Title: Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94748-Agenda 23-September 2003.
CHRISTY ADAMS, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Janice Adams,
Deceased, Appellee, v. NORTHERN ILLINOIS GAS COMPANY, 							Appellant.
Opinion filed April 1, 2004.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Christy Adams, as special administrator of the estate of
Janice Adams, brought a wrongful-death action in the circuit court of
Cook County against Northern Illinois Gas Company (NI-Gas). The
circuit court granted NI-Gas' motion for summary judgment. The
appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of NI-Gas and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 333 Ill. App. 3d
215. We allowed NI-Gas' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	The record contains the following pertinent evidence. Since 1971,
Janice Adams (decedent) resided in a house located at 1294 Greenbay
Avenue in Calumet City. Decedent's mother, Lucia Georgevich, bought
the house, but decedent paid the mortgage and the utilities. Various
appliances in the house, including a range, were fueled by natural gas.
	On the evening of December 7, 1995, decedent arrived home,
opened a door, and stepped inside. The house exploded and was engulfed
in flames, causing her death.
	First at the scene was the Calumet City fire department. Assistant
chief Dan Smits and fire investigator Joe Ratkovich investigated the cause
and origin of the explosion. Smits saw the fire and saw that the walls of the
house had been blown out. He observed the body of decedent just inside
what had been an entrance to the house. Smits inspected the gas meter,
gas piping, and gas appliances and directed that all those items be
removed and preserved.
	The Calumet City fire department determined that the cause of the
explosion and fire was the failure of the flexible brass gas connector that
connected the kitchen range to the gas supply. The brand name of the
connector was "Cobra." Failure of the connector permitted a large amount
of natural gas to escape and accumulate in the house. When decedent
entered the house and turned on an electric light, a small spark from the
switch ignited the gas. The Illinois State Fire Marshall, the United States
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the private fire investigator
employed by the homeowner's insurance carrier also investigated the
explosion and all agreed that it was caused by the failure of the gas
connector to the range.
	Plaintiff, one of decedent's daughters, brought a wrongful-death
action in a two-count, first amended complaint. Count II named NI-Gas
as a defendant.(1) Plaintiff alleged that NI-Gas "knew that Cobra brand
natural gas appliance connectors were defective and prone to failure
resulting in natural gas leaks and explosions." Plaintiff alleged that NI-Gas
"had a duty to warn its customers, including plaintiff's decedent, about the
existence of Cobra brand natural gas appliance connectors and the
dangers of natural gas leak, explosion and fire associated with these
connectors." Plaintiff alleged that NI-Gas breached this duty to warn in
that NI-Gas: failed to provide (a) any or (b) adequate warning; (c) used
an ineffective means to inform customers; (d) failed to initiate an inspection
program to identify and remove Cobra brand natural gas appliance
connectors from customer homes and businesses; and (e) failed to
properly inspect decedent's home "to cause the removal of the aforesaid
Cobra brand connector."
	The record includes the depositions of several opinion witnesses,
including Charles Lamar, Wayne Genck, Norman Breyer, and Edward
Karnes. Their testimony adduced the following additional evidence.
	The connector in this case was manufactured by the Cobra Hose
Company, which has been out of business since 1979. Made as early as
1953, Cobra connectors were widely used in Illinois and other states. The
Cobra connector essentially was a corrugated flexible brass tube with
threaded brass connectors at each end that connect a gas appliance to the
hard pipe gas source. The threaded connectors were telescoped and
fastened to the ends of the corrugated brass tube by a process known as
brazing. The compound used in the brazing process is composed of
phosphorized brazing alloys containing a substantial portion of
phosphorous and a high percentage of copper.
	It is undisputed that natural gas, in its original state, is odorless. The
chemical ethyl mercaptan, which is a sulfur component, is added as an
odorant to give natural gas its distinctive smell. In addition to sulfur that is
intentionally added, natural gas itself produces sulfur compounds through
intrinsic chemical reactions. By law, NI-Gas is required to supply odorized
gas to its customers as a safety precaution, so that customers more easily
can detect a gas leak. The natural gas that NI-Gas supplied to decedent
was as the law required it to be.
	However, when sulfur is added to natural gas, as in the present case,
a chemical reaction begins to occur between the phosphorous brazing
alloy and the sulfur. This chemical reaction causes the brazed joint to
corrode and deteriorate. Over time, the deterioration of the brazed joint
results in its separation from the corrugated tube and the consequent
release of natural gas into the home. Even the naturally occurring sulfides
in the gas are sufficient to cause the brazed connector eventually to fail.
	In 1968, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)(2) revised
its standards on gas connectors and banned phosphorous brazing. ANSI's
Z21 subcommittee on connectors is the committee that has jurisdiction
over all domestic standards for natural gas ranges, furnaces, water heaters,
and connectors. The Z21 specifications were modified to warn that the
use of brazing compounds that contain phosphorous can result in a brittle
joint and can be deadly.
	The record contains evidence that NI-Gas was aware of the potential
danger in homes using Cobra connectors. In May 1976, NI-Gas'
supervisor of Research Services reported to the Z21 subcommittee that
the "sudden, mysterious separation of brass connectors and their brazed-on end fittings has been a concern of gas utility people for several years."
In a letter dated December 14, 1979, the United States Consumer
Product Safety Commission informed the American Gas Association
(AGA) that Cobra connectors allegedly caused a number of fires in
homes. According to the letter, while some jurisdictions did not allow the
installation of Cobra connectors, many such connectors "may still be in
service, and therefore may be susceptible to creating a significant hazard
to the occupants of those residences equipped with such connectors." On
December 19, the president of the AGA sent a letter to all its member
companies, including NI-Gas, stating that the Commission had notified
AGA that Cobra connectors had an increasing potential to fail over time.
	The record also includes copies of "Consumer News" notices that
NI-Gas sent to its customers. The August/September 1978, June/July
1980, summer/fall 1981, and December 1981 notices indicated that an
old connector could crack, creating an unsafe condition, when the
appliance was moved. The December 1981, January 1985, May 1986,
and June 1987 notices warned: "The U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission has warned that certain appliance connectors manufactured
prior to 1968 may be unsafe. If you are concerned, do not try to move the
appliance to inspect the connector. Instead, call a qualified service agency
of NI-Gas to make the inspection."
	Also, NI-Gas knew that failed Cobra connectors were determined
to have caused many explosions and fires within its service area, including
Aurora, Evanston, and Rockford. In the 1970s there were a series of fires
in the Village of South Holland associated with brazed connectors. Wayne
Kortum, a volunteer firefighter in South Holland and a NI-Gas employee,
informed NI-Gas supervisors at the Glenwood district office, the district
that includes the decedent's home, about the connectors involved with
these fires. Thereafter, Kortum attended a general meeting at the
Glenwood office where NI-Gas supervisors informed him and other
service employees that there were problems with brazed connectors and
that the service employees should look for these connectors in customers'
homes.
	In November 1984, NI-Gas representatives participated in a meeting
with officials from the Village of Skokie. The Skokie fire department had
determined that several fires and an explosion in the Village were related
to brazed connector failures. Carol Anderson, one of the NI-Gas
attendees, testified that in the 1980s she was aware that brazed
connectors were a hazard. According to John Agosti, a Skokie fire
official, NI-Gas represented that it would notify its service and
construction personnel about replacing brazed connectors. In turn, these
employees would warn the NI-Gas customers with whom they came in
contact.
	Charles Henry, a trained NI-Gas serviceman, testified in a deposition
as follows. NI-Gas instructed its service employees on the potential
danger of Cobra connectors. When a NI-Gas employee encountered a
brazed connector, the employee was required to tag the connector and
advise the customer that the connector needed to be replaced as soon as
possible.
	Decedent's ex-husband, Leonard Adams, testified in a deposition as
follows. He had observed NI-Gas employees read the gas meter in the
utility room of decedent's home on occasion, but they did not examine
anything in the house other than the meter. In 1978 or 1980, after having
a new clothes drier installed by the appliance retailer, a gas leak was
detected. Decedent telephoned NI-Gas. A NI-Gas employee came to the
house and checked the gas pipe between the meter and the clothes drier.
The employee discovered that the pipe was leaking and tightened it; he did
not do anything else.
	NI-Gas moved for summary judgment against plaintiff. NI-Gas
contended that it did not owe decedent a legal duty to warn her that her
Cobra connector was potentially hazardous because decedent owned the
connector and not NI-Gas. The circuit court granted NI-Gas' motion for
summary judgment against plaintiff.(3)
	Plaintiff appealed. Initially, the appellate court, with one justice
dissenting, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of NI-Gas,
holding that NI-Gas did not owe decedent a legal duty. However, the
appellate court modified its opinion upon denial of plaintiff's petition for
rehearing. In its modified opinion, the appellate court, inter alia, reversed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of NI-Gas. The appellate court
held, "as a matter of law, that a utility company that has actual knowledge
of a dangerous condition associated with the use of its product has a
responsibility to its customers to warn them of that danger." 333 Ill. App.
3d at 224.
	This court allowed NI-Gas' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). We subsequently granted the People's Gas Light and Coke
Company et al. leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of NI-Gas. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

ANALYSIS

	This matter is before us on the grant of summary judgment in favor
of NI-Gas. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of
fact, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186 (2002); Gilbert
v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517 (1993). Summary
judgment is appropriate only where "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). 
	 In determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists,
a court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits
strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. A triable
issue precluding summary judgment exists where the material facts are
disputed, or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable
persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. The use
of the summary judgment procedure is to be encouraged as an aid in the
expeditious disposition of a lawsuit. However, it is a drastic means of
disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be allowed only when the right
of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d  at
518 (and cases cited therein); accord Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113-14 (1995). In appeals from
summary judgment rulings, review is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).
	Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of NI-Gas. To prevail in an
action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed
a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the plaintiff
incurred injuries proximately caused by the breach. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d 
at 114; Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (1990). The
existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide; however,
the issues of breach and proximate cause are factual matters for a jury to
decide (Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill. 2d 374, 382 (1993)),
provided there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding those issues
(Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d at 114).
	In this case, the sole inquiry before us concerns the existence of a
legal duty. Plaintiff asserts that NI-Gas owed decedent a duty to warn her
that Cobra connectors were potentially hazardous. NI-Gas denies that it
had such a duty because decedent owned the connector and not NI-Gas.
	There can be no recovery in tort for negligence unless the defendant
has breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. Boyd v. Racine Currency
Exchange, Inc., 56 Ill. 2d 95, 97 (1973); accord LaFever v. Kemlite
Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 388 (1998). Duty is a question of whether the
defendant and the plaintiff stood in such a relationship to one another that
the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct
for the benefit of the plaintiff. In determining whether a duty exists, a court
looks to certain relevant factors, including: (1) the reasonable forseeability
that the defendant's conduct may injure another, (2) the likelihood of an
injury occurring, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against such
injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.
Happel, 199 Ill. 2d at 186-87; Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 140-41; Kirk v.
Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526
(1987). In support of their respective positions, the parties invoke two
sources of law: (1) the common law, and (2) NI-Gas' tariff on file with the
Illinois Commerce Commission.

I. Common Law
	American consumers have been using gas as fuel for illumination or
heat for over a century. Courts from across the nation, including Illinois
courts, long ago considered the factors in determining the existence of a
duty with respect to the duties that gas distributors owe to their customers
concerning escaping gas. The common law, which is always heedful of
realities when it formulates rules to govern conduct (Graham v. North
Carolina Butane Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 684-85, 58 S.E.2d 757, 761
(1950)), has established the following principles.
	Gas is a dangerous substance or commodity when it is not under
control. Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 450
(1965); McClure v. Hoopeston Gas & Electric Co., 303 Ill. 89, 97
(1922); accord Suiter v. Ohio Valley Gas Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 77, 78,
225 N.E.2d 792, 793 (1967); Bellefuil v. Willmar Gas Co., 243 Minn.
123, 126, 66 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1954); Graham, 231 N.C. at 684, 58 S.E.2d  at 761. However, a gas company is not liable as an insurer for
injuries sustained as the result of the escape of gas. Rather, the company
is liable for its negligence in permitting the gas to escape. Pappas v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 350 Ill. App. 541, 548 (1953); accord
Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 126, 66 N.W.2d  at 782; Graham, 231 N.C. at
685, 58 S.E.2d  at 761; 27A Am. Jur. 2d Energy & Power Sources
§368, at 278 (1996); 38A C.J.S. Gas §119, at 143 (1996). Expressions
of the degree of care that a gas company must exercise range from
"reasonable" (see, e.g., Graham, 231 N.C. at 685, 58 S.E.2d at 761) to
"high" (see, e.g., McClure, 303 Ill. at 97). This variety of expression
simply means that a gas company must exercise a degree of care to
prevent the escape of gas from its pipes commensurate with or
proportional to the level of danger which it is the company's duty to avoid.
Metz, 32 Ill. 2d  at 450; Cosgrove v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 315
Ill. App. 3d 651, 654-55 (2000); accord Lewis v. Vermont Gas Corp.,
121 Vt. 168, 182, 151 A.2d 297, 306 (1959); Doxstater v. Northwest
Cities Gas Co., 65 Idaho 814, 826-27, 154 P.2d 498, 504 (1944);
Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 126, 66 N.W.2d  at 782; 27A Am. Jur. 2d
Energy & Power Sources §373, at 281 (1996); 38A C.J.S. Gas §120,
at 145-46 (1996); L. Tellier, Annotation, Liability of Gas Co. for Injury
or Damage Due to Defects in Service Lines on Consumer's Premises,
26 A.L.R.2d 136, 146 (1952).
	While a gas company must exercise the requisite degree of care so
that no injury occurs in the distribution of gas while it is under the
company's control, such responsibility is limited to the time the gas is in the
company's own pipes. Doxstater, 65 Idaho at 827, 154 P.2d  at 504
(collecting cases). In Illinois, the seminal example of the common law rule
pertaining to gas distribution in a consumer's pipes and fixtures is Clare
v. Bond County Gas Co., 356 Ill. 241 (1934).
	In Clare, the plaintiff opened a shop and hired a plumber to install a
gas stove for heat. After the installation, she noticed an offensive odor that
irritated her eyes and gave her a headache. She notified the gas company.
The president of the gas company visited the shop several times and made
suggestions to remedy the situation. His suggestions were followed, but the
problem continued. The smell was so strong in the closet where the gas
meter was located that the plaintiff kept the door to the closet closed.
Several weeks after the unsuccessful attempts to locate the source of the
problem, a friend of the plaintiff was looking for a screwdriver. He lit a
match to help him look for it in the dark closet. He opened the closet door
and an explosion occurred. It was subsequently discovered that the gas
pipe that ran beneath the floor contained holes caused by rust. The gas
that escaped from the pipe had accumulated in the closet. Clare, 356 Ill. 
at 241-43. Appealing a judgment in favor of plaintiff, the gas company
contended that "there was no evidence in the record to warrant the finding
that it [the gas company] had notice and knowledge that the pipes were
leaking and gas was escaping into the building; that without such notice or
knowledge there was no duty incumbent upon it to shut off the gas
supply." Clare, 356 Ill.  at 243.
	Reversing the judgment in favor of plaintiff, Clare relied on
established common law: "In the absence of notice of defects it is not
incumbent upon a gas company to exercise reasonable care to ascertain
whether or not service pipes under the control of the property owner or
the consumer are fit for the furnishing of gas." Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244.
Where a gas company does not install the pipes or fixtures on a
customer's premises, and does not own them and has no control over
them, the company is not responsible for their condition or for their
maintenance, and as a result is not liable for injuries caused by a leak
therein of which the company had no knowledge. Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244
(collecting cases). Clare looked to the common law as evolved up to that
time and today continues to accord with our understanding of the common
law rule. Accord Oliver v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 5 Ill. App.
3d 1093, 1099 (1972); accord Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 126, 66 N.W.2d 
at 782 (discussing rule in context of gas appliances); Doxstater, 65 Idaho
at 827-28, 154 P.2d  at 504, quoting Kelley v. Public Service Co. of
Northern Illinois, 300 Ill. App. 354, 362 (1939); 27A Am. Jur. 2d
Energy & Power Sources §§394, 395 (1996) (stating rule in context of
appliances); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Energy & Power Sources §403 (1996)
(stating general rule); 38A C.J.S. Gas §123, at 151-53 (1996); 26
A.L.R.2d at 156.
	Courts reason that a person's duty can extend no further than the
person's right, power, and authority to implement it. Gas company
employees do not have the right to enter the premises of their customers
to inspect pipes or fixtures except upon the license or permission of the
owner. Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244. The consumer, by application for gas
service, assumes the burden of inspecting and maintaining the pipes and
fittings on the consumer's property in a manner reasonably suited to meet
the required service. The company has the right to assume that the
customer's interior system of pipes and fittings is sufficiently secure to
permit the gas to be introduced with safety. Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244-45
(collecting cases); accord Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 126-27, 66 N.W.2d at
782-83; Graham, 231 N.C. at 685, 58 S.E.2d  at 761; Moran Junior
College v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 184 Wash. 543, 552, 52 P.2d 342, 346 (1935); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Energy & Power Sources §403
(1996).
	Courts also reason that, in a negligence action, knowledge of the
facts out of which the duty to act arises is essential. In order that an act or
omission may be regarded as negligent, the defendant must have
knowledge, or ought to have known from the circumstances, that the
allegedly negligent act or omission endangered another. Weber v.
Interstate Light & Power Co., 268 Wis. 479, 482, 68 N.W.2d 39, 41
(1955). Accordingly, the common law rule of no duty of a gas company
with respect to a consumer's pipes or fittings is premised on the gas
company's lack of knowledge or notice of a gas leak. See, e.g., Clare,
356 Ill.  at 244 (stating rule with proviso of gas company's lack of
knowledge or notice); Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 129, 66 N.W.2d  at 784
("the duty, by reason of actual or constructive notice of some dangerous
condition, must arise before the gas company can be found negligent for
its failure to inspect or shut off the gas supply").
	Considering the requirement of the gas company's knowledge or
notice of a gas leak, the exception to the common law rule is evident:
			"Where it appears that a gas company has knowledge that
gas is escaping in a building occupied by one of its consumers it
becomes the duty of the gas company to shut off the gas supply
until the necessary repairs have been made although the defective
pipe or apparatus does not belong to the company and is not in
its charge or custody." Clare, 356 Ill.  at 243-44.
Accord Graham, 231 N.C. at 685, 58 S.E.2d  at 761-62 (citing Clare);
27A Am. Jur. 2d Energy & Power Sources §413, at 309-10 (1996);
38A C.J.S. Gas §123, at 153-54 (1996); 26 A.L.R.2d at 150. In the
specific context of gas appliances, courts have gone so far as to impose
on a gas company that has knowledge of a gas leak a duty to inspect:
		"[W]henever a gas company is in possession of facts that would
suggest to a person of ordinary care and prudence that an
appliance of a customer is leaking or is otherwise unsafe for the
transportation of gas, the company has a duty to investigate, as
a person of ordinary care and prudence similarly situated and
handling such a dangerous substance would do, before it
continues to furnish additional gas. The duty to exercise
reasonable diligence to inspect or shut off the gas supply is
measured by the likelihood of injury. Circumstances may be such
as to require a gas company to investigate immediately and shut
off the gas supply until repairs are made. The nature of the notice
may also affect the extent of inspection necessary." Bellefuil,
243 Minn. at 128-29, 66 N.W.2d  at 783-84.
It is clear that the knowledge that would impose on a gas company this
duty is not limited to actual knowledge, but may include constructive
knowledge or notice. It is sufficient if the gas company received facts
which would have made the defects known to an ordinary prudent person.
For example, Clare was rendered in the context of the gas company's
denial of "notice or knowledge." (Emphasis added.) Clare, 356 Ill.  at
243. Further, this court expressly-and correctly-stated the common law
rule with the accepted proviso of a gas company's lack of knowledge
(Clare, 356 Ill.  at 243 ("Where it appears that a gas company has
knowledge")) or notice (Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244 ("In the absence of
notice")). See Mrdalj v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 308
Ill. App. 424, 430 (1941); Kelley, 300 Ill. App. at 362; Kilmer v.
Browning, 806 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Mo. App. 1991); Ruberg v. Skelly Oil
Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 1980); Fore v. United Natural Gas
Co., 436 Pa. 499, 504-05, 261 A.2d 316, 318-19 (1970); Bellefuil, 243
Minn. at 128-29, 66 N.W.2d  at 783-84.
	Further, Clare was directed not only to actual gas leaks, but also to
defects. Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244 ("In the absence of notice of defects"
(emphasis added)). "The rule in Illinois as to the liability of a gas company
is such company is responsible for a customer's pipe if it has knowledge
of a leak or of a possible defect therein." (Emphasis added.) Oliver, 5
Ill. App. 3d at 1099; accord Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 128-29, 66 N.W.2d 
at 783-84 (speaking of a customer's gas appliance that "is leaking or is
otherwise unsafe for the transportation of gas" (emphasis added)); 27A
Am. Jur. 2d Energy & Power Sources §413, at 310 (1996) (stating "that
if a gas company has notice of a leak or defect in pipes or lines owned
or controlled by a consumer, it is under a duty to notify the consumer
and see that the leak or defect is repaired, or shut off the gas").
	This common law rule and corresponding exception serve the
concept that a gas company is not an insurer for any injury sustained as a
result of escaping gas, but rather is liable only for its negligence. "To apply
any other rule would make the gas supplier an insurer if anything went
wrong with any of the appliances over which it had no control." Wilson v.
Home Gas Co., 267 Minn. 162, 172, 125 N.W.2d 725, 732 (1964).
	As the appellate court in this case recognized, Illinois courts have not
addressed a gas company's duty to warn its customers of the possible
deterioration of the customer's fixtures when they are damaged, in part,
due to the gas product itself. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 220. However,
addressing the same facts as in this case, two decisions from other
jurisdictions recognize that gas companies who have notice of the danger
caused by sulfides in their gas coming in contact with brazed connectors
owe common law tort duties: Lemke v. Metropolitan Utilities District,
243 Neb. 633, 502 N.W.2d 80 (1993), and Halliburton v. Public
Service Co. of Colorado, 804 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1990). We agree
with the appellate court that these cases are instructive. 333 Ill. App. 3d
at 220-22.
	In Lemke, a gas explosion destroyed the home of Lorraine and
Kenneth Lemke and severely injured Lorraine. Lemke, 243 Neb. at 634-37, 502 N.W.2d  at 82-84. The trial court found that the cause of the
explosion was a Cobra connector, which failed due to the interaction of
the phosphorous brazing alloy and the gas. Although there was evidence
that the Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) installed thousands of Cobra
connectors in the homes of MUD customers, there was no evidence that
MUD installed the Cobra connector to the plaintiff's gas range. The court
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Lemke, 243 Neb. at 642, 502 N.W.2d  at 86.
	Appealing from the judgment, MUD contended "that it had no duty
to notify its customers concerning a potential hazard from Cobra
connectors, especially a customer who may not have purchased the
connector from MUD." Lemke, 243 Neb. at 648, 502 N.W.2d  at 90.
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this contention.
	The Lemke court reviewed its past statements of the earlier-discussed common law principles. The court concluded:
		"Because a gas company has a nondelegable duty to exercise
due care regarding natural gas supplied to a customer, a gas
company's duty of care not only pertains to the company's
distribution of gas through its pipelines, but extends to distribution
through a customer's service line or gas appliance that the
company knows, or should know, is unsafe for conducting or
using gas." Lemke, 243 Neb. at 651, 502 N.W.2d  at 91.
	The court noted, as the record in this case shows, that the American
Gas Association warned all of its members, including MUD, that Cobra
connectors presented a danger in the distribution of natural gas. The court
reasoned:
		"When MUD received information about the dangerous
condition or potential hazard involving Cobra connectors but did
not disseminate this critical information to its customers who
were using gas appliances with Cobra connectors, MUD
effectively exerted control in a situation that could eventually
culminate in injury to customers who continued to use gas
supplied by MUD." Lemke, 243 Neb. at 648, 502 N.W.2d  at
89.
 According to the court, that information
		"placed MUD on notice that its customers who had gas
appliances with Cobra connectors would be endangered when
the connector separated from a gas service line or appliance.
Consequently, when MUD became aware that the distribution of
gas through a Cobra connector presented a risk of injury to
customers, MUD had the duty to use due care, such as issuance
of a warning, to protect customers ***." Lemke, 243 Neb. at
652, 502 N.W.2d  at 92.
As in Lemke, NI-Gas' superior knowledge of the risks pertaining to
Cobra connectors begat a duty of due care, such as issuing a warning to
its customers.
	In Halliburton, the Public Service Company of Colorado, similar to
NI-Gas here, knew at least since the 1970s that a large number of brazed
connectors failed because of the interaction of the brazed connector and
the sulfides in the gas. The court cited four reasons to impose a duty on
the gas company to inspect plaintiff's brazed connector: (1) the relatively
insignificant amount of time and expense that defendant would have
expended to evaluate the connector and take corrective action; (2) two
service calls at plaintiff's home after the gas company knew of this hazard,
which affected approximately 45,000 homes in the Denver area; (3) the
likelihood of the connector failing and possibly causing an explosion unless
corrective action were taken; and (4) defendant's expertise in dealing with
such problems. The court continued: "The most compelling reason,
however, for imposing a duty upon defendant is that its product, natural
gas, which contained the corrosive ethyl mercaptan, was a substantial
factor in causing the deterioration of the connector tube." (Emphasis in
original.) Halliburton, 804 P.2d  at 216.
	At oral argument, plaintiff expressly clarified that the extent of NI-Gas' duty of reasonable care in this case should be to warn its customers
of the dangers presented by its gas coming in contact with the brazed
connectors. Thus, while no issue exists in this case regarding a duty to
inspect every connector, we agree with the following from Halliburton:
"When a party can reasonably foresee that its product will be used as an
integral component of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product,
there is a duty upon that party to undertake corrective action to alleviate,
if possible, the hazard." Halliburton, 804 P.2d  at 216. The duty is simply
to use reasonable care in dealing with the hazard, including a duty to warn.
Halliburton, 804 P.2d  at 216-17. We agree with the appellate court that,
"while not controlling, Halliburton is also instructive." 333 Ill. App. 3d at
222.
	Halliburton and Lemke acknowledged the common law rule of a
gas company's lack of duty toward a customer's equipment absent
knowledge of a defect, but recognized that the gas suppliers in those cases
had knowledge of the danger of their product being in contact with brazed
connectors. Those cases also noted that the danger in question was not
one normally associated with the product and consumers were not in a
position to be aware of the danger without adequate warnings. Since the
gas companies helped create the danger and had superior knowledge of
the hazard, they owed a responsibility to their customers with respect to
that danger.
	We consider Halliburton and Lemke to represent a reasoned
adaptation of the common law to address the exigency presented by
brazed connectors. We recognize that "[t]he growth and adaptation of the
common law to our contemporary concerns should not impose impractical
burdens or impossible duties." Hensley v. Montgomery County, 25 Md.
App. 361, 367, 334 A.2d 542, 545-46 (1975). However, it is equally
clear that "[r]easonable care is not a standard beyond the reach of any
enterprise." Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 494, 524 A.2d 366, 379
(1987).
	In the present case, as in Halliburton and Lemke, there is no dispute
that NI-Gas had actual knowledge of the danger. NI-Gas knew that
sulfides in the gas corroded brazed connectors, ultimately causing the
connectors to leak gas; it was only a question of when the connector
would fail. Based on its superior knowledge and the fact that it helped to
create the dangerous condition, we hold that NI-Gas owed a common law
duty of reasonable care with respect to the brazed connectors. 
	This holding is directed exclusively to the element of duty and is
limited to the evidence contained in the present record. We repeat
plaintiff's clarification at oral argument that NI-Gas' duty of reasonable
care in this case consists only of warning and not inspection. We express
no opinion as to the adequacy of NI-Gas' conduct in this case. It is for the
trier of fact to determine whether NI-Gas' conduct met the standard of
care required of it under the circumstances. Based on our disposition of
this issue, we do not discuss other tort theories raised by the parties.

II. Tariff

	NI-Gas and supporting amici contend that NI-Gas' tariff on file with
the Illinois Commerce Commission "is the sole source" of its duties to its
customers. NI-Gas points to the following provision of its tariff on file with
the Commission at the time of the explosion:
		"Equipment Furnished and Maintained by Customer.
			All gas utilization equipment, piping, and vents furnished by
the Customer shall be suitable for the purposes hereof and shall
be installed and maintained by the Customer at all times in
accordance with accepted practice and in conformity with
requirements of public health and safety, as set forth by the
properly constituted authorities and by the Company.
			The Company assumes no responsibility in connection with
the installation, maintenance or operation of the Customer's
equipment and reserves the right to discontinue service if such
equipment is in unsatisfactory condition."
NI-Gas contends that the plain language of this provision bars imposition
of a duty in this case.
	A tariff is a public document setting forth services being offered; rates
and charges with respect to services; and governing rules, regulations, and
practices relating to those services. North River Insurance Co. v. Jones,
275 Ill. App. 3d 175, 185 (1995). The Public Utilities Act requires public
utilities such as NI-Gas to file tariffs with the Illinois Commerce
Commission. 220 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 1994). A tariff is usually drafted
by the regulated utility, but when duly filed with the Commission, it binds
both the utility and the customer and governs their relationship. See
Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
267 Kan. 760, 765, 986 P.2d 377, 381 (1999). Once the Commission
approves a tariff, it "is a law, not a contract, and has the force and effect
of a statute." Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Sankey Brothers, Inc., 67
Ill. App. 3d 435, 439 (1978), aff'd, 78 Ill. 2d 56 (1979).
	Illinois law in this area originates in federal law. In Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571-72, 65 L. Ed. 1094, 1097-98, 41 S. Ct. 584, 586 (1921), the United States
Supreme Court considered the legal effect of tariffs filed pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Act:
			"The Act of 1910 [36 Stat. 539, 544] introduced a new
principle into the legal relations of the telegraph companies with
their patrons which dominated and modified the principles
previously governing them. Before the act the companies had a
common-law liability from which they might or might not extricate
themselves according to views of policy prevailing in the several
states. Thereafter, for all messages sent in interstate or foreign
commerce, the outstanding consideration became that of
uniformity and equality of rates. Uniformity demanded that the
rate represent the whole duty and the whole liability of the
company. It could not be varied by agreement; still less could it
be varied by lack of agreement. The rate became, not as before
a matter of contract by which a legal liability could be modified,
but a matter of law by which a uniform liability was imposed."
Accord In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233,
249 (1994) (Miller, J., specially concurring); J. Meyer & Co. v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 53, 57 (1980) (both citing Esteve
Brothers, 256 U.S. 566, 65 L. Ed. 1094, 41 S. Ct. 584).
	The United States Supreme Court has described the federal filed-rate
doctrine as follows: " 'The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied
or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.' " American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227, 141 L. Ed. 2d 222, 236, 118 S. Ct. 1956, 1965 (1998),
quoting Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156,
163, 67 L. Ed. 183, 187, 43 S. Ct. 47, 49 (1922). The filed-rate doctrine
serves two goals: prevention of price discrimination among rate payers,
and preservation of the role of regulatory agencies in deciding reasonable
rates for public utilities and services. Fax Telecommunicaciones, Inc. v.
AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 1998); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX
Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994); Qwest Corp v. Kelly, 204 Ariz.
25, 35, 59 P.3d 789, 799 (2002) (and cases cited therein); Lovejoy v.
AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 99, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 721
(2001).
	Tariff provisions, such as Ni-Gas' tariff, are usually referred to as
liability limitations. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation,
161 Ill. 2d  at 247 (Miller, J., specially concurring); Danisco, 267 Kan. at
768, 986 P.2d  at 383. Liability limitations reflect: the status of public
utilities as regulated monopolies whose operations are subject to extensive
restrictions; the requirements of uniform, nondiscriminatory rates; and the
goal of universal service, achieved through the preservation of utility prices
that virtually all customers can afford. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 249 (Miller, J., specially concurring). The underlying theory of
liability limitations is that, because a public utility is strictly regulated, its
liability should be defined and limited so that it may be able to provide
service at reasonable rates. A reasonable rate is in part dependent on a
rule limiting liability. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 244-46
(and cases cited therein); Danisco, 267 Kan. at 769, 986 P.2d  at 384
(collecting cases). The goal is "to secure reasonable and just rates for all
without undue preference or advantage to any. Since that end is attainable
only by adherence to the approved rate, based upon an authorized
classification, that rate 'represents the whole duty and the whole liability
of the company.' " Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252, 259, 72 L. Ed. 555, 565, 48 S. Ct. 234, 235 (1928), quoting
Esteve Brothers, 256 U.S.  at 572, 65 L. Ed.  at 1097, 41 S. Ct.  at 586.
	To be sure, in an action for negligence, the issue of a legal duty is
generally distinguished from the issue of liability for breach of that duty.
See, e.g., Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 382. However, a "plaintiff cannot
prevail against a defendant who is under no duty and equally cannot
prevail against a defendant who is immune and to that extent the two
concepts are the same." 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Torts §225, at 576 (2001).
Illinois courts have long held that a tariff provision such as the one at issue
in this case provides the source for, and determines the nature and extent
of, a public utility's service obligations to its customers. Illinois Bell
Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 248 (Miller, J., specially concurring); J.
Meyer & Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d at 55; Sarelas v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374-75 (1963).
	"Nonetheless, all state law causes of action are not necessarily
precluded." Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Communications Group, 89 Cal. App. 4th 407, 416, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398 (2001). As
explained in Adamson v. Worldcom Communications, Inc., 190 Or.
App. 215, 222, 78 P.3d 577, 582 (2003):
		"The filed-rate doctrine bars only an action that seeks to vary the
terms of an applicable tariff. [Citation.] Thus, the effect of a tariff
on a particular claim depends on the nature of the claim and the
specific terms of the tariff. If the claim is one that implicates the
provisions of a tariff, then the tariff controls according to its
terms, which may either limit relief available or bar a claim
entirely. But if the claim is unrelated to the tariff, then the claim is
not limited or barred. In other words, merely because a tariff
exists does not necessarily mean that a claim is barred."
In the context of the federal filed-rate doctrine, we are reminded: "In order
for the filed rate doctrine to serve its purpose, therefore, it need pre-empt
only those suits that seek to alter the terms and conditions provided for in
the tariff." Central Office, 524 U.S.  at 229, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 237, 118
S. St. at 1966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Further:
			"The tariff does not govern *** the entirety of the relationship
between the common carrier and its customers. For example, it
does not affect whatever duties state law might impose ***. The
filed rate doctrine's purpose is to ensure that the filed rates are
the exclusive source of the terms and conditions by which the
common carrier provides to its customers the services covered
by the tariff. It does not serve as a shield against all actions based
in state law." Central Office, 524 U.S.  at 230-31, 141 L. Ed. 2d  at 238, 118 S. Ct.  at 1966-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Illinois law accords with this reasoning.
	In 1921, the General Assembly enacted the Public Utilities Act (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1921, ch. 111, par. 1 et seq.). This court has described the
legislative intent of the Act as follows:
			"The Public Utilities Act [citation], under which the
Commerce Commission regulates all public utilities, was enacted
to assure the provision of efficient and adequate utility service to
the public at a reasonable cost. Because unrestrained
competition prior to adoption of the Act had often resulted in the
financial failure of many utilities, the Act adopted a policy of
regulated monopoly to assure that utilities would be able to earn
a reasonable rate of return on their investment and thus would be
able to provide the required service." Local 777, DUOC,
Seafarers International Union of North America v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 45 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1970) (and cases
cited therein).
This court also has observed: "it cannot be doubted that the Public Utilities
Act supersedes the common law liability of the carrier so far as rates and
unreasonable discrimination are concerned." (Emphasis added.)
Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 304 Ill. 312, 317 (1922). This court recognized: " 'The law is well settled in this
State that the matter of rate regulation is essentially one of legislative
control. The fixing of rates is not a judicial function ***.' " Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 469-70
(1973), quoting Produce Terminal Corp. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n ex rel. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 414 Ill. 582, 589
(1953).
	However, this court in Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. of Illinois v.
Northern Illinois Gas Co., 61 Ill. 2d 6 (1975), applied the established
common law duty analysis as explained in Clare to the defendant utility,
which is the same defendant utility in this case. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 61 Ill. 2d  at 12-14. In Pioneer Hi-Bred, plaintiff customer brought an action
against NI-Gas to recover damages for an explosion and fire due to the
failure of plaintiff's gas-fueled equipment. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia,
common law negligence. The trial court refused plaintiff's proffered jury
instruction that NI-Gas was negligent in that it failed to inspect the
plaintiff's equipment. The jury found for NI-Gas. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing plaintiff's proffered
jury instruction. This court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the
judgment in favor of NI-Gas. Citing Clare, this court held that NI-Gas did
not have a duty to inspect plaintiff's equipment and, therefore, plaintiff's
proffered instruction was erroneous. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 61 Ill. 2d  at 13-14.
	We presume that the court in Pioneer Hi-Bred was not unaware of
the federal filed-rate doctrine as explained in the above-cited Priester and
Esteve Brothers decisions from the United States Supreme Court.
Additionally, according to NI-Gas, the tariff at issue in this case has been
on file with the Commission "[s]ince at least 1955."
	However, despite this court's prior decisions interpreting the Public
Utilities Act and recognizing that rate regulation is not a judicial function,
despite prior decisions from the United States Supreme Court establishing
the federal filed-rate doctrine, and despite the existence of the specific
tariff in this case, this court applied the established common law duty
analysis to NI-Gas. Neither this court nor NI-Gas believed that this tariff
precluded a common law analysis in a negligence action for personal
injury.
	Similarly, this court in Metz applied the common law doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to the defendant utility. Metz, 32 Ill. 2d  at 448-52. Why did
the appellate court and this court in each of these cases fail to mention the
Public Utilities Act, the filed-rate doctrine, or any particular tariff?
Because Illinois courts have recognized that where a utility tariff speaks to
a specific duty, the tariff may be controlling; however, where the tariff
does not address a particular situation, the common law applies and a
common law duty analysis must be applied. 
	For example, in Sarelas, the defendant telephone company, due to
a clerical error, disconnected one of the extensions of the plaintiff's office
telephone for 2½ hours. The plaintiff sued the telephone company and its
president for damages, alleging that defendant owed him a duty of
continuing service, and that defendant violated this duty by interrupting
service. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Sarelas, 42 Ill.
App. 2d at 373-74.
	On appeal, the appellate court held that the defendant's duty to
plaintiff was based on the tariff that the defendant filed with the Illinois
Commerce Commission. In so holding, the court reasoned:
			"[T]he extent to which defendants owed plaintiff 'a legal duty'
is determined by the particular provisions of the tariff on file with
the commission; there is no contract in this case on which plaintiff
can rely, nor are his allegations of a breach of duty sufficient
to constitute a claim in tort. He complains simply of the
disconnection of his telephone extension, and claims a breach of
duty which arises either from the tariff or not at all." (Emphasis
added.) Sarelas, 42 Ill. App. 2d at 375.
In Sarelas, since the plaintiff could not plead a breach of duty sufficient to
constitute a claim in tort, his duty was defined by the tariff. Sarelas clearly
leaves open the existence of common law duties had the plaintiff been able
to plead them.
	More recently, in Cosgrove, our appellate court, applying a common
law analysis, reinstated negligence and res ipsa loquitur counts against
Ni-Gas. Cosgrove, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 654-57. The court concluded:
"NI-Gas is 'subject to liability in tort' " pursuant to section 2 of the Joint
Tortfeasor Contribution Act. Cosgrove, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 658, quoting
740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1998).
	Indeed, Illinois case law reveals that Illinois courts have long applied
common law principles to defendant utilities subsequent to the 1921
enactment of the Public Utilities Act and despite the existence of tariffs
filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission. See, e.g., Metz, 32 Ill. 2d 446; Clare, 356 Ill. 241; Cosgrove, 315 Ill. App. 3d 651; Oliver, 5 Ill.
App. 3d 1093; Mrdalj, 308 Ill. App. 3d 424. Thus, whether NI-Gas'
tariff bars plaintiff's cause of action depends on the nature of plaintiff's
lawsuit and the meaning of the tariff's language.
	In this case, NI-Gas contends that the appellate court's decision
"cannot stand" in light of Illinois Bell Switching Station. We disagree,
finding that case to be distinguishable. In Illinois Bell Switching Station,
a telephone switching station caught fire, allegedly due to the negligent or
willful failure of Illinois Bell to take fire prevention measures. The fire left
many customers without telephone service for about a month. The
customers filed a class action to seek to recover economic losses incurred
due to that loss of service. Illinois Bell argued that its filed tariff defined the
limits of its liability for interruptions in service. The class plaintiffs
contended that the tariff should not bar their claims because the tariff was
against public policy and conflicted with provisions of the Public Utilities
Act. Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 242-43.
	In holding that the tariff controlled in that case, this court found no
duty on which to base the class plaintiffs' claims. This court initially noted
that Illinois Bell was nowhere charged with the duty to provide completely
uninterrupted service. Rather, its duty was to provide adequate, efficient,
and reliable service, which is not tantamount to infallible service.
Temporary disruptions may occur without reducing Bell's service to a
level less than adequate, efficient, or reliable. Further, this court held that
the exculpatory language in Bell's tariff properly limited claims from
disruption of service to a rebate of the costs for the missed service, and
concluded that the tariff's provision, which limited Bell's liability in the
event of a service disruption, was not contrary to the Act. Illinois Bell
Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 243-44.
	Unlike Illinois Bell Switching Station, where no duty existed on the
part of Illinois Bell, we have concluded in this case that NI-Gas owed a
duty to plaintiff. Further, in Illinois Bell Switching Station, the class
plaintiffs contended that the tariff applied, but conflicted with the Public
Utilities Act. However, in this case, plaintiff contends that NI-Gas' tariff,
as written, does not apply to her claim, an issue that was never addressed
in Illinois Bell Switching Station.
	Turning to the NI-Gas tariff provision in this case, it is evident that the
tariff essentially codifies the common law rule that a gas company has no
duty with respect to a consumer's gas pipes and fittings, based on the
consumer's responsibility for maintaining his or her own equipment and the
company's lack of control and knowledge. See, e.g., Clare, 356 Ill.  at
243-45 (stating common law rule). However, NI-Gas contends that the
tariff provision eliminates the common law exception to this rule.
According to NI-Gas, the tariff provision absolves it from any duty with
respect to a consumer's pipes and equipment even if it has knowledge that
a customer's appliance is leaking or is otherwise unsafe for the
transportation of gas. See, e.g., Bellefuil, 243 Minn. at 128-29, 66 N.W.2d  at 783-84 (stating common law exception).
	We agree with the appellate court's rejection of this contention. 333
Ill. App. 3d at 223. Ni-Gas' position is untenable for several reasons.
	Initially, allowing this cause of action to proceed would not
contravene the above-stated policies underlying liability limitations. Plaintiff
is not seeking rate preferences that are not accorded to other NI-Gas
customers; she is not seeking to enforce "side agreements" which vary
from our interpretation of the tariff. Rather, if proved, awarding damages
on plaintiff's claim would neither discriminate against other NI-Gas
customers nor involve the court in tariff setting. See, e.g., Lovejoy, 92 Cal. App. 4th  at 101, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 723; Day v. AT&T Corp., 63 Cal. App. 4th 325, 336, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 62 (1998).
	"Although a utility tariff is not a legislative enactment, its interpretation
is governed by the rules of statutory construction." Bloom Township High
School v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 163, 174
(1999); accord Danisco, 267 Kan. at 772, 986 P.2d  at 385. The cardinal
rule of interpreting statutes, to which all other canons and rules are
subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 423
(1998); Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 246. Although a
court should first consider the statutory language, a court must presume
that the legislature, in enacting a statute, did not intend absurdity or
injustice. McNamee, 181 Ill. 2d at 423-24; State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41 (1992); Illinois Crime
Investigating Comm'n v. Buccieri, 36 Ill. 2d 556, 561 (1967). "A
statute or ordinance must receive a sensible construction, even though
such construction qualifies the universality of its language." Illinois Bell
Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 246.
	Specifically, as earlier noted, rate regulation is one of legislative
control and is not a judicial function. Therefore, the right to review the
conclusion of the Commission acting under authority delegated by the
legislature is accordingly limited. This deference to the judgment of the
Commission is especially appropriate in the area of setting rates. Illinois
Bell, 55 Ill. 2d  at 469-70 (and cases cited therein).
	Applying these principles to the tariff provision at issue in this case,
we conclude that the Commission did not intend to completely immunize
NI-Gas with respect to a gas leak of which it has notice. It must be
remembered:
			"Public utilities do not enjoy a general tort immunity; they owe
a duty of care to the general public. Thus, if a utility company
recognizes that its conduct under certain circumstances creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to another, it has a duty to take
reasonable precautions to prevent that risk of harm from
occurring." 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Utilities §14, at 456 (2001).
Remembering that gas is a dangerous substance and commodity (Metz,
32 Ill. 2d  at 450; McClure, 303 Ill. at 97), the far-reaching consequences
of NI-Gas' interpretation of this tariff provision are readily apparent. In
effect, NI-Gas argues that if it had omitted language regarding duty and
liability from its tariff, it would owe no duty whatsoever to anyone under
any circumstances. The Commission's own decisions and orders belie
such an unreasonable contention. See Nordine v. Illinois Power Co., 32 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1965) (observing that orders and decisions of the Illinois
Commerce Commission are public records "and as such we take judicial
notice of them").
	For example, in Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, No. 94-0481
(Illinois Commerce Comm'n September 13, 1995), the utility company
(CUCI) filed with the Commission a revised tariff which proposed, inter
alia, changes to its conditions of service. Regarding one such condition,
the Commission observed: "CUCI proposes sweeping language for its fire
protection service which would absolve it from any liability for damages
of any nature to persons or property caused by fire. The Commission
agrees with Staff's criticism of this proposal."
	Indeed, the Commission has rejected the very argument that NI-Gas
makes before this court. In Teleport Communications Group, Inc., No.
96-AB-001 (Illinois Commerce Comm'n November 4, 1996), Teleport
Communications Group, Inc. (TCG), filed a petition for arbitration with
the Commission, seeking arbitration of the disputed portions of an
interconnection agreement with Ameritech.
	One disputed provision in the agreement required each party to
indemnify the other against losses suffered by customers of the ultimate
service provider. Ameritech's proposal would require Ameritech and
TCG each to limit its liability, in the event of a transmission delay or defect,
to an amount equivalent to the proportionate charge to the end user
customer for the period of service during which the delay or defect
occurred.
	TCG responded that it should not be required to include a limitation
of liability provision in contracts with its customers. The Commission noted
that TCG's intention was "to assign the responsibility for loss to the party
that has the ability to control or prevent the loss from occurring in the first
place." Further, TCG viewed Ameritech's proposal as "insulating
Ameritech from any harm caused by its actions. Ameritech would have no
liability or responsibility to TCG or its customers, even if they are harmed
by grossly negligent or deliberate wrongdoing." TCG believed that
"Ameritech's position would give Ameritech the right to dictate,
unilaterally, an important aspect of TCG's relationship with its customers."
The Commission noted that its staff believed that Ameritech's proposal
was "improper and should not be adopted." 
	The Commission rejected Ameritech's proposed indemnity provision,
disagreeing with Ameritech's portrayal of its risks. The Commission
reasoned that any claim against Ameritech by a TCG customer would
have to be founded on contract or tort. The evidence showed that
Ameritech did not anticipate having a contractual relationship with TCG's
end users. Thus, the Commission reasoned, a TCG customer could not
maintain a successful lawsuit against Ameritech based on a contract claim.
	The Commission continued as follows:
			"With respect to tort claims against Ameritech, the Illinois
Supreme Court has spoken authoritatively on this very point. The
Court in In Re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation ***
reaffirmed the Moorman doctrine. This doctrine stands for the
proposition that under the common law purely economic
damages are generally not recoverable in tort actions. Three
exceptions were articulated (1) where the plaintiff has sustained
damage resulting from a sudden or dangerous occurrence (2)
where the plaintiff's damages are the proximate result of a
defendant's intentional, false representation and (3) where the
plaintiff's damages are a proximate result of a negligent
misrepresentation by a defendant in the business of supplying
information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions. The Court held that a tort claim for economic
damages incurred from a loss of service arising from a fire at an
Illinois Bell switching station was precluded in the absence of any
exceptions to the Moorman doctrine.
			The Commission believes that the Moorman doctrine
provides Ameritech with ample protection in the vast majority of
situations it has identified in the record.
			In its Brief *** Ameritech maintains that the Proposed
Arbitration Decision overlooks the substantial exposure to direct
damages in tort left open by the Moorman doctrine. Essentially,
Ameritech turns to potential claims for personal injury and
property damage to demonstrate its exposure. Providing
telecommunications services is not an inherently dangerous
activity and it is difficult to imagine many scenarios in which
Ameritech's provision of interconnection services will put third
parties at risk. Even if such situations do arise, the public interest
does not require that we attempt to insulate either party from the
effects of its own improper conduct. We believe that it is
entirely appropriate that a telecommunications carrier
remain responsible for personal injury or property damage
which results from its own negligence or willful misconduct.
Moreover, as Staff noted there is no general rule or policy
which allows the Commission to grant utilities limitations on
liability for personal injury and property damage. This is
particularly true with respect to utilities' conduct toward
individuals who are not customers of the utility under tariff."
(Emphasis added.)
The Commission concluded: "There is potential that [Ameritech's]
proposal would shield Ameritech from responsibility for actions far
beyond what is intended by the Commission's discretionary approval of
limitations of liability in Ameritech's tariffs."
	We agree with the Commission. The Commission stated: (1) it is
entirely appropriate that a utility remain responsible for personal injury or
property damage that results from its own negligence or willful misconduct,
and (2) there is no general rule or policy that allows the Commission to
grant utilities limitations on liability for personal injury and property
damage. Although the dispute in Teleport involved Ameritech's
relationship with third parties, i.e., TCG customers, the Commission's
general statement of the public interest clearly refers also to a utility's
relationship with its own customers. 
	These administrative decisions are examples of the Commission's
rejection of the theory of absolute immunity that NI-Gas now proposes.
We do likewise.
	Additionally, if this tariff provision were a private contract, it would
not be interpreted as permitting NI-Gas to absolve itself of any duty to its
customers. See Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 42 Wash. 2d 542, 551, 256 P.2d 825, 830 (1953) (stating that "it would be
unreasonable and against public policy to approve such a contractual
limitation on the duty to inspect in cases where the facts themselves
suggest a duty to inspect"). Although a utility tariff is considered as a
statute and not as a contract, we cannot interpret the tariff provision that
NI-Gas wrote to completely absolve it of any duty in this regard, when we
would not so interpret the same provision in a contract that NI-Gas wrote.
See Bloom Township High School, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 175.
	Also, this court has held that the Public Utilities Act is in derogation
of the common law; accordingly, the Act is to be strictly construed in favor
of persons sought to be subjected to its operation. Barthel v. Illinois
Central Gulf R.R. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213, 220-21 (1978). "Thus, the statute
is to be strictly construed in favor of the utility company." Tucker v.
Illinois Power Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 15, 29 (1992). However, because
the utility company drafts a tariff, it is generally accepted that language in
a tariff, especially exculpatory language, is to be strictly construed against
the utility company and in favor of the customer. See, e.g., Pink Dot, 89 Cal. App. 4th  at 415, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 397; Krasner v. New York
State Electric & Gas Corp., 90 A.D.2d 921, 921-22, 457 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929 (1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 245 Ga. 5, 7, 262 S.E.2d 895, 897
(1980).
	Further, a court cannot construe a statute in derogation of the
common law beyond what the words of the statute expresses or beyond
what is necessarily implied from what is expressed. In construing statutes
in derogation of the common law, a court will not presume that an
innovation thereon was intended further than the innovation which the
statute specifies or clearly implies. Russell v. Klein, 58 Ill. 2d 220, 225
(1974); Cedar Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Cooper, 408 Ill. 79, 82-83
(1951); Illinois-American Water Co. v. City of Peoria, 332 Ill. App. 3d
1098, 1105 (2002) ("Although the [Public Utilities] Act is in derogation
of the common law and is to be strictly construed in favor of those sought
to be subjected to its operation, the Act will not be extended any further
than what the language of the statute absolutely requires by its express
terms or by clear implication"). Illinois courts have limited all manner of
statutes in derogation of the common law to their express language, in
order to effect the least-rather than the most-change in the common law.
See, e.g., Bush v. Squellati, 122 Ill. 2d 153 (1988) (interpreting Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 607(b)); Bagcraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,
302 Ill. App. 3d 334 (1998) (interpreting 820 ILCS 305/11 (West
1996)).
	For example, in Barthel, the plaintiffs brought a statutory cause of
action against the defendant railroad seeking damages for personal injuries
and wrongful death. Plaintiffs alleged that the railroad violated several
regulations pertaining to the safety of railroad crossings. Relying on a strict
and literal interpretation of the statutory language, the plaintiffs argued that
the statute abrogated the common law defense of contributory negligence.
As observed in Barthel:
		"They [plaintiffs] argue that the cause of action, being a creature
of the statute, bears no relation to the common law concepts of
negligence and contributory negligence, and they conclude that
since the statute does not provide that contributory negligence
shall be a defense, it imposes strict liability on the utility for any
violation." Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d  at 220.
The Barthel court rejected this argument. Noting that the Act is in
derogation of the common law, the court reasoned that tort principles
would not be deemed abrogated unless it plainly appears that the intent of
the statute is to do so. This court held that the statute did not abrogate the
common law defense of contributory negligence, and that this common law
defense was available to the railroad. Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d  at 220-21.
	In this case, applying the exact reasoning as applied in Barthel, we
must conclude that NI-Gas' tariff did not abrogate the common law
exception to the rule of a gas company's nonliability. Just as the statute in
Barthel did not abrogate a common law defense, NI-Gas' tariff does not
abrogate the common law exception. This rule of statutory construction
cannot be used to provide common law doctrines to assist defendants, but
withhold common law doctrines that assist plaintiffs.
	Specifically, courts in other jurisdictions have avoided interpretations
of utility tariffs that would abrogate the common law. For example, in
National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Electric Co., 494 S.W.2d 379
(Mo. App. 1973), the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the defendant
electric utility owed a common law duty to plaintiff utility customer.
National Food Stores, 494 S.W.2d  at 381-83. The court then rejected
the utility's contention that its filed tariff immunized it from common law
liability for damages. The court strictly construed the tariff, and found that
the plaintiff's allegations fell outside of the tariff's ambit. Acknowledging
the tariff, the court emphasized: "the crucial point is that [the utility] cannot
divorce itself from the consequences of its own failure to use ordinary care
to avoid harm to its consumers." National Food Stores, 494 S.W.2d  at
384. See also Satellite System, Inc. v. Birch Telecom of Oklahoma,
Inc., 51 P.3d 585, 588 (Okla. 2002) (holding that Oklahoma legislature
had not expressed intent that filed-tariff doctrine abolished common law
fraud claim against utility); State Farm, 245 Ga. at 6-7, 262 S.E.2d  at
896-97 (holding that utility tariff's limitations period did not abrogate
general state law); Hall v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 104 Misc. 2d
565, 568-70, 428 N.Y.S.2d 837, 840-41 (1980) (holding that tariff did
not relieve defendant utility company from its common law tort liability for
termination of electrical service); Kroger Co. v. Appalachian Power
Co., 244 Va. 560, 563, 565, 422 S.E.2d 757, 759-60 (1992)
(interpreting utility tariff in accord with common law rule, observing that
tariff would not shield utility company from "all liability in providing power
to a customer beyond the delivery point").
	As we earlier observed, the tariff provision in this case essentially
codifies the common law rule that a gas company has no duty with respect
to a consumer's gas pipes and fittings, based on the consumer's
responsibility for his or her equipment, and the company's lack of
knowledge and control. Absent express language that disavows the
common law exception based on notice, we cannot say that it was
eliminated by the tariff provision. See, e.g., Bush, 122 Ill. 2d  at 161-62
(holding that the statutory provision "cannot, by its silence," be construed
to change the applicable common law); Bagcraft Corp., 302 Ill. App. 3d
at 340 (holding that without "specific language directing application" of a
statutory provision to a scenario governed by the common law, "we
cannot conclude that the legislature intended to abrogate an entire body
of case law"). We note that our appellate court long ago rejected a gas
company's invocation of the Public Utilities Act as a defense to its
common law duty. See Mrdalj v. Public Service Co. of Northern
Illinois, 308 Ill. App. 424, 430 (1941) (holding where gas company had
been notified of odor of gas prior to explosion which killed property
owner, gas company could not defend on ground that Public Utilities Act
prohibited company from shutting off gas to make inspection, since where
gas company has knowledge that gas is escaping in a building occupied by
consumer it is gas company's duty to shut off gas supply until necessary
repairs have been made). Based on the above-stated principles of
statutory interpretation, this is precisely the situation "for the General
Assembly and not this court" to abrogate NI-Gas' common law duty. See
Bush, 122 Ill. 2d  at 162.
	We hold that NI-Gas' tariff provision did not absolve the company
of its common law duty owed to plaintiff. While a gas company is not an
insurer for any injury sustained as the result of escaping gas, the company
is nonetheless liable for its negligence. See Pappas, 350 Ill. App. at 548.



CONCLUSION
	Based on the present record, we have concluded solely that NI-Gas
owed a duty to warn in this case. Accordingly, there remains a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether NI-Gas breached this duty and, if so,
whether this breach proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Summary
judgment was thus improper. See Happel, 199 Ill. 2d  at 198. Therefore,
we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the cause for further
proceedings.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE GARMAN, dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent. I believe that our analysis should begin and end
with the tariff filed by NI-Gas and approved by the Illinois Commerce
Commission. As a result, I do not think it necessary to reach the question
whether the common law governing the duties of gas companies should be
expanded to recognize a duty to warn of the risk that a connector neither
owned nor installed by the company may deteriorate from exposure to the
odorant that must, by law, be added to the natural gas delivered by NI-Gas to its customers.
	The General Assembly enacted the Public Utilities Act (Act) in 1921.
An Act concerning public utilities, 1921 Ill. Laws 702, approved June 29,
1921, eff. July 1, 1921. Then, as now, the policy of the state is expressed
in the Act:
		"It is therefore declared to be the policy of the State that public
utilities shall continue to be regulated effectively and
comprehensively. It is further declared that the goals and
objectives of such regulation shall be to ensure
			(a) *** that:
			(iv) tariff rates for the sale of various public utility services are
authorized such that they accurately reflect the cost of delivering
those services and allow the utilities to recover the total costs
prudently and reasonably incurred[.]" 220 ILCS 5/1-102(a)(iv)
(West 1994).
	In return for the protections provided, the Act imposes certain duties
upon the utilities it regulates:
			"Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such
service instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as shall promote
the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons,
employees and public and as shall be in all respects adequate,
efficient, just and reasonable.
			All rules and regulations made by a public utility affecting or
pertaining to its charges or service to the public shall be just and
reasonable.
			Every public utility shall, upon reasonable notice, furnish to all
persons who may apply therefor and be reasonably entitled
thereto, suitable facilities and service, without discrimination and
without delay." 220 ILCS 5/8-101 (West 1994).
In addition, regarding the duties of public utilities to providing services and
facilities, the Act requires that:
			"Every public utility subject to this Act shall provide service
and facilities which are in all respects adequate, efficient, reliable
and environmentally safe and which, consistent with these
obligations, constitute the least-cost means of meeting the utility's
service obligations." 220 ILCS 5/8-401 (West 1994).
	This court has long acknowledged that the "policy established by
legislation for the regulation of public utilities is to provide the public with
efficient service at a reasonable rate by compelling an established public
utility occupying a given field to provide adequate service and at the same
time to protect it from ruinous competition." Illinois Power & Light
Corp. v. Commerce Comm'n, 320 Ill. 427, 429-30 (1926). More
recently, this court reiterated: "The Public Utilities Act [citation], under
which the Commerce Commission regulates all public utilities, was
enacted to assure the provision of efficient and adequate utility service to
the public at a reasonable cost." Local 777 v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 45 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1970). See also Bloom Township High
School v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 163, 175
(1999).
	The Act requires the utility to file a tariff with the Illinois Commerce
Commission. 220 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 1994). The tariff "plays an
integral role" in allowing the utility to meet the expectations of the General
Assembly. In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 244 (1994). The liability limitations contained in an approved tariff
serve the public policies of establishing uniform affordable rates and
providing universal service by limiting the utility's exposure to liability.
Thus, although the tariff may be seen as stating the terms of the contract
between the utility and its customers, it is more than a mere contract
between buyer and seller. There is a third party to the transaction-the
state, which as a matter of public policy has chosen to limit the liability of
utilities in return for regulation of their rates. As this court has noted:
		" ' "The theory underlying [decisions upholding the right of
regulated utilities to limit their liabilities] is that a public utility,
being strictly regulated in all operations with considerable
curtailment of its rights and privileges, shall likewise be regulated
and limited as to its liabilities. In consideration of its being
peculiarly the subject of state control, 'its liability is and should
be defined and limited. [Citation.] There is nothing harsh or
inequitable in upholding such a limitation of liability when it is thus
considered that the rates as fixed by the commission are
established with the rule of limitation in mind. Reasonable rates
are in part dependent upon such a rule." ' " Illinois Bell
Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 245-46, quoting Waters v.
Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 523 P.2d 1161, 1164,
114 Cal. Rptr. 753, 756 (1974), quoting Cole v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 419, 246 P.2d 686, 688 (1952).
	The tariff limits liability by narrowly defining the duties undertaken by
the utility and disclaiming any additional duties. The majority
acknowledges our prior case law, which requires that any duty other than
those specifically imposed upon the utility by the Act itself must be found
in the tariff:
			"Illinois courts have long held that a tariff provision such as the
one at issue in this case provides the source for, and determines
the nature and extent of, a public utility's service obligations to its
customers." Slip op. at 20, citing J. Meyer & Co. v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 53, 55 (1980), and Sarelas v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374-75
(1963).
See also Illinois Bell Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 248 (Miller, J.,
specially concurring).
	As the majority also acknowledges, Illinois law on the subject of
tariffs has its roots in federal law, specifically, the federal "filed-rate
doctrine." Slip op. at 18. Although this doctrine is no longer in effect in the
federal courts (see Tempel Steel Corp. v. Landstar Inway Inc., 211 F.3d 1029, 1030 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the ICC Termination Act,
109 Stat. 803 (1995), abolished the tariff filing requirement and the filed-rate doctrine)), it is still a useful starting point for any analysis of the legal
effect of a utility tariff filed and approved pursuant to state law.
	In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 65 L. Ed. 1094, 41 S. Ct. 584 (1921) (cited in slip op. at 18),
the issue was whether the plaintiff/customer was "without assent in fact,
bound as matter of law by the provision limiting liability, because it is a
part of the lawfully established rate." Esteve Brothers, 256 U.S.  at 570,
65 L. Ed.  at 1097, 41 S. Ct.  at 586. The Court held that "limitation of
liability was an inherent part of the rate. The company could no more
depart from it than it could depart from the amount charged for the service
rendered." Esteve Brothers, 256 U.S.  at 571, 65 L. Ed.  at 1097, 41 S. Ct.  at 586. As the majority notes, the federal act at issue in Esteve
Brothers:
			"introduced a new principle into the legal relations of the
telegraph companies with their patrons which dominated and
modified the principles previously governing them. Before the act
the companies had a common law liability from which they might
or might not extricate themselves according to views of policy
prevailing in the several states. *** Uniformity demanded that the
rate represent the whole duty and the whole liability of the
company. It could not be varied by agreement; still less could it
be varied by lack of agreement. The rate became, not as before
a matter of contract by which a legal liability could be modified,
but a matter of law by which a uniform liability was imposed."
Esteve Brothers, 256 U.S.  at 571-72, 65 L. Ed.  at 1097-98,
41 S. Ct.  at 586.
	Later, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252,
72 L. Ed. 555, 48 S. Ct. 234 (1928), the Court stated that once the
Interstate Commerce Commission approved a tariff, the "established rates
*** became the lawful rates and the attendant limitation of liability became
the lawful condition upon which messages might be sent." Priester, 276 U.S.  at 259, 72 L. Ed.  at 565, 48 S. Ct.  at 235. "What had previously
been a matter of common law liability, with such contractual restrictions
as the states might permit, then became the subject of federal legislation
to secure reasonable and just rates for all without undue preference or
advantage to any. Since that end is attainable only by adherence to the
approved rate *** that rate 'represents the whole duty and the whole
liability of the company.' " Priester, 276 U.S.  at 259, 72 L. Ed.  at 565,
48 S. Ct.  at 235, quoting Esteve Brothers, 256 U.S.  at 572, 65 L. Ed. 
at 1097, 41 S. Ct.  at 586. In response to plaintiff's argument that the
company's tariff could not limit its liability for "gross negligence," the Court
concluded: "We may not disregard a lawful exercise of the regulatory
power which has made no distinction between degrees of negligence, nor
may we, upon any theory of public policy, annex to the rate as made
conditions affecting its uniformity and equality." Priester, 276 U.S.  at 260,
72 L. Ed.  at 565, 48 S. Ct.  at 236.
	More recently, the Court stated that the " 'rights as defined by the
tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the
carrier.' " (Emphasis added.) American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227, 141 L. Ed. 2d 222,
236, 118 S. Ct. 1956, 1965 (1998), quoting Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163, 67 L. Ed. 183, 187, 43 S. Ct. 47, 49 (1922). The majority quotes this language, but overlooks the
significance of the mention of torts as well as contracts. Slip op. at 17.
	The General Assembly, by enacting the Public Utilities Act and
creating the Illinois Commerce Commission with the power to approve
tariffs filed by public utilities, has made clear the public policy of the State,
which is to hold public utilities to those duties expressly set out in the Act
and the approved tariffs, and to preclude the judicial recognition of
additional duties on the basis of common law reasoning. Thus, the majority
is correct that whether the tariff bars plaintiff's cause of action "depends
on the nature of plaintiff's lawsuit and the meaning of the tariff's language."
Slip op. at 22.

Nature of the Lawsuit
	The majority correctly states that " 'all state law causes of action are
not necessarily precluded' " by the existence of a filed and approved tariff.
Slip op. at 19, quoting Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Communications
Group, 89 Cal. App. 4th 407, 416, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398 (2001).
The nature of a lawsuit may place it outside the scope of the tariff's
limitation of liability provisions.
	Thus, although Pink Dot acknowledged that Teleport's liability for
gross negligence was limited by the applicable tariff, Pink Dot argued that
its claims against Teleport for breach of contract, fraud, willful misconduct,
intentional interference with economic relations, and unfair competition
were not barred. Pink Dot, 89 Cal. App. 4th  at 412, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 395. This argument was supported by a state statute providing that "
'All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt
anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person
or property of another, or violation of the law, whether willful or negligent,
are against the public policy of the law.' " Pink Dot, 89 Cal. App. 4th  at
413-14, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 396, quoting Cal. Civ. Code §1668 (1994).
Further, the Teleport's tariff was "silent as to the required liability for any
willful misconduct, fraud, or violations of law," although it did contain
"clauses intended to limit [its] liability to its customers for damages caused
by its conduct." Pink Dot, 89 Cal. App. 4th  at 414, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at
396-97. In the end, Pink Dot stands for the unremarkable proposition
that when a state statute expressly precludes such a limit, a tariff's
$10,000 limit on liability cannot "eliminate [the utility's] liability for willful
misconduct, fraud or violations of law by merely omitting the
acknowledgment of such liability from its tariff." Pink Dot, 89 Cal. App. 4th  at 414, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 397.
	In Adamson v. Worldcom Communications, Inc., 190 Or. App.
215, 78 P.3d 577 (2003) (quoted in slip op. at 19), plaintiff's claim for
unfair trade practices was not barred where the tariff limited the
defendant's liability " 'unless such damages are a result of Company's
willful misconduct.' " Adamson, 190 Or. App. at 222, 78 P.3d  at 582.
	The tariff at issue in the present case expressly states that NI-Gas
"assumes no responsibility in connection with the installation, maintenance
or operation" of the customer's equipment. Plaintiff has not cited either a
state statute (as in Pink Dot) or language of the tariff (as in Adamson) that
precludes the limitation of liability claimed by NI-Gas. Nor has she
brought a claim for fraud, negligent driving of a vehicle owned by the
utility, or other tortious conduct of the sort that would place it outside the
scope of the limitation of liability clause of the tariff. Thus, the duty claimed
by plaintiff must be found to exist on the basis of the language of the tariff,
or not at all.

Construction of the Tariff
	The Act is in derogation of the common law. Illinois Bell Switching
Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 240. The majority acknowledges that, as a result,
the Act it is to be strictly construed in favor of persons sought to be
subjected to its operation, that is, in favor of the utility. Slip op. at 28. As
the majority also notes, once the tariff is approved by the Commission, it
has the force of law. Slip op. at 17 (citing Illinois Bell Switching Station,
161 Ill. 2d  at 244, and Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Sankey
Brothers, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439 (1978) (stating that "[a] tariff is
a law, not a contract, and has the force and effect of a statute"), affirmed,
78 Ill. 2d 56 (1979)). Further, the majority states that interpretation of the
tariff is governed by the rules of statutory construction. Slip op. at 24.
	Nevertheless, the majority, citing cases from California, New York,
and Georgia, states that the language of the tariff, especially any
exculpatory language, should be strictly construed against the utility, based
on the canon of construction of contracts that contract terms should be
construed against the drafter. Slip op. at 28. Although it may be "generally
accepted" (slip op. at 28) in some jurisdictions that a tariff should be
construed as a mere contract, there is also contrary authority. The courts
of Washington and Oregon, for example, apply the standard principles of
statutory construction to the interpretation of a tariff, including applying the
rule of construction that the court is to ascertain the drafters' intent when
they promulgated the language. See, e.g., National Union Insurance Co.
v. Puget Sound Power & Light, 94 Wash. App. 163, 171, 972 P.2d 481, 484 (1999); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. City of
Longmont, 924 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Colo. App. 1995).
	Even in a jurisdiction in which the "construe against the drafter" canon
is applied to public utility tariffs, it has been said that "a strict construction
against a tariff's author is not justified where the construction would ignore
a permissible and reasonable construction which conforms to the intentions
of the framers of the tariff." Info Tel Communications, LLC v. US West
Communications, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. App. 1999).
	This court has never held that a public utility tariff should be
construed against the utility that drafted the language. There are valid
arguments to be made on both sides because the tariff has characteristics
of both contract and statute. This court may in some future case be called
upon to decide whether ambiguous language in a tariff should be construed
in favor of or against the drafting utility. This is not such a case. The
language at issue is unambiguous. NI-Gas "assumes no responsibility in
connection with the installation, maintenance or operation" of the
customer's equipment. Our duty is to apply the plain meaning of these
words, in light of the underlying purpose of the Act, which is to provide
citizens of Illinois with utility service at reasonable rates and, as a
necessary part of that scheme, to limit the liability of utility companies.
	The majority also suggests that the tariff provision should not be given
effect because, if it "were a private contract, it would not be interpreted
as permitting NI-Gas to absolve itself of any duty to its customers." Slip
op. at 27. This statement misses the point in several respects. First, it
defies logic to say that a tariff should be enforced under the same rules as
a private contract. The entire concept of a tariff is that it supercedes any
contract between the utility and the individual customer. Indeed, the utility
is forbidden from privately contracting around the terms of the tariff.
Second, the Act and the tariff do not permit the utility to absolve itself of
"any duty." They permit, indeed they require, that the utility undertake
precisely defined duties to its customers. Finally, unlike a private company,
a public utility cannot adjust its prices to compensate for increased
exposure to liability when the courts recognize a new common law duty.
	For example, in Sarelas the plaintiff claimed that Illinois Bell
Telephone owed him a duty of continuing service, which it violated by
interrupting his service for 2½ hours as the result of a clerical error. The
appellate court noted that "in the case of an ordinary corporation this
would be nothing of which to complain, for in general a corporation is
entitled to refrain from doing business with its customers unless it is
otherwise bound by contract; but a utility is different. It has a duty to its
subscribers that goes beyond that of an ordinary corporation. However,
this duty has but one source, the tariff, which in this instance is on file
with the Illinois Commerce Commission." (Emphasis added.) Sarelas, 42
Ill. App. 2d at 374. Thus, the court observed, "the extent to which
defendants owed plaintiff 'a legal duty' is determined by the particular
provisions of the tariff on file with the commission; there is no contract ***
on which plaintiff can rely, nor are his allegations of a breach of duty
sufficient to constitute a claim in tort." Sarelas, 42 Ill. App. 2d at 375. In
the end, a breach of duty by the utility "arises either from the tariff or not
at all." Sarelas, 42 Ill. App. 2d at 375.
	Following the mandate to construe the Act strictly in favor of the
regulated utility, the appellate court in Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf
R.R. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213 (1978), held that section 73 of the Act, which
allows the utility to be held liable for certain acts and omissions, did not
abrogate the common law defense of contributory negligence because it
did not plainly appear that the intent of the statute was to impose strict
liability. Barthel, 74 Ill. 2d  at 221. See also Tucker v. Illinois Power
Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 15, 29 (1992) (construing Act as not authorizing
award of punitive damages in action for negligent termination of gas
service in below freezing weather when plaintiff would not have been
entitled to punitive damages under common law theory of liability).
	The majority purports to apply the "exact reasoning" of Barthel (slip
op. at 29), when it concludes that just as the statute in Barthel did not
abrogate a pre-existing common law defense, the tariff at issue here "does
not abrogate the common law exception." Slip op. at 29. Plaintiff,
however, does not seek to hold NI-Gas liable under an existing
exception to the common law rule that gas companies have no duty with
regard to the fixtures and equipment of their customers. She seeks to
expand the existing exception to recognize an entirely new duty to warn.
	The majority observes that NI-Gas has had opportunities in the past
to assert that the tariff precludes imposition of a duty, yet has not done so.
Slip op. at 20. This observation is not persuasive for two reasons. First,
simple logic dictates that a party's decision to raise a particular issue or
assert a particular defense in one litigation has no preclusive effect in later
litigation with an entirely different party. Second, the cases cited by the
majority are inapposite. In Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. of Illinois v.
Northern Illinois Gas Co., 61 Ill. 2d 6 (1975), the plaintiff's theory of
liability was that NI-Gas negligently performed an inspection. There was
no leak or defect in the plaintiff's equipment. Rather, NI-Gas employees
purportedly inspected plaintiff's equipment for the specific purpose of
determining the proper pressure for the delivery of gas to the plaintiff's
premises. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 61 Ill. 2d  at 9. Previously, in Clare, this court
had noted that a gas company has no duty to inspect the pipes or fixtures
belonging to a customer in the absence of notice of a defect. Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244. Indeed, the gas company has no right to "go upon the premises
of one of its customers for the purpose of inspecting his pipes or other
fixtures except upon the invitation, license or permission of the owner."
Clare, 356 Ill.  at 244. In Pioneer Hi-Bred, as in Clare, a gas company
employee was invited to enter the plaintiff's premises for the purpose of
making an inspection. The inspections served different purposes: in Clare,
to determine the source of an offensive odor; in Pioneer Hi-Bred, to
calculate the proper pressure for the delivery of gas. In Clare, the gas
company was not liable for the eventual damages and injuries because the
evidence showed that the inspection, which was not "negligently or
unskillfully made," did not reveal the source of the leak. Clare, 356 Ill.  at
245. In Pioneer Hi-Bred, the gas company might have been held liable for
negligently conducting an inspection had the plaintiff proven that an
inspection actually took place. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 61 Ill. 2d  at 13-14. This
court agreed with NI-Gas that the trial court properly refused to give the
requested instruction on negligent inspection to the jury, because the
tendered instruction assumed a fact in dispute-that there had actually been
an inspection. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 61 Ill. 2d  at 13-14. The majority's
statement that "[n]either this court nor NI-Gas believed that this tariff
precluded a common law analysis in a negligence action for personal
injury" in Pioneer Hi-Bred (slip op. at 21), although true, is irrelevant. The
common law duty asserted in Pioneer Hi-Bred had already been
recognized in Clare.
	The majority also points to this court's decision in Metz v. Central
Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446 (1965), as further support for
its statement that "where a utility tariff speaks to a specific duty, the tariff
may be controlling; however, where the tariff does not address a
particular situation, the common law applies and a common law duty
analysis must be applied." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 21. When a tariff
speaks to a specific duty, as in this case, it is controlling. The majority
asks why the appellate court failed to mention the tariff in this case. Slip
op. at 21. Metz involved an explosion that occurred as a result of a defect
in the gas main, which is the responsibility of the gas company both
under the tariff and at common law. Thus, the answer to the majority's
question is obvious-the tariff was irrelevant to the gas company's alleged
negligence to properly maintain its own equipment.
	The majority is determined to ignore our obligation to determine
whether NI-Gas has a duty to warn by looking at the plain language of the
tariff, even if that plain meaning departs from the manner in which the
common law may have developed in the decades since the Act was
adopted and the tariff was approved, or the way in which we would
decide the question today. I accept, arguendo, the majority's statement
that "it is evident that the tariff essentially codifies the common law rule that
a gas company has no duty with respect to a consumer's gas pipes and
fittings." Slip op. at 23. Thus, I do not dispute the majority's conclusion
that the tariff "did not abrogate the common law exception to the rule of
a gas company's nonliability." Slip op. at 29. That exception, however,
applies only when the gas company has actual or constructive knowledge
of a gas leak or a defect on the premises of the individual customer.
	NI-Gas had neither actual nor constructive notice of a gas leak in the
Adams' home. At most, NI-Gas was aware that some Cobra connectors
might still be in use in its service area, and that these connectors could fail
after prolonged exposure to the odorant that NI-Gas is required, by law,
to add to natural gas. This does not constitute a "a gas leak of which it has
notice." Slip. op at 24.
	The majority even admits that recognizing a duty to warn on the facts
of this case would not be based on the common law as it existed at the
time the tariff was filed and approved some fifty years ago. It would,
instead, be a "reasoned adaptation" of the preexisting common law. Slip
op. at 15. Our prior case law does not permit such "reasoned adaptation"
of the common law when it would alter the terms of the applicable tariff.
	The majority's conclusion that "allowing this cause of action to
proceed would not contravene" the public policy of this state regarding
liability limitations contained in public utility tariffs (slip op. at 23) is
similarly flawed. Although plaintiff does not seek a rate preference or
enforcement of a "side agreement," she is seeking to impose liability in tort
in excess of that permitted by the tariff. Exposure to liability in tort bears
a direct relationship to rate setting. See Illinois Bell Switching Station,
161 Ill. 2d  at 245.
	Meyer is cited by majority (slip op. at 18) for proposition that the
tariff "provides the source for, and determines the nature and extent of, a
public utility's service obligations to its customers." The Meyer plaintiffs
installed an alarm system on their premises and connected it to the
defendant's equipment at a junction box located on a telephone pole.
Burglars disconnected the alarm at the junction box and made off with
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property from the plaintiffs'
warehouse. The issue on appeal was whether the defendant utility owed
a duty to the plaintiffs "under the circumstances as alleged." As in the
present case, the circumstances in Meyer included a connection between
the customer's equipment and the utility's equipment. That connection
failed and plaintiffs suffered damages as a result. Citing Sarelas, the
appellate court stated, "It has been established that the source of any duty
of Illinois Bell, as a public utility, to its subscribers is only in the tariff as
filed." Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 55. The portions of the tariff dealing with
customer-provided equipment and systems plainly stated that:
		" '[W]here such equipment or system is connected to Company
facilities the responsibility of the Company shall be limited to the
furnishing of facilities suitable for exchange telecommunications
service or *** the Company shall not be responsible for (1) the
through transmission of signals generated by the customer-provided equipment or system, or for the quality of, or defects
in, such transmission ***.' " Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 55.
Thus, the appellate court found that the "plain language of this provision
exculpates [the telephone company] from liability." Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d
at 55. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint
because "the tariff is the sole source of any duty owed by defendant to
plaintiffs" and the plaintiffs had failed to establish a duty thereunder.
Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 56.
	Further, the Meyer court found "a reasonable basis for treating this
public utility differently from private corporations and for limiting its liability
to subscribers in the rendering of its service." Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d at
57. The Act requires that all rates and charges imposed by a public utility
be just and reasonable and, to achieve this end, such rates and charges are
fixed by a state agency. "Without the limitations on liability set forth by the
tariff, defendant would be uniquely vulnerable to claims based on signal
transmission defects which may result from a variety of causes, adversely
affecting its ability to fulfill the public need for reasonable telephone service
charges. This would be particularly true of defects in the transmission of
signals originating from customer-provided equipment over which the
company could have little control." (Emphases added.) Meyer, 88 Ill.
App. 3d at 57.
	In addition to Sarelas and Meyer, the majority also cites North
River Insurance Co. v. Jones, 275 Ill. App. 3d 175 (1995) (slip op. at
16), as a source for the definition of a tariff: "A tariff is a public document
setting forth services being offered, rates and charges with respect to
services and governing rules, regulations and practices relating to those
services." North River, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 185, citing Black's Law
Dictionary 1306 (5th ed. 1979). However, the majority fails to note the
holding of North River. The tariff filed by the defendant utility, Illinois Bell
Telephone, described the terms and conditions under which it would
provide service, including the limitation of liability provision, which had
been in effect for "the past 50 years." North River, 275 Ill. App. 3d at
185. Once such a tariff is implemented, the court held, the utility is
"forbidden from deviating from its terms. It is the filed tariff that defines the
scope of duty owed by [the utility]. The source of any duty of [the utility],
as a public utility to its subscribers, is only in the tariff as filed." North
River, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 185 (citing Meyer, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 55, and
Sarelas, 42 Ill. App. 2d at 375).
	Thus, I conclude that the appellate court in the present case originally
reached the correct result when it concluded that Illinois Bell Switching
was dispositive and held that NI-Gas owed no duty to plaintiff's decedent.
The overwhelming weight of authority from both this court and our
appellate court supports this result. Plaintiff has identified no language in
the tariff or in the Act from which the duty she claims can be said to arise.
Indeed, the plain language of the tariff expressly disclaims any such duty.
	Even if the common law exception imposing a duty based on actual
or constructive knowledge of a leak or defect in the customer's equipment
is deemed to be incorporated into the tariff, it cannot reasonably be said
that the tariff also incorporates any change in the common law of duty that
the courts of this state subsequently make. To do so would be to engage
in bootstrapping of the most egregious kind. In effect, tariffs would not
have the effect of statutes. Rather, they would become mere restatements
of the common law, subject to change over time as the common law of
negligence evolves. This is precisely the situation that the legislature sought
to avoid.
	The majority responds to this statement by citing Bush v. Squellati,
122 Ill. 2d 153 (1988), for the proposition that it is for the General
Assembly, not this court, to abrogate NI-Gas' common law duty. Slip op.
at 31. Bush is inapposite. The issue was whether the maternal
grandparents of a child who was adopted by other relatives on the
maternal side of the child's birth family had standing to seek court-ordered
visitation. This court found no statutory basis for standing and noted that
it was for the legislature to "expand grandparental visitation rights."
Subsequent legislative efforts to do so have met with constitutional
barriers. See Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309 (2002). Bush hardly
offers support for the majority's conclusion that the tariff does not already
shield NI-Gas from liability under these facts.

Conclusion
	The death of Janice Adams was tragic. It is a further tragedy that the
entity likely to blame for the defect that caused her death is no longer in
business. That unfortunate fact, however, is not a sufficient basis for this
court to ignore the public policy of this state as expressed in the Act and
the plain language of the tariff with regard to limits of liability.
	In sum, this court should be guided by our holding in Illinois Bell
Switching Station, 161 Ill. 2d  at 244, that the exculpatory language in the
tariff, which has been "accepted for decades by the General Assembly, is
neither in contravention of the Act passed by that same body, the rules
passed by the Commission (an agency of that body), nor against public
policy." The plain language of the tariff, which not only does not impose
a duty to warn of hazards associated with pipes and fixtures installed and
owned by the customer, but also expressly disclaims any such liability,
should be given effect by this court. I would affirm the judgment of the
circuit court, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NI-Gas.

	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and THOMAS join in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.                
  Count I named Georgevich as a defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Georgevich owed decedent "a duty of ordinary care to insure 
the aforesaid premises was reasonably safe for occupancy;" and that Georgevich breached this alleged duty by (a) failing "to inspect and/or 
cause the inspection of the aforesaid premises for fire safety and prevention;" and (b) permitting the occupancy of the house "when not 
reasonably safe to do so." Georgevich filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment against plaintiff. Georgevich contended that she had no 
duty of care with respect to decedent's house. She argued that although she owned decedent's house, it was in decedent's exclusive 
possession and control. The circuit court granted the motion.       
   
       
   

2.            The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) "is a voluntary membership organization 
that develops consensus standards nationally for a wide variety of devices and procedures." Thatcher v. TWA, 69 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Mo. 
App. 2002); accord Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (2002).
3.      
NI-Gas also brought a contribution claim against Georgevich. If found liable to plaintiff, NI-Gas sought contribution from 
Georgevich in such amount that was attributable to Georgevich's relative fault. Georgevich subsequently moved for summary judgment on 
NI-Gas' contribution claim against her. After granting NI-Gas' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff, the circuit court ruled that 
Georgevich's motion for summary judgment on NI-Gas' contribution claim was moot.