Title: Hatter v. Landsberg

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

386 Pa. Superior Ct. 438 (1989) 563 A.2d 146 Sandra HATTER and Michael Hatter, h/w, Appellants, v. Dr. Marc LANDSBERG. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 18, 1989. Filed August 16, 1989. *439 Thaddeus J. Bartkowski, II, Philadelphia, for appellants. Leslie A. Miller, Philadelphia, for appellee. Robert B. Hoffman, Harrisburg, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae. *440 Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and HESTER, JJ. HESTER, Judge: Sandra and Michael Hatter appeal from the order entered by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on June 9, 1988, granting summary judgment to appellee, Dr. Marc Landsberg, and dismissing their complaint. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint by misconstruing and misapplying 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305, enacted March 25, 1988, which abolishes causes of action for wrongful birth and wrongful life, and by not permitting them to amend their complaint. We reverse. Appellee initially argues that we should quash this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101 for appellants' failure to include a statement of jurisdiction and the text of the order appealed from in disregard of Pa.R.A.P. §§ 2111, 2114 and 2115. We exercise our discretion by declining to take such action in view of the seriousness of the issues involved and since effective appellate review is not precluded by these deficiencies. See Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 363 Pa.Super. 247, 267 n. 2, 525 A.2d 1215, 1225 n. 2 (1987); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159, 166 n. 6, 401 A.2d 1148, 1152 n. 6 (1979); Pa.R.A.P. 105. We now turn to the merits. A motion for summary judgment is governed by Pa.R.C.P. 1035 which, in pertinent part, provides: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated: Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 175-76, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (1989); see also Overly v. Kass, 382 Pa.Super. 108, 554 A.2d 970 (1989). The record viewed in this light reveals the following facts. On July 7, 1980, appellee performed a tubal ligation by a laparscopic procedure on appellant to prevent her from conceiving. In December, 1982, appellant wife's family physician informed her that she was pregnant. She delivered by Cesarian section on October 1, 1983. During the course of this delivery, her obstestrician observed that one of her fallopian tubes showed no evidence of tubal ligation. He would testify at trial that this indicated to him that appellee negligently performed the tubal ligation. Appellant filed the present wrongful conception action seeking damages for pre and post-natal expenses, pain and suffering, and emotional distress for both herself and her husband. A count on behalf of the child in the form of a wrongful life action was not included.[1] 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 (1988) provides: Following the completion of discovery, but prior to trial, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the recent enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 barred appellants' suit as a matter of law. The trial court granted appellee's motion and stated that summary judgment would have been proper even in the absence of the statute based on current case authority. It is clear that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305(b) precludes only an action by a child or his representative for the child's own wrongful life resulting from a negligently performed contraceptive procedure or abortion. Thus, 8305(b) does not bar this action by appellants for their own expenses and pain and suffering resulting from an improperly performed contraceptive procedure. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court was correct in determining that § 8305(a) bars such an action. Appellants argue that the phrase "once conceived" in section 8305(a) demonstrates the limited scope of that section and does not bar recovery for costs resulting from negligence occurring prior to conception. Instead, they contend, Section a is directed solely at prohibiting suits for the nonperformance or negligent performance of an abortion. Appellants argue that the legislative history of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 clearly indicates that the bar against "wrongful birth" in § 8305(a) does not apply to an action for "wrongful conception," which is an action seeking damages for negligence occurring prior to conception. In support *443 of this argument, appellants cite the following statements by the sponsors of the law in debate in both the Senate and the House on the senate bill prior to its enactment: Pa. Senate Leg. 1961 (March 22, 1988). Pa. Senate Leg. 1963 (March 22, 1988). Similar questions and statements were made in the House: Pa. House Leg. 307-308 (February 24, 1988). Appellee counters that it is improper for us to consider the legislative history for this statute since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in precluding any damages resulting from the birth of a child, and the remarks of individual legislators in debate represent only their view and not that of the proposing or enacting body. See Martin's Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 74 A.2d 120 (1950); National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239 (1938); Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934); Zemprelli v. Thornburg, 47 Pa.Cmwlth. 43, 407 A.2d 102 (1979); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939. We disagree. Legislative history is relevant in construing a statute when the statute is unclear. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305(a) states that it bars an action by any person on the basis that a person should not have been born. *445 (Emphasis added.) It is unclear from this language whether or not the term "wrongful birth" includes actions for negligent conception, since the damages from negligent conception constitute the expenses and suffering resulting from birth and, thus, also might be construed to fall within the bar. Consequently, we deem the statutory language unclear, and in order to construe it must proceed to ascertain the reason why the act was necessary, the object to be obtained by its passage, the circumstances under which it was enacted, and the mischief that it remedied. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Coretsky v. Board of Comr's of Butler, 520 Pa. 513, 555 A.2d 72 (1989). Our review of the legislative history indicates that the legislature primarily was concerned with eliminating suits brought by children or their parents in an effort to recover damages for the failure to abort a child or negligently aborting a child. The legislature's expressed overriding concern was to prevent law suits leading to eugenic abortions of deformed or unwanted children. The legislators also specifically state that this legislation was not intended to bar cases of "wrongful conception" resulting from negligently performed sterilization. We therefore find that the trial court improperly granted appellee summary judgment on the basis of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305(a). The trial court also indicated that even in the absence of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305(a), its decision would be the same based on current case authorities. This also was incorrect. On analogous facts involving an alleged improper sterilization and birth, the supreme court held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief under basic contract and tort theories for loss of earnings and pain and suffering resulting from the negligently performed tubal ligation including pre and post-natal costs. Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982). It stated: Id., 499 Pa. at 486-87, 453 A.2d 976. Appellants therefore argue that the trial court improperly dismissed their claim for medical expenses, wage loss, and pain and suffering resulting from the pregnancy. The trial court stated that these damages should have been pleaded specifically in a separate count. Appellants argue that even if their pleading was inartful, the trial court should have permitted appellants to amend their complaint. We find that appellants properly pleaded and alleged facts which establish a cause of action falling squarely within the supreme court's holding in Mason. In count I of their complaint, appellants sought damages as a result of the wife's pregnancy, and in count II, appellant's wife also sought damages for her husband, resulting solely from the pregnancy. The damages for relief under counts I and II clearly fall within those permitted by the court in Mason. Appellants claim damages for pre and post-natal costs incident to the pregnancy and birth following the alleged negligent sterlization. We conclude these allegations were pleaded properly and should not have been dismissed. In count III of the complaint, appellants state damages that clearly relate to expenses and inconvenience of raising their child, which clearly are barred by our supreme court's decision in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., supra. *447 We find this authority conclusive; therefore the trial court properly granted summary judgment on count III. Summary judgment reversed as to counts I and II of the complaint, affirmed as to count III, case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] In count III of their complaint, appellants do seek damages on their own behalf for the birth of their child. Appellants argue herein that the trial court erred in striking this count. We disagree, as discussed in the text.