Title: Kahaikupuna v. State of Hawai'i, County of Maui. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Levinson [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 01/05/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000:

DANIEL LEALOHA KAHATKUPUNA and
FREDERICK PONCE, Plaintiffs-Appellants

STATE OF HAWAI'I, COUNTY OF MAUI,
Defendants-Appellees

g

and .

 

JOHN DOES 1-10 and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants

No. 26850

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 04-1-0227)

DECEMBER 19, 2005

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.;
WITH LEVINSON, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Daniel Lealoha Kahaikupuna and
Frederick Ponce (collectively, Plaintiffs] appeal from the
September 22, 2004 judgment of the circuit court of the second
circuit! (the court) in favor of Defendants-Appellees the State
of Havai't (the State), and the County of Maui (the County)
[collectively, Defendants]. Plaintiffs also challenge the
court's August 31, 2004 findings of fact (findings), conclusions

of law (conclusions) and order granting Defendants’ motion to

1 The Honorable Joel £, August presided

ant
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a

 

dismiss the complaint. Because we hold that Plaintiffs’
challenges to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 711-1109(1) (Supp.
2004) and Chapter 9.08.010 of the Maui County Code (MCC)? are not
proper subjects for a declaratory judgment, we vacate the
September 22, 2004 judgment and the aforesaid findings,
conclusions, and oxder and remand the case to the court to enter
summary judgment in favor of the County on its motion and in
favor of the State on its joinder to the County's motion and to
enter judgment thereon on the grounds set forth herein.
L

on May 28, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a complaint under the
provisions of HRS § 632-1 (1993),? asking the court to enter a
declaratory judgment to the effect that cockfighting is a native
Hawaiian customary right protected pursuant to article XII,

section 7 of the State Constitution and HRS § 7-1 (1993).

 

2 the texts of these provisions are produced intra.

 

4 Revised Statutes (HRS) § 632-1 1s reproduced Antea
+ Article x21, section 7 of the Hawai'l Constitution states that:

‘The State reaffirms and shall protect ali rights
costonarily and traditionally exercised for subsistent
Geltural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupus
Tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians Who
[thabited che Hawaiian sands prior to 1778, subject to the
Fight of the state to regulate such rights.

 

 

 

 

* uns § 7-1 states nat:

Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter
obtain silodial titles to their lands, the people on each
Of their lands shall not be deprived of the rignt to take
Trewood, housetinber, aho cord, thateh, or ki leaf, fron
the land on which they live, for their own private use, but
they shal! not have a right to take such articles to sell
for profit. The people shall have 2 right to drinking
rand the right of way. The springs of
(continued...)

 

 

 

 

  
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Plaintiffs named the State and the County as parties in the suit.
Cockfighting is prohibited under State‘ and County’ laws.
Plaintiffs have not been charged with a criminal offense.

In the complaint, Plaintiffs represented that they are

descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian

 

"(ss scontinued)
Water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on all
Lands granted fee simple; provided that this shall not be
applicable to wells and watercourses, which individuals have
made for their own use.

 

 

+ as g 711-1208 (1993 & Supp. 2004) of the Hawai'i Penal Code

provides in relevant part as follows

 

Ceveity to animals, (1) A person comits the offen
of crueity to animals if the person intentionally,
knowingly, oF recklessly:

‘Ia}’ “Overdrives, overloads, tortures, torments, cruet2i
beats or starves eny aninal, oF causes oF proc
overdriving, overloading, torture, torment, cruel
beating of starving of any aninal, or deprives & pet
faninal of necessary sustenance of causes. such
deprivation:

fp) Mutilstee, poisons, or kills without need any animal
Other than insects, vermin, oF other pests

[c) keeps, uses, or in any way 18 connected with or
interested in the management of, oF receives
oney for the adnission of any Gerson toy any
Place kept or used for the purpose of fightang
br baiting any Bull, bear, dog, cock, oF other
Shinal, and every person who encourages, aids,

Gf assists therelns oF who permits of suffers
ny place to be so kept oF uses:

ie} ” Assists another in the comission of any act of
‘siuelty to any animal.

 

   

he

 

 

 

 

 

 

id) Cruetty to animals is a misdeneanor
(Emphasis added.)
chapter 9.08.010 of the Mavi County Code (MCC) provides that
Leson within conduct or

saintsinn

shall be guilty of a niscene:
Ted upon conviction shel be punished by a fine not to
exceed five hundred dollars and costs, or be imprisoned
lineil auch fine and costs have been discharged by operation
of law

 

 

(emphasis added.)
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Islands prior to 1778. They further asserted that cockfighting

 

is a “traditional native Hawaiian cultural practice.” Plaintiffs
requested “entry of a [j]udgment declaring, ‘determining, and
resolving Plaintiffs’ legal status, rights and privileges” and
“entry of judgment declaring that Plaintiffs have the right to
practice raising and fighting roosters as part of their culture.”

on July 16, 2004, the County filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The County
argued that Plaintiffs failed to “allege an ‘actual controversy’”
because Plaintiffs failed to plead that they have either been
charged with or convicted of violations pursuant to State or
county laws, and, therefore, the court was “depriv(ed]” of
subject matter jurisdiction. The County also argued that “(elven
Af the [cJourt had jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ [cJomplaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

on July 22, 2004, the State filed a substantive joinder
in the County's Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss (joinder). The State asked the court
to treat the County’s motion to dismiss as one for summary
judgment pursuant to HRCP Rules 12(c) and 56 (2004)* because the

County's motion to dismiss included matters outside of the

 

 

pleadings.
+ wrce Rate 56 states in relevant part as follons:

(b) For defending party. A part;

clain, counterclaim, oF cross-claim is

  

Geclatatory jusgment is sought may nov
Supporting affidavits Zor s summery Susmment in the party's
favor as to all er any part thei

 

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on August 19, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in
opposition to both the County’s motion to dismiss and the State's
Joinder, arguing that (1) by virtue of HRS §° 632-1, infra, the
court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief for
(a) “[c]ontroversies involving the interpretation of .
statutes, municipal ordinances, and other governmental
regulations . . . ,” (b) when “antagonistic claims are present
between the parties which indicate imminent and inevitable
Litigation,” or (c) “where the court is satisfied that a party
asserts a legal{] relation, status, right, or privilege . . . and
that there is a challenge . . . by an adversary party who also
has or asserts a concrete interest therein, and the court is
satisfied also that a declaratory judgment will serve to
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
Proceeding[,]” (2) Plaintiffs’ action is ripe, (3) Plaintiffs
have standing, and (4) the complaint does state a claim. Ina
declaration, Plaintiff Kahaikupuna stated that although he has
never been charged with or convicted of a crime, he faces the
“real, immediate and adverse threat of criminal prosecution. . .
for practicing the traditional Hawaiian custom of
cockfighting!,]” and that the threat is a “serious threat which
impacts my life as well as the lives of the members of my
family."

On August 31, 2004, the court issued its findings,
conclusions, and order granting Defendants’ motion to disniss.
‘The court determined that as 2 matter of law (1) it had

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ee
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and Plaintiffs

had standing, (2) the claims were ripe in that competing
interests were likely to lead to Litigation if Plaintiffs should
attempt to exercise their claimed rights, (3) the motion to
dismiss should be decided under the provisions of Rule §6 of the
FRCP, rather than under Rule 12 because there were matters
presented to the court that were outside the pleadings, and (4)
summary judgment should be granted against Plaintiffs on the

merits.*

 

+ tm an erudite coview of the case, the court ruled:

7. ven if one asgunes that cockfighting was a
coltural practice under the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the state
fos chosen to legislatively regulate and ban such activity
Yn constitutional chellenges to legislation in Hawes'i, *(1)
Jogisiative enactments are presumptively constitutional; (2)
a°fafey challenging {a statutory scheme) has the burden of
Showing unconsttutsonality beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) "the constitutional defect ust be clear, manifest (,] and

 

 

 

    

Gaistakstle,”. Peay y. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 75 ikaw.)
335, 340, 861 P.28 123,727 (1993) (anternal quotations
oaiteed) } Sitegal £4

Saye 14 (hawel Tei, 151, €¢0 e.26 367, 37: (1992) (quoting
Biath vs Cavetans, 713. (Waw.} 536, 542, "836 P.26 1066, 1069
(3827)

81 Although cockfighting may have been popular with
certain native residents during the monarchy, the (elourt
Eekes judicial notice that under the laws of the Kingdon of
Newall such ectivity wae considered “cruelty to animals”
Gnd was iilegel. The [elowrt concludes that this illegal
SctLvity under the laws of the Kingdom of Hawai'l does not
translate into an established custom that was culturally
accepted and generally practiced as of 1892, or was a
fecognizes right of the Kingdon’ s subjects.

9. Because Plaintiffs do not argue chat cockfighting
customarily and traditionally served a religious porpose
Ghong native Hawaiians, the only remaining argument for
Constitutional protection is that cocktighting is «
Customary and treditional right encompassed in Section 7-1
Se the {Hts}, Section 7-1 protects custonary and
traditional native Hawaiian practices that relate to
Subsistence. Subsistence rights have traditionally
Eoncerned water, access, and gathering rights. The [clourt
Concludes that cockfighting, legally regarded as cruelty to
Stimalss hes absolutely no Connection with subsistence
Fights.

Jo. Plaintstfe claim that ra!

 

 

 

 

 

 

ing roosters is a
(Gontinu

 
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Plaintiffs filed 2 notice of appeal on September 27,

2004.
qn.

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the court erred
in ruling that (1) raising and fighting roosters was not a
customary traditional practice of Native Hawaiians, despite
substantial and uncontested evidence in the record to the
contrary, or at least there was a genuine issue of fact as to the
existence of such a practice, (2) pursuant to chapter 24 of the
Kingdom of Hawai'i Penal Code enacted in 1884, raising and
fighting roosters was not a right customarily and traditionally
exercised for subsistence or cultural purposes by native
Hawaiians, and (3) such a right is not protected by article xIz,
section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Plaintiffs state that

they make “no contention that any of the existing state laws

 

(continues)
Practice that ie part of their native Hawaiian culture, but
Enis claim does not raise an iseve in controversy. Nola
prevents Elaintifts trom raison roosters. and Plaintifts
have not alieaed that the County of Haul, or the State of

TT, Plaintiffs (sic) claim presents no genuine issues
to any material fact. Because tne’ (c]ourt concludes that
cockfighting was i1legal under the laws of the Kingdom of
Hawai's, and such activity is not a constitutionally oF
statutorily protected right customarily and traditionally
exercised for subsistence or cultural purposes by native
Hawsisene, Defendants are entitled to Sudgment a2 a matter

12. In the absence of any genuine issues of material
fact, the [ejourt also concludes that Plaintiffs have failed
te overcome the presumption thst state and county laws that
prohibit cockfighting are constitutional, oF that the
Constitutional defect in such laws is clear, manifest, and
nmistakebie

   

 

 

(Exphasis added.)
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
regarding cockfighting were unconstitutional” and they “do not

ask for declaration that any state or county laws were
unconstitutional.”

In response, the State argues tht (1) summary judgment
was proper because cockfighting is not a constitutionally or
statutorily protected Native Hawaiian customary right,

(2) summary judgment was correct because Plaintiffs have not set
forth specific facts to show that there are any genuine issues of
material fact, (3) the court properly ruled that the State
exercised its constitutional right to regulate Native Hawaiian
customary practices, and (4) declaratory judgment is improper
because the issue of whether cockfighting is a Native Hawaiian
customary right is not ripe for review.

The County agrees with the State’s first and second
arguments and also contends that (1) chapter 24 of the Hawaiian
Kingdom’ s penal code outlawed more than merely keeping or
managing a place used for cockfighting, (2) neither the County
nor the State prohibits the raising of roosters, (3) there are no
disputed material facts, and (4) Plaintiffs have failed to
overcome the presumption that the County's anti-cockfighting
ordinances are valid.

In requesting a declaratory judgment as to whether
cockfighting is a protected native Hawaiian right, Plaintiffs
urge this court to “determine their rights prior to having to
suffer actual criminal prosecution, which is threatened and
imminent.” Because we believe Plaintiffs’ request is not

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appropriate for a declaratory judgment action, we affirm summary

judgment on behalf of the State and County, but on different

grounds. See Waianae Model Neighborhood Area Ass'n v. City &
County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 40, 43, 514 P.2d 861, 864 (1973);
McCarthy v. Yempuke, 5 Haw. App. 45, 52, 678 P.2d 11, 16 (1984)

(holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary
judgnent on any ground appearing in the record, even if the
circuit court did not rely on it).

ui.

It is evident, as mentioned above in Plaintiffs’
complaint, that they sought a declaratory judgment because of a
perceived threat of criminal prosecution. The complaint was
filed under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act, HRS

§ 632-1, which states:

actual controversy, courts of record,
within the scope of thelr respective Jurisdiction
have power to make binding adjudications of right, whether
Of not consequential relief 18, oF at the time could b
Claimed, and no action or proceeding shall be open to
Sbjectson on the ground that a Judgment or order me
declaratory of right is prayed for provided that.
Geclarstory relief may not be obtained in any district
court, a in any controversy with respect to taxes, oF in
any case where a divorce or annulment of marriage is sought.
Controversies tnvoiving the interpretation of deeds, wills,
other instruments of writing, statutes, municipal
ordinances, and other governmental regulations, may be so
Setermined, and this enumeration does not exclude other,
Instances of actual antagonistic assertion and denial of
right.
Relief by declaratory judgment may be granted in civil
ay exists between contending
sitistied that antagonistic
nt between the parties involved which
{naieate inminent end ineviteble Litigation, oF where in any
‘such cage the court is satisfies that « party asserts a
egal relation, status, right, or privilege li waich the
party has s concrete interest and that there is 3 challenge
br denial of the asserted relation, status, right, ot
privilege by an adversary party who also has or asserts a
Eoncrete interest therein, and the court is satisfied also

     

 

 

ay

 

 

 
    

 

 
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thats declaratory judgment will serve to termina
Gncertainty or controversy givin 0 the proceeding.
however, a statute. prov: special. form of renedy
specific’ type of ‘story remedy shall be
followed; but the mere fact that an actual or threatened
Controversy is susceptible of relief through a general
‘connon law remedy, a remedy equitable in nature, oF an
Gxtraordinary legal renedy, whether such renedy' ‘8
Stcognised of regulates by etatute or not, shall not debar 2
party fron the privilege of obtaining 2 declaratory judgment
Ehiany case where the other essentials co such relief are pr

 

      

 

 

 

 

(Bmphasis added.)

Plaintiffs argue that HRS § 632-1 provides them with
the right to seek declaratory judgment where “{clontroversies
Anvolving the interpretation of . . . statutes, municipal
ordinances, and other government regulations, may be so
determined.” Plaintiffs also rely on Pires v. Phillips, 31 Haw.
720, 721 (Terr. 1930), in which this court ruled that it was
proper to grant declaratory relief concerning the meaning of
lease terms when the dispute between the parties concerning their
respective rights depended on the interpretation of the lease
itself.

on the other hand, the State and County contend that
under Bacific Meat Co, v. Otagaki, 47 Haw. 652, 655, 394 P.2d
618, 620 (1964), a declaratory judgment is not ordinarily
available to challenge the validity of a criminal statute, and
that the circumstances in this case do not warrant equitable
relief particularly because there are other adequate remedies of
law, such as defending a criminal prosecution. The State asserts
that the criminal court would be in a better position to resolve

all of the constitutional and legal questions that may arise

10
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concerning Hawaiian ancestry, cockfighting as a traditional
native Hawaiian practice, and other questions relating to an
actual criminal charge.

The State also relies on League of Women Voters of
Hawaii v. Doi, 57 Haw. 213, 552 P.2d 1392 (1976). In that case
the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment on whether defendant
elections officer was required by the Hawai'i State Constitution
to place the question of whether there should be a constitutional
convention on the 1976 general election ballot. The issue became
moot when the legislature submitted the question to the
electorate to be voted on at the 1976 general election. The
circuit court dismissed the case on sunmary judgment. On appeal,
the plaintiff agreed that the issue was moot but contended that
the interpretation of the constitutional provision as to future
years remained unresolved. This court dismissed the appeal,
declining to “decide important questions regarding the scope and
constitutionality of a particular case in advance of its
immediate adverse effect in the context of a particular case.”
Ids at 214, 552 P.2d at 1393 (citations, brackets and quotation
marks omitted) .

wv.

In the instant case, the court determined in conclusion
no. 3 that “{HRS) chapter 632. . . allows for judicial
resolution by means of declaratory judgment.” Further, the court
in conclusion no. 4 noted that “declaratory judgment will serve
to terminate any uncertainty relative to the claim that

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cockfighting is a cultural and traditional native Hawaiian right
protected under the Hawai'i Constitution.”

Generally, courts have been hesitant to employ
declaratory relief as to criminal matters. There are two general
views as to the propriety of declaratory relief with respect to

criminal matters. MW. £. Shipley, Validity, Construction, and

Application of Criminal Statutes or Ordinances as Proper for
Declaratory Judgment, 10 A.L.R.3d 727 (2004). The first view is

the traditional one, that declarative relief is inappropriate as
to criminal matters. Id. See also Schwartz v O'Connell, 124
N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1952) (noting that a court will not
grant declaratory judgment where its effect will be to restrain
criminal prosecution, or to interfere with the enforcement of
criminal law, particularly when facts are in dispute or open to
different interpretations); Witschner v. City of Atchison, 117
P.2d 570 (Kan, 1941) (holding that declaratory judgments should
not be used as a restraint against criminal action).

‘The second view many jurisdictions have taken is that
declarative relief should be limited to certain circumstances.
‘This approach essentially incorporates the traditional view, but
allows for certain exceptions. We have accepted such an
approach. In Pacific Meat Co., this court adopted the "Missouri
rule” stated as follows:

t eatery dud

waicss re cepenin
‘iireuserances; That form of relier is usually
Snnecessary where a\full and adequate remedy is provided by
another well-known form of action? ‘the purpose of 2
Geclaratory judgnent is to serve some practical end in

 

12
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abllizing an uncertain or disputed jural

quieting or
F 35 to present or prospective obligations;

elation ei

sudinariiy it cannot be utilized aso device to
cizcimvent the -cenerel rule thet equity will ner eneein the
‘snfarcenent of a valid criminal statute: neither will i: be

 

the public and law violators on particular Zacks where no
‘special circumstances require ic
47 Haw. at 655, 394 P.2d at 620 (emphases added) (quoting Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co, v. Jones," 130 $.W.2d 945, 953 (Mo. 1939)). See

also Reed v. Littleton, 9 N.E.2d 814, 615 (N.Y. 1937) (stating
that “[t]he rule has been firmly established that [the court]

will not ordinarily intervene to enjoin the enforcement of the
law by the prosecuting officials . . . unless under proper
circumstances there would be irreparable injury, and the sole
question involved is one of law. . . where a clear legal right
to the relief is established[]” (internal citations omitted).
In Pacific Meat Co., the plaintiff filed a bill in
equity to enjoin the defendants from enforcing an act requiring
labels to be affixed to all poultry and poultry products. The
action was dismissed on the basis that “plaintiffs had an
adequate remedy of law, i.e., defending a criminal prosecution.

Pacific Meat Co., 47 Haw. at 654, 394 P.2d at 619 (emphasis
added). The plaintiffs then refused to comply with the labeling

 

 

» oon 130 S.W.2d 945, 953 (Mo. 1939),
the issue was! whether declarative Feller could be used to decide w!
“lay” employees of the plaintiffs (various insurance companies) wei "
in the unauthorized practice of law and in doing business in investigating and
adjusting claims. The Missouri Supreme Court explained thet a declaratory
judgement should be used with caution and was not to be used aaa substitute
for ail other renedies. ig, However, that court granted declarater;
because there “were questions of business conduct affecting the inte:
large part of the public” and “the criminal aspects of the case were
lnimportant as compared with its general import.” 1d, Those factors are not
apparent in this case.

 

     

 

        

       

 

  

a3
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requirements and were twice served with violation notices. Id.
However, the defendants declined to bring criminal proceedings
against the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs then brought a suit
for declaratory judgment to determine whether the act was
unconstitutional

In light of the defendant’s adamant refusal to provide

 

another “full and adequate remedy” to determine the plaintiffs
rights, this court allowed declaratory relief. Id. at 656, 394
P.2d at 621. After approving the "Missouri rule” quoted above,
it was concluded that declaratory relief would be available under
the circumstances. Identifying those circumstances, this court
said that “the statute is malum prohibitum, (*] it affects =
continuing course of business, and a method of testing the
statute was not in fact available in the criminal court because
the predecessors of the defendant refused to bring criminal
Proceedings.” Id. at 656, 394 P.2d at 620.

v.

As in the case of Bacific Meat Co., courts have
permitted declaratory relief in criminal matters where property
rights have been directly affected, especially if a continuing
course of business is involved. See Sun Oil Co, v. Dir, of the
Divi on the Necessaries of Life, 163 N.£.2d 276 (Mass. 1960)

(declaratory relief granted when ongoing business relations

 

 

% Malumorchibitun is “{a]n act that is a crime merely because it is
prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral
Misdeneanors soch as Jaywalking and running a stoplight are mala prohibita, as
fare many regulatory violations.” kre Lau Dictionary 976 (8 ed. 2004)

4
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affected); Stecher v. Houston, 272 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954) (dismissing action for the stated reason that the validity
of a criminal statute, without vested property rights involved,
is exclusively in the criminal courts jurisdiction); and Dovle v
Clark, 41.N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1942) (allowing declaratory judgment
to determine the constitutionality of a penal statute which
affects business or occupation), app. dismd,, 317 U.S. 590.

on the other hand, it has also long been established
that declaratory relief is not appropriate for criminal matters
“where a full and adequate remedy is provided by another well-
known form of action,” particularly by testing the statute in a
criminal proceeding. Bacific Neat Co., 47 Haw. at 655, 394 P.2d
at 620. Of the three factors set forth in Pacific Meat Co., only
one arguably exists in this case, which is that the ordinance and
statute against cockfighting are malum prohibitum.

vr.

Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief does not
involve a continuing course of business, as in Bacific Meat Co,
See Lane=Marvey Corp, v. McCaffrey, 119 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) (noting that “[wJhere the dominant purpose is to obtain
Anmunity from criminal prosecution declaratory relief is
unwarranted and interferes with the administration and
enforcement of the laws[]”), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1013, app den.,
283 App. Div. 655 (1953). And unlike in Pacific Meat Co., where
the defendants refused to bring criminal proceedings, Plaintiffs
do not argue or demonstrate ‘facts indicating that they are in a

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similar situation but, rather, aver to the contrary, Therefore,
we conclude that this case lacks the special circumstances akin
to considerations in Pacific Meat Co, that would warrant
declarative action."

vir.

While criminal proceedings may be inconvenient and
costly, we agree with the State that it is the best forum to
resolve all of the factual, statutory and constitutional
questions that may arise in this case. Cf. State v. Kaneakua, 61
Haw. 136, 142, 597 P.2d 590, 593 (1979) (where defendants had
stipulated to participating in cockfighting, HRS $ 711-1109(1) (a)
(1965 Repl.), pertaining to cruelty to animals, encompassed
gamecocks and cockfighting but this court would not decide
hypothetical cases “as applied to other persons in situations not
before the court”).

‘The relief that Plaintiffs request is essentially one
of injunctive relief and would prohibit the State and County from
enforcing HRS § 711-1109(1) and MCC § 9.08.010 against them.
Such an injunction would greatly interfere with the enforcement
of the law, especially in the determination of who should or
should not be prosecuted. A declarative judgement in favor of
Plaintiffs in this context would likely hinder enforcement of
what are presumptively valid laws. See State v, Adler, 108

Hawaii 169, 177, 118 P.3d 652, 660 (2008) (recognizing that “this

 

© in the cases cited by the concurring and dissenting opinion, the
eLzcunstances did not include that prosecution had been refused,

16
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court has consistently held that every enactment of the
legislature is presumptively constitutional, and a party
challenging the statute has the burden of shoving
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Kan, 69
Haw, 463, 495, 748 P.2d 372, 380 (1986) (confizming that “{e]very
enactnent of the Hawaii Legislature is presumptively
constitutional, and the party challenging a statute has the
burden of showing the alleged nconstitutionelity beyond
reasonable doubt[]"). As noted above, declaratory relief will
not ordinarily be enployed to determine the enforcenent of
criminal statutes, and in the absence of the particular
circumstances Like those in Pacific Meat Co., we believe it is
snappropriate here."
vant.

For the foregoing zeasons, the court's September 22,
2004 judgment and its August 31, 2004 findings, conclusions, and
order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss complaint are
vacated and the case is remanded to the court with instructions
to (1) enter summary judgment in favor of the County on ite

motion and in favor of the State on its joinder to the County's

8 Although the concurring and dissenting opinion maintains that our
citation t 47 Haw. €52, 294 F.2d 618 (2960),
Scontenplates only two sets Of circumstances in which a plaintiff has standing
to test a criminal statute through a declaratory action(,]” concurring and
dissenting opinion at 1, Plaintiffs do not suggest circumstances other than
those noted previously as grounds for departing from the ordinary Tule agsinst
declaratory relief for criminal lews. Therefore, we need not decide what
other eircunstances would justity declaratory relief.

1”

 

 

 
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motion and (2) enter judgment therein, in accordance with this

opinion.

on the briefs:

vJames Richard McCarty for
plaintiffs-appellants.

 

David A. Webber and
Deborah Day Emerson,
Deputy Attorneys General,
State of Hawaii, for
defendant-appellee state
of Hawaii.

vane £. Lovell, Deputy
Corporation Counsel, County
of Maui, for defendant~
appellee County of Maui.

18

Gin

Pune Or areanue

pron

Gores «ces +