Title: Johnson v. Marcel

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
DEBRA I. JOHNSON, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 941482 
                                    January 12, 1996 
GRACE MARCEL 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
 
John D. Gray, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs' 
amended motion for judgment states a legally cognizable cause of 
action. 
 
Plaintiffs Debra I. Johnson and Karlista Brennan initially 
sued Grace Marcel, seeking to have her enjoined from threatening 
and harassing them and from interfering with their possessory 
rights in premises they had leased from Marcel.  On November 15, 
1993, the trial court entered a temporary injunction, which was 
extended for an indefinite period on December 27, 1993. 
 
On January 11, 1994, with leave of court, the plaintiffs 
filed an amended motion for judgment against Marcel, alleging 
that she had caused them physical harm and emotional distress and 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.  Marcel demurred to 
the amended motion for judgment, claiming that it was 
"insufficient in law in that there is no nexus between the 
compensatory and punitive damages sought, and any duty owed by 
[Marcel] to . . . the plaintiffs" and that "there has been no 
allegation of any causal connection between any specific actions 
 of [Marcel] and [the] alleged loss, damage, or injury of 
plaintiffs." 
 
On May 31, 1994, the trial court sustained the demurrer and 
 
 
 
 
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dismissed the action.  The plaintiffs appeal. 
 
The facts are those alleged in the amended motion for 
judgment, which are summarized as follows.  Pursuant to separate 
rental agreements, the plaintiffs became co-tenants of a town 
house owned by Marcel.  Soon thereafter, Marcel began to solicit 
Johnson's advice and involvement in prospective business 
ventures, but Johnson rebuffed Marcel's efforts to develop a 
business relationship.  On November 6, 1993, Marcel demanded that 
Johnson vacate the town house.  Johnson, however, had prepaid 
rent through December 20, 1993, and refused to vacate the 
premises.  Marcel then sought to enlist assistance from Brennan 
to evict Johnson, but Brennan declined.  On November 13, 1993, 
Marcel demanded that Brennan vacate the premises within 24 hours. 
 
On November 15, 1993, the plaintiffs sought the court's 
protection from Marcel's continued harassment and efforts to 
evict them.  The next day, the temporary injunction order was 
served on Marcel. 
 
Despite the issuance of the injunction, Marcel continued to 
harass the plaintiffs.  She telephoned them at home and at work. 
 She changed the locks on the town house garage, and she entered 
the town house without the plaintiffs' permission.  She called 
Johnson's father in North Carolina and repeatedly told him that 
Johnson was "crazy." 
 
On November 18, 1993, about midnight, Marcel pulled the 
plaintiffs' downstairs telephone out of the wall socket.  Also 
 
 
 
 
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that night, she blocked the plaintiffs' driveway and made 
excessive noise by screaming, banging on doors, and threatening 
Johnson with arrest. 
 
As a result of Marcel's actions, the plaintiffs, fearful for 
their physical and mental well-being, were forced to vacate the 
premises before their leases expired.  Consequently, they went 
into hiding and lost their security deposits and prepaid rents.  
They also incurred expenses for temporary housing. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that their allegations in the amended 
motion for judgment state a claim of common law trespass.  They 
also contend that, because the trespass was deliberate and 
accompanied by aggravating circumstances, they may claim damages 
for emotional distress.  We agree. 
 
Although Marcel owned the premises, the plaintiffs, as 
tenants, had the right of possession.  See Hannan v. Dusch, 154 
Va. 356, 360, 153 S.E. 824, 825 (1930).  Therefore, under the 
circumstances of the present case, Marcel had no right to enter 
the premises without the plaintiffs' consent. 
 
According to the allegations in the amended motion for 
judgment, however, Marcel entered the premises without the 
plaintiffs' consent.  Despite the injunction, she also changed 
the locks on the plaintiffs' garage, ripped the downstairs 
telephone out of the wall socket, blocked the plaintiffs' 
driveway, and continually threatened, abused, intimidated, and 
harassed the plaintiffs.  We think these allegations state a 
 
 
 
 
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claim of common law trespass. 
 
We also think the plaintiffs may claim damages for emotional 
distress.  Where, as here, the alleged trespass is deliberate and 
accompanied by aggravating circumstances, damages for emotional 
distress may be recoverable in the absence of physical injury.  
Peshine v. Shepperson, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 472, 486 (1867); see 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 354, 297 S.E.2d 
647, 653 (1982). 
 
We hold, therefore, that the amended motion for judgment 
states a cause of action for deliberate trespass and that the 
trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
*T  Accordingly, the 
trial court's judgment will be reversed and the case will be 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
     
*We reject the plaintiffs' other contentions.  We conclude 
that the amended motion for judgment does not state causes of 
action for a private nuisance, for a "generalized intentional 
tort," or for recovery under the Virginia Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act, Code § 55-248.2 et seq.