Title: State v. Thompkins

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, V. THOMPKINS ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State v. Thompkins (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law -- Drug offenses -- R.C. 2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 
2925.23(H) do not violate the due process or equal protection 
provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
R.C. 2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 2925.23(H) do not violate the due process 
or equal protection provisions of the Ohio or United States Constitutions. 
 
(No. 95-450 -- Submitted February 20, 1996 -- Decided ______, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Nos. 14851 
et al. 
 
This appeal involves thirty-three cases which were consolidated by the 
Second District Court of Appeals.  In each case, the Montgomery County Court 
of Common Pleas refused to impose a mandatory driver’s license suspension 
for an individual convicted of a drug offense.  Based upon its decision in State 
v. DeVoise (Dec. 30, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 14701, unreported, the 
appellate court reversed each case.  The matter is now before this court upon an 
allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
__________ 
 
2 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Lynn G. Koeller, Montgomery County Public Defender, Anthony R. 
Cicero and Charles L. Grove, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State 
Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, Deputy Chief Counsel, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, state of Ohio. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.   At issue is the validity of R.C. 
2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 2925.23(H),1 which mandate driver’s license 
suspensions upon conviction for drug offenses.  Each appellant in this 
consolidated appeal was subject to one of the three cited statutes.  The 
appellants challenge the constitutionality of these statutes on due process and 
equal protection grounds.2  For the following reasons, we reject their 
challenges.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the court of appeals. 
 
We begin our discussion with the premise that all statutes are presumed 
constitutional.  The party challenging the statutes bears the burden of proving 
 
3 
otherwise.  Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, 
166; Univ. Hts. v. O’Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 22 O.O.3d 372, 
375, 429 N.E.2d 148, 152.  Further, the legislation being questioned will not be 
invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Arnold at 38-39, 616 N.E.2d at 166. 
 
In challenging the statutes at issue, appellants contend that the 
mandatory license suspension provisions contained in these statutes violate 
their right to due process of the law pursuant to the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions.  They make such an assertion because the laws at issue impose 
mandatory license suspensions upon all drug offenders regardless of whether a 
motor vehicle was used in the commission of the crime.  Contrary to 
appellants’ position, we believe that R.C. 2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 
2925.23(H) are a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s police powers and 
find these statutes to be constitutional. 
 
Pursuant to its police powers, the General Assembly has the authority to 
enact laws defining criminal conduct and to prescribe its punishment.  We 
recognize that this authority is not unfettered and that almost every exercise of 
 
4 
the police power will necessarily interfere with the enjoyment of liberty or the 
acquisition or possession of property, or involve an injury to a person.  See 
Benjamin v. Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 110, 4 O.O.2d 113, 117, 146 
N.E.2d 854, 860.  Nevertheless, laws passed by virtue of the police power will 
be upheld if they bear a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be 
obtained, namely, the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, 
and are not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or unreasonable. Cincinnati v. 
Correll (1943), 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 26 O.O. 116, 118, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414.  
The federal test is similar.  To determine whether such statutes are 
constitutional under federal scrutiny, we must decide if there is a rational 
relationship between the statute and its purpose. Fabrey v. McDonald Village 
Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 354, 639 N.E.2d 31, 34 citing 
Martinez v. California (1980), 444 U.S. 277, 283, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 
L.Ed.2d 481, 488. 
 
The state and amicus curiae set forth several legislative goals for the 
enactments of the laws at issue.  These goals include the desire to keep the 
highways clear of people who have demonstrated a willingness to abandon 
 
5 
their physical and mental acuity to drugs, the desire to inhibit the ability to buy, 
sell, transport or use controlled substances, and the need to address society’s 
concern that drug offenses present a critical safety problem for which strong 
punishment is appropriate. 
 
We find a mandatory license suspension is rationally related to these 
goals.  The mandatory suspension serves as an effective means to protect other 
drivers and passengers on the roads and to deter future drug use and punish 
offenders.  It is immaterial that an automobile may not have been used in the 
commission of the crime.  The General Assembly has chosen appropriate 
means to meet its goals.  The laws at issue do not violate the due process of law 
guarantees of the Ohio or United States Constitutions. 
       
 
Appellants also challenge the statutes at issue on equal protection 
grounds under both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  The standard for 
determining if a statute violates equal protection is “essentially the same under 
state and federal law.”  Fabrey, supra, at 353, 639 N.E.2d at 33.  “Under a 
traditional equal protection analysis, class distinctions in legislation are 
permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
 
6 
objective.  Departures from traditional equal protection principles are permitted 
only when burdens upon suspect classifications or abridgments of fundamental 
rights are involved.”  State ex rel. Vana v. Maple Hts. City Council (1990), 54 
Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 561 N.E.2d 909, 911, citing Clements v. Fashing (1982), 
457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843-2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508, 516. Under 
rational-basis scrutiny, legislative distinctions are invalid only if they bear no 
relation to the state’s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them.  
Fabrey at 353, 639 N.E.2d at 33. 
 
Appellants argue that the classification created here includes all drug 
offenders, regardless of whether a motor vehicle was used in the commission of 
the offense.  They contend that this class is subject to discrimination solely on 
the basis of the type of offense and they believe it is not rational to discriminate 
against this class for purposes of deterring the use of motor vehicles in drug 
crimes or simply deterring drug crimes. 
 
First, we question whether the statutes at issue create a classification at 
all.  All drug offenders are treated equally under these statutes.  The laws 
simply impose a penalty on persons who have been convicted of a drug crime.  
 
7 
See State v. DeVoise (Dec. 30, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 14701, 
unreported (Grady, P.J., concurring, at 6).  However, assuming a classification 
is found, we find that there is a rational basis for the legislation.  As previously 
noted, these laws serve to punish drug offenders, to deter the future use of 
drugs, and to protect the health and welfare of society.  Thus, the statutes at 
issue do not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Ohio or United 
States Constitutions. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 
2925.23(H) do not violate the due process or equal protection provisions of the 
Ohio or United States Constitutions. 
 
Finally, we note that by our decision today, we join other courts across 
this nation which have considered similar constitutional challenges to similar 
suspension statutes and have found such statutes constitutional.  See, e.g., 
People v. Zinn (Colo.1993), 843 P.2d 1351; Plowman v. Pennsylvania Dept. of 
Transp. (1993), 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124; Quiller v. Bowman (1993), 262 Ga. 
769, 425 S.E.2d 641; Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1992), 413 
 
8 
Mass. 265, 596 N.E.2d 340; and State v. Wolfe (App.1995), 193 Wis.2d 641, 
537 N.W.2d 435, 1995 WL 228329 (unpublished opinion).  
Judgments affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, SUNDERMANN, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN, JR., J., of the First Appellate District, sitting 
for WRIGHT, J. 
Footnotes: 
1 
R.C. 2925.03(M) states in part: 
 
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, 
the court may revoke, and if it does not revoke the license, shall suspend for 
not less than six months nor more than five years, the driver’s or commercial 
driver’s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a 
violation of this section that is a felony of the first degree and shall suspend for 
not less than six months nor more than five years the driver’s or commercial 
driver’s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to any other 
violation of this section ***.” 
 
9 
 
R.C. 2925.11(F)(1) provides in part: 
 
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, 
the court shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the 
driver’s license or commercial driver’s license of any person who is convicted 
of or pleads guilty to a violation of this section.” 
 
R.C. 2925.23(H) states in part: 
 
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, 
the court shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the 
driver’s or commercial driver’s license of any person who is convicted of or 
has pleaded guilty to a violation of this section.  ***” 
2 
The appellants also argue that the statutes in question were enacted 
pursuant to Section 159, Title 23, U.S. Code, which violates the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  However, this issue was neither 
raised in the trial court, nor passed upon by the court of appeals.  Therefore, it 
is not properly before us now.  State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 
OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277.