Title: PEOPLE OF MI V HATTIE MAE TANNER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
NOVEMBER 25, 2003 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123414 
HATTIE MAE TANNER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
PER CURIAM 
This case concerns when, under MCL 775.15, a defendant 
is entitled to have expert assistance appointed at public 
expense in a criminal proceeding. 
Defendant sought expert 
assistance 
regarding 
deoxyribonucleic 
acid 
(DNA) 
and 
serology evidence, even though the DNA evidence excluded 
defendant and the serology evidence suggested only that 
defendant was one of 2.9 million people who could have been 
the source of the blood found at the crime scene. Further, 
defendant failed to give any specific reason why this 
expert assistance was necessary. 
The trial court refused 
defendant’s request, ruling that the appointment of an 
 
 
 
                                                 
expert was not necessary for defendant to safely proceed to 
trial. 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed 
defendant’s 
conviction on the ground that she could not have safely 
proceeded to trial without expert assistance.1
 We agree 
with the trial court; therefore, we reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit 
court for reinstatement of defendant’s conviction and 
sentence. 
I. Facts 
A. The DNA and Serological Evidence 
In the early hours of March 22, 1995, bartender Sharon 
Watson was stabbed to death during a robbery at a bar. 
Hattie Mae Tanner first became a suspect in the case when 
the police learned that she spent the evening with a man 
who was one of the last people to see the victim alive. 
When questioned by the police, defendant implicated 
herself. 
She admitted that a knife found at the bar 
“look[ed] like one of [her] knives” because of its unique 
characteristics. 
She also explained that her fingerprints 
would be on the knife because she had handled it three or 
four weeks before the homicide. 
Also, defendant admitted 
that she was on the bar premises that evening. 
1 255 Mich App 369; 660 NW2d 746 (2003). 
2  
 
 
  
                                                 
The physical evidence collected from the bar 
included the knife, a bloodstained napkin, a diluted 
bloodstain 
on 
the 
sink 
directly 
behind 
the 
bar, 
a 
bloodstained cloth, and, on the victim’s shirt, six 
bloodstains. 
The 
prosecutor 
arranged 
for 
DNA 
and 
serological analyses of this evidence. 
The DNA evidence excluded defendant.2
 Some evidence 
that could not be tested for DNA was subjected to 
serological 
testing 
for 
both 
blood 
type 
and 
phosphoglucomutase (PGM), an enzyme found in human blood.3 
This testing established that the diluted bloodstain found 
on the bar sink was of the same blood type and PGM subtype 
as defendant’s blood. 
The prosecution’s expert clarified, 
however, that a comparison of the two blood profiles did 
not confirm that the blood was defendant’s. 
Rather, the 
evidence established that defendant and about four percent 
of the African-American population have the same blood 
profile. 
The prosecution’s serology expert testified that 
2 DNA analysis of the blood on the knife and the napkin 
established a match with the victim’s DNA profile; none of
this blood matched defendant’s DNA profile. Testing of the
bloodstains on the victim’s shirt revealed that the blood 
did not match the DNA profile of either the victim or
defendant. 
These bloodstains, which originated from only
one person, were attributable to an unknown female. 
3 There are four blood types, A, B, AB, and O, and
there are ten PGM subtypes. 
3  
   
 
                                                 
African-Americans constituted twenty-six percent of the 
United States population of 280 million people, and that 
“[p]ossibly millions” would have the same blood type and 
PGM subtype as defendant.4 
B. Circuit Court Proceedings 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion under MCL 775.15 for 
expert assistance in DNA and blood typing. 
This statute 
authorizes payment for an expert witness, provided that an 
indigent defendant is able to show “that there is a 
material witness in his favor within the jurisdiction of 
the court, without whose testimony he cannot safely proceed 
to a trial . . . .” 
Id. 
If the defendant makes this 
showing, the judge “in his discretion” may grant funds for 
the retention of an expert witness. Id. 
At the hearing, defense counsel informed the trial 
court that he did not want to retain an expert to reanalyze 
the blood samples or repeat the testing conducted by the 
prosecution’s experts. 
He stated that he wanted an expert 
to help him better understand the DNA evidence and possibly 
to testify at trial. 
After the prosecution pointed out 
that the DNA evidence was exculpatory, defense counsel 
4 A calculation using these numbers indicates that
slightly more than 2.9 million African-Americans share
defendant’s type and PGM subtype. 
4  
 
 
 
 
asked for money to “consult the DNA expert, and then based 
on that consultation if I can persuade you that some money 
should be kicked in for him to testify then we can revisit 
that area . . . .” The trial court denied the request. 
The case proceeded to trial. The jury found defendant 
guilty of second-degree murder, felony murder, and armed 
robbery. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to life 
imprisonment for felony murder and vacated the other two 
convictions. 
C. The Court of Appeals Decision 
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
vacated her conviction and remanded the case for retrial. 
The Court concluded that the “trial court erred in 
depriving defendant of expert assistance in the areas of 
DNA and serology because she could not otherwise proceed 
safely to trial without such assistance.” 
255 Mich App 
404. 
It characterized the role of DNA and serology 
evidence in the case as “critical.” 
Id. at 405. 
A DNA 
expert was needed so that defendant could “develop and 
argue the point that the DNA evidence exculpated her.” Id. 
at 405-406. A serology expert was needed so that defendant 
could “defend herself against the effect” of the serology 
evidence, or “diminish its force by explaining that it 
constituted an anomalous test result.” Id. at 406. 
5  
 
 
 
 
Further, the Court held that, without this expert 
assistance, 
defendant 
received 
a 
fundamentally 
unfair 
trial. 
Because it could not say that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it reversed defendant’s 
conviction and remanded for a new trial. 
The dissent 
stated that defendant had not shown that “the absence of an 
expert jeopardized her ability to prepare a defense,” id. 
at 425, and that, therefore, the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion did not result in a fundamentally unfair 
trial. 
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal to this Court. 
II. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to 
grant an indigent defendant’s motion for the appointment of 
an expert for an abuse of discretion. MCL 775.15. “A mere 
difference in judicial opinion does not establish an abuse 
of discretion.” 
People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 
NW2d 174 (2003). 
III. Discussion 
As MCL 775.15 makes clear, a trial court is not 
compelled to provide funds for the appointment of an expert 
on demand. 
In People v Jacobsen, 448 Mich 639, 641; 532 
NW2d 
838 
(1995), 
this 
Court 
held 
that, 
to 
obtain 
appointment of an expert, an indigent defendant must 
6  
 
 
demonstrate a “'nexus between the facts of the case and the 
need for an expert.'” 
(Citation omitted.) 
It is not 
enough for the defendant to show a mere possibility of 
assistance 
from 
the 
requested 
expert. 
“Without 
an 
indication that expert testimony would likely benefit the 
defense,” a trial court does not abuse its discretion in 
denying a defendant’s motion for appointment of an expert 
witness. Id. 
Because defendant failed to show a nexus between the 
facts of this case and the need for an expert, we hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. 
As the trial court recognized, the prosecutor’s 
DNA experts testified that the blood in the bar and on the 
victim’s shirt was not defendant’s. 
The DNA evidence was 
entirely exculpatory. 
In fact, DNA analysis not only 
eliminated the possibility that the blood on the victim’s 
shirt belonged to either defendant or the victim, it 
established that the blood belonged to an unidentified 
female. 
This favored defendant’s assertion that she was 
not Watson’s killer. 
Under these circumstances, defendant 
cannot show that she could not safely proceed to trial 
without a DNA expert. 
Nor did defendant establish the need for appointment 
of an expert serologist. 
The serology evidence did link 
7  
 
  
 
                                                 
defendant to the crime scene in a general sense, by 
establishing that the diluted bloodstain by the sink was 
left by one of possibly millions of persons who shared 
defendant’s blood type and PGM subtype. 
But we agree with 
the Court of Appeals dissent that defendant did not 
establish that an expert serologist would offer testimony 
that would “likely benefit the defense,” as is required by 
the statute. Jacobsen, supra at 641. 
As the dissent stated, defendant did not seek to have 
the serology testing repeated. 
Nor did defendant argue 
that a serology expert might refute the conclusion that the 
blood found by the sink had the same blood profile as 
defendant’s blood. 
At best, defendant has raised only the 
mere possibility that the appointment of a DNA and serology 
expert might have provided some unidentified assistance to 
the defense. 
This falls short of satisfying defendant’s 
burden of showing that she could not safely proceed to 
trial without such expert assistance. We hold that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant’s motion.5 
5 For the same reason, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellate counsel’s subsequent
motion for the appointment of a serology expert. 
8  
 
 
                                                 
IV. Conclusion 
Because defendant failed to establish a nexus between 
the facts of the case and the need for a DNA and serology 
expert, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that 
defendant could not proceed safely to trial without one. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 
defendant was not entitled to such assistance under MCL 
775.15. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and remand to the trial court for reinstatement 
of defendant’s felony-murder conviction and sentence.6  MCR 
7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
6 Our holding renders moot the Court of Appeals
directive that, on retrial, the prosecution may not charge
defendant with felony murder under an aiding and abetting
theory. 
Our review of the record confirms that, when the
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the case was properly submitted to the jury on
both theories of felony murder because a reasonable juror
could find the essential elements of the crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
People v Riley, 468 Mich 135,
139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). 
We note that circumstantial 
evidence and reasonable inferences may be sufficient to
prove the elements of a crime. 
People v Jolly, 442 Mich 
458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993). 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 123414 
MATTIE MAE TANNER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I would deny leave to appeal in this case, leaving 
intact the Court of Appeals decision remanding for a new 
trial. The trial court abused its discretion in denying 
funds to the public defender for consultation with an 
expert in blood tests7 to enable counsel to understand and 
meet the prosecution’s evidence. 
Moreover, the error was 
not harmless. 
The evidence supporting the conviction was 
not as strong as the majority characterizes it. 
Because 
blood test data testimony was central to the case, the 
trial court’s decision denied defendant a fundamentally 
fair trial. 
She is entitled to a new trial after 
appointment of an expert in blood tests. 
The record shows that the public defender who tried 
the case had a limited understanding of the prosecution’s 
scientific evidence. 
He requested funds from the trial 
court to retain an expert witness to examine the data. The 
7The blood tests in question include both DNA and 
serological tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
court denied the motion because the DNA part of the data 
exculpated, rather than inculpated, defendant. 
Because 
counsel had limited knowledge of the science of 
DNA 
analysis, he failed to argue specifically for an expert to 
analyze the serological data. 
Also, he was unable to 
articulate why the defense needed an expert to examine the 
data. 
The majority finds that the trial court decision was 
proper. 
It sets an impossible goal for defense counsel. 
If counsel fully understands the prosecution’s scientific 
evidence, there would be no need for an expert to explain 
it. 
If, as here, counsel is not expert in certain 
scientific matters, the majority seems to require counsel 
to petition for funds for an expert using an expert’s grasp 
of the subject matter. 
Furthermore, the per curiam opinion characterizes the 
evidence of defendant’s guilt as being stronger than it 
was. 
All defendant’s statements to the police were not 
incriminating. Moreover, they were internally inconsistent. 
Defendant admitted having been in the bar several years 
before the slaying, but denied being there on the night in 
question. At trial, she admitted driving past the bar that 
night, but denied going in. 
The prosecution’s assertion that a knife found at the 
scene belonged to her was controverted and denied by 
defendant. 
She admitted that the picture of the knife she 
was shown had an altered tip similar to an alteration she 
had made to one of her knives. 
But she denied the knife 
was hers because it could not fold up. 
There were substantial problems with the recording 
equipment 
that 
the 
police 
used 
to 
take 
defendant’s 
statements. 
There were a large number of inaudible 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
responses. 
This raises the question of what exactly 
defendant admitted. 
Her statements, questionable in the 
accuracy of their transcription, could not have supported a 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
adopts 
the 
prosecutor’s 
statement that serological evidence narrowed the universe 
of suspects to more than two million people, hence hardly 
incriminating defendant. However, that evidence did not go 
to the jury in that form. 
Rather, the jurors were told 
that 
only 
four 
percent 
of 
black 
women, 
women 
like 
defendant, match the blood sample found at the scene. 
This blood was the only physical evidence placing 
defendant at the scene of the crime. Therefore, the denial 
of funds to retain an expert to advise the defense, given 
the closely drawn evidence of guilt, was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It was an abuse of discretion. 
For those reasons, I would remand for a new trial. 
Marilyn Kelly 
3