Title: Malloch v. Town of Hanover

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11713 
 
KRISTIN MALLOCH  vs.  TOWN OF HANOVER & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2015. - September 24, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Civil Service, Decision of Civil Service Commission, Eligibility 
list, Judicial review, Police, Promotion.  Police, 
Promotional examination.  Administrative Law, Agency's 
interpretation of statute, Decision, Findings, Judicial 
review, Agency's authority, Substantial evidence.  
Practice, Civil, Review respecting civil service. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 28, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Frank J. McGee for the plaintiff. 
 
Bryan F. Bertram, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
personnel administrator of the human resources division of the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
1 Civil Service Commission and the personnel administrator 
of the human resources division of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
Galen Gilbert, for Carla Sullivan, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The town of Hanover (town) had two open 
positions for sergeants in its police department.  Although the 
plaintiff, Kristin Malloch, had scored highest on the civil 
service examination for promotion to a police sergeant position, 
the town decided to bypass Malloch and promote the candidates 
who had scored second and third highest on the sergeants' 
examination.  Malloch appealed the town's decision to the Civil 
Service Commission (commission), pursuant to G. L. c. 31, 
§ 2 (b), arguing that, where an appointing authority promotes a 
candidate other than the candidate ranked highest on the 
certification list; the promotion will not become effective 
until the appointing authority's written statement of reasons 
for the bypass "has been received by the administrator," G. L. 
c. 31, § 27;, that "received" in this context means 
substantially reviewed and approved by the administrator; and 
that the administrator2 may not, in accordance with G. L. c. 31, 
§ 5 (l), delegate that function to the town's appointing 
authority.  Malloch argued also that, even if the delegation 
were permissible, her bypass was not supported by evidence of a 
                     
2 The administrator is the personnel administrator of the  
human resources division (HRD) of the Commonwealth, within the 
Executive Office for Administration and Finance.  G. L. c. 31, 
§ 1.  In this context, the terms administrator and HRD are 
largely interchangeable. 
 
 
3 
reasonable justification for the bypass.  The commission denied 
her appeal, and Malloch sought review in the Superior Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. 
Agreeing with Malloch that the statutory requirement that 
the written statement of bypass reasons must be "received by" 
the administrator means "reviewed and approved by" the 
administrator, a Superior Court judge concluded that it was not 
"practicable," see G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l), for the administrator 
to delegate that function.  The judge allowed Malloch's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, ordered the town to submit its 
statement of bypass reasons to the human resources division 
(HRD), and remanded the matter to HRD and the commission, 
instructing HRD to decide, after having conducted a "substantive 
review," whether the bypass reasons should be approved.  The 
administrator and the town, the defendants here,3 filed an appeal 
in the Appeals Court, and we allowed their petition for direct 
appellate review. 
We conclude that the administrator may delegate its 
administrative function to receive statements of reasons 
supporting bypass promotions, and that it was "practicable," see 
                     
3 The Chair of the Civil Service Commission, the chief human 
resources officer of HRD, and the town's manager, were named as 
individual parties, in their professional capacities, in the 
Superior Court proceedings.  The matter proceeded on appeal 
under the names of the organizations. 
 
 
 
4 
G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l), to do so here.  Because the judge remanded 
the matter to HRD to make such a determination without 
conducting his own review of whether the commission's 
determination was supported by substantial evidence, we vacate 
the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court.4 
1.  Background.  a.  Bypass of Malloch.  We briefly recite 
the facts found by the commission regarding Malloch's bypass, 
reserving the remaining facts for our subsequent discussion. 
At the time of the decision to bypass Malloch, she had 
served as a police officer in the town for eight years.  She was 
one of two female officers in the town.  In October, 2011, 
Malloch took HRD's police sergeant promotional examination and 
received a score of eighty-six.  In April, 2012, the town 
certified two vacant police sergeant positions.  Malloch's name 
appeared first on the certification list provided to the town by 
HRD, ahead of three other officers.  One of those officers 
subsequently withdrew his name from consideration.  Malloch 
initially was interviewed by a panel of three senior police 
officers from the town and from neighboring municipalities; the 
panel ranked her last among the three candidates.  She then was 
interviewed by the town manager and the chief of police, who 
also ranked her last.  Based largely on these interviews, the 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Carla 
Sullivan. 
 
 
5 
town manager, who is the town's appointing authority, chose to 
bypass Malloch and promote the two other officers. 
b.  HRD's delegation policy.  Effective September 1, 2009, 
HRD informed municipalities that it had delegated, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l), certain administrative functions to 
appointing authorities.  In a memorandum issued in August, 2009, 
HRD wrote, 
"Each municipality will be responsible for . . . 
making appointments and promotions from the eligible list 
and providing bypass and selection reasons to the 
applicants in accordance with civil service law and rules.  
After August 31, 2009, HRD will no longer review and 
approve appointments and promotions.  Appeals will be made 
directly to the [commission]." 
 
The memorandum further explained that HRD "will provide 
technical assistance as needed to assist the municipalities in 
making appointments and promotions from the eligible list."  HRD 
sent "a technical certification manual to each city and town," 
conducted training sessions to explain the type of analysis 
required, and provided a nonexclusive list of approved reasons 
for appointing authorities to consider when determining if a 
bypass promotion is reasonable.  The manual states that reasons 
which are not specifically enumerated in that list "may be 
determined unacceptable."  The manual notes also that the 
administrator retains the authority to audit appointing 
authorities to ensure compliance with civil service law. 
2.  Statutory framework.  General Laws c. 31 (civil service 
 
 
6 
statute) governs civil service law in the Commonwealth and 
details the responsibilities and authority of the administrator, 
the commission,5 and the appointing authority.6 
The civil service statute was first enacted in 1884.  See 
St. 1884, c. 320.  It created a three-member civil service 
commission to establish rules for the selection of civil service 
employees.  See St. 1884, c. 320, §§ 1-2.  In 1939, the 
Massachusetts Special Commission Established to Study the Civil 
Service Laws, Rules and Regulations, with a View to Revision 
Thereof filed a report recommending that the commission no 
longer administer the civil service rules.  See 1939 House Doc. 
No. 1722.  Instead, it recommended, the "[c]ommission should be 
relieved of all technical and administrative matters.  The only 
instances in which the [c]ommission should function are in its 
participation in the adoption of rules, and hearing and deciding 
all appeals."  Id.  The Legislature adopted this report and 
created a separate agency, the HRD, to handle technical and 
administrative matters such as administering examinations and 
creating certified appointment lists.  See St. 1939, c. 238, 
§ 30.  See also Note, The Massachusetts Civil Service Law:  Is 
                     
5 The "[c]ommission" is defined as "the civil service 
commission of the [C]ommonwealth."  G. L. c. 31, § 1. 
 
6 The appointing authority is "any person, board or 
commission with power to appoint or employ personnel in civil 
service positions."  G. L. c. 31, § 1. 
 
 
 
7 
It Necessary to Destroy the Current System in Order to Save it?, 
40 New Eng. L. Rev. 1103, 1106-1107 (2006). 
The two separate entities have clear and distinct roles.  
The commission has the adjudicative duty to "hear and decide 
appeals by a person aggrieved by any decision, action, or 
failure to act by the administrator."  G. L. c. 31, § 2 (b).  It 
also may hear appeals by persons aggrieved by a decision, 
action, or failure to act by the appointing authority.  G. L. 
c. 31, § 2 (c).  By contrast, the administrator's duties, as 
detailed in G. L. c. 31, § 5, are not adjudicative, but include, 
among other things, the duty to administer civil service law and 
rules, establish classification plans, conduct examinations, and 
maintain records.  In creating the two separate agencies with 
separate roles, the Legislature indicated its intent that the 
commission adjudicate appeals and safeguard individual rights, 
while the administrator completes tasks necessary to the 
administration of the civil service system. 
To promote efficiency, the administrator has the power 
"[t]o delegate the administrative functions of the civil service 
system, so far as practicable, to the various state agencies and 
cities and towns of the [C]ommonwealth."  G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l).  
Where an appointing authority identifies an open civil service 
position, the administrator has the duty to certify to the 
appointing authority eligible candidates for promotion or 
 
 
8 
appointment.  G. L. c. 31, § 25.  The eligible candidates are 
listed in order of their civil service examination scores, with 
the inclusion of veterans' preferences.  G. L. c. 31, § 26.  An 
appointing authority may choose to promote a person other than 
the highest ranked candidate on the certification list.  See 
Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 253 (2006).  
Whenever an appointing authority chooses to bypass a higher-
ranked candidate, it immediately must file a written statement 
of its reasons for appointing a candidate with a lower score.  
G. L. c. 31, § 27.  Such an appointment will not be effective 
until the written statement has been "received by" the 
administrator.7 
                     
7 General Laws c. 31, § 27, provides: 
 
"Except as provided otherwise by [G. L. c. 31, § 15,] 
if the administrator certifies from an eligible list the 
names of three persons who are qualified for and willing to 
accept appointment, the appointing authority, pursuant to 
the civil service law and rules, may appoint only from 
among such persons.  If such eligible list contains the 
names of fewer than three such persons, the appointing 
authority may appoint from among those persons or may 
request authorization to make a provisional appointment 
pursuant to [§§ 12, 13, and 14]. 
 
"If an appointing authority makes an original or 
promotional appointment from a certification of any 
qualified person other than the qualified person whose name 
appears highest, and the person whose name is highest is 
willing to accept such appointment, the appointing 
authority shall immediately file with the administrator a 
written statement of his reasons for appointing the person 
whose name was not highest.  Such an appointment of a 
person whose name was not highest shall be effective only 
 
 
9 
3.  Discussion.  The question before us is whether the 
administrator permissibly delegated its function under G. L. 
c. 31, § 27, to appointing authorities. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  "Our primary duty 
in interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting it.'"  Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010), 
quoting International Org. of Masters v. Woods Hole, Martha's 
Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 813 (1984).  We 
begin our analysis with the statutory language.  "Ordinarily, 
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, 
LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  Accordingly, where the 
statutory language is clear, we must "give effect to the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the language" (citation omitted), 
Morales v. Morales, 464 Mass. 507, 511 (2013), "in light of the 
aim of the Legislature," unless to do so would produce an 
"absurd" or "illogical" result.  Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 
Mass. 353, 360 (2001). 
a.  HRD's authority to delegate.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 31, 
                                                                  
when such statement of reasons has been received by the 
administrator.  The administrator shall make such statement 
available for public inspection at the office of the 
department." 
 
 
10 
§ 5 (l), the administrator has the power "[t]o delegate the 
administrative functions of the civil service system, so far as 
practicable, to the various state agencies and cities and towns 
of the [C]ommonwealth."  The plain language of G. L. c. 31, 
§ 5 (l) thus affords the administrator broad authority to 
delegate its administrative functions, with one limitation:  any 
such delegation must be "practicable."  "Practicable" commonly 
is defined as "[c]apable of being effected, done, or put into 
practice; feasible."  See American Heritage Dictionary 1421 (3d 
ed. 1992).  Thus, in order to determine whether HRD's delegation 
was permissible, we assess whether the delegation was feasible. 
b.  Receipt of bypass statement.  In reaching his 
conclusion that HRD's delegation of receipt of bypass reasons 
was impermissible, the Superior Court judge interpreted the 
statutory requirement that the statement of such reasons must 
have "been received" by the administrator, G. L. c. 31, § 27, as 
also requiring the administrator to conduct a substantive review 
of the appointing authority's statement of reasons for the 
bypass, and to approve those reasons, in order for an 
appointment or promotion to become effective.  The judge 
determined that it was not practicable for an appointing 
authority to conduct a review of its own reasons for a bypass. 
On appeal, Malloch contends similarly that HRD's delegation 
was not practicable, because G. L. c. 31, § 27, requires the 
 
 
11 
administrator to receive and approve the appointing authority's 
reasons for a bypass promotion, and it is not feasible for an 
appointing authority to approve its own reasons for its decision 
to bypass a higher-ranked candidate.  Because we conclude that 
the statutory language means precisely what it says -- that the 
administrator must have "received" the statement of bypass 
reasons before an appointment becomes effective -- we do not 
agree that HRD's delegation to municipalities, as appointing 
authorities, was not "practicable." 
In ordinary usage, "receive" means "to take into one's 
possession (something offered or delivered)"; "to have 
(something) bestowed [or] conferred"; "to have delivered or 
brought to one"; and "to get or be informed of."  Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1610 (1996).  The statutory 
language thus indicates that the Legislature did not intend to 
require the administrator to approve a list of bypass reasons.  
To the contrary, other definitions of "receive" include "to 
accept from another"; "to hold, bear, or contain"; and "to 
accept as authoritative, valid, true, or approved," id., 
suggesting that the administrator is to accept an appointing 
authority's reasons, as stated, rather than to approve them.  
This reading of the administrator's duty to accept and hold the 
statement of reasons is supported by subsequent language in the 
same paragraph of the statute.  General Laws c. 31, § 27, 
 
 
12 
provides also that an appointing authority must "immediately 
file" its written statement of reasons for a bypass with the 
administrator, and that the administrator must make such 
statements available for public inspection. 
We read G. L. c. 31, § 27, to require only receipt of 
bypass reasons by the administrator, and not approval thereof.  
To conclude otherwise in essence would require that we "read 
into [the] statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there, [and to] add words that the Legislature had an 
option to, but chose not to include."  See Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 567 (2010), 
citing General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 
Mass. 798, 803 (1999).  The Legislature's choice is clear when 
we "read the statute as a whole."  Care & Protection of Jamison, 
467 Mass. 269, 276 (2014).  In other parts of the civil service 
statute, where the Legislature intended the administrator to 
approve or authorize the actions of the appointing authority, it 
stated so explicitly.  See Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 
676, 682 (2012) ("Where the Legislature used different language 
in different paragraphs of the same statute, it intended 
different meanings"). 
For instance, the Legislature gave the administrator the 
power and duty to "approve or disapprove specifications and 
qualifications submitted by an appointing authority . . . for 
 
 
13 
any civil service position."8  G. L. c. 31, § 5 (c).  The 
Legislature provided the administrator with similar approval 
authority for provisional promotions and appointments.  Under 
G. L. c. 31, § 15, which governs provisional promotions, "[a]n 
appointing authority may, with the approval of the administrator 
. . . make a provisional promotion of a civil service employee 
in one title to the next higher title in the same departmental 
unit."  See Kelleher v. Personnel Adm'r of the Dep't of 
Personnel Admin., 421 Mass. 382, 385-386 (1995) (construing 
level of scrutiny that should be used by administrator in 
approving provisional appointments).  Similarly, under G. L. 
c. 31, § 12, which governs provisional appointments, "[a]n 
appointing authority may make a provisional appointment to a 
position in the official service with the authorization of the 
administrator."  See Kelleher v. Personnel Adm'r of the Dep't of 
Personnel Admin., supra at 386. 
Moreover, it is the role of the commission, rather than of 
the administrator, to adjudicate bypass appeals in civil service 
                     
8 Under G. L. c. 31, § 5 (c), after identifying the 
qualifications and abilities necessary to perform the job, the 
"appointing authority may request . . . that the Personnel 
Administrator approve certain qualifications for a specific 
position."  The appointing authority then may rely on those 
qualifications, in addition to the entrance requirements 
established by the administrator for that position, in making 
appointment decisions.  See Charton & Groll, A Civil Service 
Action:  Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline at the Civil Service 
Commission (1999). 
 
 
14 
appointments, in part by reviewing statements of reasons for a 
bypass and determining whether there is a "reasonable 
justification, 'sufficiently supported by credible evidence,'" 
for the bypass.  See Police Dep't of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 
Mass. 680, 688 (2012) (Kavaleski), quoting Brackett v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 241 (2006).  We interpret separate 
sections of statutes as a whole, to produce internal 
consistency, Roberts v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 438 
Mass. 187, 194 (2002), citing Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. 
v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 104 (2000), and to give a "rational and 
workable effect."  Roberts v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of 
Boston, supra at 192, citing School Comm. of Gloucester v. 
Gloucester, 324 Mass. 209, 212 (1949). 
The legislative history in enacting G. L. c. 31, § 27, 
further supports our reading.  General Laws c. 31, § 27, 
originally was codified by St. 1945, c. 704, § 4, as G. L. 
c. 31, § 15 (c).9  Before the law was codified in 1945, the 
Report of the Special Commission Studying Civil Service Laws, 
Rules and Regulations (Jan. 1943), 1943 House Doc. No. 1333, at 
5, recommended that "when the appointing authority names some 
one other than the person who is number one on the civil service 
                     
9 Subsequently, the provision was recodified by St. 1978, 
c. 393, § 11, and became G. L. c. 31, § 27.  It was most 
recently amended by St. 1985, c. 527, § 16.  None of the changes 
since 1945 made material modifications to this section. 
 
 
15 
list, the appointing official shall give the Director of Civil 
Service[10] his reasons for passing over the person or persons at 
the head of the list.  These reasons shall be in writing . . . 
[and are] to be available for examination by the person or 
persons passed over."  Another legislative report, Report of the 
Special Recess Commission Studying Civil Service Laws, Rules and 
Regulations (Jan. 1945), 1945 House Doc. No. 1675, at 6, 
similarly proposed that appointing authorities "be required to 
give reasons in writing for passing over persons at the head of 
civil service lists."  The Legislature adopted these 
recommendations when it enacted St. 1945, c. 704, § 4.  Thus, 
the purpose behind the administrator's receipt of bypass reasons 
was not to require the administrator's review, but rather to 
make those reasons known and available in writing for bypassed 
candidates to examine in deciding whether to pursue an appeal.  
See 1943 House Doc. No. 1333, at 5. 
In sum, we see no support for Malloch's contention that the 
administrator is required to conduct an independent review of a 
written statement of reasons where the Legislature did not 
plainly state its intention that the administrator do so, and 
explicitly awarded such adjudicative duties to the commission.  
                     
10 The personnel administrator previously was referred to as 
the Director of Civil Service.  See St. 1974, c. 835, § 1 
(striking out "director of civil service" and replacing with 
"the personnel administrator"). 
 
 
 
16 
See Staveley v. Lowell, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 400, 407 (2008) ("the 
administrator's powers of delegation must be viewed in the 
context of the Legislature's decision to charge the commission 
with responsibility for smooth and consistent operation of [the 
civil service] system"). 
c.  Delegation of functions under G. L. c. 31, § 27.  
Nothing in the language of G. L. c. 31, § 27, explicitly 
prohibits delegation of functions by the administrator, nor does 
G. L. c. 31, § 5 (l), contain language prohibiting such 
delegation.  See Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 
421 Mass. 117, 128 (1995) ("If the Legislature intentionally 
omits language from a statute, no court can supply it"). 
Conceding that the statutory language does not prohibit 
delegation of the administrator's authority under G. L. c. 31, 
§ 27, Malloch relies on language in MacHenry v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1996) (MacHenry), in support 
of her argument that the administrator may not delegate its 
function to "receive" statements of bypass reasons.  Malloch 
argues that MacHenry holds that G. L. c. 31, § 27, requires the 
administrator to review and approve statements of reasons for a 
bypass.  We do not agree. 
In MacHenry, the issue before the Appeals Court was whether 
the statutory scheme authorized the administrator to undertake 
to conduct a review of a statement of bypass reasons, or whether 
 
 
17 
an appointment became effective "merely upon receipt by [the 
administrator] of the statement of reasons."  Id. at 634.  The 
court noted several earlier decisions of this court and the 
Appeals Court where the administrator's role had "not [been] 
confined to mere 'receipt' but [had been] seen [in dicta] to 
involve acceptance or approval of the statement of reasons," and 
concluded that "the Legislature's presumptive knowledge of those 
decisions" indicated that this interpretation was correct.  Id. 
at 635.  The court did not address whether G. L. c. 31, § 27, 
required the administrator to approve statements of bypass 
reasons, but suggested that it was reasonable to conclude the 
statute authorized the administrator to approve or affirm such 
statements.11  MacHenry, supra at 635.  The court based its 
                     
11 The plaintiff in MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 40 Mass. 
App. Ct. 632, 635 (1996) (MacHenry) had been promoted to the 
position of police lieutenant after a board of selectmen chose 
to bypass two higher-scoring individuals on the certification 
list.  Id. at 632-633.  The administrator rejected their written 
statements of reasons for the bypass because the selectmen had 
relied on the plaintiff's educational record, which already had 
been considered in determining his civil service score, and 
requested that the selectmen provide additional, more detailed 
reasons for the bypass.  Id. at 633.  Instead, they chose to 
promote the second-ranked candidate on the certification list, 
and filed detailed reasons with the administrator explaining 
their decision for having done so.  Id.  The administrator 
accepted those reasons and the plaintiff, who had assumed the 
duties of a lieutenant, was returned to his position as 
sergeant. 
 
The plaintiff appealed to the commission, arguing that his 
promotion had become effective upon the administrator's receipt 
of the statement of bypass reasons, rather than being dependent 
 
 
18 
conclusion, in large part, on language in Bielawski v. Personnel 
Adm'r of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 466 (1996) 
(Bielawski).  Like MacHenry, Bielawski did not hold that G. L. 
c. 31, § 27, required the administrator's review,12 nor did the 
other cases cited in MacHenry, supra.  See Goldblatt v. 
Corporation Counsel of Boston, 360 Mass. 660, 662 (1971); Flynn 
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 207 (1983). 
None of these cases concluded or relied upon a 
determination that G. L. c. 31, § 27, requires the personnel 
administrator to review substantively an appointing authority's 
statement of reasons for a bypass, and we make explicit today 
                                                                  
upon its approval of those reasons.  The commission concluded 
that the plaintiff's appointment had never become effective, 
because the administrator had not approved the bypass reasons, 
even though the commission stated that the rejected reasons 
would have been sufficient to support the bypass.  The Appeals 
Court concluded that, while not required to do so, the 
commission had authority to review, and not merely to accept, a 
hiring authority's reasons, and therefore there was "no 
substantial error of law . . . adversely affecting material 
rights," as required in a petition for certiorari, G. L. c. 249, 
§ 4, the procedural posture before the court.  MacHenry, supra 
at 635-636. 
 
12 In Bielawski v. Personnel Adm'r of the Div. of Personnel 
Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 466 (1996), we concluded that a bypassed 
candidate did not have a property interest in a civil service 
promotion.  We noted, however, that even if the plaintiff had 
had such a property interest, the requirements of due process 
would have been satisfied by the "procedural scheme requiring 
approval by the personnel administrator, allowing an appeal to 
the commission, and providing for limited judicial review."  Id.  
We did not decide the issue, but made this statement concerning 
rights that might have been protected by the "procedural scheme 
requiring approval by the personnel administrator" under a 
hypothetical scenario. 
 
 
19 
that the statute contains no such requirement. 
We agree with the Appeals Court's conclusion in MacHenry, 
supra, that the administrator is charged with evaluating the 
qualifications of applicants for civil service positions 
according to "basic merit principles," see G. L. c. 31, § 1 
(defining term), and must administer, enforce, and comply with 
civil service law, pursuant to G. L. c. 31.  To ensure that 
appointments and promotions are made only from a properly 
certified eligibility list, for instance, the administrator has 
implemented a rule that no appointment or promotion will be 
deemed effective until the appointing authority has "notified 
the administrator in writing that such person has been so 
appointed or promoted, or that the appointing authority has 
notified the administrator of its intent to appoint or promote 
such person, if the appointment or promotion must be delayed due 
to the scheduling of any training required by statute, or 
municipal ordinance or by-law, or departmental rule."  Personnel 
Administration Rules par. 08(3) (effective May 1, 2010).  If at 
any point, before or after it issues the certification, the 
administrator finds that the certification (based on an 
examination conducted by the administrator) was made in error, 
or a candidate was placed on the eligible list through mistake 
or fraud, the administrator may revoke the appointment.  Id. 
The administrator may, in accordance with his or her duty, 
 
 
20 
facially examine a written statement of bypass reasons to 
determine whether the candidate chosen satisfies the 
requirements for the position (as established by the 
administrator).  Indeed, in MacHenry, the personnel 
administrator did just that, and found the statement of reasons 
for a bypass deficient because education, cited as a reason, 
already had been included in determining the candidates' civil 
service examination scores, which the administrator assigns.  
See G. L. c. 31, § 5 (e) (giving personnel administrator purview 
over civil service examinations).  See also Charton & Groll, A 
Civil Service Action:  Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline at the 
Civil Service Commission (1999); Personnel Administration Rules 
par. 08(5), supra.  The administrator is not, however, obligated 
to assume an adjudicatory role by substantively reviewing and 
approving an appointing authority's decision to bypass a 
candidate. 
We therefore conclude that the administrator permissibly 
could delegate its administrative functions under G. L. c. 31, 
§ 27.  Cf. Stavely v. Lowell, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 400. 404-405 
(2008) (determining that administrator may, pursuant to G. L. c. 
31, § 5 [l], delegate its responsibility to create and 
administer process that produces civil service eligibility 
lists). 
Malloch makes no additional arguments that delegation to 
 
 
21 
the appointing authorities was impracticable, and we discern no 
such bar.  According to the record, the administrator trained 
appointing authorities, provided each authority with a manual 
detailing acceptable and unacceptable reasons for a bypass, and 
retained the authority to audit appointing authorities to ensure 
compliance with basic merit principles.  These efforts make it 
practicable for appointing authorities to create statements of 
bypass reasons and send them to bypassed candidates, 
safeguarding basic merit principles, and allowing aggrieved 
candidates to obtain review by the commission. 
d.  Application to Malloch's bypass.  Having concluded that 
the administrator's delegation of receipt of the statement of 
bypass reasons was proper, we turn to a consideration of the 
commission's decision affirming Malloch's bypass.  "We may set 
aside or modify an agency decision if we determine 'that the 
substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced' 
because the agency decision is in violation of constitutional 
provisions; in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of 
the agency; based on an error of law; made on unlawful 
procedure; unsupported by substantial evidence; unwarranted by 
the facts found by the court on the record as submitted or as 
amplified; or arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law."  Rivas v. Chelsea 
Housing Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 334 (2013), quoting G. L. c. 30A, 
 
 
22 
§ 14 (7) and citing Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 
Mass. 311, 318 (2008). 
When a bypassed candidate for a civil service position 
appeals to the commission, "the commission determines 'on the 
basis of the evidence before it, whether the appointing 
authority [has] sustained its burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that there was reasonable 
justification' for the decision to bypass the candidate."  
Kavaleski, supra at 688, quoting Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
447 Mass. 233, 241 (2006).  "[T]he commission owes substantial 
deference to the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in 
determining whether there was 'reasonable justification' shown," 
Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 188 
(2010), because "[i]n the task of selecting public employees of 
skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with 
broad discretion."  Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. 
App. Ct. 300, 304-305 (1997).  "Reasonable justification . . . 
means 'done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by 
credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided 
by common sense and by correct rules of law.'"  Kavaleski, 
supra, quoting Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra.  A 
reviewing court is "bound to accept the findings of fact of the 
commission's hearing officer, if supported by substantial 
evidence," Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra, quoting 
 
 
23 
Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003), and 
to give due weight to the experience and knowledge of the 
commission in reviewing its decisions.  Kavaleski, supra at 689.  
A reviewing court does not substitute its own view of the 
evidence, but considers whether the commission's decision is 
supported by the record and is otherwise not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an error of law.  See id., and cases cited. 
i.  Conduct of the interviews.  The town's chief of police, 
Walter L. Sweeney, Jr., assembled an interview panel consisting 
of Hanover police Lieutenant Gregory Nihan, Marshfield police 
Captain Michael J. McDonough, and Rockland police Lieutenant 
Nicholas Zeoli.13  In addition to Malloch, the two other 
candidates were Officer Thomas Burke, who ranked second on the 
certification list, and Officer David Williams, ranked third. 
The panel asked each of the three candidates the same ten 
interview questions, which the commission deemed "appropriate, 
job-related questions gauged to assess a candidate's ability to 
perform the duties of a police sergeant." 
The panel interviewed the candidates in the order in which 
they appeared on the certification list.  The panelists took 
                     
13 Noting that the panel had been exclusively male, the 
chairman of the commission inquired of the town manager whether  
he had considered gender an issue, and whether adding a female 
interviewer would have been preferable.  The town manager 
replied "No.  I think. . . we've progressed as a society 
significantly enough as it relates to those issues that it 
didn't occur to me." 
 
 
24 
notes and rated each candidate on a score sheet using a scale of 
1 to 5 in each of four categories:  communication skills, poise-
presentation, appearance, and response to questions.  After the 
interviews, the panel ranked Burke first, Williams second, and 
Malloch third, with average interview scores of 5, 4.6, and 3.5, 
respectively.  The panelists compiled their notes into written 
statements; they delivered their score sheets and statements to 
Zeoli, who summarized their recommendations and submitted his 
written summary to the chief of police and the town manager. 
As to Malloch's score, panel members commented that she was 
"nervous"; lacked "command presence"; did not identify herself 
as a "go-to person" on her shift; and, of particular concern, 
did not offer a tactical plan in response to a question on a 
hypothetical shooting, responding merely, we "go in."  Citing 
Malloch's response to a question on her "leadership style," the 
panel expressed concerns that Malloch's answer that she "tends 
to ask a lot of questions of officers" indicated a lack of 
decision-making ability or knowledge about her job. 
The panel noted also that Malloch's answer to the question 
on how to improve the operational efficiency of the department 
"did not appropriately address the question."  The panel's 
report stated that Malloch responded that she would improve 
efficiency by "mak[ing] sure the officers went out on the 
 
 
25 
road."14  One of the other two candidates suggested a mentoring 
program for officers who had passed a "break-in period," and 
another suggested a revamped field training program for new 
officers. 
In contrast to the positive assessment of Richard's honesty 
in not giving a response that they "wanted to hear" concerning 
an atypical answer to another question, none of the interviewers 
made any comment on candor or forthrightness in Malloch's 
response.  Indeed, one of the panel members commented that 
Williams's answer on the efficiency question was "more 
adequate," because he "talked a lot about officers being on 
time, being accountable, being held accountable, things like 
that." 
Before the panel delivered its report, Nihan advised 
Sweeney verbally of the panel's rankings, which he described as 
"clear cut."  Sweeney then summarized this discussion to the 
town manager, Troy Clarkson, before they conducted their 
                     
14 Before the commission, Malloch elaborated that her 
 
"answer was that in our department there are some officers 
who tend to stay in the station for extended periods of 
time and my way to increase operational efficiency at the 
department is to make sure those officers leave the station 
and go to events such as the high school football games and 
basketball games and perhaps a "Dick's" [store] opening or 
something like that, but to not stay at the station and 
watch TV or whatever it is that they're doing for four or 
five hours an evening.  That's not efficient use of the 
department's time." 
 
 
 
26 
interview of the candidates and before the panel's report had 
been received; he explained that the panel had considered Burke 
"far and above the other two people" and as "an outstanding 
candidate of the three," that "Williams had ranked number two," 
and that Malloch "had ranked number three." 
Sweeney testified to the commission that he was "not 
surprised" by the panel's ranking.  He said Burke "seems to be 
someone that gets out in front of things and people will tend to 
follow him," and that he had seen "other officers around the 
station from time to time" asking Williams questions and that he 
thought Williams had "given good sound advice."  As to Malloch, 
his general impression was "that she does a good job.  She 
handles her calls in an efficient manner.  I think she gives a 
very good effort every time that she comes to work, but she is 
not someone that I see as taking a leadership or taking the lead 
on things[,] more of a person that needs to be reassured 
sometimes that she's doing the right thing and exhibits a desire 
to get a collective opinion on things versus just leading the 
charge." 
The chief of police and the town manager then conducted a 
second round interview with each of the candidates.  The 
interviews lasted between thirty to forty-five minutes.  
Clarkson asked each candidate two questions: (1) "What is the 
last book you read?" (Clarkson testified that he asked the 
 
 
27 
candidate's "favorite book")15 and (2) "explain the difference 
between management and leadership?"  With regard to the first 
question, the town manager was attempting to gauge how each 
candidate would respond to an "out of the box" question.  In 
posing the second question, Clarkson wanted to know if the 
candidate understood the difference between the administrative 
and operational duties associated with being a manager as 
opposed to having the leadership skills to inspire, motivate, 
and lead others. 
Malloch did not offer a "complete response," to the second 
question, and did not return to the question later in the 
interview.  By contrast, Burke's and Williams's answers 
convinced the town manager that they understood the difference 
between management and leadership.  Clarkson decided that Burke 
and Williams were the top two candidates, and Malloch was not 
ready to serve in a leadership position; Sweeney agreed. 
ii.  Bypass promotion and commission's review.  After 
                     
15 Troy Clarkson, the town manager, testified at the hearing 
before the commission that Malloch responded that "Watership 
Down" was her favorite book, and he asked nothing further about 
her response; he did not remember what Thomas Burke responded; 
and David Williams responded that he "does not read books for 
entertainment, but when he has spare time he reads the 
department policy manual." Clarkson categorized both Malloch's 
and Burke's responses as "somewhat generic," and stated that he 
was "looking for the physical and body language response" more 
than a specific answer.  Clarkson considered Williams's answer 
to display a "willingness to be honest . . . and not try to 
think of something that we wanted to hear," and testified that 
he was struck by that honesty. 
 
 
28 
reviewing the written summary from the interview panel, his own 
recollection of the candidates' second interviews, and the 
police chief's recommendation, Clarkson opted to bypass Malloch, 
and to appoint Burke and Williams.  Clarkson noted, "Officer 
Burke and Officer Williams were far better suited to hold a 
position of rank and authority in a police department in a 
paramilitary organization."  Clarkson wrote Malloch a bypass 
letter containing his reasons for the bypass, with instructions 
on how she could pursue an appeal to the commission. 
While expressing some concern about the categories used for 
ranking the candidates, the "rehearsed and exaggerated" nature 
of some of the testimony, such as "comments about the 
nervousness of [Malloch] . . .  as compared to the nervousness 
of one of the male candidates," and the "somewhat uniform nature 
of the testimony from the [t]own's sequestered witnesses," the 
commission found that the town had reasonable justification, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, to bypass Malloch. 
iii.  Reasons for remand.  During argument before us, as 
she did before the commission and in the Superior Court, Malloch 
argued that her bypass was based, at least in part, on her 
gender.  "The fundamental purpose of the civil service system is 
to guard against political considerations, favoritism, and bias 
in governmental hiring and promotion."  Massachusetts Ass'n of 
Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 260 
 
 
29 
(2001), citing Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. 
Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  The commission may, and indeed should, 
closely scrutinize appointments and promotions "[w]hen there 
are, in connection with personnel decisions, overtones of 
political control or objectives unrelated to merit standards or 
neutrally applied public policy."  Cambridge v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, supra. 
Significantly, although it ultimately affirmed Malloch's 
bypass, the commission noted that there were a number of factors 
in this case supporting a concern that gender bias might have 
played a role in the bypass determination, which would be a 
violation of basic merit principles.16  We share the commission's 
stated concerns.  Where there are overtones of gender bias, any 
proffered justification for a bypass must be weighed carefully 
to ensure decision making in accordance with basic merit 
                     
16 In the commission's written decision, the chair of the 
commission stated, "[T]here are certain factors that were of 
concern to me in this regard.  The [t]own employs only two (2) 
female police officers and no female has ever served as a 
superior officer.  The [t]own assembled two all-male review 
interview panels who rated Officer Malloch below her two (2) 
male colleagues for reasons partly related to 'poise-
presentation' and lack of 'command presence.'  The members of 
the review panels met jointly prior to their [c]ommission 
testimony, resulting in parts of their testimony (i.e. -- 
comments about the nervousness of Officer Malloch during her 
testimony) sounding rehearsed and exaggerated as compared to the 
nervousness of one of the male candidates.  Finally the [p]olice 
[c]hief's dismissive testimony about Ms. Malloch's recent 
reading choice of a novel as a 'book about animals' -- and the 
[t]own [m]anager's praise for a male candidate's candor that he 
didn't read books -- only reinforced concerns I had. . . ." 
 
 
30 
principles.  See Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement 
Officers v. Abban, supra at 264. 
Because the Superior Court judge, having concluded that 
delegation was impermissible, had ordered the matter remanded to 
HRD for a "substantive review," he did not conduct a substantive 
review, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, of the commission's 
decision, and had no opportunity to consider whether the 
commission's determination that Malloch's gender was not a 
factor in her bypass was supported by substantial evidence and 
not an abuse of discretion or an error of law.  Moreover, while 
the parties contest whether the bypass decision was based on 
impermissible reasons, the focus of their arguments before us 
was whether the administrator erred in delegating its duty under 
G. L. c. 31, § 27, and should have conducted its own substantive 
review of the town's asserted reasons for the bypass, precisely 
to consider whether the bypass was based on merit principles and 
was made "upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by 
credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided 
by common sense and by correct rules of law."  See Massachusetts 
Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, supra at 
260 quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court 
of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928).  Thus, the parties' 
briefs do not address in detail the substance of the asserted 
errors by the commission. 
 
 
31 
4.  Conclusion.  Accordingly, we vacate the judge's order 
entering judgment on the pleadings and remanding the case to the 
administrator.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
a review of the commission's decision on the merits of Malloch's 
bypass, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. 
So ordered.