Title: The People v. Joshua M. Zona

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 73  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Joshua M. Zona,
            Respondent.
R. Michael Tantillo, for appellant.
J. Scott Porter, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
The issue raised by this appeal is whether the evidence
presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
defendant, supported a good-faith claim of right jury
instruction.  We conclude that defendant was entitled to assert
this defense and that County Court erred when it denied
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defendant's request to charge.
This case centers around the removal of various items
of property from a surplus warehouse used by the Seneca County
Sheriff's department.  In October or November 2005, Undersheriff
James Larson, one of the highest ranking members of the Seneca
County Sheriff's department, instructed defendant, a deputy
sheriff, and two other deputies to transfer property stored in
the Sampson State Park warehouse to a warehouse located at the
Old Army Depot in Romulus.  Larson supervised and assisted the
deputies as they transferred the property using their personal
vehicles to the new location.  The bulk of the property stored at
the Sampson warehouse was described at trial as "old," "wrecked,"
"surplus stuff," and a "lot of junk."  According to defendant's
later statement to an investigator, Larson "told us that he was
taking a canoe home and he told us we could take what we want." 
Defendant took five brand new tires, a boat that contained a
bullet hole, and a filing cabinet.  In addition to the canoe,
Larson took some old military lights, and an electric lawn mower
for himself.  Two of the other sheriffs supervised by Larson took
canoes.
In late November or early December 2005, defendant
spoke with an employee of Trombley Tire and Auto to inquire
whether he could trade in the five tires he removed from the
warehouse for a set of four B.F. Goodrich tires that would fit
his sports utility vehicle.  The employee referred defendant to
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the owner of the shop.  Defendant negotiated with the owner,
traded in the five tires from the warehouse, and received a $375
credit toward the purchase of the B.F. Goodrich tires.  Before
finalizing the purchase, defendant spoke with one of his
colleagues and discussed that he was thinking about buying the
B.F. Goodrich tires.  Defendant's colleague wondered how he was
able to afford such expensive tires and defendant indicated that
Trombley Tire was giving him a good deal because he had solved
several bad check cases for the shop.  
The day after defendant purchased the B.F. Goodrich
tires, Trombley Tire sold four of the five tires it had acquired
from defendant to one of its customers.  Later that month,
investigators with the Seneca County Sheriff's Department
retrieved the fifth tire from Trombley Tire, as it had not yet
been sold.
According to defendant's statement, in January 2006, he
spoke with a co-worker who "told me that Jim Larson apparently
did not have the authority to tell us we could take anything from
the warehouse and that it needed to be put back in there."  When
defendant learned this, he promptly returned the boat and the
filing cabinet to the new storage facility.  Defendant then
attempted to repurchase the five tires he had previously traded
in, but was told that they had already been sold.  
On January 24, 2006, defendant went to another tire
shop to purchase replacement tires, but was informed by the
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service manager that the tires defendant desired were no longer
in stock.  The service manager convinced defendant to purchase
five comparable tires -- at a cost that exceeded the trade-in
value of the tires he removed from the warehouse.  The same day
defendant purchased these tires he placed them in the new storage
facility beneath other objects. 
A little over a week later, in the early morning hours
of February 3, 2006, a fire broke out at the new storage
facility.  Defendant was only one of four individuals who had
keys to the facility.  An investigator with the New York State
police interviewed defendant the following day.  Defendant fully
cooperated with the investigator and explained he had no
information pertaining to the fire but admitted that he had
removed property from the old warehouse facility.  The
investigator prepared a type-written statement, signed by
defendant, detailing the information provided to him during the
interview.  Defendant described the property he removed with
Larson's permission and explained that he had returned it to the
new storage facility once he learned that Larson did not have the
authority to dispose of the property. 
Two other investigators also interviewed defendant. 
According to one of these investigators, defendant orally told
him that Larson did not directly state, but only implied, that
the other deputies could take property from the old warehouse for
themselves. 
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Following this lengthy investigation, a grand jury
indicted defendant for one count of Petit Larceny (Penal Law §
155.25).  Prior to trial, he requested a dismissal of the
indictment.  Defendant argued that he honestly believed that he
could take the property and that the People's failure to properly
instruct the grand jury on the good-faith claim of right defense
unfairly prejudiced him (see Penal Law § 155.15 [1]).  County
Court reviewed the grand jury minutes and denied defendant's
motion.  The court held that the claim of right defense was
inapplicable because defendant could not assert that he had at
any time owned or possessed the property procured from the
storage facility.  The case proceeded to trial and defendant,
both at the conclusion of the People's case and at the charge
conference, requested that County Court instruct the jury on the
claim of right defense.  County Court denied the requests.  
The jury found defendant guilty of petit larceny and he
appealed.  At the Appellate Division, defendant argued for both a
reversal of the conviction and a dismissal of the indictment.  A
divided Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and
ordered a new trial, concluding that there was a reasonable view
of the evidence that would allow a jury to find that defendant
had a good-faith claim of right to the property he removed from
the warehouse (60 AD3d 1279 [4th Dept 2009]).  The dissenting
justices, on the other hand, held that no reasonable view of the
evidence supported this defense (id.).  The court did not address
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No. 73
1  Although defendant moved for the dismissal of the
indictment below, he did not cross-appeal here.  The propriety of
the grand jury proceeding is thus not before us and the focus of
our analysis is limited to whether defendant was entitled to
assert the claim of right defense at trial.
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defendant's argument concerning the sufficiency of the legal
instructions given to the grand jury.  A judge of this Court
granted the People leave to appeal and we now affirm.1
Our analysis begins with Penal Law § 155.15 (1), which
provides "[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by
trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense
that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in
good faith."  However, in evaluating the constitutionality of
this statute, we have held that a good-faith claim of right is
properly a defense -- not an affirmative defense -- and thus,
"the people have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a
reasonable doubt" (Penal Law § 25.00 [1]; see People v Green, 5
NY3d 538, 542 [2005], citing People v Chesler, 50 NY2d 203, 208-
210 [1980]).  
In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed
defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the
light most favorable to the defendant (see People v Butts, 72
NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 529 [1970];
see also, Mathews v United States, 485 US 58, 63 [1988] ["a
defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
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reasonable jury to find in his favor"]).  A failure to do so
constitutes reversible error (see People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299,
301 [1982]).  Of course, it is fundamental that a "jury may
accept portions of the defense and prosecution evidence or either
of them" (People v Asan, 22 NY2d 526, 530 [1968]).  "Therefore,
inconsistency in claimed defenses or even between a defendant's
testimony and a defense 'should not deprive [the] defendant of
the requested charge' if the charge would otherwise be warranted
by the evidence" (Butts, 72 NY2d at 750, quoting People v
Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146 [1983]).
Applying these principles, we find that there was
evidence in the record to support defendant's good-faith claim of
right defense.  We note that defendant's statement, if credited,
establishes that Larson, one of the highest ranking officials in
the Seneca County Sheriff's Department, gave defendant and his
colleagues permission to take whatever property they wanted. 
Indeed, it also indicates that two of his colleagues also relied
on Larson's representation and took property, and that Larson
procured several items of property for himself as well. 
Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the sheriffs used their
personal vehicles to move the property and that most of the
property stored at this surplus warehouse was described as junk,
old, and wrecked.  
Furthermore, we reject the People's argument that there
are no circumstances in which a public servant, such as
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No. 73
2 Although County Court relied upon this theory in its
decision to deny defendant's request to charge, the People have
not adopted this argument.
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defendant, could have a good-faith belief that he was entitled to
keep public property.  It may be that a public servant could have
no reasonable basis for such a belief, but subjective good-faith,
not reasonableness, is the test.  Thus, on this record, we hold
that a trier of fact could find that defendant had a good-faith
belief that Larson had the authority to dispose of the property
stored in the surplus warehouse and that defendant could retain
some of that property for his personal use.  
Likewise, we reject the notion that a defendant must
establish that he previously owned or possessed the property at
issue in order to assert the claim of right defense.2  We note
that there is nothing in the statutory language in Penal Law §
155.15 (1) that requires us to interpret this defense so
narrowly.  Rather, the defense merely requires a good-faith
belief "that the property was appropriated under a claim of
right" (Penal Law § 155.15 [1]).  Lower court decisions reflect
our interpretation of this defense.  For example, in People v
Ricchiuti (93 AD2d 842 [2d Dept 1983]), the defendant, an
employee of a cosmetics company was indicted for grand larceny
for allegedly stealing large quantities of merchandise from his
employer (see id. at 842).  At trial, defendant did not attempt
to establish his ownership in the company's merchandise, but
rather offered evidence that his employer authorized him to
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distribute unlimited quantities of the merchandise to various
charities, vendors, and friends of the company (see id. at 842-
843).  The Appellate Division determined that the evidence
supported a claim of right defense and reversed the judgment of
conviction because Supreme Court did not instruct the jury
accordingly (see id. at 844; see also People v Ace, 51 AD3d 1379,
1380 [4th Dept 2008] [conviction overturned where "a reasonable
view of the evidence that would enable a jury to find that
defendant took the rails under a claim of right" established
after defendant's employer instructed him to take the employer-
owned rails to a scrap yard]).
Furthermore, the People argue that there is no
reasonable view of the evidence to support the claim of right
defense because defendant concealed from his colleague the fact
that he procured tires from the surplus warehouse and was
planning to trade them in to reduce the cost of the B.F. Goodrich
tires.  The People also argue that defendant could not have had a
good-faith belief that he was entitled to keep the tires because,
upon being told he had to return the property, he attempted to
hide the replacement tires he purchased to avoid detection,
evincing consciousness of guilt.  This interpretation of the
facts does not preclude defendant from interposing the claim of
right defense, as these arguments can only be evaluated by a
jury.  Indeed, defendant may not have wanted his colleague to
know that he received permission from Larson to take the tires
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for a variety of reasons.  Moreover, the fact that defendant may
have surreptitiously attempted to replace the tires after he
learned that he, Larson, and other deputies were being
investigated does not necessarily mean that he did not possess a
good-faith belief in his claim of right at the time he removed
the property from the surplus warehouse.   
Finally, the People contend that the testimony that
defendant orally told one of the investigators that Larson only
implied that the deputies could take whatever property they
wanted negated defendant's written statement that Larson
unequivocally gave them permission to do so.  Of course, the
People are entitled to highlight the inconsistencies in the
evidence to support their arguments to a jury.  An inconsistency
in the evidence only raises issues of fact, however, and does not
relieve a trial judge's obligation to instruct the jury on a
defense if the charge would otherwise be supported by the
evidence (see Butts, 72 NY2d at 750).  Here, there is evidence in
the record to support defendant's requested charge.  Accordingly,
the jury should have had the opportunity to consider this defense
during its deliberations.
In sum, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to defendant, entitled defendant to assert a
good-faith claim of right defense at trial.  Since County Court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on this defense, defendant
was deprived of a fair trial.  Accordingly, the order of the
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Appellate Division reversing the judgment of conviction and
ordering a new trial should be affirmed.
1 A Sheriff's Department investigator testified at
defendant's trial that the property in the warehouse included not
only "junk" but also "quality property" such as beds, desks,
chairs, boats, and wrecked police cars that the officers would
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People v Joshua Zona
No. 73 
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent because in my view no reasonable
view of the evidence, even in the light most favorable to
defendant, supports the defense that he took five brand new tires
from a police warehouse, believing in good faith that he had the
right to take them.
This case arose out of an investigation of the Seneca
County Sheriff's Department, including Undersheriff James Larson,
defendant Deputy Sheriff Joshua Zona, and other deputies, in
connection with the removal of items from a warehouse used by the
Sheriff's Department, at the Seneca Army Depot in Romulus.  In
the early morning of February 3, 2006, the warehouse was
destroyed in a suspected arson.  Because defendant was one of
only four people who had access to the warehouse, he was
interviewed by the New York State Police.  
Defendant had no information about the fire, but he
admitted that he had taken five car tires, a boat, and a filing
cabinet from the warehouse.1  According to defendant's statements
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No. 73
use for parts to repair damaged police vehicles.
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to investigators, Undersheriff Larson took items for his personal
use, and "somewhat implied" that defendant and two other deputy
sheriffs could take what they wanted.  Defendant stated that he
traded the five tires in at Trombley Tire and Auto, receiving a
credit of $375, which he used towards the purchase of tires for
his pickup truck.  Once he learned there was an investigation, he
went out and bought similar tires and snuck them into the
warehouse to cover up his actions.  
Defendant was charged with and, following a jury trial,
convicted of petit larceny.  He now argues that his trial was
unfair because County Court declined to instruct the jury on a
claim of right defense.  
Under Penal Law § 155.15 (1), in a prosecution for
larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, an
available defense is "that the property was appropriated under a
claim of right made in good faith."  The question before the
Court in this case is whether a reasonable view of the trial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant,
supports defendant's claim that he had a good-faith belief in his
legal right to take another's property.
The majority finds it reasonable to conclude from the
evidence that defendant had an honest, if unreasonable, belief
that Larson had the authority to permit him to take the property
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stored in the Sheriff's Department warehouse for his personal
use.  I believe that such an inference would be irrational, given
the strong evidence that defendant was aware that his actions
were illegal.
In particular, I find it striking that, in the course
of a casual conversation with one of his colleagues about the new
tires he had bought, defendant lied, concocting the story that he
had solved bad check cases for the tire shop.  If defendant had
honestly believed that Larson was in a position to authorize the
taking of the tires, defendant would not have kept this to
himself and constructed a lie to conceal his actions.
Moreover, defendant continued to lie about his actions
and try to conceal them.  He bought five tires, similar to the
ones he had taken from the warehouse and traded in, from a
Goodyear Tire store.  There, defendant lied to the service
manager, saying that he needed the five tires for off-road use on
a sports utility vehicle.  Defendant then placed the tires in the
warehouse, covering them to make it appear that they had been
there for some time.  There is no reasonable inference to be
drawn from this action other than that defendant was conscious of
his guilt.  Someone who honestly believed that he had been given
permission to take the tires by one with authority would not have
gone to such absurd lengths -- including the expense of buying
five tires -- to cover up his actions.
The jury also heard evidence that defendant had a
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crisis of conscience in regard to the taking of the tires,
debating "should I take 'em, shouldn't I take them," before
deciding to take the items.  This inner debate cannot be
reconciled with an honest belief that one has been given
permission to take items by one with authority to do so.
It is true that the test here is not the reasonableness
of defendant's belief that he had a right to take the tires, but
its subjective good faith, i.e. whether the belief was honest or
a pretense.  But to attribute to defendant the state of mind
necessary for a claim of right defense is to do more than to
ascribe to him a single unreasonable belief; it is to assume that
he was completely lacking in any kind of worldly wisdom or
judgment.
The majority rejects the proposition that a defendant,
in order to assert the claim of right defense, must establish
that he previously owned or possessed the property at issue --
which the majority takes to be the theory relied upon by County
Court.  But that was not the ruling of the court.  Rather the
court correctly rejected a claim of right defense because
defendant failed to establish a legitimate claim to one.  
Professor LaFave sets out the scope of the claim of
right defense cogently in his treatise on substantive criminal
law.  "One may take the property of another honestly but
mistakenly believing (1) that it is his own property, or (2) that
it is no one's property, or (3) (though he knows it is another's
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property) that the owner has given him permission to take it as
he did" (3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 19.5 [a], at 88
[2d ed 2003]).  The Appellate Division cases cited by the
majority (People v Ricchiuti, 93 AD2d 842 [2d Dept 1983]; People
v Ace, 51 AD3d 1379 [4th Dept 2008]) are consistent with this
analysis.  Thus a defendant, in order to assert the claim of
right defense, must claim either that he previously owned the
property at issue, or that he was unaware that it belonged to
another, or that its owner permitted him to take it.  Defendant's
claim that an undersheriff -- clearly not the owner of county
surplus property -- permitted his actions does not accord with
this analysis.
It is well-established that "when no reasonable view of
the evidence would support a finding of [a] tendered defense, the
court is under no obligation to submit the question to the jury"
(People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]).  Consequently, County
Court's denial of defendant's request to charge a claim of right
defense should be upheld.  I would reverse the order of the
Appellate Division and reinstate defendant's conviction.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott dissents
and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Graffeo concurs.
Decided May 6, 2010