Title: People v. Bunch

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93472-Agenda 5-November 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								BERNARD BUNCH, Appellee.
Opinion filed August 21, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant Bernard Bunch was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance and sentenced to a four-year term of
imprisonment. The appellate court determined that the trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence and reversed defendant's conviction. 327 Ill. App. 3d
979. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (see 177
Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence
proceeded simultaneously with his trial. Officer Lukensmeyer
testified that at 1:10 a.m. on February 1, 2000, he was working
alone in a marked police vehicle in the area of 35th Street and
Wentworth Avenue in Chicago. He observed a 1990 Pontiac,
which was proceeding westbound on 35th Street, slow down and
come to a brief stop. Lukensmeyer did not see the car's brake
lights activate. As the Pontiac continued on its way, Lukensmeyer
shined his MARS lights, his take-down lights, and his bright
headlights onto the rear of the car. Lukensmeyer testified that he
saw the driver lean forward twice toward the dashboard before the
driver pulled the vehicle over and stopped. One other person was
in the car, defendant, who was in the front passenger seat.
Lukensmeyer approached the vehicle on the driver's side and
commanded to both, "Don't move." Lukensmeyer then asked the
driver for his license. When the driver could not provide a license,
Lukensmeyer asked him to step out of the vehicle and placed him
under arrest. He handcuffed the driver and walked him to the rear
of the car.
	According to Lukensmeyer, he then walked around to the
passenger side and asked defendant to exit the car and step to the
rear of the vehicle, where the driver was standing. Lukensmeyer
testified that he asked defendant out of the car so that he could
take charge of the vehicle, i.e., because the driver was arrested
Lukensmeyer was going to have the car transported to the station
where it would be towed to an impound lot. At some point during
the traffic stop, Lukensmeyer learned that the driver was the owner
of the vehicle, but he could not recall whether this occurred before
or after he asked defendant to exit the car.
	Lukensmeyer testified further that after defendant exited the
vehicle, he asked him, "What's your name? Where you [sic]
coming from?" When questioned as to why he asked defendant his
name, Lukensmeyer responded, "I'm a policeman[.] I want[ed] to
know who he was and I was curious to find out exactly who he
was. That's all."
	Defendant provided his name and additionally asked
Lukensmeyer why the driver was being arrested. Lukensmeyer
answered defendant's question. During this conversation, in which
the two men were about one foot apart, Lukensmeyer twice shined
his flashlight in defendant's face. Lukensmeyer explained that
when he is working nights, he shines his flashlight in everyone's
face because there is a "[s]trong possibility they may have
something in their mouths." Lukensmeyer denied that he
questioned defendant merely to see if there was anything in
defendant's mouth. Both times Lukensmeyer shined his flashlight
in defendant's face, he observed a small, clear plastic item,
containing something white, in defendant's mouth. Based on 35
years of experience as a police officer and his participation in
more than 2,000 narcotics arrests, Lukensmeyer believed that the
white substance was either heroin or cocaine. Lukensmeyer
informed defendant he was under arrest, and ordered him to spit
the object out of his mouth, which he did. Lukensmeyer recovered
one plastic bag containing a white powder. Lukensmeyer
handcuffed defendant and called for assistance. During his search
of the Pontiac, Lukensmeyer recovered two similar plastic bags,
also containing what he believed to be heroin, from a space in the
dashboard. At this point, according to Lukensmeyer, defendant
made an unsolicited statement that "[a]ll the heroin you found is
mine." Lukensmeyer later tested the brakes on defendant's vehicle,
which were working properly. The parties stipulated to the chain
of custody and that the white powder tested positive for the
presence of heroin.
	In connection with his motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence, defendant argued that the officer did not have probable
cause to ask him to exit the vehicle, to step to the rear of the car,
or to interrogate him. The State maintained that moving defendant
to the rear of the vehicle was minimally intrusive and that no
interrogation took place. Rather, defendant engaged the officer in
conversation.
	The trial court denied defendant's motion. In its oral ruling,
the trial court indicated that it found the officer's testimony
straightforward and credible. The trial court concluded that there
was nothing impermissible in asking defendant his name and that
moving defendant to the rear of the car had no legal significance.
The trial court further noted that the officer had numerous reasons
to have a conversation with defendant, including explaining to him
the reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be an
alternative driver. According to the trial court, shining the
flashlight in defendant's face merely allowed the officer to assess
defendant at 1 o'clock in the morning. Finally, the trial court found
that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant, based on
his observation of the object in defendant's mouth.
	Following the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, the
bench trial continued with defendant's testimony. Defendant
offered a different version of the vehicle stop. Defendant testified
that when the driver of the vehicle, his brother, asked Officer
Lukensmeyer why he stopped them, the officer replied, "Because
I saw two black men in the car." The officer made no mention of
the Pontiac's brake lights and never examined them. According to
defendant, after arresting and cuffing his brother, Lukensmeyer
placed his brother in the police vehicle. He then approached
defendant and asked him to get out of the car. Once outside the
vehicle, Lukensmeyer told defendant to turn around and then
placed handcuffs on him, saying that it was for the officer's own
safety. As Lukensmeyer spoke to him, the officer shined a
flashlight in defendant's face. Defendant testified that he did not
have anything in his mouth and that the officer never asked him to
spit out anything. After placing defendant in the police car,
Lukensmeyer removed a black case from the trunk and returned to
the Pontiac. A short while later, Lukensmeyer returned to the
police car and told defendant and his brother that he found drugs
inside their car. Defendant denied having narcotics in his
possession that day and denied telling Lukensmeyer that any drugs
in the car belonged to him.
	The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a
controlled substance and subsequently sentenced him to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed,
concluding that the arrest of defendant violated the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
IV). 327 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84. The appellate court stated, in
relevant part:
			"[A] police officer has to have some lawful authority to
ask a defendant for identification ***.
			In this case, the officer did more than ask for
identification. He ordered the defendant out of the car and
to the rear of it because he was 'curious.' The defendant
submitted. We believe the defendant was detained at that
point without lawful authority. Curiosity is not a good
reason to detain. Everything that flowed directly from that
unlawful detention must be suppressed." 327 Ill. App. 3d
at 983.
	For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
I
	Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will
not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. This deferential
standard applies when the disposition of the suppression motion
turns on factual determinations and credibility assessments.
Where, however, no dispute exists as to the facts or witness
credibility, the trial court's ruling will be reviewed de novo.
People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2001); People v.
Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998). In the present case, the
trial court found Officer Lukensmeyer's testimony credible. Such
finding was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we conduct de
novo review under the officer's version of events. See People v.
Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 274-75 (2002); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d  at 412.

II
	Before considering the merits of this appeal, we briefly review
the principles relevant to deciding whether a vehicle stop comports
with fourth amendment jurisprudence.
	The temporary detention of individuals-passengers and
drivers alike-during a vehicle stop constitutes a "seizure" of
"persons" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (2003), citing Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). Vehicle stops are, therefore, subject to the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Because a
traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop
is analyzed under Terry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 226. A
Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: "(1) 'whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception,' and (2) 'whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.' " Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 228,
quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at
1879.
	In this case, no issue exists concerning the lawfulness of the
initial stop of the vehicle-the first prong of the Terry analysis.
Rather, this appeal concerns the lawfulness of the officer's
conduct following the initial stop, and thus concerns the second
prong of the Terry analysis. Under the second prong we consider
the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried
out. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 233. That is, " 'an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop,' " and " 'the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short
period of time.' " Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 233, quoting Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325-26 (1983) (plurality op.). With these principles in mind, we
consider the State's arguments on appeal.

A
	The State first maintains that Officer Lukensmeyer could
lawfully direct defendant to exit the vehicle. See Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886 (1997) (holding that, consistent with the fourth amendment,
"an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out
of the car pending completion of the stop"); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 
at 420 (following Wilson and holding that the officer's command
to the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle to return to the car
was not an unreasonable seizure); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001) ("it is well established that following a lawful
traffic stop, police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and
any passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop
without violating the protections of the fourth amendment").
	Defendant concedes that Officer Lukensmeyer could lawfully
direct defendant to exit the vehicle so that the officer could take
charge of the car and have it towed. In light of defendant's
concession, there is no reason to consider this point further.

B
	The State next argues that the officer's questioning of
defendant, after he exited the vehicle, did not implicate fourth
amendment protections. In analyzing this issue, we consider our
recent decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003).
	In Gonzalez, police stopped a vehicle for not having a front
license plate. While one of the officers processed the driver, the
other officer approached the passenger, who was not suspected of
any criminal conduct, and requested identification. The passenger
complied, and the ensuing encounter between the officer and the
passenger resulted in a search of the passenger's person, revealing
a packet of cocaine. The passenger was arrested and charged. The
passenger later challenged the officer's request for identification,
arguing that it was an unreasonable seizure under our federal and
state constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §6.
	In resolving the passenger's constitutional challenge, we
formulated the following general framework for analyzing whether
police questioning during the course of a traffic stop satisfies the
second prong of the Terry analysis:
		"[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the
question is related to the initial justification for the stop.
If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the
stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the
question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the
stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement
officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would
justify the question. If the question is so justified, no
fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of a
reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a
reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider
whether, in light of all the circumstances and common
sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention
or changed the fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez,
204 Ill. 2d  at 235.
	We concluded in Gonzalez that no fourth amendment
violation occurred. Although the request for identification was not
related to the purpose of the stop or supported by a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, the request did not
prolong the passenger's detention because it was made during the
course of the stop while the driver was being processed. Further,
the facially innocuous question, which the passenger could decline
to answer, did not change the fundamental nature of the stop.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236.
	Applying the Gonzalez framework to the facts in the present
case, we reach a different result. We note first that the questions
the officer put to defendant ("What's your name? Where you [sic]
coming from?") were not related to the purpose of the
stop-operating a vehicle without brake lights. The officer's
questions also were not supported by a reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal conduct. Prior to being approached by
Officer Lukensmeyer, defendant was simply a passive occupant of
the car. Although the trial court indicated that the officer had
"numerous" reasons to have a conversation with defendant,
including explaining to him the reason for the arrest and
determining if defendant could be an alternative driver, the
questions the officer actually posed were not objectively related to
either of these reasons.
	Because the questioning of defendant was not related to the
stop and not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal conduct, we must consider whether the questioning
prolonged defendant's detention or changed the fundamental
nature of the stop. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236. Significantly,
in Gonzalez, the officer's request for identification took place
while the driver was being processed and the purpose of the stop
had yet to be completed. Thus, the officer's request did not
prolong the passenger's detention. In contrast, the questioning of
defendant in the present case occurred after the purpose of the stop
was concluded. That is, the questioning occurred after the driver
had been placed under arrest, the officer had already decided to
have the car towed, and defendant was directed to exit the vehicle
for that purpose. Thus, unlike the request put to the passenger in
Gonzalez, the officer's questioning of defendant in the instant case
fails to satisfy the second prong of the Terry analysis because it
prolonged defendant's detention beyond the completion of the
purpose of the stop.
	The State maintains, however, that the initial detention of
defendant, incidental to the stop of the vehicle, ended when
defendant exited the car. What followed, according to the State,
was a consensual conversation between defendant and the officer.
We disagree. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our
decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999).
	In Brownlee, police stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation.
Officers Guerrero and Maxey obtained the identities of the driver
and the three passengers. The officers checked for outstanding
warrants, found none, and decided not to issue any traffic citations.
The officers decided, however, to ask the driver for permission to
search the car. After the driver consented to the search, all of the
occupants were ordered out of the car. The search revealed
marijuana and all four individuals were arrested. One of the
passengers moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing
that the continued detention and search of the car were unrelated
to the original basis for the vehicle stop and any consent was the
product of the unlawful detention. The circuit court granted the
motion; the appellate court reversed. People v. Brownlee, 293 Ill.
App. 3d 315 (1997).
	On appeal to this court, the State maintained that the
conclusion of the traffic stop was merely followed by a consensual
conversation between the officer and the driver that resulted in a
voluntary consent to search the vehicle. In other words, the driver
was not seized when he gave consent to search the vehicle.
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 516. We rejected this argument.
	We proceeded from the well-established proposition that a
person is seized " 'when, by means of physical force or a show of
authority,' that person's 'freedom of movement is restrained.' "
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 517, quoting United Stated v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877
(1980). In determining whether the driver was seized at the point
that he gave consent to search the vehicle, we considered whether
" 'if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.' " Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 517, quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877.
	The facts in Brownlee, as established by the officers'
testimony, revealed that, after deciding not to issue any citations,
the officers returned to the vehicle. With Officer Guerrero
standing on the driver's side of the car, and Officer Maxey
standing on the passenger side, Guerrero returned to the driver his
license and insurance card and explained that no citations would
be issued. Although the traffic stop at that point had concluded,
the officers continued to flank the vehicle and paused for a couple
of minutes, saying nothing. Following this pause, Guerrero asked
the driver for permission to search the vehicle. We determined
that, "[g]iven these circumstances, we can find no fault with the
circuit court's conclusion that the officers' actions constituted a
show of authority such that a reasonable person would conclude
that he or she was not free to leave." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 520.
We explained that "[a] reasonable person in this driver's situation
would likely conclude that, if he or she drove away, then the two
officers would soon be in hot pursuit." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at
520. We noted that the State made no attempt to show that the
officers' continued detention of the vehicle was in any way
reasonable or objectively justified, or that the officers' detention
was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of a Terry
investigative seizure. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521. Accordingly,
the illegal detention tainted the subsequent consent to search.
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521.
	In the present case, Officer Lukensmeyer's testimony
indicates that the purpose of the traffic stop concluded when the
officer decided to have the vehicle towed and directed defendant
to exit the car. The officer's directions to defendant, however,
continued. The officer directed defendant to move to the rear of
the vehicle, where the driver-who was already under arrest and
handcuffed-was standing. Then, positioning himself just a foot
from defendant and shining his flashlight in defendant's face, the
officer asked him, "What's your name? Where you [sic] coming
from?" Given these circumstances, we conclude that the officer's
actions constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable
person would conclude that he or she was not free to leave.
	The State draws our attention to the fact that prior to
defendant's arrest, the officer did not draw his gun, place
defendant in handcuffs, physically touch defendant, or indicate in
any way that defendant was suspected of criminal conduct.
Although true, these facts are not dispositive of whether the
conversation was consensual. The officer's show of authority, as
in Brownlee, manifested itself in other ways.
	The State also points to the fact that defendant not only
responded to one of the officer's questions, but asked the officer
his own question-why the driver was being arrested. The State
argues that a "reasonable person, if they felt 'seized' *** would
not further engage that officer in conversation which is not even
related to his own arrest." We do not find defendant's concern
about the arrest of the driver-defendant's brother-indicative of
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Accordingly,
we reject the State's argument that the questioning of defendant
was the product of a consensual encounter.



CONCLUSION
	For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that defendant's
detention, following the conclusion of the purpose of the traffic
stop, was unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, and tainted the resulting discovery of the heroin. We,
therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate court reversing the
circuit court's order denying defendant's motion to quash arrest
and suppress evidence. Under the circumstances, we do not
consider the State's argument that the arrest of defendant was
supported by probable cause.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I agree with the majority that the initial seizure of defendant,
incidental to the permissible stop of a vehicle in which he was a
passenger, was lawful. In addition, despite my joining the special
concurrence in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), I agree
that this case must be resolved by application of the rule adopted
by the Gonzalez majority, which is now stare decisis. However,
unlike the majority, I conclude that the questions asked by the
officer were permissible.
	When engaged in a lawful traffic stop, an officer may direct
a passenger to remain in or to exit the vehicle. See Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886 (1997); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001);
People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 420 (1998). The officer may
also question the passenger during the seizure if the questions are
either related to the initial justification for the stop or based on
reasonable articulable suspicion of the passenger. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 235. If the questions are not justified on either of these
bases, questioning is permissible only if it does not prolong the
detention of the passenger or change "the fundamental nature of
the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 235. Facially innocuous
questions that the passenger could decline to answer do not change
the stop's fundamental nature. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236.
	In the present case, the officer asked the passenger's name and
where he and the driver were coming from. Although these
questions might have been innocuous in nature (slip op. at 13
(Thomas, J., dissenting)), they were asked while the officer was
asserting his authority by shining the beam of his flashlight in the
defendant's face. Because the stop occurred in the early morning
hours and because the officer was alone, I cannot say that it was
improper for him to make a show of authority by using his
flashlight in this manner. However, because of this display of
authority, defendant's answers to the questions cannot be deemed
voluntary.
	The majority correctly observes that the officer did not ask
defendant questions directly related to the purpose of the stop,
such as if he had a valid driver's license and was willing and able
to drive the car. Further, the officer had no reasonable articulable
suspicion of the defendant. Slip op. at 8.
	I part company from the majority at this point in the analysis.
The majority concludes that the questioning was improper because
it occurred "after the purpose of the stop was concluded."
(Emphasis in original.) Slip op. at 8. In effect, the majority blurs
the distinction between the two prongs of the inquiry adopted in
Gonzalez when it states that the officer "prolonged defendant's
detention" (the duration factor) after "the purpose of the stop" (the
scope factor) was completed. Slip op. at 8.
	There is no suggestion in the record that the two simple
questions ("What's your name? Where [are] you coming from?"),
asked shortly after directing defendant to exit the car and stand
near the driver, unnecessarily prolonged the detention of
defendant. This situation is, therefore, entirely distinguishable
from the impermissibly prolonged detention at issue in People v.
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 519-20 (1999), in which the officers,
after determining that no traffic citation would be issued,
nevertheless kept the occupants of the car from departing until
they agreed to permit the car to be searched.
	Thus, the determinative issue is whether these two simple
questions altered the fundamental nature of the stop. The special
concurrence in Gonzalez pointed out that the majority had not
explained "what type of questioning would change the
fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 242
(Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by Garman, J.). The
present case requires us to consider this question.
	Almost a year before this court decided Gonzalez and adopted
the two-pronged duration-and-scope inquiry, the appellate court
considered the question of the permissible scope of questioning
during a traffic stop in People v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 22 (2002).
The defendant was the driver of a car that was validly stopped by
police, who then inquired about items they saw in the backseat of
the car, even going so far as to ask to see sales receipts. The
receipts produced by the defendant contained a different name
from his and led to the discovery that the items had been obtained
illegally. The defendant was charged with forgery and theft by
deception. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 24. The defendant argued that
the officer violated his fourth amendment rights by questioning
him about matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop.
White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 25. The State argued that an officer is
not prohibited from making inquiries unrelated to the purpose of
the stop, so long as the stop itself and the length of the detention
were otherwise lawful. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 24.
	The appellate court relied on many of the same cases that
were cited by the Gonzalez majority when it concluded:
		"While a police officer making a lawful stop of a motorist
is not precluded from making reasonable inquiries
concerning the purpose of the stop, the scope of the
activities and questioning by the police during an
investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the
circumstances that initially justified the stop. [Citation.]
An officer may expand the scope of his detention beyond
that which is reasonably related to the circumstances only
when the officer has a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that other criminal activity may be afoot or
where matters that arise during the course of the stop
cause the officer reasonable suspicion. [Citation.]
Questioning wholly unrelated to the purposes of the stop,
which is reasonably calculated to elicit incriminating
responses, is impermissible unless supported by
independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion."
(Emphasis added.) White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 34.
The White court concluded that "the officer's questions regarding
the ownership of the items in the car were intrusive and calculated
to elicit possibly incriminating responses." White, 331 Ill. App. 3d
at 34-35. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's suppression
order. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 35. 
	In my opinion, White provides a useful framework for
application of the scope prong of the Gonzalez inquiry. If the
questions posed by the officer are unrelated to the purpose of the
stop, then they are improper if they are reasonably calculated to
elicit an incriminating response. Thus, if the basis of the stop is a
broken headlight, a question about what is in a duffle bag in the
backseat would be improper in the absence of independent,
reasonable, and articulable suspicion.
	Not all questions fall into these two categories, however. A
question may be unrelated to the purpose of the stop, but not likely
to elicit an incriminating response. The questions posed by the
officer in the present case ("What's your name? Where [are] you
coming from?") are of this variety. The answers to these questions
had nothing to do with the initial purpose of the stop, which was
to investigate a suspected inoperative brake light, yet they were not
likely to elicit incriminating information. Indeed, it was not
defendant's answers that incriminated him. It was the fact that, as
he spoke, he revealed the packet of drugs that he was trying to
conceal in his mouth.
	In sum, I conclude that defendant was lawfully seized when
the car in which he was riding was stopped for investigation of a
possible traffic violation. Even though the driver was placed under
arrest and the officer intended to impound the car, the lawful
seizure of defendant was still in effect when the officer told him
where to stand and asked him two questions while shining a
flashlight in his face. Therefore, the questions did not
impermissibly prolong the duration of his detention. The questions
themselves were permissible because they did not change the
fundamental nature of the stop by seeking to elicit incriminating
information unrelated to the purpose of the stop. I would reverse
the appellate court and affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.


	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the officer's
questioning of defendant, after defendant exited the vehicle,
violated defendant's fourth amendment rights. In reaching its
conclusion, the majority contradicts a wealth of well-settled fourth
amendment law and unduly extends People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), and People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999), to
apply to the present case, which is factually inapposite.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
"mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure" for
purposes of determining whether a fourth amendment violation
has occurred. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). Thus, "[p]olice may
approach persons and ask questions or seek their permission to
search, provided that the officers do not imply that answers or
consent are obligatory." United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950
(7th Cir. 2002), citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 170-71, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311 (1984); Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326
(1983) (plurality op.); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
552-58, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 508-12, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1876-79
(1980). Instead, a seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16
(1968).
	The usual test for determining whether a fourth amendment
violation has occurred is whether " 'if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave.' " Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567, 573, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979
(1988), quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509,
100 S. Ct.  at 1877. This test applies where police encounter a
person walking down a street or through an airport (Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 435, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 399, 111 S. Ct. at 2387), and
obviously applies to a driver at a traffic stop, who is not free to
leave until police have finished processing the stop (Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 238 (Thomas, J., specially concurring)). Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure under the "free to
leave" test include the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877.
	A different test applies, however, when the person's freedom
of movement is restricted by circumstances independent of police
conduct, such as when a person is on a bus or at work, and
therefore has no desire to leave. Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 435-36, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 399, 111 S. Ct.  at 2387 (when a person is seated on a
bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable
person would feel that he is free to leave is not an accurate
measure of the coercive effect of the encounter); Delgado, 466 U.S.  at 218, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 256, 104 S. Ct.  at 1763 (when people
are at work their freedom of movement has been meaningfully
restricted by their voluntary obligations to their employers). In
such situations, the appropriate test is not whether the person was
"free to leave." Rather, the relevant question is whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter. Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 436,
115 L. Ed. 2d  at 400, 111 S. Ct.  at 2387.
	I believe that the approach applied in Bostick is the correct
one to be applied here. Defendant's freedom to leave was
hampered not because of police conduct investigating him for a
violation of the vehicle code, but because he was a passenger in a
car driven by a defendant who was lawfully arrested. I would
further find, however, that there was no fourth amendment
violation under either analysis.
	Turning to the Bostick test first, I note that defendant was a
passenger in a stopped car and not a suspect. He then exited the
vehicle he was sitting in when it became clear that the driver and
owner of the vehicle had been arrested and that the vehicle was to
be towed and impounded. At that point, defendant was a
pedestrian, but without any immediate desire to leave because he
was being left stranded along the roadway late at night. At this
point, the officer posed the two innocuous questions at issue:
"What's your name? Where you [sic] coming from?" Defendant's
response to these questions shows, without a doubt, that he
believed he was free to decline the officer's request. Defendant
answered the first question, but ignored the second. Instead,
defendant asked a question of his own, engaging the officer in
conversation about why the driver was being arrested.
	Instead of applying a Bostick analysis, the majority applies the
"general framework" of Gonzalez, which adopted the test set forth
in a partial concurrence and partial dissent to a Tenth Circuit
opinion that involved questioning of a driver. See United States v.
Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This test looks first to
whether the question was related to the initial purpose for the stop
or whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
If the questioning is not related to the initial purpose of the stop
and there is no suspicion or criminal activity, the next inquiry is
whether the question prolonged the duration of the stop or changed
the fundamental nature of the stop.
	In Gonzalez, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle
stopped by two police officers for not having a front licence plate.
One of the officers asked the defendant for his identification
during the course of the stop. The officer ran a computer check on
the traffic ticket that the defendant handed to the officer, and the
ensuing encounter led to a search of the defendant's person,
revealing a packet of cocaine. This court found that the detention
did not violate fourth amendment principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 
at 236.
	In my special concurrence in Gonzalez, I noted that Bostick
provided the proper analysis for determining whether the
passenger had been seized for fourth amendment purposes when
the officer asked for his identification. This was because the
passenger was not suspected of any wrongdoing, and his freedom
of movement was not restricted given that police were not
investigating him for violating the vehicle code, but rather he was
a passenger in a car that had not yet reached its destination. I
pointed out that the majority had erroneously assumed that the
initial "seizure" by police thereafter subjected both driver and
passenger to a fourth amendment seizure for the entire duration of
the stop. I further noted that the majority had erroneously held that
the questioning of the passenger must be viewed as part of the
investigation of the driver. I then noted that, in the end, it appeared
that the majority actually applied Bostick rather than the Holt
partial dissent and partial concurrence to reach its result.
	In the present case, the majority goes much further down the
wrong road than it did in Gonzalez. Even applying the Gonzalez
framework lifted from the partial concurrence and partial dissent
of Holt, it is clear that the questioning of defendant did not violate
the fourth amendment. The majority begins by finding that the
facially innocuous questions in the present case were not related
to the purpose of the stop. The majority is mistaken on this point
for several reasons. Initially, I note that the majority's conclusion
appears to be the result of its faulty characterization of the purpose
of the stop, i.e., to investigate "operating a vehicle without brake
lights." See slip op. at 7. In limiting the purpose of the stop in this
way, the majority ignores that, unlike in Gonzalez, the purpose of
the stop in the present case changed once the driver failed to
produce a license and was arrested. At that point, the purpose of
the stop broadened to encompass the encounter with the stranded
passenger.
	The trial court properly concluded that the officer had
numerous reasons to have a conversation with defendant,
"including explaining to him the reasons for the arrest [and] to
determine *** who he is so that perhaps he can be an alternate
driver." (Emphasis added.) See Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554 n.6,
64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509 n.6, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877 n.6 (the subjective
intentions of an officer are irrelevant to a fourth amendment
analysis, except to the extent that they have been communicated
to the defendant); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354, 117 S. Ct. 417, 420-21 (1996) (" ' "the fact
that [an] officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action" ' "),
quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996), quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, 178, 98 S. Ct. 1717,
1723 (1978).
	Despite the trial court's undeniably objective rationale for the
questioning, the majority inexplicably concludes that the questions
the officer posed were not related to any of the reasons offered by
the trial court. I fail to understand the majority's belief that the
query "What's your name?" is not related to the reason given for
the query by the trial court, namely, to find out the identity of the
passenger to decide if he could be an alternate driver. I would find
that the officer's questions about defendant's identity and where
he had come from were clearly related to the trial court's stated
reason of determining "who he is so that perhaps he can be an
alternate driver." Obviously, if someone is to drive a vehicle away
from the scene where the owner has been arrested, the officer
would be responsible for determining if that person is legally able
to drive. The questions were also reasonably related to the purpose
of the stop based on an objective concern any officer would have
for a passenger who might be left stranded as a result of the
driver's arrest. Additionally, the innocuous questions here could
easily be viewed as nothing more than a polite prelude, leading to
an explanation for the arrest of the driver. For these reasons, I
would find that the questions were related to the purpose of the
stop. The stop was therefore proper under Gonzalez.
	Next, the majority simply concludes that because the
questioning occurred after the purpose of the stop terminated, it
must have prolonged defendant's detention beyond the purpose of
the stop. It is at this point that the majority's analysis seriously
falters. The majority's summary conclusion begs the real issue in
this case-whether the initial seizure at the time of the stop had
dissipated into a nonseizure, involving a Bostick-like encounter.
Because the stop in this particular case ended vis-a-vis defendant
by the time defendant stepped out of the vehicle with the driver
under arrest, there is no need to continue with a Gonzalez analysis
under the circumstances presented here. Instead, the proper test to
be applied is Bostick. Defendant was no longer a passenger subject
to a traffic stop when he stepped out of the vehicle. That the
officer, out of courtesy, may have wanted to explain the reason for
the arrest or that he may have been concerned for the passenger as
he attempted to arrange his way home does not mean that the
encounter continued to be a nonconsensual seizure. Defendant was
not asked to exit the vehicle to continue the "purpose" of the stop
or, as a matter of course, out of concern for officer safety. Cf.
People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001) (as a matter of
course, police may order a passenger out of a vehicle pending
completion of a stop, and if police believe he is armed and
dangerous, they may conduct a pat-down search of his person too).
Rather, defendant was asked out of the car because he would no
longer be traveling in it that night, as the driver had been arrested
and the vehicle was to be towed and impounded.
	Perhaps in recognition of the futility of applying the Holt-Gonzalez framework to the facts of the present case, the majority
ultimately attempts to dig itself out of its predicament by
shoveling forth People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999).
However, Brownlee is completely distinguishable and should have
no application here to support the majority's position. Actually,
Brownlee helps illustrate why defendant's encounter with police,
after he exited the vehicle, was consensual.
	First, Brownlee decided whether a driver was seized, not a
passenger. Unlike the present case, the driver in Brownlee
produced a valid license, which was returned to him after it was
checked. The officers decided not to issue a citation. Thus, the
valid portion of the stop in Brownlee ended without arrest, and
there was no reason to ask any of the occupants to step out of the
vehicle. Nevertheless, two officers continued to flank the vehicle
for a couple of minutes, before finally asking the driver for consent
to search. In contrast, the driver in the present case was lawfully
handcuffed and arrested, and the vehicle was impounded. The lone
officer here then lawfully directed the passenger out of the vehicle
for the purpose of taking control it. At that point, defendant was a
pedestrian with no immediate desire to leave the scene and,
therefore, a Bostick analysis should apply.
	Second, Brownlee appropriately applied the "free to leave"
test to the case before it, citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877, because there was no outside
force, aside from the police conduct, confining the driver to the
location once he was handed back his license. But even applying
the Mendenhall free-to-leave test to the facts in the case at bar, I
would conclude that there was no fourth amendment violation.
Mendenhall's criteria for examining whether a seizure has
occurred overwhelming supports the State's position: defendant
was approached by a single officer, not multiple officers flanking
the vehicle as in Brownlee; the officer did not display a weapon;
he did not physically touch defendant; and he did not use language
or tone of voice to show that compliance with his request might be
compelled. Despite a complete absence of these indicators, the
majority concludes that the officer's use of a flashlight indicated
a show of authority. However, I do not find the officer's use of a
flashlight late at night to be indicative of a show of authority in the
absence of any of the other examples that are normally looked at
to make this determination. Moreover, I am not aware of any case
law holding that a show of authority results from the mere use of
a flashlight by an officer late at night to see the person with whom
he is speaking. Furthermore, I note that the trial court correctly
concluded that directing defendant to exit toward the rear of the
car had no legal significance. An officer may question a person
without bringing about a seizure not only when the questioning
does not interrupt a person's movement, but also where the officer
overtakes the pedestrian and asks him to halt or where the officer
summons him to where the officer is located. 4 W. LaFave, Search
& Seizure §9.3(a), at 98 (3d ed. 1996).
	In conclusion, I disagree that defendant's fourth amendment
rights were violated. Applying the Bostick test, I would find that
the encounter between the officer and defendant outside the
vehicle was consensual and that a reasonable person in defendant's
position would have believed he was free to ignore the officer's
questions or otherwise terminate the encounter. The Gonzalez
framework is unworkable as applied to this kind of fact pattern,
and Brownlee is clearly distinguishable. Accordingly, I dissent
from the majority opinion.