Title: GOFF v. GOFF

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Goff v. Goff1993 WY 2844 P.2d 1087Case Number: 92-3Decided: 01/06/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
William E. GOFF, III, and Mary E. Goff, Appellants 
(Respondents),

v.

William E. GOFF and Helen 
Goff, Appellees (Petitioners).

Appeal from District 
Court, Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Kenneth M. 
Koski, Powell, and Shawn J. McBrien, Bormuth, Freeman & Montgomery, Cody, 
for appellants.

William L. 
Simpson, Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, Cody, for 
appellees.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
presented in this case is whether Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute, Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-7-101 (Supp. 1992), extends to affording rights of visitation to 
grandparents when the custodial parent is the grandparents' own child. A 
secondary issue raised by the custodial parent and his wife is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in determining the extent of the visitation rights 
afforded to the grandparents. We hold that the statute extends to situations in 
which a grandparent is seeking rights of visitation against the natural child of 
the grandparent, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
the defined visitation rights to the grandparents. The Order for Grandparents 
Visitation Rights is affirmed.

[¶2]      Appellants, the 
custodial parents, present the issues as:

1. Whether the District 
Court abused its discretion and committed an error of law in finding that the 
Appellees had a cause of action for grandparent visitation rights pursuant to 
Wyoming Statutes § 20-2-113(c) and § 20-7-101.

2. If the Supreme Court 
does find that the Appellees had a cause of action for grandparent visitation 
pursuant to Wyoming Statutes § 20-2-113(c) and § 20-7-101, did the District 
Court abuse its discretion because the visitation ordered, substantially impairs 
the Appellants' rights, was not in the best interest of the child and the 
visitation granted was excessive.

The appellees, 
the grandparents, state the issues in this way:

1. The District Court 
correctly applied W.S. § 20-7-101 (1977) in holding that Appellees were entitled 
to reasonable visitation with their granddaughter.

A. The District Court did 
not commit an error of law in finding that Appellees had valid causes of action 
under both W.S. § 20-7-101(a)(i) [Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(c)] and W.S. § 
20-7-101(a)(ii).

B. The District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees were denied reasonable 
visitation by Appellants.

2. The Appellants have 
not preserved the question of the constitutionality of § 20-7-101; if the issue 
is properly before this Court, the Statute is constitutional and does not 
infringe on any recognized and protected constitutional rights of the 
Appellants; and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
visitation over the objections of the Appellants nor is the scope of that 
visitation an abuse of discretion.

[¶3]      The custodial 
parent and his wife were married in August, 1986, and they currently live in 
Cody with their three children, the grandchild, who is the subject of this 
action, and two half-siblings. The grandchild is the child of the custodial 
parent from a prior marriage. The siblings are the natural children of the 
custodial parent and his present wife.

[¶4]      The grandparents 
live in Kingston, Arkansas. In August of 1982, shortly before the custodial 
parent was divorced from his first wife, he began nursing school in Arkansas. To 
assist the custodial parent in completing his degree and establishing 
employment, the grandchild lived with the grandparents in Kingston from December 
of 1982 until December of 1986. At that time, the custodial parent, who had 
recently remarried, moved with his wife and the grandchild from Arkansas to 
Casper.

[¶5]      Since moving to 
Wyoming, the custodial parent and his wife have allowed the grandparents one 
extended visit of six weeks with the grandchild in the grandparents' Arkansas 
home during the summer of 1987. In 1990, the grandchild was adopted by the 
custodial parent's present wife and, from that point on, they became the 
custodial parents. Since the visit in 1987, the custodial parents have allowed 
the grandparents only limited visitation with the grandchild, usually under the 
custodial parents' supervision. The custodial parents have justified their 
practice of allowing only supervised visitation by alleging the grandparents' 
failure to adhere to the custodial parents' disciplinary guidelines. More 
specifically, they assert the grandparents allowed the grandchild to watch a 
video the custodial parents considered inappropriate, and the grandparents 
purchased a jean jacket for the grandchild contrary to the wishes of the 
custodial parents.

[¶6]      The grandparents 
filed a Petition to Establish Grandparent Visitation Rights in the district 
court in Park County. Trial was commenced some three months later and, after a 
continuance, it was completed about the fourth month after the action was 
filed.  The district court found the 
custodial parents had denied the grandparents reasonable visitation with the 
grandchild, and it entered an order outlining a grandparent's visitation 
schedule.  The order provided, in 
substance, that, during the months of June, July, or August, the grandparents 
would be allowed a consecutive ten-day period of visitation with their 
grandchild, in their Arkansas home if that were their choice, without the 
supervision of the custodial parents; the grandparents would be allowed one 
weekend of unsupervised visitation with the grandchild every month; and the 
grandparents would be allowed visitation during the Christmas holiday from 
December 26 through December 30.

[¶7]      In their primary 
challenge to the order of the district court, the custodial parents contend 
Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute, § 20-7-101, does not extend to this 
situation.1  The custodial parents contend the statute 
should be invoked only when the person having custody of the grandchild is not 
the natural child of the grandparent who is seeking visitation. This argument 
cannot be supported by reference to the statute. Our rule is that, if the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, we do not resort to any rules of statutory construction in applying it. 
Matter of Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 1990); Halliburton Company v. 
McAdams, Roux and Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989).  The language of the grandparent 
visitation statute, § 20-7-101(a), is plain and unambiguous, and it conveys a 
clear and definite meaning. The statute states that a grandparent may bring an 
original action against any person having custody of the grandparents' minor 
grandchild.2  No restriction upon the identity of the 
person against whom the grandparent may bring the action can be found in either 
subpart (i) or (ii) of § 20-7-101(a).  
Subpart (i) of the statute refers generally to "the person" having 
custody, and subpart (ii) obviously extends to both parents of the 
grandchild.

[¶8]      We would decide 
this case simply by examining the language of the statute, but the case is novel 
and of substantial import to many people. We note that the statement of purpose 
in the enacting clause found in 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 119 § 1 is consistent 
with our reading of the statute since it contains no language that would limit 
an action for visitation rights by a grandparent whose own child is the 
custodial parent of a grandchild. The enactment clause 
reads:

AN ACT to create W.S. 
20-6-701; and to amend W.S. 20-2-113(c) relating to grandparent visitation 
rights; specifying when grandparents may commence original action to establish 
visitation rights to a minor grandchild; providing that courts may grant 
reasonable visitation rights to grandparents if in the best interest of the 
child; providing procedures; and providing for an effective date.3 

The only 
specific proviso to be found in the enactment clause is the mandate that the 
rights of visitation granted to the grandparent be reasonable and also in the 
best interests of the child. This phrase demonstrates the primary legislative 
concern with the advancement of the best interests of the child and does not 
demonstrate any concern with respect to limiting the grandparent who can be 
granted visitation rights.

[¶9]      In addressing a 
contention that the policy justification for establishing visitation rights in 
grandparents was primarily to afford emotional support when the child is faced 
with the death of a parent or the dissolution of the family, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey noted that the justifications are much broader.  That court 
observed:

It is [a] biological fact 
that grandparents are bound to their grandchildren by the unbreakable links of 
heredity. It is common human experience that the concern and interest 
grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds anything 
explicable in purely biological terms. A very special relationship often arises 
and continues between grandparents and grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts 
which commonly mar relations between parents and children are often absent 
between those very same parents and their grandchildren. Visits with a 
grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience and there are 
benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his 
grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship.  Neither the Legislature nor this Court 
is blind to human truths which grandparents and grandchildren have always 
known.

Mimkon v. Ford, 
66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (1975).

[¶10]   Scholarly study and research has 
confirmed this position articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court and has 
demonstrated that children who miss out on the bonding process with grandparents 
are deprived of a valuable experience. One author has set forth the significant 
factors in this way.

Social scientists have 
identified at least four "symbolic" roles that help explain the ways in which 
grandparents influence their families. The "being there" role requires nothing 
more than a grandparent's presence and may help younger generation members in 
two ways. First, this presence "mitigates against the obtrusive events of the 
outside world and disruptive events of role transitions * * * [and] serves to 
maintain the identity of the family." In times of transition, such as after the 
birth of a sibling or during divorce, a grandparent's presence may exert a 
calming influence on grandchildren. Second, just by being there, grandparents 
provide an important stabilizing influence particularly important for children 
born of early teenage mothers.

The second symbolic role 
played by grandparents is that of "family watchdog." In this role, the 
grandparent is alert for signs of abuse or neglect that might indicate that the 
family will need active care and protection. Third, an "arbitrating" role may be 
assumed when grandparents actively negotiate between parents and children 
concerning values and behaviors that may be more central, in the long run, to 
family continuity and individual enhancement than those that the parents' 
authority status allow to be expressed. Such negotiation may also occur when 
grandparents downplay volatile or disruptive differences between parents and 
children. The fourth important symbolic role for grandparents is as 
"interpreters" of the family's history. Grandparents may help grandchildren 
build connections between the family's past, present, and future, which help 
children form a firmer sense of identity.

Patricia S. 
Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 109, 
109-110 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (citing V. BENGSTON, DIVERSITY AND SYMBOLS IN 
GRANDPARENTAL ROLES, IN GRANDPARENTHOOD 21-24 (V. Bengston & J. Robertson 
eds. 1985)).

[¶11]   The traditional approach that the 
grandparents' right of visitation was simply derivative of the parents' right 
and, therefore, became effective only upon the legal absence of the related 
parent is also addressed by the Fernandez article. See also Cheryl Stockman Gan, 
Grandparental Visitation Rights in Oklahoma, 26 Tulsa L.J. 245 (1990). In 
adopting § 20-7-101, and enacting the amendment of § 20-2-113(c), the Wyoming 
legislature departed from this traditional view of grandparents' visitation 
rights, as most other states have done. These statutes include the fact of 
divorce as a situation triggering the recognition of grandparents' visitation 
rights. Under the traditional derivative rights theory, divorce could not have 
given rise to grandparental visitation rights, since the related parent was not 
legally absent. The shift away from the traditional derivative rights theory 
demonstrates a recognition of those values that attach to the 
grandparent/grandchild relationship and leads to a focus on the best interests 
of the child. In light of this focus upon the best interests of the child, no 
reason can be discerned to impose artificial limits on which grandparents or 
grandparent should be afforded standing to petition the court for visitation 
rights. We will not attach any such limit as gloss upon § 
20-7-101.

[¶12]   Turning to the second argument of 
the custodial parents, that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining that the grandparents had been denied reasonable visitation and in 
outlining the specific visitation schedule, we perceive the substance of the 
custodial parents' argument is that this visitation schedule substantially 
impairs their rights as parents and ignores the best interests of the child. As 
a general proposition, the award and scheduling of visitation rights is a 
decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we do not 
disturb that trial court's determination unless we can identify a clear abuse of 
discretion. C.f. Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1990). A court abuses its 
discretion only when it acts in a manner that exceeds the bounds of reason under 
the circumstances. Deen v. Deen, 774 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1989). The burden is placed 
upon the party attacking the ruling of the trial court to establish any abuse of 
discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court reasonably could 
conclude as it did.  Gentry v. 
State, 724 P.2d 450 (Wyo. 1986); Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶13]   In this instance, the district 
court reasonably could conclude, based on the testimony in the record, that the 
grandparents had been denied reasonable rights of visitation. The grandparents 
testified they had been allowed only one extended visit with their granddaughter 
since the custodial parents moved to Wyoming, and they also testified that the 
custodial parents have permitted only supervised visitation. The custodial 
parents admitted that the grandparents had been favored with only one extended 
visit with their grandchild since they moved to Wyoming, but they denied the 
assertion of the grandparents that they had allowed only supervised 
visits.

[¶14]   The trial judge, the trier of fact 
in this instance, was in the best situation to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and weigh their testimony. Upon review of the grandparents' testimony 
and the responses of the custodial parents to questions regarding visitation, we 
conclude that the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason. There was 
information from which it reasonably could find that the grandparents had been 
denied reasonable visitation and, therefore, it did not abuse its discretion in 
this regard.

[¶15]   The custodial parents go on to 
argue that the district court did not maintain the best interests of the child 
by requiring visitation with the child's grandparents. Their argument is that 
the order of the district court "divided and hampered proper parental authority; 
forced the child into the midst of a conflict of authority and ill feelings 
between the parents and grandparents; and coerced the parties into what should 
remain a moral rather than a legal obligation." In this regard, the legislature, 
when it adopted § 20-7-101, was the body that transformed grandparent visitation 
from a moral into a legal obligation. The district court did not create this 
rule of law; it simply exercised the authority that was conferred upon it by 
that statute.

[¶16]   In determining what visitation 
schedule would serve the best interests of the child, the district relied upon 
the expert testimony of a psychologist. The psychologist reported favorable 
results of his examination of the grandparents. He also testified about the 
importance of grandparent and grandchild relationships in general, as well as 
the impact this type of visitation dispute can have upon a child. The district 
court listened to the testimony of all of the parties to this dispute, including 
that of the custodial parents that they considered the grandparents fit to care 
for the grandchild.

[¶17]   Our examination of the record leads 
to the conclusion that the custodial parents have not successfully assumed their 
burden of demonstrating how the district court exceeded the bounds of reason 
when it exercised the discretion afforded it by the statute and ordered 
visitation. We hold that the district court reasonably could conclude that 
ordering visitation with the grandparents would promote the best interests of 
the grandchild and, therefore, it did not abuse its discretion in ordering that 
visitation.

[¶18]   The custodial parents also argue 
that the district court ordered visitation that substantially impaired their 
rights as parents. This argument is likewise without merit. It is true that the 
order of the district court impairs the custodial parents' ability to dictate 
the terms of their child's visitation with the grandparents, but the custodial 
parents have failed to show how this translates into a substantial impairment of 
their parental rights. We are not persuaded by the custodial parents' reference 
to Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla.App. 1990), in which that court concluded 
that the ordered visitation was excessive. The Florida court acknowledged that 
decisions about whether to award visitation and the extent of the visitation are 
factsensitive determinations. Sketo. It follows that no amount of visitation can 
be perceived as inherently unreasonable or excessive. The propriety of a 
particular visitation schedule must be considered in light of the facts and 
circumstances in which the order is made. The custodial parents here have failed 
to show that, in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the 
visitation ordered in this case should be perceived as unreasonable. No abuse of 
discretion has been demonstrated with respect to the visitation schedule ordered 
by the trial court.

[¶19]   The custodial parents did not raise 
any constitutional objections to the Wyoming grandparent visitation statute at 
trial. We invoke our usual rule with respect to claims of unconstitutionality 
and refuse to consider such issues raised for the first time on 
appeal.

[¶20]   The Order for Grandparents 
Visitation Rights is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
action in this case did not take place in the context of a divorce, a judicial 
separation, or a juvenile proceeding, and both parties concede that, even though 
argued by the custodial parents, Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(c) (Supp. 1992) clearly 
does not apply.

2Wyo. Stat. § 20-7-101 (Supp. 1992) 
provides:

(a) A grandparent may bring an 
original action against any person having custody of the grandparent's minor 
grandchild to establish reasonable visitation rights to the child 
if:

(i)                   
The 
grandparent's child who is the parent of the minor grandchild has died or has 
divorced the minor grandchild's other parent and the person having custody of 
the minor grandchild has refused reasonable visitation rights to the 
grandparent; or 

(ii)                 
An 
unmarried minor grandchild has resided with the grandparent for a period in 
excess of six (6) consecutive months before being returned to the custody of the 
minor grandchild's parents and the parents have refused reasonable visitation 
rights to the grandparent.  

(b) In any action or proceeding 
under subsection (a) of this section, the court may grant reasonable visitation 
rights to the grandparent of a child if the court finds, after a hearing, that 
visitation would be in the best interest of the child and that the rights of the 
child's parents are not

substantially impaired.

(c) No action to establish 
visitation rights may be brought by a grandparent under subsection (a) of this 
section if the minor grandchild has been adopted and neither adopting parent is 
a natural parent of the child.

(d) In 
any action or proceeding in which visitation rights have been granted to a 
grandparent under this section, the court may for good cause upon petition of 
the person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or amend 
the visitation rights granted to the grandparent.

3An explanation for the reference to 
W.S. 20-6-701 instead of 20-7-101 is found in the Editor's notes in the compiled 
statutes:

Although Laws 1991, ch. 119, § 1, 
enacted this section as § 20-6-701, it was apparently intended to be enacted as 
§ 20-7-101.