Title: Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 1)

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12799 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LARRY WATKINS (No. 1). 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 7, 2020. - February 11, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, New trial.  Estoppel.  
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Joint Enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court on 
December 10, 1975. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 375 Mass. 472 (1978), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 4, 2018, was 
considered by John T. Lu, J., and a motion for reconsideration 
was also considered by him. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Kafker, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Konstantin Tretyakov, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Richard J. Fallon for the defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  In 1976, a jury convicted the defendant, Larry 
Watkins, on indictments for murder in the first degree, armed 
robbery, and kidnapping in connection with the abduction and 
2 
 
 
shooting death of Edward Keen and the theft of Keen's wallet and 
automobile.  The defendant's convictions were affirmed on 
appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 492 (1978).  
More than forty years later, a judge of the Superior Court 
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the murder 
indictment, after concluding that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support the defendant's murder conviction on a 
theory of joint venture felony-murder.  Before us is the 
Commonwealth's appeal from the motion judge's order granting a 
new trial.  We reverse. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain 
details for discussion of specific issues. 
 
On November 17, 1975, the defendant and a companion, 
Theresa Nelson, were walking in Boston when Nelson hailed a 
passing motor vehicle driven by the victim.  The victim stopped, 
and Nelson and the defendant entered the vehicle.  After 
traveling for a period of time, the defendant pulled out a 
pistol and Nelson took the victim's wallet.  At some point 
thereafter, the defendant forced the victim into the trunk of 
3 
 
 
the vehicle, and the defendant and Nelson met the defendant's 
brother, Theodore.1,2 
 
The defendant, Nelson, and Theodore then drove for 
approximately one hour.  When they stopped, the defendant gave 
his gun to Theodore, the two men got out of the vehicle and 
opened the trunk, and Theodore shot the victim.  The victim's 
body was discovered in Newton the morning after the shooting. 
 
After a jury trial the following year, the defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and 
kidnapping.3 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In his direct appeal, the defendant 
argued that the judge committed several errors prior to and 
during the trial that required reversal.  This court affirmed 
the convictions, concluding after plenary review of the whole 
case pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), that "the verdict 
was neither against the law nor the evidence" and that "[t]he 
                     
 
1 Because Theodore and the defendant have the same surname, 
we use Theodore's first name to avoid confusion. 
 
 
2 There was conflicting testimony as to whether the 
defendant and Nelson met with Theodore prior to or after the 
victim was forced into the trunk.  We assume for the purposes of 
this appeal that Theodore was not present when the victim was 
forced into the trunk. 
 
 
3 In separate proceedings, Theresa Nelson was convicted of 
armed robbery and kidnapping, and Theodore was convicted of 
kidnapping and murder in the first degree.  See Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 377 Mass. 385 (1979). 
4 
 
 
interests of justice require neither a new trial nor the entry 
of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt than was found by the 
jury."  Watkins, 375 Mass. at 492. 
The defendant thereafter filed a number of motions for a 
new trial.  No action was taken on the first motion, filed in 
1990.  In 2003, the defendant moved to withdraw that motion and 
filed a second one, claiming among other things that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him on the theory of joint 
venture felony-murder,4 and that the judge made several errors in 
instructing the jury.5  The motion judge denied the motion, 
finding that no "substantial issue" had been raised.  The 
defendant filed a gatekeeper petition seeking leave from a 
single justice to appeal from the decision pursuant to § 33E, 
which, as will be discussed in further detail infra, also was 
denied. 
                     
 
4 The Commonwealth presented two theories under which the 
defendant could be found guilty of murder in the first degree:  
joint venture felony-murder and joint venture murder with 
deliberate premeditation.  The judge instructed on both theories 
and explained to the jury that they could find the defendant 
guilty under either or both.  Because the jury returned a 
general verdict of guilty without indicating the theory or 
theories upon which they relied, there must be sufficient 
evidence to support both theories of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 638 (1996). 
 
 
5 The defendant also pointed out that the conviction of 
armed robbery was duplicative of the felony-murder conviction. 
5 
 
 
In 2010, the defendant filed a third motion for a new 
trial, again challenging the validity of the judge's jury 
instructions.  The motion judge declined to act on the motion, 
indicating in part that the "same or similar issues were raised 
in the [d]efendant's [2003 motion], and denied."  The defendant 
did not seek to appeal from that decision. 
In 2018, the defendant filed the motion for a new trial at 
issue here, again arguing that the Commonwealth presented 
insufficient evidence for the felony-murder conviction.  The 
judge allowed the motion, concluding that although a "close 
question," the argument presented in the 2018 motion was "not so 
similar to [the] argument [raised in 2003] that principles of 
estoppel prevent consideration of his current claims."  After 
moving unsuccessfully for reconsideration of the decision, the 
Commonwealth filed an application for leave to appeal pursuant 
to § 33E, which was allowed by a single justice.6 
                     
6 The allowance of a gatekeeper petition normally depends on 
whether the appeal presents a "new and substantial question."  
See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  However, where the Commonwealth rather 
than the defendant petitions the gatekeeper, "the single 
justice's primary focus should be on the meritoriousness or 
'substantiality' of the Commonwealth's position on appeal and 
less on the newness of the underlying issue," because "[i]t 
would make little sense to deny the Commonwealth an opportunity 
for appellate review if it appears that the judge below erred or 
abused [his or her] discretion in granting a new trial on an 
issue that was not, technically speaking, new."  Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 322 (2011). 
6 
 
 
 
Discussion.  Rule 30 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
authorizes a judge to "grant a new trial at any time if it 
appears that justice may not have been done."  As a general 
matter, "[a] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the judge," Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 
491, 498 (2020), and "an appellate court will examine the motion 
judge's conclusion only to determine whether there has been a 
significant error of law or other abuse of discretion," id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 664 (2011).  
Where, however, the motion judge did not preside at trial and 
did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, as happened here, we are 
in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial 
record and therefore review the motion judge's decision de novo.  
See Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 547 (2020). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that granting the defendant's 
motion for a new trial was error for multiple reasons.  First, 
the Commonwealth argues that the motion judge lacked authority 
to consider the sufficiency of the evidence because this court 
had done so in the course of the plenary review undertaken 
pursuant to § 33E.  Second, the Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant is estopped from challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction on a theory of joint venture 
felony-murder because that issue previously was addressed in 
7 
 
 
response to the defendant's 2003 motion for a new trial.  
Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the evidence presented 
at trial was legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on 
the theory of joint venture felony-murder. 
 
1.  Viability of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence 
after § 33E plenary review.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
motion judge had no authority to consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence following our § 33E plenary review of the entire case 
in connection with the defendant's direct appeal.  We do not 
agree. 
 
In conducting plenary review under § 33E, "we consider not 
only the preserved and unpreserved claims of error argued by the 
defendant on appeal, but also other grounds for reversal or a 
reduction of the verdict that we may discover as a result of our 
independent review of the entire record."  Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 320 (2011).  As part of that review, we 
consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support 
the conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 
154-155 & n.12 (2013) (concluding upon § 33E review that there 
was insufficient evidence from which jury could have found 
defendant guilty of murder in first degree on theory of felony-
murder, even though defendant did not raise this issue, but 
upholding conviction on alternative theories relied on by jury); 
Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 349 n.10 (2010) (given our 
8 
 
 
duty to review entire record in capital cases under § 33E, 
affirmance of murder conviction implies evidence sufficient to 
support it). 
 
Once a defendant has had his or her conviction reviewed 
pursuant to § 33E, postappeal motions for a new trial based on 
claims that could have been, but were not, raised either at 
trial or on direct appeal are reviewed for a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Smith, 460 Mass. at 320-321.  We 
have noted that "[e]rrors of this magnitude are extraordinary 
events and relief is seldom granted."  Id. at 321, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297 (2002).  This is 
especially so where a defendant's conviction has been reviewed 
pursuant to § 33E.  Id. 
 
However, the observation that relief is rare in these 
circumstances is an implicit acknowledgement that such relief is 
not entirely foreclosed.  Although this court takes its § 33E 
review "obligation seriously and conducts a thorough review to 
the best of its ability," Smith, supra at 320 n.1, no one is 
infallible.  Notwithstanding the public's weighty interest in 
the finality of criminal convictions, we must maintain a means 
of addressing "the possibility of error and of grave and 
lingering injustice."  Randolph, supra at 294, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637 (1997). 
9 
 
 
 
"[C]onvictions based on insufficient evidence are 
inherently serious enough to create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Heywood, 484 Mass. 43, 
49 n.7 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 
294 n.2 (2002).  As defendants convicted of murder in the first 
degree face a mandatory life sentence without possibility of 
parole, see G. L. c. 265, § 2, we are unwilling to adopt a rule 
that would treat our § 33E review as absolutely precluding all 
subsequent motions for a new trial that challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Section 33E's gatekeeper 
limitations on appellate review, and the estoppel principles 
discussed infra, are sufficient safeguards against repetitive 
motions for a new trial and related appeals, and need not be 
augmented further.7 
                     
 
7 For similar reasons, we decline the Commonwealth's related 
invitation to treat the defendant's claim as permanently waived 
and his conviction as "firmly settled" due to the passage of 
time and the failure of his prior postappeal motions.  See 
Randolph, 438 Mass. at 296 n.11.  We note that Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b) authorizes a judge to order a new trial "at any time if 
it appears that justice may not have been done" (emphasis 
added).  See Amirault, 424 Mass. at 637 (motion for new trial 
can be made even decades after initial adjudication); 
Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 586 (1992) ("a 
defendant's delay in bringing a rule 30 motion does not in 
itself constitute waiver").  Moreover, as discussed supra, our 
case law concerning postappeal motions for a new trial permits 
us to consider even waived claims if they involve a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Smith, 460 Mass. at 320-
321. 
10 
 
 
 
2.  Estoppel.  The Commonwealth also contends that even if 
a judge has authority to consider a motion for a new trial based 
on insufficiency of evidence after § 33E plenary review, the 
defendant is estopped from making the argument here because the 
issue has already been decided.  We agree. 
 
"A judge's authority to grant a new trial pursuant to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 30 (b), while broad, is limited by principles of 
direct estoppel.[8]  For direct estoppel to bar relief, 'the 
Commonwealth must show that the issues raised in the defendant's 
rule 30 (b) motion were actually litigated and determined 
. . . , that such determination was essential to the defendant's 
conviction, and that the defendant had an opportunity to obtain 
review of the determination.'"  (Citation omitted.)  Sanchez, 
485 Mass. at 498, quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 
707, 710 (2005). 
 
The defendant argued insufficiency of the evidence in two 
of the four motions for a new trial that he filed.  In his 2003 
motion, the defendant argued that the evidence demonstrated at 
                     
 
8 The doctrine of direct estoppel prevents a defendant from 
relitigating an issue that already has been litigated and 
decided between the parties.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 
Mass. 71, 74 n.4 (2000).  In contrast, collateral estoppel (or 
issue preclusion) "provides that 'when an issue of ultimate fact 
has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that 
issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit'" (emphasis added).  Kimbroughtillery v. Commonwealth, 
471 Mass. 507, 509 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 
Mass. 497, 499 (1981). 
11 
 
 
best that Theodore acted as an accessory after the armed robbery 
but failed to prove that he participated in the crime.  The 
defendant went on to reason that because being an accessory to a 
crime is not punishable by life imprisonment, it cannot be a 
predicate for felony-murder.  See G. L. c. 274, § 4.  In the 
2018 motion at issue here, the defendant argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to show that Theodore was even aware that 
an armed robbery had taken place, much less that he participated 
in it.  Although the emphasis of the arguments made in the two 
motions differs slightly, the main thrust of both is that 
because the evidence was insufficient to show that Theodore was 
a joint venturer in the armed robbery committed by the 
defendant, the Commonwealth did not prove that the defendant was 
guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of joint 
venture felony-murder. 
 
In denying the defendant's gatekeeper petition in 
connection with the 2003 motion, the single justice concluded 
that the argument raised was not new, and more importantly,9 that 
it was not substantial.  See Smith, 460 Mass. at 320-321.  The 
single justice addressed the core of the defendant's argument, 
                     
 
9 As discussed supra, because a conviction based on 
insufficient evidence can create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, see Heywood, 484 Mass. at 49 n.7, such a 
claim need not be new to result in a new trial. 
12 
 
 
commenting specifically about Theodore's participation in the 
armed robbery, concluding: 
"The fact that [Theodore] joined in the venture after the 
victim was already in the trunk is not dispositive.  The 
jury could have readily found that the robbery had not 
concluded until the victim was killed and his body 
disposed.  In these circumstances, they were warranted in 
finding that [the defendant] was a joint venturer in the 
felony murder even if [Theodore] actually killed the victim 
and the killing took place after [the defendant] had 
incapacitated the victim pending a decision about what 
should be done to assure a trouble-free getaway." 
 
Thus, the question whether the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to have found that Theodore was a joint venturer in the 
armed robbery undoubtedly has been considered and decided.  The 
defendant therefore is estopped from raising the claim here, 
regardless of the subtle shift in the defendant's theory.10  Cf. 
                     
 
10 Because we hold that the defendant is estopped from again 
raising an insufficiency of the evidence claim, we need not go 
further.  We take this opportunity to note, however, that we 
agree with the observations made by the single justice when he 
denied the defendant's gatekeeper application in 2004.  When 
considering an insufficiency of the evidence claim, we view the 
evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and 
"draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."  
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017).  Even assuming 
that Theodore did not know about the armed robbery when he 
initially joined the defendant and Nelson in the vehicle, the 
jury could have inferred that Theodore became aware that the 
defendant had robbed the victim of his vehicle once the 
defendant gave Theodore the pistol and showed him that the 
victim was locked in the trunk.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
475 Mass. 705, 711 (2016) (defendant's knowledge of weapon and 
continued participation in robbery thereafter sufficient to 
implicate him as joint venturer in armed robbery).  Thus, the 
Commonwealth provided evidence from which a jury could determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Theodore knowingly participated 
in the armed robbery with the defendant and that the victim was 
13 
 
 
Commissioner of Dep't of Employment & Training v. Dugan, 428 
Mass. 138, 143 (1998) (observing that in civil cases, "even if 
there is a lack of total identity between the issues involved in 
two adjudications, the overlap may be so substantial that 
preclusion is plainly appropriate"). 
 
Conclusion.  The motion judge's order granting a new trial 
to the defendant is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
killed in furtherance of that predicate crime.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 272-273 (2015), S.C., 481 
Mass. 794 (2019).