Title: Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital (Ill. S.Ct.) 

Docket No. 83875-Agenda 
20-September 1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital 
Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987), this court held that provisions in an 
employee handbook may give rise to a binding contract with at-will employees who 
accept the terms of the contract by commencing or continuing their employment 
with the employer. The present appeal involves a related issue and concerns the 
question whether the terms of the contract so formed may be altered unilaterally 
by the employer to an employee's disadvantage and in the absence of a 
reservation of the right by the employer to make unilateral changes. The 
plaintiffs brought the present action in the circuit court of Cook County, 
alleging in their amended complaint that the defendant terminated their 
employment in violation of the provisions of the defendant's employee handbook; 
the plaintiffs sought recovery under theories of breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel. The circuit court of Cook County granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The appellate court reversed, finding a 
cause of action. 289 Ill. App. 3d 75. We allowed the defendant's petition for 
leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court.
The plaintiffs in this case were nurses employed 
by the defendant, Holy Cross Hospital, in Chicago. The plaintiffs worked for the 
defendant continuously until they were discharged, effective November 1, 1991. 
The defendant hired Mary Doyle in 1960, Leni Serra in 1968, and Susan Valderrama 
and Valerie Zorek in 1972. In 1971, the defendant issued to existing employees 
and new hires an employee handbook, which contained a number of policies and 
provisions regarding employment with the defendant. One of the policies 
pertained to discharge, and it is the subject of the present appeal. According 
to the plaintiffs' amended complaint, policy number 7-G, "Economic Separation," 
stated:
The defendant asserts that the 1971 handbook 
actually contained a different policy regarding terminations, but for purposes 
of this appeal the defendant assumes that the policy quoted above was the one in 
force in 1971.
The defendant later added disclaimers to the 
handbook. In 1983, after all four of the plaintiffs had begun working for the 
defendant, the defendant promulgated policy 5-I, which provided:
The hospital discharged the four plaintiffs 
effective November 1, 1991. The plaintiffs commenced the present action on 
November 9, 1992, by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. In 
their complaint they sought recovery under a theory of breach of contract, 
contending that their discharges were in violation of the economic separation 
provisions of the 1971 employee handbook. The defendant moved to dismiss the 
complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 
(West 1992)), and the trial judge granted the motion. At the same time, the 
judge allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs then filed 
an amended complaint, realleging the breach of contract theory and adding a 
theory of promissory estoppel. The amended complaint comprised eight counts; the 
first four counts sought recovery for each of the individual plaintiffs on a 
theory of breach of contract, and the second four counts sought recovery for 
each plaintiff on a theory of promissory estoppel. The defendant again moved for 
dismissal of the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Following a hearing, the trial judge granted the motion with prejudice. The 
plaintiffs appealed that judgment to the appellate court, which, in an 
unpublished order, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause, concluding that 
the dismissal was improper because it was based on matters outside the 
complaint-the disclaimer in the later handbook.
Following remand, the defendant sought dismissal 
of the plaintiffs' amended complaint under a different provision of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, section 2-619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1994)). This 
motion was heard by a different judge, who granted the requested relief. In 
dismissing the amended complaint, the judge relied on the appellate court's 
opinion in Condon v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 210 Ill. 
App. 3d 701 (1991), which had held that an employer may unilaterally alter the 
terms of an employee handbook to an employee's disadvantage even though the 
employer had not previously reserved the right to do so.
The plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court 
reversed, concluding that the defendant's modification of the terms of the 
handbook was not enforceable against the plaintiffs because it was not supported 
by consideration. 289 Ill. App. 3d at 79-80. In addition, the appellate court 
rejected the defendant's alternative argument that the terms of the original 
handbook provision were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a 
promise. 289 Ill. App. 3d at 78-80. We allowed the defendant's petition for 
leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We later granted leave to the Illinois 
Manufacturers' Association and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to submit 
briefs as amici curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
The trial court dismissed the amended complaint 
under section 2-619(a)(9) of Code of Civil Procedure, which permits the 
dismissal of an action when "the claim asserted *** is barred by other 
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 
ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1996). The purpose of a motion to dismiss under section 
2-619 is to provide litigants with a method for disposing of issues of law and 
easily proved issues of fact at the beginning of a case, reserving disputed 
questions of fact for a trial, if necessary. Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1995). The question on appeal from an order granting dismissal 
under section 2-619 is "whether the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, 
whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law." Kedzie & 103rd Currency 
Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993).
The "affirmative matter" raised by the defendant 
in this case is the disclaimer it inserted in its employee handbook in 1983, 
after the four plaintiffs began their employment at the hospital. The threshold 
question before us is a narrow one, involving an employer's power to make 
unilateral changes to provisions in an employee handbook, in the absence of a 
previous reservation of the right to do so, that would operate to the 
disadvantage of existing employees. If an employer may not make such changes, 
then we must determine whether the provision at issue here is sufficiently clear 
to form the basis for a contractual term.
The plaintiffs contend that the provisions of 
the employee handbook allegedly in effect in 1971 created contractual rights 
that they are now entitled to enforce. The plaintiffs argue that the appellate 
court below correctly determined that handbook modifications made unilaterally 
by their employer in later years cannot abrogate rights they acquired prior to 
that time. The plaintiffs submit that the disclaimer promulgated by the 
defendant was not supported by consideration, and they deny that consideration 
can be found in their continuing to work for the defendant. The plaintiffs 
assert that finding consideration in their continued employment would mean that 
they would have had to quit their jobs in order to reject the defendant's new 
offer, which would have rendered meaningless the rights they acquired under the 
original version of the employee handbook.
The defendant does not challenge the proposition 
that any modification to the terms of the employee handbook must be supported by 
consideration. The defendant argues, however, that consideration may be found in 
these circumstances in an employee's decision to continue to work for an 
employer after the employee handbook has been amended. According to the 
defendant, consideration exists because the plaintiffs could have quit if they 
were dissatisfied with the new provisions. The defendant and amicus 
Illinois Manufacturers' Association also contend that a number of policy 
concerns further support the view that an employer's unilateral modifications of 
an employee handbook may operate against existing employees even though the 
employer did not previously reserve the right to made changes of that 
nature.
This court first recognized the enforceable 
effect of employee handbook provisions in Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth 
Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987). The plaintiff in that case argued 
that an employee handbook that had been distributed to all employees and that 
set forth specific procedures for the dismissal of employees gave rise to a 
contract between the employer and employees. The Duldulao court 
concluded that an employee handbook or policy statement may create contractual 
rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are satisfied. The 
court explained:
Given the contractual rationale of 
Duldulao, we find it difficult to reconcile the defendant's position 
with the requirements for contract formation and modification. Applying 
"traditional principles" of contract law, as Duldulao did, we conclude 
in this case that the defendant's unilateral modification to the employee 
handbook lacked consideration and therefore is not binding on the plaintiffs. A 
modification of an existing contract, like a newly formed contract, requires 
consideration to be valid and enforceable. Chicago College of Osteopathic 
Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 776 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(applying Illinois law); Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 646-47 
(1928); De Fontaine v. Passalino, 222 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1028 (1991). 
Consideration consists of some detriment to the offeror, some benefit to the 
offeree, or some bargained-for exchange between them. Lipkin v. Koren, 
392 Ill. 400, 406 (1946). "Any act or promise which is of benefit to one party 
or disadvantage to the other is a sufficient consideration to support a 
contract. [Citation.]" Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 330 (1977). In the present case, we are unable to conclude that 
consideration exists that would justify our enforcement of the modification 
against existing employees. Because the defendant was seeking to reduce the 
rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs under the employee handbook, it was the 
defendant, and not the plaintiffs, who would properly be required to provide 
consideration for the modification. But in adding the disclaimer to the 
handbook, the defendant provided nothing of value to the plaintiffs and did not 
itself incur any disadvantage. In fact, the opposite occurred: the plaintiffs 
suffered a detriment-the loss of rights previously granted to them by the 
handbook-while the defendant gained a corresponding benefit.
For these reasons, we agree with the plaintiffs 
that, after an employer is contractually bound to the provisions of an employee 
handbook, unilateral modification of its terms by the employer to an employee's 
disadvantage fails for lack of consideration. This was the view adopted by the 
appellate court below, and a number of other courts have also relied on this 
reasoning in rejecting efforts by employers to unilaterally modify handbook 
terms or other personnel policies to the disadvantage of existing employees and 
in the absence of a reservation of the right to do so. Applying well-established 
principles of contract law, these courts have held that modifications to terms 
and provisions of employee handbooks cannot apply to existing employees in the 
absence of consideration. Moreover, these cases have held that the requisite 
consideration for a modification that would operate to an employee's 
disadvantage is not supplied simply by the employee's continued work for the 
employer. That is to say, in addition to an offer and acceptance, consideration 
must be found elsewhere, whether in the form of a new benefit to the employee or 
a new detriment to the employer, or as the product of mutual agreement. 
Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Community Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Pankow v. WestAmerica Mortgage Co., 740 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 
Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89 (1995); Brodie v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed in 
Robinson, a factually similar case involving Illinois law:
We agree with the plaintiffs that consideration 
was lacking for the unilateral modification made by the defendant here. Contrary 
to the defendant's argument, we are unable to find the required consideration in 
the plaintiffs' continuation of their employment with the defendant, following 
the amendment of the employee handbook. The fallacy of the defendant's premise 
is readily apparent: to accept the defendant's reasoning, that the plaintiffs 
must supply consideration for a change in the contract to their detriment, and 
to locate consideration in the plaintiffs' continued work, as the defendant 
urges, would paradoxically require the plaintiffs to quit their jobs in order to 
preserve the rights they previously held under the employee handbook. As the 
appellate court below explained:
The defendant argues, however, that language in 
Duldulao supports the theory that an employee's decision to continue 
working for an employer in the wake of a change in the employee handbook may 
constitute consideration. The appellate court in Condon v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 701 (1991), used similar 
reasoning when it concluded that an employer may bind existing employees to 
unilateral modifications it makes to an employee handbook. The Condon 
court explained:
Like the court in Condon, the defendant 
in the present case believes that Duldulao's use of the phrase 
"continuing to work" means that an employee's decision to continue working for 
an employer provides fresh consideration for the employer's unilateral 
modification of an employee handbook. We do not agree. Duldulao invoked 
traditional contract principles in concluding that terms and provisions of an 
employee handbook may give rise to a binding and enforceable contract. As we 
have noted, it is well established in Illinois law that modification of a 
contract requires consideration, just as the contract initially formed does. We 
believe that Duldulao's reference to continued work was intended to 
apply to cases in which an employer who did not previously have an employee 
handbook decides to promulgate one; in those circumstances, employees' continued 
work for the employer represents consideration for the handbook. 
Duldulao did not involve handbook modifications, and therefore the 
court in that case was not speaking to the situation involved here.
The defendant further argues that if continued 
employment does not constitute consideration for a disclaimer, then it also 
cannot constitute consideration for benefits that would be conferred on existing 
employees by later versions of a handbook. Thus, the defendant maintains that 
employees like the plaintiffs cannot take advantage of later benefits if they 
also refuse to be bound by later detriments. We do not agree. In that instance, 
the employee's decision to accept the beneficial modification by his or her 
continued performance would be supported by consideration. Unlike the present 
case, in those circumstances the individual's decision to continue employment 
would provide consideration for the new benefit conferred by the 
employer.
The defendant and amicus also contend 
that considerations of public policy argue in favor of allowing employers a free 
hand in modifying provisions of employee handbooks with respect to existing 
employees. The defendant and amicus note that under the appellate 
court's result here, an employer could be bound for a lengthy period to the 
terms of an employee handbook issued long ago. In addition, they assert that 
adoption of the appellate court's result in this case would mean that different 
employees could be subject to different contract terms and provisions, depending 
on when a particular person was hired and what the employee handbook provided at 
that time. Although we are aware of these potential drawbacks, we note that this 
is a matter of contract and see no compelling reason here to relieve the 
defendant of the obligations it has voluntarily incurred. Employers who choose 
to set forth policies in employee handbooks and manuals as an inducement to 
attracting and retaining a skilled and loyal work force cannot disregard those 
obligations at a later time, simply because the employer later perceives them to 
be inconvenient or burdensome.
The defendant raises the alternative argument 
that the provisions at issue here did not contain a clear promise of termination 
rights under the circumstances alleged in the plaintiffs' amended complaint. The 
defendant asserts that the allegations in the plaintiffs' amended complaint 
demonstrate the absence of any violation of the economic separation policy 
contained in the 1971 handbook. The defendant notes that the economic separation 
policy pertained to the "permanent elimination of departments, job 
classifications, and/or jobs," but that the plaintiffs allege that "there was in 
fact no permanent elimination of departments, job classifications, or jobs, as 
required by Policy No. 7-G." The defendant thus contends that the economic 
separation policy provides no guidance on what procedures must be followed in 
instances other than the permanent elimination of departments, job 
classifications, and jobs. The defendant therefore insists that the terminations 
alleged here do not fall within the scope of the economic separation 
policy.
In resolving this argument we need not consider 
the plaintiffs' assertion, made in their brief, and outside the record in the 
case, that they were informed by the defendant that their jobs were being 
permanently eliminated. We do not agree with the defendant's theory that it 
would have had a free hand in discharging its employees so long as it did not 
permanently eliminate "departments, job classifications, and/or jobs." Under the 
defendant's interpretation, the economic separation policy would have provided 
protection to employees only if the action was somehow characterized as 
"permanent" in nature, and would provide no protection in other circumstances. 
This would conflict, however, with the stated purpose of the policy, which was 
to promote stability in the work force and provide some assurance of continuity 
in employment. The plaintiffs could have reasonably believed that, apart from 
disciplinary actions, layoffs would be governed by the economic separation 
policy.
The plaintiffs argue, as an alternative 
contention before this court, that they have stated a cause of action for 
promissory estoppel in counts V through VIII of their amended complaint. Having 
concluded that an enforceable contract exists, we need not address this separate 
argument.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the 
appellate court, which reversed the circuit court and remanded the cause for 
further proceedings, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 

JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
I agree with the court that the employer's 
unilateral modification of the employee handbook fails for lack of consideration 
and that an enforceable contract exists between the parties. Therefore, I concur 
in today's opinion to the extent that it affirms the appellate court's decision 
to reverse the circuit court's dismissal of those counts in the amended 
complaint which sound in breach of contract. Unlike my colleagues, however, I 
would affirm that portion of the circuit court's order which dismissed the 
counts sounding in promissory estoppel, a theory that the appellate court did 
not discuss in its opinion and this court elects to "not address." See slip op. 
at 11.
I
Counts I through IV of plaintiffs' amended 
complaint allege a breach of contract action against defendant. In these counts, 
plaintiffs allege that defendant breached "Economic Separation" policy 7-G 
contained in the 1971 employee handbook when it discharged plaintiffs on 
November 1, 1991. Counts V through VIII allege an action based on the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. In these counts, plaintiffs allege that they had 
reasonably relied upon "Economic Separation" policy 7-G contained in the 1971 
handbook to their detriment. Defendant sought dismissal of the amended complaint 
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1994)). According to defendant, certain disclaimers made in 
1983 modified the 1971 handbook. The circuit court took the matter under 
advisement. On July 19, 1995, the circuit court issued a memorandum of opinion 
in which it found that no valid agreement existed between the parties "for 
purposes of a Duldulao theory or a promissory estoppel theory." Several weeks 
later, on August 8, 1995, the circuit court ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs' 
amended complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs thereafter sought review of the 
August 8, 1995, order and specifically included in their notice of appeal 
reference to the circuit court's earlier memorandum of opinion. The appellate 
court held that the circuit court erred in ruling that the 1983 disclaimers 
rendered policy 7-G unenforceable. 289 Ill. App. 3d 75. Notably absent from the 
appellate court's opinion is any reference to the promissory estoppel counts or 
the effect of its opinion on that theory of recovery. In fact, the appellate 
court's judgment line reads only "[r]eversed and remanded." 289 Ill. App. 3d at 
80. This court today affirms that judgment (slip op. at 1, 11) and does "not 
address" the promissory estoppel claims. One question arises from this 
procedural history-Is it only the breach of contract counts which have been 
reversed on appeal, or has the circuit court's dismissal order in its entirety 
been reversed? Both this court and the appellate court purport to reverse that 
order, yet do so without any comment on the propriety of the promissory estoppel 
claims. By "not addressing" the claims today, this court leaves the status of 
those dismissed counts unclear and creates potential confusion for both the 
parties and the circuit judge upon remand. That being the case, our discussion 
of the issue is warranted.
II
Generally, courts have used the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in order to enforce promises when consideration is lacking, 
such as in cases involving gratuitous promises, charitable subscriptions, and 
certain intrafamily promises. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 
§§6-1 through 6-3 (3d ed. 1987). However, in recent years, courts have expanded 
the use of the doctrine to enforce promises underlying otherwise defective 
contracts and promises made during the course of preliminary negotiations. In 
some instances, the doctrine has been employed to provide a remedy for reliance 
upon offers subsequently withdrawn. Calamari & Perillo, at §6-5. But, in all 
instances, application of promissory estoppel is appropriate only in the absence 
of an express agreement. The doctrine serves to impute contractual stature based 
upon an underlying promise and to provide a remedy to the party who 
detrimentally relies on the promise. 2A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §196A, at 
55-56 (Supp. 1991).
In Illinois, to establish a claim based on 
promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege and prove that (i) defendant made 
an unambiguous promise to plaintiff, (ii) plaintiff relied on such promise, 
(iii) plaintiff's reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendant, and (iv) 
plaintiff relied on the promise to its detriment. Quake Construction, Inc. 
v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 309-10 (1990). Although a 
party may plead claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel in the 
alternative, our appellate court has held that "once it is established, either 
by an admission of a party or by a judicial finding, that there is in 
fact an enforceable contract between the parties ***, then a party may no longer 
recover under the theory of promissory estoppel." (Emphasis added.) Prentice 
v. UDC Advisory Services, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 505, 512 (1995), citing 
Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn International, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 
3d 224, 237 (1992). The appellate court explained its holding as 
follows:
The analyses contained in both Prentice 
and Wagner were predicated on case law from across the nation. See 
Prentice, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 513-15 (discussing cases); 
Wagner, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 233-35 (analyzing cases). These cases hold 
that, once an enforceable contract has been found to exist, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is inapplicable. See Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 24 L. Ed. 674 (1878); General Aviation, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1042 (6th Cir. 1990); Walker v. KFC 
Corp., 728 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984); Youngman v. Nevada 
Irrigation District, 70 Cal. 2d 240, 449 P.2d 462, 74 Cal. Rptr. 398 
(1969). See also Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 
230 N.W.2d 588 (1975); Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 
135 N.H. 270, 608 A.2d 840 (1992); Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 
Va. 368, 477 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
Plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, allege 
that, in reliance on "Economic Separation" policy 7-G contained in the 1971 
contract, they gave up the opportunity to work elsewhere, thereby causing 
detriment. We today have held that plaintiffs' continued employment constituted 
the consideration necessary to make the 1971 handbook an enforceable contract. 
By remaining in their positions and presumably rendering satisfactory service, 
plaintiffs performed their part of the bargain and provided the consideration 
called for in the 1971 handbook. See Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth 
Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1987). There is no occasion, 
therefore, to rely upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which, as noted 
above, is necessary only to supply consideration for a promise when no actual 
consideration was given by the promisee. Plaintiffs admit as much here in this 
court, for they have characterized their promissory estoppel claims as an 
"alternative" theory of recovery "if the Court does not find that a valid 
enforceable contract exists." As the California Supreme Court has 
stated,
In this case, plaintiffs agreed to forgo 
employment elsewhere in order to bind themselves to the 1971 handbook. 
" 'Where *** the performance which is said to satisfy the detrimental 
reliance requirement of the promissory estoppel theory is the same performance 
which represents consideration for the written contract, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in not applicable.' " General Aviation, 915 F.2d  at 1042, quoting General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
703 F. Supp. 637, 647 n.10 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
This court, like the appellate court below, has 
held that an enforceable contract exists between the parties. In other words, 
plaintiffs are now entitled to contractual remedies upon proving defendant's 
breach and, therefore, need not resort to an equitable remedy originally 
designed to prevent injustice when the promise at issue did not rise to the 
level of an enforceable contract. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & 
Waiver §48 (1966). Although the question of whether a contract exists 
between these parties has been affirmatively answered by this court, the parties 
may, upon remand, continue to dispute the terms of the contract and the 
obligations it created, thereby creating a question of fact as to whether a 
breach of the contract did indeed occur. However, for purposes of the promissory 
estoppel question at issue here, it is irrelevant whether plaintiffs will 
ultimately prove a breach of the contract because "it is the existence 
of consideration and not the existence of a breach which precludes reliance on 
the theory of promissory estoppel." Prentice, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 513 
n.2.
In light of the above, I would hold that the 
remedy of promissory estoppel is no longer available to plaintiffs under the 
facts of this case. I, therefore, would affirm that portion of the circuit 
court's order which dismissed counts V through VIII of the amended 
complaint.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial 
concurrence and partial dissent.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
The plaintiffs in this breach of contract 
action, all at-will employees, were hired as nurses by the defendant-hospital in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1971, the hospital distributed an employee 
handbook containing an economic separation policy pertaining to the "permanent 
elimination of departments, job classifications, and/or jobs."(1) 
Later, in 1983, the hospital added a provision to the handbook which stated that 
employees could be terminated at any time with or without notice.(2) 
The plaintiff-nurses were discharged in 1991, and thereafter filed this breach 
of contract action against the hospital.
The majority holds that the hospital's handbook 
constituted an enforceable contract which it breached with the nurses by 
discharging them without the benefit of the economic separation policies 
contained in the handbook. Moreover, according to the majority, the disclaimer 
added to the handbook in 1983 was insufficient to supplant the economic 
separation policy because the disclaimer was not supported by a new 
consideration. I dissent because, under the facts of this case, the nurses were 
discharged under circumstances which do not entitle them to the procedures set 
forth in the economic separation clause. The majority therefore improperly 
reaches the question of whether the handbook modification made in 1983 required 
new consideration, and then compounds its error by making bad public policy in 
the process.
Although the clear and unambiguous language of 
the handbook's economic separation policy applies to the "permanent 
elimination of departments, job classifications, or jobs" (emphasis added), the 
complaint alleges and thereby admits that "there was in fact no permanent 
elimination of departments, job classifications, or jobs, as required by 
Policy No. 7-G." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, because the nurses were not 
discharged due to some type of "permanent" job elimination, they are not 
entitled to the economic separation procedures set forth in the 
handbook.
Furthermore, the majority's contention that 
reliance on the plain language of the handbook here would serve to defeat the 
stated purpose of the handbook policy is flatly wrong. Although the handbook 
cites stability in the workplace as the purpose for the economic separation 
policy, the majority elevates hortatory language above specific provisions and 
then erroneously assumes that stability can only be achieved by application of 
the policy to all employee discharges. Common sense tells us, however, 
that workplace stability can be furthered by providing separation procedures in 
some cases but not others. An employer is unrestricted in deciding how much 
employment security to provide to at-will employees. 
Where, as here, the language of the economic 
separation policy applies only to permanent job eliminations, this court has no 
justification to ignore that language and gratuitously broaden the scope of its 
coverage beyond the express language of the handbook. Accordingly, the majority 
errs when it purports to apply " 'traditional principles' of contract law" 
(slip op. at 6), but ignores the cardinal rule of contract 
interpretation-namely, that the intent of the parties is best ascertained from 
the plain language of a written contract. See Western Illinois Oil 
Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962). Since this court applies 
traditional contract principles in deciding whether a handbook forms a 
contract, it has the corollary duty to apply traditional contract principles in 
interpreting that handbook.
Secondly, the majority creates bad public policy 
in holding that an employee handbook may not be amended without new 
consideration. As the hospital and amicus point out, under the 
majority's holding, a large employer could now have literally hundreds of 
separate employment contracts, depending on the date when particular employees 
were hired and the particular language contained in the handbook at the time of 
each individual hiring. The majority, however, is unsympathetic because "this is 
a matter of contract and [we] see no compelling reason here to relieve the 
defendant of the obligations it has voluntarily incurred." Slip op. at 10. Such 
supposed obligations, however, were neither stated nor contemplated by the 
employer. Rather, they are obligations created out of thin air by the majority. 

Parties should be bound by the bargains they 
strike, but the majority overlooks the fact that this court did not construe an 
employee handbook as a binding contract until Duldulao v. Saint Mary of 
Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987), a full 16 years after the 
handbook in this case was distributed. Indeed, at the time the handbook was 
distributed, not a single published decision in Illinois held that an employee 
handbook constituted an enforceable contract.
Since the state of the law at the time the 
handbook was promulgated was that handbooks did not create binding contractual 
duties, the majority's presumption that the hospital should have known it was 
creating a binding contract via its handbook is completely untenable. This court 
changed the rules on employers in Duldulao by applying contract 
principles to employee handbooks. And today, the majority creates new chaos in 
the workplace by expanding Duldulao to handbook 
modifications.
Finally, the majority's entire discussion of 
whether handbook modifications must be supported by new consideration is nothing 
but dicta. As previously stated, the plain and unambiguous language of 
the handbook indicates that the economic separation clause in the handbook has 
no application to the facts in this case. The majority therefore unnecessarily 
and erroneously reaches the issue concerning the handbook modification. Thus, 
the handbook at issue confers no rights on the plaintiff nurses and no duties on 
the hospital to refrain from discharging at-will employees.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I 
dissent.
Footnotes
1. Policy number 7-G, "Economic Separation," provides in 
part as follows:
2. Policy 5-I 
provides: