Title: State v. Finley

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

198 Kan. 585 (1967)
426 P.2d 251
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
GEORGE T. FINLEY, Appellant.
No. 44,706

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 8, 1967.
Charles F. Forsyth, of Erie, argued the cause, and Clark M. Fleming, also of Erie, and John W. White, of Chanute, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
John W. Cooper, Chief Counsel for the Motor Vehicle Department, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is a criminal action in which George T. Finley (defendant-appellant) was convicted of neglecting and refusing to return his operator's license and vehicle registration to the Motor Vehicle Department as required by K.S.A. 8-760. He was sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 8-761, and appeal has been duly perfected from the judgment and sentence.
The questions presented are whether on the facts in this case the *587 appellant is subject to criminal prosecution, and if so whether the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act is constitutional as applied to the appellant.
The facts in the case have been stipulated and agreed upon by the parties.
The appellant, George T. Finley, resides on a farm near Erie, Neosho County, Kansas, and on August 31, 1965, he was the owner of a 1949 Dodge pickup truck. On that date the truck was properly registered with the state of Kansas and bore a 1965 Kansas license tag "N/O-T-530." On that date the appellant possessed a valid Kansas motor vehicle operator's license, but he had no applicable bodily injury or property damage insurance in effect while driving and operating the described pickup truck, or any other vehicle.
On the 31st day of August, 1965, the appellant was involved in a collision with another motor vehicle within Neosho County, Kansas, while driving his pickup truck, and copies of the drivers' reports to the Motor Vehicle Department of the state of Kansas were attached to the stipulation.
Pursuant to K.S.A. 8-726 the Motor Vehicle Department of the state of Kansas on October 11, 1965, notified the appellant that if he did not post security as required by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of Kansas, his driver's license, vehicle tags and registration receipts would be suspended as of October 22, 1965, a copy of which notice was attached to the stipulation.
The appellant failed to post security and failed to surrender his driver's license, vehicle tags and registration receipts.
On the 27th day of October, 1965, pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 8-727, an order of suspension was entered by the Motor Vehicle Department of the state of Kansas by reason of the appellant's failure to deposit security, and a copy of such order was attached to the stipulation. A copy of such order of suspension was served upon the appellant by certified mail and received by him on the 28th day of October, 1965.
On the 8th day of November, 1965, the appellant still failing to surrender his driver's license, registration receipts and vehicle tags, the Motor Vehicle Department issued a pickup order directed to its Neosho County representatives, R.H. Hazlett and H.E. Payne, and pursuant to such order these representatives contacted the appellant on November 17, 1965, and demanded surrender of his driver's license, vehicle tags and registration receipts, which demand *588 was refused by the appellant. Again on November 19, 1965, the appellant was contacted by these representatives and demand was again made upon him for surrender of his driver's license, vehicle tags and registration receipts, pursuant to the order issued by the Motor Vehicle Department. This demand was also refused.
At no time was the appellant before any court of competent jurisdiction and no court has ever issued an order requiring the appellant to surrender his driver's license, vehicle tags and registration receipts.
The vehicle involved in the accident herein was the sole vehicle owned by the appellant and was his sole means of transportation, both for himself and other members of his family. At the time of the accident the appellant's driver's license was in full force and effect and he had no record of careless or reckless driving. His motor vehicle was paid for and he had paid for his 1965 license plates.
On the 19th day of November, 1965, this action was instituted by filing a complaint in the city court of Chanute, Neosho County, Kansas.
From a conviction in the city court the appellant appealed to the district court of Neosho County, Kansas, where the case was submitted upon the foregoing agreed statement of facts. In a memorandum decision the trial court found the appellant guilty of the offense charged, and the appellant thereafter appeared for pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the 12th day of April, 1966. The appellant was sentenced to be confined in the Neosho County jail for a term of sixty days and to pay a fine of $250 and costs. A motion for a new trial was thereafter filed and overruled, whereupon appeal was duly perfected to this court.
This action concerns a criminal prosecution which appears to be one of first impression in the state of Kansas.
Here the alleged criminal act does not involve driving a motor vehicle without a proper license or regristration, but is based upon the appellant's failure to return to the Motor Vehicle Department his driver's license, automobile registration and license plates after suspension of his license for failure to deposit security subsequent to being involved in an accident.
In January, 1967, this court in Agee v. Kansas Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 173, 422 P.2d 949, had before it an appeal from a decision under K.S.A. 8-723, another section under the Kansas *589 Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. There the appellee driver was involved in a vehicular accident in Kansas City, Kansas, which resulted in property damage of more than $100. The accident was duly reported and the Department, upon being advised that the appellee was not protected by liability insurance, issued an order requiring security to be deposited, advising the appellee as to the amount, or his license would be subject to suspension. Upon failure of the appellee to deposit the security required, the Department issued an order of suspension.
Pursuant to 8-723, supra, the appellee filed a written request for a hearing, and upon being heard by an agent of the Department the initial order of suspension was sustained. On appeal to the district court of Wyandotte County pursuant to the statute, the suspension order was reversed.
On appeal to this court by the Kansas Highway Commission from such adverse ruling this court, insofar as the decision is material herein, held:
The sections of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act pertinent to our decision in the instant case are as follows:
K.S.A. 8-760:
*590 K.S.A. 8-760a:
K.S.A. 8-761:
To summarize briefly, it may be said K.S.A. 8-723 provides for the administrative appeal from an order of suspension as was issued in this case, and in the same section the aggrieved party is given the absolute right to a trial de novo in the district court of the county of his residence to determine whether such order is lawful and reasonable. This procedure was followed in Agee v. Kansas Highway Commission, supra. The suspension order involved here was imposed under the authority of K.S.A. 8-727; the duty to surrender is imposed by K.S.A. 8-760; and the penalty provisions asserted by the Motor Vehicle Department and adopted by the district court in pronouncing judgment and sentence are prescribed in K.S.A. 8-761.
It is the appellant's contention 8-760a, supra, prescribes the penalty for failure to return the driver's license, motor vehicle registration, and license plates to the Motor Vehicle Department  the payment of an additional fee of $25 to the Motor Vehicle Department before any new license or registration can be issued. The appellant argues this seems to be the only construction which could be placed upon 8-760a, supra, since that section makes a difference in cost of $25 to any person who has failed to return his license, registration receipts and license plates as requested. In this connection, the appellant refers to the language in 8-761, supra, to the effect that *591 8-761, supra, shall be operative only where no penalty is otherwise provided in the act.
The substance of the appellant's argument is that the $25 additional fee provided in 8-760a, supra, is a penalty within the contemplation of the language in 8-761, supra.
The question therefore posed is whether 8-760a, supra, contains an exclusive penalty for refusal to surrender the operator's license, registration and license plates, or whether such refusal constitutes a misdemeanor under the provisions of 8-761, supra.
The trial court held the categorical answer to the question lies in the legislative history of the two sections, noting that 8-761, supra, was a part of the comprehensive act adopted in 1957, long prior to the enactment of 8-760a, supra, which was adopted in 1963. On this point the trial court said:
Upon consideration of this question by the court the majority of its members are of the opinion and construe the additional fee of $25 in 8-760a, supra, to be an administrative cost imposed upon one whose license has been suspended, and who fails to immediately return his license and registration to the Department as required by 8-760, supra.
The term "penalty" has been variously defined by the courts of last resort in this country. It is applied in the sense of punishment for crime. It is also a sum of money which the law exacts the payment of by way of punishment for doing some act which is prohibited, or omitting to do some act which is required to be done. (31A Words and Phrases, pp. 417, 476 [Permanent Edition].)
As used in 8-761, supra, which imposes criminal liability, the term "penalty" was undoubtedly used by the legislature to denote punishment.
*592 The foregoing construction of the above sections of the act makes the violation of 8-760, supra, by the appellant a misdemeanor under 8-761, supra.
The appellant next contends the trial court erred in finding that 8-760, supra, is constitutional and does not deprive the appellant of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
While the appellant recognizes the generally accepted theory that a license to drive is a privilege, which can be suspended by the state for good reason, he argues it is most difficult to understand how the use of personal property can be denominated a privilege, which can be denied arbitrarily by ministerial act of an administrative department of the state without fault or violation of any law by the owner of such property. He contends it is even harder to explain how an administrative department could further require the giving up of certain items of personal property by the owner thereof by simple administrative order based on an event beyond the control of the owner of the property.
In this connection, the appellant relies upon the logic in People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961). There the defendant drove a motor vehicle while under a suspension order issued by the Motor Vehicle Department of the state of Colorado, the suspension order having been issued for refusal to deposit security under provisions similar to those in the Kansas law. The Colorado court said:
In the opinion the court found that a motor vehicle was property within the due process clause of the Constitution. It said:
The Colorado court recognized the power of the state to regulate traffic for the public safety, but said when a citizen meets the standards defined in a proper exercise of the police power, he has the right to continue the full enjoyment of that right until by due process of law it has been established that by reason of abuse of the right, or other just cause, it is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety to deprive him of the right to drive a motor vehicle on the highways. It said such action cannot be taken without notice to the party affected and an opportunity to be heard; and whether a constitutionally guaranteed property right can be denied for some justifiable reason, is essentially a judicial question. It also said the safety responsibility law requiring deposit of security after an accident does not protect the public health, safety or welfare and denies the operator due process of law and is unconstitutional. It said the act was designed and intended to bring about the posting of security for the payment of a private obligation without the slightest indication that any legal obligation exists on the part of any person; that the public gets no protection whatever from the deposit of such security.
The Colorado court held the provisions of the Colorado act requiring the suspension of a driver's license under statutory provisions similar to those of the Kansas act unconstitutional and invalid.
It may be noted the Colorado decision (two justices dissenting) represents the minority view and is premised upon the proposition that a right to use a motor vehicle upon a public highway is a property right, while Kansas has always regarded a license to drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway to be a privilege. In Agee v. Kansas Highway Commission, supra, it was said:
*594 For other cases holding the right to operate a motor vehicle upon public streets is not a natural right, but a privilege, subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest see, Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765; Marbut v. Motor Vehicle Department, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); and Heart v. Fletcher, 53 N.Y.S.2d 369, 184 Misc. 659 (1945).
Suspension of a driver's license or of the registration of a motor vehicle is not the taking of property. It deprives the operator or owner of the automobile for a limited time and on reasonable conditions of the privilege of driving or operating the motor vehicle on the public highways. The suspension can be terminated by depositing security, by procuring a release from liability, or by filing a written agreement with respect to claims for bodily injury to, or death of, any person, or property damage arising from such accident, which may provide for payment in installments. (See, K.S.A. 8-731 and 8-732.) Inconvenience is imposed upon the operator who is not at fault, but it is so imposed in the interest of prompt action for the accomplishment of the purpose of the act in the exercise of the police power. (Gillaspie v. Dept. of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 467, 259 S.W.2d 177 [1953], cert. den. 347 U.S. 933, 98 L. Ed. 1084, 74 S. Ct. 625.)
The payment by the appellant of the required fees upon the issuance to him of the operator's license and registration certificate did not convert the privilege granted into a property right of which he might not be deprived without a notice and hearing, i.e., due process of law. The privilege was granted to him under certain specified conditions, subject to all laws pertaining thereto at the time the same was issued or may later be enacted, if otherwise valid. (Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 86 L. Ed. 21, 61 S. Ct. 24 [1941]; Doyle v. Kahl, supra; and Heart v. Fletcher, supra.)
It seems clear the legislature may require, as a condition to the right of operating a motor vehicle, the procurement of insurance or the furnishing of other proof of financial responsibility. (Gillaspie v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra.)
If the legislature may require proof of financial responsibility in advance of the issuance of a driver's license, there seems to be no valid reason why it could not require the same thing of an operator who has been involved in an accident, as the condition upon which he will be permitted to retain his license. (Gillaspie v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra.)
*595 The present direct attack upon the constitutionality of the act is limited to the suspension of the operator's license, vehicle registration and license plates under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and the resultant criminal prosecution for failure to return to the Motor Vehicle Department the license or registration of the appellant immediately upon being notified of the suspension. The appellant argues that after the suspension by the Motor Vehicle Department of one's operator's license or vehicle registration, the driver or owner of the vehicle may be prosecuted for driving or using the same without such licenses. This punishment, the appellant argues, is sufficient to enforce the suspension. He says it cannot be presumed that if the items of personal property evidencing license and registration are not returned to the Department, the owner or operator will use them to violate the law. He argues the state insists the appellant has become a criminal for failure to give up items of personal property which he owns and for which he has paid. This was occasioned by the demand of a state administrative agency.
To clarify his point, the appellant asks, "For what kind of crime is the appellant being prosecuted?" The appellant argues he is accused, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment, and the payment of a fine for no commission of an offensive act, but for an omission  refusing to comply with the order of an administrative department of the state made without any judicial determination of any kind. He argues the legislature cannot render that criminal which in its very nature is innocent and essentially nonculpable, nor may it declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime. He argues the stipulated facts disclose the Department has not directed a peace officer to secure possession of the articles sought, as required by 8-760, supra, but simply sent two investigators to pick up the items.
An extended annotation considering the question of the validity of the financial responsibility acts in the United States appears in 35 A.L.R.2d 1011. This annotation supersedes an earlier one in 115 A.L.R. 1376.
It may generally be said the validity of financial responsibility acts, which by now are common enactments in the majority of the states of the United States, has been consistently upheld against constitutional and other objections, of all varieties, including the claim that they conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. This conclusion seems to rest on the fact that the state, in the exercise *596 of its police power, may make reasonable regulations as to the use of its highways, and that since financial responsibility acts aim to promote safety on the highways by protecting the users against financially irresponsible persons, they are reasonable regulations within such power.
In Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952), the Supreme Court of Nebraska in speaking of the state's automobile financial responsibility laws said:
The Supreme Court of the United States in Reitz v. Mealey, supra, recognized the powers of the state to adopt appropriate means to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees to protect others using the highway and held it to be consonant with due process. There the vehicle and traffic law of New York, as originally enacted, provided that one against whom a judgment was rendered for injury resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, and who failed to pay it within a designated time, should have his license and registration suspended for three years, unless in the meantime the judgment was satisfied or discharged.
On the facts here presented the appellant's specifications of error indicate he is making a broadside due process attack, contending the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act goes beyond the proper exercise of the state's police power.
A similar attack was made by a Wisconsin driver in State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953), on facts almost identical to those in the case at bar with one exception; namely, the Wisconsin statute imposing criminal liability differs substantially from the corresponding section of the Kansas statute. (8-761, supra.) The Wisconsin section prescribing penalties (Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, Volume 14, § 85.09 [32]) reads:
Subsection (31), to which reference is made in (b) above, is identical to the corresponding section of the Kansas act, 8-760, supra. The Wisconsin act has no section corresponding to 8-760a, supra.
As in the instant case, the Wisconsin driver was involved in a collision, and the commissioner issued a notice of suspension of his driver's license, if he failed to comply with the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act by posting security. The driver failed to post the required security, and an order of suspension of his operator's license was made and served on him by mail. He refused and failed to surrender his driver's license pursuant to the notice and was thereupon prosecuted in the district court for unlawfully and willfully failing and refusing to return his operator's license to the Motor Vehicle Department after suspension thereof, in violation of Section 85.09 (31). The trial court held the act unconstitutional and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin on appeal reversed.
The Wisconsin court reasoned that by the weight of authority driving an automobile upon public highways is a privilege, and not a property right; and is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of public safety and welfare. It quoted from a leading case involving the financial responsibility law (Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 Atl. 701, 115 A.L.R. 1367 [1938]) as follows:
In Stehlek the driver asserted there was no provision in the Wisconsin statute for a court review of the proceedings by the commissioner, excepting only that if the person notified succeeds in obtaining a judgment of the court absolving him from negligence he automatically becomes entitled to reinstatement.
The court said when the conditions imposed by the legislature, requiring the commissioner to suspend a license, have been fulfilled by acts or omissions of the licensee, the commissioner's duty to suspend is mandatory. His function in carrying out the will and mandate of the legislature is purely ministerial. The legislature has factually determined and expressed that determination in the statute itself, as to when and under what circumstances a license shall be suspended. There is then no need for reviewing the commissioner's acts, unless he has deviated from the terms of the statute. However, in those particulars where the commissioner exercises some measure of discretion, there is provision for reviewing his acts. For example, the amount of security demanded by the commissioner is subject to review by the court under the statute. In the opinion the Wisconsin court said:
Generally, an exercise of the state police power is valid insofar as it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to the promotion of the public welfare. The theory upon which the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Acts are upheld, which make no provision for a hearing prior to the suspension of a driver's license, is that much harm may come to citizens of the state unless they are speedily protected from irresponsible drivers.
In respect to the appellant's due process attack, the Supreme Court of California in Escobedo v. State of California, 35 C.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950), said:
The contention that financial responsibility laws unconstitutionally discriminate against the poor was effectively considered in Escobedo v. State of California, supra, where the court said.
In Roseblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 Atl. 701, 115 A.L.R. 1367 (1938), the court said:
The court in conclusion finds the reasoning applied by the foregoing authorities upholding motor vehicle financial responsibility laws, similar to the Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, has persuasive force. Accordingly, it is held the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which requires the Department (the Vehicle Department of the State Highway Commission  K.S.A. 8-722) to summarily suspend the license of a financially irresponsible driver involved in an accident, who falls within the act and fails to deposit security as required pursuant to K.S.A. 8-726, subsequent to the accident, and to summarily suspend the registration of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in such accident pursuant to K.S.A. 8-727, is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. The further provisions in K.S.A. 8-760, requiring any person whose license or registration has been suspended to immediately return his license and registration to the Department, and the provisions of 8-761, supra, designed to enforce the act by imposing criminal liability upon an offender, are an appropriate means adopted by the legislature to enforce the act and to insure competence and care on the part of licensees operating motor vehicles and to protect others using the highways. These provisions do not deprive such person of property without due process of law.
Under the provisions of 8-760, supra, the offense committed by the appellant was complete upon his failure to immediately return his license and registration to the Department upon receiving notice of the order of suspension. The appellant's later refusal to surrender his license or registration upon demand by agents of the Department occurred after the offense was committed.
On the facts in this case the appellant owned only one motor *602 vehicle, and the suspension order involved only the operator's license of the appellant and the registration and license plates of the vehicle which he owned, and which was involved in the accident. The foregoing opinion concerning the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act is limited to these facts; that is, the ownership of one vehicle driven by the owner who was involved in the accident. (See, K.S.A. 8-727 [2] and 8-760a.)
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
SCHROEDER, J., dissenting:
While I agree with the decision of the court upholding the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, I do not think it necessary to a decision in the instant case.
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. That is, where ambiguity or uncertainty exists, they must be construed against the state.
The provisions of K.S.A. 8-761 are ambiguous in that they fail to specifically denounce those acts which are made punishable by its provisions. An example of a penalty section in a Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which is clear with respect to the facts in this case is Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, Volume 14, § 85.09 (32), quoted in the court's opinion.
First, the provisions of 8-761, supra, state that any person who shall violate any provision of this act for which no other penalty is provided shall be fined, etc. The term "penalty" has been used in America in various senses. In one sense the term "penalty" denotes money recoverable by virtue of a statute imposing a payment by way of punishment. (United States v. Four Hundred And Twenty Dollars, 162 Fed. 803, 805 [S.D. Ala. 1908], citing Black's Law Dictionary.)
The provisions of K.S.A. 8-760a provide for an additional payment of $25 to the Motor Vehicle Department for one who fails to immediately return his license and registration to the Department upon receiving notice of an order that his license or registration has been suspended in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 8-760. Section 8-760a, supra, specifically states, in view of its enactment after the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, that the section shall be construed as a part of and supplemental to the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
It is improper to emphasize the expression "supplemental to" and ignore the expression "as a part of." Again, keeping in mind *603 that a criminal statute must be strictly construed, the appellant is entitled to have 8-760a, supra, construed as a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and not as supplemental to it insofar as the instant action is concerned.
The $25 additional fee falls within the definition of penalty used in 8-761, supra. This is fortified by the fact that the legislature specifically provided in 8-760a, supra, that "All fees collected by the motor vehicle department under the provisions of this section shall be paid into the state treasury and the state treasurer shall credit the same to the state highway fund." Customarily, when fines and penalties are collected by an agency of the state or a court, the legislature prescribes what shall be done with the money. If this were actually an administrative fee for the additional expense of administering the act, the legislature would have made no provision for the disposition of the $25 collected.
The only apparent reason the legislature could have had for enacting 8-760a, supra, was to impose a penalty of $25 upon a person failing to comply with 8-760, supra. This subsequent section of the act retains the same number as 8-760, to which it refers, with an "a" added. (8-760a, supra.)
The argument that the appellant could avoid the $25 penalty by refusing to reapply for a license is pure sophistry. If this were the appellant's choice, it would be tantamount to a permanent revocation of his driver's license by the Department, which in modern times can be ignored as an alternative choice. The driving of motor vehicles as a means of transportation in our modern economy, particularly one who resides in a rural area such as the appellant, is a necessity of life.
Second, there is no language in 8-760, supra, which makes the failure to immediately return a license and registration to the Department, where an order of suspension has been issued, unlawful. Furthermore, nowhere in either 8-760, supra, or 8-761, supra, does it require that the failure to surrender be a willful act on the part of one whose driver's license has been suspended. Thus, a criminal charge that the appellant unlawfully and willfully failed to surrender his operator's license and motor vehicle registration receipt would require the addition of these words to the sections of the statute.
From the language in 8-760, supra, it would appear that one who fails to immediately return his license and registration to the Department, *604 upon receiving notice of an order of suspension, would be subjected to a demand from a peace officer as a condition precedent to any prosecution under 8-761, supra, in the absence of more specific language as found in the Wisconsin statute. This conclusion is compelled by a strict construction of the statute imposing criminal liability.
In the instant case the Motor Vehicle Department failed to comply with 8-760, supra, in that no peace officer was ever sent to secure possession of the appellant's driver's license or automobile registration receipt and return the same to the Department.
It is respectfully submitted the conviction of the appellant should be set aside as invalid under the facts of this case. Strictly construing 8-761, supra, on the facts in this case, the appellant was not subject to criminal prosecution under this section of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
KAUL and FROMME, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.