Title: JOSEPH KRAFCZIK, JR., Administrator of the Estate of Allan H. Krafczik V. TANAYA MOON MORRIS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSEPH KRAFCZIK, JR., Administrator of the Estate of Allan H. Krafczik V. TANAYA MOON MORRIS2009 WY 53206 P.3d 372Case Number: S-08-0003, S-08-0079Decided: 04/13/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOSEPH 
KRAFCZIK, JR., Administrator of the Estate of Allan H. 
Krafczik,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
TANAYA 
MOON MORRIS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Steve 
C.M. Aron, Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Stacy 
L. Rostad and Jason M. Tangeman, Anthony, Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Tangeman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
In 
2004, Allan Krafczik executed a Warranty Deed conveying to Tanaya Morris an 
interest in a rental property he owned in Laramie, Wyoming.  The Warranty Deed established 
Mr. Krafczik and Ms. Morris as owners of undivided one-half interests 
as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  In late 2004, Mr. Krafczik's cousin, 
Joseph Krafczik, and his wife, Christine Krafczik, were appointed as guardians 
of Mr. Krafczik.  The 
Krafcziks1 filed suit on behalf of 
Mr. Krafczik against Ms. Morris, claiming that she had obtained the 
property interest through undue influence.  
After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of 
Ms. Morris.  The Krafcziks 
appealed.  

 
 

[¶2]        
While 
the litigation against Ms. Morris was pending, the Krafcziks executed a 
Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Mr. Krafczik, purporting to convey his joint 
tenancy in the property in exchange for a tenancy in common, with the express 
purpose of terminating rights of survivorship.  The Krafcziks filed, in the 
conservatorship case, a motion for approval of that conveyance.  Upon Mr. Krafczik's death, the district 
court dismissed their motion.  The 
Krafcziks also appealed that decision, and the appeals were consolidated before 
this Court.  We will affirm the 
district court in both cases.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3]        
In 
the appeal of the adverse judgment on their claim of undue influence, the 
Krafcziks state these issues for our consideration:

 
 
1.         
On a claim of undue influence concerning an elderly landlord with 
Alzheimer's disease who deeds his family home to the renter of the property, did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to find a confidential 
relationship between the parties?

 
 
2.         
Whether the trial court then abused its discretion in determining after 
trial that a confidential relationship did not exist between landlord and 
renter, where at the close of Plaintiffs' case the court had held that such 
relationship existed, and where Defendant presented no evidence to rebut the 
court's initial finding.

 
 
In 
the appeal in the conservatorship matter, the parties suggest a number of 
different issues.  This one, 
somewhat reworded, is dispositive:

 
 
3.         
Whether a conservator requires court approval to convey the real property 
of the ward in order to sever a joint tenancy and eliminate rights of 
survivorship. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]        
Allan 
Krafczik and his wife Kathy lived in Laramie, Wyoming, for many years.  They had no children or other close 
family, but they were active in their community and had many friends and 
acquaintances.  They owned their 
home, and also a rental property in Laramie, referred to as the Bradley Street 
Property.  Located on the Bradley 
Street Property was a house that had been built by Mr. Krafczik's father, 
along with a smaller apartment that connected to the main house through a common 
utility room.  In 1998, the main 
house on the Bradley Street Property was leased to Tanaya Morris and her sister 
Lay-nah,2 who were both students at the 
university.

 
 

[¶5]        
After 
his wife passed away in early 1999, Mr. Krafczik developed a closer 
friendship with the Morris sisters.  
Tanaya Morris testified that she and Mr. Krafczik would talk often, 
see each other at least once a week, occasionally have meals together, and 
exchange holiday gifts.  Near the 
end of 2003, Mr. Krafczik began asking Ms. Morris about her long-term plans, and 
in particular whether she intended to stay in Laramie.  She told him that she expected to stay 
in Laramie at least until she completed her graduate degree, but was uncertain 
what she would do after that.  In 
early 2004, Mr. Krafczik asked Ms. Morris if she would be "willing to take 
responsibility" for the Bradley Street Property "at some point in time."  She said no, apparently in part because 
she was not certain what he meant.

 
 

[¶6]        
In 
May of 2004, Mr. Krafczik went to Ms. Morris's office and asked for 
her help in preparing a document he called a "Lease to Own Purchase 
Agreement."  In general terms, the 
agreement provided that Ms. Morris would continue to rent the Bradley 
Street Property until Mr. Krafczik's death, and after that she would own 
the Bradley Street Property.  She 
was surprised, and initially objected.  
He assured her that he appreciated the way she took care of his father's 
house, and liked the fact that she had left some of his mother's pictures in 
place.  She agreed to prepare the 
document as he requested.  It was 
signed by Mr. Krafczik and Ms. Morris on May 28, 
2004.

 
 

[¶7]        
A 
few days later, Mr. Krafczik invited Ms. Morris to his home one evening.  When she got there, he gave her a pad of 
paper, and asked her to walk through the house with him and take notes about 
what he wanted done with his personal property after his death.  Ms. Morris suggested that it would be 
better if Mr. Krafczik engaged a lawyer to prepare his will.  He asked if she knew one, and she 
suggested a lawyer in Cheyenne who had once been her college roommate. 

 
 

[¶8]        
Ms. 
Morris was at Mr. Krafczik's home again the following week, when he mentioned a 
collection of photographs that he wanted to donate to a museum upon his 
death.  Ms. Morris again suggested 
that he needed a lawyer to help him accomplish that, and he agreed to get the 
lawyer on the telephone.  
Ms. Morris spoke to the lawyer first to introduce Mr. Krafczik.  Ms. Morris then left the room, went into 
the kitchen, and busied herself by washing up some dishes.  She did not hear any of the conversation 
between Mr. Krafczik and the lawyer. 

 
 

[¶9]        
A 
short time later, Ms. Morris received a fax from the lawyer, which included 
copies of a will, a living will, and two warranty deeds.3  The will had been drafted to devise and 
bequeath Mr. Krafczik's entire estate to Ms. Morris.  The living will had been drafted to 
designate Ms. Morris to make medical treatment decisions for Mr. Krafczik 
if he became incapacitated.  The two 
warranty deeds had been drafted to convey Mr. Krafczik's home and the 
Bradley Street Property to Mr. Krafczik and Ms. Morris as joint 
tenants with rights of survivorship.  
Ms. Morris was surprised by these documents, and "very 
uncomfortable" with them.  After 
work, she went to Mr. Krafczik's home to talk to him about the 
documents.  He confirmed that he had 
asked the lawyer to draft the documents for his consideration, but noted that he 
could choose whether to sign them or not. 

 
 

[¶10]     
On 
June 22, 2004, Mr. Krafczik called Ms. Morris at work and asked her to go 
to lunch.  Over lunch, Mr. Krafczik 
showed her the Warranty Deed for the Bradley Street Property, and said "We're 
going to do this today."  After some 
discussion, she insisted that the least she could do was to pay the attorney's 
fees for preparing the documents.  
Eventually, Mr. Krafczik asked if she knew where to get the Warranty Deed 
notarized, and Ms. Morris said there was a notary at the university police 
station.  She took him there, where 
he signed the warranty deed, had it notarized, and gave it to 
Ms. Morris.  Ms. Morris filed 
the deed with the County Clerk's office on July 7, 2004.  

 
 

[¶11]     
When 
Ms. Morris tried to pay rent to Mr. Krafczik after he had signed the 
Warranty Deed, he refused her offer of payment.  He said, "We're done with that.  We took care of that."  She later made some payments they called 
"rent," but which she intended as reimbursements to Mr. Krafczik for taxes 
and insurance on the Bradley Street Property.

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. Krafczik 
had a cousin, Joseph Krafczik, who lived in Laramie with his wife Christine 
Krafczik.  The Krafcziks' 
relationship with Mr. Krafczik was cordial but not close.  In October of 2004, the Krafcziks 
received a call from John Henberg, a long-time acquaintance of Mr. 
Krafczik.  Mr. Henberg had gone to 
Mr. Krafczik's home to borrow a camera.  He found the house uncharacteristically 
cluttered, and thought Mr. Krafczik seemed confused and forgetful.  Mr. Henberg had experience with 
members of his own family who had suffered dementia, and he became concerned for 
Mr. Krafczik.  He called the 
Krafcziks to express his concern.  

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
Krafcziks went to Mr. Krafczik's house that same night, and found the house 
"really in disarray," with "papers and bills and newspapers and things just 
spread all over."  They found unpaid 
bills and overdue notices.  When 
they offered assistance in bringing the bills up to date, Mr. Krafczik 
agreed that he could use some help.  
With the advice of a lawyer in Laramie, they set up a voluntary 
conservatorship, with the Krafcziks acting as conservators for Mr. 
Krafczik.  In addition to helping 
Mr. Krafczik with his bills, the Krafcziks helped him with medical matters.  In late 2004, Mr. Krafczik was diagnosed 
as suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 

 
 

[¶14]     
Among 
Mr. Krafczik's papers, the Krafcziks discovered the "Lease to Own Purchase 
Agreement" for the Bradley Street Property.  When they asked Mr. Krafczik what 
it was, he told them he did not know, and denied that he had signed the 
document.  The Krafcziks later 
discovered the Warranty Deed conveying the Bradley Street Property to Mr. 
Krafczik and Ms. Morris as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  Mr. Krafczik also said he had not 
signed that document.  The Krafcziks 
also acquired copies of the will, the living will, and the Warranty Deed for 
Mr. Krafczik's home.  These 
three documents were, apparently, unsigned.  

 
 

[¶15]     
On 
June 9, 2005, the Krafcziks, as Mr. Krafczik's conservators, filed suit 
against Ms. Morris, claiming that she had obtained her interest in the Bradley 
Street Property through undue influence.  
A three-day bench trial began on August 20, 2007.  The district court ruled in favor of Ms. 
Morris, entering its judgment on October 3, 2007.  The Krafcziks appealed from that 
judgment, bringing the first of these two consolidated cases before 
us.

 
 

[¶16]     
While 
the litigation was pending before the district court, the Krafcziks continued 
acting as Mr. Krafczik's conservators.  On September 6, 2005, the Krafcziks 
executed a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Mr. Krafczik purporting to convey 
his joint tenancy interest in the Bradley Street Property back to himself as a 
tenancy in common.  The document 
stated that the conveyance was "for the express purpose of terminating any joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship which may exist with regard to the 
property."  Put another way, they 
meant to terminate Ms. Morris's right of survivorship so that, in the event 
of Mr. Krafczik's death, his half interest in the property would pass to 
his estate rather than to Ms. Morris.

 
 

[¶17]     
On 
July 21, 2006, the Krafcziks filed in the separate conservatorship matter a 
petition seeking the court's approval of the Quitclaim Deed and its 
transformation of Mr. Krafczik's joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. 
 Ms. Morris filed an objection.  The district court took no action on 
this petition, but the Krafcziks filed a subsequent motion on December 21, 2007. 
 Ms. Morris again objected.  The district court held a hearing on the 
matter on February 5, 2008.  
Mr. Krafczik died on February 16, 2008, before the district court 
issued a decision in the matter.  
The district court then dismissed the motion as moot, further stating in 
its order that the death of Mr. Krafczik "caused the vesting of Ms. Morris' 
joint tenancy with rights of survivorship."  In other words, the district court 
determined that Ms. Morris, as the survivor, was the sole owner of the Bradley 
Street Property.  The Krafcziks 
appealed from that decision, bringing the second of the two consolidated cases 
for our review.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶18]     
"We 
review findings of fact made by the district court after a bench trial using a 
clearly erroneous standard."  Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
2008 WY 2, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo. 2008).  A district court's findings are not 
entitled to the same degree of deference afforded a jury verdict.  Accordingly, we do not limit our review 
solely to the evidence favoring the prevailing party, but instead consider all 
of the admissible evidence contained in the record.  Still, a district court's findings are 
presumed correct, and we give due regard to the fact that the district court had 
an opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the 
disputed evidence.  We set aside a 
district court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous.  Addison v. Dallarosa-Handrich, 2007 WY 
110, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 2007).  "A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
even though substantial evidence supports it, the reviewing court is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made."  Campbell County, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d  at 
49.

 
 

[¶19]     
The 
dispositive issue in the Krafcziks' appeal in the conservatorship matter is 
whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-607(a) (LexisNexis 2007) required the 
Krafcziks to obtain the district court's approval for the conveyance of 
Mr. Krafczik's joint tenancy in exchange for a tenancy in common.  "Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, so our review is de 
novo."  Qwest Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 
2007 WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Undue influence

 
 

[¶20]     
In 
their brief, the Krafcziks concede that the issue "of whether there was a 
confidential relationship between Allan Krafczik and Tanaya Morris is 
dispositive of this appeal."  In its 
decision letter following the bench trial, the district court recited 
that

 
 
Courts 
carefully scrutinize deed transactions when the parties involved have a 
confidential relationship with one another.  Short v. Hall, 785 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Wyo. 
1990).  Once the person who is 
seeking to void the transaction on the basis of undue influence has established 
that a confidential relationship existed between the grantor and the grantee, 
the burden of proof shifts to the recipient of the property to prove that the 
transaction was fair and conducted in good faith.  Walsh [v. Walsh], 841 P.2d [831,] 834 
[(Wyo. 1992)]; Short, 785 P.2d  at 
1170.

 
 

Marchant 
v. Cook, 
967 P.2d 551, 557 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
The 
Krafcziks assert that the evidence introduced during the bench trial established 
the existence of a confidential relationship between Mr. Krafczik and 
Ms. Morris.  On that basis, the 
Krafcziks claim that the district court erred in failing to shift the burden of 
proof and not requiring Ms. Morris to prove that the "Lease to Own Purchase 
Agreement" and the Warranty Deed represented fair, good faith transactions.  

 
 

[¶21]     
In 
the current case, the district court provided a thorough and thoughtful analysis 
of this issue.  The following 
quotation from the district court's decision letter is lengthy, but it contains 
a useful summary of the evidence adduced at trial.

 
 
First, 
the Court must address whether Morris and Krafczik had a confidential 
relationship, as this condition would serve to shift the burden of proof to 
Morris.  A confidential relationship 
is defined as "either one person under the domination of another or one who is 
justified, by virtue of his relation with another, in assuming that the other 
will not act inconsistently with his or her welfare."  25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence 
§ 39.  See also Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776, 
783 (Wyo. 1981); Johnson v. Soulis, 
542 P.2d 867, 874 (Wyo. 1975).  
Factors that may be considered in determining the existence of a 
confidential relationship include:  
(1) the victim's advanced age, physical or mental debility or 
weakness, or dependence on the dominant party, (2) whether the individuals 
maintain a close relationship, and (3) whether there is a power of attorney 
between the individuals.  Id.  In Wyoming, for example, parties have 
been determined to have a confidential relationship where one individual is 
dependent upon the other to some degree.  
See Perry[, 624 P.2d  at 778] 
(where Vaught's physical ailments reduced his ability to fend for himself such 
that Perry began providing transportation and other sundry services including 
grocery shopping and bill paying.).

 
 
            
Here, Krafczik was an elderly gentleman whose wife had died a few years 
before the events in question.  
Additionally, Krafczik may have been suffering the early effects of 
Alzheimer's disease during the period in question although the extent of its 
effects is disputed.  Further, in 
addition to being landlord and tenant, Morris and Krafczik had a close, familial 
relationship.  They exchanged gifts, 
dined together, and spent leisure time together.  Morris, at the least, prepared the 
"Lease to Own Purchase Agreement" and she provided Krafczik with the contact 
information for [the lawyer in Cheyenne] and introduced them, resulting in the 
Warranty Deed.  The evidence suggests that Morris had 
contact with Krafczik several times a week.  She continues to visit with him on the 
phone despite his being transferred to Fort Collins.  Additionally, Morris washed Krafczik's 
dishes on at least one documented occasion and filled out one of Krafczik's 
personal checks at his request.  
These acts indicate, at a minimum, a trusting friendship between Morris 
and Krafczik.

 
 
            
However, there are factors that preclude this Court from finding that a 
confidential relationship existed.  
Trial testimony indicates that Krafczik was an independent man in good 
physical shape.  He was not 
dependent upon Morris in completing any of his daily activities.  Outside of the single dishwashing 
episode that occurred while Krafczik talked on the telephone with [the lawyer 
from Cheyenne], Morris did not perform any chores for Krafczik. . . 
.

 
 
            
Trial testimony indicated that Krafczik was not dependent upon Morris in 
completing any daily activities.  He 
had no trouble caring for himself on a daily basis.  He could feed and clothe himself, and he 
was quite mobile.  Krafczik had many 
friends and acquaintances, including the Young family to whom he was very 
close.  In short, Krafczik had many 
people around him to depend upon, but never became truly dependent on any of 
them.  

 
 
Trial 
testimony established that Krafczik kept a strict watch on and orderly control 
over his financial affairs prior to being diagnosed with Alzheimer's and during 
the disease's earlier stages.  Even 
after the debilitating disease began affecting Krafczik to a greater degree, he 
did not depend upon anyone else to control his finances.  Instead, he simply forgot about or 
ignored his financial obligations.  
His bills were not paid on a regular basis and some of his services were 
interrupted.  Clearly, Krafczik 
never relied upon anyone else to control his financial affairs.  The Court also notes that Morris never 
had power of attorney on behalf of Krafczik.

 
 
Additionally, 
other facts in this case suggest that a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
did not exist between Morris and Krafczik.  
Documents prepared by [the Cheyenne lawyer], including the Last Will and Testament and Declaration of Living Will, provided 
Krafczik the opportunity to assign a substantial amount of control over his 
personal affairs to Morris.  The 
proposed Last Will named Morris as 
the executrix and the proposed Living 
Will designated Morris to make treatment decisions for Krafczik.  However, Krafczik never signed or 
executed either of these documents, executing only the Warranty Deed currently at issue. . . 
.

 
 
In 
Johnson v. Reiger, 2004 WY 83, 93 P.3d 992 (Wyo. 2004), the Wyoming Supreme Court examined several factors in 
finding an inference that a confidential relationship existed.  There, the conveyance was originally 
suggested by the grantee.  Id. at ¶ 19, 93 P.3d  at 997.  Here, both agreements that transferred 
an interest to Morris were initiated by Krafczik, and there is no evidence by 
which this Court could find that Morris ever suggested any conveyance at 
all.  There, the grantee had an 
agenda prepared for the meetings with the grantor's lawyer and accountant which 
was adhered to and the grantor "received pressure" from the grantee to execute 
the conveyance.  Id. at ¶ 17, 93 P.3d  at 997.  Here, Morris took no part in Krafczik's 
discussion with [the lawyer] and testified that she never knew of Krafczik's 
intent to deed the Property to her until she received the fax indicating such. . 
. .  Additionally, the Notary 
testified that Krafczik did not appear to be under any pressure when he signed 
the deed, and there was no testimony that Morris did anything at that time.  There, the grantor specifically depended 
upon the grantees to manage her financial affairs.  Id. at ¶ 15, 93 P.3d  at 997.  Here, Morris never managed Krafczik's 
affairs.  Instead, when Krafczik 
became unable to manage his own affairs, nobody tended to 
them.

 
 
In 
sum, the Court finds that Morris and Krafczik shared a close friendship that was 
just that  a close friendship, developed over several years.  Krafczik was elderly and suffered from a 
terrible disease that progressively robbed him of his mental acuity.  However, this friendship did not give 
rise to a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Morris and 
Krafczik.  A fiduciary duty "derives 
from the conduct or undertaking of the purported fiduciary."  Lee v. LPP Mortgage Ltd., 2003 WY 92, 
¶ 25, 74 P.3d 152, 162 (Wyo. 2003).  
Here, Morris conducted herself as a friend to Krafczik and he 
reciprocated.  However, Krafczik did 
not rely upon Morris to control his daily activities or his personal affairs, 
and Morris never undertook such control.  
Krafczik conducted his affairs independent from his friends, even beyond 
the point where he could have benefited from their 
assistance.

 
 
Finding 
no confidential relationship between the parties, the burden does not shift to 
Morris to present evidence that the conveyance was fair and conducted in good 
faith.  The burden remains upon the 
Krafczik[s] to establish the three elements of undue influence by preponderance 
of the evidence.

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
Krafcziks do not take issue with the district court's legal analysis.  They claim only that its factual 
findings were contrary to the evidence.  
Applying our standard of review, we consider 
all of the admissible evidence of record to determine whether the district 
court's findings are clearly erroneous.

 
 

[¶23]     
The 
first factor listed by the district court was the victim's debility or 
dependence on the dominant party.  
Put another way, the district court must ask whether Mr. Krafczik's 
"condition was such as to permit subversion of his freedom of will."  Brug 
v. Case, 
600 P.2d 710, 715 (Wyo. 1979), quoting In 
re Draper's Estate, 374 P.2d 425, 430-31 (Wyo. 1962).  The 
record does contain evidence supporting the Krafcziks' position that Alzheimer's 
disease may have diminished Mr. Krafczik's mental abilities.  Several witnesses testified that, as 
early as the fall of 2002, Mr. Krafczik sometimes seemed confused, unable to 
answer simple questions, and unable to make decisions.  Some testified that Mr. Krafczik 
seemed uncharacteristically malleable, and less willing or able to express his 
own opinions.  There is also 
evidence that Mr. Krafczik later denied signing the Warranty Deed, and may not 
have understood that the document conveyed the property interest to 
Ms. Morris.

 
 

[¶24]     
But 
there is also evidence indicating that, at other times, Mr. Krafczik did not 
exhibit diminished mental capacity.  
As one example, the Laramie lawyer testified that the Krafcziks first 
consulted him about an involuntary conservatorship.  After meeting with Mr. Krafczik, 
however, the lawyer believed that Mr. Krafczik was competent and capable of 
cooperating in a voluntary conservatorship.  Later, when Mr. Krafczik signed a 
revocation of prior wills, the lawyer felt that Mr. Krafczik understood the 
document, and that he demonstrated sufficient testamentary intent to revoke his 
prior wills.  Significantly, while 
other witnesses observed that Mr. Krafczik sometimes appeared malleable and 
suggestible, this lawyer noted that when Mr. Krafczik first reviewed the 
will revocation document, he said he wanted to think about it, and did not sign 
the document until the following day.

 
 

[¶25]     
As 
the district court stated, the record contains conflicting evidence regarding 
the effect of Alzheimer's disease on Mr. Krafczik's mental abilities.  There is, however, very little evidence 
that this condition left him dependent upon Ms. Morris.  In contrast, there is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's findings that Mr. Krafczik did not 
depend upon Ms. Morris in completing his daily activities, controlling his 
financial affairs, or managing his personal affairs.  We find no basis for concluding that the 
district court's findings are clearly erroneous.

 
 

[¶26]     
With 
regard to their relationship, it seems undisputed, and the district court found, 
that there was "a trusting friendship" between Mr. Krafczik and Ms. Morris.  However, friendship is not the kind of 
relationship that necessarily indicates the existence of a confidential 
relationship.  Compare 
Walsh v. Walsh, 
841 P.2d 831, 835 (Wyo. 1992) (the existence of a family relationship is not 
enough to establish a confidential relationship).  To establish a confidential 
relationship, it is necessary to demonstrate a relationship that afforded the 
dominant party an opportunity to control the victim.  Brug, 600 P.2d  at 715; Draper, 374 P.2d  at 430-31.  There is little evidence in the record 
of a controlling relationship between Ms. Morris and Mr. Krafczik, 
while there is ample evidence supporting the district court's findings that 
Ms. Morris never undertook to control Mr. Krafczik.  Most 
telling, we think, is testimony from the person who notarized the Warranty Deed 
by which Mr. Krafczik conveyed an interest in the Bradley Street Property to 
Ms. Morris.  The notary 
provided these observations:

 
 
Q.        Did 
Mr. Krafczik seem confused to you?

 
 
A.        No, 
not at all.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he seem disorientated [sic]?

 
 
A.        
No.  He seemed to know 
exactly what he was doing.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he seem to be fully relying upon the young lady that was with 
him?

 
 
A.        Not 
at all.  
Huh-uh.

 
 
Q.        Was 
she assisting him in any way, to your recollection?

 
 
A.        
No.  She just stood there 
while I was working with him.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he seem to be relying upon her in any way?

 
 
A.        Not 
that I'm aware of.

 
 
Q.        Did 
it look like he  she was controlling his actions in any 
way?

 
 
A.        No, 
huh-uh.

 
 
Q.        If 
some of those things or all of those things were present, would you have 
notarized the document?

 
 
A.        
Absolutely not.

 
 
Q.        And 
why not?

 
 
A.        Well, 
in notarizing something, a person who is signing it has to be aware of what they 
are doing.

 
 

[¶27]     
In 
sum, the record contains evidence that could support the existence of a 
confidential relationship between Mr. Krafczik and Ms. Morris, and it 
contains evidence to the contrary.  
The lengthy quotation from the district court's decision letter 
demonstrates the care with which the district court considered and weighed the 
evidence, and we do not engage in re-weighing.  Addison, 
¶ 8, 161 P.3d  at 1091.  Our 
review 
of the record does not leave a definite 
and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake, and so we cannot 
conclude that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous.  We affirm the district court's 
decision.

 
 
2.         
Motion at the close of plaintiffs' case

 
 

[¶28]     
After 
the Krafcziks presented their case in chief during the bench trial, Ms. Morris 
made a motion for judgment on partial findings,4 arguing in essence that the 
evidence produced by the Krafcziks was insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish the existence of a confidential relationship between Mr. Krafczik and 
Ms. Morris.  The district court 
denied the motion, with this explanation:

 
 
In 
considering a motion like this, the Court is required to consider the evidence 
that's been submitted, essentially, as true; to accept that in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff at this point, at least. . . .

 
 
There 
probably is no single thing here that establishes a confidential relationship, 
but there are a lot of little things that, taken together, at least in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff at this point, could cause the Court to conclude 
that there was, in fact, a confidential relationship here; that they had a 
relationship where Mr. Krafczik clearly trusted Ms. Morris to do things on 
his behalf and to act in his best interest. . . .

 
 
But, 
as I say, I'm required to consider this evidence in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff at this point.  That being 
the case, I do think the plaintiff has at least had evidence sufficient to 
provide the prima fa[cie] case.  For 
the record, the motion is denied.

 
 

[¶29]     
On 
appeal, the Krafcziks argue that because the district court concluded that a 
confidential relationship existed at the close of the Krafcziks' case, it could 
not then rule that the relationship did not exist at the close of Ms. Morris's 
case.  However, at the close of the 
Krafcziks' case, the district court did not conclude that a confidential 
relationship existed.  It concluded 
only that the Krafcziks had presented sufficient evidence of a confidential 
relationship to survive Ms. Morris's motion for judgment on partial 
findings.  Moreover, as the district 
court correctly indicated, it was required at that point to consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Krafcziks, affording them all favorable and reasonable inferences.  See Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1228, 1240 (Wyo. 1999); True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 795 (Wyo. 1989).  The 
district court's decision to deny the motion was fully consistent with prior 
guidance from this Court:  

 
 
Where 
plaintiff's proof has failed in some aspect the motion should, of course, be 
granted.  Where plaintiff's proof is 
overwhelming, application of the rule is made easy and the motion should be 
denied.  But where plaintiff has 
presented a prima facie case based on 
unimpeached evidence we are of the opinion that the trial judge should not grant 
the motion even though he is the trier of the facts and may not himself feel at 
that point in the trial that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of 
proof.

 
 

Angus 
Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., 
577 P.2d 645, 648 (Wyo. 1978) (emphasis and punctuation 
omitted).

 
 

[¶30]     
At 
the close of Ms. Morris's case, however, the district court was no longer 
required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Krafcziks.  It was required to weigh all of the 
evidence impartially, including the evidence introduced by Ms. Morris on 
the question of whether there was a confidential relationship.  When the district court did so, it found 
the Krafcziks' evidence less compelling than Ms. Morris's.  There is no merit in the contention that 
the district court's ruling in the Krafcziks' favor at the close of their case 
somehow obligated it to decide the case in their favor at the end of the 
trial.

 
 

3.         
Court approval of a conservator's property conveyance

 
 

[¶31]     
As 
noted above, the Warranty Deed executed by Mr. Krafczik conveyed the Bradley 
Street Property to himself and Ms. Morris as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship.  The Krafcziks, as his 
conservators, later executed a Quitclaim Deed by which they attempted to convey 
Mr. Krafczik's joint tenancy to himself as a tenancy in common, in an effort to 
destroy Ms. Morris's right of survivorship.  It is undisputed that the Krafcziks did 
not receive approval of this transaction from the district court.  The dispositive question here is whether 
court approval was required.5

 
 

[¶32]     
In 
Wyoming, the duties and powers of a conservator are established by statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-3-601 through 
-611.  In this case, we must 
determine whether the Krafcziks' actions fall within Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3-3-606  powers a conservator may exercise without court approval  or 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-607  powers a conservator may exercise only with 
court approval.

 
 

[¶33]     
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-3-606, in relevant part, provides as 
follows:

 
 

(a)  Without 
prior order of the court the conservator may: 

 
 
. 
. .

 
 

(ii)  Enforce, 
defend against or prosecute any claim by or against the ward or the 
conservator;

 
 

(iii)  Sue 
on and defend claims in favor of or against the ward or the 
conservator;

 
 

(iv)     
Sell 
and transfer personal property of a perishable nature and personal property for 
which there is a regularly established market; 

 
 
. 
. .

 
 

(vi)     
Receive 
additional property from any source;

 
 
 . . .

 
 

(xi)  Appear 
for and represent the ward in all legal proceedings, unless another person is 
appointed for that purpose, and prosecute or defend actions, claims or 
proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets and of the 
conservator in the performance of his duties;

 
 

[¶34]     
On 
appeal, the Krafcziks assert that they did not need court approval to execute 
the Quitclaim Deed because their action amounted to prosecuting a claim by the 
ward, defending claims against the ward, and prosecuting claims for the 
protection of estate assets.  This 
assertion ignores the fact that the Krafcziks were prosecuting 
Mr. Krafczik's claim in separate litigation against Ms. Morris.  The Quitclaim Deed was not executed as 
part of the litigation against Ms. Morris, but as an independent act 
intended to terminate Ms. Morris's right of survivorship regardless of the 
outcome of the litigation.  The 
execution of the Quitclaim Deed was not an act furthering the prosecution or 
defense of any claim.

 
 

[¶35]     
The 
Krafcziks also rely on subsection (vi) of the quoted statute, which allows a 
conservator to receive property from any source.  It may be true that, if the Quitclaim 
Deed was effective, they would have received a tenancy in common.  The statute allows a conservator to 
receive personal or real property without court approval.  It is equally true, however, that if the 
Quitclaim Deed was effective, they would have conveyed the joint tenancy.  The statute allows a conservator to sell 
and transfer personal property without court approval under specified 
circumstances.  The statute says 
nothing about conveying real property without court approval.  The Krafcziks' execution of the 
Quitclaim Deed does not fall within the list of powers a conservator may 
exercise without court approval. 

 
 

[¶36]     
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-3-607, in relevant part, provides as follows: 

 
 

(a)  Upon 
order of the court after hearing and notice as prescribed by the court the 
conservator may: 

 
 
            
. . .

 
 

(v)  Sell, 
mortgage, exchange, pledge or lease real and personal property belonging to the 
ward, including the homestead and exempt personal property when it appears to be 
in the best interest of the ward, in the same manner and by the same procedure 
provided by title 2, Wyoming statutes for the sale, mortgage, exchange, pledge 
and lease by personal representatives in administration of estates of 
decedents;

 
 

[¶37]     
The 
Krafcziks maintain that they are not subject to this provision because they did 
not "[s]ell, mortgage, exchange, pledge, or lease" any real property belonging 
to Mr. Krafczik.  It is 
undisputed that they did not mortgage, pledge, or lease the property, and it 
seems apparent that they did not.  

 
 

[¶38]     
It 
is not so readily apparent that they did not exchange or sell the 
property.  An exchange generally involves the 
"transfer of property other than for money" or a "[t]ransaction in which one 
piece of property . . . is given in return for another piece of property."  Black's Law Dictionary 562 (6th ed. 1990).  The Krafcziks gave one piece of 
property, the joint tenancy, in return for another piece of property, the 
tenancy in common.  The transaction 
they attempted fits the common definition of an exchange.  A 
sale generally involves the transfer of property in exchange for valuable 
consideration.  Id. 
at 1360.  By executing the Quitclaim 
Deed, the Krafcziks purported to transfer Mr. Krafczik's joint tenancy in 
exchange for the valuable consideration of a tenancy in common, an action that 
seems to fit the common definition of a sale.

 
 

[¶39]     
In 
the context of this statute, it may well be that the terms "sell" and "exchange" 
should be given more particularized definitions.  The statute provides no such 
definitions, however, and neither the Krafcziks nor Ms. Morris has provided 
legal authority for any alternative definitions.  Within the limitations of this case, we 
must rely on the general definitions.  
We therefore conclude that the Krafcziks sold the real property or 
exchanged it, or both, and that such actions required court 
approval.

 
 

[¶40]     
The 
parties also provided no authority as to the legal effect of a purported 
conveyance for which court approval is required but not obtained.  The general rule seems to be that such a 
conveyance is void, though some courts have said that it is merely 
voidable.  39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward §§ 128, 132 
(2008).  One Wyoming case suggests 
that the distinction may depend upon whether the transaction occurred before or 
after the ward has been adjudicated incompetent.  First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1988).  Applying this rule would require facts 
more detailed than those presented to us in this record.

 
 

[¶41]     
Another 
general authority avoids the distinction between void and voidable, and instead 
explains that

 
 
[a] 
guardian's sale of real property may be incomplete unless the sale is confirmed 
by the court having jurisdiction over the proceeding.  Where the ward dies before the 
confirmation of the sale, confirmation is no longer possible since title to the 
property vests in the ward's heirs and devisees; therefore, a sale conducted in 
such a situation is invalid, as is an order confirming such a 
sale.

  

39 
Am. Jur. 2d Guardian and Ward 
§ 145, at 131 (2008) (footnotes omitted).  Among the authorities cited for the 
first quoted sentence is In re 
Guardianship of Hilton's Estate, 72 Wyo. 389, 265 P.2d 747 
(1954).

 
 

[¶42]     
The 
situation described in this quotation is remarkably similar to the situation 
presented in the current case, and we, too, will avoid exploration of the fine 
distinction between void and voidable.  
The Krafcziks executed the Quitclaim Deed prior to obtaining court 
approval.  Mr. Krafczik died 
before the district court confirmed the sale.  Approval of the conveyance was no longer 
possible, because Ms. Morris, as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, 
immediately succeeded to Mr. Krafczik's interest in the Bradley Street 
Property.  In the particular 
circumstances presented by this case, the Quitclaim Deed represented an 
incomplete conveyance.  On that 
basis, we affirm the district court's ruling that Mr. Krafczik's interest 
in the property vested in Ms. Morris upon his death.

 
 

[¶43]     
The 
two consolidated cases are both affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We 
will continue referring to Allan Krafczik as Mr. Krafczik, and to Joseph and 
Christine Krafczik collectively as the Krafcziks.  Adding further confusion, the appeals 
are no longer being pursued by Joseph and Christine Krafczik as Mr. Krafczik's 
conservators, but following Mr. Krafczik's death, by Joseph Krafczik as 
administrator of his estate.  To 
avoid confusion, however, we will continue to refer to the Appellant as the 
Krafcziks.

2Although 
the lease was signed only by Lay-nah Morris, it appears undisputed that both 
sisters lived in the house, and each paid a portion of the rent.  Lay-nah Morris is not a party in these 
appeals.

3According 
to the lawyer's testimony, she mailed the original documents to 
Mr. Krafczik and, at his instruction, faxed copies to Ms. Morris.  The record does not establish whether 
Mr. Krafczik received the mailed originals.

4The 
trial transcript reflects confusion about the proper name for this motion.  Counsel for Ms. Morris stated that a 
motion for "directed verdict is not appropriate."  That is correct for two reasons.  First, amendments to the rules of civil 
procedure have replaced the old term "directed verdict" with the new term 
"judgment as a matter of law."  
W.R.C.P. 50(a).  Second, a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law is allowed only "during a trial by 
jury."  W.R.C.P. 50(a); See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d 
§ 2521, at 222-23 and § 2523, at 229-31 (2008).  Counsel for Ms. Morris instead asked to 
renew a motion for summary judgment.  
The motion a defendant makes at the close of a plaintiff's case during a 
bench trial is a motion for "judgment on partial findings."  W.R.C.P. 52(c).  Such confusion is apparently common, and 
when "the movant uses the wrong name, this defect should be disregarded."  Wright & Miller, supra, § 2523, at 
231.

5In 
their briefs, as before the district court, the parties disputed whether a joint 
tenant may extinguish the joint tenancy and terminate rights of survivorship by 
a unilateral exchange of his joint tenancy for a tenancy in common.  Because we find dispositive the question 
of whether the transaction required the district court's approval, we need not 
resolve that dispute in this case.