Title: Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co.1997 WY 64939 P.2d 233Case Number: 96-30Decided: 05/19/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, 
Deceased,

By 
and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, 

Appellant(Plaintiff), 

v. 

CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; 

and 
Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, 

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, 

The Honorable Dan Spangler, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Dallas J. Laird, 
Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper.

Representing 
Appellee:

Richard R. Wilking, 
Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, 
for Appellee Casper Concrete Company.

Rebecca A. Lewis of 
Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, 
Inc.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

TAYLOR, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      In 1989, the 
State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and 
install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a 
young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. 
Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver 
eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees 
on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa 
loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes 
this appeal. We affirm.

I. ISSUES

[¶2]      The decedent's 
mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate 
(appellant), states the following issues:

I. Whether the 
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees in 
reliance on Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 
1993)?

II. Is there a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the remaining elements of the 
negligence claim and the strict liability and res ipsa loquitur 
claims?

[¶3]      Appellee, Skorcz 
Electric, Inc. (Skorcz), takes a more elementary approach to its statement of 
the issue:

1. Did the district court err in granting 
summary judgment to Skorcz Electric, Inc.?

[¶4]      Appellee, Casper 
Concrete Company (Casper Concrete), follows Skorcz's lead in stating the 
issue:

1. Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment to Casper Concrete 
Company?

II. FACTS

[¶5]      Casper Concrete, 
the general contractor with the State of Wyoming for a number of road projects 
in the Casper, Wyoming area, subcontracted with Skorcz to perform electrical 
work, including installing the poles and connecting traffic light control 
systems to the signals at the intersection of Outer Drive and Casper Mountain 
Road. Skorcz subjected the seven-wire cables activating the signal devices to 
standard industry tests designed to detect damaged or defective wiring. Skorcz's 
work started in April of 1989 and was completed in October of that year, at 
which time Skorcz, along with representatives of the State and the equipment 
manufacturer, again checked the system for problems before activating it. 
Fourteen days after the system was put into operation, further inspection, 
maintenance, and repair became the exclusive responsibility of the State, and 
Skorcz's contractual responsibilities had been fully 
discharged.

[¶6]      A maintenance log 
at the intersection reveals that the State performed at least six thorough 
inspections, in addition to other maintenance work on the system prior to June 
of 1993. Nonetheless, late in the evening of June 2, 1993, the signals began 
flashing yellow for Outer Drive but flashing red and yellow at the same time for 
traffic southbound on Casper Mountain Road. An employee of the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) was dispatched to the scene in the early hours of June 3, 
1993. After shutting off the malfunctioning signal but leaving signals operating 
in all four directions, that employee asked for and received permission to wait 
until daylight to further troubleshoot the problem due to a persistent rain 
which was rendering further repair efforts dangerous.

[¶7]      The DOT worker 
returned shortly after daylight on June 3, 1993, prepared to put up stop signs 
for the traffic on Casper Mountain Road. However, the "flash mode" of the 
signals had reverted to normal operation and the system monitor showed no 
problems. In view of those developments, the worker decided not to put up the 
stop signs. Nevertheless, he was intent upon "troubleshooting" the system until 
rain again rendered such an exercise hazardous and he received permission to 
postpone further work.

[¶8]      Shortly before 
1:30 a.m. the following morning, appellant's decedent was approaching the 
intersection, southbound on Casper Mountain Road at forty miles per hour. 
Another driver, this one intoxicated, approached the same intersection on Outer 
Drive, traveling eastbound at forty miles per hour. Accounts vary as to whether 
the signals at the intersection were flashing yellow in all directions, or 
yellow for east-west traffic, red for northbound traffic but yellow and red, 
simultaneously, for southbound traffic. There is, however, no dispute that both 
vehicles reached the intersection virtually simultaneously. The resultant 
collision was fatal to appellant's decedent, just days short of his seventeenth 
birthday. 

[¶9]      In dawn's early 
light, the DOT employee who had twice before visited the site in the days 
preceding the fatal accident once again examined the signal system, this time 
accompanied by his supervisor. The two located a seven-wire cable leading to the 
faulty signals which had a flattened or "egg shaped" spot, covered with 
electrical tape, which was warm to the touch. Further examination showed bare 
and corroded wiring which probably allowed electricity to arc or jump from one 
wire to the next, illuminating the signals improperly. Following a splicing of 
the wires on either side of the egg-shaped defect in the seven-wire cable, the 
signals again worked properly.

[¶10]   In addition to naming Skorcz and 
Casper Concrete as defendants, the original complaint filed by the decedent's 
estate identified the drunken driver of the other vehicle and the State, 
alleging that the negligence of each defendant contributed to the death of 
appellant's decedent. The district court found the State to be immune from suit 
and dismissed it as a defendant. Appellant was permitted to amend the complaint, 
alleging negligence against the three remaining defendants but adding additional 
counts predicated upon theories of strict liability and res ipsa loquitur 
against Skorcz and Casper Concrete.

[¶11]   Summary judgment on all counts was 
granted to Skorcz and Casper Concrete on the same day that the drunken driver of 
the other vehicle was dismissed from the case on stipulation with appellant. 
This appeal timely followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12]   Summary judgment is considered a 
drastic remedy because it operates to deprive a litigant of the right to trial. 
As such, it should only be granted with caution and restraint. Kobielusz v. 
Wilson, 701 P.2d 559, 560 (Wyo. 1985). This is particularly true in 
negligence actions. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1280 
(Wyo. 1985).

[¶13]   Appellate scrutiny of summary 
judgments necessitates a de novo review of the entire record, affording 
the opposing party the benefit of all favorable inferences fairly to be drawn 
from that record. Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
907 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1995). Thereafter, summary judgment shall not be 
affirmed unless no material fact remains in dispute and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); Lincoln v. Wackenhut 
Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 702 (Wyo. 1994). Materiality is a function of a fact's 
capacity to establish or refute any essential element of a claim or defense 
thereto. Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶14]   When the party moving for summary 
judgment has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to 
the opposing party who then is obliged to marshal admissible evidence, as 
opposed to general or conclusory allegations, establishing continuing viability 
of an issue of material fact. Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 534 
(Wyo. 1995). Such evidence must be competent and admissible, lest the rule 
permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to 
trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful speculation. Verschoor, 
907 P.2d  at 1297.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. NEGLIGENCE 
CLAIMS

[¶15]   Summary judgment for the appellees 
was predicated on the district court's inability to discern any meaningful way 
to distinguish this case from that of Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1993). We, too, are perplexed by appellant's continued 
insistence that "Lynch is clearly distinguishable from the case at 
bar[,]" and agree with the district court that the holding in Lynch is 
clearly dispositive, at least with respect to the allegations of 
negligence.

[¶16]   In Lynch, the plaintiff's 
employer hired a contractor to build a sidewalk. As a consequence of that 
contractor's alleged negligence, water would collect in certain locations on the 
sidewalk and turn to ice. Aware of the problem, the plaintiff's employer took no 
corrective action nor was the contractor notified. Id. at 1096-97. When 
the plaintiff sustained debilitating injuries as a result of a fall on the icy 
sidewalk, this court upheld summary judgment in favor of the contractor. 
Expressly declining to shield the contractor based upon the accepted work 
doctrine, we held:

[A] contractor owes 
a duty to complete his work with skill and care and in a workmanlike manner, and 
that duty extends to third persons both before and after the owner has accepted 
the contractor's work.

Id. at 1100. Nonetheless, the contractor was exonerated 
because it could not reasonably foresee that the owner, when confronted with a 
dangerous defect in the contractor's work, would neither inform the contractor 
nor initiate independent corrective action to alleviate the danger. 
Id.

[¶17]   In the instant case, the State was 
not only notified of the dangerous signal defect two days before the fatality, 
but had a worker on the scene fully prepared to turn off the signals and put up 
stop signs on Casper Mountain Road in order to alleviate the dangerous 
condition. Furthermore, the State did not notify and never has notified Casper 
Concrete or Skorcz of the signal failure. Assuming, arguendo, that 
admissible evidence had been produced indicating that the negligence of the 
appellees engendered the signal malfunction, the State's failure to repair the 
dangerous condition or request the same of the appellees constituted an 
effective intervening cause. See Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County 
School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 802 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶18]   Normally a question for the finder 
of fact, proximate cause will cease to be an issue when reasonable minds could 
not differ about the existence of an intervening cause which was not reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant. Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 1099. The existence of 
such an intervening cause discharges the defendant's liability for his 
negligence, if any, and entitles such a defendant to summary judgment on the 
issue. Id.

[¶19]   Skorcz and Casper Concrete owed 
duties of reasonable care to foreseeable users of the intersection they 
constructed. Had the appellees' negligence been established with respect to the 
discharge of those duties, our holding would remain that the failure of the DOT 
to alleviate the danger thus created or notify Skorcz and/or Casper Concrete of 
the immediate need to rectify that danger was an intervening cause relieving 
Skorcz and Casper Concrete of any liability for the death of appellant's 
decedent. Id. at 1099-1100.

B. STRICT 
LIABILITY

[¶20]   The parties agree that Wyoming has 
adopted the five elements necessary to a cause of action for strict liability as 
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), and reiterated in 
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 344 (Wyo. 
1986):

(1) That the 
sellers were engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the 
harm;

(2) that the 
product was defective when sold;

(3) that the 
product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer;

(4) that the 
product was intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it was sold; and

(5) that the 
product caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer.

[¶21]   Indulging appellant's dubious 
assertion that Skorcz and Casper Concrete were in the business of selling 
seven-wire cable, the case for strict liability would remain stymied by a dearth 
of anything more than conclusory allegations concerning the origins of defect. 
Having failed to produce any evidence that the product was defective when 
"sold," appellant has revealed an inability to establish the second element of a 
cause for strict liability, leaving summary judgment the appropriate means of 
dealing with that claim.

C. RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR

[¶22]   Wyoming has, with some 
modification, accepted the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as articulated 
by Justice Van Devanter in San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 
224 U.S. 89, 98-99, 32 S. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L. Ed. 680 
(1912):

"[W]hen a thing 
which causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown 

to be under the 
exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as, in the ordinary 
course of things, does not occur if the one having such control uses proper 
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the 
injury arose from the defendant's want of care."

Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Co., 
Inc., 802 P.2d 157, 159 (Wyo. 1990). 
In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 39, 62 P.2d 1297, 
1309 (1936), Justice Blume is generally credited with qualifying Justice Van 
Devanter's definition by warning that possession may not be fully nine points of 
the law when it comes to the issue of "exclusive control." See Goedert, 
802 P.2d  at 159-60. The "exclusive control" requirement of res ipsa 
loquitur is now considered more a function of superior knowledge and ability 
to explain the occurrence, as opposed to actual physical control at the time of 
injury. See Goedert, 802 P.2d  at 160 and Rafferty v. Northern 
Utilities Co., 73 Wyo. 287, 306-07, 278 P.2d 605, 612 
(1955).

[¶23]   Appellant's res ipsa 
loquitur claim is alternative pleading in the purest sense of the term. It 
is exclusive to her negligence claim because "[t]he doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is predicated upon plaintiff's inability to specify the act of 
negligence which caused his injury[.]" Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585, 586 (Wyo. 1970). Moreover, when extensive maintenance or repair has 
occurred, the res ipsa loquitur claim is equally inimical to a strict liability 
claim because there has been a substantial change in the condition of the 
product and the entity maintaining or repairing that product assumes "exclusive 
control" by acquiring "superior means of explaining the [injurious] 
occurrence[.]" Id.

[¶24]   In this case, it is evident that 
"exclusive control" of the signal lights at Outer Drive and Casper Mountain Road 
had long since passed from Skorcz and Casper Concrete. Skorcz and Casper 
Concrete were never notified of the problem, let alone summoned to the scene. It 
was the State which had assumed full responsibility for locating and correcting 
the problem with the malfunctioning signals. If there is a cause of action based 
in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it does not lie against Skorcz or 
Casper Concrete.

V. CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Appellant's failure to muster 
competent and admissible evidence from which reasonable minds might conclude 
that Skorcz or Casper Concrete were negligent in a manner which led to the 
traffic light malfunction at Outer Drive and Casper Mountain Road leaves this 
court no choice but to affirm the dismissal of appellees from this case by 
summary judgment.