Title: P. v. Jackson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 2/5/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S110206 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County  
MICHAEL ANTHONY JACKSON, 
)  
Super. Ct. No. A530714 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
In 1984, defendant Michael Anthony Jackson was convicted and sentenced 
to death for murdering a police officer who was engaged in the performance of his 
duties.  This court affirmed the judgment in People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
1170, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the penalty verdict and 
death sentence, finding defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  
(Jackson v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) 211 F.3d 1148.)  Following a penalty phase 
retrial, a judgment of death again was imposed on September 20, 2002.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  As 
explained below, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
I. FACTS 
A. Prosecution Evidence 
Shortly after noon on August 31, 1983, West Covina Police Officer Ken 
Wrede radioed that he had been told by a citizen of an intoxicated person in the 
area and would “be checking.”  A few minutes later, Edward Butler,1 who was 
working in the area, noticed defendant walking toward the corner of Glenview 
Road and Francisquito Avenue.  Defendant was walking “kinda crooked.”  Officer 
Wrede arrived, made a U-turn, and pulled to the curb at an angle.  He radioed that 
defendant was “possibly dusted,” meaning under the influence of phencyclidine 
(PCP), and requested backup.  Officer Wrede got out of the vehicle, asked 
defendant where he was going, and told defendant to sit down on the curb.2  
Defendant began to walk away and the officer used his walkie-talkie to again 
request backup.3  The officer again told defendant to sit down on the curb, but 
defendant continued walking.  The officer approached defendant “and kind of 
tapped him in the back of the knees with the billy club.”  Defendant “turned 
around and he started fighting.”4   
Defendant and the officer fell to the ground and began “tussling” and 
fighting.  Defendant was punching and kicking the officer.  Officer Wrede tried to 
defend himself and struck defendant in the midsection with his baton several 
                                              
1  
Butler had died prior to the penalty phase retrial.  His testimony at the prior 
trial was read to the jury. 
2  
About this time, Robert Dunham (who was 19 years old at the time) drove 
by on his way to a gas station and saw defendant and the victim engaged in a 
“heated discussion.” 
3  
Over the next several minutes, Officer Wrede radioed twice more asking 
for assistance. 
4  
When Dunham returned after buying gasoline, defendant and the victim 
were fighting on the front lawn of a residence.  
 
2
times, to no effect.  Officer Wrede sprayed mace in defendant’s face several times, 
with no apparent effect.  Defendant pulled a wooden tree stake out of the ground, 
uprooting the tree it was supporting, and swung the stake at the officer, who 
blocked it with his baton, causing the stake to fly into the street.  During the 
altercation, defendant ripped the officer’s badge from his uniform and broke his 
sunglasses. 
Officer Wrede ran to the driver’s side door of the police vehicle and 
defendant ran to the opposite side of the vehicle, opened the passenger side door 
and grabbed a shotgun that was secured in a rack.  Officer Wrede broadcast, “he’s 
got my shotgun rack,” and then pushed defendant and they struggled over the 
shotgun until defendant ripped the shotgun and the rack from the vehicle.5  Officer 
Wrede broadcast, “he pulled it out,” and then pointed his handgun at defendant 
over the roof of the vehicle.  The shotgun was kept in the rack at “patrol ready,” 
meaning there were four rounds of ammunition in the magazine and the safety was 
on.  To fire the shotgun, the safety must be off and a round must be moved from 
the magazine to the firing chamber by sliding the pump action.  Defendant 
attempted to load a round into the shotgun by sliding the pump.  He pointed the 
weapon at the victim and appeared to pull the trigger, but the shotgun did not fire.  
Defendant again tried to load the weapon, which was still in the rack.  This time, 
defendant was able to move the slide and Dunham heard the sound of a load 
entering the firing chamber of the shotgun.  Officer Wrede crouched down behind 
the vehicle, still pointing his gun at defendant.  Defendant then laid the shotgun on 
                                              
5  
In a later experiment, a police officer was able to quickly rip a similar 
shotgun and rack from another patrol car.  The rack was affixed to the metal 
floorboard of the vehicle by two machine screws.  A third screw went into the 
foam dashboard. 
 
3
the roof of the vehicle and placed his hands on the roof of the vehicle, appearing to 
give up.  Officer Wrede pointed his gun up, above defendant, and started to walk 
around the vehicle when defendant picked up the shotgun and shot the officer in 
the head. 
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Stephen Vine was told by a passing motorist 
that a fight was occurring and arrived at the scene just after Officer Wrede was 
shot.  Deputy Vine pulled his vehicle next to Officer Wrede’s vehicle and saw 
Officer Wrede’s body on the ground.  As Deputy Vine left his vehicle, defendant 
stood up from behind Officer Wrede’s vehicle and pointed the shotgun at Deputy 
Vine.  Deputy Vine ducked back into his vehicle, backed away from defendant a 
couple of hundred feet, and jumped back out of the vehicle with his gun drawn.  
Defendant was walking toward the deputy, pointing the shotgun at him.  
Defendant appeared to be trying to both pull the trigger and move the slide to load 
a round into the shotgun. 
West Covina Police Officer Arthur Marinello and his police dog came up 
behind defendant.  Deputy Vine yelled for Officer Marinello to shoot defendant or 
release his dog.  Defendant responded by repeating “I’ll shoot you” and “I will kill 
all you fucking pigs,” as he continued to point the shotgun at the deputy while 
both pulling at the trigger and trying to load a round into the chamber.  Officer 
Marinello released his dog.  Defendant struck the dog with the butt of the shotgun, 
stunning the animal, but the dog recovered and bit defendant, causing him to fall 
to the ground and drop the shotgun.  West Covina Police Officer Christopher 
Mohler, who had arrived on the scene on his motorcycle just after Deputy Vine, 
ran into the street, kicked the shotgun to the side and grabbed defendant’s arm as 
Officer Marinello grabbed defendant’s other arm.  Defendant struggled and tried 
to grab Officer Marinello’s gun and Officer Mohler’s gun.  Deputy Vine 
 
4
approached and struck defendant in the stomach with his baton three or four times, 
subduing defendant enough to permit the other officers to handcuff defendant. 
Deputy Sheriff Sabino Muniz arrived at the West Covina Police Station 
shortly after defendant was arrested and accompanied defendant as paramedics 
transported him to a hospital for treatment.  The parties stipulated that a blood 
sample taken from defendant shortly after the crime revealed the presence of PCP.  
At the hospital, defendant answered the deputy’s preliminary questions, stating his 
name, age, birthday, address and other information without difficulty or apparent 
confusion.  A couple of hours later, after defendant had been treated, defendant 
asked Deputy Muniz: “Why am I under arrest?  Am I being charged for killing a 
cop?”  To Deputy Muniz’s knowledge, no one had mentioned in defendant’s 
presence that a police officer had been killed. 
Los Angeles County Sheriff Detective Sergeant Michael Lee, a homicide 
investigator, later questioned defendant in his hospital room in the jail ward.  He 
advised defendant of his rights, which defendant waived.  Defendant was 
responsive and appeared to understand.  Defendant asked Sergeant Lee what he 
was being arrested for, and Sergeant Lee answered, “murder.”  Defendant asked, 
“I killed a policeman?” The next day, Sergeant Lee and his partner returned and 
asked defendant if he remembered them.  Defendant replied, “Yeah, you’re the 
cops that said I shot that officer with a shotgun.”  To Sergeant Lee’s knowledge, 
no one had told defendant that Officer Wrede had been killed with a shotgun.  
Sergeant Lee asked defendant how he knew Officer Wrede had been killed with a 
shotgun.  Defendant replied he had read it in the newspaper, but newspapers were 
not available in the jail ward and defendant’s wrists were secured to the sides of 
his bed. 
George T. testified that seven years earlier on June 18, 1976, when he was 
17 years old and in the Army, defendant and another man entered his barracks at 
 
5
11 p.m. and climbed into his bunk.  Defendant’s accomplice struck the witness in 
the face and defendant sodomized him, causing his rectum to bleed. 
Raul Curiel testified that on April 16, 1969, when he was 18 years old, he 
was walking with a friend in West Covina when they were summoned by 
defendant, who was 15 years old, and an accomplice.  Defendant’s accomplice 
poked a knife in Curiel’s stomach and demanded money.  Curiel responded that he 
had no money, turning his pockets inside out and throwing to the ground his 
wallet and a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) application for a driver’s 
license.  Defendant then took the knife and demanded Curiel’s cigarettes.  Curiel 
handed defendant his cigarettes and defendant poked him in the stomach with the 
knife.  Defendant then returned the pack of cigarettes and he and his accomplice 
ran off.  Curiel encountered a police officer and reported that he had been robbed.  
Defendant and another man were arrested a short time later and Curiel’s wallet 
and DMV application were recovered.  Two knives were recovered from 
defendant. 
George Dorta testified that on July 5, 1983 he was a West Covina police 
officer and conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle that was weaving.  The vehicle 
stopped in a gas station with a minimarket and Officer Dorta approached the 
driver and asked for his driver’s license.  Defendant, who was a passenger in the 
vehicle said “you don’t have to do that” and got out of the vehicle and walked 
toward the officer with clenched fists.  The driver also left the vehicle and began 
walking toward the officer, who retreated behind the pumps, drew his gun and 
ordered them to stop.  Defendant cursed at Officer Dorta, but withdrew to the 
minimarket. 
Officer Gregory Bennallack arrived in response to a request by Officer 
Dorta for backup and learned from Officer Dorta that defendant was in the 
minimarket and possibly was under the influence of PCP.  Officer Bennallack 
 
6
entered the market and told defendant to come outside.  Defendant said “Fuck you, 
I don’t want to talk to you” and began to walk away.  Officer Bennallack put his 
hand on defendant’s shoulder and said they needed to go outside and talk.  
Defendant again refused and then grabbed the officer with one hand and ripped his 
badge from his shirt with the other.  Officer Bennallack struck defendant in the 
legs several times with his baton, which had no effect.  Defendant again grabbed 
for the officer’s badge, which was hanging from the officer’s shirt and reached for 
the officer’s gun.  Officer Bennallack punched defendant in the face, causing him 
to fall on his face, kneeled on top of him, and handcuffed him.  After defendant 
was booked, he threaten to rape Officer Bennallack’s wife and kill his children. 
Friends who knew and worked with the deceased described kind and heroic 
acts Officer Wrede had performed and recalled how highly people thought of him.  
Officer Wrede’s sisters testified about his childhood, his devotion to his family 
and his profession, and the impact of his death on his family.  The victim’s wife 
described their life together and the impact his death had on her.  His parents 
testified about their love for their son and how much they missed him. 
Evidence was introduced that defendant had suffered a felony conviction 
for burglary in 1974. 
B. Defense Evidence 
The defense read to the jury the prior testimony of Lucinda Smith, who had 
died prior to the penalty phase retrial.  She had seen defendant on the street shortly 
before noon on August 31, 1983.  He had socks on, but no shoes, and appeared 
disoriented.  She continued down the street and encountered Officer Wrede and 
told him about defendant.  Officer Wrede said he would take care of it. 
James Butler testified he had been defendant’s friend since 1983 and they 
would smoke PCP together several times a week.  About 10 a.m. on August 31, 
 
7
1989, defendant came to Butler’s house with two young women and Butler gave 
defendant a PCP-laced cigarette.  At some point, defendant kicked off his sandals 
and ran off. 
Defendant’s mother, Lillian Williams, testified that defendant was one of 
her six children, fathered by three different men, two of whom were deceased at 
the time of trial.  Defendant’s father, Tamridge Jackson, was a “bookie” who 
never lived with or supported defendant.  Williams supported her family on 
“county aid.”  They lived in “shacks.”  Defendant was born in March 1954.  The 
next year, Williams met and later moved in with Arthur Morrissette, until he left 
her for another woman five years later. 
Williams admitted that she “whooped” all of her children, meaning that 
when angered she would strike the children with whatever object was handy.  On 
one occasion, she choked defendant.  Two of defendant’s sisters and one of his 
brothers confirmed this. 
In 1960, Lillian Williams met Mr. Williams.  The next year, he and five of 
his six children moved in with her, so they had 11 children living in a two-
bedroom house.  Defendant had played sports and wanted to be a professional 
athlete, but around the age of 14 or 15 he began using drugs; first sniffing glue and 
later using PCP. 
Pamela Jackson, defendant’s sister, described how, as children, she and 
defendant would go looking for their father in “bookie joints.”  Although he was 
happy to see them, he would make them leave and never spent time with them.  At 
home, their mother would administer whippings using a belt or extension cord, but 
only if they misbehaved. 
Defendant’s 28-year-old daughter, Shameka Dahlberg, testified that 
defendant has been in custody since she was eight years old but she has visited 
 
8
him and he calls her on the telephone every few months.  She thinks of him more 
as a friend than as a parent. 
Defendant’s wife, Sabrina Jackson, testified.  Defendant married Sabrina 
when he was in his “early 20’s.”  She had a child when they met and she and 
defendant had two more children.  On cross examination, Sabrina testified that 
defendant was capable of taking care of himself and his family, when he was not 
taking drugs.  Defendant “wasn’t the greatest writer the greatest reader,” but he 
could read and write. 
Dr. Dale Watson, a psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, tested 
defendant and testified that defendant has “borderline intellectual abilities. His 
intelligence quotient (IQ) is in what is called the borderline range. It is just about 
retarded.”  Defendant had a “moderate degree of impairment of the brain 
functions.”  Defendant’s “full scale IQ, which is a combination of both verbal and 
non-verbal abilities, was 79. And his verbal IQ, which is simply his ability to deal 
with verbal information, was also 79.  His non-verbal or performance IQ was 83. 
All of these scores fall within what is called the borderline range.”  An average IQ 
is 100.  Defendant’s IQ was tested on numerous occasions between 1967 and 1980 
and varied between a low of 72 and a high of 90.  Defendant displayed several 
types of brain impairment.  Outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Watson told the 
court that the term “mentally retarded” meant “a score of approximately 70,” but 
that could mean an IQ of up to 75 because there was up to a five-point margin of 
error in testing.  Defendant never had received an IQ score below 70. 
Dr. Jay Jackman, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that the beatings inflicted 
by defendant’s mother “severely impaired his development.”  Defendant “has 
borderline intelligence and he has brain impairment.”  “PCP is classed as a 
dissociative anesthetic.  And what that means is that it will reduce people’s level 
of sensation to such a degree that they can have surgical anesthesia and be alert 
 
9
and awake and not feel pain.”  The amount of PCP measured in defendant’s blood 
following the crime “would result in a significant intoxication and impairment.” 
James Esten, a “correctional consultant,” examined defendant’s prison 
records and testified that he would not pose a threat to inmates or staff if he was 
sentenced to life in prison without parole. 
C. Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence 
On rebuttal, Daniel Smith testified that on July 27, 1969, he was returning 
home from the store with loaves of bread and some food stamps while running an 
errand for his mother.  As he rode through an alley on his bicycle, several people, 
led by defendant, jumped out of an automobile and ordered him to stop.  When he 
did not stop, one of them threw a rock, which hit him on the arm, causing him to 
fall off his bicycle.  Defendant and another person grabbed Smith and threw him 
up against a wall.  One person threatened Smith with a rock while defendant 
emptied his pockets and ripped a St. Christopher medal from his neck.  They took 
everything he had, including the bread and the food stamps.  Smith later told his 
family, who notified the police, and defendant was arrested. 
Dr. Terrence McGee, a physician specializing in addiction medicine, 
testified that the high level of PCP in defendant’s blood at the time of the crime 
indicated defendant had developed a tolerance for the drug.  Dr. McGee opined 
that although defendant was under the influence of PCP, “it was a very minor 
pattern.” 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Denial of Continuance to Prepare Atkins Defense 
On March 13, 2001, pursuant to the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the federal district court denied defendant’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus “as to the guilt phase” and granted his petition “as to the penalty phase of 
 
10
that proceeding.”  On April 24, 2001, the case was called in the Los Angeles 
Superior Court.  Defendant was not present but was represented by the public 
defender.  The public defender declared a conflict of interest and was relieved as 
counsel and the case was continued to April 30, 2001. 
On April 30, 2001, defendant was present in court and counsel was 
appointed to represent him.  Defendant waived the statutory time for trial and the 
case was continued numerous times.  On February 27, 2002, the trial court granted 
defendant’s request to continue the trial to May 29, 2002, but noted that no further 
continuances would be granted and trial would commence on that date. 
On May 6, 2002, defense counsel filed a written motion for continuance, 
stating that obligations in other cases had prevented him from adequately 
preparing for the penalty phase retrial.  On May 10, 2002, the trial court granted 
the motion and continued the trial to July 1, 2002. 
On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321, that executing a mentally retarded defendant is 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as “cruel 
and unusual” punishment.  The high court noted that “clinical definitions of 
mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also 
significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and 
self-direction that became manifest before age 18.”6  (Id. at p. 318.)  The high 
                                              
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
6  
The court quoted definitions of mental retardation by the American 
Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association, 
both of which required significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with 
related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work that manifests 
before age 18.  The court described “ ‘[m]ild’ mental retardation” as “an IQ level 
 
11
court, however, left to the states the task of establishing procedures to determine 
which offenders were retarded.  (Id. at p. 317.) 
On June 24, 2002, defendant filed a written motion to continue the trial 
“due to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Atkins v. 
Virginia.”  The motion stated that the high court had ruled “that mentally retarded 
people could not receive the death penalty,” but defendant’s motion acknowledged 
that “[t]he issue that is not clear is what constitutes being mentally retarded.”  
Defendant stated:  “The Supreme Court has decided that the individual States 
should define what Mental Retardation means.  There is no definition of Mental 
Retardation for this purpose in California Law.  The Supreme Court does not 
define Mental Retardation in this decision.” 
The motion for continuance stated that a week earlier (three days prior to 
Atkins) defendant had been tested to determine if he “was a ‘brain damaged’ 
person” and he was determined to have an IQ of 79, which defense counsel 
described as “borderline for retardation.”  Defense counsel requested a 60-day 
continuance, stating he could not be ready for trial until he investigated “the 
adaptive functioning factors that are mentioned in the Atkins v. Virginia opinion.” 
At a hearing on the motion conducted that day, the trial court indicated it 
was not inclined to continue the case, asking defense counsel what he hoped to 
learn.  Defense counsel responded that he hoped the Legislature would define 
mental retardation.  The trial court stated:  “I’m not going to continue the case 
based on what the Legislature may or may not do.  The period of time for a bill to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
of 50-55 to approximately 70.”  (Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 308, fn. 
3.) 
 
12
get through our legislature at a minimum you are talking months, counsel.  It is 
speculative and I will not do it.  I cannot see any reason at all to continue the 
matter.  None at all.  If you have evidence that your client is mentally retarded, 
that is evidence that you would put on in any event.  The record will be clear that 
it is an issue and both sides should be prepared to put on whatever they have in the 
issue.  These cases are not going to be resolved at the trial level.  Not for many 
years will there be given a standard to give to the jurors.  I’m not going to try to 
explain to the jury that if the person is ‘mentally retarded’ they should not impose 
the death sentence.  I don’t feel equipped to do that.  There would be no guidance 
here for this court to do it and it would be an exercise in futility.”  The penalty 
phase retrial commenced on July 1, 2002. 
Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his rights to the 
assistance of counsel and due process of law under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by denying his motion 
to continue the trial.  “The determination of whether a continuance should be 
granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion 
may not be exercised so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare.”  (People v.  Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.)  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a 
continuance to investigate “the adaptive functioning factors that are mentioned in 
the Atkins v. Virginia opinion” and to wait for the Legislature to define mental 
retardation.  Defendant asserts:  “The trial court was required to follow the law set 
forth in Atkins.”  The trial court did so.  Atkins simply held that mentally retarded 
defendants could not be executed and left it to the states to define mental 
retardation and establish procedures to determine which defendants were mentally 
retarded.  The trial court was correct that it would be months, at least, before the 
Legislature would define mental retardation and establish the necessary 
 
13
procedures for determining which defendants were mentally retarded.   In fact, it 
was not until the following year that the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 
1376,7 which defines “mentally retarded” and establishes procedures for 
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded.8  The trial court, therefore, 
did not violate the holding in Atkins by proceeding to trial in the absence of 
guidance from the Legislature on how to implement the holding in that case and 
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to continue the trial. 
Even had defendant established that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to continue the trial in light of the high court’s decision in 
Atkins, the record before this court does not establish that defendant was 
prejudiced.  (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 972 [“ ‘In the lack of a 
showing of an abuse of discretion or of prejudice to the defendant, a denial of his 
motion for a continuance cannot result in a reversal of a judgment of 
conviction.’ ”].)  Nothing in the record before us suggested that defendant would 
have been able to show that he was retarded had the trial court granted his request 
for a continuance.  Defendant’s expert did not testify he was retarded, but rather 
that he was in “the borderline range” and “just about retarded.”  Defendant does 
not argue in this court that he is retarded.  He argues only that “the question of 
whether [defendant] is mentally retarded has never been adequately investigated as 
a discrete and decisive issue.” 
                                              
7  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
8  
Section 1376 defines “mentally retarded” to mean “the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently 
with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of 18.”  (Stats. 
2003, ch. 700, § 1.)  If the prosecution seeks the death penalty, the defendant may 
elect to have the court determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded prior 
to trial, or have the jury determine the issue following a conviction of murder with 
special circumstances.  (§ 1376, subd. (b)(1).) 
 
14
Defendant contends he must be granted a new penalty phase trial at which 
jurors have the opportunity to decide whether he is mentally retarded.  Defendant 
asserts that he has a right to have a jury determine whether he is mentally retarded 
under Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, which held that the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution requires that a jury must determine all facts that 
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.  Defendant asserts that “Atkins 
expressly transformed mental retardation from solely a mitigating factor into a 
‘narrowing’ circumstance that determines a defendant’s eligibility for the death 
penalty.” 
As noted above, the Legislature in 2003 enacted section 1376, which grants 
a defendant “[i]n any case in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty . . . a 
jury hearing to determine if the defendant is mentally retarded” if the defendant 
first submits “a declaration of a qualified expert stating his or her opinion that the 
defendant is mentally retarded.”  Two years later, this court held that section 1376 
applied only to preconviction proceedings and adopted a similar procedure for 
defendants challenging a judgment of death.  (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
40, 47.)  We held that such a postconviction claim of mental retardation “should 
be raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus . . . . To state a prima facie claim for 
relief, the petition must contain ‘a declaration by a qualified expert stating his or 
her opinion that the [petitioner] is mentally retarded . . . .’  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  We 
did not, however, grant a similar right to a jury trial, deeming it “inappropriate to 
extend the jury trial option to postconviction claims.”  (Id. at p. 49.)  We held 
there was “no constitutional mandate” to have a jury determine whether a 
defendant facing a judgment of death is mentally retarded, noting that the high 
court in Atkins “expressly left to the states the responsibility of ‘ “developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 50.) 
 
15
In Schriro v. Smith (2005) 546 U.S. 6, the high court reaffirmed that its 
decision in Atkins does not give a capital defendant a right to have a jury 
determine whether he or she is mentally retarded.  The defendant in Schriro was 
sentenced to death in Arizona and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court.  After Atkins was decided, the defendant asserted that he was 
mentally retarded.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals suspended the proceedings 
and directed the defendant to “ ‘institute proceedings in the proper trial court of 
Arizona’ ” and further ordered that whether Smith is mentally retarded must “ ‘be 
determined . . . by a jury trial unless the right to a jury is waived by the parties.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 7.)  The high court reversed, holding that “[t]he Ninth Circuit erred in 
commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve [defendant]’s 
mental retardation claim.  Atkins stated in clear terms that ‘ “we leave to the 
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional 
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” ’  [Citations.]  . . .  Arizona had 
not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit pre-
emptively imposed its jury trial condition.”  (Id. at pp. 7-8.)  Accordingly, even if 
defendant had met the threshold requirement imposed in Hawthorne of submitting 
a declaration from a qualified expert stating that he is mentally retarded, he would 
not have a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether he is mentally 
retarded. 
Defendant claims he “is entitled to the statutory procedural protections of 
section 1376.”  As noted above, we held in Hawthorne that, “[b]y its terms, 
section 1376 applies only to preconviction proceedings.”  (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 44.)  Defendant argues that our decision in Hawthorne does 
not apply because his trial was conducted after Atkins was decided.  Defendant 
asserts he “had a right to have Atkins applied to his death penalty trial.”  Defendant 
is incorrect.  The decision in Atkins did not require that defendant’s trial be 
 
16
conducted in any particular fashion.  The decision in Atkins simply held that 
defendant could not be executed if he is mentally retarded.  Under our decision in 
Hawthorne, defendant still may raise that claim in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
Citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439, 
defendant contends that failing to grant him the procedural protections of section 
1376 would deny him equal protection of the law, because he is similarly situated 
“to a preconviction defendant.”  Defendant is not now similarly situated “to a 
preconviction defendant” because he is facing a judgment of death.  Nor was he 
similarly situated “to a preconviction defendant” for purposes of section 1376 just 
prior to the second penalty phase trial, because section 1376 was not enacted until 
after the judgment of death was entered. 
Defendant claims he must be granted a new penalty phase trial, “as opposed 
to remand for an after-the-fact determination of mental retardation only” because 
“[s]eparate from the issue of his eligibility for the death penalty, a defendant . . . 
must be allowed the opportunity to present evidence of his mental retardation as 
mitigation . . . .”  Defendant reasons that “Atkins’ holding that the Eighth 
Amendment restricts the states from imposing death sentences on the mentally 
retarded necessarily changed the mitigating significance of mental retardation 
evidence in a capital penalty trial” because a state may not permit an individual 
juror “to vote for the death penalty if that juror believes . . . the defendant is 
mentally retarded.”  Defendant argues that “after Atkins, the extenuating force of a 
defendant’s mitigating evidence of mental retardation must be deemed absolute.”  
The decision in Atkins does not say that.  The decision in Atkins does not discuss 
or alter the mitigating effect of evidence of mental retardation or discuss or alter 
the circumstances under which an individual juror may vote for a sentence of 
death.  As noted above, the decision in Atkins simply held that a defendant could 
 
17
not be executed if he or she is mentally retarded and left to the states the tasks of 
defining mental retardation and establishing procedures to determine which 
defendants are mentally retarded. 
Defendant contends he must be granted a new penalty phase trial so that the 
prosecution can decide whether to seek the death penalty in light of “the factors 
and principles identified in the Atkins decision.”  There is no need to do so.  The 
People point out that after the parties discussed the then-recent decision in Atkins, 
the prosecutor stated:  “I don’t think he is mentally retarded.  I’m ready to go 
forward.” 
B. Marsden Error 
Defendant asserts that the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry 
into the reasons for his repeated requests to discharge his appointed counsel, 
violating his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights to counsel and his Eighth 
Amendment “heightened need for reliability in a capital case.” 
We held in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123, that “the decision 
whether to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute 
another attorney during the trial is within the discretion of the trial court.”  The 
defendant in Marsden told the trial court he did not feel he was being adequately 
represented and moved for “ ‘proper counsel.’ ”  (Id. at p. 121.)  The court denied 
the motion, noting that appointed counsel had been “ ‘alert and has raised 
questions during the course of this hearing.’ ”  (Id. at p. 122.)  The defendant 
asked whether he could “ ‘bring up some specific instances,’ ” but the court 
refused, saying “ ‘I don’t want you to say anything that might prejudice you 
before me as to the case . . . .’ ”  (Ibid.) 
This court reversed the defendant’s subsequent judgment of conviction, 
ruling that the trial court could not “thoughtfully exercise its discretion in this 
 
18
matter without listening to [the defendant]’s reasons for requesting a change of 
attorneys” because “[t]he defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events 
relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney which are not apparent to 
the trial judge from observations within the four corners of the courtroom.”  
(People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123.)  We held, therefore, that “a judge 
who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his 
courtroom observations, despite a defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of 
misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of 
the attorney.”  (Id. at p. 124.) 
“A defendant ‘may be entitled to an order substituting appointed counsel if 
he shows that, in its absence, his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel would be denied or substantially impaired.’  [Citations.]  The law 
governing a Marsden motion ‘is well-settled. “When a defendant seeks to 
discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts 
inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the 
basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate 
performance.  [Citation.]  A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly 
shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation 
[citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an 
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].”  
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 857; see 
People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 431.) 
As noted above, the present case returned to the Los Angeles Superior 
Court from the federal court of appeals for a new penalty phase trial on April 24, 
2001.  The public defender declared a conflict of interest and Anthony Robusto 
was subsequently appointed as counsel.  Following numerous continuances, 
Robusto agreed to a trial date, which led defendant to request cocounsel status.  
 
19
The court denied defendant’s request for cocounsel status, but invited him to 
renew his request in writing. 
On February 27, 2002, defendant gave the court a three-page handwritten 
motion to appoint him as cocounsel.  Defendant stated that when he was returned 
to county jail on April 26, 2001, following the reversal of his death sentence by 
the Ninth Circuit, he was “allowed access to the telephone” to contact his attorney, 
family members, and potential witnesses.  On October 13, 2001, however, he was 
transferred to another section of the jail where he was “restricted.”  Defendant 
wrote:  “These restriction[s] interfere with my right to a fair and impartial trial 
because [I cannot] help my attorney prepare a defense or aid in my own defense. 
. . . I am force[d] to go co-counsel to prepare a strong defense on my behalf.”  The 
court read the motion, asked defendant if he had anything to add, and again denied 
defendant’s motion for cocounsel status, later adding:  “I know you are not happy 
with [your] current[] housing situation.  I am not going to remedy that by granting 
[you] co-counsel [status].” 
After a short discussion about jury selection, Robusto moved to continue 
the trial, prompting defendant to say, “If that’s the case, I need another attorney.  I 
request another attorney,” representing that he had “lined up” another attorney 
named Allen Gluck.  The following exchange then occurred: 
“The Court:  Did you hire them. 
“The Defendant:  No.  I would like for the court to hire them. 
“The Court:  You want me to hire them.  I don’t intend to hire Mr. Gluck.  
We already got a[n] attorney on the case. 
“The Defendant:  I prefer to have two. 
“The Court:  You would probably like three or four and be co-counsel 
to[o].  Your request for another attorney at this point based on this attorney’s 
request for continuance is denied.” 
 
20
Defendant argues that his “statement, ‘I request another attorney,’ . . . could 
not have been clearer, and the trial court[] obviously understood [defendant] was 
asking for a substitute attorney.”9  But defendant disregards the fact that when the 
court stated it would not appoint Gluck because defendant already had an attorney, 
defendant clarified that he was not asking to discharge Robusto as his counsel, but 
was asking for another attorney in addition to Robusto, explaining “I prefer to 
have two.”  The court demonstrated that it understood defendant was asking for an 
additional attorney by replying: “You would probably like three or four . . .” 
before denying defendant’s request for another attorney.  Unlike the situation in 
Marsden, defendant said nothing to indicate he was dissatisfied with Robusto’s 
representation, or wished to relate specific instances of misconduct.  (See People 
v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157.)  The trial court did not err in denying 
defendant’s request for another attorney without further inquiry. 
Defendant contends he “made a second request to substitute counsel on 
May 10, 2002.”  The record does not support this description of defendant’s 
request.  On May 10, 2002, the court granted Robusto’s motion to continue the 
trial.  Defendant asked the court to “reconsider my request about counsel or co-
counsel.”  The trial court agreed and defendant complained about “all these 
delays” and said that the attorney that had represented him on appeal “is very 
capable of handling the experts, PCP experts and get the job done real quick.”  
The court denied defendant’s request, stating:  “Your request for co-counsel has 
                                              
9  
The court later indicated its understanding that defendant was asking for an 
additional attorney rather than substitute counsel, in the following exchange:  “The 
Defendant:  . . . when I asked for another attorney, you denied it. [¶]  The Court:  
You mean an additional — [¶] The Defendant:  Yes.” 
 
21
been ruled upon and I haven’t heard anything today to make me change my mind 
on that.” 
Defendant claims the court erred by failing to make “a thoughtful 
determination of [defendant]’s request for substitute counsel.”  But as before, the 
record is clear that defendant did not ask to substitute Robusto as counsel, but 
rather to appoint defendant’s former appellate counsel as cocounsel in addition to 
Robusto.  As before, defendant was given an ample opportunity to state the 
reasons for his request and said nothing to indicate he wished to relate specific 
instances of misconduct. 
Two months later, defendant again asked the court to reconsider his request 
for cocounsel and, for the first time, appeared to ask that Robusto be replaced.  On 
July 1, 2002, while a jury was being selected, Robusto stated:  “My client has 
asked me, and I have told him that this request will be denied, that during the voir 
dire process that we would address the jury with respect to sleep walking.”  The 
court declined “to question the jury about sleep walking for the obvious reason 
that nothing that I have read about in this case, including the supreme court’s 
rather detailed recitation of facts, at all touches upon the issue” but permitted 
counsel to do so. 
One week later, on July 8, 2002, defendant filed a two-page handwritten 
motion entitled “Motion for Reconsideration of Co-counsel or Appoint Another 
Lawyer to Assist Me,” which stated, in part:  “I was shock[ed] by the court and my 
lawyer on July 1 – 02 when I had my lawyer to [sic] address the juror 
questionnaire about asking the jury do they believe in sleep walking or do they 
know someone that do.  My lawyer abandon[ed] me on that issue.”  Defendant 
explained that sleepwalking, or “non-insane automatism, is both significant and 
relevant to the present case because it shows that an individual can engage in serial 
activities while in an unconscious state and such individual will be amnesic [sic] 
 
22
as to these actions.  The only difference between the unconscious states of the 
patient and petitioner[’s] unconscious state at the time of the incident is that these 
individuals were in a state of unconsciousness due to the internal workings of the 
human mind while petitioner was in a state of unconsciousness due to gross PCP 
intoxication.”  In addition to asking the court to reconsider his request for 
cocounsel, defendant, for the first time appeared to ask, in the alternative, for the 
court to replace Robusto, stating:  “The reaction you the court and my lawyer 
displayed on July 1 02 cause[d] me to take action on my own defense.”  Defendant 
asked the court to appoint a lawyer who was “familiar with this area of PCP who 
can ask the right questions to the experts for the jurors understanding.”  He 
provided the names of three attorneys, adding:  “Anyone of these lawyers is 
capable of schooling the whole courtroom including the judge through the help of 
experts.” 
After taking a recess to read the document, the court denied defendant’s 
request.  Defendant responded, “Okay.” 
Defendant contends “the trial court failed to conduct any type of on-the-
record inquiry to assess [defendant]’s complaints.”  No such inquiry was required.  
Defendant filed a written motion that explained in some detail that he was 
unhappy with Robusto’s representation because Robusto had declined to question 
the prospective jurors about sleepwalking.  Defendant said nothing to indicate he 
wished to relate any other instances of misconduct. 
On July 10, 2002, the court denied defendant’s request to represent himself.  
Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying this request is discussed 
separately below, but defendant further argues that the trial court committed 
Marsden error because it “failed to explore [defendant]’s more fundamental 
complaints with counsel, as the court failed to target specific questions to 
[defendant], and made no inquiry whatsoever of appointed counsel.”  An 
 
23
examination of the proceedings, including those that occurred the day before 
defendant’s motion to proceed in propria persona, reveal no error. 
On July 9, 2002, following the noon recess, the recorded proceedings 
outside the presence of the jury began with defendant asking to address the court.  
The court told defendant to “say it through your counsel.”  Defendant replied:  
“He don’t want to say it,” and Robusto explained that defendant had “indicated 
something he wants me to address the court about.  In my professional opinion, 
I’m not going to do it.”  Defendant then asked “to go pro per.”  The court told 
defendant to make a written motion. 
The court resumed and completed selecting a jury and the prosecutor made 
his opening statement. 
On July 10, 2002, defendant filed a handwritten “Motion to Proceed in Pro 
Per,” which stated that defendant had “lost all confidence and respect” for defense 
counsel because he had refused “to speak on my behalf many times.” Defendant 
stated he had brought to defense counsel’s attention that, during jury selection, the 
bailiff had indicated defendant “was a threat and dangerous” by “grabbing his gun 
in his holster.”  Defendant declared:  “For my lawyer to say he [is] not going to 
speak on my behalf on that issue is the last straw. . . . I want to put on my defense, 
not his.  I had no part in his defense.”  Robusto confirmed that defendant had 
raised this issue the day before, but defense counsel “was not going to waste the 
court’s time with raising an issue that is a waste of time, had no force and effect, 
and has nothing to do with the trial before the court.” 
In response to questions from the court, defendant explained that the bailiff 
in the courtroom the previous day had made “a move for his gun” every time 
defendant moved in his seat. The court replied that he had “a pretty good view of 
 
24
what goes on in the courtroom” and had seen “nothing of the type you’re 
describing.”10  Defendant responded:  “I still have a right to go pro per,” adding 
he felt he had “a conflict” with his attorney, stating:  “My defense, it’s not h
defense.  We got two different defense.”  Defendant complained that “the expert 
he got me ain’t the expert that need to be presented in this court.  The PCP expert.  
I need a neurology.  Not a PCP. . . .  This neurology can explain all the movements 
that I made that day on PCP.”  The court noted that defendant’s request to 
represent himself had not been raised “in a timely fashion,” recounting that the 
case had been returned to superior court more than a year earlier and defendant did 
not ask to represent himself until the final day of jury selection.  The court added 
that “it’s up to the attorney to select the witnesses.”  The court denied the request 
on the grounds that it was not timely, that permitting defendant to represent 
himself would disrupt the trial, and defendant had not shown an irreparable 
conflict with his attorney. 
is 
                                             
Defendant is incorrect that the court committed Marsden error by failing 
“to target specific questions” to defendant or inquire further of defense counsel.  
Defendant was given an ample opportunity to explain his dissatisfaction with 
defense counsel and the trial court conducted a rather extensive examination of 
defendant’s complaint and determined that it had no basis.  No further inquiry was 
required. 
 
10  
The court held a hearing the following day at which the bailiff stated he 
never had reached for his weapon or touched his gun in response to anything done 
by defendant during jury selection, but explained that, when he stood, he usually 
placed his right hand on top of his gun.  The court stated it was “convinced that 
there was nothing inappropriate that went on. . . . I don’t believe the deputy 
touched his weapon or did anything of that sort.”  Over defendant’s personal 
objection, the court declined to question the jurors. 
 
25
On July 11, 2002, the court inquired further about defendant’s assertion the 
day before that defense counsel planned to call an expert on PCP rather than a 
neurologist, clarifying that defendant had not subpoenaed the neurology expert he 
wished to call and had never spoken to the witness.  The court stated:  “The 
court’s ruling will stand.  I made some assumptions yesterday I believe are correct 
and I just wanted to make sure.  I assumed the defendant was not ready to put 
forth a witness.  And you haven’t even spoken to this person.” 
A few days later, defendant filed a two-page handwritten document entitled 
“Motion for Removal of Counsel.”  In a paragraph bearing the heading “Conflict 
of Interest,” defendant claimed that his rights to question jurors and to cross-
examine witnesses had been violated.  Defendant stated he wished to testify, but 
had “no counsel to question[] me on the stand” because his “own appointed 
attorney [had] become a helper of the District Attorney.”  Defendant stated he had 
asked Robusto “to get [a] neuropsychologic assessment [of] motor function, which 
is a lower-level function [that] can be carried out by a person whose higher-level 
cogniti[on] is inactive.”  In a paragraph bearing the heading “Breach of Attorney-
Client Privilege Section 954,” defendant asked that Robusto be “remove[d]” 
because he had disclosed at a sidebar conference a confidential communication 
regarding defendant’s “intention for my defense.”  In his conclusion, defendant 
stated:  “I am the invisible man in your courtroom.  I want to be heard through 
a[n] attorney [I] can trust.  You see every day at trial the relationship me, Michael 
Anthony Jackson and Attorney Anthony R. Robusto have? It[’]s nonexistent and 
the jurors know this.  Robusto must be remove[d] today.  Am [I] entitled to a 
defense?  Robusto ha[s taken] that right away from me.  Its his defense not mine.  
Once again [I] ask this court to remove Robusto at once.  So [I] can repair the 
damage Robusto allow[ed] to inflict on me by the People.  So the PCP expert 
won’t be ambush[ed] by Robusto.” 
 
26
The trial court read the document and asked defendant whether he had 
anything to add.  Defendant replied:  “Not unless you have any comments, no.” 
Robusto represented that he had prepared a defense, that he intended to call about 
a dozen witnesses, including two expert witnesses, and that defendant would 
testify in his own behalf.  Defendant asked, “May I comment on that?”  The trial 
court said “no” and denied defendant’s motion to remove counsel, stating:  “You 
don’t have any grounds.”  The exchange continued and the trial court had 
defendant removed from the courtroom when he refused to be quiet,11 explaining:  
“I’m not going to try to get into a shouting contest with the defendant in open 
court so since he will not be quiet and allow the court to make a ruling, he has 
been removed for the purpose of simply making the ruling.”  Defendant then 
returned to the courtroom and trial resumed after the trial court warned defendant 
that he would be removed whenever he attempted to “talk over the court.” 
Defendant contends the trial court committed Marsden error because it 
“made no inquiry into . . . [defendant]’s complaint that there was a breakdown in 
the attorney-client relationship that was apparent to those in the courtroom” and 
failed to “inquire into [defendant]’s complaints that he did not trust his appointed 
counsel.”  This claim is belied by the record before us.  The trial court read 
defendant’s motion to remove counsel and asked defendant if he had anything to 
                                              
11  
“The Defendant:  Can I comment?  [¶]  The Court:  I don’t want to argue 
with you.  [¶]  The Defendant:  It is not an argument.  Something I want to put on 
the record.  [¶]  The Court:  Put your comments in writing.  [¶]  The Defendant:  
Still, if he made a comment about why he should do something —  [¶]  The Court:  
Quiet.  [¶]  The Defendant:  Can I speak?  [¶]  The Court:  The answer is no.  [¶]  
The Defendant:  So this is just a frame-up courtroom.  I can’t sit here —  [¶]  The 
Court:  Do you want to be present during the balance of the case?  [¶]  The 
Defendant:  That’s on you, your honor.  [¶]  The Court:  That is on you.  [¶]  The 
Defendant:  I’m an invisible male right now.  I can’t speak my mind.” 
 
27
add.  The court permitted defense counsel to comment and then denied 
defendant’s motion.  The trial court was not required to inquire further.  The fact 
that defendant did not trust his attorney did not establish a conflict that required 
that appointed counsel be removed.  “ ‘[I]f a defendant’s claimed lack of trust in, 
or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel 
appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power 
over any appointment and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of 
their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law.’ ”  (People v. Berryman 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070; see People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th 786, 857.) 
Neither did defendant’s disagreement with counsel’s choice of expert 
witnesses and his disagreement with the defense Robusto planned to present 
indicate a conflict that required that Robusto be removed as counsel.  “A 
defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but 
merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.  [Citation.]  Tactical 
disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves 
constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ‘. . . [C]ounsel is “captain of the ship” and 
can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.’ [Citation.]”  
(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 705, 719.) 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to respond 
to defense counsel’s comments.  It is apparent that the trial court considered 
defendant’s conduct to be disruptive, causing the court to remove defendant from 
the courtroom in order to state its ruling.  While a trial court must permit a 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to relate specific instances of misconduct, the 
court is not required to permit a defendant to disrupt courtroom proceedings.  
Here, defendant was given an ample opportunity to express his concerns about 
 
28
counsel and was invited by the court to respond in writing to defense counsel’s 
comments.  No error occurred. 
C. Defendant’s Request to Represent Himself 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by denying his request 
to represent himself.  As noted above, on July 9, 2001, defendant asked “to go pro 
per.”  The court instructed him to put his request in writing, and the next day 
defendant filed a written motion to represent himself that asserted he had “lost all 
confidence and respect” for his attorney and wished to represent himself so he 
could “put on my defense, not his.”  The court noted that defendant’s request to 
represent himself had not been raised “in a timely fashion,” recounting that the 
case had been returned to superior court more than a year earlier and defendant did 
not ask to represent himself until the final day of jury selection.  When asked why 
he wished to represent himself, defendant explained that defense counsel was not 
presenting the defense defendant wanted, stating:  “My defense, it’s not his 
defense.  We got two different defense[s].”  The trial court denied defendant’s 
request to represent himself because it was untimely and granting the request 
would disrupt the trial proceedings. 
“ ‘A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself at trial under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  [Citations.]  A trial court 
must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if three conditions are met. 
First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request 
knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-
representation.  [Citations.]  Second, he must make his request unequivocally.  
[Citations.]  Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 931-932.) 
 
29
Once trial has commenced, the trial court has discretion to deny a request 
for self-representation.  “[O]nce a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial 
represented by counsel, demands by such defendant that he be permitted to 
discharge his attorney and assume the defense himself shall be addressed to the 
sound discretion of the court.”  (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.)  
Defendant argues that his request was timely because he made it before the jury 
was sworn and, thus, “the court had no choice but to grant [defendant]’s request 
for self-representation.”  Defendant is incorrect.  This court never has 
“establish[ed] a hard and fast rule that any motion made before trial — no matter 
how soon before — was timely.”  (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 99.)  In 
Clark, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request 
for self-representation made three weeks before trial commenced.  (Id. at p. 101.) 
Defendant cites three decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the proposition that “a request for self-representation made prior to jury 
impanelment is per se timely ‘unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay.’ 
(Avila v. Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 750, 753, quoting Fritz v. Spalding (9th Cir. 
1982) 682 F.2d 782, 784; see also Amant v. Marquez (9th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 
552, 555.)”  In Fritz, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s request to represent 
himself made on the day of trial is timely unless it can be established that the 
request is merely “a tactic to secure delay” (Fritz v. Spalding, supra, 682 F.2d at 
p. 784), even if granting the request would delay the trial and prejudice the 
prosecution: “Delay per se is not a sufficient ground for denying a defendant’s 
constitutional right of self-representation. Any motion to proceed pro se that is 
made on the morning of trial is likely to cause delay; a defendant may nonetheless 
have bona fide reasons for not asserting his right until that time, [citation], and he 
may not be deprived of that right absent an affirmative showing of purpose to 
secure delay.”  (Ibid.) 
 
30
As defendant acknowledges, this is not, and never has been, the law in 
California.  (People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628.)  Under California 
law, “once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel, 
demands by such defendant that he be permitted to discharge his attorney and 
assume the defense himself shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court.” (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to 
represent himself.  The court correctly stated the request was “just too late, made 
after a full day of voir dire and at the tail end of jury instruction,” further noting 
that granting defendant’s request would “disrupt the orderly presentation of the 
case.”  The court reasonably was concerned that it “would have to in all likelihood 
reopen voir dire [to] query the jury as to their thoughts and feelings about a capital 
defendant going pro per” and noted that defendant had not “subpoenaed witnesses 
of [his] own.”  The court denied the request, because permitting defendant to 
represent himself at that late date “would have made a fair trial impossible for both 
sides.”  No error occurred. 
D. Prosecutorial Argument 
Defendant contends the death judgment must be reversed because the 
prosecutor asked the jurors during argument to think of how they would feel if 
someone they loved dearly died “in a gutter” like the victim did, “choking on his 
own blood.”  Defendant later asked for a limiting jury instruction telling the jurors 
“not to put yourself in the place of the victim’s family; or to consider how you 
would feel under such circumstances.”12  The trial court refused the instruction. 
                                              
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
12  
The proposed instruction read:  “There was some argument by counsel to 
the effect that you were to think about what you might feel if you lost a loved one.  
The arguments of counsel are not evidence. You are not to put yourself in the 
 
31
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s argument improperly asked the 
jurors to consider facts ― “the juror’s emotional reactions to the murder of a loved 
one” ― that were irrelevant, not in the record, and were “inflammatory and highly 
prejudicial.”  Defendant acknowledges that jurors may be urged to consider the 
impact of the murder on the victim’s family, but asserts this must be “tethered” to 
the evidence in the case.  According to defendant, “[v]ictim impact evidence does 
not open the door to urging the jurors to subjectively analyze a case from the 
viewpoint of how they themselves would react if the defendant murdered their own 
loved one.” 
During the guilt phase of a capital trial, it is misconduct for a prosecutor to 
appeal to the passions of the jurors by urging them to imagine the suffering of the 
victim:  “We have settled that an appeal to the jury to view the crime through the 
eyes of the victim is misconduct at the guilt phase of trial; an appeal for sympathy 
for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt. 
[Citations.]”  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057; People v. 
Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 704.) 
The situation is different, however, during the penalty phase.  “ ‘Unlike the 
guilt determination, where appeals to the jury’s passions are inappropriate, in 
making the penalty decision, the jury must make a moral assessment of all the 
relevant facts as they reflect on its decision.  [Citations.]  Emotion must not reign 
over reason and, on objection, courts should guard against prejudicially emotional 
argument.  [Citation.]  But emotion need not, indeed, cannot, be entirely excluded 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
place of the victim’s family; or to consider how you would feel under such 
circumstances. You are to base your decision on the facts and law as instructed.” 
 
32
from the jury’s moral assessment.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1370, 1418.) 
The prosecutor in People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 863, invited the 
jurors to put themselves in the victim’s shoes “and imagine suffering the acts 
inflicted on her.”  We held this comment “was insufficiently inflammatory to 
justify reversal,” (id. at p. 864) but cautioned against excessive appeals to passion:  
“at the penalty phase the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not 
only on the facts, but on the jury’s moral assessment of those facts as they reflect 
on whether defendant should be put to death.  It is not only appropriate, but 
necessary, that the jury weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant’s 
background against those that may offend the conscience.  [Citations.]  In this 
process, one of the most significant considerations is the nature of the underlying 
crime.  [Citation.]  Hence assessment of the offense from the victim’s viewpoint 
would appear germane to the task of sentencing.  [¶]  Nevertheless, the jury must 
face its obligation soberly and rationally, and should not be given the impression 
that emotion may reign over reason.  [Citation.]  In each case, therefore, the trial 
court must strike a careful balance between the probative and the prejudicial.  
[Citations.]  On the one hand, it should allow evidence and argument on emotional 
though relevant subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to 
show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction. On the other hand, irrelevant 
information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from its 
proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.”  
(Id. at pp. 863-864; see People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1108 [“the jury can 
be urged to put itself in the shoes of the victim.”]; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 140, 206, [proper “for the prosecutor to ask the jury to imagine the crimes 
from the victims’ perspective.”) 
 
33
A jury properly may consider the impact of the crime on the victim’s 
family.  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364.)  Such victim-impact 
evidence assists the jury in assessing “evidence of the specific harm caused by the 
defendant[’s]” crime by “demonstrating the loss to the victim’s family and to 
society which has resulted from the defendant’s homicide.”  (Payne v. Tennessee 
(1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825, 822.)  Accordingly, just as a prosecutor may ask the 
jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, a prosecutor may ask the jurors 
to put themselves in the place of the victim’s family to help the jurors consider 
how the murder affected the victim’s relatives.  (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
173, 235 [ proper to ask the jurors “ ‘to think a little bit about your own family and 
your own friends’ ”].)  The prosecutor in People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 
772, argued to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital trial “ ‘to think about 
how you would feel if [the victim] were your baby, your daughter, your wife, your 
sister.’ ”  Noting that the comments “were brief and mild,” we held the prosecutor 
did not commit misconduct.  (Ibid.)   
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by inviting the jurors to put 
themselves in the shoes of the victim’s family and imagine the impact of the 
crime.  And a prosecutor is “entitled to present his argument in colorful terms.”  
(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1179.)  While we do not encourage 
prosecutors to use such graphic and dramatic images, the prosecutor’s comments 
in the present case were brief (see People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 112; 
People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 772) and “did not exceed the bounds of 
propriety.”  (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 778.) 
E. Evidence of Other Crimes 
Among the aggravating factors a jury may consider during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial is evidence of prior “criminal activity by the defendant 
 
34
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence.”  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  Defendant contends 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider “[t]he alleged 
robbery of Edward [sic:  Tony] Ochoa on 4/19/69” in violation of his rights under 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. 
As noted above, Raul Curiel testified that in 1969 he was walking with 
Tony Ochoa when defendant and another man poked a knife in Curiel’s stomach 
and demanded money.  Curiel responded that he had no money, turning his 
pockets inside out and throwing to the ground his wallet and a DMV application 
for a driver’s license.  Defendant took the knife and demanded Curiel’s cigarettes.  
Curiel handed defendant his cigarettes and defendant poked him in the stomach 
with the knife.  Defendant then returned the pack of cigarettes; he and his 
accomplice ran off but were apprehended a short time later. 
During the discussion of jury instructions, the prosecutor asserted that both 
Curiel and his friend (whom the prosecutor erroneously called Edward Ochoa) 
were victims of the robbery described by Curiel.  Defendant did not object.  The 
court agreed but noted it made only a “slight difference” because “for all practical 
purposes if one was a victim they both were.”  The prosecutor agreed this was 
“[j]ust a technicality.”  The court instructed the jury:  “Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the 
following criminal activity which involved the express or implied use of force or 
violence or the threat of force or violence:  [¶]  1. The alleged robbery of Raul 
Curiel on 4/19/69  [¶]  2. The alleged robbery of Edward Ochoa on 4/19/69 . . . . 
Before a juror may consider any criminal activity as an aggravating circumstance 
in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did in fact commit the criminal activity . . . .” 
 
35
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury it could 
consider the alleged robbery of Ochoa because “there was no evidence that any 
property was taken from Ochoa.”  Any such error was harmless.  The jurors were 
instructed not to consider any criminal activity as an aggravating factor unless 
they were “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact 
commit the criminal activity.”  Also, there was ample evidence that defendant 
robbed Curiel during the same incident; whether defendant and his accomplice 
robbed both Curiel and Ochoa, or only Curiel, could not have affected its 
determination of the proper penalty, especially in light of the grievous 
circumstances of the charged murder and the presence of other more egregious 
prior criminal acts. 
F. Lack of Instruction to View Defendant’s Admissions with Caution 
As noted above, police officers testified that defendant made several 
statements following his arrest that indicated his knowledge of details of the 
crime, including that the victim was a police officer and the murder weapon was a 
shotgun.  Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua 
sponte to view defendant’s out-of-court admissions with caution. 
“ ‘When evidence is admitted establishing that the defendant made oral 
admissions, the trial court ordinarily has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that 
such evidence must be viewed with caution.  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Williams 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 639.)  But this general rule does not apply in the penalty 
phase of a capital trial.  We held in People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 783, 
“that the court is required to give the cautionary instruction at the penalty phase 
only upon defense request,” explaining that because guilt is already established at 
the penalty phase, “[t]he only relevance of the defendant’s extrajudicial statements 
 
36
is as either aggravating or mitigating evidence” and “[w]hether a particular 
statement is aggravating or mitigating is often open to interpretation.” 
Defendant argues that our decision in Livaditis should be distinguished 
because the statements in the present case, unlike those at issue in Livaditis, were 
solely inculpatory.  We never have so limited the rule we announced in Livaditis.  
(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1220 [“ ‘because capital sentencing is a 
moral and normative process, it is not necessary to give instructions associated 
with the usual factfinding process’ ”]; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 
1201; see People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 898 [no sua sponte duty to 
instruct competency phase jury].) 
Because defendant did not request a jury instruction to view his admissions 
with caution, there was no error. 
G. Considering Absence of Mitigating Factors as an Aggravating 
Factor 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct 
the jury that the absence of a particular mitigating factor could not be weighed as 
an aggravating circumstance.  Defendant acknowledges that we repeatedly have 
held that a trial court is not required “to give a jury instruction that a lack of 
mitigating evidence does not constitute aggravation.  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 133.)  “ ‘A jury properly advised about the broad 
scope of its sentencing discretion is unlikely to conclude that the absence of 
[mitigating] factors . . . is entitled to significant aggravating weight.’  [Citation.]”  
(Id. at p. 134.) 
Defendant challenges the assumption that juries understand how to evaluate 
the absence of particular mitigating factors by citing several journal articles that 
purportedly demonstrate that juries often misunderstand mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.  (Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, 
 
37
Sentencing Instruction, and the Jurisprudence of Death (1994) 50 J. Soc. Issues 
149, 169; Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A 
Preliminary Study of California’s Capital Penalty Instructions (1994) 18 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 411, 422-424; Haney & Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: 
An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing 
Arguments (1997) 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 575, 582-583, 589-591; Eisenberg & 
Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases (1993) 79 Cornell 
L.Rev. 1.)  We rejected a similar argument in People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 
701, 773, stating: “The presumption that the jurors in this case understood and 
followed the mitigation instruction supplied to them is not rebutted by empirical 
assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record 
and has not been subject to cross examination. [Citation.]” 
H. Automatic Application to Modify the Verdict 
Defendant argues the trial court “failed to properly exercise its 
responsibilities under section 190.4, subdivision (e)” in denying his automatic 
application to modify the verdict of death in violation of the statute and the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Section 190.4, subdivision (e), requires that in ruling on an automatic 
application to modify a death verdict, “the judge shall review the evidence, 
consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to 
whether the jury’s findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence 
presented.  The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings.” 
In the present case, defendant argued to the trial court that the appropriate 
penalty was life in prison without the possibility of parole because defendant had 
 
38
performed well in prison, had been intoxicated when he committed the offense, 
had a low IQ and brain defects and had “a problematic childhood.”  The trial court 
denied the motion, stating:  “Notwithstanding the best efforts that the defense was 
able to muster in this case, the reality is, in the court’s opinion, that the mitigating 
factors are scant at best, the aggravation rather overwhelming.”  In addition, the 
court adopted the judgment prepared by the prosecutor, which stated, in part, that 
after independently reviewing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the 
witnesses, the court found “that the jury’s finding that the aggravating 
circumstances so substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances so as to 
make death the appropriate penalty to be fully supported by the evidence and the 
law.” 
Defendant argues that the trial court treated the automatic motion to modify 
the verdict as a “mere formality” and had “already made up its mind” because the 
court had asked the prosecutor nearly a month earlier to prepare a judgment of 
death and death warrant.  Defendant acknowledges that this court long ago 
recognized that the circumstance that a court “had prepared a written statement of 
reasons in advance of the hearing” on the automatic motion to modify the verdict 
“does not mean that the court’s views as expressed in the writing were other than 
tentative or that the argument was a pointless ritual,” because “[t]o do so does not 
mean that the court is unalterably bound by the writing or that it will not amend or 
even discard the writing if counsel’s arguments persuade the court that its tentative 
views were incorrect.”  (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 645; People v. 
Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 695-696.) 
Defendant contends the present case differs from Hayes because the record 
in this case “overwhelmingly suggests the trial court had in fact prejudged the 
motion to modify the sentence, thereby rendering the hearing on the automatic 
motion a sham” because the trial court did not announce that the previously 
 
39
prepared judgment was “tentative.”  We do not agree.  Our holding in Hayes 
applies fully here.  The mere fact that the court asked the prosecutor to draft a 
judgment in advance of the hearing does not indicate that the court had already 
made up its mind.  To the contrary, the court described the draft judgment he 
asked the prosecutor to prepare as “a working copy that the court will in all 
likelihood modify.”  And the court was under no obligation to announce that the 
previously prepared judgment was tentative.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
468, 550.) 
Defendant argues we should not consider the language in the judgment 
because after denying the automatic motion, but before reading into the record the 
above quoted language in the judgment, the court heard statements from the 
victim’s parents.  The claim lacks merit.  The trial court already had denied the 
automatic motion to modify the verdict and briefly stated the reasons for that 
ruling before the victim’s parents made their statements.  There was nothing 
improper in thereafter reading into the record the language of the judgment that 
included a more detailed statement of the reasons for the court’s previous ruling.  
(People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 694-695.) 
Defendant also asserts that the judgment of death must be vacated because 
the trial court failed to state sufficient reasons for denying the automatic motion to 
modify the verdict.  Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object in the trial 
court.  (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1140-1141.) 
I. Sentencing Hearing 
Defendant argues he was denied his right to due process and “his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and California law to address the court and 
present evidence as to why a death judgment should not be pronounced” because 
the trial court denied his request to continue the sentencing hearing. 
 
40
After the jury returned its verdict, the court and counsel agreed to meet on 
August 26, 2002 to begin correcting the record on appeal and set September 23, 
2002 as the date for sentencing.  The prosecutor and defense counsel met with the 
judge as planned on August 26 and again on September 4 to begin correcting the 
record on appeal.  Defendant was not present on either occasion.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing on September 4, the prosecutor indicated he might be 
out of town on September 23, 2002 and asked if the sentencing hearing could be 
rescheduled for the preceding Friday.  Defense counsel stated he had no objection, 
and the sentencing hearing was advanced to September 20, 2002. 
On September 20, 2002, the court denied the automatic application to 
modify the verdict and was about to impose sentence when the prosecutor 
interrupted and asked the court to permit the victim’s parents to address the court.  
The victim’s parents described the effect their son’s murder had had on them and 
asked the court to impose the death penalty.  Defendant then asked if he could 
speak and said that had not been aware until that day that the sentencing hearing 
had been advanced and he had arranged for people to appear on September 23 to 
speak on his behalf.  The court noted that the date for sentencing had been 
changed weeks earlier, adding: “If that is a motion for continuance, it will be 
denied.”  The court invited defendant to make a statement, but defendant said 
only, “I want my people.”  The court then imposed sentence. 
Defendant contends he was denied his “statutory right to present testimony 
and evidence from family members at the sentencing hearing,” but cites in support 
only section 1204 and our decision in People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 
698, 725, which address correcting or explaining materials in the probation report.  
Defendant did not challenge the contents of the probation report and thus has no 
basis upon which to argue that he was denied a right to present witnesses for this 
purpose.  Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant had a right to present 
 
41
witnesses at the sentencing hearing, the court did not prevent him from doing so.  
The court only declined to continue the hearing.  Defendant does not argue that 
the trial court abused its discretion in declining to continue the sentencing hearing.  
Nor does defendant argue that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to 
inform defendant that the date of the sentencing hearing had been advanced. 
Defendant does argue that he was denied his right to allocution, because he 
was unprepared for the sentencing hearing.  Recently, we held in People v. Evans 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, that a defendant in a noncapital case has a “right at 
sentencing to make a sworn personal statement in mitigation that is subject to 
cross-examination by the prosecution.”  (Id. at p. 600.)  Even if a defendant in a 
capital case had a similar right (but see People v. Lucero (2002) 23 Cal.4th 692, 
717 [“we have repeatedly held there is no right of allocution at the penalty phase 
of a capital trial”]), defendant in the present case was invited by the court to make 
a statement, but declined to do so, stating only that he wanted his witnesses to be 
present.  Defendant did not state he was unprepared to make a statement on his 
own behalf. 
J. Challenges to the Death Penalty Statutes 
Defendant argues that application of section 190.3, factor (a), which 
permits the penalty phase jury to consider the “circumstances of the crime,” leads 
to “arbitrary and capricious decision making” in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, because “[p]rosecutors throughout 
California have argued that the jury could weigh in aggravation almost every 
conceivable circumstance of the crime, even those that ― from case to case ― 
reflect starkly opposite circumstances.” 
In Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 971, the high court 
distinguished between two aspects of the capital punishment scheme: “the 
 
42
eligibility decision and the selection decision.”  In California, a defendant 
convicted of first degree murder is eligible for the death penalty if the jury finds 
true an alleged “special circumstance” enumerated in section 190.2, subdivision 
(a).  The special circumstance must satisfy two requirements:  “First, the 
circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must 
apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder.  [Citation.]  Second, 
the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague.”  (Tuilaepa v. 
California, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 972-973.) 
Once the finder of fact has determined that the defendant is eligible for the 
death penalty by convicting the defendant of first degree murder and finding true 
an alleged special circumstance, a separate penalty phase is conducted to 
determine whether the finder of fact will select the defendant to receive the death 
penalty.  The high court “imposed a separate requirement for the selection 
decision, where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the 
death penalty should in fact receive that sentence.  ‘What is important at the 
selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of 
the individual and the circumstances of the crime.’  [Citations.]  That requirement 
is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character 
and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime.  [Citations.]”  
(Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 972.) 
There are important differences between the eligibility decision and the 
selection decision: “The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined 
classification. Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a 
question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to ‘make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.’ [Citation.] 
The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and 
must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to 
 
43
assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability.”  (Tuilaepa v. California, 
supra, 512 U.S. 967, 972.) 
Defendant acknowledges that the high court has approved of section 190.3, 
factor (a):  “Petitioners’ challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled 
principles, for our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should 
consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death 
penalty.  [Citation.]  We would be hard pressed to invalidate a jury instruction that 
implements what we have said the law requires. In any event, this California factor 
instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in 
understandable terms. The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for 
consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is 
neither vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”  (Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 976.) 
But defendant maintains that section 190.3, factor (a) is improper because 
prosecutors have used it in various cases to argue that “starkly opposite 
circumstances” were aggravating, asserting, for example, that some prosecutors 
have argued that a defendant deserves the death penalty because the defendant 
“struck many blows and inflicted multiple wounds” while others have argued that 
the death penalty was warranted because the defendant “killed with a single 
execution-style wound.”  We are not convinced.  In making the individualized 
determination required at the penalty phase of whether a defendant who is eligible 
for the death penalty deserves the death penalty, the jury must consider the 
circumstances of the crime, among other factors.  While all murders are morally 
repugnant, some are worse than others.  And murders at either end of the spectrum 
may be particularly egregious.  Thus, one prosecutor validly may argue that a 
defendant who killed the victim in an unusually savage attack involving multiple 
wounds deserves the ultimate penalty, while another prosecutor may argue with 
 
44
equal validity that an execution-style murder committed in cold blood stands apart 
and warrants the death penalty.  The fact that those arguments highlight divergent 
circumstances does not affect the validity of factor (a). 
Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the penalty phase jury to consider “[t]he 
presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use 
or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force 
or violence.”  Defendant argues that the failure to require the jury to find 
unanimously that defendant committed a particular prior act under factor (b) 
denied him his right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  We previously have rejected this contention, and recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions do not undermine this conclusion.  (People v. 
Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 
304.) 
We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to delete 
inapplicable sentencing factors from its instructions to the jury.  (People v. 
Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305.) 
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court did not err in failing to 
identify for the jury which statutory sentencing factors were mitigating and which 
were aggravating.  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305.) 
Defendant is incorrect in asserting that the use of the adjectives “extreme” 
and “substantial” “acted as a barrier to the consideration of mitigation in violation 
of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 304.) 
The trial court did not err, as defendant contends, in failing to “require the 
jurors to make written or other specific findings about the aggravating factors they 
found and considered in imposing a death sentence.”  (See People v. Ramirez 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 476; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 510.) 
 
45
We reject defendant’s argument that he was denied equal protection of the 
law because defendants charged with capital crimes are afforded “significantly 
fewer procedural protections” than defendants charged with noncapital crimes.  
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 366.)  And the failure to require intercase 
proportionality review does not render unconstitutional the California death 
penalty statutory scheme.  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 618; People v. 
Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 366.) 
 
46
The death penalty scheme does not, as defendant argues, violate the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because 
juries are not instructed on any burden of proof and do not have to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances and that death is the appropriate penalty.  (People v. Ramirez, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 475; People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 365; People 
v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 304.) 
We decline defendant’s invitation to reconsider our holding that 
“ ‘ “[b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative 
[citation], and therefore different in kind from the determination of guilt,” ’ ” there 
is no burden of proof or burden of persuasion.  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 76, 199.)  We repeatedly have reaffirmed that holding. 
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the jury is not required to agree 
unanimously on any particular aggravating factor.  (People v. Harris, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 366.)  Nor must the jury be instructed that there is a presumption in 
favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (People 
v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 199.) 
Defendant contends that the court’s concluding jury instruction, based on 
CALJIC No. 8.88, violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable 
penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  We disagree.  CALJIC No. 8.88 is defective, in 
defendant’s view, because it 1) uses the allegedly vague term “so substantial” in 
the instruction that each juror must be “persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
that it warrants death instead of life without parole”; 2) instructs the jurors to 
determine whether the death penalty is “warrant[ed]” rather than “appropriate”; 
3) fails to instruct the jury that it “shall” impose a sentence of life imprisonment 
 
47
without parole if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances; and 4) fails to instruct the jury that neither party bore the burden of 
persuasion.  We consistently have rejected each of these arguments.  (People v. 
Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 619.) 
We also consistently have rejected defendant’s contention that the 
California death penalty statutes violate international law.  (People v. Geier, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 620.) 
K. Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that his “death sentence must be reversed due to the 
cumulative effect of the numerous errors in this case.”  We discern no errors, 
considered either individually or cumulative, that warrant reversal of the 
judgment.  
 
48
 
49
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
I agree with the majority’s result and most of its reasoning.  I write 
separately to disassociate myself from the first portion of the final sentence of part 
II., D., page 34, of the majority opinion:  “While we do not encourage prosecutors 
to use such graphic and dramatic images, the prosecutor’s comments in the present 
case were brief (see People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 112; People v. 
Ghent [(1987) 43 Cal.3d 739], 772) and ‘did not exceed the bounds of propriety.’  
(People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 778.)”  I agree that the prosecutor’s 
comments did not exceed the bounds of propriety.  Because the evidence 
supported the comments, they were entirely proper. 
The cases cited for the proposition that the comments were brief and, 
presumably, appropriate for that reason (People v. Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d 
72, and People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739) are irrelevant to this issue.  They 
were decided when the United States Supreme Court had prohibited victim impact 
evidence and argument.  (See Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496.)  Today, as 
the majority recognizes, victim impact evidence and argument are permitted.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33; see Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808.) 
We have no reason either to encourage or discourage any particular 
argument that is otherwise proper.  We should simply reject defendant’s 
contention that the prosecutor’s comments were improper and stop there. 
 
CHIN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Jackson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S110206 
Date Filed: February 5, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Charles E. Horan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Jay Colangelo, 
Assistant State Public Defender, Mark Hammond and Craig Buckser, Deputy State Public Defenders, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor 
General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney 
General, and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Craig Buckser 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street, Suite 1100 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Donald E. de Nicola 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2388