Title: Bentley v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JORDAN BENTLEY, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 387, 2006 
 
Defendant Below,   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID #0409001001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  March 7, 2007 
   Decided:  June 11, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED.   
 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esq. (argued), Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esq. (argued) and James T. Wakely, Esq., Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 2
Appellant Jordan Bentley appeals his Superior Court convictions of Murder 
First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  In this case, the State 
contended that Bentley acted without any co-conspirator or accomplice in killing 
Joseph “Lucky” Cox.  After a State witness, Tina Creed, changed her testimony 
about Bentley being the shooter, the prosecution contended in its closing argument 
that this was because of her romantic involvement with Bentley.  Earlier in the 
trial, Bentley attempted to show that Creed was biased due to her recent romantic 
relationship with his uncle, Arthur “Joey” Bentley.  Bentley also sought to prove 
facultative impairment of Creed through cross-examination of her about her drug 
use.  At the time of Bentley’s trial, Creed and Joey were co-defendants on pending 
charges involving conspiracy and illegal drugs.  Creed asserted her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to all of Bentley’s questions on 
her relationship with Joey and her drug use.  The Superior Court sustained her 
claim of privilege. 
Bentley makes three arguments on appeal.  First, he contends that the trial 
court erred by precluding his cross-examination of Tina Creed on bias and 
impairment due to her drug use.  Second, Bentley contends that the trial court 
improperly denied his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter.  Finally, Bentley contends that the trial court erred when it admitted 
 3
into evidence a video of Bentley spitting on a news camera.  We find that the 
limitation of Bentley’s cross examination of Creed, without striking either part or 
all of Creed’s testimony from the record, created at least a substantial danger of 
prejudice to Bentley’s right to a fair trial.  In the alternative, the State could have 
sought use immunity for her testimony under 11 Del. C. § 3506 so that her 
assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege would be unnecessary.  Creed’s 
testimony was pivotal to the determination of whether Bentley or another person 
killed the victim in this case.  Although a grant of use immunity would have 
allowed for full cross examination of Creed, the State proffered Creed’s testimony 
without it.  Because Bentley has demonstrated at least a substantial danger of 
prejudice from the denial of any cross examination of Creed on her bias, we must 
reverse and remand for a new trial.  In this opinion, we also will address Bentley’s 
remaining arguments, which we find to be without merit, for the guidance of the 
parties and the Superior Court at the new trial. 
I. 
On September 1, 2004, Joseph “Lucky” Cox and Wayne Caldwell went to 
Hardee’s Restaurant in Dover to visit Tina Creed.  They arranged to meet after 
Creed’s shift ended, and at that time Lucky gave her a ring he had bought for her.  
Creed told Lucky that she could not accept the ring and drove both Lucky and 
Caldwell home.  She later discovered that Lucky had left the ring in her car.   
 4
Later that day, Creed told her boyfriend, seventeen-year old Bentley, that 
she had received a ring from Lucky.  They tried to return the ring to the jeweler but 
were unsuccessful.  According to Bentley’s cousin, Roland “Buddy” Pyle, Bentley 
then called Lucky and told him that he was coming over and that they had 
“something to handle.”  According to Bentley, it was Buddy who suggested that 
they go talk to Lucky.  Buddy wore his steel-tipped Timberland boots that he wears 
when he plans to fight.   
 
Buddy and Creed testified at trial that they next went to Bentley’s home 
where Bentley picked up a .32 pistol that he had purchased from a friend about a 
month earlier.  They both also testified that Bentley forced Creed to drive them to 
Lucky’s house.  Buddy said that he wore a white t-shirt, jeans and brown boots and 
Bentley wore “a black t-shirt with a white t-shirt underneath, blue jeans and white 
shoes” the evening of the shooting.   
Lucky was shot four times by either Bentley or Buddy.  The police were 
only able to find two casings at the scene of the shooting.  Two bullets were found 
in Lucky’s body.  It could not be determined whether all the shots came from the 
same weapon.  No physical evidence found at the scene indicated who the actual 
shooter was.  The gun used to kill Lucky was not recovered. 
 
