Title: State v. Urbin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Urbin, 100 Ohio St.3d 1207, 2003-Ohio-5549.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. URBIN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Urbin, 100 Ohio St.3d 1207, 2003-Ohio-5549.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
(No. 2002-1442 — Submitted September 17, 2003 — Decided November 5, 
2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 01CA007846, 148 
Ohio App.3d 293, 2002-Ohio-3410, 772 N.E.2d 1239. 
__________________ 
{¶1} 
The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
allowed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs separately. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent and would reverse. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring. 
{¶2} 
Appellant, Vince Urbin, was convicted of violating R.C. 
2921.42(A)(1), which prohibits a public official from having an unlawful interest 
in a public contract.  The court of appeals affirmed his conviction.  State v. Urbin, 
148 Ohio App.3d 293, 2002-Ohio-3410, 772 N.E.2d 1239. 
{¶3} 
I concur in the majority’s decision to dismiss appellant’s appeal as 
improvidently allowed.  Full merit briefing and oral argument have revealed that 
the appellant waived the primary legal proposition he now presents.  Moreover, 
resolution of the case is dependent upon factual determinations and the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  The case does not warrant the exercise of our 
discretionary jurisdiction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶4} 
I nevertheless write separately to state my view that the trial court 
did not err in incorporating elements of an Ohio Ethics Commission advisory 
opinion into its instructions provided to the jury to aid it in determining whether 
the appellant had violated R.C. 2921.42. 
{¶5} 
Urbin raises two propositions of law, one of which1 is grounded in 
his belief that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, a case-specific 
issue of no general interest.  See Section 2(B)(2)(e), Article IV, Ohio Constitution 
(Supreme Court may review cases of “public or great general interest”). 
{¶6} 
In arguing his remaining proposition of law,2 Urbin asserts that the 
state failed to prove that he had violated R.C. 2921.42.  As relevant herein, R.C. 
2921.42(A) provides: 
{¶7} 
“No public official shall knowingly * * *: 
{¶8} 
“(1) Authorize, or employ the authority or influence of his office to 
secure authorization of any public contract in which he, a member of his family, 
or any of his business associates has an interest.” (Emphasis added.)  
{¶9} 
The state contends that Urbin violated this statute while mayor of 
the city of Avon Lake based on two catering contracts between the city and the 
Fountain Bleau Event Center.  Urbin’s brother was the owner or manager of the 
Center. 
{¶10} Urbin asserts that conviction under the statute is dependent upon 
proof that a public official, a member of his family, or any of his business 
associates received a tangible benefit from the contract.  Although the statute does 
not define the term “interest” as used in R.C. 2921.42(A)(1), the Ohio Ethics 
Commission has issued advisory opinions providing guidance as to its meaning.  
                                          
 
1. 
Urbin’s Proposition of Law No. II states that “[a]ssertions made by defendants’ counsel 
in opening statement do not ‘open the door’ to the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence by the 
prosecution.” 
2. 
Urbin’s Proposition of Law No. I asserts that “[T]o convict a defendant of having an 
unlawful interest in a contract under Ohio R.C. §2921.42, it must be proven that he, a member of 
his family, or any of his business associates received a tangible benefit from that contract.”  
January Term, 2003 
3 
Advisory Opinion No. 89-008, 1989 WL 251686, provides that an employee is 
considered to have an interest in his employer’s contracts if, e.g., the employee 
“takes part * * * in contract negotiations” or “participat[es] in the administration 
or execution of the contract.”  Advisory Opinion No. 92-002, 1992 WL 101244, 
noted the expansion of the definition since the earlier advisory opinion, and 
recognizes that an employee has an interest in a public contract where, inter alia, 
the employee is a director, trustee, or officer of her employer, the employee 
participates in contract negotiations or the application process or the employee 
has responsibility to participate in or oversee execution or administration of the 
contract.  Those well-reasoned opinions clearly contemplate that intangible 
benefits, and not just quantifiable financial benefits, are sufficient to demonstrate 
an improper interest within the purview of the statute. 
{¶11} The trial court used the Ethics Commission definitions of 
“interest” in its jury instructions.  Urbin did not, however, assign error relative to 
the instructions in the court of appeals.  That court  thus deemed the only issue 
before it as being “whether sufficient evidence existed to support a conviction of 
having an unlawful interest pursuant to R.C. 2921.42 as that ‘interest’ was defined 
in the jury instructions,” i.e., in accord with the Ohio Ethics Commission 
definitions.  In short, Urbin did not preserve his legal assertion that R.C. 2921.42 
requires proof of a “tangible benefit,” and he is barred under the doctrine of 
waiver from raising it before this court. 
{¶12} Moreover, Urbin states in his concluding statements in this 
proposition of law in his merit brief that “[t]here is not a shred of evidence that 
Mayor Urbin or his brother received any appreciable benefit, tangible or 
intangible, from the contract.  There is no rational interpretation of the evidence 
which would support the conviction, because there is no evidence to interpret.  
When viewed under the standard of sufficiency of evidence, weight of the 
evidence, or that the judge erred in denying [Urbin’s] Rule 29 motions, the result 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
is the same.  This Court  should do what the trial court should have done: declare 
the evidence on those two counts to be legally insufficient.”  It is clear that 
Urbin’s primary complaint is with the jury’s determinations of fact, not with an 
issue of law. 
{¶13} This is not the rare case in which an appellant’s contention that a 
factfinder erroneously weighed the evidence warrants the exercise of our 
jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, this case does provide an opportunity to review and 
validate the authority of the Ethics Commission.  It is statutorily empowered to 
render “advisory opinions,” including opinions “relating to a special set of 
circumstances involving ethics, conflict of interest, or financial disclosure under 
Chapter 102, section 2921.42, or section 2921.43 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 
102.08(A) and (B).  The statute further provides that persons who seek advisory 
opinions from the Ethics Commission shall be immune from criminal 
prosecutions, civil suits, or actions for removal from office based on facts and 
circumstances covered by the opinion, if the opinion states that there is no ethics 
violation. R.C. 102.08(B).  Ethics Commission advisory opinions have been 
incorporated into Ohio Jury Instructions.  4 Ohio Jury Instructions (2003), 599-
600, Section 521.42.  While they are not binding on the courts, these opinions are 
entitled to weight by the courts, and Ohio courts have found commission opinions 
useful in applying and interpreting the law.  See e.g., Marsh v. Lampert (1998), 
129 Ohio App.3d 685, 687, 718 N.E.2d 997; Walsh v. Bollas (1992), 82 Ohio 
App.3d 588, 591, 612 N.E.2d 1252.  See, also, State ex. rel Mallory v. Pub. Emp. 
Retirement Bd. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 235, 241, 694 N.E.2d 1356, fn. 1; id. at 252, 
694 N.E.2d 1356 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). 
{¶14} In my view, Advisory Op. No. 92-002 provides a reasonable 
interpretation of the term “interest” as used in R.C. 2921.42, and the trial court in 
the case at bar did not err in incorporating elements of that opinion into the jury 
instructions. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
__________________ 
 
Jeffrey H. Manning, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary R. 
Evard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
William T. Doyle; Russell S. Bensing and James M. Kersey, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, and Patricia E. Snyder, Deputy Solicitor, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Attorney General. 
__________________