Title: L.L. v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11721 
 
L.L., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 3, 2014. - December 5, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Cordy, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Delinquent Child.  Evidence, Juvenile 
delinquency, Sex offender.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 7, 2014.  
 
 
The case was reported by Spina, J. 
 
 
 
Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Susan Oker, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with her) 
for the juvenile. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Eric Tennen, for Children's Law Center of Massachusetts & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  After admitting to sufficient facts before a 
Juvenile Court judge with respect to two counts of indecent 
assault and battery on a person fourteen or older, the juvenile 
filed a motion seeking relief from the obligation to register as 
2 
 
a sex offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]).  
After a hearing, the judge denied the motion, thereby requiring 
the juvenile to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board 
(board).  We consider here the juvenile's petition for relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The principal issue he raises 
concerns the standard by which a Juvenile Court judge determines 
the risk of reoffense on the part of a juvenile under § 178E 
(f), an issue that this court considered in Commonwealth v. 
Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 267-268 (2007).  We seek to provide 
additional guidance concerning that standard in this opinion.  
We affirm the order denying the juvenile's motion for relief 
from registration. 
 
Background.1  On the afternoon of May 9, 2013, the juvenile, 
who was then sixteen years old, approached an adult woman from 
behind as she was walking her dog in Lynn and pulled down the 
sweatpants she was wearing to her thighs.  The juvenile then 
made a vulgar comment about the victim's private parts, grabbed 
his own genitals, and ran away.  The woman described her 
assailant to the Lynn police. 
 
Eight days later, on the afternoon of May 17, 2013, a 
different woman was walking four children home from school in 
Lynn when she felt the juvenile touch her buttocks and pull her 
                     
 
1 Because the juvenile entered a plea, the background 
information provided here is taken from the Commonwealth's 
recitation of facts at the plea hearing as well as reports and 
other materials included in the record before us. 
3 
 
pants to the ground.  The woman called the police and provided a 
description of her assailant, and soon thereafter, a Lynn police 
officer observed the juvenile, who fit this description, on a 
different street from where the incident had occurred.  Lynn 
police patrol units then stopped the juvenile.  At a showup 
identification procedure soon thereafter, the second woman 
identified the juvenile as the person who had pulled her pants 
down.  The juvenile was placed under arrest and taken to the 
Lynn police station. 
 
After having the opportunity to speak with his mother, the 
juvenile agreed to speak with the police.  He admitted that he 
had pulled down the second woman's pants and, when the police 
mentioned the first woman to the juvenile, he admitted that he 
had pulled down her pants as well.2  Discussing the second 
incident, the juvenile explained that he had bought and smoked 
some marijuana that morning (May 17), and then, while walking, 
he "just went up to [the second woman] and pulled down her 
pants."  The juvenile did not give a reason for pulling down the 
second woman's pants, saying only that he "just felt the 
                     
 
2 The first woman told police that she saw the juvenile 
again on the morning of the second incident (May 17).  When the 
police, on May 17, asked the juvenile whether he had seen the 
first woman that morning, the juvenile admitted to having pulled 
her pants down.  The police prepared a photographic array that 
included the juvenile and showed it to the first woman, who 
positively identified the juvenile's photograph. 
4 
 
excitement."  The juvenile also did not give a reason for 
targeting the first woman. 
 
On May 20, 2013, two complaints issued from the Essex 
County Division of the Juvenile Court Department charging the 
juvenile with two counts of indecent assault and battery on a 
person fourteen years of age or older and one count of 
disorderly conduct.  On January 21, 2014, at a hearing before a 
Juvenile Court judge, the juvenile admitted to sufficient facts 
with regard to each charge and entered a plea that the judge 
accepted.3  Between this hearing and the final disposition of the 
case, the juvenile filed a motion for relief from the obligation 
to register with the board, and an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion was held on February 27, 2014.4 
 
At that hearing, the juvenile sought to establish that he 
did not "pose a risk of reoffending or a danger to the public," 
and therefore should be relieved of the obligation to register.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f).  He offered the report and testimony of 
                     
 
3 The two women assaulted by the juvenile attended this 
hearing, and each made a statement to the judge about the impact 
of the juvenile's assault on her. 
 
 
4 Although the judge had not yet announced the sentence she 
intended to impose, she had indicated that a delinquency 
adjudication with a probationary sentence was likely, and in 
response to that, given the charges of indecent assault and 
battery on a person fourteen years of age or older, the juvenile 
filed his motion for relief from the obligation to register as a 
sex offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]). In April 
of 2014, the juvenile formally was adjudicated delinquent and 
sentenced to probation, to terminate on his eighteenth birthday, 
September 10, 2014. 
5 
 
his expert witness, Dr. Barbara Quiñones, a forensic 
psychologist.  Quiñones testified to having administered a 
"guided clinical instrument" called the Estimate of Risk of 
Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism (ERASOR), a test that she 
described as "strongly validated" by substantial research as an 
appropriate risk assessment tool for juvenile sex offenders.5  
According to Quiñones, the ERASOR enumerates twenty-five factors 
that have been "consistently shown to be associated with risk of 
re-offense," and in administering the test to the juvenile, she 
scored each factor as "present, not present, [or] partially 
present."  She found that in the juvenile's case, four of the 
twenty-five risk factors were present,6 twenty risk factors were 
not present, no risk factors were partially present, and the 
presence of one factor was "unknown."  Based on her evaluation 
of the juvenile, which included a lengthy interview with him, a 
discussion with the juvenile's mother, the administration of the 
ERASOR test, and other evaluative processes, Quiñones saw no 
sign of deviant sexual behavior in the juvenile, in part because 
                     
 
5 Dr. Barbara Quiñones noted that the Estimate of Risk of 
Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism (ERASOR) instrument, 
although validated, does not provide an actuarial assessment 
because an offender's ERASOR score is not tied to a percentage 
rate of reoffense.  She testified that there are no validated 
actuarial instruments for determining the risk of reoffense of 
juvenile sex offenders. 
 
 
6 The four were sexual assault of two or more victims, 
sexual assault of a stranger, "[n]egative peer associations and 
influence," and "[i]ncomplete sex offender specific treatment." 
6 
 
in her opinion such a diagnosis requires a finding of six months 
of deviant behavior -- a period of time far longer than that 
involved in the juvenile's case.  She also stated that in her 
opinion, based on research she described, the juvenile's lack of 
insight into why he committed the two offenses was not 
indicative of a higher risk of reoffense.  Based on her 
evaluation, Quiñones concluded that the juvenile's "risk to 
reoffend sexually is low," adding that, in forensic psychology, 
"there is no category of no risk," and that "[o]nce someone has 
committed a sexual offense, the lowest category would be low."  
She opined that the juvenile's risk of reoffense was so low that 
he should not be required to register as a sex offender. 
 
At a hearing in April, 2014, the judge denied the 
juvenile's motion for relief from registration and proceeded to 
set out oral findings and reasons.  She described in some detail 
the facts of the two assaults on the two women, and stated that 
she found Quiñones's testimony "thoughtful," but did not credit 
the expert's opinion about the juvenile's lack of sexual 
deviance.  The judge also rejected Quiñones's ultimate 
conclusion that the juvenile posed a low risk of reoffense, 
"based primarily on the facts and the circumstances" of the 
offenses, which the judge characterized as "egregious."  She 
stated that this "was a broad daylight sexual assault on two 
strangers in our community with no apparent measure of 
7 
 
restraint" or "any understanding of why he committed these 
offenses."  The judge determined that the juvenile posed a risk 
of reoffense and would be required to register with the board.7 
 
The juvenile thereafter filed in the county court his 
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief with 
respect to the order denying him relief from the obligation to 
register as a sex offender.  The single justice stayed the 
judge's order requiring registration and reserved and reported 
the matter to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Juvenile's petition for relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  As a threshold matter, the Commonwealth contends 
that there is no issue properly before the full court for 
review, because the juvenile, in the Commonwealth's view, has 
abandoned the claim he raised in his petition for relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, that he filed in the county court.  The 
argument fails.  Although this court has deemed an argument 
waived where it was not raised either before the trial judge or 
in a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition for relief, see Paquette v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 124 n.3 (2003), cert. denied, 540 
                     
 
7 At a subsequent hearing on the juvenile's motion to 
reconsider the denial of relief from registration, the judge 
indicated that she had used her discretion in accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262 (2007), to deny relief 
from registration.  She added that she had carefully reviewed 
the victims' statements and the effect of these offenses on the 
victims, and stated that she was "well aware of the ever 
evolving research in the area of the juvenile behavior and the 
juvenile brain."  The judge denied the motion for 
reconsideration. 
8 
 
U.S. 1150 (2004), that is not the case here.  The juvenile 
previously has raised the substance of the claims he presents to 
this court, either in the Juvenile Court or before the single 
justice.  In any event, the single justice has reserved and 
reported the case to this court, and it is properly before us.  
See Burke v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 157, 159 (1977).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 14-15 (2010).8 
 
2.  Standard for obtaining relief from registration.  Under 
the sex offender registration act, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C–178P 
(act), sex offenders, whether adults who have been convicted of 
a "sex offense" within the scope of the act or juveniles 
adjudicated as a youthful offender or delinquent on account of 
committing a qualifying sex offense, are required to register as 
sex offenders with the board, unless relieved of doing so under 
                     
