Title: Roeschlein v. Thomas

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

280 N.E.2d 581 (1972)
Harold ROESCHLEIN (Reagin), Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Marjorie THOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 272S20.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
February 24, 1972.
*582 Nelson G. Grills, Collins, Grills & Suess, Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas & Thomas, Brazil, Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wendell C. Hamacher, Edw. W. Johnson, Deputy Attys. Gen., Indianapolis, for defendants-appellees.
HUNTER, Acting Chief Justice.
Appellees' "Petition to Dismiss Petition to Transfer" and "Appellees' Second Petition *583 to Dismiss Petition to Transfer, or In The Alternative, to Affirm the Decision of the Appellate Court" are hereby denied. This Court has carefully considered the Petition to Transfer and the Brief in Opposition thereto and the Per Curiam Opinion by the Appellate Court dated September 28, 1971, and reported in 273 N.E.2d 554 and hereby orders this case transferred to this Court, and upon the granting of transfer hereby orders the Clerk of this Court to enter said opinion in the records of the Supreme Court of Indiana as its opinion, to be published in the Indiana Reports and in the N.E. Reporter as adopted from the Appellate Court.
PER CURIAM.
This is an original class action in which the plaintiff seeks to have the amendment revising Article 7 (the Judicial Article) of the Indiana Constitution which was ratified in the general election of November 3, 1970, declared illegal and void, and seeks an injunction restraining the Governor from acting until such amendment has been constitutionally adopted.
Plaintiff's predecessor commenced this action in the Clay Circuit Court on October 29, 1970 and it was subsequently removed to this Court on December 3, 1970 pursuant to IC 1971, XX-X-XX-X, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-2121 et seq. (Burns' 1968 Repl.).
Prior to removal, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by the Attorney General of Indiana on behalf of the Governor and oral argument was heard on this Motion February 10, 1971. The question was taken under advisement and on March 2, 1971 an order was issued that pursuant to Rule TR. 12 the Motion to Dismiss would be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties were then given twenty days from the date of the order to file any papers for the consideration of the court in ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
On March 17, 1971, plaintiff filed an Affidavit with attached exhibits in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment and the next day filed a Petition Questioning the Qualification of Certain Judges of this court.
On April 19, 1971, this court heard oral argument relating to said Affidavit and Petition, the maintenance of this action as a class action, and at the same time, considered two further motions, i.e., Motion to Substitute a Party and a Motion to Intervene. The original plaintiff in this action having died since its commencement, Marcella Reagin sought to be substituted as a party plaintiff. Also, one Harold Roeschlein requested permission to intervene in this action as a party plaintiff.
We then entered orders on July 27, 1971:
Pursuant to Rule TR. 23(C) (1), an order was then issued on September 1, 1971 that this cause of action be maintained as a class action under Rule TR. 23(B) (1) (b).
Having thus disposed of these preliminary procedural matters, we must now decide the Motion for Summary Judgment. If no genuine issue as to any material fact *584 exists, then we are free to decide from the pleadings and affidavit before us whether the Constitutional Amendment revising Article 7 (the Judicial Article) was validly adopted by the electorate on November 3, 1970. Rule TR. 56.
A summary of the Judicial Amendment is sufficient for purposes of this opinion.[2] It completely revises the Judicial Article (7) of the Indiana Constitution, effective January 1, 1972. The method of selection of judges at the appellate level (Supreme Court and Court of Appeals) is changed from a partisan popular election system to one authorizing the Governor to select such judges from a list of three persons submitted to him by a nonpartisan nominating commission. After serving a short term a judge's name is submitted to the electorate for approval, and if approved he thereafter must be approved on a nonpartisan basis by the electorate at ten-year intervals. The Supreme and Appellate Courts are reorganized into a Supreme Court of from five to nine members and a Court of Appeals whose membership is set by the legislature. The office of Chief Justice of Indiana is created and a system of discipline, removal, and retirement of judges is established. Also, there are certain miscellaneous provisions which require the Supreme Court to retain exclusive appellate jurisdiction of certain criminal cases and limit its original jurisdiction; affect prosecuting attorneys and the operation of the Grand Jury; and remove justices of the peace as constitutional officers.
Plaintiff submits three propositions alleging defects in the procedures by which the Judicial Amendment was adopted.[3]
As we are bound to know the public records, including the acts of state officials, we take judicial notice of the fact that House Joint Resolution No. 6 (1967 Session) and House Joint Resolution No. 12 (1969 Session) proposing the Judicial Amendment were both duly authenticated by the Speaker of the House and by the President of the Senate.[4] Evans v. Browne, infra, 30 Ind. at page 520. We also take judicial notice of public history and on that basis recognize the fact that on November 3, 1970, a majority of the electorate voting thereon approved the judicial amendment. Smith v. Pedigo, (1896) 145 Ind. 361, 44 N.E. 363.
We shall consider these propositions in the order submitted by plaintiff.
It is our opinion that the authentication of the joint resolutions by the presiding officers of the Legislature is conclusive evidence of the proper enactment and evidence from the journals or elsewhere is not admissible to determine whether the Legislature has complied with the requirements of Article 16, § 1 of the Indiana Constitution.
Plaintiff points to Article 16, § 1, of the Indiana Constitution which contains the method of proposing amendments:
In particular, plaintiff refers to the language "such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals," alleging this was not done. Rhetorical paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint state:
Attempting to bolster the importance of these alleged violations, plaintiff further contends that "[a]n examination of the Indiana Senate Journal for the year 1967 will disclose that substantive amendments were made by the Senate Committee and were made on a second reading of House Joint Resolution No. 6."[5] This would mean the House and the Senate in voting upon the proposed Judicial Amendment did not vote upon the same "proposed amendment or amendments" as required by the language of Article 16, § 1. The defendant asserts that these changes are mere corrections of an unsubstantial nature. In view of the decision we reach, the character of the changes does not constitute a material issue of fact and therefore we do not need to determine whether the changes are substantial or unsubstantial.
Stated in its essential terms Proposition No. One is deceptively simple. Article 16, § 1, requires that when constitutional amendments are proposed in the legislature the amendment with the yeas and nays vote thereon shall be entered in the journals. In adopting the joint resolutions incorporating the Judicial Amendment this was not done and the same proposed amendment was not properly adopted in both houses of the Legislature and therefore the constitutional *586 amendment is void because it failed to follow these specific provisions of the constitution. Our constitution is a sacred document expressing the organic law of the State of Indiana and therefore must be strictly construed. The courts must look beyond the authentication of the presiding officers of the General Assembly to the journals for defects in the procedures required by the constitution in order to determine if the Enrolled Act or Joint Resolution is valid.
This was strong legal argument in Indiana in 1868. In 1851 our Supreme Court held in Skinner v. Deming, (1851) 2 Ind. 558, 560, that: "The defendants to this bill had a right to set up the fact that the bank was not chartered by the requisite vote and show it, if necessary, by the journals of the Michigan legislature." Citing Purdy v. People, 4 Hill, N.Y., 384. A few years later the same court decided Coleman v. Dobbins, (1856) 8 Ind. 156, where the court cited the New York case of Purdy v. People, and held that when a party claiming any right or defense growing out of the action of the assembly, brings the parts of the journal relied upon to the judicial knowledge of the Court, they will be inspected like other records, and the Court will determine whether the legislative action they record, on the bill in question, is in accordance with the constitution.
Legislative journals were referred to in other Indiana cases following Coleman v. Dobbins, supra, in order to determine the validity of the action of the General Assembly  McCulloch v. State, (1858) 11 Ind. 424, and Coburn v. Dodd, (1860) 14 Ind. 347. Plaintiff, however, cites none of these cases in support of his position.
Perhaps the reason is that in 1869 the doctrine of determining the validity of the action of the General Assembly by reference to its legislative journals was swept away like a sand castle in a flood tide of contrary judicial pronouncements, beginning with the landmark case of Evans v. Browne, (1869) 30 Ind. 514, and followed by seven Indiana Supreme Court decisions to the same effect, the last being in 1968.
Evans v. Browne, supra, specifically overruled the holding in Skinner v. Deming, supra, and the line of cases which followed that opinion. The court, in overruling Skinner, referred to the practice of examining the legislative journals as an "essentially mischievous doctrine" and added:
The court was considering the validity of a bill which had been authenticated by the presiding officers of the two houses which was challenged on the grounds that a quorum of the house of representatives was not present at the time the bill was voted on. In refusing to investigate the legislative journals to determine if a quorum was present as required by a specific provision of the constitution, i.e., Article 4, Section 25, the opinion emphasized that in doing so the courts would invade the exclusive province of the legislature and thereby violate the constitution by such invasion. Such a determination was held to be a legislative function and not a judicial question.
The holding in Evans was repeated in Bender v. State, (1876) 53 Ind. 254, where the court held that courts of this state cannot look beyond the enrolled act of the legislature, to ascertain whether there has been a compliance with the requirement of the constitution, that "no bill shall be presented to the governor within two days next previous to the final adjournment of the General Assembly."
*587 Again, in 1883, the Supreme Court in Board of Commissioners of Madison County v. Burford, 93 Ind. 383, 384, held that:
To the same effect is State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Benton County v. Boice et al., (1894) 140 Ind. 506, 514, 40 N.E. 113:
Commenting upon attacks on an act's validity in the manner of its enactment, the Supreme Court in State v. Wheeler, (1909) 172 Ind. 578, 580, 89 N.E. 1, 2, 19 Ann.Cas. 834, said:
The now firmly entrenched rule enunciated in these cases was last recognized in 1968. See State v. Clark, (1968) 247 Ind. 490, 217 N.E.2d 588.
While these authorities make no mention of joint resolutions as such, the constitutional source for authenticating enrolled acts and joint resolutions is Article 4, § 25, of our constitution, which treats them alike:
The holding in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, Auditor, et al., (1894) 141 Ind. 281, 40 N.E. 1051, specifically bears out our assumption that a duly authenticated joint resolution is treated the same as a duly authenticated bill under Article 4, § 25. In Western Union the court held that:
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that when an enrolled act or joint resolution is authenticated with the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses, it will be conclusively presumed that it was enacted in conformity with constitutional requirements.
One such exception is illustrated by State ex rel. Mayr v. Marion Circuit Court, (1931) 202 Ind. 501, 508, 176 N.E. 626, 628, where the Supreme Court said:
Another instance where courts may examine the journals of the Senate and the House is where a statute is ambiguous and in order to determine its true meaning, the journals are examined for legislative intent. In so doing, the authentication of the statute itself is not in question. This has long been the law in Indiana. In 1880 the Supreme Court stated in Edger v. Board of Commissioners of Randolph County, (1880) 70 Ind. 331, that:
Also see Stout v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County, (1886) 107 Ind. 343, 8 N.E. 222.
There is no hint in the case at bar that House Joint Resolution No. 6 or House Joint Resolution No. 12 were not duly and lawfully attested by the signatures of the presiding officers nor is there any suggestion the attestation on the Joint Resolutions was due to fraud or mistake of fact. No question is raised as to the legislative intent of the respective Joint Resolutions, so no reason is presented by plaintiff why we should not be bound by the firmly established general rule preventing courts from looking behind the authentication of the act or joint resolution to the journals of the houses.
Plaintiff fails to come to grips with Evans v. Browne, supra, and the line of similar decisions following that important case. Instead, plaintiff exclusively concerns himself with repeated quotes from Indiana cases enunciating the well-established doctrine that constitutions are to receive strict construction. We completely agree with his soul-stirring quotes from these cases proclaiming the sacredness of the organic law of our state, and while they are interesting, they are not determinative of the question before us.
Plaintiff leans heavily on Ellingham v. Dye, (1912) 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1, for succor. In this case the legislature created a unique situation by adopting in the form of a bill a proposed new constitution to be submitted to the people. It did so in the guise of an exercise of legislative power without following the specific provisions of section 1 of Article 16 setting forth the manner of proposing amendments to the constitution. The question became one of determining whether this act incorporating a total new constitution was a valid exercise of legislative power or on its face was a violation of the terms of Article 16, § 1. No question was raised as to the authentication of the bill or of looking *589 to the journals of the houses of the General Assembly for defects in procedures required by the constitution.
The court exhaustively discussed the importance of making constitutional law and distinguished that process from ordinary legislation. The majority opinion stated that "there was no pretense of complying with or proceeding under provisions of the present Constitution for amendment of it."
The rationale of this decision is that the constitution as the fundamental law of the state only permits the legislature to propose amendments to the constitution by following the steps required by Article 16, § 1. Since there was no pretense of following these steps, the legislature acted without authority as was apparent on the face of the bill.
The legislature in the 1967 and 1969 sessions acted in good faith by following the steps required in proposing an amendment and its action in so doing was duly authenticated by the presiding officers of the legislature. On its face it was acting pursuant to specific constitutional authority and not contrary thereto as in Ellingham.
Plaintiff must also contend with a presumption of constitutionality. The party questioning the constitutionality of action of the legislature must assume the burden of overcoming a strong presumption favoring the constitutionality of such actions. State v. Clark, (1966) 247 Ind. 490, 217 N.E.2d 588.
The imperfection in plaintiff's argument that the journals of the General Assembly should be viewed to invalidate the joint resolutions proposing the Judicial Amendment is that it fixes its gaze with tunnel-like vision on part of Article 16, § 1, requiring the yeas and nays to be entered in the journal, and ignores other equally important parts of the Indiana constitution. Like plaintiff, we are concerned with strict construction of the constitution, but our concern extends to all of its provisions. Those which relate to each other must be construed in pari materia. Welsh v. Sells, (1963) 244 Ind. 423, 193 N.E.2d 359; Kirkpatrick v. King, (1950) 228 Ind. 236, 91 N.E.2d 785.
Article 3, § 1, of our organic law provides:
The recording of the yeas and nays required by § 1 of Article 16 is a legislative function exclusively within the sphere of the legislature, according to the terms of this provision, and the courts have no right to exercise that function. Evans v. Browne, supra.
The function of recording the yeas and nays in the journals of the two houses of the legislature is, by its very nature, legislative in character, as is authentication. Inquiries into such facts as the presence of a quorum or whether yeas and nays are recorded in the journal must be determined by the legislature itself. As the court said in Evans v. Browne, supra, "No other tribunal can so well ascertain the fact as itself * * *. The form of our State government was intended to make these two departments co-equal but separate and independent of each other, each having distinct functions to perform, and wholly beyond the control of the other." The framers of the constitution must also have contemplated such action to be exclusively legislative when they adopted the language of Article 4, § 25, which states:
A fair construction of this language is that it is the presiding officers of the legislature, not the courts nor the executive, who exercise their official duties as officers of the legislature to authenticate "all bills and joint resolutions."
The rule of Evans v. Browne has a timeless quality because it rests upon preserving the sanctity of the constitution's principles defining the very framework of our organic law. By indulging in the conclusive presumption that a duly authenticated act or joint resolution was enacted in conformity with the constitution, we are not perpetuating a needless legal fiction. The reasons for precluding an inquiry into the possible defects of legislative proposals amending the constitution are just as powerful today as they were in 1869 when Evans v. Browne was decided. We would summarize them in this manner:
Also see Evans v. Browne, supra.
*591 We now reaffirm the repeated stand taken by our Supreme Court that courts should not look beyond the authentication of the presiding officers of the legislature to determine from their journals whether there has been a defect in following the constitutional directives of Article 16, § 1.
It is our opinion that the failure of the Secretary of State and some clerks of the Circuit Courts to comply with the statutory requirements for certification and notice does not invalidate the Judicial Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges and supports with affidavit the failure of the Secretary of State to certify the proposed Constitutional Amendment to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of each county as prescribed by I.C. 1971, 3-1-15-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4201 (Burns' 1969 Repl.).
He also alleges that in an undetermined number of counties the Clerk of the Circuit Court did not publish notice of the election upon the Constitutional Amendment as required by Burns' § 29-4201, supra, which reads as follows:
Thus plaintiff is arguing that the Judicial Amendment is invalid because of the failure of the Secretary of State to certify the Judicial Amendment and the additional failure of some county clerks to include it in the notice of the General Election of November 3, 1970. This, he contends, breaks the chain of steps necessary to properly submit a constitutional amendment to the electorate.
This argument comes to us singularly unencumbered with applicable authority. It amounts to nothing more than a bald assertion that the Judicial Amendment is invalid because certain details of the election laws were not followed verbatim.
Plaintiff refers us to Burns' § 29-4201, supra, set forth above, but makes no reference to the companion statute I.C. 1971, 3-1-21-2, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4802 (Burns' 1969 Repl.), which bears on this subject:
The italicized portions unequivocally state the legislative intention that failure of the clerk to publish notice is not grounds for invalidating an election where a constitutional amendment is submitted and the same intent can be read into the statute with respect to certification.
Plaintiff admits that the issue of certification and the publication of notice has been raised after the date of the election. Unfortunately, this brings him within the ambit of Schafer v. Ort, (1931) 202 Ind. 622, 177 N.E. 438,[6] which rather handily disposes of such defects:
Nowhere do we find any allegations that voters were denied their right to vote or that illegal voters were allowed to participate in the election or that the vote was not free and untrammeled due to the failure to certify and publish notice as prescribed by Burns' § 29-4201, supra.
The language of Burns' § 29-4802, supra, providing that no election is invalidated by reason of the failure of the clerk to give notice prior to the election indicates the intention of the legislature that the giving of notice is directory and not mandatory. Therefore, the failure of publication of such notice in certain counties does not invalidate the judicial amendment. The same is true of the failure of the Secretary of State to certify the judicial amendment to the clerk of each county's Circuit Court. Both of these alleged defects are not sufficient to invalidate the judicial amendment after the action of the electorate in adopting the amendment by a majority voting thereon on November 3, 1970. Schafer v. Ort, supra.
It is our opinion that, as a matter of law, the language used on the ballot was sufficient to meet the requirements of IC 1971, 3-1-15-2, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4202 (Burns' 1969 Repl.) and IC 1971, 3-1-15-4, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4204 (Burns' 1969 Repl.). The language adopted by the State Election Board on August 6, 1970, and used on the ballot, reads:
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint and recites specific instances in his Memorandum[7] that the description of the Judicial Amendment on the ballot did not adequately and accurately identify it so as to permit intelligent voting by the electorate and, further, that the language of the description was misleading.
In approaching this issue, we are guided by two specific statutes. Plaintiff makes no reference to § 29-4202, supra, which reads in pertinent part:
Also, § 29-4204, supra, states in part:
By the positive, unambiguous wording of these statutes the State Election Board is only required to cause a brief statement designating the constitutional amendment to be printed on the state ballots. It must inform the voter as to the particular amendment to be voted on and need not educate the voter by spelling out the entire amendment. The "brief statement" of the Amendment on the ballot is intended as a means of identification.
This precise question has been previously litigated in this jurisdiction. In Oviatt v. Behme, (1958) 238 Ind. 69, 147 N.E.2d 897, the Indiana Supreme Court analyzed the adequacy of language describing a constitutional amendment which extended the terms of certain county officials from two to four years. After pointing out the absence of any mandatory language in the constitution concerning this subject, the court held that even though an important limitation was omitted in the ballot description, the language used was adequate.
*594 The specific rule laid down in Oviatt v. Behme, supra, is:
The contents of the "brief statement" of the Judicial Amendment, appearing as Constitutional Amendment No. 2, not only adequately designated the Judicial Amendment but went further than identification by summarizing the principal features of the Judicial Amendment. Further, since there was only one amendment relating to the judicial system, we are hard pressed to see any logical basis for confusion or uncertainty in the minds of the electorate.
Plaintiff expresses numerous specific dissatisfactions with the language of the "brief statement," none of which have the benefit of supporting authority. They amount to nothing more than his disapproval of the Judicial Amendment. In view of Oviatt v. Behme, supra, and the applicable statutes they merit no further consideration.
The Attorney General urges upon us certain cases, and we have found others, which would dispose of all three of plaintiff's Propositions on various grounds. In each of them there are alleged or presumed constitutional defects in the submission and adoption of amendments to a state constitution. For example, constitutional amendments have been upheld where the provision in the constitution that is violated is held to be directory only.[8] Such holdings are generally condemned because they trifle with the sanctity of organic law. Another judicial approach upholding constitutional amendments where there exists a defect in following a constitutional directive, is represented by State ex rel. Thompson, Attorney General v. Winnett et al., (1907) 78 Neb. 379, 110 N.W. 1113. The court in this case relied on the principle of substantial compliance to uphold the amendment.
Some courts have favored a doctrine of ratification to cure defects in the adoption of constitutional amendments. Florida and Kansas boldly state that:
This doctrine is not as widely followed as Florida would have us believe. In fact, Sylvester v. Tindall, supra, which is most widely quoted for this proposition, does not support the doctrine. Our scrutiny of the case indicates there was a violation of a statutory directive, not a constitutional directive. Other Florida cases such as Collier v. Gray, (1934) 116 Fla. 845, 157 So. 40, and West v. State, (1905) 50 Fla. 154, 39 So. 412, do broadly define and apply the principle. However, in Graham v. Miller, (1957) 348 Mich. 684, 84 N.W.2d 46, Michigan rejected the doctrine.
We assume that in deciding Evans v. Browne, supra, our Supreme Court could have applied the doctrine but chose not to do so. Our research reveals no Indiana cases specifically embracing the doctrine in whole or part, although a trace of it might be said to appear in Oviatt v. Behme, supra, where the court said:
We must agree that the doctrine of ratification and the principle of substantial compliance have sufficient vitality to overcome plaintiff's three Propositions, but we ground our decision solely on the Indiana authorities and statutes specifically indicated above.
Finding no genuine issue as to any material fact, it is hereby ordered that summary judgment should be and hereby is, as a matter of law, entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants.
[1]  This action was taken on the ground that the title to office of one in actual exercise of the office cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. Osborne v. State, (1891) 128 Ind. 129, 27 N.E. 345; Case v. State, (1879) 69 Ind. 46; Gumberts v. Adams Express Co., (1867) 28 Ind. 181; Creighton v. Piper, (1860) 14 Ind. 182; and Leonard v. City of Terre Haute, (1911) 48 Ind. App. 104, 93 N.E. 872.
[2]  See Ind.Const. art. 7, § 1 et seq. (Burns' 1970).
[3]  "Memorandum In Opposition In [sic] Motion To Dismiss Filed by Governor Edgar Whitcomb," filed by plaintiff February 9, 1971.
[4]  For 1967, see Senate Journal p. 1285 and House Journal p. 1288; for 1969, see Senate Journal p. 1125 and House Journal p. 1291.
[5]  See note 3.
[6]  Cited and followed with approval in Black v. Smith, (1936) 209 Ind. 571, 200 N.E. 215, where the court said:

"The only question presented by this appeal is whether a failure of the election board to keep a poll list, and a failure of all the voters who voted to sign a poll list, will invalidate the election and make illegal all of the votes cast in the precinct, notwithstanding all of the voters were qualified voters, and all of the votes cast otherwise legal and valid. It is said in Jones v. State ex rel. Wilson (1899), 153 Ind. 440, 451, 55 N.E. 229, 233: `It is the duty of the courts to uphold the law by sustaining elections thereunder that have resulted in a full and fair expression of the public will, and, from the current of authority, the following may be stated as the approved rule: All provisions of the election law are mandatory, if enforcement is sought, before election in a direct proceeding for that purpose; but after election all should be held directory only, in support of the result, unless of a character to effect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the vote or to the ascertainment of the result, or unless the provisions affect an essential element of the election, or unless it is expressly declared by the statute that the particular act is essential to the validity of an election, or that its omission shall render it void.' This must be treated as the settled law of this state. Schafer v. Ort (1931), 202 Ind. 622, 177 N.E. 438; State ex rel. Harry et al. v. Ice et al. (1934), 207 Ind. 65, 191 N.E. 155; Lumm v. Simpson (1935), 207 Ind. 680, 194 N.E. 341." Also see Brown v. Grzeskowiak, (1951) 230 Ind. 110, 101 N.E.2d 639.
[7]  "Memorandum In Opposition In [sic] Motion To Dismiss Filed by Governor Edgar Whitcomb," filed by plaintiff February 9, 1971.
[8]  Armstrong v. Klug, (1924) 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263.