Title: Commonwealth v. Harley

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
         OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 972382 
         CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
                                            September 18, 1998 
EUGENE NAKIA HARLEY 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this case, the defendant, Eugene Nakia Harley, was convicted 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach of one count of 
robbery, two counts of abduction, and three counts of the use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.  He was sentenced to serve a 
total of forty-three years in the penitentiary, with twenty-five 
years suspended. 
 
Harley appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
raising the sole question whether the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a transcript of a suppression hearing at state 
expense.  In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 
Harley was constitutionally entitled to a free transcript of the 
suppression hearing and, therefore, that the trial court erred in 
denying Harley’s motion with respect thereto.  Harley v. 
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 342, 350, 488 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1997).  
However, the Court of Appeals found that there were “no significant 
discrepancies between the witnesses’ testimony at the suppression 
hearing and their testimony at trial” and that “[t]he evidence of 
[Harley’s] guilt was overwhelming.”  Id. at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 651.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s error 
in denying Harley a free transcript was harmless, and the court 
affirmed Harley’s convictions.  Id. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition for appeal with this Court, 
seeking reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as 
it held that “the trial court was constitutionally obligated to 
provide Harley with a free copy of his suppression hearing 
transcript.”  Harley filed a brief in opposition in which he 
assigned cross-error to the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the 
failure of the trial court to provide him a transcript at state 
expense was harmless error.  In his brief in opposition, Harley also 
attacked the Commonwealth’s standing to appeal the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
We awarded the Commonwealth an appeal and refused Harley’s 
assignment of cross-error.  He has not participated further in this 
proceeding. 
 
On the question of standing, the Commonwealth asserts that it 
is a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of Code § 17-116.08, which 
provides in pertinent part that “any party aggrieved by a final 
decision of the Court of Appeals, including the Commonwealth, may 
petition the Supreme Court for an appeal.”  The Commonwealth says 
that “[t]he decision of the Court of Appeals, if not modified, 
inevitably would lead to the squandering of substantial amounts of 
public monies, inasmuch as defendants would be constitutionally 
 
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entitled to transcripts of a host of pre-trial proceedings in order, 
supposedly, to honor their rights to a fair trial and due process.” 
 
The Commonwealth states on brief that the word “‘aggrieved’ is 
defined in the dictionary as ‘feeling distress or affliction’ or 
‘treated wrongly; offended.’  American Heritage Dictionary 87 (2d 
ed. 1991).”  The Commonwealth also notes that in Virginia Beach 
Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 
344 S.E.2d 899 (1986), we elaborated upon the meaning of the word 
“aggrieved” as follows: 
 
The term “aggrieved” has a settled meaning in 
Virginia when it becomes necessary to determine who is a 
proper party to seek court relief from an adverse 
decision. . . .  The word “aggrieved” in a statute 
contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of 
some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or 
imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner 
different from that suffered by the public generally. 
 
Id. at 419-20, 344 S.E.2d at 902-03 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  The Commonwealth then argues that because the 
decision of the Court of Appeals “will have the effect of 
imposing substantial new financial burdens on the Commonwealth 
to provide transcripts to indigent defendants who previously 
would not have been entitled to them, the Commonwealth has 
standing in this appeal.” 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth submits that “even though [it] 
ultimately prevailed in the Court of Appeals, it nevertheless 
is an ‘aggrieved’ party under [§ 17-116.08].”  The Commonwealth 
 
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argues that the statute does not state that “the losing party” 
or “the party that did not prevail” may seek review in this 
Court.  Instead, the Commonwealth says, the statute provides 
only that “any party aggrieved” may appeal, and the use of this 
less restrictive language evinces “the intent of the General 
Assembly to authorize appeals by the Commonwealth, at least 
under the circumstances of this case.” 
 
We do not agree that the Commonwealth is aggrieved by the 
Court of Appeals’ ruling with respect to the issue of Harley’s 
entitlement to a free transcript of his suppression hearing.  
That issue was rendered moot by the Court of Appeals’ further 
ruling that the error in the trial court’s denial of a free 
transcript was harmless.  As a result, the Commonwealth was 
excused from providing Harley with a free transcript of his 
suppression hearing.  So far as this case is concerned, 
therefore, and we can be concerned only with this case, the 
harmless error ruling avoided the “imposition of a burden” upon 
the Commonwealth and the “squandering of . . . public monies” 
on “transcripts . . . of pre-trial proceedings.” 
 
The Commonwealth is apprehensive, of course, about the 
effect the Court of Appeals’ decision will have upon future 
cases.  But the Commonwealth’s concerns are hypothetical and 
can only be based, at best, upon speculation and conjecture.  
Its apprehension, therefore, is not sufficient to qualify it as 
 
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a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of Code § 17-116.08 and 
the explication given the word “aggrieved” in the case of 
Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, supra.  Neither the statute nor the case can be read 
to provide the Commonwealth a present appeal based upon the 
apprehension that it will suffer the imposition of some future 
burden. 
 
In reality, the Commonwealth invites this Court to render 
an advisory opinion on a moot question based upon speculative 
facts.  This is an exercise in which the Court traditionally 
declines to participate.  “The reason . . . is that the courts 
are not constituted . . . to render advisory opinions, to 
decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely 
speculative.”  City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-
30, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1964); see also Ridgwell v. Brasco 
Bay Corp., 254 Va. 458, 462-63, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 245 Va. 24, 36, 
426 S.E.2d 117, 123-24 (1993). 
 
Accordingly, we decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to 
render an advisory opinion in this case.  Instead, we will 
await the arrival of a case in which a conviction has been 
reversed for the failure of a trial court to provide an 
indigent defendant with a free transcript of a pretrial 
hearing. 
 
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In the meantime, because in the present case the 
Commonwealth is not a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of 
Code § 17-116.08, we will dismiss this appeal. 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
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