Title: State v. Allocco

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_ALLOCCO.93-048; 162 Vt. 59; 644 A.2d 835

[Opinion Filed May 20, 1995]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-048


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Robert Allocco                               January Term, 1994


 Linda Levitt, J.

 Scot Kline, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson,
   Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 David J. Williams of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.   In this appeal from convictions for sexual assault and lewd
 and lascivious conduct with a child. 13 V.S.A. {{ 3252(a)(3), 2602, we
 decide that defendant's due process right to a fair trial as specified in 12
 V.S.A. { 1943 (confinement and care of jury) was not violated when the jury,
 during deliberations, was allowed to separate overnight.  We also reject
 defendant's other claims that error was committed when his prior bad acts
 and admissions were admitted in evidence and that the trial court denied him
 a fair trial because he was unable to hear adequately in the courtroom.  We
 accordingly affirm.
      In 1990, defendant became friends with the victim, the thirteen-year-
 old son of the woman who cleaned his house and business premises.  In

 

 January 1992, defendant was charged with sexually abusing the boy while he
 was visiting at defendant's home.  During the relationship, defendant
 lavished the boy with gifts, such as, more than a dozen pairs of jeans and
 ten pairs of sneakers, tennis lessons, dental work, and a computer for
 Christmas.  The boy spent considerable time on weekends and school vacations
 at defendant's home, where he played video games, ping pong and tennis, and
 used a computer, watched movies and rode his bicycle.  The boy also spent
 time at defendant's business where he wore a name tag indicating he was a
 vice president.
      Coworkers noticed inappropriate behavior and reported it.  At an
 initial interview by police, the boy did not reveal any wrongdoing by
 defendant.  A day later, however, he did disclose abuse, which, according to
 the boy, occurred a number of times.  One incident was described as
 defendant masturbating him as defendant masturbated himself, and on two
 other occasions, defendant putting a finger into the boy's anus.  These
 incidents were the basis of three charges, one of lewd and lascivious
 conduct with a child and two alleging sexual assault.  Defendant
 acknowledged to police that he had seen the boy naked with an erection, at
 times hugged and kissed him, taken a photograph of the boy with only
 underwear on, and given him a copy of the Kinsey report.  An explanation
 defendant gave to police for the allegation that he had touched the boy's
 penis was admitted in evidence, over defendant's objection.  The
 investigating officer testified:
             I told Mr. Allocco that [the boy] told me directly
           that Mr. Allocco touched him on the penis.  Mr.
           Allocco's response, to me was, "You know, it was locker
           room stuff.  It was there so I grabbed it.  We were just
           fooling around and I told him I would squeeze it if he
           didn't let go."

 

      Defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and one of the
 two counts of sexual assault.
                                     I.
      On the last day of trial, at about 4:30 p.m., after the jury had been
 deliberating about two hours, the court told counsel, "A juror is going into
 insulin shock so they would like to stop for now . . . and start tomorrow
 morning."  The following colloquy occurred:
           DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Are we going to have an alternate take
           her place?

           THE COURT:  No.  Because we are stopping now.

           THE COURT OFFICER:  If she gets her shot she will be all
           right.

           DEFENSE COUNSEL:  All right.

           THE COURT:  Eight-thirty tomorrow.

           DEFENSE COUNSEL:  We would, perhaps in the morning have
           an update so that if we need to voir dire the jury.

 A short recess was taken and court and counsel again talked, defense counsel
 expressing concern that the jury had dispersed without receiving
 instructions from the court not to discuss the case or learn about it from
 the media.(FN1)

 

      The next morning, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that he
 had not consented to the dispersal of the jury without a cautionary
 instruction.  The court and counsel examined the jury, and the responses
 revealed that nothing improper had occurred which would adversely affect its
 deliberations.  The motion was denied for lack of prejudice to defendant.

 

      The statute governing jury deliberations, 12 V.S.A. { 1943, states:

           Confinement and care of jury

            When the court has committed a cause to its
           consideration, the jury shall be confined until it
           agrees on a verdict or is discharged.  While so
           confined, the jury shall be under the care of an officer
           appointed by the court and sworn for that purpose.

 Our criminal rules moderate the statute by providing, in part, that the
 "court may allow the jury to separate during the trial."  V.R.Cr.P. 23(d).
      Defendant concedes that the jurors may separate after jury
 deliberations have started, but only if defendant expressly consents and the
 trial court gives "cautionary instructions."  Defendant urges us to reverse
 a conviction obtained after a deliberating jury separates even if defendant
 did not object, citing a New York memorandum decision, People v. Coons, 551 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1990).
      Coons is easily distinguished, because New York follows a standard of
 review more expansive than Vermont.  As articulated in Coons, "[e]rrors
 which '"affect the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings
 prescribed by law"' need not be preserved and, even if acceded to, still
 present a question of law for this court to review."  Coons, 551 N.E.2d  at
 588 (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976), aff'd,