Title: BEVERLY GOODMAN, and the heirs and successors and assigns in the interest of RICHARD GOODMAN v. MARK AND LAURA VOSS; and IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR A PRIVATE ROAD: MARK AND LAURA VOSS v. PETER AND KIM STEVENS, and BEVERLY GOODMAN, and the heirs, assigns, and successors in interest of RICHARD GOODMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BEVERLY GOODMAN, and the heirs and successors and assigns in the interest of RICHARD GOODMAN v. MARK AND LAURA VOSS; and IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR A PRIVATE ROAD: MARK AND LAURA VOSS v. PETER AND KIM STEVENS, and BEVERLY GOODMAN, and the heirs, assigns, and successors in interest of RICHARD GOODMAN2011 WY 33Case Number: No. S-10-0058, S-10-0115Decided: 02/25/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
BEVERLY 
GOODMAN, and the heirs and successors and assigns in the interest of RICHARD 
GOODMAN,Appellants (Respondents),v.MARK AND LAURA 
VOSS,Appellees (Petitioners),and

IN 
THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR A PRIVATE ROAD:MARK AND LAURA 
VOSS,Appellants (Petitioners),v.PETER AND KIM STEVENS, and 
BEVERLY GOODMAN, and the heirs, assigns, and successors in interest of RICHARD 
GOODMAN,Appellees (Respondents).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certified Question

from 
the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Case 
No. S-10-0058

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Gay 
Woodhouse and Deborah L. Roden of Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Woodhouse.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Mark 
T. Voss and Laura M. Voss of Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Voss.

 
 
Case 
No. S-10-0115

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Mark 
T. Voss and Laura M. Voss of Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Voss.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Daniel 
B. Frank of Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellees 
Stevens.  Gay Woodhouse and Deborah 
L. Roden of Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellees Goodman.  Argument by Mr. Frank and Ms. 
Woodhouse.

 
 
Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and PERRY, 
D.J.

 
 
VOIGT, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
 
 
  
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These related 
cases come before us in their present iterations as W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
certifications from the district court.  
The battle is between neighboring landowners, with one seeking 
condemnation of a private road under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 
1999), and one contesting location of that road on her property.1  The issues before the Court all involve 
decisions rendered by the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County, 
Wyoming (the Board), in exercising its authority under the statute.  We will affirm in part and reverse in 
part, and remand to the district court for remand to the Board for entry of a 
judgment consistent herewith.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The issues have 
been stated somewhat differently in the parties' briefs than they were stated in 
the orders of certification.  We 
view the following issues as being determinative:

 
 
1.    Was Goodman's petition for 
review timely filed?

 
 
2.    Do the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar 
Goodman from relitigating the questions of whether the Vosses' property is 
landlocked and whether the Vosses acted in good faith in pursuing their petition 
under the statute?

 
 
3.    Did the Board err as a matter 
of law in focusing upon damage to the Vosses' property instead of damage to 
Goodman's property, in locating the road?

 
 
4.    Did the Board err as a matter 
of law in allowing the Vosses to install a cattle guard at the junction of their 
property and the private road?

 
 
5.    Did the Board err as a matter 
of law in denying the Vosses' motion for an award of costs under W.R.C.P. 
68?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      We have stated 
our standard for the review of administrative agency action many times and need 
not repeat it at length here.  See Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-27, 188 P.3d 554, 557-62 (Wyo. 
2008).  For present purposes, we 
will simply state that our review is guided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009), and that our focus in the instant case is upon the questions 
of whether the Board acted "not in accordance with law," or "in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right."

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The background 
facts of this matter are set out in detail in Voss v. Albany County Commissioners, 2003 WY 94, 74 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003) (Voss I), so they will be stated here in 
a more abbreviated fashion.  The 
Vosses purchased a parcel of land in 1996.  
The property is bounded on the north and west by property owned by 
Richard and Beverly Goodman (Goodman), on the east by property owned by Peter 
and Kim Stevens (the Stevens), and to the south by federally owned land managed 
by the BLM.2

 
 
[¶5]      There were no 
recorded access easements to the Vosses' property when they purchased it.  They and their predecessors in interest 
usually entered the property from the south, crossing properties belonging to 
Air Capital Fireworks (Air Capital), Goodman, the Stevens, and the BLM.  This route has been called the 
"Highway-BLM" Road.  It connects to 
I-80 near the Buford exit.

 
 
[¶6]      After purchasing 
their property, the Vosses obtained from the BLM a thirty-year renewable 
right-of-way across the federal land, and they obtained from the Stevens an 
access easement restricted by a provision that the easement would lapse if the 
Vosses ever conveyed less than their entire parcel.  Goodmans tendered to the Vosses, and 
recorded, an unrestricted easement over their portion of the Highway-BLM 
Road.

 
 
[¶7]      In 1998, the 
Vosses negotiated with the Stevens for the purchase of an unrestricted access 
easement over the Highway-BLM Road, as well as a separate easement through the 
Stevens' property further north.  
This latter route, called the Creek Road, would have provided access from 
the Vosses' property to a county road lying east of the Stevens' property.  These negotiations were not 
successful.

 
 
[¶8]      Early in 1999, 
the Vosses filed a petition with the Board pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101, alleging that their property was landlocked, and seeking condemnation 
of a private road along the Creek Road.  
This route crossed only the Stevens' property, but the Vosses also 
notified the Goodmans of the petition because the Goodmans held a mortgage on 
the Stevens' property.  The viewers 
and appraisers appointed by the Board eventually rejected the Creek Road and 
recommended that the Board locate the private road along the Highway-BLM route, 
with a slight modification to avoid encroaching on Air Capital's property, 
because Air Capital had not been made a party to the proceedings.  This recommendation was accepted by the 
Board and incorporated into a final plat.

 
 
[¶9]      Both sides 
petitioned the district court for review of the Board's action.  The district court remanded the matter 
to the Board based upon its conclusion that the BLM right-of-way grant did not 
provide adequate legally enforceable access to a public road.  The district court also instructed the 
Board on remand to make an express determination whether the Vosses acted in 
good faith in bringing the petition.  
Both sides then appealed to this Court, resulting in Voss I.

 
 
[¶10]   Resolution of the current 
controversy requires an understanding of what was determined in Voss I.  First, we held that the thirty-year BLM 
right-of-way was not adequate to constitute access to a public road.  Voss I, 2003 WY 94, ¶¶ 12-14, 74 P.3d  at 
719.  Second, we held that the 
statute allows the viewers and appraisers to consider routes other than the 
route proposed in the petition, and we specifically noted that, upon remand, the 
Board was not "constrained to consideration of the Creek Road proposed by the 
Vosses." Id. at ¶ 16, at 720.  Third, we concluded that the Board's 
order appointing viewers "necessarily implied in its decision" the fact that the 
Vosses' land was landlocked, and that all parties subsequently acted upon that 
assumption.  Id. at ¶ 20, at 720-21.  Fourth, we held that the district court 
had erred in instructing the Board to consider on remand whether the petition 
was filed in good faith.  We 
compared this case to Mayland v. 
Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001), where, 
despite the lack of a specific finding of good faith, the record revealed that 
the petitioners had considered alternate routes, that allegations of bad faith 
were raised below, and "that the requisite finding of good faith is implicit in 
the Board's conclusion that a private road is necessary."  Voss I, 2003 WY 94, ¶ 25, 74 P.3d  at 
722.  Fifth, we concluded that the 
restrictive Stevens' easement did not satisfy the access requirements of the 
statute.  Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, at 723-24.  Finally, we reiterated our dual 
conclusion that the Vosses had established the necessity of a private road and 
that they had acted in good faith in bringing their petition.  Id. at ¶ 33, at 
724.

 
 
[¶11]   After we remanded the case to the 
Board, both Goodman and the Stevens recorded unrestricted access easements in 
favor of the Vosses covering their portions of the Highway-BLM Road.  The Vosses rejected the easements by 
filing quitclaim deeds in which they asserted that the easement deeds were 
nothing more than an attempt to get around this Court's requirement that the 
Board consider other access routes.

 
 
[¶12]   Shortly thereafter, the Vosses 
filed with the Board an amended petition seeking an entirely different access 
route, this being the "Goodman Road," which lies north of, and generally 
parallels the Stevens' and Vosses' properties, connecting on the east with a 
county road.  The map accompanying 
the amended petition shows the proposed access easement as traversing the entire 
Goodman tract lying north of the Voss property, making a 180-degree loop on 
state lands to the west, and terminating at the northwest corner of the Voss 
property.  The amended petition also 
sought two access points off the proposed road, one at the Vosses' existing 
driveway and one at the easement's terminus.

 
 
[¶13]   As the matter proceeded before the 
Board, the Vosses moved the Board to grant them temporary access via the Goodman 
Road pendente lite.  That motion was heard by the Board on 
January 30, 2007, and granted on February 20, 2007.  In response, Goodman filed a complaint in 
the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that 
the private road statute did not authorize the Board to grant temporary 
access.  The district court granted 
summary judgment to Goodman, and we affirmed the district court in Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, 203 P.3d 415 (Wyo. 2009) (Voss II).

 
 
[¶14]   Meanwhile, the case had proceeded 
before the Board.  Viewers' 
instructions were finalized on August 26, 2008, which instructions contained 
four alternative routes: the Creek Road, the Goodman Road, the Stevens Route 
(the original Highway-BLM route, but turning onto a "two track trail" on the 
Stevens' property to avoid the BLM land), and the Goodman Route (traversing 
Goodman's property from the county road westward to the Voss property, roughly 
parallel to but south of the Goodman Road).  The Creek Road was the Vosses' first 
proposal.  The Goodman Road was the 
Vosses' second proposal.  The 
Stevens Route was the Stevens' proposal.  
The Goodman Route was Goodman's proposal.

 
 
[¶15]   The viewers conducted the view on 
November 10, 2008, and presented their recommendations to the Board nine days 
later.  They selected the Goodman 
Road proposed by the Vosses, but ending at the northeast corner of the Vosses' 
property, cutting off a good deal of what the Vosses sought.  Four significant features of the route 
selected are: (1) it was the shortest route across Goodman's property on an 
existing road; (2) any roadway west and south of the Vosses' property line would 
be on the Vosses' property, rather than on Goodman's property; (3) by 
terminating east of Goodman's north-south fence line and existing cattle guard, 
it limited access to Goodman's property; and (4) the viewers proposed that the 
Vosses be allowed to install a cattle guard in Goodman's east-west fence line at 
the point of access to the Voss property.

 
 
[¶16]   After a two-day hearing in May of 
2009, the Board issued a final ruling granting the Vosses access along the 
Goodman Road, but extending that access roughly one-quarter mile west of the 
viewers' proposed terminus at the northeast corner of the Vosses' property to a 
location where the Vosses had installed a gate in Goodman's east-west fence 
line.  Perhaps the most significant 
feature of this extension by the Board, beyond the fact that it took more of 
Goodman's property than what the viewers recommended, is that it extended the 
easement west of Goodman's north-south fence line and cattle guard, thereby 
increasing the risk to Goodman of uncontrolled access to her 
property.

 
 
[¶17]   Two petitions for review have been 
certified to this Court by the district court, and have been consolidated for 
purposes of this opinion.  Docket 
No. S-10-0058 is Goodman's challenge of the above-described final order of the 
Board.  Docket No. S-10-0115 is the 
Vosses' challenge of the Board's order denying their motion for an award of 
costs.

 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was 
Goodman's petition for review timely filed?

 
 
[¶18]   W.R.A.P. 12.04(a) governs the time 
for filing a petition for review:

 
 
            
(a)  In a contested case, or 
in an uncontested case, even where a statute allows a different time limit on 
appeal, the petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after service upon 
all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of the petition for a 
rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within 30 days after service upon all 
parties of the decision.

 
 
[¶19]   The Board's order establishing the 
private road was entered on December 15, 2009.  Goodman and the Vosses personally 
obtained copies of the order on that day.  
On December 16, 2009, the County Clerk mailed copies of the order to all 
counsel of record, to the hearing officer, and to the Board.  Goodman filed her petition for review in 
the district court on January 15, 2010.  On February 1, 2010, the Vosses filed a 
motion seeking dismissal of the petition for review on the ground that it was 
untimely filed.  Primarily, they 
argued that January 15, 2010, was 31 days after December 15, 2009.  In addition, they asserted that the 
Board's December 15 order was not a final order, because the plat still had to 
be filed and damages had to be paid, meaning that the petition for review was 
premature.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court denied the 
motion to dismiss, concluding that, for purposes of W.R.A.P. 12.04(a), service 
of the petition occurred on December 16, 2009, meaning the petition was timely 
filed.  The district court further 
concluded that the order was a final appealable order because it was a final 
agency decision whether or not the plat had been 
completed.

 
 
[¶21]   After certification, the Vosses 
filed a similar dismissal motion in this Court, which we denied without 
prejudice on June 22, 2010.  The 
Vosses then raised the issue again in their appellate brief in S-10-0058.  Both sides now rely for the most part on 
the materials they filed in district court concerning the motion.  Having considered those materials and 
the relevant statutes and court rules, we will again deny the motion to 
dismiss.  We agree with the district 
court that the petition for review was filed thirty days after the date of 
service on all parties.  The fact 
that some copies of the order may have been handed out on December 15 does not 
alter the fact that formal service was made on December 16.3

 
 
[¶22]   We also agree with the district 
court that the December 15 order is an appealable order.  It contains the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 
2009).  It certainly is an "order 
affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding" under W.R.A.P. 
1.05(b).  It finally determined the 
necessity of a private road, it located the road, and it assessed damages.  In short, it determined the merits of 
the controversy.  See In re Estate of Bell, 726 P.2d 71, 80 (Wyo. 1986) (order 
was final for purposes of W.R.A.P. 1.05 where this Court had "difficulty 
identifying matters not disposed of"); and Public Serv. Comm'n v. Lower Valley Power 
& Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980) (order that determines the merits and leaves nothing 
for further consideration is final and appealable).

 
 
Do 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Goodman from 
relitigating the questions of whether the Vosses' property is landlocked and 
whether the Vosses acted in good faith in pursuing their petition under the 
statute?

 
 
[¶23]   Very recently, we reiterated the 
law of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel:

 
 
            
We have previously recognized that:

 
 
The 
doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue 
preclusion) incorporate a universal legal principle of common-law jurisprudence 
to the effect that "a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and 
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be 
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their 
privies."

 
 

Wyoming 
Dept. of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
2007 WY 112, ¶ 17, 162 P.3d 515, 522 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
            
Collateral estoppel and res judicata are analogous, but not 
synonymous.  Although they share a 
common interest in finality, the doctrines themselves are different.  Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997).  We 
recently reiterated their differences:

 
 
            
In Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶¶ 15-20, 
25 P.3d 511, [517-18] (Wyo. 
2001), we extensively recognized that res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
related but distinct concepts.

 
 
            
Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or 
causes of action.  Slavens v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 
686 (Wyo. 1993).  Four factors are 
examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity 
in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and 
relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them.  Id.  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of 
previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four similar 
factors:  (1) whether the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the 
present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.  Id.

 
 

Polo 
Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 15, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 1255, [1259] (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
            
Collateral estoppel is issue preclusion, while res judicata is claim 
preclusion.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 
WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, [517] 
(Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Pokorny 
v. Salas, 
2003 WY 159, ¶¶ 12, 13, 81 P.3d 171, 175 (Wyo. 2003) 
(emphasis omitted).  Application of 
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata involves questions of law 
that we review de novo.  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2007 WY 10, ¶ 23, 150 P.3d 653, 662 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 

Erwin 
v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 
2010 WY 117, ¶ 10, 237 P.3d 409, 412-13 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
[¶24]   We have noted several times that 
both collateral estoppel and res 
judicata apply to administrative proceedings.  Jacobs v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2009 WY 
118, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d 1128, 
1132 (Wyo. 2009); Slavens v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 1993); Joelson v. City of Casper, 676 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo. 1984).  In the context of administrative 
proceedings, the application of collateral estoppel is more apt than is the 
application of res judicata because 
"administrative decisions deal primarily with issues rather than causes of 
actions or claims . . . ."  Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 686.  See also Jacobs, 2009 WY 118, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d  at 
1132; Joelson, 676 P.2d  at 
572.

 
 
[¶25]   We would be remiss if we did not 
also mention the related "law of the case" doctrine:

 
 
            
The "law of the case" doctrine stands for the proposition that a court's 
decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding 
precedent to be followed in successive stages of the same litigation.  Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1993); see also 
1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 
0.404[1] (2d ed. 1991).  This 
doctrine is designed to avoid repetitious litigation and to promote consistent 
decision making; thus, it is related to res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
stare decisis.  Triton Coal, at 667.  Usually, the "law of the case" doctrine 
requires a district court to adhere to its prior rulings, adhere to the rulings 
of an appellate court, or adhere to another judge's rulings in the same case or 
a closely related case.  Triton Coal, at 668; see also 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure:  § 4478 (1981).

 
 

Lyden 
ex rel. Lyden v. Winer, 
913 P.2d 451, 454 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶26]   The question presented can be 
answered in fewer words than it took to describe the standard of review.  One need look no further than Voss I, where we affirmed the Board's 
conclusion that the Voss property was landlocked and the Board's conclusion that 
the Voss petition was filed in good faith.  
2003 WY 94, ¶¶ 20, 25, 
33, 74 P.3d  at 720-21, 722, 724.  
The case was remanded to the Board solely for the purpose of locating a 
private road easement that did not suffer from the deficiencies of the 
previously selected route.  Both 
issueswhether the Voss property is landlocked and whether the Vosses acted in 
good faithare barred by collateral estoppel and the law of the case 
doctrine.

 
 
[¶27]   Additional comment is appropriate 
as to Goodman's argument on this issue.  
Goodman relies upon the following language from Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Co., 2006 WY 69, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 598, 607 (Wyo. 2006), as a 
sort of pronouncement from this Court that the question of access along the BLM 
Road was still an open question in this case:

 
 

            
Stratton contends FS 807 is not a public road because it could be closed 
at some time in the future, and the access provided by the road, therefore, is 
not "legally enforceable" under the statute.  The board's decision letter indicates it 
followed a similar rationale, stating: "[t]here is no legally enforceable right 
to use the Forest Road 807 by any member of the public according to the 
evidence."  It appears this 
reasoning stems from a misreading of our opinion in Voss to the effect that the right to use 
a public road on federal land must be "legally enforceable."  In Voss, we concluded a personal thirty 
year right-of-way grant/temporary use permit over BLM land was not "legally 
enforceable access" to the public road in questiona county road.  Voss, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d  at 719.  By its terms, the grant terminated after 
thirty years and, although it was renewable at that time, renewal was not 
guaranteed.  Furthermore, the permit 
was personal and did not "pass automatically upon conveyance of the 
property."  Id.  Instead, the grant was assignable only 
upon approval by the BLM.  Id.  Because 
it was obviously a personal right-of-way, we did not directly address the issue 
of whether the access road over BLM property in Voss was a public 
road.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶28]   Goodman is reading too much into 
this passage.  In Reidy, the relevant inquiry was whether 
an adjoining Forest Service Road was a public road, thereby providing such 
access to the neighboring landowners that their property was not 
landlocked.  We concluded that it 
was, indeed, a public road, and we therefore reversed the Board's grant of a 
private road easement under the statute.  
Id. at ¶ 40, at 612.  The highlighted sentence in the passage 
above merely states that we did not consider, in the Voss case, whether the BLM Road was a 
public road because the only question was whether the thirty-year personal 
right-of-way provided legally enforceable access.  The statement was not intended as an 
invitation to reopen issues in this case that had already been decided by the 
Board, and affirmed by both the district court and this Court.  The issue before the Board, and later 
before the courts, was whether the property was landlocked.  Proof came in the form of evidence of a 
restricted right-of-way and restricted access easements.  Proof also

could 
have come in the form of evidence that the BLM Road was a public road, but that 
did not happen.  The later 
realization that the argument should have, or at least could have, been made, 
does not reopen the prior decisions.

 
 
[¶29]   The above logic also precludes 
Goodman from now raising other possible arguments as to why the Voss petition 
was not filed in good faith.  That 
would include the contention that it was bad faith not to include Air Capital as 
a respondent, and the contention that the Vosses first should have sought to 
prove a prescriptive easement over the Stevens' and Air Capital's lands.  Furthermore, those contentions have no 
merit.  There is no requirement in 
the statute that a petitioner name as a respondent a nearby landowner over whose 
land the proposed road does not pass.  
Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 65 (Wyo. 1997).  And we have said many times over the 
years that the private road statute does not require a petitioner to "overcome 
every obstacle" before utilizing the statute.  See, e.g., Wagstaff v. Sublette County  Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶¶ 11, 13, 18, 53 P.3d 79, 82, 83, 84 (Wyo. 2002) 
(landowner not required first to pursue common law way of necessity or 
potentiality that a road over State and BLM property is a public road that 
should be maintained); Mayland, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 26, 28 P.3d at 
848  (landowner not "required to 
accomplish detailed title searches, legal analyses of ownership interests, and 
even, possibly, quiet title actions"); Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 887 (Wyo. 2000) 
(landowner not required to pursue common law way of necessity or implied 
easement or other forms of relief prior to seeking relief under the statute); Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wyo. 1995) 
(potential remedy of implied easement not relevant to determination of  necessity); Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo. 1980) 
(decision whether to pursue common law way of necessity or proceed under the 
statute is exclusive choice of petitioner).4  These decisions are consistent with our 
general interpretation of the legislature's intent in the private road statute 
to "provide in a local forum a readily available, economically affordable, and 
time efficient method to obtain a means of access to property."  Wagstaff, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 82 
(quoting Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of 
County Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998)).  See also Mayland, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 26, 28 P.3d  at 
848.

 
 
Did 
the Board err as a matter of law in focusing upon damage to the Vosses' property 
instead of damage to Goodman's property, in locating the 
road?

 
 
[¶30]   The 1985 version of the statute 
contained the following sentence, which is the focus of this 
issue:

 
 

The 
proposed road shall not exceed thirty (30) feet in width from a certain point on 
the premises of the applicant to some certain point on the public road, 
and 
shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through 
which the private road is located.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 1999) (emphasis added).  Goodman argues that this language 
authorizes the viewers and the Board only to determine the "least possible 
damage" to her 
land, not to balance or equalize that damage with potential damage to the 
Vosses' property.  In particular, 
Goodman argues that the Board should not have extended the Vosses' access 
easement a quarter-of-a-mile west of the terminus recommended by the viewersall 
on her propertyjust to prevent the Vosses from having to build a road that 
length on their own property. 

 
 
[¶31]   We will begin our discussion of 
this issue with a couple of observations.  
First, under the statute, the petitioner has the right to choose any 
"reasonable and convenient" route for the proposed private road, and neither the 
Board nor neighboring landowners can force the petitioner to accept an 
"illogical, uneconomic, and unproductive road."  Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 65, 66 (alternative 
route would have entered petitioner's property where stone cliffs and timber 
barred access).  That leads to the 
logical conclusion that it is the petitioner who selects the persons to be 
notified of the petition.  Id. at 65.  In turn, that process limits the 
possible locations for the road because "the viewers and appraisers must locate 
the road within the lands of the property owners who were given notice."5  Id.  However, the petitioner only selects the 
general location of the road; it is the duty of the viewers and appraisers to 
"establish the exact location of the road so that it will do the least possible 
damage to the land through which it passes."  Id.  In applying the statute, the viewers and 
appraisers consider reason and convenience, which includes consideration of both 
the petitioner's situation and the respondent's situation, but in determining 
the "least possible damage" they look only to the property being condemned.  Id. at 65; see also Miller, 4 P.3d  at 
889.

 
 
[¶32]   We must not forget that the 
condemnation of a private road under the statute is a taking of property.  The statute has its roots in article 1, 
sections 32 and 33 of the Wyoming Constitution, which limit the exercise of the 
power, and which require "just compensation."  Snell v. Rupert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1975) overruled in part on other grounds by 
Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991).  A good statement as to the Board's power 
under the statute can be found in Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo. 
1991):

 
 
            
We reemphasize that a landlocked landowner is not entitled to seek 
whatever road he desires or is most convenient to him.  He still must seek, and the county 
commissioners are bound to approve, only such means of access to landlocked 
property as are reasonable.

 
 
[¶33]   The viewers and appraisers selected 
the Goodman Road as the most reasonable access to the Voss property, and their 
report recommended that route, beginning at the county road, and terminating at 
the northeast corner of the Voss property, that being the least amount of the 
Goodman property that could be taken to accomplish the purpose of the 
statute.  The Board, solely for the 
convenience of the Vosses, and to the detriment of Goodman, extended the 
easement another quarter-of-a-mile on Goodman's property.6  The Board's action was contrary to the 
goal of doing the least possible damage to the property taken from Goodman, 
especially because the use of the road is expected to be heavy as a result of 
the Vosses' livestock operation on their property.  Stock trucks and other heavy equipment 
will travel the road.  In addition, 
although it is not a factor in determining damage to the Goodman property, the 
fact that the Board extended the easement past Goodman's fence line and cattle 
guard should have been a factor in the reasonableness and convenience 
analysis.

 
 
[¶34]   Under these circumstances, we 
cannot say that the Board followed the statutory mandate to "do the least 
possible damage to the lands through which the private road is located."  It was possible to do less damage to 
Goodman's land by locating the road as recommended by the viewers and 
appraisers.  A taking is not 
reasonable under the statute or the constitution where its purpose is not to 
create access but to reduce the condemnor's costs at the expense of the 
condemnee.  Consequently, we will 
reverse the Board's order to that extent, and remand this matter to the Board 
for entry of an order limiting the road to the viewers' and appraisers' 
recommended location.

 
 
Did 
the Board err as a matter of law in allowingthe Vosses to install a cattle 
guard at the junctionof their property and the private 
road?

 
 
[¶35]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-102 
(LexisNexis 1999), which is part of the 1985 version of the private road 
statutes in effect for purposes of this case, reads as 
follows:

 
 
            
The viewers and appraisers appointed in accordance with the provisions of 
W.S. 24-9-101 shall have power to

determine 
in all cases whether or not gates shall be placed at the proper points on said 
road, and assess damages in accordance with such 
determination.

 
 
[¶36]   In the instant case, rather than 
recommending the placement of a gate at the point where the proposed easement 
entered the Voss property, the viewers and appraisers recommended the placement 
of a cattle guard.  In accepting 
this recommendation, albeit at a different location, the Board made the 
following findings:

 
 
            
The Viewers recommended that a cattle guard, as opposed to a gate, be 
used at the point of entry of the private road for Petitioners' property.  In support of the Viewers' 
recommendation, the Board finds that cattle guards are more convenient than 
gates.  Further, the Board notes 
that gates in this matter have been a source of conflict and hardship.  The Board further finds that cattle 
guards are the primary means by which livestock are contained at Buford, in the 
area of Petitioners' property.  
Under the 1985 version of W.S. 24-9-101, the Board has the authority to 
allow the use of a cattle guard on the entrance to the established road from 
Petitioners' property.[] marker1fn0As 
the Board has determined that the location of the temporary access gate will be 
the point of entry for the private road, said cattle guard will be placed in 
conformance with this modification.

 
 
[¶37]   In a footnote omitted from the 
above-quoted findings, the Board relied upon Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. v. Board of County 
Commissioners, Crook County, 2002 WY 167, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 1218, 1225-26 (Wyo. 2002), 
for the proposition that the private road statutes give the Board the authority 
to authorize cattle guards as opposed to gates.  The holding in Elk Horn Ranch that, as a matter of law, 
cattle guards do not materially increase the burden on the servient estate, came 
from Van Raden v. Harper, 891 P.2d 78, 79 (Wyo. 1995).  The Board's reliance upon Elk Horn Ranch is misplaced to some 
degree because we have overruled Van 
Raden and held that the question of whether a cattle guard, as opposed to a 
gate, increased the burden on the servient estate is a question of fact, not a 
question of law.  White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 395, 399 
(Wyo. 2003).  On the other hand, White did  not overrule Elk Horn Ranch's holding that a cattle 
guard, as opposed to a gate, may be ordered under the 
statute.

 
 
[¶38]   Despite the Board's reliance upon 
Elk Horn Ranch, its conclusion that a 
cattle guard was appropriate will be affirmed because the Board actually reached 
that conclusion based upon factual findings, rather than ruling as a matter of 
law.  Two such findings were that 
gates had been a source of conflict between the parties, and that cattle guards 
were the primary source of livestock containment in the area.  In that regard, one of the viewers 
testified that there were two cattle guards on the Goodman Road in the near 
vicinity: one at the entrance from the county road and one on the north-south 
fence line west of the proposed terminus of the private road.  There was sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the Board's factual determination.7

 
 
Did 
the Board err as a matter of law in denying the Vosses' motion for an award of 
costs under W.R.C.P. 68?

 
 
[¶39]   The parties agree that the Board 
adopted the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure in its Rules for Contested 
Cases.  The rule presently at issue 
is W.R.C.P. 68, which reads as follows:

 
 

            
At any time more than 60 days after service of the complaint and more 
than 30 days before the trial begins, any party may serve upon the adverse party 
an offer, denominated as an offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the 
money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then 
accrued.  If within 10 days after 
the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer 
is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance 
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the court shall enter 
judgment.  An offer not accepted 
shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a 
proceeding to determine costs.  
If 
the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the 
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the 
offer.  As used herein, "costs" does not include 
attorney's fees.  The fact that an 
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.  When the liability of one party to 
another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or 
extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the 
party adjudged liable may make an offer of settlement under this rule, which 
shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within 
a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to 
determine the amount or extent of liability.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶40]   On May 4, 2006, the Vosses served 
upon the Stevens a Rule 68 Offer of Settlement, the terms of which were that the 
Vosses would pay the Stevens $30,000.00 for an unrestricted permanent easement 
appurtenant on the Creek Road.  That 
offer was not accepted.  On June 20, 
2006, the Vosses served upon Goodman a Rule 68 Offer of Settlement, the terms of 
which were that the Vosses would pay Goodman $50,000.00 for an unrestricted 
permanent easement appurtenant on the Goodman Road, traversing the entire 
distance from the county road, through the Goodman property, through the State 
land, and through additional Goodman property to the northwest corner of the 
Voss property, with two separate access points.  This offer likewise was not 
accepted.

 
 
[¶41]   On December 29, 2009, after 
issuance of the Board's final order, the Vosses filed a Motion for Petitioners 
Costs, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 68.  
Goodman and the Stevens each filed responses in opposition to the motion. 
 Without a hearing, the Board issued 
an Order Denying Motion for Petitioners Costs on February 25, 2010.  As to Goodman, the denial was based on 
the fact that the Vosses had not obtained the road they sought, and had not 
obtained two access points, and that the $50,000.00 offer was "clearly affixed" 
to the road proposed.  The Board 
concluded that its final order was more favorable to Goodman than the W.R.C.P. 
68 offer.  As to the Stevens, the 
denial was based on the fact that the Vosses obtained nothing from the Stevens; 
in particular, they did not obtain an easement over the Creek Road, which was 
the basis of their W.R.C.P. 68 offer.  On March 29, 2010, the Vosses petitioned 
the district court to review the Board's denial of its motion, and also moved 
the district court to certify the case to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09. 
 The motion was granted and on April 
19, 2010, the district court entered an Order of Certification to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court and Consolidation of Cases.  
We accepted certification on June 8, 2010, and this issue became our 
Docket No. S-10-0115.

 
 
[¶42]   We briefly commented earlier herein 
as to the standard of review we apply in administrative agency 
appeals.  See supra ¶ 3.  There, we emphasized our role in 
determining whether the Board acted in conformance with the law.  For purposes of the question now before 
us, we note that as to factual determinations we apply the substantial evidence 
test, which means reviewing the record to determine whether the agency's 
conclusions were "contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the 
record as a whole."  Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 
561.  "The arbitrary and capricious 
standard remains a safety net' to catch agency action which prejudices a 
party's substantial rights or which may be contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review 
standards yet is not easily categorized or fit to any one particular standard." 
Id. at ¶ 23, at 
561.

 
 
[¶43]   The parties' positions are clear 
and straightforward.  The Vosses 
argue that they obtained what they wanted from the proceedings, that they paid 
less than they offered in settlement, and that they were the "prevailing party" 
as that term is used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-124 (LexisNexis 2009) (costs 
allowed to successful plaintiffs in certain actions).  The Stevens argue that the road as 
located does not cross their property at all, so they obtained what they wanted, 
and as to them, the Vosses obtained less than what they sought in their 
settlement offer.  Goodman argues 
that the evidence supports the Board's determination that the final order was 
more favorable to Goodman than to the Vosses, that the Vosses' offer was not for 
a definite sum or an easily ascertainable amount, and that W.R.C.P. 68 should 
not even apply to statutory private road actions.

 
 
[¶44]   Without determining whether or not 
W.R.C.P. 68 should apply in statutory private road actions, we will affirm the 
Board's denial of the Vosses' motion for the simple reason that, although they 
paid less than what they offered, they obtained less than what they sought.  First, of course, they obtained nothing 
from the Stevens, so there is not much to argue there. As to Goodman, there is 
nothing in the record from which we can divine that $50,000.00 for an easement 
entirely penetrating Goodman's land was a "better deal" for her than $2,340.00 
for the much more limited route that was located.  Goodman fought long and hard to try to 
prevent the Vosses from obtaining "deep" access into her property, and she 
succeeded in that goal.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶45]   Goodman's petition for review was 
timely filed because it was filed within 30 days of the Board's order, which was 
an appealable order under the rules.  
Goodman is barred, however, from relitigating the issues of whether the 
Voss property is landlocked and whether the Vosses filed their private road 
petition in good faith, those issues having been previously decided against her 
below, and affirmed by this Court.  
The remand was for the purpose of selecting a different route; it did not 
start the case over from scratch.

 
 
[¶46]   The Board was authorized to amend 
the viewers' report, but the amendment in this case violated the statutory 
mandate that the road be located so as to do the least possible damage to the 
land over which it is located.  The 
viewers recognized that ending the easement at the northeast corner of the Voss 
property did the least possible damage to Goodman's property, and they reported 
accordingly.  The extension of the 
road by the Board deeper into Goodman's property created additional damage to 
the Goodman property, solely as a convenience to the 
Vosses.

 
 
[¶47]   The Board did not err as a matter 
of law in allowing the Vosses to install a cattle guard where the easement 
entered their property because this Court's precedent has established that, if 
sufficient facts are proven, a cattle guard rather than a gate may be installed 
under the private road statute.  And 
finally, the Board did not err as a matter of law or fact in denying the Vosses' 
motion for an award of costs.  It is 
not at all clear from the record that the eventual result of the proceedings put 
the Vosses in a better position, or Goodman in a worse position, than what was 
offered.

 
 
[¶48]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part and remanded to the district court for further remand to the Board for 
entry of an order consistent herewith.  That remand shall include a recomputation 
of damages based upon the decreased amount of property allowed to be taken under 
this opinion.

  
 
 

HILL, 
J. 
dissenting.

 
 
[¶49]   I believe that the Board's decision 
should be reversed because the Vosses are not landlocked; consequently, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority decision.  Ms. Goodman should not be collaterally 
estopped from litigating the issue of whether the BLM road is a public road, and 
accordingly, whether the Vosses are landlocked.  She had no opportunity or reason to 
litigate the public nature of the BLM road in the first action because the 
Vosses were seeking a private road along the Creek Road, which only affected the 
Stevens property.  Once the Vosses 
changed their chosen route to one over the Goodman property, Ms. Goodman was 
entitled to freely litigate all relevant issues, including whether the Vosses 
were actually landlocked and, as part of that argument, the public nature of the 
BLM road.

 
 
[¶50]   The private road statute, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 1999), allows a taking of private property.  Section 24-9-101 
states:

 
 

Any 
person whose land has 
no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, 
may apply in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county for a 
private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
In 
order to pass constitutional muster, the private road must be necessary in the 
sense that the petitioner must be landlocked.  Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Co., 2006 WY 69, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 598, 604 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
[¶51]   The route initially chosen by the 
viewers and appraisers was a modified version of the Highway-BLM road.  The chosen route included access over 
the BLM road, pursuant to a thirty-year license; the Stevens property, pursuant 
to an easement which limited access to a single land owner and would not provide 
access if the Voss property were divided; the Goodman property, pursuant to an 
unrestricted easement; and a bump out on the Goodman property to avoid property 
belonging to a landowner who was not included as a party in the private road 
action.8  The only part of the modified 
Highway-BLM road that was not an existing road was the "bump out."  Voss v. Albany County Commissioners, 2003 WY 94, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 74 P.3d 714, 716-18 (Wyo. 2003) (Voss I).

 
 
[¶52]   The district court reversed, 
"ruling that the Highway-BLM road did not provide the Vosses adequate legal 
access to their land because the BLM Right-of-Way Grant does not provide legally 
enforceable permanent access."  Voss I, ¶ 8, 74 P.3d  at 718.  On appeal to this Court in Voss I, we agreed with the district court that 
the BLM Rightof-Way which had a thirty-year limit and was assignable only with 
approval of the BLM did not " constitute an outlet or connection within the 
purview of the statute.' "  Voss I, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d  at 719, quoting Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wyo. 
1989).  We also ruled that, because 
the Stevens easement was restricted, it did not provide the appurtenant access 
contemplated by the statute.  Id., ¶ 31, 74 P.3d  at 
723.

 
 
[¶53]   On remand, the Stevens recorded a 
right-of-way easement in favor of the public across their land along the 
modified Highway-BLM route originally chosen by the viewers.  The respondents then filed a motion to 
dismiss the Voss petition for a private road on the basis that the Vosses were 
no longer landlocked.  As part of 
their argument, the respondents asserted that the BLM road was actually a public 
road.  They cited to our ruling in 
Reidy as confirming that the issue of 
whether the BLM road was public was not decided in Voss I.  In response, the Vosses stated that the 
issue of whether they were landlocked was decided in Voss I and, under the preclusion 
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and law of the case, could not be 
reopened.

 
 
[¶54]   The Board of County Commissioners 
ruled on the respondents' motion to dismiss as follows:

 
 
The 
Board FINDS that the decision of [Voss 
I] is the "law of the case," affirming the determination by implication of 
this Board that Petitioners established the necessity of a private road, and 
that they are "any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a 
public road" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 1999).  The Board is bound by res judicata to its findings as affirmed 
by the Supreme Court.

The 
Board further FINDS that Respondents' position in their Motion to Dismiss that 
the BLM road is a "public road" is not a relevant inquiry in view of the 
underlying basis of the decision in Voss 
I.  In their cross-appeal in Voss I, Respondents stated their issues 
as:

1.    
Does 
BLM land containing no restrictions on use by motor vehicle constitute a public 
road such that it is not a factor in determining whether a land owner's property 
is landlocked under W.S. § 24-9-101?

2.    
If 
crossing BLM land is a factor, does a right of way grant issued by the BLM 
pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act . . . which is for a term of 30 years and renewable, 
constitute an "outlet to, or connection with a public road" under W.S. § 
24-9-101?

The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court that the Highway-BLM 
road did not provide the Vosses adequate legal access to their land because the 
BLM right of way does not provide legally enforceable permanent access.  The Supreme Court found that the BLM 
grant to Voss of a duration of 30 years, although renewable, the renewal was not 
guaranteed.  The permit was found to 
be personal to Vosses and did not pass automatically upon conveyance of the 
property.  The Court found that 
since the BLM road does not constitute an outlet or connection within the 
purview of W.S. § 24-9-101, and the BLM is not subject to the Board's 
jurisdiction, the Petitioners' application is remanded to the Board for 
reconsideration in a manner consistent with its decision.  Although the Voss case was distinguished in Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Company, it was 
not reversed or modified and remains as precedent in these 
proceedings.

            
The Board ORDERS that Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Private Road be and the same is hereby 
denied.  [Record citations 
omitted.]

 
 

[¶55]   The majority decision accepts the 
collateral estoppel rationale employed by the Board.  Collateral estoppel applies when there 
has been a final adjudication on the merits and the same issue is raised in a 
subsequent action between the same parties.  Two of the requirements for application 
of collateral estoppel are:  the 
prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits, and the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was given a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.  Erwin v. State, Dep't of Family 
Services, 2010 WY 117, ¶ 10, 237 P.3d 409, 412-13 (Wyo. 
2010).  Voss I and the case before us involve 
the same 
action.  There had been no final judgment on the 
merits when Voss I was remanded.  In addition, Ms. Goodman did not have a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the public nature of the BLM road.  The Vosses were not seeking a private 
road across Goodman property in Voss 
I.  They were seeking to condemn 
the Creek Road across Stevens.  
Thus, Ms. Goodman had no interest in proving the Vosses were not 
landlocked or that the BLM road was public.  Because she did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate those issues, Ms. Goodman's arguments should not be 
barred by collateral estoppel.

 
 
[¶56]   In an alternative ruling, the 
majority concludes that Ms. Goodman is precluded from litigating those issues by 
the law of the case doctrine.

 
 

Under 
the law of the case doctrine, a court's decision on an issue of law at one stage 
of a proceeding is binding in successive stages of the litigation.  Triton 
Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 
846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 
1993), 
citing 1B James W. Moore, Jo Esha Lucas & Thomas S. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, 
¶ 0.404[1] (2d ed. 1983).  
Ordinarily, the law of the case doctrine requires a trial court to adhere 
to its own prior rulings, the rulings of an appellate court, or another judge's 
rulings in the case or a closely related case. Id. 
at 667-68.  The law of the case doctrine is a 
discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power 
but merely "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what 
has been decided."  Brown 
v. State, 
953 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

Boykin 
v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst), 
2010 WY 155, ¶ 15, 243 P.3d 961, 966 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Lieberman 
v. Mossbrook, 
2009 WY 65, ¶¶ 28-29, 208 P.3d 1296, 1305-06 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

[¶57]   There are exceptions to application 
of the law 
of the case 
doctrine:

 
 

One 
of those exceptions applies when the evidence in a subsequent trial is 
substantially different from that presented in the earlier proceeding.  Id.  Additionally, 
the law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually decided, not to 
issues left open.  18B Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction § 4478 (2d ed. 
2002).

 
 

Boykin, 
¶ 15, 
243 P.3d  at 966.  See also, Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 463 F.3d 1138, 1144 (10th Cir. 2006).

