Title: Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices  
 
JOSEPH D. MORRISSEY 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 001139 
November 3, 2000 
 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, EX REL. 
THIRD DISTRICT COMMITTEE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Alfred D. Swersky, Kenneth E. Trabue,  
and H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judges 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal of right by an attorney from an order of 
suspension, the central question is whether an excessive 
sanction was imposed. 
II. 
A. 
 
A circuit court consisting of three judges appointed 
pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935 found Joseph Dee Morrissey, a 
member of the Virginia State Bar, guilty of one violation of 
Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) and two violations of Disciplinary 
Rule 1-102(A)(3).  The court received evidence in aggravation 
and mitigation, including Morrissey's prior record of 
discipline.  The court suspended Morrissey's license to 
practice law in this Commonwealth for a period of three years. 
B. 
 
Former Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A), which was in effect at 
the time of Morrissey's misconduct, stated in relevant part: 
 
"A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his 
client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or 
a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a 
proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in 
good faith to test the validity of such rule or 
ruling." 
 
Former Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A), which was in effect at the 
time of Morrissey's misconduct, stated: 
 
"A lawyer shall not: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"(3) Commit a crime or other deliberately 
wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law."*
 
 
Even though Morrissey does not challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the court's findings that he 
violated the aforementioned disciplinary rules, we will 
summarize the evidence because that evidence is relevant to 
the court's sanction, which Morrissey contends is excessive.  
Consistent with well-established appellate principles, we will 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Virginia 
State Bar, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  El-Amin 
v. Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 608, 612, 514 S.E.2d 163, 165 
(1999); Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 619, 385 
S.E.2d 597, 598 (1989). 
                     
* Former Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) is substantially the 
same as current Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(d).  
 
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The Harris Matter 
 
Joel W. Harris was indicted by a multi-jurisdiction grand 
jury impaneled from the City of Richmond and the Counties of 
Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico for violation of certain 
felony drug laws.  He retained Morrissey as his defense 
attorney.  The Commonwealth terminated prosecution of the 
charges against Harris by nolle prosequi. 
 
Morrissey hired an investigator to interview witnesses 
who had testified against Harris before the multi-jurisdiction 
grand jury.  The investigator interviewed John F. Buerkley, 
one of the multi-jurisdiction grand jury witnesses.  The 
investigator subsequently arranged an interview between 
Morrissey and Buerkley.  During the videotaped interview, 
Buerkley recanted much of the testimony that he had provided 
to the multi-jurisdiction grand jury. 
 
Two days after this interview, a federal grand jury 
indicted Harris on federal narcotics distribution charges.  On 
the day that the federal grand jury indicted Harris, James B. 
Comey, an Assistant United States Attorney assigned to 
prosecute the Harris case, forwarded a letter dated February 
4, 1997, by hand and facsimile, to Morrissey and attached a 
copy of Local Rule 57, promulgated by the United States 
                                                                
Former Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) has been replaced by 
Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b). 
 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  Local 
Rule 57 prohibits lawyers from making public statements about 
the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective 
witnesses, or from giving any opinion about the merits of a 
pending case.  Comey forwarded the letter and a copy of the 
local rule to Morrissey because Comey was concerned about the 
extensive media attention that the Commonwealth's case against 
Harris had received before the order of nolle prosequi was 
entered.  Comey testified that he "was specifically very 
concerned about some of the publicity that had gone on in this 
case while it was a state case.  And also [he] was . . . 
concerned about Mr. Morrissey's practice in defending cases 
and [Comey] wanted to make sure everybody was on notice that 
the federal rules were quite strict and quite clear." 
 
On February 11, 1997, Comey learned that Morrissey 
intended to hold a press conference at 3:00 p.m. on that date 
and permit the media to view Morrissey's videotaped interview 
of Buerkley, who was a potential witness in the federal 
prosecution.  Comey immediately sent a letter, by facsimile, 
to Morrissey, warning him not to proceed with the press 
conference.  Morrissey received Comey's letter and contacted 
certain attorneys and solicited their opinions about whether 
he should proceed with the press conference.  Some of the 
attorneys, including a former Assistant United States 
 
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Attorney, advised Morrissey that he would have "a problem" if 
he proceeded with the press conference.  Nonetheless, 
Morrissey held the press conference, issued a press release, 
and permitted the media to view the videotape of the Buerkley 
interview. 
 
On February 12, 1997, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a show cause order 
against Morrissey for his alleged willful violation of that 
court's Local Rule 57.  During a hearing on the show cause 
motion, the court issued a contempt citation against Morrissey 
and gave the following warning to him:  "I want it understood 
from here on out that this case will not be tried in the 
media.  It will be tried in this Court.  And any infractions 
of that admonition will be met with a harsh result." 
 
On April 1, 1997, about two weeks before Harris' 
scheduled federal trial, Morrissey made statements to a 
newspaper reporter about the Harris case, which were 
subsequently published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch 
newspaper.  Morrissey stated that the charges against Harris 
were "vindictive and vicious," and Morrissey questioned 
whether the charges should have ever been filed.  Morrissey 
also remarked that if these charges had been filed when he was 
the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, the 
charges would have been "laughed . . . out of court." 
 
5
 
The United States District Court issued another show 
cause order against Morrissey, and the court found that he had 
"willfully, intentionally, and contumaciously" violated Local 
Rule 57.  The court entered an order which sentenced Morrissey 
to 90 days' imprisonment and three years' probation for two 
counts of contempt, and the court suspended his license to 
practice law in the federal court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia for two years.  Morrissey's appeal from that judgment 
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit.  See In re Joseph D. Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999). 
The Chesterfield County Circuit Court Proceeding
 
In October 1997, Morrissey appeared in the Circuit Court 
of Chesterfield County to represent a criminal defendant 
during the sentencing phase of a trial.  The Honorable William 
R. Shelton, who presided during the trial, fixed the 
defendant's punishment at 25 years' imprisonment with ten 
years suspended.  After the court had pronounced its sentence, 
Morrissey stated in response:  "That's outrageous, that is 
absolutely outrageous."  The court cited Morrissey for 
contempt and sentenced him to ten days in jail.  Then, 
Morrissey raised his voice and "took two or three steps from 
the counsel table towards the bench" and stated, "I have never 
seen a more jaded, more bitter, more angry jurist in my life."  
 
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Morrissey accused the court of sentencing Morrissey's client 
unfairly because of the court's purported dislike for 
Morrissey.  The court sentenced Morrissey to 30 days in the 
county jail for violating Code § 18.2-456(3) and -456(4). 
Morrissey's Prior Disciplinary Record
 
In March 1986, Morrissey was found guilty of contempt of 
court in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.  Morrissey 
lost his temper, shouted at the presiding judge, and continued 
to argue with the court after it had ruled.  Morrissey was 
found guilty of contempt of court and fined $50.  The court 
vacated the contempt conviction after Morrissey wrote a letter 
of apology. 
 
In December 1987, the Circuit Court of the County of 
Henrico held Morrissey in contempt of court twice during the 
course of a single trial.  He was fined $50 for the first 
offense and $100 for the second offense.  In May 1988, the 
Circuit Court of Henrico County held Morrissey in contempt of 
court and imposed a fine of $50. 
 
In December 1990, Morrissey was issued a private 
reprimand from the Virginia State Bar because he had failed to 
file timely a petition for appeal on behalf of a client, and 
he also failed to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of that client.  He also failed to file a petition 
 
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for appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia for that client, 
and he failed to inform the client of his omissions. 
 
In June 1991, Morrissey, then Commonwealth's Attorney for 
the City of Richmond, appeared in the Richmond General 
District Court because he was upset that the court refused to 
accept a plea agreement that an assistant Commonwealth's 
Attorney had proposed to the court.  After a heated exchange 
between Morrissey and the presiding judge, Morrissey wrote a 
letter to the judge which stated in part: 
"Although I was unfailingly courteous to you, it was 
evident to everybody that you were trying to bait me 
— perhaps so you could hold me in contempt.  Please 
be assured . . . that if that behavior ever, ever, 
happens again, I will not be so kind as to merely 
draft you a letter of indignation." 
 
The general district court found Morrissey guilty of contempt 
of court, the circuit court upheld the conviction, and the 
circuit court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  
Morrissey v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 172, 428 S.E.2d 503 
(1993). 
 
In 1991, Morrissey was sentenced to jail for ten days, 
with five days suspended, for contempt of court because he was 
involved in a fist fight with opposing counsel in a criminal 
trial which was conducted in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond.  Thereafter, a three-judge court entered an order 
which reprimanded Morrissey for his unprofessional conduct. 
 
8
 
In 1993, a three-judge court suspended Morrissey's law 
license for six months because of misconduct which constituted 
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" in violation 
of former Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4).  Morrissey, while 
serving as Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 
arranged a plea bargain in a rape prosecution.  Under the 
terms of the plea agreement, a felony rape charge against a 
criminal defendant was reduced to a misdemeanor, and the 
defendant's father paid $25,000 to the victim and $25,000 to 
charities designated by Morrissey.  At a hearing before the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, when the court accepted 
the plea agreement, Morrissey directed the defendant's 
attorney not to tell the court about the part of the plea 
agreement relating to the defendant's father's contributions 
to charities of Morrissey's choice.  Morrissey also concealed 
this portion of the agreement from the victim, who had 
indicated to Morrissey that she wanted more than $25,000 as an 
"accord and satisfaction." 
 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the order of suspension.  
Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar, 248 Va. 334, 343-44, 448 
S.E.2d 615, 620 (1994).  We stated that "Morrissey's carefully 
orchestrated scheme was designed to secure something of value 
to Morrissey — the possibility that members of the donee 
charities would express their gratitude in the form of 
 
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political support in the forthcoming election" and that his 
conduct violated former Disciplinary Rule 8-101(A)(3). 
 
In 1993, while still serving as the Commonwealth's 
Attorney for the City of Richmond, Morrissey unilaterally 
amended an arrest warrant for a criminal defendant, thereby 
reducing the charged offense from driving under the influence 
to reckless driving, a misdemeanor.  Morrissey amended the 
arrest warrant without the knowledge or consent of the circuit 
court, in contravention of the Rules of Court.  Morrissey 
received a sanction from the Virginia State Bar in the form of 
a dismissal with terms in which Morrissey agreed to write a 
letter of apology to the court. 
III. 
 
Morrissey argues that the three-judge court "abused its 
discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously suspending [his] 
license to practice law for three years" because the 
suspension is inconsistent with the punishment imposed by the 
federal court in the Harris matter and the state court in the 
Chesterfield County Circuit Court proceeding.  Continuing, 
Morrissey alleges that the suspension is inconsistent with 
discipline imposed in other attorney discipline cases, that 
the suspension is excessive and that the suspension is not 
warranted by Morrissey's prior disciplinary record.  
Morrissey's arguments are without merit. 
 
10
 
The penalty imposed by a three-judge court in a 
disciplinary proceeding is viewed on appeal as prima facie 
correct, and it will not be disturbed unless, upon our 
independent examination of the whole record, we conclude that 
the court abused its discretion.  El-Amin, 257 Va. at 620, 514 
S.E.2d at 170.  Additionally, a court has broad discretion to 
impose penalties, and our holding in Maddy v. First District 
Committee, 205 Va. 652, 658, 139 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1964), is 
equally pertinent here: 
 
"In arriving at the punishment to be imposed, 
precedents are of little aid, and each case must be 
largely governed by its particular facts, and the 
matter rests in the sound discretion of the court.  
The question is not what punishment may the offense 
warrant, but what does it require as a penalty to 
the offender, as a deterrent to others, and as an 
indication to laymen that the courts will maintain 
the ethics of the profession."  (Citation omitted). 
 
Accord Delk v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 187, 193, 355 
S.E.2d 558, 562 (1987); see also Gibbs v. Virginia State Bar, 
232 Va. 39, 42, 348 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1986); Pickus v. Virginia 
State Bar, 232 Va. 5, 15, 348 S.E.2d 202, 208-09 (1986). 
 
Applying these principles, we hold that the court did not 
abuse its discretion by suspending Morrissey's license for a 
term of three years.  The evidence, which we will not repeat, 
clearly establishes that Morrissey has exhibited a pattern of 
disrespect for the judiciary, the rules of practice, and the 
laws of this Commonwealth.  He has repeatedly been sanctioned 
 
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because of his misconduct, as exemplified by the number of 
contempt of court sanctions that he has received.  He has 
often exhibited disrespect for the authority of the courts in 
which he has appeared. 
 
Contrary to Morrissey's assertions, he did not merely 
"aggressively" assert the rights of his clients.  Rather, the 
record demonstrates that he has repeatedly acted in flagrant 
disregard of the ethics and standards necessary to maintain 
public confidence in the legal profession.  A suspension of 
three years is appropriate to protect the public and deter 
others from committing similar misconduct. 
 
We also disagree with Morrissey's contention that the 
suspension is inappropriate because he has been punished by 
the federal district court and the Circuit Court for 
Chesterfield County.  Morrissey ignores the distinction 
between a criminal contempt proceeding and an attorney 
disciplinary proceeding.  A proceeding to discipline an 
attorney is not a criminal proceeding, and the primary purpose 
of an attorney disciplinary proceeding is to protect the 
public.  Seventh Dist. Comm. v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284, 183 
S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971).  The purpose of punishment in such 
proceeding is to deter others and to demonstrate to the public 
that the Bar and the judiciary will maintain the ethics of the 
legal profession.  Maddy, 205 Va. at 658, 139 S.E.2d at 60.  
 
12
By contrast, criminal contempt proceedings are punitive in 
nature and are designed to preserve the power and vindicate 
the dignity of the court.  Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303, 307, 
296 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1982); Steelworkers v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding, 220 Va. 547, 549, 260 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1979).  
Even though Morrissey has been punished by the federal 
district court and the Circuit Court for Chesterfield County, 
the purpose of the suspension imposed by the three-judge court 
in this disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public and 
to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct. 
 
We observe that Morrissey's lack of civility and 
deplorable conduct during the hearing in the Circuit Court for 
Chesterfield County, alone, would have been sufficient to 
warrant the imposition of a three-year suspension.  The 
judicial process cannot function and the public will have no 
confidence in the judicial process if attorneys are permitted 
to act disrespectfully toward the judiciary, intentionally 
ignore Rules of Court, and engage in conduct which is 
detrimental to the legal profession and the public interest.  
 
We find no merit in Morrissey's contention that his prior 
record "is so remote in terms of time, place, and 
circumstances that it does not reflect upon Morrissey's 
current fitness to practice law."  Our independent review of 
the record in this case indicates that during his career, 
 
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Morrissey has exhibited a pattern of misconduct and a lack of 
respect for the dignity, civility, and integrity of the legal 
profession. 
 
We do not consider Morrissey's argument that federal 
Local Rule 57 is unconstitutional because, as his counsel 
conceded at the bar of this Court, Morrissey failed to raise 
that argument before the three-judge court.  Rule 5:25. 
IV.  Conclusion
 
Finding no merit in Morrissey's assignment of error, we 
will affirm the judgment of the court suspending Morrissey's 
license to practice law for a period of three years. 
Affirmed. 
 
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