Title: STATE v AMOR

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12584 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - JERRY A. AMOR, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. C . Weingartner, Deputy Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Paul C . Bunn, County Attorney, Chester, Montana Donald Marble argued, Deputy County Attorney, Chester, Montana For Respondent : Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana Submitted: February 28, 1974 Decided : APR 2 1974 F i l e d : APR - 2 1974 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e of Montana brings t h i s appeal from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Liberty County suppressing c e r t a i n evidence t h e S t a t e sought t o introduce i n t h e t r i a l of defendant, J e r r y A. Amor, who is charged with burglary. The evidence i n question i s a scrap of cardboard upon which i s w r i t t e n a list of drugs and corresponding amounts, which was seized from Amor's automobile by a member of t h e Liberty County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . O n March 13, 1973, a t about 9:45 p.m., t h e Liberty County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e was n o t i f i e d by employees of t h e Chester Profes- s i o n a l C l i n i c t h a t t h e c l i n i c had j u s t been burglarized. During t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n a t about 11:40 p.m., a t t e n t i o n was centered on a lone automobile parked i n a church parking l o t a s h o r t d i s t a n c e from t h e c l i n i c . Looking through t h e windows, o f f i c e r s were a b l e t o see t h e keys i n t h e i g n i t i o n , a beer can and what appeared t o be a box of r i f l e ammunition on t h e s e a t . A l i c e n s e p l a t e check revealed t h a t t h e c a r was r e g i s t e r e d t o defendant Amor, who, t h e o f f i c e r s learned, matched t h e general d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e burglar given by t h e c l i n i c employees and who was then on parole from a conviction and sentence f o r rape. The o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t they were aware t h a t parolees a r e n o t permitted t o possess weapons. A search was next made of t h e church and no one was found i n s i d e . The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t a meeting had been held a t t h e church e a r l i e r t h a t evening. The o f f i c e r s then searched t h e Arnor c a r and discovered t h e drug list i n t h e glove compartment. The drug list was returned and t h e c a r driven t o t h e u n d e r s h e r i f f ' s p r i v a t e garage, where it was kept overnight. The next morning t h e car w a s taken t o t h e Chester Motor's Garage, and while t h e r e an o f f i c e r entered the automobile and took t h e drug list from t h e c a r ' s glove compartment. I t i s undisputed t h a t n e i t h e r t h e March 13th o r 14th searches of Arnor's automobile were made pursuant t o a warrant, o r consent given by Amor, o r w e r e incident t o an a r r e s t of Amor. The s o l e i s s u e assigned by t h e S t a t e on t h i s appeal is whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n granting t h e defendant's motion t o suppress t h e evidence. The s t a t e contends on t h i s appeal t h a t t h e "mobile premises-- probable cause" warrantless search exception applied by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Speilmann and Christensen, Mont . - , 516 P.2d 617, 30 St.Rep. 1036, i s applicable i n t h e present case. I n those cases, and i n the various f e d e r a l cases c i t e d and r e l i e d upon t h e r e i n , t h e warrantless search exception was predicated upon t h e existence of probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances. In t h e i n s t a n t case t h e presence of t h e ammunition box i n t h e automobile and t h e knowledge t h a t Amor, t h e r e g i s t e r e d owner, was a parolee who match- ed t h e general description of t h e burglar were f a c t s contributory t o t h e existence of probable cause, not exigent circumstances. I n t h e above c i t e d ca.ses exigent circumstances existed because t h e r e was a f l e e t i n g opportunity t o search an occupied automobile which had been stopped while t r a v e l i n g on a highway. I n no case may t h e existence of exigent circumstances be predicated upon t h e mere f a c t t h a t t h e o b j e c t of t h e search was an automobile. I n t h e case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L Ed 2d 564, 580, 583, t h e majority opinion s t a t e d : "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman i n whose presence t h e Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. And s u r e l y t h e r e i s nothing i n t h i s case t o invoke t h e meaning and purpose of t h e r u l e of C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s (267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280)--no a l e r t e d criminal bent on f l i g h t , no f l e e t i n g opportunity on an open high- way a f t e r a hazardous chase, no contraband o r s t o l e n goods o r weapons, no confederates waiting t o move t h e evidence, not even t h e inconvenience of a s p e c i a l p o l i c e d e t a i l t o guard t h e immobil- ized automobile. I n s h o r t , by no possible s t r e t c h of t h e l e g a l imagination can t h i s be made i n t o a case where 'it was n o t p r a c t i c a b l e t o secure a warrant,' C a r r o l l , supra, a t 153, 69 L Ed a t 551, 39 ALR 790, and the 'automobile exception,' despite its label, is simply irrelevant. Likewise in the instant case, we find that it was both practicable and mandatory that the officers obtain a valid warrant before conducting a search of Amor's parked, unoccupied automo- bile. The State also contends that the drug list seized from the glove compartment of Amor's automobile comes under the so- called "plain view" exception. This contention erroneously pre- supposes that the officers had justification for their intrusion into Amor's automobile and its glove compartment when they came upon the drug list. Quoting again from the majority opinion in Coolidge : "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evi- dence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification--whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused--and permits the warrant- less seizure. * * *" Finally, the State contends that Amor's automobile was searched as part of a "standard inventory procedure" of an impound- ed abandoned vehicle. The record shows that the officers were aware that the automobile belonged to Arnor, who was their prime suspect in a burglary. Sheriff Terry Stoppa testified: "Q. I am interested in this policy of handling abandoned automobiles. Did you take this auto- mobile in your possession because you thought it was abandoned? A. No. Not primarily. "Q. You didn't think it was abandoned, did you? A. We weren't sure. We thought-- "Q. It had the keys in it, didn't it? A. Yes. " Q . And did you make, try to determine how long it has been parked there? A. Yes. And what information did dig up in that regard? A. I t had been parked t h e r e f o r some t i m e before we had a r r i v e d t h e r e t o check it out. "Q. But t h a t was i n terms of hours, not days o r months o r weeks, i s n ' t t h a t r i g h t ? A. Yes. W e f i n d , a s d i d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h a t t h e abandoned vehicle contention i s contrary t o t h e testimony of t h e law en- forcement o f f i c e r s and i s supported by none of t h e f a c t s i n t h e record. The order of t h e d i s t r i c t cour Chief J u s t i c e