Title: LAWRENCE v HARVEY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14879 IN THE SUPREFIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 MALLORY D. LAWRENCE, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS . CHRISTENE HARVEY et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Larsen and Neill, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Thomas E . Boland, Great Falls, Montana , 4 ' iV< [, 7 , > - - - - 1 . I , : . ; L ! : Filed: Submitted on briefs: January 16, 1980 ~ecided: MAR - 1989 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n of r e a l property brought by Mallory D. Lawrence. The D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Judge H. William Coder presiding, denied p l a i n t i f f ' s prayer f o r a p a r t i t i o n sale i n a judgment dated June 12, 1979. This judgment ordered t h e p l a i n t i f f t o q u i t - claim h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l defen- dants upon t h e i r payment t o him of $ 3 7 9 . 1 5 , the s u m set by t h e D i s t r i c t Court as representing h i s equity. The judgment from which he now appeals f u r t h e r required p l a i n t i f f Mallory D. Lawrence t o pay defendants' a t t o r n e y s f e e s and c o s t s . The property i n question is a s i n g l e family residence located on a standard c i t y l o t i n Great F a l l s . By agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e property i s n o t s u b j e c t t o a c t u a l p a r t i - t i o n , and t h e p l a i n t i f f has prayed f o r a p a r t i t i o n sale and a d i v i s i o n of t h e proceeds according t o t h e i n t e r e s t s d e t e r - mined by t h e Court. The defendant F i r s t Federal Savings and Loan Association holds a f i r s t mortgage on t h e property. The p r i o r i t y of its l i e n i s conceded by a l l p a r t i e s and, by s t i p u l a t i o n , it d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e s e proceedings. The f i v e i n d i v i d u a l defendants a r e t h e c h i l d r e n of p l a i n t i f f Mallory D. Lawrence by h i s former wife, Mary K. Lawrence. The a p p e l l a n t l e f t h i s family and t h e family home i n August 1968 and t h e r e a f t e r resided i n another Montana c i t y . Mary K. Lawrence f i l e d an a c t i o n f o r s e p a r a t e maintenance and c h i l d support on August 5 , 1968, and a f t e r a show cause hearing on A p r i l 3 , 1969, a p p e l l a n t was ordered t o pay $225 p e r month c h i l d support t o t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t pending e n t r y of a decree. The property s u b j e c t t o t h i s l i t i g a t i o n w a s t h e family home of Mallory D. Lawrence and Mary K. Lawrence p r i o r t o t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n and divorce. I n t h e divorce decree dated August 6, 1970, t h e D i s t r i c t Court Judge R . J . Nelson set a s i d e t h e family home, together with f u r n i s h i n g s and f i x - t u r e s , f o r t h e use and b e n e f i t of Mary K. Lawrence and t h e minor c h i l d r e n " u n t i l f u r t h e r order of t h e Court." I n a d d i t i o n t o awarding t h e use of t h e family home t o Mary K. Lawrence and t h e four minor c h i l d r e n ( t h e e l d e s t c h i l d had already a t t a i n e d t h e age of m a j o r i t y ) , t h e divorce decree ordered a p p e l l a n t t o pay $225 per month t o t h e c l e r k of c o u r t " a s and f o r t h e support of t h e s a i d minor c h i l d r e n Appellant made t h e required payments through February 1975, when t h e youngest of t h e c h i l d r e n a t t a i n e d t h e age of majority. Later, on December 11, 1975, he p e t i t i o n e d t h e divorce c o u r t f o r an o r d e r determining t h e r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of himself and h i s former spouse i n t h e property. A hearing w a s held on t h i s p e t i t i o n on January 8, 1976, b u t t h e D i s t r i c t Judge made no decision on t h e p e t i t i o n , d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s of a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel t o o b t a i n a r u l i n g . Mary K. Lawrence discovered t h a t she had terminal cancer and quitclaimed her i n t e r e s t i n the property equally t o t h e f i v e c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e defendants-respondents i n t h i s a c t i o n , i n a deed dated and recorded May 5, 1976. She died i n 1977. D i s t r i c t Judge R . J . Nelson had l e f t t h e bench a t t h e end of 1976 without r u l i n g on a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n . Mallory D. Lawrence subsequently f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n f o r a p a r t i t i o n of t h e real property on February 9, 1978. The m a t t e r w a s heard by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on A p r i l 20, 1979 and t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law, and judg- ment w e r e entered i n favor of t h e defendants on June 12, 1979. The property w a s o r i g i n a l l y acquired i n 1958 by t h e ap- p e l l a n t and Mary K. Lawrence as j o i n t t e n a n t s with a r i g h t of survivorship. The purchase p r i c e of $15,900 was s a t i s - f i e d by t h e assumption of an e x i s t i n g loan i n the amount of $11,750 and by a downpayment of $4,150. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h e source of t h a t downpayment t o be $3,029.91 i n j o i n t e q u i t y from t h e s a l e of a previous family home i n Missoula and a $2,500 loan from a p p e l l a n t ' s f a t h e r i n t h e form of a promissory note signed by both a p p e l l a n t and Mary K. Lawrence. A n unspecified portion of t h i s note w a s paid and t h e remainder of t h e o b l i g a t i o n was cancelled a f t e r t h e 1970 divorce. The D i s t r i c t Court made t h e f u r t h e r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l amount of p r i n c i p a l owing on t h e mortgage assumed by Mallory D. Lawrence and Mary K. Lawrence had been reduced by $3,608.30 as of t h e d a t e of t h e divorce. Based on t h e foregoing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n the property t o be one-half of t h e downpayment p l u s one-half of t h e e q u i t y accumulated during t h e marriage: a t o t a l of $3,879.15. Appellant was ordered t o q u i t c l a i m h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l defendants upon t h e i r payment t o him of t h a t sum. Four i s s u e s a r e presented by t h i s appeal: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o order a p a r t i t i o n s a l e ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o c r e d i t a p p e l l a n t with a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e e q u i t y i n t h e home f o r t h e c h i l d support payments he made a f t e r t h e d a t e of divorce? 3 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o g i v e t h e a p p e l l a n t c r e d i t f o r a pro-rata s h a r e of t h e p r o p e r t y ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n i n value by considering t h e property a t its real market value? 4. Whether Mallory D. Lawrence i s estopped from as- s e r t i n g any i n t e r e s t i n t h e property beyond t h a t i n t e r e s t which he had as of t h e d a t e of t h e divorce decree? I t i s a common p r a c t i c e i n cases involving a d i s s o l u - t i o n of marriage f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Courts t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e family home be set a s i d e during t h e m i n o r i t i e s of t h e c h i l - dren f o r t h e i r use and b e n e f i t and f o r t h a t of t h e i r mother a s w e l l . It i s a l s o usual i n such c a s e s f o r t h e c o u r t s t o make some provision i n t h e decree f o r a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e house, which i s u s u a l l y t h e f a m i l y ' s only major a s s e t , a f t e r t h e c h i l d r e n have reached t h e i r m a j o r i t i e s and t h e husband's o b l i g a t i o n t o support has ceased. The problem i n t h i s c a s e arises because t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n f a i l e d t o make a n u l t i m a t e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e family home, and merely set it a s i d e f o r t h e use and b e n e f i t of t h e minor c h i l d r e n and t h e i r mother " u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e Court." No such o r d e r was forthcoming p r i o r t o t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n , although t h e a p p e l l a n t had f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r modification of t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n on December 11, 1975, and r e p e a t e d l y attempted t o o b t a i n a r u l i n g on t h a t p e t i t i o n . Subsequently, Mallory D. Lawrence brought t h i s a c t i o n f o r a p a r t i t i o n of t h e real property, requesting a p a r t i t i o n sale. The f i r s t i s s u e t o be resolved i s whether o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o o r d e r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e . During p r e t r i a l conference t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d , on agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , t h a t a s a matter of law t h e e f f e c t of a quitclaim deed by one of two j o i n t t e n a n t s t o a t h i r d p a r t y is t o c r e a t e a tenancy i n common between t h e j o i n t t e n a n t who d i d n o t join i n t h e deed and t h e t h i r d p a r t y . Appellant argued i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t i t l e t o t h e resi- dence was held i n j o i n t tenancy by himself and h i s former wife, so t h a t when she executed a q u i t c l a i m deed t o t h e i r f i v e c h i l d r e n , t h e j o i n t tenancy was severed and t h e appel- l a n t and h i s c h i l d r e n became t e n a n t s i n common. Under t h i s theory, he r e t a i n e d an undivided one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e property while they shared equally i n t h e w i f e ' s h a l f and t h e r e f o r e each received a n undivided one-tenth i n t e r e s t . I n response t o t h e defendants' contentions, a p p e l l a n t claimed i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o e q u i t y a s a b a s i s f o r determining h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property. "The primary o b j e c t of an a c t i o n of p a r t i t i o n . . . [ i s ] . . . t o d i v i d e among t h e co-owners land held by them e i t h e r a s j o i n t t e n a n t s o r as tenants i n common according t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t . . ." Emery v. Emery (1948), 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251, 265. I n Montana, an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n i s a s p e c i a l s t a t u t o r y proceeding. Hurley v. O ' N e i l l (1905), 31 Mont. 595, 79 P. 242, 243. "We must t h e r e f o r e look t o t h e s t a t u t e f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y t o bring t h e a c t i o n , and f o r t h e procedure t o be followed both i n bringing t h e a c t i o n and a f t e r it i s i n s t i t u t e d . " Hurley, supra, 79 P. a t 243. Our s t a t u t e authorizing an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n i s s e c t i o n 70-29-101, MCA: "When s e v e r a l cotenants hold and are i n possession of real property as j o i n t t e n a n t s o r t e n a n t s i n common, i n which one o r more of them have an e s t a t e o r i n h e r i t a n c e o r f o r l i f e o r l i v e s o r f o r years, - an a c t i o n m a y be brought 9 one o r more of such persons f o r ----- a p a r t i t i o n t h e r e o f , according t o t h e respec- - t i v e r i g h t s of t h e persons i n t e r e s t e d t h e r e i n , and f o r a sale of such property o r a p a r t thereof i f it appears t h a t a p a r t i t i o n cannot be made without a g r e a t prejudice t o t h e own- e r s . " (EZnphasis added.) Although he i s a t e n a n t i n common holding l e g a l t i t l e t o an e s t a t e of i n h e r i t a n c e , t h e a p p e l l a n t i n t h i s case i s n o t i n a c t u a l possession of t h e property because of t h e divorce decree g r a n t i n g exclusive possession t o h i s former wife, now deceased, and t h e i r then minor children. Actual physical possession however has been held n o t t o be essen- t i a l t o maintenance of an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n under our s t a t u t e : "The Montana s t a t u t e g i v e s t h e remedy of p a r t i t i o n t o co-tenants 'who hold and a r e i n possession of real property a s j o i n t t e n a n t s o r t e n a n t s i n common,' e t c . Code Civ. Proc. 5 1340 [now S 70-29-101, MCA]. W e think t h a t t h e possession which t h e l a w imputes t o t h e holder of t h e l e g a l t i t l e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o maintain p a r t i t i o n , under t h i s s t a t u t e . " Heinze v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co. ( 9 t h C i r . 1903), 126 F. 1, 3, c e r t . den. 195 U . S . 631. Having m e t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e r e q u i s i t e s of s e c t i o n 70- 29-101, MCA, a p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d a s a matter of r i g h t t o maintain h i s s u i t f o r p a r t i t i o n under t h a t s e c t i o n , which provides: "an a c t i o n may be brought by one o r more of such persons f o r a p a r t i t i o n . . ." This conclusion i s but- t r e s s e d by t h e d i r e c t i v e i n s e c t i o n 70-29-202(1), MCArthat while t h e c o u r t may order a p a r t i t i o n sale i n appropriate circumstances, it must otherwise o r d e r an a c t u a l p a r t i t i o n upon t h e r e q u i s i t e proofs being made. " I f it be a l l e g e d i n t h e complaint and e s t a b l i s h e d by evidence o r i f it appear by t h e evidence without such a l l e g a t i o n i n t h e complaint t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e property o r any p a r t i s s o s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i t i o n cannot be made without g r e a t prejudice t o t h e owners, t h e c o u r t may order a sale there- o f ; otherwise, upon