Title: State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 105 Ohio St.3d 476, 2005-
Ohio-2974.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] STACY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. BATAVIA 
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLEES AND 
CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
 105 Ohio St.3d 476, 2005-Ohio-2974.] 
Mandamus — Back pay — Duty to mitigate — Employee whose position was 
eliminated in violation of statute entitled to back pay that is not offset by 
Social Security benefits — SERS pension benefits must offset back-pay 
award — Attorney fees not recoverable in mandamus action. 
(No. 2004-0701 ─ Submitted March 1, 2005 ─ Decided June 29, 2005.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County,  
No. CA2000-10-077, 157 Ohio App.3d 34, 2004-Ohio-2067, 808 N.E.2d 918. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment awarding back 
pay and benefits in a mandamus action.  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
{¶ 2} From March 1985 through August 21, 1998, appellee and cross-
appellant Batavia Local School District Board of Education employed appellant 
and cross-appellee, Dorsie Stacy, as a mechanic, under a continuing contract.  
During this period, Stacy was primarily responsible for performing repairs and 
maintenance on vehicles and equipment owned by the board.  Stacy routinely 
repaired and replaced brakes, exhaust systems, transmissions, and engines on 
school buses.  Although Stacy also occasionally cleaned, fueled, and washed the 
buses during this period, the bus drivers performed most of these duties.  While 
employed as a mechanic by the board, Stacy generally worked indoors from 7:00 
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. 
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{¶ 3} In June 1998, the board contracted with Laidlaw Transit, Inc. 
(“Laidlaw”) for Laidlaw to provide transportation services in the school district 
for five years.  On July 20, 1998, the board abolished the bus-driver and mechanic 
positions and laid off the employees in those positions, including Stacy, effective 
August 21, 1998.  Stacy and the other employees received written notification of 
the layoffs, which specified that “[r]einstatement to employment shall be made 
from the list of laid off employees in order of seniority.” 
{¶ 4} Under its contract with the board, Laidlaw agreed to offer 
employment to the laid-off employees and to provide a three-percent increase in 
pay and comparable benefits to these employees.  On June 24, 1998, Laidlaw 
offered Stacy employment as a bus mechanic at his 1997-1998 salary plus a three-
percent increase.  Stacy would also receive comparable health and dental 
insurance and continued participation in the School Employees Retirement 
System (“SERS”).  Stacy, however, was already earning his 1998-1999 salary of 
$31,152.94 under his continuing contract with the board, which Stacy claimed 
was three percent more than what Laidlaw was offering.  Stacy would have been 
performing essentially the same work he had been providing when employed by 
the board, with some additional computer data entry.  Stacy rejected the offer. 
{¶ 5} After refusing the job offer from Laidlaw, Stacy tendered his 
written resignation from employment with the board effective August 21, 1998, 
and requested to be paid for all unused vacation and personal days.  Although 
Stacy accrued sick leave at the rate of 15 days a year during his over 13 years of 
employment with the board, he had a balance of only 29.75 days of sick leave as 
of August 1998.  Stacy also accrued 3 days of personal leave per year, but as of 
August 1998, he had a balance of only 3 days. 
{¶ 6} Stacy then applied for and received retirement benefits.  He 
received $5,754.20 from SERS for the 1998-1999 school year and $6,984 from 
SERS for the 1999-2000 school year.  In 2001, Stacy received $7,215.76 from 
January Term, 2005 
3 
SERS.  Stacy also received Social Security benefits beginning in 1999, including 
$9,120 in 2001 and $9,348 in 2002. 
{¶ 7} If he had continued to be employed by the board after August 21, 
1998, Stacy claims, he would have earned the following salaries under the 
applicable collective-bargaining agreements:  1998-1999 school year ─ 
$31,152.94; 1999-2000 school year ─ $34,206.72; 2000-2001 school year ─ 
$34,654.40; 2001-2002 school year ─ $35,214.40; and for the 2002-2003 school 
year until his reinstatement on December 23, 2002 ─ $16,523.68.  These salary 
amounts include step increases, which the school district treasurer conceded Stacy 
would have received had he continued in the board’s employ.  Stacy earned 
$4,792.76 working for the board in the 1998-1999 school year until his retirement 
in August 1998. 
{¶ 8} The collective-bargaining agreements during the period of Stacy’s 
retirement provided for 15 days of sick leave per year, accrued at the rate of 1.25 
days per month.  These agreements also provided an attendance incentive of up to 
$300 a year for an employee who has taken no days off for sick leave or personal 
leave. 
{¶ 9} In 
August 
1998, 
Ohio 
Association 
of 
Public 
School 
Employees/AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-CIO, the representative of the bargaining 
unit that included school bus drivers and Stacy as the sole mechanic, requested 
that the board honor the statutory employment contracts and continue to employ 
the bus drivers for school year 1998-1999 and thereafter.  Stacy had already 
tendered his resignation to the board, and the board had accepted it. 
{¶ 10} On August 24, 1998, the union and the school bus drivers filed an 
action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board, its superintendent, its 
treasurer, and its president to reinstate them and award back pay and lost benefits.  
Stacy, who had retired, was not a party to this action.  After the court of appeals 
denied the writ, this court, on June 21, 2000, reversed the judgment, granted the 
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writ, and remanded the cause to the court of appeals for a determination of back 
pay and benefits.  State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, Local 
4, AFL-CIO v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 
198-199, 729 N.E.2d 743 (“OAPSE”).  The court held that the board was not 
authorized to lay off the bus drivers, that the outsourcing of their jobs to Laidlaw 
was invalid, and that the bus drivers were entitled to reinstatement.  Id. 
{¶ 11} Shortly after the court’s judgment in OAPSE, by letter dated July 
17, 2000, Stacy requested that the board reinstate him as a school bus mechanic.  
On July 18, 2000, Stacy formally applied for a mechanic position that had been 
advertised by the board.  The board did not reinstate him or hire him for the 
mechanic position.  From the date of his retirement in August 1998 until he 
applied for the mechanic position in July 2000, Stacy did not apply for any 
position with any other employer.  Pursuant to OAPSE, the board reinstated all of 
the laid-off bus drivers, who, unlike Stacy, had not retired. 
{¶ 12} On October 10, 2000, Stacy filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Clermont County for a writ of mandamus to compel cross-appellants, 
hereafter collectively referred to as “board,” to reinstate him to his position as 
mechanic, honor his statutory employment contract, and award him both back pay 
and lost benefits.  Stacy claimed that the judgment in OAPSE collaterally 
estopped the board from contesting Stacy’s right to reinstatement, back pay, and 
lost benefits. 
{¶ 13} On March 11, 2002, the court of appeals denied the writ.  The 
court of appeals concluded that Stacy had waived his right to reinstatement and 
back pay because he had voluntarily retired. 
{¶ 14} On December 4, 2002, we reversed the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 216 (“Stacy I”).  We held that although 
collateral estoppel did not preclude the board from contesting Stacy’s entitlement 
January Term, 2005 
5 
to the writ, the board’s actions in abolishing his mechanic position, laying him 
off, and contracting out his job to Laidlaw were prohibited by R.C. 3319.081.  Id., 
¶ 20.  We further held that “Stacy’s August 1998 retirement was involuntary 
because it was precipitated by the board’s illegal actions.”  Id., ¶ 30.  We 
remanded the cause for issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the board to 
reinstate Stacy to his former position as a mechanic and for the court of appeals to 
resolve Stacy’s claim for back pay and lost benefits.  Id., ¶ 31-32. 
{¶ 15} Pursuant to our order, the board notified Stacy to report for work 
on December 23, 2002.  On that date, Stacy reported for work and was advised by 
a board employee that he could not work his old hours because the board had 
hired a mechanic for that time and that his new hours would be 5:30 p.m. to 2:00 
a.m.  He was further advised that his new duties could consist of fueling, 
sweeping, mopping, and washing the buses and notifying other employees of any 
defects he discovered when driving the buses to get gas.  He was not permitted to 
perform his old duties of maintaining and repairing the buses.  According to board 
employees, Stacy was not allowed to perform his previous maintenance duties on 
the buses because of concerns about the poor condition in which he had left the 
buses when he retired.  The board acknowledged, however, that there was nothing 
in Stacy’s personnel file indicating that Stacy had poorly performed his 
maintenance duties while employed by the board. 
{¶ 16} On December 27, 2002, Stacy injured himself while fueling buses.  
Stacy returned to work on January 6, 2003, and worked until January 9, 2003, 
when he alleged that the back pain from his injury forced him to leave work. 
{¶ 17} On remand under our order, the court of appeals granted Stacy 
leave to file an amended/supplemental complaint.  In his amended/supplemental 
complaint, Stacy requested a writ of mandamus ordering the board to (1) reinstate 
him to his former position as a mechanic, (2) award him lost back pay and 
benefits, (3) prohibit the board from retaliating against, discriminating against, or 
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terminating him for improper reasons, (4) award him costs and attorney fees 
because the board’s refusal to reinstate him and pay him his back pay was 
frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51, and (5) award him compensatory and 
punitive damages against the board in an amount in excess of $25,000.  The 
request for damages was premised upon the board’s alleged actions after this 
court’s decision in Stacy I. 
{¶ 18} The parties submitted briefs on Stacy’s claims for lost pay and 
benefits.  Stacy requested $134,221.18 in back pay, $1,200 in lost attendance 
incentive, prejudgment interest on both the back pay and the lost attendance 
incentive, and a credit of 82.5 hours of sick leave.  In calculating his request for 
back pay, Stacy offset the amount he would have earned in the 1998-1999 school 
year with the amount he received for his work for the board during that year 
before his layoff and the money he received that year from SERS.  And while he 
offset his SERS pension for school year 1999-2000, Stacy did not offset his SERS 
payments from his calculations for back pay due for the school years thereafter 
and did not offset his Social Security payments from his requested back pay for 
any of the school years. 
{¶ 19} In January 2004, the board moved for summary judgment on 
Stacy’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages.  Stacy had previously 
withdrawn his claim for punitive damages against the board but not against the 
other cross-appellants.  In February 2004, Stacy filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the board’s summary-judgment motion. 
{¶ 20} In April 2004, the court of appeals ordered the board to pay Stacy 
$25,888.18 in back pay and lost benefits pursuant to this court’s remand in Stacy 
I.  The court of appeals further ordered Stacy and the board to make appropriate 
contributions to SERS based upon the claimed total back-pay amount of 
$134,221.18, and ordered the board “to immediately reinstate Stacy to a 
mechanic’s position which encompasses work hours and work duties similar to 
January Term, 2005 
7 
those hours and duties as prior to his retirement.”  The court of appeals also 
dismissed Stacy’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages. 
{¶ 21} In determining back pay, the court of appeals concluded that Stacy 
would have earned the $134,221.18 Stacy had requested for the period between 
his retirement in August 1998 and his reinstatement in December 2002.  The court 
of appeals included in this back-pay amount the step increases Stacy requested but 
held that the back-pay award should not be offset by the SERS and Social 
Security benefits received by Stacy during the period of his layoff.  The court of 
appeals concluded, however, based on newspaper advertisements for similar 
mechanic jobs published during Stacy’s layoff, that Stacy could have found an 
equivalent mechanic or bus mechanic position paying $25,000 per year.  The 
court held that by not seeking this alternate employment, Stacy had failed to 
mitigate his damages and that his back-pay award should be reduced by $108,333 
in mitigation income, leaving a back-pay balance due of $25,888.18.  It denied 
Stacy’s request for prejudgment interest on the back-pay award. 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals further determined that Stacy was not entitled 
to sick-leave credit and attendance-incentive money for the period of his layoff 
and that he was not entitled to an award of costs or attorney fees. 
{¶ 23} This cause is now before the court upon Stacy’s appeal and the 
cross-appeal of the board. 
Back Pay:  Purpose of Award 
{¶ 24} “It is axiomatic that ‘[a] wrongfully excluded public employee 
may obtain back pay and related benefits in a mandamus action following 
reinstatement or, in some cases, may obtain reinstatement and back pay and 
related benefits in the same mandamus action.’ ”  Stacy I, 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 
2002-Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 216, at ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. Boggs v. 
Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 558, 565, 757 
N.E.2d 339. 
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{¶ 25} This appeal and cross-appeal primarily concern Stacy’s claim for 
back pay and related benefits resulting from the board’s breach under R.C. 
