Title: Fisher v. Fisher. ICA s.d.o., filed 04/19/2006 [pdf], 110 Haw. 258. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/30/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

00 ---

 

 

MARIE STELLA MARTIN FISHER,
Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellant,

oats

"251 Ha cman sag

DAVID THOMAS FISHER,
Respondent Defendant -Appellee.

 

 

No, 26935,

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS.
(FC-D NO. 03-21-3145)

JUNE 30, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
on May 19, 2006, petitioner/plaintift-appellant Marie
Stella Martin Fisher (Mother) timely petitioned this court for a
writ of certiorari to review the Intermediate Court of Appeale’
(ICA) surmary disposition order, filed on April 19, 2006.
‘Therein, the ICA affirmed in part and vacated in part the Family

court of the First Circuit’s' decree (divorce decree) entered on

 

+ per diem Family Court Judge Gregg Young presided over the divorce

proceedings.

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

October 13, 2004, granting Mother a divorce from

defendant -appellee David Thomas Fisher (Father) and determining

 

custody arrangements for their three minor children. In her
application for writ of certiorari, Mother, the primary parent,
argues that the trial court erroneously permitted Father, the
non-primazy parent, to relocate with their minor children to
Virginia, over her objection, which decision Mother apparently
believes is contrary to Hawai'i precedent. Mother contends that
Hawaii's standards for relocation cases are “too amorphous to
provide meaningful guidance and predictability to prospective
custody/relocation litigants and counsel” and urges this court to
provide “much needed judicial guidelines, policies, and/or
presunptions in the adjudication of relocation cases." We
granted certiorari on May 30, 2006 to address Mother’ s

contentions.

A. Eactual Backoround
The following facts are taken from the Findings of Fact

(PoFs) and Conclusions of Law (COLs) issued by the family court
on March 8, 2005 and are generally uncontested, except where
noted, The parties married on October 13, 1990 in Latah, Idaho
and had three daughters during the marriage: (1) Sarah Elaine
Fisher, born on June 18, 1992; (2) Lauren Dolores Fisher, born on
Novenber 12, 1995; and (3) Grace Kathryn Fisher, born on June 2,

1999. Father began military service in 1982 and served in the

 
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United states Navy throughout the marriage. As of the date the
Aivorce proceedings were initiated, Father had completed 19.5
years of military service and had risen to the rank of Commander.
Mother had completed two years of college prior to the marriage
and did not work throughout the marriage. During the marriage
and after the children were born, the family resided in four
locations prior to moving to Hawai'i in June 2001. Because of
his duties, Father was avay fron the family for several months at
a tine either on ship or at sea duty.

The family resided in Kailua, Oahu during their
residence in Hawai'i, and the children attended St. Mark school
in Kaneohe. After commencing divorce proceedings in Septenber
2003, Mother applied for and was accepted into the Nursing
Program at Hawai'i Pacific University (HPU) and began attending
classes in June 2004 to complete some prerequisite courses.

In September 2004, Father was transferred to
Washington, D.C., for a position with the Joint Chiefs of staff
at the Pentagon. Father wished to pursue his career in the
military, as he is eligible for promotion to Captain in June
2006. Father bought a hone in Virginia with the help of his
parents, who sold their home in North Carolina in order to live
with Father in Virginia, As of the date of trial (August 2004),

Father's gross salary, including allowances, was $9,765.93 per

 

month, while his expenses were $4,300. During’the marriage, the

parties accumiated substantial assets including life insurance

 
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policies, savinge, and investments. Additionally, upon the
completion of twenty-six years of military service, Father will
receive military bénefite which he expects to consist of
seventy-five percent of his base pay.
B. Proceedings

on September 30, 2003, Mother filed a complaint for
divorce against Father. Mother subsequently filed a Motion for
Pre-Decree Relief, seeking, inter alia, an order: (1) maintaining
the custodial status quo, with continued joint occupancy of the
marital residence; (2) requiring Father to pay monthly family
support; and (3) requiring Father to maintain various household
payments and living expenses. On December 12, 2003, the parties
entered into a Stipulated Order re Pre-Decree Relief
thereinafter, the Stipulation], which provided temporary custody

as follows:

‘The parties shall continue ag joint legal custodians of the
Children. (Mother) shall be primarily responsible for the
Sare of the chileren during each weekday day, and eaca
‘ieeday & Friday evenings, until bed time. {Pather] shall
be pritarily reaponsible for the care for the children
Goring Monday, Nedneeday, & Thureday evenings. The parties
Shaliveach have a weekend day and evening each weekend,
Subject to their agreement, the foregoing 1s subject to
Change and reasonable flexibility, by agreement (.i

 

Pursuant to the Stipulation, the family court entered an order on

 

December 12, 2003, appointing Marianita Lopez, Faq. as a Custody
Evaluator. On March 1, 2004, Lopez filed her Custody Evaluators

in, Lopez made several findings

 

Report to the family court. Th
regarding the children, some of which were later adopted by the

family court in its FOFs. Lopez determined that the three

 
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children were well-adjusted and performing excellently at st.

 

Mark, with very high grades and excellent behavior report!
Lopez also found that Mother had been the primary caretaker of

the children, but that Father had remained very involved with

 

them and that the children were bonded to both parenta. Lopez
reported that both parents were competent, loving parents and
that both were willing to live in or move to the location the
court determined as being in the best interest of the children.
ultimately, Lopez found that (1) the children’s futures could
best be secured by Father’s continuing to earn a living in the
military; (2) Nother would be able to pursue her educational

and (3) living in Virginia would allow

 

career goals in Virgini
the children greater access to extended family.? Based on her
findings, Lopez recomended that (1) the children be permitted to
relocate to Virginia incident to Father’s military reassignment
to Washington, D.C. and (2) the parties be awarded joint legal
and physical custody of the children.

‘Trial Proceedings

 

on August 9 and 10, 2004, trial was held before the
Honorable Gregg Young. At the conclusion of trial, the family

court judge rendered an oral decision on all disputed issues,

 

contested FOF now. 50-52,
‘any credible evidence. However, the ICA

     

+ am her opening
stating that they were
Fejected her content Lon
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including, inter alia,’ custody and relocation. With regard to
custody, the family court: (1) adopted the recommendations set
forth in Lopez's report; (2) permitted Father to relocate to
Virginia with the children; and (3) awarded joint legal and
physical custody to the parties if Mother moved to Virginia as
well, such that (a) Mother was to have the children on the first
and third weekends of each month, from Wednesday after school
until Monday morning (b) each parent was permitted to have a
right of first refusal, under which one parent could watch the
children during pericds when the other parent was unable to watch
the children.

on August 18, 2004, Mother moved for reconsideration
of, inter alia, the family court’s order regarding physical
custody of the children. On September 3, 2004, at the conclusion
of a hearing on the motion, the family court judge orally ruled
that the time-sharing schedule would be revised such that the
parties would have the children for equal periods of time and
that the right of first refusal would be amended. The family
court also requested that Father draft the divorce decree to
include the family court’s oral rulings and modifications of the
Stipulation. On Octcber 1, 2004, Mother objected to several

portions of the proposed divorce decree tendered by Father,

> me family court aleo ruled on the allocation of credit card debt,
which Nother appesied to the ICR. Mother does not appeal the ICA's ruling on
the debt allocation in her Application.

    

 
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pursuant to Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 58 (2004) .*

‘The family court denied all of Mother's objections and approved
Father's proposed divorce decree in its entirety on October 13,
2004. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on Novenber 5,
2004. At Mother's request, the family court issued written Fors
and COLs pursuant to HFCR Rule 52(a) (2004)* on March 8, 2005.
Therein, the family court made the following relevant findings:

531.1 Among witnesses called upon by the parties to
testity at trial, penultinate testimonial evidence presented
by other's sister Dr. Sarah Lawrence, N.D. ("Lawrence") and
Fistor Mark Alan Bowditch (*sowditch") forsed decisive

Hons on the court buttressing Father's custodianehip

 

 

S4(.)_ Lawrence, a practicing physician in Moscow,
rdaho, testified that ehe and Mother were roommates in
college when Nother first set and dated Father:

 

55{.]_ while growing up tog Lawrence
testified that ahe and Nother had a very close relationship
until approximately two years ago when the relationship
becane “strained.”

 

56[.]_ Lawrence observed Mother's level of anger nore
fgg Eecane Scappropriate at seeningiy meaningtess
feritations

 

“WFR mule 58 provides in pertinent part:

Within 10 daye after entry or announcesent of the decision
of the court, the prevailing party, unless otherwise ordered
by the court; shail prepare « judgeent or order in
ccordance with the Geciaion and secure thereon the approval
fae to form of the opposing counsel... . Any party
Sbjeceing to a propeeed Judgnent, OF oxder shally within 5
Gays after receipt, serve upon all parties and deliver to
the court that party's proposed Judgment or order, and in
such event, the court shall proceed to settle the judgzent
or order.

 

 

* HECR Rule 52 (a) provides in pertinent party

 

Ivipon notice of appeal filed with the coure, the [family]
court shall enter its findings of fact and conclusions of
Tew where none have been entered... .. Findings of fact if
entered shall not be set aside unless Clearly erroneous, and
Sue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
Court to judge the credibility of the wits

 

 

 
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57[.] tn the last two years Mother appeared defensive
and hostile to her parents and in-laws.

Se[.] Mother seened to focus her lifestyle primarily
pon personal fitness and triathion training.

 

59[.] Mother's priorities changed; according to
Lawrence, Mother's attitude towards children during the last
vo yeare is best expresced, “let someone lee take care of
then, i've done my part-"

 

60{.} Trial witness Bowditch, was a 6th grade teacher
at st. Natk’s [aie] school whore the parties's [ele] two
eldest daughters, Sarah and Lauren, attended school at the
Eine of trial and was a reserve chaplin in the U.8. Air
Force, having attended four years of divinity school

 

 

6i[.]_ Sarah and Bouditch's daughter were best friende
and had many sleep overs at each other's home.

 

621.] Bowditch had known both parties, equally well
throughout 12 year old Sara and @ year old Lauren's
attendance at St. Mark's. [sic]

 

63[.] As a USAP chaplain, a large part of Bowditch’s
work vas devoted to sarriage counselling {eic) and child
Custody and care.

G6.) While he did not find any fault in his
observations of others child care, Bowditch pointed out an
Snueual child care attribute.

65{.]_ From the first day Sarah started at st. Mark's
aie] to the present, Pather has never failed, when
transporting the giris to school, to park Als car to
personally walk sarah and tauren’ to clase and greet their
Eeachere every day while not on active duty outside Hawal'i.

66{.] At the came time, Father{) not only volunteered,
to chaperan {sic} Sarah and Lauren's field trips, he
chaperened all the other etudente’ field tripe hie active
Guty schedule pernitted.*

 

The family court concluded that, with regard to custody:

AL]. Te 4g in che best interests of the minor
‘children that joint legal and physical custody be awarded to
Nother and Father, with equal time with beth parents, with
te-breaking authority to Father.

 

 

«me family court aleo entered FOF no. 67, which stated that *I£]rom
hia observations and contact with the family over the years, Bowditch
testified the girls’ welfare and care would be better served by having the
Girls and Father relocated to Virginia.” Nother contested the finding and the
{ca concluded that the finding vas erroneous because the family court struck
that testimony during erial and there was thus no substantial evigence to
support that Finding,

 

 
 

* FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

2[.]_ 1 te dn the best interests of the minor

children’ to relocate to Virginia.

 

2. Appellate Proceedings

On appeal to the ICA, Mother argued that the unique
facts of the instant case provide the court with an excellent
opportunity to make inportant policy determinations affecting

3 because thie is the first reported appellate

 

relocation ©
case reviewing an order by the family court allowing a relocation
by the non-primary parent, where the primary parent was found to
be competent and fit and where the children were thriving in

Hawai'i, specifically, Mother alleged that the trial court erred
in: (1) failing to place a priority and preference upon the

continuity of the children’s primary care by Mother, as required

by case law and policy; (2) failing to place a priority and

 

preference upon maintaining the stability of the children’
residential and educational arrangements, ae required by case law
and policy; (3) failing to place a priority and preference upon
the avoidance of parental conflict and by disregarding the clear
risk that the children would be exposed to strongly negative
views by Father and his parente against Mother when the judge
conditioned the avard of joint legal and physical custody upon
Mother's moving to Virginia; (4) placing undue priority and
preference upon economic factors; (5) discriminating in favor of
Father's career goals over Mother's; (6) finding that living in
Virginia would allow the children greater access to extended

family; (7) characterizing Father's residence in Virginia as “the

 

 
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children’s primary residence’; (8) concluding that it was in the
best interests of the children to relocate to Virginia; and (9)
awarding “tie-breaking authority to Father," when the divorce
decree stated that “all decisions which materially affect the
health, education and general welfare of the minor
children . . . shall be made jointly by the parties.”

on August 22, 2005, Father soved to dismiss Mother's
appeal on the baeie that the relocation issue on appeal was moot
because Mother had since moved to Virginia and was exercising her
custodial and vieitation righte. Mother opposed Father’s motion
to dismiss and moved to strike his attached declaration on the
basie that he improperly attempted to introduce facts not
presented to the family court. On February 10, 2006, Mother
filed a motion for an order to expedite consideration of the

ued a receipt of Mother's

 

appeal. On March 10, 2006, the ICA 4
motion to expedite and stated that it would take action as soon

o it wae reasonably possible. The ICA subsequently denied

 

Father’s motion to dismiss the appeal and granted Mother's motion

yarate orders entered on

 

to etrike Father’s declaration in
April 10, 2006.
As previously mentioned, the ICA issued its summary
disposition order on April 19, 2006, wherein it stated that:
After a painstaking review of the record and the
briefs submitted by the parties, and giving careful
consideration to the argunents advanced and the issue!

Fsisea by the parties, we resolve Mother's posnte of
fon appeal as follows:

 

    

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2, Im Einding that relocation to Virginia waa in the
best interests of the minor children, the family court dia
not clearly err, Macda v, Mada, 6 Haw. App. 139, 143, 794
P.2a 268, 270 (1990), Because there was substantial evidence
to support that finding. In re Dos, 95 Hawai'i 183, 190, 20
Prad 616, 623 (2003); Tetreaile v. fetreaule, 29 wawai'd

‘55 P.34 645, 849-51 (app. 2002)- CE. Maeda, 8

 

 

    

4, The family court erred in appending to ite
conclusion of law Ar1 the ultimate clat seteh
Ele breaking authority to Father" -- because the family
court thue derogated the avard of joint legal custody.
contained in the divorce decree, snd apparently did so
Without motion, notice or opportunity to be heard.

 

5. The family court erred in paragraph 4 of the
divorce decree by referring to Father's residence in
Virginia as the children’s “primary” residence, because the
decree awarded the parties joint physical custody.

‘Therefore,

TT 18 HEREBY ORDERED chat . . . che ultimate clause of
conclusion of law A.1, contained ia the family coure’s March
1, 2008 Findings of fact and conclusions of law, (18)
vacated. The word "primary" is stricken from paragraph 4 of
the family court's October 13, 2004 divorce decree, but the
Givorce decree ie otherwise affirmed.

 

As previously mentioned, Mother filed her timely
application for writ of certiorari, which we granted on May 30,
2006. In her application, Mother apparently believes that the
ICA's upholding of the family court's divorce decree permitting
relocation by Father with the children is contrary to early
Hawai'i case law and that a recent ICA decision has left parents
contesting relocation issues with no guidance or standards to
follow. Because of the gravity of Mother's allegations, we

granted certiorari to address Mother’s contentions.

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11, say REVI

amily Court Decisions

Generally, the family court possesses wide discretion
‘and those decision will not be set
manifest abuse of discretion. Thus,
weil not Gisturb the family court's decisions on appeal
Uniess the family court disregarded rules or principles of
Yaw or practice to the substantial detrinent of a party
iitigane and ite decision clesrly exceeded the beunds of

 

 

   

 

 

Inte Doe, 95 Hawai'i 183, 189-90, 20 P.3d 616, 622-23 (2001)

(internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipsis

points omitted) .
B. Famil +9 Findin« ene of Lav

 

‘The family court's Fore are reviewed on appeal under
the ‘clearly efoneous" standard. A FOF ie clearly
Erroneous when (2) the record lacks substantial evidence to
Support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in
Support of the finding, the appellate court is nonethele
jefe with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been sade. “Substantial evidence is credible evidence
Whlen ie of cufticient quality and probative value to enable
Spereon of reasonable cation to support a conclusion

‘on the other hand, the family court's COLs are
reviewed on appes! de_navo, under the right/wrong standard.
Gite, consequently, ave thot binding upon an appellate court
Gnd are freely reviewable for their correctness.

