Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MELISSA ANN NUTT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 2, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 120489 
MELISSA ANN NUTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.   
At issue in this case is the prohibition against 
successive prosecutions found in Const 1963, art 1, § 15, 
Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause. 
In particular, we are 
called upon to determine the meaning of the term “same 
offense” as used in art 1, § 15. Until 1973, Michigan had 
defined that term to mean the “same crime” such that, where 
a defendant had committed a series of crimes with different 
elements, the defendant could be prosecuted serially for 
each distinct crime, irrespective of whether the crimes 
 
 
 
 
 
were committed during the course of one crime spree or 
“transaction.” Thus, our Double Jeopardy Clause had, until 
1973, consistently been interpreted to preclude serial 
prosecutions only of crimes sharing identical elements. In 
People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), this 
Court abandoned the “same-elements” test in favor of a 
“same transaction” test that prohibits serial prosecutions 
for entirely different crimes that were committed during a 
single criminal episode. 
Because defendant challenges as an unconstitutional 
successive prosecution under the White same transaction 
test her prosecution for receiving and concealing stolen 
weapons in Oakland County after being convicted of second­
degree home invasion in Lapeer County, we must determine 
whether the White test is consonant with art 1, § 15. 
We 
conclude that, by abandoning the same-elements test, the 
White Court ignored the ratifiers’ common understanding of 
the “same offense” term in our Constitution. 
Accordingly, 
we overrule White, reinstate the same-elements test, and 
affirm, on different grounds, the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that defendant may be prosecuted in Oakland County for 
receiving and concealing stolen firearms. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
I. FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 10, 1998, Darrold Smith’s home in Lapeer 
County was burglarized. Four firearms and a bow and arrows 
were stolen from the home. 
Lapeer County police officers 
and those of adjacent Oakland County conducted a joint 
investigation concerning three Lapeer County burglaries, 
including the burglary of Smith’s home. 
The officers 
obtained a search warrant for a cabin in Oakland County 
that was occupied by defendant and John Crosley. 
During 
the execution of the warrant on December 14, 1998, three of 
Smith’s stolen firearms were found hidden underneath a 
mattress inside the cabin. 
Smith’s bow and arrows and 
property stolen from another residence were also seized 
during the search. 
Defendant confessed to a Lapeer County detective that 
she 
participated 
as 
a 
getaway 
driver 
during 
three 
burglaries that occurred the week of December 10, 1998, 
including the burglary of the Smith residence. 
Defendant 
admitted that three of the guns stolen from Smith were 
concealed underneath a mattress in the Oakland County 
cabin. 
1 Trial has not yet occurred in this matter. 
Our 
recitation 
of 
facts 
is 
drawn 
from 
the 
preliminary
examination transcript and other documents in the record.
3 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
In January 1999, defendant was charged in Lapeer 
County with three counts of second-degree home invasion and 
three counts of larceny in a building. 
Meanwhile, on 
February 16, 1999, an arrest warrant was issued in Oakland 
County alleging that defendant had committed one offense of 
receiving and concealing a stolen firearm.2 
On February 22, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty in 
Lapeer County of one charge of second-degree home invasion3 
in connection with the burglary of the Smith residence and 
the theft of the firearms. The remaining five charges were 
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. 
Defendant was 
sentenced to probation. 
In July 1999, defendant was bound over for trial in 
Oakland County on the charge of receiving and concealing a 
stolen firearm. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, 
contending that it constituted an improper successive 
prosecution in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of 
the federal and state constitutions. Defendant argued that 
2 MCL 750.535b. 
A second count in the complaint and warrant alleged
that defendant had received stolen property in excess of
$100 in violation of MCL 750.535 on the basis of the theft 
of Smith’s bow and arrows, as well as electronics and other
property stolen from another residence. 
This second count 
was dismissed following defendant’s preliminary examination
because of the unavailability of a complaining witness. 
3 MCL 750.110a(3). 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pursuant to White, the state was required to join at one 
trial all charges arising from a continuous time sequence 
that demonstrated a single intent and goal. 
Thus, 
defendant maintained, she could not be tried in Oakland 
County for possession of the same firearms that she was 
alleged to have stolen during the home invasion for which 
she was convicted in Lapeer County. 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
The court cited People v Hunt (After Remand), 214 Mich App 
313; 542 NW2d 609 (1995), for the proposition that where a 
defendant is accused of one or more offenses not having 
specific intent as an element, the test for determining 
whether they constitute the same offense for the purpose of 
Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause is whether the offenses 
involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm 
or evil. 
The court opined that because defendant in this 
case was charged with one “general intent crime” and one 
“specific intent crime,” and because those offenses were 
designed to prevent similar harms, defendant could not be 
tried for receiving and concealing a stolen firearm 
following her conviction for home invasion. 
The prosecution’s appeal from the trial court’s 
dismissal yielded three separate Court of Appeals opinions, 
the net result of which was to reverse the trial court’s 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
order dismissing the charge.4
 In the lead opinion, Judge 
Meter opined that the Oakland County prosecution did not 
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the 
home invasion charge and the receiving and concealing 
charge did not arise from the “same transaction”; that is, 
they did not arise out of a continuous time sequence and 
did not display a common goal. 
Judge Meter relied on 
People v Flowers, 186 Mich App 652; 465 NW2d 43 (1990), in 
which the Court held that where the defendant robbed an 
individual in Oakland County and absconded to Wayne County 
with the victim’s vehicle, he could be prosecuted in 
Oakland County for armed robbery notwithstanding his prior 
Wayne County conviction for possession of the stolen 
vehicle. 
The Flowers Court held that the two offenses on 
different 
days 
were 
not 
part 
of 
the 
same 
criminal 
transaction. 
Judge Meter stated that to the extent that 
Hunt conflicted with Flowers, the latter controlled because 
it was first decided. 
Judge Meter further concluded that 
the harm or evil to be prevented by the home invasion 
statute differed substantially from the harm or evil to be 
prevented by the concealing stolen firearms statute: the 
former was directed toward peaceful habitation, while the 
4 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 9,
2001 (Docket No. 225887). 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
latter was directed toward the trafficking of firearms, and 
the two statutes were located in different chapters of the 
Penal Code. 
Judge Hoekstra issued a concurring opinion in which he 
indicated his disagreement with Judge Meter’s conclusion 
that the home invasion offense and the receiving and 
concealing offense were not part of a continuous time 
sequence. 
Rather, Judge Hoekstra agreed with dissenting 
Judge Whitbeck’s conclusion that the “actions of stealing, 
transporting, and then concealing the firearms for four 
days are logically part of the same criminal episode.” 
However, relying on People v Squires, 240 Mich App 454; 613 
NW2d 361 (2000), Judge Hoekstra determined that the two 
offenses did not “share a single intent and goal” as 
required by the second part of the White same transaction 
test and that defendant’s double jeopardy claim therefore 
failed. 
In dissenting Judge Whitbeck’s view, Hunt was directly 
on point and required the conclusion that the two offenses 
arose out of a continuous time sequence and shared a single 
intent and goal. 
