Title: State v. Lane R. Weidner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Lane R. Weidner,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 16, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 4, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Dorothy L. Bain 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. 
Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin. 
 
2 
 
 
2000 WI 52 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1334-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Lane R. Weidner, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Marathon 
County, Dorothy L. Bain, Circuit Court Judge.   Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals.1  The State of 
Wisconsin contends that the circuit court erred in finding Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2) (1997-98)2 unconstitutional as applied to the 
defendant's actions in transmitting harmful material to a minor 
                     
1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1997-98), the 
court of appeals certified an appeal of an order of the Circuit 
Court for Marathon County, Dorothy L. Bain, Judge, granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
2 
via the internet.  We determine that the statute impermissibly 
shifts to the defendant the burden of proving knowledge of the 
victim's 
age 
and 
infringes 
on 
protected 
First 
Amendment 
expression.  Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is 
unconstitutional in the context of the internet and other 
situations that do not involve face-to-face contact between the 
minor and the accused, we affirm the circuit court.3  
¶2 
The facts as alleged in the criminal complaint reveal 
that the defendant, Lane R. Weidner, began communicating with 
Samantha B. over an internet chat room known as "Teenage 
Romance."  Weidner used this internet technology to send 
Samantha B. several pictures of himself, including one that 
depicted him naked.  He additionally transmitted numerous 
photographs of pre-pubescent girls ranging from eight to 
thirteen years of age engaged in various sexual acts with a man 
and with one another.   
¶3 
During the course of their communication, Samantha B. 
disclosed her minority status to Weidner.  Although she was 
sixteen years old at the time, she informed Weidner that she was 
seventeen.  The correspondence between the two was limited to 
                     
3 We note at the outset that our constitutional inquiry is 
premised on internet communication that does not involve face-
to-face contact.  However, we are cognizant of the evolving 
nature of technology and that future communication over the 
internet may entail face-to-face contact.  Our present analysis 
is essentially based on the distinction we draw between face-to-
face interaction and interaction that does not involve face-to-
face contact.   
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
3 
their interaction over the internet and did not involve any 
face-to-face contact. 
¶4 
Weidner was eventually charged with eight counts of 
violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2), 
which 
prohibits 
the 
dissemination of harmful material to minors.4  Relying on this 
court's recent decision in State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 589 
N.W.2d 370 (1999), Weidner filed a motion to dismiss the charges 
and asserted that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional for 
failing to require that the State prove Weidner's knowledge of 
the victim's minority status. 
¶5 
The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss and 
held the statute unconstitutional as applied to Weidner's 
conduct over the internet.  Referring to Zarnke, in which this 
court invalidated an analogous child exploitation statute as 
unconstitutional 
when 
applied 
to 
distributors 
of 
child 
pornography, the circuit court determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) is likewise unconstitutional.  Because the statute 
shifts to the defendant the burden of proving knowledge of the 
victim's age, and the internet does not provide the requisite 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11(2) provides in relevant part: 
(2) 
Criminal 
Penalties. 
(a) 
Whoever, 
with 
knowledge of the nature of the material, sells, rents, 
exhibits, transfers or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, is 
guilty of a Class E felony. 
"Harmful material" is defined under § 948.11(1)(ar) as 
including representations of sexually explicit conduct that 
would be "harmful to children" as defined under subsection 
(1)(b). 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
4 
face-to-face contact to ascertain whether the victim is a minor, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
pass 
constitutional muster under Zarnke.   
¶6 
The State appealed.  Subsequently, the court of 
appeals certified to this court the question of whether Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2) is constitutional as applied to a defendant 
who distributes harmful material to a minor over the internet. 
¶7 
The constitutionality of a statute presents a question 
of law that we review independently of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court or court of appeals.  State v. 
Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).   Statutes 
generally enjoy a presumption of constitutionality that the 
challenger must refute.  Wisconsin Retired Teachers Ass'n v. 
Employe Trust Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 558 N.W.2d 83 
(1997). However, when a statute infringes on rights afforded by 
the First Amendment, as here, the State shoulders the burden of 
proving the statute constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 669, 470 N.W.2d 296 
(1991).    
¶8 
We begin by examining Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2), the 
subject of our constitutional inquiry.  This statute provides: 
 
