Title: CORRINE L. SHEAFFER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING; UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING CAMPUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, through the CUSTODIANS OF RECORDS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CORRINE L. SHEAFFER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING; UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING CAMPUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, through the CUSTODIANS OF RECORDS2006 WY 99139 P.3d 468Case Number: 05-211Decided: 08/09/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CORRINE 
L. SHEAFFER,

 
 
Appellant

(Applicant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OFWYOMING, ex rel., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING; UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING CAMPUS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, through the CUSTODIANS OF RECORDS,

 
 
Appellees

(Respondents).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bill G. 
Hibbler, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Susan C. 
Weidel, Senior Assistant General Counsel & Special Assistant Attorney 
General, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Corrine 
Sheaffer (Sheaffer) appeals a determination by the district court that a 
surreptitious tape recording of a University of Wyoming (the University) 
committee meeting was not a public record under the Wyoming Public Records Act 
(WPRA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-201 et 
seq.  We conclude that the tape 
is a public record and remand for further proceedings to determine whether any 
exemptions apply or, if disclosure is appropriate, whether any portions of the 
tape are subject to redaction. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sheaffer sets out 
three issues in her brief:

 
 

I.                     
Did the 
district court err in denying inspection of the tape recording, by finding it is 
not a "public record", as defined by Wyoming Statute § 
16-4-201?

 
 

II.                   
If the 
tape recording is a "public record", as defined by Wyoming Statute § 16-4-201, 
should inspection be denied for any exemption asserted pursuant to Wyoming 
Statute § 16-4-203?

 
 

III.                  
If the 
court orders inspection of the tape recording, should it be 
redacted?

 
 
The 
University's statements of the issues do not differ substantively from 
Schaeffer's.

 
 
FACTS

 

[¶3]      In 2003, Sheaffer 
was employed as the University's manager of Transportation and Parking 
Services.  In November, a 
subordinate secreted a recorder to tape a meeting of the University's Traffic 
Appeals Committee.1  The tape subsequently came into the 
possession of the director of the University's Auxiliary Services and the matter 
was reported to the University police.  After an investigation, the University 
concluded that Sheaffer's actions constituted "serious misconduct" and her 
employment was terminated.  No 
criminal charges resulted from the investigation.

 
 
[¶4]      In September of 
2004, after her termination, Sheaffer requested access to the tape.  The University denied the request on the 
grounds that the tape recording was not an official record2 of the University, and that it was 
otherwise exempt from disclosure under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-203(b)(i)3 and (d)(xi).4  Sheaffer responded by filing an Application for Order to Show Cause Why 
Inspection of Public Record Denied in the district court.  After a hearing, the district court 
upheld the University's determination that the tape was not a public 
record:

 
 
This 
Court disagrees with Sheaffer. It is clear that the surreptitious recording is 
not, in fact, a public record.  And, 
despite what she contends, the purpose for which the tape was made is, in fact, 
important.  The "public record" 
definition requires that such records be made by the State of Wyoming (or its agencies) 
or "received by them in connection with the transaction of public business." 
 Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-201(a)(v).  Here, the Appeals Committee does not 
record or keep minutes of its proceedings.  
[footnote omitted] The tape was made by an individual who, as it 
happened, was employed by the University, but his action was neither part of his 
official duties or undertaken at the behest of the Committee.  The fact that the tape was made by 
someone who happened to be a public employee does not, in and of itself, make 
that tape a public record.  Although 
Sheaffer asserts that the meetings are held in an area where University 
employees and others can "overhear" the proceedings and the Albany County 
Attorney's Office declined prosecution because the Appeal Committee had no 
expectation of privacy when conducting its meetings, those facts do not create a 
public record.  The tape was not a 
record kept (or received) by the University in connection with the transaction 
of public business; it was made clandestinely by Kunkel, whether at Sheaffer's 
request or not. In sum, the recorded tape does not fall within the realm of 
"public records" as intended by the Act.  See Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, 567 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1977).  Disclosure pursuant to a request 
submitted pursuant to the Public Records Act is, therefore, not 
required.

 
 
Sheaffer 
appeals the district court's order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      The determination 
of whether or not the tape is a public record requires us to construe various 
provisions of the WPRA.

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent. All statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de 
novo.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari 
materia.

 
 

Allsop 
v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 2002 
WY 22, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶ 12, 30 P.3d 36, 41 (Wyo. 
2001)).

 
 
[¶6]      The WPRA permits 
any person to access public records:  "All public records shall be open for 
inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as provided in this act or 
as otherwise provided by law . . . [.]"  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-202(a); Houghton v. 
Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1994). 

 
 
The 
policy underlying the WPRA is on disclosure:

 
 
The 
object of the public records act is disclosure, not secrecy, and we therefore 
interpret the act liberally in favor of disclosure, construing all exemptions 
narrowly.  Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of 
Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 793, 794 (Wyo. 1983); and Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1977).  Legislation requiring disclosure of 
information is considered remedial, and

 
 
[r]emedial 
statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. 
 The policy that a remedial statute 
should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for 
which it was enacted is firmly established.

 
 
Norman 
J. Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 60.01 at 147 (5th 
Ed. 1992).  See also Heltzel v. Thomas, 516 N.E.2d 103, 106 
(Ind. App. 1987).  The remedial 
purpose of the public records act is to permit access to public records unless 
disclosure would inflict irreparable harm contrary to protected 
rights.

 
 
The 
courts, legislature, administrative agencies, and the state, county and 
municipal governments should be ever mindful that theirs is public business and 
the public has a right to know how its servants are conducting its business. 
 . . .   The citizenry must be permitted to hear 
and see what public officers and their employees say and do whenever the 
imparting of this knowledge does not run contrary to the rights of those 
otherwise protected in a way that would result in disclosure having the effect 
of inflicting such irreparable harm as is recognized at 
law.

 
 
                        
Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 
791.

 
 

Houghton, 870 P.2d  at 1052; see also Allsop, at 
¶¶ 10-13; 39 P.3d at 1095-96; Wyoming Department of Transportation v. 
International Union of Operating Engineers Local Union 800, 908 P.2d 970, 
973 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The question we 
must answer in determining whether or not the tape was public record is if it 
was "made by the  [University]  or received by [it] in connection with the 
transaction of public business ... [.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(v).  The district court concluded below, and 
the University argues here, that the tape was not "made" by the University in connection 
with the transaction of public business because it was not an action authorized 
by the employment of Sheaffer or her subordinate.  We need not make that determination today 
because we conclude that the tape at issue here was "received . . .  in 
connection with the transaction of public business".

 
 
[¶8]      The tape was 
received into the possession of the director of the University's Auxiliary 
Services in connection with the investigation into Sheaffer's conduct.  "Received" is not defined in the WPRA. 
 Turning to the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the word, it is apparent that the tape was "received" by the 
University:

 
 
To 
acquire or take (something given, offered, or transmitted): get   To take in or 
hold.

 
 
Webster's 
II New College Dictionary 946 (3rd ed. 2005).  The critical inquiry then is whether or 
not the University received the tape "in connection with the transaction of 
public business."  The University 
contends that it was not, because the tape was retrieved as evidence in 
connection with an internal personnel, and an external, criminal 
investigation,5 and Sheaffer's misconduct could not 
"lead to the creation of a legitimate public record."  In contrast, Sheaffer argues that the 
University taking possession of the tape in connection with the internal 
personnel investigation made the tape a public record. We agree with 
Sheaffer.

 
 
[¶9]      While the term 
"public business" is not defined within the WPRA, the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of it is sufficiently broad enough to encompass an investigation into 
misconduct by a public employee in the performance of his or her 
duties:

 
 
The 
public has an interest in learning about the operation and functioning of a 
public agency  and the work-related conduct of public employees; in gaining 
information to evaluate the expenditure of public funds and the functioning of a 
public institution or agency; in having information openly available to them so 
that they can be confident in the operation of their government; and in 
[e]nsuring that both the activity of public employees suspected of wrongdoing 
and the conduct of those public employees who investigate the suspects is open 
to public scrutiny.

 
 

Fincher 
v. State, 497 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. App. 1998).  Other states have found the records of 
investigations to be public under their particular statutory scheme:  Griffin v. City of Knoxville, 821 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1991) (Handwritten notes of state representative who committed 
suicide were "received in connection with the transaction of official business" 
when seized as part of investigation into the death and were, therefore, public 
records subject to inspection.); Bakersfield City School District v. The 
Superior Court of Kern County, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (Cal. App. 5th App. Dist. 2004) (Complaint against 
teacher alleging sexual misconduct was a public record open for disclosure 
because public employee's right to privacy must give way to public's right to 
know.); Irvin v. Macon Telegraph Pub. 
Co., 253 Ga. 43, 316 S.E.2d 449 (Ga. 1984) (Records of an investigation by 
state Department of Agriculture into allegations of civil and criminal 
misconduct by department employees were public records.); Andrea G. Nadel, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Personal 
Matters Exempt from Disclosure by Invasion of Privacy Exemption Under State 
Freedom of Information Act, 26 A.L.R. 4th 666 § 3 (1983 & 
2005 Supp.) (collecting cases); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Are "Records" of Agency Which Must Be 
Made Available Under State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 
4th 680 § 3; cf. § 4 (1984 
& 2005 Supp) (collecting cases).

 
 
[¶10]   A review of the language of the 
WPRA supports the conclusion that the tape is a public record.  The WPRA enumerates exemptions from 
disclosure for certain public records.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203.  Subsection (a) provides that the 
"custodian of any public records shall allow any person the right of inspection 
of the records or any portion thereof except on one (1) or more of the following 
grounds or as provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this section[.]"  Subsection (d) contains a provision 
concerning records relating to investigations of violations of internal 
personnel rules or policies:

 
 
Records 
or information compiled solely for purposes of investigating violations of, and 
enforcing, internal personnel rules or personnel policies the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(d)(xi).  The 
clear implication of this subsection is that records not within any of the 
enumerated exemptions are public records as there would be no need for an 
exemption if the records of an investigation of violations of internal personnel 
rules or policies were not initially construed to be public records.  It is also consistent with, and furthers, 
the WPRA's policy of public disclosure.  The University's position would render 
the need for this exemption irrelevant.  We will not read statutes in a manner 
that would render any portion of them superfluous.  SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. Fields, 
2002 WY 141, ¶ 11, 54 P.3d 761, 764 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶11]   The University responds that the 
content of the tape is irrelevant in that the misconduct was the act of taping 
itself and, therefore, the contents of the tape should not be open to public 
inspection.  The University cites no 
authority to support its position.  The WPRA contains no language that could 
be construed to support the distinction the University attempts to draw. Under 
the WPRA, a public record is either open to inspection by the public or it is 
exempt.  The University would 
effectively have this Court carve out a judicially created exemption.  That would be contrary to the remedial 
purposes of the WPRA and we decline to do so.

 
 
[¶12]   Since the tape was received by a 
governmental entity covered by the WPRA "in connection with the transaction of 
public business"  an investigation into alleged misconduct by a public employee 
 it is a public record subject to inspection by any member of the public absent 
the application of any statutory exemption.6

 
 
[¶13]   As noted, finding the tape to be a 
public record necessitates a second inquiry: whether any exemption applies that 
would allow the record custodian to deny the public the right of inspection. 
 See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203.  Exemptions are construed narrowly. Allsop, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d  at 1095; and 
Houghton, 70 P.2d  at 1052.  While the district court did not consider 
the applicability of any exemptions, the parties have argued the matter in their 
briefs, so we will succinctly address it in the interests of judicial 
efficiency.

 
 
[¶14]   The University suggests that two 
exemptions apply to the tape.  The 
first is § 16-4-203(d)(xi), the language of which we have already set out above. 
 The exemption allows the record 
custodian to deny public inspection if the record or information was compiled solely for purposes of investigating 
violations or enforcing internal personnel rules or policies, the disclosure of 
which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  In this context, the word "solely" is 
equivalent to "exclusively."  See 
Webster's New College Dictionary 1075 (3rd ed. 
2005).  The tape was not compiled 
"solely" or "exclusively" for purposes of the investigation; the tape 
pre-existed the investigation.  The 
exemption simply is not applicable under these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶15]   The second exemption urged by the 
University is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(g):

 
 
If, in 
the opinion of the official custodian of any public record, disclosure of the 
contents of the record would do substantial injury to the public interest, 
notwithstanding the fact that the record might otherwise be available to public 
inspection, he may apply to the district court of the district in which the 
record is located for an order permitting him to restrict disclosure.  After hearing, the court may issue an 
order upon a finding that disclosure would cause substantial injury to the 
public interest.  The person seeking 
permission to examine the record shall have notice of the hearing served upon 
him in the manner provided for service of process by the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure and has the right to appear and be heard.

 
 
It is 
premature for us to consider any argument under this exemption.  There is nothing in the record indicating 
that the University filed an application or that service was effectuated 
pursuant to the subsection.  Of 
course, there was also no hearing held nor any findings made by the district 
court since it never considered the applicability of any exemptions having found 
that the tape was not a public record.  Upon remand, the University is free to 
pursue exemption of the tape from disclosure pursuant to this subsection if it 
desires.

 
 
[¶16]   As a final matter, the parties 
raise the issue of redaction.  We 
have recognized that redaction is an appropriate remedy when portions of an 
otherwise disclosable public record may be subject to an exemption.  Allsop, ¶ 30, 39 P.3d. at 1101. 
 Sheaffer argues that since the 
University did not present any evidence supporting redaction, that the remedy 
should not be available in this case.  To this point in the proceedings the 
question of redaction has been premature, as there has been no evidentiary 
hearing.  The district court held 
that the tape was not a public record.  The University has never had the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding redaction.  Furthermore, the need to present such 
evidence was moot given the district court's holding.  Sheaffer's argument is not well taken. 
 If the question of redaction 
becomes relevant during the proceedings on remand, the district court may 
consider the remedy to the extent raised by any party.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The tape recording is a public 
record under the provisions of the WPRA.  The district court's order is reversed 
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
University and the subordinate contend that Sheaffer ordered the taping; 
Sheaffer denies that, claiming that the subordinate acted on his own initiative. 
 Our determination that the tape is 
a public record is equally applicable under either 
scenario.

 
 

2What 
constitutes a public record is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
(v)  "Public records" when not otherwise specified includes the 
original and copies of any paper, correspondence, form, book, photograph, 
photostat, film, microfilm, sound recording, map drawing or other document, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics that have been made by the state 
of Wyoming and any counties, municipalities and political subdivisions thereof 
and by any agencies of the state, counties, municipalities and political 
subdivisions thereof, or received by them in connection with the transaction of 
public business, except those privileged or confidential by 
law[.]

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-203(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
(b)  The custodian may deny the right of inspection of the 
following records, unless otherwise provided by law, on the ground that 
disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the public 
interest:

 
 
(i)  Records of investigations conducted by, or of intelligence 
information or security procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, city 
attorney, the attorney general, the state auditor, police department or any 
investigatory files compiled for any other law enforcement or prosecution 
purposes[.]

 
 

4Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-203(d)(xi) (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
(d)  The custodian shall deny the right of inspection of the 
following records, unless otherwise provided by 
law:

            

            
. . . .

 
 
(xi)  Records or information compiled solely for purposes of 
investigating violations of, and enforcing, internal personnel rules or 
personnel policies the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]

 
 

5As briefly 
noted in the factual recitation, no criminal charges resulted from the 
investigation.  The Albany County 
& Prosecuting Attorney's Office concluded that because the Traffic Appeals 
Committee meeting was held in an area accessible by the public and the Committee 
took no steps to restrict access the circumstances did not "justify the 
expectation that the communication [was] not subject to interception."  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-701 and 7-3-702 
(LexisNexis 2005).  While the record 
is not entirely clear, it appears that the tape remained (and continues to 
remain) in the University's possession throughout all of the 
investigations.

 
 

6Any claim that categorizes records 
received in connection with an investigation of misconduct by a public employee 
as public records would "chill" or inhibit a governmental entity from fully 
investigating allegations of employee misconduct is not well taken.  "Public scrutiny [can] never be a pretext 
for nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance." Allsop, ¶ 26, 39 P.3d  at 1100, n.6. 
 Further, the WPRA provides  an exemption safeguarding against 
disclosure of any "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." § 
16-4-203(d)(xi).  We also note that 
the investigation at issue here has been completed and is closed.  A request to view records from an open, 
on-going investigation may present different considerations under the 
WPRA.