Title: Woods v. Mendez

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
NICHOLE WOODS 
 
v.  Record No. 020466   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          January 10, 2003 
ARMANDO V. MENDEZ, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in sustaining the defendants' demurrers on the grounds that the 
plaintiff failed to state a claim for punitive damages either 
under Code § 8.01-44.5 or at common law. 
 
On June 27, 1999, about 2:30 a.m., the plaintiff, Nichole 
Woods, was a passenger in a vehicle (the Woods vehicle) 
traveling north on Interstate Route 95 in Prince William County.  
The Woods vehicle slowed as it approached a vehicle (the Mendez 
vehicle) owned by Ernesto Mendez-Chavez and driven by his 
cousin, Armando V. Mendez.1  The Woods vehicle was unable to pass 
the Mendez vehicle, which "swerved . . . back and forth" across 
three lanes of the highway "so as to impede and obstruct" the 
movement of other vehicles. 
 
At the same time, another vehicle, driven by James W. 
Molle, collided with the rear end of the Woods vehicle, causing 
                     
 
1 Ernesto Mendez-Chavez was a defendant in the trial court 
on Woods' claim that he negligently entrusted his vehicle to 
Armando Mendez.  Ernesto Mendez-Chavez was found jointly and 
severally liable for Woods' injuries in the same trial with the 
other defendants. 
the Woods vehicle to collide with the Mendez vehicle.  The Woods 
vehicle was "sandwiched" between the Mendez and Molle vehicles 
and was forced off the highway by the impact of the combined 
collisions.  The Woods vehicle burst into flames, and Woods was 
injured as a result of the accident.  Samples of Molle's blood, 
taken at 5:56 a.m., were subjected to two separate chemical 
analyses, which indicated that Molle had a blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) of 0.13% and 0.14% by weight by volume, 
respectively. 
 
Woods filed a third amended motion for judgment in the 
trial court alleging, among other things, that she was injured 
because of the negligent acts of Armando Mendez (Mendez) and 
Molle.  In Count I, she sought compensatory damages for the 
defendants' alleged negligence.  In Count II, Woods asserted a 
claim for punitive damages against Mendez containing various 
allegations, including the claim that "Mendez's conduct was so 
willful and wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the 
rights of others."  She alleged that Mendez, who was operating a 
vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.15%, "intentionally swerved" 
the vehicle "back and forth across three lanes of interstate 
highway so as to impede and obstruct other motorists." 
 
In Count III, Woods asserted a claim against Molle for 
punitive damages, alleging that his conduct was "so willful and 
                                                                  
 
 
2
wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of 
others."  She alleged that Molle drove his vehicle while legally 
intoxicated after consuming "at least 10 beers," and that at the 
time of the collision his BAC was "0.15% or more by weight by 
volume."  She also alleged that Molle continued to drink beer 
while he was driving on the highway and fell asleep, "completely 
unaware" of her vehicle or the Mendez vehicle.  She further 
asserted that Molle drove his vehicle "with insufficient sleep 
and with actual or constructive knowledge that he was in danger 
of falling asleep."  Woods also alleged that Molle did not 
attempt any evasive action before his vehicle collided at "full-
force" with the rear of the Woods vehicle "at a speed of at 
least 60 miles per hour." 
 
Mendez filed a demurrer to Count II on various grounds, 
including the ground that Woods failed to state sufficient facts 
to support a common law claim for punitive damages.  Molle filed 
a demurrer to Count III, asserting that Woods failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages either 
at common law or under Code § 8.01-44.5. 
 
At the time of the proceedings in the trial court, before 
the amendment of Code § 8.01-44.5 in July 2002, the statute 
provided in relevant part2: 
                     
 
2 In July 2002, the General Assembly amended clause (ii) of 
the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-44.5 concerning a 
 
3
In any action for personal injury or death arising 
from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine or 
train, the finder of fact may, in its discretion, 
award exemplary damages to the plaintiff if the 
evidence proves that the defendant acted with malice 
toward the plaintiff or the defendant's conduct was so 
willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for 
the rights of others. 
 
A defendant's conduct shall be deemed sufficiently 
willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for 
the rights of others when the evidence proves that (i) 
when the incident causing the injury or death 
occurred, the defendant had a blood alcohol 
concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by 
volume or 0.15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath; 
(ii) at the time the defendant began, or during the 
time he was, drinking alcohol, he knew that he was 
going to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train; and 
(iii) the defendant's intoxication was a proximate 
cause of the injury to or death of the plaintiff. 
 
 
At a hearing, Molle argued, among other things, that Woods' 
claim against him for punitive damages under the statute was 
fatally deficient because the certificates of analysis showed 
that his BAC fell below the 0.15% statutory threshold required 
to establish such a claim.  Molle asserted that in civil, as 
well as in criminal, cases "there should be a presumption that 
the BAC is the same at the time that the blood is taken or the 
breath is tested as it was at the time of the accident." 
 
In support of her statutory punitive damages claim against 
Molle, Woods proffered evidence that a forensic toxicologist 
would testify at trial that Molle's BAC was "far in excess" of 
                                                                  
defendant's knowledge as it pertains to the willfulness of his 
conduct.  That change does not affect the disposition of this 
 
4
0.15% at the time of the collision.  Woods also proffered 
evidence that the toxicologist would base his opinion on the 
existing test results and would testify that Molle's BAC 
declined after the accident as the alcohol metabolized in his 
system. 
 
The trial court sustained Mendez's and Molle's demurrers.  
The court concluded that the allegations, considered in the 
light most favorable to Woods, failed to state a common law 
claim for punitive damages against either defendant.  In support 
of its holding, the court observed that Woods' pleadings did not 
allege facts indicating that either of these defendants "had 
prior awareness, from their knowledge of existing circumstances, 
that their conduct would probably cause injury to another." 
 
The trial court also held that Woods' pleadings failed to 
state a claim against Molle for punitive damages under Code 
§ 8.01-44.5.  The court first observed that the certificates of 
analysis showed that Molle had a BAC of 0.13% and 0.14%, which 
amounts were below the minimum concentration of 0.15% necessary 
to support a claim for punitive damages under the statute. 
 
The trial court also relied on the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 291, 381 S.E.2d 11 
(1989).  There, the Court of Appeals held that Code § 18.2-
266(i) establishes a rebuttable presumption that a defendant's 
                                                                  
appeal. 
 
5
BAC at the time of driving is the same as the BAC determined by 
testing after his arrest, and that a defendant may challenge 
such test results with other competent evidence.  Id. at 300, 
381 S.E.2d at 16.  The trial court concluded that because Woods, 
unlike the defendant in Davis, was a plaintiff in a civil case 
rather than a defendant in a criminal prosecution, she was not 
entitled to present evidence rebutting Molle's test results, 
which were conclusive evidence of his BAC when the collision 
occurred. 
 
At trial, Mendez and Molle conceded liability and a jury 
considered only the issue of compensatory damages.  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Woods against Mendez and Molle in 
the amount of $27,365.50, plus interest.  The trial court 
entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. 
 
On appeal, Woods first argues that Code § 8.01-44.5 does 
not provide a presumption that a chemical analysis of a blood or 
breath sample taken after an accident reflects a driver's BAC at 
the time of the accident.  She asserts that the statute's plain 
language requires proof that a driver's BAC at the time of the 
incident was 0.15% or greater, and does not restrict the type of 
evidence that may be offered to prove that the driver's BAC 
reached that level when the incident occurred.  Thus, she 
contends that the trial court erred in barring her from 
producing evidence concerning Molle's BAC at the time of the 
 
6
accident and in applying a conclusive presumption to the test 
results measuring his BAC more than three hours later. 
 
In response, Molle asserts that Code § 8.01-44.5 
establishes a "bright line" requirement that a driver have a BAC 
of 0.15% before being subjected to liability for punitive 
damages.  Molle argues that a plaintiff in a civil case should 
not be permitted to meet this requirement by presenting evidence 
that a driver's BAC at the time of an accident was higher than 
the BAC results shown from chemical tests administered after the 
accident.  He relies on Davis to support his contentions.  We 
disagree with Molle's arguments. 
 
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we consider 
the language of Code § 8.01-44.5 to determine the General 
Assembly's intent from the words contained in the statute.  
Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90 
(2001); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 
(2001).  When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, 
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language.  
Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 
559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002); Cummings, 261 Va. at 77, 540 S.E.2d 
at 496; Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 S.E.2d 153, 
155 (1999).  Therefore, when the General Assembly has used words 
of a plain and definite import, courts cannot assign to them a 
construction that effectively would add words to the statute and 
 
7
vary the plain meaning of the language used.  Burlile v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001); 
Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 
349 (2001). 
 
We conclude that the language of Code § 8.01-44.5 is plain 
and unambiguous.  This language permits a plaintiff who 
institutes a personal injury action arising from the operation 
of a motor vehicle to request punitive damages when the evidence 
establishes that the defendant acted with malice or with willful 
or wanton negligence.  A person's conduct may be deemed willful 
or wanton when certain statutory requirements are met.  One such 
requirement is that "when the incident causing the injury or 
death occurred, the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.15 grams or 
more per 210 liters of breath."  Id.
 
The above language requires proof of a defendant's BAC at 
the time of the incident and does not stipulate any particular 
method of proving this fact.  In contrast, the rebuttable 
presumption recognized by the Court of Appeals in Davis is based 
on the language of Code § 18.2-266(i), which requires that a 
driver's BAC be determined by a particular mode of testing, 
namely, "a chemical test administered as provided in this 
article."  Thus, we conclude that the holding in Davis is 
inapposite to a proper construction of Code § 8.01-44.5. 
 
8
 
The trial court, however, used the holding in Davis to 
create a conclusive presumption in Code § 8.01-44.5, in the 
absence of any language in that statute requiring a particular 
method of proof or otherwise reflecting a legislative intent to 
provide a statutory presumption.  The trial court's 
interpretation was erroneous because it effectively added 
language to the provisions of a plain and unambiguous statute.  
Thus, we hold that Code § 8.01-44.5 does not establish any 
evidentiary presumption regarding the results of a chemical 
analysis conducted on a sample of a driver's blood or breath 
taken after his arrest under Code § 18.2-266 for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion 
concerning the admissibility of Woods' proffered expert 
testimony about Molle's BAC at the time of the accident.  The 
admissibility of such expert testimony is a matter submitted to 
the trial court's sound discretion upon application of 
fundamental principles, including the requirement that the 
evidence be based on an adequate foundation.  John v. Im, 263 
Va. 315, 319-20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002); Keesee v. Donigan, 
259 Va. 157, 161, 524 S.E.2d 645, 647-48 (2000); Tittsworth v. 
Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 154, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1996). 
 
We turn now to consider Woods' argument that the trial 
court erred in sustaining the defendants' demurrers to her 
 
9
common law claims for punitive damages.  She contends that the 
recitations in her pleadings, as set forth above, sufficiently 
alleged a common law claim for punitive damages against both 
Molle and Mendez, because reasonable persons could conclude that 
each defendant's conduct constituted willful and wanton 
negligence. 
 
In response, Molle and Mendez argue that the trial court 
properly sustained their demurrers to Woods' common law claims 
for punitive damages because the facts alleged in her pleadings 
were insufficient to establish that their conduct was willful or 
wanton.  They assert that intoxication alone is not sufficient 
to subject a negligent driver to a plaintiff's claim for 
punitive damages, and that an intoxicated defendant is liable 
for punitive damages only when he had knowledge before an 
accident of other circumstances creating a likelihood of injury 
to others.  In addition, Mendez contends that Molle was the sole 
cause of Woods' accident and injuries. 
 
In resolving these issues, we first state the general 
principles that govern our inquiry.  Because Woods' punitive 
damages claims were decided on demurrer, we consider as true all 
material facts properly pleaded by her and all inferences that 
may be drawn from those facts.  Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz 
& Kelly, P.C., 264 Va. 310, 312, 568 S.E.2d 693, 694 (2002); 
 
10
McDermott v. Reynolds, 260 Va. 98, 100, 530 S.E.2d 902, 903 
(2000). 
 
A claim for punitive damages at common law in a personal 
injury action must be supported by factual allegations 
sufficient to establish that the defendant's conduct was willful 
or wanton.  Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 314, 427 S.E.2d 357, 
359-60 (1993); Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 273, 374 S.E.2d 
1, 3 (1988); see Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 546-47, 514 
S.E.2d 615, 619 (1999).  Willful and wanton negligence is action 
undertaken in conscious disregard of another's rights, or with 
reckless indifference to consequences with the defendant aware, 
from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, 
that his conduct probably would cause injury to another.  Id. at 
545, 514 S.E.2d at 618; Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 
486 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1997).  Each case raising an issue 
concerning the sufficiency of a claim of willful and wanton 
negligence must be evaluated on its own facts.  Alfonso, 257 Va. 
at 545, 514 S.E.2d at 618; Harris, 253 Va. at 341, 486 S.E.2d at 
102; Huffman, 245 Va. at 315, 427 S.E.2d at 360. 
 
Intoxication, of itself, will not subject a negligent 
driver to a punitive damages award.  Id. at 314, 427 S.E.2d at 
360; see Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 910, 114 S.E.2d 617, 621 
(1960).  Instead, a driver's alleged conduct must be considered 
in its entirety in determining whether that conduct showed a 
 
11
conscious disregard for the safety of others.  Huffman, 245 Va. 
at 314-15, 427 S.E.2d at 360.  If reasonable persons could 
disagree in their conclusions whether a defendant's alleged 
conduct was so willful or wanton as to show a conscious 
disregard for the rights of others, a trial court may not remove 
the issue of punitive damages from the trial of a case.  See id. 
at 315, 427 S.E.2d at 360. 
 
We disagree with Molle's argument that Woods' factual 
allegations were insufficient to state a common law claim for 
punitive damages.  According to the facts alleged, Molle was 
operating his motor vehicle after consuming "at least 10 beers," 
having attained a BAC level significantly greater than that 
established for a criminal conviction of driving under the 
influence of alcohol.  He continued to drink beer while driving 
his vehicle in this intoxicated state, knowing that he had not 
slept sufficiently and was in actual danger of falling asleep. 
 
Molle thereafter fell asleep and his vehicle collided with 
Woods' vehicle at a speed of at least 60 miles per hour.  
Because he fell asleep prior to the collision, Molle made no 
attempt to slow his vehicle's speed or to take any other evasive 
action to avoid the collision. 
 
We hold that based on these facts, reasonable persons could 
differ in their conclusions whether Molle acted with reckless 
indifference to the consequences of his actions with knowledge 
 
12
of circumstances indicating that he would probably cause injury 
to others.  We observe that the knowledge component of this 
standard is supported by the cumulative circumstances of his 
lack of sleep, his intoxicated state, and the fact that he knew 
he was in actual danger of falling asleep.  Thus, we conclude 
that the trial court erred in striking Woods' common law 
punitive damages claim against Molle. 
 
We likewise conclude that Woods' allegations against Mendez 
were sufficient to support a common law claim for punitive 
damages.3  Mendez had a stipulated BAC of 0.18% and, according to 
Woods' pleadings, he intentionally swerved his vehicle "back and 
forth" across three lanes of interstate highway in a manner that 
impeded and obstructed other highway drivers. 
 
We conclude that based on these facts reasonable persons 
could differ in their conclusions whether Mendez's actions were 
sufficient to meet the established standard for proving willful 
and wanton negligence.  The knowledge requirement of this 
standard is supported by the allegations that Mendez 
intentionally engaged in a sustained, highly erratic pattern of 
driving that affected several lanes of travel on an interstate 
                     
 
3 Woods also had asserted a claim for statutory punitive 
damages under Code § 8.01-44.5 against Mendez.  At trial, the 
court struck Woods' evidence on this claim based on its 
conclusion that the evidence failed to show that Mendez knew he 
would be driving when he began drinking, or during the time that 
 
13
highway, endangering the other drivers who lawfully were 
operating their vehicles at high rates of speed on the highway.  
Mendez engaged in these dangerous maneuvers in an intoxicated 
state evidenced by a BAC of more than twice the level 
established for a criminal conviction of driving under the 
influence.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
striking Woods' common law punitive damages claim against 
Mendez. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case for a trial on the merits of Woods' 
statutory and common law punitive damages claims against Molle, 
and on the merits of her common law punitive damages claim 
against Mendez. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I agree with the majority’s rationale and conclusion 
regarding Nichole Woods’ claim for punitive damages pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-44.5.  However, I disagree with the majority’s 
determination that Woods pled sufficient facts to state a claim 
for common law punitive damages as to both defendants.  In any 
case involving willful and wanton negligence, the evidence must 
show that a defendant had prior knowledge or notice of specific 
                                                                  
he was drinking, alcohol.  Woods has not appealed from this part 
 
14
conditions, or of actions or omissions, that would likely cause 
injury to other individuals.  See Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 
540, 546, 514 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1999); Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 
Va. 249, 253, 462 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995).  As our previous cases 
demonstrate, only the most egregious set of facts will justify 
submitting the issue of punitive damages to a jury. 
 
For example, in Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 270, 374 
S.E.2d 1, 1 (1988), the defendant drove his vehicle the wrong 
way down an exit ramp onto Interstate 81 narrowly avoiding a 
collision with a tractor-trailer truck.  The driver of that 
truck “blinked his lights[,] blew ‘a constant blast’ on his air 
horns[,]” and had to swerve in order to avoid hitting the 
defendant’s vehicle.  Id.  The defendant passed the truck and 
“ ‘just kept going . . . at a pretty high rate of speed.’ ”  Id.  
He then traveled approximately four-tenths of a mile farther 
down the interstate in the wrong direction before colliding 
head-on with the plaintiff.  Id.  A certificate of blood 
analysis indicated that, at the time of the accident, the 
defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.22% by weight by 
volume.  Id. at 271, 374 S.E.2d at 1.  We held that “the 
egregious set of facts presented” was sufficient to submit the 
plaintiff’s punitive damages claim to a jury.  Id. at 273, 374 
S.E.2d at 3; see also Webb v. Rivers, 256 Va. 460, 464, 507 
                                                                  
of the trial court's judgment. 
 
15
S.E.2d 360, 363 (1998) (evidence that defendant drove 90 m.p.h. 
in a 25 m.p.h. residential neighborhood, failed to stop at a red 
traffic light, and had a blood alcohol content of 0.21% was 
sufficient to submit punitive damages claim to a jury); Huffman 
v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 313, 427 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1993)(evidence 
that defendant had blood alcohol content of 0.32% and had caused 
a collision immediately prior to the collision at issue was 
sufficient to allow punitive damages claim to be presented to a 
jury). 
 
However, in Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499, 507, 404 S.E.2d 
42, 45 (1990), we held that the evidence did not “present the 
‘egregious set of facts’ presented in Booth” and that the trial 
court, therefore, erred in submitting the issue of punitive 
damages to the jury.  Id.  The defendant in Hack crossed into 
the opposite lane of travel on a curve and collided with another 
motorist, killing her.  Id. at 502-03, 404 S.E.2d at 43.  The 
plaintiff based the punitive damages claim upon evidence that, 
at the time of the accident, the defendant’s blood alcohol 
content was somewhere between 0.09% and 0.114%, he had two prior 
convictions for driving under the influence, and he was 
operating the vehicle on the left side of the highway, without a 
left headlight and while allegedly suffering from night 
blindness.  Id. at 506-07, 404 S.E.2d at 45.  We concluded that, 
although the defendant’s negligence certainly caused the death 
 
16
of the other motorist, it did not show the conscious disregard 
for her safety necessary to sustain an award of punitive 
damages.  Id. at 507, 404 S.E.2d at 45; see also Puent v. 
Dickens, 245 Va. 217, 219, 427 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1993) (the 
combined factors of a defendant, with a blood alcohol content of 
0.24%, failing to apply brakes to avoid hitting a vehicle that 
had stopped at a traffic signal and exhibited lighted brake and 
rear lights was insufficient to justify an award of punitive 
damages). 
 
In my view, the requirement of prior knowledge of specific 
conditions that would likely cause injury to others is missing 
with regard to both defendants in this case.  When compared to 
our prior cases, the “knowledge component” is not satisfied by 
Woods’ allegations that Armando V. Mendez had a blood alcohol 
content of 0.18% and swerved his vehicle across several lanes of 
an interstate highway, nor by the allegations that James W. 
Molle was intoxicated and drove with insufficient sleep.  
Allegations sufficient to show a conscious disregard for the 
rights of others, such as prior accidents, near collisions, or 
excessive speed, are missing in this case. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 
 
17