Title: Mary S. Downing, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Larry Downing v. The City of Dothan

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:09/24/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090933
_________________________
Mary S. Downing, individually and as administratrix of the
estate of Larry Downing 
v.
The City of Dothan
 Appeal from Houston Circuit Court
(CV-07-120)
BOLIN, Justice.
Mary S. Downing, individually and as administratrix of
the estate of Larry Downing, deceased, appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of the City of Dothan.  We affirm.
1090933
2
Facts
On January 13, 2007, Mary and her husband, Larry, arrived
at the Southern Family Market to shop for groceries.   After
placing the groceries in their automobile, Larry was returning
the shopping cart to the store when he was struck and killed
by an automobile driven by Tabitha Shea Farmer.  Farmer had
apparently temporarily lost consciousness as the result of
inhaling the fumes from an aerosol can of 3M brand dust
remover, a computer-cleaning product.  
Shortly before the accident, Farmer had been stopped by
Dothan City police officers for erratic driving.  Farmer
testified that, while sitting at a red light, she inhaled
fumes from the can of dust remover and lost consciousness.
She said that her vehicle then rolled through the red light
and over a curb and collided with a city park bench.  After
regaining consciousness, Farmer said she drove off.  Wanda
Andrews, an off-duty dispatcher for the City of Dothan,
witnessed the series of  events and immediately reported them
to the Dothan Police Department.  Andrews followed Farmer to
a nearby parking lot, where Farmer got out of her vehicle to
inspect the damage caused by the impact with the bench.
Andrews questioned Farmer regarding the accident and noted
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3
that she seemed disoriented.  Farmer drove off, and Andrews
continued to follow her, noting her erratic driving.  At
approximately 5:54 p.m., Officer Raemonica Carney, who was
nearing the end of her shift, heard the dispatch and responded
to the call, initiating a traffic stop.  Cpl. Clark Rice and
Officer Darren Pert, the two officers dispatched to the call,
arrived immediately thereafter.  Also present at the scene
were Cpl. Tim Miller, who worked in the vice-narcotics
division, and  Andrews, the off-duty dispatcher for the City.
Andrews talked to Officer Carney and told her that she
believed that Farmer was impaired.  Andrews also talked to
Cpl. Rice and described everything that she had witnessed:
Farmer's car rolling through the red light and striking a park
bench; Farmer making a U-turn; Farmer staggering, slurring her
speech, being unable to intelligently answer simple questions,
driving off again, stopping in the middle of Main Street, and
jumping the curb.  Upon questioning by Cpl. Rice about her
erratic driving, Farmer replied that she did not recall doing
anything wrong.  Cpl. Rice continued to question Farmer,
asking if she had any medical problems that could have
affected her driving or if she had possibly been attending to
her two-year-old child, who was in the backseat; Farmer
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4
responded "no."  With Farmer's permission, Officers Carney and
Pert searched Farmer's vehicle while Cpl. Rice questioned a
second witness.  Officer Carney found a can of dust remover
without a cap in the floorboard area of the driver's side of
the vehicle.  She discovered on the passenger's side
floorboard a plastic shopping bag containing, among other
things, a second can of dust remover, along with the cap from
the first can.   Officer Carney asked Farmer if she had been
driving around "huffing" the dust remover and Farmer replied,
"I don't do that."  Officer Carney showed the cans of dust
remover to Cpl. Rice; Farmer again denied having inhaled the
dust remover.  Officer Carney used a flashlight to check
Farmer's eyes for responsiveness to stimuli.  According to
Officer Carney, Farmer's eyes did not dilate or otherwise
respond to the light.  Officer Carney expressed her opinion to
Cpl. Rice that Farmer had been driving around while inhaling
the dust remover and that she should be arrested for driving
while intoxicated.  Cpl. Rice had Farmer submit to a series of
field-sobriety tests.  According to Cpl. Rice, Farmer
performed all the tests successfully and she seemed alert,
aware, and fully functional.  Officer Pert, Lt. Ray Woodham,
and Andrews witnessed Cpl. Rice administering the field-
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5
sobriety tests and agreed that Farmer had performed them
successfully.  Officer Carney, however, disputes that Farmer
passed all the tests successfully.  Cpl. Rice eventually
approached Officer Carney (because her shift had ended) and
told her that she could go and that "they would handle the
call."  Thereafter, Cpl. Rice and Officer Pert made the
decision to not arrest Farmer based on their opinion that she
was not impaired or under the influence of any substance that
would preclude her from safely operating her vehicle.   Cpl.
Rice testified in his affidavit as follows:
"Ms. 
Farmer 
recited 
her 
ABC's 
without
difficulty.  She performed the 1,2,3,4 finger count
twice correctly.  She counted from 100 backwards to
93 as instructed with no hesitations or mistakes.
She performed the one-legged stand and passed.  She
knew the date when I asked her today's date.  She
was incorrect when I asked her what time it was.
She stated 7:30 when it was 6:00 p.m.  Ms. Farmer's
eyes were not red, she was steady on her feet and
did not stagger.  Her speech was not slurred nor did
she ever act overly excited or agitated.  She had no
detectable odor of alcohol on her breath, her person
or inside her vehicle.  A search of her vehicle
revealed 
no 
alcoholic 
beverages, 
prescription
narcotics or drug paraphernalia.
"Ms. Farmer seemed alert, aware and fully
functional during the time I was with her at the
scene of the traffic stop.  She never mentioned any
medical conditions and ... did not appear to have
any.  I have had the opportunity during my career as
a police officer to witness many intoxicated persons
and I have made many arrests for public intoxication
1090933
We note that Downing also named other defendants who are
1
not parties to this appeal.
6
and [driving under the influence] which have
resulted in convictions.  Based upon my experience
and my observations of Ms. Farmer, it was then and
remains my opinion she was not under the influence
of any substance such that her ability to safely
operate a motor vehicle was compromised.  A traffic
incident report was made and Officer Pert released
Ms. Farmer."
As previously noted, after being released, Farmer proceeded to
the parking lot of the Southern Family Market grocery store
where she inhaled dust remover and lost consciousness while
she was driving, causing her vehicle to strike and kill Larry
Downing.   
Mary Downing, individually and as administratrix of her
deceased husband's estate, filed a wrongful-death action
against the City of Dothan and fictitiously named parties,
alleging negligence and wantonness.   The City of Dothan filed
1
a motion for a summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled
to State-agent immunity as governed by the analysis set forth
in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  Downing
responded by citing the following three cases: Luker v. City
of Brantley, 520 So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987), Tyler v. City of
1090933
We note that Downing sued only the City of Dothan and not
2
the police officers involved in Farmer's stop.  "'It is well
established that, if a municipal police officer is immune
pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), [Ala. Code 1975,] then, pursuant to
§ 6-5-338(b), the city of which he is employed is also
immune.'" Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 910 (Ala.
2005)(quoting Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 203
(Ala. 2003)).  Accordingly, because the liability of the City
of Dothan in this case is contingent on the liability of its
police officers, we will consider whether the police officers,
as agents of the City, would be entitled to immunity under the
analysis stated in Cranman.
7
Enterprise, 577 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1991), and Nunnelee v. City
of Decatur, 643 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993). 
"Luker stands for the proposition that once a police
officer, acting in the line and scope of his duty,
knows that a driver is intoxicated, he has a duty to
restrain him, and if he does not restrain him and a
third party is injured by the intoxicated driver,
the city may be liable for the negligence of the
officer in allowing the intoxicated driver to
proceed." 
Tyler, 577 So. 2d at 877.
 
Specifically, relying on the Luker principle, Downing
argued that the City of Dothan was not entitled to State-agent
immunity  because, she says, its police officers had a duty to
restrain Farmer from driving once they knew or reasonably
should have known that she was intoxicated.   After conducting
2
two separate hearings, the trial court ultimately concluded
that the cases relied on and cited by Downing predated the
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8
effective date of § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975 (April 26, 1994),
which provides that "[e]very peace officer ... shall at all
times be deemed to be officers of this state, and as such
shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary function
within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement
duties."  The trial court further concluded that Downing
failed to produce any evidence indicating that the police
officers had acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond their authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law in not preventing Farmer from
driving.  Downing appeals. 
