Title: State v. Wilson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-776.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-776 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WILSON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-776.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2901.05—Affirmative defenses—Self-defense—Ineffective 
assistance of counsel—Appellant produced evidence that tended to support 
claim that he had acted in self-defense, and he was therefore entitled to a 
self-defense jury instruction—Trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by 
failing to request a self-defense jury instruction—Court of appeals’ 
judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court. 
(No. 2022-1482—Submitted September 26, 2023—Decided March 7, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County, 
No. 2021-CA-68, 2022-Ohio-3763. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tyler Wilson, engaged in a heated verbal altercation with 
Billy Reffett at a gas station.  According to Wilson’s testimony at his trial on 
charges of attempted murder and felonious assault, Wilson shot a gun out his car 
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window in order to “scare” Reffett and make him “back off.”  Wilson claimed that 
he shot the gun in self-defense, but the trial court determined that because Wilson 
did not intend to harm or kill Reffett, he was not entitled to a self-defense jury 
instruction.  Wilson’s trial counsel conceded that a self-defense jury instruction was 
not warranted.  The Second District Court of Appeals concluded that self-defense 
does not apply to the facts of this case and found that Wilson’s counsel did not 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction.  
But because R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) and our case law do not require that a person intend 
to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a 
criminal trial, we reverse the judgment of the Second District, vacate Wilson’s 
conviction, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} The video footage captured by the surveillance cameras at the Shell 
gas station in Springfield where most of the events took place and testimony elicited 
from several witnesses at trial are relatively consistent.1  On the morning of June 8, 
2021, Wilson was parked at a gas pump, preparing to leave after he had purchased 
gas and other items from inside the station.  Wilson’s friend, the owner of the car, 
was sitting in the passenger seat.  Reffett, while on his way to work, stopped at the 
gas station.  He too had a passenger in his truck.  When Reffett was pulling up to 
the pump, he drove his truck in between Wilson’s car and another vehicle.  Wilson 
began to yell at Reffett because he believed Reffett had driven too close and nearly 
clipped the car.  Reffett then backed up his truck until his driver-side window was 
next to Wilson’s driver-side window.  Reffett’s truck was so close to Wilson’s car 
that Wilson believed that he could not open his car door.  Wilson also claimed that 
 
1. In addition to Wilson’s and Reffett’s testimony at trial, the gas-station attendant and his daughter 
testified, as well as three law-enforcement officers and a detective.  Neither Wilson’s passenger nor 
Reffett’s passenger testified at trial. 
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3 
 
Reffett was only a few feet away, was hanging out of the truck window, and was 
“spitting in [Wilson’s] face.”  The two men engaged in a heated verbal altercation.  
Because Reffett was in a truck, he was situated a few feet higher than Wilson, who 
was still in his car.  Wilson testified that during the altercation, Reffett said, “[W]hat 
you gonna do?  I’ll smoke you out here,” and pointed a gun at Wilson.  Reffett 
denied pointing a gun at Wilson or even having a gun.  Further, the gas station’s 
surveillance cameras did not capture the angle between the vehicles to show 
whether Reffett had pointed a gun at Wilson. 
{¶ 3} Wilson testified that he had known that there was a gun in the car and 
that he quickly grabbed it and “aimed out the window and fired up” near Reffett’s 
vehicle.  After Wilson shot the gun, Reffett drove his truck forward and turned 
around in the parking lot.  When Reffett stopped again, his passenger got out of the 
truck.  Wilson claimed that he was fearful that Reffett’s passenger was coming to 
harm him.  Wilson drove away from the gas station, and Reffett chased him along 
Interstate 70 with both vehicles reaching speeds of at least 80 or 90 miles per hour.  
Reffett called 9-1-1 during the chase, but he eventually stopped chasing Wilson, 
went back to the gas station to pick up his passenger, and went to work.  He did not 
meet with police until several hours later after he got off work. 
{¶ 4} Wilson’s car ran out of gas on the highway, and his passenger tried to 
push the car to the side of the road.  During this process, the passenger fell and the 
car ran over her shoulder.  When law-enforcement officers arrived to assist with the 
disabled vehicle, they ran Wilson’s name and discovered he had unrelated warrants 
and took him into custody, while his passenger was taken to the hospital for her 
injuries.  Wilson was later charged with attempted murder and felonious assault for 
his part in the altercation with Reffett at the gas station. 
{¶ 5} At trial, Wilson testified in his own defense.  On direct examination, 
Wilson’s counsel asked, “Did you intend to strike [Reffett]?”  Wilson answered, 
“No.  I intended to scare him and back him off because that man had a gun to me, 
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either way he had a gun to me, so instinct, I grabbed [the gun] as fast as I could to 
protect me and [the passenger].”  Later in his direct examination, Wilson reiterated 
that his intent was not to harm or kill Reffett: 
 
Q.  Did you intend to shoot [Reffett] at the time? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Did you intend to murder him? 
A.  All I wanted to do was make noise to get him out of my 
face.  That man had a gun to me, and I don’t even know how.  I got 
one shot out of the vehicle, and it did its job for real.  He got away 
from me, and the car wouldn’t start or I would have had a little more 
time to get away. 
 
{¶ 6} On cross-examination, Wilson repeatedly denied that he had 
attempted to hit or harm Reffett: 
 
Q.  * * * You admit you aimed [the gun] at him? 
A.  No. 
* * * 
Q.  Did you fire your gun at him? 
A.  I fired her gun in the air. 
* * * 
Q.  I’ll show you State’s Exhibit #7.  That’s one where we 
seen Mr. Reffett there with that circular hole or dent right by his 
head.  Do you see that? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Now, you’re saying that you shot at him but— 
A.  I didn’t shoot at— 
January Term, 2024 
5 
 
Q.  —you didn’t cause that dent right by that— 
A.  I shot out of my window to make noise. 
 
{¶ 7} Wilson never testified any differently or recanted his statement that 
he had shot out of his window to scare Reffett. 
{¶ 8} While Wilson initially presented a theory of self-defense, his counsel 
abandoned that theory at the suggestion of the trial court.  Defense counsel 
conceded that a self-defense jury instruction was not warranted, because Wilson 
admitted in his testimony that he did not intend to harm Reffett.  The jury found 
Wilson guilty of felonious assault with two firearm specifications but not guilty of 
attempted murder. 
{¶ 9} On appeal to the Second District, Wilson argued that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction.  
A divided court of appeals rejected Wilson’s argument.  The majority concluded 
that a self-defense jury instruction was not available to Wilson, because he did not 
concede that he intended to harm Reffett when he shot the gun.  To the contrary, 
the majority found that Wilson had attempted to negate the claim that he committed 
the offense of felonious assault by testifying that he had not intended to harm 
Reffett.  See 2022-Ohio-3763, ¶ 52, 56.  The majority reasoned that “because self-
defense presumes an intentional, willful use of force, when an individual testifies 
that they [sic] did not intend to cause harm, such testimony prevents the individual 
from claiming self-defense.”  (Cleaned up.)  Id. at ¶ 65.  The dissenting opinion 
countered that Wilson was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he 
testified that his purpose for firing the gun was to repel a perceived attack on him.  
Id. at ¶ 78 (Donovan, J., dissenting).  The dissent noted that “[t]he majority’s 
decision encourages an individual to only shoot to kill or maim when confronted 
by an armed assailant.”  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} Wilson appealed the Second District’s judgment to this court, raising 
one proposition of law for review: “Is the accused entitled to a self-defense 
instruction for firing a warning shot at an armed aggressor, or must they [sic] shoot 
to injure or kill in order to receive the instruction at trial?”  We accepted 
jurisdiction.  169 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2023-Ohio-381, 202 N.E.3d 717.  Wilson argues 
that the court of appeals’ majority erred by imposing a heightened burden of 
production on him in concluding that in order to assert self-defense, he had to 
concede that he intended to kill or harm Reffett.  Neither the self-defense statute 
nor this court’s case law requires such a concession.  Because Wilson, through his 
testimony that he fired a shot to scare or repel Reffett, produced evidence that 
tended to support the claim that he acted in self-defense, we conclude that he was 
entitled to a self-defense jury instruction and that his trial counsel was ineffective 
by not requesting that instruction. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  We decline to dismiss this case as having been improvidently accepted 
{¶ 11} Before discussing the merits of this case, we first address the state’s 
request to dismiss this case as having been improvidently accepted because the 
wording Wilson uses to present his case to us on appeal is different from the 
wording that he used on appeal to the Second District.  We decline the state’s 
request. 
{¶ 12} Wilson’s assignment of error in the court of appeals stated: “Trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask that the jury be 
instructed on self-defense and erroneously conceding that self-defense does not 
apply to the facts and circumstances of Mr. Wilson’s case.”  His proposition of law 
asserted in this court states: “Is the accused entitled to a self-defense instruction for 
firing a warning shot at an armed aggressor, or must they [sic] shoot to injure or 
kill in order to receive the instruction at trial?” 
January Term, 2024 
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{¶ 13} While the assignment of error and the proposition of law are worded 
differently, Wilson has asked both the court of appeals and this court to address 
whether he was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction and whether his counsel 
was ineffective by not requesting that instruction.  The slight difference in the 
wording of the assignment of error and the proposition of law is a distinction 
without a difference.  The Second District’s analysis focused on whether Wilson 
was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction and thus whether his counsel was 
ineffective by failing to request that instruction.  This is the issue squarely before 
us, and there is no substantive difference between the arguments that Wilson raised 
in the court of appeals and the arguments that he submits to us in this appeal. 
{¶ 14} The dissenting opinion claims that we should not consider the 
ineffective-counsel argument, because Wilson did not properly raise that claim in 
this court.  See dissenting opinion, ¶ 41-42.  It is ironic that the dissent finds our 
decision to be “too narrow,” id. at ¶ 33, while also encouraging such a rigid reading 
of Wilson’s proposition of law and memorandum in support of jurisdiction, in 
which Wilson did argue that his counsel was ineffective in not requesting a self-
defense jury instruction by stating that “Mr. Wilson’s trial attorney erroneously 
conceded that self-defense did not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case 
and failed to request the self-defense jury instruction” and that “without making 
any argument or providing any case law, trial counsel merely acquiesced to the 
position of the trial court and prosecution that self-defense does not apply to an 
intentional warning shot in the direction of an armed aggressor.”  There is no 
question that Wilson preserved his self-defense argument, and this court understood 
Wilson’s argument to include his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when we 
accepted his appeal (over the dissenting opinion author’s vote to deny jurisdiction), 
see 169 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2023-Ohio-381, 202 N.E.3d 717.  The dissent’s rigid 
reading of Wilson’s proposition of law therefore misses the mark, and based on this 
court’s precedent, we should still proceed to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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question, see Goudy v. Tuscarawas Cty. Pub. Defender, 170 Ohio St.3d 173, 2022-
Ohio-4121, 209 N.E.3d 681, ¶ 15, fn. 1 (because the crux of the propositions of law 
that appellant set forth in her merit brief remained largely the same as those over 
which the court accepted jurisdiction, the court proceeded to the merits of the case).  
We therefore decline to dismiss this case as having been improvidently accepted. 
B.  Intent required for self-defense 
1.  There is no intent specified in the self-defense statute 
{¶ 15} The parties agree that at the time Wilson was charged, Ohio’s self-
defense statute, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1), read as follows: 
 
A person is allowed to act in self-defense, defense of 
another, or defense of that person’s residence.  If, at the trial of a 
person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use 
of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to 
support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, 
defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
person did not use the force in self-defense, defense of another, or 
defense of that person’s residence, as the case may be. 
 
{¶ 16} Based on this statute, if there was evidence presented at trial that 
tended to support the notion that Wilson had used force in self-defense, the burden 
should have shifted to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Wilson had not used that force in self-defense.  As discussed below, Wilson 
presented evidence to support the notion that he had used force in self-defense. 
{¶ 17} The state does not point to any language in the statute specifying that 
a defendant must have acted with an intent to harm or kill another person in order 
to assert and be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.  The statute requires only 
January Term, 2024 
9 
 
that the defendant use force against another person, and there is no further 
specification of the mental state required to assert self-defense.  As there is no 
statutory support for the state’s claim that self-defense requires an intent to kill or 
maim, we turn next to case law. 
2.  Self-defense case law requires only an intent to repel or escape force 
{¶ 18} While R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) does not require a particular mental state 
in self-defense claims, case law specifies the intent necessary to assert self-defense.  
For nearly 100 years, this court has held that self-defense “presumes intentional, 
willful use of force to repel force or escape force.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. 
Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 286-287, 142 N.E. 141 (1924).  This means that the 
use of force must be intentional—not accidental.  The only additional “intent” 
required is the intent to repel or escape force, not an intent to use force to harm or 
kill another person. 
{¶ 19} Wilson’s use of force here was intentional.  He admitted to grabbing 
the gun and firing it; he did not claim that he fired the weapon by accident or that 
the gun went off at random.  He also testified that he fired the gun to escape or repel 
Reffett and to “scare him and back him off.” 
{¶ 20} More recently, this court reiterated that a person may use deadly 
force in self-defense when he or she (1) “ ‘was not at fault in creating the situation 
giving rise to the affray’ ”; (2) “ ‘had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of 
escape from such danger was in the use of such force’ ”; and (3) “ ‘did not violate 
any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.’ ”  (Brackets added in Messenger.)  State v. 
Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, ¶ 14, quoting 
State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).  Our case law 
provides that the only requisite state of mind or intent that a defendant must have 
had to assert self-defense is that he or she intended to use force and that such force 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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was used to repel or escape his or her attacker.  R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) and our case 
law do not require any other state of mind, let alone an intent to kill or maim. 
{¶ 21} In this case, according to Wilson’s testimony (which the jury could 
believe or disregard when deciding whether Wilson acted in self-defense), (1) he 
was not at fault in creating the situation, because Reffett pointed a gun at him, (2) 
he had a bona fide belief that Reffett was going to shoot him because during the 
altercation, Reffett said, “I’ll smoke you out here,” and then pointed a gun at 
Wilson, which caused Wilson to feel “scared for [his] life” and believe that his only 
means of escape was to shoot out the car window (“I grabbed [the gun] as fast as I 
could to protect me and [the passenger]”), and (3) he did not have a duty to retreat, 
see R.C. 2901.09(B).  The trial court and the Second District, however, imposed an 
additional, unlawful burden of production on Wilson by requiring that he admit to 
intending to harm or kill Reffett in order to proceed on his self-defense claim.  By 
instituting this level of intent, the state and both lower courts have read words into 
the statute and controlling case law that are not there. 
3.  Wilson presented an affirmative defense 
{¶ 22} The state argues, and the Second District agreed, that Wilson could 
not proceed on a self-defense theory, because he was not presenting it as a true 
defense but, rather, as a negation of the intent required for felonious assault.  Self-
defense must be a “true” defense—a justification for the conduct—not a negation 
of the elements of the underlying charge.  See State v. Dykas, 185 Ohio App.3d 
763, 2010-Ohio-359, 925 N.E.2d 685, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). 
{¶ 23} Wilson did not attempt to negate the intent required for felonious 
assault, but he did try to justify his felonious assault.  Unlike self-defense, the state 
of mind required for felonious assault is set forth in the statute defining the offense: 
“No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to 
another * * * by means of a deadly weapon * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2903.11(A)(2).  “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person 
January Term, 2024 
11 
 
is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 
probably be of a certain nature.  A person has knowledge of circumstances when 
the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.”  R.C. 2901.22(B). 
{¶ 24} Intentionally shooting toward or in the vicinity of another person 
when there is a risk of injury meets the “knowingly” element of felonious assault.  
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130541, 2014-Ohio-3829, 
¶ 27-28 (defendant fired multiple shots toward another person outside a store); State 
v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73364, 1998 WL 827588, *12 (Nov. 25, 1998) 
(“[f]iring a gun in a person’s direction is sufficient evidence of felonious assault”); 
State v. Gregory, 90 Ohio App.3d 124, 131, 628 N.E.2d 86 (12th Dist.1993) (“[t]he 
shooting of a gun in a place where there is a risk of injury to one or more persons 
supports the inference that [the defendant] acted knowingly”); State v. Phillips, 75 
Ohio App.3d 785, 792, 600 N.E.2d 825 (2d Dist.1991) (defendant’s “intent to cause 
physical harm to the five individuals could be inferred from his having shot a gun 
randomly in the direction of each individual”).  While the dissent argues that this 
analysis is too narrow, on the contrary, the dissent’s position is too broad—it reads 
the “knowingly” element out of the statute and argues that Wilson needed to admit 
that he intended to cause harm to Reffett.  See dissenting opinion at ¶ 33-36.  As 
explained above, for more than thirty years, courts across Ohio have consistently 
found that intentionally firing a weapon in the direction of another person is 
sufficient to meet the “knowingly” element of the felonious-assault statute.  While 
the dissenting opinion criticizes our reliance on decisions from several courts of 
appeals, it does not claim that the conclusions reached in those cases are incorrect.  
See id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 25} Wilson admitted multiple times during his testimony at trial that he 
pointed a gun out the car window and fired a shot, but he said that he did not intend 
to strike Reffett with the shot.  Regarding the dent in Reffett’s truck allegedly 
caused by the bullet from the gun Wilson used, Wilson stated that “I didn’t aim [the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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gun] at the vehicle at all, but [Reffett] was so close to me [that the bullet] couldn’t 
do nothing but probably hit there.”  We recently held that the burden of production 
in self-defense “is ‘not a heavy one,’ ” State v. Palmer, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-
Ohio-539, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 20, quoting Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-
4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, at ¶ 22, and that “[t]he question is not whether the evidence 
should be believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could convince a trier of 
fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was acting in self-defense” 
(emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 21.  Wilson’s case nearly mirrors Palmer’s—both men fired 
shots toward another person and testified to the thought processes that led them to 
shoot (though Palmer actually hit his perceived assailant).  See id. at ¶ 11-13.  Both 
men were found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of felonious assault, and 
both men were denied a self-defense jury instruction (though Palmer’s counsel 
requested the instruction).  See id. at ¶ 13-14.  Just like in Palmer, a jury would be 
free to believe Wilson or disregard his testimony, but Wilson was entitled to a self-
defense jury instruction because his testimony tended to support his claim of self-
defense and was not a negation of the element of intent required for the offense of 
felonious assault. 
C.  Wilson’s counsel was ineffective 
{¶ 26} Given that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-
defense, we now review whether Wilson’s counsel was ineffective by failing to 
request a self-defense jury instruction.  To prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Wilson must prove (1) that his counsel’s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that his counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced him, resulting in a fundamentally unfair or unreliable 
outcome of the proceeding.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
{¶ 27} While we typically defer to trial counsel’s decisions as a matter of 
strategy, there is little doubt here that Wilson’s counsel’s failing to request the self-
January Term, 2024 
13 
 
defense jury instruction—the only defense Wilson’s testimony supported2—cannot 
be chalked up to trial strategy.  See id. at 688-689.  We agree with the appellate-
court decisions that have determined that failing to request a self-defense jury 
instruction in an assault case may satisfy the first prong of Strickland.  See State v. 
Brown, 2017-Ohio-7424, 96 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.); State v. Patterson, 2d 
Dist. Greene No. 2015-CA-57, 2016-Ohio-2750, ¶ 22.  And notably, the dissenting 
opinion does not attempt to distinguish these cases in its analysis. 
{¶ 28} The second prong is also met here.  Juries are entitled to “all 
instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and 
discharge its duty as the fact finder.”  State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 
N.E.2d 640 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus.  The jury found Wilson not guilty 
of the attempted murder charge, which suggests that the jury had some question 
regarding Wilson’s intent.  Further, it is unknown who the jury may have believed 
and how it may have weighed the evidence if it was instructed to consider Wilson’s 
claim of self-defense.  There was conflicting testimony from Wilson and Reffett, 
the gas station’s surveillance cameras did not capture the angle between the 
vehicles to show whether Reffett pointed a gun at Wilson, and the parties disagreed 
on where Wilson aimed the gun when he fired it.3   
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 29} The requisite state of mind or intent that a defendant must have had 
to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction is an intent to use force to repel or 
escape force.  The trial court and Second District erred in holding that Wilson 
needed to show a different state of mind or intent—that is, an intent to harm or kill 
another person.  Under the evidence presented in this case, Wilson was entitled to 
 
2. In his closing argument, Wilson’s counsel argued that Wilson may not have been the shooter, 
even though Wilson testified repeatedly that he had fired the weapon. 
 
3. While the state posits that Wilson’s shot hit Reffett’s truck door, Wilson denied this during his 
trial testimony. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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a self-defense jury instruction; thus, his counsel was prejudicially ineffective by 
failing to request that instruction.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Second 
District Court of Appeals, vacate Wilson’s conviction, and remand this matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
DONNELLY and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DETERS, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and 
DEWINE, J. 
__________________ 
DETERS, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} Because Tyler Wilson’s claim that he did not intend to hurt Billy 
Reffett was not an affirmative defense to the charge of felonious assault, he was not 
entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.  The lead opinion sees it otherwise and 
compounds its error by deciding an ineffective-counsel claim that was not raised 
before this court, so I respectfully dissent. 
The evidence presented at trial did not constitute an affirmative defense 
{¶ 31} Wilson asserts a single proposition of law, in which he argues that 
he was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.  “[A] court’s instructions to the 
jury should be addressed to the actual issues in the case as posited by the evidence 
and the pleadings.”  State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271, 421 N.E.2d 157 
(1981).  The first question then is whether there was sufficient evidence presented 
to warrant a self-defense jury instruction.  The answer requires a review of self-
defense as an affirmative defense. 
{¶ 32} Ohio has long recognized self-defense as an affirmative defense.  
State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 93, 488 N.E.2d 166 (1986), superseded by statute 
on other grounds as stated in State v. Brooks, 170 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-2478, 
January Term, 2024 
15 
 
208 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 15.  The recent change to R.C. 2901.05(B) regarding the burdens 
of production and proof for self-defense, see generally State v. Messenger, 171 
Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, ¶ 15-22, has not changed self-
defense’s categorization as an affirmative defense, see R.C. 2901.05(A).  This court 
has explained affirmative defenses such as self-defense this way: “[Affirmative 
defenses] represent not a mere denial or contradiction of evidence which the 
prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged, but, 
rather, they represent a substantive or independent matter ‘which the defendant 
claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by 
the prosecution are true.’ ”  State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 888 
(1973), quoting 1 Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Section 19, at 54-55 
(12th Ed.1955). 
{¶ 33} On this much the lead opinion agrees, writing that “[s]elf-defense 
must be a ‘true’ defense—a justification for the conduct—not a negation of the 
elements of the underlying charge.”  Lead opinion, ¶ 22.  But the lead opinion goes 
on to determine that Wilson’s version of events constituted the assertion of a “true” 
defense and not a negation of the elements of felonious assault.  In doing so, the 
lead opinion focuses on the mens rea required for felonious assault.  Distilled, the 
lead opinion’s reasoning goes something like this: Felonious assault requires a 
person to act knowingly.  Intentionally shooting a gun satisfies the knowingly 
element.  Wilson therefore did not negate an element of felonious assault when he 
admitted that he had intentionally fired the gun.  The problem with the lead 
opinion’s reasoning is that its focus is too narrow. 
{¶ 34} Wilson 
was 
charged 
with 
felonious 
assault 
under 
R.C 
2903.11(A)(2), which makes it a crime for a person to knowingly “[c]ause or 
attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon.”  
There was no evidence that Wilson caused physical harm to Reffett, so the state of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
Ohio had to prove that Wilson attempted to cause physical harm to Reffett—a 
premise Wilson flatly denied. 
{¶ 35} At trial, Wilson conceded that he had intentionally fired the gun that 
was in the car he was driving, but he was adamant that he had not intended to hurt 
Reffett:   
 
Q.  Did you intend to strike [Reffett]? 
A.  No.  I intended to scare him and back him off * * *. 
 
Wilson repeated this assertion multiple times during his testimony.  He also 
questioned whether the shot he fired had caused the damage to Reffett’s truck: “I 
don’t think that bullet hole was even from me.  That wasn’t even a bullet hole.  That 
dent.  That close.  I just aimed out the window and fired up.” 
{¶ 36} Based on his version of the shooting, Wilson did not “ ‘conced[e] 
that the facts claimed by the prosecution [were] true,’ ” Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d at 19, 
294 N.E.2d 888, quoting Anderson, Section 19, at 54-55.  Instead, Wilson sought 
to negate the “attempt to cause physical harm” element of felonious assault.  If the 
jury had believed Wilson, it would not have found him guilty of felonious assault.  
His defense—that he had fired only a warning shot—was not an affirmative 
defense. 
{¶ 37} The lead opinion seems to accept Wilson’s argument that the court 
of appeals’ decision “impos[ed] a heightened burden of production on him in 
concluding that in order to assert self-defense, he had to concede that he intended 
to kill or harm Reffett.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 10.  But because Wilson did not present 
evidence of a true affirmative defense, the allocation of burden in R.C. 2901.05 did 
not apply.  The ultimate burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements 
of felonious assault—including “caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm,” 
January Term, 2024 
17 
 
R.C 2903.11(A)(2)—remained with the state.  And nothing prevented Wilson from 
arguing that the evidence on that element had not been proved. 
{¶ 38} The court of appeals’ decisions cited by the lead opinion do not 
persuade otherwise.  Notably, those cases are not about whether a self-defense jury 
instruction was warranted or whether the defendant had caused or attempted to 
cause physical harm.  Instead, those cases addressed the sufficiency or manifest 
weight of the evidence regarding the mens rea element of felonious assault.  See 
State v. Henderson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130541, 2014-Ohio-3829, ¶ 23, 27-
28; State v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73364, 1998 WL 827588, *12 (Nov. 
25, 1998); State v. Gregory, 90 Ohio App.3d 124, 131, 628 N.E.2d 86 (12th 
Dist.1993).  And though the lead opinion characterizes this dissent as arguing about 
what evidence would be sufficient to establish an attempt to cause physical harm, 
see lead opinion at ¶ 24, that’s not the point.  My concern is not the absence of 
direct evidence.  Quite the opposite—the problem is that there is evidence in the 
record of an active denial by Wilson that he attempted to cause physical harm. 
{¶ 39} Because Wilson attempted to negate an element of felonious assault 
at trial, he did not assert a true affirmative defense.  He was therefore not entitled 
to a self-defense jury instruction.  We should affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 
for this reason. 
Counsel was not ineffective 
{¶ 40} The sole proposition of law presented by Wilson and accepted for 
review by this court was as follows: “Is the accused entitled to a self-defense 
instruction for firing a warning shot at an armed aggressor, or must they [sic] shoot 
to injure or kill in order to receive the instruction at trial?”  See 169 Ohio St.3d 
1430, 2023-Ohio-381, 202 N.E.3d 717.  The discussion above disposes of the 
proposition.  Wilson was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.  That should 
be the end of this court’s consideration of Wilson’s appeal.  But the lead opinion’s 
discussion ranges beyond Wilson’s proposition of law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 41} The lead opinion concludes that Wilson’s proposition of law 
represents only a “slight difference in the wording,” lead opinion at ¶ 13, from the 
assignment of error that he raised in the court of appeals, which stated: “Trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask that the jury be 
instructed on self-defense and erroneously conceding that self-defense does not 
apply to the facts and circumstances of Mr. Wilson’s case,” 2022-Ohio-3763, ¶ 30.  
And so the lead opinion goes on to consider whether Wilson’s trial counsel was 
ineffective.  But Wilson did not present a proposition of law about ineffective 
assistance of counsel in his memorandum in support of jurisdiction.  The lead 
opinion declares that “this court understood Wilson’s argument to include his 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when we accepted his appeal.”  Lead 
opinion at ¶ 14.  The source of this understanding is unclear.  When we accept a 
jurisdictional appeal, we do so on the proposition of law presented by the appellant.  
No amount of squinting or reading between the lines will reveal any claim regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the accepted proposition that Wilson presented. 
{¶ 42} Our review should be limited to addressing the single proposition of 
law set forth by Wilson and accepted for review by a majority of this court.  
Nevertheless, because the lead opinion has addressed the issue, I will briefly discuss 
why its conclusion regarding the ineffective-counsel claim is incorrect. 
{¶ 43} “Counsel’s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and 
until counsel’s performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s 
performance.”  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), 
paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is 
to be highly deferential, and reviewing courts must refrain from second-guessing 
the strategic decisions of trial counsel.  To justify a finding of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the appellant must overcome a strong presumption that, under the 
January Term, 2024 
19 
 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”  
State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995), citing Strickland 
at 689, and State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 114, 126, 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990). 
{¶ 44} The lead opinion briefly nods at the notion that we “typically defer 
to trial counsel’s decisions as a matter of strategy” before it concludes that there 
was “little doubt” that counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense jury 
instruction could not be “chalked up to trial strategy.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 27.  A 
closer look at what happened at trial, however, reveals that defense counsel’s 
strategy was not unreasonable. 
{¶ 45} The lead opinion states that “[w]hile Wilson initially presented a 
theory of self-defense, his counsel abandoned that theory at the suggestion of the 
trial court.”  Id. at ¶ 8.  This assertion glosses over the discussion that took place 
before closing arguments: 
 
THE COURT: * * *   
At first I thought we were looking at a self-defense case, but 
the more I heard the defendant testify, I believe that the defense in 
this case is that the defendant did not aim the gun at the victim, did 
not intend to hurt the victim or kill the victim. 
 
His testimony was that he fired the gun in the air to scare 
them off.  So to me, that’s the defense. 
 
Now, that being said, because of that I don’t think a self-
defense instruction is warranted, but I certainly think the defense has 
every right to argue that the reason he fired the shot in the air was 
because he was afraid perhaps for his life. 
 
I don’t have a problem with that argument.  But I don’t see 
it as a true self-defense case because he’s saying he didn’t fire the 
shot at the victim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
 
Is that how you see it, [defense counsel]?  Or [prosecutor]? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: I agree, yes. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I agree too. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  So I don’t want to prevent the defense 
in any way from arguing that the defendant was afraid for his life 
and that’s the whole reason why he grabbed the gun and fired it. 
 
But again, I think the defense from that point is that I fired 
the gun into the air to scare them off, which isn’t really, doesn’t 
really fit with a true self-defense claim.  But again, [defense 
counsel], I will give you the full latitude to argue essentially what 
the defendant’s testimony was. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I believe that’s accurate.  You 
described it. 
 
In light of the trial court’s explanation, defense counsel’s not requesting a jury 
instruction on self-defense was reasonable. 
{¶ 46} The lead opinion also discounts defense counsel’s closing argument.  
While the lead opinion mentions in a footnote that during closing argument, defense 
counsel questioned whether Wilson was the shooter, lead opinion at ¶ 27, fn. 2, the 
lead opinion ignores the core of defense counsel’s argument, which was that Wilson 
was not shooting at Reffett but was instead firing a warning shot:   
 
[Reffett’s] in an elevated position over him, brandishing a 
weapon.  [Wilson’s] driving a car that he knows doesn’t start all the 
time.  How would anybody here feel in that position?  Vulnerable?  
Scared?  He testified he didn’t shoot at him. 
January Term, 2024 
21 
 
A bunch of you here are into guns, like I am, and anybody 
who has ever shot a gun knows that a .9 millimeter bullet will go 
through sheet metal.  He didn’t intend to shoot [Reffett].  It wouldn’t 
have gone straight up. 
 
{¶ 47} Defense counsel’s closing argument makes clear that he did not 
“abandon” the self-defense theory.  He simply understood that Wilson’s version of 
events did not constitute a true affirmative defense.  He took pains to explain the 
distinction to the jury:   
 
There is no proof to show that [Wilson] committed the 
crimes that he’s charged with.  He didn’t really act in self-defense.  
Self-defense would be if he tried to shoot somebody.  That’s true 
self-defense.  There is a bearing there of self-defense, but he was 
acting more of himself than others when he shot in the air. 
He wasn’t shooting at the person, so that’s not true self-
defense.  There is an element there, but that’s why you need it.  
That’s what you need to think about.  He did not intend to murder, 
did not intend to hit.  He [tried] to ward off and scare, and get out of 
that situation, and that’s why he took off and was pursued by a man 
with a gun that was waving it out the window. 
 
* * * 
So when you go back there and deliberate, I just want to 
point out the State has not met its burden.  He did not attempt to hurt 
or murder anybody.  He shot in the air in defense of himself and his 
passenger. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Reviewed with the appropriate deference, defense counsel’s performance did not 
fall “below an objective standard of reasonable representation,” Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 48} Wilson attempted to negate an element of felonious assault by 
claiming at trial that he did not intend to shoot at Reffett.  The evidence presented 
at trial did not constitute a true affirmative defense.  Therefore, a self-defense jury 
instruction was not warranted.  And in any event, trial counsel was not ineffective.  
Because the lead opinion sees it differently, I respectfully dissent. 
 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Daniel P. Driscoll, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew P. 
Pickering and Christian W. Sorg, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Kate L. Bowling, for appellant. 
Russell S. Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
________________________