Title: Berry v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jackie L. BERRY, Administrator of the Estate
of Toni Berry, Deceased v. ST. PAUL FIRE and
MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY

96-197                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 19, 1997


1.   Jury -- juror misconduct -- when verdict is void or voidable based on
     juror's lack of qualifications. -- No verdict shall be void or
     voidable because any juror shall fail to possess the necessary
     qualifications unless the juror knowingly answers falsely or
     knowingly fails to respond to any question on voir dire
     relating to the qualifications propounded by the court or
     counsel in any cause.

2.   Jury -- juror misconduct -- moving party bears burden of proving prejudice.
     -- The moving party bears the burden of proving that a
     reasonable possibility of prejudice resulted from the alleged
     juror misconduct; prejudice is not presumed, and the appellate
     court will not reverse the trial court's denial of a request
     for new trial on such grounds absent a manifest abuse of the
     trial court's discretion.

3.   New trial -- juror misconduct -- proof required. -- To warrant the
     granting of a new trial on the grounds of juror misconduct, a
     party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to honestly
     answer a question or deliberately concealed a matter during
     voir dire, and must then further show that a correct response
     would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause;
     additionally, the complaining party has the burden of
     establishing that diligence was used to ascertain the desired
     information and that he or she made known to the juror the
     specific information desired; the appellate court will affirm
     where there is substantial evidence to support a trial court's
     finding as to whether a party has met its burden.

4.   New trial -- appellant failed to meet burden regarding alleged juror
     misconduct -- trial court did not abuse discretion in denying new-trial
     motion. -- Where appellant did not use due diligence in seeking
     out information concerning a juror's employer's relationship
     to the hospital at the center of appellant's medical-
     negligence action or the juror's position with his employer;
     where appellant did not make clear to the potential jurors
     what particular information he was seeking; and where
     appellant did not show that a correct response from the juror
     would have necessarily warranted his removal for cause, the
     trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
     appellant's motion for new trial.

5.   Evidence -- relevancy -- trial court did not err in ruling that documents
     were not relevant to issue of nursing staff's negligence -- no abuse of
     discretion demonstrated. -- The supreme court found no error in the
     trial court's ruling that health department letters listing
     deficiencies in the hospital's operation were not relevant to
     the issue whether the hospital's nursing staff was negligent
     in the care of the decedent, especially where the trial court
     indicated a willingness to allow such evidence should
     appellant be able to demonstrate relevance as the testimony
     was developed, and appellant never attempted to gain the
     admission of the letters at any later point in the trial but
     instead merely made a proffer of the documents before any
     testimony had been taken; the appellate court will not reverse
     a trial court's ruling on the relevancy of evidence absent an
     abuse of discretion, and appellant failed to demonstrate such
     an abuse of discretion.  

6.   Trial -- judicial misconduct -- remarks of trial court not prejudicial
     error unless they constitute unmerited rebuke giving impression of
     ridicule. -- Remarks of a trial court do not amount to
     prejudicial error unless they constitute an unmerited rebuke
     giving the jury the impression that defense counsel is being
     ridiculed; there is no prejudice where the record reveals that
     the trial judge was merely irritated by defense counsel's
     trial tactics.

7.   Trial -- judicial misconduct -- remarks of trial court not unmerited rebuke
     -- trial court's conduct was not improper. -- From its reading of an
     exchange between the trial court and appellant's counsel in
     which the trial court denied counsel's request to approach the
     bench, stating that a question addressed to a witness might be
     phrased "in a hypothetical," the supreme court determined that
     it was not evident that the trial court's remarks amounted to
     an unmerited rebuke of appellant's counsel or that the court
     was even irritated with counsel; it is the trial court's duty
     to maintain order and proper decorum in the courtroom, which
     includes the ability to control the flow of the examination of
     witnesses and the presentation of evidence; the supreme court
     concluded that the trial court's conduct was not at all
     improper and did not rise to the level of the serious
     allegation of judicial misconduct.   

8.   Appeal & error -- contemporaneous objection necessary to preserve issue for
     appellate review. -- Appellant should have objected at the first
     opportunity when gifts from the jury to the trial judge were
     brought to the attention of the parties; a contemporaneous
     objection is necessary in order to preserve an issue for
     appellate review; appellant's failure to make a
     contemporaneous objection below precluded review of the issue
     concerning the jury's gifts to the trial judge.

9.   Trial -- opening statement -- appellant failed to show how remarks by
     appellee's counsel prejudiced him -- appellant was prevailing party on
     issue. -- Where appellant objected to remarks by appellee's
     counsel regarding nurses' use of their "professional medical
     judgment"; where the trial court sustained the objection,
     instructed counsel to refrain from using the term, and stated
     that it would instruct the jury on the relevant law at the
     appropriate time; and where the trial court offered to give
     the jury a cautionary instruction on the issue, but appellant
     declined the offer, the supreme court was not persuaded that
     counsel's remarks amounted to an improper instruction as to
     the relevant standard of care; appellant failed to demonstrate
     how counsel's remarks prejudiced him, other than the bare
     allegation that the remarks constituted reversible error;
     furthermore, appellant was entitled to no relief on appeal
     because he was the prevailing party on the issue in the trial
     court and because he received all the relief he requested;
     having refused the trial court's offer of a cautionary
     instruction to the jury, appellant should not be heard to
     complain on appeal.  

10.  Evidence -- chart listing possible causes of death used for demonstrative
     purposes only -- trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion
     for new trial. -- Where the trial court instructed appellee's
     counsel to clarify to the jury that the causes of death that
     were listed on a chart he had used during opening argument
     were only possible causes of death, and where the chart itself
     was not admitted into evidence for the jury to consider but
     was used instead for demonstrative purposes only, the supreme
     court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial on
     the issue.  

11.  Evidence -- admissibility of demonstrative evidence is within discretion
     of trial court. -- The admissibility and use of demonstrative
     evidence is a matter falling within the wide discretion of the
     trial court.   

12.  Appeal & error -- unsupported assignments of error not considered on
     appeal. -- Appellant offered no convincing authority or argument
     in support of his contention that the trial court abused its
     discretion in allowing appellee to use a time line; the
     appellate court does not consider assignments of error that
     are unsupported by convincing legal authority or argument.

13.  Jury -- preservation of objection to empaneled juror. -- To preserve
     for appeal an objection to an empaneled juror, a party is
     required to have exhausted his or her peremptory challenges
     and must show that he or she was forced to accept a juror who
     should have been excused for cause.

14.  Jury -- persons comprising venire presumed unbiased and qualified -- burden
     on challenging party. -- Persons comprising the venire are
     presumed to be unbiased and qualified to serve, and the burden
     is on the party challenging a juror to prove actual bias.

15.  Jury -- qualifications -- discretion of trial court. -- When a juror
     states that he or she can lay aside preconceived opinions and
     give the accused the benefit of all doubts to which he is
     entitled by law, a trial court may find the juror acceptable;
     the issue of a juror's qualifications lies within the sound
     discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will
     not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of discretion.

16.  Jury -- appellant failed to show that two jurors were biased or
     unqualified -- trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse
     for cause. -- Where appellant did not make a motion to have two
     prospective jurors excused for cause, and where the only
     objection to either was made after the jury had already been
     qualified and seated and only on the basis that appellant
     would have used his peremptory challenges to remove them from
     the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     refusing to entertain the late motion or in refusing to excuse
     the jurors for cause, as appellant failed to demonstrate that
     they were biased or otherwise unqualified to sit on the jury.

17.  Appeal & error -- cross-appeal -- disqualification of law firm -- issue
     rendered moot. -- The supreme court did not reach the issue
     whether the law firm representing appellant should have been
     disqualified because the decision to affirm on direct appeal
     rendered that issue moot.


     Appeal from Saline Circuit Court; Phillip H. Shirron, Judge;
affirmed on direct appeal; cross-appeal moot.
     Boswell, Tucker, Brewster & Hicks, by: Ted Boswell and John T.
Holleman, for appellant.
     Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by:  Laura Hensley Smith, Gregory D.
Taylor, and Will Bond, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Jackie L. Berry, Administrator of the Estate of Toni
Berry, appeals the judgment of the Saline County Circuit Court
implementing the jury's verdict in favor of Appellee St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company in Appellant's medical negligence
suit.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15)
(as amended by per curiam July 15, 1996).  Appellant raises seven
points for reversal, while Appellee raises one point on cross-
appeal.  We find no error and affirm.
     Appellant, as the plaintiff in the medical-negligence action
below, filed suit against Appellee, insurer for Saline Memorial
Hospital, alleging that the hospital's nursing staff was negligent
in its care of the decedent, Toni Berry, ultimately resulting in
her death.  The decedent was brought to the emergency room at
Saline Memorial Hospital on July 25, 1992, complaining of abdominal
pain.  The decedent was diagnosed with acute vascular embarrassment
and was immediately taken to surgery.  During surgery, it was
discovered that one of the decedent's intestines had slipped
through a tear in her abdominal cavity.  The surgeon removed the
intestine from the tear and untwisted the knotted intestine.  The
decedent was then sent to the surgical recovery room in good
condition.  Unfortunately, on July 26, 1992, a few hours after
surgery, the decedent died.  
     Appellant alleged in his complaint that the hospital was
negligent in failing to adequately staff its facility and properly
train and supervise its nursing staff.  Appellant also alleged that
the hospital's nursing staff was negligent in failing to follow the
hospital's written policies in caring for someone in the decedent's
condition, in failing to properly chart the decedent's vital signs,
and in failing to properly care for, supervise, and monitor the
decedent.  Trial in this matter commenced on May 8, 1995, and ended
on May 19, 1995, with the jury finding in favor of Appellee. 
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, citing the
same points for reversal that he cites on appeal, but the trial
court denied the motion.     
                        Juror Misconduct
     For his first point for reversal, Appellant argues that the
trial court should have granted his motion for new trial on the
ground that Gary Nichols, foreperson of the jury, was employed by
Stephens, Inc., at the time of the trial, and that Stephens, Inc.,
was involved in a $21 million bond issue for Appellee's insured,
Saline Memorial Hospital.  In an affidavit filed below, Appellant's
counsel, Mr. Boswell, stated that sometime after the trial had
concluded on May 19, 1995, he read a newspaper article dated
Wednesday, May 10, 1995, describing the involvement of Stephens,
Inc., in a bond-refinancing project for the hospital.  Appellant's
counsel explained that he had allowed his newspapers to accumulate
and he was thus unaware of the bond project until after the trial
had ended.  The allegation of misconduct stems from Nichols's
failure to answer affirmatively to the following inquiry made by
Appellant's counsel during voir dire:   
          Do any of you, as you come here today, have any
     employment or contractual relationship with Saline
     Memorial Hospital?  Now that would include -- or have you
     ever?  Let me add that.  That would include if you're a
     vendor, if you have a contract relationship with them, if
     you've ever worked with them, or if you had any
     connection with them that is a business connection or a
     working relationship.  And I would ask that that question
     be expanded to include, to your knowledge, any member of
     your immediate family.

     Appellant contends that the failure of Nichols to admit to
this business connection during voir dire is tantamount to juror
misconduct.  Appellant contends further that this misconduct is
more readily apparent considering the trial judge's remark, in
jest, to Nichols that the judge was in trouble with his neighbor,
who also worked for Stephens, Inc., for keeping Nichols out of work
for so long.        
     During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Appellant
attempted to question Nichols regarding his employment with
Stephens, Inc., and his knowledge, if any, of the business
relationship between his employer and the hospital.  The trial
court refused to allow that type of inquiry pursuant to A.R.E. Rule
606.  Upon reading the transcript containing the foregoing
questions posed by Appellant's counsel, the trial court ruled:
     The question that I read would not trigger in, I think a
     lay person's mind, any response other than does he or she
     have a relationship.  Any business relationship was clear
     from the jurors' questionnaire.  It could have been
     delved into in any sort of detail that any counsel
     thought necessary.  But I do not believe the juror
     responded untruthfully, or in any devious manner by not
     responding to that question.  I do not believe that it
     was triggered in his or other's [sic] minds a positive
     response based on his mere employment by Stephens, Inc.

     No verdict shall be void or voidable because any juror shall
fail to possess the necessary qualifications unless the juror
knowingly answers falsely or knowingly fails to respond to any
question on voir dire relating to the qualifications propounded by
the court or counsel in any cause.  Pineview Farms, Inc. v. Smith
Harvestore, Inc., 298 Ark. 78,