Title: State v. Sasso

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 95 
Docket: 
Han-14-400 
Argued: 
October 7, 2015 
Decided: 
June 28, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and 
HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
JOHN E. SASSO 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  John E. Sasso appeals from the judgment of conviction entered in the 
Unified Criminal Docket (Hancock County, R. Murray, J.) following his 
conditional plea of nolo contendere, pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), to the 
crime of operating after suspension (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(B) 
(2015).  Sasso argues that the court (Mallonee, J.) erred in denying his motion to 
suppress, contending that the officer’s decision to stop his vehicle was pretextual 
and that the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop.  We 
affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order 
denying Sasso’s motion to suppress, the record supports the following facts.  See 
 
2 
State v. Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 2, 48 A.3d 218.  On March 28, 2014, an Ellsworth 
police officer, who was also part of an underage drinking task force, was on patrol.  
The officer watched Sasso, who was eighteen at the time, leave a convenience 
store, get into the driver’s seat of a car, and drive away from the store.  The night 
was rainy, and the roads were wet.  The officer followed Sasso for a short distance 
and did not observe any problems with the operation of the vehicle.  He did, 
however, notice a problem with the brake lights on Sasso’s car.  One of the brake 
lights appeared to be “stuck on.”1  The officer described the problem of the brake 
light as “a safety violation.”  He turned on his blue lights and effected a stop of 
Sasso’s car.  Sasso pulled over without incident.  Sasso was driving with a license 
that had been suspended as a result of an OUI conviction, and he was arrested for 
operating after suspension. 
[¶3]  Sasso was charged by criminal complaint with operating after 
suspension (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(B).  He entered a not guilty 
plea and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the officer’s stop of the 
vehicle, arguing that the stop was pretextual and that there was no reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to justify the stop.  Regarding the alleged pretext, Sasso 
                                         
1  Sasso argued that although one of his taillights was much brighter than the other, causing the 
appearance that his brake light was stuck on, his brake light was not actually stuck on.  Whether or not the 
brake light was actually stuck on is irrelevant because the record supports a finding that at the time of the 
stop, the officer believed Sasso’s brake light was stuck on and cited the offending brake light as the 
reason for initiating the stop.    
 
3 
argued that the officer thought that Sasso had purchased alcohol at the convenience 
store, and he hoped to find evidence of underage drinking by stopping the car.   
[¶4]  Three people testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress: (1) the 
officer who stopped Sasso; (2) Sasso’s mother, who confirmed that one of the 
taillights was a bit brighter than the other, perhaps because it was canted at a 
slightly different angle; and (3) another individual regarding a potential reason for 
the brighter taillight.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion.  
The court made very brief findings on the record, including the finding that 
“there’s clearly something out of whack with this car.”  The court made no explicit 
finding on pretext, determining that the State was correct that in these 
circumstances the officer’s suspicion regarding underage possession of alcohol was 
“neither here nor there.”   
[¶5]  Neither party moved for further findings and conclusions.  See M.R. 
Crim. P. 41A(d).  Although Sasso had argued that the stop was pretextual, he did 
not seek specific findings at the hearing or seek further findings after the hearing.    
[¶6]  Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Sasso entered a 
conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).  The court 
found Sasso guilty and sentenced him to the mandatory seven days in jail to be 
satisfied by completion of ten days in an alternative sentencing program, a $600 
 
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fine, and a one-year license suspension.  Sasso then timely appealed.  See 
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2015). 
II.  OVERVIEW 
[¶7]  “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 5 of the Maine Constitution protect motorists from being unreasonably 
stopped by police.”  State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 8, 43 A.3d 961.  For a traffic 
stop to be constitutional, “a police officer must have an objectively reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to 
public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.”  State v. Sylvain, 
2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 (footnote omitted).  “Safety reasons alone can be 
sufficient” to support a stop “if they are based upon ‘specific and articulable 
facts.’”  State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989). 
[¶8]  A “pretext” challenge refers to an allegation that, although an officer 
has proffered a legal justification to stop a vehicle, the stop was effectuated for 
some unrelated purpose for which no articulable suspicion or probable cause 
existed.  Sasso argues that, because there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion 
for the stop, the stop must have been pretextual.  As set out in part IV of this 
opinion, we conclude that the officer did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
for the stop, and we move to the next question: whether the separate, subjective 
motivation of the officer renders a stop “unreasonable,” even in circumstances 
 
5 
where there is a valid criminal, civil, or safety basis for the stop.  For the following 
reasons, we conclude that it does not.   
III.  PRETEXT 
[¶9]  In 1996, the United States Supreme Court addressed pretextual vehicle 
stops in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).2  In Whren, District of 
Columbia vice-squad officers, operating in a “high drug area,” observed a motor 
vehicle that was stopped at a stop sign.  Id. at 808.  Although they suspected drug 
trafficking activity, they had no initial basis, specific to that vehicle or its 
occupants, to stop the car.  See id.  The officers then observed the vehicle remain at 
the stop sign for an unusually long time, make a right-hand turn without a proper 
signal, and speed off at an unreasonable speed.  Id.  The officers stopped the 
vehicle, at which point they saw in plain view two large plastic bags of what 
appeared to be crack cocaine.  Id. at 808-09.  They arrested the motor vehicle’s 
occupants.  Id. at 809. 
[¶10]  The defendants in Whren argued that the stop was unconstitutional 
because the officers did not have probable cause3 to believe that the vehicle’s 
                                         
2  Although Whren was based on civil traffic violations of a municipal ordinance, see Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), the United States Supreme Court has indicated that its holding extends 
to criminal traffic violations as well, see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996). 
3  We note that although the standard used by the officers to effectuate the stop in Whren was probable 
cause rather than a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the analysis regarding pretext applies uniformly.  See 
Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
 
6 
occupants were engaging in drug-related activity, and the asserted basis for 
stopping the vehicle—the traffic violations—was pretextual.  Id.  They argued that 
because of “the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law 
violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists,” the 
fact that the officers had probable cause to believe that the traffic infractions were 
occurring was not enough, and a different standard was necessary to analyze the 
situation.  Id. at 810. 
[¶11]  In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and upheld the stop.  Id. at 819.  It clarified that the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual, subjective 
motivations of the individual officers involved.  Id. at 813.  When a stop is based 
on an objectively justifiable basis, a separate motive does not strip the officer’s 
actions of the legal justification.  Id.  The Court specifically rejected the inquiry 
into the subjective motivation of the officer, stating: “Not only have we never held, 
outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . , that an 
officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”  Id. at 812.  
 
[¶12]  The Supreme Court holding announced in Whren is consistent with 
Maine’s standard for evaluating whether a traffic stop passes constitutional muster.  
In State v. Haskell, 645 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 1994), decided before the Supreme 
 
7 
Court announced its decision in Whren, we described a pretextual stop as occurring 
“when an officer uses a legal justification to stop a vehicle to search for evidence 
of an unrelated serious crime for which he did not have the reasonable articulable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop.”   
[¶13]  Additional language in Haskell did, however, reference the officer’s 
subjective motivation.  We stated in Haskell that “[t]he test is not whether the 
officer lawfully could have stopped defendant, but whether a reasonable officer 
would have made the stop absent the invalid purpose.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Thus, Haskell could reasonably have been read to overlay a second test on the 
basis for the stop—in other words, even if the stop was undertaken on an 
objectively reasonable basis, the stop may be invalidated if the officer had a 
separate, subjective motivation for the stop.    
[¶14]  We have, however, more recently clarified that the subjective 
motivation of the officer is not relevant on the ultimate determination of a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, which requires an objective analysis.  As we 
announced in State v. Bolduc, decided after Whren, “[w]hether a reasonable police 
officer would normally have stopped [the defendant] . . . is not important to the 
analysis.” 1998 ME 255, ¶ 6, 722 A.2d 44 (emphasis added); see also State v. 
Taylor, 1997 ME 81, ¶ 9 n.6, 694 A.2d 907.  Consistent with the standard 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Whren, the standard to be used 
 
8 
is whether an officer has “an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, 
is occurring, or is about to occur.”  Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 
(footnote omitted).   
[¶15]  In sum, to the extent that other language in Haskell suggested a 
different analysis, we now clarify that the officer’s subjective motivation is not 
relevant to the determination of the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary for 
a valid traffic stop.  The critical analysis, even when pretext is asserted, requires an 
objective review of the basis for the stop.  Thus, an illegal pretextual stop is one 
that occurs when an officer asserts an allegedly legitimate reason to stop a vehicle 
in order to obtain evidence of an unrelated crime when the officer did not actually 
have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a stop.  
See Haskell, 645 A.2d at 621.   
[¶16]  We note, however, that evidence of an officer’s subjective motivation 
for a stop, seizure, or search may well be relevant on matters of credibility, 
observer bias, or context.  Thus, the relevance of alleged pretext or subjective 
motivation, because it may bear on credibility of witnesses, context, or reliability 
of the evidence presented, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.  See M.R. 
Evid. 401. 
 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
[¶17]  With that background, we review Sasso’s challenges to the court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress.  As always, we apply two standards of review to 
the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigatory 
traffic stop.  State v. Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶ 16, 932 A.2d 1169.  We first 
determine whether the record supports the factual findings made by the motion 
court.  State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 881.  We then “review de 
novo the motion court’s conclusion that the officer’s subjective suspicion was 
objectively reasonable as a matter of law.”  Id. 
[¶18]  The court’s findings on the record at the conclusion of the motion 
were very brief.  In ruling on a motion to suppress, “the court shall make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law either on the record or in writing.  If the court fails 
to make such findings and conclusions, a party may file a motion seeking 
compliance with the requirement.”  M.R. Crim. P. 41A(d).  If no facts are found or 
the factual findings are not sufficient to disclose the basis for the court’s decision, 
“the party responsible for an adequate record, the appellant, has the burden to 
request the court to make findings if none are made, or to expand on inadequate 
findings in order for the record to be meaningful for appellate review.”  State v. 
Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
10 
[¶19]  This responsibility is critical in the context of this appeal because 
neither party moved for further findings.  Thus, we “infer that the court found all 
the facts necessary to support its judgment if those inferred findings are 
supportable by evidence in the record.”  State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 
A.2d 1003.  We “consider the evidence, and reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment 
to determine if the evidence rationally supports the trial court’s decision.” 4  Id.  In 
other words, we assume that the court found facts necessary to support the denial 
of the motion.  
[¶20]  The court believed the officer’s testimony regarding the taillight 
malfunction and found that “there’s clearly something out of whack with this 
car . . . . It’s clear there’s something irregular here.”  It did not specify in its 
decision whether it found that the officer stopped Sasso’s vehicle due to criminal 
conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety.  Because the State did not 
argue that the malfunctioning brake light constituted a crime and did not offer or 
                                         
4  Here, the court, in denying the motion to suppress, did not expressly find that the stop was initiated 
on an improper basis, such as a suspicion of underage possession of alcohol.  The court stated in its 
findings on the record: “Now, it may well be true that if he hadn’t suspected underage drinking, he 
wouldn’t have bothered to stop the car.  I think [the prosecutor] is right that that’s neither here nor here.”  
Because, in the absence of a motion for further findings of fact, we “infer that the court found all the facts 
necessary to support its judgment,” State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003, and we also read 
the facts in the light most favorable to the court’s ultimate determination, id., we assume that the court did 
not find that the officer’s motivation rendered his testimony less than credible. 
 
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rely on the motor vehicle inspection regulations,5 this record would not support a 
finding that the officer had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that a 
crime or traffic infraction was occurring.  Thus, the only finding that would 
provide a constitutional basis for the stop would be that the officer had a 
reasonable concern for the safety of the driver or the public.  See State v. Gulick, 
2000 ME 170, ¶ 14, 759 A.2d 1085.   
[¶21]  The record supports the court’s inferred finding that the basis for the 
stop was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of a threat to public 
safety.  The record demonstrates that it was a rainy night and the light malfunction 
could confuse other motorists.  The officer testified that the malfunctioning 
taillight was “a hazard for other people.  They might see that and think the person’s 
braking.  Or the other light might be out.”  Thus, the court could determine that the 
officer had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of a safety concern that 
supported the stop.  Cf. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶¶ 13, 17, 36 A.3d 881.  Again, 
“[s]afety reasons alone can be sufficient if they are based on ‘specific and 
articulable facts.’”  Pinkham, 565 A.2d at 319.  Given the officer’s credited 
testimony describing a malfunctioning brake light on a dark and wet street, the 
safety concern was objectively reasonable.  Furthermore, the court’s finding that 
                                         
5  A malfunctioning brake light could preclude a successful inspection of a vehicle under Maine’s 
inspection laws.  See 9 C.M.R. 16 222 001-18 § 9 (2012).   
 
12 
any separate motivation was “neither here nor there” reflected its legally accurate 
conclusion that, even if the officer had a separate motivation for the stop, the 
objectively reasonable safety basis for the stop was sufficient to demonstrate that it 
was “reasonable” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.  The court did not err in 
denying the motion to suppress. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Ezra A.R. Willey, Esq., Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for 
appellant John E. Sasso 
 
Matthew J. Foster, District Attorney, and Delwyn E. Webster, 
Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. VII, Ellsworth, for 
appellee State of Maine 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Ezra A.R. Willey, Esq., for appellant John E. Sasso 
 
Delwyn E. Webster, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
 
 
Hancock County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2014-297 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY