Title: Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12919 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JORGE DELGADO-RIVERA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 2, 2020. - June 1, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Cellular Telephone.  Search and Seizure, 
Standing to object, Expectation of privacy.  Constitutional 
Law, Search and seizure, Standing to question 
constitutionality, Privacy.  Privacy.  Practice, Criminal, 
Standing, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 20, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Shannon 
Frison, J. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gaziano, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Barry A. Bachrach for the defendant. 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, Jason D. Frank, & 
Michael A. Hacker, for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Jorge Delgado-Rivera and six codefendants were 
indicted on charges of trafficking in 200 grams or more of 
cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b); conspiracy to violate the drug 
laws, G. L. c. 94C, § 40; and conspiracy to commit money 
laundering, G. L. c. 267A, § 2.  Delgado-Rivera's indictments 
stemmed from an investigation that originated, in part, from 
evidence acquired during a search of his codefendant's cellular 
telephone.  Delgado-Rivera sought to join the owner of the 
telephone in a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the search, which produced, inter alia, the contents of text 
messages sent by Delgado-Rivera; Delgado-Rivera argued that he 
had a privacy interest in the sent messages, while the 
Commonwealth argued that he had no standing to challenge the 
search.  A Superior Court judge concluded that Delgado-Rivera 
had standing to challenge the motor vehicle stop of his 
codefendant, as well as the voluntariness of the search, and 
allowed him to join the motion to suppress.1 
 
We conclude that, in the circumstances at issue here, the 
judge erred in deciding that Delgado-Rivera could join in the 
motion to suppress to challenge the stop and subsequent search.  
Delgado-Rivera should not have been allowed to join in the 
 
 
1 The judge concluded that a third defendant did not have 
standing to join the motion to suppress. 
3 
 
motion to suppress because he enjoyed no reasonable expectation 
of privacy, under either State or Federal law, in the text 
messages sent by him that were stored on a cellular telephone 
belonging to, and possessed by, another person.2 
 
1.  Factual background.  Although the judge held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress and, subsequent to 
that hearing, the Commonwealth requested that the judge "issue 
written findings of fact," ultimately her decision contained no 
explicit findings of fact.  We recite the facts based upon the 
uncontroverted and undisputed evidence offered at the 
suppression hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 
93 (2018). 
 
On September 18, 2016, then Officer Jose Tamez of the Pharr 
police department in Texas stopped a vehicle in neighboring 
McAllen, Texas, after he observed a traffic violation.  Tamez 
had been watching the vehicle because he had received 
information that Federal agents were conducting an investigation 
that indicated that the vehicle might contain narcotics.  Leonel 
Garcia-Castaneda was the driver and sole occupant of the 
vehicle.  The stop included a canine search of the vehicle and a 
search by Tamez of the vehicle as well as of Garcia-Castaneda's 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc.; the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services; and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
cellular telephones.  There is a factual dispute as to whether 
Garcia-Castaneda consented to these searches.3 
 
While looking through one of Garcia-Castaneda's cellular 
telephones, Tamez observed text messages sent to and received 
from a Massachusetts area code.  The messages appeared to 
discuss shipments of narcotics and payments to be made into 
certain bank accounts.  The search, which evolved to include an 
X-ray of the vehicle at a nearby port of entry, did not yield 
contraband, and Castaneda thereafter was released with a 
warning.  During the stop, Tamez was assisted by a second member 
of the Pharr police department, who also was a task force 
officer with the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Following the stop, Texas authorities relayed the 
information they had gleaned to law enforcement officers in the 
Commonwealth, who linked the Massachusetts telephone number to 
Delgado-Rivera.  Police in Massachusetts thereafter conducted an 
 
 
3 At an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, 
Leonel Garcia-Castaneda argued that Officer Jose Tamez's search 
of his cellular telephones was nonconsensual, at least in part 
because Garcia-Castaneda can speak and read only in Spanish, and 
the consent form he signed to authorize the searches was in 
English.  The Commonwealth called Tamez to testify on this 
issue, but he invoked his right not to incriminate himself under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
therefore was not available to testify regarding the details of 
the stop and the subsequent searches.  The Commonwealth 
presented no other evidence regarding the stop.  The judge thus 
determined that the fruits of the search in Texas could not be 
used as evidence against Garcia-Castaneda. 
5 
 
investigation of Delgado-Rivera and other individuals suspected 
of engaging in a series of related drug trafficking and money 
laundering schemes.  This investigation led to the indictments 
of Delgado-Rivera, along with Garcia-Castaneda, Jairo Salado-
Ayala, Maritza Medina, Brandon Ortiz, Adika Manigo, and Mark 
Yarde as codefendants. 
 
2.  Procedural background.  Garcia-Castaneda moved to 
suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop; he argued 
that the search was without a warrant and without probable 
cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Delgado-Rivera moved to join Garcia-Castaneda's motion; 
the Commonwealth opposed the motion on the ground that Delgado-
Rivera lacked standing to challenge the search. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, a 
Superior Court judge orally ruled that Delgado-Rivera had 
standing and allowed him to join Garcia-Castaneda's motion.  In 
response to the Commonwealth's request, the judge subsequently 
issued a written decision on the matter.  The Commonwealth 
sought leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal in the county 
court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 
Mass. 1501 (2017), and the single justice allowed the appeal to 
proceed in the Appeals Court.  We then transferred the matter to 
this court on our own motion. 
6 
 
 
3.  Standard of review.  In reviewing a judge's decision on 
"a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
of fact absent clear error, but conduct an independent review of 
the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law."  
Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 480 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 652 (2018).  "[O]ur 
duty is to make an independent determination of the correctness 
of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found."  Scott, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Mercado, 
422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). 
 
4.  Constitutional provisions.  Article 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment protect individuals from unreasonable, governmental 
searches and seizures.  The rights secured by these protections 
are specific to the individual.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the 
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure is a 
"personal right."  See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
389 (1968) ("rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal 
rights").  With respect to art. 14, "an individualized 
determination of reasonableness" similarly is required in light 
of the individualized rights protected.  Commonwealth v. Feliz, 
481 Mass. 689, 690-691 (2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020).  
Thus, under both State and Federal law, "the question is whether 
the challenged search or seizure violated the . . . rights of a 
7 
 
criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence" obtained 
from the search, specifically those rights of privacy that these 
constitutional provisions were "designed to protect."  Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).  See generally Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–2214 (2018); Commonwealth 
v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 498 (2020).  A defendant bears the 
burden of establishing such an infringement.  See Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–105 (1980); Commonwealth v. Miller, 
475 Mass. 212, 219 (2016). 
 
The substantive rights protected by these constitutional 
provisions, however, are not necessarily coterminous.  
Article 14 "does, or may, afford more substantive protection to 
individuals than that which prevails under the Constitution of 
the United States."  Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360, 365 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 42 n.9 
(2019).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785-
789 (1996) (art. 14 defines moment when individual's personal 
liberty has been restrained by police more broadly than does 
Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373 
(1985) (concluding that probable cause to issue search warrants 
is more narrowly defined under art. 14 than under Fourth 
Amendment).  The Fourth Amendment provides a floor below which 
the protection granted by art. 14 cannot fall.  See Garcia v. 
Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 341, 350 (2020) ("Privacy rights under 
8 
 
art. 14 are at least as extensive as those under the Fourth 
Amendment"). 
 
The tests that courts have adopted to determine whether 
defendants validly may invoke the protections of these 
constitutional provisions are related but distinct.  
Traditionally, under art. 14, "we determine initially whether 
the defendant has standing to contest the search and then 
whether she [or he] had an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 207-208 
(2009).  Although the "two concepts are interrelated, we 
consider them separately."  Id. at 208.  See Commonwealth v. 
Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 244 n.3 (1991) ("we think it is best to 
separate the issue of standing from the question whether there 
has been a search for constitutional purposes").  Only if the 
defendant proves both standing and a reasonable expectation of 
privacy do the protections of art. 14 apply.  Almonor, 482 Mass. 
at 40-41.  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 705 
(2019); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 482 Mass. 94, 107-108 (2019). 
 
For purposes of art. 14, "[a] defendant has standing [to 
challenge a government search] either if [he or] she has a 
possessory interest in the place searched or in the property 
seized or if [he or] she was present when the search occurred."4  
 
 
4 Under art. 14, a defendant who has been charged with a 
possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a search 
9 
 
Williams, 453 Mass. at 208.  While this court has not 
established the precise contours of the possessory interest 
relevant to art. 14, we have held that it is congruent neither 
with legal title nor physical control.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Morrison, 429 Mass. 511, 514 (1999).  We have discerned such 
an interest where, for example, law enforcement seized the 
device subsequently searched from an individual who was not its 
owner, see Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 282 (2018), 
and evidence suggested that the individual asserting standing 
repeatedly had used, but did not own or possess, the item in 
question, see Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 35-36, 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017); Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 
472 Mass. 852, 857 n.9 (2015). 
 
By contrast, under Federal law, "the question whether the 
defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
search or seizure is merged with the determination whether the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place 
searched" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 
385, 391 (2010).  Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
105-106 (1980), with Tavares, 482 Mass. at 705.  Thus, a 
 
that yielded evidence of that possession, and also need not show 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 
456 Mass. 385, 392-394 & n.7 (2010), and cases cited; 
Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 596-601 (1990).  
Delgado-Rivera properly does not argue that the doctrine of 
automatic standing is relevant here. 
10 
 
defendant has standing under the Fourth Amendment only if the 
search violated his or her reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  To establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, a defendant must prove both a 
subjective and an objective expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991); United 
States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 566 U.S. 924 (2012).  The defendant bears the burden of 
"demonstrat[ing] that he [or she] personally has an expectation 
of privacy in the place searched, and that [this] expectation is 
reasonable, i.e., one that has a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).  See Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 715, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 
(2019).  See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 
While we have continued to recognize the conceptual 
differences between these State and Federal analyses, a number 
of our recent cases have implicitly eschewed the two-part 
inquiry set forth in Williams and instead, drawing heavily on 
recent Federal precedent, have focused on a defendant's 
11 
 
reasonable expectation of privacy, without making a separate 
inquiry as to the question of standing.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 216 (2014).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 833 (2009) (Gants, J., concurring) 
("the appropriate constitutional concern is not the protection 
of property but rather the protection of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy").  Indeed, extending this focus even 
further, in Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 392-393, we concluded that, for 
possessory offenses involving drugs or firearms, defendants did 
not need to establish either standing or a reasonable 
expectation of privacy so long as one of the individuals 
involved in the offense had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
We explained that, "[i]n other words, the 'benefit' of automatic 
standing is that the defendant need not prove that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home or automobile 
searched, where he is charged with possession of contraband 
found during that particular search."  Id. at 392 n.7.5 
 
 
5 In her concurrence, Justice Cypher asserts that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is a personal right, and that 
this court has not held otherwise.  She continues by suggesting 
that the court's holding in Mubdi has been "interpreted" to 
mean, but in fact did not say, that "a defendant did not need to 
show that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the place searched but only that someone had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy," and the court could not have intended 
to do so.  Post at    .  The decision in Mubdi, however, clearly 
explained the rationale underlying its holding that, in 
possessory offenses committed by multiple individuals, 
defendants need show neither standing nor an expectation of 
12 
 
 
This trend toward a one-step inquiry focusing on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been pronounced in our 
case law assessing the constitutionality of digital searches, to 
which the traditional notions of physical possession 
underpinning an art. 14 possessory interest may be particularly 
ill suited.  See Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 78-80 
(2019); Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013).  
See also Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 70 n.11 (1987) 
("[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the 
Government to search and seize has been discredited. . . .  
Today, the reach of [the Fourth Amendment and, we add, art. 14] 
 
privacy.  Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 392 n.7.  Mubdi reiterated that 
this court had chosen to continue to rely upon automatic 
standing even though the United States Supreme Court had 
abandoned it "because we believed it unfair to place the 
defendant in the difficult position at the motion to suppress 
hearing of needing to explain his relationship to the place 
searched in order to establish his standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the search, when that incriminating 
information may be used to impeach him if he were to testify at 
trial."  Id. 
 
 
Moreover, far from overlooking the holding in Commonwealth 
v. Carter, 424 Mass. 409 (1997), as Justice Cypher suggests that 
it did, see post at    , the court in Mubdi, supra at 393 n.8, 
explicitly declined to decide the issue raised in Carter, supra 
at 412, as to whether a defendant who was not lawfully in the 
location searched nonetheless could assert automatic standing.  
Carter did not reach the question of an automatic expectation of 
privacy, and given the absence of any briefing or record on this 
complex issue, attempting to do so here would risk creating 
innumerable unanticipated consequences.  As Mubdi itself 
recognized, an automatic expectation of privacy could produce 
some anomalous results.  See Mubdi, supra at 392 n.7.  These 
issues are best reserved for a case in which they occur. 
13 
 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure" [quotation and citations omitted]).  
This jurisprudence has given rise to well-founded skepticism 
regarding the continued utility and applicability of the 
discrete, preliminary standing analysis set forth in our earlier 
jurisprudence.  See J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression 
Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 3-4[a] (2019 ed.). 
 
In most circumstances involving physical property, the two-
part assessment to determine whether constitutional privacy 
rights are implicated under art. 14 likely would produce the 
same outcome as the one-part Federal inquiry, given the 
interrelated nature of the two analyses.  See Williams, 453 
Mass. at 207-208.  It is possible, however, to imagine 
circumstances in which that would not be the case, particularly 
where digital searches are at issue.6  As digital technologies 
continue to develop and digital searches play an increasingly 
 
 
6 For example, a defendant could send a text message using 
an encrypted messaging service, where the message subsequently 
was acquired from the recipient device by law enforcement.  
Assuming that the defendant could establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on the use of the encryption 
technology employed, the defendant would have standing under the 
Fourth Amendment to contest the search that yielded the text 
message.  Using the two-part analysis under art. 14, however, 
the defendant likely would be unable to establish standing if he 
or she had no possessory interest in the recipient device and 
was not present during the search.  This discrepancy cannot 
stand.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 341, 350 
(2020). 
14 
 
important role in government investigations, our continued 
adherence to the standing analysis has become strained.  
Moreover, the application of the two-part inquiry under art. 14 
might lead to the untenable result that the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights does not protect rights guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution (i.e., where a defendant has no possessory 
interest in the area or item searched, but does have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it).  Of course, if a 
defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the defendant 
may challenge an illegal search under art. 14.  We leave for 
another day whether this court should formally abandon the two-
part analysis set forth in Williams in light of the concerns 
addressed here, as it neither was briefed by the parties nor is 
necessarily before us. 
 
5.  Application.  To invoke the protections of either the 
Fourth Amendment or art. 14, Delgado-Rivera must prove that he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages 
that he sent to -- and that were received by -- Garcia-
Castaneda.  Without deciding whether Delgado-Rivera has standing 
under art. 14, we therefore turn to consider whether he enjoyed 
an expectation of privacy in the text messages he sent, an 
expectation that was violated when Tamez searched Garcia-
Castaneda's cellular telephone.  As the judge noted, the 
question whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
15 
 
privacy in sent text messages acquired from another's cellular 
telephone is a matter of first impression in the Commonwealth, 
and the United States Supreme Court has provided no explicit 
guidance on the issue.  See Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759-
760 (2010) (assuming, arguendo, that expectation of privacy 
existed in text messages, specifically those sent on employer-
provided device, but noting that "[r]apid changes in the 
dynamics of communication and information transmission are 
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society 
accepts as proper behavior").  While the privacy rights 
protected under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 are not 
coterminous, see, e.g., Blood, 400 Mass. at 68 n.9, both the 
United States Supreme Court and this court "have been careful to 
guard against the 'power of technology to shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy' by emphasizing that privacy rights 'cannot 
be left at the mercy of advancing technology but rather must be 
preserved and protected as new technologies are adopted and 
applied by law enforcement.'"  Almonor, 482 Mass. at 41, quoting 
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 716.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 413-418 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001). 
 
The central issue before us is the objective reasonableness 
of Delgado-Rivera's subjective expectation of privacy, set forth 
in his affidavit, in the text messages he sent to Garcia-
16 
 
Castaneda.  "What is reasonable depends upon all of the 
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature 
of the search or seizure itself."  United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).  Relevant factors in this 
determination include, inter alia, the character of the item 
searched; the defendant's possessory interest, if any, in the 
item; and the defendant's precautions to protect his privacy.  
See Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 545, cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 832 (1990). 
 
In our view, the issue of control, or a lack of control, 
i.e., Delgado-Rivera's necessary relinquishment of control over 
what became of this type of sent text messages once they were 
delivered to Garcia-Castaneda's device, is determinative with 
respect to whether Delgado-Rivera had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the delivered text messages, as persuasively set 
forth by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Patino, 93 
A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1081 (2015).  In 
these circumstances, there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the sent text messages because, as with some other 
forms of written communication, delivery created a memorialized 
record of the communication that was beyond the control of the 
sender.  Federal courts have held uniformly that, "if a letter 
is sent to another, the sender's expectation of privacy 
ordinarily terminates upon delivery" (citations omitted).  
17 
 
United States v. Dunning, 312 F.3d 528, 531 (1st Cir. 2002).  
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1030 (1999); United States v. 
King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 
(1994); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 658 F.2d 608, 611 
(8th Cir. 1981).  In reaching this conclusion, courts have 
reasoned that "when one party relinquishes control of a letter 
by sending it to a third party, the reasonableness of the 
privacy expectation is undermined."  Knoll, supra. 
 
More recently, courts have extended this logic to 
electronic communications, such as electronic mail messages, 
after concluding that these forms of communication similarly 
create a record beyond the control of the original sender and 
thus defeat any reasonable expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(declining to recognize reasonable expectation of privacy in 
electronic communication that had reached recipient); Guest v. 
Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (system operator's 
disclaimer stating that personal communications on computer 
bulletin board were not private defeated reasonable expectation 
of privacy).  This reasoning is similarly applicable to the text 
messages at issue in this case, which created a record of the 
communications that was readily and lastingly available to, 
18 
 
easily understood by, and almost instantaneously disbursable by 
the intended recipient, as well as unintended readers, all 
beyond the control of the sender.7 
 
The record here, and the relinquishment of control it 
represents, is important because "the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect items that a defendant 'knowingly exposes to the 
public.'"  Dunning, 312 F.3d at 531, citing United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).  The judge sought to 
distinguish between communications that have been shared with a 
particular individual, such as the intended recipient, and 
communications that are released "more generally . . . [in a 
way] in which [they] can be discovered by members of the public 
or police or anyone else."  This distinction is not persuasive.  
"It is well settled that when an individual reveals private 
information to another, [the individual] assumes the risk that 
his [or her] confidant will reveal that information," 
frustrating the sender's original expectation of privacy and, in 
effect, making this once-private information subject to 
disclosure without a violation of the sender's constitutional 
 
 
7 The question whether an individual could use certain types 
of technologies, such as encryption or ephemeral messaging, to 
maintain control of sent electronic messages sufficiently to 
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages is 
not before us.  Cf. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Techs. Ltd., 472 
F. Supp. 3d 649, 659 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Nield, The best apps to 
send self-destructing messages, Popular Science (Nov. 15, 2020), 
https://www.popsci.com/send-self-destructing-messages. 
19 
 
rights.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).  
In the circumstances here, Delgado-Rivera assumed the risk that 
the communications he shared with Garcia-Castaneda might be made 
accessible to others, including law enforcement, through Garcia-
Castaneda and his devices.8  See Alinovi v. Worcester Sch. Comm., 
777 F.2d 776, 784 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 
(1986). 
 
Any purported expectation of privacy in sent text messages 
of this type is significantly undermined by the ease with which 
these messages can be shared with others.  In addition to simply 
displaying the message to another, as would be possible with 
nonelectronic, written forms of communication, a recipient also 
can forward the contents of the message to hundreds or thousands 
of people at once, or post a message on social media for anyone 
with an Internet connection to view.  See, e.g., Patino, 93 A.3d 
at 56 n.21 ("We can think of no media more susceptible to 
sharing or dissemination than a digital message, such as a text 
 
 
8 An individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information held by third parties, such as telephone companies, 
is a separate and distinct question that is not at issue here.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 34, cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017) (recognizing objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in content of defendant's text 
messages stored by cellular telephone service provider); 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 241-255 (2014), S.C., 
470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015) (recognizing objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in defendant's historical cell 
site location information records held by telephone service 
provider). 
20 
 
message or email, which vests in the recipient a digital copy of 
the message that can be forwarded to or shared with others at 
the mere click of a button").  Thus, Delgado-Rivera had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in 
the text messages at issue because, once they were delivered, 
Garcia-Castaneda, as the recipient, gained "full control of 
whether to share or disseminate the sender's message."  Id. 
at 56.  The technology used by Delgado-Rivera to communicate 
with Garcia-Castaneda effectively facilitated this transfer of 
control.9 
 
The expectation of privacy we have recognized concerning 
certain oral conversations also is not applicable here.  
Delgado-Rivera -- and the amici -- contend that text messages 
are more similar to oral, rather than written, communication 
because they tend to be more informal and are exchanged more 
frequently, in a shorter format, than are other forms of written 
communication.  This reasoning is unconvincing.  The relative 
 
 
9 The Commonwealth notes the absence of evidence suggesting 
"that [Delgado-Rivera] took any steps to protect the contents 
of those messages [he sent to Garcia-Castaneda] by, for example, 
using encrypted messaging applications like Signal or Telegram, 
or an application that defaults to content deletion such as 
Snapchat."  While the use of such applications, or similar 
efforts to enhance the privacy or security of the messages at 
issue, likely would be relevant to the extent that it reveals a 
defendant's efforts to protect his or her privacy, we leave for 
another day an issue that was not briefed by the parties and is 
not presently before us. 
21 
 
formality, frequency, or sensitivity of communication does not 
alone characterize the distinction between communications in 
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
those in which the individual does not, and we discern no reason 
to adopt such a standard here.  While "the nature of the 
particular documents" is relevant to the expectation of privacy 
analysis, the content of the documents is considered in the 
context of the sharing of the information.  See Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2216-2217, and cases cited (while fact of sharing 
creates diminished expectations of privacy, fact of "diminished 
privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls 
out of the picture entirely" [citation omitted]).  The fact that 
individuals communicate personally revealing thoughts, feelings, 
and facts via text message rather than through another medium 
does not alter the analysis of whether they retained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. 
 
Moreover, we have recognized a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in oral conversations only in very limited 
circumstances, such as when the conversation occurred in person 
in a private home and neither party consented to a recording or 
transmission of the conversation.  See Blood, 400 Mass. at 70, 
74-75.  We have determined that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy where the conversation, akin to the text 
message exchanges at issue here, was overheard in some way by 
22 
 
law enforcement, with the agreement of a third party, see 
Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 230-233 (1989) (landlord 
agreed that officer could enter crawl space under floor where 
conversation was taking place), or where a participant in a 
telephone conversation (a confidential informant) had granted 
law enforcement permission to listen to it on an extension 
telephone, see Commonwealth v. Eason, 427 Mass. 595, 596, 598-
601 (1998). 
 
