Title: People v. Kotlarz

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88078-Agenda 13-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JOSEPH S. KOTLARZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 13, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Defendant, Joseph S. Kotlarz, appeals his conviction for theft
by deception of an amount exceeding $100,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1
(West 1992)), for which he was sentenced to serve four years'
probation, 180 days in the Du Page County jail, 400 hours of
community service, and to pay restitution of $190,000.
Defendant's main contention is that the appellate court erred in
affirming his conviction (No. 2-97-l194 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23)), because the State failed to prove all the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We
allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	At the joint Du Page County bench trial involving defendant
and codefendant, Robert Hickman (Hickman), Malcolm Erickson
testified that, from 1982 to 1992, he had served as chief counsel
for the Illinois Toll Highway Authority (Tollway). The Tollway
owned a piece of property on the north side of Interstate 88 and
west of Meyers Road in Du Page County which had originally
been purchased for an oasis. The property became excess because
the Tollway had decided not to build an oasis on that site and the
Tollway chose to sell the property.
	Erickson further testified that, in 1989 and 1990, he started
negotiating with Roger Berres and Gregory Constantino of Waste
Management, Inc. (Waste Management), for the sale of the Meyers
Road property. He stated that, during those negotiations, neither
side used the services of a broker. The negotiations proved
unsuccessful and the Tollway retained ownership of the property.
Erickson testified that, although he was contacted by Berres in
April 1991 about reopening negotiations, he directed Berres to
another attorney for the Tollway and was not involved in those
negotiations due to an extended illness. Erickson stated that he
would not have expected a broker to participate in the sale of the
property because a broker is normally used to find potential buyers
and, here, the buyer was already identified. Erickson testified that
in July and August of 1991, Hickman was the executive director
of the Tollway. Erickson did not know defendant.
	Michael Blonstein testified that he had been employed by
Eagle Real Estate Services (Eagle) for 11 years, up until
approximately one year before the trial in this matter. Blonstein
testified in exchange for immunity from prosecution and stated
that Eagle had, pursuant to an agreement with the State, returned
its portion of the commission from the sale of the property to the
Tollway rather than risk indictment. Blonstein stated that Eagle
primarily represented shopping center developers or retailers and
that, in 1990, defendant assisted Eagle in a Tinley Park real estate
transaction. Defendant received over $25,000 for his assistance in
the transaction.
	Blonstein testified that he and defendant were friends and that,
in the spring or summer of 1991, defendant asked Blonstein to
pick him up at Midway Airport, explaining that he had a "dream"
deal for Blonstein. When they met, defendant told Blonstein that
he was going to put Eagle in a deal in order to repay Blonstein for
the way he had handled the Tinley Park transaction relative to
defendant. Blonstein stated that defendant explained the deal
involved Waste Management purchasing property from the
Tollway and that Eagle would receive $50,000. Blonstein asked
what Eagle was expected to do in the deal and defendant replied
that Eagle would have nothing to do and that this was his way of
repaying Eagle. Blonstein testified that he asked defendant
whether the deal was legitimate and defendant assured him that it
was.
	Blonstein further testified that he never learned many details
concerning the sale of the property. When he would question
defendant about the deal, defendant would put him off, telling him
that when the problems were worked out, the deal would close.
Blonstein learned that the total commission on the deal was to be
$240,000, with $50,000 to Eagle and the balance to defendant, and
that Eagle was listed in the contract as the broker of record. When
the deal was scheduled to close, Eagle was directed to send an
invoice indicating that it had been Waste Management's broker.
Until receiving a letter dated July 23, 1991, it was not clear to
Blonstein that Eagle was representing Waste Management rather
than the Tollway. The letter, on defendant's letterhead stationary
and addressed to Hickman, was given to Blonstein by defendant
to provide him with some of the particulars of the deal. The letter
reflected the purchase price of the property as $3.8 million and the
brokerage fee to Eagle of $240,000. The State admitted into
evidence copies of Eagle's check to defendant for $190,000 and
the 1099 tax form reflecting payment of the commission.
	Blonstein stated that he never discussed the sale of the
property with anyone from either the Tollway or Waste
Management. Indeed, before attending a dinner with defendant and
Hickman, defendant instructed him not to mention the deal.
Blonstein testified that he had never before been brought into a
transaction where he had then paid a large portion of the
commission back to the purchaser's lawyer.
	George Erwood testified that he helped to form Eagle and has
been its owner since 1986. Erwood stated that he first met
defendant on July 1, 1991, when he handed defendant a check for
his services in the Tinley Park transaction. Blonstein informed
Erwood about the deal involving the Tollway and Waste
Management, and he believed Eagle was to provide comparable
listings. Erwood stated that no oral or written agreement existed
between Eagle and either the Tollway or Waste Management.
Erwood had no contact with either the Tollway or Waste
Management regarding the deal, nor did he provide services to
either party.
	Erwood further testified that he understood defendant was
representing Waste Management. At defendant's request, Erwood
drafted the broker's invoice and sent it to the title company. A day
or two later, Erwood picked up the commission check for
$240,000 from the title company and deposited it. Erwood then
drafted the $190,000 check to defendant, dated October 20, 1992.
Erwood testified that he had never been involved in a deal in
which a portion of the brokerage fee was given to the purchaser's
attorney. While Erwood admitted that he had once described Eagle
as a "conduit" with respect to the deal, he regretted that choice of
words but agreed that the deal was "processed" through Eagle.
Erwood stated that he never believed that Eagle did anything
illegal in connection with this matter, and paid back the $50,000
because he was being threatened with prosecution and felt it was
the prudent course of action. Eagle made the check payable to the
Tollway at the direction of the State's Attorney's office.
	Peter Huizenga testified that he has been a member of Waste
Management's board of directors since it was formed in 1968.
Huizenga had known defendant for 12 to 15 years, and Hickman
for 8 to 10 years. Huizenga stated that Waste Management had
been seeking the Meyers Road property for two or three years
before it was actually purchased. He was aware of the personal
friendship between defendant and Hickman, and introduced
defendant to Waste Management because defendant indicated that
he might be able to assist the company in acquiring the property.
Defendant told Huizenga that he had a personal relationship with
Hickman, which might be a "good fresh approach." Huizenga
testified that he was not involved in the real estate transaction and
was not aware that Eagle was involved. While Huizenga did not
know how defendant was going to be paid by Waste Management,
he assumed that it was being handled by Roger Berres. To
Huizenga's knowledge, no one at Waste Management approved of
an arrangement by defendant to receive $190,000 of sale proceeds
provided to a broker.
	Gregory Constantino testified that he is an attorney for Waste
Management, and that in 1991 and 1992, he worked as senior
attorney in real estate transactions. As part of his duties,
Constantino drafted, reviewed and formulated real estate contracts
and offers. In 1988 and 1989, Waste Management was attempting
to obtain an easement or right of way over the Meyers Road
property owned by the Tollway in order to construct a frontage
road to link two of the company's buildings. Waste Management
did not use a broker during these negotiations.
	In June 1991, negotiations between the Tollway and Waste
Management renewed. Constantino met defendant when he was
asked to go with Berres and defendant for a drive by the property,
after which they all joined Hickman for lunch. Constantino had no
further involvement in the negotiations and testified that Berres
handled them. Constantino did, however, participate in drafting
the sales contract and reviewed a draft agreement prepared by
defendant. Defendant's draft contained an offer of $3.8 million for
the property and a provision for payment of $240,000 to Eagle as
real estate broker. Constantino protested the provision to Berres,
stating that he was unaware that a broker had been involved, did
not know why Waste Management was paying a fee, and had not
heard of Eagle. Constantino testified that Berres told him "this was
the way the Tollway wanted the transaction." Constantino then
prepared a new version of the agreement and included a provision
in which the Tollway warranted that there were no other brokers
and that the commission would not exceed $240,000.
	Constantino further testified that he had no knowledge of any
real estate broker working on behalf of Waste Management for
this property; he believed that Eagle was the Tollway's broker.
Constantino informed Berres that because Eagle was not their
broker, some of the contract language should be changed.
Constantino objected to three sentences which were ultimately
deleted, one of which stated: "Purchaser agrees to be solely
responsible for the commission due Eagle Real Estate."
Constantino explained: "We had agreed out of proceeds to pay it,
out of the total that we were paying for the property, the
$4,040,000. But we were not going to be solely responsible for
this commission." For this same reason, Constantino stated, he
believed it was the Tollway's responsibility to deposit the
commission statement into escrow. Constantino affirmed on
redirect that Waste Management's out-of-pocket expenditure to
obtain the property was $4,040,000 plus closing costs.
