Title: State ex rel. Meissner v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Meissner v. Indus. Comm., 94 Ohio St.3d 203, 2002-Ohio-477.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MEISSNER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Meissner v. Indus. Comm. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 203.] 
Workers’ compensation — R.C. 4123.57(B), scheduled loss compensation for a 
digit, construed and applied. 
(No. 00-2353 — Submitted October 30, 2001 — Decided February 6, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-79. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant, Richard P. Meissner, suffered a hand 
injury at work, which included a fracture of the tip of the right ring finger.  He 
later moved for scheduled loss compensation for the digit pursuant to R.C. 
4123.57(B).  Dr. Alan A. Palmer indicated that: 
 
“* * * The injured worker has no active flexion or extension of the DIP 
joint.  Passive range of motion is quite limited but fluid without crepitation.  Two-
point discrimination on the volar aspect of the digit is unreliably reported.  Active 
range-of-motion of the remainder of the finger is fluid without crepitation.  There 
is a 15 degrees ulnar deviation angle deformity at the DIP and a 15 degrees ulnar 
[sic] (viewed end on) ulnar rotational deformity at the DIP.  The MP and PIP fully 
extend.  Active MP flexion is accomplished to 80 degrees and active PIP flexion 
is accomplished to 95%.  The DIP is 55 degrees at rest; there is no active flexion 
or extension; however, there is limited passive extension.” 
 
Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio awarded claimant a one-third-
loss-of use award, based “on the 4-12-99 report from Dr. Palmer indicating that 
the distal interphalangeal (DIP) joint of the claimant’s right ring finger is 
ankylosed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“The Staff Hearing Officer further finds that the District Hearing Officer 
correctly limited the award to a one-third loss.  ORC 4123.57(B) states in 
pertinent part: 
 
“ ‘For ankylosis (total stiffness of) * * * which makes any of the fingers * 
* * or parts (thereof) useless, the same number of weeks apply to the members or 
parts thereof as given for the loss thereof.’ 
 
“The statute further provides: 
 
“ ‘The loss of the third, or distal, phalange of any finger is considered 
equal to the loss of one-third of the finger.’ 
 
“With his ankylosed DIP joint, the claimant has suffered the loss of use of 
his third (distal) phalange, equivalent to the amputation of that phalange.  As 
such, the statute provides for a one-third loss of use award under the facts of this 
case.” 
 
Seeking a two-thirds loss of use, claimant filed a complaint in mandamus 
in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  That court, finding no abuse of 
discretion, denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
A permanent and total loss of use of a body part enumerated in R.C. 
4123.57(B) generates a “scheduled loss” award under that section.  The loss of the 
third or “ring” finger at issue here, for example, generates twenty weeks of 
compensation.  Id. 
 
In certain cases, the statute measures loss according to the anatomy of the 
affected member.  For example, loss of part of a finger generates an award 
commensurate with the impairment of total function caused by the loss.  R.C. 
4123.57(B) bases awards on the amount of finger lost and on which finger is 
affected.  Preceding downward, the tip of the finger, including the nail, is the 
distal phalanx (“DP”).  It is connected by the distal interphalangeal joint (“DIP”) 
to the middle phalanx.  It continues with the proximal interphalangeal joint 
January Term, 2002 
3 
(“PIP”), 
or 
mid-knuckle, 
the 
proximal 
phalanx 
and, 
finally, 
the 
metacarpophalangeal joint that unites the finger with the hand.  Stedman’s 
Medical Dictionary (26 Ed.1995) 1030. 
 
Logic dictates that the closer the loss is to the hand, the greater the 
functional damage.  Consistent with that rationale, R.C. 4123.57(B) provides: 
 
“The loss of the third, or distal, phalange of any finger is considered equal 
to the loss of one-third of the finger. 
 
“The loss of the middle, or second, phalange of any finger is considered 
equal to the loss of two-thirds of the finger. 
 
“The loss of more than the middle and distal phalanges of any finger is 
considered equal to the loss of the whole finger.” 
 
The statute also states: 
 
“For ankylosis (total stiffness * * *) * * * which makes any of the fingers, 
thumbs, or parts of either useless, the same number of weeks apply to the 
members or parts thereof as given for the loss thereof.” 
 
The claimant’s DIP joint in this case is ankylosed, creating a dispute as to 
the amount of loss—one-third or two-thirds.  Advocating the latter, claimant puts 
forth a rather fluid two-part argument that drifts between two premises.  The first 
is that the DIP ankylosis means that “more than” the DP suffers a loss of use, 
compelling a two-thirds award.  The second is claimant’s proposal that because 
the middle phalanx is connected to the DIP, it is a “part thereof” rendered useless 
by the ankylosis, entitling him to a two-thirds award under R.C. 4123.57(B).  We 
disagree with both propositions. 
 
As is typical with this kind of case, claimant presents a difficult question.  
Two things make analysis particularly cumbersome.  First, the issue is largely 
medical.  The hand is so complex and so integral to human function that it is often 
difficult to truly appreciate how much or how little of its abilities are affected 
when some of its function is lost. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Second, when the statute was written, the only compensable loss was 
amputation, and when dealing with amputation, R.C. 4123.57(B) is far less 
opaque.  Loss of use without amputation—compensation for which came later 
(State ex rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm. [1979], 58 Ohio St.2d 402, 12 O.O.3d 347, 
390 N.E.2d 1190)—can be more complicated.  For example, the middle 
phalanx—invoked in our controversy—is a single bone and does not bend.  It is 
easy to understand that hand/finger function is impaired when the middle phalanx 
is amputated.  When it is not lost by amputation, however, analysis can be more 
difficult.  The middle phalanx cannot become ankylosed because it does not bend.  
This complicates matters when dealing with compensation under R.C. 
4123.57(B). 
 
At issue is claimant’s right ring finger.  The joint closest to the fingernail 
is ankylosed.  Claimant cannot bend his finger at that point, but can bend it both at 
the PIP joint, or mid-knuckle, and at the base of the hand.  This raises in our mind 
the question of whether, from a practical standpoint, claimant has indeed lost two-
thirds of the finger’s use simply because he cannot bend the tip. 
 
This sort of practical inquiry fueled our decision in State ex rel. Riter v. 
Indus. Comm. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 89, 742 N.E.2d 615.  At issue was the 
ankylosed interphalangeal joint (“IP”), or mid-knuckle, of claimant’s thumb.  
Claimant argued that because R.C. 4123.57(B) provided that the loss of more than 
the distal phalanx equaled full loss, the ankylosed IP joint should be deemed 
sufficient to compel a full award. 
 
We disagreed.  After extensively discussing the thumb’s anatomy and 
function, we wrote: 
 
“[T]he thumb is truly unique and * * * evaluating it under standards 
directed at the fingers just doesn’t work.  The key to the thumb’s uniqueness and 
utility lies in the metacarpal bone and the metacarpocarpal joint.  Thus, to say that 
ankylosis of the IP joint makes the thumb totally useless is wrong.” 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
Amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, criticizes Riter as 
irreconcilable with State ex rel. Bellerson v. Devery (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 377, 
696 N.E.2d 209.  The difficulty with this argument is twofold.  First, Bellerson 
merely affirmed by entry a court of appeals’ judgment.  There is no comment or 
discussion.  Second, the court of appeals’ decision that gave rise to it is confusing.  
See State ex rel. Bellerson v. Devery (Sept. 28, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94 
APD10-1454, unreported.  Although the thumb alone was at issue, the court of 
appeals repeatedly referred to the thumb’s PIP joint.  The thumb, however, has no 
PIP joint.  It is, therefore, unclear whether the court was evaluating claimant’s 
loss under the thumb provisions or finger provisions.  Its precedential or 
instructional value is thus minimal. 
 
Claimant’s assertion that the ankylosed DIP joint means that “more than” 
the DP is lost so as to compel a greater award has a fundamental flaw.  Unlike 
R.C. 4123.57(B)’s provision for the thumb and for the finger’s middle phalanx, 
the distal phalanx provision does not provide for an “add-on” loss.  R.C. 
4123.57(B) directs: 
 
“The loss of more than the middle and distal phalanges of any finger is 
considered equal to the loss of the whole finger.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
It further provides: 
 
“The loss of the second, or distal, phalange of the thumb is considered 
equal to the loss of one half of such thumb; the loss of more than half of such 
thumb is considered equal to the loss of the whole thumb.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Conspicuously missing from the statute is any comparable language for 
the distal phalanx.  It says simply that “the loss of the third, or distal, phalange of 
any finger is considered equal to the loss of one-third of the finger.”  It says 
nothing about the loss of “more than” the DP equating to a two-thirds loss.  This 
absence distinguishes our case from State ex rel. Glower v. Indus. Comm. (Sept. 
1, 1988), Franklin App. No. 86AP-1026, unreported, 1988 WL 92441.  There, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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court of appeals held that ankylosis of the mid-knuckle (or PIP) indeed constituted 
“more than” the loss of the middle and distal phalanges, triggering a statutory 
entitlement to a full finger loss.  No similar statutory trigger exists that transforms 
a one-third loss into a two-thirds loss. 
 
Claimant’s second argument is similar but focuses instead on the 
following language from R.C. 4123.57(B): 
 
“For ankylosis (total stiffness * * *) * * * which makes any of the fingers, 
thumbs, or parts of either useless, the same number of weeks apply to the 
members or parts thereof as given for the loss thereof.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Claimant reasons that because the middle phalanx and DIP are contiguous, 
the middle phalanx is a “part of” the DIP.  Therefore, if the DIP is lost, the middle 
phalanx is lost, too, dictating a two-thirds award.  We view this position 
skeptically for two reasons. 
 
First, claimant misreads the statute.  R.C. 4123.57(B) says that loss of use 
by ankylosis will be paid in the same amount as loss by amputation.  It does not 
say that loss of use of a phalanx will be assumed by the proximity of the phalanx 
to a nonfunctional joint.  In this case, there is no evidence that claimant has lost 
the use of his middle phalanx. 
 
Second, claimant’s interpretation of the ankylosis provision actually 
conflicts with the statute.  Under claimant’s interpretation, if there is a DIP loss of 
use by ankylosis, the middle phalanx is deemed lost as well.  Consequently, if the 
middle phalanx is lost, claimant is statutorily entitled to a two-thirds award.  
However, if claimant loses the DIP to amputation, there is no comparable 
provision that assumes loss of use of the middle phalanx.  Thus, the amputee 
would be limited to a one-third loss.  This, of course, offends not only common 
sense but also the statute, which states that loss of use by ankylosis and loss of use 
by amputation will be treated the same. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
 
Claimant finally asserts an equal protection argument, alleging that on at 
least two prior occasions, the commission has awarded a two-thirds loss to 
claimants with the same amount of loss as his.  This argument fails for several 
reasons.  First, these two claimants are identified only by their claim numbers.  
Comparing the medical conditions of unidentified claimants with Meissner’s is 
impossible.  Second, as the commission points out, even if the medical conditions 
were the same, a wrong decision in an earlier case does not mean that the 
commission is engaged in a pattern of discriminatory treatment.  The commission 
should not have to perpetuate a mistake—if indeed one was made—in order to 
avoid an equal protection allegation.  Finally, and most important, we do not 
know what happened to these unidentified orders or if they were appealed.  Any 
perceived error may have been remedied judicially or administratively. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Nein Law Offices, Matthew R. Copp and James R. Nein, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
Philip J. Fulton & Associates, Philip J. Fulton and William A. Thorman 
III, for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________