Title: Saunders v. Saunders

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 
 
2019 WY 82 
 
 
 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 1, 2019       
 
    
 
 
 
 
MARK A. SAUNDERS, 
 
Appellant 
(Plaintiff), 
 
v. 
 
SIBYL H. SAUNDERS, 
 
Appellee 
(Defendant). 
 
S-18-0208 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County 
The Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge 
 
Representing Appellant: 
 
Melinda S. McCorkle of Kline, McCorkle & Pilger, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 
 
Representing Appellee: 
 
Devon P. O’Connell, Dustin J. Richards and Albert K. Walsh of Pence and MacMillan 
LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.   
 
 
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ. 
 
 
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final 
publication in the permanent volume. 
 
1 
 
 
KAUTZ, Justice. 
 
[¶1] 
Appellant Mark A. Saunders appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his 
divorce action against Appellee Sybil H. Saunders on the grounds of improper venue and/or 
forum non conveniens.  The district court erred by dismissing Mr. Saunders’ action for 
improper venue, and it did not apply the proper test when it dismissed for forum non 
conveniens.  Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.   
 
ISSUES 
 
[¶2] 
The issues on appeal are: 
 
1. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Mr. Saunders’ divorce 
complaint for improper venue under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3). 
 
2. 
Whether the district court erred by dismissing Mr. Saunders’ divorce 
complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.   
 
FACTS 
 
[¶3] 
The Saunders married in North Carolina in 1989.  On February 9, 2018, Mr. 
Saunders filed a complaint for divorce in the district court in Fremont County, Wyoming.  
Mr. Saunders stated he lived in Fremont County and had resided in the State of Wyoming 
for more than sixty days immediately preceding his filing of the complaint.  He also stated 
two children were born as issue of the marriage, but they were adults.  Mr. Saunders 
requested the district court grant him a divorce from Mrs. Saunders and equitably divide 
their marital property.  Mrs. Saunders was served with the complaint and summons in 
North Carolina on February 20, 2018.    
 
[¶4] 
On February 21, 2018, Mrs. Saunders filed a divorce complaint in North Carolina.  
That document is not part of the record on appeal, but her amended complaint, which she 
filed on April 9, 2018, is included in the record.  Mrs. Saunders then filed a motion to 
dismiss the Wyoming action pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3),1 claiming Wyoming was an 
improper venue for the parties’ divorce and/or forum non conveniens.     
                                               
 
1 Rule 12(b)(3) states: 
 
(b) How to Present Defenses.  –  Every defense to a claim for relief 
in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is 
required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:  
. . . . 
 
     (3) improper venue[.] 
2 
 
 
[¶5] 
Mrs. Saunders filed a personal affidavit in support of her motion to dismiss.  She 
declared the parties had lived together in North Carolina and had never resided in Wyoming 
as a married couple.  Mrs. Saunders also stated Mr. Saunders has interests in approximately 
forty-four North Carolina businesses.  According to her, he had engaged in extensive 
business dealings and real estate ventures in southeastern North Carolina for over thirty 
years, including a business named “Mark Saunders Luxury Homes,” which has “a 
significant number of employees[.]”  Mrs. Saunders stated Mr. Saunders and/or his 
companies were involved in thousands of real estate transactions over an unidentified 
period of time.2     
 
[¶6] 
As for liabilities, Mrs. Saunders stated Mr. Saunders’ businesses were involved in 
“a great number of lawsuits” and there was an outstanding lien of $74,000,000, although it 
is unclear who the lien had been filed against.  She also stated the parties had a federal tax 
lien of $3,000,000 filed against them in North Carolina and Wyoming.  Mrs. Saunders 
claimed the “identification, classification, and evaluation of all marital assets, together with 
the number of competent witnesses who may testify in the . . . action[] are primarily from 
the State of North Carolina.”  She asserted, given the complex nature of the marital 
properties and debts, North Carolina would be the “most convenient forum to litigate” the 
issues associated with their divorce.        
 
[¶7] 
In his verified response, Mr. Saunders claimed the district court in Fremont County 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.  He recognized Mrs. Saunders had filed 
a complaint in North Carolina but stated he had not been served with process in that suit.  
Mr. Saunders also admitted he continued to have significant business and personal 
connections in North Carolina.  He conceded there were pending lawsuits against him and 
his business entities and a federal tax lien had been filed in North Carolina and Wyoming 
against the parties.  He did not specifically deny the $74,000,000 lien but stated the 
                                               
 
  
 
2 Mrs. Saunders indicated in her motion and affidavit that she provided the documentation supporting her 
statements to the district court on a thumb drive.  Her court filings contain a footnote stating:   
 
[Mrs.] Saunders makes reference to a thumb drive which contains all 
attachments.  The same will be disclosed to the court as necessary and 
reasonable efforts will be undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of 
said records and to limit the filing of the same into the public records.  It 
is anticipated that a Confidentiality Order governing the presentation, 
preservation, and submission of evidence into the appropriate court 
proceeding will be entered by the court or pursuant to the terms of a 
Confidentiality Agreement executed between the parties.   
 
The thumb drive is not included in the record on appeal, the district court did not mention it in the dismissal 
order, and the parties do not reference it in their appellate briefs.   
 
3 
 
documents from the Register of Deeds, which were apparently on the thumb drive, see 
supra n.2, speak for themselves.     
 
[¶8] 
Mr. Saunders claimed to have moved permanently to Wyoming and to have 
substantial real property and business interests in this State.  He averred he had possessed 
and operated a ranch in Wyoming for over thirteen years and had interests “in at least 10 
Wyoming-based business entities.”  Mr. Saunders asserted his choice of Wyoming as the 
forum to litigate the divorce was entitled to deference.  
 
[¶9] 
The North Carolina court stayed Mrs. Saunders’ divorce action “until the 
determination of venue and any other possible jurisdictional matters are resolved by the 
Wyoming Courts.”  After a hearing, the district court in this case issued an order granting 
Mrs. Saunders’ “Motion[] to Dismiss for Improper Venue.”  Mr. Saunders appealed.     
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
[¶10] We generally review a district court’s rulings regarding venue and forum non 
conveniens for abuse of discretion.  Bourke v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP, 2013 WY 93, ¶ 
14, 305 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Wyo. 2013) (venue); Burnham v. Coffinberry, 2003 WY 109, ¶¶ 
5, 8, 76 P.3d 296, 298-99 (Wyo. 2003) (venue and forum non conveniens); West Texas 
Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Booth v. Magee 
Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1976)) (forum non conveniens).   
 
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. 
 
Burnham, ¶ 5, 76 P.3d at 298.  However, to the extent resolution of this case requires us to 
address legal issues, our review is de novo.  BTU W. Res., Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 2019 
WY 57, ¶ 14, 442 P.3d 50, 54-55 (Wyo. 2019); Bourke, ¶ 15, 305 P.3d at 1167 
(interpretation of venue statutes is reviewed de novo).   
 
[¶11] Given Mrs. Saunders filed a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, the court generally 
accepts the well-pleaded facts in Mr. Saunders’ complaint as being true.  See Espinoza v. 
Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 376 P.3d 960, 982 (Ore. 2016); 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 
1352 (3d. ed. 2019) (discussing the identical F.R.C.P 12(b)(3)).  Additionally, “the court 
must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the 
plaintiff.”  5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1352.  A district court may, however, “examine 
facts outside the complaint” to determine whether a case should be dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(3).  Id.  Thus, as in this case, the parties may submit affidavits setting forth facts 
relevant to the district court’s determination of venue and/or forum non conveniens.  Id.  
 
 
4 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12] Mr. Saunders’ complaint stated he had been a Wyoming resident for more than sixty 
days immediately preceding his filing and he resided in Fremont County.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-107 (LexisNexis 2017) sets forth the requirements for a Wyoming district court to 
acquire jurisdiction over a divorce action: 
 
(a) No divorce shall be granted unless one of the parties 
has resided in this state for sixty (60) days immediately 
preceding the time of filing the complaint, or the marriage was 
solemnized in this state and one of the parties has resided in 
this state from the time of the marriage until the filing of the 
complaint. 
  
 
(b) A married person who at the time of filing a 
complaint for divorce resides in this state is a resident although 
his spouse may reside elsewhere.    
 
[¶13] Mrs. Saunders did not dispute the district court had jurisdiction over the action 
pursuant to § 20-2-107.  She also acceded to the court’s personal jurisdiction over her.  Mrs. 
Saunders asserted, however, North Carolina was the more appropriate forum for the 
parties’ divorce and the distribution of their marital property.  Her motion to dismiss the 
action and the district court’s order referenced two distinct concepts–statutory venue and 
forum non conveniens.  We will address each, in turn.    
 
Statutory Venue 
 
[¶14] Venue is a modern legal concept referring to the county, district, or other 
geographical location where, “‘for the sake of fairness, convenience, or other commanding 
policy considerations, a cause is to be tried.’”  Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc. v. Union 
Tel. Co., 2007 WY 11, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 191, 195 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue 
§ 1 (2006)).  See also, Bourke, ¶ 16, 305 P.3d at 1168.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2017) addresses venue for divorces:  “A divorce may be decreed by the district 
court of the county in which either party resides[.]”  See Linch v. Linch, 2015 WY 141, ¶ 
25, 361 P.3d 308, 315 (Wyo. 2015). 
 
[¶15] Although the district court dismissed Mr. Saunders’ complaint for improper venue, 
it did not mention § 20-2-104 in its order.  Mr. Saunders claims the district court erred as 
a matter of law by dismissing his divorce action on the grounds of improper venue when 
he filed his complaint in a county allowed by § 20-2-104.  Mrs. Saunders responds § 20-2-
104 is permissive because it uses the word “may,” and, therefore, does not mandate a 
divorce be filed in the district court of a county “in which either party resides.”  She 
suggests the statute allows a divorce to be filed elsewhere, including in another state.    
5 
 
 
[¶16] We addressed a similar argument in Bourke, ¶¶ 16-22, 305 P.3d at 1168-69.  The 
venue statute at issue in Bourke was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-107 (LexisNexis 2017), which 
states certain actions against non-residents or foreign corporations “may be brought in any 
county where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides.”  Bourke, ¶ 11, 305 
P.3d at 1167.  We recognized the term “may” is generally permissive; however, in the 
context of the venue statute, “[i]t is permissive only to the extent of allowing a plaintiff to 
choose between filing an action where the cause of action arose or where he resides.”  Id., 
¶¶ 18-20, 305 P.3d at 1168-69.   
 
[¶17] The same is true of § 20-2-104.  Although the statute uses the word “may,” it is 
permissive only to the extent it allows a plaintiff to choose between the counties where the 
parties reside.  See generally, Linch, ¶¶ 25-26, 361 P.3d at 315 (discussing proper venue 
for divorce cases).  Mr. Saunders lives in Fremont County and Mrs. Saunders does not live 
in Wyoming; consequently, the Fremont County district court is the appropriate venue 
within the State of Wyoming.   
 
[¶18] Mrs. Saunders does not direct us to any Wyoming statute allowing dismissal or 
transfer of a divorce action simply because venue would be more appropriate in another 
state.3  See generally, Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 84 (1971, updated 2019) 
(“A court lacks power to transfer a case to the courts of another state.”); Hronek v. St. 
Joseph’s Children’s Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Wyo. 1994) (stating a Wyoming district 
court does not have authority to “change the venue to another state”).  Instead, she refers 
to the general definition of venue, i.e., the place where a case, for the sake of convenience, 
should be tried, in arguing the district court had discretion to dismiss the action for 
improper venue even though it was filed in accordance with § 20-2-104.  See, e.g., 
Sundance Mountain Resort, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 195 (definition of venue).   
 
