Title: American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 87585-Agenda 11-March 2000.
AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 								Appellant, v. MICHAEL SAVICKAS et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed September 28, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Michael Savickas stands convicted of the first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992)) of Thomas S. Vinicky
(Thomas). Elizabeth Vinicky, the administrator of Thomas's estate
(Elizabeth), has sued Savickas for wrongful death and survival.
Savickas tendered the defense of his suit to his insurer, American
Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family). American
Family filed the instant declaratory judgment action to determine
whether it must defend or indemnify Savickas. American Family
contends that it should be excused from doing so because the
policy did not apply to bodily injury "expected or intended by any
insured." The circuit court of Cook County granted American
Family summary judgment. Savickas and Elizabeth appealed, and
the appellate court reversed, with one justice dissenting. 304 Ill.
App. 3d 614. We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)),
and now reverse.
BACKGROUND
	Savickas shot and killed Thomas outside the New Gold Coast
Inn in March 1988. Elizabeth brought suit against Savickas in her
capacity as the administrator of Thomas' estate, eventually filing
the amended four-count complaint upon which American Family
was granted summary judgment. Count I of the amended
complaint, captioned "Intentional Tort/Murder/ Wrongful Death,"
brought a claim under the wrongful death act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,
ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.) for Thomas' childrens' loss of affection.
Count II, captioned "Intentional Tort/Murder Survival Action,"
sought damages for Thomas' pain and suffering prior to his death.
Count III, captioned "Negligence/Wrongful Death," was, like
count I, a claim under the wrongful death act. However, this count
alleged that Savickas had been negligent in shooting Thomas, in
that he either negligently shot him, "negligently assessed a need
for self defense" when he shot him, or both. Count IV, captioned
"Negligence/Survival Action," sought damages for Thomas' pain
and suffering prior to his death and contended that Savickas had
been negligent in the same manner alleged in count III.
	Savickas tendered his defense to his homeowner's insurer,
American Family. American Family paid for Savickas' defense.
However, American Family also filed the instant declaratory
judgment action against Savickas and Elizabeth, seeking a
determination that Savickas' acts were excluded from coverage
and that as a result American Family owed him neither the duty to
indemnify nor the duty to defend. Relying on language in its
policy, American Family moved for summary judgment in the
declaratory judgment action. The policy provides in relevant part
that American Family would
		"pay, up to our limit, all sums for which any insured is
legally liable because of bodily injury or property damage
caused by an occurrence covered by this policy. We will
defend any suit, even if the suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent provided the suit resulted from bodily injury or
property damage not excluded under this coverage."
(Emphasis omitted.)
An "Exclusions" portion of the policy provided in part that the
above coverage should not apply to bodily injury or property
damage "which is expected or intended by any insured." American
Family provided the court with a certified copy of Savickas' April
1990 conviction and a copy of the appellate court opinion
affirming that conviction (People v. Savickas, 230 Ill. App. 3d 322
(1992)). American Family also attached excerpts from the
transcript of Savickas' testimony at his criminal trial. In those
excerpts Savickas admitted that the gun did not go off
accidentally. He testified to the effect that he intentionally pointed
the gun at the decedent and intentionally pulled the trigger while
the gun was so aimed.
	The trial court denied American Family's motion in October
1994. Subsequently, in April 1995, the court dismissed the
declaratory judgment action with leave to reinstate after final
resolution of Savickas' post-conviction petition, which was then
still pending. The court reinstated the case on American Family's
motion in August 1996 after the dismissal of Savickas's post-conviction petition was affirmed on appeal.
	In November 1996 the trial court reconsidered its earlier
ruling and granted summary judgment to American Family. The
court held that based on Savickas' conviction and the testimony he
gave at his criminal trial, there was conclusive proof that Savickas
had expected to cause harm. The court explicitly ruled only that
Savickas had "expected" the harm, not that he had "intended" it.
The court stated that this ruling would have no impact on the
underlying case.
	Savickas and Elizabeth appealed, and the appellate court
reversed. 304 Ill. App. 3d 614. The appellate court held that an
insurer's duty to defend is determined solely according to the
allegations of the complaint in the underlying case. Since the
negligence allegations in the complaint were potentially covered
by the policy, the insurer had the duty to defend. The appellate
court held that it was precluded from according estoppel effect to
Savickas's criminal conviction by this court's decision in
Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132 (1978). This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
	Here, American Family presents several alternative arguments
for affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In one
way or another, all of the arguments are based on Savickas'
criminal conviction. Because we find that it is proper in this case
to accord estoppel effect to the criminal conviction, we need not
consider the other arguments raised by appellant.
I. Contract Construction
	Initially, we note that the parties do not allege any
circumstance obligating the insurer to defend the insured other
than the contract between them. Accordingly, the threshold issue
is one of contract construction. The construction of an
unambiguous insurance policy provision is a question of law, and
the policy's terms are to be applied as written unless those terms
contravene public policy. Roberts v. Northland Insurance Co., 185 Ill. 2d 262 (1998). The pertinent language in the contract in this
case is relatively straightforward. American Family contracted to
"defend any suit, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent
provided the suit resulted from bodily injury or property damage
not excluded under this coverage." Excluded from coverage was
bodily injury or property damage "which is expected or intended
by any insured." Thus, according to the relevant terms of the
contract, American Family is obligated to defend Savickas, its
insured, from any suit except suits for bodily injury or property
damage which he expected or intended. The parties call to our
attention no public policy concern which might militate against
applying this language as written.
II. Estoppel by Prior Criminal Conviction
	American Family contends that it should not be required to
defend or indemnify Savickas because his criminal prosecution
conclusively established that he intended the injury. American
Family recognizes that this argument is contrary to this court's
decision in Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132 (1978), but urges
nevertheless that Savickas should be estopped, especially
considering the fact that he was convicted of first degree murder.
	Thornton was an appeal from a garnishment action by a
judgment creditor against an insurer. The creditor obtained a
default judgment on a negligence theory against the insured, then
attempted to collect the judgment from the insurer. There, as here,
the insurer contended that its insured's criminal conviction should
be held to conclusively establish that the acts in question fell
within a policy exclusion. We declined to find a criminal
conviction constituted conclusive proof of the facts upon which it
was based. Rather, we held a conviction constituted only prima
facie evidence, which would "preserve[ ] the opportunity to rebut
the factual basis of the conviction insofar as those facts are
applicable to the civil proceeding." Thornton, 74 Ill. 2d  at 151. For
the reasons stated below, we overrule this portion of Thornton.
	In Thornton we stated that the "majority of courts which
permit the use of criminal convictions as evidence in civil cases
appear to hold *** that the criminal conviction is prima facie
evidence of the facts. (See Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1301
(1951).)" Thornton, 74 Ill. 2d  at 149. This observation no longer
holds true. As the Arkansas Supreme Court recently observed,
"today in the vast majority of jurisdictions *** a criminal
conviction now acts as a bar and collaterally estops the retrial of
issues in a later civil trial that were actually litigated in the
criminal trial." Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 428, 985 S.W.2d 737, 740 (1999) (collecting authorities and overruling its prior
precedent to allow estoppel effect to be accorded to criminal
convictions). Commentators have observed for years that this
practice has become increasingly accepted with the demise of the
mutuality requirement. See, e.g., T. Sawaya, Use of Criminal
Convictions in Subsequent Civil Proceedings: Statutory Collateral
Estoppel Under Florida and Federal Law and the Intentional Act
Exclusion Clause, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 479, 490-92 (1988); J. Thau,
Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal
Determinations: Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications
for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 Geo. L.J. 1079, 1086-95
(1982). See also 50 C.J.S. Judgments §922 (1997); 47 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments §732 (1995). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
also endorses allowing third parties to draw preclusive effect from
issues determined in criminal convictions, so long as the ordinary
requirements for estoppel are met. See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments §85(2) (1982).
	Upon careful reflection we believe that the modern trend is
correct. As the authorities have noted, the differences between
civil and criminal litigation all favor the criminal defendant. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §85, Comment c (1982); 40
U. Fla. L. Rev. at 490; 70 Geo. L.J. at 1089; Zinger, 336 Ark. at
428, 985 S.W.2d  at 740. First and foremost, the State must prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous
verdict, a greater burden than that faced by any civil litigant. The
defendant may remain silent and the State is prohibited from
commenting on his silence. Moreover, the defendant has the right
to counsel and to a record paid for by the State on appeal. See
Zinger, 336 Ark. at 429, 985 S.W.2d  at 740-41, quoting
Teitlebaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601,
375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962); Clark, 583 N.W.2d  at
382; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §85, Comment c (1982);
47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §732, at 209 (1995). These differences
militate, if anything, in favor of according estoppel effect to
criminal convictions because of the greater safeguards in favor of
their reliability. It surely could not inspire faith in our judicial
system to hold that a criminal conviction, upon which society may
deprive a defendant of his liberty, or indeed his very life, is not
worthy of the same preclusive effect as may be accorded an
ordinary civil judgment.
	Of course, as we shall discuss below, the court must evaluate
a number of factors before deciding whether to allow estoppel in
any given case. It will not always be correct to allow estoppel.
Nevertheless, we believe we must dismantle the barrier we erected
in Thornton.
	Our overruling of this portion of Thornton has been
foreshadowed by decisions of this court. Contrary to our holding
in Thornton that criminal convictions should not be accorded
estoppel effect, it has long been the rule in this state that criminal
convictions constitute "conclusive evidence of guilt" in attorney
disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., In re Scott, 98 Ill. 2d 9, 16
(1983) ("Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is
conclusive evidence that grounds for imposing discipline exist.
This court will not go behind the conviction"); In re Callas, 82 Ill. 2d 6, 14 (1980); In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill. 2d 586, 588 (1958) (and
cases cited therein). In Talarico we noted that the rule was
acknowledged generally to be the opposite of that stated in
Thornton, although the parties in that case did not contest the
issue. See Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 193 (1997) ("[i]t is
generally accepted that a criminal conviction collaterally estops a
defendant from contesting in a subsequent civil proceeding the
facts established and the issues decided in the criminal
proceeding"). And our statement in Thornton that the prior
criminal conviction "does not conclusively establish that there was
no duty to defend" (Thornton, 74 Ill. 2d at 151) has also been
chipped away by previous decisions. See, e.g., State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Martin, 186 Ill. 2d 367, 377 (1999) (finding "little
difficulty" in concluding as a matter of law that actions of insured
who had been convicted of arson fell outside of policy coverage,
notwithstanding that "for strategic reasons" the plaintiffs in
underlying case had "phrase[d] their complaints in terms of
negligence").
	We reiterate that by our holding here we overrule only that
portion of Thornton regarding the effect of a prior conviction in a
subsequent civil case. The Thornton analysis of what constitutes
fulfillment of an insurer's duty to defend when there is a conflict
in interest between the insurer and the insured remains good law.
See Thornton, 74 Ill. 2d  at 152-56. We also uphold the rule that it
is inappropriate to resolve a declaratory judgment action in such
a manner as would bind the parties in the underlying litigation on
any issues therein.
A. Estoppel of Savickas
	We have determined that estoppel effect may be accorded to
a prior criminal conviction in an appropriate case. The next step is
to determine whether this is such a case.
	Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the application of
which precludes a party from relitigating an issue decided in a
prior proceeding. Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (1997).
There are three threshold requirements which must be met before
the doctrine may be applied. First, the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical with the one presented in the suit in
question. Second, there must have been a final judgment on the
merits in the prior adjudication. Third, the party against whom
estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication. People v. Nance, 189 Ill. 2d 142,
147 (2000); Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191. Additionally, the party
sought to be bound must actually have litigated the issue in the
first suit and a decision on the issue must have been necessary to
the judgment in the first litigation. Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191.
Although once it was also required that the parties to the previous
and current case be identical, the "mutuality" requirement was
eliminated in Illinois in 1979. See Illinois State Chamber of
Commerce v. Pollution Control Board, 78 Ill. 2d 1 (1979).
	Even when the threshold requirements are satisfied, the
doctrine should not be applied unless it is clear that no unfairness
will result to the party sought to be estopped. Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d
at 191-92; Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447, 467-68
(1996). The court determining whether estoppel should apply must
balance the need to limit litigation against the right to an
adversarial proceeding in which a party is accorded a full and fair
opportunity to present his case. Also potentially relevant is the
party's incentive to litigate the issue in the prior action. Even a
party who did litigate an issue in a prior case might not be
estopped by the result therein if he can " 'show that the original
litigation was a side show rather than a struggle to the finish.' "
Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 196, quoting G. Hazard, Revisiting the
Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related
Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 584 (1981); see also
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §28 (1982).
	We find Savickas may be estopped with his murder
conviction. First, all of the threshold requirements are satisfied. In
Savickas' criminal prosecution he was held to have committed
first degree murder in shooting Thomas. See People v. Savickas,
230 Ill. App. 3d 322, 323 (1992), citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2). By finding him guilty of first degree murder
the jury necessarily found him either to have intended to kill the
victim, or at least to have known that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),
(a)(2) (West 1992). This finding establishes that he "intended or
expected" the result of his actions, the issue in the declaratory
judgment action. See Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267,
272 (1994) (tort intent generally means " 'a desire to cause
consequences or at least [a] substantially certain belief that the
consequences will result' "), quoting 1 M. Polelle & B. Ottley,
Illinois Tort Law §1.01, at 1-3 n.8 (2d ed. 1993); Restatement
(Second) of Torts §8A, Comment b, at 15 (1965) ("[i]f the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain,
to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law
as if he had in fact desired to produce the result"). There was a
final judgment on the merits in the criminal litigation, to which
Savickas was obviously a party. Savickas litigated the issue to a
jury verdict (and ensuing appeals) and a determination of his
mental state was necessary to his conviction. See People v.
Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 118 (1995) (even if defendant argues self-defense, the jury must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant killed victim without lawful justification and either
intended the victim's death or knew that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm, before proceeding to
determine whether defendant proved mitigating factor by a
preponderance of the evidence).
	Nor do we see any potential unfairness to Savickas in
estopping him with his criminal conviction. Savickas had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate all relevant issues in his criminal
trial, and did so. It cannot seriously be questioned that he had a full
incentive to litigate his criminal trial. Savickas was facing charges
of first degree murder for the shooting death of his victim, a
charge with a minimum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment and a
potential maximum penalty of 60 years' imprisonment even in the
absence of any aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a)
(West 1992). All of the requirements for application of collateral
estoppel are present in this case. We find this is the appropriate
result. Accordingly, Savickas is estopped by his criminal
conviction. He therefore is precluded from arguing now that his
conduct was not intentional, as this issue was determined
adversely to him in the previous case.
	We recognize that the estoppel in the instant case is
technically "offensive." We have previously cautioned against the
unrestricted use of offensive collateral estoppel, in which a
plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant. See, e.g., Kessinger, 173 Ill. 2d  at 461; In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 399 (1988). There are two
considerations militating against offensive estoppel. First, it
encourages potential plaintiffs to adopt a "wait and see" approach
rather than joining litigation against the defendant, because the
plaintiff could estop the defendant if the prior case were decided
against the defendant, whereas a verdict in favor of the defendant
would not estop the procrastinating plaintiff. Owens, 125 Ill. 2d  at
398-99, quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
330, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 561, 99 S. Ct. 645, 651 (1979). In addition,
offensive estoppel could be unfair to the defendant if the prior
litigation involved comparatively minor damages or if the
defendant had more beneficial procedural opportunities available
in the second suit which could readily change the result. Owens,
125 Ill. 2d  at 399.
	We find the concerns mentioned in Owens do not militate
against allowing American Family to estop Savickas. As a
preliminary matter, we note that although this case does fit the
technical definition of "offensive" collateral estoppel, in that the
plaintiff is seeking to estop the defendants, a declaratory judgment
action is somewhat different in nature than most lawsuits. Rather
than the plaintiff attempting to obtain redress for a past wrong, the
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action simply seeks
construction of a governmental regulation or written instrument
and a declaration of the rights of the parties involved. 735 ILCS
7/2-701(a) (West 1998); see also Waste Management, Inc. v.
International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 205-06
(1991). In this suit American Family is attempting to determine its
obligations in advance in order to preempt a subsequent suit in
which it would be named defendant. It is debatable whether this
case should be treated as one involving "offensive" collateral
estoppel.
	In any event, however, assuming arguendo that our warning
in Owens against the unrestricted use of offensive estoppel should
be heeded in declaratory judgment actions, neither of the concerns
raised there give any pause in the instant case. First, American
Family was not utilizing a "wait and see" approach. American
Family was of course unable to join the criminal proceeding and
moreover had no reason to file its declaratory judgment action
until Elizabeth filed the underlying lawsuit and Savickas tendered
his defense. And, as previously discussed, Savickas clearly had
full incentive to litigate the charge of first degree murder, and he
had a fair opportunity to do so. Moreover, Savickas had a far
greater procedural advantage in the criminal trial than he would in
a civil contest with American Family. See 70 Geo. L.J. at 1089
("the obvious procedural differences between criminal and civil
proceedings actually favor applying collateral estoppel in a
subsequent civil proceeding. A criminal defendant receives
procedural protections surpassing those accorded any civil litigant,
and thus cannot legitimately question the adequacy of his
opportunity to litigate or the reliability of the determinations
made"). 
	We find that American Family may collaterally estop
Savickas with his criminal conviction. In the criminal prosecution
it was established that Savickas intended the harm which is the
subject of the underlying suit. Accordingly, that harm falls within
a policy exclusion, and American Family has no duty to defend
Savickas. Because American Family has no duty to defend, it also
will have no duty to indemnify Savickas against a judgment in the
underlying case. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1993); B. Ostrager & T.
Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes §5.08, at
254 (9th ed. 1998).
B. Estoppel of Elizabeth
	American Family urges that it may estop not only Savickas,
but also Elizabeth, the plaintiff in the underlying tort action, with
the verdict in the criminal trial. At first glance this may seem an
unlikely result. Elizabeth clearly was not a party to the criminal
suit and in the criminal suit her interests would appear to have
been wholly antagonistic to Savickas' interests, just as they are
antagonists in the underlying tort suit. However, in this declaratory
judgment action it is American Family, not Savickas, who seeks
to estop Elizabeth. This is a crucial point.
	As previously noted, the only source for any duty owed by
American Family is its contract with Savickas. Elizabeth cannot
proceed against American Family directly before obtaining a
judgment against Savickas. See Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance
Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 332-33 (1968). Once she has obtained a
judgment against Savickas, Elizabeth's rights against American
Family would be wholly derivative of Savickas' contractual right
to indemnity, and she can have no greater rights against American
Family than he. Meyer v. Aetna Casualty Insurance Co., 46 Ill.
App. 2d 184, 190 (1964) ("As a general rule, a judgment creditor
is in no better position in a suit [against an insurance company]
than the insured, and any defense which the insurer may assert
against the insured may be asserted as a defense against the injured
party"). See also Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d 444, 451 (1981)
(noting that in garnishment action against insurer the judgment
creditor of insured "stood in [the] shoes" of the insured);
McRoberts v. Adams, 60 Ill. 2d 458, 464 (1975) (dismissing
garnishment action by judgment creditor against insurance
company after determining that no coverage was provided by the
company to the putative insured for the incident in question).
Because of the derivative nature of her rights, Elizabeth is bound
by the prior criminal action just as is Savickas in this litigation
against American Family. See Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Clark, 583 N.W.2d 377 (N.D. 1998); State Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35 (Me. 1991); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Reuter, 299 Or. 155, 700 P.2d 236 (1985); Tradewind
Insurance Co. v. Stout, 85 Haw. 177, 938 P.2d 1196 (App. 1997);
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Yon, 118 Idaho 367, 796 P.2d 1040 (App. 1990). Contra, Massachusetts Property Insurance
Underwriting Ass'n v. Norrington, 395 Mass. 751, 756, 481 N.E.2d 1364, 1368 (1985) (recognizing general rule that the
injured party has no greater rights than the insured against the
insurer but holding that allowing the injured party to proceed
against the insurer despite the insured being estopped from doing
so "does no violence to the substantive principle"). See also Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414
(1991) (insurer granted declaratory judgment that insured's first
degree manslaughter conviction established that injuries were
intentionally caused and thus not covered by policy); D'Arata v.
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1990) (insurer not required to pay
judgment against insured despite insurer's failure to provide
defense, because plaintiff in underlying suit was estopped by
insured's criminal conviction from relitigating insured's intent);
Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 207 Mont. 409,
673 P.2d 1277 (1984) (insurer allowed to rely on insured's
conviction for arson to bar insured and insurer of surrounding
property from recovering for fire damage).
	Accordingly, in the declaratory judgment action, Elizabeth is
precluded from contending that Savickas' actions in shooting the
decedent were not intentional.
	
III. Negligent Assessment of the Need for Self-Defense
	Elizabeth contends that the duty to defend may still be
predicated on the allegation in the complaint that Savickas
negligently assessed a need for self-defense against Thomas before
shooting him, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton,
289 Ill. App. 3d 855 (1997); Topps v. Ferraro, 235 Ill. App. 3d 43
(1992); Wegman v. Pratt, 219 Ill. App. 3d 883 (1991); and
Blackburn v. Johnson, 187 Ill. App. 3d 557 (1989). American
Family urges that these authorities were decided incorrectly, and
requests that we overrule them. We need not determine whether
Illinois law supports a free-standing cause of action based on
negligent assessment of the need for self-defense, however,
because the criminal conviction estops Elizabeth and Savickas on
this theory as well.
	At his criminal trial, Savickas argued that he was acting in
self-defense and argued in the alternative that his offense should
be reduced to second degree murder because he unreasonably
believed that he was acting in self-defense. Savickas, 230 Ill. App.
3d at 329-33. By its verdict that Savickas was guilty of first degree
murder the jury necessarily resolved both of these issues against
Savickas. Accordingly, since we have already determined that in
the declaratory judgment action the criminal conviction should be
accorded preclusive effect with respect to both Savickas and
Elizabeth, both are barred from asserting that Savickas
believed-even unreasonably-that he was acting in self-defense.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we find the trial court properly
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff American Family on its
declaratory judgment action. The judgment of the appellate court
is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.