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
  
The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by
this Court in Ex parte Cranman now governs the determination
of whether a police officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-
5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975.  See Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932
So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005)("The restatement of State-agent
immunity as set out in Cranman ... now governs the
determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to
immunity under § 6-5-338(a).").  In Cranman, this Court
stated:
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9
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons[, or serving as peace
officers under circumstances entitling such officers
to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code
1975].
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
1090933
10
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
 
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
792 So.2d at 405 (some emphasis original; some emphasis added;
and bracketed modification added by Hollis v. City of
Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006)). 
In determining whether State-agent immunity applies under
Cranman, this Court has established a "burden-shifting"
process.   Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 2002).  In
order to claim State-agent immunity, the City of Dothan bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that Downing's claims
against it arise from a function that would entitle it to
immunity.  Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d
21 (Ala. 2002).  If the City of Dothan makes such a showing,
the burden then shifts to Downing to show that one of the two
Cranman categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity is
applicable.  Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. 2008).
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11
Discussion
The City of Dothan argues that it is entitled to State-
agent immunity because, it says, its police officers were
exercising a discretionary function in deciding whether to
arrest Farmer for driving under the influence.  There is no
question that the City of Dothan met its burden because, on
the day in question, its police officers were engaged in a
law-enforcement function for which State-agent immunity would
be available.  Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-338; Ex parte Cranman,
supra; see also City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d
755, 759 (Ala. 2002) ("'Generally, arrests and attempted
arrests are classified as discretionary functions.'" (quoting
Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Ala.
2002)).  Moreover, this Court has held that "[t]here is no
hard and fast rule concerning when there is and when there is
not probable cause to arrest a driver suspected to be under
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs." Ex parte City of
Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565, 570 (Ala. 1999)(abrogated on other
grounds by Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 404).  Therefore, the burden
shifted to Downing to present evidence that one of the two
exceptions to State-agent immunity in Cranman is applicable.
The exception being asserted by Downing is that the police
1090933
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officers acted beyond their authority in failing to restrain
Farmer and otherwise allowing her to continue to operate her
vehicle.  "A State agent acts beyond authority and is
therefore not immune when he or she 'fail[s] to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist.'" Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.
2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.  2003)(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).  Downing has not alleged that the
police officers violated any departmental rules or regulations
in exercising their judgment in this case.  Instead, relying
on the Luker principle, she argues that immunity cannot be
extended to the City when its police officers failed to
restrain a driver they knew to be impaired.   However, as
previously 
stated, 
Ex 
parte 
Cranman 
now 
governs 
the
determination of whether a police officer is entitled to
immunity under § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975; § 6-5-338(a) was
enacted subsequent to this Court's decision in Luker.  In any
event, the  evidence simply does not demonstrate that the
police officers in this case acted beyond their authority in
exercising their judgment to not arrest Farmer for driving
under the influence.  See, e.g., Nunnelee, supra (defendants
entitled to immunity on a claim that they failed to arrest an
1090933
13
intoxicated driver when driver passed field-sobriety test;
driver had one unopened can of beer in vehicle; and driver did
not appear intoxicated). In the instant case, although Officer
Carney harbored the opinion that Farmer should have been
arrested for driving under the influence, the record contains
sufficient evidence to show that Cpl. Rice and Officer Pert
had facts based on which they could have reasonably believed
that Farmer was not impaired or otherwise incapable of
operating her vehicle.  As previously stated, Cpl. Rice
administered a series of field-sobriety tests.  Cpl. Rice and
Officer Pert testified in their affidavits that Farmer
performed the tests successfully and that she did not appear
impaired.  Lt. Woodham also testified in an affidavit that he
observed Farmer perform the field-sobriety tests and that she
performed them successfully.  Andrews also opined that Farmer
passed all the tests that were administered.  Downing has
failed to carry her burden of showing that the police officers
acted beyond their authority in exercising their discretion in
enforcing the criminal laws of this State.  Accordingly, the
summary judgment in favor of the City of Dothan is due to be
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Woodall and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result. 
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
Although I do not concur in all aspects of the "beyond-
their-authority" analysis expressed in the main opinion, see
Ex parte Watson, 37 So. 3d 752, 765-67 (Ala. 2009) (Murdock,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ex parte
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., [Ms. 1090387, May 14, 2010] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010) (Murdock, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), I agree that the police officers'
decision not to arrest Farmer was one that fell within their
authority.  I therefore concur in the result reached by the
main opinion.