Title: YANZICK v SCHOOL DISTRICT 23

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-394 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 TIM YANZICK, Petitioner and Respondent, SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 23, LAKE COUNTY MONTANA et al., Appellants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana Boone, Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana Richard P. Heinz, County Attorney, Polson, Montana For Respondents: Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana Christopher Swartley argued, Missoula, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Smith Law Firm, Helena, Montana Chadwick Smith argued,Mt. School Boards Assoc., Helena, Montani John Larson argued, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Helena, Montana Emily Loring argued, Montana Education Association, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: September 16, 1981 Decided : FEB i m: A r Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This i s a n appeal from t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Lewis and Clark County, dated August 22, 1980, under t h e Administrative Procedure A c t . The D i s t r i c t Court found f o r Tim Yanzick, a tenured school t e a c h e r , r e v e r s i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e S t a t e Superintendent of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n . The Superintendent of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n had affirmed t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Lake County Superintendent of Schools, who had affirmed t h e determination by t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 23 n o t t o renew Yanzick's c o n t r a c t . W e r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t Court and r e i n s t a t e t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e S t a t e Superintendent and t h e County Superin- tendent. The i s s u e s which w e f i n d t o be d e t e r m i n a t i v e a r e : (1) What i s t h e standard of review which i s t o be a p p l i e d by t h e County Superintendent, t h e S t a t e Superintendent, t h e District Court and t h i s Court? (2) Did t h e County Superintendent, S t a t e Superintendent, and D i s t r i c t Court each a c t w i t h i n its a u t h o r i t y ? ( 3 ) Based upon t h e t r a n s c r i p t and record b e f o r e t h e reviewin agency and c o u r t s , w a s t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e County Superinten- d e n t c l e a r l y erroneous? Following a r e t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s d i s c l o s e d by t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e t h e County Superintendent: T i m Yanzick w a s a tenured t e a c h e r of seventh grade s c i e n c e and math a t Polson Middle School i n Lake County, Montana. H e had t a u g h t t h e r e f o r seven years. I n t h e f a l l of 1976 problems a r o s e w i t h regard t o Yanzick's l i v i n g arrangements w i t h Sharon S c o t t , a f e l l o w t e a c h e r , and w i t h regard to various events taking place both in and out of the classroom. These will be detailed in our review of the findings of fact of the County Superintendent. In January, 1977, Dr. Christensen, Superintendent of School District No. 23, and Mr. Dupuis, the principal of Yanzick's school, met with Yanzick. There were extensive discussions which will be reviewed later. Following further conferences between Yanzick and Christensen, and upon the recommendation of Christensen, the Board of Trustees decided not to renew Yanzick's contract for the school year 1977-78. Yanzick was notified of the decision on March 15, 1977. Pursuant to Yanzick's request, the specific reasons for the Board of Trustees' decision were contained in the letter to Yanzick dated March 24, 1977. The letter sets forth the following reasons for non-renewal of Yanzick's contract as follows: "1. The Board of Trustees believe that you have demonstrated a lack of fitness for teach- ing in the position in which you have been employed and such a lack of fitness as indica- ted in all statements made to your class of Junior High School students between the ages of 11 and 14 years, with the effect that your 'girlfriend' had to move out of your home be- cause some people did not like your living arrangements, which statements were made under circumstances where it was common knowledge to your students and some of their parents that you and Miss Sharon Scott, a physical education teacher in the Polson School district, were living together at that time in your home in Polson, Montana. "2. The Board of Trustees believe you have further demonstrated a lack of fitness for the teaching position in which you have been em- ployed by reason of your introduction of the subject of abortion in your classroom, where- in you inquired of the boys in your class, ages 11 to 14, 'How many of you boys would have your girlfriend get an abortion if she were pregnant?' "3. The Board further feels that you have also demonstrated a lack of fitness for employ- ment in the teaching position by a serious lack of good judgment in permitting the use in your classroom of human f e t u s e s brought by one of your s t u d e n t s who had obtained them without a u t h o r i z a t i o n from S t . Joseph's Hospital Labora- t o r y without t h e knowledge of t h e administra- t i o n of t h a t h o s p i t a l o r of t h e owner of t h e specimens. "4. The Board of Trustees f u r t h e r b e l i e v e t h a t you have demonstrated a lack of moral values by openly and notoriously cohabitating with a female teacher, not your wife, within t h e re- l a t i v e l y small community of Polson, Montana, which f a c t , and t h e knowledge of which f a c t among your s t u d e n t s , has adversely a f f e c t e d your performance a s a teacher. "5. The Board i s of t h e opinion t h a t you lack f i t n e s s f o r t h e classroom teaching posi- t i o n i n which you have been employed because of t h e lack of r e s p e c t f o r you a s a teacher which has developed among your students as a consequence of t h e above-mentioned occurrances." (Hereafter t h e above reasons are r e f e r r e d t o a s reasons 1, 2 , 3, 4 and 5.) Yanzick requested a hearing before t h e Board of Trustees a s provided i n s e c t i o n 20-4-204(3), MCA. H i s request was denied. L i t i g a t i o n followed, culminating i n an order from t h e Montana Supreme Court r e q u i r i n g t h e Board of Trustees t o hold a hearing and reconsider t h e i r decision. The hearing w a s held August 9, 1978; t h e Board of Trustees affirmed t h e i r o r i g i n a l d e c i s i o n not t o renew Yanzick's c o n t r a c t . Yanzick then appealed t o t h e County Superintendent. O n August 24 and 25, 1978, t h e County Superintendent of Schools held a hearing and extensive testimony w a s presented. The County Superintendent upheld t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Board of Trustees n o t t o renew t h e Yanzick c o n t r a c t . The p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n s of t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law of t h e County Superintendent a r e : "FINDINGS OF FACT: "7. That t h e reasons given by t h e Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 23 f o r non- renewal of t h e teaching c o n t r a c t of Appellant f o r t h e school year 1977-78 and which w e r e re- affirmed a f t e r reconsideration hearing on August 9, 1978 were as follows: (same five reasons as previously set forth in the letter to Yanzick dated March 24, 1977) . . . "8. That during the school year 1976-77 Appellant was a seventh grade science and math teacher at the Polson Middle School District No. 23 and that his classes included approxi- mately one hundred (100) students ranging in age from eleven (11) to fourteen (14) years and of an average age of twelve and one-half (12 1/2) years. "9. That on January 18, 1977, Appellant met with Dr. Lee Christensen, Superintendent of Schools of District No. 23, and Polson Middle School Principal Darryl Dupuis and was asked why he had moved Miss Sharon Scott into his house in the city of Polson and openly lived together after he had been previously admonished about public knowledge of this living arrangement; that Appellant admitted to Dr. Christensen and Darryl Dupuis that he and Miss Sharon Scott were liv- ing together without the benefit of marriage. "10. That at said meeting of January 18, 1977, Appellant further acknowledged that his students' knowledge of his living situation was having an adverse effect on his classroom teaching. "11. That subsequent to the above mentioned meeting of January 18, 1977, Appellant made a statement to one of his classes regarding the fact that complaints had been registered against him by certain people in the community about his living relationship with Miss Scott and that she had moved out of his house. "12. That Appellant has demonstrated a lack of fitness as a teacher in that his living arrangement with Miss Sharon Scott in this community had an adverse effect upon his performance as a teacher by reason that: "a. Numerous parental complaints had been registered against Appellant during the school year with the District No. 23 Administration which necessitated District Superintendent Christensen's and Middle School Principal Dupuis' counseling of Appellant on several occasions during the 1976-77 school year; that these parental complaints stemmed either directly or indirectly from Appellant's liv- ing situation with Miss Scott. "b. Appellant's living arrangement with Miss Scott had become a matter of public knowledge within the school community and had become a matter of discussion within his classroom there- by fostering a lack of respect for Appellant by his students. "c. Appellant's l i v i n g arrangement with M i s s S c o t t had a negative influence upon t h e forma- t i o n of moral judgements by h i s students. "14. That Appellant, by having made a statement w i t h i n t h e context of h i s c l a s s e s on human re- production regarding abortion and by having displayed human f e t u s e s t o h i s c l a s s e s on human reproduction which were v o l u n t a r i l y furnished t o him by a student whose f a t h e r was chief labor- a t o r y technician a t t h e l o c a l h o s p i t a l , has not provided t h e School Board with an independent b a s i s i n e i t h e r i n s t a n c e f o r a f i n d i n g t h a t Appellant was u n f i t t o be a teacher. "15. That, though standing alone t h e above mentioned a b o r t i o n statement and d i s p l a y of f e t u s e s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r d i s m i s s a l , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e matters had become sources of s e r i o u s p r o t e s t lodged by parents and had emerged as morality-oriented i s s u e s i n t h e d i s - missal of Appellant is d i r e c t l y i n d i c a t i v e of t h e f a c t t h a t Appellant's l i v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p with M i s s Sharon S c o t t w a s having an adverse e f f e c t upon h i s performance a s a teacher." Pursuant t o s e c t i o n 20-4-204 ( 4 ) , Yanzick appealed t o t h e Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n ( S t a t e Superintendent). The S t a t e Superintendent considered t h e record without taking o t h e r evidence. The S t a t e Superintendent found t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e above quoted f i n d i n g s of f a c t s 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 and 12, which i n t u r n supported reasons 1, 4 and 5 of t h e Board of Trustees. The S t a t e Superintendent d i d not d i s c u s s reasons 2 and 3 . The S t a t e Superintendent upheld t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e County Superintendent terminating Yanzick a s a tenured teacher. Yanzick p e t i t i o n e d f o r review i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court under Sections 2-4-702 (Administrative Procedure Act) and 20-3107(2) (Education T i t l e , Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n Controversy Appeal), MCA. I n substance, t h e p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t Yanzick was aggrieved by t h e order r e f u s i n g t o renew h i s c o n t r a c t , and a l l e g e d t h a t Yanzick i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f i n t h a t h i s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s have been prejudiced because the decision violates constitutional and statutory provisions, and clearly is erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. The petition and the response to the petition do not delineate any specific issues for consideration by the District Court. In its memorandum and order dated August 22, 1980, the ~istrict Court reversed the State Superintendent's order, and remanded to the County Superintendent, with instructions to revise the findings and conclusions in accordance with the District Court opinion, and to order the Board of Trustees to reinstate Yanzick and to determine his lost wages. The District Court made an extensive review of the evidence and concluded that the finding that Yanzick and Scott were living together out of wedlock and the finding that this arrangement was a matter of public knowledge is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence. We find to the contrary. The District Court also did not find sufficient evidence to support a finding that Yanzick's alleged cohabitation and the students' knowledge of it had an adverse effect upon his performance as a teacher. We comment on this finding later. School District No. 23 and the County Superintendent appealed to this Court from the "final Order of the Court entered in this action on August 22, 1980, reversing the decision and order of the Superintendent of Public ~nstruction not to renew the contract of Tim Yanzick, for the school year 1977-1978." The Notice of Appeal does not delineate any issues for consideration by this Court. 11. The State Superintendent contends that the Montana ~dministrative Procedure Act (MAPA) is not applicable. As previously mentioned, t h e procedure followed i n t h e appeal t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court was under M A P A . A consideration of s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s i n MAPA shows t h a t it i s a p p l i c a b l e . I n order f o r M A P A t o apply, t h e County Superintendent and S t a t e Superintendent must come under t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "agency" a s defined i n M A P A . Section 2-4-102, MCA, d e f i n e s "agency" by r e f e r e n c e t o s e c t i o n 2-3-102, MCA, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e s : " ( 1 ) 'Agency' means any board, . . . a u t h o r i t y , o r o f f i c e r of t h e s t a t e o r l o c a l government authorized by law t o make r u l e s , determine contested c a s e s , o r e n t e r i n t o c o n t r a c t s except: (exceptions n o t here a p p l i c a b l e ) . " I t i s c l e a r from t h a t d e f i n i t i o n t h a t t h e t e r m "agency" includes both t h e County Superintendent and t h e S t a t e Superintende Next we must determine i f t h e p r e s e n t case comes w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "contested case" under M A P A . Section 2-4- 102, MCA, i n p a r t s t a t e s : " ( 4 ) 'Contested c a s e ' means any proceeding before an agency i n which a determination of l e g a l r i g h t s , d u t i e s , o r p r i v i l e g e s of a p a r t y i s required by law t o be made a f t e r an opportunity f o r hearing . . ." W e conclude t h a t t h e p r e s e n t controversy i s a contested case a s defined i n M A P A , making t h e M A P A code s e c t i o n s on Contested Cases ( s e c t i o n 2-4-601 t o 2-4-631, MCA) and J u d i c i a l Review of Contested Cases ( s e c t i o n 2-4-701 t o 2-4-711, MCA) applicable. The p a r t i e s followed t h e s e procedures i n t h e p r e s e n t case. W e d i s c u s s i s s u e (1) which is t h e standard of review t o be applied by t h e County Superintendent, S t a t e Superintendent, D i s t r i c t Court and t h i s Court. A s w e proceed through t h e s t a t u t o r y s e c t i o n s , we w i l l comment on i s s u e ( 2 ) , whether t h e County Superintendent, S t a t e Superintendent, and D i s t r i c t Court, each acted within its a u t h o r i t y . A s f a r a s teacher tenure is concerned and termination of employment, M r . Yanzick meets t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a tenured teacher a s defined i n s e c t i o n 20-4-203, MCA: "Whenever a teacher has been e l e c t e d by t h e o f f e r and acceptance of a c o n t r a c t f o r t h e f o u r t h consecutive year of employment by a d i s t r i c t i n a p o s i t i o n r e q u i r i n g teacher c e r t i f i c a t i o n . . . t h e teacher s h a l l be deemed t o be r e e l e c t e d from year t o year t h e r e a f t e r a s a tenure teacher . . ." Section 20-4-204, MCA, contains t h e provisions regarding termination of tenured t e a c h e r s ' s e r v i c e s . This includes provisions f o r n o t i f i c a t i o n of t h e teacher i n w r i t i n g by c e r t i f i e d o r r e g i s t e r e d mail, including a p r i n t e d copy of t h i s code s e c t i o n ; opportunity f o r t h e tenured teacher t o request a w r i t t e n statement declaring c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h e s p e c i f i c reasons f o r termination; with a hearing granted upon request of t h e teacher before t h e Trustees f o r reconsidera- t i o n of t h e termination a c t i o n . A s described i n t h e f a c t s previously o u t l i n e d , t h e foregoing procedures w e r e followed i n t h e Yanzick case. The provision f o r appeal of t h e Trustees' determination t o t h e County Superintendent i s contained i n s e c t i o n 20-4-204, MCA, which s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( 3 ) . . . I f t h e t r u s t e e s a f f i r m t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o terminate t h e t e a c h e r ' s employment, t h e tenure teacher may appeal t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o t h e county superintendent who may.appoint a q u a l i f i e d a t t o r n e y a t law a s l e g a l advisor who s h a l l a s s i s t t h e superintendent i n preparing find- ings of f a c t and conclusions of law. " ( 4 ) Subsequently, e i t h e r t h e teacher o r t h e t r u s t e e s may appeal t o t h e superintendent of p u b l i c i n s t r u c t i o n under t h e provision f o r t h e appeal of controversies i n t h i s t i t l e . " The procedure i s b r i e f l y described i n s e c t i o n 20-3-210, MCA, which a l s o d e s c r i b e s t h e use of an a t t o r n e y as a l e g a l a d v i s o r , and s t a t e s : " (1) . . . [TI he county superintendent shall hear and decide all matters of controversy arising . . . as a result of decisions of the trustees of a district in the county. When appeals are made under 20-4-204 relating to the termination of services of a tenure teacher or under 20-4-207 relating to the dismissal of a teacher under contract, the county superintendent may appoint a qualified attorney at law to act as a legal advisor who shall assist the superintendent in prepar- ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Subsequently, either the teacher or trustees may appeal to the superintendent of public instruction under the provisions for appeal of controversies in this title . . . " (2) The county superintendent shall hear the appeal and take testimony in order to determine the facts related to the controversy and may administer oaths to the witnesses that testify at the hearing. He shall prepare a written transcript of the hearing proceedings. The decision on the matter of controversy which is made by the county superintendent shall be based upon the facts established at such hearing. "(3) The decision of the county superintendent may be appealed to the superintendent of public instruction, . . ." This section requires the County Superintendent to hear and decide controversies of the Yanzick type and to make the decision based upon the facts established at the hearing. In effect, this requires a hearing de novo before the County Superintendent. The hearing provisions which apply to the County Superintendent are set forth in MAPA section 2-4-612 which in pertinent part states: "(1) Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved. "(2) Except as otherwise provided by statute relating directly to an agency, agencies shall be bound by common law and statutory rules of evidence. Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted in the record "(4) All testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation. " ( 5 ) A party shall have the right to conduct cross-examinations required for a full and true disclosure of facts, . . . "(7) The agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of evidence." MAPA also sets forth the form of findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating in section 2-4-623, MCA, as follows: "(1) A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the record. A final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the find- ings. "(2) Findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and on matters officially noticed. "(3) Each conclusion of law shall be supported by authority or by a reasoned opinion. . ." The foregoing statutes contain the procedure to be followed by the County Superintendent in the de novo hearing before her. The statutes do not contain a limitation on the decision- making power of the County Superintendent. We find that the County Superintendent followed the statutory procedure, and acted within the scope of her authority. So far as the State Superintendent is concerned, section 20-3-107, MCA, sets forth these essential elements for the appeal of the controversy to the State Superintendent: "(1) The superintendent of public instruc- tion shall decide matters of controversy when they are appealed from: "(a) A decision of a county superintendent rendered under the provisions of 20-3-210; "(2) The superintendent of public instruction shall make his decision on the basis of the transcript of the fact-finding hearing conducted by the county superintendent . . . and documents presented a t t h e hearing. . . The decision of t h e superintendent . . . s h a l l be f i n a l , s u b j e c t t o t h e proper l e g a l remedies i n t h e s t a t e c o u r t s . Such proceedings s h a l l be commenced no l a t e r than 60 days a f t e r t h e d a t e of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e superintendent. . ." I n t h i s case t h e S t a t e Superintendent d i d make h e r d e c i s i o n on t h e b a s i s of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e hearing before t h e County Superintendent. The M A P A provisions of s e c t i o n 2-4- 623, MCA, r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t be based exclusively on t h e evidence and t h a t t h e conclusions of law be supported by a u t h o r i t y , a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e S t a t e Superintendent a s w e l l a s t h e County Superintendent. The S t a t e Superintendent s t a t e d a s follows: "Bearing i n mind t h a t t h e county superinten- dent i s properly t h e judge of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses, I f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support f i n d i n g s of f a c t 9, 1 0 , 11, and 1 2 , which i n t u r n support t h e reasons 1, 4 , and 5 given by t h e board t o j u s t i f y a p p e l l a n t ' s termination." The S t a t e Superintendent then affirmed t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e County Superintendent upholding t h e termination of Yanzick a s a tenured teacher. W e hold t h a t t h e procedure followed by t h e S t a t e Superintendent i n her determination was c o r r e c t under t h e applicable s t a t u t e s . The D i s t r i c t Court is s u b j e c t t o MAPA provisions i n its j u d i c i a l review of contested cases. The standard of review a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 2- 4-704, MCA, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s follows: "(1) The review s h a l l be conducted by t h e c o u r t without a jury and s h a l l be confined t o t h e record. . . The c o u r t , upon r e q u e s t , s h a l l hear o r a l argument and r e c e i v e w r i t t e n b r i e f s . ( I n t h i s c a s e , t h e matter w a s sub- mitted upon b r i e f s . ) " ( 2 ) The c o u r t may n o t s u b s t i t u t e its judgment f o r t h a t of t h e agency a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on questions of f a c t . The c o u r t may a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e agency o r remand t h e case f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. The c o u r t may reverse o r modify t h e d e c i s i o n i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t have been prejudiced because t h e administrative f i n d i n g s , . . . conclusions, . . . a r e : " ( e ) Clearly erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , probative, and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e whole record; . . ." Under t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court may not s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e County Superintendent a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on questions of f a c t . Under t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court was given t h e r i g h t t o r e v e r s e t h e decision i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of Yanzick were prejudiced because t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e findings and conclusions were " c l e a r l y erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , probative,and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e whole record." The D i s t r i c t Court properly followed t h a t procedure i n reaching i t s conclusion i n t h e p r e s e n t case. While we d i s a g r e e with t h e conclusion of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, w e conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d a c t within t h e scope of i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y . So f a r a s t h i s Court i s concerned, t h e MAPA procedures a r e s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 2-4-711, MCA, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t reads: "An aggrieved p a r t y may o b t a i n review of a f i n a l judgment of a d i s t r i c t c o u r t under t h i s p a r t by appeal t o t h e supreme c o u r t within 60 days a f t e r e n t r y of judgment. Such appeal s h a l l be taken i n t h e manner provided by law f o r appeals from d i s t r i c t c o u r t s i n c i v i l cases . . ." From t h e foregoing, it i s apparent t h a t t h e procedure i n appealing t o t h i s Court i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t used i n an appeal from any o t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t decision. I n t h i s proceeding t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s n o t t h e t r i e r of f a c t . W e have h e r e an appeal from a lower a p p e l l a n t t r i b u n a l which i n t u r n based i t s conclusions on a review of t h e p r i n t e d record, without t h e b e n e f i t of l i s t e n i n g t o and observing t h e demeanor, conduct and testimony of witnesses. W e hold t h a t t h i s Court should n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e County Superintendent a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on questions of f a c t and t h a t t h i s Court may r e v e r s e o r modify t h e decision i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t have been prejudiced because t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n d i n g s and conclusions a r e c l e a r l y erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , probative and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e whole record. A s t h i s review demonstrates, h e r e w e have had t h e following b a s i c procedure: (1) A n i n i t i a l determination by t h e Board of Trustees t h a t t h e Yanzick c o n t r a c t should not be renewed. ( 2 ) A rehearing a t t h e request of Yanzick by t h e Board of Trustees which affirmed its p r i o r decision. ( 3 ) An appeal t o t h e County Superintendent which was a t r i a l de novo with witnesses and record evidence. (4) A n appeal t o t h e S t a t e Superintendent based upon t h e record. ( 5 ) A f u r t h e r appeal t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court based upon t h e record. ( 6 ) Last an appeal t o t h i s Court again in- volving a review of t h e record. W e suggest t h a t t h e i n i t i a l hearings followed by t h r e e s e p a r a t e and i n p a r t d u p l i c a t i n g appeals does n o t appear t o be j u d i c i a l economy o r an appropriate manner of disposing of a contested c a s e under MAPA without delay. W e suggest t h i s i s an appropriate a r e a f o r l e g i s l a t i v e consideration. IV. The remaining i s s u e is whether, based upon t h e t r a n s c r i p t and record before t h e reviewing agency ( S t a t e Superintendent) and t h e reviewing c o u r t s ( t h e D i s t r i c t Court and t h i s Court.), t h e County Superintendent's decision was c l e a r l y erroneous. I n considering t h a t i s s u e , we must consider t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determinations of t h e County Superintendent and t h e S t a t e Superintendent a s well a s t h e a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The general power of t h e Trustees of a school d i s t r i c t t o h i r e and f i r e teachers i s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 20-3-324, MCA, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e s : ". . . t h e t r u s t e e s of each d i s t r i c t s h a l l have t h e power and it s h a l l be t h e i r duty t o perform t h e following d u t i e s o r a c t s : " ( 1 ) employ o r dismiss a teacher, p r i n c i p a l , o r o t h e r a s s i s t a n t upon t h e recommendation of t h e d i s t r i c t superintendent, t h e high school p r i n c i p a l , o r o t h e r p r i n c i p a l a s t h e board may deem necessary, accepting o r r e j e c t i n g such recommendation a s t h e t r u s t e e s s h a l l i n t h e i r s o l e d i s c r e t i o n determine, i n accordance with t h e provisions of t h e school personnel p a r t of t h i s t i t l e . " [Now ". . . i n accordance with t h e provisions of T i t l e 20, Chapter 4." Section 20-3-324, MCA, 1981.1 This s e c t i o n shows t h a t t h e power and d u t i e s of t h e Trustees include t h e employment and dismissal of teachers. That s t a t u t e is c o n s i s t e n t with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions regarding t h e c o n t r o l of schools being vested i n each school d i s t r i c t . Montana Constitution, A r t i c l e X , Section 8, provides: "The supervision and c o n t r o l of schools i n each school d i s t r i c t s h a l l be vested i n a board of t r u s t e e s t o be e l e c t e d a s provided by law. " The l e g i s l a t u r e has i n d i c a t e d its d e s i r e t o place l o c a l c o n t r o l of schools i n t h e l o c a l school d i s t r i c t s . I n School D i s t r i c t N o . 1 2 , P h i l l i p s County v. Hughes (1976), 170 Mont. 267, 272-273, 552 P.2d 328, 331, t h i s Court quoted t h e proceedings of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention i n which t h e matter of l o c a l c o n t r o l w a s discussed by d e l e g a t e s who s t a t e d : " I . . . no matter what w e say, perhaps, they'd s t i l l have t h a t f e a r t h a t t h e l o c a l school d i s t r i c t s a r e going t o l o s e some --- c o n t r o l and some power. And i f you w i l l --- note i n m y remarks when w e g e t t o nine, t e n and eleven, you w i l l note t h a t we have elimina- t e d t h e word, c o n t r o l i n t h e new p u b l i c board of education where it is i n t h e o l d Constitu- t i o n , and only use t h e word, supervise. By t h i s amendment t h e i n t e n t i s shown. I t h i n k . t h a t t h i s body does want l o c a l cont r o l t o remain with -- t h e l o c a l school d i s t r i c t s and I - - h e a r t i l y support i t . " ". . . I f e e l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t w e should g i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l recognition and s t a t u s t o t h e l o c a l boards t o -- f i r s t of a l l , t o a l l a y t h e f e a r s which have been expressed, which I think a r e w e l l founded concerning t h e preser- v a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy . . . I 11 - I n cases determined p r i o r t o t h e 1972 Constitution, t h i s Court affirmed t h e wide d i s c r e t i o n reposed i n t h e Board of Trustees. I n Kelsey v. School D i s t r i c t No. 25 (1929), 84 Mont. 453, 458, 276 P. 26, 2 6 , t h i s Court s t a t e d : "A wide d i s c r e t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y reposed i n t h e t r u s t e e s who composed t h e board. They a r e e l e c t e d by popular vote, and, presumably, a r e chosen by reason of t h e i r standing i n t h e community, sound judgment, and t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e educational development of t h e young generation which i s so soon t o t a k e t h e p l a c e of t h e o l d . " I n emphasizing t h a t a t e a c h e r ' s work is a very s e n s i t i v e a r e a and t h a t school a u t h o r i t i e s have t h e duty t o screen teachers a s t o t h e i r f i t n e s s t o maintain t h e i n t e g r i t y of schools, i n Adler v. Board of Education (1952), 342 U.S. 485, 493, 72 S.Ct. 380, 385, 96 L.Ed. 517, 524, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s a i d : "A teacher works i n a s e n s i t i v e a r e a i n a schoolroom. There he shapes t h e a t t i t u d e of young minds towards t h e s o c i e t y i n which they l i v e . I n t h i s , t h e s t a t e has a v i t a l concern. I t must preserve t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e schools. That t h e school a u t h o r i t i e s have t h e r i g h t and t h e duty t o screen t h e o f f i c i a l s , teachers, and employees a s t o t h e i r f i t n e s s t o maintain t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e schools a s a p a r t of ordered s o c i e t y , cannot be doubted." While it i s t r u e t h a t the t r u s t e e s of a school d i s t r i c t do have t h e power and duty t o both employ a teacher and terminate a teacher under t h e appropriate circumstances, t h e r i g h t s of t h e teachers must a l s o be kept c o n s t a n t l y i n mind. The tenure of a teacher i s c l e a r l y both a valuable and a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t which cannot be taken away except f o r good cause. This Court s t a t e d i n S t a t e ex r e l . Saxtorph v. D i s t r i c t Court, Fergus County (1954), 128 Mont. 353, 361, 275 P.2d 209, 2 1 4 , a s follows: "The r i g h t of a school teacher t o teach i n a school, o r school d i s t r i c t , from year t o y e a r , a f t e r having taught i n such school o r school d i s t r i c t f o r t h r e e consecutive y e a r s , is c a l l e d tenure. A t e a c h e r ' s tenure is a s u b s t a n t i a l , valuable and b e n e f i c i a l r i g h t , which cannot be taken away except -- for good cause. ( ~ m p h z i s supplied) . ". . . This c o u r t s a i d ' t h e purpose of enact- ing t h e Teacher Tenure Act . . . i s n o t merely t o i n s u r e teaching employment b u t it is a l s o t o i n s u r e t o teachers who have held teaching p o s i t i o n s f o r t h r e e o r more consecutive y e a r s , s e c u r i t y i n t h e p o s i t i o n , t h e grade o r t h e s t a t u s which they have thus a t t a i n e d . . . I II I n t h i s case, Yanzick's tenure i s a s u b s t a n t i a l and valuable r i g h t which can be taken away by t h e Board of Trustees only f o r good cause. Section 20-4-204, MCA, s e t s f o r t h procedural requirements which apply upon t h e termination of a tenured t e a c h e r , including t h e manner of giving n o t i c e , hearing, and appeal. The s e c t i o n does n o t s e t f o r t h s p e c i f i c standards which a tenured teacher is required t o meet, o r p a r t i c u l a r grounds which t h e Trustees a r e required t o f i n d p r i o r t o t h e termination of a tenured t e a c h e r ' s services. Counsel f o r Yanzick contends t h a t s e c t i o n 20-4-207, MCA, contains t h e standards which apply i n t h e event of termination of t h e s e r v i c e s of a tenured teacher. By its terms, t h a t s e c t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n where t r u s t e e s seek t o dismiss a teacher before t h e e x p i r a t i o n of h i s employment c o n t r a c t , t h a t i s , during t h e course of a normal school year. The Trustees here d i d n o t attempt t o dismiss Yanzick during t h e t e r m of h i s employment c o n t r a c t . They chose n o t t o renew h i s c o n t r a c t f o r a subsequent school year. W e conclude t h a t s e c t i o n 20-4-207, MCA, i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Yanzick f a c t s i t u a t i o n . That i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t with s e c t i o n 20-3-210(1), which r e f e r s t o appeals made under s e c t i o n 20-4-204, MCA, r e l a t i n g t o t h e termination of s e r v i c e s of a tenured teacher, and which a l s o r e f e r s t o s e c t i o n 20-4-207 r e l a t i n g t o t h e d i s m i s s a l of a teacher under c o n t r a c t . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o i s c o n s i s t e n t with s e c t i o n 20-4-203(1), which provides t h a t t r u s t e e s by majority v o t e may r e s o l v e t o terminate t h e s e r v i c e s of a tenured teacher i n accordance with t h e provisions of 20-4-204. W e hold t h a t s e c t i o n 20-4-207, MCA, which sets f o r t h t h e grounds upon which t h e t r u s t e e s may dismiss a teacher before t h e e x p i r a t i o n of h i s employment c o n t r a c t is n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e termination of t h e s e r v i c e s of a tenure teacher under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 20-4-203 and 20-4-204, MCA. I n view of our r e v e r s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, it is necessary t h a t w e review t h e record i n some d e t a i l . W e have already i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e record must show good cause f o r t h e termination of a t e a c h e r ' s tenure. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e conduct of t h e teacher, including a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n t h a t it i s immoral, must be such a s t o d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e performance by t h e teacher of h i s d u t i e s a s a teacher. A s s t a t e d i n J e r r y v. Board of Education of City School D i s t r i c t of Syracuse (1974), 35 N.Y. 2d 534, , 364 N.Y.S.2d 4 4 0 , 446, 324 N.E.2d 106, 1 1 1 : "In our view what might otherwise be considered private conduct beyond the scope of licit concern of school officials ceases to be such in at least either of two circumstances -- if the conduct directly affects the performance of the profes- sional responsibilities of the teacher, or if, without contribution on the part of school officials, the conduct has become the subject of such public notoriety as significantly and reason- ably to impair the capability of the particular teacher to discharge the responsibilities of his position. " The District Court considered the California case of Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969), 1 Cal.3d 214, 82 Gal-Rep. 175, 461 P.2d 375, and concluded that the criteria set forth in Morrison should be applied to the facts in the present case. The facts of the blorrison case and its holding are not applicable here. Morrison was accused of homosexual conduct which had taken place, over a period of one week, in total privacy between him and another teacher. Morrison's conduct did not come to light until the involved teacher advised the school authorities. Thereafter, the California board sought to revoke Morrison's life diploma to teach, thereby completely eliminating his ability to work in California as a teacher. There was no suggestion in the Morrison case that the conduct of the involved teacher in any way affected his performance as a teacher. Yanzick's conduct was not some form of private conduct unknown to the community, but as will subsequently appear, was conduct broadly known throughout the community and to the Board of Trustees, which the Board of Trustees found adversely affected Yanzick's performance as a teacher. In view of the factual difference, it is not appropriate to apply the Morrison criteria to the present case. W e now review t h e record evidence t o support reasons 1, 4 and 5 of t h e Board of Trustees. I n reason 1 t h e Trustees concluded t h a t Yanzick has demonstrated a lack of f i t n e s s f o r teaching i n statements made t o h i s junior high student c l a s s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h i s " g i r l f r i e n d " had t o move o u t of h i s house because some people d i d not l i k e h i s l i v i n g arrangements I n reason 4, t h e Trustees concluded t h a t Yanzick had demonstrated a l a c k of moral values by cohabiting with a female teacher n o t h i s wife i n Polson which had adversely a f f e c t e d h i s performance as a teacher. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e f i n d i n g t h a t it was a matter of p u b l i c knowledge t h a t Yanzick and S c o t t were l i v i n g together o u t of wedlock was c l e a r l y erroneous. The record i n d i c a t e s t o t h e contrary. The record shows t h a t D r . Christensen, Superintendent of School D i s t r i c t No. 23, met with Yanzick on a number of occasions i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e matters covered by reasons 1 and 4. D r . Christensen described a p o r t i o n of one interview with M r . Yanzick a s follows: "Q. What f u r t h e r t r a n s p i r e d a t t h i s meeting on January 18th? "A. A t t h a t p o i n t , I s t a t e d t o him, ' I d i s - t i n c t l y r e c a l l t a l k i n g t o you l a s t year about comments i n t h e community r e l a t i v e t o your shacking up with M i s s S c o t t , t h e i n d i c a t o r being your coming t o work across t h e bridge every morning, sometimes t o g e t h e r . ' "And I asked him -- and t h i s i s verbatim -- 'Why i n heaven's name have you now moved her i n t o your house and openly decided t o l i v e together? What possessed you t o e n t e r i n t o such a s i t u a t i o n . ' "Q. H o w d i d M r . Yanzick respond t o t h a t question? "A. M r . Yanzick s t a t e d t h a t , ' I decided t o do t h i s because I w a s r e c e n t l y divorced. I d i d n ' t want t o make t h e same mistake again.' "He rambled on f o r about 20 minutes, p r e t t y much uninterrupted. A t times, he was emotional about t h e s i t u a t i o n . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p with M i s s S c o t t had s t a r t e d rocky, b u t had now developed i n t o a b e a u t i f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p , 'one t h a t means a g r e a t d e a l . ' I pointed o u t t o him t h a t i t ' s obvious with t h e students i n h i s classes possessing f u l l knowledge of t h i s , t a l k i n g , jok- ing, e t c e t e r a , about it, t h a t it was having a detrimental, adverse e f f e c t on h i s classroom teaching. H e s t a t e d t h a t 'This appears t o be t h e case, and t h i s worries me. I l i k e m y job. I f e e l t h a t I ' m a good teacher.' "Q. D r . Christensen, l e t me i n t e r r u p t once again, t h e r e . D o you i n d i c a t e those as being auditory responses t o you, r a t h e r than your conclusion from any conclusion you might have drawn from h i s a c t i o n o r s i l e n c e ? "A. These were h i s statements. 'This appears t o be t h e case. This worries m e , because I l i k e m y job, and I f e e l I a m a good t e a c h e r . ' He asked what he should do. He concluded -- he formed h i s own conclusion. H e s a i d he f e l t t h a t he should have M i s s S c o t t move out." I t i s important t o note t h a t M r . Yanzick agreed t h a t h i s conduct was having a "detrimental, adverse e f f e c t " on h i s classroom teaching. While M r . Yanzick's own testimony w a s enlightening, it d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l of t h e Superin- t e n d e n t ' s testimony. O n h i s own d i r e c t examination, M r . Yanzick i n p a r t t e s t i f i e d : "A. . . . He d i d ask m e i f w e were l i v i n g to- gether, and I s a i d , 'Yes, you might say t h a t . ' But I never d i d go i n t o g r e a t d e t a i l t o explain t h a t l i v i n g arrangement. "Q. What d i d you mean when you s a i d , 'Yes, you might say t h a t 1 ? "A. Well, when you r e f e r t o t h e term, most people, I think -- o r , when D r . Christensen asked t h e question, I ' m s u r e t h a t he meant were we occupying t h a t house a s husband and wife i n f u l l terms of t h e sense, probably, and I d i d not mean t h a t by -- m y concept of l i v i n g together does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y include a l l of those aspects. " I t h i n k you can be l i v i n g with someone without sharing t h e bed with them, n e c e s s a r i l y , a l l t h e time. I won't deny t h a t I went with M i s s S c o t t . I won't deny our r e l a t i o n s h i p . But I was n o t t e c h n i c a l l y l i v i n g i n t h a t house.'' With regard t o t h e discussion before h i s junior high c l a s s of h i s g i r l f r i e n d moving o u t , Superintendent Christensen f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Did anything f u r t h e r concerning M r . Yanzick then occur r e l a t i v e t o complaints of p a r e n t s o r your dealings with him over t h e s u b j e c t s you had j u s t discussed with him? "A. Yes. O n January 26th of 1977, I received another phone c a l l , again from M r s . Herreid. She was concerned because he had made a s t a t e - ment i n c l a s s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t , 'My g i r l has moved o u t because people d i d n ' t approve of our arrangement. ' "I went t o M r . Dupuis's o f f i c e t h i s time, and i n M r . Dupuis's presence once again asked him i f he had made t h a t statement. H e s a i d yes, he had, t h a t it was t o c l e a r t h e a i r . . ." It i s important t o note t h a t Superintendent Christensen believed t h e l i v i n g arrangements and statements of M r . Yanzick should be considered only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they a f f e c t e d h i s classroom performance. O n t h i s a s p e c t , Super- intendent Christensen t e s t i f i e d : "A. I recommended t o t h e Board of Trustees a t t h a t time t h a t it was m y opinion t h a t M r . Yanzick had repeatedly shown such a lack of judgment i n a c t s a s w e l l a s statements made t o h i s c l a s s e s t o make him u n f i t f o r classroom duty i n dealings with young, immature teenagers, who, I might add, a r e a t an impressionable s t a g e of development. "Q. With r e s p e c t t o any moral i s s u e s o r questions involved, d i d you venture an opinion t o t h e Board of Trustees with r e s p e c t t o such i s s u e ? "A. Y e s , I did. "Q. And what was t h a t opinion communicated t o t h e Board? "A. The concern of t h e community and of t h e Board about h i s l i v i n g arrangements. The question was r a i s e d and I i n t e r r u p t e d and pointed o u t t o t h e Board t h a t h i s l i v i n g arrangements were r e a l l y probably of no concern of o u r s , unless t h e s e l i v - ing arrangements became an i s s u e i n h i s classroom and were having a demonstrated adverse e f f e c t on h i s classroom performance. "The Board members, by and l a r g e , agreed with t h a t , and s a i d yeah, t h a t was t r u e , and t h a t was p r e t t y much t h e end of t h e discussion regarding h i s l i v i n g arrangements a s such." The County Superintendent was i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e trier of f a c t , and s o was a b l e t o hear and e v a l u a t e t h e testimony of t h e v a r i o u s witnesses. Some of t h e evidence d e f i n i t e l y i s c o n f l i c t i n g . Under such circumstances, t h e conclusions of t h e trier of f a c t deserve p a r t i c u l a r weight. The County Superintendent and t h e S t a t e Superintendent both found t h a t T r u s t e e s ' reasons 1, 4 and 5 w e r e supported by t h e evidence. Applying t h e standard of s e c t i o n 2-4-704, MCA, w e f i n d reasons 1, 4 and 5 a r e n o t c l e a r l y erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , p r o b a t i v e and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e whole record. The County Superintendent's f i n d i n g of f a c t No. 1 5 s t a t e d t h a t , although t h e a b o r t i o n d i s c u s s i o n (reason 2) and t h e d i s p l a y of f e t u s e s (reason 3 ) w e r e n o t i n themselves s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r d i s m i s s a l , they, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e r e s u l t a n t controversy, w e r e i n d i c a t i v e of t h e adverse impact t h a t Yanzick's l i v i n g arrangement w i t h M i s s S c o t t w a s having upon h i s teaching. While t h e f i n d i n g i s n o t t o t a l l y clear, it does a f f o r d a f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h i s Court t o c o n s i d e r reasons 2 and 3. I n reason 2, t h e Trustees concluded t h a t Yanzick had demonstrated a l a c k of f i t n e s s f o r teaching because of i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t of a b o r t i o n i n t h e classroom when he i n q u i r e d of t h e boys i n t h e c l a s s "How many of you boys would have your g i r l f r i e n d g e t a n a b o r t i o n i f she w e r e pregnant?" The record evidence i n s u p p o r t of reason 2 i n c l u d e s t h e following testimony by Superintendent Christensen a s t o statements made t o him by M r . Yanzick i n t h e presence of t h e p r i n c i p a l : "Q. Now, could you p l e a s e r e l a t e t o t h e Super- i n t e n d e n t what took p l a c e a t t h a t conference, what w a s s a i d t o M r . Yanzick, and what h i s r e p l i e s were? F i r s t of a l l , you k e p t -- d i d you keep t h e n o t e s t h a t you say you customarily keep re- garding such? "A. I was jotting down notes as we were talking, yes. Mr. Yanzick admitted and stated, 'Yes, I did say, "How many of you boys would urge your girl to get an abortion if you got her in trouble?" "Q. How was that done, Doctor, so far as you can recollect? "A. I related the quote to him, 'How many of you boys would have your girl get an abortion if you got her in trouble?' He said, 'Yes, I did say that. ' "Q. In other words, he verbalized it? "A. Yes. Well, he did not repeat it, but he did say, 'I did say that.' "Q. His response, then, was verbal and not by a nod of the head or other indication? "A. That is correct." Superintendent Christensen concluded that this was an improper approach to be taken with 11 to 14 year olds. Dr. Campbell, a member of the Board of Trustees, and a pediatrician, was asked whether or not the abortion question demonstrated a lack of fitness as concluded by the Board of Trustees and stated: "Q. (By Mr. Heinz) Do you continue to support that assertion as a demonstration of lack of fitness for a teacher to continue in the dis- trict's employ? "A. I would. I would think it so inappropriate that I had a hard time believing it of Mr. Yanzick." After questioning to show his qualification as an expert to testify concerning growth and development of children, including physical and sexual development of children of the ages of 11 to 14, the doctor testified that the particular question would be very inappropriate for the age group 11 to 14. In reason 3 the Trustees concluded that Yanzick had demonstrated a lack of fitness for employment in a teaching position by his lack of good judgment in the use of human fetuses in the classroom. After receiving a complaint, with regard to the use of fetuses in the classroom, Christensen testified as follows: "At seven fifteen, the morning of January 28th, I went to Mr. Yanzick's room. I walked around the room a couple of times; finally discovered a white plastic bucket sitting at the front of the room. I reached into the bucket and removed the contents. It contained three bottles and three plastic sacks. One of the sacks contain- ed an identifiable human fetus of five or six inches in length. I placed the items back in the plastic bucket and took it to my office, removed it from the school building . . . "Q. What, if anything, then transpired between Mr. Yanzick and yourself concerning the plastic bucket? "A. I asked Mr. Yanzick where the fetuses had come from. He said that one of his students, . . ., had asked to bring them. He had said that -- Mr. Yanzick had said, 'Okay. Bring them Wednesday morning.' That he had looked at them, and that he had showed them to his class on Thursday. . ." In his testimony, Superintendent Christensen set forth the opinions on his own part which he had related to the Board of Trustees prior to the Trustees' decision with regard to Mr. Yanzick. He testified to these opinions as follows: "A. Well, I just feel very strongly that 11 and 12 and 13 year old kids are at a really highly impressionable stage of development. Their maturity is not such that they can handle shocking things like the public display of a human body in a plastic bag. They cannot handle statements to the effect, 'How many of you boys would have your girlfriend get an abortion if you got her pregnant?' "I guess if Mr. Yanzick had been dealing with 17, 18 year old seniors, I probably would have viewed some of the things he was saying as certainly not being proper, but not having the devastating effect that I felt they would have at that age level." The testimony of Superintendent Christensen, including his conclusions, is confirmed by the testimony and conclusions of the other board members who testified. In addition, it is stipulated between the parties that all the balance of the Board of Trustees would have testified in the same manner had they been called as witnesses. Under section 2-4-704, MCA, this Court may reverse or modify the decision only if substantial rights of Mr. Yanzick have been prejudiced because the administrative findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. After a careful review of the whole record, we do not find that the administrative findings are clearly erroneous. We find that the County Superindent's findings of fact 7 to 15, inclusive, are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. As a result, we further conclude that the record is sufficient to support the administrative conclusion that Mr. Yanzick demonstrated a lack of fitness as a teacher, and to establish good cause for the decision by the Board of Trustees not to renew his contract. We reverse the District Court. We reinstate the decisions of the State Superintendent and the County Superintendent. We Concur: C x e f Justice f Justices Mr. Justice Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later. M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d i s s e n t i n g : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from t h e majority opinion. The majority opinion does not adequately p r e s e n t t h e record. The question before t h i s Court i s whether t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support a finding t h a t Yanzick was u n f i t t o teach. Yanzick was a tenured teached and i n t h e absence of evidence demonstrating h i s u n f i t n e s s termination was impermissible. The Board of Trustees gave its reasons f o r non-renewal by l e t t e r dated March 24, 1977: "1. The Board of Trustees b e l i e v e t h a t you have demonstrated a lack of f i t n e s s f o r teach- i n g i n t h e p o s i t i o n i n which you have been employed and such a lack of f i t n e s s a s indica- t e d i n a l l statements made t o your c l a s s of J u n i o r High School students between t h e ages of 1 1 and 1 4 years, with t h e e f f e c t t h a t your ' g i r l f r i e n d ' had t o move o u t of your home be- cause some people d i d n o t l i k e your l i v i n g arrangements, which statements were made under circumstances where it w a s common knowledge t o your s t u d e n t s and some of t h e i r p a r e n t s t h a t you and M i s s Sharon S c o t t , a physical education teacher i n t h e Polson School d i s t r i c t , w e r e l i v i n g together a t t h a t t i m e i n your home i n Polson, Montana. "2. The Board of Trustees b e l i e v e you have f u r t h e r demonstrated a lack of f i t n e s s f o r t h e teaching p o s i t i o n i n which you have been em- ployed by reason of your i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t of a b o r t i o n i n your classroom, where- i n you inquired of t h e boys i n your c l a s s , ages 1 1 t o 1 4 , 'How many of you boys would have your g i r l f r i e n d g e t an abortion i f she were pregnant?' " 3 . The Board f u r t h e r f e e l s t h a t you have a l s o demonstrated a lack of f i t n e s s f o r employ- ment i n t h e teaching p o s i t i o n by a s e r i o u s lack of good judgment i n permitting t h e use i n your classroom of human f e t u s e s brought by one of your s t u d e n t s who had obtained them without a u t h o r i z a t i o n from S t . Joseph's Hospital Labora- t o r y without t h e knowledge of t h e administra- t i o n of t h a t h o s p i t a l o r of t h e owner of t h e specimens. "4. The Board of Trustees further believe that you have demonstrated a lack of moral values by openly and notoriously cohabitating with a female teacher, not your wife, within the re- latively small community of Polson, Montana, which fact, and the knowledge of which fact among your students, has adversely affected your performance as a teacher. "5. The Board is of the opinion that you lack fitness for the classroom teaching posi- tion in which you have been employed because of the lack of respect for you as a teacher which has developed among your students as a consequence of the above-mentioned occurrances." Yanzick appealed the adverse recommendation by the school board, to the County Superintendent of Schools. The County Superintendent held a hearing. She concluded that Yanzick had - not demonstrated a lack of fitness by having made the statement regarding abortion nor had lack of fitness been demonstrated by showing that Yanzick displayed human fetuses to his classes on human reproduction. However, the County Superintendent did uphold the school board's determination that Yanzick was unfit to teach because of his relationship with a teacher to whom he was not married. Yanzick then appealed to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. She concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the County Superintendent's reasons for termination based upon Yanzick's living arrangement. The issues of abortion and fetus demonstration were not discussed. The decision of the State Superintendent was appealed to the District Court. Judge Gordon Bennett reversed the State Superintendent's decision and remanded the matter to the County Superintendent for revision of her findings and conclusions. Judge Bennett also ordered that Yanzick be reinstated and paid lost wages. Yanzick was a teacher of seventh grade science and math at Polson Middle School and had taught there for seven years. Some t i m e during t h e 1975-76 school year, Yanzick and a young woman began dating. A t t h a t t i m e t h e young woman was l i v i n g on t h e west shore of Flathead Lake and Yanzick was l i v i n g i n h i s camper. I n September of 1976, she moved i n t o Yanzick's house a s a rent-paying tenant. Yanzick remained i n h i s camper which was parked w i t h i n 15 f e e t of t h e house. The problem of t h e l i v i n g arrangement f i r s t came t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e School Superintendent, D r . Christensen, on January 18, 1977, when he received a c a l l from M r s . Herreid, a p a r e n t , complaining about Yanzick and t h e young woman's l i v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . She s t a t e d t h a t she had heard t h e school c h i l d r e n t a l k i n g about t h e i r l i v i n g arrangement. That same day, D r . Christensen c a l l e d a meeting with Yanzick and M r . Dupuis, t h e school p r i n c i p a l . They discussed t h e l i v i n g arrangement between Yanzick and t h e young woman. A discussion ensued which l e d t h e school o f f i c i a l s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e two w e r e a c t u a l l y l i v i n g together. Yanzick was concerned about students t a l k i n g about h i s l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and decided t o have t h e young woman move o u t of t h e house, which she did. O n January 26, M r s . Herreid c a l l e d D r . Christensen again complaining t h a t her son s t a t e d t h a t Yanzick t o l d t h e c l a s s t h a t h i s g i r l f r i e n d moved o u t because people objected t o t h e i r l i v i n g arrangement. O n February 2 , she c a l l e d again complaining t h a t Yanzick t o l d her s o n ' s c l a s s t h a t "Nobody i s going t o t a k e cheap s h o t s a t me. I can s l e e p and e a t wherever I please." Yanzick admitted making t h e statement t o h i s c l a s s about h i s g i r l f r i e n d moving o u t because of o b j e c t i o n s voiced by o t h e r s , b u t denied making t h e o t h e r statement. There was no corroboration f o r M r s . Herreid's testimony. Yanzick d i d respond t o a s t u d e n t ' s question about h i s personal r e l a t i o n s h i p by t e l l i n g t h e c l a s s t h a t h i s personal l i f e was not a s u b j e c t f o r classroom discussion. O n March 10, 1977, another p a r e n t had a n informal discussion with D r . Christensen, complaining t h a t Yanzick's r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e young woman was a bad influence on h i s daughter, who now f e l t t h a t l i v i n g with a man o u t of wedlock was an acceptable way of l i f e . A t t h e hearing before t h e County Superintendent only one o t h e r p a r e n t t e s t i f i e d on behalf of t h e school board. That person t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s daughter t o l d him t h a t Yanzick s a i d t h e s u b j e c t of h i s personal l i f e was nobody e l s e ' s business. The school board d i d n o t have any s t u d e n t s t e s t i f y . I n making f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court s a i d : "The finding t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and M i s s S c o t t were l i v i n g together o u t of wedlock and t h a t t h i s arrangement was a matter of p u b l i c knowl- edge i s c l e a r l y erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , probative and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. The evidence t o t h e contrary is overwhelming. M r . Yanzick t e s t i f i e d t h a t he never l i v e d with M i s s S c o t t before they were married (tr. 230). M i s s S c o t t a l s o s o t e s t i f i e d (tr. 388). Four r e n t checks paid by M i s s S c o t t t o t h e p e t i t i o n - er f o r t h e months she l i v e d i n h i s house were admitted i n t o evidence ( p e t i t i o n e r ' s e x h i b i t E ) . Three witnesses, J i m Sturm, Clay Herrin and Dennis Day t e s t i f i e d t h a t they were f r i e n d s of t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s , spent t i m e with him and never observed him and M i s s S c o t t cohabitating (tr. 173, 174, 346, 380). Not one s i n g l e w i t - ness t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n - e r and M i s s S c o t t were i n f a c t l i v i n g together. Not a s i n g l e p a r e n t who t e s t i f i e d had any i d e a a s t o t h e source of t h e i r information, o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n s ' information, about t h e l i v i n g arrange- ment o r i t s b a s i s i n f a c t (tr. 117, 128, 134, 187, 188). There i s no evidence t h a t t h e p e t i - t i o n e r ever t o l d h i s c l a s s e s t h a t he w a s l i v i n g with M i s s S c o t t . The evidence on t h e record compels t h e conclusion t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and M i s s S c o t t d i d n o t l i v e together during t h e 1976-77 school year. The ' p u b l i c knowledge within t h e school community' was nothing b u t rumor. There i s simply no b a s i s i n f a c t on t h e record t o reach any o t h e r conclusion. It i s evident t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r misled t h e school o f f i c i a l s a t t h e January 18, 1977, m e e t - ing i n t o believing t h a t he was cohabiting with Miss S c o t t (when asked i f they were l i v i n g to- g e t h e r , he r e p l i e d , 'You might say s o . ' ) (tr. 232), b u t we c e r t a i n l y cannot a t t r i b u t e t h a t meeting t o t h e spread of rumors i n t h e town. N o one can deny t h a t s m a l l towns usually make e x c e l l e n t breeding grounds f o r rumors. The town of Polson i s evidently no exception. A year before t h i s controversy erupted D r . Christensen and M r . Funk, another board mem- b e r , observed t h e p e t i t i o n e r and M i s s S c o t t crossing t h e Polson bridge together a number of times e a r l y i n t h e morning ( M i s s S c o t t l i v e d on t h e west shore a t t h a t t i m e and crossed t h e bridge t o g e t i n t o town). D r . Christensen warn- ed him about being more d i s c r e t e with h i s r e l a - t i o n s h i p with M i s s S c o t t , although he d i d not i n q u i r e as t o t h e s t a t u s of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p (tr. 50, 52). This bridge crossing i n c i d e n t was a l s o discussed a t t h e January 18th meeting ( a year l a t e r ) , a s causing t a l k i n t h e community (tr. 60). The bridge crossing i s s u e was c l a r i - f i e d , without c o n f l i c t i n g evidence, by M i s s S c o t t : (The p e t i t i o n e r drove M i s s S c o t t t o school t h r e e times when she had c a r t r o u b l e ) (tr. 400, 401). Thus, based on t h e evidence i n t h e record, t h e 'common knowledge' of t h e community was only rumor with a b s o l u t e l y no proven b a s i s and f a c t . . ." There i s some evidence i n t h e record t o support a finding t h a t Yanzick and M i s s S c o t t cohabitated o u t of wedlock. However, t h e only b a s i s i s t h e admission made by M r . Yanzick. I t i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r from Yanzick's testimony whether he was being f a c e t i o u s o r whether they a c t u a l l y cohabitated i n t h e sense charged by t h e school board. Cohabitation o u t of wedlock does n o t render one an u n f i t teacher. The problem with t h i s case i s t h a t t h e r e is no " s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence" t o show t h a t Yanzick's p r i v a t e l i f e had an adverse e f f e c t upon h i s teaching. Any such f i n d i n g by t h e County Superintendent was n e c e s s a r i l y based upon hearsay testimony. The hearing had t o be conducted pursuant t o t h e s t a t u t o r y r u l e s of evidence, s e c t i o n s 20-3- 210 ( 2 ) , 2-4-612 ( 2 ) , MCA. Hearsay testimony could n o t provide t h e b a s i s f o r a f i n d i n g t h a t Yanzick's p r i v a t e l i v i n g arrangements adversely a f f e c t e d h i s teaching. I n f a c t , t h e uncontradicted testimony is t o t h e contrary. The school d i s t r i c t could n o t o f f e r any proof t o show diminished performance on t h e p a r t of Yanzick. The school superintendent and p r i n c i p a l both f e l t t h a t he was an average o r b e t t e r teacher. M r . Dupuis, h i s immediate supervisor, recommended h i s being r e t a i n e d a s l a t e of March 1, 1977. Ralph Campbell, a board member, never received any complaints about Yanzick and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s a very s k i l l e d teacher. The law governing t h e school board i n t h i s matter was s t a t e d by t h e Montana Supreme Court i n Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 9, Glacier County v. The Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n (1977), 171 Mont. 323, 327, wherein t h e Court said: "'While school boards a r e not bound t o s t r i c t conformity with c o u r t r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s , they must, nevertheless, observe t h e elemen- t a r y and fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of j u d i c i a l inquiry. And although a degree of infor- mality may a t t e n d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e proceed- ings, it must appear t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l is -- -- based upon evidence supporting t h e s p e c i f i c charge o r charges a g a i n s t t h e teacher and -nother evidence. * * * ' " L--- Such evidence before t h e school board w a s lacking. Furthermore, t h e proceedings before t h e County Superintendent w e r e not informal and were bound by t h e s t a t u t o r y r u l e s of evidence, a s previously indicated. The record i n t h i s case f a i l s t o r e v e a l a s i n g l e witness with f i r s t hand knowledge which would s u b s t a n t i a t e a f i n d i n g t h a t Yanzick was u n f i t t o teach. While t h e r e may have been evidence he was cohabitating with M i s s S c o t t , t h i s , i n and of i t s e l f , would n o t provide a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r h i s termination. I b e l i e v e t h a t school boards should be afforded a g r e a t d e a l of l a t i t u d e i n governing l o c a l school d i s t r i c t s . However, i n m y opinion, t h e Court i s countenancing a "witch hunt" i n t h i s case. The Court i s condoning a l e g a l d e t e r - mination based upon rumor and hearsay. I n doing s o , t h e s e c u r i t y of t e n u r e has been d e a l t a s e r i o u s blow. The p r e c e d e n t i a l e f f e c t w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y diminish academic freedom i n Montana. For t h e foregoing r e a s o n s , 1 x ; e g i s t e r a vigorous d i s s e n t .