Title: P. v. Sloan

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/16/07 (precedes in sequence companion opinion, S132980, also filed 8/16/07) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S132605 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Ct.App. 3 C042448 
AARON PATRICK SLOAN, 
 ) 
 
 
 )  
Placer County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 )  
Super. Ct. No. 6621501 
 
 
 ) 
 
May enhancement allegations be considered for purposes of the rule 
prohibiting multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses?  (See 
People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355 (Pearson).)  Our recent decision in 
People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224 (Reed), filed after the Court of Appeal 
decided this case, effectively answers the question in the negative.  Reed held that 
“[c]ourts should consider the statutory elements and accusatory pleading in 
deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore may be convicted, of 
an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in deciding whether a 
defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes.”  (Id. at p. 1231.)  Like 
Reed, this case involves multiple charged crimes.  Accordingly, the statutory or 
legal elements test applies.  Under that test, enhancements are neither recognized 
nor considered in determining whether the defendant can be convicted of multiple 
charged crimes based on necessarily included offenses.  This result is also in 
accord with the long-standing rule that enhancements may not be considered as 
 
2
part of an accusatory pleading for purposes of identifying lesser included offenses.  
(See People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 96, 100-101 (Wolcott).) 
The Court of Appeal in this matter relied on an additional factor, one not at 
issue in Reed—the potential for future multiple punishment arising from multiple 
convictions—in support of its conclusion that the enhancement allegations here in 
question must be considered in determining whether the rule against multiple 
convictions based on necessarily included offenses applies.  As will be explained, 
however, neither the ban on multiple punishment found in Penal Code section 
654,1 nor principles of federal double jeopardy protection, require us to draw an 
exception from Reed’s bright-line test in this case simply because multiple 
convictions otherwise permitted under section 954 and the legal elements test in 
theory might give rise to impermissible multiple punishment in future criminal 
proceedings should the defendant reoffend upon release from prison.  The 
Legislature has clearly provided that a person may be convicted of, although not 
punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of 
conduct.  (§§ 654, 954.)  There is no evidence before us that defendant has 
reoffended or faces multiple punishment due to recidivist sentencing in any 
unrelated criminal proceeding.  The argument that improper multiple punishment 
might stem from future use of multiple convictions under recidivist sentencing 
statutes like the “Three Strikes” law raises a question that is entirely speculative 
on these facts and must await a case in which it is squarely presented.  (See People 
v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 993.) 
We therefore conclude the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which is 
inconsistent with the rule announced in Reed, must be reversed. 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As a result of a domestic violence incident on May 13, 2001, during which 
defendant Aaron Patrick Sloan threw his wife to the ground, kicked her, and broke 
her leg, defendant was charged with and convicted of willful infliction of corporal 
injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition, with a prior conviction for 
the same offense (§ 273.5, subd. (e)(1)); assault by means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); battery with serious bodily injury 
(§ 243, subd. (d)); and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)).  Enhancement 
allegations for personal infliction of great bodily injury under circumstances 
involving domestic violence were found true under the corporal injury and 
aggravated assault counts.  (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)  An allegation that defendant 
personally inflicted great bodily injury on a person who was not an accomplice 
was found true under the battery with serious bodily injury count, making that 
offense, like the aggravated assault offense, a serious felony within the meaning of 
section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). 
Defendant was sentenced to prison for the upper term of five years on count 
I (corporal injury on a spouse with a prior) plus four years for the great bodily 
injury enhancement under that count, and a consecutive term of eight months 
(one-third of the middle term) on count IV (dissuading a witness), for an aggregate 
prison sentence of nine years and eight months.  Execution of sentence on counts 
II (aggravated assault with great bodily injury) and III (battery with serious bodily 
injury) was stayed pursuant to section 654. 
In a partially published opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
convictions under counts I and IV, but vacated the convictions under counts II and 
III on grounds that they violated the rule against multiple convictions based on 
necessarily included offenses, section 654, and federal double jeopardy principles.  
We granted both the People’s and defendant’s petitions for review, designating the 
 
4
People as petitioner in this court for purposes of briefing and argument.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, Former rule 28.2; see now rules 8.512, 8.520.) 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends that under the rule prohibiting multiple convictions 
based on necessarily included offenses, also known as the multiple conviction 
rule, he could not be convicted of assault by means of force likely to produce great 
bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury (counts II and III) because 
each can be viewed as a necessarily included offense2 of willful infliction of 
corporal injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition (count I) when 
enhanced with a great bodily injury finding.  The Court of Appeal agreed, further 
concluding that conviction of those offenses along with the charged enhancements 
violated section 654’s ban on multiple punishment as well as principles of federal 
double jeopardy protection. 
As we explained in Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, “In general, a person may 
be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the 
same act or course of conduct.  ‘In California, a single act or course of conduct by 
a defendant can lead to convictions “of any number of the offenses charged.”  
(§ 954, italics added; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692.)’  (People v. 
Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.)  Section 954 generally permits multiple 
convictions.  Section 654 is its counterpart concerning punishment.  It prohibits 
multiple punishment for the same ‘act or omission.’  When section 954 permits 
multiple convictions, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court 
must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment 
                                              
2  
The terms “necessarily included offense” and “lesser included offense” 
have been used interchangeably by the courts in determining whether the rule 
against multiple convictions applies in any given case.  (See People v. Ortega 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 704 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.).) 
 
5
is prohibited.  (People v. Ortega, supra, at p. 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 351, 359-360.)”  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227.) 
Here, the trial court stayed execution of sentence on count II (assault by 
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury) and count III (battery with 
serious bodily injury) pursuant to section 654.  With one exception discussed 
below—the potential use of those convictions as “strikes” under the Three Strikes 
law in a subsequent prosecution for any felony (see §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 667, 
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12)—multiple punishment is not at issue here.  Instead, we are 
concerned with multiple convictions.  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) 
Reed goes on to explain that “A judicially created exception to the general 
rule permitting multiple conviction ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on 
necessarily included offenses.’  (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034.)  
‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser 
offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the former.’  (People v. Lopez 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.) . . . [¶]  The question whether one offense is 
necessarily included in another arises in various contexts.  A common one is 
deciding whether a defendant charged with one crime may be convicted of a lesser 
uncharged crime.  A defendant may be convicted of an uncharged crime if, but 
only if, the uncharged crime is necessarily included in the charged crime.  (§ 1159; 
People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 368-369.)  The reason for this rule is 
settled.  ‘ “This reasoning rests upon a constitutional basis:  ‘Due process of law 
requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may 
have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken 
by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.’ [Citation.]” ’  (People v. Lohbauer, 
supra, at p. 368.)  The required notice is provided as to any charged offense and 
any lesser offense that is necessarily committed when the charged offense is 
committed.  (Id. at pp. 368-369.)”  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) 
 
6
Two tests have traditionally been applied in determining whether an 
uncharged offense is necessarily included within a charged offense—the statutory 
or legal “elements” test and the “accusatory pleading” test.  “Under the elements 
test, if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory 
elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.  
Under the accusatory pleading test, if the facts actually alleged in the accusatory 
pleading include all of the elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily 
included in the former.  [Citation.]”  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1227-1228.) 
Defendant argues that by willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a 
traumatic condition on his spouse and personally inflicting great bodily injury in 
connection with that offense, he necessarily committed the charged offenses of 
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and battery with 
serious bodily injury.3 
If the conviction of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse 
resulting in a traumatic condition under section 273.5, subdivision (e)(1) (see 
count I) is considered without the great bodily injury enhancement found true 
under that count, then assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 
injury (see count II) is not a necessarily included offense, as the statutory elements 
of the former offense do not require proof of intent to inflict, or the actual 
infliction of, great bodily injury.  Corporal injury resulting in a “ ‘traumatic 
condition’ ” can be a wound or external or internal injury, whether minor or 
serious.  (§ 273.5, subd. (c).)  In contrast, if the conviction of willful infliction of 
corporal injury on a spouse is considered together with the great bodily injury 
                                              
3  
It should be noted we are here concerned only with charged offenses and 
pled enhancements, not with uncharged lesser offenses or questions involving 
notice to the defendant and the trial court’s obligation to instruct sua sponte with 
regard to uncharged lesser offenses. 
 
7
enhancement found true under that count, then all of the statutory elements of 
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, of which defendant 
was also charged and convicted, would be met. 
Similarly, “[s]erious bodily injury’ is the essential equivalent of ‘great 
bodily injury’ [citation].”  (People v. Otterstein (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1548, 
1550; People v. Corning (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 83, 90.)  Consideration of the 
great bodily injury enhancement found true under count I would effectively 
establish the elements of the charged battery with serious bodily injury (see count 
III), thereby triggering application of the rule against multiple convictions, 
whereas looking only to the statutory elements of willful infliction of corporal 
injury on a spouse would not implicate the rule. 
In Reed, the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a 
firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. 
(a)(2)), and carrying a loaded firearm while in a public place (§ 12031, subd. 
(a)(2)(A)).  The information further alleged that the defendant was a convicted 
felon in connection with the commission of each offense.  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1226, 1228.)  “Accordingly, as charged, defendant could not commit the 
crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded firearm while in a 
public place without also being a felon in possession of a firearm.”  (Id. at 
p. 1228.) 
The rationale and holding of Reed is made clear in the following paragraphs 
of that decision:  “In People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at page 356, footnote 2, 
we noted that, ‘while an expanded definition of necessarily included offenses [i.e., 
employing both the elements test and the accusatory pleading test] may be 
appropriate in the context of [conviction of an uncharged offense], there appears 
little reason to enlarge the meaning of the same phrase as it is used in other 
situations.’  We did not, however, decide the question because the offenses were 
 
8
not included in each other even under the accusatory pleading test.  (Ibid.)  More 
recently, we again recognized this question but did not decide it.  (People v. 
Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.) 
“As we noted in People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1035, the 
Court of Appeal decisions that specifically consider this question have concluded 
that the accusatory pleading test does not apply in deciding whether multiple 
conviction of charged offenses is proper.  (People v. Miranda (1994) 21 
Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467; People v. Watterson [(1991)] 234 Cal.App.3d [942,] 947, 
fn. 15; People v. Scheidt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 162, 165-171.)  Now that the 
question is squarely presented, we agree.  In deciding whether multiple conviction 
is proper, a court should consider only the statutory elements.  Or, as formulated in 
Scheidt, ‘only a statutorily lesser included offense is subject to the bar against 
multiple convictions in the same proceeding.  An offense that may be a lesser 
included offense because of the specific nature of the accusatory pleading is not 
subject to the same bar.’  (People v. Scheidt, supra, at pp. 165-166.) 
“The accusatory pleading test arose to ensure that defendants receive notice 
before they can be convicted of an uncharged crime.  ‘As to a lesser included 
offense, the required notice is given when the specific language of the accusatory 
pleading adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the 
elements of the lesser offense.’  (People v. Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368-
369.)  ‘Because a defendant is entitled to notice of the charges, it makes sense to 
look to the accusatory pleading (as well as the elements of the crimes) in deciding 
whether a defendant had adequate notice of an uncharged lesser offense so as to 
permit conviction of that uncharged offense.’  (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1039 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)  But this purpose has no relevance to 
deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged offenses.  ‘[I]t 
makes no sense to look to the pleading, rather than just the legal elements, in 
 
9
deciding whether conviction of two charged offenses is proper.  Concerns about 
notice are irrelevant when both offenses are separately charged . . . .’  (Ibid.)”  
(Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1230.) 
The Legislature has separately defined the three offenses of which 
defendant was here charged and convicted—willful infliction of corporal injury on 
a spouse causing a traumatic condition, assault by means of force likely to produce 
great bodily injury, and battery with serious bodily injury.  As was the case in 
Reed, “[d]efendant committed each of [the charged] crimes, albeit during the same 
course of conduct.  The Legislature has made clear that a defendant may be 
convicted of more than one offense even if they arise out of the same act or course 
of conduct.  (§ 954.)  We see no reason to prohibit multiple convictions that 
section 954 permits simply because of the way the offenses are charged.  ‘To 
immunize’ defendant from conviction of [assault by means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury simply because 
a great bodily injury enhancement was found true under the charge of infliction of 
corporal injury on a spouse] ‘would be irrational and would frustrate the strong 
legislative purpose behind [all three] statutes.’  (People v. Scheidt, supra, 231 
Cal.App.3d at p. 171.)”  (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1230.) 
The holding in In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090 (Jose H.), on 
which the People expressly rely, involved closely analogous facts and is consistent 
with the conclusions we reached in Reed and reaffirm here.  The Jose H. court 
concluded the juvenile court did not violate the rule against multiple convictions 
based on necessarily included offenses when it sustained charges of both assault 
with a deadly or dangerous weapon with force likely to produce great bodily 
injury, with a great bodily injury enhancement, and battery with serious bodily 
injury, also with a great bodily injury enhancement.  Citing this court’s holding in 
Wolcott—that enhancements may not be considered part of an accusatory pleading 
 
10
for purposes of defining and instructing on lesser included offenses (Wolcott, 
supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 96, 100-101)4— the Jose H. court reasoned that the same 
rule must apply for purposes of the rule against multiple convictions. 
The Jose H. court recognized it “must reconcile the direct, clear statute 
authorizing multiple convictions for ‘different statements of the same offense’ 
[(§ 954)] with the rule recognized in Pearson prohibiting multiple convictions 
based on necessarily included offenses.”  (Jose H., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1095.)  The court concluded that “section 954 appears to authorize this manner 
of charging and the limited case law created exception to section 954 described in 
Pearson does not prevent it.  Appellant cites no cases, and our research discloses 
none, that permit considering enhancements for determining lesser included or 
necessarily included offenses for any purpose.  Because the rule recognized in 
Pearson carves out an exception to a statute that appears to specifically authorize 
multiple convictions based on the same conduct, we decline to accept appellant’s 
invitation to expand the definition of necessarily included offenses beyond its 
existing boundaries. Those boundaries limit our consideration of whether count I 
and count II are necessarily included offenses of one another to the elements of the 
offenses charged, not the stated offenses with their attached enhancements.  
Assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury is not a lesser included 
offense of battery with serious bodily injury.  (People v. Corning (1983) 146 
Cal.App.3d 83, 89-91.)  The trial court properly sustained counts I and II of the 
petition.”  (Jose H., at pp. 1095-1096.) 
The Court of Appeal in this case found that an additional factor—the 
                                              
4  
Wolcott did not involve the rule against multiple convictions, but instead 
held that enhancements are not considered part of an accusatory pleading for 
purposes of defining or instructing sua sponte on lesser offenses of which a 
defendant might be convicted.  (Wolcott, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 96, 100-101.) 
 
11
potential for future multiple punishment—a factor not implicated on the facts of 
Reed, further supports its conclusion that the convictions under counts II (assault 
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury) and III (battery with 
serious bodily injury) must be vacated under the multiple conviction rule.  
Although acknowledging that defendant is not being punished for those two 
convictions in this proceeding as he is for the conviction of willful infliction of 
corporal injury on a spouse under count I, the court nonetheless reasoned, “Here, 
although the sentences on counts two and three were stayed under Penal Code 
section 654, there is a serious potential consequence of multiple convictions.  
Because of the great bodily injury allegations, each of the offenses is a serious 
felony and will qualify as a strike in a subsequent prosecution for any felony.  
(Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); id., § 667, subds. (b)-(i); id.§ 1170.12.)”  The 
Court of Appeal concluded that both federal double jeopardy principles and 
section 654 would be violated if the convictions were allowed to stand, 
notwithstanding that execution of sentence on those counts was stayed pursuant to 
section 654 in the current proceeding. 
We disagree that the possibility multiple punishment might result from 
sentencing in unrelated future criminal proceedings if defendant reoffends upon 
his release from prison itself furnishes a basis for expanding the multiple 
conviction rule or undercutting the bright-line test announced in Reed.  As regards 
federal double jeopardy principles, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause ‘protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.  It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.  And it protects 
against multiple punishments for the same offense.’  [Citation.]”  (Brown v. Ohio 
(1977) 432 U.S. 161, 165, italics added.)  The first two categories of protection 
afforded by the double jeopardy clause, by their express terms, are clearly not 
implicated here because we are directly concerned only with multiple convictions 
 
