Title: Brinkmann v. Francois

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1899 
____________ 
 
JENNIFER BRINKMANN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
TYRON FRANCOIS, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
[February 4, 2016] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, Francois v. Brinkmann, 147 So. 3d 613, 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2014), which declares invalid section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), governing 
the residency requirement for write-in candidates of elections statewide.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
affirm the district court’s decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS 
 
The Fourth District set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 
case as follows: 
 
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Five candidates for Broward County Commissioner for District 
2, all Democrats, qualified to have their names printed on the ballot 
for the August 2014 primary election.  No Republican or Independent 
candidates filed qualifying papers.  [Tyron] Francois, a sixth 
candidate and also a Democrat, filed qualifying paperwork to run as a 
write-in candidate.  As a duly qualified write-in candidate, a blank 
space on the ballot for the November 2014 general election would 
have been provided to allow voters to write in Francois’s name as 
their vote for the county commissioner to serve District 2.  Francois’s 
status as a qualified write-in candidate would constitute “opposition,” 
as that term has been interpreted in relation to the Universal Primary 
Amendment (UPA), Article VI, section 5(b) of the Florida 
Constitution, thus requiring that the primary election be closed.  See 
Telli v. Snipes, 98 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 
Appellee [Jennifer] Brinkmann, a resident voter, filed a 
complaint in the circuit court, alleging that Francois was not properly 
qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live 
within the boundaries of the district as required by section 99.0615, 
Florida Statutes (2014).  Brinkmann also sought an order forcing the 
primary election to be opened to all voters pursuant to the UPA.  
Francois conceded below, as he does on appeal, that he did not live in 
the district at the time he filed papers to qualify as a write-in 
candidate.  However, he contends that section 99.0615 is facially 
unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Florida Constitution and 
violates equal protection.  After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified 
Francois as a write-in candidate.  The circuit court also entered an 
injunction that opened the primary election to all registered voters. 
 
Francois, 147 So. 3d at 614 (footnotes omitted).   
The Fourth District reversed the circuit court’s order, concluding that 
“section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is facially unconstitutional because the 
timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing 
of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by 
Article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution.”  Id. at 616.  In support of its 
 
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holding, the district court cited State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988), 
in which this “[C]ourt construed the constitutional provision [in article VIII, 
section 1(e), Florida Constitution,] regarding the residency requirement for county 
commissioners and stated that [t]he Florida Constitution requires residency at the 
time of election.”  Id. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Given this 
interpretation, the Fourth District found itself “convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.”  Id. at 616 (quoting Mairs v. 
Peters, 52 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
appeal follows.1 
ANALYSIS 
 
Brinkmann raises three distinct issues in this case.  Her first contention is 
that the circuit court should not have been required to address Francois’ facial 
challenge as to the constitutionality of section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), 
because he did not provide the State with proper notice regarding the challenge.  
Next, Brinkmann argues that, nevertheless, section 99.0615, governing the 
residency qualification of write-in candidates for public office, does not contravene 
                                          
 
 
1.  In Matthews v. Steinberg, 153 So. 3d 295, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the 
First District Court of Appeal also overturned a circuit court ruling and held that 
the residency requirement of section 99.0615 directly contravenes the 
constitutional requirement that legislators reside within the subject district at the 
time of election.  Matthews is currently on appeal before this Court, No. SC14-
2202, and has been stayed pending disposition of the instant case. 
 
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the residency requirement applicable to county commissioners under article VIII, 
section 1(e), Florida Constitution.  As such, because Francois failed to satisfy the 
statutory residency requirement, he did not qualify to run as a write-in candidate in 
the general election for the county commissioner’s office.  Finally, Brinkmann 
alternatively argues that even if section 99.0615 contravenes article VIII, section 
1(e), and thus Francois properly qualified as a write-in candidate, such candidates 
are not included within the intended meaning of “opposition” as used in a different 
constitutional provision, namely, article VI, section 5, Florida Constitution.  
Therefore, the Democratic Party’s primary election should have been opened to all 
registered voters.  We will discuss each issue in turn. 
Preservation of Constitutionality Claim 
Brinkmann contends that the issue regarding the constitutionality of section 
99.0615, Florida Statutes, was not properly preserved because Francois failed to 
provide all appropriate parties with a meaningful opportunity to defend the 
challenge under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.071.  The record before us 
reflects that all procedural requirements were indeed satisfied, including proper 
notice being furnished to the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventeenth 
Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County.  Therefore, the State was afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to intervene and be heard.  That it did not actually 
participate in litigation does not preclude us, nor did it preclude the lower courts, 
 
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from considering Francois’ claim.  See Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tenet 
Healthsystem Hosp., Inc., 875 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“[I]t seems to 
us relatively clear that, once the Attorney General or appropriate state attorney has 
been served, he or she may choose either to appear or not.  However, in the latter 
event, non-participation has no effect on the litigation.”).  Accordingly, this 
argument is without merit. 
Constitutionality of Section 99.0615 
The crux of this issue is whether section 99.0615, Florida Statutes, 
contravenes the relevant provision of article VIII, section 1(e), Florida 
Constitution, and by extension, whether Francois properly qualified as a write-in 
candidate for the 2014 Broward County Commissioner, District 2, general election.  
Because these issues turn on the determination of a statute’s constitutionality and 
the interpretation of a provision of this state’s constitution, they are pure questions 
of law and thus subject to de novo review.  See Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 
597, 603 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 
978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008)).  We recognize that because “statutes come 
clothed with a presumption of constitutionality[,] [they] must be construed 
whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome.”  Id.  “To overcome the 
presumption, the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt, for it must be 
assumed the [L]egislature intended to enact a valid law.”  License Acquisitions, 
 
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LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 2014) 
(quoting Lewis v. Leon Cnty., 73 So. 3d 151, 153 (Fla. 2011)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
This Court has long-instructed that statutes may not impose qualification 
requirements for public office over and above those set forth in the Florida 
Constitution.  See Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056 (quoting State ex rel. Askew v. 
Thomas, 293 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1974) (“We have consistently held that statutes 
imposing additional qualifications for office are unconstitutional where the basic 
document of the constitution itself has already undertaken to set forth those 
requirements.”)); Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735-36 (Fla. 1969) (“Section 
99.032, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, invalid and ineffective because it 
prescribes qualifications for the office of County Commissioner in addition to 
those prescribed by the Constitution.”). See also Levey v. Dijols, 990 So. 2d 688, 
692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“Any statute that restricts eligibility beyond the 
requirements of the Florida Constitution is invalid.” (citing Miller v. Mendez, 804 
So. 2d 1243, 1246 (Fla. 2001))).  As such, if any provision of the Florida 
Constitution provides qualifications for an office of county commissioner, then the 
Legislature is prohibited from imposing additional qualifications.  Brinkmann 
argues that section 99.0615 does not alter the constitutional eligibility requirements 
 
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for an office of county commissioner, but instead regulates the procedures for 
being placed on an election ballot.  We disagree. 
The Florida Constitution sets forth residency requirements for various public 
officers.  See, e.g., art. V, §§ 8, 17, 18, Fla. Const. (imposing residency 
requirements for the offices of justice or judge of any court, state attorney, and 
public defender); see also Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 550 (Fla. 2014) 
(“[W]hile the Legislature may statutorily modify the qualifications of registry 
counsel, CCRC, and RCC by statute, it may not alter the constitutionally 
enumerated qualifications or disqualifications of the public defender.” (citing Crist, 
978 So. 2d at 142)); Miller, 804 So. 2d at 1247 (rejecting claim that candidate for 
the office of circuit judge was unqualified because she did not reside in office’s 
territorial jurisdiction when she filed her oath of candidate; held: constitution only 
requires that a candidate for judicial office reside within jurisdiction on the date he 
or she assumes office).  With regard to an office of county commissioner, the 
Constitution reads: 
COMMISSIONERS.  Except when otherwise provided by county 
charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county 
commissioners composed of five or seven members serving staggered 
terms of four years.  After each decennial census the board of county 
commissioners shall divide the county into districts of contiguous 
territory as nearly equal in population as practicable.  One 
commissioner residing in each district shall be elected as provided by 
law. 
 
 
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Art. VIII, § 1(e), Fla. Const. (emphasis added).  Our interpretation of the 
underscored provision has been clear. 
 
In Grassi, we reviewed the district court’s decision affirming the dismissal 
of misdemeanor charges brought against a county commissioner candidate who 
filed qualifying papers for a particular district’s election but resided in another 
district at that time.  Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1055.  The State sought review on the 
ground that section 99.032, Florida Statutes (1983), the law cited in the charging 
document, required that “[a] candidate for the office of county commissioner shall, 
at the time he qualifies, be a resident of the district from which he qualifies.”  Id. at 
1055-56.  This Court held that article VIII, section 1(e), already provided the 
requirements for office of county commissioner: “We construe this provision as 
requiring residency at the time of election.”  Id. at 1056.  As such, the Court 
concluded, section 99.032 was unconstitutional because it “impose[d] the 
additional qualification for the office of county commissioner of residency at the 
time of qualifying for election.”  Id.   
 
In light of this decision, we have already determined that candidates for an 
office of county commissioner are constitutionally required to establish their 
residency within that office’s district only at the time of election.  In other words, 
the qualification period is not the last opportunity for the candidate to move into 
the office’s representative territory.  Notably, in interpreting article VIII, section 
 
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1(e), our decision in Grassi does not distinguish between party affiliations or types 
of county commissioner candidates—that is, write-ins under section 99.0615; those 
who pay a qualifying fee under section 99.092, Florida Statutes (2014); or 
someone seeking to qualify by the petition process under section 99.095, Florida 
Statutes (2014).  Thus, it is evident that the constitutional eligibility requirement of 
residency at the time of election applies to every county commissioner candidate.  
 
The law at issue in this case is strikingly similar to the one invalidated in 
Grassi.  Section 99.0615, Florida Statutes, dictates that “[a]t the time of 
qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by 
the office sought.”  Thus, under Florida law, “write-in candidates must reside 
within the district at an earlier point than other candidates—the time of 
qualification.”  Matthews v. Steinberg, 153 So. 3d 295, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).  
This directive retracts the constitutionally-delineated deadline, by which a write-in 
candidate vying particularly for an office of county commissioner must 
demonstrate residency within that office’s district, and reasons that the statute 
impermissibly imposes a residency requirement in addition to that prescribed by 
article VIII, section 1(e), of the Florida Constitution.  See Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 
1056; Wilson, 223 So. 2d at 735-36.  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Fourth District correctly determined that 
section 99.0615, Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional. 
 
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Closing of the Democratic Party’s Primary Election 
 
Finally, Brinkmann argues that even if section 99.0615 is unconstitutional, 
the Fourth District still erred in closing the Democratic Party’s primary election on 
its flawed determination that write-in candidates like Francois are “opposition” 
under article VI, section 5(b), of the Florida Constitution.  This issue presents a 
question of constitutional interpretation, also subject to de novo review.  See 
Graham, 108 So. 3d at 603. 
The rules governing statutory interpretation generally apply with equal force 
to the interpretation of constitutional provisions.  Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003).  Accordingly,  
this Court “endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent 
with the intent of the framers and the voters.”  Zingale[ v. Powell, 885 
So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004)] (quoting Caribbean Conservation Corp.,[ 
Inc. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 
501 (Fla. 2003)]).  In ascertaining the intent of the voters, the Court 
may examine “the purpose of the provision, the evil sought to be 
remedied, and the circumstances leading to its inclusion in our 
constitutional document,” In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 
2d [1040, 1048 (Fla. 1982)], with the view that a constitutional 
amendment must be assessed “in light of the historical development of 
the decisional law extant at the time of its adoption.”  Jenkins v. State, 
385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980). 
 
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 
614 (Fla. 2012).   
Still, “[a]ny inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional 
provision must begin with an examination of that provision’s explicit language.  If 
 
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that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must 
be enforced as written.”  Fla. Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass’n, 
489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986).  Indeed, “the law is settled that when 
constitutional language is precise, its exact letter must be enforced and extrinsic 
guides to construction are not allowed to defeat the plain language.”  Fla. League 
of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1992).  “[U]nless the text of a 
constitution suggests that a technical meaning is intended, words used in the 
constitution should be given their usual and ordinary meaning because such is the 
meaning most likely intended by the people who adopted the constitution.”  
Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 2008).  This Court 
has advised that “a dictionary may provide the popular and common-sense 
meaning of terms presented to the voters.”  Id. (quoting Advisory Op. to 
Governor—1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1997)).  
Constitutional provisions should be provided “a broader and more liberal 
construction” but not construed “so as to defeat their underlying objectives.”  
Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent, 838 So. 2d at 549 (quoting Fla. Soc’y of 
Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1119) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, it 
should be noted that this Court champions a strong public policy against judicial 
interference in the democratic process of elections.  Fla. League of Cities, 607 So. 
 
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2d at 400.  Bearing these principles in mind, we first turn to the constitutional 
provision at issue. 
Universal Primary Amendment 
The Universal Primary Amendment (UPA) was passed in the 1998 general 
election and amended article VI, section 5, Florida Constitution, to state, “If all 
candidates for an office have the same party affiliation and the winner will have no 
opposition in the general election, all qualified electors, regardless of party 
affiliation, may vote in the primary elections for that office.”  Art. VI, § 5(b), Fla. 
Const.; accord Telli v. Snipes, 98 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 
Two courts have determined that a write-in candidate constitutes 
“opposition” for purposes of opening a primary election under the UPA.  See, e.g., 
Lacasa v. Townsley, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242-43 (S.D. Fla. 2012).  In Telli, 
three candidates were qualified to run in the Democratic Party’s 2012 primary 
election for the Office of Broward County Commissioner.  Two other candidates—
one Democrat and one Republican—also qualified particularly as write-in 
candidates and were represented in the November 2012 general election by a blank 
line on the ballot.  A Republican-registered voter filed suit to open the Democratic 
Party’s primary election to all registered voters, and the trial court dismissed the 
suit with prejudice.  Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1285.   
 
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The Fourth District affirmed, holding “that the language of the UPA is 
‘unambiguous’ and that write-in candidates are both ‘candidates’ and ‘opposition’ 
within the meaning of the UPA’s unambiguous language.”  Id. at 1286.  The 
district court found that “Florida’s statutory definition of ‘candidate’ includes 
write-in candidates.”  Id. at 1286 (citing § 97.021(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) 
(“ ‘Candidate’ means any person to whom any one or more of the following 
applies: . . . (b) Any person who seeks to qualify for election as a write-in 
candidate.”)).  It further rejected the plaintiff’s insistence that write-in candidates 
were not viable competition. 
[This] Court will not consult a crystal ball to determine 
when and whether a given write-in candidate constitutes 
“real” or mere illusory opposition.  The question is not 
whether [the write-in candidates] will likely prevail in the 
general election over the winner of the Democratic Party 
(or even garner a significant percentage of the vote), but 
whether, under the current framework set forth by the 
Florida Constitution, they could. 
 
Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at [1243] (emphasis [in] original).  Under the 
current framework, a write-in candidate could prevail in the general 
election, provided he or she receives the most votes. 
 
Id. at 1287.   
The Telli court’s interpretation of the UPA’s plain language is consistent 
with the common usage of “opposition” and related terms around the time the 
amendment was adopted.  According to dictionary definitions, “opposition” meant 
“a position confronting another or placing in contrast; that which is or furnishes an 
 
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obstacle to some result.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, 1093 (6th ed. 1990).  It was also 
defined as an “act of opposing,” a “hostile or contrary action or condition,” and 
“something that opposes,” or “a political party opposing and prepared to replace 
the party in power.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 816 (10th ed. 
1998).  The act of “opposing” was “appli[cable] to any conflict” and synonymous 
with “set[ting] oneself against someone or something.”  Id.  Conversely, someone 
or something was “opposed” if he, she, or it was “set or placed in opposition.”  Id.  
Additionally, an “opponent” was “one that takes an opposite position (as in a 
debate, contest, or conflict).”  Id. at 815. 
From these definitions, it appears that the usual and ordinary meaning of 
“opposition” as intended by the people who adopted the UPA contemplated an 
individual qualified to compete against a political party’s primary winner in hopes 
of prevailing in a contest for public office.  This naturally encompasses a write-in 
candidate—especially considering that subsection (b) does not specify the type of 
“opposition” one must encounter in a general election.   
Brinkmann maintains that interpreting “opposition” to include write-in 
candidates would not coincide with the UPA’s intended purpose.  Specifically, she 
argues that the amendment was adopted in order to allow all registered electors to 
vote in a primary election when the winner of that election effectively would be the 
 
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person elected to office.  This argument overstates the UPA’s purpose.  According 
to amendment commentary: 
The [UPA] was proposed by the Constitution Revision Commission in 
an effort to address the low numbers of Florida voters who participate 
in elections.  The Commission found that, prior to the amendment, in 
counties where a large majority of registered voters is registered with 
one political party, an election was often won at the primary level.  
Members of the minority party, as well as members of minor parties 
and those with no party affiliation, would not have the opportunity to 
participate in the electoral process. 
 
William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1998 Amendment, 
Art. VI, § 5. 
The federal district court in Lacasa found that current election laws 
effectuate the UPA’s purpose by giving all registered voters in a given county an 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process.  Writing for the court, Judge 
Zloch explained: 
Further, Plaintiffs’ argument that the write-in candidates do not 
constitute “opposition” justifying the closed election is inconsistent 
with the structure of Florida’s election laws.  If a candidate in a 
general election is unopposed, meaning that if there are no other 
candidates, whether write-in candidates or party-supported candidates, 
“the candidate [is deemed] to have voted for himself or herself” and 
thus “the names of [the] unopposed candidates shall not appear on the 
general election ballot.”  Fla. Stat. § 101.151(7).  It is this type of 
primary that is, by definition, a de facto general election because there 
will actually be no opportunity to vote at all in the general election—
the election for the office of Miami-Dade State’s Attorney will be 
absent from the general election ballot.   
 
 
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Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.  Based on the record before it, the court found 
that 
the situation Plaintiffs decry here is much different.  In the November 
general election, all Miami-Dade County voters will have the 
opportunity to vote for the [sic] either the winner of the Democratic 
Primary . . . [or one of the two write-in candidates].  While Plaintiffs 
may claim that the write-in candidates are not “real” or legitimate 
candidates, their presence does not diminish Plaintiffs’ and all other 
duly registered voters’ right to cast a vote in the general election. 
 
Id.   
These passages demonstrate that, even in branding write-in candidates as 
“opposition” for purposes of closing a party’s primary election, Florida’s election 
laws still guarantee all registered electors meaningful opportunities to vote at the 
general election level.  Accord Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1287 (“Come November 6th, all 
duly-registered voters will have the opportunity to participate in the electoral 
process by voting for either the winner of the Democratic Primary or one of the 
write-in candidates; and the candidate receiving the most votes in the general 
election will be elected to the office of Broward County Commissioner.”).  
Brinkmann simply conflates the write-in candidate’s chances of winning the 
general election with the elector’s chance to participate at all in the electoral 
process.  See Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (refusing to consider the likelihood 
of a write-in candidate prevailing, or even garnering a significant percentage of 
votes, in a general election). 
 
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Brinkmann further contends that “the circumstances leading to the adoption 
of article VI, section 5(b) were to allow all registered voters to participate in a 
party primary when the minority party was fielding no candidates in the general 
election.”  And, “[b]ecause a write-in candidate is necessarily not fielded by any 
party” Brinkmann adds, closing a primary election “solely on the basis that a write-
in candidate represented by a blank space on the general election ballot is 
‘opposition’ . . . ignores the policy behind the UPA.”  This position also overlooks 
the purpose of Florida’s primary election system and, if adopted, could effectuate 
unintended openings of primary elections statewide. 
Regarding the primary system’s purpose, primary elections did not exist at 
common law.  Wagner v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1954).  Yet, article III, 
section 26, Florida Constitution, has historically required the Legislature “to pass 
laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue 
influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.”  State 
ex rel. Gandy v. Page, 169 So. 854, 857 (Fla. 1936).  In Gandy, this Court held that  
such section of the Constitution contemplates laws regulating primary 
elections as well as general elections because of the inevitable 
relationship of the two classes of elections to each other.  Thus, the 
Legislature is authorized by said section of the Constitution to enact 
laws designed to confine participations in party primary elections to 
bona fide recognized members of the political parties required by law 
to participate in such legally sanctioned and regulated primary 
elections as may be provided for by statute. 
 
 
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Id.  Although a duly registered elector is entitled to exercise suffrage, there is a 
counterbalancing expectation that the elector will “comply with such other 
requirements of law as may be imposed upon him [or her] as a matter of policing 
the process by which he [or she] is authorized to cast his [or her] vote . . . .”  Id. at 
858; see, e.g., State ex rel. Hall v. Hildebrand, 168 So. 531, 532 (Fla. 1936) (“The 
primary election laws of this state clearly require participants in primary elections, 
whether as voters or candidates, to specially register for that purpose.”); § 101.021, 
Fla. Stat. (2014) (“In a primary election a qualified elector is entitled to vote the 
official primary election ballot of the political party designated in the elector’s 
registration, and no other.  It is unlawful for any elector to vote in a primary for 
any candidate running for nomination from a party other than that in which such 
elector is registered.”). 
Hence, the Legislature established the primary election mechanism to permit 
a given political party to select a representative whom that party genuinely 
intended to support in a general election for public office.  See Wagner, 74 So. 2d 
at 91; State ex rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 505 (Fla. 1936).  This Court has 
explained that 
[t]he purpose of a primary election is to give vitality to the 
constitutional guaranty of a free and untrammeled ballot by affording 
freedom of choice of candidates to the individual party voter who may 
be expected to support the party nominees at the ensuing general 
election.  The honest conduct of a primary election is therefore not 
 
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less important than freedom in expression of choice as between 
candidates on the final election is generally regarded as indispensable. 
 
Id.  Thus, primary elections are “essential to the functioning of popular free 
government” and “an integral part of the election machinery of this State[.]”  
Wagner, 74 So. 2d at 90-91. 
Additionally, federal courts have identified legitimate regulatory interests 
that are furthered by the closing of a primary election.  In Lacasa, the district court 
accepted the State’s “proposition that keeping a political party’s primary election 
closed will preserve the party as [a] viable and identifiable interest group[], 
insuring that the results of [its] primary election, in a broad sense, accurately 
reflect the voting of the party members.”  Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (citing 
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 594-95 (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court further “recognize[d] the importance of . . . party building 
efforts and the interest in maintaining party identity.”  Id. at 1240 (citing Cal. 
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 579 (2000)).  Next, the court agreed that 
“maintaining a closed primary ensures that the State’s registration rolls continue to 
accurately reflect voters’ political preferences,” which in turn “encourage[s] 
Florida citizens to vote.”  Id. (citing Clingman, 544 U.S. at 596).  The court also 
deemed significant an “independent interest in the orderly operation of elections.”  
Id. at 1240-41 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 
(1997)).  Finally, while not found to be applicable in the instant case, the court 
 
