Title: Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP96 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Friends of Frame Park, U.A., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
City of Waukesha, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 387, 950 N.W.2d 831 
PDC No: 2020 WI App 61 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren     
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶3, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to ¶¶13-24, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined, and an 
opinion with respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-12, 25-38. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John M. Bruce and West & Dunn, LLC, Two Rivers. There 
was an oral argument by John M. Bruce.  
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Joseph R. Cincotta and The Law Offices of Joseph R. Cincotta, 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Joseph R. Cincotta.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Maxted M. Lenz and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, for the 
Wisconsin Broadcasters Association, the Wisconsin Freedom of 
Information Council, the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, the 
Wisconsin Transparency Project, and the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press. There was an oral argument by James A. 
Friedman.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 57 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP96 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV2197) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Friends of Frame Park, U.A., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Waukesha, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶3, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to ¶¶13-24, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined, and an 
opinion with respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-12, 25-38. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.  In this public records case, the 
City of Waukesha denied access to a draft contract with a 
private entity to protect ongoing negotiations and until it 
consulted with the City's Common Council.  The requester brought 
a mandamus action seeking access to the withheld contract.  Two 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
2 
 
days later, after a meeting of the Common Council, the City 
turned over the record to the requester. 
¶2 
The first issue in this case relates to attorney's 
fees in public records cases.  The parties disagree over the 
test we should use to determine whether the requester, in the 
statute's words, "prevail[ed] in whole or in substantial part," 
and is therefore entitled to attorney's fees.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a) (2019-20).1  The court of appeals has previously 
employed a causal-nexus test——querying whether the release of 
records was caused in some way by the litigation.  In this case, 
where 
the 
records 
custodian 
voluntarily 
turned 
over 
the 
requested 
record, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
recognized 
the 
limitations of a causation-based approach and considered whether 
the records were properly withheld in the first place.  This is 
the first occasion for this court to fully analyze what it means 
for a party to "prevail[] in whole or in substantial part" under 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  Faced with these varying approaches, we conclude 
we must return the analytical framework to one more closely 
tethered to the statutory text.  The varying tests utilized by 
the court of appeals in the past do not track the meaning of the 
words the legislature used.   
¶3 
Four justices agree that to "prevail[] in whole or in 
substantial part" means the party must obtain a judicially 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
3 
 
sanctioned 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
legal 
relationship.  
Accordingly, a majority of the court adopts this principle. 
¶4 
This 
conclusion 
arguably 
raises 
other 
statutory 
questions.  Prior court of appeals cases have held that a 
requester could still pursue attorney's fees even if the records 
have been voluntarily turned over.  This conclusion rested on 
its causation-based theory, however.  The concurrence argues 
that under the proper statutory test we announce today, a 
mandamus action becomes moot after voluntary compliance, and 
record 
requesters 
have 
no 
separate 
authority 
to 
pursue 
attorney's fees.  We save this issue for another day.  Even if 
record requesters can pursue attorney's fees following release 
of the requested records, an award of fees would not be 
appropriate here.  This is so because in temporarily withholding 
the draft contract, the City complied with the public records 
law.  Applying the balancing test, the City pointed to the 
strong public interest in nondisclosure——namely, protecting the 
City's negotiating and bargaining position and safeguarding the 
Common Council's prerogative in contract approval.  These 
considerations outweigh the strong public policy in favor of 
disclosure.  Furthermore, the City recognized the balance of 
interests would shift after the Common Council meeting, and it 
properly disclosed the draft contract at that time.  Therefore, 
the City did not violate the public records law.  And thus, the 
requester did not and could not prevail in whole or substantial 
part in this action.  Therefore, no judicially sanctioned change 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
4 
 
in the parties' relationship is appropriate and the requester is 
not entitled to any attorney's fees. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Friends 
of 
Frame 
Park, 
U.A. 
(Friends) 
is 
an 
association composed of several members who own property, work, 
and pay taxes to the City of Waukesha and make use of City 
parks, including Frame Park.  Friends sent the City a public 
records request on October 9, 2017, seeking information about 
the City's plans to bring amateur baseball to Waukesha.2  The 
request stated in part:  "Please include any Letters of Intent 
(LOI) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Lease Agreements 
between Big Top Baseball and or Northwoods League Baseball and 
the City of Waukesha during the time frame of 5-1-16 to the 
present time frame." 
¶6 
The City responded two weeks later.  It provided all 
documents responsive to Friends' request except a draft contract 
with Big Top Baseball.  The City explained its decision to 
temporarily withhold the document as follows: 
A park use contract with Big Top Baseball is presently 
in draft form.  Because the contract is still in 
negotiation with Big Top, and there is at least one 
other entity that may be competing with the City of 
                                                 
2 Friends' registered agent, Scott Anfinson, made this 
public records request; Friends was formally established a month 
later, in November 2017.  The circuit court held that Friends 
was a proper party to bring an action in connection with the 
public records request signed by Mr. Anfinson.  The City did not 
challenge this ruling on appeal.  Thus, this opinion refers to 
the records requestor as Friends. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
5 
 
Waukesha for a baseball team, the draft contract is 
being withheld from your request, pursuant to Wis. 
Stats. §§ 19.35(1)(a) and § 19.85(1)(e).  This is to 
protect 
the 
City's 
negotiating 
and 
bargaining 
position.  The draft contract is subject to review, 
revision, and approval of the Common Council before it 
can be finalized, and the Common Council have not yet 
had an opportunity to review and discuss the draft 
contract.  Protecting the City's ability to negotiate 
the best deal for the taxpayers is a valid public 
policy reason to keep the draft contract temporarily 
out of public view - Wis. Stats. § 19.35(1)(a) states 
that exemptions to the requirement of a governmental 
body to meet in open session are indicative of public 
policy in this regard, and Wis. Stats. § 19.85(1)(e) 
exempts 
from 
open 
session 
"[d]eliberating 
or 
negotiating the purchasing of public properties, the 
investing 
of 
public 
funds, 
or 
conducting 
other 
specified public business, whenever competitive or 
bargaining reasons require a closed session."  There 
currently is a need to restrict public access for 
competitive and bargaining reasons until the Council 
has an opportunity to review the draft and determine 
whether it wants to adopt it or set different 
parameters 
for 
continued 
negotiations 
with 
the 
interested parties.  If the contract's terms were made 
public, it would substantially diminish the City's 
ability to negotiate different terms the Council may 
desire for the benefit the City. 
Because the City's negotiating and bargaining position 
could be compromised by public disclosure of the draft 
contract before the Common Council have had an 
opportunity to consider the draft, after applying the 
balancing test, the public's interest in protecting 
that negotiating and bargaining position outweighs the 
public's interest in disclosing the draft contract at 
this point.  You will get a copy of the contract after 
the Common Council has taken action on it. 
¶7 
Friends believed the City improperly withheld the 
draft contract and knew the use of Frame Park was on the Common 
Council meeting agenda for December 19, 2017.  So the day before 
the Common Council meeting, in order to preserve its remedies, 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
6 
 
Friends filed a mandamus action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1) 
seeking production of the draft contract, attorney's fees, and 
other expenses.  The following evening, the City's Common 
Council met.  It is unclear from the meeting minutes whether, or 
to what extent, the draft contract was discussed.  The minutes 
note the following with respect to Frame Park:  "Citizen 
speakers registering comments against baseball at Frame Park"; 
the 
"City 
Administrator's 
Report" 
included 
a 
"Northwoods 
Baseball League Update"; and an "item for next Common Council 
Meeting under New Business" was to, "Create an ADHOC Committee 
for the purpose to address Frame Park and Frame Park issues." 
¶8 
The next day, on December 20, 2017, the City released 
the draft contract to Friends.3  Consistent with its explanation 
initially denying release, the City explained the documents "are 
being released now because there is no longer any need to 
protect the City's negotiating and bargaining position." 
¶9 
Friends then amended its complaint, asking the circuit 
court4 to hold that the City improperly withheld the draft 
contract.  In advance of trial, the City filed a motion for 
                                                 
3 Friends included the draft contract in its appendix to its 
response brief, despite the court of appeals admonition that 
submission of the draft contract was improper.  Friends of Frame 
Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2020 WI App 61, ¶12 n.5, 394 
Wis. 2d 387, 950 N.W.2d 831.  Our review is limited to materials 
in the record.  See Roy v. St. Lukes Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, 
¶10 n.1, 305 Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d 256.  The draft contract 
was not made a part of the record before us; therefore, we do 
not consider the draft contract in making our decision. 
4 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren of the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
7 
 
summary judgment which the circuit court granted; Friends did 
not move for summary judgment.  The circuit court concluded the 
City "properly withheld certain public records temporarily in 
response to the record request made by [Friends] for the reasons 
set forth in the letter . . . and appropriately relied on Wis. 
Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) as the basis for doing so under the 
circumstances of this case."  It further concluded that Friends 
was not entitled to attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2).5 
¶10 Friends appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2020 WI App 61, 
394 Wis. 2d 387, 950 N.W.2d 831.  The court concluded that the 
City's reliance on the negotiating and bargaining "exception was 
unwarranted and led to an unreasonable delay in the record's 
release."  Id., ¶5.  Regarding attorney's fees, the court 
explained that in most cases the court of appeals has utilized a 
causation-based test, but it determined that test did not make 
sense in this case.  Id., ¶3.  Rather, the court of appeals held 
that "the key consideration is whether the authority properly 
invoked the exception in its initial decision to withhold 
release."  Id., ¶4.  Using this approach, and based on its 
conclusion that the City erred in withholding the record, the 
court determined that Friends was "entitled to some portion of 
its attorney's fees" and remanded the cause to the circuit court 
                                                 
5 The circuit court also granted summary judgment for the 
City with respect to subsequent records requests made by 
Friends.  Friends did not appeal this aspect of the decision. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
8 
 
to ascertain the amount.  Id., ¶5.  We granted the City's 
petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶11 Procedurally, this case is a review of the circuit 
court's decision to grant summary judgment, which we review 
independently.  J. Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire 
Comm'rs, 2015 WI 56, ¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563.  
Summary 
judgment 
"shall 
be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2). 
¶12 The two questions before us concern entitlement to 
attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a), and whether the 
City properly withheld the draft contract until after the Common 
Council 
meeting. 
 
These 
are 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation and application which we review independently.  
J. Times, 362 Wis. 2d 577, ¶42. 
A.  Attorney's Fees Under the Public Records Law 
¶13 When "an authority withholds a record or a part of a 
record or delays granting access to a record or part of a record 
after a written request for disclosure is made" the record 
requester may "bring an action for mandamus asking a court to 
order release of the record" or may request the district 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
9 
 
attorney to bring a mandamus action.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1).  
Section 19.37 provides that the record requester may be entitled 
to various damages and fees as a result of the mandamus action.  
See § 19.37(2)-(4).  Relevant to this case, § 19.37(2)(a) 
contains the following fee-shifting provision: 
Except as provided in this paragraph, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney fees, damages of not less 
than $100, and other actual costs to the requestor if 
the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part 
in any action filed under sub. (1) relating to access 
to a record or part of a record under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 19.35(1)(a). 
(Emphasis added).  Besides attorney's fees, the law also 
specifies that the circuit court shall award actual damages if 
"the authority acted in a willful or intentional manner" and may 
award punitive damages if the authority "arbitrarily and 
capriciously denied or delayed response to a request or charged 
excessive fees."  § 19.37(2)(b), (3); see also Cap. Times Co. v. 
Doyle, 2011 WI App 137, ¶¶7, 11, 337 Wis. 2d 544, 807 N.W.2d 666 
(concluding actual and punitive damages are limited to mandamus 
actions). 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a)——the attorney's fees 
provision at issue here——was originally enacted in 1982 and was 
comparable to the then-existing fee-shifting provision in the 
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  FOIA provided that 
courts "may assess against the United States reasonable attorney 
fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case 
under this section in which a complainant has substantially 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
10 
 
prevailed."6  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976) (emphasis added).  
But what does it mean to "prevail" under these statutes? 
¶15 The answer to this question in Wisconsin and in 
federal courts has centered on two alternatives:  a causation-
based approach, and an interpretation that requires some 
judicially sanctioned change in the parties' legal relationship.  
The latter definition is endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court and is the better interpretation of "prevails" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  To explain why, we explore how these two 
approaches came to be. 
1.  Causal-Nexus Test 
¶16 In Wisconsin, the court of appeals first considered 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) in Racine Education 
Ass'n v. Board of Education for Racine Unified School District 
(Racine I), 129 Wis. 2d 319, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1986).  
There, the court of appeals concluded the statutory language 
"prevails in whole or substantial part" failed to provide any 
criteria and was unclear.  Id. at 326.  It therefore turned to 
federal case law interpreting FOIA's fee shifting provision.  
Id. at 326-28. 
                                                 
6 Under the federal statute, this is just the start of the 
inquiry into whether a party is entitled to receive attorney's 
fees.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a), FOIA permits but does 
not require a court to grant attorney's fees.  The determination 
of whether to award fees ultimately rests with the district 
court, which is instructed to consider several non-exhaustive 
factors in making its determination.  See Church of Scientology 
of Cal. v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
11 
 
¶17 It found persuasive the D.C. Circuit's decision in Cox 
v. United States Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (per curiam).  The court in Cox held that a party could 
seek fees under FOIA "in the absence of a court order" if 
"prosecution of the action could reasonably be regarded as 
necessary to obtain the information and that a causal nexus 
exists between that action and the agency's surrender of the 
information."  Id. at 6 (citations omitted).  This later became 
known as the "catalyst theory," an interpretation "which posits 
that a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the 
desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary 
change in the defendant's conduct."  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 
(2001).  The court of appeals in Racine I adopted "the Cox 
analysis for use in determining whether a party has 'prevail[ed] 
in 
whole 
or 
in 
substantial 
part'" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  129 Wis. 2d at 328 (alteration in original). 
¶18 Although the test has evolved somewhat since Racine I,7 
the court of appeals has generally held that a party "prevails" 
                                                 
7 Subsequent cases mixed the federal catalyst theory with 
Wisconsin's causation analysis for common law negligence. 
The test of cause in Wisconsin is whether the actor's 
action was a substantial factor in contributing to the 
result.  The phrase "substantial factor" denotes that 
the actor's conduct has such an effect in producing 
the result as to lead the trier of fact, as a 
reasonable person, to regard it as a cause, using that 
word in the popular sense. 
State ex rel. Vaughan v. Faust, 143 Wis. 2d 868, 871-72, 422 
N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Merco Distrib. Corp. v. Com. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
12 
 
in a public records action if there is a causal nexus between 
the requestor bringing the action and the defendant providing 
the requested records. 
2.  Judicially Sanctioned Change in the Parties' Legal  
Relationship 
¶19 Federal courts have not followed in step, however.  In 
2001, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the D.C. 
Circuit's approach in Cox——the case Racine I relied on——is 
inconsistent with the proper understanding of what it means to 
prevail in a lawsuit.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598.  In Buckhannon, 
the Court considered the meaning of the term "prevailing party" 
in the fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).8  
                                                                                                                                                             
Police Alarm Co., 84 Wis. 2d 455, 458-59, 267 N.W.2d 652 (1978) 
(analyzing the causation element of common law negligence)).  In 
Faust, the court of appeals further explained that "but for" 
causation was not required.  Id. at 872-73.  And in WTMJ, Inc. 
v. Sullivan, the court of appeals noted, "The action may be one 
of several causes; it need not be the sole cause." 204 
Wis. 2d 452, 458-59, 555 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1996). 
We have mentioned the causation test before.  See J. Times 
v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 2015 WI 56, ¶57, 
362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563.  In Journal Times, we noted 
that "if the failure to timely respond to a request was caused 
by an unavoidable delay accompanied by due diligence in the 
administrative 
processes, . . . the 
plaintiff 
has 
not 
substantially prevailed."  Id.  However, we went on to conclude 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees because 
it "did not prevail in substantial part."  Id., ¶104.  We have 
not previously been presented a question squarely addressing the 
causation test or its contours. 
8 The fee-shifting provision under the FHAA provided, "[T]he 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
13 
 
Id. at 601.  It expressly rejected Cox's causation-based 
interpretation, concluding instead that "the term 'prevailing 
party'" refers to "one who has been awarded some relief by the 
court."  Id. at 603. 
¶20 The Court explained that "prevailing party" is a 
"legal term of art."  Id. at 603.  It referenced Black's Law 
Dictionary, which defined "prevailing party" as a "party in 
whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of 
damages awarded . . . .——Also termed successful party."  Id. 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999)).  The 
question therefore was simply whether there was a "court-ordered 
change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant."  Id. at 604 (alteration omitted) (quoting another 
source).  And while a consent decree incorporating a settlement 
agreement may suffice to establish one's status as a prevailing 
party, a "defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although 
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by 
the lawsuit" does not suffice because it "lacks the necessary 
judicial imprimatur on the change."  Id. at 605. 
¶21 In Buckhannon's aftermath, federal circuit courts 
promptly applied its interpretative analysis to the term 
                                                                                                                                                             
reasonable attorney's fee and costs."  Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Hum. Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 601 (2001) (quoting FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)).  
The fee-shifting provision under the ADA provided, "[T]he 
court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation 
expenses, and costs."  Id. (quoting ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
14 
 
"substantially prevailed" in FOIA's fee shifting provision.  
E.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL–CIO v. Dep't 
of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Union of 
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL–CIO, CLC v. U.S. 
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 
2003).  Shortly thereafter, however, Congress amended FOIA to 
state that "a complainant has substantially prevailed if the 
complainant has obtained relief through either——(I) a judicial 
order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent degree; or 
(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, 
if the complainant's claim in not insubstantial."  5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii); see also Or. Nat. Desert Ass'n v. Locke, 572 
F.3d 610, 614-15 (9th Cir. 2009).  Several circuits since have 
interpreted the amendment as reinstating the pre-Buckhannon 
catalyst theory of recovery in the FOIA context.  See First 
Amend. Coal. v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 878 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).  Wisconsin's public records law, 
however, has not been similarly amended and does not contain the 
"voluntary or unilateral change" language of the amended FOIA 
provision. 
¶22 The understanding of prevailing party expressed in 
Buckhannon is not unique to federal law.  It has a long history 
in Wisconsin as well.  In our earliest laws, numerous statutory 
provisions tied the concept of prevailing in an action to 
success in a judicial proceeding.  E.g., Wis. Stat. ch. 102, § 6 
(1849) ("[T]he plaintiff in error on the trial anew shall be the 
successful and prevailing party."); Wis. Stat. ch. 109, § 6 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
15 
 
(1849) ("If the plaintiff in such action prevail therein, he 
shall have judgment for double the amount of damages found by 
the jury.").9  This was also true when § 19.37(2)(a)'s fee-
shifting provision was enacted in 1982; many Wisconsin statutes 
on the books clearly tied a party's prevailing status to success 
in some judicial proceeding.10  Our cases reinforced this 
understanding.  Whiting v. Gould, 1 Wis. 198, 199 (1853) 
                                                 
9 See also Wis. Stat. ch. 64, § 21 (1849) ("If . . . it 
shall appear to the court, that either the petition or the 
objection thereto is unreasonable, said court may, in its 
discretion, award costs to the party prevailing, and enforce the 
payment thereof."); Wis. Stat. ch. 106, § 29 (1849) ("[T]he 
judgment in the action, if the plaintiff prevail, shall be that 
the plaintiff recover the possession of the premises . . . ."). 
10 E.g., Wis. Stat. § 52.10(6)(c) (1981-82) ("If proceedings 
have been initiated and the person demanded has prevailed 
therein the governor may decline to honor the demand."); Wis. 
Stat. § 109.03(6) (1981-82) ("In any [wage claim] proceeding the 
court may allow the prevailing party, in addition to all other 
costs, a reasonable sum for expenses."); Wis. Stat. § 655.19(1) 
(1981-82) ("In the case of a trial . . . the court may award 
actual court costs and reasonable attorney fees in excess of 
statutory limitations to the prevailing party."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(2) 
(1981-82) 
("If 
the 
plaintiff 
accepts 
the 
offer . . . and prevails upon the trial, either party may file 
proof of service of the offer and acceptance and the damages 
will be assessed accordingly."); Wis. Stat. § 811.21 (1981-82) 
("If the defendant prevails in the action or if the action be 
discontinued 
the 
damages 
sustained 
by 
him . . . shall 
be 
assessed and he shall have judgment therefore."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 823.03 (1981-82) ("[W]hen the plaintiff prevails, he shall, in 
addition to judgment for damage and costs, also have judgment 
that the nuisance be abated unless the court shall otherwise 
order."); Wis. Stat. § 879.33 (1981-82) ("Costs may be allowed 
in all appealable contested matters in court to the prevailing 
party . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 879.45(4) (1981-82) ("In all jury 
cases costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the 
prevailing party."). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
16 
 
("Therefore, interlocutory costs . . . must follow the final 
adjudication, and may be taxed, by items, by the ultimately 
prevailing party . . . .").11  Conversely, we have explained that 
a party does not prevail if "there is no final determination on 
the merits and the action does not end in judgment for one party 
or the other."  DeGroff v. Schmude, 71 Wis. 2d 554, 568, 238 
N.W.2d 730 (1976). 
¶23 When the legislature uses a legal term of art with a 
broadly accepted meaning——as it has here with "prevails" in 
§ 19.37(2)(a)——we generally assume the legislature meant the 
same thing.  Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, ¶19, 390 
Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566 (noting that terms "with specific and 
distinct meaning in our common law" should be given "their 
accepted legal meaning"); Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) ("[T]echnical 
words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the 
law shall be construed according to such meaning.").  If the 
idea that a party could prevail in a lawsuit in the absence of 
court action was unknown in Wisconsin when this statute was 
adopted, we should not read that interpretation into the statute 
                                                 
11 See also McCaffrey v. Nolan, 1 Wis. 361, 364 (1853) 
(noting that following a successful replevin action, an officer 
should "deliver the property to the prevailing party in the 
suit"); Pietsch v. McCarthy, 159 Wis. 251, 255, 150 N.W. 482 
(1915) (holding a party was "the prevailing party" after 
obtaining a reversal on appeal); Farmers Grain Exch., Inc. v. 
Crull, 50 Wis. 2d 161, 164, 183 N.W.2d 41 (1971) (using the term 
"prevailing party" juxtaposed against a "losing party" that 
"attempts to relieve itself of a judgment"). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
17 
 
now given the absence of any evidence that it was understood to 
have that meaning when enacted. 
¶24 Buckhannon's interpretation comports with Wisconsin 
law.  A causation or catalyst theory is not a comfortable fit 
with statutory text that allows recovery of attorney's fees "if 
the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part in any 
action."  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  The better course is to 
follow the United States Supreme Court's lead and return to a 
textually-rooted understanding of when a party prevails in a 
lawsuit.  Absent a judicially sanctioned change in the parties' 
legal relationship, attorney's fees are not recoverable under 
§ 19.37(2)(a).  
3.  Friends Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees 
¶25 Previously, under the causal-nexus test, the court of 
appeals has held that although a mandamus action under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(1) becomes moot when the records custodian 
provides the requested records, the question of attorney's fees 
remains live and can be litigated.  See Racine I, 129 Wis. 2d at 
324-25.  Without a causation-based theory governing the meaning 
of prevailing party under the statute, however, it is unclear 
whether voluntary compliance following the filing of a lawsuit 
could still allow a requester to pursue fees.  Cf. Bjordal v. 
Town Bd. of Town of Delavan, 230 Wis. 543, 545-46, 284 N.W. 534 
(1939); Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609.  We reserve this question 
for another day.  Even if attorney's fees may be awarded after 
the voluntary production of records, the City here did not 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
18 
 
violate the law, as explained below.  Friends therefore would 
not be entitled to any judicial relief——that is, it would not 
prevail in whole or substantial part——even if fees are available 
in this context.  Accordingly, Friends is not entitled to 
attorney's fees either way. 
B.  The Draft Contract Was Properly Withheld 
¶26 To explain why the City properly withheld the draft 
contract, we begin by discussing the general principles which 
animate the public records law. 
1.  Public Records Law General Principles 
¶27 Wisconsin's public records law begins with a strong 
declaration of public policy which provides in part, "The denial 
of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, 
and only in an exceptional case may access be denied."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31.  In light of this policy, "Except as otherwise 
provided by law, any requestor has a right to inspect any 
record."12  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  Therefore, once a legal 
custodian of a record receives a request, the custodian "shall, 
as soon as practicable and without delay, either fill the 
request or notify the requester of the authority's determination 
                                                 
12 "Requester" and "Record" are statutorily defined terms in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32-19.39.  § 19.32(2), (3).  The City does not 
argue that the draft contract fails to meet the definition of a 
record as defined in § 19.32(2). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
19 
 
to deny the request in whole or in part and the reasons 
therefor."13  § 19.35(4)(a). 
¶28 When responding to the request, the custodian must 
first determine if there is a record or records that are 
responsive to the request.  J. Times, 362 Wis. 2d 577, ¶55.  If 
a requested record exists, and if no other statute either 
requires access or exempts the record,14 the custodian must 
conduct the balancing test.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) 
("Substantive common law principles construing the right to 
inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall remain in 
effect.").  The balancing test is a common-law limitation "that 
the inspection [of a record] not be permitted if there is a 
specific showing that the public interest would be adversely 
affected."  State ex rel. J. Co. v. Cnty. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 
43 
Wis. 2d 297, 
306, 
168 
N.W.2d 836 
(1969). 
 
If, 
after 
conducting the balancing test, the records custodian determines 
the records should be withheld, the custodian must, with 
specificity, 
provide 
reasons 
"for 
withholding 
the 
records . . . sufficient to outweigh the strong public policy 
favoring disclosure."15  Portage Daily Reg. v. Columbia Cnty. 
                                                 
13 The legal custodians of various records are defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.33. 
14 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36, 346.70(4)(f). 
15 This denial must be in writing (if the request was in 
writing) and contain "the reasons for denying the written 
request."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(b).  If denied for public 
policy reasons, the statement must be specific and include more 
than "a mere citation to the exemption statute."  Chvala v. 
Bubolz, 204 Wis. 2d 82, 86-87, 552 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
20 
 
Sheriff's Dept., 2008 WI App 30, ¶12, 308 Wis. 2d 357, 746 
N.W.2d 525. 
¶29 As previously discussed, if a record is withheld in 
whole or in part, or its release delayed, an action for mandamus 
can be brought to compel the record's release.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(1).  In reviewing a mandamus action, we "examine the 
sufficiency of the custodian's stated reasons for denying the 
request."  Osborn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2002 
WI 83, ¶16, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158. 
2.  The Record Was Not Unlawfully Withheld 
¶30 The City's decision to withhold the draft contract was 
based on the balancing test.16  Although record custodians are 
obligated to conduct their own analysis, we conduct the public 
policy analysis the balancing test calls for independently.  
Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 
Wis. 2d 768, 784, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996). 
¶31 The 
City 
cited 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 19.35(1)(a) 
and 
19.85(1)(e) as public policy reasons supporting its decision to 
withhold the record.  Section 19.35(1)(a) is not itself a 
statutory exception to disclosure.  Rather, it explains that the 
policies behind the open meetings exemptions in § 19.85 are 
indicative of the public policy interests that might exempt a 
                                                 
16 There is no dispute that the City's written response 
denying access to the contract was sufficiently specific.  The 
City referenced the pertinent statutes and public policy 
interests at play, and expressly weighed those interests against 
the public interest in disclosure. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
21 
 
record from disclosure under the balancing test.17  Section 
19.85(1)(e), in turn, states:  "Deliberating or negotiating the 
purchasing of public properties, the investing of public funds, 
or 
conducting 
other 
specified 
public 
business, 
whenever 
competitive or bargaining reasons require a closed session."  In 
other words, these types of issues may allow governmental bodies 
to meet in closed session, and therefore reflect strong public 
policy interests in nondisclosure that could also serve as a 
basis to withhold records. 
¶32 Invoking the language in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e), the 
City explained that "the contract [was] still in negotiation 
with Big Top."  Withholding disclosure was important to "protect 
the City's negotiation and bargaining position" and "the City's 
ability 
to 
negotiate 
the 
best 
deal 
for 
the 
taxpayers."  
Disclosure "would substantially diminish the City's ability to 
negotiate different terms the Council may desire for the benefit 
[of] the City" and "compromise[]" "the City's negotiating and 
bargaining position."  The City further explained that the 
"draft contract is subject to review, revision, and approval of 
                                                 
17 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) provides: 
The exemptions to the requirement of a governmental 
body to meet in open session under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be 
used as grounds for denying public access to a record 
only if the authority or legal custodian under [Wis. 
Stat. §] 19.33 makes a specific demonstration that 
there is a need to restrict public access at the time 
that the request to inspect or copy the record is 
made. 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
22 
 
the Common Council before it can be finalized, and the Common 
Council [has] not yet had an opportunity to review and discuss 
the draft contract."  The City indicated it would disclose the 
draft contract after the Common Council had taken action. 
¶33 The circuit court correctly concluded the reasons set 
forth in the City's letter supported temporarily withholding the 
draft contract.  Without question, the public interest in 
matters of municipal spending and development is significant.  
There is good reason for the public to know how government 
spends public money.  This ensures citizen involvement and 
accountability for public funds.  However, contract negotiation 
often 
requires 
a 
different 
calculus. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(e) identifies the public interest in protecting a 
government's "competitive or bargaining" position in adversarial 
negotiation.  It is not uncommon for the state or local 
municipalities to negotiate certain contracts in private, 
especially in competitive business environments.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. City of Milton, 
2007 
WI App 114, 
¶19, 
300 
Wis. 2d 649, 
731 
N.W.2d 640 
("Developing a negotiation strategy or deciding on a price to 
offer for a piece of land is an example of what is contemplated 
by 'whenever competitive or bargaining reasons require a closed 
session.'" (quoting § 19.85(1)(e))). 
¶34 As illustrated here, the City communicated its belief 
that it was more likely to secure a better deal if its 
negotiations were not revealed early.  The City was in talks 
with both Big Top Baseball and Northwoods League to bring a 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
23 
 
baseball team to the City.  Revealing its hand by disclosing the 
terms of a draft contract with Big Top Baseball could have 
negatively impacted the City's ability to bring a baseball team 
to the City on favorable terms.  While no third-party competitor 
for a contract with Big Top Baseball or the Northwoods League 
was identified, this does not diminish the competitive nature of 
the negotiation.  In a competitive bilateral negotiation, 
confidentiality is often critical to advancing a negotiation 
strategy.  An identified third party may increase competition, 
but it is not a prerequisite for a competitive negotiation. 
¶35 These negotiations were by no means a secret.  In 
fact, in response to the records request, the City turned over 
other "correspondence with Big Top Baseball or Northwoods League 
Baseball related to a baseball project in Frame Park during 5-1-
16 to the present time."  The only responsive document the City 
withheld was the draft contract; every other responsive document 
was provided in a timely manner. 
¶36 Moreover, while City employees were on-the-ground 
operators in a competitive negotiation with Big Top Baseball, it 
was ultimately the Common Council that bore the responsibility 
for the contract.  "The general rule of municipal law is that 
only a duly authorized officer, governing body, or board can act 
on behalf of a city, and a valid contract with the municipality 
cannot be created otherwise."  Town of Brockway v. City of Black 
River 
Falls, 
2005 
WI App 174, 
¶24, 
285 
Wis. 2d 708, 
702 
N.W.2d 418.  Here, the City explained to Friends that once the 
Common Council had an opportunity to consider the draft 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
24 
 
contract, the balance of interests would shift.  The City 
therefore said it would disclose the draft contract to Friends 
after the Common Council took action on it.  In this context, it 
was reasonable to wait for consultation with the Common Council 
before revealing the current status of the negotiations to 
others. 
¶37 Under these circumstances, the City's interest in 
withholding the draft contract to protect its bargaining 
position until the Common Council had the opportunity to 
consider the contract outweighed the public's interest in 
immediate release.  The City properly applied the balancing test 
and did not violate the public records law by temporarily 
withholding the draft contract, nor did it delay release of the 
contract unreasonably.  Accordingly, regardless of whether the 
issue of attorney's fees is moot, Friends is not entitled to 
attorney's fees because it did not prevail in whole or in 
substantial part on the merits of its mandamus action. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 When ascertaining if a records requester is entitled 
attorney's fees as a part of a mandamus action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(1), a party must "prevail[] in whole or in substantial 
part," which means the party must obtain a judicially sanctioned 
change in the parties' legal relationship.  § 19.37(2)(a).  With 
respect to the mandamus action before us, the City properly 
applied the balancing test when it decided to temporarily 
withhold access to the draft contract in response to Friends' 
No. 
2019AP96   
 
25 
 
open records request.  Accordingly, regardless of whether 
Friends may pursue fees after voluntary delivery of the 
requested record, Friends cannot prevail in its mandamus action 
and is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶39 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  "What a 
metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its 
ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense."  
Letter from James Madison, to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824).1  The 
judiciary 
risks 
destabilizing 
the 
law 
and 
usurping 
the 
legislature's law-making power when it fails to give "legal 
terms of art" in a statute their "accepted legal meaning."  See 
Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶23, 326 
Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 (quoting Estate of Matteson v. 
Matteson, 2008 WI 48, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557).  In 
a series of cases interpreting the public records law, the court 
of appeals modified the accepted legal meaning of a "prevailing 
party" in a court proceeding.  That interpretive error requires 
correction.  
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) (2017–18)2 employs a 
legal term of art.  It states, in relevant part:  "[T]he court 
shall award reasonable attorney fees . . . to the requester if 
the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part in any 
action filed under sub. (1) relating to access to a record or 
part of a record under s. 19.35 (1)(a)."  § 19.37(2)(a).  A 
party prevails in an action, in whole or in substantial part, 
only if it obtains favorable relief from a court.  E.g., 
Prevailing party, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
                                                 
 
1 https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.20_0907_0909/?sp=2&st=tex
t. 
 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017–18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶41 The court of appeals has repeatedly failed to give the 
legal term of art in § 19.37(2)(a) its accepted legal meaning.  
In at least six cases,3 the court of appeals has instead endorsed 
the now-defunct "catalyst theory," under which a party may be 
deemed to have prevailed——even in the absence of favorable 
relief from a court——if the lawsuit achieved at least some of 
the party's desired results by causing a voluntary change in the 
defendant's conduct.4  See generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 
(2001).  This line of court of appeals precedent (the "Racine 
Education Association I Line") relied on federal decisions that 
have been abrogated.  More than 20 years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court decisively rejected the catalyst theory in 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–05.  In an even greater departure 
from the statutory text than the reasoning adopted in the Racine 
                                                 
3 WTMJ, Inc. v. Sullivan, 204 Wis. 2d 452, 555 N.W.2d 140 
(Ct. 
App. 
1996); 
Eau 
Claire 
Press 
Co. 
v. 
Gordon, 
176 
Wis. 2d 154, 499 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993); State ex rel. Eau 
Claire 
Leader-Telegram 
v. 
Barrett, 
148 
Wis. 2d 769, 
436 
N.W.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1989); Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. 
for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 145 Wis. 2d 518, 427 N.W.2d 414 
(Ct. 
App. 
1988); 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Vaughan 
v. 
Faust, 
143 
Wis. 2d 868, 422 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1988); Racine Educ. Ass'n 
v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Wis. 2d 319, 
328, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1986). 
4 As the majority/lead opinion notes, "[w]e have mentioned 
the causation test before;" however, "[w]e have not previously 
been presented a question squarely addressing the causation test 
or its contours."  Majority/Lead op., ¶18 n.7.  See generally J. 
Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'r, 2015 WI 56, 
¶57, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563.   
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
3 
 
Education Association I Line, in two cases,5 (the "Young/Portage 
Cases") the court of appeals arguably abandoned the catalyst 
theory.  According to the Young/Portage Cases, if a custodian 
improperly invokes an exception to the public records law and 
provides the requested record after the filing of a mandamus 
action, the requester is deemed to have prevailed and is 
entitled to attorney fees. 
¶42 In this case, the court of appeals6 erred in applying 
the 
Young/Portage 
Cases, 
embracing 
a 
purposivist 
and 
consequentialist 
approach 
to 
statutory 
interpretation, 
in 
derogation of the textualist approach Wisconsin courts are bound 
to follow.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.7  Because these 
decisions are objectively wrong, we must overturn them in 
fulfilling our duty to properly interpret the law.  See Wenke v. 
Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 ("We 
are not required to adhere to interpretations of statutes that 
are objectively wrong."  (internal citations omitted)). 
                                                 
5 See State ex rel. Young v. Shaw, 165 Wis. 2d 276, 292–93, 
477 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1991); Portage Daily Reg. v. Columbia 
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2008 WI App 30, ¶8, 308 Wis. 2d 357, 746 
N.W.2d 525. 
 
6 Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2020 WI 
App 61, 394 Wis. 2d 387, 950 N.W.2d 831. 
 
 
7 The same results-driven rationalizations permeate Justice 
Jill Karofsky's dissent, which does not even mention Kalal much 
less apply it. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶43 I write separately because the majority/lead opinion8 
does not acknowledge this case is moot, obviating any need to 
address the merits.  All records were given to the requester 
before the circuit court ever rendered a decision.  See Racine 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 129 
Wis. 2d 319, 322, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1986) (hereinafter 
"Racine Educ. Ass'n I").  A writ of mandamus under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(1) has a singular purpose:  "to compel performance of a 
particular act by . . . a governmental officer, usu. to correct 
a prior action or failure to act."  Mandamus, Black's Law 
Dictionary.  In this case, the act requested had already been 
performed, so neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
nor this court needed to address the merits of Friends' public 
records claim.9  Because this case is moot, we need not consider 
whether Friends is entitled to relief.  Without favorable 
relief, Friends cannot recover attorney fees.  Because the 
majority/lead opinion reaches the merits of this case without 
any explanation of what possible favorable relief could be 
granted, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
8 Wis. 
Sup. 
Ct. 
IOP 
III.G.5 
("If . . . the 
opinion 
originally circulated as the majority opinion does not garner 
the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be referred to in 
separate writings as the 'lead opinion[.]'"). 
9 See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶12, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 ("Appellate courts generally decline 
to reach moot issues, and if all issues on appeal are moot, the 
appeal should be dismissed.  We may, however, choose to address 
moot issues in 'exceptional or compelling circumstances.'"  
(citations omitted)). 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
5 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Public Records Request 
¶44 Friends was concerned about contract negotiations 
between the City of Waukesha ("City") and Big Top Baseball ("Big 
Top") to re-purpose Frame Park into a for-profit baseball 
stadium.  Friends filed a public records request with the City 
in October 2017.  The City disclosed some requested records, but 
withheld drafts of a proposed contract between the City and Big 
Top.  In a letter to Friends, the City Attorney explained the 
City temporarily withheld the draft contracts because:  (1) They 
had not yet been reviewed by the City's Common Council; (2) 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e), the Common Council could meet in 
closed session to review them; and (3) therefore, an exception 
to the public records laws, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), applied.  
The letter stated:  "You will get a copy of the contract after 
the Common Council has taken action on it." 
B.  The Mandamus Action 
¶45 Friends learned the City Council might review the 
draft contracts at a meeting on December 19, 2017.  The day 
before the meeting, Friends filed a mandamus action under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) to compel disclosure of the draft contracts.  
In Friends' own words, it needed "to preserve its remedies"——
i.e., an award of statutory attorney fees.  The day after the 
meeting, the City Attorney emailed Friends copies of the draft 
contracts, explaining they were "being released now because 
there is no longer any need to protect the City's negotiating 
and bargaining position." 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶46 The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the 
action was moot because it had turned over all responsive 
records——including the draft contracts.  Friends countered that 
a live controversy existed regarding whether it could be awarded 
attorney fees.  It argued:  "The issue at stake here would never 
be litigated if a City could withhold records and then produce 
them after the court action was filed.  The issue at stake is 
whether the exception invoked by the City was applicable under 
the law and thus validly invoked."  Specifically, Friends argued 
the City incorrectly invoked Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) to delay 
releasing the draft contracts.  Friends also seemed to assert 
that its lawsuit somehow caused the release of the draft 
contracts. 
¶47 The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment 
motion.10  It concluded Friends did not prevail in the action and 
therefore was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) because the action was not a cause of 
the release of the draft contracts.  In its written order, the 
circuit court explained:  "The Plaintiff has not provided any 
evidence indicating that . . . records were disclosed by the 
Defendant in response to Plaintiff's commencement of this 
litigation."  Instead, the circuit court found the City released 
                                                 
10 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren, Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
7 
 
the draft contracts because the exception on which it relied no 
longer applied.11 
C.  The Appeal 
¶48 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and 
remanded with directions for the circuit court to determine the 
amount of attorney fees to be awarded.12  It began by noting Wis. 
Stat. § 19.35(4)(a) instructs custodians to comply with requests 
"as soon as practicable and without delay."13  It then concluded, 
"[a] plaintiff with standing to seek a withheld record in a 
mandamus 
action 
should 
generally 
be 
considered 
to 
have 
'substantially prevailed' where it demonstrates a violation of 
this statute; that is, an unreasonable delay caused by the 
improper reliance on an exception."14   
¶49 The court of appeals' reasoning seemed to rest on a 
desire 
to 
avoid 
what 
that 
court 
considered 
to 
be 
the 
consequences of bad public policy because interpreting the 
statute according to its text might encourage custodians to 
engage in bad-faith gamesmanship.15  Specifically, a custodian 
might withhold requested records——perhaps in bad faith——but if 
litigation ensues, only then turn over a requested record.16  
                                                 
11 The circuit court also concluded the City had properly 
invoked 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(e) 
to 
withhold 
the 
draft 
contracts. 
 
12 Friends of Frame Park, 394 Wis. 2d 387.   
 
 
13 Id., ¶4 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a)). 
   
14 Id. 
 
15 See id., ¶¶28–30.   
 
 
16 Id. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
8 
 
Instead of analyzing the statutory text, the court opted to 
incentivize "voluntary compliance" by increasing the risk 
custodians face if an action is brought.17     
¶50 To 
reach 
its 
conclusion, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
endeavored to "reconcile what, at least superficially, appears 
to be inconsistent language from prior decisions addressing how 
and whether a public records plaintiff can recover attorney fees 
following voluntary release during litigation."18  The Racine 
Education 
Association 
I 
Line 
unambiguously 
requires 
the 
requester to show the action was a cause of the release of the 
record.  E.g., WTMJ, Inc. v. Sullivan, 204 Wis. 2d 452, 458, 555 
N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State ex rel. Vaughan v. 
Faust, 143 Wis. 2d 868, 871, 422 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1988)).  
In the Young/Portage Cases, however, the court of appeals 
arguably eliminated the element of causation for at least a 
subset of disputes in which the custodian withheld the record in 
reliance on an exception rather than due to "unavoidable 
delays."  See State ex rel. Young, 165 Wis. 2d 276, 292–93, 477 
N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Portage Daily Reg. v. 
Columbia Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2008 WI App 30, ¶8, 308 
Wis. 2d 357, 746 N.W.2d 525.  The Young/Portage Cases focused on 
whether the custodian was, in fact, entitled to withhold the 
record rather than what caused its release. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
17 Id., ¶29 (quoting Racine Educ. Ass'n I, 129 Wis. 2d at 
328). 
 
18 Id., ¶4.   
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
9 
 
¶51 In this case, the court of appeals applied the 
Young/Portage Cases.19  The court also relied heavily on Church 
of Scientology of California v. United States Postal Services, 
700 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983), abrogated in part on other grounds 
as recognized by First Amendment Coalition v. United States 
Department of Justice, 878 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2017) (lead 
opinion).  Under that case, three factors determine whether a 
requester prevailed:  "(1) when the documents were released; and 
(2) what actually triggered the documents' release . . . ; and 
(3) whether the . . . [requester] was entitled to the documents 
at 
an 
earlier 
time 
in 
view 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
exemption . . . [no longer applied]."  Id. at 492.  Our court of 
appeals deemed this three-factor test "a more flexible inquiry, 
one 
that 
permits 
consideration 
of 
factors 
other 
than 
causation."20     
¶52 Notably, the court of appeals seemed to prioritize the 
third factor:  
The third factor——whether the requester was entitled 
to the record at an earlier time——should control where 
a delay in a voluntary release can be attributed to 
the 
authority's 
reliance 
on 
a 
public 
records 
exception.  Where that is the case the trial court 
must scrutinize the claimed exception, rather than 
whether the lawsuit caused the release, to determine 
whether a requesting party has prevailed[.21] 
                                                 
 
19 See id., ¶¶26, 32 (quoting Portage Daily Reg., 308 
Wis. 2d 357, ¶8 and citing Young, 165 Wis. 2d at 286–91).  
  
20 Id., ¶32. 
21 Id., ¶33. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
10 
 
Applying this third factor——and seemingly only this factor——the 
court of appeals concluded:  
Here, there can be no question that the City withheld 
the draft contract on the claimed basis that a public 
records exception required nondisclosure; it later 
released the contract because it believed there was no 
longer a "competitive or bargaining" rationale to 
continue withholding it.  There also is no doubt that 
the delay in disclosing this document . . . was not 
insignificant and the triggering event (according to 
the City) was the expiration of the exception on which 
nondisclosure was based. . . .  Friends' claim for 
attorney's fees must hinge on whether the City 
appropriately invoked WIS. STAT. § 19.85(1)(e) to 
withhold disclosure until after the December 19 common 
council meeting.[22] 
The court of appeals then turned to whether the exception was 
properly invoked, concluding Friends——not the City——was entitled 
to summary judgment, even though Friends never moved for summary 
judgment.23  Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court and 
remanded the case, directing the circuit court to calculate the 
appropriate 
award 
of 
attorney 
fees 
to 
Friends. 
 
The 
majority/lead opinion concludes the court of appeals erroneously 
held the exception codified in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) did not 
apply.  The City filed a petition for review, which we granted.   
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶53 We review a grant of summary judgment independently.  
Kemper Indep. Ins. v. Islami, 2021 WI 53, ¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 394, 
959 N.W.2d 912 (quoting Talley v. Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶12, 381 
                                                 
22 Id., ¶34 
23 Id., ¶51. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55).  Summary judgment is appropriate if 
no material facts are at issue and a moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2019–
20).  Under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(6) (2019–20), "[i]f it shall 
appear to the court that the party against whom a motion for 
summary judgment is asserted is entitled to a summary judgment, 
the summary judgment may be awarded to such party even though 
the party has not moved therefor." 
¶54 Whether a requester prevailed in an action despite the 
absence of favorable court relief requires us to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  Statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law, which we review independently.  T.L.E.-C. v. 
S.E., 2021 WI 56, ¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391 (citing 
State v. Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, ¶18, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 
N.W.2d 819); see also Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 
53, ¶17, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240 (citation omitted). 
B.  Stare Decisis & Court of Appeals Precedent 
¶55 The Latin term "stare decisis" means "to stand by 
things decided."  Stare decisis, Black's Law Dictionary.  
Sometimes called "[t]he doctrine of precedent," stare decisis 
beseeches judges to "follow earlier judicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation."  Id. 
¶56 Stare decisis encompasses two related but distinct 
concepts——vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare decisis: 
Vertical stare decisis applies between higher and 
lower courts in a single system——for example, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Wisconsin court of 
appeals and circuit courts . . . .  The doctrine 
requires 
lower 
courts 
to 
faithfully 
apply 
the 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
12 
 
decisions of higher courts in their system——even if 
the lower courts believe those decisions erroneous——
unless those higher courts have overturned them.  This 
doctrine, that higher courts bind lower courts, is 
absolute and near-universally accepted . . . . 
Horizontal stare decisis . . . operates within the 
same court, requiring it to adhere to its own prior 
decisions . . . . 
Daniel R. Suhr & Kevin LeRoy, The Past and the Present:  Stare 
Decisis in Wisconsin Law, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 839, 844-45 (2019).  
Compare Vertical stare decisis, Black's Law Dictionary ("The 
doctrine that a court must strictly follow the decisions handed 
down by higher courts within the same jurisdiction."), with 
Horizontal stare decisis, Black's Law Dictionary ("The doctrine 
that a court, esp. an appellate court, must adhere to its own 
prior decisions, unless it finds compelling reasons to overrule 
itself."). 
¶57 We have recognized a third form of stare decisis, 
which may be unique to Wisconsin:  "the doctrine of stare 
decisis applies to published court of appeals opinions and 
requires this court 'to follow court of appeals precedent unless 
a compelling reason exists to overrule it.'"  Manitowoc County 
v. Samuel J.H., 2013 WI 68, ¶5 n.2, 349 Wis. 2d 202, 833 
N.W.2d 109 (quoting Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 752.41(2) (2019–20) ("Officially published opinions of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
shall 
have 
statewide 
precedential 
effect.").   
¶58 This third type of stare decisis is not recognized in 
other jurisdictions in America.  See Bryan A. Garner et al., The 
Law of Judicial Precedent 255 (2016) ("Inferior-court decisions 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
13 
 
have less precedential worth because courts superior in rank 
aren't bound by them and may overrule, vacate, reverse, or 
depublish them."); H. Campbell Black, The Principle of Stare 
Decisis, 34 Am. L. Reg. 745, 751 (1886) ("The opinion of a Nisi 
Prius court, though, perhaps, admissible as persuasive evidence 
of the principle contended for, is of course, not binding as 
precedent upon the appellate court[.]").  But see  John Cleland 
Wells, A Treatise on the Doctrine of Res Adjudicata and Stare 
Decisis 553 (1878) ("Moreover, the decisions of inferior courts 
are binding upon superior courts, sometimes, although, perhaps, 
more on the principle of res adjudicata which relates chiefly to 
fact, than on that of stare decisis which relates to law."). 
¶59 This 
third 
form 
of 
stare 
decisis 
is 
"somewhat 
paradoxical[.]" Suhr & LeRoy, Stare Decisis in Wisconsin Law, at 
844 
n.25. 
 
Article 
VII 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
unequivocally makes this court "a supreme judicial tribunal over 
the whole state[.]"  Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 436, 284 
N.W. 42 (1938) (per curiam) (quoting Attorney General v. Chi. & 
N.W. Ry., 35 Wis. 425, 518 (1874)).  The court of appeals was 
created in 1978 by constitutional amendment so that this court 
could focus on its law-developing function.  Matthew E. Garbys, 
Comment, A Shift in the Bottleneck:  The Appellate Caseload 
Problem Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1547, 1548.  A 1973 report to the 
governor explained: 
In the rush to cope with its increasing calendar, the 
Supreme Court must invariably sacrifice quality for 
quantity.  Increasing appellate backlogs necessarily 
produce 
a 
dilution 
in 
craftsmanship. . . .  
The 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
14 
 
Supreme Court is cast in the role of a "case-deciding 
court"——one which merely reacts to individual cases 
and thus slights its law-stating function.  
. . . .  
The size of this caseload can only have a detrimental 
effect on the quality of the Supreme Court's work.  
Cases involving major questions of substantive law may 
be decided on the basis of superficial issues. 
Citizens Study Comm. on Jud. Org., Report to Governor Patrick J. 
Lucey 78 (1973) (on file at the David T. Prosser Jr. State Law 
Library). 
¶60 Deference to decisions of the court of appeals 
conflicts with this court's constitutional role as the "final 
arbiter" on questions of Wisconsin law.  See Tetra Tech EC, Inc. 
v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶78, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21 (lead opinion) (explaining this court is the "final 
arbiter" on questions of state law).  By lending court of 
appeals decisions stare decisis effect, we give the court of 
appeals power that is inconsistent with the constitutional 
structure of the Wisconsin judiciary.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (noting this court has 
been "designated by the constitution and the legislature as a 
law declaring court" (quoting State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. 
Cir. Ct. for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229–30, 340 
N.W.2d 460 (1983))); State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 
Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("[I]t is this court's 
function to develop and clarify the law."  (citations omitted)); 
State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 84, ¶154, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 
N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring) ("Unlike a circuit court or 
the court of appeals, the supreme court serves a law development 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
15 
 
purpose[.]"); Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline Sewer & 
Water, Inc., 231 Wis. 2d 404, 416 n.4, 605 N.W.2d 620 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("We are primarily an error-correcting court, not a law-
declaring court."  (citation omitted)); State v. Grawien, 123 
Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, unlike the court of appeals, has been designated 
by the constitution and the legislature as a law-declaring 
court.  While the court of appeals also serves a law-declaring 
function, such pronouncements should not occur in cases of great 
moment."  (internal citation omitted)).  We must not "slight[]" 
our "law-stating function"——the precise problem the people of 
this state sought to prevent by creating the court of appeals.  
See Citizens Study Comm. on Jud. Org., Report to Governor 
Patrick J. Lucey, at 78.  
¶61 The heavy docket of the court of appeals renders that 
court better suited for deciding cases in accordance with 
established precedent rather than formulating new precedent 
itself: 
One 
reason 
why 
lower-court 
decisions 
are 
often 
unsuited to establish precedent is the nature of the 
decisional process itself.  Generally, lower-court 
decisions are shorter than published opinions of 
higher courts and contain less reasoning because those 
courts' primary job is to rule on cases then pending, 
not shape the law. . . .  In states that provide a 
right of first appeal, intermediate appellate courts 
may . . . have a heavy caseload.  So intermediate 
appellate courts . . . don't have as much time or as 
many resources to devote to resolving a case as high 
courts with discretionary jurisdiction.  The press of 
judicial business may result in opinions that aren't 
so thoroughly researched and closely reasoned.  They 
may prove therefore less valuable as precedent. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
16 
 
Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 256–57.  In 
Wisconsin, litigants have a constitutional right to a direct 
appeal, and the legislature has designated the court of appeals 
as the institution responsible for effectuating that right.  See 
State v. Pope, 2019 WI 106, ¶21, 389 Wis. 2d 390, 936 N.W.2d 606 
(citing Wis. Const. art. I, § 21(1) and Wis. Stat. § 808.02).  
Approximately 2059 cases were filed in the court of appeals last 
year.24  Each court of appeals judge was responsible for 
deciding, on average, 132 cases.25  In contrast, last term this 
court resolved 97 cases——including attorney disciplinary cases, 
judicial disciplinary cases, and bar admissions cases.26   
¶62 Perhaps 
implicitly 
recognizing 
that 
giving 
stare 
decisis effect to court of appeals decisions is inconsistent 
with our constitutional structure, we have overturned court of 
appeals decisions without even mentioning stare decisis.  See, 
e.g., Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶¶37–38, 399 
Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590 (overturning parts of Marathon 
County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 
N.W.2d 898 without any discussion of stare decisis).  Twice this 
term, we have suggested court of appeals decisions are entitled 
to significantly less weight than our own decisions.  See State 
                                                 
24 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
Annual 
Report 
1 
(2020), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqN
o=391847.   
 
25 Id. at 2.   
 
26 Wisconsin Supreme Court Annual Statistical Report 1 
(October 
6, 
2021), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqN
o=439770. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
17 
 
v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, ¶31, 400 Wis. 2d 549, 970 N.W.2d 12 
("While respecting court of appeals precedent is an important 
consideration, it is not determinative."  (quoting State v. 
Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶45, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605)); Lira, 
399 Wis. 2d 419, ¶45 ("This court has never applied the five 
factors commonly used in a decision to overturn supreme court 
caselaw to override an interpretation derived solely from the 
court of appeals.  Further, we have shown a repeated willingness 
to interpret and apply the law correctly, irrespective of a 
court of appeals decision that came to a different conclusion."  
(internal citation omitted)); see also Suhr & LeRoy, Stare 
Decisis in Wisconsin, at 844 n.25 ("In practice, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court likely grants less stare decisis effect to 
opinions of the Court of Appeals than of its own."  (citation 
omitted)). 
¶63 This court's practice, if not always its words, 
confirms that published court of appeals decisions are not 
entitled 
to 
stare 
decisis 
effect. 
 
These 
decisions 
are 
precedential; lower courts throughout the state must follow 
them.  The supreme court, however, is not so bound.  Referencing 
stare decisis in the context of court of appeals precedent has 
created confusion with no benefit.  We should take this 
opportunity to unequivocally correct this court's misspeak in 
Manitowoc County.   
¶64 Regardless, stare decisis is a judicially-created 
policy and "not an inexorable command;" for this reason, we will 
overturn precedent if it is objectively wrong.  Johnson 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
18 
 
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶97, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (citing Hohn v. United States, 
524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998)); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649, 665 (1944) ("[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court 
has 
never 
felt 
constrained 
to 
follow 
precedent.").  
Historically, the judiciary has prioritized declaring the law 
correctly over perpetuating errors in judgment in the name of 
stability in the law.  "We cannot mistake 'the law' for 'the 
opinion of the judge' because "the judge may mistake the law.'"  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶259, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, 
971 
N.W.2d 402 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(quoting 
Introduction, 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries *71)).  Because judges are not infallible, their 
decisions must not be insulated from later review: 
A Court is not bound to give the like judgment, which 
had been given by a former Court, unless they are of 
opinion that the first judgment was according to law; 
for any Court may err; and if a Judge conceives, that 
a judgment given by a former Court is erroneous, he 
ought not in conscience to give the like judgment, he 
being sworn to judge according to law.  Acting 
otherwise would have this consequence; because one man 
has 
been 
wronged 
by 
a 
judicial 
determination, 
therefore every man, having a like cause, ought to be 
wronged also. 
Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 Dall. 175, 178 (Pa. 1786). 
¶65 To avoid the injustice of subjecting parties in 
perpetuity to erroneous holdings, "[t]he primary and most 
important factor to weigh in considering whether to overrule an 
earlier decision is its correctness."  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 
¶259 (quoting Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 
397).  "[W]e do more damage to the rule of law by obstinately 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
19 
 
refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating injustice, than 
by overturning an erroneous decision."  State v. Roberson, 2019 
WI 102, ¶49, 389 Wis. 2d 813, 935 N.W.2d 813 (quoting Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100).  "By applying demonstrably 
erroneous 
precedent 
instead 
of 
the 
relevant 
law's 
text[,] . . . the Court exercises 'force' and 'will,' two 
attributes the People did not give it."  Gamble v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)).   
¶66 Although judges are particularly reluctant to depart 
from the doctrine of stare decisis with respect to a holding 
repeatedly applied, "[e]ven a series of decisions are not always 
conclusive evidence of what is law; and the revision of a 
decision very often resolves itself into a mere question of 
expediency[.]"  1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 476 
(New York, Clayton & Norden, 3d ed. 1836).  Courts tend to 
follow their earlier decisions because it is easy but not 
necessarily because the decisions were correct.  See Bartlett v. 
Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶200, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 172 (Kelly, 
J., concurring/dissenting).  No matter how long a decision has 
enjoyed judicial acquiescence, no amount of time can cure the 
error:  "[T]he law of precedent has less relation to mere 
numbers, than to the decisive nature of the conclusions 
announced, and the deliberation and care with which they have 
been investigated."  Wells, A Treatise on the Doctrine of Res 
Adjudicata and Stare Decisis, at 535; see also Monroe v. Pape, 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
20 
 
365 U.S. 167, 220–21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude 
considering, for the first time thoroughly and in the light of 
the best available evidence . . . , a statutory interpretation 
which started as an unexamined assumption on the basis of 
inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma solely 
through reiteration.").   
¶67 Revisiting 
erroneous 
precedent 
is 
particularly 
imperative when the precedent under review was established by 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  As explained in our seminal 
decision 
in 
Cook 
v. 
Cook, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
lacks 
constitutional authority to overrule, modify, or withdraw 
language from its published decisions.  208 Wis. 2d at 189–90.  
Consequently, a single erroneous interpretation can easily 
permeate a line of cases without any reconsideration by the 
court of appeals of its correctness.  In Cook, we encouraged the 
court of appeals to "signal its disfavor to litigants, lawyers 
and this court by certifying the appeal to this court, 
explaining that it believes a prior case was wrongly decided."  
208 Wis. 2d at 189.  We also noted the court of appeals could 
apply its prior decision while expressly stating its concern 
that the decision was erroneous.  Id.  As an empirical matter, 
however, the court of appeals rarely exercises these options.  
In this case, for example, the court of appeals acknowledged 
conflicting precedent but nonetheless utilized neither of the 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
21 
 
options we outlined in Cook.27  Last term we received only seven 
requests for certification from the court of appeals.28   
¶68 The people of Wisconsin established this court as the 
supreme judicial tribunal and in fulfilling our constitutional 
                                                 
27 Friends of Frame Park, 394 Wis. 2d 387, ¶29.  In this 
case, the court of appeals violated Cook by following Young, 
which 
modified 
the 
Racine 
Education 
Association 
I 
Line.  
Although Young pre-dated Cook, our decision in Cook applies 
retroactively.  State v. Bolden, 2003 WI App 155, ¶10, 265 
Wis. 2d 853, 
667 
N.W.2d 364 
("Although 
Jackson 
and 
Kuehl 
preceded Cook, this makes no difference.  Cook based its ruling 
on 'power' not policy.  If the court of appeals lacked the 
'power' to overrule or modify its prior decisions after Cook, it 
certainly also lacked that power before Cook.").   
Before Cook, if two published court of appeals decisions 
conflicted, the court often "pick[ed] the one [it] like[d]."  
Adam S. Bazelon, Practice Tips:  Dealing with Conflicting Court 
of Appeals Opinions, Wis. Law., Dec. 2009, at 22, 23, 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/pages/ar
ticle.aspx?Volume=82&Issue=12&ArticleID=1794#16 
(quoted 
source 
omitted) (second and third modification in the original).  Post-
Cook, the earlier decision prevails because the court of appeals 
lacked the power to modify it: 
If a court finds that the later court of appeals 
decision overruled or modified a prior court of 
appeals decision, the court must follow the earlier 
decision.  This is because the court of appeals lacks 
the power to overturn its own precedent and exceeds 
its jurisdiction by doing so.  In contrast, when the 
court of appeals is confronted with conflicting 
supreme court precedent, it must follow the supreme 
court's most recent pronouncement. 
Id.  In this case, the court of appeals acknowledged it had to 
"reconcile 
what, 
at 
least 
superficially, 
appears 
to 
be 
inconsistent language from prior decisions addressing how and 
whether a public records plaintiff can recover attorney fees 
following voluntary release during litigation."  Friends of 
Frame Park, 394 Wis. 2d 387, ¶4.  Had the court applied Cook, it 
would have been bound to apply the Racine Education Association 
I Line instead. 
 
 
28 Wisconsin Supreme Court Annual Statistics, at 3. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
22 
 
duty to declare the law in this state, we may overturn any 
incorrect court of appeals opinion with no consideration of the 
stare decisis doctrine.  Of particular relevance in this case, 
"the principle of stare decisis . . . does not require us 'to 
adhere to interpretations of statutes that are objectively 
wrong.'"  Samuel J.H., 349 Wis. 2d 202, ¶5 n.2 (quoting Wenke, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21).  "Reflexively cloaking every judicial 
opinion with the adornment of stare decisis threatens the rule 
of law, particularly when applied to interpretations wholly 
unsupported by the statute's text."  Manitowoc v. Lanning, 2018 
WI 6, ¶81 n.5, 379 Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring).  While court of appeals opinions may 
be helpful to this court in ascertaining a statute's meaning, 
"[i]t should be borne in mind that the mere text [of the law], 
and only the text . . . was adopted[.]"  Frederick Douglass, The 
Constitution of the United States:  Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-
Slavery?, Speech Delivered at Glasgow, Scotland (March 26, 
1860); see also Michael Sinclair, Traditional Tools of Statutory 
Interpretation 13 (1942) ("After the plain text of a statute, 
precedent is the most significant, the most ubiquitous, and the 
most 
powerful 
of 
the 
traditional 
tools 
of 
statutory 
construction."  (emphasis added)).  "By recognizing that 'a law 
is the best expositor of itself,' courts can faithfully fulfill 
their function as neutral arbiters."  Wis. Jud. Comm'n v. Woldt, 
2021 WI 73, ¶92, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring/dissenting) (quoting Pennington v. Coxe, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804)). 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
23 
 
C.  The Court of Appeals Precedent 
¶69 The Racine Education Association I Line is objectively 
wrong, and the Young/Portage Cases applied by the court of 
appeals in this case depart even further from proper statutory 
interpretation.  I would overturn the line and the Young/Portage 
Cases and instead apply the actual statutory text. 
¶70 For 
context, 
the 
legislature 
rewrote 
Wisconsin's 
public record laws in 1982, inspired in part by Congress's 
enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the late 
1960s.  Linda De La Mora, Comment, The Wisconsin Public Records 
Law, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 65, 65 (1983).  FOIA permitted federal 
district courts to award attorney fees to requesters who 
"substantially prevailed" in an action.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) 
(1976).  Although Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a), which was created 
during this re-write, uses slightly different language, it seems 
to have been based on the language in FOIA. 
¶71 A student-authored law review comment published in 
1983 suggested Wisconsin courts should look to "existing federal 
case law" to interpret Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  Mora, The 
Wisconsin Public Records Law, at 104 & nn.293–95.  The court of 
appeals has done just that, parroting federal decisions that 
have 
been 
abrogated 
instead 
of 
applying 
the 
text 
of 
§ 19.37(2)(a). 
1.  The Racine Education Association I Line 
¶72 In 1986, the court of appeals interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2)(a) for the first time in Racine Education Association 
I, 129 Wis. 2d 319.  A teachers union requested records from a 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
24 
 
school district showing who was a member of a bargaining unit.  
Id. at 323.  The district did not respond, so the union filed a 
mandamus action.  Id.  The district argued an exception applied—
—specifically, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(l), which states that 
compliance with a request is not mandated if a new record would 
need to be made by extracting information from existing records.  
Id.  The district did note, however, that it was in the process 
of compiling the information for reasons unrelated to the 
request.  Id.  While the action was pending, the district 
released the requested records.  Id.  The circuit court 
dismissed the action as moot.  Id. at 322.  The union appealed, 
arguing it was entitled to an award of attorney fees.  Id. 
¶73 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for 
factfinding.  Id. at 330.  Ostensibly following the student 
comment's guidance, the court looked to federal decisions, 
primarily Cox v. United States Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by 
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
Cox held a requester could be deemed to have prevailed, even in 
the absence of favorable relief from a court, if it showed:  
(1) its action "could reasonably be regarded as necessary," and 
(2) "a causal nexus exists between that action and the agency's 
surrender of information."  Id. at 6.  In Racine Education 
Association I, the court explicitly adopted Cox's holding.  129 
Wis. 2d at 326–28.  The court stated the case, on remand, would 
turn "largely [on] a question of causation[.]"  Id. at 327. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
25 
 
¶74 At least five subsequent cases endorsed the causal 
nexus requirement articulated in Racine Education Association I.  
See WTMJ, Inc., 204 Wis. 2d at 460; Eau Claire Press Co. v. 
Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 162, 499 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993); 
State ex rel. Eau Claire Leader-Telegram v. Barrett, 148 
Wis. 2d 769, 772–73, 436 N.W.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1989); Racine 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 145 
Wis. 2d 518, 522–23, 427 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988); Vaughan, 
143 Wis. 2d at 871–73.  Despite each case invoking the causal 
nexus test, some reached apparently contradictory results.  For 
example, in State ex rel. Eau Claire Leader-Telegram v. Barrett, 
a newspaper requested sealed settlement documents filed in 
several circuit court cases (the "Edson case").  148 Wis. 2d at 
770.  Eventually, the newspaper filed a mandamus action.  The 
clerk of court and the circuit court judge who presided over the 
Edson case, Judge Roderick Cameron, reached a stipulation with 
the newspaper, under which Judge Cameron agreed to release the 
records if no party to the Edson case objected.  Id. at 771.  
Several parties did object, the newspaper intervened to argue 
for disclosure, and Judge Cameron released an edited version of 
the documents.  Id.  The newspaper moved for an award of 
attorney fees in the mandamus action.  The court of appeals 
concluded the newspaper's intervention in the Edson case caused 
the release of the records——not the mandamus action——so it was 
not entitled to attorney fees.  Id. at 772.   
¶75 In Eau Claire Press Co. v. Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 
the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion.  A 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
26 
 
newspaper requested records from a city related to a settlement 
in a discrimination case.  Id. at 157.  The city attorney denied 
the request, citing a confidentiality agreement the city had 
entered into with the plaintiff.  Id.  The newspaper filed a 
mandamus action, and during its pendency, the plaintiff in the 
discrimination case agreed not to consider the release of the 
settlement records a breach of the confidentiality agreement.  
Id. at 158.  Thereafter, the city released the records.  Id.  
The circuit court denied the newspaper's motion for an award of 
attorney fees because, in its view, the plaintiff's agreement 
not to consider the release a breach was the cause of the 
release.  Id. at 161.  The court of appeals concluded, 
irrespective of the plaintiff's agreement, the mandamus action 
was a substantial factor in causing the release of the records, 
so an award of attorney fees was appropriate.  Id. at 162. 
2.  The Young/Portage Cases 
¶76 In two cases, the court of appeals departed from its 
own precedent requiring a causal nexus.  In State ex rel. Young 
v. Shaw, 165 Wis. 2d 276, the requester was allegedly involved 
in a "hit and run" in February 1989.  Id. at 283.  He was 
charged with leaving the scene of an accident on March 6.  Id.  
On March 9, the requester made a written demand to the district 
attorney's office for the officer's narrative and photographs.  
Id. at 283–84.  On March 22, the assistant district attorney 
responded that, because the State filed criminal charges, his 
demand was governed by discovery statutes applicable to criminal 
cases, rather than Wis. Stat. § 19.35.  Id. at 284.  She 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
27 
 
informed the requester he would have to wait until the initial 
appearance on March 29 to receive the officer's narrative.  Id.  
The requester filed a mandamus action on March 27.  Id. at 285.  
At the March 29 initial appearance, the assistant district 
attorney released the officer's narrative to the requester.  Id. 
at 291.  The photographs were released at a later conference on 
May 9.  Id. at 284.  Apparently, the assistant district attorney 
released the records only because she thought the statutes 
governing criminal discovery compelled release——not because of 
the public records laws.  See id. at 293. 
¶77 The court of appeals concluded the requester prevailed 
in his mandamus action.  It acknowledged the Racine Education 
Association I Line requires a requester to establish "a causal 
nexus" between the action and the release of the record.  Id. at 
292–93 (citing Racine Educ. Ass'n I, 129 Wis. 2d at 328 and 
quoting Cox, 601 F.2d at 61).  In the admitted absence of a 
causal nexus, the court fashioned an exception based on what the 
court considered an unreasonable delay in the release of the 
officer's narrative and the photographs——grounded in a good 
faith but legally unavailing reliance on the criminal discovery 
statutes.  See id. at 293–95.  Under "these circumstances," the 
court reasoned, to "deprive" a requester of his ability to 
recover attorney fees would "frustrate and indeed negate the 
purpose of the open records law rather than encourage compliance 
with it."  Id. at 293.  The court nevertheless concluded the 
requester 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
attorney 
fees 
because 
he 
represented himself pro se——apparently, in the court's view, 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
28 
 
that would also frustrate and indeed negate the law's purpose.  
Id. at 295–96.  
¶78 In the second case to ignore the causal nexus text, a 
newspaper requested a copy of an investigative report from a 
sheriff.  Portage Daily Reg., 308 Wis. 2d 357, ¶1.  The sheriff 
denied the request because the district attorney was considering 
criminal charges.  Id.  The newspaper filed a mandamus action; 
thereafter, the report was made public.  Id., ¶6.  The newspaper 
moved for an award of attorney fees, which the circuit court 
denied. 
 
It 
concluded 
that 
the 
denial 
was 
stated 
in 
"sufficiently specific" terms and satisfied the balancing test.  
Id., ¶1.  The issue on appeal was whether the denial was legal.  
Notably, the court of appeals did not decide whether the 
newspaper was entitled to an award of attorney fees; it simply 
said a decision on the merits was warranted, i.e., the case was 
not moot, because the decision would impact whether attorney 
fees could be awarded.  Id., ¶8 & n.4.  Portage Daily Register 
did not address any precedent on what it means for a party to 
prevail.   
D.  The Meaning of Prevailing Party 
¶79 The court of appeals' varying interpretations of the 
statute governing the recovery of attorney fees in public 
records cases are "objectively wrong."  Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
¶21.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) provides, in relevant part:  
"[T]he court shall award reasonable attorney fees . . . to the 
requester if the requester prevails in whole or in substantial 
part in any action filed under sub. (1) relating to access to a 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
29 
 
record or part of a record under s. 19.35 (1)(a)."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
never 
considered 
whether 
"prevails . . . in any action" bears an accepted legal meaning.  
It does. 
¶80 As we explained in Kalal, "[s]tatutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶8, 20, 
260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  "Legal terms of art" qualify 
as technical words or phrases, so we give them "their accepted 
legal meaning."  Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶23 (quoting Estate 
of Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶22).   
¶81 "When the legislature adopts a phrase from the common 
law that has a specific legal meaning and does not otherwise 
define it, we presume that the legislature adopts the phrase's 
specific legal meaning."  State v. Matthews, 2021 WI 42, ¶9, 397 
Wis. 2d 1, 959 N.W.2d 640 (citing Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, 
¶39 and Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 
N.W.2d 296); see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615–16 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which 
are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas 
that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning[.]" 
 
(quoting 
Morissette 
v. 
United 
States, 
342 
U.S. 246, 263 (1992))); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 47:30 n.1 (7th ed. updated Nov. 2020) ("Courts presume that a 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
30 
 
legislature that employs a term of art knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it is taken."  (citations omitted)); Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 320 (2012) ("A statute that uses a common-law term, 
without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning."). 
¶82 Consultation 
of 
legal 
dictionaries 
is 
not 
only 
appropriate, 
but, 
to 
some 
extent, 
necessary 
to 
properly 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  See, e.g., State v. 
Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶¶29–31, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 547 
(consulting Black's Law Dictionary to determine the meaning of 
"discovery").  Black's Law Dictionary defines "prevail" as:  
"(17c) 1.  To obtain the relief sought in an action; to win a 
lawsuit ."  
Prevail, Black's Law Dictionary.  "Relief" is defined as:  "3.  
The redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature (such as an 
injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a 
court. — Also termed remedy."  Relief, Black's Law Dictionary.  
Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines "prevailing party" as:  
"(17c) A party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless 
of the amount of damages awarded .  — Also 
termed 
successful 
party." 
Prevailing 
party, 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary; see also Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile 
Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 336 
F.3d 200, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2003) ("UNITE's primary contention on 
appeal is that a party that 'substantially prevails' (or a 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
31 
 
'substantially prevailing party') under FOIA is necessarily 
different 
from 
a 
'prevailing 
party' . . . . 
 
Several 
considerations 
leave 
us 
unconvinced."). 
 
As 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary notes, the definitions of "prevail" and "prevailing 
party" trace to the seventeenth century——long before the 1982 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  
¶83 The meaning of "prevailing party" had endured in the 
law, unaltered.  Black's Law Dictionary notes that "prevailing 
party" is synonymous with "successful party."  Prevailing party, 
Black's Law Dictionary.  Another legal dictionary, published in 
1920, provides a single definition of "successful":  "The word 
'successful' . . . in relation to the allowance of attorney fees 
to the plaintiff . . . means a termination of the action in his 
favor by a decree[.]"  Successful, Legal Definitions (1920) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
¶84 A legal dictionary from 1879 illustrates the meaning 
of "prevail" by summarizing the holdings of five cases.  
Prevail, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or 
English Jurisprudence (1879). 
• In Bangor & Piscataquis R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, a 
landowner sued a railroad company for damages stemming 
from a taking. 60 Me. 285, 285 (1872).  County 
commissioners awarded the landowner $650.  Id. at 286.  
The railroad company appealed.  Id.  On appeal, a jury 
reduced the award to $435.  Id.  A Maine statute provided 
that:  "When an appeal is taken, the losing party is to 
pay the cost thereon."  Id.  The Maine Supreme Court had 
to decide which party was to pay the costs of the appeal, 
framing the issue as:  "[W]hich was the prevailing 
party?"  Id.  Logically, because the losing party did not 
prevail, 
the 
court 
held 
the 
landowner 
prevailed, 
concluding he "successfully maintained his claim for 
damages[.]"  Id. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
32 
 
• In Hawkins v. Nowland, the Missouri Supreme Court 
concluded that the plaintiff was a "prevailing party," 
although the favorable judgment he recovered was not 
"what he claimed[.]"  53 Mo. 328, 330 (1873). 
• In Henry v. Miller, the Maine Supreme Court concluded a 
creditor was a "prevailing party" even though he obtained 
a judgment for less than he sought.  61 Me. 105, 105 
(1872). 
• In Rogers v. City of St. Charles, the Missouri Supreme 
Court concluded a city that obtained a verdict of 
condemnation was a "prevailing party," entitled to costs.  
54 Mo. 229, 233–34 (1873) (per curiam). 
• In Weston v. Wright, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded 
an orator had "prevailed" because he had established he 
was entitled to a decree, although the decree was less 
favorable than the relief he sought.  45 Vt. 531, 535–37 
(1873). 
None of these cases declared a party "prevailed" without 
obtaining favorable relief from a court.   
¶85 Consistent with these settled definitions, a statute 
renumbered by this court in 1975 stated:  "Judgment.  In such 
actions, when the plaintiff prevails, he shall, in addition to 
judgment for damages and costs, also have judgment that the 
nuisance be abated unless the court shall otherwise order."  
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 762 (1975) (codified as amended 
at Wis. Stat. § 823.03) (emphasis added).  This statute 
presupposes that a prevailing party obtained a favorable 
judgment in court.   
¶86 As 
evidenced 
by 
its 
stable 
legal 
history, 
"'[p]revailing party' is not some newfangled legal term invented 
for 
use 
in 
late-20th-century 
fee-shifting 
statutes."  
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.  In Buckhannon, Justice Antonin 
Scalia wrote in concurrence he was aware of "no cases, state or 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
33 
 
federal" prior to 1976 that endorsed the catalyst theory.  Id. 
at 611.  After Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) was enacted in 1982, the 
court of appeals adopted the catalyst theory, which conflicts 
with the longstanding meaning of what it means to prevail in a 
court case.  A "fair reading" of a statute requires adherence to 
the statute's text as it was understood at the time of the 
statute's enactment.  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 33.    
¶87 To "prevail[] in whole or in substantial part in any 
action filed under sub. (1)," a requester must obtain through a 
court order at least some of the relief it sought.  See Meinecke 
v. Thyes, 2021 WI App 58, ¶1, 399 Wis. 2d 1, 963 N.W.2d 816 
("[The plaintiff] contends she prevailed in substantial part in 
her mandamus action when the circuit court ordered the release 
of some but not all of the records that she requested from 
public officials.  We agree."). 
¶88 The accepted legal meaning of "prevails . . . in any 
action" also matches its common, ordinary meaning.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citing Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶8, 20).  
In common parlance, prevailing in a mandamus action is not 
equivalent to obtaining access to a public record by other 
means.  Justice Scalia illustrated the difference in his 
Buckhannon concurrence:  
If a nuisance suit is mooted because the defendant 
asphalt plant has gone bankrupt and ceased operations, 
one 
would 
not 
normally 
call 
the 
plaintiff 
the 
prevailing party.  And it would make no difference, as 
far as the propriety of that characterization is 
concerned, if the plant did not go bankrupt but moved 
to a new location to avoid the expense of litigation.  
In one sense the plaintiff would have "prevailed"; but 
he would not be the prevailing party in the lawsuit. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
34 
 
532 U.S. at 615.  In designating a plaintiff who obtained access 
to records by means other than a court judgment a "prevailing 
party," the court of appeals either excised "in any action filed 
under sub. (1)" from the statutory text or rewrote the phrase to 
say "after any action filed under sub. (1)."  We have no power 
to rewrite the words chosen by the legislature.  E.g., State v. 
Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.29 
¶89 The court of appeals' interpretations of what it means 
to prevail in a mandamus action have also been undermined by 
"changes or developments in the law."  See Roberson, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, ¶50 (quoting Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33).  
Specifically, they rest on the now-defunct "catalyst theory," 
which the United States Supreme Court rejected more than 20 
years ago.   Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600 (majority opinion).   
¶90 In Buckhannon, the plaintiff brought claims under the 
Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) against West Virginia (and two of its 
agencies), arguing that a state statute violated these federal 
                                                 
29 Even following the Racine Education Association I Line 
defeats Friends' claim for attorney fees.  "[A]n allegedly 
prevailing complainant must assert something more than post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc[.]"  Racine Educ. Ass'n I, 129 Wis. 2d at 326–
27 (quoting Cox v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 601 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (per curiam)).  Timing is not sufficient to demonstrate 
causation. 
 
If 
it 
were, 
causation 
would 
effectively 
be 
eliminated as an element altogether because any time an action 
were filed and a custodian thereafter released the requested 
record, as in this case, the requester would be able to recover 
attorney fees. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
35 
 
laws.  Id. at 601.  Before the district court rendered a 
decision, the West Virginia Legislature eliminated the statutory 
requirement.  Id.  The defendants then moved to dismiss the case 
as moot.  Id.  The district court granted the motion and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the plaintiff's claim that it 
was entitled to attorney fees.30  Id. at 601–02. 
¶91 The United States Supreme Court interpreted the 
meaning of "prevailing party" in fee-shifting schemes permitted 
in the FHAA31 and the ADA.32  Id. at 601.  The Court stated: 
Now that the issue is squarely presented, it behooves 
us to reconcile the plain language of the statutes 
with our prior holdings.  We have only awarded 
attorney's fees where the plaintiff has received a 
judgment on the merits, or obtained a court-ordered 
                                                 
30 The majority/lead opinion is confusing.  On the one hand, 
it claims to endorse the test articulated in Buckhannon.  On the 
other, it refuses to acknowledge this case is moot.  The entire 
point of Buckhannon was to determine under what circumstances, 
if any, a party could be deemed to have prevailed even though 
the case became moot, thereby barring favorable relief. 
The majority/lead opinion's misunderstanding of Buckhannon 
has serious implications.  While the majority/lead opinion 
states the test correctly (to prevail, a party must receive 
favorable relief from a court), it never applies the test.  
Instead, it turns to the merits without identifying any 
favorable relief to which Friends might be entitled at this 
point.  The prevailing party test is not a merits determination; 
if it were, Buckhannon would have been about the merits of the 
plaintiff's FHAA and ADA claims, which it never addressed. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 3601(c)(2) (2001) ("[T]he court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney's fee and cost."). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 12105 (2001) ("[T]he court . . ., in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney's fee[.]"). 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
36 
 
consent 
decree . . . . 
 
Never 
have 
we 
awarded 
attorney's fees for nonjudicial alterations of actual 
circumstances. 
Id. at 605–06 (second emphasis added) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  The Court noted that "prevailing party" was 
a "rather clear" phrase, which did not encompass the catalyst 
theory.  Id. at 607.  It explicitly relied on Black's Law 
Dictionary.  Id. at 603 (quoting Prevailing party, Black's Law 
Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). 
¶92 Buckhannon destroyed the foundation of the court of 
appeals precedent.  The Racine Education Association I Line 
rests on federal decisions interpreting FOIA and employing the 
catalyst theory, specifically, Cox, 601 F.2d 1.  Buckhannon 
abrogated Cox and similar federal cases.  The Ninth Circuit 
recognized this in Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Locke, 
noting that Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory 
logically extends to FOIA.33  572 F.3d 610, 614–16 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 
Similarly, 
in 
Oil, 
Chemical 
& 
Atomic 
Workers 
International Union, AFL-CIO v. Department of Energy, the D.C. 
Circuit, quoting Buckhannon, held "that in order for plaintiffs 
in FOIA actions to become eligible for an award of attorney's 
fees, they must have 'been awarded some relief by [a] court,' 
either in a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered consent 
decree."  288 F.3d 452, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002), superseded by 
                                                 
33 The Ninth Circuit noted a 2007 amendment to FOIA 
"modified FOIA's provision for the recovery of attorney fees to 
ensure that FOIA complainants who relied on the catalyst theory 
to obtain an award of attorney fees would not be subject to the 
Buckhannon proscription."  Or. Nat. Desert Ass'n v. Locke, 572 
F.3d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 2009). 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
37 
 
statute as stated by Summers v. Dep't of Just., 569 F.3d 500 
(D.C. 2009) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603).   
¶93 Even if the United States Supreme Court had not 
disavowed the catalyst theory, our own court of appeals cases 
are nonetheless "unsound in principle."  See Roberson, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, ¶50 (quoting Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33).  
They failed to follow our well-established rule of statutory 
interpretation 
that 
legal 
terminology 
must 
be 
given 
its 
"accepted legal meaning."  Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶23 
(quoting Estate of Matteson, 309 Wis. 2d 311, ¶22).  Choosing 
alternative 
meanings, 
particularly 
to 
advance 
preferred 
policies, destabilizes the law.  See Scalia & Garner, Reading 
Law, at 320.  Additionally, judicial tampering with accepted 
legal meaning interferes with the legislature's ability to make 
law.  See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 2.03(2)(a)(2019–20) 
(advising drafters at the Legislative Reference Bureau to 
consider whether a word or phrase is "self-defining" by 
consulting "standard or legal dictionaries"). 
¶94 Problematically, 
the 
Young/Portage 
Cases 
are 
principally grounded in public policy rather than the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  In Young, the court reasoned to 
"deprive" a requester of his ability to recover attorney fees 
would "frustrate and indeed negate the purpose of the open 
records law rather than encourage compliance with it."  165 
Wis. 2d at 293.  This sort of consequentialist reasoning is 
antithetical to our textualist approach, articulated in Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Dep't Nat. Res., 2021 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
38 
 
WI 71, ¶86, 398 Wis. 2d 346, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining Kalal is Wisconsin's "most 
cited 
case 
of 
modern 
times" 
(quoting 
Daniel 
R. 
Suhr, 
Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 969–70 
(2017))).  Consequentialists "urge that statutes should be 
construed to produce sensible, desirable results, since that is 
surely what the legislature must have intended.  But it is 
precisely because people differ over what is sensible and what 
is desirable that we elect those who will write our laws——and 
expect courts to observe what has been written."  Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 22.   
¶95 Kalal 
rejected 
the 
very 
purposivism 
and 
consequentialism employed by the court of appeals in this case 
as well as its predecessors.  "It is the enacted law, not the 
[legislature's] unenacted intent, that is binding on the 
public."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  Faithfulness to the text 
of a law rather than advancing an imagined purpose underlying 
its enactment or avoiding a consequence deemed unsavory (in the 
subjective opinion of the judge) is a condition precedent to the 
rule of law: 
The principles of statutory interpretation that we 
have restated here are rooted in and fundamental to 
the rule of law.  Ours is "a government of laws not 
men," and "it is simply incompatible with democratic 
government, or indeed, even with fair government, to 
have the meaning of a law determined by what the 
lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated."  "It is the law that governs, not the 
intent of the lawgiver . . . .  Men may intend what 
they will; but it is only the laws that they enact 
which bind us." 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
39 
 
Id., ¶52 (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 
(1997)); see also J. Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & 
Fire Comm'r, 2015 WI 56, ¶117, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring) (explaining "it seems that the 
Newspaper was sandbagged" but nonetheless concluding "the 
Newspaper has not sufficiently tethered its argument to the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a)"). 
¶96 When courts lose sight of this first principle, when 
they "fail to follow the . . . letter of the positive law," too 
easily 
are 
"the 
most 
valuable 
privileges 
of 
the 
people . . . rendered 
illusory" 
"under 
the 
pretense 
of 
explaining and extending them[.]"  Francis Stoughton Sullivan, 
Lectures on the Constitution and Laws of England 64 (1805).  
Although judges may profess well-intentioned justifications for 
"improving" the law, "interpretive approaches can be used for 
all kinds of purposes, not just beneficent ones."  Bryan A. 
Garner, Old-Fashioned Textualism Is All About Interpretation, 
Not Legislating from the Bench, ABA J., Apr. 2019.34  Ignoring 
the law's plain meaning because the result in a particular case 
is, in a judge's subjective judgment, "appealing," causes 
"considerable mischief."  Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2014 WI 
82, ¶148, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (Roggensack, J., 
dissenting).  "One can always do 'more' in pursuit of a goal, 
but statutes have limits."  N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins., 
978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992).  Those limits are prescribed 
by 
the 
people's 
representatives 
in 
the 
legislature 
and 
                                                 
 
34 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/textualism-
means-what-it-says. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
40 
 
discarding them disrupts the constitutional order by allowing 
judges to act as policy-makers.  "While textualism cannot 
prevent 
the 
incursion 
of 
policy 
preferences 
into 
legal 
analysis . . . without 
textualism, 
such 
encroachment 
is 
certain."  Woldt, 398 Wis. 2d 482, ¶92.  The people of Wisconsin 
elect judges to interpret the law, not make it. 
¶97 Even a cursory reading of the court of appeals 
precedent on awarding attorney fees in public records cases 
reveals it is "incoherent" and "unworkable in practice," 
presenting yet another reason to overturn it.  See Roberson, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, ¶50 (quoting Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33).  In 
this case, the court of appeals struggled to "reconcile what, at 
least superficially, appears to be inconsistent language from 
prior decisions addressing how and whether a public records 
plaintiff can recover attorney fees following voluntary release 
during litigation."35  Applying the statutory text would ensure 
consistent and predictable application of the law, eliminating 
the subjectivity inherent in determining who "prevailed" in a 
suit. 
¶98 When the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
catalyst theory in Buckhannon, it criticized the theory's 
subjectivity.  532 U.S. at 609-10.  The dissent proposed four 
conditions precedent for a plaintiff to be deemed to have 
prevailed under the catalyst theory: 
• "A plaintiff first had to show that the defendant 
provided some of the benefit sought by the lawsuit."  Id. 
                                                 
35 Friends of Frame Park, 394 Wis. 2d 387, ¶29. 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
41 
 
at 
627 
(Ginsburg, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(citations 
and 
quotations omitted). 
• "[A] plaintiff had to demonstrate as well that the suit 
stated a genuine claim, i.e., one that was at least 
colorable, not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."  
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
• "Plaintiff . . . had to establish that her suit was a 
substantial or significant cause of defendant's action 
providing relief."  Id. at 628 (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
• "[Sometimes] plaintiff had to satisfy the trial court 
that the suit achieved results by threat of victory, not 
by dint of nuisance and threat of expenses."  Id. 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
¶99 The majority opinion dismissed this version of the 
catalyst 
theory 
as 
"clearly 
not 
a 
formula 
for 
ready 
administrability" and likely to "spawn[] a second litigation of 
significant dimension[.]"  Id. at 609-10 (majority opinion) 
(quoting Tex. State Tchrs. Ass'n v. Garland Indep't Sch. Dist., 
489 
U.S. 
782, 
791 
(1989)). 
 
Determining 
a 
plaintiff's 
entitlement to attorney fees would require litigating the merits 
of a moot public records case, but the United States Supreme 
Court has cautioned "[a] request for attorney's fees should not 
result in a second major litigation[.]"  Id. (quoting Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).  Disregarding Buckhannon, 
the majority/lead opinion's approach will produce unnecessary 
litigation. 
¶100 The legislature forcefully declared the purpose of the 
public records laws: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
42 
 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  A declaration of policy is a permissible 
indicator of a statute's plain meaning——but only to a degree.  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 217–18.  In this case, Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) employs legal terminology with a meaning 
ensconced in the law long ago and used in substantially similar 
form in many other statutes.36  Legal terms of art employed 
throughout a code of law must be interpreted consistently to 
preserve stability and predictability in the law.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶101 This court properly reverses the metamorphosis in 
public records law created by the court of appeals' atextual 
interpretation of what it means to prevail in a court action.  
Friends did not obtain any favorable relief in court.  This case 
was moot almost as soon as it began.  We should say so, and 
overturn court of appeals precedent crafted to advance the 
policy preferences of judges at the expense of the law's text.  
The majority/lead opinion reached the right outcome for the 
wrong reasons, declining to recognize the case is moot and 
                                                 
36 See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.59(8)(d); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.49(2)(b); Wis. Stat. § 134.49(6)(b). 
No.  2019ap96.rgb 
 
43 
 
instead allowing litigation over the merits.  I respectfully 
concur with the mandate. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this concurrence. 
 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶103 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  "Sunshine is a 
great disinfectant."  Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, 
¶103, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).  That's the theory behind Wisconsin's public 
records laws.  Shine light on the government's work product and 
citizens will engage and hold to account their representatives, 
achieving a purer democracy.  A majority of this court 
frustrates that goal, seeding clouds as it eviscerates the 
mandatory fee shifting provisions integral to keeping the sun 
shining in our great state.  By reinterpreting the law to reward 
government actors for strategically freezing out the public's 
access to records, today's decision will chill the public's 
right to an open government.  And the majority/lead opinion does 
not stop there.  It also condones the City's patently 
inapplicable "competitive or bargaining" excuse to deny Friends 
timely access to a proposed contract.  The result is that 
Friends are denied the attorney fees to which it is entitled for 
bringing a claim to enforce its rights when Friends had no other 
recourse.  Because the majority/lead opinion reimagines the fee 
shifting 
standard 
too 
narrowly, 
while 
construing 
the 
"competitive and bargaining reasons" exception too broadly, all 
at the expense of our public records laws, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I.  ANALYSIS 
¶104 "In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is 
declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
2 
 
are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the 
affairs of government[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Providing 
citizens meaningful and timely access to government documents is 
"an essential function of a representative government and an 
integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees 
whose responsibility it is to provide such information."  Id.  
This transparency mandate promotes public involvement, which 
sits at the core of Wisconsin's representative democracy.  See 
Nichols v. Bennet, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996) 
("The open records law serves one of the basic tenets of our 
democratic system by providing an opportunity for public 
oversight of the workings of government.").  Our state and local 
governments have traditionally committed themselves to this 
democracy-promoting transparency, so much so that former Chief 
Justice Abrahamson declared, "[i]f Wisconsin were not known as 
the Dairy State it could be known, and rightfully so, as the 
Sunshine State."  Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 
WI 86, ¶1, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177. 
¶105 A majority of this court tarnishes Wisconsin's proud 
history of transparent government by transforming a routine 
records request into a catalyst to decimate Wisconsin's fee 
shifting structure. This analysis begins by addressing the 
majority's grievous perversion of the public records laws' 
critical fee shifting provisions.  Then, the analysis turns to 
the case at hand, first explaining how unjustified delays in 
releasing records burden the public.  Lastly, this analysis 
dismantles the City's flawed excuses for concealing the proposed 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
3 
 
contract by highlighting that:  (1) the record implicated no 
"competitive or bargaining" concern; and (2) the Common Council 
did not enter into a closed session as is required to invoke the 
"competitive or bargaining" excuse in the first place. 
A.  Attorney Fees 
¶106 Attorney fees are integral to open records litigation 
as they enable members of the public to compel the government to 
work transparently.  This section begins with an overview of fee 
shifting provisions and their important role in our public 
records laws.  Next is an explanation of how the long-standing 
"causation test" for awarding attorney fees is consistent with 
the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2)(a) and deters 
gamesmanship from all parties in a public records action.  Last 
is a warning about how the deleterious new standard for attorney 
fees may disincentivize government actors from making timely 
disclosures, eviscerating the very purpose of the public records 
laws. 
1.  Fee shifting is integral to transparency. 
¶107 In an action to enforce Wisconsin's public records 
laws, a requester is entitled to his or her attorney fees when 
"the requester prevails in whole or in substantial part."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.37(2)(a).  This fee shifting provision serves two 
important purposes:  (1) it enables people, particularly those 
with limited means, to bring enforcement actions; and (2) it 
incentivizes the government's voluntary compliance by penalizing 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
4 
 
non-compliance.1  Fee shifting is often implemented when laws 
rely on the public to bring enforcement challenges.2  In the 
arena of public records, the government holds the records and no 
other entity reviews the government's decision to withhold or 
delay the release of a record.  As a result, the only 
enforcement 
mechanism 
is 
a 
citizen's 
mandamus 
action.3  
§ 19.37(1)(a).  Without a robust fee shifting mechanism in 
public records laws, record requesters face a no-win scenario 
when a request is denied.  They can either acquiesce to the 
                                                 
1 See Thomas D. Rowe Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee 
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651, 652, 54, 62, 
73 (1982) (explaining that "the different concerns underlying 
fee shifting rationales have 
three major strains——equity, 
litigant incentives, and externalities."  At a basic level "the 
prevailing party, having been adjudged to be in the right, 
should not suffer financially for having to prove the justice of 
his position."  Furthermore, in explaining the "private attorney 
general" theory, "potential plaintiffs may well refrain from 
bringing socially beneficial suits because the gains would not 
sufficiently further their private interests."  And finally, "it 
can be important to effective deterrence to show by example that 
violators will bear the victims' enforcement costs."). 
2 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (authorizing suit by any 
person harmed by unfair trade practices to recover double 
damages 
and 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.18(2)(a)(3) 
(authorizing 
employees 
of 
health 
care 
institutions to commence an action to enforce prohibitions on 
unfair labor practices and providing for optional fee shifting 
to successful plaintiffs); Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 
352, 358, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983) (explaining that a tenant suing 
under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) "acts as a 'private attorney 
general' to enforce the tenants' rights," and thus, "not only 
enforces his or her individual rights, but the aggregate effect 
of individual suits enforces the public's rights"). 
3 A citizen may also request that the district attorney or 
attorney general bring a mandamus action on his or her behalf, a 
decision entirely up to the district attorney's or attorney 
general's discretion.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(b). 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
5 
 
government's potentially unlawful withholding of the record, or 
they can bring a mandamus action to enforce their right to the 
record at the risk of substantial legal fees. 
¶108 Legal fees can create significant hurdles for two 
common public record requesters:  concerned citizens (like 
Friends) and local news media (appearing as amici in this case).  
Often, these two groups simply cannot afford the required legal 
costs of a mandamus action.4  And without mandamus actions, 
government violations of public records laws would go largely 
unchecked, 
undermining 
these 
laws' 
legislatively 
declared 
purpose to promote democracy through transparency.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31; State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 135 
Wis. 2d 77, 81, 398 N.W.2d 154 (1987) ("[I]f the media is denied 
access to the affairs of government, the public for all 
practical purposes is denied access as well.  A democratic 
government cannot long survive that burden.").  Furthermore, 
without fee shifting, the government has little incentive to 
timely comply with records requests——it could simply delay until 
the requester sinks considerable funds into litigating a 
mandamus action.  Absent robust fee shifting, the promise of our 
public records laws is rendered a dead letter for all but the 
select few with means, leading to fewer record requests, more 
delays in the release of information, and, ultimately, a less 
informed electorate. 
                                                 
4 The once powerful and lucrative news media industry has 
weakened 
considerably 
in 
modern 
times, 
with 
local 
news 
organizations often working on a shoe-string budget.  See PEN 
America, Losing the News:  The Decimation of Local Journalism 
and the Search for Solutions 24-31 (2019). 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
6 
 
2.  The "causation" test is efficient and textually supported. 
¶109 Having 
established 
the 
critical 
importance 
and 
function of fee shifting, next is a discussion about when courts 
should implement this remedy.  The court of appeals has long 
relied upon the causation test to determine whether the 
government should pay for a requestor's attorney fees.  Under 
the causation test, a reviewing court looks for a "causal nexus" 
between the filing of a mandamus action and the document's 
release.  Eau Claire Press Co. v. Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 160, 
499 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The test of cause in Wisconsin 
is whether the actor's action was a substantial factor in 
contributing to the result."). 
¶110 The causation test appropriately captures what it 
means to "prevail . . . in substantial part" in a public records 
case and is a workable, practical test.  A majority of this 
court, however, rejects the causation test.  In its place, they 
would now condition attorney fees on a "judicially sanctioned 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
legal 
relationship." 
 
Both 
the 
majority/lead and concurring opinions insist that "prevailing 
party" is a "legal term of art" according to Buckhannon Board 
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and 
Human Services, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  See majority/lead op., 
¶20; concurring op., ¶40.  There is one glaring error with 
applying Buckhannon here.  The phrase "prevailing party" is 
conspicuously absent from Wisconsin's public records law.  
Instead, § 19.37(2)(a) states that costs and fees must be 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
7 
 
awarded "if the requester prevails in whole or in substantial 
part" in an action relating to a record's request. 
¶111 An interpretation that equates the two phrases is 
flawed because a "term of art" is "a word or phrase having a 
specific, precise meaning in a given specialty, apart from its 
general meaning in ordinary contexts."  See Term of Art Black's 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  The fact that a phrase is a 
term of art does not mean each word within that phrase, when 
used separately and independently, carries the same special 
meaning.  Specifically, a specialized meaning for "prevailing 
party" does not impose that meaning on the independent use of 
either "party" or "prevail."    
¶112 In addition, the words the legislature chose are 
meaningfully distinct.  The legislature used the phrase "the 
requester prevails" in § 19.37(2)(a) instead of "prevailing 
party."  (Emphasis added.)  The use of "requester" rather than 
"party" is instructive as "party" connotes litigation while 
"requester" places the phrase in the broader context of the 
records request.  Thus, the test derived from the term of art 
"prevailing party," which requires a judicially sanctioned 
change in a litigant's position, does not fit the specific 
language in Wisconsin's statutes.  
¶113 Because the phrase "the requester prevails" lacks a 
specialized or technical meaning, the common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning of those words controls.  See, e.g., Stroede v. 
Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶11, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305.  
"Prevail" commonly means "to succeed."  Prevail, Oxford English 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
8 
 
Dictionary.  Even under a legal-specific definition, "prevail" 
means "to obtain the relief sought in an action."   Prevail, 
Black's Law Dictionary 1438 (11th ed. 2019).  Under the legal 
definition, a requester "prevails" if the requester files a 
mandamus action seeking a record's release and then receives 
that record because it obtained the relief sought.5  The 
causation test cabins this reading slightly by requiring that 
the filing of the action be a cause of the record's release.  
This limitation keeps record requesters from filing frivolous 
mandamus actions before obtaining records that were never in 
doubt of being released simply to extract fees. 
¶114 Frivolous actions are one way to obstruct public 
records cases.  Delayed disclosures represent a second way to 
game the system.  Faust illustrates the value of addressing 
delayed disclosures with fee shifting as a remedy.  State ex 
rel. Vaughan v. Faust, 143 Wis. 2d 868, 422 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 
                                                 
5 The majority/lead opinion cites other Wisconsin Statutes 
where a final adjudication by the court is inherently necessary 
to establish a party has prevailed.  But in those statutes, this 
"judicially sanctioned change in the parties' positions" concept 
comes not from the use or plain meaning of "prevail" but instead 
from the context in which those statutes appear.  See Wis. Stat. 
ch. 102, § 6 (1849) ("[T]he plaintiff in error on the trial anew 
shall be the successful and prevailing party."); Wis. Stat. ch. 
109, § 6 (1849) ("If the plaintiff in such action prevail 
therein, he shall have judgment for double the amount of damages 
found by the jury.").  Chapter 102 § 6 discusses the designation 
of parties on appeal.  For there to be an appeal there must have 
been a judicially sanctioned resolution at trial.  Chapter 109 
§ 6 refers to damages awarded by a jury, which again require a 
judicially sanctioned resolution at trial.  The context of those 
specific statutes narrow the meaning of "prevail" in a manner 
not required by its plain meaning and which does not carry over 
to the distinct context of the public records laws. 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
9 
 
1988).  In Faust, an inmate requested records on January 26 and, 
having received no response, re-requested the records on 
February 19.  Id. at 869.  After again receiving no response, 
the inmate filed a mandamus action on March 13, and shortly 
thereafter the custodian of the records voluntarily supplied the 
inmate with the requested records along with an apology for the 
delay.  Id.  The court held that the mandamus action "was the 
precipitating cause" of the release of the records and awarded 
attorney fees and costs to the inmate.  Id. at 872.  The Faust 
court correctly recognized that "[i]f the government can force a 
party into litigation and then deprive that party of the right 
to recover expenses by later disclosure, it would nullify the 
statute's purpose."  Id.  Although nothing in Faust indicated 
that the record custodian delayed the release of records 
purposefully, a rule that allows such delay for any reason 
without fee shifting unnecessarily harms the record requester 
and encourages the government to deprioritize or flout this 
"integral part of [its] routine duties."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶115 In addition to encouraging timely compliance with 
public records laws, the causation test also promotes judicial 
efficiency.  In circumstances where the government releases a 
record before the end of trial, the test eliminates the need to 
adjudicate the merits of a now-moot record request.  It is well 
established that plaintiffs in public records actions may seek 
attorney fees and costs despite the underlying action being moot 
because of the voluntary release of records.  See Racine Educ. 
Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Wis. 2d 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
10 
 
319, 322, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1986); Cornucopia Inst. v. 
U.S. Dept. of Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2009).  The 
causation test sensibly premises an award of fees and costs on a 
finding that filing the mandamus action was reasonably necessary 
to receive the record and that there was a causal connection 
between the action and the record's release.  This test allows a 
court to make a grounded determination on the necessary attorney 
fees question without fully litigating the underlying merits.  
The factual inquiry required under a causation test is thus 
necessarily limited and has been reliably applied by the lower 
courts for decades.  Thus, we should continue to employ this 
textually faithful and practical test. 
3.  The "judicially sanctioned change" test is detrimental. 
¶116 The new test, which looks for a "judicially sanctioned 
change" in the parties legal relationship, will result in one of 
two detrimental changes in how circuit courts handle public 
records disputes.  Which detrimental change actually occurs will 
depend on how courts apply the test in cases where the records 
are voluntarily released before the underlying mandamus action 
reaches 
a 
final 
order. 
 
The 
new 
test 
would 
either:  (1) completely forego the option of awarding attorney 
fees to a record requester when an authority voluntarily 
releases a record, no matter the length of delay or the stage of 
the action at the time of release; or (2) require that circuit 
courts make a determination on the underlying merits of every 
public records case that comes before them.  The former 
approach, which is sanctioned by the concurrence, nullifies our 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
11 
 
public records laws and allows governmental authorities to delay 
the release of records; the latter is judicially inefficient.  
The effects of a "judicially sanctioned change" test have 
already played out in the federal context and we should learn 
from those mistakes, not repeat them.  Put simply, the new test 
casts storm clouds over our once clear public records laws. 
¶117 The 
first 
possible 
effect 
from 
the 
"judicially 
sanctioned change" test would occur if the test is applied to 
remove a party's ability to seek attorney fees when the 
underlying case becomes moot through voluntary disclosure of 
documents.  Under this application, the new regime creates a 
perverse incentive for the government to strategically delay the 
release of records.  If public records cases can be mooted out 
by the government's voluntary release of a record, then the 
government could escape any sanction for unlawfully delaying the 
record's release so long as the government releases the record 
at any point before the court orders the release.  Although the 
record ultimately gets released, the requester is left paying 
potentially hefty attorney fees and costs for a record he or she 
was already entitled to receive.  See Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 341 
Wis. 2d 607, ¶40 ("Increasing the costs of public records for a 
requester may inhibit access to public records and, in some 
instances, 
render 
the 
records 
inaccessible."). 
 
As 
the 
government can easily avoid paying a requester's attorney fees, 
members of the public will be disinclined to bring mandamus 
actions.  Fewer mandamus actions will chill the public's 
informed 
involvement 
in 
government 
and 
lead 
to 
a 
less 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
12 
 
participative democracy.  Rather than aspiring to be the 
"sunshine 
state" 
of 
government 
transparency, 
we 
will 
be 
relegated to the long, dark winter of obfuscation. 
¶118 Alternatively, the second possible effect would occur 
if the new test is applied to allow an award of attorney fees 
even when the government has already voluntarily disclosed the 
requested records.  This approach is consistent with precedent.6  
In this situation, the new test creates judicial inefficiency 
because a circuit court would be required to fully adjudicate 
the underlying public records claim in any action alleging undue 
delay in a record's release.  Specifically, under the new test a 
circuit court must determine if it officially sanctioned a 
change in the parties' legal relationship before shifting 
attorney fees.  This will unnecessarily burden lower courts with 
intensive factual disputes. 
¶119 In detrimentally changing Wisconsin's public records 
law, a majority of this court ignores the teachings of the past.  
Although the court of appeals found the federal courts' 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Act 
(FOIA) 
persuasive when trying to give meaning to the phrase "prevail in 
whole or in substantial part,"7 it is important to recognize that 
                                                 
6 See Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified 
Sch. Dist., 129 Wis. 2d 319, 322, 385 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 
1986); Cornucopia Inst. V. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 
676-77 (7th Cir. 2009). 
7 See Racine Educ. Ass'n, 129 Wis. 2d 319. 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
13 
 
the state and federal statutes are far from identical.8  This 
court 
must 
interpret 
the 
language 
of 
our 
state 
statute 
independently, and thus we are given the opportunity to avoid 
the mistakes made by the federal courts in interpreting what it 
means to "prevail."   
¶120 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
interpreted 
"prevailing party," in a non-public records context, to mean the 
party that was awarded some relief by the court.  Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 603.  That interpretation was read to alter FOIA's 
similar "prevailing party" fee shifting provision.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (2018).  In response to this judicial change, and to 
protect the plain meaning of FOIA's fee shifting rule and 
underlying purpose, Congress found it necessary to amend FOIA to 
make it as clear as possible that the catalyst theory (the 
federal counterpart to Wisconsin's causation test) still applied 
to FOIA's prevailing party test.  See First Amend. Coal. V. U.S. 
Dept. of Just., 878 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2017). 
¶121 History repeats itself.  This court commits the same 
error as the federal courts, but does so egregiously within the 
context of Wisconsin's public records laws and with full 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin's public records law is not modeled on FOIA and 
no Wisconsin court has held that our interpretation of the 
public records law is in lock-step with FOIA.  Among other 
significant differences, Wisconsin's law provides for mandatory 
fee shifting while FOIA's fee shifting is optional, Wisconsin's 
fee shifting provision references "the requestor" while FOIA 
references "the complainant," and Wisconsin's law includes the 
strong declaration of policy that is entirely absent from FOIA.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 & 19.37 as compared to 5 U.S.C. § 552.  
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
14 
 
knowledge of the fallout.9  We should avoid repeating this error 
and rely on the plain text.  The plain text contemplates the 
long-standing causation test that better realizes our public 
records laws' textually expressed purpose and promotes judicial 
efficiency. 
B.  Importance of Timely Access to Documents 
¶122 Deviation from absolute governmental transparency is 
permitted "when not detrimental to the public interest."  State 
ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 137 N.W.2d 470 
(1965); see Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) (incorporating common law 
principles construing access rights to government records).  In 
practice, governmental authorities are to perform a balancing 
test to determine whether "the public interest would be 
adversely affected" by the record's release.  See State ex rel. 
J. Co. v. Cnty. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 43 Wis. 2d 297, 306, 168 
N.W.2d 836 (1969).  Withholding a record requires exceptional 
circumstances as "only in an exceptional case may access be 
denied."  § 19.31. 
¶123 Here exceptional circumstances do not exist.  At issue 
is the City's denial of Friends' access to a proposed contract.  
The proposed contract involved Big Top Baseball's plan to 
repurpose Frame Park, a public space, to host a private for-
profit baseball team.  In October 2017, Friends filed a public 
records request with the City seeking the proposed contract.  
                                                 
9 Cf. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The 
Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of 
Buchannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1087 
(2007). 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
15 
 
Later that same month, the City declared it was withholding the 
proposed contract "for competitive and bargaining reasons" until 
the Common Council had an opportunity to take action on it.  The 
next opportunity for the Common Council to take action on the 
proposed contract was at the December 19 Common Council meeting.  
Having been denied access to the record in time to meaningfully 
engage and hold to account their representatives, Friends filed 
a mandamus action the day before the meeting to preserve its 
right to a remedy.  The December 19 Common Council meeting 
minutes indicate that the Council:  (1) never entered into a 
closed session to discuss the proposed contract; and (2) did not 
vote to either approve or deny the contract terms.  Unclear from 
either the minutes or the record is to what extent the Council 
discussed the proposed contract, if at all.  The next day the 
City released the proposed contract to Friends saying no further 
competitive or bargaining concerns existed. 
¶124 Friends was entitled to the release of the proposed 
contract not only in spite of its draft status, but because of 
it.10  The contract's non-final nature was significant.  As long 
                                                 
10 There is no dispute that the "draft contract" here is a 
"record" subject to disclosure under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  
This is because at the time of Friends' request, Big Top 
Baseball had already seen the proposed contract and was actively 
negotiating its terms.  See Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 414, 
438 N.W.2d 589 (1989) (clarifying that the statutory definition 
of a "record" subject to release includes "a document prepared 
for something other than the originator's personal use, whether 
it is in preliminary form or stamped 'draft.'").  Here, despite 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's 
contrary 
assertion, 
it 
is 
inconsequential to the balancing test that the Common Council 
had not yet finalized the contract because finality is not 
required. 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
16 
 
as the contract was not final, Friends had the opportunity to 
meaningfully participate in the Common Council's review of the 
document.  Said differently, once the Common Council voted on 
the proposed contract, Friends' participation would be moot.  
This situation exemplifies why Wisconsin's public records law 
demands that responses to record requests be made "as soon as 
practicable and without delay."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).  Only 
when 
citizens 
are 
timely 
informed 
about 
the 
actions 
of 
government officials may they meaningfully participate and 
create a more responsive representative government.  This is 
particularly true at the local government level where informed 
citizens often have direct access to their officials and have 
the ability to plead their case face-to-face.  In other words, 
the delayed release of public records "in effect eliminate[es] 
that information from the public debate" thereby "defeat[ing] 
the purpose . . . of providing the public with the greatest 
information possible about the affairs of government" and 
completely denying the opportunity to meaningfully participate 
in government.  State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 
200 Wis. 2d 585, 595, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996). 
¶125 Such detrimental denial occurs even when the delay is 
short-lived.  Here, Friends requested the proposed contract 
ostensibly to evaluate how the possible terms of a privately run 
baseball park operating on public park grounds would affect its 
members as neighbors and taxpayers.  For that review to be 
meaningful, however, Friends needed the document before the 
Common Council finalized the contract.  Once the contract is 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
17 
 
final and binding, public input is rendered irrelevant.  Because 
Friends was "entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding the affairs of government," Wis. Stat. § 19.31 
(emphasis added), the City carries the burden to prove that it 
did not unduly delay the release of the requested record. 
C.  The City Withholding the Proposed Contract Lacked 
Justification 
¶126 The City claims that "competitive or bargaining" 
reasons were sufficiently exceptional to tip the balance in 
favor of denying access to the proposed contract.  This excuse 
fails.  The "competitive or bargaining" excuse derives from 
Wisconsin's related open meetings law, which is incorporated 
into the public records laws.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35(1)(a) & 
19.85(1)(e).  Under the open meetings law, access to a 
government meeting may be denied (that is, a "closed session" 
may be held) for "[d]eliberating or negotiating the purchasing 
of public properties, the investing of public funds, or 
conducting other specified public business, whenever competitive 
or bargaining reasons require a closed session."  § 19.85(1)(e).  
Importantly, the government may withhold a record on this ground 
"only if the authority . . . makes a specific demonstration that 
there is a need to restrict public access at the time that the 
request to inspect or copy the record is made."  § 19.35(1)(a). 
¶127 The City's "competitive or bargaining" rationale fails 
for two reasons in this case.  First, no competitive or 
bargaining concerns remained at the time the City denied the 
records request.  Second, the City Council never entered into a 
closed session during its December 19th meeting.  Therefore, the 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
18 
 
City improperly balanced the public interest by concluding that 
the proposed contract's release would have adversely affected 
the public.  See State ex rel. J. Co., 43 Wis. 2d at 306. 
1.  No competitive or bargaining reasons existed. 
¶128 Let's turn first to the "competitive or bargaining" 
interests that were absent at the time the proposed contract was 
withheld.  A competitive or bargaining concern relating to the 
proposed contract may have arisen in one of three ways, none of 
which apply here:  (1) the City and another municipality could 
have been competing for the same baseball team; (2) the City 
could have been negotiating with more than one baseball 
organization to host a team at Frame Park; or (3) the manner of 
the City's negotiations with Big Top could require that the 
proposed contract terms be secreted from Big Top to strengthen 
the City's bargaining position. 
¶129 Regarding the first possible concern, the City does 
not allege that another municipality was competing to host the 
same baseball team.  Rather, the City claims that the mere 
possibility of another municipality's interest in a baseball 
team is enough to invoke the exception.  And yet the City fails 
to explain how another municipality's possible interest in a 
baseball team implicates competitive or bargaining concerns 
sufficient to justify nondisclosure.  A mere possibility of 
competition is a nebulous standard that could plausibly be 
invoked for any public business the City conducts, a far cry 
from the "exceptional case" that may justify a denial or delay 
of a record request.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
19 
 
¶130 The second possible concern would emerge if the City 
were negotiating with two or more baseball teams competing for 
the Frame Park location.  Under this scenario, the City would 
arguably have an interest in concealing the details of any 
proposed contracts from the competing teams so that the City 
could negotiate the best terms from each team and ultimately 
choose between them.  But here, the record makes clear that the 
City did not consider partnering with any baseball team besides 
Big Top after August of 2016——long before the record request and 
denial in October 2017. 
¶131 The third possible concern would be that publicly 
revealing 
a 
proposed 
contract's 
unapproved 
terms 
would 
necessarily give Big Top access to those terms, weakening the 
City's negotiating position.  This too fails because, as a 
conceded fact, Big Top already had access to the entire proposed 
contract during their negotiations and had provided drafting 
suggestions. 
¶132 In sum, the competitive or bargaining benefit of 
withholding the proposed contract from the public did not exist.  
According to the City, the only relevant party not to have seen 
the proposed contract before the December 19 meeting was the 
Common Council, and the City cannot seek a bargaining advantage 
against its own Common Council.  
¶133 Curiously, 
although 
the 
Common 
Council 
never 
substantially addressed the proposed contract or entered into a 
closed session at the December 19 meeting, the City released the 
proposed contract the day after the meeting indicating no 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
20 
 
further competitive or bargaining concerns existed.  That all 
but 
concedes 
there 
never 
were 
competitive 
or 
bargaining 
concerns.  If no competitive or bargaining concerns existed 
after a meeting where the Common Council never meaningfully 
addressed the proposed contract, then how could competitive or 
bargaining concerns be implicated before the meeting took place? 
¶134 The 
City 
argues 
that 
there 
were, 
nevertheless, 
bargaining reasons for the Common Council to go into closed 
session to review the proposed contract.  Specifically, the City 
argues that the Council's reactions to the proposed contract 
terms would weaken its ability to further negotiate terms with 
Big Top.  But if the City wanted to hide the Common Council's 
reactions to proposed contract terms, the solution was to have 
the Common Council go into a closed session, not withhold 
disclosure of the proposed contract Big Top had already seen and 
red-lined.  In short, no qualifying competitive or bargaining 
concerns regarding the proposed contract exist in the record. 
2.  A closed session was not "required." 
¶135 Even if competitive or bargaining concerns existed 
prior to the December 19 meeting, the City still improperly 
withheld the proposed contract because the Common Council never 
entered into a closed session.  The City's only reason for 
denying disclosure applies "whenever competitive or bargaining 
reasons require a closed session."  Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) 
(emphasis added).  But the Common Council never entered into a 
closed session at the December 19 meeting.  How could a closed 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
21 
 
session have been required when the Common Council never met in 
closed session? 
¶136 The 
facts 
indicate 
an 
alternative 
motive 
for 
withholding the proposed contract——the City sought to avoid 
public input before the Common Council had the opportunity to 
act on it.  The City admitted as much in its letter explaining 
that it would delay disclosure until "after the Common Council 
has taken action on it."  That is not a legal basis to withhold 
a record from the public. 
¶137 Because the City's alleged competitive or bargaining 
concerns were speculative at best, and disproven by the record 
at worst, the City improperly applied the balancing test.  The 
public's interest in disclosure outweighs the City's nonexistent 
competitive 
or 
bargaining 
concerns; 
the 
disclosure 
was 
unlawfully delayed. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶138 The City improperly withheld the proposed contract 
when it cited to nonexistent "competitive or bargaining" 
concerns, and the public interest would not have been adversely 
affected by the release of the proposed contract.  Friends was 
denied its statutory right to access documents that would have 
informed its participation in government.  As such, Friends 
should have prevailed in its action against the City and been 
awarded appropriate fees and costs.  The unnecessarily narrow 
"judicially sanctioned change" test for the award of attorney 
fees is not supported by the statute's plain meaning and will 
undercut the public records laws' entire purpose.  We should 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
22 
 
remain with the causation test, which encourages citizens to 
bring meritorious claims for the release of records while 
discouraging gamesmanship on all sides.  We should continue to 
disinfect with sunshine. 
¶139 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP96.jjk 
 
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