Title: State v. Bobby G.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP66-NM 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Marquette S., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Bobby G., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 13, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Cooper 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by James R. Troupis, Paul D. Barbato, and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Madison, and oral argument by James R. Troupis. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Adam Levin, assistant district attorney, with whom 
on the brief was E. Michael McCann, district attorney. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Cynthia A. 
Lepkowski, Peter M. Koneazny and the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Karyn L. Rotker and 
Laurence J. Dupuis, Milwaukee, on behalf of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Elizabeth A. Neary, 
Stephen W. Hayes, and The Schroeder Group, S.C., Waukesha, and 
Carol Gapen, Lynn Bodi, Judith Sperling-Newton, and The Law 
Center for Children and Families, Madison, on behalf of the 
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Henry J. Plum, 
Wauwatosa, on behalf of the Children’s Service Society of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
2007 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2006AP66-NM  
(L.C. No. 
2004TP285) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Marquette S., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Bobby G., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 summarily affirming the 
dispositional order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge 
                                                 
1 State v. Bobby G., No. 2006AP66-NM, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2006). 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
2 
 
Thomas R. Cooper, terminating Bobby G.'s parental rights to his 
biological son Marquette.  Based on Bobby G.'s admissions and 
answers to interrogatories, the circuit court granted the State 
partial summary judgment at the first step of the termination of 
parental rights proceedings, the fact-finding phase relating to 
the grounds for termination.2  The circuit court ruled that Bobby 
G. had failed to assume parental responsibility for Marquette 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (2003-04)3 and declared Bobby G. 
unfit as a parent.  At the second step of the termination of 
parental rights proceedings, the dispositional phase,4 after 
hearing testimony, including from Bobby G., the circuit court 
determined that it was in Marquette's best interests to 
terminate Bobby G.'s parental rights. 
¶2 
Bobby G.'s appellate counsel filed a no-merit report 
in the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 809.107(5m) 
and 809.32(1).  The court of appeals, upon review of the no-
merit report and the record, adopted the no-merit report and 
affirmed the order of the circuit court.  Bobby G. sought 
review, and his new pro bono counsel challenges the termination 
of parental rights before this court. 
                                                 
2 In this phase, the parent's rights are paramount.  See 
Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶22, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 
N.W.2d 768.   
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 In this phase, the child's best interests are paramount.  
See Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Bobby G. primarily raises a constitutional question 
for 
review, 
asking 
this 
court 
to 
decide 
that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional to terminate a father's parental rights based 
on a failure to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) when the father did not know of the child's 
existence until after the petition for termination of parental 
rights was filed.  Bobby G. argues that an unmarried biological 
father 
has 
a 
constitutionally 
protected 
interest 
in 
the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.  In the 
discussion of the constitutional issues, the parties raise, both 
implicitly 
and 
explicitly, 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
proper 
interpretation of § 48.415(6).  Because we can resolve the case 
on statutory grounds, we decline to address the constitutional 
issues presented by Bobby G.  Were the court or any member 
thereof to interpret the statute as not requiring that an 
unmarried biological father have the opportunity to develop a 
relationship with his child after he learns of the existence of 
the child, the constitutional issue the parties address at 
length would have to be decided.       
¶4 
In examining whether grounds for termination of 
parental rights existed in the instant case under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), the circuit court did not consider Bobby G.'s 
efforts to assume parental responsibility for Marquette after he 
learned he was the biological father but before the grounds for 
termination were adjudicated.  Rather, the circuit court 
concluded as a matter of law that it need not consider at the 
grounds phase Bobby G.'s efforts undertaken after the petition 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
4 
 
for termination was filed, even though Bobby G. did not learn he 
was Marquette's father until after the petition was filed.  The 
circuit court declared that it would instead consider Bobby G.'s 
efforts at the dispositional phase.5  At the dispositional phase, 
                                                 
5 The State contends that Bobby G. did not argue in the 
circuit court that his conduct after the termination petition 
was 
filed 
was 
relevant 
to 
the 
partial 
summary 
judgment 
determination, and therefore cannot claim error on review for 
the circuit court's failure to consider evidence he never tried 
to offer. 
Under our case law, the circuit court had the duty at the 
fact-finding hearing to find by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the elements of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) had been 
satisfied.  The circuit court cannot be relieved of its duty 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and chapter 48 to take sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of the grounds by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶24, 26.  
"Due to the severe nature of terminations of parental rights, 
termination proceedings require heightened legal safeguards 
against erroneous decisions. . . . [T]he Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that '[i]n order for parental rights to be terminated, 
the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the termination is appropriate.'"  Id., ¶21 (citations omitted).  
See also Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47 ¶21, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 
678 N.W.2d 856.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
5 
 
the circuit court held that Bobby G.'s attempts to assume 
parental responsibility were irrelevant before reaffirming that 
the grounds for termination had been established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
¶5 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that in determining 
whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father 
has failed to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), a circuit court must consider the biological 
father's efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the 
father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of 
the termination proceeding.  Thus the circuit court in the 
instant case proceeded under an erroneous interpretation of the 
statute.  Accordingly, the facts were not fully developed; to 
the extent facts were developed, these facts and their import 
                                                                                                                                                             
The answers to the interrogatories at the grounds phase and 
the testimony at the dispositional phase should have alerted the 
circuit court that there was a dispute about material facts and 
that the necessary factual basis was not established to justify 
the partial summary judgment.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)(c) 
(relating to admissions; before accepting an admission of the 
alleged facts in a termination petition, the circuit court shall 
"[m]ake such inquiries as satisfactorily establish that there is 
a factual basis for the admission"); State v. Lackershire, 2007 
WI 74, ¶33, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (relating to 
§ 971.08(1)(b) requiring a circuit court to make "such inquiry 
as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime 
charged" before accepting a guilty plea).  A circuit court may 
receive evidence at the dispositional phase that it might have 
used to decide the grounds phase.  In the instant case, the 
circuit court continued to view the evidence of Bobby G.'s 
relationship with Marquette after he learned of the child's 
existence as irrelevant. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
6 
 
are in dispute.  The parties disputed whether Bobby G. assumed 
parental responsibility after he learned of his paternity but 
before 
adjudication 
of 
the 
grounds 
for 
termination.  
Accordingly, with facts in dispute, the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law in granting partial summary judgment.  Moreover, 
Bobby G. requested a jury trial, which the circuit court denied 
because it erroneously found no material facts or inferences 
therefrom in dispute.  Neither the circuit court nor this court 
can deprive Bobby G. of a jury trial by deciding the factual 
dispute.6    
¶6 
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the summary judgment.  We remand 
the cause to the circuit court for a fact-finding hearing in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 48.424 to determine whether grounds 
exist for termination of Bobby G.'s parental rights to Marquette 
and, if necessary, for a dispositional hearing in accordance 
with § 48.427 on whether Bobby G.'s parental rights should be 
terminated in the best interests of Marquette. 
I 
 
¶7 
Although we have discussed this case as presenting a 
question of law, we cannot forget that this case affects a 
little boy whose fate still hangs in the balance.  At the heart 
of this case is a child named Marquette, who was born on August 
                                                 
6 A circuit court may direct a verdict in the grounds phase 
of a termination of parental rights proceeding.  Door County 
DHFS v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
7 
 
31, 2003, to Denise W. but has never lived with his mother.  
Since discharge from the hospital after birth, Marquette has 
lived exclusively with his foster parents, Dr. Jeffrey and 
Karen, who are committed to adopting Marquette and have given 
Marquette extraordinary care.  Marquette was born prematurely 
and has faced serious health problems that have required 
significant medical attention.  
¶8 
A CHIPS7 case was initiated on Marquette's behalf by 
the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare in September 2003.  Denise 
W. was not married at the time of Marquette's conception and 
birth, so the State attempted to identify Marquette's biological 
father.  Denise W. initially named Earley S. as Marquette's 
biological father.  On October 3, 2003, the circuit court 
ordered a genetic test for Earley S., which on November 11, 
2003, excluded Earley S. as Marquette's biological father.  The 
following day, Denise W. identified John J., Sr., as another 
possible father for Marquette.  In February 2004, however, John 
J., Sr., was also excluded as Marquette's biological father.  In 
March 2004, Denise W. named "Bobby" as a potential father.  
Denise W. did not have a last name or address for "Bobby." 
¶9 
On April 13, 2004, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Judge Kevin Martens, found Marquette to be a child in need of 
protection and services pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13. 
                                                 
7 CHIPS is an acronym for "child in need of protection or 
services."  See Wis. Stat. § 48.13. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
8 
 
¶10 On June 16, 2004, the State filed a petition to 
terminate Denise W.'s parental rights to Marquette, as well as 
the parental rights of Marquette's biological father.8  The 
petition for termination of parental rights named "'Bobby' and 
any unknown father" as Marquette's biological father.  The 
Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare began efforts to identify and 
locate "Bobby." 
¶11 By August 24, 2004, the Bureau of Milwaukee Child 
Welfare had identified "Bobby" as Bobby G. and served him with a 
summons for the termination of parental rights proceedings on 
August 27, 2004.  Bobby G. learned about Denise W.'s child only 
when he was served with the summons. 
¶12 On November 24, 2004, Bobby G. was adjudicated 
Marquette's father as a result of court-ordered genetic testing.  
The termination of parental rights case was then adjourned to 
January 11, 2005, to allow Bobby G. to obtain counsel. 
¶13 On January 11, 2005, Bobby G. made a formal appearance 
in the termination proceedings, contesting the termination and 
demanding a jury trial.  Throughout the termination of parental 
rights proceedings, Bobby G. emphasized that he wished to 
exercise his right to a jury trial on the issue of grounds for 
termination.   
                                                 
8 Denise W.'s parental rights to Marquette were terminated, 
and this review concerns only the termination of Bobby G.'s 
parental rights to Marquette. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
9 
 
¶14 As 
part 
of 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding, the State submitted the following eleven requests 
for admissions to Bobby G., and Bobby G. answered "yes" to each: 
Admission #1:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never assumed 
parental responsibility for Marquette S[]. 
Admission #2:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never 
established a substantial parental relationship with 
Marquette S[]. 
Admission #3:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never 
exercised responsibility for the daily supervision of 
Marquette S[]. 
Admission #4:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never 
exercised 
responsibility 
for 
the 
education 
of 
Marquette S[]. 
Admission #5:  Admit that Bobby G[] went six months or 
longer without having face to face contact with 
Marquette S[]. 
Admission #6:  Admit that Bobby G[] was unaware that 
he was the father of Marquette S[] until after June 
16, 2004. 
Admission #7:  Admit that Bobby G[] was not involved 
in assisting in, or providing for, the pre-natal care 
of Marquette S[]. 
Admission #8:  Admit that Bobby G[] went six months or 
longer without having any communication with Marquette 
S[]. 
Admission #9:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never paid 
child support for Marquette S[]. 
Admission #10:  Admit that Bobby G[] has never met 
Marquette S[]. 
Admission #11:  Admit that Bobby G[] was unaware that 
he was the father of Marquette S[] until he was 
informed of DNA test results indicating his paternity. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
10 
 
¶15 The State also submitted 24 interrogatories along with 
the requests for admissions.  The interrogatories probed the 
nature of Bobby G.'s relationship with Marquette, including what 
efforts Bobby G. had made to provide for Marquette and for 
Denise W.  The interrogatories requested information about Bobby 
G.'s conduct through April 20, 2005, that is, including a period 
of time after the petition for termination of parental rights 
had been filed.   
¶16 Many of Bobby G.'s responses to the interrogatories 
support the admissions that Bobby G. took no steps to assume 
parental responsibility before he learned of the existence of 
his son.9  Several of the responses to the interrogatories 
                                                 
9 For instance, Bobby G. was asked the following questions 
and supplied the following answers: 
Interrogatory 
#1: 
 
If 
your 
answer 
to 
any 
of 
petitioner's First Set of Requests for Admissions was 
anything other than an unqualified admission, please 
set forth in detail, for each and every admission, the 
factual basis for your response and identify all 
documents and witnesses that support or in any way 
relate to your answer. 
Response 1: 
No answer. 
Interrogatory #3:  Please list the date, location, 
duration and nature of each and every contact Bobby 
G[] has had with any foster parent of Marquette S[] 
between August 31, 2003, and April 20, 2005. 
Response 3: 
None 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
11 
 
demonstrated, however, that after he learned of his son's 
existence Bobby G. made repeated efforts to communicate with his 
son and was interested in developing a parental relationship.10  
                                                                                                                                                             
Interrogatory #20:  Please list all steps Bobby G[] 
has 
taken 
to 
establish 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship with Marquette S[]. 
Response 20: 
None. 
Interrogatory #24:  Please list all steps Bobby G[] 
has taken to exercise significant responsibility for 
the care of Marquette S[]. 
Response 24: 
None. 
10 Of note, Bobby G. was asked the following questions and 
supplied the following answers: 
 
Interrogatory #4:  Please list the date, location, 
duration and nature of each and every contact Bobby 
G[] has had with any BMCW [Bureau of Milwaukee Child 
Welfare] social worker since August 31, 2003. 
Response 4:   
Month of February, 2 letters to BMCW caseworker. 
Month of March, 1 letter to BMCW Caseworker, several 
calls to BMCW Caseworker from Caseworker at Fox Lake. 
Specific dates unknown. 
Interrogatory #5:  Please list each and every date on 
which Bobby G[] attempted to visit or communicate with 
Marquette S[] between August 31, 2003, and April 20, 
2005. 
Response 5: 
Month of February, 2 letters to BMCW Caseworker 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
12 
 
According to the interrogatories, after he learned that he was 
Marquette's father, Bobby G. communicated with the caseworkers 
assigned to Marquette's case, inquiring how he could establish 
communication with his son.  Thus the circuit court was aware at 
the grounds phase of the termination proceedings that Bobby G. 
was attempting to reach out to his son.   
¶17 On June 27, 2005, the State filed a notice of motion 
and motion for partial summary judgment.  Bobby G. argued that 
summary judgment was inappropriate because there were material 
facts in dispute and he wanted a jury to decide them.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
Month of March, 1 letter to BMCW Caseworker, several 
calls to BMCW Caseworker from Caseworker at Fox Lake. 
Specific dates unknown. 
All contacts attempted were in an effort to inquire 
about Marquette S[], his welfare and attempts to 
contact him. 
Interrogatory #6:  For each and every date listed in 
response to Interrogatory #5, please list every reason 
why no visit or communication occurred. 
Response 6: 
BMCW worker did not return contact to Bobby G[] on any 
occasion. 
11 In his response brief in opposition to partial summary 
judgment, Bobby G. contended: 
Section 48.415(6) Wis. Stats. states that a jury must 
consider whether the respondent has accepted and 
exercised significant responsibility for the daily 
supervision, education, protection and care of the 
child.  The jury must further consider whether the 
respondent has ever expressed concern for or interest 
in the support, care and well being of the child or 
has neglected or refused to provide care or support 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
13 
 
¶18 On September 16, 2005, more than a year after the 
petition for termination was filed, the circuit court heard 
argument on the State's motion for partial summary judgment.  
The State argued that given Bobby G.'s admissions that he did 
not know about Marquette prior to the filing of the petition for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
and 
had 
not 
developed 
a 
substantial relationship with Marquette prior to the filing of 
the petition for termination of parental rights, the State was 
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether grounds 
existed under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) to terminate Bobby G.'s 
parental rights.  Bobby G. opposed summary judgment, but he did 
not file a supporting affidavit.12  Bobby G. argued that it was a 
"factual case" for a jury. 
¶19 At the end of the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
the 
State's 
motion, 
declaring that the ground for termination was proved and that 
Bobby G. was unfit.  The circuit court's sole basis for its 
ruling was that Bobby G. had failed to assume his parental 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the child.  Finally, the jury must examine whether 
respondent expressed any concern or support for the 
mother during her pregnancy.  Respondent argues that 
his actions prior to the birth of the child as whether 
he has refused to provide care and support have not 
been addressed in the admissions or interrogatories 
and therefore are an issue for the jury. 
12 Although Bobby G. did not submit an affidavit, Bobby G.'s 
sworn admissions and interrogatories were in the record before 
the circuit court.  Bobby G. had signed his responses to the 
State's request for admissions and the State's interrogatories 
under oath in open court on June 21, 2005. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
14 
 
responsibilities before he even knew of the existence of his 
biological child.  The circuit court stated:  
And, quite frankly, there are no factual issues as it 
relates to a failure to assume.  He didn't know he was 
the father; didn't take part.  There is [sic] no other 
facts.  There are no facts in dispute for the jury to 
consider and I am going to grant the State's motion 
for summary judgment on failure to assume as it 
relates to the father for Marquette. 
¶20 The 
circuit 
court 
expressed 
uneasiness 
with 
terminating Bobby G.'s parental rights on a failure to assume 
parental responsibility during the time when he did not know of 
the existence of his son, describing the unfairness of the 
situation as follows:  
I'd be less than honest if I didn't say that these 
kinds of fact situations described here as it relates 
to your client [Bobby G.] leaves a very bad taste in 
my mouth.  That is a euphemism.  But what it is is, 
there is a kind of an unfairness; there is something 
wrong about somebody who didn't know he was the 
father, finds out he is the father, wants to do the 
right thing by his biological child and is prohibited 
from doing so.  That is the unfairness kind of, and 
that is the thing that leaves the bad taste. 
¶21 The circuit court also expressed concerns, however, 
about the best interests of the child, stating as follows: 
[The] [f]lip side is maybe this child is just the bi-
product [sic] of an act of sexual intercourse and that 
is all that his involvement was.  And then we have to 
deal with the best interests of the child.  What is 
best for this little child, because that is really 
what the best interest phase is about.  It's about the 
child is on equal footing with the parent as to what 
is best for that little child.  And maybe I think the 
caselaw even says it is probably in a stronger 
position than the parent. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
15 
 
My concerns in terms of the fairness can be taken care 
of in this second phase, and that is why I asked the 
district attorney for their position on that.  I 
believe the concerns your client [Bobby G.] mentions 
can be properly addressed.   
¶22 On October 25, 2006, the circuit court held a 
dispositional hearing to determine whether termination of Bobby 
G.'s parental rights would be in Marquette's best interests. 
¶23 The 
State 
presented 
one 
witness, 
Dr. 
Jeffrey, 
Marquette's foster father.  Dr. Jeffrey testified about how he 
and 
his 
wife 
managed 
Marquette's 
special 
medical 
and 
developmental needs, how Marquette had bonded with and had 
become attached to the foster family, and how the foster family 
was committed to adopting Marquette.  Dr. Jeffrey also testified 
that Denise W. had dwindling contact with Marquette, that 
Marquette had little contact with his biological siblings, and 
that Bobby G. had never met or spoken with Marquette.  
¶24 Bobby 
G. 
also 
testified. 
 
He 
explained 
his 
relationship with Denise W. and described his attempts to remain 
in communication with her.  According to Bobby G.'s testimony, 
Bobby G. and Denise W. met during the summer of 2002 when they 
were inmates in the Milwaukee County Jail.  They exchanged 
letters for about four months while incarcerated.  Approximately 
four weeks after they were released from jail in December 2002, 
Bobby G. and Denise W. met and had sexual intercourse.  Bobby G. 
stated he made several attempts afterward to see Denise W., but 
his repeated visits to her residence proved unfruitful.  A 
neighbor informed him that Denise W. had moved.  Bobby G. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
16 
 
admitted that he did not try to communicate with Denise W. 
thereafter.   
¶25 Bobby G. testified that he had not known that Denise 
W. was pregnant and that he was unaware of Marquette's existence 
until he was served with the summons for the termination of 
parental rights proceedings.13   
¶26 Bobby G. also explained in detail his efforts to begin 
a father-son relationship with Marquette upon learning of 
Marquette's existence after the petition to terminate his 
parental rights to Marquette was filed.14     
¶27 In addition to testifying about his communications 
with the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare, Bobby G. testified 
                                                 
13 The State's brief points out that Bobby G. could have 
learned whether a child came of his sexual encounter with Denise 
W. by filing with the registry of paternal interest maintained 
by the Department of Health and Social Services.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.025.  The State asserts that had Bobby G. taken this step 
he would have known about Marquette's existence when Marquette 
was 20 days old, that is, when the CHIPS proceedings began.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.27(3)(b)1.a. (a man with a registered paternal 
interest shall receive notice of CHIPS proceedings). 
14 According to the record, Bobby G. sent three letters to 
case manager Rachel Dreibelbis and tried to reach her by 
telephone, all without receiving a response.  Bobby G.'s 
girlfriend also called the caseworker asking for photographs of 
Marquette.  Bobby G. telephoned case manager Jenny Kuehn and 
also sent her letters, inquiring how to communicate with his 
son.  Bobby G. also contacted a third case manager, Ellettra 
Webster, sending her letters and placing three phone calls to 
her office.  He was able to speak to her once on the phone about 
Marquette.  Bobby G. also sent the case manager a pair of 
children's shoes (too small) for Marquette and a $25 money 
order, which were not given to the foster father, Dr. Jeffrey, 
until the dispositional hearing. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
17 
 
that he had enrolled in several personal development programs at 
the prison where he was incarcerated, including drug and alcohol 
programs, domestic violence programs, and a class on parenting 
skills.15   
¶28 After hearing the testimony and evidence presented at 
the dispositional phase, the circuit court concluded that 
terminating Bobby G.'s parental rights to Marquette was in 
Marquette's best interests.  Acknowledging that Bobby G. was 
trying to do "the right thing" for his biological child, the 
circuit court concluded that those efforts came too late. 
And the law says if you have sexual intercourse with a 
woman, it is logical to presume that that woman would 
become pregnant. 
Now, as a practical matter you didn't know [that 
Marquette existed] and all of those things, but the 
Supreme Court has stated a law that your obligation 
towards the child started at that point, and the fact 
that you didn't know and all those things as a 
practical matter is true but in a legal sense it is 
not a defense. 
So your rights were terminated for failure to assume, 
and that's because you had sex with this lady and she 
became pregnant and she didn't know you were the 
father.  She named other people ahead of time, but you 
had a legal obligation from that point in time. 
                                                 
15 During the termination of parental rights proceedings, 
Bobby G. was involved in criminal court proceedings as a result 
of selling cocaine to an undercover officer in April 2004.  He 
awaited trial in the Milwaukee County Jail and on October 1, 
2004, was sentenced to seven years, six months in the Wisconsin 
State Prison system, to be served as two years and six months of 
initial 
confinement, 
followed 
by 
five 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
18 
 
