Title: Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13098 
 
HAKEEM MUSHWAALAKBAR  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2021. - June 9, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 23, 2020. 
 
Following transfer to the Appeals Court, the case was heard 
by Sydney Hanlon, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the petitioner. 
Marina Moriarty & Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. 
Diana Fantasia & Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Plymouth District & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Hakeem Mushwaalakbar, to whom we shall refer in 
this opinion as the defendant, has been held in pretrial 
2 
 
detention for over eighteen months on charges arising out of the 
Chelsea and Lynn Divisions of the District Court Department 
(Chelsea District Court and Lynn District Court).1  His trial in 
the Chelsea case was originally scheduled for March of 2020, but 
was delayed until June 2021, when he was acquitted of the 
charges.  His trial in the Lynn case was scheduled for April of 
2020, but it has been delayed since then due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  The defendant has now been held for more than a year 
beyond his initial trial dates. 
 
The defendant appeals from various orders regarding his 
pretrial detention status, arguing that this prolonged detention 
violates his due process rights.  Deciding this issue requires 
that we revisit our holding in Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 
70 (2020).  There, we held that as of June 2020, when the case 
was decided, the length of pretrial detention caused by the 
delay of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic had not yet 
reached the point of triggering a due process analysis.  See id. 
at 84.  Now, more than a year into the pandemic, we revisit that 
holding.  Although we are heartened by successful resumption of 
jury trials in the Commonwealth, we recognize the possibility of 
 
1 In the Lynn case, the defendant is held on the basis of 
dangerousness under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  In the Chelsea case, 
the defendant was initially held on the basis of dangerousness, 
and then was held on a cash bail until June 2, 2021, when he was 
acquitted of the charges. 
3 
 
continued unforeseen delays, as well as the fact that in some 
cases the length of pretrial detention may have approached or 
exceeded the limits of constitutional due process. 
 
Given that due process is flexible and fact-specific, the 
defendant is correct that a global remedy is inappropriate.  The 
pretrial detention statutes already contain mechanisms for 
individual review of detention orders suited to the task.  As we 
noted in Lougee, 485 Mass. at 81-82, the delays caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic may constitute a changed circumstance within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4).  Thus, defendants may 
seek individualized review whether their pretrial detention 
violates due process by filing motions for reconsideration under  
§ 58A (4). 
To guide trial court judges in analyzing whether a 
defendant's pretrial detention violates due process, we set out 
the following procedural framework.  Defendants have a right to 
a hearing on motions for reconsideration under § 58A (4) if they 
have been held longer than the presumptive time periods in § 58A 
minus any periods of excludable delay other than delay due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and they make a preliminary showing on 
one or more of the following due process factors. 
 
At the hearing, judges should weigh (1) the length of 
detention and the projected length of ongoing detention, (2) the 
existence and nature of a plea offer, (3) evidence supporting 
4 
 
detention under § 58A, (4) specific unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, and (5) the Commonwealth's responsibility for the 
delay. 
 
Given that the defendant has now been acquitted in the 
Chelsea case, that case is moot.  Regarding the Lynn case, we 
vacate the single justice's decision that no due process 
violation occurred and remand the matter to the Lynn District 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
Background.  1.  Lynn case.  On October 1, 2019, a 
complaint issued out of the Lynn District Court charging the 
defendant with assault and battery on a family or household 
member (subsequent offense), G. L. c. 265, § 13M (b); and 
strangulation, G. L. c. 265, § 15D.  The alleged victim in that 
case was the defendant's then girlfriend.  A warrant issued for 
the defendant's arrest. 
 
2.  Chelsea case.  A few weeks later, on October 23, 2019, 
police responded to a single-car accident in Chelsea.  The 
occupants of the crashed car were the defendant and the same 
girlfriend.  The girlfriend told police that the two had gotten 
into an argument that had escalated into a physical fight.  The 
defendant was injured in the car crash and taken to 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the district 
attorney for the Plymouth district and joined by the district 
attorney for the Bristol district. 
5 
 
Massachusetts General Hospital.  Upon discharge from the 
hospital, the defendant was placed under arrest.  He was then 
arraigned in the Chelsea District Court for assault on a family 
or household member (subsequent offense), G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13M (b); assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 15;3 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b); 
and strangulation, G. L. c. 265, § 15D.  The defendant was 
ordered held without bail pending a dangerousness hearing. 
 
3.  Dangerousness hearings.  After a dangerousness hearing 
in the Chelsea District Court on November 7, 2019, the defendant 
was held without bail.  A Chelsea District Court judge found 
that no conditions or combination of conditions of release could 
suffice to protect the alleged victim or the public, noting the 
defendant's prior domestic violence cases, the pendency of the 
Lynn complaint, and three restraining orders that had been 
entered against the defendant. 
 
On December 5, 2019, the defendant petitioned for review of 
the pretrial detention order in the Superior Court in Suffolk 
County.  A Superior Court judge vacated the dangerousness order, 
concluding that the defendant could be safely released on 
conditions including global positioning system monitoring, an 
order to stay away from the victim, a curfew, and a $10,000 cash 
 
3 This charge was later dismissed at the request of the 
Commonwealth. 
6 
 
bail.  The defendant was unable to post the bail amount and 
remained incarcerated.4 
 
On December 11, 2019, the defendant was arraigned on the 
Lynn District Court complaint.  The Commonwealth filed a § 58A 
petition, which was heard on December 16.  After the hearing, a 
Lynn District Court judge ordered the defendant held without 
bail. 
 
4.  Prior motions for release.  Jury trials were scheduled 
for March 30, 2020, in the Chelsea District Court, and April 14, 
2020, in the Lynn District Court.  Those trial dates were 
continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Following our decision in Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. 
v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 
S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020), the defendant filed motions for 
release in both courts.  In April 2020, both motions were 
denied.  The defendant also filed an emergency petition for 
release pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, which was denied in May 
2020.  In June, in the Chelsea District Court, the defendant 
filed another motion to reduce his bail, which was denied.  
Following our decision in Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, the defendant 
filed a motion for relief in the Lynn District Court, which 
motion was denied in July of 2020. 
 
4 The defendant's motion to reconsider the imposition of 
unaffordable bail was filed and denied on December 9, 2019. 
7 
 
 
5.  Motions underlying this appeal.  In the fall of 2020, 
the defendant renewed his motions for release.  He had suffered 
from a knee injury while playing basketball at the Nashua Street 
jail and argued that his inability to receive treatment for the 
injury while in jail, as well as the continued unavailability of 
jury trials, constituted changed circumstances.  The motions 
were denied in October in the Chelsea District Court and in 
December in the Lynn District Court. 
 
In November 2020, the defendant filed a motion in the 
Superior Court in Suffolk County to reconsider its prior order 
instating a $10,000 cash bail.  In December 2020, the Suffolk 
County prosecutor conveyed an offer to defense counsel to 
resolve the Chelsea case through a change of plea with a 
recommended split sentence of two and one-half years in the 
house of correction, nine months to serve, with the balance 
suspended during a period of probation.  Because the defendant 
had by then been imprisoned for thirteen months, acceptance of 
the offer would have resulted in release on conditions for the 
Chelsea case.  A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's 
motion to reconsider.5 
 
5 The defendant filed an affidavit alerting the court to the 
proposed resolution, but the judge's order issued before that 
affidavit was filed. 
8 
 
 
Later in December 2020, the defendant filed a new petition 
in the county court requesting release.  A single justice of 
this court transferred the petition to the Appeals Court.  With 
regard to the Chelsea case, the Commonwealth agreed that given 
the length of the defendant's pretrial detention in relation to 
the likely sentence if convicted, the bail should be reduced to 
an amount he could post.  With regard to the Lynn case, the 
Commonwealth opposed any relief. 
 
On March 15, 2021, a single justice of the Appeals Court 
denied the defendant's petition.  In a written order, the single 
justice addressed the defendant's due process argument, writing: 
"In my view, it will be for the Supreme Judicial Court to 
say when, and if, we reach that point during the present 
COVID-19 pandemic emergency.  Accordingly, at least at this 
time, I conclude that the defendant's continued detention, 
which began on October 24, 2019 does not run afoul of 
statutory or due process limitations. 
 
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we allowed 
his application for direct appellate review. 
 
6.  Further developments in the trial courts.  On March 23, 
2021, the parties jointly moved for a bail reduction in the 
Chelsea District Court.  On April 5, 2021, a judge issued an 
order reducing the defendant's bail to $2,000 "by agreement" of 
the parties.  On June 2, 2021, a jury trial was held.  On the 
strangulation count, the trial judge entered a required finding 
of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case.  The jury 
9 
 
returned verdicts of not guilty on all remaining charges.  See 
Care & Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 282 (2009) (court may 
take judicial notice of docket entries). 
 
The defendant also moved in the Superior Court in Essex 
County for review of the Lynn District Court's detention order.  
On April 23, a Superior Court judge declined to hear the 
petition due to the pendency of this appeal.  On May 18, a trial 
readiness conference was held in the Lynn case.  The 
Commonwealth answered that it was not ready for trial and filed 
a motion for production of the alleged victim's medical records.  
It is unclear why the Commonwealth did not file this motion 
until seventeen months after the defendant's arraignment.  The 
motion was allowed, and the trial readiness conference was 
rescheduled for June 18. 
 
Discussion.  Over one year ago in Lougee, 485 Mass. at 84, 
we held that prolonged pretrial detention due to delays 
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic had not yet reached the 
length of delay that would trigger a due process analysis.  More 
than one year into the pandemic, we revisit that holding.6 
 
6 "When a party appeals from an adverse judgment by the 
single justice under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we review the single 
justice's order for clear error of law or abuse of discretion."  
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 697, S.C., 478 Mass. 361 
(2017).  The single justice here relied on our decision in 
Lougee, 485 Mass. at 84, which, as mentioned supra, we now 
revisit. 
10 
 
Pretrial detention based on dangerousness is constitutional 
precisely because it is "temporary and provisional" and "the 
trial itself provides an inevitable end point to the State's 
preventive authority."  Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 
781, 790 (1996).  Although delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic 
constitute excludable delay under § 58A, see Lougee, 485 Mass. 
at 72, the prolonged length of the delay may, in some cases, 
upset the careful balancing prescribed by the Legislature in 
§ 58A, see Mendonza, supra at 790 (upholding constitutionality 
of § 58A and noting Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "allows 
preventive detention in carefully circumscribed circumstances 
and subject to quite demanding procedures").  Upsetting this 
careful balance implicates constitutional concerns. 
Due process imposes limits on pretrial detention.  See 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 & n.4 (1987).  
Because assessing these limits requires fact-specific analysis, 
we hold that certain defendants are entitled to hearings on 
motions for reconsideration of § 58A orders to determine whether 
the length of detention violates due process.  See Matter of the 
Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. 218, 227 
(2021) (Certain Pretrial Detainees) (certain detained defendants 
whose trials had been postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic had 
right to reopen detention hearings).  We explain precisely what 
class of defendants this applies to infra. 
11 
 
1.  Legal landscape.  "Substantive due process prohibits 
government conduct that 'shocks the conscience,' or interferes 
with 'rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  
Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 195 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 583, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 
858 (2014).  "Where the government seeks to infringe on a 
fundamental right, in order to comply with the requirements of 
substantive due process, its action must be narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling and legitimate government interest."  G.F., 
supra, citing Commonwealth v. Aime, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).  
"The right of an individual to be free from physical restraint 
is a paradigmatic fundamental right."  G.F., supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164 (2004). 
 
"Pretrial detention schemes necessarily balance the liberty 
interest of individuals presumed innocent against public safety 
concerns posed by high-risk defendants."  Certain Pretrial 
Detainees, 245 N.J. at 231, citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-751.  
"The process is constitutional so long as it serves regulatory 
rather than punitive purposes."  Certain Pretrial Detainees, 
supra, citing Salerno, supra at 746-748, and Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 535-540 (1979).  But at some point, pretrial 
detention under a valid regulatory scheme may "become 
excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive," resulting in a 
due process violation.  Salerno, supra at 747 n.4.  See Abbott 
12 
 
A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 40 (2010) ("Pretrial detention 
under § 58A was intended to be short lived, ending on the 
conclusion of a speedy trial"); Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 781. 
 
Where that point is will differ in every case.  See Abbott 
A., 458 Mass. at 28 (due process "varies with context" and is 
"flexible" [citations omitted]).  There is no bright-line limit 
to the permissible length of a pretrial detention, and thus 
judges must assess the permissible length of detention on a 
case-by-case basis.  See Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. at 
240 (defendants held pretrial for six months or longer who could 
make preliminary showing entitled to hearing regarding whether 
length of detention violated due process).  See also United 
States v. Torres, 995 F.3d 695, 699, 709 (9th Cir. 2021) 
(twenty-one month pretrial detention for charges of drug 
possession with intent to distribute and being felon in 
possession of ammunition, prolonged due to COVID-19 pandemic, 
"[did] not yet violate due process, but . . . [was] approaching 
the limits of what due process [could] tolerate"); State v. 
Labrecque, 2020 VT 81, ¶¶ 2-3, 29-31 (twenty-five month pretrial 
detention, prolonged due to COVID-19 pandemic, for child sexual 
assault charges carrying maximum life sentence did not violate 
due process). 
Due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, we remand 
the defendant's Lynn case for a determination whether his 
13 
 
continued pretrial confinement violates due process.7  We use 
this occasion to set out guidance for judges in the lower courts 
when addressing potential due process concerns that arise when a 
defendant's pretrial detention has been prolonged because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
2.  Procedure for individualized review.  We need not 
create new procedures here.  Section 58A already contains 
mechanisms for reconsideration.  Under § 58A (4), a defendant 
may file a motion for reconsideration with the court that issued 
the original detention order.  The existing procedure prescribed 
by the Legislature is an appropriate way for defendants to raise 
due process concerns. 
 
A defendant may file a motion for reconsideration where 
there has been a material change in circumstances.  See G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (4).  We have already held that "[a] substantial 
delay in the commencement of trial may constitute a change in 
circumstances."  Lougee, 485 Mass. at 81. 
When deciding a motion for reconsideration, it is 
imperative that the judge consider "not whether the initial 
detention decision was correct, but whether the circumstances at 
the time of the later hearing warrant a defendant's continued 
detention."  Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. at 237.  Thus, 
 
7 As stated supra, we also hold that the defendant's Chelsea 
case is moot. 
14 
 
judges must make a renewed determination whether the defendant's 
release will endanger the safety of any other person or the 
community.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (2).  In making this 
determination, judges must consider whether the length of 
pretrial detention has become excessively prolonged and 
therefore violates due process. 
 
3.  Factors to consider.  Other jurisdictions that have 
analyzed the due process concerns of prolonged pretrial 
detention because of the COVID-19 pandemic have listed various 
factors to guide judges in determining whether there has been a 
due process violation.  See Torres, 995 F.3d at 708-709; Certain 
Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. at 237-240; Labrecque, 2020 VT 81, 
¶¶ 18-29.  Considering the reasoning in these cases, as well as 
our own law, we set out the following factors. 
a.  The length of detention and the projected length of 
ongoing detention.  First, the judge should consider the length 
of time the defendant has been detained, as well as the 
projected length of continuing detention.  See Certain Pretrial 
Detainees, 245 N.J. at 237.  See also Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 
39; Torres, 995 F.3d at 708; Labrecque, 2020 VT 81, ¶ 29. 
Jury trials have now resumed in the Commonwealth.  
Consequently, a judge may consider the existence of a trial date 
regarding a defendant's case, although a trial date does not in 
and of itself necessarily eliminate a potential due process 
15 
 
violation.  For example, should the length of a defendant's 
pretrial detention surpass the likely sentence on the charge if 
convicted before reaching the trial date, then due process may 
require releasing the defendant prior to the trial date.  See 
Lougee, 485 Mass. at 81 (change in circumstances where "the 
duration of pretrial confinement approaches or exceeds the 
length of sentence a defendant would be likely to receive if he 
or she were found guilty of the crimes charged").  Cf. Brangan 
v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 709-710, S.C., 478 Mass. 361 
(2017) ("when a bail order comes before a judge for 
reconsideration or review and a defendant has been detained 
. . . , the judge must consider the length of the defendant's 
pretrial detention and the equities of the case"). 
 
b.  The existence and nature of a plea offer.  "We 
anticipate that prosecutors will act in good faith and continue 
to extend plea offers in the same manner they did before the 
pandemic."  Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. at 239.  
Consequently, like the previous factor, plea offers can bear on 
how much time a defendant would likely spend incarcerated if 
there was a change in plea.  See id. at 238-239.  For example, 
in the defendant's Chelsea case, the Commonwealth's plea offer 
was nine months to serve.  The defendant had already surpassed 
that amount.  For this reason, that factor would have weighed in 
favor of release if the Chelsea case had not become moot. 
16 
 
c.  Evidence supporting detention under § 58A.  Third, the 
judge should consider the evidence supporting detention under 
§ 58A.  See Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 39-40 (degree of 
dangerousness one factor in totality of circumstances when 
considering whether length of § 58A detention is unreasonable); 
Torres, 995 F.3d at 709 (considering evidence supporting 
detention under Federal Bail Reform Act); Certain Pretrial 
Detainees, 245 N.J. at 239-240 (considering factors relevant to 
pretrial detention order). 
In addition to the record and order from the initial § 58A 
hearing, the judge should consider any evidence that may have 
changed with the passage of time.  For example, in Lougee, 485 
Mass. at 81, we noted that a delay in trial may affect the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case "if a key witness recanted 
his or her inculpatory statement, or if laboratory findings 
failed to confirm the defendant's participation in the crime, or 
if further investigation revealed exculpatory evidence or 
identified a potential third-party culprit."  Moreover, we noted 
that such changes are relevant to the nature and circumstances 
of the offense under § 58A (5).  Id.  See Certain Pretrial 
Detainees, 245 N.J. at 239 (strength of prosecution's case may 
have changed with passage of time). 
 
d.  Specific unfair prejudice to the defendant.  Next, the 
judge should consider whether continued detention would result 
17 
 
in any specific prejudice to the defendant.  See Abbott A., 458 
Mass. at 40.  Prejudice includes, but is not limited to, 
specific health risks.  Heightened risks of contracting COVID-19 
while incarcerated fall under this factor.  See Certain Pretrial 
Detainees, 245 N.J. at 239.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 
394, 405-409 (2020), citing Christie v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 
397, 401-402 (2020) (outlining analysis of COVID-19 factor for 
defendants seeking stay of sentence).  As in Nash, supra at 408-
409, this factor may only weigh in favor of the defendant, and 
the lack of either particularized health risks or a COVID-19 
outbreak at a house of correction should not make it more 
difficult for a defendant to obtain release. 
 
e.  The Commonwealth's responsibility for the delay.  
Finally, courts have considered the prosecution's responsibility 
for the delay.  While the Commonwealth is clearly not 
responsible for delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it 
nonetheless bears the responsibility of bringing the defendant 
to trial.  See Torres, 995 F.3d at 708 (defendant conceded that 
prosecutor bore no responsibility for delay due to COVID-19 
pandemic); Labrecque, 2020 VT 81, ¶ 26 ("Although no malfeasance 
or neglect underlies the delay [due to COVID-19 pandemic], the 
government bears the responsibility of bringing defendant to 
trial, even when it is delayed in the exercise of that 
responsibility by a public health emergency").  Thus, delays 
18 
 
caused solely by the COVID-19 pandemic are essentially "a wash" 
and should not be weighed in favor of either party. 
 
If, however, a delay is not solely due to the COVID-19 
pandemic -- for example, if the Commonwealth answers that it is 
not ready for trial -- then that delay would weigh against the 
Commonwealth.  Compare Torres, 995 F.3d at 708-709 (continuances 
stipulated to for defense counsel's benefit not attributable to 
prosecution); Labrecque, 2020 VT 81, ¶ 25 ("The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that, at least in the context of a 
federal speedy-trial claim under the Sixth Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution], delay caused by the actions of a 
public defender is attributed to the defendant, not the state"). 
 
In the defendant's Lynn case, after oral argument in this 
court and before this decision issued, there was a trial 
readiness conference in the District Court on May 18, 2021.  The 
Commonwealth answered that it was not ready for trial and filed 
a motion for production of the alleged victim's medical records.  
The Commonwealth indicated that it could not properly prepare 
for trial without such records.  There is nothing in the docket 
indicating why the Commonwealth took seventeen months to file 
what appears to be a basic motion pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269-270 (2004), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 
17, 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  Thus, if the Commonwealth is 
responsible for the delay in the setting of a trial date for an 
19 
 
additional month, that would constitute a fact favorable to the 
defendant. 
 
4.  Right to a hearing.  In Lougee, 485 Mass. at 81, we 
held that a substantial delay in the commencement of trial may 
constitute a change in circumstance pursuant to § 58A (4).  To 
summarize, we now clarify that defendants are entitled to a 
hearing on a motion for reconsideration under § 58A (4) if they 
have been detained for longer than the presumptive time periods 
in § 58A (3),8 and they can make a preliminary showing based on 
one or more of the due process factors discussed supra.  See 
Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 N.J. at 240 (right to hearing if 
detained longer than six months due to COVID-19 pandemic and can 
make preliminary showing on one or more due process factors).  
The right to a hearing in these circumstances will ensure 
individualized review to determine if due process requires 
release from pretrial detention. 
 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the single justice 
of the Appeals Court for entry of an order vacating the denial 
 
8 This time limit is 120 days by the District Court or 180 
days by the Superior Court, minus any period of excludable delay 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1979).  G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3).  Note, however, that even though delay due to 
our COVID-19 pandemic emergency orders constitutes excludable 
delay under the statute, see Lougee, 485 Mass. at 72-73, that 
portion of the delay should not be included when calculating 
whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for 
reconsideration. 
20 
 
by the Lynn Division of the District Court Department of the 
defendant's November 2020 renewed motion for reconsideration and 
remanding the matter for an immediate hearing in the Lynn 
Division of the District Court Department.  The defendant is 
free to supplement his motion with further argument consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.