Judge Whitbeck noted that Squires, on 
which Judge Hoekstra relied, was distinguishable because it 
involved 
multiple 
punishments 
and 
not 
successive 
prosecutions. 
Judge Whitbeck also suggested that the 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
prosecutor had “never articulated any manifest necessity 
that would justify this separate prosecution.”5 
As the three-way split among the members of the Court 
of Appeals panel below and a number of conflicting previous 
Court of Appeals cases in the area demonstrate,6 there 
appears 
to 
be 
significant 
difficulty 
inherent 
in 
application of the White rule. 
Accordingly, we granted 
defendant’s application for leave to appeal. 
We also 
directed the parties to address 
whether People v White, 390 Mich 245 (1973), sets
forth the proper test to determine when a 
prosecution for the “same offense” is barred on
double jeopardy grounds under Const 1963, art 1,
§ 15, and whether our constitution provides
greater protection than does US Const, Am V. See 
United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 696-697 
(1993). [467 Mich 901 (2002).] 
5 Judge Whitbeck cited our opinion in People v Herron,
464 Mich 593, 601-603; 628 NW2d 528 (2001), for the 
proposition that the prosecutor was required to articulate
“manifest necessity” to bring a separate prosecution. 
In 
Herron we addressed the propriety of a retrial following a
mistrial. 
Under such circumstances, either consent or
“manifest 
necessity” 
is 
generally 
a 
constitutional 
prerequisite to retrial. 
We wish to clarify that the
concept of manifest necessity is not implicated in the case
before us, which does not involve a retrial following the
declaration 
of 
a 
mistrial, 
and 
that 
the 
“manifest 
necessity” analysis was erroneously imported into this 
context. 
6 See n 22 and accompanying text.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of 
constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo. People 
v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001); People v 
Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998). 
At issue in this case is the meaning of the term “same 
offense” in art 1, § 15. 
Our goal in construing our 
Constitution is to discern the original meaning attributed 
to 
the 
words 
of 
a 
constitutional 
provision 
by 
its 
ratifiers. 
People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 
274-275; 501 NW2d 127 (1993). 
To this end, we apply the 
rule of “common understanding.” 
Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer 
Circuit Court (In re Lapeer Co Clerk), 469 Mich 146, 155; 
665 NW2d 452 (2003); People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 507; 
614 NW2d 103 (2000). 
In applying this principle of 
construction, the people are understood to have accepted 
the words employed in a constitutional provision in the 
sense most obvious to the common understanding and to have 
“ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the 
sense designed to be conveyed.” 
1 Cooley, Constitutional 
Limitations (6th ed), p 81. 
Constitutional Convention 
debates and the Address to the People are certainly 
relevant 
as 
aids 
in 
determining 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
ratifiers. 
Lapeer Co Clerk, supra at 156; People v Nash, 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
418 Mich 196, 209; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (opinion by 
BRICKLEY, J.).7 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Michigan Constitutions protect a 
person from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
US Const, Am V;8 Const 1963, art 1, ' 15.9  The 
prohibition against double jeopardy provides three related 
protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; 
and 
(3) 
it 
protects 
against 
multiple 
punishments for the same offense. 
People v Torres, 452 
Mich 43, 64; 549 NW2d 540 (1996), quoting United States v 
7 Additionally, 
our task is not to impose on the constitutional
text at issue . . . the meaning we as judges
would prefer, or even the meaning the people of
Michigan today would prefer, but to search for
contextual clues about what meaning the people
who ratified the text in 1963 gave to it. 
[Mich 
United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State 
(After Remand), 464 Mich 359, 375; 630 NW2d 297
(2001) 
(YOUNG, 
J., 
concurring) 
(emphasis 
in 
original).] 
8 “No person shall . . . be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
. . . .” 
9 “No person shall be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy.” 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Wilson, 420 US 332, 343; 95 S Ct 1013; 43 L Ed 2d 232 
(1975). 
The first two of these three protections concern 
the “successive prosecutions” strand of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, which is implicated in the case before us.10
 In 
particular, 
because 
our 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
is 
essentially identical to its federal counterpart, we must 
determine 
whether 
the 
term 
“same 
offense” 
in 
our 
Constitution was, in White, properly accorded a meaning 
that is different from the construction of that term in the 
federal Constitution. We conclude that, at the time of the 
ratification of our 1963 Constitution, the people of this 
state intended that the words “same offense” be construed 
consistent 
with 
state 
and 
federal 
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence as it then existed. 
Because this Court 
strayed 
from 
that 
intent 
when 
it 
adopted 
the 
same 
transaction test, we overrule White and its progeny and 
return 
to 
the 
same-elements 
test, 
which 
had 
been 
10 The purpose of the constitutional protection against
successive prosecutions is to prevent the state from making
repeated attempts at convicting an individual for an 
alleged crime, subjecting him to “‘embarrassment, expense
and ordeal’” and compelling him “‘to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity,’” and enhancing the 
“‘possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.’” 
Herron, supra at 601, quoting Green v United 
States, 355 US 184, 187-188; 78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199
(1957); see also Torres, supra at 64. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
consistently applied in this state until its abrogation by 
this Court in 1973.11 
B.  FEDERAL SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS PROTECTION
 AND THE SAME-ELEMENTS TEST 
Application of the same-elements test, commonly known 
as the “Blockburger test,”12 is the well-established method 
of defining the Fifth Amendment term “same offence.” 
The 
test, which has “deep historical roots,” United States v 
Dixon, 509 US 688, 704; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 
(1993), “focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. 
If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, 
the 
Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a 
substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the 
crimes.” 
Iannelli v United States, 420 US 770, 785 n 17; 
95 S Ct 1284; 43 L Ed 2d 616 (1975). 
The Blockburger analytical framework “reflected a 
venerable understanding” of the meaning of the term “same 
offence” as used in the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Grady v 
11 We wish to stress at the outset that we are not here 
concerned with the meaning of the term “offense” as it
applies to the double jeopardy protection against multiple
punishments. 
See People v Colvin, 467 Mich 942 (2003)
(CORRIGAN, C.J., 
concurring); 
Herron, 
supra; 
People
Robideau, 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). 
Our analysis
is limited to the successive prosecutions strand of Const
1963, art 1, § 15. 
12 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S
Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). 
12 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Corbin, 495 US 508, 535; 110 S Ct 2084; 109 L Ed 2d 548 
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The Clause was designed to 
embody the protection of the 
English common-law pleas of 
former jeopardy, “auterfoits acquit” (formerly acquitted) 
and 
“auterfoits 
convict” 
(formerly 
convicted), 
which 
applied only to prosecutions for the identical act and 
crime. 
See id. at 530; Wilson, supra at 339-340; 4 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th ed, 
1970), pp 335-336.13
 An examination of the historical 
record reveals that “[t]he English practice, as understood 
in 1791, did not recognize auterfoits acquit and auterfoits 
convict as good pleas against successive prosecutions for 
crimes whose elements were distinct, even though based on 
the same act.” Grady, supra at 535. 
American courts have long recognized and applied this 
common-law understanding of the meaning of the double 
jeopardy prohibition against multiple prosecutions and 
punishments 
for 
the 
“same 
offence.” 
