Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER THOUSAND

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 27, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116967  
CHRISTOPHER THOUSAND,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave in this case to consider whether the  
doctrine of “impossibility” provides a defense to a charge of  
attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law under MCL  
750.92, or to a charge of solicitation to commit a felony  
under MCL 750.157b.  The circuit court granted defendant’s  
motion to quash and dismissed all charges against him on the  
basis that it was legally impossible for him to have committed  
any of the charged crimes.  We conclude that the concept of  
impossibility, which this Court has never adopted as a  
defense, is not relevant to a determination whether a  
defendant has committed attempt under MCL 750.92, and that the  
circuit court therefore erred in dismissing the charge of  
attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor on the  
basis of the doctrine of legal impossibility.  We additionally  
conclude that, although the Court of Appeals erred to the  
extent that it relied upon the concept of “impossibility” in  
dismissing 
the 
charge 
of 
solicitation 
of 
third-degree 
criminal  
sexual 
conduct, 
the 
charge 
was 
nevertheless 
properly 
dismissed  
because there is no evidence that defendant solicited any  
person to “commit a felony” or to “do or omit to do an act  
which if completed would constitute a felony” as proscribed by  
MCL 750.157b. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in  
part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this  
matter to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with  
this opinion.  
I. FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Deputy William Liczbinski was assigned by the Wayne  
County 
Sheriff’s 
Department 
to 
conduct 
an 
undercover  
1This case has not yet been tried.  Our statement of  
facts is derived from the preliminary examination and motion 
hearing transcripts and from the documentation contained in 
the lower court record, including computer printouts of the 
Internet dialogue between “Bekka” and “Mr. Auto-Mag.”  
2  
  
investigation for the department’s Internet Crimes Bureau.  
Liczbinski was instructed to pose as a minor and log onto  
“chat rooms” on the Internet for the purpose of identifying  
persons using the Internet as a means for engaging in criminal  
activity.  
On December 8, 1998, while using the screen name “Bekka,”  
Liczbinski was approached by defendant, who was using the  
screen name “Mr. Auto-Mag,” in an Internet chat room.  
Defendant described himself as a twenty-three-year-old male  
from Warren, and Bekka described herself as a fourteen-year­
old female from Detroit.  Bekka indicated that her name was  
Becky Fellins, and defendant revealed that his name was Chris  
Thousand.  During this initial conversation, defendant sent  
Bekka, via the Internet, a photograph of his face.  
From 
December 
9 
through 16, 1998, Liczbinski, still using  
the screen name “Bekka,” engaged in chat room conversation  
with defendant.  During these exchanges, the conversation  
became sexually explicit.  Defendant made repeated lewd  
invitations to Bekka to engage in various sexual acts, despite  
various indications of her young age.2  
2Defendant at one point asked Bekka, “Ain’t I a lil [sic] 
old??” Upon Bekka’s negative reply, defendant asked, “[Y]ou 
like us old guys?”  Bekka explained that boys her age “act 
like little kids,” and reiterated that she was fourteen years 
old. Bekka mentioned that her birthday was in 1984 and that 
she was in ninth grade, and defendant asked when she would be 
(continued...)  
3  
 
During one of his online conversations with Bekka, after  
asking her whether anyone was “around there,” watching her,  
defendant indicated that he was sending her a picture of  
himself.
 Within seconds, Liczbinski received over the  
Internet a photograph of male genitalia.  Defendant asked  
Bekka whether she liked and wanted it and whether she was  
getting “hot” yet, and described in a graphic manner the type  
of sexual acts he wished to perform with her.  Defendant  
invited Bekka to come see him at his house for the purpose of  
engaging in sexual activity.  Bekka replied that she wanted to  
do so, and defendant cautioned her that they had to be  
careful, because he could “go to jail.”  Defendant asked  
whether Bekka looked “over sixteen,” so that if his roommates  
were home he could lie.  
The two then planned to meet at an area McDonald’s  
restaurant at 5:00 p.m. on the following Thursday.  Defendant  
indicated that they could go to his house, and that he would  
tell his brother that Bekka was seventeen. 
Defendant  
instructed Bekka to wear a “nice sexy skirt,” something that  
he could “get [his] head into.” Defendant indicated that he  
would be dressed in black pants and shirt and a brown suede  
2(...continued) 
fifteen. Defendant asked whether Bekka was still “pure,” to 
which Bekka responded that she was not, but that she did not 
have a lot of experience and that she was nervous.  
4  
coat, and that he would be driving a green Duster.  Bekka  
asked defendant to bring her a present, and indicated that she  
liked white teddy bears.  
On Thursday, December 17, 1998, Liczbinski and other  
deputy sheriffs were present at the specified McDonald’s  
restaurant when they saw defendant inside a vehicle matching  
the description given to Bekka by defendant. Defendant, who  
was wearing a brown suede jacket and black pants, got out of  
the 
vehicle 
and 
entered the restaurant.  Liczbinski recognized  
defendant’s face from the photograph that had been sent to  
Bekka.
 Defendant looked around for approximately thirty  
seconds before leaving the restaurant.  Defendant was then  
taken into custody.  Two white teddy bears were recovered from  
defendant’s vehicle.  Defendant’s computer was subsequently  
seized from his home.  A search of the hard drive revealed  
electronic logs of Internet conversations matching those  
printed 
out 
by 
Liczbinski from the Wayne County-owned computer  
he had used in his Internet conversations with defendant.  
Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound  
over for trial on charges of solicitation to commit third­
degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.157b(3)(a) and  
750.520d(1)(a), attempted distribution of obscene material to  
a minor, MCL 750.92 and 722.675, and child sexually abusive  
5  
 
activity, MCL 750.145c(2).3  
Defendant brought a motion to quash the information,  
arguing that, because the existence of a child victim was an  
element of each of the charged offenses, the evidence was  
legally insufficient to support the charges.  The circuit  
court agreed and dismissed the case, holding that it was  
legally 
impossible 
for defendant to have committed the charged  
offenses.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the  
charges of solicitation and attempted distribution of obscene  
material to a minor, but reversed the dismissal of the charge  
of child sexually abusive activity.4  241 Mich App 102 (2000).  
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to  
appeal.5  463 Mich 906 (2000).  
3The prosecution’s motion to add a count of attempted 
third-degree criminal sexual conduct was denied by the 
district court.  
Additionally, although the original information charged 
defendant with the completed offense of distribution of  
obscene material to a minor, the circuit court subsequently 
granted the prosecution’s motion to amend the charge to 
attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor.  
4The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the child 
sexually abusive activity statute proscribes mere preparation 
to engage in such activity, the circuit court erred in 
dismissing that charge on the basis of the doctrine of legal 
impossibility.
 241 Mich App 102, 115-117; 614 NW2d 674 
(2000).  We denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal 
from this portion of the Court of Appeals opinion, and this 
charge is not presently before us.  
5In our order, we specifically directed the parties to 
(continued...)  
6  
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We must determine in this case whether the circuit court  
and the Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine of  
“legal impossibility” in concluding that the charges against  
defendant of attempt and solicitation must be dismissed.  The  
applicability of a legal doctrine is a question of law that is  
reviewed de novo.  James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14; 626 NW2d  
158 (2001). Similarly, the issue whether “impossibility” is  
a 
cognizable 
defense 
under 
Michigan’s 
attempt 
and 
solicitation  
statutes presents questions of statutory construction, which  
we review de novo.  People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463, n 9;  
619 NW2d 538 (2000); People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329; 603  
NW2d 250 (1999).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. THE “IMPOSSIBILITY” DOCTRINE  
The doctrine of “impossibility” as it has been discussed  
in the context of inchoate crimes represents the conceptual  
dilemma that arises when, because of the defendant’s mistake  
of fact or law, his actions could not possibly have resulted  
in the commission of the substantive crime underlying an  
attempt charge.  Classic illustrations of the concept of  
5(...continued) 
address (1) whether legal impossibility is a viable defense 
under the circumstances of this case, and (2) whether the 
attempt statute codified the legal impossibility defense as 
part of the common law of attempt.  
7  
 
 
 
 
impossibility include: (1) the defendant is prosecuted for  
attempted larceny after he tries to “pick” the victim’s empty  
pocket6; (2) the defendant is prosecuted for attempted rape  
after he tries to have nonconsensual intercourse, but is  
unsuccessful because he is impotent7; (3) the defendant is  
prosecuted 
for 
attempting to receive stolen property where the  
property he received was not, in fact, stolen8; and (4) the  
defendant is prosecuted for attempting to hunt deer out of  
season after he shoots at a stuffed decoy deer.9  In each of  
these examples, despite evidence of the defendant’s criminal  
intent, he cannot be prosecuted for the completed offense of  
larceny, rape, receiving stolen property, or hunting deer out  
of season, because proof of at least one element of each  
offense cannot be derived from his objective actions.  The  
question, then, becomes whether the defendant can be  
prosecuted for the attempted offense, and the answer is  
dependent upon whether he may raise the defense of  
“impossibility.”  
6See People v Jones, 46 Mich 441; 9 NW 486 (1881);  
Commonwealth v McDonald, 59 Mass 365 (1850); People v Twiggs, 
223 Cal App 2d 455; 35 Cal Rptr 859 (1963).    
7See Waters v State, 2 Md App 216; 234 A2d 147 (1967).  
8See Booth v State, 398 P2d 863 (Okla Crim App, 1964);  
People v Jaffe, 185 NY 497; 78 NE 169 (1906).  
9See State v Guffey, 262 SW2d 152 (Mo App, 1953).  
8  
  
Courts and legal scholars have drawn a distinction  
between 
two 
categories 
of 
impossibility: 
“factual  
impossibility” and “legal impossibility.”  It has been said  
that, at common law, legal impossibility is a defense to a  
charge of attempt, but factual impossibility is not.  See  
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries  
(1985), comment to § 5.01, pp 307-317; Perkins & Boyce,  
Criminal Law (3d ed), p 632; Dressler, Understanding Criminal  
Law (1st ed), § 27.07[B], p 349.  However, courts and scholars  
alike have struggled unsuccessfully over the years to  
articulate an accurate rule for distinguishing between the  
categories of “impossibility.”  
“Factual impossibility,” which has apparently never been  
recognized in any American jurisdiction as a defense to a  
charge of attempt,10 “exists when [the defendant’s] intended  
end constitutes a crime but she fails to consummate it because  
of a factual circumstance unknown to her or beyond her  
control.”  Dressler, supra, § 27.07[C][1], p 350. An example  
of a “factual impossibility” scenario is where the defendant  
is prosecuted for attempted murder after pointing an unloaded  
gun at someone and pulling the trigger, where the defendant  
10See 
Commonwealth v Henley, 504 Pa 408, 411; 474 A2d  
1115 (1984); State v Logan, 232 Kan 646, 648; 656 P2d 777  
(1983).  
9  
 
believed the gun was loaded.11  
The category of “legal impossibility” is further divided  
into two subcategories: “pure” legal impossibility and  
“hybrid” legal impossibility.  Although it is generally  
undisputed 
that 
“pure” legal impossibility will bar an attempt  
conviction, the concept of “hybrid legal impossibility” has  
proven problematic.  As Professor Dressler points out, the  
failure of courts to distinguish between “pure” and “hybrid”  
legal impossibility has created confusion in this area of the  
law. Dressler, supra, § 27.07[D][1], p 351.  
“Pure 
legal 
impossibility exists if the criminal law does  
not prohibit D’s conduct or the result that she has sought to  
achieve.” Id., § 27.07[D][2], p 352 (emphasis in original).  
In other words, the concept of pure legal impossibility  
applies when an actor engages in conduct that he believes is  
criminal, but is not actually prohibited by law: “There can be  
no conviction of criminal attempt based upon D’s erroneous  
notion that he was committing a crime.”  Perkins & Boyce,  
supra, p 634. As an example, consider the case of a man who  
believes that the legal age of consent is sixteen years old,  
and who believes that a girl with whom he had consensual  
sexual intercourse is fifteen years old.  If the law actually  
fixed the age of consent at fifteen, this man would not be  
11See State v Damms, 9 Wis 2d 183; 100 NW2d 592 (1960).  
10  
 
 
guilty of attempted statutory rape, despite his mistaken  
belief that the law prohibited his conduct.  See Dressler,  
supra, § 27.07[D][2], pp 352-353, n 25.  
When courts speak of “legal impossibility,” they are  
generally referring to what is more accurately described as  
“hybrid” legal impossibility.  
Most claims of legal impossibility are of the 
hybrid variety. Hybrid legal impossibility exists  
if D’s goal was illegal, but commission of the 
offense was impossible due to a factual mistake by 
her regarding the legal status of some factor 
relevant to her conduct. 
This version of  
impossibility is a “hybrid” because, as the  
definition implies and as is clarified immediately 
below, D’s impossibility claim includes both a 
legal and a factual aspect to it.  
Courts have recognized a defense of legal 
impossibility or have stated that it would exist if 
D receives unstolen property believing it was 
stolen; tries to pick the pocket of a stone image 
of a human; offers a bribe to a “juror” who is not 
a juror; tries to hunt deer out of season by 
shooting 
a 
stuffed 
animal; 
shoots 
a 
corpse 
believing that it is alive; or shoots at a tree 
stump believing that it is a human.  
Notice that each of the mistakes in these  
cases affected the legal status of some aspect of 
the defendant’s conduct.  The status of property as  
“stolen” is necessary to commit the crime of 
“receiving stolen property with knowledge it is 
stolen”–i.e., a person legally is incapable of 
committing this offense if the property is not 
stolen.  The status of a person as a “juror” is 
legally necessary to commit the offense of bribing 
a juror.  The status of a victim as a “human being” 
(rather than as a corpse, tree stump, or statue) 
legally is necessary to commit the crime of murder 
or to “take and carry away the personal property of  
another.”  Finally, putting a bullet into a stuffed 
deer can never constitute the crime of hunting out 
of season.  
11  
 
 
On the other hand, in each example of hybrid 
legal impossibility D was mistaken about a fact:  
whether property was stolen, whether a person was a 
juror, whether the victims were human or whether 
the victim was an animal subject to being hunted 
out of season.  [Dressler, supra, § 27.07[D][3][a], 
pp 353-354 (emphasis in original).]  
As the Court of Appeals panel in this case accurately  
noted, it is possible to view virtually any example of “hybrid  
legal 
impossibility” 
as 
an 
example 
of 
“factual 
impossibility”:  
“Ultimately 
any 
case 
of 
hybrid 
legal  
impossibility may reasonably be characterized as  
factual 
impossibility. . 
. 
. 
[B]y 
skillful  
characterization, one can describe virtually any 
case of hybrid legal impossibility, which is a 
common law defense, as an example of factual  
impossibility, which is not a defense.” [241 Mich 
App 106 (emphasis in original), quoting Dressler, 
Understanding 
Criminal 
Law 
(2d 
ed), 
§ 
27.07[D][3][a], pp 374-375.]  
See also Weiss, Scope, mistake, and impossibility: The  
philosophy of language and problems of mens rea, 83 Colum L R  
1029, 1029-1030 (1983) (“[b]ecause ordinary English cannot  
adequately distinguish among the various kinds of impossible  
attempts, 
courts 
and 
commentators 
have 
frequently  
misclassified certain types of cases”); United States v  
Thomas, 13 CMA 278, 283; 32 CMR 278, 283 (1962) (“[w]hat is  
abundantly clear . . . is that it is most difficult to  
classify any particular state of facts as positively coming  
within one of these categories to the exclusion of the  
other”); State v Moretti, 52 NJ 182, 189; 244 A2d 499 (1968)  
12  
  
  
(“[o]ur 
examination 
of 
[authorities 
discussing 
the 
doctrine 
of  
impossibility] convinces us that the application of the  
defense of impossibility is so fraught with intricacies and  
artificial distinctions that the defense has little value as  
an analytical method for reaching substantial justice”).  
It is notable that “the great majority of jurisdictions  
have now recognized that legal and factual impossibility are  
‘logically indistinguishable’ . . . and have abolished  
impossibility as a defense.”  United States v Hsu, 155 F3d  
189, 199 (CA 3, 1998).12  For example, several states have  
adopted statutory provisions similar to Model Penal Code  
§ 5.01(1),13 which provides:  
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:  
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances  
were as he believes them to be; or  
(b) when causing a particular result is an 
element of the crime, does or omits to do anything 
with the purpose of causing or with the belief that 
it will cause such result without further conduct  
on his part; or  
12Apart from judicial abrogation of this doctrine, many 
states have done so by legislative enactment. In a 1995 law  
review 
article, 
California 
Deputy 
Attorney 
General 
Kyle 
Brodie 
listed twenty states that had specifically abolished the 
defense of impossibility by legislative enactment.  Brodie, 
The obviously impossible attempt: A proposed revision to the  
Model Penal Code, 15 N Ill U L R 237, n 39 (1995).  
13See, e.g., Kan Stat Ann 21, § 3301; Colo Rev Stat 18-2­
101(1); New York Penal Law 110.10.  
13  
  
  
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything 
which, under the circumstances as he believes them 
to be, is an act or omission constituting a 
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to 
culminate in his commission of the crime.  
In 
other 
jurisdictions, 
courts 
have 
considered 
the  
“impossibility” defense under attempt statutes that did not  
include language explicitly abolishing the defense. Several  
of these courts have simply declined to participate in the  
sterile academic exercise of categorizing a particular set of  
facts as representing “factual” or “legal” impossibility, and  
have instead examined solely the words of the applicable  
attempt statute.  See Darnell v State, 92 Nev 680; 558 P2d 624  
(1976); State v Moretti, 52 NJ 182, 189; 244 A2d 499 (1968);  
People v Rojas, 55 Cal 2d 252; 358 P2d 921 (1961).  
B. ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL TO A MINOR  
The Court of Appeals panel in this case, after examining  
Professor 
Dressler’s 
exposition 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of  
impossibility, concluded that it was legally impossible for  
defendant to have committed the charged offense of attempted  
distribution of obscene material to a minor. The panel held  
that, because “Bekka” was, in fact, an adult, an essential  
requirement of the underlying substantive offense was not met  
(dissemination to a minor), and therefore it was legally  
impossible for defendant to have committed the crime.  
We begin by noting that the concept of “impossibility,”  
14  
 
 
 
 
 
in either its “factual” or “legal” variant, has never been  
recognized by this Court as a valid defense to a charge of  
attempt.
 In arguing that impossibility is a judicially  
recognized defense in Michigan, defendant relies heavily on  
our statement in People v Tinskey, 394 Mich 108; 228 NW2d 782  
(1975), that  
[i]t is possible, although we need not decide, that  
defendants could not have been convicted of  
attempted abortion; at common law the general rule 
is that while factual impossibility is not a  
defense (People v Jones, 46 Mich 441; 9 NW 486  
[1881])[14], legal impossibility is a defense.  
LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 62, p 474.  
[Emphasis supplied.]  
As is readily apparent, our statement in Tinskey  
regarding “legal impossibility” as a defense to an attempt  
charge is nothing more than obiter dictum.  The defendants in  
Tinskey were not charged with attempt; rather, they were  
charged with statutory conspiracy.  Moreover, we specifically  
declined in Tinskey to express any opinion regarding the  
viability of the “impossibility” defense in the context of  
attempts.
 No other Michigan Supreme Court case has  
referenced, much less adopted, the impossibility defense.  
Finding no recognition of impossibility in our common  
law, we turn now to the terms of the statute.  MCL 750.92  
14In Jones, this Court, without mentioning the term 
“impossibility,” held that a conviction of attempted larceny 
could 
stand 
notwithstanding that the defendant picked an empty 
pocket.  
15  
provides, in relevant part:  
Any person who shall attempt to commit an 
offense prohibited by law, and in such attempt 
shall do any act towards the commission of such 
offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or 
shall be intercepted or prevented in the execution 
of the same, when no express provision is made by 
law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be 
punished as follows:  
* * *  
3.
 If the offense so attempted to be  
committed is punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison for a term less than 5 years, or  
imprisonment in the county jail or by fine, the 
offender convicted of such attempt shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor . . . .  
Under our statute, then, an “attempt” consists of (1) an  
attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and (2) any  
act towards the commission of the intended offense. We have  
further explained the elements of attempt under our statute as  
including “an intent to do an act or to bring about certain  
consequences which would in law amount to a crime[15]; and  
. . . an act in furtherance of that intent which, as it is  
most commonly put, goes beyond mere preparation.” People v  
Jones, 443 Mich 88, 100; 504 NW2d 158 (1993), quoting 2 LaFave  
& Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 6.2, p 18.  
15The 
characterization 
of 
“attempt” 
as 
a 
“specific 
intent” 
crime is fully consistent with the plain meaning of the word 
“attempt.”  See Perkins & Boyce, supra at 637 (“[t]he word 
‘attempt’ means to try; it implies an effort to bring about a 
desired result.  Hence an attempt to commit any crime requires 
a specific intent to commit that particular offense”).  
16  
  
 
 In determining whether “impossibility,” were we to  
recognize the doctrine, is a viable defense to a charge of  
attempt under MCL 750.92, our obligation is to examine the  
statute in an effort to discern and give effect to the  
legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the  
text of the statute itself.  People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147,  
152-153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).
 “When a legislature has  
unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute  
speaks for itself and there is no need for judicial  
construction; the proper role of a court is simply to apply  
the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular  
case.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted). Accordingly, if our  
Legislature has indicated its intent to criminalize certain  
conduct despite the actor’s mistake of fact, this Court does  
not have the authority to create and apply a substantive  
defense based upon the concept of “impossibility.” See People  
v Glass (After Remand), 464 Mich 266; 627 NW2d 261 (2001).  
We are unable to discern from the words of the attempt  
statute 
any 
legislative 
intent 
that 
the 
concept 
of  
“impossibility” 
provide 
any 
impediment 
to 
charging 
a 
defendant  
with, 
or 
convicting 
him 
of, 
an 
attempted 
crime,  
notwithstanding any factual mistake–regarding either the  
attendant circumstances or the legal status of some factor  
relevant thereto–that he may harbor.  The attempt statute  
17 
 
 
carves out no exception for those who, possessing the  
requisite criminal intent to commit an offense prohibited by  
law and taking action toward the commission of that offense,  
have acted under an extrinsic misconception.  
Defendant in this case is not charged with the  
substantive crime of distributing obscene material to a minor  
in violation of MCL 722.675.16  It is unquestioned that  
defendant could not be convicted of that crime, because  
16At the time of the alleged offense, MCL 722.675 
provided, in relevant part:  
(1) A person is guilty of distributing obscene 
matter to a minor 
if that person does either of the 
following:  
(a) Knowingly disseminates to a minor sexually 
explicit visual or verbal material that is harmful 
to minors.  
* * *  
(2) A person knowingly disseminates sexually 
explicit matter to a minor when the person knows 
both the nature of the matter and the status of the  
minor to whom the matter is disseminated.  
(3) A person knows the nature of matter if the 
person either is aware of the character and content 
of 
the 
matter 
or 
recklessly 
disregards 
circumstances suggesting the character and content 
of the matter.  
(4) A person knows the status of a minor if 
the person either is aware that the person to whom 
the dissemination is made is under 18 years of age 
or recklessly disregards a substantial risk that 
the person to whom the dissemination is made is 
under 18 years of age.  
18  
defendant allegedly distributed obscene material not to “a  
minor,” but to an adult man.  Instead, defendant is charged  
with the distinct offense of attempt, which requires only that  
the prosecution prove intention to commit an offense  
prohibited by law, coupled with conduct toward the commission  
of that offense.  The notion that it would be “impossible” for  
the defendant to have committed the completed offense is  
simply irrelevant to the analysis. Rather, in deciding guilt  
on a charge of attempt, the trier of fact must examine the  
unique circumstances of the particular case and determine  
whether the prosecution has proven that the defendant  
possessed the requisite specific intent and that he engaged in  
some act “towards the commission” of the intended offense.  
Because the nonexistence of a minor victim does not give  
rise to a viable defense to the attempt charge in this case,  
the circuit court erred in dismissing this charge on the basis  
of “legal impossibility.”  
C. SOLICITATION TO COMMIT THIRD-DEGREE CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT  
1. ANALYSIS  
Defendant was additionally charged, on the basis of his  
Internet conversations with “Bekka,” with solicitation to  
commit third-degree criminal sexual conduct. 
Defendant  
maintains that it was “legally impossible” for him to have  
committed this crime, because the underlying felony requires  
19  
 
the existence of a child under the age of sixteen.17  The Court  
of Appeals panel agreed, concluding that it was legally  
impossible for defendant to have committed the crime because  
the underlying form of third-degree criminal sexual conduct  
charged, MCL 750.520d(1)(a), required the existence of a  
person under the age of sixteen.  The panel further concluded  
that it was legally impossible for defendant to have committed  
the crime for the additional reason that he did not “solicit[]  
another person to commit a felony” as proscribed by the  
solicitation statute.  
Our solicitation statute, MCL 750.157b, provides as  
follows, in relevant part:  
(1) For purposes of this section, “solicit” 
means to offer to give, promise to give, or give 
any money, services, or anything of value, or to 
forgive or promise to forgive a debt or obligation.  
* * *  
(3) . . . [A] person who solicits another  
person to commit a felony, or who solicits another  
person to do or omit to do an act which if  
completed would constitute a felony, is punishable 
as follows:  
(a) If the offense solicited is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for life, or for 5 years 
or more, the person is guilty of a felony . . . . 
[Emphasis supplied.]  
17MCL 750.520d(1) provides that “[a] person is guilty of 
criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the person 
engages in sexual penetration with another person and . . . 
(a) [t]hat other person is at least 13 years of age and under 
16 years of age.”  
20  
The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it relied  
on the doctrine of “impossibility” as a ground for affirming  
the circuit court’s dismissal of the solicitation charge.  As  
we have explained, Michigan has never adopted the doctrine of  
impossibility 
as 
a 
defense in its traditional attempt context,  
much less in the context of solicitation crimes. Moreover, we  
are unable to locate any authority, and defendant has provided  
none, 
for 
the 
proposition that “impossibility” is a recognized  
defense to a charge of solicitation in other jurisdictions.18  
Nevertheless, the solicitation charge was properly  
dismissed for the reason that there is no evidence that  
defendant in our case solicited anyone “to commit a felony” or  
“to do or omit to do an act which if completed would  
constitute a felony” as prohibited by MCL 750.157b.  Pursuant  
to the plain statutory language, the prosecution was required  
to present evidence that defendant requested that another  
18On the other hand, some courts have had occasion to 
specifically 
reject 
the notion that impossibility is a defense 
to solicitation. See, e.g., Benson v Superior Court of Los  
Angeles Co, 57 Cal 2d 240, 243-244; 368 P2d 116 (1962) (“[i]f 
the solicitor believes that the act can be committed ‘it is  
immaterial that the crime urged is not possible of fulfilment 
at the time when the words are spoken’ or becomes impossible 
at a later time” [citations omitted]). See also Model Penal  
Code § 5.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (“[I]t is 
immaterial to the liability of a person who solicits or 
conspires with another to commit a crime that: (b) the person 
whom he solicits or with whom he conspires is irresponsible or 
has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the  
commission of the crime”).  
21  
 
 
person perform a criminal act. The evidence here shows only  
that defendant requested that “Bekka” engage in sexual acts  
with him. 
While the requested acts might well have  
constituted a crime on defendant’s part, “Bekka” (or  
Liczbinski) would not have committed third-degree criminal  
sexual conduct had she (or he) done as defendant suggested.  
As the Court of Appeals properly concluded:  
What is lacking here is defendant’s request to 
another person to commit a crime.  “Bekka,” the 
fourteen-year-old 
online 
persona 
of 
Deputy 
Liczbinski, was not asked to commit a crime. That  
is, while it would be a crime for defendant to 
engage in sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year­
old 
girl, 
a 
fourteen-year-old 
girl 
is 
not  
committing a criminal offense (or at least not CSC­
3) by engaging in sexual intercourse with an adult. 
Thus, whether we look at this case as defendant 
asking fourteen-year-old “Bekka” to engage in  
sexual intercourse with him or as defendant asking 
Deputy Liczbinski to engage in sexual intercourse 
with him, he did not ask another person to commit 
CSC-3. . . .  
For the above reasons we conclude that the  
trial court properly dismissed the charge of  
solicitation to commit criminal sexual conduct.  
[241 Mich App 111.]  
Accordingly, while the concept of “impossibility” has no role  
in the analysis of this issue, we agree with the panel’s  
conclusion that an element of the statutory offense is missing  
and that the solicitation charge was therefore properly  
dismissed.  
2. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
In his partial dissent, Justice TAYLOR opines that our  
22  
 
 
construction of MCL 750.157b(3) renders the second phrase of  
that subsection a “nullity,” and that this phrase–“or who  
solicits another person to do or omit to do an act which if  
completed would constitute a felony”–should be read to  
encompass 
“situations where the solicitee could not be charged  
with the felony, but the solicitor could be.”  Slip op, pp 3­
4. We disagree.  
We first note that, pursuant to the plain language of  
this phrase, it is the act of “another person” that must, if  
completed, “constitute a felony.” We believe that the plain  
language of the statute does not support the interpretation  
our dissenting colleague gives it.  
Moreover, our construction of § 157b(3) does not render  
the 
second 
phrase 
of 
that 
subsection 
“nugatory” 
or  
“surplusage.”  Rather, it appears that the Legislature, by its  
use of the phrase “do or omit to do an act which if completed  
would constitute a felony,” intended to make clear that the  
solicited offense does not have to be completed.  
It is noteworthy that § 157b was substantially amended in  
1986, following this Court’s holding in People v Rehkopf, 422  
Mich 198; 370 NW2d 296 (1985).
 In Rehkopf, this Court  
examined two cases in which the defendants were charged under  
the former version of § 157b. Defendant Rehkopf had asked an  
undercover police officer to kill her husband, and defendant  
23  
Snyder had asked someone to kill his brother.  In neither case  
did the intended murder ever occur.  This Court held that the  
statute was not violated where the defendants’ conduct did not  
lead to the results the defendants urged–namely, the deaths of  
Rehkopf’s husband or Snyder’s brother.  
In 1985, the statute read as follows, in pertinent part:  
Any person who incites, induces or exhorts any 
other person to . . . do any act which would 
constitute a felony . . . shall be punished in the 
same manner as if he had committed the offense  
incited, induced or exhorted.  
The Rehkopf majority held that  
§ 157b does not subject a person to criminal 
responsibility for utterances that do not result in 
the commission of the offense sought to be  
committed.  A person who does no more than utter 
words seeking the commission of an offense is 
subject to liability only for the common-law  
offense of solicitation. [Id. at 205.][19]  
Justice BOYLE and Chief Justice WILLIAMS dissented, opining that  
§ 157b contained no requirement “that the solicitation result  
in either actual incitement or completion of the solicited  
offense.” Id. at 223.  
In 1986, the Legislature rewrote § 157b.  The first  
clause of current subsection 157b(3) (“a person who solicits  
another person to commit a felony”), apart from using the term  
19This Court pointed out that “[s]olicitation remains a 
common-law offense in Michigan for which a maximum of five 
years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine may be imposed” pursuant 
to MCL 750.505. 422 Mich 204, n 3.  
24  
 
 
“solicits,” is quite similar to the phrase “[a]ny person who  
incites, induces or exhorts any other person to do any act  
which would constitute a felony” as used in the prior version  
of § 157b.  However, the Legislature apparently deemed it  
necessary–reasonably so, in light of the Rehkopf Court’s  
construction of § 157b–to clarify that the solicited act need  
not be completed in order to satisfy the elements of the  
statute.  
Accordingly, the second clause of subsection 157b(3)  
provides further that the statute is violated where the  
defendant “solicits another person to do or omit to do an act  
which if completed would constitute a felony” (emphasis  
supplied).  It is quite probable that the Legislature believed  
that the phrase “solicits another person to commit a felony”  
would not have reached solicitations in which the solicited  
act never came to fruition, and that the second clause was  
added for this purpose.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
This Court has never recognized the doctrine of  
impossibility.
 Moreover, we are unable to discern any  
legislative intent that the doctrine may be advanced as a  
defense to a charge of attempt under MCL 750.92.  Accordingly,  
the circuit court erred in dismissing this charge on the basis  
that it was “legally impossible” for defendant to have  
committed the crime.  
25  
Furthermore, although we do not agree with the circuit  
court or the Court of Appeals that “legal impossibility” was  
properly invoked by defendant as a defense to the charge of  
solicitation, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal of this  
charge.  There is no evidence that defendant solicited anyone  
“to commit a felony” or “to do or omit to do an act which if  
completed would constitute a felony.”  
Accordingly, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and  
remand this matter to the circuit court for proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  We do not retain jurisdiction.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
26  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116967  
CHRISTOPHER THOUSAND,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion  
that the doctrine of "legal impossibility" has never been  
adopted in Michigan.  There is ample evidence to the contrary  
in the case law of the state. Because "legal impossibility"  
is a viable defense, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
decision affirming the circuit court's dismissal of attempted  
distribution of obscene material to a minor.  MCL 750.92,  
722.675.  
I would also find that legal impossibility, while a  
viable defense to solicitation, is inapplicable to the charge  
of 
solicitation 
to 
commit 
third-degree 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct  
  
 
in this case.  MCL 750.157b(3)(a), 750.520d(1)(a).  I agree  
with the majority's conclusion that there is no evidence that  
defendant solicited anyone to commit CSC-3. 
Therefore, I  
would affirm the Court of Appeals decision affirming the  
circuit court's dismissal of the solicitation charge, but on  
different grounds.  
I. "LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY" IN MICHIGAN  
The 
majority 
errs 
in 
concluding 
that 
"legal  
impossibility" has never been adopted in Michigan.  It focuses  
on language in Tinskey1 pertaining to "legal impossibility" as  
a defense to attempt, but ignores the reasoning of the  
decision.
 Viewing the forest as well as the trees, one  
observes that the reasoning and the conclusion of the Tinskey  
Court prove that it accepted the doctrine of "legal  
impossibility."  
Tinskey held that the defendants could not be guilty of  
conspiracy to commit abortion because the woman who was to be  
aborted was not pregnant. Tinskey, supra at 109. The Court  
reasoned that the Legislature, in enacting the statute,  
purposely 
required 
that conspiracy to abort involve a pregnant  
woman. It thereby rejected prosecutions where the woman was  
not pregnant.  It concluded that the defendants in Tinskey  
could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit abortion  
1People v Tinskey, 394 Mich 108; 228 NW2d 782 (1975).  
2  
 
 
  
because one of the elements of the crime, a pregnant woman,  
could not be established.  
Significantly, the Tinskey Court stated that "[t]he  
Legislature has not, as to most other offenses, so similarly  
indicated that impossibility is not a defense."  Id.2  By this  
language, Tinskey expressly recognized the existence of the  
"legal impossibility" defense in the common law of this state.  
Even though the reference to "legal impossibility" regarding  
the crime of attempt may be dictum, the later statement  
regarding the "impossibility" defense was part of the  
reasoning and conclusion in Tinskey. This Court recognized  
the defense, even if it did not do so expressly concerning  
charges for attempt or solicitation.  
Moreover, Michigan common law3 is not limited to  
decisions from this Court. The majority should not ignore  
decisions from the Court of Appeals.  That Court has accepted  
2I take this to mean that with respect to conspiracy to 
abort, as with most other statutory crimes, the Legislature 
has not indicated that impossibility is not a defense.  Hence, 
it is a defense.  
3Common law is "the body of those principles and rules of 
action, relating to the government and security of persons and 
property, which derive their authority solely from usages and 
customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and 
decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing 
such usages and customs . . . . In general, it is a body of 
law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as 
distinguished from legislative enactments."  Black's Law  
Dictionary (6th ed), p 276.  
3  
 
 
 
 
"legal impossibility" as a defense.  
For example, in People v Ng, the Court of Appeals  
distinguished between "factual impossibility" and "legal  
impossibility" 
in 
rejecting a defendant's argument that he was  
not guilty of attempted murder.  156 Mich App 779, 786; 402  
NW2d 500 (1986). It found that factual impossibility is not  
a defense to a charge of attempted murder, but observed that  
legal impossibility is a defense, citing Tinskey. Similarly,  
in People v Cain, the court distinguished between "legal  
impossibility" and a defense based on a claim of right. 238  
Mich App 95, 117-119; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).  It implicitly read  
Tinskey as acknowledging the existence of the "legal  
impossibility" defense.4  Accordingly, in this case, the Court  
of 
Appeals 
correctly 
considered 
"legal 
impossibility" 
a 
viable  
defense.  
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTEMPT STATUTE  
Even 
if 
"legal 
impossibility" were not part of Michigan's  
common 
law, 
I 
would 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's  
interpretation of the attempt statute.  It does not follow  
from the fact that the statute does not expressly incorporate  
4See also People v Genoa, 188 Mich App 461, 464; 470 NW2d  
447 (1991).  Genoa held that the circuit court correctly 
dismissed the charge of attempted possession with intent to 
deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine.  Judge Shepherd based 
the holding on the fact that it was legally impossible for the 
defendant to have committed the offense.  
4  
the 
concept 
of 
impossibility that the defense is inapplicable.  
Examination of the language of the attempt statute leads  
to a reasonable inference that the Legislature did not intend  
to punish conduct that a mistake of legal fact renders  
unprohibited.  The attempt statute makes illegal an ". . .  
attempt to commit an offense prohibit by law . . . ." MCL  
750.92 (emphasis added). It does not make illegal an action  
not prohibited by law.  Hence, one may conclude, the  
impossibility of completing the underlying crime can provide  
a defense to attempt.  
This reasoning is supported by the fact that the attempt  
statute 
codified 
the 
common-law rule regarding the elements of  
attempt.  See People v Youngs, 122 Mich 292, 293; 81 NW 114  
(1899); People v Webb, 127 Mich 29, 31-32; 86 NW 406 (1901).  
At common law, "legal impossibility" is a defense to attempt.  
United States v Hsu, 155 F3d 189, 199-200 (CA 3, 1998);  
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (2d ed), § 27.07[B], p  
369; 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 178, p 254.  Absent a  
statute expressly abrogating "legal impossibility," this  
common-law rule continues to provide a viable defense.  
Bandfield v Bandfield, 117 Mich 80, 82; 75 NW 287 (1898),  
rev'd in part on other grounds Hosko v Hosko, 385 Mich 39; 187  
5  
 
NW2d 236 (1971).5  
This 
state's 
attempt statute, unlike the Model Penal Code  
and various state statutes that follow it, does not contain  
language allowing for consideration of a defendant's beliefs  
regarding "attendant circumstances."  Rather, it takes an  
"objective" view of criminality, focusing on whether the  
defendant actually came close to completing the prohibited  
act.  1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 85(a), pp 423-424;  
§ 85(b), p 426, n 22.  The impossibility of completing the  
offense is relevant to this objective approach because  
impossibility 
obviates the state's "concern that the actor may  
cause or come close to causing the harm or evil that the  
offense seeks to prevent." Id. at 424.  
The majority's conclusion, that it is irrelevant whether  
it would be impossible to have committed the completed  
offense, 
contradicts 
the language used in the attempt statute.  
If an element of the offense cannot be established, an accused  
cannot be found guilty of the prohibited act.  The underlying  
offense in this case, disseminating or exhibiting sexual  
material to a minor, requires a minor recipient.  Because the  
dissemination was not to a minor, it is legally impossible for  
5The Bandfield Court stated: 
"The legislature should 
speak in no uncertain manner when it seeks to abrogate the 
plain and long-established rules of the common law.  Courts  
should not be left to construction to sustain such bold  
innovations." Id. at 82.  
6  
defendant to have committed the prohibited act.  
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision,  
determining that it was legally impossible for defendant to  
have committed the charged offense of attempted distribution  
of obscene material to a minor, MCL 750.92, 722.675.  
III. THE SOLICITATION STATUTE  
I further disagree with the majority's conclusion that  
"legal impossibility" is not a recognized defense to a  
solicitation charge.  As discussed above, the defense has been  
implicitly acknowledged in Michigan's case law.  The majority  
states that no authority supports the proposition that "legal  
impossibility" is a defense to solicitation in other  
jurisdictions.  However, this fact is unremarkable in light of  
the rarity with which the defense is invoked.  Moreover, "the  
impossibility issue can arise in all inchoate offenses,"  
including solicitation. Robinson, § 85(f)(2), p 436.  
The language of our solicitation statute demonstrates  
that an illegal solicitation must concern an act that would  
constitute a felony if completed.  The statute states, "a  
person who solicits another person to commit a felony, or who  
solicits another person to do or omit to do an act which if  
completed would constitute a felony, is punishable as follows  
. . . ." MCL 750.157b(3).  
"Legal impossibility" would be a defense if the  
7  
 
defendant's goal were illegal but the offense incomplete due  
to 
the 
defendant's 
factual mistake concerning the legal status  
of a relevant circumstance. See Dressler, § 27.07[D][3][a],  
p 373 (discussing "hybrid legal impossibility"). 
In this  
case, defendant was mistaken regarding the legal status of  
"Bekka," whom he believed to be a female minor but who was  
actually a male adult.  
However, defendant's factual mistake is irrelevant in  
analyzing the charge of solicitation to commit third-degree  
criminal sexual conduct. Even if he had made his request to  
engage in sexual intercourse to a fourteen-year-old girl,  
defendant, not the girl, would have violated the CSC-3  
statute.  Therefore, I agree with the majority that defendant  
did not solicit "Bekka" to commit an act that constituted a  
felony within the meaning of the solicitation statute.  
I note that this is the same conclusion reached by the  
Court of Appeals.  See People v Thousand, 241 Mich App 102,  
111; 614 NW2d 674 (2000).  That Court erred, however, in  
applying a "legal impossibility" analysis.  It was not  
defendant's mistake regarding the minority status of "Bekka"  
that is significant. Rather, an element of the solicitation  
charge is missing.  "Legal impossibility" is, therefore,  
irrelevant under the facts of this case.  The solicitation  
charge was properly dismissed because the prosecution could  
8  
 
not prove all elements of the crime.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
As judges, we often decide cases involving disturbing  
facts.  However repugnant we personally find the criminal  
conduct charged, we must decide the issues on the basis of the  
law.  I certainly do not wish to have child predators loose in  
society.  However, I believe that neither the law nor society  
is served by allowing the end of removing them from society to  
excuse unjust means to accomplish it.  In this case, defendant  
raised a legal impossibility argument that is supported by  
Michigan case law.  The majority, in determining that legal  
impossibility is not a viable defense in this state, ignores  
that law.  
In keeping with precedent and legal authority, I would  
affirm the Court of Appeals decision that it was legally  
impossible for defendant to commit the charged offense of  
attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor.  Of  
course, if this view prevailed, defendant could still be  
prosecuted for his alleged misconduct. He is to be tried on  
the most serious of the charges, child sexually abusive  
activity, MCL 750.145c.  
With regard to the solicitation charge, I disagree with  
the majority's conclusion that "legal impossibility" is not a  
defense to solicitation.  However, the defense does not apply  
9  
 
under the facts of this case. Even if the facts had been as  
defendant believed, defendant did not solicit "Bekka" to  
commit CSC-3.  Hence, an essential element of the solicitation  
charge is missing.  The charge was properly dismissed for that  
reason, not because of the availability of the "legal  
impossibility" defense.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
10  
 
