Title: State v. Christian

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

967 P.2d 239 (1998) 88 Hawai`i 407 STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Taryn CHRISTIAN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 20804. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. November 10, 1998. *242 Pamela O'Leary Tower, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Artemio C. Baxa and Simone C. Polak, Kahului, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, for plaintiff-appellee. Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. LEVINSON, J. The defendant-appellant Taryn Christian appeals from the second circuit court's judgment and sentence after conviction of one count of murder in the second degree in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-701.5 (1993) (Count I),[1] one count of use of a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime in violation of HRS § 134-51(b) (1993) (Count II),[2] and one count of attempted theft in the third degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 (1993) and 708-832(1)(a) (1993) (Count III).[3] On appeal, *243 Christian argues: (1) that the trial court reversibly erred in (a) denying him his right to testify, (b) denying his motion for a new trial, wherein he argued that he should have been permitted to testify, and (c) excluding evidence that a third party had confessed to the murder; and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Christian's points on appeal are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, conviction, and sentence in Count I (second degree murder) and Count III (attempted third degree theft). However, because Christian's conviction of Count II (use of a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime) and simultaneous conviction of Count I is barred under the rationale of this court's opinion in State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998), we reverse his conviction of and sentence in connection with Count II. During the early morning hours of July 14, 1995, Vilmar Cabaccang and his girlfriend, Serena Seidel, were aroused from bed by noise from the outside. When Seidel looked out the window, she saw someone sitting in Cabaccang's car. Cabaccang and Seidel ran outside. The occupant of the car fled on foot, Cabaccang and Seidel in hot pursuit. Seidel reported that, as she ran, she called for help. She observed that the man whom she and Cabaccang were chasing was wearing jeans, a baseball cap, a flannel shirt, and covered shoes. Seidel stopped at the residence of a friend, Tesha Santana, and banged on the door for help. When no one answered, she continued running after Cabaccang and the unknown man. By the time Seidel caught up to them, Cabaccang and his quarry were struggling. Cabaccang warned, "Babe, the guy has a knife. He wants to kill me." Seidel attempted to assist. She punched the man in the head, whereupon he bit her on the wrist. As she struggled with the man, Seidel observed that he was wearing "the kind of gloves that you use when you dye people's hair." At some point, the man dropped the knife, and Seidel became aware that there was blood "all over" and that Cabaccang had been stabbed. The attacker walked away, stating that he was "going to call 911." Phillip Schmidt, who lived nearby, was aroused from his bed at about 3:00 a.m. by the sound of shouting and screaming. Coming outside to investigate, he observed a young man walking toward K&imacrhei Road. The area was well lit by street lights and a full moon, and Schmidt reported that he obtained a good look at the man's face. A short distance away, Schmidt observed Cabaccang lying on the ground and attempting to stand up. Observing several stab wounds, Schmidt pointed at the man who was walking away and asked Cabaccang if he was the person who had inflicted the injuries. Cabaccang responded in the affirmative. Schmidt, a recreational therapist with a background in first aid, proceeded to care for Cabaccang until ambulance personnel took him from the scene. Cabaccang eventually died from his wounds. Schmidt reported that the man whom he had observed walking away from the scene was wearing a long-sleeved plaid shirt, "trooper-type" pants, and high top tennis shoes. Maui Police Department (MPD) Detective Timothy Gapero arrived at the scene of the stabbing at about 4:30 a.m. Detective Gapero videotaped the area and recovered a double-bladed knife, a Phillips head screwdriver, Cabaccang's car keys, and a blood-soaked baseball cap. Because Seidel's friend, Santana, advised that an acquaintance of hers, Hina Burkhart, was supposed to have met her at her home that evening but had failed to appear as planned and that Santana suspected that Burkhart might have been responsible for the stabbing, the police initially regarded Burkhart as a suspect in the case. However, both Seidel and Schmidt failed to identify Burkhart's photo as depicting the man whom they had observed, and the investigation uncovered two witnesses who placed Burkhart *244 in another location at the time of the stabbing. Accordingly, Burkhart was ruled out as a suspect. Approximately three days after the attack on Cabaccang, Christian told his former girlfriend, Lisa Kimmey, that he had committed the homicide. A few days later, Kimmey reported the matter to the police. Kimmey's mother provided the police with photographs of Christian wearing a baseball cap identical to the blood-soaked cap found at the scene of the stabbing. Kimmey also testified that, before the stabbing, she had observed Christian in possession of a double-bladed knife like the one used to kill Cabaccang. A search of Christian's home yielded a box of the same type of plastic gloves as Seidel had observed on the attacker's hands, and Seidel and Schmidt both identified Christian's photograph as being that of the man whom they had observed at the crime scene. Subsequently, Christian was charged in this matter. At trial, Christian's theory of defense was that he had been mistakenly identified; accordingly, he attempted to introduce testimony that Hina Burkhart had confessed to the murder on two separate occasions. When called as a witness, however, Burkhart advised the trial court that he would exercise his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to any questions that might be put to him in the matter. The trial court therefore declared Burkhart to be "unavailable" within the meaning of Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 804 (1993)[4] and conducted a hearing pursuant to HRE Rule 103 (1993)[5] to determine whether there was sufficient corroboration of Burkhart's out-of-court declarations to permit Christian to introduce them into evidence.