Title: Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP801 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Michael Engelhardt, Julieann Engelhardt, 
individually and as the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Lily Engelhardt, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
City of New Berlin, ABC Insurance Company and 
New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Wiberg Aquatic Center f/k/a Wirth Aquatic Center 
and MNO Insurance Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 740, 905 N.W.2d 843  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 4, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 24, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. & 
Kelly, J. (opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Christopher E. Rogers, Susan R. Tyndall, and 
Habush Habush & Rottier S.C., Madison.  There was an oral 
argument by Christopher E. Rogers. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Dustin T. Woehl and Kasdorf Lewis & Swietlik, SC, Milwaukee.  
There was an oral argument by Dustin T. Woehl. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice by William C. Gleisner, III, and Law 
Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Brookfield. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities, 
Wisconsin 
Towns 
Association, 
and 
Wisconsin Counties Association by Ted Waskowski, Kyle W. 
Engelke, and Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Kyle W. Engelke. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 2
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP801 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV1085) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael Engelhardt, Julieann Engelhardt, 
individually and as the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Lily Engelhardt, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
City of New Berlin, ABC Insurance Company and 
New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Wiberg Aquatic Center f/k/a Wirth Aquatic 
Center and MNO Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 4, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
2 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing the 
circuit court's denial of summary judgment to the City of New 
Berlin and the New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department 
(together, "New Berlin").1   
¶2 
Eight-year-old Lily Engelhardt attended a field trip 
to Brookfield's Wiberg Aquatic Center organized and run by the 
New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department.  Lily could not 
swim. 
 
Lily's 
mother 
told 
Stuart 
Bell, 
the 
"Playground 
Coordinator" in charge of the field trip, that Lily could not 
swim.  She questioned whether Lily should go on the trip at all.  
Bell responded that Lily would be safe because her swimming 
ability would be evaluated at the shallow end or zero depth area 
of the pool.  Tragically, Lily drowned while staff and other 
children were changing in the locker rooms and proceeding to the 
pool deck. 
¶3 
Lily's parents filed suit against New Berlin and 
several other defendants, alleging negligence.  New Berlin moved 
for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit 
pursuant to the governmental immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) (2011-12).2  The circuit court denied New Berlin's 
summary judgment motion, and New Berlin moved for leave to 
                                                 
1 Engelhardt 
v. 
City 
of 
New 
Berlin, 
No. 
2016AP801, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2017). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
3 
 
appeal.  The court of appeals granted New Berlin's motion and 
reversed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment to New 
Berlin. 
¶4 
We conclude that New Berlin is not entitled to the 
defense of governmental immunity.  The known danger exception to 
governmental immunity applies in the instant case.   
¶5 
The known danger exception to governmental immunity, 
set forth in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 
(1977), applies when an obviously hazardous situation known to 
the public officer or employee is of such force that a 
ministerial duty to correct the situation is created.3  "[A] 
dangerous situation will be held to give rise to a ministerial 
duty only when 'there exists a known present danger of such 
force that the time, mode and occasion for performance is 
evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the 
exercise of judgment and discretion."4 
¶6 
In the instant case, the danger to which Lily was 
exposed at the Aquatic Center as an eight-year-old non-swimmer 
was compelling and self-evident.  The obvious dangers involved 
                                                 
3 Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶23-24, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 784 
N.W.2d 648; Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶32-40, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314; C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 
715, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn 
Area Sch. Dist., 2006 WI App 234, ¶¶14-18, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 
N.W.2d 420. 
4 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶38 (quoting C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 
717); see also Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶24 (quoting C.L., 143 
Wis. 2d at 715). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
4 
 
here resemble other obviously hazardous circumstances presented 
in Wisconsin cases that applied the known danger exception.5  
Drowning was a known danger.  Under the circumstances present 
here, Bell and other camp staff had a ministerial duty to give 
Lily a swim test before allowing her near the pool.  They did 
not perform this ministerial duty. 
¶7 
Because New Berlin is not entitled to the defense of 
governmental immunity, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶8 
The instant case reaches this court on summary 
judgment.  We recite the facts in the light most favorable to 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 541, 259 
N.W.2d 672 (1977) (park manager who knew that a trail was 
particularly dangerous at night had ministerial duty to "either 
place the signs warning the public of the dangerous conditions 
existing on the upper trail or to advise his superiors" of the 
hazardous condition); Voss, 297 Wis. 2d 389, ¶¶19-20 (teacher 
who witnessed students stumbling and falling while wearing 
"fatal vision goggles" in classroom full of desks and hard tile 
floor had ministerial duty to "stop the activity the way it was 
presently 
conceived"); 
Pries, 
326 
Wis. 2d 37, 
¶¶43-47 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (applying known danger exception 
where supervisor, aware of the dangers associated with heavy 
pieces of solid steel horse stalls that are unchained during the 
process of disassembly, "was in a position as supervisor to do 
something about the danger[,] and he failed to do anything about 
it——worse, he jumped onto the stalls"). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
5 
 
