Title: Gonzalez v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-0740 
____________ 
 
LEONARD P. GONZALEZ, JR., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 14, 2023 
 
GROSSHANS, J. 
 
 
In this death-penalty case, Leonard P. Gonzalez, Jr., seeks 
review of a nonfinal order entered by the circuit court.  We deny 
Gonzalez’s petition, concluding that the review he seeks must come 
at a later time, if at all. 
Facts 
 
Gonzalez robbed, shot, and killed a married couple in their 
home in Escambia County.  Based on those events, the State 
charged Gonzalez with home-invasion robbery and two counts of 
first-degree murder.  A jury found him guilty as charged and, 
 
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following the penalty-phase hearing, recommended a sentence of 
death for each murder by a ten-to-two vote.  Accepting the jury’s 
recommendations, the trial court imposed two death sentences. 
 
Gonzalez appealed, raising twelve issues for our review.  We 
found no reversible error and concluded that competent, 
substantial evidence supported his first-degree murder convictions.  
Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1140-69 (Fla. 2014).  
Accordingly, we affirmed his convictions and sentences.  Id. at 
1135, 1169. 
 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari review, see Gonzalez v. Florida, 574 U.S. 880 (2014), 
Gonzalez filed a motion in the circuit court asking that his 
convictions and sentences be vacated, cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 
(establishing rules for collateral challenges in death-penalty cases).  
In an amendment to that motion, Gonzalez requested relief under 
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 
40 (Fla. 2016) (on remand).  In response to the amendment, the 
State conceded that Gonzalez was entitled to a new penalty phase 
under Hurst v. State.  Consistent with the State’s concession, the 
circuit court vacated and set aside Gonzalez’s death sentences and 
 
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ordered a new penalty phase.  The court, however, denied Gonzalez 
any other relief. 
 
Since that ruling, death-penalty law in Florida has undergone 
significant changes.  In the wake of Hurst v. State, the Legislature 
codified that decision’s jury-unanimity requirement.  Ch. 2017-1, 
§ 1, Laws of Fla.  Just three years later, though, we partially 
receded from Hurst v. State, holding that juror unanimity is not a 
constitutional requirement.  State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 
(Fla. 2020).  Then, this year, the Legislature amended the death-
penalty statute and removed the unanimity requirement: the 
statute now authorizes a death recommendation if eight or more 
jurors determine that death is the appropriate punishment.  Ch. 
2023-23, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. 
(2023)). 
 
Following this legislative change, Gonzalez sought an order 
declaring that the amended statute does not apply in his case.  In 
part, Gonzalez argued that application of the amended statute 
would be unconstitutional, would violate certain preclusion 
doctrines, and would be inconsistent with the presumption that 
substantive statutes should apply prospectively.  The circuit court, 
 
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however, disagreed with Gonzalez, ruling that the amended statute 
would apply at his upcoming penalty phase.1  In response to that 
adverse ruling, Gonzalez filed the petition that is now before us. 
Analysis 
 
Gonzalez seeks to invoke our all-writs authority as well as our 
authority to issue writs of prohibition.  See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. 
Const.  On the merits, he primarily argues that the circuit court 
was wrong in ruling that the new statute could be lawfully applied 
at his upcoming penalty phase.  We, however, do not reach the 
merits of Gonzalez’s petition.  Instead, we conclude that the relief 
sought is not available by way of prohibition or our all-writs 
authority.  
 
Under article V, section 3(b)(7), we have discretionary 
authority to issue writs of prohibition.  Such writs are preventative 
and operate to preclude a lower court from acting in excess of its 
jurisdiction.  English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1977) 
(“Prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in 
excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of 
 
1.  The court denied Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing. 
 
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jurisdiction.” (citing Burkhart v. Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit, 1 So. 2d 872 (1941))); Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen 
O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 2022) (discussing scope of 
writ of prohibition).  Here, the circuit court certainly has 
jurisdiction to conduct the new penalty phase; indeed, it must do so 
if it is to impose a new death sentence.  See State v. Okafor, 306 So. 
3d 930, 933-35 (Fla. 2020); State v. Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 940 
(Fla. 2020).  Such jurisdiction would not be affected by the court’s 
decision to apply the new statute, either in instructing the jury or in 
ultimately rendering its sentence.  Accordingly, a writ of prohibition 
could not supply the relief Gonzalez requests. 
Gonzalez fares no better in seeking to invoke our all-writs 
power.  We have long recognized that the all-writs provision does 
not give us “added appellate jurisdiction.”  Williams v. State, 913 So. 
2d 541, 543 (Fla. 2005); see also St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 
392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980).  Since this writ “operates as an 
aid to the Court in exercising its ‘ultimate jurisdiction,’ conferred 
elsewhere in the constitution,” Williams, 913 So. 2d at 543, “its use 
is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked 
or protecting jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future,” 
 
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Okafor, 306 So. 3d at 933 (quoting Roberts v. Brown, 43 So. 3d 673, 
677 (Fla. 2010)).  Gonzalez has failed to show how issuance of a 
writ here is necessary to preserve or protect our jurisdiction. 
We note two things.  First, if the circuit court was to impose 
the death penalty, we would have appellate jurisdiction under 
section 3(b)(1) to review that sentence.  In such a proceeding, 
Gonzalez could advance arguments like the ones presented in his 
petition.  And second, the circuit court’s adverse ruling on the 
applicability of the new statute does not alter the nature of the 
proceedings below.  Like other capital defendants, Gonzalez will 
have the opportunity to challenge the State’s aggravating evidence, 
present his own mitigating evidence, and argue to the jury and 
judge that a life sentence is the appropriate punishment in his case. 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, we deny Gonzalez’s petition.2 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
2.  We have considered other discretionary-writ provisions in 
section 3(b) and conclude that they would not support the nonfinal 
review that he seeks.  Nor would a motion to compel mandate 
support immediate review either. 
 
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MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and 
SASSO, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
Because I agree that Gonzalez has not made the necessary 
showing for the exercise of this Court’s writ authority, I concur in 
the result. 
Original Proceeding – Prohibition 
 
Ira W. Still, III of Law Offices of Ira Still, Coral Springs, Florida; and 
Joseph A. Chambrot of the Law Office of Joseph A. Chambrot, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Scott Browne, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey 
Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Steven L. Bolotin, 
Rachel P. Roebuck, and Peter N. Mills, Assistant Public Defenders, 
Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public 
Defender for the Tenth Judicial Circuit