Title: Smitherman v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR CO. OF PIMA

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

102 Ariz. 504 (1967) 433 P.2d 634 William C. SMITHERMAN, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent, and Roy J. Meyer, Real Party in Interest. No. 8976-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 15, 1967. Rees, Estes & Browning, by Donald Estes, Tucson, Gentry, McNulty & Toci, Bisbee, for petitioner. R. Lamar Couser, Tucson, for real party in interest. McFARLAND, Vice Chief Justice: Petitioner William C. Smitherman, hereinafter referred to as Smitherman, is an attorney engaged in the practice of law, *505 with offices in Cochise County, Arizona. Respondent Roy J. Meyer, the real party in interest, hereinafter referred to as Meyer, employed Smitherman in Cochise County to file a civil action in Cochise County Superior Court against two defendants the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Southern Pacific Company. In that action, defendant Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers secured a dismissal as to it. The other defendant Southern Pacific Company was successful in having the action against it transferred to the Federal District Court at Tucson, Arizona. The employment contract between Meyer and Smitherman in that action was negotiated in Cochise County. Meyer brought a malpractice action in the Superior Court of Pima County against Smitherman in two counts. The first count alleged negligence by Smitherman in failing to appeal from the order of dismissal of the action against the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. The second count alleged that after removal of the action to the United States District Court, Smitherman was negligent in failing to request a jury trial and in agreeing to postpone the trial indefinitely. Smitherman, in the malpractice case, within the time allowed to answer, filed a motion supported by affidavit for a change of venue to Cochise County, on the grounds that his residence was in Cochise County, and that his representation of Meyer was in that county. The court, by ex parte order, extended the time to file opposition to the motion for the change of venue. Within the time so extended plaintiff filed an opposition to the change of venue, supported by affidavit and exhibits. Thereafter, the motion for change of venue was denied by the Superior Court of Pima County. Smitherman petitioned the Court of Appeals, Division 2, for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals, in a decision of February 24, 1967, 5 Ariz. App. 170, 424 P.2d 461, affirmed the order denying the motion for change of venue. This Court granted a petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals for the purpose of passing upon the question of venue of the action. Smitherman contends that the trial court's order extending the time to file opposition to the change of venue was invalid. We agree with that part of the decision of the court of appeals which holds that the order extending the time to respond to the motion for change of venue was valid. The record shows that both Meyer and Smitherman are residents of Cochise County, and that Smitherman's employment and all of the acts set out in Count One took place in Cochise County. Meyer alleged, in Count Two, that Smitherman "wilfully and intentionally did not request a jury trial" in the Federal District Court at Tucson (Pima County), although he was asked to do so by Meyer. He further alleged that Smitherman, by informal stipulation in the federal district court, agreed to postpone the cause of action indefinitely, "with the result that plaintiff's [Meyer's] cause of action was uncommonly delayed in its prosecution, * * *" Meyer contends the acts set out in Count Two were in Pima County. In support of his allegation of indefinite postponement, Meyer attached a copy of a letter from Smitherman to William R. Denton, General Attorney for Southern Pacific Company, San Francisco, California, which read: Since all of the acts alleged in Count One occurred in Cochise County, and since both defendants resided in Cochise County, there is no question but what, if this were the only count, the venue could not properly be laid in the Superior Court of Pima County. However, if Count Two states a cause of action in which Pima County has venue, then Meyer had the option of bringing the action in either Cochise County or Pima County. Ellsworth v. Layton, 97 Ariz. 115, 397 P.2d 450. The facts alleged in Count Two show that the acts which Meyer contends gave Pima County venue of this case were the failure of Smitherman to request a jury trial in the Federal District Court located in Pima County, and his telephone conversation from Cochise County to the Judge of the U.S. District Court in Pima County. These allegations show that Smitherman was not present in Pima County at the time he is alleged to have committed the acts for which Meyer seeks to recover. The general rule regarding venue is stated in 92 C.J.S. Venue § 4, pp. 670-671, as follows: The statute in Arizona follows this general trend as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum. § 12-401, A.R.S., provides that: Subsection 10 is an exception to the general rule. It was taken from the Texas statutes. This statute was interpreted by the Texas court in the case of Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59, 7 L.R.A. 618 (1890), a case in which the defendant was sued for injury to plaintiff's wife because of acts committed by him in the yard of the plaintiff in a different county from that of his residence. The injury was in the nature of a trespass on the case. The court, in passing upon this question, stated: The court thereby held that the cause of action was trespass within the meaning of the statute, and the suit was properly brought in the county where the trespass was committed. The facts show that the trespass was committed by the defendant while he was present in the county. In Ricker v. Shoemaker, 81 Tex. 22, 16 S.W. 645 (1891), the court cited Hill v. Kimball with favor. In a later case, Brooks v. Hornbeck, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W. 162, the court held that to constitute a trespass within the meaning of the exception there must be an "affirmative act." In the case of Pride v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 157, 348 P.2d 924, we said: We are of the opinion that in adopting the exception to the rule, the Arizona legislature intended that it would have a reasonable and workable meaning. In Pride v. Superior Court, supra, we adopted the reasoning of the Texas court, and held that an act of negligence charged in a tort action constitute a trespass on the case within the meaning of this section. It is clear from the facts of the case that we were speaking of acts performed by a defendant while present in the county. Regardless of the language used by the Texas courts as a basis for holding that a trespass was within the exception in the venue statute, the decisions generally resulted in requiring the presence of a defendant in the county at the time of its *508 commission. The holdings indicate that this was one of the objectives. We do not doubt that by the use of the language "a crime, offense, or trespass" it was the intent to refer to the acts of a defendant while present in the county. One of the reasons for the exception was undoubtedly that it is usually more convenient for witnesses, and for the ascertainment of the facts by the court. In our opinion, this interpretation is both reasonable and workable. We hold that a defendant must have been present in the county at the time of the commission of the "trespass" before venue can be laid in that county. The allegations of the complaint and of the affidavit resisting the motion to change venue show that defendant was not present in Pima County at the time of the alleged acts of trespass; therefore, we hold that it was the duty of the trial court to transfer the case to Cochise County. The other matters contained in Meyer's affidavit may be presented to the trial court in a motion to change venue for cause, after the case is transferred to Cochise County. That portion of the Court of Appeals opinion pertaining to venue is hereby vacated. The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the case ordered transferred to Cochise County. BERNSTEIN, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, UDALL, and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.