Title: Maryland House of Correction v. Fields

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Maryland House of Correction v. Merrill Fields - No. 125, 1996 Term; Secretary of Public
Safety and Correctional Services v. Wayne Hood - No. 126, 1996 Term; Earl D. Beshears,
Warden v. Michael S. Sayko - No. 19, 1997 Term
HABEAS CORPUS — Inmate who alleges entitlement to immediate release and makes a
colorable claim that the entire sentence, less any mandatory credits, has been served may file
habeas corpus and need not use the inmate grievance procedure — computation of
diminution credits and street-time credits
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Nos. 125 & 126
  
September Term, 1996
___________________________________
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case # 95331900
MARYLAND HOUSE OF CORRECTION
v.
MERRILL FIELDS
***********************************
Circuit Court for Somerset County 
Case # 95-CA-04731
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
v.
WAYNE HOOD
___________________________________
Circuit Court for Allegany County 
Case # 5621
         No.  19
September Term, 1997
___________________________________
EARL D. BESHEARS, WARDEN
v.
MICHAEL S. SAYKO
_______________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
         *Karwacki
Raker
Smith, Marvin H.
  (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  December 15, 1997                   
*Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, § 3A, he also
participated in the decision and the adoption of this
opinion.
    The Petitioners actually named are different here because inmates are required to direct
1
their petitions for habeas corpus to the “person having custody of the individual confined or
restrained.”  Maryland Rule 15-305.  We, however, shall refer to Petitioners collectively
throughout this opinion as “Division of Correction” or “Division” because the Division of
Correction was the unit of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
responsible for calculating the contested credits with respect to all three habeas corpus
plaintiffs.
In this certiorari review of a decision of the Court of Special Appeals, we must
address the following questions:
1.
Whether the failure of an inmate to raise an issue in an inmate grievance
proceeding operates as a procedural bar to habeas corpus review of that issue;
2.
Whether the Division of Correction (Division) awarded habeas corpus
plaintiffs the proper number of diminution credits in light of a 1992
amendment to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 700
(d)(3) that increased the rate of accumulation of diminution credits from five
days per month to ten days per month; and
3.
Whether the Division possesses the authority to reduce an inmate’s diminution
credits by the amount of “street-time credits” awarded by the Maryland Parole
Commission upon an inmate’s return to incarceration for violation of
mandatory supervision.
The following cases have been consolidated on appeal from the Court of Special
Appeals: Maryland House of Correction v. Fields (No. 125), Secretary, Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Hood (No. 126), and Earl D. Beshears, Warden
v. Sayko (No. 19).   We begin with a summary of the pertinent facts of each case.  
1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.  Fields
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    We note that throughout the record Fields’s first name is spelled in various ways,
2
including Merrill, Merril, and Merrell.  In one commitment record, a different last name is
used, Sherrod.
    A drug offense in this context is defined as “manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or
3
possessing a controlled dangerous substance as provided for under Article 27, § 286.”
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27, § 700(d)(2).  Fields’s
conviction for possession of heroin was not under § 286, but rather under § 287 and, thus,
would not be deemed drug related in the context of this statute.
On April 19, 1988, Merrill Fields  was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with all
2
but five years suspended, for a daytime housebreaking conviction.  Shortly thereafter, Fields
received a two-year-consecutive sentence (less 86 days for time served) for violation of
probation on a prior conviction of heroin possession.  These two sentences combined to form
a seven-year sentence (less 86 days).
Through the application of diminution credits to the sentences, Fields was released
on mandatory supervision on May 8, 1992.  Of these diminution credits, 401 credits were
“good-conduct” credits, calculated at a rate of five days per month in accordance with former
Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 700(d)(2).  In 1992, § 700 was amended to
provide for ten days per month of good-conduct credits where the inmate has not been
convicted of a crime of violence as defined by Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27,
§ 643B or certain drug related offenses.   Chapter 588 of the Acts of 1992 (now codified as
3
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 27, § 700(d)(3)).
On February 2, 1994, less than two years after his release, Fields was convicted of
theft and malicious destruction of property and given an eighteen-month sentence.  These
-3-
    The parole commissioner has the power to revoke these previously earned diminution
4
credits under Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 41, § 4-612(e).  See also
Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 144, 647 A.2d 106, 115-16 (1994)(holding §4-612(e), as
applied, not violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws).
    Originally, Fields was awarded fifteen months of street-time credits.  After Fields
5
appealed the MPC’s determination to the Circuit Court for Washington County, the circuit
court remanded the case to the MPC with respect to how much street-time credit Fields
should be granted and because a transcript of the revocation proceedings was unavailable.
At that point, the MPC adjusted the number of credits to 641 credits.  
    Unless otherwise noted, all citations will be to the current version of the Maryland Code,
6
which is substantively similar to the version in effect at the time of  hearings before the
MPC.
convictions violated his probation for an offense unrelated to the housebreaking and heroin
convictions, for which he was given a consecutive six-month sentence.  In addition, on May
17, 1994, the five-year sentence that had been suspended in connection with the earlier
daytime housebreaking conviction was reimposed to be served concurrent with any
outstanding or unserved sentences.
As a result of Fields’s convictions for theft and malicious destruction of property, the
Maryland Parole Commission (MPC) issued a warrant for Fields’s return to custody, and a
hearing was convened on May 3, 1994 to consider sanctions in relation to his failure to abide
by the terms and conditions of his release on his original seven-year sentence.  At this
hearing, the MPC decided to revoke Fields’s mandatory supervision release.  As part of that
decision, the MPC rescinded all good-conduct credits that had been acquired prior to Fields’s
release on mandatory supervision  and awarded Fields “street-time” credits  pursuant to Md.
4
5
Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 41 § 511.  
6
-4-
To calculate the effect of the MPC’s rescission of good-conduct credits and the award
of street-time credits on the maximum expiration date of Fields’s sentence, the Division
subtracted the number of street-time credits from the number of diminution credits that Fields
had earned during his initial confinement.  See Division of Correction Commitment
Procedure Manual, Ch. 90-134 (revised 9/15/95).  This left a balance of 190 days, which was
subtracted from the remainder of the original seven-year sentence.  The Division then
awarded Fields new good-conduct credits for the reimposed five-year portion of the sentence
that had been suspended on April 19, 1988 and the concurrent theft and malicious destruction
of property convictions.  These good-conduct credits were calculated at a  rate of five days
per month.  The award of these credits resulted in a mandatory release date of August 11,
1997.  
Dissatisfied with the manner in which the Division calculated the good-conduct
credits, Fields filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) on March 13, 1995.
Fields claimed that a 1992 amendment to Art. 27, § 700 increased the rate of accumulation
of good-conduct credits from five days per month to ten days per month, and that the
Division should have used the new rate in calculating his good-conduct credits. After a July
21, 1995 hearing on the matter, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the
grievance had merit.  On November 16, 1995, the Secretary of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (Secretary), however, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and denied
the grievance based on its conclusion that an inmate who is serving multiple sentences is still
only serving one “term of confinement” for the purposes of § 700 and the single term of
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confinement should be deemed “`imposed’ on the date that the sentence starting first within
the term of confinement was imposed.”  Fields did not appeal this final order to the circuit
court. 
 
Fields instead filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City on November 27, 1995.  In his petition, he presented two substantive
arguments in support of his request for immediate release: (1)  that good-conduct credits
should have been awarded at a rate of ten days per month; and (2) that the Division should
not have subtracted street-time credits from previously-earned diminution credits.  The court
agreed with Fields, granted habeas corpus relief, and ordered Fields be released on February
7, 1996.  The Maryland House of Correction then noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the circuit court.  This Court granted the Maryland
House of Correction’s petition for writ of certiorari on February 14, 1997.
 
B.  Sayko
On July 30, 1987, Michael S. Sayko was sentenced to two, ten-year concurrent
sentences for two cases of third-degree sexual offense.  His sentences carried a maximum
expiration date of February 13, 1997.  Having earned 1203 diminution credits and having
served all but 1203 days of his sentences, Sayko was conditionally released under mandatory
supervision on October 29, 1993.
Almost a year and a half later, on March 29, 1995, Sayko was convicted of indecent
exposure by the Circuit Court for Allegany County and was sentenced to three years
-6-
    Under Art. 41, § 4-511(d)(1), the MPC has the discretion to award an inmate street-time
7
credit for the “time between release on [mandatory supervision] and revocation of [that
mandatory supervision].”  In the instant case, this is so despite the fact that, for some of the
time between Sayko’s release on mandatory supervision and its revocation, Sayko was
incarcerated on the indecent exposure conviction.
imprisonment.  Because the indecent exposure conviction constituted a violation of Sayko’s
conditional release, the MPC revoked Sayko’s mandatory supervision at a hearing on May
4, 1995.  See Art. 41, §§ 4-612(c), 4-511(c).  As part of its decision to revoke the release, the
MPC also rescinded approximately half of Sayko’s previously-earned diminution credits
pursuant to Art. 41, § 4-612(e).  The MPC further granted Sayko street-time credit pursuant
to § 4-511(d) for some, but not all, of the 521 days between the date Sayko was released on
mandatory supervision and the date his release was revoked.   
7
As a result of the MPC’s decision, the Division subtracted Sayko’s street-time credits
from Sayko’s previously-earned diminution credits.  From the remaining diminution credits,
the Division deducted the diminution credits that the MPC had rescinded.  According to the
Division’s calculations, Sayko was left with a total of 484 diminution credits.  The Division
also awarded Sayko  additional good-conduct credits for the time Sayko spent in either a
local jail or detention center and prospective good-conduct credits for the time between
Sayko’s return to the Division’s custody and his new maximum expiration date.  These good-
conduct credits were awarded at a rate of five days per month.  The award of these credits
resulted in a mandatory release date of April 2, 1996.
Sayko filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for
-7-
    Sayko also argued that the Division miscalculated his good-conduct credits, by crediting
8
him with five rather than ten days per month.  See Art. 27, § 700.  The circuit court,
however, denied Sayko’s claim on this issue, and Sayko did not appeal the court’s decision
on the issue. 
Allegany County, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release.  Sayko alleged that the
Division illegally deducted his street-time credits from his diminution credits rather than
adding the street-time credits to the diminution credits as the MPC intended.  The circuit
court agreed that the Division was without authority to make this deduction and, on January
17, 1996, the court ordered the Division to restore the credits.  Sayko was immediately
released under mandatory supervision.  
8
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the Division raised two issues.  First, the
Division argued that Sayko should be barred from filing a habeas corpus petition because he
had not exhausted his administrative remedies.  Second, the Division argued that the circuit
court erred in concluding that the Division erred in subtracting the street-time credits
awarded Sayko by the MPC from his diminution credits.  The intermediate appellate court,
in an unreported opinion filed on December 17, 1996, affirmed the decision of the circuit
court.  This Court granted the Division’s petition for writ of certiorari on April 11, 1997. 
C.  Hood
On August 14, 1991, Wayne Hood was convicted of theft by the Circuit
 Court for Somerset County and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, with all but four
years suspended.  The sentence commenced on August 11, 1991, and Hood was paroled on
-8-
February 3, 1993. On December 22, 1993, Hood was again convicted of theft by the Circuit
Court for Wicomico County and was sentenced to four years imprisonment, to begin on July
16, 1993.  The December 1993 conviction constituted a violation of Hood’s parole for the
August 1991 sentence.  Thus, on February 10, 1994, Hood appeared before the MPC for a
hearing at which the MPC revoked Hood’s parole pursuant to Art. 41, § 4-612(c).  The MPC
granted Hood street-time credits, however, for the period from February 3, 1993 to July 16,
1993, pursuant to Art. 41 § 511(d).  On February 28, 1994, Hood was convicted of
possession of a controlled dangerous substance and sentenced to nine months.  On August
31, 1994, Hood appeared before the Circuit Court for Somerset County for a hearing on his
violation of probation.  At this time, the court reimposed the four years that were suspended
in 1991 in conjunction with Hood’s original theft conviction, to run consecutively to any of
Hood’s other sentences.  
As a result of Hood’s new sentences, the Division calculated Hood’s new maximum
expiration date as July 16, 2001,  and it determined that Hood was entitled to five days of
good-conduct credits per month until that date, a total of 569 credits.  On May 18, 1995,
Hood filed a grievance in the IGO arguing that the Division incorrectly calculated the
number of good-conduct credits Hood was due.  Hood argued that, pursuant to § 700, he was
entitled to ten days of good-conduct credits per month on the sentence for the December
1993 theft conviction because the conviction occurred after Art. 27, § 700 was amended.
The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and there was a hearing
before an ALJ on August 16, 1995.  On August 29, 1995, the ALJ determined that the
-9-
    The following discussion regarding the use of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
9
applicable only to Fields and Sayko.  Hood exhausted the administrative procedure set forth
in Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-102.1.
grievance was without merit.  
Hood sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Somerset County which affirmed
the decision of the ALJ on August 22, 1996.  Hood then appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals,  which, in an unreported per curiam opinion filed on October 30, 1996, reversed
the decision of the circuit court.  The Court of Special Appeals held that, as to Hood’s
sentences imposed after October 1, 1992, Hood was entitled to good-conduct credit at the
rate of ten days per month.  The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions
to reverse and remand the decision of the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.  The Secretary filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and this Court granted
certiorari on February 14, 1997.
II.
Before turning to the two substantive issues presented, we must first address the
procedural issue of whether plaintiffs’  use of petitions for writ of habeas corpus to secure
9
judicial review of the Division’s actions was proper.  The Division contends that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the request for habeas corpus relief because plaintiffs
failed to exhaust the administrative procedures established to redress inmate grievances.
Plaintiffs claim that the resolution of the two substantive claims in their favor leaves them
-10-
entitled to immediate release and, thus, plaintiffs may properly petition the court for writs
of habeas corpus despite their failure to exhaust the inmate grievance procedure.  We begin
with a review of inmate grievance procedure and then proceed to a discussion of why, under
the facts of the cases sub judice, an inmate need not use those procedures, but instead may
file a petition for habeas corpus.
A.
Article 41, § 4-102.1 establishes the Inmate Grievance Office and spells out the
procedure for filing an inmate grievance.  Generally, pursuant to subsection (c), individuals
who are confined to correctional facilities must submit any complaints or grievances against
any officials or employees of the Division to the IGO, which conducts a preliminary
evaluation of the grievance.  Art. 41, § 4-102.1(c)&(d).  If the IGO finds the grievance
wholly lacking in merit, it may issue an order of dismissal without a hearing or findings of
fact.  Art. 41, § 4-102.1(d).  That order constitutes the “final decision of the Secretary of
Public Safety and Correctional Services for purposes of any judicial review.”  Id.  If, on the
other hand, the grievance is not found to be wholly lacking in merit, it is forwarded to the
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which conducts a hearing on the matter and acts
upon its finding in a fashion similar to the IGO.  Art. 41, § 4-102.1(e).  If the hearing results
in a finding by OAH that the grievance is wholly lacking in merit, an order of dismissal shall
be issued, and such order constitutes the final decision of the Secretary.  Art. 41, § 4-
102.1(e).  If, however, OAH concludes that the grievance is meritorious, either in whole or
-11-
in part, OAH must promptly forward the grievance to the Secretary for review.  Id.
The Secretary has fifteen days to affirm, reverse, or modify the order.  Id.  The
Secretary must then order the appropriate officials to accept, in whole or in part, OAH’s
recommendations or the Secretary may “take whatever action he deems appropriate in light
of the findings of” OAH.  Id.  The order of the Secretary constitutes a final decision for
purposes of judicial review.  Id.  This Court has emphasized that the administrative remedy
under the Inmate Grievance statute “is both comprehensive and ‘flexible.’”  McCullough v.
Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 611, 552 A.2d 881, 885 (1989); see also State v. McCray, 267 Md.
111, 141-144, 297 A.2d 265, 281-284 (1972).  See generally Comment, Maryland Inmate
Grievance Commission, 35 MD. L. REV. 458 (1976).
The plaintiffs in the instant cases assert that the resolution of the two substantive
claims in their favor leaves them entitled to immediate release, and thus, they could properly
petition the circuit court for writs of habeas corpus despite any failure to invoke and exhaust
the inmate grievance administrative and judicial review procedures.
The question posed is one of primary jurisdiction.  Judge Rodowsky in Wash. Sub.
San. Comm'n v. Mitchell & Best, 303 Md. 544, 561-62, 495 A.2d 30, 39 (1985)(quoting in
part from Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. v. Wash. Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 601, 386 A.2d 1216,
1225-26 (1978)), stated for the Court:
“Primary jurisdiction ‘is a judicially created rule designed to
coordinate the allocation of functions between courts and
administrative bodies.’  The doctrine ‘comes into play when a
court and agency have concurrent jurisdiction over the same
matter ... and there is no statutory provision to coordinate the
-12-
work of the court with that of the agency.’” (Citations omitted).
In Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986),
after quoting the above passage from Wash. Sub. San. Comm'n v. Mitchell & Best, supra, we
further explained as follows:
“In the situation outlined above, where the General Assembly
has provided an administrative remedy and there also exists an
independent judicial remedy, and no statute coordinates the two
or specifies which is primary, we have ordinarily construed the
pertinent enactments to require that the administrative remedy
be first invoked and followed.  Sec. Dept. of [Human]. Res. v.
Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d 713, 717 (1979); White v.
Prince George's [Co.], 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265
(1978), and cases there cited.  On occasion, however, we have
held that the administrative remedy is not primary and that
resort may be had to the concurrent judicial remedy without
invoking or exhausting the administrative procedures.  See, e.g.,
Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Wash. Nat'l Arena, supra.
Where, however, the administrative remedy is deemed to
be primary, this Court has generally held that it must be pursued
and exhausted before a court exercises jurisdiction to decide the
controversy.”
Consequently, when the legislature provides an administrative and judicial review
remedy for a particular matter, and where there is a pre-existing common-law or statutory
judicial remedy for the same matter, and where the legislature fails to specify which remedy
is primary, the usual legal presumption is that the administrative remedy is primary and must
be “‘first invoked and followed’ before resort to the courts.”  Md. Reclamation v. Harford
Cty., 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996)(quoting Hubbard, 305 Md. at 786, 506
A.2d at 631).
-13-
Moreover, if “the legislative body expressly states that the administrative remedy is
primary ... or must be exhausted, the mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement is
underscored.  Such express language ‘is totally inconsistent with the notion that the
[administrative agency's] jurisdiction over [the matter] can be circumvented.’”  Md.
Reclamation, 342 Md. at 493, 677 A.2d at 576 (quoting in part from McCullough, 314 Md.
at 609, 552 A.2d at 884).
The Inmate Grievance statute indicates that the administrative remedy shall be
primary.  Article 41, § 4-102.1(k) states in relevant part as follows:
“No court shall entertain an inmate's grievance or complaint
within the jurisdiction of the Inmate Grievance Office or the
Office of Administrative Hearings unless and until the
complainant has exhausted the remedies as provided in this
section.”
The Court in McCullough, 314 Md. at 608-09, 552 A.2d at 884, pointing to “[t]his sweeping
language, delineating the need to invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy,” held that,
even if the administrative agency had lacked “the power to grant the particular type of relief
sought,” an inmate was required to invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy under the
Inmate Grievance statute before a court could adjudicate the inmate's common-law tort action
for money damages against a correctional officer.
In light of the language of Art. 41, § 4-102.1(k), and our decisions under that statutory
provision, it seems clear that a person confined under the custody of the Division of
Correction or the Patuxent Institution, “who has any grievance or complaint against any
officials or employees of the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution,” Art. 41, § 4-
-14-
102.1(c)(emphasis added), must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy under the
Inmate Grievance statute before obtaining an adjudication under an alternative common-law
or state statutory judicial remedy.  If a habeas corpus proceeding, by an inmate asserting an
entitlement to immediate release, were nothing more than a common-law or statutory
remedy, we would agree with the Division that the inmate would be required first to invoke
and exhaust the administrative procedure.
A habeas corpus proceeding, however, is not simply a common-law or statutory
remedy over which the General Assembly has full control.  Instead, it is a remedy authorized
and protected by the Constitution of Maryland.  MD.  CONST.,  Art.  III, § 55 provides that
“[t]he General Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.”    While the legislature may “reasonably” regulate the issuance of the writ, any
legislatively imposed regulations must not impair the fundamental right to the substantive
remedy of habeas corpus.   Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md.  341, 346,44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945);
see also State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880) and cases cited therein.
Without any extended discussion of the issue, this Court has reviewed habeas corpus
petitions by prisoners who had not presented their claims to the Inmate Grievance Office.
See, e.g.,  Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md.  634, cert. denied sub nom Henneberry v. Sutton,
498 U.S. 950, 111 S.Ct. 369, 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990).  In State v. McCray, we reversed an
order granting relief requested in several consolidated habeas corpus petitions filed by
inmates who alleged their confinement at, and conditions at, Patuxent Institution constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.  Although we reversed the order in light of the predecessor
-15-
    This first substantive issue is applicable only to Hood and Fields.  The trial court ruled
10
against Sayko, and the issue was not appealed.  
to the current Inmate Grievance Act, we pointed out that the inmates did not allege or
establish that they were “entitled to be released or discharged from confinement.”  267 Md.
at 146, 297 A.2d at 283.  Further in Fincher (Brown) v. Warden,  216 Md. 644, 139 A.2d 842
(1958), we held that habeas corpus was not available until the entire legal portion of the
petitioners sentences had been served.  From these cases we can distill the principle that
pursuant to MD. CONST., Art.  III, § 55 an inmate is not required to utilize the inmate
grievance procedure, and courts will entertain an inmate’s petition for habeas corpus when
the plaintiff alleges entitlement to immediate release and makes a colorable claim that he or
she has served the entire sentence less any mandatory credits.
III.
Having determined that plaintiffs were appropriately before the circuit court, we next
turn to whether plaintiffs  were entitled to have good-conduct credits calculated at a rate of
10
ten days per month rather than the five days per month used by the Division in calculating
plaintiffs’ good-conduct credits with respect to sentences imposed after October 1, 1992.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that plaintiffs are entitled to good-conduct credits
at the rate of ten days per month for those sentences imposed at a new sentencing after
October 1, 1992, and a rate of five days per month for those sentences imposed at a
sentencing  prior to October 1, 1992.
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A.
We begin with a discussion of diminution credits.  Diminution credits are credits
which can be “earned by inmates to reduce the lengths of their confinements.”  See, e.g.,
Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 128, 647 A.2d 106, 107 (1994).  “Assuming an inmate does not
forfeit diminution credits as the result of a disciplinary hearing, the inmate can earn the right
to be released on a date much sooner than that designated by his or her original term of
confinement.”  Frost, 336 Md. at 128, 647 A.2d at 108 (citations omitted).  Once the inmate
accumulates “sufficient credits to earn entitlement to release, the inmate is deemed released
under `[m]andatory supervision.’”  Id.  Mandatory supervision is “a conditional release from
imprisonment which is granted to any person serving a term of confinement of more than 12
months who was sentenced ... to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction, and who has
served the term or terms, less” diminution credits.  Art. 41, § 4-501(13).  
There are four types of diminution credits: good-conduct, work (or industrial),
educational, and special project credits. Art. 27, § 700; see also Frost, 336 Md. at 128, 647
A.2d at 107.  Good-conduct credits, which are the subject of this appeal, are different from
other diminution credits in that they are deducted “in advance from the inmate’s term of
confinement, subject to the inmate’s future good conduct.” Art. 27, § 700(d); see also Frost,
336 Md. at 128, 647 A.2d at 107.  Prior to October 1, 1992, inmates, upon incarceration,
were prospectively awarded five days of good-conduct credits for each month of their
sentence.  Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 700(d)(2).
-17-
    If any one of the sentences composing the term of confinement is a crime of violence or
11
any one of the specified crimes involving a controlled dangerous substance, then good-
conduct credits are calculated a rate of five days per month.  Art. 27, § 700(d)(2).  As we
noted earlier, Fields’s heroin conviction was not under § 286, but rather under § 287 and,
thus, would not be deemed drug related in the context of this statute.
B.
In 1992, Art. 27, § 700 was amended by Ch. 588 of the Acts of 1992.  Under the new
version, an inmate is to be prospectively awarded good-conduct credits at a rate of ten days
per month unless the term of confinement includes a sentence for a crime of violence or the
“manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing a controlled dangerous substance as
provided for under Article 27, § 286.”  Art. 27, § 700(d)(2) & (3).   The legislature,
11
however, expressly provided that § 700 would only apply to “a term of confinement imposed
on or after October 1, 1992.”  Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992 (emphasis added). The
definition of term of confinement, however, was left unchanged.
C.
In this case, we are called upon to determine the effect of the 1992 amendment, that
is, whether § 700's definition of term of confinement bars the application of the ten days per
month rate to inmates who were released on mandatory supervision and then returned to
incarceration on a sentence for a new nonviolent, non-drug offense to be served concurrently
or consecutively with the balance of the sentence reimposed for violation of the terms of the
release.  The resolution of this issue turns, in part, on the meaning of “term of confinement.”
-18-
The phrase “term of confinement” encompasses a variety of meanings in the Maryland
Code depending on the circumstances. Article 27, § 700 contains its own definition of “term
of confinement.”  According to Art. 27, § 700(a), “term of confinement” means:
“(1) The length of the sentence for a single sentence; or  (2)
The period from the first day of the sentence beginning first
through the last day of the sentence ending last for: (i)
Concurrent sentences; (ii) Partially concurrent sentences; (iii)
Consecutive sentences; or (iv) A combination of concurrent and
consecutive sentences.”
The Division argues that the definition provided in § 700(a) clearly indicates that only
five days a month good-conduct credits are to be awarded to an inmate based on a term of
confinement that includes both a pre-October 1, 1992 sentence and a post-October 1, 1992
sentence.  However, even where a statute seems clear, we are not “precluded from looking
at the purpose of the statute.”  State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993).
According to the Bill Analysis of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee for House Bill
1089, Ch. 588 of the Acts of 1992 was passed for the purpose of relieving “prison
overcrowding by moving non-violent offenders through the system at a faster pace.”
Moreover, Ch. 588 was also intended to create an incentive for nonviolent offenders “to be
on good behavior, because they will have more ‘good-conduct’ credits to lose if they cause
trouble.”  Bill Analysis of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee for House Bill 1089.
The clause restricting the effective date of the 1992 amendments to Art. 27, § 700 was
added at the request of the Division which expressed concern that recalculating good-conduct
credits “retroactively” would be administratively burdensome. Maryland Department of
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Public Safety and Correctional Services, Position on Proposed Legislation on House Bill
1089 (February 27, 1992)(“We stress that any retroactive application to inmates in the
standing population will involve manual recomputation of time records -- an enormous task
for our already understaffed commitment offices.”).  Although not part of the legislative
history, we note that Delegate John S. Arnick, one of the bill's sponsor's and the then-
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, clarified his view of the purpose of this
restriction in a letter dated November 25, 1992:
“[T]he word `imposed’ was intended to mean just that.  If a
person is sentenced before October 1, he is not eligible for the
additional credits.  A person sentenced on or after October 1
will receive the additional credits.
The reason for this is that the Division of Corrections
indicated that it would be administratively impossible and
fiscally prohibitive to recalculate good time credits for prisoners
currently incarcerated.  As you know, this deduction is made at
the front end of the sentence.  It would not be feasible to make
an additional calculation for the 20,000 current inmates.”
It should be pointed out that the definition of “term of confinement” was not amended
by the 1992 amendment.  In fact, as the Court of Special Appeals noted in the instant case
in one of its opinions being reviewed here, “it appears that the Legislature gave little thought
to the definition of ‘term of confinement’ when it enacted Ch. 588 [the 1992 amendment to
§ 700].”  “Term of confinement” originated in Ch. 354 of the Acts of 1991, and the
legislative history of that section indicates that it was designed “to ensure that inmates
serving more than one sentence at a time [would] not receive good-conduct credits for more
than one sentence.”  
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It is a “fundamental principle that statutory construction is approached from a
‘“‘commonsensical’”’ perspective.”  Frost, 336 Md. at 137, 647 A.2d at 112 (quoting
Richmond v. State, 326 Md.  257, 262, 604 A.2d 483, 486 (1992), in turn quoting United
States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct.  227, 229, 97 L.Ed 260, 264 (1952)).
An examination of  the use of the phrase “term of confinement” reveals that its interpretation
is not as clear as the Division would have us believe.  A Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee floor report explaining House Bill 1089, which changed the rate for awarding
good-conduct credits, used the term sentence rather than term of confinement and stated that:
“This bill may be applied prospectively only (i.e. to persons sentenced on or after the
effective date of the bill)."  (Emphasis added).  Shortly after the statute at issue was enacted,
one of the sponsors of that bill, Delegate John Arnick, was asked to explain the bill.  He
stated:  “If a person is sentenced before October 1, he is not eligible for the additional
credits.  A person sentenced on or after October 1 will receive the additional credits.”
(Emphasis added).
The Division posits that to make separate calculations based on date of sentence rather
than a single calculation for all of an inmate’s credits for the whole period of confinement
would be difficult to administer.  We should not adopt the Division’s theory merely because
to do otherwise would saddle the Division with more complex calculations.  Similarly, it is
suggested  that the legislature intended to simplify this process administratively as evidenced
by the fact that the statute specifically provides that when an inmate is serving sentences for
both violent and non-violent offenses, the inmate is to be awarded credits at the single rate
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of five days per month.  This situation, however, is different from a situation in which credits
are awarded at separate rates for those sentences imposed before October 1, 1992, and those
imposed after that date.  In the case of an inmate serving sentences for both violent and
nonviolent offenses, the legislature may logically have determined that an inmate
incarcerated for a violent offense should not benefit from the increase in good-conduct
credits and should not be part of the legislative efforts to decrease overcrowding in prison.
Moreover, a violent inmate should not benefit solely because the inmate has also committed
nonviolent offenses.  On the other hand, the legislature has made no similar determination
with respect to inmates who were serving sentences imposed prior to October 1, 1992.  In
fact, the legislative history reveals that the clause restricting the statute’s applicability of the
1992 amendment to sentences imposed after October 1, 1992 was added at the request of the
Division to reduce the administrative burden of recalculating the credits for all inmates in
prison at that time.  This is less of an administrative burden with respect to an inmate
sentenced prior to October 1, 1992 who later commits another nonviolent, non-drug related
offense and has a new sentence imposed after October 1, 1992.  The Division already has
to review and recalculate both good-conduct credits for such inmates.
“Statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their
application in a given situation ... is not clear.”  Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648, 689
A.2d 610, 613 (1997).  A plain reading of the statute as written also reveals that the statute
is difficult, if not impossible, to apply without using principles of interpretation.  For
example, where an inmate is serving two consecutive sentences, one imposed before October
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1, 1992 and one imposed after that date, it would be impossible to say that a single “term of
confinement” was imposed either before or after October 1, 1992 because, in fact, the “term
of confinement” was imposed both before and after that date.  Even if the legislature had
used the term “aggregate” in front of “term of confinement,” there could be absurd results.
If A were released 250 days prior to the expiration of A's sentence under mandatory
supervision on a sentence which was imposed prior to October 1, 1992, for example, the
result of a subsequent conviction imposed after October 1, 1992, using the method of
calculating good-conduct credits advocated by the Division, would be dramatically different
based on whether A committed the subsequent crime on day 249 or day 251 after his release.
If A committed the subsequent violation on the 249   day of mandatory supervision, A would
th
be awarded good-conduct credits on the new offense at the rate of five days per month,
whereas if A committed the same subsequent offense on the 251  day, one day after the
st
mandatory supervision expired, A would be awarded good-conduct credits at the rate of ten
days per month.  Surely, the legislature did not indicate an intent to make such a nonsensical
distinction. 
Finally, in interpreting Art. 27, § 700, we must examine the applicability of the rule
of lenity, which requires any ambiguity in criminal penal statutes to be construed against the
state and in favor of the defendant.  See, e.g., Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654, 684 A.2d
439, 441 (1996); State v. Purcell, 342 Md. 214, 229, 674 A.2d 936, 944 (1996).  This rule
is significant in that it forbids courts from extending “‘punishment to cases not plainly within
the language’” of the statute.  State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279
-23-
(1975)(quoting State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 57, 20 A. 172, 172 (1890)), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1680, 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976).  While Art. 27, § 700 does not establish
punishment, it does set forth a significant procedure for shortening the punishment the
inmate receives.  We see no reason why the rule of lenity should not be utilized in the instant
case.  Applying this rule, we note that construing the statute in favor of plaintiffs leads to the
interpretation that nonviolent inmates should be eligible for ten days of good-conduct credits
per month rate for new sentences after October 1, 1992. 
D.
In light of the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to Art. 27, § 700, the
applicability of the rule of lenity to this case, and what common sense dictates, we reject the
notion that all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes
to a single term of confinement.  Instead, we hold that sentences imposed before October 1,
1992 are separable from new sentences imposed after that date.  For the purposes of good-
conduct credits, new sentences imposed after October 1, 1992 should be construed as
separate instead of aggregated as part of one single term of confinement.
The effect of this decision is that, for those sentences imposed before October 1,
1992, good-conduct credits should be awarded at the old rate of five days per month.  Those
nonviolent, non-drug related sentences imposed during a new sentencing after October 1,
1992 should carry good-conduct credits at the rate of ten days per month.
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    Street time is credit for time spent between release on parole and revocation of parole
12
that is granted under the discretion of the MPC pursuant to the authority of Art. 41, § 4-
511(d).
E.
Therefore, Fields should earn credits at the rate of five days per month with respect
to the remainder of his original seven-year sentence for housebreaking and violation of
probation  for his heroin conviction.  With respect to all of Fields’s other sentences,
including the reimposition of the five years that had originally been suspended in conjunction
with Fields’s sentence for housebreaking, Fields should be awarded good-conduct credits at
a rate of ten days per month.
Hood’s sentences are similarly separable.  We, thus, hold that Hood should be
awarded good-conduct credits at a rate of five days per month for the remainder of his
original four-year sentence for theft, but not with respect to the four years that were
suspended.  All of Hood’s post-October 1, 1992 sentences, including the four years that had
been suspended, should carry good-conduct credits at the rate of ten days per month.
IV.
 The final issue we will address is whether the Division possesses the authority to
offset street-time credits  awarded by the MPC by rescinding other credits earned by an
12
inmate.  We find that the Division does not.  We premise this conclusion on two related
findings.  First, we reject the Division's theory that the Division was not exercising authority
-25-
    This final issue is applicable only to Fields and Hood.
13
when it deducted street-time credits from plaintiffs’  remaining diminution credits, but rather
13
was merely carrying out the orders of the MPC.  Second, we find that the Division is without
authority to adjust the award of diminution credits given by the MPC.  
A.
First, we reject the Division's argument that the Division is required to adjust an
award of street-time credits against the diminution credit balance.  The Division's theory is
based on the premise that when an inmate is released on mandatory supervision, that inmate
is receiving the benefit of the diminution credits the inmate earned while incarcerated.  As
each day goes by and the former inmate receives the benefit of the diminution credits by
spending a day of the sentence out on the street, these credits become "vested."  To allow
plaintiffs to have all diminution credits not revoked by the MPC would result in the plaintiffs
benefitting twice from the same credits.  Under this vesting theory, the Division is not
exercising authority, but merely effectuating the parole commissioner's orders.  We do not
agree.
Following the Division’s vesting theory to its logical, or in this case illogical,
conclusion, the MPC does not “award” street-time credits at all, but rather merely tells the
Division the number of days the inmate spent out of the Division’s custody which will be
counted against him or her, i.e., deducted from his or her previously earned diminution
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credits.  Such an interpretation of street-time credits is especially illogical in light of statutory
language and context.  Cf. Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 212, 627 A.2d 1019, 1025
(1993)(noting that, whether plain or not, statutory language must be read in its context);
Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987)(noting that even where statutory language  is plain, its meaning is controlled by its
context).  Article 41, § 4-511(d)(1) is the statutory authority for the granting of street-time
credits.  Section 4-511(d)(1) states that upon revocation of mandatory supervision “the
prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed unless the [MPC] ...,
in [its] discretion, grants credit for time between release on [mandatory supervision] and
revocation of [that mandatory supervision].” Deducting credits surely is not the same as
granting credits.  Subsection (d)(1)  first requires an inmate to serve the remainder of his or
her sentences originally imposed, and then creates an exception, i.e., if the MPC decides
otherwise the MPC can reduce the sentence by granting the inmate credit for the time he or
she was on the street.  Subsection(d)(2) creates an exception to the exception:  It states that
an inmate may not receive street-time credits if:  “(i) At the time that [mandatory
supervision] was revoked the prisoner was serving a sentence for a violent crime; and (ii)
The [mandatory supervision] was revoked due to a finding that the prisoner committed a
violent crime while on [mandatory supervision].”  In other words, in this limited
circumstance, the MPC does not have the discretionary power to award the inmate street-
time credits.  This exception makes no sense under the Division’s interpretation.  The
legislature could not have intended Art. 41, § 4-511(d) to mean that a violent offender cannot
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In its own manual, the Division recognizes this discretion, even though the same
14
procedure manual provides for the Division to adjust diminution credits by the amount of
street-time credits awarded by the MPC.  Division of Correction Commitment Procedure
Manual, Chapter 90-134-6(revised 9/15/95).
have time spent on the street credited against him or her.  Therefore, we cannot  accept the
Division’s interpretation.
  
Furthermore, street-time credits are not equivalent to diminution credits as evidenced
by the discretionary power given the MPC with respect to street-time credits and, thus,
street-time credits cannot represent the vesting of diminution credits.  Under Art. 41, § 4-
511(d)(1), the MPC has the authority to grant an inmate “credit for time between release on
parole and revocation of parole.”  COMAR 12.08.01.22F(7)(e) makes it clear that this is
within the absolute discretion of the MPC.   In other words, the MPC may choose to grant
14
an inmate credit for all days from release on mandatory supervision until the revocation of
that release, choose to grant the inmate some street-time credits, or choose to grant no street-
time credits at all.  In light of this last observation, the Division’s vesting theory also makes
little sense.  If the credits were truly “vested,” it makes no sense for the MPC to be given
discretion to deny the inmate credits.  We find no authority for the proposition and therefore
also reject the creative notion that the diminution credits somehow become vested at the
moment the MPC grants street-time credits. 
B.
Moreover, we find that the Division is without authority to adjust the award of
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diminution credits given by the MPC.  The authority to adjust street-time credits, pursuant
to Art. 41, §§ 4-511(d), is within the absolute discretion of the MPC.  COMAR
12.08.01.22F(7)(e).  Once the MPC grants street-time credits, the Division does not have
authority to deduct street-time credits from diminution credits.  Frost, 336 Md. at 142-43,
647 A.2d at 115 (interpreting Art. 27 § 700(b) as “providing that the Division of Correction’s
authority to revoke certain diminution credits and a prisoner’s entitlement to earn them is
subject to the [MPC’s] authority as delineated in Article 41, § 4-612, not vice versa”).  
When the Division deducts the street-time credits from the diminution credits, as they
did here, it essentially offsets the award of street-time credits and nullifies it.  As discussed,
the Division is without authority to do this.  We therefore hold that the Division improperly
adjusted plaintiffs’ diminution credits by the amount of street-time credits awarded plaintiffs
by the MPC.
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONERS EQUALLY.