[6] The transcript of the hearing is excerpted below: After considering Christian's offer of proof and the corroboration offered, the trial court ruled that the trustworthiness of the statements had not been clearly demonstrated and that, therefore, the necessary prerequisites of admissibility had not been met. Before jury selection began, the trial court, by way of a "Tachibana colloquy," see infra section III.A.1, advised Christian of his right to testify in his own behalf. Later, in conjunction with the defense resting its case-in-chief, a further colloquy transpired as follows: Subsequently, the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, and the trial court recessed the proceedings in anticipation of closing arguments commencing on the morning of the next day of trial. However, when the trial court reconvened the proceedings, and as the prosecution was preparing to begin its closing argument, the following exchange occurred: (Emphases added.) The jury eventually found Christian guilty of all of the offenses charged against him. On March 20, 1997, Christian filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, for entry of a "judgment of lesser conviction" as to the murder count, urging that (1) he wished to adduce newly discovered evidence that would exonerate him, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of murder, and (3) the trial court had erroneously excluded evidence of Burkhart's confessions to the crime. In a supplemental memorandum, Christian also argued that (1) a request for new counsel made during the trial had been improperly denied and (2) the court had erroneously refused him the right to testify in his own behalf. During the hearing on Christian's motion, conducted on May 29, 1997, the prosecution contended that the motion should be denied because Christian's only proffer in support of his request to testify was the existence of an inadmissible tape. Christian's counsel retorted as follows: (Emphases added.) The circuit court orally denied Christian's motion. This timely appeal followed. State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai`i 297, 304-05, 909 P.2d 1112, 1119-20 (1995) (footnote omitted). Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai`i 336, 350-51, 944 P.2d 1279, 1283-84 (1997) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 11, 928 P.2d 843, 853 (1996)) (some ellipsis points added and some in original). State v. Moore, 82 Hawai`i 202, 217, 921 P.2d 122, 137 (1996) (some brackets added and some in original). Nevertheless, insofar as HRE Rule 804(b)(3) exempts out-of-court "statement[s] tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused" (emphasis added) from the general proscription regarding the admissibility of hearsay, see infra section III.B, the rule is different because proof of "corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] ... trustworthiness" is expressly required as a precondition to the admissibility of such statements, but is not required with respect to the other classes of statements against interest enumerated in subsection (b)(3). Cf. United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir.1987) (similarly construing the equivalent federal rule). By its very nature, the assessment as to whether "corroborating circumstances" rise to the level of "clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement," so as to render it admissible into evidence as a statement against penal interest, requires the trial court to make a "judgment call" through the exercise of its discretion. Accordingly, inasmuch as the trial court is required to make a "judgment call" in determining whether to admit evidence under HRE Rule 804(b)(3), its ruling should not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. See also United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he district court has `a substantial degree of discretion in making this important finding on trustworthiness.' ... [W]e think it impossible to say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the circumstances did not `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.'") (citing United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir.1976)); United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 895 (9th Cir.1981) ("Whether to admit a statement against penal interest is in the discretion of the trial judge. `The standard for appellate review of a decision to exclude a hearsay statement under Rule 804(b)(3) is whether the trial court abused its discretion.'") (quoting United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840, 99 S. Ct. 128, 58 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1978)); People v. Greenberger, 58 Cal. App. 4th 298, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 61, 81 (Cal.Ct.App.1997) ("Determination of whether a statement is trustworthy is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing the trial court's rulings we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard."); State v. Lopez, 239 Conn. 56, 681 A.2d 950, 957 (Conn.1996) ("The determination of whether such a statement is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence at trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court."); Ross v. State, 482 A.2d 727, 741 (Del.1984) ("[W]hether there is sufficient corroborative evidence to admit a hearsay statement against interest is a matter to be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and reversible only upon a showing of abuse of discretion, or that the ruling was clearly erroneous." *251 (Citations omitted.)); State v. Patterson, 110 Ohio App.3d 264, 673 N.E.2d 1001, 1006 (Ohio Ct.App.1996) ("[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining whether such corroborating circumstances exist."). State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawai`i 462, 479-80, 946 P.2d 32, 49-50 (1997). See also State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 39, 960 P.2d 1227, 1247 (1998). Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai`i 226, 231-32, 900 P.2d 1293, 1298-99 (1995) (some citations omitted) (some brackets and ellipsis points added and some in original). Accordingly, this court held in Tachibana "that[,] in order to protect the right to testify under the Hawai`i Constitution, trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and must obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify." Id. at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (footnotes omitted). In this connection, we noted that "the ideal time to conduct the [`Tachibana colloquy'] is immediately prior to the close of the defendant's case" and that, "[t]herefore, whenever possible, the trial court should conduct the colloquy at that time." Id. at 237, 900 P.2d at 1304 (footnote omitted). Id. at 237 n. 9, 900 P.2d at 1304 n. 9. Finally, in conducting the "Tachibana colloquy," we cautioned that Id. at 236 n. 7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n. 7 (quoting State v. Neuman, 179 W.Va. 580, 371 S.E.2d 77, 82 (W.Va.1988)) (quoting People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo.1984)) (some brackets added and some in original). The record in this matter amply demonstrates that the trial judge assiduously followed the procedures mandated in Tachibana and that Christian's waiver of his constitutional right to testify in his own defense was both knowing and voluntary. See State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 221, 915 P.2d 672, 695 (1996) ("`To determine whether a waiver' of [a] `fundamental right'... was `voluntarily and intelligently undertaken, this court will look to the totality of [the] facts and circumstances of each particular case.'" (Quoting State v. Vares, 71 Haw. 617, 801 P.2d 555 (1990).) (Some brackets added and some in original.)) Indeed, Christian does not argue to the contrary. The present appeal, however, poses the question whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to testify as a result of "Tachibana colloquies," conducted both at the commencement of the trial as a preliminary matter and immediately prior to the close of the defense's case, may subsequently withdraw or revoke that waiver (i.e., may, in effect, change his or her mind) and regain the right to testify in his or her own behalf. While this court has never addressed the precise issue, in Jones v. State, 79 Hawai`i 330, 902 P.2d 965 (1995), we impliedin resolving the defendant's claim "that his trial counsel had failed to advise him that the decision whether or not to testify was his decision to make and that, despite having *253 signed [a] written waiver, he was free to change his mind at any time before the end of trial,"that a defendant who has waived his or her right to testify might later withdraw or revoke that waiver. Id. at 335, 902 P.2d at 970 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions have recognized such a prerogative. For example, in Ephraim v. State, 627 So. 2d 1102 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals resolved circumstances similar in many respects to those of the matter before us in the following fashion: Id. at 1103, 1105 (citation omitted) (emphases added). See also United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir.1985) (reversing defendant's conviction and remanding for new trial where trial court, at commencement of next day of trial after prosecution had presented rebuttal witnesses and rested its case, and prior to the parties' closing arguments and trial court's charge to the jury, denied defendant's motion to reopen evidence "`solely for the purpose' of allowing [the defendant] to testify" after defendant had originally declined to testify at close of his case because he was not "emotionally ... or ... documentarily prepared"); Mayfield v. State, 56 Md.App. 541, 468 A.2d 400, 402, 408-10 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1983) (reversing defendant's conviction and remanding for new trial where trial court, on morning after defense rested, refused to permit defendant to reopen his case for limited purpose of testifying in own behalf and ruling, inter alia, that "[t]he State argues that no error occurred below because appellant waived his right to testify. We believe a close examination of the chronology of events reveals that any waiver was rescinded. ... Our reversal of [defendant's] conviction is based on the trial court's abuse of its discretion in failing to permit [defendant] to reopen his case in order to testify in his own behalf.... In this case, we find a defendant asserting his right to testify after both sides had rested.... [Defendant] was a willing, available witness with testimony relevant to the central issue of his guilt or innocence. [Defendant] can justifiably explain his delay in asserting his desire to testify.... We do not mean to say that[,] on every occasion where a defendant recants his election to remain silent[,] the trial judge must blindly adhere to the whims of a fickle defendant. There may be cases where (after waiver) the assertion of the right to testify is merely an attempt at some subterfuge. On the other hand, situations *254 may arise where, although the recantation is sincere, the length of delay causes undue prejudice to the State or disruption to the orderly process of the trial. There, the court must consider the effects on both the defendant and the State to the end that justice may be served. In the instant case, justice would have been served by permitting the [defendant] to reopen his case." (Emphases added.)); People v. Burke, 176 A.D.2d 1000, 574 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (N.Y.App.Div.1991) ("After the close of the People's case ..., defense counsel, who had advised defendant not to take the stand, attempted to ascertain whether defendant wanted to testify. Defendant vacillated with rambling responses, first indicating his desire to testify and subsequently appearing to acquiesce to his counsel's recommendation that he decline. After the defense rested and during the charge conference, defendant clearly and unambiguously sought to testify whereupon counsel moved to reopen for that purpose. [The] County Court denied the application.... [W]e find that there must be a reversal and a new trial ordered.... Under the circumstances of this case, ... it was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law for [the] County Court to deny defendant's motion to reopen the defense and to permit his testimony.... The circumstances here are distinguishable from ... the refusal to reopen the defense to permit the defendant to testify occur[ring] after summations ha[ve] been completed. Here, the denial was a abuse of discretion requiring that a new trial be ordered." (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)). Obviously, in this jurisdiction, as the Ephraim court recognized was the case in Alabama, "the trial court has discretion in scheduling and in determining courtroom procedure." 627 So. 2d at 1105. See HRE Rule 611(a) (1993) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."). Moreover, we agree with the Mayfield court both that, "on every occasion where a defendant recants his election to remain silent," the trial judge need not "blindly adhere to the whims of a fickle defendant" or comply with an "assertion of the right to testify [that] is merely an attempt at some subterfuge" and that prejudicial delay or "disruption to the orderly processes of the trial" may legitimately entitle the trial judge to preclude the "recantation," however "sincere" the defendant's waiver of the right to testify may be. Nevertheless, we also agree with the Ephraim, Walker, Mayfield, and Burke courts that there are circumstances under which it would be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to permit a criminal defendant to change his or her mind and withdraw or revoke a Tachibana waiver of the right to testify. Our task thus becomes to posit an analytical framework by which the trial courts may be guided in ruling on future attempts to withdraw or revoke such waivers. In this connection, we believe that the wisest course is to borrow, by analogy, from the approach that this court has developed over time regarding the allowance or disallowance of withdrawals of guilty and no contest pleas that have been entered pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 11, which, by their very nature, entail the global waiver of the full panoply of a defendant's fundamental trial-related rightsincluding the right to testify in one's own defense that is at issue in the present matter. After all, a guilty or no contest plea, if accepted, is "`in itself ... a conviction and a simultaneous waiver of ... important constitutional guarantees[(1)] the privilege against self-incrimination, [(2)] a trial by jury, and [(3)] the confrontation of one's accusers.'" Carvalho v. Olim, 55 Haw. 336, 343, 519 P.2d 892, 897 (1974) (quoting Wong v. Among, 52 Haw. 420, 425, 477 P.2d 630, 634 (1970)). To the foregoing basic list of waived fundamental trial rights subsumed within an accepted plea of guilty or no contest, we would add the following: (4) the right to have guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt; see Tachibana, 79 Hawai`i at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (citing Conner v. State, 9 Haw.App. 122, 126, 826 P.2d 440, 442-43 (1992)); (5) the right to a unanimous jury *255 verdict; see State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 27, 928 P.2d 843, 872 (1996) (citing article I, sections 5 and 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution and State v. Iosefa, 77 Hawai`i 177, 185, 880 P.2d 1224, 1232 (App.), cert. dismissed, 77 Hawai`i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994)); (6) the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the accused's favor; see State v. Savitz, 67 Haw. 59, 60-61, 677 P.2d 465, 466-67 (1984) (citing the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution); and (7) the right to included offense instructions; see Tachibana, 79 Hawai`i at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (citing State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i 387, 395-96 & n. 13, 879 P.2d 492, 500-01 & n. 13 (1994)). In Merino, supra, this court recently distilled twenty years of case law addressing the proper means of resolving efforts by criminal defendants to withdraw guilty and no contest pleas, inter alia, in the following fashion: State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 223, 915 P.2d 672, 697 (1996) (some brackets and ellipsis *256 points added and some in original) (footnotes omitted). Four weeks after deciding Merino, this court amplified its "waiver withdrawal" analysis in State v. Nguyen, 81 Hawai`i 279, 286, 916 P.2d 689, 696 (1996), a case in which the defendantbased upon the subsequent enactment of federal statutory law that subjected him to involuntary deportation hearings had moved, unsuccessfully, to withdraw his entry of a no contest plea several years after the trial court had imposed sentence, thereby implicating the "manifest injustice" standard. Affirming the circuit court's denial of the defendant's post-conviction motion, we ruled as follows: Nguyen, 81 Hawai`i at 292, 916 P.2d at 702 (some brackets added and some in original) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the involuntary entry of a guilty or no contest plea, or such a plea entered without a full understanding of its consequences, constitutes the sort of "manifest injustice" under the "Jim overview" that entitles a defendant to withdraw his or her plea after sentence has been imposed.[10] The Nguyen analysis does not, however, exhaust the entire universe of relevant "manifest injustices." Indeed, this court has declared that, "where a defendant is denied due process ...., `there is "manifest injustice" as a matter of law,' and the defendant `is entitled to withdraw his guilty [or no contest] plea.'" Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 414, 879 P.2d at 519 (quoting United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 26-27 (3d Cir.1976)). In Adams, the defendant's right to due process was infringed substantively "because the prosecution violate[d] a plea agreement." Id. But, as a procedural matter, "[t]he basic elements of due process of law require notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawaii v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 243, 953 P.2d 1315, 1341 (1998) (citations omitted). See also State v. Tuipuapua, 83 Hawai`i 141, 147, 925 P.2d 311, 317 (1996) ("due process requires the government to afford notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard"); State *257 v. Vinge, 81 Hawai`i 309, 321, 916 P.2d 1210, 1222 (1996) ("due process requires ... reasonable notice ... and ... the opportunity to be heard"); State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 531, 880 P.2d 192, 206 (1994) ("`due process requires that a defendant ... `be given reasonable notice and afforded the opportunity to be heard'") (quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 277, 602 P.2d 914, 925 (1979)). In our view, the Rubicon most logically demarcating the line between the application of the "manifest injustice" standard and the "more liberal approach" to the attempted withdrawal of a criminal defendant's prior waiver of the constitutional right to testify in his or her own behalf is the actual commencement of the post-evidentiary phase of the trial, i.e., the parties' closing arguments to the trier of fact.[11] It is, after all, at this point in the proceedings that the defendant has taken the "decisive, irrevocable step" of placing his or her fate regarding the charged offenses in the jury's hands, based on the evidence presented.[12]See Ephraim, 627 So. 2d at 1103, 1105 (noting, inter alia, that, prior to closing arguments, "nothing ha[s] occurred in the presence of the jury after the defense [has] rested its case," in contrast to "situations where closing arguments ha[ve] been made before the defendant reassert[s] his right to testify"); Burke, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 860 ("[T]he statutory framework is not so rigid that the ... power of the trial court to alter the order of proof in its discretion and in furtherance of justice cannot be exercised at least until the case is submitted to the jury." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). We therefore hold that the trial court must pass on a defendant's attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach," whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard. In accordance with the foregoing general principles, and because Christian first attempted to withdraw his prior waiver of his constitutional right to testify in his own behalf before the commencement of closing arguments by declaring in open court that he "wish[ed] to exercise [his] right to testify ... in front of the jury," we review the trial court's disallowance, "pursuant to ... the two-pronged `liberal approach,' ... for abuse of discretion ... and inquire (1) whether [Christian] presented `fair and just reasons' for his request, and, if and only if he has, (2) whether the prosecution relied upon [Christian's prior waiver] to its substantial detriment." Merino, 81 Hawai`i at 223, 915 P.2d at 697 (footnote omitted). In effecting our review, we are cognizant both that the trial court was entitled as it in fact did, in camera, in response to Christian's "outburst," see supra section Ito "hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the plausibility and legitimacy of [Christian's] reasons for requesting withdrawal" of his prior waiver and that Christian had "the burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for the withdrawal." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this connection, we agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Walker that, "[i]n exercising its discretion, the [trial] court [was required to] consider... the character of the [proffered] testimony," bearing in mind that "[t]he evidence proffered should be relevant, admissible, *258 technically adequate, and helpful to the jury in ascertaining [Christian's] guilt or innocence...." Walker, 772 F.2d at 1177 (quoting United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir.1982)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S. Ct. 790, 74 L. Ed. 2d 996 (1983) (quoting United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 759, 778 (8th Cir.1979)) (emphasis added). The record reflects that the trial court accorded both Christian and his counsel a full, fair, and complete opportunity, in chambers, to establish plausible and legitimate reasons for Christian's requested withdrawal of his prior waiver of his right to testify. At that time, Christian's sole offer of proof in support and explanation of his newly expressed desire to testify was that "there's a tape of a witness that was in the presence of Hina [Burkhart] and Serena [Seidel] on more than one occasion [that] shows that Serena's committed perjury in ... court."[13] Christian's counsel then, in substance, advised the trial court that (1) he had no knowledge of the tape's contents or the source of the out-of-court declarations allegedly contained therein, (2) he lacked any foundational basis for establishing the tape's relevance, and (3) being unable to identify or produce the declarant, the tape constituted inadmissible hearsay. In other words, as the deputy prosecuting attorney aptly characterized the situation, defense counsel had "indicated [that] he doesn't ... know anything about [the] tape other than [that] there is some sort of a tape and a person whose name he does not know saying he does not know what." Under the foregoing circumstances, it is apparent, as a matter of law, that Christian failed to make an even colorably sufficient showing that the tape, which was the only evidentiary basis offered at the time in support of his request to reopen the defense's case in order that he might testify, was "relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the jury in ascertaining [his] guilt or innocence." See Walker, 772 F.2d at 1182. That being the case, it is equally apparent, as a matter of law, that Christian fell far short of meeting his "burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for the withdrawal" of his prior waiver. See Merino, 81 Hawai`i at 223, 915 P.2d at 697. Accordingly, we hold that Christian failed to present "`fair and just reasons' for his request," see id.,[14] and that the trial court therefore committed no abuse of discretion in ruling that it would "not reopen the case." In support of Christian's post-verdict motion for a new trial, defense counselfor the first timemade an offer of proof that, if he had been permitted to testify when he had initially asked to do so, Christian "would have testified as to the events that occurred [and] would have stated his version of what happened, which would have been substantially different from [the version of] the prosecution's witnesses and would have supported a [verdict] of not guilty on the charges of murder, anyway, and manslaughter." That is to say, not until the hearing on his post-verdict motion for a new trial did Christian apprise the trial court that he wanted to "tell his side of the story." See supra section I. On the present record, it is likely that, pursuant to the "liberal approach," had Christian made the foregoing proffer when, before the commencement of closing arguments, he had first sought to "exercise [his] right to testify ... in front of the jury," thereby withdrawing his prior waiver of that right, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to have refused to "reopen the case" in order to allow Christian's testimony. See Ephraim, 627 So. 2d at 1103, 1105; Walker, 772 F.2d at 1176; Mayfield, 468 A.2d at 402, 408-10; Burke, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 860. However, because Christian's belated offer of proof was not made until after the jury had returned its verdict (and, a fortiori, after the commencement of closing arguments), his attempt to withdraw his prior waiver was subject to the "manifest *259 injustice" standard. See supra section III. A.1.[15] As we have already noted, by virtue of the trial court's scrupulous adherence to the dictates of our decision in Tachibana, there is no question that Christian's waiver, prior to the commencement of the parties' closing arguments, of his constitutional right to testify in his own defense was both knowing and voluntary. Cf. Nguyen, 81 Hawai`i at 292, 916 P.2d at 702. Moreover, Christian has not suggestedand our review of the record does not revealthat his post-verdict request to withdraw his waiver was justified by any substantive denial of due process during the proceedings against him. Cf. Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 414, 879 P.2d at 519. Finally, the record establishes beyond doubt, with respect to both of his attempts at withdrawal of his waiver, that Christian was accorded a full, timely, and meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cf. Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple, 87 Hawai`i at 243, 953 P.2d at 1341; Tuipuapua, 83 Hawai`i at 147, 925 P.2d at 317; Vinge, 81 Hawai`i at 321, 916 P.2d at 1222; Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i at 531, 880 P.2d at 206. We therefore hold that the trial court's denial of Christian's post-verdict motion for a new trialbased on Christian's claim that his attempt to withdraw, prior to the commencement of closing arguments, his earlier knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to testify in his own behalf should have been allowedwas not "manifestly unjust" and, for that reason,[16] did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Christian contends that the trial court erroneously excluded hearsay testimony regarding Burkhart's alleged admissions that he, Burkhart, in fact killed Vilmar Cabaccang. In this connection, Christian asserts that: the trial court (1) failed to apply the "legitimate tendency" test, as set forth in State v. Rabellizsa, 79 Hawai`i 347, 903 P.2d 43 (1995), in order to determine the admissibility of testimony that Burkhart had confessed to Cabaccang's murder; and (2) even if it applied the correct standard, the trial court misapplied HRE Rule 804(b)(3) because Burkhart's purported confessions were "so palpably against Burkhart's interest that there [was] a circumstantial guarantee of their trustworthiness, regardless of whether there [was] corroborating evidence." We note, as a preliminary matter, that Rabellizsa is inapposite to the present case. The "legitimate tendency" test pertains to the assessment of the relevance of evidence offered to establish a third party's motive to commit the offense with which the defendant is charged. It is therefore not germane to the trial court's exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of the proffered testimony relating to Burkhart's alleged confessions, the propriety of which must be ascertained in accordance with HRE Rule 804. HRE Rule 804(b) provides in relevant part: (Emphasis added.)[17] Christian correctly points out that the seminal decision governing the admissibility of a third party confession that exculpates a defendant is Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973),[18] in which the United States Supreme Court held that a state trial court's exclusion, pursuant to local evidentiary rules, of evidence that a third party had confessed to the crime at issue violated "traditional and fundamental standards of due process" and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 302-03. Chambers, however, is manifestly distinguishable from the case before us. Chambers was accused of murdering a police officer who had been shot by someone in a crowd of twenty to twenty-five men attempting to prevent the officer from executing an arrest warrant on another individual. Id. at 285-87, 93 S. Ct. 1038. After Chambers was himself arrested for having allegedly committed the murder, another man who had been in the crowd, Gable McDonald, Id. at 287-89, 291-92, 294-95, 298, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (footnotes and some citations omitted) (some brackets in original and some added). It is apparent that corroborating circumstances of the type noted by the Chambers court are not present in the instant case. First, no eyewitness linked Burkhart to the stabbing of Cabaccang. On the contrary, the two individuals who had an opportunity to observe Cabaccang's assailant failed to identity Burkhart in a photo lineup, and instead, both identified Christian as the attacker. Cf. State v. Mabuti, 72 Haw. 106, 110-11, 115, 807 P.2d 1264, 1267, 1269 (1991) (holding that unavailable but uncontroverted gang-slaying participant's confession, which contained "great detail about exactly what transpired from the injuries which the victim suffered[] to exactly who [the declarant] saw hitting or assisting in beating the victim []," should have been admitted as statement against interest, pursuant to HRE 804(b)(3), at behest of proponent who declarant saw that evening but could not say was present or had participated in the fatal beating). Moreover, the prosecution offered two witnesses who placed Burkhart at another location at the time of the stabbing. Second, neither of the two confessions allegedly made by Burkhart were sworn, as was McDonald's confession to Chambers's attorneys. Finally, while there is evidence that Burkhart owned an unusual "butterfly" knife, Christian himself conceded *263 that the split blade knife found at the crime scene was not a "butterfly" knife. The only arguably corroborating evidence offered by Christian did not link Burkhart to the crime, but rather, in a rather tenuous manner, to the neighborhood in which the crime took place, by indicating that Burkhart had failed to appear at the nearby home of his friends, who had been expecting his visit that evening. On these facts, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that the corroboration proffered by Christian was too weak "clearly [to] indicate" the trustworthiness of Burkhart's confessions to Auld and Mullins. See HRE Rule 804(b)(3). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in excluding them from the evidence at trial. As his final point of error on appeal, Christian argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in erroneously advising him (1) that it was too late to testify after the close of the evidence and (2) against engaging in further outbursts regarding the matter in the jury's presence. Christian contends that this "erroneous" advice exhibited a "lack of skill" on his counsel's part, rising to the level of ineffective assistance. As the discussion in section III.A reflects, the law in this jurisdiction regarding whether and under what circumstances a criminal defendant may withdraw a prior waiver of his right to testify has been unsettled until now. Inasmuch as (1) there was, and still remains, no Hawai`i case law conferring on a criminal defendant the unbridled prerogative to rescind such a waiver following a properly conducted Tachibana colloquy and (2) the evidence that Christian advised his counsel that he wished to adduce was inadmissible, counsel's advice to Christian that "we're beyond [the evidentiary] stage of the trial" can neither be said to have fallen outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, in general, nor to have constituted a specific error or omission reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence, in particular. See Richie, 88 Hawai`i at 39, 960 P.2d at 1247; Fukusaku, 85 Hawai`i at 479-80, 946 P.2d at 49-50. In any event, assuming arguendo that the advice given was erroneous, Christian did not follow it. Rather, he attempted to retract his waiver in spite of his attorney's admonitions and was afforded a full opportunity to be heard with respect to his reasons for wishing to do so. Accordingly, the legal advice in question could not have been prejudicial. Christian's suggestion that his counsel's admonition "not to engage in any further outburst in front of the jury because ... it [would] only hurt his cause and not help him" amounted to ineffective assistance is nonsensical. Outbursts in the courtroom, as the trial court correctly warned Christian, may be considered a waiver of the right to be present and potentially result in the defendant's removal. HRPP Rule 43(b)(2) (1996); State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 651 n. 11, 756 P.2d 1033, 1045-46 & n. 11 (1988). Moreover, counsel's advice was obviously supported by sound tactical considerations, inasmuch as Christian's disruptive behavior was not likely to endear him to the jury. We hold that Christian's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. In State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998), this court reasoned as follows: Id. at 3-4, 950 P.2d at 1203-04 (footnotes omitted). HRS § 134-51(b), see supra note 2, which Christian was convicted of violating in Count II, is a class C felony. And, analogously *265 to HRS § 134-6(a), "the [crime] underlying an HRS § [134-51(b)] charge will always be `established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the' HRS § [134-51(b)] offense." Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 3, 950 P.2d at 1203. Consequently, as is true with respect to felonies underlying HRS § [134-6(a) offenses, "the [crime] underlying an HRS § [134-51(b)] offense is as a matter of law, an included offense of the HRS § [134-51(b)] offense," within the meaning of HRS § 701-109(4)(a), and Christian "should not have been convicted of both the HRS § [134-51(b)] offense and the underlying second degree murder offense." Id. at 2-3, 950 P.2d at 1202-03 (footnote omitted). In light of the foregoing, we reverse, sua sponte, Christian's conviction of and sentence for his violation of HRS § 134-51(b), as charged in Count II. The second circuit court's judgment, conviction, and sentence with respect to Counts I (second degree murder) and III (attempted third degree theft) are affirmed. However, because Christian's conviction of Count II (use of a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime) and simultaneous conviction of Count I is barred under the rationale of this court's opinion in Jumila, Christian's conviction of and sentence in connection with Count II is reversed. [1] HRS § 707-701.5 provides in relevant part that "a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person." [2] HRS § 134-51(b) provides that "[w]hoever knowingly possesses or intentionally uses or threatens to use a deadly or dangerous weapon while engaged in the commission of a crime shall be guilty of a class C felony." [3] HRS § 705-500 provides: Criminal attempt. (1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person: (a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believes them to be; or (b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the person's commission of the crime. (2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if, acting with the state of mind required to establish liability with respect to the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the person intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result. (3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal intent. HRS § 708-832(1)(a) provides in relevant part that "[a] person commits the offense of theft in the third degree if the person commits theft ... [o]f property or services the value of which exceeds $100[.]" The applicable definition of "theft" is supplied by HRS § 708-830(1) (1993), which provides in relevant part that "[a] person commits theft if the person ... [o]btains, or exerts control over, the property of another with intent to deprive the other of the property." [4] HRE Rule 804(a)(1) provides that a witness/declarant is "unavailable" if he or she "[i]s exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement." [5] HRE Rule 103(c) provides that "[i]n jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury." [6] HRE Rule 804(b)(3), relating to "[s]tatement[s] against interest," provides in relevant part that "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." [7] As our analysis below indicates, the circuit court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. See Lee v. Heftel, 81 Hawai`i 1, 5 n. 2, 911 P.2d 721, 725 n. 2 (1996); State v. Propios, 76 Hawai`i 474, 486, 879 P.2d 1057, 1069 (1994); State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 290, 859 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1993). [8] See Jones v. State, 79 Hawai`i 330, 902 P.2d 965 (1995), discussed infra in section III.A.1. [9] HRPP 32(d) (1995) provides: Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence shall set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. [10] A fortiori, the involuntary or "ignorant" entry of a guilty or no contest plea before the imposition of sentence would present "a fair and just reason" for its requested withdrawal. [11] Our view in this regard presupposes, of course, that the parties' closing arguments precede the trial court's charge to the jury, as is the case in this jurisdiction. See HRPP Rule 30(e) (1995) ("The court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed...."). [12] The Rubicon is a fifteen-mile-long river in northern Italy flowing east into the Adriatic Sea. "[B]y crossing this ancient boundary between Cisalpin Gaul and Italy to march against Pompey in 49 B.C., Julius Caesar committed himself to conquer or perish." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1250 (1989). Thus, to "cross or pass the Rubicon" is "to take a decisive or irrevocable step[.]" Id. [13] We emphasize that, in response to the trial court's query as to whether he wished to offer "anything else" in support of his request, Christian advised the court, "No, that is all." [14] Having so held, we need not reach the question whether the prosecution relied to its substantial detriment upon Christian's prior waiver of his right to testify. See Merino, 81 Hawai`i at 223, 915 P.2d at 697. [15] Were such not the case, defendants such as Christian would have every incentive to seek "a second bite at the apple" by waiving their constitutional right to testify in their own behalf, remaining silent during the evidentiary phase of their trials, hoping for the best, and seeking to retry their cases in the event of an undesirable outcome by claiming a resurrected desire to enlighten the trier of fact with their version of the material events. [16] See supra note 7. [17] The exception set forth in HRE Rule 804(b)(3) "is identical with Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3)." Commentary on HRE Rule 804. [18] This court discussed HRE Rule 804(b)(3) in a somewhat cursory fashion in State v. Mabuti, 72 Haw. 106, 110-11, 115, 807 P.2d 1264, 1267, 1269 (1991). [19] HRS § 134-6(a) provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly carry on the person or have within the person's immediate control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm while engaged in the commission of a separate felony...." (Emphasis added.) [20] HRS § 701-109 provides in relevant part: Method of prosecution when conduct establishes an element of more than one offense. (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an element. The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other as defined in subsection (4) of this section.... .... (4) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged[.]