Title: Howard S. v. Lillian S.

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 71  
Howard S.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Lillian S.,
            Respondent.
Jacqueline W. Silbermann, for appellant.
Walter F. Bottger, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
The dispute in this matrimonial action centers on the
extent of discovery that should be permitted into issues of
marital fault.  As set forth in the complaint, plaintiff husband
and defendant wife were married in May 1997.  Defendant had one
child from a previous relationship, who was later adopted by
plaintiff.  Three other children were born during the course of
- 2 -
No. 71
- 2 -
the marriage.  The youngest child, born in 2004, was the product
of an extramarital affair between defendant and an unidentified
man.  Plaintiff, unaware of his wife's infidelity until the child
was over three years old, has raised that child as his own. 
Plaintiff alleges that, although defendant knew or should have
known that the child was not plaintiff's, she withheld that
information from him.
In 2007, defendant allegedly commenced another
extramarital affair with an individual who was initially named as
a co-respondent in this action.  Plaintiff confronted defendant
with his suspicions of her infidelity, but she denied that she
was unfaithful.  Defendant maintained that there were no grounds
for divorce and the parties entered into the collaborative law
process at her suggestion.  Several months later, plaintiff
obtained the results of a DNA marker test revealing that he was
not the biological father of the youngest child.
Soon thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action
asserting two causes of action for divorce -- based on grounds of
cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery -- and a cause of action
for fraud, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.  The fraud
allegations stated that defendant represented that she had been
faithful to plaintiff and that he continued to participate in the
marriage in reliance upon those representations to his financial
detriment.  He sought to recover damages under the fraud claim
based upon costs he incurred due to defendant's failure to
- 3 -
No. 71
1  The parties indicate that they have stipulated to a
divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment.  A copy of
that stipulation was not included in the record on appeal.
- 3 -
disclose her adultery -- specifically, the amounts he expended in
support of the youngest child, profits from marital investments
that he would have deferred and fees for the collaborative law
process.  Among other things, plaintiff sought equitable
distribution of the marital property, alleging that the bulk of
the property should be awarded to him due to defendant's
egregious fault.  Defendant answered and asserted a counterclaim
for divorce on the ground of abandonment.
Defendant moved to dismiss or sever the fraud cause of
action and plaintiff cross-moved for liberal discovery relating
to his fraud claim and to the issue of defendant's egregious
fault for purposes of equitable distribution.1  Supreme Court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss and found that the complaint
stated a cause of action for fraud, but limited plaintiff's
available damages to his pecuniary loss in the form of
collaborative law process fees.  The court also denied
plaintiff's cross motion for liberal discovery, finding that
defendant's actions did not rise to the level of egregious fault.
A majority of the Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing
that defendant's behavior did not constitute egregious fault such
that it could be considered for purposes of equitable
distribution (62 AD3d 187 [1st Dept 2009]).  The Court further
- 4 -
No. 71
- 4 -
found that plaintiff could only pursue his claims of actual
pecuniary loss under the fraud cause of action and rejected the
claims for lost profits, child support and punitive damages.  One
Justice dissented and would have allowed plaintiff to obtain
liberal discovery on the issue of egregious conduct.  The
Appellate Division granted plaintiff leave to appeal, and we now
affirm.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) sets forth the
factors a court must consider when making an equitable
distribution award.  The statute does not specifically provide
for consideration of marital fault, but does contain a catch-all
provision that allows a court to consider "any other factor which
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Domestic
Relations Law § 236 [B][5][d][14]).  We have, however, rejected
the notion that marital fault is a "just and proper" factor for
consideration, "[e]xcept in egregious cases which shock the
conscience of the court" (O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 589-590
[1985]).  This rule is based, in part, upon the recognition that
marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership and that
the marital estate should be divided accordingly.  We also
observed that "fault will usually be difficult to assign and
[that] introduction of the issue may involve the courts in time-
consuming procedural maneuvers relating to collateral issues"
(O'Brien, 66 NY2d at 590).
Although we have not had occasion to further define
- 5 -
No. 71
2  Although the Appellate Division opinion below generally
stated the correct standard, to the extent that it can be read to
limit egregious conduct to behavior involving extreme violence,
the definition should not be so restrictive. 
- 5 -
egregious conduct, courts have agreed that adultery, on its own,
does not ordinarily suffice (see e.g. Newton v Newton, 246 AD2d
765, 766 [3d Dept 1998]; Lestrange v Lestrange, 148 AD2d 587, 588
[2d Dept 1989]).  This makes sense because adultery is a ground
for divorce -- a basis for ending the marital relationship, not
for altering the nature of the economic partnership.  At a
minimum, in order to have any significance at all, egregious
conduct must consist of behavior that falls well outside the
bounds of the basis for an ordinary divorce action.  This is not
to say that there can never be a situation where grounds for
divorce and egregious conduct will overlap.  However, it should
be only a truly exceptional situation, due to outrageous or
conscience-shocking conduct on the part of one spouse, that will
require the court to consider whether to adjust the equitable
distribution of the assets (see e.g. Levi v Levi, 46 AD3d 520 [2d
Dept 2007] [attempted bribery of trial judge]; Havell v Islam,
301 AD2d 339 [1st Dept 2002] [vicious assault of spouse in
presence of children]).2  Absent these types of extreme
circumstances, courts are not in the business of regulating how
spouses treat one another.
The complaint alleges that defendant committed adultery
and that, as a consequence of that conduct, she conceived a child
- 6 -
No. 71
3  We note that since defendant did not cross appeal the
denial of the motion to dismiss the fraud cause of action to the
Appellate Division, the issue of whether or not plaintiff stated
a cause of action for fraud was not presented to that Court and
is not before us.
4  This holding, of course, has no impact on a party's
ability to seek discovery for the dissipation of marital assets
(see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5][d][12]).
- 6 -
that she knew or should have known was fathered by another man
and that she kept that information from plaintiff.  Even taking
these allegations as true, plaintiff has essentially stated a
cause of action for adultery.  While adultery, and many of its
unintended consequences, will undoubtedly cause a great deal of
anguish and distress for the other spouse, it does not fit within
the legal concept of egregious conduct.  Moreover, plaintiff's
cause of action for fraud,3 is based entirely upon defendant's
alleged adultery and on plaintiff's reliance upon the denial of
that behavior.  Plaintiff cannot obtain discovery for what is
essentially an allegation of marital fault.4  
Although CPLR 3101 provides for "full disclosure of all
matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action," Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B)(5)(d) is the specific
statutory provision that governs equitable distribution in
marital actions.  Despite the general policy in favor of liberal
discovery, this Court has interpreted the more specific section
of the Domestic Relations Law to allow for consideration of
marital fault in only a limited set of circumstances involving
- 7 -
No. 71
- 7 -
egregious conduct.  In the absence of those circumstances,
liberal discovery on issues of marital fault -- at variance with
O'Brien -- should not ordinarily be permitted, though there may
be exceptions in rare circumstances (see e.g. Anonymous v
Anonymous, 71 AD2d 209, 214 [1st Dept 1979]).  Despite the
availability of protective orders if courts were to consider
these matters on a case by case basis, there remains significant
potential for abuse and harassment as a result of such discovery,
as well as the possibility that parties will be induced to enter
into disadvantageous settlements rather than litigate these types
of intensely personal issues.
Plaintiff's contentions pertaining to permissible
damages with respect to his fraud cause of action are without
merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in
the affirmative.
- 1 -
Howard S. v Lillian S.
No. 71 
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, it is
premature to rule that wife's behavior does not, as a matter of
law, constitute egregious misconduct for purpose of equitable
distribution under the Domestic Relations Law.  Therefore,
husband is entitled to discovery on his claim.
It is well-settled that parties are entitled to "full
disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the
prosecution and defense of an action" (CPLR 3101 [a] [1]).  This
provision makes no exception for matrimonial actions.  Further,
as the majority recognizes, this Court has held that marital
fault may be considered under factor 13 of Domestic Relations Law
§ 236 [B] [5] [d] [13], which provides that a court may consider
"any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just
and proper" (maj. opn. at 4 citing O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576
[1985]).  We limited such consideration of fault to "egregious
cases which shock the conscience of the court" (id. at 589-590).
It is within the court's discretion to determine whether a
spouse's misconduct is so egregious to justify consideration for
purposes of equitable distribution.  In my view, the court should
make this determination with full disclosure of the misconduct.
- 2 -
No. 71
- 2 -
The majority finds that discovery on the issue of fault
is precluded in this case.  Although neither party affirmatively
moved for a ruling on the egregious misconduct claim, the
majority reasons that the conduct alleged by husband is not so
egregious as a matter of law to be considered for purposes of
equitable distribution.  In my view, this is putting the cart
before the horse.  Indeed, the majority has implicitly accepted
the view of the First and Second Departments that a party is
required to make a motion for discovery on the issue of fault
(see Ginsberg v Ginsberg, 104 AD2d 482 [2d Dept 1984]; McMahan v
McMahan, 100 AD2d 826 [1st Dept 1984] [two Justices dissenting]). 
I disagree with this approach, and rather, take the view of the
Third and Fourth Departments that have no general prohibition of
pretrial discovery on fault, relying on our liberal discovery
rule (see Nigro v Nigro, 121 AD2d 833 [3d Dept 1986]; Lemke v
Lemke, 100 AD2d 735 [4th Dept 1984]).  Under that rule, husband
is entitled to discovery on the issue of fault, albeit with the
court overseeing and preventing abuses by asserting its
protective power (see CPLR 3101 [authorizing the court to issue a
protective order "to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,
embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or
the courts"]).  By first permitting discovery on the issue, the
court may adequately consider whether the misconduct alleged does
indeed "shock the conscience of the court" so as to warrant
consideration for purposes of equitable distribution.
- 3 -
No. 71
- 3 -
Further, I cannot agree with the majority's reasoning
for imposing a rule that would require a party to first seek
permission from the court to obtain discovery on egregious fault. 
The majority reasons that, despite the court's protective power,
"there remains significant potential for abuse and harassment as
a result of such discovery" (maj. opn. at 7).  However,
considerations of abuse and harassment may be found in any
contentious litigation. Further, fault is almost always an issue
in a matrimonial case as a finding of fault or the living apart
of the spouses are the only grounds for divorce in New York. 
Matrimonial cases often involve issues of a sensitive nature, and
courts are well equipped to deal with the potential problems
associated with them.  Thus, disclosure should be permitted with
restrictions imposed on a case-by-case basis, when problems
peculiar to the particular case arise (see Connors, Practice
Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, C3101:15 [noting that
CPLR 3101 [a] permits courts to restrict disclosure in specific
cases where problems exist]).  
Further, the majority believes there is a "possibility
that parties will be induced to enter into disadvantageous
settlements rather than litigate these types of intensely
personal issues."  At least one matrimonial scholar disagrees: 
"Often, the pretrial examination can motivate settlement and
avoid the far more bitter confrontation of the parties at trial,
thereby paving the way for more harmonious post-divorce
- 4 -
No. 71
- 4 -
relationships.  In any event, there would appear to be no valid
reason to force matrimonial litigants to trial with less
opportunity for disclosure and preparation than in any other
civil action" (2 New York Matrimonial Law and Practice § 16:29).  
Assuming wife moved for a protective order limiting 
husband's discovery on the issue of fault, I think the issue
would be close.  While adultery has generally been held not to be
an act so egregious as to become a factor to be considered when
distributing marital property, it may be a factor if it amounts
to "egregious" misconduct.  Here, wife not only committed
adultery on more than one occasion, she also had a child out of
wedlock and deceived both husband and child as to that child's
birth parent.  In my view, it is premature without additional
discovery to conclude at this junction that wife's misconduct is
not so egregious to warrant consideration for purposes of the
Domestic Relations Law.   
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the affirmative.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott
dissents in an opinion.
Decided April 29, 2010