Title: DUNCAN v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

DUNCAN v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS  DUNCAN v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 2004 OK 58 95 P.3d 1076 Case Number: 98295 Decided: 07/06/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TEDDY DUNCAN, for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Oklahoma, and RON WARD, Director, Defendants/Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE NANCY L. COATS, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Plaintiff/appellant/inmate, Teddy Duncan sued defendants/appellees, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Director. He challenged DOC's right to retain, for costs of incarceration, the full amount of workers' compensation permanent total disability (PTD) benefits paid to him during his incarceration. Plaintiff was awarded the PTD benefits by order of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court for work-related injury occurring before his imprisonment while employed by O G & E Energy Corporation. Interpreting CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED. William H. Stout of Carpenter & Laquer, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant. Charles K. Babb, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees. LAVENDER, J.: ¶1 Plaintiff/appellant/inmate, Teddy Duncan sued defendants/appellees, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Director, Ron Ward. He challenged DOC's right to retain, for costs of incarceration, one hundred percent (100%) of workers' compensation permanent total disability (PTD) benefits paid to him during his incarceration. The PTD benefits were awarded to plaintiff by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) for work-related injury occurring prior to his imprisonment while he was employed by O G & E Energy Corporation. ¶2 Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division III, affirmed. He sought certiorari review which we previously granted because the case involves a first impression question. We hold, although PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION JURISPRUDENCE. ¶3 In this case we gauge the meaning of § 549(B)(1) and § 22(13)(b), and decide which controls the fate of plaintiff's PTD benefits paid during his imprisonment. Confronting us is a question of law. "A legal question involving statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review . . ., i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling." Fulsom v. Fulsom, ¶4 The appellate review standard regarding a trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is also de novo, as the ultimate inquiry revolves around ascertaining the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's petition. Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., Review of a trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is de novo and involves consideration of whether a plaintiff's petition is legally sufficient. Gay v. Akin, Hayes ¶5 We also keep in mind when reviewing this matter, the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and follow the Legislature's intention. See Fulsom, ¶6 It is also the settled rule when a court is construing seemingly conflicting statutes that a specific statute controls over one of more general applicability and the most recent enactment controls over an earlier one. Milton v. Hayes, PART II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. ¶7 We set forth pertinent factual allegations, or reasonable inferences from them, contained in plaintiff's trial court petition, as we must take same as true in reviewing the trial court's dismissal. ¶8 Via his lawsuit plaintiff asserted § 549(B)(1) allowed DOC to retain no more than 50% of his workers' compensation benefits for costs of incarceration. He sought an accounting from DOC concerning the PTD benefits it had received and retained, recovery of the amount he claimed had been overcharged (i.e., in effect, anything over 50% of the PTD benefits paid since his incarceration in September 1999) and injunctive relief to prohibit DOC from future retention of more than 50% of any PTD benefits paid during his incarceration. ¶9 Defendants moved for dismissal, in essence, positing the two statutory provisions were irreconcilably inconsistent as to PTD benefits and that § 22(13)(b) controlled. The trial court agreed with defendants and dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court decided plaintiff would be unable to amend his petition to state a claim because, in effect, the matter revolved around a legal question and the answer to the question, that § 22(13)(b) allowed distribution to and retention by DOC of all the PTD benefits paid during his incarceration, required dismissal of the suit. The COCA affirmed and, as noted, we previously granted certiorari review. ¶10 On certiorari plaintiff asserts to interpret the two statutes as the trial court and COCA have done, constitutes an improper diminishment of his vested PTD benefit. He also questions the public policy considerations of treating him, a totally disabled inmate differently from a healthy inmate, who is able to work while incarcerated and to have no more than 50% of his/her income from prison employment taken for costs of incarceration. Plaintiff asserts that the disabled inmate, who cannot work because of the disability, is disadvantaged and will leave prison with no money to re-establish himself/herself in society, while the healthy inmate, who has worked while imprisoned in some type of prison employment, will upon discharge have, at least, some available funds in his/her inmate account(s) to start life anew outside the prison walls. PART III. ANALYSIS. ¶11 In June 1993 the Legislature added § 22(13)(b) to our workers' compensation statutes, to be effective September 1, 1993. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 349, § 10. Though § 22 has been amended several times since the addition, § 22(13)(b) has remained unaltered. It provides: Any employee convicted of a misdemeanor or felony and sentenced to a term of incarceration of at least ninety (90) days in this state shall have all benefits for permanent total disability or temporary partial disability awarded by the Workers' Compensation Court and paid during the period of incarceration deposited to the credit of an account established pursuant to Section 549 of Title 57 of the Oklahoma Statutes for distribution in full to the Department of Corrections for costs of incarceration. The State Board of Corrections shall have the power to collect workers' compensation benefits on behalf of the prisoner as provided in this subparagraph and to distribute the benefits as provided by law. (emphasis added). All Oklahoma awarded workers' compensation benefits received for permanent total disability or temporary partial disability by an inmate with an incarceration sentence of at least 90 days will be deposited to the department's clearing account for transfer to the revolving fund. ( At the time § 22(13)(b) was added in 1993, § 549(B)(1) provided: B. The State Board of Corrections shall cause to be placed in an account income from the inmate's employment and any other income or benefits accruing to or payable to and for the benefit of said inmate, including any workers' compensation or Social Security benefits. 1. From this account the State Board of Corrections may charge any inmate [working] in private prison industries or any other inmate for costs of incarceration not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of any deposits made to said account. 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 319, § 5; ¶12 Subsection 22(13)(b) plainly expresses, in clear and unambiguous language, an intention that inmates in plaintiff's situation "shall have all benefits for [PTD] . . . paid during the period of incarceration deposited to the credit of an account established pursuant to [§] 549 . . . for distribution in full to [DOC] for costs of incarceration." (emphasis added). The provision is written in mandatory language and, we believe may only be read in one way, that is that DOC is entitled to 100% of the PTD benefit paid during the prisoner's incarceration for the costs of that prisoner's incarceration. DOC OP 120230(I)(B)(5)(b) conforms to and is consistent with the statutory language and its plainly expressed legislative intent. ¶13 In contradistinction to § 22(13)(b), § 549(B)(1), also in plain and unambiguous language, permissively allows DOC to charge inmates, for costs of incarceration, no more than 50% of income from an inmate's employment and other income, including workers' compensation benefits, placed in the inmate's account. The two provisions are in absolute tension with each other and they irreconcilably conflict as concerns workers' compensation PTD benefits. One must prevail and that one is § 22(13)(b) in so far as PTD benefits are concerned. This is so because said provision expresses the most recent legislative intent as to PTD benefits and § 22(13)(b) specifically addresses those benefits, while § 549(B)(1) is more generally concerned with inmate income of all kinds. ¶14 For us to rule in favor of plaintiff's position would entail rewriting the language of § 22(13)(b), something we have no warrant in undertaking. If the Legislature seeks to limit DOC's entitlement, for costs of incarceration, to less than 100% of a PTD benefit being paid to an inmate by virtue of a workers' compensation order during the period of that inmate's imprisonment, it is that body which must express such an intent. To date, the Legislature has not done so and it is not within the realm of this Court's power, under the guise of statutory interpretation or construction, to do what the Legislature has failed to express in its legislation. ¶15 Plaintiff's argument, to the effect, that to interpret the two statutory provisions to allow DOC to retain 100% of the PTD benefits paid during his incarceration is an impermissible diminishment of his vested workers' compensation PTD benefit, is mistaken. In Valenti v. Special Indemnity Fund, ¶16 The plaintiff also argues in his certiorari petition that interpreting § 22(13)(b) to allow retention by DOC of 100% of his PTD benefits violates public policy. He asserts such an interpretation sanctions treating disabled inmates - who are unable to work at any job while imprisoned because of their disability and, thus, earn any "wages" - worse than healthy inmates - who are able to work and earn income while imprisoned, but who do not have all of said income taken for costs of incarceration. He also asserts the inmate who works while incarcerated has, under § 549(A)(5), twenty percent (20%) of any inmate "wages" earned during imprisonment placed in an account for the inmate, payable to him/her upon discharge, while the totally disabled inmate has no opportunity to work and earn any "wages" in prison employment, a part of which could be set aside for said inmate upon discharge. Plaintiff contends the heathy inmate will, thus, leave prison with at least some money to start life anew, while the totally disabled inmate will leave prison with no funds to re-establish himself/herself in society. ¶17 Plaintiff's public policy argument suffers from, at least, two flaws. One, absent constitutional or other recognized infirmity, it is the Legislature that sets the public policy of this State, not this Court, as to the direction of workers' compensation benefits of prison inmates during their confinement. Two, as we noted in ¶ 15 above, the totally disabled inmate will have a source of income upon discharge by virtue of his disability, assuming the PTD benefit is still in force under any pertinent and valid WCC order. Finally, we note, plaintiff has cited no controlling authority that the legislative public policy choices made in this area are constitutionally or otherwise infirm, such that this Court has the rightful authority to strike down those choices. PART IV. CONCLUSION. ¶18 This case concerns a first impression question, to wit: does § 85 O.S.2001, § 22(13)(b) or 57 O.S.2001, § 549(B)(1) control the ultimate fate of workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits paid to plaintiff during his incarceration under the control and in the custody of DOC? In that these two statutory provisions, in relation to the PTD benefits being paid to plaintiff during his imprisonment, are irreconcilably in conflict, § 22(13)(b) controls, as it is both the more specific statute as to such benefits and the most recent expression of the legislative will. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted defendants' motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the COCA did not err in affirming the trial court's dismissal. ¶19 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is VACATED and the trial court Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is AFFIRMED. ¶20 WATT, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, WINCHESTER and EDMONDSON, JJ., concur. ¶21 OPALA, V.C.J., KAUGER and BOUDREAU, JJ., dissent. FOOT