Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MESTEMAKER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Attorneys at law — Judges — Misconduct — Public reprimand — Making 
derogatory remarks related to a litigant’s national origin — Ordering 
marriage as a condition of probation — Displaying lack of judicial 
temperament in domestic violence cases. 
(No. 96-2376 — Submitted December 11, 1996 — Decided April 2, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-93. 
 
On November 24, 1995, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, relator, charged 
Judge Albert J. Mestemaker of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0022780 (“respondent”), in eight counts with, inter alia, violating three Canons of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct and one Disciplinary Rule of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  After the respondent filed an answer, the parties 
entered into a stipulation and waived a hearing before a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
The panel found that, as stipulated, in one case in which he served as judge 
in the Hamilton County Municipal Court in 1995, respondent made derogatory 
remarks related to a litigant’s national origin.  In three other cases in 1995, 
respondent ordered marriage as a condition of probation, and in presiding over 
three domestic violence cases in 1995, and one in 1992, he displayed a lack of 
judicial temperament.  The panel concluded that respondent had violated Canons 1 
(a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), 2(A) (a 
judge should respect and comply with the law and conduct himself at all times to 
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), and 
3(A)(3) (a judge should be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants and others 
 
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with whom he deals in his official capacity), and DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
The panel noted that respondent, as a candidate for reelection in November 
1995, was defeated and is now no longer a judge.  The panel recognized that 
respondent had a long and distinguished career as a member of the armed services 
and as a public servant, and was an author of legal treatises.  In addition, the panel 
noted that respondent had had coronary bypass surgery and had a recent history of 
being sick and fatigued. 
 
In response to a subpoena, the panel received letters from fourteen retired 
and active judges serving in various levels of courts in Ohio testifying to 
respondent’s good character, integrity, and work ethic.  The panel also received 
eighty-six letters from prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, and other trial 
lawyers attesting to respondent’s legal acumen, fairness, and judicial demeanor, as 
well as numerous letters attesting to respondent’s good character, community 
activities, and trustworthiness from court employees, business persons, litigants, 
and from respondent’s pastor and a person who served with respondent in the 
armed forces. 
 
Based upon the stipulations and the evidence in mitigation, the panel 
recommended that the respondent be publicly reprimanded.  The board adopted 
the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
___________________ 
 
Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Alvin E. Matthews, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
H. Fred Hoefle, for respondent. 
___________________ 
 
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Per Curiam.  Respondent has agreed that in the instances cited his actions 
violated those Canons of judicial ethics which call upon every judge to observe 
high standards of conduct both to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and to 
promote public confidence in the judicial system.  Respondent has also 
acknowledged that his actions violated both the Canon which requires that a judge 
be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants and others with whom he deals 
with in his judicial capacity and the Disciplinary Rule which prohibits lawyers 
from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
The charges against respondent involve disappointing lapses of conduct and 
decorum in an otherwise distinguished judicial career spanning fifteen years, 
during which respondent received six Superior Judicial Service Awards and was 
active in civic and educational programs.  We take particular note that in 1995 
respondent handled an ever-growing domestic violence caseload during a time of 
increasing physical stress and fatigue which resulted in coronary artery bypass 
surgery in early 1996.  In short, we are sympathetic to respondent’s situation.  
Nevertheless, we cannot disregard respondent’s conduct. 
 
Respondent is no longer a member of the judiciary.  The appropriate 
sanction, therefore, is a public reprimand, and respondent is so reprimanded.  
Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  The majority opinion seems to imply 
that since the respondent judge was defeated in his last election and is no longer 
on the bench, a public reprimand is in order.  I disagree.  Not only did the voters 
indicate their displeasure with the respondent by not reelecting him, but we should 
 
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not countenance such behavior with a public reprimand.  The conduct in this case 
was a serious violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and involved eight 
separate counts.  An example of the conduct and behavior of the respondent can be 
best described in the following discussion he had with a domestic violence victim 
who was a woman of Hispanic descent and a naturalized American citizen: 
 
“THE COURT:  Are you the same lady on the present case pending where 
he is locked up now?  He has a felony.  And how many times have you had him 
arrested? 
 
“MS. ELLERY:  About three times. 
 
“THE COURT:  Do you think you folks are done?  You cost the taxpayers 
$10,000.  When will it stop?  Where are you from? 
 
“MS. ELLERY:  El Paso, Texas. 
 
“THE COURT:  Ever think about going home? 
 
“MS. ELLERY:  I got kids here. 
 
“THE COURT:  Why is America being punished?  Did we do something to 
you folks?  We have to pay for all your crimes.  Did we do something wrong?  
Could we get foreign aid from your native land for you being here?  Now he has a 
felony.  Who is his felony attorney?  I know the taxpayers are paying for him.  Did 
we do something to your country?  Did they send you here to get even with us for 
something?  Montezuma’s revenge.” 
 
While I empathize with Judge Mestemaker’s physical condition, it cannot 
and should not excuse his egregious conduct.  From the foregoing discussion it is 
apparent that the respondent was not in the appropriate mental condition to be on 
the bench.  He could have taken a paid medical leave from his judicial 
responsibilities until he was both mentally and physically fit to resume those 
duties. 
 
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Judges are held to a much higher standard of conduct than other individuals.  
This is as it should be, since judges sit in judgment.  Canon 1 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct provides: 
 
“* * * A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and 
enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.” 
 
In addition, Canon 2(A) states: 
 
“A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
 
Finally, Canon 3(A)(3) states: 
 
“A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity * * *.” 
 
From a cursory reading of the foregoing Canons it is clear that Judge 
Mestemaker’s conduct violated each of them.  Additionally, the respondent 
ordered marriage as a condition of probation for criminal defendants sentenced in 
the Hamilton County Municipal Court in at least three other cases involving 
domestic violence.  Again, these instances indicate that the respondent violated the 
foregoing Canons.  Such conduct warrants a period of actual suspension.  I would 
enter a one-year suspension from the practice of law. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.