Title: MARCELLA TESTERMAN V. GABRIEL LEE TESTERMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARCELLA TESTERMAN V. GABRIEL LEE TESTERMAN2008 WY 112193 P.3d 1141Case Number: S-08-0006Decided: 09/25/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
MARCELLA 
TESTERMAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
GABRIEL LEE 
TESTERMAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Mary Elizabeth Galvan, 
Mary Elizabeth Galvan, PC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Raymond D. Macchia, 
Macchia & Associates, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
This appeal arises 
from the divorce proceedings of Marcella Testerman and Gabriel Testerman.  The district court awarded primary 
custody of their ten-month-old daughter to Ms. Testerman, then granted 
visitation to Mr. Testerman with the aim of having each parent spend 
approximately equal time with the child.  
The district court's express purpose in granting this visitation was to 
prevent Ms. Testerman from moving to California, as she intended to do, so that the child would 
stay in Cheyenne 
and develop a relationship with her father.  Ms. Testerman has appealed the 
district court's decision.  We will 
affirm the grant of primary custody to Ms. Testerman, but reverse the 
district court's decision regarding Mr. Testerman's 
visitation.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Ms. Testerman lists 
five issues for our consideration:

 
 
1.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when, having found that it 
was in the child's best interests for her mother to have primary residential 
custody, it disregarded that finding to implement a parenting time arrangement 
which is the functional equivalent of joint residential 
custody?

 
 
2.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by implementing a parenting 
plan which conditioned Ms. Testerman's custodial status on her continued 
residence in LaramieCounty?

 
 
3.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering an automatic, 
anticipatory alternating joint residential custody modification when the child 
enters the first grade in the absence of evidence or findings that prospectively 
modifying Ms. Testerman's primary residential custody to joint custody is 
in the child's best interests?

 
 
4.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering an automatic 
future custody modification, without requiring a change of circumstances which 
affects the child's best interests in her current living arrangement, and 
without notice and opportunity to be heard?

 
 
5.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by reaching beyond the record 
to devise a parenting plan based on an unidentified "Arizona Parenting Plan" in 
the absence of supporting evidence that such plan was in the best interests of 
the minor child and without prior notice and opportunity to challenge the 
applicability of the plan to the custody issues in this 
case?

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
The Testermans met in 
Seoul, South Korea, where both were serving 
in the military.  They married on 
June 18, 2004.  They were later 
transferred to Fort Knox, 
Kentucky, and served there until 
both were honorably discharged.  
They moved to Cheyenne, Wyoming, where their daughter was born on 
March 25, 2006.  Mr. Testerman 
was employed by the Wyoming Highway Patrol, and Ms. Testerman worked at home as 
the child's primary caretaker. 

 
 

[¶4]           
After the move to 
Cheyenne, their 
relationship deteriorated.  
Ms. Testerman describes their married life as "contentious and 
bitter, characterized by mutual lack of respect and trust, an inability to 
communicate, and an almost total inability to agree on any issue involving their 
child."  After a while, Ms. 
Testerman and her daughter came to occupy only the upstairs of their home, with 
Mr. Testerman living in the basement.  
Their interactions were infrequent and acrimonious.  While each assigns blame to the other, 
both agree that Mr. Testerman had little to do with caring for his 
daughter.  When the daughter was 
approximately six months old, Mr. Testerman commenced divorce 
proceedings.  

 
 

[¶5]           
Mr. Testerman sought 
joint custody of his daughter, which he described as "[e]qual time with the 
mother and the father."  
Ms. Testerman sought primary custody of her daughter, and indicated 
that she intended to relocate to California after the divorce.  She had grown up there, and her family, 
including her mother and two sisters, were willing to help provide care for her 
child.  Ms. Testerman had contacted 
a former employer in California, and understood that she would be 
rehired upon her return.  She had 
arranged to stay with her sister until she found her own place to 
live.

 
 

[¶6]           
In oral comments 
following the trial, the district court expressed disapproval of 
Ms. Testerman's moving to California because, "[i]n reality that is going 
to terminate Mr. Testerman's relationship with his daughter."  The district court signaled its intent 
to establish a child custody and visitation arrangement that would effectively 
require Ms. Testerman to remain in Cheyenne, "a place where you don't want to 
be."  The district court provided 
this explanation:

 
 
The two of you decided 
to have a baby.  With a baby 
you assume responsibilities.  
In the assumption of those responsibilities, you gave up options in your 
lives.  You gave up freedom in your 
lives.  In return for the joy you 
get from her, you give up different things.  One of the things you give up is in my 
mind living apart from each other. . . .  
I believe that if [Ms. Testerman and her daughter] live in California that will 
effectively deprive [the daughter] of the good things that Mr. Testerman 
can do.  I believe that that is not 
in her best interest.

 
 
The district court 
stated that it would award joint custody of the daughter, and directed the 
parties to attempt to agree upon a plan that would, at first, allow "brief, 
frequent opportunities for Mr. Testerman to be with" the child, and then 
"gradually increase" the "amount of time Mr. Testerman spends with his 
daughter" so that "within a year" each parent would spend "fairly equal" time 
with the child.

 
 

[¶7]           
The parties were 
unable to agree, so the district court imposed what it called a "Parenting 
Plan."  In the written divorce 
decree, it provided that the parents would have joint legal custody, a ruling 
that neither party disputes.  The 
district court also ruled that it was "in the child's best interests for 
[Ms. Testerman] to have primary residential custody of the child."  Then, with regard to 
Mr. Testerman's visitation, the district court ruled as 
follows:

 
 
c.         
Beginning Monday, February 12, 2007, [Mr. Testerman] shall have 
parenting time with the minor child from 5:00 p.m. through 8:00 p.m. on Mondays, 
Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays.  
In addition, on one of the days when he is off work, he will have 
parenting time between noon and 8:00 p.m. one day per 
week.

 
 
d.         
When the minor child reaches the age of three, the parenting time 
referred to in section c immediately above will be increased so that the time 
between noon and 8:00 p.m. one day per week will be changed to an overnight 
visit from 5:00 p.m. one day to 6:00 p.m. the next day on a weekly 
basis.  This time will be on one of 
his days off which the court understands rotate periodically.  This schedule will continue until the 
minor child begins the first grade.

 
 
e.         
When the minor child begins the first grade the parents will share the 
minor child every four days, including overnights, so for example, 
[Mr. Testerman] would have the minor child from 5:00 p.m. on a Monday 
evening and keep her until he takes her to school Friday morning.  [Ms. Testerman] would have the 
minor child from after school on Friday until Tuesday morning when school 
starts, and then [Mr. Testerman] would have the minor child after school 
Tuesday until Saturday morning at 9:00 a.m. and so forth until the minor child 
reaches the age of 9 at which time the parents will simply alternate the child 
on a week-to-week basis.

 
 
f.          
When the minor child reaches the age of 3, [Mr. Testerman] may have 
one two week period of extended visitation each year and shall provide 30 days 
notice to [Ms. Testerman].

 
 
g.         
[Ms. Testerman] shall be allowed two one week visits or one two week 
visit, the length of the visit to be at her choice each year so that she may 
visit her family in California or any other location.  She will provide [Mr. Testerman] with 30 
days notice of such plans.

 
 
To further discourage 
Ms. Testerman from moving to California, the district court included this 
provision in the divorce decree:

 
 
l.          
If either parent desires to move from LaramieCounty he or she shall give the remaining 
parent 60 days notice.  The notice 
to leave LaramieCounty may be considered by 
the Court as a change of circumstances sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction 
to consider a custody modification.

 
 
Ms. Testerman has 
appealed the district court's rulings.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]           
Child 
custody decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 179, 
¶ 9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
It 
has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs 
of the children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle.

 
 

Resor 
v. Resor, 
987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999), quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶9]           
In the divorce decree, 
the district court stated that it was in the best interests of the child for 
Ms. Testerman to have primary custody.  In making that decision, the district 
court appropriately considered the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-201 (LexisNexis 2007), and its determination is well supported by 
evidence in the record.  Ms. 
Testerman was the child's primary caretaker, and the evidence demonstrated that 
she was a good mother.  Although the 
parties disagreed as to the underlying reasons, Mr. Testerman had very little 
responsibility for or experience with caring for his daughter.  There was also evidence of what the 
district court called immature behavior on Mr. Testerman's part.  For example, on the night Ms. Testerman 
and her daughter were released from the hospital, Ms. Testerman was 
restricted from lifting more than ten pounds, and the baby suffered from 
jaundice, but Mr. Testerman went out with a friend, leaving the mother and 
child alone for more than four hours.  
The district court's comment about this incident was:  "Mr. Testerman, you need to grow 
up.  I can't believe that you did 
that."  

 
 

[¶10]       
There was also 
evidence indicating that Mr. Testerman cared very much for his daughter, 
and wanted to spend more time with her.  
The district court aptly summarized the evidence by observing that 
Ms. Testerman had a "terrific ability" to provide care for the child, while 
"Mr. Testerman, I think, has the intent to do that.  I think he has the desire to do 
that.  I think he is still learning 
how to do it."  Given this evidence, 
and the district court's evaluation of it, it was no abuse of discretion to 
grant primary custody to Ms. Testerman.

 
 

[¶11]       
The district court's 
"Parenting Plan" is more problematic.  
We first observe that Wyoming statutes require the court, when 
granting a divorce, to establish "custody of a child" and "visitation."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-201, -202.  There is no mention of a "parenting 
plan" or "parenting time," two terms used by the district court.  The district court may have revealed its 
source for those terms when it told the parties that "This parenting schedule is 
rather novel and I have set this up after reviewing the Arizona parenting 
plan."  Turning to the Arizona statutes, we find 
that "parenting time" is a term defined as:

 
 
the condition under 
which a parent has the right to have a child physically placed with the parent 
and the right and responsibility to make, during that placement, routine daily 
decisions regarding the child's care consistent with the major decisions made by 
a person having legal custody.

 
 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 25-402 (2008).  The Arizona 
Court of Appeals has explained that "Physical custody involves the child's 
residential placement, whereas parenting time is what is traditionally thought 
of as visitation.'"  Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421, 79 P.3d 667, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
This indicates that the district court's term "parenting time" was meant 
to be synonymous with the Wyoming statutory term 
"visitation."

 
 

[¶12]       
There is some risk of 
confusion when a court replaces the words found in our Wyoming statutes with 
terms borrowed from other jurisdictions.  
At the same time, other jurisdictions can be a source for innovative 
approaches to difficult legal problems.  
Such innovations, however, must remain consistent with Wyoming statutes and 
precedent.

 
 

[¶13]       
The district court 
said it was awarding primary custody to Ms. Testerman.  Wyoming 
statutes do not define "primary custody," but we have suggested a meaning by 
saying that "awarding custody to one parent fixes that parent as the primary 
nurturer of the child and the one with whom the child shall reside."  Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54 
(Wyo. 
1995).  This aptly describes the 
custody arrangement for the Testermans' daughter in the beginning:  residing with Ms. Testerman as her 
primary nurturer, with visitation by Mr. Testerman on 
four evenings and one afternoon per week.  

 
 

[¶14]       
Over 
time, however, Mr. Testerman's visitation increases so that, by the time 
the child enters school, she will spend four days with each parent in 
alternation.  That custody and 
visitation arrangement seems inconsistent with the district court's award of 
primary custody to Ms. Testerman.  
It is an arrangement more like joint custody.  Wyoming 
statutes do not define "joint custody," but again turning to the Arizona statutes, we find 
this definition:

 
 
"Joint physical 
custody" means the condition under which the physical residence of the child is 
shared by the parents in a manner that assures that the child has substantially 
equal time and contact with both parents.

 
 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 25-402.  In language echoing 
this statutory definition, the district court specifically told the Testermans 
that its "intent with regards to sharing parenting time is that within a year 
that it will be fairly equal."  (Emphasis added.)  The plan imposed by the district court 
might also be described as "divided" or "alternating" custody, in which custody 
is divided between the parents on an alternating basis.  See DaNece Day Koenigs & Kimberly A. 
Harris, Comment, Child Custody 
Arrangements:  Say What You Mean, 
Mean What You Say, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 591, 601 
(1996).

 
 

[¶15]       
But "[w]hether termed 
divided,' shared,' or joint physical custody,'" such arrangements are not 
favored.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 432.  "We have repeatedly said that divided or 
shared custody is not favored by this Court absent good reason therefore."  Eickbush, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d  at 
512.  We have explained that 
"stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to the child's 
well-being," Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 432, 
while "a measure of instability is inherent" in joint custody arrangements.  Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55.  We have emphasized that the "success of 
a joint or shared custody arrangement hinges on the extent to which the parents 
are able to communicate and agree on the matters relevant to the children's 
welfare."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
433.

 
 

[¶16]       
The evidence of record 
casts serious doubt on the Testermans' ability to communicate and agree on 
matters regarding their child.  In 
fact, it seems that they rarely agreed on any aspect of raising their 
daughter.  They disagreed about 
whether and when Ms. Testerman should return to work.  They disagreed about feeding schedules, 
and about how long Ms. Testerman should breast feed the child.  They disagreed about the amount of time 
Mr. Testerman spent with his friends and away from his family, and about 
the amount of contact the daughter should have with his friends.  They disagreed about how to use money 
Ms. Testerman had set aside for their daughter's education.  Mr. Testerman wanted to use it to 
buy recreational vehicles for himself and his friends.  Given the inability of the Testermans to 
communicate and agree on matters relevant to their daughter's welfare, it seems 
unlikely that the "parenting plan" imposed by the district court could prove 
workable or contribute any stability to the child's 
environment.

 
 

[¶17]       
The district court 
articulated only one reason for imposing the visitation it did:  to allow Mr. Testerman and the 
child to develop and maintain a relationship.  That was a laudable goal, but it falls 
well short of the "good reasons" needed to justify the de facto joint custody imposed by the 
district court.  Absent good 
reasons, explained in the record, the district court abused its discretion in 
ordering this custody and visitation arrangement. 

 
 

[¶18]       
Further, the custody 
and visitation arrangement established by the district court impinged on 
Ms. Testerman's rights to travel and relocate.  As we have observed, 
"It is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will remain in the same 
location after dissolution of the marriage or 
to exert pressure on them to do so."  Resor, 987 P.2d  at 151 (emphasis 
added).  The "parenting plan" 
imposed by the district court did exert pressure on Ms. Testerman to remain 
in the same location.  It was meant 
to do so.  This was an improper 
restraint on Ms. Testerman's protected constitutional 
rights:

 
 
The 
right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial 
parent to have the children move with that parent. This right is not to be 
denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court 
demonstrates another substantial and material change of circumstance and 
establishes the detrimental effect of the move upon the 
children.

 
 

Watt 
v. Watt, 
971 P.2d 608, 615-16 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 

[¶19]       
The district court 
also provided in the divorce decree that if either parent gave notice of an 
intent to move from LaramieCounty, that "may be considered by the 
Court as a change of circumstances sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to 
consider a custody modification."  
However, "our precedent is quite clear that relocation, by itself, cannot 
be a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify 
reopening a custody order."  Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 
¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Wyo. 2005); Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55; Love 
v. Love, 
851 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 

Love 
and Gurney together capture a rule 
that a relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation for the relocation 
is legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still permits reasonable visitation 
by the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and material change in 
circumstances.  A trial court abuses 
its discretion in making a contrary ruling that such a move amounts to a 
substantial and material change in circumstances.

 
 

Watt, 
971 P.2d  at 614.  The district court 
violated established legal principles when it ruled that Ms. Testerman's 
relocation could amount to a material change of circumstances justifying a 
change of custody.

 
 

[¶20]       
We 
recognize that child custody and visitation decisions are among "the most 
difficult and demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.  We also have no doubt that the district 
court attempted to craft a custody and visitation arrangement in this case that 
was in the best interests of the child.  
However, the district court imposed de facto joint custody without 
establishing the good reasons needed to support this arrangement.  The sole reason given for this 
arrangement was to keep Ms. Testerman in Cheyenne, which violates her constitutional 
rights.  Based upon our precedent, 
we are forced to conclude that the district court abused its discretion and 
violated legal principles in establishing this custody and visitation 
arrangement.

 
 

[¶21]       
We 
therefore affirm the district court's decision to grant primary custody to 
Ms. Testerman.  We reverse its 
decision concerning Mr. Testerman's visitation, specifically paragraphs 13.c. 
through 13.l. of the Amended Decree of Divorce, and remand to the district court 
with directions to establish visitation arrangements consistent with this 
opinion.