Title: State v. Lonkoski

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 30 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2809-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Matthew A. Lonkoski, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 339 Wis. 2d 490, 809 N.W.2d 900 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 9, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 25, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark Mangerson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Andrew Hinkel, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Andrew Hinkel.    
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 30 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2809-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF80) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew A. Lonkoski, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 9, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the 
judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court for Oneida 
County, the Honorable Mark Mangerson presiding.1   
¶2 
At issue in this case is the admissibility of 
statements made to detectives in an interrogation.  The 
threshold question is whether Matthew A. Lonkoski was in police 
                                                 
1 State v. Lonkoski, No. 2010AP2809-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012).   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
2 
 
custody for purposes of Miranda2 when he stated that he wanted an 
attorney.  Within moments of stating he wanted a lawyer, 
Lonkoski 
clearly 
retracted 
his 
statement 
and 
thereafter 
repeatedly and emphatically stated that he wanted to talk to the 
officers without a lawyer.  However, if he was already in 
custody for Miranda purposes at the time he stated, "I want a 
lawyer," he would receive the benefit of the Miranda rule 
requiring interrogation to cease, and his subsequent statements 
would be subject to the exclusionary rule if other exceptions to 
Miranda did not apply.  Where a person is not in custody, there 
is no such requirement to cease interrogation.   
¶3 
The circuit court first granted Lonkoski's motion to 
suppress all statements he made after he stated that he wanted 
an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards3 violation had 
occurred.  On reconsideration, the circuit court denied the 
motion to suppress, focusing its analysis on the fact that 
Lonkoski was not in custody when he stated he wanted an attorney 
and therefore found that no Edwards violation had occurred.  The 
court of appeals affirmed.   
¶4 
After the circuit court denied Lonkoski's motion to 
suppress, he pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse—
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
3 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1981) (holding 
that further interrogation is permissible after an accused 
invokes a right to counsel if the State can show that the 
accused initiated the further communications, exchanges, or 
conversations and that the accused knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel).   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
3 
 
recklessly causing great bodily harm in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(a)4 and neglecting a child resulting in the child's 
death in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d).   
¶5 
We hold that the circuit court properly denied the 
motion to suppress because Lonkoski was not in custody when he 
asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda did not bar 
further interrogation by the officers.   
¶6 
A person is in "custody" if under the totality of the 
circumstances "a reasonable person would not feel free to 
terminate the interview and leave the scene."  State v. Martin, 
2012 WI 96, ¶33, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270.  "[A] court 
must 
examine 
all 
of 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there 
was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree 
associated 
with 
a 
formal 
arrest." 
Stansbury 
v. 
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Several factors 
have 
been 
considered 
relevant 
in 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances such as "the defendant's freedom to leave; the 
purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree 
of restraint.” Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶35.   
¶7 
Lonkoski came to the sheriff's department without 
being asked and voluntarily submitted to questioning by law 
enforcement officers.  Although he was questioned in a small 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
4 
 
room within a jail by two officers with the door closed, the 
circuit court found that it was a typical interrogation setting 
locked to ingress by individuals but not for egress; he was 
never restrained in any way; and the door was opened more than 
once by people entering or exiting.  In fact, on one occasion 
when the officers left the room, one of the officers asked 
Lonkoski whether he preferred the door to the interrogation room 
to be open or shut.  Furthermore, Lonkoski was told that he was 
not under arrest and that the officers were not accusing him.  
In the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in 
Lonkoski's position at the time he stated he wanted an attorney 
would believe that he or she was "free to terminate the 
interview and leave the scene."  We decline to adopt Lonkoski's 
argument that Miranda applies when custody is "imminent."5  
Accordingly, although our analysis differs from that of the 
court of appeals, we affirm its decision.   
I. 
¶8 
Lonkoski's ten-month-old daughter, Peyton, was found 
unresponsive by her parents, Lonkoski and Amanda Bodoh. The 
medical personnel and law enforcement officers who responded to 
a 911 call declared her dead at the scene.  An autopsy showed 
that Peyton's blood and urine contained deadly amounts of 
morphine and hydromorphone.   
                                                 
5 The State argues that even if Lonkoski was in custody, 
Lonkoski reinitiated the conversation with the officers under 
Edwards such that his subsequent statements are admissible.  
Because we decide that Lonkoski was not in custody, we need not 
address this argument.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
After receiving the autopsy results, a detective from 
the Oneida County Sheriff's Department requested that Bodoh come 
in for an interview.  Lonkoski drove her to the sheriff's 
department for the interview.  Officers spoke with Bodoh while 
Lonkoski waited in the lobby.  After some time, Bodoh was 
escorted to a different part of the sheriff's department.  
Lieutenant Jim Wood went to the lobby.  Subsequently, Lonkoski 
came to the interview room that Bodoh had recently vacated.  To 
get to the room, someone at the front desk would have needed to 
push a button to release the door, and the room was located down 
a hallway from the lobby.  The door did not prevent a person 
from exiting into the lobby from the interview area.    
¶10 Detective Sara Gardner and Lieutenant Wood conducted 
the interview of Lonkoski.  The interview room was small, and 
Lonkoski was seated furthest from the door.  The entire 
interrogation was video-recorded.   
¶11 At the beginning of the interview, the following 
occurred:  
Wood: You want to have a seat over there?  Do you know 
Sara? 
Lonkoski: Yes. 
Gardner: Yeah very well.  How are you? 
Lonkoski: Very good.  How have you been? 
Gardner: Well, better than you from what I hear's been 
going on. 
Wood: Matt I'll, I'll close the door.  You're not 
under arrest.  You understand that you guys came here 
by yourself and we want to talk to you about Peyton 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
6 
 
and Peyton's death and, um, let you know about some of 
the, ah, findings from the autopsy and everything.  I 
mean you're, you're the father, right? 
Lonkoski: Mm hmm.  (Affirmative). 
Wood: Are you okay talking to us? 
Lonkoski: Yeah. 
Wood: Okay, I've got the door closed just cause I 
don't want other people to hear and stuff okay?  Um, 
what what has gone on since Peyton's death with you?  
How are you doin'? 
¶12 The next 20 minutes or so of the interview consisted 
of Lonkoski recounting the events in the days leading up to 
Peyton's death.  The tenor of the conversation changed when 
Lieutenant Wood revealed the results of the autopsy to Lonkoski.  
It was during this portion of the interrogation that Lonkoski 
made the statement——"I want a lawyer"——that is at the center of 
our analysis. 
Wood: No, no. The autopsy shows that Peyton died of an 
overdose.   
Lonkoski: An overdose?  Of what? 
Wood: Now that's – I'd like for you to try and help me 
out a little bit. 
Lonkoski: All I know is when I got back to the 
apartment, Amanda told me she gave, um, Peyton, baby 
Tylenol.  The bottle of baby Tylenol you guys seen 
when you guys went into the apartment was on top of 
the . . .  
Wood: Not the baby Tylenol, I know.  It's morphine. 
Lonkoski: What? 
Wood: Morphine. 
Lonkoski: What? 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
7 
 
Wood: Morphine. 
Lonkoski: Oh my god. 
Wood: What did you say to Peyton when you said goodbye 
to her that day out when I was out there and you went 
to the truck before they took her away . . . what'd 
you say to her? 
Lonkoski: I said that I love her and I would be by her 
soon. 
Wood: And that you were sorry? 
Lonkoski: Sorry for her passing away. 
Wood: There's, there's more to it.  And that's, and 
again Matt, it this is a very hard thing.  A hard 
thing for you as a, as a pop, and, and, this is your 
baby, but you gotta, you got to dig deep inside 
yourself now.  The autopsy knows what happened.  We 
know what happened.  What I need from you is I need 
you to look up and look in your heart and look up at 
Peyton and say, say okay, I can deal with it, I can, I 
can talk open . . . .  
Lonkoski: Are you accusing me of giving my daughter 
morphine? 
Gardner: Matt, Matt, look at me.  Every time you and I 
have talked, okay, and we go back a long way, all 
right, there's been some rough stuff that you and I 
have dealt with . . . .  
Lonkoski: I want a lawyer. I want a lawyer now. This 
is bullshit.  
Wood: Okay. 
Lonkoski: I would never do that to my kid, ever.  I 
wasn't even at the apartment at all except at night.  
Why are you guys accusing me? 
Wood: I didn't accuse you. 
Gardner: We were asking. 
Lonkoski: There is this is is is is is is is is 
insane. 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
8 
 
Wood: I have to stop talking to you though 'cause you 
said you wanted a lawyer. 
Lonkoski: Am I under arrest? 
Wood: You are now. 
Lonkoski: Then I'll talk to you without a lawyer . . . 
I, I don't want to go to jail, I didn't do anything to 
my daughter, I would not lie to you guys—this is in 
fact life or death. 
Wood: Well, now you, now you complicate things.  
Lonkoski: I just, I just want to leave here and go by 
my mom now because this is in – this is, this is 
insane. 
Gardner: Matt we can't, we can't talk to you just 
because you don't want to go to jail okay some things 
that we wanted to talk to you about were like Jim 
said—we know what happened to Peyton—we need to know a 
couple of the gaps to fill the gaps. 
Lonkoski: All right.... 
Gardner: (Unintelligible). 
Lonkoski: Ask those gaps. 
Gardner: That's what we want you to talk to us about. 
Lonkoski: Ask those gaps. 
Gardner: But I don't want you to feel like we're 
accusing you. 
Lonkoski: All right. I will calm down. 
Gardner: I don't—you don't have to talk to us—okay. 
Lonkoski: Can can I can we go smoke a can I smoke a 
cigarette when we do this? 
Wood: What we're gonna do is—I'm gonna come back and, 
and again you have to be careful what you say.... 
Lonkoski: (Unintelligible). 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
9 
 
Wood: If you want an attorney—you can have an 
attorney—we're gonna quit—what I'll do is I'll come 
back to you—go have a cigarette with Sara. 
Lonkoski: Okay thank you. 
Wood: Okay and I need to get more of the story. 
Lonkoski: I will tell you everything I promise on my 
dead daughter's life and my (unintelligible) right 
now. 
Wood: What I'm, what I'm gonna do is I'm gonna come 
back and I'll read you a Miranda card which is I'll 
read you your rights.... 
(Emphasis added). 
¶13 Lonkoski's statement about wanting an attorney, made a 
few moments before he was placed under arrest, is the focal 
point of this case.   
¶14 After the exchange excerpted above, Lonkoski was 
escorted out of the room to smoke a cigarette and use the 
bathroom.  Meanwhile, a call between Wood and the district 
attorney can be heard on the video recording, with Wood 
apparently asking if he could continue talking to Lonkoski.  
When Lonkoski returned to the room, Wood read Lonkoski his 
Miranda rights, and Lonkoski agreed to additional questioning.6  
                                                 
6 No one disputes the adequacy of Lonkoski's waiver of his 
Miranda rights after he was arrested.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
10 
 
Lonkoski made several incriminating statements during that 
interview and during two subsequent interviews in the following 
days.  
¶15 After being charged, Lonkoski moved to suppress the 
incriminating statements he made to the officers after he had 
asked for an attorney.  The circuit court reviewed the video of 
the interview, read briefs, and heard arguments from the parties 
on the admissibility of the statements.   
¶16 The circuit court originally granted the motion to 
suppress on the grounds that the statements violated Edwards, 
stating, "we never really had a ceasing of the interrogation 
like Edwards requires . . . [It] wasn't a matter here of the 
defendant not reinitiating as much as it was the interrogation 
procedure never ending."  At the circuit court's request, 
Lonkoski drafted an order for the court to sign.  The order 
drafted included a finding that Lonkoski was "in custody" when 
he invoked his right to counsel.  The State objected because no 
findings to that effect had been made by the circuit court.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
After Lonkoski returned from his cigarette break, Lonkoski 
inquired as to whether Wood had been able to talk to the 
district attorney.  Wood said that he had and asked Lonkoski if 
he wished to talk to the officers further.  Lonkoski said he 
did.  Wood subsequently read the Miranda rights to Lonkoski.  
According to statements made by Wood and Lonkoski, Lonkoski was 
also given a written copy that he read.  Wood asked Lonkoski if 
he understood; Lonkoski stated, "I understand everything."  Wood 
then asked if he understood each of the rights; Lonkoski said, 
"Yes."  Wood then stated, "Realizing that you have these Rights 
you are now willing to answer questions or make a statement?" 
and Lonkoski said, "Yes." 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
11 
 
State moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court 
granted.   
¶17 On reconsideration, the circuit court focused its 
analysis on the question of custody and found that Lonkoski was 
not in custody at the time he stated he wanted an attorney.  In 
determining that Lonkoski was not in custody, the circuit court 
made the following findings of fact.  First, it found that 
Lonkoski had been questioned by Detective Gardner for prior 
infractions, had a prior relationship with the officer, and was 
familiar with the Oneida County Sheriff's Department building.7  
Second, the door to the interview room was locked to prohibit 
ingress from the hallway but not egress to the hallway.  Third, 
the officers’ early questions were open-ended rather than 
accusatory.  The questions were also largely related to 
establishing a cause of death rather than to identifying a 
homicide suspect.  Fourth, after Lonkoski was arrested, he asked 
for and received both a cigarette break and a bathroom break. 
Fifth, Lonkoski was not physically restrained during the 
interrogation.  Finally, Lonkoski arrived at the sheriff's 
department voluntarily.  The circuit court held that because 
Lonkoski was not in custody when he stated that he wanted an 
attorney, Edwards v. Arizona did not apply.  Therefore, the 
circuit court denied the suppression motion. 
                                                 
7 We note that a suspect's history with law enforcement is 
not a factor in the objective determination of whether a suspect 
is in custody for Miranda purposes.  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 668 (2004).   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
12 
 
¶18 After the motion to suppress was denied, Lonkoski 
pleaded guilty to child abuse—recklessly causing great bodily 
harm in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) and neglecting a 
child resulting in the child's death in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.21(1)(d).  He was sentenced to five years of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision for count 
one, to be served concurrently with the sentence on count two, 
which was twelve years of initial confinement and five years of 
extended supervision.  Lonkoski appealed the order denying his 
suppression motion. 
¶19 In an unpublished per curiam decision, the court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction on different grounds than the 
circuit 
court. 
 
State 
v. 
Lonkoski, 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012).  The court 
of appeals assumed that Lonkoski was in custody at the point in 
question and focused on whether he reinitiated the conversation 
with the law enforcement officers.  Id., ¶4.  It found that 
Lonkoski validly reinitiated conversation, and therefore, the 
interrogation complied with Edwards.  Id., ¶10.   
¶20 Lonkoski petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  We now affirm on the grounds that Lonkoski was not in 
custody when he initially stated he wanted an attorney, and 
therefore, Miranda and Edwards do not apply.   
II. 
¶21 When reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence, we apply a two-step standard.  State v. 
Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶28.  We uphold the circuit court's 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
13 
 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  We 
then review de novo the application of the facts to the 
constitutional principles.  Id.   
III.   
¶22 The question we must answer in this case is whether 
the statements obtained from Lonkoski in the interviews were 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and must 
therefore be suppressed.  First, we must determine whether the 
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda because they 
were obtained after Lonkoski invoked his right to an attorney 
during a custodial interrogation.  If that is the case we must 
then consider whether Lonkoski reinitiated conversation with the 
detective such that those statements are admissible under 
Edwards notwithstanding the Miranda violation.  The threshold 
question to both of these arguments is whether Lonkoski was in 
custody when he stated that he wanted an attorney.   
¶23 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."8  Courts have 
implemented procedural safeguards consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment.  One such safeguard, grounded in the United States 
Constitution, is found in Miranda.  Dickerson v. United States, 
530 
U.S. 
428, 
432 
(2000) 
(holding 
that 
Miranda 
is 
a 
                                                 
8 The Fifth Amendment has been applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) 
("We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from 
compulsory 
self-incrimination 
is 
also 
protected 
by 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.").   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
14 
 
constitutional decision which applies to both federal and state 
courts and cannot be overruled by legislative action).  Miranda 
held that no one should be subjected to custodial interrogation 
until he or she is “warned that he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966).  If someone is subjected to custodial 
interrogation without these warnings and makes incriminating 
statements, then those statements constitute a Miranda violation 
and cannot be used by the prosecution.  Id.  Custody is a 
necessary prerequisite to Miranda protections.  State v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 344–45; Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. 778, 795 (2009) ("If the defendant is not in custody then 
[Miranda and Edwards] do not apply; nor do they govern other, 
noninterrogative types of interactions between the defendant and 
the State.")   
¶24 No one disputes that Lonkoski was interrogated, so the 
issue is whether he was in custody.  If he was not in custody, 
then Lonkoski is not entitled to have his subsequent statements 
suppressed under the Miranda rule.  See, e.g., State v. Hassel, 
2005 WI App 80, ¶9, 280 Wis. 2d 637, 696 N.W.2d 270; see also, 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, n. 3 (1991) (stating, "We 
have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda 
rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial 
interrogation' . . . Most rights must be asserted when the 
government seeks to take the action they protect against."). 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
15 
 
¶25 Lonkoski argues that because the interrogation had 
gotten to the point that the officers knew and could prove he 
was responsible for his child's death, no one would believe he 
was free to leave, and therefore, he was in custody.  He further 
argues that even if he was not actually in custody, a person may 
invoke rights under Miranda "when custodial interrogation is 
imminent or impending."9  Pet'r Br. at 13.   
¶26 The State argues that Lonkoski was not in custody when 
he asked for an attorney because he came to the sheriff's 
department without being asked, the length of time from the 
beginning of the interview to when the circuit court found that 
he was arrested totaled about thirty minutes, and the detectives 
told Lonkoski several times that he was not under arrest.  The 
State further disagrees with Lonkoski's argument that Miranda 
                                                 
9 Lonkoski also argues that no valid reinitiation occurred 
under Edwards because the officers, not Lonkoski, reinitiated 
the 
conversation 
by 
failing 
to 
cease 
the 
interrogation.  
Lonkoski believes that Wood's response to Lonkoski's request for 
an attorney and question about whether he was under arrest, "You 
are now," was likely to elicit an incriminating response and was 
thereby the functional equivalent to questioning under Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) and State v. Hambly, 
2008 WI 10, ¶46, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48.   
The State argues that even if Lonkoski was in custody when 
he asked for an attorney, he reinitiated further conversation 
with the detectives consistent with Edwards, and therefore, his 
statements should not be suppressed. 
As noted previously, because we hold that Lonkoski was not 
in custody, we need not reach the parties' arguments on whether 
he reinitiated conversation with the detectives such that his 
statements could be admitted under Edwards.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
16 
 
protections should apply when custody is "imminent," finding the 
premise unsupported by case law.      
¶27 The important threshold determination we must make is 
whether Lonkoski was in custody when he stated he wanted an 
attorney.  The test to determine custody is an objective one.  
State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 378-79, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).  
The inquiry is "whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of a degree associated with a formal 
arrest."  State v. Leprich, 160 Wis. 2d 472, 477, 465 N.W.2d 844 
(Ct. App. 1991) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 
(1984)).  Stated another way, if "a reasonable person would not 
feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene," then 
that person is in custody for Miranda purposes.  State v. 
Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶33.  Courts also formulate the test as 
"whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would 
have considered himself or herself to be in custody."  State v. 
Goetz, 2001 WI App 294, ¶11, 249 Wis.2d 380, 638 N.W.2d 386.   
¶28 The custody determination is made in the totality of 
the circumstances considering many factors.  Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 
278, ¶35.  The factors include "the defendant's freedom to 
leave; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and 
the degree of restraint" used by law enforcement.  Id.  As one 
factor in the totality of the circumstances, an interview that 
takes place in a law enforcement facility such as a sheriff's 
department, a police station, or a jail, may weigh toward the 
encounter being custodial, but that fact is not dispositive.  
See, e.g., State v. Grady, 2009 WI 47, ¶4-5, 317 Wis. 2d 344, 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
17 
 
766 
N.W.2d 
729 
(examining 
an 
undisputedly 
non-custodial 
interrogation that took place at a police station).  When 
determining the degree of restraint, courts consider factors 
like "whether the suspect is handcuffed, whether a weapon is 
drawn, whether a frisk is performed, the manner in which the 
suspect is restrained, whether the suspect is moved to another 
location, whether questioning took place in a police vehicle, 
and the number of officers involved."  State v. Morgan, 2002 WI 
App 124, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23.     
¶29 The parties agree that Lonkoski was not in custody at 
the beginning of the interview.  Because we are determining 
whether Lonkoski was in custody at the point when he stated he 
wanted an attorney, we look at the circumstances surrounding the 
interview to determine if he was in custody when he made that 
statement.   
¶30 We will begin by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, examining the facts surrounding the defendant's 
freedom to leave.  The circuit court found that the area that 
Lonkoski was in was a "typical interrogation setting."  The 
court 
stated 
that 
the 
area 
was 
"locked 
to 
ingress 
by 
individuals, but there [was] no indication that it was locked 
for egress.  That is, that the defendant could simply walk out."  
The circuit court also found that although the door was closed 
during most the interview, "there were clearly times when the 
door was opened and he could in fact have walked out."  Finally, 
the officers stated that Lonkoski was not under arrest and that 
they were not accusing him.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
18 
 
¶31 The purpose, place, and length of the interrogation 
also support the conclusion that Lonkoski was not in custody.  
Lonkoski came to the sheriff's department on his own volition, 
providing transportation for the child's mother, Bodoh.  The 
location of the interview being the sheriff's department weighs 
toward a custodial situation, but that fact is not dispositive.  
Grady, 317 Wis. 2d 344, ¶4-5.  An officer went to the waiting 
room where Lonkoski waited for Bodoh, and Lonkoski went to an 
interview room.  The circuit court found that the officers asked 
Lonkoski "open ended questions" that "called for a narrative by 
him.  They were not accusatory.  They were not leading 
questions."  The circuit court found that the length of the 
interrogation was "relatively short" before he asked for an 
attorney, after about 30 minutes.  These facts indicate that 
Lonkoski was not in custody.   
¶32 Like the other factors, the degree of restraint 
Lonkoski 
experienced 
also 
does 
not 
indicate 
a 
custodial 
situation.  Two officers questioned Lonkoski.  The door to the 
interview room was repeatedly used by the officers throughout 
the interview without a key.  At one point when both officers 
were leaving the room, Gardner asked Lonkoski if he preferred 
the door open or closed to which Lonkoski responded, "Don't 
bother me."  During the relevant portion of the interview, 
Lonkoski was not handcuffed, no weapons were drawn by the 
officers, and no frisk was performed.  Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 
¶12.  The circuit court found that Lonkoski was not physically 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
19 
 
restrained in any way.  These factors indicate a lack of 
custody.   
¶33 Lonkoski argues that once the officers zeroed in on 
him as a suspect, there was no way any reasonable person would 
have felt free to leave.  He cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions that he believes support the proposition that a 
person's knowledge that officers suspect the person of a serious 
crime is a significant factor that weighs in favor of finding 
that the person was in custody.   
¶34 Statements officers make to a suspect can be an 
indication of the presence or absence of custody.  Stansbury v. 
California, 511 U.S. at 325 (finding relevant the views of the 
officers manifested to an individual that would affect how a 
reasonable 
person 
would 
perceive 
his 
or 
her 
situation).  
However, a suspect's belief that he or she is the main focus of 
an investigation is not determinative of custody.  Id.  The 
United States Supreme Court has rejected this theory.  For 
example, the United States Supreme Court in Beckwith v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), dismissed a similar argument about 
the circumstances of a non-custodial interrogation transforming 
into custodial interrogation after the investigation focused on 
the suspect, stating, "[W]e are not impressed with this 
argument."  Id. at 345 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court quoted from United States v. Caiello, 
420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969) which stated: "It was the 
compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the 
strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
20 
 
the questioning was conducted, which led the court to impose the 
Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning." Id. 
at 346-47 (emphasis added).   
¶35 In addition, we note that Lonkoski's standard would 
necessarily focus on the subjective beliefs of both police and 
the suspect.  This is inconsistent with the objective test 
created for custody.  See, e.g., Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 378-80, 
(explaining the objective standard used to determine custody as 
not considering the "unarticulated plan" of police or the 
subjective beliefs of the suspect who may know he was guilty and 
should be in custody); see also, Stansbury v. California, 511 
U.S. at 326 (rejecting a California Supreme Court custody-
analysis because it "regarded the officers' subjective beliefs 
regarding Stansbury's status as a suspect (or nonsuspect) as 
significant in and of themselves, rather than as relevant only 
to 
the 
extent 
they 
influenced 
the 
objective 
conditions 
surrounding 
his 
interrogation."). 
 
The 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances test applied in our opinion today provides the 
appropriate framework to protect suspects in interrogations and 
to determine whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of 
Miranda.  Lonkoski's argument to the contrary is unsupported by 
the controlling case law and the purpose behind Miranda 
protections.  
¶36   Lonkoski also argues that even if he was not in 
custody when he asked for an attorney, he was undisputedly in 
custody a few seconds later when he was arrested, so Miranda 
protections 
should 
apply. 
 
He 
states 
that 
the 
policy 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
21 
 
justification for the "imminent interrogation" rule in State v. 
Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶3, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48, "applies 
with equal force whether the missing element [of custodial 
interrogation] is interrogation or custody."  Pet'r Br. at 21.  
He also argues that if this were not the rule, then officers 
could overcome an assertion of rights by immediately arresting a 
person and continuing the interrogation.  We disagree.   
¶37 The policy justification in Hambly does not apply 
here.  In State v. Hambly, we held that Miranda was properly 
invoked before a suspect was interrogated when the suspect had 
been formally arrested and asked for an attorney.  307 Wis. 2d 
98.  The suspect in Hambly had repeatedly refused to speak with 
law enforcement voluntarily; after his refusal, the officers 
formally arrested him and placed him in the back of the squad 
car; as he was escorted to the car, he stated that he wanted an 
attorney.  Id., ¶7-9.  The suspect was not being interrogated at 
the time he asked for an attorney.  Id., ¶3.  This court held: 
"a suspect in custody may request counsel and effectively invoke 
the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when faced with 
'impending interrogation' or when interrogation is 'imminent' 
and the request for counsel is for the assistance of counsel 
during interrogation."  Id., ¶24.10  The court reasoned that the 
                                                 
10 In Hambly, the court was divided on "whether to adopt a 
temporal standard to determine whether a suspect in custody has 
effectively invoked his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel."  State v. Hambly, 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶4.  The question of 
whether to adopt a temporal standard is not relevant to the 
analysis of Hambly set forth in this opinion and therefore is 
not discussed.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
22 
 
case illustrated the "type of coercive atmosphere that generates 
the need for application of the Edwards rule."  Id., ¶44 
(quoting United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 
1991)).     
¶38 Lonkoski believes that "imminent interrogation" and 
"imminent custody" are equally coercive and that this court 
should extend its holding in Hambly to the inverse situation 
where a suspect is being interrogated but is not yet in custody.  
This argument ignores the differences in the circumstances in 
each situation.  In Hambly, the suspect was enduring a much more 
coercive environment than Lonkoski, who was talking to law 
enforcement officers while he was not yet in custody.  Before a 
suspect is in custody, the coerciveness is substantially 
lessened because a reasonable person in the suspect's position 
would believe that he or she could end the conversation and 
leave at any time.  See, Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶33 (holding 
that custody exists when a reasonable person would believe that 
he could not end the conversation and leave).  
 ¶39 Another reason the "imminent custody" rule that 
Lonkoski proposes is unnecessary is that the current definition 
of "custody" encompasses both formal arrest and situations in 
which a reasonable person would consider himself or herself in 
custody.  See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at 322.  
By contemplating both, the current test prevents law enforcement 
from gaming the system by placing a suspect in a custodial-like 
situation without formally arresting the person to avoid Miranda 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
23 
 
protections.  We therefore see no reason to adopt a new test to 
fit the facts of this case.   
¶40 We 
also 
reject 
Lonkoski's 
implication 
that 
the 
officers can override an assertion of Fifth Amendment rights by 
immediately arresting a suspect.  First, warrantless arrests 
require probable cause so law enforcement officers can arrest 
only suspects they have probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., 
State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551 
("A warrantless arrest is not lawful except when supported by 
probable cause.").  Law enforcement officers do not necessarily 
have probable cause to arrest everyone who agrees to talk with 
them.  Second, upon arrest, law enforcement must give the 
warnings 
described 
in 
Miranda. 
 
Lonkoski 
dismisses 
this 
important step by stating, "the person could hardly be expected 
to believe that he or she truly had the right to counsel at this 
point; after all, he or she has just asked for a lawyer and had 
the request denied."11  Pet'r Br. at 22.  We disagree that 
providing 
Miranda 
warnings 
to 
suspects 
provides 
them 
no 
protection. 
 
The 
contents 
of 
Miranda 
warnings 
provide 
significant information about a person's rights and require the 
person to waive those rights before admissible statements can be 
                                                 
11 We note that there is no evidence Lonkoski ever "asked 
for a lawyer and had that request denied"——as explained above, 
within moments of stating he wanted a lawyer, Lonkoski made 
clear that he no longer wanted a lawyer and he wished to speak 
with the officers.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
24 
 
elicited by law enforcement.12  Therefore, our decision does not, 
as Lonkoski's argument suggests, give law enforcement free rein 
to ignore valid assertions of the right to counsel.  
¶41 We conclude that Lonkoski was not in custody when he 
asked for an attorney.  Because his statement about wanting an 
attorney 
was 
not 
made 
during 
a 
custodial 
interrogation, 
Miranda's rule requiring that the interrogation cease upon a 
request for an attorney does not apply, and there is no 
constitutional violation and no bar to using his subsequent 
statements.  As noted previously, this holding makes it 
unnecessary for us to reach the issue of reinitiation under 
Edwards because "[i]n every case involving Edwards, the courts 
must determine whether the suspect was in custody when he 
requested counsel and when he later made the statements he seeks 
to suppress."  Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 
1213, 1223 (2010) (emphasis added).   
IV.  
¶42 We hold that the motion to suppress was properly 
denied because Lonkoski was not in custody when he asked for an 
attorney, 
and 
therefore, 
Miranda 
did 
not 
bar 
further 
interrogation by the officers.   
¶43 A person is in "custody" if under the totality of the 
circumstances "a reasonable person would not feel free to 
                                                 
12 To be adequate Miranda warnings, "the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement 
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed."  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445.   
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
25 
 
terminate the interview and leave the scene."  State v. Martin, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶33.  "[A] court must examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate 
inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint 
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at 322 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Several factors 
have 
been 
considered 
relevant 
in 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances such as "the defendant's freedom to leave; the 
purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree 
of restraint.” Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶35.   
¶44 Lonkoski came to the sheriff's department without 
being asked and voluntarily submitted to questioning by law 
enforcement officers.  Although he was questioned in a small 
room within a jail by two officers with the door closed, the 
circuit court found that it was a typical interrogation setting 
locked to ingress by individuals but not for egress; he was 
never restrained in any way; and the door was opened more than 
once by people entering or exiting.  In fact, on one occasion 
when the officers left the room, one of the officers asked 
Lonkoski whether he preferred the door to the interrogation room 
to be open or shut.  Furthermore, Lonkoski was told that he was 
not under arrest and that the officers were not accusing him.  
In the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in 
Lonkoski's position at the time he stated he wanted an attorney 
would believe that he or she was "free to terminate the 
interview and leave the scene."  We decline to adopt Lonkoski's 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
26 
 
argument that Miranda applies when custody is "imminent."  
Accordingly, although our analysis differs from that of the 
court of appeals, we affirm its decision.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
    
 
No. 
2010AP2809-CR   
 
 
 
1