Title: State ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3673.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3673 
THE STATE EX REL. MOBLEY, APPELLANT, v. TYACK, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack, Slip Opinion No.  
2023-Ohio-3673.] 
Vexatious litigators—R.C. 2323.52—R.C. 2323.52(G) unambiguously prohibits an 
appeal from a court of appeals’ judgment denying a motion to continue 
proceedings as a vexatious litigator—Appeal dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
(No. 2023-0314—Submitted July 18, 2023—Decided October 11, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 22AP-313. 
_______________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Alphonso Mobley Jr., filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals against appellee, Franklin County 
Prosecutor G. Gary Tyack, seeking an order compelling production of public 
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records and awarding statutory damages.  During the pendency of the case, Mobley 
was declared a vexatious litigator.  He filed a motion for leave to continue the 
mandamus action against Tyack, but the Tenth District denied the motion and 
dismissed his complaint.  Mobley appeals the dismissal.  We dismiss Mobley’s 
appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Mobley alleges that in April 2022, he made a public-records request 
to Tyack under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for paper copies of the 
following: “a. Records Retention Schedule[,] b. File [N]o. PRR-0599[, and] c. 
Certified Statements [p]ursuant to R.C. 309.16 for the years of 2016-2020.” 
{¶ 3} On June 1, 2022, Mobley filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in 
the Tenth District, arguing that Tyack had “failed to answer” his records request.  
Mobley requested that the Tenth District compel production of the requested public 
records and award statutory damages.  Tyack moved to dismiss Mobley’s 
complaint, arguing that he had responded to Mobley’s request, that he had produced 
the requested records, and that he did not possess the certified statements for the 
years 2016 through 2019. 
{¶ 4} Mobley filed a supplemental affidavit, attesting that on June 3, 2022, 
he received a response from Tyack, in which Tyack said he would provide Mobley 
with paper copies of the records-retention schedule and the documents comprising 
“[f]ile [N]o. PRR-0599.”  Tyack filed a response to Mobley’s supplemental 
affidavit, stating that “after an extensive search, the current administration is unable 
to locate the requested certified statements for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 
2019.”  Tyack further said that he provided Mobley with the 2020 certified 
statement on July 6, 2022. 
{¶ 5} On January 20, 2023, in a separate case, the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas issued a judgment declaring Mobley a vexatious litigator under 
R.C. 2323.52.  Tyack v. Mobley, Franklin C.P. No. 21CV2747 (Jan. 20, 2023). 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 6} On January 31, Mobley filed a motion for leave in the Tenth District 
to continue his mandamus action as a vexatious litigator, as required under R.C. 
2323.52(F)(2).  On February 2, the Tenth District denied Mobley’s motion and 
dismissed the mandamus action, stating that Mobley’s motion and complaint failed 
to establish that his mandamus claim was not an abuse of process or that there were 
reasonable grounds for allowing the action to proceed. 
{¶ 7} Mobley timely appealed to this court and argues that the requirement 
that he obtain leave to proceed as a vexatious litigator is unconstitutional and 
conflicts with the Ohio Revised Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure.  Mobley 
also argues that if the Tenth District’s decision is considered a ruling on the merits, 
he is entitled to statutory damages. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 8} R.C. 2323.52 was enacted to “ ‘prevent abuse of the system by those 
persons who persistently and habitually file lawsuits without reasonable grounds 
and/or otherwise engage in frivolous conduct in the trial courts of this state.’ ”  
Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St.3d 3, 13, 740 N.E.2d 656 (2000), quoting Cent. Ohio 
Transit Auth. v. Timson, 132 Ohio App.3d 41, 50, 724 N.E.2d 458 (10th Dist.1998).  