 
8 The Commonwealth also suggests that the juvenile should be 
required to exhaust his administrative remedies by proceeding 
through the sex offender registration process and, if necessary, 
appealing from the final classification decision of the Sex 
Offender Registry Board (board) under G. L. c. 6, § 178M.  The 
Commonwealth is incorrect.  The statutory review process for 
decisions of the board does not apply to decisions of a judge 
under § 178E (f).  See Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 266.  A sex 
offender aggrieved by a denial of relief from registration under 
§ 178E (f) has "no automatic right of appeal," but may file a 
petition with a single justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, Ronald R., supra at 266-267, although to obtain substantive 
review, the grounds to do so must be significant.  See Care & 
Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 278 (2009) ("Even in the 
absence of an adequate alternative remedy . . . review on the 
substantive merits pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not 
automatic" because "petitioner must also demonstrate that 
[issue] raises a substantial claim of violation of her 
substantive rights"). 
9 
 
one of three statutory exemptions -- of which § 178E (f) is one.  
See Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 264 ("there is a presumption that 
sex offenders must register" under act).  Section 178E (f) 
provides in relevant part: 
 
"In the case of a sex offender who has been convicted 
of a sex offense or adjudicated as a youthful offender or 
as a delinquent juvenile by reason of a sex offense, on or 
after December 12, 1999, and who has not been sentenced to 
immediate confinement, the court shall, within [fourteen] 
days of sentencing, determine whether the circumstances of 
the offense in conjunction with the offender's criminal 
history indicate that the sex offender does not pose a risk 
of reoffense or a danger to the public.  If the court so 
determines, the court shall relieve such sex offender of 
the obligation to register under [§§] 178C to 178P, 
inclusive."9 
 
 
The juvenile claims that due process requires a judge, in 
determining under § 178E (f) whether a juvenile should be 
relieved from the obligation to register as a sex offender based 
on his or her "risk of reoffense," to assess the probability of 
such risk according to an articulated standard that itself is 
based on objective factors.  His argument is that a delinquency 
adjudication of a sex offense together with "the juvenile 
court's conclusion as to the propriety for excusing (or [not]) 
the juvenile's registration obligation" as a sex offender form 
                     
 
9 Under the plain terms of § 178E (f), the exemption from 
registration for which it provides applies to juvenile as well 
as adult sex offenders who are not "sentenced to immediate 
confinement."  This case is brought by a juvenile sex offender, 
and accordingly, in discussing § 178E (f), we focus solely on 
the statute's application to juvenile sex offenders in this 
opinion.  In doing so, we do not intend to suggest that we would 
interpret the statute differently in the case of an adult sex 
offender; that issue is not before us. 
10 
 
the "first step" in the statutory registration process; because 
this is so, the procedural due process requirements applicable 
to this registration process come into play; and these must 
include a requirement that a judge performing the assessment 
regarding risk of reoffense under § 178E (f) do so according to 
a defined, objective standard.  This is especially important for 
juveniles, he claims, because of the "historical view of the 
juvenile justice system as primarily rehabilitative." 
 
We disagree that a judge's determination under § 178E (f) 
whether to relieve a juvenile sex offender from the act's 
registration requirements is properly characterized as an 
integral part of the registration system itself.  See 
Commonwealth v. Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 505 (2005) 
(registration requirement is "decision made not by the trial 
court, but by the . . . board").  See also Ronald R., 450 Mass. 
at 266.  But there is no question that the statutory sex 
offender registration regime prescribed by the act imposes both 
burdensome and long-lasting requirements on a sex offender that 
implicate his or her liberty interests.10  And there also is no 
                     
 
10 See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., ante at 102, 106 (2014) (Doe No. 68549); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 596 (2013) (Doe No. 205614) (sex 
offender registration system "implicates constitutionally 
protected liberty and privacy interests").  See also Moe v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 604 (2014) ("public 
identification of a sex offender poses a risk of serious adverse 
consequences to that offender, including the risk that 
11 
 
question that, in offering a juvenile sex offender who has not 
been sentenced to immediate confinement the opportunity to be 
relieved of the obligation to participate in the registration 
system in any way, § 178E (f) provides a significant benefit.  
Accordingly, it is important that the statute's standards be as 
clear as reasonably possible. 
 
In Ronald R., after making a delinquency adjudication based 
on the juvenile's commission of a sex offense (rape of a six 
year old child), the Juvenile Court judge imposed a suspended 
sentence of commitment to the Department of Youth Services until 
the juvenile turned eighteen and placed the juvenile on 
probation.  Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 263.  The judge then held a 
separate nonevidentiary hearing pursuant to § 178E (f) and 
denied the juvenile's motion for relief from the obligation to 
register as a sex offender.  Id. at 264.  The judge did not make 
findings, written or oral, but stated that he exercised his 
discretion under § 178E (f) not to relieve the juvenile from 
registration based on the facts of the case.  Id. at 267, 270.  
This court rejected the juvenile's argument that the judge 
abused his discretion, and, quoting § 178E (f), stated that the 
judge's "sole task" under the statute was "to 'determine whether 
                                                                  
the sex offender will suffer discrimination in employment and 
housing, and will otherwise suffer from the stigma of being 
identified as a sex offender, which sometimes means the 
additional risk of being harassed or assaulted"); Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 
Mass. 780, 791 (2008). 
12 
 
the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the 
[juvenile's] criminal history indicate that the [juvenile] does 
not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public.'"11  Id. 
at 267. 
 
The juvenile in this case argues that neither the text of 
§ 178E (f) nor Ronald R. offers any meaningful guidance about 
how a Juvenile Court judge is to determine the "risk of 
reoffense," creating a statutory regime that permits the 
standardless and inconsistent exercise of judicial discretion in 
violation of fundamental concepts of fairness.  Cf. BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 588 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (legal standards "must offer some kind of constraint 
upon a . . . court's discretion, and thus protection against 
purely arbitrary behavior").  Particularly for children, for 
whom the requirement to register as a sex offender may have more 
profound consequences than for an adult,12 and in light of the 
                     
 
11 In Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 267, in addition to stating 
that the judge's determination under § 178E (f) was 
discretionary, we interpreted the statute to impose upon the 
juvenile the burden of establishing that he did not pose a risk 
of reoffense.  Id. at 268-269.  We discuss the issue of 
discretion in note 27, infra, but the juvenile does not 
challenge the allocation of burden of proof, and we have no 
reason to reconsider the point here. 
 
 
12 Registration may have especially serious consequences for 
juvenile sex offenders.  See, e.g., Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 
65 Hastings L.J. 1, 17-18 (2013) ("Humiliation and shame 
associated with registry status, and the risk of being exposed, 
often serve to isolate young people on registries," and research 
suggests that consequences of registration "affect a former 
13 
 
rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system, the 
juvenile claims it is imperative that this court "establish the 
basic parameters of the term 'risk'" in the statutory phrase 
"risk of reoffense."  He goes on to argue that at least in the 
context of juvenile sex offenders, the phrase "risk of 
reoffense" should be measured by whether the offender is 
"likely" to reoffend, and determined by analyzing factors such 
as the "seriousness of the threatened harm, the relative 
certainty of the anticipated harm, and the possibility of 
successful intervention to prevent that harm."  In support of 
this standard, the juvenile points to Commonwealth v. Boucher, 
438 Mass. 274, 276 (2002), a case involving the sexually 
dangerous person (SDP) statute, G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1-16. 
 
As previously stated, we agree with the juvenile on the 
importance of providing a more focused approach to the risk 
assessment that § 178E (f) calls for, but disagree with his 
proffered standard.  The Commonwealth points out, correctly, 
that the Legislature did not use the words "likely" to reoffend 
in § 178E (f), as it did in the SDP statute.  See G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 1 (definition of "[s]exually dangerous person").  As the SDP 
                                                                  
offender's ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate into 
society"); Letourneau & Caldwell, Expensive, Harmful Policies 
that Don't Work or How Juvenile Sexual Offending Is Addressed in 
the U.S., 8 Int'l J. of Behavioral Consultation & Therapy 23, 27 
(2013) (consequences associated with juvenile registration and 
notification include "stigma, isolation, shame, and 
depression"). 
14 
 
statute demonstrates, if the Legislature had wanted to use the 
"likely" standard in § 178E (f), it could have done so.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 74-75 (1990) 
(Legislature's inclusion of particular language in certain 
statutes, and omission of such language in statute at issue, 
indicates affirmative choice not to include that language).  
Although registration imposes distinct burdens on a sex offender 
and perhaps particularly a juvenile sex offender, the 
infringement on personal liberty is far less than if adjudicated 
an SDP.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 27914 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 615 (2012).  In 
the circumstances, it is not reasonable to infer that the 
Legislature intended the phrase, "does not pose a risk of 
reoffense," in § 178E (f) to mean, even for a juvenile sex 
offender, that he or she was not "likely to reoffend."13 
                     
 
13 Furthermore, the Legislature has used the word "likely" 
in another provision of the act, G. L. c. 6, § 178G, which 
authorizes certain registered sex offenders to seek to terminate 
the obligation to register after ten years.  Section 178G 
provides in relevant part:  "The duty of a sex offender required 
to register" shall "end [twenty] years after such sex offender 
has been convicted or adjudicated or has been released from all 
custody or supervision, whichever last occurs," unless the 
"person required to register with the [board] . . . make[s] an 
application to [the] board to terminate the obligation upon 
proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person has not 
committed a sex offense within ten years following conviction, 
adjudication or release from all custody or supervision, 
whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a danger to the 
safety of others" (emphasis added).  Given the situational 
differences between a sex offender who was last convicted of a 
sex offense at least ten years ago and a sex offender who was 
15 
 
 
In attempting to give more definition to the standard 
regarding risk of reoffense incorporated into § 178E (f), it is 
useful to take a somewhat functional approach.  We view the 
standard for determining "risk of reoffense" under § 178E (f) as 
having two components:  (1) the level of risk warranting relief 
from registration, and (2) the basis on which the judge assesses 
this risk.  We consider each component separately. 
 
a.  Level of risk.  Despite the statute's indication that 
the judge may relieve an offender from registration only if he 
or she "does not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the 
public," we do not interpret this language to mean "no risk," 
because the absence of any risk is impossible as a matter of 
logic and common sense.  See In re Harold W., App. Ct. of Ill., 
Second Dist., No. 2-12-1235 (Apr. 18, 2014) (unpublished) 
(interpretation of statute allowing termination of sex offender 
registration upon showing of "no risk to the community"; "to 
require proof of the complete absence of any risk would mean 
that no one would ever be able to satisfy the statute beyond any 
doubt" because "[t]here is always a possibility that sex 
offenders will reoffend").  Moreover, there appears to be a 
consensus among experts that it is impossible to say that a 
                                                                  
convicted or adjudicated delinquent and sentenced within the 
previous fourteen days, it is reasonable to assume that the 
Legislature used different words in §§ 178E (f) and 178G because 
it intended different standards to govern the assessment of 
risk. 
16 
 
person who has committed a sex offense -- which by definition 
includes every person potentially subject to registration under 
the act -- poses no risk of reoffense.14,15  We will not attribute 
to the Legislature the purpose of rendering § 178E (f) 
meaningless by means of an insurmountable standard for obtaining 
relief from registration.  See Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer 
Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 435 Mass. 136, 140 (2001); 
Commonwealth v. Wade, 372 Mass. 91, 95 (1977) (refusing to 
construe statute such that it "would become a useless 
legislative exercise"). 
 
Because § 178E (f) itself does not clearly define the 
appropriate level of risk warranting relief from registration 
under § 178E (f), we seek guidance on the issue from other 
sections of the act.  See Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. 
Rate Setting Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 240 (1985) ("When the 
meaning of a statute is brought into question, a court properly 
should read other sections and should construe them together 
. . . so as to constitute an harmonious whole consistent with 
                     
 
14 Quiñones testified to this effect in the present case, 
and the record suggests that this part of her testimony was 
credited by the judge.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762 (2006) 
(Doe No. 1211) (noting expert's statement that "I don't think 
that once anybody's engaged in sexual acting out behavior can 
you say that there is absolutely no risk"). 
 
 
15 The Commonwealth conceded at oral argument that the 
standard for relief from registration cannot require a showing 
that a sex offender poses absolutely no risk of reoffense, 
because such a standard would be impossible to satisfy. 
17 
 
the legislative purpose" [citation omitted]).  See also Care & 
Protection of Jamison, 467 Mass. 269, 276 (2014); Wolfe v. 
Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004).  General Laws c. 6, 
§ 178K (1), in particular, is pertinent.16  This section directs 
the board to establish a system by which all sex offenders 
required to register are classified by risk of reoffense -- low, 
moderate, or high -- according to the factors spelled out in 
§ 178K (1) (a)-(l), and in the board's implementing regulations, 
803 Mass. Code Regs. § 1.40 (2013).  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., ante 102, 
105 (2014) (Doe No. 68549).  See also G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) 
(a)-(c).  Section 178K (1) and (2) (a) establishes "low" risk of 
reoffense as the lowest level of risk classification, and 
therefore the threshold level of risk requiring registration.  
See Doe No. 68549, supra at 112.  See also Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 24341 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 74 Mass. 
App. Ct. 383, 387 (2009) (Doe No. 24341).  A "low" risk of 
reoffense under § 178K (1) is "not merely a hypothetical or 
speculative potential risk."  Doe No. 24341, supra at 388.  
                     
 
16 The Legislature created the exemption from registration 
provision in § 178E (f) and the list of factors for assessing 
risk of reoffense set out in G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), as part of 
the same piece of legislation.  See St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  This 
"common source" of origin supports reading the two sections 
together.  See Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 
569, 585 n.23 (2012).  See also Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Milk 
Control Comm'n, 340 Mass. 672, 679 (1960). 
 
18 
 
Rather, it is a risk that is "cognizable"17 –- i.e., 
"perceptible"; "[c]apable of being known, perceived, or 
apprehended by the senses or intellect"18 -- and one that can and 
indeed must be able to be articulated and described based on 
affirmative evidence.  See, e.g., Doe No. 68549, supra at 108; 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762-766 (2006) (Doe No. 1211).  It follows 
that to qualify for exemption from registration under § 178E 
(f), a juvenile sex offender's risk of reoffense should be less 
than this "low" registration-triggering risk.  In other words, 
it is a risk that is more than "no risk" -- and therefore more 
than hypothetical or purely speculative -- but not as definite 
as what qualifies as "low" under § 178K (1). 
 
b.  Assessment of risk of reoffense.  We turn to the basis 
on which a Juvenile Court judge is to make the assessment of 
risk of reoffense under § 178E (f).  The statute specifies that 
the judge is to determine this risk based on "the circumstances 
of the offense in conjunction with the offender's criminal 
history."  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f).  However, it is silent on the 
relationship between these two factors and a predictive 
assessment of risk of reoffense, and in the case of a juvenile 
                     
 
17 See Doe No. 1211, 447 Mass. at 762. 
 
 
18 2 Oxford English Dictionary 596 (1978). 
19 
 
sex offender particularly, that relationship is not self-
evident.19,20 
 
The link between the circumstances of the offense and 
criminal history and an offender's risk of reoffense may be 
illuminated, however, where, as was the case here, the juvenile 
presents expert evidence that focuses directly on the question 
                     
 
19 Research suggests some differing views concerning the 
connection between "the circumstances of the offense" and risk 
of reoffense.  Compare, e.g., Batastini, Hunt, Present-Koller, & 
DeMatteo, Federal Standards for Community Registration of 
Juvenile Sex Offenders:  An Evaluation of Risk Prediction and 
Future Implications, 17 Psychol. Pub. Policy & L. 451, 458 
(2011) (Federal Standards), with Russell, Multidisciplinary 
Response to Youth with Sexual Behavior Problems, 40 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 1058, 1070 (2014).  However, with respect to criminal 
history, there seems to be a consensus that juvenile sex 
offenders have a relatively low rate of recidivism -- even 
though "[m]ethodological variations clearly influence recidivism 
rates," and studies disagree as to what the exact rate is.  See 
United States Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, Juveniles Who Have Sexually Offended 31-
32 (2001) (summarizing seven studies that found rate of sexual 
recidivism by juvenile sex offenders to be between eight and 
thirty-seven per cent).  See also Federal Standards, supra at 
457-458 ("sex-specific recidivism rates" of juvenile sex 
offenders are between fourteen and twenty-nine per cent); 
Parker, Branded for Life:  The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory 
and Lifetime Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification, 21 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 167, 188 (2014) 
("Studies support a consensus among experienced practitioners in 
the field of juvenile sexual abuse intervention that juvenile 
sex offenders have a low rate of recidivism [between two and 
fourteen per cent] and are unlikely to become adult sex 
offenders"). 
 
 
20 Moreover, where an offense has caused a victim great 
emotional distress, there is the possibility that a decision not 
to relieve the offender of the obligation to register would be 
based solely on the effect that the offense had on the victim, 
rather than on the circumstances of the offense and the 
offender's criminal history. 
20 
 
of risk.  In this case, for example, Quiñones testified that the 
juvenile's targeting of strangers -- shown by the circumstances 
of the two offenses -- indicated a risk of reoffense, but that 
the juvenile's commission of two sexual offenses within a brief 
period (eight days) did not, in her opinion, increase his risk 
of reoffense because he committed the second offense without 
having been detected as having committed the first.21  If a 
juvenile does offer expert evidence regarding his or her risk of 
reoffense -- e.g., expert testimony or relevant research studies 
by experts in the field -- the judge should consider that 
evidence in assessing the "circumstances of the offense" and 
ultimately determining whether to exempt the juvenile from 
registration.22  That the judge is not bound to credit proffered 
expert testimony, see Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 408 Mass. 230, 
235 (1990), does not diminish the obligation to give it serious, 
reasoned consideration.  Cf. Bianco v. Bianco, 371 Mass. 420, 
423 (1976) (where judge has broad discretion, "it is important 
                     
 
21 Quiñones also testified that the juvenile's commission of 
his offenses in public and during daytime indicated a lack of 
intent to commit more invasive sexual assaults, which suggested, 
to Quiñones, a decreased risk of reoffense. 
 
 
22 Here, the juvenile presented an expert witness who 
testified.  Later, after the juvenile's motion for relief from 
registration had been denied, the juvenile submitted a number of 
studies in connection with his motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of his motion for relief from registration.  Given the 
timing of the submission of these studies, the judge acted 
within her discretion in declining to consider them. 
21 
 
that a judge's findings clearly indicate that [the judge] has 
weighed all" relevant considerations). 
 
Independent of expert evidence, and especially where no 
expert evidence is offered, the judge may seek guidance by 
reference to the factors addressing risk of reoffense in G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K (1) (a)-(l), and the board's implementing 
regulations.  More particularly, it may be appropriate for the 
judge to evaluate the juvenile's criminal history and the 
circumstances of his or her offense through the lens provided by 
these statutory and regulatory risk factors.  Consideration, for 
example, of the juvenile sex offender's status as a juvenile at 
the time of the offense and the significance of that status, see 
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (e), would seem critical in every case.  
The relevance of other factors will depend on the specific facts 
presented.23 
                     
 
23 The juvenile as well as amici express concern about tying 
the predictive assessment of risk required under § 178E (f) too 
closely to the factors used by the board in its classification 
decisions under § 178K (1).  They argue that scientific research 
and discoveries about sexual offenders have called and continue 
to call into question the accuracy of commonly held views about 
factors that indicate risk of sex offender recidivism, and they 
assert that the board does not keep up with these changes.  We 
have recognized the problem of the board's failure to update its 
regulations and its continued reliance on increasingly outdated 
studies and research.  See Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 609 
("eleven years have passed since [the board] last updated [its] 
guidelines, during which time knowledge and understanding of 
sexual recidivism has expanded considerably"); Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
612, 623 n.6 (2010) (board's guidelines "may require more 
frequent modification in order to reflect accurately the current 
22 
 
 
With respect to the process by which a Juvenile Court judge 
is to reach a decision on risk of reoffense under § 178E (f), as 
previously mentioned, this section is one of three provisions in 
the act providing for exemption from registration; the other two 
are G. L. c. 6, §§ 178E (e) (on Commonwealth's motion, judge may 
find that offender need not register) and 178K (2) (d) (board 
may determine that offender need not register).  Section 178K 
(2) (d) specifies that, with respect to the board, it must 
support a decision to "relieve [an] offender of any further 
obligation to register" upon "making specific written findings."  
The absence of similar language in § 178E (f) indicates that the 
Legislature did not intend to impose such a requirement.  See 
Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 270 (although sex offender may request 
written findings, decision whether to issue them rests in 
judge's discretion).  Rather, by specifying that the trial (or 
plea) judge is to make the determination concerning the 
offender's "risk of reoffense" and exemption from the obligation 
to register within two weeks of imposing sentence, the 
Legislature appears to have contemplated that the judge would 
make the determination not on the basis of a wholly independent 
                                                                  
state of knowledge").  We also have recognized the issue 
specifically in relation to juvenile sex offenders, because of 
the gaps between juveniles and adults and the rapid developments 
in scientific and social science research in this area.  See Doe 
No. 68549, supra at 114-116.  However, we anticipate and expect 
that the board will soon begin to take corrective steps in 
relation to the need to update its regulations. 
23 
 
proceeding, but essentially in connection with the resolution of 
the delinquency proceeding, informed by the knowledge and 
understanding of the circumstances of both the offense and the 
offender that the judge had acquired by virtue of being the 
trial (or plea) judge.24  Cf. Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 
202, 212 (2013). 
 
Although a Juvenile Court judge is not obligated to issue 
written findings under § 178E (f), and although the judge's 
process of determining a juvenile sex offender's relief from 
registration under this section may be less formal than the 
process required by the board under § 178K (2) (d), it is 
important nonetheless for the judge to explain on the record 
with some specificity the reasons for his or her assessment of 
risk of reoffense and resulting determination whether the 
juvenile should be relieved of the obligation to register.  Cf. 
Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 402 (2000), quoting 
Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968) (even where judge has 
"broad discretion," it is "essential . . . that a reviewing 
court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned 
conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of 
all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in 
                     
 
24 As discussed previously in the text, the judge of course 
also would be informed by any information relevant to assessing 
the risk of reoffense that the juvenile or the Commonwealth 
presented in connection with the § 178E (f) determination. 
24 
 
appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts 
or analysis of the law").25  The presence in the record of the 
judge's basis for allowing or denying relief from registration 
is of particular importance where, as here, the juvenile has 
presented expert testimony or other evidence addressing his risk 
of reoffense.  Cf. Bianco, 371 Mass. at 423. 
 
3.  Disposition of present case.  The juvenile claims that 
the judge's denial of his motion for relief from registration as 
a sex offender must be reversed because, on the record before 
her, the judge abused her discretion in rejecting the opinion of 
his expert witness. 
 
"[E]xperts' opinions are not binding on the trier of fact, 
who may accept or reject them in whole or in part."  
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 423 Mass. 841, 854 (1996) (quotation 
omitted).  See DeMinico, 408 Mass. at 235.  The juvenile does 
not contest this point directly, but maintains that the judge 
nevertheless was obligated to (1) consider "substantial, 
                     
 
25 There is no direct right to judicial review of a judge's 
exemption determination under § 178E (f).  See note 8, supra.  
But quite apart from judicial review, principles of fairness and 
the need for reasoned consistency make the court's observations 
in Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 402 (2000), about the 
importance of findings relevant here.  Where, as in this case, 
the juvenile has offered expert testimony or research, the judge 
should consider it and indicate on the record her view of this 
evidence and its relationship to her determination concerning 
the offender's obligation to register.  Compare Police Dep't of 
Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 694 (2012) (obligation of 
administrative agency in adjudicatory proceeding to explain 
reasons for rejecting expert testimony). 
25 
 
uncontested expert evidence" concerning the risk of reoffense, 
and (2) adequately explain any rejection of such expert 
testimony. 
 
On the first point, the record makes clear that the judge 
here did consider the opinion testimony of Quiñones, discussing 
a number of the expert's specific points or opinions in the 
judge's oral findings.  As to the second point, the record also 
shows that the judge did explain in general terms her 
disagreement with some of Quiñones's opinions.  In particular, 
the judge explained that she did not credit the expert's opinion 
that the juvenile's offenses were not connected to sexual 
deviance or that marijuana contributed to the juvenile's 
offense, based on the judge's determination that the juvenile 
committed "a broad daylight sexual assault on two strangers in 
our community with no apparent measure of restraint" or "any 
understanding of why he committed these offenses."  The judge 
stated that these circumstances led her not to have confidence 
in Quiñones's opinion that the juvenile's level of risk of 
reoffending was low enough to relieve him from the requirement 
of registration.  In both the judge's initial explanation of her 
reasons for requiring the juvenile to register and her later 
explanation of her denial of his motion for reconsideration, the 
judge emphasized that she had given careful consideration to 
Quiñones's testimony and opinions.  Although one might take a 
26 
 
different view of Quiñones's testimony and opinions from that of 
the judge, her rejection of certain of those opinions was 
neither unexplained nor without any basis. 
 
Furthermore, the judge's focus in her findings on certain 
of the circumstances of the juvenile's offenses -- the daylight 
attacks in the public street on two separate individuals without 
"apparent . . . restraint" and without insight into the reasons 
for doing so -- reflects in substance some of the concerns 
included in the factors for assessing risk of reoffense set out 
in G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), and associated regulations.26  
Considering the judge's findings in light of our discussion in 
this opinion of the risk of reoffense standard set out in § 178E 
(f), we cannot say that the findings do not support the judge's 
assessment of that risk.  In sum, we conclude that based on the 
record before her, the judge's ultimate determination that the 
juvenile should not be relieved of the obligation to register as 
a sex offender did not lie "outside the bounds of reasonable 
alternatives," Adoption of Mariano, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 660 
                     
 
26 For example, the judge's attention to the juvenile's two 
separate assaults and lack of restraint suggests a 
correspondence with the factor of "repetitive and compulsive 
behavior" set out in G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a) (ii), and 803 
Mass. Code Regs. § 1.40(2) (2013). 
 
27 
 
(2010), and, accordingly, did not constitute an abuse of her 
discretion.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
27 In discussing the abuse of discretion standard in Ronald 
R., 450 Mass. at 267, the court stated:  "In order for the 
juvenile to sustain an abuse of discretion claim, he must 
demonstrate that 'no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, 
could honestly have taken the view expressed by him.' 
Commonwealth v. Ira I., 439 Mass. 805, 809 (2003), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 350, 361 (1976)."  See Davis v. 
Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 482, 502 (1920).  As the 
dates of the cases just cited suggest, this articulation of the 
abuse of discretion standard of review has enjoyed a long career 
in our jurisprudence, but, we conclude, it has "earned its 
retirement."  Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 
(2007).  An appellate court's review of a trial judge's decision 
for abuse of discretion must give great deference to the judge's 
exercise of discretion; it is plainly not an abuse of discretion 
simply because a reviewing court would have reached a different 
result.  See Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 396 Mass. 
639, 641 (1986).  But the "no conscientious judge" standard is 
so deferential that, if actually applied, an abuse of discretion 
would be as rare as flying pigs.  When an appellate court 
concludes that a judge abused his or her discretion, the court 
is not, in fact, finding that the judge was not conscientious 
or, for that matter, not intelligent or honest.  Borrowing from 
other courts, we think it more accurate to say that a judge's 
discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where 
we conclude the judge made "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing" the factors relevant to the decision, see Picciotto v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted), such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives.  See Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 
F.3d 163, 168-169 (2d Cir. 2001); Adoption of Mariano, 77 Mass. 
App. Ct. 656, 660 (2010).