Title: R.W. Docks & Slips v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2904 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
R.W. Docks & Slips,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin and Wisconsin  
Department of Natural Resources,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 183 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 182, 617 N.W.2d 519 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 28, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Bayfield 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gallagher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Jason W. Whitley and Novitzke, Gust & Sempf, Amery, and 
oral argument by Jason W. Whitley. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was 
argued by JoAnne F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 73 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2904 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
R.W. Docks & Slips,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and Wisconsin  
Department of Natural Resources,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case pits a small emergent 
weedbed 
along 
the 
shores 
of 
Lake 
Superior 
in 
Bayfield, 
Wisconsin, against the developer of a private marina on those 
same shores.  The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
sided with the weedbed, and denied the developer a dredging 
permit needed to complete the final phase of the marina 
development.  The case has an ironic twist: the small emergent 
weedbed would not have "emerged" at all were it not for the 
calming effect of a breakwater the developer had built in the 
early stages of the project.  The presence of the emergent 
weedbed prompted the DNR to block the developer's construction 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
2 
of the last set of boat slips in the marina, 71 out of a total 
of 272 slips. 
¶2 So the developer took the DNR to court, alleging a 
regulatory taking without just compensation.  The case was 
dismissed on summary judgment, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that because the developer retained the 
benefit of all or substantially all of its property——including 
over 
200 
boat 
slips 
and 
various 
recreational 
facilities 
associated with the marina onshore——the denial of a permit for 
the construction of the remaining boat slips was not an 
unconstitutional taking. 
 ¶3 We affirm.  As takings law has evolved, there is no 
compensable categorical taking unless the regulatory action in 
question 
deprives 
a 
property 
owner 
of 
all 
economically 
beneficial use of his property.  We do not perform the analysis 
piecemeal, but, rather, consider the property as a whole in 
order to determine the extent of the deprivation.  Because the 
denial of the dredging permit did not deny the marina developer 
all economically beneficial use of its property, there was no 
categorical regulatory taking. 
¶4  Further, and again considering the property as a whole, 
the regulatory action in this case at most affected only the 
developer's riparian right of reasonable access to the lake, 
which is subordinate to the public trust doctrine. Therefore, 
the DNR's action did not so severely impact or interfere with 
the 
developer's 
reasonable 
investment 
expectations 
as 
to 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
3 
constitute an unconstitutional taking under traditional, ad hoc 
takings analysis. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  R.W. Docks, a 
general partnership in the business of developing marinas, is 
the riparian owner of 1100 feet of frontage along Lake Superior 
in Bayfield, Wisconsin.  In 1969, Docks began building a marina, 
called Port Superior, on this lake frontage land.  At the 
outset, Docks sought and obtained permits from the DNR and the 
Army Corps of Engineers to construct a breakwater and boat 
harbor in connection with the marina development. 
¶6 The marina was then built in stages.  The initial phases 
of the project consisted of the breakwater, several docks 
eventually containing 201 boat slips, a sea wall, a lagoon, a 
solid pile quay structure placed on the lakebed, a port, 
racquetball club, tennis court, and supporting infrastructure.  
Throughout the gradual development of the marina, Docks sought 
and received the necessary permits from the DNR, including 
dredging permits pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.20.   
¶7 
In 1977, Docks converted the marina into condominiums. 
 The 201 condominium boat slips, each of which included an 
undivided interest in the common areas of the marina facilities, 
were developed and sold before Docks obtained the necessary 
permits to complete construction of the final 71 boat slips at 
the marina.   
¶8 
In 1983, Docks applied to the DNR for a permit to 
dredge 20,000 cubic yards of material from the lakebed, a 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
4 
necessary prerequisite to the completion of the remaining 71 
boat slips.  The DNR, after expressing concern over the 
environmental impact of the dredging, divided the application in 
two, the first to remove 5,000 cubic yards, and the second to 
remove 15,000 cubic yards of lakebed material.  The DNR then 
granted the first dredging permit.  In 1986, the DNR denied the 
second, larger dredging permit, and without the permit, the 
final 71 boat slips could not be built.   
¶9 
The permit was denied primarily because a small 
emergent weedbed had developed near the shore within the marina 
as a result of the sheltering effect of the breakwater that 
Docks had built.  Weedbeds, evidently, are good for many things, 
including the proliferation of game fish, forage fish and 
associated macroinvertebrates and zooplankton, and so the DNR 
acted 
to 
protect 
this 
environmentally 
sensitive 
natural 
resource. 
¶10 After exhausting available administrative appeals and 
judicial review of the DNR's action, Docks sued the DNR in 
circuit court alleging an unconstitutional taking of its 
property without just compensation.  The Bayfield County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Thomas J. Gallagher, granted the DNR's 
motion for summary judgment, concluding that: (1) Docks did not 
have a recognizable property interest in the 71 undeveloped boat 
slips; (2) even if Docks had a recognizable property interest in 
the 71 undeveloped boat slips, there was no unconstitutional 
taking because its riparian right to construct structures on the 
bed of Lake Superior was subject to the public trust doctrine; 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
5 
and (3) there was no unconstitutional taking because Docks 
retained considerable practical use of the property.     
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed only the last conclusion 
of the circuit court, refraining from addressing the alternate 
arguments.  The court of appeals agreed that the denial of the 
final dredging permit did not constitute a regulatory taking 
because Docks maintained the benefit and use of all or 
substantially all of its marina property.  Furthermore, the 
court concluded that Docks assumed the risk inherent in 
commencing the project without all necessary permits, and 
therefore any economic loss it suffered as a result of the 
inability to build the last 71 slips could not be transferred to 
the State on a regulatory takings theory.  We accepted review.   
 
 
 
 
 
II 
¶12 We review a circuit court's decision granting or 
denying a motion for summary judgment independently, using the 
same methodology as the circuit court.  Wisconsin Dep't of 
Corrections v. Kliesmet, 211 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 564 N.W.2d 742 
(1997); Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  "[S]ummary judgment is proper 
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis. 2d 218, 224, 522 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. 
App. 1994).   
¶13 The issue in this case is whether the DNR's denial of 
the final dredging permit constituted a regulatory taking of 
Docks' property without just compensation.  This is also a 
question of law that we review without deference to the lower 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
6 
courts.  Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 548 
N.W.2d 528 (1996).  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides that private property shall not "be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."  Article I, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[t]he 
property of no person shall be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor."  We have stated that: 
 
Takings jurisprudence has developed from two 
competing principles: on one hand, respect for the 
property 
rights 
of 
individuals; 
on 
the 
other, 
recognition that the government retains the ability, 
in furtherance of the interests of all citizens, to 
regulate an owner's potential uses of land.  Thus, in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 
114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the United States Supreme 
Court held municipal zoning to be a permissible 
exercise of the police power, while in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 
159-60, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), the Court held that 
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking."  Such takings are described as "constructive" 
or "regulatory" takings.  
Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 373.   
¶14 "A 'taking' need not arise from an actual physical 
occupation of land by the government."  Eberle v. Dane County 
Bd. of Adjust., 227 Wis. 2d 609, 621, 595 N.W.2d 739 (1999).  If 
a regulatory restriction or action of the government deprives a 
property owner of all economically beneficial use of his 
property, there has been a categorical regulatory taking subject 
to compensation.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 374-75. 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
7 
¶15 In determining whether a regulatory restriction "goes 
too far" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, the United States 
Supreme Court has generally "eschewed any 'set formula' for 
determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engag[e] 
in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."  Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1015 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 373.  However, 
the Supreme Court has recognized "at least two discrete 
categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of 
the restraint." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.  The first includes 
regulatory actions that bring about some form of physical 
"invasion" 
of 
private 
property. 
Id. 
The 
second 
includes 
regulatory actions that deny "all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land."  Id. We have in Wisconsin interpreted 
this latter category to include regulatory actions that "deny 
the landowner all or substantially all practical uses of a 
property."  Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d 622; Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 374.  
¶16 The DNR's denial of the dredge permit in this case did 
not bring about a physical invasion of private property.  Nor 
did it deny Docks all economically beneficial or productive use 
of its property, or substantially all practical use of its 
property, inasmuch as it retained the economic benefit and use 
of the 201 boat slips and related recreational facilities at the 
marina.  Accordingly, there has been no categorical regulatory 
taking under Lucas and Zealy.   
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
8 
¶17 We 
are 
left, 
then, 
with 
the 
ad 
hoc 
factual, 
traditional takings inquiry of Penn Central and Zealy.  This 
involves an analysis of the nature and character of the 
governmental action, the severity of the economic impact of the 
regulation on the property owner, and the degree to which the 
regulation has interfered with the property owner's distinct 
investment-backed expectations in the property.  Zealy, 201 Wis. 
2d at 374 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).   
¶18 But first there is a threshold question, and that is 
the nature and extent of the private property interest at stake 
here.  This case involves riparian rights, which are subject to 
and limited by the public trust doctrine.  The State argues that 
the bed and waters of Lake Superior belong to the public, not 
Docks, and so no taking of private property occurred.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has stated that:  
 
[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the 
right to exclude others.  That is "one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property."  Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 
L.Ed.2d 332 (1979).  That is why the right that we all 
possess to use the public lands is not the "property" 
right of anyone——hence the sardonic maxim, explaining 
what economists call the "tragedy of the commons," res 
publica, res nullius. 
 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999).  If Docks had no private property 
right to place boat slips on the lakebed at the marina, it 
cannot have suffered an unconstitutional taking.   
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
9 
¶19 The public trust doctrine originated in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 and the Wisconsin Constitution, Article IX, 
Section 1.1  See Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 820, 
580 N.W.2d 628 (1998).  The state holds title to the beds of 
lakes, ponds, and rivers as follows: 
"The title to the beds of all lakes and ponds, and of 
rivers navigable in fact as well, up to the line of 
ordinary high-water mark, within the boundaries of the 
state, became vested in [the state] at the instant of 
its admission into the Union, in trust to hold the 
same so as to preserve to the people forever the 
enjoyment of the waters of such lakes, ponds, and 
rivers, to the same extent that the public are 
entitled to enjoy tidal waters at the common law." 
State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987) 
(quoting Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 425, 84 N.W. 
855 (1901)).  This includes the beds of the Great Lakes as well 
as lesser inland waters. Id.  Public ownership of the bed of a 
lake applies whether the water is deep or shallow, and extends 
to areas covered with aquatic vegetation within the ordinary 
                     
1 Wisconsin Const. art.  IX, § 1 states: 
Jurisdiction 
on 
rivers 
and 
lakes; 
navigable 
waters.  The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction 
on all rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far 
as such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary 
to the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways 
and 
forever 
free, 
as 
well 
as 
to 
the 
inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the 
United States, without any tax, impost or duty 
therefor. 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
10
high water mark of the body of water in question.2  Id. at 103-
04.  Although the public trust doctrine originally existed to 
protect 
commercial 
navigation, 
it 
has 
been 
expansively 
interpreted to safeguard the public's use of navigable waters 
for purely recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, 
fishing, hunting, recreation, and to preserve scenic beauty.  
See State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 457, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983); 
see also Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d at 820.   
¶20 The 
legislature 
administers 
the 
trust 
for 
the 
protection of the public's rights, and it may use the power of 
regulation to effectuate the intent of the trust.  Id. at 498.  
In this regard, as applicable here, the legislature has declared 
it to be unlawful to place a structure on the bed of a navigable 
waterway unless a permit has been granted by the DNR, or unless 
the structure is otherwise authorized by statute.3  See Wis. 
Stats. §§ 30.12, 30.13;  Cassidy v. DNR, 132 Wis. 2d 153, 158, 
390 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1986).  Further, the legislature has 
                     
 
2 The high water mark is:  "[T]he point on the bank or shore 
up to which the presence and action of the water is so 
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, 
destruction 
of 
terrestrial 
vegetation, 
or 
other 
easily 
recognized characteristic."  State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 
102, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987) (citing Lawrence v. American W.P. 
Co., 144 Wis. 556, 562, 128 N.W. 440 (1911)).  
3 A "structure" for these purposes has been defined as 
"something constructed or built . . . something made up of more 
or less interdependent elements or parts."  State v. Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d 454, 463, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983).   
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
11
prohibited the removal of material from the bed of a navigable 
waterway without a permit.  Wis. Stat. § 30.20.    
¶21 However, subject to the requirements of the public 
trust doctrine, "Wisconsin has . . . recognized the existence of 
certain common law rights that are incidents of riparian 
ownership of property adjacent to a body of water."  Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d at 466.  These include: 
 
[t]he right to reasonable use of the waters for 
domestic, agricultural and recreational purposes; the 
right to use the shoreline and have access to the 
waters; the right to any lands formed by accretion or 
reliction; the right to have water flow to the land 
without artificial obstruction; the limited right to 
intrude onto the lakebed to construct devices for 
protection 
from 
erosion; 
and 
the 
right, 
now 
conditioned by statute, to construct a pier or similar 
structure in aid of navigation. 
Cassidy v. DNR, 132 Wis. 2d at 159 (footnotes omitted).   
¶22 The rights of riparian owners, however, are qualified, 
subordinate, and subject to the paramount interest of the state 
and the paramount rights of the public in navigable waters. 
Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 467-68.  The common law only requires that 
riparian 
owners 
be 
allowed 
reasonable 
access 
and 
use. 
Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 731, 
556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996).  
 
[E]very . . . right which a riparian owner acquires, 
as such, to the waters...by his land, is restricted 
always to that which is a ...reasonable use, and these 
terms are to be measured and determined by the extent 
and capacity of the [lake], the uses to which it has 
been put, and the rights that other riparian owners on 
the same [lake] also have. 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
12
Id. (citing Apfelbacher v. State, 167 Wis. 233, 239, 167 N.W. 
244, 245 (1918); State v. Zawistowski, 95 Wis. 2d 250, 261-62, 
290 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1980)). 
 
¶23 The public trust doctrine as an encumbrance on riparian 
rights is established "by judicial authority so long acquiesced 
in as to become a rule of property."  Franzini v. Layland, 120 
Wis. 72, 81, 97 N.W. 499 (1903).  It is part of the organic law 
of the state, and is to be broadly and beneficially construed.  
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271-72, 145 N.W. 
816 (1914). 
¶24 The DNR's denial of the dredging permit affected only 
Docks' ability to construct the final 71 boat slips on the bed 
and in the waters of Lake Superior, and, as such, implicated 
only Docks' riparian rights, which are subject to the public 
trust doctrine.  Assuming that riparian rights, subordinate as 
they are to the rights of the public, are included in the 
"bundle of rights" recognized as private property for purposes 
of Fifth Amendment takings analysis, Docks has failed to 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
13
demonstrate a compensable regulatory taking under Penn Central 
and Zealy.4 
¶25 In Zealy, we noted that the United States Supreme Court 
has not endorsed an analysis that subdivides a contiguous 
property for purposes of determining whether a compensable 
taking has occurred.  Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 375-76.   
 
[R]ather, the Court has consistently held that a 
landowner's 
property 
in 
such 
a 
case 
should 
be 
considered as a whole. 
 
"'Taking'" jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to 
determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have 
been 
entirely 
abrogated.  In 
deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has 
                     
4 Docks claimed at oral argument that United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) supported 
its position that it had a property right for Fifth Amendment 
purposes in the 71 additional boat slips. The riparian property 
owner in Chandler-Dunbar claimed a right to construct in the 
river and upon its land such structures as were necessary to 
control and use the current of the river for commercial 
purposes, provided only that such structures not impede or 
hinder navigation.  As the Court noted, under state law, the 
owner of riparian land carried title all the way to the middle 
thread of the riverbed.  However, the Court found this title to 
 be qualified at best, subordinate to the public right of 
navigation.  The Court stated that the riparian owner had the 
"right of access to deep water, and when not forbidden by public 
law may construct for this purpose, wharves, docks, and piers in 
the shallow water of the shore.  But every such structure in the 
water of a navigable river is subordinate to the right of 
navigation, and subject to the obligation to suffer the 
consequences of the improvement of navigation, and must be 
removed if Congress, in the assertion of its power over 
navigation, 
shall 
determine 
that 
their 
continuance 
is 
detrimental to the public interest in the navigation of the 
river"  Id. at 70.  Thus, Docks' reliance on this case is 
misplaced.  Chandler-Dunbar actually stands for the proposition 
riparian rights are subject to the public's superior rights.     
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
14
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action and on the nature 
and extent of the interference with rights in the 
parcel as a whole . . . . 
 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, 98 S.Ct. at 2662-63. 
 Similarly, in Keystone [Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis], 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. at 1248-49, 
the Court noted practical arguments against allowing 
the segmentation of the property at issue: 
 
"Many zoning ordinances place limits on the 
property owner's right to make profitable use of 
some segments of his property.  A requirement 
that a building occupy no more than a specified 
percentage of the lot on which it is located 
could be characterized as a taking of the vacant 
area.... [O]ne could always argue that a setback 
ordinance requiring that no structure be built 
within a certain distance from the property line 
constitutes 
a 
taking 
because 
the 
footage 
represents a distinct segment of property for 
takings law purposes." 
Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 376. 
¶26 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its opposition to 
subdividing property for purposes of takings analysis: 
 
[W]e 
rejected 
this 
analysis 
years 
ago 
in 
Penn 
Central . . . where we held that a claimant's parcel 
of property could not first be divided into what was 
taken 
and 
what 
was 
left 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete 
and hence compensable.  To the extent that any portion 
of property is taken, that portion is always taken in 
its entirety; the relevant question, however, is 
whether the property taken is all, or only a portion 
of, the parcel in question. 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602, 642-44 (1993). 
¶27 Accordingly, we evaluate the character of the DNR's 
action, its economic impact and the degree to which it 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
15
interfered with Docks' investment-backed expectations in light 
of the marina as a whole rather than the parcel that was to have 
contained the 71 boat slips.5  And we do so recognizing that at 
most, only riparian rights of reasonable access and use, subject 
to the public trust doctrine, are implicated here. 
¶28 The DNR acted primarily to protect an emergent weedbed 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
public, 
and 
secondarily, 
to 
prevent 
interference with the rights of neighboring riparian owners.  
Reasonable 
minds 
can 
differ 
about 
whether 
governmental 
protection of weedbeds is of such a character as to outweigh 
private property interests.  But the state, not Docks, holds 
title to the lakebed, and therefore, to the extent that a 
private property interest is implicated here, it is riparian 
only and therefore qualified in nature, encumbered by the public 
trust doctrine.  We have "jealously guarded the navigable waters 
of this state and the rights of the public to use and enjoy 
them." Delta Fish and Fur Farms v. Pierce, 203 Wis. 519, 523, 
234 N.W. 881 (1931).  The character of the governmental action 
in this case, therefore, weighs against a finding that Docks has 
suffered a compensable regulatory taking.     
                     
5 Docks invites us to follow the lead of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and 
adopt "a flexible approach, designed to account for factual 
nuances" in determining whether to consider the property as a 
whole or only that portion affected by the regulatory action in 
question.  We declined to do so in Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 
201 Wis. 2d 365, 378, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996), and also decline to 
do so here, where the private property right asserted is so 
limited.   
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
16
¶29 Similarly, our evaluation of the severity of the 
economic impact of the DNR's action, and the extent to which it 
interfered 
with 
Docks' 
investment-backed 
expectations, 
is 
strongly influenced by the fact that the development of this 
private marina on the bed and waters of Lake Superior was 
encumbered by the public trust doctrine and heavily regulated 
from the get-go.  A riparian owner may apply to the DNR for a 
permit to remove material from or erect a structure on the bed 
of a navigable waterway in order to facilitate reasonable access 
and use.  But the riparian owner does not have a right to the 
issuance of a permit if it is detrimental to the public 
interest.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12, 30.13 and 30.20. 
¶30 Docks alleges that the revenue from the sale of the 
201 existing boat slips was insufficient to cover the cost of 
developing the marina and that it has to date lost in excess of 
$1 million.  It claims that the final 71 boat slips would have a 
combined value of approximately $1.5 million, enough to cover 
its losses and make a small profit.  But the fact that the 
marina development has thus far yielded a loss does not make out 
a takings case, and Docks never possessed an unfettered "right" 
to a particular number of boat slips in the first place.  Under 
the circumstances of this case, the DNR's action cannot be said 
to have "gone too far" to cause the sort of negative economic 
impact or substantial interference with investment expectations 
as to amount to a regulatory taking.  
  ¶31 In any event, the DNR's denial of the final dredging 
permit has not interfered with Docks' present economic use of 
No. 
99-2904 
 
 
17
its property, considered as a whole.  It has a 201-slip marina, 
and associated recreational facilities, and may have other means 
of recouping its losses.  It is true that Docks' plans for a 
larger marina have been frustrated, but those plans were 
encumbered by the public trust doctrine and contingent upon the 
periodic issuance of DNR permits from the beginning.  See 
Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (rejecting takings claim where 
claimant "had long been subject to federal regulation, and 
'[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if 
the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to 
achieve the legislative end'"). 
¶32 Accordingly, we conclude that the DNR's denial of the 
final dredging permit did not deny Docks all economically 
beneficial use of its property, or substantially all practical 
use of its property, and as such, did not constitute a 
categorical regulatory taking.  In addition, because the DNR's 
action affected only riparian rights, subordinate to the public 
trust doctrine, and affected only a small portion of the marina 
development as a whole, it cannot be said to have resulted in 
the sort of severe economic impact or interference with distinct 
investment-backed expectations as to constitute a regulatory 
taking under traditional, ad hoc takings analysis. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.