Title: Glenn v. Glenn

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Glenn v. Glenn1993 WY 35848 P.2d 819Case Number: 92-126Decided: 03/16/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Orland P. GLENN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Emily M. GLENN, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Crook County, Dan R. Price, II, J.

Orland P. Glenn, 
pro se.

No appearance 
by appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. Ret.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from an order modifying appellant's child support obligation by reducing it to a 
monthly payment of $100. Appellant contends that his Rawlins penitentiary inmate 
incentive pay should not be subject to child support obligations at 
all.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents these issues:

1. The district court 
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered that appellant pay child support out 
of income received from the Wyoming State Penitentiary's Incentive Pay 
Program.

2. The district court 
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered that the appellant pay child support 
out of income which totals less than that affording garnishment jurisdiction 
under W.S. 40-14-505(c).

3. The district court 
exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion when it ordered the 
appellant to pay child support in an amount which equals and/or exceeds the 
appellant's income.

4. The district court 
erred and abused its discretion when it ordered child support payments as a 
subterfuge for awarding the appellee a second judgment against the appellant for 
acts which were resolved in an earlier and separate tort action.

[¶4]      Orland P. Glenn 
(appellant) and Emily Glenn were married in 1968. They were divorced September 
21, 1987. Because of appellant's threats and violent acts, a protective order 
had been issued. Other protective measures were included in the divorce decree 
such as requiring the presence of a peace officer when he removed his 
belongings.

[¶5]      The divorce 
decree required appellant to pay child support in the amount of $110.00 per 
child per month. Since the parties had five children, the initial payments were 
$550.00 per month. Appellant made seven payments of $550.00 and one payment of 
$275.00. Beginning in April of 1988 appellant was in arrears. The monthly amount 
owing has been reduced twice, apparently due to emancipation of two of their 
minor children. Even with those reductions, appellant was $19,085.00 in arrears 
of his child support obligation as of December of 1991.

[¶6]      On July 19, 1991, 
appellant filed a petition for temporary modification of child support. 
Appellant stated that his change of circumstance was his conviction of a felony 
and subsequent sentence for a term of "natural life" in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary. Appellant's conviction and subsequent incarceration stem from the 
attempted first degree murder of Emily Glenn, his ex-wife, when he shot her in 
front of one of their children.

[¶7]      In his petition, 
appellant claimed that he has monthly personal expenses for items not provided 
by the Wyoming State Penitentiary and that those expenses meet or exceed his 
monthly income; therefore, he has nothing left with which to pay child support. 
Appellant also alleged that his income will not substantially change during the 
period of his incarceration and that the court should modify the child support 
order to meet his change in circumstances.

[¶8]      The district 
court conducted a hearing on the petition to modify on December 5, 1991. The 
district court found that there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
allowed the court to reduce appellant's child support obligation. The district 
court entered an order reducing appellant's child support obligation to $100.00 
per month starting January 1, 1992, and continuing until all of the parties' 
children reach the age of majority, are emancipated, or become self supporting. 
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's 
order.

[¶9]      Appellant argues 
that the district court abused its discretion. Concerning abuse of discretion, 
we have said:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances."

Roberts v. 
Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)).

[¶10]   When we review a child support 
order that is within the statutory guidelines, we have said that "the child 
support guidelines `shall be rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of 
child support to be awarded.'" Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 98 (Wyo. 1992) 
(quoting W.S. 20-6-302(a)).

PAYMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT OUT OF THE WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY'S INCENTIVE PAY 
PROGRAM

[¶11]   Appellant admits that he receives 
between $60 to $80 per month in prison incentive pay. Wyoming Statute 7-16-203 
(1987) allows a person in confinement to receive compensation as specified by 
the Board of Charities and Reform. This section has now been amended in 
recognition of the establishment of the Department of Corrections. W.S. 7-16-203 
(Supp. 1992).

[¶12]   Any earnings accrued by the 
prisoner are to be distributed in accordance with the following 
provision:

(a) Payment for services 
performed by any prisoner shall be deposited in the trust and agency account at 
the institution and shall be disbursed for the purposes provided in this 
subsection and in the order specified:

(i) Personal 
necessities;

(ii) Victim 
compensation;

(iii) Support of 
dependent relations of the prisoner;

(iv) Reimbursement for 
the services of public defender or court appointed counsel; and

(v) Remaining funds shall 
be paid the prisoner upon parole or final discharge.

W.S. 7-16-205 
(1987). (This section has also been amended see W.S. 7-16-205 (1992)). Appellant 
contends that the order in which the items are listed establishes their 
priority. Appellant argues, therefore, that child support obligations are a 
lower priority than personal necessities of the prisoner and he should pay 
nothing.

[¶13]   Appellant fails to make clear what 
necessities he would be deprived of as a result of the child support order. 
While it is true that child support obligations are not the first on the list, 
we need not now decide the effect of the listing in this case, for appellant has 
made no credible showing that payment of this minimal child support will deprive 
him of necessities during his prison incarceration. Since child support 
obligations are specifically designated in the statute, it is clear that the 
legislature intended they be paid where reasonably possible.

ORDERING 
APPELLANT TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT WHICH EQUALS AND/OR EXCEEDS HIS 
INCOME

[¶14]   Appellant argues that the district 
court exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion when it ordered him to 
pay child support in an amount which "equals and/or exceeds" his income. 
Appellant then cites two cases for the proposition that an incarcerated parent 
is not liable for child support unless it can be shown that he has income or 
assets sufficient to make the payments. Clemans v. Collins, 679 P.2d 1041, 1042 
(Alaska 1984); Matter of Marriage of Edmonds, 53 Or. App. 539, 633 P.2d 4, 5 
(1981), overruled by Matter of Marriage of Willis, 109 Or. App. 584, 820 P.2d 858 (1991). The Oregon Court of Appeals has now decided that a father cannot 
escape his financial obligation to his children simply because he is behind 
bars. Therefore, appellant's citation to Edmonds need not be addressed. Even so, 
what the district court did in this case was consistent with Clemans. Clemans 
holds that if an incarcerated parent has no ability to pay, he is not liable for 
child support. Here, however, the incarcerated parent does have the ability to 
pay.

[¶15]   Appellant acknowledges that he 
receives $67.50 a month from the Wyoming State Penitentiary and $36.00 a month 
in military disability payments. Therefore appellant has a monthly income of 
$103.50. Appellant also acknowledges that he receives monetary gifts from 
persons outside of the penitentiary. During a ten-month period these gifts 
totaled $185.83.

[¶16]   In the cases appellant cites, the 
incarcerated person had no income. Those cases are distinguishable because here 
appellant has admitted income sufficient to meet the child support obligation 
the judge ordered. Our research has uncovered additional cases which show that 
many courts follow the Clemans approach, that is, if the incarcerated parent 
does not have income, he is not required to pay child support during his 
incarceration. Foster v. Foster, 99 A.D.2d 284, 471 N.Y.S.2d 867 (2 Dept. 1984); 
Pierce v. Pierce, 162 Mich. App. 367, 412 N.W.2d 291 (1987). Pierce also 
acknowledges that if the incarcerated parent does have assets or income while in 
prison, that income can properly be applied against the outstanding support 
obligation. Pierce, 412 N.W.2d  at 293. We agree with this rule. When an 
incarcerated parent has income, that income can fairly be applied to the child 
support obligation.

[¶17]   The rule we adopt is consistent 
with Clemans, and it is not as far as some courts have gone. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court has ruled that in all cases an incarcerated parent should pay 
child support. Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 369 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1985). The 
Nebraska court reasoned that the obligation should not be modified where the 
means to pay the obligation was eliminated through criminal 
activity.

[¶18]   It must be remembered that 
appellant did receive a substantial reduction in the amount of child support he 
is required to pay. He is appealing because he wanted the obligation suspended 
until the end of his term of natural life. The district judge declined to do 
this but did reduce the amount in accordance with appellant's ability to 
pay.

[¶19]   The district judge did what the 
child support guidelines required of him. The statute requires that if the 
parent has an income of less than $500.00, the child support award must be made 
in accordance with ability to pay, but in no event shall the award be less than 
$50.00. W.S. 20-6-304 (1992). The district judge made no error in reducing the 
child support payment to $100.00 per month.

[¶20]   After reviewing the record, we note 
that the hearing on the petition to modify the support order was not 
transcribed. However, the record is still adequate. The record contains 
appellant's acknowledgments of his income. We are also entitled to give the 
district court due deference and assume that the award was made after an 
appropriate finding concerning appellant's ability to pay. In addition, 
appellant raises no issue about his ability to pay or any finding concerning 
it.

[¶21]   Appellant next claims that the 
Board of Charities and Reform has jurisdiction over the incentive pay program 
and therefore the district court had no jurisdiction to enter the child support 
order. Appellant misunderstands the role of the district court. While the 
district court entered an order that would affect his incentive pay, the 
district court did not attempt to administer the fund or encroach on the role of 
the Board. The district court merely established an obligation for support of 
relatives. The Board of Charities and Reform (now the Department of Corrections) 
will ultimately administer the fund.

GARNISHMENT 
JURISDICTION

[¶22]   Appellant argues that the district 
court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering child support out of income which 
totals less than what is required for garnishment under W.S. 40-14-505(c). 
Appellant is correct that § 40-14-505(c) limits the availability of garnishment 
in some situations. However section § 40-14-502 makes clear that it applies only 
to "actions or other proceedings to enforce rights arising from consumer credit 
sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans; and, in addition, to extortionate 
extensions of credit." W.S. 40-14-502 (1977). That statutory section is not 
relevant.

[¶23]   Appellant also cites W.S. 1-15-511. 
Appellant is correct that this section also limits the scope of garnishment as a 
remedy. However before any garnishment can take place, and also before any 
objection to it can be raised, a money judgment must be obtained. W.S. 1-15-502 
(1988). The judgment must then be taken to the clerk of court who must issue a 
writ for continuing garnishment against the judgment debtor's employer. W.S. 
1-15-502. It is clear from the record that none of those steps have taken place. 
It would be premature for this court to speculate about whether garnishment was 
proper when it has not occurred. All we have jurisdiction to review is the 
district court's child support order which we find proper. Therefore, we decline 
to address the garnishment issue since it is premature.

SUBTERFUGE FOR AWARDING A 
SECOND JUDGMENT IN AN EARLIER TORT ACTION

[¶24]   Appellant claims that the district 
court erred because it ordered child support as "subterfuge" for actually 
awarding the mother a second judgment against appellant for his tortious 
conduct. Appellant's claim is incorrect. The child support obligation began 
before appellant's criminal and tortious actions; therefore, the district court 
could not have been awarding child support as a pretense for a tort award. The 
record demonstrates that the district court's order was to benefit his children 
and not for another purpose. If appellant's allegation were so, the district 
court would have increased his child support obligation rather than reducing it. 
Appellant fails to present any evidence of this claim other than mere 
assertion.

[¶25]   Appellant also argues that because 
the child support order was subterfuge for awarding an additional tort judgment, 
the district court's order is void for violating res judicata. Appellant 
fails to understand that the tort and child support action are entirely 
separate, and the district court's order in no way affected the tort judgment. 
The district court never disturbed the finality of the tort action, and 
appellant's argument is without merit.

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   The district court did not err in 
reducing the child support obligation to $100.00. The district court's order is 
within the statutory guidelines, and appellant has acknowledged he has the 
ability to pay. Therefore, the district court order was properly entered. Having 
found no error, we affirm.

[¶27]   Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶28]   Orland P. Glenn committed a 
murderous assault upon his ex-wife for which he received a life term prison 
sentence. Additionally, lacking substantial income through trial and subsequent 
confinement, he has now accumulated $19,085 in delinquent child support. To this 
burden, an award for restitution of $18,950.65 must be added. Furthermore, 
Glenn's ex-wife also obtained a default judgment on November 3, 1988 in the 
amount of $500,000, which has accrued unpaid interest at a ten percent annual 
amount. On October 4, 1988, Glenn's ex-wife and mother of his children, Emily M. 
Glenn, executed an assignment for any child support payments which she might 
receive to the predecessor of the present Wyoming State Department of Family 
Services for reimbursement of the "welfare" benefits that she has 
received.

[¶29]   Appellant, looking at the 
monumental debt and the accruing numbers which, because of the age of his 
children, had declined from $550 to $300 per month, filed an application for the 
remission of the child support obligation. Following a hearing on a petition to 
modify child support and by this majority opinion, appellant is obligated to pay 
$100 per month for child support from a $36 monthly military disability payment 
and a prisoner incentive payment of $67.50. This is, in essence, a further 
punishment by a 1992 attachment of funds used for personal maintenance at the 
penitentiary (except $3.50 per month), which will constitute additional 
retribution beyond the life term confinement sentence entered approximately four 
years ago.

[¶30]   Maybe that is justice. Maybe it is, 
as appellant contends, moving numbers on the ledger. First, I find that efforts 
to obligate a person with a life sentence to provide funds for replacement of 
state obligations under aid to dependent children programs to be next to totally 
absurd. Beyond that, however, unless we are just moving numbers without 
collective purpose, I find clear violation of federal statutes and state 
laws.

[¶31]   This is true if we really intended 
to collect something for the Department of Family Services, or perhaps for the 
mother,1 in addition to the $15 remaining 
due for the Victim's Compensation Fund; $18,950.65 restitution; an unpaid 
judgment which is now approximately $735,000; and unpaid child support accrued 
through December 1991 of $19,085.

[¶32]   Candidly, we need to consider 
whether this decision is really intended to involve actual collection or, 
conversely, is a meaningless exercise in semantics to avoid the possibility of 
ignorant individuals, with malicious intent, misconstruing the decision for 
ulterior purpose in some future retention campaign.

[¶33]   I choose to believe that the 
majority intends some real result in writing the opinion and, consequently, I 
examine the meaning of a $100 per month child support order entered against a 
life term prisoner whose income consists of a $36 military disability payment 
and $67.50 incentive compensation for prison labor.

[¶34]   Starting with state law, we find 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-107(b)(ii) (1988), which provides exemptions of income from 
attachment, including "Veteran's benefits," and "[o]ther exemptions as provided 
by law." Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-107(b)(x).

[¶35]   In order to consider the 
confinement incentive compensation receipts, we find from Wyo. Stat. § 7-16-205 
(Cum.Supp. 1992) an established order of priority for prisoner earnings: (i) 
personal necessities; (ii) victim's compensation; and (iii) support for 
dependent relatives of the prisoner. The child support guidelines, Wyo. Stat. § 
20-6-304(b) (Cum.Supp. 1992), provide: "In the case of an obligor having a 
monthly net income of less than five hundred dollars ($500.00), the support 
obligation shall be based on the obligor's ability to pay, but in no case 
shall the support obligation be less than fifty dollars ($50.00) per month." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶36]   The income withholding statute, 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-210(b)(iii) (Cum.Supp. 1992), provides: "That the amount 
actually withheld for support combined with the fee authorized by W.S. 
20-6-212(c) shall not exceed thirty-five percent (35%) of the obligor's 
disposable income received from that payor[.]"

[¶37]   The majority accurately recognizes 
that Wyo. Stat. § 40-14-505(b) (1977) has, in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
statute, a garnishment limitation proviso which does not apply to child support 
obligations. The majority should have looked beyond to 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a), 
where child support is recognized as exempt by the UCCC type formula to 15 
U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2):

The maximum part of the 
aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject 
to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not 
exceed -

(A) where such individual 
is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with 
respect to whose support such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual's 
disposable earnings for that week; and

(B) where such individual 
is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in clause (A), 60 
per centum of such individual's disposable earnings for that week[.]

[¶38]   Furthermore, it is clear that 42 
U.S.C. § 659 does not establish "a right to garnishment of disability benefits." 
The McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981) 
statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, provides only a fifty percent exemption to 
court-ordered lien imposition on military pay:

The total amount of the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable under subsection (d) may 
not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired or retainer pay.

10 U.S.C. § 
1408(e)(1).

Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to 
this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 659) with respect to a member may not exceed 65 
percent of the disposal retired or retainer pay payable to such 
member.

10 U.S.C. § 
1408(e)(4)(B).

[¶39]   It is certain that McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728 in no regard considered disability benefit payments to 
the veteran. Id. at 213, 101 S. Ct.  at 2731. It is likewise apparent that the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act, P.L. 97-252, Title X, § 1006, 
96 Stat. 737, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, also excluded disability benefits from any 
attachment authorization. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4); and Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 644, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 2043, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987), White, J., dissenting. 
Consequently, if I believe that this case has any meaning, considering the 
extent of activities already pursued, there has to be something more at stake 
than increasing the delinquency in the child support account by $100 per month. 
The reason I dissent is because of the anticipation the majority intent reflects 
to reduce this life term prisoner to usable income for maintenance of $3.50 a 
month as further punishment.2

[¶40]   I fail to see reality in this 
regard considering the fifty percent limitation provided in federal law for both 
military disability retirement benefits and employment earnings. I find a 
disregard of fact in denying a real need for funds for someone sentenced to a 
life term. Beyond that, child support has an inferior position, not only to the 
necessities of the prisoner, but also to the unpaid $18,950.65 restitution. 
Further, I question that under the guidelines, the amount of $100 out of $103.50 
morally or practically reaches compliance with extensive case law of this court 
regarding "obligor's ability to pay" as we find in Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-304(b) 
where the stated minimum is $50 and not everything.

[¶41]   This is not a contempt action, nor 
does the father in this case, facing a life sentence, have cause to fear 
contempt confinement punishment from non-payment while imprisoned. Cf. Barbour 
v. Barbour, 642 S.W.2d 904 (Ky.App. 1982), where contempt might be used, but 
garnishment activities were not considered. See also Elmwood v. Elmwood, 295 
N.C. 168, 244 S.E.2d 668 (1978), where the court recognized retirement 
disability pay was not "remuneration for employment." Further cases have held 
that disability benefits are exempt from attachment unless specific provisions 
of federal law are otherwise provided. See Sanchez Dieppa v. Rodriguez Pereira, 
580 F. Supp. 735 (D.P.R. 1984).

[¶42]   The concepts advanced in Clemans v. 
Collins, 679 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1984); Pierce v. Pierce, 162 Mich. App. 367, 412 N.W.2d 291 (1987); Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 369 N.W.2d 615 (1985); and 
Foster v. Foster, 99 A.D.2d 284, 471 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1984), relating to reality 
and reasonableness in assessment of child support against the incarcerated, 
have, in my opinion, perverse persuasion from that utilized by this majority. 
The fact is, in this case, that the decision would leave $3.50 for a prisoner to 
spend on monthly necessities - that is essentially nothing. See Morehead v. 
Morehead, 811 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1991); Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1981); 
and Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933).

[¶43]   This dissent just touches the 
surface of the complexities involved in any collection effort for child support 
in this case from the sources of funds to which attention is directed. 
Addressing reality and reason, I would consider that if this effort is to really 
seek a way to provide money for the inmate's family in some amount and not just 
to create collection litigation for the courts, reason, statutes, and perhaps 
even some modest justice would determine that a maximum order should have been 
entered for the lesser of $50, or fifty percent of the prisoner's earnings and 
disability retirement benefits. This, in itself, would only be proper if both 
the inmate and the ex-wife first waived the priority requirement for payment on 
the restitution obligation.

[¶44]   This decision, by incomplete 
examination of a complex composite of statutes and case law, violates maximum 
assessment on collection provisions in both state and federal law and, in text, 
totally fails in reasoned analysis.

[¶45]   Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 The issue of who 
receives the recovered funds - the state in repayment or the family for 
additional support - is directly involved in the standard of need controversies 
currently before this court in Davidson v. Sherman, Wyoming Supreme Court, 
Docket No. 92-63.

2 I find it ludicrous and 
absurd to include gifts from friends in computation of funds for a prisoner's 
necessities. If he had excessive funds in his account, those gifts would not be 
made. Conversely, if the donors wanted to subsidize the Wyoming Department of 
Family Services, AFDC accounts, by gifts, they could have done that. We should 
confine this decision by analysis of whether a very modest disability payment 
and statutorily created confinement employment compensation can be taken 
essentially in full, leaving the prisoner virtually without any money for his 
penitentiary existence.