Title: State v. Scull

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2956-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gary Monroe Scull, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 733, 843 N.W.2d 859) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 17 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David Borowski 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, CROOKS, ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJJJ., 
concur (Opinion filed). 
 
ZIEGLER, CROOKS, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur (Opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Basil M. Loeb, Wauwatosa, and oral argument by Basil M. 
Loeb(?). 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Nancy 
A. Noet (?), assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by legal intern Nolan A. 
Jensen, Eileen Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee; and 
 
 
2 
Melinda A. Swartz and Law Office of Melinda Swartz LLC, 
Milwaukee, and intern Nolan A. Jenson behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, 
state public defender, and Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state 
public defender, on behalf of the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2011AP2956-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF337) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary Monroe Scull, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Gary Monroe Scull, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
that affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.1  
The court of appeals determined that the evidence obtained from 
a search of his home was admissible because the officers 
conducted the search in good faith reliance on a search warrant. 
                                                 
1 State v. Scull, 2014 WI App 17, 352 Wis. 2d 733, 843 
N.W.2d 859 (affirming judgment of the circuit court of Milwaukee 
County, David L. Borowski, J.). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
2 
 
¶2 
Scull contends that the warrant was invalid because it 
was based on information gained from a prior illegal search.  
More specifically, he asserts that an alert by a drug sniffing 
dog outside his home constituted a prior illegal search in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers 
needed, but did not have, a warrant to conduct the dog sniff.  
Accordingly, he argues, because the warrant relied on an 
affidavit detailing the dog's alert to the presence of drugs, 
the warrant was invalid and the evidence seized pursuant to that 
warrant must be suppressed.   
¶3 
Like the court of appeals, we resolve this case with a 
straight-forward application of our good faith jurisprudence 
governing police reliance on a warrant.  It provides that the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to 
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is 
ultimately found to be defective.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 
¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Reliance on a warrant is 
objectively reasonable when: the warrant was preceded by a 
substantial investigation, the affidavit supporting the warrant 
was 
reviewed 
by 
either 
a 
police 
officer 
trained 
and 
knowledgeable 
in 
the 
requirements 
of 
probable 
cause 
and 
reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney, 
and a reasonably well-trained officer would not have known that 
the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.  
Id. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
3 
 
¶4 
In this case we determine that the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies because the evidence 
Scull seeks to suppress was obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate.  Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence should 
not be suppressed and affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
For purposes of our review, the facts of this case are 
undisputed.  A confidential informant told Officer Wiesmueller 
that an individual named Gary M. Scull was involved in the 
distribution of cocaine base within the City of Milwaukee.  The 
informant further identified the defendant by providing an 
address where he thought Scull possibly resided.  Indicating 
that he had personally witnessed Scull distributing the cocaine 
base throughout the City, the informant stated that Scull 
conducts narcotics trafficking from his vehicle, a 1990s Ford 
Bronco, license plate 792-NYG. 
¶6 
After receiving the information from the informant 
Officer Wiesmueller conducted a follow-up investigation.  He 
discovered that an individual named Gary M. Scull, born March 
28, 1981, was on probation at the time.  The address on file for 
Scull matched the address provided by the informant.  Officer 
Wiesmueller further confirmed with the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation that a vehicle with the license plate number and 
description matching the information provided by the informant 
was registered to Scull. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
4 
 
¶7 
Officer Wiesmueller asked Detective Ederesinghe to 
take his dog to Scull's address.  Detective Edersinghe and his 
dog, Voden, are a drug detection team certified in the detection 
of the odor of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.  
When Voden detects the presence of controlled substances he will 
"alert" by aggressively scratching at the object. 
¶8 
In 
response 
to 
Officer 
Weismueller's 
request, 
Detective Edersinghe took Voden to Scull's house.  As he 
approached, a woman exited the house with two small children.  
He decided to come back at another time when he would not be 
observed.  When Detective Edersinghe returned with Voden, they 
were on the premises for less than 20 seconds.  He took the dog 
on the sidewalk to the side entrance of the home and then they 
followed the walkway to the front door.  They left the premises 
after Voden alerted at the front door.   
¶9 
Based on Voden's alert and the information provided by 
the informant, Officer Wiesmueller sought a warrant to search 
Scull's home.  The affidavit for the search warrant detailed 
Detective Edersinghe's and Voden's training and explained how 
Voden "alerts" to the presence of a narcotic.  It then stated 
that "within the past seventy two (72) hours, his canine, VODEN, 
made an 'Alert' on the front entry door to [Scull’s residence].  
Detective Christopher Ederesinghe states that the 'Alert' of 
VODEN is a positive indication that controlled substances are 
contained in said apartment unit."   
¶10 The affidavit further detailed how the information 
from the confidential informant resulted in the dog sniff.  It 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
5 
 
explained that the confidential informant was in a position to 
identify 
cocaine 
because 
the 
confidential 
informant 
had 
previously been involved in cocaine trafficking and that the 
informant was reliable because the informant had provided 
information in the past that had been confirmed by subsequent 
searches 
and 
arrests. 
 
The 
affidavit 
stated 
that 
the 
confidential informant told Officer Wiesmueller that "Gary M. 
Scull, b/m, 04-28-1981" was "involved in the distribution of 
cocaine base within the City of Milwaukee," which he had 
personally witnessed.  The affidavit included the informant's 
description of Scull's vehicle and its license plate, and the 
address he provided for Scull.  
¶11 The steps Officer Wiesmueller took to follow up on the 
information he received from the informant were likewise 
identified.  The affidavit stated that Officer Wiesmueller had 
ascertained that "Gary M. Scull, b/m, 04-28-1981, is currently 
on probation" and that the Department of Corrections gave the 
same 
address 
for 
Scull 
as 
the 
informant 
had 
provided.    
Additionally, the affidavit stated that Officer Wiesmueller had 
confirmed with the Wisconsin Department of Transportation that a 
vehicle with the license plate number and description matching 
the information provided by the informant was registered to 
Scull. 
¶12 An assistant district attorney reviewed and approved 
the affidavit for the search warrant.  It was subsequently 
submitted to a circuit court commissioner.  After reviewing the 
affidavit, the commissioner determined that the affidavit 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
6 
 
submitted by Officer Wiesmueller showed probable cause to 
believe that there were controlled substances in Scull's home.  
The commissioner granted the search warrant to search Scull's 
home for those substances.  Upon executing the warrant, officers 
found 53.85 grams of crack cocaine, 102.41 grams of marijuana, 
and drug-trafficking paraphernalia including digital scales, a 
razor blade, and numerous clear plastic baggies of various 
sizes. 
Based on this evidence, the State charged Scull with 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession with 
intent to deliver THC, and keeping a drug house.   
¶13 Scull moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his 
home.  Scull asserted that the warrant was unlawfully obtained.  
He contended that the grounds for the warrant were insufficient 
because the dog sniff of his home was a warrantless search and 
information from an unlawful search cannot be used as a basis 
for a warrant justifying a subsequent search.  
¶14 The circuit court denied the motion.  It recognized 
that there was no case directly addressing the use of a drug-
sniffing dog at the entrance of a home.  However, it agreed with 
the State that the cases addressing dog sniffs in other 
circumstances established that dog sniffs were not searches and 
that police are lawfully on an individual's property when 
approaching the front door of a residence by means of a walkway.  
Accordingly, it determined that the dog was brought to the door 
of the residence "in a valid manner, not in a manner that 
violated the Fourth Amendment."  After his motion was denied, 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
7 
 
Scull pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver more than 
forty grams of cocaine and to keeping a drug house. 
¶15 Scull appealed.2  While his appeal was pending, the 
United States Supreme Court issued Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
__, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), in which it determined that using a 
drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the 
contents of the home constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Based on Jardines, the court of appeals determined 
that the police violated Scull's Fourth Amendment rights when 
they brought a drug-sniffing dog to his home without a search 
warrant.  State v. Scull, 2014 WI App 17, ¶1, 352 Wis. 2d 733, 
843 N.W.2d 859.  Nevertheless, the court affirmed Scull's 
conviction because the police subsequently obtained a search 
warrant upon which they relied in good faith.  Id., ¶¶1, 22. 
II 
¶16 We are asked to determine whether the evidence 
obtained through the execution of a search warrant on Scull's 
home must be suppressed.  Generally, in reviewing motions to 
suppress, we apply a two-step standard of review.  Eason, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶9.  First, we review the circuit court's findings 
of fact, and uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
Second, 
we 
independently 
review 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional principles to those facts.  Id.   
                                                 
2 Although 
a 
defendant 
generally 
waives 
all 
non-
jurisdictional defects when entering a guilty plea, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.31(10) creates an exception to this rule for appellate 
review of an order denying a suppression motion. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
8 
 
¶17 In this case, however, the facts are undisputed.  It 
is further undisputed that the dog sniff of Scull's house which 
served as part of the basis for the warrant violated Scull's 
Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Thus, we are left to address whether the 
exclusionary rule applies or whether the evidence from Scull's 
home is admissible under the good faith exception to the rule.  
The application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule is an issue of law which we review independently of the 
decisions rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals.  
State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶19, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568. 
III 
¶18 We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
by 
setting 
forth 
the 
constitutional right at issue, the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  It provides the right of citizens 
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const., Amend. IV.3 
                                                 
3 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
contains substantially the same language:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
(continued) 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
9 
 
¶19 The Supreme Court has declared that Fourth Amendment 
rights are "indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property.'" Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).  Courts have long 
extolled the importance of the home, noting that the amendment 
was drafted in part to codify "the overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions 
since the origins of the Republic."  Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 601 (1980); Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 477, 117 
N.W.2d 626 (1962) ("A home is entitled to special dignity and 
special sanctity."). 
¶20 The Court first applied the exclusionary rule to 
protect against violations of Fourth Amendment rights in Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  Under the exclusionary 
rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
generally inadmissible in court proceedings.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  The court has explained that "[t]he 
exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth 
                                                                                                                                                             
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
 
Ordinarily, we interpret Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  However, in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 
¶63, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, we required additional 
safeguards. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
10 
 
Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect."  
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). 
¶21 Wisconsin has adopted the exclusionary rule and 
applied it to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the 
Wisconsin Constitution as well.  It was first applied in Hoyer 
v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  There, after 
declaring that the provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in 
the constitutions are "of substance rather than mere tinsel," 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the evidence 
obtained in an unlawful search and seizure should have been 
suppressed.  Id. at 415. 
¶22 This court has cited two rationales in support of its 
application of the exclusionary rule: assurance of judicial 
integrity and deterrence of unlawful police conduct. State v. 
Felix, 2012 WI 36, ¶39, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775; Hess, 
327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶47; State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶65, 327 Wis. 
2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430;  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶79, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; State v. Noble, 2002 WI 64, ¶31, 253 
Wis. 2d 206, 646 N.W.2d 38; Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶31 n.10; 
State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶47, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517; 
State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 177, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997); 
State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 988, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991); 
Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974).  In 
furtherance of judicial integrity, we have explained that 
"[c]ourts and judges should not sanction violations of the 
constitution.  The integrity of the judicial process must be 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
11 
 
inviolate and free from reliance upon transgressions against the 
constitution."  Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 635.4   
¶23  "Unlawful police conduct is deterred when evidence 
recovered in unreasonable searches is not admissible in courts."  
State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133-34, 423 N.W.2d 823 
(1988); State v. Gums, 69 Wis. 2d 513, 516-17, 230 N.W.2d 813 
(1975). However, when police action was pursued in good faith 
"the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." Gums, 69 
Wis. 2d at 517 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 
(1974)).  Such is the case where officers act in reliance on 
clear and well-settled law that is subsequently changed, State 
v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97, and 
where officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant, Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206.  
¶24 In this case, the parties frame the question regarding 
the application of the good faith exception as whether the 
officers could have acted in reliance on clear and well-settled 
law that was subsequently reversed.  Both parties agree that 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, rendered the dog sniff of Scull's 
home illegal at the time it was conducted.  They dispute whether 
                                                 
4  We are not asserting that judicial integrity is a stand-
alone basis for the exclusion of evidence.  The protection of 
judicial integrity goes hand-in-hand with deterrence of police 
misconduct.  As this court has explained, "[t]he protection of 
rights and the preservation of judicial integrity depend in 
reality on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule."  
State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
12 
 
the officers could have acted in reliance on the law at the time 
of the search such that the good faith exception should apply.   
¶25 We need not address this argument because a straight-
forward application of our good faith jurisprudence governing 
police reliance on a warrant resolves our inquiry.  Here, the 
officers ultimately obtained a warrant to search Scull's home 
and that warrant was issued by a detached and neutral 
commissioner.  The commissioner's decision to grant the warrant 
was a reasonable application of the unsettled state of the law 
at the time the warrant issued.   
¶26 Two Wisconsin cases had addressed the validity of a 
dog sniff.  The first, State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, 256 
Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348, addressed a warrantless dog sniff of 
a vehicle.  In addressing the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the court observed that a dog sniff is much less 
intrusive than a typical search.  Id., ¶6.  Further, dog sniffs 
reveal only illegal conduct to which there is no legitimate 
privacy interest.  Id., ¶9.  Accordingly, the court concluded 
that the dog sniff of the vehicle did not constitute a search 
and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation.  Id., ¶10.   
¶27 In the second case, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, this court likewise considered a 
dog sniff of a vehicle in a public place.  We agreed with 
Miller's statements that there is no constitutionally protected 
interest in possessing contraband, and that a dog sniff is much 
less intrusive than activities that have been held to be 
searches.  Id., ¶¶22-24.  Accordingly, we determined that a dog 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
13 
 
sniff of a vehicle located in a public place was not a search 
for purposes of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶24. 
¶28 Both Wisconsin cases are consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court precedent issued prior to Jardines.  In 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the Court assessed 
whether a dog sniff of a vehicle stopped for speeding violated 
the Fourth Amendment.  The defendant had argued that the sniff 
was 
impermissible 
because 
the 
officers 
lacked 
reasonable 
suspicion to justify it.  Id. at 407.  The court was not 
persuaded.  Like Miller and Arias, it focused on the fact that 
there is no protected privacy interest in having an illegal 
substance and the non-intrusive nature of a dog sniff.  The 
court 
observed 
that 
"[o]fficial 
conduct 
that 
does 
not 
'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy' is not a search 
subject to the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 408 (quoting United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).  Therefore, it 
concluded that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a concededly 
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the 
location of a substance that no individual has any right to 
possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 409.   
¶29  In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), 
the Court considered a dog sniff in the context of an 
individual's luggage.  After an airline passenger's conduct 
aroused suspicion, the officers seized his luggage and subjected 
it to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog.  Id. 
at 699.   The Court noted that although a person possesses a 
privacy interest in the contents of their personal luggage, a 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
14 
 
dog sniff does not require opening the luggage.  Id. at 707.  
Thus, the Court concluded that the dog sniff of the luggage did 
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id.  
¶30 In sum, at the time the commissioner issued the 
warrant in this case, there was Wisconsin and United States 
Supreme Court precedent stating there is no search when a dog 
sniffs a vehicle.  There was also precedent stating that there 
is no search when a dog sniffs luggage at an airport.  However, 
it was unsettled whether the same analysis would apply to a dog 
sniff of a home.5  Given the precedent, the commissioner's 
decision to grant the warrant appears to be a reasonable 
application of the unsettled law at the time the warrant issued.  
Accordingly, we turn to our case law addressing the application 
of the good faith exception to evidence obtained in reliance on 
a warrant. 
¶31 The seminal Wisconsin case on the application of the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in circumstances 
involving a search warrant is Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206.  In that 
case a court commissioner issued a no-knock search warrant based 
on an affidavit submitted by police.  Id., ¶4.  When the 
                                                 
5 Notably, at the time the warrant was issued, had the 
commissioner reviewed other states' jurisprudence on this 
question, he would have discovered the appellate decision in 
State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), which 
held that a dog's sniff of a home was not a Fourth Amendment 
search. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
15 
 
officers executed the warrant they discovered narcotics at the 
defendant's home.  Id., ¶5.  At trial, however, the circuit 
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the narcotics 
because it determined that the affidavit in support of the 
warrant failed to allege the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
justify the issuance of the no-knock search warrant.  Id., ¶7. 
¶32 On appeal, this court acknowledged that in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court formulated a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
where a police officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.  
Id., ¶27.  In that situation, there would be little deterrent 
effect from suppression because the "officer is acting as a 
reasonable 
officer 
would 
and 
should 
act 
in 
similar 
circumstances."  Id., ¶32 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920).    
¶33 Leon cautioned that the existence of a warrant does 
not necessarily mean that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule will apply.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.  It will 
not apply where "a reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's 
authorization."  Id. at 922 n.23.  An officer "cannot reasonably 
rely upon a warrant that was based upon a deliberately or 
recklessly false affidavit, or, a bare bones affidavit that she 
or he reasonably knows could not support probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion."  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶36 (citing 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).  Further, "[t]he officer cannot 
reasonably rely upon a warrant 'so facially deficient' that she 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
16 
 
or he could not 'reasonably presume it to be valid'" or "upon a 
warrant issued by a magistrate that 'wholly abandoned his [or 
her] judicial role.'" Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).   
¶34 The Eason court observed that Leon is consistent with 
this 
court's 
prior 
statements 
that 
application 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
requires 
a 
weighing 
of 
the 
pertinent 
interests.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶43.  It concluded that the 
good faith exception should apply to the situation where an 
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant by 
a detached and neutral magistrate because in that scenario, the 
exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect.  Id., ¶52.   
¶35 However, rather than adopting Leon outright, this 
court added to the test.  It determined that Article I, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution required additional protection.  
Id., ¶63.  Thus, in order for the good faith exception to apply 
to scenarios involving a warrant, the State must "show that the 
process used in obtaining the search warrant included a 
significant investigation and a review by either a police 
officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable 
government attorney."  Id., ¶74. 
¶36 In applying this test to the facts of the case, the 
Eason court determined that the officers had conducted a 
significant investigation before seeking the warrant.  Id., ¶70.  
The court explained that the officers had worked with a 
confidential informant, researched the suspects in police 
records, and researched utility records for the premises.  Id.  
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
17 
 
The Eason court also determined that the warrant application had 
been reviewed by a government attorney.  Id., ¶71.  To reach 
this conclusion, it relied on the fact that "[t]he warrant and 
affidavit reflect advanced legal training, beyond that given to 
a well-trained police officer."  Id.   
¶37 The application section of Eason's analysis also 
reflects that the court considered whether a reasonably well- 
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal 
despite the magistrate's authorization, which would render the 
officers' reliance on the warrant unreasonable.  Id., ¶66.  The 
court observed that "[t]here have been no allegations that the 
warrant was so facially deficient that a reasonable, well-
trained officer would not have relied upon it."  Id.  Further, 
there were "no contentions that there [were] technical or other 
glaring deficiencies with the warrant" and "[t]he affidavit 
[was] not sketchy or bare-boned."  Id.  Accordingly, the court 
determined that the officers' reliance on the warrant was 
objectively reasonable and the evidence obtained from execution 
of the warrant should not have been suppressed. 
IV 
¶38 Turning to the facts of this case, we follow the test 
laid out in Eason.  First, we determine whether officers 
conducted a significant investigation prior to obtaining the 
warrant.  Second, we assess whether the affidavit supporting the 
warrant was reviewed by either a police officer trained and 
knowledgeable 
in 
the 
requirements 
of 
probable 
cause 
and 
reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney.  
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
18 
 
Lastly, we consider whether a reasonably well-trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal despite the 
magistrate's authorization, rendering the officers' reliance on 
the warrant unreasonable.   
¶39 In terms of the first factor, we determine that 
Officer Wiesmueller conducted a significant investigation before 
obtaining the warrant.  It appears the investigation into Scull 
began when a confidential informant told Officer Wiesmueller 
that Scull was selling cocaine base.  Officer Wiesmueller 
determined that the informant would be in a position to know 
that the substance Scull distributed was cocaine because the 
informant had been involved in cocaine trafficking in the past.  
Further, he deemed the informant reliable because the informant 
had provided information in the past that had been confirmed by 
subsequent searches and arrests. 
¶40 Upon 
investigating 
further, 
Officer 
Wiesmueller 
discovered that there was an individual named Scull, matching 
the informant's description, who was on probation at the time 
for robbery and recklessly endangering safety in Milwaukee 
County.  From the Department of Corrections records, Officer 
Wiesmueller confirmed that the home address the informant had 
given him was Scull's address.  Officer Wiesmueller also 
obtained records from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
from which he was able to confirm that a vehicle matching the 
description and license plate number provided by the informant 
was registered to Scull. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
19 
 
¶41 After verifying the information from the informant, 
Officer Wiesmueller had Detective Edersinghe take his drug-
sniffing dog to Scull's address.  The dog alerted to the 
presence of drugs at Scull's front door.  With this information, 
combined with the information from the informant, Officer 
Wiesmueller sought a warrant.  The multiple steps taken by 
Officer Wiesmueller to investigate the allegations of drug 
trafficking were reasonable at the time and sufficient to 
satisfy the investigation requirement for purposes of the good 
faith exception under Eason.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
State met its burden of showing that a significant investigation 
was conducted prior to the warrant. 
¶42 The State also met its burden with regard to the 
second factor, review of the affidavit by a knowledgeable 
government attorney.   In this case, we need look only at the 
face of the affidavit for the search warrant to make this 
determination.  The affidavit states that it was "reviewed and 
approved by ADA Christopher Ladwig on 07-02-2010."  Thus, it is 
evident that the affidavit was reviewed by a knowledgeable 
government attorney.  See State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, ¶46, 
286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878 (testimony that an experienced 
district attorney had met with the officers and drafted the 
warrant established that it had been reviewed by a knowledgeable 
government attorney); Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶71 (determining 
that warrant had been reviewed by a knowledgeable government 
attorney based on the language in the warrant which "reflect[ed] 
advanced legal training."). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
20 
 
¶43 Lastly, we turn to consider whether a reasonably well 
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal 
despite the magistrate's authorization, rendering the officers' 
reliance on the search warrant unreasonable.  As in Eason, it is 
not contended and we see nothing to suggest that the warrant in 
this case was so facially deficient that a reasonable, well-
trained officer would not have relied upon it, that there were 
technical or other glaring deficiencies with the warrant, or 
that the affidavit was sketchy or bare-boned.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that at the time the officers executed the warrant on 
Scull's home, a reasonable officer would not have known that a 
search was illegal despite the warrant.  
¶44 From the record presented in this case it appears that 
the officers did everything they were required to do.  With the 
assistance of a knowledgeable government attorney they obtained 
a warrant from a detached and neutral magistrate, which they 
relied on to search Scull's home.  Suppressing evidence obtained 
in objectively reasonable reliance on that warrant would have no 
deterrent effect.  In such circumstances it is inappropriate to 
apply the exclusionary rule.  Therefore we determine that the 
good faith exception to the rule applies. 
V 
¶45 In sum, the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule applies to evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate that is ultimately found to be defective.  Reliance 
on a warrant is objectively reasonable when: the warrant was 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR  
 
21 
 
preceded 
by 
a 
substantial 
investigation, 
the 
affidavit 
supporting the warrant was reviewed by either a police officer 
trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of probable cause 
and 
reasonable 
suspicion, 
or 
a 
knowledgeable 
government 
attorney, and a reasonably well-trained officer would not have 
known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's 
authorization. 
¶46 In this case we determine that the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies because the evidence 
Scull seeks to suppress was obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate.  Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence should 
not be suppressed and we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
1 
¶47 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion's conclusions that the officers conducted 
their search in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that 
they believed was valid and that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule precludes suppression.1  I write in concurrence 
to clarify that the "assurance of judicial integrity," standing 
alone, is not a sufficient basis upon which to employ the 
exclusionary rule to preclude the prosecution's use of evidence 
seized when there is no underlying finding of police misconduct.  
Accordingly, the majority opinion is not to be read as setting a 
new standard that permits the exclusion of evidence without 
police misconduct. 
¶48 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy 
that may be applied to certain violations, including those of 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Davis v. 
United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011); State 
v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶¶46, 58, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  
The exclusionary rule was developed as a safeguard of Fourth 
Amendment rights by requiring police to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness requirements as a precondition to the 
prosecution's use of evidence that police seized.  Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Hoyer v. State, 180 
Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶1. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
2 
¶49 As 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
jurisprudence developed, the exclusionary rule has become 
subject to exceptions.  Both the United States Supreme Court's 
and our own decisions have established good faith as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule that permits prosecution's 
use of evidence even though police have transgressed the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 11.  United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 916, 920 (1984); State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶2, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625; Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶3.  These 
decisions 
are 
grounded 
in 
judicial 
assessment 
of 
the 
reasonableness of police actions under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28; Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 
206, ¶3.  
¶50 As the parameters of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule have developed both in the Supreme Court's and 
in our jurisprudence, so too have the judicial expressions of 
the policies that underlie the exclusionary rule.  For example, 
in its recent decision in Davis, the Supreme Court expended 
considerable effort explaining the policies that must be 
considered with regard to the exclusionary rule and what facts 
are necessary before exclusion of evidence is even an option for 
courts to consider.    
¶51 Davis involved the search of the passenger compartment 
of Stella Owens' vehicle, in which Willie Davis was a passenger, 
after both Owens and Davis were placed under arrest and secured.  
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425-26.  A gun was found in Davis' jacket; 
Davis was a convicted felon.  Id.  The search occurred before 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
3 
the Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), 
which Alabama agreed set out new concerns relative to the search 
of Davis' jacket under the Fourth Amendment if Gant were applied 
to that search.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431.  However, while Gant 
provided a "newly announced rule of substantive Fourth Amendment 
law as a basis for seeking relief," Gant did not determine the 
remedy, i.e., whether suppression applies.  Id.    
¶52 The ultimate question presented in Davis was whether 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the 
prosecution to present evidence obtained in a search that 
complied with appellate precedent that pre-dated Gant.  In 
deciding this question, the Court examined whether police had 
proceeded in objectively reasonable reliance on then-controlling 
precedent in conducting the search.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-
24.  After concluding that police had done so, the Court held 
that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on 
binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary 
rule."  Id.  
¶53 Although the Court's conclusion settled an important 
area of Fourth Amendment law, what is equally interesting about 
Davis is the Court's detailed descriptions of the showing that 
is required before the exclusionary rule can be considered.  For 
example, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), that the exclusionary rule's sole 
purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations by 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
4 
police.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 
141).2   
¶54 The Court explained, "[r]eal deterrent value is a 
necessary condition for exclusion, but it is not a sufficient 
one. . . .  The analysis must also account for the substantial 
social costs generated by the rule. . . .  For exclusion to be 
appropriate, 
the 
deterrence 
benefits 
of 
suppression 
must 
outweigh its heavy costs."  Id. at 2427 (cited and quoted cases 
omitted).  When the error that leads to a Fourth Amendment 
violation is not that of police but that of a magistrate or 
judge who issues the warrant, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply.  "[P]unish[ing] the errors of judges is not the office of 
the exclusionary rule."  Id. at 2428 (cited and quoted cases 
omitted).  And finally, the Court explained, "in 27 years of 
practice under Leon's good-faith exception, we have 'never 
applied' the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as 
a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct."  Id. at 2429 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144). 
¶55 Our decision in Eason discussed the development of the 
exclusionary rule.  We began by reviewing Hoyer, which addressed 
the Fourth Amendment's requirements, and we also considered the 
exclusionary rule as developed within the parameters of Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 
                                                 
2 See also State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶79-84, 327 Wis. 2d 
524, 785 N.W.2d 568 (Gableman, J., dissenting), for a thorough 
discussion of Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), and 
Herring's explanation of the considerations that courts must 
address when asked to apply the exclusionary rule.   
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
5 
206, ¶¶41, 47 (citing Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 
(1923).  We noted that at least since confirmed in State v. 
Tompkins, 
144 
Wis. 2d 
116, 
423 
N.W.2d 
823 
(1988), 
"the 
exclusionary rule has been a remedy, not a right" under Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as the 
Fourth Amendment.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶48.  We also cited 
Ward as explaining that without police misconduct, evidence was 
admissible because "exclusion . . . would serve no remedial 
objective."  Id., ¶49 (quoting Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶63).  
Therefore, just as with the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution requires police misconduct as a 
necessary predicate to consideration of whether the exclusionary 
rule should be applied.  Id.   
¶56 So how does the above discussion fit within my concern 
set out in the first paragraph of this concurrence?  It provides 
the necessary foundation to understand that the lead opinion in 
Hess cannot be combined with certain narrations of the majority 
opinion herein to conclude that the protection of judicial 
integrity, standing alone without underlying police misconduct, 
is sufficient to permit courts to suppress relevant evidence.3  
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶22, citing the lead opinion in Hess, 327 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶47, in which there was no underlying police 
misconduct.  
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
6 
Let me explain further, beginning with the problem set up by the 
lead opinion in Hess.4   
¶57 First, while protection of judicial integrity was 
mentioned in Supreme Court decisions and in our decisions that 
preceded Leon's 1984 decision on good faith, protection of 
judicial integrity is no longer part of the Supreme Court's 
analysis.  In that regard, the Supreme Court has unequivocally 
held that before the exclusionary rule may be employed as a 
remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation two conditions are 
required:  (1) police misconduct and (2) a reviewing court's 
conclusion that "the deterrence benefits of suppression [] 
outweigh its heavy costs."  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.  
Protection of judicial integrity is not part of the Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment analysis when the remedy sought is 
suppression of evidence.  We came to the same conclusion in 
Eason as we addressed Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶48.  Accordingly, when 
an opinion relies on case law that has been refined through 
years of consideration by many courts without discussing current 
                                                 
4 In Hess, the court sat six because Justice Crooks did not 
participate.  Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶70.  The lead opinion, 
authored by Justice Prosser, was joined by Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Bradley.  Justice Ziegler joined the 
result reached by the lead opinion, but on a very limited basis.  
Id., ¶71 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  Justice Gableman wrote a 
thoughtful dissent that took issue with the lead opinion's 
conclusion that application of the exclusionary rule could stand 
on a foundation of judicial integrity when there had been no 
police misconduct.  Id., ¶¶75-97 (Gableman, J., dissenting). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
7 
jurisprudence on the issues presented, it does not accurately 
articulate the state of the law and may confuse the reader.   
¶58 Second, the protection of judicial integrity was 
spoken of only in regard to its connection to police misconduct.  
See Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) 
(explaining that judicial integrity could be compromised if 
unlawful police conduct was sanctioned by the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (explaining that "[i]f the 
Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law").  
¶59 Third, the lead opinion in Hess is the only Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decision, or United States Supreme Court decision, 
that I could locate that employs protection of judicial 
integrity as a stand-alone basis for employing the exclusionary 
rule.  Justice Gableman tried to point out this concern, but the 
lead opinion in Hess did not heed his thoughtful dissent.   
¶60 Fourth, because the majority opinion herein cites the 
lead opinion in Hess in a manner that could permit the reader to 
erroneously conclude that police misconduct is not a necessary 
predicate to the application of the exclusionary rule under both 
United States Supreme Court precedent and our own precedent, I 
have chosen to bring this issue forward.  It is my hope that my 
colleagues both on the bench and at the bar will take heed of 
this trap for the unwary and recognize that the majority opinion 
is not setting a new standard that permits the exclusion of 
evidence without police misconduct.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
concur.  
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.pdr  
 
 
 
8 
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS, ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
1 
¶62 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence because I believe that the 
"assurance of judicial integrity" is not a stand-alone basis for 
suppressing evidence under the exclusionary rule.  Although the 
case at issue centers on the Fourth Amendment, I write to 
clarify that the exclusionary rule can apply to violations of 
constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment.1  The 
exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence that was 
obtained in violation of the Constitution, unless suppression 
would not deter police misconduct or the error in admitting the 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 916 (1984); Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 309-12 (1991); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
21-22 (1967); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999).   
¶63 Because this is a Fourth Amendment case, the majority 
opinion's discussion of the exclusionary rule focuses on that 
constitutional provision.  Specifically, the majority opinion 
states that, "[t]he [United States Supreme Court] first applied 
the exclusionary rule to protect against violations of Fourth 
Amendment rights in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
generally 
inadmissible 
in 
court 
                                                 
1 Because 
this 
case 
involves 
a 
discussion 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule, I do not address circumstances unrelated to 
constitutional violations, which may otherwise warrant the 
exclusion of evidence. 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
2 
proceedings."  Majority op., ¶20 (citation omitted).  Similarly, 
this 
court 
has 
previously 
discussed 
the 
origins 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule as it relates to the Fourth Amendment because 
the focus of the case was the Fourth Amendment.  See State v. 
Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶38-52, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568 
(explaining the history of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule in federal courts and Wisconsin).  I write to clarify that 
the history of the exclusionary rule is not limited to Fourth 
Amendment 
violations——it 
applies 
to 
other 
constitutional 
violations as well.   
¶64 The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to 
deter 
constitutional 
violations, 
but 
did 
not 
limit 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
right 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The exclusionary rule, if 
warranted, results in the suppression of evidence so that it may 
not be 
introduced to prove a defendant's guilt in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 916.  
The 
exclusionary 
rule, 
for 
example, 
may 
apply 
to 
deter 
violations of the Fourth Amendment,2 Fifth Amendment,3 or Sixth 
Amendment.4 
                                                 
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), 
overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 
State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶24, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473. 
3 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960); Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 548 (1897); Rudolph v. State, 
78 Wis. 2d 435, 441-42, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977). 
4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967); 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-04, 206-07 (1964); 
State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 178, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
3 
¶65 The 
origins 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
further 
demonstrate that it was designed to apply to evidence obtained 
in violation of constitutional provisions beyond the Fourth 
Amendment.  The United States Supreme Court applied the 
exclusionary rule for the first time in Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616 (1886).  See Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary 
Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. 
L. 341, 343-44 (2013).  In Boyd the Supreme Court held that the 
evidence at issue was inadmissible because it was obtained in 
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 
621-22, 633-35, 638.  Ten years later, the Supreme Court held 
that the exclusionary rule applied, in federal criminal cases, 
to confessions obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896); see also Bram 
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 548 (1897).  Nearly 20 
years later, in 1914, the Supreme Court held for the first time 
that the exclusionary rule applied, in federal criminal cases, 
to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled on 
other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (explaining that Weeks was the first case 
in which the Supreme Court "held that 'in a federal prosecution 
the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through 
an illegal search and seizure'" (quoted source omitted)).  Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment was not the only driving force behind the 
Supreme Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule, which 
occurred decades before Weeks.   
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
4 
¶66 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule does not always 
require suppression of evidence, even if it was obtained through 
unconstitutional means.  In fact, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply when suppression would not deter police misconduct.  Davis 
v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-28 (2011); 
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶35, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97.  For example, evidence may not be suppressed under 
the good faith exception5 because suppression would not serve the 
exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police misconduct.  
Evidence obtained after a constitutional violation may otherwise 
be admissible if the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently 
attenuated from the police misconduct,6 the evidence was 
discovered 
through 
a 
source 
independent 
from 
the 
police 
misconduct,7 
or 
the 
evidence 
would 
have 
been 
inevitably 
discovered through lawful means.8  In addition, evidence that is 
suppressed because of a constitutional violation may nonetheless 
                                                 
5 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984); State 
v. 
Dearborn, 
2010 
WI 
84, 
¶¶35-49, 
327 
Wis. 2d 252, 
786 
N.W.2d 97; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625. 
6 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Phillips, 
218 Wis. 2d 180, 204-06, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
7 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 
¶¶43-55, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1. 
8 Murray, 487 U.S. at 539; Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-50; State v. 
Weber, 163 Wis. 2d 116, 140-44, 471 N.W.2d 187 (1991); State v. 
Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
5 
be admitted for certain purposes.  For example, suppressed 
evidence may be used collaterally for impeachment purposes, 
outside of the prosecution's case-in-chief.9  
¶67 Some potential confusion surrounding the exclusionary 
rule could stem from the fact that evidence may be properly 
excluded for a variety of reasons.  But the mere fact that 
evidence is being excluded does not mean that it is excluded 
under the exclusionary rule.  "There are judicially created 
exclusionary rules and legislatively created exclusionary rules. 
There are constitutional exclusionary rules and statutory 
exclusionary rules."  Sun Kin Chan v. State, 552 A.2d 1351, 1355 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).  A careful reader will keep in mind 
that courts may inaccurately refer to "the exclusionary rule" 
when a constitutional violation is not the basis for exclusion.  
Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985) (explaining 
the differences between the "Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule" 
                                                 
9 Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593-94 (2009) (holding 
that defendant's statement obtained in violation of Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was inadmissible to prove guilt but 
admissible to impeach defendant's inconsistent testimony); State 
v. Pickett, 150 Wis. 2d 720, 727-30, 442 N.W.2d 509 (Ct. App. 
1989) (same); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 
(1980) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth 
Amendment was inadmissible to prove guilt but admissible to 
impeach defendant's inconsistent testimony); State v. Thompson, 
142 Wis. 2d 821, 833 & n.8, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(same); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (holding 
that defendant's statement made without warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was inadmissible to 
prove guilt but admissible to impeach defendant's inconsistent 
testimony); State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 118-19, 291 
N.W.2d 478 (1980) (same). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
6 
and the "Miranda10 exclusionary rule").  Because the Fourth 
Amendment is at issue in the present case, the majority 
opinion's discussion of the exclusionary rule focuses on the 
Fourth Amendment. 
¶68 With the foregoing clarification, I join Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, and I concur. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
 2011AP2956-CR.akz  
 
 
 
7