 

 

foteover, the fanily court is given quch leeway in ite
‘examination of the reporte concerning a child's care,
SSetody, and welfare, and ite conclusions in this regard, if
Supperced by the record and not clearly erroneous, mist

stand on appeal.

Id. at 190, 20 P.3d at 623 (citations, some internal quotation

marks, brackets, and ellipsis points omitted).

Cc. Credibility of Witnesses

“rt is well-settled that an appellate court will not
pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and

the weight of evidence; this is the province of the trier of

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fact." Id, (ellipsis points, brackets, internal quotation

marks, and citations omitted).
TIT. DISCUSSION

Nother contends that the criteria and standards for
relocation cases in Hawai'i, including “best interests [of the
child)" and “totality of circumstances" are “too amorphous to
provide meaningful guidance and predictability to prospective
custody/relocation litigants and counsel.” specifically, Mother
contends that the leading case on the subject “merely sets forth
a review of the varying approaches to adjudicating relocation
cases, wi a which a

be_used in Hawai'i.’ Mother urges this court to “join the
enormous body of cases from around the country which expressly

state a preference and priority upon the continuity of care by
the primary caretaker and stability in residential and
educational arrangements as the paramount considerations in

law

 

relocation cases” and states that “[elarly Hawai'i cé

is for a definitive ruling.” Mother apparently

 

provides the
believes that the family court's order permitting relocation by a

ye Law.

 

non-primary parent is inconsistent with Hawai'i ci
HRS § 571-46 (Supp. 2004), entitled “Criteria and
in

 

procedure in awarding custody and visitation,” provid

pertinent part:

In the actions for divorce, . . . oF any other proceeding
where there is at deque a diepute as to the custody of 2
Manor child, the coure, during the pendency of the action,
Bt the final hearing, or any time during the minority of the
Child, may make an order for the custody of the minor child

 

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fas may seem necessary of proper. In awarding the custody,
the'tourt shall be guided by the following standards,
Considerations, and procedures:

(1) Gustody should be auaxded to either parent orto
[Sth coarente scesrding to the best Interests of
she_chilas

(4) Maenever good cause appears therefor, the court
may require an investigation and report
Converting the care, welfare, and custody of any
Binor child of the parties. when so directed by
The court, Investigators or professional
Personnel attached to or assisting the court
Thal make Investigations and reports which
Shall be made available to all interested
Parties and counsel before hearing, and the
Fepores say be received in evidence if no
Chhection ie sade and, if objection ie made, may
be received in evidence; provided the persoh oF
persons responsible for the report are available

ination ag to any matter that hae

 

 

 

   

(5) Te court may hear the testimony of any person
or expert, produced by any party or upon the
Court's oim motion, vhose skill, insight,
Saowladge, oF experience ie such that the
Person's or expert's cestinony is relevant to a
Suet and reasonable determination of what is for
the best physical, wental, moral, and spiritual
well-being Of the child whose custody 1s at.
issuet-]

(Smphasis added.) Under HRS § 571-46, the sole issue in a

 

 

 

 

custody determination is the child’s best interests, which is an
issue of ultimate fact. Maeda v, Maeda, 8 Haw. App. 139, 143,
794 P.2d 268, 270 (1990) (citing In_xe Jane Doe, 7 Haw. App. 547,
558, 784 P.2d 873, 875 (1989) (stating that ‘in the child’s best
interest . . . is an ultimate finding of fact which must be
adequately supported by preliminary findings of fact”)).

In Tetreault v, Tetreault, 99 Hawai'i 352, 55 P.3d e845
(app.), cert, denied, 99 Hawai'i 352, 55 P.3d 845 (2002), a

mother sought to relocate with her children to another state over

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the father’s objection that (1) he was equally fit to have
custody and (2) there was “no showing that the children’s
well-being would be better served by such a move." Id. at 356,
55 P.3d at 850. The ICA rejected the father’s contentions, and,
in an extensive footnote supporting its decision, the ICA
reviewed two Hawai'i cages on point, including Gillespie v.
Gillespie, 40 Haw. 315 (1953), and Maeda, and provided examples
of case law from other jurisdictions.

In Gillespie, decided by the Suprene Court of the
Territory of Hawai'i, the father of two minor female children
appealed from an order amending a divorce decree which, inter

alia, permitted the mother of the two children to take them “from

 

Hawai"i to the mainland of the United States." 40 Haw. at 317.
‘The mother of the children had remarried and her new husband, who
was a menber of the United states’ military, had received word
that he would be transferred to the continental United States.
‘The trial court found that, although both parents were fit
custodians, it was in the children’s best interests to be with
their mother and permitted the mother to relocate with the
children. id, Before the trial court issued a final order, the
mother relocated with the children, and the trial court entered
an amended decree permitting the mother to take the children and
awarding her sole custody.” Id, at 318. According to the

territorial supreme court, the mother provided no reason why it

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should amend the decree to permit relocation, other than her

husband's transfer. Id, The appellate court stated that:

‘al rule of custody that the
‘parancunt consideration, this
court consistently hae given preference over the father in
favor of the sother here her custody appears sore
beneficial to the child. That does not mean, however, that
Custody will not be avarded to the father where his custody
Sppears core beneficial than the sother’s.” On the contrary,
iEineane chat

 

Pursuant to che ger
welfare of the children

 

 

    

 

dered and te far superior to the claina of
r = fre
row res To insure
that welfare, 3 divorced parent on entry of
ai bs tonsved from ite protective jurisdiction

Better eubserved thereby gat therewitn, coures in
farding custody ordinarily will prefer a resident parent
Over the other parent who 1a either « nonresident oF a
Yesident contemplating immediate removal fron the
juriediction where both parents are equally fit to have

Qustedy. Nevertheless, the welfare of the children’
sonkinuee to be paranoint over the claims of either parent.
fe he or she the resident or nonresident. for a child to be

En the costody of a resident, however, ie a benefit in
LE to the child as a ward of the coure within ite
protective jurisdiction.

Id, at 320-21 (emphases added) (citations omitted). The court

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

then reversed the order, allowing relocation on the basis that
the “record [was] barren of a sufficient basis on which to
ascertain whether the change [the mother] contemplates will be
beneficial or detrimental to the children.” Id. at 323.

In a subsequent case, Estrella v. Estrella, 43 Haw. 210
(2959), the territorial supreme court clarified its holding in
Gillespie, stating that euch holding was consistent with its
holdings in earlier cases that followed no other general rule
than “the rule to the effect that thé welfare of the children is
of paramount consideration and that each case must be decided

upon ite own facts." Id, at 213. The court further stated that,

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winiie the court did refuse in the Gillespie case to permit
tke"nother of minor children... to take them to the
fainland after her renarriage, and the opinion dié contain
Done rather unnecessarily emphatic statenents against
Permitting the removal of the children from the court's
Jurlediction, i aid not in any way attenpe to overrule the
well recognized rule [ehat) "{i]m determining divorced
Parente’ claim to child's custody, child’ welfare
Parancunt.* [glilespie, 49 Haw, at 325.) In the Gillespie
fase there was no_allegation and no_proof that the best
{Mtereste of the children would be served by their removal
from the Territory.

 

 

 

 

Id, at 213-14 (emphases in original).
Nore recently, in Maeda, the ICA addressed the issue of
relocation for a nother who sought to move with her boyfriend and
son from Hilo, Hawai'i to California or Florida because of better
employment opportunities and a nore feasible economic standard, of
Living, @ Haw, App. at 140-41, 794 P.2d at 269, The family
court order awarded sole legal and physical custody to the
mother, but provided that, if the mother decided to move to the
mainland, the father would be awarded sole custody. Id, at 142,
794 P.2d 269-70. The ICA upheld the order, holding, sua sponte,

that

eg § 571-46 gives the family court the power, where
Marranted by the facts, to award sole legal and physical
Custody of child to hls mother subject to the condition
Subsequent that the award of his custody to his mother will
be automatically terminated and awarded to his father one
week prior to the time when hia mother effectuates her plans
{Stnove with the child toa new residence out of the family,
court's Jurisdiction.

