Title: State ex rel. Daily Services, LLC v. Morrison

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Daily Servs., L.L.C. v. Morrison, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2151.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2151 
THE STATE EX REL. DAILY SERVICES, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. MORRISON,1 
ADMR., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Daily Servs., L.L.C. v. Morrison, Slip Opinion No. 
2018-Ohio-2151.] 
Workers’ compensation—Bureau of Workers’ Compensation did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined that short-term temp agency wholly 
succeeded the business operations of long-term temp agency for purposes 
of transferring long-term agency’s unpaid premium liabilities to short-term 
agency under former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1)—Court of 
appeals’ judgment granting writ of mandamus reversed. 
(No. 2017-0251—Submitted February 13, 2018—Decided June 6, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 14AP-405, 2016-Ohio-8333. 
                                                 
1 Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Sarah D. Morrison, the current administrator of the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation, is automatically substituted for Stephen Buehrer, the former administrator, 
as a party to this action. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, the administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation, appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
granting a writ of mandamus that orders the administrator to vacate the November 
14, 2013 order of the administrator’s designee finding that appellee, Daily Services, 
L.L.C., was the successor to I-Force, L.L.C., and was responsible for I-Force’s 
rights and obligations under former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C), 2006-2007 
Ohio Monthly Record 1-79, effective July 27, 2006, and to enter an order finding 
that Daily Services is not the successor to I-Force. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and deny the writ of mandamus. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 3} Daily Services is a temporary-employment agency owned by Ryan 
Mason that focuses on short-term or daily staffing.  Mason also owned another 
temporary-employment agency called I-Force that focused on long-term staffing.  
The businesses were located in adjacent buildings on Morse Road in Columbus.  
Each agency had its own workers’ compensation policy. 
{¶ 4} In 2008, I-Force’s workers’ compensation premium increased to 
approximately $3.5 million based on its poor claims history.  I-Force did not pay 
its premium for the second half of 2008, which was due by February 28, 2009. 
{¶ 5} During an audit of Daily Services conducted in April 2009, the bureau 
learned that I-Force had closed over the weekend of March 21-22, 2009, but that 
the business appeared to be continuing to operate through Daily Services.  
Consequently, the bureau concluded that Daily Services was the successor-in-
interest to I-Force and therefore was responsible for all of I-Force’s existing and 
future financial rights and obligations, effective March 23, 2009.  In addition, the 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
bureau combined the experience of the two companies pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 
4123-17-02(B), to establish the premium rate of Daily Services, as the successor. 
{¶ 6} On June 1, 2009, Daily Services received from the bureau an invoice 
for more than $3.48 million for I-Force’s unpaid premiums.  On June 15, 2009, 
Daily Services filed a protest objecting to the bureau’s determination that it was the 
successor to I-Force.  The protest was referred to an adjudicating committee of the 
bureau for a hearing on the merits of the bureau’s decision.  The committee affirmed 
the bureau’s decision to combine the experience of the two entities.  Daily Services 
did not appeal the committee’s order. 
{¶ 7} The bureau held another hearing on March 20, 2013, to resolve the 
issue of successor liability after it was determined in related collection proceedings 
that the adjudicating committee had not decided the successorship issue from the 
2009 protest.  Two of the bureau’s employees testified on its behalf: Nancy Archer, 
who conducted the 2009 investigation into I-Force’s transfer of operations to Daily 
Services, and Heidi Pack, who reviewed the information from Archer and 
determined that Daily Services had successor liability.  Daily Services presented no 
witnesses. 
{¶ 8} Following the hearing, the adjudicating committee again denied the 
June 2009 protest.  The committee concluded that Mason’s maneuvering of I-
Force’s business operations to Daily Services amounted to a voluntary transfer of 
business operations.  Thus, the committee determined that Daily Services was the 
successor to I-Force under former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1). 
{¶ 9} Daily Services appealed.  The matter was referred to the 
administrator’s designee, who determined that the adjudicating committee used the 
proper legal standard and that Daily Services wholly succeeded I-Force for 
purposes of the transfer of I-Force’s rights and obligations under the workers’ 
compensation law, including I-Force’s unpaid premiums, pursuant to former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1) (“Where one employer wholly succeeds another in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
the operation of a business, the bureau shall transfer the predecessor’s rights and 
obligations under the workers’ compensation law”). 
{¶ 10} The designee itemized the evidence set forth by the adjudicating 
committee, which included Daily Services’ hiring of I-Force’s permanent staff over 
the weekend of March 21-22, 2009, its assumption of I-Force’s property and 
computer leases, its payment of I-Force’s federal quarterly taxes, and its purchase 
of the right to use the “I-Force” name.  The designee also identified evidence that 
Daily Services had added manual codes in preparation for acquiring I-Force’s 
clients, had contacted I-Force’s clients to have them sign new contracts with a name 
change only, and had ranked the profitability of I-Force’s clients.  And the designee 
noted that Mason ceased all I-Force business as of March 23, 2009. 
{¶ 11} Daily Services filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that 
the bureau’s denial of the 2009 protest was an abuse of its discretion. 
{¶ 12} The magistrate assigned to the case at the court of appeals noted that 
former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1), in effect in 2009, did not define “wholly 
succeeds” and that case law provided little guidance on the meaning of the phrase.  
But, the magistrate noted, the rule was amended in 2010 to expressly provide that 
“an employer wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business when ‘[t]he 
succession transaction is entered into for the purpose of escaping obligations under 
the workers’ compensation law.’ ”  State ex rel. Daily Servs., L.L.C. v. Buehrer, 
2016-Ohio-8333, ¶ 66, quoting former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1)(d), 
2009-2010 Ohio Monthly Record 2-3058, effective July 5, 2010.  According to the 
magistrate, the bureau’s findings would have been proper under this version of the 
rule but were not relevant under the version of the rule that was in effect in 2009.  
Thus, the magistrate concluded that the facts did not support a finding that Daily 
Services wholly succeeded I-Force. 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals overruled the bureau’s objections and adopted 
the magistrate’s decision.  The court acknowledged that Daily Services 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
“orchestrated a business strategy to take over the most profitable aspects of I-
Force’s business” but concluded that doing so did not establish that Daily Services 
had “wholly succeeded” the business operations of I-Force.  Id. at ¶ 12.  The court 
of appeals therefore granted a writ of mandamus ordering the bureau to vacate the 
order of the administrator’s designee. 
{¶ 14} This matter is before this court on the direct appeal of the bureau.  A 
cross-appeal filed by Daily Services was dismissed for failure to prosecute.  149 
Ohio St.3d 1424, 2017-Ohio-4132, 75 N.E.3d 1279. 
Analysis 
{¶ 15} The Workers’ Compensation Fund is funded by compulsory 
contributions from employers and is administered by the state.  Ohio Constitution, 
Article II, Section 35.  The bureau is required to adopt rules with respect to the 
collection, maintenance, and disbursements of the fund, including special rules 
“necessary to safeguard the fund and that are just in the circumstances.”  R.C. 
4123.32(B).  These special rules cover “the rates to be applied where one employer 
takes over the occupation or industry of another,” and “the administrator may 
require that if any employer transfers a business in whole or in part or otherwise 
reorganizes the business, the successor in interest shall assume, in proportion to the 
extent of the transfer, * * * the employer’s account.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} This case involves former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C), which 
provided: 
 
 
Succeeding employers—risk coverage transfer. 
(1)  Whenever one employer succeeds another employer in 
the operation of a business in whole or in part, the successor shall 
notify the bureau of the succession.  Where one employer wholly 
succeeds another in the operation of a business, the bureau shall 
transfer the predecessor’s rights and obligations under the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
workers’ compensation law.  The successor shall be credited with 
any credits of the predecessor, including the advance premium 
security deposit of the predecessor.  This paragraph shall apply 
where an employer wholly succeeds another employer in the 
operation of a business on or after September 1, 2006. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  2006-2007 Ohio Monthly Record 1-79, effective July 
27, 2006.2 
{¶ 17} The issue before us is whether the bureau abused its discretion when 
it determined that Daily Services “wholly succeed[ed]” I-Force in the “operation of 
a business” for purposes of transferring I-Force’s unpaid premium liabilities to 
Daily Services pursuant to former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1).  An abuse 
of discretion occurs when there is no evidence upon which the bureau could have 
based its decision.  State ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. v. 
Lancaster, 22 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 489 N.E.2d 288 (1986).  So long as there is 
some evidence in the record to support the decision, then the bureau acted within 
its discretion and the granting of a writ of mandamus is not warranted.  State ex rel. 
Secreto v. Indus. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 581, 582-583, 687 N.E.2d 715 (1997). 
{¶ 18} The bureau argues that as part of its statutory duty to safeguard the 
Workers’ Compensation Fund, it is within its discretion under the version of former 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02 applicable to this case to deem an employer to have 
“wholly succeeded” another when nothing remains of the predecessor employer 
after the successor employer assumes the predecessor’s business operations.  Thus, 
the bureau contends, even if Daily Services did not assume every customer, 
                                                 
