Title: Mongold v. Woods

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
VIRGIL MONGOLD, CO-EXECUTOR AND 
BENEFICIARY OF THE ESTATE OF 
NINA M. DOVE, DECEASED, ET AL.           OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 081827  
           June 4, 2009 
 
TERRY V. WOODS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
George F. Tidey, Judge Designate 
 
 
This appeal presents questions concerning the interplay 
between theories of recovery based on promissory estoppel and 
quantum meruit.  It also involves the determination of quantum 
meruit damages. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
In accordance with familiar principles of appellate 
review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable 
to the party prevailing in the trial court.  Paul and Nina 
Dove, husband and wife, purchased a tract of land in 
Rockingham County as tenants by the entireties in 1985.  They 
moved into a home on part of the property and conducted a 
chicken-raising business on another part, as well as raising 
sheep and cattle and growing a hay crop.  Terry V. Woods had 
worked as a farm laborer for Paul Dove since Terry’s 
childhood, helping each summer with the hay crop on other land 
owned by the Doves. 
 
In 1985, Woods was 21 years old and was employed in the 
chicken-raising operations of the Rockingham Poultry 
Cooperative.  He had left school in the tenth grade.  Paul 
Dove was employed elsewhere, but wanted to continue the 
chicken-raising operation already located on the farm he had 
acquired.  He asked Woods to work for him, tending the 
chickens, mowing around the chicken houses, making some hay, 
and tending to the livestock.  Paul Dove intended to continue 
with his employment until he qualified for full retirement, 
after which he would return and share with Woods the 
responsibilities of the chicken-raising operation. 
 
The Doves paid Woods a salary of $7,850 in 1985.  It was 
contemplated by the parties at the inception of the 
relationship that Woods’ duties would occupy 35 to 40 hours 
per week, with every other weekend off.  In subsequent years, 
Woods received an annual raise, plus a cash bonus based on the 
year’s profit from the chicken-raising operation. 
 
About six months after Woods began to work for the Doves 
on a salary in 1985, during the hay-making season it became 
apparent that Woods’ duties would consume far more that 40 
hours per week.  He began to work every weekend.  He worked 11 
hours a day, six days per week during the spring lambing 
season and 13 or 14 hours a day during the hay-making season.  
He had to work all night during the times when chickens were 
 
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being sold.  He also worked six to eight hours on Sundays 
during these peak seasons. 
 
The Doves had no children.  They were very fond of Woods 
and, according to neighbors, treated him nearly like a son.  
At the time in 1985 when Woods’ duties nearly doubled, the 
Doves could not afford to increase his salary to compensate 
him fully for his work.  Paul Dove, however, told Woods that 
he and his wife, having no children, would, if he “stayed and 
stuck with them . . . take care of [him].”  Woods and his wife 
lived on an adjoining farm.  Paul Dove had told him at the 
beginning: “75,000 chickens ought to be able to provide two 
families with a good, comfortable living.” 
 
Woods’ employment by the Doves continued for the next 21 
years.  About halfway through that relationship, Paul Dove 
became more specific as to his intentions, telling Woods that 
when he retired from raising chickens, he would turn the 
chicken houses over to Woods so that Woods could continue the 
operation and earn his living from them.  Paul Dove also told 
Woods that the Doves would leave the entire farm property to 
him when they died.  Woods, in reliance on that assurance, 
considered it his responsibility to perform extra work for the 
Doves, beyond that compensated by his salary, during their 
lifetimes.  Woods, without further compensation, tended the 
sheep and cattle, sheared sheep, did gardening and landscaping 
 
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work around the Doves’ home, removed a wall in their house to 
enlarge a bedroom, cleaned the exterior of the house, built 
sheds, repaired fencing around the farm, and helped Paul Dove 
entirely fence a 180-acre tract of mountain land the Doves 
also owned. 
 
Notwithstanding this additional workload, Woods’ salary, 
after annual raises, had only increased to $8.96 per hour for 
a 40-hour week by 2004.1  Woods testified that when Paul Dove 
discussed annual raises with him, he told Paul that he was 
making a living, and in view of his expectancy of inheriting 
the farm, “that’s all that I was concerned about.” 
 
On March 11, 2005, Paul Dove died by accidental 
electrocution while working on a thermostat in one of the 
chicken houses.  Woods was working elsewhere on the farm at 
the time.  Paul died intestate and all the Dove property 
passed to his wife, Nina. 
 
Nina Dove had suffered a stroke before her husband’s 
death and, although in poor health, outlived him by two years.  
After Paul Dove’s death, Woods continued to work for Nina, 
taking on the work Paul Dove had formerly done in addition to 
                     
1 In 2004, the Doves paid Woods $12,508, representing 
$8.96 per hour for 50 weeks at 40 hours per week.  It was 
assumed that Woods would be off work for two weeks during the 
hunting season each year.  The 2004 salary was the highest 
Woods had ever received. 
 
 
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his usual duties.  Nina told him that she did not want the 
expense and aggravation, or the income, from the chicken-
raising operation and that Woods should take it over.  He paid 
for the electricity for her home and the propane to heat it.  
Nina was unable to walk, and Woods and his wife stayed with 
her night and day for about two weeks until her brothers and 
sisters made arrangements for her care.  Nina told him that 
she had made a will leaving him everything except the mountain 
land.2 
 
Nina had a second stroke in late 2005 and went into a 
nursing home for rehabilitation.  She returned home thereafter 
and her family members stayed with her, or employed others to 
care for her, until she died as a result of a third stroke in 
April 2007.  On March 7, 2006, while Nina was in the care of 
her family members, Woods received a letter from Lorene 
Biller, Nina’s sister, writing as Nina’s attorney in fact, 
terminating his “use of the poultry houses.”  After Nina’s 
death, her last will, dated January 12, 2006, was admitted to 
probate.  It divided her entire estate among her brothers and 
sisters, with a bequest to her church.  Woods was not 
mentioned in the will.  Virgil Mongold and Donald E. Showalter 
(the Executors) qualified as co-executors under the will. 
                     
2 A draft of such a will was introduced in evidence.  It 
was undated and never executed. 
 
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Woods brought this action against the Executors and 
beneficiaries.  His complaint contains two counts; the first 
count seeks to impose a constructive trust upon the estate 
based on a theory of unjust enrichment; the second seeks 
damages based on a theory of quantum meruit.  Woods made no 
challenge to the validity of the will. 
 
After hearing the evidence ore tenus, the circuit court, 
in a letter opinion, ruled that Woods’ evidence “does not rise 
to the level of clear and convincing evidence necessary to 
create a constructive trust on the property.”  The court 
observed that Paul Dove had clearly intended to leave the 
property to Woods and had told Woods and other witnesses of 
his intention.  The court found, however, that the property 
was not Paul’s to give, being held by husband and wife as 
tenants by the entireties, and Nina’s intentions were not 
sufficiently clear.  Accordingly, the court denied relief on 
Woods’ first count and declined to impose a constructive 
trust.  Woods does not appeal that ruling. 
 
Nevertheless, the circuit court found by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Woods had established a valid claim for 
quantum meruit damages beginning in 1996 and continuing 
through 2004, including the value of the electricity and 
propane Woods furnished to the Dove home after Paul’s death.  
The court entered a final order awarding Woods a judgment in 
 
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the amount of $115,172.57.  We awarded the Executors an 
appeal.  We also awarded an appeal to Woods on his assignment 
of cross-error to the circuit court’s ruling that his right to 
quantum meruit damages did not accrue until 1996. 
Analysis 
 
The Executors present three assignments of error:  (1) 
Woods’ claims are based on promissory estoppel, for which 
there is no cause of action in Virginia; (2) quantum meruit 
damages are not recoverable where, as here, there is an 
express contract of employment; and (3) Woods presented no 
evidence of the reasonable value of the services he rendered. 
A. 
 Promissory Estoppel and Quantum Meruit 
 
Where it is available, the cause of action based on 
promissory estoppel consists of four elements, recently 
defined as:  “(1) a promise, (2) which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to cause action by the promisee, (3) which 
does cause such action, and (4) which should be enforced to 
prevent injustice to the promisee.”  Barnhill v. Veneman, 524 
F.3d 458, 475-76 (4th Cir. 2008).  The Executors are correct 
in asserting that promissory estoppel is not a cognizable 
cause of action in Virginia.  In a trio of cases decided on 
the same day in 1997, we observed that such a cause of action 
had never been held to exist in the Commonwealth and we 
expressly declined to create such a cause of action.  W. J. 
 
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Schafer Associates v. Cordant, Inc., 254 Va. 514, 521, 493 
S.E.2d 512, 516 (1997).  See Virginia School of the Arts v. 
Eichelbaum, 254 Va. 373, 377, 493 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1997); 
Ward’s Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland North America, Inc., 254 
Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997).  We have not altered 
that position. 
 
Promissory estoppel and quantum meruit are conceptually 
distinct.  They require entirely different proof and result in 
entirely different remedies. 
 
Where promissory estoppel is available, the promisee must 
prove, by the standard of evidence required in the 
jurisdiction, the four elements quoted above from Barnhill.  
If successful, the promisee is entitled to judicial 
enforcement of the promisor’s promise.  If that remedy were to 
be applied to the present case, it would have required a 
conveyance of all the Dove property, less the mountain land, 
to Woods, if he had carried his burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 
Quantum meruit recovery, by contrast, is based upon an 
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of services 
rendered.  Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 198, 170 S.E. 
602, 604 (1933).  See also Marine Development Corp. v. Rodak, 
225 Va. 137, 140-41, 300 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1983).  This cause 
of action has been available in Virginia for many years.  In 
 
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Rea v. Trotter, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 585, 592 (1875), this Court 
referred to it as “an undeniable principle of law.”  There, we 
said, “Where service is performed by one, at the instance and 
request of another, and . . . nothing is said between the 
parties as to compensation for such service, the law implies a 
contract, that the party who performs the service shall be 
paid a reasonable compensation therefor."  (Id.)  The remedy 
available to the plaintiff is an award of damages amounting to 
the reasonable value of the work performed, less the 
compensation actually received for that work.  Hendrickson, 
161 Va. at 201, 170 S.E. at 605. 
 
A party may state in a pleading as many claims as he has, 
"regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or 
equitable grounds."  Rule 1:4(k).  The fact that Woods’ first 
count alleged facts that might have framed a cause of action 
for promissory estoppel, if such had been available, is 
immaterial to the claim made in his second count for damages 
based on quantum meruit.  Therefore, we find no merit in the 
Executors’ first assignment of error. 
B.  Quantum Meruit and Express Contract 
The Executors point out that for a court to award a 
quantum meruit recovery, the court must conclude that there is 
no enforceable express contract between the parties covering 
the same subject matter.  In such a case, the court will imply 
 
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a contract between the parties to prevent inequity; when such 
an express contract exists, however, there is no need to imply 
one because the parties have already negotiated an agreement.  
Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 477, 429 S.E.2d 201, 207 
(1993).  The Executors correctly state the rule, but the rule, 
according to its terms, applies only when there is an express, 
enforceable contract between the parties covering the services 
for which quantum meruit recovery is claimed.  Id.; Royer v. 
Board of Supervisors, 176 Va. 268, 280, 10 S.E.2d 876, 881 
(1940). 
Implicit in the circuit court’s holding is the finding 
that Woods and Paul Dove had an unwritten agreement, beginning 
in 1985, that Woods would work between 35 and 40 hours per 
week for the Doves.  In return for that labor, he was to be 
paid a salary as agreed between them annually, plus bonuses 
from the sales of chickens.  That contract was fully performed 
and Woods makes no claim for its breach.  Also implicit in the 
court’s holding is that when the first haying season began 
after the relationship was created, Woods’ workload nearly 
doubled, and remained far in excess of 40 hours per week until 
the end of the relationship.  There was, in 1985, no express 
contract covering Woods’ compensation for the additional work 
except for the vague promise that the Doves, being unable to 
fully compensate him, would “take care of [him].”  Later, Paul 
 
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Dove made a more specific promise as described above, but that 
promise was held by the circuit court not to constitute an 
enforceable contract.  That holding was not appealed and is 
therefore the law of the case.  Thus, the rule cited by the 
Executors has no application to Woods’ additional, 
uncompensated work. 
We will defer to the circuit court’s determination of the 
facts unless unsupported by evidence or plainly wrong because 
an appellate court lacks the fact-finder’s ability to hear and 
see the witnesses and assess their credibility.  Patterson v. 
Patterson, 257 Va. 558, 564, 515 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1999).  The 
record contains ample evidence to support the circuit court’s 
conclusion that no express, enforceable agreement existed 
between the parties as to Woods’ compensation for his work in 
excess of 40 hours per week.  We cannot say that the circuit 
court’s conclusion from the evidence, that an implied contract 
was necessary to prevent injustice to Woods, was plainly 
wrong. 
C. Damages 
The Executors’ final assignment of error is that Woods 
presented no evidence of the reasonable value of the services 
he rendered, an essential requisite of quantum meruit damages.  
See Virginia Fin. Assocs. v. ITT Hartford Group, 266 Va. 177, 
183, 585 S.E.2d 789, 792 (2003); Marine Development, 225 Va. 
 
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at 140-41, 300 S.E.2d at 765-66; Hendrickson, 161 Va. at 200, 
170 S.E. at 605.  Woods presented evidence of the approximate 
number of hours he worked each year from 1985 until the 
relationship ended in 2006.  The circuit court accepted that 
number as a fact in awarding damages. 
The hourly rate the court applied to Woods’ additional, 
uncompensated work was the same as the parties agreed on each 
year as compensation for the 40 hours per week for which they 
had contracted.  Woods asked for no wage rate higher than the 
parties had agreed upon each year as reasonable compensation 
for the 40 hours covered by their express contract.  The 
circuit court could properly conclude from the evidence that 
the parties, being in a position to know the prevailing wage 
rates for farm labor in the vicinity and the work Woods was to 
perform, had agreed upon the reasonable value of Woods’ 
services for the originally-contemplated 40 hours per week.  
There was no evidence to suggest that the same rate was 
unreasonably high for his additional, uncompensated work.3  We 
conclude that Woods presented sufficient evidence of the 
reasonable value of his services. 
                     
3 Instead, testimony suggested that the rate was lower 
than the value of Woods' work because Paul Dove could not 
afford to pay him a higher rate but intended to leave the 
property to him.  Woods did not ask that a higher rate be used 
in the assessment of damages.  Accordingly, the question 
whether the rate was too low is not before us on appeal. 
 
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D.  Cross-Error 
Woods contends that his uncompensated work, in excess of 
the 40 hours per week covered by his salary, began in 1985, 
when the haying season began some six months after the 
inception of his salaried employment with the Doves.  The 
circuit court must necessarily have accepted that as a fact 
because there was no evidence of any substantial change in his 
workload thereafter until the end of the relationship, except 
for additional services he rendered to Nina Dove after Paul’s 
death.  Woods argues that the circuit court erred in ruling 
that his entitlement to quantum meruit damages did not begin 
until 1996. 
Based on our review of the record, we agree with Woods.  
The circuit court stated in its opinion:  “The evidence from 
[Woods] is that the relationship began in the middle of his 
employment.  I will award [Woods] a judgment against the 
estate in the amount of $106,444.00 (1996-2004) plus the 
electric bills of $4,200.00 and the propane bills of 
$4,528.57.”  That finding was based upon Woods’ testimony that 
it was “about midways through” his relationship with the Doves 
that Paul Dove told him that the Doves intended to leave the 
entire farm property to him when they died.  The year 1996 was 
pertinent to Woods’ claim for a constructive trust on the farm 
property, but that claim was unsuccessful and is not before us 
 
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in this appeal.  The year 1996 is irrelevant to Woods’ claim 
for quantum meruit damages. 
The unrefuted evidence is that the relationship between 
Woods and the Doves began in 1985 with the agreement that he 
would work 40 hours per week, that about six months later 
Woods’ workload nearly doubled and remained at that level 
until 2006, and that he received no additional compensation 
for his services beyond 40 hours per week.  We conclude that 
the circuit court’s determination that his entitlement to 
quantum meruit damages began only in 1996 was unsupported by 
the evidence. 
Conclusion 
Because we find no merit in the Executors’ assignments of 
error, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court with 
respect to the questions presented by their appeal.  Because 
we find error in the circuit court’s judgment with respect to 
its award of damages, we will reverse the judgment in part and 
remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion, limited to the issue of damages. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 and remanded. 
 
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