Title: Jones v. Peacock

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
CHARLES WHEELER JONES, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 030123     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
DAVID W. K. PEACOCK, JR., EXECUTOR 
AND TRUSTEE UNDER THE WILL OF  
GERALDINE M. JONES, DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, Charles Wheeler Jones and Richard 
Franklin Jones ask this Court to reverse the trial court's 
judgment that their father, B. Franklin Jones, did not have 
the requisite mental capacity to execute a claim for an 
elective share of his deceased wife's augmented estate 
pursuant to Code § 64.1-13.  Because we conclude that the 
trial court utilized the wrong standard for mental competency 
and that the record does not show Franklin Jones was 
incompetent to execute the claim, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Geraldine M. and B. Franklin Jones (the Joneses) were 
married for 15 years.  During the marriage the Joneses lived 
at Westminster Canterbury, a retirement home and nursing 
facility.  For the last five years of the marriage, Mrs. Jones 
resided in the health care section of the facility.  Although 
they lived apart, the Joneses saw each other on a daily basis 
and generally dined together. 
 
Mrs. Jones died on May 15, 2000.  Her will, dated April 
11, 1995, was admitted to probate.  According to the terms of 
the will, the majority of Mrs. Jones' estate was to be held in 
trust for the lifetime benefit of Franklin Jones.  Upon his 
death, any remaining assets were to be distributed to certain 
named beneficiaries.  Mrs. Jones had no children, but Franklin 
had two sons by a prior marriage. 
 
At the time of his wife's death, Franklin resided in the 
assisted living section of Westminster Canterbury.  On August 
22, 2000, he was moved to a nursing home level of care because 
he refused to take food, fluids, or medication, had expressed 
a desire to die, and was found wrapping a call bell cord 
around his neck. 
 
On August 24, 2000, Richard Jones visited his father.  
During this visit Richard gave his father a completed but 
unsigned Notice of Claim for Elective Share of Augmented 
Estate (Notice of Claim).  Franklin signed the Notice of Claim 
and his signature was notarized by Harriet Smith, an employee 
of Westminster Canterbury.  Richard Jones filed the Notice of 
Claim with the clerk of the Circuit Court for the City of 
Virginia Beach later that day.  Franklin died two days later 
on August 26, 2000 at the age of 90. 
 
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David W. K. Peacock, Executor and Trustee of Mrs. Jones' 
estate (Executor), filed an amended bill of complaint for 
advice and guidance asserting that the Notice of Claim was not 
valid because Franklin Jones was not competent to execute it 
on August 24, 2000.  The executor argued that Code § 64.1-13 
requires a notice of claim to be recorded under the same 
conditions as other recorded instruments such as deeds and 
contracts, and thus, a notice of claim is analogous to a 
contract.  Therefore, according to the Executor, the mental 
capacity required to validly execute a deed or contract should 
also be required in order to validly execute a notice of claim 
under Code § 64.1-13.1  Based on the deposition testimony and 
medical records in this case, the Executor argued that 
Franklin Jones did not have the requisite mental capacity to 
validly execute the Notice of Claim on August 24, 2000. 
The respondents, Charles and Richard Jones, asserted that 
the Notice of Claim was analogous to a testamentary document 
and, therefore, the requisite mental capacity should be that 
applicable to the execution of wills.2  Continuing, the sons 
                     
1 A party is competent to execute a deed or contract if at 
the time of execution, the party has sufficient mental 
capacity to understand the nature of the transaction and agree 
to its provisions.  Hill v. Brooks, 253 Va. 168, 175, 482 
S.E.2d 816, 821 (1997). 
2 A party is competent to execute a will if the party has 
sufficient mental capacity at the time of execution to 
"recollect[] his property, the natural objects of his bounty, 
 
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maintained that regardless of which standard was applied, 
Franklin Jones was competent to validly execute the Notice of 
Claim on August 24, 2000. 
 
With the agreement of the parties, the case was submitted 
to the trial court on the pleadings, deposition testimony, 
medical records, and argument of counsel.  Applying the level 
of competence required to execute a deed or other legally 
binding contract, the trial court held that Franklin Jones 
"did not understand the nature of the notice of claim and the 
consequences of signing it" and therefore, the Notice of Claim 
was invalid.  We granted the sons this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Competency to Execute a Notice of Claim 
The parties and the trial court recognized that we have 
not previously considered the appropriate competency standard 
for executing a notice of claim under the augmented estate 
statutes.  Resolving the issue is a matter of law, and we 
apply a de novo standard of review to the judgment of the 
trial court.  Firebaugh v. Whitehead, 263 Va. 398, 402, 559 
S.E.2d 611, 614 (2002). 
                                                                
and their claims upon him, and kn[o]w the business about which 
he was engaged and how he wished to dispose of his property."  
Fields v. Fields, 255 Va. 546, 550, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828 
(1998). 
 
 
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In concluding that execution of a notice of claim 
requires the same level of mental capacity as that required to 
execute a deed or contract, both the trial court and the 
Executor relied in part on Code § 64.1-13.  Subsection A of 
that section prescribes that a written notice of claim filed 
with the clerk of court be "upon such acknowledgment or proof 
as would authorize a writing to be admitted to record under 
Chapter 6 (§ 55-106 et seq.) of Title 55."  The trial court 
concluded, and the Executor argues, that Code § 64.1-13 
implicitly suggests a similarity between contracts, deeds, and 
notices of claim because the referenced sections in Chapter 6 
of Title 55 govern other recorded instruments such as deeds 
and contracts. 
We do not find this argument persuasive.  The referenced 
sections in Title 55 address only the form that a document 
must meet to be admitted to record.  There is nothing in these 
statutory provisions, or any other, that establishes the level 
of competence required to execute a notice of claim. 
The parties and the trial court also looked to cases from 
other jurisdictions for guidance:  Foman v. Moss, 681 N.E.2d 
1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); In re Dellow's Estate, 287 N.W. 420 
(Mich. 1939); In re Estate of Disney, 550 N.W.2d 919 (Neb. 
1996); In re Estate of Bergren, 47 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 1951); Rau 
v. Krepps, 133 S.E. 508 (W. Va. 1926).  The trial court relied 
 
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primarily on language contained in the West Virginia case of 
Rau v. Krepps.  In that case, the surviving spouse had not 
executed any written document claiming a statutory share of 
the estate, and the issue was whether such election could be 
implied by the actions of the surviving spouse.  Rau, 133 S.E. 
at 510-12.  The mental capacity of the surviving spouse was 
not at issue.  Neither Rau nor any of the cases cited by the 
parties directly equated the competency level for taking an 
elective share of a deceased spouse's property with that 
required for executing a contract, deed, or will. 
Implicit in these cases, however, is the proposition that 
the execution of an instrument claiming an elective share is 
not the same as the execution of a contract or will.  We 
agree.  A contract involves a bilateral exchange, a meeting of 
the minds, and an understanding of obligations undertaken − 
factors not present in taking an elective share.  A will 
requires action by only the testator and does not affect the 
testator's present or future interests.  Choosing an elective 
share over provisions made in a will, although a unilateral 
act, does affect future interests of the surviving spouse.  
Indeed, the courts in each of the cases relied upon by the 
parties described the level of competence in terms of the 
consequences of the action at issue.  Disney, 550 N.W.2d at 
924 (whether surviving spouse was capable of understanding and 
 
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protecting his or her own interests when instrument executed); 
Foman, 681 N.E.2d at 1117, citing Bergren, 47 N.W.2d at 589 
(whether widow had "the capacity to understand what she was 
doing and to decide intelligently whether she desired to 
execute the instrument"); Dellow, 287 N.W. at 422 ("If [the 
widow] was capable of reasoning and taking reasonable action, 
she was competent to make an election").  We agree that the 
distinct nature of an election warrants a level of competency 
uniquely connected to that act. 
We hold that at the time an election is made under Code 
§ 64.1-13, the surviving spouse must have the capacity to 
understand his right to elect against the will and receive a 
share of the estate established by law and to know that he is 
making such an election.  Competency to execute the notice of 
claim does not require a surviving spouse to know the specific 
amount that will be received as a result of such an election.  
Indeed, that amount may not be determined without litigation.  
Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 418, 587 S.E.2d 584, 586-87 
(2003).  Whether a surviving spouse exercises good judgment 
when making an election is not relevant to the issue of mental 
capacity to make such a choice.  See, e.g., Thomason v. 
Carlton, 221 Va. 845, 855, 276 S.E.2d 171, 177 (1981) (an 
unwise decision or mistake in judgment in making a will is not 
evidence of incompetency); Smyth Bros.-McCleary-McClellan Co. 
 
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v. Beresford, 128 Va. 137, 169-70, 104 S.E. 371, 382 (1920) 
(capacity to make a contract controls, not the propriety or 
impropriety of any dispositions of the maker's property that 
may be made therein); Greer v. Greers, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 330, 
333 (1852) (testator does not lack capacity merely because his 
disposition appears unreasonable or imprudent). 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in 
applying the standard for mental capacity required to execute 
a deed or contract to the execution of a notice of claim 
pursuant to Code § 64.1-13.  Although the trial court applied 
the wrong standard, the parties have acknowledged that because 
the evidence in this case was solely in the form of deposition 
testimony, we need not remand this case for a determination of 
competency, but can resolve that issue based on the record 
before us.  Kaplan v. Copeland, 183 Va. 589, 593, 32 S.E.2d 
678, 679 (1945). 
B.  Factual Finding Regarding Competency
 
In determining whether a party was competent to make an 
election under Code § 64.1-13, we begin with the presumption 
that all persons are competent, and the party challenging this 
presumption has the burden of establishing incompetency.  
Brown v. Resort Developments, 238 Va. 527, 529, 385 S.E.2d 
575, 576 (1989). 
 
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Franklin Jones' two treating physicians testified by 
deposition.  Dr. Jerry H. Morewitz, a psychiatrist, began 
treating Franklin Jones for mild to moderate depression in 
February 2000.  Throughout his treatment, Dr. Morewitz found 
Jones alert and with appropriate mental skills.  The last time 
Dr. Morewitz saw Jones was August 22, 2000, the day Jones had 
been transferred to the health care facility because he would 
not take food, water, or medications.  On that occasion, Jones 
would not communicate with Dr. Morewitz. 
Dr. Otarod Bahrani, Jones' primary care physician, also 
saw Jones on August 22, 2000.  Jones did communicate with Dr. 
Bahrani.  According to Dr. Bahrani, Jones was alert and 
oriented on that date. 
Both doctors testified that Franklin's weakening 
condition could cause his mental state to fluctuate, but 
neither doctor could form an opinion as to whether Franklin 
Jones was competent to sign the Notice of Claim form on August 
24, 2000.3  
                     
3 Dr. Bahrani testified that he did not think Franklin 
Jones was competent to execute a contract, to buy a car, or 
purchase a house.  However, on cross-examination he explained 
that the complexity of matters associated with buying a house 
such as finances and insurance would be difficult for someone 
"just in the hospital" to undertake, although many people at 
the end of life can make decisions "in the last minute" and he 
did not know "about Mr. Jones in this case." 
 
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Nothing in the testimony of either physician indicates 
that Franklin Jones lacked the capacity to understand his 
right to claim an elective share under Code § 64.1-13 or to 
know that he was executing such a claim on August 24, 2000.  
In fact, the evidence of record suggests the contrary. 
Ms. Harriet Smith testified that she knew Franklin Jones 
"fairly well" and visited him throughout his residency at 
Westminster Canterbury.  She recalled that when she was called 
to his room to notarize the Notice of Claim on August 24, 
2000, he recognized her and called her by name.  Ms. Smith 
testified that when he signed the Notice of Claim he "was 
alert." 
 
Richard Jones testified that he brought the Notice of 
Claim to his father on August 24, 2000 pursuant to his 
father's request.  Franklin recognized Richard and "appeared 
glad" to see him.  Richard told his father about the Notice of 
Claim and told him that his signature would have to be 
notarized if he chose to sign the document.  Richard testified 
that his father read the Notice of Claim before signing it.  
Richard also testified that his father raised the subject of 
the elective share some years before and that Richard had 
assisted his father in getting the answers to some questions 
regarding the elective share. 
 
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Based on the record before us, we conclude that the 
Executor failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that on 
August 24, 2000, Franklin Jones did not have the mental 
capacity to understand his right to elect against the will and 
take a share of the estate as prescribed by statute or to 
understand that he was executing such an election when he 
signed the Notice of Claim on August 24, 2000.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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