Title: City of New York v. State of New York

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL., APPELLANTS,  v. THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT. 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 
561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
 September 18, 1990

1    No.    217
Decided September 18, 1990
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York 
Reports.

Victor A. Kovner, NY City Corporation Counsel (Joel Berger, Ronald P. Younkins, Peter 
Lehner of counsel) for Appellants.
Robert Abrams, Attorney General (Dennis J. Saffran, O. Peter Sherwood, Harvey 
Golubock of counsel) for Respondent.
Richard M. Weinberg, Robert T. Perry, NY City, for NYC Council; Asa D. Sokolow, 
Joseph Zuckerman, David Buchalter, Sanford Hausler, David A. Slossberg, NY City, for 
Citizens Union; Lydia Rocissano Marola, Albany, for NYS Conference of Mayors, et al; 
Raymond A. Fasano, Staten Island, for Assemblyman Robert A. Straniere; amici 
curiae.

PER CURIAM:
          At issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of  
chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989 (as amended by L 1990, ch 17), a 
special law that prescribes a procedure for determining Staten 
Islanders' interest in secession from New York City, and the 
basis on which they would wish such separation to be 
accomplished.  We conclude that chapter 773 is not an "act in 
relation to the property, affairs or government" of New York City 
(NY Const art IX, § 2[b][2]) requiring a home rule message under 
the State Constitution.
          Chapter 773 requires that, in the next general 
election, voters of the borough of Staten Island, one of New York 
City's five boroughs, be asked the following question:  "Shall a 
charter commission to provide for the separation of the borough 
of Staten Island from the city of New York and for the 
establishment of the city of Staten Island be created?"  If a 
majority answers yes, a commission composed only of Staten Island 
residents and legislators will be organized to draft a proposed 
charter and consider any subject it deems relevant to the 
organization of a new city of Staten Island.  The law further 
specifies that, within roughly two years, this commission must 
submit a proposed charter to the governor, the temporary 
president of the senate, the speaker of the assembly and the 
president of the borough of Staten Island, and must hold public 
hearings throughout Staten Island for at least six months 
thereafter.
          The charter commission may, in its discretion, then 
submit to Staten Island voters the question whether to adopt the 
proposed charter and, if not, whether the commission should 
continue, in order to redraft a charter proposal.   If Staten 
Island voters answer yes, the charter is "adopted," and the 
commission must submit proposed legislation enabling Staten 
Island to separate from New York City.  If they answer no, the 
commission continues briefly in order to consider an alternative 
proposed charter for the City of Staten Island; in the event of a 
second negative vote, the commission is to dissolve.
          Chapter 773 further contemplates the appointment of 
three "advisory committees" with five members each, to study and 
report on the creation of school districts, civil service rights 
and retirement benefits, and tax and finance matters.  These 
committees are also charged with responsibility for submitting 
proposed legislation to implement their recommendations.  An 
additional commission of state legislators from Staten Island is 
to be organized by the charter commission to apportion any local 
legislative body established by the proposed charter.
          All committees and commissions are to be named without 
input from the other boroughs of New York City, with a single 
exception.  Appointment of one member of the civil service rights 
and retirements benefits committee is to be made on the 
recommendation of the Mayor of the City of New York.  Thus, as 
chapter 773 has been designed and formulated, upon completion of 
the referenda, hearing and drafting processes, what the 
Legislature will have is the view of Staten Islanders as to 
whether they desire separation from New York City, and the basis 
on which they would see it accomplished.
          Significantly, as was made explicit by later amendment 
to chapter 773, no act or proposal of the various Staten Island 
committees or commissions can have the force of law.  The 
charter, or alternative charter, for the city of Staten Island 
can become law only if the Legislature enacts legislation 
enabling Staten Island to disengage and separate from the City of 
New York.  The law specifically directs that until such time, 
"the borough of Staten Island shall remain a part of the city of 
New York."  (L 1990, ch 17.)
          Upon New York City's challenge to the constitutionality 
of chapter 773, Supreme Court granted the State's cross-motion 
for summary judgment and declared the special law constitutional, 
holding that the State has plenary power to change municipal 
boundaries without home rule constraints (NY Const, art IX, § 
2[a]).  The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the 
State's plenary power to create and organize local governments 
makes the subject of municipal boundaries a matter of State 
concern, not subject to home rule.  Two concurring Justices 
upheld the law because it was "advisory only" and therefore, 
without effect on the property, affairs or government of New York 
City.
          We now affirm, but on different grounds.  In 
particular, we expressly decline to decide as unnecessary and 
premature whether genuine secession legislation, if ever it were 
to come before the Legislature, would require a home rule 
message.
          We preface our analysis by noting the familiar 
proposition that enactments of the Legislature, a co-equal branch 
of government, are presumed to be constitutional; those who 
