Title: Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC and Richard Alexander Rogers. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Lori Lee Wright v. Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC and Richard Alexander Rogers)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL 09/23/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090342
_________________________
Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, and Richard
Alexander Rogers
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Lori Lee Wright
v.
Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, and Richard Alexander
Rogers)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-09-900393)
PER CURIAM.
1090342
The materials before this Court do not indicate whether
1
Rogers was injured as a result of the collision.
2
Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, and Richard Alexander
Rogers 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively 
as 
"the
petitioners") petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to transfer this action
to Elmore County on the basis of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 3, 2007, Lori Lee Wright, a resident of Elmore
County, was driving northbound on the Deatsville Highway in
Elmore County.  Rogers, a resident of Montgomery County, was
driving a vehicle owned by Autauga Heating & Cooling, which
has its principal place of business in Autauga County, and was
traveling southbound on the Deatsville Highway.  Rogers
attempted to turn left into a private driveway and was struck
by Wright's vehicle as he crossed her pathway.  Rogers alleges
that Wright was traveling at an excessive rate of speed.
Emergency medical technicians who reside in Elmore County
responded to the scene of the accident and provided emergency
treatment to Wright.1
1090342
3
Wright sued the petitioners in the Montgomery Circuit
Court on March 31, 2009.  On May 6, 2009, the petitioners
filed a motion to transfer the case to the Elmore Circuit
Court based on § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, the forum non
conveniens statute.  The trial court denied the motion.
Standard of Review
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789
(Ala. 1998).  A writ of mandamus is appropriate when
the petitioner can demonstrate '(1) a clear right to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex
parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
2001).  Additionally, this Court reviews mandamus
petitions challenging a ruling on venue on the basis
of forum non conveniens by asking whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion.  Ex parte Fuller, 955
So. 2d 414 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte Verbena United
Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 2006).  Our
review is limited to only those facts that were
before the trial court.  Ex parte Pike Fabrication,
Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala. 2002)."
Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 2008).
Discussion
All parties agree that venue in this case is proper in
both Montgomery County and Elmore County.  However, the
petitioners argued in their motion for a change of venue
1090342
4
before the trial court as well as in their petition for the
writ of mandamus that the case should be transferred to Elmore
County pursuant to § 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975, the forum
non conveniens statute. Section 6-3-21.1(a) provides:
"With 
respect 
to 
civil 
actions 
filed 
in 
an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, or in the interest of justice, transfer
any civil action or any claim in any civil action to
any court of general jurisdiction in which the
action might have been properly filed and the case
shall proceed as though originally filed therein
...."
"A party moving for a transfer under § 6-3-21.1 has the
initial burden of showing, among other things, one of two
factors: (1) that the transfer is justified based on the
convenience of either the parties or the witnesses, or (2)
that the transfer is justified 'in the interest of justice.'"
Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 539 (Ala.
2008) (quoting Ex parte Masonite Corp., 789 So. 2d 830, 831
(Ala. 2001), and citing Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727
So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)).  The petitioners argue that a
transfer of the case to Elmore County is justified both for
the convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as in the
interest of justice.  This Court need not analyze the
1090342
5
convenience factor because we hold that a transfer is required
under the interest-of-justice factor.
This Court addressed the same issue in Ex parte Indiana
Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., supra.  In Indiana Mills, this
Court stated:
"The 'interest of justice' prong of § 6-3-21.1
requires 'the transfer of the action from a county
with little, if any, connection to the action, to
the county with a strong connection to the action.'
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d at 790.
Therefore, 'in analyzing the interest-of-justice
prong of § 6-3-21.1, this Court focuses on whether
the "nexus" or "connection" between the plaintiff's
action and the original forum is strong enough to
warrant burdening the plaintiff's forum with the
action.'  Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
994 So. 2d 906, 911 (Ala. 2008).  Additionally, this
Court has held that 'litigation should be handled in
the forum where the injury occurred.'  Ex parte
Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala. 2006).  Further,
in examining whether it is in the interest of
justice to transfer a case, we consider 'the burden
of piling court services and resources upon the
people of a county that is not affected by the case
and ... the interest of the people of a county to
have a case that arises in their county tried close
to public view in their county.'  Ex parte Smiths
Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala.
2007).  The petitioners in this case are thus
required to demonstrate '"that having the case heard
in [Elmore] County would more serve the interest of
justice"' than having the case heard in [Montgomery]
County.  Ex parte First Tennessee Bank, 994 So. 2d
at 909 (quoting Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414, 416
(Ala. 2006))."
10 So. 3d at 540.
1090342
6
Historically, the plaintiff has had the initial choice of
venue under the system established by the legislature for
determining venue.  Before the enactment of § 6-3-21.1 by the
Alabama Legislature in 1987, a plaintiff's choice of venue
could not be disturbed on the basis of convenience to the
parties or the witnesses or in the interest of justice.  With
the adoption of § 6-3-21.1, trial courts now have "the power
and the duty to transfer a cause when 'the interest of
justice' requires a transfer."  Ex parte First Family Fin.
Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 660 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis
added).  In First Family, this Court noted that an argument
that trial judges have almost unlimited discretion in
determining whether a case should be transferred under § 6-3-
21.1 "must be considered in light of the fact that the
Legislature used the word 'shall' instead of the word 'may' in
§ 6-3-21.1."  718 So. 2d at 660.  This Court has further held
that "Alabama's forum non conveniens statute is compulsory."
Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 905 n.9 (Ala. 2004).
The petitioners argue that a transfer of the case to
Elmore County is warranted because (1) the accident occurred
in Elmore County, (2) Wright, the plaintiff, lives in Elmore
1090342
Wright argues that an affidavit of the emergency medical
2
technician was not properly before the trial court for its
consideration because it was attached to the petitioners'
October 2, 2009, supplemental brief to the trial court in
support of their motion for a change of venue and the
petitioners' supplemental brief "was denied by the trial court
on October 7, 2009."  (Wright's brief, p. 6.)  However, the
materials before this Court show that the petitioners' "Motion
for Change of Venue/Transfer" was denied by an order the trial
court on October 7, 2009.  Nothing before this Court indicates
that the supplemental brief or its supporting exhibits were
ever struck from record; thus, the affidavit is evidence for
this Court's consideration.
7
County, (3) Autauga Heating & Cooling has its principal place
of business in Autauga County with business connections to
Elmore County but "few, if any, business connections with
Montgomery County," and (4) witnesses, including the emergency
medical technician who assisted in transporting Wright to the
hospital after the accident, reside in Elmore County.2
Wright, however, argues that the case should remain in
Montgomery County because, she alleges, (1) Rogers is a
resident of Montgomery County, (2) Wright's treating physician
is located in Montgomery County, (3) Baptist Medical Center
South and the Montgomery Surgical Center, where Wright was
treated for injuries sustained in the accident, are both
located in Montgomery County, (4) Wright sought chiropractic
treatment and physical therapy in Autauga County, but the
1090342
8
chiropractor who treated her also maintains a Montgomery
office, (5) the state trooper who investigated the accident is
based out of the Montgomery post of the Alabama Department of
Public Safety, and (6) two witnesses live in Crestview,
Florida, and would be able to fly directly to the Montgomery
Regional Airport.  Although Wright alleges that these facts
are undisputed, nothing before this Court reflects that Wright
presented any evidence to the trial court showing that her
treating physician is located in Montgomery, that she was
treated at Baptist Medical Center South or at the Montgomery
Surgical Center, that she sought chiropractic treatment in
Autauga County from a chiropractor who also has an office in
Montgomery County, or that the state trooper who investigated
the accident is based out of the Montgomery post of the
Department of Public Safety.  Wright merely makes these
assertions in her brief in opposition to the petitioners'
motion for a change of venue, and that brief was not
accompanied by any affidavits or any other forms of evidence
that would have attested to the veracity of these statements.
As this Court has previously held:
"'In considering a mandamus petition, we must look
at only those facts before the trial court.'  Ex
1090342
9
parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936
(Ala. 1995) (emphasis added).  Of course, facts must
be based upon 'evidentiary material,' which does not
include statements of counsel in motions, briefs,
and arguments.  Ex parte McCord-Baugh, 894 So. 2d
679, 686 (Ala. 2004).  See also Providian Nat'l Bank
v. Conner, 898 So. 2d 714, 719 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 933 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala.
2006).  See also Ex parte Verbena United Methodist Church, 953
So. 2d 395, 399 (Ala. 2006).  Because the information before
this Court regarding Wright's assertions is contained in
"statements of counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments," it
cannot be considered "evidentiary material" and thus will not
be considered by this Court.
Although we agree with Wright that the case has a
connection with Montgomery County because Rogers is a resident
of Montgomery County and Autauga Heating & Air may have some
business connections there, we hold that the overall
connection between Montgomery County and this case is weak and
that the connection between the case and Elmore County is
strong.
First, the accident occurred in Elmore County.  Wright,
the plaintiff, is a resident of Elmore County.  Further,
Rebecca McCullers, the emergency medical technician who
1090342
10
responded to the accident,  testified in her affidavit that
she worked for Haynes Ambulance of Wetumpka, Inc., and that
she is a resident of Elmore County.  The principal place of
business of Haynes Ambulance of Wetumpka, Inc., is in Elmore
County.  On the other hand, the connection between the case
and Montgomery County, given the evidence before the trial
court, is weak.  Besides the fact that Rogers is resident of
Montgomery County, there was no other evidence before the
trial court indicating a connection between the case and
Montgomery County.  
This Court addressed similar facts in Ex parte Indiana
Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., supra.  In Indiana Mills, the
decedent was driving a garbage truck in Lee County owned by
his employer when the raised rear door of the truck struck an
overhead railroad trestle, causing the truck to crash. The
decedent was killed when he was ejected from the truck.  His
widow filed a complaint in Macon County against the
manufacturers of the garbage truck and the seat belts in the
truck and three employees of the decedent's employer.  The
employer's principal place of business was in Tallapoosa
County.  The employer conducted business in Macon County, and
1090342
11
one of the individual defendants lived in Macon County.  The
defendants moved the trial court to transfer the case to Lee
County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  The
trial court denied that motion, and the defendants petitioned
this Court for mandamus relief.
This Court granted the defendants' mandamus petition and
ordered the trial court to transfer the case from Macon County
to Lee County based on the "interest of justice" prong of § 6-
3-21.1.  In doing so, this Court noted that the accident
occurred in Lee County, that the law-enforcement and emergency
personnel who had responded to the accident were based out of
Lee County, that the chief deputy coroner who investigated the
decedent's death did his work in Lee County, and that the
records and documents of the fire department that responded to
the accident were located in Lee County.  Comparing this to
the fact that only one of the individual defendant resided in
Macon County and that the employer conducted business there,
there being no other relevant facts involving Macon County,
this Court held that the nexus between Lee County and the case
was strong, that the nexus between Macon County and the case
1090342
12
was weak, and that the trial court thus had exceeded its
discretion in refusing to transfer the case to Lee County.
The accident underlying this action occurred in Elmore
County, and the emergency personnel who responded to the
accident were from Elmore County.  The plaintiff herself is a
resident of Elmore County.  This Court sees no need to burden
Montgomery County, with its weak connection to the case, with
an action that arose in Elmore County simply because the
individual defendant resides in Montgomery County and the
corporate defendant does some business there.  We thus
conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
denying the petitioners' motion for a change of venue.  The
trial court is hereby directed to transfer the case to the
Elmore Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1090342
13
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Because I dissented in Ex parte Indiana Mills &
Manufacturing, Inc., 10 So. 3d 536 (Ala. 2008), I respectfully
dissent in this case.  In Ex parte First Family Financial
Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1998), after noting that
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-21.1, the forum non conveniens statute,
contained the mandatory term "shall" instead of the permissive
term "may," this Court stated:
"The trial judge has a degree of discretion in
determining whether the factors listed in the
statute, i.e., 'the convenience of the parties and
witnesses' and 'the interest of justice,' are in
favor of transferring the action.  This Court will
reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard only
upon a showing of an abuse of discretion."
718 So. 2d at 660.  In the intervening 12 years since this
Court made that statement, I believe that subsequent decisions
of this Court have seriously eroded this "degree of
discretion."
In some instances, the facts concerning venue are so
clear-cut that a change of venue "in the interest of justice"
is justified and there is little to no room for discretion in
making that decision.  For example, in Ex parte McKenzie Oil
Co., 13 So. 3d 346 (Ala. 2008), a vehicle being operated by an
1090342
14
Escambia County resident collided in Escambia County with a
vehicle being operated by a Clarke County resident.  The
Escambia County resident pleaded guilty in an Escambia County
court to reckless driving.  Subsequently, the Clarke County
resident sued the Escambia County resident and McKenzie Oil
Company in the Barbour Circuit Court, seeking damages under
the Dram Shop Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-71.  Barbour County's
only connection to the case was that McKenzie Oil, the owner
of the convenience store, located in Escambia County, that
purportedly sold the allegedly intoxicated Escambia County
resident alcohol, was headquartered in Barbour County.  This
Court held, and I believe correctly, that this small nexus
between Barbour County and the facts of the case required that
the case be transferred to Escambia County in the interest of
justice under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-21.1.
The facts presented in this case, however, are not as cut
and dry.  Unlike in McKenzie Oil, where the county seats of
the two jurisdictions in question were some 139 miles apart,
the two courthouses in question here are a mere 19 miles
apart.  It further appears that witnesses are located not only
in Elmore County, but also in Montgomery County and Autauga
County.   In  situations like this, I believe  it is best to
1090342
15
allow the trial court the "degree of discretion" to determine
whether to transfer the action.
1090342
16
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Although the interest-of-justice prong of our forum non
conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, plays a
necessary role in some cases, I question whether this Court
has extended the statute's application in other cases beyond
what was intended by the legislature.  Among other things, my
special writing in Ex parte Ford Motor Co., [Ms. 1080438,
April 2, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2010), reflects this
concern.  I indicated in that writing, and I continue to
believe, that there is insight and wisdom in Justice Hugh
Maddox's opinion for this Court in Ex parte First Family
Financial Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1998): 
"In Ex parte First Family Financial Services,
Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 661 (Ala. 1998), Justice
Maddox, writing for the Court, stated that a change
of 
venue 
based 
on 
forum 
non 
conveniens 
is
appropriate only '"'when trial in the chosen forum
would "establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to
a defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiff's
convenience," or when the "chosen forum [is]
inappropriate because of considerations affecting
the 
court's 
own 
administrative 
and 
legal
problems."'"'  (Quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 241, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419
(1981), quoting in turn Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91
L.Ed. 1067 (1947).)  As Justice Maddox went on to
explain, a transfer based on improper venue normally
should occur only where the balance of 'the private-
and public-interest factors involved ... weigh[]
1090342
17
heavily 
against 
litigation 
in 
the 
forum 
the
plaintiff selected.'  718 So. 2d at 661.9
_______________ 
" The views expressed by Justice Maddox on
9
behalf of the Court in First Family Financial
Services are consistent with the notion that venue
statutes such as § 6-3-7 reflect a legislative
determination 
that 
the 
statutorily 
prescribed
locations are generally and presumptively just and
appropriate."
Ford Motor Co., ___ So. 3d at ___ (Murdock, J., concurring in
the result).
I am not persuaded that the standard expressed by this
Court through the opinion authored by Justice Maddox in First
Family is satisfied in this particular case.