Id. at 143, 794 P.2d at 270, The ICA explained that:

 

es a
2 Seis in son inte =
‘sourt'a decision is not based on Mathers olaniad save fron
Hava to someuhere in California or Florida. It ie based
Mother's nove ETH Nother 18

Free to nove, if she nove, however, ner existing legal
Hight to son's physical custody 18 automatically terminated
and avarded to Father until she proves in court, asa aatter

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of fact, that it will be in son's best interests to save

Tn the usual case, if it Se ina child's best.
interests to be in the mother’s sole legal and physical
Gustody, that will be true no matter where the mother
Shocses to live with her child. gee Estrella v. gatrella,
$3 Baw. 310 (1959). In thie case, however, the evidence
forced the fanily court to choose between a situation and
Elreuietances in Hawai'i chat ave known to be beneficial to
Son, even if Nother is "and an unknown #ituation
and elreumstanct or Florida.

‘As noted sbove, ty court's
fact, that it would be in Son'a beat inte:
ith’ rather in'Bilo if Nother leaves Havai'd, ie not clearly

 

 

  
    

Id, at 144, 794 P.2d at 270 (emphases added) .

in Tetreault, the ICA further noted that:

Across the country, the lay applicable to interstate
relocation of a child by a parent ie diveras. For example,
in Michigan,

wa judgment or order avarding custody of a minor mist
provide that (2) the donicile or residence of @ minor
Ray not be noved from Michigan without the approval of
the judge. "Michigan further requires that &
moving party prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that removal ie/warranted. A trial court
muse analyse four factors(.1

As noted in [a later Cave], those four factors are:
(2) whether the prospective move has the capacity to
Improve the quality of life for both the custodial
parent and the child; (2) whether the nove is inspired
By the custodial parent's desire to defeat or
Flustrate visitation by the noscustodial parent and
whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with
The substitute vieitation orders where he or abe le no
[Seger subject to the jurieaiction of the courts of
thie state; (3) the extent to which the noncustodial
parent, in resisting the nove, is motivate by che
Seeire to secure a financial advantage in respect of a
Continuing support obligation; and (a) the degree to
which the court is satiefied that there will be a
Tealistic opportunity for visitation in lieu of the
seeckly pattern which can provide an adequate basis for
preserving and fostering the parental relationship
With the noneustodial parent if resoval is allowed,
In Wiesouri, a statute andates that
‘lal person entitled to the custody of a child shall
not change the residence of the child to another state
or renove the child from this state for a period of
time exceeding ninety days except upon order of the
court or with the written consent of the parties with

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Custody or viaitation rights... -* Ia determining
Shether to grant the custodial parent’s motion, the.
farancunt concern is the Dest intereste of the child
Th ew York, s

re ‘enphaaie ol what cube

i interes cals.

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*** FOR PUBLICATION

 

 

Jota, where the custodial pa:
permanently move the children £0 another state over the
Ron-custodial parent's objection, an evidentiary hearing ie
fot required absent a priaa facie case of endangerment Or
that the nove was intended to deprive the non-custodial
parent of visitation,

‘in california the custodial parent has a
presumptive right to relocate with the minor child, subject
bo the pover of the court to restrain a change that would
prejudice the rights or welfare of the child

 

 

 

 

Tetreault, 99 Hawai'i at 357.8, 55 P.3d at 850 n.8 (citations
and brackets in original omitted). The ICA also noted that some
courts recognize that restrictions on the domicile of an
individual potentially violate parents’ rights to certain
individual freedoms, including travel. Id, at 356 n.8, 55 P.34
at 51 n.8, In addition, contrary to Mother’s contention that
Tetreault merely provided a review of various criteria without

providing guidance, the ICA expressly adhered to the best

 

interest standard applied in Maeda. Specifically, the ICA
rejected the father’s contention that there vas no evidence to
support the family court’s finding that relocation was in the
best intereste of the children, and referred to the family
court's findings that: (1) the mother was the primary caregiver;
(2) st was in the children’s best interests to award full custody
to the mother; (3) the city the mother wished to move to had
excellent schools, good job opportunities, and was a “low-crine,
family-friendly, unpolluted envizonment.” Id. at 358, 55 P.3d at
851. On that basis, the ICA affirmed the award of custody to the
mother.

In sun, Hawai'i courts have consistently adhered to the

best interests of the child standard as paramount when

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considering the issue of custody. In 80 doing, the family court
is granted broad discretion to weigh the various factors
involved, with no single factor being given presumptive paramount
weight, in determining whether the standard has been met.

in the instant case, neither parent presently contest
the other parent’s fitness,’ and, although Mother is considered
the “primary caretaker,” Father has also been substantially
involved in the children’s lives and is willing and ready to
accept full custody of the children. In addition, as Mother

stated in her Opening Brief,

Ibloth the hone the children have known for years and the
propesed relocation would provide good opportunities for the
Etilgren, “the two locations are in nice family-friendly
Reighborhoode, have excellent schools, and provide nurcuring
Places to raise the children.

‘the Gne najer Gifference ie that mother, the primary
caretaker wisher to Fenain in Hawai'i, in the home that the
chilaten nave called home for many years.

 

 

Thus, the only question before this court is whether there is
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination
that relocation was in the best interests of the children and
that such ruling does not conflict with prior case law.

Here, unlike Gillespie or Maeda, the record is not
barren of facts regarding the relocation and the opportunities it
holds for the children. on the contrary, the record indicates,
as Mother expressly adnita, that the new location is comparable

in living conditions for the children, and, moreover, Mother

 

 

Previously, Father raised {esues regarding Mother's mental fitn
mever, by the tine of trial, Pather stated that he no longer believed she
"o mentally ill.

  

 

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stated that she was willing to move with the children, if
relocation was permitted. Also, the family court stated that the
testimonial evidence presented by Mother’s sister, Sarah
Lawrence, and Pastor Mark Alan Bowditch “formed decisive
impressions on the [clourt buttressing Father’s custodianship of
the children.” Dr. Lawrence and Pastor Bowditch testified, inter
alia, as to Father’s excellent relationship with hie children and
Anvolvenent in their everyday lives. Even though the custody
evaluator, Lopez, expressed some concern at trial that the
conflict between the parents had not dissipated as she had hoped
since her recommendation for relocation, Lopez nevertheless
continued to express her belief that (1) Father was an excellent
parent, (2) he would encourage contact with the children’s
extended family, (3) Father and Mother had always planned to
leave Hawai'i eventually, but that, if the family relocated
again, Mother should then be granted custody. Inasmuch as the
family court accorded weight to certain witnesses over others and
those witnesses provided evidence that the relocation would
benefit the children, the ICA did not err in upholding the family
court’s findings and conclusions regarding the best interests of

the children, See In re Doe, 95 Hawai'i at 197, 20 P.3d at 630

 

(recognizing that “it ig not the province of the appellate court
to reassess the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence, as determined by the family court"); HFCR Rule 52(a),

supra. Moreover, the ICA’s holding is consistent with its

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decision in Naeda and ite subsequent decision in Tetreault. In
the two cases in which a relocating parent was denied custody of
a minor child, i,e., Gillespie and Maeda, the relocating parent
id not provide the court with evidence that the relocation
destination was well-suited for their children and, in fact,
neither mother knew where they would be moving at the time
custody was determined. In contrast, the ICA, in Zetreault,
affizmed the family court's award of custody to the relocating
parent based upon the uncontested findings and conclusions that
mother’s proposed relocation would be to a place with excellent
schools, good employment opportunities, and a suitable
environment. The instant case involves similar facts.
Consequently, although Mother contends that Hawaii's standards
are “too amorphous" to apply and that her status as the primary
caretaker of the children should be given preference, the record
indicates that the family court had substantial evidence upon
which it based its determination that relocation was in the best
interests of the children. Because the family court's

determination is entitled to deference, Inxe Doe, 95 Hawai'i at

 

190, 20 P.34 at 623, we see no reason to disturb the October 13,

 

2004 decree. Nor do we see any reason to expressly establish, as

 

Mother urges, “a preference and priority upon the continuity of

 

care by the primary caretaker and stability in residential and

educational arrangements as the paramount considerations in

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relocation cases." Accordingly, we hold that the ICA did not err
in upholding the family court's custody award.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ICA’s April 19,
2006 sunmary disposition order.

Paul A, Tomar and Gyn

Jill M. Hasegawa (of

Ashford & Wriston), BleaVflcmeen—

for petitioner-plaintiff-

feeeBiahes cn che erie now
fk. steven Geahell, for eee
Nopettene Seeeadane:
Seer onthe response

Unc dee:

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