Title: Matter of Cordova

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Cordova1994 WY 100882 P.2d 880Case Number: 93-138Decided: 10/07/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Benefits Claimed by San Juana CORDOVA, 

Surviving 
Spouse of Felipe A. Cordova.

San 
Juana CORDOVA,

Petitioner 
(Claimant),

v.

HOLLY 
SUGAR CORPORATION,

Respondent 
(Employer),

and

State 
of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Respondent 
(Objector).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Lowell 
H. Fitch of Fitch Law Offices, Torrington, for petitioner San Juana 
Cordova.

Representing 
Respondents:

Catherine 
W. Hansen of Hollard & Hart, Cheyenne and Jerry M. Smith of Sigler & 
Smith Law Offices, Torrington, for Respondent Holly Sugar 
Corp.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Kenneth E. 
Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Worker's Compensation 
Div.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired.

[¶1]      Felipe Cordova 
suffered a compensable hand injury but died of non-work related causes before he 
could file for permanent disability benefits. His surviving spouse, San Juana 
Cordova (Cordova), then applied for permanent disability benefits from the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division (Division) on behalf of her deceased 
husband. On motions for summary judgment, a hearing officer ruled that Cordova 
could not pursue permanent disability benefits on behalf of her deceased husband 
because he "was not entitled to receive or receiving [a permanent disability] 
award" when he died, under W.S. 27-14-403.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Cordova presents 
two issues:

I. 
Under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and subject otherwise to its 
pertinent requirements, may Employee's widow seek payment for an actual and 
compensable permanent disability suffered by Employee when formal claim for a 
permanent disability award was not made before the time of Employee's death due 
to causes other than the work related injury?

II. 
If so, should this court direct the District Court to vacate the Order made by 
the Office of Administrative Hearings granting Respondents' motions for summary 
judgment and dismissal of Petitioner's case therein?

FACTS

[¶4]      Felipe Cordova 
(Felipe) worked for the Holly Sugar Corporation (Holly Sugar) for nineteen 
years. From 1986 to February 28, 1992, Felipe, at a warehouse in Torrington, 
Wyoming, moved, weighed, sealed and stacked fifteen-pound, machine-filled 
containers of sugar packets for Holly Sugar. From September 1991, to February 
1992, Felipe suffered from recurring cramps in both palms and elbows while 
performing his duties at Holly Sugar. Felipe was laid off on February 28, 1992, 
and recalled to work on March 18, 1992. Felipe returned to work but was unable 
to perform his duties due to the pain in his palms and elbows. After visiting 
several physicians, Felipe was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome.

[¶5]      On April 9, 1992, 
Felipe filed an accident report with the clerk of the Goshen County District 
Court describing his injured hands. Holly Sugar disputed Felipe's claim. After a 
contested case hearing on July 9, 1992, a hearing officer awarded Felipe medical 
benefits and awarded temporary total disability beginning on March 19, 1992. All 
of Felipe's temporary total disability claims submitted for the period between 
March 20, 1992, and July 31, 1992, were approved and paid by the 
Division.

[¶6]      On August 18, 
1992, Felipe filed another claim for temporary total disability benefits for the 
month of August. On August 26, 1992, Holly Sugar petitioned the Division for 
review of Felipe's August claim and, ironically, Felipe died of heart failure 
unrelated to his hand injury. Holly Sugar dropped its appeal of Felipe's final 
temporary total disability claim, and the Division paid that final claim on 
August 31, 1992. Before his death, Felipe had not received a permanent partial 
or permanent total disability rating, and had not made a claim for permanent 
disability.

[¶7]      On December 2, 
1992, Cordova, Felipe's wife, by a letter from her counsel, sought permanent 
disability benefits for Felipe's injury. Enclosed with that letter was a letter 
from Felipe's physician to Cordova's counsel, written after Felipe's death, 
which stated:

I 
think [Felipe]'s hands had been rendered essentially totally useless, and in my 
medical opinion, both hands would have remained essentially totally functionless 
as a result of the inflammatory process.

On 
January 12, 1993, the Division denied Cordova's request for permanent disability 
benefits; and on February 4, 1993, Cordova requested a contested case hearing. 
Both Holly Sugar and the Division moved for summary judgment, and Cordova 
answered by filing a "Claimant's Memorandum of Law." On May 14, 1993, a hearing 
officer awarded summary judgment to Holly Sugar and the Division and dismissed 
Cordova's claim. On June 9, 1993, Cordova petitioned the Goshen County District 
Court for judicial review and, on July 6, 1993, the district court certified 
Cordova's petition to this court because it presented a "novel question of 
state-wide importance."

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The parties do 
not dispute the underlying facts. The sole question we must address is whether, 
based on the undisputed facts, the hearing officer correctly concluded that the 
Division and Holly Sugar were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm agency conclusions of 
law if they are in accordance with law. W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A); Aanenson v. 
State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶9]      The question we 
must answer is whether a surviving spouse of an employee, who suffers a 
compensable injury but who dies from causes other than the compensable injury 
before he has made a formal claim for permanent disability benefits, may 
maintain a separate action for permanent disability benefits. The dispositive 
statute, W.S. 27-14-403 (1991), provides in part:

(a) 
In addition to payment of medical and hospital care and artificial replacement, 
an injured employee and his dependents may be entitled to one (1) or more awards 
for:

(i) 
Temporary total disability;

(ii) 
Permanent partial disability;

(iii) 
Permanent total disability; or

(iv) 
Death.

* 
* * * * *

(d) 
If an injured employee entitled to receive or receiving an award under paragraph 
(a)(ii) or (iii) of this section dies due to causes other than the work 
related accident, the balance of the award shall be paid:

(i) 
To the surviving spouse[.]

(emphasis 
added). Under the statute, when an injured employee dies from causes other than 
the work related injury, the Division must pay the balance of a permanent 
disability award to a surviving spouse in two different situations. First, if 
the injured employee is an employee receiving an award of permanent 
disability and, second, if the injured employee is an employee entitled 
to receive a permanent disability award. We are concerned with the second 
situation. The hearing officer determined that Felipe was not "an injured 
employee entitled to receive" a permanent disability award because "no 
award for either permanent partial disability or permanent total disability had 
been entered as of [Felipe's] date of death."

[¶10]   Holly Sugar and the Division argue 
that the hearing officer's construction of the phrase "entitled to 
receive" is correct. They assert that the hearing officer's construction is 
supported by W.S. 27-14-404 and -405, both of which require "certification by a 
physician licensed to practice surgery or medicine that an injury results in 
permanent total [or permanent partial] disability" before a permanent disability 
award may be granted. W.S. 27-14-406 (1991), see also W.S. 27-14-405(a) 
(1991). In other words, they assert that one cannot be "entitled to 
receive" a permanent disability award until he or she has filed for such a 
claim and obtained certification as permanently disabled under W.S. 27-14-405 or 
-406.

[¶11]   Conversely, Cordova asserts that 
she should be allowed to prove that Felipe is entitled to receive a 
permanent disability award and that simply because he did not make a claim or 
receive the required certification does not mean he is not entitled to receive a 
permanent disability award. Cordova argues that the plain and unambiguous 
language of the statute does not require the filing of a claim or obtaining 
physician certification as a pre-condition to her ability to maintain this 
action.

[¶12]   We agree with Cordova. Nowhere in 
W.S. 27-14-403(d) is there a requirement that a claim for permanent partial or 
permanent total disability benefits be made before the covered worker's death. 
If we adopted the construction urged by Holly Sugar and the Division, we would 
have to read into the statute an additional and restrictive term setting a 
condition precedent, i.e., "entitled to receive [at the time of death by 
virtue of filing a claim and obtaining physician certification]." Therefore, 
adoption of Holly Sugar's and the Division's construction would contravene the 
rule that, whenever possible, we must liberally construe the Worker's 
Compensation Act in favor of the worker. Wyo-Ben, Inc. v. State ex. rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div., 783 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶13]   When faced with the question of 
"whether a dependent of a deceased employe[e] may receive benefits to which that 
employe[e] may have been entitled when no claim was filed during the 
employe[e]'s lifetime[,]" a Pennsylvania Court stated:

We 
must begin this discussion with the proposition that nothing in the Act 
specifically prohibits recovery in this situation. Nowhere in the Act is there 
the requirement that a claim for benefits due and owing a deceased employe[e] be 
filed before that employe[e]'s death. On the contrary, Section 410 can be fairly 
read to authorize a dependent's filing of such a claim. Were we to refuse 
recovery here, we would hardly be giving the Act the broad, liberal construction 
which has traditionally been accorded it.

Frederico 
Granero Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 
48 Pa.Cmwlth. 252, 599, 409 A.2d 1187, 1187-88 (1980).

[¶14]   In addition, the construction urged 
by Holly Sugar and the Division would produce an absurd, illogical and 
unreasonable statute, which we must avoid when construing statutes. Stauffer 
Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1093 (Wyo. 1989). If we read the 
statute as urged by Holly Sugar and the Division, then, no matter how obvious a 
permanently disabling injury, e.g., loss of limb, the failure to file a claim 
and obtain physician certification before an unrelated death will preclude a 
dependent from maintaining a claim for permanent disability benefits. On the 
other hand, if a claim is filed the day before death or if death results from 
the work related injury, benefits are payable to survivors. That interpretation 
contended by appellees "would indeed elevate form over substance." Weston 
County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 849 
(Wyo. 1992). We do not think the legislature intended an unjust and unreasonable 
result.

[¶15]   As further support for adopting 
this construction, an Indiana appellate court, when faced with precisely the 
same question, construed very similar statutory language in favor of the 
surviving spouse. Snyder Constr. Co. v. Thompson, 145 Ind. App. 103, 248 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1969). The employee/claimant in Snyder was injured, 
receiving temporary total disability and had not yet filed for permanent 
disability benefits when he died from causes other than the compensable 
injuries. Id., 248 N.E.2d  at 563. Five months after the 
employee/claimant's death, his wife instituted a claim in her name for 
employee/claimant's permanent partial disability. Id. The Indiana statute 
at issue provided:

When 
an employee has been awarded or is entitled to an award of 
compensation for a definite period under this act * * * for an injury * 
* * and dies from any other cause than such injury, payment of the unpaid 
balance of such compensation * * * shall be made to his dependents * * 
*.

(emphasis 
added). Id., 248 N.E.2d  at 561. That court construed the above statutory 
language as follows:

[A] 
dependent may institute an independent claim for workmen's compensation in the 
event the deceased employee died from causes unrelated to a compensable injury, 
if the employee is otherwise entitled to receive compensation under the act. 
Further, a dependent's right to compensation is not dependent upon the 
initiation of a claim for compensation by the injured employee prior to his 
death.

Id., 
248 N.E.2d  at 564.

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   We hold that the hearing officer 
did not rule in accordance with law when he granted summary judgment to Holly 
Sugar and the Division. When an injured employee dies from causes unrelated to 
his or her compensable injury, W.S. 27-14-403(d) does not require that the 
injured employee have filed a claim for permanent disability benefits and have 
obtained physician certification before his or her death in order for a 
qualified dependent to maintain an action to claim those permanent benefits. Our 
decision in this case does not determine whether or not Cordova should have 
received an award; it does allow Cordova to pursue her claim and attempt to 
prove Felipe's entitlement to a permanent disability award. Therefore, the 
decision of the hearing officer is reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[¶17]   We reverse.

THOMAS, 
J., files a dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶18]   I do not read the statute in the 
same way as the majority. I do not think the statute justifies the consideration 
of an award for permanent disability in this instance, and I would affirm the 
summary judgment of the hearing officer. Consequently, I 
dissent.

[¶19]   I am satisfied the statutory scheme 
in this instance encompasses something beyond a mere expectancy. The majority 
opinion points out Felipe Cordova had not made a claim for permanent disability 
benefits prior to his death from an unrelated cause. It also is clear he was not 
receiving an award for permanent disability and, as the majority correctly says, 
the focus must be upon whether he was entitled to receive a permanent disability 
award at the time of his death.

[¶20]   Even conceding the rule of liberal 
construction, we still must discern legislative intent with respect to this 
statutory enactment. As we said in State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 771 (Wyo. 
1990):

Legislative 
intent is the primary and foremost consideration in statutory construction. Such 
intent should be ascertained as nearly as possible from the language of the 
statute. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97 
(Wyo. 1985); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 
(Wyo. 1983); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982); Wyoming 
State Department of Education v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982). All 
portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and 
sentence of it must be given effect and considered so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, all with the purpose of ascertaining and giving 
effect to the legislative intent. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 
1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1985); Haddenham 
v. City of Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982).

 [¶21]  I am unable to take the language relied 
upon in the majority opinion out of the context of the rest of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act. For example, WYO. STAT. § 27-14-501(f) (1991) 
provides that "[a] claim for permanent disability benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 
and 27-14-406 and a claim for death benefits under W.S. 27-14-403 shall be filed 
with the division and the division shall transmit a copy to the clerk of court." 
The filing of a claim is a prior condition to any award of benefits. The 
Division is responsible for review of a filed claim and is charged with either 
approving or denying it. If it is approved, the Division shall determine the 
amount of the award for compensation. A physical impairment rating must be 
received prior to determination of the amount of the award for permanent partial 
disability. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(d) (1991). The same thing is true for 
permanent total disability. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-406 (1991). Given the use of the 
word "award" in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-403(d) (1991), I am unable to justify 
entitlement to an award unless the requisite statutory demands have been 
satisfied. Unfortunately, in this case, they were not.

[¶22]   I would affirm the order of the 
hearing examiner in this instance, even recognizing that the worker's widow is 
entitled to concern and sympathy. I simply cannot justify the construction of 
the statute adopted by the majority.