Title: State of Missouri, Respondent v. Jessica D. Reed, Appellant

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC88787 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JESSICA D. REED,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. CHARLES COUNTY 
The Honorable Lucy D. Rauch, Judge 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
A jury found Jessica Reed guilty of attempted manufacture of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), § 195.211, RSMo Supp. 2003.  On appeal she argues that: 
(1) § 491.074, RSMo 2000, is unconstitutional as applied and violates the Confrontation 
Clause of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); and (2) the trial court erred in the 
admission of hearsay testimony.1   
                                             
 
1 Although Reed's first point combined evidentiary error with constitutional error, Reed's 
allegation of evidentiary error was raised in her brief and addressed by the State.  Because Reed's 
contentions can be understood from the argument portion of her brief, this Court, in its 
discretion, reviews Reed's claims. 
This Court may address the evidentiary errors if they are dispositive rather than 
reach the constitutional claims.  See Great Southern Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wilburn, 887 
S.W.2d 581, 583 (Mo. banc 1994) (citing Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson 
City, 862 S.W.2d 338, 340 n.5 (Mo. banc 1993)). This Court finds that the trial court 
allowed prejudicial hearsay testimony to be admitted improperly into evidence.2  The 
judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.  
Facts 
On September 11, 2006, Elizabeth Reed and her boyfriend, Adam McCauley, 
visited Jessica Reed at their father's home in Foristell.  Jessica Reed had been living with 
her father, Donald Reed, in the preceding weeks. 
When McCauley and Elizabeth Reed left, they smelled ammonia as they passed a 
horse trailer parked on the property.  McCauley called Donald Reed and, minutes later, 
observed two men leaving the horse trailer carrying a backpack and a pitcher containing a 
solid substance.   
McCauley and Elizabeth Reed then saw Jessica Reed run into the woods with a 
trash bag.  McCauley later helped police retrieve a trash bag that contained equipment 
commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine.   
On July 19, 2007, a jury convicted Jessica Reed of attempted manufacture of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), § 195.211.  On August 27, 2007, Reed was 
sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to six years imprisonment. 
                                             
 
2 The prosecutor sought the admission of the out-of-court statement as a prior inconsistent 
statement pursuant to § 491.074, but the witness never was questioned about the particular topic.  
 
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I.  Standard of Review 
The standard of review for the admission of evidence is abuse of discretion.  State 
v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Mo. banc 2008).  "This standard gives the trial court 
broad leeway in choosing to admit evidence; therefore, an exercise of this discretion will 
not be disturbed unless it 'is clearly against the logic of the circumstances.'"  Id. at 426-27 
(citing State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Mo. banc 2006)).  See also State v. 
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 532 (Mo. banc 2003).  For evidentiary error to cause reversal, 
prejudice must be demonstrated.  Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 223-24. 
II. Out-of-Court Statements Introduced at Trial Over Objection of Defense Counsel 
 
Reed's claim is based on three instances where she alleges out-of-court statements 
were improperly admitted by the trial court over defense counsel's hearsay objection.  
This Court determines that Reed's claim, as it relates to the testimony of Officer Dull, has 
merit. 
Hearsay is any out-of-court statement that is offered into evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.  State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Mo. banc 2007).  Once 
counsel objects on the basis of hearsay, the proponent has the burden to demonstrate that 
the statement fits into a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.  Gough v. General Box 
Co., 302 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Mo. 1957).  See also State v. Porras, 84 S.W.3d 153, 157 
(Mo. App. 2002) (citing State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. App. 1995)). 
Reed correctly argues that the trial court improperly admitted McCauley's out-of-
court statement that Reed was making methamphetamine in the trailer.  Over defense 
 
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counsel's objection, Officer Dull testified that McCauley told him he believed Reed was 
making methamphetamine in the horse trailer:    
 
[The State]: And what, if anything, did Adam McCauley tell you? 
 
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, hearsay. 
[The State]: Judge, at this time I move that these would be –  
what I anticipate to be inconsistent statements, provide Section 491.074 as 
substantive evidence. 
 
[The Court]: Prior inconsistent statements? 
[The State]: Yes. 
 
[Defense Counsel]: To what, impeach your own witness? 
 
[The State]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]: She hasn't asked him to be declared a hostile witness 
and it's her witness. 
 
 
[The State]: My understanding of the law is that is not required. 
[The Court]: I'm going to permit you to proceed over the Defendant's 
objection. 
 
[The State]: What did Mr. McCauley tell you? 
[Officer Dull]: Mr. McCauley advised me that when he came home – or 
came to, I'm sorry, excuse me, came to the Reed's address, he observed 
Jessica Reed in the trailer and observed her with another subject.  And I 
asked him what he was – what he observed and which he stated that he 
believed –  
 
[Defense Counsel]: – Your honor, may my objection be continuing to all 
this? 
 
[The Court]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]: Because we have just had Adam McCauley testify. 
 
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[The Court]: Yes, it may be a continuing objection. 
[The State]: You can go ahead and complete what Mr. McCauley told you. 
[Officer 
Dull]: 
He 
believed 
that 
Jessica 
Reed 
was 
making 
methamphetamine inside the trailer.   
 
The trial court erred in admitting Officer Dull's testimony because it was hearsay 
and there was no foundation to admit McCauley's alleged statement as a prior 
inconsistent statement.   
Section 491.074, RSMo 2000, states: 
[A] prior inconsistent statement of any witness testifying in the trial of a 
criminal offense shall be received as substantive evidence, and the party 
offering the prior inconsistent statement may argue the truth of such 
statement. 
 
To admit a prior inconsistent statement, "[t]he only necessary foundation is the 
inquiry as to whether the witness made the statement and whether the statement is true."  
State v. Archuleta, 955 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Mo. App. 1997).  If a witness claims not to 
remember if a prior statement was or was not made, a proper foundation has been laid to 
admit the prior inconsistent statement. Id.  In contrast, however, asking a witness non-
specific questions about a previous conversation does not lay a foundation to introduce a 
prior inconsistent statement.  State v. Holmes, 845 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Mo. App. 1993).   
In its examination, the State failed to ask McCauley if he had previously stated 
that Reed was making methamphetamine in the trailer.  A specific question is not 
necessary to lay a foundation, but the State failed even to ask a generally related question 
to lay a foundation.  Id.  The most closely related question posed to McCauley was 
whether Reed lived in the trailer, to which McCauley answered that he did not know if 
 
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Reed was living in the trailer.  Whether Reed was living in the trailer is too remote a 
question to lay a proper foundation to admit McCauley's alleged statement that he 
believed she was making methamphetamine in the trailer.  Officer Dull's testimony was 
hearsay. 
III. Reed was prejudiced by Officer Dull's testimony 
Reed is not entitled to relief because of the hearsay testimony unless she was 
prejudiced.  Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 223-24.  Trial court error is prejudicial when there is 
a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome at trial.  Id.  Here, there is a 
reasonable probability that Officer Dull's testimony affected the outcome of the trial 
because no other direct testimony showed that Reed was attempting to manufacture 
methamphetamine.  
Conclusion 
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
All concur. 
 
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