Title: Moore v. Hall

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTOPHER MOORE,1 
 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHARLENE HALL, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 442, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. 11-03-05TN 
§  Petition No. 11-08387 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  March 10, 2014 
 
 
 
 
    Decided:  March 20, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of March 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the appellee’s response and motion to affirm, it appears to the 
Court that:  
 
(1) 
The Family Court terminated the parental rights of the 
appellant, Christopher Moore (“Father”), with respect to his eight-year-old 
daughter (“the Child”) by order dated August 1, 2013. This is Father’s 
appeal from the termination of his parental rights.  
                                                        
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 7(d).  
 
2
(2) 
Father’s appointed counsel on appeal has filed an opening brief 
and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c). Counsel 
asserts that he has reviewed the record and has determined that no arguable 
claim for appeal exists. By letter, Father’s counsel informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26.1(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and accompanying brief. Father did not respond with any points 
for the Court’s consideration on appeal. The appellee, Charlene Hall 
(“Mother”), has filed a response to counsel’s Rule 26.1 brief and has moved 
to affirm the Family Court’s judgment. 
 
(3) 
In March 2011, Mother filed a petition (“TPR petition”) 
seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment 
and failure to plan.  Father opposed Mother’s petition.  The Family Court 
appointed counsel to represent him.  The Family Court initially entered an 
order terminating Father’s parental rights on December 22, 2011, which this 
Court reversed on appeal. 2   After the matter was remanded for 
reconsideration, the Family Court appointed new counsel and held a retrial 
on July 8, 2013 and July 10, 2013.  The Family Court heard testimony from 
Mother, Father, Mother’s husband, Mother’s father, Father’s ex-girlfriend, 
                                                        
2 Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d 1203 (Del. 2013). 
 
3
and from a social worker who prepared reports for Mother regarding her 
petition. 
 
(4) 
The testimony at the TPR hearing fairly established that Mother 
and Father had engaged in a tumultuous relationship between March 2003 
and April 2006.  The Child was born in August 2005.  Father was not 
present for the Child’s birth and disputed whether he was the biological 
father of the Child.3  Father has had no relationship with the Child since June 
or July 2006.  Mother has since remarried and her new husband treats the 
Child as his own daughter and wishes to adopt her.  Father has been 
incarcerated since December 2006.  His anticipated release date is in 2019.  
Father made no attempt to contact the Child until Mother filed her TPR 
petition.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court found clear and 
convincing evidence that Father, without intent, had abandoned the Child4 
and that Father had failed to plan for the Child,5 and that termination of 
Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.6  
 
(5)  
On appellate review of a termination of parental rights, this 
Court is required to consider the facts and the law as well as the inferences 
                                                        
3 Father’s parentage was later established by DNA testing. 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(2)(b) (2009). 
5 Id. § 1103(a)(5)(b). 
6 Id. § 1103(a).  
 
4
and deductions made by the Family Court.7  We review legal rulings de 
novo.8  We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial court 
to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not 
clearly wrong.9  If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, our review is 
limited to abuse of discretion.10 
 
(6) 
The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires 
two separate inquires. 11   First, the court must determine whether the 
evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.12 
Second, the court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in 
the best interest of the child. 13   Both of these requirements must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.14 
 
(7) 
We have carefully reviewed the parties' submissions as well as 
the record below, including the transcript of the TPR hearing. We conclude 
                                                        
7 Scott v. DSCYF, 2012 WL 605700 (Feb. 27, 2012) (citing Wilson v. Div. of Fam. 
Services, 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010)).   
8 Wilson v. Div. of Fam. Services, 988 A.2d 435, 440 (Del. 2010).  
9  Id.  
10 Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).   
11 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).   
12 Id. at 537. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(1-8) (listing the grounds for 
termination of parental rights). 
13  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a)(1-8) (listing factors to be considered when 
determining the best interest of the child).  
14 Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d at731.   
 
5
that there is ample record evidence supporting the Family Court's 
termination of Father’s parental rights based on unintentional abandonment 
and failure to plan and that such termination is clearly in the Child’s best 
interest. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Justice