Title: Alabama Power Company v. Sellers

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

214 So. 2d 833 (1968)
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
v.
Aubrey Gene SELLERS.
3 Div. 180.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 3, 1968.
Thos. S. Lawson, Jr., Warren H. Goodwyn, Martin, Balch, Bingham, Hawthorne & Williams and Steiner, Crum & Baker, Montgomery, for appellant.
Richard M. Jordan and Whitesell, Alton & DeMent, Montgomery, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff in action to recover for damage to plaintiff's truck allegedly caused by defendant's employee in operating defendant's truck at the time it collided with plaintiff's truck on Bell Road.
*834 Plaintiff's complaint contained two counts, the first charging that defendant's employee negligently caused the collision, and the second charging that the employee wantonly caused it. At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave the affirmative charge for defendant as to the wanton count and we are not further concerned with that count.
Defendant pleaded the general issue in short by consent, etc. Defendant filed also a plea of recoupment alleging that plaintiff's employee, who was operating plaintiff's truck, was guilty of negligence which caused the collision, and defendant seeks to recover from plaintiff for the damage to defendant's truck in the same collision.
The court gave plaintiff's requested affirmative charge, with hypothesis, instructing the jury that they could not find against the plaintiff on defendant's plea of recoupment. Giving this charge is assigned for error.
The evidence shows that on an October morning, plaintiff's dump truck, loaded with gravel, was following defendant's truck and "chipper" as both traveled southward. The collision occurred at the point where a private driveway comes into Bell Road on the east side, that is, on the left of the direction in which the trucks were traveling. Defendant's driver attempted to turn left into the driveway and plaintiff's driver attempted to pass defendant's truck, all at the same time. Plaintiff's driver described the collision as follows:
Plaintiff's driver testified that he blew his horn when he pulled out and saw the way was clear to pass defendant's truck.
Plaintiff's driver also testified that the driver of defendant's truck did not give any signal of intention to turn left, either by flashing light or extended arm. Plaintiff's driver testified that the speed of both vehicles was twenty to thirty miles an hour, and that he "was trying to pass him (defendant's truck) because he was slow on the road and I had to climb two hills ahead of him." (Par. Added) He testified that the road "is not built for a loaded truck, and it is rather rough," and "has a lot of dips in it" which are "hard on a loaded truck."
The State Trooper, who investigated the collision, testified that, when he arrived on the scene, the vehicles had not been moved; that the accident occurred at 9:10; and that he arrived at 10:15. The trooper testified that defendant's driver made the following statement: that he was looking for the work site and did not know exactly where it was; that, after going over the small hillcrest, he saw a crew working to the left of Bell Road, and he started turning into the driveway; that the truck windows were up and he "wasn't paying any attention to anything other than looking for where he was supposed to report for work." Admission of this testimony of the State *835 Trooper is the action complained of in the second assignment of error.
The State Trooper testified that the turn signal lights on defendant's truck were working after the accident but the brake light did not work.
Defendant's driver testified:
The witness Bavar testified that he was an employee of defendant, was a passenger in defendant's truck, and that, immediately after the accident, the left blinker of defendant's truck was blinking. With respect to the blowing of plaintiff's horn and the window on defendant's truck, he testified:
Plaintiff contends that the court was correct in giving the affirmative charge for the plaintiff on defendant's plea of recoupment because the evidence shows without dispute that defendant's driver violated § 17(b) of Title 36, Code 1940 as Recompiled 1958, which recites:
Plaintiff further contends that defendant's driver violated § 17(c), of the same title, which recites:
Defendant appears to concede that it would not be entitled to recover on its plea of recoupment if defendant's driver was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause the damage to defendant's truck. Defendant says, however, that even if its driver was guilty of negligence, that negligence would not bar recovery on the plea of recoupment unless the negligence of defendant's driver was a proximate, contributing cause of the damage; and, that, under the scintilla rule, it was for the jury to decide whether the negligence of defendant's driver did proximately contribute to cause the damage, and whether the negligence of plaintiff's driver in failing to blow his horn or in attempting to pass, or both, was the proximate cause of the collision.
Plaintiff's driver testified he blew his horn, that it was a "good" horn and was "loud." Defendant's driver and Bavar, the passenger, testified that the window was down and they did not hear plaintiff's horn. There is more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding that plaintiff's driver did not blow his horn.
§ 12(b) of Title 36, supra, recites:
This court has said:
We hold in the case at bar, that the question of proximate cause was for the jury and that the court erred in giving the affirmative charge for plaintiff on defendant's plea of recoupment.
Defendant's second assignment is that the court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of the State Trooper showing statements that defendant's driver had made to the trooper.
Plaintiff says proper objection was not made and defendant is not entitled to review of this question. Since the judgment is reversed on the first assignment, we pretermit deciding whether objection was properly made. In view of another trial, however, we consider the admissibility of the testimony as to the statements made by defendant's driver to the State Trooper.
As we understand the record, defendant's driver made the statements in answer to questions asked by the investigating officer.
It was stipulated that both truck drivers "were acting within the line and scope of their employment at the time of the accident in question." This is not a stipulation that defendant's driver was acting for his employer an hour after the accident.
The statements by defendant's truck driver were made approximately one hour after the collision occurred and were "merely admissions by an agent as to a past transactiona declaration by the driver of the truck subsequent to the injury, and the defendant could not and should not be bound by it." Teague v. Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 209 Ala. 205, 206, 95 So. 883, 884; Johns Undertaking Co. v. Hess-Strickland Transfer & Storage Co., 213 Ala. 78, 79, 104 So. 250.
In holding that the trial court erred in admitting, against a defendant railroad, evidence showing statements made by a conductor and an engineer "`a few minutes after the plaintiff had been hurt, ....'," this court said:
We are of opinion that, in the case at bar, the statements made by defendant's driver to the State Trooper, were not part of the res gestae and were not admissible as original or independent evidence against defendant. No predicate had been laid so as to make the statements admissible to impeach defendant's driver, nor was the testimony limited to that purpose. See Engel v. Davis, 256 Ala. 661, 57 So. 2d 76; Wade v. Brisker, 223 Ala. 585, 173 So. 64.
Defendant's third assignment is that the court erred in overruling defendant's objection to a question to the witness J. C. Underwood. Defendant did not object until after the question had been answered and the objection came too late. Housing Authority of City of Decatur v. Decatur Land Co., 258 Ala. 607, 612, 64 So. 2d 594.
For giving affirmative charge for plaintiff on defendant's plea of recoupment, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and KOHN, JJ., concur.