Title: MISENHEIMER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MISENHEIMER v. STATE2001 WY 6527 P.3d 273Case Number: 00-89Decided: 07/20/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

WESLEY 
MISENHEIMER,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:  

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker; Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Vicki Johnston, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Johnston.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ, and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 HILL, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; and LEHMAN, C.J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

             
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      Wesley 
Misenheimer (Appellant) entered a conditional plea1 of guilty to one count of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001) (indecent liberties statute) subject to an 
appeal on his claims that § 14-3-105 is unconstitutional as applied and that the 
decision to charge denied him equal protection.  We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant 
presents two issues for review:

                        
Issue I

Is W.S. 
§ 14-3-105 unconstitutionally vague with respect to its application to a minor 
accused of committing immoral acts with another minor, particularly when those 
acts are entirely voluntary?

 

                        
Issue II

Have 
Appellant's Equal Protection rights been violated when the prosecutor elects to 
bring charges of violation of W.S. § 14-3-105 against only the male minor rather 
than against the female minor involved?

 

The 
State's statement of the issues is the same but uses slightly different 
language:

 

I.                     
Is Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 unconstitutionally vague as applied in this 
case?

 

II.                   
Was the 
seventeen-year-old male appellant denied equal protection of the law when he had 
sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl and was charged with violation 
of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105, even though the thirteen-year-old girl was not charged 
under the same statute?

 

[¶3]      The facts of this 
case are fairly simple.  Appellant 
was seventeen years old when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with 
the thirteen-year-old victim.  The 
victim's father discovered the nature of the relationship and reported it to the 
police.  On at least one occasion, 
Appellant and a friend had supplied the victim with alcohol prior to both of 
them engaging in sexual activity with her.  
Appellant was charged with five counts of taking indecent liberties with 
a child in violation of § 14-3-105.2  Appellant moved to dismiss the charges 
on two grounds.  First, he argued 
that § 14-3-105 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts.  Appellant argued that a reasonably 
intelligent person of ordinary sensibility would not recognize § 14-3-105 
to prohibit consensual sexual relations between minors.  In essence, Appellant's position was 
that the statute did not give fair notice that the conduct he engaged in was 
prohibited.  He also contended that 
the statute was arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced since both parties 
were minors engaged in a consensual relationship and yet he was the only one 
criminally charged.  In addition, 
that argument formed the basis for Appellant's second argument that by charging 
him, and not the minor female, his right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Wyoming Constitution was 
violated.

 

[¶4]      The district 
court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss.  The court concluded that there was "no 
reason that a reasonably intelligent 17-year-old could not determine that sexual 
intercourse with a 13-year-old was clearly conduct which is forbidden as 
immodest, 'immoral or indecent liberties.' '" (citing Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988)).  The 
district court denied the equal protection contention on the grounds that 
Appellant had failed to show that the prosecutor's discretionary decision to 
charge only him was arbitrarily based on a suspect 
classification.

 

[¶5]      After the denial 
of his motion to dismiss, Appellant entered into a plea agreement.  The State agreed to drop four of the 
charges of indecent liberties in exchange for a plea of guilty by Appellant to 
the remaining charge.  The plea was 
conditional pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) with Appellant reserving the right to 
challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.  That appeal is now before 
us.

 

[¶6]      A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to a particular defendant's actions if it 
"fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that the 
contemplated conduct is forbidden," Britt, 752 P.2d  at 428 (quoting 
Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 266 (Wyo. 1985)), and the facts of the case 
demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute.  Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 
1123 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988) 
and Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)).

 

[¶7]      Resolution of 
Appellant's vagueness claim involves the interpretation of statutory 
language.  We analyze statutes in an 
endeavor to interpret them in accordance with the legislature's intent, 
beginning with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 
564 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) and Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  "We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous."  Capshaw, 10 P.3d  at 564 (citing Fall v. State, 963 P.2d 981, 983 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 

[¶8]      In reviewing 
Appellant's equal protection challenge, we keep in mind that charging decisions 
rest within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney.  Mares v. State, 939 P.2d 724, 731 
(Wyo. 1997).  A defendant claiming a 
violation of equal protection must first demonstrate that the classification at 
issue "treats similarly situated persons unequally." Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 944 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Matter of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 313 (Wyo. 
1992)).  If the defendant can make 
that demonstration, then we apply one of two levels of scrutiny to determine 
whether equal protection was violated.

 

That is, where a statute [or a 
governmental action] affects a fundamental interest or creates an inherently 
suspect classification, the court must strictly scrutinize that statute [or the 
governmental action] to determine if it is necessary to achieve a compelling 
state interest.  However, if the 
statute [or the governmental action] only affects ordinary interests in the 
economic and social welfare area, the court need only determine that it is 
rationally related to a legitimate state objective.

 

Ellett, 883 P.2d  at 944 (quoting White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Wyo. 
1989)).

 

[¶9]      Appellant 
presents a two-pronged attack on § 14-3-105 in support of his contention that 
the statute is vague as applied to the facts of his case.  First, he argues that § 14-3-105 is 
vague as to the class of persons the legislature intended to include as 
offenders.  Appellant notes that the 
purpose of § 14-3-105 is to protect the morals of children.  Pierson, 956 P.2d 1119.  He also notes that § 14-3-105 does not 
contain specific age elements, including minors, similar to that found in the 
third degree sexual assault statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 (LexisNexis 
2001), and that our case law has exclusively focused on the fact that 
adults may be convicted of taking indecent liberties with 
children. Id.  See also, 
Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113 (Wyo. 1996); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 1993); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987); and 
McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985).  From those propositions, Appellant 
concludes that § 14-3-105 is intended to protect children from adults and not to 
prevent consensual sex between minors.  
In the second prong of his argument, Appellant contends that he could not 
have known that the conduct he engaged in was prohibited.  In essence, Appellant argues that in the 
"moral climate" of today's society consensual sexual activity between minors is 
not an action "such as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and 
improper [that] a person of ordinary intelligence can weigh contemplated conduct 
against that prohibition."  
Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1123 (quoting Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1996) and Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 
(Wyo. 1979)).

 

[¶10]   In order to resolve Appellant's 
issue, we begin by examining the statutory context established by the 
legislature for regulating sexual offenses.  Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child pursuant to § 
14-3-105, which provides:

 

                        
§ 14-3-105.  Immoral or 
indecent acts; penalty.

 

   (a)  Except 
under circumstance constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third 
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony.  Except as provided by subsection (b) of 
this section, a person convicted under this section shall be fined not less than 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or 
both.

   (b)  An actor convicted 
under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished by life imprisonment 
without parole if:

   (i)  The circumstances of 
the crime involve a victim who was under the age of sixteen (16) at the time of 
the offense and an actor who was at least four (4) years older than the victim; 
and

   (ii)  The actor has two 
(2) or more previous convictions for any of the following designated offenses, 
which convictions resulted from charges separately brought and which arose out 
of separate occurrences in this state or elsewhere:

      (A)  A 
conviction under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a criminal statute containing 
the same or similar elements as a crime defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304;

      
(B)  Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 2.

      (C)  A 
conviction under W.S. 14-3-105(a), or a criminal statute containing the same or 
similar elements as the crime defined by W.S. 14-3-105(a), if the circumstances 
of the crime involved a victim who was under the age of sixteen (16) at the time 
of the offense and an actor who was at least four (4) years older than the 
victim.

   (c)  As used in this 
section, "child" means a person under the age of eighteen (18) 
years.

 

The 
phrase "indecent liberties" is defined "as actions which are such as the common 
sense of society would regard as indecent and improper and a person of ordinary 
intelligence can weigh contemplated conduct against that prohibition.'"  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1123.  The indecent liberties statute 
references the three sexual assault statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2001), which provide as follows:

 

                        
§ 6-2-302. Sexual Assault in the first 
degree.

 

   (a)  Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the 
first degree if:

   (i)  The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement;

   (ii)  The actor causes 
submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme 
physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably 
believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these 
threats;

   (iii)  The victim is 
physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know that the 
victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented; 
or

   (iv)  The actor knows or 
reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental 
deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of 
the victim's conduct.

 

§ 
6-2-303. Sexual Assault in the second degree.

   (a)  Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

   (i)  The actor causes 
submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the future against the 
victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or children, and the 
victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this threat. "To retaliate" 
includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical 
pain;

   (ii)  The actor causes 
submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a victim 
of ordinary resolution;

   (iii)  The actor 
administers, or knows that someone else administered to the victim, without the 
prior knowledge or consent of the victim, any substance which substantially 
impairs the victim's power to appraise or control his 
conduct;

   (iv)  The actor knows or 
should reasonably know that the victim submits erroneously believing the actor 
to be the victim's spouse;

   (v)  At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim;

   (vi)  The actor is in a 
position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to 
cause the victim to submit; or

   (vii)  The actor 
inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes 
or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical 
practices.

   (b)  A person is guilty 
of sexual assault in the second degree if he subjects another person to sexual 
contact and causes serious bodily injury to the victim under any of the 
circumstances listed in W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or paragraphs (a)(i) 
through (vi) of this section.

   (c)  Repealed by Laws 
1997, ch. 135, § 2.

 

§ 
6-2-304. Sexual assault in the third degree.

   (a)  An 
actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree:

   (i)  The actor is at 
least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; or

   (ii)  The actor is an 
adult and subjects a victim under the age of fourteen (14) years to sexual 
contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing 
serious bodily injury to the victim;

   (iii)  The actor subjects 
a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) 
through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion 
on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim.

 

A review 
of these statutes readily indicates that the legislature intended them to 
operate as an integrated whole.  In 
fact, the statutory scheme evidences a hierarchical framework through a series 
of conditional clauses.  At the top 
of this hierarchy is first degree sexual assault, which, broadly speaking, 
prohibits forcible sexual contact.  
Second degree sexual assault may be charged only "under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first degree."  Similarly, as one proceeds down the 
hierarchy, third degree sexual assault cannot be charged under circumstances 
constituting first or second degree sexual assault.  The hierarchical nature of the statutory 
scheme is a sign of the seriousness attached to each crime and is reflected in 
the penalties imposed by the legislature on each.3

 

[¶11]   The sexual assault statutes protect 
all persons.4 The indecent liberties statute, on 
the other hand, only offers protection to those less than eighteen years of 
age.  § 14-3-105(c).  It is also limited in that it is 
applicable only in those circumstances not constituting first, second or third 
degree sexual assault.  In other 
words, § 14-3-105 criminalizes activities that are otherwise permissible between 
consenting adults when one of the parties is under the age of eighteen 
years.  Appellant agrees that the 
statute clearly prohibits certain conduct between adults and minor 
children.  However, he argues that 
it is less clear that the statute prohibits such conduct when the actors are 
both members of the statutorily protected group.  Thus, the question posed is from 
whom does § 14-3-105 protect children?  With the statutory scheme set out by the 
legislature in mind, we now turn to this question.

 

[¶12]   The indecent liberties statute 
prohibits "any person [from] knowingly taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with any child[.]" § 14-3-105(a) (emphasis added).  The crux of the issue then is what did 
the legislature mean by "person."  
The term is not defined within the indecent liberties statute.  The ordinary meaning of the word is very 
broad:  a human being or 
individual.  Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 867 10th Ed. (1998); Black's Law Dictionary 
1142 6th Ed. (1990).  The 
scope of the phrase cannot be clearer: "Person" means any human being or 
individual without limitation by age or other factors.  The policy behind § 14-3-105 is to 
protect children from exploitation; we cannot imagine that the legislature 
intended to withdraw the protection of the law from the victim in order to 
protect the offender. In re Hildenbrant, 548 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich.App. 
1996).  We find the reply to a 
similar argument by the Appellate Court of Connecticut succinctly on 
point:

 

