Title: The People v. Freddy Rodriguez

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 44  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Freddy Rodriguez,
            Respondent.
Stanley R. Kaplan, for appellant.
Arlen S. Yalkut, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
The issue in this case is whether defendant was
entitled to a charge of justification with respect to his conduct
during a bizarre series of events that ended with the tragic
death of one person and serious injury to two others.  That
defense, found in Penal Law § 35.05 (2), often referred to as the
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No. 44
"choice-of-evils" defense, provides that conduct that would
otherwise constitute an offense is justified when it:
"is necessary as an emergency measure to
avoid an imminent public or private injury
which is about to occur by reason of a
situation occasioned or developed through no
fault of the actor, and which is of such
gravity that, according to ordinary standards
of intelligence and morality, the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such
injury clearly outweigh the desirability of
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the offense in issue." 
Certain facts in this case are not in dispute.  On
August 1, 2005, one Francisco Rios double-parked his overloaded
box truck, facing downhill, at 103-105 Mt. Eden Avenue in the
Bronx.  Rios placed the truck in reverse and turned the engine
off, leaving the keys in the ignition before going into a store. 
Defendant, who was walking by, entered the truck.  While
defendant was inside, the truck descended Mt. Eden Avenue and
struck several cars and three pedestrians, seriously injuring two
and killing one.  At trial, the People and defendant offered the
jury markedly different stories as to how all of this occurred.  
The People claimed that an intoxicated defendant, who
admittedly knew Rios, wanted to play a trick on him by moving his
truck to the bottom of the hill.  This theory was supported by
the testimony of an eyewitness, Carlos Montilla, who had known
defendant for ten years and witnessed the accident.  Montilla
testified that defendant exited the truck after the incident and
asked him, "How many people did I kill?"  Montilla, seeing three
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No. 44
people laying in the road, responded, "You killed three people", 
to which defendant replied, "Oh, I was joking around with the
truck.  I was making a joke and look what I've done."  A police
officer, called to the scene, testified that defendant had
"glassy" eyes and "slurred" speech.  Evidence established that
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .09% nearly four hours
after the incident which, according to an expert called by the
People, meant that his blood alcohol content at the time of the
incident was between .13% and .17%, substantially above the
"legal limit" of .08%.
Defendant had a different version of events.  He
testified that he had previously owned a supermarket on Mt. Eden
Avenue and was familiar with Rios's truck because Rios had
delivered produce to his store.  On this day as he was walking
past the truck, he "saw a movement of the truck."  He ran between
parked cars to get to the truck which, by this time, was
descending the hill and approaching an intersection.  Defendant
opened the passenger side door, jumped inside, slid over behind
the steering wheel and pumped the brakes, to no avail.  He tried
steering, but the wheel was hard to move.  Despite his best
efforts, the truck struck several pedestrians crossing the
street.  He exited the truck on the passenger's side, and went to
a nearby bodega.  Defendant denied knowing Montilla or making any
statement to him after the incident.  
At the charge conference following the close of proof,
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No. 44
defense counsel sought the justification charge in accordance
with Penal Law § 35.05 (2).  The court denied the request,
stating that based upon its reading of the statute and case law,
it failed to "see how a justification charge would be warranted
under these particular facts and circumstances."
The jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]), two counts of assault in
the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [4]), vehicular
manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.12), two
counts of vehicular assault in the second degree (Penal Law §
120.03 [1]), and two counts of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192
[2], [3]).  
The Appellate Division, in a 3-2 decision, reversed,
holding that because there was "a reasonable view of the evidence
that defendant unlawfully entered and operated the [truck] while
intoxicated in an attempt to avoid injury while confronting a
situation not of his own making, he was entitled to a
justification charge," further stating that Supreme Court's
"unexplained omission" of the charge constituted reversible error
(72 AD3d 238, 239 [1st Dept 2010]).  The dissenting Justices
would have affirmed the trial court.  A Justice of that Court
granted the People leave to appeal, and we now reverse.
Addressing the most serious felonies of which defendant
was convicted--manslaughter in the second degree and assault in
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No. 44
the second degree--we conclude that there was no reasonable view
of the evidence that would have supported a justification charge
relative to either of those crimes (see People v Cox, 92 NY2d
1002, 1004-1005 [1998]).  Penal Law § 35.05 (2) is often referred
to as the "choice-of-evils" defense, and properly so.  To be
entitled to such a charge there must be two "evils".  And here,
even under defendant's scenario, there was no "evil" on his part. 
According to defendant, he was not committing any offense when he
jumped into a runaway vehicle to prevent it doing harm to others. 
So, as to the most serious charges, a justification charge was
clearly unwarranted.
Supreme Court erred, however, in refusing to give a
justification charge relative to the counts of operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated. If defendant elected to operate a
motor vehicle, here the truck, while under the influence of
alcohol, in an attempt to prevent injury, he faced the choice of
two evils:  drive while intoxicated or risk a runaway truck
causing injury.  Therefore, Supreme Court should have granted
defendant's request for a justification charge with respect to
the operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated counts.  However,
any error was harmless as evidenced by the jury's conviction of
defendant of the second degree manslaughter and assault counts. 
To find defendant guilty of those charges, the jury was required
to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused the
truck's movement, i.e., that it was not moving before he entered
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No. 44
it.  Because the jury concluded that it was defendant who caused
the truck to move, and not, as defendant contended, that the
truck was already moving, the jury never would have considered
his "choice of evils" defense on the charge of driving while
intoxicated.  As a result, the error of not giving the
justification charge with respect to the vehicular manslaughter
and vehicular assault counts, which include as an element the
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, was harmless, and
defendant is not entitled to a new trial to correct the error. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the case remanded to the Appellate Division for
consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined
on the appeal to that court. 
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People v Rodriguez (Freddy)
No. 44
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority that defendant was not
entitled to a justification charge with respect to the crimes of
manslaughter in the second degree and assault in the second
degree.  However, as to the remaining counts, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, he was
entitled to the benefit of a choice-of-evils defense.  Since the
error in failing to give the requested instruction was not
harmless, I dissent in part.
"Justification is a defense -- as opposed to an
affirmative defense -- and the People have the burden of
disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v
Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 528 [1970] [internal citation and quotation
marks omitted]).  "When evidence at trial viewed in the light
most favorable to the accused, sufficiently supports a claimed
defense, the court should instruct the jury as to the defense,
and must when so requested.  A failure by the court to charge the
jury constitutes reversible error" (People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299,
301 [1982]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
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defendant, he engaged in criminal conduct -- driving while
intoxicated -- in an attempt to avoid the potentially greater
harm that could result from an unattended truck rolling down a
busy street in a densely populated area.  There is no support for
the conclusion that defendant recklessly caused death and serious
physical injury to the victims in order to avoid greater harm. 
In other words, as the majority concludes as to the top two
counts against him, defendant was not forced to choose between
two evils (see majority op. at 5).  Defendant's version of events
does, however, clearly support the requested justification charge
as to the counts of driving while intoxicated and the alcohol-
related assault and manslaughter charges.  It was therefore error
for the court to refuse to charge the jury with the justification
defense as to those counts.
This type of error will be considered harmless when
there is overwhelming evidence refuting the justification defense
and no reasonable possibility that the requested charge would
have led to a different verdict (see People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277,
286 [2006]; People v Jones, 3 NY3d 491, 497 [2004]).  It cannot
be said that the People produced overwhelming proof disproving
defendant's claim of justification.  One version of events may
seem more likely than the other, but this presented a question of
credibility for the jury to resolve.  The absence of the charge
certainly hurt the defense, depriving it of the judicial
imprimatur of its perspective of the matter and the benefit of a 
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favorable burden of proof.  The majority's reliance on the
convictions obtained without the warranted charge hardly shows
the lack of impact of the error.  I would, therefore, modify to
reinstate the charges of manslaughter in the second degree and
assault in the second degree, and otherwise affirm.
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People v Freddy Rodriguez
No. 44
CIPARICK, J. (dissenting):
Because I believe that Supreme Court erred in refusing
to give a choice-of-evils justification instruction to the jury
(Penal Law § 35.05 [2]), as requested by defendant, I
respectfully dissent and would affirm the order of the Appellate
Division.
It is well-settled that "a defendant is entitled to an
instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor"
(Mathews v United States, 485 US 58, 63 [1988]).  In determining
whether the evidence is sufficient, "[a] court must view the
evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to
defendant" (People v Zona, 14 NY3d 488, 493 [2010]; see also
People v Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).  A court's failure to
instruct a jury on an entitled defense, when requested,
"constitutes reversible error" (Zona, 14 NY3d at 493, citing
People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]).
Here, the evidence adduced at trial warranted a
justification instruction.  As the Appellate Division majority
correctly concluded, "the jury could have inferred that defendant
took the otherwise reckless risk of driving the truck while in an
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intoxicated condition in order to prevent the vehicle from
causing imminent injury to others, there being no time to take
any other action" (People v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 238, 244 [1st Dept
2010]).  The majority's assertion that the jury must have
concluded that "defendant caused the truck's movement" (majority
op at 5) to find him guilty of the second degree manslaughter and
assault charges has no bearing on whether defendant was entitled
to his request to charge prior to the court's submission of the
case to the jury.  Had the jurors been properly charged on
justification, we do not know what they would have concluded
(People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1, 8 [1981] [it is not the function of
this Court to "speculate( ) on how the jury (would have)
perceived and weighed the evidence"]).
In sum, because a reasonable view of the evidence
supports the theory that defendant unlawfully entered and
operated the vehicle while intoxicated in an attempt to avoid
injury -- confronting a situation not of his own making -- the
refusal of Supreme Court to give a justification charge relative
to all the counts in the indictment was error.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division, First
Department, for consideration of the facts and issues raised but
not determined on the appeal to that court. Opinion by Judge
Pigott. Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur. Chief Judge
Lippman dissents in part and votes to modify in an opinion. 
Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.
Decided March 24, 2011
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