Title: CLINT PATRICK SCHULER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLINT PATRICK SCHULER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 47181 P.3d 929Case Number: S-07-0207Decided: 04/22/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CLINT 
PATRICK SCHULER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang and E. Kurt Britzius of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Britzius.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Clint Patrick Schuler was charged with 
five counts of credit card fraud.  A 
jury convicted him on one count and acquitted him on the other four counts.  Mr. Schuler claims the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction.  He also claims the district court 
improperly ordered him to pay restitution for one of the counts on which the 
jury acquitted him.  

 
 
[¶2]  We perceive the real issue in this case 
to be improper duplicitous charging.  
We are compelled to affirm the conviction, however, because Mr. Schuler 
waived the duplicity defects by failing to object as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
12(b)(5).  We reverse the district 
court's restitution order.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  Mr. Schuler presents the following 
issues:

 
 
1.         
Can a court award restitution when the transaction the restitution is 
based on occurred on a date not within the time span encompassed by the count on 
which the Appellant was convicted[?]

 
 
            
2.         
Is there sufficient evidence to find a criminal defendant guilty of 
credit card fraud under a multi-transactional count when one of the transactions 
is improperly placed under that count and none of the remaining counts are 
sufficient in themselves to satisfy the essential elements of credit card 
fraud[?]

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  In September of 2005, the State charged 
Mr. Schuler with five counts of unlawful use of a credit card in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-802(a) and (b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  The charges arose from Mr. Schuler's 
alleged use of credit cards belonging to Serge d'Elia, an individual with whom 
Mr. Schuler had business dealings involving home construction and a restaurant 
remodel in Casper, 
Wyoming.  Typically, Mr. d'Elia provided the 
financing and Mr. Schuler facilitated the construction work.  At times during the relationship, Mr. 
d'Elia gave Mr. Schuler permission to use his credit cards for purchases 
associated with the construction projects.  
The State filed the criminal charges when Mr. d'Elia alleged that Mr. 
Schuler had continued to use his credit cards without his authority after their 
business relationship ended.     

 
 
[¶5]  As described in the third amended 
information, each of the five counts related to transactions that allegedly 
occurred between specified dates in 2005.  
Count One alleged that on February 1, 2005, through February 28, 2005, 
Mr. Schuler unlawfully and with the intent to obtain property or personal 
services by fraud used a credit card or credit card number issued to another 
person without that person's consent.  
Count Two alleged the same unlawful acts beginning on March 1 and ending 
on March 31, 2005.  Count Five 
alleged acts constituting credit card fraud from May 1 through May 31, 
2005.

 
 
[¶6]  Unlike the other months in which the 
State alleged that Mr. Schuler committed credit card fraud, the month of April 
2005, was separated into two counts.  
Count Three alleged that Mr. Schuler committed credit card fraud from 
April 1 through April 12, 2005.  
Count Four alleged that he committed the offense from April 13 through 
April 30, 2005.  

 
 
[¶7]  A jury trial convened on the charges in 
February of 2006, but ended in a mistrial.  
A second jury trial was convened in June 2006.  At the second trial, the State presented 
evidence intended to show that Mr. Schuler committed multiple acts of credit 
card fraud within each count alleged in the information.  To support Count One, the State 
attempted to show that Mr. Schuler used nine different credit cards to make nine 
separate payments to Schuler Custom Homes on February 25, 2005.  In support of Count Two, the State 
attempted to show that Mr. Schuler used two different credit cards to make two 
separate payments to Thunder Publishing on March 18, 2005; two additional credit 
cards to make two more payments to Thunder Publishing on March 28, 2005; another 
credit card to make a fifth payment to Thunder Publishing on March 30, 2005; and 
still another credit card to make a payment to Diamond Vogel on March 31, 
2005.  

 
 
[¶8]  The State's evidence supporting Count 
Three involved six charges on four different credit cards on April 1, 2005, for 
payment to five different payees and two more charges on two different credit 
cards on April 11, 2005, for payments to Thunder Publishing.  To support Count Four, the State 
attempted to show that Mr. Schuler used a credit card to make a payment to 
Thunder Publishing on April 13, 2005, and another credit card to make a payment 
to iFloor on April 14, 2005.  The 
State's evidence to support Count Five involved thirteen charges to the same 
credit card for payment to two different payees on six different dates in May of 
2005.         

 
 
[¶9]  At the close of the evidence and after 
deliberating, the jury acquitted Mr. Schuler on Counts One, Two, Four and Five 
and convicted him on Count Three.  
The district court sentenced Mr. Schuler to serve two to four years in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary, but suspended the prison sentence upon the 
condition that Mr. Schuler complete three years probation.  The court also ordered Mr. Schuler to 
pay restitution of $13,266.67, the amount Mr. d'Elia's credit card was charged 
for the iFloor payment on April 14, 2005.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.      
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Schuler claims that the State 
presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count Three, in 
which he was alleged to have used Mr. d'Elia's credit cards from April 1 to 
April 12, 2005.  He points to 
State's Exhibit 1, which showed nine charges from April 1 to April 12, 2005, the 
dates alleged in Count Three for which he was convicted, and two charges from 
April 13 to April 30, 2005, the dates alleged in Count Four for which he was 
acquitted.  He claims, first, that 
the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to find that he used Mr. D'Elia's 
credit cards to charge payments from April 1 to 12, 2005, and, second, that the 
evidence showing that he used Mr. d'Elia's credit card to charge a payment on 
April 14, 2005, cannot support his conviction on Count Three because the credit 
card charge was made within the dates the State alleged for Count Four on which 
he was acquitted. 

 
 
[¶11]  In 
considering whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Schuler, we do 
not consider the evidence presented in his favor; we accept as true the State's 
evidence, with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it.  Ferguson v. State, 2007 WY 157, ¶ 9, 168 P.3d 476, 479 (Wyo. 2007).  Viewing the 
evidence in this light, we determine whether it was sufficient for the jury to 
find Mr. Schuler guilty on Count Three beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. We do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury, but rather, determine whether a quorum of reasonable and 
rational jurors could have found Mr. Schuler guilty.  Id.  

 
 
[¶12]  In support of Count Three, the State 
presented Exhibit 1, which showed that Mr. Schuler used credit cards belonging 
to Mr. d'Elia to place six charges on April 1, 2005 and two charges on April 11, 
2005.  The State also presented 
testimony from three witnesses to corroborate four of the credit card charges 
reflected on State's Exhibit 1, one involving a payment of $3,453.52 on April 1, 
2005, to American Disposal, another involving a payment of $9,957.17 on April 1, 
2005, to Statewide Electric and two involving payments totaling $15,000.00 to 
JTL Group on April 11, 2005.  The 
State also presented evidence that a transaction involving iFloor may have 
occurred within the dates alleged in Count Three. Although Exhibit 1 showed the 
transaction as taking place on April 14, 2005, iFloor's customer service 
director testified that an order was placed for flooring with Mr. d'Elia's 
credit card and iFloor began processing the transaction on April 11, 2005.  The State presented evidence to show 
that the iFloor payment was for $13,266.67.  

 
 
[¶13]  From this evidence, a quorum of 
reasonable and rational jurors could have found Mr. Schuler guilty of Count 
Three.  That is, the jurors could 
have concluded that on April 1, 11 and/or 12, 2005, Mr. Schuler fraudulently 
used Mr. d'Elia's credit cards without his consent to purchase construction 
materials and services with a value greater than $1,000.  We hold that sufficient evidence 
supported the jury's verdict.  
However, sufficiency of the evidence is not really the issue in this 
case.     

