Title: Tatro v. Langston

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Bobbie TATRO, As Personal Representative of
the Estate of Arlen D. Tatro, Deceased v.
Honorable Don LANGSTON, Circuit Judge

97-54                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 19, 1997


1.   Prohibition, writ of -- when prohibition will lie -- purpose
     of writ. -- Prohibition will not lie unless the trial court is
     clearly without jurisdiction or has acted without authority
     and the petitioner is unquestionably entitled to such relief;
     the purpose of the writ is to prevent a court from exercising
     a power not authorized by law when there is no other adequate
     remedy by appeal or otherwise; it is never issued to prohibit
     an inferior court from erroneously exercising its
     jurisdiction, but only where the inferior tribunal is wholly
     without jurisdiction or is proposing or threatening to act in
     excess of its jurisdiction.  

2.   Civil procedure -- statutes of limitation constitute
     affirmative defense -- limitations generally not
     jurisdictional -- prohibition not available as remedy if
     statute of limitations governing particular proceeding is not
     jurisdictional. -- Statutes of limitation constitute an
     affirmative defense, but they are generally not
     jurisdictional; those that are jurisdictional are tied to the
     right itself and not just the remedy; prohibition is not
     available as a remedy if the statute of limitation governing
     a particular proceeding is not jurisdictional but may only be
     raised as an affirmative defense. 

3.   Prohibition, writ of -- statute of nonclaim extends tort
     actions for personal injuries to situations where liability
     insurance was in force at time of accident even though statute
     of nonclaim has expired. -- petition for prohibition denied. -
     - The plain language in Arkansas's statute of nonclaim,  28-
     501-101(a) and (f), authorizes and extends tort actions for
     personal injuries where, as here, there was liability
     insurance in force on the deceased's vehicle at the time of
     the accident, but the statute of nonclaims has expired; even
     though respondent might not be successful in obtaining a
     judgment against the estate at the trial of this action,
     respondent was entitled to a determination of the rights
     alleged in the complaint; because petitioner failed to show
     that the respondents' tort claims were jurisdictionally barred
     and a writ was clearly warranted, the supreme court denied the
     petition for prohibition.  


     Petition for Writ of Prohibition from Sebastian Circuit Court;
Don Langston, Judge; petition denied.
     Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, by:  E.
Diane Graham and Rebecca D. Hattabaugh, for petitioner.
     Sexton & Fields, P.L.L.C., by:  Stephen H. Meeh, for
respondent.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     On April 3, 1991, Arlen D. Tatro was driving his vehicle when
it collided with John Bankord's.  Tatro died the same day as a
result of the accident and Bankord sustained injuries due to the
collision.  Arlen's widow, Bobbie, opened Arlen's estate on May 10,
1991, and was appointed administratrix.  The estate's notice was
published on May 17, 1991.  All claims against the estate were
paid, and on January 22, 1992, the probate court ordered Arlen's
estate closed, discharged Bobbie, and released her surety.
     Bankord had filed no claim in Tatro's estate.  Instead, on
April 4, 1994, and ostensibly within the three-year statute of
limitations for negligence claims, Bankord and his wife filed suit
in circuit court against Bobbie Tatro, naming her the personal
representative of Arlen's estate.  Bobbie answered, denying she was
any longer the personal representative of Arlen's estate and
specifically denying all other allegations in Bankord's complaint. 
The Bankords dismissed their complaint without prejudice on
April 11, 1995, but they reinstituted their suit on April 9, 1996,
to which Bobbie again denied being the personal representative of
Arlen's estate.  
     Bobbie subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the three-year statute of limitations had expired
before the Bankords filed suit, and that under Ark. Code Ann.  28-
53-119 (1987) the Bankords were obliged, but failed, to reopen
Tatro's estate in order to pursue their claims.  The Bankords, on
the other hand, relied upon Ark. Code Ann.  28-50-101(a) and (f)
(Supp. 1995), and argued that Tatro's estate continued in legal
existence and remained subject to suit in tort even in the absence
of initiating the procedure for reopening the estate.  Those
statutory provisions in  28-50-101 provide as follows:
          (a)  STATUTE OF NONCLAIM.  Except as provided in 
     28-50-102 and 28-50-110, all claims against a decedent's
     estate . . . shall be forever barred as against the
     estate, the personal representative, or the heirs and
     devisees of the decedent, unless verified to the personal
     representative or filed with the court within three (3)
     months after the date of the first publication of notice
     to creditors.  However, claims for injury or death caused
     by the negligence of the decedent shall be filed within
     six (6) months from the date of first publication of the
     notice, or they shall be forever barred and precluded
     from any benefit in the estate.
                     *          *          *
          (f)  CERTAIN TORT CLAIMS NOT AFFECTED. 
     Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions relating to the
     time for filing claims against an estate, or any other
     provisions of this code, a tort claim or tort action
     against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, to the
     extent of any recovery which will be satisfied from
     liability insurance or from uninsured motorist insurance
     coverage and which will not use, consume, or deplete any
     assets of the decedent's estate, may be brought within
     the limitation period otherwise provided for the tort
     action.  No recovery against the tortfeasor's estate
     shall use, consume, diminish, or deplete the assets of
     the decedent's estate, and any recovery shall not affect
     the distribution of the assets of the estate to the
     heirs, next of kin, legatees, or devisees of the deceased
     tortfeasor unless a claim is filed in the manner and
     within the time provided by this code for filing claims
     against the estate.  (Emphasis added.)
Because Arlen Tatro had liability insurance coverage at the time of
the April 3, 1991 accident and Bobbie would be merely a nominal
party on behalf of her deceased husband's estate, the Bankords
submitted below, and now on appeal that their suit is authorized
under provision (f) above.  
     The circuit court agreed with the Bankords and denied Bobbie's
summary judgment motion.  Bobbie then filed her petition for writ
of prohibition with us, asserting the circuit court's ruling was
wrong and it was without jurisdiction to proceed.  We disagree.  
     We are first met with the settled rule that prohibition will
not lie unless the trial court is clearly without jurisdiction or
has acted without authority and the petitioner is unquestionably
entitled to such relief.  Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315,