Title: Titan Machinery, Inc. v. Patterson Enterprises, Inc.

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2016 ND 19Titan Machinery,
Inc., Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant v. Patterson
Enterprises, Inc., and Josh Patterson, Defendants Patterson Enterprises, Inc., Defendant,
Appellant, and Cross-AppelleeNo. 20150025Appeal from the District
Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable John Charles Irby, Judge.AFFIRMED IN
PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.Jon R. Brakke (argued) and Neil J. Roesler (on brief), P.O. Box 1389, Fargo, N.D.
58107-1389, for plaintiff, appellee, and cross-appellant.Sean T. Foss, P.O. Box 2105, Fargo, N.D. 58103, for
defendant, appellant, and cross-appellee.Titan Machinery v.
Patterson EnterprisesNo. 20150025Crothers,
Justice.[¶1] Patterson Enterprises, Inc., appeals and Titan
Machinery, Inc., cross-appeals from a judgment and an order denying their post-judgment
motions after the district court ordered Patterson to pay Titan $88,707.75 due under several oral
equipment leases. Patterson argues the district court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit
summarizing amounts Patterson owed Titan under the oral leases, the court erred in awarding
Titan $5,617.63 for finance charges and the court erred in finding the equipment did not breach
an implied warranty of merchantability. In its cross-appeal, Titan argues the court clearly erred in
calculating the amount Patterson owed Titan for three items of leased equipment. We affirm in
part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.I[¶2] Patterson is a Montana corporation headquartered in Missoula, which uses
heavy equipment in the construction industry. Titan is an equipment rental company with several
locations in the United States, including Missoula and Williston, North Dakota. In 2011,
Patterson contracted for construction work in northwestern North Dakota and leased several
items of heavy equipment from Titan. Patterson also leased several items of equipment from
Titan for work on a remote dam project in Montana. The equipment leases were oral and were
entered into by Don Hinricher, Titan's rental account manager in Missoula, and Adam Pummill,
Patterson's general manager of operations in northwestern North Dakota. Disagreements arose
between the parties concerning delinquent lease payments, damage to leased equipment, the
operational condition of the leased equipment, and credits Patterson claimed for downtime and
repairs to make the leased equipment operable.[¶3] Titan sued
Patterson, alleging Patterson failed to pay $164,958.71 for delinquent lease payments and
equipment damages, plus $19,675.40 in accrued finance charges. Patterson answered and
counterclaimed for damages, disputing the amounts owed under the leases and alleging Titan
failed to provide Patterson equipment conforming to the leases, which resulted in Patterson's
inability to perform substantial work for third parties.[¶4] After a
bench trial, the district court found Patterson owed Titan $73,852.31 for delinquent lease
payments and damages to leased equipment. The court decided Titan's equipment did not breach
an express warranty, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or an implied
warranty of merchantability. The court found the parties impliedly agreed the leased equipment
needed to be in working order when Patterson took possession and awarded Patterson $839.90 in
costs incurred to put two items of leased equipment in working order. However, the court found
Patterson failed to establish it was entitled to additional costs to fix the leased equipment. The
court also found Patterson was not entitled to recover consequential damages for "wages paid to
employees who sat idle when the equipment they were to operate did not work, cost of using
substitute equipment that could have been working elsewhere, and other lost opportunities,"
because those claims were speculative and unforeseeable. The court denied Titan's post-judgment
motion to amend the findings, to make additional findings or amend the judgment and for a new
trial. Patterson's post-judgment motion to amend the findings, make additional findings and for
amendment of the judgment also was denied.II[¶5] Patterson argues the district court erred by admitting, under N.D.R.Ev. 1006, an exhibit summarizing
Patterson's claimed debt to Titan. Patterson claims Titan emailed the exhibit after 9 p.m. the
night before trial and did not make the information underlying debt summary available for
inspection at a reasonable time and place before trial. Patterson also argues Titan did not
establish the underlying information was admissible, and asserts the erroneous admission of the
summary affected Patterson's substantial rights.[¶6] Titan initially
argues Patterson waived its argument on the admissibility of the debt summary because it did not
raise the issue in its post-judgment "motion for reconsideration." Titan alternatively argues the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the debt summary into evidence and the
admission of the summary was not prejudicial.[¶7] Patterson's
post-judgment motion was for amended findings, additional findings and for an amended
judgment. We have not otherwise extended our jurisprudence about the necessity of preserving
issues in a motion for new trial to other post-judgment motions. See Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 728-29 (N.D. 1986) (waiver of appellate review of
issues not raised in motion for new trial). Patterson did not make a motion for a new trial, and we
conclude it has not waived appellate review of its argument about the admissibility of the debt
summary.[¶8] We review a district court's decision on the
admissibility of evidence under the abuse-of-discretion standard. In re R.L.-P., 2014 ND 28, ¶ 37, 842 N.W.2d 889. A district
court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, is a
misapplication or misinterpretation of the law or is not the product of a rational mental process
leading to a reasoned decision. Community Homes
v. Main, 2011 ND 27, ¶ 11, 794 N.W.2d 204. We also
have described a district court's role in ruling on evidentiary issues in a court
trial:"We have said a trial judge in a nonjury case should ordinarily admit
all evidence which is not clearly inadmissible because a judge, when deliberating the ultimate
decision, is capable of distinguishing between admissible and inadmissible evidence. Entry of
incompetent evidence in a nonjury trial will rarely be reversible error while exclusion of
competent evidence will cause reversal when justice requires. We presume a court in a bench
trial considered only competent evidence. Consequently, it is not reversible error to admit
incompetent evidence in a bench trial unless it induced an improper finding."
In re R.L.-P., at ¶ 37 (quoting McKechnie v. Berg, 2003 ND 136, ¶ 7, 667 N.W.2d
628).[¶9] During the March 2014 trial in this case, N.D.R.Ev. 1006,(1) provided:"The proponent may use a
summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the
originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a
reasonable time and place. The court may order the proponent to produce them in
court."[¶10] Rule 1006, N.D.R.Ev., authorizes a proponent to
introduce a summary, chart or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings,
recordings or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The explanatory note
to N.D.R.Ev. 1006 states a "condition
precedent to the invocation of the rule that the component parts of the summary be made
available for examination or copying . . . is . . . to give
the party against whom the summary is offered a chance to analyze the underlying data and
prepare any challenges to the summary." For a summary to be admissible, the underlying
writings, recordings or photographs must be admissible. Id. The language of the rule does not
delineate precisely when or how the summary must be provided to other parties; rather, the rule
requires that the proponent make the originals or duplicates of the summarized writings,
recordings or photographs available for examination or copying at a reasonable time and place.
The rule also says the court may order the proponent to produce the summarized writings,
recordings or photographs in court.[¶11] Because the
explanatory note to N.D.R.Ev. 1006 says the
rule is based on Fed.R.Ev. 1006, we may rely on federal authorities in construing our derivative
state rule. E.g. State v.
Thompson, 2010 ND 10, ¶ 21, 777 N.W.2d 617. Federal
authorities recognize that Fed.R.Ev. 1006 is an exception to the best evidence rule and allows the
introduction of secondary evidence in the form of a chart, summary or calculation for
voluminous writings, recordings or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.
31 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence § 8042 (2000); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 1006.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender 2nd ed. 2015). The rule makes the admission of summary evidence dependent
upon the presence of safeguards to reduce the risk that the summary evidence may be inaccurate.
Wright & Gold, at § 8045. The rule requires the proponent to make the original
or duplicates of the source material underlying a summary available to other parties for
examining or copying at a reasonable time and place and gives the court the power to order
production of the originals or duplicates in court. Id. Federal authorities recognize a
court's determination of the voluminosity of the underlying writings and the convenience of
examination in court involves the quantity and the complexity of the underlying source materials
and give a trial court significant discretion. Id. at § 8044. The proponent
must establish the summary accurately summarizes the source materials. Wright & Gold, at
§ 8045; Weinstein, at § 1006.07[1]. Any small deficiencies in the
accuracy of the summary go to weight, not admissibility. Id. Moreover, the evidence
underlying a summary must be admissible, but need not actually be admitted into evidence, and
the court ultimately may order production of the originals or duplicates in court. Wright &
Gold, at § 8045; Weinstein, at § 1006.06[3].[¶12] Titan does not dispute it did not provide the debt summary to Patterson
until after 9 p.m. the night before trial on March 4, 2014. However, Titan electronically filed and
caused an exhibit list to be served on Patterson on February 28, 2014, which identified a "debt
summary" as Titan's exhibit 1. Scott Bauer, the credit and risk manager for Titan, testified at trial
that he was the Titan representative who prepared the debt summary after reviewing all of the
business records, including invoices, account summaries and invoice details for Patterson's
account with Titan. The debt summary identified the equipment rented, the rental period, the
rental rate and the paid and unpaid portion for 18 items of equipment. The debt summary also
identified charges for repairs and credits for certain items of equipment and interest charges.
According to Bauer, information on the debt summary regarding the equipment rented, rental
period and rental rate came directly from Titan's invoices to Patterson and the paid and unpaid
amounts were taken from Titan's "business system," which recorded when payments were
applied to an invoice. At trial, Titan's counsel said the underlying information for the items
summarized in the debt summary were included in exhibits which would be introduced during
Bauer's testimony and had been provided to Patterson during discovery.[¶13] Evidence establishes Titan's invoices to Patterson were kept in the
ordinary course of business and were admissible. Evidence also establishes the information from
Titan's somewhat amorphous "business system" was based upon calculations of the amount Titan
believed was due under the relevant oral leases and the paid and unpaid invoices for each item of
equipment. Titan's belated disclosure of the actual summary on the eve of trial may have been
grounds for the district court to refuse to admit the document into evidence, to then require the
production of the underlying information in court or to grant a continuance. The district court
was the trier-of-fact and had to sort through Titan's "unreliable" billing system for invoices and
records of payments on twelve separate oral leases. There was evidence the invoices underlying
the debt summary were available to Patterson before the actual summary was provided to
Patterson. There also was evidence the paid and unpaid invoices constituted voluminous writings
that could not be conveniently examined in court. Moreover, the record reflects the parties' oral
leases generally were negotiated over the phone between principals for Titan in Missoula and for
Patterson in northwestern North Dakota and, as the court ultimately found, "everyone was flying
by the seat of their pants to make things happen." Those circumstances do not excuse an
imperfect application of N.D.R.Ev. 1006, and
Titan could have more clearly established the underlying sources for the debt summary at an
earlier date. We do not condone the timing of Titan's disclosure of the debt summary and the
imperfect application of the rule. However, we conclude the district court's decision to admit the
debt summary into evidence was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, was not a
misapplication of the law and followed a rational mental process. Therefore, the court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the debt summary into evidence.III[¶14] Patterson argues the district court erred
in applying the law for finance charges on its debt to Titan. Patterson claims Titan improperly
applied $5,617.63 of Patterson's lease payments to finance charges for late payments. Patterson
argues the parties did not agree to finance charges as part of any of the oral leases and it was
entitled to a credit of $5,617.63 for the amount Titan wrongfully applied to finance charges.
Patterson claims Titan did not intend to extend credit beyond thirty days or anticipate late
payment under N.D.C.C. § 13-01-14, and also did not provide Patterson with billing
statements required by N.D.C.C. § 13-01-15. Titan responds it met all the statutory
requirements of N.D.C.C. §§ 13-01-14 and 13-01-15 to impose the finance
charges and the court's application of $5,617.63 towards finance charges was not clearly
erroneous as an element of damages stemming from Patterson's breach of the equipment
leases.[¶15] This Court has recognized N.D.C.C.
§§ 13-01-14 and 13-01-15 apply to finance charges on accounts receivable
when no contractual provision explicitly authorizes the finance charges. See Industrial Fiberglass v. Jandt, 361 N.W.2d 595, 600 (N.D. 1985); Metric Constr., Inc. v. Great Plains Properties, 344 N.W.2d 679, 682-83 (N.D. 1984). Under
N.D.C.C. § 13-01-14(1), a creditor may charge "a late payment charge on all money due on
account from thirty days after the obligation of the debtor to pay has been incurred." "The
[statutory] late payment charge . . . may not exceed one and three-fourths
percent per month" and "may not be charged unless, when the obligation was incurred, the
creditor did not intend to extend any credit beyond thirty days and any late payment of the
obligation was unanticipated." N.D.C.C. § 13-01-14(2) and (3). "A creditor may not charge
the account receivable late payment charge provided for under section
13-01-14 . . . unless the creditor promptly supplies the debtor with a
statement as of the end of each monthly period, or other regular period agreed
upon . . . in which there is any unpaid balance." N.D.C.C. § 13-01-15(1). The statement must identify "a. [t]he percentage amount of the late payment charge
which will be charged beginning thirty days after the obligation is incurred for purposes of
section 13-01-14. . . [,] b. [t]he unpaid balance at the end of the period[,] c.
an identification of any amount debited to the debtor's account during the period[,] d. the
payments made by or for the debtor to the creditor during the period[, and] e. [t]he amount of the
late payment charge." N.D.C.C. § 13-01-15(2)(a-e).[¶16] In Royal Jewelers, Inc. v.
Kopp, 365 N.W.2d 525, 527 (N.D.
1985), a debtor argued N.D.C.C.§ 13-01-14 was not applicable to service charges
on the balance of an open account "because it was apparent that credit would be extended beyond
thirty days and that late payment was anticipated." This Court said no evidence existed of a
written contract authorizing finance charges, and "unless [N.D.C.C. §] 13-01-14 applie[d],
there [was] no legal or contractual basis for a 1.5% per month finance charge, and [the creditor]
would be limited to the presumed rate of interest of 6% per annum under N.D.C.C.
§ 47-14-05." Royal Jewelers, at
527. This Court concluded no findings existed
about whether the creditor intended to extend credit to the debtor beyond thirty days or whether
late payment was anticipated under N.D.C.C. § 13-01-14. Royal Jewelers, at 527. This Court reversed and remanded the award
of late payment charges for findings on the predicate facts for the applicability of N.D.C.C.
§ 13-01-14. Royal Jewelers, at
527.[¶17] The
determination of damages caused by a breach of contract is a question of fact subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review. Langer v.
Bartholomay, 2008 ND 40, ¶ 27, 745 N.W.2d 649. In Edward H. Schwartz Const., Inc. v. Driessen, we
outlined our standard of review of findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard:"A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an
erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on the entire record,
we are left with a definite and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake. A trial court's
choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous, and
simply because we may have viewed the evidence differently does not entitle us to reverse the
trial court. On appeal, we do not reweigh conflicts in the evidence, and we give due regard to the
trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 2006 ND
15, ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d 733
(quoting Brandt v. Somerville, 2005 ND
35, ¶ 12, 692 N.W.2d 144). A
district court's findings of fact must enable an appellate court to understand the factual
determinations and the court's decision. Niska v.
Falconer, 2012 ND 245, ¶ 10, 824 N.W.2d 778.[¶18] The parties operated under oral equipment leases and
Titan does not claim the leases explicitly authorized late payment charges. Evidence showed
Titan applied $5,617.63 to late payment charges from payments made by Patterson during the
course of the oral leases. The district court decided the net amount Patterson owed Titan was
$73,012.41 and awarded 6 percent prejudgment interest on that amount from December 2, 2011.
The court's findings, however, did not address late payment charges or the predicate facts for the
applicability of N.D.C.C. §§ 13-01-14 and 13-01-15 as a component of
damages. We are unable to understand the basis for the court's decision regarding late payment
charges as a component of Patterson's obligations to Titan. We reverse the judgment and remand
for findings addressing this issue.IV[¶19]
Patterson argues the district court erred in deciding it failed to produce evidence supporting its
claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability for the leased equipment. Patterson
claims the court made contradictory findings about whether the standard for merchantability was
established and improperly concluded Patterson did not submit evidence to establish the standard
of merchantability was violated. Patterson asserts the court found an implied term of the oral
lease agreements included a requirement the leased equipment needed to be in working order
when possession was given to Patterson. Patterson also asserts it presented evidence showing
some equipment was not working when delivered. Titan responds Patterson failed to establish a
claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability and ample evidence rebutted
Patterson's claims about problems with the leased equipment.[¶20] In 1991 the legislature enacted N.D.C.C. ch. 41-02.1 from the Uniform
Commercial Code [U.C.C.] art. 2A, relating to leases of goods. See 1991 N.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 448. See also N.D.C.C. §§ 41-02.1-01 [U.C.C.
§ 2A-101] (stating N.D.C.C. ch. 41-02.1 may be cited as the Uniform Commercial
Code—Leases) and 41-02.1-02 [U.C.C. § 2A-102] (defining scope of
N.D.C.C. ch. 41-02.1 as transactions creating a lease).[¶21]
Section 41-02.1-22, N.D.C.C. [U.C.C. 2A-213], says a lessor impliedly warrants leased goods
will be fit for a particular purpose if, at the time of the lease, the lessor "has reason to know of
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the lessee is relying on the
lessor's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods." Section 41-02.1-21, N.D.C.C.
[U.C.C. § 2A-212], imposes an implied warranty of merchantability for lease
contracts if the lessor is a merchant of goods of that kind and provides:"1.
Except in a finance lease, a warranty that the goods will be merchantable is implied in a lease
contract if the lessor is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."2. Goods to be
merchantable must: "a. Pass without objection in the trade under the description in the lease
agreement; "b. In the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality within the
description; "c. Be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are used; "d.
Run, within the variation permitted by the lease agreement, of even kind, quality, and quantity
within each unit and among all units involved; "e. Be adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the lease agreement may require; and "f. Conform to any promises or affirmations
of fact made on the container or label."3. Other implied warranties may arise from course of
dealing or usage of trade."[¶22] Under the
statutory warranty, a merchant impliedly warrants leased goods are merchantable unless that
warranty is excluded or modified under the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-23
[U.C.C. § 2A-214]. See 4C Lary Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code 2A-212:36 (3rd ed. 2010) (discussing U.C.C. § 2A-212). A
"merchant" means "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by the person's
occupation holds out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction." N.D.C.C. §§ 41-02-04 [U.C.C. § 2-104].
See N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-03(3)(j) [U.C.C.§ 2A-103]
(incorporating definition of merchant from N.D.C.C. § 41-02-04 into N.D.C.C. ch.
41-02.1). Section 41-02.1-23 [U.C.C. § 2A-214] deals with exclusions or
modifications of warranties in leases and provides, in relevant part:"2.
Subject to subsection 3, to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it the language must mention 'merchantability', be by a writing, and be conspicuous. Subject to
subsection 3, to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a
writing and be conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if
it is in writing, is conspicuous and states, for example, 'There is no warranty that the goods will
be fit for a particular purpose'."3. Notwithstanding subsection 2, but subject to subsection
4: "a. Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like 'as is', or 'with all faults', or by other language that in common understanding
calls the lessee's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty, if in writing and conspicuous; "b. If the lessee before entering into the lease contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as desired or has refused to examine the
goods, there is no implied warranty with regard to defects that an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed; and "c. An implied warranty may also be excluded or
modified by course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of
trade."[¶23] One noted commentator on the
Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that unless excluded or modified, a merchant lessor of
goods impliedly warrants, at a minimum, the leased goods conform to the contract and to the
requirements of U.C.C. § 2A-212(2) [N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-21(2)] and
that a failure of the goods to comply with the statutory criteria for merchantability establishes a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Anderson, at
§ 2A-212:32. Professor Lawrence explains that U.C.C. § 2A-212
[N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-21] establishes a minimum statutory standard for
merchantability and indicates a lessee may establish a breach of that statutory implied standard
by showing the leased goods are not fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are
used. Anderson, at §§ 2A-212:32—2A-212:35.[¶24] Here, the parties had oral leases without any written exclusions or
modifications of the implied warranty of merchantability. The district court's findings about
Patterson's warranty claims provide: "The equipment that [Patterson]
leased was used equipment. [Patterson] was well aware that the equipment was used and not
new. "Titan provided no express warranties with the equipment leased to
[Patterson]. "There was no breach by Titan of any implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose as [Patterson] made its own selection of equipment from what was offered without
relying on Titan to select it. "[Patterson] failed to prove a breach of any implied warranty of
merchantability. [Patterson] acknowledged that used equipment breaks down from time to time
and that [Patterson] was responsible for ordinary maintenance of equipment leased from Titan.
The Court finds this to be a fact. "[Patterson] did not provide evidence to establish the
standard of merchantability that exists in the lease and use of heavy construction
equipment. "All parties agreed, and the Court finds, that the implied agreement of the parties
included the requirement that the equipment needed to be in working order when possession was
given to [Patterson] as lessee. . . . . "The agreement between Titan and [Patterson], and the
standard in the equipment rental business, was for the equipment to be in working order when
delivered. In some instances, [Patterson] has claimed that the delivered equipment was not in
working order. The costs incurred by [Patterson] to put equipment in working order prior to
using equipment would be considered incidental damages. [Patterson's] proof was for the most
part not documented, and the amounts claimed were speculative. [Patterson's] incidental damages
should be limited to [$839.90]. "Incidental losses for other machines have not been proven by
[Patterson]. Those losses testified to in general terms were not sufficiently documented and the
distinction between maintenance, which was [Patterson's] responsibility (after delivery), and
repairs for deficiencies of machinery upon arrival were blurred. [Patterson] failed to sustain its
burden on those issues."[¶25] The district
court found Patterson failed to prove a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability and did
not provide evidence to establish the standard of merchantability that exists in the lease and use
of heavy construction equipment. The court also stated the parties agreed there was an implied
agreement that the equipment needed to be in working order when Patterson took possession as
lessee. The court's findings suggest that Patterson needed to provide evidence separate from the
statutory requirements of merchantability in order for the implied warranty to exist or to be
breached. The court's findings do not address the statutory standard for merchantability in
N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-21(2) [U.C.C. § 2A-212(2)] that goods must be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are used. Nor does the court explain if
course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade was part of the court's analysis. We
are unable to understand and reconcile the district court's determination about Patterson's failure
to provide evidence regarding the standard for the implied warranty of merchantability in the
lease and use of heavy construction equipment and the statutory requirement for merchantability
in N.D.C.C. § 41-02.1-21(2) [U.C.C. § 2A-212(2)], which requires
goods to be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are used. We reverse and
remand for findings about the implied warranty of merchantability.V[¶26] Titan cross-appeals and argues the
district court clearly erred in calculating the rent owed by Patterson for three pieces of
equipment, a Caterpillar 815F sheepsfoot packer, a SD84 roller and a Bomag BW213 roller.
Titan claims it is entitled to an additional $47,433.50 for those three pieces of equipment because
objective evidence conclusively establishes the court erred in determining the amount due from
Patterson.[¶27] The district court heard evidence about the
amount owed on those specific items of equipment and found Titan double billed the Caterpillar
815F for three weeks on one occasion and for a month on another occasion. The court also found
Titan failed to prove the length of the rental period for the SD84 roller and the Bomag BW213
roller was a rent-to-own transaction which was completely paid. Evidence supports the court's
findings on those items of equipment, and we do not reweigh that evidence on appeal. Driessen, 2006 ND 15, ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d 733. We are not
left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in calculating Patterson's lease
payments for those items of equipment. The court's findings about the lease payments owed for
those items of equipment are not clearly erroneous.VI[¶28] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.[¶29] Daniel J. CrothersLisa Fair McEversDale V. SandstromBruce B. Haskell, D.J.I concur in the result. Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J. [¶30] The Honorable Bruce B. Haskell, D.J., sitting in place of Kapsner, J., disqualified.Footnote:1. Rule 1006, N.D.R.Ev., was amended effective
March 1, 2014, in response to 2011 revisions to Fed.R.Ev. 1006, to make the rule more easily
understood and make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules without any intent to
change the result in rulings on evidence admissibility. N.D.R.Ev. 1006 (Explanatory Note). See
also Fed.R.Ev. 1006 (Advisory Committee's Note).