Title: Nowak v. St. Rita High School

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90418-Agenda 26-May 2001.
RONALD NOWAK, Appellee, v. ST. RITA HIGH SCHOOL, 
 								Appellant.
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
 
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Plaintiff, Ronald Nowak,(1) filed this action against the
defendant, St. Rita High School, seeking recovery on the bases of
promissory estoppel and breach of contract for defendant's alleged
violation of established salary policies and for improper
termination of plaintiff's employment contract as a tenured
teacher. Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, consisted of four
counts. Counts I and IV alleged that defendant had breached the
salary and tenure provisions of plaintiff's written employment
contract. Counts II and III, sounding in contract and promissory
estoppel, respectively, asserted claims for breach of an alleged
policy whereby defendant paid a portion of the salary of a teacher
on medical leave, i.e., the difference between the teacher's full
salary and that paid to a substitute. The circuit court of Cook
County dismissed counts I and IV with prejudice and entered
summary judgment for defendant on counts II and III. Plaintiff
appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment
on counts II and III, as well as the dismissal of count I with
prejudice. However, the court reversed the dismissal of count IV
and remanded the cause for further proceedings thereon. No.
1-99-2591 (order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and
we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court. We set forth
hereafter the facts pertinent to our disposition.
	Plaintiff began teaching full time at St. Rita in 1965.
Beginning in December 1990, plaintiff experienced severe health
problems. Plaintiff was absent from St. Rita between December
29, 1990, and approximately April 1, 1991, because he was
hospitalized for quadruple coronary by-pass surgery and a
subsequent infection. Plaintiff missed the final eight days of the
academic year in May 1991 because of an infection in his right leg.
As a result of these hospitalizations, plaintiff missed 65½ regular
school days and three examination days at the end of the school
year.
	On September 9, 1992, five days after the start of the 1992-93
academic year, plaintiff was taken to the hospital after he
experienced back problems that prevented him from standing
erect. He subsequently underwent surgery to stabilize his spine.
On September 29, 1992, plaintiff was transferred to a
rehabilitation center until his discharge on December 3, 1992.
	During plaintiff's absence, defendant hired a substitute
teacher, maintained plaintiff's medical insurance, and continued
to pay him a partial salary, representing the difference between
plaintiff's salary and the salary paid to the substitute teacher.
	In March of 1993, plaintiff attempted to return to work at St.
Rita. Plaintiff and his therapists met with Joseph Bamberger,
assistant principal at St. Rita, to discuss the accommodations
necessary to facilitate plaintiff's return to the classroom. As a
result of that meeting, defendant made the following
accommodations: (1) plaintiff was assigned a classroom in close
proximity to the faculty lounge and rest rooms; (2) plaintiff was
assigned a room with elevated seating so he could observe and
better control his class while he remained seated; (3) plaintiff was
assigned a parking space in close proximity to his classroom; and
(4) plaintiff was allowed to teach half days, and defendant agreed
to provide a substitute teacher for the classes he did not teach. For
four days, between March 15 and March 18, 1993, plaintiff was
able to fulfill his responsibility of teaching half days. However, on
March 24, 1993, plaintiff experienced severe swelling in his joints,
including ankles, knees, elbows and hands. This swelling rendered
plaintiff unable to stand, walk, or grasp.
	On March 24, 1993, plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital,
where he remained until June 21, 1993. During this hospital stay,
plaintiff underwent operations on both of his hands and had an
above-the-knee amputation of his left leg. While hospitalized, an
application was submitted by or on behalf of plaintiff to the Social
Security Administration (SSA) for social security disability
benefits, and plaintiff thereafter spoke with an SSA representative
to discuss the application for benefits. Subsequently, plaintiff was
transferred to another treatment facility for additional physical
therapy. On July 28, 1993, plaintiff was moved to a nursing home
until his discharge to his home on October 1, 1993, where he
received an additional five months of in-home therapy. In
November of 1993, the SSA determined that plaintiff was disabled
and he began receiving disability benefits retroactive to September
15, 1992, the date of his initial disability. Between March of 1993
and the late spring or early summer of 1994, Bamberger met with
plaintiff on several occasions, attempting to ascertain when
plaintiff would be able to resume his teaching duties. At the
beginning of the 1993-94 academic year, defendant discontinued
payment of plaintiff's salary differential. At that time, plaintiff did
not advise defendant that he intended to return to the classroom,
nor did he formally request a leave of absence.
	On October 7, 1994, defendant informed plaintiff that his
employment was terminated due to his extended illness and
ongoing inability to fulfill his teaching responsibilities. Defendant
continued to provide plaintiff with medical benefits until March
1995.
	Following his termination, plaintiff filed a timely charge of
employment discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on June 26, 1995. Plaintiff filed a federal action on
August 9, 1995. In that action, plaintiff sought recovery for
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
(42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1997)) and also asserted
a supplemental, or pendent, state claim for breach of his
employment contract. As the district court determined, in order for
plaintiff to prevail on his ADA claim, he was required to prove
that he was a "qualified individual with a disability," i.e., at the
time of St. Rita's decision to discharge him, he possessed the
necessary skills to perform his job and he was willing and able to
demonstrate those skills by coming to work on a regular basis. The
district court found plaintiff's "failure to appear at work for nearly
eighteen months before his discharge and his receipt of Social
Security disability payments *** indicate conclusively *** that he
is not a 'qualified individual' under the ADA." Consequently, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant as
to the ADA claim and, exercising its statutory discretion (see 28
U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) (1994)), "decline[d] to assert jurisdiction" over
the pendent state claim, dismissing it "for lack of jurisdiction."
Plaintiff appealed.
	The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on the ADA claim, the "sole
issue" before the court. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998). Noting the district court's ruling that
plaintiff had "failed to provide any evidence, medical or otherwise,
that on October 7, 1994, he was able to perform the essential
functions of his position as a teacher at St. Rita" (Nowak, 142 F.3d
at 1003), the court of appeals reviewed the facts and reached the
same conclusion:
			"The undisputed facts show that Nowak was unable to
perform an essential function-regular attendance-required
of a teacher at St. Rita. Prior to his termination, Nowak
was absent from his teaching position for more than
eighteen months. During his absence from St. Rita,
Nowak received SSI Benefits for more than sixteen
months and apparently still receives them today. In order
to receive this benefit, Nowak certified to the SSA that he
was unable to perform the duties of his job. Nowak
continues to receive SSI Benefits and has not notified the
SSA that he is able to return to work. At no time, during
the more than eighteen months Nowak was absent from
his teaching position, did he contact St. Rita
administrators to inform them that it was his intention to
return to his teaching duties." Nowak, 142 F.3d  at 1003-04.
Answering plaintiff's averment that he told Bamberger on the day
of his termination he was ready to return to work, and that his
medical records substantiated his assertion that he could function
as a teacher, the court responded that plaintiff "must prove that at
the time of St. Rita's decision to discharge him, he possessed the
necessary skills to perform his job and that he was willing and able
to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.
*** He fails *** to point to anything in [the] medical records
indicating he was capable or willing to come to work on a regular
basis prior to the termination decision." (Emphases added.)
Nowak, 142 F.3d  at 1003. The court of appeals concluded its
analysis by citing cases in support of its disposition, holding,
respectively, that the ADA does not protect an employee from
being fired because of illness (Christian v. St. Anthony Medical
Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997)) and that an
employee who cannot attend work is not a "qualified individual
with a disability" under the ADA (Rogers v. International Marine
Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996). Nowak, 142 F.3d  at 1004.
	As stated hereinabove, after his state claim was dismissed in
the federal district court for "lack of jurisdiction," plaintiff filed
the instant action in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit
court ultimately dismissed counts I and IV of plaintiff's amended
complaint with prejudice pursuant to defendant's section 2-619
motion (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) and entered summary
judgment for defendant on counts II and III.
	In the ensuing appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, except with respect to count IV of
plaintiff's complaint. As to that count, the appellate court reversed
the circuit court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Count IV alleged that defendant had breached the tenure
provisions of the parties' written employment contract by failing
to comply with the procedures mandated for removal of a teacher
from tenure.
	The tenure provisions of the contract provide that a teacher
cannot be removed from tenure until he has received written notice
and has been afforded three formal conferences. Conferences must
be at least one month apart, and the teacher is to be given written
notice for each conference. If an initial conference fails to result in
"sufficient improvement," or "if matters need further
clarification," second and third conferences are required before the
matter can be submitted to a tenure board for final disposition. At
the final hearing before the board, the teacher must be afforded
certain procedural safeguards, such as the right "to present his
case, to bring an advisor with him, and to present witnesses on his
behalf." The teacher also has the right to cross-examine witnesses
against him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board may
consider removal of a teacher "if he does not significantly aid the
school in furthering its goals."A decision must be rendered within
one month, and a teacher cannot be removed from tenure unless
seven of the nine board members agree that removal is the
appropriate disposition.
	The appellate court determined the language of the tenure
provisions in the parties' contract was "a clear and unambiguous
expression of the parties' intent" and "obligated defendant to
comply with the notice and hearing provisions contained therein."
The court held plaintiff had "affirmatively alleged that defendant
had failed to give [him] the written notices and hearings which are
mandated by the tenure policy" and, for purposes of the
defendant's motion to dismiss, those allegations must be accepted
as true. While the appellate court acknowledged informal contacts
between the parties during plaintiff's prolonged illness, the court
found those contacts "manifestly insufficient to constitute
compliance" with the contract's tenure provisions. Thus, the
pleadings before the trial court established a genuine issue of
material fact which precluded dismissal of count IV. The appellate
court rejected defendant's contention that the doctrine of res
judicata barred plaintiff from raising his tenure claim in state
court, finding that plaintiff had asserted his state claim in the
federal action, unlike the plaintiff in River Park, Inc. v. City of
Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290 (1998), upon which defendant
relied, and that the dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract claim
in federal court "solely upon a decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction" was not "a determination on the merits"
for purposes of res judicata.
	We review de novo the granting of a section 2-619 motion to
dismiss. Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 175 (2000). Where,
as here, a cause of action is dismissed pursuant to a section 2-619
motion, the questions on appeal are whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists and whether the defendant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 398-99 (1996).
	Defendant now argues that the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel bar assertion of plaintiff's contract tenure claim.
Defendant also contends that plaintiff's conduct amounted to
abandonment of his tenure rights under the contract. We find no
merit in these contentions.
	A prior judgment may have preclusive effects in a subsequent
action under both res judicata and collateral estoppel. The doctrine
of res judicata provides that a final judgment rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes
an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action. When res judicata is established as a
bar against the prosecution of a second action between the same
parties upon the same claim or demand it is conclusive not only as
to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other matter which might have been offered
for that purpose. Housing Authority v. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 101 Ill. 2d 246, 251-52 (1984).
	The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a party, or
someone in privity with a party, participates in two separate and
consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some
controlling fact or question material to the determination of both
causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former suit by
a court of competent jurisdiction. The adjudication of the fact or
question in the first cause will, if properly presented, be conclusive
of the same question in the later suit, but the judgment in the first
suit operates as an estoppel only as to the point or question
actually litigated and determined and not as to other matters which
might have been litigated and determined. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 101 Ill. 2d  at 252.
	For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following three
requirements must be satisfied: (1) there was a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) there
is an identity of cause of action, and (3) there is an identity of
parties or their privies. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park,
184 Ill. 2d 290, 302 (1998). Under Illinois law, the dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim is an adjudication on the
merits, while the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is not considered a decision on the merits of the
complaint. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 303. Res judicata will not be
applied where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so. Altair
Corp. v. Grand Premier Trust & Investment, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d
57, 62-63 (2000); Weisman v. Schiller, Ducanto & Fleck, 314 Ill.
App. 3d 577, 581 (2000).
	The minimum threshold requirements for the application of
collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in
question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior
adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
Du Page Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 
195 Ill. 2d 71, 77 (2001); American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2000); Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (1997). Application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel must be narrowly tailored to fit the precise facts and
issues that were clearly determined in the prior judgment.
Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447, 467 (1996).
	Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Du Page Forklift
Service, 195 Ill. 2d  at 77. Even where the threshold elements of the
doctrine are satisfied, collateral estoppel must not be applied to
preclude parties from presenting their claims or defenses unless it
is clear that no unfairness results to the party being estopped.
Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d  at 388; Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191-92. In
deciding whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable
in a particular situation, a court must balance the need to limit
litigation against the right of a fair adversary proceeding in which
a party may fully present his case. In determining whether a party
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in a prior
action, those elements which comprise the practical realities of
litigation must be examined. Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 192.
	We address first defendant's contention that res judicata bars
count IV of plaintiff's amended complaint and defendant's
reliance upon our decision in River Park in support of that
argument.
	In River Park, plaintiff initially filed a federal civil rights
action pursuant to section 1983 (42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994)) and
failed to assert therein claims for abuse of governmental power
and breach of contract, claims which plaintiff thereafter sought to
raise in state court. We held that the circuit court had properly
dismissed the subsequently asserted state claims under the doctrine
of res judicata. Employing the "transactional" test, we found
identity of cause of action and thus determined that the state
claims were barred because plaintiff had not asserted them in the
federal action. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 313-14. The transactional
test provides that the assertion of different kinds or theories of
relief still constitutes a single cause of action for purposes of res
judicata if a single group of operative facts gives rise to the
assertion of relief. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 307. Because plaintiff
was required to assert all of its related claims in the federal action,
and failed to do so, and because the dismissal of the federal action
constituted an adjudication on the merits for purposes of Supreme
Court Rule 273 (134 Ill. 2d R. 273), we found that the doctrine of
res judicata had been properly applied by the circuit court to bar
the subsequent assertion of claims that should have been raised in
the federal action.
	In this case, plaintiff asserted his contract tenure claim in the
federal action, as required by the transactional test, only to have
his claim dismissed by the district court "for lack of jurisdiction"
after an adverse decision on his ADA claim. Whether that
dismissal was discretionary or otherwise is beside the point; it was
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. There was no adjudication of
the merits on that claim despite plaintiff's proper and timely
assertion of the claim. With respect to that timely asserted claim,
plaintiff did not get his day in court and, therefore, res judicata
does not apply.
	Defendant argues that the claim nonetheless arose from a
single transaction and thus an adjudication on plaintiff's ADA
claim constitutes an adjudication of both as far as application of
the doctrine of res judicata is concerned. Such a contention is
neither consistent with notions of fairness nor supported by
controlling authority.
	Although the claims in question may be initially regarded as
a single cause of action for application of res judicata, subsequent
events may alter their status. For example, res judicata does not
apply to bar an independent claim of part of the same cause of
action if the court in the first action expressly reserves the
plaintiff's right to maintain the second action or the plaintiff is
unable to obtain relief on his claim because of a restriction of the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in the first action. Airtite v.
DPR Ltd. Partnership, 265 Ill. App. 3d 214, 219 (1994);
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §26(1) (1982).
	In River Park, we found it significant that plaintiff did not
raise claims that "could have been" asserted in federal court and
that the federal court might have exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 317-18.
Had plaintiff in that case asserted all of its claims in the federal
action, the worst case scenario for plaintiff would have entailed a
dismissal of certain claims by the federal court for lack of federal
jurisdiction. Plaintiff could then have properly pursued its claims
in state court. Because plaintiff in River Park "could have raised"
its various claims in the federal court in the first instance, but did
not, an adjudication of the claim that was raised acted as a bar to
the subsequent assertion of claims not raised in the federal
proceeding. The result in River Park is consistent with the purpose
of res judicata, i.e., to promote judicial economy by requiring
parties to litigate, in one case, all rights arising out of the same set
of operative facts. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 319. Moreover, there
is no unfairness to plaintiff: the federal court either addresses the
merits of plaintiff's claims or it exercises its discretion and
declines jurisdiction over pendent claims, in which case they can
be pursued in state court.
	 The facts of the instant case place it squarely within the
exceptions to the application of res judicata as set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §26(1) (1982), and in Airtite,
both of which were cited by this court in River Park. By declining
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's pendent state claim, dismissing it
for lack of jurisdiction, the district court in effect reserved
plaintiff's right to pursue the matter in state court. The doctrine of
res judicata need not be applied in a manner inconsistent with
fundamental fairness. People v. Somerville, 42 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1969);
Airtite, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 219. The doctrine does not apply in this
case.
	Defendant's argument for the application of collateral
estoppel is no more persuasive. Defendant's collateral estoppel
argument must fail because the issues are not identical, as required
for application of that doctrine. See Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191
(the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the
one presented in the suit in question). We cannot agree with
defendant's suggestion that the issues decided by the federal court
in its resolution of the ADA matter are the same as those pertinent
to plaintiff's contract tenure claim.
	Again and again, the court of appeals referred to the relevant
time for ADA analysis as "prior to" and "the time of [plaintiff's]
termination." Nowak, 142 F.3d  at 1003-04. The framework and
focus of ADA analysis is essentially retrospective. As the court of
appeals noted, in order for plaintiff to succeed on his ADA claim,
he was required to prove, inter alia, "that on October 7, 1994 [the
date of his termination], he possessed the necessary skills to
perform his job, and that he was willing and able to demonstrate
these skills by coming to work on a regular basis." (Emphases
added.) Nowak, 142 F.3d  at 1003. The critical date for purposes of
the ADA inquiry was the date of termination. In view of his
extended illness and prolonged absence, plaintiff's inability to
perform his job on the date of termination meant that the ADA
afforded him no protection.
	That determination has nothing to do with the independent
protection to which plaintiff was entitled by reason of tenure
provisions in the parties' contract. The focus of the tenure
resolution procedure, to which plaintiff would seem to be entitled
by contract, is at the outset prospective and remedial. The clear
objectives of that procedure are, initially, to impress upon an
errant teacher the gravity of his situation and to attempt to rectify
unacceptable conditions or behavior. The three required
conferences serve both as a series of formal warnings and a
practical means to resolve problems between parties of long-standing association. Only after the initial remedial efforts prove
unsuccessful is a hearing held to determine the teacher's fate. Even
then, removal from tenure requires the consensus of seven
members of the tenure board, rather than the edict of one. If we
were to accept the defendant's argument, we would in effect be
condoning the defendant's disregard of the very tenure apparatus
which the parties had established to protect their respective rights
and interests. The fact that plaintiff had not proven himself able to
come to work on a regular basis is not identical to the questions of
whether defendant had accorded plaintiff his rights under the
parties' contract and whether he could, in the months coinciding
with the remedial tenure conferences, rectify his attendance
problems. A finding that plaintiff was unable to perform on
October 7, 1994, does not necessarily mean that he could not, after
he was afforded his rights under the remedial provisions of the
tenure resolution procedure, "significantly aid the school in
furthering its goals" in the future. Because the issues are not
identical, collateral estoppel does not bar assertion of the claim set
forth in count IV of plaintiff's amended complaint.
	The language of the parties' tenure policy was clear and
unambiguous. It obligated defendant to comply with the formal
tenure provisions of the parties' contract regarding notice,
remediation, hearing and removal. As the appellate court
concluded, the "informal" contacts between the parties were
"manifestly insufficient" to constitute compliance with those
provisions. Obviously, the formality of the procedure serves a
purpose: to impress upon the teacher the seriousness of his or her
situation and thus further the remedial objectives of the
procedure's initial stages. Like the appellate court, we conclude
that plaintiff properly asserted a claim for breach of the tenure
provisions of his employment contract.
	Finally, we reject the contention that defendant was justified
in ignoring the tenure provisions of the parties' contract because
plaintiff's conduct constituted abandonment of his contract rights.
In fairly rapid succession, this plaintiff experienced quadruple
coronary by-pass surgery, a serious infection of his right leg, back
surgery, operations on both of his hands, and an above-the-knee
amputation of his left leg. His prolonged absence from St. Rita's
was clearly related to his medical condition. Defendant knew that
from regular contacts with plaintiff. Defendant acknowledged in
a letter that plaintiff was on sick leave. We attach little
significance to the fact that plaintiff could not provide defendant
with a date certain upon which he could return. He did try, albeit
unsuccessfully, to return to teaching on more than one occasion.
At the time of his termination, he indicated to defendant that he
wished to return and he hoped he could do so with more therapy
and time. The fact that plaintiff had been unable to do so by the
date of his termination is no more conclusive as to his intentions
and the issue of abandonment than it was in our discussion of
collateral estoppel. We find meritless defendant's suggestion that
plaintiff's circumstances are somehow comparable to those of the
teachers in cases defendant has cited. If we were to accept
defendant's argument, that a teacher "abandons" his contract rights
when he experiences an extended illness and can neither project
the date of his return nor perform his duties on the date of the
school's unilateral decision to terminate him, then tenure rights
could be rendered virtually worthless. We find no dispositive
evidence or findings in the record to date that would indicate that
plaintiff abandoned, i.e., voluntarily relinquished, his tenure rights
under the parties' contract.
	In conclusion, we find that count IV of plaintiff's amended
complaint was improperly dismissed by the circuit court. Genuine
issues of material fact exist as to count IV and the claim asserted
therein is not precluded as a matter of law. Under the judgment of
the appellate court, the cause will be remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings thereon. Since neither plaintiff nor
defendant questions the propriety of the appellate court's rulings
as to other counts of plaintiff's amended complaint, we need not
address the appellate court's disposition thereof. The appellate
court's judgment is therefore affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.

1.      1This court allowed a motion to substitute Tony Nowak as special
administrator of the estate of Ronald Nowak upon notice of his death
after the cause was taken under advisement.