Title: Monroe v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

242 Ind. 14 (1961)
175 N.E.2d 692
MONROE
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,896.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 21, 1961.
*15 William C. Erbecker, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General and Patrick D. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court denying appellant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
Appellant attempted in the coram nobis proceedings below to set aside his conviction of burglary in the second degree which had been entered by the court on appellant's plea of guilty without advice of counsel. The court denied the amended petition for the writ and appellant appealed.
Appellant's contentions can be summarized as follows:
Appellant was arraigned on September 30, 1959. At that arraignment there was considerable discourse between the appellant and the judge concerning whether or not appellant would be represented by counsel. At the conclusion of this hearing appellant definitely expressed a desire for counsel. Within an hour he was returned to the court where he changed his mind as to representation by counsel, and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of second degree burglary. The record shows no plea at the time of arraignment. It is further shown, and remains uncontradicted, that the only advice received by appellant was from a seventeen year old accomplice who recommended appellant might as well go and get the whole thing over with. A record that is kept in compliance with Rule 1-11 of this court shows that there was no counsel for appellant at arraignment, in fact there was no plea at arraignment nor waiver at the arraignment. Unless it can be said that appellant's conduct waives arraignment, there actually was no arraignment. Appellant was *17 merely taken back to jail for less than an hour, then returned to stand trial. The record of the arraignment reads as follows:
The law is well settled that the accused in a criminal case is entitled under the State and Federal *21 Constitutions to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him. Goff v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 267, 163 N.E.2d 888; State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Cir. Ct. et al. (1958), 238 Ind. 571, 574; 153 N.E.2d 914; State v. Minton (1955), 234 Ind. 578; 130 N.E.2d 226; Wizniuk v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 638, 175 N.E.2d 1.
A minor's plea of guilty may be accepted even though he is without counsel.
The record before us here indicates that the appellant, a boy sixteen years of age, during the course of his interrogation by the court was asked five times whether he wanted counsel, and that he replied in the affirmative each time. After an intermission of approximately one hour he was called back into court, and upon then being asked one time whether he wanted counsel, he replied in the negative. The court thereupon proceeded to accept his plea of guilty without counsel and entered finding and sentence.
We believe the evidence here clearly indicates the appellant expressed his desire for counsel to the court, but such was not accorded him in this case, and it is our opinion therefore that the was denied the full measure of his constitutional rights and the acceptance of his plea of guilty under the circumstances was ill advised and erroneous.
*22 The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to grant the writ.
Landis, C.J., and Bobbitt, J., concur.
Arterburn, J., concurs in result.
Achor, J., dissents without opinion.
NOTE.  Reported in 175 N.E.2d 692.