The State did not prosecute this case as a conspiracy or on an accomplice 
liability theory.  The prosecution was premised upon the ground that Bentley 
 5
intentionally killed Lucky on his own.  At trial, the central issue was the killer’s 
identity.  Buddy testified that Bentley shot Lucky.  Bentley testified that Buddy 
shot Lucky and that he (Bentley) was unaware that Buddy had a weapon with him 
when they went to Lucky’s home.   
Creed told Bentley’s counsel before trial that it was Buddy who had the gun.  
At trial, she changed her story.  She first said that she saw Bentley shoot Lucky.  
On cross examination, Creed admitted that pretrial she told defense counsel Buddy 
was the shooter.  Ultimately, Creed testified that she could not see who shot Lucky 
because a car blocked her view.   
Other witnesses, Joseph Alan Cox (“Joseph Alan”), Lucky’s uncle, and a 
neighbor, Khalilah Harmon, testified without adding clarity to the identity of the 
killer.  Joseph Alan was at Lucky’s trailer when Buddy, Bentley and Creed arrived.  
He testified that he saw a man wearing a white t-shirt yell at Lucky and then shoot 
him.  As stated earlier, Buddy acknowledged at the trial that he was wearing a 
white t-shirt that day.  Ultimately, Joseph Alan testified that he was unable to 
identify the shooter.   
Harmon identified Bentley as the one with the gun, but acknowledged that 
she might have identified Buddy as having the gun in a statement she made before 
trial.  She further testified that Creed was hunched over in her car when the 
 6
shooting took place and that Creed’s vehicle was separated from Lucky’s trailer by 
another vehicle.     
 
After Lucky was shot, Buddy, Bentley and Creed all fled the scene of the 
shooting to Millsboro, Delaware where they waited for Bentley’s mother.  The 
next morning, Bentley’s mother informed the trio that the police were after them.  
All four of them then drove to Washington, D.C. in Bentley’s mother’s truck.  The 
following day, Buddy suggested that they go to his father’s house in Ohio.  The 
police spotted the group on the Pennsylvania Turnpike while Bentley’s mother was 
driving.  A high-speed chase ensued.  At some point during the chase, Bentley’s 
mother became hysterical and Bentley took the wheel.  The chase went on for more 
than eighty miles.  The truck was finally stopped when the police threw spikes in 
the road to puncture its tires.  
 
Bentley was indicted on the charges of Murder First Degree, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Deadly Weapon 
by a Person Prohibited and convicted of all charges.  After he was convicted of all 
charges, he was sentenced to life imprisonment plus six years on the weapons 
offenses.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
Bentley first argues that his rights to confrontation and cross examination 
were violated when he was not permitted to question Creed on her potential bias 
 7
because of her relationship with Bentley’s uncle, Joey.  He also challenges the trial 
judges ruling precluding cross examination about her ability to perceive the events 
based on her drug use.  We review the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings for 
abuse of discretion.1  To the extent constitutional rights were violated, we review 
de novo.2   
“A primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment] is the right of cross-examination . . . .”3  A trial judge has “wide 
latitude” in controlling the contours of a cross examination.4  However, “the right 
of cross examination is not without limits.”5  This Court, especially when 
considering possible bias and motivations of a witness, looks to whether the jury 
had enough evidence to sufficiently draw inferences about the reliability of a 
witness and whether “defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue 
why the witness might have been biased . . . .”6    
 
After Creed testified on direct examination at trial, defense counsel sought to 
impeach her credibility by asking her questions about her prior drug use7 and her 
                                          
 
1 Dollard v. State, 838 A.2d 264, 266 (Del. 2003). 
2 Spencer v. State, 868 A.2d 821, 822 (Del. 2005); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 607 (Del. 
2001). 
3 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996) (citations omitted). 
4 Id. at 1025. 
5 Id. at 1024. 
6 Id. at 1025 (citing Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 681-82 (Del. 1983)). 
7 Six months after the homicide, on March 24, 2005, Creed was arrested for twelve drug charges 
and conspiracy and Joey was identified as her co-defendant.  
 8
relationship with Bentley’s uncle, Arthur “Joey” Bentley.  In compliance with the 
instruction of the trial judge, Bentley’s counsel proffered in writing 35 questions 
for Creed.8  Defense counsel argued that Creed’s history with drugs would cast into 
                                          
 
8 Those questions were: 
1.  Were you using drugs in September 2004? 
2.  What drugs were you using at that time? 
3.  Did you continue to use drugs during the period after September 2004? 
4.  Did you sniff cocaine during the period after September 2004? 
5.  Did you take E pills during the period after September 2004? 
6.  Did you shoot up cocaine during the period after September 2004? 
7.  Did you shoot up heroine during the period after September 2004? 
8.  Did you do speed balls during the period after September 2004? 
9.  What are speed balls? 
10.  Did you use crack during the period after September 2004? 
11.  Did you use drugs everyday during the period after September 2004? 
12.  Do you know what an 8 ball is? 
13.  Who is Rachel? 
14.  Would she give you drugs during the period after September 2004? 
15.  Who is Nicole? 
16.  Would she give you drugs during the period after September 2004? 
17.  Who is Becky? 
18.  Would she give you drugs during the period after September 2004? 
19.  Who is Joey? (Albert Bentley) 
20.  Did he give you drugs during the period after September 2004? 
21.  Is Joey related to Jordan Bentley? 
22.  Did you have a sexual relationship with Joey? 
23.  When did you start your sexual activity with Joey? 
24.  Is that the same time that you stopped visiting Jordan? 
25.  Did you ever tell Jordan about your sexual relationship with Joey? 
26. Did the drugs affect your memory as to the events that happened on 
September 1, 2004? 
27.  Did you ever lie to Jordan about your sexual relationship with Joey? 
28.  When did you finally tell Jordan about your sexual relationship with Joey? 
29.  Did you tell Jordan’s mother . . . about your sexual relationship with Joey? 
30. Did you tell Jordan’s grandmother . . . about your sexual relationship with 
Joey? 
31.  How long have you known Joey? 
32.  Did you know Joey on September 1, 2004? 
33.  Did you tell Joey what happened on September 1, 2004? 
34.  Did you tell Joey the same story you told the Jury last week? 
 9
doubt her ability to perceive or remember the shooting and surrounding events.    
Bentley’s counsel also argued that Creed’s relationship with Joey would establish 
bias or motive for the changes in her testimony.  That is, if Bentley was 
incarcerated, she would be able to continue her relationship with Joey without 
interference from her former boyfriend, Bentley.  With her own counsel present, 
Creed refused to answer the questions and asserted her privilege against self-
incrimination because of the pending drug related charges against her, including a 
criminal conspiracy with Joey.  After an extensive colloquy, the trial judge barred 
any inquiry into those matters, explaining “I don’t want anything to implicate her 
as a conspiracy [sic] in these drug charges . . . .”9   
The sustaining of Creed’s Fifth Amendment privilege is not at issue in this 
appeal.  What is at issue is the alleged denial of Bentley’s Sixth Amendment right 
to confront a witness who testified against him.  The record shows that Creed’s 
bias and motive for changing her testimony ultimately determine which of her 
versions of the shooting the jury would believe.  The jury made that determination 
without hearing about her relationship with Joey.  This relevant evidence 
                                                                                                                                        
35.  Did you tell Joey that Jordan was not the shooter on September 1, 2004? 
9 The trial judge permitted the prosecutor to ask Creed if she had been arrested in the previous 
month on drug charges and if she was “facing a considerable amount of time” on the charges.  
Creed answered yes to both questions.  The prosecutor asked Creed if she had been given any 
incentive to testify against Bentley.  She admitted that when she was arrested on the above-
mentioned drug charges, the police officer questioning her had implied that “testifying against 
[Bentley] could help me out with dropping some of my charges.”  
 10
contradicted the State’s position that she changed her story because she was biased 
in favor of Bentley. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Creed’s 
testimony changed because she was trying to protect Bentley, who was “the love of 
her life.”10  To protect Bentley, he argued, Creed originally told defense counsel 
that Buddy did it and that is why she later testified that she could not see the 
shooter.  According to the State’s theory, because Creed was protecting Bentley, 
her version incriminating him was the version the jury should believe.  The 
defense, on the other hand, relied upon Creed’s first version that identified Buddy 
as the shooter.  According to the defense’s theory, supported by evidence the jury 
did not hear, Creed later identified Bentley as the shooter because her relationship 
with him was over.  She was having an affair with Joey which could continue 
without interference from Bentley, her former boyfriend, should Bentley be 
incarcerated.  Bentley’s argument could not be made.  When Creed exercised her 
Fifth Amendment privilege any testimony from her supporting Bentley’s theory 
could not be admitted absent a grant of immunity.  Nor could Bentley confront 
Creed on her motive or bias for changing her testimony.  
                                          
 
10 The prosecutor argued through summation that her testimony could be explained by her desire 
to protect Bentley.  The prosecutor also said, “Why did [Creed] change her testimony?  Do you 
think [Creed] was still trying to protect the defendant?  They had been dating for four years, they 
had lived together.  They had written letters.”   
 11
We recognize that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is 
not absolute.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in Kastigar v. United 
States,11 “[t]here are a number of exceptions from the testimonial duty, the most 
important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  
The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and 
marks an important advance in the development of our liberty.”12 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has addressed the interplay 
between a witness’s right against self-incrimination and a defendant’s right to 
confront adverse witnesses in United States v. Dalfonso.13  A witness’ invocation 
of the Fifth Amendment does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial.  
“A criminal defendant is not entitled to a new trial merely because a government 
witness has exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent during cross-
examination on a collateral matter relating to credibility.”14  Instead, the 
“defendant must at least show a substantial danger of prejudice flowing from the 
                                          
 
11 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
12 Id. at 444.  The right against self-incrimination is broad and “protects against any disclosures 
which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to 
other evidence that might be so used.”  Id. at 445; see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 
486 (1951) (“This provision of the Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of 
the right it was intended to secure.  The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that 
would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces 
those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . 
. . crime.”). 
13 United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757,762 (3d Cir. 1983). 
14 Id. 
 12
absence of such testimony.”15  If the invocation of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters, there is no substantial danger of prejudice to the 
defendant.16  There is a substantial danger of prejudice, however, if the invocation 
of the privilege “precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there 
may be a substantial danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the 
right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness’s testimony 
should be stricken in whole or in part.”17  If there is a substantial danger of 
prejudice, the witnesses’ direct testimony must be stricken from the record.18  In 
the alternative, and to avoid having the testimony stricken, a prosecution witness 
may be granted use immunity by court order upon the request of the State, if the 
requirements of 11 Del. C. § 3506 are met.19 
                                          
 
15 Id.  
16 Newman v. United States, 490 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Where the privilege has been 
invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, 
therefore, the witness's testimony may be used against him . . . .”). 
17 Id. (“The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation requires appellate courts to reverse 
convictions where it appears that the cross-examination of government witnesses has been 
unreasonably limited.”). 
18 Id. 
19 11 Del. C. § 3506 provides: 
(a) In any criminal action or in any investigation carried on by the grand jury, if a 
person refuses to answer any question or to produce evidence of any kind solely 
on the ground that the person may thereby be incriminated, the Superior Court, 
upon motion of the Attorney General, may order such person to answer the 
question or produce the evidence after notice to the witness and a hearing. 
Provided, however, the Court shall not enter such order if the Court finds: 
(1) That such person may be subjected to criminal prosecution relating to the 
same transaction or occurrence under the laws of the United States or any other 
 13
On the facts of this case, the motive of Creed for changing her testimony and 
her relationships with Bentley and Joey were not collateral matters.  Creed’s 
assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege, given the pending conspiracy and drug 
charges, deprived Bentley of his right to test the truth of Creed’s direct testimony.  
It did not simply deprive him of an opportunity to test Creed’s credibility on an 
unrelated issue. Although Creed’s testimony changed, the State was able to offer 
an explanation for those changes to the jury while Creed’s assertion of her Fifth 
Amendment privilege deprived Bentley of the opportunity to offer a contradictory 
                                                                                                                                        
state and that any such evidence so compelled could be used against the person in 
any such prosecution; or 
(2) Such order would otherwise be clearly contrary to the public interest. 
Such person, so ordered by the Court, shall comply with the Court order. After 
complying, such person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or 
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, 
in accordance with the order, the person gave answer or produced evidence; 
provided that, but for this section, such person would have been privileged to 
withhold the answer given or the evidence produced. In no event, however, shall 
such person, acting pursuant to such order, be exempt from prosecution or penalty 
or forfeiture for any perjury, false statement or contempt committed in answering 
or failing to answer, or in producing or failing to produce evidence in accordance 
with the order, and any testimony or evidence so given or produced shall not by 
virtue of this section be rendered inadmissible in evidence upon any criminal 
action, investigation or proceeding concerning such perjury, false statement or 
contempt. 
(b) No statement or other evidence obtained from any person who shall have been 
compelled to make such statement or produce such evidence by any court of 
competent jurisdiction of the United States or of any other state pursuant to a 
claim of privilege and court order under a statute substantially equivalent to 
subsection (a) of this section shall be admissible in evidence in any criminal 
prosecution in this State against such person arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence. 
 14
explanation.  Bentley could not offer the contrary explanation that the motive was 
not to protect him but to convict him.     
This was a close case.  Creed was, in effect, the tie-breaking witness on the 
critical issue of the identity of the shooter.  The substantial danger of prejudice 
from the preclusion of cross examination on her romantic relationship with Joey 
could have been avoided if the prosecution had sought use immunity for Creed’s 
testimony under 11 Del. C. § 3506.  The State did not do so.20  With use immunity, 
Creed would not have been able to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege and 
Bentley’s proposed questions could have been asked.21  We hold that Bentley’s 
conviction must be reversed because he has shown that the limitation on his cross 
examination of Creed created a substantial danger of prejudice to his right to a fair 
trial. 
III. 
Because a new trial is required, we will address Bentley’s remaining 
arguments to provide guidance to the parties and the Superior Court.  Bentley next 
                                          
 
20 At oral argument in this appeal, no explanation was provided by the State in response to our 
inquiry into why use immunity was not sought for Creed.   
21 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446-47 (“Immunity statutes . . . have deep roots in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. . . .  [T]hey seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the 
privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.  The existence 
of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such 
a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the 
crime. . . .  [E]very State in the Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has 
one or more such statutes.”). 
 15
claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury on manslaughter, a lesser 
included offense of first degree murder.  The trial judge found that there was no 
rational basis in the record to support jury instructions on lesser included offenses.  
We review the denial of requested jury instructions de novo.22   
Lesser included offense instructions “provide the jury with a less dramatic 
alternative than the sharp choice between conviction of the offense charged and 
acquittal.”23  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Beck v. 
Alabama24 that “providing the jury with the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser 
included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of 
the reasonable-doubt standard.”25  If “there is a rational basis in the evidence for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the 
defendant of the included offense,” due process under both the United States 
Constitution26 and Delaware law27 requires that the jury be so instructed.  A jury 
should be instructed on a lesser included offense if the following four criteria are 
met: 
                                          
 
22 Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 2006). 
23 Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 864 (Del. 2002). 
24 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). 
25 Id. 
26 Beck, 447 U.S. at 635-38. 
27 11 Del. C. § 206(c); Capano, 781 A.2d at 628 (citing Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 82 
(1998)). 
 16
First, the defendant must make a proper request.  Second, the lesser 
included offense must contain some but not all of the elements of the 
charged offense.  Third, the elements differentiating the two offenses 
must be in dispute.  Fourth, there must be some evidence that would 
allow the jury to rationally acquit the defendant on the greater charge 
and convict on the lesser charge.28   
 
In Henry, this Court explained that the standard to establish the fourth prong 
is not particularly demanding.  Generally, conflicting testimony as to the element 
that distinguishes the charged offense from the lesser included offense satisfied the 
fourth prong.  “[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included 
offense if there is any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the lesser included 
offense, ‘however weak’ that evidence may be.”29 
The difference between the offense of manslaughter and first degree murder 
involves state of mind.  For first degree murder, the State must prove an intent to 
“cause[] the death of another person.”30  Bentley argues that the definition of 
manslaughter within 11 Del. C. § 632(2) applies to the facts of this case.  Section 
632(2) requires that one act “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to 
another person” but actually “cause[] the death of such person, employing means 
which would to a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, knowing the facts 
                                          
 
28 Henry, 805 A.2d at 864 (citations omitted). 
29 Id. at 865 (citing United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
30 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1).  The State did not prosecute Bentley and Buddy as accomplices. 
 17
known to the defendant, seem likely to cause death.”31  Therefore, in order to 
receive this lesser included instruction, there must have been some evidence 
showing that Bentley intended to inflict serious bodily injury upon Lucky but did 
not intend to kill him.   
Bentley argues that under one version of the events, the jury could have 
concluded that Bentley believed that only a physical altercation was going to take 
place (i.e., Buddy put on his steel boots, making Bentley think he was going to 
“kick [Lucky] in the mouth,” and Buddy and Creed’s testimony that they did not 
believe Bentley was going to shoot anyone).  As the State correctly notes, 
however, the only conflicting testimony presented in this case is who shot Lucky, 
not if the shooter intended to kill Lucky.  Bentley testified that he believed that 
Buddy was going to beat up or get involved in a physical altercation with Lucky.  
He did not testify that he intended to get involved in any physical altercation with 
Lucky.  In other words, Bentley’s defense was that Buddy committed the murder, 
not that he intended to cause serious bodily injury and death unexpectedly resulted.  
We find no error by the Superior Court in denying the proposed jury instruction 
given the evidence presented at trial.   
 
                                          
 
31 11 Del. C. § 632(2). 
 18
IV. 
Bentley’s final claim is that the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to 
watch a video tape showing that Bentley spit on a news camera as he was leaving 
the courthouse.  Bentley argues that admission of the tape violates D.R.E. 403.32  
“The determination whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the 
risk of undue prejudice ‘falls particularly within the discretion of the trial judge, 
who has the first-hand opportunity to evaluate relevant factors.’”33  Bentley 
testified that he cooperated with police throughout the proceedings.  Thus, he 
opened the door to this contradiction evidence on his demeanor.  The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it concluded that it was probative of “how [Bentley] 
conducted himself after he was taken into custody.”   
V. 
The judgments of the Superior Court are REVERSED.  This matter is 
REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  
                                          
 
32 D.R.E. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” 
33 Winn v. State, 625 A.2d 280 (Del. 1993) (TABLE) (citing Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 
1241 (1985)).