Title: Commonwealth v. Souza

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-13357 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY SOUZA. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 5, 2023. - August 14, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Assault and Battery by Means of a 
Dangerous Weapon.  Self-Defense.  Evidence, Self-defense, 
Prior violent conduct.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to 
jury, Argument by prosecutor, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 5, 2015. 
 
The cases were tried before E. Susan Garsh, J.; a motion 
for postconviction relief, filed on December 26, 2019, was 
considered by Thomas J. Perrino, J., and a motion for 
reconsideration was also considered by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Matthew V. Soares for the defendant. 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  During a physical altercation, the defendant, 
Jeffrey Souza, shot and killed Kyle Brady, the victim.  
2 
 
Thereafter, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the second degree, assault and battery by discharge of 
a firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm.  At trial, the defendant's 
theory was that he killed the victim in lawful self-defense.1  In 
support of that theory, the defendant sought to introduce so-
called Adjutant evidence or "evidence of specific incidents of 
violence allegedly initiated by the victim."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(a)(2)(B) (2023).  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 
649 (2005).  The trial judge allowed the defendant to introduce 
evidence of numerous violent incidents initiated by the victim.  
However, the judge limited the testimony about these incidents 
to evidence of the victim instigating violence and barred 
additional testimony describing the entire violent event.  On 
appeal, among other issues, the defendant contends that the 
judge committed an error of law in misconstruing our Adjutant 
jurisprudence by limiting such evidence to the victim's first 
act of violence, rather than allowing evidence of the entire 
violent interaction.  He further argues error in the judge's 
instructions limiting the jury's consideration of the admitted 
Adjutant evidence only as to who attacked whom first in the 
 
1 The defendant also suggested that the shooting was an 
accident.  He raises no issue pertaining to that claim on 
appeal. 
3 
 
altercation.  Therefore, we address when specific incidents of 
violence may be admitted in evidence pursuant to Adjutant and 
its progeny, including Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520 
(2013), the scope of such evidence, and the permissible purposes 
for which a fact finder may consider such evidence. 
We take this opportunity to reiterate that Adjutant 
evidence is one of the few narrow exceptions to the general bar 
on propensity evidence.  In a case involving a claim of self-
defense, evidence of specific acts of violence initiated by the 
victim under Adjutant are admissible in two specific 
circumstances:  (1) as to the identity of the first aggressor 
when the first aggressor is disputed; and (2) "as to which 
person [in a confrontation] escalated the potential for violence 
through the use or threat of deadly force."  Commonwealth v. 
Deconinck, 480 Mass. 254, 263 (2018).  We emphasize that 
Adjutant evidence is admissible only when one or both of the 
following issues are in dispute:  to determine (1) who started 
the confrontation; or (2) who escalated the confrontation by 
using or threatening to use deadly force. 
We further emphasize that Adjutant evidence is not strictly 
limited to evidence of the victim initiating violence or 
throwing the first punch.  Rather, when the question of who 
started the fight or who was the first to introduce deadly force 
is at issue as part of a defendant's claim of self-defense, 
4 
 
evidence of the entire violent incident initiated by the victim 
is potentially admissible to give the jury a full picture, thus 
allowing them to make an informed decision in determining who 
the first aggressor was.  Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263.  The 
admissibility of this evidence is always subject to the broad 
discretion afforded to the trial judge "in evaluating . . . and 
allowing the admission of 'so much of that evidence as is 
noncumulative and relevant to the defendant's self-defense 
claim.'"  Id., quoting Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 663. 
Here, as we shall explain, the trial judge curtailed the 
examination of numerous witnesses testifying about violent 
instances initiated by the victim by limiting the testimony to 
the victim's initiation of violence.  The judge's ruling 
excluding the additional testimony about the violent 
interactions demonstrates her belief that the objected-to 
testimony exceeded both the scope and the purpose of Adjutant 
evidence.  As such, the judge committed an error of law in 
ruling on this evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Guilfoyle, 396 
Mass. 1003, 1004 (1985).  However, we ultimately discern no 
prejudice from its exclusion.  We also discern no error in the 
judge's jury instruction regarding the jury's consideration of 
Adjutant evidence. 
We acknowledge, however, that the jury instruction 
regarding Adjutant evidence contained within the Model Jury 
5 
 
Instructions on Homicide 34 & nn.81-82 (2018) could more 
concisely and understandably explain the purpose and 
admissibility of Adjutant evidence.  We accordingly provide an 
Appendix containing a model jury instruction regarding the use 
of Adjutant evidence that is approved and recommended by this 
court. 
The defendant's other claims of error regarding improper 
closing argument and ineffective assistance of counsel provide 
no basis for relief.  We affirm the defendant's convictions of 
murder in the second degree and assault and battery by means of 
discharging a firearm and the orders denying his motions for a 
new trial and for reconsideration.  However, pursuant to our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690, 693 
(2023), we vacate the defendant's convictions of carrying a 
firearm without a license and carrying a loaded firearm without 
a license. 
Background.  The defendant's convictions stem from a fight 
and subsequent shooting that occurred near a park in Fall River 
during the early morning hours of January 1, 2015, and resulted 
in the victim's death.  Prior to the fatal shooting, there had 
been a long-standing feud between the victim and the defendant, 
which centered around Courtney Morrison, who was, when the feud 
began, the victim's girlfriend but had previously been the 
defendant's girlfriend and was the mother of the defendant's 
6 
 
children.  Between August 2014 and December 2014, the victim 
repeatedly sent the defendant threatening messages.  In some of 
these messages, the victim challenged the defendant to a fight.  
The defendant generally ignored the messages or responded by 
telling the victim to "chill out." 
On the evening of December 31, 2014, the defendant and his 
friends encountered the victim's friend Kyle Emond at a bar in 
Fall River.  At trial, there was conflicting testimony about 
this encounter.  Emond testified that he heard the defendant say 
that "he had something for [the victim],", and that Emond should 
"[t]ell [the victim] to meet [the defendant] at [the park]" in 
Fall River.  But the defendant testified that he asked Emond to 
call the victim to make peace because whenever the defendant 
tried to do so, the victim threatened him. 
Ultimately, Emond called Christopher Silvia, who was out 
that evening with a group of friends, including the victim and 
the victim's sister, Brittany Brady.2  While Emond was talking to 
Silvia, the victim took Silvia's cell phone and walked away with 
it.  When the victim returned to Silvia and his group of 
friends, the victim was "angry" and "didn't look too happy."  
The victim told Silvia and his friends that he was leaving to 
 
2 Because Brittany Brady shares a surname with her brother, 
the victim, we refer to her by her first name to avoid 
confusion. 
7 
 
meet the defendant "for a fist fight."  Brittany told the victim 
that he was not going to the fight alone.  Silvia, Brittany, and 
the victim got into Silvia's car and drove to the park.  At 
around the same time, Emond and one of his friends drove to the 
park, while the defendant and some of his friends drove to the 
park separately. 
The fight that resulted in the defendant shooting the 
victim unfolded very quickly.  Various people, in support of 
both the defendant and the victim, were present near the park, 
and the jury heard various accounts of how the fight transpired.  
Undisputed, however, was that during the confrontation the 
defendant carried a gun, produced it, and fired it.  Two 
gunshots were fired during the fight at an interval of 
approximately sixteen seconds apart.  The defendant testified 
that during the fight he fired what he characterized as a 
"warning shot."  A silver revolver covered in blood was found at 
the scene of the victim's death.3  The medical examiner 
determined that the victim's cause of death was a single gunshot 
wound to his chest. 
 
3 On December 24, 2014, the defendant brought a revolver to 
a party.  The defendant testified that he had a silver revolver 
with him near the park but that it was not the same one that he 
had brought to the Christmas Eve party.  However, a witness who 
saw the revolver at the Christmas Eve party testified that the 
revolver found near the victim's body resembled the revolver 
that the defendant had at the party. 
8 
 
Because the primary issue on appeal involves Adjutant 
evidence, the issue of how the fight began is of paramount 
importance.  Witnesses testified to various versions of how the 
fatal confrontation began. 
Under one version of events, when the victim's car arrived 
at the park, the victim jumped from the car while it was still 
moving and ran off.  The next time that the defendant and victim 
were seen, they were standing face to face, and one witness 
heard the victim say something along the lines of, "You're not 
going to shoot me."  After a loud bang, the victim and defendant 
were seen wrestling each other. 
According to a second version of events, after arriving 
near the park, the victim ran toward the car where the defendant 
was sitting in the front passenger's seat.  The victim opened 
the car door in an attempt to get at the defendant, but the 
defendant jumped out of the car, and then both the defendant and 
the victim ran off. 
The defendant testified that he arrived near the park 
before the victim and decided to leave and have someone else 
stay to talk to the victim.  As the defendant was walking away, 
someone tackled him from behind.  When he got up from the 
ground, the defendant saw the victim, Emond, Brittany, and 
Silvia all running toward him.  The defendant then pointed the 
gun in the air and yelled at them to stop.  When they did not 
9 
 
stop, he "fire[d] off a warning shot."  Thereafter, undeterred, 
the group attacked the defendant, and during the struggle the 
gun went off a second time. 
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second 
degree, assault and battery by means of discharging a firearm, 
carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license.  The defendant filed a timely notice 
of appeal.  In December 2019, the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial.  The motion was denied without a hearing by a 
different judge.4  Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was also denied.  The defendant then 
filed another notice of appeal, and the Appeals Court 
consolidated the defendant's direct appeal with his appeal from 
the orders denying his motions for a new trial and 
reconsideration.  We then transferred the case sua sponte to 
this court. 
Discussion.  Because the issues in this case deal with the 
admission of character evidence pursuant to Adjutant, 443 Mass. 
at 663-667, we briefly discuss character or propensity evidence 
more generally to put the issue in context before specifically 
addressing the purpose and admissibility of Adjutant evidence. 
 
4 The motion was decided by a different judge as the trial 
judge had since retired. 
10 
 
"Evidence of a person's bad character is generally not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity with it."  Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 562 
(2003).  Specific acts of bad conduct may be relevant and 
admissible for a nonpropensity purpose such as state of mind, 
intent, knowledge, or modus operandi, but as a general rule 
evidence of such acts cannot be used for the purpose of 
establishing the defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the crime charged.  Id. at 562-563.  Notably, if 
character evidence is misused "either in the examination of a 
witness or in closing argument, we have long recognized that 
instructions from the trial judge may mitigate any prejudice."  
Id. at 564. 
In certain very limited circumstances, the defendant may 
offer evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(2)(B)-(C).  The defendant may offer 
evidence known to the defendant of the victim's reputation for 
violence to demonstrate, when relevant, the defendant's 
reasonable apprehension of the victim.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 735-736 (1986).  See also Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(a)(2)(C).  He or she may also offer, for the same 
purpose, evidence of specific violent acts by the victim that 
were previously known to the defendant and evidence of threats 
to the defendant allegedly made by the victim and communicated 
11 
 
to the defendant by the victim or a third party.  See, e.g., 
Fontes, supra; Commonwealth v. Edmonds, 365 Mass. 496, 499-500 
(1974).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(2)(C).  Often 
understandably confused with character evidence admissible for 
propensity purposes, this evidence is not propensity evidence 
and may not be considered for propensity purposes.  Rather, it 
is relevant and admissible evidence relating to the defendant's 
state of mind.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 
220, 227 (2023) ("defendant argued that it was reasonable for 
him to assume that the victim had a gun at the park because the 
defendant had seen the victim's social media posts that depicted 
the victim with a gun").  See also Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 654 
("Massachusetts has long followed the evidentiary rule that 
permits the introduction of evidence of the victim's violent 
character . . . as it bears on the defendant's state of 
mind . . ."). 
1.  Adjutant evidence.  With this context in mind, we now 
discuss Adjutant evidence.  "Notwithstanding our usual 
hesitation to allow the admission of character evidence to prove 
conduct" in conformity therewith, pursuant to Adjutant, and as 
subsequently clarified in Chambers, there is a narrow exception 
to the general prohibition on character or propensity evidence 
that allows the admission of specific acts of violent conduct by 
a victim to be admitted in evidence and considered for 
12 
 
propensity purposes.  Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 660.  See Chambers, 
465 Mass. at 528-530.  In Adjutant, supra at 664, we held that 
"where the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute and the 
victim has a history of violence, . . . the trial judge has the 
discretion to admit evidence of specific acts of prior violent 
conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to have initiated, 
to support the defendant's claim of self-defense," regardless of 
whether the defendant knew of the victim's prior violent acts.  
This evidence "may be admitted as tending to prove that the 
victim and not the defendant was likely to have been the 'first 
aggressor'" because it may show "that the victim acted in 
conformance with his character for violence" on the occasion in 
question.  Id. at 654. 
Subsequently, in Chambers, we clarified "that the term 
'first aggressor' is not limited to the person who provokes or 
initiates" the conflict.  Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263, citing 
Chambers, 465 Mass. at 528-530.  Rather, in the context of 
Adjutant evidence, the term "first aggressor" encompasses both 
the person who started the fight and the person who first 
escalated a nondeadly fight into a deadly one by either the 
threat or use of deadly force.5  See Chambers, supra.  See also 
Deconinck, supra. 
 
5 While not at issue in this case, it is worth noting that 
if a defendant introduces Adjutant evidence, "the prosecution 
13 
 
"[A]s often occurs [in cases where] self-defense is at 
issue, there [can be] confusing and conflicting evidence of what 
actually happened and a dispute about the identity of the first 
aggressor."  Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 307 (2013).  
The purpose of Adjutant evidence "is to give the jury a full 
picture of the altercation so as to make an informed decision 
about the identity of the initial aggressor."  Deconinck, 480 
Mass. at 263, quoting Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 
718, 737 (2007).  Our rationale for creating this exception to 
the general prohibition on propensity evidence "can be found in 
the view that evidence reflecting the victim's propensity for 
 
may rebut by introducing evidence of the victim's propensity for 
peacefulness."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(2)(B) note, citing 
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666 n.19.  We also held in Commonwealth 
v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 303 (2013), that "where a defendant 
offers Adjutant evidence, the Commonwealth may offer evidence of 
the defendant's prior violent acts, provided that the 
Commonwealth gives the defendant advance notice of its intent to 
offer such evidence 'and the trial judge determines that,'" 
Chambers, 465 Mass. at 521 n.1, quoting Morales, supra, "its 
probative value is [not] outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant," Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 
228, 249 & n.27 (2014) (clarifying standard for determining 
admissibility of bad act evidence).  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 
480 Mass. 799, 809 n.9 (2018). 
 
"Our case law has not always been consistent regarding the 
[applicable] standard[s] for excluding evidence."  Moore, supra.  
In Crayton, supra, we clarified that the "more exacting 
standard" of admissibility applies to bad act evidence.  We 
acknowledge that such an inconsistency appeared in Chambers 
where we discussed the Commonwealth's ability to rebut the 
defendant's Adjutant evidence with evidence of the defendant's 
bad acts.  See Chambers, 465 Mass. at 521 n.1. 
14 
 
violence has substantial probative value and will help the jury 
identify the first aggressor [or the first to initiate or 
threaten deadly violence] when the circumstances of the 
altercation are in dispute."  Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 656.  
"Whether [the victim] was a violent [person], prone to 
aggression . . . , 'throws light' on the crucial question at the 
heart of" such cases -- who attacked whom first or who escalated 
the situation to one involving deadly force.  Id. at 657-658, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 356, cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 815 (1993).  And "[t]o decide what really occurred the 
jury need[] all the available facts, including evidence of [the 
victim's prior violence]."  Adjutant, supra at 659, quoting 
People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1984). 
We recognize that because Adjutant evidence is propensity 
evidence "admitted expressly 'for the purpose of showing that 
the victim acted in conformance with his [or her] character for 
violence,' . . . there [is] a risk both of prejudice and of 
misunderstanding on the jury's part as to the purpose of its 
admission."  Morales, 464 Mass. at 307, quoting Adjutant, 443 
Mass. at 654.  It is the trial judge's role to take action to 
mitigate such risks.  See Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 
798 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Rollings, 354 Mass. 630, 638 
(1968) ("The parties are entitled to have a jury appropriately 
guided at all stages by the trial judge, whose proper 
15 
 
participation is essential to fair trial by jury").  Indeed, 
"[i]t is the judge's function to act as the 'guiding spirit and 
controlling mind at a trial,'" Kapaia, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 368 (2004), and in that 
guiding role, "[i]t is for the trial judge to evaluate the 
proffered [Adjutant] evidence's probative value and admit so 
much of that evidence as is noncumulative and relevant to the 
defendant's self-defense claim," Adjutant, supra at 663.  The 
judge's discretion "to exclude marginally relevant or grossly 
prejudicial evidence" is important, as it "prevent[s] the undue 
exploration of collateral issues."  See id.  Moreover, it is 
incumbent on the trial judge to use adequate jury instructions 
to further mitigate prejudice and confusion "by delineating the 
precise purpose for which the [Adjutant] evidence is offered."  
Id. at 664. 
a. Adjutant evidence in this case.  In light of the 
foregoing principles, we turn to the specifics of this case.  
The Adjutant evidence in this case included testimony by police 
officers regarding multiple instances in which the victim 
started a fight at a restaurant or bar, ultimately resulting in 
him fighting with police officers.  During testimony of two of 
the officers, after defense counsel elicited testimony about how 
the violent incidents began, the prosecutor objected to further 
questions about how the confrontation continued. 
16 
 
Specifically, after the prosecutor's initial objections 
during the first officer's testimony, the parties had the 
following conversation at sidebar: 
The judge:  "It seems to me you have established that was 
the first occasion with violence with this individual, that 
he kicked him.  Anything further I don't see as --" 
 
Defense counsel:  "There's, I guess, what's the relevancy 
of anything once you have established that he was a violent 
individual who kicked out and specific acts of violence, 
that he kicked -- this person approached him, he kicked at 
him or someone -- at him." 
 
The judge:  "But --" 
 
Defense counsel:  "Well, the relevancy is that [the victim] 
is not an individual who stops, it takes a lot to subdue 
him.  I think that's important." 
 
The judge:  "That's not Adjutant, that's --" 
 
The prosecutor:  "It's well beyond the scope, I would say, 
Judge." 
 
The judge:  "Prior conduct showing a propensity, that's not 
Adjutant.  Adjutant you get to show that someone was the 
first to act in a violent manner toward someone else.  You 
have done that.  What they did afterwards, I don't think 
it's beyond -- that is creating trials within trials.  It's 
polluting the trial." 
 
After defense counsel elicited from the second police 
officer that the victim started another physical fight, the 
prosecutor objected, and the following exchange occurred at 
sidebar: 
The judge:  "What do you anticipate the response to be?" 
 
Defense counsel:  "I think the response is going to be that 
he wrestled with him, then he had ta[s]ed him a couple of 
times to stop him from kicking.  That's important." 
17 
 
 
The prosecutor:  "Again, Judge, same objection as 
previously, this doesn't go to Adjutant at this point." 
 
The judge:  "I'll sustain the objection." 
 
The defendant contends that the officers should have been 
allowed to continue their testimony and explain the full scope 
of each violent incident initiated by the victim.  Based on 
police reports about these incidents, the defendant contends 
that the first officer would have explained that the victim's 
violence did not stop after the victim was handcuffed.  Rather, 
it continued while he was being transported to the police 
station, and persisted even after he arrived at the police 
station.  The defendant explains that the second officer would 
have testified that the victim's violence was so severe that the 
officer needed to tase the victim multiple times in order to 
subdue him.  The defendant argues that this testimony concerning 
the entirety of the violent incidents was admissible and 
consistent with the purposes of Adjutant because it demonstrated 
the victim's propensity for violence and, specifically, that the 
victim was prone to initiate violence and that, when he did so, 
he was unrelenting and would inevitably continue even when 
presented with lawful opposition.  The defendant contends that, 
in ruling this evidence inadmissible, the judge's statements 
demonstrate that she believed Adjutant evidence was strictly 
limited to evidence of the victim initiating violence, rather 
18 
 
than the whole violent incident.  By contrast, the Commonwealth 
argues that the judge merely exercised her discretion under 
Adjutant to exclude the remainder of the evidence after 
considering its probative value and prejudicial effect. 
We take this opportunity to emphasize that Adjutant 
evidence is not strictly limited to testimony that the victim 
initiated a violent incident or started a fight.  In cases 
involving a claim of self-defense, where the identity of the 
first aggressor is in dispute, trial judges have discretion to 
admit in evidence "specific incidents of violence," Adjutant, 
443 Mass. at 650, or put another way, "specific acts of prior 
violent conduct," Morales, 464 Mass. at 307, that the victim is 
reasonably alleged to have initiated.  See, e.g., Deconinck, 480 
Mass. at 263-264; Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529-531; Adjutant, 
supra at 650, 664.  While we have referred to both prior "acts" 
and "specific incidents" to describe this evidence, our case law 
has always maintained that the focus is on the victim's prior 
violent behavior.  See, e.g., Adjutant, supra at 650 ("we are 
persuaded that evidence of a victim's prior violent conduct may 
be probative of whether the victim was the first aggressor").  
Nothing in our jurisprudence has limited this evidence to only 
the victim's initial act.  Such a limitation would be contrary 
to the primary purpose of Adjutant evidence:  providing the jury 
with a "full picture" including propensity evidence, so that the 
19 
 
jury may "make an informed decision about the identity of the 
initial aggressor."  Deconinck, supra at 263, quoting Pring-
Wilson, 448 Mass. at 737.  See Adjutant, supra at 658-659.  
Where a defendant seeks to introduce Adjutant evidence of a 
victim's violent conduct, the conduct must involve instances 
where the victim initiated the violence.  If that condition is 
satisfied, the entirety of the violent event or incident 
initiated by the victim is potentially admissible. 
The admission of Adjutant evidence is subject to the 
careful discretion of the trial judge, who "must carefully 
examine the particular circumstances of the case, and weigh the 
probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial 
effect."  Morales, 464 Mass. at 312 n.16.  And in the exercise 
of that discretion, a judge may reasonably exclude evidence 
regarding entire instances of victim-initiated violence, or 
alternatively limit the extent that a witness could testify 
about a particular violent incident initiated by a victim. 
We now turn to the judge's exclusion of the evidence at 
issue in this case.  "We do not disturb a judge's decision to 
admit [or exclude] evidence absent an abuse of discretion or 
other legal error."  Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003).  
A judge abuses his or her discretion where the judge made "a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the facts relevant to the 
decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range 
20 
 
of reasonable alternatives."  Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 264, 
quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  A 
judge's failure to recognize that he or she has discretion is 
necessarily an error of law.  See Guilfoyle, 396 Mass. at 1004 
("if a judge admits a record on the mistaken belief that he has 
no discretion to exclude it, he has committed an error of law in 
failing to recognize that he had discretion").  See also, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 728-729 (2005) ("The 
judge below thus erred in declining to exercise any discretion 
. . . .  That the exercise of discretion could, had it been 
undertaken, permissibly have resulted in the same decision to 
exclude the [evidence] does not necessarily insulate the error 
from reversal"); Commonwealth v. Knight, 392 Mass. 192, 194 
(1984) ("[I]t is the duty of the judge to exercise [discretion], 
and it is error as a matter of law to refuse to exercise it" 
[citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 
253, 259 n.10 (2002) ("Failure to exercise discretion is itself 
an abuse of discretion"). 
But reversal is warranted only where the requisite 
prejudice to the aggrieved party is present.6  The amount of 
 
6 The defendant contends that reversal is required in this 
case based on our statement in Adjutant that "[w]here the record 
shows that the judge has failed to exercise discretion, there 
exists an error of law requiring reversal" (citation omitted).  
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666.  This statement from Adjutant has 
been stated both directly and with slight variation in several 
21 
 
prejudice required to warrant reversal ultimately depends on 
whether the aggrieved party objected to the judge's evidentiary 
ruling.  Where a party has objected to the judge's ruling, we 
apply the prejudicial error standard.  "This means that we 
inquire[] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error might have contributed to the jury's verdict" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 
150 (2017).  "An error is not prejudicial if it did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Id.  However, where a party has not 
objected, we must determine whether the error resulted in a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845-846 (2010).  A 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice occurs when we have 
a "serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
 
prior cases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boyer, 400 Mass. 52, 57 
(1987).  We now acknowledge that the portion of the sentence 
indicating that reversal is required was a misstatement of law. 
 
There are only a small number of instances where an error 
at trial, in and of itself, requires reversal even without a 
showing of prejudice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 
Mass. 539, 545 (2017) ("An erroneous denial of a peremptory 
challenge is a structural error, requiring reversal without a 
showing of prejudice").  Evidentiary rulings involving Adjutant 
evidence do not fall into that narrow category.  Rather, 
"[w]here the record shows that the judge has failed to exercise 
discretion, there exists an error of law requiring" a 
determination whether the prejudice created by the error, as 
dictated by the applicable standard of review, warrants 
reversal.  See Adjutant, supra. 
22 
 
different had the error not been made" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 189 (2014). 
Although admittedly a close call, we agree with the 
defendant that the trial judge failed to recognize the scope of 
admissible Adjutant evidence and that her ruling was an error of 
law.  Specifically, the judge's statement that "[p]rior conduct 
showing [the victim's] propensity" is not Adjutant evidence is 
inconsistent with our Adjutant jurisprudence.  Adjutant evidence 
is by definition propensity evidence, although propensity 
evidence admitted in limited circumstances, in a specific form, 
and for a limited purpose.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Camacho, 
472 Mass. 587, 593 (2015); Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529-530; 
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 660.  Moreover, the judge's statement 
intimating that evidence of what a victim did after initiating 
violence was beyond the scope of Adjutant demonstrates a belief 
that Adjutant evidence is strictly limited to evidence that a 
victim initiated violence, as opposed to evidence of the over-
all violent occurrence.  Therefore, based on the judge's 
statements, we conclude that the judge mistakenly believed she 
did not have discretion to allow evidence regarding the entirety 
of the violent incidents initiated by the victim.  As such, her 
failure to recognize her discretion necessarily constitutes 
23 
 
error.7  See, e.g., Knight, 392 Mass. at 194.  Because the judge 
erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection over defense 
counsel's protests, we apply the prejudicial error standard and 
must determine whether failing to admit evidence regarding the 
entirety of these two violent events "did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 431 Mass. 265, 273 (2000).  See 
Commonwealth v. Wray, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 405-406 (2015).  We 
conclude that the error was not prejudicial. 
"[W]e do not speculate as to what the judge would have done 
had she recognized her discretion," Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666, 
but ultimately we discern no prejudice from the exclusion of the 
additional testimony in light of the evidence that was admitted 
in support of the defendant's theory of self-defense.  Pursuant 
to Adjutant, evidence of these three separate violent acts by 
the victim were admitted, all of which showed the victim 
initiating physical violence and ultimately fighting with police 
officers.  Specifically, one officer testified that while the 
officer was working a paid detail at a bar in Fall River, the 
victim started a fight in an elevator and ultimately fought with 
both bouncers and the officer himself before the officer was 
 
7 We emphasize, however, that the judge has wide discretion 
as to what, if any, part of the specific instance of conduct 
should be admitted on the issue of who was the first to initiate 
violence or who was the first to threaten or use deadly force. 
24 
 
able to place the victim under arrest.  The officer told the 
jury that he needed the bouncers' help to arrest the victim 
because the victim would not stop fighting.  A second officer 
testified about how on a different occasion, at a different bar, 
three officers intervened in a fight involving the victim.  The 
officer described how when he told the victim to stop fighting, 
the victim not only did not stop fighting, but also responded by 
kicking the officer.  Finally, a third officer testified about 
another incident at a bar.  That officer explained that the 
victim got involved in yet another fight at a bar and the police 
officer went to escort the victim out of the bar.  Rather than 
leave the bar, the victim "ripped his arm away from [the 
officer]."  The victim then shoved the officer, and "a physical 
altercation between [the victim and the officer] ensued." 
Moreover, the defendant testified that the victim had a 
reputation as a fighter.  While not Adjutant evidence, this 
evidence was admitted as to the state of mind induced in the 
recipient of this knowledge -- the defendant.  See, e.g., 
Fontes, 396 Mass. at 735 ("A defendant may present evidence of 
the victim's reputation as a violent or quarrelsome person and 
of his own knowledge of that reputation . . .").  See also 
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 654 (victim's reputation as violent 
person and instances of victim's prior acts of violence are 
admissible "if known to the defendant, as it bears on the 
25 
 
defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of his action 
in claiming to have acted in self-defense").  The jury also 
heard evidence about the repeated and quite explicit threats 
that the victim sent to the defendant, including that the victim 
"wanted to kick [the defendant's] ass," that the victim "was 
going to break [the defendant's] neck," that the victim "wanted 
[to] bust [the defendant's] head," and that the victim was going 
to "videotape [himself beating the defendant] and put it on 
YouTube."  See, e.g., Edmonds, 365 Mass. at 499-500, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rubin, 318 Mass. 587, 588-590 (1945) ("Where 
self defence is invoked by a defendant, threats of violence made 
against him by the person hurt or killed by him are generally 
admissible, when known to the defendant before the act, as 
evidence of his apprehension for his own safety, and the 
reasonableness of that apprehension").  We also referenced in 
Adjutant this type of nonhearsay, nonpropensity evidence as it 
relates to the state of mind of the recipient of the 
information.  See Adjutant, supra at 654. 
The evidence connecting the victim with violence and the 
defendant's knowledge of the victim's reputation for violence 
and his threats to the defendant went largely undisputed.  Based 
upon the Adjutant evidence, and the evidence of the defendant's 
knowledge of the victim's reputation for violence and his 
previous threats to the defendant, it is doubtful that 
26 
 
additional testimony from the officers about the victim's 
continued violence would have added much to the already 
significant evidence of the victim's violence.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 398 (2011); Commonwealth 
v. Cyr, 433 Mass. 617, 625 (2001).  We therefore discern no 
prejudice flowing from the judge's error. 
b.  Adjutant instructions.  Proper limiting instructions 
are an integral part of a jury trial, and a judge's role in 
crafting those instructions is critical.  Bad act or propensity 
evidence has a particular danger of creating undue prejudice, 
and in instances where such evidence is admitted, specificity 
and precision in the jury instructions both at the time the 
evidence is admitted and in final instructions is key.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 148 n.8 (2023) ("We 
take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of specificity 
and precision in the context of ruling on bad act evidence").  
While limiting instructions are essential when bad act evidence 
is admitted for a nonpropensity purpose, clear and precise jury 
instructions are perhaps of at least comparable importance when 
Adjutant evidence is admitted because it is one of the few 
instances where we allow the jury to make propensity inferences.  
As relevant to the defendant's claims, the judge gave the 
following instruction at trial: 
27 
 
"For purposes of determining who attacked whom first in the 
altercation, you may consider evidence of the deceased's 
prior past violent conduct, whether or not the defendant 
knew of it.  You cannot consider such evidence for any 
other purposes whatsoever." 
 
Although there were slight variations to her instructions 
during the trial, the judge gave substantially similar 
instructions each time Adjutant evidence was admitted and during 
the final charge.8  While the defendant did not object to the 
instructions at trial, he now makes two challenges on appeal.  
He contends first that because the case was tried after 
 
8 As relevant to Adjutant evidence, the Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide in effect at the time of trial 
provided:  "For the purpose of determining who attacked whom 
first in the altercation, you may consider evidence of the 
deceased's [and a third party acting together with the 
deceased's] past violent conduct, whether or not the defendant 
knew of it."  Chambers, 465 Mass. at 528 n.8, quoting Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 28-29 & n.68 (2013). 
 
Subsequently, the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide were 
amended in 2018.  While the language quoted above remains the 
same, see Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 34 & n.82 (2018), 
the amended instructions have an additional instruction, which 
cites to Chambers, 465 Mass. at 528, and states: 
 
"However, if the defendant was the first to use non-deadly 
force but the deceased [or a third party acting together 
with the deceased] was the first to use deadly force, such 
as by escalating a simple fist-fight into a knife fight, 
the defendant may claim self-defense where he responded to 
the escalation with deadly force." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 34 & n.81 (2018).  Judges 
are encouraged "[i]n appropriate cases, [to] add [that] 
instruction" before giving the Adjutant instruction retained 
from the 2013 model instructions.  See id. at 34.  Compare Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide 28-29 & n.68 (2013) with Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide 34 & nn.81-82 (2018). 
28 
 
Chambers, the judge erred by not specifically instructing the 
jury that the victim's prior violence also could be considered 
to determine who escalated the confrontation by the threat or 
use of deadly force.  Second, he contends that under Chambers, 
Adjutant evidence can be considered expansively to determine 
whether the Commonwealth disproved self-defense generally, and 
as such the judge's final sentence explicitly limiting the 
Adjutant evidence to the issue of who attacked whom first was 
also error.  The defendant argues that these errors individually 
and collectively created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice warranting a new trial.  We address each argument in 
turn. 
i.  Failure to expand the definition of first aggressor.  
"[A] trial judge is not constrained to use any particular 
language in his [or her] instructions; rather he [or she] is 
required only to provide a full and accurate explanation of the 
governing law applicable to a particular case."  Commonwealth v. 
Berrio, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 838 (1997).  Additionally, "[a] 
judge is not required to instruct on a hypothesis that is not 
supported by the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 
662, 680 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Gould, 413 Mass. 707, 
715 (1992). 
The defendant contends that because Chambers expanded the 
definition of first aggressor, he was entitled to a jury 
29 
 
instruction that explained that Adjutant evidence could be 
considered to determine both who started the fight and who 
escalated the fight by the threat or use of deadly force.  As a 
general proposition, we agree with the defendant that, because 
Adjutant evidence is admissible to determine not only who 
initiated the fight but also who escalated it to one involving 
deadly force, the jury should, when both issues are raised at 
trial, be instructed accordingly.  However, just as the disputed 
issues at trial ultimately determine whether Adjutant evidence 
is admissible, the disputed issues at trial necessarily 
determine the appropriate jury instruction. 
A prerequisite to the admissibility of Adjutant evidence is 
that the identity of either the first to initiate violence or 
the first to escalate the conflict through the threat or use of 
deadly force be in dispute.  See, e.g., Camacho, 472 Mass. at 
593.  Where neither issue is in dispute, Adjutant evidence is 
not admissible.  Id. at 594 (no error in excluding Adjutant 
evidence where "the primary question for the jury was not who 
began the altercation or escalated it to deadly force, but 
rather whether the defendant was legally entitled to use the 
force that he did in defense of another").  Where only one of 
those issues is in dispute, Adjutant evidence is admissible in 
order for the jury to determine that one issue.  See id. at 593-
594.  And where both issues are in dispute, Adjutant evidence is 
30 
 
admissible in order for the jury to determine both issues.  See 
id.  Therefore, the instruction to which the defendant contends 
he was entitled is only required where the evidence demonstrates 
a dispute as to who "initiated the use or threat of deadly 
force."  See, e.g., Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529-530.  See also 
Gallett, 481 Mass. at 680.  Cf. Camacho, supra. 
Here, the defendant's position at trial was that the victim 
was killed in lawful self-defense.  Like many of our cases where 
Adjutant evidence was admissible, there was inconsistent 
testimony about how the fatal fight began.  Cf. Pring-Wilson, 
448 Mass. at 723-724 (defendant's version of fight "differed 
markedly" from that of witnesses).  Specifically, there was 
conflicting evidence about how the fight began, how it 
progressed, and even how many people were involved in it.  
Crucially, however, it was undisputed that during what was 
essentially a fist fight, the defendant had a firearm, produced 
said firearm, and fired it.  Given the largely undisputed 
evidence on that point, including the defendant's admission to 
firing a "warning shot" after he was hit, there was no question 
that the defendant was the first to introduce deadly force.  See 
Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 827 (1977) ("[D]eadly 
force [is defined] as force intended or likely to cause death or 
great bodily harm. . . .  Clearly the defendant in this case 
used deadly force in firing shots from a handgun").  Thus, the 
31 
 
key questions for the jury were who started the confrontation 
and whether the defendant was legally entitled to use the force 
that he did.  Cf. Camacho, 472 Mass. at 594-596.  The identity 
of the person who escalated the conflict to one involving deadly 
force was not in dispute.  Therefore, the defendant was not 
entitled to an instruction informing the jury that the Adjutant 
evidence could be considered to determine who threatened deadly 
force or escalated the conflict to one involving deadly force.  
As such, there was no error. 
While there was no error in this case, and the current 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide appropriately cite to both 
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, and Chambers, 465 Mass. at 528, see 
Model Jury Instruction on Homicide, 33-34 & nn. 81-82 (2018), we 
take this opportunity, in the Appendix to this opinion, to 
revise the current instruction in order to more concisely and 
understandably explain how the jury may consider Adjutant 
evidence.  Henceforth, where the identity of the person who 
first threatened or used deadly force is at issue, a judge's 
instruction should inform the jury that the victim's prior acts 
of violence may also be considered in order to make that 
determination.  See Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263-264.  Where the 
identity of the person who started the fight and the identity of 
the person who escalated the fight are in dispute, a judge's 
instruction should explicitly inform the jury that the victim's 
32 
 
prior acts of violence may be considered for both purposes.  See 
id. 
ii.  Final limiting sentence.  The defendant next contends 
that the final sentence of the judge's charge instructing the 
jury that they could only consider the Adjutant evidence to 
determine who attacked whom first was error.  He argues that 
pursuant to Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529, Adjutant evidence is 
broadly admissible so that the jury may determine whether the 
Commonwealth proved the defendant did not act in self-defense as 
a general matter.  We disagree and conclude that such an 
instruction excluding from the jury's consideration the use of 
the Adjutant evidence more broadly so as to determine whether 
the Commonwealth had proved lack of self-defense was not error. 
As explained in detail supra, we clarified in Chambers, 465 
Mass. at 528-530, that the term "first aggressor" is not limited 
to the person who provoked or initiated the confrontation but 
includes the person who escalated a confrontation from one 
involving nondeadly force to one involving deadly force.  See 
Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263.  While conducting our analysis in 
Chambers, after explaining the origins and purpose of the rule 
from Adjutant, but before clarifying the term "first aggressor," 
we made the following statements: 
"It is important to note that, although Adjutant evidence 
may assist a jury to determine whether the defendant has 
lost the right of self-defense, it is not limited to this 
33 
 
purpose.  In the Adjutant case, as in this case, the jury 
were not instructed that a first aggressor loses the right 
to claim self-defense, so we reasonably may infer that the 
contested evidence was not admitted for the purpose of 
addressing that issue.  Rather, it was admitted for the 
broader purpose of giving the jury relevant information 
regarding the victim's prior acts of violence that may help 
them to evaluate the conflicting evidence, to arrive at the 
truth regarding the events that led to the victim's death, 
and ultimately to determine whether the prosecution has met 
its burden of proving that the defendant did not act in 
self-defense." 
 
Chambers, supra at 529. 
The defendant contends that this language was a 
pronouncement by this court expanding the permissible use of 
Adjutant evidence, such that it may be broadly considered "to 
determine the overall question of whether the Commonwealth 
proved that the defendant did not act in proper self-defense."  
This argument takes the quoted language out of context.  This 
language is part of a broader discussion explaining the law of 
self-defense and its intersection with Adjutant evidence before 
clarifying and expanding our understanding of the term "first 
aggressor."  See Chambers, 465 Mass. at 528-530.  And while we 
have repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of our decision in 
Chambers was to expand or clarify the definition of first 
aggressor, see, e.g., Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263; Camacho, 472 
Mass. at 593, we acknowledge that the language upon which the 
defendant relies has potential to create confusion.  Therefore, 
we take this opportunity to explicitly articulate the limited 
34 
 
purposes for which Adjutant evidence may be considered within 
the broader context of self-defense. 
Adjutant evidence is not broadly admissible to determine 
whether the Commonwealth has disproved self-defense.  As we 
explained in our original Adjutant decision, and have 
consistently reiterated in subsequent cases, Adjutant evidence 
is admissible for the "limited purpose of supporting the 
defendant's self-defense claim that the victim was the first 
aggressor" (emphasis added).  Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 660.  
Adjutant evidence is exclusively admissible to help the jury 
identify who initiated the conflict and who was the first person 
to use deadly force when relevant to the issue of self-defense.  
See Chambers, 465 Mass. at 530 ("the resolution of [who 
initiated the violence or escalated the conflict by the use or 
threat of deadly force] may assist the jury in deciding whether 
the prosecution has met its burden of proving that the defendant 
did not act in self-defense").  Cf. Camacho, 472 Mass. at 594 
("Neither the identity of the person who threw the bottle nor 
the identity of the person who fired shots is in dispute, and 
the limited sweep of Adjutant and Chambers does not authorize 
the introduction of evidence to shed light on any other 
question"). 
Limiting the scope of Adjutant evidence is consistent with 
our recognition that when the "first aggressor," as defined by 
35 
 
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 649-650, 664, and Chambers, 465 Mass. at 
528-530, is disputed, evidence about the victim's prior violent 
conduct is considered relevant and probative to determining who 
the first aggressor was.  Comacho, 472 Mass. at 591-592.  
Moreover, this limitation on Adjutant evidence strikes the 
requisite balance between the primary purpose of allowing 
Adjutant evidence -- "to give the jury a full picture of the 
altercation so as to make an informed decision about the 
identity of the first aggressor," Deconinck, 480 Mass. at 263, 
quoting Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. at 737 -- and our general 
distrust of propensity evidence, Adjutant, supra at 661-662.  As 
such, we discern no error in the judge instructing the jury in 
this case that they were not permitted to consider the victim's 
prior bad acts for any purpose other than determining who 
attacked whom first. 
2.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant next 
claims that the prosecutor misstated evidence in his closing 
argument.  He specifically takes issue with the prosecutor's 
first few sentences:  "'Tell Kyle Brady I've got something for 
him.  Tell Kyle Brady I've got something for him.'  Those are 
the words that this defendant used outside of [the bar] when he 
was talking to [Emond]." 
"Although 'counsel may argue the evidence and the fair 
inferences which can be drawn from the evidence,' . . . 'a 
36 
 
prosecutor should not . . . misstate the evidence of refer to 
facts not in evidence.'"  Kapaia, 490 Mass. at 804, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 221 (2022).  "Such 
arguments are improper."  Kapaia, supra.  Because there was no 
objection lodged at trial, we review to determine whether any 
error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 554 (2003). 
The defendant's statement was that "he had something for 
Kyle Brady," not "Tell Kyle Brady I've got something for him."  
As such, the prosecutor's statement to some extent misstated the 
evidence.  "Because the prosecutor's statement was improper, 'we 
are guided by the following factors when deciding whether' the 
error created a substantial [risk] of a miscarriage of justice: 
'[(1)] whether defense counsel seasonably objected to the 
arguments at trial . . . [(2)] whether the judge's instructions 
mitigated the error . . . [(3)] whether the errors in the 
arguments went to the heart of the issues at trial or concerned 
collateral matters . . . [(4)] whether the jury would be able to 
sort out the excessive claims made by the prosecutor . . . and 
[(5)] whether the Commonwealth's case was so overwhelming that 
the errors did not prejudice the defendant.'"  Kapaia, 490 Mass. 
at 804 & n.13, quoting Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 
635 (2021).  No one factor is dispositive, and our ultimate 
focus is whether we have a serious doubt that the result of the 
37 
 
