Title: Evelyn C. R. v. Tykila S.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-1739 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Jayton S., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Evelyn C. R.,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tykila S.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  239 Wis. 2d 232, 619 N.W.2d 307 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 25, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by Timothy A. Provis, Madison, and oral argument by 
Timothy A. Provis. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
by Theresa L. Roetter and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and 
 
2 
oral argument by Theresa L. Roetter. 
 
 
There was a brief and oral argument by the 
guardian ad litem, Janet Rasmussen, Madison. 
 
2001 WI 110 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 00-1739 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Jayton S., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
Evelyn C. R.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tykila S.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  This is a review of a court of 
appeals 
decision, 
Evelyn 
R. 
v. 
Tykila 
S., 
No. 
00-1739, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2000), which 
affirmed an order by the Dane County Circuit Court, Judge 
Maryann Sumi, terminating Tykila S.'s (Tykila) parental rights 
to her biological son, Jayton S. (Jayton).  After Tykila 
violated a court order to appear in person at the fact-finding 
hearing intended to determine whether she had abandoned her son, 
the circuit court entered a default judgment against Tykila on 
the issue of abandonment without first taking any evidence on 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
2 
the matter.  At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the 
circuit court accepted testimony supporting the termination of 
Tykila's parental rights to Jayton and, based on this testimony, 
reaffirmed the default judgment against Tykila and entered an 
order terminating Tykila's parental rights to Jayton. 
¶2 
Tykila now petitions this court to review the court of 
appeals decision, which affirmed the circuit court order 
terminating her parental rights.  In doing so, she raises a 
single issue:  Did the circuit court err in entering a default 
judgment on the issue of abandonment without first taking 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of abandonment by clear 
and convincing evidence? 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court did err in entering 
the default judgment against Tykila on the issue of abandonment 
without first taking evidence sufficient to support a finding of 
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.  However, upon 
review of the entire record in this case, we further conclude 
that the circuit court remedied this error at the dispositional 
hearing when, prior to reaffirming the default judgment and 
entering the order terminating Tykila's parental rights to 
Jayton, the court took evidence sufficient to support by clear 
and convincing evidence a finding that Tykila had abandoned 
Jayton.  As such, the error was harmless.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶4 
The following facts are undisputed.  Jayton was born 
on May 2, 1992.  He has lived with and been cared for by his 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
3 
paternal grandmother, Evelyn R. (Evelyn), for virtually his 
entire life, and in November 1997, Evelyn was appointed Jayton's 
legal guardian.  For approximately five years prior to the 
initiation of the present proceedings, Jayton's biological 
mother, Tykila, had not had any contact with Jayton.   
¶5 
On October 12, 1999, in order to adopt Jayton, Evelyn 
filed a pro se petition in Dane County Circuit Court for the 
termination of Tykila's parental rights to Jayton.  The circuit 
court subsequently held a hearing on this petition, during which 
it expressed concern about the facts that Evelyn's petition 
lacked an accompanying affidavit and neither Evelyn nor Tykila 
had counsel.  Due to these concerns, the court ordered Evelyn 
and Tykila to obtain counsel, and set a date for a continued 
hearing. 
¶6 
On November 24, 1999, after obtaining counsel, Evelyn 
filed an amended petition and supporting affidavit for the 
termination of Tykila's parental rights to Jayton.1  In this 
petition, Evelyn alleged in pertinent part that Tykila had 
"abandoned" Jayton, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)3 
(1997-98):2  "Tykila [S.] knew or could have discovered the 
                     
1 This petition also requested that the court terminate 
Jayton's father's parental rights to Jayton.  Jayton's father 
voluntarily waived his right to contest the petition and his 
parental rights to Jayton subsequently were terminated.   
2 Section 48.415(1)(a)3 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1997-98) 
provides that a parent has abandoned a child when:  "The child 
has been left by the parent with any person, the parent knows or 
could discover the whereabouts of the child and the parent has 
failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of 6 
months or longer."  
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
4 
whereabouts of the child [Jayton], and she failed to visit or 
communicate with the child since December, 1994."3  
¶7 
Tykila denied that she had abandoned Jayton.  Although 
she did not dispute the fact that she had not contacted Jayton 
since December 1994, she claimed that she did not know nor could 
she have discovered Jayton's whereabouts.  Because Tykila 
contested Evelyn's petition, the court scheduled a fact-finding 
hearing for February 28, 2000, which, at Tykila's request, would 
be held before a twelve-person jury. 
¶8 
On February 28, 2000, Tykila failed to appear in 
person at the fact-finding hearing.  The court did manage to 
reach Tykila by phone, but, in light of the fact that the jury 
would be required to determine whether Tykila had abandoned 
Jayton, the court expressed great apprehension about holding the 
hearing without Tykila's physical presence.  As the court 
explained:   
 
My concern in a case like this where the sole ground 
is abandonment, and the defendant does not appear, 
does that irretrievably persuade the jury that she in 
fact has abandoned this child because she didn't even—
—you can finish the sentence for me——care enough to 
show up.  And is that something that once the jury 
panel and the jurors are exposed to her appearing by 
telephone, I can offer any reason in the world, but I 
                                                                  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 Evelyn also alleged in the amended petition that Tykila 
had "fail[ed] to assume parental responsibility" for Jayton, as 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  However, because Evelyn 
later withdrew this allegation, it is not relevant to our 
analysis of this case. 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
5 
don't know that it's going to be enough to undo the 
impression that would be left with the jury. 
Tykila's attorney agreed with the court that it likely would be 
highly prejudicial to Tykila to proceed with the hearing in 
Tykila's absence and, for this reason, objected to proceeding.  
In the wake of this objection, the court offered Tykila several 
options, including proceeding with a trial to the court.  Tykila 
refused the court's offers and insisted that the hearing be held 
before a jury.  Evelyn then moved for a default judgment against 
Tykila.  The court denied Evelyn's motion, released the jury 
panel, and rescheduled the fact-finding hearing for April 3, 
2000.  However, the court issued an oral and written order that 
Tykila appear in person at 9:00 a.m. on April 3, 2000, and at 
"all subsequent proceedings held in this case," or face a 
potential default judgment. 
 
¶9 
On April 3, 2000, Tykila again failed to appear in 
person.  Evelyn thus moved for a default judgment against 
Tykila.  Jayton's GAL voiced "[n]o objection" to the motion.  
And Tykila's attorney merely stated:  "I would object and waive 
argument."  After noting on the record that Tykila was ordered 
to appear at 9:00 a.m. and that it was then 9:40 a.m., the court 
granted Evelyn's motion.  The court further found, based on the 
allegations in Evelyn's petition for the termination of Tykila's 
parental rights to Jayton, that Tykila had abandoned Jayton and, 
as such, grounds existed under § 48.415(1)(a)3 to terminate 
Tykila's parental rights to Jayton.  Hence, the court found 
Tykila to be an unfit parent and scheduled the case for a 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
6 
hearing to determine what disposition would be in Jayton's best 
interests.   
 
¶10 The court held the dispositional hearing on April 11, 
2000.  
Once 
again, Tykila 
failed 
to 
appear 
in person.  
Nonetheless, the court proceeded to hear testimony.  
   
¶11 Evelyn provided the court with testimony relevant to 
Tykila's alleged abandonment of Jayton.  Evelyn testified in 
part that Jayton had lived with her since May 1992, and that she 
and Jayton had lived in Madison since December 1994.  She 
further testified that her address and telephone number had been 
listed in the telephone directory the entire time that she and 
Jayton had lived in Madison.  Finally, Evelyn testified that 
although she had done nothing to prevent contact between Tykila 
and Jayton, Tykila had not contacted Jayton in any way since 
December 1994. 
 
¶12 Midway 
through 
the 
dispositional 
hearing, 
Tykila 
appeared by telephone.  Accordingly, the court offered her the 
opportunity to be heard.  But although Tykila offered brief 
testimony, she did not say anything regarding Jayton or contest 
the court's entry of default judgment against her.  Rather, she 
merely gave a one-sentence statement about why she had missed an 
earlier proceeding.  When the court asked if she had anything 
else to say, Tykila replied "no." 
 
¶13 At the close of the testimony, the circuit court 
considered the evidence before it and reaffirmed its entry of 
default judgment against Tykila: 
 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
7 
At this point then I need to consider the standards, 
the factors that are set forth in the statutes 
governing termination of parental rights.  I would 
note that Tykila [S.], the mother, has repeatedly been 
in default.4  The court has given her numerous 
opportunities, including discharging an entire jury 
panel at one point so that she could appear in person, 
even though an order for appearance had gone out.  So 
I'm satisfied that the default is sound. 
 
 
I'm also satisfied that grounds exist, that being 
the ground of abandonment, as established through the 
testimony of . . . Evelyn [R.] today.  So grounds 
exist for the termination of parental rights of Tykila 
[S.]. 
Then, after noting that Tykila's abandonment of Jayton provided 
grounds to terminate Tykila's parental rights to Jayton, the 
court concluded that it would be in Jayton's best interests to 
terminate Tykila's parental rights to him so he could be adopted 
by Evelyn.  The court thus entered an order terminating Tykila's 
parental rights to Jayton and subsequently signed an order 
granting a petition by Evelyn to adopt Jayton. 
 
¶14 Tykila appealed the circuit court's order terminating 
her parental rights to Jayton.  The court of appeals, however, 
affirmed the order.   
 
¶15 Tykila then petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals decision.  We granted review.  
II 
                     
4 This seems to be a reference to the fact that Tykila 
violated the circuit court order to appear in person not only by 
failing to appear in person at the second fact-finding hearing, 
but also by failing to appear in person at the dispositional 
hearing. 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
8 
¶16 Tykila raises a single issue for review:  Did the 
circuit court err in entering a default judgment on the issue of 
abandonment without first taking evidence sufficient to support 
a finding of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence?  
Tykila concedes that the circuit court had the authority to 
enter a default judgment against her as a sanction for failing 
to comply with the court order for personal appearance.  
However, Tykila contends that this authority did not relieve the 
circuit court of its constitutional and statutory duty to find 
by clear and convincing evidence——prior to finding her to be an 
unfit parent——that she had abandoned Jayton.  Because the 
circuit court entered default judgment without taking any 
evidence, Tykila further contends, there was no evidentiary 
basis to support the court's finding of abandonment; the circuit 
court thus could not find by clear and convincing evidence that 
she had abandoned Jayton.  Therefore, Tykila concludes, the 
circuit court erred in entering the default judgment against her 
on the issue of abandonment without first taking evidence.  We 
agree. 
A 
¶17 This case does not fall within the scope of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.02(5).5  Although Tykila was not physically present at the 
fact-finding hearing, she nevertheless "appeared" at the hearing 
                     
5 Section 806.02(5) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:  "A 
default judgment may be rendered against any defendant who has 
appeared in the action but who fails to appear at trial.  If 
proof of any fact is necessary for the court to render judgment, 
the court shall receive the proof."  
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
9 
via her counsel.  Thus, § 806.02(5) does not govern the outcome 
of this case.  Nevertheless, a circuit court has both inherent 
authority and statutory authority under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7),6 
804.12(2)(a),7 and 805.038 to sanction parties for failing to 
obey court orders.  See Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 
Wis. 2d 261, 273-74, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991) (noting the same, but 
citing a prior version of the Wisconsin Statutes).  Pursuant to 
this authority, a circuit court may enter a default judgment 
against a party that fails to comply with a court order.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7), 804.12(2)(a), 805.03; see generally 
                     
6 Section 802.10(7) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:  
"SANCTIONS.  Violations of a scheduling or pretrial order are 
subject to ss. 802.05, 804.12 and 805.03."  
7 Section 804.12(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in 
part:   
If a party . . . fails to obey an order . . ., 
the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others the following:   
 
. . .   
 
3. 
An 
order . . . rendering 
a 
judgment 
by 
default against the disobedient party . . . . 
4. 
 
8  Section 805.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in 
part:   
[F]or failure of any party to comply with the 
statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to 
obey any order of court, the court in which the action 
is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, including but not limited to 
orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a). 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
10
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 207 Wis. 2d 43, 557 
N.W.2d 775 (1997). 
¶18 The decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Shirk 
v. Bowling, Inc., 2001 WI 36, ¶9, 242 Wis. 2d 153, 624 N.W.2d 
375.  But where a circuit court has applied an incorrect legal 
standard in deciding whether to enter judgment, the court has 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Oostburg State Bank v. 
United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11-12, 386 N.W.2d 53 
(1986).  In such a circumstance, this court may reverse the 
circuit court's discretionary decision.  Id. at 11. 
¶19 In the case at hand, by entering a default judgment 
against Tykila on the issue of abandonment without first taking 
evidence sufficient to support such a finding, the circuit court 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
requirements for termination of parental rights.  We therefore 
hold that the court erroneously exercised it discretion. 
B 
¶20 Terminations 
of 
parental 
rights 
affect 
some 
of 
parents' most fundamental human rights.  T.M.F. v. Children's 
Serv. Soc'y, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983).  At 
stake for a parent is his or her "interest in the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her child."  Id.  
Further, the permanency of termination orders "work[s] a unique 
kind of deprivation.  In contrast to matters modifiable at the 
parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termination 
adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State to 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
11
destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental 
relationship."  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996) 
(citations 
and 
quotations 
omitted). 
 
For 
these 
reasons, 
"parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of 
state action."  Id.  
¶21 Due to the severe nature of terminations of parental 
rights, 
termination 
proceedings 
require 
heightened 
legal 
safeguards against erroneous decisions.  Although termination 
proceedings are civil proceedings, M.W. v. Monroe County Dep't 
of Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984), 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution9 requires that "[i]n order for parental 
rights to be terminated, the petitioner must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the termination is appropriate."  L.K. 
v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) (citing 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982)). 
¶22 This 
constitutional 
safeguard 
is 
reflected 
in 
Wisconsin's Children's Code, Wis. Stat. Chapter 48.  As 
delineated in the Children's Code, when a parent contests the 
termination of his or her parental rights, the termination 
proceeding involves a two-step procedure.  Waukesha County Dep't 
of Soc. Servs. v. C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 60, 368 N.W.2d 47 
(1985); see also Wis. Stat. § 48.422 (setting forth the 
                     
9 The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides:  "nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ."   
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
12
different procedural frameworks for contested and uncontested 
termination proceedings).  The first step is a fact-finding 
hearing "to determine whether grounds exist for the termination 
of parental rights . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424.  During this 
step, the parent's rights are paramount.  See Minguey v. 
Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 689, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981).  To 
protect these rights from erroneous termination, the Children's 
Code 
provides 
that 
at 
the 
fact-finding 
hearing, 
"[t]he 
petitioner must prove the allegations [supporting grounds for 
termination] in the petition for termination by clear and 
convincing evidence."  C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d at 60 (emphasis 
added; quotation and citation omitted); Wis. Stat. §§ 48.31(1). 
 If the petitioner surmounts this evidentiary burden, the 
circuit court "shall find the parent unfit" and advance to the 
second 
step 
of 
the 
termination 
procedure. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.424(4).   
¶23 The second step is the dispositional phase.  At the 
dispositional phase, as the name of this phase implies, "the 
circuit court decides the disposition of the child."  C.E.W., 
124 Wis. 2d at 60.  During this step, the best interests of the 
child are paramount.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426.  However, the 
parent's rights are not ignored.  The parent has the right to 
present evidence and be heard at the dispositional phase.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.427(1)-(1m).  And if the circuit court finds during 
the dispositional phase "that the evidence does not warrant the 
termination of parental rights," the court need not terminate 
the parent's rights.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2). 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
13
¶24 In the case at hand, the circuit court erred during 
the first step of this procedure.  Evelyn alleged as the sole 
ground for the termination of Tykila's parental rights that 
Tykila had "abandoned" Jayton, as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(1)(a)3.  Thus, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Wisconsin Children's Code, Wis. Stat. §§ 48.31 and 48.424, 
prior to determining that grounds existed to terminate Tykila's 
parental rights, the circuit court had the duty at the fact-
finding hearing to find by clear and convincing evidence that 
all of the elements of § 48.415(1)(a)3 had been satisfied:  "(1) 
the child has been left by the parent with a relative or other 
person; (2) the parent knows or could discover the whereabouts 
of the child; and (3) the parent has failed to visit or 
communicate with the child for a period of [6 months] or 
longer."  S.-G. v. S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 533 N.W.2d 794 
(1995).  However, by entering a default judgment against Tykila 
on the issue of abandonment without first taking evidence, the 
circuit court did not make——and, indeed, could not make——such a 
finding.  Because it failed to take evidence at the fact-finding 
hearing, the circuit court had no evidentiary basis to support 
its finding of abandonment prior to finding grounds for the 
termination of Tykila's parental rights.   
¶25 Where, as in the present case, the constitution and 
statutory code require a showing of proof before the circuit 
court can enter a particular judgment or order, the circuit 
court cannot enter the judgment or order without the appropriate 
showing.  To be sure, the circuit court may, as it did here, 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
14
determine that a party's action or inaction provides adequate 
cause for sanctions against that party.  But such cause does not 
allow the court to dispense with any independent constitutional 
or statutory burden of proof that must be satisfied prior to 
entering a judgment or order. 
¶26 The circuit court in the present case breached this 
principle.  As Tykila acknowledges, her violation of the order 
for personal appearance supplied the circuit court with adequate 
cause to sanction her by means of a default judgment.  However, 
this cause did not relieve the circuit court of its duty under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Wis. Stat. Chapter 48 to take 
sufficient evidence——prior to finding Tykila to be an unfit 
parent——to support a finding by clear and convincing evidence 
that Tykila had abandoned Jayton.  By entering a default 
judgment against Tykila on the issue of abandonment without 
first taking this constitutionally and statutorily required 
evidence, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion. 
C 
 
¶27 Our conclusion that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion does not end our review of this case.  
We also must determine whether this error requires us to reverse 
the court of appeals decision and the circuit court order 
terminating Tykila's parental rights to Jayton. 
 
