Title: State v. Felix

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP346-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
    v. 
Devin W. Felix, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 332 Wis. 2d 804, 798 N.W.2d 319 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 3, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
MARATHON 
 
JUDGE: 
CONRAD A. RICHARDS 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Leonard D. Kachinsky and Sisson & Kachinsky Law 
Offices, Appleton. 
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP346-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF659) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Devin W. Felix, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 3, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
for 
second-degree 
intentional homicide after a plea of guilty.1   This case 
involves statements and physical evidence obtained from a 
defendant outside of the home after Miranda warnings2 were given 
and waived following a warrantless in-home arrest made in 
                                                 
1 State v. Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2011). 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
3 
 
alleged violation of Payton v. New York.3  The central issue 
presented 
in 
this 
case 
is 
which 
analysis 
governs 
the 
admissibility of such evidence: does Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution demand the suppression of such 
evidence unless it is sufficiently attenuated under Brown v. 
Illinois,4 or does this court adopt the rule developed by the 
United States Supreme Court in New York v. Harris5 under its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution?  The United States Supreme Court set forth a 
three-factor attenuation analysis in Brown to determine whether 
evidence obtained following an unlawful search or seizure must 
be suppressed under the exclusionary rule as the fruit of a 
Fourth Amendment violation.6  In Harris, the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
clarified 
that 
where 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violation is an unlawful arrest without a warrant, in violation 
of Payton, but with probable cause, evidence obtained from the 
defendant outside of the home is admissible because it is not 
"the product of illegal governmental activity."7  
¶2 
In the early morning of September 8, 2007, a violent 
fight erupted outside of a house where a party was being held.  
                                                 
3 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
4 442 U.S. 590 (1975). 
5 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
6 Brown, 442 U.S. at 603-04. 
7 Harris, 495 U.S. at 17-19 (quoting United States v. Crews, 
445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)). 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
4 
 
After the fight, Nathaniel Davids (Davids) was left bleeding 
from multiple stab wounds and later died from those wounds.  
Police had probable cause to arrest Devin Felix (Felix) for 
Davids' murder based on statements from several witnesses, but 
police did not obtain a warrant for his arrest.  Police arrested 
Felix at his home, and he was charged with first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Before trial, Felix sought to suppress 
statements and evidence that police obtained at the police 
station and the jail.  
¶3 
Relevant to this appeal, the circuit court denied in 
part8 Felix’s motions to suppress statements and physical 
evidence obtained after police arrested him at his home without 
an arrest warrant.  The circuit court concluded that Felix did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because he had 
submitted himself to public view by sleeping in front of an 
unsecured door that flew open easily.  The court of appeals 
applied a Brown attenuation analysis and reversed in part the 
circuit court.  Following the State's assumption that the arrest 
was unlawful in violation of Payton and the Fourth Amendment, 
the court of appeals remanded for a trial with directions to 
suppress Felix's signed statement at the police station, a 
                                                 
8 The circuit court granted in part Felix's motion to 
suppress the statement that he made outside of his residence 
immediately after he was arrested because police had not read 
Felix his Miranda warnings.  The circuit court concluded that 
this statement could not be used in the State's case-in-chief, 
but could be used for impeachment purposes because it was made 
voluntarily. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
5 
 
buccal swab Felix agreed to provide for DNA comparison and his 
clothing because the court of appeals concluded that they were 
not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest.9  The court 
of appeals did not apply the Harris rule because it concluded 
that this court had not adopted the Harris rule and that the 
rule conflicted with this court's precedent.10  The court of 
appeals suggested that this court's decisions indicate that 
Article I, Section 11 provides more protection than the Harris 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.11  
¶4 
We continue our usual practice of interpreting Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Thus, we adopt the Harris exception to the 
exclusionary rule for certain evidence obtained after a Payton 
violation.  We hold that, where police had probable cause to 
arrest before the unlawful entry, a warrantless arrest from 
Felix's home in violation of Payton requires neither the 
suppression of statements made outside of the home after Felix 
was given and waived his Miranda rights, nor the suppression of 
physical evidence obtained from Felix outside of the home.  
Assuming without deciding that Felix's warrantless arrest from 
his home was in violation of Payton, we conclude that, pursuant 
to the Harris rule, the following evidence that police obtained 
                                                 
9 Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, ¶¶1, 20. 
10 Id., ¶¶14-19. 
11 Id., ¶19. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
6 
 
outside of his home is admissible: Felix's signed statement, 
made after Felix was given and waived his Miranda rights, the 
buccal swab obtained at the police station, and Felix's clothing 
seized at the jail, as well as any derivative evidence.12 
¶5 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In the early morning on September 8, 2007, a violent 
fight erupted outside of a party in the City of Schofield, 
Marathon County, Wisconsin.  Officers responded after the fight 
had broken up and people had fled the scene.  They discovered 
Davids lying bleeding in the middle of the street from multiple 
stab wounds.  Davids was taken to the hospital and later 
pronounced dead.  After police interviewed witnesses, they 
located, arrested, and obtained evidence and a statement from 
Felix all during the morning hours of that same day. 
¶7 
Shortly 
after 
arriving 
at 
the 
scene, 
police 
interviewed several people who were still present and also 
located several other witnesses who had attended the party.  The 
                                                 
12 The parties focused their arguments on the suppression of 
the buccal swab and the clothes themselves.  The record does not 
indicate whether DNA or blood evidence was taken from the swab 
or the clothing nor does it provide the results of any DNA or 
blood comparison with the victim.  It is reasonable to infer 
that Felix sought to suppress the DNA from the swab, the blood 
derived from the clothing and the results of tests on those 
samples, as well as the swab and the clothing themselves.  Thus, 
when we refer to the suppression of the buccal swab and Felix's 
clothing, we include any evidence derived therefrom or the 
results of any tests on that evidence.     
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
7 
 
witnesses who live near the scene stated that during the fight 
they had heard someone shouting about a stabbing.  At the police 
station, detectives interviewed several people who had attended 
the party.  T.W., a minor at the time of the homicide, described 
the fight that broke out among approximately six people outside 
of the party.  T.W. stated that she heard Felix say, "I'm going 
to prison.  I stabbed someone.  I think I killed him."  T.W. had 
responded, "[N]o you didn't, no you didn't, I think you're 
lying."  According to T.W., Felix then stated, "I'm not lying, 
I've got blood all over me."  T.W. told police that she was 
"pretty positive" or about "98" percent sure that Felix stabbed 
someone.  T.W. also said that Felix left in a green Chrysler.  A 
detective also interviewed Kyle Leder who reported hearing Felix 
say the word "stab" and also "I'm not going to prison" shortly 
before he saw Felix leave in a green Chrysler.   
¶8 
Based on this information, police obtained a warrant 
to search the residence where the party had taken place for 
Felix, witnesses and any evidence of the crime.  Police did not 
find Felix at that residence, but eventually learned from 
Felix's father that he was living at Felix's mother's apartment.  
Felix's father gave the police a description of the residence 
and told them that the rear entrance led to the Felixes' 
apartment.  When the police went to that residence they saw a 
green Chrysler parked in the driveway, which matched the 
description witnesses had given of the car that Felix had driven 
from the scene.  The police had also discovered that the car was 
registered to Felix's mother.  
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
8 
 
¶9 
When a detective knocked on the rear door of the 
residence, it popped open.  The detective could immediately see 
someone, whom he recognized as Felix from a photo, sleeping in a 
recliner at the bottom of the stairs leading to the door.  The 
detective and another officer drew their weapons and ordered 
Felix to come out with his hands up.  Felix complied and was 
searched and handcuffed outside of the residence.   
¶10 When Felix was being patted down before he was 
handcuffed, an officer asked Felix if he had any sharp objects 
on him.  Felix replied that he had a knife in his pocket.  When 
the officer did not find a knife on Felix, Felix stated that he 
"had a knife on [him]," but "must have gotten rid of it."  
¶11 When officers located the person who was renting the 
apartment and subletting to the Felixes, Dean Kudick (Kudick), 
an officer asked Kudick for permission to search the house, 
which Kudick granted.  Police found a knife next to the recliner 
where Felix had been sleeping.  Police seized the knife and the 
green Chrysler that was parked in the driveway.   
¶12 Felix was taken to the police department and placed in 
an interview room.  A detective read Felix his Miranda rights 
and Felix signed a form waiving those rights.  Felix then 
provided a statement detailing his involvement in the fight and 
Davids' death.  The detective transcribed his questions and 
Felix's responses throughout the interview, and Felix signed 
this written statement after he had an opportunity to review it.  
Felix then agreed to submit to a buccal swab for DNA analysis.  
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
9 
 
¶13 Felix was transported to the jail where the detective 
asked Felix to remove his clothes and place each item in an 
individual evidence bag.  The detective stated that he decided 
to take Felix's clothes as evidence at the jail because during 
the interview he had noticed that Felix had some "red spots" on 
his shirt that he suspected might have been blood.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶14 Felix 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide with the use of a dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) and § 939.63(1)(b) (2005-06).13  Felix made 
several pre-trial motions including four motions to suppress 
statements and evidence.  Specifically, Felix sought to suppress 
(1) the statement he made while being patted down upon his 
arrest that he "had a knife on [him]," but "must have gotten rid 
of it," (2) his signed statement at the police station, (3) the 
buccal swab he provided at the police station for DNA 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Statute § 940.01 (2005-06) provides: "First-
degree intentional homicide. (1) Offenses. (a) Except as 
provided in sub. (2), whoever causes the death of another human 
being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a 
Class A felony." 
Wisconsin Statute § 939.63 provides: "Penalties; use of a 
dangerous weapon. (1) If a person commits a crime while 
possessing, using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, the 
maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime 
may be increased as follows: . . . (b) If the maximum term of 
imprisonment for a felony is more than 5 years or is a life 
term, the maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be 
increased by not more than 5 years." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
10 
 
comparison, (4) the clothing he was wearing when arrested that 
police seized at the jail, (5) the knife police seized from his 
apartment, and (6) evidence obtained from his green Chrysler.  
The Marathon County Circuit Court, the Honorable Dorothy L. Bain 
presiding, held hearings on Felix's motions to suppress.   
¶15 The Marathon County Circuit Court, the Honorable C.A. 
Richards presiding, granted in part and denied in part Felix's 
motions.  The circuit court began with its conclusion that Felix 
was lawfully arrested.  It noted that Felix was sleeping in a 
recliner in plain view of a door to the apartment that was known 
to pop open.  According to the circuit court, the arrest was 
valid because Felix had voluntarily submitted himself to public 
view and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.  The circuit court explained, quoting 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976), what "a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or 
office, . . . is 
not 
a 
subject 
of 
[F]ourth 
[A]mendment 
protection."14 
¶16 Thus, because the circuit court concluded that Felix's 
arrest was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, it 
also concluded that Felix's signed statement, the buccal swab 
                                                 
14 Before this court, the State does not advance the 
argument that the arrest was lawful based on the reasoning of 
the circuit court.  Rather, the State's argument before this 
court presumes that the arrest was made in violation of Payton, 
445 U.S. at 590.  Consistent with the parties' positions, we 
assume, without deciding, that Felix's arrest at his home 
without an arrest warrant was in violation of Payton.  See infra 
¶29.       
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
11 
 
provided at the police station, and his clothing seized at the 
jail were not tainted by any constitutional violation and were 
admissible.  The circuit court denied Felix's motion to suppress 
the knife that police discovered in his apartment because the 
circuit court concluded that Kudick provided valid consent to 
search that area.  The circuit court suppressed the statement 
Felix made outside of his residence, that he "had a knife on 
[him]," but "must have gotten rid of it," because Felix had not 
been given Miranda warnings.  While that statement could not be 
used in the State's case-in-chief, the circuit court determined 
that because the statement was made voluntarily, it could be 
used for impeachment purposes.15   
¶17 Felix pleaded guilty to the charge in the amended 
information of second-degree intentional homicide contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05(1)(b).16  Felix was sentenced to 28 years of 
initial confinement and 20 years on extended supervision.  
                                                 
15 State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 118, 291 N.W.2d 478 
(1980) 
("A 
statement 
of 
the 
defendant 
made 
without 
the 
appropriate Miranda warnings, although inadmissible in the 
prosecution's 
case-in-chief, 
may 
be 
used 
to 
impeach 
the 
defendant's credibility if the defendant testifies to matters 
contrary to what is in the excluded statement." (citing Harris 
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971))). 
16 Wisconsin 
Statute 
§ 940.05 
provides: 
"Second−degree 
intentional homicide. (1) Whoever causes the death of another 
human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty 
of a Class B felony if: . . . (b) The state concedes that it is 
unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating 
circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By 
charging under this section, the state so concedes." 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
12 
 
¶18 Felix appealed the circuit court's denial of the 
suppression motion,17 and the court of appeals affirmed in part 
and reversed in part the circuit court's decision.  State v. 
Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2011).  The court of appeals remanded for a trial with 
directions to suppress Felix's signed statement and the buccal 
swab provided at the police station, and his clothing that 
police seized at the jail.  Id.  
¶19 Following the State's assumption that Felix's arrest 
violated Payton, the court of appeals addressed whether Harris 
or Brown provided the proper analysis regarding the suppression 
of evidence later obtained from Felix.  Id., ¶19.  The court of 
appeals 
declined 
to 
apply 
the 
Harris 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule because it had not yet been adopted by this 
court, and because the court of appeals concluded that Harris 
conflicted with this court's decisions in Laasch v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 587, 
267 
N.W.2d 278 
(1978), 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
131 
Wis. 2d 220, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986), and State v. Walker, 154 
Wis. 2d 158, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990).  Id., ¶¶14-15, 19.  The 
court of appeals also noted that after Harris was decided, this 
court applied the Brown analysis in State v. Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d 441, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991), and State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998), involving the suppression of 
evidence obtained following a warrantless home entry and search.  
                                                 
17 A defendant may appeal an order denying a motion to 
suppress despite the fact that the final judgment was entered 
upon the defendant's guilty plea.  Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).  
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
13 
 
Id., ¶¶16-17.  The court of appeals concluded that it would be 
"peculiar" to admit evidence obtained after a warrantless home 
entry and arrest under Harris and to analyze evidence obtained 
after a warrantless home entry and search under Brown.  Id., 
¶18.  Although the court of appeals recognized that Article I, 
Section 11 has typically been interpreted in accord with the 
Fourth Amendment, the court of appeals stated that it was 
constrained by this court's prior decisions.  Id., ¶19.  
Applying Brown, the court of appeals remanded with directions to 
suppress Felix's signed statement, the buccal swab provided at 
the police station, and his clothing seized at the jail as not 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest.18  Id., ¶20.  
¶20 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision to admit the knife and any evidence obtained from the 
green Chrysler.  Id., ¶¶21-22.  According to the court of 
appeals, the knife was admissible because it was seized in a 
search conducted pursuant to Kudick's valid consent.  Id., ¶21.  
The court of appeals did not remand to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the green Chrysler because the police had probable 
cause to search and did not need a search warrant to seize the 
vehicle.  Id., ¶22.    
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  The State asks this court to resolve whether under 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals declined to address Felix's argument 
that both of his statements were involuntary and that his 
Miranda waiver at the police station was invalid because the 
court of appeals remanded for suppression on other grounds.  
Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, ¶1 n.1. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
14 
 
Article I, Section 11 the Harris rule or the three-factor Brown 
attenuation 
analysis 
governs 
the 
suppression 
of 
evidence 
obtained following an arrest in violation of Payton.  The State 
also asks this court to determine, under the applicable 
analysis, whether Felix's signed statement and the buccal swab 
he provided at the police station, and Felix's clothes that were 
obtained at the jail must be suppressed.19 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 This court reviews a motion to suppress under a two-
prong analysis.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 
                                                 
19 Felix did not file a cross-petition in this court for 
review.  While he argued before the circuit court and the court 
of appeals that his statements were involuntary and his Miranda 
waiver invalid, he did not raise these issues in his briefs or 
at oral argument before this court.  In fact, in Felix's brief 
he clarified that he "is no longer arguing before this court 
that his statement to [the detective] was involuntary due to 
police misconduct."  The circuit court suppressed the statement 
Felix made in his yard because he had not been given Miranda 
warnings, but concluded that it was voluntary.  The circuit 
court denied Felix's motion to suppress his signed statement at 
the police station because it concluded that his arrest was 
lawful and that prior to making this statement he was given and 
waived his Miranda rights.  The circuit court did not address 
Felix's argument that his signed statement at the police station 
was involuntary.   
The court of appeals declined to address these issues 
because it remanded to suppress Felix's signed statement on 
other grounds. Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, ¶1 n.1.  Felix did not 
ask this court, in his briefs or at oral argument, for a remand 
to the court of appeals to allow it to address these issues.  
Thus, we do not address the voluntariness of Felix's statements 
or the validity of his Miranda waiver nor do we remand to the 
court 
of 
appeals 
to 
address 
these 
issues 
because 
Felix 
apparently has abandoned these arguments and has not asked for a 
remand to the court of appeals. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  "First, we review the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact, and will uphold them unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Second, we review the application 
of constitutional principles to those facts de novo."  Id.  
Whether police conduct violated a defendant's constitutional 
rights under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures presents a question 
of constitutional fact that this court independently reviews.  
State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 
N.W.2d 72. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
¶23 Because Felix raised multiple challenges to statements 
and evidence that police obtained following his arrest, we begin 
by clarifying the evidence at issue before this court.  The 
State appealed the court of appeals decision regarding the 
suppression of Felix's written, signed statement at the police 
station, the buccal swab that he provided at the police station, 
and Felix's clothing that police seized at the jail.  These are 
the only matters at issue in this appeal.   
 
¶24 The State urges this court to interpret Article I, 
Section 1120 consistent with the Fourth Amendment21 and to adopt 
                                                 
20 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
16 
 
the Harris rule.  The State asserts that the court of appeals 
erroneously concluded that this court's previous decisions 
conflicted with the Harris rule.  The State notes that Laasch, 
84 
Wis. 2d 587, 
Smith, 
131 
Wis. 2d 220, 
and 
Walker, 
154 
Wis. 2d 158, were decided before Harris, and that Anderson, 165 
Wis. 2d 441, involved an unlawful entry and search, which is not 
covered by the Harris rule.  Instead, the State asserts that the 
court of appeals was bound by its decision in State v. Roberson 
adopting the Harris rule.  2005 WI App 195, 287 Wis. 2d 403, 704 
N.W.2d 302, aff'd on other grounds, 2006 WI 80, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 
717 N.W.2d 111.  The State asks this court to continue with its 
usual past practice and interpret Article I, Section 11 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.   
¶25 If this court adopts the Harris rule, the State 
asserts that Felix's signed statement, the buccal swab he 
provided at the police station, and Felix's clothing seized at 
the jail are all admissible.  While Harris dealt with a 
defendant's statements, the State argues that its rationale also 
applies to Felix's clothes, and presumes that the Harris rule 
applies to the buccal swab.  According to the State, the court 
of appeals erroneously concluded that Felix's clothes must be 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
17 
 
suppressed even under Harris by relying on a Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court case, Commonwealth v. Tyree, 919 N.E.2d 
660 (Mass. 2010), which the State asserts incorrectly interprets 
Harris and is distinguishable.  Even if the clothing should have 
been suppressed under Harris, the State argues that the error 
was harmless because there is no reasonable probability that 
Felix would have decided not to plead guilty, given the rest of 
the evidence against him, and the significantly reduced exposure 
to jail time he received with the plea.  If this court declines 
to adopt the Harris rule and instead applies Brown, then the 
State asserts that Felix's statements and the buccal swab he 
provided at the police station are sufficiently attenuated and 
admissible.22 
¶26 Felix argues that the Brown attenuation analysis 
governs the suppression of the statement and the other physical 
evidence because the Harris rule conflicts with this court's 
decisions and Article I, Section 11.  According to Felix, 
applying a Brown analysis in this case is consistent with this 
court's 
decisions 
in 
Laasch, 
84 
Wis. 2d 587, 
Smith, 
131 
Wis. 2d 220, and Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, which predate Harris.  
Felix further argues that applying Brown is consistent with 
Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, and Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, which 
applied the Brown analysis after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Harris.  Felix asserts that this court should conclude, 
                                                 
22 The State makes no argument in regard to the application 
of the Brown attenuation analysis to Felix's clothes. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
18 
 
as it did in Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, that this is a situation in 
which the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant's Article I, 
Section 11 rights.  Felix finds it significant that this court 
did not adopt Harris in Anderson because, even though that case 
involved the fruit of unlawful searches, it would be "peculiar" 
to have different analyses for unlawful searches and seizures.  
If this court adopts Harris, then Felix argues that his clothing 
should be suppressed because the Harris rule applies only to 
statements and not tangible evidence, see Tyree, 919 N.E.2d at 
679-82.  According to Felix, if this court concludes that the 
clothing should have been suppressed, it is unclear whether the 
harmless error test applies and this court should decline to 
apply it here.  He argues that, if this court applies the Brown 
attenuation analysis, then the signed statement, the buccal 
swab, and his clothing should be suppressed.   
¶27 We first examine whether Brown or Harris governs the 
suppression of the physical evidence and written, signed 
statement at issue here.  Both of these decisions address 
whether evidence or statements obtained following some unlawful 
police activity must be suppressed.  Brown, 422 U.S. at 591-92; 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).  Specifically, the 
Harris rule applies to evidence and statements obtained from a 
defendant outside of the home where police had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant, but arrested him in his home without a 
warrant.  495 U.S. at 21.  Thus, two threshold matters we need 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
19 
 
to resolve are whether the police had probable cause and whether 
Felix was unlawfully arrested. 
¶28 We conclude that police had probable cause to arrest 
Felix prior to going to Felix's apartment.  Police have probable 
cause to arrest if they have "information which would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably 
committed a crime."  West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 398, 246 
N.W.2d 675 (1976); see also Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d).  Felix 
does not dispute that police had probable cause to arrest him.  
All of the witnesses that police interviewed led them to Felix.  
Specifically, we note that T.W. stated that after the fight she 
heard Felix say "I'm going to prison.  I stabbed someone.  I 
think I killed him."  Also, T.W. told police that she was 
"pretty positive" or about "98" percent sure that Felix stabbed 
someone.  Kyle Leder told police that he heard Felix yell "stab" 
and "I'm not going to prison" before Felix left in a green 
Chrysler.  Police had ample information to lead a reasonable 
officer to believe that Felix probably committed a crime by 
stabbing Davids.     
¶29 Regarding the legality of Felix's arrest, the United 
States Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York that, even if 
police have probable cause to arrest a defendant, entering the 
defendant's home without a warrant to accomplish an arrest 
violates the Fourth Amendment.  445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).  Even 
before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Payton, this court held in 
Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d at 595-97, that a warrantless entry and 
arrest in a defendant's home violates Article I, Section 11 and 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
20 
 
the Fourth Amendment.  See Payton, 445 U.S. at 575 n.3 (citing 
Laasch with approval).  In this case, the premise that Felix's 
arrest was unlawful in violation of Payton underlies both of the 
parties' briefs and the State's petition asking this court to 
decide the novel issue of whether Brown or Harris applies to the 
suppression of evidence obtained after a Payton violation.  
Consistent with the parties' positions, we assume, without 
deciding, that Felix's arrest at his home without an arrest 
warrant was in violation of Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. 
¶30 Because 
police 
obtained 
Felix's 
written, 
signed 
statement, the buccal swab, and his clothing following his 
unlawful arrest, Felix argues that this evidence must be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  The exclusionary rule 
provides for the suppression of evidence that "is in some sense 
the product of the illegal governmental activity."  State v. 
Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶22, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (quoting 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).  "The primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter future unlawful 
police conduct.'"  Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).  It is a judicially-created rule that is 
not absolute, but rather requires the balancing of the rule's 
remedial objectives with the "substantial social costs exacted 
by the exclusionary rule."  Id., ¶¶22-23 (quoting Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987)).  This rule extends to both 
tangible and intangible evidence that is the fruit of the 
poisonous tree, or, in other words, evidence obtained "by 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
21 
 
exploitation of" the illegal government activity.  Id., ¶24 
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).   
¶31 In Brown, the United States Supreme Court set forth 
the following three-factor test for whether evidence obtained 
following unlawful police conduct must be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule as the fruit of the poisonous tree, or whether 
it is admissible as sufficiently attenuated from the illegality: 
(1) "[t]he temporal proximity" between the illegal activity and 
the evidence, (2) "the presence of intervening circumstances," 
and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."  
422 U.S. at 603-04. 
¶32 After Brown was decided in 1975, and before the United 
States Supreme Court decided Harris in 1990, this court applied 
the Brown attenuation analysis in Smith and Walker, which 
involved the suppression of evidence obtained from a defendant 
outside of the home following an arrest in violation of Payton.  
In Smith, police had probable cause to arrest, but unlawfully 
entered Smith's home and arrested him without a warrant or the 
presence of any exigent circumstances in violation of Article I, 
Section 11 and the Fourth Amendment.  131 Wis. 2d at 232-35.  
Smith later confessed during an interrogation.  Id. at 226.  
This 
court 
suppressed 
the 
statements 
under 
Brown 
in 
an 
abbreviated analysis based on the State's concession that if the 
arrest was unlawful, then Smith's statements would be suppressed 
as insufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest.  Id. at 
241-42.   
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
22 
 
¶33 In Walker, this court stated that Brown governed the 
analysis of the lineup identifications made after Walker was 
unlawfully arrested from the backyard of his home in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment prohibitions articulated in Payton and 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).23  Walker, 154 
Wis. 2d at 182-87.  Police did not have an arrest warrant, but 
this court assumed that police had probable cause to arrest 
Walker for burglary.  Id. at 184.  Walker was positively 
identified by several eyewitnesses to the burglaries in a lineup 
the morning after his arrest.  Id. at 162-63.  Because this 
court lacked the necessary information in the record to examine 
the lineup under the Brown factors, we remanded to the circuit 
court to conduct a Brown analysis.  Id. at 187. 
¶34 After this court decided Smith and Walker, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Harris, 495 U.S. 14.  There the 
Court held that even if an arrest violated Payton, evidence 
obtained from the defendant outside of the home while in lawful 
police custody is not the product of the illegal arrest, so long 
as police had probable cause to arrest.  Id. at 21.  Such 
evidence need not be analyzed under Brown.  Id. at 18-19.  In 
Harris, police had probable cause to arrest Harris for murder, 
but police went to Harris's apartment, entered and arrested him 
without a warrant.  Id. at 15-16.  The Supreme Court accepted 
                                                 
23 Oliver provides that Fourth Amendment protections extend 
to the curtilage of the home, which includes "the land 
immediately surrounding and associated with the home."  Oliver 
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).   
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
23 
 
the trial court's finding that Harris did not consent to the 
police officers' entry and thus he was arrested in violation of 
Payton.  Id. at 17.  Harris argued that his statement at the 
police station, after he was given and waived his Miranda 
rights, must be suppressed because it was the fruit of his 
unlawful arrest.  Id. at 16.     
¶35 The United States Supreme Court held that "where the 
police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary 
rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the 
defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is 
taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton."  
Id. at 21.  The Supreme Court stated that the Brown "attenuation 
analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, 
courts determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense 
the product of illegal governmental activity.'” Id. at 19 
(quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).  
Harris's statement, which police obtained while Harris was in 
legal custody at the police station, and after he was given and 
waived his Miranda rights, did not require suppression because 
it was not the product of the unlawful arrest or of any further 
illegal governmental activity.  Id.   
¶36 We are bound to follow the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that sets the 
minimum protections afforded by the federal constitution.  State 
v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶39, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  
However, Felix urges this court to interpret Article I, Section 
11 in a manner that provides more deterrence of and protection 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
24 
 
against unlawful activities and seizures than that provided by 
the Harris rule.  As we have previously noted, we are 
particularly reluctant to do so given the nearly identical 
language 
in both 
provisions.24  Rather, we have usually 
interpreted Article I, Section 11 in accord with the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.25  
We have more often interpreted the Wisconsin Constitution 
differently than the federal constitution in regard to Article 
I, Sections 7 and 8 than in regard to Article 1, Section 11.26  
"On only one occasion in our development of Article I, Section 
11 jurisprudence have we required a showing different from that 
required by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
                                                 
24 State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 172, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) 
("But for a few inconsequential differences in punctuation, 
capitalization and the use of the singular or plural form of a 
word, the texts of art. I, sec. 11 and the fourth amendment are 
identical."), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dearborn, 
2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97; see supra notes 20 
and 21. 
25 We have interpreted Article I, Section 11 consistent with 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
in 
the 
following: 
Dearborn, 
327 
Wis. 2d 252, 
¶27; 
State 
v. 
Ferguson, 
2009 
WI 
50, 
317 
Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187; State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶¶19-
24, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748; State v. Malone, 2004 WI 
108, ¶15, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1; State v. Guzman, 166 
Wis. 2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992); Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 
172, overruled on other grounds by Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252; 
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977); State v. 
Williams, 47 Wis. 2d 242, 177 N.W.2d 611 (1970).  
26 See e.g., State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶¶39-40, 285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Article I, Section 8); State v. 
Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶57-62, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 
(Article I, Section 8); State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 242-
43, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998) (Article I, Section 7).  
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
25 
 
We did so in regard to our development of a good faith exception 
under Article I, Section 11."  State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, 
¶17 n.6, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187.  This remains true 
today.27   
¶37 The sole exception is Eason, in which this court 
adopted a modified good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
for officers' reasonable reliance on a no-knock search warrant. 
245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶¶2-3.  We began by examining this court's long 
history of interpreting Article I, Section 11 consistent with 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id., ¶¶38-52.  This court continued on that path in 
Eason by following the United States Supreme Court's evolving 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, but interpreting Article 
I, Section 11 as requiring some minimal additional assurances 
before triggering the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  Id., ¶¶60-63.   
¶38 We find no reason in this case to depart from our 
customary practice of interpreting Article I, Section 11 in 
                                                 
27 Justice Bradley's dissent asserts that Laasch v. State, 
84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978), is "another occasion in 
which we interpreted Article I Section 11 more expansively than 
the existing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  Dissent, 
¶131.  To the contrary, in Laasch, this court explained that our 
conclusion was premised on both the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  84 Wis. 2d at 595.  
We stated that our conclusion was "in accord with decisions of 
this court and of the United States Supreme Court."  Id.  Laasch 
is not an example of a situation in which this court has 
diverged from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment on the basis of additional protections 
provided under Article I, Section 11. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
26 
 
accord with the Fourth Amendment.  As such, we adopt the Harris 
exception to the exclusionary rule because we are persuaded by 
the United States Supreme Court's well-reasoned decision.28  
¶39  The Harris rule appropriately balances the purposes 
of the exclusionary rule and the Payton rule with the social 
costs associated with suppressing evidence.  The Payton rule was 
premised on the Fourth Amendment's protection of the "sanctity 
of the home."  Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89, 601; Harris, 495 U.S. 
at 17.  The purposes of the exclusionary rule are to deter 
police misconduct and ensure judicial integrity by refusing to 
rely on evidence obtained through police misconduct, Eason, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶44, but the primary purpose is deterrence, Knapp, 
285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶22.  The laudable goal of deterring police 
misconduct is not pursued at all costs.  As this court noted in 
its analysis of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, there are "substantial social costs" associated with 
excluding relevant evidence.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶31.    
¶40 The United States Supreme Court reiterated in Harris 
that "[t]he penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn 
upon the public, because its officers have violated the law must 
bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve."  
495 U.S. at 17.  The Harris rule is based on the Supreme Court's 
                                                 
28 As the court of appeals noted, it has applied the Harris 
rule in a number of cases.  Felix, No. 2010AP346-CR, ¶14 n.5.  
For example, the court of appeals discussed and applied Harris 
in State v. Roberson, 2005 WI App 195, ¶¶16-23, 287 Wis. 2d 403, 
704 N.W.2d 302, which this court affirmed on other grounds, 2006 
WI 80, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 717 N.W.2d 111. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
27 
 
conclusion that suppressing evidence and statements obtained 
from a defendant outside of the home following a Payton 
violation does not further the purpose of the Payton rule: "the 
rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of 
the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like 
Harris, protection for statements made outside their premises 
where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for 
committing a crime."  Id.  The Payton rule is vindicated through 
the suppression of any evidence or statements obtained from the 
defendant while officers are still inside the defendant's home 
unlawfully.  Id. at 20.  The Fourth Amendment does not require 
courts to exclude all evidence or forgo prosecuting a defendant 
following unlawful police conduct, even if doing so might have 
some deterrent effect.  Id.  Under the Harris rule, police are 
sufficiently 
deterred 
from 
violating 
Payton 
because 
"the 
principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police 
know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of 
any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home."  Id.  
There is no compelling reason to go further and suppress 
evidence lawfully obtained from a defendant outside of the home. 
¶41 The Harris Court drew a line at the entrance to the 
home because that is the heart of the Fourth Amendment and the 
focus of Payton.  Id. at 17-18.  Harris provides a narrow rule: 
where police had probable cause before the unlawful entry and 
arrest, an arrest in violation of Payton does not require the 
suppression of evidence obtained from the defendant outside of 
the home, such as statements obtained after Miranda warnings and 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
28 
 
the waiver of those rights.  For this narrow category of 
evidence, it is not necessary to do a Brown analysis where it is 
clear as it is here that the evidence is not derived from the 
illegality.  See id. at 19-20.  In other situations, this court 
and the United States Supreme Court continue to require a Brown 
analysis 
to 
ensure 
that 
evidence 
or 
statements 
obtained 
following 
police 
misconduct 
are 
not 
the 
product 
of 
the 
illegality.  Additionally, as the Supreme Court noted in Harris, 
evidence will still be suppressed if it was "the product of 
coercion, if Miranda warnings were not given, or if there was a 
violation of the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981)."  Id. at 20.  The Harris rule is a common-sense 
limitation on the exclusionary rule where excluding statements 
and evidence does not serve the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule or the purpose of the Payton rule.  
¶42 While this court's decisions in Smith and Walker, 
which preceded Harris, applied a Brown attenuation analysis to 
determine the admissibility of evidence that is covered by the 
Harris rule, we follow the United States Supreme Court's 
evolving interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.29  In accord 
                                                 
29 Felix argues that our decision in Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 
also conflicts with the Harris rule, but we disagree.  Laasch 
did not involve a Brown analysis or even the suppression of 
evidence.  In Laasch, this court held that the circuit court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Laasch as a result of the 
unlawful entry and arrest.  Id. at 597.  This part of Laasch's 
holding was later modified by State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 
240, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986) (holding that an unlawful arrest does 
not deprive a circuit court of personal jurisdiction).    
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
29 
 
with Harris, we hold that where police had probable cause to 
arrest before the unlawful entry and warrantless arrest from a 
defendant's home, this violation of Payton does not require the 
suppression of evidence obtained from a defendant outside of the 
home, such as statements obtained after the defendant was given 
and waived his Miranda rights. 
¶43 This holding does not conflict with this court's post-
Harris decisions in Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, and Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, contrary to Felix's assertions.  We applied a Brown 
attenuation analysis in those cases because they involved the 
fruits of an unlawful entry and search.  Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 
441 (involving the suppression of physical evidence obtained 
from a consent search of Anderson's home where, following 
unlawful searches by police, Anderson was lawfully arrested in 
his home pursuant to an arrest warrant and later confessed and 
consented to a search of his home); Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180 
(involving the suppression of evidence obtained following a 
search of Phillips' bedroom where police obtained Phillips' 
consent while unlawfully inside of his home).  As stated above, 
the Harris rule applies where the only illegal police conduct is 
an unlawful entry and arrest in violation of Payton, not where 
the evidence may be tied to an unlawful search by police.  
Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion and Felix's 
argument, it is not "peculiar" to limit the application of the 
Harris rule to cases where the only illegal police conduct is a 
Payton violation.  Rather it is logical to develop a limited, 
bright-line rule for a narrow category of evidence obtained 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
30 
 
after an unlawful arrest in violation of Payton, but where 
police had probable cause to arrest, that we can say as a matter 
of law does not "bear a sufficiently close relationship to the 
underlying illegality."  See Harris, 495 U.S. at 19. 
¶44 We now apply the Harris rule to determine whether 
there should be suppression of Felix's written, signed statement 
at the police station, the buccal swab provided at the police 
station, and his clothing seized at the jail.  As we stated 
above, the Harris rule applies because police had probable cause 
to arrest Felix prior to going to his apartment, and consistent 
with the position of the parties, we assume, without deciding, 
that police unlawfully arrested Felix at his home without an 
arrest warrant in violation of Payton.  See supra ¶¶28-29.   
¶45 Felix's signed statement at the police station, after 
he was given and waived his Miranda rights,30 falls squarely 
under Harris's holding that "where the police have probable 
cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar 
the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of 
his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest 
made in the home in violation of Payton."  Harris, 495 U.S. at 
21.  Felix does not argue that his statement or the buccal swab 
he provided at the police station must be suppressed under 
Harris but rather that the attenuation analysis of Brown must be 
                                                 
30 As we noted above, Felix challenged the voluntariness of 
his statement and the validity of his Miranda waiver before the 
circuit court and court of appeals, but because he does make 
those arguments before this court, we do not address them.  See 
supra note 19. 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
31 
 
applied.  Like Felix's written, signed statement at the police 
station after he was given and waived his Miranda rights, the 
buccal swab is admissible under the Harris rule, because it was 
obtained from Felix while he was lawfully in police custody at 
the police station.   
¶46 Felix's clothing that police seized at the jail is 
also admissible under a logical extension of the Harris rule.    
Felix argues that the Harris rule does not cover the clothes he 
was wearing when he was arrested, and that they must be 
suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.  Felix argues 
that the warrantless arrest led directly to the seizure of his 
clothing because if the police had taken the time to get a 
warrant, he would have changed and police would not have 
obtained his clothing.  This argument is based on the type of 
but-for causality that the United States Supreme Court rejected 
in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).  The reasoning in 
Hudson informs our interpretation of the Harris rule, and 
supports applying it to the seizure of Felix's clothes at the 
jail.   
¶47 In Hudson, the Court explained that "exclusion may not 
be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was 
a 'but-for' cause of obtaining evidence."  Id. at 592.  After 
highlighting the "substantial social costs" of the exclusionary 
rule, "which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the 
dangerous 
at 
large," 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
reiterated 
that 
"[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in 
a particular case . . . is an issue separate from the question 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
32 
 
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to 
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct."  Id. at 591-92 
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  The Hudson Court declined to 
apply the exclusionary rule for a violation of the knock-and-
announce rule, because the minimal deterrent effect was far 
outweighed by the social costs of suppressing the evidence.  Id. 
at 599.   
¶48 When we examine Harris in this light, it is clear that 
the Harris Court drew a line at the entrance to the home and 
concluded that there was sufficient deterrence for Payton 
violations by suppressing evidence and statements that police 
obtained while unlawfully inside of the home and admitting 
evidence police lawfully obtained outside of the home.  Harris, 
495 U.S. at 17-20.  Thus, we interpret Harris to apply to 
statements and evidence that police obtain from the defendant 
outside of the home.  Under our interpretation of Harris, 
Felix's clothing that police seized at the jail when he was 
being booked is admissible.  This interpretation is supported by 
the language and rationale we have noted in Harris and Hudson.  
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
33 
 
We also note that several other states have interpreted Harris 
in this way.31      
¶49 Additionally, Felix's clothing was not taken as 
evidence until after Felix was lawfully in police custody and 
was given and waived his Miranda rights.  The police did not 
even develop a reason to seize Felix's clothing until the 
detective noticed some "red spots" on Felix's shirt during 
questioning at the police station.  That fact distinguishes this 
case from Tyree, 919 N.E.2d at 682, in which the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that Harris did not apply to the 
shoes the defendant was wearing when unlawfully arrested in his 
home.  In Tyree, police noticed that the defendant's shoes 
matched the shoeprints at the scene of the crime while they were 
still unlawfully in his home.  Id. at 668.  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found it significant that police noted 
"the potential evidentiary relevance of a piece of a suspect's 
clothing while they [were] still unlawfully in the home."  Id. 
at 682.  As we explained above, the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
                                                 
31 People v. Alexander, 571 N.E.2d 1075, 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) ("While Harris refers only to 'statements,' we see no 
reason why the rule it enunciates should not apply as well to 
other evidence obtained outside the home, as the argument for 
excluding statements was that they were the 'fruits of an 
illegal arrest' rather than that there was some basis for 
distinguishing between statements and other evidence."); People 
v. Watkins, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 459 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
("Since the arrest itself is proper, physical evidence taken 
from the defendant's person at the police station need not be 
suppressed."); Timmons v. State, 734 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000) (concluding that the Harris rule applies to both 
statements and tangible physical evidence). 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
34 
 
Hudson supports our reading of the Harris rule as applicable to 
physical evidence obtained from the defendant outside of the 
home, as well as to statements made after the defendant was 
given and waived his Miranda rights.  In this case, that 
includes the clothes Felix was wearing when he was arrested that 
police seized at the jail.  
¶50 Therefore, we conclude that, under Harris, there is no  
basis for suppressing Felix's written, signed statement after he 
was given and waived his Miranda rights at the police station, 
the buccal swab that he provided at the police station, and his 
clothing that police seized at the jail.       
V. CONCLUSION 
¶51 We continue our usual practice of interpreting Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Thus, we adopt the Harris exception to the 
exclusionary rule for certain evidence obtained after a Payton 
violation.  We hold that, where police had probable cause to 
arrest before the unlawful entry, a warrantless arrest from 
Felix's home in violation of Payton requires neither the 
suppression of statements outside of the home after Miranda 
rights were given and waived, nor the suppression of physical 
evidence obtained from Felix outside of the home.  Assuming 
without deciding that Felix's warrantless arrest from his home 
was in violation of Payton, we conclude that, pursuant to the 
Harris rule, the following evidence that police obtained outside 
of the home is admissible: Felix's signed statement, made after 
No. 
2010AP346-CR   
 
35 
 
Felix was given and waived his Miranda rights, the buccal swab 
obtained at the police station, and Felix's clothing seized at 
the jail, as well as any derivative evidence. 
¶52 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶53 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  In Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
held 
that 
"the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution . . . prohibits 
the 
police 
from 
making 
a 
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in 
order to make a routine felony arrest."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
Court added that it had "no occasion to consider the sort of 
emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 
'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry 
into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search."  Id. at 
583 (emphasis added). 
¶54 The majority opinion in this case is based on the 
assumption that police officers from the Everest Metro and 
Wausau police departments violated the rule in Payton when they 
arrested Devin Felix (Felix) at the apartment of Dean Kudick in 
Wausau.  Because I do not agree with this assumption, I write 
separately to explain my position——even though I join the 
majority opinion. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶55 On September 8, 2007, officers of the Everest Metro 
Police 
Department 
were 
called 
to 
a 
Schofield, 
Wisconsin 
residence at about 1:10 a.m.  There had been a serious fight at 
an underage drinking party, and when officers arrived at the 
residence they found a man lying in the street with multiple 
stab wounds and a shirt soaked with blood.  The victim, 
Nathaniel Davids, 18, died soon after he was rushed to a local 
hospital. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶56 The fight was observed by partygoers and neighbors but 
after the stabbing, many of them quickly fled the scene.  Police 
immediately determined that they had a potential homicide on 
their hands.  They began to gather information and called in 
other Everest Metro officers, including Detective Sergeant 
Dennis Halkoski, who became the lead investigator, and Officer 
Daniel Goff, both of whom had been at home.  Eventually, when 
suspicion focused on Devin Felix, the Everest Metro police also 
brought in Wausau officers because Felix was thought to be 
living in Wausau.  The involvement of Wausau police was not only 
helpful but also necessary to avoid any jurisdictional issues in 
the event of an arrest. 
¶57 The record describes how Detective Sergeant Halkoski 
interviewed various witnesses beginning about 3:00 a.m. and 
continuing until after 7:00 a.m.  Other officers, including 
Sergeant Terrence Peterson, also conducted interviews.  At some 
point, Officer Goff and an Everest Metro captain left Schofield 
to drive to Wausau where they met up with Wausau Officer Mark 
Klein.  The two Everest Metro officers arrived at approximately 
7:00 a.m. 
¶58 The three officers were looking for Felix, his brother 
Kylie, and the green Chrysler that Felix purportedly used to 
escape.  They first went to an address on East Wausau Avenue 
where they expected to find Kylie, who had been at the party and 
may have left with his brother.  The officers found nothing, as 
no one appeared to be living at that address. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶59 The officers next went to an address on Prospect 
Avenue where Keith Felix, the boys' father, was living.  They 
found him, interviewed him, and then followed his suggestion to 
look for Felix at 617 Fulton Street, a two-story building where 
Felix was supposed to be living in the basement. 
¶60 At approximately 8:00 a.m. officers began to gather at 
the Fulton Street address.  A green Chrysler registered to 
Felix's mother was spotted in the driveway.  Detective Sergeant 
Halkoski was notified to come from Schofield, and additional 
back-up officers were enlisted from Wausau. 
¶61 After eight officers had arrived and created a secure 
perimeter around the house, Detective Sergeant Halkoski and 
Officer Goff approached the entrance to the basement at the rear 
of the house with their guns drawn. 
¶62 Halkoski knocked hard on the back door which popped 
open.  The officers saw Felix apparently sleeping in a recliner, 
five to six feet from an open doorway at the bottom of the steps 
to the basement.  The officers ordered Felix to put up his hands 
and come out, which he did.  He was placed under arrest, 
handcuffed, and put in a squad car.  The police did not have an 
arrest warrant for Felix. 
ANALYSIS 
¶63 In analyzing the facts to determine whether there was 
a Payton violation, both the majority opinion and the court 
record require close scrutiny. 
¶64 First, there is no dispute that police officers had 
probable cause to arrest Devin Felix for the murder of Nathaniel 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Davids.  The police had more statements than those described in 
the majority opinion, and they had a motive: that Nate Davids 
was beating up Felix's younger brother Kylie when Felix 
intervened. 
¶65 Second, Everest Metro police obtained a search warrant 
for the Schofield party residence at 5:44 a.m. from Marathon 
County Circuit Judge Gregory Grau.  This search warrant named a 
"suspect," Devin Felix, and relied for its probable cause on 
statements made by some of the same witnesses who provided the 
basis for Felix's arrest.  The warrant was prepared by a 
Marathon 
County 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
who 
came 
to 
Schofield in the early hours of September 8. 
¶66 Third, Everest Metro and Wausau police officers 
actively, continuously, searched for Devin Felix after he became 
the focus of the investigation.  Felix was an armed homicide 
suspect who fled the crime scene, was overheard saying he had 
killed someone, and reportedly vowed he would not go to prison.  
To find this suspect, police pursued every lead.  When they 
arrived at the Fulton Street address, they did not know how many 
people were there and whether any persons in the house would be 
in danger or possibly taken hostage. 
¶67 Fourth, there is no dispute that when Detective 
Sergeant Halkoski firmly knocked on the back door at 617 Fulton 
Street, it "popped open" ("I knocked at the door and the door 
popped open.").  This testimony was supported by Officer Goff: 
Q. 
And he knocked on the door and what happened? 
A. 
The thing opened. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
Q. 
Okay.  The thing being the door? 
A. 
Yes, the door opened.  It just swung open when he 
knocked on it. 
¶68 Dean Kudick, who had rented the first floor and 
basement for nearly four years, testified that the back door 
popped open regularly: 
Q. 
And when someone knocks on the back door, does 
the door stay closed all the time? 
A. 
I'm not sure what you mean by that. 
Q. 
Okay.  If you knock on the door, will it pop 
open? 
A. 
It is possible it could pop open.  It still does 
to this day. 
Q. 
So it had in the past? 
A. 
Yes, it had. 
 
. . . .  
Q. 
So it doesn't take much pressure then . . .  
A. 
No. 
¶69 Fifth, neither Detective Sergeant Halkoski nor Officer 
Goff entered the house to effect the arrest.  Halkoski was 
asked: 
Q. 
Did you cross the threshold or enter the house? 
A. 
No. 
¶70 On cross examination, Halkoski was asked whether his 
gun was beyond the doorjamb as he was covering Felix.  He 
responded that it was. 
Q. 
Outside or inside? 
A. 
Outside. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
Consequently, there is no evidence that the officers ever broke 
the plane of the threshold before or during the arrest. 
¶71 Several officers did enter the house after Felix had 
been arrested, for a sweep of the premises for officer safety.  
The officers explained that they did not know the whereabouts of 
Kylie Felix and they detected movement on the back porch where 
Kylie and another brother usually slept.  The officers did not 
conduct a search for evidence until they received written 
consent from the lessee of the apartment. 
¶72 In sum, the police acted conscientiously, and there 
was no violation of Payton unless the rule in Payton is extended 
to cover a "constructive entry" and the existence of exigent 
circumstances is ruled out.  Such a conclusion would require a 
change in Wisconsin law. 
¶73 In his trial brief supporting his motion to suppress 
evidence, Felix contended that his warrantless arrest "from 
inside the home and at gunpoint" violated the federal and state 
constitutions.  He cited Payton and Laasch v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978).  However, the brief went on: 
 
The Payton case did emphasize the sanctity of the 
home and made reference to the threshold as being one 
point of significance.  However, subsequent federal 
cases 
have 
had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
examine 
the 
circumstances by which the defendant's presence was 
acquired, outside and across the threshold.  It has 
been uniformly held that a warrantless arrest will be 
illegal if the defendant's presence outside was 
acquired by coercion.  See [LaFave], Search and 
Seizure at section 6.1, note 188. 
 
Wisconsin has no reported case directly on point.  
However, several circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
have examined this issue.  The universal conclusion is 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
that 
the 
4th 
Amendment 
could 
be 
too 
easily 
circumvented if law enforcement is allowed to simply 
point a gun at a home and order the occupants out, in 
order to achieve a valid warrantless arrest.  The 
requirement of a judicially-reviewed warrant is so 
fundamental that this can not be tolerated. 
 
. . . .  
 
It is clear that while the [officers] physically 
remained outside the doorway, the reach of the 
officers extended into the residence by the use of 
firearms and by the use of commands to exit. 
¶74 The LaFave treatise cited by the defendant reads in 
part: 
 
The cases involving arrests made on the premises 
(in the broad sense of that term) outside rather than 
inside the threshold deserve some attention at this 
point, 
for 
quite 
similar 
considerations 
govern 
there. . . .  [T]he warrantless arrest will be illegal 
if the defendant's presence outside was acquired by 
coercion. 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Basis For Entry to Arrest 
§ 6.1 at 306-07 (4th ed. 2004). 
¶75 This theory of "constructive entry" merits careful 
examination in light of the actual facts and language of the 
Payton decision. 
¶76 Payton v. New York was decided in 1980, with a 
majority opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens.  Payton, 
445 U.S. at 573, 574.  Over and over the opinion emphasizes 
warrantless physical entry of a private residence.  For example: 
As the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the 
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which 
the 
wording 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
directed."  United States v. United States District 
Court, 
407 
U.S. 
297, 
313. . . .  
[T]he 
warrant 
procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions 
of that sort.   
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86. 
Judge Leventhal [in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 
385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)] first noted the settled 
rule that warrantless arrests in public places are 
valid. 
 
He 
immediately 
recognized, 
however, 
that . . .  
"Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is 
the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the 
Fourth Amendment." 
. . . .  
Judge Leventhal concluded that an entry to arrest and 
an entry to search for and seize property implicate 
the same interest in preserving the privacy and the 
sanctity of the home, and justify the same level of 
constitutional protection.   
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added). 
[A]ny differences in the intrusiveness of entries to 
search and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree 
rather than kind.  The two intrusions share this 
fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance 
to an individual's home. . . .  [Nowhere] is the zone 
of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by 
the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's 
home.   
Id. at 589 (emphasis added). 
[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the 
entrance to the house.  Absent exigent circumstances, 
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a 
warrant.   
Id. at 590. 
¶77 The dissent of Justice Byron White also emphasized 
entry: "The Court today holds that absent exigent circumstances 
officers may never enter a home during the daytime to arrest for 
a dangerous felony unless they have first obtained a warrant."  
Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  "Today's 
decision 
rests, 
in 
large 
measure, 
on 
the 
premise 
that 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
warrantless arrest entries constitute a particularly severe 
invasion of personal privacy."  Id. at 615 (emphasis added). 
¶78 The facts in Payton are fully aligned with these 
statements.  Police used crowbars to break open the door and 
enter Payton's apartment.  Id. at 576 (majority opinion).  "They 
had not obtained a warrant."  Id.  When police went to Obie 
Riddick's home (in the companion case), "his young son opened 
the door."  Id. at 578.  Police "entered the house and placed 
[Riddick] under arrest."  Id.  They made an arrest and conducted 
a search without a warrant.  Id. 
¶79 The Court cited ten state court decisions, including 
Laasch, to support its opinion.  Id. at 575 n.3.1  In all these 
cases, police entered a house or apartment without a warrant, 
sometimes forcing open or kicking down the door.  Laasch 
provides a representative example.  "[T]he defendant was 
arrested in her apartment, without a warrant."  Laasch, 84 
Wis. 2d at 588.  Thereafter, she was released.  Thirteen days 
later, when she returned home, she found "police officers 
waiting inside her apartment," having been admitted by her five-
year-old son.  Id. at 589.  She was arrested, inside the 
apartment, without a warrant.  Id.  The court quoted the Supreme 
Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
                                                 
1 See State v. Cook, 564 P.2d 877 (Ariz. 1977); People v. 
Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333 (Cal. 1976); People v. Moreno, 491 P.2d 575 
(Colo. 1971); State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 1979); State 
v. Platten, 594 P.2d 201 (Kan. 1979); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 
N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1975); State v. Olson, 598 P.2d 670 (Or. 
1979); Commonwealth v. Williams, 396 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1978); State 
v. McNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1978); Laasch v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978). 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
(1948), that "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is . . . a grave concern."  Laasch, 84 Wis. 2d at 594.  
Then it concluded: 
In the absence of exigent circumstances . . . the 
entry of one's dwelling to effect an arrest is subject 
to a warrant requirement no less exacting than that 
applicable where the entry is made to effect a search 
for one's papers and effects. 
 
. . . .   
We conclude that, absent exigent circumstances, 
the entry of one's dwelling without consent to effect 
a warrantless felony arrest on probable cause, is 
unlawful. 
Id. at 595-96 (footnote omitted). 
 
¶80 The Payton Court also cited six United States Court of 
Appeals cases supporting its decision.  Payton, 445 U.S. at 575 
n.4.2  Each of these cases also involved actual entry into 
private residential property without a warrant. 
 
¶81 The Payton decision stands out as one in which the 
dueling majority and dissenting opinions devote considerable 
effort buttressing their positions by reference to English 
common law preceding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.  
Justice Stevens relied heavily on Lord Edward Coke who wrote 
that "[N]either the Constable, nor any other can break open any 
house for the apprehension of the party suspected or charged 
with the felony. . . ."  Id. at 594 n.37 (quoting 4 E. Coke, 
                                                 
2 See United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Dorman v. United States, 435 
F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
Institutes 177).  William Blackstone and other commentators had 
different views.  However, none of the opinion writers in Payton 
cited common law authority for "constructive entry."  Indeed, if 
"constructive entry" had been at issue, the result in Payton 
might have been different. 
 
¶82 Payton has been narrowly interpreted by the Supreme 
Court since 1980.  "[T]he rule in Payton was designed to protect 
the physical integrity of the home."  New York v. Harris, 495 
U.S. 14, 17 (1990).  "Payton itself emphasized that our holding 
in that case stemmed from the 'overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions 
since the origins of the Republic.'"  Id. (quoting Payton, 445 
U.S. at 601). 
¶83 In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990), the 
Court said: "The purpose of the [Payton] decision was not to 
protect the person of the suspect but to protect his home from 
entry in the absence of a magistrate's finding of probable 
cause." 
¶84 As will be explained, "constructive entry" to effect 
an arrest——that is, treating police conduct outside the home the 
same as police conduct inside the home when police have broken a 
plane or crossed the threshold of the home to make an arrest 
without a warrant——is not based on the common law that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.  It is grounded on a very 
different theory than the theory articulated in Payton. 
¶85 The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 
¶86 By its plain terms, the Fourth Amendment governs 
searches and seizures, including seizures of the person, i.e., 
arrests.  In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the 
Supreme Court held that a police officer may, without warrant, 
arrest a person who is believed by the officer, upon probable 
cause, to be guilty of a felony.  Id. at 415-17.  Payton placed 
a geographic limitation on this power to arrest.  It identified 
a place——the suspect's home——where probable cause, no matter how 
compelling, is not sufficient to make an arrest without a 
warrant, except in exigent circumstances.  Absent exigent 
circumstances, police are required to have a warrant or consent 
before they may enter a suspect's home to make an arrest. 
 
¶87 Analytically, an arrest warrant may confirm police 
power to make an arrest, but it does not create it.  With 
probable cause, the police already have that power.  If the 
police come to a suspect's home with probable cause but no 
warrant, they may surround the house and stay there until they 
get a warrant.  They do not have to absent themselves from the 
area until they get a warrant.  They may arrest their suspect as 
he comes to the house, and they may arrest him if he attempts to 
leave the house.  The police know and the suspect knows that he 
is not free to go somewhere else simply because the police do 
not have a warrant.  If he leaves, he will be arrested. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
 
¶88 The warrant, then, serves as a judicially-approved 
ticket to enter the house to arrest or search. 
¶89 When the purpose of the warrant is to facilitate an 
arrest, the warrant is not really protecting a suspect's privacy 
so much as it is protecting the sanctity of the home.  See ¶31, 
supra.  The sanctity of the home, in turn, must yield when the 
suspect creates exigent circumstances. 
¶90 This analysis is grounded in the law of trespass, as 
perfectly illustrated in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505 (1961).  Defendants were convicted at trial based on 
conversations "overheard by means of an electronic listening 
device."  Id. at 506. 
 
The instrument in question was a microphone with 
a spike about a foot long attached to it, together 
with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones.  The 
officers inserted the spike under a baseboard in a 
second-floor room of the vacant house and into a 
crevice extending several inches into the party wall, 
until the spike hit something solid "that acted as a 
very good sounding board."  The record clearly 
indicates that the spike made contact with a heating 
duct serving the house occupied by the petitioners, 
thus converting their entire heating system into a 
conductor of sound.  Conversations taking place on 
both floors of the house were audible to the officers 
through the earphones, and their testimony regarding 
these conversations, admitted at the trial over timely 
objection, 
played 
a 
substantial 
part 
in 
the 
petitioners' convictions. 
Id. at 506-07 (emphasis added). 
¶91 The 
Supreme 
Court 
declared 
that 
"Eavesdropping 
accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the 
pale of even those decisions in which a closely divided Court 
has held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights."  
Id. at 509-10.  The Court observed that in On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)——in contrast to Silverman——"no 
trespass was committed."  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510 (quoting On 
Lee, 343 U.S. at 751) (internal quotation marks omitted).3  It 
added 
that the "absence of a physical invasion of the 
petitioner's premises" was a "vital factor" in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510.  
But in Silverman, "the officers overheard the petitioners' 
conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners' house or 
office——a heating system which was an integral part of the 
premises."  Id. at 511. 
¶92 The Court's reliance on trespass and property law in 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment was suspect when a government 
search invaded a person's reasonable expectation of privacy but 
the person had no discernible property interest to serve as an 
obstacle to the invasion.  The dilemma came to a head in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the court suppressed 
evidence obtained from eavesdropping by means of an electronic 
listening device attached to a public telephone booth. 
¶93 Justice Potter Stewart, who was part of the majority 
in Payton, wrote the majority opinion in Katz, taking issue at 
once with the questions posed to the Court: 
                                                 
3 Even the concurrences by Justice Douglas and Justices 
Clark and Whittaker recognize the Court making a distinction 
based solely upon invasion into property.  Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961). 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
A. 
Whether a public telephone booth is a 
constitutionally 
protected 
area 
so 
that 
evidence 
obtained 
by 
attaching 
an 
electronic 
listening 
recording device to the top of such a booth is 
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the 
user of the booth. 
B. 
Whether 
physical 
penetration 
of 
a 
constitutionally protected area is necessary before a 
search and seizure can be said to be violative of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50. 
¶94 The Court rejected this formulation of the issues, 
making two critical points.  First, "the correct solution of 
Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by 
incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.'"  
Id. at 350.  Second, "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated 
into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'"  Id.  The 
Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain 
kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections . . . often 
have nothing to do with privacy at all."  Id.  These critical 
passages are frequently overlooked because of Justice Stewart's 
oft-quoted aphorism that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places," id. at 351, and his critique of property interests 
as the basis for certain Fourth Amendment protections: 
It is true that the absence of . . . penetration was 
at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth 
Amendment inquiry for that Amendment was thought to 
limit only searches and seizures of tangible property.  
But "[t]he premise that property interests control the 
right of the Government to search and seize has been 
discredited." 
Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted).  As a result, many Court 
decisions 
link 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violations 
to 
individual 
privacy.   
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶95 But Katz did not consistently send that signal.  The 
Court said: 
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects 
people——and 
not 
simply 
"areas"——against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear 
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure. 
Id. at 353 (emphasis added).  The phrase "not simply 'areas'" 
means that the Fourth Amendment does not apply only in the 
context of trespass.  However, by its explicit terms, the Fourth 
Amendment does protect some "areas"——e.g., "houses"——and that 
protection is based largely on trespass law.   
¶96 In addition, the Court emphasized that Katz was a 
search case when it said: "We do not deal in this case with the 
law of detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 
353 n.13 (emphasis added). 
¶97 The Court has moved away from property law in search 
cases involving sophisticated technology.  For instance, in 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001), the majority was 
troubled by technology that permitted the police to "obtain[] by 
sense-enhancing 
technology 
any 
information 
regarding 
the 
interior 
of 
the 
home," 
which 
it 
described 
as 
"the 
prototypical . . . area of protected privacy."  Id. at 34.  Even 
though the Kyllo Court recognized that the police did not 
physically enter the home, the Court stressed the importance of 
protecting the intimate details of the home from what could have 
been accomplished, at the time of the adoption of the Fourth 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
Amendment, only by physical intrusion into the home.  Id. at 38-
40. 
¶98 Both the majority opinion, id. at 40, and Justice 
Stevens' dissent, id. at 43, focused on protecting the home of 
the defendant.  They were concerned that technology, in effect, 
had permitted the police to enter and search the home without 
physical intrusion.  Hence, the decision did not eliminate the 
Fourth Amendment's link to property law.   
¶99 The Court recently reiterated and reemphasized this 
link in a case involving a GPS device placed on an automobile.  
In United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), 
the Court was accused of resolving a case involving "a 21st-
century surveillance technique" by resorting to "18th-century 
tort law" involving trespass to chattels.  Id. at 957 (Alito, J. 
concurring).  But the majority author, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
was unapologetic: 
The Government physically occupied private property 
for the purpose of obtaining information.  We have no 
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted. . . .   
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close 
connection to property. 
 
. . . .  
[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of 
the 20th century. 
 
. . . .  
[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was 
understood 
to 
embody 
a 
particular 
concern 
for 
government trespass upon the areas ("persons, houses, 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
papers, and effects") it enumerates.  Katz did not 
repudiate that understanding. 
Id. at 949-50 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). 
¶100 In her concurrence, Justice Sonia Sotomayor observed 
that "Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, 
but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory 
test that preceded it."  Id. at 955. 
¶101 In an informative article in the New England Law 
Review, Professor Steven B. Dow makes a case for constructive 
entry as a constitutional doctrine.  Steven B. Dow, "Step 
Outside, Please": Warrantless Doorway Arrests and the Problem of 
Constructive Entry, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 7 (2010).  Part of his 
argument reads as follows: 
At 
one 
point 
the 
Court's 
"Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass," but 
for more than half a century the Court has made it 
clear that "[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are not 
inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of 
tort or real property law."  More recently, the Court 
has expressly "decoupled violation of a person's 
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of 
his property."  Any lingering doubts about whether 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights stop at the physical 
line that marks a home's boundaries should have come 
to an end with the Court's 2001 decision in Kyllo v. 
United States. 
Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted). 
¶102 Contrary to Professor Dow's analysis, the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Jones unquestionably affirms the Court's 
continuing recognition of the Fourth Amendment's roots in 
property law and the Court's willingness to adhere to a property 
rationale except in searches involving sophisticated technology.  
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
The Supreme Court has not adopted a constructive entry doctrine 
in cases of arrest. 
¶103 If the Court were to treat arrests outside the home 
the same as arrests inside the home after police entry without a 
warrant, the Court would be creating law inconsistent with 
Harris as well as Payton.  Harris permits police to obtain 
voluntary confessions from suspects off premises after an arrest 
is made in the home in violation of Payton.  Unless Harris were 
repudiated, adoption of the doctrine of constructive entry in 
arrest cases would incentivize police to enter houses without a 
warrant because, by doing so, they would be able to seize their 
suspects in the home, be able to prosecute them even after 
unlawful arrests (if they had probable cause to arrest), and 
still retain the possibility of obtaining voluntary confessions 
from these suspects off premises after giving them Miranda 
warnings. 
¶104 Constructive entry to effect an arrest is not grounded 
in the English common law.  It represents a departure from the 
established bright line rule against breaking a plane to 
physically enter a protected premises, and it would, if adopted, 
create uncertainty in the law about what police conduct outside 
the home is so "coercive" or "deceptive" to a suspect inside the 
home that it compels or induces the suspect to come out and 
surrender and thus requires some sort of suppression of 
evidence.  To deter "constructive entry" in arrest cases in 
which the police have probable cause to arrest, the law might 
have to suppress more than subsequent confessions and physical 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
20 
 
evidence.  It might have to bar prosecution of persons seized 
"unlawfully" both inside and outside the home.  This would 
inevitably lead to an expansion of exigent circumstances 
authorizing entry without a warrant.4 
¶105 The court assumes a Payton violation for its analysis 
in this case.  While this assumption is understandable given how 
the case evolved, it is nonetheless somewhat troubling because 
the court adopts and follows Harris under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Harris is simply inconsistent with the notion of 
a Payton "violation" on the facts of this case where there was 
no physical entry into the home.  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
may someday decide that Harris does not apply to physical 
evidence——like bloody clothing——that a suspect brings with him 
when he comes out of the house.  Even though the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly moved beyond property law and "place" in a search 
context, it is unlikely to stray from Payton principles and 
property law when it comes to the seizure of a person in the 
home. 
¶106 Payton was more about places than people.  However, 
focusing on people, surprise and even coercion is sometimes 
preferable for both suspects and police officers than the 
violence that may accompany service of a judicially sanctioned 
warrant. 
¶107 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
 
                                                 
4 A 
persuasive 
argument 
can 
be 
made 
for 
exigent 
circumstances in this case. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.dtp 
 
21 
 
 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶108 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  To be clear, 
contrary to the concurrence's assertions, Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980) was violated when officers arrested Felix in 
his home without a warrant.   
¶109 The question before this court is not whether there 
was a violation of Payton, as the concurrence suggests.  The 
State has conceded a Payton violation at every stage of this 
case, and during oral argument in this court, it expressly 
disavowed the argument advanced by the concurrence.1    
 ¶110 
Rather, the question we address is whether we 
should interpret our state constitution as providing greater 
protection of our liberty interests than the protection provided 
                                                 
1 The concurrence opines that Payton was not violated when 
the officers, with guns drawn, ordered Felix out of his home 
where he was placed in handcuffs.  It suggests that Felix was 
arrested "outside the home" because the arresting officers never 
"broke the plane of the threshold [of Felix's home] before or 
during the arrest."  Concurrence, ¶¶103, 70. 
This suggestion is mistaken.  The flaw in the concurrence's 
analysis is that it confuses the legal concept of arrest with 
the factual, physical act of handcuffing a suspect.  "[T]he 
standard used to determine the moment of arrest is whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
considered himself or herself to be in custody, given the degree 
of restraint under the circumstances."  State v. Kiekhefer, 212 
Wis. 2d 460, 485, 569 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The State has conceded that the officers' "constructive 
entry" of Felix's apartment violated Payton (absent exigent 
circumstances).  This concession is on firm footing.  See United 
States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2001); Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Maez, 872 
F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36 
(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Scroggins v. State, 633 S.W.2d 33 (Ark. 1982); State 
v. Dahl, 915 P.2d 979 (Or. 1996); see also City of Sheboygan v. 
Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, ¶13, 330 Wis. 2d 760, 796 N.W.2d 429. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
by the United States Constitution.  The majority answers the 
question no, embracing the rationale of New York v. Harris, 495 
U.S. 14 (1990).   
¶111 Because I conclude that the Harris decision does not 
sufficiently deter illegal government activity and because that 
decision may instead create powerful new incentives encouraging 
illegal arrests, I would accord the people of this state greater 
protection 
of 
their 
liberty 
interests 
under 
our 
state 
constitution.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶112 The majority "find[s] no reason" to interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution any differently than the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the United States Constitution.  Majority op., 
¶38.  It asserts that "the Harris Court drew a line at the 
entrance to the home," and following Harris, it declines to 
suppress the statements made by Felix outside of his home 
following his warrantless home arrest.  Id., ¶48.   
¶113 Although the Harris rule pertains only to statements 
obtained outside the home, the majority goes further.  It 
extends the Harris rule to physical evidence obtained outside 
the home, even though the physical evidence would not have been 
seized "but for" the illegal entry.  Id., ¶¶25, 46.  Its 
rationale 
appears 
to 
be 
grounded 
in 
the 
Harris 
Court's 
assurances that "there is no compelling reason" to suppress this 
evidence because suppression would have little deterrent effect.  
Id., ¶40.    
II 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶114 Unlike the majority, a unanimous court of appeals 
declined to apply the Harris rule in this case.  State v. Felix, 
Case No. 2010AP346-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
29, 2011).  The court of appeals explained that the 5-4 Harris 
decision has been the subject of substantial criticism.  Id., 
¶19 n.9.  In particular, it "was the subject of a vigorous 
dissent" which advanced that the Harris majority's "reasoning 
amounts to nothing more than an analytical sleight of hand, 
resting on errors in logic, misreadings of our cases, and an 
apparent blindness to the incentives the Court's ruling creates 
for knowing and intentional constitutional violation by the 
police."  Id. (citing Harris, 495 U.S. at 21-22 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)).   
¶115 The Harris decision has also been criticized on 
various grounds by a leading scholar of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Professor Wayne LaFave.  6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search 
and 
Seizure: 
A 
Treatise 
on 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
§ 11.4(b), at 304 (4th ed. 2004) ("The trouble with [Harris], as 
the 
Harris dissenters pointed out . . . is that . . . the 
detrimental consequences of illegal police action . . . do not 
inevitably cease simultaneously with the illegality itself.").   
¶116 Several state courts have criticized the Harris 
decision and have explicitly refused to apply its rationale to 
their state constitutions.  When the Supreme Court remanded 
Harris to New York's highest court, for example, the New York 
court refused to adopt the Supreme Court's rationale.  It 
explained: "We conclude that the Supreme Court's rule does not 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
adequately protect the search and seizure rights of citizens of 
New York.  Accordingly, we hold that our State Constitution 
requires that statements obtained from an accused following a 
Payton violation must be suppressed unless the taint resulting 
from the violation has been attenuated."  People v. Harris, 570 
N.E.2d 1051, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1991). 
¶117 Although state courts have split on the question, 
several states have followed New York's lead.  In State v. 
Mariano, 160 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007), the court of 
appeals of Hawaii stated: "We cannot condone the parsimonious 
Fourth Amendment protection the Supreme Court doled out in 
Harris."  Likewise, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded 
that the Harris rule does not provide the protection required by 
that state's constitution.  State v. Luurtsema, 811 A.2d 223, 
233 (Conn. 2002), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).  See also State v. 
Eserjose, 259 P.3d 172, 178 (Wash. 2011) (concluding that the 
Harris rule "falls short of the protection afforded by our state 
constitution").  Indeed, we have previously declined to adopt 
Harris in the past, even though we were given an occasion to do 
so.  State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 717 
N.W.2d 111.    
¶118 Despite the substantial criticism, the majority today 
embraces the Harris rule and declines to afford greater 
protection of liberty interests under our state constitution.  
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provide that 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
"[t]he 
right 
of 
the 
people 
to 
be 
secure 
in 
their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated."  Even if 
officers have probable cause to arrest a suspect, they are 
required to secure a warrant before effectuating the arrest at 
the suspect's home.  Payton, 445 U.S. 573.2  The warrant 
requirement reflects the framers' conviction that the decision 
to effectuate a home arrest should not be made on the spot by a 
police 
officer 
engaged 
in 
the 
competitive 
enterprise 
of 
ferreting out crime.  Rather, the framers provided that the 
decision should be made by a neutral and detached magistrate.  
Id. at 582, n. 17.   
¶119 Absent exigent circumstances, warrantless home arrests 
are 
unconstitutional. 
 
For 
years, 
American 
courts 
have 
suppressed 
evidence 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.3  One purpose furthered by the exclusionary rule is 
to deter future constitutional violations by "compel[ling] 
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way——by removing the incentive to disregard it."  
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).4  Deterrence 
                                                 
2 See also Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 595, 267 
N.W.2d 278 (1978) (concluding that both the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution require 
officers to secure a warrant before arresting a suspect in his 
or her home). 
3 See, e.g., Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Hoyer v. 
State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).   
4 Another purpose served by the exclusionary rule is the 
preservation of the integrity of the judicial process.  State v. 
Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶3, 64-65, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568.   
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
through suppression of illegally obtained evidence is necessary 
to safeguard the constitutional rights of all citizens.5   
¶120 Driven by the purpose of deterring illegal government 
activity, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
reality that it is often necessary to suppress derivative 
evidence.  This type of evidence is not obtained during the 
actual illegal search or seizure, but rather, it is the later 
product of an initial illegal intrusion.  Derivative evidence is 
often referred to as "fruit of the poisonous tree."6   
                                                 
5 In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), Justice 
Jackson cogently explained why suppression of illegally obtained 
evidence was necessary to safeguard not only the rights of 
criminal defendants, but also, the rights of the public at 
large:   
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the 
attention of the courts, and then only those where the 
search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and 
the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to 
be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, 
or stop and search an automobile but find nothing 
incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty 
of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. 
There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many 
unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent 
people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which 
no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and 
about which we never hear. 
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions 
indirectly 
and 
through 
the 
medium 
of 
excluding 
evidence obtained against those who frequently are 
guilty. 
Id. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
6 For the origin of this phrase, see Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶121 In the landmark case Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that not 
all derivative evidence must be suppressed to fulfill the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.  Some derivative 
evidence may be so attenuated from the underlying illegal 
conduct that "the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no 
longer justifies its cost."  Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring 
in part).  Nevertheless, the Court indicated that persistent 
refusal 
to 
suppress 
fruits 
of 
the 
poisonous 
tree 
would 
"substantially dilute[]" the "effect of the exclusionary rule."7  
Id. at 602.     
¶122 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
repeatedly 
rejected per se rules which would provide that suppression of 
certain categories of derivative evidence is no longer justified 
by the cost of deterrence.8  Rather, when deciding whether 
derivative evidence must be suppressed, a court must make a 
determination "on the facts of each case" and guided by three 
                                                 
7 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1975) ("Arrests 
made without warrant or probable cause, for questioning or 
'investigation,' would be encouraged by the knowledge that 
evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at 
trial by the simple expendent of giving Miranda warnings.  Any 
incentive 
to 
avoid 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violations 
would 
be 
eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a 'cure-all,' and 
the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and 
seizures could be said to be reduced to 'a form of words.'"). 
8 See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 ("While we therefore 
reject the per se rule which the Illinois courts appear to have 
accepted, we also decline to adopt any alternative per se or 
'but for' rule."); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 487 (1963); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 
(1984).   
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
factors set forth in Brown: the temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, 
and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.  Id. 
at 603-04.       
¶123 Harris marked a significant departure from this line 
of cases.  The Harris opinion gave a nod toward the "familiar 
proposition that the indirect fruits of an illegal search or 
arrest should be suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close 
relationship to the underlying illegality."  Harris, 495 U.S. at 
17.  However, the Court proceeded to abandon that "familiar 
proposition" altogether when it came to statements procured 
outside 
the 
threshold 
of 
the 
home 
following 
an 
illegal 
warrantless home arrest.   
¶124 Instead of applying the familiar attenuation test, the 
Harris Court adopted the following categorical rule: Statements 
obtained outside the home following a warrantless arrest are not 
"the product of illegal governmental activity."  Id. at 19.  
Accordingly, "where the police have probable cause to arrest a 
suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a 
statement made by a defendant outside of his home, even though 
the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in 
violation of Payton."  Id. at 21.  The Harris Court's per se 
rule is a startling departure from Brown's attenuation analysis.  
See LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(b), at 304.   
¶125 As justification for its new rule, the Harris Court 
declared that its holding would not lead to any significant 
reduction in deterrence: "[T]he principal incentive to obey 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry 
will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or 
statements taken, inside the home.  If we did suppress 
statements like Harris', moreover, the incremental deterrent 
value would be minimal."  495 U.S. at 20.  
¶126 As the dissent in Harris quipped, "The Court's saying 
it may make it law [for purposes of the Fourth Amendment], but 
it does not make it true."  Id. at 29 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Indeed, the Harris Court's declaration that 
deterrence would not be diminished is belied by the facts 
underlying that case.9  
¶127 The following example, proffered by the dissent, 
illustrates how officers have much to gain and little to lose 
when they illegally perform a warrantless home arrest in the 
wake of Harris: 
[T]he officer knows that if he breaks into the house 
without a warrant and drags the suspect outside, the 
suspect, shaken by the enormous invasion of privacy he 
has 
just 
undergone, 
may 
say 
something 
incriminating. . . . [T]he 
officer 
envisions 
the 
following best-case scenario if he chooses to violate 
the Constitution [by making a warrantless home arrest 
in violation of Payton]: He avoids a major expenditure 
of time and effort, ensures that the suspect will not 
escape, and procures the most damaging evidence of 
                                                 
9 In Harris, the state court concluded that the police 
department had a policy of knowingly and intentionally violating 
Payton, and that the policy was "a device used to avoid 
restrictions on questioning a suspect until the police had 
strengthened their case with a confession."  People v. Harris, 
72 N.Y. 2d 614, 622 (1988).  Under these circumstances, there 
can be no doubt that the suppression of confessions obtained 
following Payton violations would help deter the department's 
policy of knowingly and intentionally violating Payton. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
all, a confession.  His worst-case scenario is that he 
will avoid a major expenditure of effort, ensure that 
the suspect will not escape, and will see evidence in 
the house (which would have remained unknown absent 
the constitutional violation) that cannot be used in 
the prosecution's case in chief.        
Id. at 32.  Ultimately, the dissent persuasively argued that 
rather than deterring illegal government conduct, the Harris 
majority actually "create[d] powerful incentives for police 
officers to violate the Fourth Amendment."  Id. 
III 
¶128 I agree with the Harris dissenters that "[a] regime 
that suppresses only some fruits of constitutional violations" 
does not go far enough to "eliminate the incentives to violate 
the Constitution."  Id. at 23.  I find the Harris dissent's 
clear explanation of the necessity of continuing to apply Brown 
much more persuasive than the rationale for abandoning Brown 
proffered by the Harris majority.   
¶129 In the wake of Harris, I fail to see how the 
exclusionary rule serves its purpose as an effective deterrent 
of warrantless home arrests.  An officer familiar with Payton 
and Harris, but wishing to avoid the hassle of securing an 
arrest warrant, has little incentive to do so.  Rather, the 
officer need only usher the suspect out of the house as quickly 
as possible so that anything the suspect accidentally blurts out 
will be admissible under Harris's categorical rule. 
¶130 Harris's limitation on the exclusionary rule may be 
the law of the land with regard to the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  But that fact does not compel this 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
court to similarly engraft this limitation of our liberty onto 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.     
¶131 If we declined to adopt the Harris rationale, it would 
not be the first time we interpreted Article I, Section 11 of 
our state constitution to provide greater protection of liberty 
interests than are provided by the United States Supreme Court's 
existing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  The majority 
acknowledges that in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶60-63, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, we concluded that the federal good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not sufficiently 
deter illegal government activity.  Majority op., ¶37.  But 
contrary to its assertion, Eason is not the only case in which 
we declined to follow lockstep the Supreme Court.10  The 
majority's own discussion admits of another occasion in which we 
interpreted Article I Section 11 more expansively than the 
existing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  See majority 
op., ¶29 (discussing Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 595-97; 
267 N.W.2d 278 (1978)).     
                                                 
10 See also State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899 (excluding evidence under Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, even though it would not have been 
excluded under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment).  In Knapp, we stated: "This 'lock-step' 
theory of interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution no broader 
than its federal counterpart appears to be aimed at promoting 
uniformity in the law.  Uniformity may be advantageous, but it 
cannot be indispensable.  It is the prerogative of the State of 
Wisconsin to afford greater protection to the liberties of 
persons within its boundaries under the Wisconsin Constitution 
than is mandated by the United States Supreme Court."  Id., ¶59. 
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶132 Here, the officers had probable cause to arrest Felix.  
See id., ¶28.  Additionally, they had ample time to secure a 
warrant for his arrest, given that they secured a warrant to 
search the crime scene, and the affidavit in support of that 
warrant named Felix as the suspect.  Id., ¶8.  Nevertheless, 
despite ample opportunity and the constitutional protections 
afforded to the home, the officers apparently decided that there 
was no need to secure an arrest warrant prior to confronting 
Felix at his apartment.11        
¶133 Under 
these 
circumstances, 
the 
officers' 
illegal 
conduct should not be sanctioned with a categorical exception to 
the exclusionary rule.  I conclude that the Harris per se rule 
is an ineffective deterrent for Payton violations, and that any 
advantage of the rule does not outweigh the potential loss of 
liberty to the people of this state.  I would remand to the 
circuit court to determine whether, under the Brown attenuation 
analysis, Felix's signed statement, the buccal swab, and Felix's 
clothing were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest 
                                                 
11 The officers procured additional evidence against Felix 
when they searched the apartment his family was renting.  
Apparently, a man named Dean Kudick rented the apartment and 
sublet it to the Felix family, and it was Kudick who consented 
to the officers' request to search.  See majority op., ¶11.  
This court has not been asked to decide whether Kudick had 
common authority over the apartment so that he could consent to 
the search, see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), and 
accordingly the majority does not decide that issue.   
No.  2010AP346-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
that 
they 
should 
not 
be 
suppressed.12 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
      
 
                                                 
12 See State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 187-88, 453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990) (remanding for the fact-finding necessary to 
conduct the Brown attenuation analysis).