Title: P. v. Low

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/24/10 (this opn. should precede companion case, S153170, filed same date) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S151961 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A112831 
TONY RICHARD LOW, 
) 
 
) 
Solano County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FCR-225077 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Tony Richard Low, a convicted felon with a long criminal 
record, was arrested while driving a stolen vehicle.  He received and waived his 
Miranda rights,1 denied any wrongdoing, and underwent a patdown search before 
being taken into custody.  No contraband or weapons were found. 
Outside the entrance to the jail, the arresting officer told defendant that it 
was illegal to bring a controlled substance into the facility.  Defendant denied 
having any drugs in his possession.  He was brought inside and searched as part of 
the booking process.  Despite his contrary assurance, defendant was found in the 
possession of a small packet of methamphetamine.  It was tucked into his sock. 
                                              
1  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
2 
A jury convicted defendant of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle — the 
crime that triggered his arrest — and of violating Penal Code section 4573.2  As 
pertinent here, the latter statute makes it a felony for ―any person‖ to ―knowingly 
bring[ ] . . . into[ ] any state prison . . . or into any county . . . jail . . . any 
controlled substance‖ without legal authority or official permission to do so. 
Defendant argues here, as he did in both the trial and appellate courts, that 
section 4573 does not apply to someone who is arrested and brought to jail, and 
who is found to possess a controlled substance during the booking process.  First, 
defendant contends no statutory violation occurred because his presence inside the 
jail was involuntary and unrelated to any intent to smuggle drugs.  The 
Legislature, he posits, has no discernable interest in penalizing someone who 
happens to have a controlled substance when detained for another crime.  Second, 
defendant claims the statutory scheme placed him in an inherently coercive bind 
— either admit possessing a controlled substance outside of jail (see Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) (Health and Safety Code section 11377(a)), or bring the 
drugs inside and risk slightly stiffer sanctions under section 4573.  Prosecution for 
the latter act, he asserts, violated his privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
We agree with the lower courts that, under the circumstances of this case, 
defendant is not statutorily or constitutionally immune from prosecution under 
section 4573.  He voluntarily secreted a controlled substance on his person in 
violation of the law, was then arrested for unrelated criminal conduct, and 
thereafter committed a third crime — knowingly entering jail in the possession of 
                                              
2  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code except as otherwise 
stated. 
3 
drugs.  While such entry was compulsory, the act of bringing drugs inside was not.  
The arresting officer gave advance warning about the prohibitions in section 4573, 
and defendant violated its terms despite ample opportunity to avoid doing so. 
In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the plain meaning of the statute, and 
on the manner in which similar statutes regulating other in-custody crimes have 
been construed.  Indeed, by essentially limiting section 4573 and related 
provisions to noninmate smugglers, defendant‘s approach would risk the 
introduction of drugs and other contraband into penal settings, and undermine the 
legislative aim to maintain order and safety therein. 
Nor does enforcement of section 4573 under the present circumstances 
violate the Fifth Amendment ban on the criminal use of compelled incriminating 
testimony.   Section 4573 does not coerce anyone to admit guilt of any crime or 
punish them for failing to do so.  It simply prevents all persons, including those 
arrested while unlawfully possessing drugs and committing other crimes, from 
engaging in a nontestimonial criminal act — walking into a custodial setting with 
knowledge they are bringing controlled substances with them.  To the extent 
defendant‘s false denial of guilt at the jail entrance incriminated him at trial, he is 
procedurally barred from raising the issue.  In any event, any federal constitutional 
error in admission of the statement was not prejudicial. 
We therefore decline to reverse the judgment of conviction. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  The Evidence 
On the afternoon of June 29, 2005, Detective Ronald Jones of the 
Sacramento County Sheriff‘s Department was driving his official vehicle on 
Interstate 80 when defendant rapidly approached him from behind in a truck.  As 
he passed the officer‘s car, defendant waved an object — a water bottle bearing a 
4 
law enforcement emblem.  Jones learned by his on-board computer and police 
radio that the truck had been reported stolen.  He requested backup, and followed 
as defendant left the freeway and stopped at a dead-end street.  The truck had 
traveled at speeds of 80 to 100 miles per hour while weaving through traffic. 
After activating his red emergency lights, Detective Jones drew his 
handgun and approached the truck.  He identified himself as a police officer, and 
told defendant to stop the engine, toss the keys outside, and put his hands in the 
air.  Over the next few minutes, defendant raised and lowered his hands several 
times, and did not otherwise do what Jones asked. 
Meanwhile, Officer Christopher Wahl of the California Highway Patrol 
arrived and ordered defendant out of the truck.  After another brief delay, 
defendant complied. 
Officer Wahl placed defendant under arrest for the unlawful driving or 
taking of a motor vehicle.  The officer patted the outside of defendant‘s clothing, 
looking for weapons, and found nothing.  Defendant was advised of his 
constitutional rights under Miranda.  After waiving those rights, he explained that 
the owner of the truck was a friend who had loaned it to him for work.  Wahl then 
drove defendant by patrol car to the Solano County jail. 
Outside the jail, near the entrance, Officer Wahl and defendant had another 
brief exchange.  Wahl testified at trial that he told defendant ―it was illegal to 
bring any controlled substances inside the jail facility.‖  Wahl asked if defendant 
had any such item in his underwear or socks, or elsewhere on his person, and said 
he would be searched inside the building.  According to Wahl, defendant stated he 
had ―nothing inside his socks or undergarments.‖ 
Deputy Brian Glenn was on duty when Officer Wahl escorted defendant 
into the jail to be booked into custody.  This process entailed a brief medical 
screening, fingerprinting, and an inventory search, in which defendant was told to 
5 
remove his socks and shoes.  When defendant fumbled with the left sock, Glenn 
peered inside the ankle-band area, and saw a small plastic baggie containing a 
clear, crystal-like substance.  Glenn gave the baggie to Officer Wahl, who logged 
it into evidence.  The packet and its contents were admitted at trial. 
A criminalist tested the crystal substance that defendant brought into jail 
and found that it contained methamphetamine.  The drug weighed 20 milligrams 
and was present in a usable amount. 
Christopher Terrell owned the truck that defendant — his friend, 
houseguest, and employee — drove when arrested.  Terrell‘s truck, which he 
cherished and rarely used for work, was a limited-edition 2003 Ford F150 with 
Harley-Davidson markings.  Terrell described the circumstances under which 
defendant took the truck on June 21 without his knowledge or consent, and refused 
numerous requests by phone to return it.  Terrell contacted the police. 
Defendant did not testify at trial.  He called one witness, his girlfriend, in 
defense of the Vehicle Code charge.  An admitted methamphetamine user, she 
claimed that Terrell gave defendant the keys to the Ford, along with a bag of 
methamphetamine, and discussed materials needed for work.  In rebuttal 
testimony, Terrell disputed this account. 
B.  The Proceedings 
The jury convicted defendant, as charged, of two felony counts:  (1) 
unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, 
subdivision (a), and (2) bringing a controlled substance into jail in violation of 
section 4573.  In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true three 
enhancements for prior prison terms alleged under section 667.5, subdivision (b).  
Two of them involved robbery convictions sustained in 1982 and 1988, and one 
6 
concerned a 1993 burglary conviction.  Defendant received a prison sentence of 
seven years eight months.3 
Near the close of trial, defendant argued, for the first time, that section 4573 
did not apply to him.  The first such exchange happened during discussions on 
jury instructions.  Absent a standard instruction under section 4573, the court 
indicated that it would give modified versions of existing instructions on similar 
offenses.  (See §§ 4573.6 [knowingly possessing controlled substance in prison or 
jail], 4574, subd. (a) (section 4574(a)) [knowingly bringing firearm, deadly 
weapon, or explosive into prison or jail]; CALJIC Nos. 7.34.01 & 7.34.03.)4  
                                              
3  
The sentence consisted of a principal term of four years under section 4573, 
a subordinate term of eight months under Vehicle Code section 10851, and one 
additional year for each of the three prior prison terms under section 667.5.  The 
four-year principal term represented the high term under section 4573, which 
authorizes two, three, or four years in prison.  In aggravating the sentence, the trial 
court noted that defendant had 10 prior felony convictions, that five of them would 
qualify as ―strikes‖ for purposes of imposing a life term, and that the prosecutor 
showed restraint in alleging them only as prior prison terms.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected challenges to the sentence.  None are raised or addressed in this court. 
4  
Thus, the trial court instructed, in pertinent part, as follows:  ―Every person 
who knowingly brings into any county jail or within the grounds belonging to the 
institution any controlled substance, such as methamphetamine[,] is guilty of a 
violation of . . . section 4573, a crime. . . .  [¶] . . . [E]ach of the following elements 
must be proved:  [¶] 1.  A person exercised control over . . . methamphetamine, a 
controlled substance;  [¶] 2.  That person knew of its presence;  [¶] 3.  That person 
knew of its nature as a controlled substance;  [¶] 4.  The substance was in an 
amount sufficient to be used as a controlled substance;  [¶] 5.  At the time of 
possession, the person entered the county jail or within the grounds belonging to 
the institution.‖  The requisite knowledge was defined as involving ―the existence 
of the facts in question.  Knowledge of the unlawfulness of any act or omission is 
not required.  A requirement of knowledge does not mean that the act must be 
done with any specific intent.‖  Along these lines, the court also instructed that 
section 4573 required a ―union or joint operation of act or conduct and general 
criminal intent.‖  The latter concept was said to occur when the person 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
7 
Neither party objected to this approach.  However, defendant asked the court to 
also instruct on the ―simple‖ possession of methamphetamine under Health and 
Safety Code section 11377(a), which he described as a lesser included offense of 
section 4573.  Defendant opined that the jury could find him not guilty of the 
section 4573 charge, and guilty only of the uncharged possession offense, because 
he did not ―intentionally‖ bring drugs into jail, and entered ―involuntarily,‖ under 
arrest for another crime.  The trial court rejected this view of the law and facts, and 
declined to instruct on the ―lesser‖ charge.5 
Defendant expanded his challenge to section 4573 in a motion for new trial 
filed after the jury convicted him of that offense.  As before, he claimed section 
4573 exempts persons who possess controlled substances when arrested and jailed 
for other crimes, and that the statute targets noninmate smugglers.  Defendant 
insisted section 4573 serves no purpose where, as here, a booking search could 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
―intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, . . . even though he 
may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.‖ 
5  
Health and Safety Code section 11377(a) prohibits the unauthorized 
possession of a controlled substance.  (See People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1180, 1184-1185 [requiring dominion and control over controlled substance in 
usable amount, plus knowledge of drug‘s presence and narcotic nature].)  The 
crime is punishable by one year in county jail or by confinement in state prison, 
with the latter term ranging from 16 months to two or three years.  (See § 18.)  
When declining defendant‘s request for an instruction on Health and Safety Code 
section 11377(a), the trial court noted that if defendant possessed drugs, he 
brought them into jail, and that nothing showed he possessed them only outside 
the jail.  The Court of Appeal rejected defendant‘s claim of error for failure to 
instruct under Health and Safety Code section 11377(a).  (See People v. 
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [instruction on lesser included offense 
required only when evidence raises doubt about all elements of charged offense].)  
Defendant does not challenge the resolution of his instructional claims below.  
They are not raised or considered here. 
8 
detect any hidden drugs, and other statutes regulating unauthorized drug 
possession seem to apply.  The new trial motion also contained a claim that 
defendant had not presented earlier concerning violation of his privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.  Under this view, 
section 4573 compels arrestees to admit before entering jail that they unlawfully 
possess drugs under Health and Safety Code section 11377(a), and punishes them 
more harshly if they do not incriminate themselves and bring the drugs inside. 
