Title: Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2343.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2343 
APPLE GROUP, LTD., APPELLANT, v. GRANGER TOWNSHIP BOARD OF ZONING 
APPEALS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2343.] 
Zoning—Townships—R.C. 519.02—A comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 
519.02 may be included within a township’s zoning resolution and need 
not be a separate and distinct document—A zoning resolution is enacted 
in accordance with a comprehensive plan, as required by R.C. 519.02, if it 
(1) reflects current land uses, (2) allows for change, (3) promotes public 
health and safety, (4) uniformly classifies similar areas, (5) clearly defines 
district locations and boundaries, and (6) identifies the use or uses to 
which each property may be put. 
(No. 2014-0301—Submitted February 4, 2015—Decided June 17, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, Nos. 12CA0065-M and 
12CA0068-M, 2013-Ohio-4259. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02 may be included within a 
township’s zoning resolution and need not be a separate and distinct 
document. 
2.  A zoning resolution is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, as 
required by R.C. 519.02, if it (1) reflects current land uses, (2) allows for 
change, (3) promotes public health and safety, (4) uniformly classifies 
similar areas, (5) clearly defines district locations and boundaries, and (6) 
identifies the use or uses to which each property may be put. 
_________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This zoning case involves the interpretation of a single statutory 
phrase.  We are asked to determine whether R.C. 519.02 requires a township to 
adopt a “comprehensive plan” separately from its zoning resolution.  We hold that 
a comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02 may be included within a 
township’s zoning resolution and need not be a separate and distinct document.  
Furthermore, a zoning resolution is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan, as required by R.C. 519.02, if it (1) reflects current land uses, (2) allows for 
change, (3) promotes public health and safety, (4) uniformly classifies similar 
areas, (5) clearly defines district locations and boundaries, and (6) identifies the 
use or uses to which each property may be put. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Apple Group, Ltd. (“Apple”), purchased 88 acres of 
undeveloped land in Granger Township (“Granger”) in May 2006.  The property 
was zoned R-1 residential, which permits the construction of single-family and 
two-family homes on a minimum lot size of two acres.  Granger’s zoning 
resolution also provides for an R-2 residential district that allows two to three 
January Term, 2015 
 
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dwelling units per acre if they can be serviced by central water and sanitary 
sewers at the time of development.  Because Apple sought to develop a 
subdivision consisting of 44 single-family homes situated on approximately one-
acre lots on its property, it applied to appellee Granger Township Board of Zoning 
Appeals (“BZA”) for 176 variances, four variances for each of the 44 proposed 
lots.1  The BZA denied the variance application. 
{¶ 3} Apple filed an administrative appeal, and the BZA’s decision was 
affirmed by the Medina County Court of Common Pleas.  The court found that 
the BZA’s decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that 
the request for variances was in reality an attempt to rezone the land to a new 
district unlike the R-1 or R-2 residential districts, a request that was not within the 
authority granted to the BZA.  Apple also filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment, seeking a declaration that Granger’s zoning resolution establishing the 
R-1 zoning classification is unconstitutional and beyond the authority delegated to 
Granger in R.C. Chapter 519.  A magistrate issued a decision denying Apple’s 
claims.  With respect to the constitutional claim, the magistrate concluded, 
“Granger Township’s desire to maintain the rural character of its land is a 
legitimate governmental goal, which may be regulated by its zoning resolution.”  
In denying Apple’s claim that Granger exceeded its authority in enacting the 
zoning resolution without enacting a separate comprehensive plan, the magistrate 
concluded, “The zoning resolution itself meets the statutory requirement of a 
comprehensive plan, because it has the essential characteristics of a 
comprehensive plan; it encompasses all geographic parts of the community and 
integrates all functional elements.”  The common pleas court adopted the 
magistrate’s findings, and Apple appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 
                                                 
1 Specifically, it asked for a variance from the R-1 district’s two-acre lot minimum, the 175-foot 
minimum street-side lot frontage, the 175-foot minimum continuous front-yard width, and the 15-
foot side-yard setback requirement.   
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{¶ 4} At the court of appeals, Apple argued that the trial court’s 
declaration that Granger had complied with R.C. 519.02’s requirement that a 
zoning resolution be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan was in 
error and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the township’s failure to enact a separate comprehensive plan did 
not mean it lacks authority to adopt a zoning resolution.  The court reasoned that 
the purpose of the requirement in R.C. 519.02 for a comprehensive plan is to 
prevent piecemeal zoning and ensure that someone purchasing property will be 
able to determine in advance how the property may be used.  The appellate court 
rejected Apple’s argument that a zoning ordinance cannot constitute a 
comprehensive plan and concluded that the trial court’s decision that Granger’s 
zoning resolution constitutes a comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02 was 
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 5} An appeal was taken to this court, and we accepted Apple’s two 
propositions of law: 
 
For purposes of a township’s exercise of its statutory 
zoning power, the “zoning plan” that R.C. Chapter 519 empowers 
townships to adopt by resolution, which includes the zoning 
regulations and a zoning map, is not identical to or a substitute for 
the “comprehensive plan” identified in R.C. 519.02, with which 
R.C. 519.02 requires the “zoning plan” to be “in accordance.” 
A township’s zoning regulations, adopted by resolution 
under R.C. Chapter 519, are, standing alone, insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish that such regulations are “in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan,” as R.C. 519.02 requires. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
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See 139 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2014-Ohio-2245, 9 N.E.3d 1062.  In short, Apple 
argues that a comprehensive plan must be enacted separately and apart from 
zoning regulations. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 6} “Zoning” is “the government’s ‘regulation of the character and 
intensity of real estate uses through police power.’  [American Institute of Real 
Estate Appraisers, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal 332 (1984)].”  
Developers Diversified Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 32, 
36, 701 N.E.2d 975 (1998).  In Ohio, the authority of a township to enact zoning 
ordinances derives not from the township’s inherent authority or the Ohio 
Constitution, but from the General Assembly.  Torok v. Jones, 5 Ohio St.3d 31, 
32, 448 N.E.2d 819 (1983), citing Yorkavitz v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 
166 Ohio St. 349, 142 N.E.2d 655 (1957). 
{¶ 7} R.C. Chapter 519 sets forth the method by which townships may 
regulate land use.  R.C. 519.02(A) grants authority to a township’s board of 
trustees to regulate the size and location of buildings and other structures and the 
use of land for residences or other purposes: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the interest of the 
public convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare, the 
board by resolution, in accordance with a comprehensive plan, 
may regulate the location of, set back lines for, and the uses of 
buildings and other structures * * * and the uses of land * * * in 
the unincorporated territory of the township, and may establish 
reasonable landscaping standards and architectural standards 
excluding exterior building materials in the unincorporated 
territory of the township. 
 
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(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 8} Apple’s appeal does not challenge the reasonableness of Granger’s 
zoning resolution but only whether the township’s resolution may also function as 
its comprehensive plan.  According to Apple, a comprehensive plan must be 
created first to assure the public that the township’s zoning has been properly 
considered.  Apple argues that a zoning resolution must implement the 
comprehensive plan.  Granger argues that its Revised Zoning Resolution is the 
comprehensive plan identified in R.C. 519.02.  The parties thus disagree over the 
meaning of the phrase “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” 
A “Comprehensive Plan”  
{¶ 9} There is no standard definition for “comprehensive plan” in the 
context of zoning law.  The original Standard Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”), 
which the United States Department of Commerce issued in 1922 as a model for 
state legislation enabling and limiting local zoning power, included a requirement 
that zoning decisions be made “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  
Hirokawa, Making Sense of a “Misunderstanding of the Planning Process”: 
Examining the Relationship Between Zoning and Rezoning Under the Change-or-
Mistake Rule, 44 Urb.Law. 295, 299 (2012).  However, “[t]he term 
‘comprehensive plan’ was not defined in the SZEA, and so both its purpose and 
confines of legal sufficiency have not been well understood or enforced.”  Id. at 
300.  The view of the majority of states adopting the SZEA language is that 
“comprehensive planning requires some form of forethought and reasoned 
consideration, as opposed to a separate plan document that becomes an 
overarching constitution guiding development.”  Sullivan & Richter, Out of the 
Chaos: Towards a National System of Land-Use Procedures, 34 Urb.Law. 449, 
454 (2002).  A minority of states view the comprehensive plan as “an independent 
document separate from the comprehensive zoning ordinance.”  Benintendi, 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Comment, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Ohio:  Moving Away from the 
Traditional View, 17 U.Dayton L.Rev. 207, 217 (1991). 
{¶ 10} While R.C. Chapter 519 offers detailed instructions on how 
townships are to adopt or amend zoning plans or resolutions, it does not define the 
term “comprehensive plan” or offer any specific guidance on the standard to be 
used to establish one.  But we have considered the phrase “in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan,” as used in R.C. 519.02, and stated indirectly what it was not 
in Cassell v. Lexington Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 
N.E.2d 11 (1955).  There, we held:  
 
A township zoning regulation, which provides merely that 
a section of a township, one square mile in area, shall be zoned for 
farming, residential, commercial and recreational uses, and which 
does not specify therein which portions of said section may be 
used for any or all of such purposes or is not accompanied by a 
map designating such use areas, is not adopted in accordance with 
a comprehensive plan. 
 
Id., paragraph two of the syllabus.  Thus, by implication, a comprehensive plan 
consists of something more than zoning a section of a township to allow farming, 
residential, commercial, and recreational uses without specifying which portions 
of the section can be used for any of those purposes.  In Cassell, we expressed 
concern over leaving the administration of zoning to the “unwarranted whim or 
caprice” of enforcement officials.  Id. at 345-346.  “The absence of any 
comprehensive plan in the regulation involved * * * open[ed] the door to an 
arbitrary and unreasonable administration of the regulation.”  Id. at 346. 
{¶ 11} We considered the phrase “in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan” more recently in B.J. Alan Co. v. Congress Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 124 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-5863, 918 N.E.2d 501.  That case addressed whether a 
township could rely on a comprehensive plan created at the county level.  In 
answering yes, we explained:  
 
R.C. 519.02 does not require that a township create its own 
comprehensive plan—it requires only that a zoning resolution be 
“in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  (Emphasis added.)  
To require each township to create its own comprehensive plan is 
to read additional language into R.C. 519.02. 
 
Id. at ¶ 13.  We emphasized that our holding in the case was limited and noted 
that among the issues not determined in the case was whether the township zoning 
ordinance was indeed “in accordance” with the county’s comprehensive plan.  Id. 
at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 12} Neither Cassell nor B.J. Alan provides the answer to the issue 
before us today, but each case sets forth principles that aid us in our decision.  
Cassell stands for the proposition that a comprehensive plan serves to protect 
against the arbitrary and unreasonable administration of a zoning regulation.  B.J. 
Alan explains that a township is not required to create its own comprehensive 
plan, but that its zoning resolution must be enacted in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan. 
{¶ 13} Apple argues that the term “comprehensive plan” is a term of art 
among zoning professionals and that the statutory language must be interpreted 
according to the meaning prevalent in that profession.  This court, however, has 
never treated the term “comprehensive plan” as a term of art, and no court has 
found that the phrase “comprehensive plan” has acquired a technical or particular 
meaning pursuant to R.C. 1.42.  We have emphasized that “the plain meaning of a 
statute is always preferred.”  State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 2005-Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 40, citing 
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 
1024 (2004).  Furthermore, “ ‘[i]f a review of the statute conveys a meaning that 
is clear, unequivocal, and definite, the court need look no further.’  Columbus City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins, 101 Ohio St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-296, 802 
N.E.2d 637, ¶ 26.”  Id. at ¶ 38.  Our consideration of the statutory language leads 
us to conclude that no formally enacted comprehensive plan is required by R.C. 
519.02. 
{¶ 14} We agree with Granger that the plain meaning of the phrase “in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan” is that zoning regulations should be 
adopted pursuant to a plan that is comprehensive, or all-encompassing, in the 
sense that the plan addresses the specific goals and objectives for the entire 
township.  This definition is implied in, and in keeping with Cassell, which 
emphasizes that comprehensive plans are essential to protecting against arbitrary 
enforcement of zoning regulations. Another court of appeals decision, however, is 
even more helpful in establishing a meaning of the contested phrase. 
White Oak  
{¶ 15} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals also concluded that a 
comprehensive plan need not be an independent document.  White Oak Property 
Dev., L.L.C. v. Washington Twp., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-05-011, 2012-
Ohio-425.  In White Oak, the property owner sought declaratory relief on the 
basis of its claim that Washington Township’s zoning resolution was 
unenforceable because it was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.  Id. at 
¶ 4.  The zoning resolution divided the territory of the township into four districts 
(agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial) and reflected the primarily 
agricultural nature of the township’s land.  Id. at ¶ 17, 24.  The zoning resolution 
covered many topics, including land use, housing, and environmental precautions, 
and it incorporated a zoning map that marked the location and boundaries of each 
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district, which the court noted allowed potential purchasers to identify the 
permissible uses of any particular piece of property.  Id. at ¶ 25.  While the zoning 
resolution covered the entire township, the court of appeals emphasized that it 
also allowed for changes in zoning as the township’s needs developed.  Id. at  
¶ 24. 
{¶ 16} The Twelfth District agreed that the township’s zoning resolution 
and accompanying zoning map constituted a comprehensive plan and that it 
therefore complied with R.C. 519.02.  Id. at ¶ 23.  The court considered the term 
“comprehensive plan” to be a “flexible term” that “ ‘must be sufficiently detailed 
that a potential purchaser might ascertain in advance to what use property might 
be put.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Rumpke Waste, Inc. v. Henderson, 591 F.Supp. 521, 
534 (S.D.Ohio 1984).  And furthermore, “[w]ith respect to sufficient detail, the 
plan must ‘define with certainty the location, boundaries and areas of the * * * 
districts,’ and a failure to do so renders the plan invalid.”  White Oak at ¶ 16, 
quoting Westlake v. Elrick, 52 Ohio Law Abs. 538, 541, 83 N.E.2d 646 (8th 
Dist.1948).  We adopt the factors that the White Oak court considered to be 
indicative of a comprehensive plan,  i.e., that it  “(1) reflect current land uses; (2) 
allow for change; (3) promote public health and safety; (4) uniformly classify 
similar areas; (5) clearly define district locations and boundaries; and (6) identify 
the use(s) to which each property may be put.”  Id. at ¶ 46, citing Rumpke Waste 
and Elrick.  These factors are present within Granger’s zoning resolution. 
Granger’s Zoning Resolution 
{¶ 17} Granger’s Zoning Resolution is an exhaustive document, which 
consists of more than 100 pages and incorporates an attached zoning districts 
map. 
{¶ 18} The resolution’s stated purpose is 
 
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to promote and protect the health, safety, morals, and welfare of 
the residents of the unincorporated area of Granter Township, 
Medina County, Ohio, and to conserve and protect property and 
property values, and to provide for the maintenance of the rural 
character of Granger Township, and to manage orderly growth and 
development in said Township. 
 
{¶ 19} Thus, the zoning resolution is intended to be a comprehensive plan 
for the entire township. And all six White Oak points are met. 
1. Reflects current land uses 
{¶ 20} The resolution contains general regulations that apply to all 
districts or zones within the township and sets forth specific uniform regulations 
for each individual district.  The resolution also clearly sets forth the zoning 
districts and their boundary line on the attached map, which allows any potential 
purchaser to determine the uses to which a piece of property may be put. 
{¶ 21} It reflects current land uses in its intention to “provide for the 
maintenance of” the already-existing “rural character of Granger Township” and 
its establishment of zoning districts reflecting the established rural character of 
the township. 
2.  Allows for change 
{¶ 22} The resolution allows for change: it establishes a process for 
property owners to obtain conditional zoning permits, which “provide controllable 
and reasonable flexibility in requirements for certain kinds of uses that will allow 
profitable latitude for the investor.” 
3. Promotes health and safety  
{¶ 23} The resolution promotes public health and safety: a number of 
provisions, such as those regulating the placement of signs that are in part 
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“intended to reduce sign or advertising distractions and obstructions that may 
contribute to traffic accidents,” regulate potential hazards. 
4. Uniformly classifies similar areas 
{¶ 24} The resolution uniformly classifies similar areas:  it creates seven 
distinct district types (R-1 Residential, R-2 Residential, C-1 Local Commercial, 
C-2 General Commercial, C-3 Highway Interchange Commercial, I-1 Industrial 
Commercial, and PDD Planned Development) and adopts clear regulations for 
each type of district. 
5. Clearly defines district locations and boundaries 
{¶ 25} The resolution contains clearly defined district locations and 
boundaries that are set forth on a zoning-districts map incorporated into the 
resolution.  It presents rules for interpretation in the event that “uncertainty exists 
with respect to the boundaries of any of the aforesaid districts as shown on the 
zoning map.” 
6. Identifies the use or uses to which each property may be put  
{¶ 26} Finally, the resolution identifies the use or uses to which each 
property may be put within each zoning type.  For example, it allows for single-
family dwellings, two-family dwellings, certain manufactured homes, and certain 
roadside stands among the permitted uses within an R-1 Residential District. 
{¶ 27} We accordingly conclude that the resolution satisfies the 
requirement of R.C. 519.02 that it be enacted “in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan.” 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} We agree with those appellate courts that have considered the issue 
and have held2 that a comprehensive plan need not be set forth in a separate 
                                                 
2 BGC Properties v. Bath Twp., 9th Dist. Summit No. 14252, 1990 WL 31789, *4 (Mar. 21, 
1990); Central Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike, 63 Ohio App.2d 34, 65, 409 N.E.2d 258 (8th 
Dist.1979); White Oak, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-05-011, 2012-Ohio-425, ¶ 46. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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document and may be included in the township’s zoning plan.  A comprehensive 
plan is defined as one that reflects current land uses within the township, allows 
for change, promotes public health and safety, uniformly classifies similar areas, 
clearly defines district locations and boundaries, and identifies the use or uses to 
which each property may be put.  Granger’s zoning resolution was enacted in 
accordance with such a comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02. 
{¶ 29} We accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} Respectfully, I dissent.  How the General Assembly intended a 
township to exercise its zoning power over privately owned land is at the very 
heart of this controversy. 
 
[T]ownships of Ohio have no inherent or constitutionally granted 
police power, the power upon which zoning legislation is based.  
Whatever police or zoning power townships of Ohio have is that 
delegated by the General Assembly, and it follows that such power 
is limited to that which is expressly delegated to them by statute. 
 
Yorkavitz v. Bd. of Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 166 Ohio St. 349, 351, 142 
N.E.2d 655 (1957). 
{¶ 31} Because 
the 
unambiguous 
language 
in 
R.C. 
519.02(A) 
demonstrates the General Assembly’s intent to strictly limit a township’s zoning 
authority to zoning regulations enacted “in accordance with a comprehensive 
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plan,” I dissent from the majority opinion’s determination that a township’s 
zoning resolution and a comprehensive plan can be one and the same. 
{¶ 32} I also disagree with the majority’s delineation of factors that it 
holds are indicative of a comprehensive plan and its determination that Granger 
Township’s zoning resolution is a comprehensive plan, because these issues were 
not raised as propositions of law in this appeal and the parties neither briefed nor 
argued these matters.  The majority defines a term that has acquired a particular 
meaning without reliance on authoritative or expert knowledge in a manner that is 
incongruous with the expert testimony presented in this matter, without 
consideration of the unique needs of Granger Township. 
{¶ 33} I do not believe that a comprehensive plan must be a single formal 
document.  Instead, it may be compiled from several sources.  In the event, 
however, that Apple Group is able to prove that Granger Township does not have 
a comprehensive plan separate from its zoning resolution, even one compiled 
from several sources, the resolution should not be presumptively deemed invalid.  
Instead, the burden of proof shifts to Granger Township to establish that the 
resolution is a valid exercise of the power to zone granted by the General 
Assembly. 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals, and I would remand this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  Issues Presented on Appeal 
Statutory Interpretation of R.C. 519.02(A) 
{¶ 35} When interpreting a statute, a court’s paramount concern is 
legislative intent. State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 
395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  “[T]he intent of the lawmakers is to 
be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from 
ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the 
January Term, 2015 
 
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lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.”  
Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  We apply the statute as written and refrain from adding or deleting 
words when the statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous.  Boley v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20; 
Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 
N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 36} R.C. 519.02(A) states: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the interest 
of the public health and safety, the board of township trustees may 
regulate by resolution, in accordance with a comprehensive plan, 
the location, height, bulk, number of stories, and size of buildings 
and other structures, including tents, cabins, and trailer coaches, 
percentages of lot areas that may be occupied, set back building 
lines, sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of 
population, the uses of buildings and other structures, including 
tents, cabins, and trailer coaches, and the uses of land for trade, 
industry, residence, recreation, or other purposes in the 
unincorporated territory of the township. Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, in the interest of the public convenience, 
comfort, prosperity, or general welfare, the board by resolution, in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan, may regulate the location 
of, set back lines for, and the uses of buildings and other structures, 
including tents, cabins, and trailer coaches, and the uses of land for 
trade, industry, residence, recreation, or other purposes in the 
unincorporated territory of the township, and may establish 
reasonable landscaping standards and architectural standards 
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excluding exterior building materials in the unincorporated 
territory of the township. Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, in the interest of the public convenience, comfort, 
prosperity, or general welfare, the board may regulate by 
resolution, in accordance with a comprehensive plan, for 
nonresidential property only, the height, bulk, number of stories, 
and size of buildings and other structures, including tents, cabins, 
and trailer coaches, percentages of lot areas that may be occupied, 
sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and the density of 
population in the unincorporated territory of the township. For all 
these purposes, the board may divide all or any part of the 
unincorporated territory of the township into districts or zones of 
such number, shape, and area as the board determines. All such 
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or 
other structure or use throughout any district or zone, but the 
regulations in one district or zone may differ from those in other 
districts or zones. 
 
{¶ 37} The term “comprehensive plan” is not defined in R.C. Chapter 519.  
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, however, we have previously recognized that 
the term has acquired a particular meaning.  Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. 
Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 555, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  R.C. 1.42 instructs that 
“[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning * * * 
shall be construed accordingly.”  Therefore, the testimony of experts engaged in 
the field of planning and zoning is relevant to determining the meaning of the 
term “comprehensive plan” as it is used in R.C. 519.02(A).  See Order of Ry. 
Conductors of Am. v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 525, 67 S.Ct. 405, 91 L.Ed. 471 
(1947); Evid.R. 702. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 38} We have not, however, treated the word “resolution” as having 
acquired a particular meaning.  An ordinary and common meaning of “resolution” 
is “a formal expression of opinion, will, or intent by an official body or assembled 
group.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1933 (2002). 
{¶ 39} The General Assembly used the phrase “in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan” and the word “resolution” in the same sentence in R.C. 
519.02(A).  Because “comprehensive plan” has acquired a particular meaning and 
“resolution” has not, they cannot describe the same thing.  This interpretation is 
supported by the testimony of both parties’ experts.  Nothing in the experts’ 
testimony provides support for concluding that “comprehensive plan” and 
“resolution” convey the same meaning.  To the contrary, both of the experts who 
testified stated that a zoning resolution is the implementation of the 
comprehensive plan.  Therefore, the terms cannot be interchangeable. 
{¶ 40} Moreover, while the majority reads the phrase “in accordance 
with” out of the statute, under our rules for statutory interpretation, we are 
required to give each word effective meaning.  “Accordance” is defined as 
“agreement, accord” and is “now used chiefly in the phrase “in accordance with.”  
Webster’s at 12.  Another definition states, “To be in accordance is to be in 
conformity or compliance.”  (Italics sic.)  Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage 14 (2d Ed.1995).  We also recently noted that “in accordance with” 
connotes rigid compliance.  State v. Niesen-Pennycuff, 132 Ohio St.3d 416, 2012-
Ohio-2730, 973 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 41} Once we strictly apply rules of statutory interpretation to R.C. 
519.02(A), its meaning is clear and unambiguous.  The General Assembly’s 
language refers to two distinct items: a comprehensive plan and a zoning 
resolution.  Therefore, the General Assembly granted townships the authority to 
zone, but required that the authority be exercised only in compliance with a 
comprehensive plan.  The zoning resolution cannot comply with itself.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18
Accordingly, the requirement of rigid compliance, coupled with the fact that 
“resolution” and “comprehensive plan” are distinct terms, conveys the meaning 
that they are separate documents. 
{¶ 42} This interpretation is supported by the language in other statutes 
and regulations in which the General Assembly and regulatory agencies use the 
phrase “in accordance with” when identifying separate actions.  In R.C. 941.21, 
which sets forth definitions relating to an animal disease, the General Assembly 
uses the phrase “in accordance with” numerous times.  See, e.g., R.C. 
941.21(B)(1) (“negative” means animals that are determined to be negative “by 
tests conducted in accordance with [United States department of agriculture] 
methods and standards”).  Ohio Adm.Code 3745-300-11, pertaining to the 
cleanup of contaminated property, repeatedly uses the phrase.  See, e.g., Ohio 
Adm.Code 3745-300-11(A)(1) (“when a phase II property assessment conducted 
in accordance with [Ohio Adm.Code] 3745-300-07), and Ohio Adm.Code 3745-
300-11(C)(1) (“an operation and maintenance plan prepared in accordance with 
this rule”).  These sections cannot be interpreted to mean that the test is also the 
methods and standards, R.C. 941.21(B)(1), or the assessment or maintenance plan 
is also the rule, Ohio Adm.Code 3645-300-11(A)(1) and (C)(1), that they must 
comply with.  Instead, each action is separate. 
{¶ 43} Lastly, the majority’s holding requires the insertion of words into 
R.C. 519.02(A) that were not used by the General Assembly. Specifically, under 
the majority’s holding, R.C. 519.02(A) would state, “the board may regulate by 
resolution, in accordance with itself.”  However, we have repeatedly held that 
“[i]n matters of construction, it is the duty of this court to give effect to the words 
used, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.”  Cleveland Elec. 
Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
19
Precedents and Scholarly Interpretations 
{¶ 44} In addition to ignoring the rules of statutory interpretation, today’s 
majority also ignores our precedents.  While this is the first case to specifically 
consider whether a township zoning regulation can also be a “comprehensive 
plan,” our precedents have acknowledged the significance of the General 
Assembly’s term “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” 
{¶ 45} In Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Montgomery, 56 Ohio St.3d 60, 
65, 564 N.E.2d 455 (1990), this court held that “there is no statutory requirement 
that [a municipality] * * * enact a comprehensive community plan pursuant to its 
power to zone under R.C. 713.06 et seq.”  To reach that conclusion, the court 
compared the statutory language permitting municipalities to zone with the 
statutes permitting counties and townships to enact zoning regulations.  Id. at 66-
67.  R.C. 713.06, which addresses a municipality’s power to zone, states only that 
a municipality may create “zones or districts * * * in the interest of the public 
health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare” and states 
that the municipality may adopt a plan for doing so.  Id.  But “R.C. 303.02, 
regulating rural land use in counties, and R.C. 519.02, regulating land use in 
townships, require that zoning regulations promulgated by counties and 
townships be in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Columbia Oldsmobile at 66. 
{¶ 46} Moreover, contrary to the majority opinion’s statement, our recent 
decision in B.J. Alan Co. v. Congress Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 124 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2009-Ohio-5863, 918 N.E.2d 501, did not analyze the entire phrase “in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  Instead, our focus was whether the term 
“a comprehensive plan” required a township to create its own comprehensive plan 
or whether it could follow the comprehensive plan created by the county.  Id. at  
¶ 13, 31.  We avoided any discussion of the phrase “in accordance with,” stating, 
“[W]e have not determined today * * * whether the * * * Township zoning 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20
ordinance is indeed ‘in accordance’ with the * * * County Comprehensive Plan.”  
Id. at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 47} Our analysis in B.J. Alan, however, supports the conclusion that the 
resolution and comprehensive plan are distinct.  We did not examine whether the 
resolution was intended by the township to be a comprehensive plan, but instead 
remanded for the trial court to determine whether the resolution complied with the 
separate and distinct county comprehensive plan, thus implicitly recognizing that 
a zoning resolution and a comprehensive plan are separate and distinct. 
{¶ 48} As noted in the dissenting opinion of Judge Belfance in the court of 
appeals in this case:  
 
[R]ecent case law from the Ohio Supreme Court suggests that 
townships are required, pursuant to R.C. 519.02, to engage in some 
form of planning and study that would form the basis for the 
creation and adoption of their zoning regulations.  See B.J. Alan 
Co. v. Congress Twp. Bd. of Zoning, 124 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-
5863, ¶ 32-42 (noting that Wayne County’s plan constituted a 
comprehensive plan as it “present[ed] a thorough study of the 
region and set[ ] forth comprehensive land-use goals for the county 
[ ]”).  It would seem that, if the Supreme Court was inclined to take 
the position that a zoning regulation and a comprehensive plan 
were one and the same, it could have used B.J. Alan as an 
opportunity to clarify the law in this area. 
Thus, instead of examining whether the county’s plan was a 
comprehensive plan, the Court could have chosen to examine the 
zoning regulations to see if they constituted a comprehensive plan. 
 
(Brackets sic.)  2013-Ohio-4259, ¶ 36. 
January Term, 2015 
 
21
{¶ 49} Planning–and-zoning scholars Stuart Meck and Kenneth Pearlman 
contend that B.J. Alan “resolved an important issue:  zoning must be consistent 
with an independently prepared comprehensive plan that is adopted separately.”  
Meck & Pearlman, Ohio Planning and Zoning Law, Section 4.37, at 121 (2014). 
{¶ 50} Perhaps more troubling is the unintended consequences of today’s 
majority opinion.  Without explanation, the majority has compromised our 
holding in B.J. Alan.  The language of R.C. 519.02(A) is almost identical to the 
language of R.C. 303.02(A), which grants authority to county commissioners to 
regulate building and land use.  The General Assembly used the phrase “in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan” in both statutes to limit the exercise of 
police power in county and township zoning.  The logical conclusion from 
today’s majority opinion has a twofold effect.  First, a county will not need to 
formulate a separate and distinct comprehensive plan to guide the enactment of its 
zoning resolutions.  Second, a township will now be able to enact a zoning 
resolution that is merely “in accordance with” a county’s zoning resolution. 
{¶ 51} Lastly, the majority’s reliance on Cassell v. Lexington Twp. Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11 (1955), as providing an implied 
definition of the term “comprehensive plan” is misplaced.  The Cassell court did 
not analyze the term “comprehensive plan” as used in R.C. 519.02(A): the 
statement that “[t]he absence of any comprehensive plan in the regulation * * * 
opens the door to an arbitrary and unreasonable administration of the regulation,” 
id. at 346, was dicta.  Cassell was a constitutional due process challenge to a 
zoning regulation in Lexington Township.  In reaching its conclusion that “the 
power to enact zoning regulations can not be exercised in an arbitrary or 
unreasonable manner,” the court cited Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 
Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925), and State ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United 
Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).  Id. 
at 345-346.  Both of those cases were decided prior to the enactment of the statute 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22
enabling townships to zone and were due-process challenges to municipal zoning 
ordinances.  Neither case addressed the term “comprehensive plan” because a 
municipality’s zoning resolution does not need to be formulated in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan. 
II.  Issues Decided by the Majority That Were Not Accepted for Review 
Factors of a Comprehensive Plan 
{¶ 52} The issue of what constitutes a comprehensive plan was not 
appealed to this court, and the parties did not brief or argue this point of zoning 
law.  In fact, at oral argument, Apple Group’s counsel, in response to questions 
from the bench, specifically stated that the issue of what constitutes a 
comprehensive plan was not before the court.  Nevertheless, the majority uses this 
case as an opportunity to define a term that already has a particular meaning, 
without relying on experts or authoritative statements and without considering the 
unique needs of Granger Township, by adopting the six factors delineated by the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals in White Oak Property Dev., L.L.C. v. 
Washington Twp., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-05-011, 2012-Ohio-425, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 53} Without engaging in any statutory analysis, the White Oak court, 
relying on cases that were decided on constitutional grounds or that involved 
municipalities, which are not required to have a comprehensive plan, held that a 
township’s zoning resolution and map was a “comprehensive plan” as used in 
R.C. 519.02.  Id. at ¶ 23.  That court then stated that because the township’s 
zoning resolution had addressed six factors, the resolution and map were “a 
comprehensive rural zoning plan.”  Id. at ¶ 46. 
{¶ 54} The majority’s decision to adopt these six factors to define a 
comprehensive plan is problematic.  First, like the majority, the White Oak court 
failed to engage in any statutory interpretation of R.C. 519.02(A) and failed to 
acknowledge that this court had previously determined that the term 
“comprehensive plan” had a particular meaning, see Symmes, 87 Ohio St.3d at 
January Term, 2015 
 
23
555, 721 N.E.2d 1057, and ignored the commands of R.C. 1.42 that “[w]ords and 
phrases that have acquired technical or particular meaning * * * shall be 
construed accordingly.”  The White Oak court also did not analyze the history of 
or trace the development of the term “comprehensive plan” in the specialized field 
of land planning. 
{¶ 55} Second, the White Oak court limited its adoption of the six factors 
to the zoning resolution and map before it, id. at ¶ 46, but today’s majority 
broadens that application and uses those factors to define the term 
“comprehensive plan” as it is used in R.C. 519.02.  This determination, in my 
opinion, removes the unique independent considerations of what factors should 
constitute a comprehensive plan for each township.  See Meck & Pearlman, 
Section 4:32, at 102-104. 
{¶ 56} Lastly, the White Oak factors are nothing more than the General 
Assembly’s statutory limitations on township trustees’ authority to regulate land 
use.  See R.C. 519.02(A) (“in the interest of the public health and safety,” 
“percentages of lot areas that may be occupied,” “sizes of yards, courts, and other 
open spaces [and] the density of population,” “the uses of land for trade, industry, 
residence, recreation, or other purposes,” and the “board may divide all or any 
part of the * * * township into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area 
as the board determines”).  Land use is a component of, but not synonymous with, 
a comprehensive plan.  See B.J. Alan, 124 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-5863, 918 
N.E.2d 501, ¶ 31; Meck & Perlman, Section 4.32, at 102-103. 
{¶ 57} The White Oak factors are inconsistent with the expert opinions 
presented by the parties in this case and the elements discussed in the 
authoritative treatise by Meck and Perlman.  Granger Township itself presented 
the expert testimony of Susan Hirsch, deputy director of the Medina County 
Department of Planning Services.  She testified that a comprehensive plan is a 
document “looking 20 years in to the future” that serves as a guide for a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24
community’s growth and development” and that it often incorporates maps and 
charts that show the community’s likely future growth.  According to Hirsch, the 
comprehensive plan contains “elements like housing, economic development, 
parks and recreation, agriculture, public facilities, and transportation and sets 
forth goals and objectives for the community as well as ways to implement those 
goals and objectives. 
{¶ 58} David Hartt, president and sole owner of D.B. Hartt, Inc., a 
Cleveland-based planning-and-development consulting firm, testified as an expert 
for Apple Group.  He stated that a comprehensive plan is “typically a 
community’s deliberate, thoughtful statement of what their aspirations are as they 
look ahead * * * to how they envision the community being developed and/or 
preserved.”  He contended that the plan should take into account the pattern of 
economic development, traffic, public facilities, and road and infrastructure 
improvements as well implementation of the plan, typically through zoning.  
Additionally, Hartt stated that the map that often is included in the plan “can be a 
very precise map indicating a future land use for each property or it can be more 
of a general map where it outlines some options for some property.” 
{¶ 59} Hirsch and Hartt agree as to what constitutes a comprehensive plan.  
Each opined that it should set forth the community’s future goals as to growth and 
development, discuss community facilities, land use, economic development, 
transportation, and implementation and should contain a map.  Their opinions 
reflect the discussion in Meck and Pearlman’s treatise, which states that a 
comprehensive plan should be accompanied by a map and contain the following 
elements: general statements of the community’s planning goals, land use, 
transportation, community facilities, housing, an implementation framework, and 
plans for the specific needs of a particular community, e.g., economic-
development strategy or historic preservation.  Meck & Pearlman, Section 4:32, at 
102-104. 
January Term, 2015 
 
25
{¶ 60} It defies logic that the White Oak factors are indicative of a 
comprehensive plan when those are the factors set out in R.C. 519.02(A) as the 
aspects of land use that are to be regulated by a resolution in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan. 
Expert Opinions Whether Granger Township has a Comprehensive Plan 
{¶ 61} The majority applies the six factors from White Oak to Granger 
Township’s zoning resolution and concludes that Granger Township’s resolution 
is a comprehensive plan.  However, both Hirsch and Hartt opined that Granger 
Township’s resolution is not a comprehensive plan. 
{¶ 62} Hirsch testified that the resolution was deficient because it did not 
have a statement of goals and objectives, a survey of transportation infrastructure, 
demographic data, or an inventory of community facilities.  Hartt opined that the 
lack of a comprehensive plan and the failure to include the features of a 
comprehensive plan in the zoning resolution left nothing for a planner to consult 
to determine whether the preservation of the community’s natural features was 
appropriate to meet Granger Township’s goals.  Nevertheless, the majority rejects 
out of hand this expertise and knowledge, instead finding that Granger 
Township’s zoning resolution is a comprehensive plan. 
Comprehensive Plan Rendered Meaningless 
{¶ 63} The majority’s decision is a death knell to the General Assembly’s 
limitation of a township’s exercise of police power because it eliminates the 
requirement for a comprehensive plan independent of a township’s zoning 
resolution.  First, the majority opinion identifies land use as only one element 
needed for a comprehensive plan.  Then, by holding that a zoning resolution may 
be the comprehensive plan, the majority has eliminated the distant-future-
planning factor from a comprehensive plan. 
{¶ 64} The statutory procedures for townships and counties to amend a 
zoning resolution are not so onerous that they cannot be undertaken on a regular 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26
basis.  See R.C. 519.12 and 303.12.  This case illustrates how easily zoning 
regulations can change: Granger Township enacted a zoning resolution effective 
May 17, 2006, and a mere 15 months later enacted another zoning resolution 
effective August 8, 2007.  The ability to amend a zoning resolution in such a short 
period of time is antithetical to a comprehensive plan’s purpose of looking 15 to 
20 years into future. 
{¶ 65} Accordingly, the majority opinion renders the grant of authority to 
a township to zone pursuant only to a resolution in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan meaningless.  Township trustees as well as county 
commissioners will be able to exercise this power without considering the long-
term impact of their zoning decisions.  Zoning resolutions will be enacted at the 
whims of those elected at that moment in time.  Such an outcome is contrary to 
the majority’s recognition “that a comprehensive plan serves to protect against the 
arbitrary and unreasonable administration of a zoning regulation.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 12, citing Cassell, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11. 
III.  Alternative Resolution 
Judicial Review when Township Lacks a Separate, Single, Formal Comprehensive 
Plan 
{¶ 66} Before the rise of zoning regulations in the early 20th century, 
governments did not regulate land-use conflicts in advance.  Meck & Pearlman, 
Section 1.2, at 4-5, and Section 2.1, at 19.  Instead, conflicts were decided 
primarily by the courts after a dispute had arisen.  Id., Section 2.1, at 19.  
Regulating land use in this manner was limiting.  Decisions affected only the 
parties to the suit and often the broader needs of society were not considered.  Id. 
at 19-20.  Further, the increasing complexity of the issues imposed upon the 
expertise and time of courts.  Accordingly, governments turned to zoning to 
regulate land use so that property disputes would not arise and planning and land 
development could proceed appropriately.  Id. at 19. 
January Term, 2015 
 
27
{¶ 67} The state’s authority to plan and regulate land use is derived from 
its police power, which is vested in the legislature.  See Ohio Constitution, Article 
II, Section 1.  Municipalities were the first to receive the police power to regulate 
by zoning in R.C. Chapter 713. 
{¶ 68} The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
municipal zoning ordinance in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 
(1925).  Recognizing the home-rule authority of a municipality in Article XVIII, 
Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, we held that “[u]nder the police power[,] 
society may restrict the use of property without making compensation therefor, if 
the restriction be reasonably necessary for the preservation of the public health, 
morals, or safety.”  Pritz at 637-638. 
{¶ 69} One year later, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
municipal ordinance restricting use of land in a residential area was constitutional.  
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 
(1926).  After recognizing the validity of exercising police power for the benefit 
of the public welfare, the court stated, “A regulatory zoning ordinance, which 
would be clearly valid to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to 
rural communities,” id. at 387, “like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard,” 
id. at 388.  In reaching its determination, the court held that the burden of proof 
rested with the party challenging the zoning ordinance and the court’s role was 
limited to determining whether the ordinance was reasonable to promote a valid 
public purpose.  Id. at 395-397. 
{¶ 70} Absent the adoption of a charter, see Ohio Constitution, Article X, 
Section 3, Ohio counties’ and townships’ police-power authority “originates 
through direct statutory delegation by the General Assembly, instead of through 
the state constitution.”  Meck & Pearlman, Section 3:4, at 63.  The General 
Assembly granted the authority to regulate land use to counties and townships in 
R.C. Chapters 303 and 519.  As stated previously, such an exercise of police 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28
power is limited “to that which is expressly delegated * * * by statute.”  See 
Yorkavitz, 166 Ohio St. at 351, 142 N.E.2d 655. 
{¶ 71} Like 
legislative 
enactments, 
zoning 
regulations 
enjoy 
a 
presumption of constitutionality.  Brown v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.2d 93, 95, 420 
N.E.2d 103 (1981).  The burden of proving unconstitutionality is on the party 
challenging the zoning regulation.  Negin v. Mentor Bd. of Bldg. & Zoning 
Appeals, 69 Ohio St.2d 492, 495, 433 N.E.2d 165 (1982); Ketchel v. Bainbridge 
Twp., 52 Ohio St.3d 239, 245, 557 N.E.2d 779 (1990).  Furthermore, “[i]n the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the procedure necessary to 
the legal adoption of legislation by a public legislative body has been followed.”  
Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954), paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 72} It is against this historical backdrop and with these legal principles 
in mind that I turn to the issues presented currently.  Apple Group asserts two 
propositions of law. 
{¶ 73} The first proposition of law states: 
 
For purposes of a township’s exercise of its statutory 
zoning power, the “zoning plan” that R.C. Chapter 519 empowers 
townships to adopt by resolution, which includes the zoning 
regulations and a zoning map, is not identical to or a substitute for 
the “comprehensive plan” identified in R.C. 519.02, with which 
R.C. 519.02 requires the “zoning plan” to be “in accordance.” 
 
{¶ 74} As stated above, the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 
519.02(A) requires a comprehensive plan separate and distinct from the zoning 
resolution. 
{¶ 75} Apple Group’s second proposition of law states: 
January Term, 2015 
 
29
 
A township’s zoning regulations, adopted by resolution 
under R.C. Chapter 519, are, standing alone, insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish that such regulations are “in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan,” as R.C. 519.02  requires. 
 
{¶ 76} Apple Group seemingly argues in both propositions of law that a 
comprehensive plan is a document drafted after professionals complete studies of 
the area and its future growth.  While I agree that a comprehensive plan would 
best be drafted as a single formal document, there is no textual support for such a 
requirement in the Revised Code. 
{¶ 77} The General Assembly did not define the term “comprehensive 
plan” in R.C. Chapter 519.  While zoning-and-planning experts agree with our 
precedents that the term has a particular meaning, it is clear that those experts 
believe that a plan should nevertheless be flexible and controlled by the unique 
needs of each township.  I agree with Apple Group that what is appropriate for an 
agricultural township might not be what is appropriate for a more cosmopolitan 
township.  However, I reject the argument made by Apple Group and amicus 
curiae, Ohio Township Association, that to be valid, a “comprehensive plan” must 
be drafted by a professional planner, which could require the expenditure of “tens 
of thousands of dollars.”  The statute did not require a comprehensive plan 
formulated by professional planners after the completion of expensive studies.  
Instead, the statute requires a zoning commission, in the development of the 
zoning plan, to make use of “information and counsel” from “public officials, 
departments and agencies,” but it leaves to the discretion of the township, and its 
financial health, whether to employ “planning consultants.”  See R.C. 519.05.  It 
would be unreasonable to find that a comprehensive plan must be created by 
professional planning consultants when it is clear that the General Assembly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30
considered the fiscal limitations of townships and granted townships the 
discretion whether to employ them. 
{¶ 78} I further reject Apple Group’s determination that Granger 
Township does not have a comprehensive plan separate from the zoning 
resolution.  The statement that Granger Township does not have a comprehensive 
plan for guidance for the proposed rezoning, which is found in a staff report from 
the township’s planning department, is subject to multiple meanings. 
{¶ 79} A comprehensive plan does not need to be a single document.  
Instead, I believe that a comprehensive plan may rely on numerous sources.  In 
other words, the township’s rationale for ensuring the appropriate use and 
development of land may be derived from several sources.  This conclusion 
balances the need to rely on experts to formulate the comprehensive plan, see 
Order of Ry. Conductors, 329 U.S. at 525, 67 S.Ct. 405, 91 L.Ed. 471, against the 
fact that the General Assembly has failed to provide a definition for the term 
“comprehensive plan” and the mechanisms by which it is to be formulated.  I 
refuse, however, to speculate as to the source or sources from which a 
comprehensive plan might be formulated, because this determination would fall 
within the province of the trial court. 
{¶ 80} Lastly, contrary to Apple Group’s argument, the determination that 
Granger Township lacks a separate, single, formal comprehensive plan does not 
render the township’s zoning resolution invalid.  Instead, I believe that the failure 
to have a separate comprehensive plan means only that the presumption of the 
resolution’s validity is rebuttable.  See Raabe v. Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 178, 174 
N.W.2d 789 (1970); Forestview Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Cook Cty., 18 Ill. 
App.3d 230, 242, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974).  Therefore, if the party challenging the 
zoning resolution shows that a township does not have a separate comprehensive 
plan, the burden shifts to the township to present evidence that notwithstanding its 
January Term, 2015 
 
31
failure to formulate a plan, the resolution is a valid exercise of police power 
granted by the General Assembly. 
Remand to Trial Court 
{¶ 81} Accordingly, I would reverse judgment of the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals, and I would remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to 
determine, relying upon the knowledge and experience of experts, what would 
constitute a comprehensive plan formulated for the unique needs of Granger 
Township.  Thereafter, Apple Group would have the burden to prove that Granger 
Township does not have a separate comprehensive plan.  Whether Apple Group is 
successful in establishing that Granger Township does not have a separate 
comprehensive plan will dictate which party carries the burden of proving that the 
resolution is a proper exercise of police powers. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 82} Respectfully, I dissent.  “In Ohio, the authority of a township to 
enact zoning ordinances derives not from the township’s inherent authority or the 
Ohio Constitution, but from the General Assembly.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 6.  
Therefore, township trustees can exercise only the authority specifically granted 
by the legislature. 
{¶ 83} The unambiguous language in R.C. 519.02(A) demonstrates that 
the General Assembly intended to limit a township’s exercise of zoning power to 
regulations enacted “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  Since a 
township’s zoning resolution and a comprehensive plan cannot be one and the 
same, I would hold that a comprehensive plan must be separate and distinct from 
a zoning resolution. 
{¶ 84} Moreover, I would neither delineate the factors that are indicative 
of a comprehensive plan nor determine whether Granger Township even has a 
comprehensive plan.  These issues were not raised as propositions of law in this 
appeal, and the parties neither briefed nor argued these matters.  The majority 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32
crafts its own definition for a term that has a particular meaning in the field of 
zoning. The majority’s definition is inconsistent with the expert testimony 
presented in this matter and does not consider the unique needs of Granger 
Township. 
{¶ 85} Further, I do not believe that a comprehensive plan must be a single 
formal document.  Instead, it may be derived from several sources.  In the event, 
however, that Apple Group is able to prove that Granger Township does not have 
a comprehensive plan, even one derived from a compilation of sources, Granger 
Township’s zoning resolution would not be presumptively invalid.  Instead, the 
burden of proof would then shift to Granger Township to establish that its 
resolution is a valid exercise of the police power granted to it by the General 
Assembly. 
{¶ 86} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Sheldon Berns, Benjamin J. 
Ockner, and Gary F. Werner, for appellant. 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian M. 
Richter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Donald F. Brosius, Peter N. Griggs, 
and Jennifer L. Huber, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Township 
Association. 
_________________