 
 
[¶58]   Both of these exceptions apply 
here.  The facts, including the 
existence of the public easement granted by Stevens, have changed since the 
first proceeding, and as we stated in Reidy, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d  at 607, the 
issue of whether the BLM road was public was not actually decided in Voss I.  As such, the law of the case doctrine 
does not prohibit consideration of the nature of the BLM road and whether, on 
the facts as they now exist, the Vosses are landlocked.  Moreover, the law of the case doctrine 
is discretionary.  I think it is 
appropriate and, in fact, imperative to allow the respondents to argue that the 
legal status of the route initially chosen by the viewers had changed since Voss I, such that the Vosses have legally 
enforceable access and are not landlocked under the statute.  

 
 
[¶59]   I can certainly appreciate the 
Board's and the majority's efforts to reach a final resolution in this case, 
particularly in light of the fact that this matter has been dragging on since 
1999.  However, if the Vosses are 
not landlocked, then there is no necessity and, consequently, no constitutional 
basis to allow a taking of the Goodman property.  See, Reidy, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d  at 604; Wyo. 
Const. art. I, § 32.  By refusing to 
allow the respondents to argue that the Vosses were no longer landlocked, the 
Board and this Court have turned a blind eye and ignored the reality of the 
situation.

 
 
[¶60]   Once the procedural hurdle is 
crossed, the Court must consider the merits  whether the record supports a 
finding that the Vosses are landlocked and, as part of that analysis, whether 
the BLM road is public in nature.  
The evidence is clear that the BLM road is open to the public.  In many ways, it is similar to the 
Forest Service Road considered in Reidy.  
In addition, the evidence established that the Vosses and their 
predecessors have used the road to access their property for many years.  In fact, that is the precise route (with 
the exception of the bump out) the Vosses used during the pendency of this very 
long action.  Thus, I would conclude 
that the BLM road is public in nature and it, together with the public easement 
given by the Stevens, provides legally enforceable access to the Vosses.  They simply are not 
landlocked.

 
 
[¶61]   The Board concluded that, even if 
it could consider the Highway-BLM road, it would rule that the Vosses were 
landlocked because that road is "unreasonable, inconvenient, illogical, 
uneconomic and unproductive."  That 
conclusion is incredible considering that the Board is discussing the exact same 
road initially chosen by the viewers and confirmed by it after the first 
hearing.  How the exact same route 
changed from being the one chosen by the Board to one that is unreasonable, 
inconvenient, illogical, etc. is hard to fathom.

 
 

[¶62]   The vast majority of the Board's 
findings about the inconvenience of the Highway-BLM road pertain to attributes 
of the Vosses property.  The primary 
concern is the steepness of the road grade on the Vosses property, which can 
make traveling problematic, particularly in winter.  We considered a similar argument in Reidy when Stratton Sheep claimed that 
it was entitled to a private road across the Reidy property because it was 
difficult to access the corrals in the southern part of its property from the 
north where the Forest Service road entered its property.  We declined to address whether § 
24-9-101 allows establishment of a private road "to remedy access difficulties 
related to barriers within 
the 
applicant's land" because the evidence did not establish the costs of 
constructing a road within the tract or that such road construction would be 
unusually difficult.  Reidy, ¶ 38, 135 P.3d  at 611 
(emphasis in original).  In this 
case, the evidence established that the road within the Voss property could be 
made more convenient with a relatively small expenditure of the funds.  Ms. Goodman made similar improvements to 
her road, which is why the Vosses wanted to use it to access their 
property.  So, even if

difficulties 
within the Voss property were properly considered, the evidence does not 
establish the level of substantial inconvenience required to justify the taking 
of a private road.

 
 
[¶63]   The other aspect of the modified 
Highway-BLM road that the Vosses argue make it substantially inconvenient is the 
necessity of constructing the "bump out" to avoid crossing property belonging to 
a landowner who had not been made a party to the proceeding.  Voss I, ¶ 7, 74 P.3d  at 717-18.  The construction will apparently be 
fairly expensive.9  However, it was not seen as 
prohibitively expensive by the viewers or the Board when they initially chose 
that route instead of the Creek Road.  
Consequently, I would rule that the modified Highway-BLM Road provides 
sufficient access to the Vosses and that they are not 
landlocked.

[¶64]   The Vosses purchased property on 
top of a mountain in Wyoming.  It 
should not have come as a surprise to them that there would be certain 
inconveniences and expenses associated with ownership of mountain property and 
the decision to live there year round.  
The inconveniences with using the Highway-BLM Road, as they and their 
predecessors have been doing for years, do not justify a taking under our 
constitution or our private roads statute.  
I would reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

1The 
statute was amended in 2000.  The 
1985 version that governs this case last appeared in the 1999 edition of the 
Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

 
 

2Richard 
Goodman is now deceased.  Generally, 
we use "Goodman" to refer to Beverly Goodman.

 
 

3Although 
not raised by the parties, it should be noted that W.R.A.P. 14.03 gives a party 
an additional three days to act if he or she has been served by 
mail.

 
 

4In 
Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991), we declared that a civil action for a common law way 
of necessity is no longer available, such having been supplanted by the 
statute.

 
 

5This 
statement of law, had it been observed, would have completely altered the course 
of this case.  Once the viewers and 
appraisers and the Board rejected the proposed Creek Road access, their only 
option under the Vosses' first petition was to locate the easement somewhere 
else on the Stevens' property.  
Neither the viewers and appraisers nor the Board had the authority under 
the statute to locate the road on the BLM-Highway route.  Further, when the Creek Road was 
rejected and the Vosses proposed the Goodman Road in their second petition, the 
easement could only be located on Goodman's property.  Much of what has happened in this case 
was unnecessary and not consistent with the law.

 
 

6Goodman 
does not contest the Board's authority to modify the report of the viewers and 
appraisers.  See Wagstaff, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 24, 53 P.3d  at 
85.

 
 

7In 
its present version, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (LexisNexis 2009), requires 
the viewers to "determine whether or not any gates or cattleguards shall be 
placed . . . ."

 
 

8Ms. 
Goodman has since conveyed her property along the Highway-BLM route to the 
Stevens.

 
 

9The 
respondents have consistently argued that the Vosses did not proceed in good 
faith when they purposely omitted the absent landowner from the private road 
action, thereby making it impossible for the Board to order them to use their 
historical access.  The point is 
well taken.  Had they noticed that 
landowner, they could have been required to use the existing Highway-BLM road 
and there would have been no need to construct the bump out or incur the 
additional expense associated with such.