The new trial motion was denied.  The trial court disagreed with 
defendant‘s reading of the statute.  The court noted that section 4573 is not limited 
on its face to persons other than those who were brought to jail and booked into 
custody, and that the Legislature could have included such language if it chose to 
do so.  In addition, the trial court rejected defendant‘s constitutional claim.  The 
court reasoned as follows:  Defendant was being punished for knowingly bringing 
drugs into the jail, not for exercising his constitutional rights.  Section 4573 has 
nothing to do with coerced incriminating admissions.  Even if both the arresting 
officer and defendant had remained silent outside the jail, defendant would have 
brought the drugs into the facility and violated section 4573. 
In an unpublished opinion, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 
Five, rejected arguments similar to those raised in the new trial motion, and 
affirmed defendant‘s conviction under section 4573.  The appellate court found no 
basis for conditioning a statutory violation on whether the person entered jail 
―voluntarily,‖ or whether drugs were ―intentionally‖ smuggled inside.  Absent any 
contrary authority, the Court of Appeal further concluded that the statutory scheme 
did not force an arrestee who possessed drugs when brought into jail to make any 
choice that was testimonial and incriminating in the Fifth Amendment sense. 
Defendant sought review.  As pertinent here, the petition renewed both his 
statutory and constitutional challenges to section 4573.  In the process, he relied 
9 
heavily on People v. Gastello (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 943, review granted 
June 13, 2007, S153170, a decision that had been filed a few days earlier by the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal‘s decision in Gastello 
conflicts in key respects with the analysis adopted by the lower courts here. 
We granted review to address whether (1) section 4573 is violated where 
the defendant possesses methamphetamine when brought into jail following his 
arrest on other charges, and (2) there is a constitutional bar to application of 
section 4573 under such circumstances.  At the same time, we ordered review on 
our own motion in Gastello.  We decide both matters by separate opinion today. 
II.  MEANING OF STATUTE 
A.  Statutory Elements 
The relevant statutory language makes it a felony for ―any person‖ to 
―knowingly bring[ ] . . . into any county . . . jail . . . any controlled substance‖ that 
he is not authorized to possess.  (§ 4573.)6  Defendant argues that this provision 
                                              
6  
Section 4573 reads in full now, as at the time of defendant‘s crime, as 
follows:  ―Except when otherwise authorized by law, or when authorized by the 
person in charge of the prison or other institution referred to in this section or by 
an officer of the institution empowered by the person in charge of the institution to 
give the authorization, any person, who knowingly brings or sends into, or 
knowingly assists in bringing into, or sending into, any state prison, prison road 
camp, prison forestry camp, or other prison camp or prison farm or any other place 
where prisoners of the state are located under the custody of prison officials, 
officers or employees, or into any county, city and county, or city jail, road camp, 
farm or other place where prisoners or inmates are located under custody of any 
sheriff, chief of police, peace officer, probation officer or employees, or within the 
grounds belonging to the institution, any controlled substance, the possession of 
which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with Section 11000) of the 
Health and Safety Code, any device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia 
intended to be used for unlawfully injecting or consuming a controlled substance, 
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, 
or four years.  [¶]  The prohibitions and sanctions addressed in this section shall be 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10 
does not apply to someone, like him, who happens to possess a controlled 
substance when arrested for another crime, and who was brought into jail 
involuntarily in order to be booked pursuant to that arrest.  He insists the 
proscribed affirmative act of ―bring[ing]‖ a controlled substance into jail cannot be 
committed under such circumstances.  In a related vein, defendant contends that a 
person who enters jail under the compulsion of an arrest does not ―knowingly 
bring[ ]‖ drugs inside, and therefore does not have the requisite intent, simply 
because a controlled substance is found on his person during the booking search.  
(§ 4573, italics added.)  According to defendant, the act is not ―knowingly‖ 
performed unless the person deliberately went to jail with the intent to smuggle 
drugs for use, sale, or some other illicit purpose.  However, based on the plain 
language of section 4573, and a commonsense meaning of its terms, we disagree.  
1.  “Any Person.”  In making the foregoing arguments, defendant largely 
overlooks a significant feature of the statute.  In particular, section 4573 applies on 
its face to ―any person‖ who commits the proscribed act under the specified 
circumstances.  Such language is quite plain and broad.  It suggests that anyone 
and everyone who knowingly brings a controlled substance into jail under the 
specified circumstances violates the statute.  No qualifications or conditions 
purport to limit liability to noninmates of the jail.  Nor does any language exclude 
persons under arrest or otherwise held in official custody. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
clearly and prominently posted outside of, and at the entrance to, the grounds of all 
detention facilities under the jurisdiction of, or operated by, the state or any city, 
county, or city and county.‖  Methamphetamine is a controlled substance for 
purposes of section 4573.  (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11055, subd. (d)(2).) 
 
11 
A similar conclusion has been reached under at least one closely related 
statute.  Section 4573 appears in part 3, title 5 of the Penal Code, concerning 
―Offenses Relating to Prisons and Prisoners.‖  (See § 4500 et seq.)  Much like 
section 4573, several adjacent provisions place restrictions on possessing and 
importing drugs and other contraband in custody.  (See §§ 4573.5 [knowingly 
bringing alcoholic beverages, drugs other than controlled substances, or drug 
paraphernalia into prison or jail], 4573.6 [knowingly possessing controlled 
substances in prison or jail], 4574(a) [knowingly bringing firearms, deadly 
weapons, or explosives into prison or jail].)7  The manner in which these statutes 
                                              
7  
Section 4573.5 states in part:  ―Any person who knowingly brings into any 
state prison . . . or into any county . . . jail . . . or any other institution or place 
where prisoners or inmates are being held . . . any alcoholic beverage, any drugs, 
other than controlled substances, . . . or any device . . . or paraphernalia intended 
to be used for unlawfully injecting or consuming any drug other than controlled 
substances, without having authority so to do . . . is guilty of a felony.  [¶]  The[se] 
prohibitions and sanctions . . . shall be clearly and prominently posted outside of, 
and at the entrance to, the grounds of all detention facilities . . . .‖ 
 
Section 4573.6 states in part:  ―Any person who knowingly has in his or her 
possession in any state prison . . . or in any county . . . jail . . . or any place or 
institution[ ] where prisoners or inmates are being held . . . any controlled 
substances, the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing 
with Section 11000) of the Health and Safety Code [or] any device . . . or 
paraphernalia intended to be used for unlawfully injecting or consuming controlled 
substances, without being authorized to [do] so . . . is guilty of a felony punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.  [¶]  The[se] 
prohibitions and sanctions . . . shall be clearly and prominently posted outside of, 
and at the entrance to, the grounds of all detention facilities . . . .‖ 
 
Section 4574(a)  states in part:  ―Except when otherwise authorized [to do 
so,] . . . any person[ ] who knowingly brings or sends into . . . any state prison . . . 
or any other place where prisoners . . . are located . . . or any jail or any county 
road camp . . . any firearms, deadly weapons, or explosives, and any person who, 
while lawfully confined in a jail or county road camp possesses therein any 
firearm, deadly weapon, explosive, tear gas or tear gas weapon, is guilty of a 
felony[,] punishable . . . in the state prison for two, three, or four years.‖ 
12 
have been construed is relevant here.  (See People v. Harris (2006) 145 
Cal.App.4th 1456, 1461 (Harris) [stating that §§ 4573 & 4573.5 should be 
― ‗construed together‘ ‖]; People v. Gutierrez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 386 
(Gutierrez) [same, as to §§ 4573, 4573.5, 4573.6 & 4574]; People v. Buese (1963) 
220 Cal.App.2d 802, 807 (Buese) [same, as to §§ 4573, 4573.5 & 4573.6].) 
Courts have long assumed that section 4573.6, which bans ―[a]ny person‖ 
from knowingly possessing a controlled substance in prison or jail, applies to 
―visitors and correctional officers as well as to inmates.‖  (People v. Wilson (1978) 
83 Cal.App.3d 982, 990, italics added; see People v. Clark (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 
775, 778 [citing ―any-person‖ language in § 4573.6 to conclude that ―no 
individuals,‖ including jail inmates, ―are excepted from its provisions‖ or 
― ‗extracted‘ from its operation‖]; People v. Trout (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 794, 796 
[using same reasoning to reject claim that only noninmates can be convicted of 
possessing heroin in jail under § 4573.6].)  It is reasonable to reach a similar 
conclusion under section 4573. 
2.  “Brings.”  As noted, defendant argues that an arrestee does not 
―bring[ ]‖ a controlled substance into jail under section 4573 simply because the 
drug is in his possession when he is brought into the facility in custody for another 
crime.  However, this narrow interpretation of the term defies common usage. 
As defendant suggests, the verb ―to bring‖ certainly means ―to take or carry 
along‖ an object as the actor moves in a self-directed fashion from one place to 
another.  (Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 278; see 2 Oxford English 
Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 554 [―carrying or bearing in one‘s hand‖].)  But it also 
contemplates scenarios in which a person or object is ―cause[d] to come along‖ 
because someone or something is ―leading, conducting, or propelling‖ such 
movement.  (2 Oxford English Dict., supra, p. 554; accord, Webster‘s 3d New 
Internat. Dict., supra, p. 278; see People v. Waid (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 614, 617-
13 
618 (Waid) [using latter definition to conclude that accused ―brings‖ drugs into 
prison under § 4573.5 by mailing them there].)  Either way, when defendant 
walked into the jail carrying methamphetamine in the band of his sock, he was 
―bring[ing]‖ the substance into the facility under section 4573, even though such 
movement was caused by his earlier arrest and directed by the arresting officer. 
California courts have long assumed that arrestees and other persons in 
custody can violate section 4573, and ―bring[ ]‖ a controlled substance into jail, 
when the entry is officially compelled and drugs are secreted on their person.  
(See, e.g., People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 967-969 & fn. 2 [implying 
§ 4573 would have applied to inmate returning to jail after work furlough if he had 
not had a doctor‘s prescription for the controlled substance found tucked between 
his toes, and affirming his conviction under § 4573.5 for bringing other drugs into 
jail that were not controlled substances]; People v. Houston (1958) 164 
Cal.App.2d 396, 398 [affirming conviction for heroin possession under 
predecessor to Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, and noting that defendant would have 
violated § 4573 if he had not disclosed heroin secreted in his rectum before 
entering jail]; People v. Woods (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 515, 521, 524-525 
[affirming conviction under predecessor to Health & Saf. Code, § 11350 where 
opiates were found in defendant‘s rectum after his arrest, and suggesting he also 
violated § 4573 by bringing them into jail].) 
To the extent we now conclude that the act prohibited by section 4573 can 
occur when someone is brought into jail in custody for another crime, this 
interpretation is consistent with cases deciding what it means to ―bring[ ]‖ 
contraband into a penal setting in violation of similar statutory prohibitions.  (E.g., 
People v. Ross (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1187-1189 (Ross) [holding that 
defendant who carried knife in her undergarments, and who denied having it when 
arrested and booked for assault, violated § 4574(a) despite her claim that she did 
14 
not voluntarily enter jail or commit affirmative act of bringing weapon inside]; 
People v. James (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 645, 650 (James) [similar conclusion under 
same statute as to defendant who kept pistol hidden in his waistband during 
booking search, and who later gave it to another jail inmate].)  The critical factors 
are the lack of any compulsion to bring contraband inside, and the rejection of a 
clear opportunity to avoid doing so by voluntarily relinquishing the forbidden 
object or substance before entering the premises.  (Ross, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1191 [defendant ―had no choice whether to go to jail, but she was afforded the 
choice not to violate section 4574‖]; James, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at p. 650 
[defendant ―knowingly possessed a firearm while in jail, after he had ample time 
to surrender it,‖ such that his ―choice about going to jail is irrelevant‖].)  We agree 
that such volitional conduct falls within the parameters of section 4573. 
For the most part, defendant ignores the foregoing principles and 
authorities.  He focuses instead on out-of-state case law, mainly, and in particular, 
a 1944 Alabama decision, Martin v. State (Ala.Ct.App. 1944) 17 So.2d 427 
(Martin).  This reliance is misplaced. 
According to the opinion in Martin, which is quite terse, police officers 
arrived at the defendant‘s home, found that he was intoxicated, and placed him 
under arrest.  The arresting officers then took the defendant from his home and 
brought him onto a public highway.  There, while still intoxicated, the defendant 
spoke loudly and used profanity.  He was ultimately charged and convicted under 
a state law prohibiting anyone from ― ‗appear[ing]‘ ‖ in a public place and 
― ‗manifest[ing]‘ ‖ a drunken condition through either boisterous or indecent 
conduct or loud and profane language.  (Martin, supra, 17 So.2d at p. 427.) 
The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed.  Relying on a commonsense 
meaning of the statute, the court determined that ―a voluntary appearance [while 
drunk in a public place] is presupposed.‖  Guilt could not be established, the court 
15 
said, where the intoxicated person ―was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that 
place by the arresting officer.‖  (Martin, supra, 17 So.2d at p. 427.)  In other 
words, it appears every part of the alleged criminal transaction was deemed 
involuntary on appeal.  By taking the defendant from the private confines of his 
own home, knowing he was intoxicated and already under arrest, and placing him 
in a public place where the terms of the statute under which he was later charged 
could be violated, police officers effectively compelled, and arguably 
manufactured, commission of the crime. 
Such is not the case here.  After being stopped by Detective Jones, 
defendant was arrested by Officer Wahl for driving a stolen vehicle.  No evidence 
shows that either officer knew or suspected that defendant had any illegal drugs in 
his possession.  In fact, the patdown search that Wahl conducted incident to the 
arrest at the scene revealed no contraband.  Wahl then took defendant to the local 
county jail, as any arresting officer presumably would be obligated to do.  Before 
entering the facility, the officer gave defendant ample opportunity to avoid 
violating section 4573.  In particular, Wahl advised defendant that it was illegal to 
bring drugs into the jail, asked whether he had any drugs in his clothes or on his 
person, and warned that he would be searched inside.  Despite this warning, 
methamphetamine was found in defendant‘s sock during the booking process. 
Thus, unlike in Martin, supra, 17 So.2d 427, nothing supports defendant‘s 
suggestion that he was forced to bring drugs into jail, that commission of the act 
was engineered by the police, or that he had no choice but to violate section 4573.  
Defendant entered jail in the possession of methamphetamine that he had 
previously secreted on his person.  Hence, he committed the act that section 4573 
proscribes. 
3.  “Knowingly.”  Defendant contends that a person cannot ―knowingly 
bring[ ]‖ a controlled substance into a custodial setting under section 4573 unless 
16 
he intends to smuggle drugs into jail for some illicit purpose, such as use or sale.  
(Ibid., italics added.)  This element is missing, he argues, absent any evidence he 
intended to get arrested and go to jail with such a drug-smuggling goal in mind. 
Section 4573 contemplates a culpable mental state, but not the one 
defendant describes.  As defined in the Penal Code, the term ―knowingly‖ involves 
―only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or omission within the 
[relevant code] provisions.‖  (§ 7, par. 5, italics added.)  It ―does not require any 
knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission.‖  (Ibid.)  This definition 
— which is consistent with the notion of general criminal intent — requires the 
accused to knowingly perform the proscribed act, but does not involve any intent 
to commit a further act or achieve a particular effect.  (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 8, pp. 209-210.) 
As we have seen, the act that must be ―knowingly‖ performed to violate the 
―bring[ing]‖ provisions of section 4573 involves entering a prison or jail in the 
possession of a controlled substance.  In general, the knowing possession of a 
controlled substance simply requires an awareness of both its physical presence 
and narcotic character.  (See People v. Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1184 
[describing basic elements of unauthorized possession of controlled substance 
under Health & Saf. Code, § 11377(a)]; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
1236, 1242 [same]; People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215 [finding 
insufficient evidence of requisite knowledge to support conviction for 
unauthorized possession of controlled substance under predecessor to Health & 
Saf. Code, § 11377(a)]; People v. Winston (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158-161 
(Winston) [requiring knowledge of drug‘s narcotic character as one element of 
unlawful possession of controlled substance under predecessor to Health & Saf. 
17 
Code, § 11350]; see also 2 Witkin & Epstein, supra, Crimes Against Public Peace 
and Welfare, §§ 90-92, pp. 602-606.)8 
Similar principles have been used to describe the mental state required for 
certain in-custody offenses that are closely related to section 4573.  (See People v. 
Carrasco (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 936, 947 (Carrasco) [holding trial court erred in 
not instructing under § 4573.6 that unauthorized possession of controlled 
substance in prison or jail requires ―dual knowledge‖ of drug‘s presence and 
nature]; People v. Rodriquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 389, 396 [rejecting claim 
under § 4574(a) that unauthorized possession of deadly weapon in jail or county 
road camp requires ―specific intent‖ to use item for violence].)  Not surprisingly, 
the trial court did not depart from this approach when instructing defendant‘s jury 
on knowledge and intent under section 4573. 
Nothing in section 4573 or other relevant authority supports defendant‘s 
view that the crime requires an intent or scheme to smuggle drugs into jail over 
and above the knowledge component we have described.  Presumably, the 
Legislature would have signaled whether a special intent to fulfill such an 
                                              
8  
In describing the knowledge component, Winston, supra, 46 Cal.2d 151, 
stated that ―specific intent to violate the law is immaterial to a conviction for the 
unlawful possession of a narcotic.‖  (Id. at p. 158.)  The court explained that by 
requiring knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance possessed, the 
crime merely involved ― ‗knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act . . . 
within the provisions of [the] code.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The word ―knowingly‖ was added 
in 1959 along with other language, including the references to ―send[ing],‖ and to 
―assist[ing]‖ in bringing or sending, controlled substances into prison or jail.  
(Stats. 1959, ch. 662, § 1, p. 2637.)  The 1959 amendment occurred shortly after 
Winston was decided.  It was evidently intended, in part, to clarify the mental state 
required to commit the various proscribed acts in a manner consistent with that 
decision.  (See generally People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 
[Legislature is deemed aware of relevant law, and presumably adopted existing 
judicial construction of terms it used in framing amendment to statute].) 
18 
unlawful purpose or to cause some adverse effect bore on commission of the 
offense.  No such language appears in section 4573.  (Cf. §§ 4535 [carrying or 
sending into prison or jail anything useful to aid escape ―with intent‖ to facilitate 
the crime], 4570.5 [presenting false identification or fraudulent documentation 
―for the purpose of‖ securing admission to prison or jail].)  We decline to rewrite 
the statute.  (See generally People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 881.) 
Here, defendant was stopped and arrested near the highway while driving a 
stolen vehicle.  At some point before he was brought to jail, he came into the 
possession of methamphetamine packed in a small plastic baggie.  Defendant 
carried the packet inside the band of his sock, outside the plain view and easy 
reach of others.  He then ignored an express warning by the arresting officer that 
controlled substances could not lawfully be brought into jail.  This evidence 
suggests that defendant, a career criminal, knew before he entered the facility 
about the packet concealed on his person and about the character of the substance 
inside.  (See Carrasco, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d 936, 947 [any person ―found in 
possession of secreted drugs or narcotics within a penal facility will be hard put to 
disprove either type of knowledge‖ required for unlawful drug possession under 
§ 4573.6 or analogous Health & Saf. Code provisions].) 
Substantial evidence thus supports the conclusion that defendant acted with 
the mental state contemplated by section 4573.  No additional intent or purpose of 
the kind urged here was required. 
B.  Historical Support 
Though the considerations discussed above amply persuade us that section 
4573 was properly applied to defendant, we find additional support for our view in 
the historical record.  As noted earlier, section 4573 was enacted in 1941 when the 
19 
Legislature overhauled part 3 of the Penal Code, and added title 5, regulating 
various crimes in custody.9  However, prior to that time, similar prohibitions 
appeared elsewhere in the code, in statutes that are predecessors of section 4573.  
The first such provision, and the oldest one, is former section 180.  (Added by 
Stats. 1899, ch. 4, § 1, p. 4 [making it a felony for ―[a]ny person,‖ not authorized 
by law, to ―bring[ ]‖ narcotics, liquor, or weapons into state ―prisons‖ or 
―reformatories‖], renumbered as former § 180a by Stats. 1901, ch. 92, § 1, p. 107, 
and repealed by Stats. 1905, ch. 490, § 5, p. 652.)  Former section 180 was 
eventually renumbered and replaced by former section 171a.  The main 
substantive change made at that time was the addition of new language prohibiting 
contraband from being brought into a ―jail‖ setting.  (Ibid., added by Stats. 1905, 
ch. 490, § 2, p. 651, amended by Stats. 1911, ch. 186, § 1, p. 364, and repealed by 
Stats. 1972, ch. 497, § 1, p. 868.) 
Critical here are materials in the legislative record accompanying the 
adoption of former section 171a, the immediate predecessor to section 4573.  
These materials indicate that the Legislature targeted inmates who, upon returning 
to penal institutions after performing labor outside, hid small amounts of opium 
and other narcotics in their clothing.  Because such contraband often went 
undetected, and because it threatened institutional control, any person who 
committed the act was made subject to felony sanctions.  (See State Bd. of Prison 
Directors, Biennial Rep. (1902-1904) Capt. of the Guard‘s Rep., p. 80, printed at 
                                              
9  
This scheme defines and punishes the following categories of in-custody 
crimes:  assaults and batteries (§§ 4500-4501.5), possessing and manufacturing 
weapons and holding hostages (§§ 4502-4503), escapes and rescues (§§ 4530-
4550), possessing and importing illegal drugs and other contraband (§§ 4570- 
4570.1, 4573-4575), entries into unauthorized areas (§§ 4570.5-4571), and 
damaging prison or jail property (§ 4600). 
20 
3 Appen. To Js. of Sen. & Assem. (1905 Reg. Sess.); id., Warden of Folsom State 
Prison, Biennial Rep., p. 93, printed at 3 Appen. to Js. of Sen. & Assem. (1905 
Reg. Sess.).)  Similar concerns apply to one who, like defendant, brings secreted 
drugs into the facility following his arrest for another crime. 
C.  Legislative Policies 
Application of section 4573 to defendant is supported not only by its 
language and history, but also is consistent with the legislative policies it was 
apparently intended to serve.  We reject the suggestion defendant has made 
throughout these proceedings that section 4573 serves no meaningful purpose if it 
is construed to apply to arrestees who are not present in jail by choice and who did 
not enter the facility in order to smuggle drugs inside. 
Section 4573 and similar laws flow from the assumption that drugs, 
weapons, and other contraband promote disruptive and violent acts in custody, 
including gang involvement in the drug trade.  Hence, these provisions are viewed 
as ― ‗prophylactic‘ ‖ measures that attack the ― ‗very presence‘ ‖ of such items in 
the penal system.  (Harris, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1461, quoting Gutierrez, 
supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 386; accord, Ross, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1189; 
People v. Lee (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 522, 536; Estes v. Rowland (1993) 14 
Cal.App.4th 508, 518, 522-523; Waid, supra, 127 Cal.App.2d 614, 617.) 
The Legislature could reasonably conclude that section 4573 aids this effort 
by encouraging all persons, including arrestees, to divest themselves of controlled 
substances in their possession in lieu of violating the statute.  Consistent with this 
goal, section 4573 requires that its ―prohibitions and sanctions‖ be ―prominently 
posted‖ for the benefit of everyone entering prison or jail property.  (See 
Gutierrez, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [―posting requirement‖ provides 
―additional deterrent‖ to statutory violation, and is not an element of the crime or a 
defense to its commission].)  As to persons entering jail in custody, the Legislature 
21 
could reasonably choose not to rely solely on the booking process to uncover 
controlled substances arrestees have not disclosed, or on the possession statutes to 
penalize those who succeed in bringing them inside.  (See James, supra, 1 
Cal.App.3d 645, 647-648 [firearm was not discovered on defendant‘s person 
during booking search and was later handled by other inmates].)  Section 4573 
deters arrestees from knowingly and voluntarily bringing controlled substances 
into jail ―with impunity.‖  (Ross, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1189.) 
A contrary conclusion could undermine operation of the statutory scheme 
as a whole.  As discussed above, section 4573 and statutes with a similar structure 
and purpose have long been construed in light of each other.  (E.g., Harris, supra, 
145 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1461; Gutierrez, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 386; Buese, 
supra, 220 Cal.App.2d 802, 807.)  Hence, if we confined section 4573 to 
noninmates and intentional smugglers as defendant suggests, courts might strain to 
reach a different interpretation under statutes closely related to section 4573, or 
adopt an equally narrow view of their reach.  We decline to promote such 
analytical confusion or thwart the interest in correctional security in this way. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE 
Defendant asserts here, as below, that application of section 4573 to him 
constituted a violation of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination under 
the Fifth Amendment, as follows:  Having been arrested and brought to jail with 
methamphetamine in his sock, defendant could not avoid prosecution under 
section 4573 unless he admitted, before entering the facility, that he possessed a 
controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377(a).  By 
refusing to confess his guilt, he had no choice but to enter jail with the drugs, 
violate section 4573, and incur a longer prison term.  Defendant claims his 
conviction should be reversed in light of the compulsion and penalties he endured.  
We disagree. 
22 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that ―[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.‖  The high court has made clear that the meaning of this language cannot 
be divorced from the historical practices at which it was aimed, namely, the brutal 
inquisitorial methods of ― ‗putting the accused upon his oath and compelling him 
to answer questions designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence 
from another source.‘ ‖  (United States v. Hubbell (2000) 530 U.S. 27, 34, fn. 8, 
quoting Doe v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 201, 212 (Doe); see Andresen v. 
Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 470-471.)  At its core, the privilege protects 
against the ―cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.‖  (Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm'n (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55.)  Accordingly, the amendment 
prohibits the direct or derivative criminal use against an individual of 
―testimonial‖ communications of an incriminatory nature, obtained from the 
person under official compulsion.  (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 
Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 189-190; Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 
760, 766-767 (Chavez); Hubbell, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 34-38; Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 593-596 (Muniz).) 
The testimonial limitation on the protection afforded by the privilege 
against self-incrimination is critical to the issue presented here.  The purpose of 
the privilege is to ―spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, 
his knowledge of facts relating him to [a criminal] offense or from having to share 
his thoughts and beliefs with the Government.‖  (Doe, supra, 487 U.S. 201, 213.)  
Hence, testimonial evidence requires a ―communication‖ that itself ―relate[s] a 
factual assertion‖ by the accused, or ―disclose[s] information‖ in the form of his 
personal knowledge or subjective beliefs.  (Id. at p. 210.) 
Applying this standard, the high court has found, for instance, that not all 
responses to official questioning are testimonial.  (E.g., Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. 
23 
582; see id. at pp. 592 [finding no testimonial communication in drunk driving 
suspect‘s slurred speech and poor muscle control while answering questions 
during police interrogation], 599 [concluding that same suspect‘s answer that he 
did not know the date of his sixth birthday was testimonial because it conveyed 
truthful admission that he was mentally confused]; cf. Schmerber v. California 
(1966) 384 U.S. 757, 763-765 [― ‗real or physical evidence‘ ‖ in the form of blood 
samples extracted from suspect‘s body over his objection and subjected to 
chemical testing disclosed nothing about his thought processes and involved no 
compelled testimonial communication].) 
Based on the foregoing principles, we disagree with defendant that, when 
he was arrested and brought into jail with methamphetamine, his commission of 
the ―greater‖ crime of bringing drugs into jail under section 4573 was the 
compelled testimonial product of his decision not to admit that he was committing 
the ―lesser‖ crime of possessing drugs outside of jail.  Nothing in section 4573 
requires a person in defendant‘s situation to ― ‗speak his guilt‘ ‖ of any crime.  
(Doe, supra, 487 U.S. 201, 211.)  Rather, liability under the statute is premised on 
the nontestimonial act of ―knowingly bring[ing]‖ prohibited drugs into a 
correctional facility. 
A hypothetical scenario inspired by the facts of this case illustrates the flaw 
in defendant‘s contrary view, as follows:  The defendant is arrested on the street 
for a crime, and patted down for weapons.  A small packet containing a controlled 
substance that he had previously placed on his person is not found by the officer at 
that time.  The defendant is taken into custody and brought to jail.  However, in 
this hypothetical version of events, the defendant stays completely silent and does 
nothing about the drugs he knows he still possesses.  He is then escorted into jail 
to be booked for the crime that triggered his arrest.  A short time later, the drugs 
are found in his possession during a routine search.  The defendant sustains a 
24 
conviction under section 4573, because all of the elements of a statutory violation 
were found. 
The foregoing scenario shows that the statutory scheme does not implicate 
Fifth Amendment protections against compelling an arrestee to be a ―witness‖ 
against himself.  Our hypothetical defendant did not make any statements or 
answer any questions that would have deterred him from violating section 4573 by 
disclosing his unlawful possession of drugs before entering jail.  His prosecution 
and conviction for knowingly bringing drugs into jail had nothing to do with the 
State extracting a confession or an incriminating admission that could be used to 
convict him of another drug offense. 
It follows that defendant in the present case, like his counterpart in the 
hypothetical case, was prosecuted and convicted under section 4573, not because 
he gave or refused ―testimony‖ under official compulsion, but because he engaged 
in the nontestimonial criminal act of knowingly entering the jail in the possession 
of a controlled substance.  As we have seen, this conduct is reasonably viewed by 
the Legislature as a threat to institutional safety and control.  Individuals like 
defendant who violate section 4573 have placed themselves in this unfortunate 
position by secreting illegal drugs on their persons before being arrested and jailed 
for committing other crimes.  A detainee can properly be expected to avoid 
knowingly bringing drugs into jail, and can be punished commensurate with his 
culpability if he does so anyway.  The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not remove every difficult choice ―of the guilty suspect‘s own 
making.‖  (Brogan v. United States (1998) 522 U.S. 398, 404.) 
Finally, we are mindful that defendant did make a statement at the entrance 
to the jail in the present case.  Prosecution evidence showed that, after giving an 
advisement under section 4573, the arresting officer asked defendant whether he 
had a controlled substance, and he basically said ―no.‖  This answer proved to be 
25 
false in light of the methamphetamine jailers found in his sock a short time later.  
Arguably, this custodial exchange, which required defendant to communicate 
knowledge about illegal substances in his possession, presented him with the 
― ‗trilemma‘ of truth, falsity, or silence‖ that the Fifth Amendment privilege was 
designed to prevent.  (Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. 582, 597.)  As indicated above, 
where such a violation occurs, the remedy is to ensure that the statements, and any 
evidence derived from them, ―cannot be used‖ against the defendant criminally.  
(Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 760, 768 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); see United States v. 
Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 639 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.) [―blanket suppression 
rule‖ protects ―actually compelled testimony‖ and its ―fruits‖].) 
However, we need not decide whether defendant‘s false denial of guilt was 
the compelled incriminating product of an unconstitutional choice, or whether this 
evidence should have been excluded from the prosecution‘s case-in-chief.  Two 
reasons appear. 
First, defendant never moved to exclude this evidence below, and has 
therefore forfeited any right to challenge its admission here.  No motion was made 
before or during trial to suppress the statement under the Fifth Amendment or on 
any other ground.  Thus, the relevant issues were not litigated below, and the trial 
court lost the opportunity to rule, during the trial proceedings themselves, whether 
defendant‘s statement should be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment.  As in 
prior similar cases, we will not decide that issue for the first time in this court.  
(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339, and cases cited; accord, People v. 
Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 506-507; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 
845-846; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 387-388.) 
26 
Second, defendant was not prejudiced by any error in failing to suppress 
this evidence in violation of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself.  
Under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, a reviewing court need not 
reverse the judgment on this ground if it determines ―beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‖  (Id. at 
p. 24.)  In other words, the alleged error must be ―unimportant in relation to 
everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the 
record.‖  (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403.)  That is the case here. 
The record shows that defendant possessed methamphetamine in jail.  The 
substance was found during a search of his clothes, leading the booking officer to 
give it to the arresting officer.  Both witnesses described the substance for the jury.  
In addition, a criminalist confirmed that it was methamphetamine and was present 
in a useable amount.  This testimony, coupled with the physical evidence itself, 
provides overwhelming proof that defendant knowingly brought a controlled 
substance into jail in violation of section 4573. 
Under the circumstances, defendant‘s brief statement beforehand that he 
did not possess a controlled substance, though demonstrably false and arguably 
indicative of a consciousness of guilt, assumed only slight importance in the 
context of all the other evidence at trial.  Defendant‘s statement did not contribute  
27 
to the verdict under section 4573.10  We therefore find no constitutional basis for 
reversing the conviction.11 
                                              
10 
Of course, any motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in jail as 
the tainted physical fruit of a Fifth Amendment violation would have lacked merit 
and been subject to denial at trial.  The discovery of the drugs in defendant‘s 
possession did not flow from, or have any connection to, his statement outside the 
jail that he had ―nothing inside‖ his clothes.  Unlike the statement, defendant‘s act 
of retaining the drugs as he entered jail was not testimonial.  His exculpatory 
statement also did not lead police to search for drugs in his sock once he brought 
them inside.  The search would have occurred in due course, and the drugs would 
have been found regardless of any contrary assurance defendant made.  (See Nix v. 
Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 444 [federal constitutional violation does not bar 
admission of physical evidence that would inevitably have been discovered by 
lawful means]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 [same].) 
11 
In his opening brief on the merits, defendant argues that application of 
section 4573 impairs his due process rights under the federal and state 
Constitutions because of the State‘s ―outrageous‖ conduct in causing him to 
violate section 4573, and because he committed no voluntary or intentional 
criminal act.  The State‘s misconduct allegedly occurred when the arresting officer 
brought defendant into jail with methamphetamine hidden on his person, and when 
the prosecutor charged him under section 4573.  In making this claim, defendant 
cites federal and state decisions debating whether, and to what extent, ―outrageous 
government conduct‖ serves as a constitutional bar to prosecution or a defense to 
conviction.  (E.g., United States v. Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423, 431-432; People 
v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 (maj. opn. of Brown, J.), 1227-1229 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar. J.).)  We decline to reverse the conviction on this ground.  
First, to the extent this argument concerns principles and authorities different from 
those already discussed herein, it was not presented either at trial or on appeal, and 
is raised for the first time on review.  Defendant has thus forfeited this 
constitutional theory by failing to timely raise or properly present it in this case.  
Second, for reasons we have already explained, defendant‘s conduct in knowingly 
bringing methamphetamine into jail violated section 4573.  Hence, his due process 
challenge to the actions of the State rests on a faulty premise, i.e., that he 
committed no criminal act for which he could be properly prosecuted and 
convicted.  No viable basis for relief on this ground therefore appears. 
28 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Low 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 3/14/07 – 1st Dist., Div. 5 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S151961 
Date Filed: June 24, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Michael R. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Matthew A. Siroka, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Laurence 
K. Sullivan, René A. Chacón and Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Matthew A. Siroka 
600 Townsend Street, Suite 329E 
San Francisco, CA  94103 
9415) 522-1105 
 
Arthur P. Beever 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5865