Title: Commonwealth v. Teixeira

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11929 
SJC-11944 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANGELO TEIXEIRA. 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER A. MEADE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 11, 2016. - September 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ.1 
 
 
Boston Municipal Court.  District Court, Probable cause hearing.  
Practice, Criminal, Probable cause hearing, Discovery.  
Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 2, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on August 10, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Spina, J. 
 
 
 
Valerie A. DePalma (Jeffrey M. Miller with her) for the 
defendants. 
 
Kathryn Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Cordy and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
John D. Donovan, Jr., Jesse M. Boodoo, Joshua D. Rovenger, 
& David M. Coriell, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  These cases stem from two unrelated, nonfatal 
shootings in the Roxbury section of Boston in June, 2015, and 
July, 2015.  Angelo Teixeira was arrested for the first 
shooting, and Christopher Meade for the second.  Meade and 
Teixeira each were charged by complaint in the Boston Municipal 
Court (BMC) with a number of felonies, including some that are 
outside the final jurisdiction of that court.  Pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 38, probable cause hearings were scheduled for each 
defendant to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 
bind them over to the Superior Court for trial.  The 
Commonwealth was ordered to provide the defendants with 
discovery in advance of those hearings.  Noting that judges of 
the BMC and the District Court Department2 are not explicitly 
authorized, either by statute or by the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to order discovery in preparation for 
probable cause hearings (prehearing discovery), the Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
2 While the discussion concerns judges of the Boston 
Municipal Court (BMC), our analysis and conclusion apply equally 
to judges of the District Court.  See Victor V. v. Commonwealth, 
423 Mass. 793, 796 (1996). 
3 
 
objected to the discovery orders and filed interlocutory 
appeals. 
 
In considering these cases, we must determine whether 
judges of the BMC may order prehearing discovery in the absence 
of specific authorization from G. L. c. 276, § 38, the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, or any trial court standing order.3  We 
conclude that, because such judges have inherent authority to 
issue orders essential to their capacity to decide cases, they 
may, in their discretion, order prehearing discovery.  We 
conclude also that, here, the judges did not abuse their 
discretion by issuing these discovery orders, which were limited 
in scope and which would have allowed defense counsel reasonably 
to prepare for the scheduled probable cause hearings.4 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Teixeira.  On June 20, 2015, Boston 
police officers were dispatched to the scene of a shooting in 
Roxbury.  There, they encountered Teixeira, who had been shot in 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services in both cases, and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in 
Teixeira's case. 
 
 
4 Because we affirm the discovery orders on the basis of the 
judge's discretionary powers, we do not reach the defendants' 
contention that prehearing discovery is necessary as a matter of 
constitutional due process.  Cf. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 
Mass. 843, 854 (1973) (having disposed of case on statutory 
grounds, court declined to decide whether "due process 
requirements of the United States Constitution mandate that the 
defendant in a probable cause hearing shall have the right to 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses and present testimony in his 
own defence"). 
4 
 
the leg and soon thereafter was transported to a hospital.  The 
officers interviewed three witnesses, including an off-duty 
police officer from another jurisdiction, who said that they 
heard gunshots and that, subsequently, someone matching 
Teixeira's description had fired several shots at "unknown 
persons."  Police obtained surveillance footage from a store 
near the scene, which showed two individuals -- one of whom is 
apparently believed to be Teixeira -- "remov[ing] items from the 
store," "flee[ing]" down the street, and "plac[ing] a white 
garbage bag in the rear of [a nearby] yard."5  Police recovered 
two firearms from the garbage bag. 
 
On June 24, 2015, a complaint issued in the BMC, charging 
Teixeira with four crimes within the final jurisdiction of that 
court:  carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n); possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification (FID) card as a subsequent offense, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b) (three counts).  The complaint 
also charged him with two crimes -- carrying a firearm without a 
license as a second offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (d); and 
committing a firearms violation having been convicted of three 
                                                          
 
5 Police reports do not reflect whether the episode recorded 
by the surveillance camera occurred before or after the 
shooting. 
5 
 
violent crimes or three serious drug offenses, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (c) -- for which final jurisdiction lies only in the 
Superior Court.6 
Teixeira was arrested and arraigned the same day.  At 
arraignment, the judge scheduled a probable cause hearing for 
July 7, 2015.  Over the Commonwealth's objection, the judge 
granted Teixeira's motion for discovery in advance of that 
hearing.  He ordered that the names and contact information of 
the Commonwealth's three witnesses be turned over by the close 
of business the following day, and that the surveillance footage 
be turned over the following week, four days before the hearing.  
The judge also issued a protective order "direct[ing defense 
counsel] not to provide to [Teixeira] any contact information on 
any witness."  The protective order was later expanded to 
prevent Teixeira from learning the names of the civilian 
witnesses. 
 
The following day, June 25, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a 
motion for reconsideration with respect to the discovery orders.  
A hearing on the Commonwealth's motion was scheduled for June 
26, 2105.  At that hearing, the Commonwealth's motion was 
                                                          
 
6 During arraignment on these charges, which took place in 
the BMC on June 24, 2015, Teixeira made threatening gestures and 
statements to Boston police detectives.  This resulted in 
additional charges of witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B, 
and threatening to commit a crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2, both of 
which are within the BMC's final jurisdiction. 
6 
 
denied, and the judge ordered that the witness information be 
turned over by the close of business.  The judge did, however, 
allow the Commonwealth's motion to continue the probable cause 
hearing for approximately one month. 
 
Later that day, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal 
with respect to the discovery order, a motion to stay the order 
pending appeal, and a request for a written ruling.  The judge 
stayed the discovery order until the close of business on June 
30, 2015.  The judge also issued a written ruling, explaining 
that he had ordered discovery because 
"[a]ffording such minimal discovery as the identities of 
witnesses and an opportunity to view video footage of the 
alleged incident in advance of the probable cause hearing 
is essential to the defendant's ability meaningfully to 
exercise his rights to confrontation and to present 
evidence at that hearing. . . .  For example, one of the 
witnesses might describe the alleged shooter differently 
from the way that the defendant is described in the police 
report or from other witness accounts.  Without the 
witnesses' identities being disclosed to defense counsel in 
advance of the hearing, such discrepancies, which might 
raise genuine issues with respect to probable cause, could 
not be explored . . . ." 
 
 
On June 30, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
further stay the discovery order.  The judge denied the motion, 
and the stay expired, by its own terms, at the close of business 
that day.  The Commonwealth did not provide the ordered 
discovery. 
 
The next day, July 1, 2015, Teixeira filed a motion seeking 
sanctions.  At a hearing later that day, the judge asked the 
7 
 
Commonwealth to address why "[nineteen] and a half hours after 
that stay expired . . . there's been no compliance."  He noted, 
"[M]y order is in effect . . .  [A]s far as I know, it 
hasn't been stayed, and I'm starting to get a little 
impatient, because I feel like I'm trying to do things 
procedurally in a way that respects the law and procedure.  
And I'm starting to feel like not everybody is adhering to 
the same rules." 
 
The judge did not then issue a ruling on sanctions.  Rather, he 
allowed the Commonwealth's request for seven days in which to 
respond to the defendant's motion for sanctions. 
 
On July 2, 2015, the Commonwealth filed an emergency 
petition in the county court, seeking an immediate stay of 
execution of the discovery order, and also seeking to vacate 
that order.  The motion for a stay was allowed on July 7, 2015, 
and a single justice thereafter reserved and reported the 
Commonwealth's petition to the full court. 
 
On July 30, 2015, a Suffolk County grand jury returned 
eleven indictments against Teixeira.7  On August 26, 2015, the 
                                                          
 
7 Teixeira was charged with four counts of attempted assault 
and battery by means of a firearm, G. L. c. 265, § 15F; one 
count of carrying a firearm without a license as a second 
offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) and (d), and after having been 
convicted of three violent crimes or three serious drug 
offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c); two counts of possessing 
ammunition without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h), and after having been convicted of three violent 
crimes or three serious drug offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c); 
one count of carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); 
one count of receiving a firearm with a defaced serial number, 
G. L. c. 269, § 11C; and two counts of witness intimidation, 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B. 
8 
 
defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court and was provided 
with the discovery he had been seeking from the BMC. 
 
b.  Meade.  Shortly after midnight on July 5, 2015, a 
"black male" wearing a red sweatshirt approached a sedan parked 
on a street in the Roxbury section of Boston, and fired 
approximately three shots into the vehicle.  Four people, 
including the driver, were inside; two passengers were hit.  The 
driver drove away from the scene, pulled up next to a nearby 
police cruiser, and sought help.  The two victims were taken to 
a hospital.  Police interviewed the driver and one of the 
passengers,8 and obtained a surveillance video recording of the 
shooting. 
 
On July 8, 2015, police showed a photographic array, which 
did not contain a photograph of Meade, to the driver and one of 
the passengers.  Neither could identify any of the pictured 
individuals as the shooter.  On July 10, 2015, Meade was 
arrested and held in custody on an unrelated charge.  On July 
11, 2015, police presented another photographic array to the 
driver and to the passenger,9 this time containing a photograph 
of Meade.  Both separately identified Meade as the shooter. 
                                                          
 
8 Because the copy of the relevant police report in the 
record is redacted, it is not clear whether the passenger 
interviewed was one of the victims. 
 
 
9 It is not clear whether this was the same passenger to 
whom police had shown the first photograph array. 
9 
 
 
Two days later, a ten-count complaint issued against Meade 
in the BMC.  Three of the counts –- carrying a firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and possessing 
ammunition without an FID card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1) -- 
were within the final jurisdiction of that court.  The other 
seven were not.10  Meade was arraigned the same day. 
 
At arraignment, a probable cause hearing was scheduled for 
August 12, 2015.  In advance of that hearing, Meade sought 
discovery of the photographic arrays, several police reports, 
and contact information for witnesses mentioned in the reports.  
Over the Commonwealth's objection, the judge allowed Meade's 
motion for discovery, ordering that the discovery "be disclosed 
and turned over by" August 10, 2015, two days before the 
hearing.  The judge stated that Meade's "ability to defend 
himself and assist his attorney in his defense [at the probable 
cause hearing] will be impacted severely if they're not allowed 
to obtain this discovery."  She also entered a protective order 
                                                          
 
10 The counts over which there was no final jurisdiction 
were four counts of armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b); carrying a firearm without a license as a 
second offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (d); committing a 
firearm violation having been convicted of three violent crimes 
or three serious drug offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c); and 
possessing a firearm while committing a felony, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18B. 
10 
 
allowing disclosure of the witnesses' contact information only 
to Meade's counsel.11 
 
On August 10, 2015, the day discovery was to be turned 
over, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the county court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief from the discovery 
order, and also seeking a stay of that order.  A stay issued 
later that day, and, on August 14, 2015, the single justice 
vacated the order.  The defendant thereafter filed a notice of 
appeal.  On October 9, 2015, a Suffolk County grand jury 
returned eleven indictments against Meade.12  On November 16, 
2015, the Commonwealth provided Meade the discovery that he had 
sought in the BMC. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that the two 
judges did not have authority to order discovery in advance of 
the probable cause hearings.  Teixeira maintains that the 
                                                          
 
11 On July 31, 2015, the defendant filed a second motion for 
discovery, seeking other evidence referenced in the police 
report.  The court took no action on that motion. 
 
12 Meade was indicted on four counts of armed assault with 
intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); carrying a firearm 
without a license as a second offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) 
and (d), and after having been convicted of three violent crimes 
or three serious drug offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c); 
carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A; two 
counts of assault and battery by means of discharging a firearm, 
G. L. c. 265, § 15E; and two counts of attempted assault and 
battery by means of discharging a firearm, G. L. c. 265, § 15F. 
11 
 
Commonwealth should be sanctioned for its failure to comply with 
the discovery order in the BMC. 
a.  Mootness.  Because the defendants have been indicted 
and are no longer entitled to probable cause hearings, the 
discovery orders themselves are moot.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f), 
as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004).  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 
464 Mass. 92, 95 (2013) (Perkins).  See Lataille v. District 
Court of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 531 (1974) (Lataille) 
("return of an indictment is itself a determination of probable 
cause and renders unnecessary a preliminary hearing").  
"However, it is within the discretion of this court to answer 
questions that, due to circumstances, no longer may have direct 
significance to the parties but raise issues of public 
importance and, because of their nature, may be 'capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.'"  Perkins, supra, quoting 
Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 782–783 (1984). 
 
The issue here -- whether a BMC judge may order discovery 
in anticipation of a probable cause hearing -- is one that 
"implicate[s] the . . . interests of all defendants who are so 
situated, and more generally [is] significant for the proper 
administration of the criminal justice system."  See Perkins, 
supra.  The issue also is likely to evade appellate review, 
since it becomes moot upon the return of an indictment, when a 
defendant loses his or her right to a probable cause hearing.  
12 
 
See Lataille, supra.  Moreover, "[w]e have been advised that the 
issue is occurring on a frequent basis in the trial courts and 
uncertainty exists whether an order similar to the one[s] in 
issue can be entered."  Commonwealth v. Durham, 446 Mass. 212, 
217, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855 (2006).  We therefore consider 
the issue raised in these cases. 
 
b.  Discovery.  Defendants who are charged by complaint in 
the BMC, but whose cases will be finally adjudicated in the 
Superior Court, have a statutory right to a probable cause 
hearing, "unless an indictment has been returned for the same 
offense."13  Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f).  See Lataille, supra 
("indictment is itself a determination of probable cause and 
renders" hearing "unnecessary").  General Laws c. 276, § 38, 
provides that, "as soon as may be" after a complaint issues, a 
BMC judge 
"shall . . . examine on oath the complainant and the 
witnesses for the prosecution, in the presence of the 
defendant, relative to any material matter connected with 
such charge.  After the testimony to support the 
prosecution, the witnesses for the prisoner, if any, shall 
be examined on oath, and he may be assisted by counsel in 
such examination and in the cross examination of the 
witnesses in support of the prosecution." 
 
                                                          
 
 
13 This right applies both to defendants whose charges are 
outside the final jurisdiction of the BMC, and those who are 
"charged . . . with an offense within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the [BMC] and Superior Courts for which the 
[BMC] will not retain jurisdiction."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f), 
as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004). 
13 
 
Following this hearing, the judge assesses whether "there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime 
or crimes alleged in the complaint" and, on that basis, whether 
to "bind the defendant over to the Superior Court" for final 
adjudication of the charges.14  Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f). 
 
Neither the statute, the rules of criminal procedure, nor 
any trial court standing order provides for discovery in advance 
of the probable cause hearing.  The question we confront is 
whether a judge, in his or her discretion, nonetheless may order 
discovery to promote the parties' full participation in the 
hearing and, thereby, to assist in the assessment of probable 
cause.  See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851-852 (1973) 
("primary function of the probable cause hearing of screening 
out 'an erroneous or improper prosecution,' . . . can only be 
effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given 
a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the 
prosecution's witnesses and to raise any affirmative defenses he 
                                                          
 
 
14 The probable cause standard used at such a hearing is 
more demanding than "probable cause to arrest."  Myers v. 
Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849 (1973).  The judge 
 
"view[s] the case as if it were a trial and he were 
required to rule on whether there is enough credible 
evidence to send the case to the jury.  Thus, the 
magistrate should dismiss the complaint when, on the 
evidence presented, a trial court would be bound to acquit 
as a matter of law." 
 
