Title: The Florida Bar v. Jeffrey Evan Cosnow

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC96262
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
JEFFREY EVAN COSNOW,
Respondent.
[October 11, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
Jeffrey Evan Cosnow.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
Although we affirm the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of guilt, we
disapprove of the referee’s recommended discipline.  Due to Cosnow’s prior
suspension and multiple misconduct we suspend Cosnow from the practice of law
for sixty days and thereafter place him on probation for one year.
The Bar filed a complaint against Cosnow alleging that in his representation
-2-
of Sharon Robinson he violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.1 (a lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client), and 4-1.7(a) (prohibition against
representing adverse interests).  The Bar then sent a request for admissions. 
Cosnow’s answer to the request admitted all material facts.  Thereafter, Cosnow
filed his motion for summary judgment and attendant affidavit arguing that the facts
did not amount to the rule violations alleged by the Bar.  The Bar filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the facts demonstrated that Cosnow
was guilty of violating the aforementioned rules.  The referee conducted a summary
judgment hearing on November 8, 1999, found no genuine issues of material fact,
and granted the Bar's cross-motion for summary judgment.  The referee’s report
reflects her findings of fact, conclusions of guilt, and recommendation as to
discipline:
III.
Findings of Fact:
Pursuant to a court order dated March 7, 1989, Ms. Sharon Robinson
was granted temporary legal custody of her grandson, Dustin R.
Carroll, who had been born out of wedlock on or about April 22,
1987.  (Hereinafter, Dustin Carroll will be referred to as "the child”). 
Ms. Robinson’s daughter, Stephanie Reed (“Ms. Reed”), was the
child’s birth mother, and Ronald Swango (“Swango”) was the child’s
putative father.  On or about September 12, 1997, Swango was killed
in a vehicular accident involving Ms. Rita Frappier (“Ms. Frappier”);
as such, Swango’s estate accrued a potential cause of action for
wrongful death against Ms. Frappier.
-3-
On September 16, 1997, Ms. Robinson entered into three separate
retainer agreements with Respondent:  one covered Respondent’s
representation in paternity and guardianship proceedings relating to the
child; another related to the administration of Swango’s estate; and the
third covered Respondent’s representation relating to a claim for
damages for Swango’s wrongful death.  On December 5, 1997,
Respondent filed a paternity action in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court
in and for Pinellas County (Case No. 97-11684-FD-23), which petition
named Ms. Frappier and Ms. Reed as individual defendants. 
However, the only party that could have been a proper defendant to
the paternity action was the estate of Ronald W. Swango and/or the
personal representative of Swango’s estate.  On March 10, 1998, the
court dismissed Ms. Frappier from the paternity action as an improper
party.
Respondent also filed a guardianship action in the Sixth Judicial
Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County (Case No. 98-1578-GD),
within which Respondent prayed that Ms. Robinson be appointed to
act as the child's guardian.  By virtue of the court order of March,
1987 [sic], Ms. Robinson already was the child's legal guardian.  On
March 26, 1998, Respondent wrote a letter to Ms. Robinson advising
that he was withdrawing as attorney of record in the guardianship
proceeding, but that he would remain as counsel in the paternity
action, in the probate action involving Swango’s estate, and in the
wrongful death action.  The next day, Ms. Robinson delivered to
Respondent a letter by which she demanded that he cease and desist
from performing any further legal representation in any matter
pertaining to herself or the child.
On April 3, 1998, Respondent filed a "Motion to Substitute Next
Friend" in the paternity action, in which pleading Respondent asserted
that he had been retained to represent the legal interests of the child by
Ms. Reed, the child's mother.  Respondent knew or should have
known that the legal interests of Ms. Robinson and Ms. Reed were
directly and materially adverse in any action that involved the care,
control, custody, or representation of the minor child.  By virtue of the
March, 1987 [sic] court order, Ms. Reed was not qualified to
-4-
supersede Ms. Robinson as representative or guardian of the child, a
fact that Respondent knew or should have known.  Ms. Robinson
then retained Susan C. Fogarty, Esq. (“Ms. Fogarty”) to represent her
and the child’s legal interests.  Ms. Robinson did not consent to
Respondent representing Ms. Reed in the same proceeding as he
previously had represented Ms. Robinson.
Respondent also filed a Petition for Formal Administration (In re:  The
Estate of Ronald W. Swango, Pinellas County, Florida Case No. 98-
1802-ES-3), in which Respondent purported to represent Ms. Reed. 
On April 3, 1998, Ms. Robinson filed an objection to the appointment
of Ms. Reed as personal representative in the probate action.  At a
hearing conducted April 13, 1998, Respondent agreed to withdraw
from the probate action but requested that the court appoint an
attorney ad litem to represent the interest of the child, upon which the
court directed Respondent and Ms. Fogarty to submit the names of
three (3) attorneys who would be willing to accept the appointment as
attorney ad litem.  One attorney whom Respondent recommended to
the probate court was John Blakely, Esq., and the court chose Mr.
Blakely.  Respondent recommended Mr. Blakely despite the fact that
he knew or should have known that Mr. Blakely was a member of the
same law firm that had represented Ms. Frappier, the (now-dismissed)
defendant in the paternity case.
On April 9, 1998,  Ms. Fogarty filed a motion to disqualify
Respondent as attorney in the paternity case, due to a conflict of
interest.  On July 22, 1998, the court held that Respondent had created
a conflict of interest in the paternity case and issued an order granting
the motion to disqualify him as counsel.  Neither Ms. Robinson, nor
Ms. Reed, nor the child had legal standing to act as personal
representative of Swango’s estate, and therefore had no legal standing
to initiate a wrongful death action on behalf of Swango’s estate.
IV.
Recommendations as to Whether or Not the Respondent
Should be Found Guilty:
I find Respondent guilty of violating the following Rules Regulating
1.  We note that, although we agree with the referee’s conclusion that
Cosnow violated the rules, we do not agree with the referee’s finding that “[n]either
Ms. Robinson, nor Ms. Reed, nor the child had legal standing to act as personal
representative of Swango’s estate, and therefore had no legal standing to initiate a
wrongful death action on behalf of Swango’s estate.”  Florida Bar v. Cosnow, No.
SC96262, report of referee at 3 (report filed Jan. 28, 2000) (report).  A cursory
review of the relevant statutes establishes that persons with adverse interests to the
estate and even strangers can be personal representatives to an estate.  See Williams
v. Infinity Ins. Co., 745 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Continental Nat’l Bank v.
Brill, 636 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1994) (“Under the Wrongful Death Act,
the personal representative is the party who seeks recovery of all damages caused
by the injury resulting in death for the benefit of the decedent’s survivors and for
the estate.”).
-5-
The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.1 (A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client); and Rule 4-1.7(a) (Prohibition against
representing adverse interests).
V.
Recommendations as to Disciplinary Measures to be Applied:
I recommend that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of 
eighteen months during which he will (1) be subject to supervision by
a member of the Florida Bar (2) refrain from representing clients in any 
areas of law that are not currently included in
his caseload until he completes a minimum of thirty hours of approved
continuing legal education courses in the new area and (3) enrolls in
and successfully completes the one-day Ethics School refresher
course operated by The Florida Bar.
Florida Bar v. Cosnow, No. SC96262, report of referee at 1-3 (report filed Jan. 28,
2000) (report). 
We agree with the referee’s conclusion that Cosnow is guilty of violating
rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.7(a).1  In Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178, 182 (Fla. 1993),
2.  Cosnow admitted all material facts in his answer to the Bar’s request for
admissions, in his motion for summary judgment and attached affidavit, and in the
November 8, 1999, summary judgment hearing.  Cosnow, however, has maintained
that he has only purported to represent the child.
-6-
we held that a referee has the authority in a bar disciplinary proceeding to enter a
summary judgment order:
Under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.6(e)(1), once a formal
complaint has been filed and forwarded to a referee for hearing, the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply except where otherwise
provided in the rule.  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c)
provides for summary judgment where . . . it is shown there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
See also Florida Bar v. Miravalle, 761 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] referee
has the authority in an [unlicensed practice of law] case to enter a summary
judgment . . . .”).  Appellate courts review summary judgment orders de novo with
all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the summary
judgment.  See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d
126, 130-31 (Fla. 2000); Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2000). 