12
in a unitary trial, not multiple punishments in successive unrelated criminal 
proceedings.  Likewise, with regard to the third category of double jeopardy 
protection—the prohibition of “multiple punishments for the same offense” (432 
U.S. at p. 165)—the Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he [Double Jeopardy] 
Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for 
the same offense [citations] . . . and then only when such occurs in successive 
proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).”  (Hudson v. 
United States (1997) 522 U.S. 93, 99, italics added; original italics omitted.) 
Federal law, like California statutory law, clearly recognizes that 
cumulative punishment may be imposed under two statutes, even where they 
proscribe the same conduct, if the Legislature has specifically authorized 
cumulative punishment.  (Missouri v. Hunter (1983) 459 U.S. 359, 368-369.)  Our 
Legislature has separately defined the three offenses of which defendant was 
convicted, separately prescribed an enhancement for personal infliction of great 
bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, 
subd. (e)), and made clear that a person may be convicted of more than one crime 
arising out of the same act or course of conduct in a unitary criminal proceeding.  
(§ 954.)  In short, federal double jeopardy principles do not support the rationale 
and holding of the Court of Appeal’s conclusions below. 
With regard to whether section 654’s proscription against multiple 
punishment for offenses arising out of the same act or course of conduct would be 
violated if multiple convictions in a unitary trial were later used to impose 
punishment under a sentencing scheme like the Three Strikes law in future 
unrelated criminal proceedings, we have twice before indicated that the question 
must await an appropriate case in which it is factually and squarely presented.  
(See People v. Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 993; People v. Benson (1998) 18 
 
13
Cal.4th 24, 36, & fn. 8.)5  In this case there is no evidence before us that defendant 
has reoffended or faces the prospect of multiple punishment due to sentencing in 
any unrelated criminal proceeding.  The mere possibility of future multiple 
punishment affords no sound basis for disregarding the mandate of section 954, 
which clearly permits multiple convictions arising from the same act or course of 
conduct in the present criminal proceeding.  The possibility of future multiple 
punishment is always speculative, yet the holding of the Court of Appeal in this 
case would require that multiple convictions otherwise permissible under section 
954 must always be vacated in a present criminal proceeding simply because they 
may lead to future impermissible multiple punishment if the defendant reoffends, 
and if the prosecution then seeks to use those convictions as a basis for sentence 
enhancement in the future criminal proceeding. 
Moreover, multiple convictions permitted under section 954 serve an 
important and legitimate function in criminal sentencing.  Where one of two 
multiple convictions valid under section 954 is overturned on appeal or habeas 
corpus, the remaining and intact conviction, even though it arose from the same 
facts or indivisible course of conduct as the conviction that is being reversed, may 
be substituted in its stead, with the stay of execution of sentence lifted at 
resentencing, so that punishment on the valid conviction can be imposed in the 
interests of justice.  This legitimate future use of multiple convictions would be 
                                              
5  
The decision in Benson made clear that the mere fact that a conviction was 
stayed pursuant to section 654 in an earlier proceeding does not in itself preclude 
use of the conviction as a strike under the Three Strikes law in a subsequent 
proceeding.  We observed that the language of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12, 
subd. (b)(1)) “unequivocally establishes that the electorate intended to qualify as 
separate strikes each prior conviction that a defendant incurred relating to the 
commission of a serious or violent felony, notwithstanding the circumstance that 
the trial court, in the earlier proceeding, may have stayed sentence on one or more 
of the serious or violent felonies under compulsion of the provisions of section 
654.”  (People v. Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 31.) 
 
14
undermined by the expanded multiple conviction rule adopted by the Court of 
Appeal in this case. 
Last, defendant argues that under the high court’s holding in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), and this court’s decision in People v. 
Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 (Seel), which interpreted and applied Apprendi in the 
context of the federal double jeopardy clause, enhancements must be considered in 
connection with the multiple conviction rule.  In the companion case of People v. 
Izaguirre ( Aug. 16, 2007, S132980) __ Cal.4th ___ (Izaguirre), also filed today, 
we have rejected the identical argument.  (Izaguirre, supra, at p. __ [p. 2].) 
Briefly, in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court held that “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490.)  The rule of Apprendi is grounded on 
the reasoning that “[t]he federal Constitution requires the elements of a crime to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt because they expose the defendant to 
punishment; likewise, the elements of a sentence enhancement must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt if there is exposure to increased punishment.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 325-326.)  The rule 
is compelled by the federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right to due process 
and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  (26 Cal.4th at p. 324.)  It is not grounded on principles of 
double jeopardy protection.  (See Izaguirre, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. __-__ [pp. 7-
9].) 
Here, as in Izaguirre, all of the enhancement allegations in question were 
submitted to the jury and proved true beyond a reasonable doubt.  There is no Fifth 
or Sixth Amendment violation within the meaning of the high court’s holding in 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466.  Beyond that, Izaguirre explains in detail why the 
 
15
decision in Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, which interpreted Apprendi’s holding in 
the specific context of the federal double jeopardy clause’s prohibition against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, has no bearing on the 
claim, raised in Izaguirre and this case, that federal double jeopardy principles 
require enhancements to be considered when applying the multiple conviction rule 
to necessarily included offenses.  (See Izaguirre, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. __-__ 
[pp. 7-9].)  Neither this case nor Izaguirre involves a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal.  Nothing in the federal double jeopardy clause, 
Apprendi, or Seel supports the conclusions and holding of the Court of Appeal 
below. 
The expanded multiple conviction rule adopted by the Court of Appeal, 
which would require consideration of enhancements in applying that rule, 
contradicts section 954 which clearly authorizes multiple convictions on the facts 
of this case.  It further conflicts with the rationale and holding of Reed, supra, 38 
Cal.4th 1224, and misconstrues federal double jeopardy law.  Moreover, this case, 
properly viewed, implicates the multiple conviction rule as applied in the present 
proceeding, not section 654’s ban on multiple punishment as it might come into 
play in future criminal proceedings. 
 
16
 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
The majority in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224 held that a court 
never may consider the language of the accusatory pleading in determining 
whether multiple convictions are proper.  The majority concluded that the 
defendant in that case properly was convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, carrying a concealed firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in public, 
despite the circumstance that the counts charging him with carrying a concealed 
weapon and carrying a loaded weapon in public alleged that the defendant was a 
felon.  Applying its broad new rule that the language of the accusatory pleading 
never may be considered in determining whether multiple convictions are 
precluded because the offenses are necessarily included within each other, the 
majority held that multiple convictions were proper in Reed because a person who 
carries a concealed weapon, or carries a loaded weapon in public, does not 
necessarily also commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
I wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in Reed that reached the same 
result as the majority but used different reasoning.  I disagreed that the language of 
the accusatory pleading never should be considered in determining whether a 
defendant improperly had been convicted of necessarily included offenses.  I 
agreed, however, that the allegations that the defendant in Reed was a felon should 
not be considered in determining whether multiple convictions were proper 
because being a felon was not an element of the crimes of carrying a concealed 
 
2 
weapon or carrying a loaded weapon in public.  (People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
1224, 1235 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).)  The circumstance that the 
defendant in Reed was a felon was alleged in the counts charging him with 
carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a loaded weapon in public in order to 
permit these crimes to be punished as felonies rather than misdemeanors.  (Id. at 
p. 1234.)  I thus reached the same result as the majority based in large part upon 
the rule we announced in People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92 “that allegations 
of sentencing enhancements should not be considered in applying the accusatory 
pleading test to determine a trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct the jury 
regarding lesser included offenses.”  (People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, 
1235 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) 
In the present case, the majority relies upon this court’s decision in People 
v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, as well as our decision in People v. Wolcott, 
supra, 34 Cal.3d 92, to hold that enhancement allegations may not be considered 
for purposes of the rule prohibiting multiple convictions based on necessarily 
included offenses.  In my view, our decision in Wolcott controls here and, for that 
reason, I reach the same result as does the majority without the need to apply the 
broad rule created in Reed that the language of the accusatory pleading never may 
be considered in determining whether multiple convictions are permitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Sloan 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 126 Cal.App.4th 1148 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S132605 
Date Filed: August 16, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Placer 
Judge: John L. Cosgrove 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John Doyle and William J. Arzbaecher, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, 
Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, John 
G. McLean, Janet Neeley and George M. Hendrickson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William J. Arzbaecher 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816-4736 
(916) 441-3792 
 
George M. Hendrickson 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5270