Title: Weedman v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Weedman v. State1990 WY 65792 P.2d 1388Case Number: 89-239Decided: 06/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN EDWARD WEEDMAN, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Michael Cornia, Asst. Public Defender, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, and Donald K. Slaughter, 
Student Intern (argued), for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John R. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., (argued), for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant pled 
guilty to charges of burglary and first degree sexual assault. He was sentenced 
to twelve to thirty-five years for the sexual assault and three to eight years 
for the burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant received 
credit against the minimum sentence for the 170 days of time served prior to 
sentencing on the sexual assault conviction. He now asks that we modify the 
sentence to give credit for time served against the maximum of both sentences 
and to give credit against the minimum burglary sentence.

[¶2]      This issue is 
controlled by our recent decision in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1990). 
In that case we retroactively eliminated the trial court's discretion to deny 
credit for presentence confinement in all cases where the defendant is indigent. 
785 P.2d  at 498. A defendant is considered indigent for the purposes of applying 
Renfro if he is incarcerated due to inability to post bond on the offense which 
results in the sentence. 785 P.2d  at 498 n. 8. The record reflects that 
appellant in this case was unable to post bond and was incarcerated upon the 
charges which resulted in the sentences at issue here. Accordingly, he was 
indigent as defined in Renfro and is automatically entitled to credit against 
both the minimum and maximum sentences. 785 P.2d  at 498.

[¶3]      The Renfro 
decision does not directly address the precise question here presented, which is 
the application of credit when unequal concurrent sentences are imposed. The 
State argues that applying credit against the shorter burglary sentence would 
have no effect because appellant must serve the longer minimum sentence for the 
sexual assault in any event. While in the majority of cases this would be 
correct, it is possible that circumstances could arise where the longer sentence 
would not be served, such as commutation or pardon. To ensure that credit is 
consistently granted, we hold that credit should be granted against the minimum 
and maximum term of each concurrent sentence.

[¶4]      Remanded for 
entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, J., 
dissenting.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶5]      I cannot agree 
that "credit should be granted against the minimum and maximum term of each 
concurrent sentence." Consequently, I must dissent. 

[¶6]      Recognizing that, 
in the instance of concurrent sentences, the end result is no different, I am 
firmly convinced that credit for presentence confinement should be given only 
once. Conceptually, awarding credit for presentence confinement on two different 
sentences is no different from awarding credit twice on one sentence. In Jones 
v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 373 (Wyo. 1989), we said, with respect to the latter 
situation, that "doubling of presentence incarceration credit is unjustified as 
well as unauthorized and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the sentencing 
court." If presentence confinement is to be awarded on each of two concurrent 
sentences, how is it to be awarded on five concurrent sentences? If it is 
awarded on each sentence, how can we avoid transferring the rule to consecutive 
sentences?

[¶7]      The correct rule 
has been articulated by the Florida Court of Appeals. That court 
said:

"* * * [I]t is important 
to point out that a defendant will be given credit only once for the 
total time spent prior to sentencing; if he is sentenced on another charge by 
the same or another judge duplicate jail time credit cannot be given." Lawrence 
v. State, 306 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla.App. 1975) (emphasis in 
original).

Other courts 
have arrived at the same conclusion. Prichard v. State, 441 So. 2d 1052 
(Ala.Cr.App. 1983); State v. Caffey, 445 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 996, 90 S. Ct. 1138, 25 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1970); Richardson v. State, 632 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. App. 1982). Read carefully, the New Mexico cases are not contrary 
authority. See State v. Page, 100 N.M. 788, 676 P.2d 1353 (N.M.App. 1984); State 
v. Ramzy, 98 N.M. 436, 649 P.2d 504 (N.M.App. 1982).

[¶8]      In the case of 
concurrent sentences, it is not necessary that the defendant be given credit on 
both sentences to assure that it will be afforded if one of the sentences is 
reversed or vacated. The time served under the sentence that is reversed or 
vacated is legally referable to the remaining concurrent sentence or sentences. 
Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1948). See 24 C.J.S. Criminal 
Law § 1582 (1989). That time to be referred to the remaining sentence must 
include the time that was served presentence.

[¶9]      I am satisfied 
that the correct rule is that, in Wyoming, a defendant must be given credit for 
presentence confinement against both the minimum and maximum term, but that 
credit appropriately should be given only once. I dissent from the opinion of 
the court awarding double credit.