Title: State v. Hochhausler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, V. HOCHHAUSLER ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State v. Hochhausler (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Motor vehicles -- Traffic laws -- Driving while intoxicated -- 
Administrative license suspension provisions of R.C. 4511.191 
do not violate right to procedural due process -- “No stay” 
provision of R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) is unconstitutional and 
severable from rest of statute -- R.C. 4511.195 unconstitutional 
as applied to owner of vehicle seized and immobilized because 
the vehicle was being operated by a third person when that 
person was arrested on a drunk-driving charge. 
1.  
The administrative license suspension provisions of R.C.  
 
 
4511.191 do not violate the right to procedural due 
 
 
 process. 
2. 
The “no stay” provision of R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) is unconstitutional  
 
 
as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and is  
 
 
severable from the rest of the statute. 
3. 
R.C. 4511.195 is unconstitutional as applied to the owner of a 
vehicle that has been seized and immobilized 
because the vehicle was being operated by a third 
 
2
person when that person was arrested on a drunk-
driving charge. 
 
(No. 95-1365 -- Submitted February 7, 1996 -- Decided July 
30,1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County, Nos. CA93-
12-104 and CA93-12-105. 
 
On December 3, 1993, appellant Thomas J. Hochhausler was 
arrested and charged with his second offense within five years of driving 
while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A).  Hochhausler’s consent 
to a breath-alcohol test resulted in a reading of .105 grams of alcohol by 
weight per two hundred ten liters of breath.  Pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191(F)(2), the police immediately placed Hochhausler under an 
administrative license suspension (“ALS”) for a period of one year.  
 
At the time of the arrest, Hochhausler was driving a Ford pick-up 
truck owned by appellant Omni Fireproofing, Inc. (“Omni”).  Omni is a 
closely held corporation in which Hochhausler is the president and 
 
3
majority shareholder.  The vehicle was seized and the license plates 
were impounded pursuant to R.C. 4511.195. 
 
On December 9, at his initial appearance before the trial court, 
Hochhausler entered a plea of not guilty and made the following 
motions: (1) to dismiss the ALS on the ground that the suspension 
violated the Ohio and United States Constitutions; (2) to appeal the ALS 
pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(H)(1); and (3) to stay the ALS pending 
appeal.  An employee of Omni also appeared at the hearing and moved 
the trial court to release the seized vehicle pursuant to R.C. 
4511.195(C)(2)(a).  Subsequently, on December 14, the trial court 
denied all four motions. 
 
On December 16, Hochhausler appealed the denial of his motions 
to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) unconstitutionally infringes upon both the doctrine of 
separation of powers by denying jurisdiction to any court to stay an ALS 
suspension, and the right to procedural due process by failing to provide 
 
4
a prompt and meaningful postdeprivation hearing.  Likewise, on 
December 20, Omni appealed the denial of its motion to regain 
possession of its motor vehicle, arguing that R.C. 4511.195 violates the 
right to procedural due process.  
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
holding that R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) and 4511.195 do not violate the Due 
Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  Further, 
the court of appeals interpreted the “no stay” provision of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) as “merely prohibiting a municipal court, county court, 
mayor’s court or other court of original jurisdiction from staying a license 
suspension imposed under R.C. 4511.191(E) or (F) pending an ALS 
appeal.”  In order to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the 
court of appeals interpreted the “no stay” provision as not precluding a 
court of appeals or the Ohio Supreme Court from staying an 
administrative license suspension pending appeal.  Finally, the court of 
appeals reversed the dismissal of Hochhausler’s ALS appeal and 
 
5
remanded the cause for a hearing on the ALS pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191(H).  Both Hochhausler and Omni appealed the adverse 
judgments to this court. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
------------------------ 
 
Timothy A. Oliver, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Carolyn 
A. Duvelius, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, 
Attorney General, Jeffery S. Sutton, State Solicitor, Susan E. Ashbrook 
and  Andrew S. Bergman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Rittgers & Mengle, W. Andrew Hasselbach and Charles H. 
Rittgers, for appellants. 
 
Baker & Hostetler, Richard W. Siehl and Anthony J. Franze, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Mothers Against Drunk Driving. 
 
6
 
Baker & Hostetler, William W. Falsgraf and Shilpa Shah, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, American Alliance for Rights and 
Responsibilities. 
 
James M. Looker, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
Gump & Slyman Co., L.P.A., Jeffrey D. Slyman and Dennis E. 
Gump, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
------------------------ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  In this case, we are asked to determine several 
issues relating to the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.191 and 4511.195. 
 
It is a well-settled rule that an Act of the General Assembly is 
entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.  Arnold v. Cleveland 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163.  Moreover, challenged 
legislation will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes the 
unconstitutional nature of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hilton 
 
7
v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O. 3d 430, 431, 405 
N.E.2d 1047, 1049.  We apply these principles to both appeals. 
I 
R.C. 4511.191 -- Procedural Due Process 
 
Hochhausler argues that the administrative suspension of his 
driver’s license pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F) is unconstitutional 
because the statute permits the suspension to occur without due 
process of law.   
 
R.C. 4511.191(F) provides:  
 
“Upon receipt of the sworn report of an arresting officer completed 
and sent to the registrar and a court pursuant to divisions (D)(1)(c) and 
(D)(2) of this section in regard to a person whose test results indicate 
that his blood contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of one per 
cent or more by weight of alcohol, his breath contained a concentration 
of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two 
hundred ten liters of his breath, or his urine contained a concentration of 
 
8
fourteen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one 
hundred milliliters of his urine at the time of the alleged offense, the 
registrar shall enter into his records the fact that the person’s driver’s or 
commercial driver’s license or permit or nonresident operating privilege 
was suspended by the arresting officer under division (D)(1)(a) of this 
section and the period of the suspension, as determined under divisions 
(F)(1) to (4) of this section.  The suspension shall be subject to appeal 
as provided in this section and shall be for whichever of the following 
periods that applies: 
 
“(1)  If the person has not been convicted, within five years of the 
date the test was conducted of a violation of section 4511.19 of the 
Revised Code, * * * the period of the suspension or denial shall be 
ninety days. 
 
“(2)  If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date 
the test was conducted, of one violation of a statute or ordinance 
 
9
described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the suspension 
or denial shall be one year. 
 
“(3)  If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date 
the test was conducted, of two violations of a statute or ordinance 
described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the suspension 
or denial shall be two years. 
 
“(4)  If the person has been convicted, within five years of the date 
the test was conducted, of more than two violations of a statute or 
ordinance described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of the 
suspension or denial shall be three years.” 
 
 
R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) permits a person to appeal the administrative 
license suspension at the initial appearance on the underlying DUI 
charge, which must be held within five days of arrest.  Division (H)(1) 
further provides that the only issues that may be raised in an ALS 
appeal are: 
 
10
 
“(a)  Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable ground 
to believe the arrested person was operating a vehicle * * * while under 
the influence * * * or with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the 
blood, breath, or urine and whether the arrested person was in fact 
placed under arrest; 
 
“(b)  Whether the law enforcement officer requested the arrested 
person to submit to the chemical test * * *; 
 
“(c)  Whether the arresting officer informed the arrested person of 
the consequences of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the test; 
 
“(d)  Whichever of the following is applicable: 
 
“(i)  Whether the arrested person refused to submit to the 
chemical test requested by the officer; 
 
“(ii)  Whether the chemical test results indicate that [the arrestee’s 
blood, breath, or urine contain alcohol in excess of the statutory limits.]”  
R.C. 4511.191(H)(1)(a) through (d). 
 
11
 
Due process under the Ohio and United States Constitutions 
demands that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be 
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner where the 
state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property interest.  Greene v. 
Lindsey (1982), 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249; Boddie 
v. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 
113; Williams v. Dollison (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 297, 299, 16 O.O. 3d 
350, 351, 405 N.E.2d 714, 716.  However, the concept of due process is 
flexible and varies depending on the importance attached to the interest 
and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation may 
occur.  Walters v. Natl. Assn. of Radiation Survivors (1985), 473 U.S. 
305, 320, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3189, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, 232. 
 
It is well settled that the Due Process Clause applies to the 
suspension or revocation of a driver’s license.  Dixon v. Love (1977), 
431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-180; Bell 
v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 
 
12
90, 94; Maumee v. Gabriel (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 60, 518 N.E.2d 558.  
Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the procedural 
safeguards provided by R.C. 4511.191 are sufficient to comply with the 
requirements of due process. 
 
In Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 
L.Ed.2d 321, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
what process is due to protect an individual against an erroneous 
deprivation of the property interest in a driver’s license.  The Mackey 
court used the three-pronged balancing test set forth in Mathews v. 
Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18. Although we 
have previously applied the Mathews test in determining that an 
administrative suspension of a driver’s license does not violate due 
process when a postsuspension hearing is provided, Gabriel, 35 Ohio 
St.3d at 62-63, 518 N.E.2d at 561-562, the statute at issue here 
requires an independent application of the Mathews test.  The test 
requires the consideration of the following factors: 
 
13
 
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Mathews at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 33. 
The Mathews Test Applied 
Private Interest 
 
Applying the first prong of the Mathews test to Hochhausler’s 
argument, it is easily determined that the private interest at issue is 
Hochhausler’s stake in the continued possession and use of his driver’s 
license pending the outcome of the ALS appeal.  This interest is 
substantial, in part because the state “will not be able to make a driver 
whole for any personal inconvenience or economic hardship suffered  
by reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through 
 
14
postsuspension review procedures.”  Mackey, at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2617, 
61 L.Ed.2d at 330.  The determinative factors we must consider in 
determining the actual weight to be given to this interest include (1) the 
duration of the license suspension, (2) the availability of prompt 
postsuspension review, and (3) the availability of hardship relief.  Id. at 
11-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2617-2618, 61 L.Ed.2d at 330-331. 
 
The duration of the license suspension for a person who takes 
and fails a chemical test is dictated by R.C. 4511.191(F).  Division (F)(1) 
provides that the period of suspension shall be ninety days where the 
defendant has not been convicted of a drunk-driving offense within the 
previous five-year period.  The length of the suspension increases to 
one, two, or three years where the defendant has previously been 
convicted of one, two, or three or more drunk-driving offenses, 
respectively, during the preceding five-year period.  R.C. 4511.191(F)(1) 
through (4).  The record demonstrates that Hochhausler’s license was 
suspended for one year due to one prior conviction of a drunk-driving 
 
15
offense within the past five years.  Hochhausler contends that the 
burden imposed by this period of suspension is so severe that due 
process requires that a pre-suspension hearing be given.  We disagree. 
 
This court and the United States Supreme Court, when reviewing 
statutes substantially similar to R.C. 4511.191(F), have consistently held 
that the burden imposed on an individual by a summary administrative 
license suspension is not so great that the specific dictates of due 
process required prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., 
Dixon, 431 U.S. 105; 95 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172; Gabriel, 35 Ohio 
St.3d 60; 518 N.E.2d 558; see, also, State v. Starnes (1970), 21 Ohio 
St.2d 38, 50 O.O.2d 84, 254 N.E.2d 675.  We adopt the rationale of the 
decisions in those cases and conclude that the suspensions that may 
be imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F) are not so burdensome that a 
presuspension hearing is required. 
 
We next consider the availability of prompt postsuspension review 
and its effect on the private interest.  R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) permits a 
 
16
defendant to appeal an administrative license suspension at the initial 
appearance for the criminal charge, which must be held within five days 
of arrest.  Division (H)(1) also provides that the defendant may raise 
issues pertaining to four specified conditions, which include questions 
regarding the reasonableness of the initial stop by the arresting officer.  
See R.C. 4511.191(H)(1)(a) through (d).  Moreover, the statute requires 
the trial court to terminate the suspension where any of the specified 
conditions are not met.  R.C. 4511.191(H)(2).  These appeal provisions 
provide an aggrieved licensee with an adequate means of obtaining 
prompt post-suspension review of an administrative license suspension.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the burden on the private interest 
implicated by an ALS is significantly reduced by the availability of the 
review procedures of R.C. 4511.191(H), and any wrongful deprivation of 
the driver’s license prior to the time of the hearing is minimal. 
 
Finally, the availability of hardship relief, while not extensive, is 
sufficient to satisfy the private-interest element.  Under R.C. 
 
17
4511.191(I), occupational driving privileges are made available to a 
driver whose license has been administratively suspended.  Although 
the statute does not provide for immediate hardship relief, we conclude 
that the statutory scheme is not so onerous as to significantly elevate 
the private interest implicated by an ALS.  Mackey, 443 U.S. at 12, 99 
S.Ct. at 2618, 61 L.Ed.2d at 330 (Hardship relief is “in no sense the 
‘controlling’ factor.”). 
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
 
The second prong of the Mathews test requires us to consider the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a driver’s license as a result of the 
procedures used.  While this prong also requires consideration of the 
reliability of the procedures, the Due Process Clause has never been 
construed to mandate that the procedures used be so comprehensive 
as to preclude any possibility of error.  Thus, “‘something less than an 
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.’” 
Dixon, at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1728, 52 L.Ed.2d at 180.  Further, when 
 
18
prompt postdeprivation review is available to correct administrative 
error, no more is generally required “than that the predeprivation 
procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for 
concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a 
responsible government official warrants them to be.”  Mackey, at 13, 99 
S.Ct. at 2618, 61 L.Ed.2d at 331. 
 
