Title: State v. James P.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 80 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP723 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Chezron M., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
James P.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 124 
Reported at:  274 Wis. 2d 494, 684 N.W.2d 164 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 17, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph R. Wall   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Carl W. Chesshir, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Carl W. 
Chesshir. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Thomas C. Binger, assistant district attorney, with whom on the 
brief was E. Michael McCann, district attorney. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Shelia R. Hill-
Roberts and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., Milwaukee, and 
there was oral argument by Shelia R. Hill-Roberts. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott A. Sussman, 
Madison, on behalf of the Center for Family Policy and Practice. 
 
2005 WI 80 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP723 
(L.C. No. 
02 TP 350) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Chezron M., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. James P., 2004 WI App 124, 
274 Wis. 2d 494, 684 N.W.2d 164, affirming an order of the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Joseph R. Wall, Judge, that 
terminated James P.'s parental rights to Chezron M.   
¶2 
James P. argues that grounds did not exist to 
terminate 
his 
parental 
rights 
to 
Chezron 
M. 
under 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(a)3. (2001-02)1 because he had not been 
adjudicated the biological father of Chezron M. prior to the 
alleged periods of abandonment and thus was not her "parent," as 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(13), 
when 
the 
abandonment 
occurred.  We disagree and affirm.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
¶3 
The following facts were found by the circuit court 
and are undisputed on appeal.  Chezron M. (Chezron) was born to 
Judy M. on April 25, 1995.  Judy M. was unmarried but was having 
relations with James P. at the time she conceived.  Judy M. told 
James P. that the child could be his or that of another man.2  
James P. was present at the hospital when Chezron was born.  His 
insurance paid the costs of Chezron's birth, as he had her 
listed on his medical insurance policy as his daughter.   
¶4 
"James P. cared for Chezron and treated her as his 
biological daughter."  He added her to his life insurance policy 
as his daughter.  Chezron called James P. "'dad,' and he 
considered Chezron 'family.'"   
¶5 
In March of 1998, Chezron was found to be in need of 
protection and services due to Judy M.'s parental failings.  In 
all court records, James P. was listed as the alleged father of 
Chezron.  James P. attended no less than three Children in Need 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
2 There was evidence presented at trial that Judy M. never 
suggested to third parties that anyone other than James P. was 
the father of Chezron.   
No. 
2004AP723   
 
3 
 
of Protective Service (CHIPS) hearings between 1998 and 2001 
that were held for Chezron.   
¶6 
The last time James P. saw Chezron was during an 
informal visit in 1999.  On two occasions between 2000 and 2001, 
James P. sent presents to Chezron via a case manager from the 
Milwaukee Child Welfare Bureau.  During this period, James P. 
did not visit Chezron or otherwise contact her.  James P. did 
not attempt to remove Chezron from foster care or hire an 
attorney to do so.  He did not attempt to contact Chezron, the 
social workers, or her foster parents, and he failed to respond 
to inquiries made by Chezron's case manager.  James P. made no 
attempt to be legally acknowledged as Chezron's father.3   
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
¶7 
On May 16, 2002, the State filed a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of James P. to Chezron.  The 
petition listed James P. as the "alleged father" of Chezron.  As 
grounds for the termination, the petition listed failure to 
assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  
Sometime thereafter in early 2002, James P. was adjudicated the 
father of Chezron as a result of DNA testing.4  The State 
                                                 
3 Despite 
his 
involvement 
in 
these 
legal 
proceedings 
concerning 
Chezron, 
James 
P. 
did 
nothing 
to 
officially 
acknowledge his fatherhood because in his view, "the children 
belonged with the mother."   
4 James P. stated at trial that the only reason he became 
adjudicated the father of Chezron was so that her mother, who 
voluntarily consented to have her parental rights terminated, 
could still see Chezron.   
No. 
2004AP723   
 
4 
 
subsequently amended the petition on June 13, 2002, to list 
James P. as the "adjudicated father" of Chezron.  On October 7, 
2002, 
the 
State 
filed 
another 
amended 
petition, 
adding 
abandonment under  § 48.415(1)(a)3. as a ground for termination 
of James P.'s parental rights.  The State subsequently moved to 
dismiss the failure to assume parental responsibility ground 
against James P., and the court granted the motion.   
¶8 
The case was tried to the circuit court, and James P. 
admitted that he had no contact with Chezron between April 25, 
2000, and December 25, 2000, and between April 25, 2001, and 
December 25, 2001.  One of James P.'s defenses was that he did 
not know Chezron was his child until he was adjudicated her 
father.  The circuit court specifically found that James P. was 
not credible and his assertion that he did not know he was 
Chezron's father was not believable.   
¶9 
At the close of the evidence, James P. moved to 
dismiss the petition on the basis that the ground of abandonment 
in § 48.415(1)(a)3. does not apply to someone who is merely an 
"alleged father," that is, someone who may be the parent of a 
nonmarital child during the periods of alleged abandonment but 
has not officially been adjudicated as the child's father.  The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion, 
reasoning: 
 
"[A] 
man 
adjudicated as the biological father has always been the 
biological father and, therefore, that man has always been a 
'parent' under § 48.02(13)."  The court concluded that "James P. 
was always the father of Chezron."  The court also found that 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
5 
 
James P. had failed to establish the affirmative defense of 
"good cause for failing to communicate with [Chezron]."5   
¶10 As such, the court found the State met its burden of 
proving the ground of abandonment under § 48.415(1)(a)3.  The 
court 
therefore 
found 
James 
P. 
unfit 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4).  At the dispositional hearing, the court 
found that it was in the best interest of Chezron that James 
P.'s 
parental 
rights 
be 
terminated 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.427(3).  On December 9, 2003, the circuit court 
entered an order terminating James P.'s parental rights, which 
order James P. subsequently appealed.   
¶11 At the court of appeals, James P. again argued that 
§ 48.415(1)(a)3. does not apply to him because he was not a 
"parent," as defined under § 48.02(13), until he was adjudicated 
Chezron's biological father.  The court of appeals noted that 
among the definitions of "parent" found in § 48.02(13), two were 
applicable: 
 
"a 
biological 
parent" 
and 
"a 
person . . . adjudicated to be the biological father."  James 
P., 274 Wis. 2d 494, ¶¶4-5.  The court of appeals rejected James 
P.'s argument, reasoning that under the first definition, the 
fact of biological parenthood did not depend on official state 
                                                 
5 The statutory ground for abandonment contains a "good 
cause" affirmative defense that may be established upon proof 
that the parent had good cause for failing to visit the child, 
or had good cause for failing to communicate with the child and, 
if the child is an infant, that the parent communicated about 
the child with the person having custody of the child or had 
good cause for failing to communicate about the child with the 
person having custody of the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)(c). 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
6 
 
recognition.  Id., ¶4.  The court of appeals further reasoned 
that although the law can terminate the parental relationship, 
it does not "create biological parenthood."  Id., ¶6. 
¶12 The court of appeals specifically cautioned that it 
was not addressing "whether an adjudication subsequent to acts 
that comprise grounds for the termination of a person's parental 
rights subjects the adjudicated person to the termination of 
parental rights based on those acts[.]"  Id., ¶5.  Rather, the 
court of appeals held that the first definition of "parent" 
applied to James P. because he "was always Chezron's biological 
father, even before he was formally adjudicated as such."  Id.  
The court of appeals stated that James P. "was in fact Chezron's 
biological parent when she was born and he has never denied 
that."  Id., ¶6.   
¶13 The court of appeals was not persuaded by James P.'s 
argument that the first definition applied only to children born 
to parents who were married because the first definition was not 
"in haec verba, limited to children of a solemnized marriage."  
Id.  The court of appeals stated that James P.'s arguments were 
merely "an attempt to eschew legal responsibility for the 
periods during which he had no contact with Chezron[.]"  Id., 
¶6.  Relying on this court's decision in Wisconsin Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶¶19-24, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612, the court of appeals stated that 
the fact that individuals falling under the first definition of 
"parent" may also be included under the last definition of 
"parent" does not narrow the scope or application of the first 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
7 
 
definition.  James P., 274 Wis. 2d 494, ¶6.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court order terminating 
James P.'s parental rights to Chezron.    
III. ISSUE 
 
¶14 The narrow question we address on appeal is whether an 
individual who is in fact the biological parent of a nonmarital 
child may have his parental rights to that child terminated 
based on conduct that occurred before he was officially 
adjudicated the biological father based on DNA evidence.  In 
other words, we must determine whether an individual who is in 
fact the biological parent of a nonmarital child meets the 
definition of "parent" under § 48.02(13) at a time when he has 
yet to be officially adjudicated as the biological father.  We 
emphasize that we, like the court of appeals, do not address 
"whether an adjudication subsequent to acts that comprise 
grounds for the termination of a person's parental rights 
subjects the adjudicated person to the termination of parental 
rights based on those acts[.]"  James P., 274 Wis. 2d 494, ¶5.  
That is, we do not decide whether an individual who is legally 
adjudicated to be the biological parent of a nonmarital child, 
but is not in fact the biological father, may have his parental 
rights terminated based on conduct that occurred prior to the 
adjudication.  
¶15 We hold that an individual who is in fact the 
biological father of a nonmarital child satisfies the definition 
of "parent" in § 48.02(13), as he is a "biological parent," 
notwithstanding that he has not officially been adjudicated as 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
8 
 
the child's biological father.  Because such an individual 
satisfies the definition of "parent," he may have his parental 
rights terminated based on periods of abandonment that occurred 
prior to his official adjudication as the child's biological 
father, assuming he has failed to establish a "good cause" 
affirmative defense to the ground of abandonment.    
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶16 This case concerns the meaning of "parent" under 
§ 48.02(13). 
 
The 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
its 
application to a set of facts are issues of law reviewed de novo 
by this court.  Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 
2003 WI 143, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633.  The rules 
governing statutory interpretation are well settled:  
When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect 
to the language in the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶43, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin by looking to 
the language of the statute because we "assume that 
the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language."  Id., ¶44.  Technical terms or legal terms 
of art appearing in the statute are given their 
accepted 
technical 
or 
legal 
definitions 
while 
nontechnical words and phrases are given their common, 
everyday meaning.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Terms that 
are specifically defined in a statute are accorded the 
definition 
the 
legislature 
provided. 
 
Wisconsin 
Citizens 
Concerned 
for 
Cranes 
and 
Doves, 
270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶6.  In addition, we read the language of 
a specific statutory section in the context of the 
entire statute.  Id.  Thus, we interpret a statute in 
light of its textually manifest scope, context, and 
purpose.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48 & n.8.   
Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157.  
Therefore, extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, are 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
9 
 
not consulted unless the statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible 
to more than one reasonable understanding.  Id., ¶47.   
V. 
ANALYSIS 
¶17 Section 48.415(1)(a)3. provides that grounds exist to 
terminate an individual's parental rights if "[t]he child has 
been left by the parent with any person, the parent knows or 
could discover the whereabouts of the child and the parent has 
failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of 6 
months or longer."  (Emphasis added.)  James P. does not contest 
that he did not visit or otherwise communicate with Chezron 
during the alleged periods of abandonment.  In addition, he does 
not contest the circuit court's ruling that he failed to 
establish "good cause" for failing to visit or communicate with 
Chezron during the periods in question.  Rather, James P. 
asserts that he was not the "parent" of Chezron during the 
periods of alleged abandonment.   
¶18 Section 48.02(13) defines "parent" as follows:   
"Parent" means either a biological parent, a 
husband 
who 
has 
consented 
to 
the 
artificial 
insemination of his wife under s. 891.40, or a parent 
by adoption.  If the child is a nonmarital child who 
is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently 
intermarry under s. 767.60, "parent" includes a person 
acknowledged under s. 767.62(1) or a substantially 
similar law of another state or adjudicated to be the 
biological father.  "Parent" does not include any 
person whose parental rights have been terminated. 
¶19 James P. does not dispute that he is the biological 
father of Chezron.  Thus, presumably, he would qualify as a 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
10 
 
"parent" under the first sentence of the definition as a 
"biological parent."   
¶20 However, according to James P., the phrase "biological 
parent" in the first sentence is inapplicable to him because it 
applies only to children who are born of solemnized marriages.  
Relying on the legislative history of § 48.02(13), James P. 
argues 
that 
the 
first 
sentence 
of 
§ 48.02(13) 
applies 
exclusively to married individuals, whereas the second sentence 
is the exclusive mechanism by which an individual may qualify as 
a "parent" of a nonmarital child.  As Chezron is a nonmarital 
child and James P. never legally acknowledged that he was the 
father, the only means by which he can satisfy the definition of 
"parent" 
under 
the 
second 
sentence 
is 
as 
"a 
person . . . adjudicated 
to 
be 
the 
biological 
father."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(13).  James P. contends that because he was 
not adjudicated the biological father of Chezron until after the 
periods of alleged abandonment occurred, he was not her "parent" 
during this time frame and thus, he had no parental rights to 
terminate.   
¶21 In contrast, the State argues that the definition of 
"parent" in § 48.02(13) is clear and unambiguous and that 
therefore it is unnecessary to resort to legislative history.  
The State agrees with the court of appeals that James P. clearly 
satisfies the definition of "parent" set forth in the first 
sentence of § 48.02(13), which, on its face, is not limited to 
married individuals.  Further, the State argues that James P.'s 
interpretation of the statute would render it absurd and would 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
11 
 
discourage fathers of nonmarital children from coming forward 
and having courts recognize them as parents.   
¶22 We agree with the State.  We begin our analysis, as we 
must, by examining the text of § 48.02(13).  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  James P.'s argument is based on the premise 
that the first sentence in the definition of "parent" applies 
exclusively to children born of legal marriages, whereas an 
individual may qualify as a "parent" of a nonmarital child only 
under the second sentence in the definition.  However, the text 
of the statute does not support this assertion.   
¶23 The first sentence of § 48.02(13) provides:  "'Parent' 
means either a biological parent, a husband who has consented to 
the artificial insemination of his wife under s. 891.40, or a 
parent by adoption."  (Emphasis added.)  On its face, the first 
sentence is not limited to children born of legal marriages.   
¶24 The second sentence of § 48.02(13) provides:  "If the 
child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents 
do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60, 'parent' 
includes 
a 
person 
acknowledged 
under 
s. 
767.62(1) 
or 
a 
substantially similar law of another state or adjudicated to be 
the biological father."  (Emphasis added.)  Clearly, this 
sentence applies only if the child in question is a nonmarital 
child.  However, while this sentence is limited in its 
application to nonmarital children, it does not, on its face, 
state that it is the exclusive means by which an individual may 
qualify as the "parent" of a nonmarital child.   
No. 
2004AP723   
 
12 
 
¶25 Furthermore, it is significant that the first sentence 
of the definition of "parent" utilizes the word "means," whereas 
the second sentence utilizes the word "includes."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used[.]").  When utilized in statutory 
definitions, 
"means" 
is 
a 
term 
indicating 
limitation 
or 
completeness, whereas "includes" is a term indicating partiality 
and expansiveness.  See Stephen R. Miller, Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2.01(1)(i)(2005-06).   
¶26 Thus, "[g]enerally, the word 'includes' is to be given 
an expansive meaning, indicating that which follows is but a 
part of the whole."  Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and 
Doves, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶17 n.11 (citing Milwaukee Gas & Light 
Co. v. Dept. of Taxation, 23 Wis. 2d 195, 203 & n.2, 127 
N.W.2d 64 (1964)).  While courts may sometimes read the word 
"includes" as a term of limitation or enumeration under the 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there must be 
some textual evidence that the legislature intended this 
doctrine to apply.  Id.   
¶27 Here, the text of § 48.02(13) contains no indication 
that the legislature intended the word "includes" in the second 
sentence to be read as a term of limitation.  Indeed, the text 
indicates the opposite.  First and foremost, the word "includes" 
appears in the sentence immediately following the general 
definition of "parent," in which the word "means" is utilized.  
If 
the 
legislature 
had 
intended 
the 
second 
sentence 
of 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
13 
 
§ 48.02(13) to be one of limitation or exclusivity, it would 
have used the word "means," as it did in the first sentence.   
¶28 Moreover, 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
first 
sentence 
of 
§ 48.02(13) provides a general definition of "parent" that is 
followed by a sentence listing additional circumstances under 
which an individual qualifies as a "parent" indicates that the 
second sentence should not be read as one of limitation or 
exclusivity.  Cf. Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and 
Doves, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶17 n.11 ("[M]any of the terms contained 
in Wis. Stat. § 29.001 are not defined by a general definition, 
but rather are defined by the use of the word 'includes' 
followed by a list of certain species.").   
¶29 Furthermore, James P.'s interpretation simply cannot 
be squared with the remaining language in § 48.02(13).  For 
instance, if James P. is correct that the second sentence lists 
the exclusive means by which an individual qualifies as a 
"parent" of a nonmarital child, then an individual who is not 
married and who adopts a child would not meet the definition of 
"parent."  The first sentence of § 48.02(13), which, according 
to James P., applies only to married individuals, states that 
"'[p]arent' means . . .  a parent by adoption."  In contrast, 
the second sentence of § 48.02(13) states:  "If the child is a 
nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not 
subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60, 'parent' includes a 
person acknowledged under s. 767.62(1) or a substantially 
similar law of another state or adjudicated to be the biological 
father."  (Emphasis added.)  Notably, the second sentence, 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
14 
 
although referring to adopted children, does not list "a parent 
by adoption" after the word "includes."  If "includes" is to be 
given a restrictive meaning, as James P. suggests, then the 
second sentence specifically 
precludes 
an 
individual 
from 
becoming the "parent" of a nonmarital child through adoption.   
¶30 While James P. asserts that an individual may be the 
"parent" of a nonmarital child through adoption, the statutory 
language and his interpretation of the word "includes" cannot 
support such a conclusion.  The plain language in the statute 
limits the applicability of those items following the word 
"includes" to circumstances where "the child is a nonmarital 
child who is not adopted."  The same illogical result occurs 
under James P.'s interpretation for unmarried individuals who 
produce children and subsequently intermarry.   
¶31 In contrast, reading the word "includes" in the second 
sentence as a term of expansion produces results consistent with 
all the statutory language and common sense.  Under this 
reading, the first sentence of § 48.02(13) provides a general 
definition of "parent" that applies to married and unmarried 
individuals.  The second sentence merely provides additional 
circumstances under which an individual qualifies as a "parent" 
of "a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do 
not subsequently intermarry."  Wis. Stat. § 48.02(13).   
¶32 This interpretation of § 48.02(13) recognizes that an 
individual who adopts a nonmarital child qualifies as a "parent 
by adoption" under the general definition of "parent" in the 
first sentence.  Likewise, two unmarried individuals who produce 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
15 
 
a child and subsequently intermarry appropriately qualify as 
parents under the first definition as "biological parents."  
Furthermore, an unmarried individual, like James P., who fathers 
a nonmarital child, qualifies as a "parent" under the first 
sentence as a "biological parent."   
¶33 However, James P. argues that if we adopt this 
interpretation, part of the second sentence will be rendered 
superfluous. 
 
