Title: Hockensmith v. UIAB

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANA L. HOCKENSMITH, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 159, 2016 
 
Appellant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court    
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware  
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
C.A. Nos. 
15A-09-002 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
§ 
 
 
15A-09-003 
APPEAL BOARD, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
15A-09-004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: August 5, 2016 
Decided: 
October 10, 2016  
 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of October 2016, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Dana L. Hockensmith, filed for unemployment 
insurance benefits from the Department of Labor’s Division of Unemployment 
Insurance, when her employer, Oakcrest Furniture, reduced her hours.  
Hockensmith received unemployment benefits for the period of time from April 6, 
2013 through January 11, 2014.   
(2) 
Following a wage audit investigation, the Division of Unemployment 
Insurance determined that, for the same period of time she received unemployment 
benefits, Hockensmith also earned wages working as an in-home care provider for 
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JEVS Supports Independence, and that she did not report those wages to the 
Division as required.  As a result, the Division issued a decision on January 16, 
2014, finding that Hockensmith had underreported her wages and that, under 19 
Del. C. § 3314(6), she was disqualified from receiving benefits for one year, from 
April 6, 2013 until April 5, 2014 (hereinafter “the Disqualification Decision”).1   
(3) 
Hockensmith appealed the Disqualification Decision to an Appeals 
Referee.  The Appeals Referee dismissed Hockensmith’s appeal as having been 
untimely filed.  When Hockensmith appealed the dismissal, the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision, and the Superior 
Court affirmed the Board’s decision.2  Hockensmith then filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s decision to this Court.  By Order dated December 11, 2014, her 
appeal was dismissed as untimely filed.3      
(4) 
Under 19 Del. C. § 3325, when there has been an overpayment of 
benefits due to a disqualification, the Division can seek recoupment of the benefits 
overpaid to the claimant.4  In this case, following its Disqualification Decision, the 
                                
1 19 Del. C. § 3314(6) (Supp. 2016). 
2 Hockensmith v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2014 WL 4686692 (Del. Super. Sept. 17, 
2014). 
3 Hockensmith v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2014 WL 7041108 (Del. Dec. 11, 2014).   
4 19 Del. C. § 3325 (Supp. 2016).  Bradfield v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2012 WL 
3776670, at *2 (Del. Aug. 31, 2012) (“Only after the [disqualification] determination becomes 
final can the [Division] issue ‘overpayment determinations’ seeking recoupment of specific 
amounts.”) (citing 19 Del. C. § 3325)).  
3 
 
Division issued three decisions in April and May 2014, establishing the amount of 
unemployment benefits that Hockensmith must repay (hereinafter “the 
Overpayment Decisions”).5  Hockensmith appealed each of the Overpayment 
Decisions to an Appeals Referee and then to the Board, arguing at both levels and 
in all three appeals that the Disqualification Decision was issued in error.  
Hockensmith contended that her failure to report her wages from JEVS Supports 
Independence was the Division’s fault because she had relied on a Division 
employee’s assurance that she did not have to report those wages.  When 
Hockensmith was unsuccessful in her appeals before the Appeals Referee and the 
Board, she appealed to the Superior Court.  On March 11, 2016, the Superior Court 
issued a consolidated decision affirming the Board’s decisions.6  This appeal 
followed. 
(5) 
In her opening and reply briefs on appeal, Hockensmith continues to 
assail the Disqualification Decision, arguing that she should not have to repay any 
of the unemployment benefits from which she was disqualified because of the 
misinformation she allegedly received from a Division employee.  On appeal from 
                                
5 The first determination, dated April 15, 2014, established an overpayment of $2,970.00 for the 
period of time April 6, 2013 to November 16, 2013.  The second and third determinations, both 
dated May 8, 2014, established overpayments of $660.00 and $1,980.00 for the periods of time 
November 23, 2013 to November 30, 2013 and December 7, 2013 to January 11, 2014. 
6 Hockensmith v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2016 WL 2620642 (Del. Super. Mar. 11, 
2016).  
4 
 
the Superior Court's affirmance of a Board decision, this Court's review is limited 
to determining whether the Board's conclusions are supported by substantial 
evidence and are free from legal error.7  
(6) 
In this case, having carefully reviewed the record, including the 
transcripts of the three Board hearings, and the parties’ briefs on appeal, the Court 
concludes that the Board’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and 
are free from legal error.  As the Superior Court explained in its March 11 order, 
Hockensmith cannot attack the Disqualification Decision in her appeal from the 
Overpayment Decisions.  Hockensmith’s remedy from the Disqualification 
Decision was limited to her prior appeal from that decision in this Court.8  
Hockensmith pursued her appeal to its conclusion, albeit without success.9  The 
only issues in this appeal are whether Hockensmith received notice of the 
Overpayment Decisions and whether the overpayment amounts were calculated 
correctly.10   
(7) 
Hockensmith does not dispute that she received notice of the 
Overpayment Decisions, and she does not claim that overpayment amounts were 
                                
7 Roshon v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 3855179 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010) (quoting 
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975)).  
8 See Kopicko v. State, 2004 WL 1427077 (Del. May 28, 2004) (holding that appellant had “no 
further right of action” after exhausting administrative remedy provided by statute). 
9 Supra note 3.   
10 Schaefer v. Butzke, 1997 WL 33098 (Del. Jan. 2, 1997). 
5 
 
calculated incorrectly.  Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the 
Superior Court’s order of March 11, 2016 must be affirmed.     
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice