Title: Bowman v. Comfort Chair Company

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

157 S.E.2d 378 (1967) 271 N.C. 702 Richard BOWMAN, Employee v. COMFORT CHAIR COMPANY, Inc., Employer; Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, Carrier. No. 361. Supreme Court of North Carolina. November 1, 1967. *379 Williams & Pannell, Newton, for plaintiff. Hedrick, McKnight & Parham, Charlotte, for defendants. BRANCH, Justice. The question presented by this appeal is: Does a hearing Commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission have authority to award plaintiff an attorney's fee as part of the costs upon an initial hearing in a workmen's compensation matter? The general rule in this jurisdiction is that counsel fees are not allowed as a part of the costs in civil actions or special proceedings. This rule is not applicable where the courts exercise chancery powers to allow compensation to aid trustees or fiduciaries in the management of estates or trusts, or where in certain cases a litigant at his own expense successfully maintains a suit preserving or increasing the common fund or common property. The rule, of course, does not apply when there is express statutory authority for fixing and awarding attorney's fees. Patrick v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 216 N.C. 525, 5 S.E.2d 724; Parker v. Mecklenburg Realty & Insurance Co., 195 N.C. 644, 143 S.E. 254; Ragan v. Ragan, 186 N.C. 461, 119 S.E. 882; In re Will of Howell, 204 N.C. 437, 168 S.E. 671; Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 72 S.E.2d 21; Rider v. Lenoir County, 238 N.C. 632, 78 S.E.2d 745. *380 The North Carolina Industrial Commission is a creature of the General Assembly and was created by statute, which is now G.S. § 97-77. Although the Commission is authorized to approve fees received by attorneys for services rendered in workmen compensation matters (G.S. § 97-90), the only statutory authority to award fees as a part of the costs is contained in the above quoted statute. It is clear that this section of the statute is applicable only when such hearings or proceedings are brought by the insurer and the court orders the insurer to make or to continue payments of compensation to the injured employee. The appellant attempts to invoke the aid of G.S. § 6-21.1 which provided: (This statute was rewritten by the General Assembly effective June 27, 1967. However, the change in the statute does not affect the decision in this case.) A cursory examination of this statute proves it not to be applicable in cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The statute refers to personal injury or property damage suits. The Workmen's Compensation Act makes no provision for property damage suits, and this Court has clearly distinguished the recoveries allowable in personal injury damage suits and payments received under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the case of Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865, where the Court stated: G.S. § 6-21.1 provides that the allowance may be made in the discretion of the presiding judge. There is no provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act for presiding judges. Thus, it is evident that G.S. *381 § 2-21.1 refers to personal injury damage suits and property damage suits tried in a court where there is a presiding trial judge This statute is not applicable. The case of Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 27 S.E.2d 644, while not applicable to the Workmen's Compensation Act, is pertinent to this decision. In that case, the Court, in holding that a justice of the peace had no jurisdiction in an action for recovery of a statutory penalty of $50, plus attorney's fees, stated: Prior to the constitutional amendment of 1961, a justice of the peace was recognized by the North Carolina Constitution (Article IV, section 2) legislative enactment, and case law as a court. Williams v. Bowling, 111 N.C. 295, 16 S.E. 176. By its decision in Hopkins, this Court held that a then-constitutionally created court could not fix and award attorney's fees. A fortiori, such powers would not reside in a statutory administrative board which is not clothed with the inherent or chancery powers of a court. We hold that, absent specific statutory authority, a hearing Commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission does not have authority to award a plaintiff's attorney a fee to be charged as a part of the costs. Affirmed.