Title: Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray1991 WY 73811 P.2d 287Case Number: 90-166Decided: 05/16/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
FERGUSON RANCH, INC., a 
Wyoming Corporation, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Edward F. MURRAY, Jr., 
and William J. Edwards, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Charles E. 
Graves of Graves, Santini and Villemez, Cheyenne, for appellant.

John B. Rogers, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and TAYLOR, District Judge.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This was an action by 
appellees Edward F. Murray, Jr. and William J. Edwards (M & E) against 
Ferguson Ranch, Inc. to obtain a right of way, termed a common law way of 
necessity, across Ferguson lands. Ferguson appeals the judgment granting M & 
E the right of way.

[¶2.]     The question we must 
answer is this: Where a grantee takes title to a parcel of property which has no 
adequate means of ingress/egress (is landlocked), is the grantor obligated to 
provide his grantee with a common law way of necessity without compensation 
therefor, or must the grantee obtain a private road in accordance with W.S. 
24-9-101 et seq. We address also the question of whether the owner of a 
landlocked parcel must look to his grantor for relief from his landlocked 
condition before seeking a right of way across the lands of third 
parties.

[¶3.]     We reverse the decision 
of the district court. Appellees' source of relief, under the circumstances of 
this case, is an action for a private road pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101. They may 
not demand a common law way of necessity over the lands of the appellant, 
Ferguson Ranch, Inc. (Ferguson).

[¶4.]     Ferguson raises these 
issues:

"I. Did the Trial Court err, as a matter of law, in 
granting a `way of necessity'?

"II. Did the Declaration 
of a Statutory private road extinguish common law easements to the same 
property?

"A. Is the Appellee 
barred due to abandonment of any implied easement?

"B. Was the issue of 
necessity previously litigated and therefore barred by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel/issue preclusion?

"C. Was the Appellee 
barred by the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel?

"D. Did necessity cease 
with the Declaration for Appellee in the Statutory private way of necessity 
proceeding?

"III. Did the Trial Court 
err in failing to bar the easement across Defendant's [Ferguson] lands by adverse 
possession for the statutory period?"

[¶5.]     M & E state this 
outline of the issues:

"A. Did the trial court 
err, as a matter of law, in granting a `way of necessity'?

"B. Did a commenced but 
uncompleted statutory proceeding for the establishment of a private road operate 
to extinguish the way of necessity as a result of:

"1. 
Abandonment?

"2. Collateral 
estoppel/issue preclusion?

"3. Judicial 
estoppel?

"4. Termination of the 
element of necessity?

"C. Did the trial court 
err in failing to bar the easement across Defendant's [Ferguson] lands by adverse 
possession for the statutory period?"

FACTS

[¶6.]     Ferguson owns section 18. 
M & E own section 19 which is landlocked - that is, there is no easement or 
right of way providing access known to law as ingress and egress. M & E seek 
a common law way of necessity over Ferguson's section 18.

[¶7.]     At one time Ferguson owned both 
sections 18 and 19. On October 19, 1984, Ferguson conveyed section 19 to a third party. 
No easement or right of way to section 19 was provided at the time of 
conveyance, although appellee alleges an existing road across section 18 was 
used for that purpose. On March 1, 1987, the third party sold and conveyed 
section 19 to M & E. M & E commenced a proceeding before the Laramie 
County Commissioners to obtain a private road pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101. M & 
E were successful in this proceeding which culminated with entry of an order 
August 15, 1988, establishing a surveyed private road across the lands of John 
and Gladys Lindt conditioned upon payment of damages for the taking in the 
amount of $33,600. M & E were dissatisfied with the results of the 
proceeding and filed a petition for review in the district court alleging that 
the damages awarded for establishment of the private road were excessive, 
speculative, and arbitrary. The respondents, John and Gladys Lindt, also filed a 
petition for review in the district court which alleged that the action of the 
county commissioners was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and M 
& E were not entitled to a private road because they had a common law way of 
necessity over the lands of Ferguson. M & E obtained dismissal of the 
appeal and commenced this action for a common law way of necessity over the 
Ferguson section 
18.

[¶8.]     M & E alleged that 
use of the old roadway over section 18, claimed abandoned by Ferguson, was "an absolute 
necessity" if they were to be able to enter and leave their lands and enjoy the 
rights of ingress and egress for themselves and their heirs, assigns, guests, 
invitees and licensees. We emphasize at this point that M & E pled, and 
attempted to prove, facts which would have established a common law way of 
necessity. There is a significant difference between a common law way of 
necessity and an implied easement. We are satisfied that M & E sought the 
former rather than the latter. The distinction between the two will be addressed 
later in the opinion. 

DISCUSSION

[¶9.]     The concept of a common 
law way of necessity serves several purposes, the most important of which was to 
ensure that land could be used for productive purposes. 2 Thompson on Real 
Property §§ 362-368 (1980 Repl.). Another very important facet of the doctrine 
was that, because the grantee of such lands had no common law right to claim a 
way across the land of third parties, the way of necessity was the only method 
by which ingress/egress could be obtained. Id. Opposed is a policy that 
recognizes that it is unfair or inequitable to permit a landlocked landowner to 
claim, without compensation, a way of necessity across the lands of his grantor 
which could have been provided for at the time of purchase and conveyance and 
which may have resulted in a reduced final cost of the land. Id. The competing policy 
questions were resolved by enactment of W.S. 24-9-101 which says that the 
solution to access is to allow a landlocked landowner to condemn a best-location 
right of way across the lands of a stranger upon payment of damages rather than 
to require a grantor, in an arm's-length real estate transaction, to provide his 
grantee with a right-of-way that is free of compensation therefor. The grantee 
at the time of real estate acquisition is well able to figure out that the 
property is landlocked and to negotiate a right-of-way as a part of the 
purchase.

[¶10.]  In this case a statute, W.S. 24-9-101, 
provides a means and procedure for obtaining access to the landlocked property. 
The statute eliminates the problem. It states as follows:

"Any person whose land 
has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the 
board of county commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his 
premises to some convenient public road. At least sixty (60) days prior to 
applying to the board, the applicant shall give notice in writing to the owner, 
resident agent or occupant of all lands over which the private road is applied 
for, of his intent to apply for a private road. If the owner of the land is a 
nonresident, and there is no resident agent upon which personal service can be 
had, then the notice may be published once a week for three (3) weeks in a 
newspaper published in the county. The last publication shall be at least thirty 
(30) days before the hearing of the application. At the hearing, all parties 
interested may appear and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road 
and all matters pertaining thereto. Upon the hearing of the application, whether 
the owner or others interested appear or not, if the board finds that the 
applicant has complied with the law and that the private road is necessary, the 
board shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the 
county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued 
directing them to meet on a day named in the order on the proposed road, and 
view and locate a private road according to the application therefor, and to 
assess damages to be sustained thereby. If for any reason the viewers and 
appraisers are unable to meet at the time set by the board to view the proposed 
road, they may fix some other date, but shall give notice in writing to the 
owner, resident agent or occupant of the lands over which the road is proposed 
to be laid of the time and place where the viewers will meet, at least ten (10) 
days before viewing the road, at which time and place all persons interested may 
appear and be heard by the viewers. Before entering upon their duties the 
viewers shall take and subscribe to an oath that they will faithfully and 
impartially perform their duties under their appointment as viewers and 
appraisers. The viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road 
in accordance with the application or in such other manner and location they 
deem appropriate, provided the location of the road shall not be marked out to 
cross the lands of any person whose lands were not described in the application 
and who has not given notice of the application. The proposed road shall not 
exceed thirty (30) feet in width from a certain point on the premises of the 
applicant to some certain point on the public road, and shall be located so as 
to do the least possible damage to the lands through which the private road is 
located. The viewers shall also at the same time assess the damages sustained by 
the owner over which the road is to be established and make full and true 
returns, with a plat of the road to the board of county 
commissioners."

[¶11.]  To the extent any ambiguity may exist in 
our previous decisions, we make clear now that a civil action for a common law 
way of necessity is not available because of the existence of W.S. 24-9-101. 
Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463-64 (Wyo. 1980); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975); and see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 
680, 99 S. Ct. 1403, 1410, 59 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1979).

[¶12.]  The decision in Snell is quite clear. We 
held that the concept of a common law way of necessity is theoretically 
incompatible with Art. I, § 32 of the Wyoming Constitution, which 
provides:

"Private property shall 
not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across 
the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary 
purposes, nor in any case without due compensation."

In addition, we 
also held that if a statute covers a whole subject matter, the abrogation of the 
common law on the same subject will necessarily be implied. Our terse and rather 
clear conclusion was that W.S. 24-9-101, et seq., "offers complete relief to the 
shut-in landowner and covers the whole subject matter." Snell, 541 P.2d  at 1046. 
Footnote 4 of the Snell opinion does detract from the clear language used in the 
body of the opinion, and footnote 1 of the Dana opinion does not serve to 
clarify the ambiguity created in Snell. Nonetheless, we conclude the time has 
come to announce that anything said in these decisions, or our decisions which 
have followed Snell and Dana, such as Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 807, 72 
A.L.R.4th 113 (Wyo. 1986)1 and Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 163 
(Wyo. 1988)2 which may suggest the existence of 
a common law way of necessity, is specifically overruled and is dicta. This 
construction of W.S. 24-9-101, i.e., that it obviates the need for recognition 
of the common law way of necessity, serves to clarify this area of the law and 
will also eliminate the confusion and complications that will undoubtedly arise 
out of the rule that a common law way of necessity lasts only as long as the 
necessity. See, e.g., Joines v. Herman, 89 N.C. App. 507, 366 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 
(1988); Dulaney v. Rohanna Iron and Metal, Inc., 344 Pa. Super. 45, 495 A.2d 1389, 1391 (1985); Oyler v. Gilliland, 382 So. 2d 517, 519, 10 A.L.R.4th 443 
(Ala. 1980); Badura v. Lyons, 147 Neb. 442, 23 N.W.2d 678, 
683-85 (1946); Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn.2d 690, 175 P.2d 669, 673 (1946). A 
private road established in accordance with W.S. 24-9-101, provides a more 
permanent as well as a more equitable solution.

[¶13.]  Moreover, as has been noted in several of 
our decisions, e.g., Dana and Snell, forcing a landlocked landowner to choose a 
wholly illogical, uneconomic, and unproductive road makes no sense at all. If 
that were to be the case, our state would soon be riddled with roads which waste 
space and money and create road development problems that would eventually have 
to be paid for by taxpayers who are truly strangers to the roadways. 

[¶14.]  We reemphasize that a landlocked 
landowner is not entitled to seek whatever road he desires or is most convenient 
to him. He still must seek, and the county commissioners are bound to approve, 
only such means of access to landlocked property as are reasonable. In the 
instant case, if the most practical and reasonable route is across the lands of 
third parties, rather than across the Ferguson lands, then that is a factual 
question to be resolved by the county commissioners.

[¶15.]  As a result of this holding, we conclude 
that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain M & E's suit 
for a common law way of necessity. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290-91 
(Wyo. 1980). 
Our holding that the existence of W.S. 24-9-101 precludes an action for a common 
law way of necessity serves to clarify and, perhaps, extends somewhat previous 
holdings of this court. Therefore, in the interests of fairness, and because the 
parties to First Judicial District Court, Civil Docket 117, , were very likely 
misled by the district court having purported to dismiss that action, as well as 
the underlying proceedings before the county commissioners, we will further 
direct that the parties to that action may pursue their respective appeals to 
the district court from the decision of the county commissioners. Such action 
must be commenced within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, or the 
decision of the county commissioners will be final, with the only further action 
required being that M & E must fulfill the remaining requirements of the 
governing statutes if they wish a private road. We emphasize again, that the 
concept of a common law way of necessity should, in any event, play no part in 
the review of the county commissioners' decision by the district 
court.

[¶16.]  It is suggested that, by this opinion, we 
legislate. The suggestion is patently incorrect. The critical decision which is 
the foundation for this opinion is Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042. The United 
States Supreme Court read Snell just exactly as it is read in the majority 
opinion of this court. Leo Sheep Co. v. United 
States, 440 U.S.  at 680, 99 S. Ct.  at 1410. Thus, 
it cannot accurately be said that the result is "strained." It is unfortunate 
that subsequent decisions of this court failed to fully recognize the holding of 
Snell v. Ruppert, but none of those decisions employ the "way of necessity" as a 
remedy, and the discussion of it amounts to nothing more than dicta. This 
probably resulted because it was not necessary to fully explore the 
concept of the "way of necessity" in those cases.

[¶17.]  Because of this disposition, we need not 
address the other issues raised by the parties.

[¶18.]  Reversed and remanded to the district 
court with directions that the district court dismiss the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction. Further, the order of the district court dismissing the petitions 
for review in the related matter arising before the county commissioners is 
reversed and the district court is instructed to vacate that order. The parties 
to the petitions for review of the order of the Laramie County Commissioners may 
continue their appeals in the district court in accordance with the directions 
provided in this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 We note that the 
reference to a common law way of necessity was dicta in the Miller case. The 
distinction between a common law way of necessity and an implied easement is an 
extremely important one. 2 Thompson on Real Property § 362 (1980 
Repl.).

2 The discussion of the 
common law way of necessity in Bush is also largely dicta, because the court was 
really concerned with an implied easement, rather than a common law way of 
necessity. As noted by Professor Thompson, the confusion between the two is not 
uncommon. 2 Thompson on Real Property § 362 (1980 Repl.). Upon close analysis, 
we agree with the United States Supreme Court that Wyoming no longer 
recognizes a common law way of necessity. Bush, 754 P.2d  at 163 fn. 3; Leo Sheep 
Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 680, 99 S. Ct. 1403, 1410, 59 L. Ed. 2d 677 
(1979).

     We note here also that 
some states treat all such easements by statute which does add clarity to this 
area of the law. See Parham v. Reddick, 537 So. 2d 132, 135-36 (Fla.App. 
1988).

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶19.]  For almost one hundred years, the 
statutes of the State of Wyoming have provided for the establishment of 
a private road in favor of "[a]ny person whose land has no outlet to, nor 
connection with a public road, * * *." Section 24-9-101, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1990). In the course of that one hundred years, this court has considered the 
legal concept of a private way of necessity on at least five occasions. In none 
of these cases, contrary to the implication of the majority, has there been any 
suggestion of any constitutional antithesis with respect to the common-law way 
of necessity. This history is consistent with the legal fact that the common-law 
way of necessity is not a taking, while the constitutional provision is intended 
to authorize a taking; instead, it is a doctrine of an implied grant. Stated 
another way, the common-law way of necessity is a doctrine of conveyancing; it 
is not an aspect of the doctrine of eminent domain.

[¶20.]  The majority asserts a holding in Snell 
v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975), that a "common law way of 
necessity is theoretically incompatible with Art I, § 32 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, * * *." (At 290). To ascribe such a holding to Snell is certainly 
overly bold, if not a clear mistake. To suggest, as the majority does, that 
"[i]t is unfortunate that subsequent decisions of this court failed to fully 
recognize the holding of Snell v. Ruppert," (at 291) is simply wrong because 
there is no such holding. The only holding of Snell in this regard is that it 
was not necessary for the owner of the landlocked tract to first pursue the 
common-law way of necessity before invoking the statutory remedy. It is 
marginally acceptable for advocates to invoke selective reading of court 
opinions, but it is inappropriate for a court to treat its own precedents in 
that fashion.

[¶21.]  This court consistently has ruled that 
the statutory right to have a private road established is an alternative remedy 
to the common-law way of necessity for the owner of the landlocked tract. I do 
not perceive this case as one in which it is either appropriate or necessary to 
abolish legal precedent that is long standing and presumably has been accepted 
by the legislature. Because I have a serious question as to whether this case 
can be resolved according to the majority opinion, I dissent.

[¶22.]  In McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 
1288 (Wyo. 
1980), this court said:

"* * * In McIlquham v. 
Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 1909, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20 [1909], this court 
implicitly found that the statute [the predecessor of Section 24-9-101, W.S. 
1977 (Cum. Supp. 1990)] was an alternative remedy and it was not intended to 
supplant the common-law right of a grantee to a means of access to his land over 
the lands of his grantor."

McGuire, in 
terms of its ratio decidendi, dealt with the application of the statute and the 
requirements incorporated in it for establishing a private road pursuant to 
it.

[¶23.]  In a similar vein, in Snell, when 
confronted with a contention that Ruppert did not qualify for relief under the 
statute because he had available to him a common-law way of necessity, the court 
recognized Ruppert's right to invoke the statute. The court said:

"The Snells contend that 
a condition precedent to proceeding under the statute is that Ruppert must first 
proceed in a civil action to enforce a common-law way of necessity across 
intervening lots of the subdivision. There is no such condition imposed by the 
statute. We cannot stretch, extend, enlarge nor amend what the legislature has 
clearly said." Snell, 541 P.2d  at 1046.

On the same 
page, however, at footnote 4, the alternative remedy concept was clearly 
articulated:

"By our holding here, we 
do not foreclose the possibility that a common-law way of necessity can be 
imposed in a proper case where the isolated landowner chooses that course. While 
not in point because it did not consider the statutory procedure and was a clear 
case against the granting of a way of necessity, McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson 
Live Stock Co., 1909, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20, does ponder the granting or denial 
of a common-law way of necessity."

For the majority 
to conclude only that "[f]ootnote 4 of the Snell opinion does detract from the 
clear language used in the body of the opinion" (at 290) is a classic 
understatement. This recognition of the alternative remedy is consistently 
maintained in Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980), and in Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1988). In this 
latter case, the court said:

"Such a common-law way of 
necessity does not constitute a taking subject to constitutional 
restraints found in Art. 1, §§ 32 and 33 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming 
because the common law presumes that the grant of ingress and egress from land 
conveyed by the owner of the servient estate was intended by the parties. Snell 
v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975); 3 R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property, supra, Ch. 34, ¶ 410 at 61-68. The rule of the common law 
is that a way of necessity goes with the land constituting the dominant estate, 
and no payment of additional compensation is contemplated." Bush, 754 P.2d  at 
163.

[¶24.]  With this history in perspective, a 
critical evaluation of the rationale of the majority opinion is in order. The 
point of departure is the statement at of the majority opinion that:

"* * * Opposed is a 
policy that recognizes that it is unfair or inequitable to permit a landlocked 
landowner to claim, without compensation, a way of necessity across the lands of 
his grantor which could have been provided for at the time of purchase and 
conveyance and which may have resulted in a reduced final cost of the 
land."

The authority 
apparently cited for this novel comment is 2 Thompson on Real Property, §§ 
362-368 (1980 Repl.). A careful reading of that text fails to disclose any basis 
for the statement articulated by the majority. In any event, it is clearly 
incompatible with the Wyoming precedent cited above.

[¶25.]  There can be little doubt that this court 
has acknowledged the statutory recognition of the common-law way of necessity by 
the adoption of § 8-1-101, W.S. 1977. Snell, 541 P.2d 1042. The majority now 
holds that the statutory adoption of this common-law remedy was repealed by 
implication by the adoption of § 24-1-109, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1990). In light 
of the continual recognition by this court of the proposition of alternative 
remedies, repeal by implication is highly suspect. It appears that the majority 
has misread the legislative intent in the same way that the precedents of this 
court have been misread and given a strained interpretation. Not only that, but 
the majority has abdicated the interpretation of Wyoming law to the federal 
judiciary.

[¶26.]  I am satisfied that the court has usurped 
the prerogative of the legislature in this instance and has achieved a result by 
judicial legislation. This case can be resolved without that judicial 
legislation, and it should be. I agree that the Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment must be reversed, but the case should be remanded for trial of 
genuine issues of material fact. Those issues of material fact relate to a 
determination of the prior events surrounding the effort to establish a private 
road under the statute. The legal issues then to be resolved would relate to the 
impact of that effort upon the common-law way of necessity. For 
example:

1. Is the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel applicable?

2. Has there been an 
election of remedies by Murray and Edwards?

3. Did that effort 
manifest a waiver or abandonment of the alternative remedy?

While I am satisfied that the summary 
judgment must be reversed, the correct resolution of this case is to remand it 
for trial. There is no justification, other than a legislative decision, to 
direct that the case must be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.