Title: Commonwealth v. James

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13395 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH JAMES. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     September 13, 2023. - April 23, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Forfeiture Proceeding.  Search and Seizure, Computer, Return.  
Constitutional Law, Taking of property, Burden of proof.  
Due Process of Law, Taking of property, Burden of proof.  
Practice, Civil, Presumptions and burden of proof.  Waiver.  
Search and Seizure, Warrant.  Statute, Construction.  
Words, "Public interest." 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 6, 2017, and February 20, 2018. 
 
 
A motion for return of property was heard by Robert C. 
Cosgrove, J., and a second motion for return of property, filed 
on April 21, 2022, was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case raises a question of statutory 
interpretation:  whether a judge may issue a forfeiture decree 
for property seized pursuant to a search warrant under G. L. 
c. 276, § 3, based solely on the judge's determination 
forfeiture would be in the "public interest," or whether the 
judge must instead follow the procedural requirements set forth 
in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, before any forfeiture decree may 
issue.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude the latter 
interpretation should apply.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
Superior Court orders insofar as they denied the return of 
certain property to the defendant, and we remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.1  Over the course of several 
months in 2016, the defendant, a thirty-eight year old 
professional photographer, sexually exploited a fifteen year old 
girl.  The defendant initially contacted the victim through a 
private message on a social networking website after the victim 
"liked" one of his posts.  The defendant then began 
communicating with the victim through telephone calls, text 
messages, and cell phone and computer applications that support 
 
1 Our recitation of the facts relies in part on the 
Commonwealth's "Statement of the Case," which was filed in the 
Superior Court after the defendant was arraigned in two cases 
stemming from his sexual exploitation of a minor.  The defendant 
does not dispute the facts contained within that statement for 
purposes of his appeal.   
3 
 
"video chat."  Through these communications, the defendant 
solicited and received nude and partially nude images of the 
victim.  The defendant eventually met the victim in person and 
started sexually abusing her.   
After learning of their daughter's exploitation, the 
victim's parents notified the Weymouth police department, which, 
alongside State police, began investigating the defendant.  The 
victim's parents provided investigators with the victim's two 
cell phones.  Upon examining the cell phones, the State police 
were able to confirm that sexual abuse occurred and that the 
defendant and the victim were in frequent communication.  The 
police also found dozens of photographs of the defendant and the 
victim together, including photographs of the two kissing.   
Based on the evidence obtained from the victim's cell 
phones, the police obtained a warrant for the defendant's 
arrest.  While attempting to locate the defendant, a State 
police trooper learned of an address where the defendant had 
lived.  The trooper spoke with a tenant living at that address 
who reported the defendant had left behind some personal 
belongings, including a computer tower2 and an external hard 
 
2 "A computer tower is basically the shell of a computer, 
without the internal hardware such as disk drives and circuit 
boards installed."  United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer 
Towers, More or Less, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 
2001).  
4 
 
drive.  The police then obtained and executed a search warrant 
for the defendant's property at this location.  They seized a 
computer battery with a power cord, a separate bag of additional 
power cords, a computer mouse and speakers, a cell phone, the 
external hard drive, and the computer tower, which contained 
five internal hard drives.   
After the internal hard drives were extracted from the 
computer tower, their contents, along with the contents of the 
external hard drive, were reviewed by a forensic examiner.  The 
examiner determined that one of the internal hard drives, a 
Kingston HyperX internal drive (Kingston drive), was the "main 
drive" in the computer tower and proceeded to "image" the 
Kingston drive.3  The examiner only "previewed" the data stored 
on the other internal hard drives, with the exception of one 
internal hard drive that could not be examined due to damage.   
On the Kingston drive, the examiner uncovered nude images 
of the victim in the form of "selfies," which appeared to have 
been taken by the victim and sent to the defendant.  The 
Kingston drive also contained images of the victim and the 
defendant together, as well as communications between them 
showing the defendant was aware the victim was only fifteen 
 
3 "A forensic image is an exact replica, bit for bit, of the 
original storage device that allows investigation of past use 
without altering the original evidence."  New Hampshire Ball 
Bearings, Inc. v. Jackson, 158 N.H. 421, 424 (2009).  
5 
 
years old.  Additionally, the Kingston drive contained "hundreds 
of images of girls, in various stages of undress," but also 
"typical 'photographer' pictures of families, kids, and/or 
couples."4   
 
The examiner did not uncover images of the victim or 
communications between her and the defendant on any of the other 
hard drives.  However, the examiner found images of nude and 
partially nude unidentified women on some of these hard drives.  
Specifically, in a folder titled "Photography" on the external 
hard drive, the examiner found "'boudoir' style" photographs 
that featured women clothed or "scantily dressed," and who 
"systematically undressed" over the course of the photography 
sessions.  As the women did so, the focus of the photographs 
changed from the women generally, to specific nude body parts, 
particularly their breasts and vaginas.   
 
On one of the internal hard drives, in a folder titled 
"Photo concepts, models, artists," the examiner discovered "one 
hundred forty-two (142) image files -- mostly of naked women."  
On another internal hard drive, the examiner found adult 
pornography.  On the last internal hard drive that the examiner 
was able to access (Toshiba drive), the examiner mostly found 
software applications, movie files, and music files.   
 
4 The report does not specify the ages of these "girls." 
6 
 
A State police trooper with experience and training related 
to child pornography investigations examined the images of the 
nude and partially nude unidentified female subjects on the hard 
drives.  Although the trooper believed some of the images "may 
constitute child pornography if the subjects [were] under 
[eighteen] years old," the trooper was "not able to make a 
determination of the age of the females in the images."  The 
trooper also noted "[i]t would be nearly impossible to make a 
determination on the age of the females in the images without 
identification."   
 
The trooper further suggested, based on his training and 
experience, the computer tower "should be looked at as one 
interconnected system," comprised of all five internal hard 
drives.  While the trooper asserted there could be "backups of 
the drives" -- otherwise referred to as "volume shadow 
copies" -- within any of the five internal hard drives, he 
stated "it is unknown" whether any such backups actually 
existed.5  The trooper further stated the Kingston drive 
 
5 The trooper defined "volume shadow copies" as a 
"technology that allows for manual or automatic backups or 
snapshot[s] o[f] computer volumes or files."   
 
7 
 
contained ".lnk files," which "could show . . . 
interconnectivity between the drives in the tower."6   
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted by a 
Norfolk County grand jury on eight counts of aggravated rape of 
a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A, and three counts of enticement of 
a minor, G. L. c. 265, § 26C (b).  He was then separately 
indicted on one count of possession of child pornography, G. L. 
c. 272, § 29C, based on the nude images of the victim discovered 
on the Kingston drive.  No charges were brought relating to the 
images of the nude and partially nude unidentified female 
subjects found on the hard drives.  The defendant eventually 
pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of 
aggravated rape of a child, where he instead pleaded guilty to 
the lesser included offense of statutory rape under G. L. 
c. 265, § 23.   
A Superior Court judge sentenced the defendant to a term of 
from seven years to seven years and one day in State prison for 
seven of the counts of statutory rape, and a term of from five 
years to five years and one day for the one count of possession 
of child pornography, all to be served concurrently.  For one of 
the counts of statutory rape and for the three counts of 
 
6 As explained by the trooper, .lnk files "are shortcut 
files that link an application or file commonly found on a 
user's desktop, or throughout a system."  
8 
 
enticement of a minor, the judge sentenced the defendant to 
three years of probation, from and after his prison sentence. 
After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for 
return of the property the Commonwealth seized from his former 
residence, including the computer tower, the external hard 
drive, four of the five internal hard drives (excluding the 
Kingston drive), the video camera, the computer battery, the 
power cords, the computer mouse, the speakers, and the cell 
phone.  The defendant also filed a motion to "stay data erasure 
or destruction of the [Kingston drive]."  In the latter motion, 
the defendant asserted "[m]ost, if not all of [his] important 
personal, business, or sentimental files are saved in the 
desktop, documents and downloads folders" contained within the 
Kingston drive.  He requested the Commonwealth preserve the 
Kingston drive and send him "a list of those files in order to 
determine whether or not a subsequent motion to preserve or copy 
that data is appropriate."   
In response, the Commonwealth filed a "motion for leave to 
destroy and dispose of certain computer equipment, digital media 
and contraband seized from [the] defendant via search warrant."  
Aside from the Toshiba drive -- which only contained 
applications, movies, and music -- the Commonwealth sought to 
destroy the hard drives and cell phone pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 3, asserting a "public interest" in destroying the devices.  
9 
 
However, the Commonwealth agreed to return the computer tower 
(with the hard drives removed), along with the Toshiba drive, 
the video camera, the computer battery, the power cords, the 
computer mouse, and the speakers.   
After holding a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge 
granted the defendant's motion for return of property with 
respect to the uncontested property, but denied his request for 
the remaining property, including three of the five internal 
hard drives, as well as the external hard drive.  The motion 
judge also granted the defendant's motion to stay destruction of 
the Kingston drive and ordered the Commonwealth to provide a 
list of files on the drive, but only to the extent that such a 
list already existed.7  The judge took no action on the 
Commonwealth's motion to destroy the hard drives and cell phone.8   
The defendant timely appealed from the motion judge's 
rulings in November 2018.9  The Appeals Court subsequently 
granted a stay of his appeal to allow the defendant to file a 
renewed motion for return of property in the Superior Court, 
which the defendant filed in March 2022.  In his renewed motion, 
 
7 The motions were considered by a different Superior Court 
judge from the sentencing judge.   
 
8 Although it is unclear from the record, the cell phone may 
have been returned to the defendant.   
 
9 The defendant's appeal only relates to the seized property 
and not to his pleas, convictions, or sentences.   
10 
 
the defendant principally raised, for the first time, the issue 
of lack of process under G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8.  The same 
motion judge denied the renewed motion in September 2022.  The 
defendant appealed from the denial, which was consolidated with 
his prior appeal, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review.   
 
2.  Discussion.  In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
return of property pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 3, "[w]e begin by 
acknowledging the strong constitutional protections against 
governmental deprivations of private property."  Commonwealth v. 
Salmons, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 65 (2019).  Among these 
constitutional protections, "no part of the property of any 
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to 
public uses, without his own consent, or that of the 
representative body of the people."  Art. 10 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Additionally, "no subject 
shall be . . . deprived of his property . . . or estate, but by 
the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."  Art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.   
a.  The search warrant statute.  Before proceeding with our 
analysis, we summarize the various sections of the statutory 
scheme at issue.  General Laws c. 276, §§ 1 et seq. (search 
warrant statute), concerns the seizure, retention, and disposal 
of property obtained pursuant to a search warrant.  See G. L. 
11 
 
c. 276, §§ 1 (describing types of property that may be subject 
of search warrant), 2-2C (describing requirements for issuing 
valid search warrant).  Most notably, § 3 provides that, apart 
from certain exceptions not relevant here, "all other property 
seized in execution of a search warrant shall be disposed of as 
the court or justice orders and may be forfeited and either sold 
or destroyed, as the public interest requires, in the discretion 
of the court or justice."  G. L. c. 276, § 3.   
 
Immediately following § 3, the statutory scheme sets forth 
detailed procedures for issuing a decree of forfeiture regarding 
property seized in execution of a search warrant.  See G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 4-8.  Pursuant to § 4, the owner of the property, and 
others with an interest in the property, are entitled to notice 
"[b]efore a decree of forfeiture . . . is issued."  G. L. 
c. 276, § 4.  Such notice must "set[] forth the substance of the 
complaint" and provide a "time and place" for the owner to 
appear to "show cause why the articles seized should not be 
forfeited."  Id.  Section 5 describes service of process for the 
notice, which must be served "not less than fourteen days before 
the time appointed for trial."  G. L. c. 276, § 5.  Section 6 
allows for the postponement of "the time appointed for the 
trial" if notice has not been properly served, if the property 
needs to be retained for use as evidence in a trial, or "if 
other sufficient cause appears."  G. L. c. 276, § 6.  Section 7 
12 
 
describes the procedure for forfeiture "[i]f upon trial the 
property is adjudged forfeited."  G. L. c. 276, § 7.  Finally, 
§ 8 describes the process for appealing from a forfeiture 
decree, indicating, inter alia, that "[a]ll proceedings [on 
appeal] . . . shall conform so far as may be to proceedings in 
criminal cases."  G. L. c. 276, § 8.   
 
We now proceed to address the primary question in this 
case:  whether there is any interplay between G. L. c. 276, § 3, 
on the one hand, and §§ 4 to 8, on the other.  As with all 
questions of statutory interpretation, we exercise de novo 
review.  See Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 73 (2022).   
The Commonwealth asks us to construe the phrase "as the 
public interest requires" in § 3 as a stand-alone provision 
unrelated to the ensuing procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8.  
The defendant counters that the Commonwealth and the courts must 
strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8 
before seized property can be lawfully forfeited pursuant to 
§ 3.  We conclude the Legislature intended for the procedural 
safeguards laid out in §§ 4 to 8 to apply whenever a decree of 
forfeiture is issued under § 3.10   
 
10 Our opinion today is limited to the forfeiture of 
property under the search warrant statute not covered by another 
forfeiture statute.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 94C, § 47 (forfeiture 
of controlled substances); G. L. c. 265, § 56 (forfeiture of 
property used in human trafficking); G. L. c. 266, § 143H 
 
13 
 
"We interpret a statute according to the intent of the 
Legislature, which we ascertain from all the statute's words, 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language 
. . ." (quotation and citation omitted).  Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 
Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent" (citation omitted).  Id.  "Ultimately, we 
must avoid any construction of statutory language . . . that 
. . . would frustrate the Legislature's intent" (citation 
omitted), Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 
332 (2021), or "render . . . any portion of it meaningless," 
Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 690 
(2022).   
 
Interpreting § 3 in isolation would violate the well-
established rule of statutory construction that "[w]e do not 
interpret . . . statutory language . . . so as to render it or 
any portion of it meaningless."  Williams, 490 Mass. at 690.  If 
we were to adopt the interpretation of § 3 advocated by the 
Commonwealth and view § 3 in isolation, a court could forgo the 
procedures set forth in §§ 4 to 8 to issue a decree of 
 
(forfeiture of illegal sound recordings); G. L. c. 267A, § 4 
(forfeiture of laundered money and property).  Our opinion also 
does not reach the enumerated exceptions under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 3 (a)-(c), including the "dangerous weapons" exception under 
§ 3 (b), which we recently construed in Commonwealth v. Fleury, 
489 Mass. 421, 429-430 (2022).   
14 
 
forfeiture, so long as the court concluded that "the public 
interest requires" forfeiture.  The procedures in §§ 4 to 8, 
therefore, would merely be superfluous suggestions.  In 
contrast, reading G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, as prescribing the 
procedures a court must follow to determine if "the public 
interest requires" forfeiture under § 3 gives meaning and 
harmony to all sections of the search warrant statute and thus 
effectuates the Legislature's over-all intent.  See Marengi v. 6 
Forest Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 25 (2022) (we "harmonize . . . 
related provisions . . . of the same statutory scheme so as to 
give full effect to the expressed intent of the Legislature" 
[citation omitted]).   
 
To the extent there is any lingering ambiguity in the 
statutory language, we turn to the legislative history.  See 
Ciani, 481 Mass. at 178.  In 1870, the Legislature passed an 
earlier version of G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, one year after this 
court held the forfeiture provision of the search warrant 
statute then in place was procedurally deficient.  See St. 1870, 
c. 242, §§ 1-4; Attorney Gen. v. Justices of the Mun. Court of 
Boston, 103 Mass. 456, 463-469 (1869).  Before the decision in 
Attorney Gen., under the historic search warrant statute, courts 
could issue a warrant for several types of contraband, including 
15 
 
gambling apparatuses or implements.11  See R.S. (1836), c. 142, 
§§ 1-5.  When seized property was no longer needed as evidence, 
it was to be destroyed under the direction of the court.12  See 
R.S. (1836), c. 142, § 5.  The statute did not require the court 
to conduct any proceedings or issue any notice whatsoever before 
ordering the destruction of the seized property.  See id.   
Subsequently, in 1869, the Legislature expanded the reach 
of the search warrant statute beyond contraband to allow 
"furniture, fixtures, and personal property" to be seized from 
"gaming-houses."13  See St. 1869, c. 364 (amending historic 
search warrant statute).  Because possession of this property 
was not inherently unlawful, such property was to be sold rather 
than destroyed if "upon [a] hearing" the court "adjudged" that 
the property was seized from a gaming-house at a time when 
gambling was taking place.  See St. 1869, c. 364, § 3.   
 
11 Specifically, pursuant to R.S. (1836), c. 142, §§ 1 and 
2, courts could issue a search warrant for (1) stolen or 
embezzled property, (2) counterfeit money, (3) obscene 
materials, (4) lottery tickets, and (5) gambling apparatuses or 
implements. 
 
12 Stolen property was returned to the owner rather than 
destroyed.  See R.S. (1836), c. 142, § 5. 
 
13 As the name suggests, "gaming-houses" were buildings 
where gambling took place.  See Commonwealth v. Blankinship, 165 
Mass. 40, 42-43 (1895). 
 
16 
 
 
The historic search warrant statute and the 1869 amendment 
were considered by this court in Attorney Gen., 103 Mass. at 
457, after an agent of the Commonwealth seized gambling 
implements, furniture, and personal property from an alleged 
gaming-house but did not arrest any persons in connection with 
the alleged gambling.  As a result, the lower court was faced 
with deciding whether to order the sale and destruction of 
property belonging to unknown persons who had received no notice 
of the proceedings.  Id. at 457, 463.   
On appeal, this court determined the lower court could not 
order the sale and destruction of the property because proper 
procedures had not been carried out.  Id. at 469.  We observed 
that "[t]he terms of the statute, taken literally" did not 
require "any formal[] . . . notice or trial," id. at 464, but we 
nonetheless read these requirements into the statute on the 
grounds that it would be "entirely contrary to the spirit of our 
laws that property which may be valuable should be literally 
destroyed without some attempt to notify the owner . . . or 
[without] hav[ing] a hearing on the question whether the 
property can be said to be of that class which the statute 
intends to condemn," id. at 465.  Regarding the 1869 amendment, 
the court concluded "to fall within the familiar provisions of 
our Constitution . . . [t]he hearing and adjudication spoken of 
in the [amendment] must be understood to mean a judicial 
17 
 
hearing, with all its incidents, of notice, actual or 
constructive[,] trial, and the right of appeal to a jury."  Id. 
468.   
One year after this court's decision in Attorney Gen., the 
Legislature passed St. 1870, c. 242, which required notice and a 
trial prior to the issuance of a forfeiture decree and provided 
the right to appeal from a forfeiture decree.  Specifically, the 
statute required 
"written notice . . . setting forth the substance of the 
[forfeiture] complaint, [and] commanding the persons, if 
any, in whose possession the things were found, and the 
owner, if alleged, and all other persons claiming any 
interest therein, to appear before said court or magistrate 
at a time and place therein named, to show cause, if any 
they have, why the things seized should not be forfeited." 
 
St. 1870, c. 242, § 2.  The statute also detailed how notice was 
to be served and permitted the trial to be postponed if such 
notice was not "duly served."  St. 1870, c. 242, §§ 3-4.   
It is no coincidence that St. 1870, c. 242, was passed 
directly after this court's decision in Attorney Gen., and that 
it codified the procedures this court read into the search 
warrant statute.  The Legislature's intent in passing these 
provisions was clearly to ensure that proper procedure was 
followed for the issuance of a decree of forfeiture.  
Considering this history, we conclude the legislative intent 
behind G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, much like its precursor, is to 
provide the necessary procedural process to ensure that 
18 
 
forfeiture is not "contrary to the spirit of our laws" and 
"fall[s] within the familiar provisions of our Constitution."  
Attorney Gen., 103 Mass. at 465, 468.  It would therefore be 
contrary to the Legislature's intent to read G. L. c. 276, § 3, 
as a stand-alone provision, separated from the procedural 
safeguards in §§ 4 to 8.   
The Commonwealth cites Beldotti v. Commonwealth, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 185 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 (1997), in 
support of its argument that the "public interest" clause of 
G. L. c. 276, § 3, is untethered to the procedural requirements 
of §§ 4 to 8.  The defendant in Beldotti was convicted of murder 
in the first degree for a "brutal sex crime" and sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of life without the possibility of parole.  
Id. at 185.  The Appeals Court denied the defendant's motion for 
the return of property seized from his house pursuant to a 
search warrant, reasoning that "[a]lthough property may not be 
forfeited simply because it is offensive or repugnant," there 
was "a connection between the property . . . and the crime . . . 
committed" that warranted forfeiture.  Id. at 189.   
In deciding Beldotti, the Appeals Court gave no 
consideration as to whether the procedural requirements in §§ 4 
to 8 had been followed, and it is unclear whether either party 
raised the issue on appeal.  Accordingly, to the extent that 
Beldotti may be read as allowing forfeiture to be accomplished 
19 
 
outside of the parameters §§ 4 to 8, it is not correct and not 
to be followed.  When the Commonwealth seizes property pursuant 
to a search warrant, unless another statute governs forfeiture 
or the property falls under one of the exceptions enumerated in 
§ 3, the procedural requirements of the ensuing sections must be 
complied with before a forfeiture decree may be entered.   
b.  Standard of proof at forfeiture proceedings.  Having 
determined the procedural requirements of §§ 4 to 8 must be 
followed prior to a determination whether forfeiture is in the 
"public interest" under § 3, we take this opportunity to clarify 
the standard of proof to be applied under the search warrant 
statute, as the statute does not specify the applicable 
standard.  We hold that a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, as the general standard in civil cases, applies here 
and the burden of proof falls upon the Commonwealth.  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015) (Doe), and cases cited.  See also 
Andrews, petitioner, 449 Mass. 587, 591 (2007) ("the baseline 
rule [is] that the fact finder in a civil case usually employs a 
fair preponderance of the evidence standard").  Therefore, in a 
forfeiture action brought under the search warrant statute, the 
Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that "the public interest requires" forfeiture.  G. L. 
c. 276, § 3.  In arriving at this conclusion, we have balanced 
20 
 
"the private interests affected, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, the probable value of additional or substitute 
safeguards, and the governmental interests involved," and we are 
satisfied that this standard of proof accords with due process 
(citation omitted).  Doe, supra at 311. 
c.  Waiver.  It is undisputed that the procedures set forth 
in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, were not followed here.  As a 
threshold matter, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant's 
claim of entitlement to such procedure is untimely and waived 
because he raised the issue of procedural deficiencies for the 
first time in his renewed motion for return of property, rather 
than in his original motion.  We disagree.   
Rather than denying the defendant's renewed motion on 
waiver grounds, the Superior Court judge instead reached the 
merits of the defendant's claim.  Although Rule 61 of the Rules 
of the Superior Court (2023), which governs motions for the 
return of property, prescribes a particular time period for the 
filing of such motions, it also confers discretion upon Superior 
Court judges to entertain these motions "at such other time as 
the court may allow."  Therefore, it was within the judge's 
discretion to reach the merits of the defendant's renewed 
motion.  See Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 792-793 
(2003) (discussing judge's discretion to hear renewed pretrial 
21 
 
motions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 [a] [5], 378 Mass. 871 
[1979]).   
d.  Application of § 3.  Irrespective of any procedural 
deficiencies, the Commonwealth argues forfeiture is in the 
"public interest" and appropriate in this case because of the 
odious nature of the crimes for which the defendant was 
convicted, and because of the possibility the disputed hard 
drives "may" contain child pornography.  We believe such a 
determination is premature.   
The Commonwealth posits that returning any of the drives 
would "result in a high likelihood" of returning child 
pornography to the defendant because the drives "may" have been 
interconnected with the Kingston drive.  In support of these 
assertions, the Commonwealth relies entirely on the affidavit of 
a State police trooper averring there are "hundreds of images of 
unidentified nude or semi-nude females" of indeterminate ages on 
the disputed drives that "may" constitute child pornography "if" 
the subjects were under eighteen years of age.  Additionally, 
the trooper asserted that the presence of .lnk files "could" 
signify that the drives were "interconnected" to the Kingston 
drive, which contains pictures of the victim.  The trooper does 
not purport to know the likelihood of either possibility being 
true.   
22 
 
The Commonwealth's arguments here are analogous to those 
that it previously presented in Salmons, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 
65, where the Commonwealth objected to the return of the 
defendant's seized property based only on speculation.  In 
Salmons, the defendant was "arrested . . . for assault and 
battery and related charges" stemming from an incident of 
domestic violence.  Id. at 62.  As part of the investigation, 
the police seized the defendant's three cell phones, two of 
which "contain[ed] 'numerous and sexually explicit photographs 
and videos of the defendant and [the victim].'"  Id. at 63.   
The Commonwealth in Salmons filed a motion to erase the 
data on the defendant's cell phones based solely on the 
possibility "the data on them could be used to harm the victim" 
in the future (emphasis added).  Id. at 68.  To avoid this 
purported risk, a judge granted the Commonwealth's motion 
without any "finding of fact that such harm was in any sense 
likely."  Id. at 69.  The Appeals Court reversed, reasoning that 
mere speculation that "lawful property . . . might be used to 
commit a crime or inflict other harm in the future" cannot 
overcome "the strong constitutional protections against 
governmental deprivations of private property."  Id. at 65, 68.   
Here, as in Salmons, the defendant's property may not be 
forfeited based merely on the speculative concern that harm 
could occur if the disputed property were to be returned.  There 
23 
 
has been no showing (as of yet) to justify that concern.  
Significantly, the trooper's supporting affidavit, the only 
basis for the Commonwealth's concerns, does not establish that 
future harm is likely to occur or that the property in question 
constitutes illegal contraband.  Instead, the trooper only makes 
vague assertions about potential illegality, in that the images 
on the disputed drives "may" constitute child pornography "if" 
the subjects were under eighteen years old.  Such assertions on 
their own cannot justify forfeiture at this juncture.   
To balance all the competing interests, what is required 
are appropriate proceedings in accordance with G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 4 to 8, including notice and a trial, so a judge may 
evaluate, on a full factual record, the merits of the competing 
arguments to determine if a forfeiture decree is in the "public 
interest" under § 3.  Indeed, this case hinges on numerous 
factual disputes and thus requires a fact finder to resolve 
them.  To be clear, we do not suggest it would be impossible or 
even unlikely for the Commonwealth to demonstrate the hard 
drives contain child pornography or forfeiture is not otherwise 
in the public interest; we conclude only that proceedings 
consistent with the requirements of §§ 4 to 8 are necessary for 
a judge to make such a determination. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The orders of the Superior Court denying 
in part the defendant's motion for return of property and 
24 
 
denying the defendant's renewed motion for return of property 
are vacated and set aside insofar as they denied the return of 
certain property.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court 
for forfeiture proceedings consistent with this opinion.14  We 
express no view on the merits of the issues to be decided.   
 
So ordered. 
 
 
14 We reject the defendant's argument that the only lawful 
remedy in this case would be an order requiring the return of 
his property.  None of the cases the defendant cites requires 
this remedy, and in fact, remand was ordered in the majority of 
these cases.  See, e.g., Lindell v. United States, 82 F.4th 614, 
622 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 23-950 
(Apr. 15, 2024) (remanding to determine whether continued 
retention of plaintiff's cell phone was justified when "the 
record ha[d] not been developed on this issue").  See also 
Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 139 (2017) (remanding when 
State had "zero claim of right" to property at issue).