Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michele A. Tjader

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP411-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michele A. Tjader, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Michele A. Tjader, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TJADER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 16, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: DALLET, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP411-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michele A. Tjader, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,   
 
 
Complainant   
 
 
v. 
 
Michele A. Tjader,   
 
 
Respondent.   
FILED 
 
OCT 16, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the supplemental report filed 
by Referee John Nicholas Schweitzer, adopting an amended 
stipulation entered between the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) and Attorney Michele A. Tjader.  
¶2 
After 
careful 
review, 
we 
accept 
the 
referee's 
recommendation and parties' stipulation wherein Attorney Tjader 
stipulates that she does not contest six counts of misconduct 
alleged in the OLR's complaint and the OLR seeks dismissal of 
three counts.  We agree with the parties and the referee that a 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
2 
 
public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline for 
Attorney Tjader's misconduct, that restitution is not required, 
and that Attorney Tjader should be assessed the full costs of 
the proceeding, which are $3,298.19 as of June 26, 2018.  
¶3 
Attorney Tjader was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1996.  She practices in Madison.  She has been 
disciplined by this court on three prior occasions.  In 2002, we 
publicly reprimanded Attorney Tjader for lack of competence, 
lack of diligence, failing to comply with reasonable requests 
for information, failing to promptly return an advance payment 
of fees that had not been earned, and conduct involving 
dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Tjader 2002 WI 37, 252 Wis. 2d 94, 643 
N.W.2d 87.  In 2006, Attorney Tjader received a private 
reprimand for failing to comply with reasonable requests for 
information and failing to explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.  Private Reprimand No. 
2006-2 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/001855.html).  In 2014, 
Attorney 
Tjader 
received 
another 
private 
reprimand 
for 
committing a criminal act that reflected adversely on her 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects as a result of being convicted of operating while 
intoxicated (OWI) – second offense.   Private Reprimand No. 
2014-20 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium. 
wicourts.gov/app/raw/002709.html).   
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
This disciplinary proceeding commenced on March 7, 
2017, when the OLR filed a complaint alleging that Attorney 
Tjader 
committed 
nine 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
involving three clients.1  The OLR initially recommended a 60-day 
suspension 
and 
that 
Attorney 
Tjader 
be 
ordered 
to 
pay 
restitution in one client matter, for failure to reimburse an 
expert for an accident report.  During the course of litigation, 
the OLR concluded that it would not be able to meet its burden 
of proof as to three of the nine alleged counts.  Accordingly, 
the OLR reduced the recommended sanction to a public reprimand.  
¶5 
On January 22, 2018, the parties executed an initial 
stipulation in which the OLR recommended dismissal of three 
counts, Attorney Tjader stated she did not contest the remaining 
six counts, and the parties agreed a public reprimand was 
appropriate.  However, this stipulation failed to address 
restitution.   
¶6 
The referee issued a report on February 13, 2018, in 
which he accepted the recommendations in the stipulation but 
further recommended that this court order Attorney Tjader to 
refund each of the three clients the full amount of fees paid, 
an amount that would exceed $34,000.  He recommended the court 
                                                 
1 Attorney Tjader initially failed to respond to the 
complaint and the OLR filed a Motion for Default Judgment.  
However, Attorney Tjader eventually responded, a referee was 
appointed, and discovery and further investigation ensued. 
 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
4 
 
place the burden on Attorney Tjader to demonstrate what, if 
anything, she earned if she wanted to reduce this amount.   
¶7 
After the referee's initial report was filed, the OLR 
filed a restitution statement stating that it does not seek 
restitution in this matter because restitution with respect to 
the first two clients was "not reasonably ascertainable" and the 
OLR had determined that the expert who prepared the accident 
report has since been paid.2  In view of this discrepancy, we 
remanded the matter with directions to the parties to amend 
their stipulation to address restitution and directed the OLR to 
explain the basis for the recommended discipline.  
¶8 
An amended stipulation was filed on May 8, 2018.  In 
the amended stipulation the OLR again recommends the court 
dismiss three of the alleged counts of misconduct.  Attorney 
Tjader states that she does not contest the remaining six 
misconduct 
counts, 
which 
alleged 
violations 
of 
former 
                                                 
2 The OLR's policy is to seek restitution only when: 
 
(1) There is a reasonably ascertainable amount; 
(2) The 
funds 
to 
be 
restored 
were 
in 
the 
respondent lawyer's direct control; 
(3) The funds to be restored do not constitute 
incidental or consequential damages; and 
(4) The grievant's or respondent's rights in a 
collateral proceeding will not likely be prejudiced. 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
5 
 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b3 and SCR 20:1.16(d),4 stemming from her 
representation of three clients. 
                                                 
3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b provided: 
A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees 
may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business 
account, provided that review of the lawyer's fee by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is available in the 
proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that 
the lawyer complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
b. Upon termination of the representation, the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees;  
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and  
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
4 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
6 
 
¶9 
The relevant facts are as follows.  In 2013 and 2014, 
Attorney Tjader represented N.B. in a criminal OWI matter; K.D. 
in a civil OWI matter; and L.H. in a felony matter.  Each of 
those clients paid advance fees to Attorney Tjader.  N.B. paid 
Attorney Tjader $3,500 in advanced fees, K.D. paid her $4,500, 
and L.H. paid her $25,000.  Attorney Tjader deposited all these 
fees directly into her business account.  Nevertheless, at the 
conclusion of her representation of each client, Attorney Tjader 
failed to provide them with the notices required under former 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.  Attorney Tjader also failed to provide 
each of the clients with a refund of unearned fees, if any, or 
sufficient information to show that no such refund was owing, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).  
¶10 In the amended stipulation, Attorney Tjader avers that 
the stipulation did not result from plea-bargaining, that she 
does not contest the facts and misconduct alleged by the OLR in 
counts 2, 3-5, and 8-9, and that the facts alleged in the 
complaint form a basis for the discipline requested.  Attorney 
Tjader further represents that she fully understands the 
misconduct allegations; fully understands the ramifications 
                                                                                                                                                             
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law.  
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
7 
 
should this court impose the stipulated level of discipline; 
fully understands her right to contest the matter; fully 
understands her right to consult with counsel; that her entry 
into the stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily; and that 
the stipulation represents her decision not to contest the level 
and type of discipline sought by the OLR director. 
¶11 The referee filed a supplemental report on May 31, 
2018, adopting the stipulation.  The referee agreed that a 
public reprimand was an appropriate sanction for the misconduct 
described above, and acceded to the parties' recommendation that 
no restitution is warranted. 
¶12 No appeal has been filed so we review this matter 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).5  A referee's findings of fact are 
affirmed unless clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  
                                                 
5 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
8 
 
¶13 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact, based on the parties' amended stipulation, are clearly 
erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We agree that dismissal 
of counts 1, 5, and 6 is appropriate, and we agree that Attorney 
Tjader violated supreme court rules noted above.6   
¶14 With respect to the appropriate sanction, this court 
follows a general policy of progressive discipline.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, 296 
Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.  Attorney Tjader's record of three 
previous reprimands makes another public reprimand somewhat 
lenient, but we are persuaded by the referee's recommendation.   
¶15 The referee observed that Attorney Tjader's failure to 
comply 
with 
SCR 
20:1.15(b)(4m)b 
"amounted 
to 
technical 
violations of essentially a failure to provide appropriate 
notice to her clients" citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Rajek, 2015 WI 18, 361 Wis. 2d 60, 859 N.W.2d 439.  In 
light 
of 
this 
precedent, 
the 
referee 
agreed 
that, 
notwithstanding the policy of progressive discipline, a public 
reprimand 
is 
appropriate 
here. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
                                                 
6 We dismiss counts 1, 6, and 7 of the OLR complaint, which 
alleged that: by failing to take steps to accurately ascertain 
the status of the matter after receiving N.B.'s inquiries into 
the status of her driver's license, and by failing to take any 
steps to mitigate the consequences of the untimely filed demand 
for a refusal hearing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 
(Diligence) (Count 1); by failing to timely address the 
restitution issue after L.H.'s sentencing, Attorney Tjader 
violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 6); and by failing to inform L.H. 
that a restitution order had been issued by the court, Attorney 
Tjader violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) (Communication) (Count 7).   
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
9 
 
Proceedings Against Shepherd, 2017 WI 66, 376 Wis. 2d 129, 897 
N.W.2d 44 (concluding a public reprimand was warranted where, in 
addition to other allegations, an attorney failed to provide 
notices and refunds of unearned fees); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Smead, 2013 WI 19, 345 Wis. 2d 625, 827 
N.W.2d 81 (imposing a public reprimand for seven counts of 
misconduct including failing to deposit fees into a trust 
account and failing to return unearned fees).  
¶16 The OLR assured the court in its memorandum in support 
of the amended stipulation that it carefully considered Attorney 
Tjader's 
disciplinary 
history 
when 
determining 
the 
OLR's 
recommendation for a public reprimand.  Consistent with Rajek, 
Attorney Tjader's misconduct in these matters, absent her 
disciplinary history, might have warranted a diversion or 
private reprimand.  The OLR explains that it maintained pursuit 
of a public reprimand, rather than private discipline, precisely 
because of Attorney Tjader's disciplinary history.   
¶17 Moreover, with respect to restitution, although the 
parties 
have 
stipulated 
that 
Attorney 
Tjader 
violated 
SCR 20:1.16(d), the OLR does not dispute that Tjader performed 
the services each of these clients hired her to do.  The OLR 
notes that to the extent that any of these clients believe the 
fees they were charged were not reasonable, the State Bar of 
Wisconsin offers fee arbitration to address such concerns.  In 
the 
amended 
stipulation, 
Attorney 
Tjader 
has 
explicitly 
confirmed her willingness to participate in fee arbitration if 
No. 
2017AP411-D   
 
10 
 
initiated by any of her clients and has agreed that she would 
comply with any arbitration award. 
¶18 Finally, we agree with the referee that, consistent 
with our general policy, Attorney Tjader should be required to 
pay the full costs of the proceeding, which are $3,298.19.  
SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶19 IT IS ORDERED that Michele A. Tjader is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.  
¶20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as stipulated, Michele A. 
Tjader shall submit any fee dispute, if pursued by any of the 
three 
grievants 
noted 
in 
this 
decision, 
to 
binding 
fee 
arbitration before the State Bar of Wisconsin Fee Arbitration 
Program and shall comply with any arbitration award. 
¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michele A. Tjader shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$3,298.19 as of June 26, 2018.  
¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
¶23 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2017AP411-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶24 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In spite of 
Attorney Tjader having received three prior reprimands, the 
court 
imposes 
yet 
another 
reprimand.1 
 
Accepting 
the 
recommendation of the referee, which in turn accepted the 
amended stipulation of the parties, it determines that a public 
reprimand is appropriate. 
¶25 In justifying its decision, the court apparently is 
persuaded by the Office of Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) assurance 
that a public reprimand is the correct level of discipline.  See 
per curiam, ¶16.  I am not persuaded by OLR's assurance.  
Instead, for the reasons set forth below, I would impose 
progressive discipline and place the onus on Attorney Tjader to 
demonstrate that no restitution is required. 
¶26 First, the opinion of this court states that "the OLR 
assured the court in its memorandum in support of the amended 
stipulation that it carefully considered Attorney Tjader's 
disciplinary history when determining OLR's recommendation for a 
public reprimand."  Part of that disciplinary history includes a 
private reprimand issued by OLR——not this court——for a second 
offense OWI.2 
                                                 
1 Attorney Tjader was publicly reprimanded in 2002, and 
privately reprimanded in 2006 and 2014. 
2 SCR 22.05(1)(c) provides that:  "Upon completion of an 
investigation, the director may do one or more of the 
following: . . . Obtain 
the 
respondent's 
consent 
to 
the 
imposition of a public or private reprimand and proceed under 
SCR 22.09." 
No.  2017AP411-D.awb 
 
2 
 
¶27 I thought that we were long since past the time of 
addressing multiple OWI convictions (a criminal offense) by 
imposing merely a private reprimand.  
See e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Horsch, 2017 WI 105, ¶23, 378 
Wis. 2d 554, 905 N.W.2d 129 (explaining that "multiple OWI 
convictions are unquestionably a serious failing that 'reflects 
adversely on [an attorney's] fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects.'")  The OLR's assurance that "it carefully considered" 
Attorney 
Tjader's 
disciplinary 
history 
when 
making 
this 
recommendation for a public reprimand rests on what appears to 
be the misguided foundation of OLR's private reprimand for her 
prior criminal conviction. 
¶28 Second, the OLR seems to be taking a statement by this 
court regarding progressive discipline and turning it on its 
head.  As justification for going along with the stipulation, 
the referee in this case observed that OLR apparently took the 
position that because Attorney Tjader's prior misconduct did not 
involve the same violations asserted here, that progressive 
discipline need not be imposed.  For this dubious proposition it 
relied on our statement recognizing that progressive discipline 
should be followed, especially in cases of repeated violations 
of the same code provision.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 
501.  Somehow, the OLR apparently now relies on this statement 
as a justification to not impose progressive discipline when 
there are violations of different code provisions. 
No.  2017AP411-D.awb 
 
3 
 
¶29 Finally, 
the 
OLR's 
position 
on 
restitution 
is 
misguided.  It places the onus for professional misconduct on 
the victim of that misconduct rather than on the attorney 
engaging in the misconduct.  We recently advised the OLR of the 
error of its ways in Matter of Med. Incapacity Proceedings 
Against 
Muwonge, 
2017 
WI 
12, 
¶23, 
373 
Wis. 2d 173, 
890 
N.W.2d 575 (explaining that restitution "may be reduced by any 
amount 
that 
[the] 
[a]ttorney 
[] 
can 
establish, 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the OLR, represents the value of legal services 
he actually performed for [the client]."). 
¶30 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶31 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP411-D.awb 
 
 
 
1