¶29 The circuit court did not consider relevant the 
evidence adduced concerning Bobby G.'s efforts to establish a 
substantial parental relationship with Marquette.  The circuit 
court announced: 
So a great deal of the testimony that we took as it's 
[sic] relates to you today really isn't particularly 
relevant. 
¶30 The circuit court ordered termination of Bobby G.'s 
parental rights to Marquette on November 4, 2005. 
¶31 Bobby G. filed a notice of appeal, and on March 9, 
2006, his attorney submitted a no-merit report to the court of 
appeals.  Appellate counsel identified two possible challenges 
for an appeal in the no-merit report and explained why neither 
had arguable merit.   
¶32 First, appellate counsel examined whether the circuit 
court had erred in granting the State's motion for partial 
summary judgment.  Because Bobby G. admitted he had no 
substantial relationship with Marquette and had taken no efforts 
to care for Marquette before the termination proceedings began, 
and because Bobby G. did not file any affidavits in opposition 
to the State's motion for summary judgment attesting that he did 
express concern for the child either before or after birth, 
appellate counsel concluded that summary judgment was proper.16   
                                                 
16 Bobby G. asserts in this court that to the extent that 
evidence of his attempts to form a relationship with Marquette 
was not before the circuit court when it considered the State's 
motion for summary judgment, Bobby G.'s counsel was ineffective. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
19 
 
¶33 Second, appellate counsel examined whether the circuit 
court 
had 
erred 
in 
exercising 
its 
discretion 
at 
the 
dispositional stage by terminating Bobby G.'s parental rights.  
Because the circuit court applied the proper standard of law, 
considered the relevant facts, and used a rational process, 
appellate counsel concluded that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion. 
¶34 The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report by 
order dated April 25, 2006.  The court of appeals explained its 
decision as follows: 
The no-merit report thoughtfully and expertly analyze 
[sic] these issues.  Accordingly, this court adopts 
the no-merit brief as our own statement of the case, 
and independently conclude [sic] that the two issues 
identified in the no-merit report lack all arguable 
merit.  Upon our review of the record, we further 
conclude that it presents no additional issues of 
arguable merit.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
court's dispositional order . . . (internal citations 
omitted).  
¶35 Bobby G. filed a letter to this court on May 23, 2006, 
which this court, the State, and the guardian ad litem treated 
as a petition for review.   
II 
 
¶36 This court reviews a circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment independently, applying the same methodology as the 
circuit court but benefiting from the circuit court's analysis.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
20 
 
 
¶37 Although relying primarily on a constitutional rather 
than a statutory analysis, Bobby G. asserts that summary 
judgment was improper in the instant case because the circuit 
court failed to consider the evidence that Bobby G. made 
attempts to establish a relationship after the filing of the 
termination petition and after he learned of Marquette's 
existence. 
¶38 In contrast, the State contends that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), 
Bobby 
G.'s 
conduct 
after 
the 
petition 
for 
termination was filed is irrelevant and that the statute so 
interpreted is constitutional.  The State claims it has 
established under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) Bobby G.'s "failure to 
assume parental responsibility" by the uncontested, admitted 
facts in the admissions and interrogatories that Bobby G. had no 
involvement with Marquette from conception through the filing of 
the petition for termination of parental rights.   
 
¶39 Partial summary judgment at the grounds phase of a 
termination of parental rights proceedings is permitted,17 
                                                 
17 In Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5, the court held that 
partial summary judgment could be granted in certain termination 
of parental rights cases on the issue of grounds.  The court 
stated:  
[P]artial summary judgment in the unfitness phase of a 
TPR case is available where the requirements of the 
summary judgment statute and the applicable legal 
standards in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 and 48.31 have been 
met.  An order granting partial summary judgment on 
the issue of parental unfitness where there are no 
facts in dispute and the applicable legal standards 
have been satisfied does not violate the parent's 
statutory right to a jury trial under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
21 
 
although 
the 
court 
has 
also 
acknowledged 
that 
not 
all 
termination of parental rights cases are suited for partial 
summary judgment.  The court has explained that "[t]he grounds 
for unfitness most likely to form the basis of a successful 
motion for partial summary judgment in a [termination of 
parental rights] case are those that are sustainable on proof of 
court order or judgment of conviction, the reliability of which 
is generally readily apparent and conceded."18  
 
¶40 The court has cautioned that "[i]n many [termination 
of parental rights] cases, the determination of parental 
unfitness will require the resolution of factual disputes by a 
court or jury at the fact-finding hearing, because the alleged 
grounds for unfitness involve the adjudication of parental 
conduct vis-à-vis the child."19  The court has further explained 
that "summary judgment will ordinarily be inappropriate in 
                                                                                                                                                             
§§ 48.422(4) 
and 
48.31(2), 
or 
the 
parent's 
constitutional right to procedural due process. 
In Steven V., we allowed summary judgment to be granted 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4), which establishes as a ground to 
terminate parental rights the denial of physical placement and 
visitation by court order for more than one year.   
More recently, in Oneida County v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 728 N.W.2d 652, we allowed summary judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10), which establishes as a ground to 
terminate parental rights the prior involuntary termination of 
parental rights to another child within the previous three 
years.   
18 Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶42. 
19 Id., ¶36. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
22 
 
[termination of parental rights] cases premised on these fact-
intensive grounds for parental unfitness."20  The court has 
identified Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) as a fact-intensive ground 
probably not suited for partial summary judgment, but the court 
has not held that this ground could never form the basis for 
partial summary judgment.  The court has instead stressed that 
"[t]he propriety of summary judgment is determined case-by-
case."21  
 
¶41 The propriety of summary judgment in the present case 
depends on the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
and whether any facts or inferences therefrom are in dispute.  
If § 48.415(6) is interpreted to mean, as the circuit court 
declared, that the State need prove only Bobby G.'s failure to 
assume parental responsibility between the time of conception 
and the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights, regardless of whether Bobby G. knew or had reason to 
believe that his child existed, then the facts may be viewed as 
undisputed and summary judgment lies.  If, however, under 
§ 48.415(6) a circuit court must weigh a father's efforts to 
establish a parental relationship with a child after he learns 
of his paternity but before the grounds for termination are 
adjudicated, then the circuit court erred as a matter of law in 
its interpretation of the statute, in refusing to consider 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id., ¶37 n.4. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
23 
 
evidence of Bobby G.'s efforts, in granting summary judgment, 
and in failing to accord Bobby G. the jury trial he requested.    
 
¶42 We must therefore decide the proper interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  Statutory interpretation ordinarily is 
a question of law that this court decides independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from the 
analyses of these courts. 
III 
¶43 We begin our statutory interpretation with the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) provides as follows:   
(6) Failure to assume parental responsibility.  (a) 
Failure to assume parental responsibility, which shall 
be established by proving that the parent or the 
person or persons who may be the parent of the child 
have never had a substantial parental relationship 
with the child. 
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has ever expressed concern 
for or interest in the support, care or well-being of 
the mother during her pregnancy (emphasis added).      
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(a) provides that failure 
to assume parental responsibility is a ground for termination of 
parental rights.  Failure to assume parental responsibility is 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
24 
 
established by proof that the parent has never had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child.  The statute defines 
"substantial parental relationship" as the "acceptance and 
exercise 
of 
significant 
responsibility 
for 
the 
daily 
supervision, education, protection and care of the child."    
¶46 Section 48.415(6)(b) gives the following non-exclusive 
examples of what a court may consider in evaluating whether the 
person has had a substantial parental relationship with the 
child: whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care, or well-being of the child, 
whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or 
support for the child, and whether, with respect to a person who 
is or may be the father of the child, the person has ever 
expressed concern for or interest in the support, care, or well-
being of the mother during her pregnancy.  
¶47 Section 
48.415(6) 
contains 
no 
express 
directive 
regarding whether a circuit court must consider that the father 
did not know of or have reason to believe of the existence of 
the child before the petition for termination was filed when 
deciding whether the father never had a substantial parental 
relationship with the child.  
 
¶48 The State argues that Bobby G.'s efforts to assume 
parental responsibility after the petition to terminate was 
filed and after he learned of his paternity but before grounds 
for termination were adjudicated are irrelevant.  We are not 
persuaded by this argument for several reasons.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
25 
 
¶49 First, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(b) 
explicitly 
uses 
language that evidences the relevancy of whether a father knew 
or had reason to believe he was the father before the petition 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
was 
filed. 
 
Section 
48.415(6)(b) requires that "[i]n evaluating whether the person 
has had a substantial parental relationship with the child," the 
circuit court may consider "whether the person [father here] has 
neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child 
(emphasis added)."  The words "neglected" and "refused" convey a 
willful or deliberate omission.  The word "neglected" is not 
synonymous with negligence here.  Rather, in the context of 
child support, "neglect" is commonly understood to mean a 
willful failure to provide support; a breach of the duty to 
support.22  Likewise, the word "refuse," as commonly understood, 
                                                 
22 State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 225, 378 N.W.2d 691 
(1985).  In Cissell, the court interpreted a child support 
statute that used the term "willfully neglects."  The defendant 
contended that the statute was vague and thus violated his due 
process rights.  Specifically, the defendant argued that the 
phrase "willfully neglects" was internally inconsistent because 
"willful" denoted intent and "neglect" denoted negligence. 
The Cissell court disagreed with the defendant, holding 
that the statute was not void for vagueness.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court examined the relevant definitions of 
"willful" and "neglect."  127 Wis. 2d at 225.  The Cissell court 
explained the meaning of the word "neglect" as follows:   
Black's [Law Dictionary] also defines neglect as the 
designed refusal or unwillingness to perform a duty.  
We conclude, therefore, that neglect does not mean 
negligence in the support context.  Neglect means 
breach of the duty of support.  
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
26 
 
involves a decision to reject a certain choice or course of 
action.23  Accordingly, the words "neglected" and "refused" in 
§ 48.415(6)(b) carry with them the sense that the father knew or 
had reason to believe he was the father but nevertheless did not 
provide care or support.  In deciding whether a father neglects 
or refuses to provide care or support for the child, a circuit 
court should consider whether these failures were willful or 
deliberate.  A circuit court therefore would have to take into 
account whether the father knew or had reason to believe he was 
the father when considering whether the father "neglected" or 
"refused" to care for the child.24  
¶50 Second, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) contains no express 
directive regarding whether the circuit court can consider only 
parental efforts undertaken prior to the filing of the petition 
for termination of parental rights.  The text seems to say the 
circuit court is not so limited.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(a) 
                                                                                                                                                             
127 Wis. 2d at 225.  Cissell's interpretation of "neglect" in 
the 
child 
support 
context 
is 
relevant 
in 
understanding 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), which examines whether a parent has 
neglected or refused to provide child support. 
23 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶7, 54, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) provides a non-exclusive list 
of factors that the circuit court may consider as relevant to 
its determination of whether the parent failed to assume 
parental responsibility.  Our analysis does not make this factor 
mandatory in the circuit court's determination; rather, the 
point is that when applying this factor, a circuit court must 
consider whether the father knew or had reason to believe the 
child existed. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
27 
 
requires that the party seeking termination must prove a 
parent's 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility 
by 
demonstrating that the parent has "never had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child" (emphasis added).  "Never" 
means never.   
¶51 Likewise, 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
consider 
under 
§ 48.415(6)(b) whether a parent has "ever" expressed concern for 
or interest in the well-being of the child or whether the father 
has "ever" expressed concern for or interest in the well-being 
of the mother during her pregnancy.  "Ever" means ever.   
¶52 The words "never" and "ever" in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
certainly 
do 
not 
suggest 
that 
the 
relevant 
period 
for 
consideration in termination of parental rights cases ends at 
the filing of the petition.  The words "never" and "ever" signal 
that the circuit court must consider all facts available, 
including a parent's conduct after the petition for termination 
was 
filed, 
when 
deciding 
whether 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship exists.25        
                                                 
25 For an example of an interpretation of "never," see State 
v 
Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 
N.W.2d 752, in which the mother argued that because she had 
taken care of the children for two years before they were 
removed from her home, the jury verdict could not find that she 
never had a substantial relationship with them under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6).  The court declared that "never" does not mean that 
any indication of an assumption of parental responsibility 
satisfies the statute, but rather requires the court to consider 
the parental conduct at the hearing on grounds.  The court of 
appeals upheld the jury verdict, explaining that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) provides that a "substantial 
parental 
relationship" 
consists 
of . . . "the 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
28 
 
¶53 Third, 
the 
introductory 
language 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415 provides that a circuit court's finding that a ground 
exists for the termination of parental rights is made "at the 
fact-finding hearing."26  This language does not require that the 
evidence regarding the grounds be limited to what has transpired 
as of the date of filing of the petition.  All the statute 
requires is that at the time of the fact-finding hearing the 
State prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 
¶54 Fourth, Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1), although relied upon by 
the State, does not support the State's position that the 
relevant cut-off date for evidence relating to the assumption of 
parental responsibility is the date the petition for termination 
is filed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(1) provides that a "'fact-
finding' hearing means a hearing to determine if the allegations 
in a petition . . . to terminate parental rights are proved by 
                                                                                                                                                             
acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility" 
for, among other things, the "protection and care of 
the child."  Here, the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that, because Quinsanna's "daily supervision" 
of [her twin sons] included her daily exposure of them 
to her own drug use and drug house, she had not 
exercised 
"significant 
responsibility" 
for 
their 
"protection and care." 
Id., ¶32 (citations omitted). 
26 The 
introductory 
language 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415 
preceding the enumerated grounds for termination provides as 
follows:  "At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury may 
make a finding that grounds exist for the termination of 
parental rights.  Grounds for termination of parental rights 
shall be one of the following: . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
29 
 
clear and convincing evidence."  The State claims that the 
"allegations in the petition" necessarily include only those 
facts that precede its filing.  The State urges that a father's 
post-termination petition conduct is admissible only for grounds 
for termination that contain a predictive element and that 
§ 48.415(6) does not include a predictive element.  The State 
cites no support except a comment to the jury instruction Wis 
JI——Children 180.  The comment, however, acknowledges that the 
issue of the time period arises in several grounds and concludes 
that "the question of timing the jury's consideration of 
prepetition and postpetition evidence must be resolved by the 
trial judge in the context of the jurisdictional ground at 
issue."   
¶55 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 48.424, which describes the 
fact-finding hearing at the grounds phase that must occur as 
part of a termination of parental rights proceeding, also does 
not command the conclusion that evidence must be limited to a 
parent's 
conduct 
that 
occurred 
before 
the 
petition 
for 
termination of parental rights was filed.  Sub-section 48.424(1) 
states in relevant part: "[t]he purpose of the fact-finding 
hearing 
is 
to 
determine 
whether 
grounds 
exist 
for 
the 
termination of parental rights . . . ."  Nothing about this 
provision limits the evidence to pre-petition conduct.  Sub-
section 48.424(2) provides in relevant part that a "fact-finding 
hearing shall be conducted according to the procedure specified 
in s. 48.31 . . . ."  This provision directs our attention only 
to § 48.31, which we already concluded does not limit the scope 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
30 
 
of the fact-finding hearing to the facts alleged in the petition 
to terminate parental rights.27  
 
¶56 Fifth, the State's position on Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
is not in accord with the express purposes of the Children's 
Code, which codifies the statutory provisions on termination of 
parental rights.  Our interpretation of § 48.415(6) comports 
with the purposes of the Code.   
¶57 The 
legislature 
expressly 
intended 
to 
protect, 
whenever appropriate, the biological family unit.  As one of the 
express goals of the Children's Code, the legislature declared 
as follows: 
While recognizing that the paramount goal of this 
chapter is to protect children and unborn children, to 
preserve 
the 
unity 
of 
the 
family, 
whenever 
appropriate, by strengthening family life through 
assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn 
children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their 
responsibilities as parents or expectant mothers.  The 
courts and agencies responsible for child welfare, 
while assuring that a child's health and safety are 
the paramount concerns, should assist parents and the 
expectant mothers of unborn children in changing any 
circumstances in the home which might harm the child 
or unborn child. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(a). 
 
¶58 With regard to the termination of parental rights, the 
legislature has expressly announced that efforts must be made to 
                                                 
27 Our holding does not mean that the State can terminate 
parental rights on allegations not included in the petition.  
The State must adhere to the notice provisions. Our holding is 
directed towards the evidence that can be presented at the fact-
finding hearing to support or refute the allegations in the 
petition. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
31 
 
reunite 
biological 
families 
whenever 
appropriate. 
 
The 
termination of parental rights is not supposed to occur until 
efforts at reunification have failed.  The goal is therefore: 
To allow for the termination of parental rights at the 
earliest 
possible 
time 
after 
rehabilitation 
and 
reunification efforts are discontinued in accordance 
with this chapter and termination of parental rights 
is in the best interest of the child.   
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(gr). 
¶59 Because biological parents' rights are deserving of 
protection, the legislature expressly mandated fair procedures 
to safeguard parental rights in their biological children.  As 
such, the legislature intended: 
To provide judicial and other procedures through which 
children and all other interested parties are assured 
fair hearings and their constitutional and other legal 
rights are recognized and enforced, while protecting 
the public safety.   
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(ad). 
¶60 A biological parent's rights, of course, are not the 
only interests at stake.  The Children's Code attempts to strike 
the appropriate balance between competing interests, including 
those of the biological parent in his or her relationship with 
the child, those of the child in permanence and stability in 
familial relationships, and those of the State in securing 
efficient and speedy resolution of termination of parental 
rights proceedings.  Thus, the legislature announced that the 
courts need not reunite families in all instances: 
The courts should recognize that they have the 
authority, in appropriate cases, not to reunite a 
child with his or her family.  The courts and agencies 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
32 
 
responsible for child welfare should also recognize 
that 
instability 
and 
impermanence 
in 
family 
relationships are contrary to the welfare of children 
and should therefore recognize the importance of 
eliminating the need for children to wait unreasonable 
periods of time for their parents to correct the 
conditions that prevent their safe return to the 
family.   
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(a). 
¶61 The 
legislature 
explicitly 
requires 
that 
the 
Children's Code "shall be liberally construed to effectuate" the 
stated legislative purposes.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01.   
¶62 To effectuate the stated legislative purposes requires 
a circuit court, in determining whether grounds exist under 
§ 48.415(6), to consider the efforts of a biological parent to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility 
after 
the 
filing 
of 
the 
termination of parental rights petition but before adjudication 
of the grounds for termination.  Furthermore, as a matter of 
sound judicial administration, a circuit court should make 
determinations on parental rights with access to the fullest 
information concerning the biological parents and children, 
including information on whether the parent has assumed parental 
responsibility up to the hearing on the grounds for termination. 
¶63 Sixth, the State's position on Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
is also inconsistent with the specific statutory provisions the 
legislature enacted to protect a putative father's rights in a 
termination of parental rights proceeding.  "Terminations of 
parental rights affect some of parents' most fundamental human 
rights."28  Termination proceedings require heightened legal 
                                                 
28 Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
33 
 
safeguards against erroneous decisions.29  For instance, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.42(2)(b)2. protects a nonmarital father's right to 
notice of a termination proceeding.  Likewise, § 48.422(6)(a) 
and (6)(b) protect a putative father's right to participate at 
the termination of parental rights proceeding.   
¶64 If we were to accept the State's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) as allowing evidence of a father's 
conduct only up to the date of the filing of the petition to 
terminate parental rights, the statute would in many instances 
create an irrebutable presumption that a man who does not know 
he is the father of a child before the filing of the petition 
for termination cannot assume parental responsibility for the 
child.30  The creation of this irrebutable presumption is not in 
accord with the various statutory provisions protecting the 
rights of a putative father and guaranteeing a father's 
participation in the termination proceedings.  We must interpret 
the statutory scheme holistically to avoid absurd results. 
¶65 Seventh, 
the 
State's 
position 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) contravenes the statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), that is, the previously enacted and repealed 
                                                 
29 Id., ¶21. 
30 Section 48.415(6) takes into account the conduct of a 
putative father toward the mother during her pregnancy.  There 
might be situations in which a man who does not know he is the 
father-to-be takes sufficient steps to establish a substantial 
parental relationship by expressing care and concern for the 
mother.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
34 
 
statutory provisions, from the adoption of § 48.415(6) in 1979 
until the 2003-04 version governing the present case.   
¶66 Section 48.415(6) was originally enacted in 1979 and 
establishes "failure to assume parental responsibility" as a 
ground for the termination of parental rights.31  In the 1979 
statute, the failure to assume parental responsibility may be 
established by demonstrating that the father did not establish a 
substantial parental relationship "prior to the adjudication of 
paternity although the father had reason to believe he was the 
father and had an opportunity to establish a substantial 
relationship (emphasis added)."  Section 48.415(6)(a)2. stated 
in relevant part as follows: 
(a) Failure to assume parental responsibility may be 
established by a showing that a child has been born 
out 
of wedlock, not subsequently legitimated or 
adopted, that paternity was not adjudicated prior to 
the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights and: 
. . . .  
2. That although paternity to the child has been 
adjudicated under s. 48.423, the father did not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
child prior to the adjudication of paternity although 
the father had reason to believe that he was the 
father of the child and had an opportunity to 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
child (emphasis added). 
¶67 Subsection (b) of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) enumerated 
non-exclusive 
factors 
a 
circuit 
court 
could 
consider 
in 
evaluating whether a person has had a substantial parental 
                                                 
31 Chapter 330, Laws of 1979; 1979 A.B. 656. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
35 
 
relationship with the child.  One of these factors was whether 
the parent "has neglected or refused to provide care or support 
even though the person has had the opportunity and ability to do 
so" (emphasis added).  Section 48.415(6)(b) read as follows in 
1979: 
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy and whether 
the person has neglected or refused to provide care or 
support even though the person had the opportunity and 
ability to do so (emphasis added). 
¶68 In 
1987, 
the 
legislature 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(a)2.32  The amended statute still provided that the 
party seeking termination could prove failure to assume parental 
                                                 
32 1987 Wisconsin Act 383, § 15; 1987 A.B. 978. 
In 1983, 1983 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 446, § 8, the Wisconsin 
legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)(intro.) to read as 
follows: 
(a) (intro) Failure to assume parental responsibility 
may be established by a showing that a child has been 
born out of wedlock, not subsequently legitimated or 
is a nonmarital child who has not been adopted or 
whose parents have not subsequently intermarried under 
s. 767.60, that paternity was not adjudicated prior to 
the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights and: 
The stricken-through language was omitted.  The underlined 
language was added.  We need not discuss this change further 
because it does not affect the instant case. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
36 
 
responsibility 
by 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
father 
did 
not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the child 
prior to the adjudication of paternity although the person had 
reason to believe he was the father of the child.  The 1987 
amendment 
deleted, 
however, 
the 
statutory 
language 
in 
§ 48.415(6)(a)2. that expressly addressed whether a father had 
an opportunity to develop a substantial relationship with his 
biological child.    
¶69 Subsection 48.415(6)(a)2. was amended in 1987 to read 
as follows: 
2. That although paternity to the child has been 
adjudicated under s. 48.423, the father did not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
child prior to the adjudication of paternity although 
the father had reason to believe that he was the 
father of the child and had an opportunity to 
establish a substantial parental relationship with has 
never assumed parental responsibility for the child. 
The insertions are shown by underlining and the deletions are 
shown as stricken.   
¶70 Subsection (b) of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) was also 
revised in 1987 as part of the same bill to eliminate the final 
phrase of subsection (6)(b) stating "even though the person had 
the opportunity [to provide care and support] and ability to do 
so."  Subsection (b) as amended in 1987 (with tracked changes) 
reads as follows:  
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
37 
 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy and whether 
the person has neglected or refused to provide care or 
support even though the person had the opportunity and 
ability to do so. 
¶71 According 
to 
the 
Legislative 
Research 
Bureau's 
analysis: "This bill modifies the current grounds for an 
involuntary [termination of parental rights] based on the 
failure of a parent to assume parental responsibility for a 
nonmarital child by eliminating the provision in which it must 
be shown that a father had an opportunity to establish a 
substantial parental relationship with the child prior to a 
paternity adjudication but failed to do so.  This bill provides 
that it must be shown that a father never assumed parental 
responsibility for the child prior to the adjudication of his 
paternity."33 
                                                 
33 See Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1987 AB 
978, LRB-5180/1, in Bill Drafting File on 1987 AB 978, available 
at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main St., Madison, 
Wis. 
An accompanying fiscal estimate by John Manske of the 
Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Community 
Services, in the same file states that "[t]his bill eliminates 
the requirement that it must be shown that a father had an 
opportunity to establish a substantial parental relationship 
with a non-marital child.  Where adoptive placements are 
available this will speed up the adoption process, and will 
shorten a child's stay in foster care, resulting in a cost 
savings to counties."  
See also Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 683-84, 500 
N.W.2d 649 (1993) (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)2. 
and (b) as amended in 1987 "no longer require a showing that the 
father had the opportunity and the ability to assume parental 
responsibility for the child"). 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
38 
 
¶72 As a result of this 1987 amendment, the party seeking 
termination did not have to prove that the father had an 
opportunity to establish a substantial relationship with his 
biological child, although the party seeking termination still 
had to prove that prior to the adjudication of paternity the 
father had reason to believe that he was the father of the child 
and had never assumed parental responsibility for the child. 
¶73 In 1989, the legislature once again amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(a)2.34  The 1989 amendment substituted the language 
"filing of a petition for termination of parental rights" for 
the previous language "adjudication of paternity."  Thus, as of 
1989 the party seeking termination could prove failure to assume 
parental responsibility by demonstrating that the father did not 
establish a substantial parental relationship prior to the 
filing of a petition for termination of parental rights rather 
than prior to the adjudication of paternity.   
¶74 After the 1989 amendment, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)2. 
read as follows with tracked changes: 
(a) Failure to assume parental responsibility may be 
established by a showing that a child is a nonmarital 
child who has not been adopted or whose parents have 
not subsequently intermarried under s. 767.60, that 
paternity was not adjudicated prior to the filing of 
the petition for termination of parental rights and: 
 
. . . . 
2. That although paternity to the child has been 
adjudicated 
under 
s.48.423, 
the 
father 
did 
not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
                                                 
34 1989 Wisconsin Act 86; 1989 A.B. 272. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
39 
 
child prior to the adjudication of paternity filing of 
a petition for termination of parental rights although 
the father had reason to believe he was the father of 
the 
child 
and 
has 
never 
not 
assumed 
parental 
responsibility for the child. 
¶75 A Drafter's Note included in the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau drafting file on 1989 AB 272 describes the 
reason for this 1989 change as follows:  "The amendment of s. 
48.415(6)(a)2 was [assistant district attorney] Meryl Manhardt's 
idea.  She said that sometimes it takes 6 months or more to have 
a paternity hearing and during this time the father starts 
spending just enough time with the child so that it can't be 
proven that he never assumed parental responsibility."35 
¶76 The 
1989 
legislature 
expressly 
and 
unequivocally 
changed the relevant time frame during which the party seeking 
termination had to show that the father failed to assume 
parental responsibility.  The party seeking termination would 
need 
to 
submit 
evidence 
of 
the 
lack 
of 
a 
substantial 
relationship only for the period up to the time when the 
petition 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
was 
filed.  
Nevertheless, the party seeking termination still had to prove 
that prior to the filing of the termination petition the father 
had reason to believe that he was the father of the child and 
had not assumed parental responsibility for the child. 
                                                 
35 Drafter's Note from Evelyn Mazack, Legislative Attorney, 
in Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file on 1989 A.B. 
272, LRB-0243/1an. 
The impact of the amendment was also clearly expressed in 
the Fiscal Estimate: "[T]he bill makes it easier to bring TPR 
petitions in the circuit court." 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
40 
 
¶77 In 1995, the legislature consolidated, renumbered, and 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6).36 
 
The 
1995 
version 
of 
§ 48.415(6) remained unchanged through 2005 and is the version 
of § 48.415(6) governing the instant case.  The 1995 amendment 
was part of a bill prepared by the Joint Legislative Council's 
Special 
Committee 
on 
Children 
in 
Need 
of 
Protection 
or 
Services.37   
¶78 The language and structure of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
were substantially changed in 1995.  Section 48.415(6)(a) reads 
as follows with the 1995 amendments (with the insertions and 
deletions shown):  
§ 48.415(6)(a) 
Failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility may, which shall be established by a 
showing proving that a child is a nonmarital child who 
has not been adopted or whose parents have not 
subsequently 
intermarried 
under 
s. 
767.60, 
that 
paternity was not adjudicated prior to the filing of 
the petition for termination of parental rights and: 
1.  The the parent or the person or persons who may be 
the father parent of the child have been given notice 
under s. 48.42 but have failed to appear or otherwise 
submit to the jurisdiction of the court and that such 
person or persons have never had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child; or. 
                                                 
36 1995 Wisconsin Act 275, §§ 82m-84; 1995 S.B. 501. 
37 The Joint Legislative Council consists of legislators 
from both the Assembly and Senate and functions through study 
committees that include legislators and public members. See 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
The 
Special 
Committee 
here 
submitted 
its 
recommendations in bill form to the Council, which then proposed 
the legislation to the legislature.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
41 
 
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy and, whether 
the person has neglected or refused to provide care or 
support for the child and whether, with respect to a 
person who is or may be the father of the child, the 
person has ever expressed concern for or interest in 
the support, care or well-being of the mother during 
her pregnancy. 
¶79 For ease of reading, here is the statute without 
tracked changes: 
§ 48.415(6)(a) 
Failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility, which shall be established by proving 
that the parent or the person or persons who may be 
the parent of the child have never had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child. 
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has ever expressed concern 
for or interest in the support, care or well-being of 
the mother during her pregnancy (emphasis added). 
¶80 The 1995 version omits the phrase "a father had reason 
to believe he was the father of the child," which had appeared 
in every version of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)2. since 1979.  
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
42 
 
Thus the 1995 text no longer explicitly provides that the party 
seeking termination must prove that the father had never assumed 
parental responsibility for the child even though the father had 
reason to believe he was the father of the child.   
¶81 Furthermore, 
the 
1995 
version 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(a) eliminated the 1989 statutory language requiring 
the party seeking termination to show that the father failed to 
establish a substantial parental relationship prior to the 
filing of the petition for termination.  The 1995 statute also 
eliminated the 1985 statutory language requiring the party 
seeking termination to show that the father failed to establish 
a substantial parental relationship prior to the adjudication of 
paternity.  Thus, unlike prior versions of 48.415(6), the 1995 
statute contains no express language about the timeframe in 
which the party seeking termination must prove that the father 
has never assumed parental responsibility.  
¶82 Despite the significant changes in language in 1995, 
the Note of the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee 
that drafted the amendments to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (printed 
in 1995 Wis. Act 275) states that no change was made to the 
prior statute except to expand the ground to include mothers, 
marital children, and fathers for whom paternity was adjudicated 
prior to the filing of the termination petition.  The Note to 
§ 48.415(6)(a) printed with 1995 Wis. Act 275 states: 
Under current law, the parental rights of the father 
of a nonmarital child, that is, a child who is neither 
conceived nor born while his or her parents are 
intermarried, who has not been adopted or whose 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
43 
 
parents have not subsequently intermarried and for 
whom paternity has not been adjudicated prior to the 
filing of the TPR petition may be terminated if: (1) 
the person or persons who may be the father of the 
child have been given notice about the PR petition but 
have failed to appear or otherwise submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court and have never had a 
substantial parental relationship with the child; or 
(2) that although paternity has been adjudicated, the 
father did not establish a substantial parental 
relationship with the child prior to the filing of the 
TPR petition although the father had reason to believe 
he was the father of the child and has not assumed 
parental responsibility for the child. 
This bill expands this ground for involuntary TPR to 
include: (1) mothers as well as fathers; (2) marital 
children as well as nonmarital children; and (3) 
fathers for whom paternity was adjudicated prior to 
the filing of the TPR petition (second emphasis 
added). 
¶83 The Note might lead one to believe that the drafters 
did not view the 1995 omission of the concept included since 
1979, that the circuit court should consider whether the father 
had reason to believe that he was the father of the child, as 
substantively changing the statute.  We agree with this 
conclusion.  As discussed previously, the words "refuse" and 
"neglect" 
incorporate 
the 
concept 
of 
willfulness 
and 
deliberateness, that is, that the father had reason to believe 
he was the father but nevertheless did not provide care or 
support for the child.  The Note also might lead one to believe 
that the drafters intended to require the father to have 
established a substantial parental relationship with the child 
prior to the filing of the petition to terminate parental 
rights.  This view is not supported by the drafting history.  
The legislative drafting file on 1995 S.B. 501 at the Wisconsin 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
44 
 
Legislative Reference Bureau contains a Memorandum from staff 
attorneys at the Legislative Council to Senator Joanne Huelsman, 
Representative Shirley Krug, Representative Bonnie Ladwig, and 
the Legislative Reference Bureau commenting on recommended 
amendments. 
¶84 One 
recommended amendment was to "[s]pecify the 
pertinent time period during which the parent must have failed 
to assume parental responsibility, for example, in the year 
prior to the time the [termination of parental rights] petition 
was 
filed." 
 
A 
handwritten 
"No" 
appears 
next 
to 
this 
recommendation.  This amendment was not adopted. 
¶85 The reasonable inference from the 1995 text of 
§ 48.415(6)(a) 
and 
this 
drafting 
memorandum 
is 
that 
the 
legislature's removal of references to both the date of 
adjudication of paternity and the date of filing of the 
termination petition removed the limitation on the proof of 
failure to assume parental responsibility to any date preceding 
the hearing on the grounds for termination. 
¶86 Furthermore, the use of the words "never" and "ever," 
as 
we 
explained 
previously, 
support 
a 
circuit 
court's 
considering all evidence as of the hearing on the grounds for 
termination. 
¶87 Our interpretation of the word "never" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(a) is supported by the same Memorandum from staff 
attorneys at the Legislative Council.  A recommended amendment 
was to "[s]pecify that the parent has 'not' had a substantial 
parental relationship rather than 'never' had a substantial 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
45 
 
parental relationship."  The staff attorneys' comment to this 
recommendation was, "This does appear to be a substantive 
difference." 
 
A 
handwritten 
"No" 
appears 
next 
to 
this 
recommendation.38   
                                                 
38 In 2005 the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 48.415(6) 
again, changing "never" to "not" and omitting the word "ever."  
2005 Act 293, § 21.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) now provides: 
48.415(6)(a) 
Failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility, which shall be established by proving 
that the parent or the person or persons who may be 
the parent of the child have never not had a 
substantial parental relationship with the child. 
(b) 
 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has ever expressed concern 
for or interest in the support, care or well-being of 
the mother during her pregnancy. 
The Wisconsin Legislative Council's Proposed Report to the 
Legislature of the Special Committee on Adoption and Termination 
of Parental Rights Law (Mar. 28, 2005) states: 
Background 
 
 . . . . 
According 
to 
testimony 
received 
by 
the 
Special 
Committee, requiring a showing that the person has 
never had a substantial relationship with the child 
can be difficult if the parent ever showed any 
interest or had any contact with the child. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
46 
 
¶88 The Legislative Council Special Committee on Adoption 
and Termination of Parental Rights Law, which had proposed the 
2005 amendment, explained the need for the change as follows:  
"According to testimony received by the Special Committee, 
requiring a showing that the person has never had a substantial 
relationship with the child can be difficult if the parent ever 
showed any interest or had any contact with the child" (Report 
at 11).  
¶89 For the reasons set forth, we are unpersuaded by the 
State's position on Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  On the basis of the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), the purposes of the Children's 
Code, and the statutory evolution of § 48.415(6), we hold, 
contrary to the State's proffered interpretation, that under 
§ 48.415(6) a father's efforts to assume parental responsibility 
                                                                                                                                                             
Description 
The bill draft modifies this ground providing that 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility 
is 
established by proving that the parent has not had a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship 
with 
the 
child 
(emphasis in original). 
The Special Committee's meeting minutes (Sept. 15, 2004) 
state the following: 
Regarding the involuntary [termination of parental 
rights] 
ground 
of 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility, Mr. Kenney [a member of the Joint 
Legislative Council] said that the ground is very 
confusing and that requiring the state to show that 
the 
parent 
never 
had 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship with the child is frequently the focus of 
the defense.  He said that he does not believe the 
Legislature intended minimal contact with a child to 
constitute a substantial parental relationship. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
47 
 
for a biological child undertaken after he learns of the 
existence of the child but before the adjudication of the ground 
must be considered by the circuit court in determining whether 
the ground of failing to assume a parental relationship under 
§ 48.415(6) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
¶90 Bobby G.'s responses to the State's interrogatories 
should have alerted the circuit court that Bobby G. was trying 
to establish a parental relationship with Marquette after he had 
reason to believe that he was Marquette's father.  Summary 
judgment was inappropriate because material facts were presented 
disputing the State's claim that Bobby G. never assumed parental 
responsibility for Marquette. 
 
¶91 Although Bobby G. admitted that, among other things, 
he failed to assume parental responsibility for Marquette and 
had not developed a substantial relationship with Marquette, the 
circuit court should not have automatically concluded that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) 
was 
satisfied 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence.  "Failure to assume parental responsibility" and 
"substantial parental relationship" are legally defined terms, 
and the statutory definitions may not neatly align with the 
common sense understanding of these phrases.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court should not have so readily accepted Bobby G.'s 
admissions as concessions that the State had proved the 
requirements under § 48.415(6). 
 
¶92 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)(c) provides that 
before accepting an admission of the alleged facts in a 
petition, the circuit court shall address the parties and 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
48 
 
determine 
that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the actions alleged in the 
petition and the potential dispositions, and shall "make such 
inquiries as satisfactorily establish that there is a factual 
basis for the admission."  The circuit court did not live up to 
these statutory obligations in the present case. 
¶93 In any event, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) provides a non-
exclusive list of factors that the circuit court or the jury may 
consider in determining whether the biological parent failed to 
assume parental responsibility.  The State's requests for 
admissions and interrogatories did not expressly address all of 
the factors listed.  Even if the State had sought admissions on 
all of the enumerated factors, the list of factors is not 
exclusive.  Such admissions may still not constitute "clear and 
convincing" evidence that the statutory ground for termination 
was actually satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.  
Section 48.415(6) is a fact-intensive ground. 
¶94 The circuit court erred as a matter of law in its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) and in granting partial 
summary judgment without taking all the relevant evidence during 
the grounds phase.  We must now determine whether the error was 
remedied and was harmless.  To decide whether the error was 
remedied and was harmless, we turn to Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768, and Waukesha County 
v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, in 
which a circuit court erred in not taking evidence at the 
grounds phase and the error was declared harmless error.   
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
49 
 
¶95 Evelyn C.R. and Steven H. differ from the instant 
case.  In Evelyn C.R. the parent had defaulted; in Steven H. the 
parent did not contest the petition.  In both those two cases a 
sufficient evidentiary basis for a court's determination of 
unfitness rendered the circuit court's error in failing to take 
evidence at the grounds phase harmless.  In contrast, in the 
instant case Bobby G. contested the petition and demanded a jury 
trial on the grounds for termination.  In the instant case, the 
circuit court's error was not remedied and was not harmless for 
the reasons set forth below. 
V 
 
¶96 Even if the circuit court had taken evidence and 
considered Bobby G.'s post-termination petition efforts during 
the grounds phase or during the dispositional phase, neither the 
circuit court nor this court could decide whether the State had 
satisfied its burden under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  The facts to 
the extent they were developed and their import are in dispute.  
Accordingly, with material facts in dispute, the circuit court 
erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment.  
Furthermore, Bobby G. had requested a jury trial, which the 
circuit court denied because it found no material facts in 
dispute.  Neither the circuit court nor this court can deprive 
Bobby 
G. 
of 
his 
statutorily 
granted 
jury 
trial 
without 
justification.  No justification exists in the present case.  A 
jury should decide any dispute of facts or disputed inferences 
from the facts, not the circuit court or this court. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
50 
 
¶97 In Evelyn C.R., in which the parent had defaulted, we 
held that although the circuit court erred when it failed to 
take evidence at the fact-finding hearing to establish the 
grounds for the termination of parental rights by clear and 
convincing evidence, the error was harmless.39  The circuit court 
remedied the error by taking evidence at the dispositional phase 
of the termination of parental rights proceeding and then 
reconsidering its finding of the ground for termination on the 
basis of the new evidence presented.  The facts were sufficient 
in Evelyn C.R. to support the circuit court's findings that 
grounds for termination existed.  We explained our decision 
upholding the circuit court as follows: 
[T]he 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
enter 
its 
order 
terminating 
Tykila's 
parental 
rights 
until 
after 
taking 
Evelyn's 
testimony 
and, 
based 
on 
this 
testimony, reaffirming its finding of abandonment.  At 
the 
time 
the 
court 
reaffirmed 
its 
finding 
of 
abandonment and prior to the court ordering the 
termination of Tykila's parental rights, the record 
contained sufficient facts to support the circuit 
court's finding of abandonment.40 
                                                 
39 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides in relevant part:   
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . error as to any matter of pleading or 
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which 
the application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
40 Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
51 
 
 
¶98 As was the case in Evelyn C.R., the circuit court here 
received evidence relevant to the issue of the ground for 
termination at the dispositional stage of the termination 
proceedings.  The circuit court took testimony from Bobby G. 
regarding his efforts to develop a relationship with his 
biological son after he learned about his son, that is, after 
the termination proceeding had begun.  Bobby G.'s counsel 
introduced into evidence several of the letters that Bobby G. 
had written to caseworkers, which included inquiries about how 
to care for and contact his son.  The foster father, Dr. 
Jeffrey, testified about the shoes and money order that he 
received from Bobby G. on Marquette's behalf.  The circuit court 
also heard that Bobby G. had made several attempts to contact 
Denise W. while (unbeknownst to him) she was pregnant.   
¶99 This evidence——which was not presented at the grounds 
phase of the termination proceeding——is relevant to whether 
Bobby G. failed to assume parental responsibility for Marquette.  
Unlike in Evelyn C.R., however, in the present case the parent 
had not defaulted in the grounds phase and the circuit court did 
not reconsider and reaffirm its finding about the ground for 
termination on the basis of this adduced evidence.   
¶100 Instead, the circuit court announced that "a great 
deal of the testimony that we took as it's [sic] relates to you 
today really isn't particularly relevant."  The circuit court 
continued, "And, quite frankly, my listening to your description 
of the programming you're going through it sounds like, yeah, 
you have had a rough 10, 15 years, but it looks like things are 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
52 
 
finally coming together for you; starting to make the necessary 
decisions you have so that your life can turn around.  And that 
is great.  I hope it works out for you.  But that is about you 
and this is about Marquette." 
¶101 The circuit court did not find the new evidence 
relevant to the issue of the ground for termination.  Because 
the statute requires the circuit court to consider evidence of 
Bobby G.'s conduct after the filing of the termination petition 
to assume parental responsibility for Marquette, we conclude 
that the circuit court erred in granting partial summary 
judgment and, unlike in Evelyn C.R., that this error was not 
remedied at the dispositional phase. 
¶102 In Steven H.,41 the parent did not contest the petition 
and did not demand a jury trial.  The Steven H. court examined 
the entire record of the termination of parental rights 
proceedings and "teased out" a factual basis to support the 
circuit court's finding of grounds for termination.  In Steven 
H., although the circuit court erred in failing to take 
testimony to support the allegations in the petition to 
terminate parental rights, "[a] factual basis for several of the 
allegations in the petition [could] be teased out of the 
testimony of other witnesses at other hearings when the entire 
record [was] examined."42  
                                                 
41 Waukesha 
County 
v. 
Steven 
H., 
2000 
WI 
28, 
233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. 
42 Id., ¶58. 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
53 
 
¶103 Even if we were to apply the command of the Steven H. 
court to "tease out" the factual basis from the relevant 
testimony when Bobby G. demanded a jury trial, we can only 
"tease out" from Bobby G.'s testimony that there was evidence, 
left largely unexplored by the parties, that Bobby G. was trying 
to assume parental responsibility for Marquette.  At a proper 
fact-finding hearing, the extent and nature of those efforts 
could be examined.  Only after a proper fact-finding hearing in 
which all of the relevant information about Bobby G.'s post-
petition efforts to assume parental responsibility is presented 
could a jury determine whether grounds exist or could this court 
determine whether a directed verdict should be entered. 
¶104 In the present case, Bobby G. was denied a jury trial 
guaranteed by statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(4) protects the 
right to a jury trial when a parent contests the petition for 
termination of parental rights.  It provides in relevant part: 
Any party who is necessary to the proceeding or whose 
rights may be affected by an order terminating 
parental rights shall be granted a jury trial upon 
request if the request is made before the end of the 
initial hearing on the petition. 
¶105 This statute is not the only reference to the right to 
a jury trial.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(2) directs that the 
fact-finding hearing be conducted according to Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.31. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(2) governs fact-finding 
hearings in the Children's Code.  It, too, emphasizes and 
protects the right to a jury trial, providing in relevant part: 
The hearing shall be to the court unless the child, 
the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
54 
 
unborn child by the unborn child's guardian ad litem, 
or the expectant mother of the unborn child exercises 
the right to a jury trial by demanding a jury trial at 
any time before or during the plea hearing. 
¶106 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 reiterates the role the jury 
plays in a fact-finding hearing on grounds for termination of 
parental rights, stating that "[a]t the fact-finding hearing the 
court or jury may make a finding that grounds exist for the 
termination of parental rights." 
¶107 The circuit court erred in concluding that no material 
facts warranting a jury trial were in dispute.  In doing so, the 
circuit court denied Bobby G.'s repeated requests for a jury 
trial.  Disputed facts remain which should have been decided by 
a jury.  
* * * * 
¶108 We recognize that our decision unfortunately further 
extends the child's period of uncertainty.  Nevertheless, the 
rights of both a parent and a child must be protected.  
¶109 For the reasons set forth, we hold that in determining 
whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father 
has failed to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), a circuit court must consider the biological 
father's efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the 
father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of 
the termination proceeding.  Thus the circuit court in the 
instant case proceeded under an erroneous interpretation of the 
statute.  Furthermore, the facts were not fully developed, and 
No. 
2006AP66-NM   
 
55 
 
the facts to the extent they were developed and their import are 
in dispute.  The parties disputed whether Bobby G. assumed 
parental responsibility after he learned of his paternity but 
before 
adjudication 
of 
the 
grounds 
for 
termination.  
Accordingly, with facts in dispute, the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law in granting partial summary judgment.  Moreover, 
Bobby G. requested a jury trial, which the circuit court denied 
because it erroneously found no material facts or inferences 
therefrom in dispute.  Neither the circuit court nor this court 
can deprive Bobby G. of a jury trial by deciding the factual 
dispute.   
¶110 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the summary judgment and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for a fact-finding hearing in accordance with Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.424 
to 
determine 
whether 
grounds 
exist 
for 
termination of Bobby G.'s parental rights to Marquette and, if 
necessary, for a dispositional hearing in accordance with 
§ 48.427 on whether Bobby G.'s parental rights should be 
terminated in the best interests of Marquette. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶111 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Could a cocaine- 
pushing, woman-battering man, who does not even know about the 
existence of his child, have accepted and exercised "significant 
responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection 
and care of the child"?  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (2003-04).    
¶112 If that is too close of a call, consider the same 
question, 
only 
the 
person 
admitted 
he 
never 
exercised 
responsibility for the daily supervision of the child, never 
exercised responsibility for the education of the child, never 
paid child support, and never met the child.  Plus, he has been 
incarcerated for the vast majority of the child's life.   
¶113 The circuit court answered no.  Such a person has not 
assumed 
parental 
responsibility 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  The majority concludes the circuit 
court erred.  "[T]he circuit court in the instant case proceeded 
under an erroneous interpretation of the statute" by failing to 
"consider the biological father's efforts undertaken after he 
discover[ed] that he is the father but before the circuit court 
adjudicate[d] 
the 
grounds of the termination proceeding."  
Majority op., ¶5.   
¶114 The plain language of the Children's Code contradicts 
the majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6).    Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
2 
 
¶115 Before addressing the analysis of the majority, it is 
necessary to supplement the facts presented by it. 
¶116 Marquette was born on August 31, 2003.  He was at 
least six weeks premature and weighed only four pounds and ten 
ounces.  He had respiratory problems, including bronchiolitis, 
reactive airway disease, and pneumonia.  From the hospital he 
was placed with foster parents, Dr. Jeffrey and Karen. 
¶117 When Marquette was born, Bobby G. was facing charges 
for battering a woman.  He was clueless about the existence of 
the child he had fathered as a result of his one and only face-
to-face contact with Denise W. while not in state custody.  Lest 
one conclude Bobby G. had no way of knowing the result of their 
volitional act, the State contacts fathers, such as Bobby G., if 
they 
register 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.025.1  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.27(3)(b)1. 
provides 
that 
a 
person 
registered pursuant to § 48.025 receive notice of any CHIPS case 
involving their potential child.2  However, Bobby G. never 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.025(1) states:  
Any person claiming to be the father of a 
nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents 
do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60 may, in 
accordance with procedures under this section, file 
with the department a declaration of his interest in 
matters affecting such child. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.27(3)(b)1. provides the following: 
Except as provided in subd. 2., if the petition 
that was filed relates to facts concerning a situation 
under s. 48.13 or a situation under s. 48.133 
involving an expectant mother who is a child and if 
the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or 
whose 
parents 
do not subsequently intermarry as 
provided under s. 767.60 and if paternity has not been 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
3 
 
registered with the state.  Any thought that he may have been 
ignorant to the potential of a CHIPS case should be offset by 
the fact that Bobby G. already had his parental rights 
terminated to another child by the time he had face-to-face 
contact with Denise.  
¶118 For the first six months of his life, Marquette's 
health problems required extensive treatment.  He required 
treatment every two to three hours twenty-four hours a day, 
which his foster parents provided.     
¶119 While Marquette endured his health problems, Bobby G. 
faced bail jumping charges.  Despite a no contact order, Bobby 
G. went to the apartment of the woman he had battered a few 
months earlier.  When he refused to leave, the woman contacted 
the police.  The police persuaded him to leave.  Within an hour, 
Bobby G. was back at the woman's apartment banging on the door.  
By his second visit, the police had discovered the existence of 
the no contact order. 
¶120 In Spring 2004 Marquette's health condition got worse.  
He suffered a series of recurrent ear infections.  He developed 
                                                                                                                                                             
established, the court shall notify, under s. 48.273, 
all of the following persons: 
a. A person who has filed a declaration of interest 
under s. 48.025. 
b. A person alleged to the court to be the father of 
the child or who may, based on the statements of 
the mother or other information presented to the 
court, be the father of the child. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
4 
 
problems eating and maintaining his nutritional status.  As a 
result of Marquette's condition, Dr. Jeffrey and Karen needed to 
administer treatment every hour and half to two hours twenty-
four hours a day to maintain his hydration and nutrition.  
Marquette's condition got so bad that he had to be hospitalized 
for four days.  Doctors found that food was going into his lungs 
and that he had multiple allergies.  As they had done for 
Marquette since he arrived from the hospital days after his 
birth, his foster parents provided the necessary treatment and 
coordinated his numerous visits to doctors and therapists. 
¶121 While Marquette was needing treatment at least 12 
times a day, Bobby G. was facing charges for delivering cocaine.  
He was still oblivious to the existence of the child he had 
fathered.  He received a maximum term of imprisonment of seven 
years and six months.  The initial confinement in the Wisconsin 
Prison System was two years and six months and the extended 
supervision was five years. 
¶122 In Summer 2004 the State filed a petition to terminate 
the parental rights of Marquette's parents, Denise W. and 
"Bobby."  At the time the petition was filed, the identity of 
Marquette's father was unknown by Denise or the State.  Denise 
misidentified Marquette's father twice before she suggested it 
may be "Bobby."  The State used "Bobby" on the petition because 
Denise did not know Bobby G.'s last name.  After genetic 
testing, Bobby G. was identified as Marquette's father.   
¶123 In Fall 2004, only as a result of the State seeking 
out the identity of Marquette's father so it could terminate his 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
5 
 
parental rights, Bobby G. finally became aware that Marquette 
existed. 
¶124 During 
the 
grounds 
phase 
of 
the 
termination 
proceedings, Bobby G. made a number of admissions.  He admitted 
he never assumed parental responsibility for Marquette.  He 
admitted 
he 
never 
established 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship with Marquette.  He admitted he never exercised 
responsibility for the daily supervision of Marquette.  He 
admitted he never exercised responsibility for the education of 
Marquette.  He admitted he was unaware the he was the father of 
Marquette until after June 16, 2004, the date the State filed 
the petition to terminate his parental rights to Marquette.  He 
admitted that he was not involved in assisting in, or providing 
for, the prenatal care of Marquette.  He admitted that he never 
paid child support for Marquette.  He admitted that he never met 
Marquette.  He admitted that he was unaware that he was the 
father of Marquette until he was informed of DNA test results 
indicating his paternity. 
¶125 The State filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
asserting that the undisputed facts entitled it to judgment as a 
matter of 
law that Bobby G. failed to assume parental 
responsibility pursuant to § 48.415(6).  The circuit court 
granted the State's motion.  Bobby G. filed a notice of appeal.  
The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report submitted by 
Bobby G.'s counsel.   
II 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
6 
 
¶126 When a circuit court grants partial summary judgment, 
we review it independently applying the same methodology.  
Oneida County Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, 
¶8, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 728 N.W.2d 652.  It is appropriate to grant 
summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Id.  The majority deems summary judgment inappropriate in this 
case based on its flawed interpretation of § 48.415(6). 
¶127 When multiple statutes in the same chapter relate to 
implementing the chapter's purpose, courts construe them to have 
a harmonized interpretation.  In re Angel Lace M., 184 
Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994).3  The majority's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 48.415(6) 
contradicts 
§§ 48.31(1) 
and 
48.424. 
 
Rather 
than 
look 
to 
the 
statutes 
accompanying 
§ 48.415(6) in the Children's Code for the proper definition of 
a fact-finding hearing, the majority provides a definition based 
on a contorted reading of the Children's Code.  
A. A Harmonized Interpretation of the Children's Code Provisions 
¶128   Reading §§ 48.31, 48.415, and 48.424 together, the 
scope of a § 48.415(6) fact-finding hearing is limited to the 
facts alleged in the petition to terminate.  Facts that arise 
subsequent to the filing of the petition to terminate are not 
relevant to the fact-finder's determination of whether grounds 
exist to terminate the parent's parental rights. 
                                                 
3 This canon of construction has been referred to as in pari 
materia.  In pari materia means "[o]n the same subject; relating 
to the same matter."  Black's Law Dictionary 794 (7th ed. 1999).  
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
7 
 
¶129 Before 
enumerating 
the 
grounds 
for 
involuntary 
termination of parental rights, § 48.415 states that "[a]t the 
fact-finding hearing the court or jury may make a finding that 
grounds 
exist 
for 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6) provides that one of the grounds for 
involuntary termination is the failure to assume parental 
responsibility.   
¶130 The 
language 
of 
§ 48.415 
does 
not 
specify 
the 
particulars of the required fact-finding hearing.  However, 
other 
provisions 
of 
the 
Children's 
Code 
do.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424, like § 48.415, appears in Subchapter 
VIII of the Children's Code.  Subchapter VIII relates to the 
termination of parental rights.  Section 48.424(1) explicitly 
states that "[t]he purpose of the fact-finding hearing is to 
determine whether grounds exist for the termination of parental 
rights."  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(2) provides that a "fact-
finding hearing shall be conducted according to the procedure 
specified by s. 48.31."   
¶131 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(1) 
defines 
a 
"fact-finding 
hearing" 
as 
"a 
hearing 
to 
determine 
if 
the 
allegations 
in . . . a petition to terminate parental rights are proved by 
clear and convincing evidence."  From the plain language of the 
statute, the scope of a fact-finding hearing is limited to those 
facts alleged in the petition to terminate parental rights.  
¶132 Applying the harmonized interpretation of the statutes 
to this case, no dispute of material fact existed when the 
circuit court granted the State's motion for partial summary 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
8 
 
judgment.  Bobby G.'s own admissions establish that he never had 
the requisite substantial parental relationship required by 
§ 48.415(6).  The circuit court properly granted the State 
partial summary judgment. 
B. The Majority's Flawed Interpretation 
¶133 In the face of the plain language of the Children's 
Code, the majority holds that circuit courts must consider a 
parent's efforts after the petition to terminate his or her 
rights has been filed.  Majority op., ¶5.  The majority provides 
seven reasons for its interpretation.  Each reason enumerated 
lacks merit.   
1. "Neglect" is Different than "Willful Neglect" 
¶134 The majority states that "Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) 
explicitly uses language that evidences the relevancy of whether 
a father knew or had reason to believe he was the father before 
the petition for termination of parental rights was filed."  
Majority op., ¶49.  It focuses on the use of the words 
"neglected" and "refused," which both appear in one of the three 
factors circuit courts may consider pursuant to § 48.415(6)(b).  
The factor specifically reads, "whether the person has neglected 
or 
refused to provide care or support for the child."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (emphasis added). Based on State v. 
Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 225, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), the 
majority asserts that "[t]he word 'neglected' is not synonymous 
with negligence here."  Majority op., ¶49. 
¶135 The majority's reliance on Cissell is misplaced.  
Cissell involved the interpretation of a child support statute 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
9 
 
that used the term "willfully neglects."4  The defendant argued 
that "willfully neglects" was internally inconsistent because 
"willful" means intentional and "neglect" means negligence.  The 
Cissell court disagreed and held that the use of the term 
"willfully neglects" in Wis. Stat. § 52.05(1) did not render the 
statute void for vagueness.      
¶136 Unlike 
Cissell, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
does 
not 
include the phrase "willfully neglects."  It merely uses the 
word "neglect."  Dismissing the distinction between a statute 
that 
uses 
the 
phrase 
"willfully 
neglects" 
and 
"neglect" 
undermines the majority's interpretation. 
2. The Non-Exclusive Discretionary Factors 
¶137 The majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6) depends 
on 
its 
interpretation 
of 
words 
found 
in 
non-exclusive 
discretionary factors.  The plain language of the statute 
indicates that was not the legislature's intent. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 52.05(1)(1981-82) states, in pertinent 
part, the following:  
Any person who deserts or willfully neglects or 
refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of 
his or her spouse or child under 18 years (legitimate 
or born out of wedlock) in destitute or necessitous 
circumstances shall be fined not more than $500 or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.  It is a 
defense to criminal liability that the person has just 
cause to desert, willfully neglect or refuse to 
provide support or maintenance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
10 
 
¶138 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) 
defines 
"substantial 
parental relationship" and provides a non-exclusive list of 
three factors the court may consider.  Specifically, it states,  
In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
(1) whether the person has ever expressed concern for 
or interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, (2) whether the person has neglected or refused 
to provide care or support for the child and (3) 
whether, with respect to a person who is or may be the 
father of the child, the person has ever expressed 
concern for or interest in the support, care or well-
being of the mother during her pregnancy. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6)(b)(emphasis and numbering added).  
The majority even recognizes that § 48.415(6)(b) gives "non-
exclusive examples of what a court may consider in evaluating 
whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship 
with the child."  Majority op., ¶46 (emphasis added). 
¶139 Nevertheless, 
in 
explaining 
its 
reasons 
for 
disregarding the State's harmonized interpretation of the 
Children's 
Code, 
the 
majority 
indicates 
that 
§ 48.415(6) 
provides a list of elements that "must," or "have to," be 
satisfied.  Majority op., ¶¶49, 52.  In concluding its 
discussion of "neglected" and "refused," the majority states 
that "[a] circuit court therefore would have to take into 
account whether the father knew or had reason to believe he was 
the father."  Id., ¶49 (emphasis added).  Why would a circuit 
court "have to" when the words "neglected" and "refused" appear 
in one of the non-exclusive list of factors "a court may 
consider?" 
3. The Legislature Defined "Fact-Finding Hearing" 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
11 
 
¶140 The introductory language of § 48.415 provides that 
"[a]t the fact-finding hearing the court or jury may make a 
finding that grounds exist for the termination of parental 
rights."  Based on that, the majority concludes that "[t]his 
language does not require that the evidence regarding the 
grounds be limited to what has transpired as of the date of 
filing of the petition."  Majority op., ¶53.  This purportedly 
supports the majority's conclusion that circuit courts must 
consider evidence that arises from conduct after the filing of 
the petition to terminate parental rights. 
¶141 The majority's assessment makes sense only if the 
introductory language of § 48.415(6) is read in a vacuum.  The 
legislature defined "fact-finding hearing" in §§ 48.31(1) and 
48.424.  As addressed above, § 48.31(1) does require that the 
evidence regarding the grounds be limited to conduct before the 
date of filing of the petition because it is proof of the 
"allegations in a petition" for which a fact-finding hearing is 
held.  
4. Statutes are Primary Authority 
¶142 The majority proclaims that § 48.31(1) "does not 
support the State's position that the relevant cut-off date for 
evidence relating to the assumption of parental responsibility 
is the date the petition for termination is filed."  Majority 
op., ¶54.  Why?  Because "[t]he State cites no support except a 
comment to the jury instruction Wis JI—Children 180."  Id.   
¶143 The plain language of § 48.31(1) supports the State's 
position.  Only by rejecting enactments of the legislature as 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
12 
 
primary authority does the majority's assessment of §§ 48.31(1) 
and 48.415(6) reach its erroneous conclusion. 
5. The Purpose of the Children's Code 
¶144 The paramount goal of the Children's Code is to 
protect children.  The majority quoted a portion of § 48.01(a), 
which is one of the many subsections that states the purpose of 
the Children's Code, as follows:  
While recognizing that the paramount goal of this 
chapter is to protect children and unborn children, to 
preserve 
the 
unity 
of 
the 
family, 
whenever 
appropriate, by strengthening family life through 
assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn 
children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their 
responsibilities as parents or expectant mothers.  
(Emphasis added.)  Family unity and strengthening family life 
are secondary goals that are furthered "whenever appropriate." 
¶145 With the legislative purposes stated, the majority 
leaps to the conclusion that "[t]o effectuate the stated 
legislative purposes requires a circuit court, in determining 
whether grounds exist under § 48.415(6), to consider the efforts 
of a biological parent to assume parental responsibility after 
the filing of the termination of parental rights petition but 
before adjudication of the grounds for termination."  Majority 
op., ¶62. 
¶146 The 
legislature 
has 
provided 
evidence 
that 
the 
majority has failed to capture the essence of the Children's 
Code's 
purpose. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
§ 48.31(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(1) explicitly limits the 
scope of a fact-finding hearing to facts alleged in the petition 
to terminate.  Were the state able to terminate parental rights 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
13 
 
on allegations outside of the petition, the parent would not 
have notice of the allegations against him or her. 
6. Participation Does Not Ensure that a Party Will Prevail 
¶147 Regardless of its aversion toward other Children's 
Code statutes that define the scope of fact-finding hearings, 
the majority claims that §§ 48.42(2)(b)2. and 48.422(6)(a) 
support its conclusion.  However, an examination of the statutes 
indicates that neither contradicts the definition of fact-
finding hearing provided by the legislature in § 48.31(1).  
Additionally, neither requires that a circuit court consider 
certain evidence at the fact-finding hearing.   
¶148 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.42(2) enumerates the parties that 
must be summoned when a petition for termination has been filed.5  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.42(2)(b) provides the following:   
(2) Who Must Be Summoned.  Except as provided in sub. 
(2m), the petitioner shall cause the summons and petition 
to be served upon the following persons: 
 . . . . 
 
(b) If the child is a nonmarital child who is not 
adopted 
or 
whose 
parents 
do 
not 
subsequently 
intermarry under s. 767.60 and paternity has not been 
established:  
1. A person who has filed a declaration of 
interest under s. 48.025.  
2. A person or persons alleged to the court to be 
the father of the child or who may, based upon the 
statements 
of 
the 
mother 
or 
other 
information 
presented to the court, be the father of the child 
unless that person has waived the right to notice 
under s. 48.41 (2)(c).  
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
14 
 
Therefore, Bobby G. had to be summoned when a petition was filed 
to 
terminate 
parental 
rights 
to 
Marquette.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(6)(a) 
provides 
that 
at 
a 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422 hearing a circuit court must ensure that all 
parties to the termination proceeding have been notified.6 
¶149 Neither §§ 48.42(2)(b)2. nor 48.422(6)(a) requires 
that a circuit court consider certain evidence at fact-finding 
hearings.  Yet, the majority depends on these procedural 
statutes to determine the proper scope of fact-finding hearings.  
The majority does so in the face of the how the legislature has 
already defined fact-finding hearings in §§ 48.31(1) and 48.424.  
7. A Legislative Theory  
¶150 The 
majority presents the convoluted history of 
§ 48.415(6).  Originally, the substantial parental relationship 
had 
to 
exist 
"prior 
to 
adjudication."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(1979-80). 
 
Later, 
the 
substantial 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. 
A 
person 
who 
has 
lived 
in 
a 
familial 
relationship with the child and who may be the father 
of the child. 
 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(6)(a) provides the following: 
If the child is a nonmarital child who is not 
adopted 
or 
whose 
parents 
do 
not 
subsequently 
intermarry under s. 767.60 and paternity has not been 
established, the court shall hear testimony concerning 
the paternity of the child. Based on the testimony, 
the court shall determine whether all interested 
parties who are known have been notified under s. 
48.42 (2).  If not, the court shall adjourn the 
hearing and order appropriate notice to be given. 
 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
15 
 
parental relationship had to exist prior to the "filing of the 
petition 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(1989-90). 
 
In 
1995, 
the 
legislature 
consolidated, 
renumbered, 
and 
amended 
§ 48.415(6).  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(1995-96).  Any reference to the temporal 
scope of the fact-finding hearing vanished.  What does that 
mean?    
¶151 One theory is that the Joint Legislative Council's 
Special Committee, which addressed statutes throughout the 
Children's Code, realized it was repetitive to define the scope 
of 
a 
fact-finding 
hearing 
in 
§ 48.31(1) 
and 
repeat 
a 
substantially similar definition in § 48.415(6).  At the time, 
§ 48.31(1) referred to "allegations in a  . . . petition to 
terminate parental rights" and § 48.415(6)(a)2. referenced a 
substantial parental relationship "prior to the filing of a 
petition for termination of parental rights."  In an effort to 
rid the statutes of some redundancy, the legislature may have 
deleted the language.  
¶152 Of course, the role of courts is not to theorize about 
what the legislature may have been thinking.  Courts interpret 
the laws as enacted by the legislature.  When statutory language 
manifests a clear meaning, it is unnecessary to consult 
extrinsic sources to ascertain the legislature's intent, such as 
legislative history.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The 
rationale behind not delving into the convoluted legislative 
history in a case like this is that courts are "not at liberty 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
16 
 
to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute."  State v. 
Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967). 
III 
¶153 Marquette should have been in a permanent home by now.  
His foster parents wanted to adopt him.  The circuit court 
properly 
granted 
the 
State's 
motion 
for 
partial 
summary 
judgment.  Bobby G. failed to assume parental responsibility.  
Nevertheless, instead of being in a permanent home, Marquette 
continues to be kept in limbo.   
¶154 For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶155 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2006AP66-NM.jpw 
 
 
 
1