 
 
[¶14]  After reviewing the parties' briefs and 
the portions of the record designated for filing in this Court, we conclude that 
the real issue concerned the State's violation of the rule against charging 
duplicity.  The rule has been 
described as follows:    

 
 
Duplicity 
is the charging of separate offenses in a single count. This practice is 
unacceptable because it prevents the jury from deciding guilt or innocence on 
each offense separately and may make it difficult to determine whether the 
conviction rested on only one of the offenses or both.  Duplicity can result in prejudice to the 
defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on 
less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in determining the 
sentence, and in limiting review on appeal.  Also, where the jury is not able to 
reach a verdict or renders a guilty verdict that is later overturned, the 
defendant may be subjected to a second trial that exposes him to double jeopardy 
insofar as it includes an offense on which the original jury would have 
acquitted if required to render separate verdicts. 

 
 
5 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 19.3(c), 285 (3d 
ed. 2007).  The violation of the 
rule that occurred in this case is not grounds for reversal because, as will be 
discussed later in our decision, Mr. Schuler waived the issue by failing to 
raise it prior to trial.  However, 
we take this opportunity to reiterate the principles relating to the rule 
against charging duplicity.     

 
 
[¶15]  This Court applied the rule against 
duplicitous charging in McInturff v. 
State, 808 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1991).  There, the State charged Mr. McInturff 
with one count of receiving or concealing stolen property in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. 6-3-403(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1987) based on conduct occurring over a 
number of days and involving property stolen from three different vehicles.  We reversed the conviction on the ground 
that it impermissibly combined several separate and independent offenses into 
one count.  We 
said:

 
 
The key 
to analyzing this issue is identification of independent and complete 
transactions which violate 6-3-403(a)(i).  
Each distinct transaction should be separately charged and may not be 
combined with other independent offenses in the state's proof.  The record before us reveals that 
McInturff was involved in several distinct transactions.  There were at least two separate 
receipts, several concealments, and multiple disposals of stolen 
property.

 
 
It may 
be acceptable to charge a defendant with a single count which employs the 
language of the statute and does not include any underlying facts, as was done 
in the amended information.  
However, this method then limits the state to proving only a single 
complete act in violation of the statute for each generally stated count, even 
though, as here, there may have been multiple offenses in separate acts of 
receipt, concealment and disposal. The state may elect which alternate 
definition [or act] it intends to prove after filing the information so long as 
its focus can be discerned from "the bill of particulars, opening statement, 
proofs and instructions to the jury."  
In this case it is not possible to identify the state's focus, as the 
bill of particulars and the evidence went to all three 
definitions.

 
 

Id. at 194. 

 
 
[¶16]  In the present case, the jury found Mr. 
Schuler guilty of the crime of credit card fraud as charged in Count Three of 
the information.  The district court 
instructed the jury on Count Three as follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Credit Card Fraud, as charged in Count Three 
of this case, are:

 
 

1.                  
On or 
about the 1st day of April, 2005, through on or about the 12th day of April, 2005

 
 
         
2.         
In Natrona County, 
Wyoming

 
 
     3.         
The Defendant, Clint Patrick Schuler

 
 
4.         
With intent to obtain property or services by fraud

 
 
5.         
[Used] a credit card or the number or description of a credit 
card

 
 

6.                  
 Issued to another 
person

 
 

7.                  
Without 
the consent of that person; and

 
 

8.                  
The 
value of the property obtained was $1,000 or more.

 
 
If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.

 
 
[¶17]  In support of Count Three, the State 
presented Exhibit 1, which reflected:  
1) six separate charges on four different credit cards on April 1, 2005, 
for payment to five different payees; and 2) two charges on two other credit 
cards on April 11, 2005, for payments to another payee.  The State also presented testimony from 
three witnesses to corroborate four of the credit card charges reflected on 
State Exhibit 1, one involving a payment on April 1, 2005, to American Disposal, 
another involving a payment on April 1, 2005, to Statewide Electric and two 
involving payments to JTL Group on April 1, 2005. 

 
 
[¶18]  From this evidence, it is not clear what 
conduct formed the basis for the conviction on Count Three.  The jurors may have unanimously agreed 
that Mr. Schuler committed four acts of credit card fraud on April 1, 2005, by 
using Mr. d'Elia's credit cards to charge payments to JTL Group, American 
Disposal and Statewide Electric.  It 
is equally possible that some of the jurors concluded Mr. Schuler illegally used 
credit cards to pay JTL Group while others concluded he used them to pay 
American Disposal or Statewide Electric.  
Still another possibility is that the jurors agreed that Mr. Schuler used 
Mr. d'Elia's credit cards for all of these transactions but they did not agree 
that he did so without consent.  

 
 
[¶19]  To further complicate the issue, the 
State presented the evidence involving the iFloor transaction.  State's Exhibit 1 showed the "date of 
charge" for the iFloor payment as April 14, 2005, one of the dates encompassed 
in Count Four.  Consistent with the 
exhibit, iFloor's customer service director testified that iFloor actually 
charged the credit card on April 14, 2005.  
However, the witness also testified that the order was placed and iFloor 
began processing the transaction on April 11, 2005.  That the jurors were confused is 
reflected in a question they sent to the court during deliberations, asking 
"When is the State charging that the iFloor transaction took place, date?"  Their confusion was not resolved when 
the district court answered the question, "the State is charging that [it] took 
place during the month of April, 2005."  

 
 
[¶20] 
This confusion clearly illustrates the reason that duplicitous charging is 
prohibited.  From the manner in 
which the State charged and presented evidence, it is not clear whether the 
iFloor transaction was the basis for the conviction on Count Three. However, the 
issue of duplicitous charging was never raised and, for that reason, we are 
compelled to affirm the conviction.

 
 
[¶21]  W.R.Cr.P. 12 provides in pertinent part 
as follows:

 
 
Rule 
12.  Pleadings and motions before 
trial; defenses and objections.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(b) Pretrial motions.  Any defense, 
objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised before trial by motion.  Motions may be written or oral at the 
discretion of the judge.  The following must be raised prior to 
trial:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(2)  Defenses and objections based on defects in 
the indictment or information (other than that it fails to show jurisdiction 
in the court or to charge an offense which objections shall be noticed by the 
court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings);   

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶22]  One reason for the rule is that a valid 
duplicity objection raised before trial will force the State to select the 
offense upon which it will proceed.  
LaFave, supra, 286.  Where the objection is first raised 
after verdict, however, the general view is that the duplicity defect is 
waived.  LaFave, supra,  287.  In United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 
889 (10th Cir. 2001), for example, the court concluded the defendant had waived 
any error stemming from the duplicitous indictment by failing to object prior to 
trial.1  Pursuant to Rule 12, any objection to 
the information was waived when it was not raised prior to 
trial.

 
 
2.         
Restitution 
Order

 
 
[¶23]  Mr. Schuler also claims the district 
court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered him to pay restitution in the 
amount of $13,266.67 for the iFloor transaction, which the State alleged took 
place on April 14, 2005, a date encompassed in Count Four on which he was 
acquitted.  Whether a sentence is 
illegal is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.  Sarr v. State, 2007 WY 140, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 891, 894 (Wyo. 2007).  An 
illegal sentence is one which exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms 
of imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the 
law. McDaniel v. State, 2007 WY 125, 
¶ 7, 163 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2007). Whether a sentence is illegal is determined 
by referencing the applicable statute or constitutional provisions, and is 
subject to statutory interpretation.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶24] 
  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 
(LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
In 
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, upon 
conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution 
to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless the court 
specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no 
reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2007) provides in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) As 
part of the sentencing process . . . in any misdemeanor or felony case, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for restitution 
submitted by any victim.

(b)               
 In every case in which a claim for 
restitution is submitted, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution 
owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's 
criminal activity . . . .

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) defines "criminal activity" as: 

 
 
[A]ny 
crime for which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty 
upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime 
which is admitted by the defendant, whether or not 
prosecuted.

 
 
[¶25]  In Mr. Schuler's case, it appears from 
the sentencing hearing transcript that Mr. d'Elia submitted several restitution 
claims.  At sentencing, however, the 
State asked for restitution only for the iFloor transaction.  Defense counsel argued then, as they do 
on appeal, that restitution for that transaction was not appropriate because Mr. 
Schuler was acquitted on Count Four, which encompassed the date that the State 
alleged the iFloor transaction took place.  
The State argued the evidence showed the iFloor order was placed and the 
credit card processed on April 11, 2005; therefore, the iFloor transaction 
occurred within the dates encompassed in Count Three on which Mr. Schuler was 
convicted.  

 
 
[¶26]  On appeal, Mr. Schuler cites Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646 (Wyo. 
2000) in support of his argument. The State asserts Layton v. State, 2007 WY 1, 150 P.3d 173 
(Wyo. 2007) is more analogous to what occurred here.  In Van Riper, the district court ordered 
the defendant to pay restitution for personal property allegedly taken from a 
vehicle.  This Court held the 
district court was without authority to order restitution for the personal 
property because the defendant denied the charges and the count charging the 
defendant with taking the items had been dismissed.  There being no guilty plea, verdict of 
guilt or admission of guilt, there was no criminal activity for which 
restitution could be ordered.

 
 
[¶27]  In Layton, the 
defendant admitted to stealing a vehicle and a jury convicted him of felony 
larceny for the theft.  The district 
court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the value of the vehicle and 
the personal items inside.  We 
upheld the order, concluding that the value of the personal items located in the 
vehicle was part of the damages resulting from the defendant's criminal 
activity.

 
 
[¶28]  We conclude that neither Van Riper nor Layton is 
controlling because neither case involved duplicitous charging, making it 
impossible to know whether the restitution ordered was for damages resulting 
from a crime for which there was a guilty verdict.  To reiterate that said in our discussion 
of duplicitous charging, there simply is no way of knowing whether the jury 
found Mr. Schuler guilty on Count Three based upon evidence that the iFloor 
transaction occurred on April 11 or acquitted him on Count Four because the 
State failed to prove the April 14 iFloor transaction constituted credit card 
fraud.  If the jury acquitted him of 
credit card fraud for the iFloor transaction, there is no criminal activity for 
which restitution in the amount of the iFloor transaction could be 
ordered.

 
 
[¶29]  One further issue merits 
discussion.  The State asserts that 
the restitution order was proper because Mr. Schuler admitted in the 
pre-sentence investigation report that he abused his authority to use Mr. 
d'Elia's credit card when he placed the order with iFloor.  The State cites § 7-9-101(a)(i) which 
includes "any crime which is admitted by the defendant" within the definition of 
criminal activity for which restitution may be ordered.  The pre-sentence investigation report is 
not part of the record.  We have 
searched the sentencing hearing transcript and find no reference to Mr. 
Schuler's alleged admission concerning iFloor.  It has long been the rule that this 
Court will not consider matters not contained in the appellate record and 
statements in briefs are not evidence which a reviewing court can consider.  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1180 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶30]  We affirm the conviction and reverse the 
restitution order.  The case is 
remanded for entry of a new judgment and sentence omitting the order requiring 
Mr. Schuler to pay restitution in the amount of $13,266.67 for the iFloor 
charge.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The court 
noted that in some circumstances a defendant can raise a late challenge to a 
duplicitous indictment if cause is shown that might justify the granting of 
relief from the waiver.  United 
States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 889 
(10th 
Cir. 2001).  The Court concluded, 
however, that no such cause was shown in Haber.  Given that Mr. Schuler never raised the 
issue of duplicitous charging, it goes without saying that he has not shown 
cause for relief from the waiver.