Title: In re Children of Meagan C.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 129 
Docket: 
Yor-18-461 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 26, 2019 
Decided: 
August 6, 2019 
Revised: 
November 21, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF MEAGAN C.  
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  A mother and father appeal from a consolidated judgment of the 
District Court (York, Duddy, J.) terminating their parental rights to their 
children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018).1  Both parents 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s determination 
that they are parentally unfit and contend that the court abused its discretion 
in determining that termination was in the children’s best interests.  
Additionally, the father challenges the denial of his post-judgment 
                                         
1  The children subject to this appeal are two girls and one boy.  The mother and father are the 
biological parents of the girls and the mother is the biological parent of the boy.  The father was the 
legal father of the boy because he and the mother were married at the time she gave birth to the boy.  
The father has since, however, consented to the termination of his parental rights with respect to the 
boy, 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1) (2018); he does not appeal from the judgment.  The judgment now on 
appeal terminated the boy’s biological father’s parental rights; he does not appeal from that 
judgment.   
 
 
2 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment on the ground of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  We affirm the judgments.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In June 2017, the Department petitioned to terminate the parents’ 
parental rights as to the girls, and the mother’s parental rights as to the boy.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).  The court (Duddy, J.) held a three-day hearing, 
from September 25 through September 27, 2018, on the Department’s petition 
at which both parents were present and represented by counsel.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4054 (2018).   
[¶3]  By judgment dated November 2, 2018, the court terminated the 
parents’ parental rights as to the girls, and the mother’s parental rights as to 
the boy.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).  The court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that each parent (1) is unwilling or unable to protect the 
children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within 
a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs and (2) has 
been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time 
which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.  See id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also found by clear and convincing 
evidence that termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best 
 
 
3 
interests.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 6, 159 A.3d 
345.   
[¶4]  The court’s supported factual findings as to the mother’s fitness are 
as follows:   
The children were taken into custody over two years ago.  
Since that time, [the mother] has failed to resolve her chronic 
substance abuse and to address her mental health.  [The mother] 
has continued to use drugs and alcohol, has failed to get clean and 
sober, and is currently abusing alcohol and Subutex.  [The mother] 
bullies and threatens her treating physician to support her various 
substance use habits.  [The mother] lies about and minimizes her 
substance use, and is in a state of denial and dishonesty.  [The 
mother] has failed to seek out and obtain mental health treatment, 
and has failed to address her mental health issues.  [The mother] 
has failed to nurture a healthy attachment with [the children].  The 
GAL testified at trial that in his opinion [the mother] has not 
improved at all since the start of this case, and the Court agrees.   
 
Given her continued state of poly substance abuse, [the 
mother] is currently unable and unwilling to protect her children 
from jeopardy.  She is also currently unable and unwilling to take 
responsibility for her children.  After two years, [the mother]’s 
visits with her children are still fully supervised.  Even in a 
supervised setting, [the mother] is barely able to feed [the boy], and 
totally unable to take responsibility for a child with his profound 
disabilities.  [The mother]’s visits with [the girls] have been hurtful 
and counterproductive.  [The mother] has demonstrated no 
understanding of or ability to manage [the younger girls]’s anxiety 
disorder or [the older girl]’s PTSD.  In view of [the mother]’s failure 
for over two years to make any progress toward sobriety and 
improved mental health, and her current state of denial, [the 
mother] shows no prospect for the foreseeable future of protecting 
the children from jeopardy, or taking responsibility for them.   
 
 
 
4 
The court’s supported evidentiary findings as to the father’s parental fitness are 
as follows: 
In the over two years since [the girls] were taken into 
Department custody, [the father] has done next to nothing to 
alleviate jeopardy or take responsibility for the girls.  When he was 
given visitation in late 2016, after being released from jail, he 
missed several visits and his visitation was suspended.  Soon after 
visitation was resumed, [the father] relapsed, and he asked for 
visitation to be suspended.  He failed to engage consistently or 
successfully in any services while he was not incarcerated.  He has 
only recently begun participating in services during his current jail 
sentence.  He concedes that it will be at least nine to ten months 
before he might be ready to parent the girls. . . .  [T]he Court finds 
that prediction unrealistic.  The smallest thing triggers [the 
father]’s drug use, and his track record establishes that [the father] 
is not willing or able to do the work necessary to improve his 
situation.  [The father] will not be able to protect the girls from 
jeopardy, or take responsibility for them, anytime in the 
foreseeable future. Accordingly, [the father] is unable or unwilling 
to protect the girls from jeopardy, or to take responsibility for 
them, within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs.  
 
[¶5]  The court also made the following supported findings regarding the 
best interests of the children:   
[The boy] . . . has lived with the [foster parents] for most of his life.  
The [foster parents] have learned how to interpret [the boy]’s facial 
expressions and how to read his body language.  [The foster mom] 
understands how to implement lessons learned from [the boy]’s 
many therapies.  [She] has also figured out how to successfully feed 
[the boy].  The [foster parents’] household is stable, and provides a 
safe environment in which all of [the boy]’s substantial physical 
and emotional needs can be met.  [The boy] is not old enough, or 
intellectually able, to express a meaningful preference.  However, 
 
 
5 
the fact that [the boy] has thrived in the care of the [foster parents] 
reflects his deep and meaningful bond with [them].   
 
[The mother] . . . ha[s] demonstrated no ability to take care 
of [the boy].  [The boy] has not lived with [the mother] . . . for over 
two years, and has no ability to integrate back into a home with [the 
mother] . . . .  [The mother] lives with her current boyfriend . . . who 
in turn lives in the home of his parents.  [He] has never met [the 
boy], and has no realistic understanding about the extent of [the 
boy]’s physical and intellectual disabilities.  [The boyfriend]’s 
statements that [the boy] (along with [the girls]) are all welcome to 
move into his parent’s house with him, are fanciful and 
unpersuasive.  [The mother] thus lacks stable and safe housing for 
[the boy].  In light of all of the above, therefore, terminating the 
parental rights of [the mother] . . . is in [the boy]’s best interest. 
 
 
. . . [The girls] have lived in foster care for well over two years.  
Both girls were in deep distress when they were taken into 
Department custody, and have improved physically and 
emotionally with the loving care, structure, and constancy of their 
therapeutic foster family.  Both girls, however, still have emotional 
and mental health challenges arising from their respective 
diagnoses and the trauma inflicted on them by their parents.   
 
Neither [of the girls has] a healthy attachment to [the 
mother] or [the father].  [The father] has not lived with or parented 
the girls since he walked away from the family in 2014.  Since that 
time, [the father] has been almost entirely absent from the girls’ 
lives, due to choices he has made, incarceration, and drug use.  He 
does not understand the girls’ needs, has no ability to meet those 
needs, and has no home into which the girls could reintegrate.  The 
girls have more recently lived with [the mother], but [the mother]’s 
relationship with the girls has been marred by [the mother]’s poly 
substance abuse.  [The mother]’s visitation with the girls has made 
matters worse, not better.  [The mother] does not understand the 
girls’ needs, and has no ability to meet those needs.  [The mother]’s 
boyfriend . . .  has never met [the girls].  [The mother’s boyfriend’s] 
comments that [the girls] . . . are welcome to move in with him in 
 
 
6 
the home of his parents, is fanciful and unpersuasive.  Accordingly, 
[the mother] also lacks a stable home into which the girls could 
reintegrate.   
 
[The older girl]’s comments regarding her future placement 
reflect deep ambivalence.  On the one hand, [the older girl] has been 
overheard on occasion to say that she would like to return home 
with her mother.  On the other hand, [the older girl] has more often 
commented that her mother is mean, lies constantly, and is not 
doing well enough to resume custody of the children.  As a result, 
[the older girl] has not expressed a meaningful preference.  In 
contrast, [the younger girl] has been quite clear about her 
preference.  [The younger girl] would like to live with her foster 
family (although she understands that is not an option), or live with 
[the boy]’s foster family.  [The younger girl] has not expressed a 
meaningful desire to live with [the mother].   
 
The girls’ placement with their therapeutic foster family is 
not pre-adoptive, but has nevertheless worked very well for [the 
girls].  The foster family has provided love, skillful care, an absence 
of trauma, and constancy.  These are the ingredients the girls need 
in a permanent placement, which can be achieved through 
adoption.  Both girls are desperate for a sense of permanency, and 
for [the older girl] especially, the ongoing uncertainty with regard 
to [the mother] and [the father] is painful and traumatizing.  [The 
mother] and [the father] offer no reasonable hope of stability and 
permanency.  Both girls are very adoptable, and adoption will 
provide an appropriate permanent placement for [the girls].  The 
Department is already exploring a possible kinship adoption.  For 
all of these reasons, terminating the parental rights of [the mother] 
and [the father] is in the best interest of [the girls].   
 
[¶6]  The mother and father each filed a notice of appeal.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4006 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), (d).   
 
 
7 
[¶7]  Over two months later, on January 9, 2019, the father moved to 
permit trial court action on his post-judgment motion for an extension of time 
to file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the termination hearing.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); M.R. 
App. P. 3(c)(2); In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 20-21, 27, 126 A.3d 718.  By order 
dated January 15, we granted the father’s motion, and stayed the appeal 
pending trial court action.  The father filed his motion for an extension.   
[¶8]  On January 25, 2019, the court (Duddy, J.) citing In re M.P., 2015 ME 
138, ¶ 20 n.4, 126 A.3d 718, denied the father’s motion for an extension, 
concluding that the father “did not timely file his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, nor did 
he timely move for an extension of time,” within the prescribed twenty-one day 
filing period.  The court concluded that, after “balancing the children’s interest 
with [the father]’s interest,” such “does not weigh in favor of [the father]’s 
interest.  There is nothing exceptional and unusual about [the father’s] 
incarceration that would warrant an extension of time to file his Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion.”  (Citing In re Alijah K., 2016 ME 137, ¶ 14, 147 A.3d 1159 (“A parent 
who is unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities by virtue of being 
incarcerated is entitled to no more protection from the termination of his 
 
 
8 
parental rights than a parent who is unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities 
as a result of other reasons.”).)   
[¶9]  The father filed a notice of appeal from that order, and we remanded 
the matter for the court to “perform an initial review of the motion immediately 
after it is filed to determine whether it raises sufficient grounds to warrant a 
response and any further proceedings.”  The father filed his Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion for relief from judgment.  Attached to the motion were signed and 
sworn affidavits from the father, his own father, his mother, and a pastor; a 
signed letter from the father to an unidentified recipient requesting supervised 
visits with the girls; an unsigned and unsworn affidavit from his sister; a letter 
from the Director of Victim Services at the Department of Corrections, allowing 
the father one visit and two phone calls with the girls; and an email from the 
Department Permanency Caseworker indicating that the father may write a 
letter responding to the girls’ letter to him.  
[¶10]  The court denied the motion after it “carefully and thoroughly 
reviewed [the father]’s motion, . . . the affidavits and other materials submitted” 
and the court’s prior orders.  The court found as follows: 
The Court concludes [the father] has not presented any persuasive 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.  The 
Court rejects [the father]’s argument that if only his attorney had 
called the ten “potential” witnesses, or offered the seven suggested 
 
 
9 
documents, or managed his trial time differently, or taken other 
steps, the Court would have had insufficient evidence to make the 
required termination findings, or the outcome would somehow 
have been different.  The Department proved its case by clear and 
convincing evidence, and the outcome with regard to [the father] 
was not close.  The Court has specifically reviewed its findings 
regarding [the father]’s parental . . . fitness, and the children’s best 
interest, in light of [the father]’s proffer in his Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion, and his supporting affidavits and materials, and concludes 
there is no reason to provide [the father] with relief from judgment.   
 
 
[¶11]  The father filed a notice of appeal from that order.  We dismissed 
the father’s appeal of the order denying his request for an extension, and 
consolidated his appeal of the order denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion with the 
parents’ appeals of the judgment terminating their parental rights.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  
Sufficiency of the Evidence  
[¶12]  Here, the court’s findings are sufficient to support the court’s 
determinations that both parents are unwilling or unable to protect the 
children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within 
a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, that both 
parents are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a 
time which is reasonably calculated to meet their needs, see 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), and that termination of the parents’ parental rights 
 
 
10 
is in the children’s best interest, see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  See In re M.P., 2015 
ME 138, ¶ 16, 126 A.3d 718.   
1. 
Parental Fitness  
[¶13]  The mother argues that the court found her unfit “mainly because 
she ‘failed to resolve her chronic substance abuse’ by continuing to use drugs 
and abuse alcohol and Subutex,” but that “the record is so void of support for 
that finding, the Trial Court could not even have been reasonably persuaded as 
to the same.”  (Emphasis added.)  To the contrary, the court did not determine 
that the mother was unfit “mainly” for that reason; the court found her unfit for 
a multitude of reasons.  The court found, and the evidence supports, that, in 
addition to her illicit substance use and alcohol abuse, she has failed to seek out 
and obtain mental health treatment, nurture a healthy attachment to the 
children, and demonstrate an understanding of or ability to manage any of the 
children’s physical and mental health needs.   
[¶14]  There is also ample evidence to support the finding that she does 
continue to “use drugs and abuse alcohol and Subutex.”  By the mother’s own 
admission, she has used heroin, fentanyl, Percocet, and cocaine since the 
beginning of the child protection proceeding.  The court also heard testimony 
and found that the mother sought hospital treatment during the pendency of 
 
 
11 
this case where she reported that she had been drinking one-half of a 
750-milliliter bottle of vodka per day and the hospital diagnosed her with “Daily 
and problematic pattern of alcohol consumption to suggest dependence and 
abuse.”  A urine sample, taken near the time she reported to the hospital, 
confirmed an “exceptionally high level” of alcohol that could corroborate her 
reported alcohol consumption.  Although the mother testified that those facts 
are not true, the court found—as is in its discretion as fact-finder—the mother 
“to be a particularly untruthful and unreliable witness, to lack credibility on key 
factual issues as to her sobriety and use of alcohol.”  See In re Child of 
Radience K., 2019 ME 73, ¶ 34, 208 A.3d 380; In re Children of Tiyonie R., 2019 
ME 34, ¶ 6, 203 A.3d 824.   
 
[¶15]  The mother also argues that the court erred in finding that she has 
“not improved” and that her housing arrangements for the children were 
“fanciful and unpersuasive” because, she argues, the Department investigated 
her care of her youngest child who remains in her care and has found “the exact 
opposite—that the Mother was fit and her home was safe and appropriate for 
an infant.”   
[¶16]  The mother’s fitness to parent one infant child with no known 
disabilities is significantly different than her fitness to parent any one of the 
 
 
12 
three children at issue in this case, much less all four children at once.  The court 
found, and the record supports, that all of the children here struggle as a result 
of past harms inflicted upon them while in the mother’s care, requiring therapy, 
special education sessions, and full, daily supervision by their foster parents.  
The testimony at trial is that in the past two years, the mother has attended a 
total of three of the boy’s medical appointments, no appointments for the girls, 
and has attended only one school event.  The mother has shown she has great 
difficulty during supervised visits in controlling and managing the needs of the 
three children and her infant son while all together.  The mother has had to 
remove herself from the group visits with the four children due to feeling 
“overwhelmed.”  The court’s findings as to the mother’s parental unfitness are 
well supported by the record.   
 
[¶17]  The father testified that it would be at least nine to ten months 
before he might be ready to parent the girls.  The court found that this predicted 
timeline was “unrealistic.”  The father argues that this finding is not supported 
by evidence in the record for the following reasons: he has been sober for nine 
months; he had previously attended Bay Street Recovery; he has been 
undergoing treatment and training while incarcerated; and he has family 
 
 
13 
support when released from prison.  The entirety of the evidence fully supports 
the court’s finding.  
[¶18]  The court found, and the evidence supports, that the father has 
been incarcerated on and off during the time that the girls have been in the 
Department’s care.  See In re Alijah K., 2016 ME 137, ¶ 14, 147 A.3d 1159 (“A 
parent who is unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities by virtue of being 
incarcerated is entitled to no more protection from the termination of his 
parental rights than a parent who is unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities 
as a result of other reasons.”).  The evidence further shows that, while he was 
released from prison, he lacked stable housing; continued to use illicit drugs—
including a relapse on cocaine in May 2017; received only some substance 
abuse counseling—admitting that he completed only two phases at Bay Street 
Recovery before being arrested; and received no mental health treatment 
despite his self-reported need for such treatment.  The father testified that he 
has only recently begun treatment and, although he has been looking for sober 
housing programs for after his release, he does not presently have housing 
arranged.  Moreover, although the father argues that he has been clean from 
substances for the past nine months, a majority of which he has spent 
incarcerated, his lack of consistent sobriety while he was not in prison supports 
 
 
14 
the court’s finding that the father’s “track record establishes that [he] is not 
willing or able to do the work necessary to improve his situation” or meet the 
girls’ needs.    
[¶19]  The court’s findings that the father is unwilling or unable to protect 
the girls from jeopardy or take responsibility for the girls within a time which 
is reasonably calculated to meet their needs are fully supported by the record.   
2. 
Best Interests of the Girls 
[¶20]  The parents argue that the court’s ultimate termination of their 
parental rights constituted an abuse of discretion because termination at this 
point, when the girls’ current foster family is not willing to adopt them, fails to 
establish permanency for the girls.2  We have frequently stated that, “[a]lthough 
permanency is often achieved through adoption, permanency can also be 
achieved through other arrangements.”  In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 10, 916 
A.2d 225.  The concept of permanency is a dynamic one, and permanency in a 
particular case “must be fashioned from the actual circumstances and needs of 
the . . . children before the court.”  Id.  Based on the record before us, the court 
                                         
2  The mother also argues that there was not sufficient evidence presented at trial for the court to 
conclude that termination of her rights is in the boy’s best interest.  As addressed above, the record 
fully supports the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the boy’s 
best interest.  Supra ¶ 12; see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2018). 
 
 
15 
did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination is in the best 
interests of these two girls when the parents have demonstrated that they are 
unable to offer the children any semblance of permanency due to their failure 
to alleviate jeopardy over the two years since the removal of the girls, even with 
ample support from the Department.  See id. ¶ 10-11; cf. In re Thomas H., 2005 
ME 123, ¶¶ 31-34, 889 A.2d 297 (vacating the denial of a petition to terminate 
parental rights when, considering the child’s need for permanency, the denial 
prevented the child from being adopted).  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
the court’s conclusion that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in 
each of the girls’ best interests.  
B.  
Post-Judgment Motion for Relief from Judgment  
 
[¶21]  The father also argues that the court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that the court erred in denying his motion 
without affording him the opportunity of a hearing to create a testimonial 
record to support his claim.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
1.  
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
[¶22]  The procedure for a parent to bring a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel through a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. 
 
 
16 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6) is now settled.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 19-21, 26-27, 
126 A.3d 718.3  Within twenty-one days following the expiration of the appeal 
period, the parent filing the motion must submit a signed and sworn affidavit 
stating, with specificity, that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient—such 
that it was incompetent or inefficient—and (2) the parent was so prejudiced by 
that deficiency that it rose to the level of preventing a just result.  Id. ¶ 21.  If the 
parent asserts that counsel’s deficiency was due to his or her failure to call any 
individuals as witnesses during the termination hearing, the parent’s motion 
must be accompanied by signed and sworn affidavits from those individuals.  
Id.  Similarly, if the parent asserts that counsel failed to offer certain exhibits 
into evidence, the parent must attach those exhibits to the motion.  See generally 
In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 8, 144 A.3d 50  (discussing the presentation of 
extrinsic evidence through the parent’s affidavit).  Affidavits submitted to 
support an alleged failure to call a witness or present specific evidence must be 
from witnesses or refer to evidence known and available to counsel before the 
                                         
3  When the existing record provides sufficient facts to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the parent asserting the claim may do so on direct appeal.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 19, 
126 A.3d 718; see also In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶¶ 6-8, 144 A.3d 50.  When, as is the case here, 
the basis for the parent’s claim is not clear from the existing record, requiring the parent to present 
extrinsic evidence to establish his claim, the parent must promptly raise the claim to the trial court 
through a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 
138, ¶ 20, 126 A.3d 718; see also In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶¶ 6-8, 144 A.3d 50.  
 
 
17 
hearing.  If a parent fails to comply with this procedure, we will affirm a trial 
court’s denial of the parent’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion “[b]ecause of the 
counter-balancing interests of the State in ensuring stability and prompt 
finality for the child.”  In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 21, 126 A.3d 718.  We review 
the factual findings underlying ineffectiveness claims for clear error and the 
trial court’s ultimate denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for an abuse of discretion.  
In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602.   
[¶23]  Here, the father filed a signed and sworn affidavit with his motion 
stating why he believed his counsel at the termination hearing was deficient.  
He asserted that his attorney failed to call ten witnesses to present testimony 
at the termination hearing.  In his motion, he provided signed and sworn 
affidavits from only three of those ten witnesses—his father, his mother, and a 
church pastor.  The father also asserted that his attorney failed to present seven 
documents in evidence.  In his motion, he provided three documents, none of 
which were identifiable as one of the seven that he had said his attorney failed 
to offer at trial.  Accordingly, the father’s motion ultimately relied on the three 
signed and sworn affidavits and three unlisted documents of minimal 
relevance.  See In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 8, 172 A.3d 916 (providing that 
 
 
18 
the court should consider the parent’s motion when it complies with the 
procedural requirements of providing signed and sworn affidavits).   
 
[¶24]  We are left to review the three properly presented signed and 
sworn affidavits—from his father, his mother, and a church pastor—to 
determine whether the court erred in concluding that these affiants’ assertions 
were insufficient to prove ineffectiveness.  To properly assert ineffectiveness, 
the affiants would have needed to assert facts that, if presented at trial, could 
have rendered as unjust the court’s finding that the father “has done next to 
nothing to alleviate jeopardy or take responsibility for the girls,” that “[h]e does 
not understand the girls’ needs, has no ability to meet those needs, . . . has no 
home into which the girls could reintegrate, . . . [and] offer[s] no reasonable 
hope of stability and permanency.”  None of the affiants asserted facts that 
spoke to contrary findings.  Nor did the affiants provide evidence suggesting 
that the father will be able to maintain sobriety and stability after his release.   
 
[¶25]  To be clear, the Rule 60(b)(6) process that we have established is 
not intended to allow a parent to have a second chance to show that he is at last 
attending to the responsibilities of providing safe and nurturing care for his 
children.  The process is specifically designed to avoid delays in the final 
adjudication of a parent’s parental rights, allowing the children some hope of 
 
 
19 
permanence and finality, while at the same time allowing a parent to be heard 
if there has truly been a lapse in the service of the attorney.  The trial court here 
understood the process, acted promptly and thoroughly, and reviewed the 
record carefully for any indication that prior counsel was ineffective.  What the 
record established was that the father, himself, had been ineffective in 
maintaining sobriety and creating a safe home for his children, and that people 
who cared about him hoped that someday he would be able to do so.  Given the 
father’s failure to present any evidence demonstrating ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the court did not err in its conclusion.    
2.  
Motion Hearing 
 
[¶26]  The father filed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment 
nearly three months after the court entered the judgment terminating his 
parental rights onto the docket.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 19-20, 126 A.3d 
718 (holding that the motion for relief from judgment should be filed no later 
than twenty-one days after the expiration of the period for appealing the 
underlying judgment).  In what was perhaps an excess of caution, we permitted 
the trial court to act, but, to effectuate promptness, ordered that it do so 
“expeditiously” and suggested that it “perform an initial review of the motion 
immediately after it is filed to determine whether it raises sufficient grounds to 
 
 
20 
warrant a response and any further proceedings.”  (Emphasis added); see In re 
Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 8, 144 A.3d 50 (holding that after the parent files a 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the trial court will then “make a prompt preliminary 
determination of whether to allow the parties to present additional 
testimony”); In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 36, 126 A.3d 718 (holding that “it is for 
the trial court to determine what process is necessary to meaningfully assess a 
parent’s [Rule 60(b)(6)] claim”).  The court did exactly as we ordered.  After it 
determined that the father failed to make a prima facia case of ineffectiveness 
in the documents accompanying the motion, the court concluded that no 
hearing on his motion was necessary.  We discern no error in the court’s actions 
taken pursuant to our direction.   
The entry is: 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., 
Biddeford, for appellant mother 
 
Kristina Dougherty, Esq., Chester & Vestal, P.A., Portland, for appellant Father 
 
 
 
21 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Zack Paakkonen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
York District Court docket numbers PC-2016-08 and PC-2016-09 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY