Title: State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4082.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4082 
THE STATE EX REL. OTTEN, APPELLANT, v. HENDERSON, MAGISTRATE, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4082.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent probate court, judge, and magistrate from 
proceeding on adoption petition — Probate court patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to act — Court of appeals’ dismissal of 
complaint for writ reversed. 
 (No. 2010-2223 — Submitted August 8, 2011 — Decided August 18, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2010-09-070. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a biological father’s 
complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Clermont County Probate Court 
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and its judge1 and magistrate from proceeding on a stepfather’s adoption petition 
when, at the time the petition was filed, a previously filed, separate adoption 
proceeding involving the same child initiated in the Hamilton County Probate 
Court by the stepfather remained pending.  Because under these circumstances, 
the Clermont County Probate Court patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed in the adoption case, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and grant the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} This case arises from three overlapping cases — a juvenile court 
parentage case involving the biological parents and the child and two separate 
probate court adoption cases involving the biological father, the stepfather, and 
the child.  In July 2005, while married to Jeremy Tuttle, Susan Tuttle, n.k.a. Susan 
Crooks (“Susan”), gave birth to P.A.C.  Genetic testing conducted in August 2005 
established that appellant, Gary Otten, is the child’s biological father.  Susan 
divorced Tuttle after P.A.C.’s birth, and in April 2007, she married Kevin 
Michael Crooks. 
Clermont County Juvenile Court Case 
{¶ 3} In January 2007, Otten filed a complaint in the Clermont County 
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for the allocation of parental rights 
and responsibilities regarding P.A.C.  Tuttle filed an action against Otten to 
establish a parent and child relationship in the same court.  In April 2007, Crooks 
filed a petition to adopt P.A.C. in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, 
Probate Division.  In August 2007, the juvenile court concluded that it was not in 
the best interest of P.A.C. to grant parenting time to Otten because any orders 
issued by the court could be superseded by an adoption decree entered by the 
                                          
 
1 Judge Alan R. Corbin is now the acting judge in the Clermont County Probate Court case so he is 
substituted as an appellee for Judge Stephanie Wyler.  See State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 
Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 6, citing Civ.R. 25(D). 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
Hamilton County Probate Court in the action pending there.  The Clermont 
County Juvenile Court declared Otten P.A.C.’s father but stayed any further 
action pending the outcome of the adoption proceeding. 
{¶ 4} However, in March 2008, a magistrate for the juvenile court 
designated Susan as the residential parent and legal custodian of P.A.C. and 
granted Otten guideline parenting time with P.A.C.  After Susan’s objections were 
overruled, she appealed from the judgment. 
{¶ 5} In June 2009, the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s 
judgment awarding Otten guideline parenting time with his daughter, P.A.C.  
Otten v. Tuttle, Clermont App. No. CA2008-05-053, 2009-Ohio-3158.  In so 
holding, the court of appeals further ordered that the parenting-time award be 
immediately implemented: 
{¶ 6} “Because of excessive delay in this case that had prevented [Otten] 
from visiting [P.A.C.] for over two years, we instruct that the juvenile court’s 
order awarding [Otten] standard parenting time be put into effect on an immediate 
basis with the issuance of this opinion.”  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 7} Instead of implementing the ordered parenting time, Susan moved 
to modify the parenting time.  In August 2009, the juvenile court amended its 
previous order and instituted a graduated schedule to transition to guideline 
parenting time.  Otten subsequently filed a motion to find Susan in contempt of 
the graduated order, which the juvenile court denied in February 2010. 
{¶ 8} Otten appealed the juvenile court orders, and the court of appeals, 
in November 2010, reversed the judgment instituting a graduated schedule of 
parenting time and again remanded the matter to the juvenile court “with the 
unambiguous instruction to grant [Otten] standard parenting time in accordance 
with its May 16, 2008 decision immediately.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Otten v. Tuttle, 
Clermont App. No. CA2009-09-055, 2010-Ohio-5424, ¶ 30.  The court of appeals 
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affirmed the judgment denying Otten’s motion to find Susan in contempt.  Id. at ¶ 
35. 
Hamilton County Probate Court Case 
{¶ 9} In April 2007, shortly after Susan married Crooks, and while the 
action to establish a parent and child relationship was pending in the Clermont 
County Juvenile Court, Crooks filed a petition to adopt P.A.C. in the Hamilton 
County Probate Court.  In the petition, Crooks stated that the consent of Tuttle, 
whom he listed as the “presumed legal father” of P.A.C., was not required 
because Tuttle was not the biological father of the child.  The petition did not list 
Otten as the biological father of the child or specify why his consent was not 
required.  Otten intervened and moved to stay or dismiss the adoption proceeding; 
the probate court then stayed the proceeding pending a determination in the 
juvenile court proceeding. 
{¶ 10} Once the juvenile court determined that Otten was P.A.C.’s 
biological father and granted him parenting time in May 2008, the probate court 
dismissed Crooks’s adoption petition because Otten’s consent was necessary for 
the adoption.  Crooks appealed the dismissal.  In February 2009, Crooks filed an 
amended petition to adopt P.A.C. in the Hamilton County Probate Court.  In his 
amended petition, Crooks listed Otten as the child’s putative father and father and 
stated that Otten’s consent was unnecessary for the adoption because Otten “has 
failed without justifiable cause to communicate with the minor for a period of at 
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption or the placement 
of the minor in the home of the petitioner” and “has failed without justifiable 
cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law 
or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing 
of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the 
petitioner.” 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 11} On Crooks’s appeal from the probate court’s judgment dismissing 
his original adoption petition, the court of appeals, in September 2009, reversed 
the dismissal because Otten had failed to timely register as P.A.C.’s father on the 
putative father registry and thus his consent to the adoption was not required.  In 
re Adoption of P.A.C., 184 Ohio App.3d 88, 2009-Ohio-4492, 919 N.E.2d 791, ¶ 
30. 
{¶ 12} On July 22, 2010, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals 
and held that the Hamilton County Probate Court had acted properly in initially 
staying the adoption proceeding pending the Clermont County Juvenile Court’s 
determination of parentage and in ultimately dismissing Crooks’s original 
adoption petition because Otten had been adjudicated the biological father of 
P.A.C. by the juvenile court and had not consented to the adoption.  In re 
Adoption of P.A.C., 126 Ohio St.3d 236, 2010-Ohio-3351, 933 N.E.2d 236.  
Crooks moved for reconsideration of our decision, and in October 2010, we 
denied the motion.  In re Adoption of P.A.C., 126 Ohio St.3d 1592, 2010-Ohio-
4880, 934 N.E.2d 939. 
{¶ 13} On September 20, 2010, Crooks withdrew his amended adoption 
petition.  The probate court set a hearing for December 30, 2010, to determine 
whether Crooks wanted to proceed on his original adoption petition.  In February 
2011, the probate court denied Otten’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and 
specified that the adoption proceeding was closed. 
Clermont County Probate Court Case 
{¶ 14} On July 28, 2010, six days after we issued our decision in P.A.C., 
126 Ohio St.3d 236, 2010-Ohio-3351, 933 N.E.2d 236, but before a mandate was 
issued in that case, Crooks filed a petition in the Clermont County Court of 
Common Pleas, Probate Division, to adopt P.A.C.  In this petition, Crooks stated 
that the consent of Otten to the adoption was not required because he “has failed 
without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor 
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for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption 
or the placement of the minor in the home of” Crooks, “has failed without 
justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as 
required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately 
preceding the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the 
home of the petitioner,” and “the adoption is in the child’s best interest.” 
{¶ 15} The probate court scheduled the matter for a hearing, and Otten 
filed an objection to the court’s jurisdiction because the adoption proceeding 
initiated in the Hamilton County Probate Court was pending. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 16} On September 20, 2010, Otten filed an action for writs of 
prohibition and mandamus challenging the jurisdiction of the Clermont County 
Probate Court over Crooks’s adoption petition.  In an amended complaint, Otten 
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent appellees, the Clermont County Probate 
Court and its judge and magistrate, from proceeding on the adoption petition and 
to immediately dismiss the petition.  After appellees submitted an answer 
admitting all matters of public record and denying any remaining claims, the court 
of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 17} Otten appealed the court of appeals’ judgment, but we granted his 
motion to remand the cause to the court of appeals to rule on his motion for relief 
from judgment.  State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 127 Ohio St.3d 1544, 2011-
Ohio-647, 941 N.E.2d 801.  On March 30, 2011, the court of appeals denied the 
motion.  We then reinstated a briefing schedule.  State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 
128 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2011-Ohio-1642, 944 N.E.2d 691. 
{¶ 18} This cause is now before the court on Otten’s appeal as of right. 
Legal Analysis 
Motions 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 19} We deny Otten’s request for oral argument because the facts are 
not overly complex, and the parties’ and amicus curiae’s briefs are sufficient for 
the court to resolve this appeal on the merits.  See generally State ex rel. Davis v. 
Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 
444, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 20} We also grant Judge Corbin’s motion to expedite our resolution of 
this case because this appeal relates to issues concerning the potential termination 
of Otten’s parental rights in the underlying adoption proceeding, a circumstance 
that would normally necessitate expedited briefing and consideration under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.2(A)(1), 6.3(A)(1), and 6.4(A)(1). 
Prohibition 
{¶ 21} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Otten had to 
establish that (1) the Clermont County Probate Court and its judge and magistrate 
were about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Cleveland v. 
Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131, 2010-Ohio-5039, 937 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 13.  The probate 
court and its judge and magistrate have exercised and would continue to exercise 
judicial power in the underlying adoption proceeding.  Probate courts have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.  See In re Adoption of 
Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055; State ex rel. Portage 
Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 144, 151, 67 O.O.2d 151, 
311 N.E.2d 6 (“original and exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings is 
vested specifically in the Probate Court pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3107”). 
{¶ 22} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
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Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12; Rosen v. 
Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 18.  “Where 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, relators need not establish the 
lack of an adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate remedies 
like appeal would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of 
Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15; State ex 
rel. Furnas v. Monnin, 120 Ohio St.3d 279, 2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 
11. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the Clermont County 
Probate Court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Crooks’s 
petition to adopt P.A.C. when the adoption proceeding filed in Hamilton County 
was pending at the time he filed his Clermont County adoption case. 
{¶ 24} Under the jurisdictional-priority rule, “ ‘[a]s between [state] courts 
of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the 
institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other 
tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the 
parties.’”  State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 
56, 17 OBR 45, 476 N.E.2d 1060, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 
50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33, syllabus.  “In general, the 
jurisdictional priority rule applies when the causes of action are the same in both 
cases, and if the first case does not involve the same cause of action or the same 
parties as the second case, the first case will not prevent the second.”  State ex rel. 
Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 429, 751 N.E.2d 472; State ex 
rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 
13. 
{¶ 25} The court of appeals determined that the adoption case instituted 
by the child’s stepfather in the Hamilton County Probate Court did not patently 
and unambiguously divest the Clermont County Probate Court of jurisdiction over 
January Term, 2011 
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the subsequently filed adoption proceeding filed by the child’s stepfather because 
they focused on different issues concerning whether consent was required: 
{¶ 26} “While both adoption petitions involve the same petitioner and the 
same minor child, the Hamilton County petition focuses on whether the consent 
of Jeremy Tuttle is required, while the Clermont County petition focuses on 
whether the consent of Gary Otten is required.  In this respect, the petitions are 
not identical and raise completely different issues with respect to consent to 
adoption.” 
{¶ 27} The court of appeals erred in so holding for the following reasons. 
{¶ 28} First, the adoption proceeding filed in the Hamilton County 
Probate Court involved the same parties — Crooks, Otten, and P.A.C. — and the 
same cause of action — Crooks’s requested adoption of P.A.C. — as Crooks’s 
subsequently filed adoption case in the Clermont County Probate Court.  These 
are not cases that involve different parties or different causes of action so as to 
generally preclude the application of the jurisdictional-priority rule.  See State ex 
rel. Judson v. Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 113-114, 515 N.E.2d 911; State 
ex rel. Maxwell v. Schneider (1921), 103 Ohio St. 492, 134 N.E.2d 443.  The rule 
requires only that the causes of action generally be the same.  As noted 
previously, the causes of action here — adoption — are the same. 
{¶ 29} Second, the jurisdictional-priority rule applies even when the 
causes of action are not the same if the suits present part of the same “whole 
issue.”  State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 647 N.E.2d 
807, citing Phillips, 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33, and John 
Weenink & Sons Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1948), 150 Ohio 
St. 349, 38 O.O. 189, 82 N.E.2d 730 (“we have at times recognized the 
applicability of the priority rule where the causes of action and relief requested 
are not exactly the same”).  Here, the stepfather’s adoption petitions include not 
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only the same parties and same causes of action, they also present the same issue 
whether Crooks can adopt P.A.C. without Otten’s consent. 
{¶ 30} Third, the court of appeals erred in finding that the adoption cases 
did not raise the same issue.  At the time Crooks filed his Clermont County 
Probate Court adoption case, the proceedings initiated in the Hamilton County 
Probate Court were still pending, and the petition filed in Hamilton County 
similarly alleged that Otten’s consent to the adoption was not required because of 
his failure to communicate with and support the child in the year preceding the 
filing of the petition. 
{¶ 31} In applying the jurisdictional-priority rule in the context of 
proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, we are guided by the 
precept that “[t]he right of a parent to the custody of his or her child is one of the 
oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by American courts.”  In re 
Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238, 875 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 10.  “[T]he 
right of a natural parent to the care and custody of his children is one of the most 
precious and fundamental in law.”  In re Adoption of Masa (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 
163, 165, 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140.  Therefore, parents must be accorded 
every legally available protection before their parental rights are terminated.  
Thompkins at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 32} Consistent with the foregoing precedent, we have recognized “the 
bedrock proposition that once a court of competent jurisdiction has begun the task 
of deciding the long-term fate of a child, all other courts are to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction over that matter.”  In re Adoption of Asente (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 734 N.E.2d 1224.  Until the first court with jurisdiction over 
the matter has relinquished jurisdiction, the second court lacks jurisdiction.  The 
party seeking adoption must wait to file a subsequent petition.  See id. at 104. 
{¶ 33} Because at the time that Crooks filed his successive adoption 
petition in the Clermont County Probate Court, the action initiated in Hamilton 
January Term, 2011 
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County Probate Court was still pending — and remained so until just recently — 
the Clermont County Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the adoption 
petition filed there.  Otten had no duty to file objections to Crooks’s adoption 
petition in Clermont County because the Clermont County Probate Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the petition. 
{¶ 34} As amicus curiae argues, Otten’s “argument is not one of mere 
technicality. Allowing overlapping adoption petitions wrongly forces a 
respondent/parent to keep objecting to adoption petitions that appear identical to a 
pending adoption petition to which he has already timely objected.  A petitioner 
can then keep filing overlapping adoption petitions until the parent neglects to 
object timely, makes some other misstep, or simply becomes exhausted or 
confused, as happened here.  Avoiding that endless litigation and procedural 
abuse is a main reason for the ‘one child and one court’ rule.” 
{¶ 35} In fact, that is what happened here.  While the Hamilton County 
adoption case was still pending and matters in the Clermont County Juvenile 
Court case were also being resolved, Crooks filed an adoption proceeding in the 
Clermont County Probate Court, and Otten, who was appearing pro se in some of 
these cases, apparently did not object to the newly filed petition until a month late, 
when he raised his claim that the Clermont County Probate Court lacked 
jurisdiction.  Terminating a natural parent’s fundamental right to care and custody 
of his or her child should not be subject to such acts of gamesmanship intended to 
trap the unwary. 
{¶ 36} Based on the foregoing, the Clermont County Probate Court and its 
judge and magistrate patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the 
adoption petition filed in that court, and the Clermont County Probate Court 
should have upheld Otten’s jurisdictional challenge to the proceeding and 
dismissed it.  Otten established the requirements for the requested extraordinary 
relief in prohibition. 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Because the court of appeals erred in denying the writ, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition to prevent 
the Clermont County Probate Court from proceeding on Crooks’s adoption 
petition and to compel the probate court to dismiss it.  The probate court also 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the adoption case 
because of visitation issues in the juvenile court case that were still being resolved 
when the adoption case was filed.  “ ‘When an issue concerning parenting of a 
minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court must refrain from 
proceeding with the adoption of that child.’ ”  In re Adoption of G.V., 126 Ohio 
St.3d 249, 2010-Ohio-3349, 933 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8, certiorari denied, Vaughn v. 
Wyrembek (2011), __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1610, 179 L.Ed.2d 501, quoting In re 
Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, 
syllabus. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Maxwell D. Kinman, for appellant. 
 
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and David H. 
Hoffmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
 
Erik L. Smith, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Erik L. Smith. 
______________________