Title: People v. Metcalfe

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93217-Agenda 23-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								WILLIAM METCALFE, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, William Metcalfe, was convicted of attempted armed
robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-2 (West 1998)) and attempted
aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-5 (West 1998)). The trial
court thereafter merged the attempted aggravated robbery
conviction into the attempted armed robbery conviction and
sentenced defendant to a term of 10 years' imprisonment.
Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that he
was denied his right to a fair trial when one of the members of his
jury indicated during voir dire that she could not be fair and
impartial.
	The First District of the appellate court reversed defendant's
conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial
judge had a duty to sue sponte excuse the juror even though the
defendant did not challenge the juror for cause or exercise one of
his peremptory challenges. 326 Ill. App. 3d 1008. We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now
reverse the appellate court's ruling.
	The charges against defendant arose from an incident that
occurred on January 8, 1998. At defendant's trial, the victim, Jerry
Dudek, testified that defendant approached him while he was
using an automated teller machine in the lobby of a Citibank
branch in downtown Chicago. Defendant twice asked Dudek for
money. Dudek refused to give defendant any money. Defendant
then brushed against Dudek, stuck his hand into his pocket, and
told Dudek that he had a gun and wanted Dudek's money. Dudek
was scared and asked defendant not to hurt him. Defendant came
closer to Dudek saying he wanted Dudek's money.
	Dudek then yelled out for help, at which point defendant took
a step back. Defendant tried to reach for Dudek's wallet, which
was on the ledge of the automated teller machine. Dudek grabbed
defendant's arm to prevent him from taking the wallet. Defendant
threatened to kill Dudek, so Dudek released his grip on
defendant's arm. Defendant ran toward the revolving door to try
to escape. Dudek, however, put his foot against the door so that
defendant was trapped in the door. Several bank employees,
including an armed security guard, then reached the scene. Dudek
explained that defendant had a gun and had tried to rob him. One
of the bank employees ran out of the bank through another door
and held the revolving door from the outside to prevent defendant
from escaping. Dudek then asked the employees to take his place
holding the door. Dudek said he was in shock and wanted to leave,
so he gave his business card to one of the employees and asked her
to have the police call him. Dudek went to the police station
approximately an hour later and signed a complaint.
	Officer Timothy Halloran of the Chicago police department
testified that he received a call around 3:40 p.m. on January 8,
1998, concerning a robbery in progress. Halloran arrived on the
scene and saw defendant trapped in the revolving doors. Several
people were yelling that defendant had a gun. The Citibank
security guard told Halloran that defendant had tried to rob Dudek.
Halloran asked defendant if he had a gun and defendant said "no."
Defendant's left hand was in his pocket, so Halloran asked
defendant to take his hand out of his pocket. Halloran then asked
the people holding the doors to let the doors go so defendant could
exit toward Halloran. Halloran handcuffed defendant and
conducted a protective pat-down search. During the search,
Halloran discovered a sharpened meat cleaver in defendant's
pocket.
	Halloran said that Dudek was holding the revolving door
when he arrived on the scene, but he did not talk to Dudek at that
time. A bank employee later handed Dudek's card to Halloran and
told Halloran that Dudek had been very shaken up and had to go
to an important meeting.
	Defendant testified that on January 8, 1998, he was homeless
and did odd jobs, such as washing windows and cars, to make
money. On January 8, he approached Dudek, told Dudek that he
was homeless and hungry, and asked him for change. When Dudek
did not respond, defendant again asked Dudek for money.
Defendant said that Dudek then grabbed him by the arm and called
for security. Defendant tried to walk away but was caught in the
revolving door. Defendant testified that a security guard arrived
with his gun drawn. Defendant tried to explain that he had done
nothing wrong. The police then arrived and defendant told the
police there had been a misunderstanding. Defendant explained
that the meat cleaver found in his pocket was a novelty item used
to scrape ice off car windshields, to open cans and for eating and
cooking.
	As noted, the jury found defendant guilty and defendant
appealed his conviction. On appeal, the appellate court held that
Officer Halloran had probable cause to arrest defendant and held
that the State had proven defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Nonetheless, the appellate court reversed defendant's
conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant did
not receive a fair trial by an impartial jury due to the presence of
a certain juror, Grevus, on the jury that convicted defendant.
	In reaching its decision, the appellate court noted that, during
the jury voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions of
prospective juror Grevus:
			"COURT: And you have not been an accused,
complainant or witness in a criminal case?
			GREVUS: I have not been an accused. I have been a
victim.
			COURT: That case go to trial?
			GREVUS: I was robbed at gun point from my father's
business.
 			COURT: That's where you have been victim [sic] of a
crime?
 			GREVUS: Yes.
			COURT: You also have a family member or close
friend who was victim [sic] of a crime?
			GREVUS: My mother and father.
			COURT: The fact that you have been a victim and your
mother and father have been victims, would that affect
your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?
			GREVUS: I hope not.
			COURT: You believe you could listen to the evidence
and make a determination from the evidence on the
witness stand?
			GREVUS: Yes.
			COURT: You have been party to a lawsuit that's no
longer pending?
			GREVUS:  Right.
			COURT: Would anything affect your ability to be fair
and impartial?
			GREVUS: I would hope not.
			COURT: As I stated, you will listen to the evidence and
make your determination based on what you hear from the
witness stand?
			GREVUS: Yes.
			COURT: Did you understand the concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and presumption of
innocence?
			GREVUS: Yes.
			***
			COURT: And if at the end of all the evidence, you felt
that the State had proven its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, would you have any problems signing a guilty
verdict?
			GREVUS: No.
			COURT: If on the other hand, you felt they had not,
would you have any problems signing a not guilty
verdict?
			GREVUS: No."
	The State then questioned Grevus concerning the crime in
which she was a victim. Grevus told the assistant State's Attorney
that she was a "witness and victim" in that case. She further
explained that she "positively identified [the perpetrator]" and that
"[h]e got off because of a technicality."
	Defense counsel also questioned Grevus as follows:
			"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Miss Gervus [sic], in your
response to the State's questions just a moment ago, you
said something about the person that you had identified or
the person getting off on a technicality. Does the result of
that case in anyway bias you as you would sit on this jury?
			GREVUS: I would-I mean I would have to answer yes.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Which way is that?
			GREVUS: I believe that the legal system, you know,
when he was clearly guilty from all the evidence but
based on the way that the system is, it was based on the
fact that he tried to discredit me as a witness based on
how many feet and inches I was away from him when I
identified him or how far away I was from the gun. I felt
that they gave-I felt like I was the victim in the crime. I'm
sorry. He felt like he was the victim and I was the
criminal.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would that affect your ability
to be fair here?
			GREVUS: Yes. You ever had something like that to
happen to you, it's hard not to feel that way."
	Defense counsel, however, then excused two other
prospective jurors but did not excuse Grevus. One of those
prospective jurors, Nolan, had never been an accused, complainant
or witness in a criminal case, had not been a victim of a crime, did
not have a family member or close friend that had been a victim of
crime, and had not been a party to a lawsuit. Nolan indicated that
she could be fair and impartial and understood the concepts of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence.
The other prospective juror excused by defense counsel, Nigan,
had not been an accused, complainant or witness in a criminal
case, but had been beaten and mugged and her car had been stolen.
In addition, one of Nigan's friends had been raped. Nigan said,
however, that the fact that she and a close friend had been crime
victims would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial. Nigan
also understood the concepts of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and presumption of innocence. Ultimately, defendant used five of
his seven available peremptory challenges to excuse potential
jurors. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 434(d) (defendant in noncapital case has
seven peremptory challenges).
	The appellate court acknowledged that defendant had waived
review of his objection to juror Grevus because he failed to object
to her presence on the jury at trial. Nonetheless, the appellate court
elected to consider defendant's claim under the plain error
exception to the waiver rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), because the
issue affected defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The
appellate court concluded that Grevus' response to defense
counsel's questions "clarified that her experience with the criminal
justice system had biased her and affected her ability to be fair
toward defendant" and necessitated a reversal of defendant's
conviction and remand for a new trial. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1016.
The appellate court held that "when a prospective juror indicates
bias or prejudice and has not been rehabilitated and counsel fails
to exercise a peremptory challenge or challenge her for cause, the
trial judge has the sua sponte duty to excuse the prospective
juror." 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1018.
	The State now contends that the appellate court erred when it
held that a trial court has a duty to strike a potentially biased or
prejudiced juror sua sponte. Noting that defendant waived any
objection to juror Grevus when he failed to challenge her, the State
argues that the appellate court improperly applied the plain error
exception in this case. The State maintains that the plain error
exception does not apply because the evidence was not closely
balanced and because the trial court could have cured the alleged
error by sustaining a challenge to Grevus, had defense counsel
made such a challenge. In any event, the State maintains that no
error occurred in this case because a trial court does not have a
duty to strike a potentially biased juror sua sponte.
	There is no question that defendant waived his objection to
juror Grevus when he failed to challenge her for cause or to use
one of his peremptory challenges to excuse her. See People v.
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 40 (1998) (defendant waives objection to
juror if he fails to challenge juror for cause or by peremptory
challenge). Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate court that the
issue should be examined under the plain error exception to the
waiver rule because the issue affects defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (plain errors affecting
substantial rights may be noticed even though not brought to trial
court's attention).
	Prior to the appellate court's decision in this case, no
published decision in Illinois had held that a trial judge has a duty
to strike any potentially biased juror sua sponte and that the failure
to do so constitutes plain error. In support of its decision, the
appellate court pointed to language in two decisions of this court,
People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), and People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377 (1984). In Williams, we observed that the purpose of
voir dire is to assure the selection of an impartial panel of jurors
free from prejudice or bias. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16. We further
noted that the circuit court has the primary responsibility for both
initiating and conducting the voir dire examination. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16. In Taylor, we stated that "[a]lthough the decision to
accept a potential juror as an impartial trier of fact is discretionary
with the trial judge, the trial judge is obliged to insure that, in fact,
the defendant receives a trial before a fair and impartial jury."
Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 386-87. Based upon the foregoing language,
the appellate court concluded that a trial court "defeats the purpose
of voir dire and fails to ensure that the defendant receives a trial
before a fair and impartial jury when he seats a juror who
expresses bias or prejudice and who has not been rehabilitated by
further questioning." 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1017. Upon review,
however, we find that the appellate court has construed our
language in Williams and Taylor too broadly.
	At issue in both Williams and Taylor was whether the trial
court had abused its discretion in allowing or denying certain
challenges for cause. Thus, in Taylor, in stating that a trial judge
is obliged to insure that a defendant receives a trial before a fair
and impartial jury, we explained that where a "defendant was
deprived of this right *** because of the denial of challenges for
cause of individual jurors, his conviction must be reversed and he
must receive a new trial." Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 387. In that case,
we held that the trial court had erred in denying the defendant's
challenges for cause of certain jurors. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 395-96.
Similarly, in Williams, we held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted the State's request to excuse a
prospective juror for cause. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16-17. We
noted that the manner and scope of the voir dire examination lies
within the discretion of the trial court. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16.
An abuse of the trial court's discretion will be found only if the
conduct of the court thwarted the selection of an impartial jury.
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16. We concluded that the trial court's
actions in that case did not impede the selection of an impartial
jury. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16-17.
	Significantly, neither Williams nor Taylor addressed whether
a trial court's duty to insure that a defendant receives a trial before
a fair and impartial jury includes a duty to sua sponte strike a
potential juror where that juror indicates some bias or prejudice.
In fact, when faced with the converse situation, the Fifth District
of the appellate court held that although the trial court's actions in
that case did not require reversal of the defendant's conviction, the
trial court should not have dismissed two potential jurors sua
sponte. People v. Beasley, 251 Ill. App. 3d 872, 884 (1993).
Moreover, prior to the appellate court's decision in this case,
another division of the First District of the appellate court declined
to impose such a duty upon the trial court. See People v. Bowman,
325 Ill. App. 3d 411 (2001).
	In People v. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d 411, 417 (2001), the
defendant had been charged with aggravated criminal sexual
assault, aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping. The defendant was
convicted and, on appeal, claimed that the trial court had abused
its discretion when it failed to sua sponte excuse a prospective
juror. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. During voir dire, the
prospective juror, Charlyn Leeper, told the trial judge that her
mother and two of her sisters had been raped. Bowman, 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 417. When the trial court asked Leeper if the rapes
would cause her to be unfair in the defendant's case, Leeper
responded, "Probably." Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 417. Defense
counsel did not move to excuse Leeper at that time; however,
defense counsel asked if he would be allowed to back strike
Leeper if necessary. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 419. The trial
judge told defense counsel he could not back strike Leeper, but
said he would include Leeper in the second panel of the venire so
that defense counsel could ask her supplemental questions.
Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 419-20. Following questioning of the
second venire, defense counsel moved to dismiss Leeper for cause
on the ground that she was involved in a pending lawsuit in
another county. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 420. The trial judge
denied defense counsel's motion to strike Leeper for cause, stating
that the fact that Leeper was involved in a pending lawsuit in
another county did not automatically require her exclusion.
Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 420. In the defendant's post-trial
motion, the defendant's only claim of error with regard to Leeper
was that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to
exclude Leeper for cause due to her involvement in a pending
lawsuit. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 421.
	On appeal, however, the defendant claimed that the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to question Leeper further
concerning her ability to be fair and impartial in light of the rapes
of her mother and her sisters and when it failed to sua sponte
dismiss her for cause. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. The
defendant claimed that he had been denied his right to a trial by an
impartial jury. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 422.
	The appellate court rejected the defendant's claim that the
trial court should have sua sponte excused Leeper when she said
the rapes of her mother and sisters would "probably" cause her to
be unfair in the defendant's case. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425.
The court noted that any problems were created by defense
counsel, who did not challenge Leeper for cause based upon her
"probably" answer, nor did he use an available peremptory
challenge to remove her from the jury. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d
at 425-26. The court stated:
			"In short, for reasons that are unclear to us, defense
counsel decided to keep Leeper on the jury. The defendant
cannot now complain about her presence in the jury box.
It would be a bad idea to allow defendants to accept a
questionable juror, proceed to trial, then, when things turn
out badly, claim entitlement to reversal because that juror
voted to convict.
			By not giving the court the opportunity to prevent or
correct errors at trial, a lawyer would gain the advantage
of obtaining a reversal through an intentional failure to
act, in effect, a free trial." Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at
426.
	We find the appellate court's analysis in Bowman to be well
taken. We decline to impose a duty upon a trial court to sua sponte
excuse a juror for cause in the absence of a defendant's challenge
for cause or exercise of a peremptory challenge. To hold otherwise
would allow a defendant "two bites of the apple." A defendant
could allow a juror such as Grevus, whose experience with the
criminal justice system was not satisfactory, to sit on his jury and
gamble that the juror's bias was directed against the State and thus
would work in his favor. Then, if convicted, the defendant could
claim that the trial court erred in failing to strike the juror sua
sponte. In addition, if a trial court strikes a juror sua sponte and
the defendant is convicted, the defendant later could challenge his
conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in striking the
juror. As the Missouri Court of Appeals observed in holding that
a trial court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte
strike a questionable juror: " '[t]he rule requiring
contemporaneous objections to the qualifications of jurors is well
founded. It serves to minimize the incentive to sandbag in the hope
of acquittal and, if unsuccessful, mount a post-conviction attack on
the jury selection process.' " State v. Wright, 30 S.W.3d 906, 914
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000), quoting State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422,
423 (Mo. 1991).
	We note that the appellate court in this case attempted to
distinguish Bowman on the ground that the juror in Bowman had
been rehabilitated when the juror did not respond negatively to
questions about fairness, impartiality and willingness to follow the
law, while Grevus equivocated concerning whether she could be
fair and impartial. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. We are not persuaded,
however, by the appellate court's attempts to distinguish Bowman.
Pursuant to the appellate court's reasoning in this case, a defendant
could always claim that a juror had not been sufficiently
rehabilitated, so that the trial court should have sua sponte excused
that juror. In any event, we are not convinced that Grevus'
responses are significantly distinguishable from the responses of
Leeper. Although Grevus stated that her experience with the
criminal justice system would affect her ability to be fair, Grevus
also stated, in response to the trial court's initial questioning, that:
she could listen to the evidence and make a determination from the
evidence on the witness stand; she understood the concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence; she
would have no problems signing a guilty verdict if the State
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and she would not have
any problems signing a not-guilty verdict if the State did not prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
	In sum, we hold that although a trial court certainly has the
discretion to remove a juror sua sponte for cause (see People v.
Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 425 (1989)), a trial court does not have a
duty to do so. The trial court, therefore, did not commit plain error
in allowing Grevus to sit on defendant's jury. In so holding, we
note that we have reviewed those cases cited by defendant in
support of the contrary result and do not find those cases
persuasive.
	For example, in United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d
Cir. 1997), although the court stated that the presiding trial judge
has authority and responsibility to dismiss prospective jurors for
cause either sua sponte or upon counsel's motion, the issue in that
case concerned whether the trial court had improperly granted the
State's motions to excuse four prospective jurors for cause.
	In Cox v. Turlington, 648 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (E.D.N.C.
1986), the court stated that it was the duty of the trial court, if not
the parties, to disqualify a judge from placement as a juror because
that judge had presided over defendant's arraignment. The
gravamen of that decision, however, was that the judge was
automatically disqualified from sitting as a juror at the defendant's
trial by virtue of the fact that he had conducted a portion of the
proceedings in the case. Cox, 648 F. Supp.  at 1557.
	Finally, in Lacy v. State, 629 So. 2d 688, 690 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993), the issue was whether the trial court had abused its
discretion in excusing a juror who had not been challenged by the
State or defendant. In finding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, the court stated that "it is the duty of the court to
ascertain juror qualifications and to disqualify all jurors not
possessing the necessary qualities." Lacy, 629 So. 2d  at 690.
	The preceding cases do not compel a different result in this
case. In fact, we observe that the majority of jurisdictions
addressing this issue have declined to impose a duty on the trial
court to excuse a potential juror sua sponte. See Cage v.
McCaughtry, No. 01-3245 (7th Cir. September 6, 2002) (prisoner
could not obtain habeas corpus relief on ground that trial judge
had obligation to dismiss juror for cause in the absence of
objection to juror by either lawyer, as such a rule is not plausible
interpretation of sixth amendment); State v. Bravo, 131 Ariz. 168,
639 P.2d 358 (App. 1981) (trial court not required to act sua
sponte, even though it may do so, to strike prospective jurors
where defendant failed to challenge jurors for cause); People v.
Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297, 315, 956 P.2d 374, 387, 75 Cal. Rptr. 412,
425 (1998) ("this court has never imposed on the trial court an
independent, affirmative obligation to excuse a prospective juror
notwithstanding counsel's failure to exercise a peremptory
challenge for that purpose"); Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 297,
509 S.E.2d 45, 49 (1998) (where defendant did not move to strike
prospective jurors for cause, trial court did not err by failing to
excuse jurors sua sponte); People v. Wise, 18 Mich. App. 21, 170 N.W.2d 487 (1969) (trial court did not err in failing to excuse juror
sua sponte where defendant did not use peremptory challenge to
excuse juror); State v. Wright, 30 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. App. 2000)
(trial court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte
remove three venire members for cause); Stewart v. State, 757 P.2d 388 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (no error where trial court
failed to sua sponte excuse juror where defendant failed to object
to juror during voir dire); Delrio v. State, 866 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993) (in absence of challenge by defendant, trial court
did not err in allowing admittedly biased venireman to serve on
defendant's jury); State v. Williams, 237 Wis. 2d 591, 614 N.W.2d 11 (App. 2000) (party that fails to request further questioning and
does not object to seating of juror cannot later allege error in trial
court's failure to remove juror sua sponte).
	Ultimately, a trial court abuses its discretion in the conduct of
voir dire only if a review of the record reveals that the trial court's
conduct thwarted the selection of an impartial jury. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16-17. As the State argues in its brief, the trial court in
this case did not thwart the selection of an impartial jury. The trial
court did not restrict the scope of defense counsel's questioning of
Grevus, did not prevent defense counsel from challenging Grevus
for cause, did not deny a challenge for cause, and did not prevent
defense counsel from using an available peremptory challenge to
excuse Grevus. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in this case. The appellate court, therefore, erred in
reversing defendant's conviction and remanding for a new trial on
the basis that the trial court should have excused Grevus sua
sponte.
	Defendant next argues that even if the trial court did not have
a duty to excuse Grevus sua sponte, defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to
challenge Grevus. Defendant therefore contends that the appellate
court's decision reversing defendant's conviction can be affirmed
on the ground that defendant was denied his sixth amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant notes that he
raised this issue in the appellate court, but the appellate court did
not reach the issue due to the disposition of the case.
	In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the Supreme Court announced a two-part
test for judging ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Under that test,
a defendant must show that his counsel's performance "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness" and must also show that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
693, 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064, 2068.
	The Supreme Court also has recognized, however, that there
are certain "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is
unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 667, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984). Such circumstances
include where there was the "complete denial of counsel," where
"counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing," and where counsel is called upon
to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel
very likely could not do so. Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 659-62, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 668-70, 104 S. Ct.  at 2047-49. Presumably claiming that
defense counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing, defendant argues that allowing an
actually biased juror to serve on the jury and determine his fate is
so inherently prejudicial that prejudice must be presumed in this
case under Cronic.
	We find no merit to defendant's claim that prejudice must be
presumed in this case. The Supreme Court recently explained that
"[w]hen we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming
prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's
case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete."
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. ___, ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914, 928, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2002). Thus, the Court in Bell rejected a
defendant's claim his case was one in which prejudice must be
presumed. The Court stated that "respondent's argument is not that
his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the
sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do
so at specific points. For purposes of distinguishing between the
rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of
degree but of kind." Bell, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 928,
122 S. Ct.  at 1851.
	In this case, as in Bell, defendant does not contend that his
counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the voir dire
proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so with
regard to juror Grevus. In fact, defense counsel did exercise five
peremptory challenges. Consequently, any alleged failure to test
the prosecution's case here was not complete, as required under
Cronic. We therefore review defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.
	As noted, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland, a defendant must show both that his
counsel's performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient
performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. With regard to the first prong, judicial scrutiny of a
counsel's performance is highly deferential so that a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome a strong
presumption that the challenged actions of counsel were the
product of sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065.
	In Bowman, the appellate court held that the decision to
exercise an available peremptory challenge is a strategic one, and
further held that the defendant had failed to show that his
counsel's decisions "questionable as they might be, were not
tactical and a matter of jury selection strategy." Bowman, 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 428. We agree that defense counsel's conduct during
jury voir dire involves matters of trial strategy that generally are
not subject to scrutiny under Strickland. See People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994) ("counsel's strategic choices are virtually
unchallengeable"). As in Bowman, we cannot say that counsel's
actions in this case were not tactical or matters of jury-selection
strategy. Defense counsel did challenge five potential jurors. For
example, defense counsel did excuse potential jurors Nolan and
Nigan, both of whom were members of the jury panel that
included Grevus. It certainly is possible that defense counsel
considered that the bias toward the system expressed by Grevus
due to the handling of her case might be directed against the State
rather than the defendant. In any event, given defense counsel's
challenge to two other members of the jury panel that included
Grevus, we find that defense counsel's decision to accept Grevus
was a matter of trial strategy.
	Finally, even if we were to assume that defense counsel's
actions were not objectively reasonable, defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel may be disposed of on the ground
that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the alleged error. See
People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 271 (1989) (ineffective
assistance of counsel claims can be disposed of on ground that
defendant suffered no prejudice without deciding first prong of
Strickland). In order to show prejudice, a defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Here, the appellate court found, and we agree, that
the evidence was more than sufficient to prove defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, there is absolutely no
evidence that Grevus' bias against the system was directed at
defendant and not the State. Consequently, we cannot say that the
result of the proceedings would have been different if Grevus had
not served as a juror at defendant's trial.
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.