Title: State of New Jersey, Department of Corrections v. International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 195

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). ZAZZALI, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses the appropriateness of the arbitrator's award and the continued vitality of the no work, no pay rule - a common-law rule established in 1859 that prohibits payment to individuals for services they did not perform. The collective negotiations agreement (Agreement or contract) between the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) and the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 195 (Local 195) provides in pertinent part that employees covered under the contract can receive overtime compensation at a rate of time and one-half for overtime hours accrued in excess of the normal hours of the established work week. In addition, the Agreement provided that overtime shall be scheduled and distributed by seniority and on a rotational basis by occupational classifications within each work unit. On three occasions in 1997, the DOC assigned overtime to Ernie Guinta, a supervisor at a State correctional facility. Although Guinta's name was on the overtime-rotation list, he should not have been included because he was not a member of the Local 195 bargaining unit. Because Guinta worked on those three occasions, the first member of the bargaining unit on the rotation list was not called for overtime. Local 195 filed a grievance for each incident, alleging that the DOC breached the Agreement's overtime provisions. The parties submitted the grievances to arbitration. They stipulated that the sole issue to be determined was the appropriate contractual remedy under the Agreement for having a supervisor on the Local 195 rotation list and for calling him to work overtime on three separate days. The Agreement establishes the boundaries for an arbitrator's determination. It provides that an arbitrator may impose an appropriate back pay remedy when he finds a violation of the contract, provided that remedy is permitted by law and is consistent with the terms of the Agreement. The arbitrator found that the appropriate remedy for the contractual violation was to award back pay to the Local 195 members at the top of the overtime rotation list on the three dates in question. The arbitrator rejected the State's contention that the no work, no pay rule precluded an award of back pay to remedy the violation. He concluded that Communication Workers, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Board of Social Services did not compel that result because the Court in that case reached its conclusion based on the absence of contractual authority for an award of back pay, and explicitly refused to address whether the rule precluded such an award. The arbitrator reasoned that he had authority to make a back pay award against the State. The Law Division vacated the arbitrator's award, concluding that Communication Workers, although not explicitly resting its holding on the no work, no pay rule, demonstrated that the rule still exists and, therefore, prohibits a back pay award. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed that decision, finding that although the back pay award was authorized by the Agreement, the no work, no pay rule precluded such an award. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: The no work, no pay rule is an anachronism in modern-day labor jurisprudence and, therefore, is abolished. 1. The role of courts in reviewing arbitration awards is extremely limited and the award is not to be set aside lightly. Generally, courts will accept an arbitrator's interpretation so long as the interpretation is reasonably debatable. A court may vacate an arbitrator's award in cases of corruption, fraud, evident partiality, or where the arbitrator exceeded or imperfectly executed his or her power. In addition, an award can be vacated if it is contrary to existing law or public policy. (Pp. 7-10) 2. In Communication Workers, the Court used a three-tiered analysis. Based on the similarity of language in the arbitration clause here and in the clause in Communication Workers, and based on the fact that the governing principles are the same, reliance on that three-tiered analysis is appropriate here. Thus, the Court must consider whether: 1) the parties intended to give the arbitrator the authority to award back pay for a violation of the Agreement's overtime provisions; 2) whether such an award is permitted by law; and 3) whether, because this case involves public employees, public policy precludes such an award. (Pp. 10-12) 3. The arbitrator found explicit authority for back pay in the Agreement as a remedy for a contractual violation. The Court must defer to that interpretation because it is reasonably debatable. It is noted that, on the merits, the Court agrees with the arbitrator's conclusion. Case-law precedent, federal labor jurisprudence, and the writings of learned commentators make clear that the Agreement authorizes an award of back pay as a remedy. Moreover, although the Court need not reach the question, the commentators suggest that the award may have been permissible even without a contractual authorization. (Pp. 12-21) 4. The phrase permitted by law means that the award cannot be prohibited by law. It does not mean, as the dissent has interpreted, that the award must be explicitly authorized by statute or regulation. At the very least, the arbitrator's contractual interpretation of the phrase is reasonably debatable and is entitled to deference. There are existing statutes that, at the very least, give implicit authority to the DOC to agree to an award of back pay as a remedy for a violation of an overtime provision. More importantly, there is no need for specific statutory authorization for every possible item to which the public employer and the bargaining unit may agree. (Pp. 21-28) 5. There are two policy justifications for the no work, no pay rule: 1) to protect the public entity from paying for services it did not receive, so that it would not have to pay twice for the same services; and 2) to prevent a windfall to the officer or employee who works elsewhere during a period of suspension, earning double compensation. The New Jersey Legislature has recognized the unfairness inherent in the no work, no pay rule; specifically, that a person could be illegally dismissed, win reinstatement, and not recover back pay. Accordingly, the Legislature adopted several amendments chipping away at the no work, no pay rule. (Pp. 29-39) 6. Communication Workers merely recognized the existence of the no work, no pay rule _ it did not decide whether the public policy underlying the doctrine precluded recovery of back pay. The contract in that case did not provide for such recovery. (Pp. 39-40) 7. The Court has a responsibility to reevaluate common-law rules to determine if they still are in harmony with society's needs. With that responsibility in mind, the Court concludes that the no work, no pay rule is an outdated and outmoded anachronism in modern-day labor jurisprudence. The rule is largely irrelevant and is unworkable in application. Legislative intent indicates a strong disapproval of the rule. Moreover, awards of back pay are essential to stability in labor relations and the usefulness of arbitration provisions depends on effective remedies, such as back pay, when the contract is violated. (Pp. 40-50) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for reinstatement of the arbitration award. JUSTICE VERNIERO, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joins in the Court's elimination of the no work, no pay rule from our common law. However, Justice Verniero agrees with Justice LaVecchia's analysis in respect of the meaning of permitted by law as the phrase is used in the Agreement. Under our tripartite system, executive agencies may act only by virtue of an expressed or implied grant of authority from a legislative enactment or constitutional provision, or a judicial directive interpreting either of those sources. Unlike the majority, Justice Verniero does not find an expressed or implied grant of authority to permit a back-pay award in this setting. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, and LONG join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 195, Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 13, 2001 -- Decided July 12, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Arnold Shep Cohen argued the cause for appellant (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys). George N. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson, Former Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). Judiann Chartier argued the cause for amicus curiae, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys). A. 1. Employees covered by this Contract will be compensated at the rate of time and one- half for overtime hours accrued in excess of the normal hours of the established work week. These compensation credits shall be taken in compensatory time or in cash. . . . . B. 1. Overtime shall be scheduled and distributed by seniority on a rotational basis by occupational classifications within each functional work unit without discrimination provided it does not impair operations. Employees within their functional work unit who are qualified and capable of performing the work without additional training shall be called upon to perform such overtime work. To the extent that it is practical and reasonable to foresee, the State shall give the employee as much advance notice as possible relative to the scheduling of overtime work. 2. A list showing the rotational order and the overtime call status of each employee shall be maintained in the work unit. Such records shall be made available for inspection on request to Union Officers, Stewards and employees concerned. On three occasions in 1997, the DOC assigned overtime to Ernie Guinta, a supervisor at a State correctional facility. Although Guinta's name appeared on the overtime rotation list, he should not have been included because he was not a member of the Local 195 bargaining unit. Because Guinta worked on those three occasions, the first member of the bargaining unit on the rotational list was not called for overtime. Local 195 filed a grievance for each incident, alleging that the DOC breached the Agreement's overtime provisions. The parties submitted the grievances to arbitration. They stipulated that the sole issue was: What is the contractual remedy in Article XII, Sections A, B, and C, [for] having a supervisor on the IFPTE, Local 195 overtime rotational list and . . . call[ing him] from that list on March 28, 1997, May 4, 1997 and May 25, 1997? Article VII, Section F, Subsection 5 of the Agreement establishes the boundaries for an arbitrator's determination. It provides in pertinent part: c. The arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from, or modify the provisions of this Contract or laws of the State, or any policy of the State or subdivision thereof or to determine any dispute involving the exercise of a management function which is within the authority of the State as set forth in Article II, Management Rights, and shall confine his [or her] decision solely to the interpretation and application of this Contract. . . . The arbitrator may prescribe an appropriate back pay remedy when he finds a violation of this Contract, provided such remedy is permitted by law and is consistent with the terms of this Contract. If the arbitrator renders a back pay award, then in accordance with State policy, appropriate benefits will be restored to the employee for the period of time covered by the back pay award. [Emphasis added.] The arbitrator found that the appropriate remedy for the contractual violation was to award back pay to the Local 195 members at the top of the overtime rotational list on the three dates in question. The arbitrator concluded: Absent any limitations on my authority, I would direct the State to compensate the senior person who was on the occupational overtime list on the three dates at the overtime rate for the number of hours worked by Mr. Guinta. That would be the only way to make these employees whole for the contractual violation . . . . Here, because the overtime was worked by a person who was not in the bargaining unit, that work was lost by the bargaining unit. The three employees who should have been called cannot get back what they should have gotten by working other overtime because that overtime would have to come at the expense of other employees who were entitled to work it and therefore this would violate their contractual right to the overtime. Only by directing that the three be compensated for the overtime worked by Mr. Guinta can the contractual breach be remedied. The arbitrator rejected the State's contention that the no work, no pay rule precluded an award of back pay to remedy the violation. He concluded that Communications Workers, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Board of Social Services, 96 N.J. 442 (1984), did not compel that result because the Court in that case reached its conclusion based on the absence of contractual authority for an award of back pay, and explicitly refused to address whether the rule precluded such an award. The arbitrator reasoned that he had the authority to make a back pay award against the State: In my view, given the overall purpose of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act in the prevention and prompt settlement of disputes, given the general negotiability of terms and conditions of employment including overtime, given the absence of statutory or regulatory constraints on the State regarding payment for overtime, given the fact that these parties have specifically agreed in their negotiated agreement that an arbitrator can award back pay for a contractual violation, and given the fact that such an award is the standard remedy in such cases, there is no public policy prohibition against an award of back pay in this case. The Law Division vacated the arbitrator's award. The court concluded that Communications Workers, although not explicitly resting its holding on the no work, no pay rule, demonstrated that the rule still exists, and that the rule therefore prohibited the arbitrator's back pay award. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the Law Division, reiterating that the no work, no pay rule controlled the case. The court noted that [a]ccording to the agreement, a back pay remedy may only be awarded 'provided such remedy is permitted by law,' and that [t]he arbitrator's authority was expressly circumscribed by the agreement by denying to the arbitrator the 'power to add to, subtract from, or modify the . . . laws of the State, or any policy of the State.' The panel stated that [i]n Communications Workers, the court made it clear, even though the agreement did not provide for the remedy of back pay under the facts there presented, 'that the public policy of not paying individuals for services they did not perform (the 'no work-no pay' rule) is to be respected.' (quoting Communications Workers, supra, 96 N.J. at 455). We granted certification, 165 N.J. 604 (2000). [Neptune, supra, 135 N.J. Super. at 409.] Another recognized treatise, Fairweather's Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 4th ed. 1999), opens the discussion on Back-Pay Awards with the observation that [e]ven in the absence of specific contractual authority, arbitrators have the power to decide whether back pay should be awarded to remedy the wrong. Id. at 458. Former Solicitor General Archibald Cox, when serving as a labor arbitrator, succinctly set forth the philosophy undergirding back pay: When the employer causes the loss, however innocently, it is more just that he should bear the cost of making the employee whole than that the employee should be forced to suffer a denial of contract rights without a remedy. [Electric Storage Battery Co., AAA Case No. 19_22 (1960) (Cox, Arb.).] The dissent correctly notes that the arbitrator's authority to resolve a dispute depends on whether the parties have delegated that power to him or her. Ante at __ (slip op. at 4). Clearly, in this case they have. The contract says that the arbitrator may prescribe an appropriate back pay remedy when he [or she] finds a violation of this Contract. In sum, our precedent, federal labor jurisprudence, and the works of learned commentators make clear that the agreement in this case authorizes an award of back pay in this appeal. Moreover, although we need not reach the question, the commentators suggest that the award may have been permissible even without that contractual authorization. Because the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonably debatable, we therefore must proceed to the second tier of the Communications Workers analysis, and determine whether the arbitrator reasonably concluded that the back pay award in this case is permitted by law. The dissent concludes that an award of back pay for a specific contract violation is only permitted by law if there is a statute or regulation that specifically provides for a back pay award in that particular situation. Because there is no statute or regulation specifically authorizing an arbitrator to award back pay as a remedy for a contractual violation of an overtime provision, the dissent concludes that such an award is not permitted by law. The dissent errs for two reasons. First, the phrase permitted by law means that the award cannot be prohibited by law. If there was a statute or regulation that prohibited a back pay award against the Department of Corrections for the DOC's violation of an overtime provision, the parties did not intend the arbitrator to have the authority to make such an award because it is not permitted by law. That phrase does not mean, as the dissent would interpret it, that the award must be explicitly authorized by statute or regulation. That interpretation is not faithful to the parties' intent, which is best evidenced by the language of the contract. Had the parties intended that result to obtain, they would have used the phrase authorized by law. At the very least, that contractual interpretation of the phrase permitted by law, implicitly reached by the arbitrator, is reasonably debatable and is therefore entitled to deference. [Id. at 279 (citing Conner v. Mayor of New York, 5 N.Y. 285, 1 Selden 285 (1851)).] The court also observed that principles of public policy prohibited the action because the public entity would have been forced to pay for the services twice, once to the appointed officer and once to the officer who actually performed the services. Id. at 280. Moreover, that recovery would supply an ingenious device by which both candidates, if they could not enjoy the honor, might at least reap the emoluments of the office. Ibid. Thus, City of Hoboken stood for three propositions: (1) a governmental entity's appointment of a public officer does not create a contract-type right enforceable by the officer against the entity; (2) because the contract does not exist, the officer has no property interest in the position; and (3) there is a policy against the State paying for services it does not receive. The Court of Errors and Appeals adopted City of Hoboken's rationale in Stuhr v. Curran, 44 N.J.L. 181 (E. & A. 1882). In that case, the plaintiff and the defendant were opposing candidates for Freeholder in Hudson County. The board of canvassers declared that the defendant won the election, and he performed the duties of the office for six months. He was subsequently ousted from office by the plaintiff, the rightfully- elected candidate, in a quo warranto action. The plaintiff then instituted an action against the defendant to recover the salary received by the defendant while he was in possession of the office. The court noted: In this country [public offices] are not held by grant or contract, nor has any individual a property or vested right in them beyond the constitutional tenure and compensation. . . . The right to the fees or compensation does not grow out of any contract between the government and the officer, but arises from the rendition of the services. The legislative history of that bill signaled an intent to mitigate the harshness of the no work, no pay rule: This is a bill to protect the employees and officers of municipalities who may be illegally dismissed from their employment. It is now possible under the law to illegally dismiss a man, and when the dismissal is set aside as illegal, it may happen in many instances that the individual cannot recover the salary that is rightfully his because of the law and the decision of this State. In a word, the Civil Service Law does not give the protection that it ought to give. This Bill would remedy that evil and would protect the individual. [Mason, supra, 51 N.J. at 122-23 (quoting Statement to Assembly Bill No. 231 (1918)) (emphasis added).] That ameliorative principle, after several legislative revisions, Mason, supra, 51 N.J. at 120-24, was enacted in three separate statutes: N.J.S.A. 40A:9-172; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-23; and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151. The first of those statutes provides that a municipal officer or employee is entitled to backpay if he or she is illegally suspended or dismissed. N.J.S.A. 40A:9-172. The other two statutes provide essentially the same entitlement, but to firefighters and police officers, respectively. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-23 (firefighters); N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151 (police officers). [T]he legislative purpose sought to be achieved by these enactments was to change the harsh rule of the common law which had denied recovery to blameless municipal officials who had been improperly suspended or dismissed from office. Township of Springfield v. Pedersen, 73 N.J. 1, 7 (1977) (emphasis added); accord Note, The Right of New Jersey's Governmental Officers and Employees to Recover for Back Pay When Illegally Dismissed or Suspended, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 516 (1961) [hereinafter Governmental Officers]. Despite that broad indication of our Legislature's disapproval of the common law rule, courts followed the maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Hart v. Borough of Hawthorne, 120 N.J.L. 27, 30 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 121 N.J.L. 135 (E. & A. 1938); Strohmeyer v. Borough of Little Ferry, 136 N.J.L. 485 (E. & A. 1948); Governmental Officers, supra, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. at 523. Strict construction often defeated the legislative intent underlying those statutes. In DeMarco v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 21 N.J. 136 (1956), for example, a county detective had been indicted on a charge of wilfully neglecting to perform his duties. Id. at 139. He was suspended from his position, but the indictment was dismissed before trial. Ibid. After he was reinstated, the plaintiff brought an action to recover his salary for the period during which he was under suspension. Id. at 139-40. The Court noted that the no work, no pay rule was firmly established in the common law of New Jersey. Id. at 140-41. The Court then addressed whether the plaintiff fell within the then-applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 40A:46-34. At the time, that statute applied to municipal officer[s] or employee[s]. DeMarco, supra, 21 N.J. at 142 (quoting R.S. 40:46-34). The Court noted that to view [the statute] as applicable to a county detective would be to enlarge its language in disregard of the rule of strict construction. Id. at 145. Thus, the Court concluded that the statute applied only to municipal officers and employees, and did not apply to a county detective. The Legislature, on one occasion, has rejected that rule of strict statutory construction. In Strohmeyer, the Court of Errors and Appeals held that a plaintiff who had been illegally suspended could not recover back pay under the statute because the plain language of the statute spoke only to illegal dismissals. Strohmeyer, supra, 136 N.J.L. at 485-86. The Legislature, in an emphatic indication of intent, amended the statute three weeks later to apply to illegal suspensions as well as dismissals. L. 1948, c. 395. The statement annexed to the bill stated: The present law is R.S. 40:46-34. It only applied to persons illegally dismissed. Recently the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Strohmeyer v. Little Ferry held that a police officer illegally suspended could not recover his salary during the period of the suspension because the present law was not broad enough. The courts differentiate between 'dismissal' and a 'suspension.' The present act grants relief to any officer or municipal employee who has been illegally suspended. [Statement to Assembly Bill No. 229 (1948).] Strohmeyer filed another action, and he recovered back pay based on the statutory amendment. Strohmeyer v. Borough of Little Ferry, 6 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 1950). We also discussed in DeMarco the policy concerns underlying the no work, no pay rule. We noted that the Legislature if it chose, could enact legislation that in clear and direct terms constitutionally allow[s] compensation to all law enforcement officers (state, county and municipal) who are suspended pending trial on an indictment for misconduct in office and are later acquitted or otherwise vindicated. While such legislation would tend to satisfy the individual interests involved it would admittedly do so by placing upon the public the burden of expenditures for salaries without corresponding services. If other officers are appointed during the period of suspension duality of payments may result and if the suspended officers engage in private work during their suspensions they may be enabled to receive double compensation. [Id. at 143 (citation omitted).] Thus, two policy justifications evolved for the no work, no pay rule. First, the rule sought to protect the public entity from paying for services it did not receive, such that the entity would not have to pay twice for the same services. Second, the rule sought to prevent a windfall to the officer or employee who works elsewhere during the period of the suspension, earning double compensation. Those policies have undergirded the rule since its inception. City of Hoboken, supra, 27 N.J.L. at 280. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 195, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________ VERNIERO, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I join the Court in eliminating the no work-no pay rule from our common law. However, I agree with Justice LaVecchia's analysis in respect of the meaning of permitted by law as that phrase is used in the parties' agreement. Under our tripartite system, executive agencies may act only by virtue of an expressed or implied grant of authority from a legislative enactment or constitutional provision, or a judicial directive interpreting either of those sources. Silverman v. Berkson, 141 N.J. 412, 416-17, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S. Ct. 476, 133 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1995). Moreover, as a general rule, implied grants of authority to agencies are carefully circumscribed. See Playmate Toys, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 162 N.J. 186 (1999). Unlike the majority, I do not find an expressed or implied grant of authority to permit a back-pay award in this setting. On that narrow basis, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 195 Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________ LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. The majority asserts, in sweeping language, that the common- law rule of no work, no pay no longer serves any appropriate governmental purpose and should be interred. It pronounces the rule to be an anachronism, and harsh and unnecessary, and finds, in light of those pronouncements, that plaintiffs here are entitled to receive back pay for lost opportunities to work overtime as awarded by the arbitrator appointed pursuant to the dispute-resolution provisions of the collective-negotiations agreement. specific language explicitly circumscribing the arbitrator's authority with respect to back-pay awards. The agreement provides that the arbitrator may 'prescribe an appropriate back pay remedy' only when there is a violation of the agreement, and 'provided such remedy is permitted by law and is consistent with the terms of [the] Agreement, except that [he] may not make an award which exceeds the Welfare Board's authority.' The contract language reviewed in Communications Workers clearly provided that the terms of the negotiated agreement, and the details of the law, set specific boundaries on the arbitrator's substantive authority to make back-pay awards. Both the words of empowerment of the arbitrator, and the language limiting the authority of the arbitrator, are substantively identical in this case. As Justice Schreiber pointed out in Communications Workers, the form of arbitration clause that limits the arbitrator's authority to resolving disputes arising out of the terms of the agreement and denying him the authority to modify it, represents a narrow delegation of authority, rather than a broad one. Id. at 449. As a consequence, only disputes involving rights traceable to the agreement are arbitrable, and it is also presumed that [the parties] intended that their dispute be resolved in accordance with the law. Id. at 450. Furthermore, [t]he parties in a public employment case cannot clothe the arbitrator with unbridled discretion, 'for public policy demands that inherent in the arbitrator's guidelines are the public interest, welfare and other pertinent statutory criteria.' Id. at 450-51 (quoting Kearney PBA Local #21, supra, 81 N.J. at 217). Nor can a public entity bestow power on an arbitrator that is beyond that delegated to it. See State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 79 (1978) (stating that negotiated agreement with respect to matters beyond the lawful authority of the public employer is impermissible ). Thus, as in Communications Workers, our task in this case, involving a substantively identical arbitration and back-pay clause, is to determine whether the agreement envisioned that back pay was to be a permitted remedy for lost overtime opportunities, and whether that is a remedy permitted by law. The Communications Workers decision instructs us how to approach those interpretive issues. First, one must look to the language of the agreement to ascertain whether its terms expressly provide for back pay for the alleged violation. Communications Workers, supra, 96 N.J. at 451. In Communications Workers, Justice Schreiber found that the text of the agreement provided no evidence that the parties intended that back pay should be awarded for failure to promote, because it provided by its terms for an increase in salary only from the date that an employee is actually promoted. Id. at 451-52. The arbitrator, therefore, was not authorized under the agreement to provide back pay as a remedy for failure to promote. The contract here similarly provides for overtime hours accrued in excess of the normal hours of the established work week. These compensation credits shall be taken in compensatory time or in cash. As was the case in Communications Workers where the language spoke in terms of an increase from the date of promotion, the language here bespeaks overtime compensation for overtime worked. There is no reference to back pay as a remedy for lost overtime opportunity, and nothing to indicate that that is what the parties intended. The failure to tie the provision of back pay as a remedy to a specific violation cannot be explained as an oversight. The contract at issue here was negotiated well after the Court's unanimous decision in Communications Workers, and the parties were on notice about how this Court had construed the language of the identical arbitration and back-pay provisions. Nonetheless, the parties elected to insert into their agreement the same provision that this Court had concluded in Communications Workers did not vest the arbitrator with the power to award back pay. They knew, therefore, that they had to tie the allowance of back pay to the specific violation to allow the arbitrator to provide that remedy. They did not do so, and the arbitrator had no authority under the negotiated agreement to award back pay under these circumstances. Id. at 452. Only one construction of the contract is possible: the parties did not intend to vest the arbitrator with power to order back pay for lost overtime opportunities. The majority attempts to circumvent Communications Workers through circuitous reasoning. The majority cites to the principle that courts should defer to an arbitrator when his decision is reasonably debatable as support for its conclusion. The presumption, however, cannot carry the day here. The arbitrator's decision is bottomed exclusively on his interpretation of the arbitration clause of the contract to conclude that the parties intended a back-pay remedy. That arbitration clause is identical to the clause in Communications Workers that this Court said is narrow and does not itself confer a back-pay remedy. We held in that case that the parties must indicate in a separate provision that they intend a back-pay remedy for a specific contract violation. NO. A-20 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 195, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 11, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz