Title: Jimmy L. King v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jimmy L. KING v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-884                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 26, 1996


1.   Criminal procedure -- pretrial identification -- when Due
     Process Clause is violated. --  A pretrial identification
     violates the Due Process Clause when there are suggestive
     elements in the identification procedure that make it all but
     inevitable that the victim will identify one person as the
     culprit. 

2.   Criminal procedure -- suggestive pretrial identification --
     factors considered in determining reliability of
     identification. -- Even when the pretrial identification
     process is suggestive, the circuit court may determine that
     under the totality of the circumstances the identification was
     sufficiently reliable for the matter to be decided by the
     jury; in determining reliability, the following factors are
     considered: (1) the prior opportunity of the witness to
     observe the alleged act; (2) the accuracy of the prior
     description of the accused; (3) any identification of another
     person prior to the pretrial identification procedure; (4) the
     level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; (5) the
     failure of the witness to identify the defendant on a prior
     occasion; and (6) the lapse of time between the alleged act
     and the pretrial identification procedure.

3.   Criminal procedure -- photo lineups not unduly suggestive --
     appellant's argument without merit. -- Appellant's argument
     that both photo lineups were unduly suggestive was without
     merit where, except for appellant's photo, photos from the
     first lineup were not preserved, thus preventing the court
     from determining whether appellant's photograph from the first
     lineup was so different from the others as to single him out
     and, thereby, taint his identification in the second lineup;
     and, in viewing the pictures in the second lineup in
     conjunction with the photograph of appellant from the first
     lineup, the court found that the two photographs of appellant
     were different; and, there was nothing in the second lineup
     which would direct a witness toward appellant as the primary
     suspect, nor was there any legitimate insinuation that the
     police officer sought to influence the identification by the
     methods he used in presenting the photographs; the fact the
     defendant was the only person included in both a photographic
     lineup and a physical lineup did not, in itself, render the
     identification unduly suggestive.  

4.   Appeal & error -- argument not ruled upon by trial court not
     preserved for appeal. --  Where the specific argument raised
     by appellant was not ruled upon by the trial court, it was not
     preserved for appeal. 

5.   Criminal procedure -- identification process not unduly
     suggestive -- no abuse of discretion in trial court's
     admission of the evidence. -- Appellant's argument that the
     identifications were unreliable was without merit where the
     appellate court found that even though the bulk of the
     reliability factors appeared to have been satisfied, they did
     not need to be addressed because the process involved was not
     unduly suggestive; the court will not inject itself into the
     process of determining reliability unless there is a very
     substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification; it
     was for the jury to evaluate the weakness or strength of the
     identification testimony, and the circuit court did not abuse
     its discretion in admitting the evidence. 


     Appeal from Miller Circuit Court; Jim Gunter, Judge; affirmed.
     Thomas A. Potter, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.February 26, 1996 *ADVREP2*






JIMMY L. KING,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                     APPELLEE,

CR 95-884




APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR 93-257-2,
HON. JIM GUNTER, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.



                    Robert L. Brown, Justice.


     Appellant Jimmy L. King appeals his conviction for aggravated
robbery and first-degree battery and his sentence of 60 years.  He
contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to suppress a
photo lineup and in-court identification.  We conclude that the
circuit court ruled correctly, and we affirm.
     On April 17, 1993, Tammy Akins, Kristine Barnette (now
Templeman), Lynette Oliver, and Kelly Eaves (now Barnette) drove to
Fat Jacks Oyster Bar in Texarkana to celebrate Kelly Eaves upcoming
marriage.  When they arrived, they parked in the last row of
parking places.  Eaves, who was driving, turned the car off and
opened her door to get out.  Akins and Barnette were in the back
seat.  Barnette's door was locked so she reached across Akins and
opened her door, while Akins was rummaging through her purse.  As
the door opened, a man leaned into the car and said, "Give me all
your money".  Akins responded sharply that the man was not getting
her money.  The man then put a gun to her chest, and Akins kicked
him in the stomach.  The man leaned back into the car, shot her,
and fled.
     Eaves started the car, drove to an E-Z Mart down the street,
and called the Texarkana Police Department.  Akins did not realize
that she had been shot until about an hour later when she began
breathing irregularly and was rushed to the hospital.  The bullet
had pierced her stomach twice before becoming embedded in a mass of
muscle.
     On April 18, 1993, the day after the shooting, Sergeant Mike
Mauldin of the Texarkana Police Department conducted a photographic
lineup consisting of several sheets of pictures in which King's
picture was included.  These lineups were separately shown to Kelly
Eaves and Kristine Barnette.  Neither could make an identification. 
On May 11, 1993, these same photographs were shown to the victim,
Tammy Akins.  She, too, was unable to make an identification.
     On May 25, 1993, Tammy Akins was shown a second photo lineup
of six photographs, where a different, more recent picture of King
was included.  All six men photographed had some facial hair.  King
was the only person included in both lineups.  This time Akins
tentatively identified King as the person who shot her.  This same
photo lineup was shown to Kristine Barnette on May 28, 1993, and
Barnette positively identified King as the perpetrator.
     Based on these identifications, King was charged with
aggravated robbery and first degree battery.  Prior to trial, King
moved to have the photo lineups, as well as any subsequent in-court
identification, suppressed on the basis that the pretrial lineups
were unduly suggestive.  Both motions were denied.  At trial, Tammy
Akins and Kristine Barnette positively identified King as the
offender.  King was ultimately convicted by a jury on both counts
and sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.
     King urges on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the pretrial identifications and the in-
court identifications by Tammy Akins and Kristine Barnette.  He
contends that the identifications should have been suppressed
because the pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive
and tainted the later in-court identifications.  He then argues
that the identifications should have been excluded because they
lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.  Neither argument has
merit.
     A pretrial identification violates the Due Process Clause when
there are suggestive elements in the identification procedure that
make it all but inevitable that the victim will identify one person
as the culprit.  Monk v. State, 320 Ark. 189,