Title: State v. McAdams

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-788 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL LINDSEY MCADAMS,  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-826 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL LINDSEY MCADAMS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 21, 2016] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This matter is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in McAdams v. State, 137 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 
 
 
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2014).  In its decision, the district court ruled upon a question that it certified to be 
of great public importance.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
FACTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The Pasco County Sheriff’s Office was notified that Lynda McAdams 
(Lynda), the estranged wife of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Michael McAdams 
(McAdams), and her boyfriend/coworker, William Andrews (Andrews), had been 
reported missing by concerned family members.  On October 21, 2009, a detective 
responded to Lynda’s home on Palomino Lake Drive in Dade City and, after 
observing her truck parked at the residence, conducted a welfare check at the 
house.  He found the door unlocked and walked through the residence.  No one 
was present.   
During the welfare check, the detective observed that the lid of the washing 
machine was open and a substance that appeared to be blood could be seen on the 
rim.  Blood-stained clothing was inside the washing machine.  The detective also 
observed latex gloves in the kitchen, along with rolls of duct tape.  He departed the 
residence and notified a supervisor of his observations.  McAdams was contacted, 
and he gave written consent for a search of the Palomino Lake Drive home.1  
During the search, in addition to other items of interest, there appeared to be blood 
                                          
 
 
1.  The records of the Pasco County Property Appraiser listed McAdams as 
the owner of the home.   
 
 
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spatter on a wall, blood was discovered on clothing, and a bedroom door evidenced 
what appeared to be a bullet hole.  A projectile was later recovered from the wall.   
 
A different detective entered McAdams’s separate residence in Spring Hill 
to perform a welfare check there with the consent of McAdams’s father.  When the 
detective walked through the garage, he observed a pair of blue-jean shorts that 
appeared to have blood on them.  Further, a broken cell phone was found on a 
night stand and McAdams’s father stated that it did not belong to McAdams.  Law 
enforcement subsequently obtained a search warrant for the Spring Hill home.  The 
warrant was executed at approximately 2:22 a.m. on October 23, and McAdams 
was not present.  The shorts, a grey shirt, and a black belt were seized.   
Later that morning, a detective with the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office 
approached McAdams in the driveway of the Spring Hill home and asked if he 
would be willing to come to the sheriff’s office to speak with detectives.  
McAdams understood that the detective was there because Lynda was missing and 
replied that he wanted to help.  McAdams rode to the sheriff’s office in the back of 
a deputy’s vehicle, but he was not handcuffed.2  The detective specifically 
informed McAdams that he was not under arrest.    
                                          
 
 
2.  The detective told McAdams that he could either travel to the sheriff’s 
office in his own vehicle or ride in a police vehicle.  McAdams elected to accept a 
ride from a deputy.    
 
 
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Upon his arrival at the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office, McAdams was 
escorted to an interview room where he met with Pasco County Detectives 
Christensen and Arey.  The encounter at the sheriff’s office between McAdams 
and the detectives began at 11:55 a.m., and the interview was recorded in its 
entirety.  During the majority of the interview, McAdams maintained that he did 
not know what happened to Lynda or Andrews.  However, at 2:27:15 p.m., while 
McAdams was in the room with only Detective Arey, he commenced a confession 
in which he admitted that he fatally shot Lynda and Andrews on October 18, 2009.  
McAdams also confessed that he buried the bodies and discarded the weapon off a 
bridge.  At 2:42:07 p.m., Detective Arey read McAdams the Miranda3 warnings.  
After receiving the warnings, McAdams continued to speak with Detective Arey, 
and he subsequently directed law enforcement to the bodies. 
 
At 2:04 p.m., while McAdams was being interrogated by the Pasco County 
detectives in the Hernando office, and before the confession commenced, an 
attorney retained by McAdams’s parents arrived at that office.  After determining 
that McAdams was being interrogated in the building, the deputy at the counter 
advised the attorney that it would not be possible to convey any information to the 
location where McAdams was being questioned by any means, including e-mail, 
                                          
 
 
3.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
 
 
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telephone, a knock on the door, or even a note slipped under the door.  Although 
the attorney stated: 
I want all questioning to stop.  I don’t want anymore [sic] questioning 
to go on without my presence.  
he was not allowed to see or otherwise communicate with McAdams in any 
manner.  Facing that insurmountable obstacle, the attorney departed from the 
sheriff’s office at 2:17 p.m., just ten minutes before McAdams commenced his 
confession.  McAdams was first informed about the presence of the attorney only 
after he directed the detectives to the burial site.  On November 10, 2009, 
McAdams was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder.   
 
McAdams subsequently filed a motion to suppress any statements made to 
law enforcement, any evidence obtained as a result of those statements, and any 
audio or video evidence that resulted from those statements.4  McAdams asserted 
that he was in custody when he was questioned by Detectives Arey and 
Christensen, and they failed to read him the Miranda warnings.  McAdams also 
contended that he was improperly denied access to his attorney, who was actually 
at the sheriff’s office while he was being interrogated.   
                                          
 
 
4.  McAdams also filed a separate motion to suppress evidence seized from 
the Palomino Lake Drive residence.  The trial court denied the motion, and the 
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling.  McAdams, 137 So. 3d at 
403.   
 
 
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During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Christensen 
outlined the reason the attorney was not allowed to see or speak with McAdams: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  What did they tell you as far as this 
lawyer in the lobby of the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  I was told that an attorney came up wanting 
to speak with Mr. McAdams.  And we discussed the situation about 
just an attorney showing up.  And that— 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  What did they tell you about the 
attorney, anything specific that you recall? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  I don’t remember.  I don’t even know who 
the attorney was. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Did they tell you that the attorney 
wanted to speak to Mr. McAdams and that he wanted the questioning 
to stop? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  I believe so.  But I know there was an 
attorney present, that he wanted to speak with Mr. McAdams, and I 
decided that the attorney wasn’t going to have access to Mr. 
McAdams. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And why is that? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  Because he wasn’t under arrest, and Mr. 
McAdams never requested for an attorney. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  If he’s not under arrest, why not let 
him talk to his attorney? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  Because there was no need to.  I did not have 
to have him have access to Mr. McAdams. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And that was your call . . . or someone 
else? 
 
 
 
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CHRISTENSEN:  It was ultimately my call. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And why not tell McAdams that his 
lawyer is out there? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  I didn’t have to. 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And what makes you think that you 
didn’t have to, based on what? 
 
CHRISTENSEN:  Because he was not in custody.  He came 
there on his own free will to discuss the disappearance of his wife.  
And at that time he didn’t confess to anything.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
 
 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress on both the Miranda basis and 
the failure of law enforcement to notify McAdams with regard to the presence of 
the attorney for him.  With regard to the Miranda claim, the trial court considered 
the four-factor test approved in Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999),5 to 
provide guidance to courts in determinations as to whether an individual is in 
custody, which would require the warnings to be read.  The court concluded that 
                                          
 
 
5.  The Ramirez factors are:  
(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; 
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent 
to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; 
[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave 
the place of questioning.   
Id. at 574 (citing State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997)). 
 
 
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McAdams was in custody only when Detective Arey read the Miranda warnings 
and placed him under arrest.   
With regard to the failure to advise McAdams of the attorney who had been 
retained by his parents and appeared at the sheriff’s office, the trial court 
considered Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987) (Haliburton II), in 
which this Court reversed murder and burglary convictions and ordered a new trial 
where the defendant gave a statement while an attorney who had been retained on 
the defendant’s behalf was at the police station requesting to speak with him.  Id. at 
1089.  The trial court concluded that Haliburton II was distinguishable: 
 
In this case the attorney was long gone by the time that 
defendant was in custody.  And there was no evidence even that the 
defendant had any idea that he had had—that someone had retained an 
attorney for him, no evidence of that whatsoever.  And that in reading 
the Supreme Court cases, there seems to be some distinguishable facts 
as to whether or not Haliburton, the holding in Haliburton of 
suppression should be applied here. 
 
 
After a jury trial, during which the video of the interview was played, McAdams 
was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.   
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and sentences.  
McAdams, 137 So. 3d at 408.  The district court agreed with the trial court that 
McAdams was not in custody when he initially confessed to the murders.  Id. at 
407.  The district court noted that Haliburton II involved a custodial interrogation, 
 
 
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and declined to hold that a refusal by law enforcement officers to interrupt an 
interview to allow an attorney access to a client who has voluntarily agreed to 
speak with police constitutes misconduct.  However, the district court certified the 
following question as one of great public importance: 
DOES AN ADULT SUSPECT WHO IS NOT IN CUSTODY BUT 
VOLUNTARILY ENGAGES IN A LENGTHY INTERVIEW IN AN 
INTERROGATION ROOM AT A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICE 
HAVE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE INFORMED THAT A 
LAWYER HAS BEEN RETAINED BY HIS FAMILY AND IS IN 
THE PUBLIC SECTION OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICE 
AND WISHES TO TALK TO HIM? 
Id.  
 
Nonetheless, the Second District held that once McAdams confessed and the 
Miranda warnings were read, he was in custody and should have been informed 
about the attorney, and the detectives violated McAdams’s right to due process 
under the Florida Constitution when they failed to do so.  Id. at 407-08.  Based 
upon this violation, the Second District held that any evidence collected after 
McAdams was read his rights and until he was informed about the attorney should 
have been suppressed pursuant to Haliburton II.  Id. at 408.   
 
Both the State and McAdams petitioned for review of the certified question.  
For purposes of our analysis, we rephrase the question as follows: 
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION, WHEN MUST A PERSON WHO IS BEING 
QUESTIONED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A NON-PUBLIC 
LOCATION BE NOTIFIED THAT AN ATTORNEY RETAINED 
 
 
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ON HIS OR HER BEHALF IS AT THE LOCATION AND 
AVAILABLE TO SPEAK WITH HIM OR HER?  
ANALYSIS 
The rephrased certified question is a pure question of law that requires 
interpretation of the Florida Constitution and is, therefore, subject to de novo 
review.  Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth., 8 So. 3d 1076, 1084-85 
(Fla. 2008).  To provide context and background as to the current state of Florida 
law on this issue, we summarize Haliburton II, and its predecessor decision, 
Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1985) (Haliburton I).   
Haliburton I & II 
 
Haliburton was brought to a police station with regard to a homicide, read 
the Miranda warnings, and questioned.  Haliburton I, 476 So. 2d at 193.  The 
following then occurred: 
[Haliburton] submitted to a polygraph examination at 2:05 p.m.  
Meanwhile appellant’s sister retained an attorney to represent him.  
The attorney called the police near the end of the polygraph 
examination and requested that the questioning stop.  The attorney 
arrived at the police station a few minutes before 4 p.m. and asked to 
speak with appellant, but was not allowed to do so.  Appellant gave a 
recorded statement from 3:56 until 4:20 p.m. that was played to the 
jury.  By 4:18 p.m. the attorney had a telephone court order requiring 
that the police give him access to appellant.  After the judge’s second 
phone call, the police chief ordered that the interrogation cease, and 
the attorney was able to see appellant.  
Id.  Haliburton was convicted of burglary and first-degree murder, and he was 
sentenced to death.  Id.  On direct appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred 
 
 
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when it refused to suppress the statements that Haliburton gave after the attorney 
arrived at the station and sought access to his client.  Id.  We explained that 
because Haliburton was not notified of the attorney retained for him who was at 
the station and available to advise him, the waiver of the Miranda rights was 
invalid, and he was entitled to a new trial.  Id. at 194.  In support of the holding, we 
stated: 
Our emphasis is on fairness in apprising a defendant of the recourse 
available to him.  In order for the right to counsel to be meaningful, a 
defendant must be told when an attorney who has been retained on his 
behalf is trying to advise him.  If the defendant wishes to reject the 
opportunity for such advice, he may do so.    
Id.  
 
 
 
The State petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review, 
and the Supreme Court vacated Haliburton I for further consideration in light of the 
decision in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).  Florida v. Haliburton, 475 
U.S. 1078 (1986).  In Burbine, an attorney telephoned the police station and 
advised that she would act as Burbine’s legal counsel in the event the police 
intended to question him.  475 U.S. at 417.  The attorney was informed Burbine 
would not be questioned that day; however, he was actually questioned that 
evening.  Id.  After waiving his Miranda rights on three separate occasions, 
Burbine signed three statements in which he confessed to a murder.  Id. at 417-18.  
 
 
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During that time, Burbine was not notified of the telephone call from the attorney.  
Id. at 417.   
The Supreme Court held that suppression of the confessions was not 
required under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 428.  
The Supreme Court concluded that events occurring outside of a suspect’s 
presence can have no impact on his or her ability to understand and knowingly 
waive a constitutional right.  Id. at 422.  It also rejected an expansion of Miranda 
that would require law enforcement to keep a suspect informed as to the status of 
his or her legal representation.  Id. at 427.  However, the Supreme Court 
specifically noted that nothing in its decision precluded the States from 
implementing different requirements under state law.  Id. at 428.  The Supreme 
Court further concluded that although deception by the police may rise to the level 
of a constitutional due process violation, the police conduct in Burbine was not of 
the type that “so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal 
intrusion into the criminal processes of the States.”  Id. at 433-34. 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court, in Haliburton II, held that 
the conduct of the police violated the due process provision of article I, section 9, 
of the Florida Constitution6 and again granted Haliburton a new trial, stating: 
                                          
 
 
6.  Article I, section 9, provides: 
 
 
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[W]e must agree with Justice Stevens [in his Burbine dissent] that 
 
due process requires fairness, integrity, and honor in the 
operation of the criminal justice system, and in its 
treatment of the citizen’s cardinal constitutional 
protections. . . .  [P]olice interference in the attorney-
client relationship is the type of governmental 
misconduct on a matter of central importance to the 
administration of justice that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits. . . .  Just as the government cannot conceal 
from a suspect material and exculpatory evidence, so too 
the government cannot conceal from a suspect the 
material fact of his attorney’s communication. 
[475 U.S. at 467] (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
514 So. 2d at 1090 (emphasis supplied).   
Due Process Under the Florida Constitution 
Three theories have been posited as to what is required under the Due 
Process Clause of the Florida Constitution when an attorney retained on behalf of 
an individual who is being questioned in a non-public area of a law enforcement 
office appears at the office.  They are: 
1)  Absent some other outrageous conduct, no due process 
violation occurs under the Florida Constitution where the police fail to 
inform a person about the appearance of an attorney who has been 
retained on his or her behalf, even if he or she is in custody (the 
position taken by the State).   
                                          
 
Due process.—No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against 
oneself. 
 
 
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2)  The Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution requires a person 
to be informed about the appearance of an attorney who has been retained on 
his or her behalf once he or she is in custody (the holding of the Second 
District). 
 
3)  The Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution requires a person 
to be informed about the appearance of an attorney who has been retained on 
his or her behalf regardless of whether he or she is in custody (the position 
taken by McAdams).   
 
The State’s theory simply does not lead to a practical application.  Were this 
Court to adopt such a position, the police could routinely conceal from a suspect 
who is even in custody the fact that an attorney who has been retained on his or her 
behalf is at the law enforcement office and is available to speak with him or her.  
This application would constitute a complete departure from the conclusion of 
Haliburton II that under the Florida Constitution, “[p]olice interference in the 
attorney-client relationship is the type of governmental misconduct on a matter of 
central importance to the administration of justice that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits.”  Id. (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also 
Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1991) (“Due process contemplates that 
the police and other state agents act in an accusatorial, not an inquisitorial, 
manner.”).   
 
Further, to adopt the interpretation of the State would inject uncertainty into 
the law.  Questions would arise as to what type of conduct, coupled with the failure 
to inform the individual of the attorney’s presence, would be sufficiently 
 
 
- 15 - 
outrageous to rise to the level of a due process violation.  No bright-line rule would 
exist for trial courts to apply or law enforcement officers to follow.  Instead, 
outrageousness would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, creating a substantial 
risk that trial courts would reach different conclusions on similar facts.  This would 
muddy, rather than clarify, the level of conduct by law enforcement officers that is 
constitutionally permissible.  Therefore, we reject the position advocated by the 
State. 
 
Moreover, while Haliburton II involved a situation where the defendant was 
in custody, the present case demonstrates why it is also unworkable for the due 
process rights of an individual under the Florida Constitution to be contingent upon 
custodial status with regard to access to a retained attorney.  It is clear that as soon 
as a retained attorney arrives at the law enforcement office, the questioning of the 
individual can intensify significantly with the goal of obtaining a confession.7  
                                          
 
 
7.  In Bruce v. State, 92 So. 3d 902, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal concluded that whether interrogating officers are actually 
aware of a retained attorney’s arrival at the law enforcement office is irrelevant to 
the right of the person being questioned to be informed about the attorney: 
The police cannot rely on the failure to notify interrogators of a 
lawyer’s presence to skirt the . . . due process requirements imposed 
by Haliburton II.  Thus, the fact that the interrogating detectives in 
this case were unaware of [the attorney’s] presence at the station 
house is without legal significance.  To allow the police to hide 
behind the imprecise standard of the good faith ignorance of the 
 
 
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Here, within minutes of the arrival of the attorney at the Hernando County 
Sheriff’s Office, the questioning of McAdams by the detectives became more 
pointed and aggressive.  Detective Arey confronted McAdams with the blood and 
DNA evidence discovered at both of his residences.  Further, Arey clearly 
conveyed to McAdams that law enforcement knew he was responsible for the 
disappearances of Lynda and Andrews.  Although probable cause may have 
existed to arrest McAdams, Detective Arey continued to apply psychological 
pressure until McAdams confessed.   
We conclude that the only way to properly protect the due process rights of 
citizens under the Florida Constitution is to implement a bright-line rule.  
Otherwise, determinations of when voluntary questioning evolves into custodial 
interrogation will spawn hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs or expenses and 
hours in litigation.  Therefore, we now hold that when an individual is being 
questioned in a non-public area, and an attorney retained on his or her behalf 
arrives at the location, the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution requires 
                                          
 
interrogators would encourage law enforcement to be deaf and blind 
to a lawyer’s attempts to contact his client in the station house.   
We agree with the conclusion reached by the Fourth District.  In the present matter, 
once it was determined that McAdams was at the Hernando County Sheriff’s 
Office, a duty existed for law enforcement to inform him that an attorney retained 
on his behalf was present.  See id. (“Because they are responsible for the suspect’s 
isolation, the police have a duty to act reasonably, diligently, and promptly to 
provide the defendant with accurate information.”). 
 
 
- 17 - 
that the police notify the individual of the attorney’s presence and purpose.  
Pursuant to this holding, a person can no longer be deprived of the critical 
information that an attorney is present and available to provide legal advice based 
on pure police conjecture that the individual is not in custody.  We also cannot 
allow law enforcement to refuse to interrupt an interview, as occurred here.  Under 
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution that we 
adopt today, it is the individual, rather than law enforcement, who is given the 
knowledge and power to decide whether to take advantage of the attorney’s 
services.   
 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that McAdams’s right to due process under 
the Florida Constitution was violated when law enforcement officers failed to 
inform him that an attorney retained by his parents had arrived at the Hernando 
County Sheriff’s Office and was available to assist him.  Pursuant to this holding, 
the determinations of both the trial court and the Second District as to when 
McAdams had the right to be notified about the attorney were in error.   
Custodial Status 
 
Moreover, although custodial status is irrelevant to a person’s right under the 
Florida Constitution to know that an attorney retained on his or her behalf is at the 
location where he or she is being questioned, we also conclude that the trial court 
and the district court erred when they determined that McAdams was not in 
 
 
- 18 - 
custody before he confessed to the homicides at 2:27:15 p.m., and a Miranda 
violation occurred when this confession was admitted during trial.   
 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court explained that: 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court 
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their 
freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being 
compelled to incriminate themselves.  We have concluded that 
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of 
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and 
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. 
 
 
384 U.S. at 467.  Failure to provide the Miranda warnings prior to custodial 
interrogation generally requires exclusion from trial of any post-custody statements 
given.  Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004); see also Deviney v. State, 
112 So. 3d 57, 79 (Fla. 2013) (“[I]f a defendant’s statement resulted from a law 
enforcement officer’s illegal actions, that evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ 
and the trial court should exclude it from trial.”).   
Interrogation occurs when a state agent asks questions or engages in actions 
that a reasonable person would conclude are intended to lead to an incriminating 
response.  Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 n.17 (Fla. 1992).  We have further 
explained that: 
Custody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only formal 
arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 
associated with formal arrest.  See Arbelaez v. State, 626 So. 2d 169, 
175 (Fla. 1993).  A person is in custody if a reasonable person placed 
in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action 
 
 
- 19 - 
was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.  See Traylor, 
596 So. 2d at 966 n.16; Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 
1985).  “The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, 
but rather how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would 
have perceived the situation.”  Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 
(Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1127. 
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573.  Although we approved in Ramirez a four-factor test 
to provide courts with guidance in determining whether an individual in is custody, 
the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the “circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation;” and (2) “given those circumstances, would a 
reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate 
the interrogation and leave.”   
Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004)).  Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances 
in determining whether a reasonable person would believe that his or her freedom 
of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.  Caldwell v. 
State, 41 So. 3d 188, 197 (Fla. 2010).  Further, while precedent remains a guide, 
custody determinations are heavily fact dependent.  Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 
221, 246 (Fla. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 965 (2010).   
We have applied these standards and conclude that although McAdams was 
not in custody initially, the encounter with the detectives steadily evolved into a 
custodial situation in which a reasonable person would not have felt free to 
terminate the interview and leave.  The record reflects that McAdams voluntarily 
accompanied law enforcement to the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office.  When 
 
 
- 20 - 
approached in his driveway by a detective, McAdams acknowledged that his wife 
was missing and expressed a desire to help law enforcement.  McAdams was told 
that he was not under arrest, and he accepted a ride to the sheriff’s office after he 
was informed he could drive his own vehicle.  Although he rode in the back of a 
deputy’s vehicle, he was not handcuffed.  Further, McAdams’s parents arrived at 
the house before he departed, and he was allowed to speak with them.   
Upon arrival at the sheriff’s office, McAdams was placed in a small room 
with a desk and three chairs that was located in a non-public area.  During the 
motion to suppress hearing, Detective Christensen described herself, Detective 
Arey, and McAdams as being “pretty close.”  McAdams’s access to the door of the 
interview room was not blocked, and there is no indication that the door was ever 
locked.  At the beginning of the interview, Detective Christensen informed 
McAdams that he was not under arrest, and he confirmed that he came to the 
sheriff’s office voluntarily.  At no point did the detectives yell at him or even raise 
their voices—the interview was conducted at all times in a conversational tone.  
After approximately 1.5 hours of questioning, McAdams was offered a drink, and 
the detectives also brought him a slice of pizza.  
At 1:26:17 p.m., McAdams was given a restroom break.  However, 
McAdams testified during the motion to suppress hearing that he was only allowed 
to have a restroom break while escorted to the restroom by three Hernando County 
 
 
- 21 - 
officers, and the officers entered the restroom with him.  McAdams further 
testified that he could not exit the restroom unless the officers moved.  It is 
questionable that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave the sheriff’s 
office under such circumstances.   
Further, whereas before the restroom break, the interview focused mainly on 
McAdams’s movements during the week that Lynda and Andrews disappeared, 
and his relationship with Lynda, the tone began to change shortly after the break.  
Arey noted that McAdams’s parents had already lost their daughter to an aneurysm 
and informed McAdams that his mother was “pretty fragile” and “really very, very 
distraught” about the current situation.  McAdams confirmed that the day before, 
he had taken a gun from his parents’ residence and contemplated suicide due to 
financial troubles and family difficulties, but ultimately decided against it.  
Detective Arey later informed McAdams:  
I’ve got a—a theory as—as to what may be going through your head 
and to what led you to try to go find some peace yesterday and, you 
know . . . this is the time for the rest of the story.  I’m just, I’m being 
really honest with you.  I think you can look at me and know that I’m 
not trying to bullshit you.  I’m not trying to be—play head games with 
you.  I’m being real honest and real up front.  And I think that there’s 
quite—quite a bit more that you could probably tell me.  And I’m just 
asking you from man to man with no disrespect to you.  You know, 
I’d really appreciate if you’d tell me the rest of what I can see that you 
want to tell me.     
 
 
- 22 - 
(Emphasis supplied.)  When McAdams asked Detective Arey what he thought 
McAdams wanted to tell him, Arey responded, “Well, I think there’s some more 
things that may have gone on.”  Detective Christensen followed up: 
What happened on Sunday and Monday?  Something obviously 
went down on Sunday, between Monday, either between you, your 
wife, or the boyfriend.  Something went on at your house, and it 
probably continued on to your new house. 
She later asked McAdams if he bled in either of his residences, noting that he had 
cuts on his hands.  She stated, “I’m talking bleeding, I’m not talking about a little 
smudge of, you know, ‘cause you scratched yourself.”  McAdams explained that 
the cuts on his hands were snake bites because he handles reptiles.   
Detective Arey also sought to establish a rapport with McAdams through 
commiseration.  Arey confided that he too had been through a divorce and 
recognized that it can be an “emotional roller coaster.”  In response to a question 
from McAdams as to how many men would feed their wives’ horses so that their 
wives could spend time with their new boyfriends, as McAdams agreed to do for 
Lynda, Arey replied: “[F]rom a man’s perspective, I can tell you that a person—a 
person can only take so much crap.  That’s—a person can only take so much.”  
Arey later continued:   
[T]here’s no middle ground in—in love.  Love is—is—is a strong 
emotion, and when that emotion swings the other direction, we don’t 
think straight.  Been there, done it.  I mean, and I—I can—I can talk 
about those things out of personal experience.  And I know how 
 
 
- 23 - 
quickly things can, during highly emotional situations, clear judgment 
doesn’t—doesn’t always happen. 
Detective Christensen then told McAdams:  
[S]omething happened either between you, the boyfriend and her, 
something happened ‘cause this isn’t, this is not your—just your—you 
know, you guys live out in the woods, you know—it’s not like 
somebody just came over and, and did something bad to any of you 
guys, you know, this—this is a personal, isolated incident.  Something 
happened. 
She noted there were things at both the Palomino Lake Drive and Spring Hill 
residences that “just don’t look right.”   
Detective Arey left the interview room at 2:03:37 p.m. and returned at 
2:04:32 p.m.8  Upon his return, Detective Christensen mentioned blood found at 
the Palomino Lake Drive residence and blood found on clothing at McAdams’s 
Spring Hill residence.  McAdams claimed he did not know anything about the 
blood.  At 2:05:16 p.m., Detective Arey asked Detective Christensen to leave the 
room.  He then moved to the chair that Detective Christensen previously occupied, 
which was closer to McAdams.  The following dialogue then occurred:9 
AREY:  I think you can tell when I look at you, I’m not staring 
you down.  I’m giving you respect.  I’m looking you in the eyes, and 
I’m being honest with you.  I have been in [unintelligible] a divorce 
that I never wanted.   
                                          
 
 
8.  This is the approximate time that the attorney arrived at the sheriff’s 
office.   
 
9.  We quote this interaction in its near entirety to demonstrate the direction 
and manner of the interrogation.   
 
 
- 24 - 
 
MCADAMS:  So you can, you can— 
 
AREY:  Almost verbatim, I know, and I can tell you, some of 
the shit that went through my head turned my brain to fucking mashed 
potatoes.  I can relate.  I know. . . .  Mike, I’ve been in this situation, 
literally.  I know, I know what thoughts have gone through my head.  
I can relate.  For the sake of you, for your conscience, for your family, 
for everything.  I’m telling you, your conscience and the weight of—
of—of your family, this is—this is it.  This is the time to talk to me 
and tell me what actually happened. 
 
MCADAMS:  Well, what’s [Detective Christensen] talking 
about blood . . . and would you fill me in, or no on that? 
 
AREY:  Yeah, I will. ‘Cause, again, I mean, literally, ‘cause 
I’m being honest.  I’ve been inside your house.  
 
MCADAMS:  Right. 
 
AREY:  [B]oth of them.  We’re not CSI.  If we were, we could 
solve everything that happened in sixty minutes with no paperwork.  
 
MCADAMS:  Yup. 
 
AREY:  We’d be super fucking heroes.  We’re not.  But, we do 
have most of that equipment.  It just takes a lot longer.  The evidence 
that they’ve got is really, really strong.  We’ve got tons of blood 
evidence, tons of DNA.  I was at your Glover house last night. . . .  
The shorts that were there, with the blood on ‘em.  The t-shirt.  All of 
it.  That’s what they’re talking about with the evidence.   
You know, what you know about the knowledge, with your 
snakes, and your things like that, I can’t begin to touch. 
 
MCADAMS:  Mmm-hmm. 
 
AREY:  I know some basics but I can’t begin to touch ‘em.  
With my job, I’ve got my knowledge about what I do the way you do 
about your snakes.  And pretty much, when you and I are talking and 
we’re together, I’ve already got a pretty dang good idea of—of what 
 
 
- 25 - 
went down.  I wasn’t there.  I wasn’t a witness.  I can’t tell you I know 
what happened. 
 
MCADAMS:  Can I just say one thing? 
 
AREY:  Absolutely.   
 
MCADAMS:  A lot of that blood on my shirt is probably rat 
blood.  Because I killed— 
 
AREY:  Okay.  Well a lot of it’s—a lot of it’s not.  Because we 
already tested for the human blood, and the DNA is already there. 
 
MCADAMS:  Alright.   
 
AREY:  So, and again, I’m not—I’m not gonna to insult you, 
and—and try to play games with you. 
 
MCADAMS:  No, I—I can tell.   
 
AREY:  I just, I’m not gonna do that.  Because I’m not going to 
try to treat you like some eighteen-year-old crackhead thug and play 
games with you.  And that’s why I’m just being very honest.  I’m 
laying my stuff out on the table.  And I’m telling you that—that this—
this isn’t gonna go away.  And, this is—this is the time for you and I 
to—to—to lay it out to what actually happened. 
 
MCADAMS:  Let me ask you this.  If we don’t lay it out on 
what exactly happened, then what happens? 
 
AREY:  Things get uglier.  I don’t mean ugly in that sense.  But 
it becomes very public.  Perhaps warrants issue.  All—all sorts of 
things, you know, and it’s going to be media at your parents’ house.  
It’ll be a zoo.  It’ll be a zoo.  ‘Cause it won’t go away.  I mean, and 
again, you know, the evidence . . . it’s all there.  And—and, it won’t 
go away.  So the difference in you and I discussing this here, now, 
quietly, low profile, versus a big profile thing, your daughters, your 
parents.  Crap like that.  And I know you can tell, I’m not bullshitting.   
 
MCADAMS:  Yeah. 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
AREY:  I’m just—you know.  I’m not bullshitting.  And trust 
me.  I’m talking to you, and you know I’m being genuine ‘cause I 
have been there.  
 
MCADAMS:  Is there any way you can give me a couple of 
days to think about it, or no? 
 
AREY:  Regretfully, everything’s already set in motion.  I 
mean, I could tell you that and it wouldn’t be the truth, and I’m not 
gonna lie to you.  I just—I wouldn’t want to be lied to.  It’s—it’s—it’s 
time, Mike, I mean, it’s—it’s just not gonna go away.   
 
MCADAMS:  Well, what am I—what I’m saying is am I gonna 
be able to leave here today or no? 
 
AREY:  I don’t know, Mike.  I don’t know.  And again, I’m 
looking you in the eye, man to man, being honest.  I’m just—I’m not 
going to bullshit you.   
 
. . . . 
 
AREY:  . . . .  I’m telling you Mike, your conscience, for the 
sake of your family, this needs to stay as calm as it can be, and that’s 
the opportunity we have here today.   
What happened out there at the house? 
 
MCADAMS:  . . . .  I mean, as far as I know, her—her 
boyfriend could have killed her.  I don’t know who killed her.  I don’t 
know who killed anybody.  I really don’t. 
 
AREY:  Think about what I’m telling you, Mike.  I’m not—
you’ve probably haven’t had a whole lot of dealing with law 
enforcement. 
 
MCADAMS:  No I haven’t.  And I like— 
 
AREY:  But I think you know enough that I’m just being 
honest.  And what I’m asking you to do is to be honest with me, tell 
 
 
- 27 - 
me what happened, and let’s keep this as quiet and as easy on your 
family as we can possibly keep it.   
 
. . . . 
 
AREY:  And Mike, I’ve probably been within a few drinks 
of—of doing things that would have—I’ve been there, I know.  And 
I’ve known that in those situations, alcohol eases the pain.   
 
MCADAMS:  Yep, that it does.   
 
AREY:  Regretfully, it fucked my judgment up, but it eases the 
pain.   
Did she tell you he was coming over? 
 
MCADAMS:  Who, my wife?  No.  No.  No, she did not.  
  
AREY:  Then what happened? 
 
MCADAMS:  Your guess is as good as mine.   
 
AREY:  Mike, Mike.  Look at me. 
 
MCADAMS:  I am looking at you.  
  
AREY:  I know.  But you know what?  Do you have any doubt 
in your mind that I have done anything but be honest with you? 
 
MCADAMS:  You’ve been nothing but honest with me. 
 
AREY:  Don’t you think you should give me the same respect 
that I’m giving you?  And I’m being honest with you because I don’t 
want to insult your intelligence.  I’m being honest.   
 
. . . . 
 
AREY:  Mike, it’s—this needs to get settled today.  For the 
sake of everything and everybody.   
How much had you been drinking? 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
MCADAMS:  Too much. 
 
. . . . 
 
AREY:  . . . .  What went wrong when you drank too much that 
night or that day? 
 
MCADAMS:  I went home and went to sleep. 
 
AREY:  What are your intentions, Mike? 
 
MCADAMS:  My intentions as far as what?  
 
AREY:  What’s gonna happen from here? 
 
MCADAMS:  Hopefully, my wife’s gonna show up. 
 
AREY:  We both know that’s not the case. 
 
MCADAMS:  How do you know that? 
 
AREY:  From all that evidence.  I’m telling you, Mike.  It’s not 
going to go away.  And I really had hoped that you would have tried 
to keep this as easy and as quiet as possible and spare the rest of your 
family because, last night, your mother was frickin’ beside herself.  
You know, if—if for no other motivation to—to—to try to make this 
resolve as quickly and quietly as possible, you know, your family 
loves you, and they’re going to love you no matter what.  
  
MCADAMS:  And I love them. 
 
AREY:  Then, knowing that this isn’t going to go away, try to 
spare them some of the—the heartache.   
 
MCADAMS:  Well, let me ask you this.   
 
. . . .  
 
MCADAMS:  What would I be looking at? 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
AREY:  Honestly, until we get done talking, and you tell me 
exactly what did happen, I can’t answer that.  I’m being honest.   
 
MCADAMS:  I mean, in your professional opinion. How mu—
how long am I looking?  Just off, just—top of your head. 
 
AREY:  You know what?  Depending, depending on the totality 
of what—what happened, the circumstance, I don’t know.  It could be 
anywhere from nothing to a lot.  I—I don’t know.  Until we know, 
and that’s one of the reasons I’m asking you, what actually happened.  
You know what I’m saying?  Alcohol’s a factor.  Well, you know, it’s 
common knowledge, alcohol affects judgment.  Okay, I mean, so 
there’s all sorts of things.  Honest to gosh, I’m not trying to be 
evasive.   
 
MCADAMS:  No, you’ve been— 
 
AREY:  I’m just—I don’t wanna bullshit you. 
 
MCADAMS:  Well let—can I ask you this then, is there any 
way we could—you could you talk to the DA and see what kind of 
time I would be looking at? 
 
AREY:  You know what they’re gonna tell me?  Until they 
know what’s happened, they can’t answer.  I can tell you this—that 
honesty, the cooperation that you’re giving, how you’re being a 
gentleman.  That goes a long ways, an awful long ways, ‘cause 
nobody likes just a flagrant asshole.  And that, there’s no statute for 
that, but how people are treated.  You, you have been—and you’re a 
gentleman.   
 
MCADAMS:  Yeah. 
 
AREY:  What went wrong? 
 
MCADAMS:  Ah, if you could just give me five, ten years.  
Maybe if I could go insanity or something.  You think I’m capable of 
that? 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
AREY:  And I—I cannot guarantee that.  I just can’t.  I would 
love to be able to sit here and tell you yes.  But I can’t.  Until I know, 
and until everybody knows exactly what went down, I don’t know.  
But I can tell you that your cooperation, your honesty, alcohol being 
involved, those are all factors that—that come into consideration.  I 
know I may not be telling you exactly what you want to hear.  I’m 
just, and I’m being honest with you, Mike.  Just being honest.  That’s 
what I’m asking from you in return.   
What went wrong?   
 
MCADAMS:  Well, I tell you, I—I can’t—I don’t want [to] do 
a twenty-year kickout.  I can’t do it. 
   
AREY:  I understand that.  And I can tell you that whatever I 
can do, I’ll go on behalf for you.  I’ve been there.  I know.  And you 
know I’m being honest about that.   
 
MCADAMS:  Do you mind getting me a little bit more soda 
please, and then we’ll talk?   
 
AREY:  Sure. Yeah. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Upon Detective Arey’s return, the dialogue continued: 
MCADAMS:  So where do we go, what—what happens from 
here now?  
 
AREY:  Well, you and I, we talk it out, and then we see where 
we’re—there’s a lot of options, there’s a lot of things.  ‘Cause again, I 
don’t know exactly where—what went down.  I’m mean, I’ve got a 
good idea.  But, you know, there may be things that when you tell me 
what actually happened, that make the situation a whole lot better for 
you.  ‘Kay?  That’s why it’s so important that you and I talk this out.  
We’ll see where we’re at.  So you tell me where, at what point, and 
what went wrong.   
And remember, you’re talking to someone who has sat there in 
the shoes that you’ve been having to wear.  There[’s] no prejudgment 
on my part.   
 
 
 
- 31 - 
MCADAMS:  Yeah, but you’re not gonna have to go where I 
gotta go. 
 
AREY:  Well, you’re not there yet.  And, uh, keep the faith.  
What went wrong?   
 
MCADAMS:  You guys know what happened.  It’s right there 
in black and white. 
 
AREY:  I know, but, what—how did it go down?  I mean, 
what—what happened that—that kicked it off? 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Thereafter, McAdams commenced his confession.  
There is not necessarily a single specific comment, question, or 
circumstance that converts an encounter from noncustodial to custodial.  A 
situation can commence as a voluntary interaction with police, but slowly intensify 
and become more pressured, pointed, and accusatory until it evolves into custodial 
status.  The circumstances of this interview, which involved: (1) an escort to, and 
inside, the restroom by multiple officers; (2) accusatory statements that there is 
human blood and DNA evidence at both of McAdams’s residences, and the 
evidence is “really, really strong,” indicating to McAdams that the police believed 
he was the prime suspect in what had happened to Lynda and Andrews; (3) 
repeated assertions that the situation will not “go away”; (4) being informed that a 
couple of days are not available to consider the matter because “everything’s 
already set in motion”; and (5) being advised that the possibility of leaving the 
sheriff’s office that day is uncertain, would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
 
 
- 32 - 
that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the encounter and depart from the 
sheriff’s office.  Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415.   
The fact that McAdams asked Arey about possible penalties and defenses 
and stated “[y]ou guys know what happened.  It’s right there in black and white,” 
prior to the confession demonstrates that McAdams believed the police possessed 
sufficient evidence to arrest him for a crime.  Therefore, based upon a totality of 
the circumstances, we hold that McAdams was in custody before he commenced 
his confession at 2:27:15 p.m., and the Miranda warnings should have been given 
prior to that time.  Accordingly, both the trial court and the district court erred 
when they held that McAdams’s pre-Miranda confession was properly admitted 
during trial. 
Moreover, this analysis supports our earlier conclusion that it is unworkable 
for the due process right of an individual to be advised of a retained attorney’s 
presence at a law enforcement office to be contingent upon only custodial status.  
From the time that Detective Arey asked Detective Christensen to leave the 
interview room so that he could speak with McAdams alone until 2:17 p.m.—a 
time period of almost twelve minutes—an attorney retained by McAdams’s parents 
was at the sheriff’s office attempting to obtain access to McAdams.  It was during 
this time period that Arey informed McAdams about the “tons” of blood and DNA 
evidence, that McAdams could not have a couple of days to consider the matter, 
 
 
- 33 - 
and that it was unclear whether McAdams would be allowed to leave the sheriff’s 
office that day.  As previously discussed, the attorney was denied access to his 
client, and McAdams was not notified about the attorney until after he directed the 
detectives to the bodies.   
Further, during the entire one-on-one interaction between Detective Arey 
and McAdams prior to the confession, the detective used numerous interrogation 
tactics to gain McAdams’s trust and wear down his resistance.  These tactics 
included suggestions that (1) McAdams spare his family heartache and a media 
“zoo”; (2) Arey too had been involved in a difficult divorce, so he knew what 
McAdams was experiencing and would not judge him; (3) McAdams’s role in 
what happened to Lynda and Andrews would inevitably be established by the 
“tons” of “really strong” evidence, so it would be in McAdams’s best interest if he 
cooperated and confessed; and (4) Arey would speak favorably on his behalf if 
McAdams confessed.  Detective Arey was well aware that McAdams was in a 
fragile state because McAdams admitted he had contemplated suicide the previous 
day because of financial and familial stress.   
We have previously recognized that “the modern practice of in-custody 
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented.”  Rigterink, 2 So. 
3d at 251.  Had McAdams been notified with regard to the attorney who had been 
retained on his behalf and chosen to take advantage of that attorney’s services, he 
 
 
- 34 - 
would have been insulated from these tactics, which, while initially conveyed in a 
compassionate and sympathetic fashion, were unquestionably utilized solely for 
the purpose of obtaining a confession.   
Precedent 
 
Precedent supports our conclusion that McAdams was subject to custodial 
interrogation.  In Ross, we held that a noncustodial interrogation turned custodial 
when the defendant was informed that blood evidence on his clothing matched 
blood found at the crime scene, and he was told by the detective that “this evidence 
could not be disputed.”  45 So. 3d at 410; see also id. at 417 (“Once the police 
informed Ross that they had his bloody pants that matched the crime scene, a 
reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave.  At this point the officer should have advised Ross as to his Miranda 
rights.”).   
In Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 644 (Fla. 2000), a custodial 
interrogation occurred where the defendant was confronted with evidence that 
strongly suggested his guilt (a pager found at the murder scene was traced to the 
defendant), he was never informed that he was free to leave, and the questions that 
were asked “made it readily apparent that the detectives considered him the prime, 
if not the only, suspect.”  Cf. Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052, 1062-63 (Fla. 2008) 
(holding that interview was not custodial prior to the reading of the Miranda 
 
 
- 35 - 
warnings, in part, because the defendant was not a person of interest at the time he 
went to the police station, but had been identified as an acquaintance of a person 
who had already been taken into custody; “the purpose of the interview was to 
learn about Mr. Victorino and not necessarily about Mr. Hunter.”). 
Here, consistent with Ross and Mansfield, McAdams was confronted with 
evidence that strongly suggested his guilt, i.e., human blood and DNA evidence.  
Further, Detective Arey’s statement that “it’s time, Mike, I mean, it’s—it’s just not 
gonna go away,” communicated to McAdams that he was considered to be the 
prime, if not the only, suspect in what had happened to Lynda and Andrews.  Once 
this evidence was presented, McAdams was not told he was free to terminate the 
encounter.  To the contrary, he was informed that it was unclear whether he would 
be allowed to leave the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office that day.   
Further, lower courts have considered whether a law enforcement officer 
questioned a defendant’s version of events or accused him of lying in determining 
whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda.  For example, in 
Meredith v. State, 964 So. 2d 247, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), after voluntarily 
travelling to a law enforcement office, the defendant was notified that his ex-
girlfriend’s younger brother had alleged that the defendant had touched him 
inappropriately.  The detective informed the defendant that he was not under arrest 
and stated that he just wanted to get the defendant’s “side of the story.”  Id.  After 
 
 
- 36 - 
the defendant told the detective that the touching occurred during either wrestling 
or playing “show and tell,” the detective did not question these explanations and 
even told the defendant, “relax, I’m not calling you a child molester.”  Id. at 249, 
252.  Based upon the low-key interrogation tactics, the consolatory tone of the 
detective, and the failure of the detective to challenge the defendant’s explanation 
for the inappropriate touching, the Fourth District held that the questioning was not 
custodial for purposes of Miranda.  Id. at 252-53.      
Similarly, in State v. Pitts, 936 So. 2d 1111, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), after 
the defendant (Pitts) voluntarily rode to a sheriff’s office substation, law 
enforcement officers interviewed him with regard to property he pawned that 
belonged to one of two missing men.  Pitts admitted he had been the passenger in a 
car that had been involved in a police chase.  Id.10  When the officers told Pitts that 
they believed he knew the location of the missing men, he admitted that he pawned 
the items, but said they were given to him by someone named Tavares “T.J.” 
Wright, and he did not know the property was stolen.  Id.  
During a subsequent interview that occurred at a different location, the 
supervising officer, Captain W.J. Martin, wrote on a pad, “TJ says [Pitts] killed 
                                          
 
 
10.  The police believed that the vehicle involved in the chase had been in 
the possession of the missing men at the time of their disappearances.  Id.   
 
 
- 37 - 
these guys,” and left the pad in the room with Pitts.  Id. at 1119.11  After seeing the 
note, Pitts denied the allegation and said he was not present.  Id.  Martin 
responded, “ ‘you and I both know that ain’t true, you were there, and you know 
where these guys’ bodies are, don’t you.’ ”  Id.  After further questioning by the 
police, Pitts admitted that he was present when the murders occurred, but Wright 
was the person who carjacked the men and shot them.  Id. at 1120.  Pitts stated that 
at the request of Wright, he held a gun on the men while they were in the backseat.  
Id. 
In concluding that Pitts was not in custody at the time he made these 
admissions and before he was read the Miranda warnings, the Second District 
stated with regard to the fabricated accusation by Wright: 
Martin did not specifically say that he believed the accusation 
made by T.J. was true.  That circumstance would tend to lessen the 
impact of the accusation on a reasonable person in Pitts’[s] situation.  
The indirect manner in which the accusation was presented to Pitts 
would also suggest to such a reasonable person that the police were 
not prepared to take Pitts into custody based on the accusation.  
Although Martin told Pitts of his suspicion that Pitts was “there,” this 
is not a case where the questions and comments of the officers “made 
it readily apparent that the detectives considered him the prime . . . 
suspect.”  
                                          
 
 
11.  The decision of the Second District notes that Wright made no such 
accusation against Pitts.  Id. at 1119.   
 
 
- 38 - 
Id. at 1128 (quoting Mansfield, 758 So. 2d at 644).12  Conversely, here, when 
McAdams tried to explain that the blood on his clothing at the Spring Hill 
residence was likely rat blood, Detective Arey immediately told McAdams that his 
explanation was inconsistent with the evidence because the blood on the clothing 
was human.  Further, unlike Pitts, and consistent with Mansfield, upon being 
confronted with the presence of “tons” of DNA and blood evidence at both of his 
residences, a reasonable person in McAdams’s situation would feel that he were 
the prime, if not the only, suspect in the disappearances of Lynda and Andrews.   
 
The State relies heavily on Pitts to assert that McAdams was not in custody 
at the time he initially confessed.  The State notes that Martin told Pitts, “Sammy, I 
have been doing this a long time now, I think you know more than what you’re 
telling us.  I actually believe that you were there.”  Id. at 1119.  Further, according 
to the Second District, 
Martin said, “Sammy, you know this thing is eating you up inside, and 
you probably see those boys laying there every time you close your 
eyes and you know you want to talk about it . . . .  [T]he truth will set 
you free . . . don’t bottle this thing up inside of you.”  Martin also said 
that the missing young men “deserved a proper burial” and that their 
families “deserve[d] to know what had happened.”  With tears welling 
up in his eyes, Pitts said, “I got a kid, can I go home if I tell you what 
happened or will I go to jail[?]”  Martin responded that he could not 
                                          
 
 
12.  Wright was eventually convicted and sentenced to death for the murders 
of the two men, whereas Pitts received only life sentences.  See Wright v. State, 19 
So. 3d 277, 283 n.2 (Fla. 2009).  This Court held that Wright’s death sentences 
were not disproportionate to the life sentences received by Pitts.  Id. at 305.  
 
 
- 39 - 
tell him “one way or the other” because he did not know what Pitts 
would tell him.   
Id. at 1119 (emphasis supplied).  While the emphasized language is similar to what 
Detective Arey told McAdams, the two cases are factually distinguishable.  In its 
decision, the Second District specifically noted that: 
A reasonable person understands that the police ordinarily will not set 
free a suspect when there is evidence “strongly suggesting” that the 
person is guilty of a serious crime.  That does not mean that whenever 
a suspect is confronted with some incriminating evidence, the suspect 
is in custody for purposes of Miranda.  The significance of this factor 
turns on the strength of the evidence as understood by a reasonable 
person in the suspect’s position as well as the nature of the offense.  If 
a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would understand that 
the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for a serious crime 
such as murder or kidnapping, that circumstance militates strongly 
toward the conclusion that the suspect is in custody.  
Id. at 1128 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).  The Second District then held 
with regard to the fabricated accusation by Wright, “[a] reasonable person 
understands that ordinarily the police do not take a suspect into custody on the 
basis of a potentially self-serving accusation that is unsupported by any details 
concerning the circumstances of the crime.”  Id. 
 
Pitts was confronted with an uncorroborated accusation that he killed the 
victims.  Further, he was only told that the police believed he was present when the 
killings occurred, and that he knew the location of the bodies.  These comments 
indicate mere suspicion, and do not reflect that the police were in possession of 
concrete, inculpatory evidence that connected Pitts to the disappearance of the 
 
 
- 40 - 
victims (other than the fact that he pawned items belonging to one of the victims 
and had been a passenger in a vehicle involved in a police chase, but he provided 
innocent explanations for this conduct).  Here, however, Detective Arey told 
McAdams there was “tons” of DNA and blood evidence at his two residences, and 
that the evidence was “really, really strong.”  Further, Arey created an atmosphere 
of inevitability when he told McAdams that he would not be allowed a couple of 
days to think about the situation because “everything’s already set in motion” and 
expressed his belief that Lynda would not reappear because of “all that evidence.”  
Under such circumstances, a reasonable person would believe “that the police have 
probable cause to arrest the suspect for a serious crime such as murder or 
kidnapping.”  Id.  Thus, the degree to which McAdams was confronted with 
tangible evidence that strongly suggested his guilt, rather than uncorroborated 
accusations and mere suspicion, distinguishes this matter from Pitts.  Accordingly, 
our conclusion that McAdams was subjected to custodial interrogation and, 
therefore, should have been read the Miranda warnings prior to his confession is 
not altered by the decision of the Second District. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 41 - 
Harmless Error 
 
Statements admitted during trial in violation of Miranda are subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1988).  In State v. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986), we explained: 
The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction.  Application of the test requires an examination of 
the entire record by the appellate court including a close examination 
of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately 
relied, and in addition an even closer examination of the 
impermissible evidence which might have possibly influenced the jury 
verdict. 
(Citation omitted.)  Here, compelling evidence of McAdams’s guilt was presented 
to the jury through his confession, in which he admitted that after being berated by 
his estranged wife and her new boyfriend at the Palomino Lake Drive residence, he 
became outraged, retrieved a gun from outside the residence, fatally shot them, 
buried the bodies in a rural area, and disposed of the weapon.  It is simply 
impossible to conclude that the erroneous admission of this highly detailed 
confession did not contribute to the convictions in this matter.  Id.  Accordingly, 
we hold that the Miranda violation constituted harmful error.13   
                                          
 
 
13.  Further, although McAdams continued to speak with the detectives after 
the Miranda warnings were given, he was not informed about the attorney at the 
sheriff’s office until after he directed the detectives to the bodies.  As previously 
discussed, this conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Florida 
 
 
- 42 - 
CONCLUSION 
More than twenty years ago, we stated with regard to the Declaration of 
Rights in the Florida Constitution: 
Special vigilance is required where the fundamental rights of 
Florida citizens suspected of wrongdoing are concerned, for here 
society has a strong natural inclination to relinquish incrementally the 
hard-won and stoutly defended freedoms enumerated in our 
Declaration in its effort to preserve public order.  Each law-abiding 
member of society is inclined to strike out at crime reflexively by 
constricting the constitutional rights of all citizens in order to limit 
those of the suspect—each is inclined to give up a degree of his or her 
own protection from government intrusion in order to permit greater 
intrusion into the life of the suspect.  The framers of our Constitution, 
however, deliberately rejected the short-term solution in favor of a 
fairer, more structured system of criminal justice: 
These rights [enumerated in the Declaration of Rights] 
curtail and restrain the power of the State. . . .  Under our 
system of constitutional government, the State should not 
set the example of violating fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens in order to 
obtain a conviction. 
Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 963-64 (quoting Bizzell v. State, 71 So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 
1954)) (some alterations in original).  The sentiments expressed in Traylor remain 
equally important today, and this case demonstrates why constitutional safeguards 
must be jealously guarded to prevent overreaching by law enforcement in the quest 
to obtain a confession.   
                                          
 
Constitution.  Accordingly, the post-Miranda confession was similarly invalid and 
suppression of that confession, as well as all evidence derived from that 
confession, was required under the Florida Constitution. 
 
 
- 43 - 
In response to the rephrased certified question, we hold that when a person is 
questioned in a location that is not open to the public, and an attorney retained on 
his or her behalf appears at the location, the Due Process Clause of the Florida 
Constitution requires that law enforcement notify the person with regard to the 
presence and purpose of the attorney, regardless of whether he or she is in custody.  
The decision of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed, and this matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting 
McAdams’ confession.  Similar to the majority, I believe that McAdams was in 
custody before he confessed based upon the fact that he was informed, in response 
to a direct question after being confronted with incriminating evidence, that it was 
uncertain whether he could leave the sheriff’s office.  See Ramirez v. State, 739 
So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999) (“A person is in custody if a reasonable person placed 
in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed 
to a degree associated with actual arrest.”).  Therefore, because McAdams was in 
 
 
- 44 - 
custody and officers failed to advise him of his Miranda rights, the trial court 
should have suppressed McAdams’ confession.   
 
Once McAdams was in custody, this Court’s decision in Haliburton v. State, 
514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987) (Haliburton II), required law enforcement to notify 
McAdams that his family had retained counsel for him and that this counsel would 
like to speak with him.  In Haliburton II, this Court adopted a dissent regarding the 
right to due process under the United States Constitution to create a broader right 
to due process under the Florida Constitution.  Specifically, quoting Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), this Court in 
Haliburton II held that the failure to inform Haliburton of privately retained 
counsel after he was in custody and Mirandized was “[p]olice interference in the 
attorney-client relationship [and] the type of governmental misconduct on a matter 
of central importance to the administration of justice that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits.”  Haliburton II, 514 So. 2d at 1090 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 467 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Accordingly, pursuant to Haliburton II, any evidence 
collected between the time McAdams was in custody and when law enforcement 
informed him of the attorney should have been suppressed as a violation of 
Florida’s due process clause. 
However, I disagree with the majority’s extension of our decision in 
Haliburton II to voluntary interactions with law enforcement.  As the Second 
 
 
- 45 - 
District cogently explained, “[n]either Haliburton nor any other case [cited] holds 
that it is misconduct for law enforcement officers to refuse to interrupt a 
noncustodial interview to permit an attorney access to a suspect who has 
voluntarily agreed to be interviewed.”  McAdams v. State, 137 So. 3d 401, 407 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014).  In fact, cases in which Florida district courts have held that 
due process violations occurred pursuant to Haliburton II involved custodial 
interrogations, not voluntary interviews.  See Bruce v. State, 92 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2012); State v. Allen, 548 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).  Furthermore, 
the conclusion that Haliburton II only applies while a suspect is in custody is 
supported by and entirely consistent with this Court’s precedent that protections for 
the right against self-incrimination under the Florida Constitution only apply in 
custodial settings.  See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) (holding 
that a suspect must be properly advised of his right to counsel in order to protect 
his right against self-incrimination under the Florida Constitution but explaining 
that “[t]hese guidelines apply only to statements obtained while in custody and 
through interrogation; they do not apply to volunteered statements initiated by the 
suspect or statements that are obtained in noncustodial settings or through means 
other than interrogation”) (footnotes omitted); see also Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 
1228, 1233 (Fla. 1985) (concluding that “police officers questioning a suspect in a 
noncustodial setting [were not required to] comply with an attorney’s request that 
 
 
- 46 - 
they cease questioning the suspect and then inform the suspect of the attorney’s 
call”) (emphasis added). 
To be clear, the defendant in Haliburton II (like the defendant in this case) 
was in custody when privately retained counsel informed law enforcement of 
counsel’s presence and purpose.  See Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 
1985) (Haliburton I).  And because both Haliburton and McAdams were in 
custody, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for this Court to address whether 
Haliburton II should apply to non-custodial interviews.   
The only reason given by the majority for extending Haliburton II to 
voluntary interactions in a case about evidence collected while the defendant was 
in custody is the majority’s desire to “implement a bright-line rule” to avoid 
“determinations of when voluntary questioning evolves into custodial interrogation 
[that] will spawn hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs or expenses and hours 
in litigation.”  Majority op. at 16.  However, the majority then goes on to determine 
the exact issue that it claims is too burdensome to litigate, namely that the 
defendant was in custody at the time the retained lawyer informed law enforcement 
of the desire to speak to the defendant.  Moreover, the bright-line rule the majority 
adopts for pragmatic reasons is not justified because custody issues will still need 
to be decided pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda 
and this Court’s decision in Traylor.  Specifically, in order to determine whether 
 
 
- 47 - 
incriminating statements made to law enforcement are admissible at trial, Florida 
courts will still need to decide whether a suspect was in custody and, if the suspect 
was in custody (even if that suspect was informed of retained counsel), whether 
any waiver of rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  See Ramirez, 739 
So. 2d at 572-73 (“Both the United States and Florida Constitutions provide that 
persons shall not be ‘compelled’ to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal 
matter.  U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  This constitutional guarantee 
‘is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.’  Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 460 - 61 [(1966)].”).         
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D11-3158 
 
 
(Pasco County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; John M. Klawikofsky, 
Bureau Chief, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and William Larocque Sharwell, 
Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner