Title: State v. Alexander Caleb Grunke

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2744-CR, 2006AP2745-CR, 2006AP2746-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Alexander Caleb Grunke, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Nicholas Owen Grunke, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dustin Blake Radke, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
A REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
2007 WI App 198 
Reported at: 305 Wis. 2d 312, 738 N.W.2d 137 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
George S. Curry   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent, Nicholas Owen Grunke, there 
was a brief by Suzanne Edwards and Law Office of Suzanne 
Edwards, Dodgeville, and oral argument by Suzanne Edwards. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Dustin Blake Radke, there was 
a brief and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 82
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR  
(L.C. Nos. 06CF140A through 06CF140C) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Alexander Caleb Grunke, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Nicholas Owen Grunke, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dustin Blake Radke, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
2 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
by the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the circuit court2 
that dismissed one count of attempted third-degree sexual 
assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) (2005-06)3 and Wis. 
Stat. § 939.32, against Nicholas Grunke, Alexander Grunke and 
Dustin Radke.  The issue presented is whether § 940.225 
criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim 
already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused 
did not cause the death of the victim.  We conclude that it 
does.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts presented are 
undisputed.  Nicholas Grunke sought and received the consent of 
his twin brother, Alexander Grunke, and his friend, Dustin 
Radke, to help him disinter a female corpse located in a 
Cassville, Wisconsin cemetery so that the three of them could 
                                                 
1 State v. Grunke, 2007 WI App 198, 305 Wis. 2d 312, 738 
N.W.2d 137. 
2 The Honorable George S. Curry of Grant County Circuit 
Court presided.   
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted.   
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
3 
transfer the corpse to another location where Nicholas planned 
to have sexual intercourse with it.  Apparently, Nicholas 
conceived this plan after seeing the obituary of the victim4 in a 
newspaper. 
¶3 
The Grunkes and Radke began to execute Nicholas's plan 
days after Nicholas read the obituary.  Nicholas and Radke drove 
together to the Cassville cemetery and located the victim's 
gravesite.  Later, on September 2, 2002, the three defendants 
returned to the cemetery with shovels, a crowbar, a tarpaulin, 
and a box of condoms, which the men had purchased that evening 
on their way to the cemetery.  Nicholas and Radke dug into the 
victim's gravesite while Alexander stood watch.  The men dug a 
hole three and a half feet wide, by three feet long, by one foot 
eight inches deep.  The crater uncovered the top of the victim's 
concrete vault, which they were unable to pry open.  Soon after 
the Grunkes and Radke discovered that the concrete vault was 
impenetrable, a car drove into the cemetery, and the men fled. 
¶4 
At 11 p.m. that evening, Village of Cassville Police 
Officer Brent McDonald arrived at the cemetery in response to 
receiving a call of a suspicious vehicle located there.  Upon 
finding the vehicle, Officer McDonald also encountered Alexander 
Grunke.  Alexander was dressed in black from "head to toe," and 
when he opened the door to the van the defendants had driven, 
Officer McDonald could see a crowbar, a tarpaulin and the box of 
condoms inside.  When Alexander could not explain to Officer 
                                                 
4 We deem it appropriate to withhold the woman's name. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
4 
McDonald why he was in the cemetery, Officer McDonald placed him 
in custody.  Alexander and Radke later gave interviews to law 
enforcement officers after waiving their Miranda rights. 
¶5 
In a multi-count criminal complaint, the State charged 
the Grunkes and Radke with (1) attempted theft, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 943.20(1)(a) and (3)(a), 939.05, and 939.32; and (2) 
attempted third-degree sexual assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.225(3), 939.05, and 939.32.5   
¶6 
Following the preliminary hearing, the circuit court 
denied bindover on the charge of attempted third-degree sexual 
assault.  The court concluded that the sexual assault statute 
did not apply to circumstances in which the victim is deceased 
due to no act of the accused.   
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that a 
combination of provisions within Wis. Stat. § 940.225 rendered 
the statute ambiguous.  On the one hand, the court noted, under 
§ 940.225(3), the State must prove that the sexual intercourse 
occurred "without the consent" of the person victimized.  State 
v. Grunke, 2007 WI App 198, ¶9, 305 Wis. 2d 312, 738 N.W.2d 137.  
                                                 
5 After the preliminary hearing, the circuit court ordered 
the defendants bound over on damage to cemetery property, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.012(1) and (2), and on attempted 
damage to property, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.01 and 939.22.  
The defendants do not challenge the circuit court's order; 
however, we mention the charges disclosed in the order because 
it contains a typo that should be corrected.  It seems apparent 
that the circuit court meant to bind the defendants over on Wis. 
Stat. § 939.32, "Attempt," but actually bound them over on 
§ 939.22, "Words and phrases defined."  The order should be 
amended to reflect that the defendants are bound over on 
§ 939.32, rather than on § 939.22.   
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
5 
However, the court pointed out that subsection (4) provides a 
list of occasions where "consent is not an issue," but the 
victim being dead is not included in that list.  Id., ¶¶9-10.  
The court of appeals also observed that subsection (7) of 
§ 940.225 provides that the entire statute applies regardless of 
whether the victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse.  Id., ¶10.  Consequently, the 
court of appeals concluded that "[b]ecause a corpse can never 
give consent through words or actions and death is not one of 
the instances listed in which consent is not an issue, but at 
the same time subsection (7) states that the entire section 
applies whether the victim is dead or alive at the time of the 
sexual contact," the statute is ambiguous.  Id., ¶¶10-11.   
¶8 
Because the statute was ambiguous, the court of 
appeals consulted its legislative history.  Id., ¶12.  It 
concluded that the legislative history showed that subsection 
(7) of Wis. Stat. § 940.225 was enacted in response to State v. 
Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985).6  Grunke, 
305 Wis. 2d 312, ¶12.  Based on the reference to Holt in the 
legislative history, the court of appeals in Grunke concluded 
that § 940.225 applied to corpses only when the sexual assault 
victim was killed and sexually assaulted by the same perpetrator 
during a sequence of events and, accordingly, it did not apply 
                                                 
6 In State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. 
App. 1985), the court of appeals concluded that to convict a 
defendant of first-degree sexual assault under the then current 
statutes, the State must prove that the victim was alive at the 
time of the sexual assault.  Id. at 121.   
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
6 
to a sexual assault of a corpse when the defendant did not cause 
the death.  Id., ¶¶14-15.  Therefore, the court concluded that 
the defendants could not be charged under § 940.225.  Id., ¶15.  
¶9 
We granted review and now reverse and remand. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225 to undisputed facts.  We review questions of 
statutory interpretation and application independently, but 
benefiting from the discussions of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.    
B. 
The Parties' Positions 
¶11 The parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225.  The defendants argue that the statute is 
ambiguous and therefore we must rely on extrinsic sources, such 
as legislative history, to guide our interpretation.  In 
contrast, the State argues that the language of the statute 
bears a plain meaning, rendering it unnecessary for us to 
consult legislative history to discern its meaning.  Before 
examining the language of the statute, it is instructive to 
examine the parties' respective arguments in greater detail. 
 
1. 
Defendants' position 
¶12 The defendants offer a multi-part interpretation that 
we summarize briefly.  They posit that the plain meaning of 
subsection (7) of Wis. Stat. § 940.225 does not criminalize 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a corpse, because, 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
7 
when that subsection is read in conjunction with other portions 
of the statute, an element of third-degree sexual assault 
becomes superfluous, and also, such an application of subsection 
(7) creates absurd results.   
¶13 First, 
the 
defendants 
argue 
that 
to 
interpret 
subsection (7) of Wis. Stat. § 940.225 as a "general prohibition 
against 
necrophilia" 
renders 
the 
element 
of 
consent 
in 
subsection (3) superfluous.  Consent as used in § 940.225 means, 
"words or overt actions" and obviously a corpse cannot speak or 
act as required by § 940.225(4).  They contend that subsection 
(4) contains an exclusive list of circumstances in which consent 
is "not an issue" and death is not among those circumstances 
listed.  They conclude that the State can prove that the victim 
did not consent only by ignoring the element of consent or by 
reading its definition out of the statute.   
¶14 Second, the defendants argue that interpreting Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(7) 
as 
a 
"general 
prohibition 
against 
necrophilia" creates absurd results.  They contend that such an 
interpretation clashes with the graduated penalty structure of 
§ 940.225.  They point out that § 940.225 contains four degrees 
of sexual assault and punishes certain perpetrators to a greater 
extent than others.  For example, a perpetrator of sexual 
assault who threatens the victim with a dangerous weapon is 
guilty of a Class B felony,7 § 940.225(1)(b), while other 
                                                 
7 The defendants' argument describes first-degree sexual 
assault.  Wisconsin Statute § 940.225(1) provides: 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
8 
occasions of sexual assaults result in lesser punishments.  The 
defendants argue that if subsection (7) is interpreted as a 
"general 
prohibition 
against 
necrophilia," 
§ 940.225 
will 
provide for four degrees of sexual assault of a corpse.  Such an 
interpretation is absurd, they contend, because, to use the 
example above, a corpse is unable to apprehend the threat that 
accompanies a sexual assault with a dangerous weapon.   
¶15 The defendants argue that the surplusage of the 
element of consent and the absurd result of graduated penalties 
for having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a corpse 
renders Wis. Stat. § 940.225 ambiguous.  As a result, they argue 
we should consult legislative history to interpret the statute.  
They argue that the legislative history of subsection (7) 
indicates that it was enacted to relieve the State from being 
required to prove that the victim was alive when the sexual 
assault occurred in those circumstances in which the perpetrator 
                                                                                                                                                             
First degree sexual assault.  Whoever does any of 
the following is guilty of Class B felony: 
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person and 
causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person. 
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person by use 
or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article 
used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim 
reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon. 
(c) Is aided or abetted by one or more other 
persons and has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with another person without consent of that person by 
use or threat of force or violence. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
9 
sexually assaults and kills the victim in a series of acts.  
Accordingly, 
the 
defendants 
contend 
we 
should 
construe 
subsection (7) as criminalizing the act of sexually assaulting 
and causing the death of a person who is alive at the beginning 
of the sexual assault, but dead when the assailant completes his 
crimes.   
2. 
State's position 
¶16 The State, in contrast, argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(7) is unambiguous; that by its terms the statute 
subjects individuals to criminal penalty for sexual assault 
"whether a victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse."  The State contends that the 
limited interpretation that the defendants offer is refuted by 
subsection (7)'s plain language.  There is nothing in subsection 
(7) that suggests it applies only to those circumstances in 
which the perpetrator sexually assaults and kills the victim.   
¶17 Moreover, the State argues, the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(7) does not render the element of consent in the 
various provisions of § 940.225 superfluous.  Because a dead 
person is incapable of giving or withholding consent, there is 
no reason to include death among the circumstances listed in 
subsection (4) in which consent "is not an issue."   
¶18 In addition, the State argues that the graduated 
penalty for sexual assault within Wis. Stat. § 940.225 does not 
create absurd results when subsection (7) is interpreted as 
criminalizing sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
corpse.  The State agrees that first-degree sexual assault of a 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
10 
dead person is factually impossible to commit.  However, it 
points out that the possibility that the facts of a particular 
case will not come within the elements necessary to establish 
every crime listed in § 940.225 does not mean that the statute 
is absurd, but rather, it simply means that the evidence 
necessary for all potential crimes under § 940.225 does not 
exist in all cases. 
¶19 Finally, the State contends that, even though the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(7) suggests it was 
enacted to relieve the State of the burden of proving that the 
victim was alive when the sexual assault occurred during a rape-
murder, the plain language is not limited to that scenario.  
Contrary to the defendants' argument, the State contends, by its 
terms, subsection (7) is not limited to circumstances in which 
the same defendant both murders and sexually assaults the victim 
and the sequence of those crimes cannot be established.   
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.225 
 
1. 
General principles 
¶20 We accepted review to decide whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when 
the defendant did not cause the victim's death.8  The relevant 
facts are undisputed; accordingly, the issue presented requires 
us to interpret various provisions of § 940.225. 
                                                 
8 We hasten to note that the defendants do not challenge the 
sufficiency of the attempt evidence.  Accordingly, whether their 
actions constitute an attempt is not at issue.   
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
11 
¶21 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 236 Wis. 2d 
211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Plain meaning may be ascertained not 
only from the words employed in the statute, but from the 
context.  Id., ¶46.  We interpret statutory language in the 
context in which those words are used; "not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id.   
¶22 If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a "plain, 
clear statutory meaning," without ambiguity, the statute is 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms.  
Id., ¶46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 
260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  However, if a statute is 
"capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is ambiguous, and we 
may consult extrinsic sources to discern its meaning.  Id. at 
¶¶47-48, 50.  While extrinsic sources are usually not consulted 
if the statutory language bears a plain meaning, we nevertheless 
may consult extrinsic sources "to confirm or verify a plain-
meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
12 
 
2. 
Application of Wis. Stat. § 940.225 
¶23 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
statute.  Id., ¶45.  Section 940.225 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
provides in relevant part: 
(3) Third degree sexual assault. Whoever has 
sexual intercourse with a person without the consent 
of that person is guilty of a Class G felony.  . . . 
. . . . 
(4) Consent.  "Consent", as used in this section, 
means words or overt actions by a person who is 
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely 
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact. 
 
Consent 
is 
not 
an 
issue 
in 
alleged 
violations of sub. (2)(c), (cm), (d), (g), (h), and 
(i).  The following persons are presumed incapable of 
consent but the presumption may be rebutted by 
competent evidence, subject to the provisions of s. 
972.11(2): 
(b) A person suffering from a mental illness or 
defect which impairs capacity to appraise personal 
conduct. 
(c) A person who is unconscious or for any other 
reason 
is 
physically 
unable 
to 
communicate 
unwillingness to an act. 
. . . . 
(7) Death of victim.  This section applies 
whether a victim is dead or alive at the time of the 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse.  
¶24 Prosecution of the defendants for attempted third-
degree sexual assault when the victim is already dead invokes 
multiple subsections of Wis. Stat. § 940.225, and we must 
interpret those subsections in context as they relate to each 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
13 
other.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Under subsection (3), one 
who has sexual intercourse with a person "without the consent" 
of that person is guilty of a Class G felony.  § 940.225(3).  
Subsection (4) lists circumstances in which "consent is not an 
issue," and the circumstance of the victim being dead is not 
among them.9  § 940.225(4).  Subsection (4) also defines 
"consent" as "words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely 
given agreement to have sexual intercourse."  Id.  The 
defendants contend that, because a corpse cannot provide or 
withhold consent, allowing prosecution for sexual intercourse 
with a corpse under subsection (7) would clash with the 
requirement in subsection (3) that the intercourse occur without 
the victim's consent.  The defendants are incorrect. 
¶25 There is no statutory ambiguity or incompatibility 
between, on the one hand, a victim being incapable of consent 
because the victim is dead and, on the other hand, subsection 
(3)'s requirement that sexual intercourse occur "without the 
consent" of the victim.  In order to achieve a conviction for 
third-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3), the 
State must still prove the element "without consent" beyond a 
reasonable doubt; that endeavor is subject to a simple proof 
when the victim is a corpse. 
                                                 
9 The statute specifies that a victim is legally unable to 
consent if the victim has a mental illness (subsection (2)(c)), 
is intoxicated (subsection (2)(cm)), is unconscious (subsection 
(2)(d)), or is under the care or supervision of certain 
institutions or facilities (subsections (2)(g), (h) and (i)). 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
14 
¶26 The defendants' ambiguity argument with respect to the 
consent element of the statute suggests that they believe an 
element of a crime is rendered superfluous merely because it is 
simple to prove.  They are mistaken.  An element of a crime is 
not 
rendered 
superfluous 
because 
that 
element 
might 
be 
relatively easy to prove under the facts of a particular case.  
Rather, an element of a statute is superfluous when it is 
redundant of some other portion of the statute.  See, e.g., 
State v. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, ¶15, 257 Wis. 2d 274, 650 
N.W.2d 908 (concluding that "reckless" and "utter disregard" are 
two distinct elements); State v. Dauer, 174 Wis. 2d 418, 431-32, 
497 N.W.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that "verbal, written 
or printed" threats are not redundant in regard to the crime of 
extortion).  Similarly, no redundancy is created by the "without 
consent" element of subsection (3). 
¶27 Moreover, the presence of subsection (7), which states 
that Wis. Stat. § 940.225 applies whether the victim is dead or 
alive, does not render the "without consent" element of 
subsection (3) superfluous.  This is so because the statute also 
recognizes certain circumstances in which consent is "not an 
issue," thereby exempting the State from having to prove the 
lack of consent element in limited circumstances and without 
removing lack of consent as an element from other provisions.  
§ 940.225(4).  The absence of the circumstance of a dead victim 
from the list of circumstances in which consent is "not an 
issue" does not cause the lack of consent to become a 
superfluous element of the crime; rather, the absence merely 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
15 
leaves the element of consent intact.  Subsection (7) reinforces 
that the State must prove that the sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse occurred without the victim's consent even though 
the victim is dead; by the plain meaning of its terms, 
subsection (7)'s application is not so limited as the defendants 
contend.   
¶28 The defendants' argument that subsections (7) and (3) 
conflict further stems from their mistaken interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225 to require the State to prove that the 
victim withheld consent.  The element "without consent" in 
subsection (3) requires no affirmative act, such as the 
withholding of consent, on the part of the victim.  Rather, the 
State must prove that there was no affirmative consent. Stated 
otherwise, the plain language of subsection (3) requires the 
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants 
attempted to have sexual intercourse with the victim without her 
"words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given 
agreement to have sexual intercourse."  Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4).  
The State does not have to prove that the victim withheld 
consent. 
¶29 Accordingly, contrary to the defendants' assertions, 
subsections (3) and (7) exist in harmony.   
¶30 The defendants' second argument, that interpreting 
subsection (7) as a "general prohibition against necrophilia" 
leads 
to 
absurd 
results, 
is 
equally 
unavailing. 
 
The 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(7) as criminalizing 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a dead person does not 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
16 
create the absurd prospect of four degrees of sexual assault of 
a dead person, as the defendants suggest.  The State agrees with 
the defendants that one who has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a dead person could not be charged with first-
degree10 or second-degree11 sexual assault, because such facts 
                                                 
10 The statutory provisions of first-degree sexual assault 
are contained in note 7, supra. 
11 Second-degree sexual assault is described in Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2) as follows: 
Second degree sexual assault.  Whoever does any 
of the following is guilty of a Class C felony: 
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person by use 
or threat of force or violence. 
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person and 
causes injury, illness, disease or impairment of a 
sexual or 
reproductive organ, or mental anguish 
requiring psychiatric care for the victim. 
(c) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
a person who suffers from a mental illness or 
deficiency which renders that person temporarily or 
permanently 
incapable 
of 
appraising 
the 
person's 
conduct, and the defendant knows of such condition. 
(cm) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with a person who is under the influence of an 
intoxicant to a degree which renders that person 
incapable of giving consent if the defendant has 
actual knowledge that the person is incapable of 
giving consent and the defendant has the purpose to 
have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the 
person while the person is incapable of giving 
consent. 
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
a person who the defendant knows is unconscious. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
17 
cannot correspond with the elements of those two charges.  
However, the inapplicability of subsections (1) and (2) to 
circumstances where sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
dead person is alleged to have occurred is not an absurd result.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) Is aided or abetted by one or more other 
persons and has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with another person without the consent of that 
person. 
(g) Is an employee of a facility or program under 
s. 940.295(2)(b), (c), (h) or (k) and has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who is a 
patient or resident of the facility or program. 
(h) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
an individual who is confined in a correctional 
institution if the actor is a correctional staff 
member.  This paragraph does not apply if the 
individual with whom the actor has sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse is subject to prosecution for the 
sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse under this 
section. 
(i) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
an individual who is on probation, parole, or extended 
supervision if the actor is a probation, parole, or 
extended 
supervision 
agent 
who 
supervises 
the 
individual, either directly or through a subordinate, 
in his or her capacity as a probation, parole, or 
extended supervision agent or who has influenced or 
has attempted to influence another probation, parole, 
or extended supervision agent's supervision of the 
individual.  This paragraph does not apply if the 
individual with whom the actor has sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse is subject to prosecution for the 
sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse under this 
section. 
(j) 
Is 
a 
licensee, 
employee, 
or 
nonclient 
resident of an entity, as defined in s. 48.685(1)(b) 
or 50.065(1)(c), and has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a client of the entity.   
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
18 
¶31 An absurd result follows when an interpretation would 
render the relevant statute contextually inconsistent12 or would 
be contrary to the clearly stated purpose of the statute.13  By 
its terms, Wis. Stat. § 940.225 applies regardless of whether 
the sexual assault victim is dead or alive.  § 940.225(7).  The 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
create 
internal 
inconsistencies; nor, obviously, does the plain meaning confound 
the statute's clearly stated purpose.  To the contrary, it is 
entirely possible to apply § 940.225(7) as written and be 
consistent with the plain meaning of the statute's punishment of 
those who have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a dead 
person.  See, e.g., Suchomel v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics, 
2005 WI App 234, ¶28, 288 Wis. 2d 188, 708 N.W.2d 13. 
¶32 The defendants' third argument, that subsection (7) 
limits subsection (3) to only those circumstances in which the 
perpetrator kills and has sexual intercourse with the victim in 
a series of events, finds no support in the plain language of 
the statute.  The defendants' argument is derived from Holt and 
from subsection (7)'s legislative history.   
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Indus. to Indus., Inc. v. Hillsman Modular 
Molding, Inc., 2002 WI 51, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236 
(concluding that an absurd result would follow were "person" 
interpreted to include only natural persons, and to exclude 
corporations, given the context in which "person" is used in the 
statute).  
13 See, e.g., Suchomel v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics, 
2005 WI App 234, ¶28, 288 Wis. 2d 188, 708 N.W.2d 13. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
19 
¶33 Following his conviction for first-degree murder and 
first-degree sexual assault in a case predating the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(7), Holt argued there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of sexual assault because the evidence 
could not support a finding that his victim was alive when he 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.  Holt, 128 Wis. 2d at 
121.  Although the court of appeals upheld Holt's conviction for 
sexual assault, shortly after the case was decided, the 
legislature enacted § 940.225(7).  By enacting § 940.225(7), it 
appears that the legislature sought to close the loophole in the 
then current version of § 940.225 that Holt sought to exploit.  
A note contained in subsection (7)'s drafting file states:  
"Problem——don't 
want 
prosecution 
to 
fail 
because 
the 
DA 
[district attorney] has to prove that victim was alive at the 
time SA [sexual assault] took place——Have statute [so] that DA 
does not have to prove that victim was alive or dead."  Drafting 
File for 1985 Wis. Act 134, Analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau of 1985 A.B. 328, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.  
¶34 While the parties agree that subsection (7) was 
enacted to remedy the problem identified in Holt, namely, 
proving that the victim was alive when the sexual assault 
occurred as part of a rape-murder, the language of subsection 
(7) does not so limit its application.  Indeed, subsection (7), 
by its very terms, applies to all of Wis. Stat. § 940.225.  The 
defendants direct us to no authority that stands for the 
proposition that, when the legislature enacts a statute to apply 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
20 
to a specific circumstance, the statute may be applied only to 
that circumstance.  It is doubtful that such authority exists.  
Furthermore, when the United States Supreme Court considered 
such 
a 
contention, 
it 
concluded, 
"The 
fact 
that 
[the 
legislature] may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a 
statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to 
give effect to its plain meaning."  Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 
U.S. 151, 158 (1991).  The plain language of § 940.225(7) is our 
guidepost; and by its terms, it is not limited to circumstances 
in which a perpetrator murders and sexually assaults the victim 
in a series of events.14 
                                                 
14 In addition, the defendants' suggestion that subsection 
(7) be interpreted to apply only to those circumstances in which 
the perpetrator commits a rape-murder in a series of events, 
thwarts the plain language the legislature chose to punish those 
who commit a sexual assault regardless of whether their victim 
is dead or alive.  At oral argument, the defendants contended 
that only the person who caused the death of the victim could be 
prosecuted for sexual assault.  The defendants cite the title of 
subsection (7), "Death of Victim," as support. 
We reject the defendants' argument.  The untoward results 
that could flow from such an interpretation may be illustrated 
by an example.  Under the defendants' interpretation of the 
statute, had Nicholas Grunke killed the victim, and then both he 
and his brother Alexander had sexual intercourse with the 
victim's dead body, only Nicholas could be charged with and 
found guilty of sexual assault.  Such an interpretation is 
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, which nowhere 
indicates that prosecutions are limited to only those who cause 
the death of the victim.  
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
21 
¶35 In addition, the legislative history supports, rather 
than confounds, our plain-meaning interpretation.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  The note referenced above to which the 
parties direct us does not constitute the full legislative 
history of subsection (7).  A note in the legislative council 
file for the Committee on Judiciary and Consumer Affairs, to 
which Assembly Bill 328 creating Wis. Stat. § 940.225(7) was 
referred, states:   
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
title 
of 
subsection 
(7) 
does 
not 
advance 
the 
defendants' argument.  The title of the statute does not state 
that a perpetrator can be punished for attempted sexual assault 
of a corpse only when the perpetrator causes the victim's death.  
Moreover, because the title of a statute is not part of the 
statute, we do not consult the title "to create a doubt where 
none would otherwise exist."  Wis. Valley Improvement Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 N.W.2d 798 
(1960).  The plain language of subsection (7) leaves no doubt as 
to 
the 
applicability 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225 
in 
these 
circumstances:  subsection (7) applies regardless of "whether a 
victim is dead or alive."  Accordingly, we will not construe the 
title of subsection (7) to create a contrary interpretation.  
Id.    
The 
defendants' argument is further confounding when 
considered in tandem with their argument that the element of 
consent is superfluous.  Their argument that the consent element 
is superfluous would apply equally when a perpetrator kills the 
victim and proceeds to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with the corpse, the very Holt-type of circumstance for which 
subsection (7) was enacted.  The defendants appear not to 
account for this disparity, and we decline to give judicial 
sanction to such an internally inconsistent interpretation of 
the statute. 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
22 
AB 328 
Specifies that sexual assault laws are applicable 
whether the victim is alive or dead at the time of the 
assault 
Problem:  Unclear if sex. assault laws apply if not 
sure victim was alive at time of assault 
- language "consent of another person" implies that 
victim is alive 
- tough issue for jury to determine (issue arises in 
jury deliberations) 
- In Homicide & sex assault case, may be able to prove 
sex assault, but not HOMICIDE 
- No necrophilia stats. in WI   
Legislative Council file on 1985 A.B. 328 (capitalization and 
emphasis in original). 
¶36 It appears from the note that the lack of a 
"necrophilia" statute in Wisconsin contributed to the problem of 
determining whether Wis. Stat. § 940.225, Wisconsin's sexual 
assault statute, applied when a victim may have been alive at 
the time of the assault.  The expansive language of subsection 
(7) remedies the primary problem, as well as all four of the 
ancillary problems, identified in the legislative council file 
note.  Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature meant that 
subsection (7) would remedy the problems it identified within 
§ 940.225 prior to subsection (7)'s enactment.  The legislative 
council file indicates that subsection (7) was enacted to punish 
those who engage in sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
dead victim, as well as a live victim.  Therefore, the 
legislative history supports our interpretation that, by its 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
23 
plain meaning, subsection (7) is not so limited in meaning as 
the defendants contend.  
¶37 In sum, by its plain terms, Wis. Stat. § 940.225 
prohibits the conduct that the defendants are alleged to have 
attempted.  Section 940.225(3) provides that "[w]hoever has 
sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of that 
person is guilty of a Class G felony," and § 940.225(7) provides 
that "[t]his section applies whether a victim is dead or alive 
at the time of the sexual contact or sexual intercourse."  The 
language of the statute is clear on its face.  A reasonably 
well-informed person would understand the statute to prohibit 
sexual intercourse with a dead person.  In addition, the element 
of consent is not rendered superfluous by our interpretation.  
The State is obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the sexual intercourse was attempted without the victim's 
consent.  Simplicity of proof does not make an element 
superfluous.  See, e.g., Dibble, 257 Wis. 2d 274, ¶¶13-15; 
Dauer, 174 Wis. 2d 418, 431-32.  Furthermore, applying the plain 
meaning of § 940.225 does not create absurd results.  It is not 
absurd that one who sexually assaults a dead person could not be 
punished for first-degree or second-degree sexual assault; such 
punishments are simply factually unavailable in cases in which 
the victim is a dead person.  Finally, the legislative history 
verifies that the plain meaning of § 940.225 is not so limited 
as the defendants assert.  Accordingly, the defendants may be 
charged with attempted third-degree sexual assault pursuant to 
§ 940.225(3). 
Nos. 2006AP2744-CR through 2006AP2746-CR   
 
 
 
24 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 The issue presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 940.225 
criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim 
already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused 
did not cause the death of the victim.  We conclude that it 
does.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP2744-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
¶39 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion purports to reach its result by relying on the 
"plain terms" of Wis. Stat. § 939.22.  Majority op., ¶37.  I 
agree with the dissent that the majority opinion does not rely 
on the statutory text to answer the question posed in the 
present case.  
¶40 In examining not only the text of Wis. Stat. § 939.22 
but also the legislative history and the consequences of various 
interpretations, the majority opinion and I conclude that the 
most reasonable interpretation of the statute is that it covers 
the fact situation presented.  I therefore concur in the court's 
mandate. 
 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶41 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
reaches a desired result through an undesirable analysis. I 
acknowledge that this is heinous conduct and good public policy 
would indicate that this conduct should be criminalized.    
¶42 The majority believes that § 940.225(3) clearly covers 
sexual assault of a corpse. It concludes that the language of 
the statute "is clear on its face." Majority op., ¶37. It 
determines 
that 
"a 
reasonably 
well-informed 
person 
would 
understand the statute to prohibit sexual intercourse with a 
dead person." Id. 
¶43 Unlike the majority, I conclude that the circuit court 
judge and the court of appeals judges here are "reasonably well-
informed" persons. They unanimously concluded that § 940.225 
does not prohibit sexual intercourse with a corpse. They 
determined (1) that the language of the statute was ambiguous 
and, (2) that when the legislature enacted § 940.225(3), it did 
not intend that the statute cover the conduct here.1 I agree.  
I 
¶44 The majority explains that we accepted review in this 
case to decide whether Wis. Stat. § 940.225 criminalizes sexual 
intercourse with a corpse when the defendant did not cause its 
death. Majority op., ¶20. The engine that drives the majority's 
analysis is its belief that the language of the statute is 
                                                 
1 We have previously determined that when courts reach 
contradictory interpretations of a statute, it "is indicative of 
ambiguity." Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 
¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (citing Stockbridge Sch. 
Dist. v. Dep't of Public Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal 
Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 222, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996)). 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
"plain."  It makes that assertion over and over again in the 
opinion. See id., ¶¶27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37.  
¶45 To begin, it is always suspicious to me when an 
opinion asserts that the meaning is plain and then proceeds to 
spend a multitude of pages explaining it. It is as though the 
lengthy explanation belies the assertion. If it is so plain, why 
is the explanation so complex and lengthy? 
¶46 My suspicions are well founded when you examine the 
analysis. Let's start by looking at the text of the statute that 
the majority says is so plain. Wis. Stat. § 940.225 provides in 
relevant part: 
(3) Third Degree Sexual Assault.  Whoever has sexual 
intercourse with a person without the consent of that 
person is guilty of a Class G felony. Whoever has 
sexual contact in the manner described in sub. 
(5)(b)2. or 3. with a person without the consent of 
that person is guilty of a Class G felony. 
(4) Consent.  "Consent", as used in this section, 
means words or overt actions by a person who is 
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely 
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact. . . . 
(7) Death of Victim. This section applies whether a 
victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶47 Looking at subsection (4), it is not at all "plain" 
how to apply the concept of consent to cases involving corpses. 
I don't think a corpse can give consent.  
¶48 Subsection (4) provides a definition of consent——
"words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give 
informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact." That definition cannot 
apply to a corpse.  
¶49 The majority, however, concludes that consent is an 
issue in this case. Apparently, as an element of the offense, 
the majority would have the jury determine whether the corpse 
consented to intercourse. According to the majority, consent is 
an element that is "simple to prove." Majority op., ¶26.  
¶50 I find it unlikely that the legislature intended 
consent to be an element of a crime involving the sexual assault 
of a corpse. Under the majority's interpretation, prosecuting 
attorneys will now have to prove that element beyond reasonable 
doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).  
¶51 Another reason to doubt the majority's claim that the 
statute is "plain" is that the majority's interpretation renders 
subsection (7) superfluous. As noted above, the majority's view 
is that sexual assault of a corpse is proscribed by § 940.225(3) 
and that the consent element is merely "simple to prove" in the 
case of a corpse. Majority op., ¶¶25-27. If the majority is 
correct, however, there would be no need for subsection (7) in 
the statute.2 The majority's interpretation therefore violates 
the principle of statutory construction that "meaning should be 
given to every word, clause and sentence in the statute, and a 
construction which would make part of the statute superfluous 
                                                 
2 The majority focuses on whether applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225 to corpses renders subsection (3) or the element of 
consent superfluous. Majority op., ¶27. It fails to address the 
argument that applying the statute to corpses renders subsection 
(7) superfluous.  
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
should be avoided wherever possible." Hutson v. State Pers. 
Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 655 N.W.2d 212. 
¶52 The language of the statute is thus far from "plain."  
Under the majority's "plain" meaning interpretation, prosecutors 
must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the corpse did not 
consent to intercourse. This makes no sense to me and I cannot 
imagine that it is what the legislature intended.  
II 
¶53 The legislative history of § 940.225 indicates that 
subsection (7) was enacted to address cases in which the 
prosecutor could not prove whether the victim of a sexual 
assault was alive or dead at the time of the assault. Subsection 
(7) was created by 1985 Wis. Act 134, which passed the 
legislature in February 1986.  
¶54 The drafting records for the bill include a drafter's 
note articulating the problem that the act was intended to 
address. The note states "Problem——don't want prosecution to 
fail because the DA has to prove that the victim was alive at 
the time the [sexual assault] took place." It further states a 
desire to "Have [a] statute so that DA does not have to prove 
that victim was alive or dead." Legislative Reference Bureau 
drafting file for 1985 Wis. Act 134.  
¶55 Further, the history indicates that a case involving 
murder and sexual assault prompted the legislation. Just prior 
to the time that 1985 Wis. Act 134 was enacted, the court of 
appeals decided State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 382 N.W.2d 679 
(Ct. App. 1985). The defendant in Holt was charged with sexual 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
assault and murder. He argued that he could not be convicted of 
sexual assault because of insufficient evidence that the victim 
was alive at the time of the sexual assault. Id. at 121. The 
court of appeals determined that in a rape-murder case where the 
sequence of events cannot be proved, the jury may, but is not 
required to, infer that the victim was alive during the assault. 
Id. 
¶56 The notes regarding the legislation indicate that it 
was intended to solve a single problem: prosecuting sexual 
assault where it is unclear whether the victim was alive at the 
time of the assault. Nothing in the legislative history 
indicates that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 940.225 to 
operate as a necrophilia statute.3 
¶57 The language of the statute is far from "plain." The 
majority's interpretation requires prosecutors to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a corpse did not consent, and it renders 
subsection (7) superfluous, neither of which were intended by 
the legislature. Likewise, the legislative history indicates 
that the legislature intended § 940.225(7) to apply to cases 
involving murder and sexual assault, and not to cases of 
necrophilia. I therefore respectfully dissent.  
                                                 
3 I also note that the legislature has expressly included 
necrophilia in the definition of "sexual conduct" in Wisconsin's 
obscenity 
statutes. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 944.21(2)(e) 
states 
"'[s]exual 
conduct' 
means 
the 
commission 
of 
any 
of 
the 
following: . . . necrophilia." 
This 
statutory 
language 
establishes that the legislature is aware of the conduct that 
constitutes necrophilia, has proscribed it as part of the 
obscenity statute, and has chosen not to proscribe it outside of 
the obscenity context. 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this dissent.   
 
 
No.  2006AP2744-CR & 2006AP2745-CR & 2006AP2746-CR.awb 
 
1