Title: Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8856.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8856 
LORAIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. NELSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-8856.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Rules for the Government of the Bar—Two-year suspension with 18 months 
stayed on condition. 
(No. 2016-1830—Submitted May 16, 2017—Decided December 7, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-010. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth Allen Nelson II, of Avon Lake, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0075834, was admitted to the practice of law in 2003.  In October 
2015, we publicly reprimanded him for neglecting a client’s personal-injury case, 
failing to properly notify the client that he lacked malpractice insurance, and failing 
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to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Nelson, 144 Ohio St.3d 414, 2015-Ohio-4337, 44 N.E.3d 268. 
{¶ 2} In April 2016, relator, Lorain County Bar Association, charged 
Nelson with mishandling a client’s fee in a criminal matter and failing to cooperate 
in relator’s investigation.  After a hearing, the Board of Professional Conduct found 
that Nelson engaged in most of the charged misconduct and recommended that we 
suspend him for two years, with 18 months stayed on conditions.  Nelson objects 
to most of the board’s misconduct findings and to its recommended sanction, 
arguing that a fully stayed one-year suspension is more appropriate. 
{¶ 3} For the reasons explained below, we overrule Nelson’s objections and 
adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} On May 28, 2015, the federal government charged Efren Vega with a 
drug-related felony, and the following day, Vega’s girlfriend, Linda Sanchez, paid 
Nelson $10,000 in cash to represent him.  At Nelson’s disciplinary hearing, he 
testified that he considered the $10,000 a “flat fee * * * earned on receipt” and that 
he therefore placed the funds in a lockbox at his house rather than in his client trust 
account.  Nelson admitted that at the time he collected the fee, he failed to advise 
Vega or Sanchez that if he did not complete the representation, they may be entitled 
to a refund of all or a portion of the fee.  Nelson also failed to advise them that he 
lacked malpractice insurance. 
{¶ 5} Nelson completed some legal work in Vega’s case and twice visited 
him in prison.  However, about two weeks after Vega retained him, Vega 
terminated the representation.  Nelson testified that when Vega discharged him, he 
advised Vega that he would refund the unearned portion of the $10,000 fee after he 
completed a bill.  Similarly, when Sanchez contacted Nelson about a refund, he told 
her that he would refund a portion of the money upon completion of a bill.  But 
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after waiting two months without receiving a refund, Sanchez filed a grievance 
against him. 
{¶ 6} On September 10, 2015, relator sent Nelson a copy of the grievance 
and requested that he respond within 20 days.  Nelson did not respond to relator’s 
letter or to a September 30 follow-up e-mail.  On October 5, 2015, relator sent 
Nelson another letter and e-mail.  Although Nelson contacted relator by telephone 
and indicated that he would respond to the grievance by October 9, he failed to do 
so.  On October 12, relator e-mailed Nelson to remind him that he had agreed to 
respond to the grievance, but Nelson again failed to reply to relator’s inquiry. 
{¶ 7} On February 11, 2016, relator notified Nelson of its intent to file a 
disciplinary complaint, and about a month later, on March 18, Nelson formally 
responded to Sanchez’s grievance.  With his response, he submitted an itemized 
statement of legal services in Vega’s case, showing that his fees and expenses 
amounted to $6,803.50.  However, he also stated that in order to resolve the dispute, 
he had refunded $9,000 to Sanchez, which was the amount that she had requested 
in her grievance.  The parties stipulated that Nelson refunded the money on March 
17, the day before he responded to the grievance.  At his disciplinary hearing, 
Nelson conceded that because he did not deposit the $10,000 fee into his client trust 
account, he failed to comply with the record-keeping requirements for client funds 
held in trust. 
{¶ 8} Based on this conduct, the board found that Nelson violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client on a separate written 
form that the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance and 
requiring the client to sign the form), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging 
a fee denominated as “earned upon receipt” or in similar terms without 
simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be entitled to a 
refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not complete the representation), 
1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into a client 
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trust account), 1.15(a)(1) through (5) (requiring a lawyer to maintain certain client 
records regarding funds held in a trust account and bank records, as well as to 
perform and retain monthly reconciliations of the trust account), 1.16(e) (requiring 
a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from 
employment), and 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) (both requiring an attorney to 
cooperate with a disciplinary investigation). 
{¶ 9} Nelson objects to the board’s findings that he mishandled the $10,000 
fee and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.  According to Nelson, 
because he told Vega after Vega discharged him that he would refund the unearned 
portion of the $10,000, he “effectively gave the notice required by Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(d)(3) to qualify as a ‘flat fee’ or as a fee ‘earned upon receipt.’ ”  And because 
he “effectively” complied with Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), Nelson argues that he was 
not required to deposit his fee in his client trust account and that his violation of the 
rules regulating flat fees and a lawyer’s trust account should be given “little 
weight.” 
{¶ 10} Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) prohibits a lawyer from collecting a fee 
denominated as “earned upon receipt” or in similar terms unless the client is 
simultaneously advised in writing that if the lawyer does not complete the 
representation for any reason, the client may be entitled to a refund of all or a 
portion of the flat fee.  If a lawyer complies with the conditions in Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(d)(3), advance fees collected by the lawyer are considered the lawyer’s property 
and the lawyer should deposit those funds in any place other than his client trust 
account.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. McCord, 150 Ohio St.3d 81, 2016-Ohio-3298, 79 
N.E.3d 503, ¶ 7; see Board of Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion No. 2016-1 
(Feb. 12, 2016). 
{¶ 11} Nelson, however, did not comply—or “effectively” comply—with 
the conditions in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3).  According to Nelson’s own testimony, 
he told Vega at the time Vega discharged him, which was about two weeks after he 
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collected the fee, that he would refund the unearned portion of the $10,000.  
Further, he did not give notice in writing.  He therefore failed to comply with 
essential elements of the rule.  In addition, Nelson admits that when Vega 
terminated him, a portion of the $10,000 fee was unearned and Vega was entitled 
to a refund.  Yet for the next nine months, Nelson kept his client’s funds in a 
lockbox in his house, rather than in an appropriately safeguarded client trust 
account as required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c).  Thus, the evidence supported the 
board’s findings that Nelson failed to comply with the rules regulating flat fees and 
client trust accounts. 
{¶ 12} Regarding his failure to cooperate, Nelson states that he considered 
Sanchez’s grievance a fee dispute and that he delayed responding to the grievance 
because he thought that he could settle with her.  Nelson’s belief that the grievance 
amounted to a fee dispute, however, did not relieve him of his duty to timely 
respond to relator’s repeated inquiries.  See Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G).  Relator’s 
investigator testified that in September and October 2015, she sent Nelson six 
inquiries about the grievance.  However, he did not formally respond until March 
2016.  On this record, the board had ample evidence to conclude that Nelson failed 
to cooperate in relator’s investigation. 
{¶ 13} We therefore overrule Nelson’s objections and agree with the 
board’s findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 15} As aggravating factors, the board found that Nelson has a prior 
disciplinary record and that he failed to cooperate with relator’s investigation.  See 
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Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (5).  Nelson again objects to the board’s finding that 
he failed to cooperate, but for the reasons explained above, we overrule this 
objection. 
{¶ 16} In mitigation, the board found that Nelson lacked a selfish motive, 
submitted evidence from three judges attesting to his good character and reputation, 
and acknowledged some of his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2) and (5).  
The board also noted that Nelson’s eventual cooperation in the disciplinary 
process—after relator filed its complaint—is entitled to some mitigating effect. 
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 17} The board cited several cases to support its recommended sanction, 
including Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 141 Ohio St.3d 35, 2014-Ohio-4278, 21 
N.E.3d 290, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers, 131 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-
1144, 967 N.E.2d 183. 
{¶ 18} In Scaccia, an attorney charged a nonrefundable fee without 
simultaneously advising the client that she may be entitled to a refund, failed to 
deposit client funds into his trust account, failed to maintain the necessary trust-
account records, and neglected a client matter.  Mitigating factors included that the 
attorney had no prior discipline and submitted evidence of good character and 
reputation.  In aggravation, the attorney failed to make restitution or to 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct.  Based on those facts, we suspended 
him for one year, with six months stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 19} In Summers, an attorney charged a nonrefundable fee without 
simultaneously advising the client that he may be entitled to a refund, failed to 
promptly refund his unearned fee after withdrawing from employment, and charged 
a clearly excessive fee.  In mitigation, we found that the attorney had no prior 
discipline and submitted extensive evidence of good character and reputation.  
Aggravating factors included failing to make restitution, refusing to acknowledge 
the misconduct, and a dishonest and selfish motive.  Noting that the attorney had 
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“fabricated mistruths about his clients” and had shown “disdain for the disciplinary 
process,” we imposed an actual six-month suspension on him.  Id. at ¶ 45, 49. 
{¶ 20} The board noted that Nelson’s misconduct was not as egregious as 
the misconduct in Scaccia or Summers, but because this is Nelson’s second 
disciplinary case, the board concluded that an actual suspension is necessary.  
Indeed, the board determined that Nelson’s “failure to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation for a second time” was the “most significant factor requiring at least 
six months [of] actual suspended time.” 
{¶ 21} Nelson objects to the board’s reliance on Scaccia and Summers, 
arguing that those cases involved substantially worse conduct and more aggravating 
factors, including the failure to make restitution.  He further asserts that an actual 
suspension in this case is punitive and more severe than necessary to protect the 
public.  Citing Dayton Bar Assn. v. Washington, 143 Ohio St.3d 248, 2015-Ohio-
2449, 36 N.E.3d 167, he argues for a fully stayed suspension. 
{¶ 22} As noted above, the board recognized that Scaccia and Summers are 
not directly on point, but because the range of misconduct in those cases is similar 
to Nelson’s and because this is Nelson’s second disciplinary case, the board 
concluded that an actual six-month suspension is warranted in this case as well.  We 
agree.  And contrary to Nelson’s position, our opinion in Washington is not helpful 
to him.  Although the misconduct in Washington is somewhat comparable to 
Nelson’s, there were no aggravating factors in that case and there was significant 
mitigating evidence, including the attorney’s clean disciplinary record, cooperation 
in the disciplinary process, and timely payment of restitution.  Id. at ¶ 12.  Here, 
Nelson has prior discipline for the same misconduct, and he did not make restitution 
or cooperate in the disciplinary process until after relator notified him of its intent 
to file a disciplinary complaint. 
{¶ 23} In addition, an actual suspension is necessary to protect the public.  
The board noted that Nelson violated the rules relating to fees and client trust 
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accounts because he failed to read and comprehend them, which shows that he does 
not appreciate his obligations to comply with the professional-conduct rules.  For 
example, Nelson testified that although he had implemented procedures to notify 
his clients in writing that he lacked malpractice insurance, he could not state 
whether he had begun to ensure that they sign the notice, as required by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c).  Indeed, he testified that he had been “lax” with that 
requirement.  We disciplined Nelson for violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) in 2015, and 
relator charged him with violating that rule again in this case.  Yet at his disciplinary 
hearing, he testified that he had failed to implement procedures to ensure 
compliance with the rule.  An actual suspension is necessary to give Nelson the 
time to review and understand his ethical obligations and to implement the 
procedures necessary to ensure compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
especially those applicable to solo practitioners.  Accordingly, we overrule 
Nelson’s objections and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} For the reasons explained above, Kenneth Allen Nelson II is 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with 18 months stayed on the 
condition that he engage in no further misconduct.  As a condition of reinstatement, 
Nelson must provide proof that he completed at least six hours of continuing legal 
education relating to law-office management in addition to meeting the other 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  Upon reinstatement, Nelson shall serve a one-year 
period of monitored probation focusing on trust-account and record-keeping 
requirements relating to fees and other client materials.  If Nelson fails to comply 
with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire 
two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Nelson. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., 
concur. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH, J. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 26} This grievance is in the nature of a fee dispute, and I would issue a 
24 month suspension all stayed, given the refund paid and that respondent 
eventually cooperated in the disciplinary process. 
 
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
D. Chris Cook, Bar Counsel, and Lindsey C. Poprocki, Interim Bar Counsel, 
for relator. 
Daniel G. Wightman, for respondent. 
_________________