Title: Whitfield v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Compton, S.J., and Whiting, R.J. 
 
JOHNNY MAURICE WHITFIELD  
 
OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 021520 
 
February 28, 2003 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole question in this criminal appeal is whether the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia correctly approved a circuit 
court's refusal to suppress certain evidence gathered following 
defendant's detention by the police. 
 
Defendant Johnny Maurice Whitfield was indicted in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Newport News for possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Prior to arraignment, 
he moved the court to suppress evidence seized from his person 
when he was detained and arrested without a warrant. 
 
Subsequently, during a bench trial, the court denied the 
motion and found the defendant guilty as charged.  Later, he was 
sentenced to incarceration and fined. 
 
The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's petition for 
appeal in an unpublished order.  Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 2978-01-1 (May 22, 2002).  We awarded defendant this 
appeal from the Court of Appeals' judgment. 
 
The facts are undisputed.  On January 26, 2001, about 3:30 
a.m., J. L. Barnes, a uniformed Newport News police officer in a 
marked police vehicle was patrolling an area of the city known 
for illegal drug activity, burglaries, and prostitution.  
Although there was no report of criminal activity at that 
particular time, "several burglaries" recently had occurred in 
that "neighborhood." 
 
The officer noticed the defendant dressed in "all black," 
standing on private property "15 feet from the roadway" between 
a condemned house and an occupied dwelling.  The officer knew 
that the area was not "a common cut-through" to other property. 
 
The officer "shined" the spotlight of the police vehicle 
"directly on that subject, and at that time the subject turned 
around and took off running between the houses, going to the 
back of the house."  The officer "exited" his vehicle in an 
attempt to "catch" defendant, who then was walking at "a fast 
pace" and "looking over his shoulder" at the officer. 
 
D. A. Bonday, another uniformed police officer in a marked 
police vehicle, arrived on the scene to assist Barnes.  Bonday 
"went in foot pursuit of the subject,"  who ran from the officer 
in "a zig-zag direction, back and forth" across the street.  The 
defendant then ran between houses and unsuccessfully attempted 
to climb a six-foot fence. Bonday detained defendant, who "had 
his hands in his pockets." 
 
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Upon being detained, defendant possessed a cigar tube in 
one hand and a clear plastic bag in the other.  These items 
contained "numerous rocks" of crack cocaine. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), contends that officer Barnes did not "have a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he 
first observed [defendant] and decided to detain him for a Terry 
stop."  We do not agree. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides, as pertinent here, that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, . . . and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."  We 
apply settled standards of appellate review to decide the 
present claim that evidence was seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
Such a claim presents a mixed question of fact and law that 
an appellate court reviews de novo.  Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 
Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002).  In evaluating the 
claim, the appellate court must give deference to the factual 
findings of the trial court and independently determine whether 
the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.
 
While "the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the 
legitimacy of a warrantless search and seizure," Simmons v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989), the 
defendant must show that the trial court's denial of his 
suppression motion, when the evidence is considered in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, was reversible error.  
Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 838. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer in 
appropriate circumstances may detain a person for the purpose of 
investigating possibly criminal behavior, even though there is 
no probable cause to make an arrest.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.  
Accord Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 839; Ewell v. 
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997).  In 
order to justify the brief seizure of a person by such an 
investigatory stop, the police officer must "have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is 
involved in criminal activity."  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 
(1979).  Accord Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 
S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988). 
 
To determine whether a police officer had a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped may 
be involved in criminal activity, a court must consider the 
totality of the circumstances.  Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 
S.E.2d at 722-23 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18 (1981)).  Accord Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 
288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982). 
 
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In the present case, when considering the totality of the 
circumstances, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the police had a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that defendant 
may have been engaged in criminal activity. 
 
About 3:30 a.m., Officer Barnes observed defendant, 
apparently trespassing on private property, near an abandoned 
building in an area notorious for crime problems.  When the 
officer aimed the spotlight of his marked police vehicle toward 
defendant, he began to run away.  When Officer Bonday joined the 
chase, defendant continued to run and to evade the officer.  
When defendant could not escape over a high fence, he was 
detained. 
 
The characteristics of the area and the defendant's 
conduct, including his unprovoked flight, justified the stop, 
and further investigation.  "[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a 
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. (citations 
omitted) Headlong flight – wherever it occurs – is the 
consummate act of evasion:  it is not necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."  Illinois 
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 
Consequently, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly 
approved the circuit court's refusal to suppress the evidence 
 
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seized from defendant's person.  Thus, the judgment confirming 
the conviction will be 
Affirmed. 
 
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