challenge statutes bear a heavy burden of proving 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt (see, e.g., 
Elmwood-Utica Houses, Inc. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 65 NY2d 489, 
495).   Appellant, the City of New York, has not satisfied that 
burden.
          The City makes a plausible argument that chapter 773 is 
not "advisory only."   A State-sponsored referendum merely 
soliciting the interest of Staten Islanders in secession might, 
for example, be deemed advisory only, because by definition it 
has no effect on the property, affairs or government of New York 
City, and therefore outside the home rule requirement.  Chapter 
773, however, does more than that.  It authorizes  the commitment 
of public funds and other public resources, potentially extending 
over a period of several years, to conduct studies, hold hearings 
and submit legislation that would effectuate Staten Island's 
separation  from the City of New York if the Legislature ever 
passed such a law and the Governor ever signed it.[n 
1]  Chapter 773 
is in this respect more than "advisory only," and is surely ripe 
for review (compare, Cuomo v LILCO, 71 NY2d 394).
          That conclusion does not, however, answer the 
dispositive question whether the special law is an "act in 
relation to the property, affairs or government" of New York City 
requiring a home rule message under article IX, § 2(b)(2) of the 
State Constitution.  By their very nature, special laws 
ordinarily will have an effect on the subject locality. However, 
not every special law in and of itself requires a home rule 
message, as the effect may be at most incidental, not  a direct 
impact on the property, affairs or government of that entity.  
"The intent of these provisions of the Constitution was to 
provide some measure of protection to a city from possible danger 
of ill-considered interference by the legislature in its local 
affairs." (City of New York v Village of Lawrence. 250 NY 429, 
439; see also, Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965 Retrospect 
and Prospect, 15 Buffalo L Rev 335, 337-338.)
          Here we discern no State interference in New York City 
property, affairs or government, and we therefore need not reach 
the next step of determining whether there is any substantial 
State interest in the matter (see, Adler v Deegan, 251 NY 467, 
484 [Cardozo, Ch. J., concurring]).[n 2]  
Chapter 773 does not 
authorize secession; it does not authorize the voters of Staten 
Island to decide the secession issue; it does not not initiate 
secession, or commit the State to support it;  it does not 
represent any relinquishment by the Legislature of any power it 
may have with respect to secession; and it in no way 
circumscribes whatever protections exist in the State 
Constitution home rule provision with respect to an act formally 
triggering secession.
          Indeed, rather than any direct effect of chapter 773 on 
the property, affairs or government of New York City, the impact 
of the law as the City portrays it is either wholly speculative, 
or simply the anticipated response to Staten Island's already 
publicized interest in secession.  In the category of 
speculative, for example, are the City's references to the loss 
of population, acreage and investment in Staten Island's 
infrastructure, none of which could result from  the present 
legislation.  Likewise, any anticipated uncertainties in City 
planning or financing are not the direct consequence of chapter 
773, which commits to no binding law of any sort; Staten Island's 
expressed interest in secession after Morris v Board of Estimate 
(171 F2d 656, affd 489 US 103) itself suggested planning for that 
contingency even without chapter 773.
          Nor does the dissent add any material consideration to 
the factors relied on by the City (see, dissenting opn, pp 5-6).  
That New York City may choose to incur expense in a desire to 
track the various Staten Island processes can hardly be deemed 
the State's intrusion into New York City's property, affairs or 
government; similarly, commission authorization to "request and 
receive" assistance is not tantamount to license to requisition 
resources or commandeer City agencies, and plainly does not 
constitute "open-ended" or "unbridled" intrusion into City 
affairs (dissenting opn, p 6).
          The City's equal protection argument is also 
unavailing.  Even in voter classification, a State is not 
prohibited from recognizing the distinctive interests of the 
residents of its political subdivisions (see, e.g., Town of 
Lockport v Citizens for Community Action, 430 US 259, 268-269).  
The legislative choice to allow Staten Island voters to express 
their views as to whether, and how, they might wish to separate 
from New York City--while affording them no unilateral right to 
do so--is a reasonable classification based on the distinct 
interest of that subdivision of the State.
          Finally, our difference with the dissent may be 
summarized as follows.  First, while fully mindful of the 
importance of home rule, we are sensitive as well to another 
fundamental precept of government: that, whether or not we 
endorse their wisdom, acts of the Legislature are presumptively 
valid and cannot be overturned unless proved unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, however often repeated, 
merely saying that chapter 773 "deeply" or "profoundly" intrudes 
into New York City property, affairs and government does not make 
it so.  The virtual exclusivity of Staten Islanders in the 
process marks chapter 773 for what it is--not as a procedure 
aimed at dividing New York City without the voice of its other 
boroughs but as a procedure that allows Staten Island to explore 
its publicized interest in secession, stripped of any force 
without further act of the Legislature.
          Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should 
be affirmed with costs.

F O O T N O T E S

1.  Citation to the annexation provisions of the State 
Constitution (NY Const art IX, § [1][d]; dissenting opn, pp 6-7) 
serves only to underscore that were annexation or the actual 
alteration of boundaries in issue, this would be a different 
case.

2.  Contrary to the dissent (dissenting opn, p 2), the 
argument that the legislation is "legally immaterial" was most 
assuredly advanced by the State.  The fact that the Court offers 
as a sole reason for affirmance that there is no intrusion into 
New York City property, affairs or government is hardly a 
criticism:  that is the necessary first step in any home rule 
analysis.

HANCOCK, JR., J. (dissenting):
          The court today holds that a measure which establishes 
a detailed process aimed at splitting New York City into two 
separate cities -- while depriving four of its five boroughs from 
any voice in the process -- does not affect its property, affairs 
or government.  I cannot agree.
          In concluding that chapter 773[n 1] 
does not violate the 
home rule provisions of the state constitution, the court rejects  
the argument that the legislation can be upheld as merely 
advisory or preliminary.[n 2]  It does not 
adopt the rationale of the 
courts below for upholding the measure -- that because the 
legislation is a matter of state concern, constitutional home 
rule compliance is unnecessary.  Indeed, the court pointedly 
abstains from addressing that contention.
          Instead, it offers as the sole reason for its 
affirmance the contention that there is no "interference in New 
York City property, affairs, or government" (Majority Opn, at 6) 
--a reason not embraced by the courts below or affirmatively 
advanced by the parties.  But a simple reading of chapter 773 
reveals that the process intrudes deeply into city affairs and 
has a direct and immediate impact on the personnel, finance and 
administration of the city.  For this reason, and because the 
subject matter of the statute is essentially of local -- not 
state -- concern (see e.g., Wambat Realty v State of New York, 41 
NY2d 490, 494), a home rule message was mandated under Art IX, § 
2(b)(2).  There was no such message and the legislation, 
therefore, is invalid.
          Realistically, no subject more directly concerns the 
affairs and government of a city than whether the integrity of 
its boundaries and of its existing governmental structure should 
be altered.  There can be no question that chapter 773 sets in 
motion a process that has one purpose: to disengage Staten Island 
from New York City and establish it as a separate and independent 
City of Staten Island.[n 3]  Thus, with good 
reason the court 
concludes -- as did the Appellate Division majority -- that the 
legislation is "more than 'advisory only', and surely ripe for 
review" (Majority Opn, at 5).  That the voters have not yet 
approved the referendum does not alter this conclusion.  The 
constitutional invalidity of the referendum -- coupled with the 
inadequacy of post-election determination of that constitutional 
issue in preventing the threatened harm -- makes the question 
before us clearly justiciable (See Matter of Fossella v Dinkins, 
66 NY2d 162, 166-167; see also Cantrell v Hayduk, 45 NY2d 925, 
926; Matter of McCabe v Voorhis, 243 NY 401, 412-413).
          The charter commission -- the statute's guiding 
component -- is not a study group charged with investigating and 
reporting on the advisability of secession; it is the official 
body created by the Legislature for the purpose of directing the 
continuing process toward secession.  It must support secession, 
hold hearings, do research, gather information and draft the 
complex bill that will be necessary to effectuate it.  (See 
Chapter 773, § 4[e] [as amended][mandating that within "three 
months of adoption of the charter by the voters of Staten Island, 
the commission shall submit * * * proposed legislation enabling 
the borough of Staten Island to disengage and separate from the 
City of New York" (emphasis added)]).
          All thirteen-members of the charter commission must 
come from Staten Island.  Each of the five Staten Island 
legislators, all of whom are on record as favoring the 
legislation, is automatically a member of the commission.  Each 
legislator is empowered to appoint one member to the commission.  
The three other commission members -- also Staten Island 
residents -- are to be appointed by the Governor, the temporary 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly.  The 
commission members are to be reimbursed by the state for their 
actual and necessary expenses.
          The commission is vested with broad powers and 
prerogatives for carrying out its function.  It may employ and 
set the compensation for such employees and consultants as it 
shall require.  It is empowered to conduct private hearings, take 
testimony, subpoena witnesses and require the production of 
books, papers and records.  Significantly, the commission may 
demand from any state or city department or bureau, commission, 
office, agency or other instrumentality such facilities, 
assistance, data and personnel as may be necessary or desirable 
for the proper execution of its powers and duties (Chapter 773, 
par. 6 [e]).  It must establish advisory committees on the 
creation of school districts for Staten Island, on civil service 
rights and retirement benefits for city employees who will become 
employees of the Staten Island municipal government, and on the 
various tax and financial problems that will arise.
          There can be no doubt that -- irrespective of the 
ultimate possibility of secession -- the very pendency of the 
process and the activities of the commission will have, at least, 
the following immediate effects:
          Uncertainty and Confusion -- by creating this 
secession-aimed legislation, the future makeup of the city's 
legislative body, and the configurations of its civil service 
system, its school system, its public works, its pension and 
retirement funds, its entire public debt structure, and its solid 
waste disposal scheme are put in question.  This widespread 
uncertainty necessarily impairs effective present-day city 
planning for the future in several governmental areas.
          Conscription of Resources and Personnel -- from the 
very beginning of this multi-year process, the city's resources 
and personnel are affected.  The referendum to poll Staten 
Island's interest in secession is to be supervised by the city 
board of election.  The board must prepare the ballots, canvass 
the results and certify the results to the Senate and Assembly 
(chapter 773, § 2).  Although the city's expenditures are to be 
reimbursed by the state (id. § 3), the city must initially lay 
out its money, assign its personnel, detail its expenses, and 
submit them to the state, subject to audit by the comptroller.  
Finally and most significantly, the unbridled authorization 
vested in the commission to "request and receive from any * * * 
city * * * agency or other instrumentality such facilities, 
assistance, data and personnel as may be necessary or desirable 
(to the commission) * * *" (id. § 4[e] [emphasis added]) amounts 
to an open-ended license for commandeering virtually every agency 
of city government.
          Resultant Costs to the City -- that there are direct 
and indirect costs to the city incident to its compliance with 
section 4(e)'s command to assist the charter commission is 
self-evident.  Notably, no provision is made for state 
reimbursement of these costs.  Beyond that, to protect its vital 
interests, the city -- because it is excluded from any 
participation in the commission's proceedings --must now create 
and fund a parallel process in preparation for evaluating and 
reacting to any Staten Island secession bill emanating from the 
chapter 773 process.
          Once the effect on city affairs, property or government 
is demonstrated, as it is here, a special act can be passed 
without a Home Rule message only where a concern exists "of 
sufficient importance to the State, transcendent of local or 
parochial interests" (Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 
41 NY2d 490, 494, supra).  The court's holding that chapter 773 
was properly passed without  a home rule message (Art IX, § 
2[b][2]) in the absence of a showing of such State concern 
contradicts prevailing authority (see Matter of Islip v Cuomo, 65 
NY2d 50, 56-57; Matter of Kelly v McGee, 57 NY2d 522, 538; Wambat 
Realty Corp v State, 41 NY2d 490, 494-495, supra; Baldwin v City 
of Buffalo, 6 NY2d 168, 172-174; New York Steam Corp. v City of 
New York, 268 NY 137, 143) and ignores the significant 
enlargement of municipal home rule protections given to 
municipalities in the new reformatted local governments 
provisions of Article IX, adopted on January 1, 1964.[n 4]  (See, 
Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423, 428-429.)

          Without citing to any relevant authority and without 
addressing the substantial burdens imposed on broad areas  of New 
York City government, the court simply announces that it discerns 
"no State interference" in city affairs.  Significantly, it does 
not hold that chapter 773 is "of sufficient importance to the 
State, transcendent of the local or parochial interests" (Wambat 
Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 494, supra).  
Indeed, it never reaches this issue.  With no showing of a 
perceptible state interest, chapter 773 is before us as a measure 
that is quintessentially local in its effect .  Under these 
circumstances, there can be no question that under governing case 
law (see Matter of Islip, supra; Matter of Kelly, supra; Wambat 
Realty, supra), a home rule message was mandated by Art IX, § 
2(b)(2).
          In conclusion, one might well ask: what will "affect" 
the property, affairs or government of an existing city so as to 
necessitate Home Rule compliance, if a statute having the 
invasive characteristics of chapter 773 does not, even though it 
establishes a process aimed at the city's very dissolution?  The 
court's remarkable holding that such compliance is not called for 
gives unwelcome  credence to the gloom expressed by one 
commentator for the future of Home Rule in New York (see Cole, 
Constitutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of Home Rule", 
59 St. John's L Rev 713, 749 [1985]).  The words of Chief Judge 
Cardozo --  written more than six decades ago -- now seem all too 
prescient:

Home Rule for cities, adopted by the People with much ado and after many years of 
agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of words and little else, if the courts in 
applying the new tests shall ignore the new spirit that dictated their adoption.  The 
municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against the inroads of 
evasion.

(Mayor of the City of New York [Elm Street], 246 NY 72, 76 
[emphasis added]; see, Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423, 
428, supra; Baldwin v City of Buffalo, 6 NY2d 168, 173, supra).

F O O T N O T E S

1.  Chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989 was amended by chapter 
17 of the Laws of 1990.  Unless otherwise noted the statute in 
its present amended form will be referred to simply as chapter 
773. 

2.  The Appellate Division majority in affirming the holding 
of Supreme Court that the measure does not violate Article IX, § 
2(b)(2) expressly rejected the view of the concurrers that the 
statute is "purely advisory in nature".

3.  The Assembly memorandum in support of the bill notes the 
impetus behind the bill was the change in New York City 
government, which diluted Staten Island's voice in municipal 
affairs, resulting from Morris v Board of Estimate (707 F2d 656 
affd 489 US 103).  Thus the bill was introduced:

as one of a series of bills seeking to separate the Borough of Staten Island from the City 
of New York.  All the bills establish the county of Richmond as a New York State county 
separate and distinct from New York City, with its own local governing 
unit.

(Sponsor's [Senator Marchi, Assemblywoman Connelly] Memo in 
Support, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 773, at 1; see also Revised Memo 
in Support by Senators Marchi and Connor, Assembly members 
Connelly, Vitaliano and Straniere, id.).

4.  The 1964 amendment added a new provision (Art IX, § 
3[c]) which expressly repudiated the prevailing rule (Dillon's 
rule) mandating strict judicial construction of the municipal 
home rule provision (Art IX, § 2[b][2]).  That amendment also 
established a "bill of rights for local governments" which 
included an annexation provision recognizing that the residents 
of a municipality affected by a boundary change have both a 
compelling interest in any process by which boundary changes do 
occur, and a fundamental right to participate in that process 
(see Art IX §[1][d]).
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed with costs.  Opinion Per Curiam.  Chief Judge 
Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye and Bellacosa concur.  Judge 
Hancock dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which 
Judge Alexander concurs.  Judge Titone took no part.