Title: In re Ochoa

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 12, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Inquiry Concerning a Judge re:
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH V. OCHOA,
Accused.
(CJFD 05-23; SC S054152)
On review of the Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation
Submitted on the record February 22, 2007.
Mark H. Wagner, Hoffman, Hart & Wagner LLP, Portland, attorney for accused.
Don H. Marmaduke, Special Counsel to the Oregon Commission on Judicial
Fitness and Disability, Tonkon Torp, LLP, Portland, filed the brief for the Commission on
Judicial Fitness and Disability.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler and
Walters, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended for a period of 30 days, during which he shall not
receive the salary of his public office, commencing on the effective date of this decision.
*Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM 
This is a proceeding pursuant to ORS 1.420 and Article VII (Amended),
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, to inquire into the conduct of a circuit court
judge. (1)  The Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability (commission)
concluded that Joseph V. Ochoa (the accused), a Marion County circuit judge, had
violated the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct (the code) and recommended that this court
suspend the accused without pay for 30 days.  This court reviews the record de novo. 
ORS 1.430.  Based on that review, and with the exception noted below, we approve the
commission's findings and recommendations and suspend the accused for a period of 30
days, during which he shall not receive the salary of his public office.
The commission made findings of fact regarding the accused's conduct,
which we summarize as follows.  On December 3, 2004, the accused presided over a
criminal jury trial involving the misdemeanor charge of resisting arrest.  During opening
statements, the accused repeatedly admonished and belittled defense counsel in and out of
the presence of the jury.  In addition, the accused terminated defense counsel's opening
statement after defense counsel commented on the defendant's innocence, and
subsequently instructed the jury that defense counsel's comments were inappropriate and
should be disregarded.    
Following the opening statements, the accused allowed the prosecutor to
elicit detailed testimony regarding a variety of subjects, but prohibited defense counsel
from cross-examining on those same subjects.  During the defense cross-examination that
the accused did allow, the accused repeatedly admonished defense counsel, objected to
her questions, and criticized her in and out of the presence of the jury.  Throughout the
trial, the accused, by words, expressions, and tone of voice  manifested in and out of the
presence of the jury an impatience, intemperance, bias, and prejudice against defense
counsel.  In doing so, the accused prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial.  Finally,
the accused, on his own motion, declared a mistrial.  Over defense counsel's objections,
the accused continued the defendant in custody and ordered a retrial date.  
Before the start of the second trial, defense counsel moved to disqualify the
accused for bias and to dismiss the case on former jeopardy grounds.  Initially, the
accused denied both motions.  The prosecutor then pointed out to the accused that the
presiding judge of the circuit court was required to rule on the motion to disqualify the
judge.
The accused proceeded to undermine the defendant's confidence in his
defense counsel and encouraged the defendant to dismiss her.  Specifically, the accused
told the defendant that if he chose to go to trial and if the facts were aggravated, he would
"probably face more than a year [in prison]," but that if he resolved the case "today * * *
in essence, you're released."  Ultimately, the accused succeeded in convincing the
defendant to dismiss his defense counsel and plead no contest to the charges against him.  
At the commission hearing, the accused acknowledged his misconduct and
indicated that he had taken and will continue to take steps to modify his behavior.   The
Presiding Judge of the Marion County Circuit Court described the accused as "the
hardest-working judge in Marion County."  
Following the hearing, the commission concluded that, by engaging in the
conduct summarized above, the accused: 
"1.  failed to observe high standards of conduct so that integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary are preserved and failed to act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary and the judicial
process in violation of JR 1-101(A);
"2.  engaged in conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's
character, temperament and fitness to serve as a judge in violation of JR 1-101(C);
"3.  while a proceeding was pending in a court within his
jurisdiction, made public comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome and impair the fairness of the proceeding in violation of
JR 2-103; 
"4.  failed to be faithful to the law and decide matters on the basis of
the facts and applicable law in violation of JR 2-107; 
"5.  failed to be patient, dignified and courteous to a litigant and a
lawyer in violation of JR 2-110(A); and
"6.  acted in a way that he knows, or reasonably should know, would
be perceived by a reasonable person as biased and prejudiced toward the
litigant and the lawyer in violation of JR 2-110(B)."
Based on the foregoing conclusions, which the accused does not contest in
this court, the commission recommended that the accused be suspended for 30 days
without compensation.  
In In re Gallagher, 326 Or 267, 951 P2d 705 (1998), we identified a
number of factors to be considered in determining an appropriate sanction.  We consider,
among other things, (1) whether the misconduct was frequent and exhibited a persistent
and pervasive pattern of behavior; (2) whether there was an exploitation of the judge's
position for personal interests; (3) whether there was an indirect economic detriment to
the public; (4) whether the judge was experienced and familiar with the higher standards
of conduct that apply to judges; (5) whether the misconduct adversely affected the
public's perception of the integrity and dignity of the judiciary; and (6) whether there was
a prior sanction. Id. at 287-88. 
The commission found that the accused's misconduct did not demonstrate a
pattern of frequent behavior, that there was no evidence that the accused exploited his
position for personal interest, and that there was no evidence of any indirect economic
detriment to the public. (2)  However, the commission did find that the accused is an
experienced judge and is well aware of the higher standards that apply to judges, that the
accused was previously sanctioned regarding similar misconduct, (3) and that the
misconduct in this case adversely affected the public's perception of the integrity and
dignity of the judiciary. 
Based on our review of the record we conclude that the 30-day suspension
recommended by the commission is commensurate with the accused's misconduct.
Pursuant to Article VII (Amended), section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, 
the accused is suspended for a period of 30 days, during which he shall not receive the
salary of his public office.  The suspension shall commence on the effective day of this
decision.
1. ORS 1.420 provides, in part:
" (1) Upon complaint from any person concerning the conduct of a
judge or upon request of the Supreme Court, and after such investigation as
the Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability considers necessary, the
commission may do any of the following:
"(a) The commission may hold a hearing pursuant to subsection (3)
of this section to inquire into the conduct of the judge.
"(b) The commission may request the Supreme Court to appoint
three qualified persons to act as masters, to hold a hearing pursuant to
subsection (3) of this section and maintain a record on the matter referred to
them and to report to the commission on the conduct of the judge.
"(c) The commission may allow the judge to execute a consent to
censure, suspension or removal. If a consent is entered into under this
paragraph, the judge and the commission must enter into a written
stipulation of facts. The consent and stipulation of facts shall be submitted
by the commission to the Supreme Court.
"(2) If the commission receives a complaint that appears to indicate
that a judge has a disability as defined in ORS 1.303, the commission may
refer the complaint to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for
appropriate proceedings under ORS 1.303.
"(3) When a hearing is held by the commission or by masters as
authorized in subsection (1) of this section, the hearing shall be public and
all the testimony and evidence given and received in the hearing shall be
public records. The judge shall have the right to be present at such hearing,
to be represented by counsel, to present testimony and evidence and to
cross-examine witnesses.
"(4) If, after hearing or after considering the record and report of the
masters, the commission finds that the conduct of the judge justifies
censure, suspension or removal from office, the commission shall
recommend to the Supreme Court the censure or suspension or removal of
the judge."
Article VII (Amended), section 8, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"(1) In the manner provided by law, and notwithstanding section 1 of
this Article, a judge of any court may be removed or suspended from his
judicial office by the Supreme Court, or censured by the Supreme Court,
for:
"(a) Conviction in a court of this or any other state, or of the United
States, of a crime punishable as a felony or a crime involving moral
turpitude; or
"(b) Wilful misconduct in a judicial office where such misconduct
bears a demonstrable relationship to the effective performance of judicial
duties; or
"(c) Wilful or persistent failure to perform judicial duties; or
"(d) Generally incompetent performance of judicial duties; or
"(e) Wilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be
established by the Supreme Court; or
"(f) Habitual drunkenness or illegal use of narcotic or dangerous
drugs.
"(2) Notwithstanding section 6 of this Article, the methods provided
in this section, section 1a of this Article and in section 18, Article II of this
Constitution, are the exclusive methods of the removal, suspension, or
censure of a judge."
2. Unlike the commission, we conclude that the accused's conduct caused an indirect
economic detriment to the public in that additional court proceedings were required as a
result of the accused's misconduct.
3. See In re Ochoa, 334 Or 484, 51 P3d 605 (2002) (accused violated Oregon Code
of Judicial Conduct JR 1-101(A) (failed to observe and act in manner that promotes
public confidence), JR 1-101(C) (engaged in conduct reflecting adversely on judge's
character, competence, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge); JR 2-110(B) (acted in
manner that indicates bias or prejudice toward lawyers)).