Title: State ex rel. Gilbert v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Gilbert v. Indus. Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 243, 2007-Ohio-6096.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GILBERT, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Gilbert v. Indus. Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 243, 2007-Ohio-
6096.] 
Workers’ compensation—Violation of specific safety requirement—Relevance of 
air-quality testing after exposure to fumes—“Air contaminants”—Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-17(F)(1). 
(No. 2006-1949–Submitted September 11, 2007– Decided November 21, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 05AP-777, 2006-Ohio-4484. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We must determine whether appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio abused its discretion in finding that appellee American Hood Cleaning II, 
Inc. (“AHC”) did not violate former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-17(F)(1), a 
specific safety requirement.  Because we find that the commission did not abuse 
its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} AHC specializes in cleaning commercial kitchen exhaust systems.  
Part of the process involves the use of a chemical stripper to remove accumulated 
grease and dust.  According to AHC President Dan Branigan, the chemical 
stripper was mixed with water and transferred into a container that had a hose and 
a spray nozzle.  The employee was to spray the chemical stripper into the exhaust 
hood by reaching inside a plastic curtain draped around the hood.  A pressure 
washer rinsed off the substance after chemical cleaning was complete.  The 
employee finished by removing the protective plastic curtain and wiping down 
and polishing the unit. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 3} Appellant Harvey Gilbert worked as an exhaust-system cleaner for 
AHC for four years and, before that, had performed the same job for a competitor.  
In 1999, Gilbert began having episodes of itching and hives.  In July 2001, these 
symptoms were accompanied by anaphylaxis.  Dr. D. Ann Middaugh examined 
Gilbert, assessed his history and his reported work environment, and diagnosed a 
restrictive lung disease “likely due to the long term, low level exposures to the 
stripper.” 
{¶ 4} Gilbert filed a workers’ compensation claim, which was allowed 
for “fumes/vapor, chronic respiratory condition and acute bronchiolitis.”  He also 
applied for additional compensation, alleging that AHC had committed numerous 
violations of specific safety requirements (“VSSRs”), including former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-17(F)(1), now 4123:1-5-17(F)(1), which required the 
employer to provide respiratory protection “where there are air contaminants as 
defined in rule 4121:1-5-01 of the Administrative Code.” 
{¶ 5} At a hearing before a commission staff hearing officer, the parties 
agreed that no respirator was provided to Gilbert until after he complained to 
AHC of respiratory problems.  AHC maintained that a respirator had not been 
provided previously because the level of chemical exposure was below the hazard 
threshold.  In support, AHC relied on an air-quality test performed by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) during an AHC 
cleaning job just days after Gilbert’s diagnosis.  That test measured the amounts 
of sodium hydroxide and perchloroethylene in the work environment and 
determined that they were far below the permissible exposure limits as defined by 
the agency. 
{¶ 6} Gilbert disagreed with Branigan’s description of the cleaning 
process and the amount of chemical to which he had been exposed.  He also 
argued that the OSHA test performed after his diagnosis was not evidence of the 
amount of chemicals that he had been exposed to earlier.  He cited the chemical 
January Term, 2007 
3 
stripper’s Material Safety Data Sheet, which indicated that in sufficient 
concentrations, both sodium hydroxide and perchloroethylene can be harmful — a 
point that no one disputes.  Gilbert also relied heavily on Dr. Middaugh’s report, 
which confirmed that Gilbert had an occupational disease caused by chemical 
exposure. 
{¶ 7} On November 29, 2004, the staff hearing officer denied a VSSR 
award: 
{¶ 8} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that regulations of O.A.C. 
4121:1-5-17(F)(1)(2) do not apply.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that air 
sampling performed by OSHA on September 24, 2001 confirms that there were 
not hazardous concentrations of dust, fumes, mist, vapors or gases within the 
definition of ‘air contaminants’ contained in O.A.C. 4121:1-5-01(B)(4) - OSHA 
Air Sampling Results – Kennings Circle K Restaurant.  The Staff Hearing Officer 
finds ‘air contaminants’ as defined under O.A.C. 4121:1-5-01 were not found to 
be present. 
{¶ 9} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the employer complied with 
the specific safety requirement, O.A.C. 4121:1-5-17(F)(1)(2).  The Staff Hearing 
Officer finds that evidence presented does not establish that the proximate cause 
of injured worker’s injuries was employer’s non-compliance with O.A.C. 4121:1-
5-17(F)(1)(2) as alleged by injured worker.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds 
employer was not in violation of O.A.C. 4121:1-5-17(F)(1)(2).” (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 10} Rehearing was denied: 
{¶ 11} “The Staff Hearing Officer does not find an obvious mistake of 
fact or a clear mistake of law.  This Staff Hearing Officer finds that the 
09/24/2001 OSHA report is evidence related to hazardous concentrations of dust, 
fumes, etc.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds no obvious mistake of fact related to 
that OSHA report. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 12} “The Staff Hearing Officer also finds no clear mistake of law.  The 
VSSR Staff Hearing Officer relied on the OSHA report to find the requirements 
of O.A.C. 4121:1-5-01(B)(4) are not met.  The VSSR Staff Hearing Officer 
further found no violation of O.A.C. 4121:1-5-17(F)(1)(2) because the 
requirements of O.A.C. 4121:1-5-01(B)(4) are not met.  This Staff Hearing 
Officer finds no clear mistake of law based on the VSSR Staff Hearing Officer 
analysis.” 
{¶ 13} Gilbert filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, objecting primarily to the commission’s reliance on OSHA data 
obtained after the relevant exposure period.  The magistrate’s analysis focused on 
the definition in former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(B)(74), now 4123:1-5-
01(B)(74), of “hazardous concentrations” as those concentrations “which are 
known to be in excess of those which would not normally result in injury to an 
employee’s health.”  The magistrate found that the commission’s analysis was 
incomplete because it did not address what AHC knew about “the concentrations 
to which relator would be exposed in the performance of his job.”  2006-Ohio-
4484, ¶ 76.  The court of appeals did not adopt this conclusion, finding that the 
employer’s knowledge was irrelevant, since the commission expressly found that 
there were not hazardous concentrations of air contaminants.  Id. at ¶ 13.  The 
court of appeals accordingly denied the writ, prompting Gilbert’s appeal as of 
right to this court. 
{¶ 14} The interpretation of a specific safety requirement lies with the 
commission.  State ex rel. Arce v. Indus. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 90, 822 N.E.2d 
795, ¶ 19.  A VSSR award, however, is a penalty against the employer, so all 
reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety regulation must be 
“construed against its applicability to the employer.”  State ex rel. Burton v. 
Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216. 
{¶ 15} The controversy centers on Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-17(F)(1): 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 16} “(F) Respiratory protection. 
{¶ 17} “(1) Where there are air contaminants as defined in rule 412[3]:1-
5-01 of the Administrative Code, the employer shall provide respiratory 
equipment approved for the hazard.  It shall be the responsibility of the employee 
to use the respirator or respiratory equipment.” 
{¶ 18} “Air contaminants” are “hazardous concentrations of fibrosis-
producing or toxic dusts, toxic fumes, toxic mists, toxic vapors, toxic gases, or 
any combination of them when suspended in the atmosphere.”  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-01(B)(4), 
now 
4123:1-5-01(B)(4). 
“Hazardous 
concentrations,” in turn, are those concentrations “which are known to be in 
excess of those which would not normally result in injury to an employee’s 
health.” (Emphasis added.)  Former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(B)(74), now 
4123:1-5-01(B)(74). 
{¶ 19} Gilbert’s position is essentially this:  I have an occupational 
disease due to chemical exposure; ergo, the level of exposure was hazardous.  
This position, from the outset, conflicts with the definition of “hazardous 
concentrations.”  The definition describes concentrations that would not normally 
cause injury.  As used in that definition, “normally” is a qualifying term.  Inherent 
in the use of this word is the recognition that some persons may have an abnormal 
sensitivity to a given substance, for which the employer could not be held 
accountable. The presence of an occupational disease does not necessarily 
establish that hazardous concentrations of contaminant existed, since a person 
may have contracted an occupational disease because of abnormal sensitivity to or 
because of hazardous concentrations of a contaminant. 
{¶ 20} Gilbert’s logic was previously rejected in State ex rel. Garza v. 
Indus. Comm. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 397, 763 N.E.2d 174.  At issue was whether 
an accident occurred during a press’s “operating cycle.”  Responding to an 
argument similar to Gilbert’s, we wrote: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 21} “These cases can be difficult because of the simple truth 
exemplified by the claim before us:  the press obviously cycled when the 
claimant’s arm was in the danger zone or claimant would not have been hurt. 
{¶ 22} “The claimant’s position reflects this reasoning.  The hidden 
danger in this approach, however, is that, in effect, it declares that because there 
was an injury there was by necessity a VSSR — i.e., someone was injured; 
therefore, the safety device was inadequate.  This violates two workers’ 
compensation tenets: (1) the commission determines the presence or absence of a 
violation and (2) all reasonable doubts as to a specific safety requirement’s 
applicability must be resolved in the employer’s favor.”  (Emphasis sic.)   Id. at 
400, 763 N.E.2d 174. 
{¶ 23} Garza was overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Advanced 
Metal Precision Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 109, 2006-Ohio-
5336, 855 N.E.2d 435, but its discussion on this point is still viable.  To hold that 
the mere presence of an occupational disease establishes that a VSSR occurred 
would in effect impose strict liability on an employer, contrary to a long line of 
cases.  See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.D. Prods. v. Stebbins (1975) 43 Ohio St.2d 114, 
72 O.O.2d 63, 330 N.E.2d 904; State ex rel. Taylor v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 445, 639 N.E.2d 101; State ex rel. S & Z Tool & Die Co. v. Indus. 
Comm. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 288, 703 N.E.2d 779.  We have recognized “the 
practical impossibility of guaranteeing that a device will protect against all 
contingencies.”  State ex rel. Jeep Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
83, 84, 537 N.E.2d 215, citing State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 
Ohio St.3d 152, 12 OBR 223, 465 N.E.2d 1286.  The purpose of specific safety 
requirements is to “provid[e] reasonable, not absolute safety for employees.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 24} Specific safety requirements, moreover, must contain “specific and 
definite requirements or standards of conduct * * * which are of a character 
January Term, 2007 
7 
plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligations toward his employees.”  
State ex rel. Holdosh v. Indus. Comm. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 179, 182, 36 O.O. 
516, 78 N.E.2d 165.  A specific standard, however, cannot arise from individual 
susceptibility.  There must be a quantifiable baseline from which the employer 
can work in order to measure compliance.  The baseline cannot vary from 
employee to employee. 
{¶ 25} Consistent with this premise, the commission used as its standard 
OSHA’s 
limits 
on 
permissible 
exposure 
for 
sodium 
hydroxide 
and 
perchloroethylene.  Permissible levels are 2.00 mg/m3 and 200 ppm, respectively.  
OSHA testing during cleaning by an AHC crew disclosed much lower 
concentrations, with sodium hydroxide at .01 mg/m3 and perchloroethylene at 
only 6 ppm.  Relying on this data, the commission found no hazardous 
concentration of air contaminants and hence no duty on the employer to provide 
respiratory protection under Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-17(F)(1). 
{¶ 26} Gilbert objects vigorously to this data, arguing that the sampling 
was done after his exposure period and thus is irrelevant to the amount of 
exposure he encountered prior to his diagnosis.  We reject this argument.  In some 
cases, testing after the injurious exposure will be irrelevant because the work 
environment has changed.  New exhaust systems may have been installed, 
ventilation may have been improved, or other safety initiatives may have been put 
into place.  On the other hand, where the test environment replicates the earlier 
exposure conditions, the testing results may be significant. 
{¶ 27} The varying facts that may exist underscore the importance of 
preserving the commission’s evidentiary discretion and authority.  Many times, 
contemporaneous air-sampling data will not be available because — absent a duty 
to monitor — employers may assume that air quality is satisfactory until alerted 
otherwise.  Consequently, in some situations, the only test results available will be 
either from a prior test or from a test performed after a problem has been alleged.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
For this reason, it is crucial to maintain the commission’s ability to evaluate each 
situation individually in order to determine whether a particular test result is 
relevant to the claim being made. 
{¶ 28} In this case, Gilbert was diagnosed on September 5, 2001.  The 
OSHA air-quality test was done on September 24, 2001, just 19 days later.  The 
commission had the evidentiary discretion to conclude that this test was 
representative of the amount of contaminants to which AHC’s cleaning procedure 
generally exposed employees.  This data, therefore, provided the requisite 
evidence to support the conclusion that Gilbert was not exposed to hazardous 
concentrations of air contaminants. 
{¶ 29} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Harris & Burgin, L.P.A., and Jeffrey W. Harris, for appellant. 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Brian P. Perry, for appellee American 
Hood Cleaning II, Inc. 
______________________