Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 1999-Ohio-330.] 
 
 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FERRERI. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Eighteen-month suspension from practice of law with 
final twelve months stayed — Suspension without pay from position as judge 
of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for six 
months — Making statements to the media on three separate occasions in 
violation of the judicial canons and the Disciplinary Rules. 
(No. 98-2636 — Submitted February 24, 1999 — Decided June 9, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-46. 
 
On September 2, 1997, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed an 
amended complaint charging that respondent, Judge Robert A. Ferreri of the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Attorney 
Registration No. 0000860, made statements to the media on three separate 
occasions in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Disciplinary Rules.  
In his answer, respondent admitted many of the alleged facts but claimed that his 
statements either were taken out of context or did not violate the judicial canons or 
the Disciplinary Rules. 
 
The matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”), which received 
stipulations of the parties, videotapes of interviews with the respondent, articles 
published in various newspapers, and two days of testimony from reporters, 
respondent, and other witnesses.  Both parties fully briefed the issues involved. 
 
As to count one of the amended complaint, the panel found that in 
November 1996, respondent granted an interview to a television news reporter 
after the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a custody 
 
 
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decision rendered by respondent in In re Hitchcock (1996), 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 
696 N.E.2d 1090 (“Hitchcock”).  In the interview, which was taped at respondent’s 
home, respondent made several false statements about certain of the Hitchcock 
parties, including an erroneous accusation that one of them had filed for 
bankruptcy, and “stuck people — thousand dollars [sic] for court reporters fees.”  
In the same interview respondent stated that the court of appeals’ decision was 
“purely political,” and that the court of appeals’ decision was both made and 
written by a law clerk who “made a value judgment that was based in error and on 
law that doesn’t exist.”  Without any personal knowledge of the activity at the 
court of appeals, respondent told the television interviewer that “volumes of data 
[were sent] to the court of appeals which obviously went unread.”  In the same 
interview respondent falsely stated that the judges of the court of appeals were 
influenced by the wife of one of the appellants’ attorneys and that the attorney’s 
wife was also a clerk to one of the judges on that court. 
 
The panel found that although the interview tape ultimately broadcast on a 
local television station did not contain these false and derogatory remarks, and 
although respondent considered his remarks which were not broadcast to be “off 
the record,” respondent intended by his remarks to influence the reporter and 
thereby influence public opinion regarding the case.  The panel further found that 
by making these statements, whether on or off the record, respondent acted without 
due regard for the impression he left as to the character and reputation of the party 
against whom he had ruled, the integrity of the court of appeals, the fairness and 
objectivity of the judicial system, and his own impartiality and judicial 
temperament. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct during the taped interview 
violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (a judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
 
 
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confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), Canon 3(B)(9) (a 
judge shall abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding 
that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or 
make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or 
hearing), and Canon 4 (a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities).  The panel further concluded that as a 
lawyer, respondent violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2) and Gov.Jud. R. I(2), both of which 
provide that it is the duty of a lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the 
courts. 
 
The panel found that the facts on which count two of the amended complaint 
were based also occurred in November 1996.  Three days after two youths were, 
on November 10, 1996, separated for fighting in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile 
Detention Center, a social worker informed respondent of the incident.  The social 
worker also told respondent that after the fight, one of the youths was taken to St. 
Vincent’s Charity Hospital for treatment and that the juvenile claimed that he was 
beaten by detention center staff members.  The next day, November 14, 1996, 
respondent, accompanied by the head of the juvenile prosecutor’s office, 
interviewed the juvenile.  Respondent was unaware that the Court Administrator’s 
Office was investigating the matter.  The social worker who first informed 
respondent of the incident then wrote a second letter, and that letter referred not 
only to the fight but also to the juvenile’s injuries and his allegation that they were 
a result of his being beaten by a staff member. 
 
The investigation by the court administrator resulted in the termination and 
resignation of two staff members who were alleged to have beaten the youth. 
 
A week after his own investigation, respondent gave an interview to the 
Cleveland edition of The Call and Post newspaper, in which he stated that 
detention center staff members routinely beat inmates and that subsequent 
 
 
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coverups of the beatings by a conspiracy of the court’s public relations officer and 
the administration were also routine.  The article attributed to respondent, without 
a direct quote, stated that problems exist at the detention center because of a lack 
of leadership by the Administrative Judge of the Juvenile Court, Judge Peter 
Sikora, and detention center director Tom Foster.  The respondent characterized 
the juvenile court as being “out of control.”  Respondent, however, had not 
discussed the incident with the court administrator, the administrative judge, the 
director of community services, or the detention center’s public relations officer, 
all of whom denied any conspiracy. 
 
The panel found not only that respondent made these statements without 
determining whether the court administrator was investigating the incident, but that 
there was no “coverup” as respondent alleged.  The panel further found that 
respondent unjustifiably criticized the administrative judge and the court 
administrator without confirming the accuracy of his remarks. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s statements with respect to the 
juvenile detention center violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
3(C)(1) (a judge shall diligently discharge the judge’s administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in 
judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court officials 
in the administration of the court’s business), Gov.Bar R. IV(2) and Gov.Jud. R. 
I(2), and DR 8-102(B) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations 
against a judge). 
 
Count three of the amended complaint involved respondent’s statements in 
an August 1995 Cleveland Free Times article about Camp Roulston, a juvenile 
detention facility operated as a “boot camp.”  The panel found that respondent was 
quoted in a Cleveland Free Times article as describing the Administrative Judge of 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and the court’s 
 
 
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Director of Community Services and Probation as “the two most entrenched and 
incompetent bureaucrats at the courthouse.”  The article also quoted respondent as 
accusing the administrative judge and the director of community services of “lying 
to officials of the federal government about the success rate of the boot camp and 
how successful the programming was.”  However, respondent claimed that these 
comments related to the director of community services and the court administrator 
and not to the administrative judge.  The director of community services denied 
that she had attempted to mislead  federal authorities, and the author of the 
newspaper article testified that he read the article to the respondent before it was 
published and respondent approved the contents of the article as it appeared. 
 
The panel found that while it could not find clear and convincing evidence 
that respondent’s comments related to the administrative judge, the comments 
nevertheless were false and reflected adversely upon the administration of the court 
under the judge’s direction and upon persons appointed by him or under his 
supervision.  The panel therefore concluded that respondent’s comments violated 
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gov.Bar R. IV(2), and Gov.Jud.R. I(2). 
 
After reviewing the evidence submitted in mitigation, the panel found some 
connection between respondent’s conduct and his laudable concern to protect 
children and youths from being harmed by the system.  Nevertheless, after hearing 
the testimony of the newspaper reporters and viewing the videotape, the panel did 
not believe that respondent’s statements were made “off the record” and not 
intended for broadcast.  The panel recommended that respondent be suspended 
from the practice of law for eighteen months; that the entire suspension be stayed 
in favor of probation under the monitoring of a judge; and that, as a condition of 
probation, respondent commit no further violations of the judicial canons, 
Disciplinary Rules, or administrative rules.  The board adopted the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  Canon 2 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge respect and comply with the 
law and act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary.  Shortly after one of his decisions was reversed, 
respondent invited a television reporter into his home and gave an interview in 
which he maligned the court of appeals, saying that its ruling was “political,” that 
it was made and written by a law clerk, that the appellate court was influenced by 
the wife of one of the appellant’s attorneys, and that the appellate court failed to 
read the volumes of data which were sent to it.  Respondent had no information or 
authority to support any of  these remarks. 
 
Canon 2 does not distinguish, as respondent would have us distinguish, 
between comments on and “off the record.”  Nor does the canon distinguish 
between unedited comments to a television reporter and the edited portions of 
those comments that are ultimately broadcast to the general public.  The canon 
requires that a judge “at all times” conduct himself or herself in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the judiciary.  We recognize that on occasion a 
judge may unwittingly make an inappropriate casual remark.  However, 
respondent’s remarks about the appellate court were not unwitting, inadvertent 
“slips.”  His statements were part of lengthy intemperate comments about the 
appellate court’s reversal of his decision. 
 
By this series of statements respondent also violated Canon 3(B)(9) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge not make any comment 
 
 
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about a pending case that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome.  
Canon 3(B)(9) does not preclude judges from making “public statements in the 
course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the 
procedures of the court.”  However, at the time of his statements to the television 
reporter, respondent was not acting in the course of his official duties, nor were his 
comments limited to an explanation of court procedures. 
 
For the same reasons, we find, as did the board, that respondent’s conduct in 
the television interview violated Canon 4, which requires that a judge avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of his activities and, because 
the judge is a lawyer, his same actions violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2) and Gov.Jud. R. 
I(2), both of which provide that it is the duty of a lawyer to maintain a respectful 
attitude toward the courts. Respondent’s statements to the television reporter, 
whether or not ultimately broadcast, and whether or not “on the record,” were 
false, intemperate, disrespectful, and improper for a judicial official. 
 
We agree with the board that respondent’s comments to The Call and Post 
about the operation of the juvenile detention center also violated Canon 2.  
Respondent should not have given The Call and Post reporter his opinion that it 
was routine for juvenile detention center staff members to beat inmates and also 
routine for them to “cover up” the beatings.  Nor should respondent in speaking 
with the media have charged that such coverups were a result of a conspiracy of 
the court’s public relations officer and the administration.  By suggesting to the 
media that the administrative judge was engaged in a conspiracy with officials of 
the juvenile detention center to “cover up” violations, that the administrative judge 
failed to provide leadership in solving the problems of the detention center, and 
that the juvenile court was “out of control,” respondent failed to cooperate with 
other judges and court officials in the administration of the court’s business and, 
 
 
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thus, was in violation of Canon 3(C)(1), Gov.Bar R. IV(2), Gov.Jud. R. I(2), and  
DR 8-102(B). 
 
As found by the board, respondent’s comments to the Cleveland Free Times 
in August 1995 about Camp Roulston also violated Canon 2, Gov.Bar R. IV(2) and 
Gov.Jud. R. I(2).  Respondent’s expressed opinion that the Administrative Judge of 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and the court’s 
Director of Community Services and Probation were the two most entrenched and 
incompetent bureaucrats at the courthouse and his unsupported statements that they 
lied to federal government officials about the success rate of the facility should not 
have been made to the media or anyone else.  Even though the board did not find 
that respondent had criticized the administrative judge, it found that he clearly 
maligned court officers working under that judge’s direction and control, and 
thereby maligned the court itself. 
 
Respondent, like many judges, cares deeply about the area of the law under 
his jurisdiction. The mitigation evidence introduced in this case is directed to his 
concern for children, and particularly the welfare of underprivileged children.  But 
strong feelings do not excuse a judge from complying with the judicial canons and 
the Disciplinary Rules.  Nor is deep concern a license to criticize fellow members 
of the judiciary who may hold different views. 
 
Like the board, this court has no doubt that respondent’s remarks about the 
appellate court and his statements about the juvenile detention center undermine 
the public’s confidence in a fair and impartial judicial system and violate the Code 
of Judicial Conduct.  Those comments which were specifically directed at a judge 
violated the Disciplinary Rules. 
 
We therefore believe that an appropriate sanction in this case is suspension 
from the practice of law for eighteen months with the final twelve months stayed.  
Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A) mandates that a disciplinary order suspending a judge from 
 
 
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the practice of law shall include a provision immediately suspending the judge 
from judicial office without pay for the term of suspension.  Accordingly, 
respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months with 
the final twelve of those months stayed, and he is hereby suspended without pay 
from his position as Judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Division, for six months.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  Language is a wonderful and powerful part of our 
lives.  It can make us cry; it can bring us great joy.  Language and context are 
inextricably intertwined.  When they are at odds, the result can be destructive.  The 
choice of words, the audience, and the time and place we say something all affect 
the impact of language. 
 
The context of the language used in this case is especially complex.  This 
case has to be judged before the backdrop of the natural tension between our rich 
history of free speech under the First Amendment and the limitations to judicial 
speech contained in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon 2 requires 
judges to act in a manner that “promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary.”  Canon 2, in its general terms, addresses the issue of 
context in judicial speech by requiring appropriateness. 
 
Canon 2 was never meant to stifle judges — it recognizes that a judge need 
not sit silent in order to show his or her respect for the law and promote public 
confidence in the judiciary.  Canon 2(A) encourages judges to speak about the law 
and the legal system and consult with other governmental bodies about the 
 
 
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administration of justice.  Sometimes a judge’s commentary must necessarily be 
tough. 
 
On the other hand, Canon 2 recognizes that judges are not ordinary citizens, 
and that the words they say reflect on the entire institution, an institution that owes 
its life to public confidence.  An erosion of that confidence affects everyone.  Thus, 
while every citizen has the right to stand up and speak out, even irresponsibly, a 
judge is limited to speaking out responsibly.  That limitation should hardly be 
thought of as a muzzle. 
 
Judge Ferreri’s choice of words and the context in which he spoke them 
went beyond tough commentary.  Judge Ferreri is not being sanctioned for the fact 
that he spoke out, but instead because of the manner in which he did it.  He 
employed false and purposely incendiary comments.  Off the record or not, some 
of his comments were made on camera. 
 
There is a difference in degree to what this judge said, a difference that 
makes a sanction appropriate in this case.  The majority opinion recognizes the 
necessary vibrancy of the judiciary, but also recognizes that judges must act 
responsibly.  Respondent in this case did not, and I agree with the majority in that.  
Respondent’s genuine concern and passion for the juvenile court system is 
laudable; his judicial temperament in this case was unacceptable. 
 
I dissent only from the sanction the majority imposes.  I would have 
followed the recommendation of the panel: an eighteen-month suspension with the 
entire suspension stayed in favor of probation under the monitoring of a judge, 
with conditions.