Title: Aric A. Williams v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96672
____________
ARIC A. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 11, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review  Williams v. State, 738 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v. Cotton,
728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000).  We
have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Williams challenges his five-year prison sentence under the Prison Releasee
Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed
2The district court, in affirming Williams’ sentence, cites to Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th
DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1999).  In Cotton, we disapproved the decision in Speed to
the extent that it was inconsistent with our opinion in Cotton. 
-2-
by this Court in other opinions.  See McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.
2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that
the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the
State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison
releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1032 (Fla. Nov. 2, 2000)
(rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act does not
violate the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal
protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy); Ellis v.
State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in
the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of
the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142
(Fla. 1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (holding that the Act does
not violate separation of powers, is not void for vagueness, and does not violate
principles of due process by allowing a “victim veto” precluding application of the
Act).  Accordingly, the decision in Williams is approved to the extent it is
consistent with Cotton,2 Ellis, McKnight, and Grant. 
It is so ordered.
-3-
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d
345, 358-59 (Fla. 2000).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
Fifth District - Case No. 5D99-362 
(Seminole County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lyle R. Hitchens, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan, Carmen F.
Corrente, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent