Title: Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Hutto

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

401 So. 2d 1277 (1981) KERR-McGEE CORPORATION and Home Insurance Co. v. Tommy HUTTO, Deceased, Dependent of. No. 52333. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 22, 1981. Rehearing Denied August 12, 1981. James M. Anderson, McCoy, Wilkins, Noblin & Anderson, Jackson, for appellant. J. Brice Kerr, Rex Gordon, Sr., Pascagoula, for appellee. EN BANC. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal by Kerr-McGee Corporation and Home Insurance Company, hereinafter Kerr-McGee, from the Circuit Court of Jackson County's decision awarding Cecil Hutto workmen's compensation benefits for the death of his son, Tommy. Kerr-McGee contends the lower court erred (1) in finding that the death of Tommy Hutto arose out of and in the course of his employment; (2) in failing to find that the death of Tommy Hutto was the result of his wilful intention to injure or kill another; and (3) in finding that Cecil Hutto, father of the deceased, Tommy Hutto, sustained his burden of proving dependency. Tommy Hutto was shot on June 24, 1978, on the premises of People's Service Station on Chico Road in Pascagoula, where he was employed, by Robert Glenn Scruggs. Tommy Hutto, who died from the injury, was 21 years of age and single. The only dependent entitled to make claim for workmen's compensation benefits was Cecil Hutto, Tommy's father. According to the appellee's brief, Cecil Hutto died on January 29, 1980. Alice Scruggs was manager of the service station where Tommy Hutto was shot. At the time of Tommy's death, Mrs. Scruggs was living with him, although she was married to Robert Glenn Scruggs, who shot Tommy. The fact that Mrs. Scruggs was involved in an affair with Tommy was known to her husband. Mr. Scruggs was *1278 the manager of another People's Service Station which was located on Ingalls Avenue. Mrs. Scruggs testified Tommy had occasionally worked part-time for her husband, who also testified that Tommy had worked for him some two or three days. Also, Scruggs testified that he controlled Mrs. Scruggs' station: On the day young Hutto was killed, Scruggs arrived at the station and pulled to the side of it. He then motioned for Mrs. Scruggs to come out. Scruggs stated that he went to the station for the purpose of seeing Alice and after talking to Alice, asked her to send Tommy to his car. Alice testified: Tommy went to Scruggs' car, and following a conversation, Scruggs shot Tommy. Mrs. Scruggs testified she did not hear any of the conversation. Scruggs testified his shooting of Tommy had nothing to do with his work at the service station and that he shot in self-defense because Tommy was pulling a knife. Furthermore, Scruggs testified Tommy had pulled a knife on him twice before and threatened to kill him. Prior to the hearing in this case, Scruggs had pleaded guilty in circuit court to the charge of manslaughter. The Administrative Judge decided Cecil Hutto's claim was compensable, stating: A majority of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed the Administrative Judge's award and stated in part: The Chairman of the Commission dissented, because in his opinion the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that Mr. Scruggs shot Tommy for a purely personal reason. The Circuit Court of Jackson County affirmed the decision of the Commission on the basis that the "employer, through its supervisors, created or caused the confrontation even though the basis for the confrontation was non-work related." The foregoing has been stated to explain the posture of the case before deciding the question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and if jurisdiction has been established, then for a disposition on the merits. The following is the sequence of events leading to this appeal: When the appeal reached this Court, there was no mention in the record of Cecil Hutto's death. At no time, until requested by this Court, had the attorney for Cecil Hutto filed a motion to revive. Claimant's death came to our attention by a statement in the Brief for the Appellee. The Appellants state in their brief in response to the jurisdictional issue that the Appellee's brief filed in the circuit court also contained a statement that the claimant, Cecil Hutto, had died on January 29, 1980. This Court, after discovering that Cecil Hutto had died, entered an order abating this cause pending its revival. See Mississippi Sup.Ct. Rule 6. This is not a case where a party died between verdict and judgment. That situation is covered by Section 11-7-25 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972): Nor is it a case where a party died after judgment in the lower court but prior to a decision by this Court. That situation is covered by Section 11-3-17 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972): In this case, Cecil Hutto died between the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the circuit court's affirmance of that judgment. We are of the opinion the decision in Burton v. Redmond, 211 Miss. 158, 51 So. 2d 210 (1951), rev'd on other grounds 220 Miss. 704, 71 So. 2d 772 (1954), governs the instant case. In Burton, as in the present case, one of the parties in the ejectment action in county court, Dr. Redmond, died prior to a circuit court's decision on appeal. At the time of the circuit court's affirmance of the county court's decision, Dr. Redmond's death was not pointed out by either side. On appeal to this Court, the appellants argued the circuit court erred in affirming the judgment because Dr. Redmond was dead. The response was a revivor motion by the heirs and devisees of Dr. Redmond. We held: We, therefore, are of the opinion that all parties are now properly before this Court. This case is distinguished from Owen v. Abraham, 233 Miss. 558, 102 So. 2d 372 (1958). In Owen, the chancellor, who originally tried the case on the merits, took the case under advisement on November 30, 1956, and rendered a written opinion on March 19, 1957. Meanwhile, the defendant, who was being sued for divorce, had died on December 4, 1956. This Court, after motion by the appellee that the court was without jurisdiction because an appeal bond cannot be executed by a dead man, held the appeal should be dismissed and stated: Owen is distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. First, in Owen the deceased died prior to a finding by the original trier of the facts, whereas here, Cecil Hutto died during an appeal and review process. Second, and more importantly, the Owen case is distinguishable because it involved a divorce proceeding and the general rule is that the death of a party in a divorce action prior to the final decree ends the marriage of the parties and cancels the bill of complaint for divorce. Pittman v. Pittman, 375 So. 2d 415 (Miss. 1979). But see Thrash v. Thrash, 385 So. 2d 961 (Miss. 1980). In contrast, the Burton and instant case involved property disputes which allow the heirs, devisees, or legatees to step into the shoes of the deceased. As pointed out by this Court in discussing its original opinion when Burton reached it a second time for a consideration of whether the filing of a suggestion of error suspends the time for performance of a condition in the judgment: Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 620, at 667 (1950), states in part: In the instant case, assuming Cecil Hutto was entitled to benefits, the compensation, accrued but unpaid prior to death, becomes an asset of his estate. Truck Trailer Sales & Service Co. v. Moore, 244 Miss. 317, 141 So. 2d 541 (1962). See also Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation § 191, at 259-260 (1967). Therefore, Cecil Hutto's heirs have "stepped into his shoes" and are asking for a revival of this action. Because we are of the opinion the Burton case is applicable and the cause is properly before the Court, we proceed to the merits of this case. We are of the opinion that compensation benefits were properly allowed by the administrative judge, Commission, and circuit court. We think so because Tommy Hutto's death occurred as a result of being about his business at his place of employment. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7 (1972). Specifically, Tommy Hutto was injured while responding to a directive from his immediate superior, Mrs. Scruggs, that her husband, also his superior, wanted to speak to him. As previously observed, Mr. Scruggs had some managerial capacity over Mrs. Scruggs, who managed the station where Hutto was employed. Hutto responded to a directive, and was shot and killed as a result. In our opinion, the employee's death was so strongly connected to the directive of his superior that it cannot be completely disassociated from his employment, and compensation should be allowed. Section 71-3-7 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) provides in part: Section 71-3-3(b) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) defines injury as: Perhaps the issue presented can best be illustrated by the following from Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, 2d Ed. § 161, at 207 (1967): It is our opinion the facts of this case are unique and that the usual coemployee and third party cases heretofore decided are not directly applicable. The coemployee cases are somewhat distinguishable because the present injury was not occasioned by a coemployee but rather by a superior, the employer. Also, we cannot determine whether young Hutto and Mrs. Scruggs became *1282 enamored of each other because of their physical proximity to each other brought about by their employment, or whether they were romantically involved prior to the employee-employer relationship. Again, the facts are unusual but see Mutual Implement and Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 214 Miss. 823, 59 So. 2d 547 (1952), generally as to injuries between coemployees. Those cases concerning injury caused by a third party, although somewhat analogous on the facts, are not applicable, because none of the injuries or death were caused by a fellow employee or employer. See Ellis v. Rose Oil Company of Dixie, 190 So. 2d 450 (Miss. 1966); Estate of West v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 228 Miss. 890, 90 So. 2d 1 (1956); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 59 So. 2d 294 (1952). In sum, Section 71-3-7 requires that the death of an employee from injury arise out of and in the course of employment before it is compensable. The administrative judge, Commission and circuit court all held this requirement was met because Tommy Hutto, when requested by his immediate superior, went to the parking lot to talk to another superior. It is our opinion this was not error; and therefore, the allowance of compensation benefits is affirmed. Since Cecil Hutto, the claimant, is deceased, the compensation, accrued but unpaid prior to this death, becomes an asset of his estate. AFFIRMED. SUGG, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. WALKER, J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and BROOM, J., dissent. WALKER, Justice, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court which holds that workmen's compensation benefits must be paid for the death of a service station attendant who was shot and killed because he was engaged in a love affair with the wife of the service station owner (the wife managed the station where the deceased worked). I firmly believe in the concept of workmen's compensation for the protection of workers who are killed or injured from the hazards of their work. However, to allow benefits for injuries or death arising out of a love affair, as in the present case, seems to me to stretch the workmen's compensation concept too far and certainly far beyond the intent of the legislature which provided that benefits would only be payable for injuries or death arising out of and in the course of a workman's employment. I fail to see how Mr. Hutto's employment had anything to do with his death except to afford the amorous couple the opportunity to meet. It seems significant to me that no case from this or any other state is cited as allowing recovery of benefits under similar circumstances. In this instance, Mississippi deserves no award for being "first." Uncalled for awards, such as this, must ultimately be paid by the general public through higher-priced goods in the market place. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and BROOM, J., concur in this dissent.