Title: Abbott v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

417 N.E.2d 278 (1981)
Milton ABBOTT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 380S60.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 9, 1981.
Gregory D. Ball, Public Defender, Richmond, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
Appellant Abbott appeals here from a conviction following a trial by jury of attempted murder, a class A felony under Ind. Code § 35-45-1-1, and Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1), in the shooting and critical *279 wounding of one Billy Joe Daugherty. He received a sentence of thirty years.
The claims made on appeal are:
The court's Instruction No. 4 read in pertinent part as follows:
The instruction also contains an explanation of sudden heat. Trial counsel objected to the instruction on the basis that there is no such crime as attempted voluntary manslaughter in Indiana.
An attempt is defined in Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1:
Indiana Code § 35-42-1-3(a) defines voluntary manslaughter as follows:
Pursuant to this definition and the common law since the days of Blackstone, manslaughter like murder involves an intentional killing of another human being. At common law the punishment for murder required a retaliatory letting of blood. But when the murder occurred during a fight or other circumstance involving the heat of passion induced by a sufficient provocation the punishment of banishment was deemed sufficient. In McDonald v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 477, 346 N.E.2d 569, we held:
This understanding of the nature of manslaughter is carried forward in subsection (b) of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3, wherein it is stated:
Thus since the intentional element is present in a voluntary manslaughter as in the case of murder, although modified in nature by the presence also of sudden heat, the attempt statute is applicable to voluntary manslaughter upon the same basis that it is applicable to murder itself. There is therefore in Indiana a crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the objection to the instruction was not well-founded.
Appellant also contends that it was error to give this instruction because there was no evidence of sudden heat to warrant it. In Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692, 284 N.E.2d 770, we stated:
The evidence presented showed that appellant and Daugherty argued and fought in a pool room, and that Daugherty wrestled a pool cue from appellant's grip and in the immediate aftermath of this appellant shot *280 Daugherty from a distance of ten to twelve feet as Daugherty was in the process of returning the cue to the wall and retaking his seat at a table. This was evidence warranting the inference that appellant was acting in anger and frustration as a result of his humiliation before others in the pool room at the hands of Daugherty. There was no error in giving the instruction.
The deputy prosecutor at trial brought out on cross-examination of appellant that he had shot a man in 1974. That shooting had not resulted in any conviction. The challenged cross-examination proceeded as follows:
In Hensley v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 258, 268 N.E.2d 90, we said:
This prohibition does not prevent the State from presenting competent and relevant evidence tending to prove or disprove a fact in issue even though it may tend to show guilt of another crime, Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843, and the subject matter in the above cross-examination falls in this latter category.
Appellant testified on direct examination that he had the pistol with which he shot Daugherty on his person to "take care" of his business which he operated in the same neighborhood. Further he stated that Daugherty attacked him and struck him in the head with the pool cue, and that in a dazed, half drunken, and fearful state he turned around towards the spot where Daugherty was standing and fired off several shots, not knowing how many, in that general direction, never aiming at Daugherty or intending to shoot and kill him, but only to defend his life, which he deemed to be in great danger. This testimony tended to portray appellant as a naive businessman having a good reason for carrying a handgun and having a very limited ability to use it in a skilled and calculated manner. By it he sought to have the jury infer that he acted in panic in an uncontrollable fear or confusion rather than in a deliberate, calculated and intentional manner in shooting Daugherty. The testimony elicited on cross-examination tended to show that he had fired the gun on a former occasion, striking another human being, and was therefore experienced in the handling of the gun and in its use against others, and that he was fully capable of using it against Daugherty in a conscious and deliberate manner to hit and wound or kill him. The subject was relevant on the issue of intent as it was being litigated in this case, and was not improper.
Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to negate the defense of self-defense. In White v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 32, 349 N.E.2d 156, in considering the claim of self-defense upon appeal we stated:
Customers present in the tavern and pool room where the shooting took place presented testimony from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time appellant drew his gun and shot Daugherty he was not in real danger of death or great bodily harm or in apparent danger which would cause him in good faith to fear death or great bodily harm. Appellant asked Daugherty to pay him back for a debt owed. Daugherty refused. Appellant threatened Daugherty's family. Daugherty seized the pool cue from appellant after a brief struggle and a heated verbal exchange. Appellant was not struck with the cue or injured in any fashion. Daugherty did not verbally threaten to kill appellant. Daugherty returned the cue to the wall and returned to his seat at a table. Appellant, at a distance of twelve feet, while moving away from Daugherty and the point where they had struggled, drew his gun, turned and shot five times at Daugherty, severely wounding him. Daugherty was not armed. This testimony if believed was sufficient to negate self-defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.