Title: Patrick G. Schilling v. State of Wisconsin Crime Victims Rights Board

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 17 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1855 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Patrick G. Schilling,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Crime Victims Rights Board,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant the cause was argued by Bruce 
A. Olsen, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Thomas 
M. Pyper, Cynthia L. Buchko and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Thomas M. Pyper. 
 
A joint amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of 
appeals) by Eva L. Shiffrin, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Coaltion Against Sexual Assault, Inc.; Joanna Tucker Davis and 
Douglas E. Beloof, Portland, OR, on behalf of the National Crime 
Victim Law Institute; and the Wisconsin Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, Madison. 
 
 
2005 WI 17 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1855  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 2590) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patrick G. Schilling,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Crime Victims Rights  
Board,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 23, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Michael N. Nowakowski, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   The first sentence of 
Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
"This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with 
fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy."  We recognize 
that according crime victims fairness, dignity and respect is 
very important to a just enforcement of the criminal code of the 
State of Wisconsin.  The legislature has recognized the 
importance of victims' rights as well, by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.04.  However, because we conclude that this constitutional 
No. 
03-1855   
 
2 
 
provision is a statement of purpose that describes the policies 
to be promoted by the State and does not provide an enforceable, 
self-executing right, we affirm the circuit court decision 
reversing the private reprimand of District Attorney Patrick 
Schilling issued by the Crime Victims Rights Board under Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(a) (1999-2000).1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Jennifer Hansen Marinko (Hansen) was murdered in Price 
County in October 1999.  She was survived by her two children, 
her mother and nine siblings.  Patrick Schilling, District 
Attorney for Price County, prosecuted Daniel Marinko (Marinko) 
in connection with her death, and on March 8, 2001, Marinko was 
convicted of both first-degree intentional homicide and armed 
burglary with a dangerous weapon. 
¶3 
At the sentencing hearing held on April 12, 2001, 
Schilling played part of the tape of the 911 telephone call that 
Hansen's son had made to the police after discovering his mother 
dead.  While Schilling made sure that Hansen's children would 
not be present at the sentencing hearing, he did not inform 
other family members that he was going to play the tape or 
otherwise give them an opportunity to leave the courtroom before 
he played it.  Schilling turned off the tape before it had 
finished playing because he recognized that it was having a 
dramatic effect on the family members. 
                                                 
1 All further statutory references are to the 1999-2000 
statutes, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In July 2001, five of Hansen's survivors (collectively 
"complainants") filed a complaint against Schilling with the 
Crime Victims Rights Board (Board).2  After determining that 
there was probable cause to believe that Schilling had violated 
the complainants' crime victims' rights, the Board held an 
evidentiary hearing on May 30 and 31, 2002.   
¶5 
In a written decision, the Board found that the tape 
of the 911 call was "highly upsetting" and that "Schilling knew 
of the tape's powerful emotional content . . . [which] was the 
reason for its presentation at the sentencing hearing."  The 
Board further found that "Schilling intended to create an 
emotional event at the sentencing hearing for the purpose of 
influencing the sentencing decision, which, unfortunately, was 
at the expense of [Hansen's] family."   
¶6 
Citing 
Article 
I, 
Section 
9m 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 950.01 for the principle that 
"[v]ictims of crime are entitled to be treated with fairness, 
dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity," the Board found 
that the complainants had "met their burden to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that [] Schilling failed to treat them 
with fairness, dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity on 
April 12, 2001, when he played the 911 tape made on the day of 
[Hansen's] death at the sentencing hearing."  Citing its 
                                                 
2 The complaint was also filed against the Price County 
Victim/Witness Coordinator.  The Board determined that probable 
cause 
did 
not 
exist 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
Victim/Witness 
Coordinator violated the complainants' rights. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
4 
 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), the Board ordered a 
private reprimand of Schilling "for violating the complainants' 
rights to be treated with fairness, dignity, respect and 
sensitivity in the playing of the 911 tape at the April 12, 
2001, sentencing hearing."  
¶7 
Schilling 
sought 
judicial 
review 
of 
the Board's 
decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52, 227.53 and 227.57 in 
the circuit court for Dane County.  The circuit court, the 
Honorable Michael N. Nowakowski presiding, reversed the Board's 
decision.  The Board then appealed to the court of appeals, and 
we granted the court of appeals' certification. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶8  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a), the Board may 
"[i]ssue private and public reprimands of public officials, 
employees or agencies that violate the rights of crime victims 
provided under this chapter, ch. 938, and article I, section 9m, 
of the Wisconsin constitution."  At issue in this case is 
whether the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which reads, "This state shall treat 
crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy," creates a "right" that the Board may 
enforce under § 950.09(2)(a), or whether it is descriptive of 
policies to be furthered by the State.   
¶9 
The Board argues that the first sentence of Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution is self-executing and 
thereby provides crime victims an enforceable right to be 
treated with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy.  
No. 
03-1855   
 
5 
 
Schilling counters that the language in question instead serves 
to articulate general policies and does not create enforceable 
rights.  We conclude that the constitutional language in 
question is a statement of purpose that describes the policies 
to be promoted by the State and does not create an enforceable, 
self-executing right.3 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 This is an appeal following a decision by the Board, 
which is an administrative agency.  We review the Board's 
decision, not the circuit court's.  See Beecher v. LIRC, 2004 WI 
88, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29. 
¶11 Both parties state that our review in the present case 
is de novo, relying on the court of appeals decision in Zip 
Sort, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 2001 WI App 185, 247 
Wis. 2d 295, 634 N.W.2d 99.  While we agree that our review of 
the Board's decision is de novo, we disagree with the parties' 
reliance on Zip Sort.   
¶12 The Zip Sort decision addressed the standard of review 
of an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute, 
explaining that there are three possible levels of deference in 
a review of an agency's statutory interpretation and describing 
the circumstances under which each level of deference is 
appropriate.  Zip Sort, 247 Wis. 2d 295, ¶11-14.  However, the 
                                                 
3 Due to this conclusion, we do not reach the parties' 
arguments as to whether the Board's authority to issue private 
reprimands invades prosecutorial discretion or whether the first 
sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is unconstitutionally vague. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
6 
 
instant 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional, 
not 
statutory, construction.  While the Board interpreted Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution pursuant to its duties 
conferred by Wis. Stat. § 950.09, it does not follow that we 
analyze the Board's decision in this case as we would an agency 
interpretation of a statute.  See Beecher, 273 Wis. 2d 136, ¶26.  
Instead, 
because 
construing 
the 
constitution 
is 
a 
task 
ultimately for the courts, we give no deference to the Board's 
interpretation of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Knights of Columbus v. State, 151 Wis. 2d 404, 
409, 444 N.W.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1989).  Our review, therefore, is 
de novo. 
B. 
Interpreting Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
¶13 The Wisconsin Constitution was amended in 1993 to 
include Article I, Section 9m.  We have explained that the 
purpose of construing a constitutional amendment is "to give 
effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who 
adopted it."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
665 N.W.2d 328 (quoting Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 
Wis. 2d 718, 729-30, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967)).  The question 
presented in the present case is whether the first sentence of 
Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was intended 
as a statement of purpose that articulates the importance of 
recognizing crime victim rights, or whether it was intended to 
provide crime victims with an enforceable right that is self-
executing.   
No. 
03-1855   
 
7 
 
¶14 Like statutes, constitutional provisions may include 
statements of purpose that use broad language.  See State ex 
rel. Columbia Corp. v. Pacific Town Bd., 92 Wis. 2d 767, 772, 
286 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1979).  As with a statute's statement 
of purpose, a constitutional section's statement of purpose does 
not provide for an independent, enforceable claim, as it is not 
in itself substantive.  See id. at 779 (citing Smith v. 
Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 7, 74 N.W.2d 770 (1956)). Such a 
statement of purpose is instead instructive of intent and guides 
implementation.  See id. (citing Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. 
PSC, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975)). 
¶15 We have 
also explained 
that "[a] 
constitutional 
provision is self-executing if no legislation is necessary to 
give effect to it, and if there is nothing to be done by the 
legislature to put it in operation."  Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 731 
(citation omitted).  However, a statement of purpose, policy or 
principle is not self-executing.  16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional 
Law § 102 (1998) (explaining that a constitutional provision is 
"not self-executing when it merely lays down general principles 
or a line of policy without supplying the means by which such 
policy or principles are to be effectuated").   
¶16 To ascertain whether the first sentence of Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was intended to serve 
as a statement of purpose or was intended to provide an 
enforceable, 
self-executing 
right 
requires 
constitutional 
interpretation.  We examine three sources in interpreting a 
constitutional provision:  "the plain meaning of the words in 
No. 
03-1855   
 
8 
 
the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices 
in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and 
the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature 
as manifested in the first law passed following adoption."  
Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 
40, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted); 
accord, e.g., Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶10.  We have broadly 
understood the second of these sources, the constitutional 
debates and practices in existence contemporaneous to the 
writing, 
to 
include 
the 
general 
history 
relating 
to 
a 
constitutional amendment, see State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 
v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶¶27, 30-36, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 
260, as well as the legislative history of the amendment, see 
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶10, 36-41. 
¶17 Applying this analysis, we note first that the plain 
meaning of the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in context indicates that it serves as a 
statement of purpose and does not create enforceable, self-
executing rights.  Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides:  
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
No. 
03-1855   
 
9 
 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused.  The legislature 
shall provide remedies for the violation of this 
section.  Nothing in this section, or in any statute 
enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any 
right of the accused which may be provided by law. 
The provision in question, "This state shall treat crime 
victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect 
for their privacy," opens the section.  See id.  It uses very 
broad terms to describe how the State must treat crime victims.  
See id.  The subsequent sentence requires the State to "ensure" 
that 
crime 
victims 
have 
a 
number 
of 
"privileges 
and 
protections," which are articulated in detail.  See id.  This 
structure, opening the section with broad indications of how 
crime victims should be treated, followed by a detailed list of 
privileges and protections to which victims are entitled, shows 
that the first sentence was intended to serve as a general guide 
or statement of policy regarding victims' rights, whereas the 
second sentence was intended to provide an outline of the 
specific rights that the State shall afford crime victims.  See 
id. 
¶18 Next, 
we 
examine 
the 
constitutional 
amendment's 
history.  In an early attempt to secure the initial legislative 
approval needed to adopt a state constitutional victims' rights 
amendment, Senator Barbara Ulichny introduced 1989 Senate Joint 
No. 
03-1855   
 
10 
 
Resolution 94.4  With her drafting request to the Legislative 
Reference Bureau (LRB), Senator Ulichny attached two articles 
written by other states' attorneys general as background 
material for the drafter that provide some evidence of the 
legislature's intent.  See Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, 
Victims' Rights in State Constitutions, 1 Emerging Issues in St. 
Const. L. 163 (1988); Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims 
of Justice, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 29 (1987); Legislative Reference 
Bureau Drafting Record for 1989 S.J.R. 94. 
¶19 From this background material, we learn that 1989 
Senate Joint Resolution 94 was introduced in the midst of a 
larger, nationwide movement to recognize the rights of crime 
victims, 
particularly 
through 
the 
amendment 
of 
state 
constitutions.  Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 163-64, 170-71.  
The materials note that crime victims were being treated 
insensitively and with a lack of consideration, even by well-
meaning public agencies.  See Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 169; 
Eikenberry, supra, at 31-32.  Moreover, it was believed that 
                                                 
4 Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides for amending the constitution.  For an amendment to the 
Constitution to become effective, it must be adopted by two 
successive legislatures and then ratified by voters.  Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
XII, 
§ 1; 
see 
generally 
Wisconsin 
Briefs, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
and 
Advisory 
Referenda 
To 
Be 
Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993, LRB-93-WB-4, at 1 
(March 
1993) 
[hereinafter 
Wisconsin 
Briefs, 
Constitutional 
Amendments].  To create Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
the 
legislature 
adopted 
1991 
Senate 
Joint 
Resolution 41 and 1993 Senate Joint Resolution 3, and the 
amendment proposal was submitted to voters on April 6, 1993.  
See Wisconsin Briefs, Constitutional Amendments, supra, at 1. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
11 
 
rights of crime victims needed to be addressed both out of a 
sense of fundamental fairness and justice to victims, see 
Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 172; Eikenberry, supra, at 30, 32-
33, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system, because the cooperation of crime victims and 
witnesses was understood to be central to law enforcement, see 
Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 169; Eikenberry, supra, at 31-32.  
Lois Haight Herrington, who chaired a presidential task force on 
victims of crime, explained that her task force concluded that: 
the treatment of crime victims in America was a 
national disgrace.  Ignored, mistreated, or blamed, 
the innocent victims had been handled like photographs 
or fingerprints——mere evidence to be manipulated at 
the criminal justice system's convenience.  By the end 
of the ordeal, many victims vowed that they would 
never again become embroiled in the system, and that 
they would tell their friends and loved ones to stay 
away from the courts.  Just as a pebble dropped in a 
pool causes rippling all across the water, the 
mistreatment of victims spread resentment and distrust 
of the justice system throughout entire communities.  
We saw that this insensitivity toward victims was not 
only unjust, it was unwise.  The criminal justice 
system is absolutely dependent upon the cooperation of 
crime victims to report and testify.  Without their 
help, the system cannot hold criminals accountable and 
stem the tide of future crime. 
Eikenberry, supra, at 30 (emphasis added).   
¶20 With this background established, we turn to the 
history of the actual language adopted.  The legislature 
considered and rejected identical language for Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1991 Assembly Joint 
Resolution 4 and 1989 Assembly Joint Resolution 138, both of 
No. 
03-1855   
 
12 
 
which included a right to fairness and respect in a list of 
specifically enumerated rights:  
The rights of victims of crime shall be defined and 
protected by law and shall include: the right to be 
treated with fairness and respect for their dignity 
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process; 
the right to timely disposition of the case following 
arrest of the accused; the right to be reasonably 
protected from the accused throughout the criminal 
justice process; the right to notification of court 
proceedings; the right to attend trial and all other 
court proceedings that the accused has the right to 
attend; the right to confer with the prosecution; the 
right to make a statement to the court at sentencing; 
the right to restitution and compensation; and the 
right to information about the disposition of the 
case, including the conviction, sentence, imprisonment 
and release of the accused. 
1991 A.J.R. 4 (emphasis added); 1989 A.J.R. 138 (emphasis 
added).  The legislature rejected this language, deciding to 
remove the reference to fairness, dignity and respect from the 
list of enumerated rights and move it to a separate sentence.  
See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.  We infer from that decision that 
the broad language of fairness, dignity and respect in the 
amendment's first sentence was intended to have a different 
significance than the language specifically articulating rights 
in the second sentence. 
¶21 The statutory structure that was in place prior to the 
adoption of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides evidence of the manner in which the amendment's first 
and second sentences were intended to differ in significance.  
The legislature had created Chapter 950, "Rights of victims and 
witnesses of crimes," in 1980.  Section 4, ch. 219, Laws of 
No. 
03-1855   
 
13 
 
1979.  On its face, Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution appears to have adopted the structure of the pre-
amendment codification of victims' rights.  See 16 Am. Jur. 2d 
Constitutional Law § 90 (1998) ("A constitutional provision must 
be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and 
understanding of . . . existing laws and with reference to 
them."); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 34 (1984) ("Where a 
constitutional provision similar or identical to that contained 
in a . . . statute . . . is adopted, it is presumed that such 
provision was adopted with the construction previously placed on 
it."). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 950.01 
(1991-92), 
entitled 
"Legislative intent," read in language very similar to the first 
sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution:  
"[T]he legislature declares its intent, in this chapter, to 
ensure that all victims . . . of crime are treated with dignity, 
respect, courtesy and sensitivity."5  Then, at Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.01 (1991-92) provided in whole: 
In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims 
and witnesses of crime to fully and voluntarily 
cooperate 
with 
law 
enforcement 
and 
prosecutorial 
agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing 
importance of such citizen cooperation to state and 
local 
law 
enforcement 
efforts 
and 
the 
general 
effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice 
system of this state, the legislature declares its 
intent, in this chapter, to ensure that all victims 
and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, 
respect, courtesy and sensitivity; and that the rights 
extended in this chapter to victims and witnesses of 
crime are honored and protected by law enforcement 
agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less 
vigorous 
than 
the 
protections 
afforded 
criminal 
defendants. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
14 
 
§ 950.04 (1991-92), entitled "Basic bill of rights for victims 
and witnesses," specific rights of victims and witnesses were 
enumerated in detail,6 as they are in the second sentence of 
Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶22 Not only is the structure of the constitutional 
amendment on its face parallel to the pre-existing codification, 
the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB)7 has explained that the 
constitutional amendment was adopted with the Chapter 950 
provisions in mind.  See Wisconsin Briefs, Constitutional 
Amendments and Advisory Referenda To Be Considered by Wisconsin 
Voters April 6, 1993, LRB-93-WB-4, at 3-4 (March 1993).  A LRB 
publication regarding the amendment explained that advocates of 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.04 (1991-92) provided for such 
specific 
rights 
as: 
to 
be 
informed 
of 
a 
case's 
final 
disposition; to be notified under specified circumstances if a 
defendant is released from custody; to be notified of pardon 
applications; to be notified under specified circumstances if a 
court proceeding is canceled; to have the court consider a 
crime's impact on the victim; to be protected from harm or 
threats arising out of cooperation with law enforcement or 
prosecutor efforts; to be informed of financial and other 
assistance available to crime victims; when a witness fee is 
available, to be informed of the procedure to apply for and 
receive such fee; when possible, to be provided a secure waiting 
area during court proceedings; to have stolen or other personal 
property expeditiously returned by law enforcement agencies; to 
be provided with appropriate employer intercession services; and 
to be entitled to speedy disposition of the case.   
7 Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) statements carry some 
weight because the agency "is deeply involved in the legislative 
drafting 
process, 
as 
LRB 
attorneys 
draft 
all 
bills 
and 
resolutions that are introduced into the legislature."  State v. 
Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶36 n.12, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  
Further, the LRB's analyses are entitled to consideration 
because of its legal expertise.  Id.   
No. 
03-1855   
 
15 
 
the amendment believed it was "necessary to give weight to the 
statutory language," id. at 3, and included a rationale for the 
amendment given by Eau Claire County Supervisor Gerald L. Wilkie 
in 19908 that refers to the pre-existing codification of victim 
rights:  
Though we have a comprehensive set of victim rights, 
the real problem is that these laws carry little 
weight 
. . . . 
 
A 
constitutional 
amendment 
is 
important because it would permanently ensure the 
rights will be honored and it will give our courts a 
constitutional basis for recognizing the victim's 
interest. 
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).  As Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution was adopted to give weight to Chapter 950 
and parallels that statutory scheme's structure, our conclusion 
that the opening sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution was meant to be a statement of purpose, 
set apart from and then followed by the enumeration of the 
specific enforceable rights crime victims are afforded in the 
second sentence, is further reinforced. 
¶23 We 
turn 
next 
to 
the 
legislature's 
earliest 
interpretation of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, as manifested in 1997 Wis. Act 181, the first 
significant law passed regarding the rights of crime victims 
following the amendment's adoption.  With 1997 Wis. Act 181, the 
                                                 