Specifically, 
he 
suggests 
that 
under 
our 
interpretation, the final statutory definition of "parent"——"a 
person . . . adjudicated to be the biological father[]"——will 
always be subsumed in the first definition——"a biological 
parent."  We disagree that the final definition of "parent" will 
always be subsumed within the first definition because the final 
definition 
covers 
an 
individual 
"adjudicated 
to 
be 
the 
biological 
father," 
and 
is 
thus 
broader 
than 
the 
first 
definition, which applies only to "a biological parent."   
¶34 As discussed extensively during oral argument, an 
adjudication of biological fatherhood is a legal determination, 
and an individual may be "adjudicated to be the biological 
father" of a child by default.  In contrast, as the court of 
appeals correctly recognized through its colorful, metaphysical 
discussion, the phrase "a biological parent" in the first 
sentence of § 48.02(13) refers to the actual biological parent 
of a child:   
[T]he fact of biological parenthood does not turn on 
whether it is recognized, found, or adjudicated, any 
more than the fact that a tree has fallen in the 
forest depends on someone's perception of the crashing 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
16 
 
sound, or, in another context, gravity's existence 
depended on Sir Isaac Newton's formulation of its 
principles.   
 . . . . 
 . . . Although the law can terminate a parent-child 
relationship . . . only a power much much higher than 
law, lawyers, judges, states or nations can, as the 
State points out, create biological parenthood.  
James P., 274 Wis. 2d 494, ¶¶4, 6.   
¶35 In other words, the phrase "adjudicated to be the 
biological father" in the second sentence of § 48.02(13) refers 
to someone who is legally determined to be a biological father, 
who may or may not be an actual biological parent——a de jure 
biological father.  In contrast, the phrase "biological parent" 
in the first sentence refers to a person who actually is a 
biological parent——a de facto biological parent.  While an 
individual who is "a biological parent" will always be capable 
of being "adjudicated to be the biological father[,]" an 
individual who is "adjudicated to be the biological father" is 
not necessarily "a biological parent."   
¶36 As such, the second sentence of § 48.02(13) is not 
superfluous because although an individual may qualify as a 
"parent" under both the definition in the first sentence and the 
definition in the second sentence, the definition in the second 
sentence is broader than the first, as it applies to a factual 
scenario to which the first sentence does not——a biological 
father by 
default. 
 As 
the court 
of appeals 
correctly 
recognized, the fact that a given item may fall within a narrow 
definition and also qualify under a broader definition does not 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
17 
 
narrow the scope of the broader definition.  Id., ¶6 (citing 
Wisconsin 
Citizens 
Concerned 
for 
Cranes 
and 
Doves, 
270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶19-24).   
¶37 Therefore, 
we conclude that 
the 
only 
reasonable 
reading of the text of § 48.02(13) is that the first sentence 
provides a general definition of "parent" that is applicable to 
both married and unmarried individuals.  The second sentence 
supplies additional means by which an individual may qualify as 
the "parent" of "a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose 
parents do not subsequently intermarry."  The fact that the 
second sentence supplies additional means by which an individual 
may qualify as the "parent" of a nonmarital child in certain 
circumstances in no way means that an individual may not also 
qualify as the "parent" of a nonmarital child under the general 
definition provided in the first sentence.  Thus, the plain 
language of § 48.02(13) does not support James P.'s contention 
that the first sentence of the statute applies exclusively to 
married individuals and that individuals may qualify as parents 
of nonmarital children only under the circumstances set forth in 
the second sentence.   
¶38 As we conclude there is but one reasonable reading of 
the plain text of the statute, there is no need to consult the 
legislative history of § 48.02(13).  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.  However, we do note that our interpretation is consistent 
with the legislative purposes of the Children's Code, as 
explicitly set forth in the text of the Code.  See id., ¶49 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
18 
 
(noting that the plain meaning of a statute should comport with 
any textually manifest statutory purpose).    
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part: 
In construing this chapter, the best interests of the 
child or unborn child shall always be of paramount 
consideration. 
 This 
chapter shall be 
liberally 
construed 
to 
effectuate 
the 
following 
express 
legislative purposes: 
(a) While recognizing that the paramount goal of 
this chapter is to protect children and unborn 
children, to preserve the unity of the family, 
whenever appropriate, by strengthening family life 
through assisting parents and the expectant mothers of 
unborn children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling 
their 
responsibilities 
as 
parents 
or 
expectant 
mothers. . . . The courts and agencies responsible for 
child welfare should also recognize that instability 
and impermanence in family relationships are contrary 
to the welfare of children and should therefore 
recognize the importance of eliminating the need for 
children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their safe return to the family.   
 . . . . 
 
(gr) To allow for the termination of parental 
rights 
at 
the 
earliest 
possible 
time 
after 
rehabilitation 
and 
reunification 
efforts 
are 
discontinued in accordance with this chapter and 
termination of parental rights is in the best interest 
of the child.  
¶40 Under James P.'s interpretation of § 48.02(13), an 
individual who fathers a nonmarital child is not legally the 
"parent" of that child (and thus cannot have his parental rights 
terminated) unless and until he either acknowledges that he is 
the father of the child or is adjudicated to be the father of 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
19 
 
the child.  This interpretation, in contrast to the express 
legislative purpose behind the Children's Code, encourages 
individuals like James P. to wait until the last possible moment 
to acknowledge their fatherhood or have a court adjudicate their 
parenthood, in order to avoid having their rights terminated.  
Thus, James P.'s interpretation provides an incentive for 
putative fathers to avoid taking legal responsibility for their 
children 
and 
does 
nothing 
to 
preserve 
family 
unity 
and 
stability.   
¶41 In addition, James P.'s interpretation of § 48.02(13) 
allows an individual who has fathered a nonmarital child to 
establish 
a 
relationship 
with 
that 
child, 
disappear 
for 
unreasonable periods of time, and then seek to have his parental 
rights validated when it is most convenient for him.  This type 
of ephemeral parenting is precisely the type of "instability and 
impermanence in family relationships" that the Code seeks to 
avoid.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).   
¶42 In contrast, our interpretation——which recognizes that 
an individual who is, in fact, the biological father of a child 
has always been the child's biological parent——encourages 
putative fathers to acknowledge their fatherhood or have a court 
determine their parenthood as soon as possible, encourages such 
individuals to fulfill their responsibilities as parents, and 
holds such individuals accountable when they fail to do so.  If 
someone who is the actual biological father of a nonmarital 
child establishes a substantial relationship with that child and 
thereafter 
refuses 
to 
fulfill 
his 
legal 
duties 
and 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
20 
 
responsibilities by abandoning the child, our interpretation 
protects the child by allowing the State to terminate the 
father's 
rights 
"at 
the 
earliest 
possible 
time."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(gr).   
¶43 James P.'s interpretation, on the other hand, would 
not only lead to results contrary to the stated purposes of the 
Children's Code, his interpretation would lead to results that 
are patently absurd and that endanger child safety.  Under James 
P.'s interpretation, an individual who is, in fact, the 
biological father of a nonmarital child cannot have his parental 
rights terminated unless and until he is legally adjudicated the 
child's biological father or acknowledges his fatherhood.  An 
individual who never formally acknowledges his fatherhood and 
does not seek a legal determination of his parenthood until long 
after his child has been removed from his home is therefore free 
to engage in a variety of reprehensible conduct while living 
with the child and avoid being subject to a termination of his 
rights based on such conduct.   
¶44 For instance, someone like James P. could murder the 
mother of his child and yet avoid having his parental rights 
terminated under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(8) because he was not the 
"parent" of the child (as he had yet to be adjudicated the 
biological father) when the murder took place.  An individual 
could abuse the child and avoid having his parental rights 
terminated under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5) because he had yet to be 
adjudicated the biological father at the time of abuse.  In 
addition, as in the present case, an individual could begin to 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
21 
 
raise and care for his child and then abandon his child yet 
avoid having his rights terminated under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1) 
because he was not adjudicated the biological father when the 
periods of abandonment occurred.   
¶45 Therefore, we can find no support in the statute for 
James P.'s assertion that the parental rights of an individual 
who fathers a child outside a marriage attach and can be 
terminated only after the State officially recognizes him as the 
father.  Here, it is uncontested that James P. is the biological 
father of Chezron.  As such, he meets the definition of "parent" 
in the first sentence of § 48.02(13) as he is, and always was, 
Chezron's biological parent.   
¶46 James P.'s final argument is that our interpretation 
raises due process concerns.  Although he is not specific, he 
alludes to the fact that an individual who is the biological 
parent of a nonmarital child may not be aware of this fact until 
he is adjudicated as such, and therefore may not be aware of his 
legal obligations towards the child.  However, this argument is 
a red herring in this case because § 48.415(1)(c) specifically 
provides an affirmative defense to the abandonment ground if an 
individual can establish "good cause" why he did not visit or 
have contact with the child.   
¶47 Here, the circuit court specifically found, and James 
P. has not challenged on appeal, that he failed to establish a 
good cause defense.  The circuit court explicitly rejected James 
P.'s contention that he was unaware that Chezron was his child.  
The circuit court set forth the following factual findings:   
No. 
2004AP723   
 
22 
 
James P. was at the hospital when Chezron was born.  
His insurance paid the costs of her birth and he 
listed her on his medical insurance policy as his 
daughter.  He also added Chezron to his life insurance 
policy as his daughter.  James P. cared for Chezron 
and treated her as his biological daughter.  Chezron 
called him "dad," and he considered Chezron "family."   
Additionally, the circuit court highlighted that James P.'s 
testimony had been impeached on a number of issues and that he 
was not a credible witness.  It noted that the testimony at 
trial contradicted James P.'s assertion that Chezron's mother 
told him the child was not his.  As he does not contest any of 
these findings on appeal, James P. is in no position to now 
suggest that he was unaware that Chezron was his child.   
¶48 Because we have concluded that James P. meets the 
definition of "parent" in § 48.02(13), as he is and always was 
Chezron's "biological parent," and the circuit court concluded 
that he failed to establish a good cause defense to abandonment 
under 48.415(1)(c), we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the circuit court order terminating 
James P.'s parental rights to Chezron.  We emphasize that we do 
not hold, as did the circuit court, that "a man adjudicated as 
the biological father has always been the biological father and, 
therefore, 
that 
man 
has 
always 
been 
a 
'parent' 
under 
§ 48.02(13)."  We merely hold that James P. satisfies the 
definition of "parent" in the first sentence of § 48.02(13) 
because he is and always was, in fact, Chezron's "biological 
parent."   
 
 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
23 
 
VI. CONCLUSION.   
¶49 We hold that an individual who is in fact the 
biological father of a nonmarital child satisfies the definition 
of "parent" in § 48.02(13), as he is a "biological parent," 
notwithstanding that he has not officially been adjudicated as 
the child's biological father.  Because such an individual 
satisfies the definition of "parent," he may have his parental 
rights terminated based on periods of abandonment that occurred 
prior to his official adjudication as the child's biological 
father, assuming he has failed to establish a "good cause" 
affirmative defense to the ground of abandonment.    
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No. 
2004AP723   
 
 
 
1