Title: Campbell v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

679 So. 2d 720 (1996)
James Bernard CAMPBELL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83792.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 27, 1996.
Rehearing Denied September 6, 1996.
*722 Geoffrey C. Fleck, Gainesville, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Fariba N. Komeily, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon James Bernard Campbell following resentencing. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We reverse due to improper conduct by the prosecutor.
The facts are set out fully in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla.1990). Campbell rang the doorbell to the Bosler home at 2:15 p.m. on December 22, 1986, and when Billy Bosler answered the door, Campbell stabbed him a number of times. Billy's adult daughter, Sue Zann Bosler, heard the commotion and came to her father's aid, and Campbell stabbed her. Billy died, Sue Zann lived.
Campbell gave oral and written confessions, was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death in conformity with the jury's nine-to-three vote. The court found five aggravating circumstances[1] and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.[2] This Court struck one aggravating circumstance[3] and held that two others should have been combined.[4] We ruled that the court should have considered in mitigation the fact that Campbell suffered from impaired capacity and had a deprived and abusive childhood. We remanded for resentencing before the judge.
Because the original trial judge was unavailable on remand, Campbell was given a whole new sentencing proceeding before a different judge and jury. The State presented four witnesses: A technician related details of the crime scene; a detective told of Campbell's confession; the medical examiner described the victim's wounds; and Sue Zann gave an account of the crime. Campbell presented several witnesses: Psychologist Dr. Frumkin testified concerning Campbell's *723 abusive childhood and present emotional problems; the prior testimony of two of Campbell's aunts was read to the jury; and psychologist Dr. Toomer testified relative to Campbell's emotional problems.
After the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two, the court heard testimony from Sue Zann who stated that both she and her father did not believe in the death penalty. The victim's mother testified, requesting imposition of the death penalty. The court imposed the death penalty, finding three aggravating circumstances,[5] one statutory mitigating circumstance,[6] and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.[7] Campbell raises five issues and a number of subissues.[8]
Campbell claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in several ways. First, he asserts that the prosecutor improperly discredited the defense psychologist, Dr. Toomer, on cross-examination by saying that he frequently testified for killers of police officers. We agree. Not only did the prosecutor ask Dr. Toomer if he testified frequently for the defense in such cases, he quizzed him at length about the death of specific officers in the Dade County area:
(Emphasis added.)
The prosecutor then emphasized this matter by commenting to the jury at closing:
We have held that in a capital case the State may point out the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants, since this is "relevant to show bias, prejudice, or interest." Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 71 (Fla.1991). But the fact that an expert has testified for defendants in cases involving the murder of a police officer is prejudicial and irrelevant in a case, such as the present, where no officer was killed. This line of questioning both denigrated the testimony of Dr. Toomer and raised the specter of "cop-killers" where none was actually present. Further, Campbell's resentencing took place in Miami and each of the four cases mentioned by the prosecutor involved the death of one or more officers in Dade County. The prosecutor thus unfairly exploited the jurors' natural sense of sympathy and outrage for the fallen officers and fear for their own safety.
Campbell next complains that the prosecutor made the following comment to the jury in closing:
Responding to a defense objection, the court addressed the prosecutor at sidebar: "Court will overrule the objection. Please don't talk about messages to other people." The prosecutor said, "Other than the defendant," and then addressed the jury:
"Message to the community" arguments are impermissiblethey are "an obvious appeal to the emotions and fears of the jurors." Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985). "These considerations are outside the scope of the jury's deliberation and their injection violates the prosecutor's duty to seek justice...." Id.
We conclude that the above errors combined to deny Campbell a fair penalty hearing. The "cop-killer" rhetoric and "message to the community" statements played to the jurors' most elemental fears, dragging into the trial the specter of police murders and a lawless community that could imperil *725 the jurors and their families. These arguments, which were emphasized at closing, were fresh in the jurors' minds when they retired to consider Campbell's sentence, and the State has failed "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error[s] ... did not contribute to the [recommended sentence]." State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986). On this record, it is entirely possible that several jurors voted for death not out of a reasoned sense of justice but out of a panicked sense of self-preservation.
We repeat our admonition in Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1985):
Id. at 133 (citation omitted). See also Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla.1993); Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346 (Fla.1990).
Although the above errors require reversal of Campbell's death sentence, we address several additional claims to aid in resentencing. Campbell claims that the prosecutor unnecessarily introduced testimony and photographs depicting Campbell's attack on Sue Zann. We find the testimony and photographs relevant to explain the sequence of events surrounding the murder of Billy Bosler and to provide details showing that Campbell had been convicted of a prior violent felony. See, e.g., Dufour v. State, 495 So. 2d 154 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S. Ct. 1332, 94 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1987). The court instructed the jury:
We find no error.
After Sue Zann testified for the State giving details of the crime, defense counsel sought to bring out on cross-examination that she is opposed to the death penalty. Campbell claims that the court erred in preventing this line of questioning. This issue has already been decided adversely to Campbell. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 498 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S. Ct. 3241, 97 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1987).
Campbell argues that the court should have allowed Sue Zann to testify that Billy was opposed to the death penalty. We disagree. The victim's opposition to the death penalty is unrelated to the defendant's culpabilityit has nothing to do with the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the crimeand thus is irrelevant to sentencing. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978). We find no error.
At the time of resentencing, Campbell had already been sentenced to consecutive life terms for other related crimes and now claims that the court erred in preventing him from pointing this out to prospective jurors and in declining to instruct the jury on this. This issue has already been decided adversely to Campbell. See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854, 112 S. Ct. 164, 116 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1991). We find no error.
Campbell claims that the court erred in failing to give the requested instruction on age as a mitigating circumstance. We agree that the court erred under the facts of this case. Florida's capital sentencing scheme expressly establishes age as a mitigating circumstance:
§ 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1985).
There is no bright-line rule for applying this provision at any particular age. Rather, circumstances in addition to chronological age are often determinative:
Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492, 498 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964, 101 S. Ct. 2036, 68 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1981).
Chronological age standing alone thus is generally of little import, warranting no special instruction. See Echols v. State, 484 So. 2d 568, 575 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986) ("[I]f [age] is to be accorded any significant weight, it must be linked with some other characteristic of the defendant or the crime such as immaturity or senility."). However, where the defendant has requested an instruction on age and submitted reliable evidence tending to link his or her chronological age to "some other [relevant] characteristic of the defendant or the crime," an appropriate instruction should be given. See Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416, 420 (Fla. 1990) ("[A]n instruction is required on all mitigating circumstances `for which evidence has been presented' and a request is made.").
In the present case, evidence was presented showing Campbell's relatively young chronological age at the time of the crime (he was twenty-one) and linking this to the defendant's significant emotional immaturity: Dr. Toomer testified, "I would place [Campbell's] age, his emotional age in terms of functioning at being somewhere in the adolescent range." In light of this evidence, the court should have given the requested instruction.
Campbell claims that the court erred in finding that the murder was committed in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. We disagree. The record shows that Billy was stabbed twenty-three times over the course of several minutes and had defensive wounds. See, e.g., Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.1987). We find no error.
We reverse Campbell's death sentence due to improper conduct by the prosecutor and remand for resentencing before a new judge and jury.[9]
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
GRIMES, J., dissents with an opinion.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
GRIMES, Justice, dissenting.
While I agree that the objections to the prosecutor's arguments referred to in the majority opinion should have been sustained, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that these errors were harmless.
WELLS, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent.
First, my reading of the record in this case causes me to conclude that the cross-examination questions in respect to the defense expert's other cases did not have the inflammatory effect which the majority ascribes to the questions. Moreover, I believe that it is not a proper basis upon which to reverse a trial judge for this Court to speculate that these questions together with the very isolated comments of the prosecutor caused any jurors to make a decision in this case "out of a panicked sense of self-preservation." At the end of the two long trials in which twenty-four jurors have weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in respect to the death sentence, nineteen jurors have recommended death. I find no basis upon which to conclude that any of these jurors made their decisions other than on the basis of the overwhelming evidence which supports the death sentence in this case.
Second, it is my view that if there was any error in the overruling of the objections upon which the majority bases its decision, the *727 error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I do not comprehend how the majority can, on the basis of the limited testimony and statements to which the majority opinion refers, again remand this case for a new trial when the testimony of the victim's daughter, Sue Zann, is considered. This courageous 31-year-old woman identified appellant as being her father's murderer, and testified in detail as to witnessing her father's murder and being stabbed herself repeatedly by appellant. A part of Sue Zann's testimony about the murder began with her describing what happened when she came out of her bedroom at the parsonage, which was the home of her father, mother, and sister:
My conclusion is that the error upon which the majority bases its decision pales into harmlessness in the face of this testimony.
*729 Remanding this case for a third sentencing proceeding is not harmless. There is real harm in requiring Sue Zann Bosler to relive her father's murder a third time on the witness stand. There is real harm in this case not reaching the final judgment stage in the ten years since the murder.
[1]  The court found the following aggravating circumstances: prior conviction of a violent felony; commission during a burglary and robbery; commission for pecuniary gain; commission in a heinous, atrocious or cruel manner; and commission in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner.
[2]  The court found that Sue Zann and members of Bosler's parish requested that Campbell be spared.
[3]  The evidence failed to support the trial court's finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.
[4]  We noted that commission during a robbery and pecuniary gain should have been treated as a single aggravating circumstance.
[5]  The court found the following aggravating circumstances: that Campbell had been convicted of a prior violent felony; that the murder was committed during a robbery and for pecuniary gain; and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
[6]  The court found that Campbell suffered from impaired capacity.
[7]  The court found that Campbell had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, an abusive childhood, a limited education, a low IQ, and learning disabilities.
[8]  Campbell claims that the court erred in the following matters. 1) The prosecutor improperly: attacked the defense expert as sympathetic to cop-killers; advocated imposing the death penalty to send a message to the community; and introduced testimony and photos depicting Campbell's attack on Sue Zann; 2) Sue Zann should have been allowed to testify that she and her father were opposed to the death penalty; 3) defense should have been allowed to tell the venire that Campbell was already serving consecutive life sentences; 4) the court should have instructed the jury that Campbell was already serving consecutive life sentences; 5) the court should have given more weight to nonstatutory mitigators; the court should have given more weight to the statutory mitigator; the court should have found more mitigators as established; the court should not have found HAC; the death penalty is disproportionate; the death penalty is unconstitutional.
[9]  We find the remainder of Campbell's claims to be moot or without merit.