Title: DeVries v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DeVries v. State1996 WY 10909 P.2d 977Case Number: 95-173Decided: 01/12/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jennifer K. DeVRIES, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v. 

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County, 
Gary P. Hartman, J.

Dan O. Caldwell III, Thermopolis; and 
William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Lou Piccioni, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Jennifer DeVries appeals from her convictions for two counts of receiving and/or 
concealing stolen property as defined in WYO. STAT. § 6-3-403(a)(i) 
(1984).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents a single issue for our review:

Did the District 
Court err in denying Defendant's Motion for Acquittal and Defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Acquittal?

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant grew up 
on the 71 Ranch located near Elko, Nevada, where her father worked as a ranch 
manager. All the cattle on the 71 Ranch belonged to the ranch owner except for 
two Holstein heifers which a former ranch employee's sister 
owned.

[¶5]      In March of 1993, 
Appellant received a Nevada brand certificate which allowed her to use the Slant 
8 Arrow brand. Appellant's father branded the two Holstein heifers with 
Appellant's brand. In the spring of 1993, Appellant's parents purchased the Owl 
Creek Angus Ranch located in Hot Springs County, Wyoming. On June 26, 1993, the 
two Holstein heifers, along with some other cattle, were shipped from the 71 
Ranch in Nevada to the Wyoming ranch. Appellant signed the brand inspection 
certificate1 in Nevada, 
representing that she owned the cattle. Once the cattle arrived at the Wyoming 
ranch, they were branded with Appellant's father's J Lazy S 
brand.

[¶6]      On February 7, 
1994, Appellant shipped another fifteen head of cattle which bore the Slant 8 
Arrow brand from Nevada to herself at the Wyoming ranch. She was present in 
Nevada when the cattle were inspected, and she again signed the required brand 
inspection certificate, certifying that she was the owner of the 
cattle.

[¶7]      Upon realizing 
that the Holstein heifers were missing, the brother of the heifers' owner 
reported that fact to the district brand inspector. The heifers were eventually 
returned. Since they had been branded with the Slant 8 Arrow and J Lazy S 
brands, the Nevada livestock investigators became suspicious of the 
configuration of the various brands and asked a Wyoming livestock investigator 
to check the cattle which had been shipped from Nevada to the Wyoming ranch. The 
inspection of the Wyoming ranch supported the Nevada livestock investigators' 
concerns, and a search warrant was obtained. The search revealed that the 71 
Ranch's 7 Lazy S brand had been converted to the Slant 8 Arrow brand on the 
cattle kept at the Wyoming ranch.

[¶8]      An information 
was filed, charging Appellant with two counts of unlawfully receiving and/or 
concealing stolen property as defined in § 6-3-403(a)(i) and with one count of 
conspiracy to unlawfully receive and/or conceal stolen property as defined by § 
6-3-403(a)(i) and WYO. STAT. § 6-1-303(a) (1983). A jury trial was held during 
which Appellant moved at the close of the State's case for a judgment of 
acquittal. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the conspiracy 
charge, but it denied the motion as to the other charges. Appellant did not 
present any evidence, and the case went to the jury. The jury convicted 
Appellant of the two counts of receiving and/or concealing stolen property 
pursuant to § 6-3-403(a). Appellant renewed her motion for a judgment of 
acquittal, and the trial court once again denied her motion. Appellant appeals 
from the denial of her original and renewed motions for a judgment of 
acquittal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9]      We have often 
stated the standard of review which we use when we are reviewing a denial of a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal:

[W]e accept as true 
the evidence of the prosecution, together with all logical and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely the evidence of the 
defendant in conflict.

"A motion for 
judgment of acquittal is to be granted only when the evidence is such that a 
reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the 
essential elements of the crime. Or, stated another way, if there is substantial 
evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not be granted. 
This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or 
circumstantial." (citations omitted) Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 
1981).

Apodaca v. State, 796 P.2d 806, 807 (Wyo. 
1990) (citation omitted). 

[¶10]   In analyzing a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument:

This Court assesses 
whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the 
basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn 
by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are 
applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 
1995) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Section 6-3-403(a)(i) 
provides:

(a) A person who 
buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has 
reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty 
of:

(i) A felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is 
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more;

* * 
* * * *

[¶12]   The essence of Appellant's argument 
is that, if she committed any crimes, she committed them in Nevada. She claims 
that the evidence does not show that she acted in Wyoming to receive and/or 
conceal the stolen property.

[¶13]   "Concealment is generally defined 
to mean `to prevent disclosure or recognition of or `to place out of sight.'" 
Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 717 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (1979)).

When used in a 
legal sense, the word concealment means more than to place out of sight or to 
prevent recognition. It means to place out of sight of the owner, or to prevent 
recognition by the owner. "The word `conceals' in the statute was not used in a 
technical sense but includes all acts done which render the discovery or 
identification of property more difficult. . . . Concealment is not limited to 
proof that the stolen property was hidden or kept out of sight, it is enough if 
it is proven that the property was withheld from the owner and made difficult 
for the owner to discover and this includes acts or conduct which enables the 
one who received the stolen goods to convert the property to his own use." State 
v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 325 A.2d 199, 212 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 976, 
94 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973) [(citations omitted)].

704 P.2d  at 717-18. See also DeLeon v. 
State, 896 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶14]   In Hunter, we determined that 
sufficient evidence supported the judge's finding that the appellant had 
concealed stolen property in the state of Wyoming from its Michigan owner when 
he stole the automobile in Michigan and drove it to Wyoming. 704 P.2d  at 715. We 
held:

Certainly appellant 
was concealing the stolen vehicle from its lawful owner, who lived in Michigan, 
by driving said vehicle to Wyoming. It was unlikely that the owner would 
discover its whereabouts. There was more than sufficient evidence of 
concealment.

704 P.2d  at 718.

[¶15]   Similarly, in the case at bar, we 
conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury's determination that 
Appellant received and/or concealed the cattle in Wyoming. We cannot subscribe 
to Appellant's argument that, since she was in Nevada when she signed the brand 
inspection certificates which allowed the cattle to be transferred, she cannot 
be guilty of receiving and/or concealing the cattle in Wyoming. Her actions 
caused the cattle to be shipped to and concealed in Wyoming. Her caring for the 
stolen cattle at the Wyoming ranch after the cattle arrived was further evidence 
that Appellant had receiving and/or concealed the cattle in Wyoming. The fact 
that Appellant did not physically transport the cattle into Wyoming herself did 
not preclude her from being convicted of receiving and/or concealing the cattle 
in Wyoming. 

[¶16]   The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered a similar fact pattern in United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S. Ct. 121, 74 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1982). In 
that case, the defendant signed false vehicle titles for stolen vehicles on 
which he represented himself as being the seller. 664 F.2d  at 96. The court, 
recognizing that "there must be some overt physical act on the part of the 
defendant in order to support a conviction," held that using false titles 
constituted a physical attempt to disguise the vehicles and fell within the 
meaning of concealment. Id. "[T]he physical act need not include contact with 
the vehicle or a physical hiding of the vehicle." Id.

[¶17]   In the case at bar, Appellant knew 
or had reason to believe that the cattle which were bearing her brand had been 
stolen. She signed the brand inspection certificates which allowed the cattle to 
be transferred to Wyoming where they would be out of the sight of their owners. 
She also allowed the cattle to bear her brand as they were being shipped to 
Wyoming, precluding their owners from recognizing them. Accordingly, the jury 
could have reasonably found that Appellant's activities constituted receiving 
and/or concealing the cattle in Wyoming which had been shipped from 
Nevada.

CONCLUSION

[¶18]   We hold that sufficient evidence 
supported the trial court's denial of Appellant's original and renewed motions 
for a judgment of acquittal.

[¶19]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In 
Nevada, when cattle are sold, transported out of their home district or state, 
or consigned to slaughter or a sale yard, a brand inspector must inspect each 
animal prior to that transaction and issue a brand inspection certificate which 
certifies that the cattle belong to the person who has offered them for 
inspection.