Title: In Re Hanson

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

94 Wn.2d 798 (1980) 620 P.2d 95 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of FERLYN HANSON, Petitioner. No. 47095-2. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 4, 1980. John Midgley of Institutional Legal Services, for petitioner. John Panesko, Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. DOLLIVER, J. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on April 18, 1975, and received a life sentence with a 20-year mandatory minimum. He did not appeal. A personal restraint petition was filed with the Court of Appeals. We accepted certification. The petition alleges: (1) Petitioner did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his constitutional right of appeal; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. [1] In State v. Sweet, 90 Wn.2d 282, 581 P.2d 579 (1978), we held the State has the burden of demonstrating the waiver of the right of appeal was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. We believe this burden has been met by the State. CrR 7.1(b) provides: On the day of sentencing, the record shows the following occurred: (Italics ours.) Not once but twice the trial court led petitioner through the requirements of CrR 7.1(b). We believe the rights of petitioner were protected and that on the face of the record petitioner made a conscious, knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal. It is not necessary that the trial court inquire further into the nature of petitioner's understanding of his right of appeal when the requirements of CrR 7.1(b) are strictly followed, as they were here. Plaintiff contends, however, that regardless of what is contained in the court record he did not waive his appeal because at the time he was under misapprehensions brought about, he claims, by his then counsel. This counsel, an experienced criminal practitioner, is now deceased. In his affidavit, which accompanied his petition, petitioner claims: (1) petitioner's counsel told him an appeal would be "a waste of time, or just a formality, or something like that"; (2) petitioner was advised by counsel that he "would have to remain in the Lewis County Jail during the appeal. He told me the appeal could take a long time, up to several years"; (3) petitioner had been in solitary confinement for several weeks before and during the trial and he "expected to stay in solitary all during any appeal if I were forced to stay in the jail ... I wanted to get out of solitary and out of the jail, and so decided not to appeal when I heard I would have to stay in jail during the whole appeal." Petitioner states that "Had I known the information my attorney gave me about an appeal was incorrect, I would have appealed my conviction." In July 1976, shortly after an inquiry from petitioner's present counsel, the former counsel wrote: *802 The comment about not discussing the taking of an appeal certainly conforms to petitioner's affidavit that he was told an appeal would be a waste of time. Having once given this advice, counsel would hardly then discuss the taking of an appeal. The only real point of contention seems to be whether petitioner's counsel advised him he would be confined to the county jail during appeal. On this matter, we have the statement of petitioner that this is what he had been told and the letter from his experienced and knowledgable first counsel that no such advice was ever given. In examining the record before us which includes petitioner's unequivocal statement, "Yes, I understand," before the trial judge, as well as the unequivocal statement of his experienced counsel that he did not advise that petitioner would be confined in the county jail during the appeal, we believe and hold that petitioner did voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waive his right of appeal and that he was at all times effectively represented by his counsel. Petition denied. UTTER, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. Reconsideration denied December 31, 1980.