Title: Coburn v. Coburn

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

William E. Coburn, Jr. v. Marcia Coburn - No. 85, 1995 Term
EVIDENCE - Domestic Abuse -- In a domestic abuse protective order
hearing, evidence of prior abusive acts is admissible to establish
the need for protection and the appropriate remedy.
William E. Coburn, Jr. v. Marcia Coburn - No. 85, 1995 Term
EVIDENCE - Domestic Abuse -- In a domestic abuse protective order
hearing, evidence of prior abusive acts is admissible to establish
the need for protection and the appropriate remedy.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 85
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
WILLIAM E. COBURN, JR.
v.
MARCIA COBURN
___________________________________
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
McAuliffe, John F.
 (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  April 17, 1996       
          
We are called on in this case to determine whether evidence of
alleged prior abusive acts is admissible in a protective order
hearing pursuant to Maryland's domestic violence statute, Maryland
Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Family Law Article, §§ 4-
501 through 4-516.  We hold that such evidence is admissible in
light of the remedial purpose of the domestic violence statute and
affirm the decision of the circuit court.
I.
The instant case arose out of a petition for protection from
domestic violence filed by Marcia Coburn against her estranged
husband, William E. Coburn, Jr.  The petition was filed pro se on
March 3, 1995 in the District Court of Maryland sitting in
Baltimore City.  It alleged that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn
slapped, punched, and threatened Ms. Coburn.  Ms. Coburn also noted
in the space provided for "other injuries" that she had been the
victim of past abuse by Mr. Coburn sometime in July of the previous
year, that an ex parte order had been granted and extended several
times, and that Mr. Coburn had harassed her over the telephone at
her place of employment.  
In response to Ms. Coburn's petition, the District Court
issued a temporary ex parte order for protection from abuse and
scheduled a final protective order hearing for March 10, 1995.  The
court found that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn shoved Ms. Coburn
against a car, hit her in the face open-handed, chased her, and
-2-
     Ms. Coburn testified at the hearing that on July 3, 1994, Mr.
1
Coburn punched her in the face and threw her down a flight of
stairs.  Ms. Coburn also alleged that on July 25, 1994, Mr. Coburn
made harassing telephone calls at her work threatening to kill her.
Finally, Ms. Coburn testified that on November 9, 1994, Mr. Coburn
attempted to run her off the Baltimore Beltway. 
then punched her in the back of her head.  The judge also noted a
"history of abuse" on the ex parte order.   
Mr. Coburn, although served with the ex parte order, failed to
appear at the March 10, 1995 protective order hearing.  The
District Court granted a final protective order in favor of Ms.
Coburn effective through September 26, 1995.  The judge noted on
the order that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn pushed, shoved,
punched, and threatened to shoot Ms. Coburn.  The order did not,
however, mention any incidents of past abuse other than the
February 25, 1995 occurrence.
Mr. Coburn appealed the decision and a de novo protective
order hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  In
addition to the alleged abuse occurring on February 25, 1995, the
Honorable Kathleen O'Ferrall Friedman heard testimony from Ms.
Coburn concerning alleged prior instances of abuse occurring on
July 3, July 25, and November 9 of 1994.   A police officer who
1
witnessed part of the November 9, 1994 incident also testified.
Mr. Coburn repeatedly objected to the admission of evidence of past
abuse, but the judge allowed the testimony.  Judge Friedman asked,
"do you understand this is not a criminal case, that this is a
-3-
domestic violence case?  Prior injuries that have been caused by
the same respondent are relevant in a domestic violence case."  At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found in favor of Ms.
Coburn and granted her request for protection.  The judge
summarized her findings on the protective order as follows: "On
2/25/95 [Mr. Coburn] hit, punched and threatened [Ms. Coburn].  On
previous occasions he has abused her and put her safety in
jeopardy."
Mr. Coburn petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this Court,
contending that the issue before Judge Friedman was limited to
whether Mr. Coburn abused Ms. Coburn on February 25, 1995 and that
accordingly, evidence of alleged instances of prior abuse was
inadmissible.  We granted certiorari to consider whether a trial
judge may admit evidence of alleged prior abuse in a protective
order hearing under the domestic violence statute.  We hold that
due to the remedial, preventive purpose of this legislation,
evidence of alleged past abuse is highly relevant to establish the
need for protection and the appropriate remedy, and thus is
admissible in a protective order hearing.
II.
Preliminarily, we note that the instant case is moot because
the final protective order at issue expired on September 26, 1995.
A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy
between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the
-4-
     Unless otherwise provided, all statutory citations herein are
2
to Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Family Law
Article.
court cannot provide an effective remedy.  Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md.
371, 375, 564 A.2d 395, 397 (1989).  Generally, a moot case is
dismissed without our deciding the merits of the controversy.
State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (1989).  This
Court in rare instances, however, may address the merits of a moot
case if we are convinced that the case presents unresolved issues
in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will
establish a rule for future conduct.  See Peterson, 315 Md. at 82-
83, 553 A.2d at 677.  We stated in Lloyd v. Supervisors of
Elections, 206 Md. 36, 111 A.2d at 379 (1954), that if "the matter
involved is likely to recur frequently" and "the same difficulty
which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is
likely again to prevent a decision," we would be justified in
deciding a moot issue.  206 Md. at 43, 111 A.2d at 382.
We exercise our discretion to decide the issue raised in the
instant case because it is likely to recur frequently but will
escape judicial review by this Court due to the limited duration of
protective orders.  See § 4-506(g)(protective orders not to exceed
200 days in duration).   In addition, the issue involves
2
construction of a statute routinely applied by courts of this
state, and our interpretation of it will assist judges in
determining whether victims of abuse are in need of protection.
-5-
     Although we recognize that men can also be victims of
3
domestic abuse, it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, the
victims are female.  Developments in the Law -- Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 n.1 (1993);
Catherine F. Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 808 (1993).  It has been suggested that between
one-third and one-half of all female murder victims are killed by
their male partners, compared with a mere four percent of male
victims, and between 22 and 35 percent of all injuries in emergency
room visits by females are from domestic assaults.  Nancy Gibbs,
'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 41.  We do not
in any way mean to diminish the severity of abuse of male victims.
Clearly, our interpretation of the domestic violence statute in the
instant case is gender-neutral.
See Peterson, 315 Md. at 85, 553 A.2d at 678.  Because the issue is
of public importance, we find more than adequate justification in
proceeding to review the merits.  
III.
A.
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in
this country.   Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23
3
CONN. L. REV. 973, 981 (1991).  According to some estimates, there
are approximately four million incidents of domestic violence
against women annually.  Developments in the Law -- Legal Responses
to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993).  The
problem of domestic abuse, however, remained largely ignored by our
society until the last two decades, when national efforts toward
legal and social reform began to surface.  See Developments in the
Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. at 1502, 1505 n.1; Catherine F. Klein and
-6-
     We note that despite the significant progress that has been
4
made in the domestic violence arena, there is still ample room for
further legal and social reform.  Domestic abuse remains a
prevalent national problem today.
     The statute was enacted by Chapter 887 of the Acts of 1980
5
and was originally codified as Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.,
1980 Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 4-501 through
4-506.  In 1984, the statute was repealed by Chapter 296, § 1 of
the Acts of 1984, and was reenacted in the Family Law Article, §§
4-501 through 4-516.
     The General Assembly further evinced its understanding of the
6
serious and potentially life-threatening situations that victims of
domestic abuse face by implementing a state-wide program to provide
shelter, counseling, information, referral and rehabilitation to
victims of domestic violence and their children.  See §§ 4-513
Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810
(1993).  Since then, domestic abuse has gained widespread public
attention.  Social service agencies developed battered women's
shelters and hotlines, and state legislatures recognized that
domestic violence needed to be adequately addressed.   See The
4
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. at 974.  
B.
It is against this background that in 1980 the Maryland
General Assembly enacted the domestic violence statute (the
statute).  §§ 4-501 through 4-516.   The statute grants courts the
5
power to issue civil protection orders, which can prohibit a
perpetrator of domestic violence from, among other things, abusing,
contacting or harassing the victim.   See §§ 4-505 and 4-506.
6
-7-
through 516.
Through the statute, victims of domestic abuse are offered access
to the judicial system to seek emergency relief and protection from
their abusers.  It has been reported that fourteen-thousand victims
sought relief from abuse through filing petitions for temporary
protective orders in the courts of this state in 1994 alone.
Christina Asquith, Domestic Abuse Cases Multiply, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
November 5, 1995, at 1C, col. 7.
The purpose of the domestic abuse statute is to protect and
"aid victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and
effective" remedy.  Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623, 537 A.2d
224, 225 (1988).  The statute provides for a wide variety and scope
of available remedies designed to separate the parties and avoid
future abuse.  Thus, the primary goals of the statute are
preventive, protective and remedial, not punitive.  The legislature
did not design the statute as punishment for past conduct; it was
instead intended to prevent further harm to the victim.  
C.
The statute defines "abuse" as an act that causes serious
bodily harm or places a person eligible for relief in fear of
imminent serious bodily harm, battery, assault and battery, rape,
sexual offense, or false imprisonment.  § 4-501(b)(1).  Individuals
at risk of domestic violence are covered under the statute as
-8-
     Because under the statute, the term "petitioner" refers to
7
the person seeking protection from domestic violence, § 4-501(i),
and the term "respondent" refers to the alleged abuser, § 4-501(j),
we shall use these terms and their corresponding definitions in
this opinion for the sake of clarity.  Although Mr. Coburn is
actually the Petitioner and Ms. Coburn is the Respondent on
petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, we refer to them
as such only in our mandate.
     Filing a petition for protection from abuse does not initiate
8
divorce proceedings, award permanent custody of children, issue a
restraining order, or file criminal charges.  Christopher L. Beard
and Jacqueline J. Judd, Victims No More: Changes in Domestic
Violence Law, 25 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 29, 30 (July/August 1992).
"person[s] eligible for relief" and include current or former
spouses, cohabitants, relatives by blood, marriage or adoption,
parents, stepparents, children or stepchildren, individuals who
reside or resided with an alleged abuser for at least 90 days out
of the last year before filing a petition, vulnerable adults, and
individuals who have a child in common with an alleged abuser.  §
4-501(h).
  
Section 4-504 of the statute authorizes a person eligible for
relief (petitioner) to file a petition alleging abuse against the
alleged abuser (respondent)  and requesting immediate and temporary
7
relief from the violence.   § 4-504(a).  A petition may be filed in
8
either a circuit court or District Court.  § 4-501(d).  The statute
requires that the petition be under oath, § 4-504(b)(i), include
information of prior or pending action between the parties in any
court, provide the nature and extent of the abuse for which relief
is being sought, state any previous injury resulting from abuse by
the respondent, and provide the whereabouts of the respondent, if
-9-
     A special ad hoc committee, chaired by Judge Mary Ellen T.
9
Rinehardt, Administrative Judge of the District Court of Maryland
sitting in Baltimore City, was created by Chief Judge Robert C.
Murphy in 1992 to address concerns over implementation of the
domestic violence statute.  Martha F. Rasin, The New Domestic
Violence Law's Surprising Track Record, 26 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 30,
32 (November/December 1993).  The committee devised a uniform set
of forms for utilization by both the District and circuit courts to
implement the domestic violence law.  See id.  These forms include:
Petition for Protection From Domestic Violence, Child Abuse,
Vulnerable Adult Abuse; Ex Parte Order for Protection from Abuse;
Protective Order; Petition to Modify/Rescind Protective Order;
Order as to Rescission or Modification; and Petition for Contempt.
See JOHN F. FADER, II AND RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW, at 283
(2d ed. Michie 1995).
known, to facilitate service.  § 4-504(b)(ii).  The court can waive
the filing fee where appropriate.  § 4-504(c).
Since relief under the statute is designed to be available for
pro se applicants, standard petition forms are provided and kept
readily available by the courts.   These pre-printed forms aid
9
potential petitioners who are not familiar with the specific
requirements of the statute.  The forms provide space for a
petitioner to describe, inter alia, the alleged abusive act or acts
that occurred and any resulting injuries.  A petitioner can then
check the desired types of relief on the back of the petition.  In
addition, a petition form requests that a petitioner include and
describe information "of other injuries the [r]espondent has caused
the victim in this case."  Petition for Protection, Form DV-1.
Once a § 4-504 petition is filed, the petitioner appears
before a judge for an ex parte hearing.   § 4-505(a)(1).  At the
hearing, the presiding judge may enter a temporary order to protect
-10-
a petitioner from abuse and grant emergency relief if the judge
finds that there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that abuse
occurred.   § 4-505(a)(1).  To support the allegations of abuse,
the victim may present the court with photographs, medical records,
witnesses, the victim's own testimony or any other available proof.
See, e.g., Christopher L. Beard and Jacqueline J. Judd, Victims No
More: Changes in Domestic Violence Law, 25 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 29,
30 (July/August 1992).  The statute gives the court discretion to
determine whether to issue an ex parte protective order based on
the affidavit, testimony and other facts presented.  If abuse is
found, the judge may order that a respondent refrain from abusing,
contacting or harassing a petitioner, from entering a petitioner's
residence and place of employment, and may additionally award
temporary use and possession of the home and temporary custody of
any minor children.  § 4-505(a)(2).  
The temporary order also states the time and date of a second
hearing to determine if a final protective order should be issued.
See § 4-506(a) and (b).  The ex parte order expires a maximum of
seven days after a law enforcement officer serves a respondent, and
can be extended only up to 30 days in order to effectuate service
on the respondent.  See § 4-505(b) and (c).  It is not until the
second, full hearing, held within seven days of service of the
temporary order on the respondent, that the court can grant
extended relief to the victim for up to 200 days.  See § 4-506(g).
-11-
At the second hearing, the alleged abuser is given an
opportunity to contest the allegations of abuse and be heard on the
issue of whether a final protective order should be granted to the
petitioner.  § 4-506(a).  Even if the respondent fails to appear at
the hearing, as in the instant case, the court may issue a final
protective order based on evidence presented by the petitioner, as
long as the respondent has been served with the temporary
protective order or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction
over the respondent.  See § 4-506 (c)(1).  
The court is authorized to grant a final protective order, not
to exceed 200 days, § 4-506(g), if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that abuse occurred.  § 4-506(c)(1)(ii).  The
court may, in addition to ordering any or all of the remedies
available for the temporary order, establish temporary visitation
with a minor child, direct the respondent to participate in a
domestic violence program or counseling, award emergency family
maintenance and temporary use and possession of a jointly owned
vehicle, and order the respondent to pay court costs.  § 4-506(d).
The statute provides for modification or rescission of the
protective order within the duration of the order after notice to
both parties and a hearing.  § 4-507(a).  A de novo appeal in the
circuit court from the District Court's order is available to
either a petitioner or respondent.  § 4-507(b)(2).  See also
Barbee, supra.  The District Court protective order remains in
-12-
effect pending appeal.  See Maryland Rule 7-112(b).
IV.
A.
To determine whether evidence of past abuse is admissible in
a protective order hearing, it is essential that we look to the
legislature's purpose in adopting the domestic violence statute.
This Court has made clear that the cardinal rule in construing any
statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature.  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429
(1995).  The primary source from which to determine this intent is
the language of the statute itself.  Vest v. Giant Food Stores,
Inc., 329 Md. 461, 466, 620 A.2d 340, 342 (1993).  In seeking out
the legislative intent, we examine the statute as a whole,
considering the interrelationship or connection among all of its
provisions.  Vest, 329 Md. at 466-67, 620 A.2d at 342.
Furthermore, remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to
"suppress the evil and advance the remedy."  Harrison v. Pilli, 321
Md. 336, 341, 582 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1990).  With these principals in
mind, we turn to the domestic violence statute.    
Section 4-506 does not specifically address what evidence is
admissible in a final protective order hearing.  It provides that
"if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged abuse has occurred" it may grant a protective order.  § 4-
-13-
506(c)(1)(ii)(emphasis added).  This section also lists a number of
factors for a judge to assess in determining whether to order a
respondent to vacate the home, § 4-506(e), and includes "the
history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the
respondent 
and 
any 
person 
eligible 
for 
relief." 
 
§ 4-
506(e)(5)(emphasis added).  The only other language concerning
evidence found in the statute provides that a petition for
temporary relief from abuse shall include information concerning
"the nature and extent of the abuse for which the relief is being
sought, including information known to the petitioner concerning
previous injury resulting from abuse by the respondent."  § 4-
504(b)(ii)(1) (emphasis added).  The language found in both
sections indicates that the legislature recognized the importance
of evidence of a pattern of abuse in determining the need for
protection against future abuse.  To allow evidence of past injury
to be admitted at the ex parte hearing for temporary relief, but
preclude its introduction at the final protective order hearing
would be illogical and in contradiction with the principles of
statutory construction outlined above.  To deprive a petitioner of
the use of that evidence to show the need for appropriate remedies,
other than vacation of the home, would also be illogical and would
totally eviscerate the preventive purpose of the statute.  In
construing the statute as a whole, we believe the legislature
intended for evidence of past abuse, in addition to evidence of the
-14-
abuse that led to the filing of the ex parte petition, to be
admissible at both temporary and final protective order hearings.
This result is consistent with the protective design of the
legislation and works to "suppress the evil and advance the
remedy."  See Harrison, 321 Md. at 341, 582 A.2d at 1234.
B.
We next address Mr. Coburn's argument that evidence of alleged
past abuse between a petitioner and respondent is irrelevant in a
final protective order hearing because the only question at issue
is whether the one incident of abuse that led to the filing of the
ex parte petition occurred.  We disagree with Mr. Coburn.
The purpose of the final protective order hearing is to
determine whether a final protective order should be issued, not
solely to prove that a single act of abuse occurred.  In
determining whether to issue a protective order, the judge should
consider not only evidence of the most recent incident of abuse,
but prior incidents which may tend to show a pattern of abuse.
Allegations of past abuse provide the court with additional
evidence that may be relevant in assessing the seriousness of the
abuse and determining appropriate remedies.  The legislature
expressly recognized this by including the history of abuse between
the parties as a factor in ordering at least one remedy, vacation
of the home.  See § 4-506(e)(5).  Admitting prior acts of abuse
-15-
aids in assessing the need for immediate and future protection.
The fact that there is a history of prior abusive acts implies that
there is a stronger likelihood of future abuse.  See Cruz-Foster v.
Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.App. 1991)("[A] defendant's past
conduct is important evidence -- perhaps the most important -- in
predicting his probable future conduct."); Providing Legal
Protection For Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 900 ("Due to the
cyclical nature of domestic violence, introduction of evidence of
the relationship's history of abuse ... is vital in allowing a
court to fully comprehend the risk posed to a particular
petitioner.")(footnote omitted).  Thus, there is a corresponding
need for more severe remedies.
One act of abuse may not warrant the same remedy as if there
is a pattern of abuse between the parties.  Different remedies are
required when there has been an isolated act of abuse that is
unlikely to recur, as compared to an egregious act of abuse
preceded by a pattern of abuse.  The more abuse that occurred in
the past, the higher the likelihood that future acts of abuse will
occur and thus, the need for greater protective measures.  Thus,
the statute appropriately gives discretion to the trial judge to
choose from a wide variety of available remedies in order to
determine what is appropriate and necessary according to the
particular facts of that case.  See § 4-506(d).  Evidence of prior
incidents of abuse is therefore highly relevant both in assessing
-16-
whether or not to issue a protective order and in determining what
type of remedies are appropriate under the circumstances.  See
Providing Legal Protection For Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at
901.
We believe that excluding evidence of past abuse would violate
the fundamental purpose of the statute, which is to prevent future
abuse.  The statute was not intended to be punitive.  Its primary
aim is to protect victims, not punish abusers.  Whether a
respondent has previously abused a petitioner is important and
probative evidence in determining the appropriate remedies.
Protective orders are based on the premise that a person who has
abused before is likely to do so again, and the state should offer
the victim protection from further violence.
In holding that evidence of past abuse is relevant in
determining the present need for a protective order, this Court
follows the trend of many jurisdictions.  See Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d
at 930 (considering past history of abuse to be critical in
determining whether "good cause" exists for extending a protective
order); Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989)("Past abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor
in determining cause for protection."); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793
S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(noting that trial court
determines potential for violence based in part on past incidents
of abuse or threatened abuse); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1208
-17-
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992)(recognizing that a history of domestic
violence between the parties is an evidentiary consideration under
domestic violence statute); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 81
(N.D. 1992)("[P]ast actions act as relevant and pragmatic evidence
in assisting the court's determination of whether domestic violence
is actual or imminent" and the court may consider past action as
evidence "of what might occur in the future."); Snyder v. Snyder,
629 A.2d 977, 981-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)(holding that incidents
of prior abuse are admissible in protective order hearings even if
not pleaded in original petition); Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d
532, 535 (Utah App. 1992)(holding that individuals who are
"reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct
coupled with a present threat of future harm" are protected by the
protective order statute).  See also Providing Legal Protection For
Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 900-04.
C.
Alternatively, Mr. Coburn argues that evidence of prior
abusive acts is inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b).  The rule
prohibits admission of evidence of prior bad acts to prove that the
person acted in conformity with those acts, subject to certain
exceptions.  We hold that this rule is inapplicable here because
the purpose of admitting evidence of prior abuse in a domestic
violence protective order hearing is not to prove that a respondent
-18-
     We need not consider whether evidence of prior abuse may be
10
admissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b) for purposes such as proof
of motive, intent, or absence of mistake or accident.  See 5 LYNN
MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 353 (1987).
has acted in conformity with those prior acts, but instead to prove
the likelihood of future abuse.   
10
The policy consideration underlying the general prohibition
against admission of evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is that
such evidence tends to prejudice the defendant because the trier of
fact will improperly use the evidence to determine the ultimate
issue of guilt.  See Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233,
1238 (1993).  This rationale does not apply in a civil protective
order hearing where the ultimate issue is what, if any, remedy is
necessary to protect the petitioner based on the likelihood of
future abuse.  Evidence of past abusive acts is admissible to show
that abuse is likely to recur and to help the court determine what
remedies will adequately prevent future abuse.  Hence, Md. Rule 5-
404(b) is inapplicable and evidence of prior incidents of abuse is
admissible.
Although not raised by Ms. Coburn, we note that evidence of
specific past acts may be admissible under Md. Rule 5-405 because
a respondent's character as an abuser may be at issue, tending to
establish the potential for future abuse.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 187, at 789-91 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).  Section (b)
of Md. Rule 5-405 provides that "[i]n cases in which character or
-19-
     Although a court may, in its discretion, grant a brief recess
11
so that a respondent can secure proffered evidence or testimony,
the court must be cognizant of the problems a recess or continuance
might cause a petitioner.  See generally Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1056-57.  The protective
order hearing comes before the court upon the expiration of the
temporary ex parte order and therefore a petitioner would be
without judicial protection if the court were to grant an extended
continuance.  Accordingly, when lack of notice could prejudice a
respondent, the judge should generally grant the briefest recess or
continuance necessary to permit the respondent to summons proffered
rebuttal witnesses or secure proffered rebuttal evidence. 
a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of relevant
specific instances of that person's conduct." 
  
D.
Lastly, Mr. Coburn asserts that he was denied due process of
law because he was not given notice that evidence of alleged prior
abusive acts would be introduced at the hearing.  Ms. Coburn
responds in her brief that "Mr. Coburn did not request a
continuance at trial to allow him additional time to prepare a
response to the allegations of past abuse."  There may be instances
where there is no advance notice of the introduction of alleged
prior abusive acts and due process may require a brief recess to
allow time for a respondent to call witnesses or acquire evidence
to rebut or defend against those allegations.   See, e.g., Snyder,
11
629 A.2d at 982 n.3.  In general, however, a respondent is put on
notice that acts of alleged past abuse can be introduced at a
-20-
protective order hearing when a petitioner files an ex parte
petition for protection.  A petitioner should also, whenever
possible, allege all instances of past abuse on the ex parte
petition that might be offered in later court hearings.
Failure to list every allegation of past abuse will not
prevent such evidence from being admitted.  Such a requirement
would place a burden too onerous on a petitioner filing pro se.  We
hold that generally, an ex parte petition should indicate prior
incidents of abuse to serve as a form of notice to the respondent,
but the absence of that information will not preclude a petitioner
from introducing evidence of prior incidents of abuse absent clear
prejudice to the respondent.  Such prejudice was not established in
the case sub judice.
In the instant case, Ms. Coburn alleged on the ex parte
petition that previous abusive acts by Mr. Coburn included:
"[a]buse in July complaint number 94-1840636, Ex parte taken
extended four times.  [Mr. Coburn] evaded service at work.
Telephone misuse complaint by my employer 7/25/94."  In addition,
the judge noted a "[h]istory of abuse.  Crim[inal] charges filed
and cross-complaint" on the ex parte order.  Under these particular
circumstances, Mr. Coburn had sufficient notice that some evidence
of prior abuse would be introduced.  Although Ms. Coburn's petition
should not be used as a model, it adequately averred that Mr.
Coburn had previously threatened to or did abuse her in the past.
-21-
 
V.
We hold that allegations of a prior history of abuse are
admissible at a protective order hearing regardless of whether such
allegations were sufficiently pleaded in the original petition for
protection.  We do not believe the legislature intended to limit
the evidence at a protective order hearing to the specific
allegation of abuse that led to the filing of the ex parte
petition.  Such a result would be directly contrary to the remedial
and preventive purpose of the statute.  Evidence of past abuse is
often the most indicative evidence of the likelihood of future
abuse.  Such evidence assists a judge in understanding the context
in which the present allegation of abuse occurred and helps that
judge formulate an appropriate remedy in order to adequately
protect the victim. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 85
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
WILLIAM E. COBURN, JR.
-22-
v.
MARCIA COBURN
___________________________________
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
McAuliffe, John F.
 (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  April 17, 1996       
          
We are called on in this case to determine whether evidence of
alleged prior abusive acts is admissible in a protective order
hearing pursuant to Maryland's domestic violence statute, Maryland
Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Family Law Article, §§ 4-
501 through 4-516.  We hold that such evidence is admissible in
light of the remedial purpose of the domestic violence statute and
affirm the decision of the circuit court.
I.
The instant case arose out of a petition for protection from
domestic violence filed by Marcia Coburn against her estranged
husband, William E. Coburn, Jr.  The petition was filed pro se on
March 3, 1995 in the District Court of Maryland sitting in
Baltimore City.  It alleged that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn
slapped, punched, and threatened Ms. Coburn.  Ms. Coburn also noted
in the space provided for "other injuries" that she had been the
victim of past abuse by Mr. Coburn sometime in July of the previous
year, that an ex parte order had been granted and extended several
times, and that Mr. Coburn had harassed her over the telephone at
her place of employment.  
In response to Ms. Coburn's petition, the District Court
issued a temporary ex parte order for protection from abuse and
scheduled a final protective order hearing for March 10, 1995.  The
court found that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn shoved Ms. Coburn
against a car, hit her in the face open-handed, chased her, and
-2-
     Ms. Coburn testified at the hearing that on July 3, 1994, Mr.
12
Coburn punched her in the face and threw her down a flight of
stairs.  Ms. Coburn also alleged that on July 25, 1994, Mr. Coburn
made harassing telephone calls at her work threatening to kill her.
Finally, Ms. Coburn testified that on November 9, 1994, Mr. Coburn
attempted to run her off the Baltimore Beltway. 
then punched her in the back of her head.  The judge also noted a
"history of abuse" on the ex parte order.   
Mr. Coburn, although served with the ex parte order, failed to
appear at the March 10, 1995 protective order hearing.  The
District Court granted a final protective order in favor of Ms.
Coburn effective through September 26, 1995.  The judge noted on
the order that on February 25, 1995, Mr. Coburn pushed, shoved,
punched, and threatened to shoot Ms. Coburn.  The order did not,
however, mention any incidents of past abuse other than the
February 25, 1995 occurrence.
Mr. Coburn appealed the decision and a de novo protective
order hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  In
addition to the alleged abuse occurring on February 25, 1995, the
Honorable Kathleen O'Ferrall Friedman heard testimony from Ms.
Coburn concerning alleged prior instances of abuse occurring on
July 3, July 25, and November 9 of 1994.   A police officer who
12
witnessed part of the November 9, 1994 incident also testified.
Mr. Coburn repeatedly objected to the admission of evidence of past
abuse, but the judge allowed the testimony.  Judge Friedman asked,
"do you understand this is not a criminal case, that this is a
-3-
domestic violence case?  Prior injuries that have been caused by
the same respondent are relevant in a domestic violence case."  At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found in favor of Ms.
Coburn and granted her request for protection.  The judge
summarized her findings on the protective order as follows: "On
2/25/95 [Mr. Coburn] hit, punched and threatened [Ms. Coburn].  On
previous occasions he has abused her and put her safety in
jeopardy."
Mr. Coburn petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this Court,
contending that the issue before Judge Friedman was limited to
whether Mr. Coburn abused Ms. Coburn on February 25, 1995 and that
accordingly, evidence of alleged instances of prior abuse was
inadmissible.  We granted certiorari to consider whether a trial
judge may admit evidence of alleged prior abuse in a protective
order hearing under the domestic violence statute.  We hold that
due to the remedial, preventive purpose of this legislation,
evidence of alleged past abuse is highly relevant to establish the
need for protection and the appropriate remedy, and thus is
admissible in a protective order hearing.
II.
Preliminarily, we note that the instant case is moot because
the final protective order at issue expired on September 26, 1995.
A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy
between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the
-4-
     Unless otherwise provided, all statutory citations herein are
13
to Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Family Law
Article.
court cannot provide an effective remedy.  Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md.
371, 375, 564 A.2d 395, 397 (1989).  Generally, a moot case is
dismissed without our deciding the merits of the controversy.
State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (1989).  This
Court in rare instances, however, may address the merits of a moot
case if we are convinced that the case presents unresolved issues
in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will
establish a rule for future conduct.  See Peterson, 315 Md. at 82-
83, 553 A.2d at 677.  We stated in Lloyd v. Supervisors of
Elections, 206 Md. 36, 111 A.2d at 379 (1954), that if "the matter
involved is likely to recur frequently" and "the same difficulty
which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is
likely again to prevent a decision," we would be justified in
deciding a moot issue.  206 Md. at 43, 111 A.2d at 382.
We exercise our discretion to decide the issue raised in the
instant case because it is likely to recur frequently but will
escape judicial review by this Court due to the limited duration of
protective orders.  See § 4-506(g)(protective orders not to exceed
200 days in duration).   In addition, the issue involves
13
construction of a statute routinely applied by courts of this
state, and our interpretation of it will assist judges in
determining whether victims of abuse are in need of protection.
-5-
     
Although we recognize that men can also be victims of
14
domestic abuse, it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, the
victims are female.  Developments in the Law -- Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 n.1 (1993);
Catherine F. Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 808 (1993).  It has been suggested that between
one-third and one-half of all female murder victims are killed by
their male partners, compared with a mere four percent of male
victims, and between 22 and 35 percent of all injuries in emergency
room visits by females are from domestic assaults.  Nancy Gibbs,
'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 41.  We do not
in any way mean to diminish the severity of abuse of male victims.
Clearly, our interpretation of the domestic violence statute in the
instant case is gender-neutral.
See Peterson, 315 Md. at 85, 553 A.2d at 678.  Because the issue is
of public importance, we find more than adequate justification in
proceeding to review the merits.  
III.
A.
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in
this country.   Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy,
14
23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 981 (1991).  According to some estimates,
there are approximately four million incidents of domestic violence
against women annually.  Developments in the Law -- Legal Responses
to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993).  The
problem of domestic abuse, however, remained largely ignored by our
society until the last two decades, when national efforts toward
legal and social reform began to surface.  See Developments in the
Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. at 1502, 1505 n.1; Catherine F. Klein and
-6-
     We note that despite the significant progress that has been
15
made in the domestic violence arena, there is still ample room for
further legal and social reform.  Domestic abuse remains a
prevalent national problem today.
     
The statute was enacted by Chapter 887 of the Acts of 1980
16
and was originally codified as Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.,
1980 Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 4-501 through
4-506.  In 1984, the statute was repealed by Chapter 296, § 1 of
the Acts of 1984, and was reenacted in the Family Law Article, §§
4-501 through 4-516.
     The General Assembly further evinced its understanding of the
17
serious and potentially life-threatening situations that victims of
domestic abuse face by implementing a state-wide program to provide
shelter, counseling, information, referral and rehabilitation to
victims of domestic violence and their children.  See §§ 4-513
Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810
(1993).  Since then, domestic abuse has gained widespread public
attention.  Social service agencies developed battered women's
shelters and hotlines, and state legislatures recognized that
domestic violence needed to be adequately addressed.   See The
15
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. at 974.  
B.
It is against this background that in 1980 the Maryland
General Assembly enacted the domestic violence statute (the
statute).  §§ 4-501 through 4-516.   The statute grants courts the
16
power to issue civil protection orders, which can prohibit a
perpetrator of domestic violence from, among other things, abusing,
contacting or harassing the victim.   See §§ 4-505 and 4-506.
17
-7-
through 516.
Through the statute, victims of domestic abuse are offered access
to the judicial system to seek emergency relief and protection from
their abusers.  It has been reported that fourteen-thousand victims
sought relief from abuse through filing petitions for temporary
protective orders in the courts of this state in 1994 alone.
Christina Asquith, Domestic Abuse Cases Multiply, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
November 5, 1995, at 1C, col. 7.
The purpose of the domestic abuse statute is to protect and
"aid victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and
effective" remedy.  Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623, 537 A.2d
224, 225 (1988).  The statute provides for a wide variety and scope
of available remedies designed to separate the parties and avoid
future abuse.  Thus, the primary goals of the statute are
preventive, protective and remedial, not punitive.  The legislature
did not design the statute as punishment for past conduct; it was
instead intended to prevent further harm to the victim.  
C.
The statute defines "abuse" as an act that causes serious
bodily harm or places a person eligible for relief in fear of
imminent serious bodily harm, battery, assault and battery, rape,
sexual offense, or false imprisonment.  § 4-501(b)(1).  Individuals
at risk of domestic violence are covered under the statute as
-8-
     
Because under the statute, the term "petitioner" refers to
18
the person seeking protection from domestic violence, § 4-501(i),
and the term "respondent" refers to the alleged abuser, § 4-501(j),
we shall use these terms and their corresponding definitions in
this opinion for the sake of clarity.  Although Mr. Coburn is
actually the Petitioner and Ms. Coburn is the Respondent on
petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, we refer to them
as such only in our mandate.
     Filing a petition for protection from abuse does not initiate
19
divorce proceedings, award permanent custody of children, issue a
restraining order, or file criminal charges.  Christopher L. Beard
and Jacqueline J. Judd, Victims No More: Changes in Domestic
Violence Law, 25 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 29, 30 (July/August 1992).
"person[s] eligible for relief" and include current or former
spouses, cohabitants, relatives by blood, marriage or adoption,
parents, stepparents, children or stepchildren, individuals who
reside or resided with an alleged abuser for at least 90 days out
of the last year before filing a petition, vulnerable adults, and
individuals who have a child in common with an alleged abuser.  §
4-501(h).
  
Section 4-504 of the statute authorizes a person eligible for
relief (petitioner) to file a petition alleging abuse against the
alleged abuser (respondent)  and requesting immediate and temporary
18
relief from the violence.   § 4-504(a).  A petition may be filed
19
in either a circuit court or District Court.  § 4-501(d).  The
statute requires that the petition be under oath, § 4-504(b)(i),
include information of prior or pending action between the parties
in any court, provide the nature and extent of the abuse for which
relief is being sought, state any previous injury resulting from
abuse by the respondent, and provide the whereabouts of the
-9-
     
A special ad hoc committee, chaired by Judge Mary Ellen T.
20
Rinehardt, Administrative Judge of the District Court of Maryland
sitting in Baltimore City, was created by Chief Judge Robert C.
Murphy in 1992 to address concerns over implementation of the
domestic violence statute.  Martha F. Rasin, The New Domestic
Violence Law's Surprising Track Record, 26 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 30,
32 (November/December 1993).  The committee devised a uniform set
of forms for utilization by both the District and circuit courts to
implement the domestic violence law.  See id.  These forms include:
Petition for Protection From Domestic Violence, Child Abuse,
Vulnerable Adult Abuse; Ex Parte Order for Protection from Abuse;
Protective Order; Petition to Modify/Rescind Protective Order;
Order as to Rescission or Modification; and Petition for Contempt.
See JOHN F. FADER, II AND RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW, at 283
(2d ed. Michie 1995).
respondent, if known, to facilitate service.  § 4-504(b)(ii).  The
court can waive the filing fee where appropriate.  § 4-504(c).
Since relief under the statute is designed to be available for
pro se applicants, standard petition forms are provided and kept
readily available by the courts.   These pre-printed forms aid
20
potential petitioners who are not familiar with the specific
requirements of the statute.  The forms provide space for a
petitioner to describe, inter alia, the alleged abusive act or acts
that occurred and any resulting injuries.  A petitioner can then
check the desired types of relief on the back of the petition.  In
addition, a petition form requests that a petitioner include and
describe information "of other injuries the [r]espondent has caused
the victim in this case."  Petition for Protection, Form DV-1.
Once a § 4-504 petition is filed, the petitioner appears
before a judge for an ex parte hearing.   § 4-505(a)(1).  At the
hearing, the presiding judge may enter a temporary order to protect
-10-
a petitioner from abuse and grant emergency relief if the judge
finds that there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that abuse
occurred.   § 4-505(a)(1).  To support the allegations of abuse,
the victim may present the court with photographs, medical records,
witnesses, the victim's own testimony or any other available proof.
See, e.g., Christopher L. Beard and Jacqueline J. Judd, Victims No
More: Changes in Domestic Violence Law, 25 THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 29,
30 (July/August 1992).  The statute gives the court discretion to
determine whether to issue an ex parte protective order based on
the affidavit, testimony and other facts presented.  If abuse is
found, the judge may order that a respondent refrain from abusing,
contacting or harassing a petitioner, from entering a petitioner's
residence and place of employment, and may additionally award
temporary use and possession of the home and temporary custody of
any minor children.  § 4-505(a)(2).  
The temporary order also states the time and date of a second
hearing to determine if a final protective order should be issued.
See § 4-506(a) and (b).  The ex parte order expires a maximum of
seven days after a law enforcement officer serves a respondent, and
can be extended only up to 30 days in order to effectuate service
on the respondent.  See § 4-505(b) and (c).  It is not until the
second, full hearing, held within seven days of service of the
temporary order on the respondent, that the court can grant
extended relief to the victim for up to 200 days.  See § 4-506(g).
-11-
At the second hearing, the alleged abuser is given an
opportunity to contest the allegations of abuse and be heard on the
issue of whether a final protective order should be granted to the
petitioner.  § 4-506(a).  Even if the respondent fails to appear at
the hearing, as in the instant case, the court may issue a final
protective order based on evidence presented by the petitioner, as
long as the respondent has been served with the temporary
protective order or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction
over the respondent.  See § 4-506 (c)(1).  
The court is authorized to grant a final protective order, not
to exceed 200 days, § 4-506(g), if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that abuse occurred.  § 4-506(c)(1)(ii).  The
court may, in addition to ordering any or all of the remedies
available for the temporary order, establish temporary visitation
with a minor child, direct the respondent to participate in a
domestic violence program or counseling, award emergency family
maintenance and temporary use and possession of a jointly owned
vehicle, and order the respondent to pay court costs.  § 4-506(d).
The statute provides for modification or rescission of the
protective order within the duration of the order after notice to
both parties and a hearing.  § 4-507(a).  A de novo appeal in the
circuit court from the District Court's order is available to
either a petitioner or respondent.  § 4-507(b)(2).  See also
Barbee, supra.  The District Court protective order remains in
-12-
effect pending appeal.  See Maryland Rule 7-112(b).
IV.
A.
To determine whether evidence of past abuse is admissible in
a protective order hearing, it is essential that we look to the
legislature's purpose in adopting the domestic violence statute.
This Court has made clear that the cardinal rule in construing any
statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature.  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429
(1995).  The primary source from which to determine this intent is
the language of the statute itself.  Vest v. Giant Food Stores,
Inc., 329 Md. 461, 466, 620 A.2d 340, 342 (1993).  In seeking out
the legislative intent, we examine the statute as a whole,
considering the interrelationship or connection among all of its
provisions.  Vest, 329 Md. at 466-67, 620 A.2d at 342.
Furthermore, remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to
"suppress the evil and advance the remedy."  Harrison v. Pilli, 321
Md. 336, 341, 582 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1990).  With these principals in
mind, we turn to the domestic violence statute.    
Section 4-506 does not specifically address what evidence is
admissible in a final protective order hearing.  It provides that
"if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged abuse has occurred" it may grant a protective order.  § 4-
-13-
506(c)(1)(ii)(emphasis added).  This section also lists a number of
factors for a judge to assess in determining whether to order a
respondent to vacate the home, § 4-506(e), and includes "the
history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the
respondent 
and 
any 
person 
eligible 
for 
relief." 
 
§ 4-
506(e)(5)(emphasis added).  The only other language concerning
evidence found in the statute provides that a petition for
temporary relief from abuse shall include information concerning
"the nature and extent of the abuse for which the relief is being
sought, including information known to the petitioner concerning
previous injury resulting from abuse by the respondent."  § 4-
504(b)(ii)(1) (emphasis added).  The language found in both
sections indicates that the legislature recognized the importance
of evidence of a pattern of abuse in determining the need for
protection against future abuse.  To allow evidence of past injury
to be admitted at the ex parte hearing for temporary relief, but
preclude its introduction at the final protective order hearing
would be illogical and in contradiction with the principles of
statutory construction outlined above.  To deprive a petitioner of
the use of that evidence to show the need for appropriate remedies,
other than vacation of the home, would also be illogical and would
totally eviscerate the preventive purpose of the statute.  In
construing the statute as a whole, we believe the legislature
intended for evidence of past abuse, in addition to evidence of the
-14-
abuse that led to the filing of the ex parte petition, to be
admissible at both temporary and final protective order hearings.
This result is consistent with the protective design of the
legislation and works to "suppress the evil and advance the
remedy."  See Harrison, 321 Md. at 341, 582 A.2d at 1234.
B.
We next address Mr. Coburn's argument that evidence of alleged
past abuse between a petitioner and respondent is irrelevant in a
final protective order hearing because the only question at issue
is whether the one incident of abuse that led to the filing of the
ex parte petition occurred.  We disagree with Mr. Coburn.
The purpose of the final protective order hearing is to
determine whether a final protective order should be issued, not
solely to prove that a single act of abuse occurred.  In
determining whether to issue a protective order, the judge should
consider not only evidence of the most recent incident of abuse,
but prior incidents which may tend to show a pattern of abuse.
Allegations of past abuse provide the court with additional
evidence that may be relevant in assessing the seriousness of the
abuse and determining appropriate remedies.  The legislature
expressly recognized this by including the history of abuse between
the parties as a factor in ordering at least one remedy, vacation
of the home.  See § 4-506(e)(5).  Admitting prior acts of abuse
-15-
aids in assessing the need for immediate and future protection.
The fact that there is a history of prior abusive acts implies that
there is a stronger likelihood of future abuse.  See Cruz-Foster v.
Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.App. 1991)("[A] defendant's past
conduct is important evidence -- perhaps the most important -- in
predicting his probable future conduct."); Providing Legal
Protection For Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 900 ("Due to the
cyclical nature of domestic violence, introduction of evidence of
the relationship's history of abuse ... is vital in allowing a
court to fully comprehend the risk posed to a particular
petitioner.")(footnote omitted).  Thus, there is a corresponding
need for more severe remedies.
One act of abuse may not warrant the same remedy as if there
is a pattern of abuse between the parties.  Different remedies are
required when there has been an isolated act of abuse that is
unlikely to recur, as compared to an egregious act of abuse
preceded by a pattern of abuse.  The more abuse that occurred in
the past, the higher the likelihood that future acts of abuse will
occur and thus, the need for greater protective measures.  Thus,
the statute appropriately gives discretion to the trial judge to
choose from a wide variety of available remedies in order to
determine what is appropriate and necessary according to the
particular facts of that case.  See § 4-506(d).  Evidence of prior
incidents of abuse is therefore highly relevant both in assessing
-16-
whether or not to issue a protective order and in determining what
type of remedies are appropriate under the circumstances.  See
Providing Legal Protection For Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at
901.
We believe that excluding evidence of past abuse would violate
the fundamental purpose of the statute, which is to prevent future
abuse.  The statute was not intended to be punitive.  Its primary
aim is to protect victims, not punish abusers.  Whether a
respondent has previously abused a petitioner is important and
probative evidence in determining the appropriate remedies.
Protective orders are based on the premise that a person who has
abused before is likely to do so again, and the state should offer
the victim protection from further violence.
In holding that evidence of past abuse is relevant in
determining the present need for a protective order, this Court
follows the trend of many jurisdictions.  See Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d
at 930 (considering past history of abuse to be critical in
determining whether "good cause" exists for extending a protective
order); Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989)("Past abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor
in determining cause for protection."); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793
S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(noting that trial court
determines potential for violence based in part on past incidents
of abuse or threatened abuse); Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1208
-17-
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992)(recognizing that a history of domestic
violence between the parties is an evidentiary consideration under
domestic violence statute); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 81
(N.D. 1992)("[P]ast actions act as relevant and pragmatic evidence
in assisting the court's determination of whether domestic violence
is actual or imminent" and the court may consider past action as
evidence "of what might occur in the future."); Snyder v. Snyder,
629 A.2d 977, 981-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)(holding that incidents
of prior abuse are admissible in protective order hearings even if
not pleaded in original petition); Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d
532, 535 (Utah App. 1992)(holding that individuals who are
"reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct
coupled with a present threat of future harm" are protected by the
protective order statute).  See also Providing Legal Protection For
Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 900-04.
C.
Alternatively, Mr. Coburn argues that evidence of prior
abusive acts is inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b).  The rule
prohibits admission of evidence of prior bad acts to prove that the
person acted in conformity with those acts, subject to certain
exceptions.  We hold that this rule is inapplicable here because
the purpose of admitting evidence of prior abuse in a domestic
violence protective order hearing is not to prove that a respondent
-18-
     We need not consider whether evidence of prior abuse may be
21
admissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b) for purposes such as proof
of motive, intent, or absence of mistake or accident.  See 5 LYNN
MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 353 (1987).
has acted in conformity with those prior acts, but instead to prove
the likelihood of future abuse.   
21
The policy consideration underlying the general prohibition
against admission of evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is that
such evidence tends to prejudice the defendant because the trier of
fact will improperly use the evidence to determine the ultimate
issue of guilt.  See Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233,
1238 (1993).  This rationale does not apply in a civil protective
order hearing where the ultimate issue is what, if any, remedy is
necessary to protect the petitioner based on the likelihood of
future abuse.  Evidence of past abusive acts is admissible to show
that abuse is likely to recur and to help the court determine what
remedies will adequately prevent future abuse.  Hence, Md. Rule 5-
404(b) is inapplicable and evidence of prior incidents of abuse is
admissible.
Although not raised by Ms. Coburn, we note that evidence of
specific past acts may be admissible under Md. Rule 5-405 because
a respondent's character as an abuser may be at issue, tending to
establish the potential for future abuse.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 187, at 789-91 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).  Section (b)
of Md. Rule 5-405 provides that "[i]n cases in which character or
-19-
     Although a court may, in its discretion, grant a brief recess
22
so that a respondent can secure proffered evidence or testimony,
the court must be cognizant of the problems a recess or continuance
might cause a petitioner.  See generally Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1056-57.  The protective
order hearing comes before the court upon the expiration of the
temporary ex parte order and therefore a petitioner would be
without judicial protection if the court were to grant an extended
continuance.  Accordingly, when lack of notice could prejudice a
respondent, the judge should generally grant the briefest recess or
continuance necessary to permit the respondent to summons proffered
rebuttal witnesses or secure proffered rebuttal evidence. 
a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of relevant
specific instances of that person's conduct." 
  
D.
Lastly, Mr. Coburn asserts that he was denied due process of
law because he was not given notice that evidence of alleged prior
abusive acts would be introduced at the hearing.  Ms. Coburn
responds in her brief that "Mr. Coburn did not request a
continuance at trial to allow him additional time to prepare a
response to the allegations of past abuse."  There may be instances
where there is no advance notice of the introduction of alleged
prior abusive acts and due process may require a brief recess to
allow time for a respondent to call witnesses or acquire evidence
to rebut or defend against those allegations.   See, e.g., Snyder,
22
629 A.2d at 982 n.3.  In general, however, a respondent is put on
notice that acts of alleged past abuse can be introduced at a
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protective order hearing when a petitioner files an ex parte
petition for protection.  A petitioner should also, whenever
possible, allege all instances of past abuse on the ex parte
petition that might be offered in later court hearings.
Failure to list every allegation of past abuse will not
prevent such evidence from being admitted.  Such a requirement
would place a burden too onerous on a petitioner filing pro se.  We
hold that generally, an ex parte petition should indicate prior
incidents of abuse to serve as a form of notice to the respondent,
but the absence of that information will not preclude a petitioner
from introducing evidence of prior incidents of abuse absent clear
prejudice to the respondent.  Such prejudice was not established in
the case sub judice.
In the instant case, Ms. Coburn alleged on the ex parte
petition that previous abusive acts by Mr. Coburn included:
"[a]buse in July complaint number 94-1840636, Ex parte taken
extended four times.  [Mr. Coburn] evaded service at work.
Telephone misuse complaint by my employer 7/25/94."  In addition,
the judge noted a "[h]istory of abuse.  Crim[inal] charges filed
and cross-complaint" on the ex parte order.  Under these particular
circumstances, Mr. Coburn had sufficient notice that some evidence
of prior abuse would be introduced.  Although Ms. Coburn's petition
should not be used as a model, it adequately averred that Mr.
Coburn had previously threatened to or did abuse her in the past.
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V.
We hold that allegations of a prior history of abuse are
admissible at a protective order hearing regardless of whether such
allegations were sufficiently pleaded in the original petition for
protection.  We do not believe the legislature intended to limit
the evidence at a protective order hearing to the specific
allegation of abuse that led to the filing of the ex parte
petition.  Such a result would be directly contrary to the remedial
and preventive purpose of the statute.  Evidence of past abuse is
often the most indicative evidence of the likelihood of future
abuse.  Such evidence assists a judge in understanding the context
in which the present allegation of abuse occurred and helps that
judge formulate an appropriate remedy in order to adequately
protect the victim. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.