Title: Walker v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE WALKER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 38, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 1005009912 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 29, 2011 
 
Decided: 
September 6, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 6th day of September 2011, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In November 2010, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant-appellant, Andre Walker, of first degree robbery, possession of a 
deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, two counts of aggravated 
menacing, criminal mischief, and resisting arrest.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Walker as an habitual offender on the first degree robbery 
conviction to life imprisonment.  This is Walker’s direct appeal. 
2 
 
(2) 
Walker’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Walker’s counsel asserts that, based upon 
a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Walker’s attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Walker with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Walker also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Walker has raised numerous 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Walker’s 
points, as well as to the position taken by Walker’s counsel, and has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record at trial fairly established that Walker had 
approached a cashier in the garden center of a Home Depot store on May 13, 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
3 
 
2010 with a bucket and a hatchet.  After the cashier rang up the items, 
Walker grabbed the cashier and held up the hatchet, ordering the cashier to 
open the register.  He then struck the cashier in the head with the flat side of 
the hatchet and then used the blade to break open the register.  Walker 
grabbed several hundred dollars from the register and then ran to the parking 
lot, where he threatened several other store patrons with the hatchet before 
fleeing.  Shortly thereafter, Walker was apprehended by police officers 
several blocks away from the store with the hatchet in his hand and $370 in 
his pocket.  Walker attempted to flee and struggled with police as they tried 
to arrest him.  Several eyewitnesses testified at trial, including the cashier 
who suffered a concussion, and positively identified Walker as the man with 
the hatchet. 
(5) 
Walker raises several issues for this Court’s consideration in 
response to his counsel’s brief and motion to withdraw.  First, Walker 
contends that he should not have been declared an habitual offender because 
he was never offered a chance at rehabilitation between his offenses and 
because his prior offenses were so old.  Next, Walker asserts that the deputy 
attorney general who signed the habitual offender motion failed to appear at 
the habitual offender hearing.  Third, Walker contends that the Superior 
Court judge erred in allowing witnesses to testify at the habitual offender 
4 
 
hearing.  Fourth, Walker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because of his “over all lack of presents [sic] during [the] trial.”  Fifth, 
Walker contends that the first degree robbery charge given to the jury “was 
in question” and that the trial court erred in not emailing the jury instructions 
to the parties, as it indicated it would.  Next, Walker contends that the facts 
supported a charge of second degree robbery or theft but not first degree 
robbery.  He also suggests that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the first degree robbery charge.  We 
consider these claims in order. 
(6) 
With respect to Walker’s challenge to his status as an habitual 
offender, we first note that the General Assembly adopted no statute of 
limitations on the prior felony convictions that may establish a defendant’s 
status as a habitual offender.2  Thus, we find no merit to Walker’s argument 
that his prior convictions were too old to be considered predicate offenses 
for purposes of establishing his status as an habitual offender.  Moreover, we 
find no merit to Walker’s reliance on Eaddy v. State3 to support his 
argument that he could not be declared an habitual offender because he had 
never been offered drug counseling and thus had no opportunity for 
                                                 
2 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §4214(b) (2007). See also Tate v. State, 1990 WL 17762 
(Del. Jan. 31, 1990) (affirming the Superior Court’s reliance on thirty-year old 
convictions as predicate offenses to establish defendant’s habitual offender status). 
3 Eaddy v. State, 1996 WL 313499 (Del. May 30, 1996). 
5 
 
rehabilitation between his offenses.  In Eaddy, this Court held that a 
defendant must be given some chance for rehabilitation between his offenses 
before being declared an habitual offender.  This means only that some 
period of time must have elapsed between sentencing on an earlier 
conviction and the commission of the offense resulting in the later felony 
conviction.4  It does not mean that a defendant is entitled to receive 
rehabilitative treatment at State expense.  In this case, nine years had passed 
between Walker’s first two offenses, and twelve years had elapsed between 
his second and third offenses.  Walker had ample opportunity to rehabilitate 
himself in the intervening years. 
(7) 
Walker next suggests that he was prejudiced because the deputy 
attorney general who prosecuted him was not the same prosecutor who 
appeared on behalf of the State at the habitual offender hearing.  Walker can 
point to no specific error or prejudice arising from this fact, however, and we 
find none.  The record of the habitual offender hearing reflects that the 
deputy attorney general who appeared on behalf of the State was well-
prepared and presented sufficient evidence to support the habitual offender 
motion.  Accordingly, we reject Walker’s contention as a ground for appeal. 
                                                 
4 See Eaddy v. State, 1996 WL 313499 (Del. May 30, 1996). 
6 
 
(8) 
Walker also asserts that the Superior Court erred at the habitual 
offender hearing by allowing the State to present live witnesses to prove 
Walker’s prior criminal offenses.  The State presented live witnesses 
because Walker contested his status as an habitual offender and demanded 
that the State prove the allegations in its motion.  Although live witnesses 
may not be a common practice at habitual offender hearings, the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to prove Walker’s 
predicate offenses through testimony rather than written documentation.  
Accordingly, we find no merit to this claim on appeal. 
(9) 
Walker next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective at 
trial.  This Court, however, will not consider claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.5  Accordingly, we do not 
address this claim further. 
(10) Walker next asserts that the jury instructions on the charge of 
first degree robbery were “in question.”  He also complains that the Superior 
Court erred in failing to email a written copy of the jury instructions to 
defense counsel and the prosecutor after the parties had reached a verbal 
agreement on the form of the instructions.  Walker, however, did not raise 
any challenge to the jury instructions below.  We find no plain error with 
                                                 
5 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986). 
7 
 
respect to the instruction given on first degree robbery.6  Moreover, Walker 
asserts no prejudice, and we find none, from the Superior Court’s failure to 
email the written instructions to the parties.  In accordance with Rule 30,7 
the Superior Court verbally informed the parties of its proposed action with 
respect to the jury instructions, and Walker’s counsel agreed with the trial 
court’s proposed action.  We find no merit to Walker’s argument on appeal. 
(11) Walker’s final two claims challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction for first degree robbery and the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on that charge.  
Essentially, Walker contends he could not be found guilty of first degree 
robbery because he opened the register and took the money rather than 
compelling the cashier to do it.  We find no merit to this contention.  The 
evidence reflected that Walker struck the cashier in the head with a hatchet, 
giving her a concussion, to prevent her from interfering with Walker’s theft 
from the register.  This evidence was more than sufficient to sustain 
Walker’s conviction for first degree robbery.8 
                                                 
6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2011). 
7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 30 (2011) (which provides that the trial court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action with respect to the parties’ requests for jury instructions). 
8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 832(a) (2007).  See, e.g., Cubbage v. State, 2003 WL 
21488129 (Del. June 25, 2003) (in order to prove first degree robbery, the State must 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant, while in course of committing theft, 
used or threatened to use force upon another person with the intent to prevent or 
overcome resistance to the theft and displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon). 
8 
 
(12) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Walker’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Walker’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Walker could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Justice