Title: Smith v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Desmond Jerrod Smith v. State of Maryland  
No. 64, September Term 2007
Headnote:  Where, in a jury trial, a tape-recorded statement of a witness testifying in the trial
was played for the jury, and where the trial judge instructed the jury to consider the taped
statement just as if that witness had testified at trial, but also instructed the jury to consider
the circumstances under which the witness testified, such an instruction does not warrant a
reversal.
 
Circuit Court for Wicomico C ounty
Criminal Case No. K-05-0213
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 64
September Term 2007
Desmond Jerrod Smith
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C. J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Wilner, Alan M.
(retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. 
(retired, specially assigned), 
                      JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   March 14, 2008
Desmond Jerrod Smith (“petitioner”) was charged by the State of Maryland
(“respondent”) with murder, first degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a
crime of violence, and other firearm related offenses.  He prayed a jury trial, and it was held
in August 2005 in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, with the Honorable W. Newton
Jackson, III, presiding.  The jury acquitted Smith of first degree murder and found him guilty
of second degree murder, first degree assault, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony,
and wearing, carrying and transporting a handgun.  In September 2005, petitioner was
sentenced to an aggregate fifty-year term of incarceration for the second degree murder and
for use of a handgun in commission of a felony.  The remaining offenses were merged for
purposes of sentencing.  He filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on
September 7, 2005.  There, he argued that the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury that
it must consider the unsworn,  out-of-court statement of a witness for petitioner “just as if she
had testified at trial.”  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected that
argument, and affirmed the judgment below.  Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of
certiorari, which we granted.  Smith v. State, 401 Md. 172, 931 A.2d 1095 (2007).  Petitioner
presents only one question for our review:
“May a trial court, over a defendant’s objection, instruct the jury that
it must consider the unsworn out-of-court statement of a State’s witness ‘just
as if she had testified at trial’?”
We shall hold that the instruction to the jury does not warrant a reversal, and affirm the
judgments of the lower courts.
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Facts
The facts of this case are uncontested, and only the facts relevant to the issue
presented are conveyed here.  On December 30, 2004, Willie Lee Hunter, III, also known as
“Punkin,” was shot twice, in his right shoulder and left arm, dying a short time later.
Petitioner was charged with that murder.  On January 3, 2005, during the time the case was
being investigated, a witness, Angela Henson, was picked up on unrelated charges.
Evidently, she conveyed to an officer that she had information regarding the shooting on
December 30, 2004.  In her statement to police, Ms. Henson claimed to have been present
during the shooting, and had observed petitioner shoot Mr. Hunter.  She further stated that
the shooting was a result of Mr. Hunter’s having robbed petitioner one week earlier.
During the trial, respondent called Ms. Henson as a witness.  There, she stated she was
“pleading the fifth” because she had not been present during the shooting and that the
statement she had provided originally to police was untrue.  Ms. Henson explained that she
had provided the police with the false statement because:  “The police came to me and
questioned me about the shooting and I gave them a false statement [because] I was up for
a prostitution charge and I was trying to get out of it.”  The allegedly false statement that she
had given police had been recorded, and that recording was subsequently played for the jury
at trial.  
The trial court ultimately included the following instruction in its charge to the jury:
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“In making your decision you must consider the evidence in this case.
And evidence consists of the following:  testimony from the witness stand,
physical evidence or exhibits admitted into evidence, stipulations between the
attorneys, and you will be reminded I’m sure by the attorneys that there were
several stipulations in this case.  You are to consider those as evidence.  You
will also consider as evidence the recorded statement of Angela H[e]nson just
as if she had testified at trial.
. . . 
“You are the sole judges of whether any witness should be believed.
In making this decision you apply your common sense and your every day
experiences.  You judge all the testimony in evidence and the circumstances
under which the witness testified, and you consider the following factors: the
witness[es]’s behavior on the stand and the manner of testifying; did the
witness appear to be telling the truth; the witness[es]’s opportunity to see or
hear things about which testimony was given; the accuracy of the witness[es]’s
memory; does the witness have a motive not to tell the truth; does the witness
have an interest in the outcome of the case; was the witness[es]’s testimony
consistent; was the witness[es]’s testimony supported or contradicted by
evidence that you believe; whether and the extent to which the witness[es]’s
testimony in court differed from statements made by the witness on any
previous occasion.”
Petitioner does not argue that Ms. Henson’s statement was inadmissible, but rather
that the portion of the instructions stating that the jury must “consider as evidence the
recorded statement of Angela H[e]nson just as if she had testified at trial” constitutes error.
Standard of Review
“We have held that the standard of review for jury instructions is that so long as the
law is fairly covered by the jury instructions, reviewing courts should not disturb them.”
Farley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 Md. 34, 46, 733 A.2d 1014, 1020 (1999) (citing Jacobson v.
Julian, 246 Md. 549, 561, 229 A.2d 108, 116 (1967)).  See also Boone v. American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Md.App. 201, 227, 819 A.2d 1099, 1113 (2003).  If, however, the
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instructions are “ambiguous, misleading or confusing” to jurors, those instructions will result
in reversal and a remand for a new trial.  See Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 684-85, 414 A.2d
1266, 1271 (1980) (quoting Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 41, 139 A.2d 209, 217 (1958)).
On the other hand, the instructions must be read in context.  “The charge to the jury must be
considered as a whole and the Court will not condemn a charge because of the way in which
it is expressed or because an isolated part of it does not seem to do justice to one side or the
other.”  Morris v. Christopher, 255 Md. 372, 378, 258 A.2d 172, 176 (1969) (citing Nora
Cloney & Co. v. Pistorio, 251 Md. 511, 515, 248 A.2d 94, 96 (1968)).
Discussion
The issue in the instant case, as noted above, is not that the out-of-court statement was
admitted, but rather the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it consider the out-of-court
statement just the same as it did the sworn testimony.  In discussing the oath requirement
with regard to this case, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion stated:
“Maryland Rule 5-603 embraces a general requirement that, before
testifying at trial, ‘a witness shall be required to declare that the witness[’]
testimony be made by oath or affirmation.’  The purpose of Rule 5-603 is to
‘make clear that false testimony would fall within the definition of perjury.’
Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence (2nd ed. 2002) Md. Rule 5-603 at 110.
Maryland Code Annotated (2002, 2006 Supp.), § 9-101(a), (b) of the Criminal
Law Article (‘CR’), provides that ‘[a] person may not willfully and falsely
make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact’ and is subject to
‘imprisonment not exceeding 10 years’ if the person violates the statute.”
Smith v. State, No. 1744, slip op. at 4 (June 6, 2007).  We have previously held that the
purpose of an oath is to impress upon the declarant the importance of telling the truth:
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“The requirements of an oath and testimony given under penalty of perjury
discourage lying, reminding the declarant of punishment by both supernatural
and temporal powers.  See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 934 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979, 84 S.Ct. 1885, 12 L.Ed.2d 747 (1964).  The
formal setting, oath and the reminder of perjury all convey to the declarant the
dignity and seriousness of the proceeding, and the need to tell the truth.”
Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 571, 629 A.2d 633, 644 (1993).  The implications, therefore,
of an oath, reside with the declarant, not with the jury.  It is the role of the jury to determine
the weight of the evidence.  The jury must determine which statements, if any, are true, and
it does so by examining the circumstances in each case, including whether the testimony was
sworn.  The Court of Special Appeals, in its unreported opinion in this case, stated: “It is
possible that a jury might believe that sworn testimony is more credible than unsworn
testimony.  The jury, however, is free to consider the reliability of all the evidence as it sees
fit.”  Smith v. State, No. 1744, slip op. at 4 (June 6, 2007).   See also Bellamy v. State, ___
Md. ___, (2008) (No. 47, September Term, 2007) (filed February 14, 2008) (quoting Dykes
v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260-61 (1990)) (“‘what evidence to believe,
what weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence are for the jury . . . to
determine’”).
In the instant case, the trial court’s instructions were not clearly erroneous.  The jury
knew that some of the witness’ testimony was under oath and some was not.  The jury was
free to believe the unsworn testimony or the sworn testimony.  Indeed, the trial court clearly
impressed upon the jury their role in the weighing of evidence:  
“You are the sole judges of whether any witness should be believed.
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In making this decision you apply your common sense and your every day
experiences.  You judge all the testimony in evidence and the circumstances
under which the witness testified . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)
It was the jury then, who could choose to believe, or not to believe, either testimony
Ms. Henson offered; the out-of-court statement, or the in-court testimony.  In considering
either of the statements the jury was instructed that it could consider the circumstances under
which the witness found herself giving the different statements.  The instruction to the jury
that it consider the recorded, out-of-court statement “just as if she had testified at trial,”
clearly indicated no more than an instruction to the jury to weigh both portions of evidence.
As the Court of Special Appeals stated in their unreported opinion in this case: 
“Read in context, it is clear that the instruction at issue was not intended to
persuade the jury that Henson’s unsworn, out-of-court statement was more or
less credible than her trial testimony but was, instead, to advise the jury that it
could, during deliberations, be considered the same as other testimony and
evidence produced at trial.”
Smith v. State, No. 1744, slip op. at 4 (June 6, 2007).  To impose, on a single sentence in the
instructions, some deeper meaning, as petitioner would have us do, would be inappropriate.
“It is a well established rule that when objection is raised to a court’s instruction, attention
should not be focused on a particular portion lifted out of context, but rather its adequacy is
determined by viewing it as a whole.”  State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 397, 283 A.2d 411, 415
(1971).  Accord Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 237, 867 A.2d 1095, 1106 (2005) (“When
reviewing a jury instruction we look to the instruction as a whole.”); State v. Grady 276 Md.
178, 185, 345 A.2d 436, 440 (1975) (“[J]ury instructions . . . must be viewed as a whole and
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. . . portions should not be read out of their proper context.”).    
In his brief, petitioner relies on State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436, for the
proposition that where the jury is instructed with an incorrect statement of law that has the
potential to mislead jurors, a reversal would be required.  Such a reliance, however, is
misplaced, because in that case, the court gave an incorrect statement of law.  There, the trial
court instructed the jury that where an alibi is presented, it was the defense who had the
burden of establishing the alibi for the entire duration of the crime.  This improperly shifted
the burden of proof to the defense, when in fact, the burden resided with the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had in fact committed a crime.
In the instant case, there is no incorrect statement of law.  The jury was free to
consider the out-of-court testimony as evidence, just as the sworn, in-court testimony could
also be considered evidence.  The oath as to one statement and the lack thereof as to the other
were circumstances before the jury.
Conclusion
So long as the jury was fully apprised of the giving or not giving of the oath, it was
free to weigh both statements and the circumstances under which they were given.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.