Id. at 850. 
14 
 
may have" [citation omitted]).  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that, subject to certain limitations, a judge may order 
discovery to assist in this process. 
General Laws c. 276, § 38, is silent on the question 
whether a BMC judge may issue discovery orders, or any other 
orders, in anticipation of a probable cause hearing.  That such 
authority is not provided explicitly in the terms of the 
statute, however, does not mean that it does not exist.  
"[C]ourts have inherent power 'to do whatever may be done under 
the general principles of jurisprudence to insure to the citizen 
a fair [hearing], whenever his life, liberty, property or 
character is at stake'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 73 (2013).  We have noted, in this vein, 
that "the District Court [and the BMC] have the power to 
[issue] . . . orders which are reasonably designed to provide 
the means for intelligent consideration of probable cause" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hinterleitner, 391 Mass. 
679, 683 (1984).  To the extent that a judge's order is "a 
legitimate exercise of [this] inherent power of the District 
Courts [or BMC], the lack of statutory authorization for that 
[order] is immaterial."  Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 535 (1982). 
 
A court's "[i]nherent powers" constitute, among other 
things, those "whose exercise is essential to . . . [the 
15 
 
court's] capacity to decide cases" (citation omitted).15  Id.  
This includes the authority "to facilitate . . . discovery."  
DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 454 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 214 (2011).  
See Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 454 (1970), 
quoting Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Bresnahan, 322 Mass. 629, 
631 (1948) (power to order discovery "does not depend upon 
statute, but is a part of the general jurisdiction of a court of 
equity"); G. L. c. 218, § 19C ("district court and [BMC] 
departments of the trial court shall have the same equitable 
powers and jurisdiction as is provided for the superior court").  
Accordingly, to the extent discovery is "essential" to a judge's 
"capacity to decide" the question of probable cause, it is 
within his or her inherent powers to order it.  See Brach v. 
Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, supra at 535. 
 
We are persuaded that, in at least some instances, a judge 
reasonably could conclude that prehearing discovery is 
                                                          
 
 
15 As a general matter, a court's inherent powers are 
strongest with respect to matters of procedure.  See Brach v. 
Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 535 
(1982) ("All the inherent powers recognized by this court . . . 
have  involved the internal functioning of the judiciary").  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 
213-214 (2011) (inherent authority "to issue protective 
orders"); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 69 (2006) 
(inherent authority "to grant pretrial bail and [to] compel the 
presence of a defendant at trial"); George W. Prescott Publ. Co. 
v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 277 
(1985) (inherent authority "to impound . . . files" [citation 
omitted]). 
16 
 
"essential."  This is so because, at a hearing pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 38, "complete cross-examination and the . . . 
present[ation of] affirmative defenses [a]re crucial and 
necessary to effectuate a true probable cause standard," 
Lataille, supra at 530; these functions, in turn, often are 
facilitated by material obtained through discovery.  See, e.g., 
Myers, supra at 852 (absent evidence obtained by defendant 
before hearing and used during cross-examination, "examining 
magistrate could not have possibly made an informed judgment"). 
 
The Appeals Court reached a similar conclusion in 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 791 (1980).  In 
holding that a prosecutor may be sanctioned for disobeying an 
order to provide prehearing discovery, the court presumed that a 
District Court judge has inherent authority to issue such an 
order.  See id. at 790-791 ("In connection with that hearing, it 
is essential that the District Court have the power to enforce 
any of its orders which are reasonably designed to provide the 
means for intelligent consideration of probable cause . . .").  
Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a 
"court[] ha[s] the inherent power to order appropriate . . . 
discovery . . . ancillary to [its] statutory power to determine 
whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant to 
answer."  Holman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 29 Cal. 
3d 480, 485 (1981) (magistrates may order such discovery 
17 
 
notwithstanding that criminal charges are outside their final 
jurisdiction).  See State v. Laux, 167 N.H. 698, 704 (2015) 
("circuit court has the inherent authority, within its sound 
discretion, to order discovery prior to the preliminary hearing" 
even where final adjudication will take place in superior 
court); State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983) ("power 
to compel discovery is . . . inherent in the magistrate's power 
to conduct" probable cause hearing).  See also People v. Laws, 
218 Mich. App. 447, 451 (1996) ("district court may order 
discovery in carrying out its duty to conduct preliminary 
examinations" and may do so "before the preliminary 
examination").16 
 
This analysis notwithstanding, the Commonwealth contends 
that BMC judges have no authority to order prehearing discovery, 
and that, even if they have such authority, they ought not to 
exercise it. 
                                                          
 
 
16 But see People v. Quinn, 183 Colo. 245, 251 (1973) 
("discovery should not be ordered prior to the preliminary 
hearing"); Janklow v. Talbott, 89 S.D. 179, 183 (1975) (same).  
The Commonwealth cites two other decisions from other 
jurisdictions that are claimed to reflect a similar conclusion. 
Those cases however, involved materially different issues from 
the question before this court.  See State v. O'Brien, 349 Wis. 
2d 667, 682 (2013), aff'd, 354 Wis. 2d 753, 850, cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 494 (2014) (no constitutional right to prehearing 
discovery); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 1999) 
(prehearing discovery proper in general, but improper where 
judge "ordered the State to permit discovery of material which 
did not pertain to probable cause"). 
18 
 
The Commonwealth notes, first, that BMC judges may not 
depart from the rules of criminal procedure, which make no 
provision for discovery in advance of a probable cause hearing.  
See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) 
("Whatever the scope of [a court's] 'inherent power,' however, 
it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent 
or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure").  
This silence, the Commonwealth argues, is significant because 
the rules anticipate other occasions when BMC judges may or must 
issue discovery orders.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 11 (b), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1509 (2004) (at pretrial hearing, courts 
"shall" consider discovery motions); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as 
amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) (requiring automatic pretrial 
discovery of certain materials); Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. P. 3 
(where charges fall within court's final jurisdiction, judge 
"shall" issue order at arraignment "requir[ing] the parties to 
provide . . . discovery").  These occasions, in the 
Commonwealth's view, "occupy the field" and leave no room for 
the discretionary discovery at issue here.17 
                                                          
 
 
17 The Commonwealth also argues that, if the Legislature had 
intended to provide defendants with a prehearing right to 
discovery, it would have stated so explicitly, much as it has in 
other contexts.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 231, §§ 61-69 (right to 
discovery in civil litigation).  The question here, however, is 
whether a court has discretionary authority to order discovery, 
not whether the Legislature provided defendants with a right to 
such discovery. 
19 
 
 
The Commonwealth's contention is unavailing.  The fact that 
the procedural rules are silent about a court's authority to 
exercise one of its inherent powers does not imply that the 
rules envision the court being deprived of that power.  See 
Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 752 (1998) ("While the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly 
permit a judge to rehear a matter, no policy prohibits 
reconsideration of an order or judgment in appropriate 
circumstances," and doing so is an "inherent power of a court" 
[citation omitted]).  See also Reporters' Notes (2004) to 
Rule 1, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 1343 (LexisNexis 2015) (rules are "general and 
flexible, prescribing only basic essentials"). 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the rules of criminal procedure 
cited by the Commonwealth were intended to occupy the field with 
respect to discovery.  Those rules concern one specific issue:  
the mandatory pretrial discovery process.  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 13 (e), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004) (defendants 
have "right to a hearing" on motions for further discovery); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (requiring automatic discovery of certain 
materials); Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Crim. P. 3 (at arraignment, judge 
"shall" issue discovery order).  Even if these rules set forth 
the exclusive means through which mandatory pretrial discovery 
is to be conducted, they imply nothing about the availability or 
20 
 
lack of availability of the discretionary prehearing process at 
issue here.18 
 
As mentioned, the Commonwealth maintains also that, even if 
BMC judges have authority to order prehearing discovery, it 
would be unwise for them to exercise it.  The Commonwealth 
expresses concern that, because prehearing discovery might 
reveal the identities of the prosecution's witnesses, it will 
lead to witness tampering.19  Such tampering is asserted to be 
                                                          
 
 
18 Indeed, the Commonwealth concedes in its brief that, "in 
the course of a probable cause hearing, there may arise 
circumstances in which a judge may properly order a Commonwealth 
witness to disclose information that is central to the 
determination of probable cause."  The rules of criminal 
procedure, however, contain no explicit provision concerning 
such an order. 
 
 
19 The Commonwealth contends further that prehearing 
discovery will not provide defendants with significant practical 
benefits, as they can learn the essential aspects of the 
Commonwealth's case either at the hearing itself or when 
discovery is turned over upon the conclusion of a "prompt grand 
jury investigation."  See Janklow v. Talbott, 89 S.D. at 181-
182; Superior Court Standing Order 2-86 (discovery to be 
provided at arraignment). 
 
 
In practice, however, probable cause hearings, which are 
meant to be conducted "as soon as may be" after a defendant is 
charged, see G. L. c. 276, § 38, have largely become extinct.  
This has happened not, as the Commonwealth contends, because 
"prompt grand jury investigations" usually lead to the issuance 
of an indictment before the scheduled date of the probable cause 
hearing, but because the Commonwealth routinely is granted a 
series of continuances -- usually between three and four months 
in total length –- that postpone the hearing until an indictment 
issues and the hearing no longer is required.  See Commonwealth 
v. Perkins, 464 Mass. 92, 108 (2013) (Gants, J., concurring) ("a 
probable cause hearing in a criminal case is virtually never 
conducted in the courts of Massachusetts; the only preliminary 
21 
 
particularly problematic during the early stages of an 
investigation, when witnesses might not yet have revealed the 
full extent of their knowledge to police or to a grand jury.  
See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 305 (2011) (Gants, 
J., concurring) (instances of "victims or witnesses refusing to 
cooperate or changing or recanting earlier testimony . . . 
occurred in up to ninety per cent of [Suffolk County district 
attorney's] cases involving guns, gangs, or serious violence"). 
 
While we acknowledge the gravity of this concern, judges of 
the BMC have adequate means at their disposal to address it if 
the situation requires.  For example, when discovery is 
warranted, they may, as here, issue protective orders concerning 
a witness's identity or contact information, allowing it to be 
disclosed only to defense counsel.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) 
(6) ("judge may, for cause shown, grant discovery to a defendant 
on the condition that the material to be discovered be available 
only to counsel for the defendant").  See also Berend, Less 
Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal 
Cases in California:  Discovery Before and After Proposition 
115, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 465, 522 n.244 (1998) ("study . . . 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
screening of a defendant's case is conducted by a grand jury, 
sometimes months after the initial appearance").20 Charges of 
witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B, were pending against 
both defendants.  In Meade's case, the Commonwealth gave as an 
additional reason that the shooting was an apparently "random 
act of violence" and that the victims and perpetrator did not 
know each other. 
22 
 
concluded that early and broad discovery in California not only 
encouraged more early guilty pleas, but had no impact on witness 
intimidation").  Where a protective order is insufficient, 
judges simply may deny the discovery request altogether.  Cf. 
Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 534 (1984) (trial court judges 
are "in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs 
and interests of parties affected by discovery" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
We turn now to the orders at issue here.  The parties 
recognize that, to the extent that BMC judges have authority to 
order prehearing discovery, there was no abuse of discretion in 
ordering it in these two cases.  In each, the central issue at 
the probable cause hearing was likely to be whether the 
defendants had been identified correctly by witnesses, and each 
defendant sought discovery of materials that would allow him to 
test this issue, such as police reports, photographic arrays, 
the identities of the witnesses, and surveillance video.  See 
Holman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 29 Cal. 3d 480, 
485-486 (1981) (judge properly ordered "limited discovery 
directed to the restricted purpose of the preliminary 
examination").  Without these materials, as the judge in 
Teixeira's case reasoned, "discrepancies [regarding 
identification], which might raise genuine issues with respect 
to probable cause, could not be explored" at such a hearing.  
23 
 
See id. at 485 (discovery proper if has been "show[n] that such 
discovery is reasonably necessary to prepare for the preliminary 
examination").  At the same time, recognizing the Commonwealth's 
particularized concerns regarding witness intimidation,20 the 
judges in both cases issued protective orders shielding the 
witnesses' contact information from the defendants, and the 
judge in Teixeira's case issued an order preventing the 
defendant from learning their names.  Given that the defendants 
demonstrated good cause for seeking discovery directed to the 
restricted purpose of the probable cause hearing, that the 
resulting orders were carefully circumscribed, and that they 
were accompanied by protective orders addressing the 
Commonwealth's particularized concerns, we discern no abuse of 
discretion. 
 
c.  Teixeira's motion for sanctions.  Teixeira asks that 
this court impose sanctions on the Commonwealth for failing to 
comply with the BMC judge's discovery order during the period 
before a stay was issued by the single justice.21  He seeks 
                                                          
 
20 Charges of witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B, 
were pending against both defendants.  In Meade's case, the 
Commonwealth gave as an additional reason that the shooting was 
an apparently "random act of violence" and that the victims and 
perpetrator did not know each other. 
 
 
21 The discovery order was issued on June 24, 2015, took 
effect on June 30, 2015, and was stayed by a single justice of 
this court seven days later, on July 7, 2015. 
24 
 
dismissal of the indictments or, alternatively, imposition of 
another "appropriate sanction." 
 
The Commonwealth acted inappropriately by failing to comply 
with the judge's order.  Even if that order had been issued in 
error, the Commonwealth was not without its remedies.  It could 
have, as in Meade's case, sought an immediate stay from the 
single justice pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Instead, it 
waited until eight days after the order issued -- and two days 
after it went into effect -- to seek such relief.  The 
Commonwealth may not fail to pursue a timely appeal and then 
disobey a judge's order when the opportunity for appeal is no 
longer available.  "Litigants may not resort to self-help 
remedies and unilaterally flout court decrees."  Commonwealth v. 
Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 433 n.20 (2010).  If a court issues a 
directive that a party believes to be unlawful, it "must be 
obeyed, and until it is reversed by orderly review, it is to be 
respected."  Id., quoting Mohamad v. Kavlakian, 69 Mass. App. 
Ct. 261, 264 (2007). 
 
Nonetheless, we are constrained to conclude that dismissal 
would not be an appropriate sanction for the Commonwealth's 
conduct, as "we have never upheld the dismissal of a complaint 
or indictment for misconduct in the absence of a showing of 
prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 421 Mass. 272, 278 
(1995).  Teixeira has not attempted to make such a showing, nor 
25 
 
would he be able to do so.  See id. at 279-280 (before 
dismissing complaint, trial judge must determine that "the 
prosecutor's refusal to disclose [information following 
discovery order] 'caused such irreparable prejudice that the 
defendant could not receive a fair trial if the complaint were 
reinstated'" [citation omitted]). 
Whether some other sanction is appropriate we leave to the 
discretion of the Superior Court judge in whose jurisdiction 
this case now lies.  See id. at 280 & n.8 (while dismissal with 
prejudice not appropriate, case remanded for factual findings 
and determination whether "some other sanction" appropriate); 
Reporters' Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, Mass. Ann. Laws 
Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1517 (rule 
regarding sanctions "is based on [the] assumption that the trial 
court is in the best situation to consider the opposing 
arguments concerning a failure to comply with a discovery order 
and to fashion an appropriate remedy"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The orders requiring discovery in the 
Boston Municipal Court are affirmed.  In Teixeira's case, the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for consideration, 
after any hearings that the judge may deem appropriate, whether 
a sanction should be imposed on the Commonwealth for its refusal 
to obey the Boston Municipal Court judge's order and, if so, the 
nature of the sanction. 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.