Title: Pekas v. Thompson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pekas v. Thompson1995 WY 161903 P.2d 532Case Number: 94-270Decided: 09/20/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Darold 
J. PEKAS and Katherine Splichal, 

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

Elizabeth 
Karen THOMPSON, Successor Trustee of the 

Elizabeth 
M. Rizzi Testamentary Trust, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Paul 
Thomas Glause, Rock Springs, for Appellants.

Richard 
Mathey of Reese & Mathey, Green River, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Donald J. Pekas 
and Katherine Splichal (appellants) appeal from a summary judgment awarding 
Elizabeth K. Thompson (appellee), successor trustee of the Elizabeth M. Rizzi 
Testamentary Trust, a forfeiture under a contract for deed. Appellants raise 
issues concerning the propriety of the summary judgment, the denial of a motion 
to amend the pleadings and the awarding of attorney fees.

[¶2]  We affirm the judgment but reverse and 
vacate the award of attorney fees for a failure of proof.

[¶3]      Appellants raise 
three issues:

1. 
Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Appellee and against Appellants?

2. 
Whether, because a trial was required, the Trial Court should have allowed the 
Appellants to amend their pleading to assert causes of action for declaratory 
judgment, interpleader, accounting of rents paid and for damages?

3. 
Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding the Appellees attorney 
fees in light of the applicable rule of law?

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1979, 
Elizabeth Rizzi (Rizzi) entered into an Agreement for Sale of Real Estate (the 
First Agreement) with Kennard, Carol and Terry Bigler (the Biglers) for property 
in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. The Biglers agreed to purchase the property in 
installments plus interest; and, in exchange, Rizzi agreed to place the deed in 
escrow to be delivered to the Biglers upon final payment. In addition to the 
installment payments, the agreement required the Biglers to pay all taxes and 
assessments.

[¶5]      In 1982, Rizzi 
died, leaving her interest in the property to John and Kathleen Rizzi (the 
Rizzis). The Biglers then sold their interest in the property to appellants. 
That deal was evidenced by a Real Estate Agreement (the Second Agreement) which 
was executed by the Biglers, appellants and the Rizzis in December of 1983. That 
agreement provided that it was to be "read in conjunction with the [First 
Agreement] which is attached hereto and made a part hereof." The Rizzis died in 
1992, and their interest then passed on to appellee, their daughter.

[¶6]      Regular payments 
were made by the appellants until 1988, and thereafter, only payments of 
interest were intermittently made. On August 17, 1992, appellee sent a notice of 
forfeiture to appellants. The notice advised appellants that no payments of 
interest or principle had been received for 1992 and that appellee had paid the 
1991 property taxes. The notice requested payment and that failure to cure would 
result in a forfeiture. The appellants paid interest through August 1992 and 
reimbursed appellee for the property taxes on August 20, 1992.

[¶7]      Then, on 
September 18, 1992, a second notice of forfeiture was sent to appellants 
demanding reimbursement for the 1989 property taxes which had been paid by John 
and Kathleen Rizzi. Appellants failed to make payment, and appellee filed an 
Affidavit of Default and Forfeiture in the Sweetwater county clerk's office on 
December 16, 1992.

[¶8]      Appellee assumed 
possession of the property late December 1992. On January 26, 1993, appellants 
filed a Petition for Ejectment and Delivery of Deed. Appellee counterclaimed to 
quiet title. Both sides filed briefs and affidavits in support of their 
positions; and on April 25, 1994, the district court judge awarded summary 
judgment to appellee, finding that appellants had forfeited their rights under 
the agreements, and awarded appellee attorney fees.

[¶9]      After the 
district court entered its order on May 20, 1994, appellants filed a Motion to 
Amend and Clarify Judgment, Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary 
Judgment, Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings to Assert Causes of Action for 
Declaratory Judgment, Interpleader, Accounting for Rents Paid and Damages, and 
Objection to Award of Attorney Fees (post-judgment motion). The district court 
denied all motions and assessed additional attorney fees against them. 
Appellants now appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. 
Summary Judgment

[¶10]   Appellants contend that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment for several reasons. First, 
appellants assert that appellee's parents, the Rizzis, "clearly and 
unequivocally" decided to add the unpaid 1989 property tax to the amount owed 
under the agreements rather than as a default, pursuant to the agreements. 
Second, appellants claim that appellee gave an improper notice of forfeiture by 
failing to mail the notice to appellant Splichal's known address and that the 
notice reduced the time allowed to cure in the agreements. Lastly, appellants 
argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because the agreements are 
ambiguous as to whether they create an installment contract or an equitable 
mortgage.

[¶11]   Appellants did not raise these 
arguments during the summary judgment proceeding. Instead, they were made for 
the first time in appellants' post-judgment motion. When we review a grant of 
summary judgment, the case is examined in the same manner as the trial court; 
and the motion is treated as if it were originally before us, using the 
identical materials and information presented to the trial court. Baldwin v. 
Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo. 1988). The rule is that a party on appeal "may 
only refer to the record as it existed at the time the trial court ruled, 
outline the arguments made at that time, and explain why the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment." Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers 
Elevator Co., 226 Ill. App.3d 507, 168 Ill.Dec. 634, 636, 589 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 
(1992); see also E.B. Smith Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 850 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App. 1993); Diamond v. Aronov, 621 So. 2d 263, 265 (Ala. 1993). 
Therefore, we would ordinarily decline to consider appellants' arguments which 
were raised after the trial court made its ruling on summary 
judgment.

[¶12]   However, even if we were to 
consider appellants' arguments on the merits, we would still conclude that 
summary judgment for appellee was appropriate. The record is devoid of any 
evidence that the Rizzis "clearly and unequivocally" added the 1989 property 
taxes to the amount owed rather than to treat the failure to pay as a default. 
The only evidence on the issue, the September 18, 1992 Notice of Forfeiture, 
demonstrates to the contrary. Also, it is clear that the Notice of Forfeiture 
complied with the terms of the agreements. The notice gave appellants more than 
the thirty days required by the agreements to cure, and it was mailed to the 
address specified in the Second Agreement. Under the terms of that agreement, 
appellants were required to notify appellee, in writing, of any address change; 
no such notice was recorded. Finally, appellants are judicially estopped from 
claiming that the agreements constitute anything but an installment contract 
since, in their Reply to Counterclaim and their Brief in Support of Petition for 
Ejectment and Delivery of Deed, appellants admitted that fact. Appellants cannot 
claim otherwise on appeal. Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 
(Wyo. 1991).

B. 
Motion to Amend Pleadings

[¶13]   Appellants contend that the trial 
court erred by not allowing them to amend their pleading to assert causes of 
action for declaratory judgment, interpleader, accounting of rents and for 
damages.

[¶14]   The decision to permit amendment to 
the pleadings is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Herrig 
v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992); W.R.C.P. 15. In Slavens v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 854 P.2d 683, 687 (Wyo. 1993), we held that it was not an abuse 
of discretion for the district court to deny an amendment to the pleadings when 
the motion was filed four days after the court's decision letter had issued. In 
this case, appellants did not file their motion to amend until seventeen days 
after the court had issued its order. Therefore, there was no abuse of 
discretion when the district court denied the motion to amend. Id. See also 
Herbel v. S.K. Wood Co., 897 P.2d 478, 480 (Wyo. 1995).

C. 
Attorney Fees

[¶15]   Both agreements provided that 
appellants would pay all reasonable attorney fees and costs in the event they 
were in default and court action ensued. The order granting summary judgment 
provided for an award of $3,442.34 in attorney fees to appellee. The order 
denying appellants' post-judgment motion provided for an additional $1,241.00 in 
attorney fees. Appellants appeal these awards complaining that there is no 
evidence that the award is reasonable in accordance with this court's opinion in 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 915 (Wyo. 1991):

Wyoming 
has adopted the federal "lodestar" test for the determination of the 
reasonableness of attorney fees. UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 
774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). See Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1990). The 
lodestar test requires that two factors be considered: (1) whether the fee 
charged represents the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and 
(2) whether other factors of discretionary application should be considered to 
adjust the fee either upward or downward. UNC Teton, 774 P.2d  at 595. The party 
who is seeking an award of fees has the burden of providing proof of the 
reasonableness of his fee. See Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 
1988); Jones Land & Livestock v. Federal Land Bank, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 
1987). In order to meet that burden of proof, the claimant must present not only 
an itemized billing reflecting the time and the rate, but there must be evidence 
demonstrating that the fee was reasonable. UNC Teton.

Appellants 
note that the attorney for appellee simply submitted an affidavit which 
reiterated the total amount of his fees claimed. Since appellee did not offer an 
itemized billing or any other evidence of reasonableness, appellants assert that 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees.

[¶16]   Appellee counters that W.S. 
1-14-126(b) (Cum.Supp. 1995), enacted in 1992 after the Hinckley opinion was 
published, "does away" with the requirement of demonstrating that the award was 
reasonable and with the presentation of an itemized billing. That statute 
provides as follows:

(b) 
In civil actions for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court 
in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
without requiring expert testimony. In exercising its discretion the court may 
consider the following factors:

(i) 
The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;

(ii) 
The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment by the lawyer;

(iii) 
The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;

(iv) 
The amount involved and the results obtained;

(v) 
The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(vi) 
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;

(vii) 
The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and

(viii) 
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Appellee 
claims that the affidavit submitted by her attorney is sufficient in light of 
the "new law" set out in this statute.

[¶17]   We disagree. Nothing in the statute 
purports to say that proof of reasonableness is no longer required. Indeed, the 
statute explicitly contemplates that attorney fees will be reasonable. The 
statute simply sets out a list of factors the court may consider when awarding 
attorney fees and that the court may do so without requiring expert testimony on 
the subject. We fail to see how the statute affects the burden of proof 
requirements we articulated in Hinckley. That burden was, and still is, on 
appellee. There was no testimony or evidence on the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees, nor did appellee submit an itemized billing. We find no error in 
awarding attorney fees; the agreements clearly support the district court's 
decision to do so. However, we find no support in the record that the amount of 
attorney fees claimed by appellee are reasonable.

[¶18]   Past decisions of this court 
concerning unproven attorney fees have not resulted in any "realistic or 
consistent result whether to deny as unproven or remand for trial consideration 
upon proper proof." UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 596 (Wyo. 1989). We have remanded for further proof in at least two 
situations: when a party did not have an opportunity to present proof to the 
lower court, Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1975), and 
when a case was being remanded for other reasons, Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign 
Co., Inc., 618 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1980). In other cases where there has been a 
failure of proof we have reversed the award of attorney fees without remand. 
Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988). 
Today, we make it clear that if a party has had an opportunity to present proof 
of attorney fees to the trial court, and they fail to do so, the award will be 
summarily reversed on appeal with no remand. Durdahl v. Bank of Casper, 718 P.2d 23, 31 (Wyo. 1986). A party will not be allowed "another bite of the apple" in 
order to prove an element of their claim. Downing v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808, 817 
(Wyo. 1981). A remand to allow additional proof on attorney fees will be allowed 
only in those instances where a party was denied an opportunity to make proof in 
the proceeding below.

[¶19]   In this case, appellee had adequate 
opportunity to make proof of her attorney fees. She failed to do so, therefore 
we reverse and vacate the award of attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

[¶20]  The district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of appellee or in denying appellants' 
post-judgment motion. Appellee failed to prove her attorney fees in conformity 
with the requirements of our precedent and, consequently, the award is reversed 
and vacated.