 
____________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee,  
No. 116967  
CHRISTOPHER THOUSAND,  
Defendant-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant.  
TAYLOR, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts and  
its excellent analysis of why “hybrid legal impossibility”  
should not be recognized as a defense to a charge of attempt  
under MCL 750.92.  Thus, I concur with parts I, II, III(A),  
and III(B) of the majority opinion.  
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s  
analysis of the solicitation of third-degree criminal sexual  
conduct (CSC 3) charge in part III(C).  In my view, defendant  
may be charged with solicitation on the basis of the evidence  
that he solicited a person whom he believed to be a fourteen­
year-old child to engage in an act of sexual penetration even  
though a child victim of such an act of CSC 3 would not be  
guilty of CSC 3 for “voluntarily” engaging in the act.  
My difference with the majority is in its understanding  
of the solicitation statute, MCL 750.157b(3).  That section  
provides in pertinent part:  
[A] person who solicits another person to 
commit a felony, or who solicits another person to  
do or omit to do an act which if completed would  
constitute 
a 
felony, 
is 
punishable 
as  
follows:. . . . [Emphasis added.]  
As to the first clause (“a person who solicits another  
person to commit a felony”), I agree with the majority that  
defendant cannot be considered to have asked “Bekka” to commit  
the felony of CSC 3 in violation of the solicitation statute  
because she cannot commit this felony by engaging in sex with  
an adult.  If an adult and a child aged thirteen to fifteen  
engage in an act of “consensual” sexual penetration, only the  
adult would be committing the crime of CSC 3.1  Thus, an adult  
who asks a fourteen-year-old child to engage in such an act  
cannot be considered to have asked the child to commit CSC 3.  
That is, the solicitor has not breached the first clause in  
1 The CSC 3 statute provides, in pertinent part, that 
“[a] person is guilty of [CSC 3] if the person engages in 
sexual penetration with another person and . . . [t]hat other 
person is at least 13 years of age and under 16 years of age.” 
MCL 750.520d(1)(a).  As one would expect, this language is 
phrased so as to impose criminal liability on an adult who 
engages in sexual penetration with a child aged thirteen to 
fifteen without imposing liability on the child victim of the 
crime.  
2  
this section.  
However, regarding the disjunctive clause that follows  
the first clause, i.e., “or who solicits another person to do  
or omit to do an act which if completed would constitute a  
felony,” this language is broader in scope than merely  
prohibiting a person from soliciting another person to commit  
a felony.  I believe this language makes it unlawful to  
solicit another person to do an act that if the act were  
completed would be a felony. While this part of the statute  
surely is not as clear as it could be,2 we must use statutory  
construction rules to give it meaning.  A primary rule is that  
we should avoid making the second clause a nullity by giving  
it the same meaning as the first clause.3  Using this tool, I  
conclude that the second clause means it is unlawful to  
solicit another person to join with the solicitor in doing an  
act that would constitute a felony whether the solicited party  
could be guilty of the felony or not.  
2 Perhaps the Legislature will want to consider revising  
the solicitation statute to employ more straightforward 
language in place of the phrase “to do or omit to do an act 
which if completed would constitute a felony.”  
3 “It is a maxim of statutory construction that every 
word of a statute should be read in a way as to be given 
meaning, and a court should avoid a construction that would 
render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”  In re  
MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 414; 596 NW2d  
164 (1999); see also People v Warren, 462 Mich 415, 429, n 24; 
615 NW2d 691 (2000) (no word of a statute should be treated as 
surplusage or rendered nugatory).  
3  
This all means that the first clause requires that the  
solicited act would be a felony for which the solicitee could  
be charged.  The second clause encompasses situations where  
the solicitee could not be charged with the felony, but the  
solicitor could be.  This construction of the statute gives  
viability to both clauses of the section at issue and is,  
thus, in my view, not only preferable, but required.  
The gist of the majority opinion, with regard to the  
solicitation issue, is that the second phrase, i.e., “or who  
solicits another person to do or omit to do an act which if  
completed would constitute a felony,” is merely clarifying  
language to make clear that the Legislature did not intend to  
require that the solicitee actually complete the solicited  
felony in order for the solicitor to have violated the  
statute.  That is, the majority states that the second clause  
was “intended to make clear that the solicited offense does  
not have to be completed.”  Slip op, p 23.  Yet, the majority  
seems to acknowledge that the first clause is also violated by  
a solicitation to commit a felony even if the felony is never  
actually completed.  This, then, makes the second clause a  
nullity.  It is that outcome that disciplined readers of  
statutes should avoid.  
Also, the majority indicates that my interpretation is  
contrary to the plain language of the statute because “it is  
4  
the act of ‘another person’ that must, if completed,  
‘constitute a felony.’”  Slip op, p 23. I disagree because  
the majority’s view on this point fails to give meaning to the  
words “if completed.”  If, as the majority argues, the conduct  
of the solicitee in itself must constitute a felony, then the  
language of the second phrase has no different meaning than if  
it simply referred to “an act which ... would constitute a  
felony.” The reason is that, if the statutory language read  
“or who solicits another person to do or omit to do an act  
which would constitute a felony,” then it might well be argued  
that the solicited person’s contemplated “act,” standing  
alone, must constitute a felony for the statute to be  
violated.  However, the “if completed” language allows for the  
imposition of liability where completion of the solicited act  
by another person would necessarily constitute a felony.  
I agree with the majority that the current language of  
the solicitation statute, MCL 750.157b, seems to be in large  
measure a reaction to this Court’s interpretation of the  
preceding statutory language at issue in People v Rehkopf, 422  
Mich 198; 370 NW2d 296 (1985).  However, that means only that  
the 
Legislature 
intended to include circumstances in which the  
solicited felony is never actually committed within the scope  
of the solicitation statute.  Indeed, the language of the  
first clause proscribing a person from merely asking another  
5  
person “to commit a felony” suffices, by its plain and  
unambiguous meaning, to accomplish that goal. That does not  
mean, however, that the Legislature might not have wanted to  
cover more situations inasmuch as it was acting to broaden the  
scope of the statute. Accordingly, the discussion of Rehkopf  
does not alter my view that, in keeping with the canon of  
construction against rendering statutory language nugatory or  
surplusage, the second clause must be taken as encompassing  
more than the first clause, standing alone, does.  
Turning to the circumstances of the present case, there  
was 
evidence 
that 
defendant 
solicited 
“Bekka,” 
believing 
“her”  
to be a fourteen-year-old child, to engage in an act of sexual  
penetration with him.  In other words, defendant solicited  
“Bekka” to engage with him in an act of sexual penetration  
between an adult and a fourteen-year-old child.  Thus,  
defendant solicited “Bekka” to do an act that, “if completed”  
by 
the 
participation 
of defendant, would constitute the felony  
of CSC 3 on defendant’s part.  Accordingly, I conclude that  
such a solicitation falls within the range of conduct in the  
solicitation statute’s prohibition of soliciting another  
person “to do . . . an act which if completed would constitute  
a felony.” MCL 750.157b(3).  
Of course, I recognize that because “Bekka” was actually  
Deputy William Liczbinski, an adult, the solicited person  
6  
could not actually have committed the act envisioned by  
defendant.  However, that is immaterial. There is nothing in  
the language of the pertinent part of the solicitation  
statute, MCL 750.157b(3), that requires that it be possible  
for the solicited person to carry out the conduct that is  
solicited in order for the statute to be violated.  Thus,  
consistent 
with 
the 
majority opinion’s rejection of the “legal  
impossibility” defense, I conclude that it is immaterial that  
the deputy could not have carried out the solicited act.  
Accordingly, 
I 
agree with the majority’s treatment of the  
attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor charge.  
However, I would also reverse the Court of Appeals with regard  
to the solicitation of CSC 3 charge, and would remand to the  
circuit court for trial on that charge.  
7