Title: Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1042.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1042 
STAMMCO, L.L.C., D.B.A. THE POP SHOP, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. UNITED 
TELEPHONE COMPANY OF OHIO, D.B.A. SPRINT, ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1042.] 
Civ.R. 23 — Class-action certification — Class-action definition certified by trial 
court does not allow class members to be readily identified. 
(No. 2008-1822 — Submitted October 21, 2009 — Decided March 24, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fulton County, 
No. F-07-024, 2008-Ohio-3845. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal to consider two propositions 
concerning the definition of a class for purposes of a class action under Civ.R. 23.  
Appellants, United Telephone Company of Ohio and Sprint Nextel Corporation, 
ask us to hold that the trial court’s class certification is improper under Civ.R. 23 
and that the case cannot be maintained as a class action.  Because the class 
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definition does not allow the class members to be readily identified, we reverse 
the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court so that it may 
clarify the class definition. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} In June 2005, appellees, Stammco, L.L.C., d.b.a. The Pop Shop 
(“Stammco”) and its owners, Kent and Carrie Stamm, filed a complaint on behalf 
of themselves and all others similarly situated against United Telephone Company 
of Ohio, d.b.a. Sprint (“UTO”) and the Sprint Nextel Corporation (“Sprint”), who 
provided appellees with local and long-distance phone service.  The complaint 
alleged that Stammco and other customers of UTO and Sprint had been damaged 
by appellants’ negligent acts and billing practices.  Specifically, appellees alleged 
that UTO and Sprint had engaged in the practice of “cramming,” or causing 
unauthorized charges to be placed on their customers’ telephone bills.  Appellees 
highlighted one incident, in which charges from a third party, Bizopia, appeared 
on Stammco’s phone bill.  Although Bizopia claimed that it had secured from a 
Stammco employee authorization to charge fees on the bill, Stammco claimed that 
the employee had explicitly told Bizopia that he did not have the authority to 
authorize such charges. 
{¶ 3} Pursuant to Civ.R. 23, appellees filed a motion for certification of 
the following class:  “All individuals, businesses or other entities in the State of 
Ohio who are or who were within the past four years, subscribers to local 
telephone service from United Telephone Company of Ohio d.b.a. Sprint and who 
were billed for charges on their local telephone bills by Sprint on behalf of third 
parties without their permission.  Excluded from this class are defendants, their 
affiliates (including parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, and any other 
entity or its affiliate which has a controlling interest), their current, former, and 
future employees, officers, directors, partners, members, indemnities, agents, 
attorneys and employees and their assigns and successors.”  The trial court 
January Term, 2010 
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granted the motion for class certification, named the Stamms and Stammco class 
representatives, and designated their counsel as counsel for the class. 
{¶ 4} UTO and Sprint appealed the judgment certifying the class, 
asserting in part that the trial court failed to carefully apply the requirements for 
class certification under Civ.R. 23, and that, as a matter of law, no class could 
ever properly be certified based upon appellees’ claims.  After applying the 
factors in Civ.R. 23(A) and the four factors in Civ.R. 23(B)(3), the court of 
appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining the 
motion to certify the class. 
{¶ 5} After initially declining jurisdiction, Stammco, L.L.C. v. United 
Tel. Co. of Ohio, 120 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2009-Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 198, this 
court granted appellants’ motion to reconsider and accepted discretionary 
jurisdiction over appellants’ two propositions of law.  Stammco, L.L.C. v. United 
Tel. Co. of Ohio, 121 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2009-Ohio-1296, 903 N.E.2d 327.  The 
first states, “A plaintiff cannot define the class to include only individuals who 
were actually harmed.”  The second states, “A class action cannot be maintained 
when only some class members have been injured.” 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 6} Civ.R. 23 sets forth the requirements for maintaining a class 
action.  We have noted that there are seven requirements for a class action to be 
maintained under this rule:  “(1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition 
of the class must be unambiguous; (2) the named representatives must be 
members of the class; (3) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; (4) there must be questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (5) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class; (6) the representative parties must fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class; and (7) one of the three Civ.R. 23(B) 
requirements must be met.”  Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
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67, 71, 694 N.E.2d 442, citing Civ.R. 23(A) and (B) and Warner v. Waste Mgt., 
Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 91, 521 N.E.2d 1091. 
{¶ 7} In the present case, the trial judge and court of appeals determined 
that the class was proper under Civ.R. 23(B)(3), which provides that a class action 
may be maintained when “the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  However, we 
have held that “[a]n identifiable class must exist before certification is 
permissible.  The definition of the class must be unambiguous.”  Warner v. Waste 
Mgt., Inc., 36 Ohio St.3d 91, 521 N.E.2d 1091, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
“‘[T]he requirement that there be a class will not be deemed satisfied unless the 
description of it is sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the 
court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.’  7A Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d 
Ed.1986) 120-121, Section 1760.  Thus, the class definition must be precise 
enough ‘to permit identification within a reasonable effort.’ ”  Hamilton v. Ohio 
Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 71-72, 694 N.E.2d 442, quoting Warner v. Waste 
Mgt. at 96. 
{¶ 8} In Warner, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in response to alleged 
activities in and around a dump site by the defendants, including Waste 
Management, Inc.  The trial court certified a class consisting of people who 
“lived, worked, resided or owned real property within a five-mile radius of the 
Waste Management * * * site.”  Warner at 93.  We held that a class defined to 
include all people who had ever worked within five miles of a specific site did not 
permit identification of its members with a reasonable effort and that the trial 
court had abused its discretion in certifying a class whose members were not 
readily identifiable.  Id. at 96. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 9} On the other hand, in Hamilton, the trial court had denied 
plaintiffs’ motion seeking certification of a class and subclasses consisting of 
mortgagors on whose residential loans Ohio Savings Bank calculated interest 
according to a certain method.  Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 72, 694 N.E.2d 
442.  We held that an identifiable class existed because the trial court needed only 
to look at the actions or practices of Ohio Savings Bank to determine whether an 
individual was a member of the class or subclasses.  Id. at 73.  We rejected Ohio 
Savings Bank’s argument that the trial court would be required to conduct an 
individual inquiry into each prospective member’s knowledge or understanding of 
the method for calculating interest before ascertaining whether each person was a 
member of the proposed class.  Because the bank was able to identify prospective 
class members with a reasonable effort, we concluded that there was an 
identifiable class.  Id. at 72-73. 
{¶ 10} In the case now before us, the class certified by the trial court does 
not have readily identifiable members and fails to meet the first requirement of 
Civ.R. 23—that its definition be unambiguous.  The class definition includes 
customers who “were billed for charges on their local telephone bills by Sprint on 
behalf of third parties without their permission.”  This definition does not specify 
whether the customers were expected to give Sprint or the third parties 
authorization for billing, or whether the third parties were expected to obtain 
authorization from the customers for charges on the bill.  In addition, in the phrase 
“their permission” in the class definition, it is unclear who the word “their” refers 
to.  While one might assume that the word “their” refers to customers, it could be 
read to refer to either customers or third parties.  Nor is it clear how authorization 
was to be accomplished—that is, whether written, verbal, or any other form of 
permission was necessary to authorize billing, and to whom it should be given, 
whether directly to Sprint or to the third party. Because the definition is 
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ambiguous, we are unable to rule on appellants’ objections to the class as 
currently defined. 
{¶ 11} Furthermore, unlike in Hamilton, the trial court cannot readily 
identify prospective class members.  In Hamilton, the court needed only to review 
the bank’s records to determine whether a person was a member of the class.  
Here, however, the court must determine individually whether and how each 
prospective class member had authorized third-party charges on his or her phone 
bill.  The trial court must examine testimony by the person claiming to be a 
member of the class and what most likely will be conflicting testimony by Sprint 
or the third party.  For example, the court must determine whether Stammco’s 
employee had authority to authorize Bizopia’s charges and whether the employee 
actually did so.  Unlike the class in Hamilton, the class here cannot be ascertained 
merely by looking at appellants’ records.  While it appears that the class is 
intended to consist only of customers who received unauthorized charges, the 
class definition prevents the class members from being identified without 
expending more than a reasonable effort.  We conclude that a class action cannot 
be maintained under Civ.R. 23 using the class definition as stated and that the trial 
court abused its discretion in certifying the class as so defined. 
{¶ 12} Rather than attempt to redefine the class ourselves, we remand the 
case to the trial court to do so, for two reasons.  First, the parties did not have the 
opportunity to present and argue the merits of alternative class definitions in their 
briefs before us.  Second, the trial judge who conducts the class action and 
manages the case must be allowed to craft the definition with the parties.  See 
Marks v. C.P. Chemical Co., Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 201, 509 N.E.2d 
1249 (“A trial court which routinely handles case-management problems is in the 
best position to analyze the difficulties which can be anticipated in litigation of 
class actions.  It is at the trial level that decisions as to class definition and the 
scope of questions to be treated as class issues should be made”).  In Marks, we 
January Term, 2010 
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noted that “[e]ven if the appellate court does find an abuse of discretion, it should 
not proceed to formulate the class or issue itself.”  Id.  We thus conclude that it is 
proper for the trial court to redefine the class on remand. 
{¶ 13} Because we remand the case to the trial court to clarify and 
complete the class definition, we do not reach appellants’ arguments that the class 
is a fail-safe class, that individualized issues predominate the class, that the class 
is unmanageable, and that a class action is not suitable for the issues present in 
this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 14} We hold that the class certified by the trial court as presently 
defined does not permit its members to be identified with a reasonable effort.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court so that it 
may clarify the class definition in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed, 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and CUPP, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
Introduction 
{¶ 15} I agree with the majority that the class definition in this case is 
ambiguous and that the matter should be remanded in order that the trial court 
may redefine the class.  Therefore I concur in that portion of the majority opinion.  
But I do not completely agree with the analysis used by the majority in reaching 
that determination because the majority strays into issues of predominance and 
superiority.  Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. 
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{¶ 16} In addition, I dissent from the majority opinion because I would 
address the appellants’ propositions of law.  When the trial court redefines the 
class on remand, the court and the parties would benefit from a ruling on the 
issues raised in the propositions of law.  Judicial economy would be served by 
determining these issues now, rather than allowing the issues to lurk on remand 
and resurface in a new appeal. 
{¶ 17} I would hold that the class in this case was ambiguously defined, 
but was not otherwise improper.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it determined that classwide issues are predominant in this case. 
Law and Analysis 
The class definition is ambiguous 
{¶ 18} To properly establish a class under Civ.R. 23(A), the definition 
must define an identifiable group of persons in unambiguous terms.  Warner v. 
Waste Mgt. Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 91, 96, 521 N.E.2d 1091.  “ ‘The test is 
whether the means is specified at the time of certification to determine whether a 
particular individual is a member of the class.’ ” Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 73, 694 N.E.2d 442, quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. 
of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 63, 556 N.E.2d 
157. 
{¶ 19} The class in this case is defined as follows: “All individuals, 
businesses or other entities in the State of Ohio who are or who were within the 
past four years, subscribers to local telephone service from United Telephone 
Company of Ohio d.b.a. Sprint who were billed for charges on their local 
telephone bills by Sprint on behalf of third parties without their permission.  
Excluded from this class are defendants, their affiliates (including parents, 
subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, and any other entity or its affiliate which 
has a controlling interest), their current, former, and future employees, officers, 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
directors, partners, members, indemnities, agents, attorneys and employees and 
their assigns and successors.” 
{¶ 20} I agree that the class definition is ambiguous.  The phrase “without 
their permission” is unclear.  We cannot discern whether the customers/plaintiffs 
should have given permission to United Telephone Company of Ohio, d.b.a. 
Sprint, or to the third parties for the charges, and what form that permission 
should have taken. Thus, the definition fails to unambiguously specify the criteria 
by which to determine whether a particular person is a member of the class.  I 
concur in that portion of the majority opinion.  As an appellate court, we should 
refrain from endeavoring to define the class; that responsibility rests with the trial 
court.  Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 201, 509 N.E.2d 
1249.  Therefore, I agree that the matter should be remanded to the trial court. 
The determination of ambiguity under Civ.R. 23(A) should not be confused with 
the determination of the predominance of classwide issues and the superiority of a 
class action under Civ.R. 23(B)(3) 
{¶ 21} In analyzing whether the class definition is ambiguous, the 
majority improperly includes issues relating to predominance and superiority 
under Civ.R. 23(B)(3).  In particular, the majority explains that the class 
definition is ambiguous because, among other reasons, the trial court cannot 
“readily identify” class members.  The majority states: “[T]he trial court cannot 
readily identify prospective class members. * * *  Here, * * * the trial court must 
determine individually whether and how each prospective class member had 
authorized third-party charges on his or her phone bill.  The trial court must 
examine testimony by the person claiming to be a member of the class and what 
most likely will be conflicting testimony by Sprint or the third party.”1  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 11. 
                                                 
1.  This analysis closely mirrors the predominance analysis in Brown v. SBC Communications, 
Inc. (Feb. 4, 2009), S.D.Ill.. No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2009 WL 260770.  When determining whether 
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{¶ 22} We have held that a class must be identifiable with “reasonable 
effort” and that an amorphous class is not “readily identifiable.”  Warner v. Waste 
Mgt., 36 Ohio St.3d at 96, 521 N.E.2d 1091.  For example, “[c]lasses such as ‘all 
people active in the peace movement,’ ‘all people who have been or may be 
harassed by the police’ and ‘all poor people,’ are too amorphous to permit 
identification within a reasonable effort and thus may not be certified.”  Id.  The 
focus is on the definition itself—whether it is so abstract that it defies utilization. 
{¶ 23} Yet according to the majority’s analysis of the issue, the trial court 
cannot “readily identify” class members if there are differing facts and legal 
issues among them. 
{¶ 24} In Hamilton, we rejected a similar argument: “[E]ven when a class 
is appropriately defined by reference to defendant’s conduct, it is nevertheless 
indefinite if separate adjudications are likely required to finally determine the 
action.”  Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 73, 694 N.E.2d 442.  “The focus at this stage 
is on how the class is defined.  ‘The test is whether the means is specified at the 
time of certification to determine whether a particular individual is a member of 
the class.’  Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho 
(1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 63, 556 N.E.2d 157, 165.  The question as to whether 
there are differing factual and legal issues ‘do[es] not enter into the analysis until 
the court begins to consider the Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requirement of predominance and 
superiority.’ Marks, supra, 31 Ohio St.3d at 202, 31 OBR at 400, 509 N.E.2d at 
1253.”  Hamilton at 73.  In Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Project Jericho, we 
explained that “[t]he fact that members may be added or dropped during the 
course of the action is not controlling.  The test is whether the means is specified 
                                                                                                                                     
questions common to the class predominated over individual questions, the court in Brown found, 
“[T]he Court will need to make individual determinations as to whether each proposed class 
member authorized the charges for which he was billed by defendants. The result will be multiple 
mini-trials, each requiring individual proofs.”  Id. at *3.   
January Term, 2010 
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at the time of certification to determine whether a particular individual is a 
member of the class.” 52 Ohio St.3d at 63, 556 N.E.2d 157. 
{¶ 25} Thus, we have already rejected an analysis that blends Civ.R. 
23(A) concepts, such as a readily identifiable class, with Civ.R. 23(B)(3) 
considerations, such as the predominance of individualized issues.  Yet the 
majority’s decision today blurs the line by injecting issues relating to 
predominance and superiority under Civ.R. 23(B)(3) into the analysis of whether 
the class definition is readily identifiable under Civ.R. 23(A).  This is no small 
point.  The majority’s analysis will not help the trial court to define the class on 
remand, nor will it help clarify the law regarding class actions.  Instead, courts 
may be caused to question whether our holding represents a new development in 
the law. 
{¶ 26} In this case, class definition provided means to determine the class, 
which would have sufficed, were it not for the ambiguity.  In order to determine 
class membership, the trial court would need to determine whether a putative 
class member (1) received a bill from United Telephone, (2) was assessed for 
third-party charges on that bill, (3) did not give appropriate authorization for the 
placement of those charges on that bill, and (4) is not among the exempted 
entities.  The ambiguity lies in the phrase “without their permission”; the trial 
court lacks a method to determine the form and manner such permission should 
have taken.  But once that method is clarified, the trial court will possess 
sufficient means for determining class membership from the class definition. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that classwide questions 
of law and fact predominate 
{¶ 27} Appellants contend in their second proposition of law that the class 
was improper under Civ.R. 23(B)(3) because of the predominance of issues 
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affecting only individual members of the class.2  Appellants argue that the class 
cannot be maintained, because the validity of third-party charges would have to 
be determined on an individualized, case-by-case basis.  I would address this 
proposition of law and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that classwide questions predominate.  The four federal court cases 
that appellants cite do not persuade me otherwise. 
{¶ 28} Appellants’ second proposition of law asks us to apply the long-
settled law controlling class certification. 
{¶ 29} A trial court must “find[] that the questions of law or fact common 
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members” before it certifies a class under Civ.R. 23(B)(3). 
{¶ 30} We have held that “[t]he mere existence of different facts 
associated with the various members of a proposed class is not by itself a bar to 
certification of that class. If it were, then a great majority of motions for class 
certification would be denied. Civ.R. 23(B)(3) gives leeway in this regard and 
permits class certification where there are facts common to the class members.”  
In re Consol. Mtge. Satisfaction Cases, 97 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002-Ohio-6720, 780 
N.E.2d 556, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 31} This case presents the type of claims appropriate for class-action 
treatment because it includes common questions regarding significant aspects of 
the case which “arise from standardized forms or routinized procedures.”   
Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 84, 694 N.E.2d 442.  As the court of appeals correctly 
observed, this case will require significant individualized determinations, but the 
majority of those determinations as well as classwide determinations can be made 
by examining appellants’ computerized records. 
                                                 
2.  Appellants also assert in their merit brief that the class action is not manageable and is not 
superior to other methods of resolving disputes.  However, these issues were not raised in the 
memorandum seeking jurisdiction or the motion for reconsideration and are therefore outside the 
scope of the propositions of law that we accepted for review.   
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 32} We have consistently held that a trial court has discretion in 
determining whether to certify a class under Civ.R. 23 and that that determination 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.  “[A] trial judge is given 
broad discretion when deciding whether to certify a class action. * * * Moreover, 
‘absent a showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court's determination as to class 
certification will not be disturbed.’  [Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
310, 312-313, 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822.]  An abuse of discretion connotes 
more than a mere error of law or judgment, instead requiring a finding that the 
trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  In re 
Consol. Mtge. Satisfaction Cases, 97 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002-Ohio-6720, 780 
N.E.2d 556, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 33} Appellants direct us to four decisions of federal courts, which they 
believe should guide the outcome of this case.  I would hold that those cases are 
distinguishable and that, in any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it determined that classwide issues were predominant in this case. 
{¶ 34} In two of the cited cases, the entanglement of multiple causes of 
action and multiple statutes and a lack of standardized practices led the federal 
courts to hold that individualized issues predominated.  Sikes v. Teleline, Inc. 
(C.A.11, 2002), 281 F.3d 1350; Andrews v. AT&T (C.A.11, 1996), 95 F.3d 1014. 
{¶ 35} Sikes and Andrews are conceptually similar to Schmidt v. Avco 
Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 314, 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822, in which we 
held that “a class action would be inefficient and non-economical * * * because 
the claims raised involve noncommon issues that are either inextricably entangled 
with common issues or are too unwieldy to be handled adequately on a class 
action basis.” 
{¶ 36} We distinguished Schmidt from Hamilton by noting that the claims 
in Schmidt involved many “inextricably entangled” “noncommon issues.”  
Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 83-84, 694 N.E.2d 442.  In Hamilton, we explained 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that “class action treatment is appropriate where the claims arise from 
standardized forms or routinized procedures” despite the need for individualized 
proof on the issue of reliance.  Id. at 84.  Sikes and Andrews are distinguishable 
from this case because they involved a broader spectrum of claims and law and 
demanded an inquiry into the state of mind of each individual plaintiff.  Sikes and 
Andrews do not aid in the disposition of this case. 
{¶ 37} Appellants also direct us to Stern v. Cingular Wireless Corp. (Feb. 
23, 2009), C.D.Cal. No. CV 05-8842, 2009 WL 481657, and Brown v. SBC 
Communications, Inc. (Feb. 4, 2009), S.D.Ill. No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2009 WL 
260770.  While those cases are admittedly similar to this case, appellants have 
failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the 
class in this case. 
{¶ 38} In Stern, the trial court refused to certify a class defined as cell-
phone purchasers who claimed that certain services had been added to their plans 
without their permission.  Id. at *2.  The outcome in Stern was based on the 
plaintiffs’ inability to offer any evidence that would establish on a classwide basis 
which services had been selected by the customer at the point of purchase and 
which had been provided.  Id. at *7-8. 
{¶ 39} Similarly, in Brown, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had 
placed unauthorized monthly fees on their local phone bills.  2009 WL 260770 at 
*1.  The court refused to certify the class, finding that “the Court will need to 
make individual determinations as to whether each proposed class member 
authorized the charges for which he was billed by defendants. The result will be 
multiple mini-trials, each requiring individual proofs. Consequently, there will be 
no judicial economy realized from certifying this action as a class action.”  Id. at  
*3. 
{¶ 40} Unlike in Sikes and Brown, the trial court in this case determined 
that a class action was appropriate.  Relying on Ritt v. Billy Blanks Ents., 171 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
Ohio App.3d 204, 2007-Ohio-1695, 870 N.E.2d 212, the trial court found that 
individualized issues did not predominate and that the policies behind class 
actions supported allowing the class in this case.  Although the unpublished 
district court cases Stern and Brown are somewhat similar to this case, that fact 
does not automatically mean that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying 
the class. 
{¶ 41} Each class action is different and each trial court will decide issues 
of predominance based upon the facts present in the case before it.  Thus, one 
court may appropriately certify a class, even if it resembles one that was not 
certified by another court under Civ.R. 23(B), when the circumstances, claims, 
issues, and evidence alter the analysis.  Furthermore, the determination will be 
upheld absent an abuse of discretion, so a trial court may certify a diverse range of 
classes—even classes similar to those that have been rejected in the past—and 
that determination will not be reversed based upon a mere error of law or 
judgment.  In re Consol. Mtge. Satisfaction Cases, 97 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002-Ohio-
6720, 780 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 5. 
The defined class is not a “fail-safe class” 
{¶ 42} In their first proposition of law, appellants urge us to find that the 
class in this case is a “fail-safe class” and that it is therefore defectively defined.3  
“Fail-safe class” refers to a class definition that is improper because the members 
of the class cannot be known until a determination has been made as to the merits 
of the claim or the liability of the opposing party.  Adashunas v. Negley (C.A.7, 
1980), 626 F.2d 600, 603.  Thus, a fail-safe class “put[s] the cart before the 
horse”.  Mims v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (N.D.Tex.2008), 254 F.R.D. 482, 486. 
                                                 
3.  Appellants’ first proposition of law is phrased: “A plaintiff cannot define the class to include 
only individuals who were actually harmed.”  The substance of appellants’ arguments under this 
proposition of law deal predominantly with the notion of a “fail-safe class.”  The remainder of 
appellants’ arguments under the first proposition of law deal mainly with alleged errors of the 
findings that a trial court must make in certifying a class and are not germane to the resolution of 
the fail-safe-class issue that we accepted for review.     
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{¶ 43} We can resolve this issue by applying the holding in Ojalvo v. Bd. 
of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 233, 12 OBR 313, 466 
N.E.2d 875, that a court cannot reach the merits of a case at the class-certification 
stage.  Here, the class definition contains the phrase “individuals * * * who were 
* * * billed for charges on their local telephone bills * * * on behalf of third 
parties without their permission.”  Appellants contend that this phrase prohibits 
class certification because class membership cannot be determined until a finding 
on the issue of liability has been made.  In so contending, appellants appear to 
concede that the lack of permission equates automatically with liability, but this is 
not the case.  Defining the class in such a way does not require a determination on 
the issue of liability or the merits of the underlying causes, because finding a class 
of customers who were assessed charges that they had not authorized does not 
require a determination that appellants are liable to the customers.4   
{¶ 44} In sum, determination of membership in the class in this case does 
not depend on a predetermination of the merits of the case or liability of the 
appellants. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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4.  Furthermore, appellants contend that they are not liable for the third-party-billing practices 
even if a charge was unauthorized.  In their notice of appeal, appellants state that “United 
Telephone's practice of passing third-party charges along to the customer is a neutral one. Most 
charges are unquestionably legitimate, and if one were proved ultimately to be unauthorized, it 
would be as a result of the conduct of a third party, not United Telephone.”  In appellants’ merit 
brief, they explain that even if plaintiffs could prove that the third-party charges were 
unauthorized, liability would still not automatically attach: “Even class members who could prove 
[that they received and paid a third-party charge for a service that they did not request or use] 
would still have to prove that their payment of the charge was caused by United Telephone and 
not by their own conduct or the conduct of a third-party service provider.”  
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Dennis E. Murray Sr., and Donna J. Evans, 
for appellees. 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Michael K. Farrell, Thomas D. Warren, Karl 
Fanter, and John B. Lewis, for appellants. 
Aneel L. Chablani, Andrew D. Neuhauser, and Stanley A. Hirtle, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. 
Linda S. Woggon, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce. 
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