Title: Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1956   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
James E. Kochanski and Cynthia Kochanski, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wisconsin and Kathleen 
Sebelius,  
Secretary of the United States Department of 
Health and  
Human Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 519, 822 N.W.2d 736 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John Siefert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Jay R. Starrett, Lisa M. Lawless, Thomas Gonzalez, 
Erin M. Keesecker, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Ross Anderson.   
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Donald H. 
Piper, Patrick A. O’Neil, and Piper & Schmidt, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Patrick A. O’Neil. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1956 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV12191) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James E. Kochanski and Cynthia Kochanski, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wisconsin and 
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's order2 
affirming the jury's verdict, which found Speedway SuperAmerica, 
LLC (Speedway) liable for injuries James Kochanski sustained 
                                                 
1 Kochanski v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, No. 2011AP1956, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012). 
2 The Honorable Judge John Siefert of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
2 
 
when he fell outside one of Speedway's stores.  Speedway 
appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously gave the 
absent witness instruction, that the verdict should be reversed 
because it is contrary to the greater weight of the credible 
evidence, and that a new trial should be granted in the interest 
of justice.  The court of appeals reversed on the jury 
instruction issue and remanded for a new trial.  It did not 
reach Speedway's other two arguments.   
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  The 
circuit court's decision to give the absent witness instruction 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion because there was no 
evidence in the record that the absent witnesses, former 
Speedway employees who had been on duty at the time of the 
accident, were material and within Speedway's control or that it 
was more natural for Speedway, rather than Kochanski, to call 
them.  Furthermore, Speedway's decision not to call the former 
employees did not reasonably lead to the conclusion that it was 
unwilling to allow the jury to have "the full truth."  Ballard 
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 616, 148 N.W.2d 65 
(1967).  And finally, the instruction was prejudicial because 
without drawing a negative inference about Speedway's snow 
removal methods and processes from Speedway's decision not to 
call the former employees, the jury would not have found that 
Kochanski satisfied the notice element of his safe-place claim 
that was necessary to liability.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision and remand for a new trial.  
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On February 6, 2007, Kochanski filled his car with gas 
at a Speedway convenience store in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  
Between one half and two inches of snow had fallen that morning.  
When the machine at the pump would not process his credit card, 
Kochanski decided to pay for his purchase inside.  As he 
approached the front door of the store, he noticed a yellow curb 
on either side of the door and a patch of snow in the middle, 
which he assumed was a curb ramp to provide wheelchair access.  
The curb ramp was actually located four or five feet to his 
left.  Having misjudged the ramp location, Kochanski either 
slipped or tripped on the curb, breaking his arm and injuring 
his wrist.  He brought this suit in which he alleges that 
Speedway violated both its common law duty of care and the safe-
place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11 (2009-10).3 
¶4 
At a May 2011 jury trial, Kochanski proffered the 
following evidence in support of his claims:  (1) his own 
testimony regarding the circumstances of the fall; (2) video 
footage from the store's surveillance camera that captured the 
fall; (3) deposition testimony of his treating physician 
regarding his injuries; (4) testimony of his wife regarding the 
impact the accident had on her and her husband's lives; and (5) 
Speedway's interrogatory responses that identified five former 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
4 
 
employees who were on duty at the time of the accident and 
provided their last known addresses.  
¶5 
In defending against the imposition of liability, 
Speedway relied on the video that captured the fall.  Speedway 
explained to the jury that it had been unsuccessful in its 
attempt to locate the manager on duty at the time of the 
accident, but no testimony was necessary because the video was 
sufficient to prove that it was not liable.  
¶6 
Based on Speedway's decision not to call any former 
employees as witnesses, Kochanski requested, and the court gave, 
the absent witness instruction, which provides: 
 
If a party fails to call a material witness 
within [its] control, or whom it would be more natural 
for that party to call than the opposing party, and 
the party fails to give a satisfactory explanation for 
not calling the witness, [the jury] may infer that the 
evidence which the witness would give would be 
unfavorable to the party who failed to call the 
witness.  
Wis JI——Civil 410.  The court reasoned that the jury had a right 
to know about Speedway's snow removal methods and processes.  It 
explained that since Speedway did not call former or current 
employees who would have known about those methods and processes 
and the video did not show whether the premises was salted 
before the accident, the instruction was proper.  
¶7 
During 
closing 
arguments, 
Kochanski's 
attorney 
capitalized on the instruction, arguing as follows: 
 
The law says——and you've taken an oath to follow 
the law——that if there is a witness that would have 
been natural for SuperAmerica to call to explain to 
you what was done on this day, you can infer that had 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
5 
 
they called that witness, they would have gotten some 
unfavorable testimony.  
 
Why didn't [Speedway] call anybody?  What would 
that unfavorable testimony have been? Other evidence 
that's missing in this case. . . . 
 
Not a single document, and not [a] single 
witness.  It makes you wonder what's going on[.]  What 
is it that's being decided at the highest levels of 
SuperAmerica?  How will they defend these cases?  Why 
don't you get to hear the whole story? 
¶8 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Kochanski and 
awarded the plaintiffs $317,545.58 in damages, which represented 
Kochanski's medical expenses and pain and suffering, as well as 
Cynthia Kochanski's loss of society and companionship.  The 
circuit court affirmed the verdict and denied Speedway's request 
for a new trial.  
¶9 
On appeal, Speedway argued that the circuit court 
erroneously gave the absent witness instruction.  Specifically, 
it said that the missing witnesses were not material because 
their testimony would have been cumulative of the video and that 
it is not necessarily more natural for defendant-employer to 
call former employees.  The court of appeals agreed4 with 
Speedway that the record lacked the facts necessary to give the 
absent witness instruction.  We granted review and now affirm 
the court of appeals.  
                                                 
4 Judge Fine filed a dissenting opinion in which he 
concluded that the instruction was appropriate because Speedway 
did not prove "via evidence" that the former employees were not 
within its control or that it had a satisfactory reason for not 
calling them.  
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 A circuit court has broad discretion to instruct a 
jury.  Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, ¶50, 246 
Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301.  This does not mean, however, that 
a jury instruction is insulated from review.  Facts of record 
must support the instruction and the instruction must correctly 
state the law.  Id.  We independently review whether these two 
criteria are met.  State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶9, 281 Wis. 2d 
654, 698 N.W.2d 594. 
¶11 The correctness of the jury instruction affects the 
validity of a jury's verdict.  State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 
87, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998).  However, an "erroneous jury 
instruction warrants reversal and a new trial only if the error 
was prejudicial."  Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 
N.W.2d 10 (1992).  An error is prejudicial when it probably 
misled the jury.  Id. at 850.  Put another way, "an error 
relating to the giving or refusing to give an instruction is not 
prejudicial if it appears that the result would not be different 
had the error not occurred."  Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 
Wis. 2d 743, 751, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975). 
B.  Absent Witness Instruction 
¶12 Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court 
issued a definitive statement of the absent witness rule:  "[I]f 
a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses 
whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that 
he does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
7 
 
produced, would be unfavorable."  Graves v. United States, 150 
U.S. 118, 121 (1893); Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 
1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1990).  As with the best evidence rule5 and 
the spoliation doctrine,6 the absent witness rule is based on the 
notion that: 
[t]he failure to bring before the tribunal some 
circumstance, document, or witness, when either the 
party himself or his opponent claims that the facts 
would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as 
the most natural inference, that the party fears to do 
so; 
and 
this 
fear 
is 
some 
evidence 
that 
the 
circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would 
have exposed facts unfavorable to the party. 
2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 285, at 
192 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979); Robert H. Stier, Jr., 
Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference——Quieting the Loud 
Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 Md. L. Rev. 137, 139-43 (1985). 
¶13 However, contrary to the language of Graves, the 
instruction does not create a presumption; it describes a 
permissible inference.  Booth v. Frankenstein, 209 Wis. 362, 
370, 245 N.W. 191 (1932); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 264, at 322 
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013).  The instruction allows 
jurors to decide whether it was more natural for one party to 
                                                 
5 The best evidence rule provides that "[t]o prove the 
content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original 
writing, 
recording 
or 
photograph 
is 
required, 
except 
as 
otherwise provided . . . by . . . statute."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 910.02. 
6 The spoliation doctrine allows a fact-finder to draw a 
negative inference against a party who destroys relevant 
documents.  Jamie S. Gorelick et al., Destruction of Evidence 
§ 2.1, at 32 (1989). 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
8 
 
call a material witness who was within that party's control than 
for the other party to call the witness and whether the witness' 
absence was satisfactorily explained.7  Furthermore, a court may 
give the instruction only if there are facts in the record that 
would allow the jury to reasonably draw a negative inference 
from the absence of a particular material witness.8  Thoreson v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 237, 201 
N.W.2d 745 (1972); see also State v. Glenn, 199 Wis. 2d 575, 
585, 545 N.W.2d 230 (1996) (instruction on lesser-included 
offense proper only when there is evidence to support it).  In 
other words, materiality, control, and reasonableness of the 
inference are threshold requirements.  We now examine these 
requirements individually. 
1.  Materiality 
¶14 A material witness is one "capable of supplying 
information of strong probative value for the party's case."  
Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 237 (quoting Dodge v. Dobson, 21 Wis. 2d 
200, 205, 124 N.W.2d 97 (1963) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  One cannot assume that a witness has such 
information.  Id. (citing Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d 601).  Rather, the 
                                                 
7 Whether a witness is material is a question of law.  
Jessica J.L. v. State, 223 Wis. 2d 622, 629, 589 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
8 We say "particular" witness because a court cannot 
determine if the witness is material, if it is more natural for 
one party to call the witness, or if a failure to call the 
witness supports a negative inference without first identifying 
that witness.  In other words, these evaluations cannot be made 
in the abstract.  
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
9 
 
record must show that the witness' relationship to the issues in 
the case is such that the witness is capable of producing 
material testimony.  For instance, when a witness' own conduct 
is at issue in a civil trial, the witness is usually material.  
E.g., Coney v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 
520, 527-28, 99 N.W.2d 713 (1959) (instruction was proper when 
the defendant transportation company failed to call the driver 
of its trolley bus, and the driver's negligence was at issue).  
The same holds true when the witness' job required him or her to 
make an assessment relevant to the claim.  E.g., Schemenauer v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 299, 308-09, 149 N.W.2d 644 
(1967) (instruction was proper when the defendant claimed 
amnesia, which was relevant to his credibility but not necessary 
to his claim, and failed to call his treating physician); Dodge, 
21 Wis. 2d at 205 (instruction was proper when the extent of the 
plaintiff's injuries was at issue and she did not call her 
treating physician); DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 204 
Wis. 2d 137, 149-50, 554 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1996) (instruction 
was proper in a bad-faith insurance action when the defendant 
failed to call its field agent who assessed the plaintiff's 
claim).  
¶15 A party also may show that the absent witness has 
material information through other foundational evidence.  For 
example, in Carr v. Amusement, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 177 N.W.2d 
388 (1970), the intoxication of a slip and fall plaintiff was at 
issue.  When the plaintiff did not call his wife, with whom he 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
10 
 
had been sitting at the same end of the bar,9 the court properly 
gave the instruction because "the wife could have produced 
testimony relevant to the events that occurred while she was 
with her husband at the bar, specifically including how much 
alcohol he had consumed."  Id. at 376.  
¶16 When there is no evidence that a witness could supply 
material information, the instruction is improper.  Thoreson 
provides a good example.  In that case, a transportation company 
failed to call a passenger who was riding on a bus that struck a 
child who ran into its path.  The court explained that the 
instruction was improper because "[w]e cannot assume the bus 
passenger was a material witness; he may or may not have seen 
the accident."  Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 237.  Similarly, in 
Ballard, we affirmed a refusal to give the instruction when an 
injured plaintiff did not call her chiropractor because it was 
not "clear from the record" that she saw the chiropractor for 
injuries she sustained in the accident.  Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d at 
614-15.  We also held that a party's mere assertion that a 
witness has material information is insufficient to support 
giving the instruction.  Id. at 615.   
¶17 Additionally, even a witness capable of supplying 
relevant information will not support giving the missing witness 
instruction if that information would be merely cumulative.  
Featherly v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 2d 273, 282-83, 243 N.W.2d 
                                                 
9 Appendix to Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 153, Carr v. 
Amusement, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 177 N.W.2d 388 (1970) (citing 
Transcript of Record at ¶297). 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
11 
 
806 (1976) (testimony of the plaintiff's reconstruction expert 
would have been "superfluous in light of other evidence"); Karl 
v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 78 Wis. 2d 284, 300, 254 N.W.2d 255 
(1977) (testimony of the plaintiff's family physician would have 
been cumulative in light of a psychiatrist's testimony).  
2.  More natural for one party to call a witness 
¶18 As to the second requirement, that a witness be 
peculiarly within one party's control or that it be more natural 
for one party to call a witness than the other party, courts 
"cannot assume the witness was more available to" one party than 
another.10  Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 238.  That it was "more 
natural" for one of the parties to have called an absent witness 
is grounded in the concept that one party had more control over 
the witness than the other party.  McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 
189, 200, 234 N.W.2d 325 (1975).  We have held that it is 
improper to give the absent witness instruction when the witness 
is equally available to both parties.  Capello v. Janeczko, 47 
Wis. 2d 76, 84-85, 176 N.W.2d 395 (1970).  
3.  Absence/Inference relationship 
¶19 Finally, the instruction is proper only when the 
failure to call a witness reasonably leads to the conclusion 
that "the party is unwilling to allow the jury to have the full 
truth."  Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d at 615-16.  This requirement is 
satisfied when a party does not satisfactorily explain its 
                                                 
10 Because 
Kochanski 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
the 
absent 
witnesses were within Speedway's control, we focus on the "more 
natural" prong of this requirement. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
12 
 
failure to call a material witness that is peculiarly within its 
control.  We require that factual foundation to prevent a party 
from "hav[ing] the burden, at his peril, of calling every 
possible witness to a fact, lest his failure to do so will 
result in an inference against him."  Id. at 615.  
¶20 Satisfaction of all three requirements is important 
because 
the 
instruction 
has 
significant 
"potential 
[for] 
inaccuracy 
and 
unfairness." 
 
Stier, 
supra, 
at 
151, 
153 
("qualifications on the use of the rule are intended to limit 
its application to those situations in which the inference has a 
basis in fact").  Assumptions upon which the instruction is 
based are not always true.  For example, the inference assumes 
that a party intentionally fails to produce evidence, yet "such 
an intention is not clear from the mere absence of evidence in 
court."  Id. at 145.  Even if a party intentionally fails to 
call a witness, its decision is not necessarily the product of 
"fear that weaknesses in the case will be exposed" or a 
nefarious desire to hide evidence.  Id.  
¶21 Moreover, modern rules of procedure and evidence11 
create mechanisms by which to accomplish the rule's objectives 
without the risk of "add[ing] a fictitious weight to one side or 
another of the case."  Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 
234 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Herbert, 911 F.2d at 1048 (Federal Rules 
                                                 
11 "If discovery is available but not employed, the party 
ought not to be allowed to resort to the somewhat speculative 
inference 
when 
discovery 
would 
substitute 
certainty."  
McCormick, supra, at 320 n.19 (citing Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 
F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1964)). 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
13 
 
of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "render[] the 
uncalled-witness rule an anachronism.").  
¶22 These concerns have led courts and lawmakers to 
increasingly limit, and in some instances eliminate, the 
instruction.  Stier, supra, at 151; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 52-216c (eliminating the instruction in civil cases); Herbert, 
911 F.2d at 1047 ("the uncalled-witness rule has no place in 
federal trials").  Accordingly, we reiterate that facts in the 
record, 
not 
assumptions 
or 
speculation, 
must 
establish 
materiality, control, and the reasonableness of a negative 
inference before the instruction may be given.  
C.  Application 
¶23 As the court of appeals correctly concluded, the 
record in the present case lacks factual evidence necessary to 
uphold the circuit court's decision to give the absent witness 
instruction.  Starting with materiality, Kochanski presented no 
evidence that the former Speedway employees on duty at the time 
of Kochanski's fall had information of strong probative value.  
Just as the court could not presume a bus passenger saw the 
accident in Thoreson, we cannot presume that employees on duty 
at the time of Kochanski's fall could testify about Speedway's 
snow removal methods and processes or what was done that day.  
See Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 237.  Speedway's witness list 
indicates that it hired a contractor to provide snow removal 
services.   
¶24 As to the circuit court's assertion that current 
employees could testify about Speedway's snow removal methods 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
14 
 
and processes, the record does not contain facts that show that 
a particular current employee could provide information "of 
strong probative value" on that point.  Dodge, 21 Wis. 2d at 
205.  Additionally, Kochanski did not argue to the circuit court 
that the instruction was proper based on Speedway's failure to 
call current employees.  The circuit court appears to have 
constructed that theory, prior to the close of trial, based on 
pure speculation.  This had the effect of improperly placing a 
burden on Speedway to call "possible witness[es] to a fact, lest 
[its] failure to do so will result in an inference against 
[it]."  Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d at 615.  
¶25 Next, Kochanski did not establish that the former 
employees were peculiarly under Speedway's control or that it 
was more natural for Speedway to call former employees than for 
Kochanski to call them.  The circuit court reasoned that it was 
more natural for Speedway to call its former employees because 
Speedway did not effectively prove that the absent witnesses 
were ex-employees and that "[f]or all [the court] know[s], 
they're currently employed in a different SuperAmerica."  It 
also found that even if the witnesses were ex-employees, they 
still had a special relationship with Speedway because "[e]x-
employees . . . have to obtain letters of recommendation for 
future employers from their former employer" and there is a 
possibility that "the manager may be on a pension or a deferred 
pension."  These findings are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  The 
record lacks any evidence that the uncalled witnesses were 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
15 
 
working at a different Speedway, that they had contacted 
Speedway for letters of recommendation, or that the manager was 
drawing a pension from Speedway.   
¶26 Additionally, Kochanski read the names and addresses 
of the former employees into the record, so their whereabouts 
were known to him.  Kochanski had obtained these names and 
addresses through Speedway's answers to his interrogatories, yet 
he made no showing that he could not compel their appearance at 
trial by subpoena.  The safe-place claim was Kochanski's to 
prove; it was not Speedway's obligation to disprove it.   
¶27 The absent witness instruction allows for a negative 
inference in order to encourage parties to present, not conceal, 
relevant evidence.  Herbert, 911 F.2d at 1046.  However, "the 
substance of a witness' testimony is uncertain."  Stier, supra, 
at 145.  This uncertainty is too great to allow for a negative 
inference when an absent witness' relationship to a party is not 
predictive of the witness' testimony.  Without evidence that 
former employees were in the control of or indebted to Speedway, 
there is no reason to conclude that their testimony would 
naturally favor one party or the other. 
¶28 Speedway 
chose 
to 
defend 
its 
liability 
with 
surveillance footage of the accident, which it believed was 
sufficient to prove that it was not liable for Kochanski's 
injuries.  It explained that it did not call the manager on duty 
at the time of the accident because he could not be located at 
his last known address, which was that of his parents who had 
not heard from him in some time.  Kochanski provided no evidence 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
16 
 
that called the truthfulness of Speedway's explanation into 
question.  Kochanski provided no factual foundation in the 
record from which it reasonably could be concluded that there 
existed a relationship between the former employees' absences 
and 
the 
inference 
that 
their 
testimony 
would 
have 
been 
unfavorable to Speedway.  
¶29 Having concluded that the circuit court's decision to 
give the instruction was erroneous; we must next decide if it 
was prejudicial.  This requires an understanding of the 
substantive law that underlies Kochanski's claims. 
D.  Kochanski's Substantive Claims 
¶30 Kochanski's 
complaint 
alleges 
both 
common 
law 
negligence and safe-place claims.  The sole question regarding 
liability reads as follows:  "Was Speedway SuperAmerica LLC, 
through the acts of its employees, negligent in failing to 
maintain the Speedway SuperAmerica premises as safe as its 
nature would reasonably permit on February 6, 2007?"12 
¶31 The 
special 
verdict 
question 
on 
liability 
is 
problematic because common law negligence and the safe-place 
statute involve different standards of care and different 
elements of proof.13  With a negligence claim, a defendant is 
                                                 
12 Special verdict question no. 1.  
13 Compare Sturm v. Simpson's Garment Co., 271 Wis. 587, 74 
N.W.2d 137 (1956).  In that case, the plaintiff pleaded both 
safe-place and ordinary negligence violations.  The special 
verdict questions on the safe-place claim and the negligence 
claim were separated as follows: 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
17 
 
liable when he has a duty of ordinary care that he breaches and 
the breach is a cause of damage to the plaintiff.  Hoida, Inc. 
v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 
N.W.2d 17.  However, with a safe-place claim, an employer or 
owner of a public building has a duty to maintain the building 
as safely as its nature will reasonably permit.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.11(1); Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention 
Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶22, 274 Wis. 2d 162, 682 N.W.2d 857.  
¶32 In order to be subject to the higher standard of care 
under the safe-place statute, a defendant must have actual or 
constructive notice that an unsafe condition or defect exists.  
Megal, 274 Wis. 2d 162, ¶11.  Constructive notice is a fiction 
that attributes knowledge of a fact to a person "as if he had 
actual notice or knowledge although in fact he did not."  Strack 
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 35 Wis. 2d 51, 54-55, 150 N.W.2d 
361 (1967).   
¶33 In Megal, we explained constructive notice further:  
In 
the 
context 
of 
an 
alleged 
safe-place 
violation, the general rule is that an employer or 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Question 1:  Did defendant Simpson's Garment 
Company fail to have the platform here in question as 
free from danger to frequenters as the nature of the 
premises would reasonably permit? . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
Question 3:  Was defendant Simpson's Garment 
Company, at or about the time and place of the 
accident, negligent in failing to furnish a mat to 
cover the platform here in question?   
Id. at 589.  
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
18 
 
owner is deemed to have constructive notice of a 
defect or unsafe condition when that defect or 
condition has existed a long enough time for a 
reasonably vigilant owner to discover and repair it.  
Ordinarily, constructive notice requires evidence as 
to the length of time that the condition existed.  
The length of time required for the existence of 
a defect or unsafe condition that is sufficient to 
constitute 
constructive 
notice 
depends 
on 
the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the 
nature of the business and the nature of the defect.  
We have carved out a limited exception to the general 
rule 
that 
temporal 
evidence 
is 
required 
before 
constructive notice can arise. . . .  
[W]hen an unsafe condition, although temporary or 
transitory, arises out of the course of conduct of the 
owner or operator of a premises or may reasonably be 
expected from his method of operation, a much shorter 
period of time, and possibly no appreciable period of 
time 
under 
some 
circumstances, 
need 
exist 
to 
constitute constructive notice.  
Megal, 
274 
Wis. 2d 
162, 
¶¶12-13 
(internal 
citations 
and 
quotations omitted).  
¶34 As explained above, it is the "general rule . . . that 
constructive notice is chargeable only where the hazard has 
existed for a sufficient length of time to allow the vigilant 
owner or employer the opportunity to discover and remedy the 
situation."  May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 36, 264 
N.W.2d 574 (1978).  In addition, "constructive notice [usually] 
cannot be found when there is no evidence as to the length of 
time the condition existed."  Kaufman v. State St. Ltd. P'ship, 
187 Wis. 2d 54, 59, 522 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, 
when it is reasonably probable that an unsafe condition will 
occur because of the nature of the business, or the manner in 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
19 
 
which the owner conducts the business, a much shorter period of 
time may support constructive notice.  Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 55.   
¶35 Accordingly, if a plaintiff who alleges a safe-place 
violation cannot prove actual notice of an unsafe condition, or 
the length of time the unsafe condition existed sufficient to 
support constructive notice, he or she must prove constructive 
notice by offering evidence of "the nature of the business, the 
nature of the [unsafe condition], and the public policy 
involved" so that the jury could find that the defendant's 
methods and processes would reasonably be expected to give rise 
to the unsafe condition.  May, 83 Wis. 2d at 37.14   
¶36 Speculation as to how long the unsafe condition 
existed 
and 
what 
reasonable 
inspection 
would 
entail 
are 
insufficient to establish constructive notice.  Megal, 274 
Wis. 2d 162, ¶20 (defendant did not have constructive notice of 
french fry on which plaintiff slipped because plaintiff provided 
no "testimony about the usual management and maintenance of a 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Steinhorst v. H. C. Prange Co., 48 Wis. 2d 
679, 684, 180 N.W.2d 525 (1970) (constructive notice satisfied 
when slip and fall plaintiff introduced evidence that a 
defendant retail store's self-service display of shaving cream 
led to spills on the floor on at least five previous occasions 
and that 15 minutes before the accident, a store clerk observed 
"boys playing around" with the display); Strack v. Great Atl. & 
Pac. Tea Co., 35 Wis. 2d 51, 55-56, 150 N.W.2d 361 (1967) 
(defendant grocery store charged with constructive notice when 
its method of operating a self-service fruit display caused an 
unsafe condition). 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
20 
 
61,000 square-foot public building" or what is "reasonable to 
expect for the management of such a facility").15 
¶37 Furthermore, given the weather that often occurs in 
February in Wisconsin, standing alone, a temporary natural 
accumulation of snow is insufficient to provide notice of an 
unsafe condition under the safe-place statute.  See Bersch v. 
Holton St. State Bank, 247 Wis. 261, 262, 19 N.W.2d 175 (1945) 
(concluding that wet floor caused by snow tracked into bank 
while it was snowing did not support liability because constant 
floor mopping was not required).  The safe-place statute does 
not make employers and owners insurers of frequenters.  Megal, 
274 Wis. 2d 162, ¶9.   
¶38 Special verdict question no. 1, the question directed 
to Speedway's liability, asked the jury to determine whether 
Speedway violated the higher standard of care required by the 
safe-place statute because it asked whether Speedway made the 
"premises as safe as its nature would reasonably permit on 
                                                 
15 See also Kaufman v. State St. Ltd. P'ship, 187 Wis. 2d 
54, 522 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1994) (defendant did not have 
constructive notice of a banana on which plaintiff slipped 
because there was no evidence that defendant did or did not do 
something to create the unsafe condition). 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
21 
 
February 6, 2007."16  Therefore, in order to find in Kochanski's 
favor, the jury had to find that Speedway had notice, actual or 
constructive, of the allegedly unsafe condition because notice 
is a required predicate for a safe-place claim.  Topp v. Cont'l 
Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 2d 780, 789, 266 N.W.2d 397 (1978); see also 
Gerdmann v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 367, 371, 
350 
N.W.2d 
730 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984) 
(concluding 
that 
the 
determination of whether the owner had notice of an unsafe 
condition is generally a jury question).  
¶39 It 
was 
Kochanski's 
burden 
to 
"make 
a 
showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of a[ll] element[s] 
essential" to his safe-place claim, here notice of an unsafe 
condition that caused injury.  Transp. Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger 
Constr. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 281, 290-92, 507 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986)).  However, Kochanski presented no evidence that Speedway 
did not have satisfactory snow removal methods and processes or 
that it had satisfactory snow removal methods and processes but 
did not follow them.  The jury had Speedway's surveillance video 
that showed the yellow curb clearly visible through a light 
                                                 
16 Special verdict question no. 1 limits inquiry to the acts 
of Speedway's employees.  However, an owner can violate the 
safe-place statute in other ways.  See Megal v. Green Bay Area 
Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 
162, 682 N.W.2d 857 (citing Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 47, 
212 N.W.2d 2 (1973)) ("safe-place statute addresses unsafe 
conditions, not negligent acts").  Because special verdict 
question no. 1 asked whether the premises was as safe as its 
nature would reasonably permit, the jury had to find that all of 
the requirements of a safe-place claim were met. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
22 
 
accumulation of snow on the walkway where Kochanski fell.  
Therefore, the jury likely coupled the video with the negative 
inference from the jury instruction, as urged by counsel for 
Kochanski, to find that Speedway had constructive notice of an 
unsafe condition.  We next examine prejudice. 
E.  Prejudice 
¶40 When properly used, the absent witness instruction 
will not "act as a substitute for affirmative proof" but rather, 
will be "used by the jury in weighing the evidence actually 
produced."  Zuber v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 74 N.W.2d 641, 650 (Minn. 
1956).  To hold otherwise would cause the instruction to operate 
as a presumption rather than as an inference.  
¶41 Normally, a party seeking relief must produce evidence 
to satisfy each element of his claim and bear the risk of non-
persuasion.  Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. 
Rev. 51, 51 (1961).  However, when one party has evidence within 
its exclusive control, a presumption in favor of the other party 
may be appropriate.  Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable 
Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
307, 314 (1920) (presumptions arise when there is a "need [to] 
relax[] the stringency of the proof," such as when "the power to 
produce evidence of the fact on which the litigant's rights 
depend is exclusively in the power of [his or her] opponent").  
These concepts inform our prejudice analysis. 
¶42 A party cannot rely on the inference from the missing 
witness instruction to satisfy a necessary element of proof for 
that party's claim.  Paulsen Lumber, Inc. v. Anderson, 91 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
23 
 
Wis. 2d 692, 699, 283 N.W.2d 580 (1979) (concluding that "[e]ven 
were the defendant's failure to produce the subpoenaed documents 
without adequate excuse, the resultant inference cannot be used 
to relieve the plaintiff of its obligation to establish a prima 
facie case").  Therefore, an erroneously given absent witness 
instruction is prejudicial when a party with the burden of proof 
uses the inference from the instruction to provide factual proof 
for an element of a claim.  Id.; Zuber, 74 N.W.2d at 650.   
¶43 An 
erroneously 
given 
absent 
witness 
instruction 
misleads jurors when it allows them to find that a party has 
satisfied an element of a claim when it has not.  In other 
words, an erroneously given absent witness instruction is 
prejudicial when the jury could not have found that the party 
requesting the instruction proved all of the elements of his or 
her claim without drawing the inference that a party has 
prevented the jury from having "the full truth."  Paulsen 
Lumber, 91 Wis. 2d at 698-99; Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d at 616.  That 
is precisely what happened in the present case.  
¶44 Without inferring from Speedway's decision not to call 
former employees as witnesses that its snow removal methods and 
processes could reasonably be expected to give rise to an unsafe 
condition or that there were satisfactory methods and processes 
but the employees did not follow them, the jury would not have 
found that Kochanski satisfied the notice element of his safe-
place claim.  Kochanski provided no evidence that Speedway had 
actual notice of an unsafe condition based solely on the video 
showing a light accumulation of snow.  Compare Hannebaum v. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
24 
 
Direnzo & Bomier, 162 Wis. 2d 488, 500, 469 N.W.2d 900 (Ct. App. 
1991) (slip and fall defendants who asked arriving clients about 
continuing weather conditions two-and-one-half hours after their 
agent salted had actual notice of icy conditions).  
¶45 Kochanski also offered no evidence as to how long the 
alleged unsafe condition existed.  His testimony that a Speedway 
employee applied salt to the walkway after his fall does not 
establish the length of time that the snow, which Kochanski 
alleged concealed the curb, contrary to the video depiction, was 
a dangerous condition before the accident.  Nor does the weather 
record from Milwaukee Mitchell Airport, which Speedway used to 
dispute the amount of snow accumulation, establish a dangerous 
condition at the particular Speedway store where the accident 
occurred.  Having submitted special verdict question no. 1 that 
asked the jury whether Speedway made the "premises as safe as 
its nature would reasonably permit," which describes the 
standard of care under the safe-place statute, and without 
proving actual notice of an unsafe condition or the length of 
time the allegedly unsafe condition existed, Kochanski had to 
prove constructive notice to succeed on liability.17 
                                                 
17 There 
is 
an 
additional 
exception 
to 
the 
notice 
requirement under the safe-place statute.  When a defect is 
structural, meaning it "arises by reason of the materials used 
in construction or from improper layout or construction," no 
notice is required.  Mair v. Trollhaugen Ski Resort, 2006 WI 61, 
¶22, 291 Wis. 2d 132, 715 N.W.2d 598 (quoting Barry v. Emp'rs 
Mut. Cas. Co., 2001 WI 101, ¶28, 245 Wis. 2d 560, 630 N.W.2d 
517) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
25 
 
¶46 Instead 
of 
subpoenaing 
or 
deposing 
the 
former 
employees who were working at the time of his fall and 
questioning them about any snow removal methods and processes 
Speedway may have had in place at that time, Kochanski's 
attorney took another route.  At trial, he had a member of his 
staff read Speedway's interrogatory responses that identified 
the former employees and provided their last known addresses 
into the record.  He then requested the absent witness 
instruction and after it was given, he argued:  
The law says . . . you can infer that had they 
called that witness, they would have gotten some 
unfavorable testimony.   
Why didn't [Speedway] call anybody?  What would 
that unfavorable testimony have been?  
It makes you wonder what's going on[.]  What is 
it that's being decided at the highest levels of 
SuperAmerica? . . . Why don't you get to hear the 
whole story?    
In essence, he told the jury that despite the lack of any 
evidence as to Speedway's snow removal methods and processes, 
the jury should infer notice from Speedway's failure to call any 
employees as witnesses.    
                                                                                                                                                             
This exception does not apply.  While Kochanski testified 
that he expected the curb's ramp location to be directly in 
front of the door and Speedway argued that "Kochanski's defense 
concerning . . . contributory negligence was that the curb 
opening was in the wrong place," Kochanski never made the legal 
argument that a structural defect caused his fall.  To be sure, 
if Kochanski intended to argue the curb's location was a 
structural defect, he would have objected when Judge Siefert 
gave the latter portion of Wis JI——Civil 1900.04, which 
instructs the jury that they must find notice. 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
26 
 
¶47 However, we already have decided that providing proof 
necessary to a plaintiff's claim is not a proper function of the 
missing witness instruction.  Paulsen Lumber, 91 Wis. 2d at 699.  
If Kochanski could not establish actual notice or the length of 
time the defect existed, he should have produced evidence that 
Speedway's methods and processes could either reasonably have 
been expected to give rise to an unsafe condition or that 
Speedway had satisfactory methods and processes, but they were 
not followed.  Kochanski did neither.   
¶48 To allow the absent witness instruction to substitute 
for evidence in this manner would subvert the requirement that a 
plaintiff prove notice in a safe-place claim.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the erroneous giving of the absent witness 
instruction was prejudicial, and we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 We conclude that the circuit court's decision to give 
the absent witness instruction was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion because there was no evidence in the record that the 
absent witnesses, former Speedway employees who had been on duty 
at the time of the accident, were material and within Speedway's 
control or that it was more natural for Speedway, rather than 
Kochanski, to call them.  Furthermore, Speedway's decision not 
to call the former employees did not reasonably lead to the 
conclusion that it was unwilling to allow the jury to have "the 
full truth."  Ballard, 33 Wis. 2d at 616.  And finally, the 
instruction was prejudicial because without drawing a negative 
No. 
2011AP1956   
 
27 
 
inference about Speedway's snow removal methods and processes 
from Speedway's decision not to call the former employees as 
witnesses, the jury would not have found that Kochanski 
satisfied the notice element of his safe-place claim that was 
necessary to liability.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision and remand for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
1 
 
¶50 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  If an attorney 
were advising someone who had fallen because of a snow-covered 
or icy sidewalk, likely one of the things the client would be 
told is to take a picture of the conditions with a cell phone or 
camera. 
¶51 Why?  A picture says a thousand words and represents 
some of the best evidence.  But if a picture says a thousand 
words, then a video speaks volumes.   
¶52 In this case, the conditions, both before and after 
the fall, were recorded on Speedway's surveillance cameras.  The 
video recordings they created were played to the jury and 
provided a wealth of information——evidence——about the condition 
of the area where Mr. Kochanski fell.   
¶53 It is only by refusing to acknowledge what is depicted 
in this video evidence presented to the jury that the majority 
is able to discard the jury verdict and conclude that Speedway 
had no notice of the unsafe condition.  Thus, the majority 
usurps the role of the jury, substituting its own limited view 
of the evidence for that of the actual evidence of record 
presented to the jury. 
¶54 The majority also turns a blind eye to the circuit 
court's 
actual 
rationale 
for 
giving 
the 
missing 
witness 
instruction, thus skewing the circuit court's analysis.  As a 
result, the majority is able to sidestep the deference an 
appellate court is to give to a circuit court when it makes a 
discretionary determination that the evidence of record supports 
the giving of a particular instruction.  
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
2 
 
¶55 Perhaps most problematic of all, however, is not the 
majority's failure to acknowledge actual evidence of record or 
ignoring the circuit court's actual rationale for giving the 
missing witness instruction.  Those errors potentially affect 
the outcome of only this particular case.  Most problematic is 
the majority's failure to acknowledge well-settled safe place 
precedent which has the potential to unsettle long-standing safe 
place jurisprudence for years to come. 
¶56 When I consider the evidence presented to the jury, 
the circuit court's actual rationale, and our safe place 
precedent, I conclude that the jury's findings and the circuit 
court's discretionary decision to give the missing witness jury 
instruction are to be given deference.  There is credible 
evidence that supports the jury's verdict.  Likewise, the 
circuit court's discretionary decision to give the absent 
witness instruction was grounded in a reasonable view of the 
evidence of record.  
¶57  Assuming for argument's sake that it was error to give 
the instruction, I conclude such error was harmless.  Our law is 
clear that Kochanski could have made closing arguments about the 
inferences to be drawn from the missing witnesses even without 
the jury instruction.  Contrary to the majority's assertion that 
the instruction was a substitute for any evidence in the record, 
there 
was 
ample 
credible 
evidence——with 
or 
without 
the 
instruction——for the jury to find that Speedway had notice of 
the unsafe condition.   
 ¶58  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
3 
 
I. 
 
¶59 The majority attempts to avoid the tried-and-true 
standard of appellate review by simply refusing to acknowledge  
the evidence of record presented to the jury.  It is only by 
substituting its own limited view of the evidence for that of 
the actual evidence considered by the jury that the majority is 
able to overturn the jury's verdict and conclude as a matter of 
law that Speedway had no notice of the unsafe condition.  
¶60 It has long been established that the question of 
negligence under the safe place statute is for the jury.1  See 
Gould v. Allstar Ins. Co., 59 Wis. 2d 355, 361, 208 N.W.2d 388 
(1973); Heiden v. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 102, 275 N.W. 922 
(1937); Dugenske v. Wyse, 194 Wis. 159, 165, 215 N.W. 829 
(1927).  Appellate review of such determinations "is very 
limited, narrow, and circumscribed."  Hoffmann v. Wis. Elec. 
Power Co., 2003 WI 64, ¶9, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664 N.W.2d 55.   We 
must view evidence "in a light most favorable to a verdict" and 
will not upset a verdict or finding of fact if "there is any 
credible evidence which, under a reasonable view, admits to an 
                                                 
1 The safe place statute states: 
Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be 
safe for the employees therein and shall furnish a 
place of employment which shall be safe . . . for 
frequenters thereof . . . and shall adopt and use 
methods and processes reasonably adequate to render 
such employment and places of employment safe, and 
shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to 
protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such 
employees and frequenters. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 101.11(a).   
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
4 
 
inference which supports the verdict."  Becker v. Barnes, 50 
Wis. 2d 343, 345, 184 N.W.2d 97 (1971).   
¶61 Our review is even more restrained where, as here, the 
verdict has the approval of the circuit court.  In such cases we 
have repeatedly stated that jury determinations are afforded 
"special deference." D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. 
Anderson, 2008 WI 126, ¶22, 314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803; 
Hoffmann, 262 Wis. 2d 264, ¶9; Meurer v. ITT General Controls, 
90 Wis. 2d 438, 450, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979).  "Therefore, this 
court will not upset a jury verdict unless there is such a 
complete failure of proof that the verdict must have been based 
on speculation."  Hoffmann, 262 Wis. 2d 264, ¶9 (citing Coryell 
v. Connecticut, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 (1979)). 
¶62 Notice, in particular, is a matter this court has 
generally declared to be a jury question.  Burmek v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 405, 413, 107 N.W.2d 583 (1961); see 
also Werner v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 8 Wis. 2d 491, 493, 99 N.W.2d 
708 (1959) ("The only issue on this appeal is the question of 
fact whether the defendants' actual or constructive notice of 
the unsafe condition of the walk warned them in time to require 
them to take reasonable precautions to prevent such an accident.  
We consider that the evidence bearing on that issue presents a 
jury question not to be determined as a matter of law.").   
¶63 Here, the jury was instructed that in order to find 
that Speedway failed to maintain the premises as safe as its 
nature would reasonably permit, it must find that Speedway had 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
5 
 
actual or constructive notice of the defect.  The jury made such 
a finding, which the majority now overturns as a matter of law.  
¶64 The majority is able to disregard the jury's findings 
because it fails to acknowledge that the evidence considered by 
the jury showed the unsafe condition, that the employees had 
notice of the condition, and that an employee later ameliorated 
the condition by salting.  Instead it suggests that the only 
relevant information on the video is that it was snowing.  See 
Majority op., ¶37 ("[A] temporary natural accumulation of snow 
is insufficient to provide notice of an unsafe condition under 
the safe-place statute."), ¶44 ("Kochanski provided no evidence 
that Speedway had actual notice of an unsafe condition based 
solely on the video showing a light accumulation of snow."), ¶48 
("To allow the absent witness instruction to substitute for 
evidence in this manner would subvert the requirement that a 
plaintiff prove notice in a safe-place claim.").  
¶65 The heart of the safe place claim rests on the issues 
of notice of the condition of the premises and procedures 
employed by Speedway to keep the premises "as safe as the nature 
of the . . . place . . . will reasonably permit."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 101.01(13).  Contrary to the majority's conclusion, 
there 
was 
ample 
credible 
evidence 
in 
the 
record——both 
testimonial and video——to support the jury's findings. 
¶66 The jury heard testimony that between one half and two 
inches of snow had fallen that morning.  Kochanski testified 
that as he approached the front door of the Speedway store, he 
observed what he thought was a wheelchair cut-out from the 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
6 
 
elevated sidewalk abutting the store.  It was immediately in 
front of the door.  To the right there was a visible segment of 
a yellow painted line that marked the edge of the elevated 
sidewalk.  No yellow painted line was visible immediately in 
front of him.  Rather, it was covered with snow.   
¶67 Likewise, the video pictures revealed to the jury that 
snow covered all portions of the yellow painted line that edged 
the elevated sidewalk, with the exception of a segment of the 
yellow paint to the right of the doors.  The edge of the 
sidewalk was partially hidden to those who entered and exited 
the front entry door. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶68 The video pictures also revealed that the outside snow 
conditions were in plain view of the Speedway employees.  At all 
relevant times, at least one employee was stationed at a cash 
register located within a few feet of the front door and 
immediately next to the front side of the building.  The front 
side of the building as well as the front doors were glass. 
                                                 
2 This image is from 12:54:46 on the surveillance tape.  The 
online version of this opinion displays the images in color and 
more clearly shows where the snow obscured the yellow line from 
vision.  
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
7 
 
 
¶69 Kochanski told the jury that after he fell he lay in 
front of the entry door, writhing in pain.  He observed two 
Speedway employees looking out at him, but they did nothing to 
assist him.  The video picture3 below shows the two Speedway 
employees looking out the window at Kochanski during the time 
that he is lying on the sidewalk.  
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶70 Kochanski testified at trial that as he was lying on 
the ground in front of the door, he saw someone come out of the 
store with salt.  He stated that she came around the corner on 
the north side of the building and then went back.  The video 
footage presented to the jury also revealed someone salting 
after Mr. Kochanski was taken from the scene.  The first picture 
below4 shows a woman salting the sidewalk.  The second video 
picture, from approximately 45 minutes later, shows that after 
the fall and salting, the yellow line edging the pavement was 
visible to all.          
                                                 
3 This image is from 12:54:57 of the surveillance tape.  
Again, the online version of this opinion is displayed in color 
and more clearly shows the images. 
4 The first image is at 12:59:21 on the surveillance tape, 
the second image is at 01:45:22 on the surveillance tape. 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
¶71 The video footage is helpful in that it demonstrated 
to the jury the unsafe condition, i.e. the snow covering the 
yellow line on the curb, that the unsafe condition was in plain 
view of Speedway employees, that Speedway had some policy or 
procedure on salting, and that the salting eliminated the unsafe 
condition.  When considering all of the evidence presented to 
the jury, it is apparent that there is credible evidence that 
supports the jury's findings that Speedway had notice of the 
unsafe condition and that it did not maintain the premises as 
safe as its nature would reasonably permit. 
                                II. 
¶72 In addition to ignoring evidence of record, the 
majority also turns a blind eye to pivotal parts of the record 
which state the circuit court's actual rationale for giving the 
missing witness instruction.  As a result, the majority skews 
the circuit court's analysis. 
¶73  This court accords deference to a circuit court's 
decision to give a particular jury instruction.  A circuit court 
is on the front lines during a trial.  It sees the evidence 
firsthand and is in the best position to evaluate whether it 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
9 
 
supports giving a particular jury instruction.  As the majority 
correctly notes, "[a] circuit court has broad discretion to 
instruct a jury."  Majority op., ¶10 (citing Nommensen v. Am. 
Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, ¶50, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 
301).  
¶74 After reviewing the evidence and considering the 
parties' arguments, the circuit court decided to give the absent 
witness jury instruction.  Admittedly, the missing witness 
instruction is to be sparingly given.  Here, the circuit court 
clearly stated its reasoning on the record and succinctly 
summarized its reasoning for giving the instruction.  The first 
two reasons focus on the former employees who did not testify: 
Number one, all five were placed on the witness list 
by Speedway;  
Number Two, it does not appear that any effort was 
made to subpoena any of those five; 
The third reason discusses Speedway's failure to call any of its 
current employees:  
Number three, as to Speedway's policy and practices, 
current 
employees 
are 
capable 
of 
giving 
that 
testimony, and none of them has been subpoenaed 
either.   
The fourth reason focuses on the materiality of their testimony, 
reasoning that the jury has a right to know Speedway's policies 
regarding salting, particularly whether there was any salting 
done of the sidewalk area before the accident: 
And then Number Four, I think that the jury has a 
right to know what Speedway's policies are regarding 
salting; and, particularly the videotape, at least so 
far, has not shown whether or not the premises or the 
area were salted before the accident. 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
10 
 
For all of those reasons, the Court has decided that 
Instruction 
410 
[the 
absent 
witness 
instruction] 
should be given. 
¶75 On appeal, "review of the trial court's decision is 
deferential."  DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 2d 
137, 148, 554 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1996).  Our examination is 
two-fold: (1) did the circuit court's instruction correctly 
state the law and (2) was the instruction "grounded on a 
reasonable construction of the record."  Id. at 151.  
¶76 Here, 
no 
one 
argues 
that 
the 
jury 
instruction 
misstated the law.  We are left then to examine whether a 
reasonable view of the evidence of record supports the giving of 
the instruction.  
¶77 Instead of deferring to the circuit court, the 
majority skews the circuit court's analysis and concludes that 
it was error to give the absent witness instruction.   
¶78 At the threshold of its analysis, the majority 
correctly notes there are three elements necessary to support a 
jury instruction regarding an absent witness: (1) that the 
uncalled witness has material information, (2) that the uncalled 
witness is within the control of the party or that it is more 
natural for a party to call that witness, and (3) that it is 
reasonable to infer that the absent witness would have exposed 
facts unfavorable to the party.5  Majority op., ¶13. After 
                                                 
5 The majority states: "a court may give the instruction 
only if there are facts in the record that would allow the jury 
to reasonably draw a negative inference from the absence of a 
particular material witness."  Majority op., ¶13 (citing 
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 
237, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972); State v. Glenn, 199 Wis. 2d 575, 
585, 545 N.W.2d 230 (1996)) (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
11 
 
determining that the three elements have not been met, the 
majority concludes that the giving of the instruction was error.   
  
¶79 In reaching this conclusion, the majority skews the 
circuit court's stated rationale in two ways.  First, in 
considering materiality, it reframes the issue, focusing on 
whether the employees had knowledge of the independently 
contracted snow removal methods rather than the actual focus of 
the circuit court——Speedway's policies for salting.  Majority 
op., ¶23.  In elaboration, the majority cites the lack of proof 
that the employees would know about the snow removal services, 
relying on the fact that Speedway's witness list indicated it 
had an independent contractor for snow removal.  Id.    
¶80 The circuit court's rationale had nothing to do with 
the independently contracted snow plowing procedures.  Rather, 
the circuit court clearly stated that its concern about 
Speedway's salting policies informed the fourth rationale for 
giving the absent witness instruction: "I think that the jury 
has a right to know what Speedway's policies are regarding 
salting; and, particularly the videotape, at least so far, has 
not shown whether or not the premises or the area were salted 
before the accident."    
                                                                                                                                                             
For several reasons it appears that the majority's use of 
the word "particular" is akin to a fugitive word in the 
sentence: (1) the cases cited neither support nor even mention 
the word "particular" anywhere in the opinions; (2) because the 
word "particular" is not further used and the concept is not 
further discussed, it is unclear in application what degree of 
particularity is required; and (3) in some situations it may be 
unworkable because the party asking for the instruction may not 
know what "particular" witness or witnesses are knowledgeable 
and should have been called to testify.  
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
12 
 
¶81 In this case, testimony regarding Speedway's salting 
policies is relevant to determining whether Speedway had 
reasonably adequate processes in place to maintain their 
premises in as safe a condition as its nature would reasonably 
permit.  A reasonable construction of the record supports the 
circuit court's determination that the employees would have this 
information. 
 
As 
noted 
above, 
Mr. 
Kochanski's 
testimony 
described someone coming out of the store and salting while he 
was lying on the ground.  The videotape also shows someone 
salting after Mr. Kochanski had left.  Indeed, from the video 
footage, the results after the salting can also be viewed.   
Further, Speedway's witness list indicates that the employees 
might be called to testify about Speedway's policies and 
procedures concerning maintaining the safety of the premises.   
¶82 Even if the employees could not testify about policies 
and procedures, their lack of knowledge regarding a salting 
policy or procedure may be relevant.  Likewise, their knowledge 
(or lack thereof) of the unsafe condition was directly at issue 
due to the safe place claim.   
¶83 Second, the majority also skews the circuit court's 
stated rationale in its analysis of whether it would be more 
natural for Speedway or Kochanski to call the employees to 
testify by focusing exclusively on former employees.  It 
concludes it is not more natural for Speedway to call the former 
employees but leaves a total void in its analysis regarding 
whether it would be more natural for Speedway to call current 
employees as witnesses to testify about the policies and 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
13 
 
procedures for salting.  Majority op., ¶24.  Although the 
circuit court specifically addressed current employees in its 
analysis, the majority dismisses them entirely.  Id.  Rather 
than analyzing the circuit court's actual rationale, it attempts 
to delegitimize it by merely noting that Kochanski did not 
advance the argument.  Id.6 
¶84 If it had analyzed the propriety of giving the missing 
witness instruction vis-a-vis current employees, the majority's 
conclusion would be unsupportable.  So what does it do?  It 
ignores the current employees and as a result also ignores the 
circuit court's stated rationale. 
¶85 The circuit court explained that the third basis of 
its reasoning for giving the missing witness instruction focused 
exclusively on current employees, not former employees: "Number 
three, as to Speedway's policy and practices, current employees 
are capable of giving that testimony, and none of them has been 
subpoenaed either."   
                                                 
6 The majority also suggests that giving the absent witness 
instruction 
based 
on 
Speedway's 
failure 
to 
call 
current 
employees is somehow improper as it places the burden on 
Speedway to call "'possible witness[es] to a fact, lest [its] 
failure to do so will result in an inference against [it].'"  
Majority op., ¶24 (quoting Ballard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
33 Wis. 2d 601, 615, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967)) (alterations in 
majority op.). 
In Ballard, this court stated that the absent witness 
instruction does not place a burden on a party to call "every 
possible witness to a fact."  Id.  However, that statement was 
made in reference to an absent witness whose testimony would 
have been cumulative of other testimony presented.  Id.  
Requiring Speedway to call a witness (or sufficiently explain 
witnesses' absences) is far different from requiring Speedway to 
call every possible witness. 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
14 
 
¶86 Kochanski argues that the absent witness instruction 
was appropriate based on Speedway's failure to introduce the 
testimony of any of the employees on duty on the day of his 
accident or any other employees (including current employees) 
who would have knowledge of Speedway's practices and procedures 
regarding salting and snow removal.  Under our precedent, 
current employees are viewed as being under the control of their 
employer, or at least more natural for the employer to call.  
See, e.g., Coney v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 8 Wis. 
2d 520, 527, 99 N.W.2d 713 (1959).   
¶87 Indeed, at oral argument Speedway acknowledged the 
obvious: when it comes to current employees, it would be easier 
for Speedway to compel their testimony and they would be more 
likely to testify in favor of their employer. 
J. Bradley: If this had been a situation where the 
employees, or some of them, were still current - how 
does that affect your analysis and argument?  Would 
it?  
Attorney for Speedway: Well if there were some current 
employees, that, I think that would have made a 
difference.  Because then there's an employer-employee 
relationship.  And it's easier to compel that person 
to appear.  That person who's a current employee is 
much more willing or much more apt to testify 
favorably for their employer. 
Yet, the majority fails to acknowledge the obvious.  The 
consequence of this failure is more than just having an analysis 
that is a couple of bubbles off plumb. By reaching its 
conclusion without considering current employees, the majority 
skews not only the circuit court's stated rationale, it also 
skews the result of its opinion.  
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
15 
 
¶88 If the majority had considered the current employees 
as absent witnesses, it would be reasonable to conclude that it 
would be natural for Speedway to call the employees as witnesses 
and that their testimony would naturally favor Speedway, 
satisfying the third showing necessary for giving the absent 
witness instruction.  See Coney, 8 Wis. 2d at 527 (where 
employee was a material witness, "the failure on the part of the 
defendant to call its own employee as a witness, or to 
satisfactorily explain the reason for his not being called as a 
witness permits an inference that the witness' testimony would 
be or is unfavorable to the defendant's cause."). 
¶89  In sum, the majority errs by analyzing its own skewed 
version of the circuit court's rationale rather than analyzing 
the actual rationale stated on the record.  Had it analyzed the 
circuit court's actual rationale, the majority's conclusion that 
the instruction was erroneously given could not stand.  Here, 
the jury instruction correctly stated the law and was grounded 
on a reasonable construction of the record.  Accordingly, the 
discretionary decision to give the jury instruction is to be 
accorded deference by a reviewing court.  DeChant, 204 Wis. 2d 
at 148.   
III. 
¶90 The majority also misstates or ignores well-settled 
safe place precedent which has the potential to unsettle safe 
place precedent for years to come. 
¶91 As the majority explains, a plaintiff must establish 
that a defendant had actual or constructive notice of an unsafe 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
16 
 
condition in order to prevail on a safe place claim.  Majority 
op., ¶32.  It indicates that constructive notice can be 
established in two ways: (1) by showing that the unsafe 
condition existed for a long enough time that a reasonably 
vigilant owner would have discovered and repaired it, or (2) by 
showing the nature of the business, the nature of the condition, 
and the public policy involved so that the jury could find that 
the defendant's methods and processes would reasonably be 
expected to give rise to the unsafe the condition.  Id. at ¶34-
35.  The majority concludes that because none of these was 
shown, the jury would not have found that the defendant had 
actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition without 
taking an impermissible inference from the absent witness jury 
instruction.  Id. at ¶44-45. 
¶92 Missing from the majority's analysis is any reference 
to our plain view precedent.  Constructive notice may be 
established by showing that the unsafe condition was in plain 
view of the defendant.  See Terrence Berres, Boyle's Wisconsin 
Safe-Place Law (online ed. 2006) ("Time of a defect's existence 
is of no materiality where it was readily observable to an agent 
or employee who was in the area.").   
¶93 For example, in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, Inc., 16 
Wis. 2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466 (1962), where a woman slipped on wet 
spots on the floor only a few feet from where the usher was 
sitting, the court concluded there was a sufficient basis for 
finding notice even without any indication of how long the spots 
had been there.  "This is because [the wet spots] were in plain 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
17 
 
view of this usher and the jury would be warranted in concluding 
that he should have seen them.  This would afford sufficient 
basis for a finding of constructive notice."  Id. at 249.   
¶94  Likewise, in Caldwell v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co., 32 
Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966), even though the unsafe 
condition existed for only a short period of time, the court 
determined that there was sufficient evidence of constructive 
notice because the manager was in a position from which he could 
have seen the unsafe condition if he had looked in that 
direction. The court explained that "[the jury] could have 
concluded that the hazard was in plain view even if [the 
manager] in fact had not seen it."  Id. at 455. 
¶95 Here, the majority fails to acknowledge that the 
evidence shows that the unsafe condition was in plain view of an 
employee.  Kochanski fell in front of the doors to the Speedway.  
The doors and surrounding façade of the building are glass.  
From this, the jury could have determined that the unsafe 
condition was in plain view of an employee inside the store and 
that 
an 
employee 
should 
have 
observed 
the 
condition, 
constituting constructive notice to Speedway.   
¶96 Based on the video evidence, the jury could also have 
found that Speedway employees had actual notice of its unsafe 
condition. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
video 
footage 
from 
Speedway's 
surveillance cameras shows that the checkout counter is right 
next to the window and an employee standing there behind the 
register prior to the accident.  Later portions of the video 
show two employees looking out the window at Kochanski.   
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
18 
 
¶97 The majority overlooks this plain view evidence and 
fails to apply our plain view safe place precedent.  Instead, it 
incorrectly determines that the jury would not have found notice 
but for the absent witness instruction.7 
¶98 The majority's discussion of the safe place claim also 
errs by ignoring well-established caselaw on the special verdict 
question.  The majority recites the verdict question that the 
circuit 
court 
read 
regarding 
liability: 
"Was 
Speedway 
SuperAmerica LLC, through the acts of its employees, negligent 
in failing to maintain the Speedway SuperAmerica premises as 
safe as its nature would reasonably permit on February 6, 2007?"  
Id., ¶30.  The majority then suggests that this instruction was 
improper because it combined the standards of care and the 
elements of proof for negligence and safe place claims.  Id., 
¶31.  In support of this suggestion, the majority points to a 
case from the mid-1950s.  Majority op., ¶31 n.13 (citing Sturm 
v. Simpson's Garment Co., 271 Wis. 587, 74 N.W.2d 137 (1956)). 
¶99 Our law on the form of the safe place jury instruction 
has since changed.  The circuit court's special verdict question 
                                                 
7 Additionally, the physical appearance of an unsafe 
condition may be circumstantial evidence from which a jury could 
infer the length of time it had been present.  See, e.g., 
Gulbrandsen v. H & D, Inc., 2009 WI App 138, ¶15, 321 Wis. 2d 
410, 773 N.W.2d 506. 
In this case, the snow in the area of the fall was dirty 
and trampled.  From this the jury could have inferred that the 
snow had been there for a long enough time that Speedway should 
have discovered it and thus had constructive notice of the 
unsafe condition. 
 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
19 
 
was consistent with the change in law and with caselaw that we 
have been relying on for decades. For example, see Krause v. VFW 
Post No. 6498, 9 Wis. 2d 547, 554, 101 N.W.2d 645 (1960); Mullen 
v. Reischl, 10 Wis. 2d 297, 307, 103 N.W.2d 49 (1960); Petoskey 
v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 323, 331-32, 124 N.W.2d 1 (1963); Presti 
v. O'Donahue, 25 Wis. 2d 594, 599, 131 N.W.2d 273 (1964); 
Skybrock v. Concrete Constr. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 480, 484, 167 
N.W.2d 209 (1969); Carr v. Amusement, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 375, 
177 N.W.2d 388 (1970); May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 
34, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978); Topp v. Continental Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 
2d 780, 783, 266 N.W.2d 397 (1978); Barry v. Emp'rs. Mut. Cas. 
Co., 2001 WI 101, ¶33, 245 Wis. 2d 560, 630 N.W.2d 517.   
¶100 In 1960, the Krause court instructed circuit courts to 
use essentially the same language that the circuit court used 
here.  9 Wis. 2d at 554.  Krause instructed that the special 
verdict question ask: ". . . was the defendant negligent with 
respect to maintaining the dance hall as safe as the nature of 
the place reasonably permitted?"  Id.  Likewise, the special 
verdict question that the circuit court read is based on the 
model jury instruction: "[w]as (defendant) negligent in failing 
to (construct) (repair) (maintain) the premises as safe as the 
nature of its business would reasonably permit?"  Wis JI——Civil 
1900.4.   
¶101  The majority's criticism of the instruction appears 
to be that it combines a negligence claim with a safe place 
claim. Majority op., ¶31.  This criticism overlooks the long 
recognized role of negligence in a safe place claim.  A safe 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
20 
 
place claim is based on negligence with a higher standard of 
care than ordinary negligence.  Krause, 9 Wis. 2d at 552.  See 
also Barry, 245 Wis. 2d 560, ¶18 ("Wisconsin's safe place 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1), is a negligence statute that . 
. . establishes a duty greater than that of ordinary care 
imposed at common law."). See also Gennrich v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 2010 WI App 117, ¶23, 329 Wis. 2d 91, 789 N.W.2d 106.   
 
¶102   The special verdict question used in this case is 
essentially the same as the language that was indicated by our 
caselaw decades ago and was in substance the same as provided in 
the model jury instruction, Wis JI——Civil 1900.4.  The model 
instruction and comments were approved by the Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction Committee in 1974. Wis JI——Civil 1900.4, Comment.  
Despite the suggestion of the majority, there was nothing 
improper with the wording of the instruction used in this case. 
IV. 
¶103 The majority's discussion of the safe place law is 
contained in its analysis of whether it was harmless error to 
give the absent witness instruction.  It determines that because 
the jury had no basis in the record to find that Speedway had 
notice of the unsafe condition, the error in giving the absent 
witness instruction was not harmless.  Majority op., ¶48. 
¶104 Contrary to the majority I conclude that even if it 
was error for the circuit court to give the absent witness 
instruction, such error was harmless.   
¶105 Notably, Kochanski could still have pointed to the 
nonproduction 
of 
the 
employees 
in 
closing 
arguments 
and 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
21 
 
suggested the jury make an inference even if the circuit court 
had not given the absent witness instruction.  See Feldstein v. 
Harrington, 4 Wis. 2d 380, 390, 90 N.W.2d 566 (1958) ("It also 
would have been proper for plaintiff's counsel to comment in the 
argument to the jury on such failure of the defendants to have 
called Dr. Houkom, if the fact had previously been established 
in evidence that such doctor had examined the plaintiff at the 
defendants' request."); cf. Ballard., 33 Wis. 2d at 615 ("[The 
court] did permit the defendant to comment to the jury upon the 
nonproduction of the chiropractor and, as a consequence, the 
defendant could not have been prejudiced by the failure to give 
the specific instruction.").   
¶106 The only grounds for the majority's conclusion that 
the instruction was not harmless is the lack of evidence of 
notice on the safe place claim.  Majority op., ¶¶44, 49.  The 
majority reasons that because there is no evidence of notice in 
the record, the only way the jury would have found in favor of 
Kochanski was if it had taken an impermissible inference based 
on the absent witness jury instruction.  Id.  Contrary to the 
majority's assertion that the instruction was a substitute for 
any evidence in the record, here there was ample credible 
evidence——with or without the instruction——for the jury to find 
that Speedway had notice of the unsafe condition. 
V. 
¶107 As discussed above, the majority fails to acknowledge 
the evidence presented to the jury supporting its verdict; fails 
to deal with the circuit court's actual rationale, including the 
No.  2011AP1956.awb 
 
22 
 
analysis of current employees and the policies on salting; and 
fails to apply established safe place precedent on plain view 
and jury instructions.   
¶108  Contrary to the majority, I apply the tried-and-true 
standards of appellate review and conclude that both the jury's 
determination 
of 
negligence 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary decision to give the absent witness instruction 
are to be accorded deference.  There was ample credible evidence 
in the record for the jury's verdict.  Further, the circuit 
court's instruction correctly stated the law and was based on a 
reasonable construction of the record.  In any event, even if it 
was error to give the instruction, such error was harmless.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.     
¶109 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶110 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This case raises 
troubling issues about appellate review. 
¶111 James 
E. 
Kochanski 
(Kochanski) 
sustained 
serious 
injuries when he tripped on a raised sidewalk and fell as he 
attempted to go inside a Speedway SuperAmerica gas station to 
pay his bill.  The incident occurred at 12:54 p.m. on February 
6, 2007.  It had been snowing that morning, and snow had 
accumulated on the ground.  According to Kochanski, the snow 
obscured his vision of the raised sidewalk in front of the door 
to the station, and he fell. 
¶112 On August 5, 2009, Kochanski and his wife filed suit 
against Speedway SuperAmerica LLC (Speedway) in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.  They claimed that Speedway had been negligent 
and had violated Wisconsin's safe-place statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.11. 
¶113 Because this is Wisconsin, not Florida, individuals 
and merchants must deal with the frequency of snow-covered 
surfaces during winter months.  Even in good weather, people can 
trip and fall.  Bad weather, with its attendant ice and snow, 
increases this risk.  However, the fact that a person falls on a 
merchant's property does not necessarily mean that the merchant 
can or should be held responsible for the person's injuries. 
¶114 Whether a merchant is liable for a person's injuries 
on 
the 
merchant's 
property 
is 
dependent 
on 
the 
factual 
circumstances of each case, as those facts and circumstances are 
presented to the trier of fact at trial.  The plaintiff must 
satisfy his burden of proof, and the defendant is entitled to 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
2 
 
challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence before 
being asked to present a defense.  In this case, the defendant 
did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the end of 
the plaintiff's case or ask the court later for a directed 
verdict. 
¶115 When a case is permitted to go to a jury, the jury's 
verdict is entitled to substantial deference.  When the circuit 
court approves a jury verdict, "this court will not overturn the 
jury's verdict unless 'there is such a complete failure of proof 
that the verdict must be based on speculation.'"  Morden v. 
Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶40, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 
(quoting Coryell v. Conn, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 
(1979)).  As we said in Ballard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty 
Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 605, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967): 
 
The review of this court: 
 
[M]ust be based on the rule that when there is 
any credible evidence which under any reasonable view 
supports the jury finding, especially when the verdict 
has the approval of the trial court, it should not be 
disturbed.  This is another way of saying the evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.   
Id. (quoting Springen v. Ager Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 19 
Wis. 2d 487, 489, 120 N.W.2d 692 (1963)). 
¶116 Given this well established law, a party that fails to 
obtain the verdict it expected almost inevitably searches to 
find error in the trial.  In this case, the error alleged is 
Judge Seifert's decision to give the absent witness instruction 
to the jury.  Wis JI——Civil 410. 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶117 The law on review of jury instructions also is clear.  
This court will not reverse a circuit court's decision to give a 
jury instruction "absent an erroneous exercise of discretion."  
State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶28, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839 
(citation omitted).  Even if a circuit court does err in giving 
a jury instruction:  
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . misdirection of the jury . . . unless 
in the opinion of the court to which the application 
is made, after an examination of the entire action or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2).   
¶118 The majority here appears astonished that the circuit 
court gave the following absent witness instruction: 
 
If a party fails to call a material witness 
within [its] control, or whom it would be more natural 
for that party to call than the opposing party, and 
the party fails to give a satisfactory explanation for 
not calling the witness, you may infer that the 
evidence which the witness would give would be 
unfavorable to the party who failed to call the 
witness. 
Wis JI——Civil 410. 
¶119 Kochanski requested the absent witness instruction.  
Speedway opposed it.  Judge Seifert supported his ruling as 
follows: 
 
Okay.  Now I'll make my ruling: 
Number one, all five were placed on the witness 
list by Speedway;  
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
4 
 
Number [t]wo, it does not appear that any effort 
was made to subpoena any of those five;  
Number 
three, 
as 
to 
Speedway's 
policy 
and 
practices, current employees are capable of giving 
that testimony and none of them have been subpoenaed, 
either. 
 . . . . 
And then [n]umber [f]our, I think that the jury 
has a right to know what Speedway's policies are 
regarding salting; and, particularly the videotape, at 
least so far, has not shown whether or not the 
premises or the area were salted before the accident.   
For all of those reasons, the Court has decided 
that Instruction 410 should be given. 
¶120 The judge's reference to "all five" refers to the five 
persons that Speedway named in response to Kochanski's request 
in interrogatories to identify "each person you believe has 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
accident."  The five people Speedway submitted included the 
former 
store 
manager, 
two 
former 
customer 
service 
representatives, and two former food stewards.  The names of 
these people appeared on Kochanski's witness list as adverse 
witnesses, but they also appeared on Speedway's witness list.  
Speedway later explained to the jury that the former store 
manager had "moved out of state" [Pennsylvania].  "We tried to 
contact him . . . but were unable to do so."  Three other 
"former" employees were listed as having Milwaukee addresses; 
one former employee lived in Waukesha.  Speedway did not explain 
why these "former" employees were not called, or why no current 
employee at the store was called, except to say that "Speedway 
is not going to be calling any witnesses from the store. . . .  
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
5 
 
We don't need any testimony from the manager in this case.  It's 
all clear from the videotapes."   
¶121 At trial, Speedway presented no live witnesses and no 
witnesses at all on the issue of liability.  With respect to 
liability, Speedway relied on videotape from the store which was 
introduced by the plaintiff. 
¶122 To overturn the jury's verdict on the basis of the 
absent witness instruction, the majority must determine, first, 
that giving the instruction constituted an erroneous exercise of 
discretion, and, second, that the "misdirection of the jury" 
affected the substantial rights of Speedway.  This is where the 
troubling issues come in. 
¶123 The majority finds that "there was no evidence in the 
record that the absent witnesses, former Speedway employees who 
had 
been 
on 
duty 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
accident, 
were 
material . . . or that it was more natural for Speedway, rather 
than Kochanski, to call them."  Majority op., ¶2.  The majority 
also concludes that "the instruction was prejudicial because 
without drawing a negative inference about Speedway's snow 
removal methods and processes from Speedway's decision not to 
call the former employees, the jury would not have found that 
Kochanski satisfied the notice element of his safe-place claim 
that was necessary to liability."  Id.   
¶124 A determination by the majority that "there was no 
evidence in the record that the absent witnesses . . . were 
material" is problematic.  First, as stated in the majority 
opinion and quoted above in paragraph 123, the majority's 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
6 
 
determination refers only to five former employees, not to the 
former and current employees referred to by the circuit court.  
Second, the determination that "there was no evidence in the 
record" appears to be a finding of fact, directly at odds with 
the determination of the circuit court.1  Third, the jury 
instruction specifically refers to "a material witness," not 
every witness who might be called.  It must be remembered that 
the defendant did not call any witnesses.  Implicitly, then, the 
majority is determining that there were no material witnesses 
for Speedway to call——no former employees, no current employees, 
no corporate executives, nobody at all who could provide 
probative evidence on company policies on salting, snow removal, 
and safety or what happened the morning and noon hour of 
February 6, 2007 at the station.  If Speedway had called even 
one witness, the propriety of the absent witness instruction 
would likely have been greatly diminished. 
¶125 Speedway did not call anyone to explain company 
policy, if any, and how that policy was executed that morning.  
No one came to affirm that he or she had salted, swept, or 
shoveled the sidewalk sometime that morning before the incident. 
¶126 This, of course, might not have been necessary if 
Speedway had produced videotape of some employee salting, 
sweeping, or shoveling the affected area before the incident, 
but it did not.  The tape begins at 12:45 p.m.  The incident 
                                                 
1 At the least, the determination fails to give proper 
deference to the circuit court because the circuit court must 
have determined that at least one person among Speedway's 
current and former employees was a material witness. 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
7 
 
occurred at 12:54 p.m., nine minutes later.  The jury did not 
see any tape showing events before 12:45 p.m.  Why?  The tape 
could have shown employees salting, sweeping, or shoveling the 
raised sidewalk during the morning.  Or not.   
¶127 In addition, no employee came to boast that no one had 
ever tripped on that raised sidewalk before February 6, or after 
February 6.  As a result, there was no one there who might have 
had to acknowledge that several people had tripped at the same 
spot——if any had——making clear visibility of the step even more 
important.   
¶128 This court does not know all the facts because the 
jury was not given all the facts. 
¶129 The majority asserts that there was "no evidence in 
the record" that it was more natural for Speedway to call one of 
its former employees than Kochanski.  This is unpersuasive.  All 
the former employees had a past relationship with Speedway and 
an interest in vindicating their own conduct when the accident 
occurred.  They had no relationship with Kochanski, who expected 
them to be adverse.  These potential witnesses were not neutrals 
like the passenger on the bus in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & 
Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 237-38, 201 N.W.2d 745 
(1972).  Speedway was in a better position to assess whether its 
former employees had relevant information than Kochanski was, in 
part because Speedway had all the videotape.  Speedway had an 
even stronger relationship with its current employees and its 
executives and the ability to determine whether any one of them 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
8 
 
would be a valuable witness.  But it decided to offer no 
witnesses. 
¶130 Speedway could have given a persuasive argument why it 
called no witness at the trial.  It satisfactorily explained the 
absence of the former manager, but it did not explain the 
absence of anyone else, except to say, "It's all clear from the 
videotapes." 
¶131 It was not all clear from the videotapes because the 
videotapes were not complete.  They didn't start until mere 
minutes before the incident.  This is precisely the point that 
the circuit court made in its fourth justification for the 
instruction. 
¶132 In short, the majority is second-guessing the circuit 
court's decision to give the absent witness instruction in 
several ways that are inappropriate. 
¶133 Even if the absent witness instruction is deemed to be 
an erroneous exercise of discretion, there should be no reversal 
of the jury verdict unless there was prejudice affecting the 
substantial rights of the defendant.  This presents another 
problem in the majority opinion. 
¶134 If the majority had said, "the jury could not have 
found that Kochanski satisfied the notice element of his safe-
place claim that was necessary to liability" without the absent 
witness instruction, it would have been concluding that the 
instruction permitted the jury to draw an inference from 
evidence that was insufficient to support the inference.  Such a 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
9 
 
conclusion would probably have required the court to dismiss the 
case rather than send it back for a new trial. 
¶135 The majority does something different.  It concludes 
that "the jury would not have found that Kochanski satisfied the 
notice element of his safe-place claim that was necessary to 
liability" without the absent witness instruction.  Majority 
op., ¶2 (emphasis added).  This, however, is pure conjecture. 
¶136 We task plaintiffs and defendants with putting forth 
their best evidence so that the party with the stronger case 
prevails.  If a litigant's evidence is truly so scant that an 
alleged 
erroneous 
jury 
instruction 
is 
necessary 
to 
lend 
artificial credence to an insufficiently supported claim, we 
should not give that litigant another chance.  Perhaps, 
confronted with the daunting standards of review, the majority 
feels that it is fairer to send the case back for trial to see 
if another jury will reach the same conclusion without the 
absent witness instruction.  The new trial will be a touchstone 
for the majority's determination that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the safe-place claim without the absent 
witness instruction.  Of course, the new trial will be skewed 
because the defendant will have a second chance to put on 
formerly absent witnesses so that these defense witnesses will 
not be "absent" a second time. 
¶137 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
 
No.  2011AP1956.dtp 
 
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