Title: Parker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Kelvin Parker a/k/a Calvin Parker v. State of Maryland, No. 89, September Term, 2008
EVIDENCE – CRIMINAL LAW – HEARSAY – RULE COMPONENTS –
RELEVANCE – CONFUSION, MISUSE, PREJUDICE – INFORMANT
INFORMATION
In a case in which the defendant was convicted by a jury of heroin possession, the trial court
erroneously allowed a police detective to testify that he received a tip from a confidential
informant that a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a black hooded sweatshirt was
selling heroin at a particular intersection.  The testimony was inadmissible hearsay because
it contained too much specific information about the defendant and his criminal activity to
be justified by the proffered non-hearsay purpose of establishing why the detective was at
the intersection.  The specificity of the informant’s extrajudicial statement created a danger
that the jury would misuse the information as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt
and the State proved this point by referencing the informant’s tip for the truth of the matter
asserted in closing argument.
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – APPEALS – STANDARDS OF REVIEW –
HARMLESS ERROR
The admission of the informant’s extrajudicial statement was not harmless error.  The jury
only heard testimony from the police detective, who relayed the informant’s information, and
the defendant.  The State introduced into evidence sixteen vials of heroin the detective said
he found on the defendant, but the vials were never fingerprinted.  The jury informed the
court on two occasions before returning its verdict that it was deadlocked.  In this case the
jury evidently considered a close one, that turned on whether the jury credited the detective’s
testimony over the defendant’s, the informant’s statement that an individual fitting the
defendant’s description was “selling heroin from his person” at a particular intersection
provided potentially scale-tipping corroboration for the detective’s testimony that he
observed the defendant engage in what he believed to be “illegal narcotic activity” and then
recovered from the defendant sixteen gel caps of heroin.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 802242008
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 89
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
KELVIN PARKER
A/K/A CALVIN PARKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   May 4, 2009
_______________________________________
This case illustrates the risk inherent in admitting an informant’s statement implicating
the defendant through the testimony of a police officer, purportedly for a non-hearsay
purpose.  The trial court allowed a police detective to testify at a jury trial that he received
a tip from a confidential informant that a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a black
hooded sweatshirt was selling heroin at a particular intersection.  Appellant Kelvin Parker
was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin and sentenced to four years imprisonment.
We shall hold that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it contained too much
specific information about the defendant and his criminal activity to be justified by the
proffered non-hearsay purpose of establishing why the detective was at the intersection.
Because its admission into evidence was not harmless, we shall reverse the judgment below
and remand the case for new trial.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
On the morning of November 2, 2006 at approximately 10:30, Detective David
McGowan of the Baltimore City Police Department was working in plain clothes in an
unmarked vehicle near the intersection of Carey and Laurens Streets.  McGowan described
the area as “an open air drug market” and a “heroin shop.”  He said that he was at the
location because of a telephone call he had received from one of his registered confidential
informants.  McGowan testified, over Parker’s objection, that the informant told him that a
black male wearing a blue baseball cap and black hooded sweatshirt was “at the corner of
Carey and Laurens selling heroin from his person, meaning the drugs were on him.”
McGowan related that once he arrived in the area, he began making observations from
a covert location “[a]bout a half a city block” from the corner of Carey and Laurens.  He
2
observed a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a black hooded sweatshirt – later
identified as Mr. Parker – walking around at the intersection of Carey and Laurens. 
McGowan indicated that he observed Parker for twenty to thirty minutes.  He watched Parker
walk into a corner liquor store and “within a couple of seconds two unknown males followed
him into the liquor store.”  The two unknown individuals were inside the liquor store for
“maybe five to ten seconds” and then walked out empty-handed and left the area.
McGowan indicated that before these two men entered, he had seen “about four to five
other individuals walk in the store” and “walk right back out with no packages in hand.”
McGowan explained that based upon his experience, “individuals who are engaged in illegal
narcotics activity will utilize these corner stores, these Chinese stores, these carryouts,
whatever they might be, . . . to conceal what they’re doing[.]”  He then expressed his expert
opinion that “Mr. Parker was engaged in illegal narcotic activity.”
According to McGowan, Parker walked out of the store and walked westbound on
Laurens Street.  McGowan lost sight of Parker for a brief period, but then saw Parker by the
Capital Cake Company.  McGowan and two other detectives who were with him, Detectives
Ott and Maurice, pulled up next to Parker in their vehicle and got out.  The detectives were
in plain clothes, but were wearing badges on the outside of their garments.  Parker did not
run when McGowan approached, but according to McGowan, Parker said, “Oh shit.”
McGowan recovered three gel caps of heroin out of Parker’s right rear pants pocket
and an additional thirteen gel caps of heroin in a small incision in the seam of his waistband.
Each of the gel caps was worth $10.  The detectives also recovered $82 from Parker’s person,
1A blue light camera is a closed-circuit surveillance camera utilized by the Baltimore
City Police Department that stores and relays images of public areas.  A blue light is affixed
on the camera.   
3
including one $20 bill, two $10 bills, six $5 bills, and twelve $1 bills.  Based on the
denominations of money, McGowan believed the bills were proceeds from the sale of eight
gel caps.  McGowan testified that the drugs were never fingerprinted “because [he] recovered
them directly from the person of Mr. Parker or his possession.”
On cross examination, McGowan first testified that Parker went into the store for
“several brief seconds.”  When defense counsel showed him the statement of probable cause,
however, McGowan acknowledged that he then wrote that Parker went into the store for
“several minutes.”  McGowan also admitted that: during his investigation he never went
inside the liquor store; the two unknown men he observed were not stopped; there was no
blue light camera1 at that intersection; he could not recall how many other people were
present on the street outside of the Capital Cake Company; and the pants with the incision
were not recovered.  Neither of the detectives who were with McGowan was called to testify.
Parker testified that he was in front of the Capital Cake Company about 10:30 in the
morning talking to a girl who worked there.  About fifteen or twenty minutes later, Parker’s
friend Warren passed by and spoke to Parker.  Parker then picked up his bike and walked
with it up the street to the corner liquor store.  As Parker got to the liquor store, Warren “and
the guy that was with him” were coming out of the store, so Parker “stepped in and stepped
right back out.”  Warren and the person with him then walked across the street, got into the
4
truck Warren was driving, and pulled away.
Parker said that about five minutes later, three white officers in an unmarked tan car
who had been sitting “by the bar the whole time” backed up around the corner.  McGowan
then got out of the car, asked Parker if he had “anything to poke, stick, or stab him[,]” and
started searching Parker.  According to Parker, McGowan “dropped [Parker’s] pants to the
ground” but “didn’t find anything.”  While McGowan was searching Parker, one of the other
officers was searching two men that he had against the liquor store wall.  The third officer
went across the street to search the grass.  When the third officer returned, he told McGowan
that “it’s not over there, I don’t see it.”  Parker testified that the officer went over to the
grassy area again, returned, and said something to McGowan.  Parker was then handcuffed.
On cross examination, Parker denied that McGowan found sixteen vials of heroin on
him.  He also denied saying “oh shit” to McGowan, and that he told McGowan that he had
“a little bit of heroin in my back pocket[.]”  In rebuttal, McGowan testified that after Parker
said “oh shit[,]” he asked Parker if he had any illegal narcotics on his person.  According to
McGowan, Parker replied, “I got a little bit of heroin in my back pocket.”
The jury began its deliberations late in the second day of trial and continued their
deliberations the next day.  After twice reporting itself deadlocked, the jury found Parker
guilty of possession of heroin.  Parker filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  We
issued a writ of certiorari, on our own initiative, to consider the following question:
Did the trial court err in allowing testimony by Detective
McGowan that he received a tip from a registered confidential
informant that a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a
5
black hooded sweatshirt was selling heroin from his person at
the corner of Carey and Laurens Streets?
DISCUSSION
The Informant’s Extrajudicial Statement
Parker contends that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by Detective
McGowan that he received a tip from a registered confidential informant that a black male
wearing a blue baseball cap and a black hooded sweatshirt – later identified as Parker – was
selling heroin at the corner of Carey and Laurens streets.  This testimony requires reversal,
he argues, because (1) it is inadmissible under the Maryland Rules of Evidence, (2) its
admission violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) its admission was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Parker offers two related evidentiary grounds for
the statement’s inadmissibility – hearsay and relevancy:
[T]he informant’s statement to Detective McGowan was clearly
inadmissible hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and, if offered “to show why Detective McGowan was
there,” . . . the probative value (if any) of the informant’s
statement was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
because of the strong likelihood that the jury would misuse the
information and treat it as additional substantive evidence of Mr.
Parker’s guilt.
The State asserts that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the
confidential informant’s statements.  The State maintains that it made clear to the court in a
pre-trial motions hearing that it intended to introduce the confidential informant’s statement
to explain why McGowan “was there and what, if any, actions [he] took.”  It argued that the
6
statement was not being offered “for the truth of the matter.”  The motions court deferred its
ruling on the evidence until its introduction at trial.
At trial, Parker objected when the State asked McGowan during direct examination,
“Do you remember why on November 2nd you were called to that 1200 block of Laurens
Street?”  At the ensuing discussion at the bench, Parker expressed his concern that “this jury
is going to hear hearsay.”  The State then re-asserted its reason for offering the statement:
“it’s just to show the [effect] on the listener.  It’s non-hearsay.  It’s to show why Detective
McGowan was there.  It’s not a confrontation clause argument.”  The trial court then
overruled Parker’s objection “based on [the State’s] representation that it’s not being offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted as to the confrontation clause[.]”
“[T]his Court has regularly adhered to the principle that we will not reach a
constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.”
State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 404 n. 13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n. 13 (1993).  Because we
shall hold that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the confidential
informant’s extrajudicial statement under our laws of evidence, we will not address Parker’s
contentions based upon the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Graves v. State, 334
Md. 30, 38, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1994)(declining to address the defendant’s right of
confrontation arguments when reversing the judgment on state evidentiary grounds).
Under Maryland Rule 5-801, hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
7
of the matter asserted.”
The threshold questions when a hearsay objection is raised are
(1) whether the declaration at issue is a “statement,” and (2)
whether it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  If the
declaration is not a statement, or if it is not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and it will not be
excluded under the hearsay rule.
Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 688-89, 887 A.2d 564, 568 (2005).  Maryland Rule 5-802
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by these rules or permitted by applicable
constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is not admissible.”  We discussed the standard
of review for hearsay rulings in Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 7-8, 887 A.2d 602, 606
(2005):
We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence
ordinarily on an abuse of discretion standard.  Review of the
admissibility of evidence which is hearsay is different.  Hearsay,
under our rules, must be excluded as evidence at trial, unless it
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule excluding such
evidence or is “permitted by applicable constitutional provisions
or statutes.” Md. Rule 5-802.  Thus, a circuit court has no
discretion to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision
providing for its admissibility.  Whether evidence is hearsay is
an issue of law reviewed de novo.
(Citation omitted.)
In arguing that the confidential informant’s statements were admissible for a non-
hearsay purpose, the State invokes the evidentiary rules on relevancy.  Maryland Rule 5-402
provides that “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”  “‘Relevant evidence’ means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
8
evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401.  Under Rule 5-403, however, evidence may be excluded, though
relevant, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]”
Our standard of review on a relevancy question depends on whether the “ruling under
review was based on a discretionary weighing of relevance in relation to other factors or on
a pure conclusion of law.” J. L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 92, 792 A.2d 288, 300 (2002).  “When the trial judge’s ruling involves
a weighing, we apply the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Id.  When the trial
judge’s ruling involves a legal question, however, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.
Id.  The trial court’s conclusion that the informant’s statement was not being offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted is a hearsay ruling.  Thus, we review the statement’s
admissibility de novo.
In Graves, 334 Md. at 33-34, 637 A.2d at 1199-200, we considered the admissibility
of an extrajudicial statement made to the arresting officer by an individual arrested for having
assaulted two men.  One of the victims, Derek Jones, was sitting on the steps of a store,
waiting for a bus, when two men approached.  One of the men pulled out a gun and said,
“Don’t move.”  The victim’s father, David Jones, witnessed the incident, crossed the street
toward Derek, and asked Derek “what the trouble was.”  When the two men looked at David,
Derek pushed the gun away and ran.  The two assailants then walked away.  When the police
arrived, Derek gave a description of one of the men and the police eventually arrested
Kenneth Trusty, who told the arresting officer, John Reynolds, that Graves had been his
9
accomplice.  Graves was charged with assault upon Derek and David and attempted robbery
of Derek with a dangerous and deadly weapon.  A jury convicted Graves of both assault
charges but acquitted him of attempted robbery.
At trial, Trusty was not called as witness to testify against Graves.  Instead, the trial
court permitted Officer Reynolds to testify on direct examination that when Trusty was
arrested, Trusty told him that the other individual involved was Graves:
“Q [Prosecutor]: Did you have an opportunity to talk to
[Trusty]?
A [Reynolds]: Yes.
Q And about what did you talk to him?
A About the other individual.
Q Which other individual?
A The one that was still at large.
Q Did he give you a name – ?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A Yes. He said his name was Michael Graves.
Q What did you do with the name?
A I recorded it in my small – I carry a small notebook with
each date of when I work and my car number and I recorded
the name.”
Id. at 35, 637 A.2d at 1200.  The notebook was also admitted into evidence over Graves’s
10
hearsay objection.
Graves contended that the testimony in which Trusty was said to have named Graves
was a statement made by an out-of-court declarant, offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.  The State responded that the evidence at issue was “not hearsay because it was not
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather, was properly admitted for the limited
purpose of showing how the police came to assemble a photographic array containing
Graves’ picture.” Id. at 37, 637 A.2d at 1201.
We held that Trusty’s extrajudicial statements contained in the officer’s testimony and
notebook were inadmissible. Id. at 42-43, 637 A.2d at 1203-04.  We observed the general
rule that “a relevant extrajudicial statement is admissible as nonhearsay when it is offered for
the purpose of showing that a person relied on and acted upon the statement and is not
introduced for the purpose of showing that the facts asserted in the statement are true.” Id.
at 38, 637 A.2d at 1201.  This general rule is frequently applied in criminal cases when police
reliance on extrajudicial statements is “relevant on issues of probable cause, lawfulness of
arrest and search and seizure where evidence is offered that was obtained as a result of the
search for evidence.”  Id. at 38, 637 A.2d at 1202.
We cautioned, however, that the non-hearsay purpose of providing the basis upon
which the arresting officer acted is not relevant to the question of a defendant’s guilt or
innocense and is inadmissible hearsay:
“[I]n many cases coming before this Court where the lawfulness
of an arrest and of a search incidental thereto are in issue, direct
evidence to show the basis upon which the arresting officers
11
acted either is not offered at all, or is alluded to guardedly as
‘information received’ or in some other and equally
uninformative manner (doubtless designed to avoid an objection
that it is hearsay), or is actually excluded as hearsay. On the
question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant it clearly is
hearsay and hence is inadmissible; but on the issues of
probable cause and the lawfulness of arrest and of the
admissibility of evidence obtained through any search made in
connection with the arrest, such testimony, even if hearsay, is
directly relevant and is admissible.  Therefore, the determination
of the admissibility of evidence which is dependent upon the
lawfulness of an arrest should be made by the trial judge as a
preliminary matter quite apart, of course, from the question of
the guilt or innocence of the accused; and if the case is being
tried before a jury, such a matter should be heard out of the
presence of the jury.  Such a question may be raised, before trial
by a motion to exclude any evidence claimed to have been
improperly obtained.”
Id. at 39, 637 A.2d at 1202 (quoting Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 532-33, 197 A.2d 434,
437-38 (1964))(emphasis added).  Quoting Professor McCormick, we explained the danger
of allowing the jury to hear an arresting or investigating officer’s specific basis for his
actions:
“In criminal cases, the arresting or investigating officer will
often explain his going to the scene of the crime or his interview
with the defendant, or a search or seizure, by stating that he did
so ‘upon information received’ and this of course will not be
objectionable as hearsay, but if he becomes more specific by
repeating definite complaints of a particular crime by the
accused, this is so likely to be misused by the jury as evidence of
the fact asserted that it should be excluded as hearsay.”
Graves, 334 Md. at 39-40, 637 A.2d at 1202 (citing McCormick on Evidence § 248, at 587
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d. ed. 1972))(emphasis in original).
We pointed to the Court of Special Appeals decision in Purvis v. State, 27 Md. App.
12
713, 343 A.2d 898 (1975) as an application of this principle.  We summarized Purvis: 
[Purvis’s] conviction by a jury of distribution of heroin was
reversed because the trial court permitted testimony by an
undercover police agent, who had purchased heroin from the
defendant, that he decided to attempt to make the purchase
because he had been told by a confidential informant that the
defendant was selling heroin.  The testimony of the agent
submitted to the jury the out-of-court declaration of an unknown
informant that the defendant was selling heroin.  The fact that
the defendant was a heroin dealer was the very object that the
prosecution had undertaken to establish.  Thus, the Court of
Special Appeals found the statement to be “of misleading
probative force which tended to influence the trier of facts to
believe that before Purvis’ contact with the officers he was
already a dealer in heroin and thus more likely to have sold the
drug to the detectives as charged.”
Graves, 334 Md. at 40, 637 A.2d at 1202 (citing Purvis, 27 Md. App. at 725, 343 A.2d at
904).  The Purvis court concluded that it was error to have admitted the hearsay testimony
by the police agent. Purvis, 27 Md. App. at 725, 343 A.2d at 905.  We reached the same
conclusion in Graves, viewing this limitation on the admission of extrajudicial statements
to justify police conduct as “in accord with the well-settled rule that the trial court, in its
discretion, may exclude relevant evidence if it believes that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues or misleading the jury.” Graves, 334 Md. at 40, 637 A.2d at 1202-03.
In concluding that the extrajudicial statement in Graves was inadmissible, we rejected
the proffered non-hearsay purpose on relevancy grounds:
[W]hen Officer Reynolds’ testimony that Trusty told him that
Graves was his accomplice was offered before the jury, its only
possible relevance as nonhearsay at the guilt/innocence stage
13
was to demonstrate that the investigating officer relied on that
information when he included the petitioner’s photograph
among those assembled for a photographic array to be viewed
by the assault victims.  That conduct by the police officer would
have been just as effectively explained by testimony that his
selection of the photographs was based “on information
received.”  When that limited probative value is weighed against
the unfair prejudice to the petitioner because of the likelihood
that the jury would misuse that information as substantive
evidence of guilt, we hold that the trial judge abused his
discretion in admitting the testimony.
* * *
Therefore, if the statement was offered for the purpose of
proving the truth of the matter asserted by Trusty, it was clearly
inadmissible hearsay.  On the other hand, if it was offered for its
limited probative value to show that the officer acted upon it in
arranging the photographic array, that probative value was
greatly outweighed by its unfair prejudice to Graves because of
the danger of misuse of the information by the jury.
Id. at 42-43, 637 A.2d at 1203-04.
Our Court of Special Appeals and courts in other jurisdictions, when confronted with
an officer’s trial testimony that relays specific information received from an informant,
generally have ruled such testimony to be inadmissible hearsay. See Zemo v. State, 101 Md.
App. 303, 306, 312-13, 646 A.2d 1050, 1051, 1054-55 (1994)(concluding that a detective’s
testimony violated the rule against hearsay when he indicated that he “‘received information
. . . which led [him] to a couple of names’” and then stated that he “‘was given the name of
Joe Zemo’”; the court reasoned that the “only rational conclusion that one can draw from the
testimony is that the unnamed source passed on to the detective knowledge that the appellant,
‘Joe Zemo,’ was implicated in the breaking and entering”)(emphasis omitted); Conley v.
14
State, 620 So.2d 180, 182-83 (Fla. 1993)(holding that it was error for a court to admit an
officer’s hearsay testimony of a police dispatch report that he “‘received the call in reference
to a man chasing a female down the street’” and that “[t]he man supposedly had some type
of gun or rifle[,]” especially when the State argued in closing that the officer’s testimony
about the weapon helped prove the defendant used a rifle to commit the offenses charged);
State v. Bankston, 307 A.2d 65, 67-69 (N.J. 1973)(concluding that a court admitted hearsay
by allowing a detective’s testimony that the defendant fit the description of the person they
were looking for after indicating that based on information received from an informer,
officers “‘had a description of [the individual’s] clothing’” and learned that “‘[h]e was inside
the tavern’” and “‘had narcotics in his possession’”; the “inescapable inference from [the
detective’s testimony] was that the informer had given information that defendant would
have narcotics in his possession” and “the jury was led to believe that an unidentified
informer . . . had told the officers that defendant was committing a crime”); State v. Braxter,
568 A.2d 311, 312, 315 (R.I. 1990)(ruling inadmissible a detective’s testimony that he
received information from an informant about a holdup that would take place at Louttit
Laundry on August 26, 1986 and reasoning that such testimony that “recounts the substance
of a conversation with an informant concerning a crime by the accused is not within the
officer’s personal knowledge and violates the hearsay rule”; the testimony was “far more
than was necessary to explain the police presence at the laundry” and “had the effect of
bolstering the state’s case with impermissible hearsay by showing ‘as background’ that a
conspiracy was in the works and that there was an intent to rob the laundry”).
15
In arguing for the statement’s admissibility as non-hearsay in this case, the State
would have us distinguish Graves, Purvis, and Zemo on the grounds that in those cases, the
evidence directly implicated the defendant in the crime with which he was charged by
specifically referencing the defendant’s name.  It argues that here, on the other hand, the
confidential informant did not tell the police that Parker was selling heroin, and “said only
that someone wearing a blue hat and black sweat shirt was selling heroin on the corner of
Carey and Laurens Streets.”  Specifically distinguishing Graves, the State argues that
“because the confidential informant did not directly implicate Parker, there was less
‘likelihood that the jury would misuse [the statement] as substantive evidence’ of Parker’s
guilt.”
We do not view this distinction from Graves as material.  Use of a defendant’s name
is not the only way to identify him or her, and when the hearsay provides contemporaneous
and specific information about the defendant’s clothing, location, and activity, it can be
highly persuasive as to the defendant’s actual guilt of the crime charged, even without a
name.  Here, the timing and particularity of the description, without evidence that there were
other individuals wearing this type of clothing, left the jury with a virtually inescapable
inference that the individual observed by the informant selling heroin at the corner of Carey
and Laurens was Parker, who was wearing exactly these clothes when arrested.  McGowan
testified that he received the informant’s tip via a cell phone call and arrived “[w]ithin five
minutes” at the location from which he observed Parker.  One can hardly conclude, therefore,
that the jury was not likely to misuse the informant’s information as substantive evidence of
16
Parker’s guilt.
Indeed, the State proved this point by using the informant’s extrajudicial statement
for the truth of the matter asserted.  In closing, the State argued as follows:
Mr. Parker got caught with sixteen vials of heroin.  He’s been
charged with possession of heroin and you must find him guilty
of possessing this heroin.  The evidence in this case was very
simple.  You heard from Detective McGowan who sat right here
at this witness stand.  He looked at you straight in the eye.  He
had no reason not to tell you what happened, and what did he
tell you?
He told you he got a tip from his registered confidential
informant that an individual wearing jeans and a black hoody
was selling heroin at this corner.  So he responded to the
corner and what did he see.  He saw Mr. Parker who matched
that description.
(Emphasis added.)  The State thus used the hearsay statement to corroborate McGowan’s
account that Parker was engaging in “illegal narcotic activity” which explained Parker’s
heroin possession. See Conley, 620 So. 2d at 183 (concluding that “[r]egardless of the
purpose for which the State claims it offered the evidence, the State used the evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted”).
Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the State offers, as alternative grounds for
admission, that it was justified in eliciting the informant’s statement because out-of-court
statements explaining an officer’s actions are admissible when the propriety of an
investigation is placed at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 778-79 (8th.
Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1169, 119 S. Ct. 1090 (1999)(stating that “evidence may
not be admitted for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining an investigation where the
17
propriety of the investigation is not a relevant issue at trial[,]” but finding no error in the
admission of out-of-court statements when defense counsel argued in opening that “the
government did not conduct ‘any independent investigation’ to verify [an informant’s] story
and made ‘automatic assumptions’ about the defendant’s guilt”); Chestnut v. Commonwealth,
250 S.W.3d 288, 292-94 (Ky. 2008)(affirming admission of testimony by an officer that one
of the victims made a “show up” identification of the defendant on the same day of the crime
in order to rebut defendant’s testimony accusing the officers of lying about their
investigation, when the testimony was offered to prove the officer’s motive for arresting the
defendant).  Applying the rationale in these cases, the State argues that admission of the
informant’s statement was proper because Parker, in denying (1) having any heroin on his
person, (2) saying “oh shit” to McGowan, and (3) telling McGowan that he had “a little bit
of heroin in my back pocket[,]” implied that McGowan was “lying about the circumstances
surrounding his investigation of Parker and Parker’s ultimate arrest.”
Parker’s mere denials did not place at issue the propriety of McGowan’s investigation
such that the State was justified in eliciting the informant’s extrajudicial statements.  Parker
never challenged at trial why McGowan was at the 1200 block of Laurens Street.  He never
argued to the jury in opening that McGowan insufficiently investigated the veracity of the
informant’s information and made automatic assumptions about his guilt, as in Davis.  Nor
did Parker accuse McGowan of lying and question McGowan’s motive for arresting Parker,
as in Chestnut.  In his opening statement, defense counsel merely asserted Parker’s innocence
and exhorted the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard and presumption of innocence:
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Mr. Parker has been charged with a crime he didn’t commit.
The State’s Attorney and a police officer who you’re going to
see later[,] they’re the ones accusing and prosecuting him.  He
didn’t do this.  He’s not taking a deal so we’re having a trial and
as a result we need you.  We need you to sit and listen to the
evidence and apply the standard which in this case is guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
* * * 
[Parker] is presumed innocent.  That means that each and
everyone [sic] of you during this entire process take it for
granted that he did not commit this crime.  Only if the State can
remove all of that reasonable doubt do you get to that point.
Defense counsel then responded to the State’s Attorney’s several statements in open
argument prefaced by the words “Detective McGowan will tell you[,]” and encouraged the
jury to base their verdict on the facts:
One of the things that I’m not going to do right now is talk about
the evidence.
Shoot, the State certainly did.  I think some of the most
interesting words that the State’s Attorney mentioned is
Detective McGowan will tell you.  Evaluate the evidence ladies
and gentlemen.  At the end of this case we will talk about the
facts.  It is my belief that after you’ve heard those facts you’re
going to find Kelvin Parker not guilty.
The informant’s statement, moreover, was introduced during the State’s case-in-chief
and then used for the truth of the matter asserted in the State’s closing argument.  These two
aspects fatally undermine the State’s asserted non-hearsay purpose justification.  In
permitting McGowan to explain why he was working at the 1200 block of Laurens Street,
the court should have allowed McGowan to say only that he was there “based ‘on
19
information received.’” See Graves, 334 Md. at 42, 637 A.2d at 1204.
Harmless Error
The State argues that the admission of McGowan’s testimony regarding the
informant’s statements, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In assessing
whether an error was harmless, we apply the following test as articulated in Dorsey v. State,
276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976):
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless
a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the
record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot
be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated.  Such
reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of – whether
erroneously admitted or excluded – may have contributed to the
rendition of the guilty verdict.
The State posits that the jury “was presented with two diametrically opposed versions
of events” and its verdict was founded on its finding McGowan’s testimony more credible
than Parker’s.  It then asserts that the admission of the informant’s statements, while helping
explain why McGowan was in the area conducting surveillance, did not influence this
credibility determination.  According to the State, “if the jury found Detective McGowan
credible, then his testimony amply supported a guilty verdict even without the confidential
informant’s statements. . . . If the jury found Detective McGowan not credible, however, it
would not have credited his testimony about the confidential informant’s statements.”
This argument simply begs the question.  Credibility is determined by many factors,
including the existence of corroborating evidence.  The State’s argument suggests that the
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jury makes its credibility determination simply on the jurors’ personal assessments of the
witness based on his story, his appearance, his body language, and his words.  And it implies
that the jury is more likely to believe a police officer just because he or she is a police officer
– an unacceptable bias – or because the officer is not charged with a crime.  Were we to
make this assumption, we would sabotage two cornerstones of our criminal justice system
– neutrality and the presumption of innocence.
We cannot declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of the
informant’s statement into evidence in no way influenced the jury’s verdict.  Both McGowan
and Parker testified that there were two other officers present at the time of Parker’s arrest,
but only McGowan was called to testify.  The State introduced into evidence the sixteen vials
of heroin McGowan said he found on Parker, but McGowan indicated that the vials were
never fingerprinted.  The jury evidently considered this case a close one, as it informed the
court on two occasions before returning its verdict that it was deadlocked.  In this close case,
that turned on whether the jury credited McGowan’s testimony over Parker’s, the informant’s
statement that an individual fitting Parker’s description was “selling heroin from his person”
at the corner of Carey and Laurens provided potentially scale-tipping corroboration for
McGowan’s testimony that he observed Parker engage in what he believed to be “illegal
narcotic activity” and then recovered from Parker sixteen gel caps of heroin.  As in Graves,
the testimony in question “added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the State’s
case” against Parker. 334 Md. at 43, 637 A.2d at 1204.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
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FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL FOR
BALTIMORE CITY.