Title: Orbe v. Johnson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Wednesday, the 31st day of 
March, 2004. 
 
 
Dennis Mitchell Orbe, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  against  
 
Record No. 040673 
 
Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia 
  Department of Corrections, et al., 
 
 
 
Appellees. 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond. 
 
 
 
Appellant did not move to proceed in forma pauperis. 
Nonetheless, we grant him the right to do so. 
 
Yesterday, the Court denied Dennis Mitchell Orbe's Petition for 
Appeal from a dismissal of his Bill of Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond. Orbe v. Johnson, et al., Record No. 040598 (March 30, 
2004).  The Court denied his petition for rehearing today.  His 
prior action sought an adjudication that the particular method of 
implementation of lethal injection employed by the Commonwealth and 
anticipated to be utilized in his execution "constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and violates due process of law under Article I, 
Sections 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia."  Additionally, 
Orbe requested the issuance of a permanent injunction "barring [the 
Commonwealth] from carrying out [his] execution using a protocol 
that will cause unnecessary pain."  In a separate motion, Orbe 
requested the issuance of a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction "to protect the status quo ante" and 
enjoining the Commonwealth from carrying out Orbe's execution 
currently scheduled to be carried out at 9:00 p.m. tonight.  Orbe 
raised no federal constitutional questions in his prior appeal.  We 
dismissed the appeal for the reasons stated in the order. 
 
Orbe has filed another Bill of Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond.  The trial court denied the request for injunctive relief 
and dismissed the Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. 
 
Orbe appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court 
maintaining that "[t]he circuit court erred in denying a temporary 
restraining order and dismissing Orbe's federal constitutional 
claims."  The trial court did not err in refusing to grant 
injunctive relief that would stay Orbe's execution.  Pursuant to 
Code § 53.1-232.1, "[o]nce an execution date is scheduled, a stay of 
execution may be granted by the trial court or the Supreme Court of 
Virginia only upon a showing of substantial grounds for habeas 
corpus relief."  The "trial court" referred to in Code § 53.1-232.1 
is the sentencing court, in this case, the Circuit Court of York 
County.  The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond does not have the 
power to issue an injunction staying Orbe's execution.  While a 
court ordinarily has the power to issue orders necessary to preserve 
its own jurisdiction, that power has been expressly limited by the 
General Assembly when the subject matter is the stay of an already 
scheduled execution.  Additionally, Orbe does not demonstrate 
"substantial grounds for habeas corpus relief."  Rather, he has 
filed an action for declaratory judgment. 
 
2
 
Additionally and independently, as more fully explained below, 
Orbe may not maintain an action for declaratory judgment under 
Virginia law. Consequently, relief ancillary to an improper bill of 
complaint cannot be granted.  A declaratory judgment action is not a 
substitute for an appeal or collateral attack upon conviction. 
Declaratory judgment "does not provide a means whereby previous 
judgments by state or federal courts may be reexamined, nor is it a 
substitute for appeal or post conviction remedies."  Shannon v. 
Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966). "A declaratory 
judgment action is not part of the criminal appellate process."  
State v. Brooks, 728 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).  The 
issue Orbe presents in his declaratory judgment action should have 
been raised before the trial court in Orbe's criminal case and on 
direct appeal from that judgment. 
 
Also and independently, declaratory judgment does not lie under 
Virginia law when there is no actual controversy.  Orbe has removed 
the actual controversy by his selection of the method of execution. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 53.1-234, Orbe had the right to 
choose whether his execution will be by lethal injection, as it is 
administered in Virginia, or by electrocution.  If the condemned 
prisoner has not made a choice by at least fifteen days prior to the 
scheduled execution, the statute provides that the method of 
execution shall be by lethal injection.  Under these circumstances, 
the condemned prisoner may affirmatively choose electrocution, 
affirmatively choose lethal injection, or choose the statutory 
consequences of a failure to specify, namely, lethal injection.  In 
any case, it is the condemned prisoner's choice. 
 
3
 
We have previously held that execution of prisoners by 
electrocution does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 
172, 202, 563 S.E.2d 695, 715 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 
(2003); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 
569 (1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994), 
cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995); Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215, 402 S.E.2d 196, 209-10 (1991); 
Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 
(1980); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 S.E. 582, 587 
(1921).  When a condemned prisoner has a choice of method of 
execution, the inmate may not choose a method and then complain of 
its unconstitutionality, particularly when the constitutionality of 
the alternative method has been established. 
In Stewart v. LaGrand, a case involving a challenge to 
execution by lethal gas, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that: 
Walter LaGrand, by his actions, has waived his claim that 
execution by lethal gas is unconstitutional.  At the time 
Walter LaGrand was sentenced to death, lethal gas was the only 
method of execution available in Arizona, but the State now 
provides inmates a choice of execution by lethal gas or lethal 
injection, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(B) (creating a default 
rule of execution by lethal injection).  Walter LaGrand was 
afforded this choice and decided to be executed by lethal gas.  
On March 1, 1999, Governor Hull of Arizona offered Walter 
LaGrand an opportunity to rescind this decision and select 
lethal injection as his method of execution. Walter LaGrand, 
again, insisted that he desired to be executed by lethal gas.  
By declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over 
the state's default form of execution − lethal injection − 
Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it. 
 
526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). 
 
Orbe's circumstances are legally indistinguishable from those 
presented to the United States Supreme Court in LaGrand. As 
 
4
previously discussed, under Code § 53.1-234, Orbe could have chosen 
electrocution or he could have chosen lethal injection. Instead, he 
chose to allow the statutory default provisions to apply.  The 
Commonwealth did not make his choice.  The Commonwealth only 
provided the choices for him, including the choice of allowing the 
default provisions to apply.  Orbe has waived any right he may have 
to complain about lethal injection as it is administered in 
Virginia. 
 
The effect of his waiver removes Orbe's claims from those that 
may be properly considered by declaratory judgment under Virginia 
law.  Declaratory judgment proceedings were not available at common 
law.  This statutory cause of action arises only "[i]n cases of 
actual controversy."  Code § 8.01-184.  Declaratory judgment is not 
intended to provide advisory opinions.  Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes, 
240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990).  Orbe's waiver of the 
right to contest the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is 
administered in Virginia removes the requirement of "actual 
controversy" from the case.  Simply stated, Orbe has no cognizable 
cause of action under Virginia law. 
 
In his prior Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Orbe 
based his claims entirely upon Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  He presents virtually the same claims in 
this declaratory judgment action except that he bases his claims 
upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  We find his claims without merit. 
 
5
 
In summary, Orbe may not maintain an action for declaratory 
judgment under Virginia law because he may not use declaratory 
 
6
judgment as a substitute for appeal or habeas corpus.  He should 
have raised these issues before the trial court during his criminal 
trial and on appeal from his conviction.  Additionally and as an 
independent basis for this Court's judgment, Orbe waived any right 
he may have had to challenge lethal injection as it is administered 
in Virginia because he had a choice among lethal injection, 
electrocution, or the default of lethal injection provided by 
statute upon his refusal to specify.  For this reason there is no 
controversy upon which declaratory judgment may properly lie.  
Finally, and independently, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to grant injunctive relief staying the execution.  The Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond has no jurisdiction under Code § 53.1-232.1 
to grant such relief. 
 
Orbe's appeal from the judgment order of the trial court dated 
March 31, 2004 is denied.  His request that this Court enter a stay 
of execution is denied. 
_______________ 
 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
We would grant the appeal and proceed in the manner and for the 
reasons expressed in the dissent filed in Orbe v. Johnson, et al., 
Case No. 040598, filed March 30, 2004. 
 
This order shall be certified to the said circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk