Title: City of Albuquerque v. Patrick

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

316 P.2d 243 (1957) 63 N.M. 227 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. S.V. PATRICK, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6193. Supreme Court of New Mexico. October 1, 1957. Everett M. Grantham, Albuquerque, for appellant. Frank Horan, Malcolm W. de Vesty, and Paul F. Henderson, Jr., Albuquerque, for appellee. SADLER, Justice. The defendant, as an appellant before this court, complains of a judgment of the district court of Bernalillo County at a trial de novo on appeal to that court from the police court of Albuquerque wherein he had been convicted of (1) driving while intoxicated; (2) resisting arrest; and (3) evading arrest. The trial was before the court at the conclusion of which it found defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and not guilty of the other two charges. The sentence was the imposition of a fine of $200, suspended by the court during the good behavior of defendant and unless shown to satisfaction of the court he had violated any law of the state of New Mexico or the City of Albuquerque, it was not to be placed in effect. When the court had imposed this sentence, the judge added: The disturbance out of which the commission of the offenses grew took place on the night of November 10, 1954. At some hour after midnight on the date mentioned an Albuquerque city policeman, Dave Timlin, while proceeding north on Rio Grande Boulevard observed two cars, one of which was pushing the other. He noticed that one of the cars did not seem to be properly handled, so he followed them until the rear car stopped and, accosting the driver, noticed a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. After some conversation, the driver, who proved to be the defendant, was taken to his home and advised to stay there. Officer Timlin continued on his patrol and while later proceeding north on Second Street, his attention was attracted by the weaving from left to right of the headlights on a car following him. He stopped to observe the car, then trailed it until it stopped, passed it and stopped his *244 own car. Having alighted from his car, he went back to the other car to investigate and, to his astonishment, the driver was Mr. Patrick, the defendant. Accordingly, officer Timlin advised him he was under arrest for drunk and reckless driving and began assisting him to get out of his car. While so engaged he was assaulted by defendant and a scuffle between them took place. As soon as the officer could become disengaged from the scuffle, he hastened to his car to notify headquarters, whereupon the defendant bolted down a driveway and climbed up on a garage. Help arriving, the officer climbed onto the garage roof where a violent encounter took place between him and the defendant, during which a bottle of whiskey in one of defendant's coat pockets was broken. The defendant suffered several cuts and lacerations about the face and head, had his dentures broken by blows from the officers, but was finally subdued. He first was taken to police headquarters, handcuffed, booked and a technician was called to give him a blood test. This he first had agreed to take but then refused. After a stop-over at police headquarters of not more than 30 minutes, the defendant was found to be bleeding so badly from various wounds about the head and face and, the officers having been advised he was a "bleeder," they removed him to the County-Indian Hospital for examination and first aid. Upon arrival there he immediately asked to use the telephone to call his attorney and his doctor but was not allowed to do so because, at that time, it was the police department policy, later changed, that no person booked for intoxication could use the telephone for four hours. It later developed that defendant in addition to other injuries had a fracture of both the right and the left jaw. It should be mentioned that the car being pushed by defendant's car, as mentioned above, was that of a city policeman named Hernandez, the engine of whose car had gone dead on him when defendant happened along and offered assistance. Counsel makes much of the fact that Hernandez was not called as a witness, though available, of course, to either party upon subpoena. At the conclusion of the trial the court found defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and not guilty of the other two charges, viz., (1) resisting arrest and (2) evading arrest. When both parties had rested the following colloquy took place between the court and counsel for the defendant, to-wit: Counsel for the defendant (appellant) presents his case under two points, No. I being that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws contrary to the provisions of Art. II, § 18, of the State Constitution and Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the federal constitution. Point No. II rests on a claim that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that defendant was driving while intoxicated. We may as well dispose of the points presented in reverse order. There can be no question but that the evidence conflicts on the issue of defendant's intoxication. Dr. O.A. Nesbit who first attended defendant upon his arrival at the County-Indian Hospital, among other things, testified: Defendant's daughter, although admitting he had two or three drinks before dinner, says, in her opinion, he was not drunk. There was abundant evidence, however, from the officers that he was intoxicated. The trial judge was so well satisfied from the testimony of defendant's intoxication while driving that he felt called upon, in passing upon the motion to dismiss made by his counsel to comment: Coming next to the claim that defendant's constitutional rights were invaded and denied, we are compelled to agree with the trial judge that the decisive issue before the court was whether the defendant was guilty of driving while intoxicated. Having been found guilty of that charge and the evidence, though conflicting, supporting the finding, we might well close the opinion but for the claim by defendant that he was prejudiced at the trial in a denial of due process and equal protection of the laws contrary to Art. II, § 18, of the State constitution and section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Counsel for defendant rests his claim of a denial of constitutional rights mainly (1) on the refusal of the city police to permit him to contact his own attorney forthwith following booking, by reason of a regulation then in effect, but later dropped, that they would not permit a prisoner arrested for intoxication to consult an attorney for four hours after arrest; and (2) that he was entitled to be treated for his wounds by his own doctor. Whether the first regulation postponing for four hours contact with an attorney was to give the drunks time to sober up, we need not consider since the regulation has long since been eliminated. We see no prejudice in any event, to defendant in its application to him. Within thirty minutes after reaching police headquarters he was under the care of a physician at County-Indian Hospital and apparently was well cared for as indicated by his ability to attend his trial and testify intelligently. The officers may have used more force than necessary to effect defendant's arrest. The trial judge intimated he harbored such a thought. This feeling on the part of the trial judge very likely brought about an acquittal for defendant of the more serious charges *247 against him as language of the judge plainly indicates. We fail to see, however, any denial to defendant at the trial of a constitutional right in any respect claimed, or that can be fairly imagined. Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., concur. KIKER, J., not participating.