Title: The Florida Bar v. James Harvey Tipler

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC03-149 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES HARVEY TIPLER, 
Respondent. 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC05-1014 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES HARVEY TIPLER, 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC06-1775 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES HARVEY TIPLER, 
Respondent. 
 
 
[April 30, 2009] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review referees’ reports from three Bar discipline cases 
recommending that respondent, James Harvey Tipler, be found guilty of various 
acts of professional misconduct and subjected to various sanctions, including 
disbarment.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  In an order 
previously entered in Florida Bar v. Tipler, No. SC06-1775 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2008), 
we disbarred Tipler and noted that this opinion was to follow.  We now consolidate 
that case with Florida Bar v. Tipler, No. SC03-149, and Florida Bar v. Tipler, No. 
SC05-1014, for purposes of review.  For the reasons expressed below, Tipler is 
disbarred. 
 
 
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FACTS 
Case No. SC03-149 
 
In Case No. SC03-149, the referee found that Tipler represented a client, an 
eighteen-year-old mother, in Bay County, Florida, on a charge of aggravated 
assault.  Tipler charged his client a fee of $2,300 and entered into a fee agreement 
with her that allowed a “credit of $200 for each time she engaged in sex with 
Respondent” and a “$400 credit if she arranged for other females to have sex with 
him.”  For his misdeeds, Tipler was charged with racketeering and four counts of 
prostitution.  He ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of solicitation of 
prostitution. 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Tipler, and the matter was stayed 
pending the resolution of a disciplinary case in Alabama arising out of the same 
incident.  Tipler admitted that the agreement existed and that he engaged in sex 
with his client and another woman in exchange for credits toward the amount the 
client owed Tipler in attorney fees.  Tipler also admitted that his actions were 
morally and ethically wrong.  After the disciplinary case worked its way through 
the three levels in the Alabama disciplinary system, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
suspended Tipler for fifteen months.  Tipler failed to file a copy of the suspension 
order with this Court within thirty days of the effective date of the suspension.  
Nevertheless, after the matter in Alabama was completed, The Florida Bar filed an 
 
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amended complaint and moved for summary judgment.  The referee granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Bar.  
Based on the foregoing, the referee recommended that Tipler be found guilty 
of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3 (“The commission by a lawyer 
of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is 
committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, 
whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the 
act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline.”); 3-4.4 
(indicating that criminal misconduct is a cause for discipline); 3-7.2(l)(1) (“A 
member of The Florida Bar who . . . has been . . . suspended from the practice of 
law by a court or other authorized disciplinary agency of another state . . . shall 
within 30 days . . . [notify] the Supreme Court of Florida and the executive director 
of The Florida Bar . . . .”); 4-1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, 
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
criminal or fraudulent.”); 4-1.5(a) (“An attorney shall not enter into an agreement 
for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee or cost . . . .”); 
4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another.”); 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . commit a criminal 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
 
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lawyer in other respects.”); 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct . . . 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”); and 4-8.4(i) (“A lawyer 
shall not . . . engage in sexual conduct with a client that exploits . . . the lawyer-
client relationship . . . .”). 
The referee found the following aggravating factors: (1) Tipler had a prior 
disciplinary history; (2) his motives were dishonest and selfish; (3) he exhibited a 
pattern of misconduct; (4) he committed multiple offenses; (5) the victims were 
vulnerable; and (6) he had substantial experience in the practice of law. 
In mitigation, the referee found that Tipler (1) had personal and emotional 
problems; (2) had a physical or mental impairment or disability; (3) received only 
minimal penalties or sanctions for being found guilty of a misdemeanor; and (4) 
expressed remorse for his actions. 
For Tipler’s misconduct in Case No. SC03-149, the referee recommended 
that Tipler be suspended for eighteen months, placed on probation for two years 
following reinstatement, and required to contact Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. 
(FLA), within thirty days of the final judgment in this case and sign a three-year 
FLA rehabilitation contract under the terms and conditions recommended by FLA.  
The referee further recommended that Tipler be charged with the Bar’s costs in the 
amount of $3,734.50. 
 
 
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Case No. SC05-1014 
In Case No. SC05-1014, the referee found that in Alabama, Tipler 
represented a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case arising out of a patient’s 
death.  Tipler attempted to submit into evidence a videotape depicting the patient 
on the day before the surgery that allegedly resulted in his death.  To authenticate 
the tape, Tipler questioned the patient’s son as to whether the tape was accurate.  
The videotape Tipler attempted to submit was edited from the original version to 
delete or move scenes that would have been harmful to the plaintiff’s case.  
Further, the patient’s son had never viewed the edited tape and, thus, unknowingly 
gave false answers concerning the authenticity of the tape during Tipler’s 
questioning. 
Upon objection by the defense, the trial court conducted an inquiry and 
disallowed the entry of either the original or edited tape.  Additionally, based on 
Tipler’s answers to questions posed to him during the inquiry, the trial court held 
Tipler in criminal contempt after a show-cause hearing.  A grand jury indicted 
Tipler for perjury, a first-degree felony.  Tipler eventually pleaded guilty to 
interference with judicial proceedings, a misdemeanor. 
After a successful first appeal by Tipler within the Alabama disciplinary 
system, the Supreme Court of Alabama ultimately determined that Tipler’s 
conviction was a “serious crime” and reversed and remanded the case for further 
 
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proceedings.  See Ala. State Bar v. Tipler, 904 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 2004).  
Thereafter, Tipler was suspended for 120 days in Alabama.  Tipler failed to file a 
copy of the suspension order with this Court within thirty days of the effective date 
of the Alabama suspension.  Nevertheless, the Bar filed a complaint against Tipler.  
Tipler did not file an answer to the complaint or respond to the Bar’s requests for 
admission.  The Bar moved for summary judgment, and Tipler eventually 
consented to summary judgment on guilt.  Accordingly, summary judgment was 
granted on all the factual allegations and rule violations. 
In addition to his Alabama disciplinary proceedings, Tipler has disciplinary 
proceedings pending in California.  Tipler testified before the referee that a 
stipulation submitted to the referee and entered into evidence was a final 
stipulation with the State Bar of California.  In fact, the stipulation was not final.  
Rather, Tipler was referred to California’s Alternate Discipline Program (ADP) by 
the disciplinary judge.  The disciplinary judge noted that if Tipler was not accepted 
into the ADP, the stipulation would be final, subject to the approval of the 
California Supreme Court.  At the time of the proceedings before the referee, the 
California case was pending before the ADP judge.  Hence, there was not yet a 
final disposition in the California proceedings. 
Based on the foregoing, the referee recommended that Tipler be found guilty 
of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3 (“The commission by a lawyer 
 
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of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is 
committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise, 
whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the 
act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline.”); 3-4.4 
(indicating that criminal misconduct is a cause for discipline); 3-7.2(l)(1) (“[A] 
member of The Florida Bar who . . . has been . . . suspended from the practice of 
law by a court or other authorized disciplinary agency of another state . . . shall 
within thirty days . . . [notify] the Supreme Court of Florida and the executive 
director of The Florida Bar . . . .”); 4-3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.”); 4-3.4(a)-(b) (lawyer 
shall not unlawfully alter or conceal documents or fabricate evidence); 4-8.4(b) 
(“A lawyer shall not . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”); 4-
8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .”); and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in 
conduct . . . that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”). 
The referee found the following aggravating factors: (1) Tipler had a prior 
disciplinary history; (2) his motives were dishonest and selfish; (3) he had 
substantial experience in the practice of law; (4) he exhibited a pattern of 
misconduct; (5) he committed multiple offenses; and (6) he submitted false 
 
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evidence during the disciplinary process.  The referee found the following 
mitigating factors: (1) minimal penalties or sanctions were imposed on Tipler for 
being found in criminal contempt and being convicted of a misdemeanor 
conviction; and (2) Tipler expressed remorse for his conduct. 
For Tipler’s misconduct in Case No. SC05-1014, the referee recommended 
that the Court suspend Tipler for three years and that he be taxed the Bar’s costs in 
the amount of $2,212.32. 
Case No. SC06-1775 
On August 31, 2006, the Bar filed its complaint against Tipler in Case No. 
SC06-1775.  The Bar mailed its complaint by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to Tipler at his record Bar address; the complaint was returned as 
unclaimed, prompting the Bar to mail Tipler a second copy of the complaint by 
regular mail.  The second copy was not returned. 
Tipler failed to answer the complaint.  After a referee was appointed, Tipler 
filed a motion to disqualify the referee on November 21, 2006, which was denied 
on November 29, 2006.  The Bar filed a notice of application for default on 
February 8, 2007, and a motion for default on March 7, 2007.  The referee entered 
a default against Tipler on March 12, 2007.  After Tipler unsuccessfully moved to 
overturn the default, a final sanction hearing was held on September 26, 2007.  At 
the hearing, Tipler did not present any evidence in mitigation. 
 
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In Case No. SC06-1775, the referee found seven instances of misconduct, 
wherein Tipler misused over $57,000 in funds received from various clients and 
failed to diligently prosecute the clients’ cases or even communicate with the 
clients.  The case types ranged from dissolution of marriage to real estate to 
copyright infringement.  In addition, Tipler secured fees based on intentional 
misrepresentation and fraud.  In most of the cases, Tipler charged an excessive fee, 
failed to comply with the Bar rules governing trust accounts, and failed to protect 
the clients’ interests by refunding unearned fees.  Further, Tipler committed 
conversion and criminal theft in many of the instances.  In one instance, Tipler 
labored under a conflict of interest.  In some instances, Tipler failed to respond to 
inquiry letters sent by the Bar to his record address. 
For example, in one of the charged cases, two clients hired Tipler to 
represent them in filing two separate personal injury claims for two different 
accidents.  Tipler filed two separate personal injury complaints on behalf of the 
clients.  Tipler failed to provide a copy of the signed contingency fee agreement 
and statement of clients’ rights to the clients in either lawsuit.  After discovery, 
both lawsuits proceeded to a settlement in which two checks for $4,750 were 
issued, payable to the clients and Tipler. 
 
The clients came to Tipler’s office to sign the checks; Tipler told them he 
would provide them with copies of the checks and the written closing statements 
 
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the next business day.  The settlement funds were paid out after the checks were 
endorsed.  The checks were cashed by Tipler, but the funds were not deposited into 
Tipler’s trust account. 
 
There were outstanding medical bills associated with the accidents totaling 
approximately $2,500.  Tipler paid the clients what he alleged to be the balance of 
the settlement funds after his fees and the medical bills were paid.  However, 
Tipler paid none of the medical bills.  From November 2004 through March 2005, 
the clients attempted to communicate on numerous occasions with Tipler, who told 
them that he would provide them with a copy of the closing statements and also 
copies of the checks that he had mailed to the medical providers to verify payment 
of the bills.  Despite numerous requests from his clients, however, Tipler did not 
provide the clients with a written closing statement for either of the personal injury 
cases or copies of the checks for the alleged medical payments.  Due to Tipler’s 
failure to pay a $1,924 hospital bill, one of the clients was sued and a judgment 
entered against him for $2,481.15 in February 2005.  Although a large sum of 
money was not involved, this particular instance demonstrates Tipler’s complete 
lack of probity. 
 
Additionally, to exacerbate matters, Case No. SC06-1775 also includes an 
instance in which Tipler attempted to defraud his creditors with respect to a 
$487,714.81 judgment before a federal bankruptcy court.  The bankruptcy court 
 
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specifically found that Tipler’s actions indicated that he intended to hinder, delay, 
or defraud his creditors, and that his failure to file income tax returns for four 
years, as well as his failure to maintain and preserve adequate records, made it 
impossible for the creditors to ascertain Tipler’s true financial condition.  In 
particular, the bankruptcy court found that Tipler “made numerous false and 
conflicting statements under oath” and “knowingly and fraudulently made a false 
oath or account in connection with his bankruptcy case.”  In re Tipler, 360 B.R. 
333, 354-55 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2005). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the referee recommended that Tipler be found 
guilty of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3 (“The commission by a 
lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the 
act is committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or 
otherwise, whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether 
or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline.”) 
(two counts); 4-1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation . . . .”) (two counts); 4-1.3 (“A lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”) (six counts); 
4-1.4 (“A lawyer shall . . . keep [a] client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”) (five 
counts); 4-1.5(a) (“An attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or 
 
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collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee or cost . . . .”) (six counts); 4-
1.7 (prohibiting representation of adverse interests); 4-1.15 (“A lawyer shall 
comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating Trust Accounts.”) (two counts); 4-
1.16(d) (“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest . . . .”) (six counts); 4-
8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another.”); 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . commit a criminal 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.”) (three counts); 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .”) (three 
counts); 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct . . . that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice . . . .”) (four counts); 4-8.4(g)(1) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . fail to respond in writing to any . . . initial written investigative inquiry by 
bar counsel [or a disciplinary agency].”) (six counts); 4-8.4(g)(2) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . fail to respond [to] any follow-up written investigative inquiries by bar 
counsel [or a disciplinary agency].”) (two counts); 5-1.1(a) (“A lawyer shall hold 
in trust funds and property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s 
possession in connection with representation.”) (two counts); 5-1.1(b) (“Money or 
other property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose, including advances 
 
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for fees, costs, and expenses, is held in trust and must be applied only to that 
purpose.”) (four counts); 5-1.1(e) (“[A] lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled 
to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a 
full accounting regarding such property.”) (three counts); and 5-1.1(f) (requiring a 
lawyer to treat disputed funds as trust property) (two counts). 
 
The referee found the following aggravating factors:  (1) Tipler had a prior 
disciplinary history; (2) his motives were dishonest and selfish; (3) he exhibited a 
pattern of misconduct; (4) he committed multiple offenses; (5) his victims were 
vulnerable; (6) he had substantial experience in the practice of law; and (7) he was 
indifferent to making restitution.  The referee found no mitigating factors. 
 
For his misconduct in Case No. SC06-1775, the referee recommended that 
Tipler be disbarred, ordered to pay restitution, and taxed with the Bar’s costs.  As 
stated above, we have already issued an order approving in its entirety the referee’s 
report in Case No. SC06-1775.  See Fla. Bar v. Tipler, 999 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2008) 
(table). 
ANALYSIS 
 
In all three cases, Tipler petitioned for review of the referees’ reports, 
challenging their findings and recommendations on due process grounds; he also 
challenged the referees’ recommendations as to discipline.  
 
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Tipler primarily argues that he was denied due process in all three of the 
proceedings against him.  None of his due process arguments have merit.  With 
regard to Case No. SC03-149, Tipler argues that the findings in the Alabama 
disciplinary system should not be considered conclusive proof of guilt because the 
Alabama proceedings were defective in that he was not allowed to call witnesses, 
and since the incidents transpired in Florida, the disciplinary proceedings should 
have been held in Florida.1  Accordingly, Tipler argues that the referee should not 
have granted summary judgment in Case No. SC03-149. 
Rule 3-4.6(a) provides in pertinent part:2  
                                          
 
 
1.  With regard to Case Nos. SC03-149 and SC05-1014, Tipler also argues 
that the referee should have been disqualified and alleges that there is a motion to 
disqualify pending before the referee.  In the motion, Tipler argues that the referee 
should be disqualified because he failed to consider as mitigating evidence the 
treatment that Tipler underwent as part of California’s ADP.  Tipler complains that 
the referee instead considered inadmissible evidence and found in aggravation that 
Tipler misrepresented the finality of the California stipulation as to discipline.  On 
review, Tipler also directly challenges the referee’s findings with regard to the 
California stipulation. 
However, the motion to disqualify, which the referee denied as moot, was 
filed two months after the referee issued his reports in those cases and was 
therefore untimely.  See Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla. 1986).  
Additionally, as there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support 
the referee’s findings with respect to the California disciplinary proceedings, we 
approve those findings without further comment. 
 
 
2.  Rule 3-4.6 has been amended since Case No. SC03-149 was initiated.  
See In re Amendments to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin., 
907 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2005).  Quoted here is the entire text of the rule as it existed 
at the time Case No. SC03-149 was initiated. 
 
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A final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a court or other 
authorized disciplinary agency of another jurisdiction, state or federal, 
that an attorney licensed to practice in that jurisdiction is guilty of 
misconduct justifying disciplinary action shall be considered as 
conclusive proof of such misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding 
under this rule. 
 
Based on the rule, the Florida referee properly relied on the records of the Alabama 
disciplinary proceedings.  See Fla. Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965); see 
also Fla. Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2000).  However, as stated 
in Wilkes, there is a limited exception to the rule: 
[R]ight and justice require that when the accused attorney shows that 
the proceeding in the foreign state was so deficient or lacking in 
notice or opportunity to be heard, that there was such a paucity of 
proof, or that there was some other grave reason which would make it 
unjust to accept the foreign judgment as conclusive proof of guilt of 
the misconduct involved Florida can elect not to be bound thereby. . . .  
[T]he burden of showing why a foreign judgment should not operate 
as conclusive proof of guilt in a Florida disciplinary proceeding is on 
the accused attorney. 
179 So. 2d at 198 (emphasis added).  Tipler’s claim that the Alabama proceedings 
were deficient in due process fails because (1) he was afforded a full opportunity to 
conduct discovery; (2) he was afforded a full opportunity to confront witnesses; 
and (3) he was represented by competent counsel.  Indeed, the very fact that Tipler 
was afforded two appeals to contest his discipline in Alabama negates his claim 
that he was denied due process there.  Further, Tipler’s argument that the case 
should have been litigated in Florida is disingenuous.  Tipler failed to object to any 
of six motions for extension of time to file the referee’s report filed by Bar counsel 
 
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pending the resolution of the Alabama proceedings.  Moreover, the record of the 
Alabama proceedings before the referee supported the Bar’s position.  Finally, 
Tipler failed to present any documents to support his position.  The referee 
correctly granted summary judgment and used the Alabama findings to support a 
conclusion that Tipler is guilty of the rule violations charged.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 2000) (“It is not enough for the [party opposing 
summary judgment] merely to assert that an issue does exist.” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979))).3 
 
With regard to Cases No. SC05-1014 and SC06-1775, Tipler argues that he 
received inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard, in violation of his right to 
due process.  Due process is satisfied in Bar disciplinary proceedings where the 
attorney is served with notice of the Bar’s charges and is afforded an opportunity 
in the disciplinary hearing to be heard and defend himself.  Fla. Bar v. Committe, 
916 So. 2d 741, 745 (Fla. 2005).  Further, this Court has defined due process in this 
regard as follows: 
[D]ue process requires the giving of reasonable notice and such shall 
be effective by the service of the complaint upon the respondent by 
mailing a copy thereof by registered or certified mail return receipt 
requested to the last-known address of the respondent according to the 
records of The Florida Bar or such later address as may be known to 
the person effecting the service. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Similarly, the referee correctly found that the Alabama disciplinary 
findings constituted conclusive proof of guilt in Case No. SC05-1014. 
 
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R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.11(c). 
As to Case No. SC05-1014, Tipler argues that although his counsel for Case 
No. SC03-149 was served with papers for Case No. SC05-1014, she was not his 
counsel for the latter case, Tipler was never personally served, and he therefore 
was denied an opportunity to answer the charges against him.  Tipler’s argument is 
disingenuous.  Five days before the scheduled hearing on summary judgment, 
Tipler’s counsel filed a “Motion for Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel” in 
which she stated that she did not intend to make an appearance in the matter.  A 
letter attached to the motion to withdraw indicates that months earlier, Tipler’s 
counsel informed Bar counsel that she had forwarded the documents to Tipler and 
requested that he accept service.  Hence, Tipler actually received the documents 
filed in the case.  Additionally, Tipler faxed a letter to the referee stating that his 
counsel was representing him in various Bar matters and was withdrawing from 
representation in Case No. SC05-1014.  It is impossible for counsel to withdraw 
from representation in a matter in which she did not represent Tipler.  Further, in 
the same letter, Tipler consented to the entry of a summary judgment in that case.  
Tipler was represented by counsel, who was served with copies of all filings, 
actually received notice, had an opportunity to respond, and, in fact, consented to 
summary judgment.  The process afforded him in Case No. SC05-1014 was 
sufficient. 
 
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As to Case No. SC06-1775, Tipler argues that the referee should not have 
granted default judgment because (1) Tipler was not properly served with a copy of 
the Bar’s formal complaint; and (2) justice favors deciding issues on the merits 
rather than by default.  Tipler first argues that the practice of law is akin to a 
property right and comes with the same due process protections applicable to 
deprivation of property claims.  Tipler compares the “right” to practice law to a 
parent’s fundamental right to raise a child.  Tipler is incorrect.  The Bar rules, as 
adopted by this Court, clearly state that “[a] license to practice law confers no 
vested right to the holder thereof but is a conditional privilege that is revocable for 
cause.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-1.1. 
 
The Bar mailed its complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
Tipler at his record Bar address.  This satisfied due process.  Although not required 
to do so, the Bar further satisfied due process by mailing another copy of the 
complaint to Tipler after the first one was returned as unclaimed. 
 
Tipler misperceives our holding in Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So. 2d 810 
(Fla. 1996).  He argues that pursuant to Porter, he was entitled as a matter of due 
process to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he knowingly ignored his 
mail.  However, in Porter, we did not state that an evidentiary hearing was ever 
held.  In fact, the opinion recites facts remarkably similar to the case at bar: 
The Bar then filed a formal complaint against Porter and sent 
this complaint by certified mail to Porter’s record Bar address on 
 
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January 30, 1996.  After three attempts to deliver this complaint to 
Porter, the post office sent the complaint back to the Bar on February 
19, 1996.  On February 22, 1996, Porter spoke with counsel from the 
Bar, who informed him that a complaint was coming in the mail.  The 
Bar received the unclaimed complaint on February 27, 1996.  
Thereafter, the Bar sent Porter a notice of default by certified mail, 
and he again failed to retrieve the mailing.  Based on these facts, the 
referee granted the Bar’s motion for default and scheduled a hearing 
limited solely to the issue of appropriate sanctions for the misconduct.  
After a hearing which Porter attended, the referee found Porter guilty 
of violating [various Bar rules]. 
Id. at 812.  Based on these facts, we concluded that we could not “endorse Porter’s 
knowing decision to ignore his mail.”  Id. at 813 (citing Fla. Bar v. Santiago, 521 
So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1988)).  Porter does not support Tipler’s argument that he is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his conduct was knowingly 
done. 
 
Tipler attempts to distinguish Porter by asserting that he did not know that 
the Bar mailed the complaint.  Once again, Tipler is being disingenuous.  At oral 
argument, Tipler stated that he was unable to retrieve the Bar’s complaint from his 
record Bar address because he was under treatment and doing business in 
California at the time.  But he admitted that he did not change his record address or 
notify Bar counsel of his temporary change of address.  Further, Tipler knew that 
the complaint had been filed.  On November 21, 2006, Tipler moved to disqualify 
the referee in this case, and it was not until February 8, 2007, that the Bar filed its 
notice of application for default; the Bar filed its motion for default a month later 
 
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on March 7, 2008.  Accordingly, it appears that in addition to being properly 
served with the complaint (and thus being provided with due process), Tipler was 
dilatory in his actions to prevent the entry of a default judgment. 
 
Tipler’s final due process argument with regard to Case No. SC06-1775 is 
that justice favors hearing cases on the merits, especially in cases where 
disbarment is a possible disciplinary sanction.  It is true that justice generally 
favors deciding issues on the merits rather than by default.  See generally Asset 
Mgmt. Consultants of Va., Inc. v. City of Tamarac, 913 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2005); Allied Roofing Indus., Inc. v. Venegas, 862 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  
However, as noted above, in Porter we upheld a referee’s decision to enter default 
judgment and disbarred a lawyer based on facts strikingly similar to those in the 
case at bar.  We stated: “By this default, the allegations in the Bar’s complaint 
were deemed admitted, and the default thereby provided the referee with 
competent, substantial evidence upon which to base the findings.  Porter is 
precluded from now complaining about any factual findings deemed admitted.”  
Porter, 684 So. 2d at 813 (citations omitted); see also Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So. 
2d 1002 (Fla. 2004) (approving default judgment based on Porter and imposing 
three-year suspension); Fla. Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1999) (same).  
Hence, we did not see fit to vacate the default judgment entered in Porter even 
though disbarment was a possible sanction, which we actually imposed.  Likewise, 
 
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we see no reason to vacate the default judgment entered in Case No. SC06-1775.  
Instead, we approve the referee’s decision. 
Finally, Tipler challenges the referees’ recommendations as to discipline.  
Although Tipler presents some inappropriate mitigation arguments, Tipler provides 
little analysis as to why he should not be disbarred.  First, Tipler argues that the 
sexual relationship in Case No. SC03-149 was preexisting4 and consensual, 
distinguishing it from cases where harsh sanctions were imposed for coercive 
sexual relationships with clients.  As to Case No. SC05-1014, Tipler argues that 
the recommended discipline is inconsistent with the discipline imposed in Alabama 
and California for the same misconduct and that because lawyers are in court more 
often and are therefore more likely to be convicted for contempt, they should not 
be disciplined harshly for such a conviction.  As to Case No. SC06-1775, Tipler 
argues that disbarment is unfair in light of the default judgment. 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
                                          
 
 
4.  There is no indication in the record that the sexual relationship was in 
fact preexisting.  Tipler states that he would have established this fact had 
summary judgment not been entered against him, but he failed to raise the issue in 
his affidavit in opposition to summary judgment.  In any event, Tipler is guilty of 
multiple other rule violations in Case No. SC03-149. 
 
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Const.  However, generally speaking, the Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and 
the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 
753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  “Further, this Court views cumulative 
misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct.”  Fla. Bar v. 
Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002) (citing Fla. Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044 
(Fla. 2000)).  In the reciprocal discipline cases, we are free to impose a sanction 
greater than that imposed in other states.  See Fla. Bar v. Hagendorf, 921 So. 2d 
611, 614 (Fla. 2006). 
Considered in conjunction, Tipler’s violations in Cases No. SC03-149 and 
SC05-1014 warrant disbarment.  In Florida Bar v. Scott, 810 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 
2002), we considered two cases involving the same lawyer.  In the first case, Scott 
coerced a vulnerable, unwilling female client faced with the termination of her 
parental rights to engage in sexual relations in exchange for a reduction in attorney 
fees.  Id. at 900.  In the second case, Scott was found to have been held in criminal 
contempt for failing to attend the first day of a criminal trial and was dishonest in 
stating the reason for his inability to attend.  Id. at 896.  Other than an 
admonishment for minor misconduct, Scott had no prior discipline.  Id. at 900.  
Nonetheless, we held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.  
 
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Although we specifically noted that the sexual coercion present in Scott—
but not immediately apparent in the instant cases—was a determining factor, Scott 
provides useful guidance here.  Like the respondent in Scott, Tipler, in Case No. 
SC03-149, engaged in a sexual relationship with a vulnerable client.  In addition, 
Tipler was convicted of solicitation of prostitution.  Further, in contrast to Scott, 
Tipler has not just one additional pending case, but two—Cases No. SC05-1014 
and SC06-1775.5 
In Case No. SC05-1014, Tipler essentially manufactured evidence and 
elicited false testimony from an innocent witness in an attempt to authenticate that 
evidence.  For his misconduct, Tipler was held in criminal contempt and pleaded 
guilty to a misdemeanor charge of interference with judicial proceedings, which 
the Alabama Supreme Court held to be a “serious crime.”  Additionally, in the 
proceedings before the referee, Tipler misrepresented the status of his disciplinary 
proceedings in California.  Moreover, Tipler is currently suspended from the 
practice of law in Florida for misconduct in earlier proceedings and has in the past 
received two public reprimands and an admonishment. 
                                          
 
 
5.  The Court is also currently awaiting referee reports in an additional three 
disciplinary cases pending against Tipler.  See Fla. Bar v. Tipler, No. SC07-1752 
(Fla. filed Sep. 14, 2007); Fla. Bar v. Tipler, No. SC07-915 (Fla. filed May 17, 
2007); Fla. Bar v. Tipler, No. SC06-2318 (Fla. filed Nov. 27, 2006).  
 
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In Florida Bar v. Klausner, 721 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1998), we reiterated 
that lawyers who knowingly and deliberately seek to corrupt the legal process will 
be excluded from the process.  In Klausner, an inexperienced and remorseful 
attorney with no prior disciplinary history received a three-year suspension for 
submitting forged stipulations and misrepresenting the authenticity of the 
documents.  Id.  Additionally, although the attorney was criminally charged with 
felonies and misdemeanors, he was only adjudicated guilty of the misdemeanors.  
Id.  Unlike the situation in Klausner, where we heavily considered the attorney’s 
inexperience and lack of a prior disciplinary history, Tipler, in the present cases, 
has substantial experience in the practice of law and an extensive disciplinary 
history in three states. 
We have already determined that, standing alone, Tipler’s misconduct in 
Case No. SC06-1775, which involved multiple misuses of client funds, warrants 
disbarment.  We have recognized that the overwhelming majority of cases 
involving the misuse of client funds have resulted in disbarment.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 338 (Fla. 2008) (“There is never a valid reason 
for taking client funds held in trust or for completely abandoning clients.”).  Case 
No. SC06-1775 involves seven instances of misuse of an aggregate of $57,680.44 
in client funds and an instance in which Tipler attempted to defraud his creditors in 
the amount of $487,714.81 by misrepresenting facts to a federal bankruptcy court.  
 
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Further, the fact that a default was entered against Tipler does not mitigate the 
discipline that should be imposed.  As pointed out above, in Porter the Court 
disbarred an attorney despite the fact that the recommended discipline was based 
on a default judgment.  Unlike the present case, however, the lawyer in Porter 
engaged in just one instance of misuse of client funds.  In Case No. SC06-1775, 
Tipler stole money from seven clients and perpetrated a fraud on a federal court.  
Clearly, this type of misconduct warrants disbarment. 
 
Tipler has broken numerous Bar rules.  He satisfied his own sexual appetite 
with a client as part of a sex-for-fees arrangement.  He altered evidence and caused 
a witness to unknowingly give false testimony.  He has charged his clients 
excessive fees and stolen their money.  He has failed to maintain a trust account.  
He has broken public confidence in the profession of the practice of law by 
neglecting his clients and failing to prosecute their cases.  He has labored under a 
conflict of interest.  He has prejudiced the administration of justice by 
misrepresenting facts to multiple courts.  And, throughout the disciplinary process 
in these cases, he has been dilatory, deceitful, and evasive.  Tipler has thus 
engaged in an ongoing pattern of egregious misconduct.  Although we question 
whether Tipler is truly amenable to rehabilitation, we take into account the 
mitigating factors found by the referee in Case No. SC03-149 and choose not to 
permanently disbar Tipler at this time.  See Fla. Bar v. Bailey, 803 So. 2d 683, 695 
 
- 26 -
 
- 27 -
n.4 (Fla. 2001) (declining to impose permanent disbarment).  Based on the 
foregoing, there is no appropriate sanction for Tipler in these cases other than 
disbarment. 
CONCLUSION 
James Harvey Tipler is disbarred, effective nunc pro tunc February 23, 2006. 
In addition to the award of restitution and costs in our prior order in Case 
No. SC06-1775, judgment in Cases No. SC03-149 and SC05-1014 is entered for 
The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for 
recovery of costs from James Harvey Tipler, in the amount of $5,946.82, for which 
sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., did not participate. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Three Cases Consolidated: 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of Lawyer 
Regulation, and Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
James Harvey Tipler, pro se, Beverly Hills, California, 
 
 
for Respondent