Title: BRIAN SEYMORE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRIAN SEYMORE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 32152 P.3d 401Case Number: No. 05-179Decided: 02/23/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
BRIAN 
SEYMORE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; H. Michael Bennett, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Bennett.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a dissenting opinion; 
and HILL, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an escape conviction.  The appellant contends that the jury was 
improperly instructed and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the 
trial.  We 
reverse and remand for a new trial.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      On December 24, 2003, 
during probation revocation proceedings in another matter, the appellant was 
ordered into placement with Frontier Corrections System (FCS) in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  As part of the FCS intake process, the 
appellant signed an "understanding of escape" form that advised him of the types 
of actions considered by FCS to constitute "escape."  Those actions 
included failing to return to the facility at the required time.

 
 
[¶3]      On July 2, 2004, the 
appellant checked out of FCS at 5:00 p.m., with a required return time of 10:00 
p.m.  Trial 
testimony revealed that, instead of returning to FCS, the appellant spent the 
evening at his girlfriend's house.  When the appellant did not return to the 
facility at 10:00 p.m., FCS personnel placed several telephone calls in an 
effort to locate him.  
Being unsuccessful, they notified local law enforcement agencies early 
the next morning that the appellant had escaped.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
telephoned FCS later that morning, allegedly stating that he "knew he was in 
trouble" and asking whether he should return to FCS or turn himself in to the 
local jail.  
The appellant testified that he tried to turn himself in at the jail, but 
the jail would not take him without an arrest warrant.  Ultimately, the 
appellant was arrested on August 17, 2004 and charged with escape.  He was convicted 
following a jury trial.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]     1.   Whether the 
jury was misinformed about the mens rea element of escape?

 
 
           
2.   
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct?

 
 
STATUTES

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant was 
charged with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005),1 which reads as follows:

 
 
(a)    A person commits a crime if he 
escapes from official detention.  Escape is:

 
 
(i)     A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, if the detention is the result of 
a conviction for a felony[.]

 
 
[¶7]      The term "official 
detention" is defined at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-201(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
(ii)    "Official detention" means 
arrest, detention in a facility for custody of persons under charge or 
conviction of crime or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for 
extradition or deportation, or detention in any manner and in any place for law 
enforcement purposes.  
"Official detention" does not include supervision on probation or parole 
or constraint incidental to release on bail[.]

 
 
[¶8]      As part of the adult 
community corrections statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112 (LexisNexis 2005) 
provides specialized definitions of "escape from official detention" for persons 
housed in such facilities:

 
 
(a)    An offender, parolee or an inmate 
is deemed guilty of escape from official detention and shall be punished as 
provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper authorization, he:

 
 
(i)     Fails to remain within the 
extended limits of his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an 
adult community correctional facility to which he was assigned or transferred; 
or

 
 
(ii)    Being a participant in a program 
established under the provisions of this act he leaves his place of employment 
or fails or neglects to return to the adult community correctional facility 
within the time prescribed or when specifically ordered to do so.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether the jury was misinformed about the 
mens rea element of escape?

 
 
[¶9]      We have a 
well-established standard for the review of jury instructions, which standard 
incorporates the test to be applied when there was no trial objection:

 
 
Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the 
applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to 
the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and 
legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any 
one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give 
an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a 
jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is 
whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the 
crime can be found to have been committed.

 
 

Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001) (citing 
Schmidt v. 
State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo.2001) and Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo.2000)).  We analyze jury instructions as a whole and 
do not single out individual instructions or parts thereof.  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 
109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo.2001).  We give trial courts great latitude in 
instructing juries and "will not find reversible error in the jury instructions 
as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire set of 
instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial.'" 
Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 
933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo.1997)).  Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶ 9 
(Wyo.2002).

 
 
             
Finally, we have indicated that when an appellant does not object at 
trial to the jury instructions, or request that a certain instruction be 
included, our review of this issue follows our plain error standard:

 
 
First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged 
to be error.  
Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.  Last, appellant 
must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice against him.

 
 

Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (quoting In Interest of CB, 
749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo.1988)); see also Brown, ¶ 10.

 
 

Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant did not object at trial 
to the jury instructions that were given, and did not offer any additional 
instructions.  
Therefore, we review this issue under our plain error standard.  Succinctly stated, 
the appellant now contends that plain error occurred here because the district 
court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the 
crimeintentwhich is a fundamental error requiring reversal.  See Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 
940 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
[¶11]   Nine instructions were read to the 
jury, two of which bear upon this issue.  Instruction No. 2, in pertinent part, set 
forth the elements of the charged crime:

 
 
1.    On or about July 3, 2004.

 
 
2.    In Laramie 
County, Wyoming.

 
 
3.    The Defendant, Brian Seymore.

 
 
4.    Escaped from official 
detention.

 
 
5.    While being detained as the 
result of a conviction for a felony.

 
 
In turn, Instruction No. 3 defined the term "escape" in the 
context of an adult community correctional facility:

 
 
            
A person placed at an adult community corrections facility is deemed to 
have escaped from that facility if, without proper authorization, the person 
fails to return to the facility within the time prescribed.  The Frontier 
Corrections facility at which Mr. Seymore was placed is an adult community 
corrections facility.

 
 
            
The parties have stipulated that Mr. Seymore was placed by the District 
Court at Frontier Corrections facility as a result of his conviction for a 
felony offense.

 
 
[¶12]   All first-year law students are taught 
that, as a general rule, every crime must contain two elements:  an actus reus and a mens rea.  Those terms are 
defined in Black's 
Law Dictionary 39 and 1006 (8th ed. 2004), respectively, as follows:

 
 
[The] actus reus [is] the wrongful deed that comprises the 
physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to 
establish criminal liability; a forbidden act .  
--  Also 
termed deed of 
crime; overt act.

 
 

Mens rea [is] the state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a 
conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal 
intent or recklessness .  Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of 
every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus.  --  Also termed mental element; 
criminal intent; guilty mind.

 
 

See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 19, 86 P.3d 851, 858 
(Wyo. 2004) (malice as the mens rea element of second-degree murder); Keats v. State, 
2003 WY 19, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo. 2003) (malice as the mens rea element of 
first-degree arson); Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596, 599 (Wyo. 1993) 
(physical intrusion as the actus reus and sexual arousal, gratification or abuse 
as the mens rea 
of second-degree sexual assault); and Mondello v. State, 843 P.2d 1152, 1163 (Wyo. 1992) 
(agreement as the actus reus in conspiracy).

 
 
[¶13]   In his brief, the appellant contends 
not only that the jury should have been instructed as to a mens rea element, 
but that it should have been instructed that escape is a "specific intent" 
crime.  Not too 
long ago, we addressed the historical attempt to distinguish between "specific 
intent" and "general intent" crimes:

 
 
            
Appellant's claimed "logical impossibility" arises from the "intent" 
elements of these respective statutes.  In the past, crimes have commonly been 
categorized by whether they require a "specific intent" or a "general 
intent."  For 
many years, Wyoming had several 
pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the 
differences between the concepts were not always readily discernible.

 
 
            
Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a 
general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by 
stating it in a somewhat different way.  When the statute sets out the offense with 
only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent 
to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the 
jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act.  Such intention is 
general intent.  
When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some 
further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to 
be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury.

 
 

Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.1978).  Following that 
logic, an "attempt" is a "specific intent" crime in that the attempt statute 
requires that one act with the intent to commit the object crime.  On the other hand, 
we have held that second-degree murder is a general intent crime, because it 
requires proof only that the act was done voluntarily or deliberately, not that 
there was a specific intent to kill.  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo.1992); Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 830 (Wyo.1991).

