Title: Town of Beloit v. County of Rock

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 8 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1231 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Town of Beloit,  
 
Petitioner-Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
County of Rock,  
 
Respondent-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Belle Zyla, Marvin Prothero, and Green-Rock 
Audubon Society,  
 
Intervenors-Third-Party Plaintiffs- 
 
Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 256 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 88, 637 N.W.2d 71 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 4, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
William D. Johnston   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
intervenors-third-party 
plaintiffs-respondents-
petitioners there were briefs by Joseph R. Cincotta and 
Schweitzer & Cincotta LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Joseph R. Cincotta. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Eugene R. Dumas, deputy corporation counsel. 
 
For the petitioner-third-party defendant-appellant, there 
was a brief by Kenneth W. Forbeck and Forbeck, Elliott, Monahan 
 
 
2
& Schomber, S.C., Beloit, and oral argument by Kenneth W. 
Forbeck. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carol B. Nawrocki, 
Shawano, on behalf of the Wisconsin Towns Association. 
 
 
 
2003 WI 8 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1231  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-529) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Beloit,  
 
          Petitioner-Third- 
          Party Defendant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
County of Rock,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Belle Zyla, Marvin Prothero, and  
Green-Rock Audubon Society,  
 
          Intervenors-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 4, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Belle Zyla, Marvin Prothero, 
and the Green-Rock Audubon Society (Intervenors) petitioned for 
review of a court of appeals decision, which reversed and 
remanded the decision of the Circuit Court for Rock County, 
William D. Johnston, Circuit Court Judge.  The court of appeals 
No. 
00-1231   
 
2 
 
held that the Town of Beloit (town)1 has the statutory authority 
to spend public tax monies to develop and sell property in the 
Heron Bay subdivision, and that the town's goals in developing 
the subdivision constitute legitimate and valid public purposes.2 
¶2 
We 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision. 
 
In 
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 809, 
546 N.W.2d 424, (1996), this court held that creating jobs and 
enhancing the tax base were legitimate and valid reasons, along 
with others, for finding a legislative public purpose in the 
expenditure of public funds to build the Milwaukee Brewers' 
Miller Park.  Accordingly, we hold that the combination of the 
town's enunciated goals of creating jobs, promoting orderly 
growth, increasing the tax base, and preserving and conserving 
an environmentally sensitive area for the benefit of the 
citizens of the town is a legitimate and valid public purpose 
under Wisconsin statutes, case law, and the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  Def. Appellant Br. at 20.3 
¶3 
In 1999 the Town of Beloit commenced this action in 
the circuit court when it filed a petition for a writ of 
                                                 
1 The word "town" refers to actions taken by the town's 
officials, such as the Town Board, and the Town Administrator 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Rock County (county) joins the Intervenors in this action.  
As a result, all references to the Intervenors include Rock 
County. 
3 See also, Town Attorney Kenneth Forbeck Affidavit, ¶23 
stating that "the [town's] purpose of development has been to 
develop jobs, a greater tax base for the community and places 
for its citizens to live." 
No. 
00-1231   
 
3 
 
certiorari complaining that the respondent, County of Rock, 
lacked authority to impose certain conditions on the town's 
proposed subdivision plat.4  While this certiorari action was 
                                                 
4 The County of Rock (county) granted approval for the 
development of the Heron Bay lands conditioned upon seven 
modifications.  The Town of Beloit (town) challenged only one of 
these conditions, which pertained to the best method for 
preserving the 300-foot area along the Rock River.  At the Rock 
County Planning and Development Committee (committee) Meeting of 
April 7, 1999, the committee discussed its staff recommendations 
regarding conditions for approval of the Heron Bay Subdivision 
proposal from the Town of Beloit. (Intervenors-Third-Party-
Pls.'-Resp't-Pet'r 
App. 
at 
63-76.) 
The 
following 
seven 
conditions were outlined.  
The first condition advanced by the committee required two 
access points into the division, while the second condition 
called for road name changes at each direction change in the 
road.  Id. at 65.  The third requirement regarding storm water 
runoff on site was resolved between the town and county 
engineers.  Id.  The fourth condition required that 300 feet 
along the Rock River be dedicated as park and open space which 
would allow it to be open to the public, left in its natural 
state and subject to restrictive covenants. Id. The fifth 
condition required the subdivision lots to be redrawn while the 
sixth called for a green space easement to preserve the natural 
vegetation, which in turn would act as a buffer zone for the DNR 
natural area.  Id. at 66.  Finally, the seventh condition 
provided by the county required a ten-foot walkway to the park 
and open space from Heron Circle.  Id. 
 
No. 
00-1231   
 
4 
 
pending in the circuit court, Belle Zyla, Marvin Prothero, and 
the Green-Rock Audubon Society (Intervenors) filed a motion to 
intervene and a complaint for declaratory judgment, on the basis 
that the town exceeded its authority in both preparing and 
approving the subdivision plat and in developing the subdivision 
without a public purpose.  
¶4 
The town then filed a motion for summary judgment. In 
its brief in support of the motion and an attached affidavit, 
the town asserted that, prior to hiring its own engineering firm 
to plat the property, it sought proposals from private builders. 
However, 
the 
town 
found 
all 
submitted 
proposals 
to 
be 
unacceptable.  Accordingly, the town argued, it was proper for 
the town to develop its own land as a means of increasing the 
town's tax base and controlling orderly expansion of the area. 
Additionally, by creating and enforcing a 300-foot conservation 
easement along the Rock River, the town asserted it was acting 
to protect and preserve an environmentally sensitive area. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Town of Beloit municipal attorney, Kenneth Forbeck, 
represented the town at this meeting.  He indicated that the 
town would acquiesce to many of the conditions set forth by the 
county, except for the fourth condition requiring dedication of 
the 300-foot area along the Rock River as public lands.  Id. at 
69.  Forbeck stated that the town believed the best way to 
preserve this area would be to prevent it from being overrun by 
the public.  Id. at 75.  To prevent this from happening, the 
town proposed extending the lots that ran along the river to 
include the 300-foot area of concern by the county and 
controlling the use of this area through restrictive covenants 
thereby prohibiting development in this area without permission.  
Id.  The town also desired to enact an environmental easement in 
addition to the restrictive covenants that would equip the town 
with the ability to enforce the restrictions.  Id. at 76. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
5 
 
Finally, the town alleged that it acted properly in reviewing 
its own subdivision proposal because it complied with all of the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. ch. 236 (1999-2000)5 by submitting its 
proposal to all appropriate political bodies.  
¶5 
The Intervenors, including Rock County, filed briefs 
in opposition to the town's motion.  The circuit court denied 
the town's motion for summary judgment against the Intervenors 
and instead issued summary judgment in favor of the Intervenors.  
¶6 
The court of appeals reversed the decision that 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Intervenors, and 
instead granted summary judgment against the Intervenors, and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.  The court of appeals 
held that the town had statutory authority to develop and plat 
the Heron Bay Subdivision, and that the town's goals in 
developing Heron Bay constituted a public purpose.   
¶7 
The Intervenors sought review of the court of appeal's 
decision, regarding the public purpose doctrine.  On January 29, 
2002, this court accepted review. 
¶8 
The 
following 
are 
stipulated 
facts. 
 
The 
town 
currently owns a 20.4 acre parcel of land located in the Town of 
Beloit, Rock County, along the Rock River.  The parcel is known 
as the "Heron Bay Lands."  The Heron Bay Subdivision is a 20.4-
acre parcel of property located in the SE 1/4 of the SW 1/4, 
Section 2, Town of Beloit, Rock County, and located between the 
                                                 
5 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
6 
 
Rock River and Walters Road (R. 29).  The Heron Bay Lands have 
been open to and used by members of the public for recreation.   
¶9 
The history of this property prior to 1995 is 
incomplete. However, according to the record, early owners of 
this land used it for farming for 30-40 years (R. 39).  The land 
was then purchased by the town and held, off and on, since the 
mid 1960s (R. 39).  
¶10 The Caterpillar Company (Caterpillar) purchased the 
land owned by the town, along with additional parcels from 
individual property owners, for possible industrial development 
(R. 23).  After encountering some economic problems, Caterpillar 
decided not to develop the property (R. 39).  Thereafter, the 
town exercised its right to buy back the property and purchased 
approximately 210 acres from Caterpillar, including the lands 
originally owned by the town and additional private lands (R. 
23).  This property became known as the "Prairie Property." 
Fifty-five acres of the property were designated the "Heron Bay 
Lands," a portion of which is at issue in this case (R. 29).  
¶11 In the 1980s, the town's attempt to sell the land to a 
Beloit businessman, who proposed developing fourteen lots on the 
then 55-acre parcel, failed (R. 39).  Subsequent attempts to 
develop the land in 1990s were also unsuccessful (R. 39).  From 
1989 to 1995, the town worked with the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) after it had expressed an interest in 
purchasing a portion of this property (R. 23, 39).  In order to 
grant the DNR's request to purchase the land, the town divided 
the property into two parcels (R. 23).  The 37-acre parcel was 
No. 
00-1231   
 
7 
 
zoned as a Conservancy District while the other 20.4-acre parcel 
was retained by the Town of Beloit (R. 29).6  The parcel that the 
town 
retained, 
which 
eventually 
became 
the 
Heron 
Bay 
Subdivision, was zoned as a Single Family Residential District 
in 1995 (R. 29).  In October 1995, the 37-acre parcel was sold 
to the Department of Natural Resources for the preservation of 
rare species and to be maintained for public use (R. 23, 29).  
The town made it clear to the DNR and other interested parties 
that 
the 
20.4-acre 
parcel 
was 
retained 
specifically 
for 
residential development.  In fact, as part of the purchase 
agreement, the DNR agreed not to pursue purchase of the Heron 
Bay Subdivision and agreed not to oppose residential development  
(R. 24). 
¶12 In 1997, after years of attempted development by 
private individuals, the town decided to develop the land known 
as the Heron Bay Subdivision. Initially, the town sought 
approval for its master plan by the Town Board of the Town of 
Beloit (Board).  After several meetings, the town adopted the 
Master Plan.  The town developed and distributed a Request for 
Proposal (RFP) to area builders as well as other builders, but 
                                                 
6 Although the briefs filed by the town and the Intervenors 
refer to the parcel of land being 35 acres or more, the record 
reflects, in the stipulated facts, that "[u]p until 1995, the 
town owned an additional 37 acres of land directly to the south 
and contiguous to the Heron Bay Lands."  We note that the 55 
acres designated as the "Heron Bay Lands," less the 37 acres 
sold to the Department of Natural Resources, leaves less than 
the 20.4 acres the record reflects were retained for residential 
development.  This discrepancy is not a determinative factor in 
our decision. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
8 
 
did not garner significant interest or acceptable results (R. 
24).  The town reviewed the various proposals sought and 
submitted to develop the Heron Bay Subdivision (R. 24).  The 
proposals were rejected because they either had not responded to 
the request, or the proposals were apparently unacceptable for 
various reasons (R. 24).  As a result of this lack of interest 
and the inadequacy of the proposals, the town decided that the 
town would develop the site, agreeing that the town would 
benefit from the development (R. 24). 
¶13 At a 1997 Town of Beloit Board of Supervisor's 
meeting, the town approved a "Master Plan" for the Heron Bay 
Lands, zoning it for single-family residential housing.  At a 
subsequent meeting in December 1998, the town authorized and 
approved the expenditure of town tax revenues for planning and 
platting services to develop the land.  The town authorized an 
engineering firm to produce a plan to develop the Heron Bay 
Lands 
into 
a 
thirty-six-lot, 
single-family 
residential 
subdivision and to submit the plan to the State of Wisconsin. 
The town also authorized the bidding of contracts necessary for 
engineering and construction of the infrastructure.  It is the 
development by the town and sale of the remaining 20.4-acre 
parcel, known as the Heron Bay Subdivision, which is at issue in 
this case.  
¶14 The town considered and approved a preliminary plat 
for the subdivision.  The preliminary plat was forwarded to Rock 
County for its review and approval.  After Rock County's initial 
review, the subdivision was reduced from thirty-six lots to 
No. 
00-1231   
 
9 
 
twenty-four lots. Rock County then conditionally approved the 
twenty-four-lot preliminary plat subject to various conditions, 
including the 300-foot-wide environmental easement commencing on 
the bank of the Rock River and extending the entire eastern 
border of the property.7 
¶15 The town's Planning Commission then reviewed the 
preliminary plat.  In December 1998, the town authorized its 
engineers to provide planning and platting services to create 
what was to be called the Heron Bay Subdivision (R. 29).  In 
January 1999, one month later, the town authorized the engineers 
to proceed with plans, specifications, and bidding on the Heron 
Bay Subdivision infrastructure (R. 29).   
¶16 Although the town ultimately approved the twenty-four-
lot preliminary plat, it filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
in May of 1999, seeking to reverse Rock County's conditional 
approval based on the town's assertion that Rock County did not 
have the statutory authority to impose certain conditions.  
¶17 After the filing of the petition, the town authorized 
the expenditure of over $600,000 in town tax revenues for the 
development and construction of waste and "sewerage piping" with 
the intent that it serve both the future Heron Bay Lands 
subdivision and over 1500 additional acres of land in the area. 
                                                 
7 The record reflects that the town initially intended to 
preserve this conservancy or environmental area by the use of 
restrictive covenants.  Use of such restrictive covenants was 
discussed at workshops in February 1999.  (Savage, Town 
Administrator, Aff.) (R. 24). 
No. 
00-1231   
 
10 
 
See Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2001 WI App 256, 249 
Wis. 2d 88, 637 N.W.2d 71. 
¶18 The above facts are stipulated; however, the record 
reflects that underlying the town's decision to develop the land 
itself was a desire to create jobs, increase the tax base, and 
promote orderly growth of single family housing to benefit 
members of the community (R. 23).  In addition, the record 
reflects 
the 
town's 
concern 
over 
preservation 
of 
the 
environmentally sensitive land.  The town ultimately determined 
that it was its duty to ensure that an ecologically fragile area 
was properly developed, and the  best way to accomplish this 
goal was to carry out the development itself (R. 30).  In 
carrying 
out 
that 
goal, 
the town 
decided 
to 
utilize a 
conservation or environmental easement to preserve the east 300 
feet of the subdivision in lieu of less effective restrictive 
covenants (R. 23). 
¶19 The issue presented for this court to decide is 
whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the Town of 
Beloit's expenditure of public tax monies to develop and sell 
municipally-owned property in accord with the public purpose 
doctrine, based on the combined goals of promoting orderly 
growth, creating jobs, increasing the tax base, and preserving 
and conserving environmentally sensitive areas.  
¶20 This case involves a question of whether the Town of 
Beloit violated the public purpose doctrine.  Although there is 
no specific clause in the Wisconsin Constitution establishing 
the public purpose doctrine, this court has recognized that the 
No. 
00-1231   
 
11 
 
doctrine is firmly accepted as a basic constitutional tenet of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution, 
mandating that public appropriations may not be used for other 
than public purposes.8  State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 
Wis. 2d 57, 62, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967).  Courts are to give great 
weight 
and 
afford 
very 
wide 
discretion 
to 
legislative 
declarations of public purpose, but are not bound by such 
legislative expressions.  State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. 
La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973).  It is the duty 
of this court to determine whether a public purpose can be 
conceived, which might reasonably be deemed to justify the basis 
                                                 
8 See State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 413 
n.8, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973): 
The origin of the public purpose doctrine has been 
variously attributed by this court to the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions, State ex rel. Wisconsin Development 
Authority v. Dammann (1938), 228 Wis. 147, 277 N.W. 
278, 280 N.W. 698; art. IV, sec. 4, of the United 
States Constitution, which guarantees to every state a 
republican form of government, Heimerl v. Ozaukee 
County (1949), 256 Wis. 151, 40 N.W.2d 564; and art. 
VIII, sec. 2, of the Wisconsin Constitution which 
provides that no money shall be paid out of the 
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by 
law, State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter (1967), 33 
Wis. 2d 384, 
147 
N.W.2d 304. 
Other 
authors 
have 
attributed the doctrine to judicial articulation of 
the belief that governmental power should be used for 
the benefit of the entire community.  Mills, The 
Public Purpose Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1957 Wis. L. 
Rev. 40.  See also:  State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczark 
(1967), 34 Wis. 2d 57, 62, 63, 148 N.W.2d 683; Eich, A 
New Look At The Internal Improvements And Public 
Purpose Rules, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 1115.  
No. 
00-1231   
 
12 
 
of the duty.  Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 199 
Wis. 2d 790, 809, 546 N.W.2d 424, (1996).  As we have stated: 
Under the public purpose doctrine, "[w]e are not 
concerned with the 'wisdom, merits or practicability 
of the legislature's enactment.'  Rather we are to 
determine whether a 'public purpose can be conceived 
which might reasonably be deemed to justify or serve 
as a basis for the expenditure.'"  A court can 
conclude that no public purpose exists only if it is 
'clear and palpable' that there can be no benefit to 
the public." 
Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 896, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998) 
(citations omitted). 
¶21 Consequently, a conclusion that no public purpose 
exists can be determined only if it is "clear and palpable" that 
there can be no benefit to the public.  West Allis v. Milwaukee 
County, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 377, 159 N.W.2d 36 (1968); Hammermill, 
58 Wis. 2d at 56.     
I 
¶22 The court of appeals was correct in holding the town 
had the statutory authority to develop Heron Bay.  The town 
adopted village powers "as early as April, 1949" (R. 24).  While 
neither the Intervenors nor Rock County disputes that the town 
had authority to act as a subdivider under the general powers 
No. 
00-1231   
 
13 
 
granted to a village in Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1), (3) and (5),9 a 
brief analysis of the town's statutory authority is necessary 
for a complete understanding of the public purpose doctrine in 
Wisconsin.  
                                                 
9 61.34 Powers of village board. (1) GENERAL GRANT.  Except 
as otherwise provided by law, the village board shall have the 
management and control of the village property, finances, 
highways, streets, navigable waters, and the public service, and 
shall have power to act for the government and good order of the 
village, for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety, 
welfare and convenience of the public, and may carry its powers 
into effect by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing, 
taxation, special assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, 
and other necessary or convenient means.  The powers hereby 
conferred shall be in addition to all other grants and shall be 
limited only by express language. 
 . . . .  
(3) ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.  The village 
board may acquire property, real or personal, within or outside 
the village, for parks, libraries, recreation, beautification, 
streets, water systems, sewage or waste disposal, harbors, 
improvement of watercourses, public grounds, vehicle parking 
areas, and for any other public purpose; may acquire real 
property within or contiguous to the village, by means other 
than condemnation, for industrial sites; may improve and 
beautify the same; may construct, own, lease and maintain 
buildings 
on 
such 
property 
for 
instruction, 
recreation, 
amusement and other public purposes; and may sell and convey 
such property.  Condemnation shall be provided by ch. 32.  
 . . . .  
(5) CONSTRUCTION OF POWERS.  For the purpose of giving to 
villages the largest measure of self-improvement in accordance 
with the spirit of article XI, section 3, of the constitution it 
is hereby declared that this chapter shall be liberally 
construed in favor of the rights, powers, and privileges of 
villages to promote the general welfare, peace, good order and 
prosperity of such villages and the inhabitants thereof. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
14 
 
¶23 The Legislature has plenary power to act except where 
forbidden by the Wisconsin Constitution.  Libertarian Party, 199 
Wis. 2d at 801.  As noted in Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 
151, 40 N.W.2d 254 (1949) (Broadfoot, J., dissenting) (citing 16 
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, 550, sec. 182): 
The preamble of our state constitution provides that 
one of the main purposes in establishing our state 
government is to promote the general welfare.  The 
police powers of the state are inherent and are only 
limited by the constitution. 
"The real object of the police power, and that indeed 
which in its broad sense includes every instance of 
its exercise, is the securing of the general welfare, 
comfort, and convenience of the people." 
 
Id. at 161 (Broadfoot, J., dissenting).  Pursuant to the village 
powers 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 60.10(2)(c)10 
and 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 60.22(3)11 the town may exercise powers relating to villages 
and conferred on village boards under Chapter 61 of Wis. Stats., 
except those powers which conflict with statutes relating to 
                                                 
10 60.10(2)(c).  Exercise of village powers.  Authorize the 
town board to exercise powers of a village board under s. 
60.22(3).  A resolution adopted under this paragraph is general 
and continuing. 
11 60.22 General powers and duties.  The town board: 
 . . . .  
(3) VILLAGE POWERS.  If authorized under s. 60.10(2)(c), 
may exercise powers relating to villages and conferred on 
village boards under ch. 61, except those powers which conflict 
with statutes relating to towns and town boards. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
15 
 
towns and town boards.12  Here, it does not appear that the 
village powers conflict with statutes relating to towns and town 
boards.13  Accordingly, the court of appeals was correct in 
holding that there was no legal prohibition which prevented the 
town from subdividing property which it owned pursuant to 
subsections (1), (3) and (5) of Wis. Stat. § 61.34.  See Town of 
Beloit, 2001 WI App 256 at ¶15. 
II 
¶24 Although the town's authority to act as a subdivider 
under 
the 
general 
powers 
granted 
to 
a 
village 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 61.34 (1), (3) and (5) is not disputed, the 
creation of the subdivision involved the expenditure of public 
funds.  It is the town's expenditure of tax monies to develop 
and sell  the land in the Heron Bay subdivision that constitutes 
the central dispute in this case.   
¶25 Specifically, the Intervenors maintain that a public 
purpose can only 
be found 
when 
the 
"subject 
matter of 
legislative action is carrying out or implementing a traditional 
public function, and is public in nature."  Pet'r Br. at 18 
(citing the two-prong test of State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Auth. 
v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 280 N.W. 698 (1938)).  Based on the 
two-prong test of Dammann, which requires that the public 
purpose be of public necessity, convenience or welfare, and 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 See Wis. Stat. §§ 60.10(2), 61.34(3) and 60.10(2)(g). 
No. 
00-1231   
 
16 
 
difficult for individuals to provide for themselves, the 
Intervenors assert that the "development of a residential for-
profit river-front subdivision" is not a traditional public 
function, and therefore, it fails the first prong of the test 
rendering the town's expenditures unconstitutional.  Pet'r Br. 
at 24. 
¶26 In order to address the Intervenor's argument, an 
analysis of the public purpose doctrine and its application by 
Wisconsin courts is necessary.   
¶27 As briefly discussed earlier, although there is no 
specific language in the state constitution establishing the 
public purpose doctrine, this court has recognized that the 
doctrine is firmly accepted as a basic constitutional tenet 
mandating that public appropriations may not be used for other 
than public purposes.   State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 
Wis. 2d 57, 62, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967); State ex rel. Hammermill 
Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 47-48, 205 N.W.2d 784 
(1973).  The public purpose doctrine commands that public funds 
be used only for public purposes.  State ex rel. Warren v. 
Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 211, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969); State ex 
rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 414, 208 N.W.2d 780 
(1973).  In Reuter, this court described the public purpose 
concept as fluid: 
"[T]he concept of public purpose is a fluid one and 
varies from time to time, from age to age, as the 
government and its people change.  Essentially, public 
purpose depends on what the people expect and want 
their government to do for the society as a whole and 
No. 
00-1231   
 
17 
 
in this growth of expectation, that which often starts 
as hope ends in entitlement." 
Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 213.  As a result, it is a well-settled 
rule that the legislative body determines what constitutes a 
public purpose, and that "[C]ourts will not interfere unless at 
first blush the act appears to be so obviously designed in all 
its principal parts to benefit private persons and so indirectly 
or remotely to affect the public interest that it constitutes 
the taking of property of the taxpayers for private use."  State 
ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d  57 at 64  (quoting State 
ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 182, 277 
N.W. 278, 280 N.W. 698 (1938)).  
¶28 Although 
courts 
are 
not 
bound 
by 
legislative 
expressions of public purposes, they nevertheless have a 
constitutional burden to examine legislative actions for the 
existence of a public purpose pursuant to the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391.  However, the court's 
duties are limited to determining whether the legislation 
contravenes the provisions of the constitution.  The presumption 
of 
constitutionality 
is 
applicable 
in 
making 
such 
a 
determination.  Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 46-47.  As such, 
courts are to give great weight to the opinion of the 
legislative body, and "[i]f any public purpose can be conceived 
which 
might 
rationally 
justify 
the 
expenditure, 
the 
constitutional 
test 
is 
satisfied." 
 
Bishop 
v. 
City 
of 
Burlington, 
2001 
WI 
App 
154, 
¶11, 
246 
Wis. 2d 879, 
631 
N.W.2d 656 (citations omitted).  Consequently, a court will 
No. 
00-1231   
 
18 
 
conclude that there is no public purpose only if it is "clear 
and palpable that there can be no benefit to the public".  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
¶29 In determining whether a public purpose exists, courts 
have considered whether the subject matter or commodity of the 
expenditure 
is 
one 
of 
"public 
necessity, 
convenience 
or 
welfare," as well as the difficulty private individuals have in 
providing the benefit for themselves.  Dammann, 228 Wis. 2d at 
182; see also Libertarian Party, 199 Wis. 2d at 810.  Courts 
also look to see if the benefit to the public is direct or 
remote.  Bowman, 34 Wis. 2d at 64.  Additionally, provided that 
the primary purpose of the expenditure is designed for a public 
purpose, any direct or incidental private benefit does not 
destroy 
the 
public 
purpose 
and 
render 
the 
expenditure 
unconstitutional.  Libertarian Party, 199 Wis. 2d at 810. 
¶30 Because of the accepted view that local governments 
are often in the best position to determine the needs of the 
public 
in 
that 
locality, 
Wisconsin 
municipalities 
have 
traditionally been given wide discretion to determine whether a 
public expenditure is warranted due to public necessity, 
No. 
00-1231   
 
19 
 
convenience, or welfare.  As such, the public purpose doctrine 
has been broadly interpreted.14                                             
¶31 A review of Wisconsin case law illustrates that the 
trend of Wisconsin courts is to extend the concept of public 
purpose.  
¶32 In 
Bowman, 
34 
Wis. 2d at 
64-65, 
the 
industrial 
development through the creation of separate county agencies and 
bond issues, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.071, was determined to 
be a valid constitutional enactment as it related to a 
declaration of public purpose.  In West Allis v. Milwaukee 
County, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 159 N.W.2d 36 (1968), construction of 
incinerators and waste disposal facilities was considered a 
public purpose.  In addition, financial aid to the Marquette 
School of Medicine (now the Medical College of Wisconsin), a 
private nonprofit corporation, was upheld on the premise that 
public health is a public purpose.  See State ex rel. Warren v. 
Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969).  This court 
upheld the industrial bonding law under Wis. Stat. § 66.521 
(1969), as a public purpose, because the protection of the 
economic interests of the general public fell within the scope 
                                                 
14 State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 
Wis. 2d 32, 55-56, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973) (holding that "[t]he 
trend of both legislative enactments and judicial decisions is 
to extend [the public purpose] concept . . . in considering the 
demands upon municipal governments to provide for the needs of 
the citizens"); State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57,  
64, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967) (holding that "the tendency of later 
cases is toward greater liberality in characterizing taxes or 
appropriations as public in purpose . . .").      
No. 
00-1231   
 
20 
 
of promotion of the general welfare.  Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 
55-56. Similarly, the elimination of unsafe, unsanitary and 
overcrowded housing was found to promote the overall public 
purpose of providing stable residences for those of lower 
income.  Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391.   
¶33 A few years later, this court upheld the creation and 
operation of the Wisconsin solid waste recycling authority, in 
part because "recycling can be defined as a means of garbage 
collection, and, as such, has been denominated as clearly a 
matter justifying expenditure of public funds."  Wisconsin Solid 
Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 480-81, 235 
N.W.2d 648 (1975).  
¶34 Recently, Wisconsin courts have continued the liberal 
application of the public purpose doctrine.  In 2001, the court 
of appeals held that the construction of a parking lot to 
promote rehabilitation of the downtown area was held to be a 
public purpose.  Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI App 154, 
¶11, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 631 N.W.2d 656 (citations omitted).  In a 
similar vein, a city's expenditure of funds to increase the tax 
base and generally enhance the economic climate of the community 
was held to satisfy the public purpose doctrine.  Alexander v. 
City of Madison, 2001 WI App 208, 247 Wis. 2d 576, 634 
N.W.2d 577.  
¶35 Most significantly, this court was recently presented 
with the question of whether the expenditure of public funds for 
the construction of the new Milwaukee Brewers' Miller Park 
satisfied the public purpose doctrine.  The purported goals of 
No. 
00-1231   
 
21 
 
creating jobs and enhancing the tax base were held to be valid 
reasons, along with other reasons, by this court.  In our 
analysis, we recognized that enhancing the tax base and creation 
of new jobs are legitimate and valid public purposes, and held 
that: 
The purpose of the Stadium Act is to promote the 
welfare and prosperity of this state by maintaining 
and increasing the career and job opportunities of its 
citizens and by protecting and enhancing the tax base 
on which state and local governments depend upon.  It 
is clear that the community as a whole will benefit 
from the expenditures of these public funds.  Creation 
of new jobs is of vital importance to the State of 
Wisconsin 
and 
economic 
development 
is 
a 
proper 
function of our government. 
Libertarian Party, 199 Wis. 2d at 826.  
¶36 Accordingly, the goal of increasing the tax base, as 
well as creation of new jobs, has been recognized by this court, 
and other Wisconsin courts to be a legitimate and valid public 
purpose justifying the expenditure of public funds.  Id.; 
Alexander, 2001 WI App 208. 
¶37 In addition to Wisconsin case law acknowledging the 
town's 
expenditures 
here 
as 
involving 
traditionally 
and 
expressly recognized public purposes, it is clear from the 
record that the public welfare has been, and continues to be, 
the basis of the town's decision-making process.  See Dammann, 
228 Wis. at 182, (whether the subject matter or commodity of the 
expenditure 
is 
one 
of 
"public 
necessity, 
convenience 
or 
welfare").   
No. 
00-1231   
 
22 
 
¶38 As discussed previously, the town originally owned the 
property in dispute and sold it to the Caterpillar Company for 
purposes of industrial development.  Caterpillar determined not 
to develop the site and the town repurchased the land.  In the 
1980s the town failed to sell the land to a developer (R. 39).  
Attempts to develop the land in the 1990s were similarly 
unsuccessful.  Id.   
¶39 Nevertheless, the town, as part of its duties to the 
citizens of the town, continued to find ways to utilize the land 
for the public benefit. In order to preserve the environmentally 
sensitive land, the town worked with the DNR from 1989 to 1995, 
and eventually sold 37 acres to the DNR in October of 1995, for 
the preservation of rare species and to be maintained for public 
use (R. 23, 29).  
¶40 In 1997, after years of attempted development by 
private individuals, the town itself decided to develop the land 
known as the Heron Bay Subdivision.  
¶41 The 
record 
is 
replete 
with 
references 
to 
the 
underlying reasons for the town's decision to develop the Heron 
Bay Subdivision. In particular, the town was motivated to 
develop the land by its desire to create jobs, expand the tax 
base and create an orderly growth of single family housing for 
the benefit of members of the community (R. 23).   
¶42 The town was also concerned with the environmental 
impact that a subdivision would have in this ecologically 
sensitive area (R. 30).  As a result of that concern, the town 
ultimately determined that it was its duty to ensure that an 
No. 
00-1231   
 
23 
 
ecologically fragile area was properly developed and that the 
best way to accomplish this goal was to carry out the 
development itself (R. 30).  As a result of the review process 
by the several agencies, the size of the subdivision was reduced 
from thirty-six (36) to twenty-four (24) lots, the entrances 
were changed, and an environmental corridor was created (R. 23).    
¶43 Thus, contrary to the Intervenors' argument that the 
court of appeals overlooked the two-prong test of Dammann, the 
record clearly indicates that the town acted on behalf of the 
public welfare.  It is necessary to comment on the argument of 
the Intervenors, set forth in their initial brief and at oral 
argument that the court of appeals decision weakens the 
protections afforded by the public purpose and public use 
requirements.  Pet'r Br. at 21-23 (citing the takings provision 
of the Wisconsin Constitution Article I, Section 13).15  While 
                                                 
15 The following exchange took place at oral argument: 
Justice Diane S. Sykes:  If I could refocus us on the legal 
question that's presented here and that is the public purpose 
doctrine.   Is there any distinction between the public purpose 
doctrine as a constitutional doctrine and the public use 
requirement in the takings law? 
Attorney Kenneth W. Forbeck (representing the Town of 
Beloit):  The public use requirement in what now? 
Justice Sykes:  In the takings law under the 5th amendment 
and its state counterpart. 
Attorney Forbeck:  There's no takings here that I know of, 
but I can't, to be candid with you . . .  
Justice Sykes:  But there's a distinction between the two 
constitutional concepts? 
No. 
00-1231   
 
24 
 
the Intervenors may be correct in asserting that the reason for 
the public purpose requirement and the public use clause under 
the doctrine of eminent domain is to protect individual property 
rights against the government, their argument that the court of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Attorney Forbeck:   I know the public takings law was cited 
by other counsel, and candidly I think it's a completely 
different set of laws and set of rules.  There's no taking being 
done here. 
Justice Sykes: I understand there's no taking being done 
here.  
Attorney Forbeck: Okay. 
Justice Sykes:  But I'm asking you if there's any 
distinction, 
any 
principled 
distinction 
between 
the 
two 
constitutional doctrines. 
Attorney Forbeck: I don't know, I can't honestly answer the 
question. 
Justice Sykes:  Well let me ask it this way, perhaps this 
will spark something. 
Attorney Forbeck: Okay. 
Justice Sykes: Would the public purposes that you're 
asserting sustain the town's actions in this case be sufficient 
to sustain a condemnation/eminent domain taking of this property 
if it were privately held? 
Attorney Forbeck:  I don't think so, to answer your 
question. 
Justice Sykes:  The town could not force a sale on a 
private property owner based upon these public justifications? 
Attorney Forbeck:  Need  . . . and I've done municipal law 
for thirty some years now, I'm not a proponent of doing eminent 
domain first of all, number one.   But number two is——I don't 
think you could show an eminent domain necessity to do this 
particular piece of property. 
 
No. 
00-1231   
 
25 
 
appeals 
decision 
weakens 
not 
only 
the 
public 
purpose 
limitations, but also the protections of the public use clause 
fails.  The eminent domain provisions of the 5th amendment 
establish that government may take private property if two 
requirements are met:  (1) a public use has been determined; 
and, (2) just compensation is paid.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution also states 
that "[t]he property of no person shall be taken for public use 
without just compensation therefor."  Here, the property at 
issue was not private property being taken.  To the contrary, 
the property was currently owned by the town, and pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 61.34 (3), the town has the authority to sell and 
subdivide the property.   An entirely separate statute deals 
with a town's authority to condemn property under eminent 
domain.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 32. 
¶44 Although the test under the public use clause, like 
the test under the public purpose doctrine, is deferential to 
the legislative determination, the analyses are not identical.  
In any event, "[a] purely private taking could not withstand the 
scrutiny of the public use requirement."  Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).  See also Southwestern Ill. 
Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (Ill. 2002): 
While the difference between a public purpose and a 
public use may appear to be purely semantic, and the 
line between the two terms has blurred somewhat in 
recent years, a distinction still exists and is 
essential to this case . . . .  [The] flexibility [in 
terminology] does not equate to unfettered ability to 
exercise takings beyond constitutional boundaries. 
No. 
00-1231   
 
26 
 
"[E]minent domain cannot be employed to take private property 
for a predominantly Private use; it is, rather, the means 
provided by the constitution for an assertion of the public 
interest and is predicated upon the proposition that the private 
property sought is for a necessary public use."  Baycol, Inc. v. 
Downtown Dev. Auth. of City of Fort Lauderdale, 315 So.2d 451, 
455.  However, because this is not in fact a takings case, we 
need not and do not address whether the asserted public purposes 
of the Heron Bay project would be sufficient to sustain a 
challenge under the public use clauses of the Fifth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 13.  Given the history surrounding the 
property at issue, it seems clear that the combination of the 
town's enunciated goals would be difficult for individuals to 
achieve by themselves.  
¶45 In addition, the Intervenors maintain that the town's 
pursuit of profit from the development is not allowed under the 
public purpose doctrine.16  In support of that position, the 
Intervenors rely on Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 2d 151, 
40 N.W.2d 564 (1949).  In that case, Ozaukee County attempted to 
enter into a contract to build private driveways for local 
residents and others using county employees and resources 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 80.106 (1947).  The court there held: 
(1) that the Ozaukee County resolution was invalid, (2) that a 
                                                 
16 The Intervenors, along with Rock County, allege that the 
primary, if not exclusive, purpose behind the town's decision to 
subdivide Heron Bay, was a drive to maximize profit.  See Pet'r 
Br. at 28, 31.  Our review of the record does not find support 
for that allegation.  
No. 
00-1231   
 
27 
 
public purpose was not satisfied because the benefit must be 
"direct and not merely indirect or remote."  Id. at 157 (citing 
Dammann, 228 Wis. 2d at 180). 
¶46 However, as noted by the court of appeals, there is 
nothing in Heimerl to suggest that municipalities may never 
engage in traditionally private business; rather, in that case, 
the court found that no public purpose was satisfied by Ozaukee 
County's expenditure of public funds to construct private 
driveways.  Town of Beloit, 2001 WI App 256 at ¶28.  As long as 
the primary purpose of the expenditure is for a public purpose, 
the fact that private individuals directly or indirectly benefit 
does not render the expenditure unconstitutional.  Libertarian 
Party, 199 Wis. 2d at 810.  While certain private individuals 
may indirectly benefit from the town's development, there are 
identifiable public purposes behind the activity.  The town is 
not attempting to promote the expansion of a particular industry 
as prohibited by Hermann v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 537, 
539-543, 82 N.W.2d 167 (1957),17 nor is the town constructing the 
subdivision solely for the benefit of private owners as 
prohibited in Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 151, 40 N.W.2d 
564 (1949). 
                                                 
17 Hermann v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 537, 82 
N.W.2d 167 (1957), was distinguished by Bishop v. City of 
Burlington, 2001 WI App. 154, ¶13, 246 Wis. 2d 897, 631 
N.W.2d 656, on a factual basis.  The proposition for which 
Hermann is cited is valid, and bolstered by the holding in 
Bishop.  See Bishop, ¶19 (" . . . we interpret Hermann to 
prohibit the use of public funds to promote the expansion of a 
particular industry").       
No. 
00-1231   
 
28 
 
¶47 Finally, as noted by the town, any profit realized 
from the sale of the subdivision would in fact benefit the Town 
of Beloit in that the profit would go into the Town Treasury and 
ultimately benefit all of the citizens of the town by way of 
decreased taxes and reduced debt.  (See Def. Appellant Br. at 
29.) 
III 
¶48 In summary, the Town of Beloit had the statutory 
authority to subdivide and sell the property at issue.  In 
addition, this court has recognized, pursuant to our decision in 
Libertarian Party, that purposes for legislative action such as 
increasing the tax base and creation of new jobs, along with 
other reasons, are legitimate public purposes justifying the 
expenditure of public funds.  The expenditures by the Town of 
Beloit to develop  and sell property in the subdivision are not 
in 
contravention 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions, nor in violation of statutory provisions.   
¶49 This court holds that the combination of goals here of 
creating jobs, promoting orderly growth, enhancing the tax base, 
and preserving and conserving environmentally sensitive lands is 
a legitimate and valid public purpose justifying the expenditure 
of public funds by the Town of Beloit.   Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals decision.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I would affirm the order of the circuit court granting summary 
judgment to the intervenors on the ground that the town's 
proposed expenditure for the development of the subdivision did 
not serve a public purpose.18   
¶51 An expenditure is for a public purpose if it provides 
a direct advantage or benefit to the public at large.  It is not 
for a public purpose if the advantage to the public is indirect, 
remote, or uncertain.19 
¶52 The constitutional public purpose test is satisfied 
when 
the 
purposes 
expressed 
by 
the 
legislative 
body 
or 
"conceived" by the court rationally justify the expenditure.  In 
determining whether a public purpose exists the judiciary 
accords the legislative branch deference and thus plays a 
limited role.  Nevertheless, the court does not merely rubber-
stamp 
government 
expenditures. 
 
The 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions demand that courts perform their independent 
function to assess the realistic operation of the law to protect 
the public.  A court "is not bound by the legislature's 
                                                 
18 I agree with the well-written decision of Circuit Court 
Judge William D. Johnston.  Judge Johnston concluded that this 
expenditure does not meet the two-part test established in State 
ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 55-56, 
205 N.W.2d 784 (1973):  Is the expenditure for public necessity, 
convenience, or welfare?  Would private individuals have 
difficulty in providing the subdivision for themselves?  The 
answer to both questions in the present case is no. 
19 Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d  
790, 810, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (citing State ex rel. Wisconsin 
Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 277 N.W.2d 278 (1938)). 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
2 
 
enactment or declarations regarding its purpose, for it is the 
court's 
constitutional 
burden 
to 
examine 
the 
challenged 
legislation and assess its realistic operation."20 
¶53 The combination of goals enunciated by the majority 
opinion as constituting a legitimate and valid public purpose 
for the Town of Beloit's expenditures properly includes a list 
of benefits that might conceivably, in some circumstances, 
provide a direct benefit to taxpayers and thereby satisfy the 
public purpose doctrine.  An expenditure of funds that is 
legitimately designed to create jobs, promote orderly growth, 
increase the tax base, and preserve an environmentally sensitive 
area is made for a public purpose. 
¶54 I dissent in this case, however, to express my 
conviction that some of the goals on which the majority opinion 
rests its conclusion are merely assertions unsupported by the 
facts of this case while others are admittedly hoped for but 
distant outcomes, not justifications.  The public purpose 
doctrine becomes a charade if a town may justify expenditures by 
merely offering enough of the proper buzzwords, "job creation," 
"orderly growth," "increasing the tax base," and "environment 
concerns," without any facts to back up the assertions.  
Moreover, judicial review cannot begin and end simply with the 
recitation of those buzzwords, without any analysis. 
¶55 I dissent because I conclude on the basis of this 
record that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
                                                 
20 Hopper v. Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 128, 256 N.W.2d 139 
(1977). 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
3 
 
taxpayers of the Town of Beloit will be paying taxes to support 
the sale of lots for the future construction of private housing 
from which any benefit to the taxpayers is indirect, remote, and 
uncertain. 
¶56 I also write separately to object strenuously and 
vehemently to the continuing inclination of this court to reach-
out-and-decide-issues-not-before-the-court, whether it does so 
off-handedly in footnotes or squarely in the opinion's text.   
I 
¶57 This case is before the court on summary judgment and 
so our analysis is based upon stipulated facts and affidavits.  
The parties' stipulation regarding the public purpose states 
only that the development is based on a policy decision that the 
town will be able to sell the lots to private individuals, 
realize a profit, expand the town's tax base, and open up the 
northwest side of the town in an orderly planned manner.  The 
affidavits do not discuss any particular public purpose except 
in passing and in conclusory terms.  Indeed, analysis of the 
record exposes the town's asserted justifications and those 
conceived of by the majority of this court as nothing more than 
a recitation of buzzwords. 
¶58 I begin by looking at the four justifications upon 
which the majority opinion rests its holding:  job creation, 
expanding 
the 
tax 
base, 
promoting 
orderly 
growth, 
and 
environmental conservation.   
¶59 The majority opinion lists job creation as an express 
goal of the town's expenditure in this case, despite the fact 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
4 
 
that the town did not articulate that benefit as a goal in its 
stipulation, brief, or oral argument.  Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the record that the Town of Beloit ever intended the 
expenditure of monies to develop and sell property in the Heron 
Bay subdivision to create jobs, let alone that the expenditure 
would in fact create jobs. 
¶60 The majority opinion includes this noble public goal 
based solely upon a single affidavit from the town's attorney, 
asserting in broad terms, not necessarily related to this 
subdivision development, that "the Town of Beloit has a history 
of leading development for the benefit of its citizens.  The 
purpose of development has been to develop jobs, a greater tax 
base for the community and places for citizens to live."   
¶61 No evidence appears in the record of the types of jobs 
that would be created in this case, who would receive those 
jobs, or how long those jobs would last.  The only jobs 
immediately on the horizon may be jobs related to development of 
the subdivision.  If homes are constructed in the future, one-
time construction jobs might be made available in the community.  
A public purpose cannot rest on conjecture alone. 
¶62 The 
court's 
emphasis 
on 
the 
public 
purpose 
of 
preservation of an environmentally sensitive strip of land along 
the Rock River also amounts to reliance on buzzwords.  This case 
began as a suit by the Town of Beloit challenging conditions 
that the County of Rock placed upon its approval for the 
development of the Heron Bay lands.  One of the challenged 
conditions was that a 300-foot strip of land along the Rock 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
5 
 
River be dedicated as park and open space that would allow it to 
be open to the public.  The Town of Beloit rejected this 
approach to environmental conservation, arguing that the town 
had a better plan:  preserve this area by extending the lots all 
the way to the river and imposing restrictive covenants 
prohibiting development in this area without permission of the 
lot owners or the town.   
¶63 The validity of this environmental condition will 
apparently still be before the circuit court.  The court of 
appeals noted that "because there seems to be a factual dispute 
whether the town will voluntarily create such an easement, we 
decline to consider whether the easement is an additional public 
purpose."21  The majority opinion apparently feels no such 
restraint. 
¶64 In any event, it is unclear why any expenditure of 
funds for subdivision improvement is necessary for environmental 
protection of land the town owns along the river.  The monies 
expended go to the development of the sites, not the creation or 
enforcement 
of 
any 
environmental 
easement 
or 
covenant.  
According to the parties' stipulation, the public can access 
these lands for recreation and enjoyment at the present time.  
To conclude that the town is justified in expending funds for 
sewer, water, roads, gas, electricity, storm sewer management 
and any other appurtenances necessary for development of the 
subdivision for sale for homes because the public would benefit 
                                                 
21 Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2001 WI App 256, ¶26 
n.6, 249 Wis. 2d 88, 637 N.W.2d 71. 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
6 
 
from no development on a particular strip of town-owned land is 
doublespeak. 
¶65 The two other goals in the combination of objectives 
the majority opinion says supports the expenditures for a public 
purpose are the promotion of orderly growth and increasing the 
tax base.  The town, however, makes no showing of the 
relationship of the subdivision to orderly growth.  Orderly 
growth is accomplished by a master plan, zoning codes, and 
regulation of private land developers.  The Town of Beloit has 
such a master plan in place.  How the town is promoting orderly 
growth by development of the subdivision is therefore unclear.  
The majority opinion appears to have accepted the town's mere 
suggestion of promoting orderly growth.  It certainly cannot 
base its conclusion on facts because the record is devoid of any 
such facts.  
¶66 The final objective of the expenditures is to increase 
the tax base.  The tax base will increase if the lots are sold 
and houses are constructed.  Yet the stipulation states that the 
"Town has not sold any portion of the Heron Bay Lands as of this 
date [December 7, 1999].  The Town has no guarantee that anyone 
will purchase any of the future residential lots. . . . "   
¶67 The majority opinion's combination of goals justifying 
the expenditures in this case thus boils down to this:  the 
expenditure serves an acceptable public purpose because the 
town's tax base might be enhanced.  I disagree with this 
position.  An enhanced tax base from the sale of land and the 
construction of homes is an indirect, remote, and uncertain 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
7 
 
benefit of the expenditure in the present case and is not a 
sufficient public purpose to justify the town's running a for-
profit real estate development business and engaging in the non-
traditional enterprise of building residential home sites.   
¶68 Next we turn to the two additional goals the town 
asserted as justifications for the expenditure in this case that 
the majority opinion rightly ignores.  Both of them are 
similarly indirect, remote, and too uncertain to constitute 
public purposes.   
¶69 First, the town freely admits in the stipulation that 
it is acting with the hope of making a profit.  The town has the 
power to sell property.  The majority opinion goes to great 
length to explain this statutory authority.  Even where a 
government entity acts pursuant to a valid law, however, it is 
still subject to the constitution and the public purpose 
doctrine.  The issue in this case is whether the town may expend 
funds for subdivision development to make a bigger profit on the 
sale.  No evidence was presented analyzing either the expected 
revenue or market demand for the lots.  The justification of a 
hoped-for profit, pursued to its logical end, would justify the 
expenditure of public funds for any potentially profitable 
endeavor in which the town seeks to engage.  That cannot be what 
the public purpose doctrine means. 
¶70 Second, the affidavit from the town attorney asserts 
in broad terms, not necessarily related to this subdivision 
development, that development in the town is to provide places 
for citizens to live.  Nothing in the record evidences a need 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
8 
 
for single-family residential housing or the lack of private 
capital to develop such housing.22  Several private ventures 
proposed development of the land, but the Town rejected the 
proposals.  In Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 151, 40 
N.W.2d 564 
(1949), 
the 
court 
held 
that 
building 
private 
driveways was not "allied with a public purpose" and declared 
the expenditures unconstitutional.  Similarly, the development 
of river front lots in and of itself is not allied with a public 
purpose.   
¶71 The public purpose doctrine demands deference to the 
legislative branches of government.  Nevertheless, the court 
must 
examine 
the 
operational 
facts 
concerning 
government 
expenditures in order to determine whether a direct benefit to 
the public results.23  No facts exist in the record in the 
present case or can be conceived by the court to support a 
public purpose.  I therefore conclude, as did the circuit court, 
that the possibility of public benefit is too indirect, remote, 
and uncertain to sustain the expenditures. 
                                                 
22 Private developers were rejected by the town.  The 
statutes reflect a pattern authorizing villages and towns with 
village powers to increase housing but only for certain segments 
of the population and subject to limitations and prescribed 
procedures.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 66.1203 (housing authority 
not for profit); 66.1213 (housing authorities for elderly 
persons); 66.1301 (urban development); 66.1335 (housing and 
community development authorities).  One inference from these 
statutes is that a town does not have the power to provide 
housing for purposes not similar to those set forth in the 
statutes. 
23 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La 
Plante, 58 Wis. 2d at 50-53; State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 
Wis. 2d 57, 70-71, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967). 
No.  00-1231.ssa 
 
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II 
¶72 There is a growing tendency for this court to reach 
out and decide issues that are neither squarely presented nor 
adequately briefed and argued by the parties.24  In the present 
case, the majority opinion does exactly that in its discussion 
of the relationship between the public purpose doctrine and the 
public use doctrine under eminent domain.  Specifically, the 
majority opinion declares that "[a]lthough the test under the 
public use clause, like the test under the public purpose 
doctrine, is deferential to the legislative determination, the 
analyses are not identical."25  Because I believe that this 
tendency is detrimental to the development of Wisconsin law, I 
dissent. 
¶73 My dispute is not with the correctness of the legal 
analysis or conclusion the majority opinion reaches with regards 
to public purpose and public use.26  I do not know whether the 
majority opinion is correct.  The majority opinion offers no 
authority for these statements of law.  It cites cases from 
other jurisdictions relating to public use that do not bind this 
court, and I do not understand the parenthetical comments 
included or the purpose of citing these cases. 
¶74 My gripe is with the very existence of the discussion 
in the present case.  The majority opinion's discussion is pure, 
adulterated dicta, and it has no place in the court's opinion.  
                                                 
24 See majority op., ¶43 n.15. 
25 Majority op., ¶44. 
26 Majority op., ¶¶43-44. 
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The intervenors' brief merely cautions that a broad definition 
of public purpose might result in a broad definition of public 
use in eminent domain law, but neither the opposing parties nor 
amici argued or briefed the issue.27 
¶75 The dangers of this court's inclination to reach out 
either in the text or in a footnote and decide an issue not 
before it, without full inquiry and without full discussion, are 
graphically illustrated in State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996), and State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, 243 
Wis. 2d 328, 347, 627 N.W.2d 195. 
¶76 In footnote 10 of the Petty decision, the court stated 
that it need not and therefore would not address a particular 
issue.  In footnote 13, however, the Petty court then proceeded, 
in a cursory and superficial manner, to address the issue it 
previously stated it would not address. 
¶77 The very issue referred to in footnotes 10 and 13 in 
Petty then reached the court in State v. Hansen.  The Hansen 
court, discussing the conflicting Petty footnotes and the Petty 
court's incomplete inquiry into the issue, refused to abide by 
Petty footnote 13, characterizing the footnote as "providing 
non-essential commentary."  Hansen, 243 Wis. 2d 328, ¶32.  This 
characterization, however, is problematic under Wisconsin law.  
Justice Wilcox, the author of the Petty opinion, and Justice 
Crooks, the author of the majority opinion in the present case, 
argued in their dissent in Hansen that it is the rule in 
Wisconsin that a discussion of issues not decisive of a 
                                                 
27 See majority op., ¶43 n.15. 
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controversy is a binding judicial act, not dicta.  See Hansen, 
243 Wis. 2d 328, ¶60 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (citing State v. 
Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)).  
¶78 The relationship between the public purpose doctrine 
and the public use doctrine under eminent domain will inevitably 
be raised in a case before this court.  When that happens, some 
litigant will argue that the majority opinion is an obstacle to 
a thorough, thoughtful, and fully briefed consideration of the 
issue, asserting the rule of stare decisis and pointing out that 
the majority's discussion is binding precedent and not mere 
dicta. 
¶79 The majority's discussion of the relationship between 
public purpose and public use under eminent domain, however, is 
mere dicta, and should the issue ever squarely present itself in 
this court, litigants and justices will be wise to abide by the 
other line of Wisconsin cases that assert the generally accepted 
doctrine that "a statement not addressed to the question before 
the court or necessary for its decision" is dictum, Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 
(1984), and not binding on the court, Reiter v. Dyken, 95 
Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980). 
¶80 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
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