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mentioned the State’s interest in preventing “party raiding” and “excessive 
factionalism.”  Id. at 1241.  We too find most, if not all, of these state interests to 
be prevalent in the instant case.   
Further, Brinkmann’s position embraces an interpretation of the UPA that 
would yield unintended openings of primary elections.  Article VI, section 5(b) is a 
general law: it uniformly governs primary elections for any public office 
throughout the state.  See License Acquisitions, LLC, 155 So. 3d at 1142 (“A law 
that operates universally throughout the state, uniformly upon subjects as they may 
exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible classification is a 
general law.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, under 
Brinkmann’s theory, members of majority parties, among others, conceivably 
would always be permitted to participate in a given party’s primary election when 
the minority party fields no candidate for the general election.  This would be 
equally true “in counties where a large majority of registered voters is registered 
with one political party” as it would be in counties where multiple parties account 
for significant percentages of registered voters.  Because majority parties typically 
influence election outcomes, it is unreasonable to conclude that the UPA was 
intended to create such a loophole in election laws and authorize members of a 
majority party to meddle in the political affairs of another party which they “have 
no interest in joining or in supporting.”  See Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 
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Based on the above, we conclude that, for purposes of opening a primary 
election under the UPA, the plain and obvious meaning of “opposition” includes 
write-in candidates.  Therefore, we must determine whether the Fourth District 
correctly ordered the Democratic Party’s primary election to be closed. 
This Case 
Under Florida law, a primary election for public office will not be opened to 
all registered voters unless two conditions are met: “(1) all candidates for the office 
must have the same party affiliation; and (2) the winner of the primary will have no 
opposition in the general election.”  Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1286 (citing art. VI, § 5(b), 
Fla. Const.).  Both prongs contemplate that each candidate has met the 
qualification requirements set forth under Florida Statutes and thereby has been 
duly qualified for the office sought.  See Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
Here, the record reflects that five candidates qualified by filing a fee or 
submitting a petition to run in the Democratic Party’s primary election in August 
2014: Lisa Aronson, Mark Bogen, Carmen Jones, Charlotte E. Rodstrom, and 
Terry Williams-Edden.  The record also reflects that Francois, a sixth candidate 
who qualified by the write-in process, was a registered Democrat at all relevant 
times.  Therefore, all candidates for the Office of Broward County Commissioner, 
District 2, shared the same party affiliation.  Cf. id. at 1241-42 (concluding that 
UPA would not work to open the Democratic primary for the state attorney’s office 
 
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to all registered voters because three candidates were registered Democrats but one 
of the two write-in candidates was a registered Republican).   
Nevertheless, Brinkmann cannot satisfy the second prong necessary for 
opening a primary election.  Because we have determined today that section 
99.0615, Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional, the fact that Francois did not 
live within District 2 at the close of the qualification period is not dispositive.  
Francois testified that he intended to move into the district if he won the general 
election.  The parties do not otherwise dispute whether he failed to satisfy other 
eligibility requirements as prescribed under Florida law.  Thus, the circumstances 
of this case are such that the primary winner was opposed by a duly qualified 
write-in candidate in the November 2014 general election.   
Accordingly, we conclude that it was appropriate and constitutionally 
mandated for the Democratic Party’s primary election to be closed to only 
Democratic-registered voters. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fourth District’s decision in 
Francois. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional 
Invalidity 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D14-2739 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
William R. Scherer of Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Bruce S. 
Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Robert C. L. Vaughan of Kim Vaughan & Lerner, LLP, Fort Lauderdale Florida; 
Mark Herron, Robert J. Telfer, III, and Joseph Brennan Donnelly of Messer 
Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee Tyron Francois