Title: Rice v. Forby

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

228 N.W.2d 581 (1975) Clara RICE, et al., Appellants, v. Daniel P. FORBY, et al., Respondents, William Levy, Respondent. No. 45283. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 25, 1975. *582 Gerald C. Magee and Theodore K. Abe, Minneapolis, for appellants. Coulter, Nelson & Sullivan, Mark Sullivan, John Cope, and Dorian Zaske, Minneapolis, for respondents. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and ROGOSHESKE and YETKA, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. YETKA, Justice. Plaintiffs appeal from an order issued in Hennepin County District Court denying their motion to vacate an order granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants Daniel P. Forby and Daniel Tutelman, doing business as Tufor Properties. We affirm the summary judgment. The stipulated facts upon which the summary judgment was entered are as follows: The issue presented for our consideration is whether or not, under the stipulated facts, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant lessor on grounds that the public use exception to the general rules governing the liability of lessors to those injured upon the leased premises did not apply in the instant case. In this jurisdiction, "the general rule is that the lessor is not liable in tort to the lessee, or to his invitees, for any dangerous conditions or defects in the premises * * *."[1] However, there are several exceptions to the above rule. For example, the lessor has the duty to warn the lessee of any concealed defects, the existence of which the lessor knew or should have known.[2] In the instant appeal, plaintiffs assert that another exception to the aforesaid general rule is applicable. That exception was perhaps best defined by this court in the case of Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 212 Minn. 551, 555, 4 N.W.2d 617, 619 (1942), where it was stated: In Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 420, 35 N.W.2d 719, 727 (1949), this court provided the following definition of the public purpose exception The italicized portion of the above excerpt from the Breimhorst opinion is particularly relevant in this case. Although the stipulated facts do not show the precise cause of plaintiff's fall, the record indicates that her fall was not occasioned by any preexisting defective condition of the leased premises. Rather, the accident was caused when she lost her balance because of certain obstructions placed in the entryway by the tenant.[4] Such being the case, the lessor cannot be held liable for plaintiff's injuries under the public use exception. Additionally, we find that the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant lessor is sustainable under Rule 56.05, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part as follows: If plaintiffs assert that the injury was caused by a preexisting dangerous condition on the premises, then they must support that proposition as required by Rule 56.05. Since the record is void of any such showing, we find that plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden in the face of defendant lessor's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that if the injury was caused by the tenant's negligence in repairing the floor, then a fact question is presented as to whether the lessor may be held liable for that negligence under an agency theory. In support of that theory plaintiffs cite Myhre v. Schleuder, 98 Minn. 234, 108 N.W. 276 (1906). We disagree. Plaintiffs have stipulated that the tenant was not acting as the agent of the lessor in the making of the repairs to the entryway of the leased premises. In summation, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Tufor Properties. Affirmed. CHANAK, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 417, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949). [2] Id. [3] See, also, Torwick v. Lisle, 268 Minn. 197, 128 N.W.2d 330 (1964). [4] In their "statement of the case" (filed with the trial court), plaintiffs described the accident giving rise to the instant litigation as follows: "Clara Rice walked with a cane at the time and came in the front door of the laundromat where she proceeded to wash her clothes. She was bringing some clothes from the drier out to the car. The defendant William Levy was doing some repair work on the premises. He was doing renovating work and had boards standing around by the door and loose tile in the general area of the door. "As the plaintiff tried to negotiate herself around the boards that were nailed up temporarily to protect the work that was being done, the bags of her clothes that she was carrying struck the boards and she lost her balance and fell." During oral argument on appeal plaintiffs did not alter this contention.