Title: Cordes v. Wooten

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

476 So. 2d 89 (1985)
James CORDES and Dewey Hutson
v.
Richard WOOTEN.
83-1300.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 6, 1985.
*90 Juliet G. St. John of St. John & St. John, Cullman, for appellants.
Larry Waites of Dinsmore, Waites and Stovall, Birmingham, and Roy W. Williams, Jr., Cullman, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
Plaintiff Richard Wooten,[1] while riding a motorcycle on Cullman County Road 18, collided with a hay rake being pulled by a tractor owned by co-defendant Dewey Hutson and driven by co-defendant James Cordes.
*91 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Wooten for $300,000. Both defendants appeal.
On appeal, they claim that they were entitled to a directed verdict, because:
In addition, defendant Hutson claims he was entitled to a directed verdict because Cordes was not his agent at the time of the accident.
Defendants also say they were entitled to a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
We believe that the jury was authorized to find that defendant Cordes was Dewey Hutson's agent.
The facts regarding agency were in dispute. Cordes worked as a farmhand for both Dewey and Melvin Hutson. Hutson and Cordes argue that the evidence established that on the day in question Cordes was Melvin Hutson's agent. Wooten, on the other hand, contends that the evidence established that Cordes was moving the tractor and hay rake to Butler Field in order to rake hay for Dewey Hutson. Because the facts were in dispute, we must conclude that the question of agency was properly submitted to the jury.
The law states that a principal is liable for the acts of an agent done in the interest of and in the prosecution of the principal's business, if the agent is acting within the scope of his employment. Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Washington, D.C. v. Hendley, 251 Ala. 261, 37 So. 2d 97 (1948); Craft v. Koonce, 237 Ala. 552, 187 So. 730 (1939); Southern Railway Co. v. Wildman, 119 Ala. 565, 24 So. 764 (1898). To constitute agency, there must be a meeting of the minds of both the principal and the agent as to the scope of employment. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Northcutt, 158 Ala. 539, 48 So. 553 (1908). The rule governing whether the question of agency shall be submitted to the jury is best set forth in Craft, supra, 237 Ala. at 554, 187 So.  at 731, as follows:
It is elementary that the test of agency is the right of control, whether exercised or not, and that is a question for the trier of fact if the evidence is in dispute. Hatton v. Chem-Haulers, Inc., 393 So. 2d 950 (Ala.1980).
We think not. Alabama's Code does exempt "implements of husbandry" from the provisions of law applicable to other vehicles.
Code 1975, § 32-9-22, provides as follows:
Although "implements of husbandry" are exempt from the width restrictions, it is not a blanket exemption which would apply regardless of the manner in which a motor vehicle was operated on the public highways. The law requires that travelers on public highways, whether in an automobile or on a tractor, use the highway in such a way that they will not injure other travelers. Barber Pure Milk Co. v. Holmes, 264 Ala. 45, 84 So. 2d 345 (1955).
The evidence tends to show that County Road 18 is approximately eighteen feet wide at the scene of the accident, and that the tractor with the hay rake attached is a total of ten feet wide with three feet of the hay rake protruding from the left side of the tractor. The evidence was conflicting as to how much room was available on the other side of the road for oncoming traffic. Cordes testified that the right wheels of the tractor were along the right edge of the pavement. Other witnesses testified, however, that the vehicle was in the center of the road.
Because of this conflict in the evidence, we cannot agree with the defendants, therefore, that the only evidence of negligence was the width of the hay rake. The jury could have concluded that the defendants were negligent in the manner in which they operated the equipment, even though it was an "exempt" item.
We think not.
Defendants contend in their brief that plaintiff "admitted that he would expect to see [a hay rake] on this road," that "the presence of the hay rake was no surprise," that "he knew it was dangerous to be riding the motorcycle," that "he knew he was coming into a curve," that "he had enough room to get by the hay rake," that "he could have missed this hay rake if he had been travelling slower," and that "[t]wo witnesses testified that plaintiff admitted at the scene that the accident was his fault."
We have examined the specific testimony of the plaintiff to which the defendants refer and we are of the opinion that there was sufficient testimony for the jury to conclude that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributing to his injuries. For example, he testified, in substance, that although he was not surprised to see a farm vehicle on the road, he was obeying all traffic laws and that he slowed down to 30 m.p.h. when he entered the curve, but that there would have been no way to avoid the rake without running off the road.
Plaintiff did make what the jury could have determined was an admission of fault:
In context, this statement could have been taken by the jury to mean that he was blaming himself for getting hurt. One of the defendants' witnesses testified that the essence of the plaintiff's statement made at the scene when he was hurting was: "I shouldn't have been on the motorcycle." The jury apparently did not find that the plaintiff's conduct and statements showed him to be guilty of contributory negligence.
*93 We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a directed verdict or new trial based on the claim of contributory negligence.
We think not.
Defendants correctly cite the applicable rule in their brief:
They claim that this is the kind of case referred to in Casey, contending that the undisputed evidence is that at the time of the accident, Cordes was the agent of Melvin Hutson. They contend that Melvin was the principal in this case and should have been added as a party defendant, and that plaintiff himself recognized this fact and attempted to add Melvin Hutson on August 1, 1983, but the statute of limitations had run at that time, and that the trial court properly denied the addition. They argue:
As we have pointed out, defendants presented each of these claims to the jury and the jury refused to respond in defendants' favor. The law, however, is well settled in this area.
A jury verdict is presumed to be correct, and that presumption is strengthened where the trial court denies a motion for new trial. Merrill v. Badgett, 385 So. 2d 1316 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 1319 (Ala.1980). "Granting or refusing a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness which will not be disturbed by this court unless some legal right was abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial court was in error." Hill v. Cherry, 379 So. 2d 590 (Ala.1980). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The judgment of the trial court is due to be, and is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  While Richard Wooten's wife Linda was originally a party plaintiff, the lower court's verdict was in favor of Richard Wooten alone.