 
 
            
We have acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury 
instructions defining and explaining intent due to their "vagueness and general 
failure to enlighten juries."  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997).  
Instead, juries should be instructed as to the appropriate intent that is 
an element of the particular crime; "it is more important that the jury 
understand what exactly they [are required] to determine."  Id.  This is consonant 
with our recent holding that "the test of whether a jury has been properly 
instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions 
leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to 
have been committed."  
Mueller v. 
State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001).  The point is that 
attempting formally to distinguish between specific intent and general intent, 
beyond the substantive elements of the crime, may not be the surest way to 
define the nature of the intent that must be proven.

 
 

Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶¶ 8-9, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262-63 (Wyo. 2002) 
(footnote omitted.).

 
 
[¶14]   It is the appellant's argument that the 
specific intent element of escape is that a defendant must have specifically 
intended to "evade the due course of justice" by "avoiding confinement."  We cannot, however, 
find any indication in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i) or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112 that the 
legislature intended there to be a specific intent element to the crime of 
escape, and we previously have said that escape is a general intent crime.  Slaughter v. State, 
629 P.2d 481, 483 (Wyo. 1981).  Therefore, the 
appellant is not correct in arguing that the district court's failure was the 
failure to include a specific intent element in the instructions detailing the 
elements of the crime of escape.

 
 
[¶15]   The fact that the appellant's argument 
misses the mark does not, however, fully answer the intent question.  The instructions 
were inadequate, but for a different reason: "even a general intent crime 
requires a showing that the prohibited conduct was undertaken voluntarily."  Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 1999) 
(citing Crozier v. 
State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo. 1986)).  The law of 
intent, as applied to the facts of this case, required the State to prove that 
the appellant voluntarily 
failed to return to FCS at the required time.  Unfortunately, the jury was not instructed 
that it had to find the failure to return to have been voluntary.  Without voluntary 
conduct, there is no mens rea.  No crime has been committed, for instance, if 
an adult community corrections resident fails to return to the facility because 
of disabling injuries suffered in an automobile accident or a natural 
calamity.  As 
we stated in Reilly, 
quoting from Dorador, "[w]hen the statute sets out the offense with 
only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent 
to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks 
the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act."  Reilly, 2002 WY 
156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d  at 1262 (quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978)) (emphasis added).  That was not done 
in this case, and we have repeatedly stated that it is fundamental error 
requiring reversal for a trial court to fail to instruct on an essential element 
of the charged crime.  
Leyva, 
2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d  at 876; Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 862, 865 
(Wyo. 2004); Mueller 
v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001); and 
Compton, 931 P.2d  at 940.

 
 

Whether the prosecutor committed 
misconduct?

 
 
[¶16]   Even though our determination of the 
first issue requires reversal, we will discuss this second issue to restate 
important legal principles and to make sure the same mistakes are not made if 
the matter is re-tried.

 
 
[¶17]   Our standard for the review of claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct is well settled:

 
 
            
Where there has been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error standard:

 
 
Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.04 states that "any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded by the reviewing court."  Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) and 
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 103(a) contain similar provisions.  The test for 
harmless error is as follows:

 
 
"An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility 
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error 
had never occurred.  
To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under 
circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which 
offends the public sense of fair play.'"

 
 

Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Dysthe v. 
State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo.2003)).  Where there has not 
been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under 
the plain error standard set forth earlier herein.  Condra, 2004 WY 
131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d  at 389.

 
 
            
We decide claims of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the entire 
record, and where the claim is one of improper argument, we consider it in the 
context of the entire argument.  Law [v. State], 2004 WY 111, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d [181,] 191 
[(Wyo.2004)].  
We are reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument "lest the 
trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does 
not object."  
Belden v. 
State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 38, 73 P.3d 1041, 1087 (Wyo.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1165, 124 S. Ct. 1179, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1212 (2004) (quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 
(Wyo.1994)).  
The question is whether, "based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 
157 (Wyo.2004).  
"The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the 
appellant who raises the issue."  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 
45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002).

 
 

Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶18]   The appellant identifies nine alleged 
acts of prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative effect of which allegedly 
denied to appellant a fair trial:

 
 
1.   During voir dire, the 
prosecutor asked the panel, "[c]an we agree that, in my role as a prosecutor, 
that part of my job is to present the evidence, which I think tends 
to show Mr. Seymore guilty of a crime?" (Emphasis added.)  This comment drew 
an objection from defense counsel and, during a bench conference, the prosecutor 
agreed that his phrasing was improper and offered to rephrase the 
statement.  He 
then did so, as follows:

 
 
Can you agree that as a prosecutor, it would be my job to 
present the evidence that tends to show Mr. Seymore guilty, and [defense 
counsel's] job, as the attorney for Mr. Seymore, is to present whatever evidence 
tends to show him not guilty, and then your job will be to determine the wheat 
from the chaff?

 
 
Where I'm going with that is, can we agree those are the 
roles?  If the 
defense has evidence they want you to consider in deciding this case, then they 
should put it to you.  
They should bring it to your attention.  They should bring it to court and show it to 
you, or have someone testify about it, that it's not the State's role to present 
that evidence to you.

 
 
Although there was no trial objection to the rephrased 
question, the appellant now relies upon Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 21, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 
(Wyo. 2005)2, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1633 (2006), for the 
proposition that it is always improper for a prosecutor personally to vouch for 
the credibility of the state's evidence:

 
 
The rationale for this rule has been stated as follows:

 
 
            
When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an 
additional factor is injected into the case.  This additional factor is that counsel may be 
perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than 
their own opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the 
evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because 
of his position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with 
enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state.  While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.

 
 
[Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 29, 63 P.3d 875, 886 
(Wyo. 2003)].  
See also 
Mazurek [v. 
State, 10 P.3d 531,] 542 [(Wyo. 2000)].  ("[I]t is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant.").

 
 
2.   The prosecutor's rephrasing of his "I 
think" question made the situation worse because he then misstated the law as to 
the burden of proof by adding the statement as to defense counsel's duty to 
bring exculpatory evidence into court.  The appellant cites White v. State, 
2003 WY 163, ¶ 24, 80 P.3d 642, 653 (Wyo. 2003), and Lane, 12 P.3d 
at 1066, for the dual propositions that the burden of proof in a criminal case 
never shifts from the State to the defendant, and the defendant has no duty to 
present evidence.

 
 
3.   During closing argument, the prosecutor 
resurrected his improper burden-shifting argument through the use of a 
demonstrative exhibit (not preserved in the record) that indicated evidence the 
prosecutor believed should have been brought before the jury by the 
appellant.  
Defense counsel's objection was overruled.

 
 
4.   During voir dire, defense 
counsel objected to the prosecutor's question in regard to the State's burden of 
proof being "beyond a reasonable doubt," whether "we [can] all agree that does 
not mean beyond any doubt?"  The appellant's trial counsel argued, and 
appellate counsel now argues that it is error to attempt to define the term 
"reasonable doubt."  
The appellant relies upon Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1975), wherein we confirmed the 
holding in Cosco v. 
State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wyo. 
1974) that no instruction defining "reasonable doubt" should be given, because 
the term is self explanatory.  See also Rivera v. State, 987 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1999); Collins v. State, 
854 P.2d 688, 699 (Wyo. 
1993); Wells v. 
State, 613 P.2d 201, 205 n.1 (Wyo. 1980); and Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 206 (Wyo. 1972).

 
 
5.   The appellant's fifth alleged claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct concerns the first issue discussed in this 
opinion.  
During voir 
dire, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor told the jury panel that 
"[t]he State has to show you the who, the when, the where, and the what they 
did, but I don't have to show you why they did it.  I don't have to 
show you what was going on in the mind "  The objection was overruled and the 
prosecutor went on to explain at considerable length why proof of the 
appellant's "mindset" was unnecessary.  The appellant's argument that this 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct tracks his argument as to the first 
issue.

