Title: Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Adams

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC v. ADAMS2012 OK 49Case Number: 108864Decided: 05/29/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Plaintiff,andRAHI REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, Substitute 
Plaintiff/Appellee,v.VINCENT ADAMS and LESLIE ADAMS, 
Defendants/AppellantsandJOHN DOE, JANE DOE and HARVARD POINTE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendants.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALSDIVISION 
II
¶0 This matter comes to this Court on a Writ of Certiorari granted March 5, 
2012. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed an order of the trial court that 
granted summary judgment to Appellee in a foreclosure action. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED AND 
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Phillip A. Taylor, Taylor & Associates, Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, for 
Defendants/AppellantsSteven A. Heath, Baer Timberlake, Coulson & Cates, 
P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee
COMBS, J.
¶1 This matter comes before us on a writ of certiorari to the Oklahoma Court 
of Civil Appeals, Division II (COCA). This case concerns a summary judgment 
granted by the district court in favor of the plaintiff/appellee RAHI Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC, (appellee) and against the defendants, Vincent Adams and 
Leslie Adams (appellants). COCA affirmed the district court's ruling and we 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
¶2 On October 20, 2006, appellant Vincent Adams (Vincent), executed a 
promissory note to Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC, (Gateway) for the purchase of 
real property. On the same day, appellants executed a mortgage to Gateway to 
secure the note. 
¶3 The original plaintiff, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 
(Residential) filed a petition to foreclose on June 26, 2009, claiming 
appellants defaulted on the note beginning January 1, 2009. Residential attached 
a copy of the subject note and mortgage to the petition. The note has a special 
indorsement from Gateway which states "Pay to The Order Of: Option One Mortgage 
Without Recourse." It is executed by "Amanda Goodnight ITS: SHIPPING 
SPECIALIST." Also attached to the note is a blank indorsement by Option One 
Mortgage Corporation, A California Corporation, (Option One Mortgage 
Corporation). It is executed by "Dora Galvan Assistant Secretary." On July 24, 
2009, a motion to substitute plaintiff and modification of caption was filed, 
thereby substituting RAHI Real Estate Holdings, LLC, (RAHI) in place of 
Residential. The motion stated that RAHI was subsequently assigned all of 
Residential's rights in the mortgage. On July 27, 2009, the district court 
granted the motion and substituted RAHI as plaintiff in place of Residential in 
this foreclosure action and ordered that the caption be modified to reflect RAHI 
as plaintiff. One day after the order granting substitution, July 28, 2009, 
Residential as plaintiff filed its first amended petition. 1 The amended petition 
added a new defendant, Harvard Pointe Homeowners Association, Inc., and 
re-alleged all allegations made in the original petition. It also attached the 
same note and mortgage.
¶4 Defendants filed their answer on August 24, 2009, admitting that a note 
and mortgage were executed but denied that the note and mortgage attached to the 
petition are the ones he/they signed. Further, they deny default and demand 
strict proof thereof. They then blame "plaintiff/servicing agent" for the cause 
of the alleged default. Appellants also attacked plaintiff's standing and the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
¶5 On February 9, 2010, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging 
there is no controversy as to any material facts and attached an affidavit. The 
affidavit is from Denise Bailey, Assistant Secretary of Litton Loan Servicing, 
LP, as servicer for RAHI Real Estate Holdings. The affidavit states the 
plaintiff is the holder of the note and mortgage by virtue of an attached 
assignment of mortgage and the defendants are in default. She states she is in 
charge of loan servicing, and the records and files concerning the loan in this 
action are maintained under her supervision, and she has personal knowledge of 
the contents therein. She also states that there has been no extension or 
agreement to delay entry of judgment. The motion also attached a copy of the 
note and mortgage, the same as the ones attached to the original petition, and 
an assignment of mortgage.The assignment of mortgage is executed January 18, 
2010, but made effective June 26, 2009. It assigns only the subject mortgage; 
there is no attempted assignment of the note. It is made by Sand Canyon 
Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation (Sand Canyon) to RAHI Real 
Estate Holding, LLC, and signed by Brian McConnell, a Vice President of Sand 
Canyon.
¶6 On March 1, 2010, appellants' attorney filed an entry of appearance and a 
motion to deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Appellants allege they 
need more time to respond to the motion because appellee failed to respond to 
their discovery requests pursuant to Oklahoma District Court Rule 13(d).2 They allege it cannot be 
determined if the appellee is the real party in interest, proper party or that a 
valid note exists. It is further alleged that the indorsements on the note are 
not valid, and under the UCC, a note must be indorsed by its holder before it 
can be transferred.3 Appellants attach an affidavit made by the appellants 
and a copy of their discovery requests. The affidavit states that appellants 
mailed their discovery requests to appellee's attorney on or about August 23, 
2009. They allege that as of March 1, 2010, they have not received any responses 
to their discovery requests. Appellants also refer to a certificate of mailing 
made by appellee's attorney certifying, on June 19, 2009, he mailed appellants 
answers to their request for admissions. Appellants assert that this date was 
prior to the petition being filed. 
¶7 In the response to the motion to deny, appellee's attorney claims he 
timely mailed a response to the request for admissions on September 17, 2009, 
but it was returned undeliverable. He refrained from providing additional 
responses because it appeared appellants had vacated the address listed on their 
pleadings and appellants failed to provide a telephone number on their pleadings 
which he could call. Appellee also asserts that appellants' affidavit is 
incorrect because on the same day that appellants executed their affidavit, 
March 1, 2010, they came to appellee's attorney's office and demanded their 
discovery requests. Appellee claims later that day its attorney gave appellants 
a copy of the response to their request for admissions and a complete response 
to appellant's other discovery requests. Appellee attached a copy of a 
certificate of hand delivery signed by appellee's attorney reciting that on 
March 1, 2010, "I hand delivered Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Requests 
Documents to the Defendant." Appellee also claims that appellants cannot recite 
any authority why the indorsements on the note are invalid and that appellants 
are inaccurate in their assertion that in order for a negotiable instrument to 
be transferred it must be indorsed. It cites 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203(b), which provides a 
transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests 
in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument. 
Appellee asserts it is a person entitled to enforce the note because an 
indorsement is not necessary for a transfer but, in this case, the subject note 
and allonge are indorsed and in its possession. 
¶8 Appellants replied on March 26, 2010, stating on March 1, 2010, appellee's 
attorney did not attach any documents to their discovery request. They allege 
most of appellee's responses say "see attached" but no documents are attached. 
They also assert that Title 16 O.S. 2001 § 93, applies to the 
indorsements in this case and a "shipping specialist" is not authorized to 
indorse a note under this statute.4 
¶9 On April 15, 2010, the district court issued an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of appellee. This was later vacated on April 28, 2010, because 
appellants' attorney was not notified of the hearing. The district court also 
allowed responsive pleadings to the motion for summary judgment to be made 
within twenty (20) days.
¶10 On May 17, 2010, appellants filed a motion to compel discovery and a 
renewal of motion to deny the motion for summary judgment. In the motion to 
compel, appellants restate that appellee's attorney did not attach requested 
discovery to its response even though he had been personally contacted. They 
also assert the following: 1) the real party in interest cannot be determined by 
the filings attached to appellee's motion for summary judgment; 2) the 
indorsements are invalid and therefore appellee has no standing to bring this 
action; 3) the allonge is made by Option One Mortgage Corporation but the 
original lender, Gateway, specially indorsed the note to an alleged different 
entity, Option One Mortgage; and 4) the affidavit attached to the motion for 
summary judgment is invalid, insufficient, and inadmissible; and the assignment 
of mortgage is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. This last contention is 
based on no showing the assignor was an indorsee of the note and therefore could 
not have any rights as to the mortgage. Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One 
Mortgage Corporation is the assignor of the mortgage, however, Gateway indorsed 
the note to Option One Mortgage not Option One Mortgage Corporation. Further, 
there is no documentation Sand Canyon Corporation succeeded Option One Mortgage 
Corporation. The assignment was made on January 18, 2010, and backdated to June 
26, 2009. Appellants allege there is no law in Oklahoma that authorizes such 
backdating. They assert the assignment of mortgage is unrecorded and therefore 
unenforceable and inadmissible because it is irrelevant.
¶11 Appellee responded to both motions. In its response to the motion to 
compel, appellee alleges its attorney provided the requested responses to 
discovery on March 1, 2010, and made good faith attempts with appellants' 
counsel to find out what documents he needed. Instead of providing that 
information appellants filed a motion to compel. Appellee states its attorney's 
records show all documents, except the customer contact log, were provided on 
March 1, 2010, and on May 21, 2010, the log was mailed to appellants.
¶12 Appellee asserts in its response to the renewal of the motion to deny the 
motion for summary judgment: 1) RAHI is the real party in interest, and the 
amended petition merely included a new defendant and re-alleges all allegations 
made in the original petition; 2) the affidavit by RAHI's servicer is admissible 
because it is made under personal knowledge and it proves RAHI is the owner of 
the note, and appellants are in default; 3) appellants cite no authority for 
their position that Title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes is applicable because it 
relates to documents which must be properly "executed or acknowledged in the 
manner required by law as legal prerequisites for record filing;" and 4) a note 
does not require an acknowledgement nor is it recorded. 
¶13 Appellee asserts a copy of the fully indorsed note is attached to their 
motion for summary judgment and the original has been presented to the court, 
and is in its attorney's possession. Further, even if the note had not been 
indorsed the presentation of the original note entitles the person in possession 
to enforce it. 12A O.S. 2001, 
§3-203(b).5 
¶14 Regarding the assignment of mortgage, appellee asserts that the recording 
of an assignment is only made to protect the assignee. Chase v. Commerce 
Trust Co., 1923 OK 
676, 244 P. 148. The note is the controlling factor and the mortgage follows 
the note when the note is assigned. Gill v. First National Bank & Trust 
Co., 1945 OK 
181, 159 P.2d 717. Regardless, the assignment of mortgage was recorded on February 9, 
2010. Appellee further asserts there is nothing disclosed by the record which 
provides grounds to doubt the truth that Sand Canyon Corporation succeeded 
Option One Mortgage Corporation. Appellee cites The Title Examination Standards, 
16 O.S. 2001, § 12.4, Ch. 1, App. which provide, "Unless there is some reason 
disclosed of record to doubt the truth of the recital then: A. A recital of 
succession by corporate merger or corporate name change (e.g., the corporation 
was formerly known by another name) may be relied upon if contained in a 
recorded title document properly executed by the surviving or resulting 
corporation." Appellee concludes that appellants have provided nothing to show 
they are not in default, the existence of the mortgage is not disputed and 
ownership of the note and mortgage cannot be disputed, therefore appellants 
raise no issue of fact which requires the motion for summary judgment to be 
overruled. 
¶15 A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on June 29, 2010. 
The court issued a minute order finding the appellee held the original note, 
discovery was provided to the appellants and granted ten (10) additional days 
for appellants to supplement their response to the motion for summary judgment. 
Further, the court stated it would rule on the pleadings after ten (10) days 
from this order. No supplemental responses were filed and on July 13, 2010, the 
court issued a minute order sustaining the motion for summary judgment. A 
journal entry of judgment followed on September 28, 2010. It found there was no 
substantial controversy as to any material fact, the appellee is the 
owner/holder of the note and mortgage, and default had occurred. 
¶16 Appellant appealed the journal entry of judgment by filing a petition in 
error on October 29, 2010. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, 
issued its opinion on November 30, 2011, affirming the trial court. Appellants 
then filed a petition for writ of certiorari on December 21, 2011, which was 
granted by this Court on March 5, 2012.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY PROCESS
¶17 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo examination.6 All facts and inferences 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.7 Summary process is 
applied where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn 
from undisputed facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim. To 
that end, the court may consider, in addition to the pleadings, items such as 
depositions, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, as well as 
other evidentiary materials which are offered by the parties in acceptable 
form.8 A motion for summary judgment should be denied if the 
facts concerning any issue raised by the pleadings, as set forth in the 
depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits on file in 
the case when such motion is filed, and as set forth in affidavits thereafter 
filed in opposition to such motion and meeting the requirements of said Rule 13, 
are conflicting, or if reasonable men, in the exercise of a fair and impartial 
judgment, might reach different conclusions from undisputed facts concerning any 
issue as set forth in such instruments.9 The focus in summary process is not on the facts which 
might be proven at trial (i.e., the legal sufficiency of evidence that 
could be adduced), but rather on whether the tendered material in the record 
reveals only undisputed material facts supporting but a single inference that 
favors the movant's quest for relief.10 Appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test 
all evidentiary material tendered in summary process for its legal sufficiency 
to support the relief sought by the movant.11 
¶18 The main issue on appeal is whether or not the appellee is a person 
entitled to enforce the note.12 Appellants essentially claim appellee is not entitled 
to enforce the note because there is no evidence appellee obtained its interest 
from a person entitled to enforce the note. They assert the indorsements on the 
note and allonge are invalid, and it is a question of fact whether the first 
indorsee, Option One Mortgage and the subsequent indorser Option One Mortgage 
Corporation are the same entities. 
¶19 Appellants first allege Gateway's indorsement to Option One Mortgage was 
invalid because it was made by a "shipping specialist" and not a person 
authorized to do so under Title 16 O.S. 2001, §93. Section 93, requires 
every instrument affecting real estate made by a corporation to have the name of 
such corporation subscribed thereto by an attorney-in-fact, president, 
vice-president, chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors of such 
corporation. Appellants contend that a "shipping specialist" is not authorized 
to indorse the note under this statute and therefore the succession of transfers 
of the note is invalid and Gateway is still the holder. They also make this same 
argument concerning the "allonge" indorsed by an assistant secretary of Option 
One Mortgage Corporation. That particular indorsement is an indorsement in blank 
and is the basis for appellee's claim to the note. The core to this argument is 
whether the "note" is an instrument affecting real estate for purposes of §93. 
We hold it is not. 
¶20 A negotiable instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code13 is considered a "note" if it constitutes a promise to 
pay.14 It is an instrument that obligates the maker to pay the 
lender according to the terms of the note. However, the mortgage and not the 
note affect the real property. The mortgage creates a security of particular 
property for the payment of the debt evidenced in the note. The note by itself 
is only an obligation to pay. Therefore, Title 16 O.S. 2001, §93, does not control who may 
indorse a note. The UCC does not have a specific requirement similar to that 
found in §93 concerning who may indorse a note. However, the UCC does provide in 
12A O.S. 2001, § 
3-308 (a), "[i]f the validity of a signature is denied in the pleadings, the 
burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the 
signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized unless the action is to 
enforce the liability of the purported signer and the signer is dead or 
incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature." The 
present action is not one to enforce the liability of a purported signer who is 
dead or incompetent. 
¶21 Appellants also contend there is no proof the assignment of mortgage to 
RAHI, which was executed by Sand Canyon Corporation, f/k/a Option One Mortgage 
Corporation (Sand Canyon), is valid because there is no evidence that Sand 
Canyon succeeded Option One Mortgage Corporation, and the lender indorsed the 
note to Option One Mortgage not Option One Mortgage Corporation. Appellee argues 
the assignment of the mortgage is inconclusive because it is intended only to 
protect the assignee.15 Further, appellee emphasizes the note is the 
controlling factor and the mortgage follows the note when the note is 
assigned.16 We agree. In the present case, appellee claims to be 
the holder of the note. The note and not the assignment of mortgage is the 
vehicle appellee is using to establish it is a holder of the note. In a case 
where a party is alleging it is entitled to enforce a note as a nonholder in 
possession who has the rights of a holder, an assignment of mortgage which also 
assigns the note may be evidence of the purpose of the transfer.17 However, here the assignment of mortgage does not 
purport to assign the note and appellee is not claiming to be a nonholder in 
possession who has the rights of a holder. Appellee has consistently asserted 
its position in their pleadings as the holder of the note.
¶22 We also need to address the conflict between Court of Civil Appeals' 
divisions. In the present matter, the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, found 
that "RAHI could prevail in a foreclosure action even if it had chosen not to 
pursue or was ultimately unsuccessful in its pursuit of a money judgment against 
the Adamses on the note." COCA admits it deviated from a decision of the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division I,18 which reversed a summary judgment that was in favor of 
a lender because there was a dispute of fact regarding ownership of the note. 
That court held "in Oklahoma it is not possible to bifurcate the security 
interest from the note," and "assignment of the mortgage to one other than the 
holder of the note is of no effect." COCA found that in order for the appellants 
to prevail they must prove that RAHI owns neither the note nor the mortgage. 
COCA cites several cases holding an action to foreclose a mortgage may be 
maintained without seeking a personal judgment for the mortgage indebtedness; 
the facts of the cases relied upon demonstrate the notes were not considered to 
be invalid and the plaintiff elected not to pursue a personal judgment.19 COCA found that the note and mortgage are distinct 
instruments enforceable under different titles of the Oklahoma Statutes.20 They cite 42 O.S. 2001, §172, which provides "[a]ny 
lien provided for by this chapter may be enforced by civil action in the 
district court of the county in which the land is situated." The implication 
being, if a note which is secured by a mortgage is found invalid, the owner of 
the mortgage can still foreclose the mortgage. However, the facts of the cases 
relied upon by the Court of Civil Appeals do not support such a conclusion. For 
example, in Irwin v. Sands, 1953 OK 383, 265 P.2d 1097, the plaintiff was the holder of the note 
and mortgage and instituted an action to recover a money judgment on the note 
and to foreclose the mortgage. After the commencement of the case, the plaintiff 
chose not to pursue a personal judgment, but instead to foreclose the mortgage. 
The cases cited do not stand for the proposition that a person who owns a 
mortgage may foreclose without also being a person entitled to enforce the note. 
Foreclosure of the mortgage and subsequent sale of the asset may satisfy all or 
part of the amount owed a plaintiff as evidenced in the note. It is up to the 
plaintiff to elect whether or not to seek a personal judgment in the amount of 
any deficiency.21 
¶23 Several decisions of this Court have been adopted subsequent to COCA's 
opinion.22 In these opinions we reviewed the Division I decision, 
BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 2011 OK CIV APP 35, 256 P.3d 1014, and have agreed with the analysis. We 
hold, once again, in Oklahoma it is not possible to bifurcate the security 
interest from the note and proof of ownership of the note carries with it 
ownership of the mortgage.23 To foreclose the mortgage one must be a person entitled 
to enforce the note which is secured by the mortgage. The mortgage is merely 
incidental to the note and without the note there could be no default of an 
obligation, and thus, no basis for a foreclosure action. COCA's statement that 
the appellants must prove appellee owns neither the note nor the mortgage in 
order to prevail suggests that if the note was found to be invalid, i.e., 
because of the challenged indorsements, appellee could still foreclose if it had 
a valid assignment of mortgage. This is incorrect. To prevail, appellants need 
only show that appellee is not a person entitled to enforce the note.24 
¶24 Finally, appellants ask whether it was proper for the trial court to 
assume the alleged indorsement to Option One Mortgage was an indorsement to 
Option One Mortgage Corporation, absent evidence such names are for the same 
entity. Gateway, specially indorsed the note to Option One Mortgage. An allonge 
was attached to the note that included an indorsement in blank executed by 
Option One Mortgage Corporation. The significance of the trial court's 
assumption is that it made a clear connection between the note and RAHI. By 
assuming Option One Mortgage and Option One Mortgage Corporation are the same 
entity, it established RAHI as a holder due to RAHI possessing a blank indorsed 
note. Court of Civil Appeals found this issue to be immaterial relying 
upon the provisions of 12A O.S. 2001, 3-115. This section provides "(a) 
'Incomplete instrument' means a signed writing, whether or not issued by the 
signer, the contents of which show at the time of signing that it is incomplete 
but that the signer intended it to be completed by the addition of words or 
numbers." However, it cannot be determined without fact finding whether the 
reference in the original indorsement to Option One Mortgage was incomplete. 
This Court has previously held that "[i]t must be remembered, neither this Court 
[n]or a trial court weighs the evidence on a motion for summary judgment and it 
is not the purpose of such procedure to substitute a trial by affidavit for a 
trial according to law. Weighing of evidence is a function for the jury and, in 
a non-jury case, for the trial judge after an appropriate trial of the 
issues."25 The summary judgment process is for determining issues 
of law where the facts are not controverted. There should be no weighing of the 
evidence as to controverted facts in order to determine a motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶25 We do not have a transcript of the June 29, 2010, hearing in the record, 
assuming one was even made. We cannot determine what evidence was presented, 
including any concerning whether or not Option One Mortgage and Option One 
Mortgage Corporation are the same entity. It does, however, appear from the 
filed record that there is at least one issue of material fact and summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENTREVERSED AND 
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
¶26 CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, 
JJ.
¶27 DISSENT: WINCHESTER (JOINS GURICH, J.), GURICH (BY SEPARATE WRITING), 
JJ.
¶28 NOT PARTICIPATING: COLBERT, V.C.J.
FOOTNOTES
1 The First Amended 
Petition refers to "plaintiff" as Residential and not "substitute plaintiff" 
RAHI. The caption still refers to Residential as plaintiff and RAHI as 
substitute plaintiff. This pleading was executed by Steven A. Heath as attorney 
for plaintiff on July 23, 2009, four days before the order granting 
substitution. 
2 Okla. Dist. Ct. R. 13(d), 12 O.S. Supp. 
2002, 
ch.2, app. ,"Should it appear from an affidavit of a party opposing the motion 
that for reasons stated the party cannot present evidentiary material sufficient 
to support the opposition, the court may deny the motion for summary judgment or 
summary disposition without prejudice or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. A motion filed pursuant to this paragraph 
shall not be deemed a consent to the exercise by the court of jurisdiction over 
the party, or a waiver of the right to file a motion to dismiss the action." 

3 They cite 12A O.S. Supp. 2001, § 3-301(b) (sic); §3-201(b) ". . 
. if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires 
transfer and possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. . . 
" 
4 16 O.S. 2001, § 93. "Every deed or other 
instrument affecting real estate made by a corporation must have the name of 
such corporation subscribed thereto either by an attorney-in-fact, president, 
vice-president, chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors of such 
corporation."
5 12A O.S. 2001, 3-203(b). "Transfer of an instrument, 
whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right 
of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in 
due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a holder in due course 
by a transfer, directly or indirectly, from a holder in due course if the 
transferee engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument." 
6 An order that grants summary relief, in whole or in 
part, disposes solely of law questions. It is thus reviewable by a de novo 
standard. Brown v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, ¶5, 935 P.2d 319, 321. See also Kluver v. 
Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1083 ("Issues of law are reviewable by a 
de novo standard and an appellate court claims for itself plenary, 
independent and non-deferential authority to re-examine a trial court's legal 
rulings. . . "). 
7 Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. 
8 Polymer Fabricating, Inc. v. Employers Workers' 
Compensation Ass'n., 1998 OK 113, ¶8, 980 P.2d 109, 113.
9 Perry v. Green, 1970 OK 70, ¶28; 468 P.2d 483, 489.
10 Id.; Hulsey v. Mid-America Preferred Ins. Co., 
1989 OK 107, 777 P.2d 932, 936 n. 15. 
11 State ex rel. Fent v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board, 2003 OK 29, ¶14, 66 P.3d 432, 440. Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, 
Inc., 1987 OK CIV APP 
45, ¶10,743 P.2d 682,685 (approved for publication by the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
12 12A O.S. 2001, §3-301. There are three ways to 
be a "person entitled to enforce" a note. The most common way is to be the 
"holder" of the note. The second way is to be a "nonholder in possession" of the 
note who has the rights of a holder. The third way is not very common and 
pertains to person who is not in possession of the note but is entitled to 
enforce the note. This is based upon a person not being reasonably able to 
obtain possession of the note because it was lost, destroyed or in the wrongful 
possession of another. 
13 12A O.S. §§ 1-101 through 11-107.
14 12A O.S. 2001, §3-104(e). 
15 Chase v. Commerce Trust Co., 1923 OK 676, 244 P. 148.
16 Gill v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 
1945 OK 
181, 159 P.2d 717.
17 Transfer of a note occurs when it is delivered by a 
person other than its issuer (maker/payor) for the purpose of giving to the 
person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203(a). Delivery means a 
voluntary transfer of possession. 12A O.S. 2001, § 1-201(b)(15). 
18 BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 
2011 OK CIV APP 35, ¶10, 256 P.3d 1014, 1017.
19 Irwin v. Sands, 1953 OK 383, ¶16, 265 P.2d 1097, 1110; Hooks v. Berry-Hart Co., 
1928 OK 700, ¶0, 274 P. 657 (Syllabus 1); and Cahill v. Kilgore, 
1960 OK 
88, ¶10, 350 P.2d 928, 931.
20 Title 42 concerning liens; Title 46 concerning 
mortgages; and Title 12A concerning the UCC. 
21 12 O.S. 2001, § 686; ". . . Simultaneously 
with the making of a motion for an order confirming the sale or in any event 
within ninety (90) days after the date of the sale, the party to whom such 
residue shall be owing may make a motion in the action for leave to enter a 
post-judgment deficiency order. . ."
22 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. 
Matthews, 2012 OK 
14, ¶5, _P.3d_, 2012 WL 621356; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. 
Richardson, 2012 OK 
15, ¶6, _P.3d_, 2012 WL 622492.
23 Engle v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 
1956 OK 176, 300 P.2d 997. 
24 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-301 provides, as follows: 
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means (i) the holder of the 
instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights 
of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is 
entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 12A-3-309or subsection 
(d) of Section 12A-3-418 of this title. A person may be a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument 
or is in wrongful possession of the instrument." 
25 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Glass, 
1998 OK 
52, ¶3, 959 P.2d 586, 588. 

GURICH, J., with whom WINCHESTER, J. joins dissenting: 
¶1 I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses and remands this case 
because it cannot determine from the record whether the indorsement to Option 
One Mortgage was an indorsement to Option One Mortgage Corporation. No evidence 
is present in the record because the Defendants failed to present any evidence 
at summary judgment that created a question of fact as to whether the entities 
were the same. Furthermore, the Defendants cannot raise this issue because only 
RAHI Real Estate Holdings, the substitute plaintiff, had the authority to 
require the signatures from both Option One entities. See 
12A O.S. 2001 § 
3-204(d). RAHI Real Estate Holdings was the proper party to pursue the 
foreclosure and presented the proper documentation at summary judgment to prove 
such. Because no issues of material fact remain and summary judgment was 
properly granted in this case, I would affirm the trial court and the Court of 
Civil Appeals for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in Deutsche 
Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting) and 
Bank of America, NA v. Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting).1 
FOOTNOTES
1 Although I originally 
concurred in the majority opinion in Deutsche Bank National Trust v. 
Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 
3, 
___P.3d___, after further consideration, I disagree with the majority's analysis 
in that case, and my views on the issues in these cases are accurately reflected 
in J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting); 
CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Kham, 2012 OK 22, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting); 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Richardson, 2012 OK 15, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); and Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., 
dissenting).