Title: Matter of Injury to Seevers

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Injury to Seevers1986 WY 134720 P.2d 899Case Number: 86-15Decided: 06/18/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the INJURY TO: Robert R. SEEVERS, Deceased; Darold E. Gamble, and 
Clifford R. Haux. APOLLO DRILLING, Appellant (Employer),

v.

Debra J. SEEVERS, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert R. Seevers, Deceased, Appellee 
(Claimant), Darold E. Gamble and Clifford R. Haux, Appellees (Injured 
Workers).

Appeal from District Court,JohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Mark W. Gifford 
and Catherine W. Hansen, of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, for appellant.

David F. 
Palmerlee, of Omohundro & Palmerlee, Buffalo, for appellee Seevers.

Stephen K. 
Gregersen, Sheridan, for appellee Gamble.

Leonard Lang, 
Casper, for appellee 
Haux.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the trial court's denial of a motion under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., to set aside 
orders dismissing employees' claims for worker's compensation benefits. It is 
unique in that the employer, Apollo Drilling (Apollo), is the party which sought 
to have the orders dismissing the claims set aside. We find that Apollo has 
failed to carry its burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In August 1985, Gerald 
Barlow, a driller for Apollo, was driving his four-man crew to a well in 
Johnson County, Wyoming. On the way to the well, Barlow 
swerved to miss a deer and rolled his vehicle. Robert Seevers, one of the 
passengers, died as a result of the accident. Barlow, Robert Lentz, and 
appellees Darold Gamble and Clifford Haux were injured.

[¶4.]     All of the vehicle's 
occupants filed claims under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, § 27-12-101 
et seq., W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). George Ratcliff, operations manager 
for Apollo, filed employer's reports of the accident. In the space provided for 
disputing the claim, Ratcliff stated that Apollo was not responsible for the 
accident since the employees were not on the work site. He also stated that each 
employee's wages began when he relieved the preceding crew member and that he 
was not being paid to travel to work. On the employer's report for Barlow's 
claim, Ratcliff added that the "[d]riller receives 20 cents per 
mile."

[¶5.]     After the employer's 
reports were received, the clerk of the district court sent each appellee a 
notice to employee and request for written answer, in which the employees were 
informed that they were required to file written answers to the employer's 
reports and that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of their claims 
and denial of worker's compensation benefits. Appellees Gamble and Seevers 
responded by filing letters with the clerk stating that the injuries and death 
did not occur in the course of employment and that worker's compensation did not 
cover the accident. Both requested that their claims be denied. Appellee Haux 
did not answer. The district court then entered orders dismissing the appellees' 
claims. Apollo did not appeal from these orders.

[¶6.]     Apollo entered an 
appearance approximately 30 days after the entry of the order dismissing 
Seevers' claim and approximately ten days after the entry of the orders 
dismissing Gamble's and Haux's claims. At that time, Apollo moved to set aside 
the orders of dismissal under Rule 60(b) and filed a document attempting to 
withdraw its objection to the claims. 

[¶7.]     A hearing on Apollo's 
motion to set aside the orders in all three cases was held in November 1985, and 
the district court denied the motion. Apollo timely filed a notice of appeal 
from the denial of the motion.1 In its appeal, Apollo raises the 
following issue:

"Did The District Court 
Abuse Its Discretion In Refusing To Set Aside The Orders Dismissing Appellees' 
Worker's Compensation Claims?"

[¶8.]     Appellees set forth 
numerous issues in response. We need only consider whether Apollo was entitled 
to relief under Rule 60(b). Our determination of that question makes it 
unnecessary to decide whether appellees were or were not covered under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶9.]     Apollo contends that 
the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the orders 
dismissing appellees' claims. It makes this claim without stating specifically 
the grounds under Rule 60(b) upon which it relies. We believe it is important to 
first recognize the grounds for relief provided in Rule 60(b), which states in 
part:

"On motion, and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. * * *"

[¶10.]  In its motion to set aside the orders, 
Apollo stated that it paid Barlow mileage, and thus the claims were compensable 
under worker's compensation. Apollo also stated that the orders of dismissal 
were entered without giving it notice or opportunity for hearing and that 
justice required that the orders of dismissal be set aside. Finally, in its 
withdrawal of objection to the claims, Apollo stated that at the time it 
objected it was unfamiliar with Wyoming case law, which it now believes holds 
that these employees are entitled to worker's compensation benefits. See Jensen 
v. Manning and Brown, Inc., 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947). Apollo also 
claims that the employer's reports were filed without the benefit of 
counsel.

[¶11.]  "Equitable principles may be taken into 
account by a court in the exercise of its discretion under Rule 60(b)." 11 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2857 at 158 (1973). 
This Court has consistently held that a movant holds no absolute right to have a 
judgment vacated under Rule 60(b) but must show an exceptional circumstance 
specified in the rule. Sanford v. Arjay Oil 
Company, Wyo., 
686 P.2d 566 (1984). Review of a court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is 
confined to a determination of whether the court abused its discretion, and it 
is the movant's burden to bring his cause within the claimed grounds of relief 
and to substantiate these claims with adequate proof. We will reverse an order 
denying relief under Rule 60(b) only if the trial court clearly was wrong. 
McBride v. McBride, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 814 
(1979).

[¶12.]  Appellant recognizes these principles but 
maintains that an error of law committed by the court amounts to an abuse of 
discretion, Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 
(1980), and that an error of law occurred in this case. In order to determine 
whether there was an abuse of discretion in denying Apollo's Rule 60(b) motion, 
we must examine the grounds supporting the motion and determine whether Apollo 
has shown an exceptional circumstance specified in the 
rule.

PROCEDURAL 
FLAWS

[¶13.]  After appellees Seevers and Gamble filed 
their letters with the district court, in which they agreed with Apollo's 
contention that there was no coverage, the district court dismissed their claims 
without a hearing. Apollo insists that this was in violation of § 27-12-602, 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). According to Apollo, this procedural flaw was 
a ground for granting its Rule 60(b) motion. It cites R.L. Manning Company v. 
Millsap, Wyo., 687 P.2d 252 (1984), for the proposition 
that when such a procedural flaw occurs, a court abuses its discretion in 
denying a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment.

[¶14.]  R.L. Manning Company v. Millsap does not 
support Apollo's position. There the worker's compensation claim was transferred 
from one district court to another in the total absence of any provision 
permitting the transfer. Therefore, the district court which entered an order 
granting compensation had no jurisdiction to do so, and the order should have 
been set aside under Rule 60(b). That case concerned a judgment void for lack of 
jurisdiction, in which case the district court must set aside the judgment. 2-H 
Ranch Company, Inc. v. Simmons, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 68 (1983). Here there is no claim of lack of jurisdiction but only an 
asserted procedural irregularity. Even failure to give the required notice, 
generally regarded as a serious procedural irregularity which may provide the 
basis for relief under an appropriate clause of Rule 60(b), should not usually 
be treated as serious enough to render the judgment void. 7 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 
60.25[2] at 60-238 (1985).

[¶15.]  In any event, we do not find a procedural 
error in this case. Section 27-12-602(a) provides in part that "[i]f there is a 
dispute as to the right of the employee * * * to receive compensation, * * * the 
judge shall set the case for hearing at the earliest possible date." Subsection 
(b) of § 27-12-602 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll written reports, 
claims and other writings filed with the clerk of court by the parties shall be 
considered as pleadings in a claim." Section 27-12-607, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), states in part: "Except as otherwise provided, the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure shall govern in matters before the courts of this state in 
reference to this act."

[¶16.]  In worker's compensation cases, the 
claims and reports take the place of pleadings and as such should be liberally 
construed. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, Wyo., 
474 P.2d 297 (1970). When appellees filed their claims and Apollo filed the 
employer's reports contesting the claims, there were "dispute[s] as to the 
right[s] of the employee[s] * * * to receive compensation." After the disputes 
arose, appellees Seevers and Gamble filed their letters. These letters amounted 
to requests for voluntary dismissals of their claims, by order of the court, as 
provided in Rule 41(a)(2), W.R.C.P. At the time the court entered the orders of 
dismissal, there were no disputes as to the employees' rights to benefits, since 
all parties agreed there was no coverage. Therefore, § 27-12-602 did not require 
a hearing, and there can be no abuse of discretion in denying Apollo's Rule 
60(b) motion insofar as it was based on the lack of a 
hearing.

[¶17.]  Because there was no dispute as to the 
employees' rights to compensation, Apollo's reliance on Herring v. Welltech, 
Inc., Wyo., 
660 P.2d 361 (1983), is misplaced. In that case, it was clear that the employee 
claimed benefits and the employer disputed part of the claims. Under those 
circumstances, the failure to set the case for hearing, as well as other clearly 
erroneous procedures, was held as sufficient ground to set aside the order 
closing the case under Rule 60(b).

MISTAKE OF 
LAW

[¶18.]  Apollo also asserted in its Rule 60(b) 
motion that the driller was paid mileage and that this fact made the claims 
compensable. This is not a valid basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) since 
"newly discovered evidence" must be evidence which "by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial." Evidence in a party's 
possession before a judgment is rendered is not newly discovered evidence 
entitling one to relief under Rule 60(b)(2). 11 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2859 (1973). Here it is clear that Apollo knew 
of this evidence when it submitted the employer's reports of the 
accident.

[¶19.]  We do not believe that Apollo's 
contention that this evidence compelled a finding that the employees were 
covered dictates that the court should have granted the Rule 60(b) motion. 
Relying on Jensen v. Manning and Brown, Inc., Apollo claims the law is clear 
that if an employer pays the driller mileage for providing transportation, any 
injuries received by any employee passengers traveling in the vehicle are 
compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.2 We need not decide whether this 
statement is accurate since it does not determine whether the court should have 
granted the Rule 60(b) motion. The assertion is that an error of law was 
committed by the trial court in dismissing the claim. Yet Apollo failed to 
appeal from the orders. We have previously noted that an application under Rule 
60(b) is not a substitute for appeal. Kennedy v. Kennedy, Wyo., 
483 P.2d 516 (1971). The rule is not intended as a means for enlarging the time 
for appeal except under compelling circumstances where justice requires that 
course.

[¶20.]  In asserting that justice requires relief 
in this case, Apollo notes that it filed the employer's reports without benefit 
of counsel. In Booth v. Magee Carpet Company, Wyo., 548 P.2d 1252 (1976), the 
defendant sought to have a default judgment set aside under Rule 60(b), because 
he failed to employ an attorney until 53 days after he had been served with the 
complaint. Under those circumstances, we held that although there was clearly 
neglect, this was not "excusable neglect" which justified relief under Rule 
60(b)(1). Likewise, Apollo's failure to consult an attorney for nearly two 
months is not such excusable neglect as would justify relief in this 
case.

[¶21.]  Connected with Apollo's failure to retain 
counsel is its claim that it was ignorant of case law which it believes holds 
that the employees here are entitled to benefits under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. Such a mistake, however, is not sufficient in itself to 
justify relief under Rule 60(b). The moving party must make some showing of why 
he was justified in failing to avoid mistake or inadvertence. "Ignorance of the 
rules is not enough, nor is ignorance of the law." 11 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2858 at 170 (1973); see 
United 
States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Apollo's deliberate choice to not retain counsel until nearly two months after 
the accident occurred is not sufficient justification for its mistake, entitling 
it to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(6).

[¶22.]  Apollo failed to bring its cause within 
any of the claimed grounds of relief stated in Rule 60(b). We find no abuse of 
discretion and affirm the trial court's order denying Apollo relief under Rule 
60(b).

FOOTNOTES

1 The fact that both 
parties denied there was coverage under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
does not eliminate a justiciable issue. In Mini Mart, Inc. v. Wordinger, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 206 (1986), we allowed an employee who originally claimed and received benefits 
to seek relief from the award. So, too, may an employer initially deny coverage 
and later assent to it. Once Apollo filed its motion under Rule 60(b) and 
contended that the orders dismissing appellees' claims should be set aside, a 
justiciable issue existed. The question of Apollo's right to have the orders set 
aside had to be determined.

2 In support of its claim 
that the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts in this case, Apollo 
includes statements made by the trial court in a subsequent civil action between 
it and appellees Seevers and Gamble. These statements were included in Apollo's 
motion to supplement the record, which was denied by this Court, but are not 
found anywhere in the record before this Court. Having denied the parties' 
motions to supplement the record, we will not consider matters upon which the 
record is silent. Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, Wyo., 
578 P.2d 1351 (1978).