Title: de Benveniste v. Aaron Christensen Family, LP

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARY VILLON DE BENVENISTE 
 
 
 
 
v.  Record No. 082387 
  OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 September 18, 2009 
AARON CHRISTENSEN FAMILY, LP, et al. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Burke F. McCahill, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a trial court may 
require a cotenant to share expenses that result in an 
increase in the value of real property, despite the fact that 
the investment does not result in “permanent” physical 
improvements to the property.  We also consider whether such 
an award, if otherwise permissible, should be barred by the 
doctrine of unclean hands under the circumstances presented 
here. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute among four siblings and 
other assorted family members concerning the disposition of a 
large farm in Loudoun County, inherited from the siblings’ 
parents.  The parcel, known as Mountain Gap Farm (“the 
Property”), was owned at the outset of the period relevant to 
these proceedings by Dr. Aaron W. Christensen, who held a 
51.12017% interest, and his wife, who held a 48.87983% 
interest.  In 2000, Dr. Christensen created the Aaron W. 
Christensen Family Limited Partnership (“the Partnership”); 
Dr. Christensen was the sole general partner, while he and his 
four children, Judith L. Pohlman, Carol J. Bartholomew, John 
N. Christensen, and Mary Villon de Benveniste (“Mary”), were 
all named as limited partners.  The Partnership held title to 
Dr. Christensen’s portion of the Property during the remainder 
of his life.  During Dr. Christensen’s life, he made annual 
gifts of his partnership interests to his children and 
grandchildren, so that by the time of his death, all of the 
ownership shares in the Partnership were held by his four 
children and members of their families.  The Partnership 
continued to hold title to 51.12017% of the Property’s 
ownership.  Mrs. Christensen’s 48.87983% ownership interest 
passed, by way of a testamentary trust, to the four children 
in equal 1/4 shares.  As a consequence of these transfers, at 
all times relevant to the dispute at issue here Mary held 
approximately 25% of the ownership interest in the Property, 
while her siblings and their children (collectively, “the 
Christensens”) held the remaining 75%. 
Following their parents’ deaths, Mary and the 
Christensens investigated a division of the Property into four 
approximately equal parcels.  However, John Christensen 
discovered that there were 71 approved drainfields on the 
Property, and also learned that the Property might soon be 
 
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subject to downzoning.1  To take advantage of the drainfield 
approvals, the Christensens decided to begin the process of 
subdividing the Property into as many lots as possible (which 
proved to be 68 lots) before the expected downzoning would 
prevent them from doing so.  Mary sent letters to the 
Christensens informing them that she was “not interested in 
subdividing or developing and selling the farm.” 
The Christensens, acting through the Partnership, 
nonetheless hired an engineering firm to complete surveys and 
other engineering work necessary to move forward with the 
subdivision, at a cost of approximately $650,000.  Both John 
Christensen and the attorney hired by the Partnership to 
advise it in pursuing subdivision explained to Mary that they 
understood her desire for a four-lot division, but needed to 
pursue the 68-lot subdivision to avoid devaluation of the 
Property due to downzoning. 
John submitted a land development application to the 
Loudoun County Department of Building and Development that 
listed the Partnership as the sole owner of the Property.  
However, at the time of this application, the Partnership only 
                     
 
1 “Downzoning” is a zoning action that results “in a 
reduction in a formerly permitted land use intensity or 
density.”  Board of Supervisors v. Greengael, L.L.C., 271 Va. 
266, 285, 626 S.E.2d 357, 368 (2006) (citing Turner v. Bd. of 
County Supervisors, 263 Va. 283, 289, 559 S.E.2d 683, 686 
(2002) and Code § 15.2-2286(A)(11)). 
 
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held title to 51.12017% of the Property’s ownership, while 
each of Dr. Christensen’s four children held title to 
12.2199575% (or 25% of Mrs. Christensen’s original ownership).  
The application also explicitly required the signatures of 
“all property owners.”  The county approved the preliminary 
plan.  The Christensens did not send Mary demands that she pay 
for a share of these expenses related to subdivision because 
she had stated she would not pay them; however, John 
Christensen testified that Mary was kept fully informed of the 
Christensens’ subdivision efforts and at times expressed 
approval of those efforts. 
The Christensens eventually filed suit against Mary, 
seeking allotment of the Property, a sale in lieu of 
partition, or a partition of the Property.  At trial, the 
Christensens’ appraiser testified that the value of the 
Property as a single, undivided lot (without the preliminary 
subdivision plan) was $4,800,000, while the value of the 
Property “as 68 potential lots with the preliminary 
subdivision plan in place” was $8,895,000.  This enhancement 
of appraised value due to the preliminary subdivision plan was 
accepted by the trial court in a finding of fact.  The trial 
court held that Mary was obligated to pay a share of the 
expenses related to obtaining the preliminary subdivision plan 
and permitted the Christensens the opportunity to purchase the 
 
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entire Property.  The trial court ordered that should the 
Christensens not purchase the Property, it would be sold and 
the proceeds divided, with Mary’s proceeds reduced by her 
share of the subdivision plan expenses.  The Christensens 
ultimately did not purchase the Property, and following a 
deterioration in the real estate market, it was eventually 
sold to a third party for $6,000,000.  The trial court 
approved the sale and ordered that a portion of Mary’s share 
of the proceeds, $147,277.72 representing her share of the 
expenses of the subdivision plan, be held in escrow pending 
her appeal. 
We awarded Mary an appeal on the following two 
assignments of error: 
1. 
The Trial Court erred in charging a portion of the 
cost of the subdivision process for the Property to 
Mary because the “improvements” are not permanent. 
 
2. 
The Trial Court erred in requiring Mary to pay a pro 
rata share of the subdivision costs because the 
Appellees do not have clean hands. 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. 
Right to Compensation for Improvements 
 
Mary first claims the trial court erred in requiring her 
to pay, out of her profit from the partition sale ordered by 
the trial court, a share of the Christensens’ expenses to 
obtain the subdivision plan.  She maintains that because this 
 
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investment was not a “permanent improvement” under Virginia 
law, she is not liable for these costs. 
The evidence relating to the subdivision plan and the 
Christensens’ efforts to obtain it is undisputed.  The question 
presented is whether the enhancement of value due to the 
Christensens’ efforts is a compensable “improvement” within the 
meaning of our prior cases.  The resolution of this question is 
a matter of law; consequently, we review the issue de novo.  
Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 
301, 303 (2006). 
 
It has long been a principle of law in Virginia that 
[g]enerally, a joint tenant who at his own 
expense has constructed permanent improvements 
on property owned in common is entitled in a 
partition suit to compensation for the 
improvements, even in the absence of a showing 
that his cotenant assented thereto.  The rule is 
founded on the desire of the court to do justice 
and to prevent unjust enrichment of one cotenant 
at the expense of the other.  But in a partition 
suit the amount of the compensation, in the 
absence of an agreement with the other tenant or 
tenants, is limited to the amount by which the 
value of the property owned in common has been 
enhanced by the improvement. 
 
Jones v. Jones, 214 Va. 452, 454-55, 201 S.E.2d 603, 605 
(1974).  In most of the cases in which we have applied this 
rule, our recitation of the legal principles has included the 
term “permanent improvements.”  See Butler v. Hayes, 254 Va. 
38, 43, 487 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1997); Quillen v. Tull, 226 Va. 
 
6
498, 502, 312 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1984); Jones, 214 Va. at 454-55, 
201 S.E.2d at 605; Shotwell v. Shotwell, 202 Va. 613, 618, 119 
S.E.2d 251, 255 (1961); Dalgarno v. Baum, 182 Va. 806, 808, 30 
S.E.2d 559, 560 (1944); Griffin v. Tomlinson, 159 Va. 161, 179, 
165 S.E. 374, 380 (1932); Ballou v. Ballou, 94 Va. 350, 352, 26 
S.E. 840, 840 (1897). 
 
Most often the cases applying this principle have dealt 
with “permanent improvements” in the form of physical 
construction or repair, often of a structure intended for 
residence.  See, e.g., Butler, 254 Va. at 44, 487 S.E.2d at 
232; Jones, 214 Va. at 453, 201 S.E.2d at 604; Shotwell, 202 
Va. at 615, 119 S.E.2d at 253; Dalgarno, 182 Va. at 807, 30 
S.E.2d at 559; Ballou, 94 Va. at 351, 26 S.E. at 840.  However, 
in Quillen we reviewed a judgment partitioning land on 
Chincoteague Island among various parties with ownership 
interests.  226 Va. at 500-01, 312 S.E.2d at 278-79.  The land 
at issue consisted of four parcels, designated A, B, C, and D.  
Id. at 501, 312 S.E.2d at 279.  The trial court ordered Parcels 
C and D to be sold at public auction and the proceeds divided, 
with Tull, the party who had been in possession of the 
property, receiving credit for enhancing its value by 30 per 
cent.  Id.  The enhancement was in the form of easements Tull 
purchased over adjacent property, which were the only means of 
accessing Parcels C and D.  Id. at 502, 312 S.E.2d at 280.  
 
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Applying the principle of compensation for permanent 
improvements, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment, noting 
that 
[t]here was evidence that the value of parcels C 
and D was enhanced approximately one-third or 
more by Tull’s acquisition of the easements.  
Accordingly, we hold that there was evidence to 
support the court’s finding that the value of 
these parcels was enhanced by 30 per cent and 
its ruling that Tull was entitled to credit for 
such enhancement.  We will not disturb the 
finding or the ruling. 
 
Id. at 503, 312 S.E.2d at 280.  Purchased easements such as 
those at issue in Quillen are not physical improvements like 
the houses constructed in other compensation cases; indeed they 
are not even tangible assets and are not located on the 
property being partitioned.  Nonetheless, we have considered an 
easement to be sufficiently “permanent” to require cotenants to 
pay a share of its cost. 
Other courts, applying equitable principles, have held an 
award of credit to a cotenant to be appropriate for 
improvements that are not obviously “permanent,” but which have 
resulted in an increase in the value of the property that was 
subsequently realized by partition sale.  For example, in 
Leinweber v. Leinweber, 385 P.2d 556, 557-58 (Wa. 1963), the 
Supreme Court of Washington reversed a trial court’s judgment 
denying credit for “summer fallowing” (plowing and weeding 
agricultural land in preparation for the next year’s crop).  
 
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Although the summer fallow could be reversed through later 
neglect, the court treated the practice as an improvement, 
placing particular emphasis on evidence indicating that the 
purchaser of the land at the partition sale included the 
additional value for the summer fallow in his bid.  Id. at 557.  
The court concluded that 
[w]hen consideration is given to the fact that 
[the] summer fallowing was not only necessary, 
but also substantially enhanced the valuation of 
the property, and such increased valuation was 
realized upon the partition sale instigated by 
the other cotenants, it seems appropriate to 
treat the summer fallow as an improvement, even 
though it was not permanent in nature. 
 
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).  Implicit in this analysis is the 
principle that the increase in value, irrevocably realized by 
the cotenants at the time of the partition sale, rendered the 
improvements sufficiently “permanent” for a court to require 
compensation for them. 
In this case, the trial court did not err in reaching the 
same conclusion.  Although the fruits of the efforts undertaken 
by the Christensens to obtain a preliminary subdivision plan 
were as intangible as the easements in Quillen, they likewise 
benefited the Property’s value.  Like the summer fallow in 
Leinweber, the subdivision plan could be allowed to lapse and 
thus lacked a degree of permanence, but this factor weighing 
against requiring an allowance was overcome when the benefiting 
 
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property was sold and the increase in value was realized by the 
cotenants.  Although Mary now disputes that the subdivision 
plan increased the value of the Property, the trial court made 
an explicit factual finding to the contrary, and Mary has not 
assigned error to that finding.  For the purposes of this 
appeal, we must accept the trial court’s factual finding that 
the subdivision plan increased the value of the land, and that 
this increase was realized when the Property was sold. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of equitably dividing the 
proceeds from the partition sale among the parties here, the 
trial court did not err in treating the Christensens’ securing 
of a preliminary subdivision plan as a “permanent improvement” 
and requiring Mary to pay her share of the associated expenses. 
B. 
Unclean Hands 
 
Nonetheless, Mary contends that, even if the improvements 
are of the sort for which compensation may generally be 
required, the Christensens are not entitled to such 
compensation because of the equitable doctrine of unclean 
hands.  According to Mary, the Christensens were aware at all 
relevant times that she opposed the subdivision plan and acted 
without her consent in obtaining it. 
We have established that 
[t]he allowance ordinarily given a cotenant for 
permanent improvements upon real estate that is 
ultimately partitioned is not a legal right.  
 
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Rather, compensation of this kind is allowable 
to enable a court of equity to do justice and to 
prevent one tenant from becoming enriched at the 
expense of another.  
 
Butler, 254 Va. at 43, 487 S.E.2d at 232 (citing Shotwell, 202 
Va. at 618, 119 S.E.2d at 255).  Consequently, we review the 
decision of a trial court to award or deny such equitable 
relief for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 44, 487 S.E.2d at 
232. 
 
To support her unclean-hands argument, Mary relies on 
Butler, contending that the factual similarities between that 
case and the current controversy suggest the same result: that 
those seeking compensation be denied it because of their 
inequitable conduct.  In Butler, buyers purchased land 
purportedly owned by the seller alone.  However, the seller 
claimed sole ownership by a deed he had fraudulently prepared 
by forging the signatures of his cotenants.  Id. at 40, 487 
S.E.2d at 230.  Despite having been informed of the fraud, 
which left them with only a fractional share of ownership, the 
buyers substantially improved the property, and then sought an 
allowance from the cotenants when the trial court ordered that 
the property be partitioned.  Id. at 41-42, 487 S.E.2d at 231.  
The trial court refused compensation because the buyers “had 
actual notice of an infirmity in their title, and they did not 
place the improvements on the property in good faith.”  Id. at 
 
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42, 487 S.E.2d at 231.  We affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.  Id. at 45, 487 S.E.2d at 233. 
 
The conduct of the Christensens here does not compare to 
the conduct of the buyers in Butler.  It is true that the 
application signed by John Christensen on behalf of the 
Partnership explicitly required all owners to sign and the 
engineer who filled out the application for the Christensens 
knew the signatures of all of the owners were required, and 
that Mary expressly indicated her opposition to subdivision 
several times. 
However, there was also evidence that Mary was kept fully 
informed about the Christensens’ pursuit of the subdivision 
plan and that she also expressed approval of and satisfaction 
with the Christensens’ progress.  For example, Mary’s brother 
John Christensen, who managed the subdivision application 
process, testified that Mary “was very happy” about the 
discovery of county-approved drain fields on the property, 
which would enable a valuable subdivision provided the plan 
was approved before the impending downzoning of the property.  
According to John, although Mary later voiced some concern 
about the “risk” involved in pursuing subdivision, she did not 
object to subdivision at the time the drain fields were 
discovered. 
 
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John also testified that Mary repeatedly changed position 
as to her desires for the ultimate disposition of the 
property: 
 
We spent a lot of time and an awful lot of 
money trying to settle this issue with my 
sister.  Asking her what she wanted.  At 
certain times she wanted her section of the 
property. 
 
At certain times she wanted to be bought 
out.  Certain times she wanted the western side 
of the property.  Certain times she wanted the 
eastern part of the property . . . and now she 
wants to throw away the preliminary plan and 
wants the center part of the property. 
Finally, John described Mary’s reaction to the approval of the 
preliminary subdivision plan as “ecstatic,” and said she 
commended him for doing “a wonderful job.” 
 
On cross-examination, Mary herself admitted that she told 
John his discovery of drain fields (a necessary precursor to 
subdivision) was “great.”  She also acknowledged a letter in 
which she expressed interest in receiving one-quarter of the 
property but also purchasing her siblings’ shares of her 
parents’ house, and expressed a variety of opinions as to 
whether the property could be feasibly partitioned in kind, 
and as to which section she would like to receive if such a 
partition were possible. 
With regard to the vitality of the family partnership 
during the period in question and its authority to apply for a 
subdivision plan, Mary admitted she wrote a capital 
 
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contribution check for the partnership after the time at which 
she now contends the partnership was dissolved and had no 
authority to seek subdivision, and that during the same period 
she volunteered to serve as a managing general partner. 
The trial court, in announcing its initial ruling from 
the bench, credited John’s testimony as confirmed by Mary’s 
admissions that she did not consistently oppose the pursuit of 
the subdivision plan.  For example, the trial court noted that 
John Christensen “believed that [Mary] would at times 
equivocate and that she didn’t have the money to invest in the 
engineering costs. . . .  I summarize and believe that overall 
there were some equivocations, some missed2 signals that he 
received from his sister.”  The trial court later referenced 
Mary’s indecision about how the property should be divided, 
noting that Mary “had a hard time making the selection,” and 
again referring to her actions as “equivocation.”  In denying 
Mary’s motion to reconsider, the trial court rejected her 
unclean-hands argument, citing among other things the evidence 
of “mixed signals” by Mary.  
Instead of proceeding with their improvements in the face 
of notice of serious defects in their title like the buyers in 
                     
 
2 It is unclear whether the court reporter erroneously 
took down “missed” rather than “mixed,” which appears several 
times elsewhere in the transcript of the court’s ruling; the 
latter would be more consistent with the trial court’s 
description of “equivocations.” 
 
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Butler, the Christensens were majority owners of the property, 
seeking to maximize value despite Mary’s mixed feelings about 
subdivision.  This conclusion is supported by testimony, 
accepted by the trial court, that the Christensens were facing 
imminent downzoning that would diminish the value of the 
Property absent subdivision. 
Contrary to Mary’s argument, the submission of the 
subdivision plan application in the sole name of the 
Partnership does not provide a basis for reversing the trial 
court’s holding regarding the issue of unclean hands.  Mary 
did not ask the trial court to declare the subdivision plan 
invalid on the basis that the Partnership lacked the necessary 
authority to submit it.  Nonetheless, she argues that she 
should not be credited for a share of the costs incurred 
because of alleged procedural defects in the application.  The 
trial court rejected this argument when it was presented in 
Mary’s motion to reconsider and concluded that even if there 
were formal defects in the application, such defects would not 
constitute unclean hands in light of Mary’s “mixed signals” 
regarding the subdivision process. 
Considering the evidence in its entirety, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that preclusion of 
compensation based upon the doctrine of unclean hands was not 
appropriate in this case. 
 
 
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III.  Conclusion 
 
We hold that the preliminary subdivision plan obtained by 
the Christensens in this case was a compensable improvement of 
the property and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in requiring Mary to compensate the Christensens for a share 
of their expenses related to the increase in value associated 
with the improvement.  We also hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it held that the Christensens 
were not precluded from seeking such compensation from Mary 
because of the doctrine of unclean hands.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  
Affirmed. 
 
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