weaken the State’s case against Matthews as to 
give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.  Specifically, it does not 
weaken the following evidence presented at trial: (1) Matthews’ statement to the 
police that he killed Zoeller in self-defense; (2) Matthews’ statement to Teague 
that he “ran into a couple of people that probably wish they had not run into him 
that evening” and that he “just eliminated a couple of problems;” (3) the testimony 
of Teague that she gave Matthews a knife days before the murder; (4) the 
testimony of the medical examiner that Zoeller had been stabbed 24 times and that 
Zoeller had defensive wounds on his forearms; (5) the police found Matthews 
hiding under a pile of clothes in the bedroom of Teague’s home; (6) DNA testing 
results linked the bloody shirt and shoes to Matthews and indicated that the blood 
on Matthews’ shirt, shoes, and jeans matched Zoeller’s; and (7) the testimony of 
the DNA analyst that swabs from four of Matthews’ fingers taken hours after the 
murder revealed blood that matched Zoeller’s.  Matthews, 124 So. 3d at 812-14, 
817.  Accordingly, it is not probable that the fingerprint evidence would produce 
an acquittal on retrial.  See Rivera v. State, 187 So. 3d 822, 841 (Fla. 2015) 
(concluding that in light of the evidence presented at trial, “the newly discovered 
DNA evidence is not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal 
on retrial”); Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 801 (Fla. 2007) (concluding that in 
light of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt presented at trial, “the newly 
 
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discovered DNA evidence . . . would probably not produce an acquittal on retrial”).  
Therefore, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Matthews next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed in accordance with Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  To be entitled to relief, the defendant must 
establish the following two prongs, deficient performance and prejudice: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
To establish the Strickland deficiency prong, “the performance inquiry must 
be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances” 
under “prevailing professional norms.”  Id. at 688.  The defendant “must identify 
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of 
reasonable professional judgment.”  Id. at 690.  There is a strong presumption that 
counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  See id.  “A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
 
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hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  
Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
The Strickland prejudice prong requires the defendant to show that “there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different,” where “[a] reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694. 
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Matthews’ six ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims as set forth below. 
1. Fingerprint Expert 
 
Matthews argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult 
with or hire a fingerprint expert in order to examine physical evidence submitted to 
the jury and present evidence that corroborated Matthews’ version of events at 
trial.  However, we disagree. 
First, Matthews failed to demonstrate deficiency.  At the evidentiary hearing, 
trial counsel testified that the blood evidence supported Matthews’ proposition, so 
there was no need to conduct any forensic investigation.  Trial counsel also 
testified that Matthews admitted to killing Kirk Zoeller, so there was not a question 
 
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regarding who did it.  Trial counsel further testified that based on Matthews 
admitting to killing Kirk Zoeller in self-defense, there would be no need for a 
fingerprint expert.  Further, trial counsel testified he did not need a fingerprint 
expert because Matthews never stated that Justin Wagner killed or assisted in 
killing anyone.  Matthews did not establish that trial counsels’ strategic reasons to 
not to hire a fingerprint expert were deficient.  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 
1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses of conduct have been considered and 
rejected and counsels’ decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.”). 
Second, Matthews failed to demonstrate prejudice.  He failed to demonstrate 
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different but for trial counsel’s failure to hire a fingerprint expert.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the claim. 
2. Crime Scene Expert and Forensic Expert 
Next, Matthews argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct 
a reasonable investigation and failing to hire a crime scene expert and a medical 
examiner. 
An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851 motion whenever the 
movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination.  See 
 
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Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 
491 n.2 (Fla. 2000).  A court may summarily deny a postconviction claim when the 
claim is legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or refuted by the record.  See 
Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla. 2008).  “A summary or conclusory 
allegation is insufficient to allow the trial court to examine the specific allegations 
against the record.”  Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998). 
First, Matthews’ claim is facially insufficient.  The record reflects that the 
postconviction court entered an order regarding Matthews’ first amended 3.851 
motion finding as follows, “Defendant’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to consult with a crime scene expert and an independent forensic 
medical examiner were insufficiently pled and are summarily denied without leave 
to amend.”  The record also reflects that in a Motion for Rehearing on Order 
Denying Evidentiary Hearing on Claim IC (ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for failure to consult a crime scene expert and forensic examiner), Matthews 
attached the affidavits of Dr. Daniel Spitz and Barie Goetz setting forth what 
testimony the experts would have provided at the evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, 
it appears that it was not until after the postconviction court summarily denied the 
claim that Matthews provided the affidavits.  See Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 
821 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]hen a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to call specific witnesses, a defendant is ‘required to allege what testimony 
 
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defense counsel could have elicited from witnesses and how defense counsel’s 
failure to call, interview, or present the witnesses who would have testified 
prejudiced the case.’ ” (quoting Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004))). 
Second, this claim is facially insufficient because Matthews’ postconviction 
motion did not allege prejudice.  See Ragsdale, 720 So. 2d at 207 (“A hearing is 
warranted on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only where a defendant 
alleges specific facts, not conclusively refuted by the record, which demonstrate a 
deficiency in the performance that prejudiced the defendant.”).  Matthews did not 
explain how there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. 
Further, as to the crime scene photographs and the purported testimony of 
Barie Goetz regarding the crime scene photographs not showing evidence of a 
struggle in the bedroom, this testimony would have been cumulative to the 
photographs themselves and to the testimony of Detective Robert Kay.  
Specifically, at trial, Detective Kay testified that there was really no blood spatter 
on the floor and nothing on the walls of the bedroom.  Failing to present 
cumulative evidence—even by mere omission rather than decision—does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Beasley v. State, 18 So. 3d 473, 
484 (Fla. 2009) (citing Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 378 (Fla. 2007)). 
 
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As to the purported testimony of Goetz regarding whether Matthews could 
see into the bedroom where Donna Trujillo’s body was found from where 
Matthews struggled with Zoeller before killing him, and as to the purported 
testimony of Dr. Daniel Spitz, who would have testified that while the wounds 
might indicate a similar weapon was used on both victims, the wound patterns did 
not indicate who the perpetrator was and whether the victims were definitively 
killed by the same person, neither witness’s testimony would have done anything 
to undermine the State’s theory or otherwise support Matthews’ self-defense claim.  
This is particularly true in light of Matthews’ admission to being Zoeller’s killer, 
combined with testimony of Teague regarding the incriminating statements made 
by Matthews that he “ran into a couple of people that probably wish they had not 
run into him that evening” and that he “just eliminated a couple of problems,” as 
well as the testimony of the medical examiner who established that Kirk Zoeller 
was violently stabbed 24 times, including multiple stabs in the back.  See 
Matthews, 124 So. 3d at 813-14. 
Moreover, although no evidentiary hearing was granted as to this claim, at 
the evidentiary hearing, one of Matthews’ trial counsel, Michael Nielsen, testified 
regarding why he did not hire a crime scene expert, stating that he felt it was not 
needed based on the photographs, DNA, physical evidence, testimony of the 
witnesses, and Matthews’ version of events.  We have consistently held that a trial 
 
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counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be reasonable 
trial strategy.  See Bowles v. State, 979 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2008) (holding that 
counsel’s failure to call clinical psychologist to provide emotional disturbance 
mitigation was reasonable trial strategy); Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 39 (Fla. 
2005) (holding that trial counsel’s failure to call defendant’s family members as 
witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective 
assistance of counsel).  Further, trial counsel’s “strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048.  We have also concluded 
that trial counsel’s strategy of relying on evidence elicited through the cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses—in lieu of calling additional witnesses—was 
sound trial strategy.  See id.; see also Belcher v. State, 961 So. 2d 239, 250 (Fla. 
2007) (explaining that it is not necessary for defense counsel to retain a defense 
expert “where defense counsel cross-examined the State’s experts to establish the 
facts necessary for the defense”).  Therefore, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of this claim. 
3. Cross-Examination of the State’s Witnesses 
 
Matthews further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
cross-examine the State’s witnesses, specifically Wagner and Officer Penny Dane.  
 
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The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged 
failure to cross-examine Wagner but summarily denied this claim as to Officer 
Dane.  
As to Justin Wagner, Matthews argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately cross-examine Wagner and confront him on his inconsistent 
statements to the police.  However, Matthews has failed to demonstrate deficiency.  
Both the State and defense trial counsel elicited the fact that Wagner had two 
shoplifting convictions.  Defense trial counsel established during cross-
examination that Wagner had done things in the past that he was “not really proud 
of.”  The State and defense trial counsel also established that Wagner was a drug 
dealer and a drug user at the time he witnessed the murder.  Also conclusively 
refuted by the record is Matthews’ claim that his trial counsel did not confront 
Wagner on his inconsistent statements.  During cross-examination, Wagner 
explained to trial defense counsel that he initially lied to the police because he was 
“scared,” “wanted nothing to do with [the situation,]” and was in possession of 
morphine at the time.  The State also confronted Wagner about his inconsistent 
statements specific to lying to the police, and defense counsel impeached Wagner 
regarding his prior statement that Zoeller fell in his lap.  Further, trial counsel’s 
cross-examination elicited impeachment evidence regarding the fact that Wagner 
received help from the State Attorney’s Office with changing one of his court 
 
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dates.  Trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to do what the record 
demonstrates they did. 
Additionally, Matthews did not demonstrate prejudice, as “[n]o prejudice 
result[s] from counsel’s failure to present cumulative evidence of inconsistent 
statements.”  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1104 (Fla. 2008) (holding that 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach with one statement because 
counsel impeached witness with many other inconsistent statements).  Any 
additional impeachment of Wagner would have been cumulative, and failing to 
present cumulative evidence is not ineffective assistance of counsel.  Valle v. State, 
705 So. 2d 1331, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 
545-46 (Fla. 1990).  Moreover, Matthews did not establish that, but for trial 
counsel’s failure to more adequately cross-examine Wagner, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Second, as to Officer Dane, Matthews argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and properly impeach Officer Dane who 
testified that, based on her observations, it was impossible for Matthews to have 
seen the body of Trujillo lying on the bed from where Matthews struggled with 
Zoeller.  Matthews further asserts that a crime scene photograph proves he could 
have seen Trujillo and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use that 
photograph to cross-examine Officer Dane.  However, this claim is facially 
 
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insufficient because Matthews’ postconviction motion did not allege prejudice.  
See Ragsdale, 720 So. 2d at 207 (“A hearing is warranted on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim only where a defendant alleges specific facts, not 
conclusively rebutted by the record, which demonstrate a deficiency in the 
performance that prejudiced the defendant.”).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief as to both claims. 
4. Failure to Investigate Matthews’ Mental Health and Mental State 
 
Matthews also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and assess Matthews’ mental health and mental state at the time of the 
crime to further support trial counsel’s theory of the case in the guilt phase. 
Matthews’ postconviction motion failed to allege prejudice; therefore, this 
claim is facially insufficient.  See Ragsdale, 720 So. 2d at 207 (“A hearing is 
warranted on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only where a defendant 
alleges specific facts, not conclusively rebutted by the record, which demonstrate a 
deficiency in the performance that prejudiced the defendant.”).  Matthews’ 
postconviction motion generally alleged that “[t]rial counsel’s failure prejudiced 
Mr. Matthews by depriving him of evidence that would have created reasonable 
doubt and corroborated his claims of self-defense.”  However, Matthews failed to 
provide any additional facts or support for this conclusory statement.  As we have 
explained, “bare conclusory allegations” are insufficient to establish entitlement to 
 
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an evidentiary hearing.  See Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 483 (Fla. 2011) 
(“Because Johnston presented only bare conclusory allegations on these several 
issues, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claims.”). 
Moreover, to the extent Matthews is raising an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for trial counsel’s failure to raise the defense of diminished capacity 
during the guilt phase, this claim is without merit.  We have repeatedly rejected 
similar claims.  See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006) (“[D]efense 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to present the defense of diminished capacity 
because diminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida.”); Hodges v. State, 
885 So. 2d 338, 352 n.8 (Fla. 2004) (“This Court has held on numerous occasions 
that evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is 
inadmissible to negate specific intent.”); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 63 (Fla. 
2003) (holding that evidence of defendant’s dissociative state would not have been 
admissible during the guilt phase).  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s summary denial of this claim. 
5. Juror Bias Regarding Race and Drugs 
 
Next, Matthews alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate potential jurors’ sentiments and biases regarding race and drugs.  
However, Matthews has failed to demonstrate a basis for relief.  
 
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First, with regard to race, the record reflects that trial counsel Nielsen asked 
the following during voir dire: 
Now, this is a little bit of a hot-button issue, but it’s out there, and I’m 
just going to have to address it.  There’s no way around it.  Okay?  
And it’s the issue of race.  All right?  My client is – I guess you’d 
refer as mixed race.  His mother is Caucasian and his father is 
African-American, just like President Obama.  All right?  Now, the 
female, Ms. Trujillo, is Caucasian, as well as Mr. Zoeller.  And, of 
course, you know, it’s 2010, our president is African-American.  And 
so my question is this: Is there anyone here that would potentially 
have a problem with the dynamics of the races of the parties that 
we’re talking about?  And if you do, you’ve just kind of got to let me 
know.  So does anyone – is that going to be a concern for anyone?  
Okay.  Anyone here ever been involved in some aspect of their life 
where race did kind of play an issue one way or the other?  Anyone 
ever have anything like that?  Okay.  I’m not seeing any yeses.  All 
right.  Thank you. 
 
