Title: State v. Walker

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed September 9, 1966.
Petition for rehearing denied October 11, 1966.
*406 Charles R. Cater, La Grande, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Arthur R. Barrows, Deputy District Attorney, Pendleton, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard J. Courson, District Attorney, Pendleton.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and LUSK, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant James Fred Walker was convicted of the crime of burglary not in a dwelling house and appeals.
The facts, in general, are that Miller and Walter Rayborn, brothers, were potato growers in Umatilla County and maintained a potato cellar near Weston, Oregon, where potatoes were stored. The brothers had counted the sacks of potatoes in the cellar on January 28, 1965. On January 30 they counted the sacks and noted that 71 one hundred pound sacks of potatoes were missing. The potatoes were traced to the defendant and he testified he purchased them from a *407 man who called himself Raymond Campbell, who could not be located.
There was no evidence of how entry was made into the potato cellar. There were no openings of sufficient size in the cellar, except swinging front doors which were closed and locked, and there was no evidence that the lock had been picked.
The defendant contends reversible error was committed because the state and the prosecuting witness refused to furnish him with the names and addresses of itinerate workers who had been working for the brothers during the two years prior to the burglary.
After the defendant's arrest, and prior to the trial, the defendant with his attorney called upon Mr. Miller Rayborn and requested the names of the workers. According to the record the following occurred:
Subsequently, and prior to trial, the defendant made a written demand upon the state for inspection and copying of a list of these persons prior to trial. This demand was refused as not a proper demand.
However, prior to the making of the written demand upon the state, the defendant filed in the trial court a motion in part as follows:
Subsequently, and before the matter could be heard by the trial court, the defendant moved to withdraw this motion, which was granted.
To justify defendant's position, he relies upon the federal cases Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L ed2d 215, and Jencks v. United States, 353 US 657, 77 S Ct 1007, 1 L ed2d 1103. These cases do not deal with the question here presented. Jencks deals with the right to inspect documents in the government's possession. Brady deals with the suppression of evidence known to the government to be favorable to the defendant. Here there is nothing to indicate in the slightest that those who had previously worked for the complaining witness knew anything that would be material or relevant in the trial of this case.
Also, in this case it should be noted that the defendant was granted a preliminary hearing. If the *410 names and addresses of those who worked for the Rayborns was thought by the defendant to be important this information could have been obtained at that time.
1, 2. While it is as much the duty of the state to prevent the conviction of the innocent as it is to successfully prosecute the guilty, and the giving of the names would have shown a more cooperative spirit in carrying out the purpose of criminal prosecutions, no error was committed.
It should also be noted that the defendant did not press his demands at the trial. It appears to us that had he believed the names were material he would have insisted upon their production at the trial, and then, if it were made to appear they were material, requested a continuance.
3. The defendant also made the same demand with respect to the lock on the door. The lock was introduced into evidence, and the testimony of both the state and defendant's witness being to the same effect, the defendant was in nowise prejudiced.
The defendant also assigns as error the failure of the trial court to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.
The defendant argues that since the state was unable to prove how the building was entered there is no proof of an unlawful entry, and the lack of proof of an unlawful entry demands an acquittal of the crime of burglary.
4, 5. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish any necessary element of a crime, State of Oregon v. Watts, 208 Or 407, 410, 301 P2d 1035, and, therefore, entry, like any other element of the corpus delicti of the crime of burglary, need not be proven by *411 direct evidence, but may be established by circumstantial evidence.
In this case, in addition to proof of the defendant's possession of the stolen property, the state's evidence disclosed that the sacks of potatoes had been wheeled to the door on a rubber-tired truck kept in the cellar; that a dual-tired truck had left tracks near the entrance to the place where the potatoes were stored and that these tire tracks were of a design that would be made by tires found on defendant's truck.
There was also testimony that defendant had told one witness he was going to Walla Walla on January 28th "to pick up spuds"; another, that he had grown them at home; another, that he had grown them at La Grande and stored them in a cellar; and another, that he had paid for the potatoes in cash and had written a check on his bank account for that purpose, although a bank official testified he had not.
Also, the evidence disclosed that, although the defendant said he paid cash for the potatoes, he had not taken a receipt from the undiscoverable seller.
6. From all of these circumstances a jury could reasonably reach the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had gained access to the cellar by some undiscovered means.
7. The defendant also assigns as error the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury to the effect that evidence of defendant's motive or lack of motive to commit the crime was an important issue to be considered by the jury.
The defendant's requested instruction was erroneous in that it constituted a comment upon the evidence.
8. Motive is but a cause or reason that moves the *412 will and induces action, Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa 555, 167 A 333, an inducement which leads to or tempts the mind to commit an act, People v. Lewis, 275 NY 33, 9 NE2d 765.
9, 10. Motive is not a requisite element of the crime of burglary and it is only when the state attempts to prove motive to bolster its case that an instruction would be at all proper. There is no evidence offered in this case by the state to establish the defendant's motive to commit the crime charged. But even if the state had offered such evidence, then motive is but a circumstance to be considered with other evidence surrounding the commission of the crime and to be given only such weight as the jury deems proper. People v. Garcia, 2 Cal2d 673, 42 P2d 1013.
There was no error in refusing to give the requested instruction.
The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
The newly discovered evidence consists of an affidavit by a Mr. Greenwood. Greenwood was a friend of Bertrand Wardell, and Wardell was working on his automobile in a quonset hut at the same time defendant was working on his truck. The affidavit of Greenwood states that at some time late in the month of January, 1965, he dropped by the quonset hut to visit his friend Wardell; that Wardell was not there, but he saw a large truck that was wet backed in against the rear of defendant's truck, which was dry, and two men were transferring what looked like sacks of potatoes from the backed-in truck to defendant's truck.
11. Motions for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence "are not favored; to the contrary *413 they are viewed with distrust." Lewis v. Nichols, 164 Or 555, 570, 103 P2d 284.
12. There is also a presumption that if due diligence had been exercised the evidence could and would have been discovered before trial. N.W. Ice & Cold Stor. v. Multnomah Co., 228 Or 507, 365 P2d 876; Lewis v. Nichols, supra.
The defendant by affidavit stated:
Mr. Wardell, who was called as a witness for defendant, stated in his affidavit:
13. It is quite evident from the above that defendant was well aware of the fact that from time to time people dropped into the quonset hut where the defendant and Wardell were working. While it may be true that defendant did not know that any of those who dropped in were friends of Wardell, it is quite certain that had inquiry been made of Wardell as to who did occasionally stop at the quonset hut the name of Greenwood would have been mentioned. It does not *414 appear to us that any real diligence was used in this matter.
The defendant also contends there was misconduct in the fact that one of the witnesses, while in the audience, made a disparaging remark concerning testimony of a witness for the defendant that must have been overheard by one of the jurors while in the jury box.
The statement is denied by the witness charged with the misconduct. The trial judge was not impressed with the charge made, nor are we.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.