2  Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C) was amended, effective July 2010, to require transfer of the 
predecessor’s rights and obligations when the succession transaction was entered into for the 
purpose of escaping financial obligations under the workers’ compensation law.  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1), 2009-2010 Ohio Monthly Record 2-3058, effective July 5, 2010.  The 
bureau did not apply this provision and does not contend that it applies to the facts of this case.   
January Term, 2018 
 
7
employee, or lease held by I-Force, it wholly succeeded the business operations of 
I-Force, which no longer existed after the weekend transfer in March 2009.  The 
bureau also maintains that its statutory obligation to safeguard the fund authorizes 
it to find that an employer is a “successor in interest” when that employer attempts 
to evade workers’ compensation liabilities. 
{¶ 19} We agree. 
Daily Services “wholly succeeded” the business operations of I-Force even if it 
did not assume every customer, employee, or lease held by I-Force before the 
transfer 
{¶ 20} This court has held that a successor-in-interest, for workers’ 
compensation purposes, is simply a transferee of a business in whole or in part.  
State ex rel. Lake Erie Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.3d 81, 83-84, 578 
N.E.2d 458 (1991).  The transfer must be voluntary.  State ex rel. Valley Roofing, 
L.L.C. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 122 Ohio St.3d 275, 2009-Ohio-2684, 910 
N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 5.  A transfer may be in a manner other than by a purchase.  State 
ex rel. K & D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer, 135 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-734, 985 
N.E.2d 1270, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 21} The bureau maintains that the transfer of business operations from 
one entity to another does not require counting the assets that the successor 
acquired.  The bureau argues that the evidence established that over the course of 
one weekend, Daily Services assumed I-Force’s business functions, including 
many of its employees, leases, and best customers.  The bureau further argues that 
because I-Force then ceased to exist, Daily Services wholly succeeded the business 
operations of I-Force. 
{¶ 22} The evidence supports this conclusion.  The administrator’s designee 
detailed the transfer of I-Force’s permanent employees, leases, and contracts to 
Daily Services over the weekend before I-Force ceased doing business, Mason’s 
planning the transition in advance by establishing a system ranking I-Force’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
customers based on creditworthiness and payment history, and Mason’s adding 
new manual codes to Daily Services’ account in preparation for workers’ 
compensation coverage for those customers moving from I-Force to Daily Services. 
{¶ 23} The administrator’s designee also relied on statements from I-
Force’s regional supervisors who were told to contact I-Force’s clients and have 
them sign new contracts informing them that it was a name change only with no 
interruption of services.  Finally, the evidence indicated that on March 23, 2009, 
Mason ceased operating I-Force altogether. 
{¶ 24} Thus, even if Daily Services did not assume every customer, 
employee, or lease held by I-Force, there was some evidence to support the 
conclusion that Daily Services wholly succeeded I-Force for purposes of the 
version of former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C) applicable here.  As of March 
23, 2009, nothing remained of I-Force except the business functions that were 
assumed by Daily Services.  The bureau did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that Daily Services wholly succeeded the business operations of I-
Force. 
The bureau’s statutory obligation to safeguard the Workers’ Compensation Fund 
authorizes it to find that an employer is a “successor in interest” when that 
employer attempts to evade workers’ compensation liabilities 
{¶ 25} The bureau has a fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the Workers’ 
Compensation Fund.  R.C. 4123.32(B); State ex rel. Harry Wolsky Stair Builder, 
Inc., v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.3d 222, 224, 569 N.E.2d 900 (1991).  This 
responsibility includes detecting and thwarting an employer’s scheme to avoid its 
workers’ compensation liabilities. 
{¶ 26} Below, the court of appeals acknowledged that Mason intentionally 
orchestrated a business strategy for Daily Services to take over the most profitable 
aspects of I-Force’s business by cherry-picking customers, employees, and 
business locations.  Under these circumstances, the bureau did not abuse its 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
discretion when it concluded that Daily Services was the successor-in-interest to I-
Force based on the evidence that Mason was attempting to evade workers’ 
compensation liabilities. 
{¶ 27} When an order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, 
there is no abuse of discretion and a reviewing court must not disturb the order.  
State ex rel. Avalon Precision Casting Co. v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 
2006-Ohio-2287, 846 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 9.  The final order of the administrator’s 
designee, affirming the March 20, 2013 decision of the adjudicating committee, 
concluded that the adjudicating committee correctly analyzed the evidence in light 
of the proper standard in effect at the time of the transfer—whether Daily Services 
wholly succeeded I-Force—under the version of former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-
02(C)(1) at issue here and that the committee based its decision on extensive 
evidence in the record.  Therefore, the bureau did not abuse its discretion, and Daily 
Services failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to relief in mandamus. 
{¶ 28} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’DONNELL and DEWINE, 
JJ. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} Because the plain language of former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02, 
2006-2007 Ohio Monthly Record 1-79, effective July 27, 2006, compels the 
conclusion that appellee, Daily Services, L.L.C., did not wholly succeed I-Force, 
L.L.C., in the operation of its business, I dissent.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a writ of mandamus to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
compel the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) to vacate its order finding 
that Daily Services is I-Force’s successor-in-interest. 
{¶ 30} R.C. 4123.32 directs appellant, the administrator of the BWC, to 
adopt rules concerning  
 
the collection, maintenance, and disbursements of the state 
insurance fund including * * * : 
* * * 
(B) Such special rules as the administrator considers 
necessary to safeguard the fund and that are just in the 
circumstances, covering the rates to be applied where one employer 
takes over the occupation or industry of another or where an 
employer first makes application for state insurance, and the 
administrator may require that if any employer transfers a business 
in whole or in part or otherwise reorganizes the business, the 
successor in interest shall assume, in proportion to the extent of the 
transfer, as determined by the administrator, the employer’s 
account and shall continue the payment of all contributions due 
under this chapter. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 31} We have recognized that R.C. 4123.32(B) “is an enabling statute and 
does not independently impose any employer obligation.”  State ex rel. Health Care 
Facilities, Inc. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 80 Ohio St.3d 642, 646, 687 N.E.2d 763 
(1998). 
{¶ 32} The BWC’s administrator exercised this authority to promulgate 
rules regarding successor liability and adopted former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-
02(C)(1), which at the times relevant to this appeal provided: 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
 
Whenever one employer succeeds another employer in the 
operation of a business in whole or in part, the successor shall notify 
the bureau of the succession.  Where one employer wholly succeeds 
another in the operation of a business, the bureau shall transfer the 
predecessor’s 
rights 
and 
obligations 
under 
the 
workers’ 
compensation law. 
 
2006-2007 Ohio Monthly Record 1-79, effective July 27, 2006. 
{¶ 33} As we recently explained in In re A.J., “[w]e apply the same rules of 
construction to interpreting administrative regulations as we do to interpreting 
statutory provisions.”  148 Ohio St.3d 218, 2016-Ohio-8196, 69 N.E.3d 733, ¶ 19.  
We therefore “give the words of the administrative rules their plain and ordinary 
meaning to discern the intent of the rule.”  Id.  And when the language of a rule is 
plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, it must be 
applied, not interpreted.  See Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 
549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000); Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 
413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 34} Former 
Ohio 
Adm.Code 
4123-17-02(C)(1) 
is 
plain 
and 
unambiguous.  The word “wholly” means “to the full or entire extent: without 
diminution or reduction: ALTOGETHER, COMPLETELY, TOTALLY.”  (Capitalization 
sic.)  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2612 (2002).  And we have 
explained that for purposes of workers’ compensation law, succession is not the 
same as the legal concept of corporate succession but, rather, involves the voluntary 
act of one employer transferring its business operations to another.  State ex rel. 
K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer, 135 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-734, 985 N.E.2d 
1270, ¶ 13, 15.  Successor liability therefore applies only when one employer 
voluntarily transfers its entire business operations to another. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 35} Moreover, a comparison of R.C. 4123.32(B) and former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1) reveals that although the General Assembly 
authorized the administrator to impose successor liability when the employer 
“transfers a business in whole or in part or otherwise reorganizes the business,” the 
rule imposed liability only “[w]here one employer wholly succeeds another in the 
operation of a business.”  Similarly, the rule required a successor to notify the BWC 
when it succeeded the business operations of another “in whole or in part,” yet in 
the next sentence, the rule provided for successor liability only when one employer 
wholly succeeded another.  The use of different words conveys the intent that those 
words have different meanings.  Huntington Natl. Bank v. 199 S. Fifth St. Co., 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1082, 2011-Ohio-3707, ¶ 18; State v. Steele, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 105085, 2017-Ohio-7605, ¶ 15.  Therefore, succession in part, a 
business reorganization, or anything short of a total transfer is not sufficient to 
establish that one employer has wholly succeeded another in the operation of a 
business. 
{¶ 36} In this case, according to Heidi Pack, the BWC employee who 
determined that Daily Services was I-Force’s successor, I-Force’s “business” was 
providing its customers with temporary workers.  And the most important aspect of 
that business was I-Force’s relationship with its customers; she testified that “if 
they didn’t take any of the clients over there, * * * there’s no successorship there.”  
However, Rick Fazzina, chief financial officer of Daily Services, averred that the 
company “captured thirty-four point seven percent (34.7%) of I-Force’s payroll 
when it closed.”  Reviewing comparisons of Daily Services’ and I-Force’s 
customers, the administrator’s designee found that “on day one of business, Daily 
Services had approximately half of I-Force’s business” and “30 percent of the 
customers.”  And the lead opinion itself recognizes that Daily Services “cherry-
pick[ed]” I-Force’s customers.  Lead opinion at ¶ 26.  Therefore, because Daily 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
Services did not receive I-Force’s entire business—i.e., its relationship with its 
customers—it did not wholly succeed I-Force in the operation of that business. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, Daily Services entered new contracts with a number of I-
Force’s former employees and clients and assumed some of its business leases.  
Other than the transfer of the right to use the I-Force name, there is no asset-
purchase agreement or assignment of contractual rights in this record.  In fact, at 
the hearing before the BWC adjudicating committee, the BWC’s auditor, Nancy 
Archer, testified that three of I-Force’s employees were bound by noncompete 
agreements and did not believe that they could sign new contracts with Daily 
Services. 
{¶ 38} In State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc., we rejected the view that one 
employer, K&D Group, wholly succeeded the business operations of another 
employer, Mid-America Management Corporation, when K&D Group “hired some 
former employees of Mid-America, assumed management of the leases that the 
prior apartment-complex owner had with its tenants, and operate[d] under the same 
workers’ compensation manual numbers as Mid-America.” 135 Ohio St.3d 257, 
2013-Ohio-734, 985 N.E.2d 1270, at ¶ 16.  Rather, we concluded that “K&D Group 
merely contracted with the new owner to assume management of the existing 
apartment complex.  Thus, the [BWC] abused its discretion when it treated K&D 
Group as a successor in interest.” Id. 
{¶ 39} Similarly, here, I-Force did not transfer its entire business 
operations, but rather, Daily Services entered new contracts with some of I-Force’s 
former employees, clients, and lessors.  As in K&D Group, that is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that Daily Services wholly succeeded I-Force’s business operations. 
{¶ 40} The lead opinion also states that the BWC “did not abuse its 
discretion when it concluded that Daily Services was the successor-in-interest to I-
Force based on the evidence that [Ryan] Mason [the owner of Daily Services and 
I-Force] was attempting to evade workers’ compensation liabilities.”  Lead opinion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
at ¶ 26.  In essence, the lead opinion concludes that regardless of the meaning of 
the rule, the BWC’s decision to declare Daily Services liable for I-Force’s 
obligations is justified by the BWC’s fiduciary duty to protect the state insurance 
fund.  However, the administrator promulgated former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-
02(C)(1) as the means of protecting the fund in these circumstances, and the “BWC 
and the commission must follow their own rules as written. * * * They cannot give 
selective effect to provisions to produce a desired result or otherwise change them 
without complying with the R.C. Chapter 119 rule-making procedure,” State ex rel. 
Health Care Facilities, Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d at 647, 687 N.E.2d 763. 
{¶ 41} This does not mean that I-Force can evade its liability under 
workers’ compensation law.  However, rather than taking the shortcut of invoicing 
a separate corporate entity that received none of I-Force’s corporate assets other 
than the right to use the I-Force name, the BWC has to pursue other remedies to 
recoup the unpaid premiums from I-Force (or its owner, if it can pierce the 
corporate veil).  See Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. Mullins, 140 Ohio App.3d 375, 377-
378, 747 N.E.2d 856 (4th Dist.2000) (explaining that the BWC could seek recovery 
for unpaid premiums through garnishment proceedings). 
{¶ 42} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
granting a writ of mandamus to compel the BWC to vacate its order holding Daily 
Services liable for I-Force’s unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. 
 
O’DONNELL and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and John Smart, Assistant Attorney 
General; and Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., L. Bradfield Hughes, James 
A. King, and David S. Bloomfield Jr., for appellant. 
_________________