[¶19] The cases cited by Mrs. Saunders recite the general definition of venue but resolve 
the issues presented by reference to the relevant venue statutes.  See Sundance Mountain 
Resort, ¶ 10, 150 P.3d at 195 (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-101); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Kunz, 2008 WY 71, ¶ 14, 186 P.3d 378, 382 (Wyo. 2008) (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301); 
Bourke, ¶ 20, 305 P.3d at 1169 (Section 1-5-107).  As we noted in Bourke, the legislature, 
when it adopted Wyoming’s various venue statutes, made its choice of the “‘geographical 
location[s] in which, for the sake of fairness, convenience, or other commanding policy 
considerations, a cause is to be tried.’”  Bourke, ¶ 21, 305 P.3d at 1169 (quoting Kunz, ¶ 
14, 186 P.3d at 382).  The general definition of venue is not authority for dismissal or 
transfer of a case to a more appropriate venue.     
                                               
 
3 If child custody had been an issue in this case, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-201 through 20-5-502 (LexisNexis 2017), would have governed the choice 
of forum for the child custody determination.  The Act includes statutory authority for a court to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a child custody matter when another state is a more appropriate forum.  Section 
20-5-307.  The court may, however, retain jurisdiction over “the divorce or other proceedings.”  Id.   
6 
 
 
[¶20] Fremont County was the proper venue within Wyoming; therefore, to the extent the 
district court dismissed Mr. Saunders’ divorce action for improper venue, it erred.  See 
Burnham, ¶ 5, 76 P.3d at 298 (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. 
Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1352 (1990) (if a defect in venue is not demonstrated, the court will 
deny a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss)).  Compare Bourke, ¶ 31, 305 P.3d at 1171 (the 
district court properly dismissed the case because it was filed in a venue not authorized by 
statute).  The only legal authority for the district court to dismiss Mr. Saunders’ divorce 
complaint because North Carolina is a more convenient forum is the common law doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, which we address below.  
 
Forum Non Conveniens 
 
[¶21] Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a court, even though it has 
jurisdiction, [may decline to] entertain the suit if it believes itself to be a seriously 
inconvenient forum[,] provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.”  
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 84 (1971, updated 2019).  The doctrine “allows 
a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s chosen forum is significantly 
inconvenient and the ends of justice would be better served if the action were brought and 
tried in another forum.”  Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1178 (R.I. 2008) 
(citing Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1991)); Volt Delta Res., 
Inc. v. Devine, 241 Kan. 775, 740 P.2d 1089, 1094 (1987); Qualley v. Chrysler Credit 
Corp., 191 Neb. 787, 217 N.W.2d 914, 915 (1974)).  Each state decides the extent to which 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies.  20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 109.   
 
1. Wyoming Precedent Regarding Forum Non-Conveniens 
 
[¶22] This Court mentioned common law forum non conveniens in a few cases in the 
1970s.  In Booth, 548 P.2d at 1255 n.2, we declined to decide “whether a trial court in this 
state can dismiss a suit in reliance upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens” because the 
issue had not been presented to the district court and it was unnecessary to the decision.  In 
Lohman v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1, 3 (Wyo. 1974), we recognized 
“‘the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction 
or mistake of v[e]nue.’”  Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 67 S.Ct. 
839, 841, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), application to federal cases limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1404)).  
Following that principle, we refused to address the appellant’s forum non conveniens 
argument because Wyoming did not have jurisdiction over the dispute.    
 
[¶23] This Court finally considered forum non conveniens on the merits in 1991 when we 
decided West Texas Utilities Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1991).  
West Texas, a public utility, produced electricity at coal-fired power plants in Texas.  It 
contracted to purchase coal mined by Exxon in Wyoming.  Id. at 933.  When the market 
7 
 
price of coal dropped below the contract price, West Texas attempted to negotiate a new 
price with Exxon but was unsuccessful.  Id. at 933-34.  Exxon filed suit in Wyoming 
“seeking a declaration of its remedies in the event that West Texas repudiated the contract.”  
Id. at 934.   
 
[¶24] West Texas claimed the district court should have dismissed the case for forum non 
conveniens because it involved “a dispute between two Texas companies over a contract 
executed in Texas” and, therefore, should be litigated in Texas.  Id. at 935.  With limited 
analysis, this Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
West Texas’s motion.  We ruled the district court properly reviewed the arguments for and 
against dismissing the action and concluded Exxon’s choice to litigate the case in Wyoming 
was “rational,” given the mines were located within the state, and “the suit was not brought 
for purposes of harassment.”  Id.  See also, Burnham, ¶ 8, 76 P.3d at 299 (stating the forum 
non conveniens issue was “addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court” but refusing 
to consider it on the merits because the appellant failed to provide cogent argument or cite 
to pertinent authority).  West Texas, therefore, recognized the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens applies in Wyoming but provided little direction for how to apply it.   
 
[¶25] Mr. Saunders argues that, while our precedent confirms Wyoming courts have 
authority to deny a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, we have never recognized 
the right of a court to grant a motion to dismiss on that basis.  It is true we have never 
affirmed a forum non conveniens dismissal.  However, that does not mean Wyoming courts 
do not have the authority to do so.  If we did not intend to allow relief for forum non 
conveniens, we would have ruled the doctrine does not apply in Wyoming.  See 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Courts § 109 (each state decides the extent to which forum non conveniens applies).  
Furthermore, in Durdahl v. National Safety Associates, Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 528 n.1 (Wyo. 
1999), we stated:  “The concept that a court can decline to exercise jurisdiction which it 
otherwise could legitimately exercise has been recognized previously by this Court in the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.”  We, therefore, reject Mr. Saunders’ argument that the 
district court did not have general authority to grant a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens. 
2.  Standard for Application of Forum Non Conveniens 
 
[¶26] A review of authorities from other jurisdictions demonstrates West Texas does not 
fully address the forum non conveniens doctrine.  The majority of jurisdictions follow a 
more structured two-stage forum non conveniens test originally articulated by the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Gulf 
Oil 
Corp., 
330 
U.S. 
at 
506-09, 
67 
S.Ct. at 842-44.  See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 84; Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 
974; Ledy, 946 A.2d at 1182 n.11 (collecting authorities).    
 
[¶27] In the first stage, the court determines whether an alternate forum is available and 
capable of providing relief.  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 974; Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07, 67 
8 
 
S.Ct. at 843-44.  This is a threshold issue because, if no adequate alternate forum exists, 
the court must not dismiss the case.  Id.; Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 84.  To 
be considered adequate, the parties must be amenable to service of process in the alternate 
forum and the court in the alternate forum must have jurisdiction over the matter.  Espinoza, 
376 P.3d at 984 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 102 S.Ct. 252, 258, 
70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981)).  See also, Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07, 67 S.Ct. at 842-43 (the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens “presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant 
is amenable to process”).  In addition, the alternate forum’s law must be capable of 
providing a meaningful remedy.  Id.  The alternate forum is not adequate if some procedural 
bar, such as a statute of limitations, would prevent litigation.  Espinoza, 376 P.2d at 984.  
See also, Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254, 102 S.Ct. at 265.     
 
[¶28] In the second stage, the court balances the private and public interests to determine 
whether it should grant the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.  Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 
at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. at 843-44.  In doing so, the court must keep in mind the plaintiff’s 
“choice of a forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.”  Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 84.  See also, Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  Stated 
another way, a court should dismiss a case for forum non conveniens only when the private 
and public interests “strongly favor” litigating the matter in an alternate forum.  Espinoza, 
376 P.3d at 975 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843).  See also, Sinochem 
Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 167 
L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (“A defendant invoking forum non conveniens ordinarily bears a heavy 
burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum.”). 
 
[¶29] In analyzing the parties’ private interests, the court will weigh the relative 
advantages of trying the case in the plaintiff’s chosen forum against the obstacles to the 
defendant obtaining a fair trial.  Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  The private 
interests may include:   
 
“[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability 
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost 
of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of 
view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; . 
. . all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive[;] * * * [and] the enforceability of 
a judgment if one is obtained.”            
 
Id.  Additionally, “the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ 
‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary 
to his own right to pursue his remedy.”  Id.  Cf. West Texas, 807 P.2d at 935 (mentioning 
there was no evidence the plaintiff chose Wyoming as its forum to harass the defendant).   
 
9 
 
[¶30] As part of the second stage of the forum non conveniens analysis, the court also 
considers the interests of the public, including:  
 
the administrative difficulties and burden on the court in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum; the unfairness of imposing the 
expense of trial and the burden of jury duty on residents of a 
community with little or no connection to the controversy; the 
interest in “having localized controversies decided at home”; 
and choice of law issues, including whether the court will be 
required to apply its own law, or that of another jurisdiction.  
 
Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 975 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. at 843-44). 
 
[¶31] Gulf Oil embraces the West Texas concept of giving the district court discretion to 
balance the arguments for and against dismissing the case, but also recognizes the 
important policies of making sure there is an adequate forum available for the suit and 
respecting the plaintiff’s choice of forum when it is appropriate to do so.  The second stage 
of the test incorporates the concepts of rationality and preventing harassment articulated in 
West Texas but provides a more structured and comprehensive means of analyzing the 
forum non conveniens issue.  We, therefore, join the majority of jurisdictions and adopt the 
Gulf Oil two-stage test.    
   
3. Application of the Gulf Oil Forum Non Conveniens Test to the 
Saunders Action  
 
[¶32] The district court’s order4 dismissing Mr. Saunders’ complaint  stated, in pertinent 
part: 
 
1. 
The parties married November 4, 1989, in North 
Carolina, where they resided together until recently. 
 
2. 
Mr. Saunders has extensive business and real estate 
ventures in North Carolina.  The parties also own real 
property in Wyoming. 
 
3. 
Mr. Saunders filed a Complaint for divorce in Wyoming 
on February 9, 2018. 
 
4. 
Mrs. Saunders filed a Complaint for [d]ivorce in North 
Carolina on February 21, 2018. 
                                               
 
4 For ease of reading, we have changed the district court’s references to the parties as “plaintiff” and 
“defendant” to their names without bracketing. 
10 
 
 
5. 
The North Carolina Court has stayed all proceedings 
pending this Court’s determination of Mrs. Saunders’ 
Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue. 
 
6. 
Mrs. Saunders contends[,] although Mr. Saunders filed 
first and Wyoming has subject matter jurisdiction [and] 
personal jurisdiction, North Carolina is the more 
appropriate forum in which to distribute the parties’ 
apparently complex assets because the majority of the 
property, the witnesses, and relevant evidence is located 
in North Carolina. 
 
7. 
Mr. Saunders requests this court retain jurisdiction. . . . 
 
8. 
 . . . 
 
9. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has . . . held:  “Whether a 
case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens lies within the discretion of the district court.”  
Booth v. Magee Carpet Company, 548 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 
1976). 
 
W[est] Texas Utilities Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 
932, 935 (Wyo. 1991).  
 
10. The Court finds Mrs. Saunders’ motion should be 
granted.  The parties have never resided in Wyoming as a 
couple.  The majority of Mr. Saunders’ business dealings, 
the witnesses, financial records, property records, [and] 
the discovery as to the extent of marital property is 
located in North Carolina.  North Carolina is the more 
convenient forum.   
 
[¶33] The district court followed West Texas; however, that analysis was not adequate 
under Gulf Oil.  The court did not consider whether North Carolina was an adequate 
alternate forum or balance the private and public interest factors identified in Gulf Oil.  
Importantly, the district court did not give any consideration to Mr. Saunders’ right, as 
plaintiff, to choose the forum to litigate his action.  Consequently, we reverse and remand 
for application of the correct test.  On remand, the district court must keep in mind that 
Mrs. Saunders, as the party seeking dismissal, bears a “heavy burden” to establish Mr. 
Saunders’ action should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.  Sinochem, 549 
U.S. at 430, 127 S.Ct. at 1190.   
11 
 
 
[¶34] As a threshold matter, the district court will need to determine whether North 
Carolina is an adequate alternate forum.  If North Carolina is not an appropriate forum, 
Wyoming must entertain the suit no matter how inconvenient it is.  Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws § 84, comment c.  This inquiry will require a determination of whether 
Mr. Saunders is amenable to service of process in North Carolina, whether the North 
Carolina court has jurisdiction over the case, and whether North Carolina law provides a 
meaningful remedy.5  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 984.; Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22, 102 
S.Ct. at 265 n.22.   
 
[¶35] Mr. Saunders contends the remedy in North Carolina is inadequate because a 
divorce is not immediately available, like it is in Wyoming.  The parties cite different North 
Carolina divorce statutes as applying to their situation.  Mr. Saunders asserts N.C. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 50-6 applies, and it requires spouses to be separated for a minimum of one 
year prior to divorce.  However, Mrs. Saunders filed for a divorce from bed and board 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50-7, which apparently has different requirements.  The 
district court will need to clarify which statute applies and whether it provides an adequate 
remedy.   
 
[¶36] Mr. Saunders also claims North Carolina is an unsuitable forum because it requires 
all his business entities to be joined as parties in the divorce action.  This requirement is 
confirmed by Mrs. Saunders’ North Carolina divorce complaint which names numerous 
business entities as co-defendants.  The parties also raise issues related to each state’s 
jurisdiction over their business and property interests and the enforceability of the final 
property distribution order.     
 
[¶37] The district court will need to evaluate these circumstances in the context of relevant 
authorities and the facts.  In doing so, it should keep in mind “the remedy provided by the 
alternate forum ‘need not be the same as that provided by the [plaintiff’s chosen forum].’”  
Yavus v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gschwind v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 607 (10th Cir. 1998), which quoted Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 
254-55, 102 S.Ct. 252 (some internal quotation marks omitted)).  To fail the first stage of 
the Gulf Oil test, the remedy in the alternate forum must be “‘so clearly inadequate that it 
is no remedy at all.’”  Id.  In the event North Carolina is not a suitable alternate forum, the 
district court cannot dismiss the action.  Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 84, 
comment c.   
 
                                               
 
5 This list of considerations is not exhaustive.  For example, some courts have said an alternate forum is 
inadequate if its courts are so “fraught with corruption, delay and bias” they provide “no remedy at all.”  
Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 984.  This factor seems more applicable when the alternate forum is a foreign country.  
See id. (Peru offered as an alternate forum); Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 
2006) (Philippines offered as an alternate forum).   
12 
 
[¶38] If the district court determines North Carolina is an adequate alternate forum, it will 
move to the second step of the Gulf Oil analysis and balance the private interests and the 
public interests.  Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens “‘leaves much to the 
discretion of the court,’ the exercise of that discretion is not unlimited.”  Espinoza, 376 
P.3d at 985 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843).  The district court must 
recognize the plaintiff has the right to choose his forum; it cannot dismiss a case simply 
because another forum may be generally more convenient than the one chosen by the 
plaintiff.  Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518, 524 (Conn. 1990); Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 84.  “[U]nless the balance [of interests] is strongly in favor of 
the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”  Gulf Oil, 330 
U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  In other words, to support a dismissal for forum non 
conveniens, the combination of factors must significantly outweigh the policy of respecting 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  See id.   
 
[¶39] As we stated earlier, the private interests considered in the balancing include the 
relative ease or difficulty in obtaining sources of proof, both documentary and testimonial. 
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  Gulf Oil mentioned considerations such as the 
availability of process for compelling the attendance of witnesses, the cost of obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses, and the possibility a premises must be viewed by the court.  Id.  
Mrs. Saunders, as the party seeking dismissal, must identify specific evidence material to 
the case and “demonstrate that accessing it for purposes of litigating in the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum will be extraordinarily difficult.”  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 988 (citing Aveta, 
Inc. v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 609 (Del. Ch. 2008), and Pierce v. Albertson’s Inc., 121 N.M. 
369, 372, 911 P.2d 877, 880 (1996)).   
 
[¶40] Under the category of private interest factors, the district court should also consider 
“all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”   
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  This factor is fairly broad, including:  the 
practical burden of a new action in the alternate forum; rules particular to the alternate 
forum that make it more difficult to initiate and sustain an action; the need to join third 
parties and the relative ease or difficulty of doing so in each forum; and any potential 
difficulty in enforcing a judgment obtained in the alternate forum.  Espinosa, 376 P.3d at 
990; Picketts, 576 A.2d at 526-27 (more restrictive procedural rules in alternate forum); 
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 259, 102 S.Ct. at 258 (joinder of third-party defendants); Gulf 
Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843 (enforceability of judgment).  
 
