Title: State v. Turnage

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES ALLEN TURNAGE, JR.
No. 228A08
FILED: 10 OCTOBER 2008
Appeal and Error; Burglary--sufficiency of evidence--majority and dissenting Court of
Appeals opinions--inconsistencies
The Supreme Court remanded the Court of Appeals’ reversal of a first-degree
burglary conviction where there were inconsistencies in the Court of Appeals’ majority and
dissenting opinions.  The Supreme Court could not ascertain whether the basis for the majority’s
reversal was limited to insufficient evidence of the identity of the perpetrator or insufficient
evidence of both the element of entry and the identity of the perpetrator.  The writing of the
dissenting opinion leaves the Supreme Court to speculate as to how the dissenting judge
interpreted the majority opinion on the issue of entry.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 190 N.C.
App. ___, 660 S.E.2d 129 (2008), reversing in part and finding no
prejudicial error in part in judgments entered 10 March 2004 by
Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Superior Court, Wake County.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 8 September 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Catherine F. Jordan
and David W. Boone, Assistant Attorneys General, for
the State-appellant.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Emily H.
Davis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-
appellee.
PARKER, Chief Justice.
In this case we review the Court of Appeals’ holding
that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of
first-degree burglary against defendant, James Allen Turnage, Jr.
In the early morning hours of 29 April 2003, Kristina
Coleman was asleep in her home where she lived with her father 
at 508 Calloway Drive in Raleigh, North Carolina.  Mr. Coleman
had left to handle his paper route.  The house was locked and
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secured.  Shortly before 4:00 a.m. Ms. Coleman was awakened to
the sound of breaking glass at the front entrance to her home;
she called 911 to report that someone was attempting to break
into the house.
When police responded they found defendant running up
an embankment at the rear of the house toward a fence that ran
along Highway 440.  Raleigh Police Officer R.J. Armstrong
apprehended defendant.  A screwdriver-like object with an eyelet
at one end, a seven inch metal rod, and a pen lighter were found
in and taken from defendant’s pockets.  Officer Armstrong and
Officer Jason Bloodworth also observed that defendant had cuts
and blood on the inside of his hand.  Defendant later testified
that he had also had a crack pipe in his pocket that he had
thrown away as he ran from the officers.
Defendant was subsequently indicted for first-degree
burglary, possession of burglary tools, and habitual felon
status.  At his trial in March 2004, the evidence showed that the
residence had a storm door and a wooden front door with three
diagonal glass panes across the top of the wooden door.  The
State presented evidence that one of defendant’s fingerprints was
found on the exterior of the wooden front door to the Coleman
house.  Additionally, one of the panes of glass in the door was
broken completely through, and glass was found both inside and
outside the door.  Although the edges of the broken window were
“jagged,” no blood was found.  The exterior of the wooden door
was damaged, but the interior of the door showed no damage, and
none of the fingerprints on the inside of the door matched
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defendant’s.  Defendant testified that he had been at the Coleman
house that night with an acquaintance, Artis Barber, but had not
participated when Mr. Barber attempted to break into the house. 
Defendant further stated that he had slept very little in the
days preceding the attempted break-in and had smoked crack
cocaine and consumed at least a liter of Richard’s Wild Irish
Rose wine on the night in question.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree burglary and possession of
implements of housebreaking.  The verdict sheet also listed the
lesser-included offenses of attempted first-degree burglary,
felonious breaking or entering, and non-felonious breaking or
entering.  Defendant pled guilty to habitual felon status.
On writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the
panel unanimously found no prejudicial error in defendant’s
conviction for possession of implements of housebreaking, but
split with respect to the conviction for first-degree burglary
with the majority voting to reverse and the dissenting judge
voting no error.  The State appealed to this Court based on the
dissenting opinion.
In ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine
“only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential
element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the
perpetrator of the offense.”  State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73,
472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (citing State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231,
236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)).  “Substantial evidence is
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relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.”  Id. (citing Vause, 328 N.C. at 236,
400 S.E.2d at 61).  The trial court “‘must consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State and the State is
entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that
evidence.’”  Id. at 73, 472 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting State v.
Saunders, 317 N.C. 308, 312, 345 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1986)).
Moreover, “[c]ircumstantial evidence may withstand a
motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence
does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.”  State v.
Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988) (citing
State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 384, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). 
In order to be submitted to the jury for determination of
defendant’s guilt, the “evidence need only give rise to a
reasonable inference of guilt.”  Id. (citations omitted).  A
motion to dismiss should be granted, however, “where the facts
and circumstances warranted by the evidence do no more than raise
a suspicion of guilt or conjecture since there would still remain
a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.”  Id. (citations
omitted).
Burglary is a common-law offense defined in North
Carolina as “the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of
another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony
therein.”  State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 355, 333 S.E.2d 708,
720 (1985) (citation omitted); see also N.C.G.S. § 14-51 (2005). 
Regarding the element of entry, “the least entry with the whole
or any part of the body, hand, or foot, or with any instrument or
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weapon, introduced for the purpose of committing a felony, is
sufficient to complete the offense.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 478
(5th ed. 1979); see also State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C. 410, 418-19,
255 S.E.2d 168, 174 (1979) (approving language stating that entry
in the law of burglary “‘is not confined to the intrusion of the
whole body, but may consist of the insertion . . . . into the
place broken the hand, the foot, or any instrument with which it
is intended to commit a felony’” (quoting 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary
§ 10 (1964))).
The State’s appeal is based on the dissenting opinion
in the Court of Appeals, and that opinion addressed only the
element of identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the
offense.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the only issue properly before this Court is whether
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the State presented
insufficient evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of the
first-degree burglary to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
We hold that the majority of the Court of Appeals erred on this
issue.
The evidence tended to show that defendant’s
fingerprint was found on the outside of the exterior wooden door
just under a broken windowpane.  Defendant was found by police in
the backyard of the residence, and at the time defendant was
attempting to escape over a fence at the top of an embankment. 
Defendant’s hand was bloody, and he had in his possession tools
that would be useful in breaking and entering.  Upon being
apprehended, defendant said that he did not know the house was
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occupied.  The Colemans had never seen defendant and had never
invited him into their home.  This evidence was sufficient to
support a reasonable inference that defendant was the perpetrator
of the crime and to withstand a motion to dismiss.
However, this Court cannot determine the proper
disposition of the Court of Appeals’ decision on account of
inconsistencies in both the majority and dissenting opinions.
The Court of Appeals’ majority first stated that
“because we find that the State failed to present substantial
evidence that Defendant James Allen Turnage, Jr. either entered
the residence in question or was the perpetrator of an entry if
it did occur, we reverse his conviction for first-degree
burglary.”  State v. Turnage, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 660 S.E.2d
129, 131 (2008) (emphasis added).  However, later in its
discussion of the burglary charge, the majority stated:
Although the fact of entry may be a
reasonable inference from the broken glass,
in that a body part or instrument may have
crossed the plane of the door at the moment
the glass broke, the State did not offer
proof that it was Defendant who committed the
entry, aside from a single thumbprint that
was on the exterior of the door.  Taken
together, this evidence gives rise to mere
speculation, “sufficient only to raise a
suspicion or conjecture as to either the
commission of the offense or the identity of
the defendant as the perpetrator[.]”
Id. at ___, 660 S.E.2d at 133 (citation omitted).
These two statements are conflicting; hence this Court
cannot ascertain whether the basis for the majority’s reversal of
the burglary conviction was limited to insufficiency of the
evidence as to identity of the perpetrator as suggested by the
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first sentence in the indented quotation or whether the basis was
insufficiency of the evidence as to both the element of entry and
identity of the perpetrator as suggested by the second sentence
in the indented quotation.
Assuming without deciding, that, as a matter of law,
the fact of entry for purposes of burglary may be established by
an instrument crossing the plane of the door at the moment the
glass broke, the conclusive second sentence does not comport with
a correct application of the test for a motion to dismiss based
on insufficient proof of entry.  Under the long-established test
for a motion to dismiss as outlined above, if, as a matter of
law, the evidence of broken glass permits a reasonable inference
of the fact of entry “in that a body part or instrument may have
crossed the plane of the door at the moment the glass broke,”
id., then the evidence of entry was sufficient to submit to the
jury and to withstand a motion to dismiss as to that element of
burglary.  Thus, the two statements in the above indented
quotation cannot lie down together.
The dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
addressed only the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as
to the identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the offense,
but the dissenting judge stated that in her opinion, “defendant
received a fair trial free from error, prejudicial or otherwise,”
Turnage, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 660 S.E.2d at 134 (Bryant, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and that she would
“hold no error in the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the
charge of first-degree burglary,” id. at ___, 660 S.E.2d at 135. 
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The dissenting judge does not indicate whether she concurs or
dissents from the majority opinion on the issue of entry, stating
only that “[t]he majority reasons this ‘gives rise to mere
speculation . . . “[as to] the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator[,]”’ and on this ground holds defendant’s motion to
dismiss should have been allowed.”  Id. at ___, 660 S.E.2d at 135
(brackets in original) (citation omitted).  The dissenting
opinion’s use of an ellipsis for the words “‘as to either the
commission of the offense or’” in the majority opinion leaves
this Court to speculate as to how the dissenting judge
interpreted the majority opinion on the issue of entry.
Accordingly, as to the only issue before this Court on
the State’s appeal of right, namely, the sufficiency of the
evidence as to defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the
offense if a burglary occurred, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for
reconsideration of the sufficiency of the evidence on the element
of entry for purposes of first-degree burglary and defendant’s
remaining assignments of error in light of this holding. 
Defendant’s convictions for possession of implements of
housebreaking and habitual felon status are not before this Court
and remain undisturbed.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.