Title: State v. Phelps

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

456 N.W.2d 290 (1990) 235 Neb. 569 STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Bernard G. PHELPS, Appellee. No. 90-045. Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 8, 1990. *291 Ronald L. Staskiewicz, Douglas County Atty., and Maria R. Leslie, Omaha, for appellant. Thomas M. Kenney, Douglas County Public Defender, and Brian S. Munnelly, for appellee. SHANAHAN, Justice. In its information, the State charged Bernard G. Phelps with first degree sexual assault. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-319(1)(c) (Reissue 1989). Phelps filed a motion to suppress his custodial statements. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-115 (Reissue 1989) (suppression of a defendant's statement). Because the district court for Douglas County sustained Phelps' suppression motion, the State appeals to obtain review by a judge of this court, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-116 (Reissue 1989). Sgt. Michael Cavanaugh, an Omaha police officer assigned to criminal investigations, received information regarding occurrence of a sexual assault. Later that same day, Cavanaugh spoke with the victim at a hospital, where the victim indicated that Bernard Phelps was her assailant. Cavanaugh proceeded to the Phelps home and told Phelps that he wanted to ask some questions regarding an alleged sexual assault. In the course of this meeting, Cavanaugh arrested Phelps on "suspicion of sexual assault" and transported Phelps to police headquarters for further questioning. On arrival at police headquarters, Phelps was taken to an interrogation room, where Cavanaugh advised him of his Miranda rights. Phelps stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to speak with Cavanaugh regarding the alleged assault. Phelps was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and spoke freely with Cavanaugh, but appeared nervous. Only Phelps and Cavanaugh were in the interrogation room. Initially during the questioning, Phelps denied any contact with the victim. However, about 10 to 15 minutes into the interrogation, Cavanaugh stated that the victim had described Phelps' clothing and that Phelps' clothing at the time of the interview matched exactly the description of the clothing worn by the victim's assailant. Further into the interview, Cavanaugh said that Phelps might have to submit to a penile swab with a "Q-tip." A penile swab is performed to determine, through laboratory analysis, if an assailant's penis bears any secretions originating from contact with the victim and is obtained pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-3301 et seq. (Reissue 1989) ("identifying physical characteristics act," which prescribes a procedure for obtaining certain physical data from an individual for identification purposes). Questioning at the suppression hearing provides details of Cavanaugh's conversation with Phelps concerning the penile swab: Q. And why did you tell him that? After Cavanaugh's description regarding the penile swab, Phelps orally admitted that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that the victim had consented. Phelps also gave a written statement to Cavanaugh in which Phelps, in substance, admitted that the victim and he had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. In view of those statements during the interrogation, which lasted 35 minutes, Phelps was "booked" and later charged with first degree sexual assault. Phelps filed a motion to suppress his statements obtained during the interrogation process and asserted that his statements were involuntary and the product of coercion "by threats and promises." At the suppression hearing, Phelps argued that Cavanaugh's description of the painful penile swab precluded voluntariness in Phelps' statements, which are, therefore, constitutionally inadmissible. Based on Cavanaugh's testimony and description of the penile swab procedure, the district court concluded that and that "the defendant's oral admissions and written statement [are] involuntary. The defendant's motion to suppress is *293 granted, and the oral and written statements are suppressed." The State contends that Phelps' statements are voluntary and not the result of any coercion. The State further argues that Cavanaugh's statements regarding the penile swab merely communicated to Phelps an "intent to do an act permissible under law," brief for appellant at 8, that is, the State's right to obtain physical data pursuant to the identifying physical characteristics act, and did not amount to coercive conduct in violation of Phelps' constitutional rights. "In determining the correctness of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the Supreme Court will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 689, 401 N.W.2d 141, 154 (1987). "In determining whether a trial court's findings on a motion to suppress are clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court recognizes the trial court as the `trier of fact' and takes into consideration that the trial court has observed witnesses testifying regarding such motion to suppress." State v. Dixon, 222 Neb. 787, 795, 387 N.W.2d 682, 687 (1986). The admissibility of a defendant's custodial statements depends on all the circumstances under which the statement is made. "[T]o be admissible, an accused's statement, admission, or confession must have been freely and voluntarily made, and must not have been extracted by any direct or implied promise or inducement, no matter how slight." State v. Robertson, 219 Neb. 782, 787, 366 N.W.2d 429, 433 (1985). See, also, State v. Dixon, supra; State v. Bodtke, 219 Neb. 504, 363 N.W.2d 917 (1985). This court examined voluntariness of a defendant's statement in State v. McCurry, 228 Neb. 841, 846-47, 424 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1988), and stated: See, also, State v. Dixon, supra. A law enforcement officer's communication to a defendant which expresses *294 the officer's intention to take a course of conduct permissible under the law is not, by itself, coercion preventing voluntariness of the defendant's statement in response to the officer's communicated intention. State v. McCurry, supra. However, under the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of Phelps, the trial court concluded that Cavanaugh's statements reasonably indicated a physical procedure which would subject Phelps to pain and trauma and that the imminent prospect of the procedure prevented Phelps' statements from being "`"the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice...."'" State v. McCurry, supra 228 Neb. at 846, 424 N.W.2d at 368. Although seeking to characterize sensation from a Q-tip inserted into the urethra as rather minor "discomfort or slight pain," brief for appellant at 11, the State, nonetheless, stands on Cavanaugh's description of the penile swab and its consequent pain. The district court concluded that pain, to render a defendant's statement involuntary, need not be of such nature or degree that would have resulted in recoil by Tomás de Torquemada of the Spanish Inquisition. In view of the circumstances surrounding Phelps' statements in question, the State has failed to satisfy the burden of proving that Phelps' statements were voluntarily made, "`"the product of a rational intellect and a free will."'" State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 819, 381 N.W.2d 120, 127 (1986). The district court's findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court's suppression order is affirmed. AFFIRMED.