¶28 Section 805.18(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
15
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . error as to any matter of pleading or 
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which 
the application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
(Emphasis added.)  For an error to "affect the substantial 
rights" of a party, there must be a reasonable possibility that 
the error contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding 
at issue.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 547, 370 N.W.2d 
222 (1985); see also Town of Geneva v. Tills, 129 Wis. 2d 167, 
184-85, 384 N.W.2d 701 (1986) (noting that the standard set 
forth in Dyess applies in civil cases as well as criminal 
cases).  A reasonable possibility of a different outcome is a 
possibility sufficient to "undermine confidence in the outcome." 
 Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45 (quotation omitted).  If the error 
at issue is not sufficient to undermine the reviewing court's 
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding, the error is 
harmless.   
 
¶29 Last term, in Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 
28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, we applied harmless error 
analysis to a case similar to the one presently at hand.  Steven 
H. involved a respondent to a termination of parental rights 
petition who voluntarily waived his right to contest the 
allegations in the petition.  Id. at ¶51.  Based largely on this 
waiver, and without first taking testimony to support the 
allegations in the petition, the circuit court found that 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
16
grounds existed to terminate the respondent's parental rights.  
Id. at ¶54.   
¶30 On review of Steven H., we concluded that the circuit 
court erred in failing to take testimony to support the 
allegations in the petition to terminate the respondent's 
parental rights.  Id. at ¶56.  As we explained, the respondent's 
waiver of his right to contest the petition was not tantamount 
to the respondent admitting the allegations in the petition; the 
circuit court still had the duty to make findings sufficient to 
support the allegations in the petition for termination.  Id. at 
¶¶52, 56. 
¶31 Nonetheless, we concluded in Steven H. that the 
circuit court's failure to take testimony did not require us to 
overturn the order terminating the respondent's parental rights. 
 Id. at ¶57.  Rather, we noted that "[a] factual basis for 
several of the allegations in the petition c[ould] be teased out 
of the testimony of other witnesses at other hearings when the 
entire record [wa]s examined."  Id. at ¶58.  Based on this 
factual basis, we held that although we had grave concerns about 
the circuit court's failure to follow the statutory procedure 
for termination proceedings, our examination of the entire 
record persuaded us that the circuit court's error was not 
sufficient to justify overturning the termination order.  Id. at 
¶60. 
¶32 We find Steven H. to be instructive in the present 
case.  Although the circuit court in the case at hand may have 
procedurally erred, we nonetheless must examine the entire 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
17
record to determine whether it provides a factual basis to 
support the court's finding of grounds for termination. 
¶33 In the present case, the circuit court did not enter 
its order terminating Tykila's parental rights until after 
taking 
Evelyn's 
testimony 
and, 
based 
on 
this 
testimony, 
reaffirming its finding of abandonment.  At the time the court 
reaffirmed its finding of abandonment and prior to the court 
ordering the termination of Tykila's parental rights, the record 
contained sufficient facts to support the circuit court's 
finding of abandonment.  First, the record contained evidence 
that Tykila had left Jayton with Evelyn:  as Evelyn explained in 
her testimony, Jayton had lived with her since May 1992.  
Second, there was evidence that Tykila knew or could have 
discovered Jayton's whereabouts:  Evelyn testified that her 
telephone number and address had been listed in the telephone 
directory throughout all of the approximately five years 
preceding the commencement of this case.  And third, the record 
contained 
evidence 
that 
Tykila 
had 
failed 
to 
visit 
or 
communicate with Jayton for far more than six months:  Evelyn's 
testimony revealed that Tykila had not contacted Jayton since 
December 1994; that is, at the time Evelyn filed her petition 
for the termination of Tykila's parental rights to Jayton, 
Tykila 
had 
not 
contacted 
Jayton 
for 
about 
five 
years——
approximately ten times the amount of time necessary under 
§ 48.415(1)(a)3 to constitute abandonment.  Although given the 
opportunity to do so, Tykila did not dispute any of these facts. 
    
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
18
¶34 In addition, the record reflects that the circuit 
court weighed these facts prior to reaffirming its finding of 
abandonment and terminating Tykila's parental rights.  Indeed, 
the circuit court made specific reference to Evelyn's testimony 
when it reexamined whether grounds existed for the termination 
of Tykila's parental rights.  
 
¶35 With these considerations in mind, we hold that the 
circuit court's failure to take evidence prior to entering the 
default 
judgment 
against 
Tykila 
fails 
to 
undermine 
our 
confidence in the outcome of the termination proceeding.  
Accordingly, while this case again raises the concerns that we 
expressed in Steven H. about the circuit court failing to follow 
the procedures delineated in Chapter 48, we conclude that the 
circuit court's procedural error was harmless. 
III 
 
¶36 In sum, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
entering a default judgment against Tykila regarding the issue 
of abandonment without first taking evidence sufficient to 
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Tykila 
indeed had abandoned Jayton.  However, we further hold that 
because the record——when examined in its entirety——reveals that 
prior to reaffirming the default judgment and issuing the order 
terminating Tykila's parental rights, the circuit court had 
taken and considered evidence sufficient to support its finding 
of abandonment, the circuit court's procedural error was 
harmless.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
No. 
00-1739 
 
 
19
appeals, which upheld the circuit court order terminating 
Tykila's parental rights to Jayton. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 00-1739.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring). 
 
Errors are the insects in the world of law, travelling 
through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless 
procession.  Many are plainly harmless; some appear 
ominously 
harmful. 
 
Some, 
for 
all 
the 
benign 
appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a 
plague of followers that deplete trials of fairness. 
 
The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for 
harmless errors adrift in an imperfect world.  Its 
well-being must also encompass the capacity to ward 
off the destroyers.  So an inquiry into what makes 
error harmless, though one of philosophical tenor, is 
also an intensely practical inquiry into the health 
and sanitation of the law.  
 
Roger J. Traynor, Foreword, The Riddle of Harmless Error 
(1970). 
¶38 The harmless error doctrine, as applied in state and 
federal 
courts 
alike, 
has 
inspired 
several 
decades 
of 
commentary, criticism, skepticism, and attempted clarification.10 
                     
10 See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 
(1970) (proposing several different variations of the harmless 
error standard depending on the nature of the error); Harry T. 
Edwards, Madison Lecture: To Err is Human, But Not Always 
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1167, 1199 (1995) (expressing skepticism that "in practical 
application we can ever solve the riddle of harmless error").   
No. 00-1739.ssa 
 
2 
 This academic and judicial scrutiny will likely continue to 
flourish as this court and other courts expand the harmless 
error doctrine to violations of substantive rights in which the 
effect of the error is difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify.11   
¶39 The present case, like other cases this year12 and in 
prior years,13 requires this court to apply the harmless error 
                                                                  
See also James Edward Wicht III, There is No Such Thing as 
a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of 
Automatic Reversal, 12 B.Y.U. Pub. L. 73 (1997); Gregory 
Mitchell, 
Against 
"Overwhelming" 
Appellate 
Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1335 
(1994); Vilija Bilaisis, Comment, Harmless Error: Abettor of 
Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 457 (1983); 
Comment, Confusion in the Court: Wisconsin's Harmless Error Rule 
in Criminal Appeals, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 643 (1980).  For a 
discussion of reversible error and the review function, and a 
critique of Wisconsin case law, see Ruggero J. Aldisert, The 
Judicial Process: Readings, Materials and Cases 706-42 (1976). 
11 See, e.g., State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (applying harmless error doctrine to the 
circuit court's failure to strike a biased juror for cause, 
requiring the defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove 
the juror). 
12 See also Green v. Smith, 2001 WI 109, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___; Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Nommenson v. Amer. Cont’l, 2001 WI 
112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Lindell, 2001 WI 108.  
13 See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 864, 596 
N.W.2d 736 (1999); State v. Jones, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 597-98, 594 
N.W.2d 738 (1999); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 178-79, 
593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 367-
71, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999); State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
792-94, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 
668-69, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998); State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 
671, 695-96, 575 N.W.2d 268 (1998); State v. Alexander, 214 
Wis. 2d 628, 652-54, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  
No. 00-1739.ssa 
 
3 
doctrine. 
Some may 
view 
the 
cases 
decided 
today 
as an 
opportunity to "fix" Wisconsin's harmless error doctrine once 
and for all.  I do not share this sentiment.  Appellate courts 
should not tinker with the harmless error doctrine without the 
benefit of briefing by both parties, oral argument on the issue, 
and an exploration of the federal and state cases and the 
historical development of the law.14  
¶40 Our cases and scholarly commentary reveal that the 
doctrine of harmless error is a work in progress.15  Numerous 
approaches have been explored in the legal literature.  For 
example, Justice Roger Traynor and others have proposed that the 
harmless error test might vary depending on the nature of the 
error.16  For errors at trial that affect some aspect of the 
fact-finding 
process, 
Justice 
Traynor 
proposed 
that 
the 
appellate court reverse unless it finds it "highly probable that 
                                                                  
This court has also applied the harmless error doctrine in 
the context of administrative agency determinations.  See, e.g., 
Responsible Use of Rural and Agric. Land v. PSC, 2000 WI 129, 
¶63, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888; State ex rel. Anderson-El 
v. Cooke, 2000 WI 40, ¶¶21-24, 234 Wis. 2d 626, 610 N.W.2d 821. 
14 See also State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 88, 406 N.W.2d 
744 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
15 See, e.g., 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 27.6(b), at 938-39 (2d ed. 1999) ("Few areas of doctrinal 
development have been marked by greater twisting and turning 
than the development of standards for applying the harmless 
error rule.").  
16 See also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 27.6(b) at 934-36 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that courts have long 
applied the harmless error statute differently depending on the 
nature of the right violated).  
No. 00-1739.ssa 
 
4 
the error did not affect the judgment."17  Justice Traynor would 
require reversal for "errors that carry a high risk of prejudice 
to the judicial process itself," such as errors relating to the 
composition of a jury.18  Likewise, Justice Traynor would require 
reversal for errors "that inherently carr[y] a high risk of 
affecting the judgment," such as admitting an unlawfully 
obtained confession or not policing against the effect of 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.19  
¶41 My hope is for increased discussion of the doctrine of 
harmless error and educational programs for the bench and the 
bar regarding the application of, and limitations of, the 
                     
17 See Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 35, 
49-51 (1970). 
18 See Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 64-66 
(1970) (noting that a defendant challenging, for example, the 
denial of the right to peremptory challenges could not possibly 
show prejudice, and that the appellant "should not be called 
upon to do the impossible at the appellate stage"). 
19 See Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 58-64 
(1970). 
No. 00-1739.ssa 
 
5 
doctrine.  Appellate counsel should continue to brief the issue 
of harmless error in requests for new trials.   
¶42 Although I join the majority opinion, for the reasons 
set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
No.  00-1739.npc 
 
1 
 
¶43 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's decision today and write separately only to 
remark upon the harmless error test utilized by the majority.  
See majority op. at ¶27.  The majority's standard is whether 
there is "a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the outcome," and that a "reasonable possibility" is one 
"sufficient to 'undermine confidence in the outcome.'"  Id. 
(quoting State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544-45, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985)).  Since the standard for harmless error is the same for 
civil, as well as criminal, cases (Town of Geneva v. Tills, 129 
Wis. 2d 167, 184-85, 384 N.W.2d 701 (1986)), it is imperative 
that the standard be accurately conveyed.  
¶44 For at least the past 35 years, this court has 
wrestled with formulating a standard for harmless error.  See, 
e.g., Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 450, 456-57, 129 N.W.2d 204 
(1964); State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 339-40, 179 N.W.2d 841 
(1970); Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482 
(1973); State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987).  
In an attempt to formulate a single, uniform test for harmless 
error, Dyess "conclude[d] that the test of prejudice as 
formulated in Strickland subsumes the various statements of the 
harmless error test that this court has used over the years."  
No.  00-1739.npc 
 
2 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545.20  The Strickland case referred to is 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984), and the test 
is whether "there is a reasonable probability" that "but for" 
the error, "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome."  466 U.S. at 694 
(emphasis added).   Dyess obviously adopted that test, but 
incorrectly assumed that there was no real difference between 
using 
"reasonable 
possibility" 
instead 
of 
"reasonable 
probability." 124 Wis. 2d at 544.  Granted, Dyess applied its 
test by stating that "[i]n the present case, the probability to 
be weighed is whether the defendant would have been acquitted." 
 Id. at 546 (emphasis added).  However, as evident in the 
majority's opinion here today,21 Wisconsin courts have frequently 
                     
20 Dyess' single test for harmless error standard has not 
been without controversy.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  In addition to the majority opinion's 
discussion of Dyess' harmless error standard, authored by 
Justice Day, in State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 
(1987), 
Chief 
Justice 
Heffernan, 
Justice 
Day, 
Justice 
Abrahamson, and Justice Callow separately concurred on the Dyess 
issue.  The controversy has continued.  See State v. Dodson, 219 
Wis. 2d 
65, 
92-98, 
580 
N.W.2d 
181 
(1998) 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring, joined by Justice Steinmetz and Justice Wilcox).    
21 See also, Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 
2001 WI 109, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; and Nommensen v. 
American Cont’l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112,  ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  (I have written dissents or concurrences in these 
cases.)  But see State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___ (Strickland's probability sufficient to undermine 
the confidence in the outcome test used to determine ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim). 
No.  00-1739.npc 
 
3 
used the term "reasonable possibility," and have not indicated 
that, in the context of a harmless error standard, possibility 
means probability.22   
¶45 There can be no doubt that there is a significant 
difference between what is reasonably probable and what is 
reasonably possible.  "A possibility test is the next thing to 
automatic reversal."  Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 
N.W.2d 482 (1973).23  While I agree that the focus should be "on 
whether the error 'undermine[s] confidence in the outcome,'" 
(Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694)), if that error need only possibly undermine the confidence 
in the outcome, rather than probably, appellate courts, and 
circuit courts considering motions after verdict and post-
convictions motions, will find themselves invading the purview 
of the jury.  A cornerstone of the common law is deference to 
the jury, which is diluted by determining whether the alleged 
error possibly, and only possibly, may have affected the jury's 
decision.  
                     
22 According to my research, on few occasions since Dyess 
has this court, in a majority opinion, noted that reasonable 
possibility 
means 
reasonable 
probability. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 372 n.40, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999); see 
also State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 695-96, 575 N.W.2d 
268 (1998).  However, several court of appeals opinions have 
applied the Dyess harmless error test using the correct 
"reasonable probability" standard.  See, e.g., State v. A.H., 
211 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Joseph P., 200 Wis. 2d 227, 237, 546 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996). 
  
23 Wold's "reasonable probability" test for harmless error 
was replaced by Dyess' "reasonable possibility" test.  
No.  00-1739.npc 
 
4 
¶46 I do not take issue with the term "reasonable 
possibility," so long as it is made clear that this term means 
reasonable probability, and probability is the standard to be 
applied.  Accordingly, I offer the following test for harmless 
error, which makes clear that Dyess' use of the term "reasonable 
possibility" is intended to require "reasonable probability": 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides that an error 
requires reversal only where it has "affected the 
substantial rights of the party" claiming error.  We 
have long recognized that the focus of a court's 
analysis under this statute is whether, in light of 
the 
applicable 
burden 
of 
proof, 
the 
error 
is 
significant enough to "undermine confidence in the 
outcome" of the trial.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45. 
 An 
error 
is 
significant 
enough 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome if there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome without the error. 
 Dyess 
made 
it 
clear 
that 
"probability" 
is 
substantially 
the 
same 
as 
"possibility" 
under 
Wisconsin law.  Id. at 544. 
¶47 Even 
though 
the 
majority 
used 
a 
"reasonable 
possibility" test, the error at issue here——that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in entering a default 
judgment against Tykila S.——would be harmless under the more 
stringent "reasonable probability" test.  I joined the unanimous 
majority opinion in a similar case decided last term, Waukesha 
County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 
607, wherein we concluded that the circuit court's error there——
its failure to hear testimony in support of the allegations in 
the petition to terminate parental rights——was harmless because 
it did not prejudice the parent, Steven H.  Id. at ¶¶53-57.  I 
No.  00-1739.npc 
 
5 
find no substantive distinction between Steven H. and the 
instant case. 
¶48 That Wisconsin courts have often used "reasonable 
possibility" rather than "reasonable probability" should not 
dissuade the court from correcting such missteps today.  See, 
e.g., State v. Sullivan 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998); State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 653, 571 N.W.2d 662 
(1997).  There is no time like the present——dum fervet opus24——
when the court has before it five cases wherein it discusses the 
harmless error standard, to clarify Dyess.   
¶49 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
                     
24 "While the action is fresh; in the heat of action."  
Black's Law Dictionary 518 (7th ed. 1999).