In reaching the conclusion that Delgado-Rivera had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his sent text messages, the 
judge relied in large part upon the reasoning of the Washington 
State Supreme Court in State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862 (2014).  
In Hinton, the court held that the defendant retained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages 
recovered from another individual's cellular telephone.  Id. at 
873.  The analysis in Hinton, however, is not relevant here, in 
part because, unlike Delgado-Rivera, Hinton sought to assert 
privacy rights over text messages delivered to, but never 
received by, the intended recipient.  See id. 
 
Moreover, the relatively few State and Federal courts to 
have examined this issue have soundly rejected the logic relied 
upon in Hinton.  These assessments uniformly have concluded that 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect similar text messages.  
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. Appx. 954, 959 (11th 
23 
 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1189 (2006) (defendant did 
not have reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages 
saved on coconspirator's cellular telephone); United States vs. 
Bereznak, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 3:18-CR-39 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 
2018) ("courts appear to be in general agreement that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic content . . . 
once they are on a recipient's device").  See also Fetsch vs. 
Roseburg, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 6:11–CV–6343–TC (D. Or. Dec. 31, 
2012); Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 669 (2014); State v. Boyd, 
597 S.W.3d 263, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Carle, 266 Or. 
App. 102, 112-114 (2014); State v. Tentoni, 2015 WI App 77, ¶ 8. 
 
In sum, Delgado-Rivera lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the sent text messages and therefore cannot challenge 
the search of Garcia-Castaneda's cellular telephone under either 
the Fourth Amendment or art. 14. 
 
6.  Conclusion.  The decision allowing the motion to 
suppress is vacated and set aside.  The case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I agree with the reasoning and 
the outcome in the court's opinion.  I write separately to 
examine the vexing relationship between standing and a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 207–208 (2009) (standing and 
expectation of privacy "interrelated" concepts but considered 
separately); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 244 n.3 
(1991) ("we think it is best to separate the issue of standing 
from the question whether there has been a search for 
constitutional purposes").  The court recognizes the trend in 
our case law toward a one-step reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis and the concern that as digital searches become more 
common, the standing analysis, which encompasses the traditional 
notions of physical possession, may become strained.  I agree 
that this is a topic for another day and write in an effort to 
clarify our case law and a difficulty I see in Commonwealth v. 
Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 393 (2010). 
 
A reasonable expectation of privacy alone is sufficient to 
establish that a defendant has standing under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. King, 
389 Mass. 233, 240 (1983) (defendant has standing if he or she, 
as occupant of vehicle, had legitimate expectation of privacy).  
The defendant also may establish standing by showing a 
possessory interest or presence in the place searched.  See 
2 
 
Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990) ("When a 
defendant is charged with a crime in which possession of the 
seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an 
essential element of guilt, the defendant shall be deemed to 
have standing . . .").  See also Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 
Mass. 885, 900 (1978) (defendant had standing where prosecution 
presented ample evidence at trial to prove defendant's presence 
and proprietary interest in apartment searched).  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Mora, 402 Mass. 262, 267 (1988) (no basis for 
asserting automatic standing where defendant was not present in 
apartment at time of search).  As such, I agree with the court 
that it is unnecessary to decide whether the defendant has 
standing where he did not enjoy a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages he sent.  In a case where the 
defendant is charged with a possessory offense, and any claim of 
possessory interest in order to assert standing would result in 
the defendant's admission to the crime, standing is conferred 
upon the defendant to challenge the search and seizure.  See 
Amendola, supra at 597. 
 
