Title: State ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC v. Circuit Court for Brown County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP291-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Circuit Court for Brown County, the Honorable 
Thomas J. Walsh, presiding, Society Insurance, 
Smet Construction Services Corporation and GB 
Builders, LLC, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 21, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 10, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: DALLET, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Eric M. 
McLeod, Paul D. Cranley, Katherine Smith Polich, Joseph S. 
Diedrich, and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison.   
 
For the respondents, Circuit Court for Brown County and the 
Honorable Thomas J. Walsh, there was a brief filed by Brian P. 
Keenan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2
For the respondent, Society Insurance, there was a brief 
filed by Jeffrey Leavell, Danielle N. Rousset, Brandon L. Parks, 
and Jeffrey Leavell, S.C., Racine.  
  
 
 
2019 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP291-W   
(L.C. No. 
2017CV1324) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. CityDeck Landing 
LLC, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Brown County, the Honorable 
Thomas J. Walsh, presiding, Society Insurance, 
Smet Construction Services Corporation and GB 
Builders, LLC, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 21, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for supervisory writ.  Granted; stay order 
vacated. 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   The circuit court ordered 
the arbitration of a private construction dispute stayed until 
it could decide an insurance coverage dispute between one of the 
contractors connected to the arbitration and the contractor's 
insurer.  CityDeck Landing LLC petitions this court, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.71 (2015-16),1 for a supervisory writ.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
2 
 
CityDeck 
asks 
this 
court 
to 
exercise 
its 
superintending 
constitutional authority to vacate the circuit court's2 order. 
CityDeck asserts the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by 
putting the private arbitration3 on hold, and that a supervisory 
writ is necessary to correct the circuit court's extra-
jurisdictional act.  We hold the circuit court lacked the 
authority to issue the order staying the arbitration, the 
requirements necessary to issue a supervisory writ have been 
satisfied, and the stay order must be vacated. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In December 2013, CityDeck hired Smet Construction 
Services Corporation as its general contractor to construct an 
apartment building called "CityDeck Residences" in Green Bay.  
Smet hired subcontractors, including GB Builders of Northeastern 
Wisconsin, LLC; Lunda Construction Company; Security-Luebke 
Roofing, Inc.; and Lakeland Construction, Inc.  The construction 
contract required any disputes to be resolved by arbitration.  A 
dispute arose and in May 2016, CityDeck filed for arbitration 
against Smet, alleging breach of the construction contract and 
theft by contractor.  It filed an amended demand for arbitration 
in November 2016.  In July 2017, Smet sought to bring the 
subcontractors into the arbitration because it contended the 
                                                 
2 Brown County Circuit Court, Thomas J. Walsh, Judge. 
3 The parties independently initiated the arbitration in 
this case pursuant to a private contract, without involvement by 
the court system. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
3 
 
subcontractors were responsible for the problems and each of the 
subcontracts contained an indemnity provision requiring the 
subcontractor to "defend, indemnify and hold [Smet] harmless."  
Most of the subcontractors voluntarily joined the arbitration.  
GB Builders notified its insurer, Society Insurance, of the 
claim, and Society hired an attorney to represent GB Builders 
under a reservation of rights.  In August 2017, Smet tendered 
the defense of the CityDeck claim to Society, asserting it was 
an additional insured under the insurance policy Society issued 
to GB Builders.  In October 2017, GB Builders filed an answer to 
Smet's demand for arbitration, asking the arbitrator for 
dismissal.  The arbitrator scheduled the arbitration hearing for 
March 1, 2018. 
¶3 
In October 2017, however, Society Insurance filed a 
declaratory judgment complaint in Brown County Circuit Court 
against CityDeck, Smet, and GB Builders.  Society sought a 
declaration "on the scope of its insurance duties" to Smet and 
GB Builders with respect to CityDeck's construction claims under 
arbitration.  Society asked the circuit court to stay the 
arbitration until it could decide the insurance coverage issue.  
The circuit court granted Society's request and ordered the 
arbitration stayed on January 2, 2018. 
¶4 
CityDeck 
asserted 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction to order a private arbitration stayed, particularly 
when the circuit court action and the arbitration involved 
different issues and different parties; three subcontractors who 
were parties to the arbitration were not named in the circuit 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
4 
 
court suit.  CityDeck filed a motion asking the circuit court to 
reconsider its decision.  The circuit court ignored CityDeck's 
motion to reconsider, and CityDeck filed a petition for a 
supervisory writ in the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
construed the petition as an appeal from a non-final order and 
denied the petition.  CityDeck filed a petition for a 
supervisory writ with this court.  We accepted jurisdiction over 
CityDeck's petition and heard oral argument. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
Historical Analysis 
¶5 
Wisconsin cases contain inconsistencies regarding writ 
procedure, terminology, and the standards applicable to the 
exercise of our constitutional superintending authority.  For 
the sake of clarity, we set forth the history of writs requested 
under our superintending authority, the origin of the term 
"supervisory writ," and an unexplained discrepancy in our cases  
illuminated in State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, 35 Wis. 2d 
418, 151 N.W.2d 48 (1967). 
1.  History of writ procedure 
¶6 
Article VII, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives 
the supreme court "superintending and administrative authority 
over all courts" and the ability to "issue all writs necessary 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
5 
 
in aid of its jurisdiction."4  Interpreting this provision, this 
court held that "[the supreme court] was endowed with a separate 
and independent jurisdiction, which enables and requires it in a 
proper case to control the course of ordinary litigation in such 
inferior courts, and was also endowed with all the common-law 
writs applicable to that jurisdiction."  State ex rel. Fourth 
Nat'l Bank of Phila. v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 613, 79 N.W. 1081 
(1899).  This court concluded that "when the makers of the 
constitution used the words 'superintending control over all 
inferior courts' they definitely referred to that well-known 
superintending jurisdiction of the court of king's bench."  Id. 
at 614.  "The two great writs by which this superintending 
jurisdiction was principally exercised by the court of King's 
bench were the writs of mandamus and prohibition; the one 
directing action by the inferior court, and the other forbidding 
action."  Id. 
¶7 
A writ of prohibition "restrain[s] a court in the 
exercise 
of 
judicial 
functions 
outside 
or 
beyond 
its 
jurisdiction, and when there is no other adequate remedy."  
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court of Eau Claire Cty., 
                                                 
4 In 1899, the provision read, in relevant part, "The 
supreme court shall have a general superintending control over 
all inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, 
and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine 
the same."  State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Phila. v. 
Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 610, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899) (emphasis 
omitted). 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
6 
 
97 Wis. 1, 15, 72 N.W. 193 (1897).  See also State ex rel. 
De Puy v. Evans, 88 Wis. 255, 263, 60 N.W. 433 (1894) ("So this 
court has repeatedly held that under our statutes such writ 
issues only to restrain the acts of a court or other inferior 
tribunal exercising some judicial power which it has no legal 
authority to exercise at all."); State ex rel. Kellogg v. Gary, 
33 Wis. 93, 98 (1873) ("It does not issue to restrain the acts 
of either executive or administrative officers, but only those 
of a court or other inferior tribunal engaged in the exercise of 
some judicial power, and that not merely in a manner not 
authorized by law, but it must also be in defiance of law, or 
without any legal authority whatever for that purpose."). 
¶8 
Prior to 1921, it was the rule in Wisconsin "that 
prohibition will not lie against a judge of a lower court except 
in a situation where such judge is exceeding his jurisdiction."  
State ex rel. Kiekhaefer v. Anderson, 4 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 90 
N.W.2d 790 (1958).  However, the rule changed so that 
"prohibition may be invoked in case of a non-jurisdictional 
error in a situation where appeal from the judgment would come 
too late for effective redress and great hardship would result 
if such writ were not issued."  Id.  See also In re Inland Steel 
Co., 174 Wis. 140, 143, 182 N.W. 917 (1921) ("[I]t is the 
opinion of the court that jurisdiction may properly be exercised 
though the duty of the court below may not be so plain as to 
permit of but one conclusion, if a careful consideration of all 
the facts shows that a valid service has not been made."); State 
ex rel. Hustisford Light, Power & Mfg. Co. v. Grimm, 208 Wis. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
7 
 
366, 370, 243 N.W. 763 (1932) ("Neither the power nor the 
exercise of it as a matter of policy is limited to keeping the 
lower court within its jurisdiction or compelling it to act."); 
State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d 609, 614, 143 N.W.2d 
437 (1966) ("Traditionally, this writ was used to keep an 
inferior court from acting outside its jurisdiction when there 
was no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise.  But, . . . the 
writ has been expanded to cover cases of 'nonjurisdictional 
error when the appeal may come too late for effective redress, 
or be inadequate and there is a need for such intervention to 
avoid grave hardship or a complete denial of the rights of a 
litigant.'") (internal citations and quoted source omitted). 
¶9 
In Fourth National Bank, this court acknowledged it 
granted a writ of prohibition in Attorney General, to prevent 
"the further prosecution of certain contempt proceedings in the 
circuit court because such court was acting in excess of its 
jurisdiction."  Fourth Nat'l Bank, 103 Wis. at 617.  This court 
explained in Attorney General:  "Having held that the attempt to 
punish the publication in question as contempt was in excess of 
the jurisdiction of the circuit court, no reason is seen why the 
writ is not an apt and proper remedy, unless, indeed, there be 
other adequate remedies."  Attorney Gen., 97 Wis. at 15. The 
court proceeded to rule out the use of other writs and concluded 
that a writ of prohibition was appropriate.  Id. 
¶10 While Fourth National Bank explained the court's 
superintending power, it specifically dealt with the issuance of 
a writ of mandamus.  103 Wis. at 618.  The court stated that 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
8 
 
"unless there be adequate remedy for such denial in the regular 
exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this court, it is 
difficult to see why the superintending jurisdiction should not 
be exercised to quash the neglect or refusal of the circuit 
court, and compel it to act within its jurisdiction."  Id. at 
621. 
¶11 In addition, Fourth National Bank created several 
principles for issuing a writ of mandamus.  First, "[t]he 
general rule of law undoubtedly is that mandamus will not lie 
where there is a remedy by appeal or writ of error.  But the 
remedy by appeal must be substantially adequate in order to 
prevent relief by mandamus."  Id. at 622 (internal citations 
omitted).  Second, "[i]t is very plain that, if the creditors 
are to exercise their rights with any prospect of benefit, they 
must exercise them promptly."  Id.  Third, "reliance is placed 
upon the well-known principle that mandamus will not lie to 
control the exercise of discretion."  Id.  Fourth, "[w]here it 
clearly appears that discretion has been not merely abused, but 
not exercised at all, or that the action taken by the inferior 
court is without semblance of legal cause, and no other adequate 
remedy exists, mandamus will lie to compel the specific action 
which should have been taken."  Id. at 623.  Fifth, "[t]he duty 
of the court must be plain, the refusal to proceed within its 
jurisdiction to perform that duty must be clear, the results of 
such refusal prejudicial, the remedy, if any, by appeal or writ 
of error utterly inadequate, and the application for relief by 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
9 
 
mandamus speedy and prompt, in order to justify the issuance of 
the writ."  Id. at 623-24. 
¶12 It appears, however, that the requirements outlined in 
Fourth National Bank for a writ of mandamus became requirements 
for all writs issued under the court's supervisory powers.  In 
1907, in a mandamus case, the court wrote that it would apply 
its supervisory control only "where the duty of the inferior 
court to act within its jurisdiction or to refrain from going 
beyond its jurisdiction is plain and imperative, where such 
court threatens to violate that duty to the substantial 
prejudice of the rights of the petitioner, where all other 
remedies are inadequate, and the application for relief [is] 
prompt."  State ex rel. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. 
Circuit Court for Rock Cty., 133 Wis. 442, 444, 113 N.W. 722 
(1907) (citing Fourth Nat'l Bank).  That case, Fourth National 
Bank, and two other mandamus cases,5 were then cited in State ex 
rel. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee 
Cty., 143 Wis. 282, 127 N.W. 998 (1910), as principles for 
exercising general superintending control.  The court stated: 
Those 
principles 
in 
substance 
are 
that 
this 
[superintending] jurisdiction is not to be exercised 
upon 
light 
occasion, 
but 
only 
upon 
some 
grave 
exigency; that the writs by which it is exercised will 
not be used to perform the ordinary functions of an 
appeal or writ of error; that the duty of the court 
below must be plain; its refusal to proceed within the 
                                                 
5 State ex rel. City of Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 
82 N.W. 158 (1900); State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 
432, 118 N.W. 158 (1908). 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
10 
 
line of such duty, or, on the other hand, its intent 
to proceed in violation of such duty must be clear; 
the results must be not only prejudicial, but must 
involve extraordinary hardship; the remedy by appeal 
or writ of error must be utterly inadequate; and the 
application 
for 
the 
exercise 
of 
the 
power 
of 
superintending control must be speedy and prompt. 
Id. at 285.  Pierce-Arrow, however, was a prohibition case——not 
a mandamus case. 
¶13 Nonetheless, the principles outlined in Pierce-Arrow 
were reiterated in a later prohibition case, State ex rel. Pabst 
v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Cty., 184 Wis. 301, 304, 199 N.W. 
213 (1924).  However, that court went on to apply only some of 
the Pierce-Arrow principles, stating "[i]f the duty of the 
circuit court to abate the action against the Pabst Brewing 
Company were clear, and the relator did suffer extraordinary 
hardship by reason of the court's failure to perform its duty, 
and if he had no other adequate remedy, the duty of this court 
to assume jurisdiction is well settled."  Id.  Notably, the 
court did not address the factor requiring that "the application 
for the exercise of the power of superintending control must be 
speedy and prompt." 
¶14 Likewise, 
other 
cases 
did 
not 
uniformly 
or 
consistently apply the Pierce-Arrow principles.  Some cases 
utilized only two.  First, "[i]n order to entitle a party to a 
writ of prohibition, the results of the error attacked must not 
only be prejudicial to him but must [also] involve extraordinary 
hardship."  Kiekhaefer, 4 Wis. 2d at 490 (emphasis omitted) 
(citing Pierce-Arrow).  Second, "[i]t is a further well 
established principle that prohibition will not lie where there 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
11 
 
is an adequate remedy by appeal."  Id. at 491.  See also State 
ex rel. Mitchell v. Superior Court of Dane Cty., 14 Wis. 2d 77, 
81, 109 N.W.2d 522 (1961) ("Ordinarily such a writ should be 
issued only to prevent an inferior court from exercising 
jurisdiction in a case where i[t] should not be exercised or 
assumed.  Nor should a writ of prohibition be issued if there is 
an adequate remedy by way of appeal, except where great hardship 
would result.") (internal citations omitted).  However, other 
cases referenced all of the principles from Pierce-Arrow.  For 
example, in State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, the court cited 
Pierce-Arrow and affirmed a motion to quash a petition for a 
writ of prohibition because "from this record it cannot be said 
that the justice court's 'duty' to refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction was plain."  Beaudry, 35 Wis. 2d at 425-26; see 
also State ex rel. Lang v. Municipal Justice Court of Cudahy, 50 
Wis. 2d 21, 23-24, 183 N.W.2d 43 (1971) (citing Pierce-Arrow); 
State ex rel. Prentice v. Cty. Court, Milwaukee Cty., 70 
Wis. 2d 230, 234-35, 234 N.W.2d 283 (1975) (citing Pierce Arrow 
and Beaudry). 
¶15 Eventually, the principles developed in Pierce-Arrow 
and cited in Beaudry merged into a four-factor test: 
A petition for a supervisory writ will not be granted 
unless:  (1) an appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) 
grave hardship or irreparable harm will result; (3) 
the duty of the trial court is plain and it must have 
acted or intends to act in violation of that duty[;] 
and (4) the request for relief is made promptly and 
speedily. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
12 
 
State ex rel. Oman v. Hunkins, 120 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 352 N.W.2d 
220 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Beaudry).  This court subsequently 
endorsed these four factors, and routinely applies them whenever 
a party petitions for a supervisory writ.  See Burnett v. Alt, 
224 Wis. 2d 72, 96-97, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999); State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; DNR v. Wis. Court of Appeals, Dist. 
IV., 2018 WI 25, ¶9, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114.  This was 
not always the case. 
¶16 Before adoption of the modern four-factor test, Wis. 
Stat. ch. 817 (1975-76) provided guidance for writs of errors 
and appeals.  Parties asking the supreme court to exercise its 
superintending authority did so via an application or a petition 
for a particular writ——typically a writ of mandamus or a writ of 
prohibition.  In 1978, the typical practice changed when 
Wisconsin revamped its court system, adding the intermediate 
appellate court——the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  The newly 
revised 
appellate 
court 
structure 
required 
revisions 
to 
appellate rules.  The Judicial Council drafted new rules of 
appellate procedure, which this court enacted.  Sup. Ct. Order, 
83 Wis. 2d xxvii (1978).  Two Rules, 809.51 and 809.71, created 
procedural and filing guidance regarding writ practice in the 
appellate courts.  Rule 809.51 applied to the newly-created 
court of appeals, and Rule 809.71 applied to this court.  Both 
Rules were titled "Supervisory Writ" although this term did not 
appear in the text of the original statutes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ (Rules) 809.51 & 809.71 (1977-78). 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
13 
 
¶17 The text of the court of appeals' rule said:  "A 
person may request the court to exercise its supervisory 
jurisdiction over a court . . . by filing a petition and 
supporting memorandum."  The text of the supreme court rule 
said:  "A person may request the supreme court to exercise its 
supervisory 
jurisdiction . . . by 
filing 
a 
petition 
in 
accordance with Rule 809.51."  The term "supervisory writ" does 
appear in the second sentence of our current Rule 809.71:  "A 
person seeking a supervisory writ from the supreme court shall 
first file a petition for a supervisory writ in the court of 
appeals[,]" but the term still does not appear in the text of 
Rule 809.51.6 
                                                 
6 The full text of current Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.51 and 
809.71 provides: 
809.51 Rule 
(Supervisory 
writ 
and 
original 
jurisdiction to issue prerogative writ). 
(1) A person may request the court to exercise its 
supervisory jurisdiction or its original jurisdiction 
to issue a prerogative writ over a court and the 
presiding judge, or other person or body, by filing a 
petition and supporting memorandum.  The petition and 
memorandum combined may not exceed 35 pages if a 
monospaced 
font 
is 
used 
or 
8,000 
words 
if 
a 
proportional serif font is used.  The petitioner shall 
name as respondents the court and judge, or other 
person or body, and all other parties in the action or 
proceeding.  The petition shall contain: 
(a) A statement of the issues presented by the 
controversy; 
(b) 
A 
statement 
of 
the 
facts 
necessary 
to 
an 
understanding of the issues; 
(c) The relief sought; and 
(continued) 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) 
The 
reasons 
why 
the 
court 
should 
take 
jurisdiction. 
(2) The court may deny the petition ex parte or may 
order the respondents to file a response with a 
supporting memorandum, if any, and may order oral 
argument on the merits of the petition.  The response 
and memorandum combined may not exceed 35 pages if a 
monospaced 
font 
is 
used 
or 
8,000 
words 
if 
a 
proportional serif font is used.  The respondents 
shall respond with supporting memorandum within 14 
days after service of the order.  A respondent may 
file a letter stating that he or she does not intend 
to file a response, but the petition is not thereby 
admitted. 
(3) The court, upon a consideration of the petition, 
responses, supporting memoranda and argument, may 
grant or deny the petition or order such additional 
proceedings as it considers appropriate.  Costs and 
fees may be awarded against any party in a writ 
proceeding. 
(4) A person filing a petition under this section 
shall append to the petition a statement identifying 
whether the petition is produced with a monospaced 
font or with a proportional serif font.  If produced 
with a proportional serif font, the person shall set 
forth the word count of the petition. 
809.71 Rule (Supervisory writ). A person may request 
the 
supreme 
court 
to 
exercise 
its 
supervisory 
jurisdiction over a court and the judge presiding 
therein or other person or body by filing a petition 
in accordance with s. 809.51.  A person seeking a 
supervisory writ from the supreme court shall first 
file a petition for a supervisory writ in the court of 
appeals under s. 809.51 unless it is impractical to 
seek the writ in the court of appeals.  A petition in 
the supreme court shall show why it was impractical to 
seek the writ in the court of appeals or, if a 
petition had been filed in the court of appeals, the 
disposition made and reasons given by the court of 
appeals. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
15 
 
¶18 With the introduction of the term "supervisory writ" 
via the new appellate rules, post-1978 cases attempted to draw 
from both the old, existing terminology and the new rules.  The 
term "supervisory writ" appears for the first time in Wisconsin 
cases in State v. Whitty, 86 Wis. 2d 380, 385, 272 N.W.2d 842 
(1978), which references Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.51 and 
809.71.  Six years later, the current four-factor "supervisory 
writ" test was explicitly declared in a 1984 court of appeals' 
per curiam opinion in Oman, 120 Wis. 2d at 91.  Oman lists the 
test with a citation to Beaudry.  Beaudry, as noted, does not 
explicitly denominate a four-factor test, but instead cites to 
the general principles set forth in Pierce-Arrow. 
¶19 Dissecting the relevant paragraph in Pierce-Arrow 
results in a list of seven factors guiding the exercise of 
superintending authority: 
(1) This jurisdiction is not to be exercised upon 
light occasion, but only upon some grave exigency; 
(2) The writs by which it is exercised will not be 
used to perform the ordinary functions of an appeal or 
writ of error; 
(3) The duty of the court below must be plain; 
(4) Its refusal to proceed within the line of such 
duty or, on the other hand, its intent to proceed in 
violation of such duty must be clear; 
(5) The results must be not only prejudicial but must 
involve extraordinary hardship; 
(6) The remedy by appeal or writ of error must be 
utterly inadequate; 
(7) The application for the exercise of the power of 
superintending control must be speedy and prompt. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
16 
 
Pierce-Arrow, 143 Wis. at 285. 
¶20 While the Oman court did not say how it arrived at the 
four factors, it likely condensed these seven principles into 
four factors given their overlap: 
(1) An appeal is an inadequate remedy (see #2 and #6 
of Pierce-Arrow); 
(2) Grave hardship or irreparable harm will result 
(see #1 and #5 of Pierce-Arrow); 
(3) The duty of the trial court is plain and the court 
must have acted or intend to act in violation of that 
duty (see #3 and #4 of Pierce-Arrow); 
(4) The request for relief is made promptly and 
speedily (see #7 of Pierce-Arrow). 
¶21 Alternatively, because the party in Oman sought two 
writs——a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition——the Oman 
court may have applied factors derived from each of the tests 
tied to those writs, respectively.  Mandamus requires:  "(1) a 
clear legal right; (2) a plain and positive duty; (3) 
substantial damages or injury should the relief not be granted, 
and (4) no other adequate remedy at law."  Oman, 120 Wis. 2d at 
88 (citing Law Enf't Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon Station, 
101 Wis. 2d 472, 493-94, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981), which actually 
lists two additional factors not mentioned, including "no 
laches" 
and 
"no 
special 
reasons" 
making 
the 
remedy 
"inequitable."). 
¶22 As Wisconsin appellate courts grappled with the 
language of the older cases, together with the post-1978 body of 
cases, profuse variations of both terminology and tests appeared 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
17 
 
in our modern writ cases.  Cases sometimes referred to 
"supervisory writs" and sometimes referred to a specific common 
law writ.  Some courts combined the old and new terminology into 
"supervisory writ of prohibition."  See State ex rel. Godfrey & 
Kahn, S.C. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Cty., 2012 WI App 120, 
¶¶48-50, 
344 
Wis. 2d 610, 
823 
N.W.2d 
816 
(granting 
a 
"supervisory writ of prohibition" after applying four-factor 
test because trial judge exceeded authority); State ex rel. 
Individual Subpoenaed to Appear at Waukesha Cty. v. Davis, 2005 
WI 70, 281 Wis. 2d 431, 697 N.W.2d 803 (court granted a "writ of 
prohibition," but did not apply four-factor test); State ex rel. 
Garibay v. Circuit Court for Kenosha Cty., 2002 WI App 164, ¶2, 
256 
Wis. 2d 438, 
647 
N.W.2d 
455 
(denied 
petition 
for 
"supervisory writ."). 
¶23 Attempting to define "supervisory writ," the court of 
appeals described it as "a blending of the writ of mandamus and 
the writ of prohibition."  State ex rel. Dressler v. Circuit 
Court for Racine Cty., 163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing Oman).  This court likewise adopted this 
definition.  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2011 WI 72, ¶74, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442; DNR, 
380 
Wis. 2d 354, 
¶8. 
 
Nevertheless, 
courts 
continued 
to 
distinguish between writs of prohibition and writs of mandamus.  
See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶¶1, 75-76.  This 
historical review reveals inconsistencies in writ law and the 
standards governing our exercise of superintending authority. 
 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
18 
 
2.  Supervisory Writ 
¶24 With the introduction of the term "supervisory writ" 
in 1978, our cases became less clear.  The cases are silent as 
to whether the "supervisory writ" was an intentional invention 
or resulted fortuitously from the title the Judicial Council 
drafters chose for Rules 809.51 and 809.71.  It is also unclear 
whether a supervisory writ existed as an independent writ under 
which this court exercised its superintending authority or 
whether it was simply a generic term providing the mechanism by 
which parties reached the appellate courts when seeking the 
exercise of supervisory (court of appeals) or superintending 
(supreme court) authority. 
¶25 Notably, just last term, in DNR, we referenced an 1874 
case empowering this court to use both the traditional common 
law 
writs 
when 
exercising 
superintending 
jurisdiction 
or 
"devise" any new writs we might deem necessary: 
We have previously observed that with the grant of 
[art. VII, § 3 superintending] jurisdiction [over all 
courts] come all the writs necessary to give it 
effect: 
The framers of the constitution appear to have 
well 
understood 
that, 
with 
appellate 
jurisdiction, the court took all common law writs 
applicable 
to 
it; 
and 
with 
superintending 
control, all common law writs applicable to that; 
and that, failing adequate common law writs, the 
court might well devise new ones, as Lord Coke 
tells us, as "a secret in law." 
Attorney Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 
515 (1874) (construing our original constitution); see 
State v. Buchanan, 2013 WI 31, ¶11, 346 Wis. 2d 735, 
828 
N.W.2d 
847 
("As 
the 
court 
of 
original 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
19 
 
jurisdiction, 
we 
have 
discretion 
to 
issue 
a 
supervisory writ."). 
DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶7 (footnote omitted). 
¶26 This suggests our "supervisory writ" may in fact be a 
new writ devised to exercise our superintending constitutional 
authority.  But, the term "supervisory writ" also bears a second 
meaning.  Since its appearance in 1978, a supervisory writ is 
commonly known as the general term used when petitioning 
Wisconsin appellate courts under Rules 809.51 and 809.71.  This 
terminology, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
it 
entered 
the 
law 
intentionally or fortuitously, is firmly entrenched in our 
jurisprudence, and we have never explained or addressed its 
purpose or presence.  This historical analysis does not provide 
clear answers, but the court takes this opportunity to clarify 
and acknowledge the dual purpose of the term supervisory writ.  
It is both:  (1) the general term used in petitioning the court 
of appeals to exercise its constitutional supervisory authority7 
and in petitioning this court to exercise its constitutional 
                                                 
7 Article VII, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives the 
court of appeals "supervisory authority": 
(3) The appeals court shall have such appellate 
jurisdiction in the district, including jurisdiction 
to 
review 
administrative 
proceedings, 
as 
the 
legislature may provide by law, but shall have no 
original jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ.  
The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid 
of 
its 
jurisdiction 
and 
shall 
have 
supervisory 
authority over all actions and proceedings in the 
courts in the district. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
20 
 
superintending authority;8 and (2) a new writ this court devised 
independent of the traditional common law writs. 
3.  Beaudry's jurisdictional distinction 
¶27 Our last consideration in this historical analysis 
addresses 
the 
unexplained 
discrepancy 
in 
our 
case 
law 
illuminated 
in 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Beaudry 
v. 
Panosian, 
35 
Wis. 2d 418, 151 N.W.2d 48 (1967).  Beaudry makes a distinction 
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional cases requesting 
the exercise of this court's superintending authority.9  The 
court in Beaudry recognized that this court's constitutional 
superintending authority includes "the power to issue writs 
prohibiting 
inferior 
courts 
from 
acting 
outside 
their 
jurisdiction" and explained that "[t]raditionally, this writ was 
used to keep an inferior court from acting outside its 
jurisdiction when there was no adequate remedy by appeal or 
otherwise" but the "use of the writ to prohibit action by 
inferior courts and tribunals in cases of nonjurisdictional 
error" was historically limited to situations "where 'the appeal 
                                                 
8 The term "supervisory" is used in both Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.51 (court of appeals) and Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.71 
(supreme court), but the Wisconsin Constitution uses the term 
"supervisory authority" with respect to the court of appeals and 
the term "superintending authority" with respect to this court. 
9 State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, 35 Wis. 2d 418, 151 
N.W.2d 48 (1967), was not the only case to recognize the 
distinction. 
 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Kiekhaefer 
v. 
Anderson, 
4 
Wis. 2d 485, 490, 90 N.W.2d 790 (1958) and State ex rel. Gaynon 
v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d 609, 614, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966) similarly 
acknowledge a jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional distinction. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
21 
 
may come too late for effective redress, or be inadequate and 
there is a need for such intervention to avoid grave hardship or 
a complete denial of the rights of a litigant.'"  Id. at 421-22 
(quoted 
source 
omitted). 
 
Beaudry, 
at 
least 
implicitly, 
suggested a lesser burden to secure superintending assistance 
from this court when addressing a jurisdictional error and a 
greater burden when the case presents a non-jurisdictional 
error.  This makes sense, of course, because non-jurisdictional 
errors are more likely to be remedied through the normal appeal 
process 
than 
purely 
jurisdictional 
errors, 
as 
this 
case 
illustrates well.  Indeed, as recently as 2005, this court 
dispensed with the four-factor supervisory writ test in Davis, 
281 Wis. 2d 431, ¶17, holding that "the requested writ of 
prohibition will issue if the John Doe judge acted in excess of 
his powers."  In that case, the court concluded "a John Doe 
judge does not have statutory or inherent power to require a 
witness's counsel to take an oath of secrecy" and on that basis 
alone granted the writ of prohibition.  Id., ¶¶32-34.  Despite 
this distinction, this court largely ignored any substantive 
differences between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors 
post-Beaudry and continued to blur the general principles 
involved in the writ cases. 
¶28 Although Beaudry has never been overruled, it appears 
time, lack of precision, and perhaps the commonplace use of the 
supervisory 
writ 
has 
eroded 
any 
distinction 
between 
jurisdictional 
and 
non-jurisdictional 
categories 
of 
error.  
Parties seeking a supervisory writ——regardless of which category 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
22 
 
of error——must satisfy the four-criteria supervisory writ test.  
This test is well-known, easy to apply, and firmly entrenched in 
Wisconsin law. 
B.  Application 
¶29 This court's authority to issue a supervisory writ 
arises from the constitutional grant of jurisdiction in Article 
VII, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides: 
(1) The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts. 
(2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over 
all 
courts 
and 
may 
hear 
original 
actions 
and 
proceedings.  The supreme court may issue all writs 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The supreme court may review judgments and orders 
of the court of appeals, may remove cases from the 
court of appeals and may accept cases on certification 
by the court of appeals. 
We do not exercise this authority lightly; instead, we reserve 
this jurisdiction for extraordinary circumstances.  See DNR, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, ¶8; Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630. 
¶30 A party seeking the issuance of a supervisory writ 
must establish four factors:  (1) a circuit court had a plain 
duty and either acted or intends to act in violation of that 
duty; (2) "an appeal is an inadequate remedy;" (3) "grave 
hardship or irreparable harm will result;" and (4) the party 
requested relief "promptly and speedily."  DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 
¶9 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17). 
¶31 In deciding whether to grant the writ requested by 
CityDeck, we consider the four criteria in turn.  First, there 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
23 
 
must be a plain duty violated by the Brown County Circuit Court—
—in this case, the duty to refrain from exercising jurisdiction 
over a private arbitration with which it had no authority to 
interfere.  We conclude the circuit court had a plain duty to 
act within its jurisdiction and a concomitant duty to refrain 
from acting beyond it. 
¶32 Article VII, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution confers 
broad jurisdiction on Wisconsin circuit courts to hear "all 
matters civil and criminal within this state," but not without 
exception: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal within this state and such appellate 
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may 
prescribe by law.  The circuit court may issue all 
writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added.)  The Wisconsin Arbitration Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 
788, comprises one constitutionally-permissible exception to a 
circuit court's original jurisdiction: 
A provision in any written contract to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part of the contract, or an agreement in 
writing between 2 or more persons to submit to 
arbitration any controversy existing between them at 
the time of the agreement to submit, shall be valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable except upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. 
Wis. Stat. § 788.01.  In this Act, the Wisconsin legislature 
recognizes the freedom of persons to agree to resolve their 
disputes outside of the state's court system, via arbitration. 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
24 
 
¶33 A circuit court possesses only limited, statutorily 
enumerated powers with respect to a private arbitration.  See 
Midwest Neurosciences Assocs. v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical 
Assocs., LLC, 2018 WI 112, ¶¶47-49, 384 Wis. 2d 669, 920 
N.W.2d 767.  Nothing in the Wisconsin Arbitration Act permits a 
circuit court to stay or otherwise intermeddle with a private 
arbitration proceeding.  A fundamental canon of statutory 
construction provides that "[n]othing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies[.]"  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 
(2012); see also Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 
Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 ("We decline to read into the 
statute words the legislature did not see fit to write.").  By 
specifying particular powers of a circuit court to act with 
respect to an arbitration proceeding, the legislature has 
circumscribed the authority of the circuit court, which may not 
arrogate to itself any additional powers. 
¶34 A circuit court's role in arbitration is restricted 
because parties who contract for arbitration do so to avoid the 
court system altogether.  Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 
70, ¶61, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42 ("[T]he goal of 
arbitration is 'to resolve the entire controversy out of court 
without the formality and expense that normally attaches to the 
judicial process.'" (quoted source and emphasis omitted)); 
Midwest Neurosciences Assocs., LLC, 384 Wis. 2d 669, ¶41 ("When 
parties agree to arbitration, a court's role is limited because 
a different forum of dispute resolution has been selected."). 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
25 
 
¶35 Arbitration is a matter of contract between private 
parties who enjoy that freedom.  McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 
2018 WI 88, ¶25, 383 Wis. 2d 358, 914 N.W.2d 708; Parsons v. 
Associated Banc-Corp, 2017 WI 37, ¶31, 374 Wis. 2d 513, 893 
N.W.2d 212 
("Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
long 
recognized 
the 
importance of freedom of contract and have endeavored to protect 
the right to contract." (quoted source omitted)).  The circuit 
court has no authority to halt a contractually agreed upon 
arbitration.  Consistent with Wisconsin's arbitration statute, 
the circuit court may act only to ensure the parties who 
contracted for arbitration abide by their contractual agreement.  
See generally First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate 
Grp., LLC, 2015 WI 34, ¶¶30-31, 361 Wis. 2d 496, 860 N.W.2d 498 
("The legislature has determined that the courts have a limited 
role in the context of arbitration."); Midwest Neurosciences 
Assocs., LLC, 384 Wis. 2d 669, ¶77 ("Courts should remain 
mindful of the limited role endowed to them under chapter 788 
and not endeavor into the province of the parties' contractual 
choice to arbitrate."). 
¶36 Nothing in the statutes or the cases authorizes a 
circuit court to halt a private arbitration so that an insurance 
company can litigate whether its policy provides coverage to an 
insured.  Although Wisconsin cases do allow insurance companies 
to bifurcate coverage from liability when both coverage and 
liability are being decided in the courts, see, e.g., Newhouse 
by Skow v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 824, 836, 
501 N.W.2d 1 (1993), no legal authority confers on a circuit 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
26 
 
court the power to interfere with a liability claim when the 
parties have contracted to resolve it in arbitration.  An 
insurer may file a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
coverage determination when the insurer has not been named as a 
party in a lawsuit involving its insured, see, e.g., Fire Ins. 
Exch. v. Basten, 202 Wis. 2d 74, 78, 549 N.W.2d 690 (1996), but 
the declaratory judgment statute does not authorize a circuit 
court to obstruct a scheduled arbitration over the liability 
claims pending the circuit court's coverage determination. 
¶37 Society suggests American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65 
and Delta Group, Inc. v. DBI, Inc., 204 Wis. 2d 515, 555 
N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1996), authorize a circuit court to stay a 
private arbitration.  We disagree.  In American Girl, the 
circuit court did not order a stay of the arbitration.  Rather, 
the insurer intervened in the arbitration and asked the 
arbitrator to stay the arbitration until coverage could be 
determined.  268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶109 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).  
Society's reliance on American Girl is inapposite.  The same is 
true for its reliance on Delta Group.  In that case, the parties 
filed suit in court and then agreed to stay the court case to 
allow 
for 
mediation 
and 
arbitration. 
 
Delta 
Group, 
204 
Wis. 2d at 519.  The court of appeals decided the insurer 
breached its duty to defend its insured and was therefore 
obligated to pay the arbitration award.  Id. at 525-26.  The 
insurer had denied the claim entirely and never sought a 
coverage determination.  Id.  Although Delta Group reiterates 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
27 
 
general rules about bifurcation and an insurer's duty to resolve 
coverage disputes, it does not establish a circuit court's 
authority to stay a private arbitration. 
¶38 We conclude the circuit court violated its plain duty 
when it stepped outside its original jurisdiction under Article 
VII, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution by issuing an order it 
had no authority to make.  The circuit court compounded its 
error by stopping an arbitration proceeding involving three 
parties who were not participating in the court case at all and 
therefore had no opportunity to be heard on an order that 
affected their rights.  Accordingly, the first criterion for a 
supervisory writ is met. 
¶39 The second criterion for granting a supervisory writ 
requires a showing that CityDeck cannot receive an adequate 
remedy through the ordinary appeal process.  This criterion is 
also met.  Here, the circuit court acted beyond its original 
jurisdiction 
under 
Article 
VII, 
§ 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution and halted a private arbitration to decide a 
separate coverage issue in the circuit court involving different 
parties.  There is no adequate appellate remedy for the circuit 
court's unlawful act because any "appeal comes too late for 
effective redress" and the damage——stopping the parties from 
resolving their dispute in arbitration——is not reparable or 
compensable.  See DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶41 (quoted source 
omitted).  Challenging the circuit court's exercise of power via 
a regular appeal would be futile.  CityDeck would have to wait 
until the coverage issue was resolved before it could appeal and 
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
28 
 
ask an appellate court to declare the circuit court had no 
authority to stay the arbitration.  At that point, the wrongful 
exercise of authority over the arbitration either becomes moot 
if the circuit court allows the arbitration to proceed during 
the appeal, or if the circuit court continues the stay pending 
the appeal, CityDeck continues to be wrongly subjected to the 
circuit court's exercise of authority it lacks.  Either way, a 
regular appeal is inadequate as it comes "too late for effective 
redress."  Id. (quoted source omitted). 
¶40 Significantly, the appeal process continues to subject 
the parties to the court system for resolving their dispute, 
effectively trampling their agreement to avoid court altogether.  
Rather than serving as a vehicle for vindicating a party's 
rights, the appeal exacerbates the injury.  The damage is done 
and cannot be reversed. 
¶41 Third, 
we 
consider 
whether 
grave 
hardship 
or 
irreparable harm will result if we do not issue the supervisory 
writ.  We conclude that it would.  A litigant's right to be free 
from the exercise of the court's power has been completely 
denied.  The circuit court's unlawful stay order halted attempts 
by these private parties to resolve a construction dispute in 
their contractually-selected forum of arbitration.  CityDeck was 
deprived of the benefits of its bargained-for method of dispute 
resolution:  rather than avoiding the court system, it was 
subjected to an order issuing from it, and instead of its 
contractually 
agreed-upon 
arbitration 
progressing, 
it 
was 
indefinitely delayed by a court acting without authority.  
No.  2018AP291-W 
 
29 
 
Additionally, CityDeck was forced into public proceedings in a 
matter it had contracted to resolve privately.  These factors 
satisfy the grave hardship/irreparable harm criterion. 
¶42 Finally, CityDeck met the fourth criterion by acting 
promptly and speedily.  Although Society asserts that the 21 
days between the issuance of the unlawful stay order and 
CityDeck's writ filing is neither prompt nor speedy, we 
disagree.  The circuit court issued the stay order on January 2, 
2018.  Two days later, on January 4, 2018, CityDeck filed a 
motion for reconsideration with the circuit court, which the 
circuit court ignored.  On January 11, 2018, the circuit court 
issued an order giving the parties permission to proceed with a 
planned mediation.  Twelve days after that order, CityDeck filed 
its writ petition in the court of appeals.  This timeline 
satisfies the "prompt and speedy" criterion. 
¶43 CityDeck's petition fulfills all four criteria for 
issuance of a supervisory writ; therefore, we grant CityDeck's 
request and vacate the circuit court's order staying the 
arbitration. 
By the Court.—The petition for a supervisory writ is 
granted; the stay order is vacated. 
¶44 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
1 
 
¶45 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Until now, it 
has been well settled that a supervisory writ is intended to be 
"an extraordinary and drastic remedy[,]" reserved for rare 
situations involving "some grievous exigency."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; see Matter of Civil Contempt of 
Kroll, 101 Wis. 2d 296, 304, 304 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(denominating a supervisory writ an "extraordinary remed[y]"); 
State ex rel. Kenneth S. v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty., 2008 WI 
App 120, ¶8, 313 Wis. 2d 508, 756 N.W.2d 573 (referring to a 
supervisory writ as an "extraordinary and drastic remedy that is 
to be issued only upon some grievous exigency") (citation 
omitted). 
¶46 Ignoring 
this 
admonishment, 
the 
majority 
greatly 
expands the application of our supervisory writ jurisprudence.  
Throwing caution to the wind, it elevates jurisdictional errors 
above all others as deserving of special treatment under 
Wisconsin's supervisory writ procedures. 
¶47 In doing so, the majority pays lip service to the 
familiar and well-established four-factor test used to determine 
whether a supervisory writ is an appropriate remedy under the 
circumstances, but fails to apply it correctly.  Adopting an 
argument that CityDeck did not make, the majority's result is 
that a supervisory writ, which is supposed to be reserved for 
the most "extraordinary" or "grievous" situations, may become 
commonplace. 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
2 
 
¶48 In 
my 
view, 
CityDeck 
has 
not 
met 
a 
necessary 
prerequisite for the issuance of a supervisory writ.  Mere delay 
in arbitration proceedings is not the type of "grave hardship" 
or "irreparable harm" that entitles a party to such a writ. 
¶49 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶50 Although the majority spills a great deal of ink 
exploring the history of writ procedures in Wisconsin, it 
ultimately purports to reaffirm and apply the familiar and well-
established 
four-factor 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
supervisory 
writ 
is 
an 
appropriate 
remedy 
under 
the 
circumstances. 
¶51 As the majority correctly explains, "[a] party seeking 
the issuance of a supervisory writ must establish four factors: 
(1) a circuit court had a plain duty and either acted or intends 
to act in violation of that duty; (2) 'an appeal is an 
inadequate remedy;' (3) 'grave hardship or irreparable harm will 
result;' and (4) the party requested relief 'promptly and 
speedily.'"  Majority op., ¶30 (citing DNR. v. Wis. Court of 
Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶9, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 
N.W.2d 114).  If any one of these factors is not present, the 
writ must be denied.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17; see also 
State ex rel. Kiekhaefer v. Anderson, 4 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 90 
N.W.2d 790 (1958) (explaining that where the "petition fails to 
allege any facts which disclose that he would suffer great 
hardship[,]" a writ of prohibition may not be granted). 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
3 
 
¶52 I focus my analysis on the third supervisory writ 
factor:  grave hardship or irreparable harm.  The irreparable 
harm claimed by CityDeck is a simple delay in its arbitration 
proceedings.  In my view, the fact that CityDeck's arbitration 
is delayed, without more, is insufficient to show grave hardship 
or irreparable harm. 
¶53 The harm caused by any such delay is not similar to 
the harm suffered by parties that previously sought and obtained 
supervisory writs.  In prior cases, the petitioner would have 
suffered a complete denial of a right in a way that could not be 
undone or remedied in the absence of a supervisory writ——that 
is, the "bells" in those cases could not be "unrung." 
¶54 For example, courts have determined that the failure 
to 
substitute 
a 
judge 
when 
required 
by 
law 
constitutes 
irreparable harm.  State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. 
Circuit Ct. for Milwaukee Cty., 2000 WI 30, ¶37, 233 Wis. 2d 
428, 608 N.W.2d 679 (2000); State ex rel. Laborers Int'l Union 
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Circuit Ct. for Kenosha Cty., 112 Wis. 2d 
337, 342, 332 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Oman v. 
Hunkins, 120 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 352 N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1984).  
Similarly, the potential disclosure of information subject to 
the attorney-client privilege is irreparable harm sufficient to 
support the issuance of a supervisory writ.  State ex rel. 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. v. Circuit Ct. for Milwaukee Cty., 2012 WI 
App 120, ¶52, 344 Wis. 2d 610, 823 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 2012).  
Finally, in DNR, 380 Wis. 2d 354, ¶47, this court determined 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
4 
 
that the failure to honor an appellant's statutory right to 
choice of venue constituted irreparable harm. 
¶55 Ignoring this case law, CityDeck fails to make any 
persuasive argument that the delay caused by the circuit court's 
stay of the arbitration proceedings constitutes grave hardship 
or irreparable harm.  CityDeck's "argument" with regard to this 
factor is tucked away in the very last paragraph of its 28-page 
brief-in-chief.1 
¶56 It 
baldly 
asserts 
that, 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
a 
supervisory writ, it will incur unspecified "substantial damages 
for which there is no adequate remedy."  CityDeck further 
complains that "[t]he inability to resolve the arbitration and 
the indefinite delay resulting from the Stay Order has already 
caused substantial damage to CityDeck's interests and will 
continue to do so until it is lifted." 
¶57 In my view, CityDeck is not being denied its right to 
arbitrate its claims.  Arbitration is merely delayed, not 
denied.2  CityDeck loses no statutory right and it loses no 
contractual right. 
¶58 What about the delay in the arbitration proceedings 
cannot be remedied with money, such as interest on CityDeck's 
                                                 
1 CityDeck did not supplement its argument in its reply 
brief. 
2 This is an important distinction that is either lost on, 
or ignored by, the majority.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶39 
(characterizing the "damage" in the instant case as "stopping 
the parties from resolving their dispute in arbitration") 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
5 
 
judgment if it is successful in arbitration?  Indeed, at oral 
argument, CityDeck asserted that "the irreparable harm is that 
we continue to lose money that we will not recover because of 
the delay associated with our arbitration proceedings."  Exactly 
how will the loss of money from delay result in grave hardship 
or irreparable harm?  CityDeck does not explain, so the majority 
conjures its own justification. 
¶59 Putting on its advocacy hat, the majority sua sponte 
discovers a new type of irreparable harm.  In the majority's 
broad view, CityDeck suffers irreparable harm by the delay of 
arbitration proceedings because "[a] litigant's right to be free 
from the exercise of the court's power has been completely 
denied."  Majority op., ¶41. 
¶60 If this is the thrust of the injury (i.e., being 
subject to a court's power despite that court's lack of 
jurisdiction), then the majority has short-circuited Wisconsin's 
supervisory writ procedure.  It treats jurisdictional errors as 
a special class of errors for which the issuance of a 
supervisory writ appears to be all but a certainty.3 
¶61 Following the majority's logic, would a defendant be 
entitled to a supervisory writ if a motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction was erroneously denied?  See 
Richards v. Young, 150 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 441 N.W.2d 742 (1989) 
                                                 
3 Although the majority expressly rejects the proposition 
that jurisdictional errors are treated differently under our 
writ procedure than non-jurisdictional errors, its analysis 
belies that assertion.  See majority op., ¶27. 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
6 
 
("This 
court 
has 
previously 
held 
that 
if 
the 
statutory 
requirements for obtaining judicial review are not fully 
complied with, the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit 
court cannot be invoked."). 
¶62 Is a supervisory writ to be employed whenever it is 
asserted that a circuit court exercised personal jurisdiction 
despite a fundamental defect in service?  See Johnson v. Cintas 
Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶50, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756.  
Could a party turn to a supervisory writ to resolve a question 
of 
whether 
a 
juvenile 
court 
could 
exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction?  See State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶27, 283 
Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4. 
¶63 It appears that in each of these situations, for the 
entirety of the case, the circuit court would be "stepp[ing] 
outside its original jurisdiction" and issuing orders "it ha[s] 
no authority to make" that would bind the defendant.  See 
majority op., ¶38.  Further, the ordinary appeals process will 
be inadequate because an appeal would always "come[] too late" 
to effectively redress the error.  Id., ¶39 (quoted source 
omitted).  The harm to the defendant would be considered 
irreparable because, for the duration of the case, the defendant 
would be "completely denied" the "right to be free from the 
exercise of the court's power."  Id., ¶41. 
¶64 If there is a principle under which the majority's 
analysis would not apply to all jurisdictional errors, that 
principle is well hidden.  Such an expansion of the availability 
of supervisory writs is anathema to the limitations provided in 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
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our supervisory writ jurisprudence.  A supervisory writ should 
be a last resort, not a first option. 
¶65 In sum, the majority has placed itself in the role of 
CityDeck's attorneys, relying on arguments not made in order to 
issue a writ to which CityDeck is not entitled.  In doing so, 
the majority improperly elevates jurisdictional errors as a 
special class of errors that can always be redressed via a 
supervisory writ regardless of the specific facts of any 
particular case.  The majority's reasoning is incompatible with 
Wisconsin's supervisory writ jurisprudence that has consistently 
described a supervisory writ as an "extraordinary and drastic 
remedy" reserved for only the most "grievous exigenc[ies]."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17. 
¶66 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP291-W.awb 
 
 
 
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