the Engelhardts, the parties opposing summary judgment, and draw 
all reasonable inferences from those facts in their favor.6 
¶9 
On 
Monday, 
July 
2, 
2012, 
eight-year-old 
Lily 
Engelhardt started her first day at a summer day camp organized 
and run by the New Berlin Parks and Recreation Department.  On 
her second day of camp, the camp was scheduled to take a field 
trip to Brookfield's Wiberg Aquatic Center.   
¶10 Lily could not swim.  Despite having taken three 
sessions of beginner swimming lessons through the New Berlin 
Parks and Recreation Department, Lily had not moved on to the 
next level and was otherwise not making much progress.  Other 
than these three sessions of swimming lessons, Lily had very 
little experience with swimming or being in or around pools. 
¶11 The field trip to the Aquatic Center was optional.  
When Lily's mother received a permission slip upon picking Lily 
up after her first day, she questioned whether Lily should go on 
the field trip given that Lily could not swim.   
¶12 Lily's mother communicated her concerns to Stuart 
Bell, the "Playground Coordinator" in charge of the day camp 
program.  She told Bell that Lily could not swim and asked 
whether Lily should go on the field trip to the Aquatic Center.  
Bell responded that it would be all right for Lily to attend the 
                                                 
6 Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 2006 
WI 67, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 259, 715 N.W.2d 620; Kraemer Bros., Inc. 
v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 567, 278 N.W.2d 857 
(1979). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
6 
 
field trip because Lily would be restricted to the splash pad 
area of the Aquatic Center. 
¶13 In his deposition, Bell testified that New Berlin gave 
swim tests to all new campers in order to test their swimming 
ability.  In fact, when Lily's mother told Bell that her 
daughter could not swim, Bell told her that Lily would be safe 
because her swimming ability would be evaluated at the pool.  
However, Lily was not given a swim test, and Bell told no other 
staff members that Lily could not swim.  
¶14 The Aquatic Center was very busy the day of the field 
trip.  Upon arriving at the Aquatic Center, 77 campers were 
divided by gender and went into the locker rooms to change.  
Although new campers who had not been given a swim test were 
instructed to find a leader before getting into the pool, they 
were not directed to go to any specific location to find a 
leader, and no leaders were stationed at the locker room door to 
direct them.   
¶15 At some point when most of the children were in the 
water but before all staff members were out of the locker room, 
lifeguards had already discovered a distressed Lily in the pool.  
Despite the efforts of lifeguards and other medical personnel, 
Lily died as a result of this incident. 
¶16 Lily's parents sued New Berlin and several other 
defendants, alleging negligence.  New Berlin moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4).  The circuit court determined that an issue 
of fact precluded New Berlin's immunity as a matter of law.  New 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
7 
 
Berlin moved for leave to appeal.  The motion was granted by the 
court of appeals.   
¶17 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding that New Berlin was immune from suit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4)7 and was entitled to summary judgment.  
¶18 The court of appeals reasoned that none of the camp 
documents highlighted by the Engelhardts (specifically, the 
camp's information packet, staff guidelines, and staff handbook) 
created ministerial duties and that the known danger exception 
to governmental immunity did not apply. 
II 
¶19 The issue presented is whether New Berlin is entitled 
to governmental immunity or whether an exception to governmental 
immunity applies.  "Whether an exception to immunity applies 
requires us to determine the proper scope of the common law 
doctrine of governmental immunity; that is a question of law 
that we review de novo without deference to the circuit court or 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
8 
 
court of appeals, but benefitting from the analysis of each 
court."8 
III 
A 
¶20 We begin our analysis with the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), the governmental immunity statute.9  
¶21 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) immunizes 
municipalities from liability arising out of "acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions."   
¶22 For over 40 years, this court has consistently 
interpreted this particular statutory language to include any 
acts that involve the exercise of discretion.10  Immunizing 
government officials from liability arising out of their 
discretionary 
acts 
"is 
based 
largely 
upon 
public 
policy 
considerations that spring from the interest in protecting the 
public purse and a preference for political rather than judicial 
                                                 
8 Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶19 (citing Kimps v. Hill, 200 
Wis. 2d 1, 8, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996)); see also Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶17 (citing Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 
228 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999)). 
9 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
10 Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 N.W.2d 537 
(1977); see also Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 
2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (concluding 
that this particular statutory language is "synonymous with 
discretionary acts"). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
9 
 
redress for the actions of public officers."11  We highlighted 
these important policy considerations in Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), as follows: 
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office.12 
¶23 Despite decades of legislative silence with regard to 
this court's long-standing interpretation of the governmental 
immunity statute, the Engelhardts invite this court to reverse 
course 
on 
the 
past 
40 
years 
of 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence 
interpreting the governmental immunity statute.13  They urge the 
court to adopt an interpretation of the statute that would have 
the effect of exposing municipalities to liability in a far 
greater number of circumstances. 
                                                 
11 Lodl, 
253 
Wis. 2d 323, 
¶23 
(citing 
Kierstyn, 
228 
Wis. 2d at 89-90). 
12 See also Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶23 (quoting Lister v. 
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). 
13 Our interpretation of the particular statutory language 
at issue has stood undisturbed for over 40 years.  The 
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts is over 
60 years old.  See Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 331-33, 73 
N.W.2d 514 (1955). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
10 
 
¶24 We decline the Engelhardts' invitation.  Decades of 
jurisprudence cannot, and should not, be discarded casually.  
"'This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously 
because of our abiding respect for the rule of law.'"14  The 
doctrine 
of 
stare 
decisis 
is 
vital 
to 
"the 
evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles[.]"15  
It "fosters reliance on judicial decisions[] and contributes to 
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."16 
¶25 The doctrine of stare decisis is a particularly 
important concern "where a court has authoritatively interpreted 
a statute[.]"17  This is because "the legislature remains free to 
alter its construction" if it believes we interpreted the 
statute incorrectly or in a way that results in unintended or 
undesirable consequences.18  
¶26 The legislature has not overturned our interpretation 
of the statute.  Although it is not conclusive of legislative 
                                                 
14 Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶41, 
281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (quoting Johnson Controls v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257). 
15 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); Romanshek, 
281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶43; Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
16 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827; Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶43; 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
17 Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶45 (citing Hilton v. S.C. 
Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).                 
18 Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶45 (citing Hilton, 502 U.S. 
at 202). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
11 
 
intent, we note that the legislature has on numerous occasions 
revised and recreated Wis. Stat. § 893.80 without altering the 
statutory language in response to this court's interpretation of 
the statute.19  Indeed, the legislature repealed and recreated 
the governmental immunity statute in 1977,20 but it did not see 
fit to "correct" the court's understanding of governmental 
immunity for discretionary acts as discussed in Lister, a case 
decided just one year earlier.21   
¶27 If 
we 
adopt 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) urged by the Engelhardts, we would effectively pull 
the rug out from under municipalities and other governmental 
entities that have managed their affairs relying upon our 
decades-old interpretation of the governmental immunity statute.  
Such a result would be especially jarring to the public and 
legal community given that just two years ago, we rejected the 
specific interpretation of the statute that the Engelhardts urge 
us to adopt today.22   
                                                 
19 Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶52 ("Legislative inaction 
following 
judicial 
construction 
of 
a 
statute, 
while 
not 
conclusive, 
evinces 
legislative 
approval 
of 
the 
interpretation.") (quoted source omitted). 
20 See 1977 Wis. Act 285, § 11. 
21 Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300-02. 
22 See generally Melchert v. Pro Elec. Contractors, 2017 WI 
30, ¶¶53-65, 374 Wis. 2d 439, 892 N.W.2d 710 (R.G. Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  
No. 
2016AP801   
 
12 
 
¶28 It is unwise for a court to frequently call into 
question existing and long-standing law.  Doing so gives the 
impression that the decision to overturn prior cases is 
"undertaken merely because the composition of the court has 
changed."23  "When existing law is open to revision in every 
case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, 
with arbitrary and unpredictable results."24   
B 
¶29 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
provides 
no 
immunity 
against liability associated with several categories of acts:   
There is no immunity against liability associated 
with:  1) the performance of ministerial duties 
imposed by law; 2) known and compelling dangers that 
give rise to ministerial duties on the part of public 
officers or employees; 3) acts involving medical 
discretion; and 4) acts that are malicious, willful 
and intentional.25   
¶30 These 
exceptions 
"represent[] 
a 
judicial 
balance 
struck between 'the need of public officers to perform their 
functions freely [and] the right of an aggrieved party to seek 
redress.'"26 
                                                 
23 Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
24 Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. 
Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶29, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 
628 
N.W.2d 376); 
see 
also 
Romanshek, 
281 
Wis. 2d 300, ¶42; Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
25 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶24 (citing Willow Creek Ranch, 
235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶25). 
26 C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 710 (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 
300). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
13 
 
¶31 In the instant case, the Engelhardts invoke the 
"ministerial duty" and "known danger" exceptions to governmental 
immunity.  These two exceptions are related——they "overlap to an 
extent, inasmuch as they both require the identification of a 
ministerial duty."27  Thus, a brief discussion of ministerial 
duties is relevant to the application of both exceptions. 
¶32 In Wisconsin, the test for determining whether a duty 
is ministerial or discretionary was articulated in Meyer v. 
Carman, 271 Wis. 2d 329, 332, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955).  We have 
described the test for ministerial duties as follows: 
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.28 
                                                 
27 Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶24. 
28 Lister, 
72 
Wis. 2d at 
301; 
see 
also 
Pries, 
326 
Wis. 2d 37, ¶22. 
The difference between a ministerial duty for purposes of 
the "ministerial duty" exception to governmental immunity and a 
ministerial duty for purposes of the "known danger" exception 
has been described as follows: 
[A] ministerial duty for purposes of the ministerial 
duty exception is imposed by law or policy and 
performance is required in a time, manner, and under 
conditions 
where 
the 
officer 
does 
not 
exercise 
discretion or judgment.  In contrast, the ministerial 
duty for purposes of the known danger exception arises 
not from a written law or policy, but when an 
obviously dangerous situation presents itself. 
Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶24. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
14 
 
¶33 We have explained that "circumstances may give rise to 
such a certain duty, where . . . the nature of the danger is 
compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that 
the public officer has no discretion not to act."29 
¶34 If either the "ministerial duty" exception or the 
"known danger" exception applies, New Berlin is not entitled to 
governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
IV 
¶35 Having established the proper legal framework, we now 
apply that framework to the facts of the case.  We conclude that 
the known danger exception applies, and therefore, New Berlin is 
not entitled to governmental immunity. 
¶36 The known danger exception was first established by 
this court in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 
(1977).  The Cords case involved an accident where hikers, 
legally accessing a park hiking trail at night, fell into a deep 
gorge located on a part of the trail known by the park manager 
to be particularly hazardous at night.30   
                                                 
29 C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715 (citing Domino v. Walworth Cty., 
118 Wis. 2d 488, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984)); see also 
Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶24. 
30 Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 532-35. 
In Cords, we described the topography of the trail in great 
detail, and we do not repeat that description here.  We note, 
however, that the hazardous condition on the trail was a cutback 
"where one misstep of a foot in a southerly direction would 
cause an uninterrupted twenty foot slide down a sharp incline to 
a direct dropoff of approximately eighty feet to the rock bottom 
of the gorge."  Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 532. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
15 
 
¶37 The issue was whether the park manager was entitled to 
immunity from the hikers' negligence suit. 
¶38 We concluded that the park manager "had an absolute, 
certain, or imperative duty to either place the signs warning 
the public of the dangerous conditions existing on the upper 
trail or to advise his superiors" of the hazardous conditions.31   
¶39 We explained: "[The park manager] knew the terrain at 
the glen was dangerous particularly at night; he was in a 
position as park manager to do something about it; he failed to 
do anything about it.  He is liable for the breach of this 
duty."32  Based on the facts presented in Cords, the court held 
"that the duty to either place warning signs or advise superiors 
of the conditions is . . . a duty so clear and so absolute that 
it falls within the definition of a ministerial duty."33 
¶40 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
applied 
the 
known 
danger 
exception in Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn Area School 
District, 2006 WI App 234, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 N.W.2d 420.  In 
Voss, a teacher was instructing the class regarding the dangers 
of driving after having consumed alcohol.34  The teacher had the 
students 
wear 
"fatal 
vision 
goggles" 
which, 
when 
worn, 
replicated a .10 blood alcohol concentration.35  The teacher 
                                                 
31 Id. at 541. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 542. 
34 Voss, 297 Wis. 2d 389, ¶2. 
35 Id. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
16 
 
arranged the desks in the classroom into three straight rows and 
instructed three students wearing goggles to walk in between the 
rows and go after a tennis ball thrown by the teacher.36  "[T]he 
purpose of this particular exercise was to divert the student's 
attention away from an otherwise simple task (walking down an 
aisle of desks) and then show how the addition of another simple 
task (going after a ball) makes the performance of both tasks 
difficult when a person is under the influence of alcohol."37   
¶41 The teacher was aware of the risks inherent in the 
exercise.  Although the potential for danger was obvious, the 
teacher had also witnessed first-hand a student who bumped into 
a desk and hit her knees against the floor while performing this 
exercise.38  The incident giving rise to the lawsuit in Voss 
occurred when a student caught her foot on the leg of a desk, 
tripped, and hit her mouth on the top of the desk, causing 
severe injuries to her teeth.39   
¶42 The 
student's 
parents 
sued 
the 
school 
district 
claiming negligence, and the school district argued that it was 
entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).40   
                                                 
36 Id., ¶4. 
37 Id., ¶5. 
38 Id., ¶¶5-6. 
39 Id., ¶¶6-9. 
40 Id., ¶10. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
17 
 
¶43 The court of appeals determined that the school 
district was not entitled to governmental immunity because the 
known danger exception applied to the facts of the case.41   
¶44 The court of appeals stated that, like the facts 
presented in Cords, the facts presented in Voss represented an 
"example[] of conditions that are nearly certain to cause injury 
if not corrected, or in other words, are 'accidents waiting to 
happen.'"42  The court of appeals explained: 
The teacher knew of the perils of conducting the 
exercise.  The fatal vision goggles distort vision and 
impair depth perception and sense of balance.  The 
teacher testified that students using the goggles 
would lose their balance and slip or stumble while 
doing the simple tasks he had them perform.  In fact, 
that was the entire purpose of the exercise——to show 
students how difficult a simple task becomes when 
alcohol is consumed.  The teacher, however, chose to 
conduct 
the 
exercise 
within 
the 
confines 
of 
a 
classroom with a hard tile floor and in between aisles 
of desks made of steel or aluminum and wood.  Despite 
these obvious hazards, the teacher took no precautions 
to minimize the risk of injury. 
 
 
 . . . . 
[T]he circumstances presented on the day of Voss' 
injury admitted of only one response on behalf of the 
teacher——stop the activity the way it was presently 
conceived.  Before Voss tripped and fell, some of the 
male students had collided with each other and slid on 
the floor and one other student had stumbled and 
fallen to her knees.  At that point, given the 
physical layout of the room and the desks made of 
steel or aluminum and wood, the manner in which the 
students were stumbling and falling and the very 
                                                 
41 Id., ¶23. 
42 Id., ¶19. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
18 
 
nature of the effects of the goggles themselves, it 
should have been self-evident to the teacher that the 
activity was hazardous and the only option was to put 
an end to it.  Accordingly, the known and present 
danger exception to immunity applies.43 
¶45 Though not decided on the basis of the known danger 
exception, Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 784 
N.W.2d 648, is also instructive. 
¶46 In Pries, a group of workers were disassembling a 
steel horse stall at the state fair.44  The stalls were made up 
of four steel pieces:  a front, back, and two sides.45  Each 
piece measured approximately 10 feet high, 10 feet wide, and 
four inches thick, and weighed approximately 200 pounds.46  When 
assembled, the pieces were secured to each other with pins, and 
the side and back pieces were secured to a wall with chains.47 
¶47 At the time of the accident giving rise to the 
lawsuit, a two-page written procedure was in effect setting 
forth the proper method of disassembling horse stalls.  The 
supervisor who was in charge of the workers was aware of the 
written instructions and that they stated, in relevant part: 
"Always have someone holding up the piece that you are taking 
down."48  The supervisor also knew that if the stalls were not 
                                                 
43 Id., ¶¶19-20. 
44 Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶4. 
45 Id., ¶5. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id., ¶9. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
19 
 
disassembled in an appropriate manner, they posed a risk of 
injury.49  "[The supervisor] confirmed that he knew that if the 
chains had been removed from the back stall pieces, the stalls 
could fall and injure people standing nearby, particularly if 
someone jumped up on the stalls."50 
¶48 At 
one 
point 
while 
disassembling 
a 
stall, 
the 
plaintiff and two other workers struggled to dislodge a stall 
piece that was stuck to another piece.51  The supervisor, a full-
time employee of the Wisconsin State Fair Park, observed that 
the chains responsible for securing the pieces had been removed 
and commented that they should not have been.52  Despite that, 
the supervisor jumped up on and straddled the stall next to the 
piece that the workers were trying to free and started jerking 
it up and down with his hands.53  Immediately after, there was a 
devastating accident in which unchained stall pieces started 
falling in a domino effect on the workers, striking all three of 
them.54 
¶49 The plaintiff sued the supervisor and State Fair Park 
claiming negligence, and the supervisor argued that he was 
                                                 
49 Id., ¶11. 
50 Id. 
51 Id., ¶6. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
20 
 
entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).55 
¶50 The Pries court held that the ministerial duty 
exception to governmental immunity applied because the written 
instructions 
"establish[ed] 
a 
ministerial 
duty 
that 
[the 
supervisor] then violated when he jumped on and shook the stuck 
stall knowing that 'the chains were undone' and knowing of the 
instructions to '[a]lways have someone holding up the piece that 
you are taking down.'"56  
¶51 Although the parties in Pries briefed the application 
of the known danger exception, the Pries court concluded that 
"[b]ecause . . . the ministerial duty exception applies here, it 
is not necessary for us to determine whether the known danger 
exception also applies."57  
¶52 Writing separately, one justice analyzed the known 
danger exception and concluded that it applied to the facts of 
the case: 
The pieces of solid steel horse stalls weigh[ed] 200 
pounds, [were] typically handled by no less than four 
workers, and need[ed] to be constantly supported 
during 
disassembly. 
 
Disassembly 
here 
[was] 
an 
"accident waiting to happen" and gives rise to an 
absolute duty to take steps to prevent the steel horse 
stall pieces from falling.  [The supervisor] knew the 
unchained steel stall pieces were dangerous; he was in 
a position as supervisor to do something about the 
                                                 
55 Id., ¶¶7, 14-16. 
56 Id., ¶33. 
57 Id., ¶41. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
21 
 
danger; and he failed to do anything about it——worse, 
he jumped onto the stalls.  In my view, he thereby 
breached a duty that was "absolute, certain, and 
imperative" following the analysis of the known danger 
cases.58 
¶53 Our review of Cords, Voss, and Pries leads us to the 
conclusion that the known danger exception applies in the 
instant case, and as a consequence, New Berlin is not entitled 
to governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
¶54 As 
the 
facts 
somberly 
illustrate, 
the 
danger 
associated with bringing a young child who cannot swim to a busy 
water park along with 76 other children is apparent.  A young 
child can quickly become distressed in deep water if he or she 
cannot swim.  Serious injury or death can occur very suddenly, 
so it is paramount that precautions be taken to lessen those 
risks.  The nature of the danger here was immediate, compelling, 
and self-evident.  The danger was like hiking a trail with a 
treacherous cutback along a steep gorge at night, attempting to 
go after a tennis ball in a classroom full of desks while 
wearing goggles that simulate a .10 BAC, and jumping on an 
unchained 200-pound solid steel piece of a horse stall.  The 
danger was "of such force" that Bell had no discretion not to 
act——the circumstances of the situation imposed upon him a 
ministerial duty to test Lily's swimming ability before she got 
into the water.59 
                                                 
58 Id., ¶46 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
59 See C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
22 
 
¶55 Bell was aware that Lily could not swim.  Lily's 
mother told him that Lily could not swim before the field trip 
to the Aquatic Center, but Bell did nothing with this 
information.  He did not tell any other staff member that Lily 
could not swim.  He did nothing to ensure that Lily's swimming 
ability would be tested before allowing her to be without direct 
supervision.  In short, Bell was aware of the danger, he was in 
a position as the Playground Coordinator to do something about 
it, and he failed to do anything about it.60   
¶56 The parties spend a great deal of effort questioning 
whether Bell and other camp staff had a ministerial duty to 
directly supervise Lily and keep an eye on her at all times 
before administering a swim test. 
¶57 Properly framed, the issue in the instant case is 
whether the circumstances of the situation created a ministerial 
duty to test Lily's swimming ability before she got into the 
pool.  We conclude that they did.  The Engelhardts' theory of 
liability is that New Berlin's procedure for making sure that 
new campers like Lily did not get into the water without first 
having a swim test was ineffective and constitutes negligence.  
New Berlin negligently performed (or, as a result of its 
negligence, did not perform) its ministerial duty to administer 
a swim test before Lily got into the water, and governmental 
                                                 
60 Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 541. 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
23 
 
immunity is not available "for the negligent performance of a 
purely ministerial duty."61   
¶58 Before ending, we note that there might have been a 
number of ways in which New Berlin could have discharged its 
ministerial duty to test Lily's swimming ability before she got 
in the water.  For example, new campers who had not yet taken a 
swim test, including Lily, could have been grouped together by 
gender and assigned a specific counselor to supervise them until 
a swim test was performed.  Alternatively, camp staff could have 
been stationed at the exit of each locker room to fit each new 
camper who had not yet taken a swim test, including Lily, with a 
life jacket. 
¶59 In Cords, we specifically enumerated two different 
ways in which the park manager could have fulfilled the 
ministerial duty arising out of the circumstances of that 
particular case.62  That there were at least two possible ways 
for the park manager to fulfill his ministerial duty did not 
affect the resolution of the case.  "[S]imply allowing for the 
exercise of discretion does not suffice to bring the actions 
under the blanket of immunity provided by sec. 893.80(4), 
Stats., when the facts or the allegations reveal a duty so clear 
                                                 
61 Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶22 (quoting Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 
10). 
62 See Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 541 (concluding that the park 
manager had a duty to either place signs warning the public of 
the dangerous condition or advise his superiors of the dangerous 
condition). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
24 
 
and absolute that it falls within the concept of a ministerial 
duty."63   
¶60 Similarly, that there may have been several possible 
ways in which New Berlin could have fulfilled its ministerial 
duty does not affect the resolution of the instant case.  
Rather, it is sufficient for us to conclude that a ministerial 
duty was created by the obviously hazardous circumstances 
presented in the instant case, and as a result, New Berlin is 
not entitled to governmental immunity from the Engelhardts' 
negligence suit. 
¶61 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
known 
danger 
exception applies. 
¶62 Because we conclude that the known danger exception to 
governmental immunity applies, we need not and do not address 
whether any of the written documents highlighted by the 
Engelhardts created a ministerial duty for purposes of the 
ministerial duty exception. 
V 
¶63 We conclude that the known danger exception applies in 
the instant case, and as a result, New Berlin is not entitled to 
governmental immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
                                                 
63 C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715 n.8 (quoting Domino, 118 Wis. 2d 
at 491-93); see also Pries, 326 Wis. 2d 37, ¶45 n.4 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring) (quoting Domino, 118 Wis. 2d at 491). 
No. 
2016AP801   
 
25 
 
¶64 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶65 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  This case is 
about whether the City of New Berlin and the New Berlin Parks 
and Recreation Department (together, "New Berlin") are entitled 
to immunity for the negligent acts of their camp staff which 
resulted in the drowning of eight-year-old Lily.  While the 
majority opinion chooses to expand the narrow exception to 
immunity carved out for a "known danger," I apply the plain 
language set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to reach the same 
result. 
¶66 After adopting and applying governmental immunity in 
Wisconsin for almost a century, in 1962 this court boldly 
abrogated governmental immunity, declaring it "ancient and 
fallacious," "archaic," and "unjust, inequitable, and patently 
unfair."  Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 33-35, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962).  In the landmark Holytz decision, this court 
provided clarity in its statement that "henceforward, so far as 
governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity."  Id. at 39.  An exception 
to immunity was carved out for a governmental body in the 
exercise of its "legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40.   
¶67 The following year, the legislature signaled its 
approval of the Holytz decision with the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) which provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o suit 
may be brought against any . . . governmental subdivision or any 
agency thereof . . . or against its officers, officials, agents 
or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
2 
 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."1  The 
language of Holytz and § 893.80(4) advance the original purpose 
of governmental immunity, which is "to ensure that courts refuse 
to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of 
coordinate branches of government, if such a policy decision, 
consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place."  Legue 
v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶40, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 
N.W.2d 837.   
¶68 Although governmental immunity was intended to be 
reserved only for government agents or employees in the exercise 
of their legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions, this court soon revived the pre-Holytz 
distinction between "ministerial duties" and "discretionary 
acts."  See Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis. 2d 31, 39-41, 214 N.W.2d 432 
(1974).  The exercise of a "discretionary act," subject to 
immunity, is now synonymous with the exercise of a legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
and 
quasi-judicial 
function.  
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 
235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.   
¶69  The artificial distinction between a ministerial duty 
and discretionary act is impracticable and the resulting 
decisions regarding the limits of governmental immunity have 
been labeled "jurisprudential chaos."  Scott v. Savers Property 
                                                 
1 The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 331.43, which later 
became Wis. Stat. § 895.43, which is now Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  
See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 
WI 8, ¶¶53-54 & n.13, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  However, 
the pertinent language of the statute has remained unchanged.   
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
3 
 
and Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶58, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 
N.W.2d 715 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).2  Every act has a 
discretionary component, such that "[i]t would be difficult to 
conceive 
of 
any 
official 
act, 
no 
matter 
how 
directly 
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner 
of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a 
nail."  Id., ¶136 (Prosser, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).    
¶70 Far from creating an "evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles,"3 the basis for 
adherence to stare decisis, the determination that an act is 
sufficiently discretionary so as to invoke immunity has appeared 
almost random at times.  See, e.g., Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. 
Co., 2002 WI 71, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 (holding that 
although the statute at issue described the procedures the 
officer should use in deciding to manually control traffic, the 
                                                 
2 While the majority opinion paints a picture of the 
jurisprudence surrounding governmental immunity as being clear 
and consistent, quite the contrary is true.  See Bostco LLC 
v. Milwaukee 
Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2013 
WI 
78, 
¶135, 
350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) 
("Government immunity and liability is a complicated area of 
jurisprudence with 50 years of Wisconsin case law precedent that 
is not always easy to explain or justify.").  Criticism of this 
court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is well 
documented.  See, e.g., Melchert v. Pro Electric Contractors, 
2017 WI 30, ¶57, 374 Wis. 2d 439, 892 N.W.2d  710 (R.G. Bradley, 
J., dissenting); see also Nicholas J. Bullard, Comment, Pushing 
the Reset Button on Wisconsin's Governmental Immunity Doctrine, 
2014 Wis. L. Rev. 801.  
3 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); Progressive 
N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶43, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417; Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 
2003 WI 108, ¶95, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
4 
 
officer had discretion as to when to perform manual traffic 
control); Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 127 (holding that a guidance 
counselor's act of wrongly advising a student that his classes 
were approved by the NCAA was discretionary, despite the 
guidance counselor's receipt of clear and unambiguous forms 
detailing approved and unapproved NCAA courses); Brown v. 
Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96 (holding that 
a firefighter was liable for running through a red stop signal 
with his emergency lights activated, but without an audible 
signal, because he violated a clear ministerial duty).  The 
result of this court's adoption of the pre-Holytz, pre-Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
language 
conditioning 
immunity 
on 
the 
performance 
of 
discretionary 
acts 
has 
been 
a 
return 
to 
governmental 
immunity 
as 
the 
rule 
and 
liability 
as 
the 
exception.    
I. 
THE NARROW KNOWN DANGER EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY 
¶71 In this case, instead of analyzing whether New Berlin 
camp staff had a ministerial duty by operation of law, 
regulation, 
or 
governmental 
policy, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
concludes that a ministerial duty arose by virtue of a "known 
danger."  To date, the known danger exception has been limited 
to situations where "there exists a known present danger of such 
force that the time, mode and occasion for performance is 
evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the 
exercise of judgment and discretion."  C.L. v. Olson, 143 
Wis. 2d 701, 717, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).  "[T]he danger must be 
compelling enough that a self-evident, particularized, and non-
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
5 
 
discretionary municipal action is required.  The focus is on the 
specific act the public officer or official is alleged to have 
negligently performed or omitted."  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶40.  
The known danger exception has been applied in cases where the 
potential of danger was high and the act required to prevent the 
danger was clear.  See, e.g., Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn 
Area School Dist., 2006 WI App 234, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 
N.W.2d 420 (known danger exception applied where the hazards of 
conducting an exercise within the confines of a classroom with a 
hard tile floor and full of desks was apparent after other 
students had previously collided with each other and fallen); 
but cf. C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 723 (known danger exception did not 
apply because the potential danger of a parolee attacking a 
victim did not rise to "such a degree of probability" that the 
parole agent was deprived of the discretion regarding the manner 
and level of parole supervision required).   
¶72 In order to apply the known danger exception to the 
case at hand, the majority opinion must necessarily expand the 
exception to apply in situations where the danger was not 
necessarily imminent and where there was discretion in how to 
respond to the potential danger.  The majority opinion concludes 
that the known, compelling danger to Lily as a non-swimmer was 
that she would drown and that the ministerial duty that arose 
from the compelling danger was the administration of a swim 
test.  Majority op., ¶6.  The known danger exception as 
previously defined does not apply to the facts of this case.   
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
6 
 
¶73 First, the danger involved was not compelling and of 
such force to give rise to a duty to act.  Lily's presence at 
the Wiberg Aquatic Center alone did not present a compelling 
danger.  Stuart Bell, the Playground Coordinator, had taken 
campers to the Aquatic Center every Tuesday in the summer for 
twelve years.  During that time there were only two incidents in 
which participants needed lifeguard assistance, with neither 
incident resulting in injury.  On the date of the incident, 
Aquatic Center lifeguards were on duty, New Berlin camp staff 
was present, and procedures were in place to allow non-swimmers 
like Lily to safely enjoy the trip to the Aquatic Center.  No 
one saw Lily near the pool which could have created a compelling 
danger.  As noted by the court of appeals, "[a]ware that Lily 
could not swim, if Bell had seen her walking right along the 
edge of a deep area of the pool, this case would be akin to Voss 
in that a situation would exist that required Bell to take 
immediate action to stop an 'accident waiting to happen.'"  
Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, No. 2016AP801, unpublished 
slip op., ¶33 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2017).  While in hindsight 
Lily's drowning can be said to be an "accident waiting to 
happen," 
most 
cases 
alleging 
negligence 
fit 
that 
broad 
definition.   
¶74 Second, there was discretion as to the mode of 
response.  The majority opinion defines the immediate action 
required to prevent the danger of Lily drowning as a swim test.  
A swim test would have revealed that Lily could not swim, a fact 
already known by Bell based on a conversation that he had with 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
7 
 
Lily's mother the day before the incident.  Lily's mother 
testified at her deposition that after she informed Bell that 
Lily could not swim, Bell's response was:  "That's okay. She can 
stay in the splash pad area."  There were multiple ways that the 
New Berlin camp staff could have kept Lily safe at the Aquatic 
Center, such as keeping her at the shallow end of the pool or in 
the splash pad area, alerting the lifeguards and other camp 
staff of her inability to swim, having her wear a lifejacket 
and, most importantly, supervising Lily.  There was no one time, 
mode or occasion for performance to alleviate the risk of Lily 
drowning.  The facts of this case did not present a known, 
present and compelling danger and there was no "self-evident, 
particularized, and nondiscretionary" response.  Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶40.  The known danger exception does not apply.  
II. 
APPLICATION OF WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4) 
¶75 Instead of expanding the known danger exception to fit 
the facts of this case, allowing for broader future use of what 
was intended to be a "narrow, judicially-created exception," 
this court should return to an interpretation that is tethered 
to the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 
¶4.  Returning to the text of § 893.80(4) would not only result 
in coherency in our jurisprudence, it would also allow redress 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
8 
 
to innocent victims for wrongs committed by the government.4  See 
Melchert v. Pro Electric Contractors, 2017 WI 30, ¶¶63-65, 374 
Wis. 2d  439, 892 N.W.2d 710 (R.G. Bradley, J., dissenting).  
¶76 This court recently acknowledged that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) "is best honored by applying the legislature's 
chosen plain language, rather than a judicial distillation 
thereof."  Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, 
¶35, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226.  This court has been 
called upon in the past to revisit § 893.80, yet we have been 
reluctant to do so.  See Melchert, 374 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶52-65 
(R.G. Bradley, J., dissenting); Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2013 
WI 
78, 
¶136, 
350 
Wis. 2d 554, 
835 
N.W.2d 160 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 
127, ¶33.  The argument for revisiting the standard of 
governmental immunity has been made and, through amicus briefs, 
the 
court 
has 
heard 
from 
governmental 
entities 
and 
representatives of tort victims.  There is no time like the 
present.   
¶77 It 
is 
a 
fundamental 
principle 
of 
statutory 
construction to presume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
                                                 
4 As Justice N. Patrick Crooks noted in his concurrence in 
Showers, the court "must do a better job of striking the balance 
between too much immunity, which creates a heavy burden for 
those who suffer harm from negligent government acts, and too 
much liability, which creates a heavy burden for taxpayers."  
Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶69, 350 
Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d  226 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
9 
 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Statutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning . . . ."  Id.  
Where the "meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry," and decline to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation.  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶78 We look then to the common, ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the words in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The word 
"legislative" means "[o]f, relating to, or involving lawmaking 
or the power to enact laws; concerned with making laws."  
Legislative, Black's Law Dictionary  1039 (10th ed. 2014).  The 
word "judicial" means "[o]f, relating to, or involving a 
judgment."  Judicial, Black's Law Dictionary 974.  The word 
"quasi" means "[s]eemingly but not actually; in some sense 
or degree; resembling; nearly."  Quasi, Black's Law Dictionary 
1439. 
 
A 
"function" 
refers 
to 
an 
"[a]ctivity 
that 
is 
appropriate to a particular business or profession."  Function, 
Black's Law Dictionary 787.  Taken together, § 893.80(4) 
provides governmental immunity only for agents or employees of a 
governmental entity who are engaged in an act that, in some 
sense or degree, resembles making laws or exercising judgments 
related to government business.   
¶79 Applying the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
to the facts in this case, the New Berlin camp staff was 
provided with "Staff Guidelines" which set forth the relevant 
expectations of camp staff as follows:  "[i]t is your 
responsibility to supervise the kids at all times.  For example, 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
10 
 
during weekly swimming field trips you are to actually watch the 
kids in the water by being in the water with them, or by sitting 
on the edge of the pool."  The guidelines further provided:  
"[m]ake sure you know where the kids in your care are at all 
times," 
and, 
underlined 
for 
emphasis, 
that 
"[u]nder 
no 
circumstances should kids be left alone." 
¶80 While the promulgation of these guidelines would 
qualify as a "quasi-legislative" activity of New Berlin, and 
thus New Berlin would receive immunity for legal challenges 
involving the content of those guidelines, New Berlin is not 
immune from suit for its camp staff negligently failing to 
supervise 
Lily 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
guidelines. 
 
The 
guidelines provided clear instructions to camp staff to "know 
where the kids in your care are at all times" and "[u]nder no 
circumstances should kids be left alone."  When the New Berlin 
camp staff failed to supervise Lily as required by the 
guidelines, they were not making any laws or exercising any 
judgments related to government business.  They cannot be said 
to have acted in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial manner 
and therefore governmental immunity does not apply.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶81 In sum, although I agree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that New Berlin is not immune from suit for the 
negligence of its camp staff, I cannot join the majority opinion 
because it expands the known danger exception beyond the 
"narrow, judicially-created exception" to confer immunity in 
this case.  Instead, I return to the plain language of Wis. 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
11 
 
Stat. § 893.80(4) and conclude that New Berlin is liable for 
Lily's drowning because the negligent supervision of Lily at the 
Aquatic Center on July 3, 2012 was not an act done in the 
exercise of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function.  
¶82 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.  
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2016AP801.rfd 
 
1