Title: Rathgeber v. James Hemenway, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: MAY 22, 2003 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

TOM RATHGEBER
and KAREN RATHGEBER,
		Petitioners on Review,
	v.
JAMES HEMENWAY, INC.,
dba Hemenway Realtors/Better Homes & Gardens;
and WILLIAM ZOBEL,
	Respondents on Review,
     and
OREGON EXTERMINATING COMPANY, INC.,
aka Oregon Exterminators;
and CHARLES C. ODEDO,
Defendants. 
(CC 16-98-20193; CA A108783; SC S49068)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 6, 2003.
	Frank C. Gibson, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioners on review.  With him on the briefs was C.
Edward Gerdes, Jr.
	Janet M. Schroer, of Hoffman, Hart & Wagner, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause for respondents on review.  With her on the
brief was Marjorie A. Speirs.
	Phil Goldsmith, of Law Office of Phil Goldsmith, Portland,
filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Consumer League
and Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.  With him on the brief was
Charles Robinowitz.
	Andrea L. Bushnell, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Oregon Association of Realtors.  With her on the brief was
Matt Farmer.
	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
a brief on behalf of amicus curiae State of Oregon.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, and Cheryl A. Pellegrini, Attorney-in-Charge,
Financial Fraud/Consumer Protection Section.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to circuit court for further
proceedings.
	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Darryl L. Larson, Judge. 176 Or App 135, 30 P3d 1200 (2001).
	** Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		BALMER, J.
Plaintiffs brought this action against James Hemenway,
Inc., and William Zobel (defendants) (1) for breach of fiduciary
duty and violation of the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA),
ORS 646.005 to 646.652, following plaintiffs' employment of
Zobel, a real estate associate of James Hemenway, Inc., as their
buyer's agent in the purchase of a home.  A jury returned a
verdict for plaintiffs on both claims and awarded economic
damages and noneconomic damages for emotional distress.  Because
plaintiffs had prevailed on their UTPA claim, the trial court
entered an order awarding them attorney fees under the UTPA. 
Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment for violation of the UTPA, the award of noneconomic
damages, and the award of attorney fees.  Rathgeber v. James
Hemenway, Inc., 176 Or App 135, 30 P3d 1200 (2001).  We allowed
plaintiffs' petition for review.  As explained below, we conclude
that plaintiffs failed to prove a violation of the UTPA and
failed to plead and prove a claim for emotional distress damages. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals,
although on somewhat different grounds.
FACTS
We summarize the facts as set out in the Court of
Appeals opinion.  Plaintiffs, Tom and Karen Rathgeber, planned to
move from Portland to Lane County and decided to purchase a home
in a rural area.  Plaintiffs hired Zobel, an associate with
Hemenway Realtors, to assist them in purchasing that home and
described to him the type of home that they desired to purchase. 
ORS 696.820 (1997), in effect at the time of the events in this
case, required that agents such as Zobel provide sellers and
buyers with the agency disclosure form set out in former ORS
696.830 (1997), repealed by Or Laws 2002, chapter 300, section
84. (2)  Zobel provided plaintiffs with that form, which stated, in
part:
	"A buyer's agent has the affirmative obligations
[under ORS 696.810]:
		"(1) To the buyer:  The fiduciary duties of
loyalty, obedience, disclosure, confidentiality,
reasonable care and diligence, and accounting in
dealing with the buyer.
		"(2) To the buyer and to the seller:  Honest
dealing and disclosure."
Zobel and Tom Rathgeber signed the disclosure form.
		Zobel showed plaintiffs approximately 50 properties. 
Plaintiffs made offers to purchase four properties, and the
sellers of one of those properties accepted.  After discovering
various problems with that property, plaintiffs refused to
proceed with the purchase.  The sellers brought an action for
specific performance, which the parties eventually settled. 
Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendants.  The Court
of Appeals described the evidence at trial:
	"[P]laintiffs presented evidence that Zobel failed to
adequately investigate the property to discover
foundation problems; failed to procure a dependable dry
rot report; relied on a dry rot report that should have
been questioned; failed to bring to plaintiffs'
attention potential problems with the roofing and a
loose light-switch cover that he noticed; failed to
insert in the purchase offer a contingency clause
related to the sale of plaintiffs' Portland home;
failed to provide plaintiffs a property disclosure
statement at the proper time; glossed over electrical
problems and trash discovered on the property after
plaintiffs took possession; pressed plaintiffs to
proceed to closing despite plaintiffs' reservations;
and failed to tell plaintiffs at any time that they had
five days to rescind the transaction."
Rathgeber, 176 Or App at 139.  The jury determined that
defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and
had violated the UTPA.  It awarded $13,600 in economic damages
and $20,000 in noneconomic damages for emotional distress.  The
trial court then awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees under the
UTPA.  See ORS 646.638(3) (court may award reasonable attorney
fees to prevailing party in UTPA action).  As noted, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment for violation of the UTPA, the
award of emotional distress damages, and the award of attorney
fees.UNLAWFUL TRADE PRACTICES ACT CLAIM
		Plaintiffs alleged that defendants willfully
represented to them that defendants' "services as buyer's agents
had qualities of competence and diligence that [the services] did
not have."  According to plaintiffs, when Zobel told them that he
would act as a buyer's agent on their behalf and gave them the
disclosure form listing the fiduciary duties of a buyer's agent,
he represented to them that he would fulfill that fiduciary duty
competently and diligently.  Plaintiffs assert that Zobel
pressured them to close on the purchase of the property in spite
of problems with the property and plaintiffs' concerns about it,
and that he otherwise failed to act competently and diligently,
as summarized above.  Plaintiffs argue that defendants violated
the UTPA by willfully representing that their services would have
the qualities of diligence and competence of a buyer's agent when
the services did not, in fact, have those qualities.  
		Defendants respond, first, that ORS 646.612(1) prevents
the statutory disclosure form from providing the basis for an
action under the UTPA because that statute provides that the UTPA
does not apply to "[c]onduct in compliance with * * * a statute
administered by a federal, state or local governmental agency." 
According to defendants, because ORS 696.820 (1997) required them
to provide plaintiffs with the disclosure form, its contents
cannot support a UTPA claim.  
Second, defendants argue that, even if ORS 646.612(1)
does not prevent the statutory disclosure form from providing the
basis for a UTPA claim, plaintiffs failed to introduce any
evidence that defendants willfully made any misrepresentations
about the qualities of the services that they provided
plaintiffs.  According to defendants, the only evidence of
wrongdoing in this case is evidence that Zobel breached his
fiduciary duty as a buyer's agent. (3)  Defendants contend that
evidence that Zobel breached a duty that he owed to plaintiffs
cannot, standing alone, support a UTPA claim. 
		The provision of the UTPA at issue here is ORS
646.608(1)(e), which provides, in part:
		"A person engages in an unlawful practice when in
the course of the person's business, vocation or
occupation the person does any of the following:
		"* * * * *
		"(e) Represents that * * * services have * * *
qualities that they do not have or that a person has a
* * * qualification * * * that the person does not
have."
To prevail on a claim under that paragraph, a plaintiff must
prove that a defendant willfully represented that the defendant
had qualifications that the defendant did not have or that the
defendant's services had qualities that those services did not
have.  As noted above, plaintiffs assert that the actionable
representations in this case were (1) Zobel's statement that he
would act as plaintiffs' buyer's agent, and (2) the statutory
disclosure form.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for a
directed verdict and submitting the UTPA claim to the jury. 
		First, we address defendants' argument that ORS
646.612(1) prevents the statutory disclosure form from providing
the basis for a UTPA claim under ORS 646.608.  The Court of
Appeals agreed with defendants on that issue.  Rathgeber, 176 Or
App at 141.  Plaintiffs and amici curiae State of Oregon, Oregon
Consumer League, and Oregon Trial Lawyers Association argue that
the Court of Appeals misconstrued that statute.  As noted, that
statute provides that "[c]onduct in compliance with * * * a
[state] statute" cannot violate ORS 646.608.  Plaintiffs and
amici argue that, although ORS 696.820 (1997) required defendants
to provide plaintiffs with the disclosure form, the act of
providing the form is not the "conduct" that plaintiffs allege
violated the UTPA.  Instead, the UTPA violation that plaintiffs
alleged is based on the representation that Zobel would fulfill
certain fiduciary duties identified on the statutory disclosure
form and Zobel's subsequent failure to do so.  That conduct,
plaintiffs assert, would permit the inference that Zobel never
intended to provide services with the qualities that he
represented that those services would have.  We agree with
plaintiffs and amici that ORS 646.612(1) does not bar plaintiffs'
claim.  No statute required Zobel to breach his fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs or to act in any manner that was inconsistent with
that duty.  The conduct that plaintiffs contend gives rise to
this cause of action, therefore, was not "[c]onduct in compliance
with * * * a [state] statute[,]" and ORS 646.612(1) does not
preclude plaintiffs from relying on the statutory disclosure form
to support their UTPA claim.
		We now turn to the question whether the trial court
erred in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict.  At
the outset, we note that 
	"[t]his court reviews the denial of motion for a
directed verdict for any evidence to support the
verdict in plaintiff's favor.  * * *  This court cannot
set aside a jury's verdict unless there was no evidence
from which the jury could have found the facts
necessary to establish the elements of plaintiff's
cause of action."  
Woodbury v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 335 Or 154, 159, 61 P3d 918 (2003). 
Like a trial court considering a motion for a directed verdict,
we do not weigh the evidence but, rather, "consider all the
evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."  Bolt v.
Influence, Inc., 333 Or 572, 578, 43 P3d 425 (2002).  If
plaintiffs' evidence, including the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence, would permit a jury to find
facts establishing the required elements of plaintiffs' UTPA
claim, then we must affirm the verdict.
		We now consider the elements of plaintiffs' UTPA claim
and the evidence adduced to support them.  As noted, ORS
646.608(1)(e) makes unlawful a representation that "services have
* * * qualities * * * or that a person has a * * * qualification"
that they do not, in fact, have.  The Court of Appeals analyzed
plaintiffs' claim as though it were based on an alleged
representation that Zobel had a "qualification" that, in fact, he
did not have.  Rathgeber, 176 Or App at 140.  However, the
allegations in the amended complaint, the jury instructions, and
the judge's colloquy with counsel regarding defendants' motion
for a directed verdict all demonstrate that plaintiffs' claim was
based on defendants' alleged representation that defendants'
services had "qualities" that they did not have.  The jury
instruction on that issue stated:  
		"To recover, the plaintiffs must prove the
following three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence concerning their claim of unlawful trade
practice:
		"* * * * *
		"Second, that the defendants willfully
engaged in the unlawful practice, in that the
defendants violated the [UTPA] by willfully
representing to plaintiffs that defendants'
services as buyer's agents had qualities of
competency and diligence that they did not have."
(Emphasis added.)  The amended complaint alleged that defendants
"violated the provisions of the [UTPA] by willfully representing
to plaintiffs that their services as buyer's agents had qualities
of competence and diligence that they did not have."  (Emphasis
added.)  We conclude that the record reflects that the trial
court sent the allegation to the jury as that allegation was
presented in plaintiffs' amended complaint.
As noted, plaintiffs argue that the statutory
disclosure form and Zobel's agreement to act as plaintiffs'
buyer's agent, by implying that Zobel would act in compliance
with his fiduciary duty as a buyer's agent, represented to
plaintiffs that defendants' services had qualities of competence
and diligence that those services did not have. (4)  An actionable
representation under the UTPA may be express or implied.  See ORS
646.608(2) ("A representation under [646.608(1)] may be any
manifestation of any assertion by words or conduct, including,
but not limited to, a failure to disclose a fact.").  Plaintiffs'
complaint thus provided a basis for them to introduce evidence
that the defendants' representations violated the UTPA. 
Plaintiffs argue that they presented evidence at trial that the
services Zobel provided to them lacked the qualities of
competence and diligence.  
		The problem with plaintiffs' argument is that
defendants' representations violated the UTPA only if, at the
time that they were made, defendants knew or should have known
that their services did not have the qualities defendants
represented them to have.  ORS 646.638(1) establishes a party's
right to bring an action for damages for a UTPA violation:  
	"[A]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of
money or property, real or personal, as a result of
willful use or employment by another person of a
method, act or practice declared unlawful by ORS
646.608 or 646.648, may bring an individual action in
an appropriate court to recover actual damages or $200,
whichever is greater."  
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, a private party who seeks to recover
damages for a UTPA violation must plead and prove a "willful"
violation of the statute by the defendant.  "A willful violation
occurs when the person committing the violation knew or should
have known that the conduct of the person was a violation."  ORS
646.605(10). (5)  Here, however, plaintiffs acknowledged that they
had not submitted evidence that, at the time of Zobel's agreement
to act as plaintiffs' buyer's agent, he knew or should have known
that he would not perform his duties as a buyer's agent
competently and diligently.  That is, plaintiffs introduced
evidence that Zobel breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
provide services that had the qualities of competence and
diligence, but they introduced no evidence that he knew or should
have known that he would do so at the time that he made
representations to plaintiffs regarding the qualities of his
services.
Amicus State of Oregon argues that the evidence of
defendants' breach of fiduciary duty shows conduct so far out of
compliance with that duty that the jury could infer that, at the 
time that Zobel represented that he would act as plaintiffs'
buyer's agent and would provide the attendant quality of
services, he did not intend to provide services of that quality. 
The state further argues that a single act of misconduct can be
sufficient to support the finding of a UTPA violation.  We agree
that a single act of misconduct, in certain circumstances, can be
sufficient to support a finding that an actor did not intend to
act in compliance with a promise made.  However, plaintiffs in
this case twice acknowledged to the jury that the misconduct here
would not support the conclusion that Zobel knew or should have
known that he would breach his fiduciary duty at the time of the
representations alleged in this case. (6)  Given those
acknowledgments, plaintiffs were not entitled to have the jury
consider their claim of a willful violation of the UTPA.
		For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs
failed to establish that Zobel willfully made a representation
that would allow them to recover damages under the UTPA.  The
trial court, therefore, erred in denying defendants' motion for a
directed verdict on plaintiffs' UTPA claim.  Because we conclude
that plaintiffs cannot succeed in their UTPA claim, we do not
address the question whether emotional distress damages are
recoverable under that statute.  The trial court's award of
attorney fees was based on the judgment for a violation of the
UTPA.  Because we conclude that plaintiffs failed to prove such a
violation, we also affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of the
award of attorney fees to plaintiffs.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
		Plaintiffs argue that they properly were awarded
emotional distress damages arising from their claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.  As plaintiffs acknowledge, Oregon allows
recovery for emotional distress without accompanying physical
injury under narrow circumstances, including when a defendant's
conduct infringes on a plaintiff's legally protected interest. 
See Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or 17, 23,
816 P2d 593 (1991) (so stating).  Plaintiffs argue that
defendants infringed on their legally protected interest created
by the disclosure requirements and delineation of agency duties
of ORS 696.810 (1997), ORS 696.820 (1997), and ORS 696.830
(1997).  The purpose of enacting the disclosure requirements,
plaintiffs contend, was to protect real estate consumers. 
According to plaintiffs, Zobel's failure to fulfill his duties as
a buyer's agent is the type of harm that the agency disclosure
requirements are designed to prevent.  Thus, plaintiffs conclude
that they had a legally protected interest in having Zobel act as
a buyer's agent on their behalf.  If Zobel failed to act on their
behalf, plaintiffs argue, and breached the duties that he owed to
them, then he infringed on that protected interest, giving rise
to liability for emotional distress damages.  
		Defendants respond that plaintiffs cannot recover under
the "legally protected interest" rule set out in Hammond.  They
assert that the legally protected interest rule is not the proper
analytical framework for the issue presented in this case. 
Instead, defendants assert that plaintiffs' claim for emotional
distress damages should be analyzed within the framework of this
court's decision in Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, 327 Or 9,
956 P2d 960 (1998), and that, when considered within that
framework, plaintiffs' claim fails.  
		In Curtis, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, by
negligently performing a medical procedure, caused the plaintiff
severe emotional harm.  The plaintiff alleged no physical injury;
the parties argued the case within the framework of a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  This court
determined, however, that the proper analytical framework for the
case was professional malpractice because "the most obvious claim
stated by the pleadings [was] a straightforward claim for medical
malpractice."  Curtis, 327 Or at 13.  This court went on to hold
that, to state a claim for emotional distress damages in a
medical malpractice setting not involving physical harm, a
plaintiff must plead and prove a standard of care that includes a
duty to protect against psychic harm.  Id. at 14-15.  
		Defendants ask us to apply the reasoning in Curtis to
all types of professional malpractice, not just to medical
malpractice.  According to defendants, if a medical professional,
in the absence of a specific duty, does not have a general duty
to protect patients against psychic harm, a real estate
professional also does not have that general duty.  Because
plaintiffs failed to plead or prove any duty of real estate
professionals to protect their clients from emotional harm,
defendants argue, plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim for
emotional distress damages.
		The Court of Appeals did not decide whether this case
should be analyzed under the legally protected interest rule of
Hammond or under the duty to protect rule of Curtis.  Rathgeber,
176 Or App at 145.  Instead, that court concluded that, under
either rule, plaintiffs' emotional distress claim could not
succeed.
We first address the proper analytical framework within
which to analyze plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress
damages.  In Hammond, the plaintiff brought separate claims for
negligent and reckless infliction of emotional distress. 
Emotional harm was the only harm alleged.  This court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover emotional distress damages for negligent
infliction of emotional harm without pleading and proving that
the defendant had violated a "legally protected interest" of the
plaintiff.  Hammond, 312 Or at 24. (7)  In Curtis, the parties
argued their case within the framework of the legally protected
interest rule in Hammond.  However, this court recognized that
the claim properly was characterized as a malpractice claim, not
as a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
analyzed the claim in the framework of a malpractice case.  
In this case, the pleadings allege a breach of
fiduciary duty by a real estate professional acting for a client
in a business relationship.  Plaintiffs sought economic and
emotional distress damages arising from that breach of fiduciary
duty.  It is clear from the pleadings that plaintiffs' claim for
breach of fiduciary duty is, essentially, a claim for real estate
professional malpractice. (8)  Plaintiffs alleged (and proved to the
satisfaction of the jury) that Zobel had failed to meet the
standard of care of a real estate professional.  Thus, the
professional malpractice analysis in Curtis is the proper
framework within which to analyze this case.
		In Curtis, this court held that the plaintiff's claim
survived summary judgment because the claim "invoke[d] specific
duties imposed on a group of medical professionals to guard
against recognized medical risks that happen to be psychological
in nature."  Curtis, 327 Or at 15 (emphasis in original).  This
court further stated:
	"Our holding should not be read to mean that medical
professionals operate under a general duty to avoid any
emotional harm that foreseeably might result from their
conduct.  In that regard, their duty is no greater than
that of the population at large.  But, where the
standard of care in a particular medical profession
recognizes the possibility of adverse psychological
reactions or consequences as a medical concern and
dictates that certain precautions be taken to avoid or
minimize it, the law will not insulate persons in that
profession from liability if they fail in those duties,
thereby causing the contemplated harm."
Id. at 15-16.  Thus, in the absence of allegations that the
standard of care requires something more, medical professionals
have no unique duty to avoid emotional harm.