3319.081 of his continuing-contract status as a mechanic employed by the board.  
Stacy I, id. at ¶ 20 (“the board’s actions [in abolishing the positions of school bus 
driver and mechanic, laying off public employees in those positions, and 
contracting out those jobs to a private entity] were invalid because they violated 
R.C. 3319.081, and Stacy – assuming that he did not waive his rights – was not 
properly terminated from his continuing-contract status as a mechanic employed 
by the board”). 
{¶ 26} The purpose of a back-pay award is to make the wrongfully 
terminated employee whole and to place that employee in the position the 
employee would have been in absent a violation of the employment contract.  In 
re Lilly (2002), 173 Vt. 591, 593, 795 A.2d 1163; United Protective Workers of 
Am., Local No. 2 v. Ford Motor Co. (C.A.7, 1955), 223 F.2d 49, 53.  This purpose 
is consistent with the general precept in breach-of-contract actions:  “Money 
damages awarded in a breach of contract action are designed to place the 
aggrieved party in the same position it would have been in had the contract not 
been violated.”  Schulke Radio Prod., Ltd. v. Midwestern Broadcasting Co. 
(1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 436, 439, 6 OBR 480, 453 N.E.2d 683; Stratton v. Kent State 
Univ., Franklin App. No. 02AP-887, 2003-Ohio-1272, 2003 WL 1227570, ¶ 44 
(“In giving an award of money damages in a breach of contract action, the intent 
is to place the injured party in the same position it would have been in had the 
contract not been breached”). 
{¶ 27} With this purpose providing the analytical framework, the parties’ 
contentions concerning various aspects of the back-pay award are next 
considered. 
Back Pay:  Step Increases 
January Term, 2005 
9 
{¶ 28} “A reinstated public employee may maintain an action in 
mandamus to recover compensation due for a period of wrongful exclusion from 
employment, ‘provided the amount recoverable is established with certainty.’ ”  
State ex rel. Martin v. Bexley City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 
36, 37, 528 N.E.2d 1250, quoting Monaghan v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 
190, 61 O.O.2d 425, 291 N.E.2d 462, syllabus.  The term “with certainty” 
generally refers to “whether a particular amount has been precisely determined as 
to its value in dollars and cents” and at times “also refer[s] to the quality of proof, 
in order for an employee to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the relief 
for which he prays.”  State ex rel. Hamlin v. Collins (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 117, 
120, 9 OBR 342, 459 N.E.2d 520. 
{¶ 29} The board asserts that Stacy did not establish his entitlement to 
step increases in salary during the period of his wrongful exclusion from 
employment with the board.  The board relies on Hamlin, id. at 122, 9 OBR 342, 
459 N.E.2d 520, in which the court rejected claims for salary increases granted to 
other board employees during the period of wrongful exclusion from employment 
because there was “no evidence in the record to show what Hamlin would have 
received by way of a pay raise, if any” and “[a] willingness to accept the 
minimum raise given others is not sufficient to satisfy the ‘with certainty’ 
standard.” 
{¶ 30} The board’s assertion is meritless.  Unlike the public employee in 
Hamlin, Stacy established by affidavit and deposition testimony ─ including the 
testimony of the school district treasurer ─ that if Stacy had not been wrongfully 
laid off by the board, he would have received the step increases that took effect 
automatically.  Stacy thus satisfied his burden of proving his entitlement to these 
step increases with the requisite certainty.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Crockett v. 
Robinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 363, 366, 21 O.O.3d 228, 423 N.E.2d 1099 
(“relator proved by testimony, by an exhibit, and by stipulation that he would 
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have received a salary award which included the salary increases”); State ex rel. 
Woods v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation (June 30, 1986), Clermont 
App. No. CA83-10-084, 1986 WL 7395, *5 (in which the parties stipulated that 
“across the board salary increments were awarded to all employees of Clermont 
County”). 
{¶ 31} Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in determining that 
Stacy was entitled to the step increases in salary as part of his back pay. 
Offset for SERS Benefits 
{¶ 32} The board next asserts that the court of appeals erred in failing to 
set off any back-pay award by the amount of retirement benefits received by 
Stacy from SERS during the period he was wrongfully excluded from 
employment with the board.  The court of appeals determined that no offset for 
these benefits was warranted because if the board were permitted to reduce the 
amount of back pay owed to Stacy by the amount of these retirement benefits, the 
board would receive a “windfall.”  For the following reasons, the court of appeals 
erred in so holding. 
{¶ 33} First, as noted previously, the purpose of a back-pay award in a 
case involving a wrongfully excluded public employee is to put the employee in 
the same position the employee would have been in had the employer honored the 
contract.  In United Protective Workers, 223 F.2d at 53-54, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in an action by a union and 
employee against an employer for damages for breach of a collective-bargaining 
agreement resulting in wrongful compulsory retirement that the back pay had 
been properly reduced by amounts of retirement payments received by the 
employee. 
{¶ 34} In so holding, the Seventh Circuit held that if these retirement 
benefits had not been deducted from the back-pay award, the improperly retired 
January Term, 2005 
11 
employee would have received more than he would have if the employment 
contract had not been breached: 
{¶ 35} “The status of [retirement] payments is not material to the decision 
here.  The question for us to decide concerns only the proper damages for breach 
of contract.  If Orloski had not been improperly retired, he would not have 
received the payments in question.  The District Court’s judgment awarded him 
all the wages he would have received if the contract had not been breached, and if 
the [retirement] payments are not deducted, Orloski will have received more than 
he would have if the contract had not been breached.”  Id. at 53.  Therefore, 
Stacy, who ─ like the employee in United Protective Workers ─ involuntarily 
retired, was required to offset his SERS payments from his back-pay claim. 
{¶ 36} Second, this conclusion is consistent with the holdings of Ohio 
courts, including this one.  Cf. Lynch v. Chupka (Apr. 29, 1980), Franklin App. 
No. 79AP-803, 1980 WL 353427, *2-3 (public employee wrongfully denied 
reinstatement to position entitled to back pay offset by a disability pension and 
unemployment compensation); cf., also, State ex rel. Guerrero v. Ferguson 
(1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 6, 7, 22 O.O.3d 98, 427 N.E.2d 515 (back pay due public 
employee to compensate for wrongful exclusion from employment is reduced by 
amount received in unemployment compensation benefits because “the state 
cannot be required to pay twice”); Bertolini v. Whitehall City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn., Franklin App. No. 02AP-839, 2003-Ohio-2578, 2003 WL 21152516, ¶ 48-
51 (back-pay award reduced by amount of disability payment received from 
School Teachers Retirement System). 
{¶ 37} Third, this result comports with the holdings of other courts.  See, 
e.g., United Protective Workers, 223 F.2d at 53 (back-pay award reduced by 
retirement benefit payments); Jacobs v. New Jersey State Highway Auth. (1969), 
54 N.J. 393, 406, 255 A.2d 266 (“Out of the sum of back wages recovered by 
each man he is obliged to return to [state-public-employee retirement system] the 
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pension payments received”); see, generally, Annotation, Right of Employer, 
Liable for Wrongful Discharge or Retirement, to Reduce or Mitigate Damages by 
Amount of Social Security or Retirement Benefits Received by Employee (1956), 
48 A.L.R.2d 1293, 1293-1295, citing United Protective Workers, 223 F.2d 49; cf. 
Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc. (1996), 450 Mich. 620, 544 N.W.2d 278, 279 (back-
pay award in wrongful-discharge action based on breach of employment contract 
reduced by unemployment-compensation benefits); Dehnart v. Waukesha 
Brewing Co. (1963), 21 Wis.2d 583, 595-596, 124 N.W.2d 664 (offset of 
unemployment-compensation benefits from back-pay award). 
{¶ 38} Fourth, the collateral-source rule is not applicable to cases 
involving the breach of an employment contract.  Stacy cites Pryor v. Webber 
(1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 104, 52 O.O.2d 395, 263 N.E.2d 235, in support of his 
argument that based on the collateral-source rule, retirement benefits should not 
be deducted from his back-pay award.  But the Pryor holding is expressly limited 
to tort actions:  “The collateral source rule is an exception to the general rule of 
compensatory damages in a tort action, and evidence of compensation from 
collateral sources is not admissible to diminish the damages for which a tort-
feasor must pay for his negligent act.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  See, also, Hollingsworth v. Levy (Jan. 17, 1996), Hamilton App. 
Nos. C-950319 and A-9401166, 1996 WL 13849, *1 (“in Ohio, the collateral 
source rule is limited to actions sounding in tort and does not apply to contract 
actions”).  “Several jurisdictions have considered whether the common-law 
collateral source rule should apply in breach of contract actions.  With little 
exception, the majority of these courts has concluded that the rule should not 
apply outside the realm of tort actions.”  See Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mercy 
Clinics, Inc. (Iowa 1998), 579 N.W.2d 823, 830, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 39} Fifth, the court of appeals cited no authority for its holding that 
these retirement payments should not be deducted from Stacy’s back-pay award.  
January Term, 2005 
13 
Instead, the court of appeals simply noted that offsetting these payments would 
confer a windfall on the board.  This rationale, however, supports the common-
law collateral-source rule in tort actions, which is intended to have both a punitive 
and deterrent effect on the tortfeasor.  See Saine, Preserving the Collateral Source 
Rule:  Modern Theories of Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application 
(1997), 47 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 1075.  These principles are inapplicable in breach-
of-contract actions.  See Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d at 830, quoting 
22 American Jurisprudence 2d (1988), Damages, Section 568 (“The principle 
behind the collateral source rule is less compelling in contract actions because of 
the inapplicability of the deterrence factor in such cases and the countervailing 
principle that ‘no one should profit more from the breach of an obligation than 
from its full performance’ ”); see, also, United Protective Workers, 223 F.2d at 54 
(“rule of tort law has a flavor of punitive damages,” but court is “unable to find a 
single case in which this rule has been carried over to contract damages”). 
{¶ 40} Sixth, Stacy cites cases that are likewise inapposite because they 
primarily involved noncontract claims in which deterrence or punitive purposes 
were evident.  See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. O’Grady (C.A.7, 
1988), 857 F.2d 383, 389 (pension benefits not offset from award of back pay in 
age-discrimination case); Dominguez v. Tom James Co. (C.A.11, 1997), 113 F.3d 
1188, 1191 (unemployment-compensation benefits not deducted from back-pay 
award in age discrimination and Title VII discrimination cases); Ohio Civil Rights 
Comm. v. David Richard Ingram, D.C., Inc. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 89, 95, 630 
N.E.2d 669 (“allowing the discriminating employer to deduct unemployment 
benefits from a back pay award would benefit the employer by reducing the 
deterrence against discriminatory conduct while conferring no gain upon the 
victim”).  There is no similar suggestion that deterrence concerning the board’s 
failure to accord continuing-contract status to Stacy is a legitimate purpose in 
fashioning a back-pay award in a wrongful-discharge case that involves neither 
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discrimination nor tortious conduct.  In fact, the court of appeals acknowledged 
that the cases cited by Stacy in his argument concerning retirement benefits had 
“little application here” because “[t]his case involves a collective bargaining 
agreement, not discrimination.” 
{¶ 41} Finally, it must be emphasized that because the court of appeals 
ordered the parties to make contributions to SERS for the period of his wrongful 
exclusion from employment with the board, Stacy will be credited with these 
years under SERS for purposes of retirement. 
{¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in failing to 
offset Stacy’s back-pay award by the amounts he received in SERS payments 
during the period he was wrongfully excluded from employment by the board.  A 
contrary holding would place Stacy in a better position than if the board had not 
breached his continuing contract. 
Offset for Social Security Retirement Benefits 
{¶ 43} The board further claims that the court of appeals likewise erred in 
refusing to offset any back-pay award by the amount of Social Security retirement 
benefits received by Stacy during the period of his wrongful exclusion.  The 
board’s claim lacks merit. 
{¶ 44} As the court of appeals concluded, and unlike the SERS benefits, 
“the Social Security benefits received by Stacy were not related to work 
performed for the board in any way.”  That is, because Stacy’s receipt of these 
benefits was not based on contributions to Social Security during his public 
employment with the board and was not contingent upon whether he was 
employed by the board, these benefits should not be considered as payments that 
place Stacy in a better position than if the board had not laid him off.  In fact, 
receipt of the Social Security payments is not inconsistent with the employee’s 
continued public employment with the board.  In contrast, SERS payments would 
have been inconsistent with Stacy’s continued employment with the board. 
January Term, 2005 
15 
{¶ 45} Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in refusing to offset 
Stacy’s Social Security payments from any back-pay award. 
Back Pay:  Duty to Mitigate 
{¶ 46} “A public employee * * * who is wrongfully excluded from his 
position and sues to recover compensation for the period of exclusion, is subject 
to have his claim reduced by the amount he earned or, in the exercise of due 
diligence, could have earned in appropriate employment during the period of 
exclusion.”  State ex rel. Martin v. Columbus, Dept. of Health (1979), 58 Ohio 
St.2d 261, 12 O.O.3d 268, 389 N.E.2d 1123, paragraph two of the syllabus.  This 
principle of mitigation of damages is “an affirmative defense and the burden of 
proof on that issue resides upon the employer responsible for the wrongful 
discharge.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus; see, also, Marshall v. Columbus 
(1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 353, 355, 15 O.O.3d 436, 402 N.E.2d 509. 
{¶ 47} The employee’s due diligence in mitigating damages must be 
considered in light of employment opportunities based on the employee’s 
education and experience.  State ex rel. Martin v. Columbus, 58 Ohio St.2d at 
266-267, 12 O.O.3d 268, 389 N.E.2d 1123.  Nevertheless, the wrongfully 
discharged employee must accept similar employment in the same vicinity to 
mitigate damages: 
{¶ 48} “ ‘Being subject to the universal rule that a person injured by the 
act of another is bound to use ordinary diligence to make the damage as light as 
may be, the discharged employee must use ordinary care to obtain employment.  
He may not be required to seek elsewhere, or to engage in a different industry.  
But he is bound to use ordinary effort to obtain similar employment in the same 
vicinity; at least if such employment is offered he is bound to take advantage of 
it.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 264-265, 12 O.O.3d 268, 389 N.E.2d 1123, 
quoting James v. Allen Cty. (1886), 44 Ohio St. 226, 233-234, 6 N.E. 246; see, 
generally, Danne, Nature of Alternative Employment Which Employee Must 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Accept to Minimize Damages for Wrongful Discharge (1972), 44 A.L.R.3d 629, 
640, Section 3 (“the general rule [is] that an individual who has been discharged 
in breach of his contract for a definite term of employment is obliged to mitigate 
damages by accepting available alternative employment of the same or similar 
character, but not employment of a significantly different kind”).  (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
{¶ 49} The court of appeals determined that the board had proven that 
Stacy had failed to mitigate his damages by not seeking alternative employment 
as a mechanic as advertised in two local newspapers during the period of his 
wrongful exclusion from employment by the board.  The board asserts that the 
court of appeals erred in failing to consider the Laidlaw offer of employment to 
Stacy as an appropriate offer of similar employment that reduces Stacy’s back-
pay claim. 
{¶ 50} The board’s assertion has merit.  The offer of employment by 
Laidlaw was similar employment ─ to perform mechanical work on the same 
buses he serviced when employed by the board ─ in the same work location.  
Although the pay may not have been quite as much as he would have earned 
under his continuing contract with the board, his salary would have been 
comparable. 
{¶ 51} Stacy claims, however, that the Laidlaw offer was not the same as 
his board job so as to require him to accept it in order to mitigate his damages.  
Stacy misconstrues his duty.  “Similar” is not synonymous with “same.”  See 
State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-
Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 31, quoting Webster’s Third New World 
International Dictionary (1986) 2007 and 2120 (“ ‘Same’ means ‘resembling in 
every way’ and ‘identical,’ and ‘similar’ means ‘very much alike,’ ‘comparable,’ 
and ‘alike in substance or essentials’ ”).  The mere fact that the Laidlaw job 
differed in certain particulars from the board job did not make the job dissimilar.  
January Term, 2005 
17 
“ ‘It has never been the law that the mere existence of differences between two 
jobs in the same field is sufficient, as a matter of law, to excuse an employee 
wrongfully discharged from one from accepting the other in order to mitigate 
damages.’ ”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Cal. School Emp. Assn. v. Personnel Comm. of 
Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. of Santa Cruz Cty. (1973), 30 Cal.App.3d 241, 
254, 106 Cal.Rptr. 283, quoting Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 
(1970), 3 Cal.3d 176, 186, 89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689 (Sullivan, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 52} Stacy mistakenly relies on our statements in Stacy I, 97 Ohio St.3d 
269, 2002-Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 216, at ¶ 25 that “[i]t would be nonsensical to 
require a public employee like Stacy to accept an offer of employment for a job 
that was created illegally * * * in order to retain his right to continued public 
employment.  And as a Laidlaw employee, Stacy would not have had the same 
protections as a public employee of the board, e.g., union representation and 
termination of employment only for the reasons specified in R.C. 3319.081(C).”  
(Emphasis added.)  These statements, however, were directed toward the issue of 
whether Stacy’s retirement was voluntary, not the issue of mitigation of damages.  
As we emphasized in Stacy I, id. at ¶ 25, “Stacy’s refusal of an offer of 
employment with Laidlaw is irrelevant to the determination of whether his 
retirement was voluntary.  It does, however, bear on the post-liability issue of 
mitigation of damages.”  (Emphasis sic and added.)   
{¶ 53} Accepting Stacy’s position would mean that nonunion- and at-will-
employment offers could not constitute offers of “similar” employment for 
purposes of mitigation.  This position has never been the law.  Cf. Ryan v. 
Superintendent of Schools of Quincy (1978), 374 Mass. 670, 676, 373 N.E.2d 
1178 (“we specifically hold that nontenured positions are ‘comparable’ to tenured 
positions for the purpose of mitigating damages.  Any other conclusion would 
render the requirement of mitigation inapplicable to tenured employees, a result 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
which we have declined to reach”).  Nor did acceptance of the Laidlaw job 
“constitute a disadvantageous renegotiation of the original contract or an 
abandonment of rights and remedies thereunder.”  Fair v. Red Lion Inn 
(Colo.1997), 943 P.2d 431, 438-439.  In fact, all of the bus drivers employed by 
the board who accepted Laidlaw’s offer of employment were ultimately reinstated 
to employment with the board pursuant to OAPSE, 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 729 N.E.2d 
743. 
{¶ 54} Stacy further argues that his duty to mitigate damages for the 
1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years was satisfied when he offset his request 
for back pay by the SERS retirement benefits he received for those school years.  
Stacy, however, cites no law that authorizes the substitution of pension benefits 
for the duty to mitigate, and his argument is not persuasive.  Stacy himself 
claimed he was ready, willing, and able to work during the period of his wrongful 
exclusion, but he did not actively seek other employment.  “ ‘Generally, a party 
who has been wronged by a breach of contract may not unreasonably sit idly by 
and allow damages to accumulate, but instead must attempt to minimize his 
damages.’ ”  See Farmer v. Meigs Ctr. Ltd. (Mar. 30, 1998), Meigs App. No. 96 
CA 12, 1998 WL 166451, *9, quoting PDT & Co. v. Ballinger (July 8, 1992), 
Hamilton App. No. C-910452, 1992 WL 161412, *5. 
{¶ 55} Stacy finally claims that the board is precluded from asserting the 
defense of mitigation of damages to reduce the back-pay award because it failed 
to mitigate its own damages by refusing to reinstate him following the court’s 
decision in OAPSE and after he filed this mandamus action.  But OAPSE did not 
collaterally estop the board from claiming that Stacy’s retirement waived his 
entitlement to back pay.  Stacy I, 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 
216 at ¶ 18.  Before our decision in Stacy I, the board could have reasonably 
concluded that unlike the relators reinstated in OAPSE, Stacy was not entitled to 
reinstatement, because he had retired. 
January Term, 2005 
19 
{¶ 56} Stacy relies on Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Huntington Natl. Bank 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 270, 277, 719 N.E.2d 955 (“When both parties have the 
same opportunity to reduce damages, a defendant cannot later contend that the 
plaintiff failed to mitigate”) and S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co. (C.A.3, 
1978), 576 F.2d 524, 530 (“The duty to mitigate damages is not applicable where 
the party whose duty it is primarily to perform a contract has equal opportunity 
for performance and equal knowledge of the consequences of nonperformance”).  
These cases, however, are inapplicable because they involved circumstances in 
which the breaching party could have minimized damages by performing the 
same act as the other party.  See Chicago Title, 87 Ohio St.3d at 277, 719 N.E.2d 
955 (insured not obligated to minimize damages by bidding on secured property 
in a foreclosure resulting from title insurer’s failure to discover a senior lien when 
insurer had equal opportunity to bid on property at foreclosure); S.J. Groves, 576 
F.2d at 530 (subcontractor not obliged to mitigate damages by contracting for 
additional supply of concrete when supplier would not perform and supplier was 
in as good a position as subcontractor to obtain a supplemental supply). 
{¶ 57} Stacy’s theory is also incorrect because “[i]t would relieve every 
plaintiff of the duty to mitigate because the defendant could have mitigated by not 
breaching the contract in the first place.”  Rossi v. Mobil Oil Corp. 
(C.A.Temp.Emer. 1983), 710 F.2d 821, 834.  The federal court of appeals further 
observed that S.J. Groves was inapposite because in that case, “both parties could 
have reduced damages by performing the same act.”  (Emphasis sic.)  See, also, 
Natl. Communications Assn., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (S.D.N.Y.2001), No. 93 
CIV. 3707, 2001 WL 99856, *7 (“In essence, NCA is arguing that AT & T could 
have mitigated the damages caused by its breach by not breaching.  This is an 
inaccurate and illogical application of the principle cited by NCA”). 
{¶ 58} As the court of appeals cogently concluded, Stacy’s argument is 
specious: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 59} “Simply because the position that Stacy voluntarily retired was not 
ultimately upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court does not mean that the position was 
unreasonable or that it should now be construed as a foregone opportunity to 
mitigate damages.  To adopt this view is tantamount to concluding that all that 
employees who believe they have been improperly discharged need to do to 
mitigate damages is ask for their jobs back.  This would absolve such employees 
from making any further effort to obtain similar employment to mitigate 
damages.” 
{¶ 60} Based on the foregoing, the board was not precluded from raising 
the mitigation defense.  The court of appeals erred in failing to determine that the 
board had established that Stacy did not exercise due diligence to mitigate his 
damages when he rejected the offer of substantially similar employment as a bus 
mechanic with Laidlaw.  Stacy’s back-pay award should consequently be reduced 
by the amount of money he would have made with Laidlaw.  After subtracting the 
offsets for SERS payments received by Stacy during the period of his wrongful 
exclusion, the amount he would have made from Laidlaw during that same period, 
and the amount he earned while working for the board during that portion of the 
1998-1999 school year before his layoff, Stacy is entitled to no back-pay award, 
i.e., this sum exceeds the amount he would have received under his continuing 
contract with the board. 
Prejudgment Interest 
{¶ 61} Stacy claims that the court of appeals erred in failing to award 
prejudgment interest on the back-pay award.  Stacy’s contention lacks merit 
because after making the appropriate deductions, he is not entitled to any back 
pay. 
{¶ 62} Moreover, “[a] public school board of education is not liable for 
the payment of prejudgment interest on an award of back pay absent a statute 
requiring such payment or an express contractual agreement to make such 
January Term, 2005 
21 
payment.”  Beifuss v. Westerville Bd. of Edn. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 187, 525 
N.E.2d 20, syllabus.  In Beifuss, we construed R.C. 1343.03(A), relied on by 
Stacy here, and determined that this statutory provision did not “clearly express 
any intention of the legislature to assess prejudgment interest against a public 
school board” in a case involving a back-pay award.  Id., 37 Ohio St.3d at 190, 
525 N.E.2d 20, fn. 1.  See, also, Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 122, 2003-Ohio-5277, 797 N.E.2d 45, ¶ 30.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
did not err in denying Stacy’s request for prejudgment interest on his back-pay 
award. 
Lost Benefits:  Sick-Leave Credits 
{¶ 63} The court of appeals determined that Stacy did not establish his 
entitlement to the sick-leave credits he would have earned during the period of his 
wrongful exclusion from employment with the board.  Stacy challenges that 
determination and claims entitlement to the full 82.5 hours of sick-leave credit he 
would have earned if had not been laid off and had not used any sick leave during 
that period. 
{¶ 64} In rejecting a similar claim (“whether, in a mandamus action 
brought by a reinstated municipal employee to recover back pay, the reinstated 
employee is entitled to be credited with vacation days, holidays and sick leave 
hours he would have earned”) we noted, quoting from the court of appeals 
decision in that same case, that “ ‘to accept * * * (the claim) we would have to 
conclude that Crockett was so diligent and so healthy an employee that he would 
never have taken a vacation day, that he would have worked on every holiday and 
that he would not have taken one hour of sick leave during the entire four-and-
one-half year period.  The record does not support such a conclusion * * *.’ ”  
Crockett, 67 Ohio St.2d at 368, 21 O.O.3d 228, 423 N.E.2d 1099. 
{¶ 65} Similarly, after over 13 years of employment with the board, Stacy 
had a balance of only 29.75 days of sick leave when he retired in August 1998, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
and he had regularly used an average of 11 days of sick leave per year in the past.  
Given that evidence, the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Stacy’s 
claim for 82.5 hours of sick-leave credit, which assumed that Stacy would never 
have taken sick leave during the period of his layoff, had not been established 
with the requisite certainty.  Guerrero, 68 Ohio St.2d at 7, 22 O.O.3d 98, 427 
N.E.2d 515 (“since [vacation and sick leave] days cannot be established with 
certainty, they cannot be credited to relators”). 
Lost Benefits:  Attendance-Incentive Pay 
{¶ 66} The court of appeals also correctly denied Stacy’s claim for lost 
attendance-incentive pay.  The amount that Stacy requested ─ $1,200 for four 
years ─ assumes that he would not have missed any days due to sick or personal 
leave during the entire over four-year period of his layoff.  But as discussed, this 
claim is inconsistent with his use of sick leave in the past.  Moreover, Stacy 
testified that he “always take[s]” personal leave.  Therefore, based on Crockett, 67 
Ohio St.2d at 368, 21 O.O.3d 228, 423 N.E.2d 1099, Stacy failed to prove his 
entitlement to the requested $1,200 in attendance-incentive pay with certainty. 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
{¶ 67} Stacy asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting the board’s 
motion for summary judgment on his claim for compensatory and punitive 
damages because these damages are permissible in mandamus under R.C. 
2731.11. 
{¶ 68} R.C. 2731.11 provides: 
{¶ 69} “If judgment in a proceeding for a writ of mandamus is rendered 
for the plaintiff, the relator may recover the damages which he has sustained, to 
be ascertained by the court or a jury, or by a referee or master, as in a civil action, 
and costs.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 70} Stacy claims that under R.C. 2731.11, he is entitled to 
compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees, which “flow from [the 
January Term, 2005 
23 
board’s] unlawful actions subsequent to issuance of the writ and after remand by 
this Court.” 
{¶ 71} Stacy’s claim is meritless because R.C. 2731.11 provides for the 
recovery in a mandamus action only of damages sustained before the writ is 
granted. Under R.C. 2731.11, “[a] writ of mandamus must be granted before a 
claim for damages may be considered.”  State ex rel. Natl. City Bank v. Maloney, 
103 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-4437, 814 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 13.  Once the writ is 
granted, relator may recover the damages sustained, which manifestly refers to 
damages incurred by the relator before the writ was granted, not thereafter.  
Adopting Stacy’s construction of R.C. 2731.11 would require adding the words 
“and will sustain until the writ is complied with” to the phrase “the relator may 
recover the damages which he has sustained.”  We cannot, however, add language 
to the statute.  See State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-
5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 25; State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 
N.E.2d 540 (“In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words”). 
{¶ 72} Moreover, Stacy’s claim for postreinstatement damages was, 
according to his motion for leave to file an amended/supplemental complaint, a 
tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Greeley v. 
Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 
N.E.2d 981, and Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51.  
Stacy has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by bringing a civil 
action in tort to raise these claims.  “Mandamus will not issue if there is a plain 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Ullmann v. 
Hayes, 103 Ohio St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 73} Finally, in State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
453, 459-460, 588 N.E.2d 840, we rejected a comparable mandamus claim for 
damages alleged to have occurred after a wrongfully discharged public employee 
had been reinstated to public employment: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 74} “In their cross-appeal, three appellees claim that the court of 
appeals erred by refusing a writ of mandamus to correct the pay decreases 
imposed upon their reinstatement.  * * * 
{¶ 75} “We, however, share the view that a public employee is entitled 
under Monaghan [v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 190, 61 O.O.2d 425, 291 
N.E.2d 462] to no more back pay than the amount of the employee’s salary 
accrued during the period of unlawful exclusion from public employment * * * 
and that a writ of mandamus is therefore available to enforce the civil service 
laws.  We see nothing in that case or any other cited by appellees to suggest that 
the same rule applies when employees are reinstated at wages lower than they 
previously enjoyed.  Thus, employees suffering such a loss must affirmatively 
show the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for a writ 
of mandamus to issue.  R.C. 2731.05. 
{¶ 76} “Appellees have not satisfied this prerequisite.” 
{¶ 77} Therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Stacy’s claim for 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 78} Stacy contends that the court of appeals erred in denying his claim 
for attorney fees because the board acted in bad faith when it failed to reinstate 
him as a bus mechanic and pay him back pay.  Attorney fees are not recoverable 
as damages in a mandamus action under R.C. 2731.11.  State ex rel. Chapnick v. 
E. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 449, 452, 755 
N.E.2d 883. 
{¶ 79} Stacy’s claim for attorney fees based on the board’s refusal to pay 
him back pay is baseless because after making the appropriate deductions, Stacy 
is not entitled to any back-pay award.  And Stacy’s claim for attorney fees 
concerning the alleged circumstances surrounding his reinstatement again 
concerns postwrit actions that are more properly addressed in a tort action. 
January Term, 2005 
25 
{¶ 80} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 
Stacy’s request for attorney fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 81} We reverse the court of appeals judgment insofar as it grants back 
pay to Stacy.  The court of appeals erred in failing to reduce the back pay that 
Stacy would have been entitled to by the amount he received in SERS retirement 
benefits and the amount he would have earned if he had exercised due diligence 
by accepting the Laidlaw job offer.  In all other respects, the judgment of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 82} I disagree with the majority’s decision insofar as it reduces the 
back-pay award to appellant and cross-appellee, Dorsie Stacy, by the amounts he 
received in benefits from the School Employees Retirement System (“SERS”) and 
would have received in wages had he accepted employment with Laidlaw Transit, 
Inc.  In my opinion, these offsets are inappropriate under the present 
circumstances. 
{¶ 83} In finding that Stacy’s back-pay award should not be reduced by 
the amount of benefits he received from the SERS, the court of appeals explained, 
“Stacy received these benefits due to his years of service and payments into the 
SERS retirement system.  It would be a windfall to the board if it were permitted 
to reduce the amount of back pay owed to Stacy by the amount he received from 
SERS as a result of his retirement.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 84} In reversing the court of appeals’ judgment on this issue, the 
majority relies on breach-of-contract cases in which retirement benefits and 
unemployment-compensation payments were held to be properly offset against 
back-pay awards.  The majority reasons that the party whose employment contract 
was breached is not entitled to be placed in a better position than he or she would 
have been in had there been no breach.  Furthermore, the majority reasons, the 
principle of deterrence behind the collateral-source rule, which precludes an offset 
for amounts received from a source independent of the wrongdoer, is inapplicable 
in breach-of-contract actions. 
{¶ 85} By offsetting Stacy’s retirement benefits, however, the majority 
places Stacy in a worse position than he would have been in but for the board’s 
illegal layoff and concomitant privatization of his job.  In United Protective 
Workers of Am., Local No. 2 v. Ford Motor Co. (C.A.7, 1955), 223 F.2d 49, 53, 
upon which the majority places significant weight, the court explained, “The 
District Court’s judgment awarded [plaintiff] all the wages he would have 
received if the contract had not been breached, and if the social security and 
annuity payments are not deducted, [plaintiff] will have received more than he 
would have if the contract had not been breached.” 
{¶ 86} In this case, the court of appeals did not award Stacy all of the 
wages he would have received had the board not forced his retirement.  From the 
$134,221.18 that Stacy would have received from continued employment with the 
board, the court of appeals deducted $108,333 in “mitigation income” that Stacy 
might have earned from obtaining equivalent employment as a general or bus 
mechanic, thus awarding him a total of $25,888.18 in back pay.  Indeed, after 
subtracting his SERS benefits also, the majority declares, “Stacy is entitled to no 
back-pay award.” 
{¶ 87} Moreover, this case does not involve a simple breach of an 
employment contract.  In this case, “the board illegally abolished [Stacy’s] 
January Term, 2005 
27 
position and laid him off and contracted out the same work to Laidlaw.”  State ex 
rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-
Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 23.  In this regard, “the board’s actions were 
invalid because they violated R.C. 3319.081,” which provides nonteaching 
school-district employees with certain rights and protections regarding the 
termination of their employment.  Id. at ¶ 20.  See, also, State ex rel. Boggs v. 
Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 757 
N.E.2d 339; State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, Local 4, 
AFL-CIO v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 
195, 729 N.E.2d 743. 
{¶ 88} Under these circumstances, “[r]educing recovery by the amount of 
the benefits received by plaintiff would be granting a windfall to defendant by 
allowing [it] an undeserved credit on [its] own wrongdoing from a source never 
so intended.”  Sporn v. Celebrity, Inc. (1974), 129 N.J.Super. 449, 459, 324 A.2d 
71 (refusing offset of unemployment compensation received by plaintiff in 
wrongful-discharge action.) 
{¶ 89} The majority also offsets the amount of wages that Stacy would 
have earned if he had gone to work for Laidlaw, reasoning that the Laidlaw offer 
of employment was sufficiently similar to Stacy’s work as a bus mechanic for the 
board so as to require its acceptance in mitigation of damages.  Yet in that very 
equivalence lies its illegality.  The board’s actions in this case were invalid under 
R.C. 3319.081 precisely because the board had laid off public employees by 
abolishing their positions while in reality retaining the same positions and hiring 
nonpublic employees to fill them.  It is a strange holding, indeed, that requires a 
wrongfully terminated public employee to mitigate his damages by accepting the 
very conditions that made his termination illegal. 
{¶ 90} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 91} I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant is entitled 
to no back pay. 
{¶ 92} In Stacy I, we held that Stacy’s retirement was involuntary and that 
he was entitled to reinstatement and back pay.  However, in Stacy II, the appeal at 
issue, we award him nothing, holding, in an ironic twist, that he should have taken 
the very Laidlaw job that we held he had no obligation to take in Stacy I and that 
Laidlaw’s higher salary now becomes the measure for his duty to mitigate. 
{¶ 93} Then, to add insult to injury, we also add to the Laidlaw salary his 
School Employees Retirement System (“SERS”) benefits, thereby attributing to 
Stacy more compensation than his contract had allowed.  Therefore, Stacy may 
recover no back pay. 
{¶ 94} While an employee may retire, collect SERS benefits, and become 
re-employed, he is not required to pursue both retirement benefits and full-time 
employment to mitigate his damages.  We should either credit Stacy for SERS 
benefits as his efforts at mitigation or hold that he had a duty to mitigate and find 
another job — not both.  Mitigation law does not require a plaintiff to take 
retirement benefits and a comparable job to recover – nor should the measure of 
damages encompass both retirement benefits and full-time employment. 
{¶ 95} In this case, the court of appeals concluded that jobs similar to 
Stacy’s were available and paying $25,000 per year.  That figure should be the 
measure of the mitigation damages, not the amount Laidlaw was offering, since 
we have already held that Stacy was not obligated to take the Laidlaw job.  Any 
other requirement puts the defendant in an untenable position – take the very job 
that we have held to be illegal or receive no back pay for failure to mitigate. 
{¶ 96} Granting mitigation credit for both the Laidlaw job amount and 
SERS benefits does give the school board a windfall – it ends up liable for 
January Term, 2005 
29 
nothing.  Instead, we should hold either that the plaintiff did mitigate by accepting 
SERS benefits or that $25,000 per year for comparable mechanical jobs is the 
measure for mitigation, and award defendant the difference between the amount 
guaranteed in the continuing contract and either measure of mitigation.  To do 
otherwise would allow the school board to lose the battle but win the war. 
{¶ 97} Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the failure to award back pay 
to Stacy. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Buckley King, James E. Melle, and Donell Grubbs, for appellant and 
cross-appellee. 
 
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer Co., L.P.A., and C. Bronston McCord III, for 
cross-appellants and appellees. 
______________________