Title: Walsh v. Town of Millinocket

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 99 
Docket: 
Pen-10-478 
Argued: 
June 14, 2011 
Decided: 
September 8, 2011 
  
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
MARY WALSH 
 
v.  
 
TOWN OF MILLINOCKET 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
 
[¶1]  In this case, a jury has found, twice, that a Town Councilor exhibited 
discriminatory animus towards Mary Walsh because she had engaged in 
statutorily-protected conduct, and that this discriminatory animus was a cause or a 
motivating factor for the Millinocket Town Council’s decision to eliminate Mary 
Walsh’s position and thus terminate her employment with the Town.  Walsh 
contends that discriminatory animus expressed by one member of the Town 
Council can be found to be a cause or a motivating factor for an adverse 
employment action approved by a vote of a Town Council.  The Town contends 
that the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus by any other member of the 
Town Council insulates the Town from liability in Walsh’s discrimination action, 
despite the jury’s findings of causation.   
 
2 
[¶2]  Resolution of these divergent views of the law of causation in a 
discrimination action is the central issue in this appeal.  We conclude that our 
established jurisprudence for discrimination actions, placing the burden on the 
plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, causation of an adverse 
employment action by a discriminatory act or discriminatory animus, is sufficient 
to govern such actions.  No change in a plaintiff’s burden of pleading or proof is 
required when it is alleged that a discriminatory act or discriminatory animus of 
one or a minority of members of a multi-member decision-making body was a 
motivating factor for an adverse employment action. 
I.  APPEAL SUMMARY 
[¶3]  The Town of Millinocket appeals and Mary Walsh cross-appeals from 
the judgment and order of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) 
entered following a retrial at which the jury found that Walsh, the former Town 
Recreation 
Director, 
had 
engaged 
in 
activities 
protected 
by 
Maine’s 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840 (2010),1 when she reported 
to the Maine Department of Conservation unsafe conditions on Town-owned 
snowmobile trails, and that those protected activities were a substantial motivating 
cause for the Town’s decision to eliminate her position.  The jury awarded Walsh 
                                               
 
1  The Whistleblower’s Protection Act prohibits employment discrimination when an “employee, 
acting in good faith, . . . reports to the employer or a public body, orally or in writing, what the employee 
has reasonable cause to believe is a condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of . . . 
any other individual.”  26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(B) (2010).   
 
3 
$30,000 in compensatory damages, and, on issues left for the court, the court 
awarded Walsh back pay of more than $60,000, as well as attorney fees and costs.   
 
[¶4]  The Town argues that (1) it cannot be held liable on Walsh’s claim 
because there is no dispute that the majority of the seven-person Town Council 
was not motivated by discriminatory animus when it voted to eliminate Walsh’s 
position; and (2) the court’s causation instruction was erroneous because it did not 
require the jury to find that Walsh’s protected conduct was the substantial 
motivating factor for the votes of a majority of the Town Council. In her 
cross-appeal, Walsh contends that the court erred in (1) determining the amount of 
back pay to which she was entitled; (2) declining to order reinstatement to her 
position; and (3) refusing to award Walsh front pay until reinstatement to her 
former position was possible.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
II.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶5]  When a jury has found in favor of the plaintiff on her claim for 
employment discrimination, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  See Sullivan v. Porter, 2004 ME 134, ¶ 2, 861 A.2d 625; Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189 (2011).  
[¶6]  In 1993, Mary Walsh began working for the Town of Millinocket’s 
recreation department.  In 2000, she was promoted to recreation director.  One of 
Walsh’s responsibilities was to be the grant administrator for State grants to 
 
4 
support maintenance of the Town’s snowmobile trails.  The Town contracted with 
the Twin Pines Snowmobile Club to maintain and groom the trails.  To perform the 
grooming functions, Twin Pines utilized employees from New England Outdoor 
Center, a business owned and operated by Millinocket Town Councilor Matthew 
Polstein, who also served as Twin Pines’ president.  
[¶7]  In the winter of 2004-2005, Walsh complained repeatedly about the 
condition of the snowmobile trails to both the Town Manager and Polstein.  She 
asserted that the corners of the trails had been banked too high, that trail surfaces 
were “washboarded” (severely uneven), and that inadequate signage had been 
placed on the trails.  Because Walsh believed that the Town and Polstein were not 
responding adequately to her concerns, she complained to a snowmobile division 
director within the Maine Department of Conservation.  Polstein was aware of 
Walsh’s contact with the Department of Conservation.   
[¶8]  In February 2005, Walsh had lunch with friends at a local restaurant.  
She told them that she was frustrated that Polstein was not taking her concerns 
seriously.  Walsh also told her companions that she would not have a problem 
“calling the state on anyone who wasn’t doing their job.”  Two days later, Walsh 
received an email from Polstein that read, in part, “Mary, you should be careful 
about how loud you talk when you’re out on the town, talking town politics, i.e. 
 
5 
eating at the [restaurant]!  The walls always have ears in this town, as you should 
know.”   
[¶9]  In March, outside the same restaurant, Polstein blocked the car in 
which Walsh was sitting with his car so that she could not leave.  Polstein then 
shouted, “Mary, what did I tell you about having lunch at [the restaurant]?”  
Polstein asked Walsh what her problem was and became “visibly angry” when 
Walsh informed him that she had reported the trail maintenance problem to the 
Department of Conservation.  As a result of these incidents, Walsh felt threatened 
and believed that her job was in jeopardy, given Polstein’s position as a Town 
Councilor.   
[¶10]  In May 2005, a proposal that would lead to the outsourcing of the 
Town’s recreation services to another town was presented to the Town Council for 
a vote.  At the council meeting, only one local citizen—Polstein’s wife—spoke in 
favor of the proposal, which would eliminate Walsh’s position entirely.  Several 
citizens spoke against the proposal.  On June 23, 2005, the Town Council voted 
four to three in favor of outsourcing; Polstein was a member of the majority.  As a 
result of the vote, Walsh’s position was eliminated.   
[¶11]  Walsh filed a complaint of discrimination with the Maine Human 
Rights Commission, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4611 (2008) and 26 M.R.S. § 834-A 
 
6 
(2010).  After review, the Commission issued her a “right-to-sue” letter, pursuant 
to 5 M.R.S. § 4612(6) (2010).  
[¶12]  In June 2007, Walsh filed a complaint against the Town in the 
Superior Court, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4621 (2010), claiming a violation of the 
Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840.  The Town 
filed a motion for summary judgment based on its claim that because only one 
councilor possessed discriminatory animus against Walsh, the council’s decision 
could not be causally connected to that discrimination.  The court denied the 
motion. 
[¶13]  A jury trial began on September 8, 2008.  On September 10, 2008, the 
jury returned a verdict for Walsh and awarded her $25,000.  After the verdict, the 
Town filed a motion for a new trial.  The court granted the motion, concluding that 
it had erred in not allowing the Town to present testimony from the other members 
of the Town Council who had voted on the position elimination proposal. 
[¶14]  The second trial was held from August 17 to 20, 2009.  The facts 
discussed above are derived from the evidence presented at the second trial.  
During the trial, as the Town prepared to present the other Town Council members 
to testify, Walsh offered to stipulate that the other Town Council members who 
voted on the position elimination proposal were free of any discriminatory animus 
at the time.  Walsh’s stipulation offer was not accepted by the court, and two other 
 
7 
Town Council members testified.  No evidence was presented indicating that any 
Town Councilor, other than Polstein, held any discriminatory animus toward 
Walsh for her engaging in the protected conduct of reporting her concerns about 
the condition of the Town snowmobile trails to the Department of Conservation. 
[¶15]  After the conclusion of the evidence and closing arguments, the court 
instructed the jury.  On the liability issue the court advised the jury that Walsh had 
to prove that three elements of her discrimination claim against the Town were 
established to the preponderance of the evidence, a more likely than not, standard 
of proof.  For the first element, the court advised the jury that Walsh had to prove 
that she engaged in conduct that was protected by the WPA.  For the second 
element, the court advised the jury that Walsh had to prove that the Town 
subjected her to an adverse employment action.  While issues regarding these 
elements were contested at trial, no issue is raised on appeal contesting the jury’s 
findings regarding these first two elements.  Thus, the propriety of the court’s 
instructions and the jury’s findings on these points is assumed for purposes of this 
appeal.  
[¶16]  Causation was the principal issue at trial and is the principal issue on 
appeal.  On the causation question, the court instructed the jury that Walsh had to 
prove “a causal connection between her protected conduct and the adverse 
employment action that she suffered.”  Describing the question for the jury further, 
 
8 
the court advised:   “There is a causal connection if Ms. Walsh’s protected conduct 
was a substantial, even though perhaps not the only, factor motivating Ms. Walsh’s 
dismissal.”  The court continued, “Even if more than one factor affected the 
decision to eliminate Ms. Walsh’s position, this third element is satisfied if one 
factor is her protected conduct . . . and, in fact, it made a difference in determining 
whether to eliminate the position.”  The court concluded,  “If Ms. Walsh would not 
have been dismissed but for protected conduct[] under the Whistle Blower 
Protection Act, the existence of other reasonable grounds of discharge does not 
relieve the employer from liability.” 
[¶17]  The language of the court’s instruction tracked language we had 
suggested in Wells v. Franklin Broadcasting Corp. to address the causation issue, 
there in an age discrimination case, when there may be evidence of multiple causes 
for an employment action: 
the proper inquiry is whether age was a substantial, even though 
perhaps not the only, factor motivating the employee’s dismissal. . . . 
[T]he jury must be instructed that even if more than one factor affects 
the decision to dismiss an employee, the employee may recover if one 
factor is his age and in fact it made a difference in determining 
whether he was to be retained or discharged.  If an employee would 
not have been dismissed but for his age, the existence of other 
reasonable grounds for his discharge does not relieve the employer 
from liability under the applicable statutory provisions. 
 
403 A.2d 771, 773 (Me. 1979). 
 
9 
[¶18]  Following completion of the instructions, the court invited the parties 
to address concerns about the instructions at sidebar.  There, the Town reiterated its 
request, previously presented in a proposed instruction, that the jury be instructed 
that in order to find that Walsh’s protected conduct caused the decision to 
eliminate her position, the jury had to find that her protected conduct “was a 
substantial motivating factor—in other words that it made a difference—in the 
decision of a majority of the Town Councilors.”  The court declined the Town’s 
request to amend its instructions to require the jury to find that a majority of the 
Town Councilors had a discriminatory animus in order to find causation proven.  
The jury was then recessed to begin deliberations.     
[¶19]  As had occurred in the previous trial, the jury returned a verdict for 
Walsh, this time awarding her $30,000 in compensatory damages.  The Town 
moved for a judgment as a matter of law; the court denied the motion.  
[¶20]  Following a hearing on damages and several motions to amend the 
judgment, the court awarded Walsh $30,000 in compensatory damages, reflecting 
the jury verdict, an additional $61,232 in back pay plus interest, $71,864.50 in 
attorney fees, and more than $3,400 in costs and expenses.  The court declined to 
award Walsh the full amount of back pay she requested because it found that she 
did not mitigate her damages in 2008.  The court also declined to order Walsh’s 
 
10 
reinstatement or award Walsh front pay.  The Town timely appealed, and Walsh 
timely filed her cross-appeal.  
III.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Decision-maker Liability for Improper Motives of an Individual 
[¶21]  The United States Supreme Court recently held that an employer can 
be found liable for employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus 
of an employee who intentionally influenced, but did not make, the ultimate 
employment decision.  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189, 1194 
(2011).  Staub involved a claim of discrimination in violation of the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 4301-4334 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010).  In Staub, as in the instant appeal, 
the plaintiff did not contend that the employment decision-maker, there a company 
vice president, held any discriminatory animus that caused the adverse 
employment action.  Staub, 131 S. Ct at 1190.  However, the Court held that the 
discriminatory animus of other corporate employees was enough to support a 
finding of liability if the jury could have found that the actions of those with 
discriminatory animus influenced the decision-maker and thus became a 
motivating factor leading to the adverse employment action.  Id. at 1192-94. 
[¶22]  Although Staub involved a private employer and action by a single 
decision-maker, rather than a public employer and action by a multi-member 
 
11 
council, Staub addressed principles directly applicable to this appeal.  In Staub, the 
Court addressed the so-called “cat’s-paw” theory of liability.   Id. at 1190 & n.1.  
Normally, a decision-maker’s adverse employment action that is free of 
discriminatory animus is a subsequent, independent cause that insulates the 
decision-maker from liability for a prior act of an agent that was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.  However, the “cat’s-paw” theory provides that if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that the agent with an improper motive influenced the 
ultimate decision-maker’s decision, the agent’s improper motive may be imputed 
to the ultimate decision-maker, thereby establishing a causal link between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Id. at 1192.  See also 
Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2004).   
[¶23]  The Town of Millinocket argues that because only one member of the 
seven-member Town Council was proven to have exhibited discriminatory animus 
against Walsh, the Town cannot be held liable for discrimination, as a majority of 
the Council’s members did not discriminate against Walsh.  Thus, the Town 
argues, the court erred when it denied the Town’s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b).   
[¶24]  To prevail on a claim of unlawful retaliation pursuant to the WPA, 
Walsh had to prove, and the jury had to find, that: (1) she engaged in activity 
protected by the WPA; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) 
 
12 
a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.  Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157 ¶ 11, 864 
A.2d 169; DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 14, 719 A.2d 509.  Because the 
Town does not dispute the first two elements of the WPA analysis, the only issue 
on appeal is that of causation, specifically, whether Walsh’s complaints to the State 
concerning the condition of the Town’s snowmobile trails were a “substantial 
factor” or a “motivating factor” in the elimination of her position.  See Mt. Healthy 
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Stanley, 2004 ME 
157, ¶¶ 12, 24, 864 A.2d 169. 
[¶25]  In Wells we held that the proper inquiry on an employment 
discrimination claim is whether the discrimination itself—in this case retaliation 
against an employee who engaged in protected conduct pursuant to the WPA—
“was a substantial, even though perhaps not the only, factor motivating the 
employee’s dismissal.”  Wells, 403 A.2d at 773; see also Maine Human Rights 
Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1268 (Me. 1979). 
[¶26]  We have not explicitly addressed the circumstances under which 
discriminatory animus of one or a minority of members of a multi-member local 
council or commission can be found to be a “substantial factor” or a “motivating 
factor” causing an adverse employment action approved by the multi-member 
body.    The Town contends that we should adopt the quantitative approach of the 
 
13 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which requires that in 
order for a plaintiff to recover, she “must show that the municipal body itself acted 
with a discriminatory purpose or motive.”  See Matthews v. Columbia Cnty., 294 
F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).  In Matthews, the court, concluding that 
improper motives of one member of a three-member majority was insufficient to 
impute improper motive and thus causation to an entire decision-making body, 
held that “[b]ecause policymaking authority rests with the Commission as an 
entity, the County can be subject to liability only if the Commission itself acted 
with an unconstitutional motive.”  Id.  The court concluded that it was improper to 
hold the County liable based on the improper motives of only one commissioner.  
Id. at 1298.   
[¶27]  The Eleventh Circuit’s approach appears to not fully appreciate the 
decision-making dynamics of local councils and commissions, which can be 
influenced by the improper but unstated views of a member with a particular 
interest in a matter to whom other members may defer in collegial discussions.  As 
the First Circuit has observed, “[B]ecause discriminatory animus is insidious and a 
clever pretext can be hard to unmask . . . it may be overly mechanistic to hold 
[a plaintiff] to strict proof of the subjective intentions of a numerical majority of 
council members.”  Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 
 
14 
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 
(1998).  
[¶28]  In a case involving a unanimous vote of a five-member board on 
which one member had articulated a discriminatory animus as a basis for his vote, 
the Second Circuit, allowing a cause to proceed, noted: “[I]t is possible that, even 
if a majority of the individuals that participate in the decision lack unconstitutional 
motives, the unconstitutional intentions of a minority of those involved can taint 
the ultimate outcome.”  Cine Sk8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 786 
(2nd Cir. 2007). 
[¶29]  The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Matthews may also be inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Staub that an adverse employment action 
taken by a corporate decision-maker with no improper motive may be actionable if 
the decision-maker’s adverse employment decision is influenced or promoted by 
other corporate agents who have acted with a discriminatory animus.  See 131 
S. Ct. at 1192-94; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) 
(commenting that “[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a 
problematic undertaking” when the action is taken by a multi-member government 
body). 
[¶30]  The trial court in the present case employed the “motivating factor” or 
“substantial factor” causation standard articulated in Staub and in our prior 
 
15 
opinions in Stanley and Wells.2  The jury could, and apparently did, infer from the 
evidence in the record that the termination of Walsh’s job would not have occurred 
but for Polstein’s discriminatory animus.  Polstein, because of his relationship to 
the snowmobile club and the trail grooming contractor, may have been viewed 
with significant deference by other councilors who may have had a lesser interest 
in the issue.  In addition, Polstein was the deciding vote.  Without his vote, the 
tally would have been split evenly, resulting in the resolution not passing and 
Walsh keeping her job.  
[¶31]  An improper motive or discriminatory animus of one member of a 
multi-member council or commission may create an actionable claim against the 
governmental entity if a plaintiff proves, and the jury finds, that the improper 
motive or discriminatory animus was a motivating factor or a substantial cause for 
an adverse employment action taken against a plaintiff who is a member of a 
protected class or who has engaged in a protected activity.  In this case, the 
plaintiff proved and the jury found such a causal connection between Polstein’s 
discriminatory animus and the adverse employment action taken by the Town.  
                                               
 
2  The court’s instruction in this case, consistent with Wells, also used “but for” language, but in a 
different and broader context than an opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
cited by the Town to support its argument.  Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 262 
(6th Cir. 2006).  The Sixth Circuit held that “where improperly motivated members supply the deciding 
margin, the board itself is liable.”  Id.  However, it is the influence of those with discriminatory animus, 
not the vote count, that is, in the final analysis, the proper focus of the inquiry for the causation question.  
 
 
16 
“[W]e will not substitute our judgment as to the weight or credibility of the 
evidence for that of the fact-finder if there is evidence in the record to rationally 
support the trial court’s result.”  State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003.  
With the jury having been instructed in accordance with the law as we have 
articulated it over the past three decades, and there being evidence in the record to 
support the jury’s verdict, the trial court did not err in denying the Town’s motion 
for a judgment as a matter of law. 
B. 
Instructions to the Jury on Causation 
[¶32]  The Town of Millinocket contends that the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury on causation, because it did not instruct the jury that it had to 
find that Walsh had proven that a majority of the Town Council had acted with a 
discriminatory animus in order to render a verdict for Walsh.  This is, in essence, 
and as conceded by the Town at oral argument, the same argument as the Town’s 
first argument concerning the legal standard to be applied to the causation issue.  
Our reasoning above, addressing the legal standards to be applied in reviewing the 
actions of a multi-member council or commission, applies equally to this 
argument.  
C. 
Remedies of Back Pay, Front Pay, and Reinstatement 
 
[¶33]  Walsh argues that the court erred when it reduced the amount of back 
pay it awarded when it found that Walsh “no longer made reasonable efforts to 
 
17 
locate suitable employment because she unduly limited the scope of her search.” 
Walsh further contends that the court inappropriately shifted the burden of proof 
for damage mitigation to her, rather than to the Town.  
[¶34]  We have held that “back pay awarded as relief for unlawful 
employment discrimination is to be reduced by actual earnings on another job 
during the pertinent period, or by whatever amount [the victim] could with 
reasonable diligence have earned during that time.”  Maine Human Rights Comm’n 
v. Dep’t of Corrections, 474 A.2d 860, 869 (Me. 1984).  The employer has the 
“burden to prove that the employee could have mitigated her damages by finding 
other employment.”  LeBlond v. Sentinel Serv., 635 A.2d 943, 945 (Me. 1993).  
We will uphold an award of back pay or a limitation on the amount of back pay 
“absent clear error by the grant of the award or an abuse of discretion in the 
amount awarded.”  Id.  
[¶35]  In the present case, the Town demonstrated that after Walsh moved to 
Lincoln in 2007, she did not apply for similar recreation-related positions in the 
Bangor area that were advertised in the Bangor Daily News.  The trial court found 
that, in 2008, she “no longer made reasonable efforts to locate suitable 
employment because she unduly limited the scope of her search, which impaired 
her ability to apply for reasonable employment opportunities,” and accordingly 
concluded that she failed to mitigate her damages.  The court differentiated 
 
18 
Walsh’s situation from the situation presented in Maine Human Rights 
Commission v. Dep’t of Corrections, 474 A.2d at 869, because, it reasoned, “there 
is a huge difference between expecting a person from Springvale to accept 
employment in Skowhegan [a commute or move of nearly two-and-one-half hours] 
and expecting a person from Lincoln to pursue employment in greater Bangor [a 
commute or move of approximately one hour].”  Considering our deferential 
standard of review, the trial court’s findings on the back pay issue are supported by 
the record and are not clearly erroneous. 
[¶36]  Walsh argues that because reinstatement, when possible, is the 
preferred remedy in the context of employment discrimination, the trial court erred 
when it did not order her reinstatement to the position of recreation director.  
Walsh offers that her reinstatement is not impossible, as ongoing hostility between 
her and the Town was not proven and that the two-year contract that effectively 
removed her from her position expired in July 2009, which would have allowed 
her to retake her position with the Town.   
[¶37]  We review a trial court’s determination concerning the feasibility of   
reinstatement for clear error to the extent that the determination relies on findings 
of fact and for an abuse of discretion to the extent that the determination relies on 
evaluative factors and choices.  See Wells v. Powers, 2005 ME 62, ¶ 2, 873 A.2d 
 
19 
361 (explaining clear error review); Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 
A.2d 1074 (explaining abuse of discretion review).   
[¶38]  The trial court found that after Walsh’s position was eliminated in 
July 2005, it has not existed.  Instead, the Town entered into an outsourcing 
contract with the Town of East Millinocket that has remained in effect to 
consolidate recreation services between the towns.  In addition to the court’s 
finding that the position no longer exists, the trial court determined that it would 
not order reinstatement “because it is predictable that the employer-employee 
relationship in this small workplace will remain hostile.”   
[¶39]  The trial court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it 
determined that reinstatement would be impractical or infeasible.  Similar to the 
situation in Mercier v. Town of Fairfield, 628 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Me. 1993), the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order that Walsh be reinstated 
to a position that no longer exists.  
[¶40]  Walsh finally contends that, should reinstatement be impossible, she 
is entitled to front pay, which the trial court did not award to her.  Walsh suggests 
that because front pay is the closest approximation to reinstatement a court can 
award in a discrimination case, front pay should have been awarded to her in this 
case.  
 
20 
[¶41]  We review the trial court’s decision to reward front pay or not for an 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 1056.  “In the employment context, . . . reinstatement or, 
if reinstatement is not feasible, front pay, is a proper remedy for a deprivation of 
procedural due process unless it is shown that the discharge was otherwise 
justified.”  Id. 
[¶42]  In its order, the trial court did not make “a front pay award” 
“[b]ecause the Court’s findings with regard to mitigation also apply to front pay.”  
This decision was not an abuse of discretion and will be affirmed. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for the Town of Millinocket: 
 
Melissa A. Hewey, Esq.   (orally) 
Kaighn Smith, Esq. 
Elek A. Miller, Esq. 
Drummond Woodsum 
84 Marginal Way, Suite 600 
Portland, Maine  04101-2480 
 
Attorneys for Mary Walsh: 
 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq.   (orally) 
Julie D. Farr, Esq. 
Gilbert & Greif, P.A. 
82 Columbia Street 
PO Box 2339 
Bangor, Maine  04402-2339 
 
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2007-154 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY