Title: Kuykendall v. Newgent

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

504 S.W.2d 344 (1974) Ralph M. KUYKENDALL et al., Appellants, v. Harrol L. NEWGENT et ux., Appellees. No. 73-175. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 28, 1974. Davis, Plegge & Lowe, Little Rock, for appellants. Thomas A. Glaze, Little Rock, William B. Blevins, No. Little Rock, for appellees. BYRD, Justice. This is a case of slip and fall on ice and snow by a business invitee. From a judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of appellees Harrol L. Newgent and wife the appellants Ralph M. Kuykendall, Creston B. Fendley and J. D. Ashley, d/b/a Razorback Drive Inn No. 2 bring this appeal. For reversal they contend that the trial *345 court should have directed a verdict in their favor because (1) Newgent assumed the risk; (2) there was no proof that appellants were guilty of any negligence; and (3) a landowner is not liable for open and obvious hazards due to natural accumulations of ice and snow. We find no merit in any contention. The record shows that appellants keep their restaurant open 24 hours a day. There is a front entrance for the appellant's customers and a delivery entrance for supplies received. The delivery entrance has a slope of seven and three-quarters inches in a distance of four feet. The parking area adjacent to the delivery entrance is fairly level. U. S. Climatological Data reflects snow and ice conditions on January 6th and 7th, 1973 with .4 inches of precipitation. The last measurable trace of precipitation of ice and snow was between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. on January 6th. Newgent testified that he was working for Brown Packing Company on January 7th. His duties as such employee required him to deliver meat to appellants which he did around 8:30 a.m. on January 7th. He drove the truck near the delivery entrance and carried in one box. The next box contained a hind quarter of beef weighing from 80 to 100 lbs. He placed this box on his shoulder and as he started in his feet slipped forward and the box fell on top of him. With reference to Newgent's knowledge of the conditions, the record shows: When asked on cross-examination if it was his decision to walk across the icy spot, he replied: "the only decision I had to make was to keep my job." On redirect he testified that when he fell, he did not know the delivery entrance had that much slope. Newgent's lack of knowledge of the slope would certainly make a fact issue on the assumption of risk. That doctrine depends upon actual knowledge of the risk. See McDonald v. Hickman, 252 Ark. 300, 478 S.W.2d 753 (1972). While Newgent may have been guilty of some negligence, we cannot say as a matter of law that such negligence exceeded that of appellants. Such issues are ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. See McDonald v. Hickman, supra. The duties of owners and occupiers of land to business invitees usually end when the danger is either known or obvious to the invitee. However, most authorities; see Prosser on Torts, Invitee § 61 (4th ed. 1971); 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 27.13 (1956); and Restatement of Torts 2d § 343A (1965); recognize that under some circumstances a possessor of land may owe a duty to the business invitee despite the knowledge of the latter. To the contrary see Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 42 Ohio Ops.2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 589, 32 A.L.R.3d 1 (1968). Prosser on Torts, supra, explains the landowner's duties under those exceptional circumstances in this language: Appellants here argue that since ice and snow in Arkansas are of an unexpected nature and short but hazardous duration we should not hold them liable as landowners for open and obvious hazards due to natural accumulations of ice and snow. We need not here determine whether a landowner would owe a duty to an invitee because of the accumulation of ice and snow on a parking lot nor whether the landowner would owe a duty to an invitee using an entrance way during such a storm or immediately thereafter, for the proof here shows that during the operation of a 24 hour business the accumulated ice and snow was permitted to remain upon a sloping entrance way for a period of some 18 to 20 hours. It would appear under those circumstances that the landowner should have anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause physical harm to one required to use the entrance way notwithstanding the known or obvious danger. Affirmed. HOLT, J., not participating.