Title: Attorney Grievance v. Hunt

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Larry D. Hunt, Misc. Docket AG No. 90, 
September Term, 2014.  Opinion by Hotten, J. 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT – The Respondent, Larry 
D. Hunt, violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.5(a) and (b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) of 
the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.  A 60 day suspension from the 
practice of law is the appropriate sanction for a non-Maryland attorney that represented a 
criminal defendant on a pro bono basis in Maryland District Court, and made a false 
statement to Bar Counsel about his pro hac vice admission to the Maryland Bar.      
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland 
Case No. CAE15-13637 
Argued: March 4, 2016 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 90 
 
September Term, 2014 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
v. 
LARRY D. HUNT 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
*Battaglia, 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten,  
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
Filed:  April 22, 2016 
 
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 
3A, she also participated in the decision and 
adoption of this decision. 
 
 
 
This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who was only licensed to 
practice in the District of Columbia, yet represented a defendant pro bono for a criminal 
proceeding in a Maryland District Court, sitting in Prince George’s County (“District 
Court”), and made a false statement to Bar Counsel regarding his pro hac vice admission 
to the Maryland Bar. 
Larry D. Hunt (“Respondent”) was admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia 
on November 1, 1999, and at all times relevant to this case, maintained a law office in 
Washington, D.C.1   
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition 
for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent on February 27, 2015.  Petitioner 
requested that this Court take appropriate disciplinary action against Respondent for 
violating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) (Md. Rule 
16-812) during his unauthorized representation of Jaimel Fatin Peace (“Mr. Peace”) in the 
District Court.  Petitioner alleged violations of MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 
1.4 (Communication), 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law, Multijurisdictional Practice of 
Law), 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct).  
This Court, by an order dated March 17, 2015, transmitted the action to the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County, and designated the Honorable Albert W. Northrop (“the 
hearing judge”) to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On November 2, 2015, a 
hearing was held, and on November 25, 2015, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact 
                                                          
 
1 Respondent no longer maintains a law office.  
 
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and Conclusions of Law.  The hearing judge found that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 
1.3, 1.4, 5.5(a) and (b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).   
On March 4, 2016, we heard oral argument.  For the reasons outlined below, we 
uphold the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and order that 
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 60 days.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
a. The hearing judge’s findings of fact 
The hearings judge’s findings of fact, beginning with Respondent’s representation 
of Mr. Peace, were as follows: 
On March 13, 2013, Jaimel Fatin Peace (“Mr. Peace”) was arrested 
for possession of controlled dangerous substances (“CDS”) – not marijuana.  
On April 8, 2013, Respondent appeared on Mr. Peace’s behalf for a 
preliminary hearing … in the District Court for Prince George’s County.  
Respondent represented Mr. Peace on a pro bono basis.  During the April 8, 
2013, hearing, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mr. Peace’s behalf 
as his attorney.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss did not contain a Certificate 
of Service.  During the April 8, 2013, preliminary hearing, the court set Mr. 
Peace’s criminal hearing for June 27, 2013.  On or about June 11, 2013, 
Respondent filed a “Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Defendant” in Mr. 
Peace’s case.  Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw did not contain a Certificate 
of Service.  On June 12, 2013, Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw was denied 
because it did not have a Certificate of Service.  Mr. Peace’s criminal 
proceeding occurred on June 27, 2013.  Although Respondent was still 
counsel of Record for Mr. Peace, he was not present during the June 27, 2013 
hearing.   
 
On July 2, 2013, the Honorable Thomas J. Love issued a Show Cause 
Order for Respondent to appear before him in court on August 29, 2013 due 
to Respondent’s failure to appear at the June 27, 2013 hearing.  Judge Love 
also rescheduled Mr. Peace’s criminal hearing for August 29, 2013.  On or 
about July 24, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion to request that the court 
dismiss the Show Cause order and grant his Motion to Withdraw from Mr. 
 
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Peace’s case.  Respondent’s Certificate of Service for his July 24, 2013 
Motion listed Mr. Peace’s address instead of opposing counsel’s address.  On 
or about August 6, 2013, the court denied Respondent’s July 24, 2013 
Motion.  Respondent failed to appear at the Show Cause hearing scheduled 
on August 29, 2013. 
 
On October 3, 2013, Judge Love filed a complaint with the Attorney 
Grievance Commission- Office of Bar Counsel.   
 
On December 13, 2013, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent stating 
inter alia, “If you are not a Maryland Attorney, please advise this office 
whether you were admitted pro hac vice in the underlying matter of State v. 
Jaimel Fatin Peace.”  On February 4, 2014, Respondent sent Bar Counsel a 
response to its December 13, 2013 letter.  Respondent stated in his February 
4, 2014 letter: “However, please be advised that I am not an attorney licensed 
in Maryland, but was being admitted pro hac vice in the underlying matter 
of State v. Jaimel Fatin Peace before Mr. Peace informed me that he [sic] 
longer wanted me to repr[e]sent him in the above-referenced matter.”   
 
Respondent testified in his deposition for this matter that he contacted 
Maryland attorney Bruce Johnson, Esquire sometime during mid-2013 
concerning Mr. Johnson sponsoring his pro hac vice admission to Maryland.  
However, Respondent failed to take any discernable steps to file a pro hac 
vice motion in Maryland before representing Mr. Peace.   
 
Citations omitted. 
 
b. The hearing judge’s conclusions of law 
Based on the above findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.5(a) and (b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).   
Rule 1.1 
MLRPC 1.1 requires that “[a] lawyer … provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”  The hearing judge concluded that 
 
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“Respondent’s admitted ignorance of the Maryland Rules and repeated errors in filing his 
Motions violated [MLRPC] 1.1.”  The hearing judge observed that Respondent had filed 
motions lacking certificates of service, and failed to send the motions to opposing counsel.   
The hearing judge also noted that “Respondent testified in his deposition that he 
believed his appearance in Mr. Peace’s case had essentially been struck once he filed a 
Motion to Withdraw with the District Court.”  Respondent was obviously mistaken, and 
according to the hearing judge, Respondent had a duty to “keep abreast of changes in the 
law and its practice,” see comment 6 to MLRPC 1.1, yet Respondent “had little to no 
knowledge of the Maryland Rules because he was not admitted to the Maryland Bar.”  The 
hearing judge opined that “[c]laimed ignorance of ethical duties… is not a defense in 
disciplinary proceedings.”  (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 
435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997)). 
Rule 1.3 
 
MLRPC 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  The hearing judge concluded that, because the 
District Court denied Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Mr. Peace, 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing to attend the June 27, 2013 hearing.  The 
hearing judge also concluded that MLRPC 1.3 was violated by Respondent’s failure to 
attend the August 29, 2013, show cause hearing.   
Rule 1.4 
 
MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) requires that a lawyer “keep [his] client reasonably informed 
about the status of the matter[.]”  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated 
 
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MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) by not informing Mr. Peace that Respondent was still counsel of record 
on June 27, 2013, the day of Mr. Peace’s criminal hearing.  While Mr. Peace allegedly 
terminated Respondent’s representation on April 8, 2013, Respondent remained counsel of 
record because the District Court denied his Motion to Withdraw. 
Rule 5.52 
 
MLRPC 5.5(a) prohibits an attorney from engaging in the practice of law “in a 
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction[.]”  In 
determining “whether an individual has engaged in the practice of law, the focus of the 
inquiry should be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in 
order to apply legal principles and precedent.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hallmon, 
343 Md. 390, 397, 681 A.2d 510, 514 (1996).  MLRPC 5.5(b)(2) provides that “[a] lawyer 
who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not … hold out to the public or 
otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.”    
                                                          
 
2 MLPRC 5.5 provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 
doing so. 
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: 
 
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or 
other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice 
of law; or 
 
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted 
to practice law in this jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
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The hearing judge found that Respondent’s representation of Mr. Peace required 
“legal knowledge and skill[,]” and was therefore prohibited by MLRPC 5.5(a).  The 
hearing judge noted that the Motion to Dismiss filed on Mr. Peace’s behalf argued “that 
there was no probable cause and that the State violated [Mr. Peace’s] Fourth Amendment 
rights by illegally searching and seizing his property[.]”  According to the hearing judge, 
“Respondent’s motions [were] replete with legal arguments that an attorney, not a lay 
person, would normally argue.”  The hearing judge also observed that Respondent held 
himself out as an attorney when he checked a box marked “attorney” in his Motion to 
Dismiss.3   
                                                          
 
3 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent did not fit within any of the 
exceptions enumerated in MLRPC 5.5(b).  This appears to be a misstatement, as the 
exceptions to the prohibitions in MLRPC 5.5(a) and (b) are contained in MLRPC 5.5(c) 
and (d):   
 
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred 
or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on 
a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: 
 
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice 
in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; 
 
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a 
tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer 
is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or 
reasonably expects to be so authorized; 
 
 (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, 
mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or 
another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to 
the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice 
(continued…) 
 
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Rule 8.1(a) 
 
MLRPC 8.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of 
material fact[]” in connection with a disciplinary matter.  The hearing judge concluded that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by informing Bar Counsel that he was “being admitted 
pro hac vice in the underlying matter of State v. Jaimel Fatin Peace[.]”  The hearing judge 
noted that “Respondent never filed a pro hac vice motion in Mr. Peace’s case.”   
Rule 8.4  
MLRPC 8.4 provides, inter alia, that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to:” 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, 
or do so through the acts of another; 
 
                                                          
 
(…continued) 
 admission; or 
 
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably 
related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is 
admitted to practice. 
 
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred 
or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in 
this jurisdiction that: 
 
(1) are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and 
are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or 
 
(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or 
other law of this jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
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(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice 
… 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated each of the aforementioned 
subsections.   
Regarding MLRPC 8.4(a), the hearing judge relied on the previously mentioned 
ethical violations. 
Relative to MLRPC 8.4(b), the hearing judge noted that the unauthorized practice 
of law is prohibited by Md. Code (1989 Repl. Vol. 2010), § 10-601(a) of the Business 
Occupations and Professions Article (“Bus. Occ. & Prof.”).   Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-602 
also prohibits a person not barred in Maryland from “represent[ing] to the public, by use 
of a title, including ‘lawyer’, ‘attorney at law’, or ‘counselor at law’, by description of 
services, methods, or procedures, or otherwise, that the person is authorized to practice law 
in the State.”  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated § 10-601(a) and § 10-
602 by “representing Mr. Peace at his preliminary hearing, filing motions on his behalf, 
and otherwise engaging in the unauthorized practice of law[.]”  Such violations are 
classified as misdemeanors, thus Respondent’s representation of Mr. Peace was a criminal 
violation.4  See Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-606. 
                                                          
 
4 Although the hearing judge did not find that Respondent’s criminal conduct 
(continued…) 
 
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Regarding MLRPC 8.4(c), the hearing judge found that Respondent’s statement to 
Bar Counsel – that he was “being admitted pro hac vice in the underlying matter of State 
v. Jaimel Fatin Peace” – involved “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  
MLRPC 8.4(c).  As discussed in the factual findings, Respondent never filed a pro hac vice 
motion.  
Concerning MLRPC 8.4(d), the hearing judge described conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice as follows: 
Behavior that may seriously impair public confidence in the entire 
profession, without extenuating circumstances, may be conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.  See Attorney Grievance v. Childress, 360 
Md. 373, 381, 758 A.2d 117, 121 (2000). An attorney’s material 
misrepresentation to the client, his failure to act on the client’s case for over 
three years and failure to expedite litigation, to the client’s detriment, is 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Failure to represent a 
client in an adequate manner and lying to a client constitute a violation 
of Rule 8.4(d).  
                                                          
 
(…continued) 
 “reflect[ed] adversely on [his] honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer[,]” 
MLRPC 8.4(b), we have previously ruled that the unauthorized practice of law, in 
contravention of the Business Occupations & Professions Article, is sufficient to establish 
a violation of MLRPC 8.4(b): 
 
A finding that Respondent violated MLRPC 5.5 supports the conclusion, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent also violated the 
unauthorized practice provisions of the Business Occupations and 
Professions Article.  [Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 47 
45 A.3d 281, 300 (2012)] (“Because unauthorized practice of law is 
unquestionably a ‘criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,’ there is clear 
and convincing evidence that Respondent violated M[L]RPC 8.4(b).”).  
Therefore, by virtue of Respondent’s violation of Rule 5.5, Respondent also 
violated Rule 8.4(b) of the MLRPC. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 645-46, 72 A.3d 567, 
575 (2013).   
 
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(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 222, 892 
A.2d 533, 540-41 (2006)).  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 
8.4(d) by 1) failing to provide competent representation, 2) failing to appear for the show 
cause hearing, and 3) assuming that the Motions to Withdraw were granted, or failing to 
exercise due diligence in ascertaining their status.   
Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances 
 
The hearing judge did not find any aggravating circumstances, and opined that there 
was “no evidence … to support any mitigating factors.”  Nonetheless, the hearing judge 
noted that Respondent was caring for his elderly mother in North Carolina for a portion of 
the summer of 2013.  The hearing judge also observed that Respondent admitted the alleged 
violations. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
a. Standard of Review  
 
This Court must determine whether Bar Counsel proved the allegations in the 
disciplinary petition by clear and convincing evidence.  See Md. Rule 16-757(b).  In doing 
so, “[w]e accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly 
erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 
(2010) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 
1095 (2006)).  Uncontested findings of fact may be accepted “as conclusively established.”  
Id. at 707, 4 A.3d at 964 (citing Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) (“If no exceptions are filed, the 
Court may treat the findings of fact as established....”)).  However, “‘[a]ll proposed 
conclusions of law by the hearing judge… are subject to de novo review by this 
 
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Court.’”  Id. (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 409 Md. 121, 147, 973 A.2d 
185, 201 (2009)). 
b. Exceptions  
 
Neither party noted exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions 
of law.  Accordingly, we accept the findings of fact as established.  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Good, 445 Md. 490, 513, 128 A.3d 54, 67 (2015) (noting that “we shall accept 
the hearing judge’s ‘findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining 
appropriate sanctions’” where neither Petitioner nor Respondent noted any exceptions) 
(citing Md. Rule 16–759(b)(2)(A)).  In addition, having reviewed the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law de novo, we agree that Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convicting 
evidence, that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.5(a) and (b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), 
(b), (c) and (d). 
c. This Court’s sanction5 
 
The purpose of this Court’s sanction in an attorney discipline proceeding is to 
“protect the public rather than to punish the attorney….”  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547, 886 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (citations omitted).  In 
furtherance of this goal, we impose a sanction that “demonstrates to members of the legal 
                                                          
 
5 “[N]on-Maryland attorneys engaging in the unauthorized practice of law… can be 
sanctioned by this Court.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, 444 Md. 299, 339, 
119 A.3d 765, 788-89 (2015) (citing MLRPC 8.5(a)(2) (“A lawyer not admitted to practice 
in this State is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this State if the lawyer (i) 
provides or offers to provide any legal services in this State, [or] (ii) holds himself or herself 
out as practicing law in this State[.] …”)).  
 
 
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profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated….”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191, 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004) (quoting Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994)).  To determine the 
appropriate sanction, we consider the facts and circumstances of an individual case, “the 
nature of the ethical duties violated,” and “any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, 444 Md. 299, 339, 119 A.3d 765, 788 (2015) 
(citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Paul, 423 Md. 268, 284, 31 A.3d 512, 522 (2011)).   
Petitioner requests that this Court indefinitely suspend Respondent from the practice 
of law.  According to Petitioner, Respondent’s unauthorized practice of law (MLRPC 5.5), 
along with his misrepresentations to Bar Counsel and the District Court (MLRPC 8.1(a) 
and 8.4), warrant such a sanction.  In contrast, Respondent proposes a 30 day suspension.  
In seeking their respective sanctions, both Petitioner and Respondent rely on Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. 72, 737 A.2d 567 (1999), where we imposed 
a 30 day suspension for the unauthorized practice of law by a non-Maryland attorney, and 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566, 805 A.2d 1040 (2002), where we 
imposed disbarment.  However, as explained below, the misconduct in Barneys and the 
misconduct in Harris-Smith represent opposite ends of the unauthorized practice spectrum, 
with Respondent’s conduct falling in between.  Because Respondent’s misconduct was not 
as egregious as that involved in Barneys, yet slightly more culpable than that involved in 
Harris-Smith, we shall suspend Respondent from the practice of law for 60 days.   
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris-Smith, Ms. Harris-Smith maintained a law 
office in Maryland, with several Maryland attorneys as partners.   356 Md. at 74, 737 A.2d 
 
- 13 - 
 
at 568.  However, Ms. Harris-Smith was only licensed to practice in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland and several out-of-state jurisdictions.  Id.  In 
violation of MLRPC 5.5(a), Ms. Harris-Smith performed screening interviews with 
potential Maryland clients who called her law office, and engaged in the practice of law by 
providing legal advice based on the facts presented.  Id. at 77, 737 A.2d at 570; see 
Hallmon, 343 Md. at 397, 681 A.2d at 514 (stating that, when determining whether an 
attorney engaged in the practice of law, “the focus of the inquiry should ‘be on whether the 
activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in order to apply legal principles 
and precedent.’”) (citation omitted).  Ms. Harris-Smith also violated MLRPC 5.5(b) by 
holding herself out as a Maryland attorney through her business card and radio 
advertisements, which “failed to disclose that her practice was limited to bankruptcy law 
and the [federal district court].”  Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 78, 737 A.2d at 570.   
In imposing a sanction for Ms. Harris-Smith’s unauthorized practice of law, we 
recognized several factors justifying a lesser sanction.  We first observed that the hearing 
judge found in favor of Ms. Harris-Smith on the alleged violations of MLRPC 8.4(b) and 
(c) (Misconduct), which are “serious violations going to the attorney’s integrity.”  Id. at 
90, 737 A.2d at 577.  We also observed that Ms. Harris-Smith made several attempts “to 
practice within the limits of her admission to the bar of the federal district[,]” by referring 
clients requiring representation in Maryland state courts to her partners, appearing only on 
behalf of those clients with bankruptcy matters in federal district court, and by including 
her jurisdictional limitation on her law firm’s letterhead.  Id. at 78, 90, 737 A.2d at 570, 
577.  We reasoned that Ms. Harris-Smith’s case was distinguishable from those where we 
 
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imposed disbarment, because those cases presented “purely a territorial issue, with no 
federal overlay” – i.e., the Respondents in those cases was not barred in Maryland or the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.  Id. at 91, 737 A.2d at 577 (discussing 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harper, 356 Md. 53, 737 A.2d 557 (1999) and Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. James, 353 Md. 681, 728 A.2d 697 (1999)).  Lastly, regarding our 
goal of deterring future misconduct, we noted that Ms. Harris-Smith had dissolved her 
Maryland practice, and maintained an office in the District of Columbia where she was 
licensed to practice.  Id. at 90-91, 737 A.2d at 577.  We therefore imposed a 30 day 
suspension from the practice of law.6  Id. at 90, 737 A.2d at 577.   
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barneys, also involving a non-Maryland attorney, 
stands in stark contrast to Harris-Smith.  In that case, Mr. Barneys violated MLRPC 5.5(b) 
by establishing the “Law Offices of Bradford J. Barneys, P.C.” in Maryland, and 
referencing his practice as such in his letterhead, business cards, and signage at his office.  
Barneys, 370 Md. at 571, 805 A.2d at 1043.  While Mr. Barney’s application to the 
Maryland Bar was pending, he also committed several violations of MLRPC 5.5(a) by 
representing five clients in the District Court, and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County.  Id. at 572, 805 A.2d at 1043.   
In addition to his unauthorized practice of law, Mr. Barneys made several false 
statements in violation of MLRPC 8.1(a):   
                                                          
 
6 We also affirmed the hearing judge’s finding that Ms. Harris-Smith violated 
MLRPC 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services) and 7.5 (Firm Names and 
Letterheads) by failing to advise clients that she was not admitted to practice in Maryland, 
and using a business card that listed a Maryland address.   
 
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[Mr. Barneys] made a false statement on his Petition for Admission to the 
Maryland Bar-representing that he practiced only in the District of Columbia, 
when he actually had an office in Maryland and was engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law; [Mr. Barneys] told [Bar Counsel’s] investigator 
that he had only one Maryland client; and [Mr. Barneys] entered his 
appearance, without special permission and while not a Maryland lawyer, … 
and otherwise represented those clients. 
 
Id. at 574, 805 A.2d at 1044.   
We also observed that Mr. Barneys violated MLRPC 8.4(b), (c), and (d), by making 
a material misrepresentation to a bail bonds company in securing the bond of one of his 
clients, and by being “deceitful and dishonest to the judges of the District and Circuit 
Courts of Prince George’s County by entering his appearance on behalf of clients when he 
knew that he was not authorized to practice law in the state of Maryland.”  Id.  Regarding 
the bail bonds company, we noted that a Mr. Sanchez, Mr. Barneys’ client, was detained 
on a $150,000 bond pending CDS violations.  Id. at 572, 805 A.2d at 1043.  To secure Mr. 
Sanchez’s bond, Mr. Barneys proposed that Gates Bail Bonds “‘accept an assignment of 
Mr. Sanchez’s workers’ compensation settlement proceeds,’” and in return, post Mr. 
Sanchez’s bond.  Id.  When an agent of Gates Bail Bonds agreed to this arrangement, “[Mr. 
Barneys] provided a document titled ‘Assignment of Settlement Proceeds,’ which was 
signed by [Mr. Barneys] and purportedly Mr. Sanchez.”  Id.  However, Mr. Barneys did 
not represent Mr. Sanchez in the workers’ compensation matter, and the attorney who did 
represent Mr. Sanchez was entirely unaware of this agreement.  Id. at 572-73; 805 A.2d at 
1043.  As a result, the bail bonds company forfeited the posted bond because Mr. Sanchez 
received the settlement proceeds from the other attorney, and did not contact Gates Bail 
Bonds or appear for trial.  Id. at 573; 805 A.2d at 1043. 
 
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In determining the appropriate sanction, we observed that Mr. Barneys’ misconduct 
was distinguishable from Harris-Smith.  First, we noted that Ms. Harris-Smith never 
represented a client in a Maryland court, whereas Mr. Barneys did so on at least five 
occasions.  Id. at 589, 805 A.2d at 1053.  Second, contrary to the federal overlay involved 
in Harris-Smith, there was no plausible reason why Mr. Barneys would have believed that 
he was permitted to establish a law office in Maryland.  Id.  Third, Ms. Harris-Smith had 
attempted to practice within her jurisdictional limits and “ceased to hold herself out as a 
Maryland attorney when she corresponded with the [her] firm’s clients,” because Ms. 
Harris-Smith’s letterhead disclosed her jurisdictional limitation.  Id. at 590, 805 A.2d at 
1053.  To the contrary, Mr. Barneys “held himself out as an authorized Maryland attorney 
by means of his business cards, his letterhead, and signs in the building immediately 
outside his office suite.”   Id. at 590, 805 A.2d at 1053. 
We also discussed our sanctions in several attorney discipline matters involving the 
unauthorized practice of law – including Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harper, 356 Md. 
53, 737 A.2d 557 (1999), and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 363 Md. 598, 770 
A.2d 130 (2001) – where we imposed disbarment.  In Harper, we observed that Mr. Harper, 
a District of Columbia barred attorney, had engaged in “deliberate and persistent” 
violations of MLRPC 5.5(a) by setting up a law office in Baltimore City “‘to wring 
whatever value he could out of the inventory of pending cases of a disbarred lawyer….’”  
Barneys, 370 Md. at 584-85, 805 A.2d at 1050 (quoting Harper, 356 Md. at 70, 737 A.2d 
at 566).  We noted that Mr. Harper’s motivation to establish this Baltimore law office was 
simply greed.  Id. (quoting Harper, 356 Md. at 70, 737 A.2d at 566).   
 
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We also discussed Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 363 Md. 598, 770 A.2d 
130 (2001), where Mr. Johnson was barred in the District of Columbia and Virginia, but 
established a Maryland law office with a partner who was barred in Maryland.  Barneys, 
370 Md. at 585, 805 A.2d at 1050 (citing Johnson, 363 Md. at 625, 770 A.2d at 146).  We 
observed that Mr. Johnson met with and advised clients in his Maryland office, and misled 
the public and his clients by neglecting to include his jurisdictional limitations on his 
letterhead.  Id. at 585, 805 A.2d at 1051 (citing Johnson, 363 Md. at 631, 770 A.2d at 150).  
We also observed that Mr. Johnson violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), and (c) by forging the 
signatures of a Maryland couple on a bankruptcy petition, which he filed without the 
couple’s knowledge.  Id. (citing Johnson, 363 Md. at 631, 770 A.2d at 150).   
 
We concluded that Mr. Barneys’ conduct was most similar to those cases where we 
imposed disbarment: 
Overall, our review of the unauthorized practice cases resulting in disbarment 
leads us to believe that they have more elements in common with [Mr. 
Barneys’] case than does his case with Harris-Smith.  For example, although 
Harper seemed to have represented many more clients than [Mr. Barneys], 
the cases share at least two common features. First, both attorneys held 
themselves out as admitted in Maryland, in violation of M[L]RPC 7.5.[7]  In 
                                                          
 
7 MLRPC 7.5 provides, inter alia: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional 
designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in 
private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency 
or with a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise 
in violation of Rule 7.1. 
 
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
 
- 18 - 
 
fact, one of Harper’s regular letterheads indicated his jurisdictional practice 
limitations, while none of [Mr. Barneys’] letterheads did. Second, the 
description of the misconduct as “deliberate and persistent,” relied on by this 
Court in Harper … and cited again in Johnson, appears to be an apt 
description of [Mr. Barneys’] conduct, wrongfully representing five clients 
in Maryland state court proceedings and pretending to represent [Mr.] 
Sanchez in a workers’ compensation matter when he did not. 
 
[Mr. Barneys’] conduct regarding Mr. Sanchez also highlights his deceptive 
tendencies, making his case like Johnson, where we found the attorney 
“repeatedly engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and 
misrepresentation.”  Both Johnson and [Mr. Barneys] forged signatures of 
purported clients, and both caused significant damage to third parties; in [Mr. 
Barneys’] case, the losses incurred by Gates Bail Bonds[]. 
 
In addition, whether the facts of a particular case sustain related or 
companion violations of M[L]RPC 8.4 seems also to be an influencing factor 
in our choice of sanction in at least some of the unauthorized practice cases 
under M[L]RPC 5.5(a). Specifically, in Harris-Smith we found that the 
attorney’s conduct did not reach the level of a M[L]RPC 8.4 violation, which 
“would be [a] serious violation going to the attorney’s integrity.” By 
comparison, Harper was found in violation of M[L]RPC 8.4(b) and (d), and 
Johnson in violation of M[L]RPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Both were attorneys 
who, like [Mr. Barneys], had not been admitted in Maryland previously, and 
who, like [Mr. Barneys], undertook actual representation of clients in 
                                                          
 
(. . . continued) 
name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the 
firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to 
practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located. 
… 
 
MLRPC 7.1 provides, inter alia: 
 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if 
it: 
 
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially 
misleading; 
… 
 
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Maryland state court matters.  Because [Mr. Barneys] violated M[L]RPC 
8.4(b), (c), and (d), violations that are arguably more serious than in 
either Harper[] or Johnson, we should not shy away from disbarment. 
 
Id. at 591-92, 805 A.2d at 1054.   
 
Turning to the case at bar, Respondent’s misconduct is meaningfully distinguishable 
from the misconduct in Barneys, and in some ways, less egregious than the misconduct in 
Harris-Smith.  First, Respondent’s representation was isolated to one client in the District 
Court, whereas both Ms. Harris-Smith and Mr. Barneys regularly engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Lawson, 
401 Md. 536, 583, 933 A.2d 842, 869 (2007) (noting that an aggravating factor considered 
by this Court in imposing a sanction is “a pattern of misconduct[.]”).  Second, Respondent 
never held himself out as a Maryland attorney through advertisements, business cards, 
stationery, or a Maryland law office, as was the case in both Barneys and Harris-Smith.  
See Barneys, 370 Md. at 591, 805 A.2d at 1054 (2002) (noting that, in cases where this 
Court has imposed disbarment, the attorney held himself out as admitted to practice law in 
Maryland, in violation of MLRPC 7.5).  Lastly, Respondent agreed to represent Mr. Peace 
pro bono, whereas both Mr. Barneys and Ms. Harris-Smith were deriving income from 
their unauthorized practice.  Cf. Harper, 356 Md. at 70, 737 A.2d at 566 (imposing 
disbarment where Mr. Harper’s unauthorized practice was motivated by greed); Lawson, 
401 Md. at 585, 933 A.2d at 871 (noting that one of the mitigating factors this Court 
considers in imposing a sanction is the “absence of a dishonest or selfish motive[.]”). 
Notwithstanding the limited nature of Respondent’s unauthorized practice of law, 
Respondent’s misconduct is also similar to Barneys, and more severe than Harris-Smith in 
 
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several regards.  Like Barneys, Respondent deliberately and willfully violated MLRPC 
5.5(a) by appearing on behalf of a client in the District Court.   See Barneys, 370 Md. at 
592, 805 A.2d at 1054 (noting that we have imposed disbarment where the attorney 
“undertook actual representation of clients in Maryland state court matters.”).  
Furthermore, contrary to Harris-Smith, there was no “federal overlay” indicating that 
Respondent reasonably believed he was authorized to practice law in Maryland.  See 
Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 91, 737 A.2d at 577 (remarking that the cases where we have 
imposed disbarment involved “purely a territorial issue, with no federal overlay”).  Lastly, 
like Barneys, Respondent was dishonest with Bar Counsel and the District Court, and 
committed a misdemeanor offense that reflected adversely on his honesty.  MLRPC 8.1(a) 
and 8.4(b) and (c); see Bus. Occ. & Prof. §§ 10-601 and 10-606 (making the unauthorized 
practice of law a misdemeanor offense); Barneys, 370 Md. at 592, 805 A.2d at 1054 
(commenting on the relevance of an attendant MLRPC 8.4 violation). 
 
Had Respondent engaged in an ongoing pattern of dishonest conduct like Mr. 
Barneys, this Court would be inclined to impose disbarment or indefinite suspension, as 
requested by Bar Counsel.  See Barneys, 370 Md. at 591, 805 A.3d at 1054 (noting that 
disbarment is appropriate where “the attorney repeatedly engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.”) (citation omitted); Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n of Maryland v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001) 
(“[I]ntentional[ly] dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters 
of basic character[.]”).  However, the isolated nature of Respondent’s unauthorized 
practice, and the pro bono nature of his representation, does not warrant such a sanction.  
 
- 21 - 
 
Instead, a 60 day suspension from the practice of law will deter Respondent and other non-
Maryland attorneys from practicing law in Maryland courts without authorization, 
notwithstanding that such representation was on a limited, pro bono, basis.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 556, 103 A.3d 629, 648 (2014) (noting that 
“the chief purpose of the sanction is to protect the public.”).    
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MD. 
RULE 16-761(b), FOR WHICH SUM 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR 
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION AGAINST LARRY D. 
HUNT.