Title: In re Hoffman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368.] 
 
 
IN RE HOFFMAN. 
[Cite as In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368.] 
Juvenile law — Permanent custody proceeding — Parties to the proceeding 
have the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem concerning the 
contents of the report and the basis for the custody recommendation 
when the report will be a factor in the trial court’s decision. 
(No. 2002-0246 — Submitted June 26, 2002 — Decided October 23, 2002.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2001CA00207, 2001-
Ohio-1816. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a permanent custody proceeding in which the guardian ad litem’s report will be 
a factor in the trial court’s decision, parties to the proceeding have the 
right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the 
report and the basis for a custody recommendation. 
__________________ 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
On April 18, 2000, Stark County Department of Human Services 
(“SCDHS”) filed a complaint seeking temporary custody of appellee Brenda 
Hoffman’s two children: Brandon Hoffman, born July 30, 1999, and Melanie 
Dedmon, born August 14, 1991.  The complaint alleged that Brandon was an 
abused, dependent, and neglected child due to a skull fracture and an epidural 
hematoma.  The complaint further alleged that Melanie was a dependent child due 
to the abuse of Brandon and the instability of her biological father.  After an 
emergency hearing, the trial court ordered that the children be placed in the 
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temporary custody of SCDHS and that appellee undergo a psychological 
evaluation.  The trial court also issued a “no contact” order, prohibiting appellee 
from having any contact with her children. 
{¶2} 
An adjudicatory hearing was held on June 29, 2000.  At that 
hearing, appellee stipulated to a finding of abuse regarding Brandon and a finding 
of dependency relative to Melanie.  Brandon remained in the temporary custody of 
SCDHS and was placed in foster care with Allen and Martha Miller.  The trial 
court granted legal custody of Melanie to her paternal grandparents.  Thereafter, 
the involvement of SCDHS with Melanie was terminated. 
{¶3} 
In February 2001, appellant, Stark County Department of Job and 
Family Services (“SCDJFS”), filed a motion for permanent custody of Brandon 
and termination of appellee’s parental rights pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.  Carol 
and Raymond Ritchey, relatives of appellee, also filed a motion for custody.  On 
April 17, 2001, the guardian ad litem filed a written report pursuant to R.C. 
2151.414(C), which detailed her investigation of all parties involved in the 
dispute.  The report was admitted into evidence by the trial court. 
{¶4} 
The trial court hearing on the permanent custody motion, which 
began on May 29, 2001, was divided into two phases.  The first phase focused on 
termination of appellee’s parental rights, while the second phase focused on the 
best interests of the child.  Appellee, through her counsel, initially represented that 
she would stipulate to phase one.  At that time, appellee specified that she 
intended to litigate the best-interest phase.  Upon inquiry by the court, appellee 
requested a trial for both phases, and the case proceeded.  SCDJFS called appellee 
as its sole witness in phase one; appellee called no witnesses. 
{¶5} 
The best-interest phase was contested due to the fact that both the 
Ritcheys and the Millers sought placement pending an adoption.  During this 
portion of the hearing, the guardian ad litem participated in the cross-examination 
January Term, 2002 
3 
of witnesses; however, the parties were not allowed to cross-examine the guardian 
pertaining to her report. 
{¶6} 
On June 22, 2001, the trial court issued a decision terminating 
appellee’s parental rights, privileges, and obligations and granting permanent 
custody of Brandon to SCDJFS.  Further, the trial court denied the Ritcheys’ 
motion for custody and ordered that Brandon remain with the Millers pending an 
adoption decree by the probate court.  In reaching its decision, the trial court 
quoted portions of the guardian’s report as follows: “The guardian states, ‘The 
Millers have provided Brandon with a placement which is both emotionally and 
physically healthy.  * * * While it is true that children can adapt to change, it is 
equally true * * * that children grieve at the loss of loved ones and that their 
grieving is commensurate to the attachment they have to their care takers.  In this 
case, the grieving would be lengthy, unnecessary and contrary to Brandon’s best 
interest.’ ” 
{¶7} 
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, concluding, 
“[O]nce the trial court admitted the guardian’s report into evidence, the trial court 
was required to permit mother to cross-examine the guardian.” 
{¶8} 
Appellant moved the court of appeals to certify a conflict to this 
court on the issue of whether, in a permanent custody action, a party may cross-
examine the guardian ad litem, notwithstanding the language of R.C. 
2151.414(C), which specifies, “A written report of the guardian ad litem * * * 
shall be submitted to the court * * * but shall not be submitted under oath.”  The 
court of appeals granted appellant’s motion, finding its judgment to be in conflict 
with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Wayne County in In re Fox (Sept. 
27, 2000), Wayne App. Nos. 00CA0039, 00CA0038, 00CA0040 and 00CA0041, 
2000 WL 1420276. 
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{¶9} 
The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists. 
{¶10} The question certified for our review is “whether, in a permanent 
custody action, a party may cross-examine the guardian ad litem, notwithstanding 
the language of R.C. 2151.414(C).”  For the reasons that follow, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative and therefore affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
{¶11} R.C. 2151.414(C) states: 
{¶12} “In making the determinations required by this section * * * a court 
shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency 
would have upon any parent of the child.  A written report of the guardian ad 
litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the 
hearing * * * but shall not be submitted under oath.” 
{¶13} From the plain language of the statute, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the purpose of enacting R.C. 2151.414(C) is to give the court information, in 
addition to that elicited at the hearing, to assist it in making sound decisions 
concerning permanent custody placements.  This legislative enactment, however, 
cannot come at the expense of a parent’s opportunity to defend herself against the 
possibility of termination of her rights. 
{¶14} In In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d. 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680, the 
court noted, “Permanent termination of parental rights has been described as ‘the 
family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’  * * * Therefore, 
parents ‘must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law 
allows,’ ” quoting In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45. 
{¶15} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in permanent 
custody proceedings, parents must be afforded due process before their rights can 
be terminated.  In Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 
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L.Ed.2d 599, parents appealed from the judgment of a family court that had found 
their children to be neglected.  Id. at 751, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.  Based 
on that finding, the trial court permanently terminated the parents’ custody, and 
the appellate court affirmed.  Id. at 752, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599. 
{¶16} The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and noted, 
“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been 
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.  Even 
when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing 
the irretrievable destruction of their family life.  If anything, persons faced with 
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural 
protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.  
When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the 
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.”  Id. at 753-754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 
L.Ed.2d 599. 
{¶17} In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Serv. of Durham Cty., North Carolina 
(1981), 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, the United States 
Supreme Court stated, “For all its consequence, ‘due process’ has never been, and 
perhaps can never be, precisely defined.  * * * Rather, the phrase expresses the 
requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning can be as 
opaque as its importance is lofty.  Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore 
an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists 
of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by 
assessing the several interests that are at stake.” 
{¶18} While the issue of cross-examination of guardians ad litem in 
permanent custody proceedings is one of first impression in this court, other states 
have concluded that due process concerns dictate that parties should be given the 
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opportunity to cross-examine persons who prepare investigative reports for the 
court’s consideration. 
{¶19} In Collins v. Collins (1984), 283 S.C. 526, 324 S.E.2d 82, the wife 
appealed from the judgment of the court in her divorce action, which granted 
custody of the parties’ daughter to the husband.  The wife contended that the 
court’s in camera receipt of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, and her 
resulting inability to cross-examine, denied her due process.  Id. at 528, 324 
S.E.2d 82.  Although the error was ultimately ruled harmless, the court held, “We 
believe that the ends of justice are better served by permitting cross-examination 
of a guardian ad litem.  * * * [W]e hold that where the report contains statements 
of fact, the litigants are entitled to cross-examine the guardian ad litem and any 
witnesses whose testimony formed the basis of the guardian’s recommendation.  
The family court’s failure * * * to permit proper cross-examination is reversible 
error * * *.”  Id. at 530, 324 S.E.2d 82. 
{¶20} In Mazur v. Lazarus (App.D.C.1964), 196 A.2d 477, the court 
determined that the action of the court in basing its decision, at least in part, on 
investigative reports without opportunity for the parties to cross-examine the 
persons who prepared them violated due process requirements.  The court 
expounded, “[T]he courts of this jurisdiction sometimes call to their aid 
experienced and disinterested trained social workers * * * to make unbias[ed] 
examinations of the qualifications of those seeking custody of children, and the 
circumstances of the children themselves.  But it has never been the practice to 
receive such reports after trial, with no opportunity for the parties to read them or 
to cross-examine the persons who prepared them.  There is an obvious and 
fundamental unfairness in receiving evidence in this manner, for it violates due 
process requirements.  It amounts to a private investigation by the court in 
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assembling or receiving evidence, out of the sight and hearing of the parties, who 
are thus deprived of the opportunity to test, explain or rebut it.”  Id. at 479. 
{¶21} In State ex rel. Fisher v. Devins (1972), 294 Minn. 496, 200 
N.W.2d 28, the Supreme Court of Minnesota also upheld the right to cross-
examine a probation officer who had prepared a report for custody proceedings.  
In Fisher, a long-term foster mother appealed the decision of the trial court to 
award custody of a son to the natural mother.  Id.  Specifically, the foster mother 
contended that she should have been given the opportunity to cross-examine the 
probation officer who prepared a report relating to custody of the child.  Id.  The 
court agreed with the foster mother, stating, “Counsel for appellant was not 
permitted to cross-examine the probation officer to ascertain the basis for her 
opinion * * * .  Under our decisions it was error to deny appellant’s counsel an 
opportunity to cross-examine the probation officer in order to ascertain the basis 
of her opinion that the child should be removed from the custody of [the foster 
mother].”  Id. at 499-500, 200 N.W.2d 28.  The court added, “If the report is to be 
used as a basis, wholly or in part, for a determination as to what is best for the 
welfare of the child, the one who made the report should be subject to cross-
examination in order to ascertain what it is based on.”  Id. at 501, 200 N.W.2d 28. 
{¶22} Likewise, in Stanford v. Stanford (1963), 266 Minn. 250, 258, 123 
N.W.2d 187, the court said, “We do not condemn the practice of using court 
agencies to make investigations and reports on custody questions.  Where the sole 
issue is what will best serve the welfare of the child, such reports are an 
invaluable aid to the court in determining the question.  Their use should be 
encouraged, but care should be taken to give fair notice of the contents of such 
reports to the parties involved so as to afford them every opportunity to test the 
credibility of the reporter through cross-examination or otherwise and to meet or 
answer every adverse fact or inference included therein.” 
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{¶23} Finally, in In re Dolly D. (1995), 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 48 Cal 
Rptr.2d 691, the child was adjudicated a dependent of the juvenile court.  The trial 
court denied the father’s request to cross-examine the social worker who had 
prepared the report relating to custody.  The appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s judgment, stating, “In dependency proceedings, as in other civil 
proceedings, parties have a due process right to cross-examine and confront 
witnesses.”  Id. at 444, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691. 
{¶24} Applied to the case at bar, Brandon was adjudged an abused, 
dependent, and neglected child.  During the best-interest phase of the permanent 
custody hearing, appellee requested that the guardian ad litem be called to testify 
about her report.  That request was denied by the court.  In the alternative, 
appellee requested that the court allow her to cross-examine the guardian ad litem 
regarding the contents of her report, which request was also denied. 
{¶25} Due process necessitates that appellee should have had the right to 
cross-examine the guardian ad litem, since the trial court relied upon the report.  
As such, notwithstanding R.C. 2151.414(C), we hold that in a permanent custody 
proceeding in which the guardian ad litem’s report will be a factor in the trial 
court’s decision, parties to the proceeding have the right to cross-examine the 
guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the report and the basis for a custody 
recommendation.  Without these safeguards, there are no measures to ensure the 
accuracy of the information provided and the credibility of those who made 
statements. 
{¶26} We remand this cause to the trial court for a proceeding in which 
the guardian ad litem may be subject to cross-examination. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2002 
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COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Michael B. Vaccaro, for appellant. 
 
Christopher M. VanDevere, for appellee. 
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