Title: LARA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LARA v. STATE2001 WY 5325 P.3d 507Case Number: 00-232Decided: 06/13/2001

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

DONNIE 
RAY LARA, SR.,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Terrence O'Brien, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, WY

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant, Donnie 
Ray Lara Sr. (Lara), seeks review of the judgment and sentence of the district 
court which found him guilty of one count of delivery of methamphetamine and one 
count of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.  The district court sentenced Lara to two 
concurrent sentences of four to ten years for those crimes.  Although Lara originally entered a plea 
of not guilty, he later decided to change his plea to guilty conditioned upon 
leave to appeal the district court's determination that his confessions to those 
crimes were not coerced.

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3]      The sole issue 
raised in this appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Lara's 
motion to suppress his confessions.  
Lara contends that his confessions were not voluntary but, on the 
contrary, were coerced because the police officers that questioned him indicated 
that if he cooperated with them, then custody of his four children would be 
returned to him.  The police denied 
that any such coercive tactic was used.  
Lara's children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of 
Family Services (DFS) in the late night hours of Thursday-Friday, November 
11-12, 1999.  Lara's woman friend 
and the mother of his children, Michele Henderson (Henderson), was arrested 
during that time on charges relating to possession of methamphetamine, and there 
was no other responsible adult in the household to care for the children.  As we shall set out in more detail 
below, the police officers involved testified that they did no more than inform 
Lara that his children were in the custody of DFS so that he would know where 
they were and attempted to inform him of the procedure to follow to locate them 
and inquire about the custody arrangements.

FACTS

[¶4]      At about 8:00 
p.m., on November 11, 1999, the Gillette Police Department was called upon to 
investigate a report of child abuse that is unrelated to this case.  However, in the course of conducting 
that investigation, the police seized methamphetamine from a female suspect, and 
that suspect reported that Henderson had delivered the methamphetamine to the 
suspect at Henderson's home.  The 
police officers then obtained a warrant to search the house that Henderson and 
Lara shared.  Methamphetamine was 
found in the residence, although neither Henderson nor Lara were present when 
the search warrant was executed.  
Henderson later confessed to her role in possessing, delivering, and 
conspiring to deliver methamphetamine, and she was arrested.  The only adult present at the 
Henderson-Lara residence was Steve Newport.  He was in possession of a syringe, which 
contained methamphetamine, and he appeared to be high on methamphetamine.  For these reasons, DFS was contacted for 
the purpose of providing shelter care for the children1.  Over the next 12 hours the police 
interviewed Lara on three occasions, and on each of those occasions Lara 
provided police with information that incriminated him in the activities for 
which he was ultimately convicted.

[¶5]      The first such 
contact went as follows:  Because 
Lara was not at home, the police began looking for him, and they actually ended 
up finding him driving to his residence.  
The police pulled him over just a half-block from his home.  At about 1:00 a.m., on Friday, November 
12, 1999, Forest "Frosty" Williams (Williams), a special agent for the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and Kevin McGrath, a Gillette police 
officer working with DCI, stopped Lara and asked him if he was willing to talk 
about what had happened that night.  
The officers intended to talk with Lara about his and Henderson's 
involvement in selling methamphetamine.  
They also wanted to inform Lara what had occurred at his home (that 
Henderson had been arrested and his children placed in shelter care).  During that talk, as well as the 
succeeding interviews, Lara admitted to delivering methamphetamine to Ronald 
Wheelhouse and conspiring with Jason Cioffi to deliver methamphetamine.  Both Williams and McGrath knew Lara from 
contacts they had with him in the past.  
Lara referred to the two police officers in the familiar names "Frosty" 
and "Kevin."  With respect to this 
incident, Lara said that McGrath told him he could get his children back on the 
following Monday if he would cooperate with the police.  Lara was not arrested during this 
encounter.  The interview with Lara 
was not tape-recorded by the police.

[¶6]      The second 
contact occurred only a few minutes later inside Lara's home.  Williams left the scene of the first 
meeting with Lara and proceeded to follow-up on another aspect of the 
investigation into these crimes.  
McGrath rode with Lara (in Lara's pickup) the half-block to his home and 
followed him inside.  Once inside, 
McGrath initiated a second interview with Lara.  McGrath again told Lara about the 
children being placed in shelter care and that if he cooperated and was 
truthful, they would talk to the prosecutor on his behalf.  McGrath made clear that no threats or 
promises were made concerning the children.  Lara testified that McGrath told him he 
could get his children back on the following Monday if he cooperated with the 
police.  Lara claimed he thought he 
was under arrest and that the police were going to take his children away from 
him.  Lara also said that he 
understood McGrath to say that if he cooperated, then his children would be 
returned to him later that same day.  
Lara said he would not have cooperated if the police had not brought up 
the subject of his children.  Lara 
was not arrested that night.  These 
discussions likewise were not tape-recorded.

[¶7]      The third contact 
occurred at about 1:00 p.m., on November 12, 1999, at the Campbell County 
Courthouse.  Williams and McGrath 
ran into Lara in a courthouse hallway.  
Lara was there to attend Henderson's arraignment.  They asked to talk with Lara and he 
again agreed to talk.  At that 
interview, Lara again asked about his children:

[Williams]:  I re-explained to Mr. Lara again why we 
had taken his children.  Again, I 
explained to him what the conditions were at the time we were at the 
residence.  I explained to him that 
shortly after entering the residence I had made the call to DFS to take his 
children, and it was several hours later that Mr. Lara had shown up at the 
residence.

I 
explained to him that he would need to talk to Jim Schermetzler of the county 
attorney's office in order to find out the exact process and when the court 
hearing was going to be so he could get his children back.

. . . 
.

Towards 
the end of the interview I walked out of the room and I explained to Donnie 
Lara, the defendant, that I was going to go try to find Mr. Schermetzler so 
Schermetzler could answer the questions directly.  However, Schermetzler was not in the 
office.

[¶8]      Williams also 
testified that he did not threaten Lara, nor did he tell Lara that he could only 
regain custody of his children if he confessed to the crimes and cooperated with 
the police.  This interview was not 
tape-recorded either.  Lara 
testified that he was threatened at this interview with the loss of his children 
and that he was unable to find out from the police where his children were or 
how to regain custody.  Lara was not 
arrested on November 12, 1999.  In 
his testimony at the suppression hearing, Lara went on to say that he went to 
bed at home in the early morning hours on November 12, 1999, and woke up about 
10:00 a.m. that same morning.  He 
listened to the radio and then later attended Henderson's arraignment.  Lara said that on November 12, 1999, he 
talked with his niece about how to get his children back.  He also claimed he contacted two lawyers 
on November 12, 1999, about regaining custody of the children.  Lara was arrested on Monday, November 
15, 1999.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]      A trial court's 
ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress a statement on the grounds that it 
was made involuntarily is reviewed de novo.  In conducting such a review, we defer to 
the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  This Court considers all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess 
the credibility of witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is obtained by coercion 
is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made 
it.  A defendant is deprived of the 
right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is admitted at his 
trial.  A statement is considered to 
be voluntary if the defendant of his own free and deliberate choice, and not 
because of intimidation, coercion or deception, makes it.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is 
voluntary.  Edwards v. State, 
973 P.2d 41, 48 (Wyo. 
1999).

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   We must examine the totality of the 
circumstances that existed when the statements were procured in order to 
determine the voluntary nature of those statements.  Edwards, 973 P.2d  at 48-49.  We note at the outset that the district 
court did not find Lara's testimony credible.  The district court characterized Lara's 
declarations in this way:  "It seems 
that Mr. Lara's memory is convenient, and it also appears most likely that it's 
the product of cultivated retrospection and enlightened self-interest."  In addition, the district court opined 
that even if all Lara had to say with respect to the alleged coercion was true, 
". . . the fact that Mr. Lara may have thought that somehow his 
cooperation was linked to getting his kids back, that doesn't satisfy the test 
of coercion, and I don't find from the evidence that the children were used as a 
threat to get Mr. Lara to testify."  
As noted above, we defer to such findings made by the trial 
court.

[¶11]   The first statement was obtained 
while Lara was in his vehicle near his home.  He was not under arrest, he was familiar 
with the officers who talked with him, and the officers testified that the stop 
was made for the purpose of informing Lara as to what was going on in his home 
and that his children were in the custody of DFS.  This interview lasted only a few 
minutes.  The second interview took 
place in Lara's kitchen and he was not under arrest.  That interview lasted about 30 
minutes.  The third interview 
occurred when the police coincidentally ran into Lara in the courthouse.  Although that interview took place in 
the prosecutor's conference room, Lara was not under arrest.  That interview also lasted about 30 
minutes.  Lara's only allegation of 
coercion arises from his subjective perception that if he cooperated/confessed, 
then his children would be returned to him.  The district court resolved that 
evidentiary dispute in favor of the State.  
There is no indication that Lara's mental state was impaired, other than 
the natural anxiety a defendant might feel when methamphetamine is found in his 
home and he has been involved in the distribution of that drug, i.e., 
that the jig was up.  Lara was read 
his Miranda rights, and he was given the opportunity to speak with a 
lawyer if he chose.  Indeed, on 
November 12, 1999, Lara enlisted the assistance of his niece, as well as 
consulting with two lawyers, in his efforts to determine the whereabouts of his 
children.  Lara alleges no other 
coercive conduct on the part of the police nor does he allege that his will was 
overborne because of his physical condition, educational background, or 
employment status.  It was clear 
that Lara was familiar with law enforcement in general and, specifically, with 
the police officers involved in questioning him.  Where police informed a defendant that 
the custody of an infant (who the defendant was accused of physically abusing) 
would be affected by the defendant's cooperation with police, a reviewing court 
held that the defendant failed to show that this was deceptive or so 
fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process and that the conduct of the 
police did not render the confession involuntary.  People v. Cannady, 663 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1997)2.  Applying the standard of review set out 
above, we conclude there was no error in the trial court's determination that 
Lara's statements/confessions were voluntary.

[¶12]   Lara contends that the credibility 
of the police officers should be reviewed more closely here because none of the 
interviews was tape-recorded.  The 
district court noted that the problems that came up in the suppression hearing, 
as well as in this appeal, could be avoided if tape recorders were used in 
interviews.  The district court also 
noted that the county attorney's office repeatedly had been reminded that it 
would be a good idea to tape interviews:

Instead, 
they want to do it some other way and they expose themselves in every case to 
the  to the allegations that  that something was left out or misinterpreted or 
incorrectly emphasized, and they have to end up explaining to me and to the jury 
why they don't do it.  Their 
explanations don't make sense to me, but I don't --  it's not my prerogative to tell them 
they have to do that.

[¶13]   In this instance, it is probably 
quite reasonable that the initial roadside interview near Lara's home was not 
taped.  However, we agree with the 
district court that tape-recorded interviews do leave far fewer loose ends to be 
tied up and in many, if not most, instances would be a well-advised protocol to 
follow.  Lara cites no authority for 
the proposition that this renders the trial court's findings any the less 
convincing given the totality of the circumstances in this case.  In our independent research we have 
found no such case law either3.  However, the trial court's advice is 
sound, and we include it for the instructive purpose it may 
serve.

[¶14]   The judgment on the guilty pleas 
and the sentence of the district court are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1The governing 
statutes required shelter care for the children under the circumstances 
presented by this case (and Lara does not challenge those underlying factual 
circumstances).  In addition, the 
police were required by those statutes to inform the children's parents as soon 
as possible that the children were in shelter care.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-405 and 406 
(LEXIS 1999).

  
2For instructive 
purposes, we note that the voluntariness of a confession may be undermined if 
coercion in the form of suggesting relatives will benefit from a confession is 
used.  Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, 
Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's 
relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495, see 
esp. § 11 ("Removal of child or children from parental custody") 
(1987).  Lara cites cases from this 
annotation, but all are readily distinguishable from the circumstances present 
in the instant case.

  
3However, see 
Baynor v. State, 355 Md. 726, 736 A.2d 325, 331-32 (Md. 1999), collecting 
cases to the effect that a majority of state courts have rejected a requirement 
that custodial interrogations be recorded for a confession to be considered 
voluntary.