t h e r e q u i s i t e proofs being made, - -- it must order a p a r t i t i o n according -- t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s a s ascertained by t h e court and appoint t h r e e r e f e r e e s t h e r e f o r and must designate t h e portion t o remain un- divided f o r t h e owners whose i n t e r e s t s remain unknown o r a r e n o t ascertained." Section 70-29-202(1), MCA. (Emphasis added.) Although t h e r e a r e no Montana c a s e s d i r e c t l y on p o i n t , t h e general r u l e i s t h a t a cotenant is e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i t i o n as a matter of r i g h t , and n o t merely as a matter of grace within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e court. While t h e r i g h t i s sometimes s a i d t o be absolute, p a r t i t i o n may be denied where it would be a g a i n s t p u b l i c policy o r l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , and t h e r i g h t may i n appropriate circumstances be waived by agreement of t h e p a r t i e s . 68 C.J.S. P a r t i t i o n § 21; 59 Am.Jur.2d P a r t i t i o n 530; 4 Thompson on Real Property 5 1822 (1979); 2 Tiffany on Real Property § 474 (3rd ed. 1939); 4A Powell on Real Property 5 611 (1949). C a l i f o r n i a has i n t e r p r e t e d i t s p a r t i t i o n s t a t u t e i n accordance with t h i s general r u l e . Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich (1952), 39 Cal.2d 48, 244 P.2d 1, 2; DeRoulet v. Mitchel (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 120, 160 P.2d 574, 576. Sections 70-29-101 and 70-29-202(1), MCA,were o r i g i n a l l y enacted i n 1867 a s p a r t of t h e Bannack S t a t u t e s ; t h e i r source i s s e c t i o n s 752 and 763 of t h e C a l i f o r n i a Code of C i v i l Procedure. Montana follows t h e r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction t h a t where a s t a t u t e i s adopted from a sister s t a t e , it i s o r d i n a r i l y presumed t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e borrows t h e construction placed upon it by t h e h i g h e s t c o u r t of t h e state from which it i s borrowed, although such construction is n o t binding upon t h i s Court. Continental O i l Co. v. Board of Labor Appeals (1978), - Mont. 582 P.2d 1236, 1240, 35 St.Rep. 1153, 1156; J.T. M i l l e r Co. v. Made1 (1978), Mont. - 1 575 P.2d 1321, 1322, 35 St.Rep. 263, 265; S t a t e v. Murphy (1977), - Mont. , 570 P.2d 1103, 1105, 34 St.Rep. 1174, 1177; S t a t e ex r e l . Mankin v. Wilson (1977), Mont . 569 P.2d 922, 924, 34 St.Rep. 1075, 1078. Therefore, i n view of t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e s , which a r e both s i m i l a r t o and the source of our own s t a t u t e s , w e are persuaded t o adopt t h e general r u l e i n t h i s j u r i s d i c - t i o n . Since p a r t i t i o n may be denied where it would be a g a i n s t p r i n c i p l e s of l a w o r e q u i t y o r a g a i n s t p u b l i c policy, w e must ask whether any of these reasons e x i s t f o r denying p a r t i t i o n i n t h i s case. The d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s because of t h e open divorce decree, which f a i l e d t o make a f i n a l d i s - p o s i t i o n of t h e marital property, i.e. t h e house and l o t now sought t o be p a r t i t i o n e d . Certainly, it would be a g a i n s t p u b l i c policy and p r i n c i p l e s of l a w and e q u i t y t o allow p a r t i t i o n during t h e minority of t h e c h i l d r e n while t h e house w a s set a s i d e f o r t h e exclusive use of t h e mother and minor c h i l d r e n under a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n . I n t h e p r e s e n t case, however, t h e former wife i s deceased and a l l of t h e c h i l d r e n have a t t a i n e d t h e age of majority. They are now t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s cotenants, having been deeded t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e i r mother by quitclaim deed p r i o r t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n . That being t h e case, we conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s - c r e t i o n i n denying p a r t i t i o n . Our conclusion i s supported by t h e d e c i s i o n s i n s e v e r a l cases holding t h a t a former spouse i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i t i o n a f t e r a decree of divorce. T u l l i s v. T u l l i s (Fla. 1978), 360 So.2d 375; B e s t v. ~ i l l i a m s (19761, 260 Ark. 30, 537 S.W.2d 793; Squibb v. Squibb (1961), 190 Cal.App.2d 766, 12 Gal-Rptr. 346; Barba v. Barba (1951), 103 Cal.App.2d 395, 229 P.2d 465, 466; Deacon v. Deacon (1929), 101 Gal-App. 195, 281 P. 533, 535; Yax v. Yax (1925), 240 N.Y. 590, 148 N.E. 717; Lang v. Lang (1920), 182 Cal. 765, 770, 190 P. 181. The second i s s u e presented by t h i s appeal i s whether o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o c r e d i t a p p e l l a n t with a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e e q u i t y i n t h e home f o r t h e c h i l d support payments he made a f t e r t h e decree of divorce. The D i s t r i c t Court ordered a p p e l l a n t t o q u i t - claim h i s i n t e r e s t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l respondents upon t h e i r payment t o him of a s u m representing one-half of t h e down- payment made on t h e house p l u s one-half of t h e reduction i n t h e p r i n c i p a l balance owing on t h e mortgage as of t h e d a t e of t h e divorce decree: a t o t a l of $3,879.15. Thus, appel- l a n t complains he w a s n o t c r e d i t e d with any i n c r e a s e i n e q u i t y i n t h e property a f t e r t h e 1970 decree, although he made support payments of $225 per month u n t i l h i s youngest c h i l d reached majority i n 1975. The testimony was t h a t t h e house payments, including taxes and insurance, were approxi- mately $130 per month. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t from March 1969 t o t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , Mary K. Lawrence and her c h i l d r e n have made a l l of t h e monthly mortgage payments and paid a l l t a x e s and insurance on t h e property, while a p p e l l a n t has f a i l e d t o make any such payments. The payments which a p p e l l a n t was ordered t o make f o r t h e "support" of h i s minor c h i l d r e n W e r e intended t o provide f o r t h e common n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e . I£ t h e D i s t r i c t Court had intended t h a t a p a r t of t h e support payment was r e t u r n a b l e t o t h e f a t h e r i n t h e form of an e q u i t y i n t h e house a f t e r t h e c h i l d r e n w e r e emancipated, it should have been c l e a r l y s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e divorce judg- ment. I t w a s not. Appellant claims t h a t Judge Nelson's remarks t o a p p e l l a n t a t t h e conclusion of t h e A p r i l 3 , 1969 show cause hearing demonstrate t h a t he intended t h e $225 monthly c h i l d support payments t o cover t h e house mortgage payments. H i s remarks may appear t o i n d i c a t e t h i s b u t again they may not. This i s t h e reason t h a t a refund of t h i s kind must appear i n t h e judgment. The D i s t r i c t Court properly denied a p p e l l a n t c r e d i t f o r any i n c r e a s e i n e q u i t y i n t h e house on account of t h e c h i l d support payments he made a f t e r t h e decree of divorce. Nevertheless, t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o c r e d i t a p p e l l a n t with a pro-rata share of t h e p r o p e r t y ' s appreciation i n value. Appellant remained a cotenant a f t e r t h e 1970 divorce decree, and a s such he was e n t i t l e d t o a share of t h e appreciation i n proportion t o h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property. B y l i m i t i n g h i s i n t e r e s t t o one- h a l f of t h e 1958 downpayment and one-half of t h e amount by which t h e p r i n c i p a l owing on t h e mortgage was reduced during t h e marriage, t h e D i s t r i c t Court completely denied a p p e l l a n t t h e b e n e f i t of t h e p r o p e r t y ' s i n c r e a s e i n value over t h e p a s t twenty-odd years. Appellant w a s e n t i t l e d t o h i s pro- p o r t i o n a t e share of t h a t appreciation a s a cotenant. That i s n o t t o say t h a t a p a r t i t i o n c o u r t may n o t make an e q u i t a b l e adjustment of t h e cotenants' i n t e r e s t s . O n t h e contrary, t h e r u l e i s t h a t " [ t l h e c o u r t can a d j u s t a l l t h e e q u i t i e s of the p a r t i e s t o a p a r t i t i o n s u i t , i f they a r e l i m i t e d t o such a s a r i s e from t h e p a r t i t i o n of t h e land . . ." 4 ~hompson on Real Property § § 1829, 1830 a t 331 (1979). See a l s o 4A Powell on Real Property S 611 a t 646-647 (1949); 68 C.J.S. P a r t i t i o n § 135; Demetris v. D e m e t r i s (1954), 125 C a l . ~ p p . 2 d 440, 270 P.2d 891, 894; Withington v. C o l l i n s (1943), 60 Cal.App.2d 110, 1 4 0 P.2d 493, 495. Our p a r t i t i o n s t a t u t e provides t h a t " [ t l h e r i g h t of t h e s e v e r a l p a r t i e s , p l a i n t i f f as w e l l a s defendant, may be p u t i n i s s u e , t r i e d , and determined i n such action." Section 70-29-201, MCA. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t a p p e l l a n t ceased making house payments a f t e r t h e divorce w a s granted, and a l l house payments a f t e r t h a t time w e r e made by t h e respondents and t h e i r mother. " I n t h e f i n a l accounting between t h e co- t e n a n t s i n c i d e n t t o p a r t i t i o n , a cotenant w i l l be charged with . . . payments i n discharge of p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t on mortgages and o t h e r l i e n s . . ." 2 American Law of Property § 6.26 a t 117 (1952). See a l s o Bailey v. Mormino (1958), 6 App.Div.2d 993, 175 N.Y.S.2d 993; Fundaburk v. Cody (1954), 261 Ala. 25, 72 So.2d 710; Hermance v. Weisner (1938), 228 W i s . 501, 279 N.W. 608, 610. Thus, respondents should be c r e d i t e d with payments i n excess of t h e i r share expended by them a f t e r t h e divorce f o r p r i n c i p a l and i n - t e r e s t p l u s insurance and taxes on t h e property. Appellant i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o an o f f s e t a g a i n s t t h i s c r e d i t f o r t h e reasonable r e n t a l value of t h e property during t h e period of t i m e before t h i s a c t i o n . Even though t h e respondents re- mained i n exclusive possession, t h e general r u l e is t h a t a cotenant i n possession i s n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e use and occu- pation of t h e premises. 68 C.J.S. P a r t i t i o n § 1 3 8 ( b ) , That i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h i s case where respondents enjoyed t h e b e n e f i t s of possession under a c o u r t decree. he re- spondents, however, must account f o r t h e value of t h e i r use and occupation i n excess of t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e a f t e r t h e a p p e l l a n t demanded t h e e q u i v a l e n t of j o i n t possession i n February 1978 by i n i t i a t i n g t h i s a c t i o n f o r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e . Eldridge v. Wolf (1927), 129 Misc.Rep. 617, 221 N . Y . S . 508, 511. The f i n a l i s s u e f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s whether o r n o t Mallory D. Lawrence i s estopped from a s s e r t i n g any i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y beyond t h a t which he had a s of t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e decree. The District Court found t h a t he was s o estopped f o r two reasons: (1) because he a l l e g e d l y changed h i s purpose t o t h e i n j u r y of t h e defendant by f i r s t claiming t o have made c h i l d support payments under t h e d i v o r c e decree and then a s s e r t i n g t h a t he has been making house payments a l l t h e s e years; and ( 2 ) because he a l l e g e d l y attempted t o t a k e advantage of h i s own "wrong" by f a i l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e accumulated e q u i t y i n t h e p r o p e r t y and by now seeking an award of p a r t of t h a t e q u i t y . I t i s unnecessary f o r u s t o consider t h e f i r s t f i n d i n g because w e have concluded t h a t t h e District Court p r o p e r l y denied a p p e l l a n t c r e d i t f o r any i n c r e a s e i n e q u i t y i n t h e house on account of t h e c h i l d support payments he made a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e decree. W e d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e District C o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t a p p e l l a n t was estopped from a s s e r t i n g any i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n i n value a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e f o r reasons s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s opinion r e l a t i n g t o h i s r i g h t s a s a cotenant. Furthermore, a p p e l l a n t com- m i t t e d no "wrong" by f a i l i n g t o make house payments a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t he i s estopped t o t a k e advantage of h i s own a l l e g e d "wrong" i s erroneous. I n summary, t h e r e was no s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s as t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property, and t h e s e f i n d i n g s must be s e t a s i d e . "Where t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r D i s t r i c t Court f i n d i n g s and i f a c l e a r and s a t i s f a c t o r y showing i s n o t made t o support t h e findings, t h i s Court w i l l set such f i n d i n g s a s i d e . " Swanson v. S t . J o h n ' s Lutheran Hospital (1979), Mont. , 597 P.2d 702, 708, 36 St.Rep. 1075. See a l s o Johnson v. Johnson (1977), 172 Mont. 150, 560 P.2d 1331, 1333. The cause i s affirmed i n p a r t and reversed i n p a r t and remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e and t o a d j u s t the p a r t i e s ' e q u i t i e s i n conformity with t h i s opinion. J u s t i c e W e concur: % & J P Z ' ~ - Chief J u s t i c e - a . J u s t i c e s