Title: McCormick v. Hunt

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

328 So. 2d 140 (1976) John McCORMICK and Ernie Ray Clanton v. Elayn HUNT. No. 56907. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 23, 1976. *141 William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Ralph E. Tyson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., James E. Boren, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendants-relators. Vincent Wilkins, Jr., Director, Benjamin E. Smith, New Orleans, Roland T. Huson, III, App. Counsel, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-respondent. DIXON, Justice. We granted the State's application for writs in this case to review a ruling of the trial judge that the Department of Corrections must award prisoners "good time" credits for "jail time," that is, time spent in a parish prison after arrest, but prior to conviction and sentence. We reverse. R.S. 15:571.3 B provides: The very words of the statute make it clear that it does not apply to time served in a parish prison after arrest while awaiting trial, since at that time the accused is not an "inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections who has *142 been convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment." Therefore, unless some constitutional right mandates that "good time" be awarded for jail time, there is no merit in petitioners' contentions. Petitioners argue that the failure to award good time credits for jail time violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law, because an accused who can afford bail actually serves less time in jail than an accused who cannot afford bail.[1] This same argument was presented to the United States Supreme Court in McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1973). In that case, New York did not award good time on jail time in computing the minimum date that an inmate could appear before the parole board. In reversing a lower court ruling that the state scheme violated the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court stated: The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974). As stated in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970): The United States Supreme Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 *143 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S. Ct. 337, 340, 55 L. Ed. 369 (1910), laid down the rules to be used in determining whether a legislative enactment violated the equal protection clause: In the instant case, petitioners have not shown the absence of a reasonable distinction between those incarcerated in the State prison serving their sentences after conviction and those in the parish prison awaiting trial. The lower federal courts have consistently held that good time need not be awarded for jail time. See Blackshear v. United States, 434 F.2d 58 (C.C.A.5 1970); Aderhold v. Ellis, 84 F.2d 543 (C.C.A.5 1936), cert.den., 299 U.S. 587, 57 S. Ct. 123, 81 L. Ed. 433 (1936); Swope v. Lawton, 83 F.2d 814 (C.C.A.9 1936). As stated in Bandy v. Willingham, 398 F.2d 333, 335 (C.C.A.10 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1006, 89 S. Ct. 497, 21 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1968): The purpose of good time is two-fold: to promote work and self improvement, and to serve as a disciplinary tool for prison officials. Parish jails, unlike the State institutions, generally serve as detention centers only, holding those accused of crime who cannot post bail while awaiting trial. The awarding of good time is a matter of state law, not a federal constitutional right. Holtzinger v. Estelle, 488 F.2d 517 (C.C.A.5 1973). The legislature has seen fit to award good time only to an inmate "in the custody of the Department of Corrections who has been convicted of afelony." An accused awaiting trial is not an inmate who has been convicted of anything. Therefore, the good time statute does not apply, and the classification violates no federal constitutional guarantee. McGinnis v. Royster, supra. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the demands of petitioners for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are denied. [1] Assume A and B are arrested together for simple robbery on January 1, 1975. A makes bail and is released pending trial. B cannot make bail and is incarcerated in the parish jail awaiting trial. Both men go to trial on January 1, 1976, are convicted, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. A, who posted bond, serves two years, eight months and twenty-one days in jail, with maximum good time. B, who could not post bond, receives credit for the year in jail. C.Cr.P. 880. His stay at Angola will be two years, two months and five days with maximum good time. Thus B serves approximately six months longer in over-all jail time than A.