Title: CECH v STATE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14216 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 RICHARD CECH, as Administrator of the Estate of Kelly Cech, Deceased, and ARLENE CECH, Deceased, and as Guardian of the Estate of Bruce Cech and Kerry Cech, Minor Children, Plaintiffs and Respondents, THE STATE OF MONTANA, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Dolphy 0 . Pohlman argued, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana Richard Anderson argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 14, 1979 Decided: BEC 1 2 1974 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Richard Cech, a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e s t a t e s of h i s wife, Arlene Cech, and h i s c h i l d , Kelly Cech, and as guardian of t h e e s t a t e s of h i s c h i l d r e n Bruce and Kerry Cech, sued t h e S t a t e of Montana under provisions of t h e Montana T o r t C l a i m s A c t f o r damages r e s u l t i n g from an automobile accident on I n t e r s t a t e 90, approximately eleven m i l e s e a s t of Whitehall, Montana. The jury t r i a l began November 1 4 , 1977, i n t h e District Court of t h e S i x t h Judi- cial D i s t r i c t , Park County. The jury returned four s e p a r a t e v e r d i c t s f o r p l a i n t i f f as follows: For t h e estate of Arlene Cech $15,000 (deceased) For t h e estate of Kelly Cech $35,000 (deceased) For t h e guardian of Bruce Cech $25,000 (minor c h i l d ) For t h e guardian of Kerry Cech $25,000 (minor c h i l d ) From t h e e n t r y of judgment on t h e v e r d i c t s , t h e S t a t e ap- peals. The o r i g i n a l opinion i n t h i s case w a s issued August 1, 1979. A p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing w a s f i l e d August 1 4 , 1979, and t h i s Court ordered a rehearing on August 22, 1979. The case w a s set on t h e September calendar, r e b r i e f e d and reargued t o t h e Court. The S t a t e raises t h e following i s s u e s f o r our review: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by denying t h e S t a t e ' s motions f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t made a t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief and a t t h e c l o s e of a l l t h e evi- dence? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures? 3 . Whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t i n favor of p l a i n t i f f ? The single-vehicle accident s u b j e c t of t h i s a c t i o n occurred on t h e afternoon of November 29, 1974, on I n t e r - state 901 on a portion of t h a t road known a s Cottonwood H i l l . Richard Cech w a s driving the family c a r , a 1967 Rambler, w e s t on t h e freeway. H i s passengers were h i s wife, Arlene, and t h r e e of t h e i r seven children. The weather on t h e day of the accident was described by Cech a s "sunshiny," " ~ 0 0 1 , " " c l e a r and f a i r l y nice." H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e road was " f a i r l y dry" and " i n good shape" from Livingston, t h e town from which they were t r a v e l i n g , t o Bozeman. From Bozeman westward t h e conditions were d i f f e r e n t ; t h e l e f t l a n e was snow-packed, b u t t h e r i g h t lane, i n which he w a s driving, w a s "dry" according t o Cech. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t near t h e h i l l on which t h e accident occurred both lanes had s t a r t e d t o c l e a r up and t h e r e was less snow on the road. Cech f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was d r i v i n g around 55 m i l e s per hour and had maintained t h a t speed almost a l l t h e way. H i s c a r d i d n o t have snow tires. H e s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t recall seeing t h e roadside sign warning of ice on the next t h r e e m i l e s of highway, within which space t h e accident occurred. The automobile, a t an estimated speed of 55 t o 60 m i l e s per hour, passed from a dry s e c t i o n of the highway onto an i c y s e c t i o n on a shaded curve. The automobile went i n t o a skid, and Cech l o s t control. Cech s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t brake while on t h e highway o r once t h e c a r l e f t t h e pavement. However, once the c a r was on t h e " f i e l d o r pasture" a s he described it ( t h e S t a t e c a l l s it the "recovery a r e a " ) , he t e s t i f i e d t h a t he must have been braking because " t h e c a r w a s coming t o a slower motion." The car d i d n o t s t o p within t h i s recovery area b u t went over t h e edge i n t o a ravine. Cech's wife w a s k i l l e d i n t h e accident. One son, Kelly, died i n a Great F a l l s h o s p i t a l about a week l a t e r . Cech and t h e o t h e r two boys sustained r e l a t i v e l y minor i n j u r i e s from which they recovered. A t t h e t i m e of t h e accident, g u a r d r a i l s protected t h i s p a r t i c u l a r curve except f o r a portion of t h e curve approxi- mately 600 f e e t i n length. Through t h i s gap of g u a r d r a i l , t h e Cech automobile t r a v e l e d i n t o t h e recovery area. Evi- dence showed t h a t t h e automobile skidded 84 f e e t 2 inches on t h e o i l m a t of t h e highway, 378 f e e t 1 inch on t h e recovery area, and then over t h e edge of t h e recovery area i n t o t h e r a v i n e where presumably t h e i n j u r i e s occurred. This s e c t i o n of t h e i n t e r s t a t e w a s designed during t h e mid-1960's by t h e S t a t e Highway Department. The construc- t i o n c o n t r a c t w a s l e t i n 1968, and t h e four-lane i n t e r s t a t e w a s opened t o t h e t r a v e l i n g p u b l i c i n t h e f a l l of 1970. The S t a t e contended throughout t h e t r i a l t h a t t h e design of t h e highway and g u a r d r a i l s , o r l a c k of g u a r d r a i l s , was proper. I t contended t h e r e w a s a "recovery area" a t t h e p l a c e of t h e gap i n t h e g u a r d r a i l ; t h a t t h i s recovery area was s a f e r than a g u a r d r a i l ; and, t h a t t h e presence of a g u a r d r a i l where t h e gap e x i s t e d would n o t have prevented t h e accident. P l a i n t i f f ' s contention was, and h i s evidence tended t o prove, t h a t a f t e r t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e i n t e r s t a t e had been completed, t h e S t a t e noticed t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n of t h e roadway was dangerous when i c y ; t h a t i c e always accumu- l a t e d during t h e winter months; t h a t t h e l a c k of g u a r d r a i l permitted v e h i c l e s t o s t r a y o u t upon t h e grassy slope desig- nated a s the "recovery area;" and t h a t vehicles going o u t upon the recovery area would be unable t o stop on the slope and would go i n t o the deep ravine. Further, p l a i n t i f f contended t h a t while a guardrail would not have prevented t h e accident, it would have prevented the i n j u r i e s received. The S t a t e a l s o contended t h a t a s an economic choice i n t h e o r i g i n a l design of the highway, and l a t e r i n maintaining it, the c o s t of guardrails a s compared t o the cost of pro- viding a recovery area was a factor i n its decision. A look a t the testimony w i l l demonstrate the kind of evidence t h a t was adduced by the S t a t e i n support of i t s theory. David S. Johnson was called by the State. H e i s a professional engineer f o r the Department of Highways. A t the time of t r i a l he was supervisor of engineering spe- c i a l i t i e s f o r the Department. Johnson t e s t i f i e d : "Q. N o w with regard t o the second page of Defen- d a n t ' s Exhibit I, would you look a t t h a t page of t h e document and t e l l m e i f you i n your review of the design of t h i s highway, and possibily [ s i c ] others, f o r the S t a t e of Montana, would follow the information provided on t h a t document? A. Yes, we would use t h i s . "Q. Generally what does t h a t information r e l a t e to? A. It r e l a t e s t o the providing of c l e a r recovery areas wherever you can on a highway. "Q. Does it make a d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h a t document with regard t o the median a s opposed t o the shoulder of the road recovery areas? A. Well, I don't see a reference t o median i n here, j u s t of fhand. "Q. So it would be s a f e to say t h a t t h a t ap- p l i e s t o recovery areas along the shoulders of i n t e r s t a t e highways? A. Yes, I think so. "Q. A s a designer, and based upon your educa- t i o n and your experience i n t h a t f i e l d , i s there a preference t h a t you follow with regard t o shoulder of the road areas, a preference t h a t you take of recovery area over guardrail? A. W e l l , i t ' s always b e t t e r --- t o have a c l e a r space where a vehicle can recover as opposed t o having a g u a r a r a i l , which i s something t h a t a vehicle - can run i n t o . "Q. D o you consider, as a designer, t h a t guard- r a i l i s a hazard? A. Oh, d e f i n i t e l y . "Q. I n your design of i n t e r s t a t e highways would you p r e f e r t o have a recovery area b u i l t o r a g u a r d r a i l b u i l t ? A. W e l l , as a designer, and a s a d r i v e r , I would r a t h e r have t h e recovery area. "Q. A l l r i g h t . O n t h i s area of Cottonwood H i l l i s t h e r e i n t h e design of t h e i n t e r s t a t e highway a design of recovery area? A. Y e s , t h e r e i s . " (Emphasis added.) Ronald J. Hensen, a consulting engineer from Boulder, Colorado, a l s o t e s t i f i e d f o r the S t a t e : "Q. D o you have a term t h a t you use i n describ- i n g such an area on t h e shoulder of t h e road? A. Where they have been dressed down, such a s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r area, they are r e f e r r e d t o as a secondary recovery area. "Q. ---- t h e use of g secondary recovery -- area an Is accepted p r a c t i c e i n protecting a vehicle a s - - it leaves t h e travelerway? A. - yes, -- it is. "Q. And i s t h a t method, t h e use of a recovery area, a primary o r secondary s a f e t y f e a t u r e with reqard t o protection on t h e shoulders? A. weli, - -- i t ' s t h e primary o b j e c t i v e -- i n road- way design t o provide a recovery area wherever possible, such t h a t a vehicle which inadvertently leaves t h e road has an opportunity t o g e t i t s e l f back under c o n t r o l without impacting e i t h e r an- o t h e r vehicle o r a fixed object. "Q. Is g u a r d r a i l used f o r t h e protection a t t h e shoulders of t h e road when a vehicle leaves t h e traveled way? A. Guardrail --- i s used i n design a s a secondary s o l u t i o n where t h e physical space - - - cannot be provided. That is, where t h e topogra- phy i s such t h a t t o provide a d d i t i o n a l space o u t t h e r e would be p r o h i b i t i v e i n t e r m s of t o t a l c o s t . "Q. NOW, a r e you suggesting t h a t t h e r e are eco- nomic considerations f o r t h e use of recovery a r e a s , as opposed t o guardrail? A. W e l l , t h e r e a r e economic considerations i n t h e design of roadways. And t h e b a s i c economics of t h i s , t h e r e has t o be some t r a d e o f f between how many m i l e s of roadway can be improved versus how s a f e they can be made. The ultimate end of it i s on one end you merely provide space f o r a vehicle t o move, and on t h e opposite end you make it crash proof such t h a t no matter what a d r i v e r would do he would be protected from himself." (Emphasis added. ) The foregoing evidence demonstrates t h e posture of t h e State--that recovery a r e a s were s a f e r than g u a r d r a i l s , more economical, and within t h e standards. I n c o n t r a s t t o t h a t evidence, p l a i n t i f f produced an i n t e r o f f i c e memorandum dated December 10, 1974, i n which t h e manager of t h e t r a f f i c u n i t of t h e Department of Highways reported t o t h e Administrator of t h e Department i n p a r t a s follows: ". . . W e have made an accident a n a l y s i s run from t h e H.I.S. System and according t o t h e in- formation obtained, t h e r e have been f i v e acci- d e n t s ( p l u s t h e s e two) which have happened i n t h i s a r e a i n t h e t i m e period of January 1, 1972 t o November 11, 1974. The e x a c t l o c a t i o n of t h e s e accidents i s i n t h e westbound l a n e , milepost 259.9. "This a r e a has a shaded s p o t which g e t s very s l i p p e r y a t t i m e s i n t h e winter. When v e h i c l e s l o s e c o n t r o l and go i n t o t h e d i t c h they a r e i n t r o u b l e because they can s l i d e behind t h e shoul- d e r g u a r d r a i l and i n t o a hole which i s a t l e a s t 100 f e e t deep. This s i t u a t i o n could very e a s i l y be f i x e d by adding about 600 f e e t of g u a r d r a i l which would connect t o t h e g u a r d r a i l on both ends. There i s now a s a f e t y p r o j e c t which i s under construction i n t h i s a r e a and g u a r d r a i l i s b i d a t $2.75 a f o o t . Therefore, w e f e e l t h a t t h i s g u a r d r a i l should be added t o t h e p r o j e c t . " The evidence a l s o showed t h a t eventually t h e 600 f e e t of g u a r d r a i l was i n s t a l l e d by t h e Department, a f t e r t h e Cech accident, a t a c o s t t o t h e state of approximately $145, disregarding t h e f e d e r a l contribution. The S t a t e challenges t h e l e g a l p r o p r i e t y of t h e ver- d i c t s . I t d i r e c t s t h e C o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n t o evidence sup- p o r t i n g i t s defenses t h a t t h e design and construction of t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e i n t e r s t a t e w e r e proper and i n accordance with accepted standards, conforming t o t h e s t a t e of t h e a r t a t t h e t i m e . A t t h e t i m e of t r i a l , a f t e r submission of p l a i n t i f f ' s pretrial memorandum and his counsel's statements of clari- fication made during trial, the only issue was whether the State was negligent in not placing guardrails at the edge of the interstate where the accident occurred after the initial construction and before the accident involving the Cech family. Plaintiff's counsel stated, "[tlhis case is limited strictly to the subject of guardrails. And we aren't con- tending there is any engineering defect other than that." During cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel made it clear that he was not alleging or contending that the State failed to warn of icy road conditions or that plaintiff's visi- bility was in any way interfered with or obstructed at the time of the accident. At the close of plaintiff's case, the State made a motion for a directed verdict which reads in part: "MR. POHLMAN: Comes now the Defendant, and pur- suant to Rule 50 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, moves for a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant, upon the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiff has not by a preponderance of the evidence proved a prime [sic] facie case, in that the Defendant negligently designed the highway in question in its initial design. And further, that the Defendant negligently failed to provide adequate guardrails at the scene in accordance with its initial design of guardrails. And further, that the Plaintiff has not proved a prime [sic] facie case that the Defendant negli- gently constructed the highway in question in accordance or not in accordance with the design as to the highway, including guardrail and other factors or elements of design and construction. Further, that we want to note to the Court that in Plaintiff's Pre-Trial memorandum Plaintiff has abandoned and withdrawn all initial conten- tions that the Defendant negligently failed to give warning of hazards, and that Defendant negligently maintained the highway, and in the terms of the Plaintiff's Pre-Trial memorandum, as maintenance pertaining to the usual proce- dures of sanding, etcetera. The Motion is based upon the record and the testimonial evidence and the exhibits in the Plaintiff's case in chief. Further, that there has been no testi- mony or other evidence presented by Plaintiff whatsoever showing or proving that there was negligence i n t h e design of t h e highway on be- h a l f of t h e S t a t e of Montana. That t h e r e was no evidence whatsoever by e x p e r t testimony o r otherwise t h a t t h e r e was a duty o r standard of care f o r t h e design of t h e highway a s t o align- ment, slope, grade, g u a r d r a i l placement, recovery a r e a , signing o r any o t h e r concepts of design. And f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e r e was no evidence presented by P l a i n t i f f t h a t t h e r e w a s any such breach of t h e s a i d duty o r standard of c a r e by t h e Defen- dant. "Further, t h a t t h e r e has been no testimony o r o t h e r evidence presented by P l a i n t i f f proving t h e Defendant w a s negligent i n f a i l i n g t o pro- vide g u a r d r a i l s subsequent t o t h e o r i g i n a l de- s i g n and construction b u t p r i o r t o t h e Cech a c c i d e n t of 11-29-74. And f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e r e has been no evidence of a duty o r a standard of c a r e f o r t h e provision and e r e c t i o n of g u a r d r a i l subsequent t o t h e i n i t i a l design and construc- t i o n , b u t p r i o r t o t h e Cech accident of 11-29- 74, and no evidence presented of a breach of any such duty by t h e Defendant. And f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e r e has been no evidence of a standard of care o r duty on behalf of t h e Defendant with regard t o accident frequency r a t i o a n a l y s i s f o r t h i s highway i n question. And f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e r e has been no evidence showing any breach of duty o r standard of care f o r t h e compilation and re- p o r t i n g of a c c i d e n t s and accident d a t a f o r t h i s i n t e r s t a t e 90 highway." W e note t h a t t h e f i r s t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r i s d i r e c t e d a t t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o d i r e c t a v e r d i c t on t h e question of t h e S t a t e ' s negligence t o place a g u a r d r a i l a t t h e scene of t h e accident a t t h e t i m e t h e freeway w a s f i r s t designed and b u i l t . The motion d i d n o t go t o t h e question of whether t h e S t a t e was negligent i n f a i l i n g t o p u t a g u a r d r a i l t h e r e a f t e r t h e r e had been a c c i d e n t s i n t h e area. With t h e uncon- t r o v e r t e d e x p e r t testimony before it a t t h e t i m e , t h e c o u r t might w e l l have d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t on t h i s very narrow i s s u e . However, t h e c o u r t was n o t requested t o d i r e c t a v e r d i c t f o r f a i l i n g t o p u t a g u a r d r a i l i n a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l construction and design, s o it w a s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o d i r e c t o r r e f u s e t o d i r e c t a v e r d i c t on t h i s point. There- f o r e , w e f i n d no e r r o r . The second issue concerns the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by the State after the accident. The investigating officer of the Cech accident requested an emergency study of the area which went to the Spot Safety Unit of the Department of Highways. Approxi- mately a month after the accident, after an investigation, a recommendation was made which resulted in the placement of a guardrail across the entrance of the recovery area. This construction was done subsequent to the Cech accident and was completed in 1975. Over the State's objection, the court allowed evidence of this "subsequent request for an emergency study" to be admitted into evidence. The objection was based on Rule "When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evi- dence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, con- trol, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." Plaintiff argues that the admission of other incidents is both relevant and material under the case law of Montana, citing Leonard v . City of Butte (1901), 25 Mont. 410, 65 P. 425, and Robinson v . F. W. Woolworth Co. (1927), 80 Mont. In view of the foregoing testimony, we find no error in the trial court's ruling allowing the offered testimony. In Raybell v. State (1972), 6 Wash.App. 795, 496 P.2d 559, the Washington court found the duty applying to a municipality to maintain adequate protective barriers where such barriers are shown to be practical and feasible. The court commented that the feasibility of such a guardrail was shown by the fact that the State later installed one in the very location of the accident. The interdepartmental memorandum quoted above stated that the dangerous situation "could very easily be fixed" by adding about 600 feet of guardrail. This is further proof of feasibility. Under Rule 407, Mont.R.Evid., the subsequent installa- tion was also admissible for impeachment. The State con- tended that the so-called recovery area was preferable to guardrail and its experts contended that the absence of a guardrail conformed in every way with acceptable standards so as to refute negligence. They also indicated that eco- nomically the recovery areas were preferable to guardrails. In Lawlor v. County of Flathead (1978), Mont. , 582 P.2d 751, 35 St.Rep. 884, we found that repair of a chuck- hole by the county two days after an accident occurred was admissible to establish feasibility of repair, and to im- peach the testimony given by a county road foreman. The point on which this decision turns should be governed by the appellate rule that the question of admissibility of evidence must in every case be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review only in case of manifest abuse. Gunderson v. Brewster (1970), 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589. Affirmed. We concur: &Afi@?Lh4Qf Chief Justice \3dkq y Justices