Title: Broderick v. Wyo Central Fed. Credit Union

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
MARK 
D. BRODERICK,Appellant(Defendant)v.WYO CENTRAL 
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Stephen 
R. Winship of Winship & Winship, P.C., Casper, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Thomas 
M. Hogan, Attorney at Law, Casper, Wyoming
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      In 2005, the Wyo 
Central Federal Credit Union (Credit Union) filed an action in state district 
court against Mark Broderick (Broderick) seeking judgment and foreclosure on a 
note and mortgage on which Broderick had defaulted.  Broderick immediately filed a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition, which stayed the Credit Union’s state court action.   Following the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, which cured Broderick’s original default under the note 
and mortgage but did not discharge the debt, Broderick again defaulted on the 
note.  In 2010, the Credit Union 
amended its original complaint and again sought judgment and foreclosure on its 
note and mortgage.  The district 
court granted the Credit Union summary judgment both on the amount the Credit 
Union demanded as due and owing under the note and on the attorney fees and 
costs it requested pursuant to the mortgage enforcement terms.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Broderick 
presents the following issues on appeal, all of them relating to the award of 
attorney fees and costs:
 
            
1.         
Whether the determination by a state court of an oversecured creditor’s 
attorney fees incurred in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the Preemption 
Doctrine?
 
            
2.         
Whether Appellee should be denied its attorney fees by its failure to 
submit these fees to the Bankruptcy Court for approval?
 
            
3.         
Whether Appellee proved its damages with a reasonable degree of 
certainty?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On July 24, 2003, 
Broderick executed a fifteen-year note by which he agreed to repay the Credit 
Union the sum of $52,000.00, on or before August 1, 2018.  The Note was secured by a Mortgage on 
Broderick’s home executed on that same date.  Broderick defaulted on the Note, and on 
September 26, 2005, the Credit Union filed a Complaint in district court seeking 
judgment and foreclosure on the Note and Mortgage. On September 28, 2005, 
Broderick responded by filing a Notice of Bankruptcy, and the district court 
thereafter stayed the state court action until resolution of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  
 
[¶4]      On January 16, 
2008, the bankruptcy court confirmed Broderick’s “Eighth Amended Chapter 13 
Plan.”  Through payments under the 
plan, Broderick’s default on the Note and Mortgage was cured, but the plan did 
not discharge the debt.  Under the 
confirmed plan, Broderick was required to make payments directly to the Credit 
Union, in accordance with the terms of the Note.  Those payments were to be made outside 
Broderick’s plan payments and continue after Broderick’s bankruptcy 
discharge.  On August 11, 2009, the 
bankruptcy court issued its Discharge of Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 
Plan.  
 
[¶5]      Shortly after the 
bankruptcy court discharge, Broderick defaulted on the Note, and on April 22, 
2010, the Credit Union filed an Amended Complaint, again seeking judgment and 
foreclosure on the Note and Mortgage.  
The Credit Union claimed unpaid principal in the amount of $36,024.94, 
plus interest accruing on that balance and late fees.  The terms of the Note and the Mortgage 
obligated Broderick to pay the Credit Union’s costs and expenses expended in the 
collection of the debt, and the Credit Union therefore also sought attorney fees 
and costs.  
 
[¶6]      On June 21, 2010, 
the Credit Union filed a motion for summary judgment on all of its claims.  In its summary judgment motion, the 
Credit Union requested attorney fees in the amount of $34,079.55.  The Credit Union attached to its motion 
a twenty-nine page fee statement, detailing the fees and costs its attorney 
charged on the Broderick matter from February 2, 2005, through May 24, 
2010.  Also attached to the summary 
judgment motion was an affidavit from the Credit Union’s attorney, which 
attested to the following:
 
8.         
The following factors have been considered by your Affiant in determining 
what reasonable attorney fees should be allowed in this 
instance:
 
            
a.         
That Affiant has been a member of the Wyoming State Bar for approximately 
twenty seven (27) years and has been actively engaged in the practice of law in 
Natrona County, Wyoming, for approximately twenty seven (27) years and that on 
other occasions Affiant has handled similar actions for various clients 
involving legal questions of the same nature and complexity involved in the 
within action;
 
            
b.         
That, at the commencement of this case, Affiant charged the rate of 
$150.00 per hour in-house and $200.00 per hour in Court for services of Affiant 
in performing legal services in this matter.  Later, these rates were changed to 
$200.00 per hour in-house and $250.00 per hour in Court for services of Affiant 
in performing legal services in this matter, that to Affiant’s best knowledge 
and belief rates for similar actions throughout Natrona County and the State of 
Wyoming vary from $90.00 to $300.00 per hour for similar legal services; that 
the hourly rate charged by Affiant is, in Affiant’s opinion and legal 
experience, reasonable, commensurate and well within the range of fees 
customarily charged by other attorneys in this locality for similar services. 

 
            
c.         
That Affiant charges the rate of $75.00 per hour and $90.00 per hour for 
paralegal work in this matter; that to Affiant’s best knowledge and belief rates 
for similar services throughout Natrona County and the State of Wyoming vary 
from $35.00 to $105.00 per hour; that the hourly rate charged by Affiant is, in 
Affiant’s opinion and legal experience, reasonable, commensurate and well within 
the range of fees customarily charged by other firms for paralegal 
services.
 
            
d.         
As of May 31, 2010, for representing the Plaintiff in this matter and in 
the Defendant’s bankruptcy proceeding, Affiant has charged the Plaintiff to that 
date a total of $40,517.50 in fees and a total of $765.26 in costs for a total 
of $41,282.76 which fees and costs are set out in detail in the attached 
statement dated May 31, 2010.
 
            
e.         
Your Affiant’s involvement in this case has precluded him from accepting 
other employment from other clients as well as the 
Plaintiff.
 
9.         
As of August 22, 2008, the Plaintiff had received from the Defendant’s 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee payments for court-approved attorney fees and 
costs in the principal sum of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Three and 21/100 
Dollars ($7,203.21) for which the Defendant should be given credit against the 
total amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs awarded 
herein.
 
10.       That in the 
opinion and legal expertise of your Affiant, based upon the ability and quality 
of the attorney involved in this matter, the complexity of the matter, the work 
actually performed to date, the manner in which said work has to date been done 
and in the future will be performed and the expected result of the legal 
services performed to date, when considered in the further light of fees 
customarily charged in the locality of Natrona County, Wyoming for similar 
services, a fee of $40,517.50 is a reasonable attorney’s fee in the within 
action for my representation up through and including May 31, 2010; that the 
Plaintiff ought to also recover $765.26 in costs; that the Defendant should be 
given credit against these fees and costs in the amount of $7,203.21; and that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to a total award of $34,079.55.  It is also anticipated that the 
Plaintiff will incur additional attorney’s fees and costs from and after May 31, 
2010 and that this Court should, after further notice and hearing, award the 
Plaintiff said additional reasonable costs and fees.
 
[¶7]      On July 29, 2010, 
Broderick filed in the bankruptcy court a motion to reopen his bankruptcy case, 
along with a Motion for Order to Show Cause and/or Contempt Citation.  Through those motions, Broderick 
requested that the bankruptcy court hold the Credit Union in contempt for 
“attempting to assess attorney fees against [Broderick] in violation of the 
Bankruptcy Code and . . . [the] plan confirmation order.”  In particular, Broderick argued to the 
bankruptcy court that the Credit Union’s failure to apply to that court for 
compensation for attorney fees and costs, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a), 
must result in a denial of such fees and costs.  
 
[¶8]      On August 6, 
2010, Broderick filed an objection in state district court to the Credit Union’s 
summary judgment motion.  He argued 
the following in opposition to the motion:
 
            
There are genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) the amount of 
Plaintiff’s attorney fees, since $34,389.69 were not disclosed to or approved by 
the Bankruptcy Court, (2) the application of the payments as between late 
charges, escrow expenses, attorney fees and principal and interest, and (3) 
whether all payments made by Defendant to Plaintiff have been applied to the 
loan balance.
 
[¶9]      On August 13, 
2010, the bankruptcy court entered an order reopening Broderick’s bankruptcy 
case.   On August 17, 2010, 
Broderick filed in state district court a Motion to Stay Proceedings, requesting 
that the state action be stayed until such time as the bankruptcy court had an 
opportunity to rule on the bankruptcy-related issues. On September 14, 2010, the 
district court entered an Order Granting Stay of Proceedings until the 
bankruptcy court’s resolution of any bankruptcy-related issues.  
 
[¶10]   On February 2, 2011, the bankruptcy 
court issued an order denying the relief requested by Broderick.  The court found that the Credit Union 
had properly applied the trustee distributions it received pursuant to the 
confirmed plan, and that its foreclosure action did not violate the discharge 
order since Broderick’s confirmed plan provided for payment of the Credit Union 
debt outside the plan.  The court 
further found as follows with respect to overlapping attorney fees between the 
bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings:
 
            
Wyo Central, when it filed its complaint to foreclose its security 
interest in the Seventh Judicial District Court, included a request for attorney 
fees that also appears to encompass fees that were already approved and paid in 
the bankruptcy case.  The court 
finds the applicant’s statements to the court, that inclusion of those fees 
requested in the state court action was in error as credible.  The court finds that this is harmless 
error and denies Debtor’s request for sanctions.
 
[¶11]   On February 7, 2011, Broderick 
filed a motion to alter or amend the bankruptcy court’s order denying his 
contempt motion, and on June 13, 2011, the bankruptcy court issued an order 
denying that motion.  On August 11, 
2011, the district court set the Credit Union’s summary judgment motion for 
hearing, and on September 29, 2011, it heard argument on the motion.  On December 15, 2011, the district court 
entered an order granting the Credit Union’s summary judgment motion.  With respect to attorney fees and costs, 
the order provided:
 
            
The court entertained the arguments of counsel for the parties and made 
note that counsel for the Plaintiff, in order to remove any possible confusion 
or controversy concerning the attorney fees awarded and paid in the Defendant’s 
bankruptcy case and those requested in this “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment”, verbally revised his “Affidavit of Thomas M. Hogan [In] Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Award of Reasonable 
Attorney’s Fees” filed herein on June 21, 2010 to remove the Plaintiff’s 
request for attorney fees and costs from the beginning of this matter up through 
and including May 31, 2007, that period representing the dates considered by the 
Defendant’s bankruptcy court in it[s] previous ruling allowing for the 
Plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs.  
Plaintiff’s counsel represented to this court that the revised figures 
for attorney fees and costs requested in this matter are as 
follows:
 
Requested 
fees and costs
through 
May 31, 2010 (Affidavit) -                        
$41,282.76
Fees 
and costs through May 31, 2007
 (Bankruptcy Court adjudication) -                        
<19,653.82>
 
Revised 
request for fees and costs, 
June 
1, 2007 thru May 31, 2010 -                                     
$21,628.94
 
[¶12]   Based on the verbal revisions 
counsel for the Credit Union made to the Credit Union’s request for fees and 
costs, the district court awarded fees and costs in the amount of 
$21,628.94.  
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶13]   Motions for summary judgment come before the trial 
court pursuant to Rule 
56(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
that
 
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter 
of law.
 
Redco 
Const. v. Profile Properties, LLC, 
2012 WY 24, ¶ 21, 271 P.3d 408, 414 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Formisano v. 
Gaston, 2011 WY 8, ¶ 3, 246 P.3d 286, 288 (Wyo. 2011)). We review a 
grant of summary judgment following a well-established procedure: 

 
We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 
992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 1999)]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998). We examine the record from the vantage point most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. 
A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by 
the parties. Id. If the moving party presents supporting summary judgment 
materials demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is 
shifted to the non-moving party to present appropriate supporting materials 
posing a genuine issue of a material fact for trial. Roberts v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question 
of law de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. 
Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d  at 156; Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, 
Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).
 
Wallace 
v. Pinnacle Bank–Wyoming, 
2012 WY 64, ¶ 11, 275 P.3d 1250, 1253-54 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Lindsey v. 
Harriet, 
2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2011)).
 
[¶14]   Our standard for reviewing an 
attorney fees award is likewise well established.  This Court 
reviews a district court’s decision awarding attorney fees for an abuse of 
discretion, and the appellant bears the burden of establishing that the trial 
court abused its discretion.  Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 
N.A., 2005 WY 138, ¶ 22, 121 P.3d 783, 789 (Wyo. 2005) (citing 
Johnston 
v. Stephenson, 
938 P.2d 861, 862 (Wyo. 1997)).  “Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.”  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2003 WY 126, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Pasenelli 
v. Pasenelli, 
2002 WY 159, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 324, 329 (Wyo. 2002)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶15]   Broderick has condensed his three 
issues relating to attorney fees into two arguments.  Broderick first contends that summary 
judgment was improper because federal bankruptcy law preempts the issue of 
attorney fees related to Broderick’s bankruptcy and only the bankruptcy court 
may rule on the fee issue.  
Broderick’s second contention is that the Credit Union failed to prove 
its fees and costs with the required certainty.  We reject both 
arguments.
 
1.         
Bankruptcy Law Preemption
 
[¶16]   Broderick argues that to the extent 
the Credit Union sought recovery of fees it incurred during Broderick’s 
bankruptcy, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a) requires bankruptcy court approval of 
those fees.  He argues that under 
principles of federal preemption, this bankruptcy rule controls over any 
conflicting state law.
 
[¶17]   We reject Broderick’s argument 
because Rule 2016, by its plain terms, applies only to applications for payment 
from the bankruptcy estate.  The 
rule provides, in relevant part:
 
An 
entity seeking interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of 
necessary expenses, from the estate shall file an 
application setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, 
time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts 
requested.
 
Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 2016(a) (emphasis added).
 
[¶18]   The Credit Union applied for 
attorney fees and costs after Broderick’s bankruptcy case was closed, based on 
Broderick’s post-discharge default, and it applied for those fees and costs to 
be paid from foreclosure proceeds, not from the bankruptcy estate.  Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) therefore does 
not apply.1  
 
[¶19]   That the present foreclosure 
proceedings are outside the bankruptcy estate and do not infringe on the 
bankruptcy domain is confirmed by the bankruptcy court’s ruling on Broderick’s 
contempt motion, which he filed after the Credit Union began the present 
proceedings.  The bankruptcy court 
ruled that the foreclosure proceedings were proper and did not violate its 
discharge order.
 
            
The Debtor alleges that Wyo Central’s action to foreclose its security 
interest in the state court violates the discharge.  The Debtor’s confirmed plan provided for 
the payment to Wyo Central under Class 8, “Unmodified Claims” or “outside of the 
plan.”  The plan language of 11 
U.S.C. § 1326(c) allows that the plan or the order confirming the plan can 
“otherwise provide” for payments to creditors under the plan.  This is what the Debtor chose to do in 
making payments to Wyo Central under Class 8.
 
            
A debtor may choose not to provide for a secured claim and elect instead 
to pay those claims directly to the creditor outside the plan.  The lien securing those claims merely 
passes through the bankruptcy unaffected . . . . such claim will not be eligible 
for discharge.  The Debtor did not 
receive a discharge on this secured debt that was classified as an Unmodified 
Claim.  Therefore, the Court finds 
that Wyo Central did not violate the discharge upon filing a proceeding in the 
state court after the Debtor’s discharge was entered and the case was closed. 
[Citations omitted.]
 
[¶20]   The Credit Union filed its initial 
foreclosure action in 2005 and amended that action in 2010 when Broderick again 
defaulted after his bankruptcy case was concluded.  While the bankruptcy case was on-going, 
the Credit Union sought reimbursement for certain of its fees and costs from the 
bankruptcy estate.  For those fees 
and costs, the Credit Union sought approval from the bankruptcy court as 
required by Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a).  
The fees and costs at issue in this appeal, however, are those fees and 
costs for which the Credit Union did not previously seek reimbursement from the 
bankruptcy estate.   The Credit 
Union seeks reimbursement of these fees, not from any bankruptcy proceeds, but 
from the foreclosure proceeds as allowed by the express terms of the Note and 
Mortgage.  
 
[¶21]   The Note provides as follows 
concerning the Credit Union’s right to fees and costs in the event of 
Broderick’s default:
 
            
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as 
described above, the Note Holder will have the right to be paid back by me for 
all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note to the extent not 
prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.
 
[¶22]   Section 22 of the Mortgage contains 
a similar attorney fee and costs shifting provision:
 
If 
the default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender 
at its option may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this 
Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the power of sale and 
any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law.  Lender shall be entitled to collect all 
expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, 
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of title 
evidence.
 
[¶23]   A separate provision of the 
Mortgage allows the Credit Union to also collect costs related to protecting its 
interests in any bankruptcy proceeding.  
Section 9 of the Mortgage provides, in part:
 
            
If (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained 
in this Security Instrument, [or] (b) there is a legal proceeding that might 
significantly affect Lender’s interest in the Property and/or rights under this 
Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for 
condemnation or forfeiture, for enforcement of a lien which may attain priority 
over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), . . . then 
Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect 
Lender’s interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, 
including . . . (c) paying reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in 
the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including its secured 
position in a bankruptcy proceeding. . . .
 
            
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become 
additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. 

 
[¶24]   Under the terms of the Note and 
Mortgage, the Credit Union has a clear right to reimbursement from the 
foreclosure proceeds for the expenses it incurred in pursuing its foreclosure 
action and protecting its security interest.  The Credit Union’s right to 
reimbursement of fees and costs is independent of Broderick’s bankruptcy, was 
pursued after Broderick’s bankruptcy case was concluded, and does not run afoul 
of bankruptcy law.
 
2.         
Adequacy of Credit Union’s Proof of Fees and 
Costs
 
[¶25]   Broderick argues that the Credit 
Union did not prove its attorney fees and costs to a reasonable degree of 
certainty.  In particular, Broderick 
contends that the Credit Union’s oral revision to the application during 
argument, its redactions in the fee statements, its lack of clarity regarding 
which loan obligation the fees applied to, and mathematical errors in the fee 
calculations have created such confusion that the amount of fees cannot be 
determined with a reasonable degree of specificity.  We disagree.
 
[¶26]   With respect to the oral revision 
to the fee application, the district court’s order is clear that the Credit 
Union removed all fees and costs incurred through May 31, 2007, from its 
application.  That left fourteen 
pages of fee statements with charges clearly detailed from June 7, 2007, through 
May 24, 2010.  We find nothing 
confusing in the oral revision.  

 
[¶27]   With respect to the alleged 
confusion caused by redactions in the fee statements, we find that in the 
fourteen pages of fee statements that remained after the oral revision, there is 
one redaction.  The redaction 
appears in the entry for one-half hour of time on May 2, 2008, and reads as 
follows:
 
Janice 
wrote – 'We have just received a 10 day payoff request from WESC FCU for 
Broderick. [Redacted Text] – Review payoff fax. Telecon with Janeice and Tyler – 
went through figures for payoff.
 
Broderick 
does not explain how this single redaction caused even this one entry to become 
too vague to determine the reasonableness of the charge, let alone how it 
rendered the entire fee application too vague.  We thus reject this 
argument.
 
[¶28]   With respect to the question of 
which loan obligation the fees and costs apply to, the Credit Union submitted an 
affidavit from its attorney which stated that the Note and Mortgage form the 
basis of the Credit Union’s claims in this matter.  Broderick presented no evidence to the 
contrary, and we thus reject this argument.  
 
[¶29]   With respect to the alleged errors 
in mathematical calculations, Broderick again presented no evidence of such 
errors, or even examples of such errors.  
We thus, again, reject Broderick’s argument.
 
[¶30]   Wyoming Statute § 1-14-126 allows 
the district court discretion to determine the reasonableness of an application 
for attorney fees and costs based on:
 
(i) 
The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;
 
(ii) 
The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment by the lawyer;
 
(iii) 
The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;
 
(iv) 
The amount involved and the results obtained;
 
(v) 
The time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;
 
(vi) 
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;
 
(vii) 
The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and
 
(viii) 
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶31]   The Credit Union’s fee application 
addressed these factors through the attached affidavit of its attorney, and the 
attached fee statements set forth the fee and cost amounts with sufficient 
certainty.  We thus find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s award of fees and 
costs.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶32]   The district court acted within its 
discretion in its award of fees and costs to the Credit Union, and its order did 
not violate bankruptcy law or procedure.  
Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1We find no 
authority to the contrary in the cases cited by Broderick.  See In re Moffitt, 408 B.R. 249, 258-59 
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009) (creditor must file a Rule 
2016 application with the bankruptcy court in order to collect fees from 
the estate) (emphasis added); In 
re Payne, 387 B.R. 614, 631 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (“While 
§ 
1322(b)(2) 
preserves a lender’s pre-petition rights and protects them from modification 
through the plan, a 'contractual right to seek reimbursement is not the 
equivalent of a right to collect an undisclosed charge from 
the estate.’”) (citation omitted and emphasis added); In re Sanchez, 372 B.R. 289, 304-05 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (“Defendant, as the entity seeking reimbursement for 
expenses from the estate, has the burden to 
file Rule 
2016 
disclosures[.]”) (emphasis added).