Title: State v. Schutter

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

588 P.2d 428 (1978) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David C. SCHUTTER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5863. Supreme Court of Hawaii. December 21, 1978. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing January 5, 1979. John S. Edmunds, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Charlotte E. Libman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee. Before KOBAYASHI, Acting C.J., OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ., and FUKUSHIMA, Circuit Judge, in place of RICHARDSON, C.J., recused. PER CURIAM. The defendant attorney was found guilty of criminal contempt under HRS § 710-1077 by the district judge and fined $100.00. He appeals from the oral order and judgment of the district court. We reverse. *429 HRS § 710-1077(5) expressly provides that "[w]henever any person is convicted of criminal contempt of court [and] sentenced therefor, the particular circumstances of the offense shall be fully set forth in the judgment and in the order or warrant of commitment." (Emphasis added) This particular statutory provision is simply a restatement of former law. See HRS § 729-5. See also Crow v. Crow, 49 Haw. 258, 414 P.2d 82 (1966). In this case, the factual specifications required by the statute are to be found in neither the clerk's calendar notation of judgment, entered pursuant to the District Court Rules of Penal Procedure,[1] nor in the court's special oral findings. This was due in large part to the district court's clearly erroneous impression that it was not required to make these special findings: The failure of the trial court to comply with the statute warrants a reversal, and this ought to put an end to the matter before this court. However, an examination of the entire record of the proceedings compels us to make certain observations concerning the conduct of both trial judge and counsel. Subject to the exercise of sound judicial discretion, a trial judge has the right to examine witnesses to elicit pertinent material facts not brought out by either party or to clarify testimony. Such power is incident to the search for truth in judicial proceedings. Territory v. Hall, 39 Haw. 397 (1952); Territory v. Van Culin, 36 Haw. 153 (1942); Territory v. Kikipi, 24 Haw. 500 (1918); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1952). See also Kamahalo v. Coelho, 24 Haw. 689 (1919); The Kawailani, 128 F. 879 (9th Cir.1904). At no time, however, must the court assume the role of an advocate for either party. In this connection, the following observations are pertinent: This power to interrogate must be judiciously exercised, and the examination ought not to be extended beyond that which is reasonably necessary to elicit needed material facts or to clarify testimony. The record in this case shows that the court's examination of the witnesses, especially those called by the defense, far exceeded that which was reasonable and proper under the circumstances.[2] And while such *430 extended court interrogation, at least according to the trial judge, had the effect of satisfying the court that the defendant was not guilty as charged, the trial judge's excessive and unduly extended examination also had the unfortunate effect of causing the defendant to react in an unprofessional manner, and in terms uncharacteristic of the defendant.[3] We think that the following statement from Com. of Pa. v. L.U., 542, Intern. U. of Op. Engrs., 552 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir.1977), bears repeating: Reversed. [1] The District Court Rules of Penal Procedure have since been superseded by the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure. [2] A trial judge ought to be careful not to usurp the functions of counsel. In the examination of defense witness Dean Arakaki, defense direct examination covered four pages of testimony, the prosecution's less than a page, defense redirect, one page, and the court's, 27 pages. As to defense witness Gary Kawamoto, defense direct examination ran six pages, the prosecutor's, two pages, and the court's, 17 pages. Three other defense witnesses were subjected to similarly extensive examination by the court following relatively short interrogations by defense and prosecution. Seasonable objections were made by the defendant throughout the court's examination. [3] We need not indulge in intimate detail regarding the defendant's conduct. But the record does show that, on a number of occasions in the course of the proceedings his words and conduct towards the court were intemperate and disrespectful. The fact that they were obviously the product of his frustration over the court's overextensive examination of his witnesses did not furnish justification for the defendant's conduct.