Title: State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5697.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5697 
THE STATE EX REL. JEAN-BAPTISTE, APPELLANT, v. KIRSCH, JUDGE, 
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5697.] 
(No. 2011-0934—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 10CA3338, 
2011-Ohio-3368. 
_____________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals denying 
the claim of appellant, Pression Jean-Baptiste, for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
appellee, Judge James W. Kirsch of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Division, from classifying him as a juvenile-offender registrant in a 
delinquency case after he turned 21 years old.  Because the juvenile court patently 
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed with classifying Jean-Baptiste, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition. 
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I.  Facts 
A.  Juvenile-Delinquency Case 
{¶ 2} Jean-Baptiste was born in Haiti on January 18, 1989.  According to 
Jean-Baptiste, he was brought to the United States from a Haitian orphanage in 
1996 and was placed with Paula Kessler in Portsmouth, Ohio.  There were no 
legal proceedings regarding his custody until December 2004, when the juvenile 
court placed him in the legal custody of Kessler. 
{¶ 3} On October 19, 2006, a Scioto County Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney filed a complaint in the Scioto County Juvenile Court alleging that Jean-
Baptiste, then 17 years old, appeared to be a delinquent child for committing a 
rape of a 10-year-old child on August 19, 2006, an offense that would be a felony 
of the first degree if committed by an adult.  In January 2007, Jean-Baptiste 
admitted the allegations of the complaint, and, on the day after Jean-Baptiste 
turned 18 years old, Judge Kirsch adjudicated him to be a delinquent child.  On 
February 5, 2007, following a dispositional hearing, Judge Kirsch ordered that 
Jean-Baptiste be committed to the permanent custody of the Ohio Department of 
Youth Services (“DYS”) for placement in an institution for a minimum of one 
year and for a maximum period not to extend beyond his 21st birthday—January 
18, 2010.  The judge also classified Jean-Baptiste as a sexual predator and ordered 
him to meet the registration requirements of that classification upon his release. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the juvenile court’s sexual-
predator classification based on its holding that because the court committed Jean-
Baptiste to a secure facility as part of its dispositional order, the court could not 
classify him as a sexual predator under R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) until his release from 
the secure facility.  In re P.B., Scioto App. No. 07CA3140, 2007-Ohio-3937.  No 
appeal was taken from this decision. 
{¶ 5} On May 23, 2008, the United States Department of Homeland 
Security placed an immigration detainer on Jean-Baptiste to assume custody of 
January Term, 2012 
3 
him.  On July 17, 2008, DYS released Jean-Baptiste from its institution, and he 
was held in the Seneca County Jail until hearings could be conducted to determine 
his citizenship.  In December 2009, DYS notified Judge Kirsch, the county 
sheriff’s office, and the county prosecutor that on January 18, 2010 (Jean-
Baptiste’s 21st birthday), he would be discharged from the department’s legal 
custody.  Judge Kirsch had scheduled a status conference in the case for January 
15, but continued it because Jean-Baptiste was still in the Seneca County Jail and 
would not be released until January 26, 2010.  Judge Kirsch ordered that Jean-
Baptiste’s juvenile-offender classification hearing be held on February 8, 2010.  
When Jean-Baptiste was released from the Seneca County Jail, he was placed by 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Faith Mission 
residential facility. 
B.  Prohibition Case 
{¶ 6} On February 2, 2010, Jean-Baptiste filed a complaint in the court of 
appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Kirsch from proceeding to 
classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant.  Jean-Baptiste claimed that the 
juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because 
no statute authorized the court to conduct a classification hearing after he had 
turned 21 years old on January 18, 2010.  After the court of appeals denied Judge 
Kirsch’s motions to dismiss and for relief from judgment and for leave to renew 
his motion to dismiss, the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 7} Jean-Baptiste raised the following arguments:  (1) Judge Kirsch does 
not have jurisdiction to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant, because he 
is over 21 years old and is thus not a “child” as defined in R.C. 2152.02, (2) the 
juvenile court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is over 21 years 
old, and (3) Judge Kirsch lacks jurisdiction to classify him because the judge 
failed to hold a classification hearing within a reasonable time of his release from 
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DYS.  Judge Kirsch argued in part that the court of appeals should not consider 
Jean-Baptiste’s last argument because it was not raised in his complaint. 
{¶ 8} On April 18, 2011, the court of appeals denied the writ of 
prohibition.  Jean-Baptiste appealed, and after briefing, we sua sponte held the 
case for our decision in In re J.V., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-4961, __ N.E.2d 
__, which was decided on October 30, 2012.1  State ex rel. P.J. v. Kirsch, 131 
Ohio St.3d 1478, 2012-Ohio-955, 963 N.E.2d 156.  This cause is now before the 
court for our consideration. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
A.  Oral Argument 
{¶ 9} Jean-Baptiste has filed a motion for oral argument.  He claims that 
oral argument is appropriate because this case involves a matter of great public 
importance, complex issues of law or fact, and a conflict between courts of 
appeals. 
{¶ 10} In cases in which oral argument is not mandatory—such as direct 
appeals from cases originating in a court of appeals, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.2(A)—we 
have discretion to grant oral argument, and “in exercising this discretion, we 
consider whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex 
issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts 
of appeals.”  State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 
118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} Jean-Baptiste contends that this appeal involves a matter of great 
public importance because this court has pending cases that relate to the 
application of 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”), Ohio’s version of the 
federal Adam Walsh Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, see, e.g., In 
                                                 
1. Because of the factual differences between J.V. and the present case, we do not look to J.V. for 
guidance here. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
re D.J.S., case No. 2008-1624,2 and its related cases, and because we recently 
held that S.B. 10 “as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to 
its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which 
prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.”  State v. Williams, 
129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, syllabus.  Yet in his 
motion, Jean-Baptiste concedes that the litigants in In re D.J.S. and its related 
cases “have not raised issues” similar to those involved in this appeal.  And he 
does not suggest that the holding in this case is governed by either Williams or In 
re D.J.S.. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, Jean-Baptiste does not specify in what respect this direct 
appeal in a prohibition case involves either complex issues of law or fact or what 
purported conflict exists between courts of appeals on the claims he raises here. 
{¶ 13} Finally, the parties’ briefs are sufficient for the court to resolve this 
appeal.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2011-
Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 14} For all of these reasons, we deny Jean-Baptiste’s motion for oral 
argument and proceed to address the merits. 
B.  Prohibition 
{¶ 15} To be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition, 
Jean-Baptiste had to establish that (1) Judge Kirsch was about to exercise judicial 
power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and (3) denying 
the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the 
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-
Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 7.  It is uncontroverted that by ordering the 
February 8, 2010 juvenile-offender classification hearing, Judge Kirsch was about 
to exercise judicial power when Jean-Baptiste filed his prohibition action. 
                                                 
2. In re D.J.S. is no longer pending; it was decided on October 20, 2011.  130 Ohio St.3d 257, 
2011-Ohio-5342, 957 N.E.2d 291. 
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{¶ 16} For the remaining requirements, “[i]n the absence of a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 
119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Pruitt v. 
Donnelly, 129 Ohio St.3d 498, 2011-Ohio-4203, 954 N.E.2d 117, ¶ 2.  
“Prohibition will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 
128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 9.  The dispositive issue 
is thus whether Jean-Baptiste established that the juvenile court patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile-offender classification 
hearing. 
C.  Continuing Jurisdiction Did Not Extend to Jean-Baptiste After He Turned 21 
{¶ 17} In his first proposition, Jean-Baptiste asserts that he established that 
the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct the 
February 8, 2010 classification hearing because he had turned 21 on January 18, 
2010. 
{¶ 18} Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court have basic statutory 
jurisdiction over the delinquency case under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which provides 
that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction “[c]oncerning any child 
who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is 
alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.”  See also R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) 
(for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, “child” generally “means a person who is 
under eighteen years of age”).  The complaint filed in the juvenile court alleged—
and Jean-Baptiste subsequently admitted—that he was a delinquent child based on 
a rape he committed when he was 17 years old. 
{¶ 19} However, although the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Jean-
Baptiste’s delinquency case, Jean-Baptiste argues in his first proposition of law 
January Term, 2012 
7 
that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over the disposition once it had been fully 
satisfied and once he was no longer a “child” relative to that disposition.  He 
points to R.C. 2152.02(C), which has eight subparts and defines the word “child” 
for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2152: 
 
(C)(1) “Child” means a person who is under eighteen years 
of age, except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(2) to (8) of 
this section. 
(2) Subject to division (C)(3) of this section, any person 
who violates a federal or state law or a municipal ordinance prior 
to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a “child” 
irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with 
respect to that violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is 
held. 
(3) Any person who, while under eighteen years of age, 
commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult 
and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until 
after the person attains twenty-one years of age is not a child in 
relation to that act. 
(4) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(5) and (7) 
of this section, any person whose case is transferred for criminal 
prosecution pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code shall 
be deemed after the transfer not to be a child in the transferred 
case. 
(5) Any person whose case is transferred for criminal 
prosecution pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code and 
who subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in 
that case, unless a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence 
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is imposed on the child for that offense * * *  and the adult portion 
of that sentence is not invoked * * *, and any person who is 
adjudicated a delinquent child * * * who has a serious youthful 
offender dispositional sentence imposed * * * and whose adult 
portion of the dispositional sentence is invoked * * * shall be 
deemed after the conviction, plea, or invocation not to be a child in 
any case in which a complaint is filed against the person. 
(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is 
adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to 
attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one 
years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that 
adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a 
person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic 
offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-
one years of age. * * * 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over any person 
whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution solely for the 
purpose of detaining the person * * * unless the person is 
convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in the adult court. 
(8) Any person who, while eighteen years of age, violates 
division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2919.27 of the Revised Code by 
violating a protection order issued or consent agreement approved 
under section 2151.34 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code shall be 
considered a child for the purposes of that violation of section 
2919.27 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphases added.)  
January Term, 2012 
9 
{¶ 20} Jean-Baptiste argues that the definition of “child” in R.C. 
2152.02(C)(2) is limited by R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) to persons under the age of 21, 
and that the extension of jurisdiction for a “hearing on the complaint” in R.C. 
2152.02(C)(2) is limited to matters of adjudication.  We disagree with the first 
point, and hold that R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) and (3) are independent, but we agree 
with the second argument. 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals in this case stated that “R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) 
does not limit the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to only the ‘hearing on the 
complaint,’ i.e., the adjudication and disposition.”  State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. 
Kirsch, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3338, 2011-Ohio-3368, ¶ 12.  In concluding that the 
trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste, the court of appeals 
relied upon our decision in State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-
Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) and 2152.02(C).  
Jean-Baptiste at ¶ 14-16. 
{¶ 22} The facts of N.A., however, differ from Jean-Baptiste’s case.  N.A. 
arose out of a reversal of a delinquency adjudication because the juvenile court 
had failed to properly record the hearing, and N.A. had sought a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the juvenile court judge from proceeding with an 
adjudicatory hearing on remand.  The juvenile court had begun its rehearing 
before the day that N.A. turned 21, but then continued the hearing to a date after 
his 21st birthday.  See id. at ¶ 4.  In affirming the court of appeals’ denial of the 
writ, we concluded that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction to proceed on the 
delinquency case: 
 
Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction 
to proceed with the delinquency case even though N.A. turned 21 
years old before the case concluded.  And notwithstanding N.A.’s 
argument to the contrary, even though the latest hearing in the 
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matter was precipitated by the court of appeals’ remand for a 
rehearing, that proceeding is still a “hearing on the complaint.” 
 
(Emphases added.)  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 23} We agree with Jean-Baptiste that his case is distinguishable from 
N.A.  Unlike the rehearing in N.A., the juvenile-offender classification hearing in 
this case is not a hearing on the complaint.  Jean-Baptiste’s adjudicatory and 
dispositional hearings took place in 2007.  Because this case involves a 
classification hearing, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, N.A. is not controlling. 
{¶ 24} We recognize that the court of appeals relied in part upon the 
following language from N.A.:   
 
[T]he delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is 
adjudicated a delinquent child based on the rape offenses, N.A. 
would still be subject to the juvenile-offender-registration 
provisions. See R.C. 2152.82(C) (if an order classifying a child as 
a juvenile-offender registrant is issued, “the child’s attainment of 
eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate 
the order”); see also R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (juvenile court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction to “conduct the hearings, and to 
make the determinations, adjudications, and orders authorized or 
required under sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 * * * of the Revised 
Code regarding a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent 
child”). 
 
N.A., 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 13.  This language, 
however, is also irrelevant to Jean-Baptiste’s case.  It is true that N.A. may have 
been subject to registration if the court adjudicated him delinquent; however, the 
January Term, 2012 
11 
court’s ability to classify in that case arose from the clause of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) 
granting the court jurisdiction to issue an order classifying the child as part of the 
dispositional order.  This portion of the statute was applicable in N.A. because in 
that case, the juvenile court maintained continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate 
N.A.’s delinquency.  In this case, Jean-Baptiste’s delinquency proceeding was 
concluded when the juvenile court issued its 2007 order committing him to the 
custody of a secure facility.  Because the juvenile court concluded the 
delinquency proceeding, the portion of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) at issue in N.A. is 
inapplicable here. 
{¶ 25} The statute that controls the procedure for juvenile sex-offender 
classification is R.C. 2152.83.  The dissent argues that the majority conflates 
Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition of law with his second.  But the dissent fails to 
recognize that Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition of law includes the argument that a 
court lacks jurisdiction to classify a child once the disposition has been fully 
satisfied.  In Jean-Baptiste’s merit brief, he specifically argues that a juvenile 
court has no jurisdiction over a disposition that has been fully satisfied or over a 
person who is no longer a child relative to that disposition.  This argument is 
included under his first proposition of law, which asserts that a juvenile court is 
without subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to conduct an initial 
juvenile sex-offender classification hearing for an adult. 
{¶ 26} The dissent also argues that Jean-Baptiste waived any claim related 
to the timing requirement in R.C. 2152.83 by failing to raise it in his complaint in 
the court of appeals.  We note that Jean-Baptiste did raise this issue in his 
complaint.  The complaint asserts that Judge Kirsch “patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction to proceed,” that if Judge Kirsch “had validly classified [Jean-
Baptiste] before [Jean-Baptiste] attained twenty-one years of age, the court’s 
order would remain valid beyond [Jean-Baptiste’s] twenty-first birthday pursuant 
to R.C. 2152.83(E),” that “there is no existing order classifying [Jean-Baptiste] 
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and there is no statute extending the jurisdiction of the court past [Jean-Baptiste’s] 
twenty-first birthday,” and that because “no statute authorizes a juvenile court to 
conduct a classification [hearing] after a person has turned twenty-one, any action 
by Judge Kirsch would be void ab initio.” 
{¶ 27} The statute relating to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to conduct a 
classification hearing for juvenile sex offenders is R.C. 2152.83(A)(1): 
 
The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall 
issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the 
child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall 
issue at the time of the child’s release from the secure facility, an 
order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and 
specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04, 
2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  We must thus look to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) to determine the 
validity of the argument raised in Jean-Baptiste’s complaint that “there is no 
statute extending the jurisdiction of the court past [Jean-Baptiste’s] twenty-first 
birthday.” 
{¶ 28} Because Jean-Baptiste was adjudicated a delinquent child and was 
committed to a secure facility, the statute is clear that the court must issue the 
order classifying the child a juvenile-offender registrant at the time the child is 
released from the secure facility—not afterward.  The statute is logical, given that 
the juvenile-offender registrant may be subject to certain registration requirements 
upon his or her release into the community.  Because Jean-Baptiste was released 
on the day that he turned 21 and because R.C. 2152.83 specifies that classification 
must occur when a child is released from a secure facility, the juvenile court 
January Term, 2012 
13 
patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste after his 
21st birthday, when he was no longer a child. 
{¶ 29} This conclusion is in accord with In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 
2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258.  There we held, “A juvenile court does not 
have the jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a Department of 
Youth Services facility after a juvenile has been released from probation.”  Id. at 
syllabus.  In so holding, we noted a distinction between a juvenile court’s 
extended jurisdiction over abused, neglected, or dependent children and a juvenile 
court’s more limited jurisdiction over delinquent children, stating, “The criminal 
aspects of juvenile delinquency proceedings require greater constraints on 
juvenile courts.”  Id. at ¶ 25.  We also explained: 
 
While this court has held, in In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
63, 748 N.E. 2d 67, syllabus, that a juvenile court proceeding 
generally is a civil action, this court also noted that “there are 
criminal aspects to juvenile court proceedings” and that “the 
United States Supreme Court has carefully imposed basic due 
process requirements on [the juvenile justice system].”  Id. at 66 
and 65, 748 N.E.2d 67. 
 
Id. at ¶ 21.  In keeping with these principles, we concluded that “[w]hen the court 
ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to 
Cross on th[e] delinquency count.”  Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 30} The reasoning behind Cross also applies to Jean-Baptiste’s case.  
Because this case arises out of a delinquency adjudication, Jean-Baptiste is 
entitled to basic due process protections.  R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) plainly states that 
the court shall issue the classification order at the time of the child’s release from 
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a secure facility.  This is a clear expression of the legislature’s intent that juvenile 
courts lose their ability to hold classification hearings after that time. 
{¶ 31} Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, this conclusion is not in 
conflict with either State v. Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 714 N.E.2d 381 (1999), 
or In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999).  Both Bellman and 
Davis were decided before the enactment of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and therefore did 
not contemplate the specific statutory language at issue today.  Bellman, 
moreover, concerned former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), a statute that dealt with adult 
offenders rather than  juveniles.  Although Davis is a juvenile case, it specifically 
dealt with the question whether the seven-day time frame within which a juvenile 
court must enter its disposition of a child adjudicated as abused, neglected, or 
dependent under R.C. 2151.35 also applied to motions for permanent custody 
filed by an agency under R.C. 2151.414 prior to the September 1996 amendment 
to that statute.  As mentioned above, we noted in Cross that a juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction in a delinquency case is more limited than in an abuse, neglect, or 
dependency case.  Davis is accordingly inapplicable to this case. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) requires that the court issue an order 
classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time of the child’s 
release from the custody of a secure facility.  Because the juvenile court lacks 
statutory authority to classify Jean-Baptiste after he was released and the court’s 
delinquency disposition has been fully satisfied, we agree with Jean-Baptiste’s 
first proposition of law as applied to this case and hold that the juvenile court 
lacks jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste, who is now no longer a “child” under 
the applicable statute. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 33} In this case, the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed with classifying Jean-Baptiste.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition. 
January Term, 2012 
15 
Judgment reversed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
_____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} It is a fundamental tenet of jurisprudence in extraordinary-writ 
cases that the scope of review by this court and courts of appeals is less expansive 
than in cases that arise in the ordinary course of law.  This is a sensible corollary 
to the “ ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide 
more, it is necessary not to decide more.’ ”  State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of 
Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 34, 
quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment).  Consequently, in cases seeking extraordinary relief 
in prohibition, courts should not address the merits of a jurisdictional claim, 
because their duty is limited to determining whether jurisdiction in the lower court 
is patently and unambiguously lacking.  See State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 12 (court does not rule on 
merits of jurisdictional claim, “because our duty in prohibition cases is limited to 
determining whether jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking”); State 
ex rel. Davet v. Sutula, 131 Ohio St.3d 220, 2012-Ohio-759, 963 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 3 
(court of appeals did not need to address the merits of jurisdictional claim, 
because its jurisdiction in writ case was limited to determining whether 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking). 
{¶ 35} Although the majority opinion in this case parrots the general 
standard applicable to Jean-Baptiste’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition, 
it fails to apply it, and instead it erroneously conflates Jean-Baptiste’s properly 
raised prohibition claim with a claim that he waived in the court of appeals and 
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then decides the merits of the prohibition claim based largely on the waived 
jurisdictional claim. 
{¶ 36} Jean-Baptiste raises two distinct claims in this appeal—his primary 
one challenging the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to conduct a classification 
hearing for a delinquent child over 21 years of age and his secondary claim 
contesting the juvenile court’s alleged failure to hold a classification hearing 
within a reasonable time after he was released from a secure facility.  It is the 
second of these two claims that relies on R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and that is not 
properly before this court. 
Failure to Hold Classification Hearing within Reasonable Time 
{¶ 37} In his second proposition of law, Jean-Baptiste claims that the court 
of appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition because the juvenile court 
patently and unambiguously lost jurisdiction under R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) to classify 
him as a juvenile-offender registrant by failing to hold a classification hearing 
within a reasonable time after he was released from a DYS facility on July 17, 
2008.  It is this claim that the majority finds to be dispositive. 
{¶ 38} R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)3 provides that under circumstances such as 
those in the underlying delinquency case here, the juvenile court “shall issue at 
                                                 
3. R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) provides: 
 
The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the 
dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the 
custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child's release from the 
secure facility an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and 
specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 
2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code if all of the following apply: 
(a) The act for which the child is or was adjudicated a delinquent child is a 
sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense that the child 
committed on or after January 1, 2002. 
(b) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of 
committing the offense. 
(c) The court was not required to classify the child a juvenile offender 
registrant under section 2152.82 of the Revised Code or as both a juvenile 
January Term, 2012 
17 
the time of the child’s release from the secure facility an order that classifies the 
child a juvenile offender registrant and specifies that the child has a duty to 
comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised 
Code.” 
{¶ 39} Jean-Baptiste failed to raise this claim in his complaint and did not 
seek leave to amend his complaint to raise the claim.  The parties then submitted 
evidence based on the allegations of the complaint, and in his court-of-appeals 
merit brief, Judge Kirsch objected to Jean-Baptiste’s raising the claim in his brief 
when he had failed to raise it in his complaint.  Notwithstanding the majority’s 
claim that no waiver occurred, the fact remains that his complaint did not cite 
R.C. 2152.83(A)(1), which the majority now finds to be dispositive as a basis for 
the writ of prohibition.  Under these circumstances, Jean-Baptiste waived this 
jurisdictional claim in his prohibition case.  See State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 87 
Ohio St.3d 159, 160, 718 N.E.2d 428 (1999) (court declined to address merits of 
claim on appeal from dismissal of prohibition complaint when appellant did not 
raise the issue in his complaint or amend the complaint to include the claim, and 
appellees did not expressly or implicitly consent to litigation of it). 
{¶ 40} Moreover, for the following reasons, even assuming that Jean-
Baptiste’s claim was not waived by his failure to properly raise it in the court of 
appeals, he did not establish that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to conduct his classification hearing within a reasonable time 
after he was released from custody. 
{¶ 41} First, R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) does not specify that if a juvenile court 
fails to hold a hearing at the time specified in the statute, its jurisdiction to hold 
the hearing is terminated.  “ ‘As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the 
                                                                                                                                     
offender registrant and a public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant 
under section 2152.86 of the Revised Code. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for 
performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for 
convenience or orderly procedure.’ ”  State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. 
Farrar, 146 Ohio St. 467, 66 N.E.2d 531 (1946), paragraph three of the syllabus; 
see also State ex rel. Madsen v. Jones, 106 Ohio St.3d 178, 2005-Ohio-4381, 833 
N.E.2d 291, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 42} Significantly, in State v. Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 714 
N.E.2d 381 (1999), the court held that former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), which 
provided that the judge “shall conduct the [sexual predator] hearing prior to 
sentencing,” id. at 210, did not impose any jurisdictional restriction based on a 
judge’s failure to comply with the timing requirement to hold the classification 
hearing.  See also In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999) 
(time requirement for juvenile court to make disposition order is directory and not 
jurisdictional).  Similarly, R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) includes no expression of 
legislative intent to restrict the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to hold a juvenile-
offender classification hearing for failure to hold a classification hearing at the 
time of the child’s release from a secure facility. 
{¶ 43} Second, Jean-Baptiste cites two appellate decisions in support of 
his claim, but these cases were resolved in the ordinary course of law by appeal 
rather than in an extraordinary-writ action.  See In re McAllister, 5th Dist. No. 
2006CA00073, 2006-Ohio-5554 (juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to classify 
person as a juvenile sex offender 13 months after his release from a secure 
facility); In re B.W., 2d Dist. No. 1702, 2007-Ohio-2096, ¶ 13-14 (although 
classification hearing was not held until more than two months after the juvenile’s 
release from a secure facility, it was held within a reasonable time after release 
“given docket constraints and appropriate time for evaluations appurtenant to 
classification”); see also State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2012 
19 
76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 21 (affirming sua sponte dismissal of 
complaint for a writ of prohibition because the appellant’s argument was one 
normally raised in ordinary course of law rather than in an action for 
extraordinary relief and so did not establish a patent and unambiguous lack of 
jurisdiction). 
{¶ 44} Third, Jean-Baptiste was not released from a secure facility in July 
2008; instead, he was released from DYS to the custody of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security pursuant to an immigration detainer and was 
placed in another secure facility—the Seneca County Jail.  Jean-Baptiste was not 
released from this federal custody until January 26, 2010, and Judge Kirsch then 
promptly scheduled his classification hearing for February 8, 2010. 
{¶ 45} Fourth, I note that that the 10th District Court of Appeals, in an 
appeal in the ordinary course of law, resolved the substantive issue concerning 
R.C. 2152.83(A) in favor of the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction.  We 
allowed an appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment in that case, and oral 
argument is scheduled for January 13, 2013.  See In re J.B., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
243, 2011-Ohio-6134, appeal allowed, 131 Ohio St.3d 1483, 2012-Ohio-1143, 
963 N.E.2d 824.  We should not decide an issue in the context of an appeal in an 
extraordinary-writ case in which the issue was not properly raised; this is 
especially true when the same substantive issue is before the court in a pending 
discretionary appeal in the ordinary course of law. 
{¶ 46} Finally, the majority’s emphatic reliance on In re Cross, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258, is misplaced for three separate 
reasons.  First, that case was decided in the ordinary course of law and not in the 
context of an action for extraordinary relief.  Second, Jean-Baptiste cites Cross in 
support of his first proposition, but not in support of his waived second 
proposition regarding R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) for which the majority cites it.  Third, 
as the 10th District Court of Appeals persuasively reasoned in J.B., our holding in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Cross, which is limited to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended 
commitment to a  DYS facility after a juvenile has been released from probation, 
does not govern a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a sex-offender juvenile-
delinquency case: 
 
 
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a sex-offender 
adjudication is different from its jurisdiction with respect to other 
adjudications.  While a juvenile court ordinarily “relinquishes 
control” over a child committed to DYS, the court does not 
relinquish control over a child adjudicated delinquent for 
committing a sexually-oriented offense.  R.C. 2152.22(A).  And, 
while a child may only be held at DYS until the age of 21, R.C. 
2152.83(E) provides that an order issued under R.C. 2152.83(A) 
“and any determinations included in the order shall remain in 
effect for the period of time specified in” R.C. Chapter 2950.  
Compare R.C. 2152.16 (provisions precluding juvenile court from 
committing a child to DYS for a period exceeding age 21).  The 
child’s attainment of age 18 or 21 “does not affect or terminate the 
order, and the order remains in effect for the period of time 
described in this division.”  R.C. 2152.83(E). 
 
J.B. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 47} Therefore, Jean-Baptiste’s second proposition, which is based on 
R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and which the majority holds to be dispositive of this case, 
does not warrant reversal of the court of appeals’ judgment denying the writ of 
prohibition. 
 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
21 
Jurisdiction to Conduct Classification Hearingfor Delinquent  
Child Over 21 Years Old 
{¶ 48} In his first proposition, Jean-Baptiste asserts that he established that 
the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct the 
February 8, 2010 classification hearing because he had turned 21 on January 18, 
2010. 
{¶ 49} Jean-Baptiste’s assertion lacks merit.  As the majority concedes, 
Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court have basic statutory jurisdiction over the 
delinquency case under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and 2151.011(B)(6), and they have 
exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct the juvenile-offender classification 
hearing at issue here. 
{¶ 50} Under R.C. 2152.02(C)(2), subject to a provision that is 
inapplicable here, “any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal 
ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a ‘child’ 
irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with respect to that 
violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is held.”  See also Juv.R. 2(D) (“ 
‘Child’ has the same meaning as in sections 2151.011 and 2152.02 of the Revised 
Code”).  Jean-Baptiste committed the rape before he was 18 years old, and as the 
court of appeals concluded, the “language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) does not limit 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to only the ‘hearing on the complaint,’ i.e., the 
adjudication and disposition.”  State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, Scioto App. 
No. 10CA3338, 2011-Ohio-3368, ¶ 12.  In fact, it is arguable that the 
classification hearing constitutes a hearing on the complaint for purposes of the 
statute because it is a hearing that is required after the adjudication and 
disposition for certain sex-oriented or child-victim-oriented offenses. 
{¶ 51} Therefore, the juvenile court does not patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction to conduct the required hearing to classify Jean-Baptiste as a 
juvenile-offender registrant. 
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22 
{¶ 52} This holding is supported by precedent.  In State ex rel. N.A. v. 
Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, we affirmed a 
judgment dismissing a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent a juvenile 
court judge from proceeding with an adjudicatory hearing in a delinquency case 
after the alleged delinquent child had turned 21 years old.  We held that the 
juvenile court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed.  In 
so holding, we emphasized that “even though N.A. is now over 21 years old, the 
delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is adjudicated a delinquent 
child based on the rape offenses, N.A. would still be subject to the juvenile-
offender-registration provisions.”  Id. at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) and 
2152.82(C).  Similarly, Jean-Baptiste, who has been adjudicated a delinquent 
child based on his rape of a ten-year-old boy, is subject to the juvenile-offender-
registration provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950.  And he should be.  The public has a 
right to be notified of his prior offense. 
{¶ 53} Although N.A. is distinguishable in certain particulars, it provides 
support for the juvenile court’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction here.  The 
appellate cases that have relied on N.A. have applied our holding in that case to 
rule that juvenile courts have jurisdiction to conduct classification proceedings 
after the juvenile reached 21 years of age.  State ex rel. [J.P.] v. Kirsch, 2011-
Ohio-3368; In re B.D., 5th Dist. No. 11-CA-27, 2012-Ohio-2223, 970 N.E.2d 
1178 (court affirmed juvenile court’s decision to conduct sex-offender 
classification hearing after juvenile reached 21 years of age).  These courts did not 
act unreasonably in so holding. 
{¶ 54} Finally, this case has been held for several months for a decision in 
J.V.  Our recent holding in In re J.V., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-4961, ___ 
N.E.2d ___, however, does not require a different conclusion than that reached by 
the court of appeals.  In J.V., we held that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to 
correct its original disposition to impose postrelease control after a delinquent 
January Term, 2012 
23 
child turned 21 years old.  In that case, we interpreted R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which 
provides: 
 
 
The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is 
adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to 
attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one 
years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that 
adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a 
person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic 
offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-
one years of age. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 55} R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which is not relied on by the parties in this 
appeal, does not apply here, because Jean-Baptiste was not adjudicated a 
delinquent child before he was 18 years old.  See N.A., 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-
Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 11 (“R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), however, is 
inapplicable because N.A. was not adjudicated a delinquent child before he was 
18 years old”).  Consequently, our holding in J.V. does not address Jean-
Baptiste’s claim. 
{¶ 56} Therefore, Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition also lacks merit. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 57} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 
Jean-Baptiste’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Jean-Baptiste failed 
to establish that Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction to conduct a hearing to classify Jean-Baptiste as a juvenile-
offender registrant in accordance with R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and the pertinent 
provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950.  Jean-Baptiste thus had an adequate remedy in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
the ordinary course of law to raise his jurisdictional claims, and the court should 
affirm the well-reasoned decision of the court of appeals.  Because the majority, 
in reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, instead conflates Jean-Baptiste’s 
arguments on appeal, credits a jurisdictional claim that Jean-Baptiste waived by 
not properly presenting it in the court of appeals, and ignores our well-established 
axioms restricting the scope of our review in extraordinary-writ cases and 
extolling judicial restraint, I respectfully dissent. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_____________________ 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant 
State Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Danielle M. 
Parker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_____________________