Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JAMAL S ALLEN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 30, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119427  
JAMAL S. ALLEN  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree  
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316. The mandatory sentence of  
life imprisonment was imposed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed  
the defendant’s conviction and sentence.  We do likewise,  
rejecting 
the 
defendant’s claim that the trial court committed  
a structural constitutional error when, after instructing the  
jury that it must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable  
doubt, it failed to give a further instruction defining  
reasonable doubt.  For the reasons explained below, we hold  
that the concept of reasonable doubt is within the common  
 
 
understanding of jurors.  It is sufficient that a jury is  
instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in  
order to convict a defendant.  A court’s failure to define the  
phrase “reasonable doubt” is not a plain error requiring  
reversal of a defendant’s conviction.  
I  
Mary Morgan died from strangulation and blunt force head  
injury.  The defendant was charged with first-degree murder in  
connection with Ms. Morgan’s death.  At the jury trial on that  
charge, witnesses testified that Ms. Morgan sought refuge in  
the witnesses’ home, but that the defendant followed Morgan  
into the home.  There, the defendant hit Ms. Morgan. 
She  
fought back.  The witnesses said they forced Ms. Morgan out of  
the home, whereupon defendant pursued her.  What occurred  
after that was a matter of some dispute at the trial.  Police,  
who had been called, found Ms. Morgan on a nearby street lying  
on her back. She had no vital signs.  
The prosecutor contended that the defendant followed Ms.  
Morgan, continued to beat her, and then strangled her.  
Although the defendant admitted in his testimony that he hit  
Ms. Morgan while in the witnesses’ home, he denied that he  
strangled her after leaving there. 
Additionally, the  
defendant interposed an intoxication defense.  
Trial was held in the Wayne Circuit Court.  At the  
conclusion of proofs, the jury was instructed as follows  
2  
regarding the prosecutor’s burden of proof:  
[E]very crime is made up of parts called  
elements. The prosecution must prove each element 
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The defendant is not required to prove his  
innocence or to do anything. 
If you find the 
prosecution has not proven every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty.1  
The defendant did not object, nor did he request that further  
instruction defining reasonable doubt be given.  
The jury was instructed on first-degree murder and  
second-degree murder. Additionally, the jury was instructed  
on the defense of intoxication. The jury returned a verdict  
of guilty of first-degree murder.  The court then imposed the  
mandatory term of life in prison.  
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which  
issued a divided unpublished per curiam opinion affirming the  
conviction.  The majority stated the trial judge was not  
required 
to 
define 
the phrase reasonable doubt.  Additionally,  
the jury had been repeatedly told that to convict the  
1 Preliminary instructions that were given to the jury 
were accurate:  
During arguments of counsel you will hear a 
great deal about reasonable doubt.  A reasonable  
doubt is exactly what it infers.  A reasonable  
doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the 
evidence or lack of evidence in this case; or 
growing out of any reasonable or legitimate 
inferences drawn from the evidence or lack of  
evidence.  It is not merely an imaginary doubt or a 
flimsy, fanciful doubt.  But, rather, it is a fair, 
honest doubt based upon reason and common sense.  
3  
 
 
defendant required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The  
dissenting judge opined that the failure to provide any  
definition of reasonable doubt was a clear error that required  
reversal.  
II  
Defendant asks us to review a claim of error that he did  
not preserve at trial.  We thus apply the principles  
articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d  
130 (1999):  
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error 
rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must 
have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear 
or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected  
substantial 
rights. 
The 
third 
requirement 
generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., 
that the error affected the outcome of the lower  
court proceedings.  It is the defendant rather than  
the government who bears the burden of persuasion 
with respect to prejudice. . . . Reversal is 
warranted only when the plain, forfeited error 
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent 
defendant or when an error seriously affected the 
fairness, 
integrity 
or 
public 
reputation 
of  
judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s 
innocence. [Citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted.]  
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude defendant has not  
demonstrated that a plain error occurred.  
The right to a jury trial in a criminal felony  
prosecution is fundamental. Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145,  
149; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968).  The fundamental  
nature of the right to a jury trial is reflected in both the  
federal and state constitutions.  US Const, Am VI; Const 1963,  
4  
  
  
 
art 1, § 20. Interrelated with the right to a jury trial is  
the requirement that the prosecutor prove guilt beyond a  
reasonable doubt.  Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 279; 113  
S Ct 2078; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993).  The requirement of burden  
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is important because it  
ensures a reliable determination of guilt.  In Sullivan, an  
erroneous definition of reasonable doubt was held to  
constitute a “structural” error in the trial.2  A structural  
error 
necessarily 
renders 
unfair 
or 
unreliable 
the  
determination of guilt or innocence and defies harmless error  
analysis. 
People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 50; 610 NW2d 551  
(2000).  An erroneous definition of reasonable doubt in a jury  
instruction violates the jury trial guarantee.  Sullivan,  
supra.
 A decision rendered on the basis of an erroneous  
definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a true  
“verdict” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee  
of a jury trial. Id.  
III  
That a constitutionally defective reasonable doubt  
instruction violates the constitutional guarantee of a jury  
trial does not necessarily imply that a failure to define  
2 In Sullivan, the instructions included a definition of  
reasonable doubt as a “grave uncertainty” and “moral  
certainty.” State v Sullivan, 596 So 2d 177, 186, n 3 (La, 
1992). Such instructions were found to be erroneous in Cage  
v Louisiana, 498 US 39; 111 S Ct 328; 112 L Ed 2d 339 (1990).  
5  
 
 
reasonable doubt at all constitutes such a violation.3  For  
well over a century, this Court has recognized that  
“reasonable doubt” is not an arcane phrase beyond the  
comprehension of jurors.  Hamilton v People, 29 Mich 173  
(1874), People v Cox, 70 Mich 247; 38 NW 235 (1888), People v  
Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886), and People v  
Trudell, 220 Mich 166, 172; 189 NW 910 (1922).  
In Hamilton at 194, this Court stated:  
If a jury cannot understand their duty when  
told they must not convict when they have a 
reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt, or of any 
fact essential to prove it, they can very seldom 
get any help from such subtleties as require a 
trained mind to distinguish.  Jurors are presumed  
to have common sense, and to understand common  
English.  But they are not presumed to have 
professional, or any high degree of technical or 
linguistic training.  
In Stubenvoll at 334, this Court said:  
We do not think that the phrase “reasonable 
doubt” is of such unknown or uncommon signification 
that an exposition by a trial judge is called for. 
Language that is within the comprehension of  
persons of ordinary intelligence can seldom be made 
plainer by further definition or refining.  All  
persons who possess the qualifications of jurors 
know that a “doubt” is a fluctuation or uncertainty 
of mind arising from defect of knowledge or of 
evidence, and that a doubt of the guilt of the 
accused, honestly entertained, is a “reasonable 
doubt.”  
3 As Justice Rehnquist noted in a concurring opinion in 
Sullivan, “[a] trial in which a deficient reasonable-doubt 
instruction is given seems to me to be quite different from 
one in which no reasonable-doubt instruction is given at all.” 
Sullivan, 508 US 284.  
6  
Therefore, giving an affirmatively misleading definition  
differs substantially from merely declining to elaborate on  
the meaning of a commonly understand phrase.  If a trial court  
gives a deficient definition of reasonable doubt, it cannot be  
presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond a  
reasonable doubt, whereas, if the trial court instructs on the  
need to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without more, it  
can be presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond  
a reasonable doubt.  
Accordingly, 
omitting 
a 
definition 
of 
reasonable 
doubt 
in  
a jury instruction does not violate due process.  Victor v  
Nebraska, 511 US 1, 7; 114 S Ct 1239; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994).4  
The failure to define reasonable doubt is not a structural  
error, or any error for that matter, because it is not  
necessary to define this commonly understood phrase. People  
v Spears, 241 Mich 67, 71; 216 NW 398.  The jury here was  
adequately instructed that the prosecutor had the burden of  
proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime  
with which the defendant was charged.  No structural error  
occurred because defendant was not deprived of a basic  
protection.5  The instructions that were given allowed the  
4 “[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from 
defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a 
matter of course.” Victor, supra at 5.  
5 “It is not a case where the trial judge gave a wrong 
and harmful definition of the term, but where he did not give 
any.” Trudell, supra at 171-172.  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
jury 
to 
determine 
reliably the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  
We hold that a defendant is not entitled to reversal of  
a jury conviction because of the unchallenged omission of a  
definition of “reasonable doubt.” We affirm the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
8  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119427  
JAMAL S. ALLEN  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
I concur with the result in this case, affirming  
defendant’s conviction and sentence and rejecting defendant’s  
claim 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
committed 
a 
structural  
constitutional error when it failed to define reasonable  
doubt. However, I write separately because in reaching this  
result, the majority applies the plain error principle  
articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d  
130 (1999).  
In Carines, I joined Justice Kelly’s partial dissent,  
which 
stated 
that 
“a 
contemporaneous objection to an erroneous  
jury instruction is not required to preserve the issue for  
 
appeal.” 460 Mich 778. Justice Kelly also stated:  
Defendant’s 
conviction 
should 
only 
“be  
affirmed if the reviewing court is satisfied that 
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229 
(1998).
 Given that “erroneous jury instructions 
regarding essential elements [are] reviewed for 
harmless 
error 
by 
utilizing 
a 
‘prejudice’ 
standard,” this Court must assess whether a  
properly instructed jury might have reached a 
different result, had the error not occurred. 
[People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217, 228, 230, 238; 524 
NW2d 217 (1994) (opinion of Brickley, J.).] [Id.]  
I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled  
to reversal of his jury conviction because of the omission of  
a definition of “reasonable doubt” because I do not believe  
that a jury would have found any differently even if the trial  
judge would have defined reasonable doubt. Because I disagree  
with the principle articulated in Carines that is applied  
here, I am unable to join the majority opinion.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
2