Once Mobley was declared a vexatious litigator, R.C. 2323.52(F)(2) required him 
to file a motion for leave to proceed in the court of appeals on his pending 
mandamus action.  To grant Mobley leave to proceed, the court of appeals had to 
be “satisfied that the proceedings * * * [were] not an abuse of process of the court 
and that there [were] reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application,” id.  In 
denying Mobley leave, the Tenth District necessarily determined that his 
mandamus claim constituted an abuse of process of the court and that there were 
no reasonable grounds for the action. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2323.52(G) states that when the order declaring an individual a 
vexatious litigator is in effect, “no appeal by the person who is the subject of that 
order shall lie from a decision of the * * * court of appeals * * * that denies that 
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person leave for the * * * continuance of * * * legal proceedings * * * in a court of 
appeals * * * .”  See also Marin v. Trumbull Cty. Probate Court, 133 Ohio St.3d 
1416, 2012-Ohio-4758, 976 N.E.2d 908 (under R.C. 2323.52(G), “no appeal shall 
lie from a decision that denies leave to institute or continue legal proceedings in a 
court of appeals”).  Because R.C. 2323.52(G) unambiguously prohibits an appeal 
from a court of appeals’ judgment denying a motion to continue proceedings filed 
by a vexatious litigator, we lack jurisdiction to consider Mobley’s appeal.  Our 
resolution of this issue is dispositive, and we need not reach Mobley’s other 
propositions of law. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 10} Mobley’s appeal from the Tenth District is prohibited under R.C. 
2323.52(G).  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Appeal dismissed. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 11} I agree with the majority that the appeal brought by appellant, 
Alphonso Mobley Jr., is prohibited by R.C. 2323.52(G) and must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction.  I write separately, however, to caution courts against using the 
vexatious-litigator statute to thwart legitimate public-records requests. 
{¶ 12} “ ‘The purpose of the vexatious litigator statute is clear.  It seeks to 
prevent abuse of the system by those persons who persistently and habitually file 
lawsuits without reasonable grounds and/or otherwise engage in frivolous conduct 
in the trial courts of this state.’ ”  Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St.3d 3, 13, 740 N.E.2d 
656 (2000), quoting Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Timson, 132 Ohio App.3d 41, 50, 
724 N.E.2d 458 (10th Dist.1998), abrogated by Mayer.  The statute is designed to 
prevent “ ‘baseless litigation,’ ” id., quoting Timson at 50, and “illegitimate 
January Term, 2023 
 
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activities,” id.  “[T]he statute is not designed, nor does it operate, to preclude 
vexatious litigators from proceeding forward on their legitimate claims.”  Id. at 14. 
{¶ 13} In this case, the vexatious-litigator statute did not operate according 
to its purpose.  As noted by the majority, by denying Mobley’s motion for leave to 
proceed, the Tenth District Court of Appeals necessarily determined under R.C. 
2323.52(F)(2) that either Mobley’s mandamus action was an abuse of process or 
there were no reasonable grounds for the action.  But the facts demonstrate that 
Mobley did have reasonable grounds for the action, because he had a legitimate 
claim. 
{¶ 14} In April 2022, Mobley requested records under Ohio’s Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, from appellee, Franklin County Prosecutor G. Gary 
Tyack, including “Certified Statements [p]ursuant to R.C. 309.16 for the years of 
2016-2020.”  Three months later, on July 6, Tyack provided Mobley with only the 
2020 certified statements.  Construing the Public Records Act liberally, the 
presiding magistrate denied Tyack’s motion to dismiss, finding that Tyack had 
failed to prove by sworn statement that the 2016 through 2019 certified statements 
did not exist.  Although Mobley maintained a legitimate claim, resolution of his 
mandamus action did not proceed until after he was declared a vexatious litigator. 
{¶ 15} When a person has a legitimate mandamus claim based on a party’s 
failure to provide public records within a reasonable time, that person’s status as a 
vexatious litigator should not be used to preclude the claim.  Nor should courts 
grant vexatious-litigator status simply because a person is exercising a substantive 
right as afforded by the General Assembly to seek access to a public record.  
However, because I agree that R.C. 2323.52(G) divests this court of jurisdiction 
over Mobley’s appeal, I must concur in the majority opinion in this case. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas W. 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________