Title: Major v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

180 So. 2d 335 (1965)
Henry MAJOR, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 34203.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 17, 1965.
*336 Harvey J. St. Jean, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and N. Joseph Durant, Jr., Asst. State Atty., for appellee.
CALDWELL, Judge.
This cause is here on appeal to review the decision of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County upholding the validity of F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A., the basis of the information charging Henry Major, defendant, appellant herein, as follows:
Defendant's motion to quash the information on the grounds it was vague, indefinite and unconstitutional, was denied.
On appeal the defendant raises the following points:
As a general rule the Florida courts have held that indictments and informations which charge in terms of a statute are sufficient. Herrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922 (1920); Gibbs v. Mayo, 81 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1955); 17 Fla.Jur., Indictment and Information §§ 55-57. But appellant contends that because the statute itself *337 is vague and indefinite, in that it describes no ascertainable standard of guilt, the information against him violates constitutional guaranties.
Florida Statute § 817.41, F.S.A., prohibiting misleading advertising, originated as § 2 of Chapter 59-301, Acts of 1959. Section 1 of that Act, now F.S. § 817.40, F.S.A., provides in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant contends that he cannot be found guilty of violating § 817.40 (the definition section) under an information charging a violation of § 817.41 (the prohibition and penalty section). However, as we have indicated, the two sections were enacted as parts of the same act and are plainly intended to be read together. Ervin v. Capital Weekly Post, 97 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1957); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664 (Fla.App. 1st 1960).
Florida Statute § 817.40, F.S.A. requires that the definition prescribed be read into F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A. It is noted that, absent such requirement, the general rule of statutory construction would exact the same result.[1]
Appellant insists, under his second point on appeal, that, to obtain conviction under F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A., the information must charge and the state must prove all the elements of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses and, as authority for this contention, cites the following portion of F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A.:
Appellant argues it was necessary that the prosecution allege and prove the purchaser in question relied upon misleading advertising to his detriment.
Our view is to the contrary. The above quoted clause of the statute was intended to eliminate the need to prove the elements of a crime of false pretenses once the dissemination of misleading advertising was established.
The decision of the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County, is affirmed.
THORNAL, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
[1]  Statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia, Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1962); Amos v. Conkling, 99 Fla. 206, 126 So. 283 (1930) and this rule is applicable with special force where the statutes in question were enacted by the same legislature as part of a single act, Ex parte Perry, 71 Fla. 250, 71 So. 174 (1916).