Title: State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. SCHNEIDER v. KREINER. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Public records — Exemptions — R.C. 2317.023(B) — Disclosure of mediation 
communication — Mandamus to compel Hamilton County Municipal Court 
Private Complaint Mediation Service Director to provide relator access to 
“Preliminary Complaint Form” used by mediator during mediation 
between relator and his ex-wife — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 97-1331 — Submitted May 26, 1998 — Decided September 23, 1998.) 
IN MANDAMUS 
 
In 1988, relator, Tom Schneider (“Schneider”), married Theresa Schneider.  
They had two children.  In 1994, the Schneiders divorced and entered into a shared 
parenting agreement.  Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Schneider 
for violating the agreement.  The criminal case was referred to the Private 
Complaint Mediation Service (“Mediation Service”).  The Mediation Service, 
established by the Hamilton County Municipal Court, mediates disputes between 
parties in certain municipal court cases. 
 
During a mediation of this type, the mediator listens to the positions of both 
parties and then asks each party to agree on the issues and to recommend possible 
solutions.  If an agreement is reached, the mediation concludes, but the parties do 
not sign a written agreement.  However, the mediator may suggest that each party 
take notes regarding the requirements of the agreement.  At the conclusion of the 
mediation, a “Statement of Voluntary Settlement” is signed by the parties and filed 
with the court.  In addition, the mediator completes a “Preliminary Complaint 
Form.”  On the form, the mediator describes the allegations made by the plaintiff, 
denotes the relationship between the parties, and compiles information relating to 
the parties and the status of the dispute.  The mediator also describes the 
 
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disposition of the dispute under a section entitled “Hearing Disposition.”  Under 
another section, the mediator states what future action may be taken if the 
agreement is broken and, under a “Comments” section, may make personal 
observations about the mediation and the dispute.  This form is not shown to the 
parties and, unlike the Statement of Voluntary Settlement, is not signed by them. 
 
In December 1996, the Mediation Service mediated the case.  Schneider and 
his former spouse agreed to perform and refrain from performing certain acts in 
exchange for the dismissal of the criminal charges against Schneider.  The parties 
signed the Statement of Voluntary Settlement form indicating their agreement. 
 
Subsequently, Schneider requested access to the entire mediation file from 
respondent, Cathleen Kreiner, director of the Mediation Service.  Included in the 
file was a copy of the complaint form prepared by the mediator.  Kreiner denied 
access to the file.  Kreiner later offered to provide Schneider a copy of the 
Statement of Voluntary Settlement and a disposition report of the mediation 
service, both of which were filed in the office of the clerk of courts. 
 
Schneider then filed a complaint requesting a writ of mandamus to compel 
Kreiner to provide him access to the complaint form.  Schneider also requested 
attorney fees.  This court granted an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the 
presentation of evidence and briefs. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of Schneider’s 
request for oral argument as well as the merits. 
__________________ 
 
Kimpel, Hyland, Weinkam & Goodson, William M. Gustavson and Nicole A. 
Tipton, for relator. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christian J. 
Schaefer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
 
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__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  For the reasons that follow, we deny relator’s request for oral 
argument and his request for a writ of mandamus. 
I 
 
Relator requests oral argument “[i]n the event that the Court finds the 
decisional process would be aided by oral argument  * * *.” 
 
We deny this request because oral argument would not be beneficial to 
resolution of this appeal.  None of the issues raised is so complex that oral 
argument would assist the court in resolution of this cause.  Further, relator has 
neither established nor argued any factors warranting oral argument here.  State ex 
rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 
286, 690 N.E.2d 1273, 1276. 
II 
 
Relator contends that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus under R.C. 
149.43.  We have construed R.C. 149.43 “ ‘to ensure that governmental records be 
open and made available to the public * * * subject to only a few very limited and 
narrow exceptions.’ ”  State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 513, 518, 687 N.E.2d 661, 668, quoting State ex rel. Williams v. 
Cleveland (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 544, 549, 597 N.E.2d 147, 151. 
 
Among those exceptions in effect at the time of relator’s request was former 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(k), 146 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4661, which provided that public 
records do not include “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or 
federal law.”1  Respondent asserts that R.C. 2317.023 exempts the requested 
complaint form from disclosure as a confidential mediation communication.  We 
agree with the respondent. 
 
R.C. 2317.023 provides: 
 
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“(A) As used in this section: 
 
“(1) ‘Mediation’ means a nonbinding process for the resolution of a dispute 
in which both of the following apply: 
 
“(a) A person who is not a party to the dispute serves as mediator to assist 
the parties to the dispute in negotiating contested issues. 
 
“(b) A court, administrative agency, not-for-profit community mediation 
provider, or other public body appoints the mediator or refers the dispute to the 
mediator, or the parties, engage the mediator. 
 
“(2) ‘Mediation communication’ means a communication made in the 
course of and relating to the subject matter of a mediation. 
 
“(B) A mediation communication is confidential.  Except as provided in 
division (C) of this section, no person shall disclose a mediation communication in 
a civil proceeding or in an administrative proceeding.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Pursuant to the statute, the initial question is whether the complaint form 
sought by Schneider is a “mediation communication” as defined by the statute.  
R.C. 2317.023(A)(2) defines a mediation communication as “a communication 
made in the course of and relating to the subject matter of the mediation.”  The 
document sought here is a complaint form completed by the mediator.  The 
mediator, in completing the form, describes information relating to the parties and 
the nature of the dispute.  Significantly, the mediator also describes the disposition 
of the dispute under a section entitled “Hearing Disposition,” and may make 
personal observations about the dispute under a separate section. 
 
Under the statutory definition, it is clear that this form is a mediation 
communication.  It is made in the course of the mediation by the mediator.  The 
mediator compiles information on the form and then describes the outcome.  The 
form is also related to the subject matter of the mediation.  The form contains 
 
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information about the dispute between the parties.  It also reflects the thoughts and 
impressions of the mediator as to the outcome of the mediation, whether and what 
action shall be taken in the event of breach of the agreement, and the mediator’s 
own observations about the mediation. 
 
R.C. 2317.023(B) states that “[a] mediation communication is confidential.”  
The words of this statute are clear.  Mediation communications are confidential 
and may not be disclosed.  “[A]n unambiguous statute means what it says.”  
Hakim v. Kosydar (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 161, 164, 3 O.O.3d 211, 213, 359 N.E.2d 
1371, 1373.  We give words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning unless 
otherwise defined.  Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 
120, 122, 18 OBR 151, 152, 480 N.E.2d 412, 414.  Accordingly, having 
determined that the document sought by relator is a mediation communication, we 
are compelled by the words of the statute to conclude that the form is confidential 
and may not be disclosed, unless one of the exceptions enumerated in R.C. 
2317.023(C) applies to the relator’s cause. 
 
Relator contends that the confidentiality requirement of R.C. 2317.023(B) 
does not apply because R.C. 2317.023(C)(1) and (4) preclude the application of 
R.C. 2317.023(B).  We disagree. 
 
R.C. 2317.023(C) provides: 
 
“Division (B) of this section does not apply in the following circumstances: 
 
“(1)  * * * [T]o the disclosure by any person of a mediation communication 
made by a mediator if all parties to the mediation and the mediator consent to the 
disclosure; 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(4)  To the disclosure of a mediation communication if a court, after a 
hearing, determines that the disclosure does not circumvent Evidence Rule 408, 
 
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that the disclosure is necessary in the particular case to prevent a manifest 
injustice, and that the necessity for disclosure is of sufficient magnitude to 
outweigh the importance of protecting the general requirement of confidentiality 
in mediation proceedings.” 
 
R.C. 2317.023(C)(1) does not prevent the application of R.C. 2317.023(B) 
to this cause.  There is no evidence that either relator’s former spouse or the 
mediator has consented to disclosure of the complaint form. 
 
Similarly, R.C. 2317.023(C)(4) does not apply to allow disclosure of the 
complaint form compiled by the mediator.  The plain language of R.C. 
2317.023(C)(4) requires a hearing to determine whether this exception to 
confidentiality is applicable.  The presence of a hearing requirement presupposes 
that the parties will argue the applicability of the exception at a hearing conducted 
solely for that purpose.  There has been no such hearing or request for such a 
hearing in this cause. 
 
Even applying the substantive provisions of this provision, the relator’s 
arguments lack merit.  Disclosure of the complaint form compiled by the mediator 
is not necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, nor is the necessity for disclosure 
of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of protecting the general 
requirement of confidentiality.  Relator’s sole assertion for requesting the 
document is that he may face potential criminal charges if he does not comply with 
the agreement reached in mediation.  However, the mere possibility that the relator 
may be involved in future litigation cannot possibly establish the presence of a 
manifest injustice, as required by the statutory exception.  Such a conclusion does 
not comport with the common meaning of “manifest injustice,” which is defined as 
a clear or openly unjust act.  See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
 
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(1986) 1164, 1375.  The plain meaning of the words of the statute requires more 
than a possibility of future litigation. 
 
Likewise, the possibility of future litigation does not create a necessity for 
disclosure of a magnitude sufficient to outweigh the general requirement of 
confidentiality.  Every agreement in mediation may be breached.  Such a breach 
could result in future litigation.  However, this possibility cannot outweigh the 
plain words of R.C. 2317.023(B), which establish a requirement of confidentiality.  
By those words, the General Assembly has determined that confidentiality is a 
means to encourage the use of mediation and frankness within mediation sessions.  
Were we to agree with the relator’s argument, we would severely undermine that 
determination by the General Assembly, as reflected in the clear words of the 
statute.  Accordingly, R.C. 2317.023(C)(4) does not apply to relator’s request. 
 
Finally, relator asserts that R.C. 2317.023(B) does not apply to this cause 
because the statute was not effective at the time that the record was created, i.e., 
when the mediation session occurred.  R.C. 2317.023 became effective on January 
27, 1997, which was after the record was created but before relator requested the 
form and filed this mandamus action.  146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4033. 
 
This contention also is meritless.  R.C. 2317.023 was effective at the time of 
the request for the form.  The date the form was created is not relevant for the 
purposes of R.C. 149.43.  “Since the statute merely deals with record disclosure, 
not record keeping, only a prospective duty is imposed upon those maintaining 
public records.”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Univ. of Akron 
(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 392, 396, 18 O.O.3d 534, 537, 415 N.E.2d 310, 313. 
 
Accordingly, there is no authority to overcome the confidentiality 
requirement of R.C. 2317.023(B).  The complaint form sought by the relator is a 
mediation communication which is not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43 
 
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because R.C. 2317.023(B) clearly provides for its confidentiality.  Therefore, we 
deny the relator’s request for a writ of mandamus, and his request for attorney fees 
is also denied. 
Writ denied. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
This provision is now R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p).  R.C. 149.43 now provides a 
specific exemption for “[r]ecords containing information that is confidential under 
section 2317.023 or 4112.05 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(i).