Title: McCullough v. Henderson

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

804 S.W.2d 368 (1991) 304 Ark. 689 Joani McCULLOUGH, Appellant, v. Mitchell Ray HENDERSON, Appellee. No. 90-362. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 4, 1991. J. Scott Covington, Harrison, for appellant. Kent Coxey, Berryville, for appellee. HAYS, Justice. Mitchell Ray Henderson petitioned the Boone Chancery Court to determine that he was the natural father of Cody Charles McCullough, born to Joani McCullough on September 22, 1989. The chancellor held accordingly and ordered visitation, child support, and payment of hospital and medical expenses. Some months later Mitchell Ray Henderson petitioned for a change in the child's surname from McCullough to Henderson, which Joani McCullough controverted on the premise that it would not be in the best interest of the child. Relying on Ark.Code Ann. § 20-18-401 (1987), the chancellor held he was without discretion in the matter and ordered the name change. Ms. McCullough has appealed. We reverse and remand for a ruling consistent with the best interests of the child. It appears from the record that at the initial hearing the chancellor indicated a tentative view that the law gave him no latitude, but no definite ruling was made. At a later hearing, some months thereafter, the chancellor announced his ruling: The statute referred to, Ark.Code Ann. § 20-18-401(e)(3) (Supp.1989), reads: While we agree with the chancellor that the word "shall" renders the provision mandatory, we do not read the statute as directing that the surname of the child should necessarily become that of the father. We think the statute merely states that the full name of the father and the surname of the child shall be entered on the birth certificate "in accordance with the finding and order of the court." Nothing in the language suggests the two must be the same. In some cases the father may not even want the two names to agree. While we can conceive of instances where the child should bear the father's name, we can conceive of as many others wherein the welfare of the child, particularly one of more advanced years, would not be well served. We believe a rule which makes the result automatic would be neither prudent nor consistent with the established traditions of the law, hence, we are unwilling to adopt a construction of the statute which produces rigidity, where such an interpretation is decidedly less than self-evident. In Stamps v. Rawlins, 297 Ark. 370, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988), we addressed the power of chancery courts to change the names of children in the context of other provisions of our code: Here, we have no record of factors which inveigh for or against either surname. But we believe that judgment must be the product of the chancellor's informed discretion, exercised in response to what is deemed to be in the best interests of the child. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.