Cosnow points to no genuine issues of material fact in respect to the basis of the
referee’s conclusion that he violated rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.7(a).  Thus, we find no
genuine issue of material fact exists in the instant case.2  Rather, the parties disagree
as to whether Cosnow’s admitted actions in representing the child constitute
-7-
unethical conduct.  We find this to be a question of law.  We affirm the referee’s
conclusions from the admitted facts that Cosnow did not provide competent
representation of his client, Ms. Robinson, or of her ward, the child.  See Florida
Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 1997) (finding violation of rule 4-1.1
where lawyer demonstrated failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or
procedures and caused injury).  We likewise agree that Cosnow was in violation of
the conflict of interest rule 4-1.7(a) in his representation of Ms. Reed.  See Florida
Bar v. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Fla. 1999) (finding violation of rule 4-1.7
where attorney represented a husband and wife in matters related to their business
and then represented husband against wife in dissolution of marriage proceeding);
Florida Bar v. Wilson, 714 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1998) (finding conflict of interest
where attorney represented husband and wife in lawsuit against Department of
Lottery and then subsequently represented wife in dissolution of marriage
proceeding).
DISCIPLINE
The Bar argues that Cosnow’s conduct merits discipline of a sixty-day
suspension, a one-year probation, and required attendance at ethics school.  We
agree.  This Court has a broad scope of review regarding discipline, as we bear the
ultimate responsibility of ordering the appropriate sanction.  See Florida Bar v.
-8-
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions support a suspension. 
Standard 4.32 states that “[s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a
conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to the client the possible effect of
that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”  Standard 4.52
provides that “[s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of
practice in which the lawyer knowingly lacks competence, and causes injury or
potential injury to a client.”  Cosnow created a conflict of interest in which he
exposed Ms. Robinson to potential harm in representing Ms. Reed.  Further, Ms.
Frappier was injured in that she hired legal counsel to get herself dismissed from the
paternity action.  Cosnow’s incompetence and creation of a conflict of interest also
caused harm in unnecessarily complicating and prolonging litigation involving the
child.  See Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1243;  Lecznar, 690 So. 2d at 1286.
We have imposed suspensions for similar conduct.  In Wilson we imposed a
ninety-day suspension where the attorney represented a husband and wife against
the Department of Lottery and then represented the wife against a husband in a
dissolution of marriage proceeding.  In Florida Bar v. Dunagan, 565 So. 2d 1327
(Fla. 1990), we imposed a sixty-day suspension on an attorney who improperly
billed a client and attended a loan closing to represent his own interests while
-9-
purporting to represent those of the client.
We also note that Cosnow has a history of ethical violations.  Cosnow has
been disciplined and suspended for ten days for past unethical misconduct.  See
Florida Bar v. Cosnow, 732 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1999) (suspending by order
Cosnow's license to practice law for ten days for violating rules 4-1.3 (diligence),
and 4-1.4(b) (failure to explain matters to the extent necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation)); Florida Bar v. Cosnow,
661 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1995) (imposing public reprimand and one-year probation on
Cosnow by order for violating rules 4-1.3 and 4-8.4(d) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice)); Florida Bar v. Cosnow, 582 So. 2d 624
(Fla. 1991) (imposing public reprimand by order for several trust fund violations).
In light of the case law, Cosnow’s prior suspension, and his multiple
instances of misconduct, we now suspend Cosnow from the practice of law for
sixty days followed by a one-year period of probation under the conditions
recommended by the referee.  Before Cosnow is reinstated, he must successfully
complete the ethics school course operated by The Florida Bar.  The sixty-day
suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that
Cosnow can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If
Cosnow notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not
-10-
need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making
the suspension effective immediately.  Cosnow shall accept no new business from
the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed.  Judgment is entered
for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for
recovery of costs from Jefferey Evan Cosnow in the amount of $750, for which
sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Division
Director, Tallahassee, Florida, and Brett Alan Geer, Assistant Staff Counsel,
Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant
Jeffrey E. Cosnow, pro se, Palm Harbor, Florida,
for Respondent