Title: Marshall v. Crocker

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

387 So. 2d 176 (1980)
William G. MARSHALL and Rhonda Carolyn Marshall
v.
Rodney K. CROCKER, as Guardian of Ray G. Crocker, a person of unsound mind.
79-40.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 22, 1980.
*177 Norborne C. Stone, Jr. of Stone, Partin & Granade, Bay Minette, for appellants.
Francis A. Poggi, Jr., Fairhope, for appellee.
*178 FAULKNER, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baldwin County holding that there was no fraud in the sale of a house that had been damaged by fire. We affirm.
In 1977, through a real estate broker, the Marshalls bought a 15-year-old house from Rodney K. Crocker, as Guardian of Ray G. Crocker, a person of unsound mind. (There was neither contact nor negotiation between the Marshalls and Crocker.) The purchase price of the house was paid by a cash payment, a first mortgage and a second mortgage to Crocker payable in eight months.
About two weeks after the Marshalls moved into the house, Mr. Marshall discovered that there had been a fire in the attic. He called the broker, and asked him, "Did you know there was a fire over here?" The broker replied, "No, I didn't." Subsequently, the broker went to the house, inspected the attic, and, indeed, found that there had been a fire there. (The evidence shows that the fire occurred in 1971.) Nothing more was said or done by either Marshall or the broker until the broker sought to help Crocker by calling Marshall about paying the second mortgage. At that time, a year had passed by, and the mortgage was in default. Marshall let it be known that he was not going to pay because he felt like some fraud had been involved. The broker offered to purchase the house from Marshall. No agreement between them was ever consummated. Eventually, Crocker began foreclosure proceedings.
After foreclosure was begun, Marshall brought suit to enjoin, alleging misrepresentation and deceit in the sale of the house to him.
Rodney Crocker testified that Ray Crocker lived there until he went to a nursing home; that while the roof sagged there had been no damage from leakage; that the sagging was normal for that age house, and could result from the way the roof was constructed. An expert witness testified that repair done after the fire was structurally sound, but 40 to 50 percent of the area where work needed to be done is not structurally sound. He opined that the roof structure was not structurally sound and the cause of this was the fire.
On the question of misrepresentation of the soundness and the fire, the evidence shows that neither the broker nor the owner said anything. Moreover, the evidence shows that Marshall did not inquire about the fire when the house was shown to him on two occasions; he made no effort to inspect the attic before the sale-his inspection was two weeks after he moved in, and at that time he found evidence of the fire.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred by finding that there was no actionable fraud committed by the seller when he did not reveal the fire damage. We hold that it did not.
Mr. Justice Clopton stated in Jordan & Sons v. Pickett, 78 Ala. 331 (1884), that:
The rules of law stated in Jordan were reiterated by Mr. Justice Somerville in Corry v. Sylvia Y Cia, 192 Ala. 550 (1915). They are applicable to this case.
Here Marshall could have, by ordinary diligence, easily discovered evidence of the fire. He was not prevented from inspecting the attic before he bought the house. As a matter of fact, the real estate agent testified that Marshall inspected the house inside and out, and had ample opportunity to look at anything he wanted to, including the attic.
We opine that his failure to inquire, plus his failure to inspect, negates actionable fraud under the facts of this case. It does not appear that Marshall was unlearned or in any way afflicted with any physical or mental disability. Moreover, we do not find any evidence of intent to deceive either on the part of the real estate broker or the seller.
The trial court heard the case ore tenus, and under our standard of review, its findings will not be disturbed unless plainly *180 erroneous. Adams v. Bethany Church, 380 So. 2d 788 (Ala.1980). We find no errors warranting a reversal of the court's decree.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs in the result.
ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur with MADDOX, J.
JONES, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result. This case was heard ore tenus and, on review, we indulge in a presumption that the findings of fact which are supported by evidence have the force and effect of a jury verdict.
ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.