Therefore, the record refutes Matthews’ claim that trial counsel failed to inquire as 
to race, and trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to do something 
they did.  Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Nielsen testified, “I 
just don’t think race was involved in this drug transaction.  I don’t think it had 
anything to do with it . . . just because you have a, quote, ‘Caucasian victim and a 
mixed race defendant’ does not mean that race is involved in the case.”  Further, 
Nielsen testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not aware of anything in 
this case that made the crime “racially motivated,” and his decision not to inquire 
further was a reasonable, strategic one.  See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 
(“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
 
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alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”). 
Next, with regard to drugs, a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must establish that the juror “was actually biased against the defendant,” such that 
they had a “bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror.”  
Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323-24 (Fla. 2007).  “[P]rejudice can be shown 
only where one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror.”  Id. 
at 324.  Matthews fails to identify, in anything other than a conclusory way, any 
legitimate juror bias that existed against him.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
6. Failure to Preserve Denial of Cause Challenge 
Next, Matthews argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly preserve for appeal the denial of trial counsel’s cause challenge to a juror 
who expressed ambivalence during voir dire regarding Matthews’ right to remain 
silent, stating, “I think I would be bothered by not hearing from the defendant.”  
When asked whether it could potentially affect her verdict, she responded, “It 
could.  I know it would always be in the back of my mind.”  However, a valid 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise or preserve a for-cause 
challenge against a juror must establish that the juror “was actually biased against 
the defendant,” such that they had a “bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an 
 
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impartial juror.”  Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 323-24.  “[P]rejudice can be shown only 
where one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror.”  Id. at 
324.  The record reflects that Matthews testified at trial; therefore, the record 
refutes any claim that the juror was biased by Matthews exercising the right to 
remain silent.  Therefore, Matthews cannot demonstrate prejudice. 
Moreover, as the postconviction court concluded, the record reflects that the 
juror was sufficiently rehabilitated.  Specifically, trial counsel for the State asked 
the following regarding the juror’s feelings on Matthews’ right to remain silent, 
“So you do feel you can separate that from your verdict,” and the juror replied, 
“Yes.”  The State also asked the juror whether she understood that she could not 
base her decision on Matthews refusing to testify, and the juror replied, “Uh-huh.”  
Therefore, since the juror was sufficiently rehabilitated, trial counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective or deficient for failing to preserve a meritless claim.  See 
Raleigh v. State, 932 So. 2d 1054, 1064 (Fla. 2006) (“[D]efense counsel cannot be 
deemed deficient for failing to make a meritless objection.”). 
Additionally, Matthews argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to peremptorily challenge another juror who maintained that she would hear all the 
evidence first before she made up her mind regarding the death penalty.  The 
record also reflects that this juror stated that her niece’s murder would not affect 
her ability to serve as a juror.  However, Matthews’ postconviction motion failed to 
 
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identify, in anything other than a conclusory way, any actual juror bias that existed 
against him regarding this juror.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of the claim. 
C. 
Cumulative Error 
Matthews argues cumulative error.  As discussed above, we conclude that 
the alleged individual errors are without merit.  “[W]here the individual claims of 
error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of 
cumulative error also necessarily fails.”  Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 
2008) (quoting Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)).  Thus, we affirm 
the postconviction court’s denial of relief based on cumulative error. 
D. 
Incompetent at Time of Execution 
As his final claim, Matthews claims that his Eighth Amendment right 
against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be 
incompetent at the time of execution.  Matthews stipulates that this claim is 
premature; however, argues that it is necessary to raise it here to preserve the claim 
for federal review.  “We have repeatedly held that this claim may not be asserted 
until a death warrant has been issued.”  Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 918 (Fla. 
2013).  Therefore, because a death warrant has not been issued in this case, we 
conclude the claim was properly denied. 
 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
Matthews’ guilt phase claims.  
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, 
R. Michael Hutcheson, Judge - Case No. 642008CF030969XXXAES 
 
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa R. Fontán, Chelsea 
R. Shirley, and Kara Ottervanger, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M. Perry and 
Lisa-Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee