Title: Oukrop v. Wasserburger

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Oukrop v. Wasserburger1988 WY 73755 P.2d 233Case Number: 86-306Decided: 06/01/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
RAY K. OUKROP, D.D.S., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

DENNIS WASSERBURGER, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Carl L. Lathrop, 
David D. Uchner, Nicholas G. Kalokathis and Peter K. Michael of Lathrop & 
Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Frank R. 
Chapman, R.E. Rauchfuss and Debra L. Cheatham, Beech Street Law Office, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The critical question 
to be resolved in this case is whether the expert testimony of a 
pharmacologist-toxicologist is relevant in a case involving toxic injuries to a 
human being from a drug overdose when the expert testimony consists of an 
interpolation of the results of experiments on animals in the absence of 
empirical data with respect to people. There is a collateral procedural issue as 
to whether the expert testimony was a surprise to the defendant attributable to 
a failure to designate properly the expert witness in accordance with the 
pre-trial order. The trial court ruled that there was no basis for the claim of 
surprise and permitted the testimony to be introduced at trial. We agree with 
the rulings of the trial court, and we affirm the 
judgment.

[¶2.]     The appellant, Ray K. 
Oukrop, D.D.S. (Dr. Oukrop), appeals from an amended judgment, including costs, 
in the total amount of $751,816.37 awarded to the appellee, Dennis J. 
Wasserburger (Dennis), as the result of toxic poisoning and resulting injuries 
attributable to an overdose of the drug atropine. In his brief, Dr. Oukrop sets 
forth these issues to be resolved:

"I. Whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it permitted a professor of pharmacology, who 
was not a medical doctor and who had never examined or tested the plaintiff, to 
give to the jury his diagnosis and prognosis of the plaintiff's brain 
damage.

"II. Whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it permitted the pharmacologist's brain damage 
testimony even though that testimony was not set out in the pre-trial 
order.

"III. Whether the errors 
in admitting the pharmacologist's brain damage testimony were 
prejudicial."

Dennis restates 
these issues in this way:

"I. Whether the 
pharmacologist-toxicologist was properly designated or did he cause 
surprise.

"II. Whether the 
pharmacologist-toxicologist was competent to testify regarding the probable 
toxic effects of the poison atropine on the appellee.

"III. If any error was 
committed, was it prejudicial enough to require a new 
trial."

[¶3.]     In a visit to Dr. 
Oukrop on January 7, 1984, Dennis sought advice with respect to the removal of 
his wisdom teeth. The product of that discussion was an appointment for oral 
surgery to remove the wisdom teeth on February 3, 1984. During the January 
visit, Dr. Oukrop prescribed four chemical substances to be taken by Dennis 
prior to the surgery. One of those was a prescription for:

"Atropine 1/4 
grain

Take 1/2 hour before 
dental appt."

The atropine 
that was prescribed is twenty-five times the normal adult dosage. 

[¶4.]     Dennis took the 
prescriptions to a pharmacist in Gillette to have them filled. The pharmacist 
observed the excessive dosage in the atropine prescription and telephoned Dr. 
Oukrop to discuss the dosage. In a manifestation of professional arrogance, 
which wise practitioners of the healing arts avoid, Dr. Oukrop refused to 
discuss the prescription with the pharmacist, requested that the pharmacist fill 
the prescription as written and hung up. The pharmacist then filled the 
prescriptions, as they had been ordered, and gave them to Dennis. On the morning 
of the scheduled oral surgery, Dennis took all twenty-five atropine capsules in 
accordance with Dr. Oukrop's direction.

[¶5.]     Dr. Oukrop realized, 
prior to the surgery, that Dennis had taken a toxic dose of atropine in 
accordance with Dr. Oukrop's instructions. He also knew of the possible side 
effects of that overdose. After recognizing that there had been an overdose, Dr. 
Oukrop called a medical doctor seeking advice with respect to the potential side 
effects. The medical doctor confirmed the overdose and suggested to Dr. Oukrop 
that, if he was concerned, he should call the PoisonControlCenter. Dr. Oukrop's reaction was not a 
model of responsible behavior. Instead of calling the PoisonControlCenter - which he did eventually, more 
than twenty-four hours later - Dr. Oukrop proceeded with the surgery, after 
deciding that he would "just wait and see what Dennis was going to go through." 
Dr. Oukrop did not advise either Dennis or his mother, who were his friends and 
had been his patients for almost twenty years, that Dennis had taken a toxic 
overdose of atropine.

[¶6.]     The testimony of two 
emergency room physicians, who had worked with the WyomingPoisonControlCenter, revealed that Dennis' problems 
could have been avoided, or alleviated, to a substantial degree if Dr. Oukrop 
had informed someone of the overdose within approximately six hours. Treatment, 
in the form of giving Dennis something to induce vomiting, pumping his stomach, 
and giving him activated charcoal slurry and laxatives, could have been 
administered to eliminate the maximum possible amount of the atropine from his 
system. This treatment would have prevented most of the toxic effects of the 
overdose. At the trial, the same doctors testified about rate of absorption and 
that these were standard techniques to eliminate toxic substances taken 
orally.

[¶7.]     On the way back to his 
home following the surgery, Dennis began to hallucinate and manifest unusual 
behavior. At 2:14 P.M., his mother called Dr. Oukrop to tell him of Dennis' 
behavior and her concern about that. Dr. Oukrop told her to give Dennis some 
soup and malted milk in one hour and that Dennis would be okay. The 
hallucinations became worse, and, at 5:30 P.M., his mother called Dr. Oukrop 
again; Dr. Oukrop again assured Mrs. Wasserburger that Dennis would be all 
right. At 9:00 P.M., in another telephone call, Dr. Oukrop instructed Mrs. 
Wasserburger to take Dennis outside for a walk, but that provided only temporary 
relief. After another call from Mrs. Wasserburger at 11:29 P.M., Dr. Oukrop 
promised to call her back, which he did. Dr. Oukrop never did explain to Mrs. 
Wasserburger that Dennis had taken a toxic overdose of atropine, nor did he 
suggest at any time that the Wasserburgers should obtain medical assistance. Dr. 
Oukrop even allowed Mr. and Mrs. Wasserburger to assume that Dennis may have 
been using illicit substances.

[¶8.]     At 2:36 A.M. the next 
morning, Mrs. Wasserburger finally called the family physician about Dennis' 
unusual behavior. In the course of that conversation, she read the label from 
the atropine bottle to the physician who then told Mrs. Wasserburger what to 
anticipate and what to do. Dennis ran away from the family ranch house during 
this telephone conversation. The temperature was around thirty degrees, and 
Dennis was wearing only blue jeans, a velour shirt and moonboots. He thought he 
saw men chasing him with guns and shining lights on him. During his 
hallucinations, Dennis broke his glasses, ran into a barbed wire fence and got 
wet running through a creek. He also suffered a serious knee injury when he 
stepped off the top of a hill and fell forward through the snow. He managed to 
make his way to a neighbor's ranch some two and one-half miles away from his 
home, and he spent the night in a haystack.

[¶9.]     The next morning, 
Dennis still was hallucinating, and he saw the men who were after him blow up 
the haystack next to the one he was in. Assuming that they were going to blow up 
his haystack as well, Dennis left the haystack and was discovered by the 
neighbor. The neighbor persuaded Dennis to come into the house for some coffee 
and to telephone his parents. The Wasserburgers picked Dennis up and later took 
him to see the family physician. The physician examined Dennis, but, because of 
the length of time since the atropine had been administered, the physician was 
unable to suggest any treatment. The hallucinations continued throughout that 
day and into the following evening.

[¶10.]  The next week, Dennis developed a jaw 
infection for which he eventually was hospitalized, treated and released. 
Evidence submitted at the trial indicated that his exposure and lack of rest 
following the oral surgery could have caused this infection. He returned to work 
February 16, 1984, but he had to quit a few days later because of his knee 
injury. That injury was treated by arthroscopic surgery in March, 1984. At the 
trial, Dennis and members of his family testified that he has difficulty 
remembering things, and his temper is more volatile. Furthermore, he is not as 
responsible as he was prior to the poisoning.

[¶11.]  We turn first to the procedural attack 
upon the testimony of Dr. Allan C. Collins, an expert witness in pharmacology 
and toxicology. Dr. Collins testified as an expert witness in 
pharmacology-toxicology to a number of things, but the peculiar thrust of his 
testimony that generates the procedural issue was:

"Q. Based on those 
studies, doctor, do you have an opinion of what effect the overdose of atropine 
on Dennis Wasserburger will have on him in the future?

"A. 
Yes.

"MR. UCHNER: I object, 
your Honor, and move that the testimony be stricken. This testimony, again, 
calls for speculation and conjecture. There are certain possibilities involved 
in this case. This witness is not qualified to give a medical opinion as to the 
particular plaintiff in this particular case.

"THE COURT: My feeling on 
that is that he is qualified to testify as to what his studies disclose, and you 
can take a shot at him in cross-examination if you wish to bring out some of the 
fallacies. Go ahead. You may answer the question, doctor.

"A. Would you repeat the 
question, please?

"Q. My question was: 
based on those studies, do you have an opinion of what the effect that the 
atropine overdose Dennis Wasserburger suffered will have on him in the 
future?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. What is your opinion, 
doctor?

"A. It is highly probable 
that the receptors in Mr. Wasserburger's brain have been affected in a fashion 
that is entirely consistent with the observations that we have made on 
animals.

"Q. And what effect will 
that have on Mr. Wasserburger in a high probability?

"A. Since the function of 
these receptors is involved in learning and memory, it is highly probable that 
you will have an alteration of learning and memory 
processes."

Dr. Oukrop 
claims that the information furnished prior to trial in accordance with the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure did not suggest the possibility of such 
testimony by Dr. Collins, and Dr. Oukrop was entitled to a ruling that the 
testimony was not admissible.

[¶12.]  The record discloses that Dr. Collins was 
first made known as a witness in a scheduling conference held by telephone 
conference call on October 22, 1985, a little less than three months after the 
complaint was filed. Then, on December 2, 1985, Dr. Collins was listed in a 
Notice of Experts, and his Curriculum Vitae and a November 6, 1984 report to 
counsel were attached to the Notice of Experts. Even though the report was 
limited to the immediate toxic effects of atropine and how those related to 
Dennis' conduct, the Notice of Experts also stated:

"* * * Any or all of the 
witnesses may testify as to the pharmacology of atropine, its effects, side 
effects, and propensities. Any or all of the above-referenced experts may 
testify that the damages suffered by the Plaintiff were a direct result of the 
drug overdose prescribed by the Defendant and that the injuries and the damages 
suffered by the Plaintiff were a natural and direct consequence of the 
Defendant's acts and omissions."

Next, in the 
Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Submissions filed February 18, 1986, Dr. Collins was 
identified as a witness "who will testify as to the composition and effects of 
the drug Atropine by itself and taken in combination with the other drugs given 
to the Plaintiff, * * *." It should be noted that, in this same pleading, other 
witnesses were listed with the notation that they would testify as to Dennis' 
continuing injury and suffering and his changing personality subsequent to the 
incident.

[¶13.]  Dr. Oukrop made no effort to depose Dr. 
Collins prior to the trial. Before Dr. Collins testified with respect to 
long-range effects of the drug atropine, Dr. Oukrop did object, claiming that 
this testimony went outside that disclosed by the pre-trial submissions, 
constituted a surprise to Dr. Oukrop, and should not be received because it 
amounted to a disregard of the pre-trial proceedings. The ultimate ruling of the 
trial court with respect to this objection was:

"THE COURT: Well, 
gentlemen, I guess I should say I don't believe there is any surprise in this 
case. * * * You may go ahead."

Dr. Collins then 
testified that it was highly probable that the receptors in Dennis' brain had 
been affected and that meant he would have an alteration of learning and memory 
processes for which there was no known treatment.

[¶14.]  Dr. Oukrop attacks the ruling of the 
trial judge admitting Dr. Collins' testimony contending that the district judge 
departed from the terms of the pre-trial order. Primary reliance is placed upon 
Smith v. Ford Motor Company, 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 918, 101 S. Ct. 1363, 67 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1981). Dr. Oukrop argues that the 
burden Dennis must assume is to establish manifest injustice before the court 
could expand the pre-trial order in order to justify the admission of this 
testimony. Other authorities relied upon are Hale v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber, 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); Roberto v. Roberto, 452 F.2d 635 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Clark v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied 377 U.S. 1006, 84 S. Ct. 1943, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1964); Globe Cereal 
Mills v. Scrivener, 240 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1956); Walker v. West Coast Fast 
Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1956); Fernandez v. United Fruit Company, 
200 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 935, 73 S. Ct. 797, 97 L. Ed. 2d 1363 (1953); and Fowler v. Crown-Zellerbach Corporation, 163 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 
1947). In presenting his argument, Dr. Oukrop assumes that the challenged 
testimony constitutes a departure from the pre-trial submissions. Since we do 
not agree with that assumption, the authorities relied upon by Dr. Oukrop in 
this argument are distinguishable.

[¶15.]  Rule 16, W.R.C.P., is similar to Rule 16, 
F.R.C.P., relating to pre-trial procedure. The subject also is addressed by Rule 
601 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming. This latter rule 
is the one on point, and it provides in pertinent part:

"(c) Before pre-trial, 
counsel shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(4) Furnish opposing 
counsel names and addresses of witnesses with a summary of their expected 
testimony; * * *."

This rule was 
complied with in this instance, but Dr. Oukrop contends that the furnished 
summary circumscribed Dr. Collins' testimony in such a way that he should not 
have been permitted to testify concerning the long-range effect of an overdose 
of atropine with respect to Dennis.

[¶16.]  We previously have held that any 
requirement of adherence to a pre-trial order entered in accordance with our 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of discretion with the trial court. 
Claims of error in that regard are examined under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 519 (1982); Chrysler Corporation 
v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978); Ford Motor Company v. 
Kuhbacher, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1255 (1974). In this instance, 
the district court did not rule that testimony would be admitted by, in effect, 
amending the pre-trial order. The essence of the trial judge's ruling was that 
the pre-trial submissions were sufficient to discern the tenor of Dr. Collins' 
testimony. The trial court must be vested with as much discretion in construing 
its own orders as it is in permitting departure from those 
orders.

[¶17.]  The pre-trial submissions in this 
instance are sufficiently equivocal to justify the district judge in concluding 
that Dr. Collins' testimony had not been circumscribed in the manner argued by 
Dr. Oukrop in either the pre-trial submissions of Dennis or in the pre-trial 
order. In substance, the trial court ruled that Dr. Oukrop was on notice of such 
potential testimony. Ample opportunity was available prior to trial to depose 
Dr. Collins or to require Dennis, pursuant to discovery rules, to specify the 
tenor of his testimony. Simonsen v. Barlow Plastics Company, Inc., 551 F.2d 469 
(1 Cir. 1977). Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the district 
court committed an abuse of discretion in receiving Dr. Collins' testimony in 
evidence, despite Dr. Oukrop's claim of surprise.

[¶18.]  We turn then to the relevance vel non of 
Dr. Collins' testimony. Dr. Collins testified as an expert witness, and, 
essentially, his testimony is covered by Rules 702 and 703, W.R.E. These rules 
provide:

"Rule 702. Testimony by 
experts.

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

"Rule 703. Bases of 
opinion testimony by experts.

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."

In this 
instance, we also must consider Dr. Collins' testimony in the light of Rules 401 
and 402, W.R.E. These rules provide:

"Rule 401. Definition of 
`relevant evidence'.

"`Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.

"Rule 402. Relevant 
evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible.

"All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible."

In applying 
these rules, we must recognize that rulings with respect to the admission of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and those rulings 
are entitled to considerable deference. E.g., Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, Wyo., 707 P.2d 161 (1985); Banks v. 
Crowner, Wyo., 694 P.2d 101 (1985); Caterpillar 
Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 (1982); Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 423 (1982).

[¶19.]  In this case, the trial court determined 
to submit to the jury the issue of whether the overdose of atropine had any 
long-term deleterious effect upon Dennis. There is no serious question that Dr. 
Collins was not qualified as an expert in pharmacology-toxicology by his 
knowledge, skill, experience, training and education, and his scientific and 
specialized knowledge obviously was of assistance to the jury in determining the 
issue of the long-term effect of the overdose of atropine. The facts or data 
that he relied upon in forming his opinion come within the scope of Rule 703, 
W.R.E.

[¶20.]  Dr. Oukrop objected because Dr. Collins' 
testimony concededly related to animal testing and did not have any specific 
relation to Dennis. It is clear that Dr. Collins had not examined in any way or 
even been acquainted with Dennis prior to trial. His testimony did, however, 
have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action [the long-range effect of atropine on Dennis] more 
probable * * * than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, W.R.E. The 
extent of his knowledge and the basis of his opinion clearly were subject to 
scrutiny by cross-examination; and it was left to the trier of fact to determine 
his credibility, evaluate his testimony and decide what weight it should be 
given. Reed v. Hunter, Wyo., 663 P.2d 513 (1983). Our evaluation of 
the record persuades us that the trial court carefully considered the 
admissibility of Dr. Collins' testimony on this critical issue and in the 
exercise of its discretion admitted the testimony into evidence. We can perceive 
no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in receiving this 
testimony.

[¶21.]  We respond to the appellant's first two 
issues in the negative. Since we conclude that no error occurred in admitting 
the testimony of Dr. Collins, there is no need to consider whether any error was 
or was not prejudicial.

[¶22.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

BROWN, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶23.]  The majority apparently was so offended 
by the outrageous conduct of appellant Ray K. Oukrop, D.D.S., that it suspended 
the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Civil Procedure for this one case. A 
large judgment against appellant is clearly justified, but should have been 
visited upon him without resort to outlawry.1

[¶24.]  It seems to me most strange that Allen C. 
Collins, Ph.D., was allowed to testify as a medical expert. Throughout the trial 
Collins was referred to and addressed as "doctor," and properly so. However, he 
is a pharmacologist with a doctorate in philosophy; he is not a medical 
doctor.2 Foundation testimony indicated that 
Collins had researched the effects of Belladonna Alkaloids, such as atropine, on 
the nervous system and brains of laboratory animals (mice), but had no clinical 
experience either treating or diagnosing physiological brain dysfunctions in 
human beings.

[¶25.]  At trial, over appellant's objection, 
Collins gave expert medical testimony, and testified that appellee had permanent 
brain damage.3 This is interesting because Collins 
never examined or treated appellee.

"* * * Only an expert 
medical witness is competent to testify as to medical matters. * * *" Harris v. 
Grizzle, Wyo., 
625 P.2d 747, 751 (1981).

 

Pharmacologists 
and toxicologists are not trained to diagnose mental injuries. Pharmacology 
is

"[t]he science concerned 
with drugs, their sources, appearances, chemistry, actions and uses." Stedman's 
Medical Dictionary, 1065 (5th ed. 1982).

[¶26.]  Pharmacologists and chemists are 
qualified to describe the general effects of a drug on the human body. Roberts 
v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 492-493 (3rd Cir. 1963); and Stertz v. Briscoe, 184 Kan. 163, 334 P.2d 357, 
361 (1959), 70 A.L.R.2d 1029 (1960). This type of testimony may be characterized 
as chemical opinion. State v. Bessette, 130 Vt. 438, 296 A.2d 179, 181 (1972). Therefore, 
an expert witness called upon to give an opinion on permanent brain damage 
logically should be a neurosurgeon, neurophysiologist or a clinical 
psychiatrist, not a doctor of philosophy or a pharmacologist with a Ph.D. in 
philosophy.

[¶27.]  My main concern about this case, however, 
is the element of surprise, or stated another way, "trial by ambush." There is 
no way appellant's counsel could have known that appellee's principal claim for 
damages was permanent brain damage. In the middle of the trial appellee revealed 
for the first time that he was claiming damages for permanent brain injury and 
that Collins would testify as an expert in support of that claim. Neither 
appellee's complaint nor opening statement gives any hint that permanent brain 
damage is claimed as an element of damages, and says nothing to indicate that 
Collins would testify as though he were a medical doctor. Rather, the complaint 
and opening statement pleads a case of knee injury as a result of 
hallucinations. Also, the depositions of appellee, his mother and family 
physician describe a case of knee injury. Three physicians (not doctors of 
philosophy, juris doctors or doctors of Divinity), testified at trial; they said 
nothing about brain damage.

[¶28.]  Appellee gave notice of the substance of 
Collins' testimony when he filed his "Notice of Experts." The notice 
incorporated by reference an opinion letter from Collins to appellee's counsel 
dated November 6, 1984. The letter was never modified nor supplemented, and 
represented the sum and substance of Collins' proposed testimony. It partially 
states:

"* * * As I mentioned 
above, there is no doubt in my mind that the symptoms described are due to the 
overdose of atropine. I should mention, however, that atropine toxicity is 
rarely fatal and long term toxic effects are rare. If the patient survives the 
first 24 hours the prognosis is usually excellent. This is also consistent with 
the records that I have seen for this case."

The letter does 
not disclose that Collins had formed an opinion that appellee suffered from 
permanent and worsening brain damage, and counsel for appellant had no reason to 
suspect that Collins would give such testimony, i.e., testimony that should be 
elicited from a neurosurgeon, neuropsychologist or clinical 
psychologist.

[¶29.]  On February 18, 1986, appellee filed a 
document entitled "Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Submissions," which contained a section 
pertaining to the designation of witnesses. He listed Collins as a witness who 
would "* * * testify as to the composition and effects of the drug Atropine by 
itself and taken in combination with the other drugs given to the Plaintiff, 
to-wit: Mephyton, demerol and Decadron." Nowhere did appellee give any 
indication that Collins would give a medical opinion that appellee suffered 
from permanent and worsening brain damage. Appellee specifically designated 
physicians as the persons who would provide testimony on the issue of causation 
and damages. The designation pertaining to Collins says nothing about damages 
suffered by appellee, and the absence of such a designation leads to the logical 
conclusion that appellee was not designating Collins as someone who would 
testify about damages. Therefore, counsel would not suspect that a 
pharmacologist or doctor of philosophy would be qualified to provide a medical 
diagnosis of brain damage, and the designations would not lead a reasonable 
person to suspect that Collins would attempt to do so. 

[¶30.]  On February 25, 1986, the court entered 
its "Pretrial Conference Report and Order." There is no mention in either the 
order or the pretrial memoranda that appellee would seek to prove by Collins' 
testimony that appellee was suffering from worsening brain damage. Rule 16, 
W.R.C.P., provides:

"The court shall make an 
order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed 
to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the 
matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed 
of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls 
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice."

[¶31.]  Absent amendment or modification, the 
parties were bound by the contents of the pretrial order. The order not only 
limited the issues, but it also limited the scope of the proposed testimony to 
that contained within the designation. Smith v. Ford Company, 626 F.2d 784 (10th 
Cir. 1980). The majority does not challenge this point of law, but instead 
side-steps it by misapplying the standard of review. In Smith, the Tenth Circuit 
quoted from Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 817-818 (10th Cir. 1979), 
where it had earlier held:

"`* * * When there exists 
a "properly drawn, detailed pretrial order, a trial court's determination that 
certain facts or issues must [or should not] be excluded from trial on the basis 
of a pretrial order may be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion. 
[Citation.]" * * *.'" Smith v. Ford Motor Company, supra, at 
795.

The majority 
applies this rule by stating that "[t]he pre-trial submissions in this instance 
are `sufficiently equivocal' to 
justify the district court's conclusion that Collins' testimony had not been 
circumscribed in the manner argued by Dr. Oukrop [appellant] in either pre-trial 
submissions of Dennis [appellee] or in the pre-trial order. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.) Majority at 238. The pre-trial order in this case was "properly drawn" 
in terms of Collins testifying as a pharmacologist, and the trial court had 
discretion to allow expert testimony under that order. It could deviate from 
that order at trial only to prevent a manifest injustice. See McCabe v. Manning 
Construction Co., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699, 703-704 (1983). The basic 
purpose for having a pre-trial order is, in part, to try to put all of the 
parties on equal and fair notice about what evidence will be presented by the 
expert witnesses to be called in the trial. 6 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1527 at 604-615 (1971). In Clark v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company, 328 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 1006, 84 S. Ct. 1943, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1964), the court stated:

"* * * One of the prime 
objectives of this new, but now firmly established procedural device [Rule 16], 
is to do away with the old sporting theory of justice and substitute a more 
enlightened policy of putting the cards on the table, so to speak, and keeping 
surprise tactics down to a minimum. * * *"

See also Hale v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber, 756 F.2d 1322, 1335 (8th Cir. 1985); Walker v. West Coast Fast 
Freight, 233 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1956); Fernandez v. United Fruit, 200 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir. 1952); Fowler v. Crown-Zellerbach Corporation, 163 F.2d 773, 
774 (9th Cir. 1947).

[¶32.]  Undisclosed testimony at variance with 
the pre-trial order should not be allowed if it causes surprise. Apparently, the 
trial court believed that appellant should have anticipated Collins' testimony 
and taken his deposition.

[¶33.]  Smith v. Ford Company, supra, was a case 
similar to this case. In Smith, plaintiff, who had incurred an injury to his 
pancreas, filed a pretrial memorandum designating a physician as one of his 
witnesses. The witness designation filed with the court made no mention of the 
fact that the physician would testify that the injury to the pancreas was due to 
the location of the seatbelt within the automobile. The designation said only 
that the physician would discuss the medical treatment of the plaintiff and his 
prognosis. Relying on this limited designation, counsel for defendant decided 
that a deposition of the physician would not be necessary. In its opinion, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals placed the burden upon plaintiff to apprise the 
defendant in advance of trial of the nature of the expert's testimony. The 
burden was upon the plaintiff to articulate the subject matter of those areas 
about which his expert would be testifying. If this had been done, the defendant 
"could have taken his deposition," if deemed essential.

[¶34.]  I cannot subscribe to the majority's view 
that any pre-trial order that is "sufficiently equivocal" or otherwise ambiguous 
concerning the substance of expert witness testimony can be used to affirm the 
trial court under the abuse of discretion standard of 
review.

[¶35.]  I would reverse this case and remand for 
a new trial for the reason that appellant never received fair notice that a 
nonmedical witness was going to give a medical opinion on brain damage, and that 
Allen C. Collins, Ph.D., did not possess medical credentials to testify as a 
medical expert on brain damage to human beings.

FOOTNOTES

1 "* * * [O]utlawry is 
putting a man out of protection of the law so that he is incapable to bring an 
action for redress of injuries; and it is also attended with a forfeiture of all 
one's goods and chattels. * * *" II W. Blackstone, Commentaries [*]283, 284 
(1899). In the United 
States the concept of outlawry is unknown. Hall 
v. Lanning, 91 U.S. [1 Otto] 160, 23 L. Ed. 271 
(1875).

2 As a matter of fact 
there were several doctors floating around the courtroom the day of the trial. 
The trial judge, counsel for plaintiff, and counsel for defendant were all 
doctors - Juris Doctors, that is. Just because a person is addressed "doctor," 
it does not necessarily follow that he is enfused with medical 
expertise.

3 If the trial court's 
ruling was not so prejudicial to appellee, I might change my mind about Collins' 
so-called expert testimony under the doctrine of "Let it in for what it's 
worth." In Wyoming, under this doctrine, a lot of 
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent evidence gets into trials. The "Let it in 
for what it's worth" rule of evidence is usually reserved for nonjury trials. 
The trial judge who invokes this doctrine does so as a sop to the proponent, 
knowing he is not going to consider it in any event. But, employing this 
doctrine is dangerous in jury trials. The jury may take the suspect evidence and 
run with it, as they apparently did here.