See, 
e.g., 
Commonwealth v Roby, 29 Mass 496; 12 Pick 496 (1832) (“In 
considering the identity of the offence, it must appear by 
the plea, that the offence charged in both cases was the 
13 “That the framers and ratifiers of the Bill of 
Rights intended to constitutionalize the common law’s 
protection 
against 
double 
jeopardy 
is 
unquestioned.”
People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 724; 506 NW2d 482 (1993)
(RILEY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
same in law and in fact”). 
The Blockburger test itself 
derives directly from Morey v Commonwealth, 108 Mass 433, 
434 (1871), in which the court stated: 
A 
conviction 
or 
acquittal 
upon 
one 
indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction
and sentence upon another, unless the evidence
required to support a conviction upon one of them
would 
have 
been 
sufficient 
to 
warrant 
a 
conviction upon the other. 
The test is not 
whether the defendant has already been tried for
the same act, but whether he has been put in
jeopardy for the same offense. 
A single act may
be an offense against two statutes; and if each 
statute requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not, an acquittal or 
conviction under either statute does not exempt
the defendant from prosecution and punishment
under the other. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The 
Morey 
analysis 
was 
adopted 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
successive prosecutions in Gavieres v United States, 220 US 
338, 345; 31 S Ct 421; 55 L Ed 489 (1911). 
As later 
articulated in Blockburger, supra at 304: 
The applicable rule is that where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does
not. 
Although Justice William Brennan was a persistent 
advocate of the same transaction test,14 the idea that 
14 See, e.g., Werneth v Idaho, 449 US 1129, 1129-1130;
101 S Ct 951; 67 L Ed 2d 118 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 170; 97 S Ct 2221;
53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ashe v 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
crimes arising from the same criminal episode constitute 
the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes has been 
consistently rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 
Dixon, supra at 709 n 14; see also Carter v McClaughry, 183 
US 367, 394-395; 22 S Ct 181; 46 L Ed 236 (1901) (“[t]he 
fact that both charges related to and grew out of one 
transaction made no difference” in determining whether they 
were the “same offence” under the Fifth Amendment).15 
Swenson, 397 US 436, 448-460; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
As Justice Brennan 
explained: 
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
requires the prosecution, except in most limited
circumstances, to join at one trial all the 
charges against a defendant that grow out of a
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or 
transaction. 
This "same transaction" test of 
"same offence" not only enforces the ancient 
prohibition 
against 
vexatious 
multiple
prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but responds as well to the increasingly
widespread recognition that the consolidation in
one lawsuit of all issues arising out of a single
transaction or occurrence best promotes justice,
economy, and convenience. 
[Ashe, supra at 453­
454.] 
15 Rejection of the “same transaction” framework for
defining the “same offence” was consistent with the English
common law and with application of the common law by early
American courts. See, e.g., State v Standifer, 5 Port 523,
531 (Ala, 1837) (“It is not of unfrequent occurrence, that
the same individual, at the same time, and in the same
transaction, commits two or more distinct crimes, and an
acquittal of one, will not be a bar to punishment for the
other”). 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead, the Morey/Blockburger same-elements analysis 
was consistently applied by the Court, with two limited 
exceptions,16 until the Court in Grady, supra, adopted a 
“same-conduct” rule——a somewhat compromised version of 
Justice Brennan’s “same transaction” test——as an additional 
step to be performed in addressing successive prosecutions 
claims. In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, 
the Court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a 
subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential 
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the 
government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense 
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” 
Id. 
at 510.17 
16 
See 
Grady, 
supra 
at 
528-529 
(Scalia, 
J.,
dissenting). 
The exceptions apply (1) where a statutory
offense expressly incorporates another statutory offense
without specifying the latter’s elements, see Harris v 
Oklahoma, 433 US 682; 97 S Ct 2912; 53 L Ed 2d 1054 (1977),
and (2) where a second prosecution would require litigation
of factual issues that were necessarily resolved in the
defendant’s favor in the first prosecution (i.e., where the
prosecution 
would 
be 
barred 
on 
collateral 
estoppel
grounds), see Ashe, supra. 
17 The majority noted that Blockburger was a multiple
punishments case and that the test was formulated as a 
means 
of 
determining 
legislative 
intent, 
while 
the 
successive prosecutions strand of the double jeopardy
provision was intended to protect against the state making
repeated attempts to convict an individual. 
Grady, supra
at 517-518. To that end, the Court held that the test for
successive prosecutions should limit the prosecution’s
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
Justice Scalia dissented, noting that the majority’s 
holding was wholly without historical foundation and that 
it created a procedural mandatory joinder rule: 
[The Double Jeopardy Clause] guarantees only
the right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense, and has been interpreted since its
inception, as was its common-law antecedent, to
permit a prosecution based upon the same acts but
for a different crime. . . . In practice, [the
majority’s holding] will require prosecutors to
observe a rule we have explicitly rejected in
principle: that all charges arising out of a
single occurrence must be joined in a single
indictment. 
[Id. 
at 
526-527 
(emphasis
supplied).][18] 
Looking to the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause and 
its origins in the common law, Justice Scalia opined that 
the Blockburger rule best gave effect to the plain language 
of the Clause, “which protects individuals from being twice 
ability to use defendant’s conduct against him in more than
one prosecution. 
18 As noted by Justice Scalia, the policy interests
espoused 
by 
the 
majority 
might 
well 
be 
served 
by
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: 
The collateral-estoppel effect attributed to
the Double Jeopardy Clause [in Ashe, supra] may
bar a later prosecution for a separate offense
where 
the 
Government 
has 
lost 
an 
earlier 
prosecution involving the same facts. 
But this 
does not establish that the Government “must 
. . . bring its prosecutions . . . together.”  It 
is entirely free to bring them separately, and 
can win convictions in both. 
[Dixon, supra at 
705.] 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
put in jeopardy ‘for the same offense,’ not for the same 
conduct  
or actions.” Id. at 529 (emphasis supplied).19 
The Grady same-conduct test was short-lived. 
In 
Dixon, the Court overruled Grady as wrongly decided for the 
reasons expressed in Justice Scalia’s Grady dissent and 
returned to the Blockburger formulation of the test for 
both successive prosecutions and multiple punishments: 
Unlike 
[the] 
Blockburger 
analysis, 
whose 
definition of what prevents two crimes from being
the "same offence," US Const., Amdt. 5, has deep
historical roots and has been accepted in numerous
precedents 
of 
this 
Court, 
Grady 
lacks 
constitutional roots. 
The "same-conduct" rule it 
announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier 
Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common­
law understanding of double jeopardy. 
[Dixon, 
supra at 704.] 
C.  MEANING OF “SAME OFFENSE”IN MICHIGAN’S 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISION 
1. PRE-1963 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Initially, it must be noted that the Fifth Amendment 
was not enforceable against this state until 1969, when the 
United States Supreme Court declared that its protections 
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784; 89 S Ct 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 
19 Quoting early dictionaries, Justice Scalia further
noted that the term “offense” was commonly understood in
1791 to mean “transgression,” i.e., “the violation or 
breaking of a law.” Grady, supra at 529. Thus, the Clause
did not protect against successive prosecutions for the
same conduct, but for a violation of the same law. 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
(1969). 
Thus, the people of Michigan were free, at the 
times that our constitutions of 1835, 1850, 1908, and 1963 
were ratified, to implement a double jeopardy protection 
that was not coterminous with the federal Double Jeopardy 
Clause. 
Nevertheless, in 1835 this state adopted a double 
jeopardy provision that was virtually identical to the 
Fifth Amendment: “No person for the same offense, shall be 
twice put in jeopardy of punishment.” Const 1835, art 1, § 
12. 
Until White was decided in 1973, this Court defined 
the scope of our Constitution’s double jeopardy protection 
by reference to the scope of the protection provided by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
See, e.g., People v Bigge, 297 Mich 58, 
64; 297 NW 70 (1941) (“[t]his State is committed to the 
view upon the subject of former jeopardy adopted by the 
Federal courts under the Federal Constitution”); People v 
Schepps, 231 Mich 260, 265; 203 NW 882 (1925) (“this court 
is now committed to the views [regarding Michigan’s double 
jeopardy protection] adopted by the Federal courts under 
the United States Constitution”).20 
20 Significantly, this Court consistently construed our
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
in 
accordance 
with 
federal 
jurisprudence notwithstanding that our constitutions of 
1850, art 6, § 29, and 1908, art 2, § 14, appeared to
provide a narrower double jeopardy protection than the
Fifth Amendment in that the 1850 and 1908 provisions
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
In accordance with the principle that our double 
jeopardy provision was intended to embody English common­
law tenets of former jeopardy, this Court more than one 
hundred years ago rejected the “same transaction” approach 
and instead embraced the federal same-elements test as 
supplying the functional definition of “same offense” under 
our Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause. 
In People v 
Parrow, 80 Mich 567; 45 NW 514 (1890), this Court held that 
Const 1850, art 6, § 29 did not preclude the defendant’s 
prosecution for larceny of money stolen during an alleged 
burglary where the defendant had previously been acquitted 
offered protection against only retrial, and then only
“after 
acquittal 
upon 
the 
merits.” 
This 
Court,
acknowledging 
that 
our 
constitutional 
double 
jeopardy
protection was a creature of the common law, applied the
double jeopardy clauses of the constitutions of 1850 and
1908 in the same manner as the Fifth Amendment was 
traditionally understood to apply. 
See, e.g., In re 
Ascher, 130 Mich 540, 545; 90 NW 418 (1902) (“while [the 
language of Const 1850, art 6, § 29] differs from that used
in the United States Constitution, the law of jeopardy is
doubtless the same under both provisions.”); People v 
Gault, 104 Mich 575, 578; 62 NW 724 (1895) (noting that
acquittal or conviction bars a prosecution for the same
offense); People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 484-485; 19 NW 155
(1884) (rejecting the contention that Const 1850, art 6, §
29 protected against retrial only after acquittal “upon the
merits”). 
The narrower language used in our constitutions of
1850 and 1908, and this Court’s steadfast adherence to
common-law double jeopardy jurisprudence in the face of
that restrictive language, are relevant to the reason that
this language was changed in our 1963 Constitution. 
See 
the discussion at 30-32. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
of burglary. 
Citing Morey, supra, the Parrow Court held 
that, because the offense of burglary required proof of 
elements that the offense of larceny did not, neither the 
defendant’s acquittal of burglary nor the prosecution’s 
failure to charge the defendant with larceny in the first 
information barred the subsequent prosecution. 
Parrow, 
supra at 569-571. 
Similarly, in People v Ochotski, 115 Mich 601, 610; 73 
NW 889 (1898), this Court squarely rejected the notion that 
offenses arising from the “same transaction” constituted 
the same offense under Const 1850, art 6, § 29. 
In 
Ochotski, the defendant allegedly assaulted a husband and a 
wife. 
This Court held that the defendant’s acquittal in a 
prosecution for the assault upon the husband did not bar 
the subsequent prosecution for the assault upon the wife: 
There is a difference between one volition 
and one transaction. 
* * * 
In the present case it was not the same
blow, even, which caused the injury to the two,
but different blows. It was the same transaction,
but not the same volition. 
[Ochotski, supra at 
610.][21] 
21 See also People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 275-276;
183 NW 177 (1921) (quoting Morey, supra, and holding that
“[t]he transaction charged may be the same in each case,
but if the offenses are different there is no second 
jeopardy for the same offense”); People v Cook, 10 Mich
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Thus, at the time of the ratification of our 1963 
Constitution, it had long been established that (1) our 
double jeopardy provision in prior constitutions was 
construed coterminously with the common law and, more 
specifically, (2) the term “same offense” was defined by 
application of the federal same-elements test. 
It is against this historical backdrop of our double 
jeopardy jurisprudence that we must determine what the 
ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution intended when they 
adopted art 1, § 15. 
2. PEOPLE V WHITE AND PROGENY 
This Court’s commitment to the same-elements test 
continued after ratification of our current Constitution. 
In People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 607; 202 NW3d 278 
(1972), this Court followed the unbroken line of precedent 
rejecting the argument that serial prosecutions were not 
permissible under Michigan’s double jeopardy provision 
where the charges arose from the same transaction: 
Defendant . . . contends that we should 
prohibit multiple prosecutions arising out of the
same 
factual 
situation. 
Defendant 
properly
points 
out 
that 
in 
some 
cases 
multiple
prosecutions are prejudicial to a defendant. 
In 
some cases multiple prosecutions may aid a 
164, 167 (1862) (“[t]he question of a former acquittal as a
bar to a new indictment must always depend upon the 
substantial identity of the offenses charged”).
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defendant. 
Therefore, we believe a mandatory
rule would be an unwise solution to this problem.
Moreover, we believe that the type of rule 
proposed by the defendant, such as is found in
the Model Penal Code, is properly a decision for
the Legislature and not for this Court. 
However, in White the majority overruled Grimmett and 
adopted the same transaction test advocated unsuccessfully 
by Justice William Brennan——one even more expansive than 
the defunct compromise Grady test. 
The defendant in White followed the victim to her home 
in Inkster, forced her to get into his car, drove her to 
Detroit, and, while in Detroit, raped her. 
The defendant 
was first tried and convicted in Wayne Circuit Court on a 
kidnapping charge. 
Subsequently, the defendant was tried 
and convicted in Detroit Recorder’s Court on charges of 
rape and felonious assault. 
Citing Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v 
Swenson, 397 US 436, 448-460; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 
(1970), the White Court adopted the Brennan test and held 
that the rape and felonious assault convictions were 
violative of art 1, § 15. 
We noted that several other 
states had adopted the same transaction test, either under 
their 
own 
constitutions 
or 
under 
statutes 
requiring 
mandatory joinder, and that several commentators had echoed 
Justice Brennan’s concern that the same transaction test 
was necessary to effectuate the intent of the framers that
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the state not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict 
a 
defendant. 
Without 
reference 
to 
our 
Constitution, its text, or its ratification process, the 
White Court opined that the same transaction test fostered 
sound policy: 
The use of the same transaction test in 
Michigan will promote the best interests of 
justice and sound judicial administration. 
In a 
time of overcrowded criminal dockets, prosecutors
and judges should attempt to bring to trial a
defendant as expeditiously and economically as
possible. 
A far more basic reason for adopting
the 
same 
transaction 
test 
is 
to 
prevent
harassment of a defendant. 
The joining of all
charges arising out of the same criminal episode
at one trial “ * * * will enable a defendant to 
consider the matter closed and save the costs of 
redundant litigation.” 
It will also help “* * *
to equalize the adversary capabilities of grossly
unequal 
litigants” 
and 
prevent 
prosecutorial
sentence shopping. 
“In doing so, it recognizes
that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for 
the defendant’s protection.” 
[White, supra at 
258-259, quoting 41 Mich App 370, 378; 200 NW2d
326 (1972).] 
The White Court also noted that the equivalent of the 
same transaction test had long been the standard applied to 
civil actions by the court rule governing joinder and by 
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. 
Finally, 
the 
Court 
concluded 
that 
the 
three 
crimes 
committed by the defendant were all part of a single 
criminal transaction because they “were committed in a 
continuous time sequence and display[ed] a single intent 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
and goal——sexual intercourse with the complainant.” Id. at 
259. 
Justice Thomas E. Brennan vigorously dissented in 
White and criticized the adoption of the same transaction 
test as contrary to the plain meaning of the term “offense” 
as used in our Constitution. Justice Brennan further noted 
that, far from being constitutionally mandated, the same 
transaction test constituted nothing more than a mandatory 
joinder rule. Id. at 263-265. 
In Crampton v 54-A Dist Judge, 397 Mich 489, 501-502; 
245 NW2d 28 (1976), this Court, recognizing the difficulty 
of applying the same transaction test, introduced a 
different inflection on the White “single intent and goal” 
factor where some of the offenses at issue did not involve 
criminal intent: 
Where criminal intent is required in the
offenses involved, the criterion set forth in
White applies: “continuous time sequence and 
display [of] a single intent and goal.” 
[390
Mich 259.] 
[However], [w]here one or more of the 
offenses does not involve criminal intent, the
criterion is whether the offenses are part of the
same criminal episode, and whether the offenses
involve laws intended to prevent the same or
similar 
harm 
or 
evil, 
not 
a 
substantially
different, or a very different kind of, harm or
evil. 
Thus, a defendant who was convicted of both driving under 
the 
influence 
of 
liquor 
(DUIL), 
MCL 
257.625, 
and,
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
subsequently, failure to display a valid registration on 
demand, 
MCL 
257.223——both 
“non-intent” 
offenses——was 
properly tried for both offenses because the applicable 
statutes were intended to prevent different harms or evils. 
Id. at 503-504.22 
In recent years, this Court has looked generally to 
federal 
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence 
in 
determining 
whether the successive prosecutions strand of our Double 
Jeopardy Clause bars a prosecution. 
See, e.g., Herron, 
supra; People v Wilson, 454 Mich 421, 428; 563 NW2d 44 
(1997) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J., noting without elaboration 
that "[t]he same offense includes prosecution for a greater 
crime after conviction of [a] lesser included offense”). 
As Justice Boyle noted in her partially concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Wilson, the approach taken by the 
22 To further complicate matters, the Court of Appeals
has since put a different, and wholly unfounded, spin on
the White/Crampton test such that the cases now recite that 
the Crampton “legislative intent” test applies where one of
the offenses involved is not a “specific intent crime.”
See Flowers, supra; Hunt, supra. 
This is certainly not an
accurate reflection of Crampton (which stated that the rule
it announced pertained to non-intent crimes), nor is it
responsive to the problem that Crampton intended to resolve 
(the application of the “single intent and goal” element of
the White same transaction test to a defendant who did not 
necessarily harbor any intent at all). 
The tripartite
split among the Court of Appeals judges in the case before
us 
exemplifies 
the 
difficulty 
that 
inheres 
in 
the 
application of the same transaction test, particularly as
that test has been muddled by Crampton and the Court of 
Appeals’ “specific intent” jurisprudence.
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
majority in that case avoided the necessity of deciding 
whether, as the defendant argued, the test for successive 
double jeopardy claims differed under the federal and state 
constitutions, or whether the Blockburger test should apply 
to a claimed violation of art 1, § 15. 
Id. at 444. 
Because this issue is ripe for consideration in this case, 
and because we conclude that White was wrongly decided, we 
return to this Court’s longstanding practice——commensurate 
with federal double jeopardy law——of reviewing successive 
prosecutions claims under the Blockburger same-elements 
test. 
3. RATIFICATION OF CONST 1963, ART 1, § 15 
In our 1963 Constitution the narrower language of the 
1850 and 1908 double jeopardy provisions was replaced with 
language similar to that of the original Constitution of 
1835 and the Fifth Amendment: “No person shall be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” Art 1, 
§ 15. 
It is immediately striking that the plain language of 
the provision provides no support for the conclusion that 
the term “same offense” should be interpreted by reference 
to whether a crime arises out of the “same transaction” as 
another. 
Rather, we believe that the plain and obvious 
meaning 
of 
the 
term 
“offense” 
is 
“crime” 
or 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
                                                 
 
 
 
“transgression.”23
 As noted by Justice Scalia in Grady, 
supra 
at 
529, 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
“protects 
individuals from being twice put in jeopardy ‘for the same 
offence,’ not for the same conduct or actions” (emphasis 
supplied).24 
The ultimate inquiry, of course, is the meaning 
ascribed to the phrase “same offense” by the ratifiers of 
our 1963 Constitution. 
Examination of the record of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1961 provides the historical 
context and persuasive support for our decision to return 
to the original meaning given to the Fifth Amendment-based 
double jeopardy language in art 1, § 15. 
Constitutional Convention Committee Proposal Number 15 
recommended that Const 1908, art 2, § 14 be revised to 
mirror the language of the Fifth Amendment, with the 
deletion of the “archaic” words “of life and limb.” 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 464­
465, 540. 
Delegate Stevens explained that “[t]he Supreme 
Court of Michigan . . . has virtually held that [Const 
23 See, for example, the American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language, New College Ed, which defines
“offense,” in relevant part, as “[a]ny violation or 
infraction of a moral or social code; a transgression or
sin[;] . . . [a] transgression of law; a crime.” 
24 “Obviously, the word transaction is broader than the 
word 
offense.” 
White, 
supra 
at 
263 
(BRENNAN, 
J.,
dissenting). 
28 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1908, art 2, § 14] means the same thing as the provision in 
the federal constitution, and that is what we have put in . 
. . .” 
Id. at 539. 
It was reported that the change was 
not substantive and that the judiciary committee wished 
simply to bring the text of the double jeopardy provision 
“in line with the law as it now stands in the state of 
Michigan” and “in line with the federal constitution.” Id. 
at 542, 543. 
It was further noted that although the 
Convention of 1908 may have intended to restrict the double 
jeopardy protection to retrial following acquittal on the 
merits, “the court did not in fact go along with this 
[intention], and it never has.” 
Therefore, Delegate 
Stevens explained, the committee “want[ed] to make the 
constitution read the way the supreme court says it does 
read.” 
Id. at 542, 544.25
 Thus, it is clear that the 
25 As noted by Delegate Stevens, it was “difficult to 
understand why the supreme court has ruled that it means
what we are putting in here now.” 
Id. at 543. 
We agree
with 
Delegate 
Stevens 
that 
this 
Court’s 
pre-1963
constructions 
of 
our 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
seemed 
obviously at variance with the terms of the Clause. 
See n 
20. 
Our holding today is meant to bring our jurisprudence
into conformity with the intent expressed by the people in
ratifying art 1, § 15——an intent that was wholly overlooked
or ignored by this Court in White. 
We are nevertheless 
compelled to look to the state of the law as it existed in
1963——however erroneous it may have been at the time our
Constitution was ratified——to determine what, precisely,
the 
people 
intended 
in 
adopting 
art 
1, 
§ 
15. 
Notwithstanding this Court’s apparent disregard for the
narrow language of the constitutions of 1850 and 1908, the
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
drafters understood that they were making no change to the 
state of the law and that they wished merely to amend the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to conform to the prior decisions of 
this Court. 
Of even greater significance to our analysis is the 
Address to the People, 2 Official Record, Constitutional 
Convention 1961, p 3355, accompanying Const 1963, art 1, § 
15:26 
This is a revision of Sec. 14, Article II,
of the present constitution. The new language of
the first sentence involves the substitution of 
the double jeopardy provision from the U.S. 
Constitution in place of the present provision
which merely prohibits “acquittal on the merits.”
This is more consistent with the actual practice
of the courts in Michigan. [2 Official Record, p
3364.] 
Thus, the ratifiers were advised that (1) the double 
jeopardy protection conferred by our 1963 Constitution 
would parallel that of the federal Constitution, and (2) 
that the proposal was meant to bring our double jeopardy 
people in 1963 were free to codify that erroneous case law.
The Constitutional Convention discussions make unmistakable 
the conclusion that our current Double Jeopardy Clause was
designed to conform to then-extant judicial decisions. 
26 The Address to the People, widely distributed to the
public prior to the ratification vote in order to explain
the import of the sundry proposals, “is a valuable tool in
determining 
whether 
a 
possible 
‘common 
understanding’
diverges from the plain meaning of the actual words of our
constitution.” 
Mich United Conservation Clubs, supra at 
378, 379 n 11 (YOUNG, J., concurring).     
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
provision into conformity with what this Court had already 
determined it to mean. 
4. WHITE CONFLICTS WITH ART 1, § 15, AND THUS CANNOT STAND 
In 1973, this Court disregarded decades of precedent 
and, without consideration of the will of the people of 
this state in ratifying the Double Jeopardy Clause in our 
1963 Constitution, adopted Justice William Brennan’s long­
rejected “same transaction” test. 
In adopting this 
definition and equating the word “transaction” with the 
constitutional term “offense,” the White Court accorded to 
that term a meaning quite at odds with its plain meaning or 
the common understanding. 
In the absence of any evidence 
that the term “offense” was understood by the people to 
comprise all criminal acts arising out of a single criminal 
episode, we are compelled to overrule White.27 
We conclude that in adopting art 1, § 15, the people 
of this state intended that our double jeopardy provision 
would be construed consistently with Michigan precedent and 
the Fifth Amendment. 
It has long been understood that our 
Double Jeopardy Clause derives from the common law and that 
its meaning must be discerned by reference thereto. At the 
27 The dissent notes that the same-elements test 
“permits multiple prosecutions stemming from a single
incident.” 
Post at 5 (emphasis supplied). 
The dissent 
conflates, as did the White Court, the terms “offense” and
“incident,” which certainly do not have identical meanings.
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
time of the ratification of art 1, § 15, in 1963, it was 
established that the term “same offense” was defined by 
reference to the same-elements test as set forth by the 
Massachusetts 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Morey, 
supra 
(and 
subsequently adopted by the United States Supreme Court). 
See People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 275-276; 183 NW 177 
(1921); Parrow, supra. 
Moreover, the people were advised 
in the Address to the People that the proposed double 
jeopardy 
provision 
was 
conterminous 
with 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment. 
In 
1963——and 
thereafter, 
notwithstanding 
Grady’s short-lived detour——the Blockburger same-elements 
test provided the definition for the term “same offence” in 
the Fifth Amendment. We agree with Justice Scalia that the 
same-elements test best gives effect to the plain meaning 
of that term. 
We further conclude that the same-elements 
test best gives effect to the intent of the ratifiers of 
the 1963 Constitution.28 
28 As noted by Justice Scalia in Grady and by our own
Justice Brennan in White, principles of collateral estoppel
and properly adopted procedural joinder rules might well 
compel the dismissal of charges in certain circumstances.
See, e.g., MCR 6.120. 
Nevertheless, collateral estoppel
and joinder are discrete, nonconstitutional concepts that
should not be conflated with the constitutional double 
jeopardy protection. 
This Court has appointed a committee to review the
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to determine whether any of
these rules should be revised. 
In light of our decision
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
D. APPLICATION 
Defendant’s Oakland County prosecution for possession 
of stolen firearms, following her conviction for second­
degree 
home 
invasion 
in 
Lapeer 
County, 
withstands 
constitutional 
scrutiny 
under 
the 
same-elements 
test. 
Defendant was convicted of home invasion pursuant to MCL 
750.110a(3), which provided:29 
A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with
intent to commit a felony or a larceny in the
dwelling or a person who enters a dwelling without
permission with intent to commit a felony or a
larceny in the dwelling is guilty of home invasion
in the second degree. 
Required for a conviction of this offense was proof that 
defendant (1) entered a dwelling, either by a breaking or 
without permission, (2) with the intent to commit a felony 
or a larceny in the dwelling. 
here today that the constitution does not require the
prosecutor to join at one trial all the charges against a
defendant arising out of the same transaction, we will be
requesting the Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to consider whether our permissive joinder rule, MCR 
6.120(A), should be amended to impose mandatory joinder of
all the charges against a defendant arising out of the same
transaction 
and 
to 
provide 
this 
Court 
with 
its 
recommendation within sixty days. In considering whether a
mandatory joinder rule should be adopted, the Committee
should 
consider 
statutory 
provisions 
concerning
prosecutorial jurisdiction, including MCL 767.45(1)(c), MCL
767.63, MCL 762.3, MCL 762.8, and MCL 762.10. 
29 MCL 750.110a was subsequently amended by enactment
of 1999 PA 44, effective October 1, 1999.
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant now stands charged with receiving and 
concealing 
a 
stolen 
firearm 
in 
violation 
of 
MCL 
750.535b(2), which provides: 
A person who receives, conceals, stores,
barters, sells, disposes of, pledges, or accepts as
security for a loan a stolen firearm or stolen
ammunition, knowing that the firearm or ammunition
was stolen, is guilty of a felony, punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 10 years or by a
fine of not more than $ 5,000.00, or both. 
Thus, the Oakland County Prosecutor is required to prove 
that defendant (1) received, concealed, stored, bartered, 
sold, disposed of, pledged, or accepted as security for a 
loan (2) a stolen firearm or stolen ammunition (3) knowing 
that the firearm or ammunition was stolen. 
Clearly, there is no identity of elements between 
these two offenses. 
Each offense requires proof of 
elements that the other does not. Because the two offenses 
are nowise the same offense under either the Fifth 
Amendment or art 1, § 15, we affirm the result reached by 
the Court of Appeals majority and hold that defendant is 
not entitled to the dismissal of the Oakland County charge. 
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT 
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s assertion 
that our decision to overrule White is “grounded in the 
improper belief that the same-elements test is the sole 
test used by the United States Supreme Court to protect 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
citizens’ constitutional rights under the United States 
Constitution.” 
Post at 2. 
First and foremost, the 
critical 
inquiry 
in 
determining 
the 
meaning 
of 
our 
constitutional analogue of the federal Double Jeopardy 
Clause is the intent of the ratifiers in adopting our 1963 
Constitution. 
Thus, the meaning ascribed to a federal 
constitutional provision by the United States Supreme Court 
is not dispositive, except to the extent that it appears—— 
as we have explained that it does in the case of Const 
1963, art 1, § 15——that the ratifiers of our Constitution 
intended that a provision be construed consistently with 
the corresponding federal provision. 
Moreover, the proposition advanced by the dissent—— 
that the term “same offence” is accorded different meanings 
in different contexts——has been squarely rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in Dixon. We need not refurrow 
the ground that was so thoroughly plowed by the Dixon 
Court. 
However, we refer the reader to Dixon, supra at 
704-709, where the Court emphatically held that “there is 
no authority, except Grady, for the proposition that [the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause] 
has 
different 
meanings 
[in 
different contexts],” id. at 704, and supported that 
conclusion with an exhaustive review of federal case law. 
Indeed, many of the very cases that our dissenting 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
colleague cites in support of his assertion that the term 
“same offence” in the federal Double Jeopardy Clause is 
susceptible of different meanings, see post at 3-4, were 
addressed point by point by the Court and were soundly 
rejected as bases for so concluding. 
See Dixon, supra at 
705-709.30 
The dissent further asserts that we have given short 
shrift to the purpose of the double jeopardy provision’s 
successive prosecutions strand, which is to prevent the 
state from making repeated attempts to obtain a conviction 
for an alleged offense. 
However, the instant case in fact 
illustrates that this venerable purpose is in no way served 
by the ill-conceived rule set forth in White. 
Defendant 
was not subjected to repeated attempts to convict her of 
“an alleged offense.” 
Rather, she was subjected to 
30 Two of the cases cited by the dissent, Ball v United 
States, 470 US 856; 105 S Ct 1668; 84 L Ed 2d 740 (1985),
and Albernaz et al v United States, 450 US 333; 101 S Ct
1137; 67 L Ed 2d 275 (1981), although not addressed by the
Dixon majority, are equally inapposite. 
Indeed, in both 
cases, the Court reiterated that Blockburger had long
provided the controlling framework for resolving multiple
punishments claims, and in both cases the Court applied the
Blockburger test. 
See Ball, supra at 861; Albernaz, supra
at 337. In any event, we are simply not addressing in this
case the multiple punishments strand of the double jeopardy
protection. 
See n 11 supra. 
Moreover, it should be noted
that the Albernaz Court specifically stated that “[i]t is
well settled that a single transaction can give rise to
distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 344 n 3. 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
prosecution for two independent offenses in two separate 
jurisdictions. 
Application of the White rule, rather than 
ensuring that the state would not get more than “one bite 
at the apple,” would preclude the state from ever trying 
defendant for one of the charges against her. 
This is not 
at all consistent with the purpose of the double jeopardy 
protection.31 
V. CONCLUSION 
The White Court improperly imposed on the text of art 
1, § 15 its own notions of prosecutorial policy and, in so 
doing, 
conflated 
the 
constitutional 
double 
jeopardy 
protection with a self-created procedural mandatory joinder 
rule. 
Because it is clear that the ratifiers of our 1963 
Constitution intended to continue to accord the same double 
jeopardy protection under art 1, § 15 that was provided by 
the Fifth Amendment, we overrule White and its progeny as 
31 The dissent asserts that our holdings in Parrow, 
supra, and Ochotski, supra, illustrate the evil that will
spring from abrogation of the White rule. See post at 6-7. 
Although reasonable minds might differ with respect to
whether a prosecutor is morally obligated to join in a
single prosecution all offenses arising from a criminal
episode (for example, burglary and larceny [Parrow], or the
murders of two different individuals [Ochotski]), this is a
matter of policy and is simply not of constitutional 
concern. 
As we have noted, the White Court imported into
Michigan’s double jeopardy provision a mandatory joinder
rule that finds no place in either the text of the 
provision or in its jurisprudential history.
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contrary to the will of the people of the state of 
Michigan. We hold that the Blockburger same-elements test, 
as the reigning test in both this Court and the federal 
courts in 1963, best gives effect to the will of the people 
in ratifying art 1, § 15. 
Because the prosecution was not 
required to bring against defendant in a single trial all 
charges arising from the same transaction, and because 
second-degree home invasion and receiving and concealing 
stolen firearms are not the same offense under either art 
1, § 15 or the Fifth Amendment, we vacate the judgments of 
the lower courts, affirm the result reached by the Court of 
Appeals on other grounds, and remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 120489 
MELISSA ANN NUTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today’s majority overrules People v White, 390 Mich 
245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), which held that the “same 
transaction” test should be used to determine if serial 
prosecutions violate our Constitution’s double jeopardy 
provision.1  The majority now holds that courts must use the 
“same elements” test to determine when our Constitution’s 
prohibition against double jeopardy is violated. As was so 
eloquently stated in White, supra at 258, “It is our duty 
to assure to all who come before us the rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution of the United States and the 
1 “No person shall be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy.” Const 1963, art 1, § 15. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Constitution of the State of Michigan.” 
Because I believe 
today’s majority fails to honor that duty in its decision 
to overrule White, I must respectfully dissent. 
This Court’s decision to overrule White is grounded in 
the improper belief that the same elements test is the sole 
test used by the United States Supreme Court to protect 
citizens’ constitutional rights under the United States 
Constitution.2
 However, the same elements test, also 
referred to as the Blockburger test,3 is not as entrenched 
in federal jurisprudence as the majority claims. 
“The 
Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining 
whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the 
same offense.” Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 166 n 6; 97 S Ct 
2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977). “It has long been understood 
that separate statutory crimes need not be identical—either 
in constituent elements or in actual proof—in order to be 
the 
same 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition.” Id. at 164. 
2 Federal jurisprudence is relevant to our analysis
because of the majority’s argument that the ratifers of our
Constitution wanted Michigan’s double jeopardy protection
to 
be 
parallel 
with 
that 
conferred 
by 
the 
federal 
constitution. 
3 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180;
76 L Ed 306 (1932). 
2  
 
 
 
In numerous cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
used other tests because it recognized that the same 
elements test is not an adequate safeguard to protect a 
citizen’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. In 
Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 443-444, 447; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 
L Ed 2d 469 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held 
that the double jeopardy clause includes a collateral 
estoppel guarantee. 
In Ball v United States, 470 US 856, 
857, 865, 866 (appendix); 105 S Ct 1668; 84 L Ed 2d 740 
(1985), the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
Blockburger test, see n 3, yet determined a defendant could 
not be convicted of two offenses that stemmed from the same 
conduct, even though the offenses had different elements, 
because it was contrary to congressional intent. As stated 
in Albernaz v United States, 450 US 333, 340; 101 S Ct 
1137; 67 L Ed 2d 275 (1981), “The Blockburger test is a 
‘rule of statutory construction,’ and because it serves as 
a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should 
not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent.” 
 
Further, in In re Nielsen, 131 US 176, 187; 9 S Ct 
672; 33 L Ed 118 (1889), a conviction for unlawful 
cohabitation precluded a subsequent charge of adultery 
because the incident occurred during the same two and a 
3  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
half year period as that for unlawful cohabitation. 
In 
Harris v Oklahoma, 433 US 682, 682-683; 97 S Ct 2912; 53 L 
Ed 2d 1054 (1977), the defendant was convicted of felony 
murder after a store clerk was killed during a robbery. 
After the defendant’s conviction for felony murder, the 
defendant was tried and convicted of robbery with firearms. 
The United States Supreme Court held that when “conviction 
of a greater crime . . . cannot be had without conviction 
of the lesser crime, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the 
greater one.” 
Id. at 682. 
And in Brown, supra at 166, 
double jeopardy barred a subsequent prosecution for a 
greater offense even though the greater offense required 
proof of an additional element.4 
The majority relegates the purpose of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to a footnote, ante, p 11 n 10; however, it 
4 The majority states that many of these “very cases”
were addressed “point by point” in United States v Dixon,
509 US 688; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993). 
That 
is correct; however, cases addressed in Dixon were also 
addressed, and I believe more convincingly, in the Dixon 
dissent. 
Further, the majority notes that certain cases I
cited addressed multiple punishment claims, and “we are
simply not addressing in this case the multiple punishments
strand of the double jeopardy protection.” 
Ante, p 36 n
30. 
While this case does not deal with a multiple
punishment 
claim, 
Blockburger 
itself 
was 
a 
multiple
punishment case and Dixon, supra at 704, stated that the
term “same offense” means the same whether dealing with
successive prosecution or multiple punishment claims. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
is 
worth 
stating 
clearly 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is “to 
limit the state to having generally only one attempt at 
obtaining a conviction. 
Otherwise, the state could 
repeatedly 
prosecute 
persons 
for 
the 
same 
crime, 
transforming the trial process itself into a punishment and 
effectively punishing the accused without his having been 
adjudged guilty of an offense meriting punishment.” People 
v Dawson, 431 Mich 234, 250-251; 427 NW2d 886 (1988). 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court stated that 
the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty. [Green v 
United States, 355 US 184, 187-188; 78 S Ct 221;
2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957).] 
Our Double Jeopardy Clause is meant to protect our 
citizens from government zeal and overreaching; yet, the 
same elements test permits multiple prosecutions stemming 
from a single incident. 
“The same-elements test is an 
inadequate safeguard, for it leaves the constitutional 
guarantee at the mercy of a legislature’s decision to 
modify statutory definitions.” 
United States v Dixon, 509 
US 688, 735; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993) (White, 
J., dissenting). 
Notably, a technical comparison of the 
5  
 
 
 
 
  
elements is neither constitutionally sound nor easy to 
apply. 
While the same elements test appears at first 
glance to be easy to apply, this Court’s recent struggle 
with whether materiality is an element of perjury in People 
v Lively, 468 Mich 942; 664 NW2d 223 (2003) (order granting 
leave), provides proof to the contrary. 
“As with many 
aspects of statutory construction, determination of what 
elements constitute a crime often is subject to dispute.” 
United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 525; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 
L Ed 2d 444 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
If our 
courts struggle with the basics of determining what 
elements constitute a crime, it is inevitable that these 
struggles will continue when courts attempt to determine 
whether two crimes contain the same elements. 
In contrast to the same elements test, the same 
transaction test requires the government to join at one 
trial all the charges against a defendant arising out of a 
continuous time sequence, when the offenses shared a single 
intent and goal. 
White, supra at 254. 
Although a single 
transaction can give rise to distinct offenses, the charges 
must be joined at one trial. However, the same transaction 
test also offers flexibility for certain circumstances, 
such as when facts necessary to sustain a charge have not 
yet occurred or have not been discovered despite due 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
diligence. 
People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 702; 506 NW2d 
482 (1993). 
The same transaction test best protects Michigan 
citizens against government harassment and overreaching, 
while the same elements test increases the potential for 
government abuse. 
To this end, the majority has helpfully 
provided cases that illustrate that the government will 
expend resources and repeatedly prosecute citizens for 
crimes that stem from one incident and that could have been 
consolidated at one trial. 
In People v Parrow, 80 Mich 
567, 568; 45 NW 514 (1890), the defendant was acquitted of 
burglary with intent to commit the crime of larceny and 
then the government chose to charge the defendant with 
larceny for stealing the same money as in the alleged 
burglary. And in People v Ochotski, 115 Mich 601, 602-603; 
73 NW 889 (1898), the defendant was charged and convicted 
of assaulting a woman after he was acquitted of assaulting 
her husband during the same incident. 
In this case, defendant pleaded guilty of second­
degree 
home 
invasion, 
MCL 
750.110a(3). 
She 
was 
subsequently charged with receiving and concealing stolen 
firearms, MCL 750.535b. 
Notably, defendant was the driver 
in the home invasion during which the guns were stolen. 
She also admitted that the guns concealed were the ones 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
stolen during the home invasion. 
Defendant’s actions 
represent a single intent and goal, as well as the events 
being 
part 
of 
a 
continuous 
time 
sequence. 
Almost 
universally, inherent in stealing an item is receiving it 
and concealing it, if only for a brief time. 
Defendant’s 
intent when she participated in the home invasion was to 
successfully steal the guns. 
Defendant’s intent when she 
participated 
in 
the 
concealing 
of 
the 
guns 
was 
to 
successfully steal the guns. 
The subsequent prosecution 
for receiving and concealing stolen firearms violated 
defendant’s double jeopardy rights. 
Government maneuvering and manipulation should not be 
used to evade the protections granted our citizens by the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause. 
Protecting 
our 
citizens’ 
constitutional rights is a constitutional obligation, not 
merely a moral one. 
The same transaction test best meets 
our Constitution’s mandate against twice putting a person 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Without double jeopardy 
protections, our citizens are at risk of facing multiple 
prosecutions by the government, regardless of a prior 
acquittal. 
“Further, because the state can devote its 
resources to improving the presentation of its case, the 
probability 
of 
a 
conviction 
may 
increase 
with 
each 
retrial.” Dawson, supra at 251. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
After pleading 
guilty 
of 
second-degree 
home 
invasion, 
defendant’s 
subsequent prosecution for receiving and concealing stolen 
firearms violated her double jeopardy rights. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
9