Title: Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc.1997 WY 123947 P.2d 273Case Number: 96-270Decided: 10/29/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

DON TERRY, 

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

PIONEER PRESS, INC., d/b/a Pioneer of Jackson Hole; 

 

SCOTT KERBY; and TERESA JACOBS, 

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County 

The 
Honorable D. Terry Rogers, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard J. 
Mulligan, Jackson.

 Representing 
Appellees:

William R. 
Fix, Jackson.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Don Terry filed 
this wrongful termination action against his former employer, Pioneer Press, 
Inc. (Pioneer), as well as Scott Kerby, vice-president of Pioneer, and Teresa 
Jacobs, production supervisor (collectively appellees). Terry appeals from the 
summary judgment granted in favor of appellees. We 
affirm.

 

[¶2]      Appellant Terry 
states the issue for review as:

Did 
the District Court commit reversible error in awarding summary judgment in favor 
of the Appellee with regard to Appellant's claims for breach of implied 
employment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, promissory estoppel, emotional distress and punitive 
damages?

Appellees articulate four 
issues:

A. 
Was appellant an "at-will" employee and subject to discharge at any time for any 
reason or for no reason at all?

B. Does appellant meet the Wilder "special 
relationship" test?

C. Can the appellant avail himself of promissory 
estoppel?

D. Are punitive damages appropriate in this 
case?

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Terry was hired 
by Pioneer on September 7, 1989, as a bindery employee, and within a few months 
he was promoted to bindery supervisor. Terry was fired in early 1991 for coming 
to work intoxicated but was rehired approximately one week later. Aside from 
that one week absence in 1991, Terry worked continuously at Pioneer from 
September 1989 until his employment was terminated in August 
1995.

 

[¶4]      The circumstances 
surrounding Terry's termination are not in dispute. On August 31, 1995, the 
Thursday preceding the Labor Day holiday weekend, Jacobs phoned Terry at home 
and asked him to return to work to complete a job. Terry told Jacobs that he 
could not complete the job alone, that no other help was available, and that he 
would come in on Friday and attempt to complete the job. Jacobs informed Terry 
that if he did not return that evening, he would be terminated. Shortly 
thereafter, Jacobs phoned Terry back, told him he was fired and that he could 
pick up his final paycheck the following day. In their depositions, both Jacobs 
and Kerby stated that Terry was fired for insubordination.

 

[¶5]      Terry filed suit 
for breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The district court granted appellees' summary judgment motion, 
dismissing all of Terry's claims. Terry appeals the district court's 
order.

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994). This court evaluates the propriety 
of summary judgment using the same standards and materials used by the district 
court, affording no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law. Id. We look at the record from a 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, allowing that party 
all reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Implied-in-Fact 
Contract

 

[¶7]      In Wyoming, 
employment for an indefinite time is presumed to be a contract for at-will 
employment which either party can terminate at any time for any or no reason. Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wyo. 1997). The at-will presumption is rebuttable, and we 
examine, under an objective test, whether the employer has intended, either by 
words or conduct, to include job security as part of the implied employment 
contract. McDonald v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶8]      Terry contends 
that the Pioneer of Jackson Hole Procedures Manual, considered along with other 
documents, created an enforceable right to permanent employment such that Terry 
could only be discharged for cause. When an employer's specific representations 
in an employee handbook amount to an offer of job security, we will enforce such 
a promise as an implied contract modification of at-will status. Brodie v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1986)). For example, a handbook that lists misconduct 
that could result in discharge implies that cause is required. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1063. A promise of 
permanent employment can also alter the at-will presumption if the employee has 
supplied additional consideration or if the employment contract contains 
explicit language stating that the employee can only be terminated for cause. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218. We have 
reviewed the procedures manual and other documents upon which Terry relies, and 
we conclude as a matter of law that those materials do not manifest an intent on 
the part of Pioneer to include job security as part of Terry's implied 
employment contract.

 

[¶9]      Pioneer 
distributed the Pioneer of Jackson Hole Procedures Manual to its workforce at a 
company meeting held in early 1992. The procedures manual is a document designed 
"to help everyone in the company perform their duties in a standard way" and to 
serve "as a reference to various policies within the company, from benefits and 
personnel issues to the current pricing structure." The majority of the manual 
is devoted to job descriptions, customer relations, pricing and explanations on 
how to fill out various forms, such as job tickets and work orders. Section 
XXII, consisting of three pages, is entitled "Personnel Policies." Subsections 6 
and 7, entitled "Reviews" and "Dismissal" respectively, are blank. The manual 
does not discuss probationary periods or probationary versus permanent 
employment status.

 

[¶10]   The procedures manual contains no 
"for cause" language nor does it list misconduct which will result in 
termination. Subsection 10 restricts smoking and prohibits drinking on the job, 
but does not state that an employee will be fired for smoking or drinking. Terry 
claims the fact that Pioneer once fired him for drinking implies he could only 
be terminated for cause. Terry's reasoning is faulty in two respects. First and 
foremost, he was fired for drinking before the handbook (and, thus, any implied 
"for cause" provision) was even in existence. Second, employment at will 
encompasses dismissals for cause by permitting termination of employment for 
any reason or for no reason. The fact that Terry was dismissed for cause 
in 1991 is of no consequence in analyzing whether cause was required for his 
dismissal in 1995.1 In short, the handbook has no 
provisions which negate the presumption of employment at 
will.

 

[¶11]   Terry insists that when the 
procedures manual is read together with certain other documents, job security is 
implied. The other documents are an enrollment form for Pioneer's 401(k) plan, 
an employee performance appraisal completed in 1992, and internal personnel and 
payroll forms used to document employment history and record pay 
changes.

 

[¶12]   We have already determined that the 
procedures manual contains no promises which became part of Terry's employment 
contract. Nor does the procedures manual incorporate by reference or even 
mention any of the other documents described above. With the exception of the 
performance appraisal, the record provides no explanation of when or how Terry 
obtained copies of the internal personnel forms and payroll documents, and Terry 
fails to enlighten us as to why these forms should be considered part of his 
employment contract. He contends that the performance appraisal and his 
eligibility to participate in the 401(k) plan implied that he was a permanent 
employee. However, to the extent that any of these extraneous documents tend to 
show that Pioneer distinguished between permanent and probationary employees, 
that distinction has no significance without a showing of additional 
consideration or explicit for cause language in the employment contract. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218. Both are 
lacking here. Terry's attempt to transform this miscellany into an 
implied-in-fact promise of job security is without merit.

 

[¶13]   Terry has failed to rebut the 
presumption that his employment was at will; and, therefore, the court properly 
entered summary judgment on his claim for breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract.

 

Promissory 
Estoppel

 

[¶14]   Promissory estoppel claims must 
show a clear and definite agreement, proof that the party urging the doctrine 
acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement, and that the 
equities support enforcement of the agreement. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 
710 (Wyo. 1996). Application of promissory estoppel in the at-will employment 
context is not a straightforward proposition, and to date we have not recognized 
promissory estoppel as another exception to the at-will doctrine. Loghry, at 710-11.

 

[¶15]   Terry argues that promissory 
estoppel should be applied in his case because he reasonably relied on Pioneer's 
promises that it would follow certain procedures for discipline, termination and 
performance review, and would require employees to go home early when work was 
slow. He also contends that he relied on the representations of Chad Budge, 
Terry's former supervisor at Pioneer, that if he moved to Wyoming he was assured 
of permanent employment with Pioneer.

 

[¶16]   Even if we were to accept that 
at-will employment permits application of promissory estoppel, Terry is unable 
to satisfy the first element of the claim - the existence of a clear and 
definite agreement. Promissory estoppel is a way to satisfy the consideration 
element, not a way of supplying a promise. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE 
DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.39 (3d ed. 1992). As previously discussed, 
Pioneer's procedures manual and the other documents did not contain promises to 
terminate for cause or to terminate after following certain procedures. Nor do 
those materials promise that performance reviews will be conducted. The manual 
does say "[h]ourly employees must go home when there is no work." Regardless of 
whether that language constitutes a promise, it does not apply here, where 
Pioneer has alleged that Terry failed to come in when there was work to do. Therefore, the handbook 
and other documents cannot support Terry's claim.

 

[¶17]   In his brief, Terry asserts that 
Chad Budge promised him permanent employment at Pioneer. However, Terry's 
affidavit states that Budge told Terry he "would have a job at Pioneer of 
Jackson Hole" if he moved from Idaho, where he was living at the time, and "upon 
returning to Teton County, Wyoming [he] would have a job in the bindery 
department at Pioneer of Jackson Hole." The distinction between representing 
that a person will have "a job," as compared to "a permanent job," is critical 
and proves fatal to Terry's claim. According to Terry's own summary judgment 
materials, Pioneer lived up to its promise, which was to hire him in the bindery 
when he moved to Jackson.

 

[¶18]   The record in this case, viewed in 
the light most favorable to Terry, fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of 
material fact which would preclude summary judgment on his promissory estoppel 
claim.

 

Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing

 

[¶19] An implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a substitute for an express or implied-in-fact promise by the 
employer and tests a defendant's compliance with a duty imposed by law rather 
than with a promise voluntarily made. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221; see also 1 PERRITT, supra, § 4.9. Wyoming recognizes that 
the bad motives of an employer may be actionable in limited circumstances under 
a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710. An employee's 
assertion that he was treated unfairly by his employer is not enough to support 
a claim for breach of the implied covenant. Only in those rare and exceptional 
cases in which a special relationship of trust and reliance exists between the 
employer and employee is a duty created which can give rise to tort liability. 
Id. at 712.

 

[¶20]  
Terry claims a special relationship based on his six years of employment 
with Pioneer. In addition, Terry avers a special relationship between him and 
Pioneer by virtue of his relationship with Kerby. Prior to his employment at 
Pioneer, Terry had been Kerby's supervisor and taught him the bindery trade. In 
1992, Kerby conducted a performance review of Terry in which Kerby stated Terry 
was an outstanding employee and an asset to the company. Terry also points to 
the fact that he was allowed flexibility in his scheduling when other employees 
were not. 

 

[¶21]  
Terry misconstrues the nature of special relationship required to create 
a legal duty on the part of Pioneer. A special relationship of trust and 
reliance sufficient to support a cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be found by the existence of 
separate consideration, rights created by common law or statute, or rights 
accruing with longevity of service. Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712. A personal 
relationship between a supervisor and employee is clearly not the type of 
special relationship contemplated by the tort. Similarly, an outstanding 
performance review and permission to set flexible work hours do not constitute 
separate consideration or rights giving rise to a special relationship of trust 
and reliance.

 

[¶22] Trust and reliance can be based on the 
existence of rights accruing with longevity of service. In Garcia v. Uniwyo Federal Credit Union, 
we noted that usually the special relationship giving an employee a cause of 
action stems from a long term employment relationship coupled with a discharge 
calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the employee, for example, 
payment of benefits or commissions. 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996); see also Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221-22. Terry does 
not contend that he was discharged so Pioneer would avoid paying him retirement 
benefits or commissions, nor does he claim any special reliance on extended 
employment or retirement benefits that would have accrued by virtue of his 
continued, long-term employment. The fact that Terry was employed by Pioneer for 
nearly six years, without more, is not sufficient to establish a special 
relationship. The court properly entered summary judgment on Terry's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 

Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

[¶23]   Terry bases his intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim on the fact that he was fired at a time 
when Jacobs and Kerby knew he was extremely vulnerable due to the death of a 
long-time friend. Terry alleges the conduct in this case was particularly 
outrageous given his close personal relationship with Kerby and the fact that 
Terry was replaced as bindery supervisor by his son, Shawn 
Terry.

 

[¶24]   In order to recover for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's 
conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the defendant intentionally or 
recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional harm. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065-66. In Leithead, where we adopted the tort, we 
recognized that there are some wrongful discharge cases in which an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot succeed. Id. at 1066. If an 
employee's mental distress is caused solely by his discharge, and if the 
discharge was permitted in his contract, then the employer has a complete 
defense, even if the employer is aware that the discharge will cause emotional 
distress. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, 
SECOND, TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965)); Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
223.

 

[¶25]   Because Terry's employment was at 
will, his contract permitted discharge for any reason or for no reason. Terry 
does not claim that Pioneer sought to publicly humiliate him or to prevent him 
from obtaining other employment. See 
Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 223-24 and cases cited therein. In fact, Terry's 
allegations do not demonstrate that Pioneer did anything more than act on its 
legal rights in a permissible way when it terminated his employment and 
subsequently filled his position. Consequently, even if Jacobs or Kerby knew 
Terry was emotionally vulnerable and would suffer emotional distress as a result 
of his dismissal, Pioneer has a complete defense. The court properly entered 
summary judgment on Terry's intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   We find no genuine issue of 
material fact as to any of Terry's claims; Pioneer was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. The district court's Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 Arguably Terry's 1995 termination was 
also for cause - insubordination. However, as with the 1991 dismissal, whether 
or not cause existed is immaterial to the determination of whether cause was 
required.