		Applying the analysis in Curtis to this case, we
conclude that if, in the absence of a particular standard of
care, doctors do not have the general duty to guard against
emotional harm, then real estate professionals similarly do not
have that general duty.  It is always foreseeable that some
emotional harm might result from the negligent performance of
real estate professional services, as it might from legal,
accounting, or other varieties of professional malpractice.  That
possibility, however, cannot give rise to emotional distress
damages unless a standard of care that includes the duty to
protect a client from emotional harm governs the professional's
conduct.  Because plaintiffs did not plead such a duty, the trial
court erred in denying defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs'
request for emotional distress damages.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.



1. 	Plaintiffs also named Charles Odedo and the Oregon
Exterminating Company, Inc., as defendants.  Neither appeared in
the trial court, and that court entered a default judgment
against them.  Neither appealed or sought review.

2. 	In 2001, the legislature repealed ORS 696.830, and
amended ORS 696.820, Or Laws 2001, ch 300, § 48, which now
requires that agents provide a copy of an agency disclosure
pamphlet written by the Real Estate Commissioner. 

3. 	As noted, the jury found that Zobel had breached his
fiduciary duty to plaintiffs.  Defendants did not challenge that
determination on appeal.

4. 	Plaintiffs do not rely on any other, later acts or
statements by Zobel.

5. 	We note in passing that, although a private plaintiff
may bring a UTPA claim only if it has suffered an "ascertainable
loss of money or property" as a result of a "willful" violation
of the statute, the ascertainable loss and willfulness
requirements do not apply when the state brings a UTPA claim. 
See ORS 646.632 (describing state UTPA enforcement processes).

6. 	In his opening statement, plaintiffs' counsel stated:
	"We're not arguing that [Zobel] was dishonest or that
he intentionally withheld information, we're just
saying that he was careless and he did not live up to
the statutory standards."
In closing argument, plaintiffs' counsel further stated:
	"I want to say a word before I finish about our [UTPA]
claim, the second claim.  It doesn't ask for anything
more than the breach of fiduciary duty claim, but it's
important that you hold [in] our clients' favor on
that; because if you do, it gives the Court a chance to
award attorney fees that they have incurred in this
case.  That's the point of it."


7. 	This court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment
on the plaintiff's claim for reckless infliction of emotional
distress, because the plaintiff had failed to show that the
defendant's conduct was anything more than negligent.  312 Or at
27-28.  

8. 	This court stated in Georgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 313 Or 97, 110 n 7, 831 P2d 7 (1992):
		"The parties have referred to plaintiff's second
claim as a claim for 'breach of a fiduciary duty.'  
This is a correct appellation in the same sense that
one would state a claim for 'breach of a physician's
duty,' 'breach of a lawyer's duty,' or 'breach of a
landlord's duty.'   In each case, the duty is one
created by law, the duty is one that arises from the
relationship between the parties, and the action is in
the nature of an action on the case.  
		"The form of action for a claim against a
fiduciary for breaching a duty of care arising from the
relationship is not materially different from a claim
against a physician, a lawyer, or an engineer for
breaching a duty of care arising from such a
relationship.  Notwithstanding repeated references by
this and other courts to a 'breach of a fiduciary
duty,' the form of action is the same, and the theory
of recovery -- breach of the duty of care that the law
implies from the relationship -- is the same."
		The fact that the fiduciary duty of a real estate
licensee acting as a buyer's agent is set out in ORS 696.810 does
not alter the conclusion that the breach of fiduciary duty claim
in this case is the equivalent of a professional malpractice
claim.  The fiduciary duty described in the statutes is nothing
more than a codification of the common law of fiduciary duties of
buyer's agents.  See ORS 696.855(1) ("ORS * * * 696.800 to
696.855 * * * shall not directly, indirectly or by implication
limit or alter any preexisting common law or statutory right or
remedy including actions for fraud, negligence or equitable
relief.").  Moreover, the real estate statutes specifically
provide that they do not affect "[c]ommon law and statutory
remedies."  ORS 696.855(3).