Title: Conyers v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Clarence Conyers, Jr. v. State of Maryland - No. 39, 1996 Term
CRIMINAL LAW -- Convictions affirmed, death penalty sentence
reversed and remanded for new sentencing hearing.  Doctrine of
verbal completeness did not require admission of a second oral
statement made by a witness after the state introduced the first
statement.  Joinder of two murder prosecutions was proper. 
Sentencing -- Admission of juvenile record listing eighteen
juvenile charges, when a finding of delinquency had only been made
on seven of the eighteen charges and six of the charges were nol
prossed, dismissed, etc. and where the State's attorney referred to
defendant's "extensive history of criminal type behavior," was
inflammatory and highly prejudicial and necessitated a new
sentencing hearing.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County 
Case #96CR0460
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 39
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
CLARENCE CONYERS, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed: May 8, 1997           
      
This direct appeal comes to us pursuant to Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 414(a).  Appellant, Clarence
Conyers, Jr., was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County of premeditated murder, felony murder, first-degree
burglary, robbery with a deadly weapon, attempted robbery with a
deadly weapon, robbery, attempted robbery, and use of a handgun in
the commission of a crime of violence with respect to Wanda
Johnson.  He was also convicted of premeditated murder and use of
a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence with respect to
Lawrence Bradshaw.  Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder
of Ms. Wanda Johnson and to life without the possibility of parole
for the murder of Mr. Bradshaw.  Appellant presents ten issues for
review, and he asks this Court to grant him a new trial or, in the
alternative, a new sentencing hearing.
I. 
At approximately 9:35 p.m. on Friday, October 21, 1994,
Appellant's estranged girlfriend, Monica Wilson, went to visit her
mother, Wanda Johnson, at the home Ms. Johnson shared with her
husband, Elwood Johnson.  Ms. Wilson had just spoken with her
mother at 9:00 p.m. that evening, and her mother had agreed to
babysit for Ms. Wilson's son.  Arriving with Ms. Wilson at the
Johnson home was her cousin, Carla Clinton.
As the two women approached the Johnson home, they saw someone
looking outside through a second floor bedroom window.  The women
-2-
knocked on the door, and, as they waited for someone to open it,
they saw through a window a man walking down the stairs.  The women
saw this man turn off the lights inside the house and duck down as
if to avoid being seen.  The two women walked to a back door and
knocked on it.  The women heard sounds of a struggle, described as
"a commotion," "tussling" and "fighting," coming from inside the
house.  Then Ms. Johnson began to scream, and a window on the
second floor broke over the women's heads.  
The two women fled to the home of a relative who lived nearby
and called the police.  On the way to the relative's house, Ms.
Wilson noticed a car parked across the street from her mother's
house.  The car resembled one that Appellant sometimes borrowed
from his former girlfriend and mother of his child, Debra Meyers.
Upon returning to the Johnson home, Ms. Wilson was informed by the
police that her mother was dead.
There were no signs of forced entry into the Johnson home.
Wanda Johnson's body was found in the master bedroom.  She had been
shot three times in the head, once in the back, and once in the
arm.  It was Ms. Johnson's custom to keep a small amount of money
in her wallet.  Furthermore, when Ms. Wilson spoke to Ms. Johnson
earlier that evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Ms. Johnson said
that she had twenty dollars.  Ms. Johnson's open wallet was found
atop her dresser in the master bedroom; there was no money in the
wallet.
In the den, a door to a closet had been forced open, revealing
-3-
a safe.  The closet door had a hasp and a lock on it for security,
but the hasp and lock had been pried out of the door jamb to gain
access to the closet.  Pulling the hasp out of the door jamb had
caused splinters to fall on the floor around the closet.  The safe
inside the closet was closed.  Mr. Johnson opened the safe the day
after his wife's murder; it contained fifteen dollars.
The next day, Ms. Clinton worked with a police artist on a
sketch of the man she had seen on the staircase inside the Johnson
home the evening before.  Ms. Wilson was asked to look at the
sketch that had been made based on Ms. Clinton's description.
Appellant, who had come to the police station to keep Ms. Wilson
company, took the sketch away before Ms. Wilson had a chance to see
it, telling the police that the sketch would upset her.  When Ms.
Wilson finally had a chance to see the police sketch, she did not
immediately identify Lawrence Bradshaw as the man depicted in the
sketch.  She made a photo identification of another man, who was
arrested and incarcerated for a brief time as a result.  Ms. Wilson
later agreed, however, that the police sketch looked like Lawrence
Bradshaw.
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on October 23, 1994, approximately 27
hours after the murder of Ms. Johnson, Lawrence Bradshaw was shot
in the 4300 block of McDowell Lane.  This street is located in the
Lansdowne area, near Debra Meyers's home.  Mr. Bradshaw had been
shot three times in the head, once in the back, once in the arm,
and once in the finger.  Mr. Bradshaw was taken to Shock Trauma,
-4-
where he died the following day.
Appellant was charged with both the Johnson and the Bradshaw
murders.  With regard to Ms. Johnson, Appellant was charged with
premeditated murder, felony murder, first-degree burglary, robbery
with a deadly weapon, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon,
robbery, attempted robbery, and use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence.  With regard to Mr. Bradshaw, Appellant was
charged with premeditated murder and use of a handgun in the
commission of a crime of violence.
At trial, Ms. Wilson testified that she and Appellant had been
romantically involved for approximately two years and that they had
lived together from February 1994 until October 1994.  She moved
out of the house in October of 1994 because her relationship with
Appellant had become "real violent."  She returned to the home she
had shared with Appellant frequently, however, and she often saw
Bradshaw there.  
Ms. Wilson explained that Appellant was a frequent and welcome
guest in the home of Wanda and Elwood Johnson.  She testified that
she told Appellant about the safe in the Johnsons' upstairs closet.
Appellant also knew that Ms. Johnson was usually out of the house
on Friday evenings.  Ms. Wilson testified that her mother often
spent entire weekends babysitting for Keion, Ms. Wilson's son.  At
some time before her murder, however, Ms. Johnson's routine changed
and she was no longer able to babysit for Keion on the weekends.
Ms. Wilson testified that she often complained to Appellant that
-5-
because of Ms. Johnson's new routine, Ms. Wilson did not have a
weekend babysitter.
Ms. Wilson testified that she spent the night of her mother's
murder at the apartment she used to share with Appellant; that
sometime during the next day, Lawrence Bradshaw called the
apartment to speak to Appellant, who was not at home; that when Ms.
Wilson gave Appellant the message that Mr. Bradshaw had called,
Appellant became angry, and he said:  "[H]ow the F did he get my
phone number[?]  What is he doing calling here?  I don't know why
he would call here."  Ms. Wilson also testified that the day after
the murder, October 22, Appellant would change the television
channel whenever the news of Ms. Johnson's murder was being
broadcast.
Wanda Johnson and Lawrence Bradshaw were both shot with a .38
caliber handgun.  Ms. Wilson testified that Appellant owned two .38
caliber handguns and that she had seen and held one of those
handguns when she lived with Appellant.  Ms. Wilson explained that
Appellant occasionally stored that handgun in a Charlie Rudo bag.
Ms. Wilson never saw the second gun, but she was told about it by
Appellant while he was incarcerated for the Johnson and Bradshaw
murders.
Debra Meyers testified that on the evening of October 21, the
night of Ms. Johnson's murder, Appellant came to Ms. Meyers's house
between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., shortly after the time of the murder,
and asked to leave a Charlie Rudo bag at her house.  Ms. Meyers
-6-
agreed.  She returned the bag to Appellant the following day,
October 22, at his request.  The State theorized that the bag
contained the gun that had been used to commit one or both of the
murders, but, after being given a gun to hold at trial, Ms. Meyers
testified that the bag she held for Appellant did not weigh enough
to contain a gun and that, when dropped, the bag did not sound as
if it contained a gun.
Ms. Meyers also testified that in the early hours of October
23, shortly before Mr. Bradshaw was killed, Appellant and Mr.
Bradshaw, whom Appellant introduced as "Molek," arrived at Ms.
Meyers's house, 4236 Twin Circle Way, and stayed for twenty
minutes.  A short time after the two men left Ms. Meyers's house,
she heard gunshots.  Appellant returned to Ms. Meyers's house,
alone, after the gunshots were fired, and left a few minutes later.
One witness, who lived at 4245 Twin Circle Way, testified that she
saw someone running down the street and into a neighbor's house
shortly after hearing gunshots at approximately 1:15 a.m.  The
witness knew only that the neighbor's first name was Debbie.
One of the policemen who arrived at the scene of the Bradshaw
murder, David Kruger, was a member of the K-9 unit.  After ensuring
that the crime scene had not been contaminated, he followed his
canine partner, Hero, who had picked up a scent, from the crime
scene to Debra Meyers's home.
Charles Johnson, who is not related to the murder victim,
Wanda Johnson, was Appellant's cellmate for approximately one month
-7-
in 1994.  Charles Johnson testified that, while they shared a cell,
Appellant had confessed to committing the two murders.  Charles
Johnson seemed to know many of the details of the killings,
including details that had not been released to the media and that
could not have been learned by reading Appellant's papers in their
shared jail cell.  According to Charles Johnson, Appellant stated
that he had borrowed his daughter's mother's car to go with
Bradshaw to Wanda Johnson's home to rob a safe that was kept in the
closet.  While the men were upstairs, they heard a knock at the
door, and Bradshaw went downstairs to be sure that no one could get
into the house.  Bradshaw walked down the stairs, turned out the
lights and ducked down to avoid being seen.  Appellant then heard
Ms. Wilson at the back window.  When Ms. Johnson called out her
daughter's name, Appellant panicked and shot Ms. Johnson in the
head, behind the right ear.  Bradshaw left the scene immediately,
but Appellant waited until Ms. Wilson left.  Appellant later shot
Bradshaw because he was a witness to the robbery and shooting of
Wanda Johnson.  Cellmate Johnson knew that Bradshaw had been shot
three times and that he had been shot near some woods.
Appellant's parents and two sisters testified that Appellant
had been with them before and during the time Wanda Johnson was
killed, but in earlier statements made to the police, one sister
stated that she had seen Appellant only briefly on the night of Ms.
Johnson's murder, and the other sister stated that she did not see
Appellant until he had returned from the police station that night.
-8-
The jury convicted Appellant on all counts and sentenced him
to death for the murder of Wanda Johnson. Appellant was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the
murder of Lawrence Bradshaw.  The remaining counts were resolved by
merger or received lesser sentences.   
Additional facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal
will be provided as needed.
II.
The first issue is whether the trial court erred when it
refused to admit a statement, attributed to Appellant, that someone
other than Appellant was in possession of his guns on the night of
Ms. Johnson's murder.  Appellant contends that the statement should
have been admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness.
During the State's examination of Monica Wilson, she testified
that Appellant owned two .38 caliber handguns.  Ms. Wilson
testified that she had seen and held one of the guns while she and
Appellant lived together, and that she learned that Appellant owned
a second gun during a telephone conversation they had shortly after
Appellant was incarcerated for Ms. Johnson's murder.  Ms. Wilson
also testified that Appellant sometimes stored one of his guns in
the Charlie Rudo bag that was introduced as State's Exhibit 24.
This testimony tended to support the State's theory that Appellant
hid a gun at Debbie Meyers's house on the evening of Ms. Johnson's
murder.
-9-
During cross-examination, Appellant attempted to elicit
testimony from Ms. Wilson concerning another conversation she had
had with Appellant while he was incarcerated; the substance of that
conversation was that Appellant had given his guns to Mr. Bradshaw
sometime before the two murders occurred:
"Q.
With reference to the two guns, ma'am,
you had indicated you were aware that Clarence
Conyers had owned two guns during the time you
lived with him, am I correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you had a conversation at some point
with him as to where those guns were, is that
correct?
A.
I had a conversation with him ... stating
that he had two guns, not where they were,
that he had two guns.
Q.
Did there ever come a time where you
discussed with him where are those guns and
specifically where were they on the night that
your mother was killed?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And did he not tell you --"
At this point the State objected on the ground that the statement
about to be produced was hearsay.  Appellant argued that, under the
doctrine of verbal completeness, the court was required to admit
this exculpatory hearsay statement to balance the effect of the
inculpatory hearsay statements elicited during Ms. Wilson's direct
examination.
Maryland's doctrine of verbal completeness is partially
codified, at least as to timing, in Maryland Rule 5-106, which
-10-
reads:
"When part or all of a writing or
recorded statement is introduced by a party,
an adverse party may require the introduction
at that time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously
with it."
This rule allows certain writings or recorded statements to be
admitted earlier in the proceedings than the common law doctrine of
completeness.  See Md. Rule 5-106, Committee Note.  Maryland Rule
5-106 does not change the requirements for admissibility under the
common law doctrine or allow the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence, "except to the extent that it is necessary,
in fairness, to explain what the opposing party has elicited."  Id.
In such a circumstance, the evidence is offered merely as an
explanation of previously-admitted evidence and not as substantive
proof.  Id.  In the present case, Ms. Wilson's statement concerning
the location of the Appellant's guns on the night of the Johnson
murder was not offered by Appellant contemporaneously with Ms.
Wilson's statement, admitted by the State, that Appellant owned two
guns.  Thus, the issue is not one of timing and Md. Rule 5-106 is
not applicable.  
The issue of primary concern in the present case is the
admissibility of Ms. Wilson's second statement under the common law
doctrine of completeness.  The doctrine allows a party to respond
to the admission, by an opponent, of part of a writing or
-11-
conversation, by admitting the remainder of that writing or
conversation.  Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 598 A.2d 180
(1991).  The requirements of the doctrine of completeness were
first set forth by this Court in Feigley v. Balto. Transit Co.:
"`"This right of the opponent to put in
the remainder is universally conceded, for
every kind of utterance without distinction;
and the only question can be as to the scope
and limits of the right.
* * *  In the definition of the limits of
this right, there may be noted three general
corollaries of the principle on which the
right rests, namely:
(a) No utterance irrelevant to the issue
is receivable;
(b) No more of the remainder of the
utterance than concerns the same subject, and
is 
explanatory 
of 
the 
first 
part, 
is
receivable;
(c) The remainder thus received merely
aids in the construction of the utterance as a
whole, and is not in itself testimony.'"
(Emphasis omitted).
211 Md. 1, 10, 124 A.2d 822, 827 (1956)(quoting 7 Wigmore, EVIDENCE,
§ 2113 (1940)).  The doctrine is further limited in that the
remainder of a writing or conversation sought to be introduced must
not be irrelevant and should be excluded if "the danger of
prejudice outweighs the explanatory value."  Richardson, 324 Md. at
622-23, 598 A.2d at 185 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 56 (E. Cleary
ed., 3d ed. 1984)).
Neither party has cited, nor have we found, a case in this
-12-
Court or in the Court of Special Appeals that has, under the
doctrine of completeness or Md. Rule 5-106, admitted a writing or
statement that was not the remaining part of a single writing or
conversation.  In an appropriate circumstance, however, the
doctrine would permit the admission of a separate writing or
conversation to place in context a previously-admitted writing or
conversation.  
An example of such a case is State v. Baca, 902 P.2d 65 (N.M.
1995).  In that case, Baca appealed his convictions for the murder
of his wife, Geraldine, and the attempted murder of his daughter,
Renee.  Baca, 902 P.2d at 67-68.  At trial, the State introduced
into evidence Renee's statement, made during a therapy session with
social worker David Breault, that she was afraid of dogs because
she was bitten by a dog in the house where "they killed me."  Baca,
902 P.2d at 69.  The use of the word "they" tended to bolster the
State's theory that two men, Baca and Sergio Flores, a friend of
the Baca family, killed Geraldine and attempted to kill Renee.
Baca, 902 P.2d at 68-69.
Baca objected to the admission of the statement made during
the Breault therapy session as hearsay, and, in the alternative,
asked to introduce contemporaneously a video tape of Renee's later
therapy session with therapist Judith Fuhrer.  Baca, 902 P.2d at
69.  In that session, Renee used the phrase "they killed me"
several times, but each time Renee was asked who "they" were, she
-13-
answered "Huero."  Id.  "Huero" was Flores's nickname.  Baca, 902
P.2d at 68.  Baca argued that, under the rule of completeness, the
second statement should be admitted into evidence to explain or
place into context the evidence admitted by the State, although it
derived from a separate conversation.  See Baca, 902 P.2d at 72.
The trial court excluded the evidence as inadmissible hearsay.
Baca, 902 P.2d at 69.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico conceded that whether the
second statement was admissible may have been moot because the
first statement was erroneously admitted, either because it was
hearsay not falling within any exception or because it was unfairly
prejudicial.  See Baca, 902 P.2d at 70-72.  Nevertheless, the court
discussed the admission of the second statement under the rule of
completeness "because it illustrate[d] one of the many errors that
occurred and deprived Baca of a fair trial."  Id.
New Mexico's rule of completeness, like Maryland's, allows
courts to admit any writing or recorded statement that should, in
fairness, be considered contemporaneously with a writing or
statement previously introduced by another party.  See Baca, 902
P.2d at 72 (citing SCRA 11-106).  In Baca, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico explained that "Renee's statement, when viewed alone, was
misleading because when Renee said `they' she meant `Huero.'"  Id.
The court held that the video tape should have been admitted to
place in context Renee's use of the word "they" in her first
-14-
statement.  Id.
In the present case, the State's witness, Ms. Wilson,
testified that Appellant owned two .38 caliber handguns.  On cross-
examination, Appellant wished to have Ms. Wilson testify that she
had been told by Appellant that he had given his guns to Mr.
Bradshaw sometime before Ms. Johnson's murder.  We hold that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit the
separate 
hearsay 
statement 
under 
the 
doctrine 
of 
verbal
completeness.  
The State questioned Ms. Wilson about a conversation she had
with Appellant shortly after he was incarcerated.  It is clear from
the testimony reproduced above that, during this conversation, all
Ms. Wilson and Appellant discussed was "that he had two guns, not
where they were...."  Appellant may have been entitled to have Ms.
Wilson testify about other parts of that same conversation under
the doctrine of verbal completeness.  See Richardson, 324 Md. at
622, 598 A.2d at 185; Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 133, 468 A.2d
101, 110-11 (1983).  Appellant acknowledges that the statement that
Appellant sought to elicit took place during a different
conversation between himself and Ms. Wilson.  The doctrine of
completeness allows, and under some circumstances fairness may
require, a court to admit statements from separate conversations.
This is not a case like Baca, however, where the jury clearly could
have been misled by the first statement if not also allowed to
-15-
consider the second, and we cannot hold that the trial judge abused
his discretion in refusing to admit Appellant's second statement
concerning the weapons.
Even if the two statements had been part of a single
conversation, Ms. Wilson's testimony may have been less likely to
be admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness because, when
offered by the appellee, the statement was an admission, but if
offered by appellant, it would be inadmissible hearsay.  Hearsay
has been defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial ..., offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Graves v. State, 334 Md.
30, 36 n.2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2 (1994).  The statement
Appellant made to Ms. Wilson was offered by the State as an
admission.  Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1).  In Maryland, a statement by a
party that is offered against that party is a hearsay exception.
Id.  By contrast, when Appellant tried to introduce his own
statements, they were hearsay.
"An admission ... may be admitted into
evidence at trial when offered against the
declarant.  The same statement, however, is
not admissible if it is offered for the
declarant.  Such statements are inherently
suspect as being self-serving."  (Citation
omitted).  (Emphasis in original).   
Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 656, 498 A.2d 666, 670 (1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986).  The
doctrine of verbal completeness does not allow evidence that is
-16-
otherwise inadmissible as hearsay to become admissible solely
because it is derived from a single writing or conversation.  See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 56 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1991).  
This, however, does not absolutely preclude Appellant from
arguing that the proffered evidence was admissible under the
doctrines of "curative admissibility" and "opening the door."  The
applicability of these two doctrines was never clearly articulated
at trial, but even if they had been, neither doctrine would have
allowed Appellant to introduce Ms. Wilson's second statement into
evidence.  Each doctrine is applicable only in limited and well-
defined circumstances to combat a particular inequity.
  
"Opening the door" and "curative admissibility" are two
doctrines that, in limited circumstances, give a party the right to
introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence.  This Court highlighted
the distinction between the doctrines in Clark v. State, 332 Md.
77, 629 A.2d 1239 (1993).  The doctrine of "opening the door" gives
a party "`the right to introduce evidence in response to (a)
admissible evidence, or (b) inadmissible evidence admitted over
objection....'"  Clark, 332 Md. at 84, 629 A.2d at 1242 (quoting
JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 106(D), at 25 (1989)).
"Opening the door" is a rule of expanded relevancy; it allows the
admission of evidence that is competent, but otherwise irrelevant,
in order to respond to evidence introduced by the opposing party
during its direct examination.  Clark, 332 Md. at 84-85, 629 A.2d
-17-
at 1242-43.  Whether the opponent's evidence was admissible
evidence that injected an issue into the case or inadmissible
evidence that the court admitted over objection, once the "door has
been opened" a party must, in fairness, be allowed to respond to
that evidence.  Clark, 332 Md. at 85, 629 A.2d at 1243.  In other
words, the doctrine makes relevant what was irrelevant before
opposing counsel's direct examination.  Id. ("Generally, `opening
the door' is simply a contention that competent evidence which was
previously irrelevant is now relevant through the opponent's
admission of other evidence on the same issue.")(emphasis added).
In this case, the State was able to put into evidence, during
the direct examination of Ms. Wilson, the fact that Appellant owned
two .38 caliber handguns.  The evidence that Appellant wished to
elicit in response during cross-examination, that he told Ms.
Wilson he had given the guns to Mr. Bradshaw before Ms. Johnson's
murder, was hearsay.  This testimony was indeed inadmissible, but
not because it was irrelevant; the testimony was inadmissible
because it was incompetent.  The "opening the door" doctrine does
not permit the admission of incompetent evidence.  Clark, 332 Md.
at 87, 629 A.2d at 1244.
The "curative admissibility" doctrine, on the other hand, "in
rare instances allows otherwise irrelevant and incompetent evidence
to repair the damage caused by previously admitted [highly
prejudicial] incompetent inadmissible evidence."  Clark, 332 Md. at
-18-
88, 629 A.2d at 1244. This doctrine allows a party to admit
evidence to respond to "`inadmissible evidence admitted without
objection.'"  Clark, 332 Md. at 84, 629 A.2d at 1242 (quoting JOSEPH
F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 106(D), at 25 (1989)).
Appellant's incompetent inadmissible evidence could not be admitted
under this doctrine, however, because the evidence was offered in
response to State's evidence that was competent and admissible.
III.
The second issue Appellant raises is whether the trial court
erred in denying his motion to sever the counts of the indictment
and to obtain separate trials for the Johnson murder and the
Bradshaw murder.  There has been some confusion regarding the law
of trial joinder and severance in Maryland, as was illustrated by
the briefs and oral arguments of counsel in this case.  We wish to
clarify the law in this area before applying the law to Appellant.
In doing so we borrow heavily from Judge Moylan's in-depth analysis
in Solomon v. State, 101 Md. App. 331, 646 A.2d 1064 (1994).
A.
Two related problems fall under the heading of trial joinder
and severance:  when to try multiple defendants in a single trial
("joinder of defendants"), and when to try one defendant on
multiple charges in one trial ("joinder of offenses").  See Md.
-19-
Rule 4-253.  Maryland's Rule on "Joint or Separate Trials" states:
 
"(a)  Joint Trial of Defendants. -- On motion
of a party, the court may order a joint trial
for two or more defendants charged in separate
charging documents if they are alleged to have
participated in the same act or transaction or
in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses.
(b)  Joint Trial of Offenses. -- If a
defendant has been charged in two or more
charging documents, either party may move for
a joint trial of the charges.  In ruling on
the motion, the court may inquire into the
ability of either party to proceed at a joint
trial."
(c) Prejudicial Joinder. -- If it appears that
any party will be prejudiced by the joinder
for trial of counts, charging documents, or
defendants, 
the 
court 
may, 
on 
its 
own
initiative or on motion of any party, order
separate trials of counts, charging documents,
or defendants, or grant any other relief as
justice requires."  
Id.  The present case involves subsection (b), the single trial of
one defendant, Conyers, for two separate offenses:  the first-
degree murder of Ms. Johnson and the first-degree murder of Mr.
Bradshaw.
The watershed case concerning trial joinder is McKnight v.
State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977).  McKnight interpreted Md.
Rule 745, the precursor to Md. Rule 4-253.  280 Md. at 607, 375
A.2d at 553-54.  The cases that preceded McKnight regarded
questions of trial joinder as the province of the trial judge, who
enjoyed broad discretion.  Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 340, 646 A.2d
at 1068.  McKnight was a watershed case because it identified, for
-20-
the first time, a limit on trial judges' discretion to decide
issues of joinder and severance.  Id.
In McKnight, a single defendant charged with multiple
robberies that occurred over a period of one month sought to have
the counts of the indictment severed so that he could have a
separate trial on each charge.  280 Md. at 605-06, 375 A.2d at 552.
The trial judge denied McKnight's motion for severance, and a
single jury trial was held on four criminal informations, each of
which contained eight charges.  McKnight, 280 Md. at 606-07, 375
A.2d at 553.  McKnight was convicted on at least one of the charges
contained in each of the four counts, and he appealed.  See
McKnight, 280 Md. at 607, 375 A.2d at 553.  This Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed
McKnight's convictions.  McKnight, 280 Md. at 616, 375 A.2d at 558.
We explained that joinder of offenses, traditionally, has been
justified on the basis that "a single trial effects an economy, by
saving time and money, to the prosecution, the defendant, and the
criminal justice system."  McKnight, 280 Md. at 608-09, 375 A.2d at
554.  There is a risk, however, that joinder of offenses may be
prejudicial to the defendant.  McKnight, 280 Md. at 609, 375 A.2d
at 554. 
"First, 
he 
may 
become 
embarrassed, 
or
confounded in presenting separate defenses.
Secondly, the jury may cumulate the evidence
of the various crimes charged and find guilt
when, 
if 
the 
offenses 
were 
considered
separately, it would not do so.  At the very
-21-
least, the joinder of multiple charges may
produce a latent hostility, which by itself
may cause prejudice to the defendant's case.
Thirdly, the jury may use the evidence of one
of the crimes charged, or a connected group of
them, to infer a criminal disposition on the
part of the defendant from which he may also
be found guilty of other crimes charged."
McKnight, 280 Md. at 609, 375 A.2d at 554-55.  It was the third
example of prejudice that this Court was most concerned with in
McKnight.  280 Md. at 609, 375 A.2d at 555.  We, therefore,
explained how a judge could avoid such prejudice and ensure that
the jury would not "infer a criminal disposition on the part of the
defendant."  It was in providing this explanation that the
confusion regarding the law of trial joinder began.
We explained that if a judge could determine that the evidence
of any two or more offenses would be mutually admissible, that is,
"evidence of one crime would be admissible at a separate trial on
another charge," then joinder of those offenses would be
permissible because the defendant would not suffer any additional
prejudice as a result of the joinder.  McKnight, 280 Md. at 610,
375 A.2d at 555.  Thus, mutual admissibility became the
precondition for similar offense joinder.  Solomon, 101 Md. App. at
341, 646 A.2d at 1069.
The analysis of mutual admissibility is made by answering a
hypothetical question:  Would evidence of each charge be admissible
in a separate trial of each other charge?  This hypothetical
question, in McKnight, was actually twelve separate questions,
-22-
     The number of analyses of mutual admissibility can be
1
expressed by the formula (n x (n-1)).  When there are two offenses,
A and B, there will be only two analyses of admissibility (2 x 1 =
2), whether A is admissible in B (AB) and whether B is admissible
in A (BA).  When there are three offenses, A, B, and C, there will
be six analyses of admissibility (3 x 2 = 6) AB; AC; BA; BC; CA;
and CB.  In McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977), we
assume that the Court made twelve analyses of admissibility (4 x 3
= 12).
because mutual admissibility in four criminal events involves
several assessments of one-directional admissibility.   See
1
Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 341, 646 A.2d at 1069.  One-directional
admissibility is another name for the common evidentiary
determination of admissibility that is made many times in every
trial.
Whether evidence of one offense would be admissible in a trial
on another offense concerns, by definition, "other crimes"
evidence.  Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 341-42, 646 A.2d at 1069.
"Other crimes" evidence is "evidence that relates to an offense
separate from that for which the defendant is presently on trial."
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989).  In
McKnight, we quoted Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680
(1976), to explain the "other crimes" rule.  280 Md. at 612, 375
A.2d at 556.  In Ross we said:
"The frequently enunciated general rule
in this state ... is that in a prosecution for
a particular crime, evidence which in any
manner shows or tends to show that the accused
has committed another crime wholly independent
of that for which he is on trial, even though
it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant
a
le is merely an
pplication of the policy rule 
initial
f
ence
e
 not present evidence of other crimina
acts
f the accused unless the evidence i
`
e other purpose
an
d
 crime on trial because he is a man o
criminal character.'"  (Citations omitted).
76 Md. at 66
C ORMICK ON VIDENCE
(E.
eary ed., 2d ed. 1972)).  Some of the "other purposes" fo
which "other crimes" evidence may be admitted were discussed i
S
, 101 Md. App. at 353-55, 646 A.2d at 1075-76, but the
o
tained
Solomon
1075-76 (quoting 
, 318 Md. 541, 547, 569 A.2d 657,
 (1
Harris v. State
,
  The 
r
 evidence is 
, 
.  
 created a test
con
 of three procedural steps, that a judge must appl
before
t
,
r
prima facie
exception to the presumptive rule of exclusion, 
, 314 Md.
 634,
n
.
s
 in the other crimes is established by clear an
-24-
convincing
Id.  Finally, the judge must weigh "[t]h
necessity
e
...
ainst any undue prejudice likely to result from its
Faulker, 314 Md. at 635, 552 A.2d at 898.
her evidence that the defendant was involved in "othe
crimes"
e
a
Solomon
1066.  Whether to permit joinder in the interest of judicia
economy, in contrast, is a procedural question that must b
resolved during a pre-trial hearing.  Id.
a court need only consider the 
Faulkner to determine
 admissibility.  If the evidence fits within one of the
ions to the presumptive rule of exclusion, then mutua
admissibility exists.  
S
Faulkner test w
pre-trial
e
accused
g
evidence serves an important evidentiary function during a trial.
, 101
e
court to examine the reliability of the "other crimes" evidence
efore it has a chance to influence the jury.  
  In a pre-trial
jo
 hearing, however, "[a]ll crimes charged, and, therefore,
nable to the possible joinder, are the considered products o
grand 
Id.
Additionally, during the trial of a single charge,
"there
l
char
 that is the centerpiece of the trial
 the so-called `other crime' is merely 
peripheral incident, perhaps never to b
received 
r
t
e situation, by
contrast,
d
a
oinder context,
who
d
which is merely the `other crime?'"
, 101 Md. App. at 344, 646 A.2d at 1070.
S
equired by Faulkner
three way balance in a pre-trial joinder hearing, where a concern
t
fenses
or
endants in a single trial is to save time and money by
 Stevenson v. State, 43 Md. App. 120,
 403 A.2d 812, 818 (1979)(interpreting Md. Rule 745, th
precursor to Md. Rule 4-253), ff'd on other grounds, 287 Md. 504,
13 A.2d 1340 (1980).  Judicial economy is not implicated, however,
crimes"
t
conserve precious judicial resources; neither does rejecting such
ce squander those resources.  The rejection of [`othe
crimes'] evidence at the trial in question will not entail a
additional trial."  
, 101 Md. App. at 346, 646 A.2d at 1071.
of the four offenses charged in McKnight
the 
 test, and we concluded "that the evidence produced ...
-26-
to prove appellant's guilt under each of the four charges would not
have been mutually admissible at separate trials for the same
offenses."  McKnight, 280 Md. at 614, 375 A.2d at 557.  We held
that, under such circumstances, it was error for the trial judge to
deny McKnight's motion to sever:  "We think that a defendant
charged with similar but unrelated offenses is entitled to a
severance where he establishes that the evidence as to each
individual offense would not be mutually admissible at separate
trials."  McKnight, 280 Md. at 612, 375 A.2d at 556. 
McKnight's holding, technically, did not apply to multiple
defendant joinder, but this Court has stated that the McKnight
analysis is also the proper way to determine the propriety of
multiple defendant joinder.  Osburn v. State, 301 Md. 250, 482 A.2d
905 (1984).  It should also be noted that McKnight dealt with the
law of joinder and severance in a jury trial.  The law of trial
joinder in bench trials is more flexible.  A judge has the
discretion to permit joinder of offenses or defendants even if
there is no mutual admissibility of offenses because it may be
presumed that a judge will not transfer evidence of guilt as to one
offense to another offense.  Graves v. State, 298 Md. 542, 546-47,
471 A.2d 701, 703 (1984).
McKnight created the connection between "other crimes"
evidence and joinder that may have caused some confusion ever
since.  In order to reach its holding, that McKnight's offenses
should have been severed, this Court made its own determination of
m
re not
clearly set forth, and the elements of two distinct theories have
 been co-mingled and sometimes misapplied.  In sum, th
analysis of jury trial joinder issues may be reduced to a tes
encompasses two questions:  (1) is evidence concerning the of
or def
n
judicial economy outweigh any other arguments favoring severance?
f the answer to both questions is yes, then joinder of offenses or
ants is appropriate.  In order to resolve question numbe
one, a 
"
a
Faulkner.  If question number one is an
in the negative, then there is no need to address question number
two; 
 mandates severance as a matter of law.
 
This Court must determine whether the trial judge properl
joined two offenses for trial.  As previously mentioned, th
present
n
two separate charges:  the first-degree murder of Ms. Johnson and
he first-degree murder of Mr. Bradshaw.  Because Appellant was to
e tried before a jury, an analysis of the mutual admissibility of
he offenses was required.  The judge made such an analysis, and he
ded that the commission of the Johnson murder would be
-28-
admissible in a trial for the Bradshaw murder and that the
commission of the Bradshaw murder would be admissible in a trial
for the Johnson murder.  The judge's finding on this point was a
legal determination.  Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 338, 646 A.2d at
1067. 
With respect to mutual admissibility, the first step of the
joinder analysis, the judge stated:
"The court believes the murder of Mr[s].
Johnson would be admissible in the trial for
the murder of Mr. Bradshaw, to show motive. 
Mr. Bradshaw was killed supposedly under the
theory of the State to prevent identification.
There is a motive, and I think there is a
mutuality of admissibility in the trial of the
two crimes on the theories as set forth by the
State.
I think [State v. Edison] in 318 Maryland
541 did recognize the consciousness of guilt
theory [in] the severance[-]joinder situation,
and defendant's murder of Bradshaw is evidence
of consciousness of guilt because he allegedly
killed Bradshaw to cover up his guilt in the
murder of Johnson."
The judge determined that evidence concerning the Johnson murder
would be admissible in a trial on the Bradshaw murder because it
would be relevant to show motive.  The Bradshaw murder was,
according to the State's theory, committed to conceal the Johnson
murder.  This Court has repeatedly stated that motive is one of the
"other purposes" that will overcome the presumption of exclusion
that pertains to "other crimes" evidence.  Harris v. State, 324 Md.
490, 501, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (1991); Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552
A.2d at 898; Ross, 276 Md. at 669-70, 350 A.2d at 684.  See also
-29-
Md. Rule 5-404(b).
Evidence concerning the Bradshaw murder, similarly, would be
admissible in a trial on the Johnson murder.  It would be relevant
to show consciousness of guilt by showing that Appellant murdered
the only witness to the Johnson killing.  This Court has held that
consciousness of guilt is an "other purpose" that will overcome the
presumption of exclusion that is attached to "other crimes"
evidence.  State v. Edison, 318 Md. 541, 548, 569 A.2d 657, 660
(1990).  Evidence of escape from confinement or of flight after a
crime is the most common "other crimes" evidence that is offered to
show consciousness of guilt.  See Edison, 318 Md. at 548-49, 569
A.2d at 660-61 (escape from confinement); Hunt v. State, 312 Md.
494, 508, 540 A.2d 1125, 1132 (1988)(flight from crime scene).
Other attempts to conceal involvement in criminal activity have
also been held admissible to show a defendant's consciousness of
guilt, however.  See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 88 Md. App. 173,
594 A.2d 597 (1991)(making false statements); Marshall v. State, 85
Md. App. 320, 583 A.2d 1109 (destruction of evidence), cert.
denied, 323 Md. 2, 590 A.2d 159 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1047, 112 S.Ct 911, 116 L.Ed.2d 812 (1992); Byers v. U.S., 649 A.2d
279, 286 n.3 (D.C. App. 1994)(threatening witnesses); U.S. v.
Rocha, 916 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1990)(threatening witnesses), cert.
denied, Hinjosa v. U.S., 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057, 114 L.Ed.2d
462 (1991).  Mr. Bradshaw was present at the scene of Ms. Johnson's
-30-
murder and potentially could identify Appellant as Ms. Johnson's
murderer.  Evidence that Appellant was also responsible for Mr.
Bradshaw's murder would be admissible as evidence of Appellant's
consciousness of guilt and as an expression of his attempt to
conceal his involvement in the murder of Ms. Johnson.
The judge then performed the second step of the joinder
analysis.  The following excerpt from the transcript, however,
reveals that the judge may have given the Appellant more than he
was entitled to by lumping together the "other crimes" balance and
the joinder balance.
"I agree that there is a very difficult
balancing issue when we are admitting evidence
of one crime in the trial of another which we
do if we join offenses for trial.  When we
balance judicial economy against prejudice, I
believe there is prejudice to the defendant.
Judicial economy certainly weighs toward
trying them together, but I would not join
these matters for trial for the sake of
judicial economy in light of the prejudice it
would cause the defendant, but the question is
the probative nature of the evidence."
The judge then performed the Faulkner balancing test, weighing the
probative value of the evidence against the prejudice to the
defendant:
"It seems to me that where the evidence
of consciousness of guilt is offered in the
one case, it is very probative, and where in
the other case the evidence of motive, the
motive to kill Bradshaw to silence him is very
probative.  I think that is very probative
evidence.... ***
In 
weighing 
the 
prejudice 
to 
the
-31-
defendant against the probative value of the
evidence, the Court believes that the evidence
would be properly admitted...."
Clearly, the judge did not have to make this assessment; the
balancing test required by Faulkner has no part in a joinder
analysis.
If a judge has determined that the evidence concerning
separate offenses or defendants is mutually admissible then the
evidence would have been admissible against the defendant even if
severance had been granted.  Thus, once a determination of mutual
admissibility has been made, any judicial economy that may be had
will usually suffice to permit joinder unless other non-evidentiary
factors weigh against joinder.  
The balancing test is a discretionary function, and this Court
will only reverse a trial judge's decision to permit joinder if the
decision was a clear abuse of discretion.  The judge found that
some economy could be effected by joining the two offenses for
trial, as evidenced by his statement:  "Judicial economy certainly
weighs toward trying them together...."  We hold that the judge's
decision that the "other crimes" evidence was mutually admissible
was correct and that his decision to permit joinder was not an
abuse of discretion.
IV.
Appellant next argues that the evidence introduced at trial
-32-
was insufficient to sustain his convictions for burglary, robbery,
and robbery with a deadly weapon.  If Appellant is correct as to
all three convictions, his felony murder conviction must be
reversed and his sentence of death based on the aggravating factor
of robbery or attempt to commit robbery must be reversed.  In a
criminal case where the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a
conviction is based is at issue, the constitutional standard of
review is "whether after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt...."  State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 245, 424 A.2d 720, 725
(1981)(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)); Williams v. State, 342 Md.
724, 734, 679 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1996).
We agree that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
Appellant's conviction for burglary of Ms. Johnson's home.  The
essential elements of the crime of burglary are "the breaking and
entering of the dwelling of another at night with the intent to
commit a felony."  Williams, 342 Md. at 734, 679 A.2d at 1112.
Appellant argues that the State failed to prove the element of
breaking, which can be actual, via forced entry, or constructive,
via "artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threats."  Id.
In Williams, this Court reversed a defendant's burglary
conviction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.  342 Md. at
-33-
736, 679 A.2d at 1112.  In that case, the State had produced no
evidence of an actual breaking but had relied, instead, on the
theory of constructive breaking.  Williams, 342 Md. at 735, 679
A.2d at 1112.  Testimony offered at trial indicated that one of the
homeowners was security conscious and that the house was protected
by a security system.  Id.  The State argued that, based on this
evidence, the jury could infer that the homeowners would not have
left their door open and that the appellant had gained entrance
either by opening a door or by fraud or threat.  Id.  This Court
held, however, "that any such inference, without more, is
insufficient to prove a breaking beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.
The evidence of breaking in the present case is, similarly,
insufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for burglary.  As in
Williams, the State failed to produce any evidence of an actual
breaking.  As to a constructive breaking, the State suggested only
that Ms. Johnson was security conscious and always locked her
doors.  Such evidence, however, is insufficient to prove a
constructive breaking.  Id.  Unlike Williams, however, Appellant
was a frequent and welcome visitor in the Johnson home.  Thus,
there is even less evidence upon which a jury could base an
inference that Appellant's entrance into the house was gained by
"artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threats"; he would just as likely
have been invited into the home after knocking on the door.
Appellant's conviction of the crime of burglary must be reversed.
-34-
The same cannot be said of Appellant's convictions for robbery
and robbery with a deadly weapon, however.  The essential elements
of the crime of robbery are "the felonious taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another, from his person or in his
presence, by violence or putting in fear."  West v. State, 312 Md.
197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988).  Robbery with a deadly weapon
is not a separate substantive offense, but if the State can prove
that a defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of a
robbery, the defendant is subject to harsher penalties.  Md. Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 486, 488; see Whack v. State,
288 Md. 137, 140-41, 416 A.2d 265, 266 (1980), cert. denied and
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 990, 101 S.Ct. 1688, 68 L.Ed.2d 189
(1981).  Appellant was convicted of robbery and robbery with a
deadly weapon, and he argues that this conviction must be reversed
because the State failed to prove the element of taking and
carrying away.  We hold that the convictions are supported by
sufficient evidence.
Ms. Johnson regularly kept some money in her wallet, and, on
the night of the crime, Ms. Wilson was told by Ms. Johnson that she
had twenty dollars.  Mr. Johnson testified that when his wife was
at home, her wallet was usually kept in her purse, which was stored
out of sight.  At the scene of the shooting, Ms. Johnson's purse
was found on the floor of her bedroom, and her wallet was found,
opened and empty of cash, on top of her dresser.  From these facts,
we hold that some rational trie
and carrying away of Ms. Johnson's personal property beyond 
reasonable doubt.  
Appellant's conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon shall
 be reversed.  Thus, Appellant's felony murder conviction and
 sentence of death based on the aggravating factor of robbery
V.
 The next issue presented for our review is whether th
admission of evidence that Appellant was involved in offenses
than tho
r
s
calls our attention to three pieces
of
mony, which, he argues, deprived him of a fair trial and
cing hearing especially "in the context of a jury alread
improperly exposed to evidence 
a res
o
sever."  We have previously explained, however, that the decision
o sever offenses for trial is left to the discretion of the trial
Appellant's motion to sever in this case.  See
supra.
ellant first asks this Court to consider a portion o
testimony given by Charles Johnson.  Johnson, who was no relation
to Ms. Johnson, the murder victim, was a cellmate of Appellant's.
-36-
Appellant's counsel recognized, before Johnson was to testify, that
he potentially could introduce irrelevant and damaging evidence.
Thus, Appellant's counsel said:
"[APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, I
want to be very sure the jury does not hear.
I would appreciate your cooperation, sir.
I want to try to avoid a mistrial here.
This Johnson, if allowed to ramble on is going
to interject in this case many, many things
which would be a clear basis for a mistrial."
Counsel for both parties and the court then agreed that the State's
Attorney would help to control Mr. Johnson's testimony by asking
leading questions and that the court would warn Mr. Johnson before
questioning began that he was only to answer the specific questions
asked.  The State's Attorney had a brief discussion with Mr.
Johnson before he took the stand, where he testified to Appellant's
alleged confession to the murder of Ms. Johnson.  The prosecutor
then began to question the witness about the murder of Mr.
Bradshaw:
"[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Now, did you have
[a] conversation about the occurrences or what
happened the next day?
[CHARLES JOHNSON]:  He stated the next
day he believed that Molek [(Bradshaw)] was
described as being at the robbery, and that
his picture was shown on television.  And he
make contact with Molek, and they were
supposed to meet up to hustle, and he picked
Molek up at Molek's house which was near some
woods."
At this point Appellant moved for a mistrial, stating at a bench
conference that the word "hustle" was "street lingo for robberies,"
which was just the type of testimony Appellant sought to preven
from reac
 
Ap
 contends that the court thus admitted "other crimes"
vidence without first performing the required procedural analysis
Faulkner, 
 part II.  Therefore, Appellant argues
tha  this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Generally,
s
inadmissible
r
d
ed the
c
  Ross
684.  The evidence about the "h
for s
o
p
urders
of
e
w
ify and asked innocuous and leading
questi
 of the witness once testimony began.  The prosecution
d in no way have anticipated Johnson's unresponsive answer
Appellant argues, however, that the jury could have been unfairly
prejudiced by the statement.  
his Court has often stated that whether to declare a mistrial
 a decision left to the discretion of the trial judge.  E.g.
Watters v. State
 cert.
enied, 507 U.S. 1024, 113 S.Ct
-38-
trial judge enjoys broad discretion in this area.  Id.  The judge
in the instant case considered Appellant's motion and denied it,
concluding that there was no necessity to declare a mistrial.  
This Court will only disturb a trial court's decision to deny
a motion for a mistrial if the court has abused its discretion, and
it is clear that the accused has been prejudiced.  Johnson v.
State, 303 Md. 487, 516, 495 A.2d 1, 15 (1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986).  We hold that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Appellant's
motion for a mistrial.  We cannot say that Appellant was prejudiced
by the witness's statement that "they were supposed to meet up to
hustle."  The word "hustle" would not necessarily be understood by
the jurors to mean a robbery.  In addition, the reference was brief
and was not repeated.  Furthermore, our decision here is in accord
with other decisions of this Court in which we have held that it
was not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse to
declare a mistrial under circumstances arguably more damaging than
those in the present case.  See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 602
A.2d 677 (1992)(where evidence was admitted that defendant sought
treatment at a hospital, after an attempted suicide, on the night
of the murder and that defendant had been identified in hospital
records under a false name); State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d
88 (1989)(where judge, in front of jury, made sarcastic comment to
defense counsel and mistakenly corrected defense counsel's comment
-39-
that, in a criminal prosecution, the State is an advocate); 
,
3
y left
courtroom
o
communications recorded during the shooting); 
, 310
M
ere witness referred to defendant's
presence
vacated, 
.
Maryland  486 U.S. 1050, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 916, (for
 in light of Mills v. Maryland
8
S
on remand, 
e, 314
d. 111, 549 A.2d 17 (1988)(affirming all judgments of trial court
xcept for sentence of death); Johnson, Jr. v. State
192 A.
y
that the defendant had said to the officer:  "I guess I messed up
Appellant also alleges that he 
of Ms. Wilson's statements.  Although Appellant found nothin
objectionable about these statements at the time they were ma
now contends that the statements in question were "other crimes
evidence admitted without the appropriate procedural analysi
required by 
, supra
s, Ms.
Wilson
e
v
ellant
shared,
of them would do harm to the other.  In the second
ment, Ms. Wilson testified that although Appellant wa
-40-
employed as a tractor trailer driver, he often spent his entire
paycheck on drugs on the day the paycheck was received.  
We think it highly unlikely that Ms. Wilson's statements
prejudiced the jury to such a degree that a new trial or sentencing
hearing would be warranted, but we also point out that Appellant
did not preserve the issue for our review.  Maryland Rule 4-323(a)
states, in part:  "An objection to the admission of evidence shall
be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter
as the grounds for objection become apparent.  Otherwise, the
objection is waived."  Appellant made no such objection until he
drafted his brief to this Court.  Similarly, Md. Rule 8-131(a)
states, in part:
"Ordinarily, the appellate court will not
decide any other issue unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in
or decided by the trial court, but the Court
may decide such an issue if necessary or
desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid
the expense and delay of another appeal."
Thus, there exists a presumption that this Court will not review
any issue that has not been preserved via objection at trial.
Appellant raises one other theory under which this Court might
review the admission of Ms. Wilson's statements despite the lack of
proper preservation.  This Court has said that in the case of plain
error, "that is, error which vitally affects a defendant's right to
a fair and impartial trial," we retain the discretion to provide
appellate review, although the error was unobjected to.  Rubin, 325
-41-
M
(quoting State v. Daughton
206, 210-11, 582 A.2d 521, 523 (1990)).  We have explained
however, that plain error review should only be undertaken wh
error is "compelling, extraordi
assure the defendant of fair tr
See State v. Hutchinson, 287
 198, 203, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).  Such extenuating
find no error if the issue were presented.
VI.
his juvenile record to be admitted to the capital sentencing jury
a
ed to a new sentencing hearing.  We
agree
that 
portions 
of 
Appellant's 
juvenile 
record 
were
nadmissible and should have been excluded.  Because this evidence
 inflammatory and highly prejudicial, we reverse Appellant'
sentence of death and grant a new sentencing hearing.
A.
presentence
e
filed with the court in every capital sentencing proceeding.  Md.
ode (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41 § 4-609(d).  Appellant asked
he court to strike his entire juvenile record from the PSI, or, in
-42-
the alternative, to strike at least "any juvenile incident in which
a finding of delinquency was not made."  The court denied
Appellant's motion.
As a result, the jury was presented with evidence that
Appellant had been charged with eighteen offenses as a juvenile.
PSI at 3-5.  On 10/30/81, he was charged with petty theft, for
which he was placed under informal supervision with no finding of
delinquency.  PSI at 3.  On 2/12/82, Appellant was charged with
assault and battery, robbery, and breaking and entering.  All of
the charges were nol prossed.  PSI at 3.  On 2/4/83, he was charged
with breaking and entering.  He was granted probation without a
finding of delinquency.  PSI at 3.  On 9/21/83, Appellant was
charged with breaking and entering and theft.  He was found
delinquent on both charges and was granted probation.  PSI at 4.
Appellant was charged with breaking and entering on 12/3/83,
2/10/84 and 2/11/84.  The three charges were consolidated in one
proceeding, and Appellant was found delinquent of two counts of
theft and one count of breaking and entering.  He was granted
probation.  PSI at 4.  On 2/16/84, he was charged with breaking and
entering, grand theft, and destruction of property.  Appellant was
found delinquent only of breaking and entering and was granted
probation.  PSI at 4.  On 3/20/84, he was charged with burglary,
but the charge was dismissed.  PSI at 4.  On 4/5/84, he was charged
with assault, but the charge was withdrawn.  PSI at 4.  On 6/1/84,
he was charged with theft, but the charge was nol prossed.  PSI at
4.  On 3/27/85, Appellant was charged with possession of a deadly
weapo
  The weapon had been stolen from a private residence on
 and Appellant was also charged with that theft.  The
and Appellant was found delinqu
He was committed to the Charles Hickey School.  PSI at 5.
T
:
"When
e
investigation, you will see [Appellant's] ...
 juvenile history of criminal type
ehavior, and you will see that
even 
e
deg
 that he was placed at the Hickey
ol or the Maryland Training School as 
result
"
(Emphasis added).
the ei
,
fu
 had actually been nol prossed, dismissed, or
n.  PSI at 3-4.  Appellant first contends that the tria
court erred in submitting to the sentencing jury evidenc
concerning the charges in which
made.  We agree.
T
n a capital sentencing hearing
is
overned by Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §
  "Section 413 is structured to guide the discretion
 in the sentencing authority with `clear and objective
tandards' to ensure that the death penalty is not inflicted in an
ary and capricious manner in violation of constitutiona
-44-
principles."  Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 437, 439 A.2d 542, 560
(1982).  The Maryland Rules of Evidence do not apply in capital
sentencing proceedings.  Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d
223 (1995), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 100 (1996).  Instead, subsection (c)(1) describes the
evidence that shall be admissible in such a sentencing proceeding.
Section 413(c)(1) states:
"(c) Evidence ... (1) The following type of
evidence is admissible in this proceeding:
(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating
circumstance listed in subsection (g) of this
section;
(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating
circumstance listed in subsection (d) of this
section of which the State had notified the
defendant pursuant to § 412 (b) of this
article;
(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal
convictions, 
pleas 
of 
guilty 
or 
nolo
contendere, or the absence of such prior
convictions or pleas, to the same extent
admissible in other sentencing procedures;
(iv) 
Any 
presentence 
investigation
report. However, any recommendation as to
sentence contained in the report is not
admissible; and
(v) Any other evidence that the court
deems of probative value and relevant to
sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a
fair opportunity to rebut any statements."
"In determining the admissibility of evidence under § 413(c)(1),
the five provisions of the section are read together so as to
effectuate 
the 
legislative 
purpose 
of 
delineating 
and
-45-
circum
 the type of evidence admissible in [a capital
Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 525, 495
.2d 1, 20 (1985), cert. denied
L.Ed.2d 907 (1986)(citing 
 v. State, 297 Md. 235, 245-46, 465
 1126, 1132 (1983)).  Thus, this Court has held that an
evidence a trial court wishes to admit under subsection (iv) must
b
 reliable under subsection (v), see
 v. State, 341 Md. 175, 237, 670 A.2d 398, 42
(1995)(holding
n
infractions for which there was no institutional finding of guilt
issible because relevant to sentence and reliable), 
.
denied
Hunt
v.
, 321 Md. 387, 432, 583 A.2d 218, 240 (1990)(holding
nce of defendant's prison infractions contained in PS
admissible
,
cert. denied
and that subsection (v) does not authorize the admission o
evidence that would violate sub
Scott, 297
In 
, this Court considered whether, in a capital
 hearing for premeditated murder, evidence that th
defendant
e
un
 § 413(c)(1).  297 Md. at 242, 465 A.2d at 1130.  The State
 that the evidence at issue was admissible under
-46-
subsection (v).  Scott, 297 Md. at 243, 465 A.2d at 1131.  The
defendant, however, argued that only evidence that the defendant
had been convicted of or had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to
unrelated crimes was admissible.  Id.  We held that subsections (i)
and (iii) prohibited the admission of evidence of unrelated crimes,
in a death penalty case, if the defendant had not either been
convicted of those crimes or entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, Scott, 297 Md. at 246-47, 465 A.2d at 1133, and
explained that subsection (v) did not overcome or negate that
prohibition.  Scott, 297 Md. at 247-48, 465 A.2d at 1133.  We held
that the admission of evidence concerning the two unadjudicated
murder charges constituted reversible error.  Scott, 297 Md. at
252-53, 465 A.2d at 1135-36.
The State, in the present case, contends that this Court's
later decision, Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 568 A.2d 1, cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 805 (1990),
should control our decision.  In Collins, we allowed a defendant's
juvenile record to be included in the PSI that was submitted to the
capital sentencing jury.  318 Md. at 294-95, 568 A.2d at 13-14.
One of the pronouncements this Court made in Collins has been
singled out for attention by the State in the instant case:  "[t]he
only limit placed upon the admissibility of [PSI] reports is in
reference to `any recommendation as to sentence contained in the
report.'"  318 Md. at 295, 568 A.2d at 14.  The State argues that
under 
, a trial court has the discretion to admit a
efendant's entire juvenile record if it is presented as part of a
 but the State overlooks the fact that the record in 
s
consisted only of adjudications.
he defendant's primary basis for challenging the admission of
 juvenile record, in Collins
d
bee  destroyed.  Collins
e
a
 prove the accuracy of the juvenile
record
e
per
 unreliable.  See id.
s
a
Collins, 318 Md. at 295, 568 A.2d at 14.  The ju
record had been part of an earlier PSI, which was incorporated by
r
Collins PSI.
Collins, 318 Md. at 294 n.14, 568
 at 13 n.14.  At the time the earlier PSI was prepared,
ollins's juvenile file had not been destroyed and the presentence
the information.  
  The fact that the juvenile record had since
 destroyed did not make the evidence about the record in th
PSI unreliable. 
Thi  does not mean, however, that any juvenile record is
matically admissible in a capital sentencing hearing merel
because the evidence is contained in a PSI.  Rather, th
presumption
e
information
o
-48-
sentencing ... provided the defendant is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any statements."  Hunt, 321 Md. at 431-32, 583
A.2d at 239.  
Appellant's juvenile record lists eleven charges in which no
finding of delinquency was made.  These mere arrests are not
probative of any issue and should not have been permitted to
influence the jury.  "[E]vidence of an arrest (as distinguished
from actual acts of misconduct) is not relevant, 3A WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, Sec. 980 a [(1970)], and if admitted is not harmless error
because of its potential prejudicial effect upon a jury."  Chenault
v. Director, 28 Md. App. 357, 361, 345 A.2d 440, 443 (1975).  We
hold that it was reversible error to inform this capital sentencing
jury of Appellant's numerous juvenile charges in which there had
been no adjudication resulting in a finding of delinquency, just as
it would be to inform the jury of adult charges in which there had
been no adjudication resulting in a conviction.  See State v.
Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179 (would have been reversible
error to admit evidence of defendant's mere arrests at capital
murder trial, but error was cured by court's jury instruction),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986);
Henry v. State, 273 Md. 131, 147-48, 328 A.2d 293, 303
(1974)(quoting Henry v. State, 20 Md. App. 296, 314, 315 A.2d 797,
807 (1974)(Davidson, J., concurring and dissenting)("[I]t has been
recognized that when they stand alone, bald accusations of criminal
-49-
conduct for which a person either has not been tried or has been
tried and acquitted may not be considered by the sentencing
judge.")); Craddock v. State, 64 Md. App. 269, 494 A.2d 971 (would
have been error for judge to consider mere arrests during
sentencing phase of trial, but judge presumed to know that such
evidence could not be considered and no evidence in record that
judge did consider such evidence), cert. denied, 304 Md. 297, 498
A.2d 1184 (1985); Chenault, 28 Md. App at 360-61, 345 A.2d at 443
(error, in a defective delinquency civil hearing, for judge to
consider evidence of an arrest); Wentworth v. State, 33 Md. App.
242, 364 A.2d 81 (1976)(error, in a defective delinquency civil
hearing, to admit evidence of mere arrests).  
Thus, although information contained in a PSI generally will
be admissible pursuant to § 413(iv), a party may object to the
admission of any information that would not fall within any
subsection of (c)(1), has no relevance, and is unduly prejudicial.
Of the eighteen charges listed on Appellant's juvenile record, a
finding of delinquency had been made on only seven of those
charges.  The remaining eleven charges, in effect, mere arrests,
are analogous to, in the criminal system, charges for which there
has been no conviction or plea of guilty or of nolo contendere.
The admission of such evidence, which is not "of probative value
and relevant to sentence," during Appellant's capital sentencing
hearing violated § 413(c)(1)(iii) and (v).  See Bowers v. State,
-50-
306 Md. 120, 153, 507 A.2d 1072, 1088-89 (1986)(holding explanation
of length of time one might serve under life sentence inadmissible
because not "of probative value and relevant to sentence").
The State contends that if the admission to the jury of the
seven unadjudicated juvenile charges was error, the error was, at
most, harmless.  As this Court explained in Dorsey v. State, 276
Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976), an error may be deemed
"harmless" in a criminal case only if "a reviewing court, upon its
own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the
verdict...."  See also Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 683, 637 A.2d
117, 128-29 (applying Dorsey to evidence admitted at capital
sentencing hearing), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 109, 130
L.Ed.2d 56 (1994).  Otherwise, the reviewing court must reverse.
Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.  In the instant case, we
cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the unadjudicated
juvenile charges in no way influenced the jury to hand down a
sentence of death.  
Appellant was a relatively young man when the jury considered
his sentence.  The majority of the jury's information about
Appellant, therefore, concerned his juvenile years.  By presenting
eighteen charges on the juvenile record, the jury saw what looked
like a continuous stream of misconduct from ages 14 to 18,
amounting to an average of over four offenses per year.
-51-
rmore, some of those unadjudicated charges concerned th
violent offenses of assault, as
fact, Appellant was found delinquent seven times as a juvenil
all of the findings of delinque
By presenting eleven inadmissible, unadjudicated charges, the PSI
presen
 a distorted picture of Appellant's juvenile criminal
to 
n
h
t that
this
istorted juvenile history in no way influenced the jury's
remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.
B.
 leaves seven charges on Appellant's juvenile record i
which a finding of delinquency was made.  Appellant argues tha
this evidence was also inappropriately admitted to the sentencing
jury.
e
cha
 admitted at the new sentencing hearing, we will consider
ppellant's remaining arguments concerning the charges in order to
Appellant argues that the seven
delinquency
r
three
y
cr
 of violence," (2) the record contained inflammatory and
-52-
detailed evidence of the underlying facts surrounding the charges,
and (3) Appellant was not represented by counsel on any of the
charges.
(1)
Appellant first argues that Scott "restricts the type of
evidence relating to other crimes that is admissible ... to
evidence of crimes of violence for which there has been a
conviction." (Emphasis added).  Appellant's Brief at 54, 55
(quoting Scott, 297 Md. at 247, 465 A.2d at 1133).  "Crimes of
violence" is defined in § 413(g)(1), which states, in part:
"As 
used 
in this 
paragraph, 
`crime 
of
violence' means abduction, arson in the first
degree, 
escape, 
kidnapping, 
manslaughter,
except 
involuntary 
manslaughter, 
mayhem,
murder, 
robbery, 
carjacking 
or 
armed
carjacking, or rape or sexual offense in the
first or second degree, or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses, or the use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony or
another crime of violence."
None of the remaining six offenses on Appellant's juvenile record
could be defined as crimes of violence under § 413(g)(1).
Appellant contends, therefore, that evidence concerning these
offenses was inadmissible.  He has considered a lone phrase out of
context, however, and has misconstrued Scott's discussion of §
413(g).  
In Scott, we explained that § 413(c)(1)(i) makes admissible,
in a capital sentencing hearing, any evidence relating to the
mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (g).  297 Md. a
465 A.2d at 1132.  Subsection (g)(1) lists the following miti
circumstances:
"The
n
found
guilty of a crime of violence; (ii)
ntered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to
a ju
f
ju
 entered on a charge of a crime of
We then said of § 413(g)(1):
"
of evidence relating to other crimes that i
admissible to evidence of crimes of violence
for which there has been a conviction.  Thus,
§ 413 (c)(1)(i) establishes a more stringent
standard of relevance for the admission of
evidence relating to other crimes in a death
penalty case than is applied in a nondeath
penalty case.  That section establishes that a
lack of a conviction of a crime of violence is
a mitigating circumstance to be taken into
account and given some weight.  It precludes,
in a death penalty case, the admission of
evidence of crimes of violence for which there
have been no convictions, evidence that may
well result in the mitigating circumstance of
the 
absence 
of 
prior 
convictions 
being
outweighed or, in essence, `wiped out' or
eliminated."  (Emphasis added).
Scott, 297 Md. at 247, 465 A.2d at 1133.
When read in context, it is clear that the phrase quoted by
Appellant relates only to evidence of mitigating circumstances
under § 413(c)(1)(i).  See Johnson, 303 Md. at 529, 495 A.2d at 22
("Section 413(g)(1), through § 413(c)(1)(i), explicitly permits
evidence of past convictions of violent crime....").  Thus, in
Calhoun
, this Court held admissible, in a capital
entencing hearing, evidence of the defendant's misconduct that was
ot a crime of violence as defined in § 413(g).  297 Md. 563, 601,
 A.2d 45, 62-63 (1983)(if charges had been brought, the crime
cert. denied sub nom., 
v. Maryland, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984).
n Grandison
e, in a capital sentencing hearing,
a
ctions
a
olence
as
0
A.2d
s
t
dicial
pr
 narcotics violations, and throwing shaving powder in
Appellant's juvenile adjudicati
offered under § 413(c)(1)(iv), 
is of no consequence that Appellant's adjudicated charges are not
definable as crimes of violence.
In 
, this Court interpreted § 413(c)(1)(iii) to preclude,
 a death penalty case, "inflammatory detailed evidence of th
underlying facts and circumstances surrounding unrelated crimes."
297 Md. at 247, 465 A.2d at 1133; see also Colvin-el, 332 Md. a
-55-
159, 630 A.2d at 732.  Appellant argues that such inflammatory
details were submitted to the sentencing jury in this case.  
At issue are five statements, each one to four sentences in
length, describing some of Appellant's juvenile charges.  Beneath
the 2/4/83 charge of breaking and entering, for which no finding of
delinquency was made, the record reads:  "The defendant and three
juvenile co-defendants were charged in this case with breaking into
a storage room of an apartment complex."  PSI at 3.  Whether or not
this statement reveals "inflammatory" details about the charge, the
description must be redacted from the PSI at Appellant's
resentencing 
hearing 
because, 
pursuant 
to 
part 
(A), 
the
corresponding charge for which there was no finding of delinquency
must be redacted.  
The remaining four statements, however, concern charges for
which there were findings of delinquency.  If these four statements
do not disclose "inflammatory" details, they may be admitted as
part of the PSI during Appellant's resentencing hearing.  Statement
number one, which corresponds to the finding of delinquency on the
9/21/83 charge of breaking and entering and theft, the record
reads:  "Conyers was charged with breaking into a private
residence."  PSI at 4.  Statement number two, which corresponds to
findings of delinquency, made on 4/2/84, on two counts of theft and
one count of breaking and entering the record states:  
"The defendant was charged in the above cases
with three separate Breaking and Enterings.
The 
12/3/83 
offense 
involved 
a 
private
-56-
r
elry, liquor, a
camera,
e
recorder,
e
2
t of jewelry, a
stereo, United States currency, a camera, and
which occurred on 2/11/84 involved the thef
of 
o
cassettes, and jewelry from a private home." 
SI at 4.  As explained above, Appellant was only found delinquent
resulted i
 
T
nile record, which corresponds
t
ng and
e
a co-defendant broke into a private
reside
 and took various items including guns, jewelry, and a
  PSI at 4.  Statement number four, which corresponds to
a deadly weapon, explains:  "The defendant was charged in the
case after a consented search of his residence revealed a saw
shotgun which had been reported stolen from a home on 3/2/85.
at 5.  As we explained above, Appellant was charged with the 
theft, but he was not found delinquent of that charge.
Appellant
Scott'
prohibition against the admission of "inflammatory detaile
evidence
g
unrela
 crimes."  He specifically states:  "Among the more
rejudicial details [contained in the descriptions] were the theft
-57-
of "guns" from one of the residences, and the recovery of a
reportedly stolen sawed-off shotgun from Appellant's residence in
a separate incident."  We disagree that the four descriptions
explaining charges for which Appellant was found delinquent were
"inflammatory" or prejudicial.
The brief descriptions at issue may have been included on the
actual petition under which Appellant was charged.  If they were,
and if the information was accurate, then their submission to the
jury was permissible.  Even if the brief descriptions were not
reflected on the petition under which Appellant was charged,
however, if the descriptions were accurate, their introduction to
the jury would not be prejudicial because the descriptions disclose
little more than was disclosed by the findings of delinquency
themselves.  See Grandison, 305 Md. at 758, 506 A.2d at 617, cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986).
Finally, Appellant concedes that the most damaging detail contained
in the descriptions was likely that guns were stolen on two
occasions, and that detail can hardly be considered "inflammatory."
The brief descriptions corresponding to the juvenile charges in
which Appellant was adjudicated delinquent were admissible.
The fourth statement explains a charge for which there was a
finding of delinquency, but the statement also refers to a theft
for which Appellant was charged but was not found delinquent.  The
words "which had been reported stolen from a home on 3/2/85,"
should be redacted at resentencing because, pursuant to part (A),
the corresponding charge of theft must be redacted.
The la
f
A
unsel,
or
n
Appell
 record that are meant to indicate whether he was
epresented by counsel on his juvenile charges were left blank.  We
at Appellant's new sentencing hearing.
C.
 sum, seven of the eighteen charges listed on Appellant'
juvenile
n
the record were appropriately admitted to the sentencing jury via
 PSI.  All of the remaining charges, however, amount to "mer
arrests," which are not probative or relevant for any purpose
Appellant
s
e
 a new
sentencing hearing.  
ppellant raises several other issues related to the sentence
f death.  Our grant of a new sentencing hearing makes these issues
-59-
VII.
Finally, Appellant argues that Maryland's death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because (1) it requires the defendant
to establish mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence; (2) it requires the defendant to establish that arguably
mitigating circumstances that are not enumerated in the statute
are, in fact, mitigating circumstances; and (3) it requires a death
sentence when aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by
some higher standard.  
We respond with an excerpt from our recent opinion, Perry v.
State, 344 Md. 204, 686 A.2d 274 (1996), pet. for cert. filed (Jan.
9, 1997), wherein Perry's counsel advanced precisely the same
arguments:  
"We have addressed these claims in prior
cases and have rejected each of them.  See
Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 231, 670 A.2d
398, 425 (stating that a similar claim,
`though made time and time again over the
years, has been consistently rejected by this
Court'), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct.
581, 136 L.Ed. 2d 512 (1996); Whittlesey v.
State, 340 Md. 30, 82-83, 665 A.2d 223, 249
(1995)(rejecting 
similar 
constitutional
challenges to Maryland death penalty statute),
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 1021,
134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996); Wiggins v. State,
324 Md. 551, 582-83, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374
(1991)(finding no merit in challenges to
defendantUs 
burden 
regarding 
statutorily
recognized and other mitigating factors and to
burden of proof), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007,
112 S. Ct. 1765, 118 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1992)."  
-60-
Perry, 344 Md. at 247-48, 686 A.2d at 295.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, EXCEPT THE
CONVICTION 
FOR 
BURGLARY IS
REVERSED AND THE IMPOSITION OF
THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR WANDA
JOHNSON IS VACATED.  CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR WICOMICO COUNTY FOR A NEW
SENTENCING PROCEEDING UNDER §
413 OF ART. 27.  COSTS TO BE
EQUALLY DIVIDED.