Title: Johnson v. DeBusk Farm, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
 
    JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
 
DIANE B. JOHNSON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 052476 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
DEBUSK FARM, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
C. Randall Lowe, Judge 
 
 
The principal issues in this appeal are whether the trial 
court erred in finding (1) the existence of a prescriptive easement 
and (2) that the owner of the servient tract had notice of such 
easement when she purchased the tract. 
I. 
 
DeBusk Farm, Inc. (DeBusk), filed a declaratory judgment 
action against Diane B. Johnson, seeking the establishment of a 
prescriptive easement across Johnson’s property.  Johnson, in turn, 
filed a third-party cross-bill against Meade M. Willis and Mary B. 
Willis, her predecessors-in-title, claiming the Willises had 
breached their covenant of general warranty set forth in their deed 
to her. 
 
The trial court, after an ore tenus hearing, ruled in favor of 
DeBusk, finding the existence of a prescriptive easement that was 
open and obvious to Johnson when she purchased her property.  
Having found that the easement was open and obvious to Johnson, the 
court dismissed her cross-bill against the Willises.  We awarded 
Johnson this appeal. 
 
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II. 
 
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to DeBusk, 
the prevailing party at trial.  Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225, 
563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002).  So viewed, the evidence showed that 
Johnson acquired her farm from the Willises on August 20, 1999.  
Johnson’s farm straddles DeBusk Mill Road, a state secondary 
highway.  The Middle Fork of the Holston River flows through 
Johnson’s farm south of DeBusk Mill Road.
 
DeBusk owns farmland (the DeBusk Tract) that adjoins Johnson’s 
farm on its southern border and just south of the Middle Fork as it 
flows through Johnson’s farm.  DeBusk acquired the DeBusk Tract 
from the DeBusk family (the Family) in 1988.  If DeBusk cannot use 
the farm road, which is the subject of this litigation, the DeBusk 
Tract is virtually landlocked. 
 
The Family had long owned farmland on both sides of the Middle 
Fork of the Holston River.  The evidence established that the farm 
road was used for many years to cross the river during the time 
that the historic DeBusk Mill was in operation.  After the mill 
closed about 1967, the Family, from 1967 to 1988, and DeBusk, 
thereafter, continued to use the farm road. 
 
David DeBusk, vice president and farm manager of DeBusk, 
testified that, during the 33-year period that the Willises owned 
what is now the Johnson farm, the farm road was regularly traveled 
with farm equipment and to transport cattle.  The Willises were 
aware of DeBusk’s and the Family’s continued use of the farm road 
 
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across their property for the entire time they owned it, and they 
acknowledged under oath the existence of the farm road as an 
easement. 
 
The evidence established the location and visible markings of 
the farm road.  The north end of the farm road is marked by a 
“turnout” from the state highway, DeBusk Mill Road.  From there, 
the farm road passes through the part of Johnson’s farm south of 
DeBusk Mill Road and through a permanent “cut” in the north bank of 
the river.  From the cut, the farm road proceeds down the river 
bank to a ford in the river, and, after crossing the river, the 
farm road proceeds about 15 feet up the south bank of the river and 
over a 10-foot strip of Johnson’s land into the DeBusk Tract.  On 
the south bank of the river is a concrete ramp, apparently 
constructed to allow vehicles to exit the river. 
 
Johnson inspected the Willises’ property before she bought it.  
She testified that she had observed the turnout at the north end of 
the farm road.  She also “saw a place on the south side of the 
river where people had passed or trucks or something.” 
 
Others who had been on the property at or around the time of 
Johnson’s purchase testified that they had noticed a portion of the 
farm road that they believed provided access to the river.  Still 
others testified that they had seen the ford in the river and the 
concrete ramp leading out of it. 
 
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III. 
 
The trial court heard the evidence ore tenus and, on its own 
motion, conducted a view of the properties.  The trial court stated 
its finding as follows: 
 
The Court, after reviewing the evidence, finds as a 
matter of fact that the complainant has established, by clear 
and convincing evidence, an easement by prescription over the 
respondent’s property.  The evidence established this easement 
was used for many years to cross the river during a period of 
time when a mill on the river was in use.  The mill was closed 
in approximately 1967.  The evidence further established 
thereafter the easement continued to be used to cross the 
respondent’s property [then] the river to enter the DeBusk 
property on the other side for the purpose of farming. 
 
The court further stated the following: 
After a view of the property, the Court can find clearly that 
anyone purchasing the property would have seen that there was 
a ford in the river, which crossed to an embankment on the 
other side with a road leading up from the river on the other 
side.  Also, on Ms. Johnson’s side of the property, the bank 
clearly was tailored down and it was open and obvious that 
that property had been crossed to use the ford to obtain 
access to the other side of the river. 
 
 
Having found that the easement was open and obvious, the trial 
court held that the Willises had not breached their general 
warranty covenant in their deed to Johnson.  Accordingly, the trial 
court dismissed Johnson’s claim against them. 
IV. 
 
As previously stated, we must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to DeBusk, the prevailing party at trial.  Caplan, 
264 Va. at 225, 563 S.E.2d at 722.  Additionally, when a trial 
court’s decision is based upon an ore tenus hearing, we owe that 
decision great deference.  Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, 259 Va. 521, 527, 
 
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526 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2000).  Therefore, we will not disturb the 
trial court’s decision unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Id. 
 
First, we consider whether the trial court erred in finding 
the existence of a prescriptive easement over Johnson’s land.  In 
order to establish a prescriptive easement, DeBusk had the burden 
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that its use of the 
farm road was “ ‘adverse, under a claim of right, exclusive, 
continuous, uninterrupted, and with the knowledge and acquiescence 
of the owner of the land over which it passes, and that the use has 
continued for at least 20 years.’ ”  Amstutz v. Everett Jones 
Lumber Corp., 268 Va. 551, 559, 604 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2002) (quoting 
Martin v. Moore, 263 Va. 640, 645, 561 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2002)). 
“Where there has been an open, visible, continuous and 
unmolested use of a road across the land of another for at 
least twenty years, the use will be presumed to be under claim 
of right, and places upon the owner of the servient estate the 
burden of rebutting this presumption by showing that the use 
was permissive, and not under claim of right.” 
 
Pettus v. Keeling, 232 Va. 483, 485, 352 S.E.2d 321, 323-24 (1987) 
(quoting Rives v. Gooch, 157 Va. 661, 663, 162 S.E. 184, 184 
(1932)). 
 
Johnson contends that the evidence that Virginia McKee, a 
predecessor-in-title of the Willises, had owned a one-third 
interest in the DeBusk Mill and also happened to be David DeBusk’s 
great aunt was sufficient to rebut any presumption that the 
Family’s use was adverse or under a claim of right.  Even if this 
 
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use were permissive, acquisition of the property by the Willises, 
who had no familial relationship to the Family, constituted a 
"change in circumstances and conditions" so that the use would not 
have continued to be permissive.  Eagle Lodge v. Hofmeyer, 193 Va. 
864, 880, 71 S.E.2d 195, 204 (1952).  Indeed, the trial court, in 
finding the existence of a prescriptive easement, focused primarily 
on the 33-year period when the servient tract was owned by the 
Willises.  During this period, the farm road was openly and 
continuously used by DeBusk and the Family to cross the river, and 
the road was used with the knowledge of the Willises.  Thus, under 
the trial court’s finding, which is supported by the evidence, the 
prescriptive easement was established at least 13 years before 
Johnson ever acquired her farm. 
 
Johnson also contends that, because there is evidence in the 
record that the public once used the farm road to reach the DeBusk 
Mill, no prescriptive-easement right arose.  Again, Johnson ignores 
the trial court’s finding that a prescriptive easement arose while 
the Willises owned the servient tract. Finally, we consider 
Johnson’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that she 
had had sufficient notice of the farm road’s existence prior to the 
time she purchased her farm from the Willises.  We do not agree. 
 
Although the evidence was in conflict concerning this issue, 
the trial court viewed the properties and resolved the conflict in 
DeBusk’s favor.  We hold that the trial court’s finding regarding 
notice to Johnson, which is entitled to great deference, is not 
 
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plainly wrong and is supported by the evidence.  Indeed, Johnson’s 
own testimony indicates that she had observed sufficient 
indications of an existing road to put her on notice that an 
easement may exist.  We also agree with the trial court that, 
because the easement was open and obvious, the Willises had not 
breached their covenant of general warranty contained in their deed 
to Johnson.  Scott v. Albemarle Horse Show, 128 Va. 517, 529-31, 
104 S.E. 842, 846-47 (1920) (easements that are open and obvious 
not within covenant of general warranty); see Russakoff v. Scruggs, 
241 Va. 135, 141, 400 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1991).  Therefore, the trial 
court was correct in dismissing Johnson’s claims against the 
Willises. 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.