Title: Miller v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
LENARD MILLER, JR.,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
   No. 504, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. ID No. 91002433DI 
                      
 
Submitted:  May 20, 2005   
   Decided:  July 18, 2005    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 18th day of July 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lenard Miller, Jr., filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s September 30, 2004 order denying his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  We find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In July 1992, Miller was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of two 
counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree.  He was sentenced to a 
                                                 
1 Miller’s first postconviction motion was denied by the Superior Court.  This Court dismissed 
Miller’s appeal from that order as untimely.  Miller v. State, Del. Supr., No. 145, 1996, Veasey, 
C.J. (Apr. 22, 1996).  
 
 
-2-
total of 35 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 30 years for 
decreasing levels of probation.  Miller’s convictions were affirmed by this Court 
on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Miller claims that: a) the prosecution engaged in 
misconduct at trial; b) the prosecution failed to properly collect and preserve 
evidence; c) the trial was unfair in that it was presided over by a biased judge; and 
d) his counsel provided ineffective assistance.   
 
(4) 
Because Miller’s postconviction motion had to be filed within three 
years of the date his conviction became final, it clearly is untimely.3  Furthermore, 
because this is Miller’s second postconviction motion, any ground for relief that 
was not asserted in his previous postconviction motion is procedurally barred.4  In 
order to overcome these hurdles, Miller must demonstrate the existence of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the legality, reliability, integrity or 
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.5  To the extent 
                                                 
2 Miller v. State, Del. Supr., No. 471, 1992, Moore, J. ( Nov. 1, 1993). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1).  The record reflects that the mandate in Miller’s case was issued 
by the Clerk on November 17, 1993; therefore, his motion had to be filed no later than 
November 17, 1996 in order to be timely.  Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554-55 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
 
-3-
that Miller asserts claims that were formerly adjudicated, he must demonstrate that 
reconsideration of those claims is warranted in the interest of justice.6   
 
(5) 
Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the 
Superior Court that Miller has failed to demonstrate that the procedural bars should 
not apply.  Moreover, to the extent Miller seeks to overcome the procedural bars 
by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to demonstrate that any 
alleged error on the part of his counsel prejudiced his case.7   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).