Title: Milton v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1338 
____________ 
 
AHMAD R. MILTON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[November 20, 2014] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
This case involves the crime of attempted felony murder, which requires the 
defendant to commit an “intentional act that is not an essential element of the 
underlying felony.”  § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2006).  Specifically, we consider 
whether the act of discharging a firearm can satisfy the “intentional act” element of 
attempted felony murder when the underlying felony is attempted murder and the 
same individuals are the victims of both crimes.  We conclude that because the 
defendant’s act of discharging a firearm constitutes an essential element of the 
underlying felony of attempted murder, this act of discharging a firearm cannot 
 
 
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also constitute the “intentional act that is not an essential element of the underlying 
felony,” as is required to establish attempted felony murder.  Id. 
In Milton v. State, 126 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), the Third 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the defendant’s three convictions for attempted 
felony murder, which were each predicated upon the underlying felony of 
attempted second-degree murder, even though as to each separate count, the 
defendant’s sole act was the discharge of a firearm at a group of individuals who 
were the victims of both the attempted felony murder and the underlying felony of 
attempted second-degree murder.  Conversely, in Tucker v. State, 857 So. 2d 978, 
979-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District Court of Appeal vacated a 
defendant’s convictions for attempted felony murder, which were predicated upon 
attempted premeditated murder of those same victims, concluding that the 
defendant’s discharge of a firearm did not satisfy the “intentional act” element of 
attempted felony murder because “[n]o act distinguishe[d] the attempted 
premeditated murder from the attempted felony murder.”  We accepted jurisdiction 
to resolve the conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
We quash the Third District’s decision in Milton and approve the Fourth 
District’s decision in Tucker, to the extent it is consistent with our analysis.  While 
the act of discharging a firearm may be able to support attempted second-degree 
murder, which is a second-degree felony, the discharge of a firearm at the same 
 
 
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individuals cannot support attempted felony murder, which is a first-degree 
felony.1  Accordingly, we vacate the defendant’s convictions for attempted felony 
murder and, after reviewing the jury instructions given by the trial court, we also 
determine that the instructions were fundamentally erroneous.  We therefore 
remand this case for a new trial on the underlying felony of attempted second-
degree murder.  
FACTS 
In April 2006, the defendant, Ahmad Milton, discharged multiple gunshots 
at a crowd of people who were standing in front of a house.  As a result of this 
shooting, Milton was charged with one count of second-degree murder, three 
counts of attempted felony murder that were each predicated upon attempted 
second-degree murder, and one count of shooting into a dwelling.  For each count 
of attempted felony murder, the State charged and the jury was instructed that the 
same individuals constituted the victims of both the attempted felony murder and 
the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder.  The State asserted that 
                                          
 
 
1.  Because the State charged attempted felony murder, instead of the 
underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder, the defendant was charged 
with a first-degree felony as opposed to a second-degree felony.  Attempted felony 
murder carries with it much more serious penalties.  See § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. 
(stating that any defendant found guilty of attempted felony murder “commits a 
felony of the first degree”); § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006) (stating that if an 
“offense attempted . . . [is] a felony of the first degree . . . the offense of criminal 
attempt . . . is a felony of the second degree”); § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2006) 
(providing that second-degree murder is a first-degree felony). 
 
 
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the intentional act that could have resulted in the victims’ deaths, but that was not 
an essential element of the underlying attempted second-degree murders, was 
Milton’s act of discharging a firearm.   
Ultimately, the jury acquitted Milton of second-degree murder in count one, 
but convicted him of each of the attempted felony murder charges in counts two, 
three, and four, as well as the separate charge of shooting into a dwelling.  Milton 
was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences with twenty year mandatory-
minimum terms of imprisonment for each of the attempted felony murder 
convictions and a concurrent sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment for shooting 
into a dwelling. 
On appeal, the Third District affirmed Milton’s attempted felony murder 
convictions, as well as Milton’s conviction for shooting into a dwelling.  Milton, 
126 So. 3d at 274-75.  In affirming Milton’s convictions for attempted felony 
murder, the Third District determined that discharging a firearm at the group of 
individuals in front of the house satisfied the requisite “intentional act” element of 
attempted felony murder.  Id. 
The Fourth District reached the opposite conclusion on the same “intentional 
act” issue in Tucker, 857 So. 2d at 979.  Although Tucker involved attempted 
premeditated murder and not attempted second-degree murder as the underlying 
felony, both cases involved defendants who were convicted of attempted felony 
 
 
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murder with attempted murder as the predicate felony based on having fired 
multiple bullets at multiple victims during a single episode.   
The defendant in Tucker was convicted of two counts of attempted first-
degree murder and two counts of attempted felony murder, which were each 
predicated upon the attempted first-degree murder charges.  Id.  In contrast to the 
Third District’s decision in Milton, where the defendant was also charged with 
attempted felony murder with a predicate felony of attempted murder, the Fourth 
District in Tucker vacated the defendant’s convictions for attempted felony 
murder, concluding that “[n]o act distinguishes the attempted premeditated murder 
from the attempted felony murder; the attempted murder is the predicate felony 
and the same act on the same victim.”  Id.  In other words, “there is no intentional 
act that is not an essential element of the attempted premeditated murder as is 
required by section 782.051(1).”  Id.  We granted review of Milton to address this 
conflict. 
In addition to the conflict issue before the Court, Milton raises three other 
issues on appeal: (1) the trial court’s jury instructions were fundamentally 
erroneous; (2) the final amended information was defective; and (3) his convictions 
for shooting into a dwelling and attempted felony murder violate double jeopardy.  
We conclude that Milton is entitled to relief on the conflict issue, address the jury 
 
 
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instructions claim to determine the appropriate remedy, and decline to address his 
two other claims because they are moot in light of our analysis.  
ANALYSIS 
 
The conflict issue in this case is whether in proving attempted felony 
murder, which is predicated upon the underlying felony of attempted murder and 
where the same individuals constitute the victims of both the attempted felony 
murder and the underlying felony of attempted murder, discharging a firearm at 
those same victims satisfies the statutory element of attempted felony murder that 
requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
an “intentional act that is not an essential element of the underlying felony.”  
§ 782.051(1), Fla. Stat.  In addressing this question, we first review the crime of 
attempted felony murder under Florida law.  Then, we turn to the conflict issue, 
concluding that under these factual circumstances, discharge of a firearm cannot 
satisfy the “intentional act” element of attempted felony murder in the absence of 
an intentional act that is not an essential element of the underlying felony that 
distinguishes the attempted felony murder from the underlying felony.  Finally, in 
order to determine the appropriate remedy, we address Milton’s claim that the trial 
court’s jury instructions were fundamentally erroneous.   
I.  The “Intentional Act” Element of Attempted Felony Murder 
 
 
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Prior to its codification in the Florida Statutes, this Court concluded that 
attempted felony murder was a common law offense under Florida law.  See 
Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1984).  However, in State v. Gray, 654 
So. 2d 552, 552-53 (Fla. 1995), we receded from our holding in Amlotte.  This 
Court reasoned that the “legal fictions required to support the intent for felony 
murder [were] simply too great” to extend to attempted felony murder.  Id. at 554.  
“The Legislature in 1996, in response to our decision in Gray, enacted section 
782.051, which created the offense of ‘Felony causing bodily injury.’  See ch. 96-
359, § 1, at 2052, Laws of Fla.”  Coicou v. State, 39 So. 3d 237, 240 (Fla. 2010).   
 
In 1998, however, the Legislature substantially rewrote section 782.051 and 
retitled it “Attempted felony murder.”  See ch. 98-204, § 12, at 1970, Laws of Fla.  
In this amendment, in order to avoid the problems set forth in Gray, the Legislature 
added an additional element to the crime—that the defendant commit an 
“intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but 
does not, cause the death of another.”  Id.  Thus, at the time the crimes occurred in 
this case, section 782.051(1) provided as follows: 
Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any 
felony enumerated in s. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids, or abets an 
intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that 
could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of 
the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not 
exceeding life, or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, 
which is an offense ranked in level 9 of the Criminal Punishment 
Code.  Victim injury points shall be scored under this subsection. 
 
 
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§ 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2006).   
Section 782.04(3) then enumerated the felonies upon which attempted 
felony murder could be predicated.  These included offenses, when “committed by 
a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,” felonies 
such as robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and carjacking that are more readily 
distinguishable from the charged attempted felony murder and for which the 
“intentional act” element may be more easily satisfied than when murder 
constitutes the underlying felony.  § 782.04(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).   
However, the Legislature also included, as a potential underlying felony, 
“[m]urder of another human being.”  § 782.04(3)(o), Fla. Stat.  Therefore, based on 
this statutory scheme, a defendant may be convicted of attempted felony murder 
based upon the predicate felony of attempted murder as long as, in committing the 
underlying attempted murder, the defendant commits an intentional act that could 
have resulted in the victim’s death but that was not an essential element of the 
underlying attempted murder.  See § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat.   
Relying on this statutory scheme, the State in this case charged Milton with 
three counts of attempted felony murder, with attempted second-degree murder as 
the underlying felony in accordance with section 782.04(3)(o).  As this Court has 
previously stated, attempted second-degree murder has two elements: “(1) the 
defendant intentionally committed an act that could have resulted, but did not 
 
 
- 9 - 
result, in the death of someone, and (2) the act was imminently dangerous to 
another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life.”  
Coicou, 39 So. 3d at 241 (quoting State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945-46 (Fla. 
2005)).   
Milton contends that because discharge of a firearm was an essential element 
of attempted second-degree murder, in that it was the only act capable of satisfying 
the element of attempted second-degree murder requiring that the defendant 
“intentionally commit[] an act that could have resulted, but did not result, in the 
death of someone,” id., this same act cannot also constitute the “intentional act” 
necessary to support a conviction for attempted felony murder under section 
782.051(1).  The State counters that because Milton fired multiple gun shots, only 
the first shot fired was an essential element of the predicate attempted second-
degree murders and any subsequent shots were not essential to the commission of 
the underlying felony.  The State reasons that after Milton fired the initial gunshot, 
the attempted second-degree murder was completed and any subsequent shots were 
independent of that felony.  
 
In its decision below, the Third District affirmed Milton’s convictions for 
attempted felony murder based upon Milton’s “intentional act” of discharging a 
firearm.  However, a review of the Third District’s decision illustrates two 
fundamental flaws in the Third District’s analysis.  First, in discussing and 
 
 
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affirming Milton’s attempted felony murder convictions, the Third District cited to 
the incorrect statutes.  Attempted felony murder is governed by section 782.051(1), 
Florida Statutes.  However, although naming attempted felony murder as the 
pertinent crime, the Third District erroneously cited to sections 777.04(1) and 
782.04(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which govern attempted second-degree 
murder—a crime that was the underlying felony but with which Milton was not 
charged.  See Milton, 126 So. 3d at 274.  This error may have led the Third District 
to the erroneous conclusion it reached below.   
Second, in affirming Milton’s attempted felony murder convictions, the 
Third District erroneously relied on double jeopardy jurisprudence.  That analysis 
was inapposite, though, because double jeopardy concerns are not implicated in 
this case, as Milton was not charged with both attempted felony murder and the 
underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder.  Specifically, the Third 
District relied on Brinson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), 
which involved the crime of felony murder rather than attempted felony murder.  
In Brinson, the defendant and his associates fired multiple gunshots at one victim, 
but struck and killed a different victim.  Id.  Based on this shooting, Brinson was 
convicted of first-degree murder of one victim and attempted second-degree 
murder of another.  Id.   
 
 
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On appeal, Brinson argued that the attempted second-degree murder of one 
victim could not serve as the predicate felony for the charge of felony murder of 
the other victim because his dual convictions for those crimes violated the 
prohibition against double jeopardy.  Id.  The Second District Court of Appeal 
denied Brinson’s claim, explaining that his dual convictions did not violate double 
jeopardy because the dual convictions did “not doubly punish Mr. Brinson for a 
single homicide.”  Id. at 1078.   
Because Brinson did not involve the crime of attempted felony murder, 
which requires an element not found in felony murder—the occurrence of an 
“intentional act” that is not an essential element of the underlying felony—and 
because Brinson turned on inapplicable double jeopardy considerations, it is not 
relevant to this case.  Thus, the Third District’s reliance on Brinson in affirming 
Milton’s attempted felony murder convictions was erroneous.   
 
We agree, instead, with the Fourth District’s rationale in Tucker, in which 
the Fourth District vacated a defendant’s convictions for attempted felony murder 
that were predicated on the underlying felony of attempted murder.  See Tucker, 
857 So. 2d at 979.  The Fourth District reasoned that where a defendant is charged 
with attempted felony murder, which is predicated on the underlying felony of 
attempted murder, and the defendant undertakes only one act—discharging a 
firearm—“[n]o act distinguishes the attempted [murder] from the attempted felony 
 
 
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murder.”  Id.  Although the State attempts to differentiate between each shot 
discharged by Milton and asserts that only Milton’s first shot was essential in 
satisfying the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder, we reject this 
argument. 
We hold that Milton’s single act of discharging a firearm did not satisfy the 
“intentional act” element of attempted felony murder, as it was an essential 
element of the underlying attempted second-degree murder.  Therefore, because 
the State cannot satisfy each element of the attempted felony murder statute, 
Milton’s attempted felony murder convictions must be vacated. 
II.  Jury Instructions Relating to Attempted Felony Murder 
Milton also argues that the jury instructions given by the trial court on 
attempted felony murder were fundamentally erroneous.  In light of our conclusion 
that his convictions for attempted felony murder must be vacated, we address this 
issue to determine whether this case should be remanded with instructions to enter 
judgment on the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder or whether 
Milton is entitled to a new trial.  Cf. Coicou, 39 So. 3d at 244 (concluding that a 
case-by-case analysis is warranted when determining if attempted second-degree 
murder is a lesser-included offense of attempted felony murder permitting the 
appellate court to direct entry of a judgment for attempted second-degree murder, 
or whether a new trial is warranted).  
 
 
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After reviewing the jury instructions given by the trial court on each of 
Milton’s attempted felony murder charges, we conclude that, although Milton did 
not object to the instructions, these instructions were fundamentally erroneous 
because they did not accurately recite the elements necessary to find that Milton 
committed the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder.  Instead, the 
trial court added an additional element to the standard jury instruction on attempted 
felony murder and, rather than instructing the jury on the underlying felony of 
attempted second-degree murder, actually instructed the jury on the underlying 
felony of second-degree murder.  
“This Court has long held that defendants have a fundamental right ‘to have 
a Court correctly and intelligently instruct the jury on the essential and material 
elements of the crime charged and required to be proven by competent evidence.’ ”  
Battle v. State, 911 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla. 2005) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 
643, 644 (Fla. 1991)).  This Court has also “explained that for jury instructions to 
constitute fundamental error, the error must ‘reach down into the validity of the 
trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.’ ”  Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 
1042 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644-45).  “Fundamental error only 
occurs when ‘the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider 
in order to convict.’ ”  Battle, 911 So. 2d at 89 (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 645).   
 
 
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As to attempted felony murder, the trial court erroneously added a fourth 
element to that instruction, which should have been the first element of the 
instruction on the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder.  Thus, 
each of the attempted felony murder instructions for counts two, three, and four 
were identical and read in pertinent part as follows: 
ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER 
 
To prove the crime of attempted felony murder by Ahmad 
Milton, as charged in Count [2, 3, and 4] of the Information, the State 
must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
1. 
Ahmad Milton committed or attempted to commit a 
second degree murder of [the victim]. 
 
2. 
While engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of a second degree murder, the defendant committed, 
aided or abetted an intentional act that is not an essential element of 
the second degree murder. 
 
3. 
This intentional act of shooting a firearm could have but 
did not cause the death of [the victim].  
 
4. 
The act would have resulted in the death of [the victim] 
except that someone prevented Ahmad Milton from killing [the 
victim] or he failed to do so.  
(Emphasis added.) 
Then, instead of instructing on attempted second-degree murder as the 
underlying felony, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of 
second-degree murder.  With only the definition of second-degree murder 
and without any instruction informing the jury as to the distinguishing 
features between an attempted second-degree murder and second-degree 
 
 
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murder, the jury was left to its own devices as to what constitutes attempted 
second-degree murder.  See Robles v. State, 188 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 
1966).   
As a result of these instructions, although each of Milton’s attempted felony 
murder charges was predicated on the underlying felony of attempted second-
degree murder, each instruction included the definition of second-degree murder, 
rather than attempted second-degree murder, as the underlying felony.  Further, by 
adding one of the elements of attempted second-degree murder to the attempted 
felony murder instruction, the jury was never clearly instructed on either attempted 
felony murder or attempted second-degree murder, and the instructions were 
unclear as to the requisite “intentional act” element of attempted felony murder. 
Since attempted second-degree murder constituted the underlying felony 
upon which each of Milton’s attempted felony murder charges were predicated, 
clearly these erroneous instructions were “pertinent or material to what the jury 
must consider in order to convict.”  Battle, 911 So. 2d at 89 (quoting Delva, 575 
So. 2d at 645).  Therefore, we conclude that the jury instructions were 
fundamentally erroneous.  Milton is entitled to a new trial where the jury can be 
correctly instructed on attempted second-degree murder.2 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because we conclude that Milton is entitled to relief on his claim 
regarding the “intentional act” element of the attempted felony murder statute and 
his claim challenging the trial court’s jury instructions, and we vacate Milton’s 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, we quash the Third District’s decision in Milton; 
approve the Fourth District’s decision in Tucker to the extent it is consistent with 
our analysis; vacate Milton’s convictions for attempted felony murder in counts 
two, three, and four; and remand this case for a new trial on attempted second-
degree murder. 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
Because I conclude that there is no basis for this Court to exercise 
jurisdiction, I would discharge this case.  I therefore dissent. 
 
Contrary to the view adopted by the majority, the decision of the Third 
District Court in Milton v. State, 126 So. 3d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), does not 
expressly and directly conflict with Tucker v. State, 857 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2003).  While both Milton and Tucker involve appeals by defendants who were 
charged with attempted felony murder with a predicate felony of attempted 
                                                                                                                                        
convictions for attempted felony murder accordingly, we do not address Milton’s 
other two claims, which also involve his attempted felony murder convictions that 
we have vacated. 
 
 
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murder, Milton and Tucker are factually distinguishable.  See Milton, 126 So. 3d at 
274; Tucker, 857 So. 2d at 979. 
In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first-
degree murder and two counts of attempted felony murder as a result of shooting 
two victims.  857 So. 2d at 979.  The Fourth District “reverse[d] only appellant’s 
dual convictions for attempted premeditated murder and attempted felony murder 
because they constitute double jeopardy violations.”  Id.  The Fourth District 
concluded that “the attempted premeditated first degree murder charges serve as 
the sole underlying felonies for the attempted felony murder charges.  No act 
distinguishes the attempted premeditated murder from the attempted felony 
murder; the attempted murder is the predicate felony and the same act on the same 
victim.”  857 So. 2d at 979 (emphasis added).  As a result, the Fourth District 
affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences for attempted first-degree 
murder and vacated the defendant’s convictions and sentences for attempted felony 
murder.  Id. at 980. 
In Milton, the Third District explicitly distinguished Tucker and explained 
that “the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that double jeopardy was violated 
because the charges were directed at the same victim.  This is not the case here, as 
the facts indicated that there were multiple victims, and Milton was not shooting 
specifically at one person.”  Milton, 126 So. 3d at 274 (emphasis added) (internal 
 
 
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citation omitted).  As a result, the Third District affirmed Milton’s convictions and 
sentences.  Id. 
 
In Tucker, the issue was whether a double jeopardy violation occurred where 
the defendant was convicted of both attempted first-degree murder and attempted 
felony murder with regard to each of the two victims.  See 857 So. 2d at 979.  
Milton involved an entirely different fact pattern in which the issue was whether 
double jeopardy was violated by a single conviction for shooting into a dwelling 
and three convictions of attempted felony murder.  See 126 So. 3d at 274.  The 
factor that resulted in reversal in Tucker—convictions for both attempted 
premeditated murder and attempted felony murder with respect to the same 
victim—is not present in Milton. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D09-122 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Donna Greenspan Solomon of Solomon Appeals, Mediation & Arbitration, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Richard L. Polin, 
Bureau Chief and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent