Title: Rosty v. Skaj

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VINCENT ROSTY V. SHARI SKAJ AND STEVEN SKAJ2012 WY 28Case Number: S-11-0063, S-11-0136Decided: 02/23/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
VINCENT 
ROSTY,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
SHARI SKAJ and STEVE 
SKAJ,
 
Appellees
(Plaintiffs).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Hampton K. O’Neill 
and Timothy M. Stubson, Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Stubson.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Robert T. Ingram, 
Ingram Olheiser, P.C., Casper, Wyoming; Timothy W. Miller, Miller Law Office, 
Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Ingram.
 
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
In 
these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Vincent Rosty, challenges the district 
court’s order entering default judgment and the district court’s denial of his 
motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment.  We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Appellant presents 
the following issues:
 
1.    
Whether Appellant 
timely appealed the district court’s ruling denying Appellant’s motion to set 
aside entry of default and motion to set aside default 
judgment?
 
2.    
Whether the district 
court erred by permitting the hearing on default judgment to proceed when 
Appellees failed to provide notice to Appellant of the hearing as required by 
Rule 55(b)(2)?
 
3.    
Whether the district 
court violated Appellant’s due process rights by entering default judgment 
without allowing Appellant a meaningful opportunity to present evidence on 
issues of fault and damages?
 
4.    
Whether the default 
judgment issued by the district court is void because of Appellees’ failure to 
properly serve the Appellant with the Complaint and 
Summons?
 
5.    
Whether the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the entry of default and the 
default judgment in this case?
 
6.    
Whether the district 
court’s award of punitive damages was permitted where the Appellees failed to 
provide any evidence of Appellant’s wealth?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellees, Shari and 
Steve Skaj, brought suit against R & R Roofing, Inc., Steve Rosty, and 
Appellant to recover damages caused when an idling dump truck that had been 
driven by Appellant was knocked into gear, pinning Ms. Skaj against a motor 
home.  The complaint alleged that 
the dump truck and R & R Roofing were owned by defendant Steve Rosty, and 
that the truck was used by Appellant in his employment with the business.  The complaint stated causes of action 
for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and sought to 
recover compensatory and punitive damages from all defendants.   
 
[¶4]        
According to the 
complaint, Appellant was using the truck to deliver roofing supplies when he 
stopped the truck in an alley behind Ms. Skaj’s house.  He exited the vehicle and left the 
engine running with the transmission in neutral, but failed to engage the 
parking brake.  Some roofing 
material that had been placed in the cab of the truck became dislodged, knocking 
the transmission into gear and causing the truck to move forward toward the 
motor home, which was also parked in the alley.  Ms. Skaj was severely injured when she 
was caught between the truck and the motor home.  After freeing Ms. Skaj, Appellant took 
her into her house and placed her on the couch.  He then left and drove the truck several 
miles to the R & R Roofing shop.  Mr. Skaj subsequently arrived at the 
residence and discovered his wife’s “nearly lifeless” body on the couch.  The complaint alleged that Appellant had 
used marijuana and methamphetamine prior to the incident and that a blood sample 
taken from Appellant on the day of the incident revealed the presence of 
cannabinoids and amphetamines. 
 
[¶5]        
An answer to the 
complaint was filed on behalf of defendants R & R Roofing and Steve 
Rosty.  Appellant, however, failed 
to plead or otherwise defend against the allegations in the complaint.  As a result, default was entered against 
Appellant by the clerk of court.  After default was entered, the 
non-defaulting parties were dismissed from the suit without prejudice.  On March 23, 2010, the Skajs filed a 
motion for judgment on the default, and the district court set a hearing on the 
motion for September 24, 2010.  On 
the day prior to the hearing, counsel retained by Cornhusker Casualty Company 
entered an appearance on behalf of Appellant and submitted a motion in 
opposition to the entry of default judgment.  Although counsel noted that he had “not 
yet been able to make contact with [Appellant],” he asserted that, upon 
information and belief, service of process “may have been insufficient” because 
service may not have been effected at Appellant’s usual place of abode under 
W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1).  Counsel also 
moved to set aside the entry of default and requested an extension of time to 
answer the complaint.
 
[¶6]        
At the default 
judgment hearing held the following day, the district court denied Appellant’s 
request for a continuance.  The 
court noted that “[T]he entry of appearance and filing yesterday is very last 
minute.  This hearing has been set 
since June 9, 2010.  There’s been no 
showing whatsoever of why representatives of Vincent Rosty could not have 
pursued the requests that they’re now making at an earlier date.”  The court did not rule on Appellant’s 
motion to set aside the entry of default because the Skajs had not had an 
opportunity to respond to the motion, and the matter had not yet been scheduled 
for a hearing.  The court noted, 
however, that “Defendant Rosty should have an opportunity to schedule that up 
and pursue it if there’s a request to do so.”  
 
[¶7]        
The court then 
proceeded to address the matter of the default judgment.  The court received testimony from Shari 
and Steve Skaj relating to damages resulting from the incident, and heard 
arguments from counsel for both parties.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court determined that default judgment was appropriate.  The court found that the allegations in 
the complaint, which were deemed admitted upon entry of default, and the 
testimony presented at the hearing, indicated that Appellant was negligent. 
 Based on the Skajs’ testimony and 
the affidavits of various healthcare providers, the court found that Ms. Skaj 
was entitled to compensatory damages totaling $731,053.25, including medical 
expenses, past and future pain and suffering, past and future loss of enjoyment 
of life, past and future disability, and property damage.  The court awarded $80,000 to Mr. Skaj for 
loss of consortium, but denied Mr. Skaj’s claim for damages arising from 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The court also assessed $75,000.00 in 
punitive damages against Appellant.  A Default Judgment Order was entered on 
October 11, 2010.
 
[¶8]        
Appellant filed a 
notice of appeal from the Default Judgment Order on November 8, 2010, and that 
appeal was docketed in this Court as No. S-11-0063.  Also on November 8, Appellant filed a 
“Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default or for Relief from Default Judgment” 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(c), claiming that he was not properly served with the 
complaint, and did not receive sufficient notice of the default judgment 
hearing.  The district court held a 
hearing on the motion on December 16, 2010.
 
[¶9]        
On March 14, 2011, 
the Skajs filed a “Notice of Denial by Operation of Law,” asserting that the 
district court had not issued a ruling on Appellant’s post-judgment motion 
within the ninety-day period established by W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), and that, as a 
result, the motion was deemed denied.  Two days later, Appellant renewed his 
motion to set aside the default judgment.  
On the same day, the court issued an “Order Denying Defendant Vincent 
Rosty’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default or for Relief from Default 
Judgment.”  On April 14, 2011, 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of his 
motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment.  That appeal was docketed in this Court as 
No. S-11-0136.
 
[¶10]     
The Skajs moved to 
dismiss case number S-11-0136, claiming that this Court is without jurisdiction 
to consider the appeal because it was not filed within thirty days after 
Appellant’s motion was deemed denied.  
We denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and instructed the 
parties to present additional briefing on the jurisdictional issue.  In conjunction with the order denying 
the motion to dismiss, we consolidated the appeals.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Timeliness of 
Appeal
 
[¶11]     
As a threshold 
matter, we must first determine whether Appellant timely appealed the order 
denying his motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment.  After careful review of the additional 
arguments and authority presented, we find that the appeal was timely 
filed.
 
[¶12]     
The Skajs contend 
that Appellant’s motion was denied ninety days after it was filed under 
operation of the “deemed denied” provision of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  That rule provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
 
Any 
motion, under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59 and 60(b), not determined within 
90 days after filing shall be deemed denied unless, within that period, the 
determination is continued by order of the court, which continuation may not 
exceed 60 days, at which time, if the motion has not been determined, it shall 
be deemed denied.
 
The 
Skajs begin from the proposition that Appellant’s motion to set aside was filed 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b), bringing the motion within the reach of the deemed 
denied rule set forth in W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  
Accordingly, due to operation of the deemed denied rule, they claim that 
the motion was deemed denied on February 7, 2011, and that Appellant had thirty 
days from that date to file an appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
2.01.
 
[¶13]     
Appellant 
contends that a motion to set aside default judgment is not subject to the 
deemed denied rule because default judgments are governed by Rule 55, 1 which is not identified in Rule 
6(c)(2).  He points out that his 
motion was filed pursuant to Rule 55(c), and that the district court’s order 
denying his motion also cites Rule 55(c).  
He claims that, because motions filed under Rule 55(c) are not subject to 
the deemed denied rule, the thirty-day period for filing an appeal commenced 
when the district court entered its order denying his motion on March 16, 
2011.
 
[¶14]     
The issue we must 
resolve is essentially a dispute over the operation of the provision in Rule 
55(c) which states that a default judgment may be set aside “in accordance with 
Rule 60(b).”  The Skajs suggest that 
this provision indicates that a motion to set aside default judgment is 
identical to a motion for relief from judgment filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), and 
that all such motions are subject to the deemed denied provision of Rule 
6(c)(2).  Appellant contends that a 
motion to set aside default judgment is distinct from a Rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from judgment, and that the reference to Rule 60(b) merely instructs that 
a motion to set aside default judgment may be granted for the same reasons set 
forth in Rule 60(b). 
 
[¶15]     
We find both parties’ 
interpretations of Rule 55(c) to be plausible.  However, in light of the fact that Rule 
55(c) is omitted from the list of rules and corresponding motions that are 
subject to the deemed denied provision of Rule 6(c)(2), we find no clear 
indication that a motion to set aside default judgment is subject to the deemed 
denied rule.  Further, we note that 
because motions to set aside default or default judgment do not affect the 
finality of a judgment or toll the time for filing an appeal under W.R.A.P. 
2.02, the prevailing justification for application of the deemed denied rule 
does not exist. Accordingly, we find that the motion to set aside entry of 
default and default judgment was not deemed denied upon expiration of ninety 
days from the date of filing.  The 
appeal, filed within thirty days of the district court’s order denying 
Appellant’s motion, was timely.
Due 
Process
 
[¶16]     
In Appellant’s second 
and third issues, he claims that the district court violated his rights to due 
process by failing to provide time for adequate notice of the default judgment 
hearing, and by depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the 
hearing.  Appellant asserts that, as 
a result of these due process violations, the default judgment is void.  Whether a trial court violated a 
litigant’s right to due process presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Kelly v. Kilts, 2010 WY 151, ¶ 9, 243 P.3d 947, 950 (Wyo. 
2010).
 
[¶17]     
Appellant first 
contends that his right to due process was violated because the district court 
failed to comply with the notice requirement set forth in W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2).  That rule provides, in 
relevant part, that “If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought 
has appeared in the action the party (or, if appearing by representative, the 
party’s representative) shall be served with written notice of the application 
for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such application.” 
 Appellant claims that “Under the 
express terms of Rule 55(b)(2), [the Skajs] were required to provide service of 
notice of their application for default judgment three days prior to the hearing 
once Mr. Rosty had entered his appearance.”  We disagree with Appellant’s 
interpretation of the rule.
 
[¶18]     
Appellant’s claim is 
that, under Rule 55(b)(2), a default judgment hearing may not be held without 
three-day notice to the defaulting party, regardless of when the party enters an 
appearance, provided that the appearance is entered prior to the scheduled 
hearing.  The logical extension of 
Appellant’s interpretation of the rule, however, is that a trial court cannot 
set a default judgment hearing, and confidently expect to hold the hearing on 
the scheduled date, under circumstances where the defaulting party has not yet 
entered an appearance.  We do not 
think the rule mandates such a result.  
Rule 55(b)(2) does not require the default hearing to be moved, causing 
further delay to the complainant, as the result of a last-minute entry of 
appearance by the defaulting party.  
Rather, in using the phrase “has appeared in the action,” the rule 
contemplates that the defaulting party will have entered an appearance at least 
three days prior to the hearing.  As 
we have previously noted, “[A] workable system of justice requires that 
litigants not be free to appear at their pleasure.  We therefore must hold parties and their 
attorneys to a reasonably high standard of diligence in observing the courts’ 
rules of procedure. The threat of judgment by default serves as an incentive to 
meet this standard.”  Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 1000 
(Wyo. 1993).  In accordance with 
this standard of diligence, and the plain language of the rule, we find that the 
three-day notice requirement in Rule 55(b)(2) applies when the defaulting party 
enters an appearance in sufficient time to allow for that 
possibility.
 
[¶19]     
Further, we are not 
persuaded that Appellant’s representatives did not have actual notice of the 
proceedings in this case.  The 
record indicates that Cornhusker Casualty Company, which ultimately retained 
counsel to defend Appellant on September 23, 2010, had knowledge of the 
proceedings from the beginning of this case.  On October 30, 2008, a senior claims 
examiner at Cornhusker Casualty sent a letter to Appellant referencing the 
insurance claim arising from the incident involving Ms. Skaj.  The letter stated 
that
 
[W]e wish to advise 
you of your right to retain personal counsel, at your own expense, as pertains 
to your potential excess exposure.  
We are not advising that you must retain personal counsel, as Cornhusker 
Casualty Company will continue to provide a defense, but merely to advise you of 
your right to do so.
 
Additionally, the 
record reveals that on April 17, 2009, the day after the complaint was filed, 
counsel for the Skajs sent a courtesy copy of the complaint to an attorney 
retained by Cornhusker Casualty to defend the suit.  A letter from the Skajs’ counsel 
accompanying the complaint indicated that R & R Roofing, Steve Rosty, and 
Appellant would be served:
 
The Cornhusker 
Casualty claims representative indicated that you would be representing R & 
R Roofing.  I am not sure how the 
co-defendants will be represented so I am having all the Defendants 
served.
 
On April 29, 2009, 
counsel for the Skajs received a response from the defense attorney, indicating 
that she had requested an extension to file an answer on behalf of 
Appellant:
 
Thank you for 
agreeing to extend the answer deadline for all defendants in the above-captioned 
case to May 18, 2009.  As I 
explained, at this point I do not know if I will be representing all of the 
defendants.  In addition, I 
requested that you consider dismissing Steve Rosty as a defendant as it is my 
understanding he was not involved in any way in the 
accident.
 
Defense counsel 
subsequently filed an answer to the Skajs’ complaint on behalf of R & R 
Roofing and Steve Rosty, but did not answer on behalf of Appellant.  In light of this correspondence, it is 
clear that Cornhusker Casualty was aware that Appellant was facing an impending 
lawsuit, and had actual knowledge of the suit immediately after it was 
initiated.  Yet Cornhusker Casualty 
waited until September 23, 2010, sixteen months after default was entered 
against Appellant, and one day prior to the default judgment hearing, to retain 
counsel to defend him.  Under these 
circumstances, we find that Appellant had ample notice, through his 
representatives, of the default judgment hearing.  
 
[¶20]     
Appellant’s claim 
that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the default 
judgment hearing is based entirely on the assertion that he did not receive 
adequate notice of the hearing.  He 
contends that he “was not given sufficient time to meaningfully participate in 
the hearing,” and acknowledges that this claim is “closely related” to the 
failure of adequate notice.  Appellant, however, does not present any 
additional support for the claim that he was deprived of his right to due 
process separate from his assertion of inadequate notice.  Consequently, for the same reasons 
discussed immediately above, we reject Appellant’s claim that he was deprived of 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the hearing.  We also note that Appellant’s counsel 
was present at the hearing and took full advantage of the opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses, object to witness testimony and exhibits, and present 
argument to the court.  See Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 891 
(Wyo. 1984) (“[S]ince [appellant] did appear by counsel at and participate in 
the [default judgment] hearing no prejudice could be asserted.”).  We find no violation of Appellant’s due 
process rights.
 
Service of 
Process
 
[¶21]     
We turn next to 
Appellant’s claim that he was not properly served with the summons and 
complaint, and that the default judgment entered against him is void as a result 
of the fact that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.  On appeal, Appellant does not dispute 
the fact that the summons and complaint were delivered to his mother at his 
usual place of abode.  Rather, he 
contends that his mother was not competent to accept service on his behalf 
because she was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease at the time of service.  We conclude, however, that Appellant has 
not satisfied his burden of proving that his mother was incompetent and, as a 
result, we reject Appellant’s claim that service of process was 
insufficient.
 
[¶22]     
As we have previously 
recognized, a court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a party that has 
not been properly served:
 
A summons is “the 
means of compelling a defendant to subject his person to the jurisdiction of the 
court from which the summons issues.” Strict compliance with the requirements of 
service of process is mandatory. Any omissions of statements that are required 
under W.R.C.P. 4 are fatal and such omission prevents the trial court from 
obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant. A judgment entered without proper 
service of the summons is void and subject to attack directly or 
collaterally.  

 
Hoke 
v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc., 
2006 WY 38, ¶ 7, 131 P.3d 369, 374 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  We review factual determinations 
relating to service of process by accepting the evidence of the prevailing party 
as true and giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that can 
fairly be drawn from the evidence while disregarding conflicting evidence.  Crotteau v. Irvine, 656 P.2d 1166, 1169 
(Wyo. 1983).  Where the facts of 
service are not in dispute, the issue of adequate service of process is a matter 
of law and is reviewed de novo.  See Hoke, ¶ 6, 131 P.3d  at 
373.
 
[¶23]     
W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1), 
which governs personal service of a summons and complaint, allows for 
substituted service at the defendant’s usual place of abode.  The rule provides, in relevant part, that 
service of a summons and complaint “shall be made as 
follows”:
 
(1) Upon an 
individual other than a person under 14 years of age or an incompetent person, 
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual 
personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the 
individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person over the 
age of 14 years then residing therein[.]
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In Appellant’s motion in 
opposition to the entry of default and default judgment, filed on the day prior 
to the default judgment hearing, his counsel claimed that service “may have been 
insufficient” because his mother’s residence “may not have been” his usual place 
of abode:
 
[T]he attempted 
service of process upon Vincent Rosty, detailed in the Affidavit of Scott J. 
Olheiser, filed May 21, 2009, may have been insufficient, improper and 
inadequate service as, upon information and belief, Ms. Jackie Fran[z]en’s 
residence at 1310 Granite in Mills, Wyoming may not have been Mr. Rosty’s 
“dwelling house or usual place of abode” under W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1), and accordingly 
the attempted personal service may have been inadequate.
 
At the default 
judgment hearing, Appellant’s counsel, who had not yet been able to contact 
Appellant, stated that “we don’t know whether [Mr. Rosty] was served properly or 
not,” and requested a continuance so that he could “attempt to determine the 
circumstances of service.”  As 
indicated above, the district court denied the request for a continuance, noting 
that “There’s been no showing whatsoever of why representatives of Vincent Rosty 
could not have pursued the requests that they’re now making at an earlier 
date.”
 
[¶24]     
After issuance of the 
default judgment, and after Appellant had an opportunity to consult with his 
attorney, he conceded, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, that he 
was living at his mother’s home at the time of the accident.  He claimed, however, that service was 
improper because his mother was not competent to accept service on his behalf. 
 Appellant submitted an affidavit 
stating that his mother had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and that she 
“was suffering increased symptoms of forgetfulness and memory problems” at the 
time of service.  Appellant’s sister 
also submitted an affidavit stating that her mother’s memory “appears to be 
substantially impaired.”  Her 
affidavit further stated as follows:
 
10.  In April of 2009 my mother called me and 
told me that someone had delivered papers to her.  She didn’t know what they were for but 
thought they might be for Vince.
 
11.  Because I was concerned about her 
wellbeing, I told her she should not worry about the papers and should not get 
involved in anything having to do with the papers.
 
The district court 
ultimately found, in its order denying the motion to set aside the default 
judgment, that “The return of service reflecting the service of the Summons and 
Complaint in this action upon Defendant Vincent Rosty establishes facts 
supporting proper service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and [Mr. Rosty] has failed to rebut the proof of the service made 
upon him at his residence and usual place of abode.”marker1fn0
[¶25]     
The Skajs assert that 
nothing in Rule 4(d)(1) prohibits substituted service upon an incompetent person 
at the defendant’s usual place of abode.  
Although we note that this scenario raises due process concerns, we need 
not address the issue in this appeal because we find that the burden was on 
Appellant to demonstrate that his mother was incompetent, and that he failed to 
satisfy that burden.  In Crotteau, 656 P.2d  at 1169, a case in which the 
defendant claimed that substituted service of process was not effected at her 
“usual place of abode,” we held that “the party asserting the validity of the 
service bears the burden of proof, and that no presumption attaches, in the case 
of substituted service, to shift the burden.”  This case, however, is distinguishable 
from Crotteau.  In contrast to Crotteau, Appellant contends that 
substituted service was invalid because his mother was incompetent.  Under these circumstances, where a party 
asserts that substituted service is invalid due to acceptance of service by an 
incompetent person, we find that the burden is on the party asserting that 
service was invalid to prove incompetence.  
This is consistent with the approach followed in federal courts and in 
most states, as recognized in Crotteau, 656 P.2d at 
1168:
 
[T]he 
burden of proof to establish the validity of the service is on the party on 
whose behalf the service is accomplished. See 4 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, § 1083, p. 384 (1969), and cases cited therein. Normally, 
however, the process server’s return will provide a prima facie case as to the 
facts of service, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the 
proof. 
San 
Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting & Refining 
Company, 
327 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964). The defendant has to overcome the proof by strong 
and convincing evidence. Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 
1955).
 
[¶26]     
The return affidavit 
of service filed with the district court stated that, on April 17, 2009, copies 
of the summons and complaint were delivered to “Vincent Rosty – by serving 
copies to Jackie Franzen – mother of Vincent – a person over the age of 14 years 
at 1310 Granite, Mills, WY 82644 – their usual place of abode.”  The return of service, which recited 
facts sufficient to meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1), established a 
presumption that service was proper under the rule.  The affidavits offered by Appellant, 
suggesting that his mother had accepted service on his behalf and had informed 
Appellant’s sister that she thought the documents were for Appellant, failed to 
rebut this presumption by “strong and convincing evidence.”  Accordingly, we hold that service of 
process was properly effected pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
4(d)(1).
 
Denial of Motion to 
Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
 
[¶27]     
In his fifth issue, 
Appellant claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to set 
aside entry of default and default judgment.  We apply the same standard of review to 
the denial of a motion to set aside entry of default as to the denial of a 
motion to set aside default judgment:  
“Decisions resolving motions for setting aside the entry of default or a 
default judgment are made in the exercise of sound discretion by the trial 
court.”  Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 
1998).
 
Rules 55(c) and 
60(b), W.R.C.P., are remedial and are intended to promote decisions on the 
merits when possible. A trial court has wide judicial discretion to grant or 
deny a defendant’s motion under these rules. We will not disturb the exercise of 
that discretion unless appellant demonstrates that the trial court abused it and 
was clearly wrong.  

 
Nowotny 
v. L & B Contract Indus., 
933 P.2d 452, 460 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 
(Wyo. 1988)) (internal citations omitted).  
The proponent of a motion to set aside default judgment has the burden of 
proving that he is entitled to relief.  
Lykins v. Habitat for Humanity, 
The Heart of Wyo., Inc., 2010 WY 118, ¶ 10, 237 P.3d 405, 408 (Wyo. 
2010).
 
[¶28]     
As noted above, 
W.R.C.P. 55(c) provides that “For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).”  Rule 60(b), in turn, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
 
Rule 60. Relief from 
judgment or order.           
. . .       
(b) Other 
reasons. – On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve 
a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 

 
As we have previously 
noted, the factors described in Rule 60(b) are relevant to our determination of 
whether the defendant has shown “good cause.”  Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 999.  If the defendant “cannot substantiate 
reasons under Rule 60(b) for setting aside the default judgment, then 'good 
cause’ also does not exist to set aside the entry of default under Rule 
55(c).”  Id.; see also M & A Constr. Corp. v. Akzo Nobel 
Coatings, 936 P.2d 451, 
454-55 (Wyo. 1997).
 
[¶29]     
We have acknowledged 
two competing policy considerations that guide a decision to set aside a default 
judgment: “The justice system and litigants have an interest in the finality of 
judgment and efficiency in litigation.  However, this court has long recognized 
that 'default judgments are not favored in the law’ and 'it is preferable that 
cases be tried on their merits.’” Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 997 (quoting Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 
(Wyo. 1992)).  Although a decision 
on the merits is preferred, “given a proper case, we will recognize the 
propriety of a default judgment.”  
Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 997.  
 
[¶30]     
In his motion to set 
aside default and default judgment, Appellant claimed that he was entitled to 
relief from the default judgment because “the complaint and summons were not 
properly served and cannot form the basis of a valid judgment.”  He asserted that “the facts regarding 
the complete lack of service on Mr. Rosty fulfill the requirements of Rules 
60(b)(1), 60(b)(2), 60(b)(4), and 60(b)(6).”  The district court, however, found that 
service had been properly effected pursuant to W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1), and concluded 
that Appellant had not established grounds for relief from the default 
judgment.
 
[¶31]     
On appeal, Appellant 
again relies on the assertion that he was not properly served with the summons 
and complaint in claiming that the district court’s denial of his motion to set 
aside default and default judgment was an abuse of discretion.  He emphasizes that there has been no 
demonstration that he was “in any way culpable in the failure of the [Skajs] to 
ensure good service upon him.”  However, as discussed above, Appellant 
failed to carry his burden of proving that service of process was 
inadequate.  Consequently, as the 
district court properly concluded, any claim for relief founded on the 
proposition that Appellant was not properly served is simply unavailing.  See Lykins, ¶ 13, 237 P.3d  at 409 (finding no abuse of 
discretion where district court denied motion to set aside default judgment 
because defendants “failed to prove that they were not properly served, and did 
not demonstrate any other reason justifying relief”).  Appellant has presented no argument that 
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion aside from his 
claim of insufficient service of process.  
In light of our conclusion that service of process was valid, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s request 
for relief.
 
Punitive 
Damages
 
[¶32]     
In Appellant’s final 
issue, he challenges the district court’s award of punitive damages.  The district court assessed $75,000 in 
punitive damages based on the following findings:
 
[T]he punitive damage 
allegations and claim is defaulted also.  
Also, it does appear that with the driver, Mr. Vincent Rosty, having been 
under the influence of cannabinoids and I believe it was methamphetamine and 
his, basically, desertion of Ms. Skaj after she was injured, that some 
component of punitive damages is appropriate for his willful and wanton 
misconduct.
 
Although the facts as 
alleged in the complaint and the testimony of Ms. Skaj at the default hearing 
raise questions as to the factual basis of Appellant’s “willful and wanton 
misconduct,” Appellant does not dispute the district court’s findings.  Rather, he contends that the district 
court erred in failing to give proper consideration to his wealth or financial 
condition prior to assessing punitive damages.  He claims that because the Skajs did not 
present sufficient evidence on which the district court could have made a 
determination of his wealth or financial condition, the award of punitive 
damages must be reversed.  The Skajs 
respond that they satisfied their evidentiary burden. 
 
[¶33]     
The 
decision to award punitive damages is within the district court’s discretion, 
and we will not reverse the decision on appeal without finding a clear abuse of 
that discretion.  Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶ 41, 
47 P.3d 206, 219 (Wyo. 2002).  In 
reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we consider whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the district court’s conclusion:
 
A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the district court’s decision, and we afford the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Findings of fact not supported by 
the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the 
evidence cannot be sustained.          

Vargas Ltd. P’ship v. Four “H” Ranches 
Architectural Control Comm., 
2009 WY 26, ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Witowski v. 
Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 13, 199 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Wyo. 2009)).            

 
[¶34]     
As we noted in Alexander, ¶ 40, 47 P.3d  at 218, punitive damages are 
not favored and are to be awarded “only for conduct involving some element of 
outrage,” such as willful or wanton misconduct.  Punitive damages are “an implement of 
public policy” and are intended to punish the defendant with the purpose of 
deterring others from similar conduct in the future.  Id; see also Adel, 681 P.2d  at 890.  Consistent with the purposes of 
punishment and deterrence, we have looked to multiple factors in determining 
whether an award of punitive damages is appropriate, including the financial 
condition or wealth of the defendant, the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, and the nature and extent of the injury caused by the 
defendant’s conduct.  Alexander, ¶ 42, 47 P.3d  at 219.  The burden of proof with respect to 
punitive damages is on the party seeking such damages.  Adel, 681 P.2d  at 
892.
 
[¶35]     
In 
Adel, 681 P.2d  at 892, a case in 
which we affirmed the entry of default judgment, we held that “in the absence of 
evidence of a defendant’s wealth or financial condition an award of punitive 
damages cannot be sustained.”  We 
stated that evidence relating to the wealth or financial condition of the 
defendant constitutes “foundational proof” supporting an award of punitive 
damages and noted that a defendant in default does not concede the amount 
demanded for punitive damages.  Id.  Based on the facts in Adel, where no evidence was presented on 
the financial condition or the wealth of the defendant, we held that the award 
of punitive damages was inappropriate.  
Id.  
 
[¶36]     
Both 
before and after our decision in Adel, we have not hesitated to reverse 
an award of punitive damages in cases where there has been inadequate evidence 
of a defendant’s wealth or financial condition.  For example, in Sears v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d 765, 773 
(Wyo. 1980), we reversed an award of punitive damages where the only evidence of 
the defendant’s wealth was that “appellant’s ranch extended for at least six 
miles along the private road; appellant stated that it would take at least six 
days to separate the cows from the yearlings after appellee’s crew allegedly 
left the gates open; and appellant owns road-construction equipment which he 
rents for $50.00 an hour.”  From 
this evidence, we concluded that “there was no evidence present from 
which the jury could have considered appellant’s wealth.”  Id.; see also Ruwart v. Wagner, 880 P.2d 586, 
593 (Wyo. 1994); United States ex rel. 
Farmers Home Admin. v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1040 (Wyo. 1985); Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 811 (Wyo. 
1984). 
 
[¶37]     
In the present case, 
we find that the Skajs failed to produce sufficient evidence of Appellant’s 
wealth or financial condition to support an award of punitive damages.  The only evidence produced by the Skajs 
consisted of deposition testimony indicating that Appellant had worked at R 
& R Roofing for approximately seven years, from April, 2001 to May, 2008, 
and a paystub from one day of Appellant’s employment at R & R Roofing, 
showing that he earned $16.50 per hour.  
In evaluating this evidence in the context of the Skajs’ request for 
punitive damages, the district court, noting the requirements of Wyoming Civil 
Pattern Jury Instruction 4.06(A), which requires consideration of the “financial 
condition of the defendant,” stated as follows:

            
The other matter that I mentioned is the punitive damage claim.  And as was noted in the Plaintiffs’ 
memorandum, the Wyoming pattern jury instructions do provide guidelines.  I believe they set forth seven or so 
factors that may be included in an award of punitive damages.  And I’ve tried to take a look at 
that.  There [are] some areas where 
I’m not that sure.  For example, I 
don’t think there was any profit made by Mr. Vincent Rosty that would come into 
play.  His 
financial position is somewhat nebulous.  
Obviously, he was a wage earner. I struggled a little bit with what his 
financial position would have been at or near the time of the 
event.  I’m not real sure 
about the criminal sanctions that were imposed.
 
            
But taking a look at all of those factors and considering them, I think 
some component of punitive damage is appropriate. . . .
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The fact that Appellant was 
a wage-earner at the time of his tortious conduct does not constitute evidence 
of his wealth.  Although Appellant’s 
term of employment with R & R Roofing and a paystub may provide some 
indication of his income during the time of his employment, that evidence does 
not provide a sufficient indication of Appellant’s wealth or financial condition 
to support an award of punitive damages.  
The Skajs presented no evidence of Appellant’s assets or net worth.  Further, the Skajs presented no evidence 
of Appellant’s financial condition at the time the judgment was entered.2  Because the district court was presented 
with insufficient evidence of Appellant’s wealth or financial condition, we find 
that the district court abused its discretion in awarding punitive damages and 
reverse that part of the district court’s order.
 
[¶38]     
The district court’s 
denial of Appellant’s motion to set aside default and default judgment is 
affirmed.  We reverse that part of 
the district court’s order awarding punitive damages and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶39]     
FOOTNOTES
1W.R.C.P. 55 provides, 
in relevant part, as follows:
 
Rule 55.  Default.
 
(a) Entry. – When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit 
or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party’s default.      
(b) Judgment. – 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:            

(1) By the 
Clerk. – When the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or 
for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that 
amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for 
failure to appear and is not a minor or an incompetent person;    (2) By the 
Court. – In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall 
apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against 
a minor or an incompetent person unless represented in the action by a guardian, 
guardian ad litem, trustee, conservator, or other such representative who has 
appeared therein. If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought has 
appeared in the action the party (or, if appearing by representative, the 
party’s representative) shall be served with written notice of the application 
for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such application. If, 
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to 
the parties when and as required by any statute. 

(c) Setting aside default. – For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b).
. . 
.
2Although this Court 
has not addressed the issue, other jurisdictions have held that a defendant’s 
wealth is appropriately measured “at the time of entry of the judgment, in 
recognition that that is the time that the wrongdoer must feel the sting of an 
appropriately sized punitive damage penalty.”  Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, 
Inc., 194 N.J. 212, 219-20, 
943 A.2d 866, 871 (N.J. 2008); see also 
Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 941 (D.C. 1995) (“[S]ince 
current net worth fairly depicts a tortfeasor’s ability to pay punitive damages, 
the plaintiffs here were required to present sufficient proof of current net 
worth to support the punitive damages awarded by the jury.”); Hayes Oyster Co. v. Dulcich, 199 Ore. 
App. 43, 57, 110 P.3d 615, 624 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (“What 'would constitute a 
penalty in relation to a defendant’s wealth’ is properly measured at the time 
the penalty is assessed, not at the time the tortious action occurred.”); Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573, 
621 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2001) (compiling cases).       

[¶40]