Title: State v. Dortch

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-681 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
VERNSON EDWARD DORTCH, 
Respondent. 
 
May 20, 2021 
 
MUÑIZ, J. 
 
A Florida rule of appellate procedure requires a criminal 
defendant to file a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court 
before appealing an involuntary plea.  This case presents a certified 
conflict over whether there is a “fundamental error” exception to 
that rule.  We hold that there is no such exception.  A defendant 
who does not comply with the rule’s preservation requirement must 
seek any available relief through collateral review. 
 
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I. 
A. Facts and Procedural Background 
On August 3, 2016, Vernson Dortch pleaded no contest to 
charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, dealing in 
stolen property, aggravated assault by a detainee with a deadly 
weapon, and introducing contraband into a county detention 
facility.  The plea, which resolved two cases then pending against 
Dortch, was against the advice of counsel. 
 
Dortch gave appropriate answers to the trial court’s questions 
at the plea hearing.  The trial court stated on the record that he 
found the plea to be “freely and voluntarily given” and that Dortch 
“under[stood] the nature and consequences of it.”  Dortch’s counsel 
signed the felony plea form, confirming that counsel “consider[ed] 
[Dortch] competent to understand the charges against [him] and the 
effect of the plea entered by this document.” 
 
About two weeks later, the trial court held a sentencing 
hearing.  After hearing from Dortch and from one of the victims of 
Dortch’s crimes, the court imposed a ten-year prison sentence, 
including a three-year mandatory minimum.  The next day, 
Dortch’s counsel filed a notice of appeal.  Notwithstanding the 
 
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preservation requirement of Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c), which we discuss in detail below, Dortch did not 
first file a motion to withdraw his plea. 
 
Dortch’s appeal centered on events that happened months 
before the plea hearing, when the case was before a different judge 
and Dortch was represented by different counsel.  On October 30, 
2015, Dortch’s then-counsel had filed a written “Motion for 
Examination of Defendant” under Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.210(b).  The motion requested the appointment of an expert to 
examine Dortch “on the issue of competence to proceed.”  As 
required by rule 3.210(b)(1), the motion included a certification that 
Dortch’s counsel had “reasonable grounds to believe that [Dortch] is 
incompetent to proceed.” 
 
We do not know the factual basis for defense counsel’s belief.  
Rule 3.210(b)(1) says: “To the extent that it does not invade the 
lawyer-client privilege, the motion shall contain a recital of the 
specific observations of and conversations with the defendant that 
have formed the basis for the motion.”  As to this requirement, 
defense counsel’s motion said: “[T]he undersigned cannot allege 
further as any recitation of specific observations of and 
 
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conversations with the Defendant would invade the lawyer-client 
privilege.” 
 
All of that is unremarkable.  The irregularity is that defense 
counsel’s motion also said that “the defendant hereby waives the 
required 20 day hearing, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b).”  
This was a reference to the rule’s requirement that the court hold a 
competency hearing within 20 days if the court “has reasonable 
ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to 
proceed.” 
 
The trial court (again, a different judge from the one who 
months later would take Dortch’s plea) entered an order that 
granted defense counsel’s motion and appointed a psychologist to 
examine Dortch.  The court used a form order, with pre-printed 
information and blank spaces that could be marked.  In pre-printed 
text, paragraph 5 of the form order gave notice of the 20-day 
hearing requirement of rule 3.210(b).  But beneath that notice, the 
trial court added: “The Defendant hereby waives this provision and 
shall schedule a competency hearing pursuant to the Florida Rules 
of Criminal Procedure should it become necessary, with notice to 
the State and Court.” 
 
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The order did not say that the court had reasonable ground to 
believe that Dortch was incompetent to proceed.  Nor did the order 
recite any facts about Dortch’s behavior or mental condition.  
Instead, the order simply checked the box indicating that the 
matter was before the court on motion by defense counsel. 
  
The record does not indicate that the trial court ever held a 
hearing to determine Dortch’s competence.  Nor does the record 
indicate whether Dortch’s examination took place or the results of 
any such examination. 
B. The Fourth District’s Decision 
 
The Fourth District ruled on Dortch’s appeal in a unanimous 
en banc decision.  Dortch v. State, 242 So. 3d 431, 433 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2018).  Citing rules 3.210(b) and 3.212(b), the district court 
first held that “[o]nce a trial court has reasonable grounds to believe 
the defendant is incompetent and orders an examination, it must 
hold a hearing and it must enter a written order on the issue.”  Id.  
The district court concluded that the trial court violated these rules 
here and that it had thereby committed “fundamental error.”  Id. 
 
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The Fourth District further held that, in these circumstances, 
“it is not necessary that a defendant first file a motion to withdraw 
plea.”  Id.  The district court reasoned: 
To require a criminal defendant, who may be 
incompetent, to file a motion to withdraw a plea before 
raising the issue on appeal is unwarranted.  If a 
defendant is incompetent, confining him to post-
conviction relief, without the assistance of counsel, is not 
a remedy designed to do justice. 
 
Id.  As a remedy, the Fourth District remanded the case with 
instructions to determine Dortch’s competence nunc pro tunc, if 
possible.  If not, the judgment and sentence were to be vacated and 
the case set for trial.  Id. 
 
The Fourth District certified conflict with the decisions in 
Pressley v. State, 227 So. 3d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017); Garcia-
Manriquez v. State, 146 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); and Hicks v. 
State, 915 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).  We accepted 
jurisdiction to resolve the conflict. 
II. 
 
On the conflict issue, the State argues that the Fourth District 
erred by holding that Dortch could directly appeal his convictions 
without first filing a motion to withdraw his plea.  We agree.  There 
 
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is no fundamental-error exception to the applicable preservation 
requirement. 
A.  Robinson and the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996 
 
This Court’s leading decision on the right to appeal after 
pleading guilty or nolo contendere is Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 
898 (Fla. 1979).1  We held in Robinson that “[t]here is an exclusive 
and limited class of issues which occur contemporaneously with the 
entry of the plea that may be the proper subject of an appeal.”  Id. 
at 902.  We characterized those issues as ones that stem from 
“conduct that would invalidate the plea itself.”  Id. 
 
Robinson’s list of appealable issues includes “only the 
following: (1) the subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the illegality of the 
sentence, (3) the failure of the government to abide by the plea 
 
 
1.  Robinson involved a constitutional challenge to the 
following provision, which the Legislature had enacted in 1976: “A 
defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere with no express 
reservation of the right to appeal shall have no right to a direct 
appeal.  Such a defendant shall obtain review by means of collateral 
attack.”  Ch. 76-274, § 7, Laws of Fla.; § 924.06(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 
1976).  We upheld the statute, concluding that its prohibitions “are 
directed to pretrial rulings and not to matters which may occur 
contemporaneously with” the plea.  Robinson, 373 So. 2d at 900.  
We concluded that the Legislature had done “no[thing] more than 
codify the existing case law on the subject.”  Id. 
 
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agreement, and (4) the voluntary and intelligent character of the 
plea.”  Id. at 902. 
 
Importantly for this case, we further held in Robinson that “an 
appeal from a guilty plea should never be a substitute for a motion 
to withdraw a plea.”  Id. (emphasis added).  To illustrate the point, 
we said: “If the record raises issues concerning the voluntary or 
intelligent character of the plea, that issue should first be presented 
to the trial court in accordance with the law and standards 
pertaining to motions to withdraw a plea.”  Id.  Our decision in 
Robinson thus determined that the state constitutional right to 
appeal does not include the right to appeal an involuntary plea 
without first filing a motion to withdraw plea. 
 
Nearly two decades after we decided Robinson, the Legislature 
enacted the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996.  Among its 
provisions was the following: 
If a defendant pleads nolo contendere without expressly 
reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, or 
if a defendant pleads guilty without expressly reserving 
the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, the 
defendant may not appeal the judgment or sentence. 
Ch. 96-248, § 4, Laws of Fla.; § 924.051(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).  
Despite the categorical language of the text, in Amendments to the 
 
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Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 
1996) (1996 Amendments), we held that “[a] defendant must have 
the right to appeal that limited class of issues described in 
Robinson.” 
 
In response to the 1996 Act, this Court amended the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to codify Robinson’s limited list of appealable 
issues and its requirement that a defendant file a motion to 
withdraw plea before appealing an allegedly involuntary plea.  Id.  
We also announced our adoption of Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.170(l), “which authorizes the filing of a motion to withdraw the 
plea after sentencing within thirty days from the rendition of the 
sentence, but only upon the grounds recognized by Robinson or 
otherwise provided by law.”  Id.  We said that we were adopting the 
new rule 3.170(l) “[c]onsistent with the legislature’s philosophy of 
attempting to resolve more issues at the trial court level.”  Id. 
B.  Voluntariness and Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c)  
 
Dortch’s appeal is governed by Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c)—again, the rule through which we codified 
Robinson and responded to the 1996 Act.  That rule allows a 
defendant to appeal “an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion 
 
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to withdraw plea.”  Accordingly, we begin by addressing the 
threshold question whether Dortch’s claim goes to the voluntariness 
of his plea.2 
As we will explain in detail, Dortch claims that he had a 
procedural due process right to a determination of his competence 
before the trial court accepted his no contest plea.  “The nature of 
competency goes to the heart of whether a defendant has the 
capacity to make a cogent, legally binding decision.”  Sheheane v. 
State, 228 So. 3d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).  And we have 
said that a plea “must be voluntarily made by one competent to 
know the consequences of that plea and must not be induced by 
promises, threats, or coercion.”  Mikenas v. State, 460 So. 2d 359, 
361 (Fla. 1984).  Because a voluntary plea requires a competent 
defendant, we conclude that Dortch’s appeal claims an “involuntary 
 
 
2.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii) says 
that, absent reservation, a “defendant who pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere may otherwise directly appeal only: a. The lower 
tribunal’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction; b. a violation of the 
plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; c. an 
involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; d. a 
sentencing error, if preserved; or e. as otherwise provided by law.” 
 
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plea” for purposes of the rule and that we must therefore proceed to 
address the rule’s preservation requirement. 
C.  Preservation and Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c) 
 
The Fourth District concluded that the trial court had erred by 
not holding a competency hearing before accepting Dortch’s plea 
and that this was fundamental error.  It further concluded that, 
because the trial court had committed fundamental error, it was 
not necessary for Dortch to file a motion to withdraw plea before 
pursuing a direct appeal. 
1. 
 
A threshold issue in addressing any claim of fundamental 
error is whether there was error at all—“fundamental” or not.  
Dortch’s claim of error in this case warrants discussion. 
 
“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally 
incompetent violates due process.”  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 
378 (1966).  In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1993), the 
Supreme Court held that the constitutional standard for 
competence to plead guilty is the same as the standard for 
competence to stand trial, as established in Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402 (1960).  That standard asks “whether the defendant 
 
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has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ”  
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Dortch does not allege a violation of his right not 
to be proceeded against while incompetent.  He instead asserts that 
he “may have been and may still be incompetent.”  Dortch thus 
invokes the separate “procedural due process” right that the 
Supreme Court established in Pate and in Drope v. Missouri, 420 
U.S. 162, 172 (1975).3 
The Supreme Court in Pate held that “the failure to observe 
procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or 
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due 
process right to a fair trial.”  Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (explaining 
Pate’s holding).  But the Court did not “prescribe a general standard 
with respect to the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to 
 
 
3.  To be clear, Pate and Drope addressed the circumstances in 
which a defendant has a constitutional right to procedures to 
protect his right not to be tried while incompetent.  Those cases did 
not involve a right to appeal or due process rights in the appellate 
context. 
 
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require resort to an adequate procedure.”  Id. at 172.  Instead, the 
question in every case is whether the information known to the trial 
court “create[s] a sufficient doubt of [the defendant’s] competence to 
stand trial to require further inquiry on the question.”  Id. at 180. 
In Drope, the Supreme Court cautioned that there are “no 
fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for 
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often 
a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle 
nuances are implicated.”  Id.  Factors that the Supreme Court 
deemed relevant to determining whether further inquiry is required 
include “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor 
at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand 
trial.”  Id. 
One thing is clear: while defense counsel’s views about a 
defendant’s competence are important, the Supreme Court in Drope 
rejected the notion that “courts must accept without question a 
lawyer’s representation concerning the competence of his client.”  
Id. at 177 n.13.  Federal circuit courts applying Drope have held 
that mere assertions of defense counsel, without more, do not 
trigger a defendant’s constitutional right to competency 
 
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proceedings.  See, e.g., United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 
891, 901 (6th Cir. 2014) (competency hearing not constitutionally 
required where defense counsel’s motion “did not provide sufficient 
factual details that would cause the court to question 
Abdulmutallab’s competency”); Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 
1202 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he concerns of counsel alone are 
insufficient to establish doubt of a defendant’s competency.”); 
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). 
We have long recognized that rule 3.210 establishes the 
procedures through which Florida complies with the mandate of 
Drope and Pate and protects a defendant’s right not to be proceeded 
against while incompetent.  See Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022, 
1025 (Fla. 1980).  In Lane we explained that “[t]he law is now clear 
that the trial court has the responsibility to conduct a hearing for 
competency to stand trial whenever it appears reasonably 
necessary, whether requested or not, to ensure that a defendant 
meets the standard of competency set forth in Dusky.”  Id. 
Consistent with Drope and Pate, rule 3.210(b) requires a 
hearing when the trial court “has reasonable ground to believe that 
the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed.”  Once that 
 
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predicate is established, rule 3.210 says that the trial court “shall” 
hold a competency hearing within 20 days and that it “may” order a 
psychological examination.  Given the text of the rule, and reading 
the rule in light of Drope and Pate, the “reasonable ground” test is 
an objective one that looks at the information available to the trial 
court at the relevant time in the proceedings. 
Whether the trial court erred in Dortch’s case, and if so 
whether any error was of constitutional dimension, would present 
an issue of first impression for our Court.  Here, the only record 
“evidence” of Dortch’s potential incompetence was his initial 
counsel’s unelaborated representation to that effect—a 
representation that counsel undermined by simultaneously waiving 
a hearing (at least pending the psychological evaluation).  Other 
evidence in the record cuts against the argument that there existed 
“reasonable ground” to question Dortch’s competence.  Most 
importantly, Dortch’s second counsel affirmed that Dortch was 
competent at the time of his plea, and the trial judge who 
 
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conducted the plea colloquy also found Dortch competent to enter 
his plea.4 
Dortch is thus left to argue that the due process violation in 
this case consists of the trial court deviating from rule 3.210 by 
“ordering an evaluation of [Dortch’s] competency but then accepting 
his plea without conducting a competency hearing or making a 
competency determination.”  This argument presents a question 
that this Court has never addressed: does a trial court’s decision to 
order a psychological evaluation create a constitutional entitlement 
to a subsequent competency hearing, regardless of whether the 
information available to the trial court met the evidentiary threshold 
 
 
4.  For context, consider the contrast with the evidence that 
triggered the right to a competency determination in Drope and 
Pate.  The defendant in Drope tried to choke his wife to death on the 
eve of trial and then shot himself in a suicide attempt on the 
morning of the second day of trial.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.  In Pate, 
the trial court had been presented with the testimony of four 
witnesses showing that the defendant “had a long history of 
irrational behavior,” including a suicide attempt and the murder of 
his 18-month-old son.  Pate, 383 U.S. at 378-81. 
 
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for invoking the rule 3.210 competency procedures in the first 
place?5 
Several variables specific to this case would potentially be 
relevant to answering the question.  Dortch’s counsel asked for an 
evaluation but explicitly waived a hearing.  The trial court granted 
the psychological examination without making any explicit finding 
about whether there was “reasonable ground” to question Dortch’s 
competency.  And neither the record nor the court’s order discloses 
any details about Dortch’s condition or behavior that would have 
supported such a finding. 
 
In any event, there is no need for us here to resolve the 
question whether (and if so how) the trial court erred by failing sua 
sponte to hold a competency hearing.  Dortch did not comply with 
the preservation requirement of rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c).  
Accordingly, for the court of appeal to have considered Dortch’s 
claim of error at all, there would have to be a fundamental-error 
 
 
5.  This Court’s decision in Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672 
(Fla. 2014), in which we emphasized the importance of compliance 
with rule 3.210(b), sheds no light on this issue.  The defendant in 
Dougherty had been adjudicated incompetent, and the issue was 
whether defense counsel could subsequently stipulate that the 
defendant’s competence had been restored.  Id. at 673. 
 
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exception to the rule.  We next explain why there is no such 
exception. 
2. 
To put the preservation issue in context, we begin with some 
observations about the fundamental error doctrine itself.  
“Fundamental error” is a label for error that an appellate court will 
remedy even though the claim was not preserved in the court below.  
Appellate courts will not find fundamental error unless the error 
meets some threshold level of seriousness.6  But courts (including 
this Court) have articulated the fundamental error test in different 
ways depending on the context.  See Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 
89, 99 (Fla. 2000) (“It is no secret that the courts have struggled to 
establish a meaningful definition of ‘fundamental error’ that would 
be predictive as compared to descriptive.”) (quoting Denson v. State, 
711 So. 2d 1225, 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).  We will not muddy the 
waters even more by attempting to make sense of or harmonize the 
various tests here. 
 
 
6.  “Courts and lawyers well know the meaning of fundamental 
error—a mistake in a proceeding substantial enough to abrogate the 
need for contemporaneous objection.”  Thomas v. State, 894 So. 2d 
1000, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). 
 
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That said, two overarching conceptual points about the 
fundamental error doctrine are central to this case.  First, a 
defendant has no constitutional due process right to the correction 
of unpreserved error.  “No procedural principle is more familiar,” 
the Supreme Court has observed, “than that a constitutional right, 
or a right of any other sort, may be forfeited in criminal as well as 
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before 
a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”  United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (citation omitted).   
Courts developed the fundamental error doctrine as a matter 
of grace, not because of any entitlement on the part of criminal 
defendants.  We have said that an “appellate court should exercise 
its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very 
guardedly.”  Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970) 
(emphasis added).  And we have explained: “The reason that courts 
correct error as fundamental despite the failure of the parties to 
adhere to procedural rules regarding preservation is not to protect 
the interests of a particular aggrieved party, but rather to protect 
the interests of justice itself.”  Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 98. 
 
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The second overarching point is that there is no ironclad rule 
that every preservation requirement must have an unwritten 
exception allowing the appellate court to correct an unpreserved 
error.  For example, Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) says that 
“[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal” unless preserved 
by a contemporaneous objection or by filing a motion under Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).  In Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 
569 (Fla. 2008), we interpreted this rule to mean that “for 
sentencing errors, to raise even fundamental errors on appeal, 
defendants must first file a motion under rule 3.800(b).”  There is 
such a thing as a truly mandatory preservation requirement. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we can turn again to rule 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c).  The Fourth District held that it could apply a 
“fundamental error” exception in this case.  For several reasons, we 
disagree. 
 
First, recall where rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c) came from.  The rule 
codified our decision in Robinson.  And in Robinson we said that “an 
appeal from a guilty plea should never be a substitute for a motion 
to withdraw a plea.” 373 So. 2d at 902.  If we were to recognize or 
 
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create a fundamental-error exception in this case, we would be 
contradicting ourselves. 
 
Second, a fundamental-error exception would be inconsistent 
with this Court’s precedent interpreting the 1996 Act.  In Leonard v. 
State, 760 So. 2d 114, 116-17 (Fla. 2000), we held that the 1996 
Act itself codified existing law as embodied in Robinson.  We did 
that even though the text of the 1996 Act says that a defendant who 
pleads guilty or nolo contendere without reservation “may not 
appeal the judgment or sentence.”  § 924.051(4), Fla. Stat. (2020).  
We reasoned that it was necessary to read Robinson into the statute 
to avoid potential constitutional concerns.  Leonard, 760 So. 2d at 
118. 
Given this Court’s construction of the 1996 Act, it is important 
that we adhere to Robinson, including what it said about the need 
to file a motion to withdraw plea.  The 1996 Act expressly says: 
It is the intent of the Legislature that all terms and 
conditions of direct appeal and collateral review be 
strictly enforced, including the application of procedural 
bars, to ensure that all claims of error are raised and 
resolved at the first opportunity.  It is also the 
Legislature’s intent that all procedural bars to direct 
appeal and collateral review be fully enforced by the 
courts of this state. 
 
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§ 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).  Having committed ourselves 
to the position that the Legislature adopted the 1996 Act against 
the backdrop of Robinson, and indeed that the 1996 Act 
incorporates Robinson, we cannot pick and choose which aspects of 
Robinson to follow.  We must honor the legislative mandate. 
 
Third, a fundamental-error exception would be inconsistent 
with the underlying logic of Robinson and of the rule itself.  For an 
error to be considered “fundamental error,” it is generally necessary 
(though not sufficient) that the error be of constitutional dimension.  
Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 575.  But every meritorious claim of an 
involuntary plea involves constitutional error.  “[I]f a defendant’s 
guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been 
obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.”  Bolware 
v. State, 995 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 2008) (quoting McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). 
In this context, then, a fundamental-error exception would 
produce one of two outcomes.  Either the “exception” would swallow 
the rule; or the appellate courts of this state would need to develop 
a set of standards—unavoidably unpredictable in application—to 
distinguish “fundamentally erroneous” involuntary pleas from “non-
 
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fundamentally erroneous” involuntary pleas.  Neither outcome is 
acceptable. 
 
Fourth, given the overall framework of the relevant rules of 
procedure, a fundamental-error exception is simply unwarranted.  
At the same time this Court codified Robinson in rule 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c), we took care to facilitate defendants’ compliance 
with the rule’s preservation requirement.  Specifically, we adopted 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) to give defendants 30 days after 
the rendition of sentence to file a motion to withdraw plea.  That 
makes the deadline for filing a motion to withdraw plea concurrent 
with the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.  We also coupled our 
adoption of rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c) with an amendment to Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), “to provide that a motion to withdraw 
the plea after sentencing will postpone rendition until its 
disposition.”  1996 Amendments, 696 So. 2d at 1106.  We said we 
were making these changes to be “[c]onsistent with the legislature’s 
philosophy of attempting to resolve more issues at the trial court 
level.”  Id. at 1105.  In light of the structure of these interlocking 
rules of procedure, there is no justification for a fundamental-error 
exception to rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c). 
 
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Finally, Dortch’s case proves the wisdom of requiring 
involuntary plea claims to be addressed in the first instance by the 
trial court, relatively close in time to the plea hearing.  If the trial 
court made a mistake here, it was easily correctable.  A timely-filed 
motion to withdraw plea would have allowed the parties and the 
trial court to promptly clean up the messy record in this case and to 
conduct any necessary competency proceedings.  Instead, because 
Dortch chose to ignore the governing rules of procedure, the Fourth 
District found itself years after the fact asking the trial court to 
reconstruct a record of Dortch’s competence at the time of his plea. 
III. 
 
Dortch makes several arguments in support of the Fourth 
District’s decision, none of them persuasive. 
 
First, Dortch points to Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(e), a catchall provision that allows direct appeals 
from unreserved pleas “as otherwise provided by law.”  As we have 
explained, there is no law that authorizes Dortch’s direct appeal in 
these circumstances.  And in any event, we would not strain to 
apply this catchall provision to an appeal that is covered by one of 
 
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the circumstances (an involuntary plea) specifically listed in rule 
9.140(b)(2)(A). 
 
Second, Dortch invokes this Court’s decision in State v. T.G., 
800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001).  In T.G., we applied the fundamental 
error doctrine to allow a direct appeal by a juvenile who, without 
counsel, had pleaded guilty to felony charges.  Id. at 212.  We 
concluded that T.G.’s plea was involuntary as a matter of law 
because the trial court had not complied with the procedures 
governing a juvenile’s waiver of counsel.  Id. at 213.  As to 
preservation, we acknowledged that Robinson and the applicable 
rules of procedure required T.G. to have first filed a motion to 
withdraw plea.  But out of a “unique concern for juveniles who 
enter pleas without the benefit of counsel,” we found it “appropriate 
to recognize a narrowly drawn and extremely limited exception to 
Robinson.”  Id. 
 
Our opinion went on to say: “We again emphasize that in all 
other cases involving a challenge to the voluntariness of the plea, 
including those cases where the appellate court cannot determine 
the voluntariness of the waiver from the face of the record, the 
procedure of Robinson should be followed.”  Id.    
 
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T.G. is easily distinguishable—Dortch is not a minor, he did 
have counsel when he entered his plea, and our decision in T.G. did 
not consider the statutory limitations on our authority in this area.  
But on an even more basic level, without receding from T.G., we 
reject its approach to creating ad hoc exceptions to rule 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c).  Dortch’s appeal—and the Fourth District’s 
decision—prove that no matter how emphatically a court stresses 
that its reasoning is good-for-one-case-only, every exception begets 
demands for more.  We think it best to follow the text of rule 
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c) and to heed our own admonition from T.G. 
 
Third, Dortch argues that we should not apply the 
preservation requirement here because “unlike most challenges to 
the voluntariness of a plea, trial courts are responsible for the 
underlying error.”  Again, we disagree.  Beyond the problem of 
asking us to create an ad hoc exception to the rule, this argument 
is based on a flawed premise. 
The acceptance of pleas is governed by Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.172, which “provides basic procedures to ensure that a 
defendant’s rights are fully protected when he or she enters a plea 
to a criminal charge.”  Griffin v. State, 114 So. 3d 890, 900 (Fla. 
 
- 27 - 
2013).  Like rule 3.210, rule 3.172 is animated by due process 
concerns.  Also like rule 3.210, rule 3.172 imposes obligations 
directly on trial courts. 
Rule 3.172(a) makes it the trial judge’s responsibility to 
determine that a plea is voluntary.  To that end, rule 3.172 requires 
the trial court to question the defendant about the nature of the 
charge, the defendant’s right to representation, the right to trial by 
jury and attendant rights, the effect of a plea, the terms of any plea 
agreement, any deportation consequences resulting from the plea, 
and other matters.  Thus, in the context of appeals from potentially 
involuntary pleas, confining a fundamental-error exception to 
judge-caused errors would not be a limiting principle. 
 
Finally, Dortch argues that applying the rule’s preservation 
requirement in these circumstances would be unjust.  Dortch 
worries that a potentially incompetent defendant would be left to 
pursue postconviction relief without the assistance of counsel.  We 
are not unsympathetic to this concern. 
However, this argument does not supply a reason why we 
would be authorized to depart from the governing law as we have 
explained it.  And even if our discretion were unbridled, we would 
 
- 28 - 
have to consider the positive ends that rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c) 
serves, not just the potential consequences to an individual 
defendant who does not comply with the rule.  Faithfully applied, 
the rule brings clarity and finality.  It allows errors to be corrected 
promptly and efficiently—a benefit not just to the criminal justice 
system overall, but to defendants themselves.  And the rule is fair, 
particularly because the accompanying rule on motions to withdraw 
a plea gives defendants ample opportunity to seek relief from error 
before pursuing an appeal.  Here we note that Dortch does not 
dispute that he would have been entitled to the assistance of 
counsel in filing a motion to withdraw his plea. 
To create an ad hoc exception in this case would contradict 
governing law, spawn even more exceptions, and breed uncertainty.  
We decline that invitation. 
IV. 
 
We hold that there is no fundamental-error exception to the 
preservation requirement of rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(c).  Accordingly, 
we do not reach the question whether the trial court in this case 
committed error.  Nor do we express any view on the claims that 
will be available to Dortch if he seeks collateral relief.  We quash the 
 
- 29 - 
decision under review and remand with instructions to affirm 
Dortch’s convictions and sentences. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and COURIEL and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority that issues relating to a criminal 
defendant’s competency are subsumed within the larger topic of the 
voluntariness of the plea and are therefore expressly subject to the 
preservation requirement of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(B)(2)(A)(ii)c.  However, because due process dictates that we 
recognize a fundamental-error exception to this rule, I would 
approve the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s unanimous en banc 
opinion, which reversed and remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings with the following instructions:  
The trial court may determine the defendant’s 
competence nunc pro tunc if possible.  If the trial court 
cannot do so, the judgement and sentence should be 
vacated and the case set for trial. 
 
 
- 30 - 
Dortch v. State, 242 So. 3d 431, 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citation 
omitted). 
I analyze the issue as follows: 
ANALYSIS 
I.  The trial court’s failure to follow Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.210 violated Dortch’s constitutional right to 
procedural due process. 
 
It is first important to recognize that Dortch suffered the 
deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right in the trial court.  
This occurred when the trial court found a reasonable basis to 
question Dortch’s competency7 and yet accepted Dortch’s guilty 
plea without holding a competency hearing as required by Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 385-86 (1966) (holding that due 
process8 requires that (1) a trial court must hold a competency 
 
 
7.  The trial judge granted defense counsel’s motion “to 
determine the mental condition of the defendant” and appointed a 
doctor to examine Dortch for the purpose of determining Dortch’s 
competency to proceed.  The trial judge made this determination in 
reliance on defense counsel’s representation in a motion that he 
made the motion “in good faith and on reasonable grounds to 
believe that the Defendant is incompetent to proceed.” 
 
8.  See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
 
- 31 - 
hearing where the record reflects a bona fide doubt as to 
defendant’s competence; and (2) that a state’s “procedures must be 
adequate to protect this right”).9 
Pate establishes that where the record reflects a bona fide 
doubt as to a defendant’s competency, the trial judge must hold a 
hearing before proceeding to any material stage of the criminal 
proceeding.  Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86.  It also holds that Florida’s 
procedures “must be adequate to protect this right.”  Id. at 378.  
Rule 3.210 was promulgated to implement this procedural right and 
expressly mandates that courts follow through with a competency 
determination, before conducting any material stage of the criminal 
proceeding, after finding a reasonable basis to question a 
defendant’s competency.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b) (“If, at any 
material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, 
 
of law . . . .”).  Florida’s constitution also affords each person the 
same protection.  Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. 
 
9.  The majority rightly recognizes that Dortch’s claim is not a 
substantive claim of incompetency but rather a claim that the trial 
court denied him adequate procedures to protect his right not to be 
tried while incompetent.  Majority op. at 9; see Pate, 383 U.S. at 
378-85. 
 
- 32 - 
or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state, has 
reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally 
competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order 
setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental 
condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date 
of the filing of the motion . . . .”). 
Although trial courts have discretion in determining whether 
reasonable grounds exist to believe a defendant to be incompetent, 
Rodgers v. State, 3 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Fla. 2009), they do not have 
discretion to determine that reasonable grounds exist and then 
proceed to a material stage of the proceeding without making the 
required competency determination.  Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 
672, 676 (Fla. 2014) (“Indeed, it is necessary for courts to observe 
the specific hearing requirements set forth in [rules 3.210-3.212] in 
order to safeguard a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and 
to provide the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal.”). 
  
Therefore, rule 3.210 is tightly aligned with the due process 
clause, as construed in Pate, to assure procedural due process for 
potentially incompetent criminal defendants.  Because of this tight 
alignment—both require the same hearing under the same 
 
- 33 - 
circumstance—a violation of the rule also constitutes a procedural 
due process violation under Pate.  
That this violation occurred in Dortch’s case is not in 
question.  The question is whether Dortch can seek relief on appeal.  
In my view, rule 3.210 and the due process right it was adopted to 
protect are meaningless unless they can be enforced.  
II.  The Florida Constitution guarantees Dortch the right to a 
meaningful appeal. 
 
Article V, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution provides in 
pertinent part that “[d]istrict courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction 
to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final 
judgments or orders of trial courts . . . not directly appealable to the 
supreme court or a circuit court.”  We have interpreted this 
provision as affording criminal defendants a constitutional right to 
an appeal.  See McFadden v. State, 177 So. 3d 562, 566 (Fla. 2015) 
(“Article V, section 4(b) [of the Florida Constitution], grants the 
district courts jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals and affords 
criminal defendants a constitutional right to an appeal.”); Harriel v. 
State, 710 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“While our 
supreme court has recognized that criminal defendants have no 
 
- 34 - 
federal constitutional right to a direct appeal, under article V, 
section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, there is constitutional 
protection of the right to appeal.”) (citations omitted).  The 
Legislature—and our rules of procedure—may place reasonable 
conditions upon this right “so long as they do not thwart the 
litigants’ legitimate appellate rights.”  Amends. to the Fla. Rules of 
App. Proc., 696 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 1996). 
In addition to this limitation, by affording criminal defendants 
a constitutional right to an appeal, the procedures used in deciding 
direct appeals in Florida’s courts must comport with due process.  
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (explaining that 
although the United States Constitution “does not require States to 
grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review 
alleged trial court errors,” if a State creates such a right, “the 
procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the 
demands of the Due Process . . . Clause[] of the Constitution”). 
Accordingly, a criminal defendant’s due process right to a 
direct appeal, as secured by Florida’s constitution, requires that a 
defendant who is being deprived of freedom as punishment for 
illegal conduct have a meaningful appeal during which any 
 
- 35 - 
conviction secured through deprivation of a fundamental right can 
be set aside and revisited in the trial court. 
III.  Applying rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c.’s “preservation 
requirement” would deny Dortch a meaningful appeal such 
that, to satisfy due process on appeal, a fundamental-error 
exception must be recognized. 
 
In this case, Dortch’s own trial counsel invited the due process 
violation by asserting a bona fide basis to question Dortch’s 
competency, securing the trial court’s finding adopting the 
assertion, asking that a hearing not be set at the time of the 
finding, and then scheduling the plea without first addressing 
Dortch’s competency with the trial court.  Both common sense and 
a fair reading of Pate dictate that the trial counsel’s actions in 
assuring the due process violation cannot at the same time cause 
waiver of the issue on appeal. 
 
Common sense also dictates that it would not “comport with 
the demands of the Due Process . . . Clause[],” Lucey, 469 U.S. at 
393, to apply rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c. as written, in this unique 
context, because it would require a potentially incompetent 
defendant to file his own pro se motion to withdraw plea to 
“preserve” the issue.  It should not require legal training to 
 
- 36 - 
recognize the fundamental unfairness of a rule that would require 
independent action by a potentially incompetent criminal defendant 
before appointed appellate counsel can vindicate a clear violation of 
the procedure constitutionally required to assure that the defendant 
was competent to enter his plea in the first instance.  Although 
important constitutional rights may be waived, see majority op. at 
13 (noting Dortch’s apparent waiver of rule 3.210(b)’s required 
hearing within twenty days), an incompetent defendant cannot do 
so. 
IV.  It is irrelevant to the analysis that Dortch appeared 
competent at the plea colloquy. 
 
 
It is apparent from this record that Dortch was very likely 
competent at the time he entered his plea.  One might therefore 
naturally see no problem with enforcing the preservation 
requirement in this case—where it seems very likely that the trial 
court would be able to make a nunc pro tunc finding of competency 
such that the plea would still stand; no harm, no foul.  However, 
Pate also involved a defendant represented by counsel who 
appeared competent during colloquies with the trial judge.  Those 
colloquies occurred at a different material stage of the proceeding 
 
- 37 - 
(during trial for Pate versus during a plea for Dortch).  However, 
that factual difference is immaterial.  See Godinez v. Moran, 509 
U.S. 389, 391 (1993) (holding that the competency standard for 
pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard for 
standing trial).  Because it is the procedural deprivation itself that 
constitutes the constitutional violation, Pate properly held that the 
procedural deprivation warranted a reversal, even though Pate 
appeared competent at trial. 
 
Therefore, in this case, irrespective of whether it appears that 
Dortch was fully competent, rule 3.210 does not allow counsel to 
represent that his client is likely incompetent and then waive the 
hearing requirement.10  Nor does it allow a trial judge to order an 
 
 
10.  By contrast, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216 
allows private counsel appointed or retained to represent a 
defendant adjudicated to be indigent or partially indigent and who 
“has reason to believe that the defendant may be incompetent to 
proceed,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.216(a) (emphasis added), to request 
appointment of a single expert to evaluate the defendant and 
“report only to the attorney for the defendant,” id.  Rule 3.216 then 
leaves it to defense counsel to raise the issue of competency with 
the trial court after receiving results from the confidential 
evaluation, if there is a basis to do so.  Id.; see Crosby v. State, 175 
So. 3d 382, 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (explaining that trial courts 
are not required to hold competency hearings after appointment of 
an expert pursuant to rule 3.216 and “unless the defendant’s 
attorney decides to actually raise the defense of insanity or assert 
 
- 38 - 
evaluation without setting a competency hearing.  Whether Dortch 
was competent or incompetent at the time of his plea is irrelevant to 
the legal issue presented.  Rather, to vindicate his due process 
right, as required by Pate, we must recognize a fundamental-error 
exception to the preservation requirement as held by the Fourth 
District. 
V.  Recognizing a fundamental-error exception here is also 
consistent with our case law recognizing a similar exception in 
a comparable case. 
 
Our decision in State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001), 
further underscores that a fundamental-error exception must 
apply.  In T.G., we recognized an exception to a similar preservation 
requirement for cases in which the record reflects that the trial 
court failed to follow the procedural rule designed to assure that 
 
incompetence to proceed, no further proceeding regarding the 
defendant’s mental status is required by rule 3.216”).  The motion 
in this case cannot be fairly understood as a motion pursuant to 
rule 3.216 because the motion states that it is made pursuant to 
rule 3.210 and because counsel asserted a good faith basis for 
believing that Dortch was actually incompetent, consistent with rule 
3.210, and not simply that Dortch “may be incompetent,” as 
required when seeking appointment of an expert pursuant to rule 
3.216.  In addition, although Dortch had been adjudicated to be 
indigent, he was not represented by an appointed private counsel. 
 
- 39 - 
waivers of counsel are made freely and voluntarily before accepting 
the plea.  Id. at 211-12.  We reasoned as follows: 
Because of this unique concern for juveniles who 
enter pleas without the benefit of counsel, we find that it 
is appropriate to recognize a narrowly drawn and 
extremely limited exception [to the general preservation 
requirement in this context].  “Fundamental error” occurs 
in instances when juveniles enter uncounseled pleas 
where the trial court failed to comply with the 
requirements of rule 8.165.  In these circumstances if the 
waiver of counsel is invalid as a matter of law, it follows 
that the guilty plea entered without advice of counsel 
should also be deemed involuntary as a matter of law.  
Thus, if it appears from the face of the record that the 
trial court did not comply with the specific procedures of 
rule 8.165, including conducting a “thorough inquiry into 
the child’s comprehension of that offer [of the assistance 
of counsel] and the capacity to make that choice 
intelligently and understandingly,” any subsequent plea 
should be deemed involuntary as a matter of law and the 
appellate court would have the authority to reverse 
absent a motion to withdraw or a contemporaneous 
objection. 
 
Id. at 213 (second alteration in original). 
Similarly, there are unique concerns related to individuals 
whose competence is called into question and procedural rules that 
judges must follow to protect defendants’ constitutional rights when 
these concerns are present.  “While not all errors of constitutional 
magnitude constitute fundamental error,” id. at 212, an error in 
failing to hold a due-process-required competency hearing before 
 
- 40 - 
accepting a plea “goes to the foundation of the case,” Jaimes v. 
State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Sanford v. Rubin, 237 
So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)), because it constitutes a denial of the 
very process that Florida has implemented to assure that 
defendants have the mental capacity to understand the proceedings 
against them after their competence is reasonably questioned by 
the court.   
The majority’s rejection of the approach we took in T.G. 
because “every exception begets demands for more,” majority op. at 
25-26, misses the point.11  Pate appropriately placed the burden on 
trial judges to protect a defendant whose competence a judge has 
reason to question.  Pate, 383 U.S. at 385; see also id. at 388 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the general proposition that 
when a defendant’s incompetence has become “sufficiently 
manifest,” it “denies [a defendant] due process for the trial court to 
 
 
11.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion that allowing Dortch’s 
claim to be heard on direct appeal would “spawn even more 
exceptions . . . and breed uncertainty,” majority op. at 28, an 
exception would only be necessary in the rare case where, as here, 
the record reflects a bona fide question as to the defendant’s 
competence.   
 
- 41 - 
fail to conduct a hearing on that question on its own initiative”) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, appellate counsel should be able to 
seek relief on appeal when a trial judge does not fulfill his obligation 
to hold a required competency hearing. 
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a 
fundamental-error exception is unwarranted here “given the overall 
framework of the relevant rules of procedure.”  Majority op. at 22.  
Enacting a rule similar to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.800(b)(2), the rule discussed by the majority, would allow trial 
courts to address noncompliance with rule 3.210 while protecting 
the due process rights of defendants who lack the mental capacity 
to enter a plea.  Rule 3.800(b)(2) allows appellate counsel to file a 
motion to correct a sentencing error in the trial court after trial 
counsel files a notice of appeal.  Appellate counsel must serve the 
motion in the trial court “before the party’s first brief is served,” and 
counsel is also required to file a “notice of pending motion to correct 
sentencing error . . . in the appellate court, which notice 
automatically shall extend the time for the filing of the brief until 10 
days after the clerk of circuit court transmits the supplemental 
 
- 42 - 
record” of the proceedings on the motion to correct sentencing 
error.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2). 
It is only because rule 3.800(b)(2) gives appellate counsel the 
tools needed to have sentencing errors corrected by the trial court—
during the appeal—that we can preclude raising a fundamental 
sentencing error in the initial brief, as we did in Jackson v. State, 
983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008), and still comply with a defendant’s due 
process right to a meaningful appeal. 
Of course, Dortch’s appellate counsel did not have the benefit 
of a rule such as 3.800(b)(2), and where, as in Dortch’s case, there 
is a bona fide issue of the defendant’s mental competency apparent 
on the face of the record, it is wholly inadequate, and violative of 
due process, to bar appellate counsel from raising, on direct appeal, 
the trial court’s failure to comply with rule 3.210.  Such a bar 
leaves the potentially incompetent defendant to seek relief years 
later, without the benefit of counsel, after suffering a prolonged 
deprivation of liberty. 
Moreover, if incompetent, the defendant would be 
extraordinarily unlikely to vindicate the due process violation 
suffered, particularly in light of our precedent requiring claims 
 
- 43 - 
regarding competency to be raised on direct appeal.  See Nelson v. 
State, 43 So. 3d 20, 33 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that the defendant’s 
claim that he was tried and convicted while mentally incompetent 
was “procedurally barred because he failed to raise it on direct 
appeal”). 
Therefore, the majority’s decision leaves potentially 
incompetent defendants like Dortch with no effective remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Today’s decision renders our procedures effectively inadequate 
to protect the due process right recognized in Pate by barring 
appellate counsel from seeking relief on appeal where the trial court 
does not fulfill its obligation under rule 3.210 to hold a required 
competency hearing, proceeds to accept a plea, and the potentially 
incompetent defendant does not move to withdraw the plea.  While 
it appears from the record that Dortch did possess the necessary 
mental capacity to enter his plea voluntarily, that satisfies neither 
the procedural requirements of rule 3.210 nor the constitutional 
right that the rule is designed to protect.  For these reasons, I would 
approve the Fourth District’s decision and its remand instructions. 
POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
- 44 - 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
– Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case Nos. 4D16-2815 and 4D16-2816 
 
 
(Okeechobee County) 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia 
Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Joseph D. Coronato, Jr., Assistant 
Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, 
Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent