Title: People v. Harris

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89796-Agenda 2-March 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DAVID HARRIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:	Defendant, David Harris, was convicted of first degree murder
and attempted armed robbery in 1995 and sentenced to death. On
direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's conviction and
sentence. People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114 (1998). Defendant
thereafter petitioned the Cook County circuit court for relief
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1998)). Defendant now appeals directly to this court
the Cook County circuit court's order dismissing his first and
second amended post-conviction petitions without an evidentiary
hearing. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).

ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural
mechanism for a criminal defendant to assert that "in the
proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a
substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Illinois or both." 725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 1998); People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 375-76
(2000); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). A
post-conviction proceeding is a collateral attack upon a prior
conviction or sentence and does not relitigate a defendant's
innocence or guilt. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999).
Therefore, any issues considered by the court on direct appeal are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues which could have
been raised on direct appeal are deemed waived. People v. West,
187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	After a capital defendant files a post-conviction petition, the
trial court examines the petition and appoints an attorney to
represent the defendant, if necessary. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1)
(West 1998). Thereafter, the State may answer or move to dismiss
the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1998). If the State moves to
dismiss the petition, the trial court must examine and rule upon the
legal sufficiency of the defendant's allegations, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1999).
A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the
allegations of the post-conviction petition, supported by the trial
record and any accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 448 (2001); Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 376. A trial court's ruling on
the sufficiency of defendant's allegations is a legal determination
and, therefore, our review is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388.
	In this appeal, defendant raises eight issues. He contends: (1)
he is actually innocent of the crime; (2) he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to request a
fitness examination; (3) he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because his lawyer failed to adequately investigate the
case and produce exculpatory evidence and alibi witnesses; (4) the
State committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose
impeachment evidence regarding its witness Theodore Traylor; (5)
the State committed a Brady violation at his capital sentencing
hearing when prosecutors failed to disclose material exculpatory
evidence regarding a disciplinary incident; (6) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his capital sentencing hearing
because his lawyer failed to perform a proper mitigation
investigation; (7) he was not statutorily death eligible; and (8) the
Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional.

I. Actual Innocence
	Defendant argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his claim that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he
was convicted. Defendant's claim of actual innocence is based
upon the affidavits of codefendants Demetrius Daniels and
Howard McClinton, who state that defendant was not present at
the time of the crime and that they conspired to frame defendant.
Defendant also bases his claim upon the affidavits of his brothers,
Darrell and Rashid Harris, who state that defendant was at home
with them in defendant's basement apartment watching a movie
at the time of the shooting.
	Courts may consider a free-standing claim of actual innocence
in a post-conviction proceeding if the claim is based on newly
discovered, material, and noncumulative evidence that the
defendant is innocent of the crime for which he has been tried,
convicted, and sentenced. People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475,
489 (1996). Newly discovered evidence is evidence that was
unavailable at trial and could not have been discovered sooner
through due diligence. People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169, 180
(1996). A defendant is only entitled to relief on his claim of actual
innocence if the evidence is of such a conclusive character that it
would probably change the result of retrial. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d  at 489; Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d  at 180.
	We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's claim
of actual innocence without an evidentiary hearing. First, the
affidavits of defendant's brothers, Darrell and Rashid, do not
contain "newly discovered" evidence. This evidence could have
been discovered before trial with the exercise of due diligence.
Despite defendant's contention that the evidence is newly
discovered because the alibi affidavits are dated after the time of
trial, the mere fact that these affidavits are dated after the time of
trial does not render the evidence newly discovered. Clearly, the
fact that defendant was allegedly with his brothers on the night of
the crime could have been discovered sooner. More importantly,
defendant is the source of this information and was armed with
this information at the time of trial.
	Turning to the affidavits of codefendants Daniels and
McClinton, we also reject defendant's claim of actual innocence
based upon the evidence contained in these affidavits. In 1994,
Daniels and McClinton gave statements to the police in which they
outlined their involvement in the crime and identified defendant
as the shooter. In their affidavits, however, they state that it was "a
scheme to say that it was [defendant] who shot Clifford Chase in
the event any of us were caught." However, as we observed in
defendant's direct appeal, "evidence of guilt in this case was
overwhelming." Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 142. Defendant was
convicted based upon the following evidence: defendant's written
statement in which he confessed to personally shooting the victim;
the testimony of an eyewitness, Theresa Barnes, who identified
defendant as the shooter; and the testimony of codefendant
Theodore Traylor, who stated that defendant was the shooter.
Importantly, the statements of Daniels, McClinton, Traylor,
Barnes, and defendant describe in strikingly similar detail the
circumstances of the crime. Based upon the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, the affidavits of codefendants Daniels and
McClinton are not of such a conclusive character that they would
probably change the outcome on retrial. We affirm the decision of
the circuit court dismissing this claim without an evidentiary
hearing.

II. Guilt-Phase Issues

A. Strickland-Failure to Request a Fitness Hearing

	Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to seek a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104-11(a) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-11(a)
(West 1998)). Under section 104-11(a), "[t]he issue of the
defendant's fitness for trial, to plead, or to be sentenced may be
raised by the defense ***. When a bona fide doubt of the
defendant's fitness is raised, the court shall order a determination
of the issue before proceeding further." 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a)
(West 1998). Defendant argues that at the time of trial and
sentencing there was a bona fide doubt of his fitness because he
suffered from depression, a dependent personality disorder, and
organic brain damage.
	The State argues that defendant waived this claim because it
could have been raised on direct appeal. See People v. Olinger,
176 Ill. 2d 326, 365 (1997) ("argument is waived because it was
apparent from a direct examination of the record and should have
been raised on direct appeal"). The record on direct appeal
contains defendant's pretrial and presentence investigation reports.
These reports state that in 1994, one year prior to his conviction
and sentence in August 1995, defendant was diagnosed with
depression and prescribed medication for a period of five months,
to manage his depression.
	Defendant, however, also relies on evidence outside the
record on direct appeal, including psychological assessments
gathered by his post-conviction counsel which conclude that
defendant suffers from severe depression, dependent personality
disorder, and organic brain disorder. Accordingly, to the extent
defendant relies upon evidence outside the record, we examine this
claim. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined
under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Regarding the
first Strickland prong, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
and (2) absent counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93. Under Strickland,
reviewing courts entertain a strong presumption that the attorney's
performance was a product of sound trial strategy and professional
judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065; see also People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 414
(2000) ("Counsel's decision whether to present a particular
witness is generally a strategic choice which cannot support a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"). To overcome this
presumption, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that but for the attorney's deficient performance the result
would have been different. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 202
(1988); see also People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92 (1984)
("Effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect
representation"). Regarding the second Strickland prong, a
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome-or put another way, that counsel's
deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or
fundamentally unfair. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 376. To prevail, a
defendant must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs
of the Strickland test. People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 487
(1996). If this court concludes that defendant did not suffer
prejudice, the court need not decide whether counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at
94.
	To establish that the failure to request a fitness hearing
prejudiced a defendant within the meaning of Strickland, a
defendant must show that facts existed at the time of trial that
would have raised a bona fide doubt of his ability "to understand
the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist
in his defense." 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998); People v.
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 319 (2000). "Defendant is entitled to relief
*** only if he shows that the trial court would have found a bona
fide doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness hearing if it had been
apprised of the evidence now offered." Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 319.
To determine whether there exists a bona fide doubt of defendant's
fitness, a court may consider the defendant's irrational behavior,
the defendant's demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion
on defendant's competence. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 319; see also
People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1991) (There are " 'no
fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is
often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and
subtle nuances are implicated' "), quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975).
	Taking as true defendant's allegations that he suffers from
mental impairments as they are stated in his post-conviction
psychological assessments (see Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380-82),
these allegations do not necessarily establish that defendant was
unfit. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322-23. The issue is whether defendant
could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel.
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 323. Specifically, we have stated that
"[f]itness speaks only to a person's ability to function within the
context of a trial. It does not refer to sanity or competence in other
areas." Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 320, 322.
	In this case, the record clearly illustrates that defendant
understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings. On several
occasions, the court provided defendant with a detailed
explanation of the proceedings and informed defendant of his
rights during those proceedings. Following these admonishments,
defendant stated that he understood. Furthermore, the record
shows that defendant participated in his own defense;
communicated and conferred with his trial counsel; expressed to
the court his understanding of the proceedings, including his
decisions to litigate rather than agree to a plea, waive his right to
testify, and waive his right to a jury at the sentencing hearing; and
articulated a clear statement in allocution during mitigation.
	Because defendant has not shown that there was a bona fide
doubt concerning his fitness, defendant fails to make a substantial
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim. The
circuit court correctly dismissed defendant's claim without an
evidentiary hearing.

B. Strickland-Failure to Present Alibi and Exculpatory
Evidence
	Defendant asserts that even if this court rejects his claim of
actual innocence, at the very least we should find that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed
to investigate and present his alibi evidence that at the time of the
shooting he was at home with his brothers. Defendant argues that
his trial attorney's deficient performance is the reason this
evidence was not discovered before trial and presented in his
defense.
	We disagree. As we noted previously, defendant is clearly the
source of this evidence and, yet, does not explain why he failed to
inform his attorney about the existence of his alibi defense before
trial. He cannot now blame his attorney for failing to investigate
and discover this evidence. Moreover, given all of the evidence
that was before the jury, defendant does not demonstrate that the
result of the proceeding would have been different. We affirm the
circuit court's dismissal of this claim without an evidentiary
hearing.
	Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
because (1) he negligently failed to present evidence that
codefendant Daniels was seen with a .38-caliber handgun, the
same type of gun used to kill the victim, several days after the
shooting, and (2) he negligently failed to present the testimony of
assistant Cook County Public Defender Maura Shapiro, who
would have advanced defendant's claim that his post-arrest
statements were coerced. We address each issue in turn.
	The victim was shot to death in his car on June 7, 1993.
Bullets were recovered from the front seat and the back floor of
the victim's car. At trial, the parties stipulated that an expert would
testify that both of the bullets recovered from the victim's car were
fired from a .38 Special revolver. Prior to trial, defense counsel,
Dennis Doherty, received an arrest report dated June 19, 1993,
with information that codefendant Daniels was seen with a .38-caliber gun. The arrest report summary indicated that a Chicago
Housing Authority security guard noticed Daniels holding a .38-caliber gun, that Daniels fled with the gun, but when he was
apprehended several minutes later, he was no longer in possession
of the gun. The gun was not recovered. In Doherty's post-conviction affidavit, he states:
		"My overall strategy was to establish a reasonable doubt
that [defendant] had in fact shot Clifford Chase with a .38
handgun. In this connection, I had been tendered a police
report relating to the subsequent arrest of a co-defendant
who was observed *** to be in possession of a .38. I
conducted no investigation based upon this report even
though it obviously advanced my reasonable doubt
defense ***. In fact, at the time of trial I overlooked the
information altogether and never even considered it in
terms of the defense that I did present. *** [T]his was not
a strategic or tactical decision on my part."
We conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed this claim
without an evidentiary hearing because defendant fails to make a
substantial showing of prejudice. See Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at
512. In the instant case, evidence against defendant was based, in
part, upon the eyewitness testimony of Barnes, a disinterested
bystander present in the parking lot at the time of the shooting, and
Traylor, an individual present in the car with defendant before,
during, and after the shooting. Evidence that a codefendant was
seen with a similar model handgun, never recovered by the police,
almost two weeks after the incident does not render the result of
trial unreliable. Put another way, this evidence does not create a
reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been
different.
	Next, defendant contends Doherty was ineffective for failing
to call Assistant Public Defender Shapiro at trial. Defendant twice
confessed to the crime, and the second time he memorialized his
participation in the crime in a detailed, court-reported statement.
These statements were offered as evidence at trial; however,
defendant claimed that the police physically coerced his
statements.
	Turning to the time of his statements, on July 15, 1993,
defendant was transferred from Judge Singer's courtroom by the
police to Area Two Police Headquarters for questioning. At that
time, Assistant Public Defender Shapiro was assigned to Judge
Singer's courtroom and oversaw defendant's transfer from the
courtroom. Two days later, on July 17, 1993, defendant was
returned to the Cook County jail with injuries to his lip and mouth.
	At trial, the State called Assistant State's Attorney Chiampas,
the attorney who took defendant's statement on June 15, 1993.
Chiampas testified that when she took defendant's statement he
had no visible injuries. Additionally, the State presented the
stipulated testimony of Officer Hughes, an Area Two officer who
returned defendant to the lockup at 1:15 a.m. on June 16, 1993,
after defendant made his statement. Officer Hughes provided in
his stipulated testimony that when he returned defendant to the
lockup, defendant had no visible injuries.
	Defendant relies upon Doherty's affidavit to support his claim
that Shapiro's testimony at trial would have advanced his defense
that his statements were physically coerced:
		"I never asked Ms. Shapiro about her practice in this case
where a prisoner appears in court with obvious or even
apparent injuries. This was a significant omission on my
part because my defense at trial was predicated in part on
the theory that [defendant's] statement to authorities was
coerced by physical violence. If Ms. Shapiro had not
observed injuries to [defendant] *** on the date the police
removed him from Judge Singer's courtroom, this fact
obviously would have bolstered our defense by
eliminating the possibility that [defendant's] injuries were
pre-existing ones. *** The fact that Ms. Shapiro did not
testify as a defense witness at trial was therefore not a
tactical or strategic decision on my part."
Defendant also attaches Shapiro's affidavit to support his claim:
		"If affiant observes a prisoner who appears in court with
apparent injuries, she will make inquiry on the record
concerning the matter. *** Based upon my experience as
a public defender in Judge Singer's courtroom, affiant
also believes that Judge Singer would make similar
inquiry of any prisoner who appears before him with
apparent injuries. Long after June of 1993 affiant was
contacted by attorney Dennis Doherty about a client of his
named [defendant]. By this time affiant had no
independent recollection of who [defendant] was."
	We find that defendant does not make a substantial showing
of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon this evidence. The
affidavits neither prove nor disprove defendant's allegation that
his statement was coerced. If called to testify, Shapiro could only
have narrowed the time period in which defendant sustained his
injuries, but her testimony could not identify the cause of
defendant's injuries. The testimony is, therefore, irrelevant and
immaterial. Simply stated, the result of the proceeding would not
have been different if Shapiro was called to testify at trial. The
trial court correctly dismissed this claim without an evidentiary
hearing because this evidence does not establish prejudice under
Strickland.

C. Brady Violation
	Defendant argues that his constitutional right to due process
was violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) when the State withheld exculpatory
evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to
disclose evidence which would have impeached a State witness,
Theodore Traylor.
	Traylor testified that on June 7, 1993, a car occupied by
Daniels, McClinton, Antoine Moore, and defendant pulled up next
to him on the side of the road. Traylor accepted an offer of a ride
home and got into the car. During the ride that followed, Daniels,
McClinton, Moore, and defendant discussed carjacking.
Eventually, the driver of the car pulled into a parking lot upon
seeing an older man walking to his car. Traylor testified that the
car pulled within several feet of the man, who was by this time
seated inside his car. According to Traylor, Moore initially
attempted the carjacking, but when the man refused to exit his car,
Moore returned to the car and said, "Shoot him." Traylor stated
that defendant jumped out of the car and shot the man twice
through the window. Subsequently, Traylor turned himself in and
provided a handwritten statement describing the offense. Several
weeks later Traylor enter into a plea agreement concerning an
unrelated drug charge and was assigned to the Cook County
probation department's mental health unit for evaluation. Based
upon his examination and reports from the Psychiatric Institute, a
probation status report, dated July 28, 1993, indicated that Traylor
"does not have a psychiatric disorder other than a polysubstance
dependence." This same report provided that Traylor "admitted to
some thoughts about harming persons who [sic] he considered
foes, because of street gang alliances." Traylor was reassigned to
an intensive drug probation unit.
	In his post-conviction petition, defendant argues that the State
failed to disclose impeachment evidence that Traylor was drug and
alcohol dependent and that he admitted to having thoughts about
harming people he considered gang rivals. Traylor's drug
conviction was disclosed to defendant at the time of trial, but
psychiatric evaluations and probation recommendations
concerning Traylor's polysubstance dependence were not
disclosed. This information was reported in a Cook County adult
probation department status report. Defendant argues that the
information directly impacted Traylor's ability to recall, recollect,
and narrate events and, therefore, it was impeachment evidence.
Moreover, defendant argues that the information concerning
Traylor's harmful thoughts about gang rivals also was impeaching
because it exposed Traylor's motive to testify falsely. Defendant
claims that the evidence was known to the State because the Cook
County State's Attorney's office was involved in the proceedings
that eventually resulted in Traylor's drug charges and was a party
to Traylor's plea agreement. In response, the State only argues that
the evidence is not material or sufficient to cast doubt upon the
verdict. The State does not dispute that it knew of this evidence
and did not disclose it, and we confine our analysis to the issue of
materiality.
	As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Brady, the
prosecution must disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused
and "material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady, 373 U.S.  at
87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1197; see also 134 Ill. 2d R.
412(c); Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 485-86. Evidence is material if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985); see also
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 486 ("the standard for materiality under
Brady is whether there is a reasonable probability that disclosure
of the evidence to the defense would have altered the outcome of
the proceeding"). However, under this test courts of review do not
examine the sufficiency of the evidence. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at
393. Rather, a defendant must show that " 'the favorable evidence
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' " Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 393, quoting Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 435, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 506,
115 S. Ct.  at 1566. Impeachment evidence may be considered
material to guilt. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1972).
	In this case, defendant does not make a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation under Brady. Taking the allegation
that the State failed to disclose evidence of Traylor's
polysubstance abuse as true, this evidence is not material under
Brady. Specifically, defendant fails to show that there is a
reasonable probability that had the evidence of Traylor's
polysubstance dependency been disclosed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. The evidence allegedly
withheld was merely cumulative of other evidence presented at
trial which challenged Traylor's credibility. See People v.
Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d 392, 400-01 (2000) (finding no Brady
violation where the evidence allegedly withheld was merely
cumulative of other evidence presented at trial). For example,
Traylor offered evasive answers concerning his prior conviction.
On direct examination, evidence was introduced concerning his
prior conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Traylor then
stated on cross-examination that he just happened to be walking
down the street and found a bag of "dope" and was innocent of the
drug crime for which he pleaded guilty. Further, Traylor offered
evasive answers concerning his occupation. He stated that he did
not sell drugs, but rather made his living selling candy for his
church. Later, Traylor offered that he frequently traveled, not with
money from his occupation, but rather with money paid to him by
lawyers for "filing" lawsuits. Last, Traylor provided evasive
answers concerning his presence in the area on the night of the
crime. On cross-examination, Traylor stated that he was in the area
on the night of the crime to watch a person to pay off his debt to
a drug dealer. Subsequently, Traylor stated that he was in the area
to pay a drug dealer money he owed. Traylor finally offered that
he was in the area to pay a "gambling debt." Therefore, it is
unlikely that additional evidence challenging Traylor's credibility
would have altered the outcome of the proceeding.
	Moreover, defendant fails to make a substantial showing that
evidence concerning Traylor's harmful thoughts about gang foes
is material to guilt. The adult probation department status report
noted that Traylor "admitted to some thoughts about harming
persons who [sic] he considered foes, because of street gang
alliances." Defendant claims that this evidence exposes Traylor's
motive to testify against him. We disagree. There is nothing to
suggest that this alleged statement was directed toward defendant.
Defendant does not offer evidence that he and Traylor were in
rival gangs. Defendant does not offer evidence that Traylor
considered defendant a "foe." In fact, the record belies this
assertion. For example, the status report states that Traylor "admits
that most of his friends are active gang members and sell drugs,
but denies any [personal] gang affiliation or drug dealing."
Moreover, after conversing with defendant and his companions in
the car on the night of the crime, Traylor accepted a ride home in
the car with defendant. Thus, defendant fails to make a substantial
showing that Traylor's alleged statement illustrates a motive to
testify against him. If this evidence had been disclosed to the
defense, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different.


III. Sentencing-Phase Issues

A. Brady Violation

	Defendant argues that the State also violated its duty under
Brady during the aggravation/mitigation portion of the capital
sentencing hearing. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194. First, defendant argues that the State knowingly
presented false or misleading testimony.
	On May 28, 1995, Cook County department of corrections
officer Donnie Booker was temporarily assigned to division one,
tier C-2, in response to a riot. During his search of the tier, he
discovered a two-foot-long homemade knife hidden beneath a bed
mattress upon which defendant was asleep. Officer Booker
submitted a disciplinary report, and on May 30, 1995, defendant
received 29 days in isolation for this violation. Officer Booker
testified about his discovery of the homemade knife during the
aggravation portion of the sentencing hearing.
			"ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY: And while you
were on tier 2 that afternoon, did you recover anything?
			BOOKER: Yes, sir, I did, I recovered a homemade
knife, about two feet long.
			Q. And, was that from cell C-14?
			A. Yes, it was.
			Q. And did you learn whose cell that was?
			A. Yes, I did.
			Q. And where did you recover that two foot long
homemade knife, where did you recover it from?
* * *
			A. I got it out of cell 14, it was right in the guy's,
inmate's mattress, and I pulled it out of his mattress
stuffed inside.
* * *
			Q. Now did you learn whose, who slept on that
mattress?
			A. Yes, I did.
			Q. Who is that?
			A. I know it's [defendant]."
The department of corrections' internal affairs division conducted
an investigation following the incident to determine whether
prosecution for possession of contraband in a penal institution was
warranted. Investigators interviewed Officer Booker in connection
with the investigation and prepared a written summary.
		"Officer Booker said that the weapon was hidden inside
the bed mattress of the bed that [defendant] *** was
sleeping on ***. ASA Stephenson asked Officer Booker
if he knew if [defendant] was assigned to cell 14? Officer
Booker said that he assumed that [defendant] was
assigned to cell 14 but was not positive. Reporting
Investigator obtained a copy of the tier sheet which
indicated that [defendant] was assigned to cell 10."
On June 10, 1995, investigators closed the case and declined to
approve the filing of criminal charges for the incident, and instead
reported that because defendant was assigned to cell 10, but not
cell 14, "[i]t would be difficult to prove exclusive possession."
Investigators memorialized their decision in a "Cook County
Sheriff's Police Department Offense/Incident Report." This report
was never disclosed to the defense.
	Defendant claims that knowledge of the investigators who
compiled the offense/incident report is imputed to the trial
prosecutors and, therefore, the trial prosecutors committed a
violation under Brady when they failed to correct Officer Booker's
"misleading" testimony.
	The Brady rule applies to three general situations where the
State has an affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence to a
criminal defendant. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391. In the first
instance, a Brady violation occurs if undisclosed evidence
demonstrates that the prosecution knew or should have known that
its case included perjured testimony. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391-92, citing Agurs, 427 U.S.  at 103, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 349-50, 96 S. Ct. 
at 2397. Under this circumstance, courts examine the alleged
violation under a "strict standard of materiality" and the
"conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 392, citing Agurs, 427 U.S.  at 103,
49 L. Ed. 2d  at 349-50, 96 S. Ct.  at 2397. Defendant argues that
the strict standard of materiality applies. We disagree because the
instant matter does not concern perjured testimony.
	In Coleman, a witness testified regarding her identification of
the defendant at a lineup. Although she did not positively identify
the defendant at the lineup, she testified that the defendant " 'could
have been' " the individual she saw leave the murder scene
because the defendant resembled the individual's " 'height,
physical build, and complection [sic].' " Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at
395. However, the witness explained in an affidavit attached to the
defendant's post-conviction petition that the assistant State's
Attorney "pressured" her to identify the defendant as the gunman
at trial. She stated that prior to her lineup identification she
informed the assistant State's Attorney that the individual " 'didn't
look like the guy I saw' " and was " 'not dark enough to be the
guy.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 395. However,
the prosecution never disclosed the statement that she was
uncertain about her identification. We reversed the circuit court's
dismissal of the defendant's Brady claim and remanded the issue
for an evidentiary hearing.
	Conversely, in the instant matter, there is no evidence that the
State's case included perjured testimony. Unlike Coleman, Officer
Booker's testimony was consistent with his limited knowledge of
the incident. He was assigned to division one, tier C-2, for a
limited search following a riot lockdown and was not necessarily
familiar with the particular inmate cell assignments. Further, the
record shows that defendant never informed Officer Booker that
he was sleeping in a different cell. Last, Officer Booker's
testimony is corroborated by the investigative report, which states
that "Officer Booker assumed that Harris was assigned to Cell 14."
There is no information contained in the record to suggest that
Officer Booker knew, or later learned before he testified during
aggravation, that Harris was assigned to a different cell. Defendant
does not show that the State's case during aggravation included
perjured testimony.
	Defendant further argues, however, that the State's failure to
tender the offense/incident report constitutes a Brady violation
because the evidence would have carried weight in mitigation to
rebut the State's argument that defendant lacked rehabilitative
potential. When the defense makes a pretrial request for specific
evidence, or makes either no discovery request or only a general
request for "Brady" material, and exculpatory evidence is withheld
by the State we must examine whether the suppression
" ' "undermines confidence in the outcome" ' " such that " 'the
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence' " in the
sentence. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 393, quoting Kyles, 514 U.S.  at
434-35, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 115 S. Ct.  at 1566.
	In aggravation, the State presented testimony of five
department of corrections officers. Officer King testified about an
incident occurring on November 11, 1993, when defendant was
observed jumping from cell to cell. Defendant was cited for two
violations: being in an unauthorized area and interfering with the
prisoner count. Officer Brown testified that on May 11, 1994, he
found a six-inch homemade knife in defendant's mattress.
Defendant received 20 days in isolation. Officer Brown also
testified that on April 9, 1995, he discovered defendant on the
wrong tier. Defendant responded to Officer Brown's inquiries with
profanities, and defendant received 10 days in isolation for the
violation. On August 17, 1994, during a routine check of
defendant's cell, Officer Adorjan discovered a nine-inch
homemade knife inside an envelope located underneath
defendant's bed. As a result, defendant received 10 days in
isolation. On September 14, 1994, Lieutenant Torres intervened in
a fight between defendant and another inmate. When Lieutenant
Torres arrived to stop the fight, he saw defendant with a seven-inch homemade knife in his hand. Defendant received 29 days in
isolation. Based upon the State's overall presentation of testimony
regarding these various incidents, we can reasonably conclude that
Officer Booker's testimony regarding his discovery of a two-foot
homemade knife in defendant's presence was immaterial to the
result of the sentencing hearing.

B. Strickland - Failure to Investigate or Present Mitigating
Evidence
	Next, defendant claims that his trial counsel, Doherty, was
ineffective during the capital sentencing hearing because he failed
to investigate and present evidence in mitigation. He argues that
Doherty's ineffective representation denied a meaningful
assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. Defendant
asks this court to grant him a new sentencing hearing or, at a
minimum, order the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on this issue.
	Defendant's sentencing hearing lasted one day. In
aggravation, the State presented the victim impact testimony from
the victim's two daughters and widow; evidence concerning two
prior carjackings performed by defendant in the five days before
the murder; evidence regarding defendant's prior drug offenses;
disciplinary violations occurring at the Cook County jail during his
incarceration, including several instances involving homemade
knives; evidence concerning defendant's gang affiliation and his
position within the gang; and testimony from the assistant State's
Attorney that defendant was "cool, calm, and collected" during her
interrogation and his subsequent statement.
	Conversely, in mitigation Doherty submitted 17 letters from
defendant's family and friends. Defendant's sister collected these
letters from family and friends without Doherty's instruction or
assistance. These letters discussed defendant's childhood, family,
capacity for good grades, and devotion to religion. The letters did
not request leniency, but consistently stated:
		"I like to start off by saying I am a tax paying citizen and
by that token [defendant] is a waste of tax paying citizen
money. I say this because I know he is innocent, no doubt
about it.
* * *
			[Defendant] went to school and got very good grades
like he was suppose [sic] to. He played with the children
in the neighborhood. [Defendant] was a quiet person who
loved people. I just don't believe [defendant] committed
such an offense as hurting someone or killing someone.
*** [Defendant] shouldn't have to do the time if he didn't
do the crime. I think [defendant] took the blame or got
framed.
 * * *
			It is my strong belief, as God as my witness,
[defendant] did not commit this offense. He was
wrongfully accused and convicted of committing this
offense, despite the overwhelming evidence to support his
innocence. The prosecutorial arguments weren't
convincing enough to link him to this crime."
After Doherty submitted the letters to the court, he presented a
short argument in mitigation, during which he quickly discussed
defendant's troubled childhood and summarized the letters:
			"MR. DOHERTY: I won't recite from the rest of the
letters, judge, but they are all similar in that fashion, that
he got good grades in school, he was growing up all right,
was given religion and then was led astray by the gang.
			THE COURT: Mr. Doherty, I just want you to know if
you want to quote from any of those letters, you go ahead
and do it, you take whatever time you need to present
whatever you want to present, don't feel that you're being
rushed because you're not going to be rushed at all.
			MR. DOHERTY: No, no, no, I know your Honor would
allow, and I sincerely believe that ***."
	Defendant argues that if Doherty had reviewed pretrial
investigation reports, and performed even minimal investigation,
he would have learned that defendant suffered from severe
depression, dependant personality disorder, and organic brain
disorder. Defendant also argues that Doherty failed to investigate
and present evidence concerning his personal and family history,
including the history of drug and alcohol abuse, emotional neglect
and possible physical abuse. Finally, defendant maintains that
Doherty failed to present evidence regarding his rehabilitative
potential to rebut the State's evidence of future dangerousness. To
support his claim, defendant relies upon Doherty's affidavit
wherein Doherty admits that he negligently failed to investigate or
present evidence in mitigation:
			"I never seriously considered that his case was a death
penalty case in the sense that it ever occurred to me that
a death sentence might actually be imposed.
* * *
			I never investigated David's case to develop evidence
for purposes of a capital sentencing hearing. My failure to
investigate was not based on facts that led me to conclude
no investigation was necessary, to the contrary, my failure
to investigate was based entirely upon my own feeling
that David's case didn't merit imposition of the death
penalty, and that I hadn't received any 'signals' to the
contrary. In short, my failure to investigate this aspect of
David's case was neither a strategic nor a tactical
decision."
Furthermore, defendant relies upon a mitigation report from
Marylynne Kaplan, a licensed forensic social worker; a
psychological assessment report by Dr. Harry Gunn, Ph.D.; a
neuropsychological assessment report by Dr. Johnathan Hess,
Ph.D; a risk assessment report by Dr. Mark Cunningham, Ph.D.,
a forensic psychologist; psychiatric records from the Cook County
department of corrections' Cermak Health Services; psychiatric
records from the Illinois Department of Corrections; an affidavit
from defendant's sister, Susie Harris; school records from the
Chicago board of education and Sullivan House High School; and
a copy of a Gangster Disciples organizational chart used as a
government exhibit in federal litigation.
	"In every case the court should be concerned with whether,
despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the
particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
results." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 696, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. The standard to determine whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing
hearing is governed by the Strickland standard. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 403. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel a
defendant must show that "counsel's performance fell below
minimal professional standards and that a reasonable probability
exists that the sentence was affected by the poor performance."
People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 257 (1997), citing Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 168; People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259-60 (1989);
People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 186 (1992). Generally, courts of
review are deferential of trial counsel's decisions regarding the
presentation of evidence in mitigation. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 257.
However, deference is not warranted if counsel's failure to present
evidence is due to his or her failure to investigate. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 257; see also People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (1997)
("where counsel has neglected to conduct a proper investigation
into mitigating circumstances, the failure to introduce mitigating
evidence cannot be attributed to strategy"), quoting People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 535 (1995).
	In Steidl, we considered a defendant's claim that his counsel
was ineffective at the sentencing hearing for failing to prepare and
present sufficient mitigation evidence. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 257.
Defense counsel indicated that based upon the defendant's lack of
a serious criminal history, and his belief that it was unlikely that
defendant would get the death penalty, he did not prepare for the
sentencing hearing. We held that defense counsel's failure to
"conduct even a minimal investigation into possible mitigation
evidence raises serious questions as to the effectiveness." Steidl,
177 Ill. 2d  at 258-59. In Steidl, defense counsel's serious inaction
constituted deficient performance, and the lack of evidence offered
in mitigation prejudiced defendant.
	Similarly, in this case defendant argues that Doherty was
woefully unprepared for the capital sentencing hearing because he
did not consider defendant a serious candidate for the death
penalty. Doherty's failure to present evidence in mitigation was
not a strategic choice, but rather an omission due to his own lack
of preparation. Doherty's failure to investigate and present
evidence in mitigation produced an unreliable and unjust result.
He failed to investigate potential sources of mitigation clearly
contained in the pretrial investigation report. The pretrial report
indicates that defendant was treated for depression in 1994 and
prescribed psychotropic medicine for a period of five months
before he refused to continue treatment. The pretrial report states
that defendant consumed a pint of hard liquor and a half ounce of
marijuana on a weekly basis. Doherty failed to make even initial
inquiries into these matters. Furthermore, although defendant
denied a history of physical or emotional abuse, the pretrial report
indicated that he described his childhood as "rough." Again,
Doherty never investigated or contacted individuals regarding this
potential mitigating evidence. See People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 544-45 (1999) (the duty to investigate is "not limited to
matters about which defendant has informed defense counsel" or
"lessened by the lack of the specificity of information conveyed").
	Therefore, we consider whether a reasonable probability
exists that defendant's sentence was affected by the poor
performance. In so doing, we take into account the extent of the
evidence in mitigation, as well as aggravation. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 538. In this case, evidence regarding defendant's depression,
dependent personality disorder, organic brain damage and social
background may have explained the aggravating evidence
presented by the State and, more importantly, defendant's actions
at the time of the crime. Particularly, the post-conviction exhibits
suggest that defendant suffers from dependent personality
disorder. Several individuals, including defendant's former
academic advisor and one expert concluded that defendant is a
"follower not a leader," "easily led by his peers," "unwilling to
make decisions without assistance from others," "in constant need
of approval," "insecure," "an unwise follower," and "suffers from
massive dependency."
	Additionally, a review of the sentencing transcript reveals that
the trial judge was influenced by the lack of mitigation evidence:
		"I started out with the feeling that I would attempt to look
at everything in the best eye possible to find something
mitigating in Mr. David Harris.
* * *
			I was listening to the arguments of the defense saying,
you know that David had this problem where three people
died in his family, and then he had no role models ***.
* * *
			I am suppose to think that David Harris acted this way
only because somebody else told him, I don't think so. I
think that David Harris acted on his own volition."
These comments clearly reveal a connection between the judge's
imposition of the death penalty and Doherty's failure to present
any mitigating evidence. We cannot say that the mitigation
evidence contained in the post-conviction record could not have
altered the determination that there was no evidence that mitigated
against the imposition of the death sentence. Doherty's deficient
performance, and the weight of the missing evidence in mitigation,
make a substantial showing that Doherty's performance
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Doherty's failure to
investigate and present evidence in mitigation may have so
undermined the proper function of the adversarial system as to
have produced an unjust result and raises serious doubts regarding
the propriety of defendant's sentence. See Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
557 ("The court must scrutinize and remain vigilant in
determining whether the proceedings are unreliable because of a
breakdown in the adversarial process"). Accordingly, we reverse
the circuit court's dismissal of the defendant's petition on this
ground and remand for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's
allegations.
	Defendant requests that this court remand the matter for a new
sentencing hearing, rather than remand the matter to the circuit
court for an evidentiary hearing. Although the record clearly
makes a showing that Doherty's performance was deficient and
that his performance, or lack thereof, prejudiced defendant, we
decline to grant a new sentencing hearing absent an evidentiary
hearing. The circuit court, in the context of an evidentiary hearing,
offers the more appropriate forum to address Doherty's alleged
ineffective representation. This is true because, although there is
no evidence that Doherty willfully committed reversible error, a
court should be critical of conduct designed to disrupt the
appropriate administration of justice. Thus, while counsel is
obligated to admit that he or she negligently represented a
defendant, his or her obligation does not end with the filing of an
affidavit. The State has the right to attack the factual basis of the
affidavit, and one method to attack the credibility of an affidavit
is through cross-examination during the course of an evidentiary
hearing. This ensures that counsel, in their zeal to advocate for
their client, do not betray their obligation to the court. For this
reason, we decline to grant defendant a new sentencing hearing
absent an evidentiary hearing.


IV. Death Eligibility
	Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted
armed robbery and found eligible for the death penalty based upon
his commission of murder in the course of another felony. 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994). Defendant argues that under the
facts of this case he did not qualify for the offense of attempted
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 1994)) and, therefore, his
sentence of death violates the due process clauses of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions.
	In support of his claim, defendant argues that he was indicted
for the offenses of murder and attempted armed robbery in
November 1993. However, on August 13, 1993, the legislature
amended the Criminal Code of 1961, and the robbery statute was
amended to exclude the taking of a "motor vehicle" as conduct
constituting the offense of robbery. Pub. Act 88-351, §5, eff.
August 13, 1993. At the same time, the legislature created the new
offense of aggravated vehicular carjacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4
(West 1994)). At trial, defense counsel stipulated that defendant
was eligible for the death penalty based upon his convictions of
attempted armed robbery and murder. Further, this court stated on
direct appeal that "defendant's convictions for attempted armed
robbery formed the basis for the trial judge's subsequent
determination, under section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of
1961 [citation], that the defendant was eligible for the death
penalty." Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 134. Thus, there is no dispute that
defendant was found eligible for the death penalty based upon
section 9-1(b)(6).
	Defendant alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. See People v.
Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 269-70 (1989). For this reason, we
reject the State's argument that this claim is waived and we will
address the merits of defendant's claim.
	A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is
examined under the Strickland test. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d  at 269-70. Defendant must show that his appellate counsel's failure to
raise the issue on appeal was objectively unreasonable and that the
decision prejudiced him. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 377; People v. Flores,
153 Ill. 2d 264, 283 (1992). As a general rule, we accord appellate
counsel's decision whether or not to pursue issues on appeal
substantial deference. People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 532-33
(1995). Defendant does not suffer prejudice under Strickland
unless the underlying issue is meritorious. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at
329.
	This court has stated that the law in effect at the time of the
offense governs unless there is " 'an express statutory provision
stating an act is to have retroactive effect.' " People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1, 22-23 (1983), quoting Village of Wilsonville v. SCA
Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1981). Defendant argues that he
was not indicted until November 1993, after the August 13, 1993,
amendment to section 9-1(b)(6). The record contradicts his
assertion. Defendant was indicted for first degree murder and
attempted armed robbery on July 23, 1993. Defendant was
reindicted in November 1993, but only to add codefendant Moore
to the indictment. Defendant was indicted under section 9-1(b)(6)
before the amendment. The legislature did not express its intention
to make the amendment to section 9-1(b)(6) retroactive, and,
therefore, it could only be applied prospectively. Defendant's
claim is nonmeritorious. Thus, defendant's claim that he received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is without merit.

V. Constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty
	As his final argument, defendant contends that the Illinois
death penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998)) is
unconstitutional based upon the United States Supreme Court
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), because it does not require the
sentencer to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence.
	In People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 74 (2001), we stated that
"Apprendi requires that only those facts that increase the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) The
consideration of mitigating factors does not concern enhancement
of defendant's sentence because once a defendant is found eligible
for the death penalty, the prescribed statutory maximum is death.
See Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 74-75. Thus, defendant's argument does
not implicate Apprendi. The defendant cannot raise this
nonmeritorious constitutional issue in a post-conviction context.(1)
See People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 224 n.3 (2001). Accordingly
we reject defendant's final claim.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we affirm in part, and
reverse and remand in part. We reverse the circuit court's
dismissal of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to investigate and
present evidence in mitigation, and direct the circuit court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
	I agree that the circuit court erred when it dismissed, without
an evidentiary hearing, Harris' claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence in
mitigation. I write separately because I would go beyond the
majority's disposition and hold that Harris is entitled to immediate
post-conviction relief. Regardless of the outcome of any further
proceedings on remand, Harris' convictions and sentences cannot
stand. That is so because he was tried, convicted and sentenced
under a system of capital punishment that is fatally defective.
	Our court has now adopted a comprehensive set of new rules
governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the
death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion
in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 34-37 (September 27,
2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in
those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital
cases now coming before us on review. Whether the new rules will
be sufficient to place this State's capital punishment system within
the tolerances permitted by the State and federal constitutions is a
question we cannot yet answer. It is clear, however, that no
proceeding conducted without the benefit of those rules can be
deemed reliable. As a result, remanding for further proceedings on
Harris' petition is unnecessary. Rather, we should grant Harris
relief on the merits, set aside his convictions and sentence of
death, and order that he be granted a new trial without further
delay.

	JUSTICE McMORROW, also concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority that defendant has made a substantial
showing that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during
defendant's sentencing hearing. In agreeing with the majority on
this point, however, I do not depart from the position taken in my
dissent on direct appeal that the death penalty is inappropriate in
this case. See People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 165-71 (1998)
(McMorrow, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
	As I explained in detail in my dissent on direct appeal, the
character of defendant and the circumstances of his crime simply
do not warrant imposition of the death penalty. Defendant was 18
years old at the time of the offense and had a minimal history of
criminal behavior. The murder which defendant committed, while
unquestionably senseless and tragic, was not accompanied by
torture or other exceptional brutality. Further, the murder was not
the product of premeditation or planning, nor was it part of any
murderous spree. Instead, the murder was an impulsive act,
"committed at the instigation of a friend after seeing a film
glamorizing carjacking." Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 169 (McMorrow,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In sum, the record in
this case establishes that defendant was "susceptible to a cohort's
influence, that he was immature, impressionable, and reckless" but
that he is not a hardened criminal deserving of death. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 168 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part). The post-conviction exhibits cited by the majority in support
of its decision to remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing (see
slip op. at 22) serve only to confirm this conclusion.
	"The death penalty should be reserved for the most dangerous
and incorrigible criminals-the 'worst' criminals. Foolishness,
susceptibility to peer influence, immaturity, impressionability, and
recklessness by an 18-year-old, taken individually or collectively,
should not render a defendant one of society's 'worst' criminals,
for whom the death penalty is appropriate. The deterrent and
retributive purposes of the death penalty are not served by its
imposition in this case." Harris, 182 Ill. 2d  at 168 (McMorrow, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). I therefore dissent from
that portion of the majority opinion which remands this cause for
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. I would remand this case for the imposition
of a sentence other than death.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
	I agree with the majority's judgment to allow, at minimum, an
evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. I further agree, in part, with Justice McMorrow's
conclusion that the death penalty is inappropriate in this case for
the reasons stated in her dissent on direct appeal. See People v.
Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 165-71 (1998) (McMorrow, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, for the reasons set
forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v.
Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38 (September 27, 2001)
(Kilbride, J., dissenting), I maintain that defendant's convictions
and sentence should be set aside because the trial court
proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. The procedures in
capital cases prior to this court's adoption of the new rules were
inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant's
constitutional rights. Consequently, since the new rules were
promulgated to address the deficiencies of constitutional
dimension that regularly occurred under the old system, those rules
must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending
on appeal before this court. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997).
1.      1We do not decide, however, whether a meritorious Apprendi issue
is cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, "i.e., whether Apprendi
applies retroactively to cases on collateral review." Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 
at 224.