The reverse, however, cannot be true:  standing does not 
necessarily establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991), citing 
Frazier, 410 Mass. at 244 n.3 ("When a defendant has standing 
under our rule for State constitutional purposes, we then 
3 
 
determine whether a search in the constitutional sense has taken 
place").  Thus, even if a defendant has established standing, he 
or she also must show an expectation of privacy in the place 
searched.  See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 
326 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 475 Mass. 611 (2016) (defendant charged with 
possessory offenses has automatic standing but no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in place searched where he was in 
position of trespasser). 
In other words, where standing is not automatic and is not 
based on a reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather on 
presence or a possessory interest, a defendant also must show 
that his or her own expectation of privacy was intruded upon.  
See Commonwealth v. Carter, 424 Mass. 409, 411 n.3 (1997) 
(defendant does not have right to "assert the constitutional 
rights of someone in no way involved with his allegedly criminal 
conduct"). 
Although the defendant may not assert another person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy, in Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 393, 
the court stated:  "The defendant, however, still must show that 
there was a search in the constitutional sense, that is, that 
someone had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place 
searched, because only then would probable cause, reasonable 
suspicion, or consent be required to justify the search."  This 
4 
 
sentence has been interpreted to mean that a defendant did not 
need to show that he or she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place searched but only that someone had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  See J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. 
McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 3-4[a] 
(2019 ed.) (Grasso & McEvoy). 
 
Such a construction would overrule Carter, 424 Mass. at 
410, which specifically rejected this argument.  Mubdi did not 
purport to overrule Carter, as one can fairly deduce from cases 
that followed Mubdi.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 
303-304 (2014); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 
303 (2017).  See also Commonwealth v. Carnes, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 
713, 718 (2012). 
A reasonable expectation of privacy is personal to a 
defendant.  Were the court to have held otherwise, a person 
would have an expectation of privacy in any place in which 
another person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Such a 
result would collapse the two-prong reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis.  Although a defendant may have automatic 
standing to challenge a possessory offense, we have not created 
an automatic expectation of privacy.1  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
 
1 Where the defendant has automatic standing, the defendant 
need not show that he or she has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place searched.  See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 
406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990).  A codefendant charged with 
5 
 
Arzola, 470 Mass. 809, 816-817 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 
1061 (2016) (defendant does not have expectation of privacy that 
would prevent deoxyribonucleic acid analysis of lawfully seized 
evidence); Martin, 467 Mass. at 303-304 (defendant had no 
expectation of privacy in abandoned telephone); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 866 (2010) (defendant does not have 
expectation of privacy in telephone call made after arrest). 
It appears to me, as expressed in Grasso & McEvoy, supra at 
§ 3-4[a], that 
"Mubdi confuses Carter's expressed rationale for excusing a 
co-defendant charged with a possessory offense from the 
need to show that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the area searched and instead declares an 
automatic expectation of privacy in the defendant whenever 
automatic standing exists and someone has an expectation of 
privacy." 
 
Instead, the court in Carter, 424 Mass. at 410-411, 
observed:  "[w]e have granted a defendant automatic standing to 
challenge the seizure of property in the possession of another 
 
constructive possession may be excused from establishing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, so long 
as the codefendant's confederate has done so.  It is not, 
however, sufficient for the defendant to show that just 
"someone" has an expectation of privacy in the area searched.  
In Frazier, 410 Mass. at 244-245, we held that a defendant 
charged with constructive possession had automatic standing to 
challenge the search of his confederate's handbag.  There, the 
court concluded that the defendant's confederate had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the handbag and that the 
search was unlawful.  Id. at 241.  Because the search was 
illegal as to his confederate, it was also illegal as to the 
defendant.  Id. at 246. 
6 
 
at the time of the search, if the defendant has been charged 
with the constructive possession of that property at that time."  
In fact, Carter specifically stated that "[s]uch a defendant and 
his confederate are treated, in effect, as one for the purposes 
of deciding whether there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, otherwise the person who carried the contraband might 
go free (because of suppression of the evidence) and the 
defendant confederate would not."  Id. at 411.