Title: Baine v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FENEL BAINE,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 152, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0512011466  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 20, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 18, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 18th day of November 2010, upon careful consideration of the 
briefs on appeal and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant filed this appeal from the Superior Court’s 
February 24, 2010 denial of his second motion for postconviction relief as 
without merit and/or procedurally barred under various subsections of 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).1  We have determined that there is no 
merit to the appeal and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 
                                          
 
1 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to relief). 
2 
 
 
(2) 
On December 16, 2005, the appellant, Fenel Baine, and his 
friend, Keenan Bacon, were arrested and charged with the December 15, 
2005 fatal shooting of Michael Cannon, and also with assaulting Michael 
Cannon’s brother, Jeremy Cannon, and their friend, Marcus Johnson.  Baine 
and Bacon each possessed a gun on the night in question.  Baine’s gun 
discharged as he was assaulting Jeremy Cannon with it.  No one was struck 
by the bullet.  Seconds later, Bacon’s gun discharged.  Michael Cannon was 
killed by the shot fired by Bacon. 
 
(3) 
Under a pre-indictment plea agreement, Bacon pled guilty to 
manslaughter, the related charge of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony (PFDCF), and third degree assault.  Bacon was 
sentenced to a total of thirty years at Level V suspended after fifteen years 
for decreasing levels of supervision.2 
 
(4) 
Baine was indicted on charges of manslaughter, assault in the 
second degree, assault in the third degree, conspiracy in the third degree, 
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and two counts of PFDCF.  
Baine was tried as a principal in the assaults of Marcus Johnson and Jeremy 
Cannon and as a principal or an accomplice in the death of Michael Cannon.  
Baine’s first trial ended in a mistrial. 
                                          
 
2 See Bacon v. State, 2007 WL 2570813 (Del. Supr.) (reciting terms of sentence when 
affirming the denial of a motion for correction of sentence). 
3 
 
 
(5) 
At the second trial, Baine’s trial counsel moved for acquittal of 
all charges on the basis of insufficient evidence.  The Superior Court denied 
the motion, concluding that “there is ample evidence, in light [of] both direct 
evidence and inferences, to support the case going to the jury.”3 
 
(6) 
The 
jury 
convicted 
Baine 
on 
all 
charges 
including 
manslaughter, but rejected the lesser-included charge of criminally negligent 
homicide.  The Superior Court sentenced Baine to a total of ninety-one years 
at Level V followed by probation.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed 
Baine’s convictions and sentences.4 
 
(7) 
In his first motion for postconviction relief, Baine alleged that: 
there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions, the trial judge 
gave an improper jury instruction on accomplice liability, and his trial 
counsel was ineffective.  The Superior Court denied the motion on the basis 
that the insufficient evidence claim was procedurally barred and the 
accomplice liability and ineffective counsel claims were either conclusory or 
without merit.  Baine filed appealed from the Superior Court’s decision; 
however, the appeal was dismissed as untimely.5 
                                          
 
3 Trial tr. at 102 (Oct. 24, 2006). 
4 Baine v. State, 2007 WL 2372635 (Del. Supr.). 
5 Baine v. State, 2008 WL 5307386 (Del. Supr.). 
4 
 
 
(8) 
In his second motion for postconviction relief, Baine expanded 
his previously adjudicated claims.  Also, Bain advanced two new claims that 
his indictment was defective, and that his due process rights were violated 
when he was not consulted before the Superior Court’s decision to declare a 
mistrial in his first trial. 
 
(9) 
By order dated February 24, 2010, the Superior Court denied 
Baine’s second postconviction motion after concluding that all of the claims, 
except for a sentencing claim, were without merit and/or procedurally 
barred.  The Superior Court did not directly address the sentencing claim.  
This appeal followed. 
 
(10) On appeal, Baine argues that the Superior Court failed to 
properly instruct the jury to consider his “accountability for an aggravating 
fact or circumstance” when determining his individual culpability in the fatal 
shooting of Michael Cannon.6  Baine’s claim is without merit.  Having 
reviewed the jury instructions given by the Superior Court, we conclude that 
                                          
 
6 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 274 (2007) (governing “offenses involving 2 or more 
persons; convictions for different degrees of offense”); Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 214 
(Del. 2009) (holding that when the State proceeds under an accomplice liability theory 
and a crime is divided into degrees based on differing mental states or on an aggravating 
fact or circumstance, § 274 requires that the jury make an individualized determination of 
the requisite mental state of the defendant and, where appropriate to the charge, the 
defendant’s accountability for the aggravating fact or circumstance). 
5 
 
the jury was properly instructed on Baine’s criminal liability with respect to 
Michael Cannon’s homicide.7  Baine’s claim was properly barred. 
 
(11) Baine argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him 
of manslaughter and the related charge of PFDCF because he did not know 
that Bacon had a gun.8  That claim is procedurally barred as well.  The 
Superior Court and this Court previously concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Baine knew that Bacon had a firearm, and that Baine recklessly caused the 
death of Michael Cannon.9  Baine has not demonstrated that the claim 
warrants further consideration. 
 
(12) Baine argues that he should have been consulted before the 
Superior Court declared a mistrial during his first jury trial.  In support, 
Baine cites to Superior Court Criminal Rule 26.3, which provides that 
“[b]efore ordering a mistrial, the court shall provide an opportunity for the 
state and for each defendant to comment on the propriety of the order, 
                                          
 
7 See Guy v. State, 999 A.2d 863, 872 (Del. 2010) (concluding that “[t]he individualized 
finding of a defendant’s particular mental state ensures that a defendant is convicted of 
the degree of homicide appropriately related to [the defendant’s] specific conduct.”). 
8 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A (providing that a person who is in possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony is guilty of PFDCF). 
9 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 632(1) (providing that a person is guilty of manslaughter 
when the person recklessly causes the death of another person).   
6 
 
including whether each party consents or objects to a mistrial, and to suggest 
any alternatives.”10 
 
(13) In this case, Baine’s trial counsel moved for a mistrial during an 
office conference because of issues involving a videotaped interview that 
was played for the jury.11  Under these circumstances, Baine cannot show 
that he was excluded from “comment[ing] on the propriety of” a mistrial or 
that he was prejudiced.  The Superior Court properly denied the claim as 
without merit and procedurally barred. 
 
(14) Baine claims that his indictment was defective because it was 
not sufficiently specific.  The Superior Court determined that the claim is 
without merit and procedurally barred.  Having reviewed the indictment, we 
agree with that determination. 
 
(15) Finally, we have considered Baine’s claim that his ninety-one 
year sentence “as an accomplice” is “cruel and unusual” as compared to the 
thirty-year sentence received by Bacon.  We conclude that the claim is 
without merit and is procedurally barred.12 
                                          
 
10 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 26.3 (governing “mistrial”). 
11 The record reflects that the videotape may have contained hearsay as well as the 
interviewing officer’s opinion or beliefs as to Baine’s guilt. 
12 On direct appeal we considered and rejected Baine’s claim that the trial judge exhibited 
a closed mind when imposing the sentence.  Baine v. State, 2007 WL 2372635 (Del. 
Supr.). 
7 
 
 
(16) The record reflects that Baine’s agenda to avenge a family 
member was the catalyst for the events that unfolded on the night of 
December 15, 2005.13  Baine’s violent mission began when he assaulted 
Marcus Johnson and continued when he assaulted Jeremy Cannon with a 
gun.  Ultimately, the violence brought about by Baine resulted in the 
senseless fatal shooting of Cannon by Baine’s cohort, Bacon.  Under these 
circumstances and in view of the aggravating factors identified at 
sentencing, there was no error in the Superior Court imposing a sentence at 
the top of the statutory ranges.14 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                          
 
13 Baine believed that his younger brother was “jumped” by Marcus Johnson and others 
several weeks earlier. 
14 See Bryant v. State, 2006 WL 1640177 (Del. Supr.) (concluding that defendant’s 
sentence as compared to co-defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment and was not otherwise constitutionally excessive).