Title: Ex parte Anthony Lane.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 14, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2018
_________________________
1160984
_________________________
Ex parte Anthony Lane
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Anthony Lane
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson  Circuit Court, CC-09-3202;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-10-1343)
SELLERS, Justice.
Anthony Lane was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court
of murder made capital because it was committed during the
1160984
course of a robbery in the first degree.  See § 13A-5-
40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  Although Lane initially lied to
police about his involvement in the murder, he eventually told
police that he had approached Frank Wright at a car wash to
ask him the time, that Wright had used a degrading racial
epithet to describe Lane, and that Lane had "blanked out" and
shot Wright multiple times, killing him.  Lane claimed that,
after he shot Wright, he panicked and drove away in Wright's
vehicle.  A police officer testified that Wright's body, which
was found at the car wash, was discovered with his pants
pockets "turned out" and his wallet missing.
Lane parked Wright's vehicle in an alley next to a
convenience store, paid for two dollars' worth of gasoline,
put approximately one dollar's worth of gasoline in a
container, and offered the remainder of the gasoline to
another customer.  After telling the other customer "that he
had to go get rid of some evidence," Lane went to the alley,
poured the gasoline in Wright's vehicle, and set it on fire. 
The partially burned vehicle was discovered next to the
convenience store.  Lane told police that he gave the gun he
had used to kill Wright to a man he did not know, with the
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understanding that the man would give Lane money for the gun
at a later time.  Wright's wallet was discovered in his
vehicle.  It contained his personal identification documents
but no money.  An investigating police officer testified that,
in his opinion, Wright's vehicle had been "ransacked,"
although the wallet, the stereo, and other valuable items had
not been taken.
Before he was sentenced, Lane argued to the trial court
that he is intellectually disabled and therefore, under Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), ineligible to be sentenced
to death.1  The trial court rejected that argument and,
following the jury's 10-2 recommendation, sentenced Lane to
death.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Lane's
conviction and sentence.  Lane v. State, 169 So. 3d 1076,
1087-94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) ("Lane I").  Judge Welch
dissented, concluding that the evidence established that Lane
is intellectually disabled.  169 So. 3d at 1145.  This Court
denied Lane's petition for a writ of certiorari.
1The Court in Atkins v. Virginia used the term "mentally
retarded."  That term has since been replaced with
"intellectually disabled."  See Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S.
___, __ n.1, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2274 n.1 (2015).
3
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On October 5, 2015, the United States Supreme Court
granted Lane's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remanded the
cause "for further consideration in light of Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014)." 
Lane v. Alabama, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 91, 91 (2015). 
The Court gave no further guidance as to the applicability of
Hall.  On remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals again affirmed
Lane's conviction and sentence.  Lane v. State, [Ms.
CR–10–1343, April 29, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2016) ("Lane II").  Judge Welch again dissented.  We granted
Lane's petition for a writ of certiorari.  The State has now
agreed with Lane's argument and conceded that the trial court
should not have sentenced Lane to death.
In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the execution of mentally retarded offenders (now referred to
as "intellectually disabled").  Although the Court in Atkins
left "'to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their]
execution of sentences,'" 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v.
4
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Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 (1986)), the Court also referred
to definitions of "mental retardation" that had been adopted
by the American Association of Mental Retardation ("the AAMR")
and the American Psychiatric Association ("the APA").  Those
organizations defined mental retardation as significantly
subaverage 
intellectual 
functioning, 
accompanied 
by
significant limitations in 
adaptive 
functioning, 
both 
of 
which
manifest themselves before age 18.  536 U.S. at 308 n.3.  See
also Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239, 248 (Ala. 2007) ("[I]n
order for an offender to be considered mentally retarded in
the Atkins context, the offender must currently exhibit
subaverage 
intellectual 
functioning, 
currently 
exhibit
deficits in adaptive behavior, and these problems must have
manifested themselves before the age of 18.").
According to the Supreme Court in Atkins, "[i]t is
estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the population has
an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is typically
considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function
prong of the mental retardation definition."  536 U.S. at 309
n.5.  As for the adaptive-functioning prong, Atkins identified
10 "adaptive skill areas" that had been recognized by the AAMR
5
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and the APA--communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, utilization of community resources, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. 
Id.  The Court of Criminal Appeals noted in Lane I that, "[i]n
order for an individual to have 'significant or substantial
deficits in adaptive behavior,' he must have 'concurrent
deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning in at
least two of the [adaptive] skill areas [identified in
Atkins].'"  169 So. 3d at 1090 (quoting Albarran v. State, 96
So. 3d 131, 197 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), quoting in turn
Holladay v. Allen, 555 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009)). 2
It is undisputed that Lane has an IQ of 70.  The State
has never seriously argued that his intellectual functioning
2The Court in Atkins pointed to the ninth edition of the
AAMR's manual entitled Mental Retardation: Definition,
Classification, and Systems of Supports, which was published
in 1992, and the fourth edition of the APA's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("the DSM-IV"), which
was published in 2000.  During Lane's Atkins hearing, which
took place in April 2011, the trial court heard testimony from
Dr. John Goff, a clinical neuropsychologist.  Dr. Goff relied
on the standards set out in the DSM-IV, which was the most
current edition of the DSM at the time.  The Court notes that,
in 2013, the APA published the fifth edition of the DSM ("the
DSM-V").  See Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct.
1039, 1045 (2017).  There has been no discussion in the
filings 
with 
this 
Court 
regarding 
the 
relevancy 
of
differences, if any, in the standards for determining
intellectual disability in the DSM-IV and the DSM-V.
6
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is anything but significantly subaverage.  Rather, the 
dispute
has centered around whether Lane also has the requisite
deficits in adaptive skills necessary to render him
intellectually disabled.3 
In Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014),
upon which the United States Supreme Court relied in vacating
the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment in the present case,
the Court considered a challenge to the State of Florida's
practice of mandating that a defendant have an IQ score of 70
or below before he or she is allowed to present evidence of
limitations in adaptive skill areas.  The Court in Hall
described the issue presented in that case as follows: 
"The question this case presents is how
intellectual disability must be defined in order to
implement 
these 
principles 
[weighing 
against
imposing 
the 
death 
penalty 
on 
intellectually
disabled criminals] and the holding of Atkins. To
determine if Florida's [IQ score] cutoff rule is
valid, it is proper to consider the psychiatric and
professional studies that elaborate on the purpose
and meaning of IQ scores to determine how the scores
relate to the holding of Atkins. This in turn leads
to a better understanding of how the legislative
policies of various States, and the holdings of
3It also has not been seriously disputed that Lane's
subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive
skill areas, if present, manifested themselves before Lane
turned 18 years old.  The Court notes that Lane was 19 years
old when the crime was committed.
7
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state courts, implement the Atkins rule. That
understanding informs our determination whether
there is a consensus that instructs how to decide
the 
specific 
issue 
presented 
here. 
And, 
in
conclusion, this Court must express its own
independent determination reached in light of the
instruction found in those sources and authorities."
572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1993.  The Court in Hall
stressed 
that, 
"[i]n 
determining 
who 
qualifies 
as
intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical
community's opinions."  572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1993. 
After 
embracing 
"clinical 
definitions 
of 
intellectual
disability," the Court held:
"If the States were to have complete autonomy to
define intellectual disability as they wished, the
Court's decision in Atkins could become a nullity,
and the Eighth Amendment's protection of human
dignity would not become a reality. This Court thus
reads Atkins to provide substantial guidance on the
definition of intellectual disability."
572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1999.  Ultimately, the Court
struck Florida's IQ score threshold because it "disregard[ed]
established medical practice" in failing to take into account
the "standard error of measurement" in IQ tests.  572 U.S. at
___, 134 S. Ct. at 1995.  The standard error of measurement is
a "reflection of the inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test
itself" and "means that an individual's score is best
8
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understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded
score."  572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1995.  Thus, the Court
concluded, the State of Florida could not conclusively
determine that a criminal defendant is not intellectually
disabled based solely on the fact that his or her IQ score is
higher than 70.
In addition to Florida, the United States Supreme Court
in Hall identified Alabama as one of a few states that "may
use a strict IQ score cutoff at 70."  Hall, 572 U.S. at ___, 
134 S. Ct. at 1996.  The Court pointed to Smith v. State, 71
So. 3d 12, 20 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), in which the Court of
Criminal Appeals had refused to adopt a rule whereby trial
courts must factor in the margin of error of an IQ test when
considering a defendant's IQ score.  71 So. 3d at 20.  After
the United States Supreme Court remanded the cause in the
present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Smith to
the extent it so held and, based on Hall, adopted a rule
whereby trial courts should factor in the standard error of
measurement.  Lane II, ___ So. 3d at ___.
As for Lane, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that Hall afforded him no relief.  The court noted
9
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that Lane had an IQ test score of 70 and that he had been
allowed to present the trial court with evidence relating to
deficits in adaptive functioning.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded:
"Hall is not as broad as Lane contends and does not
require this Court to revisit [whether Lane has
demonstrated that he was intellectually disabled].
The holding in Hall centered only on the medical
community's interpretation of the significance of an
IQ test score. The United States Supreme Court held
that '[t]he Florida statute, as interpreted by its
courts, misuses IQ score on its own terms; and this,
in turn, bars consideration of evidence that must be
considered in determining whether a defendant in a
capital case has intellectual disability.' Hall, 572
U.S. at ____, 134 S.Ct. at 2001. Because Lane was
afforded an Atkins hearing, the trial court was not
barred 
from 
considering 
other 
evidence 
in
determining 
whether 
Lane 
was 
intellectually
disabled. Accordingly, Lane is due no relief under
Hall."
Lane II, ___ So. 3d at ___.
Because the United States Supreme Court did not provide
any guidance in remanding this case in light of Hall, we are
left to presume the Court's rationale based on the record
before it.  Lane argues that Hall made clear that the medical
community's standards for assessing intellectual disability
cannot be disregarded when a defendant is facing the death
penalty.  See generally Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831
10
1160984
(2009) ("Our opinion [in Atkins] did not provide definitive
procedural or substantive guides for determining when a 
person
who claims mental retardation 'will be so impaired as to fall
within [Atkins' compass].'"); and Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S.
___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044-49 (2017) ("As we instructed
in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be
'informed by the views of medical experts.' 572 U.S. at ___,
134 S. Ct. at 2000. ... That instruction cannot sensibly be
read to give courts leave to diminish the force of the medical
community's consensus. ... Hall indicated that being informed
by the medical community does not demand adherence to
everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither
does our precedent license disregard of current medical
standards.").  In dissenting from the Court of Criminal
Appeals' judgment, Judge Welch reasoned that, because Lane had
not been subjected to an IQ score cutoff or precluded from
presenting additional evidence of intellectual disability,
"the only reason the United States Supreme Court could have
had for remanding this case is for additional consideration of
the ample evidence of Lane's adaptive deficiencies."  ___ So.
3d at ___.  We find Judge Welch's reasoning persuasive.
11
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Intellectual disability must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence.  Ex parte Smith, 213 So. 3d 313, 319 (Ala.
2010).  A trial court's determination regarding that issue is
entitled to deference on appeal.  Id.  "'A judge abuses his
[or her] discretion ... where the record contains no evidence
on which [the judge] rationally could have based [the]
decision.'" Lane I, 169 So. 3d at 1094 (quoting Hodges v.
State, 926 So. 2d 1060, 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)).
Medical records indicate that Lane was born with a chest
deformity and acute respiratory-distress syndrome, which
necessitated medical providers rushing Lane to a more capable
hospital immediately following his birth.  Dr. John Goff, a
clinical neuropsychologist, testified that acute respiratory-
distress syndrome can have a substantial negative effect on
the development of a person's brain and that such a condition
is "a typical kind of birth history for an individual who has
cognitive deficits."  Members of Lane's family interviewed by
Dr. Goff reported that Lane was also born with hydrocephalus,
although Lane's attorneys were unable to locate medical
records supporting that assertion.  Lane's sister testified
that, when Lane was 11 years old, his mother was murdered and
12
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that, when he was 14 years old, his uncle hit him in the head
with a shotgun, rendering him unconscious; the attack also
resulted in a broken arm.  See generally Moore v. Texas, 581
U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 ("[T]raumatic experiences
[such as childhood abuse] count in the medical community as
'risk factors' for intellectual disability." (emphasis
omitted)).
Dr. Goff testified that he met with Lane and his family
members and that he administered various tests to Lane that
are accepted as reliable by the medical community.  Among
those tests were the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, used to measure IQ; the fourth edition of
the Wide Range Achievement Test, used to measure functional
academics; the second edition of the Adaptive Behavior
Assessment System, used to measure deficits in adaptive-skill
areas; and the Victoria Symptom Validity test, used to
determine 
whether 
test 
subjects 
are 
exaggerating 
deficiencies.
Lane's family members reported that he had been
developmentally delayed since birth and had been placed in
special-education classes throughout his time in school. 
According to Dr. Goff's reports and testimony, Lane has
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deficits in verbal skills, he reads and performs mathematics
at a third-grade level, he needs assistance with basic hygiene
and dressing himself, he has trouble with simple financial
transactions, he cannot live on his own, he has deficits in
social relationships and social understanding, he does not
make use of any available community services, he has deficits
in overall judgment, and he has never held a job.  Dr. Goff's
reports cite substantial deficits in the specific adaptive
skill areas of community-resource utilization, functional
academics, home living, and self-direction.  Dr. Goff's
reports and testimony show that Lane also suffers from
deficits in the remaining six adaptive-skill areas, although
it is not entirely clear whether Dr. Goff considered those
deficits quite as substantial.  Based on standards that have
been 
accepted 
by 
the 
medical 
community, 
Dr. 
Goff's
professional opinion is that Lane is intellectually disabled. 
Dr. Goff testified that Lane "definitely meets" the 
definition
of mental retardation set out in the APA's fourth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the
version of that publication in effect at the time of Lane's
Atkins hearing.  The State did not present its own expert
14
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witness to rebut Dr. Goff's opinion.  Thus, the only opinion
before the trial court from a member of the medical community
who had formally and properly evaluated Lane for intellectual
disability was that Lane is indeed intellectually disabled. 
We conclude that the trial court's rejection of Dr. Goff's
opinion is not supported by the evidence. 
Although the trial court acknowledged on the record that
it considered Dr. Goff's testimony "very important," it
ultimately disagreed with his conclusion.  In doing so, the
trial court initially referred to a "lack of medical records
to substantiate some of the factors that were pertinent to the
deficits in the adaptive behavior prong."  The only lack of
medical records that has been specifically referenced relates
to the assertion of Lane's family members that he was born
with hydrocephalus.  There has been no demonstration that
Lane's intellectual disability could not be proven in the
absence 
of 
written 
records 
showing 
that 
particular
abnormality.  Moreover, Dr. Goff stated that the information
he had obtained from Lane's family was sufficient to allow him
to form his opinion.  As Judge Welch stated in dissent: "The
lack of medical records does not rebut Dr. Goff's opinion
15
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regarding Lane's mental retardation."  Lane I, 169 So. 3d at
1147.4
The trial court also found that Lane "was functioning
relatively on his own, with little day-to-day supervision." 
Lane I suggests that such a finding could have been based on
Lane's behavior during the police interrogation, which,
according to the Court of Criminal Appeals, indicated that
Lane was able to converse with the police, that he read and
understood a waiver of his Miranda rights, that he remembered
what clothing he was wearing on the day of the murder, and
that he claimed he had a group of friends that he "chilled"
with every other day.  169 So. 3d at 1091-92.  The trial court
and the Court of Criminal Appeals also relied on the fact that
Lane had written some rap-music lyrics.
The trial court did not identify any specific adaptive-
skill area to which its finding that Lane "was functioning
relatively on his own" related.  According to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, the above-referenced evidence
4It is also noteworthy that the trial court judge referred
to the fact that he had studied psychology in college.  Lane
argues that the trial court substituted its own standards for
judging intellectual disability for the standards accepted by
the medical community.
16
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weighed against a finding that Lane suffers from deficits in
the areas of communication, self-care, social skills, and
leisure.  Lane I, 169 So. 3d at 1092.  Even if the Court
assumes that is correct, Dr. Goff also determined that Lane
has deficits in each of the other six adaptive-skill areas.
As for those six adaptive-skill areas, the Court of
Criminal Appeals pointed to Lane's age and his history of
substance abuse to explain any perceived deficits.  169 So. 3d
at 1092-93.  Lane was 19 when Dr. Goff evaluated him.  Lane's
sister testified that he had used marijuana, the drug
"ecstacy," and alcohol, although there is no indication as to
how much or how often.  The only specific adaptive-skill area
Dr. Goff was asked about in connection with Lane's substance
abuse and age was work.  Dr. Goff responded in the affirmative
when asked whether substance abuse can hinder a person's
ability to be gainfully employed and when asked whether
"there's a lot of folks in their late teens and early 20s that
don't work."  Notwithstanding, Dr. Goff was steadfast in his
opinion that Lane has the requisite deficits in all 10
adaptive-skill areas and that he is intellectually disabled. 
The evidence in this case simply does not demonstrate that
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Lane's substance abuse and age affected the results of Dr.
Goff's testing in any meaningful way.5
Finally, the trial court "place[d] a lot of weight on how
this crime was committed" and "what it took to commit the
crime."  In Ex parte Smith, 213 So. 3d 313 (Ala. 2010), this
Court, in concluding that a defendant had not established that
he was intellectually disabled, found "especially persuasive
[the defendant's] behavior during the commission of [the]
murders."  The Court in Smith noted:
"[The defendant] arrived at [a house owned by one of
the victims] armed with a sawed-off rifle that he
purposefully concealed, he systematically shot three
victims, and he attempted to shoot a fourth victim
and made an effort to stab that victim after the
rifle jammed. He made the statement after the
murders had been committed that he planned to kill
everyone present in [the victim's] house to
eliminate witnesses. These are not the impulsive
actions of a mentally retarded person who cannot
understand the consequences of his actions as
contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in
Atkins."
5The trial court also noted that Dr. Goff had been unable
to obtain Lane's school records.  According to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the lack of such records weighed against Dr.
Goff's conclusion that Lane suffered from deficits in the area
of functional academics.  Lane I, 169 So. 3d at 1093.  Dr.
Goff, however, testified that he had administered a specific
test relevant to functional academics and that the results of
that test demonstrated that Lane has significant deficits in
that adaptive-skill area.
18
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213 So. 3d at 320.  Lane asserts in his brief to this Court
that the United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of
Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017),
"specifically disapproved of a lower court's reliance on the
defendant's 'commission of the crime in a sophisticated way
and then fleeing,' [581 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1047,] as
grounds on which to dismiss evidence of adaptive deficits." 
We need not consider that argument, however, because, although
the crime Lane committed was violent and despicable, there is
nothing 
particularly 
"sophisticated" 
about 
the 
manner 
in 
which
he committed it.  There was no evidence of detailed planning,
thoughtful 
premeditation, 
or 
sophisticated 
advanced
preparation.  The means Lane employed to commit the crime are
not sufficient to refute the evidence that he has the
requisite deficits in at least two adaptive-skill areas and is
intellectually disabled.
After the United States Supreme Court remanded this cause
to the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Criminal
Appeals directed the parties to file briefs, the State filed
a brief acknowledging that the trial court had failed to make
findings regarding the relevant adaptive-skill areas and
19
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conceding that the trial court "did not apply the correct legal
definition of intellectual disability in reviewing Lane's
Atkins claim."  The State invited the Court of Criminal
Appeals to remand the matter to the trial court for a new
Atkins hearing.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.  Lane
II.  After this Court granted Lane's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the State went further in its 
concessions, joining
Lane in requesting that we remand the matter so that the trial
court can sentence Lane to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.  In a subsequent joint filing, the
State expressly conceded that "death is not the proper
sentence for Lane."  Thus, the State has indicated that it
concedes that the evidence established that Lane is
intellectually disabled and that the trial court simply
substituted its own standards for intellectual disability for
those accepted by the medical community.
Based on Atkins, Hall, and the apparent reasons behind
the United States Supreme Court's vacation of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' judgment, we must reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause to that
court with directions to remand the matter to the trial court
20
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to sentence Lane to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.6
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Main, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
6Lane and the State have asked this Court to remand the
matter directly to the trial court and to direct that court to
implement a "settlement agreement" that Lane and the State
have entered into.  Pursuant to that agreement, Lane promises
that, "if his conviction or sentence of life without the
possibility of parole is ever set aside, or if he challenges
either, the death sentence that was originally imposed upon
him will be reinstated with full force and effect, the same as
if it had never been set aside."  Lane and the State, however,
have not persuasively demonstrated that this Court has the
power to direct the trial court to accept such an agreement. 
Accordingly, we decline to do so.  We express no opinion on
the effect of the agreement.
21
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
I believe that, in the posture of this case, we are
acting prematurely in vacating the death sentence of the
petitioner, Anthony Lane.
The Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002), that individuals who are intellectually disabled
are ineligible for the death penalty; Lane contends that
Atkins applies in his case.  Stated very generally, to
determine whether Lane is intellectually disabled, Atkins
requires that we look at whether Lane exhibits subaverage
intellectual functioning and whether he exhibits deficits in
adaptive 
behavior, 
which 
problems 
manifested 
themselves 
before
the age of 18.  
Lane was given the opportunity to prove at trial that he
was intellectually disabled under Atkins.  The trial court
ruled that he failed to prove that he exhibited significant or
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior--the second part of
the Atkins analysis described above.  On direct appeal the
Court of Criminal Appeals considered all the evidence Lane
presented and affirmed the trial court's judgment.  Lane v.
State, 169 So. 3d 1076, 1087-94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) ("Lane
22
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I"). This Court subsequently denied Lane's request for
certiorari review.  Ex parte Lane (No. 1131373, Jan. 30,
2015).  However, the Supreme Court of the United States
vacated the judgment in Lane I and remanded the matter "for
further consideration in light of Hall v. Florida, 572
U.S.___, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014)." Lane v. Alabama, 577 U.S.
___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 91, 91 (2015).    
The decision in Hall addressed Florida law defining an
intellectual disability as having an IQ score of 70 or less. 
This "mandatory cutoff" foreclosed further review of evidence 
the medical community accepted as probative of intellectual
disability, including evidence as to individuals who have an
IQ score above 70.  572 U.S. at ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1990,
1994.  The Supreme Court faulted Florida's rule as taking
imprecise IQ scores as conclusive evidence of intellectual
capacity, when medical experts would consider additional
evidence.  572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1995.  The Court
held: "[W]hen a defendant's IQ test score falls within the
test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the
defendant must be able to present additional evidence of
23
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intellectual 
disability, 
including 
testimony 
regarding
adaptive deficits."  572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.
On remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that
Alabama law does not impose the type of "bright-line cutoff"
deemed unconstitutional in Hall, Lane v. State, [Ms. CR-10-
1343, April 29, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2016) ("Lane II"); noted that Lane had been provided the
ability to present evidence of intellectual disability,
including 
evidence 
of 
adaptive-behavior 
deficiencies 
at 
trial;
and held that he thus was entitled to no relief.  Lane II, ___
So. 3d at ___.  
I agree that no strict IQ score cutoff was used in this
case and that Lane was afforded the full opportunity to
present exactly the type of adaptive-skills evidence that was
denied the defendant in Hall.  I do not believe that Hall
requires a reversal in this case.   
I disagree that the United States Supreme Court's
decision 
called 
for 
a 
reevaluation of 
Lane's 
adaptive-behavior
deficiencies, which is the issue he raises before this Court
and that the main opinion addresses.  That part of the Atkins
analysis was not at issue in Hall.  Further, if the Supreme
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Court had accepted Lane's allegations regarding his adaptive-
behavior deficits, then it presumably would have simply
granted certiorari and addressed the issue.  Instead, the
Supreme Court remanded Lane's case for "further consideration
in light of Hall."  577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 91. I
believe that it did so because the Court had stated in Hall
that Alabama's law might have the same problem it found with
Florida's law: "Alabama also may use a strict IQ score cutoff
at 70."  572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1996.  
Nevertheless, after this 
Court 
granted 
certiorari review,
the State and Lane filed a "joint motion" indicating that they
had "reached an agreement" and asking this Court to remand the
case to the trial court with instructions to resentence Lane
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
Because it did not appear to this Court that such a remand
request was proper under any of our appellate rules, statutory
law, or caselaw, we issued an order directing the parties to
provide authority for this Court's granting such a motion.  In
their joint reply, the parties state that they are in
agreement "that death is not the proper sentence" in this case
and that "[t]his agreement was reached after a thorough review
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of the existing record and an examination of additional
evidence that is outside the record."  They further cite
Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), in
which a death sentence was vacated when the State "stipulated"
that the defendant met the Atkins definition of intellectual
disability and the evidence "overwhelmingly" supported such a
finding.  Jackson, 963 So. 2d at 157.
There is no stipulation in this case by the State that
Lane is intellectually disabled; instead, there is an
unexplained "agreement" that death is not the "proper
sentence" in this case.  Further, given the analysis in Lane
I, I disagree that there is "overwhelming" evidence that
Atkins bars a death sentence here. 
If the State wishes to expressly concede that, under
Atkins, Lane is ineligible for the death penalty, then it
should do so in its brief, which has yet to be filed.  The
State should make clear how the trial court's and Court of
Criminal Appeals' analysis of the evidence is wrong and how
the adaptive-behavior-deficits issue is properly before us so
that we can vacate the sentence, as was done in Jackson. 
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Further, I would not reverse a death sentence based on
innuendo regarding "evidence that is outside the record."  
The State may have very good reasons to concede the
issue.  Lane may very well be entitled to a judgment in his
favor.  But there is a better, more procedurally proper way to
do this; I thus respectfully dissent.
Wise, J., concurs.  
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