Title: Brooks v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Derelle BROOKS v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-296                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 7, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors. -- Under Ark. Code
     Ann.  (Supp. 1995), a circuit court and a juvenile court have
     concurrent jurisdiction, and a prosecuting attorney may charge
     a juvenile in either court where a case involves a juvenile
     who was at least sixteen years old when he engaged in conduct
     that, if committed by an adult, would be any felony; in making
     the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case,
     the court must consider the following factors: (1) the
     seriousness of the offense and whether violence was employed
     by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2) whether
     the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated
     offenses that would lead to the determination that the
     juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
     rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat
     and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to those
     efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor that reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.

2.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- court not required to give
     factors equal weight. -- In juvenile-transfer determinations,
     the trial court is not required to give equal weight to each
     of the statutory factors.

3.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- serious and violent nature
     of offense sufficient basis for denying motion. -- The serious
     and violent nature of an offense is a sufficient basis for
     denying a motion to transfer and for trying a juvenile as an
     adult.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- information was sufficient
     evidence of serious and violent nature of crime -- no
     additional element of violence necessary. -- The information,
     which charged a class Y felony, was sufficient evidence of the
     serious and violent nature of the crime to support an order
     denying the seventeen-year-old appellant's motion to transfer
     the case to the juvenile division of chancery court; no
     element of violence beyond that required to commit the crime
     is necessary.

5.   Criminal law -- statutory rape is serious offense -- trial
     court did not err in concluding that statutory rape involved
     violence. -- It is undisputed that statutory rape is a serious
     offense; given the allegations in the case, the supreme court
     could not say that the trial court erred in its conclusion
     that the offense charged, statutory rape, involved violence.

6.   Juveniles -- eighteen year old cannot be committed to youth-
     services center. -- A person who has reached his eighteenth
     birthday cannot be committed to a youth-services center; the
     chance for rehabilitation within the Division of Youth
     Services is nonexistent when a commitment cannot be had for a
     young person older than eighteen; although Ark. Code Ann. 
     9-28-208(d) (Supp. 1995) extended the commitment time for
     juveniles beyond age eighteen under certain circumstances, it
     presupposes that the youth was committed upon reaching
     eighteen and that the commitment will continue.

7.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court's decision that
     juvenile should be tried as adult was not clearly erroneous. -
     - The decision that a juvenile is to be tried in circuit court
     as an adult must be supported by clear and convincing
     evidence; the supreme court will not reverse the trial court's
     decision unless it determines that the decision was clearly
     erroneous; where the evidence showed that the statutory
     factors were satisfied, the supreme court could not conclude
     that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.


     Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court; Berlin C. Jones, Judge;
affirmed.
     Cross, Kearney & McKissic, by: Jesse L. Kearney, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Derelle Brooks, a seventeen-year-old, was charged with rape in
Jefferson Circuit Court on August 7, 1995.  He moved to transfer
the case to the juvenile division of chancery court.  The motion
was denied.  The Trial Court's statement on the matter emphasized
the seriousness of, and violence involved in, the offense.  We
affirm the decision.
     A "criminal charge sheet" found in the record states that Mr.
Brooks placed his finger in the vagina of the two-year-old victim,
causing her to bleed.  Evidence presented by Mr. Brooks in support
of the transfer motion showed that he and the infant victim were
foster children in the same foster home.  
     Mr. Brooks was charged with statutory rape.  Ark. Code Ann. 
5-14-103(a)(3) (Repl. 1993).  It was alleged that Mr. Brooks
committed the offense by engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual activity with another person less than fourteen years of
age.
     Mr. Brooks's motion contended he was seventeen and had no
prior felony convictions or delinquency adjudications.  He contends
his motion to transfer should have been granted because he has not
previously been adjudicated as a delinquent, and because there have
been no past efforts to rehabilitate him.
     Section 9-27-318 (Supp. 1995) provides in part:

     (b) A circuit court and a juvenile court have concurrent
     jurisdiction and a prosecuting attorney may charge a
     juvenile in either court when a case involves a juvenile:
     (1) At least sixteen (16) years old when he engages in
     conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be any
     felony;
                             * * * 
     (e) In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to
     transfer the case, the court shall consider the following
     factors:
     (1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence
     was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the
     offense;
     (2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern
     of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and

     (3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity,
     and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile's
     prospects for rehabilitation.

     The Trial Court is not required to give equal weight to each
of the statutory factors.  Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128,