8 Our precedent supports consideration of a statement made 
contemporaneous to the time of drafting to ascertain the intent 
behind a constitutional provision.  See Wagner v. Milwaukee 
County Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶62, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 
N.W.2d 816. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
16 
 
legislature retained the pre-amendment statutory structure of 
providing for rights in detail in a provision entitled "Basic 
bill of rights for victims and witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 950.04.  
Further, 1997 Wis. Act 181 created a subsection at § 950.04(1v) 
entitled "Rights of victims," which enumerated crime victim 
rights, none of which make reference to fairness, dignity or 
respect for privacy.  See 1997 Wis. Act 181, § 65.  Instead, the 
legislature retained the broad language referring to fairness 
and dignity in the provision entitled "Legislative intent" at 
Wis. Stat. § 950.01. 
¶24 Moreover, subsequent to the adoption of 1997 Wis. Act 
181, the LRB explained that Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution "recognizes specified privileges and 
protections for crime victims and directs the legislature to 
provide remedies for violations of those rights."  Legislative 
Briefs, Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses, LB-98-3, at 1 
(May 1998).  Thus, the amendment apparently was intended to 
require remedies, such as the private reprimand at issue in this 
case, only for violations of the "privileges and protections" 
enumerated in the second sentence of Article I, Section 9m of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  See id.  The LRB further noted that 
1997 Wis. Act 181 lists "the rights of crime victims as 
protected by the Wisconsin Constitution and statutory law" in 
Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v), id., which, because § 950.04(1v) does 
not list rights of fairness, dignity or respect for privacy, 
further supports our conclusion. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
17 
 
¶25 The LRB's analysis of Engrossed 1997 Assembly Bill 
342,9 which created 1997 Wis. Act 181, also suggests that the 
legislature did not interpret Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to provide a separate enforceable right 
to fairness, dignity and respect for privacy.  The LRB's 
analysis lists the rights that the state constitution provides 
to crime victims, without including the right to fairness, 
dignity and respect for privacy in the list.  See Legislative 
Reference Bureau Analysis of Engrossed 1997 A.B. 342.   
¶26 In sum, based on our examination of the plain meaning 
of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution, which is 
affirmed by the history of and the legislature's earliest 
interpretation of that amendment, we conclude that the first 
sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
does not provide a self-executing right that the Board is 
empowered to enforce via private reprimand pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 950.09(2)(a). However, we recognize that crime victims, 
by virtue of the crimes they suffer, experience profound tragedy 
before they encounter the criminal justice system.  While every 
act of insensitivity towards a crime victim may not constitute a 
                                                 
9 The LRB's "analysis of a bill is printed with and 
displayed on the bill when it is introduced in the legislature." 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 
N.W.2d 1 (citing Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)2; see Badger State 
Bank v. Taylor, 2004 WI 128, ¶42 n.39, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 688 
N.W.2d 439 (citing Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)2).  As such, the 
LRB's analysis indicates legislative intent.  See Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶36 n.12; State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, ¶72, 
248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488. 
No. 
03-1855   
 
18 
 
violation of a right enforceable under § 950.09(2)(a), we 
believe that justice requires that all who are engaged in the 
prosecution of crimes make every effort to minimize further 
suffering by crime victims.  Accordingly, we encourage officials 
within the criminal justice 
system, 
including 
prosecuting 
attorneys and their staffs, to establish effective lines of 
communication and good rapport with crime victims to the 
furthest extent possible.   
¶27 Moreover, this holding is not to be construed as 
rendering the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution without meaning or to minimize the 
importance of the rights of crime victims in this state.  
Rather, the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
is 
a 
constitutional 
mandate. 
 
It 
articulates this State's policy regarding the treatment of crime 
victims. 
 
It 
also 
functions 
to 
guide 
Wisconsin 
courts' 
interpretations of the state's constitutional and statutory 
provisions concerning the rights of crime victims. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 The first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution states: "This state shall treat crime 
victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect 
for their privacy."  We recognize that according crime victims 
fairness, dignity and respect is very important to a just 
enforcement of the criminal code of the State of Wisconsin.  The 
legislature has recognized the importance of victims' rights as 
well, by enacting Wis. Stat. § 950.04.  However, because we 
No. 
03-1855   
 
19 
 
conclude that this constitutional provision is a statement of 
purpose that describes the policies to be promoted by the State 
and does not provide an enforceable, self-executing right, we 
affirm 
the 
circuit 
court 
decision 
reversing 
the 
private 
reprimand of District Attorney Patrick Schilling issued by the 
Crime Victims Rights Board under Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a). 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
03-1855   
 
 
 
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