Title: WENZ v SCHWARTZE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14228 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 19 79 EMlL m Z , et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, DIANE S C H W A K F Z E , et al. , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal f m : D i s t r i c t Court of the Ninth Judicia D i s t r i c t , Honorable Joel G. Fbth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Smith, m n s , Baillie & Wash, Great Falls, Mntana Jams R. Walsh argued, Great Falls, Mntana For Wspondents: Marra, Wenz, I = and Johnson, Great Falls, mntana Joseph Marra argued and Warren Wenz arqued, Great Falls, Fbntana Carroll Blend argued, G r e a t Falls, mntana Suhitted: May 4, 1979 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The ~ i s t r i c t Court of Pondera County terminated the p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of a f a t h e r and mother, both r e s i d e n t s of C a l i f o r n i a , and granted custody of t h e i r daughter t o her a u n t and uncle, r e s i d e n t s of Montana. The f a t h e r appeals. The s u b j e c t of t h i s appeal i s a minor c h i l d who was born i n C a l i f o r n i a i n 1969. H e r p a r e n t s separated some eighteen months a f t e r her b i r t h and obtained a f i n a l d i s - s o l u t i o n of marriage on January 13, 1972. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, i n an uncontested proceeding, granted custody t o the mother and allowed reasonable v i s i t a t i o n t o t h e f a t h e r . I t a l s o ordered the f a t h e r t o pay weekly c h i l d support of $25 and t o maintain medical and l i f e insurance p o l i c i e s f o r h i s daughter's b e n e f i t . P r i o r t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , the mother had separated from t h e f a t h e r and had begun l i v i n g with another man, a l t e r n a - t i v e l y known a s Bridges, Martin, o r Leonard. While t h e p a r e n t s ' l i v i n g condition p r i o r t o t h e i r separation had n o t been i d e a l , the conditions under which t h e mother and c h i l d l i v e d grew s t e a d i l y worse i n the company of Bridges. The mother, c h i l d , and Bridges l i v e d i n a v a r i e t y of houses, and f i n a l l y i n a run-down apartment with l i t t l e f u r n i t u r e , l i t t l e food, and much questionable company. A s t i m e went on and conditions worsened f o r the mother and c h i l d , t h e c h i l d ' s p a t e r n a l grandmother, who l i v e d i n t h e a r e a , became concerned f o r the c h i l d ' s welfare. She made f r e q u e n t v i s i t s t o t h e mother's a p a r m e n t and of ten k e p t the c h i l d on weekends. I n l a t e 1973 a £ ter her mother and Bridges had moved i n t o an apartment building i n eni ice, c a l i f o r n i a , the c h i l d began r e l a t i n g information which caused her grandmother considerable concern. She described i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t her mother and Bridges had received, on occasion, hypodermic i n j e c t i o n s from some unknown man, and t h a t she was unable to awaken her mother a f t e r she had received those i n j e c t i o n s . She a l s o t o l d how she had been repeatedly subjected t o sexual abuse by Bridges. The grand- mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t the c h i l d ' s complaints of abuse w e r e ongoing and confirmed t h a t the c h i l d had v i s i b l e physical i n d i c a t i o n s of abuse. The grandmother shared this information with the c h i l d ' s f a t h e r and h i s new wife. When questioned by t h e f a t h e r , the c h i l d f i r s t refused t o answer b u t later gave an a f f i r m a t i v e response. She a l s o responded p o s i t i v e l y t o the f a t h e r ' s new wife. The f a t h e r next questioned the c h i l d ' s mother, who denied any such a c t i v i t i e s . H i s testimony i n d i c a t e s that he cannot remember whether he ever confronted Bridges with this informa t i o n . I n November 1973 t h e f a t h e r spoke t o Jerome Kessler, an a t t o r n e y i n Los Angeles, about a change of custody. Accord- i n g t o Kessler, t h e f a t h e r s a i d t h a t h i s former wife "was a h i p p i e who wanted t o go on welfare" and the f a t h e r "expressed an i n t e r e s t a t some p o i n t obtaining custody of h i s daughter." Kessler t o l d the f a t h e r a t t h a t t i m e t h a t he doubted whether t h e f a t h e r had ample grounds t o o b t a i n a modification of the decree. The f a t h e r again consulted Kessler i n February 1974, and, according t o Kessler, t o l d him of a t l e a s t one of t h e a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t s of abuse. Kessler t e s t i f i e d t h a t he informed the f a t h e r t h a t some form of proof would be neces- s a r y , and that a l a w s u i t t o change custody would be d i f f i - c u l t t o maintain i n t h e absence of an eyewitness t o t h e mistreatment of the c h i l d . A deposition by Linn Davis, a paralegal i n Kessler's o f f i c e , i n d i c a t e s t h a t the f a t h e r spoke with her on numerous occasions regarding a change of custody. However, her testimony i n d i c a t e s t h a t the f a t h e r ' s reasons f o r d e s i r i n g custody remained general u n t i l the e a r l y p a r t of 1975. "At first it was j u s t an expression of d e s i r e f o r the child." I n January o r February, according t o Davis, the f a t h e r complained t h a t h i s former wife was a "hippie, an irrespon- s i b l e woman who d i d n o t seem t o c a r e about the s u i t a b i l i t y of the environment of the c h i l d . " I n February 1975 the f a t h e r c a l l e d t o ask "'Can I g e t custody i f [ t h e mother] is smoking marijuana?'" According t o Davis, it was March 1975 when the f a t h e r f i r s t r e l a t e d anything t o her about any alleged abuse of h i s daughter. During the summer of 1974, the mother permitted the p a t e r n a l grandmother t o take the c h i l d t o Oregon t o s t a y a t her ranch home there. I n e a r l y July, however, i n response t o a request from the c h i l d ' s maternal grandmother i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, the c h i l d was p u t on a plane t o B i l l i n g s s o she could spend p a r t of the summer with her mother's r e l a t i v e s i n Montana. When she a r r i v e d i n B i l l i n g s , the maternal grandmother noticed t h a t the c h i l d t s h a i r was matted with blood and pus around one e a r . She had heard e a r l i e r from the o t h e r grandmother t h a t the c h i l d had e a r problems, b u t t h a t the mother was unwilling t o have the condition t r e a t e d by a physician. The maternal grandmother obtained medical a s s i s t a n c e f o r the c h i l d and by the t i m e she returned t o Los Angeles i n August t h e condition, a bad i n f e c t i o n , had cleared up. The maternal grandmother accompanied the c h i l d on the r e t u r n t r i p t o Los Angeles and s p e n t about three days i n the mother's apartment. During t h a t v i s i t she observed the deprived conditions under which her daughter and grand- daughter l i v e d . She a l s o observed t h e f a t h e r i n the company of the mother and Bridges and noticed t h a t t h e f a t h e r ap- peared f r i e n d l y toward Bridges. The c h i l d remained i n t h e mother's custody f o r the next s e v e r a l months, b u t her p a t e r n a l grandmother continued to c a r e f o r her on weekends. The grandmother t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c h i l d again complained of abuse by Bridges and t h a t she k e p t the c h i l d a s much as p o s s i b l e t o keep her away from Bridges. I n May 1975 t h e p a t e r n a l grandmother, who had remar- r i e d , prepared t o move t o Oregon with her husband. O n May 1 2 , s h o r t l y a f t e r she had l e f t t h e c h i l d with her mother i n Venice, she received a call from t h e mother who t o l d her t o come back and g e t t h e c h i l d "before [Bridges] k i l l s her." When she a r r i v e d back a t the mother's apartment, the c h i l d ' s c l o t h i n g w a s a l l i n the hallway, and t h e mother t o l d the grandmother, " t a k e her, she c a n ' t l i v e with m e . She c a n ' t l i v e with [Bridges] and I any more." I t appeared to t h e grandmother t h a t Bridges had learned t h a t the c h i l d had t o l d about h i s abuse of her. She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e mother r e f e r r e d t o her c h i l d a s a l i a r . The grandmother and her husband kept the c h i l d f o r the next month as they prepared f o r an extended tour through the western s t a t e s and Canada. They a r r i v e d a t the residence of t h e c h i l d ' s a u n t and uncle i n Pondera County, Montana, on June 15, 1975, and t h e r e shared the f u l l s t o r y of the c h i l d ' s l i f e with her mother and Bridges. The c h i l d ' s a u n t testi- f i e d that when she and her husband heard t h e grandmother's s t o r y they were h o r r i f i e d and agreed with her t h a t t h e c h i l d should n o t go back t o her mother. The a u n t and uncle contacted t h e w i f e ' s cousin, an a t t o r n e y i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana, who agreed t o come t o t h e i r ranch t o t a l k t h e s i t u a t i o n over. A t t h e a t t o r n e y ' s r e q u e s t , t h e grandmother prepared a letter d e t a i l i n g a l l she knew of t h e c h i l d ' s s i t u a t i o n , c l o s i n g w i t h a p l e a t h a t someone would h e l p h e r son, t h e f a t h e r , g a i n custody o f t h e c h i l d . The a t t o r n e y then telephoned t h e f a t h e r i n C a l i f o r n i a who t o l d him t h a t he was t o m e e t with Kessler i n Los Angeles t h e n e x t day. According t o an a f f i d a v i t prepared by t h e a t t o r n e y , he t o l d t h e f a t h e r t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s a u n t and uncle w e r e considering f i l i n g f o r custody. On t h e following day t h e grandmother and her husband l e f t f o r Canada, leaving t h e c h i l d ' s c l o t h i n g , medical records, and b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e w i t h h e r a u n t and uncle. The grandmother t e s t i f i e d t h a t she understood t h e c h i l d would be r e t u r n e d t o her i n Oregon a f t e r she g o t home from Canada. That same day t h e Great F a l l s a t t o r n e y telephoned Kessler i n Los Angeles and discussed t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s d e s i r e t o keep t h e c h i l d away from h e r mother, and t h e i r doubts con- cerning t h e f a t h e r ' s w i l l i n g n e s s o r a b i l i t y t o care f o r t h e c h i l d . H e learned from Kessler t h a t t h e f a t h e r had n o t y e t f i l e d f o r t h e c h i l d ' s custody and s t a t e d t h a t Kessler t o l d him t h a t t h e f a t h e r was n o t a b l e t o make up h i s mind about whether t o seek custody. The n e x t day, June 18, t h e Great F a l l s a t t o r n e y again c a l l e d K e s s l e r t o inform him t h a t t h e a u n t and uncle had decided t o seek permanent custody and t h a t a complaint would be f i l e d i n Pondera County on June 20, when t h e c h i l d ' s maternal grandparents could come from B i l l i n g s , Montana, t o s i g n it. H e f u r t h e r informed Kessler t h a t t h e a u n t and uncle would have a temporary custody and r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r i s s u e d t o them a t t h a t same t i m e . The o r d e r g r a n t i n g t e m - porary custody t o t h e a u n t and u n c l e was signed on June 19, 1975. On June 19, 1975, t h e f a t h e r , having been informed t h a t a n a c t i o n was a b o u t t o be f i l e d i n Montana, f i l e d a s e p a r a t e a c t i o n i n Los Angeles County t o have custody changed t o himself, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e mother was u n f i t because s h e had permitted t h e c h i l d t o be abused. H e subsequently obtained a s t i p u l a t i o n from t h e mother agreeing t o a change of cus- tody and on J u l y 7 t h e Los Angeles County Superior Court g r a n t e d custody t o t h e f a t h e r . On June 24, 1975, t h e grandmother, f a t h e r , and a f r i e n d of t h e f a t h e r ' s appeared a t t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s ranch i n Pondera County and took t h e c h i l d away, i n t e n d i n g t o f l y her back t o C a l i f o r n i a . With t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e s h e r i f f , however, t h e a u n t and uncle recovered t h e c h i l d t h a t same evening. Two y e a r s later, i n August 1977, t h e Pondera County D i s t r i c t Court, s i t t i n g without a jury, i n G r e a t F a l l s , heard o r a l and d e p o s i t i o n testimony from t h e p a r t i e s named i n t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s custody p e t i t i o n . Both t h e f a t h e r and p a t e r n a l grandmother appeared and t e s t i f i e d , b u t t h e c h i l d ' s mother d i d n o t appear. A t t h e recommendation of a G r e a t F a l l s c l i n i c a l psychologist, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t a s k t h e c h i l d whether she wanted t o s t a y w i t h h e r a u n t and uncle o r r e t u r n t o h e r f a t h e r . H e r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e c a s e w e r e represented, however, by t h e Cascade County a t t o r n e y . Following t h e hearing t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d t h a t t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s had abused and abandoned t h e i r c h i l d , ordered t h e termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of both n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and awarded f u l l custody of t h e c h i l d t o h e r a u n t and uncle. I t a l s o appointed t h e a u n t and uncle g e n e r a l guardians f o r t h e c h i l d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of h e r minority. The s p e c i f i c conclusions upon which t h e c o u r t r e l i e d i n e n t e r i n g i t s o r d e r s w e r e t h a t t h e conduct of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s c o n s t i t u t e d abuse and abandonment of t h e i r minor c h i l d , and t h a t t h i s conduct rendered them " u n f i t t o have o r regain" t h e " c a r e , custody, and c o n t r o l " of her. F u r t h e r t h e c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d r e q u i r e d t h a t she be " f r e e from t h e dominion" of h e r p a r e n t s and placed i n t h e f u l l and complete c a r e of h e r a u n t and uncle. The D i s t r i c t Court made lengthy and d e t a i l e d f i n d i n g s concerning t h e circumstances under which t h e c h i l d had been r a i s e d during her f i r s t f i v e years. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e s e f i n d i n g s focus on t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e f a t h e r during t h e t i m e h i s daughter l i v e d i n Los Angeles County. These find- i n g s show t h a t t h e f a t h e r had n o t sought custody when h i s marriage was d i s s o l v e d d e s p i t e h i s knowledge of h i s w i f e ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Bridges, of h i s w i f e ' s and Bridges' use of drugs, and of h i s w i f e ' s apparent mental i l l n e s s . They show t h a t t h e f a t h e r g r o s s l y misrepresented h i s a s s e t s a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n by d e c l a r i n g t h a t property which he owned by i n h e r i t a n c e was worth $1000, when i n f a c t it had been appraised a t $54,400 t e n y e a r s e a r l i e r (and which he s o l d f o r $lO8,000 i n 1973); t h a t t h e C a l i f o r n i a Superior Court ordered t h e f a t h e r t o pay h i s w i f e $ 2 5 per week i n c h i l d support, b u t t h a t he i n f a c t paid only $30 f o r t h e support of h i s daughter from J u l y 1, 1971 t o January 1973, a t which t i m e he was ordered t o appear i n response t o a contempt c i t a t i o n i s s u e d by t h e Los Angeles County s u p e r i o r Court; t h a t t h e f a t h e r h i r e d counsel t o r e p r e s e n t him a t t h e contempt hearing and obtained a reduction of h i s support o b l i g a t i o n t o $66 per month, commencing December 1, 1973, while i n t h e meantime he had sold h i s i n h e r i t e d property, and a f t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n s t o o t h e r h e i r s received $99,400 i n cash on August 30, 1973; t h a t t h e f a t h e r continued t o ne- g l e c t h i s reduced support o b l i g a t i o n and was again c i t e d f o r contempt and ordered t o appear i n February 1975; t h a t t h e f a t h e r meanwhile purchased a home f o r $38,000 and remodeled it, and d i d " l i t t l e i n t h e way of s e r i o u s employment" de- s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t he declared himself t o be a musician and photographer; t h a t h i s a c t u a l annual income, except f o r t h e year i n which he s o l d h i s i n h e r i t e d land, has never exceeded $4,000; t h a t t h e f a t h e r knew a s e a r l y a s February 1974 t h a t h i s daughter had reported t o her grandmother t h a t she had been sexually molested by Bridges, t h a t she had observed her mother and Bridges being i n j e c t e d with hypodermic needles, t h a t she w a s l i v i n g i n f i l t h y conditions, b u t t h a t d e s p i t e t h i s knowledge he f a i l e d t o e i t h e r pay h i s "minimal" support o b l i g a t i o n o r t o commence proceedings t o r e g a i n custody; t h a t it i s i n c r e d i b l e t h a t t h e f a t h e r would doubt h i s daugh- ter's t r u t h f u l n e s s when she "described i n d e t a i l " t h e un- n a t u r a l sexual a c t s which she had been compelled t o endure; t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o commence any proceedings on behalf of h i s daughter u n t i l she was o u t s i d e of C a l i f o r n i a , and then only a f t e r he had been informed t h a t t h e aunt and uncle intended t o commence such an a c t i o n ; t h a t t h e evidence showed t h a t the f a t h e r had talked t o two lawyers about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of gaining custody of t h e c h i l d , b u t t h a t he had n o t made up h i s mind t o do s o u n t i l informed of t h e Montana a c t i o n ; and f i n a l l y , t h a t when he d i d a t l a s t commence an a c t i o n , he r e l i e d e n t i r e l y upon evidence of sexual molesta- t i o n of which he had known f o r a t least s i x t e e n months. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c o u r t r e l i e d upon t h e testimony of t h e psychologist and o t h e r s i n f i n d i n g t h a t during t h e two y e a r s p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h e c h i l d had l i v e d with h e r a u n t and uncle and had become w e l l a d j u s t e d t o h e r circumstances and t h a t her c o n d i t i o n had changed from a nervous, hyper- a c t i v e and anxious c h i l d t o a secure and comfortable c h i l d . I t found s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e a u n t and u n c l e are f i t and proper persons t o be awarded custody. F i n a l l y t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r had never had a " v i a b l e parent-child r e l a t i o n s h i p " w i t h h i s daughter. Three p r i n c i p l e m a t t e r s must be decided on t h i s appeal: 1. Did t h e Montana D i s t r i c t Court have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify an e x t a n t C a l i f o r n i a decree? 2. Did t h e evidence presented t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court s u p p o r t i t s determination t h a t t h e c h i l d w a s abused and abandoned by both p a r e n t s ? 3 . Did t h e District Court have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o name t h e c h i l d ' s a u n t and uncle g e n e r a l guardians of t h e c h i l d ? The f i r s t i s s u e is t e c h n i c a l l y complex. I t involves t h e e f f e c t of p l a i n t i f f s ' f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e of process on t h e f a t h e r ; t h e e f f e c t of t h e f a t h e r ' s appear- ance i n t h e Montana proceeding; t h e e f f e c t of t h e - ex p a r t e proceeding by which t h e f a t h e r obtained a m o d i f i c a t i o n of custody i n t h e C a l i f o r n i a Superior Court; t h e e f f e c t of Montana's enactment of t h e Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c - t i o n A c t during t h e pendency of t h e s e proceedings; and f i n a l l y , t h e e f f e c t of t h e f u l l f a i t h and c r e d i t c l a u s e of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . W e hold t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e ~ a l i f o r n i a decree. Personal J u r i s d i c t i o n Over t h e Father. -- The D i s t r i c t Court, on J u l y 1, 1975, obtained p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e mother and Bridges by personal s e r v i c e of process i n C a l i f o r n i a . E f f o r t s by t h e Los Angeles County s h e r i f f ' s department t o s e r v e process on t h e f a t h e r w e r e unsuccessful. Thus, t h e f a t h e r contends t h a t he was n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . H e contends f u r t h e r t h a t h i s appearance a t t h e hearing on p l a i n t i f f s ' p e t i t i o n d i d n o t s e r v e t o confer t h e c o u r t w i t h i n personam - j u r i s d i c t i o n over him. Montana's Rule 4B(2), M.R.Civ.P., which has no counter- p a r t i n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s of c i v i l procedure provides t h a t a c o u r t o b t a i n s - i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over a person when t h a t person v o l u n t a r i l y appears: " J u r i s d i c t i o n may be acquired by o u r c o u r t s over any person through s e r v i c e of process a s h e r e i n provided; o r & t h e voluntary appearance -- i n a n a c t i o n any person e i t h e r p e r s o n a l l y , o r through an a t t o r n e y , o r through any o t h e r au- t h o r i z e d o f f i c e r , a g e n t o r employee." (Emphasis added. ) A d d i t i o n a l l y , c o u r t s and commentators are q u i t e w i l l i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h c h i l d custody c a s e s i n which c o u r t s a c t a s a r b i t e r s between d i s p u t i n g p a r e n t s from dependent and n e g l e c t and abuse cases when t h e c o u r t s t a n d s as parens p a t r i a e seeking t o a s s i s t t h e w e l f a r e of t h e abused, abandoned, o r neglected c h i l d . H. Clark, -- Law of Domestic R e l a t i o n s , 818.2 a t 610-11 (1968); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble t o Family Law Chaos, 45 Va.L.Rev. 379, 398, 404 (1959); C u r r i e , J u s t i c e Traynor and t h e C o n f l i c t of Laws, 1 3 Stan.L.Rev. 719, 768 (1961). A s d e c l a r e d by t h e Arizona Court of Appeals i n a r e c e n t termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s d e c i s i o n : ". . .when t h e i s s u e i s p r i m a r i l y between t h e s t a t e i n its p a r e n s p a t r i a e c a p a c i t y and an ab- s e n t non-consenting spouse, t h e state i s j u s t i - f i e d i n providing f o r e f f e c t i v e termination proceedings, even i n t h e absence of i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over a non-consenting gent." I n R e Appeal i n Maricopa County, J u v e n i l e Action No. JS-734 (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 333, 543 P.2d 454, 459. I n l i g h t of t h e weight of a u t h o r i t y , w e must a g r e e t h a t p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r e n t is n o t necessary t o t h e termination of h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t o a minor c h i l d , s o long a s t h e p a r e n t has a c t u a l n o t i c e of t h e termination pro- ceedings o r t h e District Court, under Rule 4 D , M.R.Civ.P., makes a n e f f o r t reasonably c a l c u l a t e d t o provide n o t i c e t o t h e p a r e n t . See, Commissioners' Note, Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t , S e c t i o n 13, 9 Uniform Laws Annot. 121 (1973) ("Personal j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e f a t h e r i s n o t re- q u i r e d . . . The A c t emphasizes t h e need f o r t h e p e r s o n a l appearance of t h e c o n t e s t a n t s r a t h e r than any t e c h n i c a l requirement f o r personal j u r i s d i c t i o n . " ) ; Armstrong v . Manzo (1965), 380 U.S. 545, 549-50, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1190-91, 1 4 L.Ed.2d 62, 65-66; Restatement (Second) of C o n f l i c t of Laws S69 (1971). I n t h e c a s e of o u t - o f - s t a t e p a r e n t s , see Sec- t i o n 5 of t h e Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t , sec- t i o n 40-7-106 MCA. S u b j e c t Matter J u r i s d i c t i o n . The f a t h e r ' s second j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t under t h e Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n Act (UCCJA), s e c t i o n s 61-401 t o -425, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 40-7-101 t o -125 MCA, t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t , r a t h e r than t h e Montana c o u r t , had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o determine t h e custody of h i s c h i l d . To consider t h i s argument, it i s necessary t o ex- amine t h e e f f e c t of t h e enactment of t h e UCCJA following t h e commencement of t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s a c t i o n under s e c t i o n 61-111, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-233 MCA, t o terminate t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s . This a c t i o n was commenced on June 19, 1975, more than two y e a r s before t h e J u l y 1, 1977, e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e UCCJA. The f a t h e r contends t h a t t h e A c t must c o n t r o l t h e District Court' s j u r i s d i c t i o n d e s p i t e i t s l a t e r enactment, w h i l e t h e a u n t and u n c l e c i t i n g s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 1-2-109 MCA, argue t h a t t h e A c t cannot be r e t r o - a c t i v e l y a p p l i e d because it i s s u b s t a n t i v e and does n o t , by i t s express terms, apply t o a c t i o n s which had a l r e a d y been commenced. A n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was r e c e n t l y considered i n a New York UCCJA case, Pitrowski v. Pitrowski (1979), 412 N.Y.S.2d 316. The c o u r t described t h e changes set f o r t h i n i t s newly adopted UCCJA a s procedural and acknowledged t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t such s t a t u t e s a r e t o r e c e i v e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n t o a c t i o n s commenced p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e . I t reasoned, however, t h a t " d i f f e r e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s arise" i f t h e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e pro- c e d u r a l changes embodied i n t h e s t a t u t e a r e t o be a p p l i e d t o a c t i o n s previously taken i n t h e pending proceeding. The c o u r t held t h a t i n t h e absence of a c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e i n - t e n t , t h e pre-UCCJA j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s would apply t o t h e c o u r t ' s p r e e f f e c t i v e d a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r u l i n g s : " ' I n o t h e r words, while procedural changes a r e , i n t h e absence of words of exclusion, deemed - - a p p l i c a b l e t o "subsequent proceedings i n pend- i n q a c t i o n s " [ c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ] , it t a k e s a " c l e a r expression . . . of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e pur- pose t o j u s t i f y " a r e t r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of even a procedural s t a t u t e s o as t o a f f e c t pro- ceedings previously taken i n such a c t i o n s . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] '" 412 N.Y.S. 2d a t 320, (quoting Simonson v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank (1964) , 1 4 N.Y.2d 281, 289-90, 200 N.E.2d 427, 432, 241 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440.) (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) Applying t h i s p r i n c i p l e t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e j u r i s - d i c t i o n a l r u l i n g s which t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1977, a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e UCCJA. The r e q u i r e - ments of t h e A c t , however, a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o subsequent j u r i s d i c t i o n a l determinations including t h e District C o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e determination t h a t it had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e C a l i f o r n i a custody decree. While t h e D i s t r i c t Court was n o t , a s of t h e commence- ment of t h i s proceeding, bound by t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e q u i r e - ments of t h e UCCJA, it i s nonetheless prudent t o i n q u i r e whether t h e f a c t s which e x i s t e d on June 19, 1975, would have permitted t h e District Court t o t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c a s e had t h e Act been e f f e c t i v e on t h a t d a t e . I f t h e f a c t s as of t h a t d a t e would n o t have j u s t i f i e d t h e assumption o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e c o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e custody o r d e r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e c o g n i t i o n and enforcement by o t h e r UCCJA s t a t e s under S e c t i o n 1 3 of t h e A c t , s e c t i o n 40-7-114 MCA. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , f a c t s meeting t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n - dards of t h e Act d i d e x i s t on t h e d a t e t h e a c t i o n was f i l e d . The UCCJA a t t e m p t s t o avoid p r o t r a c t e d i n t e r s t a t e c h i l d custody l i t i g a t i o n by reducing competition among c o u r t s which might otherwise i s s u e c o n f l i c t i n g custody o r d e r s : "The Act i s designed t o b r i n g some semblance of o r d e r i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g chaos. It l i m i t s custody j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e s t a t e where t h e c h i l d has h i s home o r where t h e r e are o t h e r s t r o n g c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e c h i l d and h i s family. See S e c t i o n 3. I t pro- v i d e s f o r t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and enforcement of out- o f - s t a t e custody d e c r e e s i n many i n s t a n c e s . See S e c t i o n s 13 and 15. J u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify de- crees of o t h e r s t a t e s i s l i m i t e d by g i v i n g a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p r i o r c o u r t under c e r t a i n conditions. See S e c t i o n 14. A c c e s s t o a c o u r t may b e denied t o p e t i t i o n e r s who have en- gaged i n c h i l d snatching o r s i m i l a r p r a c t i c e s . See S e c t i o n 8. Also, t h e A c t opens up d i r e c t l i n e s of communication between c o u r t s of d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s t o prevent j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t and b r i n g about i n t e r s t a t e j u d i c i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n custody cases." Commissioners' P r e f a t o r y Note, Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t , 9 U.L.A. 101 (1973). See a l s o , Bodenheimer, Progress Under t h e Unif o m Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t and Remaining Problems: P u n i t i v e Decrees, J o i n t Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal.L.Rev. 978, 982-83 (1977). The A c t e s t a b l i s h e s a two-tiered j u r i s d i c t i o n a l test which a c o u r t must f i n d s a t i s f i e d b e f o r e it makes even an i n i t i a l custody decree, and a f u r t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l test which l i m i t s a c o u r t ' s power t o modify an out-of-state decree. I t is t h e two-tier test t h a t must f i r s t be examined. See, Note, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 820, 827-30 (1976). The g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s of t h e UCCJA a r e found i n s e c t i o n 40-7-104 MCA, i n c o r p o r a t i n g by r e f e r e n c e s e c t i o n 40-4-211 MCA. This s e c t i o n d e t a i l s f o u r s e p a r a t e bases of j u r i s d i c t i o n . The f i r s t i s i f t h i s s t a t e i s t h e c h i l d ' s home state o r has been t h e home state w i t h i n t h e s i x months p r i o r t o t h e commencement of t h e custody proceeding. S e c t i o n 40-4-211 (1) ( a ) MCA. "Home s t a t e " i s defined a s t h e state i n which t h e c h i l d has l i v e d with a p a r e n t o r p a r e n t s o r someone a c t i n g i n t h e c a p a c i t y of a p a r e n t f o r a t l e a s t s i x months. S e c t i o n 40-7-103(5) MCA. Second, a c o u r t may have j u r i s d i c t i o n i f it i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t o do s o because t h e c h i l d and one o r both of h i s p a r e n t s ( o r c o n t e s t a n t s ) has a s i g n i f i c a n t connection w i t h t h i s s t a t e and because s u b s t a n t i a l evidence concerning t h e c h i l d ' s c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and personal r e l a t i o n - s h i p s i s a v a i l a b l e here. Section 40-4-211(1)(b) MCA. Third, i f t h e c h i l d i s p r e s e n t i n t h i s state and has been abandoned o r r e q u i r e s emergency p r o t e c t i o n because he has been threatened with mistreatment o r abuse o r i s neglected o r dependent, t h e c o u r t may t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e o r d i n a r y parens p a t r i a e power. Section 40-4-211(1)(c) MCA. Fourth, a c o u r t is empowered t o t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n i f no o t h e r state has j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e f i r s t t h r e e grounds o r another state has refused j u r i s d i c t i o n and i f it i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t t h e c o u r t do so. Sec- t i o n 40-4-211(1) (d) MCA. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e c h i l d had been l e f t i n Montana because i n May and June of 1975 she w a s n o t wanted by e i t h e r of her parents. H e r mother had e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d h e r and h e r f a t h e r , though p r o f e s s i n g a d e s i r e f o r h e r presence and company, had permitted h e r t o be l e f t with h i s former w i f e ' s r e l a t i v e s more than 1000 m i l e s away. H e had taken no a c t i o n t o g a i n h i s d a u g h t e r ' s custody even a f t e r h i s former w i f e had made it c l e a r t h a t t h e c h i l d could n o t l i v e with h e r and was i n physical danger from h e r boy- f r i e n d . S e c t i o n 40-4-211 (1) (c) MCA provides: "A c o u r t of t h i s state competent t o decide c h i l d custody m a t t e r s has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a c h i l d custody determination by i n i t i a l o r modification decree i f : " ( c ) t h e c h i l d i s p h y s i c a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h i s state and: " (i) has been abandoned; o r " (ii) it i s necessary i n an emergency t o pro- tect him because he has been subjected t o o r threatened with mistreatment o r abuse o r i s neglected o r dependent." The Commissioners' Note t o t h i s s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s it a s a r e t e n t i o n and r e a f f i r m a t i o n of parens p a t r i a e j u r i s d i c t i o n b u t c a u t i o n s t h a t it i s t o be used only i n "extraordinary circumstances." 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 108 (1973). See a l s o , I r e n e R. v. Inez H. (1978), 410 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55; Bodenheimer, supra, 65 Cal.L.Rev. a t 992-951; F o s t e r and Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial F i g h t s : The Case f o r t h e uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t , 28 Hastings L.J. 1011, 1020-21 (1977). I n view of t h e circumstances a t t e n d - i n g t h e c h i l d ' s presence i n Montana i n June 1975, w e con- c l u d e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s j u s t i f i e d i n a c c e p t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . The f a c t s a t t h a t t i m e m e t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l standards of s e c t i o n 40-4-211(1) (c) MCA, because t h e c h i l d w a s p r e s e n t i n Montana, had been abandoned by both o f h e r n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and had been subjected t o and threatened w i t h f u r t h e r mistreatment and abuse. The second tier of t h e i n i t i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a l test i s found i n s e c t i o n 40-7-108 MCA, a complex s e c t i o n d e s c r i b i n g inconvenient forum c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . This s e c t i o n a u t h o r i z e s a D i s t r i c t Court t o " d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n " any t i m e before e n t r y of a decree i f it f i n d s t h a t it i s a n "inconvenient forum" and t h a t a c o u r t of another s t a t e i s a "more a p p r o p r i a t e forum." The s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s s e v e r a l c r i t e r i a by which a District Court may c o n s i d e r whether it i s a n inconvenient forum, b u t does n o t c r e a t e a mandatory duty on t h e c o u r t t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n upon such grounds. The s e c t i o n i s e n t i r e l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y . Thus, while t h e f a t h e r contends t h a t t h e Montana c o u r t w a s a n inconvenient forum under t h e c r i t e r i a of S e c t i o n 7 ( c ) , s e c t i o n 40-7- 108(3) MCA, t h e a c t s p e c i f i c a l l y l e a v e s t h e inconvenient forum determination w i t h i n t h e f u l l d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . W e f i n d no abuse of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . J u r i s d i c t i o n - t o Modify t h e C a l i f o r n i a Decree. A second l i m i t a t i o n on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c - t i o n a r i s e s when a d e c r e e of another s t a t e i s a l r e a d y i n f o r c e . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e C a l i f o r n i a Superior Court had f i r s t granted custody t o t h e c h i l d ' s mother. Then, by a m o d i f i c a t i o n decree dated J u l y 7, 1975, g r a n t e d custody t o t h e f a t h e r . The f a t h e r argues t h a t t h e UCCJA and t h e f u l l f a i t h and c r e d i t c l a u s e p r o h i b i t a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e decree by t h e Montana c o u r t . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has n o t r u l e d e x p l i - c i t l y whether t h e f u l l f a i t h and c r e d i t c l a u s e a p p l i e s t o custody decrees. P a s t d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court, however, have t r e a t e d t h e c l a u s e as a l i m i t a t i o n on a Montana c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify custody determinations made by o t h e r s t a t e s . C a r r o l l v. White (1968), 151 Mont. 332, 443 P.2d 13. While t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court has n o t speci- f i c a l l y held whether t h e c l a u s e i s a p p l i e d i n - any custody c a s e s , it has r e f u s e d t o apply it t o p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s i n which t h e procedure i n a state c o u r t was n o t considered adequate. Of p a r t i c u l a r relevance i s Ford v. Ford (1962) , 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240. I n Ford a ~ i r - g i n i a c o u r t awarded custody of c h i l d r e n t o t h e i r mother. Some months l a t e r t h e f a t h e r p e t i t i o n e d t h e same c o u r t f o r a modification of t h e decree, b u t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d judgment on h i s p e t i t i o n , t h e p a r t i e s agreed t o a modifica- t i o n and s o n o t i f i e d t h e c o u r t , which dismissed t h e p e t i - t i o n . Subsequently, t h e mother moved t o South ~ a r o l i n a and p e t i t i o n e d a c o u r t of t h a t s t a t e t o r e g a i n custody of t h e p a r t i e s ' c h i l d r e n . The f a t h e r defended h i s custody on t h e b a s i s of t h e agreement and t h e V i r g i n i a c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l i n response t o t h a t agreement. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court h e l d t h a t t h e South Carolina c o u r t s w e r e n o t bound by t h e dismissal of t h e V i r g i n i a p e t i t i o n f o r modification. I n s o r u l i n g , t h e Court c i t e d s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which a r e r e l e v a n t here: "The Virginia c o u r t held no hearings a s t o the custody of t h e children. I n entering i t s order of dismissal, t h e c o u r t n e i t h e r examined the t e r m s of t h e parents' agreement nor exercised i t s own judgment of what was b e s t f o r t h e c h i l - dren. The c o u r t ' s order meant no more than t h a t t h e parents had made an agreement between themselves. . . ". . . w e do n o t believe t h a t , i n view of V i r - g i n i a ' s strong policy of safeguarding t h e w e l - f a r e of t h e c h i l d , a c o u r t of t h a t S t a t e would consider i t s e l f bound by a mere order of dis- missal where, as here, t h e t r i a l judge never even s a w , much less passed upon, t h e parents' p r i v a t e agreement f o r custody and heard no testimony whatever upon which t o base a judg- ment as t o what would be b e s t f o r t h e children." 371 U.S. a t 193-94, 9 L.Ed.2d a t 244-45, 8 3 S.Ct. a t 276-77. These same considerations a r e applicable here. While t h e Los Angeles County Superior Court a t l e a s t appears t o have viewed t h e substance of the s t i p u l a t i o n between t h e n a t u r a l parents, it i s a matter of record t h a t no hearing was held, the c o u r t heard no testimony regarding what would be b e s t f o r the c h i l d , and therefore could not have exer- c i s e d i t s own judgment of what was "best" f o r t h e c h i l d . Thus, because these w e r e precisely t h e i s s u e s which t h e Montana c o u r t heard and decided, it i s no more bound t o follow t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t ' s decree than w a s t h e South Carolina c o u r t bound t o follow t h e Virginia order i n Ford. Similarly, w e conclude t h a t t h e Montana c o u r t was not prevented from modifying t h e California decree by t h e UCCJA. A c e n t r a l purpose of the Act i s t o reduce i n t e r s t a t e compe- t i t i o n for a c h i l d ' s custody by requiring recognition and enforcement of one state's decrees by t h e courts of other s t a t e s . However, before t h e recognition and enforcement provisions of the A c t can be applied, t h e i n i t i a l decree must be entered i n conformity with s t r i c t n o t i c e require- ments. S e c t i o n 13 of t h e UCCJA, s e c t i o n 40-7-114 MCA, provides f o r t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and enforcement of o u t - o f - s t a t e custody d e c r e e s : "The c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l recognize and en- f o r c e a n i n i t i a l o r modification d e c r e e of a c o u r t of another s t a t e which had assumed j u r i s - d i c t i o n under s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n accordance w i t h t h i s c h a p t e r o r which was made under f a c t u a l circumstances meeting t h e j u r i s - d i c t i o n a l standards of t h e c h a p t e r , s o long as t h i s decree has n o t been modified i n accordance w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n a l standards s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i - l a r t o t h o s e of t h i s c h a p t e r . " S e c t i o n 1 4 of t h e A c t , s e c t i o n 40-7-115 MCA, l i m i t s a D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e d e c r e e s of another state: "(1) I f a c o u r t of another s t a t e has made a custody decree, a c o u r t of t h i s state may n o t modify t h a t decree u n l e s s it appears t o t h e c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e t h a t t h e c o u r t which ren- dered t h e d e c r e e does n o t now have j u r i s d i c t i o n under j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n accordance w i t h t h i s c h a p t e r o r has d e c l i n e d t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e d e c r e e and t h e c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e has j u r i s d i c t i o n . " (2) I f a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e is a u t h o r i z e d under subsection (1) and 40-7-109 t o modify a custody decree of another s t a t e , it s h a l l g i v e due con- s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e r e c o r d and o t h e r documents of a l l previous proceedings sub- m i t t e d t o it i n accordance w i t h 40-7-123." The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s t o t h e p r e s e n t m a t t e r a r i s e s from t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Cali- f o r n i a Superior Court t o comply w i t h t h e n o t i c e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n s 4 and 5 of t h e A c t , s e c t i o n s 40-7-105 and -106 MCA. See Cal.Civ.Code s e c t i o n s 5153, 5154. S e c t i o n 40-7- 105 MCA provides f o r n o t i c e t o , among o t h e r s , "any person who has p h y s i c a l custody of t h e c h i l d " : "Before making a decree under t h i s c h a p t e r , rea- sonable n o t i c e and opportunity t o b e heard s h a l l b e given t o t h e c o n t e s t a n t s , any p a r e n t whose p a r e n t a l r i g h t s have n o t been previously t e r m i - nated, and any person who -- has p h y s i c a l custody of t h e c h i l d . I f any of t h e s e persons a r e out- -- s i d e t h i s s t a t e , n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard s h a l l be given pursuant t o 40-7-106." (Emphasis added. ) S e c t i o n 40-7-106 MCA c o n t a i n s n o t i c e requirements when a person t o whom n o t i c e and opportunity t o be heard must be given i s i n another s t a t e . I t r e q u i r e s such n o t i c e " a t l e a s t 10 days b e f o r e any hearing i n t h i s s t a t e . " " S t r i c t compliance" w i t h t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e v a l i d i t y of a decree: " S t r i c t compliance w i t h s e c t i o n s 4 and 5 i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e v a l i d t y of a custody d e c r e e w i t h i n t h e s t a t e and i t s r e c o g n i t i o n and en- forcement i n o t h e r s t a t e s under s e c t i o n s 1 2 , 1 3 and 15." Note, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 110 (1973). Y e t i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , no n o t i c e o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard w a s e v e r given t o t h e a u n t and uncle who had p h y s i c a l custody of t h e c h i l d on June 1 9 , 1975, when t h e f a t h e r ' s m o d i f i c a t i o n p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n t h e Los Angeles County Superior Court. The f a t h e r a c t e d q u i c k l y t o o b t a i n a modi- f i e d order--only seventeen days a f t e r h i s p e t i t i o n was f i l e d . There was no compliance w i t h S e c t i o n s 4 and 5. Thus, t h e r e can b e no requirement of r e c o g n i t i o n and enforce- ment under S e c t i o n 13. A more d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n arises under S e c t i o n 1 4 , which r e q u i r e s deference t o t h e continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t which f i r s t granted a custody decree. The c e n t r a l i d e a of t h a t s e c t i o n i s t h a t once a s t a t e c o u r t has made a custody decree, t h a t s t a t e r e t a i n s an almost e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e decree u n l e s s it (1) no longer has j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s " s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n accord- ance" w i t h t h e A c t ; o r ( 2 ) has d e c l i n e d t o assume j u r i s d i c - t h e t i o n t o modify/decree; and ( 3 ) t h e c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e has j u r i s d i c t i o n . (See, Commissioners' Note t o S e c t i o n 14. ) I n t h i s c a s e t h e i n i t i a l custody d e c r e e granted t h e c h i l d t o her mother. A t t h a t p o i n t C a l i f o r n i a became t h e " p r i o r s t a t e " and p e t i t i o n s f o r modification w e r e t o be addressed t o its c o u r t s , a s w a s t h e f a t h e r ' s p e t i t i o n . The f a t h e r ' s p e t i t i o n , however, d i d n o t g i v e t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e c h i l d ' s custody because of t h e f a i l u r e t o n o t i f y t h e persons who had p h y s i c a l custody of her. The f a t h e r had a duty t o n o t i f y t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t t h a t persons n o t p a r t y t o h i s a c t i o n f o r modification had p h y s i c a l custody of t h e c h i l d , Section 9 ( a ) (3) UCCJA, Cal .Civ.Code s e c t i o n 5158 (1) (c) , and t h a t c o u r t w a s r e q u i r e d t o o r d e r t h o s e persons t o be joined as p a r t i e s and t o n o t i f y them of t h e pending a c t i o n . Section 10 UCCJA, Cal.Civ.Code s e c t i o n 5159. The f a t h e r has maintained throughout t h i s a c t i o n t h a t t h e proper forum i n which t o hear t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s p e t i t i o n i s t h e Los Angeles County Superior Court, y e t he neglected t h e mandatory procedures by which t h e a u n t and uncle would have been made p a r t i e s t o t h e C a l i f o r n i a a c t i o n which he commenced i n 1975. N o w he argues t h a t t h e matter must be heard once again i n C a l i f o r n i a . W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e UCCJA r e q u i r e s such a r e s u l t . O r d i n a r i l y i f a s t a t e which has e n t e r e d a decree s t i l l has j u r i s d i c t i o n under S e c t i o n 3 of t h e A c t , s e c t i o n 40-4-211 MCA, i t s c o u r t s must be looked t o ahead of t h e c o u r t s of another s t a t e which subsequently g a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Thus, w e must i n q u i r e whether C a l i f o r n i a s t i l l has j u r i s d i c t i o n under Section 3. P l a i n l y it does n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n under Section 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) because C a l i f o r n i a i s no longer t h e c h i l d ' s home state. Nor does it have j u r i s d i c t i o n under Section 3 ( a ) ( 3 ) because t h e c h i l d i s n o t p r e s e n t i n C a l i f o r n i a , o r under Section 3 ( a ) ( 4 ) because t h e Montana c o u r t has assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n under f a c t s which meet S e c t i o n 3 ( a ) ( 3 ) . The only remaining s e c t i o n i s 3 ( a ) ( 2 ) , s e c t i o n 40-4-211 (1) (b) MCA: "A c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e competent t o decide c h i l d custody m a t t e r s has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a c h i l d custody determination by i n i t i a l o r modification decree i f : " (b) it i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n because: " ( i ) t h e c h i l d and h i s p a r e n t s o r t h e c h i l d and a t l e a s t one c o n t e s t a n t have a s i g n i f i c a n t con- nection with t h i s s t a t e ; and " ( i i ) t h e r e i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s state s u b s t a n t i a l evidence concerning t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and personal r e l a t i o n - s h i p s . " The Oregon Supreme Court r e c e n t l y considered whether t h e c o u r t s of Indiana w e r e t h e more a p p r o p r i a t e forum f o r r e s o l u t i o n of a custody d i s p u t e under t h i s s e c t i o n i n a c a s e i n which Indiana had entered t h e f i r s t decree. The mother had secreted two c h i l d r e n ages 4 and 8 away from t h e i r f a t h e r who was s t i l l i n Indiana. Some months a f t e r they had l e f t Indiana, she p e t i t i o n e d an Oregon c o u r t f o r a modifi- c a t i o n of t h e Indiana decree. I t w a s n o t u n t i l t h e c h i l d r e n had been away from Indiana f o r eighteen months t h a t t h e Oregon c o u r t heard t h e case. The Supreme Court observed t h a t t h e passage of t i m e had eliminated any " s i g n i f i c a n t connection" with Indiana t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n had once had: ". . . a t t h e t i m e of t h e hearing by t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h e c h i l d r e n had no s i g n i f i c a n t connection with Indiana because of t h e length of t i m e they had been away. I n t h e l i v e s of c h i l d r e n 4 and 8 years of age, 18 months i s a long time." Mar- r i a g e of S e t t l e (1976), 276 O r . 759, 556 P.2d 962, 966. I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e passage of time has c r e a t e d an i d e n t i c a l l o s s of " s i g n i f i c a n t connection" between t h e c h i l d and C a l i f o r n i a . She was f i v e years of age when she was l e f t with her Montana r e l a t i v e s . Two years had passed by t h e t i m e of t h e hearing, and nearly two more have s i n c e elapsed. A s t h e Oregon Supreme Court noted, j u r i s d i c t i o n under Sec- t i o n 3 ( a ) ( 2 ) e x i s t s only when it is i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d because t h e c h i l d and i t s p a r e n t s have a s i g n i - f i c a n t connection w i t h a s t a t e and t h e r e i s "optimum a c c e s s t o r e l e v a n t evidence." S e t t l e , 556 P.2d a t 966. See a l s o , Commissioners' Note, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 107-08 (1973). I n t h i s case t h e r e i s n e i t h e r . C a l i f o r n i a does n o t now have j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e A c t and d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e hearing i n August 1977. Thus, t h e District Court w a s f r e e t o e n t e r a new custody o r d e r . The second p r i n c i p l e i s s u e r a i s e d by t h i s appeal i s whether t h e District Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by termina- t i n g t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of t h e f a t h e r and mother. There i s more than s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t a n t i a l , c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s and judgment of t h e D i s - trict Court i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s . The concern has been advanced t h a t t h e f a t h e r was n o t e q u a l l y c u l p a b l e . I t i s undisputed t h a t he had misrepresented h i s a s s e t s t o t h e Superior Court and thereby reduced h i s p o t e n t i a l s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . It i s a m a t t e r of record t h a t t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t was forced t o t h r e a t e n t h e f a t h e r w i t h a contempt c i t a t i o n t o induce him t o provide f o r h i s c h i l d . These matters i n themselves have n o t been thought t o j u s t i f y a termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . See Matter of J.L.B. (1979), Mont . , 594 P.2d 1127, 1135, 36 St.Rep. 896, 906- - 07. Nor may t h e abuse o r n e g l e c t which t h e mother and h e r boyfriend may have shown be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a t h e r . Matter of T.E.R. (19791, Mont. , 590 P.2d 1117, 1121, 36 St.Rep. 276, 281. W e f i n d , however, two circumstances t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y s u p p o r t i v e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t t h e f a t h e r had neglected h i s minor c h i l d . F i r s t , t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o n o t i f y t h e juvenile a u t h o r i t i e s concerning t h e p l i g h t of h i s daughter. According t o t h e f a t h e r ' s mother, t h e c h i l d repeatedly complained of abuse by her mother's boyfriend over a period of a t least one and one-half years. One of t h e a t t o r n e y s consulted by t h e f a t h e r , M r . Gewirtz, advised him t o n o t i f y t h e juvenile a u t h o r i t i e s , b u t t h e f a t h e r did not. Second, it is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i n May 1975, when t h e mother forced t h e c h i l d o u t of her apartment, t h e c h i l d ' s p a t e r n a l grandmother, n o t her f a t h e r , took c a r e of h e r . The evidence shows t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s grandmother took t h e g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t i n her while she was l i v i n g with her mother. The grandmother, not t h e f a t h e r , kept her a t her home over many weekends. The D i s t r i c t Court found s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e grandmother was t h e p r i n c i p l e f o r c e behind t h e f a t h e r ' s "belated attempts" t o o b t a i n custody of h i s daughter. I t a l s o found t h a t no " v i a b l e parent-child r e l a t i o n s h i p " has ever e x i s t e d between t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d . W e must measure t h e s e f i n d i n g s a g a i n s t some o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a t o determine whether t h e f a t h e r ' s conduct amounted t o neglect and abuse of p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y . "The abuse of p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y i s t h e s u b j e c t of j u d i c i a l cognizance i n a c i v i l a c t i o n brought by t h e c h i l d o r by i t s r e l a t i v e w i t h i n t h e t h i r d degree o r by t h e county commissioners of t h e county where t h e c h i l d r e s i d e s . When t h e abuse i s estab- l i s h e d , t h e c h i l d may be f r e e d from t h e dominion of t h e p a r e n t and t h e duty of support and educa- t i o n enforced." Section 40-6-233 MCA. I n t h e absence of standards d e f i n i n g abuse i n t h i s s e c t i o n , we r e f e r t o t h e standards contained i n Chapter 3 of T i t l e 4 1 on c h i l d abuse, neglect, and dependency. Section 41-3-102 ( 2 ) MCA provides: "'Abuse' o r ' n e g l e c t ' means: " ( a ) t h e commission o r omission of any a c t o r a c t s which m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal p h y s i c a l o r emotional development of a youth. Any exces- s i v e p h y s i c a l i n j u r y , sexual a s s a u l t , o r f a i l u r e t o t h r i v e , t a k i n g i n t o account t h e age and medi- c a l h i s t o r y of t h e youth, s h a l l be presumed t o be nonaccidental and t o m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal development of t h e youth. " ( b ) t h e commission o r omission of any act o r a c t s by any person i n t h e s t a t u s of p a r e n t , guard- i a n , o r custodian who thereby and by reason of p h y s i c a l o r mental i n c a p a c i t y o r o t h e r cause re- f u s e s o r , w i t h s t a t e and p r i v a t e a i d and a s s i s t a n c e , i s unable t o d i s c h a r g e t h e d u t i e s and responsibi- l i t i e s f o r proper and necessary s u b s i s t e n c e , educa- t i o n , medical, o r any o t h e r c a r e necessary f o r t h e y o u t h ' s p h y s i c a l , moral, and emotional well-being." W e h e l d i n Matter of J . L . B . , 594 P.2d a t 1136, 36 St.Rep. a t 908, t h a t p a r e n t a l d e f i c i e n c i e s by themselves, a b s e n t some harm t o t h e c h i l d , a r e an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s upon which t o terminate p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e c h i l d was undoubtedly harmed, although n o t d i r e c t l y and s o l e l y by her f a t h e r . Y e t , he knew of h i s d a u g h t e r ' s circumstances and d i d nothing t o i n t e r v e n e on her b e h a l f . A c h i l d i n h e r p o s i t i o n has a r i g h t t o e x p e c t more. The f a t h e r ' s argument t h a t t h e c o u r t s of C a l i f o r n i a would n o t modify t h e o r i g i n a l custody without proof of t h e c h i l d ' s mistreatment wears t h i n i n l i g h t of t h e f a t h e r ' s f a i l u r e t o even n o t i f y t h e j u v e n i l e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t something was wrong. The f a t h e r ' s a t t e m p t t o blame t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t system f o r h i s own f a i l u r e t o seek a i d f o r h i s c h i l d f o r more than a year w i l l n o t s u f f i c e . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e f a t h e r had abused h i s p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y by n e g l e c t i n g and abandoning h i s c h i l d under t h e s e circum- s t a n c e s . W e do n o t f i n d t h i s t o be an abuse of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n t o weigh t h e evidence b e f o r e it and a r r i v e a t a " c l e a r and convincing" view of t h e f a c t s . See Matter of J.L.B., 594 P.2d a t 1136, 36 St.Rep. a t 908-09. The f i n a l i s s u e presented i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court had a u t h o r i t y t o name t h e c h i l d ' s a u n t and uncle a s her g e n e r a l guardians. The f a t h e r contends t h a t t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s complaint d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t t h e c r e a t i o n of a guardianship and t h e r e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court could n o t name them as guardians. W e do n o t agree. The complaint f i l e d i n t h i s a c t i o n sought: (1) To t e r m i n a t e t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ; (2) t o award f u l l c a r e and custody of t h e c h i l d t o h e r a u n t and uncle; ( 3 ) t o o b t a i n a r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e mother's boyfriend t o prevent him from molesting t h e c h i l d ; and, ( 4 ) f o r such o t h e r r e l i e f a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court deemed proper. The D i s t r i c t Court c l e a r l y had power t o a u t h o r i z e a guardianship, t h e e f f e c t of which g i v e s t h e c o u r t continuing supervisory a u t h o r i t y over t h e a u n t and u n c l e ' s c a r e and p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e c h i l d , under t h e f o u r t h paragraph of t h e p r a y e r f o r r e l i e f . Rule 5 4 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p a r t : "Except a s t o a p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a judgment i s e n t e r e d by d e f a u l t , every f i n a l judgment s h a l l g r a n t t h e r e l i e f t o which t h e p a r t y i n whose f a v o r it i s rendered i s e n t i t l e d , even i f t h e p a r t y has n o t demanded such r e l i e f i n h i s plead- i n g s . " See, Smith v. Zepp (1977), - Mont. , 567 P.2d 923, 930, 34 St.Rep. 753, 762; 10 C. Wright & A. M i l l e r , Federal P r a c t i c e and Procedure, 92662 a t 96-97. The s t a t u t e under which p l a i n t i f f s proceeded, s e c t i o n 61-111, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-233 MCA, c l e a r l y g i v e s t h e District Court j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s : ". . . and when t h e abuse i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e c h i l d may b e f r e e d from t h e dominion of t h e p a r e n t . . ." Upon t h e proper termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s , a D i s t r i c t Court i s empowered t o name a s u i t a b l e guardian of a n unmarried minor. S e c t i o n 72-5-222 MCA. See Guardianship of Aschenbrenner (1979) , Mont. P I - P.2d I 36 St.Rep. (No. 14610, decided J u l y 16, 1979). The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e C Q d W k 4 - , L d y , , J u s t i c e s