Title: Matter of Swasso

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Swasso1988 WY 37751 P.2d 887Case Number: 87-229Decided: 03/17/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ANTHONY L. SWASSO. ANTHONY L. 
SWASSO, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE/CLAIMANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX 
REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR/DEFENDANT), v. 
BARNHART DRILLING COMPANY, INC., (EMPLOYER/RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District Court,FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Sky D. Phifer, 
Lander, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Susan Maher Overeem, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this worker's 
compensation case, appellant Anthony L. Swasso appeals from the district court 
order granting motions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division (state 
fund) dismissing his Petition for Relief from Order, and Amended Petition for a 
new trial, constituting a request to re-examine a previously denied worker's 
compensation claim. We affirm, based on principles of res 
judicata.

[¶2.]     Swasso fashions the 
appeal:

"1. Does the District 
Court lack jurisdiction to hear Employee/Claimant's Petition for Relief from 
Order on the grounds of lack of standing on the part of the 
Employee/Claimant?

"2. Does the District 
Court lack jurisdiction to hear Employee/Claimant's Petition for Relief from 
Order because of a lack of statutory authorization for the 
Petition?

"3. Is the Petition for 
Relief from Order filed by the Employee/Claimant barred by the Doctrine of Res 
Judicata?"

The state fund 
inquires:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by granting appellee's motion to dismiss when a motion for 
a new trial had previously been denied and when the issues before the court had 
already been litigated and appealed."

[¶3.]     On December 19, 1983, 
Swasso, who was then employed by Barnhart Drilling Company, Inc. (employer) as a 
tool pusher and driller, filed a worker's report of accident with the district 
court, alleging that an injury to his back had occurred on December 4, 1983, at 
work, while he lifted a 250-pound "crossover sub structure of [a] rig" on which 
he was working. Subsequent claims for awards were filed, including claims for 
chiropractic treatment for a two-month period, and were paid for by the state 
fund. According to the treating chiropractor, the "injury" constituted an 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

[¶4.]     Nine months after this 
treatment, with no intervening claim, a further claim was filed on December 3, 
1984, for expenses of chiropractic treatment incurred on November 27, 1984, "to 
have my back injuries evaluated and if disability payment is feasible," as 
recited in the form. This new claim by Swasso gave December 4, 1983 as the 
injury date, and resulted in employer's response by a letter to the clerk of 
court to request medical documentation to establish that Swasso's current back 
problems should be attributed to the year-earlier back strain. In that letter, 
employer further stated that Swasso had worked for him until his October 26, 
1984 employment discharge, and that at no time during the spring, summer, or 
fall of 1984 was there any report of any recurring pain or re-injury. On 
December 20, 1984, Swasso filed for the first time for temporary total 
disability benefits for the period from October 27, 1984 (day after discharge) 
through December 31, 1985. Again by letter to the clerk of court dated January 
4, 1985, the employer objected to the application for benefits, stating that it 
did not believe that its former employee's current ailment could be attributed 
to a specific incident or accident that occurred during covered employment. The 
objection letter was followed by a more formal Petition Protesting Benefits and 
Statement of Reasons for Objection to Claim.

[¶5.]     On March 19, 1985, 
Swasso filed another Application, Claim and Award for Initial Temporary Total 
Disability for the period from November 26, 1984 to the time of claim, signed by 
himself and by Dr. W. Michael Pryor. 

[¶6.]     The trial was held in 
September, 1985, at which time the court heard testimony from Swasso, Dr. W. 
Michael Pryor, Deborah Lind, D.C., and three employer witnesses. Following 
conclusion of the trial, in January 1986, the court entered specific findings of 
fact, to which objection was taken by a motion for new trial. Judgment was 
entered adverse to Swasso on March 19, 1986, concluding that the employee 
"failed to meet his burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence and that 
therefore he is entitled to no benefits as claimed." Undeterred even though he 
had lost in trial on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence decision, Swasso promptly 
filed a Combined Motion for New Trial and Motion for Relief from Judgment Order, 
alleging that there was an error in the assessment of recovery, that the 
decision was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the law, 
and further that there was an error of law occurring at trial and that the 
Judgment and the Findings of Fact were based upon substantial mistakes of fact 
and evidence. These motions were deemed denied on May 25, 1986, pursuant to 
automatic denial provisions of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., and by denial order filed 
June 13. Following prompt appeal and after docketing in the Supreme Court, the 
state fund filed a motion for dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution in 
that appellant's brief was not timely filed. Responsive to that motion, the 
appeal was dismissed by this court on August 29, 1986, pursuant to Rule 5.11, 
W.R.A.P.1

[¶7.]     Eight months later, 
back to the district court and now by different counsel, Swasso filed a Petition 
for Relief from Order based on mistake and newly discovered evidence, which 
initiated this present proceeding. The petition alleged that a March 19, 1985 
form document, Application, Claim and Award for Initial Temporary Total 
Disability was "unable to be submitted as evidence" at trial and now constituted 
newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence 
prior to trial, since only to be found in the files of the state fund. The 
petition also alleged that recent medical evidence existed that was not 
presented at trial, and requested that the court reopen the worker's 
compensation case to allow Swasso's benefits as originally claimed, and for 
medical treatment and disability subsequent to trial, as well as permanent 
partial disability.

[¶8.]     On May 19, 1987, the 
state fund filed a response to Swasso's petition, in part opposing Swasso's 
contention that the Application, Claim and Award for Initial Temporary Total 
Disability was unable to be submitted as evidence at the original trial, 
reciting that the document had been in the court file during the entire sequence 
of the earlier proceeding which then ended with appeal dismissal. The state fund 
further argued that since Swasso was applying for benefits, the doctrine of res 
judicata barred relitigation so that Swasso was without standing to pursue his 
petition, and that the district court was without further jurisdiction. Claimant 
answered the response by a one-sentence Amended Petition:

"COMES NOW Anthony L. 
Swasso, Employee/Claimant, and hereby amends his initial petition to amend the 
prayer to include a request for a new trial."

[¶9.]     As a further answer, 
the state fund filed a motion to dismiss, and after hearing, the trial court 
sustained the state fund's motions, from which this appeal followed. At the 
hearing, the state fund had raised the defense of res judicata, and although not 
stated on the face of the dispositive order, it is clear that the court based 
its decision on that premise.

[¶10.]  CLS v. CLJ, Wyo., 693 P.2d 774, 
775-776 (1985), contains the following discussion of the doctrine of res 
judicata:

"Res judicata is a fact 
of the Anglo-American system of unified adjudication.

"`A court does not face a 
legal problem as a new, pristine blackboard "never writ upon." Decisions are 
mirrors of past decisions and in turn are reflected in the decisions of the 
future. The continuum can no more be broken than can reflecting mirrors be 
interrupted.' A. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion at V-3 
(1969).

"The doctrine of 
res judicata is that a judgment, decided upon the merits by a court with 
jurisdiction, is conclusive of that cause of action and facts or issues 
litigated, both to the parties and their privies in any other action in the same 
or different court of concurrent jurisdiction on the same issues. 46 Am.Jur.2d 
Judgments § 394.

"`Res judicata is the 
term applied to the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and 
their privies; and, as to them, it constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.' Barrett v. 
Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395, 398 
(1982).

"Res judicata is 
a rule of universal law which pervades every well-regulated system of 
jurisprudence. Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965). A final, valid 
determination on the merits of a case is conclusive on the parties and those 
matters adjudicated. Roush v. Roush, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 841 (1979).

"In cases 
involving identical parties, capacity of parties, cause of actions, and subject 
matter, a decision in the first case bars relief in the second case. United 
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 98 N.M. 
633, 651 P.2d 1277 (1982). The criteria involved in res judicata are: (1) 
identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same 
and relate to the subject matter; (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. 
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., Mont., 645 P.2d 929 (1982). See, Kumberg v. 
Kumberg, 232 Kan. 692, 659 P.2d 823 (1983). A policy reason 
for res judicata is that each litigant shall be limited to one opportunity to 
try his case on the merits. Santos v. State, 
Dept. of Transp., Kauai Division, 64 Haw. 648, 
646 P.2d 962 (1982).

"`The principle of res 
judicata fosters reliance on judicial action, and tends to eliminate vexation 
and expense to the parties, wasted use of judicial machinery and the possibility 
of inconsistent results.' Developments in the Law, Res Judicata, 65 Harvard 
L.Rev. 820 (1952). See also, Delgue v. Curutchet, Wyo., 677 P.2d 208 
(1984)."

[¶11.]  In order to determine whether the 
doctrine of res judicata applies to bar Swasso's petitions, we must first 
determine whether in both the September, 1985 hearings and the July 20, 1987 
motion hearing (1) the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter was 
identical; (3) the issues were the same and related to the subject matter; and 
(4) the capacities of the persons were identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them. CLS v. CLJ, supra, 693 P.2d  at 
775-776. Application of these rules is not troublesome, particularly so where 
this proceeding presents a second motion for new trial as the first was invoked 
in the aborted appeal.

[¶12.]  In the September, 1985 hearings, the 
parties to the action were Anthony L. Swasso, Employee/Claimant; Barnhart 
Drilling Company, Inc., Employer/Respondent; and the State of Wyoming ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division. Neither the parties nor their capacities 
to the action changed between the first hearings and the second. At the initial 
hearings, the issue was Swasso's eligibility for worker's compensation benefits 
for temporary total disability for the period from October 27, 1984 through 
December 31, 1985. The court heard testimony from Swasso; Dr. W. Michael Pryor, 
his treating physician; Deborah Lind, D.C., a chiropractor; and three employer 
witnesses.2 

[¶13.]  In his 1987 Petition for Relief from 
Order and Amended Petition for a new trial, filed 18 and one-half months after 
initial decision, Swasso argued that the district court should have reopened the 
case under Rule 60(b)(2), W.R.C.P. to award "the benefits as originally claimed 
and for medical treatment and disability subsequent to trial, as well as for 
permanent partial disability." Appellant was clearly praying for benefits 
already denied by the trial court for injuries found not to be compensable. Had 
the trial court reopened the case, the court would have had to relitigate the 
threshold question of whether or not Swasso was suffering from a work-related 
injury, an issue fully litigated at the September, 1985 hearings. With identity 
of the parties, the subject matter, and the issues, the trial court properly 
applied the doctrine of res judicata to bar Swasso's Petition for Relief from 
Order and Amended Petition for a new trial.

[¶14.]  Additionally, however, in this appeal 
Swasso contends that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply because claims 
of newly discovered evidence and mistake do not fall within the doctrine. As the 
foundation of his contentions, Swasso submits that a document entitled 
Application, Claim and Award for Initial Temporary Total Disability, filed March 
19, 1985, was unavailable for trial as it was not sent to Swasso or his attorney 
prior to the trial due to a mistake of the clerk of court. We consequently 
consider and adversely decide whether a document filed in the formal worker's 
compensation court file constitutes "newly discovered evidence" for the purpose 
of Rule 60(b)(2), W.R.C.P. Cf. Keser v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 756 
(1987).

[¶15.]  Newly discovered evidence is that "which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b)." Rule 60(b)(2), W.R.C.P.3 We have held that "[e]vidence in a 
party's possession before a judgment is rendered is not newly discovered 
evidence entitling one to relief under Rule 60(b)(2)." Matter of Injury to 
Seevers, Wyo., 720 P.2d 899, 903 (1986), quoting 11 
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2859 (1973). Here, 
Swasso was constructively in possession of the document long before the trial on 
the issue of his worker's compensation eligibility. The document was signed by 
Swasso and also by Dr. W. Michael Pryor. Swasso himself submitted the document 
to the clerk of court on March 19, 1985, which became a part of the file on that 
date. It is clear from the record that Swasso was aware of the existence of this 
document before the trial. Moreover, Dr. Pryor was a witness in the original 
hearings and was questioned and cross-examined by the parties. Thus, any factual 
information the document contained would have been merely duplicative of Dr. 
Pryor's testimony at trial. The same is true of the "new medical evidence" 
offered by Swasso in his petitions in light of the res judicata doctrine. Rule 
60(b) only "applies to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, but a 
showing of such exceptional circumstances should be made." McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814, 816 (1979). Here, in 
dismissing Swasso's petition, the trial court found that no such showing was 
made, and, based on the record on appeal, we agree.

[¶16.]  A decision by the trial court for relief 
under Rule 60(b) invokes consideration by this court whether an abuse of 
discretion has occurred. By granting the division's motion to dismiss, the court 
denied Swasso's Petition for Relief from Order and his Amended Petition for a 
new trial. We have held that:

"* * * An order denying 
relief under Rule 60(b) is appealable, but proceeding under the rule is not to 
be regarded as a substitute for an appeal. Since the granting of relief pursuant 
to that rule is a matter of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, on 
review the appellate court is limited to the question of whether there has 
occurred an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It [is] the appellant's 
burden before the trial court to bring her cause within the claimed grounds for 
relief and to substantiate by adequate proof the grounds that she claimed for 
relief. The rule applies to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, 
but a showing of such exceptional circumstances should be made. A reversal of an 
order denying relief under Rule 60(b) will be ordered only if the trial court 
clearly was wrong." McBride v. McBride, supra, 598 P.2d  at 
816.

See also Kreuter 
v. Kreuter, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1986); and Matter 
of Injury to Seevers, supra, 720 P.2d  at 901.

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously." Martin v. 
State, Wyo., 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (1986).

[¶17.]  In agreement with both the mandatory 
rejection of retrial based on res judicata, and the denial of a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence as exercised discretion, the decision is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Differing from a fairly 
frequent occurrence, counsel for Swasso also failed to file any request for 
reconsideration by this court as might have been premised on cause for default 
shown.

2 In the 1987 Special 
Session, the Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805 was 
repealed and recreated as §§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804, W.S. 1977, 1987 
Replacement.

The old act, § 27-12-611, 
W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement, provided in pertinent part:

"(a) Each employee 
awarded compensation for temporary total disability shall submit himself for 
medical examination by a physician 
licensed to practice medicine in this state, * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

The corresponding 
recreated statute, Section 27-14-609, W.S. 1987, on the other hand, provides in 
pertinent part:

"(a) The division shall 
review every award for temporary total disability under W.S. 27-14-404 at least 
once every six (6) months. Upon request by the employer or division, an employee 
awarded compensation for temporary total disability shall submit to medical 
examination by a health care provider 
* * *." (Emphasis added.)

Section 27-14-102(a)(x) 
defines a health care provider as a

"* * * doctor of 
medicine, chiropractic or osteopathy, 
dentist, optometrist, podiatrist or psychologist, acting within the scope of his 
license, licensed to practice in this state or in good standing in his home 
state."

The effect of this change 
is that now under the worker's compensation statutes, the medical testimony of 
chiropractors is accepted as relevant medical testimony, whereas, under the old, 
repealed statute, such testimony was not. This is notable in this case in that 
Swasso was injured at a time when the old statute was in effect, and as such, 
the court used that statute to deny Swasso worker's compensation benefits. On 
review of a trial court's decision, we must act under the same statutory 
guidelines as used by that court. State ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation 
Division v. Tallman, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 835, 838 
(1979).

3 "(b) Mistakes; 
inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: * * * (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
* * *." Rule 60(b)(2), W.R.C.P.