Title: SWENSON v BUFFALO BLDG CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-280 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 OSCAR A. SWENSON, M.D.; RICHARD A. NELSON, M.D.; ABC COLLECTORS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, BUFFALO BUILDING CO., a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead. Honorable James Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Warden, Christiansen & Johnson, Kalispell, Montana Merritt C. Warden argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: E. Euqene At.herton argued and Jim Moore 'argued, Kalispell, Montana Morrison Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Frank Morrison Sr. argued, Missoula, Montana McGarvey, Lence and Heberling, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: June 16, 1981 Decided: September 28, 1981 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Buffalo Building Company (Buffalo) appeals from t h e jury v e r d i c t and judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, The i s s u e s c e n t e r on t h e Uniform Building F i r e and Safety codes of K a l i s p e l l . Buffalo p r e s e n t s t h e following i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Defendant B u f f a l o ' s main i s s u e i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly denied i t s motion t o r e t r a c t c e r t a i n admissions regarding t h e e f f e c t and v a l i d i t y of uniform building, f i r e , and s a f e t y codes purportedly adopted by t h e C i t y of K a l i s p e l l , t h e motion t o r e t r a c t having been made two work days before t r i a l . 2. To show t h a t such d e n i a l c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r Buffalo presents t h e i s s u e whether c i t i e s had t h e power t o adopt t e c h n i c a l codes by reference p r i o r t o 1967, when t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e passed a b i l l s p e c i f i c a l l y giving t o c i t i e s such power. Included a s subissues a r e : a . Did the t r i a l c o u r t properly deny B u f f a l o ' s motion i n limine t o exclude mention of t h e t e c h n i c a l codes, and properly g r a n t t e n a n t s ' motion i n limine t o prevent Buffalo from contesting t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e codes? b. Were e x h i b i t s concerning t h e codes properly received i n t o evidence? c . Was the jury properly i n s t r u c t e d a s t o the a p p l i c a b i l i t y and e f f e c t s of t h e codes? 3. Buffalo argues t h a t t h e codes were i r r e l e v a n t i n any event under t h e i r own t e r m s . 4. Buffalo a s s e r t s t h a t c e r t a i n of i t s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning landlord/tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p s should have been given and c e r t a i n of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s should n o t have been given. 5. ~ u f f a l o c i t e s a s e r r o r t h e awarding of prejudgment i n t e r e s t , and of c o s t s f o r telephone charges, photocopies, e x h i b i t s and s u p p l i e s , c o n s u l t a n t f e e s , and witness f e e s t o t h e tenants. W e a f f i r m t h e lower c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of Buffalo's motion t o r e t r a c t t h e admissions. Therefore, w e need n o t d i s c u s s i s s u e no. 2 o r i t s t h r e e subissues. Many of the i n s t r u c - t i o n s which Buffalo c i t e s a s e r r o r a l s o need n o t be addressed because they involved provisions of t h e technical codes. W e a f f i r m the awarding of c o s t s , b u t w e r e v e r s e the award of prejudgment i n t e r e s t . Buffalo purchased an o l d e r building i n K a l i s p e l l i n 1956, renovated it, and rented it o u t a s commercial and o f f i c e space. The p l a i n t i f f s were a l l s e p a r a t e tenants i n t h e building. I n 1976, t h e building caught f i r e and was t o t a l l y destroyed, t h e f i r e apparently caused by t h e a c t s and nature of work of another tenant, t h e Flathead Dental Laboratory. Two s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s w e r e brought, on June 2 0 , 1978, and September 6, 1978, which w e r e eventually consolidated i n t o t h i s case. The tenants a l l e g e d negligence by Buffalo i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t a l l adequate f i r e p r o t e c t i o n m a t e r i a l s i n t o t h e building, and negligence per -- se i n f a i l i n g t o f u l l y comply with c i t y building, f i r e and s a f e t y code s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . Buffalo denied a l l a l l e g a t i o n s . The codes involved h e r e a r e t h e 1946 and 1973 Uniform Building Codes, t h e 1973 L i f e Safety Code, and t h e 1970 F i r e Prevention Code. The tenants sought t o e s t a b l i s h c e r t a i n elements of t h e i r case during discovery through t h e use of r e q u e s t s f o r admissions, pursuant t o Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P. Section 104(b) of t h e uniform Building Code, 1946 Edition, provides t h a t i f the c o s t of a l t e r a t i o n s t o an o l d e r building i n any one year exceeds 50 percent of t h e value of t h e building i t s e l f , t h e building s h a l l be made t o conform t o the requirements f o r new buildings. The tenants requested Buffalo t o admit t h a t t h e c o s t of r e p a i r s and remodeling i n t h e year of purchase had exceeded 50 percent of t h e b u i l d i n g ' s value. The r e q u e s t f o r admission was dated May 9, 1979. Buffalo admitted t h e a l l e g a t i o n by d e f a u l t a s provided by Rule 3 6 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. : " . . . . The matter i s admitted unless, within 30 days a f t e r s e r v i c e of t h e r e q u e s t . . . t h e p a r t y t o whom t h e r e q u e s t i s d i r e c t e d serves upon t h e p a r t y requesting t h e admission a w r i t t e n answer o r o b j e c t i o n addressed t o the matter, signed by t h e p a r t y o r by h i s a t t o r n e y . . ." The admission by d e f a u l t was n o t mere o v e r s i g h t by counsel f o r Buffalo; t e n a n t s ' counsel wrote t o Buffalo's counsel on June 13, 1979, t o i n q u i r e about t h e s t a t u s of t h e r e q u e s t f o r admissions, and Buffalo's counsel responded, by l e t t e r dated June 18, 1979, "I have n o t f e l t t h a t it w a s necessary t o prepare a formal r e p l y t o your Request f o r Admissions dated May 9, 1979, f o r t h e reason t h a t under Provisions of Rule 36, those matters w e r e deemed automatically admitted i n t h e absence of a d e n i a l o r o t h e r response." The D i s t r i c t Court scheduled t r i a l f o r October 9, 1979, and a p r e t r i a l conference f o r August 29. The t e n a n t s prepared a p r e t r i a l order, which was signed by t h e d i s t r i c t judge and by a l l p a r t i e s on August 15. Buffalo a s s e r t s t h a t t h e p r e t r i a l order was never adopted by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The order was signed by t h e judge and it was entered i n t h e docket, although it apparently w a s never f i l e d , as t h e o r i g i n a l i s n o t contained i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e ( t h e tenants in- clude a copy of t h e p r e t r i a l order i n t h e separate appendix t o t h e i r b r i e f ) . The tenants itemized 30 alleged v i o l a t i o n s of t h e uniform codes i n t h e " P l a i n t i f f ' s Contentions" portion of t h e p r e t r i a l order. I t i s clear, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Buffalo was aware of t h e b a s i s f o r t h e t e n a n t s ' claim of negligence p e r se. The order a l s o contained 31 r e q u e s t s f o r admissions, -- t h e most c r u c i a l of which a r e a s follows: "9. That K a l i s p e l l C i t y ordinance #515 was duly adopted by t h e City Council of K a l i s p e l l on Sep- tember 3, 1946 and was i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t a t t h e time of t h e purchase of s a i d building by t h e Defendant Buffalo Building Company, and a t a l l times during t h e a l t e r a t i o n of s a i d building by s a i d company during t h e year 1956. "10. That t h e Uniform Building Code, a s adopted and published by t h e P a c i f i c Coast Building Offi- c i a l s Conference, on January 1, 1946 i s t h a t iden- t i f i e d marked E x h i b i t A and a t t h e time of t h e p r e - t r i a l conference, placed i n t h e custody of t h e Court. That such code i s t h a t r e f e r r e d t o i n Ordi- nance #515 a s aforementioned." On t h e same day t h a t t h e p r e t r i a l order was signed, August 15, Buffalo moved t h e c o u r t f o r an order permitting it t o withdraw i t s previous admission regarding t h e value of t h e building and of improvements made t h e r e i n ( t h e admissions dated May 9 ) . Buffalo sought t o revoke i t s former admission f o r t h e reason t h a t it had "mistakenly and i n a d v e r t e n t l y f a i l e d t o analyze t h e wording contained" i n t h e f i r s t request. Leave t o revoke t h e admission was granted by t h e c o u r t over o b j e c t i o n by the tenants. The tenants then requested a six- month continuance of t r i a l " r e l u c t a n t l y " , because they were now "faced with t h e n e c e s s i t y of independently proving" t h e values of t h e building and r e p a i r work. T r i a l was reset f o r A p r i l 1 4 , 1980. Buffalo f i l e d i t s responses t o t h e r e q u e s t s f o r admissions contained i n the p r e t r i a l order on August 27, 1979. Requests 9 and 1 0 set f o r t h above, and o t h e r , s i m i l a r requests, were s p e c i f i c a l l y admitted. Three months p r i o r t o t r i a l t h e t e n a n t s moved f o r summary judgment based upon a l l of B u f f a l o ' s admissions. Buffalo opposed t h e motion, arguing i n i t s b r i e f , f o r t h e f i r s t time, t h a t it had never admitted t h e c i t y t e c h n i c a l codes were p e r t i n e n t o r applicable o r had been v a l i d l y adopted by t h e c i t y council. The c o u r t then ordered counsel t o prepare an amended p r e t r i a l o r d e r , s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t i n g Buffalo t o include i n t h e amended order i t s contentions and p o s i t i o n on nonapplicability of t h e various codes and t h e s p e c i f i c reasons f o r such nonapplicability. Neither p a r t y ever prepared an amended p r e t r i a l order. Buffalo argues t h a t it was p l a i n t i f f s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o prepare a l l p r e t r i a l orders. Two work days p r i o r t o t r i a l , Buffalo moved t o revoke i t s admissions contained i n t h e p r e t r i a l order f o r t h e reason t h a t the c i t y technical codes had never been v a l i d l y adopted and thus, any admissions based thereon were i n c o r r e c t and n o t p e r t i n e n t . A hearing was held where Buffalo argued t h a t c i t i e s had been granted no power by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o adopt a t e c h n i c a l code by refence i n 1946, any such adoption was a void a c t , and no evidence concerning t h e codes should be received a t t r i a l . B u f f a l o ' s reason f o r requesting leave t o amend t h i s t i m e : "[Counsel f o r Buffalo] assumed t h a t counsel f o r P l a i n t i f f s had i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e a s s e r t i o n and honestly and c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d t h e f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n b u t [Counsel f o r ~ u f f a l o ] has now learned t h a t such was n o t the case and t h a t such a s s e r t i o n w a s i n c o r r e c t and f a l s e . " The c o u r t denied Buffalo's motion, s p e c i f i c a l l y f i n d i n g t h a t Buffalo had already delayed t r i a l once by r e t r a c t i n g an admission and t h a t i t s new motion went t o t h e very foundation of t h e tenants' case, was n o t timely made, would cause another lengthy delay, and would subvert t h e r u l e s of procedure and t h e o r d e r l y d i s p o s i t i o n of cases. Buffalo moved i n limine t o exclude a l l mention of t h e t e c h n i c a l codes a t t r i a l . The motion was denied. The t e n a n t s moved i n limine t o prevent Buffalo from arguing t h e i n v a l i d i t y of t h e codes a t t r i a l . That motion was granted. Jury t r i a l was held. The c o u r t received e x h i b i t s con- cerning t h e technical codes, and i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury on t h e codes' a p p l i c a b i l i t y and e f f e c t s . The jury returned a v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e tenants and judgment w a s entered. The c o u r t then received motions and heard argument on t h e awarding of c o s t s and prejudgment i n t e r e s t . Such i n t e r e s t was awarded t o one t e n a n t only. Buffalo appeals t h e d e n i a l of i t s motion t o revoke i t s admission, t h e conduct of t h e t r i a l , and t h e awarding of prejudgment i n t e r e s t and of c e r t a i n c o s t s . A p a r t y has no absolute r i g h t t o f i l e l a t e answers t o r e q u e s t s f o r admissions. The matter r e s t s within t h e d i s c r e - t i o n of the t r i a l c o u r t and w i l l n o t be disturbed i n t h e ab- sence of a manifest abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e of N.D. v. Newberger (1980), - Mont. - , 613 P.2d 1002, 1006, 37 St.Rep. 1119, 1 1 2 4 ; Morast v. Auble (1974), 164 Mont. 1 0 0 , 105, 519 P.2d 157, 159. The D i s t r i c t Court held a hearing on t h e defendant's motion on April 15, 1980. The c o u r t then found s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t r i a l had been set t o commence on A p r i l 16; t h a t previously t h e defendant had been granted a s i m i l a r motion t o amend responses t o requests f o r admissions, such order causing a lengthy delay i n t r i a l ; t h a t the defendants had f a i l e d t o timely a s s e r t t h e i r arguments concerning t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e t e c h n i c a l codes' adoption even though t h e c o u r t had requested t h a t such contentions be s e t f o r t h ; t h a t another lengthy delay would r e s u l t i f t h e new motion was t o be granted; and, t h a t the defendants f a i l e d t o provide the c o u r t with any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r overturning an admission which had been d e l i b e r a t e l y d r a f t e d by experienced counsel f o r t h e express purpose of l i m i t i n g and defining t h e i s s u e s . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e i s s u e s involved i n t h e case were complex andinvolved t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of e x p e r t witnesses from o u t of the regional a r e a ; t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s of t h e motion went t o the very foundation of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' case and had been r e l i e d on by t h e p l a i n t i f f s ; t h a t the motion was due t o i n s u f f i c i e n t and untimely i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e i s s u e s and f a c t s by the defendants; and, t h a t t h e r u l e s of procedure and o r d e r l y d i s p o s i t i o n of cases would be subverted by allowing t h e r e t r a c t i o n s and amendments. The defendants' motion was denied. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t manifestly abuse i t s d i s c r e - t i o n i n denying t h e motion. The f i n d i n g s a r e supported by t h e record, and do provide a base f o r t h e conclusions. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e conclusions properly apply t h e law. Delay i t s e l f i s i n c r e a s i n g l y recognized by c o u r t s a s a problem. A s t h i s Court noted i n t h e r e c e n t case of Owen v. Mont. F. A. Buttrey Co. (19811, - - , 627 P.2d 1233, 1235, 38 St.Rep. 714, 717: "Crowded dockets have l e d more and more c o u r t s t o overcome . . . [ t h e i r ] reluctance and reem- phasize t h e j u d i c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e public. Note, Rule 1, M.R.Civ.P., providing t h a t t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure be i n t e r p r e t e d t o 'secure t h e j u s t , speedy and inexpensive determination of every a c t i o n . ' This Court recognizes t h a t a predisposi- t i o n toward discovery sanctions, wherein we would r e s o l v e doubts about c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s and t h e purpose of our procedural r u l e s i n favor of r e - s t r a i n t , may be i n c r e a s i n g l y inappropriate given t h e compelling need t o maintain e f f i c i e n t and f a i r j u d i c i a l administration. " Owen involved imposition of sanctions f o r delay during discovery, b u t t h e same concerns apply i n t h i s case, p a r t i c u l a r l y because Buffalo had previously r e t r a c t e d an admission of f a c t , and had forced t h e tenants t o r e q u e s t a postponement of t r i a l i n order t o acquire new proof. To t h e same e f f e c t i s Calaway v. Jones (1981), - Mont. , 624 P.2d 991, 38 St.Rep. 340, where delay caused by a p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o appear a t p r e t r i a l conference, together with h i s general unresponsive- ness during discovery was found s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y e n t r y of d e f a u l t judgment. W e a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s action. The d e n i a l was within t h e bounds of the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . Because of our holding on t h i s i s s u e , w e do n o t need t o address defendants' i s s u e s regarding e r r o r i n t h e motions i n limine, t h e majority of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury, t h e introduction of t h e technical codes i n t o evidence, o r t h e i s s u e whether t h e codes w e r e properly and v a l i d l y adopted by t h e K a l i s p e l l C i t y Council. The e f f e c t of t h e admissions was t o conclusively e s t a b l i s h t h e matters admitted. Rule 36 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. Buffalo argues t h a t t h e technical codes should have been excluded a s i r r e l e v a n t under t h e i r own t e r m s . The jury was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e Uniform Building Code, 1946 Edition, was i n f o r c e and e f f e c t when t h e building was pur- chased and renovated, and the code included t h e following pro- vision: "Any building o r s t r u c t u r e which i s enlarged, a l t e r e d , r a i s e d , r e p a i r e d o r b u i l t upon t o an e x t e n t exceeding expenditure within any f i v e year period of 20 percent of t h e value of the building o r s t r u c t u r e , s h a l l be made t o comply with a l l t h e requirements f o r f i r e r e s i s t a n c e of a new building o r s t r u c t u r e e r e c t e d i n F i r e Zone 1. " Section 1 6 0 2 (d) . (Emphasis added. ) - There was testimony t h a t r e p a i r s t o t h e building had been made i n 1956 a t a c o s t of $205,000. The building i t s e l f was valued a t $450,000 t o $500,000. Therefore, t h e code d i d apply. Buffalo f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e r e was no evidence i n t h e record t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the building was located i n any " F i r e Zone 1." However, t h a t was one of t h e f a c t s Buffalo admitted i n the p r e t r i a l order (Request f o r Admission # 1 2 and answer t h e r e t o dated August 27, 1979.) That was one of t h e admissions which Buffalo moved t o amend on the eve of t r i a l , which motion was denied by t h e court. A s discussed previously, the admission conclusively e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t f a c t f o r t h e purpose of t r i a l . The code was properly admitted. Buffalo a l s o argues t h a t the o t h e r t e c h n i c a l codes were i r r e l e v a n t and t h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n caused p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . The p l a i n t i f f s provided an e x p e r t witness a t t r i a l t o e s t a b l i s h t h e relevancy of t h e t e c h n i c a l codes. That w i t n e s s had extensive experience with t h e content and a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e codes. H i s testimony was uncontradicted by any o t h e r evidence o r testimony. There was s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n t h e record f o r t h e i s s u e of t h e codes' a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o go t o t h e jury. The codes w e r e properly received i n t o evidence. 111. Buffalo argues t h a t t h e records of t h e K a l i s p e l l F i r e Department ( P l a i n t i f f s ' Exhibit # 2 7 ) , m a t e r i a l s from t h e in- v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e f i r e , c o n s t i t u t e d hearsay and should have been excluded a s a whole. Again, however, Buffalo had s t i p u l a t e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l order, under Section "E: ~ d m i s s i o n of F a c t s and Documents Requiring N o Foundation o r proof" a s follows: "1. Report of t h e K a l i s p e l l F i r e Department of t h e f i r e of September 2 2 , 1976, together with a l l p i c t u r e s and e x h i b i t s attached t o t h e r e p o r t . " Because, i n th$ p r e t r i a l order dated August 15, 1980, Buffalo agreed t o the admission of those records a s r e q u i r i n g no found- a t i o n o r proof, Buffalo's objection t o t h e r e p o r t a s hearsay was properly denied. IV. Buffalo a l l e g e s t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n giving one of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s , dealing with concurrent negligence, and a l s o e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o give ten of B u f f a l o ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e f i n d no e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s ' i n s t r u c t i o n no. 7 was a s follows: "There may be more than one proximate cause of an i n j u r y . When negligent conduct of two o r more persons c o n t r i b u t e s concurrently a s proximate causes of an i n j u r y , the conduct of each of s a i d persons i s a proximate cause of the i n j u r y r e g a r d l e s s of t h e e x t e n t t o which each c o n t r i b u t e s t o the i n j u r y . A cause i s concurrent i f it was o p e r a t i v e a t t h e moment of i n j u r y and acted with another cause t o produce t h e i n j u r y . I t i s no defense t h a t t h e negligent conduct of a person n o t joined a s a p a r t y was a l s o a proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y . " There was evidence brought o u t a t t r i a l t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e f i r e s t a r t e d i n t h e rooms leased t o the Flathead Dental Laboratory and t h a t it was negligent. The i n s t r u c t i o n i s f a i r l y designed t o m e e t an i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e r e p o r t s of t h e f i r e department. Buffalo c i t e s e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l i n g t o give its o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n nos. I, 2 , 3, 4 , 5, 6, 8, 9, 1 1 and 13. Nos. 1, 2 , 4 , 6, 1 1 and 13 a r e n o t presented with any c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y showing them t o be c o r r e c t statements of t h e law; Buffalo a l s o n e g l e c t s t o p o i n t t o evidence i n t h e record s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y giving t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The i n s t r u c t i o n s c i t e d a l l d e a l primarily with landlord/ tenant law and t h e d u t i e s owed thereunder. The jury was adequately i n s t r u c t e d on both common law negligence and negligence per s e t h e o r i e s . The o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e r e p e t i t i o n s and c o n f l i c t i n g , because they d i d not d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e two t h e o r i e s i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n . The giving of c o n f l i c t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s on a m a t e r i a l i s s u e has been held t o be re- v e r s i b l e e r r o r by t h i s Court. Bohrer v. Clark (1978), - Mont. , 590 P.2d 117, 124, 35 St.Rep. 1878, 1887. Also, r e p e t i t i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s s e t t i n g f o r t h a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s of law should be avoided. O'Brien v. Great Northern Railway Company (1965), 145 Mont. 13, 2 2 , 400 P.2d 634, 639, cert.den. (1967), 387 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 2034, 18 L.Ed.2d 974. The t r i a l c o u r t properly refused t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . Buffalo o b j e c t s t o t h e award of c e r t a i n c o s t s and of prejudgment i n t e r e s t t o one of t h e p l a i n t i f f s . The c o s t s t a t u t e i s s e c t i o n 25-10-201, MCA: "Costs generally allowable. A p a r t y t o whom c o s t s are awarded i n an a c t i o n i s e n t i t l e d t o include i n h i s b i l l of c o s t s h i s necessary disbursements, a s follows: " ( 1 ) t h e l e g a l f e e s of witnesses, including mileage, o r r e f e r e e s and o t h e r o f f i c e r s ; " ( 2 ) t h e expenses of taking depositions; " ( 3 ) t h e l e g a l f e e s f o r publication when publi- c a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d ; " ( 4 ) t h e l e g a l f e e s paid f o r f i l i n g and recording papers and c e r t i f i e d copies thereof n e c e s s a r i l y used i n t h e a c t i o n o r on the t r i a l ; " ( 5 ) t h e l e g a l f e e s paid stenographers f o r per diem o r f o r copies; " ( 6 ) t h e reasonable expenses of p r i n t i n g papers f o r a hearing when required by a r u l e of court; " ( 7 ) t h e reasonable expenses of making t r a n s c r i p t f o r t h e supreme c o u r t ; " ( 8 ) t h e reasonable expenses f o r making a map o r maps i f required and necessary t o be used on t r i a l o r hearing; and " (9) such o t h e r reasonable and necessary expenses as a r e taxable according t o t h e course and p r a c t i c e of t h e c o u r t o r by express provision of law." Buffalo o b j e c t s t o t h e award of c o s t s f o r telephone charges ($28.61), photocopy charges ($60.10) , e x h i b i t s , sup- p l i e s and photographs ($151.87), e x p e r t witness f e e s ($1500), witness f e e s i n excess of t e n d o l l a r s per day p l u s mileage ($1500), t i t l e company charges ($86.63) and miscellaneous charges ($6.25) . The p l a i n t i f f s submitted t h e i r memorandum of c o s t s on A p r i l 28, 1980. They were awarded everything except t h e "depositions and t r a n s c r i p t s " item, which was p u t a t $256.63, and t h e i r r e q u e s t s f o r witness f e e s were pared t o $1500 from $2,502.11 f o r e x p e r t f e e s and t o $1500 from $2,648.33 f o r o t h e r witness fees. The D i s t r i c t Court held a hearing on t h e motion t o tax c o s t s , a f t e r which it s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h e remaining items t o be reasonable and necessary c o s t s under s e c t i o n 25-10-201 (9), MCA. A v e r i f i e d memorandum of c o s t s and disbursements i s prima f a c i e evidence t h a t t h e i t e m s were n e c e s s a r i l y expended and a r e properly taxable, unless, a s a matter of l a w , they appear otherwise on t h e face. The burden of overcoming t h i s prima f a c i e case rests upon t h e adverse party. Gahagan v. Gugler (1935), 100 Mont. 599, 607, 52 P.2d 150, 154. Buffalo has f a i l e d t o c a r r y i t s burden of showing t h a t the i t e m s a r e n o t reasonable and necessary a s found by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Buffalo p a r t i c u l a r l y o b j e c t s t o t h e $1,500 award f o r "witness f e e s " , arguing t h a t it c l e a r l y exceeds t h e t e n d o l l a r s per day i n attendance plus mileage allowed by s e c t i o n 26-2-501, MCA. However, t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l judge on t h i s i t e m does n o t i n d i c a t e on what ground it i s based, t h e number of days t h a t t h e witnesses w e r e i n attendance, o r t h e amount of i n - s t a t e miles they traveled. Under t h i s condition, Buffalo's r a i s i n g of questions i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c a r r y i t s burden; "we cannot say whether t h e i t e m of witness f e e s was properly allowed and we must t h e r e f o r e s u s t a i n t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l judge . . ." Broberg v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1947), 120 Mont. 280, 303, 182 P.2d 851, 863. W e a f f i r m t h e award of c o s t s . One of the p l a i n t i f f s was awarded i n t e r e s t f o r her l o s s e s a s of the d a t e of t h e f i r e . Section 27-1-211, MCA, provides as follows: "Right t o i n t e r e s t . Every person who i s e n t i t l e d t o recover damages c e r t a i n o r capable of being made c e r t a i n by c a l c u l a t i o n and t h e r i g h t t o recover which i s vested i n him upon a p a r t i c u l a r day i s en- t i t l e d a l s o t o recover i n t e r e s t thereon from t h a t day except during such t i m e a s t h e debtor i s pre- vented by law o r by t h e a c t of t h e c r e d i t o r from paying the debt. " The D i s t r i c t Court awarded prejudgment i n t e r e s t upon motion of t h e p l a i n t i f f , a f t e r a hearing. The award was based on t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony regarding t h e property t h a t she l o s t i n t h e f i r e and the value of such property. A s s e t f o r t h i n t h e p r e t r i a l order, p l a i n t i f f claimed $43,917.15 f o r d e s t r u c t i o n of equipment, records, f u r n i t u r e and o t h e r personal property, together with l o s s of business p r o f i t s . A f t e r the testimony of witnesses as t o t h e value of t h e s e various i t e m s , t h e jury awarded t h e f l a t sum of $25,000. W e do n o t f i n d t h a t t h i s p l a i n t i f f has shown damages capable of being made c e r t a i n by c a l c u l a t i o n a s required under t h e s t a t u t e . W e , t h e r e f o r e , conclude t h a t t h e order of prejudgment i n t e r e s t t o p l a i n t i f f Conklin was i n e r r o r . W e af firm t h e judgment with t h e exception t h a t w e re- v e r s e t h e award of prejudgment i n t e r e s t t o p l a i n t i f f Conklin. / Chief J u s t i c e \