[¶41] The procedural and judgment enforcement issues relate to the first-step of the forum 
non conveniens analysis.  If the problems are serious enough, the plaintiff may be without 
a remedy in the alternate forum, which would mandate denial of the motion to dismiss.  
However, if such problems exist but do not reach the level of depriving the plaintiff of a 
remedy, they may still be considered in balancing the private interest factors in the second 
step of the Gulf Oil test.  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 990; Restatement (Second) Conflict of 
Laws § 84, comment c.  Here, the parties agree North Carolina law imposes different 
13 
 
requirements to obtain a divorce and for distribution of marital property than Wyoming 
law.  If the district court does not conclude that North Carolina’s requirements effectively 
provide Mr. Saunders with “no remedy,” it still will need to consider the additional 
procedural hurdles required by North Carolina law in balancing the private interest factors.  
The district court will also need to consider issues raised by the parties regarding each 
court’s authority to render a judgment distributing assets located in the other forum and the 
enforceability of any such judgment.   
 
[¶42] Gulf Oil also mentions “the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 
‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not 
necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.”  Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 
843.  See also, West Texas, 807 P.2d at 935.  The district court should, on remand, consider 
whether Mrs. Saunders has established Mr. Saunders brought the action in Wyoming to 
vex, harass, or oppress her.   
 
[¶43] As part of the second step of the Gulf Oil balancing test, the district court will also 
need to consider relevant public interest factors.  To reiterate, the public interest factors 
include: 
 
the administrative difficulties and burden on the court in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum; the unfairness of imposing the 
expense of trial and the burden of jury duty on residents of a 
community with little or no connection to the controversy; the 
interest in “having localized controversies decided at home”; 
and choice of law issues, including whether the court will be 
required to apply its own law, or that of another jurisdiction.  
 
Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 975 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. at 843-44).  There 
is considerable overlap in these factors.  Consequently, “the central question which a court 
must answer when weighing the public interests . . . is whether the case has general nexus 
to the forum sufficient to justify the forum’s commitment of judicial time and resources to 
it.”  Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1980), overruled in part on 
other grounds in Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241, 102 S.Ct. at 252.  Stated another way, the 
court must consider “the extent to which either forum has an interest in, and connection to, 
the underlying controversy.”  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 991 (citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509, 
67 S.Ct. at 843).   
 
[¶44] The district court’s balancing of the public interests should also include analysis of 
any administrative difficulties in litigating the case.  These could include the time and 
expense to determine matters that are not of particular interest to Wyoming and/or the 
congestion (or lack thereof) in the court’s calendar.  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 990; 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 84.  However, the doctrine of forum non 
14 
 
conveniens may not be used as a mechanism to control the court docket.6  Id.  The court 
must also consider whether there are choice-of-law issues that pose difficulties in 
resolution of the case.  Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509, 67 S.Ct. at 843.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[¶45] Mr. Saunders filed his divorce complaint in the Fremont County district court in 
accordance with the applicable venue statute, § 20-2-104.  To the extent the district court 
dismissed on the basis of improper statutory venue, it erred.  The district court’s dismissal 
order also referenced principles associated with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  
Although the district court followed this Court’s West Texas decision, the analysis was 
inadequate.  We, therefore, adopt the two-stage test for forum non conveniens from Gulf 
Oil and direct the district court to apply that test on remand.  In applying the test, the district 
court must recognize, “it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit” and “his choice of 
a forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.”  Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws, comment c.   
 
[¶46] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
                                               
 
6 The public interest factors also include the unfairness of asking a jury to determine matters not particularly 
relevant to the local community.  Espinoza, 376 P.3d at 990-91.  Wyoming will not bear the burden of a 
jury trial because the district court, not a jury, will grant the divorce and make an equitable distribution of 
the parties’ property.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114.