trial might have been different had the statement not been made.  
Kapaia, supra at 804 n.13.  See Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 
1012, 1016-1017 (2016). 
Although the statement was technically inaccurate, we 
discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The 
prosecutor's statement was a minor deviation from what the 
defendant actually said.  It occupied only two lines of an 
approximately fifteen-page closing argument.  See Kapaia, 490 
Mass. at 804-805.  Moreover, the judge properly "instructed the 
jury that closing arguments are not evidence and that, to the 
extent an attorney's statement conflicts with their memory, it 
is the jury's memory that controls."  Id. at 805.  See 
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018) (where judge 
properly instructed jury that closing arguments were not 
evidence, brief isolated statement was "not egregious enough to 
infect the whole of the trial").  "Furthermore, '[w]e ascribe a 
certain level of sophistication to the jury, and, [on this 
record], have little doubt that they would not have been swayed 
by this [misstatement].'"  Kapaia, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 181 (2020). 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argued that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to present additional easily obtainable 
evidence about the victim's reputation for violence and 
38 
 
additional instances of prior violence initiated by the victim.  
He maintains this argument on appeal. 
Where, as here, the defendant claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective, "we ask whether counsel's performance fell 
'measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinarily fallible lawyer,' and 'likely deprived the defendant 
of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Henry, 488 Mass. 484, 497 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  "The burden 
of proving entitlement to a new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel rests on the defendant."  Commonwealth v. 
Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 256 (2009).  "A defendant must show that 
better work might have accomplished something material for the 
defense."  Id.  "A strategic or tactical decision by counsel 
will not be considered ineffective assistance unless the 
decision was manifestly unreasonable when made" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id.  Only decisions that a lawyer of 
ordinary training and skill in criminal law would not consider 
competent are manifestly unreasonable.  Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 
(2017). 
Here, trial counsel's strategy in support of the victim's 
self-defense claim involved showing the jury that the victim was 
a "violent person with a history of getting into fights."  This 
39 
 
focus on the victim's violence was present in both trial 
counsel's opening statement and closing argument.  And the 
argument that the victim was a ferocious and violent person was 
supported by the evidence.  During the defendant's case-in-
chief, three police officers testified about three separate 
violent fights initiated by the victim, and the defendant 
himself testified about both the victim's reputation as a 
fighter and the threatening messages that the victim had been 
sending him in the months preceding the conflict. 
In essence, the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
present even more evidence about the victim's violence.  
Although some of evidence that the defendant contends should 
have been presented involved different violent acts by the 
victim, there already was powerful Adjutant evidence and 
evidence regarding the defendant's knowledge of the victim's 
reputation for violence that was properly admitted to support 
the defendant's theory of self-defense.  The evidence that the 
defendant contends should have been offered would have been 
admitted for the same purpose and to support the same theory of 
the case, thereby rendering it cumulative.9  And "[t]he failure 
 
9 By stating that the evidence was cumulative, we express no 
view on how the trial judge might have exercised her discretion 
to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of," inter alia, 
40 
 
to offer cumulative evidence is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  Commonwealth v. Drew, 447 Mass. 635, 650 (2006), 
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 943 (2007).  See Commonwealth v. Britt, 
465 Mass. 87, 94 (2013) ("The decision not to raise cumulative 
evidence merely for quantity's sake does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel").  Therefore, trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to offer this additional 
evidence. 
4.  Firearm convictions.  Finally, the defendant challenges 
his conviction of carrying a firearm without a license and 
carrying a loaded firearm without a license based on the absence 
of a jury instruction requiring the Commonwealth to prove that 
the defendant did not have a valid license to possess a firearm.  
Recently, in Guardado, 491 Mass. at 690, 693, we held that "to 
convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm, the 
Commonwealth must prove as an element of the crime charged that 
the defendant in fact failed to comply with the licensure 
requirements for possessing a firearm" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 690.  Our decision was based on the United 
States Supreme Court's recognition, in New York State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022) (Bruen), 
that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
 
"needlessly presenting cumulative evidence" if the evidence had 
been offered.  Mass. G. Evid. § 403. 
41 
 
protects an individual's right to carry a firearm outside the 
home.  For that reason, our precedent predicated on a narrower 
view of the rights secured by the Second Amendment, see 
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 807 (2012), no longer was 
valid.  Guardado, supra at 689-690.  The Guardado holding 
applied prospectively and to those cases, like this one, that 
were active or pending on direct review as of the date of the 
issuance of Bruen. 
Without the benefit of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Bruen, or of our ruling in Guardado, the judge did not instruct 
the jury that the Commonwealth was required to prove an absence 
of a valid license, and the defendant did not object to the 
instructions.  When the issue appealed is not preserved, we 
usually grant relief only if the error created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  In Guardado, however, we 
applied the "clairvoyance exception" to excuse the failure to 
object to the absence of a jury instruction on licensure because 
"the constitutional theory on which the defendant . . . relied 
was not sufficiently developed at the time of trial . . . to 
afford the defendant a genuine opportunity to raise his claim."  
Guardado, 491 Mass. at 686, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123, 126 (1984).  Here, similarly, the 
defendant did not have an "an adequate opportunity at the time 
of his trial to raise the present issue."  Guardado, supra.  
42 
 
Because the clairvoyance exception applies, "[t]he remaining 
question is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281, 286-287 
(1995). 
Here, as the Commonwealth concedes, no evidence was 
admitted at trial that would suggest the defendant did not have 
a license to carry a firearm.  As such, we cannot say that the 
judge's failure to instruct was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt and therefore vacate the defendant's convictions of 
carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license.10 
Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth supra, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree and 
assault and battery by discharge of a firearm and the orders 
denying his motions for a new trial and for reconsideration.  
However, we vacate the convictions of carrying a firearm without 
a license and carrying a loaded firearm without a license and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
 
10 The issue whether retrial shall be permitted is currently 
pending before the court and is scheduled for oral argument in 
September 2023.  See Commonwealth vs. Guardado, No. SJC-13315.  
The rescript in this opinion shall be stayed pending our 
decision in that case. 
Appendix. 
 
 
Model Jury Instruction -- Adjutant evidence. 
 
For the purpose of determining who attacked whom first in 
the altercation [or who escalated the potential for violence 
through the use or threat of deadly force], you may consider 
evidence of the deceased's [and a third party acting together 
with the deceased's] past violent conduct, whether or not the 
defendant knew of it.  You may not consider such evidence for 
any other purpose.