Title: RM and BC, v. WASHAKIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE; and WYOMING SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RM and BC,  v.  WASHAKIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE; and WYOMING SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION2004 WY 162102 P.3d 868Case Number: C-03-2Decided: 12/10/2004NOTICE:   This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming  82002 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
October Term, A.D. 2004

 

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF RM, a minor

IN 
THE INTEREST OF BC, a minor

 
 
RM 
and BC,

 
 
Appellants(Respondents),

 
 
v.

 
 

WASHAKIE 
COUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT

NUMBER 
ONE; and WYOMINGSCHOOL

BOARDS 
ASSOCIATION,

 
 
Appellees(Intervenors).

 
 
Reserved 
Constitutional Question

from 
the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 

John 
P. Worrall and Kyle R. Smith of Worrall & Greear, PC, Worland, WY; John M. 
Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Nick Beduhn and Meredith Asay, Student Interns, 
of the University of Wyoming Legal Services Program, Laramie, WY.  Argument by Mr. Smith and Ms. 
Asay.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 

Tracy 
J. Copenhaver and Scott E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & 
Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, WY.  
Argument by Mr. Kolpitcke.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
 

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
*Final 
decision of the court rendered on November 29, 2004.

 
 
 
 
            
LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      This case 
comes to this court as a reserved constitutional question pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-13-101 (LexisNexis 2003).  
Washakie County School District Number One (the School 
District) expelled two students for a period of one 
year.  These two students were also 
subject to actions under the Juvenile Justice Act, and both were adjudged 
delinquent.  During the juvenile 
proceedings, the court ordered the School District to provide both students with a free and appropriate 
education during the period of expulsion.  
The School District and the Wyoming 
School Boards Association (WSBA) intervened and made a motion for an order 
reserving a constitutional question.  
Thus, we are asked to consider whether the provisions of the Wyoming constitution 
require a school district to provide an education to a student who has been 
lawfully expelled.  We answer the 
reserved question in the negative.   

 
 
 
 
RESERVED 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 

 
 
[¶2]      The parties each 
state the reserved question in a slightly different manner.  The question as stated by the juvenile 
court is:

 
 
Do the provisions of Wyoming Constitution Article 1, Section 3, or 
the provisions of Wyoming Constitution Article 7, Section 9, require a public 
school district that has lawfully expelled a student for a period of one (1) 
year or less to continue to provide an educational program to a student adjudged 
to be a juvenile delinquent?
 
 
The 
basic argument presented by the parties in their briefs is whether an alternate 
education must be provided for lawfully expelled students under the Wyoming 
constitution.  We determine that 
this is a proper characterization of the issue we must 
resolve.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      RM and BC were 
caught selling marijuana to other students while on school grounds.  After a hearing before the School 
District's board of trustees, the board unanimously elected to expel both 
students from school for a period of one year, finding that RM's and BC's acts 
were detrimental to the safety, education, and welfare of the other students in 
the district.  The expulsions were 
not appealed, and there is no issue as to the propriety of the expulsions.   

 
 
[¶4]      Petitions were 
also filed in the juvenile court pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Act alleging 
both juveniles to be delinquent.  In 
separate juvenile court proceedings, each juvenile admitted to the allegation 
that he was a delinquent child.  In 
addition to the terms of probation for each child, the juvenile court ordered 
the School District to provide RM and BC with a 
free and appropriate education during the period of the student's 
expulsion.  In doing so, the 
juvenile court specifically concluded that the School District had an obligation 
under the Wyoming constitution to provide such an 
education to these students.  

 
 
[¶5]      The School District also expelled a third student for selling 
marijuana on school grounds.  This 
third student had been previously identified as a special education student and 
was receiving services pursuant to his individualized education plan (IEP).  Pursuant to federal statute and 
Department of Education rules governing special education, this student 
continued to receive the educational services mandated by his 
IEP.

 
 
[¶6]      After the 
juvenile court's entry of orders requiring the School District to provide a free 
and appropriate education to RM and BC, the School District and the WSBA were allowed to 
intervene in the juvenile court action.  These parties requested that the juvenile 
court reserve the question of constitutional law to this court.  For purposes of 
allowing this review to proceed, the School District agreed to waive any objection 
to lack of notice and opportunity to participate.  The juvenile court agreed to reserve the 
constitutional question, and this court accepted the reserved question of 
constitutional law as presented above.  The School District did not provide any educational 
services to either student during the terms of their respective expulsions. 

 
 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The district court's 
interpretation of the requirements of the Wyoming constitution and the 
resulting constitutional question presents a question of law, which we review de novo.  Eklund v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 2004 WY 24, ¶10, 86 P.3d 259, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2004). 

 
 
            
In construing our constitution, we follow essentially the same rules as 
those governing the construction of a statute. The fundamental purpose of those 
rules of construction is to ascertain the intent of the framers. Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 
2000); Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 
Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 (1918). 
"We are charged with discerning the intent of the Constitutional Convention, and 
we look first to the plain and unambiguous language to discern that intent." Geringer, 953 P.2d  at 843.

 

Director of Office of StateLands & Invs. v. 
Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 
73, ¶33, 70 P.3d 241, ¶33 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Because this case 
comes before us after the expiration of the student's term of expulsion, it is 
appropriate that we first address the issue of mootness.  While it is true 
that this question is technically moot because the expulsion period is over, 
there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine.  One exception is if the case presents an 
issue of great public importance.  See Walker v. Board of CountyComm'rs, 644 P.2d 772, 774 
(Wyo. 1982).  The question of 
what constitutes great public importance rests with this court, and we find this 
case to present such an issue.    Jolley v. 
State Loan & Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 
7, ¶10, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2002).  
Specifically, the reserved question involves the recognized fundamental 
right to an education and an interpretation of the provisions of our 
constitution providing for that right.  Although not all cases involving fundamental 
rights and constitutional interpretation present an issue of great public 
importance sufficient to overcome the mootness doctrine, this matter does so 
because it involves the significant issue of education in an area not previously 
considered by this court. As such, this action presents this court with the 
opportunity to consider the constitution in a manner not considered before and 
is of sufficient importance to warrant a full discussion.  

 
 
[¶9]      Another important 
exception, likewise applicable in this instance, is if the case presents a 
controversy capable of repetition yet evading review.  See Board of County Comm'rs v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶18, 55 P.3d 714, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2002).  Under 
Wyoming statute a school district 
can expel a student for a maximum period of one year.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-4-305(d) (LexisNexis 2003).1  Given the time it takes for a case to reach 
this court, it is unlikely that a one-year expulsion term will ever be intact 
when a case gets to the point of our review.  As such, if mootness stands as a barrier to 
considering the question in this case, it likely always will.  Accordingly, we 
find it appropriate to consider this issue at this time. 

 
 
[¶10]   We are also compelled to comment on the 
procedural oddities that attended this case.  This case is presented and argued to this 
court as a reserved constitutional question pursuant to § 1-13-101 and W.R.C.P. 
52(d).  Section 
1-13-101 reads:

 
 
            
When an important and difficult constitutional question arises in a 
proceeding pending before the district court on motion of either party or upon 
his own motion the judge of the district court may cause the question to be 
reserved and sent to the supreme court for its decision.

 
 
Rule 52(d) is a reduction to rule form of the applicable 
case law regarding proceedings pursuant to § 1-13-101.  Rule 52(d) states: 

 
 
(d)  Reserved 
questions.In all cases in which a court reserves an important and difficult 
constitutional question arising in an action or proceeding pending before it, 
the court, before sending the question to the supreme court for decision, shall 
(1) dispose of all necessary and controlling questions of fact and make special 
findings of fact thereon, and (2) state its conclusions of law on all points of 
common law and of construction, interpretation and meaning of statutes and of 
all instruments necessary for a complete decision of the case. No constitutional 
question shall be deemed to arise in an action unless, after all necessary 
special findings of fact and conclusions of law have been made by the court, a 
decision on the constitutional question is necessary to the rendition of final 
judgment. The question reserved shall be specific, and shall identify the 
constitutional provision to be interpreted. The special findings of fact and 
conclusions of law required by this subdivision of this rule shall be deemed to 
be a final order from which either party may appeal, and such appeal may be 
considered by the Supreme Court simultaneously with the reserved question.

 
 
In 
this instance, the School 
District and the WSBA were not parties to the juvenile court 
action.  
Consequently, they never presented evidence or participated in the 
proceedings before they intervened nor did they present evidence after they 
intervened.  The district court, therefore, never had the 
opportunity to make findings of fact on any evidence that the School District and WSBA may have 
presented.  
Nevertheless, the underlying case in this appeal is a juvenile action 
alleging both juveniles to be delinquent.  The findings necessary for a complete 
decision in that case have been made.  All that remains to be determined is the 
constitutional question.  We similarly conclude that the district court 
has made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law for our purposes and 
that additional findings are not necessary.    

 
 
[¶11]   With these preliminary matters 
addressed, we finally arrive at the constitutional question before us.  The first order of 
business is to determine the level of constitutional analysis to apply.  The School District and the WSBA advance 
the argument that the rational basis test applies in this situation.  In doing so they 
cite to Doe v. Sup't of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995) 
and Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807 (Neb. 1997).   The courts in 
both these cases determined that even though education had been found to be a 
fundamental right under their state constitutions and strict scrutiny applied 
when considering school funding issues, rational basis review was the proper 
level of review for analyzing a suspension or expulsion.  

 
 
[¶12]   In making this determination the Doe court found that the Massachusetts constitution did not 
guarantee each individual student the fundamental right to an education.  Doe, 653 N.E.2d  at 1095.  The court refused to hold that a fundamental 
right existed "which would trigger strict scrutiny analysis whenever school 
officials determine, in the interest of safety, that a student's misconduct 
warrants expulsion." Id.  In doing so, the 
court seemed to accept the idea that education is a community right not an 
individual right.  
Therefore, the right may be lost by conduct detrimental to the community 
as a whole.  
Id.  
The Kolesnick court held similarly.  See Kolesnick, 558 N.W.2d  at 813.  While the rationale 
for this distinction undoubtedly has its merits, we find it incompatible with 
our constitution and our previous interpretations of the constitutional 
provisions pertaining to education.   

 
 

[¶13]   When considering the issue of 
education, we have stated:  "In the light of the emphasis which the 
Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is no room for any conclusion 
but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental 
interest."  
Washakie CountySch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 
(Wyo. 1980).  Our extensive 
analysis in Washakie considered the Wyoming constitution as a whole, 
citing to many provisions of the Wyoming constitution pertaining to 
education.  
Some of the provisions cited include, art. 1 § 28, art. 1 § 23, 
art. 7 § 1-14, and art. 21 § 28.  Id., at 319-33.  In looking at these various provisions, we 
concluded that the founders of our state placed fundamental importance on 
education and, therefore, strict scrutiny must apply.  Id., at 333.  "Strict scrutiny' is the standard applied when it becomes 
necessary to balance a fundamental right against a compelling state interest. It 
requires the establishment of the compelling state interest and the showing that 
the method of achieving such is the least intrusive of those methods by which 
such can be accomplished."  Michael v. 
Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶14]   After Washakie, several cases involving the right to 
education followed, in which this court further considered the applicable 
analysis.  In Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1266 
(Wyo. 1995) we explained, "[t]he 
triggering issue in Washakie was wealth-based 
disparities; however, we now extend that decision beyond a wealth-based 
disparity to other types of causes of disparities."  We then went on to 
state: 

 
 
            
Because the right to an equal opportunity to a proper education is 
constitutionally recognized in Wyoming, any state action 
interfering with that right must be closely examined before it can be said to 
pass constitutional muster.  Such state action will not be entitled to the 
usual presumption of validity; rather, the state must establish its interference 
with that right is forced by some compelling state interest and its interference 
is the least onerous means of accomplishing that objective.
 
 

Id., at 1266-67.  See also State v. 
Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 
19, ¶42, 19 P.3d 518, ¶42 (Wyo. 
2001).  

 
 
[¶15] In Campbell, we likewise noted that 
the interaction of the various components revealed the necessity to review the 
financial system as a whole under one level of scrutiny.  Campbell, 907 P.2d  at 1267.  Although that conclusion pertained to whether 
various provisions of the school financing system should be reviewed under 
different levels of scrutiny, we find the import of that statement equally 
applicable in this instance.  Education and how it is funded, maintained, 
and provided on a day-to-day basis is complex and made up of many different 
interconnected parts.  
We, therefore, think it unwise and in many respects impractical to use 
different constitutional tests for the various aspects of that important 
right.  Thus, 
we conclude that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to apply to the matter 
at hand.    

 
 
[¶16]   The first thing to determine under the 
strict scrutiny test is whether the state has a compelling interest to 
protect.  The 
School District asserts 
that they have a compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of 
its students and that it is this interest that the expulsions protect.  We agree.  There is little 
doubt that the safety and welfare of students in the state are of utmost 
importance.  
Article 7 § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution requires that the legislature 
create and maintain "a thorough and efficient system of public schools."  As noted by the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, implicit within the constitutional 
guarantee of "a thorough and efficient system of free schools" is the need for a 
safe and secure school environment.  A school cannot fulfill its basic purpose of 
providing an education without such an environment.  Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914 (W.Va. 1996) (overruled on other grounds by Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W.Va. 1997)).  
Indeed, RM and BC rightfully concede that the School District's interest in this area is 
compelling and that expulsions further this interest. 

 
 
[¶17]   Having concluded that a compelling 
state interest exists, we must next determine whether the School District's actions are the least onerous 
means of accomplishing that compelling interest.  The majority of RM's and BC's argument 
focuses on this step of the analysis.  They claim that expulsion without providing 
alternate educational benefits is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's 
interest.  
Instead, they argue that providing students with an alternate education 
is less onerous because each student would still be receiving educational 
services.  Thus 
the student's right to an education is more thoroughly and precisely protected 
when an alternate education is provided.  We do not agree that an alternate education 
must be provided for several reasons.  

 
 
[¶18]   First, in deciding whether the action 
is narrowly tailored in this case, it is important to remember the fundamental 
right at stake.  
Article 1 § 23 of the Wyoming Constitution states: "The right of the 
citizens to opportunities for education should have practical recognition.  The legislature 
shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences 
and liberal arts."  
As can be seen by the language of the constitution, the fundamental right 
provided is an opportunity for an education.  After considering 
the various provisions of the constitution related to education, we have noted 
"[t]he sense of Washakie was to require the 
legislature to examine the entire education system, including its funding, and 
reform it in order to provide an equal opportunity for a quality 
education.'"  
Campbell, 907 P.2d  at 1263.  The state's 
obligation then is to, "provide an education system of a character which 
provides Wyoming students with a uniform 
opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens, participants 
in the political system, and competitors both economically and 
intellectually."  
Id., at 
1259.   

 
 

[¶19]   The school district has provided such a 
system and, as a result, has given RM and BC an equal opportunity for a quality 
education.  
However, the fundamental right to an opportunity for an education does 
not guarantee that a student cannot temporarily forfeit educational services 
through his own conduct.  Educational services are provided with 
reasonable conditions because the Wyoming constitution requires that 
all students receive an 
equal opportunity to a quality education.  State v. Campbell 
County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 
90, ¶1, 32 P.3d 325, ¶1 (Wyo. 
2001). The actual receipt of educational services is accordingly contingent upon 
appropriate conduct in conformity with state law and school rules.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned:

 
 
[A]s this Court stated in Fowler v. Williamson, 39 N.C.App. 715, 718, 251 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1979), "[t]he right to attend school and claim the benefits of the 
public school system is subject to lawful rules prescribed for the government 
thereof." A student's right to an education may be constitutionally denied when 
outweighed by the school's interest in protecting other students, teachers, and 
school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system. As 
a general rule, a student may be constitutionally suspended or expelled for 
misconduct whenever the conduct is of a type the school may legitimately 
prohibit, and procedural due process is provided. Reasonable regulations 
punishable by suspension do not deny the right to an education but rather deny 
the right to engage in the prohibited behavior. See Craig v. Buncombe Co. Board of Education, 80 N.C.App. 
683, 343 S.E.2d 222 (1986).

 

In 
re Jackson, 
352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (N.C.App. 1987).  

 
 
[¶20]   Additionally, while the Doe court ultimately decided that rational basis was 
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, the court provided sound reasoning 
regarding the opportunity for an education and its relationship to school 
discipline.  
Therein, the court stated, "It reasonably may be argued that a 
requirement that a student who is expelled for misconduct, no matter how 
egregious, be provided with alternate education by a public school system, would 
be likely to have a serious detrimental effect on the ability of school 
officials to deter dangerous behavior within a school by imposing expulsion as a 
sanction."  Doe, 653 N.E.2d  at 1097.  "A child may be entitled to an education but 
is not entitled to disrupt or to endanger the educational process."  Id., at 1103 (Liacos, Chief Justice, dissenting, arguing 
that strict scrutiny should be applied).  We agree with this reasoning.  The power to 
prohibit conduct is ineffective without the additional capacity to impose 
penalties for noncompliance.  We, therefore, conclude that a student may 
temporarily have his educational services suspended if his conduct threatens the 
safety and welfare of other students and school employees and thereby interferes 
with the school district's obligation to provide an equal opportunity for a 
quality education to all the students of that district.  

 
 
[¶21]   Second, the term of each student's 
expulsion lasts for only one year.  As mentioned above, Wyoming statute does not allow a 
school to expel a student permanently.  The "fact that the forfeiture is temporary is 
important" because "temporary deprivation of constitutional rights does not 
require the protection that a permanent deprivation would."  Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 355 (W.Va. 1997) (Workman, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, citing Keith D. v. Ball, 350 S.E.2d 720, 
723 n.3 (W.Va. 1986)).  Indeed, RM's and BC's argument that the 
action is not narrowly tailored is based on the premise that the school 
district's action in expelling them without an alternate education "denied all 
educational opportunities to the students."  We do not believe this to be the case.  The temporary 
suspension of educational services is not the denial of all educational 
opportunities.  
Students in Wyoming may attend school 
until the age of 21.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-301 
(LexisNexis 2003).   Following the expiration of the 
expulsion term students can return to school and once again receive educational 
services.  
Accordingly, RM and BC are not being denied all educational 
opportunity.  
Following a suspension it is the student's choice whether or not to 
return to school.  

 
 
[¶22]   Third, a school district is not 
required to expel every student in every instance, nor is there a policy that 
alternate education cannot be provided.  In arguing that the School District was 
required to provide an alternate education, the juvenile court cited to Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340.  While we 
agree with the Cathe A. court that strict scrutiny 
is the proper level of constitutional analysis, several factors at work in that 
case are distinguishable from the case at hand and, as a result, we find the 
ultimate analysis and conclusion inapplicable.  

 
 
[¶23]   In Cathe A., 
the court was called on to consider the West Virginia Productive and Safe 
Schools Act, which required expulsion for bringing a weapon to school.  The court first 
noted that in West Virginia education is a 
fundamental right and therefore the strict scrutiny test must be applied.  Id., at 346-47.  The court then noted that the need for a safe 
and secure environment is implicit in the guarantee of a thorough and efficient 
system of schools, and that the legislature was entitled to believe that only a 
12-month expulsion would serve as an effective deterrent to further that 
important goal. Id., at 348 (citing Phillip Leon 
M., 484 S.E.2d at 914).  Thus, the court concluded that the act 
requiring expulsion for weapons violations was not facially unconstitutional. 

 
 
[¶24]   However, following its discussion of 
the facial constitutionality of the act, the court sought to determine whether 
an alternate education must be provided and conducted an "as applied" analysis 
in light of two West Virginia policies.  The first policy 
was that an alternate education would be provided to an expelled student only if 
that student's parents paid for it.  The court found that this policy was not 
narrowly tailored.  
Id., at 349.  In making this finding the court found that a 
child's fundamental right to an education, including the right to be provided 
with educational opportunities and services, which can be limited by narrowly 
tailored restrictions necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, cannot 
be conditioned on the child's or parent's ability or willingness to reimburse 
the state.  
Id., at 
349.  The 
second policy was a state superintendent policy mandating that a child who was 
removed by the act was not entitled to any state-funded instruction during the 
pendency of their expulsion.  Id., 
at 350.  
The court stated:

 
 
            
A policy to the effect that the State has no 
responsibility to provide any state-funded 
educational opportunities and services to any 
children who are expelled under the Productive and Safe Schools Act, W.Va.Code, 
18A-5-1a(g) [1995] is constitutionally infirm because the State has not shown 
that applying such a limitation to all such children 
under all circumstances is reasonably necessary and 
narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest in safe and secure 
schools. 

 
 

Id., at 350 (emphasis in original).  No comparable 
policies are at work in this case, and we therefore find that the court's 
analysis is not strictly applicable.  

 
 
[¶25]   Indeed, in circumstances such as those 
before us, a school district is not required to expel a student but must 
determine whether to do so on a case-by-case basis. As such, that district can 
tailor the length of a suspension according to each student's 
circumstances.  
Because school districts must tailor their decisions to deny educational 
services to fit the circumstances of each case, the temporary expulsion of 
students is narrowly tailored to fit the state's compelling interest in 
protecting the safety and welfare of its students.2  Furthermore, the 
school districts are in the best position to judge the student's actions in 
light of all the surrounding circumstances and tailor the appropriate punishment 
to fit the unique circumstances of each student's situation.  Because Wyoming 
does not have a policy that an alternate education cannot be provided, the 
decision whether to provide such services can similarly be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.3  In tailoring the appropriate response when 
faced with such a decision, the school district can then balance the compelling 
state interest of needing to protect other students, teachers, and staff, as 
well as the need to deter other children from engaging in the same type of 
conduct against the student's fundamental right to an opportunity for an 
education.   

 
 
[¶26]   In light of these considerations, we 
determine that a school district is not constitutionally required to provide an 
alternate education to lawfully expelled students.  Furthermore, 
because the school district must consider all of the surrounding circumstances 
and cannot expel a student for more than a year, we find that expulsions without 
an alternate education are a narrowly tailored interference with a child's right 
to an opportunity for a quality education.  Lastly, RM and BC argue that many social 
policies exist for providing an alternate education, such as increased academic 
abilities, decreased disruptive behavior, and decreased drop out rates.  We would note that 
just as no one doubts that the state had a compelling interest in keeping 
schools safe, we are confident that no one doubts that these policies are indeed 
good and worthwhile policies.  However, we must agree with Chief Justice 
Workman in Cathe A, wherein he said:  

 
 
In an ideal world it surely would be preferable to provide 
an alternative education to students who are expelled; and even in our own 
imperfect world, it is still a better idea to do so (at least in my 
opinion).  
However, we are judges, not legislators; and 
unless the legislation is determined to be unconstitutional, it is really 
properly a legislative decision as to what is a good idea.  Thus, the only 
proper inquiry for this Court is whether our state constitution requires the provision of such educational 
services.  And 
the answer to this question is quite clearly that the constitution does not 
require it.  

 
 

Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d  at 354-55 (Workman, Chief Justice, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).4

 
 
[¶27]   RM and BC also argue that their 
expulsion violates equal protection because students covered by the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) receive educational services if they are 
expelled.  See 
20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1)(A).  IDEA is a federal law pertaining to the 
education of disabled students.  IDEA creates certain procedural and 
substantive protection for the education of disabled students.  Although the act is 
mandated by the federal government and backed up with federal funds, its 
application in Wyoming must nevertheless be 
analyzed under the same strict scrutiny test in determining whether its 
requirements present an equal protection violation.  Thus, we must first 
determine whether the state has a compelling state interest to protect.  In Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309, 108 S. Ct. 592, 596-97, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686, 698 (1988) (citations omitted) the United States 
Supreme Court explained some of the rationale behind the act.   

 
 
[C]ongressional 
studies revealed that better than half of the Nation's 8 million disabled 
children were not receiving appropriate educational services.  Indeed, one out of 
every eight of these children was excluded from the public school system 
altogether; many others were simply "warehoused" in special classes or were 
neglectfully shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop 
out.  Among the 
most poorly served of disabled students were emotionally disturbed children: 
Congressional statistics revealed that for the school year immediately preceding 
passage of the Act, the educational needs of 82 percent of all children with 
emotional disabilities went unmet.  
 
 
[¶28]   We believe that this history presents a 
compelling interest in treating children with disabilities differently than 
those without disabilities.  The history of discrimination and inadequate 
educational services for disabled children, compounded with the hardship 
disabled children face in overcoming their disability, presents a compelling 
interest.  
Furthermore, the IDEA is a narrowly tailored method of providing for that 
interest.  
Providing services to disabled students covered by IDEA, without 
providing the same services to non-disabled students is narrowly tailored in 
rectifying the long history of disparity that existed for disabled 
students.  We 
can think of no other less onerous means of remedying this disparity.  As such, we find 
that there is no equal protection violation.  

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   We hold that the Wyoming constitution does not 
require that an alternate education be provided to students who have been 
lawfully expelled.  
We similarly find that it does not violate equal protection to provide an 
alternate education to disabled students that are expelled while not providing 
such an education for non-disabled students.  As a result, we answer the reserved 
constitutional question in the negative.  

 
GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶30]      I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe this Court has the authority 
to alter the reserved question.  The reserved question presented was 
specifically limited to the constitutional requirements of a public school 
district to provide an alternative education to properly expelled youths who are 
also adjudged delinquent.  The question does not address the generic 
situation of expelled youths generally.  The difference is significant.  The question 
reserved includes, by implication, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  By altering the 
question, the majority has taken the question out of context and the result is 
an advisory opinion with no application to the underlying case.  

 
 

[¶31]      RM and BC were lawfully expelled from school and did not 
directly appeal their expulsions or bring declaratory judgment actions 
challenging the constitutionality of the terms and conditions of their 
expulsions (including the absence of any provision for publicly provided 
alternative education).  The majority opinion would be appropriate 
only if this Court were reviewing the results of such a declaratory action.

 
 

[¶32]      A great deal of analysis in the majority opinion is spent 
on the constitutionality of expulsion.  Yet the expulsion is not at issue.  The issue is 
whether the juvenile court can order the public school district to provide a 
free and appropriate alternative education to the expelled youths adjudged 
delinquent.  
Constitutionally, the question is whether the state has a compelling 
interest in not providing expelled students adjudged delinquent with an 
alternative education and whether not providing an alternative education to 
these students is narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.  Neither question is 
answered by the majority opinion.  The conclusion of the majority opinion is 
that the Wyoming Constitution does not demand the provision of alternative 
education to expelled students, but nothing prevents the provision of 
alternative education.5  Thus, the majority opinion leaves open the 
possibility that the juvenile court can order a public school district to 
provide alternative education, exactly what the juvenile court did in the 
underlying case and what the public school district is attempting to protest.6

 
 

[¶33]      The particular context of the actual reserved question 
presented does not lend itself to proper review by this Court.  The reserved 
question, while raising a constitutional issue, also specifically refers to the 
students being subject to the authority of the juvenile court and having been 
adjudged delinquent.  
In their respective subsequent delinquency proceedings, the juvenile 
court, without the participation of the School District, ordered the School District to provide RM and BC 
with a free and appropriate education.  In the juvenile court action, the ultimate 
goal of the specific order was to ensure that RM and BC received a free 
alternative education during the term of their respective expulsions.  Instead of 
investigating other possible sources of authority for ordering a free and 
appropriate education from any available, appropriate source,7 the juvenile 
court relied instead solely upon its interpretation of a constitutional mandate 
upon the public school district.  

 

[¶34]      It has long been held that this Court will not determine 
constitutional questions when a decision can be based upon other grounds.  Further, W.R.C.P. 
52(d) states that "[n]o constitutional question shall be deemed to arise in an 
action unless, after all necessary special findings of fact and conclusions of 
law have been made by the court, a decision on the constitutional question is 
necessary to the rendition of final judgment."  This Court has held that "it would be not 
only improper to decide the constitutional question sought to be presented on 
the brief and the reserved questions, but that this court is without 
jurisdiction to do so until it shall plainly appear that such decision is 
necessary to the disposition" of the case.  State v. Kelley, 
17 Wyo. 335, 344, 98 P. 886, 889 (Wyo. 1909).  Because the 
juvenile court never looked to its own authority or alternative resources 
available to it for its disposition of these students, the constitutional 
question is not appropriately before this Court for review.

 
 

[¶35]      Even if this Court were to accept the reserved question for 
review, I do not agree that this Court has the facts available to it to 
adequately analyze the reserved question.  No adversarial proceedings were held below by 
which the legal and factual issues relevant to the reserved constitutional 
question were framed, argued and decided.  The School District was not a party to the juvenile 
court actions when the juvenile court issued its respective orders.  When the School District did intervene, it did 
not request a rehearing before the juvenile court.  The School District simply requested the 
juvenile court reserve a constitutional question to this Court, which was 
done.  

 
 

[¶36]      The juvenile court thus was not presented with the legal 
and factual arguments from the School 
District.  
Because the issue was not properly joined and argued below, the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of the juvenile court are incomplete.  There are no 
findings regarding a compelling state interest or narrowly tailored 
resolutions.  
The legal arguments presented by the School District in its brief upon review were 
never considered by the juvenile court.  Factually, after intervention the School District submitted several 
affidavits containing factual assertions that it deems pertinent to the 
determination of the reserved question, yet these facts have never been examined 
by the juvenile court, either for accuracy or for applicability.  The juvenile court 
had no information regarding the impact of the lack of education to expelled 
students on the expelled students, the main student body, the school districts, 
the state, or anyone else potentially affected by both the policy and any 
potential alternatives.  Such information is relevant to a 
determination of the nature of the government interest concerned and the 
appropriateness of the option chosen by the state to further that government 
interest. 

 
 

[¶37]      Because of the procedural posture of this case, for all 
practical purposes this Court is being asked to exercise original jurisdiction 
in this matter.  
We are being asked to make the initial determination of the facts and the 
law necessary to the determination of the reserved question.  Neither Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-13-101 nor W.R.C.P. 52(d) grant this Court jurisdiction to review a 
constitutional question prior to a full determination of the lower court of all 
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.  "It has 
consistently been the position of this court that even when constitutional 
questions are reserved, under statutory authority, the court will not consider 
them until all preliminary matters, including factual questions, are finally 
disposed of and there is nothing left to do but apply the answer to the 
constitutional question."  Knudson v. 
Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680, 686 
(Wyo. 1976). See also State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1976); Hanchey v. Steighner, 549 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1976).

 
 

[¶38]      Finally, I am concerned about deciding a question that is 
so patently moot.  
The expulsion of these students ended over a year ago.  The principle of 
mootness applies even to issues of fundamental importance.  See In re SNK, 2003 WY 141, ¶¶22, 23, 78 P.3d 1032, ¶¶22, 23 
(Wyo. 2003) (even though issue presented was important, the issue was not 
reviewed because of a finding that the issue was moot.  "This court has 
clearly estab­lished that it will not make determinations which may be 
characterized as advisory, and this court will not digress from such a position 
unless extreme circumstances demand.")  
 Neither side has presented any argument in 
their respective briefs as to why this Court should not consider the question 
moot.  

 
 

[¶39]      I cannot say that the answer to the reserved constitutional 
question is necessary in the context of a juvenile court proceeding nor will the 
answer to the actual question reserved be anything but advisory at this 
time.  See In re AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 
1987) ("The disposition of AJ and the efficacy of the order entered by the 
district court will continue without change regardless of the determination of 
the issues by this court.  The case is moot and will not be considered 
because the judgment rendered cannot be carried into effect.")  Most importantly, 
the answer to the question of constitutional law reserved would not be 
dispositive of the question of the authority of the juvenile court to order a 
public school district to provide expelled students adjudged delinquent with a 
free and appropriate education.  Given the context and the procedural posture 
of this case, this Court should decline to review the reserved question.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-4-305(d) provides: 

 
 
The board of trustees of any school district or the 
superintendent if designated, may suspend a student for a period exceeding ten 
(10) school days or may expel a student for a period not to exceed one (1) year, 
provided the student is afforded an opportunity for a hearing in accordance with 
the procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115].  

 

2We note that a 
statute similar to the West Virginia Productive and Safe Schools Act requiring 
expulsion for weapons violations exists in Wyoming.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-305(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  
Because that statute was not the basis for RM's and BC's expulsions, we 
do not consider that statute at this time.   

 
 

3Because RM and 
BC did not appeal their expulsions we have no record to review whether such 
consideration was given in this case.  

 

4Legislatures in 
other states have decided that providing an alternate education is a "good idea" 
and have determined that an alternate education must be provided to lawfully 
expelled students.  
See, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-266 (2003); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-92 
(2004).

 

5This answer 
raises its own questions, such as potential equal protection issues.

 
 

6By answering 
only a generic question, the majority opinion also leaves open the question of 
which governmental entity should be responsible for providing and paying for an 
alternative education, if such were to be ordered and provided to expelled 
students adjudged delinquent.

 

7For instance, 
there is no discussion of the authority of the juvenile court to order placement 
of the juveniles in a facility such as Cathedral Home or Normative Services 
where the juveniles would receive an education.  Also, it could be argued that the juvenile 
court has the authority to order the School District to provide free and appropriate 
educational services to expelled students based upon the statutory and equitable 
powers possessed by the juvenile court granting it the flexibility to deal with 
the needs of juveniles.  This judicially recognized and supported 
flexibility is best illustrated by the cases of In re 
NG, 14 P.3d 203 (Wyo. 2000), 
and In Re DCP, 2001 WY 77, 30 P.3d 29 (Wyo. 
2001).  In In re NG, a juvenile court ordered the Department of 
Family Services (DFS) to pay for electronic monitoring services provided to a 
juvenile.  The 
services were provided to the juvenile while the juvenile was subject to a Child 
In Need Of Supervision (CHINS) action, but not pursuant to the CHINS 
action.  The 
services had been ordered by the municipal court in a different case and were 
continued after the municipal court order had expired.  Certainly there is 
no constitutional requirement that DFS provide such services.  Despite that fact, 
and the fact that the services were never ordered as part of the CHINS 
proceeding, the NG Court affirmed the order of the 
juvenile court, citing the authority of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-403(a)(ii):

(a) Coincident with proceedings concerning a minor alleged 
to be in need of supervision, the court has jurisdiction to:

                        
. . . . 

(ii) Order any party to the proceedings to perform any 
acts, duties and responsibilities the court deems necessary; . . . .

In its reliance upon this statute, the 
NG Court emphasized that 
juvenile courts must have the authority to be flexible because "[i]t is not 
reasonable to expect the legislature to foresee every method that might be 
employed to assist a juvenile."  NG, 14 P.3d  at 
205.   

This Court again stressed the propriety of juvenile court 
flexibility in ordering services and payment for services in In re DCP.  The 
DCP Court determined that 
DFS could be ordered to pay for an out of state placement of a child subject to 
a juvenile delinquency petition.  The Court determined that, although specific 
statutes regarding requirements for out-of-state placements had not been 
strictly complied with, substantial adherence to the placement statutes was 
adequate because there were overriding interests to strict compliance.  "In this case, we 
conclude there was a clear indication that the out-of-state placement 
effectuated the protection of public safety and provided for the care, 
protection, and mental and physical development of DCP. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-201(c)(ii), (iii) (LexisNexis 2001)." DCP, ¶19. 

Thus, in the instant case, whether or not the School 
District is required by the Wyoming Constitution to provide lawfully expelled 
students with an alternative education is irrelevant to the question of whether 
a juvenile court can order this School 
District to provide an alternative education to RM and BC.  Even should we 
answer the constitutional question in the negative, the Juvenile Court arguably 
possesses other authority supporting such an order.  The Juvenile 
Justice Act, at issue in this case, contains the same grant of flexible power to 
the juvenile court as the statute in In Re NG.  The juvenile court 
can order any party to perform any act the court deems necessary.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-203(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Pursuant to the logic of this Court in In re DCP, the overriding factor in a delinquency case 
is to "effectuate[] the protection of public safety and provide[] for the care, 
protection, and mental and physical development of" RM and BC.  DCP, ¶19.

This Court is not suggesting that we hereby decide that the 
juvenile court has the authority to order the School District to provide students with a free 
alternative and appropriate education.  We only hold that the means sought  an 
answer to a reserved question of constitutional law  will have no dispositive 
effect in the underlying juvenile court proceedings.  First and foremost, 
the propriety of this juvenile court order must be reviewed within the context 
of the Juvenile Justice Act.