Title: Evergreen West Business Center, LLC v. Emmert

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  February 13, 2014 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
 
EVERGREEN WEST BUSINESS CENTER, LLC,  
an Oregon limited liability company, 
Petitioner on Review, 
 
v. 
 
TERRY W. EMMERT, 
Respondent on Review, 
 
and 
 
PREMIER WEST BANK, 
Impartial. 
 
(CC CV07020348; CA A146301; SC S061049 (Control)) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EVERGREEN WEST BUSINESS CENTER, LLC,  
an Oregon limited liability company, 
Respondent on Review, 
 
v. 
 
TERRY W. EMMERT,  
Petitioner on Review, 
 
and 
 
PREMIER WEST BANK, 
Impartial. 
(SC S061158) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted November 4, 2013. 
 
John M. Berman, Tigard, argued the cause for petitioner on review/respondent on 
review Evergreen West Business Center, LLC.  With him on the briefs was J. Rion 
Bourgeois. 
 
 
 
Hollis K. McMilan, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on 
review/respondent on review Terry W. Emmert. 
 
 
Cody Hoesly, Larkins Vacura LLP, Portland, and Phil Goldsmith, Law Office of 
Phil Goldsmith, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers 
Association. 
 
 
BREWER, J. 
 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that 
court for consideration, in light of this decision, of the parties' remaining assignments of 
error. 
 
 
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Jeffrey S. Jones, Judge. 254 Or 
App 361, 296 P3d 545 (2012). 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
BREWER, J. 
1 
 
 
For centuries, the choice between legal and equitable remedies in civil 
2 
actions has been informed by the shibboleth that equitable relief ordinarily is not 
3 
available when the claimant has an adequate legal remedy.  See, e.g., Norton v. Elwert, 29 
4 
Or 583, 587, 41 P 921 (1895) (stating principle).  This case, which involves alternative 
5 
legal and equitable claims for damages and a constructive trust on real property that arose 
6 
from the same breach of fiduciary duty, provides an opportunity to reexamine the 
7 
foundations of that principle.  The primary issue on review is whether plaintiff's election 
8 
of the equitable constructive trust remedy was foreclosed by a jury determination that 
9 
plaintiff's damages for the breach of fiduciary duty were $1.  For the reasons set out 
10 
below, we conclude that the trial court properly permitted plaintiff to elect its equitable 
11 
remedy. 
12 
 
 
We state the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the prevailing 
13 
party at trial.  Liles v. Damon Corp., 345 Or 420, 423, 198 P3d 926 (2008).  Plaintiff is a 
14 
limited liability company that looked to defendant, who was one of its members, to save 
15 
its property from foreclosure by a lender.  Defendant did save the property from 
16 
foreclosure by purchasing the loan and associated encumbrance for his own benefit for 
17 
$613,979.49.  Defendant then foreclosed on the property himself, bought it at a 
18 
foreclosure sale with a maximum credit bid, and then encumbered the property with a 
19 
$900,000 loan from a different lender. 
20 
 
 
Plaintiff brought this action for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking in separate 
21 
claims alternative forms of relief:  either damages or a constructive trust on the property 
22 
2 
that defendant acquired.  Plaintiff alleged in both claims that the property was worth 
1 
$1,390,000 when defendant acquired it for himself.  In its claim for a constructive trust, 
2 
plaintiff alleged: 
3 
 
"[Defendant] obtained title to [the disputed] real property by fraud 
4 
and breach of his fiduciary duty to plaintiff and the other members of 
5 
plaintiff and by taking an opportunity that belonged to plaintiff. 
6 
 
"The court should declare that defendant holds title to said real 
7 
property in trust for plaintiff and said members. 
8 
 
"The affairs of plaintiff should be wound up, said real property sold 
9 
for the benefit of plaintiff and the proceeds distributed first to creditors and 
10 
then to members as their interests may appear." 
11 
 
 
Plaintiff's claim for damages was identical in substance to the constructive 
12 
trust claim except that, instead of equitable relief, plaintiff sought actual damages in the 
13 
sum of $800,000, and, in addition, punitive damages.  In the prayer of its complaint, 
14 
plaintiff requested the following relief: 
15 
 
"Pursuant to its [constructive trust claim,] that the court declare that 
16 
defendant holds said real property in a constructive trust for plaintiff, that 
17 
the affairs of plaintiff be wound up and said property sold and that the 
18 
proceeds by disbursed to pay plaintiff's creditors, and any remaining sum to 
19 
be distributed to plaintiff's members or 
20 
 
"In the alternative and in the event no constructive trust is ordered, 
21 
then for damages equal to the difference between the fair market value of 
22 
said real property and the price paid for it by [defendant] together with any 
23 
punitive damages that maybe awarded against him[.]"  
24 
 
 
At plaintiff's request, the trial court instructed the jury on the damage claim 
25 
that, if defendant "breached a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff," plaintiff "is entitled to any 
26 
profits made by [defendant] as a result of the breach."  The jury found in plaintiff's favor 
27 
and awarded plaintiff actual damages of $1 and punitive damages of $600,000. 
28 
3 
 
 
After the jury returned its verdict, defendant filed a motion to reduce the 
1 
punitive damages award.  The trial court granted that motion, reduced the punitive 
2 
damages award to $4, and offered plaintiff the choice between a money judgment for $5 
3 
or a constructive trust.  The court reasoned that a constructive trust was available to 
4 
plaintiff, but that an award of equitable relief could not support a punitive damages 
5 
award.  Faced with the choice between a $5 award and the imposition of a constructive 
6 
trust, plaintiff elected the latter remedy.  The court then entered a judgment "that 
7 
[plaintiff] is granted a constructive trust of the [p]roperty" and that the  
8 
"[p]roperty shall be sold by [plaintiff].  From the proceeds [plaintiff] shall 
9 
repay to [defendant] the first $613,979.49.  [Defendant] shall be responsible 
10 
for paying any obligations for which [defendant] has pledged the 
11 
[p]roperty.  To the extent [defendant] does not do so, and proceeds from the 
12 
sale of the [p]roperty are used to pay [defendant's] debt in excess of 
13 
$613,979.49, [plaintiff] shall be entitled to a supplemental judgment for any 
14 
such sums." 
15 
 
 
Defendant appealed, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to a constructive 
16 
trust, or, in the alternative, that the value of that trust should not exceed $1.  Plaintiff also 
17 
appealed, challenging the trial court's reduction of the punitive damages award.  The 
18 
Court of Appeals agreed with defendant on the constructive trust issue and agreed with 
19 
plaintiff on the punitive damages issue.  Evergreen West Business Center, LLC v. 
20 
Emmert, 254 Or App 361, 296 P3d 545 (2012).  This court allowed review of both 
21 
parties' petitions for review.  For the reasons set out below, we conclude that plaintiff was 
22 
entitled to elect the constructive trust remedy.  Moreover, because we uphold plaintiff's 
23 
election of its equitable remedy, the jury verdict, including the punitive damages award, 
24 
must be vacated; it follows that defendant's cross-appeal is moot.  Accordingly, we 
25 
4 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for consideration, in 
1 
light of this decision, of the parties' remaining assignments of error. 
2 
 
 
Because it drives our overall analysis, we begin with plaintiff's challenge to 
3 
the Court of Appeals' reversal of the constructive trust award.  Before that court, 
4 
defendant argued that the jury's verdict determined that the "unjust benefit" to defendant 
5 
was $1 and, for that reason, the trial court lacked authority to impose a constructive trust 
6 
that would allow plaintiff to recover more than that amount.  Plaintiff, for its part, argued 
7 
that defendant was unjustly enriched far more than the $1 jury verdict, because he 
8 
"received property worth $1,390,000 by paying only $613,979.49 as a result of his breach 
9 
of fiduciary duty." Moreover, plaintiff argued, the constructive trust remedy and damages 
10 
remedy serve different purposes:  "The constructive trust is imposed to give [plaintiff] 
11 
back its property, not so that [plaintiff] can obtain a dollar." 
12 
 
 
As noted, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant.  In reversing the 
13 
constructive trust award, the court explained: 
14 
 
"In the abstract, we agree with [plaintiff's] contention that damages 
15 
might be an inadequate remedy where an agent's breach of fiduciary duty 
16 
has divested his principal of real property.  However, that is not true here, 
17 
given how this case was tried to the jury.  As set out above, [plaintiff] did 
18 
not seek damages in the amount of its own loss from [defendant's] actions; 
19 
rather, [plaintiff] sought damages measured by [defendant's] gain.  The jury 
20 
was instructed, at [plaintiff's] request, that 'the non-breaching party is 
21 
entitled to any profits made by the breaching party as a result of the breach.'  
22 
[Plaintiff] offered evidence that the property was worth more than $1.3 
23 
million at the time of the foreclosure sale and that [defendant], by breaching 
24 
his fiduciary duties to [plaintiff], had obtained that property for 
25 
approximately $600,000.  During closing arguments, [plaintiff's] counsel 
26 
emphasized that evidence and told the jury that [defendant] had therefore 
27 
profited 'overnight' more than $700,000.  [Plaintiff] asked the jury to award 
28 
that amount -- that is, the profit that [defendant] obtained -- to [plaintiff]. 
29 
5 
 
"For whatever reason, the jury returned an award of damages in the 
1 
amount of $1.  It was only after the jury awarded nominal damages on that 
2 
claim that [plaintiff] requested that the court rule on its alternative request 
3 
for a constructive trust.  Given that posture, we agree with [defendant] that 
4 
the constructive trust imposed by the court was not a permissible equitable 
5 
remedy." 
6 
Evergreen West, 254 Or App at 372-73 (emphasis omitted).  The Court of Appeals 
7 
further explained that "[e]quitable remedies are not for the purpose of correcting 
8 
disappointing jury verdicts or remedying a failure of proof."  Id. at 373.  Relying on its 
9 
own case law, the court reasoned that "there is a difference between a jury verdict that is 
10 
inadequate as a matter of law and one that is inadequate as a matter of fact."  Id. 
11 
(emphasis in original).  In this case, the court stated, "[plaintiff] has not seriously 
12 
contended that [defendant] was unjustly enriched in a way that could not have been 
13 
valued for or compensated by a damages award in this case.  Rather, the contention is that 
14 
the jury, as a matter of fact, did not actually award damages in accordance with the 
15 
evidence."  Id. at 375 (emphasis in original). 
16 
 
 
The court acknowledged that "real property is unique," but stated that 
17 
plaintiff "has never suggested that the property should have been conveyed back to it; 
18 
from the beginning, [plaintiff] has asked that the property be sold for its benefit.  We also 
19 
appreciate that the valuation of the property has changed over time, but that alone does 
20 
not render damages an inadequate remedy."  Id. at n 1.  Thus, the court concluded: 
21 
 
"Under the circumstances -- that is, where the jury is presented with 
22 
evidence of a damages claim that would wholly compensate the 
23 
nonbreaching party -- the equitable remedy of a constructive trust is not 
24 
available simply because the jury returns a lesser verdict than requested." 
25 
Id. at 375. 
26 
6 
 
 
On review, plaintiff asserts that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in 
1 
concluding that its legal remedy was adequate.  According to plaintiff and amicus Oregon 
2 
Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA), (1) the availability of damages is not a bar to the 
3 
award of a constructive trust; (2) the election among remedies for breach of fiduciary 
4 
duty belongs to the claimant alone; and (3) plaintiff was entitled to make that election at 
5 
any time before entry of judgment.  Defendant replies that (1) plaintiff's damage claim 
6 
was "an action at law" and therefore appropriately tried to a jury; (2) proof of unjust 
7 
enrichment is an essential element in showing entitlement to a constructive trust; (3) the 
8 
jury's verdict provided the definitive measure of plaintiff's unjust enrichment damages, so 
9 
"[t]he court [was] bound by the jury's findings"; and (4) therefore, at most, plaintiff was 
10 
entitled to a constructive trust to secure payment of the $1 damage award that the jury 
11 
made. 
12 
 
 
To place the parties' arguments in their proper context, we first consider the 
13 
nature of plaintiff's claims and the extent of their interrelationship.  As pleaded, plaintiff's 
14 
claim for damages was based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment, in that it sought a 
15 
recovery "equal to the difference between the fair market value of said real property and 
16 
the price paid for it by [defendant]."  That theory focused on the unjust benefit that 
17 
defendant derived, rather than the loss that plaintiff suffered.  See Porter Const. Co. v. 
18 
Berry, 136 Or 80, 91, 298 P 179 (1931).  Similarly, the doctrine of unjust enrichment 
19 
governed plaintiff's claim for a constructive trust.  See Tupper v. Roan, 349 Or 211, 219, 
20 
243 P3d 50 (2010); Barnes v. Eastern and Western Lbr. Co., 205 Or 553, 597, 287 P2d 
21 
929 (1955).  Money relief and constructive trusts are parallel means at law and equity, 
22 
7 
respectively, of preventing unjust enrichment and forcing restitution to the plaintiff of 
1 
something which in equity and good conscience did not belong to the defendant.  
2 
Derenco, Inc. v. Benj. Franklin Federal Sav and Loan Ass'n, 281 Or 533, 559, 577 P2d 
3 
477 (1978).  In short, both claims depended on plaintiff's entitlement to restitution for 
4 
unjust enrichment based on defendant's breach of the same fiduciary duty. 
5 
 
 
The concept of constructive trust does not stand on its own as a substantive 
6 
claim, but exists solely as an equitable remedy, available to divest an individual who has 
7 
been unjustly enriched of property that he or she "ought not, in equity and good 
8 
conscience, hold and enjoy."  Marston v. Myers et ux., 217 Or 498, 509, 342 P2d 1111 
9 
(1959).  It is proper to use a constructive trust when there is some specific property 
10 
identified as belonging to the plaintiff, but when no specific identifiable property is at 
11 
issue and only a money judgment is requested, only the legal remedy is available.  Id.  
12 
However, as discussed, the rationale of the two remedies is identical.  Id.  If a pleader is 
13 
unsure which theory can be established at trial, ORCP 16 C authorizes inconsistent 
14 
claims or defenses, alternative statements of fact, and separate claims or defenses, 
15 
"regardless of consistency and whether based upon legal or equitable grounds or upon 
16 
both."  Davis v. Tyee Industries, Inc., 295 Or 467, 479 n 9, 668 P2d 1186 (1983). 
17 
 
 
In Tupper, this court distilled from its prior decisions three "elements"1 that 
18 
                                              
 
1 
Although it seems anomalous to refer to "elements" of a remedy that, of 
itself, does not qualify as an independent substantive claim, we have used that description 
in Tupper and other cases and retain it here. 
8 
a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, as a basis for 
1 
imposing a constructive trust as an equitable remedy:  (1) that property or a property 
2 
interest that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff was taken or obtained by someone else 
3 
under circumstances that in some sense were wrongful or inequitable; (2) that the person 
4 
who now possesses the property is not a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice; 
5 
and (3) by clear and convincing evidence, that the property in the hands of that person, 
6 
i.e., the property upon which the plaintiff seeks to impose a constructive trust, in fact is 
7 
the very property that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff, or is a product of or substitute for 
8 
that property.  Tupper, 349 Or at 223. 
9 
 
 
The formula for entitlement to a constructive trust reveals the first problem 
10 
with defendant's position.  That is, although the right to restitution underlying a 
11 
constructive trust depends on the defendant's having been unjustly enriched, the latter 
12 
requirement does not mean that the wrongful acquisition must have been profitable to the 
13 
defendant.  In fact, it is not "material that there should be an advantage, or profit, arising 
14 
out of a purchase by the [defendant] from the [plaintiff].  It is not necessary to prove such 
15 
advantage or profit:  it is enough to show the relation and the purchase."  1 Perry on 
16 
Trusts § 197 (6th ed)).  That being so, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiff was 
17 
not entitled to a constructive trust in the absence of a determination that defendant 
18 
"profited" from his appropriation of plaintiff's property. 
19 
 
 
As noted, defendant nevertheless contends that, in deciding the constructive 
20 
trust claim, the trial court adopted the jury's verdict in the damage claim, including the 
21 
jury's determination that the value of plaintiff's interest in the property was essentially 
22 
9 
worthless when defendant acquired it.  In any event, according to defendant, the jury's 
1 
damage determination controlled the resolution of the equitable claim, and, as the Court 
2 
of Appeals reasoned, there was no justification for the imposition of a constructive trust 
3 
to enforce a property interest of such negligible value.  Because of their multiple 
4 
implications, those interrelated arguments require extended attention. 
5 
 
 
We begin our analysis by rejecting defendant's threshold premise that the 
6 
trial court adopted the jury's determination that plaintiff's actual damages were merely $1.  
7 
To the contrary, the court was careful, in deciding the equitable claim, merely to adopt by 
8 
reference in its general judgment the jury's findings that defendant owed a fiduciary duty 
9 
to plaintiff and that he breached that duty by acquiring the property for himself.  Nothing 
10 
in the record indicates that the court adopted the jury's damage determination.  Defendant 
11 
is mistaken in contending otherwise. 
12 
 
 
To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court was bound by the 
13 
jury's damage determination, the analysis is more complicated.  Both defendant and the 
14 
Court of Appeals appear to have reasoned that the jury's award -- even though 
15 
unsatisfactory to plaintiff -- was legally adequate so as to preclude an award of equitable 
16 
relief.  In support of that proposition, defendant relies, as did the Court of Appeals, on 
17 
decisions by this court holding that equitable relief is not available if there is an adequate 
18 
remedy at law for the same breach or wrong.  See, e.g., Alsea Veneer, Inc. v. State, 318 
19 
Or 33, 862 P2d 95 (1993); Johnson v. Steen, 281 Or 361, 575 P2d 141 (1978). 
20 
 
 
It is true that this court repeatedly has discussed -- and sometimes has relied 
21 
on -- that principle in cases involving a choice between legal and equitable remedies.  It 
22 
10 
is also true that the meaning of that principle has been the source of confusion over the 
1 
years, owing in part to the shifting sands of its foundation.  In the beginning, 
2 
"the chancery courts were established primarily to mitigate the harsh 
3 
application of common law in the law courts, [so] the applicant in chancery 
4 
had to first demonstrate that his remedy at law was 'inadequate.'  Because 
5 
the politically powerful law courts were jealous of their authority, the 
6 
inadequacy requirement became solidly entrenched as a jurisdictional 
7 
limitation on the power of the chancellors.  Thus, the policy considerations 
8 
behind the inadequacy rule are largely jurisdictional, based upon the 
9 
function of the equity courts in English jurisprudence.  Although the merger 
10 
of law and equity has rendered these considerations anachronistic, 
11 
American courts continue to apply the rule without fully evaluating the 
12 
continuing validity of its underlying policy considerations." 
13 
M.J. Mehr and L.A. Kilgore, Enforcement of the Real Estate Loan Commitment:  
14 
Improvement of the Borrower's Remedies, 24 Wayne L Rev 1011, 1026-27 (1978) 
15 
(citations omitted). 
16 
 
 
In Oregon, as elsewhere in the United States, the procedural distinctions 
17 
between law and equity largely have been abolished.  As this court explained in M.K.F. v. 
18 
Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 420, 287 P3d 1045 (2012), in 1979, "the Oregon legislature 
19 
adopted the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) and dispensed with the procedural 
20 
distinctions between law and equity."  See ORCP 2 (providing, in part, that "[a]ll 
21 
procedural distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity are hereby abolished, 
22 
except for those distinctions specifically provided for by these rules, by statute, or by the 
23 
Constitution of this state"); see also ORCP 24 A (permitting joinder of legal and 
24 
equitable claims and defenses in one action).  Thus, in Oregon the jurisdictional rationale 
25 
for the legal adequacy principle no longer exists.  That change has altered the nature of 
26 
the choice between legal and equitable remedies for the same wrong.  As a leading 
27 
11 
authority aptly put it many years ago: 
1 
 
"In those states which have carried out 'the true spirit of the reformed 
2 
procedure,' all branches of the law are of equal dignity -- the common law, 
3 
statutory law, and principles of equity.  The court does not so much inquire 
4 
into the question as to the adequacy of a legal remedy as compared with an 
5 
equitable remedy, as it inquires into the appropriateness of the relief 
6 
sought." 
7 
John Norton Pomeroy, 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 358 (5th ed 1941).  In 
8 
conducting that inquiry, "the growth of modern equity has been in the direction of 
9 
granting specific relief more freely."  William F. Walsh, A Treatise on Equity 133-34 
10 
(1930). 
11 
 
 
In the wake of those developments, the adequate legal remedy principle has 
12 
receded to narrower limits.  As pertinent here, when the choice of remedies for breach of 
13 
fiduciary duty is between a money award and a constructive trust, the rule in Oregon is 
14 
well established.  In Kroll v. Coach, 45 Or 459, 472-73, 78 P 397 (1904), this court 
15 
explained that that a constructive trust may be imposed for breach of a fiduciary duty 
16 
"wherever it is necessary for the obtaining of complete justice, although the law may also 
17 
give the remedy of damages against the wrongdoer."  In Kroll, this court further 
18 
elaborated: 
19 
 
"[D]efendant has procured something with plaintiffs' money that he 
20 
is not entitled to have or retain, and it is distorted logic to say that the 
21 
plaintiffs are entitled to damages, but not to the land which their money has 
22 
purchased.  If the land were worth much less than the purchase price, 
23 
defendant might be contending that the land, and not damages, was the only 
24 
relief to which they were entitled.  But, legally, they are entitled to either 
25 
remedy, according to their own choosing.  Defendant came by their money 
26 
fraudulently, and has invested it in property.  Plaintiffs may now either 
27 
ratify the purchase and accept the property, or recover damages for the 
28 
defendant's fraudulent practices whereby he obtained their funds. 
29 
12 
 
"This solves also the question made by defendant that plaintiffs are 
1 
without relief in equity because they have an adequate remedy at law." 
2 
Id. at 474-75. 
3 
 
 
The foregoing reasoning applies here even though the jury determined that 
4 
plaintiff's actual money damages, measured in terms of defendant's unjust enrichment 
5 
when he acquired the property, were a mere dollar.  Only a constructive trust would 
6 
permit plaintiff to obtain the property that defendant misappropriated and to enjoy its 
7 
benefit.  Butson v. Misz, 81 Or 607, 613, 160 P 530 (1916); Ferchen v. Arndt, 26 Or 121, 
8 
126-29, 37 P 161 (1894).  Said another way: 
9 
 
"A claimant who seeks restitution via constructive trust -- either 
10 
because property in the hands of the defendant has increased in value, or for 
11 
the sake of priority against the defendant's general creditors -- does not 
12 
usually have to explain to the court why an award of damages does not 
13 
afford equivalent relief." 
14 
1 Restatement of the Law (Third), Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 4 cmt e (2011). 
15 
 
 
Defendant nevertheless urges that, because plaintiff’s damage claim was 
16 
properly tried to a jury, the jury's damage finding required the trial court to find in the 
17 
equitable claim that defendant had not been unjustly enriched.  In Miramontes, this court 
18 
stated that Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon 
19 
Constitution,2 do not guarantee a right to jury trial for claims or requests for relief that, 
20 
                                              
 
2  
Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution provides:  "In all civil 
cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."  Article VII (Amended), section 3, 
provides in part that, "[i]n actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
$750, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."  Reading those provisions together, 
this court has explained that Article I, section 17, guarantees a jury trial "in those classes 
of cases in which the right [to a jury trial] was customary at the time the [Oregon] 
 
13 
standing alone, are equitable in nature and would have been tried to a court without a jury 
1 
at common law.  352 Or at 425.  However, the court concluded that, in the absence of a 
2 
showing that the nature of a claim or request for relief is such that, for that or some other 
3 
reason, it would have been tried to a court without a jury, those provisions do guarantee a 
4 
right to jury trial on claims or requests that are properly categorized as "civil" or "at law."  
5 
Id.  The court also observed that, with the abolition of the procedural distinction between 
6 
law and equity that permitted the joinder of such claims in a single action,  
7 
 
"[t]he availability of jury trial must be separately determined for 
8 
different issues when a case arises presenting both legal and equitable 
9 
issues. * *   Some issues in the same case may involve a right to jury trial 
10 
while others do not * * *. 
11 
 
"[S]ome care is necessary in order of trial in mixed law and equity 
12 
cases because of the constitutional right to jury trial.  If there are 
13 
overlapping factual issues between a legal claim and an equitable defense 
14 
* * *, having the court pass on the defense first would settle those factual 
15 
issues and bind the jury.  If under the historical test the plaintiff actually 
16 
would have been able to maintain an action at law and have the jury pass on 
17 
those factual issues, the result may be a denial of the right to jury trial. * * * 
18 
The question of order of trial should not be allowed to obscure the question 
19 
of right to jury trial." 
20 
Miramontes, 352 Or at 421-22 (internal citations omitted). 
21 
  
 
In this case, the jury returned its verdict before the trial court decided the 
22 
equitable claim, so there is no potential problem with the order of trial.  Thus, defendant's 
23 
argument reduces to the proposition that the jury's damage finding prohibited the trial 
24 
                                              
 
[C]onstitution was adopted or in cases of like nature."  Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 
Or 62, 69, 987 P2d 463 (1999) (quoting Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or 
290, 295, 744 P2d 992 (1987)). 
14 
court from making what defendant asserts was an inconsistent finding -- that is, that 
1 
defendant had been unjustly enriched -- in awarding a constructive trust.  That argument 
2 
founders on its initial premise that the jury and the trial court made inconsistent findings 
3 
of fact.  As discussed, the jury's damage finding was based on its determination of the 
4 
value of the property when defendant acquired it at the foreclosure sale.  In contrast, in 
5 
the constructive trust claim, plaintiff sought specific relief that did not require a 
6 
determination of the value of the property at that point in time.  Instead, that relief 
7 
assigned to plaintiff the potential benefit -- as well as the risk of loss -- associated with 
8 
holding the property for a court-ordered sale that would facilitate the winding-up of 
9 
plaintiff's affairs and satisfaction of its debts.  As we already have concluded, plaintiff 
10 
was entitled to pursue that relief, even though the jury had determined that plaintiff's 
11 
actual money damages were a mere dollar.  Because the constructive trust claim focused 
12 
on a different sort of unjust enrichment -- that is, the benefit of owning the property 
13 
itself -- the jury's damage finding was not material to the availability of equitable relief.3 
14 
 
 
Defendant contends, however, that the fact that plaintiff sought a sale of the 
15 
disputed property, rather than its outright award, distinguishes this case from other 
16 
constructive trust cases.  The Court of Appeals appeared to regard the remedy of sale as 
17 
the functional equivalent of a money award and, therefore, not an equitable remedy that 
18 
                                              
 
3  
We do not reach the question whether, in making a finding of fact in an 
equitable claim, a trial court must defer to a jury's previous finding of fact on the same 
issue in a legal claim in the same action. 
15 
plaintiff could elect.  Evergreen West, 254 Or App at 375 n 1.  So understood, the Court 
1 
of Appeals' reasoning invoked a limitation on equitable relief sometimes associated with 
2 
the adequate legal remedy principle that is described in the following passage from the 
3 
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: 
4 
"There remains a narrow class of cases in which an equitable remedy 
5 
(typically constructive trust) may not be allowed merely for the asking; the 
6 
reasons for the refusal might at one time have been described by saying that 
7 
the claimant had an adequate remedy at law.  Such a case is one in which 
8 
the claimant asks for constructive trust although the effect of the remedy is 
9 
identical to what would be achieved by an action at law for unjust 
10 
enrichment.  The same limitation means, of course, that this is a case in 
11 
which constructive trust will not be requested; or if it is requested, it is only 
12 
because the claimant misconceives the function of the remedy.  
13 
Constructive trust may be refused in such a case, not because of any 
14 
supposed primacy of legal over equitable remedies, but because 
15 
constructive trust is superfluous." 
16 
1 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 4 cmt e (2011). 
17 
 
 
That limitation on the availability of equitable relief is not implicated here, 
18 
though.  As discussed, the reach of a constructive trust is not confined to the specific 
19 
property at issue; it extends to any other property or funds that "can be traced and 
20 
followed" from the specific property, including proceeds from the sale of that property.  
21 
Ferchen, 26 Or at 129.  Because a constructive trust can attach to sale proceeds, no 
22 
redundancy arises from plaintiff's request for a judgment imposing a constructive trust on 
23 
the property and ordering its sale, with the net proceeds to be paid to plaintiff. 
24 
 
 
Here, a sale was ordered not because plaintiff may not have wanted the 
25 
disputed property, but because plaintiff was required to "do equity if [it] is to obtain 
26 
equity."  Bechtel v. Bechtel, 162 Or 211, 220, 91 P2d 529 (1939).  Because defendant 
27 
16 
paid $613,979.49 for the property, plaintiff needed to reimburse those funds to defendant 
1 
as part of any constructive trust remedy.  Id. at 219-20.  Plaintiff, however, was in 
2 
"significant financial distress" and facing foreclosure.  Evergreen, 254 Or App at 383 n 3.  
3 
The trial court properly could have determined based on those facts that plaintiff lacked 
4 
the resources to reimburse defendant and could only obtain those funds through sale of 
5 
the property.  In other words, sale was practical, if not necessary, under the circumstances 
6 
here.  See Cameron v. Benson, 295 Or 98, 105, 664 P2d 412 (1983) (where equity is 
7 
concerned, "it is the function of the court to do full and complete justice to the parties.  
8 
With this principle in mind, the court requires broad discretion in framing its equitable 
9 
remedies in order to adapt the relief to the circumstances of a particular case"). 
10 
 
 
Consistently with the foregoing considerations, the judgment in this case 
11 
ordered the property sold for plaintiff's benefit, with the proceeds going first to reimburse 
12 
defendant for the sum that he paid for the property, and the excess going to plaintiff after 
13 
the payment of its debts.  The judgment also accounted for the fact that defendant had 
14 
encumbered the property with a $900,000 loan.  To the extent that sale proceeds were 
15 
used to pay off that loan, the first $613,979.49 would be credited toward plaintiff's 
16 
obligation to defendant, and the next $286,020.51 would result in a money judgment in 
17 
plaintiff's favor against defendant for that amount (because, while plaintiff owed 
18 
defendant only $613,979.49, it effectively would be paying $900,000 to satisfy 
19 
17 
defendant's obligations under the loan).4  In short, that remedy was not identical to what 
1 
plaintiff was able to obtain at law. 
2 
 
 
Finally, as noted, the Court of Appeals disapproved plaintiff's election of its 
3 
equitable remedy after the jury returned a disappointing verdict.  The Court of Appeals 
4 
explained that plaintiff sought damages at trial which "would wholly compensate" it for 
5 
defendant's wrongdoing.  Evergreen, 254 Or App at 375.  The Court of Appeals then 
6 
stated that "[i]t was only after the jury awarded nominal damages on that claim that 
7 
[plaintiff] requested that the court rule on its alternative request for a constructive trust."  
8 
Id. at 373.  In the Court of Appeals' view, that procedural posture rendered a constructive 
9 
trust impermissible:  "Equitable remedies are not for the purpose of correcting 
10 
disappointing jury verdicts or remedying a failure of proof."  Id. 
11 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' statement is inapposite.  The doctrine of election 
12 
between inconsistent remedies does not require an election before the entry of judgment.  
13 
A party need only choose between or among inconsistent remedies, not inconsistent 
14 
claims or theories of recovery.  ORCP 16 C; see also Colonial Leasing Co. v. Tracy, 276 
15 
Or 1193, 1196-97, 557 P2d 639 (1976) ("Ordinarily an election is not made until a 
16 
judicial proceeding has gone to judgment on the merits.").  Accordingly, subject to the 
17 
limiting principles discussed above, when it comes to an election of remedies, the choice 
18 
                                              
 
4  
Because the Court of Appeals reversed the constructive trust remedy 
entirely, it did not resolve defendant's assignment of error asserting that he was entitled to 
a greater reimbursement than the trial court allowed.  Evergreen, 254 Or App at 375 n 2.  
Thus, it is necessary to remand that issue to that court to resolve in the first instance.  
18 
is for the claimant to make, not the defendant or the court.  Kroll, 45 Or at 474-75 
1 
("[L]egally, [plaintiffs] are entitled to either remedy, according to their own choosing."); 
2 
Oregon etc. Colonization Co. v. Strang, 123 Or 377, 382, 260 P 1002 (1927) 
3 
("Defendants have no right to select for plaintiff the remedy or the course of procedure 
4 
where it has more than one open to it under the law."). 
5 
 
 
To sum up, the constructive trust that the trial court imposed was available 
6 
to plaintiff despite the jury's damage award.  Although the jury properly determined 
7 
plaintiff's damages in this case, the jury's damage finding did not foreclose equitable 
8 
relief because the trial court did not adopt it, and that finding was not necessary to 
9 
plaintiff’s constructive trust claim.  Nor was the constructive trust remedy identical to the 
10 
damage award because plaintiff sought a sale of the disputed property.  And, finally, 
11 
plaintiff -- not defendant -- was entitled to elect its preferred remedy before the entry of 
12 
final judgment.  It follows that the trial court did not err in awarding a constructive trust 
13 
in this case, and the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded otherwise. 
14 
 
 
We turn briefly to defendant's cross appeal from the Court of Appeals' 
15 
reinstatement of the punitive damage award that the jury made.  It is undisputed that 
16 
plaintiff was required to elect between its damage and constructive trust claims.  Plaintiff 
17 
pleaded the claims alternatively in its complaint and, as noted, plaintiff expressed its 
18 
preference for the equitable remedy in its complaint.  Moreover, plaintiff has prevailed 
19 
before this court on its election of the equitable remedy, and it does not assert on review 
20 
that the trial court erred in requiring it to make an election.  It follows that the jury's 
21 
damage award -- including the punitive damage award -- must be vacated, and there is 
22 
19 
nothing for us to decide on defendant's cross appeal; it is therefore moot. 
1 
 
 
However, plaintiff did assign error before the Court of Appeals to the trial 
2 
court's ruling that "punitive damages are not legally available for [plaintiff's] claim for a 
3 
constructive trust."  Evergreen West, 254 Or App at 377-78.  Because the Court of 
4 
Appeals reversed the constructive trust award, it concluded that that assignment of error 
5 
was moot and did not reach it.  Id. at 378.  Our reinstatement of the constructive trust 
6 
award puts that assignment of error back in play.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
7 
should address it on remand. 
8 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded 
9 
to that court for consideration, in light of this decision, of the parties' remaining 
10 
assignments of error. 
11