Title: Ward v. Delmarva Power & Light Co.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CARLET D. WARD, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 389, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  C.A. No. 7591 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 22, 2012 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: December 17, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of December 2012, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion for affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Carlet Ward, filed this appeal from a decision of the 
Court of Chancery, dated July 5, 2012, which denied her motion for a temporary 
restraining order and dismissed her complaint.  The appellee, Delmarva Power and 
Light Company (DP&L), has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Ward’s opening brief that her appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
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(2) 
Ward filed a complaint against DP&L and the Public Service 
Commission1 in the Court of Chancery on June 4, 2012, seeking a monetary 
judgment of more than $11,000 for alleged overpayments that Ward made to 
DP&L over a six year period.  Ward alleged that DP&L had engaged in fraudulent 
billing practices and that the Public Service Commission (the Commission) had 
denied her due process because of “her race and class” at a hearing that was held 
by the Commission to resolve Ward’s complaints about DP&L’s disputed 
overcharges.  Ward also requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel 
DP&L to restore electrical service to her residence.2 
 
(3) 
The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Ward’s complaint, among 
other reasons, on the ground that Ward had failed to appeal the Commission’s 
decision upholding DP&L’s charges to the Superior Court as required by the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 29 Del. C. ch. 101.3  DP&L also filed a motion to 
dismiss, alleging that no grounds existed for a TRO because the harm alleged 
could be fully remedied by money damages and because Ward alleged no 
irreparable harm and had failed to avail herself of statutory remedies.  DP&L also 
                                                 
1 Ward indicated in her notice of appeal to this Court that she was not taking the appeal against 
the Public Service Commission.   
2 Ward filed the TRO petition seeking to prevent DP&L from cutting off her electrical service.  
Her petition, however, did not set forth any grounds, as required by Court of Chancery Rule 
65(b), for the trial court to issue a TRO without prior notice to DP&L. Ward had failed to 
effectuate service of her petition on DP&L, and thus her petition was not ruled upon by the trial 
court, prior to DP&L shutting off her service. 
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10102(4), 10142(a) (2003). 
 
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moved to dismiss on the ground that the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because the action was untimely, because the Superior Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision, and because an 
adequate remedy at law existed for the relief Ward sought. 
 
(4) 
Following a hearing on July 3, 2012, the Court of Chancery issued a 
ruling from the bench, which denied Ward’s petition for a TRO because she had 
failed to state a colorable claim for relief.  The Court of Chancery further found 
that Ward’s allegation of fraudulent billing had not been pleaded with particularity 
as required by Court of Chancery Rule 9(b).  Having found that the complaint 
failed to state a claim for equitable relief, the Court of Chancery declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over any legal claims because Ward was pursuing a claim for 
money damages in the Court of Common Pleas and because Ward had failed to 
pursue an appeal to the Superior Court from the Commission’s decision denying 
her complaint against DP&L for allegedly overbilling her. 
 
(5) 
After careful consideration of the parties’ respective contentions on 
appeal, we find it manifest that the judgment below should be affirmed for the 
reasons set forth in the Court of Chancery’s bench ruling issued July 3, 2012.  
Ward brought her complaint against DP&L for alleged overbilling to the 
Commission, which held a hearing and ruled that DP&L had properly billed Ward.  
Ward failed to appeal that decision to the Superior Court, which had exclusive 
 
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jurisdiction to review the Commission’s findings and conclusions.4  The 
Commission’s decision that DP&L had properly billed Ward, thus, was a final 
order.  Under these circumstances, the Court of Chancery did not err in denying 
Ward’s motion for a TRO because Ward could not establish that she had a 
colorable claim for relief.5   
 
(6) 
Furthermore, we find no error in the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of 
Ward’s substantive complaint.  While Ward alleged that DP&L had engaged in 
fraudulent billing practices, she failed to set forth any facts supporting that claim 
with particularity, as required by Court of Chancery Rule 9(b).6  Having failed to 
state any claim for equitable relief, the Court of Chancery properly declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over Ward’s legal claim for money damages.7  To the extent 
that Ward contends in her opening brief that the Vice Chancellor had a 
disqualifying conflict of interest in her case, she failed to raise this claim below.  
We will not consider it for the first time on appeal.8  Moreover, she offers no 
                                                 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10102(4), 10142(a) (2003). 
5 The Court of Chancery will issue a TRO only if the plaintiff can establish: (i) a colorable claim; 
(ii) that absent entry of the TRO, plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; and (iii) the harm to 
plaintiff absent entry of the TRO outweighs the harm that entry of the TRO may cause the 
defendant.  See Smart Home, Inc. v. Selway, 2011 WL 3808274 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2011). 
6 See Hauspie v. Stonington Partners, Inc., 945 A.2d 584, 586 (Del. 2008) (setting forth the 
elements of fraud, which must be pled with particularity).  
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 342 (1999). 
8  Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2012). 
 
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factual basis for her allegation that the judge was personally biased against her.  A 
judge’s unfavorable ruling alone does not establish bias.9 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
9 See Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 383, 385 (Del. 1991).