Title: Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc.  (96-329); 169 Vt. 37; 726 A.2d 77

[Filed 29-Jan-1999]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 96-329

Constance Remes	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.		                                 Windsor Superior Court

Nordic Group, Inc.	                         February Term, 1998
and Tri-Nordic, Inc.

Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       Allan R. Keyes of Ryan, Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Peter F. Young of Miller, Eggleston & Cramer, Ltd., Burlington, for
  Defendants-Appellants.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Defendants Nordic Group, Inc. and Tri-Nordic, Inc.
  appeal the superior  court's decision granting plaintiff Constance Remes
  prejudgment interest on the jury award based  on promissory estoppel. 
  Defendants claim the court erred in applying prejudgment interest as of 
  right to the back pay award because the amount of back pay was neither
  liquidated nor capable  of ready ascertainment at the time of plaintiff's
  termination.  Additionally, defendants maintain  that, even if an award of
  prejudgment interest were proper, the court abused its discretion by 
  calculating the prejudgment interest from the date of termination to the
  date of judgment on the  lump sum awarded by the jury.  We affirm the grant
  of prejudgment interest, but remand for  further elaboration or
  recalculation of the amount of interest awarded.

       In 1989, defendants hired plaintiff on an at-will basis as an office
  manager responsible for  performing accounting and bookkeeping services. 
  In 1992, she took a three-month medical leave.  Prior to going on leave,
  one of the corporate directors assured her that her job was safe and that 
  she could take all the time she needed.  During her absence, an audit
  disclosed accounting errors. 
 
 

  Upon plaintiff's return to work, defendants informed her that she could not
  have the same  job back.  Instead, they offered her another job for
  considerably less money, but she declined the  offer.  

       Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging wrongful discharge
  under a promissory  estoppel theory, and later amending the complaint to
  include breach of contract.  She claimed that  she had reasonably relied on
  the promise that she could return to her job upon return from medical 
  leave and that the promise altered her at-will employment contract.  The
  alternative theories of  promissory estoppel and breach of contract were
  submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict  on the basis of promissory
  estoppel finding defendants liable to plaintiff for $38,344.57. During 
  trial, defendants objected to plaintiff's exhibit related to calculation of
  interest.  The parties then  agreed that the court, not the jury, would
  determine the issue of prejudgment interest and the  exhibit was withdrawn.  

       After the trial concluded, plaintiff argued to the court that
  prejudgment interest should be  awarded either as of right, pursuant to
  Rule 54(a), or under the court's discretion.  In response,  defendants
  contended that this case did not warrant prejudgment interest and,
  alternatively, that  it should be assessed only as and when the lost wage
  payments were due, not from the date her  employment ended.  The court
  granted plaintiff prejudgment interest at Vermont's statutory rate  of
  twelve percent, see 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a), or $12.61 per day, from the date of
  plaintiff's  termination until the date of entry of judgment on the entire
  jury award, without indicating  whether it did so by discretion or as a
  matter of right.   This appeal followed.

                                     I.

       Pursuant to Rule 54, prejudgment interest may be "awarded as damages
  for detention of  money due for breach or default."  See Reporter's Notes
  to 1981 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 54.   Such interest on a wrongfully-detained
  principal sum is awarded as of right where it is "liquidated  or capable of
  ready ascertainment," or "in the court's discretion for other forms of
  damage."  Id.  Defendants' argument against assessment of prejudgment
  interest in this case focuses exclusively 

 

  on whether the back pay award was liquidated or readily ascertainable. 
  They fail to address,  however, the court's well-recognized discretion to
  award prejudgment interest.  See id.  (prejudgment interest may be awarded
  in court's discretion for unliquidated forms of damages);  Fleming v.
  Nicholson, 9 Vt. L.W. 315, 317 (1998) (stating that d'Arc Turcotte v.
  Estate of  LaRose, 153 Vt. 196, 569 A.2d 1086 (1989) did not eliminate
  traditional discretionary capacity  to award prejudgment interest); Smith
  v. Osmun, 165 Vt. 545, 547,