The 
defendant first claims that he had no notice that the statute applies to the 
actions of one who is himself a minor.  
We cannot agree.  Section 
53-21 provides that "any person" who engages in the proscribed conduct is in 
violation of the statute.  Statutory 
language clear on its face will be construed for what it says.  State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 
150, 460 A.2d 26 (1983).  The 
statute does not limit the definition of "any person" to adults.  The legislature was free to, and did 
not, define violators in terms of age. * * * The defendant cannot contest the 
fact that he is in the class of "any person," nor is there any merit to his 
claim that he is the first juvenile to fall within the statute's purview. See 
In re Michael B., 41 Conn.Sup. 229, 566 A.2d 446 
(1989).

 

            
The defendant argues that, as a matter of policy, § 53-21 should not 
apply to violators who are minors since they are themselves within the class of 
children protected by the statute.  
Despite the defendant's assertion that interpreting § 53-21 to include 
acts between children would criminalize instances of "playing doctor," we will 
not interpret the law to give minors license to sexually molest other 
minors.  It is contrary to the law's 
intent, and to common sense, to establish a policy that withdraws the law's 
protection from the victim in order to protect the violator, even one who is a 
minor.

 

In re 
John C., 569 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Conn.App. 1990).  
The exclusion of minors from the prohibitions of the indecent liberties 
statute would undercut the purpose behind the statute: the protection of 
children.  It is a sad reality that 
minors are capable of, and do commit, crimes just as adults 
do.

 

An increasing number of reported sex 
cases involving children have demonstrated that the problem of sexual 
molestation is not simply confined to adults abusing children, but extends to 
adolescent and preadolescent minors committing sexual acts upon even younger 
minors.

 

Susan M. 
Kole, Annotation, Statute Protecting Minors in a Specified Age Range from 
Rape or Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to Defendant Minor within Protected 
Age Group, 18 A.L.R. 5th 856, 866 (1994).  Statutes must be read in a manner that 
effectuates the legislature's intent and the inclusion of minors within the 
meaning of the phrase "any person" accomplishes that by ensuring the protection 
of children from sexual abuse inflicted by not only adults but also by their 
peers.  The phrase "any person" is 
sufficiently clear to put an individual of any age on sufficient notice that 
their conduct may come within the prohibitions of the 
statute.

 

[¶13]   Furthermore, the inclusion of 
minors within the meaning of the word "persons" in § 14-3-105 is consistent 
with the overall statutory framework established by the legislature.  As noted above, the indecent liberties 
statute is a part of the statutory scheme designed to protect people from sexual 
exploitation.  The assault statutes, 
§§ 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, use the word "actor" when referring to the 
perpetrator.  That word is defined 
within the statutes as meaning, "the person accused of criminal 
assault[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).  Appellant acknowledges that minors are 
subject to the prohibitions established in the sexual assault statutes at §§ 
6-2-302 through 6-2-304.  
Consistency argues for the application of the same meaning to a word that 
is included in related statutes.

 

[¶14]   Appellant also argues that he could 
not have reasonably known that a sexual relationship between a 
seventeen-year-old and a thirteen-year-old was prohibited by § 14-3-105.  In support of his position, Appellant 
points out that children are reaching sexual maturity and are engaging in sexual 
conduct at earlier ages.  The mere 
fact that children are reaching sexual maturity at an earlier age is, however, 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Appellant's actions were in violation of § 
14-3-105.  The attainment of sexual 
maturity is not a license for the sexual exploitation of 
children.

 

[¶15]   We agree with the district court's 
assessment that there is no reason a reasonably intelligent seventeen-year-old 
could not determine that sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old was conduct 
which is forbidden under § 14-3-105.5  An ordinary, reasonably intelligent 
seventeen-year-old could determine that supplying a thirteen-year-old child with 
alcohol prior to engaging in sexual acts with her was forbidden conduct.  A vague statute lacks ascertainable 
standards for establishing guilt.  
We have previously held that § 14-3-105 is not facially vague as to the 
types of conduct that are proscribed.  
Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1123-24; Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 
1034-35.  The indecent liberties 
statute is not vague as applied to the facts of Appellant's case, and the 
district court's decision on this issue is affirmed.

 

 

[¶16]   Appellant argues that the decision 
to charge him but not the minor female violated his equal protection rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Wyoming Constitution.  In essence, Appellant has raised two 
separate issues here.  First, 
Appellant argues that the only distinction between him and the victim is their 
sex.  He posits this as the probable 
basis for the prosecutor's decision to charge him and not the victim.  This is a claim of selective 
prosecution.  In his second 
argument, Appellant argues that he and the victim are similarly situated under § 
14-3-105, and charging him under the statute and not the victim violated his 
equal protection rights.

 

[¶17]   A selective prosecution exists when 
it is demonstrated that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and 
the prosecution of the defendant is based on an impermissible motive.  Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 
1235 (Wyo. 1994).  "The 
impermissible motivation must be demonstrated by showing that the charge was 
deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard or designed to inhibit the 
exercise of a constitutional right by the accused." Id.  Appellant claims that he was similarly 
situated with the victim, who was not charged.  From that, Appellant draws the 
conclusion that the only basis for prosecuting him and not the victim must be 
his sex.  Appellant's argument is 
purely speculative and ignores some salient facts that distinguish the victim's 
position from his.  The prosecutor 
could have relied upon any or all of the following factors in deciding to 
prosecute Appellant: (1) the age difference between him and the victim; (2) the 
relative maturity levels of the parties related to their ages; and (3) 
Appellant's actions, such as supplying alcohol to the victim.  Appellant has failed to show that he is, 
in any way, similarly situated as the victim, and his claim that the decision to 
prosecute him was based solely on his sex ignores the facts in the record and is 
only speculation.

 

[¶18]   An equal protection analysis begins 
with the threshold question of whether the statute at issue treats similarly 
situated persons unequally.  
Ellett, 883 P.2d  at 944.  
Appellant and the victim are similarly situated within the context of § 
14-3-105 because they are both a "child" as defined in section (c) of the 
statute.  The statute is treating 
the similarly situated persons unequally because one is being subjected to a 
criminal penalty and the other is not.  

 

[¶19]   The next step of the analysis is to 
determine what level of scrutiny we apply to determine whether the unequal 
treatment violates equal protection.  
The classification at issue here involves age  persons under eighteen 
years old.  Age is not a protected 
class. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15, 
96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 457-58 (Ill. 1992).  Therefore, 
we need only determine whether § 14-3-105 is rationally related to a legitimate 
state objective.  As noted above, 
the purpose of § 14-3-105 is to protect children from sexual exploitation and 
abuse.  There can be absolutely no 
question that such protection is a legitimate state objective.  Section 14-3-105 bears a rational 
relationship to that objective and is a reasonable method of obtaining it 
because the statute recognizes that any person, including minors, is capable of 
preying upon children.  The statute 
does not violate Appellant's right to equal protection.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   Section 14-3-105 is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Appellant's conduct nor does it violate 
his right to equal protection.  
Therefore, Appellant's plea of guilty is affirmed.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 

[¶21]   I have 
no quibble with the majority's reasoning.  
Indeed, affirmance appears to me to be mandated by the indecent liberties 
statute, which permits the prosecution of "any person."  However, although I am not troubled by 
application of the indecent liberties statute under these specific facts, I am 
concerned that this case has the potential to lead to absurd results in future 
cases.  

 

[¶22]   Imagine this scenario.  A boy and a girl, both high school 
seniors just short of their eighteenth birthdays, engage in consensual sex.  After today's opinion, 
both could potentially be found guilty of indecent liberties, a 
felony conviction that includes drastic collateral consequences in addition to 
imprisonment for up to ten years.  I 
do not believe this is a desirable result.  
As Justice Blume observed so many years ago, "[i]t is not the purpose or 
end of government to incarcerate as many of its citizens as possible."  Hubble v. State, 285 P. 153, 155, 
41 Wyo. 275, 280 (Wyo. 1930).

 

[¶23]   In the most recent amendments to 
the indecent liberties and third degree sexual assault statutes, the legislature 
has made laudable efforts to harmonize the two provisions.  Nevertheless, I am still concerned that 
the indecent liberties statute can be applied in ways that I believe would be 
absurd and unfortunate.  I would 
respectfully suggest to the legislature that it re-examine this issue.  Does it intend the result in the 
scenario cited above or in the case at hand?  Or, given the comprehensive sexual 
assault statutory scheme, should the indecent liberties statute be applied only 
when the perpetrator is an adult and/or four years older than the victim?  Finally, are there some types of conduct 
that should be considered for misdemeanor treatment?  With these concerns, I concur in the 
majority opinion.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2).

  
2Appellant was 
initially charged with five counts of sexual assault in the third degree in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2001).  The two circumstances relevant to the 
facts of this case that could constitute third degree sexual assault require: 
(1) the actor be at least four years older than a victim under the age of 
sixteen; or (2) the actor be an adult.  
Appellant was born on October 24, 1981, and the victim was born on May 
17, 1985.  At the time of the acts 
constituting the basis of the charges, Appellant was neither an adult nor at 
least four years older than the victim.  
Since a third degree sexual assault charge was not applicable under the 
facts of this case, the State was allowed to amend the information to reflect 
charges under § 14-3-105.

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 (LexisNexis 
2001) states:

 

                        
§ 6-2-306. Penalties for sexual assault

 

   
(a)  An actor convicted of sexual assault who does not 
qualify under the criteria of subsection (b) or (d) of this section shall be 
punished as follows:

(i)  Sexual assault in the 
first degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) 
years nor more than fifty (50) years;

            
(ii)  Sexual assault in the second degree is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) 
years;

            
(iii)  Sexual assault in the third degree is a felony 
punishable [by] imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) 
years;

            
(iv)  Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 
2.

   (b)  An actor who is 
convicted of sexual assault and who does not qualify under the criteria of 
subsection (d) of this section shall be punished by the extended terms of 
subsection (c) of this section if:

      (i)  He is being sentenced for two (2) or more separate acts of 
sexual assault in the first or second degree;

      
(ii)  He previously has been convicted of any crime containing 
the same or similar elements as the crimes defined in W.S. 6-2-302 or 
6-2-303.

   (c)  An actor convicted 
of sexual assault who qualifies under the criteria of subsection (b) of this 
section shall be punished as follows:

      
(i)  Sexual assault in the first or second degree is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years or for 
life;

      
(ii)  Sexual assault in the third degree is a felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) 
years;

      
(iii)  Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 
2.

(d)  An actor who is convicted 
of sexual assault shall be punished by life imprisonment without parole if the 
actor has two (2) or more previous convictions for any of the following 
designated offenses, which convictions resulted from charges separately brought 
and which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere:

      (i)  A 
crime defined in W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a criminal statute containing 
the same or similar elements as a crime defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304;

      
(ii)  Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 
2.

      
(iii)  A conviction under W.S. 14-3-105(a), or a criminal 
statute containing the same or similar elements as the crime defined by W.S. 
14-3-105(a), if the circumstances of the crime involved a victim who was under 
the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at least 
four (4) years older than the victim.

 

  4The statutes use 
the term "victim," which is defined as "the person alleged to have been 
subjected to sexual assault[.]"  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(viii) (LexisNexis 
2001).

  
5Appellant's 
position that he could not know that engaging in sexual relations with a 
thirteen-year-old was prohibited conduct is undercut by his own actions.  He told the police, and maintained at 
his plea hearing, that he believed the victim's age to be sixteen.  However, the victim informed the police 
that she had, in fact, told Appellant her true age.  Furthermore, Appellant acknowledged that 
he knew the victim attended a junior high school, an admission that casts 
serious doubt on Appellant's veracity concerning his lack of knowledge of the 
victim's age.  By obfuscating on 
this issue, Appellant shows that on some level he knew his actions were 
inappropriate.