The procedures followed by an arresting officer pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191 simply do not present so substantial a risk of erroneous 
deprivation as to require a full presuspension hearing.  The underlying 
circumstances for the administrative license suspension -- an arrest, 
reasonable grounds for the arrest, and either a refusal to take the 
chemical test, or taking the chemical test and failing -- may be accepted 
as objective facts.  These facts are recorded in a sworn report 
completed by the arresting officer pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(D)(1)(c).  
This report is prima facie proof of the information and statements 
included in the report by the arresting officer.  R.C. 4511.191(D)(3).  
 
19
Moreover, the use of chemical testing procedures in drunk-driving cases 
is widely accepted by courts.  State v. Vega (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 
186, 12 OBR 251, 252-258, 465 N.E.2d 1303, 1305.  The tests have 
been generally recognized for over twenty-seven years as being 
reasonably reliable when conducted with proper equipment and by 
competent operators.  Id., citing Westerville v. Cunningham (1968), 15 
Ohio St.2d 121, 44 O.O.2d 119, 239 N.E.2d 40.  While the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation may increase when the result of a chemical test, 
rather than a refusal to submit to the test, serves as the basis of the 
suspension,  the risk would not rise to a level requiring a result different 
from that reached in Mackey.  Therefore, we conclude that the risk of an 
erroneous suspension of a driver’s license pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 is 
not so substantial as to require that the accused receive prior notice and 
an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension. 
Governmental Interest 
 
20
 
The final prong of the Mathews test requires consideration of the 
governmental interest served by the provisions of R.C. 4511.191(F).  
The state interest served by the reasonable use of an administrative 
license suspension is obvious and compelling.  In view of the death and 
injury caused by persons driving on public roads and highways while 
intoxicated, the General Assembly, by a perpetual process of amending 
Ohio’s “drunk driving” laws, and the courts, by their sentencing 
practices, have unequivocally stated the state’s interest in removing 
intoxicated drivers from public roadways.   
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the administrative 
license suspension provisions of R.C. 4511.191 do not violate an 
individual’s right to procedural due process. 
II 
Separation of Powers 
 
21
 
Hochhausler contends that the “no stay” provision of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) violates the doctrine of separation of powers.  R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) provides in part: 
 
“If the person appeals the suspension [of his driver’s license] at 
his initial appearance, the appeal does not stay the operation of the 
suspension.  Subject to division (H)(2) of this section, no court has 
jurisdiction to grant a stay of a suspension imposed under division (E) or 
(F) of this section, and any order issued by any court that purports to 
grant a stay of any suspension imposed under either of those divisions 
shall not be given administrative effect.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The principle of separation of powers is embedded in the 
constitutional framework of our state government.  The Ohio 
Constitution applies the principle in defining the nature and scope of 
powers designated to the three branches of the government.  State v. 
Warner (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43-44, 564 N.E.2d 18, 31.  See State 
v. Harmon (1877), 31 Ohio St. 250, 258.  It is inherent in our theory of 
 
22
government “‘that each of the three grand divisions of the government, 
must be protected from the encroachments of the others, so far that its 
integrity and independence may be preserved.  * * *’”  S. Euclid v. 
Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 28 OBR 250, 252, 503 N.E.2d 
136, 138, quoting  Fairview v. Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187 76 
N.E. 865, 866. 
 
In order to preserve the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.191(H)(1), 
the court of appeals interpreted the “no stay” provisions “as merely 
prohibiting a municipal court, county court, mayor’s court or other court 
of original jurisdiction from staying a license suspension imposed under 
R.C. 4511.191(E) or (F) pending an ALS appeal.”  The court of appeals 
also said, “We do not believe that the ‘no stay’ provisions of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) were intended to preclude a court of appeals or the 
Ohio Supreme Court from staying an ALS appeal.”  Although we agree 
that a court should not declare a statute to be unconstitutional if a 
constitutional construction is available, State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft 
 
23
(1993) 67 Ohio St.3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, 689, the holding of the 
court of appeals strains that principle beyond its purpose. 
 
We have held that “[t]he administration of justice by the judicial 
branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of 
the government in the exercise of their respective powers.”  State ex rel. 
Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 20 O.O.3d 361, 423 
N.E.2d 80, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We have also held that 
“[c]ourts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or 
established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all powers 
necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise 
of their judicial functions and cannot be directed, controlled or impeded 
therein by other branches of the government.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. 
at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The legislative branch has no right to limit the inherent powers of 
the judicial branch of the government.  Hale v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 
210, 212-213, 45 N.E. 199, 200.  Inherent within a court’s jurisdiction, 
 
24
and essential to the orderly and efficient administration of justice, is the 
power to grant or deny stays.  See Landis v. N. Am. Co. (1936), 299 
U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed. 153, 158; State v. Smith 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60, 61, 537 N.E.2d 198, 200.  To the extent that 
R.C. 4511.191(H) deprives courts of their ability to grant a stay of an 
administrative license suspension, it improperly interferes with the 
exercise of a court’s judicial functions.  Thus, the part of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) that prevents “any court” from granting a stay violates 
the doctrine of separation of powers and is unconstitutional. 
 
Having found part of R.C. 4511.191 unconstitutional, we next 
determine whether the offending “no stay” provision may be severed 
from the remainder of the statute.  R.C. 1.50 provides that statutory 
provisions are severable: “If any provisions of a section of the Revised 
Code or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held 
invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of 
the section or related sections which can be given effect without the 
 
25
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are 
severable.”   
 
Prior to severing a portion of a statute, we must first determine 
that the severability will not fundamentally disrupt the statutory scheme 
of which the unconstitutional provision is a part.  State ex rel. Maurer v. 
Sheward (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 523, 644 N.E.2d 369, 377.  The 
test for determining whether part of a statute is severable was set forth 
in Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28, 33: 
 
“‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable 
of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself?  (2) Is 
the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the 
whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of 
the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out?  (3) Is the insertion 
of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part 
from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?’”  
 
26
Id., quoting State v. Bickford (1914), 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, 
paragraph nineteen of the syllabus. 
 
Denying a court the power to grant a stay is not so essentially 
connected with the remainder of R.C. 4511.191 that, if eliminated, the 
statute loses its intent.  Thus modified, the remainder of R.C. 
4511.191(H) continues to give effect to the intention of the General 
Assembly.  Therefore, we hold that the “no stay” provision of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) is unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and is severable from the rest of the statute. 
III 
R.C. 4511.195 -- Procedural Due Process 
 
Omni contends that the newly enacted vehicle-seizure provisions 
of R.C. 4511.195 are unconstitutional because no hearing is provided 
prior to a vehicle being seized and immobilized.1  The relevant portion of 
R.C. 4511.195 provides: 
 
27
 
“(B)(1)  If a person is arrested for a violation of section 4511.19 of 
the Revised Code or of a municipal OMVI ordinance and, within five 
years of the alleged violation, he previously has been convicted of or 
pleaded guilty to one or more violations of section 4511.19 of the 
Revised Code [or] a municipal OMVI ordinance * * *, the arresting officer 
or another officer of the law enforcement agency that employs the 
arresting officer, in addition to any action that the arresting officer is 
required or authorized to take by section 4511.191 of the Revised Code 
or by any other provision of law, shall seize the vehicle that the person 
was operating at the time of the alleged offense and its identification 
license plates.  Except as otherwise provided in this division, the officer 
shall seize the vehicle and license plates under this division regardless 
of whether the vehicle is registered in the name of the person who was 
operating it or in the name of another person.”  (Emphasis added.)  
 
Omni argues that it is being denied its right to procedural due 
process because a vehicle that it owns was seized without adequate 
 
28
notice and a meaningful hearing to determine the status of the 
ownership of the vehicle.  Consequently, we must again apply the 
Mathews three-pronged balancing test, which requires consideration of 
the private interest that will be affected by the official action, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, and the governmental interest, including the 
burdens that would be imposed on the government by additional 
procedural requirements. 
The Matthews Test Applied 
Private Interest 
 
Clearly, there is a substantial interest in the possession and use of 
a vehicle.  “Automobiles occupy a central place in the lives of most 
Americans, providing access to jobs, schools, and recreation as well as 
to the daily necessities of life.”  Coleman v. Watt (C.A.8, 1994), 40 F.3d 
255, 260-261.  The private interest in a vehicle, however, is different 
from the interest in a driver’s license.  A motor vehicle may be the 
subject of multiple private interests, i.e., a jointly owned family 
 
29
automobile or, as here, a company-owned vehicle, and the due process 
constriction on the state should be afforded to any person or entity with 
an interest in the instrumentality of the criminal offense.  A private 
interest in a vehicle is transferable, whereas a driver’s license is unique 
to that individual.  Further, an individual whose vehicle is seized 
pursuant to R.C. 4511.195 must wait until the initial appearance on the 
criminal violation, which must occur within five days of arrest, for the first 
opportunity to recover the vehicle.  Such a delay, with no statutory 
mechanism to provide for immediate review, significantly increases the 
weight of the private interest of the vehicle owner.   
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
 
The state argues that the risk of erroneous deprivation of an 
individual’s vehicle is exceedingly low.  While we agree that a clerical 
search performed by the arresting officer may quickly and accurately 
determine whether an individual has a prior conviction warranting 
seizure of the vehicle, that is no comfort to the owner of a vehicle that 
 
30
has been seized because someone else operated it in violation of the 
law.  Under R.C. 4511.195(B)(1), the officer shall seize the vehicle 
operated by the arrestee regardless of the identity of the vehicle’s actual 
owner or the manner in which the vehicle operator obtained the vehicle.  
Resolution of that issue must wait until the arrestee’s initial appearance 
for the underlying drunk-driving charge and depends on a favorable 
determination of several factors, including whether “the vehicle owner 
knew or should have known after a reasonable inquiry that the vehicle 
was used or involved or likely to be used or involved in the offense or 
violation [and] * * * the vehicle owner or his agent expressly or impliedly 
consented to the use or involvement of the vehicle in the offense or 
violation.”  R.C. 4503.235(B)(3)(b)(i) and (ii).  Thus, it is obvious that the 
risk of erroneous deprivation is extremely high under the summary 
seizure provisions of R.C. 4511.195.  Unlike the relatively straight 
forward factual situations involved in an administrative license 
suspension, vehicle seizure and immobilization are inextricably linked 
 
31
with the drunk-driving charge, which presents a wide array of factual 
issues that have a direct impact on the resolution of the vehicle 
impoundment.  Because the factual disputes are not resolved until trial 
on the criminal charge, the likelihood of erroneous deprivation is 
significantly higher than in an ALS.  Although the erroneous deprivation 
ultimately would be terminated, given the importance of the property 
interest affected, even the temporary denial of possession and use of 
the vehicle inflicts too severe a hardship on the individual wrongfully 
deprived. 
Governmental Interest 
 
As previously stated, the government has a compelling interest in 
protecting the public by removing from Ohio’s streets and highways 
persons who operate motor vehicles while intoxicated.  However, the 
statutory scheme of R.C. 4511.195 is designed to remove from public 
roadways the instrumentality of the drunk-driving offense regardless of 
whether the vehicle is owned by the person arrested for that offense. 
 
32
The lack of a direct effect on public safety is readily apparent.  For 
example, R.C. 4511.195, which is unique among the states, treats an 
owner of a stolen vehicle operated by a drunk driver the same as the 
owner-operator who drives while drunk.  The owner of the stolen 
vehicle, which is now in the hands of the police, nonetheless must wait 
until the initial appearance of the drunk driver.  This could be as long as 
five days, during which time the vehicle owner is subject to 
impoundment fees.  As the statute is one step more removed from the 
clear compelling interest of public safety, the governmental interest 
under R.C. 4511.195 is decreased.  
 
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio reviewed a constitutional challenge to the due process afforded 
under R.C. 4507.38, which requires an arresting officer to seize and 
immobilize any vehicle operated by an individual driving without a valid 
driver’s license. Kutschbach v. Davies (S.D.Ohio 1995), 885 F.Supp. 
1079, 1093.  A comparison of R.C. 4507.38 with 4511.195 reveals the 
 
33
two statutes to be virtually identical in all relevant respects.  After 
subjecting R.C. 4507.38 to analysis under the Mathews test, Judge 
Beckwith in Kutschbach stated that the violation to due process by the 
statute was “manifest.”  The court concluded that “[t]he procedures set 
forth in the statute virtually ensure the erroneous deprivation of *** 
property.  No governmental interest justifies a delay of several days 
before the government is required to establish probable cause for the 
detention of a [a person’s] vehicle.”  Id. at 1093. 
 
Likewise, we conclude that the governmental interest advanced 
under R.C. 4511.195 is insufficient to outweigh the private interest in a 
vehicle and the attendant risk of erroneous deprivation under the 
present statutory scheme, and does not justify the deprivation of a 
vehicle owner’s property interest when that vehicle is operated by a third 
party.  R.C. 4511.195 is unconstitutional as applied to the owner of a 
vehicle that has been seized and immobilized because the vehicle was 
 
34
being operated by a third person when that person was arrested on a 
drunk-driving charge. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals as to 
Hochhausler’s due process challenge to R.C. 4511.191.  Further, 
having severed the “no stay” portion of R.C. 4511.191(H), we reverse 
and remand that issue, which was raised by Hochhausler through a 
motion to dismiss, to the court of appeals to determine whether 
Hochhausler was unfairly prejudiced.  Based on our determination of 
R.C. 4511.195, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to 
the issue of the seizure and immobilization of Omni’s vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reversed in part 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded.  
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and KARPINSKI, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs, except with paragraph three of the 
syllabus and the related discussion in the opinion, to which he dissents. 
 
35
 
PATTON and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
JOHN T. PATTON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
WRIGHT, J. 
 
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
PFEIFER, J. 
 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1  In Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 516 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 
L.Ed.2d 68, 64 LW 4124, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed a 
long line of cases in which the court held that an innocent owner’s 
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use of the 
property.  We note that Bennis is distinguishable from the case at bar in 
that Bennis involves an equitable action on a nuisance abatement.  In 
contrast to Omni’s appeal, the Bennis court stated: 
 
“The gravamen of petitioner’s due process claim is not that she 
was denied notice or an opportunity to contest the abatement of her car; 
she was accorded both.***  Rather, she claims she was entitled to 
 
36
contest the abatement by showing she [was an innocent owner].”  Id. at 
___, 116 S.Ct. at 998, 134 L.Ed.2d at 74-75.  Thus, it was the lack of an 
“innocent owner” defense in the challenged statute that was at issue in 
Bennis.  Such a defense is available in R.C. 4511.195 pursuant to 
4503.235.  However, the trial court here found Omni not to be an 
“innocent owner,” and that issue is not before this court.  
 
Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur with 
paragraph one of the syllabus but respectfully dissent from paragraphs two and 
three. 
I.   
The “No Stay” Provision 
 
I dissent from paragraph two of the syllabus, holding that the “no stay” 
provision violates the doctrine of separation of powers in that it interferes with 
the exercise of a court’s inherent powers.  The majority reaches this conclusion 
by reasoning that among a court’s inherent powers necessary “‘to secure and 
safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions’” and to 
 
37
secure “‘the orderly and efficient administration of justice’” is a court’s ability 
to grant or deny stays.  Among the authority the majority cites for this 
proposition is Hale v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 210, 212-213, 45 N.E. 199, 
200.  In Hale, we held that the court possesses the inherent authority to issue 
contempt orders.  Unlike the power to stay, the power to issue contempt orders 
deals with the court’s ability to regulate the conduct of the parties and 
witnesses before it and to ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to 
collect and present its evidence. Such safeguarding is at the core of a court’s 
ability to administer justice.  However, such is not always the case with regard 
to the court’s power to stay proceedings.  
 
 By the majority’s own standard, a court’s inherent ability to grant or 
deny a stay is not a general power, but is an extraordinary remedy limited to 
those times when necessary to the administration of justice.   For example, the 
majority cites Landis v. N. Am. Co. (1936),  299 U.S. 248, 254-255, 57 S.Ct. 
163, 166, 81 L.Ed.2d 153, 158, where the Supreme Court held that a stay of 
proceedings is incidental to the court’s inherent power to control and manage 
 
38
its docket and will be granted only in the rare case.  Because the appeal of an 
ALS is limited in scope and defined by statute, courts do not need to stay the 
license suspension for the outcome in the criminal case in order to streamline 
the issues in the appeal.  See R.C. 4511.191(H)(2).  Therefore, such a stay does 
not implicate a court’s ability to manage or control its docket as contemplated 
in Landis, supra. 
 
A stay is also necessary to the administration of justice where a court 
seeks to prevent the undue hardship or irreparable injury resulting from the 
enforcement of a determination which may have been wrong. See, e.g., State v. 
Smith (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60, 61, 537 N.E.2d 198, 200 (courts have no 
inherent authority to suspend criminal sentences except to suspend execution of 
a sentence pending appeal or a motion for a new trial).   
 
Initially, we note that the circumstances under which an ALS is imposed 
all but ameliorates the wrong determination concern.  An ALS is imposed for 
one of two reasons -- refusing to submit to chemical testing or failing the test.  
Because the ALS for refusing the test is not ultimately dependent on the 
 
39
accused’s conviction of an OMVI offense, that judicial determination has no 
bearing on the propriety of the enforcement of the ALS.  On the other hand, 
where an ALS is imposed for failing the test, there is a good indication that the 
driver was, in fact, operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol 
level.  While the accused still enjoys the judicial safeguards requisite to a 
criminal conviction, the interim suspension imposed for remedial purposes is 
justified.  The suspension is reasonably likely to remove a threat from the 
roadways pending a judicial determination of guilt, thereby promoting public 
safety. 
 
Moreover, the granting of a license is a privilege and not an absolute 
property right, State v. Williams (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 290, 667 N.E.2d 932; 
Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533, 538, 664 
N.E.2d 908, 912; Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 
46, 51, 554 N.E.2d 97, 102, and the temporary loss or suspension of this 
privilege is an “inconvenience.”  Columbus v. Adams (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 57, 
 
40
60, 10 OBR 348, 350, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890. Thus, an ALS imposed under R.C. 
4511.191 does not by law qualify as an undue hardship or irreparable injury.   
 
A stay of an ALS is neither necessary to control or manage a court’s 
docket nor necessary to prevent undue hardship or irreparable harm.  
Accordingly, I would find that the “no stay” provision does not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine because the power to stay the ALS is not an 
inherent power essential to the administration of justice.   
 
By allowing the judiciary to stay the ALS, the majority thwarts the 
remedial purpose of driver’s license suspensions.  The ALS is intended to 
protect the public by removing drunk drivers from our highways until a judicial 
determination of the four statutory criteria set forth in R.C. 4511.191(H)(1) is 
made.  If  R.C. 4511.191 is to have any meaningful remedial purpose, the “no 
stay” provision must be enforced.   
II.   
Due Process and R.C. 4511.195 
 
41
 
The majority also holds that R.C. 4511.195 violates due process as 
applied to the owner of a vehicle that has been seized and immobilized when 
the vehicle was being operated by a third party, primarily because a possible 
five-day delay exists before an “innocent owner” can assert this defense. This 
possible delay, according to the majority, “significantly increases the weight of 
the private interest of the vehicle owner,” causes an “obvious” and “extremely 
high” risk of erroneous deprivation, and removes the statute one more step 
from a compelling public safety interest.  Yet, the trial court here has found that 
Omni, a closely held corporation, could not be an “innocent owner” in light of 
Hochhausler’s roles as Omni’s president and majority shareholder.  That 
finding has not been challenged and, therefore, is not at issue today.     
 
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht  Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 
94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, the United States Supreme Court considered 
and rejected a due-process challenge to the seizure of a yacht when its owner 
was not involved in any criminal activity and was unaware that the lessee of the 
yacht had engaged in illegal activities upon it.  The court held that a seizure 
 
42
without prior notice and opportunity to be heard does not violate due process 
where the seizure serves a significant government interest, there is a special 
need for prompt action, and the seizure is not initiated by self-interested 
parties. Id. at 678-680, 94 S.Ct. at 2089-2090, 40 L.Ed.2d at 465-466. 
 
As was held in Calero-Toledo, due process is not violated by the seizure 
in this case.  This seizure serves the important government interest of promptly 
eliminating 
recidivist 
drunk 
driving 
by 
immediately 
removing 
the 
instrumentality of the drunk-driving offense.  There also exists a special need 
for prompt seizure, since a car, like a yacht, could be removed to another 
jurisdiction or concealed if advance notice of the seizure were to be given. Id. 
at 679, 94 S.Ct. at 2090, 40 L.Ed.2d at 466.  The seizure is not initiated by self-
interested private parties, but rather is initiated by law enforcement officers 
under narrowly tailored circumstances.  The seizure is warranted only when a 
driver has at least one prior OMVI conviction within the preceding five years, 
the driver’s record of prior arrests is easily verifiable, the arrest may be 
 
43
weighed according to objective criteria, and the statute employs extensive 
notice provisions. 
 
Moreover, persons affected by the seizure are given a prompt 
opportunity to be heard.  The driver or innocent owner is given an opportunity 
to appeal the immobilization at the initial hearing, which must be held within 
five days of the arrest.  The request for an appeal may also be made at any time 
thereafter. 
 
For these reasons, I cannot agree that R.C. 4511.195 violates due process 
or that the “no stay” provision of R.C. 4511.191 violates the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
 
PATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.