Title: State ex rel. Rothkegel v. Westlake

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Rothkegel v. Westlake, 88 Ohio St.3d 409, 2000-Ohio-364.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ROTHKEGEL, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF WESTLAKE; INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Rothkegel v. Westlake (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 409.] 
Workers’ compensation — Denial of claimant’s application for permanent total 
disability compensation — Absence of an age discussion in Industrial 
Commission’s order not a fatal flaw — Commission not required to list all 
evidence considered — Court of appeals’ denial of writ of mandamus 
affirmed. 
(No. 98-1203 – Submitted February 8, 2000 — Decided May 17, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD04-505. 
 
Appellant-claimant, Edward Rothkegel, sustained two industrial injuries, in 
1984 and 1985, while employed with the fire department of the city of Westlake.  
He applied for permanent total disability compensation in 1993.  Appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio denied his application, writing: 
 
“The following claims have been recognized for: * * * aggravation of 
arteriosclerotic heart disease[;] * * * hyperextension injury right knee 
superimposed upon pre-existing degenerative arthritis right knee. 
 
“ * * * 
 
 
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“This order is based upon the medical report(s) of Drs. [Donald E.] Pearson, 
[W. Jerry] McCloud and [Mubeen H.] Chida. 
 
“Claimant is a 62 year old former firefighter-paramedic who is also a high 
school graduate.  * * *  His past experience includes being a carpenter and a lawn 
mower mechanic.  Claimant was a paramedic for the last fourteen years of his 
twenty-eight year career with the Westlake Fire Department. 
 
“Dr. McCloud * * * opin[ed] that claimant’s right knee injury did not 
prevent him from returning to his former position of employment as a firefighter-
paramedic.  Dr. Pearson * * * indicated that the allowed knee injury would not 
prevent claimant from returning to his former position of employment.  * * * 
 
“The Staff Hearing Officer adopts the reports of Drs. McCloud and Pearson 
and finds that the allowed knee condition does not prevent claimant from returning 
to his former position of employment. * * * 
 
“ * * * Dr. Chida indicates that claimant gets angina on severe exertion.  * * 
* Dr. Chida indicates that although claimant could not return to work as a 
firefighter-paramedic[,] he could perform a light occupation such as a desk job. 
 
“The Staff Hearing Officer doubts the conclusions of Dr. Chida and finds 
that claimant could perform sedentary and/or light work.  It is noted that with 
claimant’s mechanical abilities he probably would have no difficulty in performing 
 
 
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various light assembly table work types of positions.  Claimant’s expertise as a 
former carpenter could well qualify him to become a building inspector. 
 
“Claimant’[s] fourteen years of experience as a paramedic would enable him 
to use his medical knowledge in various fields.  It is noted that a paramedic is at 
the highest level of training that a firefighter or ambulance worker can attain short 
of being a physician’s assistant, nurse or physician.  Paramedic certification 
typically takes at least one year of training beyond that of an emergency medical 
technician. 
 
“Someone with paramedic training would have the medical knowledge that 
would be useful in such positions as insurance claims adjuster, workers’ 
compensation claims examiner and medical billing clerk.  Having attained a high 
school degree shows that claimant would be capable of being trained to perform 
various positions. 
 
“Based upon the above, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that the allowed 
conditions in these claims do not preclude claimant from returning to sustained 
remunerative employment; therefore, the permanent and total disability application 
is denied.” 
 
Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in failing to (1) 
 
 
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consider the vocational report of Mark A. Anderson and (2) properly discuss 
claimant’s age.  The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Ticktin, Baron, Koepper & Co. and Harold Ticktin, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Steven K. Aronoff, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant initially alleges the right to a return of the cause to 
the commission pursuant to State ex rel. Fultz v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 327, 631 N.E.2d 1057, based on the lack of reference to the Anderson 
vocational report in the commission’s order.  Fultz, however, does not apply.  Fultz 
applies only where the disputed PTD order lists the evidence considered and omits 
a report from that list.  In such a case, the evidence omitted is presumed to have 
been ignored.  Where, as here, the commission lists only the evidence relied upon, 
omission does not raise the presumption that the evidence was overlooked.  As we 
explained in State ex rel. Buttolph v. Gen. Motors Corp., Terex Div. (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 73, 77, 679 N.E.2d 702, 705. 
 
“Although the commission is required to consider all evidence properly 
before it, it is not required to list each piece of evidence that it considered in its 
 
 
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order.  Under [State ex rel.] Mitchell [v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 481, 483-484, 6 OBR 531, 534, 453 N.E.2d 721, 724], * * * the commission 
is required to enumerate in its order ‘only that evidence which has been relied upon 
to reach their conclusion * * *.’ (Emphasis added.)  * * *  There is no requirement 
that the commission list all evidence considered. * * * 
 
“Nor does Fultz impose such a requirement.  Fultz holds, in effect, merely 
that if the commission unnecessarily endeavors to enumerate the evidence 
considered, it must appear from its order that all evidence was given consideration.  
Thus, if the commission lists only the evidence relied upon, without any attempt to 
enumerate the evidence considered Fultz does not apply.  * * * 
 
“In the case sub judice, the commission’s June 24, 1993 order listed only the 
evidence relied upon.  No effort was made to list the evidence considered.  Thus, 
Fultz is inapplicable, and the claimant’s argument must fail.” 
 
We reached the same conclusion in State ex rel. Lovell v. Indus. Comm. 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 250, 658 N.E.2d 284.  There, we wrote: 
 
 
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“The present case and Fultz are distinguishable.  Unlike Fultz, the present 
order did not unnecessarily enumerate the evidence considered.  It listed only the 
evidence on which the order was based.  Therefore, the presumption of regularity 
controls and consideration of claimant’s deposition must be presumed.”  Id. at 253, 
658 N.E.2d at 287. 
 
In this case, the commission listed only the medical evidence on which it 
relied.  Fultz does not, therefore, control. 
 
Claimant also proposes that the commission’s treatment of his age warrants 
a return of the cause for further consideration.  The commission concedes that it 
mentioned claimant’s age only in passing, but argues that the defect does not 
compel a return of the cause. 
 
Claimant relies on State ex rel. Moss v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
414, 662 N.E.2d 364, in which we held: 
 
“[The commission has a] responsibility to affirmatively address the age 
factor.  It is not enough for the commission just to acknowledge claimant’s age.  It 
must discuss age in conjunction with the other aspects of the claimant’s individual 
profile that may lessen or magnify age’s effects.” Id. at 417, 662 N.E.2d at 366. 
 
Since that time, we have declared that the absence of an age discussion is not 
necessarily a fatal flaw, nor does it, in some cases, even compel a return of the 
cause.  In State ex rel. Blue v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 466, 683 
 
 
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N.E.2d 1131—relied on by both the commission and the court of appeals—we 
wrote: 
 
“As another Noll flaw, claimant assails the commission’s cursory mention of 
his age.  While the commission did not ‘discuss’ this factor, that flaw, in this 
instance, should not be deemed fatal.  Claimant was fifty-seven when permanent 
total disability compensation was denied.  While not a vocational asset, claimant’s 
age is also not an insurmountable barrier to re-employment.  If claimant’s other 
vocational factors were all negative, further consideration of his age would be 
appropriate, since age could be outcome-determinative—the last straw that could 
compel a different result.  All of claimant’s other vocational factors are, however, 
positive.  A claimant may not be granted permanent total disability compensation 
due solely to his age.  Therefore, even in the absence of detailed discussion on the 
effects of claimant’s age, the commission’s explanation satisfies Noll.”  Id. at 469-
470, 683 N.E.2d at 1134. 
 
Claimant responds that Blue did not overrule Moss and did not, therefore, 
eliminate the commission’s responsibility to affirmatively discuss age.  This is 
true, but claimant misses the point.  The question is not whether the commission 
has such a duty, but rather what happens when the commission falls short of this 
duty.  Blue indicates that where the claimant’s other vocational factors are 
favorable, a return of the cause is not a given. 
 
 
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In this case, claimant’s other vocational factors are favorable.  Like the 
claimant in Blue, our claimant is a high school graduate.  Both claimants, 
moreover, received extensive additional schooling in highly demanding areas—
Blue as a certified electrician and our claimant as a paramedic. 
 
Therefore, consistent with Blue, we decline to return the cause for further 
consideration, and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS,  J., dissents. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals.