Title: State v. Gillespie

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARION PRESTON GILLESPIE
No. 2PA07
FILED: 25 JANUARY 2008
Criminal Law–discovery--sanctions--trial court exceeded authority--punishment based on
actions of nonparties
The trial court in a first-degree murder case exceeded its authority under N.C.G.S. § 15A-
910 when it sanctioned defendant by excluding the testimony of two of defendant’s mental
health experts, and defendant is entitled to a new trial, because: (1) although N.C.G.S. § 15A-
910 authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions on the parties in addition to exercising the
court’s inherent contempt powers, nothing in the language of the statute indicates that this
authority extends so far as to punish either the State or a criminal defendant for the actions of
nonparties; and (2) the trial court based its decision to sanction defendant solely upon the
conduct of defendant’s expert witnesses, thus acting under a misapprehension of law that the
actions of a nonparty in a criminal proceeding can trigger a trial court’s authority under N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-910 to sanction a party.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 180 N.C. App. 514,
638 S.E.2d 481 (2006), awarding defendant a new trial after
finding error in a judgment entered 8 December 2004 by Judge W.
Erwin Spainhour in Superior Court, Rowan County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 16 October 2007.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Norma S. Harrell, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
James R. Glover for defendant-appellee.
BRADY, Justice.
Defendant Marion Preston Gillespie was found guilty of the
first-degree murder of Linda Faye Patterson Smith and sentenced
to life imprisonment without parole.  The sole issue before this
Court is whether the trial court exceeded its authority under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-910 in its order sanctioning defendant by
excluding the testimony of two of defendant’s mental health
experts.  We hold that it did and in so doing modify and affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding defendant a new
trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Murder
In the early morning hours of 15 June 2003, defendant
approached Deputy Sheriff Bradley Bebber of the Rowan County
Sheriff’s Office as Deputy Bebber was walking from that office to
a nearby parking lot.  Defendant, who appeared to have blood on
his shirt and jeans, informed Deputy Bebber that the blood was
his girlfriend’s.  He further stated that he and his girlfriend,
Linda Faye Patterson Smith, had been arguing about money at their
shared residence in Cleveland, North Carolina, when Smith charged
at defendant with a knife in her hand.  Defendant then took the
knife from her and “began cutting her with it,” which he stated
had likely caused her serious injury.  He informed Deputy Bebber
that Smith and the knife would probably be found in the bathroom
of the residence.
Law enforcement was dispatched to the residence, wherein the
deceased victim was discovered in the rear bathroom, lying on her
side in the bathtub.  There was a large amount of blood in the
bathtub and on the nearby walls, and a knife was discovered on
the edge of the bathtub.
Defendant subsequently waived his Miranda rights and
consented to a search of the residence and his vehicle. 
Additionally, he provided a statement to investigators,
containing the following:  During an argument which took place in
the bathroom of their residence, the victim had threatened to
have her brothers kill defendant.  In response, defendant
threatened to leave.  The victim then tried to kill him with a
knife that defendant had placed on the toilet after attempting to
repair it.  Defendant managed to wrest control of the knife from
the victim, pushed her, and inadvertently cut her on the arm.
Defendant further stated that he had diabetes and was taking
cancer medication.  He indicated that he had taken his medicine
between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on 15 June 2003, an unspecified
amount of time before the altercation with the victim.  Defendant
was not sure whether the medication affected his memory of the
incident.
On 23 June 2003, the Rowan County Grand Jury returned a true
bill of indictment charging defendant with first-degree murder of
Linda Faye Patterson Smith.  Initially, the case was set to be
tried capitally, but on 1 March 2004, the State elected to try
the case noncapitally.  On 21 June 2004, the trial court issued a
scheduling order with the consent of both parties setting 29
November 2004 as the trial date.
II. Trial Court’s Pre-trial Order Sanctioning Defendant
On 14 October 2004, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-959,
defendant gave the State written notice of his mental health
defense, stating his intent to raise defenses of insanity and
diminished capacity at trial.  On 21 October 2004, the trial
court held a hearing to resolve discovery motions filed by both
the State and defendant.  The State moved for notice of
defendant’s intent to offer at trial any of a specific list of
defenses, including insanity, mental infirmity, diminished
capacity, and voluntary or involuntary intoxication.  The State
also moved that defendant provide, inter alia, specific
information as to the nature and extent of a number of these
defenses and discoverable information pertaining to any expert
witness defendant reasonably expected to call at trial.  The
trial court entered an order allowing the State’s motion and
orally instructed defendant to comply by 15 November 2004. 
However, this deadline does not appear in the written order later
signed by the trial court and filed on 8 December 2004.
Also on 21 October 2004, the trial court allowed defendant’s
motion to order the State to turn over a number of discoverable
items, including “exculpatory material from all doctors, social
workers, law enforcement personnel, state’s witnesses, or other
persons or sources, which are available to the State.”  This
order was similarly entered by the trial court with the directive
that the State comply by 15 November 2004, which was reflected in
a written order later signed by the trial court and filed on 8
December 2004.  Finally, on 21 October 2004, the trial court
issued an order committing defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital, a
provider under the Division of Mental Health, Developmental
Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, within the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, for evaluation
of his mental condition.
On 16 November 2004, the trial court allowed the State’s
motion for access to defendant’s medical records.  The following
day, defendant filed a motion for continuance and on 23 November
2004, filed a supplemental motion for continuance on the bases
that:  (1) defense counsel continued to receive discovery
documents from the district attorney; (2) neither the State nor
defense counsel had received any reports from Dorothea Dix
Hospital staff or from any other experts; and (3) defendant was
still at Dorothea Dix Hospital but needed to be transported to
Rowan County Detention Center so that he could meet with counsel
in order to prepare his case for trial.
On 22 November 2004, Charles Vance, M.D., Ph.D., a forensic
psychiatrist at Dorothea Dix Hospital, wrote a letter to the
Rowan County Clerk of Court stating that “[t]he medical staff of
the Forensic Psychiatry Division has completed their forensic
evaluation and observation of [defendant] and found him to be
capable to proceed to trial.”  However, neither Dr. Vance nor the
hospital staff provided a report of defendant’s mental status at
the time of the offense, in part because the State had not
received any mental health reports from defendant.  On 23
November 2004, the State moved to prohibit defendant from
presenting any mental health defense or, in the alternative, to
require him to provide requested documentation to Dorothea Dix
Hospital staff so that they could evaluate defendant’s mental
condition at the time of the offense.
On 29 November 2004, the day defendant’s trial was set to
begin, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s and
defendant’s motions.  After hearing arguments from both sides,
the trial court entered an order prohibiting defendant from
introducing testimony from Nathan Strahl, M.D., Ph.D., a private
practice psychiatrist and consultant associate to Duke University
Medical Center, and from Jerry W. Noble, Ph.D., a private
practice clinical psychologist and instructor for the Wake Forest
University School of Medicine’s department of psychiatry,
concerning any mental health defense to be offered by defendant. 
Thereafter, the trial court heard arguments on defendant’s motion
to continue and then denied the motion.
III. Defendant’s Conviction and Appeal
On 8 December 2004, the jury returned its verdict finding
defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  The trial court entered
judgment accordingly and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment
without parole.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held
unanimously that the trial court abused its discretion when it
precluded defendant from introducing the testimony of his mental
health experts.  The State filed a motion with this Court for a
temporary stay, which was allowed on 8 January 2007, along with a
petition for writ of supersedeas and a petition for discretionary
review, both of which were allowed on 3 May 2007.
ANALYSIS
We now consider whether, as a matter of law, the trial court
exceeded its statutory authority under the North Carolina
Criminal Procedure Act when it sanctioned defendant pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-910.  This statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings the court determines that a party
has failed to comply with this Article or
with an order issued pursuant to this
Article, the court in addition to exercising
its contempt powers may
. . . .
(3) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 15A-910(a)(3) (2005) (emphasis added).  By its plain
meaning, the statute ensures that in criminal proceedings, the
trial court has the authority to require both the State and
defendants to comply with North Carolina’s discovery statutes and
any orders entered pursuant to those statutes.  To this end,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-910 authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions
on the parties in addition to exercising the court’s inherent
contempt powers.  However, nothing in the language of the statute
indicates that this authority extends so far as to punish either
the State or a criminal defendant for the actions of non-parties. 
For this reason, the record demonstrates that the trial court in
this case exceeded its statutory authority to sanction defendant.
Conclusion of law number four of the trial court’s order
prohibiting defendant from introducing the expert testimony at
issue reads in part:
The defendant should not be permitted to compel the
court to continue the case from the 29 November 2004
session because of the failure of the defendant to obey
the discovery statutes and the Order of this court of
21 October 2004 and the intentional, inexcusable
conduct of the defendant’s mental health witnesses.
This conclusion of law is, at best, ambiguous as to whether
defendant’s compliance, or lack thereof, factored into the trial
court’s decision to impose its sanction.  This ambiguity is
resolved, however, by the transcript of the trial court’s hearing
on the State’s motion:
THE COURT: And I will prepare my own order.  And
of course, I’ll be happy to have any further input
anybody else wishes to.  But the Court’s going to find,
basically, that Doctor Strahl and Doctor Noble have
violated the Court’s order, violated the discovery
statute.  And that pursuant to N.C.G.S. [§] 15A-
910[(a)](3), that the Court finds that the defendant,
again, not through counsel, but through these
physicians, that is Doctor Strahl is a medical doctor,
Doctor Noble is a clinical psychologist, not a medical
doctor, that those persons have failed to comply with
the discovery statute, and/or -- and/or with the orders
of this Court issued pursuant to the statutes, and the
Court therefore prohibits the defendant from
introducing evidence relating to a mental health or
insanity defense, or whatever you described, whatever
it’s been described as.
(Emphasis added.)  It is readily apparent from this portion of
the transcript that the trial court based its decision to
sanction defendant solely upon the conduct of defendant’s expert
witnesses, thus acting under a misapprehension of law that the
actions of a non-party in a criminal proceeding can trigger a
trial court’s authority under N.C.G.S. § 15A-910 to sanction a
party.
The trial court therefore erred as a matter of law when it
entered its order sanctioning defendant, and defendant is
entitled to a new trial.  In light of our holding, we believe it
was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to address conclusions
of law numbers one through three in the trial court’s order.  Nor
was it necessary for that court to address defendant’s federal
constitutional argument under Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400
(1988).  See State v. Crabtree, 286 N.C. 541, 543, 212 S.E.2d
103, 105 (1975) (“It is well established that appellate courts
will not pass upon constitutional questions, even when properly
presented if there is some other ground upon which the case can
be decided . . . .” (citations omitted)).
For the reasons stated above, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals granting defendant a new trial is modified and affirmed.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.