Title: Mintle v. Mintle

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mintle v. Mintle1988 WY 135764 P.2d 255Case Number: 88-90Decided: 11/08/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT MARK MINTLE, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),
v.
TERESA REA MINTLE, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).
Appeal from the District Court, 
NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.
Robert T. Moxley of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.
William W. Harden of Harden, Harden & Peek, Casper, for appellee. 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
GOLDEN, Justice.
[¶1.]     Appellant 
Robert Mark Mintle (husband) appeals a divorce decree entered on January 6, 
1987. In the decree the trial court granted custody of the two Mintle daughters 
to appellee Teresa Rea Mintle (wife) and ordered husband to pay $350 child 
support per month and wife's attorney's fees. Husband raises essentially four 
issues all asserting an abuse of trial court discretion. Considering his 
arguments, we review two evidentiary rulings, the grant of custody to wife, the 
amount of child support ordered, and the award of attorney's fees to wife.
[¶2.]     We 
affirm.
[¶3.]     The 
parties were married in Casper, Wyoming, on September 2, 1977. The same year, 
on June 27, they had their first daughter, Brenda Lee Mintle. Their second 
daughter, Christine Lynn Mintle, was born on September 10, 1978. By 1987, the 
parties were at odds. Their bad relations culminated on July 9, 1987, when 
husband filed a complaint seeking divorce and custody of the two children.
[¶4.]     The case 
was tried as a bench trial on December 14, 1987. Husband called wife as an 
adverse witness. Wife testified about her care and discipline of the children 
and about various events that took place during the pendency of the divorce 
action. Much of her testimony involved the parties' disagreements over husband's 
visitation of the children during that time.
[¶5.]     Husband 
also testified about these events, refreshing his memory from his diary. This 
diary was not offered into evidence at trial. Concerning his income, husband 
testified that his present job paid $240 per week, but that he did not always 
get to work a full week. He estimated the job would last through 1988. Husband 
testified that he expected independent income from other work, and he thought he 
could sell roughly thirty cords of firewood during the winter for $75 per cord. 
During the summer he contracted various landscaping jobs. Husband testified he 
had turned down offers of employment received since his last energy-related job 
in 1985. When asked about his debts, he listed day-to-day living expenses, a 
house payment, and a debt of $1,300. He also admitted to having withdrawn 
approximately $5,000 from each of two family bank accounts established for the 
children. These withdrawals took place before husband filed his complaint for 
divorce, and wife was never given access to those funds.
[¶6.]     The trial 
court also heard in camera testimony from the two Mintle daughters. Both 
children stated a preference for living with their mother.
[¶7.]     Toward 
the conclusion of husband's testimony, the trial court suggested that both 
parties submit a written summary of their additional evidence and arguments for 
a final determination. This was done in lieu of an additional hearing, and both 
parties agreed to this arrangement. The parties submitted their summaries, 
arguments, and supporting materials over the following two weeks. In her 
submission wife included two affidavits supporting her request for attorney's 
fees.
[¶8.]     The trial 
court filed its decision letter on December 16, 1987, and a corresponding 
divorce decree on January 6, 1988. In the decree, the trial court awarded 
custody to wife, ordered husband to pay $350 child support per month, set out 
specific visitation instructions, and awarded wife attorney's fees of $2,537.50. 
Husband appeals the decree.
[¶9.]     Husband 
first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, on relevancy 
grounds, it sustained wife's objections to husband's direct examination of wife, 
and husband's direct examination of wife's neighbor, Donna Boyd, concerning 
wife's alleged plan to abscond with the two children. Wife's first objection, 
during husband's direct examination of wife, occurred when husband's counsel 
referred to wife's deposition testimony about her alleged plan to take the 
children with her out of state. Rather than repeat her earlier denial of such a 
plan, wife answered that at one point she had planned to do that but had changed 
her mind. Husband's counsel next asked about the timing of her change of mind. 
That question drew a relevancy objection from wife's counsel. Although proposing 
to make an offer of proof, husband's counsel did not; instead, he argued that 
his line of questioning went to wife's credibility.
[¶10.]   Wife's second 
objection occurred during husband's direct examination of wife's neighbor, Donna 
Boyd. Husband's counsel asked Donna Boyd about her knowledge that wife was 
planning to leave husband. Specifically, he asked Donna Boyd about the substance 
of a conversation she allegedly had with wife in July 1987. Wife's counsel 
objected to the relevancy of the question. The trial court sustained the 
objection and allowed husband's counsel to make an offer of proof, which 
included arguments that Donna Boyd's testimony was admissible to challenge 
wife's credibility about planning to leave with the children and to challenge 
her fitness as a potential custodial parent to fulfill duties to afford 
visitation between the father and his children and to promote the father-child 
relationship.
[¶11.]   Evidentiary rulings 
are within the sound discretion of the trial court; we defer to them absent an 
appellant's clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1985). "Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). Applying these standards, we hold 
the trial court erred by sustaining wife's objections to husband's questions of 
wife and Donna Boyd.
[¶12.]   Concerning wife's 
objections to husband's questions of her, the trial court should have allowed 
husband's counsel to challenge wife's credibility. In her deposition she 
testified that she did not plan to leave with the children. At trial she 
testified that she did plan to leave with the children at one time, but changed 
her mind. The trial court did not permit enough questioning to explain the 
apparent change in wife's testimony. Husband should have been allowed to pursue 
that perceived inconsistency.
[¶13.]   We also disagree 
with the trial court's ruling on the relevancy objection to wife's testimony. 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a 
material fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." (Emphasis 
added.) W.R.E. 401. In a divorce case involving custody of children, W.S. 
20-2-113(a) (June 1987 Repl.) directs the trial court to "consider the relative 
competency of both parents * * *." (Emphasis added.) One aspect of a person's 
relative competency and fitness as a parent has to be his or her willingness to 
allow the non-custodial parent to visit the children and maintain a 
parental-child relationship. Alfieri v. Alfieri, 105 N.M. 373, 733 P.2d 4, 10 
(1987). Cf., Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963). Thus, a 
party's fitness as a parent is a material fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the custody question. Id. Evidence that a custodial parent has 
taken children from a jurisdiction and thereby denied the other parent 
visitation can be grounds for modification of a custody decree. Id. 733 P.2d  at 11. See 
generally Annotation, Interference By Custodian of Child With Noncustodial 
Parent's Visitation Rights as Ground for Change of Custody, 28 A.L.R.4th 9, § 6 
(1984 & Supp. 1987). In the same sense, evidence that a parent planned to 
abscond with children who are the subject of a pending custody battle, and 
thereby deny the other parent visitation, is relevant to an initial custody 
determination under W.S. 20-2-113(a) (June 1987 Repl.). The trial court did not 
have to believe that wife planned to leave with the children in an effort to 
deny husband visitation, but husband's evidence on that issue was relevant.
[¶14.]   Testimony Donna Boyd 
might have given about wife's alleged plan was similarly relevant and should 
have been allowed by the trial court. Donna Boyd's conversations with wife1 
about the alleged plan to leave with the children were also admissible as proof 
of a specific instance of wife's conduct offered to prove her lack of character 
as a competent custodial parent. In a divorce action involving custody of 
children, each party's fitness as a parent is an essential element of the claim 
involved. 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 69.1 at 1457. See also W.S. 20-2-113(a) 
(June 1987 Repl.) When a person's character is an essential element of the claim 
involved, proof of that character may be made by specific instances of conduct. 
W.R.E. 405(b). See also Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So. 2d 416, 419 (Ala. 1982); and 
1A Wigmore, supra. Donna Boyd's testimony would have been admissible under 
W.R.E. 405.
[¶15.]   Having identified 
these two incorrect trial court rulings, husband must show that these rulings 
constituted prejudicial error. The trial court's incorrect rulings must 
adversely affect his substantial rights so that, without them, a reasonable 
possibility exists of a custody decision more favorable to him. W.R.A.P. 7.04; 
and Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Wyo. 1987) (citing ABC Builders, 
Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 935 (Wyo. 1981)).
[¶16.]   Husband did not make 
that showing on this issue. Although the trial court did not hear more from 
wife's counsel about the inconsistency between her deposition testimony and her 
trial testimony, it did hear enough to know that an inconsistency might exist. 
It was also well aware of husband's assertion that wife had planned to abscond 
with the children at one time based on the questions that were allowed. Although 
relevant and admissible, Donna Boyd's testimony about wife's alleged plan would 
have been cumulative. See Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo. 1987). 
Despite the trial court's errors, husband has not shown prejudice to a 
substantial right illustrating a reasonable possibility that including the 
evidence would have changed the outcome. The errors were harmless and will not 
support a reversal.
[¶17.]   Husband next 
challenges the trial court's grant of custody to wife and the amount of child 
support he is ordered to pay. We review a trial court's findings and conclusions 
in that regard as an exercise of its sound discretion; we will defer to them 
unless they are clearly abusive. Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 345 (Wyo. 1986). 
See also Martin, 720 P.2d  at 897.
[¶18.]   The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by granting custody to wife based on the evidence 
presented. Husband's argument that the trial was unfair because it ended before 
he rested is not reflected by the transcript of that proceeding. Husband was 
concluding his direct testimony and then both parties agreed to submit the 
remainder of their cases and arguments to the court in writing. The trial court 
considered the evidence submitted by both parties representing their conduct as 
parents and concluded that the children's best interests would be served by 
granting custody to wife. We find no abuse of discretion in that decision.
[¶19.]   Likewise, the $350 
child support per month award was not arbitrary or capricious. Husband testified 
that he had steady monthly income plus income from the sale of firewood in the 
winter and landscaping jobs in the summer. He also admitted that he turned down 
other employment in recent years. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in setting the amount of child support at $350 per month.
[¶20.]   Husband's final 
challenge concerns the attorney's fees awarded to wife. In divorce cases, the 
award of attorney's fees is considered a part of the property division and will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court abused 
its discretion. Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1162 (Wyo. 1982). See also 
Martin, 720 P.2d  at 897. Husband testified on cross-examination that he withdrew 
a substantial amount of money from two family bank accounts established for the 
children before he filed his complaint. Considering this evidence along with 
husband's relative financial condition and wife's affidavits of attorney's fees, 
we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding her 
attorney's fees.
[¶21.]   AFFIRMED.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
FOOTNOTES

1 
No hearsay problem arose with any testimony from Donna Boyd about what wife had 
told her. As husband's witness, Donna Boyd could have related her conversations 
with wife as admissions of a party opponent under W.R.E. 801(d)(2).
THOMAS, Justice, concurring.
[¶22.]   I certainly agree 
that the judgment in this case should be affirmed. I am not so critical of the 
evidentiary ruling of the district judge with respect to the effort to 
cross-examine the wife and introduce the testimony of the neighbor. The record 
discloses rather clearly that the wife advised the court that she had considered 
a plan to move the children with her out of the state. To the extent that her 
testimony contradicted her deposition testimony, she was impeached, and the 
court was aware of that. Given the tenor of her answer, i.e., that she had 
considered such a plan but had abandoned it, the additional relevancy is minimal 
indeed. The court was advised of her consideration of the plan and the 
inconsistency with her deposition, and that was adequate under the 
circumstances. Consequently, I would not find the ruling excluding this 
testimony to be erroneous either with respect to impeachment or its independent 
relevancy. It need not be justified as harmless error because there was no 
error.
URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting.
[¶23.]   I disagree with the 
reasoning of the majority on both fact and principle. Again, we are faced with 
the issue causing the greatest divorce case strife involving excessiveness of 
court ordered child support where the present capacity to pay is not clearly or 
factually shown. The record does project, conversely, that the trial court based 
the child support award on appellant's previous salary during better economic 
times in Wyoming. This mistake was not made just once, but twice with the denial 
of the motion for new trial also grounded on excessiveness of the child support 
award. See Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 431 (Wyo. 1985), where the denial 
of such motion in addition to the initial child custody decree was considered on 
appeal. This issue takes on greater significance because of the present economic 
distress of Wyoming, and I reject the majority's gloss on moral grounds as well 
as its disregard for Wyoming precedent. The current loss of population in 
Casper, which is the residence of these parties, is mute evidence of the bygone 
halcyon days of high employment and higher wages.
[¶24.]   This court's 
function for analysis of exercised discretion of the trial court is to determine 
if the amount of the child support, when all the surrounding circumstances are 
considered, is based on what the parent can reasonably be expected to pay, which 
means now, not in prior years when the state was blessed with high 
prosperity.
[I]t is imprudent to contend that, when the 
question involves support payments, the matter should be decided without 
consideration of the paying parent's ability to pay, the recipient's spending 
habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. Redman v. Redman, Wyo., 521 P.2d 584, 587 (1974). See also, § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977. This court in Redman 
agreed with the proposition that a child support order may not accurately 
reflect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent can 
reasonably be expected to pay. The circumstances of the parents are recognized 
by our controlling statute as well. Even in unbroken homes a child's monetary 
needs must be limited by the parents' income. Child support cannot be determined 
in a vacuum. If a child's wants and needs were to be the sole criterion, then 
child support may have to fall upon the state since few parents are able to 
raise their children without having to make do with what they have.
Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis added and 
footnote omitted). The majority concludes in a bland fashion that there was no 
abuse of that discretion because the child support award was not arbitrary or 
capricious. I find fault with such a short hand method of justice which does not 
even analyze this issue in relation to what the parent could reasonably be 
expected to pay at this time.1 
I would reject the expediency portrayed when the decisional process looks only 
superficially to appellant's income in relation to the child support and 
disregards other surrounding circumstances such as the property settlement, 
attorney fees, the childrens' medical expenses, in addition to appellant's own 
day-to-day living expenses. See W.S. 20-2-114 (which mandates that property 
division be based inter alia on "the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children") (emphasis added); 9A Uniform Laws 
Annotated, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 309 at 400 (1987) (which 
specifically looks to "the financial resources and needs of the non-custodial 
parent") and 2 J. McCahey, Valuation & Distribution of Marital Property §§ 
41.04[2] and 41.06[7] (1988) (concluding that the amount of the property 
settlement and alimony must be considered as part of the parent's financial 
resources for setting child support).2

[¶25.]   This case does not 
amount to a simple equation of a father with steady income paying $350 child 
support. The testimony at the time of trial on December 4, 1987 revealed that 
appellant's employment of cutting and burning beetle killed timber was only when 
the weather permitted and with a short indefinite future.3 
The income from the landscaping was greatly varied, with one job bringing in 
only $30. Consequently, when one contrasts the lean present income of appellant 
with the court imposed responsibilities of $350 per month child support, $475 a 
month until $5,000 was paid to equalize the property division, the payment of 
appellee's attorney's fee of $2,537.50, and half of the childrens' medical 
expenses, in addition to his own living expenses, one must find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding the child support figure which 
represented approximately 72% of appellant's monthly income. Moreover, this 
conclusion is further borne out by the testimony presented that appellant could 
not financially stay afloat when paying the lesser amount of $250 per month 
child support during the divorce process.4

[¶26.]   Realistically, a 
proper analysis of all the surrounding circumstances should not look to past 
earnings in a different economic climate. There was much testimony before the 
trial court that appellant had worked for Exxon in the boom years as an 
underground uranium miner and had earned a good wage and received bonuses when 
the employment ended. However, bonuses from a past time should not be figured 
into the amount of income for setting child support unless there is "evidence 
indicating any resumption of a bonus plan or any substitute arrangement 
providing additional income * * *." Petersen v. Petersen, 208 Neb. 1, 301 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1981). There was no evidence of any present bonus plan and, in fact, 
the testimony indicated appellant had no present steady income. Actually, as is 
commonly known and could be judicially noticed, the Exxon mining operation no 
longer exists in Wyoming.
[¶27.]   At the crux of 
appellee's argument and perhaps at the back of the trial court's mind was that 
appellant was intentionally bringing his income to an artificial low to avoid 
paying child support. Moreover, the majority now seems mesmerized by the 
perception that possibly appellant may have turned down other employment in 
recent years, at the expense of his children. Wyoming does impose a good faith 
obligation on a non-custodial parent to provide support.
A duty to pay child support is 
not satisfied merely by showing limited income. One obligated to support his 
child has a duty to make a good faith effort to generate enough income to 
discharge that obligation.
Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 675 (Wyo. 1985). However, there was no 
finding that appellant did not act in good faith to earn more.5 
Further, testimony disclosed that there were few job offers, and that appellant 
had no prospects which would cause his economic situation to improve. Without 
that specific finding as sustainable by a record demonstrating that appellant 
intentionally, deliberately, or in bad faith was failing to generate the income, 
I cannot condone a practice which penalizes an individual caught in bad economic 
times by requiring him to pay an amount in excess of what he can.
[¶28.]   While appellant may 
have a greater earning capacity when high paying jobs are again available, the 
trial court should award support based on current income, even if it is less 
than previous earnings.6 
If appellant secures a job which increases his income, a modification of child 
support can also be secured. Woodward v. Woodward, 428 P.2d 389, 390 (Wyo. 
1967). Appellee is not left without remedial opportunity. At this time, however, 
"[a] party's ability to pay must be evaluated with regard to the party's 
resources at the time of hearing." In Re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 96 
Ill.Dec. 69, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986) (citing Elizer v. Elizer, 36 Ill. 
App.3d 552, 555, 344 N.E.2d 493 (1976)).
[¶29.]   In observing what 
may be considered as a tunnel vision focus on the parent's past income to award 
child support, I find an abuse of discretion in setting the child support award 
above what appellant can reasonably be expected to pay, and would remand the 
matter to the trial court.
[¶30.]   That abuse of 
discretion does not denote misplaced intent, but rather results when the 
untenable decision "unfairly depriv[es] a litigant of a substantial right and 
den[ies] a just result * * *." Wachtel By and Through Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. 
392, 427 N.W.2d 56, 64 (1988). That is this case, and consequently, I 
respectfully dissent.
FOOTNOTES

1 
It bears repeating, although previously stated by this writer and many others, 
that "there is an intractable law of economics that persons do not pay more than 
they can (unless they rob a bank, etc.)."

2 
A career of experience in marital relations general practice engenders a second 
axiom of ex-husband behavior. "If he reasonably can pay, he will, but when faced 
with an order beyond his means, he will ordinarily pay nothing much of the 
time."

3 
The exchange went as follows:
Q. Is there a way to know whether or not this 
employment will last?
A. Yes, they have a $60,000. budget.
Q. And so do you have any idea how long it will 
last?
A. Through this year and possibly next year, I 
mean through the winter this year into '88 until the snow goes off and then next 
-
Q. You weren't talking about this calender 
year.

4 
Cf. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 664 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. App. 1984) (where the court 
reversed a child support award finding a complete lack of an evidentiary basis 
as to the father's ability to pay) and Olson v. Olson, 175 Mont. 444, 574 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1978) (where the court found the imposition of "an obligation to pay 
child support without any evidence of an ability to pay" unwarranted).

5 
For other state's approaches to intentional depression of income, see: Philbin 
v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411-12 (1971) (where ability 
to pay rather than current income could be considered only when there was a 
deliberate or intentional attempt to shirk his family financial 
responsibilities); Travis v. Travis, 19 Mich. App. 128, 172 N.W.2d 491 (1969) 
(where past earnings could be considered when the father was content to work 
part time without any explanation for not pursuing a full time livelihood); 
Boyer v. Boyer, 567 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1978) (where income from possible 
best efforts of parent could be imputed when it was shown he voluntarily 
declined to work); Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. App. 1965) (where former 
earnings were considered as well as present ones when the father voluntarily 
reduced his income shortly before trial); Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1976) (where past income was not considered if honesty and good 
faith were present); and Annotation, Excessiveness Or Adequacy Of Money Awarded 
As Child Support, 27 A.L.R.4th 864 (1984).

6 
Perhaps another economic fact of the past eight years is not always perceived. 
The wage scale for blue collar employment nearly anywhere in this country has 
generally sustained severe deflationary reduction, while new employment for 
manually related occupations commands a singularly reduced hourly rate.