Title: Johnny Hoskins v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-28 
____________ 
 
JOHNNY HOSKINS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 19, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Johnny Hoskins appeals a circuit court judgment imposing a sentence of 
death upon resentencing.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
I. 
THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts supporting Hoskins’s convictions are detailed in our decision on 
his direct appeal of his convictions and previous death sentence.  Hoskins v. State, 
702 So. 2d 202, 203-04 (Fla. 1997).  We briefly summarize them.  On Sunday, 
October 18, 1992, police went to eighty-year-old Dorothy Berger’s home after 
neighbors discovered that her door was open but no one was home.  The television 
and air-conditioning were on; a small amount of blood, a bent pair of eyeglasses, 
and a green hand towel were on the bed; several items in the room appeared to be 
out of place; a shoe impression was visible in the dust on the floor; and Berger’s 
car was gone.  There was no sign of forced entry.  The victim had last been heard 
from around 6:30 p.m. the previous evening. 
 
Hoskins lived with his girlfriend next door to the victim.  On the evening of 
October 17, a witness saw him driving a car similar to the victim’s.  At about 5 
a.m. the next morning, Hoskins arrived at his parents’ house in Georgia driving 
that same car.  After he arrived, he borrowed a shovel and left.  He returned about 
twenty minutes later.  On Monday, October 19, he was stopped in Georgia for a 
traffic violation.  Police later determined that the car he was driving belonged to 
the victim.  Police found vegetation and blood in the trunk of the car.  Thereafter, 
Hoskins’s father led police to an area near his home where the type of vegetation 
found in the trunk grew.  The victim was discovered there in a grave with her 
hands tied behind her back and a gag in her mouth.   
 
Further examination revealed that the victim had been raped; had numerous 
injuries to her body; had several blows to her head, one of which likely caused her 
to become unconscious; and had died of strangulation, which occurred after the 
sexual battery and beating.  DNA analysis revealed that the semen found on the 
victim and on the victim’s bed sheet could have come from Hoskins. 
 
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The jury convicted Hoskins of first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, 
sexual battery with physical force, kidnapping, and robbery, and the circuit court 
sentenced him to death for the first-degree murder.  Hoskins, 702 So. 2d at 203.  
The trial court set aside the original penalty phase proceeding.  Id. at 204.  Before 
the second proceeding, at the suggestion of defendant’s mental health expert (Dr. 
Krop), the defense requested neurological testing to develop mitigating mental 
health evidence.  The trial judge denied the request.  Id.  In the second penalty 
phase proceeding, the jury unanimously recommended, and the trial judge 
imposed, a death sentence.  Id.  On appeal, we affirmed Hoskins’s convictions and 
the sentences, except the death sentence.1  As to the death sentence, we remanded 
for a PET scan and subsequent evidentiary hearing to determine whether the PET 
scan showed an abnormality and, if so, whether the results caused Dr. Krop to 
change his testimony. Id. at 210-11.  The trial judge concluded that the PET scan 
showed an abnormality and that (as conceded by the State) Dr. Krop’s testimony 
changed as a result.  Hoskins v. State, 735 So. 2d 1281, 1281 (Fla. 1999).  The trial 
court did not reach the validity of the PET scan or conduct a hearing pursuant to 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring new or novel 
                                          
 
1.  We rejected Hoskins’s sole guilt phase issue on appeal—“that he was 
deprived of his right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury drawn from a 
representative cross section of the community” because the trial court permitted the 
court clerk to excuse certain jurors—as procedurally barred.  Hoskins, 702 So. 2d 
at 205-06.  
 
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scientific principles to “have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs”).  735 So. 2d at 1281 n.1.   Based on the trial court’s findings, we 
vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding, with 
the validity of the PET scan and Frye issues to be considered as part of the new 
sentencing proceeding.  Id.  The trial court held a Frye hearing and overruled the 
State’s objection to the admissibility of the PET scan evidence. 
Following the new penalty phase proceeding, the jury recommended death 
by a vote of 11-1.  By special interrogatories, the jury found three aggravating 
circumstances:  (1) the capital felony was committed during the course of or in 
flight after committing the crimes of robbery, sexual battery, or kidnapping (vote 
of 12-0); (2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest (vote of 12-0); and (3) the capital felony was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (vote of 10-2).  The trial court found the same 
aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.   
The trial court found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) the 
Defendant formed and maintained loving relationships with his family (little 
weight); (2) the Defendant was a father figure to his siblings (little weight); (3) the 
Defendant protected his mother from his father’s abuse (little weight); (4) low IQ 
(little weight); (5) low mental functional ability (little weight); (6) some 
abnormalities in the brain which may cause some impairment (little weight); (7) an 
 
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impoverished and abusive background (some weight); (8) mental age equivalent 
(between fifteen and twenty-five) (little weight); (9) the Defendant helped support 
his family financially (little weight); (10) the Defendant had and cared for many 
pets (little weight); (11) no disciplinary problems in school (little weight); (12) the 
Defendant suffered from poor academic performance and left school at age sixteen 
to work to help his family (little weight); (13) the Defendant was not malingering 
(little weight); (14) the Defendant expressed remorse (little weight); (15) potential 
for rehabilitation and lack of future dangerousness (little weight); and (16) good 
jail conduct, including death row behavior (little weight). 2  The trial court 
concluded that any one of the aggravating circumstances standing alone far 
outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances and resentenced Hoskins to death.   
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Hoskins raises six claims:  (1) the trial court erred in overruling his objection 
                                          
 
2.  The trial court found each mitigating circumstance pursuant to section 
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2004), “any other factors in the defendant’s 
background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.”  The trial 
court also found mitigating circumstance (8) pursuant to section 921.141(6)(g), 
“[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.”  Thus, the trial court found 
one statutory mitigator and fifteen nonstatutory mitigators.  The trial court found 
mitigators (14) through (16) based on the hearing held pursuant to Spencer v. State, 
615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the trial court should conduct a 
hearing to allow the parties to be heard, afford the parties an opportunity to present 
additional evidence, allow the parties to comment on or rebut information in any 
presentence or medical report, and afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard 
in person).  
 
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to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to an African-American juror; (2) the 
trial court erred in limiting Hoskins’s voir dire examination regarding the potential 
jurors’ ability to consider “gory photographs” which were already in evidence; (3) 
the trial court erred in failing to give the requested limiting instruction on victim 
impact evidence at the time of introduction; (4) the trial court erred in denying 
Hoskins’s requested jury instructions; (5) the trial court included improper 
aggravating circumstances, excluded existing mitigating circumstances, and failed 
to properly find that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances; and (6) Florida’s capital sentencing process is unconstitutional 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000).  The State cross-appealed, asserting the trial court improperly 
admitted PET scan evidence.  Below we address each of Hoskins’s claims and the 
proportionality of Hoskins’s death sentence.  Because we affirm, we do not address 
the State’s cross-appeal.   
A. 
Peremptory Challenge 
Hoskins claims the trial court erred in permitting the State’s peremptory 
challenge of an African-American juror (Ms. Harp) because: (1) the record does 
not support the  prosecutor’s and trial court’s interpretation of Ms. Harp’s voir dire 
responses; (2) the State accepted similarly situated jurors; (3) the State’s 
questioning “singled out” Ms. Harp; and (4) the trial court erred in focusing on the 
 
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“reasonableness” of the State’s reason rather than its “genuineness.”   
As we stated in Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996): 
A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory 
challenge on racial grounds must:  a) make a timely objection on that 
basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial 
group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for 
the strike.  If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must 
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.   
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent 
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2).  
If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, 
given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is 
not pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3).  
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Peremptory challenges “are presumed to be exercised in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.”  Jones v. State, 923 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 2006) 
(quoting Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764).  “[T]he appropriate standard for appellate 
review for determining the threshold question of whether there is a likelihood of 
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is the abuse of discretion 
standard.”  Files v. State, 613 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Fla. 1992).  The trial court’s 
decision turns on an assessment of credibility and will be affirmed unless clearly 
erroneous.  Jones, 923 So. 2d at 490.   Below, we detail the circumstances 
surrounding the strike, address each of Hoskins’s arguments, and conclude that 
Hoskins has failed to establish that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. 
The parties conducted jury selection over two days.  Each day, the State 
asked potential jurors about prior contact with law enforcement and whether they, 
 
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members of their families, or their friends had prior criminal arrests or 
investigations.  Ms. Harp responded, “I have several people in my family, friends, 
that ha[ve] been arrested.  My godson right now is serving time in prison . . . with 
several counts of felonies.”  Upon further inquiry she indicated that her godson’s 
felonies were violent.   
Following voir dire on the second day, the State moved to strike Ms. Harp, 
and the defense objected:  
MR. CHANG [defense counsel]:  Judge, we would object and ask the 
State to show a race-neutral reason.  Let the record reflect she’s the 
only African-American person on the venire. 
THE COURT:  Well, she certainly is an African-American, and 
whether she’s the only one or not, I’m not sure.  But I’ll still find that 
she is a member of a group and sufficient predicate has been laid for 
the challenge.3
 
What’s your reason here, Mr. Brown? 
MR. BROWN [prosecutor]:  Judge, the reason on Miss Harp, she 
indicated her godson, who she indicated some bit of closeness, serving 
a long-term prison sentence, it was for a violent felony.  She also 
indicated a number of other family members and friends who had 
been convicted, have been to prison. 
 
The defense pointed to jurors Mayhue, Ingraham, Wilborn, Nopper, Loftis, and 
Campione as similarly situated to Ms. Harp, but acceptable to the State.  The trial 
court asked the court reporter to read back the pertinent portion of Ms. Harp’s 
                                          
 
3.  Hoskins asserts that Ms. Harp was the only African-American on the 
panel.  Other than this exchange regarding Ms. Harp, the record does not reveal the 
races of any of the other potential jurors or the racial composition of the jury 
seated.  However, because the defense pointed to jurors Mayhue, Ingraham, 
Wilborn, Nopper, Loftis, and Campione as similarly situated at trial, it is at least 
implied that these jurors are not African-American. 
 
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questioning and, following argument of counsel, ruled: 
THE COURT:  Well, certainly the proffered reasons are neutral and 
reasonable.  I don’t think that somebody else has got somebody else 
somewhere who’s been arrested or another family member or friend 
that’s been convicted of a crime and therefore this is not neutral and 
not reasonable, I think you’ve got to look at the overall picture. 
 
Certainly the answers given by Mrs. Harp support the reasons 
proffered for the neutrality of the challenge, and you know, I just—I 
can’t find that the reasons given are pretextual; they’re not, they’re 
real.  And if there’s to be anything left of peremptory challenges, and 
I believe there is, that once the Court determines that the reasons 
proffered are both neutral and reasonable, which I’ve determined, and 
that the answers given in Voir Dire support those reasons, which they 
do, the Court Reporter has just read it back and confirmed it, and once 
the Court finds that the reasons are not pretextual as an excuse to 
excuse the juror for racial reasons, I think it’s appropriate that the 
challenge be allowed and that the objection to the challenge be 
overruled. 
 
Had that same challenge been made to any other member of the 
venire who testified identically to Ms. Harp, without regard to black 
or white or Hispanic or any other kind of group, male, female, 
whatever, old, young, it would have passed muster with absolutely no 
problem; I don’t see why it should be any different here.  
 
The challenge will be allowed.   
 
 The defense then exercised another peremptory challenge and the parties reached 
an agreement regarding the panel.  Following announcement of the final panel, the 
defense indicated, “The panel’s acceptable,” the parties selected alternate jurors, 
and Mr. Hoskins himself accepted the jury.4  
                                          
 
4.  It appears that Hoskins failed to preserve this claim by failing to renew 
his objection or accept the panel subject to the earlier objection.  See, e.g., Zack v. 
State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1204 (Fla. 2005).  However, because the parties did not 
brief this issue, and because we reject the claim on the merits, we do not address it. 
 
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1. 
“Misinterpretation” of Voir Dire Responses 
 
Hoskins asserts that the State’s reason is not genuine because the record 
does not support the prosecutor’s and trial court’s interpretations of Ms. Harp’s 
voir dire responses.  Specifically, in response to the trial court’s request to provide 
a reason for the strike, the prosecutor stated that Ms. Harp had a godson serving a 
“long-term prison sentence” and had “a number of other family members and 
friends who had been convicted, have been to prison.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Hoskins argues that the record does not support this claim because Ms. Harp 
actually stated that several family members and friends had been arrested and the 
State did not ask the length of her godson’s prison sentence.  We reject this 
argument.  While the trial judge initially confused Ms. Harp’s voir dire responses 
with those of another juror, counsel corrected him, and the trial judge asked the 
court reporter to read back Ms. Harp’s questioning.  Thus, to the extent the 
prosecutor misstated Ms. Harp’s responses, the misstatement was corrected when 
the responses were read back verbatim.  In addition, other than correcting the 
initial confusion regarding the testimony, the defense did not question the facts on 
which the strike was based, but argued only that other jurors also had convictions 
or contacts with the law.  Therefore, the issue was not preserved.  See, e.g., 
Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 321 (Fla. 2002) (“The trial court . . . cannot be 
faulted for accepting the facial reason offered by the State, especially where the 
 
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State’s factual assertion went unchallenged by the defense.”); Fotopoulos v. State, 
608 So. 2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992) (“[The] claim that this reason is not supported by 
the record was not raised below and therefore has been waived.”); Floyd v. State, 
569 So. 2d 1225, 1229 (Fla. 1990) (“[W]hen the state asserts a fact as existing in 
the record, the trial court cannot be faulted for assuming it is so when defense 
counsel is silent and the assertion remains unchallenged.”).  
2. 
Other Venirepersons Were Not “Similarly Situated” 
 
The State’s concern with Ms. Harp was that she had a number of family 
members and friends who had been arrested, in addition to a godson currently in 
prison on a violent felony conviction.  “The fact that a juror has a relative who has 
been charged with a crime is a race-neutral reason for excusing that juror.”  
Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 788.  Hoskins asserts that the proffered reason is 
discriminatory because other prospective jurors also had family and friends who 
had been arrested or had been arrested themselves.  Certainly, a challenge based on 
reasons equally applicable to an unchallenged juror can indicate pretext.  See 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d 764 n.8.  However, the trial court is in the best position to 
assess the genuineness of the reason advanced, and the decision will be affirmed 
unless clearly erroneous.  See Jones, 923 So. 2d at 490.   
At trial, the defense identified jurors Mayhue, Ingraham, Wilborn, Nopper, 
Loftis, and Campione as similarly situated to Ms. Harp.  Of these, the State 
 
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challenged Mr. Wilborn for cause based on his prior experiences with law 
enforcement and problems with the death penalty.  The defense peremptorily 
challenged Mr. Ingraham.  The others served on the jury.  Mr. Mayhue’s sister-in-
law had been arrested for shoplifting.  Mr. Ingraham counseled a church member 
convicted and serving twelve years for child molestation.  Mr. Wilborn had a DUI 
and other traffic violations.  Mr. Nopper’s nephew had been arrested for domestic 
violence, but no charges were pressed.  Ms. Loftis’s son had been arrested for a 
traffic violation in college.  Finally, Mr. Campione had a friend convicted of a 
felony in Arkansas several years before.  None of these jurors have the 
combination of a number of family members or friends who have been arrested and 
a close family member or friend with a violent felony conviction.   
We have upheld peremptory challenges against charges of discrimination in 
similar circumstances.  In Files, 613 So. 2d at 1302, the defendant argued that the 
State’s reason for striking an African-American juror—that she was divorced, had 
five children, and was unemployed—was pretextual where the State did not also 
strike divorced or unemployed white jurors.  In upholding the challenge, we 
recognized that “we must rely on the superior vantage point of the trial judge, who 
is present, can consider the demeanor of those involved, and can get a feel for what 
is going on in the jury selection process.”  Id. at 1305.  We found two divorced and 
employed jurors and a third married unemployed juror dissimilar from an 
 
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unemployed, divorced mother of five.  Id.; see also Smith v. State, 799 So. 2d 421, 
425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that the reasons for a strike were not “equally 
applicable” where the juror challenged had one cousin recently prosecuted and 
another in federal prison and the “similarly situated” juror had a son whose 
juvenile charge was dropped prior to prosecution); Henderson v. State, 810 So. 2d 
1065, 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (finding a juror with a spouse currently serving 
time in federal prison on drug charges dissimilar from a juror whose son had been 
charged and tried for a DUI offense).  Similarly, here, the potential jurors Hoskins 
identified at trial are not similarly situated to Ms. Harp.  None identified more than 
one person (themselves, a friend, or family member) with prior arrests.  None 
identified a person with whom they are close currently incarcerated for a violent 
felony conviction.  It is the number of family members or friends that have been 
arrested along with the nature of her godson’s conviction that distinguishes Ms. 
Harp from the other jurors. 
On appeal, Hoskins argues that potential jurors Shoeman, Campione, 
Cottrill, Ingraham, Salley, and Sauro were also situated similarly to Ms. Harp.  
However, at trial Hoskins did not mention jurors Shoeman, Cottrill, Salley or 
Sauro.  Therefore, his claim is waived as to these jurors.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 
691 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (noting that the similarly situated juror 
argument “was not made to the trial judge and was consequently waived for 
 
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purposes of appellate review”).  In addition, while it is clear from the record that 
Ms. Harp is African-American (and it is at least implied that the jurors identified as 
similarly situated at trial are not African-American), the races of jurors Shoeman, 
Cottrill, Salley and Sauro are not identified in the record.  Therefore, even if the 
claim is not waived, it is impossible to determine the question of pretext as it 
relates to these jurors.  See id. at 1182 (noting that the failure to identify race of a 
venireperson makes it “impossible . . . to determine the question of pretext”); cf. 
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e cannot determine the 
absence of pretext where the similarly situated venireperson used . . . to support his 
argument [that the defense challenge was not pretextual] was never identified as 
Hispanic.”)  Thus, because the peremptory is presumed to be nondiscriminatory, 
Hoskins has failed to demonstrate pretext.  See Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764. 
3. 
The State’s Questioning Did Not “Single Out” Ms. Harp 
Hoskins argues the State singled out Ms. Harp because it did not ask the 
other jurors about the nature of the crimes committed, but specifically asked Ms. 
Harp whether any of the felony arrests of her family members and friends were for 
violent felonies.  Hoskins did not raise this argument below.  See, e.g., Austin v. 
State, 679 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (finding no error in the exercise 
of the peremptory challenge but noting that the defendants failed to preserve 
additional pretext arguments by failing to raise them below).  Even on the merits, 
 
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although singling out a juror for special treatment can indicate pretext, see 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8, the record does not support Hoskins’s claim. 
The State asked each venireperson about prior contact with law enforcement 
and whether they, members of their families, or their friends had prior criminal 
arrests or investigations.  For the vast majority of the panel who responded 
affirmatively, it was unnecessary to inquire further because the nature of the crime 
was implied in the response.  For others, like Ms. Harp, the State did inquire as to 
the circumstances of the arrest.  For example, the State asked Mr. Shoeman about 
the result of his brother’s arrest, and Mr. Salley about the nature of the crime 
committed by his nephew.  Although the State did not inquire about the nature of 
the crime committed by Mr. Campione’s friend, Ms. Wirkus’s nephew, Ms. 
Cottrill’s son, or Ms. Sauro’s brother, it peremptorily challenged Ms. Wirkus and 
challenged for cause Ms. Cottrill.  Ms. Sauro had previously indicated that her 
husband was a deputy for the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office.  Thus, the State 
likely found Ms. Sauro acceptable on that basis, regardless of any negative law 
enforcement contacts her brother may have had.  Finally, the State did not inquire 
as to the nature of the felony committed by Mr. Campione’s friend several years 
before in Arkansas.  However, the State could have concluded that, unlike Ms. 
Harp’s godson currently serving time for “several counts” of felonies, the nature of 
Mr. Campione’s friend’s felony conviction several years before was unimportant.  
 
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Again, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate what is going on in the jury 
selection process.  Files, 613 So. 2d at 1305.   
In addition, the State peremptorily struck Ms. Wunsch, who indicated that 
her brothers had been arrested for “various things”; Ms. Wirkus, who indicated that 
her nephew had been arrested and served some jail time; Mr. Kerwood, who had 
been arrested after being stopped for a seatbelt violation in his brother’s car; and 
Mr. Hammons, who did not indicate prior arrests on his juror questionnaire or 
during voir dire, but upon further questioning admitted to two prior DUI arrests.  
The fact that the State also struck other potential jurors who responded 
affirmatively about arrests further indicates it did not single out Ms. Harp.  See 
Smith, 799 So. 2d at 425 (stating that the State did not single out a juror where it 
struck other jurors for similar reasons).  In sum, we find that the record does not 
support Hoskins’s claim that the State singled out Ms. Harp. 
4. 
The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standard 
Hoskins vaguely argues that the trial court employed an incorrect standard 
because it focused on the reasonableness of the proffered reason rather than its 
genuineness.  Indeed, we have specified that “[t]he court’s focus in step 3 is not on 
the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its genuineness.”  Melbourne, 679 
So. 2d at 764.  However, reasonableness is one factor that the court can consider in 
assessing genuineness.  Id. at 764 n.9.  Here, the trial court did just that in finding 
 
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the reason given “reasonable” and non-pretextual.  In addition, while the trial court 
did not use the word “genuine,” the trial court did find the reason “real.”  These 
words are synonymous.  There is no requirement that the trial court specifically use 
the word “genuine.”  See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 787 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2001) (“There are no specific words that the trial court must state to satisfy 
the step 3 considerations of Melbourne.”).  Accordingly, we reject Hoskins’s 
claim. 
B. 
Use of Autopsy Photograph During Voir Dire 
 
Hoskins next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
request to show the potential jurors an autopsy photograph of the victim during 
voir dire.  Defense counsel sought to show potential jurors the photograph and ask 
whether it would cause them to vote for the death penalty.  The trial court denied 
the request, but indicated that the defense could “tell the Jury that they’re going to 
hear and see probably some pretty graphic testimony and photographs of injuries, 
including photographs taken during the autopsy.”  The defense did inform the 
jurors that they would see “very graphic photos” and “gory, graphic images” of the 
victim, and questioned some of the jurors regarding their ability to remain 
impartial and fair despite viewing the photographs. 
 
No Florida court has addressed whether the defense must be permitted to 
show potential jurors graphic autopsy photographs during voir dire.  Hoskins has 
 
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cited no cases, and we are not aware of any, holding to that effect.  Instead, courts 
have found no abuse of discretion in preventing the use of such photographs.  See 
State v. Thibodeaux, 728 So. 2d 416, 422 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the use of photographs of the 
victims during voir dire); State v. Bibb, 626 So. 2d 913, 942 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 
(recognizing that the “purpose of voir dire examination is not to elicit jurors’ 
opinions concerning particular evidence,” and holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the defense to show potential jurors 
gruesome photographs of the defendant’s slain children); cf. State v. Proctor, 585 
N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (Iowa 1998) (holding the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in restricting defense counsel’s display of gruesome crime scene 
photographs from another murder case); Commonwealth v. Keohane, 829 N.E.2d 
1125, 1133 (Mass. 2005) (holding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
refusing to display two autopsy photographs to the venire where the trial judge 
explained that there would be graphic photographs and asked prospective jurors 
whether they could remain fair and impartial); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 
S.E.2d 303, 317 (Va. 1988) (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to permit 
use of photographs of the victim during voir dire where the photographs had not 
been admitted into evidence and the trial court permitted an oral description of the 
murder scene).  
 
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Here, defense counsel, in effect, sought an advance opinion of the evidence 
from the jurors.  The purpose of voir dire is to “obtain a fair and impartial jury, 
whose minds are free of all interest, bias, or prejudice,” not to shock potential 
jurors or to obtain a preview of their opinions of the evidence.  Ferreiro v. State, 
936 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Pope v. State, 94 So. 865, 869 
(Fla. 1922)).  “The scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound discretion of 
the court and will not be interfered with unless that discretion is clearly abused.”  
Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1994).  While the trial court did not 
permit the use of the actual photographs, it did permit questioning about the effect 
of viewing graphic autopsy photographs.   Therefore, the record does not 
demonstrate that the trial court restricted Hoskins’s ability to determine the jurors’ 
fairness.  See Ferreiro, 936 So. 2d at 1142 (holding that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion or restrict counsel’s ability to determine the fairness of jurors where it 
refused to permit defense counsel to question potential jurors in a manner that 
referred to the facts of the case); King v. State, 790 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing 
defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors on the effect of viewing 
graphic autopsy photographs where the State already had questioned prospective 
jurors about the effect of the photographs).  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in preventing use of autopsy photographs during voir dire. 
 
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C. 
Victim Impact Limiting Instruction 
In his third claim, Hoskins argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to give a limiting instruction when admitting victim impact evidence.  Such 
evidence, “designed to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual 
human being and the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s 
death,” is admissible once the prosecution has provided evidence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances.  § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2004).  Just before resting its 
case, the State called the victim’s niece to read a short statement (less than two 
pages in the transcript).  The defense requested that the jury be given a limiting 
instruction both before and after it heard the victim impact evidence.  The trial 
court asked, “Is there some authority . . . for giving [the instruction] now?”  
Defense counsel responded in the negative, and the trial court denied the request. 
At the conclusion of all evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that the 
victim impact evidence “may be considered by you to determine the victim’s 
uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community’s 
members by the victim’s death,” but that “the law does not allow you to weigh this 
evidence as an aggravating circumstance.”  We have consistently approved similar 
instructions.  See, e.g., Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 330-31 (approving an instruction 
that victim impact evidence “should not be considered by you as evidence of an 
aggravating circumstance or rebuttal of mitigating circumstances,” but  “may be 
 
- 20 -
considered to demonstrate the victim[’]s uniqueness as an individual human being 
and the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim[’]s death”); 
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998) (approving an instruction that 
“you shall not consider the victim impact evidence as an aggravating circumstance, 
but the victim impact evidence may be considered by you in making your decision 
in this matter”). 
Hoskins does not quarrel with the wording of the instruction or the content 
of the statement.  Instead, he argues that under section 90.107, Florida Statutes 
(2004), the court should have given a limiting instruction before the statement was 
given.  That rule of evidence provides that “[w]hen evidence that is admissible as 
to one party or for one purpose, but inadmissible as to another party or for another 
purpose, is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its 
proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.”  § 90.107, Fla. Stat. 
(2004).  Hoskins failed to preserve this argument.  Upon inquiry, defense counsel 
told the trial court he did not have authority for giving the victim impact limiting 
instruction at the time of introduction.  “For an issue to be preserved for appeal, . . . 
it ‘must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground 
to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered 
preserved.’”  Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 359 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Archer v. 
State, 613 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
 
- 21 -
2359 (2006); see also Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 330.  In Rimmer, the defendant 
argued on appeal that the victim impact instruction did not provide the jury with 
clear instructions on how to consider the evidence.  825 So. 2d at 330.  While 
defense counsel objected to introduction of several statements and presented 
alternative instructions, he did not raise the argument made on appeal with the trial 
court.  Id.  We held that “because appellant raises on appeal an argument that is 
different than the one argued to the trial court, appellant’s claim is not preserved 
for appellate review.”  Id. at 330.   Similarly, here, defense counsel did not raise 
section 90.107 in the trial court.  Therefore, the claim is not preserved.  
In any event, given that the trial court ultimately instructed the jury properly, 
the minimal amount of victim impact evidence presented, and the strong case for 
aggravation and relatively weak case for mitigation, any error would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Alston, 723 So. 2d at 160 (finding harmless 
any error in admitting victim impact testimony from victim’s mother “given the 
strong case in aggravation and the relatively weak case for mitigation”); Varnadore 
v. State, 626 So. 2d 1386, 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding error in failing to 
give a limiting instruction at the time of admission of evidence of a prior 
conviction harmless where standard instructions were given at the close of the 
evidence and defense counsel told the jury during closing that the prior felonies 
could only be considered in relation to the weight of the defendant’s testimony). 
 
- 22 -
D. 
Requested Jury Instructions 
Hoskins next argues that the trial court erred in denying modifications to the 
standard jury instructions related to: (1) consideration of aggravating factors; (2) 
HAC; (3) mitigation; and (4) resentencing.  We review the denial of a requested 
instruction for an abuse of discretion.  See James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1236 
(Fla. 1997) (“[A] trial court has wide discretion in instructing the jury, and the 
court’s decision . . . is reviewed with a presumption of correctness on appeal.”).   
1. 
Aggravating Factors 
The standard instruction on aggravating factors reads in part: “The 
aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the 
following that are established by the evidence.”  Hoskins requested that the 
instruction be modified to read: “The aggravating circumstances that you may 
consider are limited to any of the following that you find are established by the 
evidence.”  He also requested that the standard instruction, “If you find the 
aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, your advisory sentence 
should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five 
years,” 5 be modified to read, “If the aggravating circumstances you find do not 
                                          
 
5.  The standard instructions do not include the phrase “for twenty-five 
years,” but note that “[f]or murders committed prior to May 25, 1994, the penalties 
were different; . . . this instruction should be modified to comply with the statute in 
effect at the time the crime was committed.”  Hoskins murdered Ms. Berger in 
 
- 23 -
justify the death penalty, your advisory sentence should be one of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years even in the 
absence of mitigation evidence.”  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 7.11 (2004).  The trial 
court denied the requests.  Hoskins argues that the standard instructions 
impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant.  He also vaguely argues 
that the standard instructions “comment on the evidence” because they give the 
impression that the listed aggravating factors already have been established.   
We have held that the standard instructions do not improperly shift the 
burden of proof and therefore reject this argument.  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 926 
So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 2006).  We also fail to see how the standard instructions 
improperly comment on the evidence.  In addition to the above-quoted instructions, 
the trial court instructed the jury (also in accord with the standard instructions) that 
“[e]ach aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt 
before it may be considered by you in arriving at your decision.”  Thus, the 
instructions made clear that the aggravators had not already been established but, 
instead, had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before being considered.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury in accord with the 
standard instructions. 
                                                                                                                                        
October of 1992.  The statute in effect at the time provided, “A person who has 
been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall 
be required to serve no less than 25 years . . . .”  § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). 
 
- 24 -
2. 
The HAC Instruction 
 
With regard to HAC, the defense requested that the judge instruct the jury on 
several points: that the term “unnecessarily torturous” be defined to include an 
intent element; that “[t]he fact that it might have taken a matter of minutes to die 
once the process of the homicidal assault began cannot, by itself, support a finding 
of this aggravating circumstance”; and that “premeditation does not make a killing 
‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.’”  The trial court denied the requests, but 
granted the defense’s requested additional instruction that “the actions of the 
defendant which were taken after the victim was dead or rendered unconscious 
from which she never regained consciousness should not be considered in 
determining whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  With 
this addition, the court instructed the jury in accord with the standard instructions. 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requests.  First, 
HAC does not have an intent element.  See, e.g., Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 
1211 (Fla.) (“The intention of the killer to inflict pain . . . is not a necessary 
element of the aggravator.”) (quoting Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 135 (Fla. 
2001)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 184 (2006); Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1177 
(Fla. 2001) (rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in refusing a proposed HAC 
instruction that included an intent element).  Further, in Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 
473, 478 (Fla. 1993), we approved an instruction mirroring the one given in this 
 
- 25 -
case.  Thus, we reject this claim. 
3. 
Mitigation 
 
 
The trial court denied several defense requested instructions regarding 
mitigators: one noting that mitigators do not need to be found unanimously; one 
explaining the definition of mitigating evidence; and one clarifying how jurors 
should consider mental impairment in mitigation.  Instead, the trial court used the 
standard jury instructions.  We have repeatedly held that where the standard 
instructions are followed, “clarifying instructions regarding mitigating 
circumstances are not required.”  Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 163 (Fla. 2002); 
see also Miller, 926 So. 2d at 1257 (“[T]his Court has rejected the claim that the 
standard mitigation instructions fail to define mitigation adequately.”). We reject 
this claim as well. 
4. 
Resentencing 
 
 
The defense requested that the standard instruction on resentencing be 
modified to avoid telling the jury the procedural status of the case.  The trial court 
denied the request and instructed the jury in accord with the standard instruction.  
In Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1130 (Fla. 2000), we recognized that the 
standard instruction on resentencing should be given and “[n]o other instruction is 
to be given by the court as to a prior jury’s penalty-phase verdict or why the case is 
 
- 26 -
before the jury for resentencing at this time.”  Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing the requested instruction.   
E. 
Consideration of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
Hoskins next claims that the trial court erred in considering aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  This claim consists of several subclaims, which we 
address below: (1) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mental mitigators; 
(2) the trial court erred in assigning weight to mitigators and concluding the 
aggravators outweighed the mitigators; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on and finding the killing to avoid arrest aggravator; and (4) the trial court 
erred in finding HAC.  We reject all these claims. 
1. 
Statutory Mental Mitigators 
 
Hoskins asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting two statutory mental 
mitigators: that “the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. 
Stat. (2004); and that “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of 
his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired.”  § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004).  As we have previously 
stated: 
Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted 
evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find 
that the mitigating circumstance has been proved.  A trial court may 
 
- 27 -
reject a defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been 
proved if the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s rejection of the mitigating circumstance.  
 
Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 529 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So. 
2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994)).  With respect to expert psychological evaluations, we 
have explained that “expert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.  Even uncontroverted opinion testimony can be 
rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented 
in the case.”  Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 936 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Knight v. 
State, 746 So. 2d 423, 436 (Fla. 1998)).  “A trial court has broad discretion in 
determining the applicability of a particular mitigating circumstance, and this 
Court will uphold the trial court’s determination of the applicability of a mitigator 
when supported by competent substantial evidence.”  Id.; see also Foster v. State, 
679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996) (“As long as the court considered all of the 
evidence, the trial judge’s determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a 
palpable abuse of discretion.”).  As we explain below, the sentencing order reflects 
that the trial court considered all of the evidence presented, and the rejection of the 
statutory mental mitigators is supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
(a) 
The “Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance” Mitigator 
In rejecting the “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” mitigator, the trial court summarized the evidence presented, 
 
- 28 -
including substantial expert testimony, and found that (1) Hoskins has a 
hypofrontal lobe abnormality that can result in reduced ability to control impulsive 
behavior; (2) it is not a mental or emotional disturbance, much less an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) even if considered an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, the testimony is clear that Hoskins was not under its 
influence at the time of the murder.  The evidence supports the trial court’s 
findings.  The defense’s own expert (Dr. Krop) testified that, while the frontal lobe 
impairment could explain the rape, there was no connection between the frontal 
lobe impairment and Hoskins’s subsequent actions.  None of the experts testified 
that Hoskins was under the influence of any mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the murder.   
This case is similar to Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 936.  There, a defense expert 
testified that the defendant suffered from a psychotic disturbance as well as a 
possible brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder.  Id.  The State’s expert 
found no credible evidence that the defendant suffered from psychosis or brain 
damage, but agreed that the defendant suffered from an antisocial personality 
disorder.  Id.  After considering the testimony, the trial court concluded that “[t]he 
facts and circumstances of the homicide indicate a coherent and well thought out 
plan . . . . There simply is no record evidence to suggest the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of 
 
- 29 -
commission of the homicide.”  Id.  We upheld the rejection of the mental mitigator.  
Id. at 937; see also Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 391 & n.8 (Fla. 1994) (noting 
that “[r]easonable persons could conclude that the facts of the murder are 
inconsistent with the presence of the two mental mitigators” and that “[a] debatable 
link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually means, at 
most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve”).  Similarly, here, the 
facts show an element of planning—Hoskins placed Ms. Berger in the trunk of the 
car, drove approximately six hours (stopping for gas and to change a fuse), stopped 
at his parents’ house to borrow a shovel, drove to a remote location nearby, and 
eventually killed Ms. Berger by manual strangulation.  The defense’s own expert 
testified that Hoskins’s actions required planning.  The facts of the murder are 
inconsistent with a claim that Hoskins was under the influence of an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. 
Finally, the trial court clearly considered the evidence presented.  It found 
low IQ, low mental functional ability, brain abnormalities, and mental age 
equivalent to be nonstatutory mitigators (although it assigned little weight).  
Because the trial judge considered all of the evidence and the findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, we reject Hoskins’s claim.  
 
- 30 -
(b) 
The “Capacity to Appreciate Criminality of Conduct” Mitigator 
 
The trial court likewise rejected the “capacity to appreciate criminality of 
conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law” statutory mental 
mitigator.  Specifically, the trial court rejected the argument that Hoskins lacked 
the mental and emotional maturity to control his conduct (to stop and extricate 
himself from the situation): 
There may be evidence to support this argument with regard to the 
rape, but there is simply no evidence to support this argument with 
regard to the murder.  Dr. Krop’s testimony is that after the sexual 
battery, “The rest of what happened is pretty much consistent with an 
individual who has already engaged in an act which he knows is 
wrong and trying both to avoid detection and trying to cover up for his 
crime.”  When questioned about the Defendant’s purpose in binding 
and gagging Ms. Berger and stuffing her in the trunk of the car, Dr. 
Krop testified that “I presume the purpose was to avoid detection and 
to get away from the scene as quickly as he could without being 
detected.”  With regard to the drive to Georgia, Dr. Krop testified, 
“Well, he’s driving.  He’s obviously—again, by this point he knows 
he’s done something and he’s trying to avoid detection.”  
 
(Record citations omitted.)   
 
Again, the defense’s own expert testified that by the time Hoskins drove to 
Georgia (prior to the murder), he knew he had done something wrong and was 
trying to avoid detection.  In Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 531, the defendant (who the 
defense argued suffered from brain damage) removed the victim from her home 
after sexually assaulting her, drove to two separate orange groves before killing 
her, and lied to police about the crime.  We found the defendant’s “purposeful 
 
- 31 -
actions . . . indicative of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could 
conform his conduct to the law if he so desired.”  Id.  Similarly, Hoskins’s 
purposeful actions in binding and gagging Ms. Berger before placing her in the 
trunk, driving to his parents’ home six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to 
a remote area where he killed Ms. Berger, and then telling his brother he hit a 
possum when blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well are indicative 
of someone who knows his conduct is wrong.  While evidence may suggest 
otherwise regarding the rape, there was no evidence that because of the frontal lobe 
impairment Hoskins could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time 
of the murder.  Because the trial court’s findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, we reject Hoskins’s claim.  See Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 936.   
2. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
Hoskins next asserts the trial court erred in failing to attach “real weight” to 
the mitigating evidence and in concluding that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  Trial courts are in the best position to 
observe the unique circumstances of a case and have broad discretion in assigning 
weight to mitigators.  Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 193 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 1350 (2006). 
As detailed above, the trial court found three aggravators, one statutory 
mitigator, and fifteen nonstatutory mitigators.  The court concluded that any one of 
 
- 32 -
the aggravators, standing alone, far outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances.  
The court considered each of the mitigators advanced by the defense.  In addition 
to the statutory mental mitigators, the trial court properly rejected the lack of injury 
to Ms. Berger’s anus and that the defendant buried the body rather than 
“callous[ly] dumping it out in the open” as nonmitigating.  See Rogers v. State, 
511 So. 2d 526, 534 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing that factors established, but that do 
not “extenuate or reduce moral culpability,” can be rejected).  The detailed 
sentencing order discusses each of the other proffered mitigating circumstances, 
along with evidentiary support and the weight assigned.  There is simply no 
indication that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning weight to the 
mitigators.  See Hoskins, 702 So. 2d at 207-08 (rejecting a similar argument in 
Hoskins’s previous appeal); Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 679 (Fla. 2004) 
(rejecting the argument that the trial court erred in affording “little” and “slight” 
weight to nonstatutory mitigating factors); Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 532 (finding no 
merit in the argument that the trial court did not give enough weight to the fifteen 
nonstatutory mitigators).  In addition, both the jury and trial court found that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  It is not our 
function to reweigh those factors.  See, e.g., Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 612 
(Fla. 2001) (recognizing that weighing the mitigating factors against the 
aggravating factors is the trial judge’s function).  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
 
- 33 -
3. 
The “Avoid Arrest” Aggravator 
Hoskins claims that the trial court improperly found and instructed the jury 
on the “avoid arrest” aggravator. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“The capital 
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody.”).  We disagree.   
We have delineated the proper circumstances for finding this aggravator: 
Where the victim is not a police officer, “the evidence [supporting the 
avoid arrest aggravator] must prove that the sole or dominant motive 
for the killing was to eliminate a witness,” and “[m]ere speculation on 
the part of the state that witness elimination was the dominant motive 
behind a murder cannot support the avoid arrest aggravator.”  
However, this factor may be proved by circumstantial evidence from 
which the motive for the murder may be inferred, without direct 
evidence of the offender’s thought processes. 
In other cases, this Court has found it significant that the 
victims knew and could identify their killer.  While this fact alone is 
insufficient to prove the avoid arrest aggravator, we have looked at 
any further evidence presented, such as whether the defendant used 
gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating statements about 
witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and 
whether the victims were confined or were in a position to pose a 
threat to the defendant. 
 
Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Consalvo 
v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1997)). 
While the fact that Ms. Berger could identify her assailant may not alone be 
sufficient to support a finding that the dominant motive was to avoid arrest, the 
factor is significant.  Id.  In addition, we have repeatedly upheld the finding of this 
aggravator where a sexual battery or robbery occurred in one location and the 
 
- 34 -
victim was taken to and killed in another one.  See, e.g., Hall, 614 So. 2d at 477 
(“[W]e have uniformly upheld finding this aggravator when the victim is 
transported to another location and then killed.”); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 
409 (Fla. 1992) (“The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts of this 
case is that Preston kidnapped [the victim] from the store and transported her to a 
more remote location in order to eliminate the sole witness to the crime.”).  In this 
case, the jury (by a vote of 12-0) and trial court both found that the killing to avoid 
arrest aggravating circumstance had been proven.   
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 526.  
There, the defendant broke into the home of an elderly woman, sexually battered 
her, placed her in the trunk of her own car, drove around for several hours, and 
drove to two separate orange groves before he attempted to strangle her with his 
bare hands, emptied the contents of a fire extinguisher into her mouth, and forced a 
tire iron into her mouth and through the back of her head.  Id. at 518.  In upholding 
the avoid arrest aggravator, along with considering the defendant’s own 
statements, we recognized: 
The evidence in this case indicates that Nelson probably could have 
accomplished the burglary of Brace’s home and sexual battery 
without killing her since Brace likely posed little physical resistance 
to Nelson:  she was 78 years old; she was awakened from her bed in 
the middle of the night when she was wearing only a nightgown; and 
at that time her eyeglasses and hearing aids were on her night stand. 
Further, Nelson easily obtained access to her car.  Therefore, it 
appears that once Nelson immobilized Brace by putting her in the 
 
- 35 -
trunk, he secured an uncontested getaway and there was no reason to 
kill her except to eliminate her as a witness.   
Nelson’s act of taking Brace to a remote area to kill her also 
lends support to the finding of the avoid arrest aggravator in this 
case. . . . Nelson’s journey to two different orange groves was 
intended to find an isolated place to kill Brace, the sole witness to his 
crimes. 
 
Id. at 526 (citations omitted).  Here, the combination of Ms. Berger’s ability to 
identify Hoskins in connection with the rape; Hoskins’s ability to leave Ms. 
Berger’s home with little resistance without killing her (due to her age, the fact she 
was bound and gagged, and easy access to her car); and Hoskins’s act of taking 
Ms. Berger to a remote area to kill her all lead to the conclusion that Hoskins’s 
purpose in killing Ms. Berger was to eliminate the sole witness to his crimes.  
The defense contends that the evidence does not establish Hoskins 
committed the murder to avoid arrest because he thought Ms. Berger was dead 
when he put her in the trunk.  However, as the trial court noted, even if true (which 
is unlikely given that one need not bind and gag a corpse and the medical examiner 
testified that Ms. Berger was alive when gagged), Hoskins certainly discovered 
Ms. Berger was alive when, upon opening the trunk, she kicked at him.  He could 
have fled in her car without killing her, but instead killed her and buried her in a 
shallow grave.  See Knight, 746 So. 2d at 435 (recognizing that “if [the defendant] 
had wanted to perfect his get-away he could have taken the car after he asked [the 
victims] to exit the vehicle and driven away”).  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
 
- 36 -
4. 
HAC 
 
Hoskins claims that the evidence does not support the trial court’s HAC 
finding because “there was no showing that the victim was conscious during most 
of the attack.”6  HAC “focuses on the means and manner in which death is 
inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.”  Duest v. State, 
855 So. 2d 33, 47 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 
1998)).  On appeal, we review the record to ensure the finding is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  Id. 
 
The jury found (10-2) that HAC had been proven.  The trial court agreed, 
concluding, “[T]his Court is hard pressed to think of any way in which the murder 
of Dorothy Berger could have been any more heinous, atrocious or cruel in every 
manner in which that aggravating circumstance has ever been defined.”  This Court 
previously upheld application of the HAC aggravator to this killing.  Hoskins, 702 
So. 2d at 207.  The relevant facts have not changed.  Id. at 206-07.  If anything, the 
                                          
 
6.  Hoskins also claims that “[b]ecause of the defendant’s extreme mental 
impairment and state of rage, there can be no showing that the defendant intended 
for the victim to suffer or even intended the method for the killing.”  The intent to 
harm Ms. Berger in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner is not a required element 
of the aggravator.  See, e.g., Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 1996) 
(“[S]trangulation creates a prima facie case for [HAC]; and the defendant’s mental 
state then figures into the equation solely as a mitigating factor that may or may 
not outweigh the total case for aggravation.”); Francis, 808 So. 2d at 135 (rejecting 
argument that defendant was mentally ill at the time and thus could not have 
intended to cause suffering or torture because intent is not a necessary element of 
the aggravator).  Thus, we summarily reject this argument. 
 
 
- 37 -
evidence presented at the resentencing, specifically the testimony from Dr. Krop 
that Hoskins admitted that Ms. Berger was alive when he opened the trunk, lends 
further support to the HAC aggravator.   
Hoskins asserts, in the face of contrary evidence (including many defensive 
wounds and wounds on different planes of Ms. Berger’s head indicating she moved 
her head to avoid being hit), that there is no evidence that Ms. Berger was 
conscious “from the time of the attack at her house to the opening of the trunk in 
Georgia” and therefore the evidence does not support the HAC finding.  However, 
Hoskins concedes that the evidence shows Ms. Berger was conscious when he 
opened the trunk and that he then “hit her and strangled her to death.”  Even if Ms. 
Berger lost consciousness during the initial attack and the transport to Georgia, the 
fact that she was conscious for the strangulation is sufficient to support HAC.  See, 
e.g., Bowles, 804 So. 2d at 1178 (“Strangulation of a conscious murder victim 
evinces that the victim suffered through the extreme anxiety of impending death as 
well as the perpetrator’s utter indifference to such torture.”); James, 695 So. 2d at 
1235 (upholding HAC where the defendant picked up the victim by her neck and 
strangled her as they looked at each other).  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
F. 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty 
Hoskins next argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under Ring and 
Apprendi.  We have previously addressed this argument and denied relief.  See 
 
- 38 -
e.g., Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 68 (Fla. 2005); Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 
495, 525 (Fla. 2005); Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1264 (Fla. 2004).  
Further, one of the aggravators found by the trial court (and unanimously by the 
jury) is commission during a robbery, sexual battery, and kidnapping.7  The jury 
found Hoskins guilty of these crimes as charged in the indictment and we affirmed 
those convictions.  Hoskins, 702 So. 2d at 203.  The trial judge determined that any 
one of the aggravating circumstances alone far outweighed all of the mitigating 
circumstances.  Accordingly, we reject this claim as we have similar claims.  
G. 
Proportionality 
Although Hoskins does not raise the issue of proportionality, we have an 
independent obligation to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.  
See, e.g., Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 939.  The jury recommended death by a vote of 
11-1.  The trial court (as well as the jury) found three statutory aggravators:  (1) 
commission during the course of or in flight after a robbery, sexual battery, or 
kidnapping; (2) commission for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and (3) HAC.  The 
latter is considered one of the most serious aggravators.  See, e.g., Douglas, 878 
So. 2d at 1262 (recognizing that “HAC is one of the most serious aggravators in 
                                          
 
7.  We have disapproved of special verdict forms detailing jurors’ 
determinations concerning aggravating factors.  State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 
544 (Fla. 2005).  However, here, the parties agreed to their use and neither party 
has raised it as an issue on appeal.  
 
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the statutory sentencing scheme”).  The trial court also found one statutory 
mitigating circumstance, the defendant’s mental age equivalent (given little 
weight), and fifteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, most of which were 
given little weight.  We find the sentence proportional to other death sentences this 
Court has upheld.  See, e.g., Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1288 (Fla. 2004) 
(upholding a death sentence where the victim was beaten, raped, and then 
suffocated after having her neck broken where the trial court found three statutory 
aggravators—(1) convicted felon under sentence of imprisonment; (2) commission 
during the course of a sexual battery or burglary; and (3) HAC—five statutory 
mitigators, and four nonstatutory mitigators), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 987 (2005); 
Douglas, 878 So. 2d at 1262-63 (upholding a death sentence where the victim was 
sexually battered and beaten and the trial court found two aggravators—HAC and 
commission during the course of a sexual battery—one statutory mitigator and 
sixteen nonstatutory mitigators); Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 286 (Fla. 2003) 
(upholding a death sentence where the victim was sexually battered and strangled 
and the trial court found two aggravating factors—previous violent felony 
conviction and HAC—one statutory mitigator, and twenty-six nonstatutory 
mitigators); Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678, 686 (Fla. 2003) (upholding a death 
sentence where victim was sexually assaulted and then strangled and drowned 
where the trial court found three aggravating factors—(1) previous violent felony 
 
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conviction; (2) commission during the course of a sexual battery; and (3) HAC—
and fifteen nonstatutory mitigators).  
III. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Hoskins’s sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Warren Burk, Judge - Case No. 05-1992-CF-017795-AXXX-XX 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
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