Title: Wright v. Holy Name of Jesus Med. Center

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

628 So. 2d 510 (1993)
David Wayne WRIGHT, By and Through Josephine WRIGHT,
v.
HOLY NAME OF JESUS MEDICAL CENTER, et al.
1920261.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 1, 1993.
Rehearing Denied November 19, 1993.
*511 Andrew T. Citrin, Michael A. Worel, and Randolph B. Walton of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder, and Brown, Mobile, for appellant.
Edgar M. Elliott III and Deborah Alley Smith of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for Holy Name of Jesus Medical Center.
W. Stancil Starnes, Michael A. Florie, and Joseph S. Miller of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for James R. Phillips, M.D., and Gadsden Clinic for Women.
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff, David "Dusty" Wright, by and through his mother, Josephine Wright (hereinafter "Wright"), appeals from the judgment based on the jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Holy Name of Jesus Medical Center, Dr. J.R. Phillips, and Gadsden Clinic for Women, in his action seeking damages for injuries he suffered at birth. (We will refer to the mother as the plaintiff and appellant.) Wright alleged that Dusty became acutely asphyxiated during birth because he was not delivered soon enough and that, as a result of negligence on the part of the defendants, Dusty suffered moderate to severe cerebral palsy and motor and speech impairment. She asserts that the trial court erred in not striking a particular veniremember for cause and that the trial court gave the jury an incorrect "dynamite" charge.
The trial court initially granted Wright's motion to strike veniremember P.C. for cause but changed that ruling after questioning P.C. concerning her ability to be objective. The relevant portions of the voir dire transcript read as follows:
The following discussion then occurred outside the presence of the jury:
Back in the presence of the jurors, the court again took up the question with Ms. P.C.:
As the above colloquies indicate, P.C. admitted that she would feel awkward on her next visit to Dr. Phillips after having served on the jury in his case, but she did not say that she would feel awkward sitting on the jury. Although a doctor-patient relationship is prima facie evidence of probable prejudice on the part of a potential juror, Roberts v. Hutchins, 613 So. 2d 348 (Ala.1993), it is not cause for automatic exclusion of a veniremember. See Dixon v. Hardey, 591 So. 2d 3 (Ala.1991), in which this Court declined to hold that as a matter of law a patient may never serve as a juror in a case against his or her personal physician. The presumption of prejudice is, rather, a rebuttable one:
Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1989) (citations omitted).
It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether that presumption can be overcome:
Id. at 234. Thus, we must look at the questions asked and the answers given in this case to determine whether the trial court here abused the discretion reserved to it.
When we compare this case to others involving strikes for cause, we must conclude that the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause as to veniremember P.C. In Gray v. Sherwood, 436 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1983), two veniremembers who were patients of the defendant doctors specifically asked to be struck from the jury. Similarly, in Wood v. Woodham, 561 So. 2d 224 (Ala.1989), one prospective juror vacillated in her answers to the judge's questions. First, she said that she would rather not serve on the jury; then she said she would do "her best" to make a decision based only on the evidence; then she did not respond to the judge's attempt to clarify an answer. She finally answered that she could base her decision solely on the evidence and the judge's instructions. 561 So. 2d  at 227. The other prospective juror in that case worked in the medical community and admitted repeatedly that that fact would influence her decision. This case is strikingly similar.
In Knop v. McCain, supra, one prospective juror expressed the following sentiments regarding lawsuits: "I guess my personal opinion is that people are too quick to sue. The evidence would have to be, I guess, I guess the evidence would have to be overwhelming for your client before I would be willing to give her money." 561 So. 2d  at 230. She also said that being on the jury would make her uncomfortable because "lawsuits bother me a little bit." Id. Another prospective juror, who had taught all three of the defendant doctor's children, expressed doubts about her ability to be fair and impartial toward the plaintiff. This Court reversed the judgment in that case because of the trial court's failure to dismiss those prospective jurors for cause.
Finally, in Dixon v. Hardey, supra, a prospective juror who was a regular patient of the defendant doctor and who was employed by a dentist expressed reservations about her ability to further the "best interest of justice" and said that she would rather not serve. We held that her misgivings, coupled with the trial court's failure to question her or to allow the plaintiff's attorney further voir dire examination, warranted reversal.
Litigants are entitled to a trial before an impartial jury, as nearly as that is possible. In this case, P.C. was currently a patient of Dr. Phillips, and she candidly stated that that fact would place her in an awkward position if she served on this jury. After more questioning by the trial judge, she said that she believed that she could be fair, although she never withdrew her initial statement that serving on this jury would place her in an awkward position because of the fact that she was currently a patient of Dr. Phillips. We hold that under these facts the trial court erred in not striking P.C. for cause.
Because of the error in failing to strike juror P.C. for cause, the judgment is reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
*514 HOUSTON, J., concurs specially.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
I joined Justice Maddox's dissent in Wood v. Woodham, 561 So. 2d 224, 228-29 (Ala. 1989). I did not vote in Roberts v. Hutchins, 613 So. 2d 348 (Ala.1993); Dixon v. Hardey, 591 So. 2d 3 (Ala.1991); or Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229 (Ala.1989). If I were writing on a clean slate, I would affirm, because I do not believe the trial court in this case, or in any of the four cases cited herein, abused its discretion. However, I cannot materially distinguish this case from Wood v. Woodham, Roberts v. Hutchins, Dixon v. Hardey, or Knop v. McCain; therefore, I am bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to reverse and remand.
STEAGALL, Justice (dissenting).
I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause as to veniremember P.C. As the majority notes in its opinion, P.C. acknowledged that she would feel awkward on her next medical visit to Dr. Phillips after having served on the jury in his case, but she did not say that she would feel "awkward" serving on the jury or that her medical relationship with Dr. Phillips would affect her ability to remain impartial. P.C. did not vacillate in her answers, nor did she indicate that she had "deep-seated impressions" that would prohibit her from remaining neutral and objective. She merely acknowledged that seeing Dr. Phillips as his patient after the trial would put her in an "awkward situation." She consistently said that she could be fair and unbiased as a juror. Thus, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright's motion to strike P.C. for cause. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.