Title: Crosby v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
CHRIS A. CROSBY, 
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 411, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN01-06-1203; 1206 
                      
 
Submitted:  January 22, 2004 
   Decided:  February 17, 2004   
 
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of February 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and 
the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Chris A. Crosby, pleaded guilty to Forgery 
in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation.  He was sentenced as an 
habitual offender1 to 8 years incarceration at Level V on the forgery conviction.  
He also was sentenced to 1 year incarceration at Level V, to be suspended for 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2001). 
 
 
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Level IV probation, on the criminal impersonation conviction.  This is Crosby’s 
direct appeal from his convictions and sentences.2 
 
(2) 
Crosby’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant 
to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of 
a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) 
the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the 
appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 
whether the appeal is so devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be 
decided without an adversary presentation.3 
 
(3) 
Crosby’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Crosby’s counsel informed Crosby of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Crosby was also informed of his right to supplement his 
attorney’s presentation.  Crosby responded with a brief that raises two issues for 
                                                 
2 The Superior Court originally gave Crosby a “life sentence” (i.e. a fixed term of 45 
years) as an habitual offender.  Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a).  This Court reversed the 
Superior Court’s sentence as in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual 
punishments” and remanded the matter for re-sentencing by a different judge.  Crosby v. State, 
824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003).   
3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Crosby’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Crosby and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
The two claims that Crosby raises are that: a) his conduct did not 
encompass all the elements of the crime of forgery; and b) the habitual offender 
statute is unconstitutional.  
 
(5) 
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects that, during Crosby’s 
colloquy with the Superior Court, he acknowledged that he was not under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, he understood he would be sentenced as an habitual 
offender, no one had promised him what his sentence would be, he actually 
committed the crimes with which he was charged, he was satisfied with his 
counsel’s performance, and he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily.  In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Crosby is bound by those representations.4  Moreover, Crosby’s voluntary guilty 
plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged defects or errors occurring prior to the 
entry of the plea.5 
 
(6) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Crosby’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
                                                 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
5 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
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issue.  We also are satisfied that Crosby’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and has properly determined that Crosby could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice