Title: In the Matter of Judge Rosemarie R. Williams, A Judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PORITZ, C. J., writing for a majority of the Court. From the time of her appointment to the bench on March 5, 1993, to March 5, 2000, Superior Court Judge Rosemarie R. Williams sat in the Mercer County Courthouse, where Alfred Wesley Bridges served as an employee of the Mercer County Sheriff's Office. Starting around April 1998, the judge and Bridges became romantically involved, but by April 14, 2000, that relationship had apparently ended. For at least a year prior to that date, Bridges and the judge had been abusive and confrontational toward one another. On the night of April 14, 2000, Judge Williams was having dinner with Assistant Deputy Public Defender Joan Austin at the Revere Restaurant in Ewing Township. She noticed Bridges entering the restaurant with a woman that the judge did not know. The judge confronted Bridges in the back of the restaurant, where she demanded that Bridges leave. Bridges' companion, Tami DeVitis, testified that the judge spoke to her using sexually explicit language, but the judge denied any confrontation with her. There were no outside witnesses to that alleged encounter. Bridges and DeVitis left the restaurant. Judge Williams followed them to the parking lot where another confrontation took place. Although Bridges told the judge that he would take DeVitis to Lorenzo's Restaurant in Trenton and then return to speak with her, he testified that he did not intend to return. The judge told her dinner companion that she was going home. Instead of doing that, however, she drove to Trenton where she saw Bridges and DeVitis entering Joe's Mill Hill Saloon. Judge Williams approached them. The judge testified that Bridges threatened to have the judge arrested and stated that he would see that she lost her job. Pam Fruscione, the judge's secretary, was talking to the judge on the latter's cell phone and heard Bridges' remarks. Bridges and DeVitis entered the Mill Hill where he asked the owner to call the police. Judge Williams followed them inside and heard Bridges' request. Another confrontation ensued while Dennis Clark, the Mill Hill's proprietor, called the Trenton police. Judge Williams left the Mill Hill and drove two blocks to the Hughes Justice Complex. There she parked her vehicle and called 911 on her cell phone. She told the operator her name and location and said that there had been a confrontation at the Mill Hill after Bridges had followed her there. Police officers who were on their way to the Mill Hill were rerouted to the Justice Complex. When they arrived at the judge's vehicle, she again represented that Bridges had followed her to the Mill Hill. Judge Williams waited at the Justice Complex while the police went to the Mill Hill and took statements from Bridges and DeVitis. All three parties declined to file any complaint. Thomas Keefe, the bartender at the Mill Hill, testified that after the police left, he answered a call from a woman who identified herself as a police officer from the Hopewell Police Department and asked to speak with Bridges. When Bridges took the phone from Keefe, however, he immediately recognized the judge's voice and hung up. According to Judge Williams, she told Keefe that she was calling from the Hopewell Police Department because she was near there. Judge Williams thereafter called Bridges' home and left a message saying she was on route to the Hopewell Police Department. She did arrive there, where she gave a statement but again declined to file a complaint. This matter came to the Court by a Presentment from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC). The committee concluded that Superior Court Judge Rosemarie R. Williams violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 2:!5-8(a)(6). Four members of the ACJC recommended the imposition of a censure. Two members voted for the judge's removal from office. One member recommended a six-month suspension. The Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the judge should not be removed from office or otherwise disciplined. HELD: Based on the Supreme Court's independent review of the record, there is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that respondent violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 2:15-8(a)(6). A three-month suspension from judicial duties, without pay, is required. 1. The Supreme Court performs an independent review of the record on a presentment from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. When, as here, the facts are sharply contested, that standard may be difficult to meet on all issues. (pp. 9-10) 2. Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct require a judge to observe high standards of conduct and to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Rule 2:15- 8(a)(6) requires the ACJC to review any claim that a judge has engaged in conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute. (pp. 10-11) 3. Despite the differences in testimony about the events of April 14, 2000, certain core facts stand out by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent engaged in confrontations in public places and twice gave false and misleading information. The first time was when she stated to the police operator that Bridges had followed her and, subsequently, when she repeated that statement to the police. The Court agrees with the ACJC that the judge's explanation was incredible. Respondent's actions were irresponsible and although they involved her private life, they took place in public. She demonstrated a lack of respect for the law that as a judge she has sworn to uphold. (pp.12-14) 4. The Court's primary concern in determining discipline is not the punishment of the judge but the restoration and maintenance of the dignity and honor of the position and to protect the public from future excesses. (pp. 15-16) 5. Respondent has committed serious violations but she has not directly and willfully misused her judicial office. Although the Court deems removal to be too harsh in this case, it also views censure, as proposed by four members of the ACJC, to be too lenient. A discipline greater than censure is warranted if public confidence in the judiciary is to be maintained. (pp. 16-19) 6. Respondent's participation in an abusive and damaging personal relationship suggests that psychological counseling would be helpful to her. Indeed, she has been and continues in therapy to better understand her behavior. (p. 20) 7. Despite her personal problems, Judge Williams performs well on the bench and has a reputation as a solid and fair judge. Her work with the Inns of Court and her conscientious attention to her judicial duties are commendable. She has served in three divisions of our court system in eight years. The picture that emerges from the record is of a person driven by strong emotions who behave inappropriately as a result of a flawed personal association. (pp. 20- 21) 8. Notwithstanding mitigating factors, Judge Williams has failed to adhere to the high standards we expect and demand of our judges. Moreover, the events of April 14, 2000, were not isolated. Prior incidents involving her relationship with Bridges are not before the Court except insofar as they bear on the amount of discipline that should be imposed. The Court notes that as a consequence of the prior matters, respondent was reappointed without tenure due to a break in service. She has already paid a heavy price for her intemperate behavior. (pp. 21-22) 9. The Court agrees with the rationale of ACJC public member Arthur Kamin, who concluded in his separate dissent that respondent should be suspended rather than censured or removed from judicial office. Noting that the constitution prohibits a judge from engaging in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit while in judicial office, the Court concludes that a three-month suspension, without pay, from judicial duties is the appropriate sanction. The suspension is to take effect August 13, 2001. (pp. 22-24) LONG, J., dissenting, would impose an Order of censure. She is of the view that the Court should agree with the majority of the ACJC, who recommended that respondent be censured for misconduct that occurred entirely within the setting of her private life. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA did not participate. IN THE MATTER OF JUDGE ROSEMARIE R. WILLIAMS, A JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY Argued February 13, 2001 -- Decided July 31, 2001 On an Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be removed from judicial office or otherwise disciplined. Patrick J. Monahan, Jr., Designated Presenter, argued the cause on behalf of Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. Justin P. Walder argued the cause for respondent (Walder, Sondak & Brogan, attorneys; Mr. Walder and Jeffrey A. Walder, of counsel and on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. In this judicial disciplinary case participating members of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC or Committee) have concluded that respondent Superior Court Judge Rosemarie Ruggiero Williams has violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 2:15-8(a)(6). By presentment filed with the Court, four members of the Committee recommend public censure as an appropriate sanction and, further, that Judge Williams continue to receive psychological counseling. Two members of the Committee, however, recommend that removal proceedings should be instituted pursuant to Rule 2:14 and N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-1 to -11, and one member recommends a suspension for six months. On initial review of the presentment, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be subject to removal proceedings or otherwise disciplined, and the matter was scheduled for oral argument. We now concur in substantial part with the findings of the ACJC majority but modify its recommendation in respect of discipline. Under our disposition Judge Williams shall be suspended from her judicial duties for a period of three months commencing on August 13, 2001, and shall forfeit her salary during that period. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canons 1 and 2A are clear: judges in this State are held to high standards of conduct because, otherwise, we risk the integrity and independence of the judiciary. See footnote 33 As the comment to Canon 2A explains, [p]ublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety and must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on personal conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The single overriding rationale behind our system of judicial discipline is the preservation of public confidence in the integrity and the independence of the judiciary. See In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 579 (1984); In re Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 431 (1973). As we have noted before, This Court cannot allow the integrity of the judicial process to be compromised in any way by a member of either the Bench or the Bar. Spitalnick[,] supra, 63 N.J. at 431. Accordingly, institutional concerns figure prominently in cases involving judicial discipline. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota has observed, the standard of judicial conduct is a high one precisely so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. [In re] Miera, 426 N.W 2d [850,] 855 [(Minn. 1988)] . . . . Because public confidence in judges is essential to maintaining the legal system, misconduct by a judge brings the office into disrepute and thereby prejudices the administration of justice. [In re Winton, 350 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Minn. 1984).] Our primary concern in determining discipline is therefore not the punishment of the judge, but rather to restore and maintain the dignity and honor of the position and to protect the public from future excesses. Id. at 97 (quoting In re Buchanan, 669 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wash. 1983)); see also In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. 342, 386-87 (1985) (stating that purpose of judicial discipline is not penal in nature . . . but rather serves to vindicate the integrity of the judiciary ). We once before adopted the reasons given by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine for disciplining a judge. In re Seaman, supra, 133 N.J. at 97. Those reasons bear repeating here: [Judges engaging in misconduct must be disciplined] to instruct the public and all judges, ourselves included, of the importance of the function performed by the judges in a free society. We discipline a judge to reassure the public that judicial misconduct is neither permitted nor condoned. We discipline a judge to reassure the public that the judiciary of this state is dedicated to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. [Ibid. (quoting In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981)).] Society gives this power on condition that judges be independent, trusting them and no one else. Respondent sold this power, he sold his judgments, he sold his independence. He not only betrayed his trust, he betrayed New Jersey's tradition of judicial honesty . . . . And, in In re Imbriani, we ordered removal where the judge pled guilty to Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Property Received in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9. 139 N.J. 262, 266 (1995). Although the judge's criminal conduct did not touch on his judicial performance, in considering the public interest and our steadfast commitment to maintaining an independent and incorruptible judiciary, we determined that removal was warranted on that criminal conviction. Ibid. Respondent's conduct in the instant matter does not involve the misuse of judicial office such that it poison[s] the well of justice as in In re Samay and In re Yaccarino. Neither does her conduct include criminal acts that corrupt the judicial decision- making power as in In re Corruzi, or that are totally incompatible with continued judicial service as in In re Imbriani. Respondent has committed serious violations but she has not directly and willfully misused her judicial office. Although we deem removal to be too harsh in this case, we likewise deem censure, as proposed by the ACJC majority, to be too lenient. Censure does not reassure the public that judges will be deterred from acting out in public and that such behavior will not reoccur. The gravity of respondent's violations requires a strong response. Censure has been imposed, for example, in cases where the misconduct involved making inappropriate comments during judicial proceedings, In re Albano, 75 N.J. 509 (1978), and where the judge, without revealing his status, appeared on behalf of his son in legal proceedings, In re Di Sabato, 76 N.J. 46 (1978). Respondent's violations are more serious and require a discipline greater than censure if public confidence in the judiciary is to be maintained. We agree with the ACJC that respondent has not established that she suffers from a condition known as the battered woman's syndrome. The expert reports she submitted from the two psychologists and the therapist who have had contact with her in the last eighteen months do not make a sufficient connection between battered woman's syndrome and her behavior. Cf. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193 (1984) (describing common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives ). We find, based on both the expert reports and testimony at the hearing, that respondent lacked control over her behavior in her personal relationship with Bridges. Respondent has herself testified that she exercised bad judgment. Respondent's participation in that abusive and damaging relationship suggests that psychological counseling would be helpful to her. Indeed, she has been and continues in therapy to better understand her behavior. Despite her personal problems, respondent performs well on the bench and has a reputation as a solid and fair judge. Her work with the Inns of Court and her conscientious attention to her judicial duties are commendable. She has served in three divisions of our court system -- Criminal, Family, and Civil -- in the eight years she has been a judge. Her transgressions are related to her personal life and her dysfunctional relationship with Bridges. Indeed, the picture that emerges from the record is of a person driven by strong emotions, who behaved inappropriately as a result of a flawed personal association. Notwithstanding those mitigating factors, she has failed to adhere to the high standards we expect and demand of our judges. Her actions affected persons removed from the immediate controversy and her disregard for social norms negatively affects public confidence and brings discredit to the judiciary. Of greatest concern, she misled the Trenton police and, later, implied she was an official from the Hopewell Police Department. Moreover, the events of that night were not isolated. Prior incidents relating to respondent's relationship with Bridges are not before us except insofar as they bear on the quantum of discipline that should be imposed. In one such incident a year earlier, respondent was physically injured during another confrontation with Bridges. Neighbors called the police and respondent filed and then withdrew a complaint against him. She was asked to seek therapy at that time and did so. Although she was reappointed, her reappointment was without tenure due to a break in service. See N.J. Const., art. VI, 6, 3 (stating that [t]he Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall hold their offices for initial terms of [seven] years and upon reappointment shall hold their offices during good behavior ). Respondent has already paid a heavy price for her intemperate behavior. To this day, the office of judge is one that I hold in high esteem and even awe. As a lay member of the ACJC, I truly believe the general public views our judges and justices in a like manner. They expect a quality of distinction and integrity in and out of the courtroom. Still, I must disagree with my ACJC colleagues in the types of sanctions they recommended be imposed. Censure, as proposed by the majority, is -- in my opinion -- too mild a discipline. Removal . . . is too harsh. What deeply concerns me is that Judge Williams severely damaged the stature of the judiciary in New Jersey by her extra- curricular activities. I expect judges to exercise good judgment. Judge Williams did not in this matter. . . . . But there is another side to Judge Williams. That must be taken into consideration as well. She appears to be a competent judge. She worked hard to get where she is. Her life has not been easy. She has surmounted many difficulties in her personal life and in her legal and judicial careers. I believe a sanction of suspension for six months would best serve the public interest. It would show New Jerseyans that the high standards of the judiciary will be maintained and that there will be a severe penalty if they are not adhered to -_ beyond reprimand and beyond censure. A suspension has teeth to it for all to see. Suspension also will offer a degree of compassion for a judge who is undergoing professional treatment to help solve her problems. Judge Williams still can be a credit to our excellent state court system -- and can serve as a shining example of someone determined to make a successful comeback after a period of difficulty and darkness. We agree. However, we have chosen to suspend respondent for three rather than six months because of the constitutional prohibition against a judge, while in office, engag[ing] in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit. N.J. Const., art. VI, 6, 6. Because of that restriction, we are concerned about the substantial adverse consequences of a longer suspension. We believe that the goal of our disciplinary system -- enhancing public confidence in the judiciary -- is furthered by a three- month suspension. IN THE MATTER OF JUDGE ROSEMARIE R. WILLIAMS, A JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY _____________________________ LONG, J., dissenting I would adopt the censure recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct. We repose in that Committee, chaired by a retired Supreme Court Justice of long and rich experience and made up of highly regarded members of the legal community and the public at large, the responsibility of conducting formal hearings in cases such as this and, upon such hearings, the duty to recommend sanction. That is what occurred here. After painstakingly reviewing the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony, a majority of the Committee concluded that, on an historical discipline continuum, respondent's violation was less egregious than those that poisoned the well of justice, thus warranting removal, but more problematic than those wholly personal misjudgments that merely justified a reprimand. Given that the conduct that led to these proceedings took place entirely within the setting of respondent's private life; that it did not touch on her judicial office; that she is uniformly regarded as a good and fair judge; that after seven years of hard work she has been denied tenure due to the fallout from the very same romantic misadventure; and that she has been subjected to unusual obloquy in the media, I am satisfied that the penalty of censure is appropriate. It will follow her to the end of her judicial life and, combined with continued counseling to uncover the root of the behavior that led her into these circumstances, is adequate and just. As judges, we come to our task with the cares, the weaknesses, and the emotional needs that attend all human existence. Our duty is to recognize those impediments to proper judicial performance and, as far as is humanly possible, to act outside their influence. By and large our judges meet and exceed that expectation. If, from time to time, one of our number makes an error in judgment in his or her personal life, accepts due punishment, learns from that experience and is permitted to continue as a judicial officer, I do not believe the public's confidence in the integrity and independence of our institution will be shaken. Indeed it may be strengthened by the notion of the proportionality of the punishment assessed. JUDGE ROSEMARIE R. WILLIAMS, : O R D E R A Judge of the Superior Court : of the State of New Jersey. : This matter having come before the Court on a presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, and respondent having been Ordered to Show Cause why she should not be disciplined, and good cause appearing; IT IS ORDERED that JUDGE ROSEMARIE R. WILLIAMS is hereby suspended from the performance of her judicial duties, without pay, for three months, effective August 13, 2001, through November 12, 2001; and it is further ORDERED that respondent shall continue to receive psychological counseling until the further Order of the Court. /s/ Stephen W. Townsend Clerk of the Supreme Court NO. D-73 IN THE MATTER OF JUDGE ROSEMARIE R. WILLIAMS, A JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. Decided July 31, 2001 Order returnable February 13, 2001 Opinion by Chief Justice Poritz Dissenting Opinion by Justice Long