(2) Criminal Penalties. (a) Whoever, with knowledge of 
the nature of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
transfers or loans to a child any harmful material, 
with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a 
Class E felony. 
The statute does not require the State to prove scienter, that 
is knowledge, of the age of the person receiving the harmful 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
5 
material.  Rather, it sets forth an affirmative defense in 
subsection (c) that states: 
 
 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a 
violation of this section if the defendant had 
reasonable cause to believe that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years, and the child exhibited 
to the defendant a draft card, driver's license, birth 
certificate or other official or apparently official 
document purporting to establish that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years.  A defendant who raises 
this affirmative defense has the burden of proving 
this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.   
¶9 
As 
a 
variable 
obscenity 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
948.11(2) prohibits a person from exhibiting to children those 
materials deemed obscene to minors but not obscene to adults.  
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 523-24, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994). 
 Variable  obscenity statutes are premised on established 
constitutional tenets recognizing the significance of age in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
¶10 Non-obscene sexual expression benefits from protection 
under 
the 
First 
Amendment. 
 
United 
States 
v. 
Playboy 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1885 (2000); Sable 
Communications 
v. 
F.C.C., 
492 
U.S. 
115, 
126 
(1989).  
Nevertheless, sexual expression that is appropriate for adults 
may not be suitable for children.  Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968).  Accordingly, the government may 
regulate the exposure of minors to sexually explicit material in 
promoting the government's compelling interest to safeguard the 
physical and psychological welfare of children.  New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).  
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
6 
¶11 Because age represents the critical element separating 
illegal conduct from that which remains protected, to avert 
significant constitutional dilemmas some form of scienter must 
be implied in a statute imposing criminal liability based on 
age.  See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
69, 73 (1994).  Indeed, scienter constitutes the rule in our 
criminal jurisprudence and is generally presumed even absent 
express statutory reference.  State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 
476, 147 N.W.2d 550 (1967).  See also Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).  
¶12 Although Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) includes scienter as 
to the nature of the materials deemed harmful to children, the 
statute currently does not contain a parallel requirement as to 
the age of the victim.  Prior to the creation of Chapter 948, 
the State's proof of scienter was a prerequisite to a lawful 
conviction based on exposing a child to harmful material.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 944.25(10) (1985-86).     
¶13 A 1987 legislative amendment effected a shift in the 
law by which scienter presently stands as an affirmative defense 
that the defendant must prove to avoid criminal liability.  See 
1987 Wis. Act 332; Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c).  By reformulating 
scienter 
as 
an 
affirmative 
defense, 
the 
legislature 
has 
eliminated it as an element of the offense under the statute.  
Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d at 127 n.3. 
¶14 Weidner contends that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is  
constitutionally 
flawed 
for 
having 
dispensed 
with 
the 
requirement that the State prove a defendant's knowledge of the 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
7 
victim's minority status.  He asserts that allocating to the 
defendant the burden of demonstrating scienter chills protected 
speech and results in self-censorship that violates the First 
Amendment. 
¶15 According 
to 
Weidner, 
self-censorship 
is 
acutely 
apparent in the context of the internet because this particular 
medium renders it virtually impossible to ascertain the age of 
the person receiving the transmitted materials.  As a result, 
those intending to take advantage of the internet to distribute 
constitutionally protected materials to adults will refrain from 
doing so in fear of prosecution under the statute. 
¶16 The State counters that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is 
constitutional in all its applications, having already survived 
constitutional scrutiny on two separate occasions.  Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d at 536; State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 576 N.W.2d 
62 (Ct. App. 1997).  Regardless of whether there is face-to-face 
contact between the person intending to disseminate material and 
the recipient of that material, the State posits that there 
exists no absolute guarantee as to the recipient's actual age.  
However, the State maintains that an affirmative defense proving 
lack of scienter represents constitutionally adequate protection 
against the chilling of speech.  United States v. United States 
Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Ca., 858 F.2d 534, 541-43 (9th Cir. 
1988).  
¶17 The State's position rests primarily on the argument 
that Weidner's actions comport with the exception to the 
requirement of scienter.  Referring to X-Citement Video, the 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
8 
State claims the United States Supreme Court recognized an 
exception that scienter need not be presumed within a criminal 
statute when there is an opportunity for personal confrontation 
between the defendant and the minor.  513 U.S. at 76 n.5 (citing 
United States Dist. Ct., 858 F.2d at 543 n.6). 
¶18 Furthermore, the State notes that Zarnke affirmed the 
validity of this exception, relying on it to hold that 
distributors, not producers, of child pornography are shielded 
from the burden of demonstrating lack of knowledge.  According 
to the State, Zarnke excepted distributors from carrying the 
burden because they do not have the opportunity to interact 
personally with the minors depicted in their distributed films. 
 Unlike distributors of child pornography, the State asserts 
that internet users are afforded the opportunity to interact 
personally with others using this medium and therefore may 
reasonably ascertain the age of a potential recipient of 
sexually explicit material.  Because there exists a reasonable 
opportunity to gauge the recipient's minority status, the State 
contends that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is constitutional as 
applied to the internet. 
 
¶19 In addressing the State's contentions to determine 
whether it satisfies the burden of proving that Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) withstands constitutional attack, we look to prior 
cases that have commented on the statute's constitutionality.  
This court first addressed the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) in Thiel, which focused on an allegation of 
impermissible overbreadth under the statute.   
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
9 
¶20 The 
defendant 
in 
Thiel 
raised 
the 
overbreadth 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) based on the statutory term 
"exhibit," claiming that it encompassed a broad range of 
innocent display of sexual expression, including commercial 
display to a general audience.  183 Wis. 2d at 535.  The court 
held that the statute survived this particular constitutional 
attack, noting that the term "exhibit" contemplates affirmative 
conduct to target specific minors rather than a commercial 
display to a general audience.  Id.  
¶21 Neither the constitutional question of scienter nor 
the unique problems associated with the burgeoning of the 
internet were raised before the court.  Thus, Thiel is of 
limited benefit to the State and does not control our present 
constitutional inquiry. 
¶22 We turn next to Kevin L.C., in which the court of 
appeals 
sustained 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) and determined that the statute "reasonably imposes 
upon an individual the obligation to ascertain the age of 
persons to whom he or she wishes to exhibit materials deemed 
harmful to children."  216 Wis. 2d at 184.  In Kevin L.C., the 
defendant was convicted for sexual assault and for showing a 
"dirty" movie to children left in his care.  His conviction was 
affirmed on appeal notwithstanding his constitutional challenge 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).   
¶23 The appellate court reasoned that the statute does not 
present an unreasonable burden on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights because the statute criminalizes conduct when 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
10
an individual "personally confronts, or has the opportunity to 
personally confront" a specific child.  Id. at 188.  As the 
circuit court in this case observed, Kevin L.C. needs to be 
reexamined in light of our recent decision in Zarnke.  Zarnke 
both admonishes against the legislative enactment of statutes 
devoid of scienter and limits the constitutional reach of the 
statute at issue to those situations in which there is "personal 
contact" or "personal meeting" between the accused and the child 
victim.  224 Wis. 2d at 127, 132-33.     
¶24 In Zarnke, this court recently addressed the issue of 
whether the child sexual exploitation statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.05, was constitutional as applied to distributors of child 
pornography.  Like the statute at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.05 did not require the State to prove a defendant's 
knowledge of the minor's age.  Rather, the statute provided an 
affirmative defense similar to the affirmative defense provision 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c).  The Zarnke court concluded 
that it was a "practical impossibility" for a distributor of 
sexually explicit material to prove the affirmative defense set 
forth in the exploitation statute.  224 Wis. 2d at 126.   
¶25 Relying on X-Citement Video, the court reasoned that a 
distributor of pornography may be many steps removed from its 
production, which would render it virtually impossible to 
discover the age of the person reduced to a visual depiction.  
Id. at 132.  The affirmative defense in essence imposed strict 
liability on distributors and impermissibly infringed on their 
First Amendment rights.  Id.  Consequently, the Zarnke court 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
11
invalidated the statute because it did not require the State to 
prove the essential element of scienter when the accused's 
conduct did not entail a "personal meeting" with the minor.  Id. 
at 133. 
¶26 Although Zarnke did not fully develop the parameters 
of "personal meeting," we conclude that contact on the internet 
does not constitute a personal meeting because it does not 
entail 
face-to-face 
contact.5 
 
We 
discern 
no 
meaningful 
distinction, as the State argues, between the distributor in 
Zarnke and the person who intends to disseminate via the 
internet 
material 
deemed 
harmful 
to 
minors. 
 
Although 
communication over the internet necessarily entails some level 
of interaction between persons who are "on-line," this current 
level of interaction does not justify the onerous constitutional 
restriction imposed by Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).   
¶27 As the parties here agree, the substance of a 
"personal meeting" is the ability to ascertain the age of the 
victim.   The holding in Zarnke was premised on the inability of 
distributors of child pornography to ascertain reliably and 
conveniently the age of child victims.  We believe the same 
holds true for persons using the internet to distribute 
materials deemed harmful to minors.  
                     
5 Although State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 125-26, 131, 
589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) settled on the term "personal meeting," it 
acknowledged that both the court of appeals in that case and the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) contemplated an element of 
scienter in the absence of "face-to-face" interaction.  
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
12
¶28  The difficulty of age verification over the internet 
becomes apparent when examining the affirmative defense under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c), which contains two requirements.  Not 
only must the defendant prove reasonable cause to believe that 
the victim has attained the age of 18 years, but the defendant 
must also prove that the victim exhibited some "official or 
apparently official" document to verify the victim's age.  
¶29 The internet provides no effective means to gauge the 
identity and age of persons who access material through use of 
this continuously evolving technology.  Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997).  Participants in chat 
rooms often assume pseudonyms and do not divulge truthful 
personal data. Requiring the transmission of documentation 
constitutes an encroachment into the personal lives of those who 
use the internet precisely because it affords anonymity.  
¶30 Although the State offers suggestions as to how a 
person may reasonably discover the age of the recipient of 
transmitted 
materials, 
we 
remain 
unpersuaded 
that 
these 
suggestions relieve the significant burden placed on persons by 
the affirmative defense under Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c).  The 
State claims that a recipient who is asked to send verification 
may electronically scan or fax official documentation and 
blacken out personal information so that the recipient's privacy 
is protected.   
¶31 This suggestion ignores the reality that many internet 
users do not possess scanners and other technology that would 
conveniently allow them to transmit documentation.  The State's 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
13
proposal that those recipients send proof of age via regular 
mail also fails to recognize that the delay adversely affects 
the dissemination of ideas and images that enjoy First Amendment 
protection.  Moreover, sending documents via internet or mail 
does not obviate the uncertainty as to whether the documentation 
corresponds to the recipient's personal data.  The lack of face-
to-face interaction, which impairs the ability to ascertain 
reliably the age of the recipient, effectively serves to chill 
speech. 
¶32 The 
State 
emphasizes 
that 
there 
is 
a 
crucial 
distinction 
between 
reasonableness 
as 
required 
by 
the 
affirmative defense and the reliability of age verification over 
the internet.  According to the State, Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c) 
only requires that a defendant's efforts in ascertaining age be 
reasonable, not that the documentation sent in response to a 
verification request be reliable.  However, we question whether 
it is constitutionally tenable to require a person to assume the 
risk that the lack of reliability of internet age verification 
will be construed as reasonable by a jury. 
¶33 Imposing the onus on the defendant to demonstrate 
reasonableness in light of the unreliability of the internet is 
too grave a burden.  Not only must the defendant prove the 
reasonableness of his or her belief but in essence the defendant 
must also prove the fraud of another in displaying false 
documentation of age.  The incentive resulting from such 
uncertainty is self-censorship.  Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
14
502, 511 (1966).   This self-censorship exacts too great a cost 
and renders freedom of expression the loser. 
¶34 Similar to the statute at issue in Zarnke, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) essentially sets forth a strict liability offense 
that deprives an individual of the opportunity to prove lack of 
knowledge.  224 Wis. 2d at 132.  Persons employing the internet 
lack the means to ascertain reasonably the age of the persons 
with whom they are corresponding.  There is an absence of both  
face-to-face contact and a satisfactory degree of reliability.  
Thus, the statute renders it virtually impossible for defendants 
as internet users 
to 
meet 
the burden under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(c).   
¶35 The legislature may permissibly dispense with scienter 
for various strict liability offenses.  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 
253-54.  Nevertheless, the State is limited in its use of strict 
liability offenses when freedom of expression is implicated and 
the 
elimination 
of 
scienter 
substantially 
restricts 
that 
expression.  Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).  The 
First Amendment does not permit the imposition of criminal 
sanctions when doing so would substantially chill protected 
speech.  Id. at 150-51.  Indeed, "a rule that would impose 
strict liability on a publisher for [unprotected speech] would 
have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech . . . that does 
have constitutional value."  Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 52 (1988).   
¶36 By requiring an internet user like Weidner to prove 
lack of knowledge regarding the age of the person exposed to 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
15
material  deemed harmful to a child, the statute effectively 
chills protected internet communication to adults.  The "vast 
democratic forum[]" of the internet would be rendered a nullity 
if persons refrained from sharing a wide range of ideas and 
images in fear of criminal sanctions.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.  
See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).   The 
State has failed to satisfy us beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) passes constitutional muster.  
¶37 Following Zarnke, we conclude that because the State 
does not bear the burden to prove scienter under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2), the statute is unconstitutional in the context of 
the internet and other situations that do not involve face-to-
face contact.  Although our analysis has centered exclusively on 
the internet as posed by the certified question, our holding 
applies equally to mail, fax, and other situations devoid of 
face-to-face contact.  We therefore distinguish Kevin L.C. and 
do not disturb its holding because that case essentially 
addressed only face-to-face interaction. 
¶38 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is 
unconstitutional in the context of the internet and other 
situations that do not involve face-to-face contact, we conclude 
next that the statute may not be salvaged by a judicial 
construction.  Neither the State nor Weidner has argued for the 
application of a limiting or narrowing construction to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2).  We likewise decline to apply a narrowing 
construction that requires the State to prove scienter because 
doing so would contravene the expressed legislative intent. 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
16
¶39 As previously discussed, the predecessor statute to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) placed the burden on the State to 
demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of age when exposing a child 
to harmful material.  Wis. Stat. § 944.25 (1985-86).  However, 
when the legislature created Chapter 948 and reallocated the 
burden to the defendant in the form of an affirmative defense, 
it consciously eliminated scienter as an element under Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2).  Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d at 127 n.3.  If we were 
now to add scienter to the statute, we would defy the 
legislative intent and usurp the role of the legislature.    
¶40 X-Citement Video presented a different statute that 
was amenable to judicial re-writing: The Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.  513 U.S. at 65.  The 
Court determined that the placement of the term "knowingly" in 
the statute rendered a strictly grammatical reading unworkable. 
 Id. at 69.    Recognizing the absurd results that would flow 
from such a reading, and gleaning no express congressional 
intent to the contrary, the Court relied on the presumption of 
scienter to read the element into the statute.  Id. at 78.     
¶41 Unlike in X-Citement Video, here we have discerned 
clear legislative 
intent 
against 
supplementing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) with the element of scienter.  While we may "strain 
to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional 
attack," we "must not and will not carry this to the point of 
perverting the purpose of a statute." Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (quotations omitted). 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
17
¶42 Although the Constitution mandates that we invalidate 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2), we are mindful that our decision today 
essentially exonerates one who has engaged in both dangerous and 
abhorrent conduct by exposing a child to explicit and harmful 
material.  In Zarnke, this court also declined to judicially 
rewrite Wis. Stat. § 948.05 to render it constitutionally 
viable, deferring instead to the legislature's primary role in 
enacting constitutional statutes.  In response, the legislature 
reformulated the statute.  1999 Wis. Act 3, §§ 2 to 4.    We 
urge the legislature to respond as swiftly as it did following 
Zarnke so that the welfare of children and protected First 
Amendment expression may both be safeguarded and co-exist in 
harmony.  
¶43 In sum, we determine that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is 
unconstitutional in the context of the internet and other 
situations that do not involve face-to-face contact.  Because 
the statute does not require the State to prove a defendant's 
knowledge of the victim's age when disseminating materials 
deemed harmful to children, Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) has an 
impermissible chilling effect on protected speech and is 
therefore constitutionally invalid.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
99-1334-CR 
 
 
 
1