Title: Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Robert B. Clemens 
Curtis T. Jones 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Danford R. Due 
Scott E. Andres 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 33S01-1206-CT-312 
HOLIDAY HOSPITALITY FRANCHISING, INC., 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
AMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Henry Circuit Court, No. 33C01-0901-CT-0003 
The Honorable Mary G. Willis, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 33A01-1103-CT-00104 
March 6, 2013 
David, Justice. 
A motel and an insurance company entered into an insurance contract that specifically 
excluded several categories of injury and harm—including harm resulting from acts of sexual 
molestation by motel employees.  After an off-duty motel employee (now convicted for his 
crimes) molested a young motel guest, the motel’s insurer sought a declaratory judgment to 
enforce its reading of the contract disclaiming coverage for, and its duty to defend against, a civil 
complaint brought by the motel guest.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
insurer, and the Court of Appeals reversed.  We now affirm the trial court. 
Mar 06 2013, 9:40 am
2 
Facts and Procedural History 
In mid-May 2007, R.M.H., a minor, was a guest at a motel in New Castle, Indiana, 
operating under the name of Holiday Inn Express-New Castle, LLC (“Holiday Inn Express”), 
and owned by Anil Megha.  The motel was a Holiday Inn franchise, established pursuant to an 
agreement with Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. During this stay, R.M.H. was molested by 
a Holiday Inn Express employee, Michael Forshey, who entered R.M.H.’s locked room at night.1   
At the time R.M.H. was molested, Holiday Inn Express was insured under a policy issued 
by Amco Insurance Company (“AMCO”).  Holiday Hospitality and Megha were additional 
insureds under the policy’s terms.  The policy provided coverage for, as well as a duty to defend 
against, claims for bodily injury and personal and advertising injury liability.2  However, AMCO 
had no duty to defend against any suit to which the policy did not apply.   
AMCO’s policy expressly disclaimed coverage for both bodily injury and personal and 
advertising injury when the injury arose out of intentional conduct.  Specifically, it excluded 
coverage for bodily injury “which is expected or intended by the insured,” even if the actual 
injury “[i]s of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended,” or it “[i]s 
sustained by a different person, entity, real property, or personal property than that initially 
expected or intended.”  (App. at 129.)  For personal and advertising injury, the policy did not 
apply to such injury “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the 
act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury.’”  
(App. at 136.) 
                                                 
1 Forshey was later convicted of felony child molestation.   
2 “Bodily injury” is defined by the policy as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time.”  (App. at 147.)  “Personal and advertising 
injury” is defined as “injury, including consequential ‘bodily injury’, arising out of . . . [f]alse arrest, 
detention or imprisonment.”  (App. at 149.)  
3 
The policy also disclaimed coverage for acts of molestation or abuse, by excluding any 
bodily injury or personal or advertising injury arising from “[t]he actual or threatened abuse or 
molestation by anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of the insured.” (App. 
at 133, 137.).  This included claims of negligent employment, investigation, supervision, 
reporting (or failure to report), or retention of any insured responsible for the abuse or 
molestation. 
  Additionally, AMCO only provided coverage for bodily injury caused by an 
“occurrence,” which the policy defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”  (App. at 128, 149.)  And finally, 
the policy contained a “Separation of Insureds” provision, providing that the policy applied “[a]s 
if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured . . . and . . . [s]eparately to each insured 
against whom claim is made or ‘suit’ is brought.”  (App. at 146.) 
 
In September 2008, R.M.H.’s mother, S.H., sued Holiday Inn Express, Holiday 
Hospitality, and Megha.  She claimed battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent hiring, negligent retention and supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, all brought under agency and vicarious liability theories.3   
 
AMCO filed a separate complaint in January 2009, seeking a declaratory judgment that it 
owed no coverage for any potential liability arising from S.H.’s complaint, and also that it had no 
duty to defend Holiday Inn Express, Holiday Hospitality, or Megha.  AMCO then filed a motion 
for summary judgment, with S.H. and Holiday Hospitality filing separate responses that Holiday 
                                                 
3 In this underlying complaint, Forshey was found to have been acting outside the course and scope of his 
employment when he molested R.M.H..  As a result, the trial court granted summary judgment for the 
collective defendants as to the issue of vicarious liability.   
4 
Inn Express and Megha later joined.  The trial court granted AMCO’s motion, framing its order 
as a final judgment and appealable order.   
 
Holiday Hospitality appealed.  S.H., Holiday Inn Express, and Megha did not file a notice 
of appeal or joinder in Holiday Hospitality’s appeal, but instead filed “Briefs of Interested 
Parties.”  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that an “occurrence” took 
place under the terms of AMCO’s insurance policy, and that there remained a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether R.M.H. was “in the care, custody or control” of Holiday Inn Express 
at the time Forshey molested him.  Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co., 955 
N.E.2d 827, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).   
On rehearing, the Court of Appeals clarified that its reversal applied only to Holiday 
Hospitality, Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co., 963 N.E.2d 1125, 1125–26 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), because even though Appellate Rule 17(A) made S.H., Holiday Inn 
Express, and Megha “parties to the appeal,” that did not relieve them of their Rule 9(A) 
obligation to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after a final judgment was entered against 
them or forfeit appellate relief, id. at 1126.   
We granted transfer, thereby vacating the two Court of Appeals decisions.4  Holiday 
Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co., 969 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. 2012) (table); Ind. Appellate 
Rule 58(A). 
                                                 
4 AMCO, Holiday Inn Express, and Megha all sought transfer. 
5 
Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the moving party affirmatively shows that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to a particular issue or claim.  Ind. Trial 
Rule 56(C); Town of Avon v. W. Cent. Conservancy Dist., 957 N.E.2d 598, 602 (Ind. 2011).  
The non-moving party then bears the burden of coming forward with designated evidence 
showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.   
An appellate court reviews these cases through the same lens, and we view all designated 
evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party; any doubts 
are resolved against the moving party.  Id.  We will affirm a trial court’s summary judgment on 
any theory supported by the record.  Woodruff v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 
784, 790 (Ind. 2012).  When the facts are undisputed, reversal is only appropriate if the trial 
court incorrectly applied the law to those facts.  Id. 
The construction of a contract is particularly well-suited for de novo appellate review, 
because it generally presents questions purely of law.  Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Guzorek, 690 
N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. 1997).  Insurance contracts are governed by the same rules of construction 
as any other contract.  Id.  Clear and unambiguous policy language is given its ordinary meaning, 
id., in order to accomplish the primary goal of contract interpretation:  “to determine the intent of 
the parties at the time the contract was made as disclosed by the language used to express their 
rights and duties,” First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ind. 
1990).  
Where contractual language is ambiguous, we generally resolve those ambiguities in 
favor of the insured, Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d at 667, but will not do so if such an interpretation fails 
to harmonize the provisions of the contract as a whole, see Key Markets, 559 N.E.2d at 603.  
However, the failure to define a contractual term does not necessarily make that term ambiguous, 
Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d at 667, nor does a simple disagreement about the term’s meaning.  “Rather, 
6 
an ambiguity exists where the provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.”  Id. 
Discussion 
 
AMCO sought summary judgment based on two distinct provisions of the contract.  First, 
it said that the contractual definition of “occurrence” did not extend to Forshey’s criminal 
conduct or Holiday Inn Express’s decision to hire and retain him.  Second, it argued that the 
policy specifically excluded coverage for acts of abuse and molestation, as well as coverage for 
any negligence in hiring or retaining someone committing those acts.  Because we find this 
second issue dispositive on appeal, we need not address the first.5 
We think it obvious that the plain and ordinary meaning of the abuse/molestation 
exclusion as a whole is that both parties intended to exclude from coverage those claims arising 
from conduct like Forshey’s.  However, the exclusion is limited to acts occurring when the 
victim is in the “care, custody or control” of an insured, making the issue a bit counter-intuitive.  
On one hand, the insurer is arguing that R.M.H. was under the “care, custody or control” of its 
insureds so it can deny coverage.  And on the other hand, the insureds are arguing that R.M.H. 
was not under their “care, custody or control,” in order to obtain coverage; in essence, they seek 
insurance coverage for injury to an individual over whom they claim they had little (if any) 
power or authority. 
Be that as it may, the phrase “care, custody or control” is undefined in the policy 
agreement, but no party claims it is ambiguous.  Instead, they dispute the existence (or non-
                                                 
5 We also do not need to address the petition of S.H., Holiday Inn Express, and Megha, challenging the 
Court of Appeals’s opinion on rehearing. 
7 
existence) of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether R.M.H. was “in the care, custody or 
control” of Holiday Inn Express, Holiday Hospitality, or Megha when he was molested; but they 
do so without advancing a particular definition for the phrase. 
Holiday Hospitality points to Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 170 Ind. App. 321, 
352 N.E.2d 860 (1976), in which the Court of Appeals said “application of such clauses depends 
on the facts of each case.”  Id. at 328, 352 N.E.2d at 864.  And in this case, Holiday Hospitality 
says, there is no evidence that Holiday Inn Express, Megha, or Holiday Hospitality exercised any 
care or control over R.M.H., nor did S.H. expect for R.M.H. to be under anyone’s care or control 
other than his friend’s mother.  “Thus, the issue of whether R.M.H. was in the care custody or 
control of Holiday Hospitality or the Franchisee Defendants presents a genuine issue of material 
fact that can not be determined on summary judgment.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) 
AMCO argues that “it is readily evident that R.M.H. was in the ‘care’ of the motel at the 
time of the molestation,” because “the molestation took place in one of the motel’s rooms while 
R.M.H. was a guest at the motel.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 16.)  Because R.M.H. was a guest, he was 
therefore a business invitee owed a particular duty of care by Holiday Hospitality and its 
franchisees.  “Put simply, the motel was legally charged with the ‘care’ of R.M.H. while he 
stayed at its premises and any reasonable person reading the Policy would understand as much.”  
(Appellee’s Br. at 17.) 
For its part, the Court of Appeals rejected AMCO’s argument, concluding that being a 
business invitee “is not the same as being ‘in the care, custody or control’ of Holiday Inn.”  
Holiday Hospitality, 955 N.E.2d at 835.  A hotel’s duty of care with respect to its guests 
“governs the responsibility given it to reasonably protect business invitees and to keep the 
business property in a reasonably safe condition,” but “[b]eing in the care, custody, or control of 
someone, however, requires more than a mere business invitee status.  In the context of a hotel, it 
would require something additional, such as a minor being supervised by hotel employees.”  Id. 
8 
 
These relative positions, however, are of little value without a defined frame of reference.  
Given that the parties seem to agree as to the unambiguous nature of the provision, we look to 
the “usual and common meaning unless, from the contract and the subject matter thereof, it is 
clear that some other meaning was intended.”  Hilbert v. Conseco Serv., LLC, 836 N.E.2d 1001, 
1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.  Nothing in the terms of this contract indicates that the 
phrase “care, custody or control” is meant to have anything other than a plain and ordinary 
meaning.  The lack of ambiguity also negates any need to construe the clause against the drafting 
party; instead we construe it to reflect the intent of the parties and harmonize it with the contract 
as a whole. 
 
Webster’s defines “care” in this context as “[t]he function of watching, guarding, or 
overseeing.”  Webster’s II New College Dictionary 168 (1995).  “Custody” is defined as “[t]he 
act or right of guarding, esp. such a right granted by a court.”  Id. at 280.  “Control” means “[t]o 
exercise authority or influence over” or “[t]o hold in restraint.”  Id. at 246.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary is similar, defining “care” as “[u]nder the law of negligence or of obligations, the 
conduct demanded of a person in a given situation,” Black’s Law Dictionary 240 (9th ed. 2009), 
defining “custody” as “[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, preservation, or 
security,” id. at 441, and “control” as [t]o exercise power or influence over,” id. at 378.   
 
We think these are reasonable definitions for these terms as they are used in the insurance 
policy at issue.  We also note that the policy lists the three terms in the disjunctive, thus not 
requiring all three to be satisfied for coverage to be excluded.  The question, then, is whether the 
designated evidence is sufficient to hold, as a matter of law, that R.M.H. was in the “care,” 
“custody,” or “control” of Holiday Inn Express, Megha, or Holiday Hospitality.  Bentley is 
9 
correct in noting that this is a fact-sensitive inquiry,6 but that does not necessarily preclude 
summary judgment when the material facts are undisputed. 
Here, it seems apparent from the facts that R.M.H. was not in the “custody” of Holiday 
Inn Express.  We can reasonably imagine that he was, to some extent, under the “control” of 
Holiday Inn Express (i.e. the motel probably had the power to exercise some authority or power 
over R.M.H. if, for example, he smoked a cigarette in a non-smoking room, or made loud noises 
that disturbed neighboring guests); however, no such guest policies or rules are present in the 
record before us.  As such, this conclusion would be pure speculation. 
However, given the scope and context of the insurance policy, we believe the facts are 
sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that R.M.H. was in the “care” of Holiday Inn Express (as 
that term was used in the policy) at the time the molestation occurred.  It is undisputed that 
R.M.H. was molested by Forshey while R.M.H. was a guest at Holiday Inn Express, staying in a 
room rented to the mother of R.M.H.’s friend.  It is further undisputed that R.M.H. was in that 
guest room, behind a door locked by an electronic key provided by Holiday Inn Express, when 
Forshey entered and molested him.7  It is also undisputed that at this time—because of R.M.H.’s 
status as a guest—Holiday Inn Express owed him a duty of care by law.8   
                                                 
6 The “care, custody or control” clause arises more frequently in the context of property damage 
exclusions in construction or manufacturing contractor insurance policies.  See Bentley, 170 Ind. App. at 
328, 352 N.E.2d at 864.  In that context, to determine whether the clause is satisfied, courts tend to look at 
“(1) whether the property is personalty or realty; (2) the location, size, and other characteristics of the 
property; and (3) the insured’s relationship to the property, including the insured’s duties with respect to 
the property, the nature and extent of the insured’s control over the property, and any interest the insured 
may have in the property.”  43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 695. 
7 We also note that the insurance policy required Holiday Inn Express to maintain a number of “Protective 
Safeguards,” such as sprinkler systems, fire alarms, burglar alarms, and watchman services.  Though 
these safeguards were required under the policy in exchange for reduced premiums only on Holiday Inn 
Express’s property damage coverage, it is axiomatic that they also provide a needed safety benefit to the 
10 
The dissent points out that the evidence shows R.M.H.’s mother intended and expected 
him to be under the care of a friend’s mother—the adult actually renting the hotel room in which 
R.M.H. was molested— while staying at the hotel, and that at no point did R.M.H.’s mother 
communicate to any of the defendants a desire or request for a hotel employee to provide care for 
R.M.H.  But this does not mean that Holiday Inn Express did not undertake to do so anyway, by 
its own affirmative conduct.  That R.M.H. was intended to be under the care of his friend’s 
mother does not mean he could not also be under the care of Holiday Inn Express—the two 
concepts need not be mutually exclusive. 
Simply put, we believe these facts reflect precisely the sort of scenario contemplated by 
the parties to be excluded from coverage when they agreed to the insurance contract.  In fact, if 
                                                                                                                                                             
motel’s guests, just like a building code or fire code.  See, e.g., Noble v. Alis, 474 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985) (purpose of city housing code to “protect the public health, safety, and welfare”). 
8 “[A] hotel guest is at least the equivalent of a business invitee and, as such, is entitled to a duty of 
reasonable care for the guest’s safety.”  Ellis v. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Ind. 1999).  
This duty of care does not make the hotel a guarantor of its guests’ safety, see Booher v. Sheeram, LLC, 
937 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, and Holiday Hospitality is correct that in Ellis 
we were unable to determine, based on the evidence designated for summary judgment, whether a 
particular criminal act was sufficiently foreseeable so as to fall within the scope of this duty of care.  
However, that does not mean the hotel in Ellis did not owe any duty of care whatsoever.   
Holiday Inn Express and Megha believe analogizing “duty of care” and “care” to be 
“nonsensical,” and that duty of care is “wholly separate and distinct from the issue of whether R.M.H. 
was in the ‘care, custody or control’ of Holiday Inn for purposes of the exclusionary language at issue 
here.”  (Interested Parties’ Reply Br. at 6.)  Carrying this argument “to its logical conclusion” they say, 
“would result in every hotel guest being in the ‘care’ of the hotel during their stay.  This is hardly the case 
. . . it is likely that most ‘reasonable persons’ would agree that they are not in the ‘care’ of a hotel during 
their hotel stay.”  (Interested Parties’ Reply Br. at 5–6.)   
But we think the line between the two concepts is not as bright and distinct as Holiday Inn 
Express and Megha claim.  Though we agree that the analogy is not directly on point, it remains 
informative based on the definitions of “care,” “custody,” and “control” above. 
11 
these facts did not reflect the contemplated exclusion, we would struggle to imagine what 
reasonably could and still remain within the confines of an ordinary motel business.9 
Finally, we note that we do not need to provide discrete analysis on this issue for Holiday 
Hospitality, despite the policy’s Separation of Insureds clause.  That provision provides that the 
policy applies “a. As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and b. Separately to 
each insured against whom claim is made or ‘suit’ is brought.”  (App. at 146.)   
However, the policy only lists one “Named Insured”—Holiday Inn Express.  (App. at 
78.)  Holiday Hospitality is instead classified as an “Automatic Additional Insured,” and 
afforded coverage by virtue of being a “Grantor of Franchise or License.”  (App. at 142.)  
Accordingly, subsection (a) of the Separation of Insured provision has no impact on this analysis.  
Likewise, applying this abuse/molestation exclusion “separately to each insured” does not 
change the analysis.  The exclusion bars coverage for abuse or molestation of someone “while in 
the care, custody or control of any insured,” or for the negligent hiring or retention “of a person 
for whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible” and who commits abuse or molest.  
(App. at 133–34, 137 (emphasis added).)  The use of the word “any” in this provision means the 
fact that R.M.H. was in the care of Holiday Inn Express, and that Holiday Inn Express employed 
                                                 
9 This is not a bright-line declaration that any guest of any motel is ipso facto “in the care of” that motel 
and we recognize that the facts of this case are not the same as those from other jurisdictions applying this 
type of exclusion.  See, e.g., Sarah G. v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 866 A.2d 835 (Me. 2005) (hotel owner 
took nude photographs of minor child staying at hotel alone); Cmty. Action for Greater Middlesex Cnty., 
Inc. v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 1074 (Conn. 2000) (child sexually abused by other children while 
attending preschool program); Doe v. Lenarz, 2007 WL 969610 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (minor child 
molested by instructor at karate studio when enrolled in karate classes); 12th St. Gym, Inc. v. Phila. 
Indem. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1652690 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2006) (gym member sexually assaulted by massage 
therapist in small, closed massage room).  But that does not mean the facts here are insufficient. 
 
12 
Forshey, bars coverage as conclusively for Holiday Hospitality and Megha as it does for Holiday 
Inn Express.10 
Conclusion 
We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 
Massa and Rush, JJ., concur. 
 
Dickson, C.J., concurs with separate opinion. 
 
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
                                                 
10 It would be a different circumstance if the provision applied to “the” insured.  That language is used, 
for example, in the “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion, barring coverage for bodily injury “which is 
expected or intended by the insured,” (App. at 129 (emphasis added)), the “Contractual Liability” 
exclusion, barring coverage for bodily injury “for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by 
reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement,” (App. at 129 (emphasis added)), and in 
the provision excluding personal and advertising liability “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured,” 
(App. at 136 (emphasis added).)  A number of other exclusions, however, use the word “any” just like the 
one at issue in this case, and we must assume the distinction was both intended and intended to make a 
difference. 
 
Dickson, C.J., concurring. 
 
 
I write separately because I believe that the proper understanding of "care" is determined 
by well-established Indiana law that a hotel guest is considered a business invitee and is entitled 
a duty of reasonable care.  Ellis v. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Ind. 1999).  Here, 
the exclusion is phrased in the disjunctive, and excludes coverage when the victim is in the "care, 
custody, or control" of any insured.  I agree with Justice Rucker's dissent with respect to the 
question of fact as to "custody" and "control."  But in this case, "care" exists as a matter of law.  
As such, the exclusion applies, and the summary judgment for the insurer was correct. 
 
Rucker, J., dissenting. 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
R.M.H. was “in the care, custody or control” of Holiday Inn Express.  Holiday Hospitality 
Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co., 955 N.E.2d 827, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  At least with 
respect to “care” and “control” I agree with the court’s conclusion and would thus deny summary 
judgment in favor of AMCO on this issue.  Therefore I respectfully dissent. 
 
I agree with the majority that R.M.H. was not in the “custody” of Holiday Inn Express.  
And I also agree that “to some extent” R.M.H was under Holiday Inn Express’ “control.”  Slip 
op. at 9.  But this very qualifier also implies the opposite: “to some extent” R.M.H. was not 
under the motel’s control.  It is thus left to the trier of fact to resolve these competing inferences.  
This leaves us with deciding whether R.M.H. was in the “care” of Holiday Inn Express.  
 
Relying on its plain and ordinary meaning the majority defines “care” in part as “[t]he 
function of watching, guarding, or overseeing.”  Slip op. at 8 (quoting Webster’s II New College 
Dictionary 168 (1995)).  But there is nothing in the record before us or in the case authority cited 
by the parties supporting the notion that as a matter of law a motel is obligated or otherwise 
required to engage in any of the foregoing functions.  And at the very least the facts are in 
dispute concerning whether in this case Holiday Inn Express actually engaged in “watching, 
guarding, or overseeing” R.M.H.  Although not addressing this precise point, in support of its 
motion for summary judgment AMCO submitted the motel’s response to AMCO’s requests for 
admissions.  In relevant part Holiday Inn Express admitted that it “rented two (2) rooms to Amy 
McGinnis who was staying at the hotel with her sons, both minors.  R.M.H. was invited by Amy 
McGinnis and/or one of her minor sons to stay at the Holiday Inn with them.”  App. at 176.  
Generously interpreted this admission could imply that the hotel was perhaps somehow 
“guarding” or “overseeing” R.M.H. and thus in the hotel’s care.  On the other hand, in response 
to AMCO’s motion for summary judgment Holiday Inn Express included the affidavit of 
R.M.H.’s mother, S.H., who declared in relevant part that when she gave her son permission to 
spend the night at Holiday Inn Express, “she intended and expected that he would be in the care 
and control of Amy McGinnis during the time that he was at the hotel.”  App. at 181-82 (citing 
2 
Affidavit of S.H. para. 5); and that “[a]t no time prior to May 17, 2007, did S.H. speak to or 
otherwise communicate with any employee or agent of the Holiday Inn Express to request that 
any hotel employee provide care for R.M.H. while he was at the hotel.”  App. at 182 (citing 
Affidavit of S.H. para. 6).  Although not dispositive of whether the hotel in fact undertook the 
care of R.M.H., S.H.’s affidavit at least shows that his mother never contemplated as much.  
 
At most there was no evidence presented to the trial court either way on the question of 
whether Holiday Inn Express engaged in “[t]he function of watching, guarding, or overseeing” 
R.M.H.  At the very least the facts that were presented to the trial court on the question suggest 
competing inferences.  In either event Holiday Inn Express is not entitled to summary judgment 
on this issue.  I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.11  
 
                                                 
11 I agree with the Court of Appeals that an “occurrence” took place for the purpose of the insured’s 
insurance policy.  See Holiday Hospitality, 955 N.E.2d at 832.  And therefore I would summarily affirm 
this portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.