Title: Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
DIANA NIEVES NOEL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S246490 
 
First Appellate District, Division Four 
A143026 
 
Marin County Superior Court  
CIV1304712 
 
 
July 29, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
S246490 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
This case is a putative class action brought on behalf of 
retail purchasers of an inflatable outdoor pool sold in packaging 
that allegedly misled buyers about the pool’s size.  We must 
decide whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied 
the 
representative 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
for 
class 
certification on the basis that he had not supplied evidence 
showing how class members might be individually identified 
when the time came to do so.  The Court of Appeal upheld this 
ruling.  It reasoned that this evidence was necessary to ensure 
that proper notice would be given to the class, and that without 
it, the trial court could appropriately conclude that plaintiff had 
not satisfied the ascertainability requirement for class 
certification.   
We conclude that the trial court erred in demanding that 
plaintiff offer such evidence to satisfy the ascertainability 
requirement.  Plaintiff’s proposed class definition articulates an 
ascertainable class, in that it defines the class “in terms of 
objective characteristics and common transactional facts” that 
make “the ultimate identification of class members possible 
when that identification becomes necessary.”  (Hicks v. 
Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 915 
(Hicks).)  As we will explain, the ascertainability requirement 
does not incorporate the additional evidentiary burden that the 
courts below would have imposed.  We therefore reverse the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In November 2013, plaintiff James Noel1 filed a verified 
complaint in Marin County Superior Court, alleging claims 
under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et 
seq.) (UCL), the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17500 et seq.) (FAL), and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act 
(Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (CLRA).   
These claims arose out of Noel’s purchase of an inflatable 
outdoor pool marketed as Kids Stuff Ready Set Pool 8FT X 25IN 
(hereinafter Ready Set Pool) from a Rite Aid drugstore in San 
Rafael.2  Noel alleges that his purchase of the pool was 
influenced by a photograph that appears on its packaging.  This 
photo, as it appears within the complaint, indicates that the pool 
can handily accommodate several adults when inflated and 
filled:   
                                        
1  
James Noel died while this action was pending before the 
Court of Appeal and has been replaced as plaintiff by his widow, 
Diana Nieves Noel.  To avoid confusion, our opinion refers to 
both as “Noel,” and uses the masculine pronoun whenever 
referring to plaintiff. 
2  
Defendant Thrifty Payless, Inc., operates the Rite Aid 
drugstore chain.  Our opinion refers to defendant as “Rite Aid.” 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
Noel asserts that when he set up the pool, he discovered that it 
was much smaller than the photograph on the box conveys.  To 
demonstrate this, the complaint also includes another 
photograph of the pool, as inflated and filled:   
Noel’s claims under the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA are 
premised on this alleged discrepancy.3 
In May 2014, Noel moved to certify a class defined as “[a]ll 
persons who purchased the Ready Set Pool at a Rite Aid store 
                                        
3  
Rite Aid responds that Noel did not set up the pool 
correctly.  
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
located in California within the four years preceding the date of 
the filing of this action.”  By that time, Noel had conducted 
discovery that yielded the total number of Ready Set Pools that 
Rite Aid had sold in California during the class period (20,752, 
with 2,479 of the pools being returned), and the revenue 
obtained through these sales ($949,279.34).  Noel’s discovery did 
not, however, delve into whether Rite Aid kept records of these 
transactions, or into the more general subjects of whether and 
how Rite Aid collected contact information from its customers 
and how it disseminated information to them.4   
In opposing class certification, Rite Aid argued that Noel 
had not demonstrated the existence of an ascertainable class — 
a well-established prerequisite for class certification under 
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  (See, e.g., Brinker 
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 
(Brinker); In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 318 (In 
re Tobacco II); Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 319, 326 (Sav-On); Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 429, 435 (Linder); Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (Richmond); Vasquez v. Superior 
Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809 (Vasquez); Daar v. Yellow Cab 
Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 (Daar).)  Specifically, Rite Aid 
asserted that to show an ascertainable class, Noel bore the 
burden of introducing evidence in connection with his 
certification motion that would show how members of the 
putative class could be identified later in the proceeding, so they 
                                        
4  
In his deposition, Noel testified that he had not retained 
the store receipt associated with his purchase of a Ready Set 
Pool, but had bought the pool using a debit card and possessed 
bank records containing an entry consistent with such a 
transaction.   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
could be provided with notice of the pending action.  In Rite Aid’s 
view, Noel’s failure to supply such proof doomed his certification 
effort.  
Noel responded that he had no obligation to offer evidence 
on this issue in order to secure certification of the class he 
proposed.  His briefing in support of class certification described 
various ways in which notice of the action might be distributed 
to absent class members when the time came to do so.5  He 
explained that “modern day point of sale systems used by major 
retailers such as Rite Aid can already track purchases by 
customers who pay by credit card.  Many of those customers 
likely belong to Rite Aid’s reward savings program, which 
means Rite Aid has contact information for these individuals.  
Thus, Rite Aid should be quite capable of sending individual 
notices to these purchasers.”  Noel also claimed that Rite Aid 
“sends weekly e-mails to subscribers alerting them to new sales 
and deals” and mails out weekly advertisements to California 
customers, providing two other avenues through which notice 
could be provided to absent class members.  However, Noel 
pointed to no evidence in the record (whether in the form of 
declarations, interrogatory responses or admissions by Rite Aid, 
deposition testimony, or information presented via a request for 
judicial notice) that substantiated his assertions regarding how 
class members could be notified.  He did not, for example, supply 
the trial court with specific proof that, through a loyalty 
                                        
5  
Noel advanced certain methods of identifying class 
members to explain why, in his view, published notice (although 
possible) might be unnecessary.  (See Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. 
(c)(2).)   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
program, Rite Aid has access to pertinent customer contact 
information. 
The trial court denied the motion for class certification.  
The court’s order explained that “[w]hile the court might 
reasonably infer that the class, as defined by [p]laintiff, could be 
ascertained based on common business practices and record 
keeping, [p]laintiff has presented no evidence on this subject.  
Absent some evidence as to what method or methods will be 
utilized to identify the class members, what records are 
available, (either from [d]efendant, the manufacturer, or other 
entities such as banks or credit institutions), how those records 
would be obtained, what those records will show, and how 
burdensome their production would be, the court is without 
sufficient evidence to determine whether the proposed class is 
ascertainable.  Accordingly, [the] motion to certify must be 
denied.”   
The trial court also declined to certify a class in connection 
with Noel’s CLRA claim for a second, separate reason.  In the 
court’s view, common issues did not predominate with this claim 
because reliance had to be proved individually as to each class 
member.  Finally, the court also found “that a class action is not 
superior to numerous individual actions, in light of the above 
findings.  The class action will be no more efficient than 
individual actions in light of the individual issues that must be 
presented on the issue of reliance and damages.”  The court’s 
order was not clear whether this last determination applied only 
to the CLRA class, as might be inferred by the reference to 
reliance, or to the action as a whole. 
After Noel appealed (see Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 435 [denial of certification to an entire class is an appealable 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
order]), the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the 
denial of class certification.  (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2017) 
17 Cal.App.5th 1315, 1321 (Noel).)  Addressing the superior 
court’s determination that Noel had not shown an ascertainable 
class, the reviewing court diagnosed “the underlying problem 
with the class certification motion” as “class counsel’s premature 
filing of the motion without first conducting sufficient discovery 
to meet its burden of demonstrating there are means of 
identifying members of the putative class so that they might be 
notified of the pendency of the litigation.”  (Ibid.)  The Court of 
Appeal emphasized that Noel had “submitted nothing offering a 
glimmer of insight into who purchased the pools or how one 
might find that out.  He neither described nor produced Rite 
Aid’s records . . . nor did he indicate how much . . . information 
those records might reveal.  Unless Noel could propose some 
realistic way of associating names and contact information with 
the 20,000-plus transactions identified by interrogatory 
response, there remained a serious due process question in 
certifying a class action.”  (Id., at p. 1328.)  The Court of Appeal 
continued, “While Noel was not required to actually identify the 
20,000-plus individuals who bought pools, his failure to come up 
with any means of identifying them was a legitimate basis for 
denying class certification.”  (Ibid.)6 
                                        
6  
The Court of Appeal stressed that “the modest evidentiary 
burden” (Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1333) it would impose 
upon plaintiffs seeking class certification was “something that, 
with proper foresight in the early stages of a class proceeding, 
can be addressed quite easily, especially if it is given the same 
level of care and attention as, for example, drafting a precise 
description of the class” (id., at pp. 1333-1334).   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeal 
sought 
to 
harmonize 
its 
understanding of the ascertainability requirement with the 
views of other courts.  The Court of Appeal noted that the court 
in Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (2007) 154 
Cal.App.4th 1 (Estrada) had regarded a class as “ ‘ascertainable 
if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set 
of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that 
group to identify himself as having a right to recover based on 
the description.’ ”  (Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1326, 
quoting Estrada, at p. 14, italics omitted.)  The Court of Appeal 
also observed that Sotelo v. MediaNews Group, Inc. (2012) 207 
Cal.App.4th 639 (Sotelo) had prescribed a “more demanding 
standard” for ascertainability (Noel, at p. 1327), having 
explained, “ ‘The ascertainability requirement is a due process 
safeguard, ensuring that notice can be provided “to putative 
class members as to whom the judgment in the action will be res 
judicata.”  [Citation.]  “Class members are ‘ascertainable’ where 
they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or 
time by reference to official records.  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  In 
determining whether a class is ascertainable, the trial court 
examines the class definition, the size of the class and the means 
of identifying class members.’ ”  (Noel, at p. 1327, italics omitted, 
quoting Sotelo, at pp. 647-648.)  Addressing these different 
formulations, the Court of Appeal in this case endorsed the 
Sotelo approach — describing it as “a more pragmatic approach 
in determining ascertainability, and one which comports with 
the rationale underlying the ascertainability requirement” 
(Noel, at p. 1327) — but also sought to reconcile these views by 
characterizing “Sotelo’s three-factor test as a refinement of the 
ascertainability prong of the Estrada test when that prong . . . 
requires a closer look.”  (Noel, at p. 1329.) 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
Although the appellate court below sought to reconcile the 
views of the Courts of Appeal, it recognized that some tension 
might exist between its analysis and that in Aguirre v. Amscan 
Holdings, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1290 (Aguirre).  The 
Court of Appeal in Aguirre held that a superior court had erred 
when it declined to certify a putative consumer class on 
ascertainability grounds.  (Id., at p. 1299.)  The Aguirre court 
explained that a “representative plaintiff need not identify, 
much less locate, individual class members to establish the 
existence of an ascertainable class.  [Citations.]  Nor must the 
representative plaintiff establish a means for providing personal 
notice of the action to individual class members.”  (Id., at p. 1301, 
italics added.)  The Court of Appeal in this case sought to bridge 
the distance between its views and those expressed by the 
Aguirre court by noting that the class in Aguirre could have 
included up to a million members, whereas there were only 
approximately 20,000 purchasers of the Ready Set Pool.  With 
the larger class, the Court of Appeal surmised, “perhaps 
assuming personal notice cannot be given was realistic, but with 
a class size of 20,000 we are not so quick to make that 
assumption.”  (Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1331.)  The 
Court of Appeal nevertheless conceded that its view of the 
ascertainability requirement “may be contrary to that of 
Aguirre.”  (Id., at p. 1333.) 
The Court of Appeal also found no abuse of discretion in 
the superior court’s refusal to certify a CLRA class on the basis 
that common issues did not predominate.  (Noel, supra, 17 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1334-1336.)  This aspect of the trial court’s 
order is not presently before us.  Turning to the lower court’s 
determination that a class action was not a superior vehicle for 
pressing the claims at issue, the Court of Appeal noted the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
ambiguous scope of this ruling.  (Id., at p. 1336.)  The court also 
recognized Court of Appeal precedent holding that superiority is 
not required for a class action brought under the CLRA.  (Noel, 
at p. 1336, citing Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern 
California (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 719, 727-728; see also Hogya 
v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 132-136.)  
Nevertheless, the court found any error harmless: “If the court 
intended to include lack of superiority as a reason for rejecting 
class certification on the CLRA cause of action, that was error, 
but harmless due to the other valid reasons for denying class 
certification.  If the court intended its negative superiority 
finding to apply only to the FAL and UCL causes of action, then 
it was supported by the evidence and did not amount to an abuse 
of discretion.”  (Noel, at p. 1336.)   
We granted review to clarify what the ascertainability 
requirement for class certification involves. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion, we begin by surveying the relevant general principles 
applicable to class certification.  We then turn to case law that 
has considered what it means for a class to be ascertainable.  
Drawing from this review, we conclude that the functions 
properly assigned to the ascertainability requirement are best 
served by regarding a class as ascertainable when it is defined 
“in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional 
facts” that make “the ultimate identification of class members 
possible when that identification becomes necessary.”  (Hicks, 
supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.)  This standard was satisfied 
here because the class definition provided a basis for class 
members to self-identify.  The courts below erred in importing 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
an additional evidentiary burden into the ascertainability 
requirement.   
A. General Principles 
In reviewing a class certification order, our inquiry is 
“narrowly circumscribed.”  (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 1022.)  “ ‘The decision to certify a class rests squarely within 
the discretion of the trial court, and we afford that decision great 
deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest abuse of 
discretion:  “Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate 
the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, 
they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying 
certification.”  [Citation.]  A certification order generally will not 
be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial 
evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on 
erroneous legal assumptions. ’ ”  (Ibid.)  “Under this standard, 
an order based upon improper criteria or incorrect assumptions 
calls for reversal ‘ “even though there may be substantial 
evidence to support the court’s order.” ’ ”  (Linder, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 436; see also Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, 
Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 537 [“[a] certification decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, but when the supporting 
reasoning reveals the court based its decision on erroneous legal 
assumptions about the relevant questions, that decision cannot 
stand”].) 
Here, plaintiff sought certification of a class pursuant to 
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a 
general authorization for class actions, and section 1781 of the 
Civil Code, the provisions of which govern class suits brought 
under the CLRA and inform class action practice more 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
generally.  (See Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 437; Vasquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 820.) 
Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a 
class action when “the question is one of a common or general 
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, 
and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  “[W]e 
have articulated clear requirements for the certification of a 
class” under this statute.  (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021.)  
“The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the 
existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a 
well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits 
from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to 
the alternatives.”  (Ibid.)  “The community of interest 
requirement involves three factors: ‘(1) predominant common 
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or 
defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who 
can adequately represent the class.’ ”  (Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th 
at p. 435.)  Regarding the first of these factors, we have 
recognized “ ‘[a]s a general rule’ ” that “ ‘if the defendant’s 
liability can be determined by facts common to all members of 
the class, a class will be certified even if the members must 
individually prove their damages.’ ”  (Brinker, at p. 1022; see 
also Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 706.)  Relatedly, “In certifying 
a class action, the court must also conclude that litigation of 
individual issues, including those arising from affirmative 
defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently.”  (Duran v. U.S. 
Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29.)  Finally, other 
considerations relevant to certification “include the probability 
that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove 
his or her separate claim to a portion of the total recovery and 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and 
redress alleged wrongdoing.”  (Linder, at p. 435.)   
The CLRA includes its own set of requirements for class 
certification.  Under this statute, “The court shall permit [a 
class] suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the 
represented class if all of the following conditions exist:  (1) It is 
impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court.  
[¶]  (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are 
substantially similar and predominate over the questions 
affecting the individual members.  [¶]  (3) The claims or defenses 
of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class.  [¶]  (4) The representative plaintiffs will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”  (Civ. 
Code, § 1781, subd. (b).)  We have not specifically identified 
ascertainability as an essential element for class certification 
under the CLRA, as we have for class actions authorized by 
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Yet the Courts of 
Appeal have routinely demanded that CLRA plaintiffs 
demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable class (see, e.g., 
Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1101, 1116, 
fn. 2; In re Vioxx Class Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 116, 128, 
fn. 12), and this requirement is fairly subsumed in the need to 
have a coherent “represented class” to pursue a class action 
under the statute (Civ. Code, §1781, subd. (b)). 
B. Past Discussions of Ascertainability  
Although our case law has been clear that a plaintiff must 
show an ascertainable class as a prerequisite to class 
certification, neither our decisions nor those of the Courts of 
Appeal have been as pellucid in explaining what this 
requirement entails.  
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
1. Weaver 
Our first discussion of class ascertainability appeared 
more than 70 years ago — a time when class action litigation 
remained in a formative stage.  (See Miller, The Preservation 
and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic 
Imperative (2014) 64 Emory L.J. 293, 294.)  In this milieu, the 
four plaintiffs in Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses 
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 833 (Weaver) brought a lawsuit to recover 
statutory penalties for an allegedly wrongful refusal to admit 
them to the 1947 Rose Bowl football game.  (Id., at p. 835.)  The 
plaintiffs sought to pursue the matter as a representative suit 
on behalf of themselves and hundreds of other would-be patrons 
who also had waited in line for tickets that ended up being 
allocated through assertedly improper private sales.  (Id., at p. 
836.)   
We agreed with the superior court’s determination that 
the suit was not an appropriate representative action.  (Weaver, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 835.)  We stressed, “In the present case 
there is no ascertainable class, such as the stockholders, 
bondholders, or creditors of an organization.  Rather, there is 
only a large number of individuals, each of whom may or may 
not have, or care to assert, a claim against the operators of the 
1947 Rose Bowl Game for the alleged wrongful refusal of 
admission thereto.  Each of such claimants must establish 
separately that he was refused admission, and that such refusal 
was wrongful . . . .  While each would be ‘similarly situated’ in 
that his cause of action arises under the same statute, his 
recovery would rest on a distinct premise correlative with 
varying proof as to the facts of his particular case.  In such 
circumstances there is not the necessary ‘common or general 
interest’ in the subject-matter of the litigation appropriate to the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
maintenance of a representative action as that type of 
proceeding has been analyzed in the adjudicated cases.”  (Id., at 
pp. 839-840.)   
Our opinion in Weaver, supra, 32 Cal.2d 833, also noted 
“one further point” that provided additional support for the trial 
court’s ruling.  (Id., at p. 842.)  We observed, “In cases properly 
falling within the category of representative litigation, the 
judgment or decree would be res judicata for or against the class 
sought to be represented.  [Citations.]  But that result could not 
be extended to entirely separate causes of action, such as the 
four plaintiffs have pleaded here, so as to bind ‘several hundred 
individuals’ who are not named, and who are, so far as the 
complaint shows, unknown and unascertainable.  Rather, these 
unknown parties are ascertainable only insofar as each may 
come forward and individually present proof of all the facts 
necessary to authorize a recovery in accordance with the merits 
of his particular case, and judgment in one would by no means 
be a judgment in any other.  Plaintiffs here do not claim to 
represent an association or protective committee nor do they 
present any reasonable basis for ascertaining the members of 
the alleged class for whom they seek to act in this litigation.  
[Citation.]  In short, plaintiffs’ complaint can be regarded as no 
more than an invitation to such persons as may be interested to 
join with them in this action in seeking relief ‘arising out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions’ [citation], but such 
situation furnishes no ground for the maintenance of a 
representative proceeding. . . .”  (Id., at pp. 842-843.) 
2. Chance 
We next discussed ascertainability in the context of a 
representative proceeding in Chance v. Superior Court (1962) 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
58 Cal.2d 275 (Chance).  The plaintiffs in Chance sued on behalf 
of themselves and all other owners of promissory notes secured 
by 2,139 trust deeds on specific parcels within a tract of land.  
(Id., at pp. 278-279.)  The plaintiffs alleged that they and other 
members of the putative class had been ensnared in a scheme in 
which each deed of trust was associated with only a miniscule 
parcel.  (Id., at p. 280.)  The plaintiffs sought a collective 
foreclosure, the proceeds of which would help mitigate their 
investment losses.  (Id., at p. 283.) 
In concluding that this suit could be brought as a 
representative action, we first addressed whether the requisite 
community of interest existed among class members.  We 
concluded that it did.  (Chance, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 284-286.)  
Only later did we discuss ascertainability.  Our analysis 
provided, “[A]ll of the members of the instant class are 
ascertainable (compare with Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of 
Roses Assn, supra, 32 Cal.2d 833, 839-840, 843), and it is 
assumed that they will be given notice of the pending class 
foreclosure action by registered mail or other like reliable 
method [citation], thereby being afforded an opportunity to 
decide whether to appear and argue for any and all appropriate 
or available forms of redress desirable from their individual 
points of view, against the named defendants.”  (Id., at p. 290.)  
3.  Daar 
Our most extensive discussion of class ascertainability 
appeared five years after Chance, in Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695.  
The plaintiff in Daar sued the Yellow Cab Company for allegedly 
overcharging him and other taxi customers.  (Id., at pp. 699-
700.)  He sought certification of both a subclass of customers who 
had paid for taxi services with script book coupons, and another 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
subclass of customers who had paid with cash.  Regarding the 
first of these subclasses, plaintiff alleged “that the names and 
addresses of all purchasers and users of script books can be 
definitely ascertained from defendant’s books and records.”  (Id., 
at p. 700.)  No similar assertions relevant to identification 
appeared in the class allegations pertaining to cash customers, 
as related in a separate count.  (Id., at p. 702.)   
The defendant in Daar had successfully demurred to the 
complaint.  (Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 698.)  We reversed, 
holding that the allegations in each count stated facts sufficient 
for class treatment under section 382 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.  (Daar, at pp. 714, 717.)  In relating the background 
legal principles that guided our analysis, we explained that “it 
uniformly has been held that two requirements must be met in 
order to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an 
ascertainable class [citations]; and (2) there must be a well 
defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact 
involved affecting the parties to be represented.”  (Id., at p. 704.)  
In describing the first of these requirements, we cited to our 
decisions in Weaver, supra, 32 Cal.2d 833, and Chance, supra, 
58 Cal.2d 275, and further explained that “[a]pplicable 
precedents indicate that in observing the ascertainable class 
requirement they are at the same time giving recognition to the 
principle that a group of individuals’ rights to recover, each of 
which is based on a separate set of facts, cannot be determined 
by a judgment in a class action.  To put it in another way, 
although a judgment in a class action is res judicata as to claims 
of members of the class represented therein [citations], res 
judicata will not preclude subsequent actions by those whose 
rights to recover are based upon different facts.  Therefore, such 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
individuals cannot properly be brought under the umbrella of a 
class action.”  (Daar, at pp. 704-705.)  
As in Weaver, the description of ascertainability in Daar, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d 695 did not consistently distinguish this 
prerequisite for class certification from the need to establish a 
community of interest among the class.  Portions of our opinion 
in Daar instead cast these elements as intertwined, such as our 
explanation at one juncture that “whether there is an 
ascertainable class depends in turn upon the community of 
interest among the class members in the questions of law and 
fact involved.”  (Id., at p. 706.)  
Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695 did clarify certain aspects of 
the ascertainability inquiry, however.  We explained in Daar 
that the requirement that a plaintiff show an ascertainable class 
does not subsume a “necessity of identifying the individual 
members of such class as a prerequisite to a class suit.  If the 
existence of an ascertainable class has been shown, there is no 
need to identify its individual members in order to bind all 
members by the judgment.  The fact that the class members are 
unidentifiable at this point will not preclude a complete 
determination of the issues affecting the class.”  (Id., at p. 706.)  
In the Daar matter itself, “Presumably an accounting in the suit 
at bench will determine the total amount of the alleged 
overcharges; any judgment will be binding on all the users of 
taxicabs within the prior four years.  However, no one may 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
recover his separate damages until he comes forward, identifies 
himself and proves the amount thereof.”  (Ibid.)7   
4.  Subsequent decisions of this court 
Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695 remains our most detailed 
explication of the ascertainability requirement.  In the half-
century since Daar, we have frequently mentioned the need to 
show an ascertainable class as a prerequisite to certification.  
(E.g., Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021; In re Tobacco II, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 318; Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326; 
Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 435; Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d 
at p. 470; Vasquez, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 809.)  In some instances, 
we have explained how the class before us satisfied this 
requirement.  (E.g., Richmond, at p. 478 [observing that the 
members of the class “are easily identified and located”]; 
Vasquez, at p. 811 [noting that the names and addresses of the 
approximately 200 persons in the proposed class “may be 
ascertained from defendants’ books”]; Occidental Land, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355, 360 [“class members can 
be readily identified by a search of public records”].)  On two 
other occasions, we have referenced ascertainability in finding 
no abuse of discretion in trial courts’ refusals to certify proposed 
                                        
7  
Our opinion in Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695 also quoted a 
leading treatise’s observation that “ ‘[a] distinction is sometimes 
drawn between the maintenance of the suit and its binding 
effect on the absent parties.  A sufficient pleading of the 
conditions may withstand a demurrer and satisfy the court that 
the action should proceed.  But if the judgment is thereafter 
collaterally attacked by an absent party, a more careful scrutiny 
of its representative character may be made in determining 
whether it is res judicata.’ ”  (Id., at p. 706, quoting 2 Witkin, 
Cal. Procedure (1954) Representative or Class Suits, § 99, 
p. 1080.)  
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
classes.  In both of these cases, however, there were multiple 
grounds for denying class certification, which meant that our 
analysis did not squarely address whether the failed class was 
or was not ascertainable.  (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National 
Bank (1979) 23 Cal.3d 442, 448-449; Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 
68 Cal.2d 864, 912-913.)   
We have only twice offered additional explanations of 
what it means for a class to be ascertainable.  Both of these 
descriptions were of a summary nature.  In Vasquez, supra, 
4 Cal.3d 800, we stated that “[a]s to the necessity for an 
ascertainable class, the right of each individual to recover may 
not be based on a separate set of facts applicable only to him.”  
(Id., at p. 809.)  More recently, the majority opinion in In re 
Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298 characterized ascertainability 
as a “preliminary step” to class certification, which requires that 
a class “ ‘ “be sufficiently definite so that it is administratively 
feasible for the Court to determine whether a particular 
individual is a member of the proposed class.” ’ ”  (Id., at p. 323, 
quoting Miller v. Janssen Pharmaceutica Products, L.P. (S.D.Ill. 
2007) 2007 WL 1295824, p. *5.)  Class ascertainability was not 
an issue before us in In re Tobacco II, however, and we had no 
occasion in that case to exhaustively consider how the concept 
should be understood. 
To summarize, our case law has recognized an 
ascertainability requirement for class actions, but we have not 
clearly articulated what this requirement entails or how it is 
distinct from other prerequisites for certification — especially 
the need to show a community of interest among class members.  
Our 
decisions 
have 
also 
abstractly 
tethered 
class 
ascertainability to due process considerations that include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, the need to provide absent class 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
members with adequate notice.  But this connection has not led 
to a consensus among the Courts of Appeal regarding what the 
ascertainability requirement entails. 
5. The views of the Courts of Appeal regarding 
ascertainability 
Following our decision in Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, the 
Courts of Appeal have developed two basic views of the 
ascertainability requirement.   
One view of ascertainability concentrates on the proposed 
class definition itself.  This view was applied in Bartold v. 
Glendale Federal Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816 (Bartold), 
superseded by statute on another point as stated in Markowitz 
v. Fidelity Nat. Title Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 508, 524.  The 
Bartold court explained that “[a] class is ascertainable if it 
identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of 
common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that 
group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover 
based on the description.”  (81 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.)  This basic 
view of ascertainability has been reiterated by numerous other 
Courts of Appeal, including the courts in Estrada, supra, 154 
Cal.App.4th at page 14 and Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 
pages 1299 to 1300.  (See also Aguirre, at p. 1300 [listing cases].)  
A similar formulation regards a class as ascertainable when it 
is defined “in terms of objective characteristics and common 
transactional facts” that make “the ultimate identification of 
class members possible when that identification becomes 
necessary.”  (Hicks, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.)   
The second basic view of ascertainability entails a more 
exacting inquiry.  One such articulation regards the 
ascertainability requirement as calling for an examination into 
“(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class and (3) the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
means of identifying class members.”  (Miller v. Woods (1983) 
148 Cal.App.3d 862, 873 (Miller); see also Noel, supra, 17 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1324, Sotelo, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 648; 
Reyes v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 
1274.)  Consistent with this view, it has been said that “[c]lass 
members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily 
identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to 
official records.”  (Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 
926, 932 (Rose).)  On its face, the quoted language from Rose 
could be understood as specifying a sufficient, as opposed to a 
necessary, basis for finding an ascertainable class within the 
Miller framework.8  But some courts, drawing from Rose’s focus 
on the mechanics of identifying class members, have gone 
further and required a class plaintiff to make a specific factual 
or evidentiary showing in order to show an ascertainable class.  
The Court of Appeal below, for example, regarded plaintiff as 
obligated to provide proof substantiating a specific mechanism 
or mechanisms through which class members could be identified 
                                        
8  
The court in Rose, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, ultimately 
determined that “[t]he identity of the class . . . is readily 
ascertainable from . . . departmental records” — a conclusion 
that did not necessarily rule out other avenues for showing an 
ascertainable class.  (Id., at p. 932; see also Faulkinbury v. Boyd 
& Associates, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 240 [applying the 
Rose standard and finding an ascertainable class]; Mora v. Big 
Lots Stores, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 496, 504 [same]; 
Bomersheim v. Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center (2010) 184 
Cal.App.4th 1471, 1481 [same]; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, 
Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1532-1533 [same]; Lee v. 
Dynamex, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1334 [same]; Bufil 
v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 
1206-1208 [same]; Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2006) 144 
Cal.App.4th 121, 135-136 [same].) 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
so as to be personally notified of the class proceeding.  (Noel, 
supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1329, 1333.)  The absence of 
“official” records identifying class members was central to the 
analysis in Sotelo, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 639, in which the 
Court of Appeal affirmed a denial of class certification due to the 
representative plaintiffs’ perceived failure to show an 
ascertainable class.  (Id., at p. 650.)  Other Courts of Appeal, in 
affirming denials of class certification on ascertainability 
grounds, have emphasized that the representative plaintiff or 
plaintiffs had not shown that individual class members could be 
readily identified without unreasonable expense or time.  (E.g., 
Cruz v. Sun World Internat., LLC (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 367, 
382; Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 50, 59-
61.) 
The differences between these two basic approaches to 
ascertainability can be somewhat blurred in practice.  And as 
previously noted, the Court of Appeal below attempted to 
synthesize these views.  (Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1329.)  But as this case illustrates, a court’s choice between 
the two views can be critical.  A construction of ascertainability 
that assigns the plaintiff in a putative class action an 
affirmative responsibility to show the existence of records (or 
some other mechanism or channel) through which individual 
class members can be identified for the purpose of providing 
them with personal notice of the proceeding may function to 
defeat class certification in a variety of situations.  A plaintiff 
may not anticipate the need to adduce such proof at the time 
class certification is sought, meaning that no precertification 
discovery will have occurred on this point.  This kind of 
evidentiary requirement also can prevent certification when a 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
plaintiff’s 
discovery 
efforts, 
albeit 
substantial, 
produce 
inadequate evidence from the perspective of the court.   
An additional burden emerges when the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that individual members of the proposed class can 
“be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time.”  
(Rose, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 932.)  With such a 
requirement, 
class 
certification 
may 
be 
denied 
on 
ascertainability grounds due to expected complexities in the 
provision of notice, or in distinguishing class members from 
nonmembers — without close consideration necessarily being 
given to whether these difficulties are actual, as opposed to 
merely hypothetical, or whether they are so intransigent and 
pervasive 
that 
they 
would 
make 
a 
class 
proceeding 
unmanageable, or undesirable in light of the plausible 
alternatives.   
6.  The 
views 
of 
the 
federal 
courts 
regarding 
ascertainability 
Federal courts have wrestled with ascertainability issues 
in cases where plaintiffs have sought certification of a class under 
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.).9  
Although this rule does not expressly demand an ascertainable 
class, most courts tasked with applying it have regarded 
ascertainability as an implicit “ ‘threshold’ ” requirement for 
certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3).  (Sandusky Wellness 
Center v. MedTox Scientific (8th Cir. 2016) 821 F.3d 992, 995; but 
see Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 844 F.3d 1121, 
1124-1125, fn. 4 [“we have addressed the types of alleged 
definitional deficiencies other courts have referred to as 
                                        
9  
All further references to “Rule 23” and its subparts are to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.).  
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
‘ascertainability’ issues . . . through analysis of Rule 23’s 
enumerated requirements”].)  In this context, competing views 
regarding ascertainability have emerged within the federal 
system, just as they have within the courts of this state.   
A stringent view of ascertainability is most closely 
associated with decisions produced by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  (See Marcus v. BMW of North 
America, LLC (3d Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 583, 592-594 (Marcus); 
Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (3d Cir. 2013) 725 F.3d 349, 354-
356; Carrera v. Bayer Corp. (3d Cir. 2013) 727 F.3d 300, 305-
312.)  Under this approach, a plaintiff seeking class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(3) must show not only that the class has been 
“defined with reference to objective criteria,” but also that there 
is “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for 
determining whether putative class members fall within the 
class definition.”  (Hayes, at p. 355.)  Courts adopting this 
conception of ascertainability have refused to certify (or upheld 
refusals to certify) consumer classes in situations such as the 
one presently before this court — in which it is unlikely, or at 
least unproven, that individual purchasers of the commodity at 
the heart of the dispute would have retained their receipts or 
other proof of purchase, the defendant did not maintain a 
specific list of purchasers, and the putative class representative 
offered no proof when seeking certification “that a single 
purchaser of [the product] could be identified using records of 
customer membership cards or records of online sales.”  
(Carrera, at p. 309; see id., at pp. 304, 312.)   
Other courts have pushed back on this stringent approach 
to ascertainability.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit is among the federal courts that assign a 
narrower function to the ascertainability requirement.  Its 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
decision in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC (7th Cir. 2015) 795 
F.3d 654 (Mullins) offers a thorough, and in our view 
illuminating, assessment of how ascertainability should be 
understood in connection with class certification.  Because the 
analysis in Mullins is particularly helpful in resolving the issue 
before us, we discuss its facts and reasoning at some length 
below.  (See Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 437-439 [consulting 
federal court decisions construing Rule 23 for guidance in 
dealing with similar class certification issues arising under 
state law].) 
The plaintiff in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654, secured the 
certification of a consumer class under Rule 23(b)(3) in a matter 
alleging that the defendant made fraudulent representations in 
marketing a dietary joint supplement.  (Mullins, at p. 658.)  
Drawing from the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence, the defendant 
in Mullins argued on appeal of the certification order that the 
class was not ascertainable because the plaintiff had “fail[ed] to 
show a reliable and administratively feasible way to determine 
whether a particular person is a member of the class.”  (Id., at 
p. 661.)   
The appellate court in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654, 
rejected this view of ascertainability and affirmed the class 
certification order entered by the district court.  (Id., at p. 658.)  
In doing so, the federal court of appeals distinguished between 
a 
relatively 
uncontroversial 
“ ‘weak’  
version 
of 
ascertainability,” and the more demanding ascertainability 
standard adopted by the Third Circuit.  (Id., at p. 659.)  The 
“ ‘weak’ ” construction of ascertainability, the court explained, 
derives from “experience [that] has led courts to require that 
classes be defined clearly and based on objective criteria.”  (Ibid.)  
Even in this weak form, Mullins elaborated, the requirement of 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
a clearly defined class based on objective criteria is far from 
toothless, for it serves to weed out “classes that are defined too 
vaguely” (ibid.), “classes that are defined by subjective criteria, 
such as by a person’s state of mind” (id., at p. 660), and “classes 
that are defined in terms of success on the merits — so-called 
‘fail-safe classes’ ” (ibid.), all of which raise due process or other 
fairness concerns.  The Mullins court regarded this approach to 
ascertainability as striking an appropriate balance, whereas the 
Third Circuit’s more exacting conception of this requirement did 
not.  In the view of the Mullins court, the more demanding 
specification “does not further any interest of Rule 23 that is not 
already 
adequately 
protected 
by 
the 
Rule’s 
explicit 
requirements.  On the other side of the balance, the costs of 
imposing the requirement are substantial.  The stringent 
version of ascertainability effectively bars low-value consumer 
class actions, at least where plaintiffs do not have documentary 
proof of purchases, and sometimes even when they do.”  (Id., at 
p. 662.)   
Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 then proceeded to dissect the 
specific policy arguments advanced for the Third Circuit’s 
construction of the ascertainability requirement.  (Id., at pp. 
663-672.)  One such contention was that the “stringent version 
of ascertainability ‘eliminates serious administrative burdens 
that are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class 
action by insisting on the easy identification of class members.’ ”  
(Id., at p. 663, quoting Marcus, supra, 687 F.3d at p. 593.)  The 
Mullins court saw this concern as “better addressed by the 
explicit requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that the 
class device be ‘superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently 
adjudicating 
the 
controversy,’ ” 
with 
one 
consideration relevant to the superiority inquiry being “ ‘the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
likely difficulties in managing a class action.’ ”  (Mullins, 
quoting Rule 23(b)(3), (b)(3)(D).)   
Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 explained why it made more 
sense to address within the context of manageability any 
concerns about the burdens that could be associated with the 
identification 
of 
class 
members: 
“When 
administrative 
inconvenience is addressed as a matter of ascertainability, 
courts tend to look at the problem in a vacuum, considering only 
the administrative costs and headaches of proceeding as a class 
action.  [Citation.]  But when courts approach the issue as part 
of a careful application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority standard, 
they must recognize both the costs and benefits of the class 
device.  [Citation.]  [¶] . . . In many cases where the heightened 
ascertainability requirement will be hardest to satisfy, there 
realistically is no other alternative to class treatment.”  (Id., at 
pp. 663-664.)  The court in Mullins cautioned that “[t]his does 
not mean . . . that district courts should automatically certify 
classes in these difficult cases,” and granted that “[i]f faced with 
what appear to be unusually difficult manageability problems 
at the certification stage, district courts have discretion to insist 
on details of the plaintiff’s plan for notifying the class and 
managing the action.”  (Id., at p. 664.)  Yet, the court continued, 
judges who encounter such challenges should attempt to 
leverage their “experience with and flexibility in engineering 
solutions to difficult problems of case management,” and 
“refusing to certify on manageability grounds alone should be 
the last resort.”  (Ibid.)   
The court in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 also addressed 
an argument that resonated with the Court of Appeal in this 
case — “that the heightened ascertainability requirement is 
needed to protect absent class members.  If the identities of 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
absent class members cannot be ascertained, the argument 
goes, it is unfair to bind them by the judicial proceeding.”  (Id., at 
p. 665.)  It perceived that “[a] central premise of this argument 
is that class members must receive actual notice of the class 
action so that they do not lose their opt-out rights.”  (Ibid.)   
The court in Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 regarded this 
premise as mistaken.  It emphasized that, when a class has been 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the 
provision of the “ ‘best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who 
can be identified through reasonable effort’ ” — language 
connoting that individual notice need not be given to members 
who cannot be so identified.  (Mullins, at p. 665.)10  Nor, in the 
court’s view, did principles of due process invariably require 
individual notice to absent class members.  Instead, in cases 
such as the one before it, “When class members’ names and 
addresses are known or knowable with reasonable effort, notice 
can be accomplished by first-class mail.  [Citation.]  When that 
is not possible, courts may use alternative means such as notice 
through third parties, paid advertising, and/or posting in places 
                                        
10  
With classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), 
meanwhile, the federal rules provide more generally that “the 
court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”  (Id., Rule 
23(c)(2)(A).)   
 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
frequented by class members, all without offending due 
process.”  (Ibid.)11 
Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 also explained why 
construing the ascertainability requirement as anticipating 
personal notice in all cases could provide absent class members 
with a pyrrhic victory.  “More broadly,” the court wrote, “the 
stringent version of ascertainability loses sight of a critical 
feature of class actions for low-value claims like this one.  In 
these cases, ‘only a lunatic or a fanatic’ would litigate the claim 
individually, [citation], so opt-out rights are not likely to be 
exercised by anyone planning a separate individual lawsuit.  
When this is true, it is particularly important that the types of 
notice that courts require correspond to the value of the absent 
class members’ interests.  [Citation.] . . . .  [¶]  The heightened 
ascertainability approach upsets this balance.  It comes close to 
insisting on actual notice to protect the interests of absent class 
members, yet overlooks the reality that without certification, 
putative class members with valid claims would not recover 
anything at all.”  (Id., at pp. 665-666.)  
                                        
11  
Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 also rejected the argument 
that a heightened ascertainability requirement was necessary 
to protect the due process interests of class action defendants by 
protecting them from bogus claims and disproportionate 
liability.  (Id., at pp. 669-672.)  These concerns do not resonate 
here, in any event.  There is no suggestion that, if the plaintiff 
class ultimately prevails, Rite Aid will face any onslaught of 
spurious claims, much less a bevy that could not be weeded out 
through a competent claims administration process.  Also, 
because it is known how many pools were sold and not returned, 
and how much in revenue Rite Aid earned from these sales, the 
overall body of claims has a functional ceiling that further 
marginalizes any prospect of exaggerated liability.    
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
C. 
Analysis 
1. An ascertainable class is one defined in objective 
terms that make the eventual identification of class 
members possible 
Although Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d 654 applied only 
federal law, much of its analysis rings true here as well.  We 
agree with Mullins’ assignment of a limited but important 
function to the ascertainability requirement.  We conclude that 
the objectives of this requirement are best achieved by regarding 
a class as ascertainable when it is defined “in terms of objective 
characteristics and common transactional facts” that make “the 
ultimate identification of class members possible when that 
identification 
becomes 
necessary.” 
 
(Hicks, 
supra, 
89 
Cal.App.4th at p. 915.)  We regard this standard as including 
class definitions that are “sufficient to allow a member of [the 
class] to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover 
based on the [class] description.”  (Bartold, supra, 81 
Cal.App.4th at p. 828.)   
This understanding of the threshold requirement of 
ascertainability for class certification protects the due process 
interests of all parties and absent class members without 
unduly impairing the efficacy of the class action mechanism.  We 
have explained some of the benefits that class proceedings such 
as the one at bar can yield:  “Not only do class actions offer 
consumers a means of recovery for modest individual damages, 
but such actions often produce ‘several salutary by-products, 
including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in 
fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises by 
curtailing illegitimate competition, and avoidance to the judicial 
process of the burden of multiple litigation involving identical 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
claims.’ ”  (Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 445, quoting Vasquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 808; see also Vasquez, at p. 807.)   
But a class proceeding must be maintained in a manner 
consistent with due process.  A class definition framed in 
objective terms that make the identification of class members 
possible promotes due process in at least two ways.  Such 
phrasing puts members of the class on notice that their rights 
may be adjudicated in the proceeding, so they must decide 
whether to intervene, opt out, or do nothing and live with the 
consequences.  (See Hicks, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 914 
[“[a]scertainability is required in order to give notice to putative 
class members as to whom the judgment in the action will be res 
judicata”].)  This kind of class definition also advances due 
process by supplying a concrete basis for determining who will 
and will not be bound by (or benefit from) any judgment.  
Allowing a class to be defined in vague terms, by contrast, could 
blunt any invocation of res judicata by the defendant in 
subsequent lawsuits brought by persons attempting to relitigate 
issues decided in the earlier class proceeding.  The outcome 
might resemble that which obtains when the “one-way 
intervention” condemned by our decision in Fireside Bank v. 
Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1078 (Fireside Bank) 
occurs — the defendant could be unfairly exposed to a succession 
of essentially duplicative class lawsuits (see id., at pp. 1078-
1083).12 
                                        
12  
The ascertainability standard we endorse also addresses 
similar fairness concerns that may be associated with other 
problematic class definitions, such as a class defined by its 
putative members’ subjective states of mind, as opposed to 
 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
The Court of Appeal saw a slightly different set of due 
process considerations as favoring a more stringent approach to 
ascertainability.  It expressed concern that, without an 
evidentiary showing by plaintiff, absent class members would 
never receive notice of the action and would therefore lack the 
opportunity to opt out.  To this effect, the Court of Appeal quoted 
Sotelo, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at page 649: “ ‘The theoretical 
ability to self-identify as a member of the class is useless if one 
never receives notice of the action.’ ”  (Noel, supra, 17 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1327.)  We appreciate the court’s interest in 
protecting the due process rights of absent class members.  Yet, 
as we explain below, this concern does not justify the evidentiary 
burden that the Court of Appeal attached to the ascertainability 
requirement — or, for that matter, any blanket requirement 
that class members must be identifiable “by reference to official 
records” (Rose, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 932) to form an 
ascertainable class. 
We agree, of course, that the provision of notice to absent 
class members carries due process connotations.  (See Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S 797, 811 (Shutts); 
Fireside Bank, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1083.)  But due process 
does not dictate that certification of a putative plaintiff class 
invariably must depend on all absent class members being sent 
(much less receiving) individual notice of the action.  Instead, 
                                        
objective facts.  (See 1 Newberg on Class Actions (5th ed. 2011) 
§ 3:5, p. 168 [“[c]ourts generally deny certification when the 
putative class is defined by class members’ state of mind”]; see 
also Mullins, supra, 795 F.3d at p. 660; Simer v. Rios (7th 
Cir.1981) 661 F.2d 655, 669-670.)  
 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
the law adopts a more nuanced and pragmatic approach, 
consistent with the general principle that when an important 
judicial mechanism for advancing the social good is involved, “A 
construction of the Due Process Clause which would place 
impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be 
justified.”  (Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 
306, 313-314 (Mullane).)   
Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. 306 provides the touchstone for 
assessing how due process informs the provision of notice in the 
context of a class action.  The court in Mullane recognized that 
“[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process 
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.  [Citations.]  The 
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information, [citation], and it must afford a reasonable 
time for those interested to make their appearance [citations].”  
(Id., at p. 314.)  Significantly, the court drew the following line: 
“But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of 
the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional 
requirements are satisfied.  ‘The criterion is not the possibility 
of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of 
the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the 
statute deals.’ ”  (Id., at pp. 314-315.)   
Applying these principles, the court in Mullane, supra, 
339 U.S. 306 reasoned that in connection with a particular 
judicial settlement of accounts, notice by personal mail was 
required for beneficiaries whose identities and mailing 
addresses were actually known.  (Id., at p. 318.)  Yet, “in view of 
the character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests” 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
involved, notice by publication would suffice for those 
beneficiaries “whose interests or whereabouts could not with 
due diligence be ascertained.”  (Id., at p. 317.)  Likewise, “more 
certain notice” could be dispensed with for those beneficiaries 
“whose interests are either conjectural or future or, although 
they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course 
of business come to knowledge of the common trustee.”  (Ibid.)  
This notice scheme was “the best practicable, ‘reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.’ ”  (Shutts, supra, 472 
U.S. at p. 812, quoting Mullane, at pp. 314-315, italics added.) 
Our case law has adopted a similarly practical approach, 
in which the circumstances of each case determine what forms 
of notice will adequately address due process concerns.  (See 
Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 444 [describing the notice inquiry 
as entailing due consideration of “the necessity, feasibility and 
costs of any particular form of notice”].)  Recall that in Daar, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, examined ante, we found the allegations 
in the complaint sufficient to state a viable class even as to 
taxicab customers who paid in cash, for whom the prospect of 
individualized notice was far-fetched at best.  (Id., at p. 714.)  In 
doing so, we disavowed any “necessity of identifying the 
individual members of such class as a prerequisite to a class 
suit.  If the existence of an ascertainable class has been shown, 
there is no need to identify its individual members in order to 
bind all members by the judgment.”  (Id., at p. 706.)  We then 
added, “The fact that the class members are unidentifiable at 
this point will not preclude a complete determination of the 
issues 
affecting 
the 
class.” 
 
(Ibid., 
italics 
added.)  
“Unidentifiable” means more than just unidentified.  Our use of 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
the former term conveyed that in a case such as Daar, due 
process does not demand that the proponent of class treatment 
demonstrate, as a prerequisite for certification, that (much less 
how) class members eventually will receive individual notice of 
the action. 
Since then, we have observed that individual notice may 
not always be required even for absent class members whose 
whereabouts are known, explaining “the representative plaintiff 
in a California class action is not required to notify individually 
every readily ascertainable member of his class without regard 
to the feasibility of such notice; he need only provide meaningful 
notice in a form that ‘should have a reasonable chance of 
reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.’ ”  
(Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 861, 
quoting Cartt v. Superior Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974; 
compare Rule 23(c)(2)(B) [upon certifying a class under Rule 
23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort”].)  One Court of Appeal has elaborated that “when the 
membership of the class is huge, the damages are minimal, and 
res judicata and . . . other problems . . . are insignificant, notice 
by publication is adequate.”  (Cooper v. American Sav. & Loan 
Assn. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 274, 285.)   
The pertinent statutes and California Rules of Court are 
in accord.  With claims brought as putative class actions under 
the CLRA, “If the action is permitted as a class action, the court 
may direct either party to notify each member of the class of the 
action.  The party required to serve notice may, with the 
consent of the court, if personal notification is unreasonably 
expensive or it appears that all members of the class cannot be 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
notified personally, give notice as prescribed herein by 
publication in accordance with Section 6064 of the Government 
Code in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in 
which the transaction occurred.”  (Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (d).)  
In the same spirit, the Rules of Court prescribe an array of 
considerations for determining the form or forms of notice that 
should be provided to a certified class.  Pursuant to rule 3.766(e) 
of the California Rules of Court, “In determining the manner of 
the notice [to class members], the court must consider: [¶] 
(1) The interests of the class; [¶] (2) The type of relief requested; 
[¶] (3) The stake of the individual class members; [¶] (4) The cost 
of notifying class members; [¶] (5) The resources of the parties; 
[¶] (6) The possible prejudice to class members who do not 
receive notice; and [¶] (7) The res judicata effect on class 
members.”  The rules of court also provide that “[i]f personal 
notification is unreasonably expensive or the stake of individual 
class members is insubstantial, or if it appears that all members 
of the class cannot be notified personally, the court may order a 
means of notice reasonably calculated to apprise the class 
members of the pendency of the action — for example, 
publication in a newspaper or magazine; broadcasting on 
television, radio, or the Internet; or posting or distribution 
through a trade or professional association, union, or public 
interest group.”  (Id., rule 3.766(f), italics added.) 
To summarize, due process does not invariably require 
that personal notice be directed to all members of a class in order 
for a class action to proceed, or for that matter that an individual 
member of a certified class must receive notice to be bound by a 
judgment.  (See Juris v. Inamed Corp. (11th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3d 
1294, 1321 [citing cases]; 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure (3d ed. 2005) § 1789.1, p. 571.)  It follows that a 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
construction of the ascertainability requirement that presumes 
such notice is necessary to satisfy due process, and demands 
that the plaintiff show how it can be accomplished, threatens to 
demand too much, too soon.  It is likewise mistaken to take a 
categorical view that the relevant due process interests can be 
satisfied only when “official records” (Rose, supra, 126 
Cal.App.3d at p. 932) supply the means of identifying class 
members, and for a similar reason: due process is not that 
inflexible.13  
The Court of Appeal below recognized the possibility that 
due process might not require individual notice to absent class 
members in all circumstances.  As recounted ante, the Court of 
Appeal noted that the court in Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th 
1290 had declined to require such notice to consumers within 
the plaintiff class.  (Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1331.)  It 
distinguished Aguirre on the ground that the class in that case 
was much larger than the proposed class is here.  (Noel, at 
p. 1331.)  We believe the point is more fundamental: As a rule, 
a representative plaintiff in a class action need not introduce 
evidence establishing how notice of the action will be 
communicated to individual class members in order to show an 
ascertainable class.   
This bright-line rule maintains the straightforward 
nature of what is properly understood as a threshold 
requirement for class certification, and allows for the relevant 
                                        
13  
As a somewhat distinct point, we also observe that 
premising ascertainability on the existence of official records 
capable of being used to identify class members might, in some 
situations, incentivize potential class action defendants to 
destroy or refuse to maintain useful records that could provide 
a basis for class treatment.   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
due process interests to be more sensitively calibrated and 
addressed through other mechanisms.  As shown, the 
development of a notice plan that comports with due process 
implicates a diverse array of considerations.  (See Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 3.766(f); Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 444, 446.)  
Some of the facts relevant to the development of a 
constitutionally adequate notice plan normally will not be 
immediately obvious from the class definition itself.  Regardless 
of the size of the class or other relevant circumstances, a demand 
that the representative plaintiff show how individualized notice 
could be provided to class members in order to establish an 
ascertainable class could preempt a more careful, nuanced, and 
potentially collaborative assessment, and in doing so impose 
upon the plaintiff an absolute requirement that closer review of 
all of the relevant facts could demonstrate to be excessive in 
light of the interests involved.  
This case illustrates the problem.  The record before us 
does not establish all of the facts and circumstances relevant to 
a determination regarding the appropriate form or forms of 
notice to the class.  Yet the record casts substantial doubt on the 
proposition that due process can be satisfied only through the 
provision of individual notice to the approximately 20,000 
members of the putative class.  For one thing, these purchasers 
may not be reasonably identifiable.  Meanwhile, given the 
modest amount at stake (the pool having retailed for $59.99), 
the odds that any class member will bring a duplicative 
individual action in the future are effectively zero.  Thus the 
true choice in this case is not between a single class action 
challenging the packaging of the Ready Set Pool and multiple 
individual actions pressing similar claims; it is between a class 
action and no lawsuits being brought at all.  Under the 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
circumstances, due process may not demand personal notice to 
individual class members, and to build a contrary assumption 
into the ascertainability requirement would be a mistake.14  
Reading into the ascertainability element an additional 
requirement that the identification of class members must occur 
“ ‘without unreasonable expense or time’ ” (Sotelo, supra, 207 
Cal.App.4th at p. 648) runs a similar risk of preempting a more 
careful analysis later.  Our jurisprudence addressing class 
certification has stressed the importance of a careful weighing 
of both the benefits and the burdens that may be associated with 
a proposed class action.  (See, e.g., Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
pp. 445-446.)  A conception of ascertainability as concerned with 
whether class members can be identified without an 
unreasonable commitment of expense or time is at cross 
purposes with this direction.  As the court in Mullins supra, 
795 F.3d at pages 663 to 664 explained in rejecting a similar 
expansion of the ascertainability requirement, such an approach 
trains the court’s attention, at a threshold juncture, exclusively 
toward the side of the ledger where costs and challenges are 
compiled.  This focus means that full attention will not 
necessarily be given to countervailing considerations — such as 
whether these difficulties, although present, might nevertheless 
be effectively managed through application of the various tools 
and resources courts have at their disposal for effective 
                                        
14  
To be clear, we have no occasion at this time to decide 
precisely what would constitute adequate notice to absent 
members of the proposed class in this case.  Presumably, after 
remand any and all appropriate inquiries will be made into 
matters relevant to the provision of adequate notice.   
 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
supervision of a class proceeding, and whether, notwithstanding 
possible notice issues, an appropriately supervised class action 
nevertheless can be expected to deliver benefits that, from a 
comparative perspective, 
would make it preferable to 
alternative courses of action.15   
                                        
15   
Numerous decisions by the Courts of Appeal, in addition 
to the opinion below, have invoked and applied the standard for 
ascertainability originally set forth in Rose v. City of Hayward, 
supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at page 932, providing that “[c]lass 
members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily 
identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to 
official records.”  (See Hefczyc v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San 
Diego (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 518, 536-540; Kendall v. Scripps 
Health (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 553, 574-575; Cruz v. Sun World 
Internat., LLC, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 375-382; Hale v. 
Sharp Healthcare, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58-61; 
Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, supra, 
217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728-731; Faulkinbury v. Boyd & 
Associates, Inc., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 240; Sotelo v. 
MediaNews Group, Inc., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 648-650; 
Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 504; 
Bomersheim v. Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center, supra, 184 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1481; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1532-1533; Lee v. Dynamex, Inc., 
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334; Bufil v. Dollar Financial 
Group, Inc., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1206-1208; Aguiar v. 
Cintas Corp. No. 2, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 135-136.)  As 
our analysis should make clear, this is one way but not the only 
way to show an ascertainable class.  We therefore disapprove of 
this standard insofar as it could be perceived as exclusive.  
Likewise, 
insofar 
as 
the 
three-factor 
approach 
to 
ascertainability set forth in Miller, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at 
page 873 could be read to demand a more exacting inquiry than 
the approach we endorse today, we disapprove of it, as well. 
 
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
Our view of the ascertainability requirement does not 
prohibit a court asked to certify a class from considering the 
separate question of notice to absent class members.  Arguments 
and evidence relating to the provision of notice to the class 
conceivably could counsel against class certification insofar as 
they may show that another requirement for a proper class 
proceeding, aside from ascertainability, has not been met — e.g., 
that a class action would be unmanageable, even after due 
consideration is given to how manageability concerns could be 
resolved; or that a class proceeding would not be superior to the 
alternatives.  (Accord, Mullins, 795 F.3d at p. 664 [“If faced with 
what appear to be unusually difficult manageability problems 
at the certification stage, district courts have discretion to insist 
on details of the plaintiff’s plan for notifying the class and 
managing the action.”].)16  But, at the risk of repetition, we 
conclude that these issues, where they exist, are appropriately 
addressed outside of and separately from the ascertainability 
requirement.   
2.  The trial court abused its discretion when it found no 
ascertainable class existed 
 
It follows from the analysis above that the trial court erred 
when it determined that the class proposed by plaintiff is not 
ascertainable.  It is.  The phrasing, “All persons who purchased 
                                        
16  
Even though class definition is logically antecedent to the 
question of how notice is to be provided to the class (see Fireside 
Bank, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1074; Home Savings & Loan Assn. 
v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010) and notice 
is commonly addressed after class certification (see, e.g., Linder, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 444), contemporaneous inquiries into 
both class definition and notice are permissible under the CLRA 
(see Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (c)(1), (2)) and the rules of court 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.766(c)).   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
the Ready Set Pool at a Rite Aid store located in California 
within the four years preceding the date of the filing of this 
action” is neither vague nor subjective.  A member of the class 
could appreciate from this definition whether he or she is 
included within it, and thus be in a position to take appropriate 
steps to protect his or her interests.  And the definition makes 
the res judicata consequences of a judgment clear, creating no 
ambiguity as to who will and will not be bound by the outcome.  
(See Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 706.)17   
To the extent that the trial court had concerns regarding 
the state of the record as it pertained to matters such as the 
provision of notice to class members, or how burdensome it 
would be to identify class members, those issues should not have 
been resolved in the context of ascertainability.  And regardless 
of whether plaintiff’s failure to supply evidence associated with 
the identification of class members might have supported a 
refusal to certify a class on some other ground (but cf. Daar, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 706), it manifestly did not justify a failure 
to find an ascertainable class.  Our review ends there.  (See 
Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 436.)  
III.  DISPOSITION 
As noted ante, the trial court denied the motion for class 
certification in its entirety on ascertainability grounds.  That 
                                        
17  
The record developed below does not establish whether 
Rite Aid sold Ready Set Pools in other sizes during the class 
period.  If so, the class definition’s reference to purchasers of “the 
Ready Set Pool” (italics added) may require clarification, to 
establish that only purchasers of the model measuring eight feet 
by 25 inches are included within the class.  This flaw within the 
definition would not, however, mean that the class is not 
ascertainable.   
NOEL v. THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
court also denied certification of the proposed CLRA class on the 
basis that common issues did not predominate.  Because we do 
not address the latter aspect of the trial court’s ruling here, 
overturning its ascertainability determination would not, by 
itself, make a CLRA class viable.  The trial court also offered a 
third justification for denying class certification that was 
ambiguous in its scope.  It is unclear whether the trial court had 
only the proposed CLRA class in mind when it determined that 
a class action would not be superior to the alternatives, or 
whether this conclusion applied to the entirety of the action.  It 
also cannot be discerned from this vantage point whether the 
court’s erroneous view of ascertainability informed its analysis 
on this issue.  Because of these uncertainties, we reverse the 
judgment below and remand the case to the Court of Appeal 
with directions to remand the matter to the superior court for 
further proceedings consistent with our decision.  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 17 Cal.App.5th 1315 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S246490 
Date Filed: July 29, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Marin 
Judge: Paul M. Haakenson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Emergent Legal, Emergent, Christopher Wimmer, Peter Roldan; Public Justice, Leslie Brueckner and Karla 
Gilbride for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Chavez & Gertler, Mark A. Chavez; Public Citizen Ligation Group and Allison M. Zieve for Public Citizen 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Rock Law, Matt J. Malone; Nelson & Fraenkel, Gretchen M. Nelson; Arbogast Law and David M. 
Arbogast for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Robert J. Nelson, Roger N. Heller and Melisa Gardner for National 
Consumer Law Center and National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jocelyn D. Larkin and Daniel Nesbit for Impact Fund, California Employment Lawyers Association, 
Centro Legal de la Raza, Legal Aid at Work and Worksafe as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Kelly, Hockel & Klein, Klein, Hockel, Iezza & Patel, Michael D. Early and Mark P. Iezza for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Utrecht & Lenvin and Paul F. Utrecht for Washington Legal Foundation and California Retailers 
Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Leslie Brueckner 
Public Justice 
475 14th Street, Suite 610 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 622-8205 
 
Michael D. Early 
Klein, Hockel, Iezza & Patel 
455 Market Street, Suite 1480 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 951-0535