Title: Gordon v. Collins

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
KATHLEEN M. GORDON,                      
           
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
DONALD E. COLLINS,  
     
 
 
     
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
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   Nos. 233, 234, and 235, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Family Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   File Nos. CN87-1214; 1215 
   CPI Nos. 04-6672; 04430                   
 
Submitted:  October 4, 2004   
Decided:  
December  28, 2004    
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R1 
 
 
This 28th day of December 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s briefs 
on appeal and the appellee’s motions to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that:2 
 
(1) 
Petitioner-appellant Kathleen M. Gordon (“Mother”) appeals from an 
order of the Family Court accepting the Commissioner’s dismissal of Mother’s 
petition for an order for protection from abuse (“PFA”) against respondent-
appellee Donald E. Collins (“Father”) on behalf of the parties’ daughter, Karen.  
Mother also appeals from the Family Court’s orders accepting the Commissioner’s 
                                                 
1 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
2 All three of the instant appeals relate to the same Family Court order. Therefore, in the interest 
of judicial economy, we will dispose of all three appeals in this Order. 
 
 
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dismissal of Mother’s two subsequent PFA petitions.  Father has moved to affirm 
the Family Court’s orders on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Mother’s 
opening briefs that the appeals are without merit.3  We agree and AFFIRM.  
 
(2) 
This litigation has a long history, beginning in July 2000.  At that 
time, 
the 
Delaware 
Division 
of 
Family 
Services 
(“DFS”) 
filed 
a 
dependency/neglect petition for custody of Karen, who was living with Mother.  
The petition was denied, although DFS was permitted three unannounced visits at 
Mother’s home during the subsequent three-month period.  In March 2001, after 
filing a PFA petition, Father was granted temporary custody of Karen.   
 
(3) 
In August 2001, DFS filed a second petition for custody.  At that time, 
Karen was placed with her maternal grandparents.  In March 2002, Karen was 
again placed with Mother.  During 2002, Mother filed numerous motions relating 
to child support.  In November 2002, the Family Court found it necessary to issue 
several orders to control Mother’s filings, which the Court found to be frivolous.  
Despite the Family Court’s orders, Mother continued to file frivolous motions 
during 2003.   
 
(4) 
On December 5, 2003, the Family Court Commissioner held a hearing 
on PFA petitions filed by Mother and Father, each of whom was represented by 
                                                 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
 
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counsel.  Karen, who was then 17 years old and pregnant with her boyfriend’s 
child, appeared at the hearing.  The Commissioner offered Karen representation by 
a guardian ad litem, but she chose to represent herself.   
 
(5) 
Mother’s attorney argued that Father had abused Karen by failing to 
provide her with health insurance or access to prenatal care for her unborn child, 
by failing to make sure she took her asthma medication, and by permitting conflict 
between Karen and Father’s wife.  Karen testified, among other things, that she 
had a good relationship with Father, but had been punched in the head and beaten 
with a broomstick by Mother.  Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
Commissioner granted Father’s PFA petition against Mother and dismissed 
Mother’s PFA petition against Father.   
 
(6) 
On February 13, 2004, Mother filed another PFA petition, which the 
Commissioner dismissed on the ground that Mother’s claims were res judicata.  On 
March 1, 2004, Mother filed yet another PFA petition, which alleged that her 
second petition should not have been dismissed because it contained new 
allegations.  The Commissioner dismissed that petition and issued an order 
prohibiting Mother from filing any further petitions on Karen’s behalf without 
Karen’s co-signature, and awarded attorney’s fees to Father.  Mother filed several 
 
 
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motions seeking review of the Commissioner’s orders and several motions for 
reconsideration, all of which were denied by the Family Court.      
 
(7) 
In this appeal, Mother claims that the Family Court erred: (a) by 
accepting the Commissioner’s orders, because the Commissioner utilized an 
erroneous legal definition of “abuse” and did not permit Mother to fully present all 
her claims; (b) by accepting the Commissioner’s order requiring Mother to pay 
Father’s attorney’s fees; and (c) by denying Mother’s petitions for review of the 
Commissioner’s orders and her motions for reconsideration. 
 
(8) 
The Family Court reviews de novo those portions of a 
Commissioner’s order to which objection is made and may accept, reject or modify 
the order in whole or in part, and may receive further evidence or remand the 
matter to the Commissioner with instructions.4  This Court’s review of appeals 
from the Family Court extends to review of the facts and the law.5  If the Family 
Court has applied the law correctly, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.6 
 
(9) 
We have reviewed carefully the record in this case, including the 
transcripts of the hearings before the Family Court Commissioner, the 
Commissioner’s orders and the Family Court judge’s orders accepting the orders of 
the Commissioner and denying Mother’s motions for reconsideration.  We find 
                                                 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 915(d) (1); Fam. Ct. Civ. Proc. R. 53.1(e). 
5 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
6 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
 
 
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that the Commissioner applied the proper statutory definitions of “abuse” in 
granting Father’s PFA petition and dismissing Mother’s PFA petition;7 that the 
Commissioner properly determined that the claims in Mother’s second and third 
PFA petitions were res judicata;8 and that the Commissioner afforded Mother 
ample opportunity to present her claims.  We also find no error or abuse of 
discretion in the Family Court’s acceptance of the Commissioner’s orders or in its 
denial of Mother’s motions for reconsideration.  Moreover, the Commissioner’s 
award of attorney’s fees, which the Family Court accepted, was clearly justified 
given Mother’s pattern of vexatious filings.9       
 
(10) It is manifest on the face of Gordon’s opening brief that these appeals 
are without merit because the issues presented are controlled by settled Delaware 
law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(1); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 902(1); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
761. 
8 Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Del. 1997); Bradley v. DCSE, 582 A.2d 478, 480 
(Del. 1990). 
9 Smith v. Francisco, 737 A.2d 1000, 1009 (Del. 1999). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court 
is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice