Title: Brooks v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Brooks v. State1985 WY 141706 P.2d 664Case Number: 84-136Decided: 09/17/1985WILLIAM H. BROOKS, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM H. BROOKS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, and James A. 
Horner, Jr., Student Director, Wyo. Defender Aid Program, for appellant 
(defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J. and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
judgment and sentence of appellant's jury conviction of aggravated assault and 
battery, attempted manslaughter, and kidnapping. The issues for our review 
are:

I

"Does Section 
7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977, as amended, violate due process by requiring a defendant 
to prove his insanity defense by the greater weight of the 
evidence?"

II

"Did reversible error 
occur when the trial judge instructed the jury that every person is presumed to 
be mentally responsible?"

[¶2.]     We will affirm. 

[¶3.]     In the early morning of 
January 8, 1984, Lois Epperson Brooks and Marilyn Gardner were in a vehicle 
stuck in the snow between Laramie and Centennial. In an effort to get 
assistance, Mrs. Gardner flagged down a vehicle which was driven by Mrs. Brooks' 
estranged husband, the appellant, William H. Brooks. Appellant insisted that 
Mrs. Brooks sign some papers and that Mrs. Gardner be a witness. An argument 
developed between Mr. and Mrs. Brooks. Appellant fired a pistol into the ground, 
walked back to his vehicle, and returned with a club. He smote Mrs. Brooks with 
the club more than a few times. When Mrs. Gardner screamed, appellant hit her 
with the club, rendering her unconscious. He then dragged Mrs. Brooks from her 
vehicle, hit her again with the club, placed her in the back seat of his vehicle 
and drove off. A short time later, a sheriff's deputy arrived at the scene. The 
deputy picked up Mrs. Gardner and began to pursue appellant, who was eventually 
stopped at a roadblock on Herrick 
Lane near Interstate 80. Mrs. Brooks was found in the 
back seat of appellant's car bound at the hands and feet. Appellant was 
convicted of one count of aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 
6-2-502(a)(ii), W.S. 1977; one count of attempted manslaughter in violation of 
§§ 6-7-301(a)(i) and 6-2-103, W.S. 1977; and one count of kidnapping in 
violation of § 6-2-207(a)(iii), (b), and (d), W.S. 1977.

[¶4.]     In his brief, appellant 
outlines his argument of the issues as follows:

"This appeal is based on 
two issues both of which concern Wyoming Statute § 7-11-305(b) (Cum.Supp. 1984). 
This Statute was used in the court below as the basis for instructing the jury 
on who should bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of mental 
deficiency.

"The first issue involves 
whether this Statute violated the Due Process Clause because it shifts the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant to negate an element of the offense 
charged. Argument I will discuss how this burden is shifted by the Statute, and 
that intent is an element of each of the crimes charged. It will be shown that 
this Statute unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the defendant to negate 
this intent element, and that this error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

"The second issue 
involves whether the instruction based on § 7-11-305(b) was improper due to the 
fact that the jury was not told that the presumption within that instruction was 
permissive and not mandatory. Argument II will discuss how Rule 303(c) is 
applied in this State. The argument will also discuss how this issue has been 
preserved for appeal, and that a constitutional error of this magnitude was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

I

[¶5.]     The first issue raised 
by appellant involves the statute on mental illness or deficiency as amended. 
Before July 1, 1983, the statute on mental responsibility 
provided:

"The prosecution shall 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged and the 
mental responsibility of the defendant. However, every defendant is presumed to 
be mentally responsible and the burden of first going forward and entering 
evidence on the issue of mental responsibility is upon the defendant." § 
7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977.

[¶6.]     In 1983 this statute 
was amended and now provides:

"The prosecution shall 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged. Every 
defendant is presumed to be mentally responsible. The defendant shall have the 
burden of going forward and proving by the greater weight of the evidence that, 
as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked the capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law." § 7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp.

[¶7.]     We do not disagree with 
appellant that intent is an essential element of each of the crimes charged, nor 
do we disagree with appellant's argument that the mental responsibility statute, 
as amended, shifts the burden of persuasion to the accused to prove his mental 
deficiency.

[¶8.]     Under the applicable 
insanity statute before July 1, 1983, the prosecution had the burden of proving 
all of the essential elements of the crime charged and the mental responsibility 
of the accused. Kind v. State, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 960 (1979); Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270 (1977); Reilly v. State, Wyo., 496 P.2d 899 
(1972). Under the former statute, a determination of insanity precluded a 
finding of guilt. Thus, mental responsibility was an integral part of the 
determination of guilt.

[¶9.]     Since July 1, 1983, 
under the statute in effect at the time of appellant's conviction, the 
prosecution was not required to prove the accused's mental responsibility. The 
effect of this statute places the burden of proving lack of mental 
responsibility to the accused. Under the former statute, insanity precluded 
criminal responsibility, while under the current statute insanity does not 
preclude guilt but excuses it.

[¶10.]  Under the current statute, mental 
responsibility is an affirmative defense to be proved by the greater weight of 
the evidence. Appellant apparently contends that proof of mental illness or 
deficiency, in effect, requires the disproof of intent and consequently imposes 
an unconstitutional burden of proof on him. We do not 
agree.

[¶11.]  In State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980), the court said:

"The State, of course, 
had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
`purposely' committed the crime with which he is charged. [Citations.] This does 
not mean, however, that the defendant may not be required to bear the burden of 
proof on the issue of insanity, for although `evidence relevant to insanity . . 
. may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, the 
existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to 
the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.' 
[Citations.] Indeed, insanity and criminal intent are distinct aspects of a 
criminal trial between which the jury is capable of distinguishing. [Citation.] 
* * *"

[¶12.]  The United States Supreme Court has 
addressed the problem raised by appellant's first issue. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302 (1952), the Court held that insanity was an affirmative defense separate 
from the elements of the offense charged, and that there was no violation of due 
process when the accused is required to prove his defense of insanity. Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S. Ct. 226, 50 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1976), was a dismissal of a Delaware case by the 
United States Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question, Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561 
(1976). This dismissal effectively approved the decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court that although a Delaware statute included irresistible impulse 
as an insanity defense, it was not a denial of federal due process to require 
the accused to prove insanity.

[¶13.]  Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), 
involved a New 
York law requiring a defendant to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance. In that case the Court confirmed its holding in Leland and Rivera, supra, and 
said:

"We thus decline to adopt 
as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must 
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all 
affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, 
due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be 
observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the 
accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb 
the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause 
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements 
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. 
Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been 
constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in 
this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here." Id., 432 U.S. 210, 97 S. Ct. 2327, 53 L. Ed. 2d 292.

[¶14.]  We hold that mental responsibility is not 
an element of the offense charged. It is an issue separate and apart from the 
essential element of criminal intent. Mental illness or deficiency is an 
affirmative defense which relieves an accused of responsibility for the crime he 
committed. Requiring the accused to prove the affirmative defense of mental 
illness or deficiency does not constitute a shifting of the burden of proof to 
the accused to disprove an essential element of the crime 
charged.

II

[¶15.]  Appellant's second issue on appeal is 
that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that "every defendant is 
presumed to be mentally responsible." Appellant brings to our attention Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), and our application of Sandstrom in Krucheck v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1222 
(1983). In Krucheck we held that an 
instruction which could have been interpreted by the jury as a mandatory or 
burden-shifting presumption violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. We also held in Krucheck that Rule 303(c), Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence, had not been complied with.

[¶16.]  The court's instruction, No. 29, which 
contains language appellant now objects to, provided:

"Under certain 
circumstances a person is not legally responsible for his criminal conduct. 
Among those circumstances, Defendant is not legally responsible for criminal 
conduct if:

"1. He was suffering at 
the time of the criminal conduct from a mental illness or deficiency; 
and

"2. As a result, he 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

"The term `mental 
deficiency' means a defect attributable to mental retardation, brain damage and 
a learning disability.

"The phrase `mental 
illness or deficiency' does not include an abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

"The prosecution shall 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense 
charged.

"Every Defendant is 
presumed to be mentally responsible. The Defendant shall have the burden of 
going forward and proving by the greater weight of evidence that, as a result of 
mental illness or deficiency he lacked capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.

"Thus, if you do not 
believe that the Defendant has proven by a greater weight of the evidence that 
he lacked capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law your verdict should not be: 
Not Guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency excluding responsibility." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶17.]  Rule 303(c), W.R.E., 
provides:

"Whenever the existence 
of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of 
the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In addition, if the presumed 
fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, 
the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.)

[¶18.]  The direction in Rule 303(c) that the 
jury be instructed on the effect of a presumed fact does not specify the exact 
language to be used in the instruction. The intent of the rule is to tell the 
jury that they are not bound by the presumption and that it is therefore 
rebuttable. It is adequate for the wording of an instruction to convey to the 
jury the direction that they are not required to find the accused mentally 
responsible.

[¶19.]  It is inconceivable that the jury in this 
case would single out a sentence in Instruction No. 29 and conclude that they 
were bound to find the accused mentally responsible. In order to do that, the 
jury would have had to ignore all other directions in the instruction and assume 
that the other words were put in the instruction to occupy space. Other portions 
of the instruction discuss circumstances such as when a person is not legally 
responsible for his conduct, and that defendant must prove by a greater weight 
of evidence his lack of mental responsibility. Proofs by the accused would be 
futile if the jury thought the presumption was conclusive.

[¶20.]  Considering Instruction No. 29 in its 
entirety, we find that there was no possibility that the jury could have been 
led into thinking that they were required to find, because of the presumption, 
that the appellant was mentally responsible. Under the circumstances here, we 
hold the spirit of Rule 303(c), W.R.E., had been complied with and that the 
principles of Krucheck v. State, 
supra, have not been distorted.

[¶21.]  Appellant is in a feeble position to 
complain about presumption of mental responsibility. Instruction No. 29, 
containing the presumption, is an instruction requested by appellant. Perhaps 
the instruction was inartfully drawn, but such deficiency, if it be a deficiency 
as appellant now claims, is appellant's fault and not that of the 
state.

[¶22.]  In Wyoming we have a strong policy against 
seizing upon one's own dereliction and seeking to gain an advantage therefrom. 
In Settle v. State, Wyo., 619 P.2d 387, 388 
(1980), we said:

"Appellant requested the 
instruction. He did not object to it. If it was an erroneous instruction, 
appellant invited it. If we would condone the action of a party whereby he 
offers and obtains an erroneous instruction, thus trapping the trial court and 
insuring reversible error should the verdict be against him, each party to every 
lawsuit could attempt to hedge against an adverse verdict by doing likewise. * * 
*"

See also, Burns v. State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 422 (1978); Pack v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 
(1977).

[¶23.]  We hold that § 7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977, as 
amended, is not unconstitutional, and under the circumstances here, Rule 303(c), 
W.R.E., was complied with.

[¶24.]  Affirmed.