Title: Whitaker v. Becker

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Kevin L. Likes 
Auburn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Jane E. Malloy 
William A. Ramsey 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
No. 02S03-1201-CT-27 
RICKEY D. WHITAKER, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
v. 
TRAVIS M. BECKER, 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Appeal from the Allen Circuit Court, No. 02C01-0812-CT-40 
The Honorable Thomas J. Felts, Judge 
The Honorable Craig J. Bobay, Magistrate 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 02A03-1006-CT-303 
January 18, 2012 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
After an automobile collision in which Travis Becker struck Rickey Whitaker from 
behind, Whitaker filed suit for personal injuries. 
Over the next year, Whitaker’s lawyer ignored repeated requests to provide information 
about his client’s medical treatment, finally responded only after the trial court ordered him to do 
so, and then supplied false and misleading information, and did so in a way that palpably 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jan 18 2012, 12:08 pm
2 
damaged the defendant’s ability to ascertain the facts necessary to litigate the only real issue in 
the case. 
Becker filed a motion for sanctions, seeking dismissal of Whitaker’s suit.  The trial court 
found that both Whitaker and his lawyer had acted in bad faith and concluded that dismissal was 
the only realistic and effective remedy.  It dismissed the case.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
On December 19, 2008, Rickey D. Whitaker filed suit against Travis M. Becker and 
Roger R. Becker, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries.  Whitaker alleged that on 
December 21, 2006, Travis was driving Roger’s vehicle negligently, and that Travis crashed into 
Whitaker’s vehicle from behind as a result.  The trial court later dismissed Roger from the suit on 
March 24, 2009, leaving Travis as the sole defendant. 
On January 19, 2009, Becker’s counsel sent Whitaker’s counsel a set of interrogatories 
and a request for production of documents.  Becker’s counsel indicated that Indiana Trial Rule 
33 required Whitaker to answer by February 23, 2009.1  Whitaker’s counsel neither responded 
nor requested an extension of time to respond. 
Three separate times, on April 14, April 29, and May 12, 2009, Becker’s counsel wrote to 
Whitaker’s lawyer, reminding him that his responses were overdue.  (Appellant’s App. at 71–
                                                 
1 As Whitaker’s counsel noted, Indiana Trial Rule 33 grants a party thirty days to respond to a discovery 
request.  Because Trial Rule 6(E) provides for an additional three days when a party serves a discovery 
request by regular mail, and Trial Rule 6(A) further delays a deadline for responding until the following 
business day when the deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, Whitaker’s counsel had more than the 
standard thirty days either to respond or to request an extension. 
3 
73.)  The third letter, by citing Indiana Trial Rule 26(F), implicitly warned Whitaker’s lawyer 
that Becker would involve the trial court if Whitaker did not respond.2  (See Appellant’s App. at 
73.)  Whitaker’s lawyer did not respond to any of these three letters. 
On May 27, 2009, Becker filed a motion to compel discovery.  The trial court granted the 
motion on June 1, 2009, ordering Whitaker’s counsel to respond to Becker’s discovery requests 
by June 16, 2009.  Consistent with the rest of the picture, Whitaker’s counsel has recharacterized 
this order as “an extension.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 4.) 
On June 15, 2009, the day before the trial court’s deadline, Whitaker’s counsel finally 
served Whitaker’s sworn responses, the following of which later proved inaccurate and 
misleading: 
Interrogatory No. 45:  Has any doctor or any other person assigned 
a disability rating to you as a result of the injuries received in said 
accident? . . . 
Answer:  not yet [sic] – surgery can’t be done because of no 
insurance coverage.  Have to pay up front for surgery. 
* * * 
Interrogatory No. 48:  Are you presently being treated by any 
doctor or medical practitioner for any injury, complaint, symptom 
or ailment that you are claiming was caused by the accident in 
question? . . . 
Answer:  Dr. McGee not treated recently – waiting for money for 
surgery.  Can’t take treatment any further with lack of insurance. 
* * * 
                                                 
2 Indiana Trial Rule 26(F) requires a party to make a reasonable effort to resolve a discovery dispute 
informally before moving for an order to compel discovery or a protective order. 
4 
Interrogatory No. 49:  Will such treatment be continued in the 
future? . . . 
Answer:  Not sure.  If it would resume it would be with Dr. 
McGee, at this time not sure of what he would want to do. 
* * * 
Interrogatory No. 52:  Itemize all of the medical expenses, hospital 
expenses, wages lost, and any other special damages which you are 
claiming to have incurred as a result of the injuries alleged to have 
been received in said accident in question, which have not been set 
forth in the previous answers to these Interrogatories. 
Answer:  Enclosed Special Damages Brochure.  For medical bills 
to date. 
(Appellant’s App. at 96–99.)  Both Whitaker and his lawyer signed the responses.  (Appellant’s 
App. at 106.)  The trial court later found as fact that Whitaker knew these answers were false 
when his lawyer filed them.  (Appellant’s App. at 15–16.) 
Three days later, on June 18th, Whitaker’s lawyer mailed Becker’s counsel a letter 
disclosing the fact that Whitaker was undergoing cervical fusion surgery on his spine on—of all 
days—June 18th. 
It was later revealed that concrete preparations for surgery had been underway for several 
weeks, even as Whitaker and his lawyer were declaring in writing that “surgery can’t be done” 
due to lack of funds. 
Dr. Alan W. McGee of Orthopaedics Northeast had issued surgery orders for Whitaker 
on April 14, 2009; Whitaker had undergone pre-operative testing on June 1, 2009, and a pre-
operative physical examination on June 12, 2009.  (Appellant’s App. at 112–24.)  All these 
disclosures specifically contradicted Whitaker’s responses to Interrogatory Nos. 45, 48, and 49.  
Moreover, Whitaker’s Special Damages Brochure did not include any expenses for those 
services until Whitaker’s counsel supplemented it on September 15, 2009, despite his sworn 
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representation that the Special Damages Brochure was up to date as of June 15, 2009.  
(Appellant’s App. at 107–08, 123–24.) 
Becker’s counsel eventually filed a motion for sanctions, to which Whitaker’s lawyer 
also failed to respond.  (Appellant’s App. at 52–70.)  The trial court held a hearing on January 
21, 2010.  In considering Becker’s request for outright dismissal, the court explicitly inquired 
into whether lesser sanctions like excluding evidence of the surgery might be adequate.  (Tr. at 
21–25.)  Becker’s counsel argued that the surgery seriously undermined the value of a post-
operative examination in helping to establish whether the accident or Whitaker’s preexisting 
degenerative disc disease caused his bulging disc condition because the surgery would have 
removed part of the disc.  (Tr. at 21–25.) 
After considering the range of possible sanctions available under Indiana Trial Rule 37, 
the court noted the centrality of the need to resolve whether Whitaker’s surgery was prompted by 
his preexisting degenerative disc disease or by the automobile collision.  (Appellant’s App. at 
13–14.)  It found that Whitaker’s actions in depriving Becker of the chance for an independent 
medical examination constituted “significant and material prejudice.”  (Appellant’s App. at 14.)  
The court further found that “[t]he loss of this evidence [could not] justly be cured by a sanction 
less severe than dismissal of this cause.”  (Appellant’s App. at 15.)  The court granted the 
motion, finding that Whitaker and his counsel had supplied “deceptive interrogatory answers” 
and had done so “in bad faith.”  (Appellant’s App. at 16.) 
Perhaps now grasping the gravity of the situation, Whitaker’s lawyer filed a motion to 
correct error and, for the first time, attached multiple exhibits not previously before the court.  
(Appellant’s App. at 125–45.)  Whitaker argued that Becker could still request a post-operative 
examination and that he in effect provided notice of Whitaker’s need for surgery by submitting 
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claims to Becker’s insurance claim representative during 2008.3  (Appellant’s App. at 125–28.)  
He also claimed and that Becker’s counsel could have received notice of Whitaker’s need for 
surgery had she pursued a nonparty request.4  (Appellant’s App. 125–28.)  The trial court denied 
the motion. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating Whitaker’s case and finding that 
requiring him to pay $625 of Becker’s attorneys’ fees was an adequate sanction.  Whitaker v. 
Becker, 946 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
We grant transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate 
Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
We assign the selection of an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation to the trial 
court’s sound discretion.  McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. 1993).  
Trial judges stand much closer than an appellate court to the currents of litigation pending before 
them, and they have a correspondingly better sense of which sanctions will adequately protect 
                                                 
3 The exhibits pertinent to this point included three letters from late 2008 to a claims representative at 
Westfield Insurance.  (Appellant’s App. at 133–36.)  The gist of these letters was that surgery had been 
recommended but was not in the offing because Whitaker had no health insurance or other means to pay.  
(Appellant’s App. at 133–36.)  How Whitaker’s surgery in June 2009 came to be paid for is not clear 
from the record. 
4 Becker’s lawyer had, in fact, served Whitaker’s counsel on January 19, 2009, with a proposed nonparty 
request she intended to serve on multiple medical providers and a body shop.  (Appellant’s App. at 137.)  
Indiana Trial Rule 34(C) requires a lawyer to give an opposing party at least fifteen days’ notice before 
serving a request on a nonparty.  Whitaker’s counsel never responded to this notice.  It is understandable 
that the trial court did not see this sequence of events as shifting responsibility from Whitaker and his 
lawyer to the opposing party. 
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the litigants in any given case, without going overboard, while still discouraging gamesmanship 
in future litigation.  We therefore review a trial court’s sanction only for an abuse of its 
discretion.  Id. at 180–81. 
Outright Dismissal for Misleading Responses That Make a Full Defense Impossible 
The purpose of the discovery rules is to allow for minimal trial court involvement and to 
promote liberal discovery.  Chustak v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 259 Ind. 390, 288 N.E.2d 
149 (1972).  Although “concealment and gamesmanship were [once] accepted as part and parcel 
of the adversarial process,” we have unanimously declared that such tactics no longer have any 
place in our system of justice.  Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 
77 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2002)).  Today, “the 
purpose of pretrial discovery is to ‘make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). 
In service of that goal, Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(c) expressly provides that a trial court 
may impose sanctions, including outright dismissal of the case or default judgment, if a party 
fails to comply with an order to compel discovery.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, 
the purpose of sanctioning discovery violations is “not merely to penalize those whose conduct 
may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such 
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.”  Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). 
Whitaker argues that the trial court abused its discretion here because the court’s order 
was “primarily founded” on the finding that Whitaker’s actions prevented Becker from obtaining 
a valid independent medical examination, which Whitaker claims is not so.  (Appellant’s Br. at 
9.)  Moreover, Whitaker argues that he did not conceal his surgery from Becker and that Becker 
suffered no prejudice in any event.  (Appellant’s Br. at 14–17.)  Finally, Whitaker argues that he 
8 
did give Becker notice of his need for surgery because he notified a claims representative for 
Becker’s insurance company.  (Appellant’s Br. at 17–19.) 
In response, Becker argues that the trial court acted appropriately because the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that Whitaker violated a court order by submitting false and 
misleading answers to Becker’s interrogatories, answers to which were already long overdue.  
(Appellee’s Br. at 8–12.)  Moreover, Becker argues, the trial court found that these responses 
materially prejudiced Becker’s defense, a finding the trial court did not necessarily need to make 
to warrant dismissal, but one that clearly supports it.  (Appellee’s Br. at 12–16.)  Finally, Becker 
argues that while Whitaker waived any argument that Whitaker gave notice to Becker through a 
claims representative for his insurance company, this notice really constituted no notice at all in 
any event.  (Appellee’s Br. at 16–21.) 
This state’s case law confirms the notion that under the appropriate facts a trial court may 
enter an outright dismissal or default judgment when a party failed to respond to discovery 
requests on time, the trial court granted an order to compel discovery, and the party violated the 
order to compel by failing to respond.  See, e.g., Peters v. Perry, 877 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007); see also Pfaffenberger v. Jackson Cty. Reg’l Sewer Dist., 785 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003); Wozniak v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 620 N.E.2d 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. 
denied; Mulroe v. Angerman, 492 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
A court may sometimes do likewise when a delinquent party did respond but did so in an 
incomplete or misleading way.  See, e.g., Prime Mortg. USA, Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (forged document and refusals to produce others); see also Mallard’s Pointe 
Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. L&L Investors Group, LLC, 859 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) 
(appearing at deposition without documents under subpoena duces tecum), trans. denied; Ross v. 
Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (responding to only one of four sets of 
interrogatories); Castillo v. Ruggiero, 562 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (responding with 
reference to allegations in complaint and by claiming information unavailable without showing 
why), trans. denied.  Although the regular practice is to fashion progressive sanctions leading up 
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to a dismissal or default judgment when it is possible to do so, imposing intermediate sanctions 
is not obligatory when a party’s behavior is particularly egregious.  Prime Mortgage, 885 N.E.2d 
at 649. 
In Prime Mortgage, for example, a shareholder filed suit against her corporation’s co-
owner, alleging that they each owned fifty percent of the corporation and that it was deadlocked, 
and seeking a dissolution.  Id. at 637–38.  The co-owner missed his first deadline for producing 
corporate records, the trial court had granted the shareholder’s motion to compel, and the co-
owner still refused to produce twenty-two of twenty-seven requested documents.  Id. at 647.  The 
only documents the co-owner produced were ones to which the plaintiff already had access.  Id.  
The co-owner later violated a second order to compel in much the same way.  Id. at 647–48. 
Of particular interest, however, when the co-owner first answered the shareholder’s 
complaint, he produced a forged shareholder’s agreement under which he claimed he had sold 
shares to his daughter and an employee.  Id. at 637, 650.  As a result, the co-owner claimed, the 
shareholder did not own fifty percent of the corporation, so the corporation was not deadlocked 
and no dissolution was necessary.  See id. at 637.  On the shareholder’s motion for sanctions, the 
trial court entered a default judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 638, 652.  The 
Court of Appeals found that forging the shareholder’s signature on the agreement went to the 
heart of the case and forced the shareholder to change the theory on which she proceeded.  Id. at 
651. 
Here, Whitaker’s counsel failed to respond to discovery requests on time, the trial court 
issued an order to compel discovery,5 and Whitaker responded in a false and misleading way.  
                                                 
5 Whitaker’s only debate with these facts is that the trial court’s order to compel discovery was nothing 
more than an extension of time.  (Appellant’s Br. at 4.)  According to Whitaker, the court’s order “just set 
the date for Whitaker’s responses.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 18.)  This is flatly not the case.  The court’s order 
did not “just” set the date for Whitaker’s responses; the Indiana Trial Rules did that.  The court’s order 
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Whitaker’s counsel did not respond to Becker’s interrogatories within the time limits set out in 
the Indiana Trial Rules.  Whitaker’s counsel ignored three separate reminder letters from 
Becker’s counsel reminding him his responses were overdue, prompting the order to compel 
discovery under Trial Rule 37(A).  Whitaker’s counsel violated the court’s order to compel by 
providing false and misleading answers that expressly denied any future plans for Whitaker to 
undergo future medical treatment when, in fact, Whitaker had already scheduled a surgery to 
have a disc removed and vertebrae in his spine fused. 
Although Whitaker has characterized the court’s order as being “primarily founded” on 
the finding that Whitaker’s actions prevented Becker from obtaining a valid independent medical 
examination, it is clear that the court viewed this concern as an aggravating circumstance on top 
of and in addition to Whitaker’s misleading violation of the court’s order.  We think an 
experienced trial judge could easily conclude that a surgery to remove a disc and fuse two 
vertebrae together would generate evidentiary problems for a defendant trying to prove that the 
plaintiff’s need for surgery really resulted from a preexisting condition—a degenerative disc 
disease. 
Finally, it is little answer to say, as Whitaker does, that his dishonest act of saying in 
writing that no surgery was in the offing precisely at the moment surgery preparation was 
occurring should be discounted by his having told Becker’s insurance company’s claims 
representative seven months earlier that surgery was recommended but not yet planned. 
                                                                                                                                                             
essentially gave Whitaker one last chance before opening the door to all manner of unpleasant sanctions 
under Indiana Trial Rule 37(B). 
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Conclusion 
Magistrate Bobay and Judge Felts acted within the range of their discretion in making it 
clear to counsel that this type of behavior is unacceptable.  We affirm the trial court. 
Dickson and David, JJ., concur. 
Sullivan, J., dissents, believing the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals in this case to 
have been correct. 
Rucker, J., dissents.