Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ALLAN WASHINGTON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121864  
ALLAN WASHINGTON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
Defendant 
was 
convicted of armed robbery and assault with  
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.  The Court of  
Appeals reversed the convictions because the accomplice’s  
statement, in which the accomplice identified himself as the  
shooter, was improperly admitted against defendant. 251 Mich  
App 520; 650 NW2d 708 (2002).  It also found that the trial  
court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel the  
opportunity to conduct voir dire of a juror in mid-trial.  We  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the  
verdict.  
I  
 
On May 8, 1998, two men robbed James Turner while he was  
using a public pay phone at a Detroit gas station.  One of the  
men pulled a gun, pointed it at Turner’s head, and demanded  
money. The other went through Turner’s pockets and took his  
watch and pager.  When Turner told his assailants that he  
didn’t have anything else of value, he was shot in the back.  
A few minutes later, two police officers saw a car  
containing defendant and Daniel Mathis drive into an alley  
behind a gas station that was approximately a mile from the  
scene of the robbery.  The officers decided to investigate  
because the area was known for drug sales and prostitution.  
Defendant was uncooperative with the officers and, following  
a scuffle, he was handcuffed pending further investigation.  
As the officers returned to talk to Mathis, who had remained  
in the car, the report of the Turner robbery and a description  
of his assailants were broadcast over the police radio.  When  
one of the officers asked to have the description repeated,  
Mathis blurted out, “I did it——I’m the shooter.”  Turner  
identified defendant in a lineup as one of his assailants.  He  
failed to identify Mathis.  
Defendant and Mathis were charged with armed robbery,  
MCL 750.529, and assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83.  
They were tried separately.  On the morning of defendant’s  
trial, 
the 
issue 
whether Mathis’s statement was admissible was  
raised.  Without elaboration, the trial court decided that the  
2  
 
 
statement would be allowed into evidence.  Defendant was  
convicted of armed robbery and assault with intent to do great  
bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84.  
The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s convictions.  
It concluded that Mathis’s statement was improperly admitted  
as a statement against penal interest because it was not  
reliable. According to assertions made by defense counsel,  
Mathis was mentally ill.1  In addition, the panel found that  
the trial court should have allowed defense counsel to  
question a juror in mid-trial.  
II  
The decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse  
of discretion.  People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d  
673 (1998).  When the decision regarding the admission of  
evidence involves a preliminary question of law, such as  
whether a statute or rule of evidence precludes admissibility  
of the evidence, the issue is reviewed de novo.  People v  
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
1  Specifically, the Court of Appeals majority held:  
A review of the record reveals an assertion by 
defense counsel that codefendant Mathis suffered  
from mental illness and that he had a history of 
psychiatric 
and 
psychological treatment. Certainly, 
an inculpatory statement made by a mentally ill 
codefendant . . . is not a statement that contains  
“particularized 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness”  
sufficient 
to 
introduce 
the 
statement 
as  
substantive evidence against defendant without the 
opportunity for cross-examination. [251 Mich App 
527.]  
3  
 
III  
Declarations against penal interest constitute an  
exception 
to 
the 
general 
proscription 
against 
hearsay 
provided  
by MRE 802.  MRE 804(b)(3), in pertinent part, defines a  
declaration against penal interest as  
[a] statement which was at the time of its making 
. . . so far tended to subject the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable 
person in the declarant’s position would not have 
made the statement unless believing it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to 
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the 
accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness 
of the statement.  
The exception is based on the assumption that people do not  
generally make statements about themselves that are damaging  
unless they are true.  People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 161; 506  
NW2d 505 (1993), citing the comment of the Advisory Committee  
on Federal Rules of Evidence relating to FRE 804(B)(3).  
Mathis’s statement is against his penal interest and,  
therefore, is admissible.  
The inquiry, however, does not stop there because the  
Confrontation Clauses of the federal and state constitutions  
are implicated.  US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.  
The admission of Mathis’s statement as substantive evidence  
does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution  
can establish that Mathis was unavailable as a witness and  
that his statement bore adequate indicia of reliability.  
Alternatively, 
the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated if the  
4  
 
statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  
Poole, supra at 163.  
Some jurisdictions have held that the hearsay exception  
for statements against penal interest is a firmly rooted  
hearsay exception.  See, e.g., United States v McKeeve, 131  
F3d 1, 9 (CA 1, 1997), People v Wilson, 17 Cal App 4th 271,  
278; 21 Cal Rptr 2d 420 (1993), and State v Tucker, 109 Or App  
519, 526; 820 P2d 834 (1991).2 However, we need not decide  
that issue because Mathis had been charged with the crimes and  
was considered unavailable because it was expected that he  
would assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.  
Additionally, Mathis’s statement bears adequate indicia of  
reliability.  
In Poole, supra at 165, we instructed:  
In evaluating whether a statement against 
penal interest that inculpates a person in addition 
to the declarant bears sufficient indicia of  
reliability to allow it to be admitted as  
substantive evidence against the other person, 
courts must evaluate the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement as well as its content.  
The presence of the following factors would 
favor admission of such a statement: whether the  
statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made 
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) 
made 
to 
family, 
friends, 
colleagues, 
or  
confederates——that is, to someone to whom the 
declarant would likely speak the truth, and (4) 
uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the 
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the  
2 We acknowledge, without approving, Neuman v Rivers, 125  
F3d 315 (CA 6, 1997), a case from Michigan, concluding that 
the exception is firmly rooted.  
5  
 
listener.  
On the other hand, the presence of the  
following 
factors 
would 
favor 
a 
finding 
of  
inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made 
to law enforcement officers or at the prompting or 
inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes the role or 
responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to 
the accomplice, (3) was made to avenge the  
declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the 
declarant had a motive to lie or distort the truth.  
Courts 
should 
also 
consider 
any 
other  
circumstance bearing on the reliability of the 
statement at issue. See, generally, United States  
v Layton, 855 F2d 1388, 1404-1406 (CA 9, 1988). 
While the foregoing factors are not exclusive, and 
the presence or absence of a particular factor is 
not decisive, the totality of the circumstances 
must indicate that the statement is sufficiently 
reliable to allow its admission as substantive  
evidence although the defendant is unable to cross­
examine the declarant.  
When those precepts are applied to the facts at bar, we  
find that Mathis’s statement to the police officers bears  
sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy Confrontation  
Clause concerns and to allow its admission as substantive  
evidence at trial.  The statement was voluntarily given and  
made contemporaneously with the events referenced.  It was  
uttered spontaneously by Mathis and without prompting or  
inquiry by the officers.  In fact, the officers had just heard  
of the robbery when Mathis made the statement.  Mathis did not  
minimize his role in the crimes, admitting that he shot the  
victim, and he had no motive to lie or distort the truth. In  
addition, there is nothing in the statement indicating that  
the declarant was attempting to curry favor at the time he  
6  
 
made the statement.  
We agree with the dissenting judge of the Court of  
Appeals that there was no record evidence establishing that  
Mathis “suffered from mental illness.” The unsubstantiated  
assertions 
of 
defense counsel are not substantive evidence and  
cannot be used to undermine the indicia of reliability  
contained in the accomplice’s statement.  
IV  
We also find that the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion in denying defense counsel’s request to voir dire  
a juror during the trial.  
On the third day of trial, after deliberations had begun,  
defense counsel reported that a juror had been seen talking  
with a trial spectator who counsel believed was familiar with  
the victim or the victim’s family. The trial court summoned  
the juror and, in response to the court’s direct questions,  
the juror stated that she had not discussed the case with her  
friend.  She affirmed that her friendship would not influence  
her ability to make a fair decision in the case.  The trial  
court did not allow defense counsel to make further inquiry of  
the juror.  
“The trial court has discretion in both the scope and the  
conduct of voir dire.” People v Tyburski, 445 Mich 606, 618­
619; 518 NW2d 441 (1994). A defendant does not have a right  
to have counsel conduct the voir dire.  Id.  However, where  
7  
 
the trial court, rather than the attorneys, conducts voir  
dire, the court abuses its discretion if it does not  
adequately question jurors regarding potential bias so that  
challenges 
for 
cause 
can 
be 
intelligently 
exercised.  
Fedorinchik v Stewart, 289 Mich 436, 438-439; 286 NW 673  
(1939).  Here, the trial court more than adequately questioned  
the juror about the allegations of grounds for her possible  
disqualification.  There was no need for defense counsel to  
interrogate her further.  
A defendant is entitled to relief from a verdict because  
of disallowance of voir dire only if he can prove that he was  
actually prejudiced by the presence of the juror in question  
or that the juror was properly excusable for cause. Bynum v  
The ESAB Group, Inc, 467 Mich 280, 286; 651 NW2d 383(2002);  
People v Hannum, 362 Mich 660, 666-667; 107 NW2d 894 (1961);  
People v DeHaven, 321 Mich 327, 330-334; 32 NW2d 468 (1948).  
Defendant has not established either criterion in this case.  
V  
We conclude that the accomplice’s statement contains  
sufficient “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,”  
considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding its  
utterance, to justify its admission.  Poole, supra at 164. We  
also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion 
when 
it 
denied defense counsel’s request to conduct  
voir dire of a juror.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of  
8  
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit  
court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
9  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 121864  
ALLAN WASHINGTON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree that the indicia of reliability surrounding  
codefendant's statement were sufficient to support admission  
of 
the 
statement 
into 
evidence 
in 
defiance 
of 
the  
confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  
Rather, I agree with the Court of Appeals majority that the  
circuit court should not have admitted the statement.  The  
majority, Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly and Judge Harold Hood,  
aptly stated:  
A review of the record reveals an assertion by 
defense counsel that codefendant Mathis suffered  
from mental illness and that he had a history of 
psychiatric 
and 
psychological 
treatment.  
Certainly, an inculpatory statement made by a  
 
mentally ill codefendant that tacitly inculpates 
defendant as his accomplice is not a statement that 
contains 
"particularized 
guarantees 
of  
trustworthiness" 
sufficient 
to 
introduce 
the  
statement as substantive evidence against defendant 
without the opportunity for cross-examination.  
Permitting codefendant's statement to come in as 
substantive evidence against defendant, while  
depriving defendant the opportunity to challenge 
that statement through the adversarial process, 
violates the bedrock principles underlying the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
itself. 
Indeed, 
"'the  
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when 
the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to 
probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross­
examination, thereby calling to the attention of 
the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight 
to the witness' testimony.'"  [People v Gearns, 457  
Mich 170, 186; 577 NW2d 422 (1998)] quoting  
Delaware v Fensterer, 474 US 15, 22; 106 S Ct 292; 
88 L Ed 2d 15 (1985) (emphasis omitted).  
The trial court's admission of codefendant's  
inculpatory statement as substantive evidence  
against defendant without providing defendant any 
opportunity to challenge the statement through 
cross-examination is not harmless error. Based on  
the evidence presented at trial, it is more  
probable than not that a different outcome would 
have 
resulted 
without 
the 
admission 
of  
codefendant's statement.  
On appeal, the prosecution asserts that  
defendant ran from the police officers, but  
neither the testimony of defendant nor the officers 
supports this assertion.  Also, the prosecution 
contends that defendant tried to drive away. 
However, the testimony of the officers actually 
indicates that the car was never started and that  
they were not even sure if defendant attempted to 
insert the keys into the ignition.  Furthermore, 
defendant was alleged to have stolen $71, but, when 
apprehended, he had over $500 on his person. 
Neither he nor codefendant had a gun, the stolen 
pager, the stolen watch, and these items were not 
found in the car in which they were traveling.  The  
fact that defendant was found within minutes of the  
robbery within one mile of the crime scene does not  
2  
 
tend to establish his guilt any more than any other 
person who lives in the area and was also at the 
gas station at the same time.  Finally, the 
description the victim gave to the police was 
"quite vague" and did not match either the  
defendant or codefendant.  
Although we acknowledge the victim identified 
defendant in a lineup, we do not believe this, 
standing alone, clothes the codefendant's statement 
with "adequate indicia of reliability."  The lineup 
was conducted ten days after the robbery and after 
the victim had been sedated and medicated in the  
hospital for five days. The victim identified the  
defendant as the man who shot him, but defendant 
was tried as the accomplice of the shooter.  In  
addition, 
the 
victim 
did 
not 
identify 
the  
codefendant.  
As we noted People v Spinks, 206 Mich App 488, 
493; 522 NW2d 875 (1994), quoting People v Banks, 
438 Mich 408, 430; 475 NW2d 769 (1991), if the 
"'"minds of an average jury" would have found the 
prosecution's case "significantly less persuasive" 
had 
the 
statement 
of 
the 
[accomplice] 
been  
excluded,'" then the error is not harmless.  
Considering that codefendant's statement is the 
only concrete evidence linking defendant to the 
crime for which he now stands convicted, we find 
that had the statement been properly excluded, the 
prosecution's case would have been significantly 
less persuasive in "the minds of an average jury". 
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused 
its discretion by admitting the statement.  [251 
Mich App 520, 527-529; 650 NW2d 708 (2002).]  
For the reasons expressed by the Court of Appeals  
majority, 
I 
would 
hold 
the 
codefendant's 
statement  
inadmissible.  Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the  
Court of Appeals and allow the case to be remanded for a new  
trial.  
Marilyn Kelly  
3