 
 
6.   In discussing the concept of "escape" 
near the end of the State's voir dire, the prosecutor described movies he had seen 
wherein "Clint Eastwood or Steve McQueen [were] climbing the wire, tunneling out 
under the fence, guard towers, sirens, spotlight.  You all can concede that the law will tell 
you it could be different than that.  It doesn't have to be that extreme or 
dramatic."  
Defense counsel's objection that the prosecutor was making an argument on 
the law was sustained, but nothing further was said and the comments were not 
ordered to be stricken.  The appellant contends that the statement was 
improper because it "went to the ultimate issue:  was Mr. Seymore guilty of escape.'"  See Vargas-Rocha v. 
State, 891 P.2d 763, 771 (Wyo. 1995); and Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 617 (Wyo. 1993), which, respectively, condemn a 
prosecutor or a witness giving an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant.

 
 
7.   After outlining the State's evidence 
during his opening statement, the prosecutor concluded by saying, "It's that 
straightforward, folks.  July of 2004, Brian Seymore walked away from 
the FCS program, walked away from justice, and now he's asking you to help him 
do it again."  
Defense counsel objected to the statement as being argument, but her 
objection was overruled.  The appellant now contends not that the 
statement was argument, but that it "went to the ultimate issue."

 
 
8.   The prosecutor failed to produce in 
discovery certain documents mentioned by State witnesses concerning courses the 
appellant had taken while at FCS.  Defense counsel's objections as to the 
relevancy of the information and alleging the discovery failure both were 
sustained.  The 
appellant's appellate complaint is that the State has an affirmative duty to 
disclose evidence favorable to a defendant.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995); and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972).

 
 
9.   The appellant's ninth allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which involves numerous comments made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument, will be easier to follow if quoted verbatim 
rather than being paraphrased:

 
 
            
In closing, the [prosecutor] argued that "the defense and the State agree 
on almost everything."  He argued that "the only question is escape" 
and informed them that Instruction No. 3 provided that a person placed in an 
[adult community corrections] facility is deemed' to have escaped if, without 
proper authority, the person fails to return within the time prescribed.  "It means, if you 
check out, and they tell you you have to be back by a certain time, the law says 
that's escape."

 
 
He went on to state that the facts were that the "defendant 
checked himself out, and he chose not to return."  He asked, rhetorically, whether the defendant 
"regret(ted) that decision today as he sits in front of you?  I'm sure he does, but does that change the fact that it 
happened?  
No."  He 
explained that it was for the jury to "hold someone accountable, responsible for 
their actions.  
I know that's a tough decision to look at someone and say they did wrong, but that's what you agreed to do when 
you agreed to become part of this jury . . . look at the facts, apply the 
law, and hold someone accountable."

 
 
Without bothering to say that the "evidence showed" the 
following scene, the [prosecutor] simply told the jury "what happened" on the 
night in question.  
". . .  
Mr. Seymore walked away from the FCS program.  He walked away from 
a court order placing him at that program.  Now he's hoping you 
will let him walk away from this court one more time by being swayed by 
sympathy or thinking it wasn't such a big crime, as they all go. . . .  I submit that it's your duty to find him guilty of the crime of escape as 
charged."

 
 
(Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)  Specifically, the 
appellant then argues that it is reversible error for a prosecutor to tell a 
jury that it is the jury's duty to find the defendant guilty.  See United States v. 
Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999); and United 
States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986).

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, the appellant contends that, 
even if this Court finds each instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to 
have been individually non-prejudicial, the doctrine of cumulative error 
requires reversal.  
See Wilde v. 
State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 30-31, 74 P.3d 699, 711-12 (Wyo. 2003) ("the doctrine 
is, indeed, an available tool to address prosecutorial excess").  "Cumulative error" 
is defined at Black's Law Dictionary 582 (8th ed. 2004) as 
follows:  "The 
prejudicial effect of two or more trial errors that may have been harmless 
individually. · The cumulative effect of multiple harmless errors may amount to 
reversible error."  
This Court has considered cumulative error innumerable times.  See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 
904 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1995).  Seldom, however, 
have we reversed a conviction based upon the doctrine.  See, e.g., Schmunk v. State, 
714 P.2d 724, 743 (Wyo. 
1986); and Browder 
v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo. 
1982).

 
 
[¶20]   A similar fate has almost always 
befallen the appellant who raises in this Court the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct, despite specific rules against such misconduct.  Time-and-time 
again, we have said that "prosecutorial misconduct has always been condemned in 
this state."  
Condra v. 
State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 5, 100 P.3d 386, 388 (Wyo. 2004); see also Adams v. 
State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 2005); Williams v. State, 
2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2002); and Wilks v. State, 
2002 WY 100, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002).  More specifically, we have said that 
prosecutors are not to inject into the trial their personal beliefs as to the 
credibility of the evidence.  Moe, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 21, 110 P.3d  at 1214; and Lane, 12 P.3d  at 
1065.  We have 
also repeatedly said that prosecutors should not suggest that a defendant 
carries any burden of proof.  Id. at 
1066 (citing Harper 
v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 405 (Wyo. 
1998)).   
And it is not appropriate for a prosecutor to argue to a jury that it is 
the jury's duty to convict the defendant.  Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 25, 89 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 2004); Burton v. State, 
2002 WY 71, ¶ 50, 46 P.3d 309, 321 (Wyo. 2002); see also Sanchez, 
176 F.3d  at 1224.

 
 
[¶21]   Despite these repeated admonitions, 
prosecutors continue to test the waters by making statements and asking 
questions that cross the line, forcing this Court repeatedly to analyze an 
entire record for harmless error in the context of the whole case.  In the instant 
case, we find that the cumulative effect of the following transgressions was 
prejudicial error in that we cannot be sure that the appellant was convicted 
just upon the evidence presented:

 
 
1.   The prosecutor told the jury panel 
during voir dire 
that "I think" the evidence shows the appellant is guilty.

 
 
2.   The prosecutor told the jury panel 
during voir dire 
and in closing argument that the defendant "should" bring any exculpatory 
evidence into court and present it to the jury.

 
 
3.   The prosecutor told the jury panel 
during voir dire 
that the State did not have to prove any mens rea element of 
the crime.

 
 
4.   The prosecutor told the jury panel 
during closing argument that, by becoming jurors, they had agreed to hold 
someone accountable.

 
 
5.   The prosecutor told the jury panel 
during closing argument that "it's your duty to find him guilty of the crime of 
escape as charged."

 
 
[¶22]   Perhaps, as the State argues in its 
brief, we could search the record and find support for the conjecture that none 
of these comments prejudiced the appellant because of the strength of the 
evidence, or because there was no objection, or because there was an objection, 
or because of the context, or because defense counsel successfully countered the 
comment.  
However, we are convinced that the number and gravity of these errors 
require reversal.  
The cumulative effect of the instructional error and the prosecutor's 
misstatements in this case was a conviction that cannot be trusted because it 
was a conviction by a jury that was not told that it had to find the appellant had 
acted voluntarily, but was told that the prosecutor believed the appellant 
was guilty, that the appellant had a duty to bring in any exculpatory evidence, 
and that the jury had a duty to convict the appellant.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   We reverse and remand to the district 
court for a new trial because the jury was not properly instructed as to the mens rea element of 
the crime charged and because of the cumulative effect of several instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The appellant was charged under the 2003 version of the 
statute, which had the same wording.

 
 

2This writer feels compelled to note that, in the 
appellant's brief, the citation to Moe contained no paragraph number and no page number, 
and did not show that the language quoted from Dysthe was a 
quotation.  The 
failure to provide pinpoint cites occurred repeatedly throughout the brief.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶24]   The majority opinion determines that 
mens rea is a required element of the offense of escape as charged and therefore 
it is reversible error if the jury is not instructed thereon.  I fail to 
see such an element in the statute.  To refresh  Seymore was charged under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a) which states that "[a] person commits a crime if he 
escapes from official detention."  Clearly absent from the statute is a 
requirement of mens rea.  The statute defines a strict liability 
crime.  Had the Wyoming Legislature intended to make escape under this 
statute a general intent crime, it could have included a mens rea requirement as 
it did in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-309, which defines an escape from a work 
release program to require an "intentional act."  Because I find escape as 
defined by § 6-5-206 to be a strict liability crime, the jury instructions 
correctly excluded mens rea as an element of the crime.

 
 
[¶25]   As for the prosecutor's statements, I 
have reviewed the trial transcript in its entirety.  I find I must agree 
with Justice Hill.  
While some of the prosecutor's statements certainly are improper when 
read in isolation, when considered in the proper context and in the context of 
the entire record, as we must, the comments are not enough, in my estimation, to 
require reversal. 

 
 
HILL, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶26]   I concur with the majority in that 
escape is a general intent crime.  I cannot agree, however, with the majority's 
decision to reverse Seymore's conviction on the basis that the jury should have 
been instructed to find whether or not the failure of Seymore to return to FCS 
at the required time was voluntary because the issue was not raised by him.  It is the 
responsibility of an appealing party to clearly identify and define the issues 
for this Court's review.  "It is not the function of this court to 
frame appellant's argument or draw his issues for him."  Saldana v. State, 
846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring) (quoting Hance v. Straatsma, 
721 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Wyo. 1986)); see also Ultra Resources, Inc. 
v. McMurry Energy Company, 2004 WY 121, ¶ 8, 99 P.3d 959, 962 (Wyo. 
2004) ("[T]his court will not frame the issues for the litigants and will not 
consider issues not raised by them and not supported by cogent argument and 
authoritative citation.") (quoting State v. Campbell County School District, 2001 WY 90, 
¶ 35, 32 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2001)); and W.R.A.P. 7.01(f) (requiring 
appellant to set forth an argument with respect to the issues presented for 
review).  
Seymore's contention of error was predicated on a claim that the district 
court erred by not instructing the jury that escape was a specific intent 
crime.  No 
argument regarding voluntariness appears in Seymore's brief.  I would find that 
any claim of error on this point was waived by his failure to clearly identify 
the issue and support it with cogent argument and citation to pertinent 
authority.

 
 
[¶27]   I must also respectfully disagree with 
the majority's analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct issue.  Even assuming that 
the incidents identified in paragraph 21 of the majority opinion constituted 
misconduct, I cannot agree that Seymore has met his burden of establishing 
prejudice.  The 
majority's conclusion as to the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper 
comments is based, at least in part, on its determination that the jury was not 
properly instructed.  
See ¶ 22.  
Since that error was waived, the instructions as given to the jury are 
the law of the case and the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the 
jury's verdict.  
Reilly v. 
State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 14, 55 P.3d 1259, 1264 (Wyo. 2002) ("[F]ailure to 
object to instructions at trial before the jury begins its deliberations 
operates to preclude appellate review of the instructions, which become the law 
of the case unless a plain or fundamental error can be shown to prevail.").  Accordingly, I 
would hold that the prosecutor's comments, taken individually or collectively, 
did not prejudice appellant.

 
 
[¶28]   I understand and fully sympathize with 
the majority's frustration with the actions of some of the prosecutors in this 
state and their seeming disregard of our repeated admonitions regarding proper 
argument and questioning.  Nevertheless, each case must be examined on 
its own merits.  
In this case, I would not find prejudice and would affirm Seymore's 
conviction and sentence.