Title: MELCHER v. BENSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MELCHER v. BENSON2004 WY 12699 P.3d 999Case Number: 03-210Decided: 10/29/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

THELMA 
E. MCLEAN, Deceased:

 

DONNIE 
MELCHER,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

EUGENE 
H. BENSON; THE BENSON AGENCY;

and 
HEATHER L. BENSON,

 

Appellees(Defendants),

 

and

                                                                                                

DAVID 
A. HALL, Personal Representative

of 
the Estate of Thelma McLean,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Douglas Fowler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Julie M. Yates of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,  and 
VOIGT, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J. Ret.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      On November 28, 
1994, Thelma E. McLean (McLean) executed her Last Will and Testament.  McLean's friends, EuGene and Heather 
Benson, were the only named beneficiaries.  
After McLean's death, her grandson, Donald Melcher (Melcher), challenged 
the validity of her will, arguing that she lacked the requisite testamentary 
capacity.  The Bensons moved for 
summary judgment, which was granted by the district court.  Melcher appealed.  We affirm.

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented in this case are as follows:

 

1.         
Whether the district court's decision to determine the validity of 
McLean's will before addressing issues raised in a connected civil action was 
correct?

 

2.         
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Bensons?

 

3.         
Whether the Bensons are entitled to recover attorney's fees under 
W.R.A.P. 10.05?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      We had prior 
opportunity to examine the facts of this case in Estate of McLean ex rel. 
Hall v. Benson, 2003 WY 78, 71 P.3d 750 (Wyo. 2003).  Although additional details will be 
provided where necessary, the essential facts are the 
same:

 

In 
1992, Thelma McLean (McLean) was "befriended" by EuGene Benson (Benson) and his 
daughter, Heather.  Both Bensons 
were stockbrokers.  From 1992 until 
her death in 1998, McLean transferred practically all of her financial dealings, 
not to mention most of her assets, to the Bensons.  In 1994, McLean signed a Last Will and 
Testament that had been prepared by Benson's brother-in-law, an attorney, and 
typed by Heather.  The Bensons were 
the beneficiaries under the will. 

 

In 
1999, McLean's nephew, David Hall (Hall), petitioned the district court for 
appointment as personal representative of McLean's intestate estate.  Hall then immediately filed, on behalf 
of the estate, a civil action against the Bensons, alleging breach of fiduciary 
duties, undue influence, constructive fraud, constructive trust, breach of 
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional interference with expected inheritance, civil 
conspiracy, negligence, and fraudulent transfers.  Several months later, Benson filed the 
purported Last Will and Testament of McLean, and eventually sought appointment 
as personal representative of McLean's testate estate.

 

On 
December 7, 2001, the district court ordered the two probate actions and the 
civil suit consolidated.  Three 
months later, after summary judgment motions left most of the issues extant, the 
district court signed an Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Personal 
Representative, and a separate Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Hall became 
personal representative in both probates.  
All proceedings in the civil action were stayed pending resolution of any 
will contest in the combined probate.

 

Id., 
2003 WY 78, ¶¶ 2-4, 71 P.3d  at 751-52.  
Hall appealed the order admitting the will to probate, and we dismissed 
the appeal because it was not a final appealable order.  Id., 2003 WY 78, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d  at 
753-54.

 

[¶4]      On June 14, 2002, 
while the appeal was still pending before this Court, Melcher, McLean's only 
grandchild and the only potential heir1 under Wyoming's intestacy statute, 
filed an Objection to the Order for Admittance of Will to Probate and a Petition 
to Set Aside and Contest the Will and the Validity of the Will.  Melcher asserted that McLean's will 
should not be admitted to probate, maintaining essentially the same claims 
raised in Hall's civil action.  
Melcher argued that McLean lacked the "mental faculties and capacities to 
fully understand the ramifications and provisions of the document" at the time 
the will was executed.  He 
maintained that when McLean executed the will, she was legally blind, that she 
had no legal representation, that the Bensons had unduly influenced her and used 
fraudulent statements to induce her to execute the will, that Mr. Benson had 
breached his fiduciary duty to McLean as her financial advisor, and that the 
Bensons had breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 

[¶5]      In response to 
Melcher's motion, the Bensons asked the district court to establish the validity 
of McLean's will by ruling on their previously-filed motion for summary 
judgment, which motion had been stayed pending a ruling from this Court on the 
previous appeal.  On June 26, 2003, 
we issued our opinion dismissing the appeal, and shortly thereafter the district 
court heard the Bensons' motion for summary judgment.  While the record does not contain a 
transcript of that proceeding, the district court's order reveals that although 
Melcher's attorney received adequate notice, he did not appear at the hearing.2  The motion for summary judgment was 
granted and McLean's will was admitted to probate.  Melcher filed a timely 
appeal.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]                              
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo.1994); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, 
using the same materials and following the same standards.  "We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record."  Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., 
Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 
(Wyo.1991).  Summary judgment serves 
the purpose of eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are 
involved.  Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo.1997); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 
(Wyo.1986).  We review a grant of 
summary judgment by deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference 
to the district court's ruling on that question.  Sammons v. American Auto. Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo.1996); Blagrove, 
934 P.2d  at 1275.

 

Gray 
v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 
984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 1999).  We will examine other aspects of the 
summary judgment standard in the discussion section of this 
opinion.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      This appeal is 
from the district court's determination of Probate No. 5230, which is actually 
three consolidated cases: Probate No. 5359, Probate. No. 5230, and Civil Action 
No. 26947.  Melcher asserts that 
because the district court had previously recognized the existence of genuine 
issues of material fact in the civil action, those issues should not have been 
disposed of when the district court granted summary judgment to the Bensons in 
the consolidated cases.  He directs 
our attention to the following language in the district court's ruling in the 
civil action:

 

Given 
numerous genuine issues of material fact, as discussed above, this Court finds 
it improper to grant summary judgment with respect to the claims of: breach of 
fiduciary duty, undue influence, fraud, constructive fraud, constructive trust, 
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
civil conspiracy, negligence, and punitive damages.

 

Melcher 
argues that the same issues remained after the three cases were consolidated, 
and thus the district court should not have disposed of them in the subsequent 
summary judgment.

 

[¶8]      The district 
court addressed another issue in its decision letter, even though Melcher did 
not present this argument in his response to the Bensons' motion for summary 
judgment or at the hearing:

 

The 
validity of Ms. McLean's Will becomes important because any assets that might be 
ordered returned pursuant to the [civil action] would go to her Estate for 
distribution to her heirs.  The 
named beneficiaries in her Will are Eugene and Heather Benson.  Thus, they would stand to inherit that 
which they are accused of having stolen if her Will is determined to be 
valid.  This would essentially moot 
any further proceedings under [the civil action].

 

We 
agree with the district court that, in the instant case, the more prudent and 
judicially economic approach was first to determine the validity of McLean's 
will, rather than spend considerable time and resources deciding the civil 
action, the outcome of which would have virtually no effect on the ultimate 
result.

 

            
The 
Validity of McLean's Will

 

[¶9]      Melcher claims 
that McLean's will was the product of the Bensons' undue influence, and that 
McLean lacked the requisite testamentary capacity.  Melcher further contends that the 
Bensons never satisfied their burden of establishing a prima facie case for 
summary judgment, and therefore the burden never shifted to him to refute their 
evidence regarding McLean's capacity.  
The Bensons counter that they satisfied their summary judgment burden, 
and that as a matter of law, McLean had the necessary testamentary capacity and 
was not subject to undue influence.

 

[¶10]   Unless the testator's incompetence 
is established by proof or admission, a presumption of testamentary capacity 
exists where a will is duly executed and properly attested.  In re Estate of Schlueter, 994 P.2d 937, 
939 (Wyo. 2000).  We have articulated the following 
standard in determining testamentary capacity:

 

"Testator 
must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to know, in 
general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is 
about to dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to perform, and the 
names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and 
his relation towards them.  He must 
have sufficient mind and memory to understand all of these facts, and to 
comprehend these elements in their relation to each other, and a charge in 
negative form, that capacity is lacking if testator is not able to know all of 
these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he is unable to understand 
any one of them.  He must be able to 
appreciate the relation of these factors to one another, and to recollect the 
decision which he has formed."

 

In 
re Estate of Schlueter, 
994 P.2d at 939 (quoting 
Matter of Estate of Roosa, 
753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988)).  To challenge a testator's competence, 
and the validity of a will, the opponent must demonstrate that when the will was 
executed, the testator was not able to comprehend "(1) the extent and nature of 
the estate, (2) the identity of the beneficiaries and their relationship, 
whether by blood or circumstances, to the testator, and (3) the nature of the 
testamentary act, that it is a disposition of property to take effect at 
death."  In re Estate of 
Schlueter, 994 P.2d  at 939 (quoting Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 
P.2d at 1032).  Evidence of the testator's declining 
mental and physical health before the will was executed, or during the years 
later, is irrelevant, as the testator must only possess testamentary capacity at 
the time the will is executed.  
In re Estate of Schlueter, 994 P.2d  at 940; Matter of Estate of 
Loomis, 810 P.2d 126, 129 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶11]   With respect to the claim 
of undue influence, we have stated that the party alleging the exercise of undue 
influence must present competent evidence establishing:

 

"(1) 
the relations between the one charged with exercising the undue influence and 
the decedent affording the former an opportunity to control the testamentary 
act; (2) that the decedent's condition was such as to permit * * * subversion of 
h[er] freedom of will; (3) that there was activity on the part of the person 
charged with exercising undue influence; and (4) that such person unduly 
profited as beneficiary under the will."

 

Matter 
of Estate of Loomis, 
810 P.2d at 129 (quoting In re Nelson's 
Estates, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 252 (1954)).  The will contestant bears the burden of 
proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the 
testator's free agency was destroyed and that his volition was substituted for 
that of another.  Matter of 
Estate of Loomis, 810 P.2d  at 128; 
see also Matter of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 
1988) and Matter 
of Estate of Brosius, 
683 P.2d 663, 666 (Wyo. 1984).  We have stated that "[i]n Wyoming, a 
will deliberately made by a person of sound mind is not to be lightly set 
aside."  Matter 
of Estate of Loomis, 810 P.2d  at 128; 
see also 
Matter of Estate of Brosius, 
683 P.2d  at 666.

 

[¶12]   While Melcher bore the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of testamentary capacity and demonstrating undue 
influence, the Bensons, as the moving party, had the initial burden of 
presenting a prima facie case for summary judgment.  Coates v. Anderson, 2004 WY 11, ¶ 
5, 84 P.3d 953, 956 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. 
Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997) and Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Wyo. 1975)).  The Bensons provided substantial 
evidence regarding McLean's capacity at the time she executed her will, 
including several affidavits wherein the affiants attested to McLean's 
competency.  John R. Deti, the 
attorney who drafted McLean's will, stated that during their meetings, McLean 
was "coherent, alert and very assertive about her wishes," and that she "asked 
many questions through out the drafting process which exhibited her 
understanding of the meaning of her Will and the manner in which she wished to 
distribute[] her estate."  Deti also 
stated that although McLean had difficulty seeing the document, she was able to 
read it.  Finally, Deti averred that 
he was not aware of any undue influence exerted by the 
Bensons.

 

[¶13]   In a sworn statement, McLean's 
treating physician, Dr. Kenneth L. Robertson, stated that after independent 
examination and discussion with McLean, his impression was that she was mentally 
and physically capable of making appropriate decisions.

 

[¶14]   M. Vanay Syme, one of the witnesses 
when McLean executed her will, stated that she had a conversation with McLean 
prior to her signing her will and found her to be "competent, coherent and 
alert."  The second witness, Charles 
Bryan Brodersen, stated that he "never observed Mr. Benson coerce or attempt to 
influence Ms. McLean in her decisions" and that "McLean seemed comfortable in 
making decisions independently."  
Likewise, Karen Gaines, the notary public present when McLean executed 
her will, stated that "McLean seemed competent and aware of what she was doing 
that day."

 

[¶15]   We find that this evidence 
satisfied the threshold requirement of establishing the nonexistence of any 
genuine issue of material fact with regard to McLean's testamentary capacity or 
Melcher's claim of undue influence.  
The burden then shifted to Melcher to present specific and substantiated 
evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 247 
(Wyo. 1992).  A material fact is one which, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the 
cause of action.  Baker v. Pena, 
2001 WY 122, ¶ 6, 36 P.3d 602, 605 (Wyo. 2001).  W.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that "[w]hen a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 
party's pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial."  
Further, we have held that conclusory statements, mere opinions, or 
categorical assertions of ultimate facts without supporting evidence are 
insufficient to establish some disputed issue of material fact.  Clark v. Industrial Co. of Steamboat 
Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 628 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting TZ Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1990) and Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987)); 
Seamster v. Rumph, 698 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1985).  Any evidence relied upon to "sustain or 
defeat a motion for summary judgment must be such as would be admissible at 
trial and that it should be as carefully tailored and professionally correct as 
any evidence which would be presented to the court at the time of trial."  Equality 
Bank of Evansville, Wyo. v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶16]   Melcher failed to meet this 
burden.  His attorney did not appear 
at the summary judgment hearing and presented virtually no evidence refuting the 
above-mentioned sworn statements regarding McLean's capacity on the day she 
executed her will.  The only factual 
information Melcher provided in response to the Bensons' motion was an affidavit 
signed by his wife3 asserting 
that:

 

I 
dated my husband for three years prior to our marriage and have personal 
knowledge by meeting and associating with Mrs. McLean from the summer of 
1991.  At such time, Mrs. McLean was 
determined to be legally blind.  
During my conversations and associations with Mrs. McLean, she was in a 
frail condition, both mentally and physically, and was often confused in regards 
to her affairs.

 

On 
appeal, Melcher attempts to construct issues of material fact with statements 
from the pleadings regarding Mclean's mental health and the Bensons' interaction 
with her.  The statement of Mrs. 
Melcher and those found in the pleadings regarding McLean's capacity are 
conclusory, contain only unsubstantiated facts, and are generally irrelevant to 
McLean's capacity to execute her will.  
As such, they are insufficient to establish a disputed issue of material 
fact.

 

[¶17]   Melcher also fails to demonstrate, 
as a matter of law, that he is entitled to judgment.  He is unable to provide sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity or to overcome his 
burden of showing undue influence.  
While the record contains some general statements regarding McLean's 
mental health, the only evidence specifically addressing her testamentary 
capacity on the day she executed her will  which under In 
re Estate of Schlueter and 
Matter 
of Estate of Loomis 
is the only relevant time frame  demonstrates that she was competent.  Melcher provides no evidence to rebut 
the sworn statements of those individuals who were present and witnessed McLean 
execute her will.  Likewise, 
although the record contains statements indicating that the Bensons developed 
some relationship with McLean, the record does not clearly 
demonstrate that the Bensons' desires were substituted for McLean's, or that her 
free will was destroyed.  Melcher 
does not provide adequate evidence to support his claims, and as a matter of 
law, we find that McLean possessed the requisite capacity to execute her 
will.

 

            
Sanctions

 

[¶18]   The Bensons claim that there is no 
cause for this appeal, and request that we order Melcher to pay costs and 
reasonable attorney fees.  We 
decline to do so because this case does not rise to the level of "those rare 
circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence 
of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a 
failure to adequately cite to the record."  
Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997); 
see also Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 
1993).  Although parts of Melcher's argument 
were lacking, we did not consider any position advanced that was not supported 
by cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority.  Basolo v. Gose, 994 P.2d 968, 970 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   Inasmuch as any ruling in the 
civil suit would be moot if McLean's will was determined to be valid, the 
district court properly chose to first decide the validity of McLean's will 
before addressing the issues raised in the civil suit.  With respect to the validity of McLean's 
will, Melcher failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact or provide 
evidence establishing that McLean had been unduly influenced by the Bensons or 
that she lacked the requisite testamentary capacity.  The district court's decision to admit 
the will to probate is affirmed, and the Bensons' request for sanctions is 
denied.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Hall became involved in McLean's 
estate with the understanding that he would be eligible to inherit, but it later 
became clear that under Wyoming's intestacy laws, Melcher was the only 
heir.  Although Hall retained his 
position as the personal representative for McLean's estate, the district court 
ruled that because he was not an "interested person," Hall did not have standing 
to challenge the validity of the will.

 

  2On appeal, Melcher's attorney 
explained that his absence was the result of a scheduling error. Apparently he 
scheduled the summary judgment hearing for August 22, rather than August 
12.

 

  3In 1996, Melcher had a brain tumor 
removed, leaving him a quadriplegic and unable to speak.  Prior to the operation he executed a 
Durable Power of Attorney appointing his wife as his 
agent.