Title: Morris v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
SAMANTHA LYNN MORRIS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 052654 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support a mother's conviction of felonious child 
neglect in violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B).  The accused 
mother, Samantha Lynn Morris, contends that the evidence is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, because it did not prove that 
she willfully failed to provide care for her two children in a 
manner so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for their lives. 
I 
 
In a bench trial, Morris was found guilty of two charges of 
felony child neglect.  The court sentenced Morris to two years' 
imprisonment, with one year and nine months suspended, on each 
offense and directed that the sentences run concurrently. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge panel of the Court 
of Appeals reversed the convictions and dismissed the charges.  
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's 
petition for a rehearing en banc and affirmed the convictions.  
Morris v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 34, 37, 622 S.E.2d 243, 244 
(2005).  We awarded Morris this appeal. 
II 
 
In considering whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party at trial and grant to it all 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.  
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 
(2004).  When thus viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence established that, as of September 29, 
2003, Morris had two children, both boys, L.J., age five-and-a-
half years, and S., age two-and-a-half years.  L.J. had hearing 
and speech impairments and wore hearing aids. 
 
On the morning of September 29, 2003, Richard Goodin, a 
family support worker at L.J.'s elementary school, learned that 
L.J. was not in school.  When Goodin was unable to contact 
Morris by telephone, he went to the trailer court where Morris 
lived.  Goodin arrived about 9:30 a.m. and knocked on Morris' 
door.  Despite knocking "for a significant amount of time," 
Goodin raised no response, except for a dog's barking, and left 
Morris' trailer. 
 
About 11:15 a.m. that day, Goodin returned to Morris' 
residence and again raised no response to his knocking.  Goodin 
looked around the neighborhood and saw two children playing in 
 
2
the nearby woods.  One child appeared to be between four and six 
years old, and the other child, who was naked, appeared to be 
between two and three years old.∗  The children were "interacting 
and laughing" and seemed to be "having a good time."  The 
younger child was "fairly dirty" and had a runny nose and dried 
fecal matter on his leg. 
 
Goodin knocked on several doors in the neighborhood, hoping 
to ascertain where the children lived.  When he got no response 
from any residences, Goodin called Child Protective Services and 
911.  While waiting for the police to arrive, Goodin decided to 
take custody of the younger child because the child had started 
to climb on an automobile that appeared to be awaiting repair.  
Goodin thought the area was "dangerous" due to the presence of 
the car as well as engine blocks and a weight lifting bench with 
weights on it, all of which were "closer to the road." 
 
Two police officers arrived within five to 15 minutes after 
Goodin's call.  Officer Raleigh Anderson knocked on the doors of 
several residences, including Morris' trailer, but received no 
response.  When he knocked on the door to Morris' trailer, 
however, the door came open.  Anderson yelled, "[C]ounty 
police," several times, and, when no one responded, he "pulled 
the door closed" and continued his search for the children's 
home. 
                     
TP
 
∗ The temperature was approximately 70 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
3
 
In the meantime, Corporal James Larkin approached L.J.  Due 
to L.J.'s hearing and speech difficulties, however, Larkin was 
unable to learn L.J.'s address.  When Larkin asked L.J. if the 
younger child was his brother, L.J. "kept saying no," so he and 
L.J. walked away to look for L.J.'s home. 
 
As Larkin and L.J. walked away, the younger child became 
"pretty visibly upset," "started calling mommy," and ran toward 
a particular trailer.  Anderson followed the child to the 
trailer.  The child pushed the door open and ran into the 
trailer and toward one of the rear bedrooms, still "calling 
mommy."  Anderson followed and, in the darkness, saw a man and a 
woman lying on the bedroom floor.  Upon seeing them, Anderson 
stopped and "announced county police a couple of times."  When 
he received no response, Anderson backed out of the trailer. 
 
Anderson then began "pounding on the door" with his fist 
while "announcing county police."  Ultimately, the man came to 
the door.  When Anderson asked about the children, the man went 
to get the woman.  The woman came into the living room, 
identified herself as the children's aunt, and said that she was 
just watching the children for her sister, Samantha Morris.  The 
younger child, however, kept calling the woman, "Mommy."  When 
the woman asked Anderson where the five-year-old child was, 
Anderson radioed Larkin that he had found the children's 
residence, and Larkin brought L.J. to the residence. 
 
4
 
The woman continued to maintain that the children were her 
nephews until the children's grandmother arrived on the scene.  
After the two women had some private conversation, the woman 
admitted that she was the children's mother and that her name 
was Samantha Morris.  Morris said she had given the false 
information because she was afraid that there were outstanding 
warrants for her arrest.  When Morris was asked to explain why 
the children were outside unattended, she said that she had been 
sleeping.  She also said that the children had gotten out of the 
trailer on another occasion "a few days prior" and that 
"somebody in the [neighborhood] had to return them home."  
Thereupon, Larkin arrested Morris for the instant offenses. 
 
At trial, Morris testified that L.J. had "great hearing 
loss . . . in his left ear" and a lesser hearing loss in his 
right ear and that he had lost one of his hearing aids.  She 
explained that L.J. also had chronic asthma and a painful 
condition in his left leg.  She said that, because of these 
conditions, L.J. "had been up the couple nights before" 
September 29, which caused him to "be tired in the mornings."  
When L.J. awoke on September 29, he told Morris that he did not 
feel well, so Morris decided to let him stay home from school. 
 
According to Morris, she and her two children were sitting 
on the couch watching television when the younger child appeared 
to be getting sleepy.  She asked L.J. if he wanted to take a 
 
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nap, and he said, "[S]ure."  Morris closed the curtains, turned 
on a fan, and "locked the chain lock on the door and the door 
knob lock" of the trailer.  She and the children "went in and 
all laid down in the bed."  Morris then fell asleep.  She later 
was awakened when she heard someone yelling, "Albemarle County 
Police." 
 
Morris admitted that, at the time of trial on February 3, 
2004, she had a "significant substance abuse problem."  However, 
she denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol on 
September 29, 2003.  She further stated that she had last used 
drugs "[a]bout three days prior" to that date. 
III 
Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) provides as follows: 
Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible 
for the care of a child under the age of 18 whose 
willful act or omission in the care of such child was 
so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for human life shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony. 
In explaining his reasons for finding Morris guilty of felonious 
child neglect under the statute, the trial judge stated the 
following: 
[T]he [question] the Court's confronted with is . . . 
did she omit proper care of her children and [was] 
this omission, this negligence, . . . so great that it 
was wanton and likely to cause injury or which would 
make it not improbable that injury would be 
occasioned[.]  [T]he facts that I've got are that 
somehow, she was so sound asleep, she was so deep in 
sleep that nothing would arouse her to alert her that 
 
6
her children were getting up and going outside and 
were outside for forty-five (45) minutes and that 
there were knocks at the door by Mr. Goodin . . . .  
There were knocks at the door by the police.  There 
was shouting and whatever sleep she was in, it was so 
sound, it almost would require an earthquake to wake 
her up, and going to sleep in that fashion, and 
whatever caused that, with a five-year-old who I've 
heard is speech impaired, hearing impaired, had leg 
pain and a limp with chronic asthma and a two-year-old 
who can't communicate.  So we've got kids that are 
wandering outside who cannot communicate, cannot tell 
anybody who they are, there are no other responsible 
adults around, the two-year[-]old's unclothed, Mr. 
Goodin says he finds them in a dangerous area and he 
searches for the parents, and she's so asleep that she 
can't be awakened to check on her children or know 
where her children are, and I think that meets the 
definition, coupled with what—that the neighbors 
[previously] brought the children back, that it was 
seventy (70) degrees, that she had awakened that 
morning, but couldn't remain alert enough to omit 
being negligent in caring for her children or . . . to 
be negligent in the omission of the care of her 
children, so I find her guilty . . . .  [A]nd I add to 
that her credibility about not even being their 
mother.  I think that factors in, too, in her omission 
in the care of her kids. 
 
As previously stated, we must view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at 
trial.  Jackson, 267 Va. at 204, 590 S.E.2d at 535.  
Additionally, the trial court's judgment is presumed to be 
correct and will be reversed only if it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Id.; Code § 8.01-680.  Thus, we 
do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder even 
 
7
if our opinion were to differ.  Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 
506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1999). 
 
In order for a person to be convicted of felony child 
neglect, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused committed a "willful act or omission in the 
care" of a child.  The Commonwealth also must prove that the act 
or omission is "so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a 
reckless disregard for human life."  Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1). 
 
We have said that "[t]he term 'willful act' imports 
knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act 
done.  The act done must be intended or it must involve a 
reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably 
result in an injury."  Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 
183, 597 S.E.2d 104, 111 (2004).  We have also said that the 
term "willful," as used in the statute, refers to conduct that  
"must be knowing or intentional, rather than accidental, and 
[undertaken] without justifiable excuse, without ground for 
believing the conduct is lawful, or with a bad purpose. . . .  
Thus, the term 'willful' . . . contemplates an intentional, 
purposeful act or omission."  Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 Va. 
377, 384-85, 593 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (2004) (citations omitted).  
Accord Barrett, 268 Va. at 183, 597 S.E.2d at 111. 
 
Additionally, we have stated that the term "gross, wanton 
and culpable" describes conduct, whether by action or omission. 
 
8
The word "gross" means "aggravated or increased 
negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving 
of blame or censure."  Bell [v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 
597, 611, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938)].  " 'Gross 
negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied 
by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or 
willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent 
disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances 
reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make 
it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and 
the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge 
of, the probable result of his acts."  Id. at 611-12, 
195 S.E. at 681. 
Barrett, 268 Va. at 183, 597 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting Cable v. 
Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992)). 
 
In Barrett, a ten-month-old infant was drowned when he was 
placed in a bathtub by his two-year-old sister.  Barrett, the 
children's mother, was charged with felony neglect of her 
daughter under Code § 18.2-371.1(B).  268 Va. at 173-74, 597 
S.E.2d at 105.  The evidence established that Barrett knew that 
her daughter was jealous of her infant brother and had a 
"propensity for attempting to injure [him]."  Id. at 184, 597 
S.E.2d at 111.  Barrett also knew that her daughter liked to 
play in the bathtub and was able to operate the tub's faucets by 
herself.  In addition, Barrett knew that, shortly before the 
infant's death, when she had left her daughter unattended in the 
bathtub, her daughter had pulled the infant "head first" into 
the bathtub.  Id. at 185, 597 S.E.2d at 111-12. 
 
The evening before the tragic incident, Barrett was out all 
night drinking beer.  She admitted that, when she drove her car 
 
9
home at 6:00 a.m., she was still intoxicated enough to have been 
arrested for driving under the influence.  Later that morning, 
while Barrett was tired and still intoxicated, she fell asleep 
at a time when she "[knew] she was the only one left in the 
apartment to supervise the children."  Id. at 185, 597 S.E.2d at 
112. 
 
We affirmed Barrett's conviction of felony child neglect 
under Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1).  Id. at 186, 597 S.E.2d at 112.  
We concluded that the evidence revealed "the story of a disaster 
just waiting to happen, a disaster any reasonable person would 
consider likely to result in injury to [Barrett's children]."  
Id. at 185, 597 S.E.2d at 112.  Yet, Barrett, with abundant 
knowledge of the substantial risk of serious injury to her 
children, failed in her duty to protect them.  Id. at 185-86, 
597 S.E.2d at 112. 
IV 
 
The Commonwealth contends and the Court of Appeals' 
majority held that the present case is governed by our decision 
in Barrett.  We disagree. 
 
In Barrett, the mother had knowledge of many facts that 
should have forewarned her that an injury was likely to occur.  
She also was tired and intoxicated from a night of drinking beer 
and totally unable to protect her children from a tragedy.  In 
the present case, Morris had no reason to believe her children 
 
10
would be in any danger while she was asleep with them, 
particularly after she had double-locked the trailer door.  
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, there was no evidence 
that Morris was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the 
time she and the children went to sleep.  While Morris admitted 
that she had a substance abuse problem at the time of trial and 
had used drugs three days prior to September 29, there was no 
evidence presented to indicate that Morris was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs on that day.  She was also in the 
presence of two police officers for a lengthy interview that 
same day, and the officers did not note that Morris was under 
the influence.  It is mere speculation, therefore, to say that 
Morris' deep sleep was likely drug or alcohol induced. 
V 
 
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth and considered in light of all the 
circumstances preceding and surrounding the events of September 
29, 2003, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Morris' conduct 
was not a willful act or omission in the care of her children 
that was so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for their lives.  Therefore, we hold that the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain Morris' convictions.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss 
the charges against Morris. 
 
11
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain Morris’ two convictions 
for felonious child neglect in violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B) 
and accordingly would affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, this Court is required to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party at trial, in this case 
the Commonwealth, and accord to that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.  Viney 
v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005); 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 
(2004); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 
538, 539 (2003).  “Additionally, this Court has the duty to 
review the evidence that tends to support the conviction . . . 
.”  Correll v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 3, 12, 607 S.E.2d 119, 124 
(2005).  “The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be 
correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is 
‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’”  Viney, 269 
Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28 (quoting Code § 8.01-680).  
Although the majority cites these well-established principles of 
 
12
appellate review and acknowledges that this Court cannot 
substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, I believe 
that the majority fails to consider the evidence that supports 
the convictions in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 
but, instead, makes its own credibility determinations and 
substitutes its view of the facts for the judgment of the trial 
court. 
The majority contrasts the facts in the case at bar with 
those in Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 597 S.E.2d 104 
(2004), by focusing on Barrett’s knowledge of her two children’s 
prior behavior that should have forewarned Barrett about the 
likelihood of injury to one or both of her children and her 
state of fatigue resulting from intoxication on the evening 
before the incident at issue in that case.  The majority asserts 
that, unlike Barrett, “Morris had no reason to believe her 
children would be in any danger while she was asleep.”  Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I 
disagree. 
Morris was indeed on notice about her children’s propensity 
to wander from the trailer without her knowledge or any adult 
supervision.  Morris admitted to one of the police officers that 
a similar episode had occurred “a few days prior to [the 
incident at issue], [and] that somebody in the trailer park had 
to return [the children] home.”   Despite this notice, Morris 
 
13
fell into such a coma-like sleep during the daytime that she 
could not be aroused for a period of more than two hours by 
repeated banging on her door and a barking dog.  She was 
sleeping so soundly that she did not realize her children had 
gotten out of the bed, unlocked the chain lock on the door and 
the doorknob lock, both of which Morris allegedly had locked, 
and left the trailer.  She did not hear the police officer’s 
entry into the trailer or respond to his calls announcing he was 
a police officer.  Even more disturbing is the fact Morris was 
in such a deep sleep that she did not hear her younger child 
calling for “mommy” when he ran back into the trailer. 
Despite the overwhelming evidence about Morris’ coma-like 
sleep on the day in question, the majority concludes there was 
no evidence presented to show that Morris was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol when her children wandered out of 
the trailer.  At trial, Morris acknowledged, however, that she 
had used cocaine about three days prior to the incident, and 
when asked if she has a significant substance abuse problem, 
Morris answered, “I do.”  Furthermore, when questioned about the 
nature of her substance abuse problem, she replied, “I was using 
cocaine.”  Yet, the majority concludes that “[i]t is mere 
speculation . . . to say that Morris’ sleep was likely drug or 
alcohol induced.” 
 
14
The majority apparently chooses to believe Morris’ 
testimony denying that she was under the influence of drugs on 
the day in question despite the fact Morris lied about being the 
children’s mother.  When the police officers questioned Morris 
at her trailer, she initially identified herself as Billie Jean 
Lloyd and stated that the children were her nephews.  After 
Morris’ mother arrived at the trailer, Morris told the police 
that the children were hers but still used the name, Billie Jean 
Lloyd.  Only after further conversations with her mother did 
Morris admit her true identity.  Morris testified at trial that 
she gave false information to the police officers because she 
thought there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest. 
Given Morris’ greater concern about an arrest warrant than 
the condition of her children or their whereabouts, and her 
lying to conceal her identity, the fact finder was entitled to 
give little weight to Morris’ testimony.  In fact, the trial 
court noted her lack of credibility, evidenced by her denying 
that she was the children’s mother.  “The factfinder need not 
believe an accused’s explanation and, if that explanation is not 
believed, may infer that the accused is lying to conceal [her] 
guilt.”  Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 
284 (1999).  Moreover, this Court is not free to re-weigh the 
evidence.  See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Bell, 118 Va. 492, 495, 87 
S.E. 570, 572 (1916)(appellate court “cannot consider the weight 
 
15
of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses”).  “We must 
review the evidence in this case not with respect to what action 
we might have taken, but as to whether the evidence justified 
the trial judge, as a trier of the facts, in finding defendant 
guilty.”  Avent v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 474, 477, 164 S.E.2d 
655, 657 (1968). 
The saga does not end here.  The older child had certain 
disabilities that caused him to be unable to respond to the 
police officer’s inquiries about where he lived.  The child was 
not even able to give his name to the officer.  Furthermore, the 
condition of the younger child, in particular his state of 
nakedness with dried fecal matter on his legs and chafing on his 
posterior, demonstrates that the child had been left unattended 
for a significant period of time.  In fact, because of the 
child’s condition and the dangerous automobile parts around 
which the children were playing, the family support worker from 
the elementary school was so concerned that he called child 
protective services and then “9-1-1.” 
As this Court stated in Barrett, we must view “all the 
circumstances preceding and surrounding” the incident on the day 
in question.  268 at 184, 597 S.E.2d at 111.  In light of the 
older child’s disabilities, the young age of the other child, 
Morris’ knowledge of the prior incident when her children 
wandered from the trailer, and her coma-like sleep on the day in 
 
16
question, I conclude that Morris “created a situation 
‘reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which [made] it not 
improbable that injury [would] be occasioned, and [she knew], or 
[was] charged with the knowledge of, the probable results of 
[her] acts.”  Id. at 184, 597 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting Cable v. 
Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992)).  
Thus, I reach the same conclusion as this Court did in Barrett.  
The fact finder could have reasonably concluded that Morris’ 
“conduct was willful and accompanied by acts of omission of a 
wanton nature showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the 
life and health of both children.”  Id. at 185, 597 S.E.2d at 
112. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
17