Title: MARK D. JENKINS v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARK D. JENKINS v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2007 WY 39153 P.3d 39Case Number: No. 06-145Decided: 03/09/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

                                                                                                

 
 
MARK D. 
JENKINS,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
         

AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
Schilling of Schilling & Winn, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Radosevich.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mark D. Jenkins 
(Jenkins) is a professional writer who writes articles for Outside magazine on an independent 
contractor basis.  For tax purposes, 
Jenkins formed a subsection C corporation, Mark D. Jenkins, Inc., with himself 
and his wife as the sole officers and employees.  The corporation obtained workers' 
compensation coverage for Jenkins.  After an injury suffered while rock 
climbing during a staff retreat in New 
Mexico, Jenkins was awarded worker's compensation 
benefits after a contested case hearing.  The district court reversed the award 
concluding that the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) did not permit 
coverage for corporate officers when there were no non-corporate officer 
employees.  Jenkins appeals that 
decision.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Jenkins states 
the issue before us as:

Did the 
hearing examiner properly apply the law in concluding Appellant was a covered 
employee under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act?

 
 
The 
Wyoming Workers Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) 
responds:

 
 
Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings committed an error of law when it 
determined a corporate officer is covered under the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act when there are no non-corporate officers employed by the 
corporation?

 
 

FACTS

[¶3]      The facts are not 
in dispute. Jenkins is a professional writer who works as an independent 
contractor for Outside magazine. 
 On the advice of his tax preparer, 
Jenkins formed a regular Subsection C corporation.  Jenkins and his wife were listed as the 
corporate officers and were the only employees of Mark D. Jenkins, Inc.  Jenkins sought workers' compensation 
coverage filing the Joint Employer Registration form with the Wyoming Department 
of Employment. On November 7, 2002, the Department of Employment notified 
Jenkins that his request for workers' compensation coverage for himself as a 
corporate officer of the corporation was approved. 

 
 
[¶4]      On October 8, 
2004, Jenkins suffered a severe wrist injury while rock climbing during a 
retreat for staff and writers of Outside magazine in New Mexico.  Jenkins filed a Report of Injury with the 
Division.  On November 18, 2004, the 
Division issued a Final Determination denying benefits:  Finding that the injury was not within 
the scope of Jenkins' employment as a writer; Wyoming did not have jurisdiction 
because the accident occurred in New Mexico; and an injury sustained in the 
course of recreational or social events was outside the scope of the definition 
of injury when an employee was not required to attend the event.  Jenkins objected to the Final 
Determination and requested a hearing.  In its disclosure statement, the Division 
added that there was a question under the Act whether corporate officers could 
obtain workers' compensation coverage when there were no non-corporate officer 
employees in the corporation.  After 
a contested case hearing, the hearing examiner granted Jenkins benefits.  With respect to the issue of corporate 
officer coverage, the examiner concluded that "[a]lthough the corporation has 
two employees, Jenkins and his wife, the fact that Jenkins is a corporate 
officer and only employee electing coverage does not defeat benefits in this 
case.  There are no provisions under 
the Act that exclude coverage in this case."

 
 
[¶5]      The Division 
filed a petition for review in the district court, which reversed the award of 
benefits.  The court concluded that 
under the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-102(a) (vii) and 
27-14-108(k) (LexisNexis 2005) that a corporate officer may be covered under the 
Act only if the corporation employs a covered individual other than a corporate 
officer. Since Jenkins' corporation had only two employees, Jenkins and his 
wife, and both were corporate officers, the court held that Jenkins was not 
entitled to benefits.  Jenkins has 
appealed that ruling to this Court.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶6]      Judicial review 
of agency action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2005):

 
 
To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 

(i)                 
Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 

(ii)               
Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 

(A)       
Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)       
Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)      
In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)      
Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)       
Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
The 
determinative issue here is a question of law concerning the construction of 
several statutory provisions of the Act.

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with legislature's intent.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  We must not give a statute a meaning that 
will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.  Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, 
expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its express 
provisions.

 
 

Muller 
v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 2006 
WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, 
¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Resolution of 
this appeal turns on the construction of the following provisions of the 
Act:

 
 
"Employee" 
means any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under any appointment, 
contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and 
includes legally employed minors, aliens authorized to work by the United States 
department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services, and 
aliens whom the employer reasonably believes, at the date of hire and the date 
of injury based upon documentation in the employer's possession, to be 
authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of 
citizenship and immigration services. "Employee" does not 
include:

            
. . . .

(C) An officer of a corporation unless coverage 
is elected pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k).

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii)(C) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis 
added).

Any 
corporation or limited liability company employing individuals covered pursuant 
to subsections (a) or (j)1 of this section may 
elect to obtain coverage under this act for its corporate officers or limited 
liability company members by electing to cover any or all of its officers or 
members and notifying the division in writing of its election upon initial 
registration with the division, or thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of a 
calendar quarter.  Notwithstanding 
subsection (j) of this section, an employer shall not withdraw coverage at any 
time during the subsequent eight (8) calendar quarters.  Application for termination of coverage 
under this subsection shall be filed in writing with the division not less than 
thirty (30) days before any calendar quarter following the initial eight (8) 
calendar quarters of coverage.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-108(k) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶8]      Jenkins' argument 
for coverage under the Act is based upon a "dual capacity" theory where coverage 
for corporate officers is provided for under the previously cited provisions if 
the corporation had elected coverage and the corporate officer suffered a 
work-related injury while acting in the capacity of an employee.  The Division argues, and the district 
court held, that the coverage is available for corporate officers under the 
provisions of the Act only if the corporation employs individuals covered under 
subsections (a) or (j) of § 27-14-108 other than a corporate officer and the 
corporation elected coverage for its officers. We agree with the Division and 
district court's analysis.

 
 
[¶9]      The Act makes it 
clear that a corporation or limited liability company must be "employing" 
individuals who are "covered" under subsections (a) or (j) of § 27-14-108.  The plain language of the statute clearly 
sets forth a requirement that a corporation or limited liability company employ 
individuals as employees, other than the corporate officers, before coverage for 
corporate officers may be elected.  If the intent had been to allow coverage 
when there were no non-corporate officer employees, then the Act would have 
simply stated that any corporation or limited liability company could elect to 
obtain coverage for its corporate officers.  There would have been no need for the 
phrase "employing individuals pursuant to subsections (a) or (j)".  We will not read a statute so as to 
render any part of it superfluous or without effect. 

 
 
[¶10]   This interpretation of the statute 
is consistent with other provisions of the Act.  The definition of "employee" specifically 
excludes sole proprietors, partners of a business partnership and spouses or 
dependants of employers living in the same household.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). 
 This evidences a legislative intent 
contrary to Jenkins' "dual capacity" theory. 

 
 
[¶11]   Jenkins' corporation has two 
corporate officers and no other employees.  Without any employees covered under 
subsections (a) or (j) of § 27-14-108, worker's compensation benefits are not 
available for the corporate officers of Mark D. Jenkins, Inc.  Accordingly, the district court's order 
reversing the hearing examiner's award of benefits is affirmed.2

 
 
  
KITE, 
J., dissenting.

 
 
[¶12]   I disagree with the majority's 
reading of the applicable statutes and would affirm the conclusion of the Office 
of Administrative Hearings that Mr. Jenkins was covered by worker's compensation 
insurance because he was an officer of a corporation that had elected worker's 
compensation coverage for its officers as it was entitled to do pursuant to the 
plain language of the statute.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-108(k) (LexisNexis 2005) provides, "Any corporation or 
limited liability company employing 
individuals covered pursuant to subsections (a) or (j) of this section may 
elect to obtain coverage under this act for its corporate officers . . . ." 
(emphasis added).  It is undisputed 
the corporation employs Mr. Jenkins.  
So the only question becomes whether he was an individual "covered 
pursuant to subsections (a) or (j) . . . ."  He is not covered by subsection (a); 
however, he is covered by subsection (j) because he is an employee whose 
employer has elected coverage under the act and made payments as required.  Subsection (k) does not say that the 
company must employ individuals who are 
not corporate officers before it can make the statutory election for 
coverage of its officers.  We do not 
read into statutes language which the legislature did not include.  Stutzman v. Office of WyomingState Eng'r, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006); KP v. 
State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 22, 102 P.3d 217, 224 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 
[¶13]   I would reverse the district 
court's decision and remand the matter for consideration of the second issue 
raised by the division, i.e. whether Mr. Jenkin's injury was 
work-related.

 
 
 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-108(a) concerns extrahazardous employment while Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-108(j) concerns non-extrahazardous 
employment.

 
 
  2An additional 
argument related to Jenkins' status as an independent contractor and its effect 
on his eligibility for coverage was also briefed by the parties.  We need not address that issue given our 
ruling that Jenkins was not covered under the Act as a corporate officer.