Title: People v. Blue

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 94564-Agenda 7-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							MURRAY BLUE, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, Murray Blue, asks the
court to decide whether principles of collateral estoppel embodied in
the double jeopardy protections of our state and federal constitutions
(U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10) bar the State
from seeking the death penalty should defendant be convicted for the
first degree murder of Louis Moret upon retrial. We find that, under
the circumstances presented, double jeopardy principles do not
preclude the State from attempting to secure a death sentence.
BACKGROUND
	On March 8, 1995, defendant was arrested and charged with
multiple crimes, including the first degree murder of Chicago police
officer Daniel Doffyn, in relation to two separate shooting incidents
which occurred that day. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000).
That same day, defendant was also charged with the February 26,
1995, murder of Louis Moret, pursuant to a warrant issued March 4,
1995. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 114.
	The State opted to try the Doffyn murder and related crimes first.
After a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was
found guilty of the first degree murder of Officer Doffyn, as well as
three counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of
aggravated battery with a firearm, and two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at
103. With respect to the first degree murder conviction, the trial court
imposed the death penalty after the jury found defendant eligible based
on the statutory aggravating factor found in section 9-1(b)(1) of the
Criminal Code of 1961, that the "murdered individual was a peace
officer *** killed in the course of performing his official duties, ***
and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered
individual was a peace officer" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 1998)),
and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death sentence. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 103.
Defendant then brought a direct appeal to this court (134 Ill. 2d R.
302(b)).
	While the appeal of defendant's conviction and sentence for
Officer Doffyn's murder was pending, defendant was tried for Moret's
murder and found guilty. Again, the State sought the death penalty,
this time arguing that defendant was eligible under the multiple-murder aggravating factor because defendant had been convicted of
murdering two individuals. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998).
Defendant was sentenced to death after the jury found defendant
eligible under section 9-1(b)(3) and, further, that there were no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
sentence. See People v. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (2001). Defendant
appealed this conviction and sentence directly to this court.
	On January 27, 2000, this court issued an opinion with regard to
defendant's first appeal. We held that defendant was denied a fair trial
because of cumulative errors which occurred during defendant's trial
for the murder of Officer Doffyn. As a result, defendant's convictions
were reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. People v. Blue,
189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000). Shortly thereafter, defendant was retried and
again found guilty of Officer Doffyn's murder. At defendant's capital
sentencing hearing the State argued that defendant was eligible for the
death penalty pursuant to section 9-1(b)(1), because the murdered
individual was a peace officer. In addition, the State argued that
defendant was also eligible for the death penalty pursuant to section
9-1(b)(3), because defendant now stood convicted for the first degree
murder of a second individual, Louis Moret. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1),
(b)(3) (West 1998). The jury found defendant eligible for the death
penalty under both statutory factors. Nevertheless, the jury declined
to sentence defendant to death and the trial court imposed a sentence
of natural life in prison.
	After defendant was retried and sentenced for the Doffyn murder,
the direct appeal of his conviction for the murder of Louis Moret
came before this court. On September 27, 2001, this court reversed
that conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial
court had improperly limited defendant's cross-examination of certain
key State witnesses. People v. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d 1 (2001). Prior to
retrial, defendant filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to bar the
State from initiating death penalty procedures should he again be
convicted of Moret's murder. Defendant posited that implicit in the
section 9-1(b)(3) statutory aggravating factor is the notion that a
defendant convicted of first degree murder for the first time is not
eligible for the death penalty and that it is only after defendant's
second conviction for first degree murder that he becomes death
eligible. Extrapolating from this concept, defendant theorized that
when a defendant is tried separately for the commission of two
unrelated murders, as is the case here, one of the murder convictions,
logically, must be the first conviction, while the other murder
conviction must be the second conviction. Expanding on this theory,
defendant contended that if a person is convicted of committing two
separate, unrelated murders and the multiple-murder aggravating
factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998)) is the sole basis for
finding that person eligible for the death penalty, the State can have
only one opportunity to seek the death penalty with respect to these
two murders. He further contended that, once the State tries the
defendant for one of the two murders, obtains a conviction, and uses
that conviction as the aggravating factor to seek the death penalty at
the trial for the other murder, the earlier conviction is determined to
be the "first conviction." The State is then bound by that
determination and, with respect to those two murders, principles of
collateral estoppel prevent the State from later "reversing the order"
of these convictions.
	Applying this theory to his current situation, defendant contended
that when the jury found him eligible for the death penalty pursuant to
section 9-1(b)(3) following his retrial for the murder of Officer
Doffyn, the jury made a legally binding determination that the Moret
murder was defendant's "first conviction" and, thus by definition, the
non-death-eligible conviction. Accordingly, defendant concluded that
the State should be barred by principles of collateral estoppel
embodied in the double jeopardy protections of our state and federal
constitutions from attempting to establish the Doffyn murder as
defendant's first conviction to prove defendant eligible for the death
sentence under section 9-1(b)(3) for the murder of Moret at his
retrial.
	Defendant also argued that when the jury declined to impose the
death penalty after defendant's retrial for the murder of Officer
Doffyn, that verdict was "a final judgement that determined whether
the defendant is to be given death on the convictions of killing Daniel
Doffyn and Louis Moret." Accordingly, defendant argued that "the
verdict of no death based upon the [two convictions] is an acquittal on
the death issue based upon [the section 9-1(b)(3)] aggravating factor
and a new death hearing is barred by double jeopardy."
	The trial court rejected defendant's arguments and denied
defendant's motion to bar the State from initiating death penalty
proceedings. Defendant then brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)). This court
assumed jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)).
ANALYSIS
	The double jeopardy clause contained within the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. There are three separate protections
embraced by this double jeopardy clause: (1) protection against retrial
for the same offense after an acquittal, (2) protection against retrial for
the same offense after a conviction, and (3) protection against multiple
punishment for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664-65, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969);
People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324, 333 (1992). These protections are
also guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides
that "[n]o person shall be *** twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10; People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138
(1993).
	As a general rule, the protections afforded by the double jeopardy
clause are limited to the "same offense." Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995). However,
because collateral estoppel principles are embodied in the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy (Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970)), an issue of
ultimate fact, if determined by a valid and final judgment, may not be
relitigated in a future proceeding. This does not mean, however, that
"the double jeopardy clause *** prevent[s] a state from selecting a
penalty independently for each crime a person commits." Kokoraleis
v. Gilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1997). Nor does it violate
double jeopardy principles for a defendant to be convicted and
sentenced for a crime even though the conduct underlying that offense
has been considered in determining the defendant's sentence for a
previous conviction. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.  at 398, 132 L. Ed. 2d  at 363, 115 S. Ct.  at 2205; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 3 L. Ed. 2d 516, 79 S. Ct. 421 (1959).
	Applying the above principles, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that collateral estoppel does not apply to prohibit a
State from seeking capital punishment a second time for the same
series of murders that was before a prior jury. Kokoraleis, 131 F.3d 
at 695. In Kokoraleis, the defendant was a serial killer who had
confessed to murdering as many as 18 women. Defendant was tried
and convicted for the murder of Rose Beck Davis, but the jury
decided not to impose the death penalty. Thereafter, defendant was
convicted for the murder of Lori Borowski and sentenced to death.
He appealed his death sentence, claiming that capital punishment for
the Borowski murder was precluded by the fact that the other jury had
decided not to impose the death penalty. The court held:
			"Kokoraleis tells us that the question decided by the jury
in the Cook County prosecution was 'whether he should be
put to death for torturing and being a serial killer of sixteen
to eighteen women.' Phrasing the question in this way makes
it possible to say that the two juries decided the same issue.
But this is not the question either jury decided. The Cook
County jury selected the punishment for the murder of Rose
Beck Davis; the DuPage County jury chose the punishment
for the murder of Lori Borowski. Each jury was entitled to
consider facts about Kokoraleis' background, including his
other criminal acts (which by the time of the prosecution for
the Borowski murder included a prior murder conviction),
but this does not mean that the punishment in a given case is
for these other crimes; it is for the crime of which the
defendant now stands convicted." Kokoraleis, 131 F.3d  at
695.
	In the case at bar, defendant raised the same argument made by
the defendant in Kokoraleis and the trial court rejected it. Defendant
has since abandoned this argument in his appeal before this court.(1)
Consequently, the only argument which defendant has presented for
our consideration is whether the State is precluded from seeking the
death penalty at defendant's retrial for Moret's murder because the
jury at defendant's resentencing for Doffyn's murder "ruled" that the
Moret murder was defendant's "first conviction."
	Before addressing this argument, we examine the statutory
provision at issue here. Section 9-1(b)(3) of the Illinois death penalty
statute provides:
			"(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of
the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or
more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder
may be sentenced to death if:
 * * *
				(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or
under any law of the United States or of any state which
is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section
regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of
the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long
as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more
than one person or of separate acts which the defendant
knew would cause death or create a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or
another[.]" 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998).
	In People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 533-34 (1984), we
interpreted the phrase "has been convicted of" as used in section
9-1(b)(3) and concluded that "[t]he statute speaks in terms of prior
convictions, not prior offenses." We held that when a defendant, like
the defendant in the case at bar, commits two murders on two
separate dates and he is tried first for the murder which occurred on
a later date, that conviction may be used as an aggravating factor at
the trial of the other murder, which occurred earlier in time. We
concluded that it was the sequence of convictions, not the sequence
of conduct, which determines whether or not the multiple-murder
aggravating-factor provision applies in a given case. People v.
Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 109 (1998); People v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72,
105 (1986).
	Our own examination of the statutory language convinces us that
the statute clearly provides that a defendant will be eligible for the
death penalty if it is shown that he "has been convicted of murdering
two or more individuals *** whether the deaths occurred as the result
of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts." Nothing in the
statutory language suggests that a capital sentencing jury is required
to make a factual determination as to the order of these convictions.
The jury simply must find whether, at the time of sentencing, the
defendant stands convicted of two or more first degree murders.
	It follows, then, that in the case at bar, the Doffyn sentencing jury
made no factual determination, legally binding or otherwise, that the
Moret murder was defendant's "first conviction." The jury merely
found that, at the time of defendant's second sentencing hearing for
Doffyn's murder, defendant had another conviction for first degree
murder. Thus, the jury's finding that the section 9-1(b)(3) aggravating
factor was proved at defendant's retrial for the murder of Officer
Doffyn has no collateral impact on the State's ability to seek the death
penalty in the case at bar.
	Furthermore, even if defendant was correct in his premise that the
Doffyn jury implicitly ruled that defendant's prior conviction for the
murder of Moret was defendant's "first conviction" for purposes of
death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3), that prior conviction no
longer exists. The "slate was wiped clean" when this court reversed
on appeal defendant's conviction for Moret's murder. See Poland v.
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 152, 90 L. Ed. 2d 123, 130, 106 S. Ct. 1749,
1753 (1986) (the usual rule is that, when a defendant obtains reversal
of his conviction on appeal, the original conviction has been nullified
and the slate wiped clean); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 443,
68 L. Ed. 2d 270, 281-82, 101 S. Ct. 1852, 1860 (1981).
	Although we reject defendant's contention that a murder
conviction which occurs, chronologically, before another conviction
remains the "first conviction" despite subsequent reversal, we
recognize that there is an interdependent relationship which exists
between a defendant's murder convictions when they are used to
establish death eligibility pursuant to the section 9-1(b)(3). In Johnson
v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575, 108 S. Ct. 1981
(1988), the United States Supreme Court reversed a defendant's death
sentence when a prior murder conviction, which served as an
aggravating factor, was reversed on appeal. The Court held:
		"Since that conviction has been reversed, unless and until
petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of
that charge. Indeed, even without such a presumption, the
reversal of the conviction deprives the prosecutor's sole piece
of documentary evidence of any relevance to Mississippi's
sentencing decision." Johnson, 486 U.S.  at 585, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 584, 108 S. Ct.  at 1986.
	Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in Oats v. State, 446 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1984), when considering a situation where an aggravating
circumstance of a prior conviction, valid at the time of sentencing, is
subsequently reversed and vacated by an appellate court, stated:
		"We now hold that in such a situation the vacated conviction
cannot be used as an aggravating factor. Therefore, the trial
court was in error in finding this aggravating circumstance
present." Oats, 446 So. 2d  at 95.
	What these cases mean to the defendant here is that, had the
multiple-murder aggravating factor been the only basis for finding
defendant death eligible in the Doffyn case and had the jury imposed
the death penalty in that case, the reversal of the Moret murder
conviction might have supplied defendant with grounds for obtaining
resentencing in the Doffyn case.
	In the case at bar, however, defendant will receive a new trial on
the question of his guilt for the murder of Louis Moret. If he is found
guilty, the question before the capital sentencing jury will be whether,
at the time of sentencing, defendant has been convicted of committing
two or more murders. If the jury finds the "has been convicted of
murdering two or more individuals" factor to exist, defendant shall be
eligible for a death sentence. The State is not precluded by collateral
estoppel principles from using defendant's conviction for Officer
Doffyn's murder to establish defendant's eligibility for the death
sentence.
	Our conclusion in this case is supported by the Florida Supreme
Court decision in Oats. In that case, the court noted that the defendant
had subsequently received a new trial on the offenses underlying his
earlier convictions which had been vacated. The new trial had resulted
in convictions, which were upheld on review. The court held:
		"Although the use of this aggravating factor was in error at
the time it was found, and we therefore disallow it, were we
to remand for a new penalty phase trial the jury could
properly consider evidence of the later, valid conviction."
Oats, 446 So. 2d  at 95.
	As a final matter, defendant's counsel, at oral argument, raised an
arbitrariness argument. He contended that it would be arbitrary to
allow the State to reverse or interchange the order of convictions to
create death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(3) for both murders.
Under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), this argument is untimely and 
thus has been waived.
CONCLUSION
	We find no merit to defendant's claim that principles of collateral
estoppel embodied in the double jeopardy protections of our state and
federal constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§10) bar the State from seeking the death penalty should defendant be
convicted for the first degree murder of Louis Moret upon retrial. We
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to preclude the
State from initiating such proceedings.
	Affirmed. 
1. Although the State addresses the matter,
defendant offers no argument in his brief that the Doffyn jury's decision not
to impose the death sentence works as an acquittal of the death sentence.
Defendant merely states that Kokoraleis is distinguishable from the case
at bar because, in Kokoraleis, there were additional aggravating factors.