	Ben Swislow testified that he had been employed in the
Tollway's real estate department since March 1991. He was
informed about the potential sale of the Meyers Road property to
Waste Management, and contacted Berres about the property, but
was not involved in the negotiations regarding the sale. Swislow
stated that Hickman was the executive director of the Tollway at
this time, and he occasionally spoke with Hickman about the sale
of the property and was told the deal was not closed. Hickman told
Swislow that the Tollway would receive $3.8 million for the
property.
	In the winter of 1991, Hickman directed Swislow to take the
contracts to Berres at Waste Management. While waiting in the
reception area at Waste Management's offices, Swislow met
defendant. When Berres came down, the three men went to Berres'
office and Swislow gave him the contracts. Swislow testified that
he found the broker's commission odd because, to his knowledge,
there was no broker involved in the deal and the Tollway had no
broker's agreement with respect to the property. Swislow stated
that an appraisal of the property contained a variety of values, but
he did recall the amount $2,265,000. He believed that the price of
$3.8 million was "a fabulous price."
	Frank Howard testified under a grant of immunity. He had
been defendant's law partner from 1983 to 1987, doing the "hands
on" work while defendant brought in the business. The parties
stipulated that defendant's law office was across the hall from
Future Realty, that defendant used Future Realty's fax machine,
and that Hickman was never in defendant's office. Howard
testified that he became the Tollway's chief legal counsel on
November 1, 1991. Although he stated that he obtained the
position by applying and interviewing for it, he acknowledged that
defendant had said he would assist Howard in any way possible
and told Howard that he had made efforts on his behalf. Shortly
after he started his job at the Tollway, Howard was told to contact
Roger Berres at Waste Management because there was a deal
pending for Waste Management to purchase excess property.
Howard learned of defendant's involvement in this transaction
either shortly before or after beginning employment with the
Tollway. He ultimately assigned the drafting of this transaction to
staff attorney Paul Olszewski.
	Howard testified that he was informed that the purchase price
of the property was $3.8 million, and he was involved in
negotiating the other terms of the contract. Howard denied ever
talking to Hickman about the purchase price. Howard testified that
People's Exhibit No. 6, a July 30, 1991, letter to Hickman, signed
by defendant, outlined the terms of the deal as Howard understood
them. As executive director, Hickman would have been the party
responsible for negotiating the contract.
	Howard further testified that, before beginning work on the
project, he did not see anything in writing regarding who brought
a broker into the deal. Howard was told that the commission of
$240,000 was to be paid by Waste Management, and made a
notation on the contract to that effect. Howard stated that, pursuant
to his interpretation of the contractual language, Eagle was Waste
Management's broker. According to Howard, the board of
directors would be required to expressly approve a brokerage
contract for the Tollway.
	Howard testified that Paul Olszewski attempted to insert three
sentences into the contract which would have made it very clear
that the broker was Waste Management's, that Waste Management
was to pay the commission, and that the commission was not part
of the sale proceeds due the seller. When they got the contract
back from Waste Management, that language had been deleted and
Howard told Olszewski that it was something that he and Berres
had argued over, and that this was the way the contract was to be
presented to the board. Howard testified that he did not know that
defendant was to receive $190,000 of the commission and, had he
known, he would have investigated. No one ever told Howard that
there was a $4,040,000 offer for the property before the $240,000
brokerage fee was written into the agreement.
	Christine Benn testified that she was employed by the
Tollway as an executive secretary from 1987 to 1994. She worked
for Hickman in 1991 as his administrative assistant. Benn
identified the signature on People's Exhibit No. 2 as Hickman's,
and the parties stipulated to this fact. People's Exhibit No. 2 was
a letter dated July 17, 1991, from Hickman to Berres of Waste
Management which stated, in part:
			"This letter is in reference to your proposal of July 10,
1991. My Board and I would react negatively to any offer
below four million dollars and it would probably take a
little more than that to gain our approval.
			Your next proposal should include a reference to the
brokerage fee. This is made payable to the Eagle Real
Estate Services and will be at six percent of the purchase
price."
	Robert Douglas testified that he was a senior attorney
employed by the Tollway in 1991. In 1992, he was appointed
assistant chief counsel to Frank Howard. Douglas stated that he
was familiar with the procedures for the sale of excess property in
1991. Douglas testified that he first became aware of the Meyers
Road transaction in August 1993, after a discussion with Paul
Olszewski. Douglas thereafter brought the information to the
attention of the Tollway chairman's secretary, and then met with
the chairman, John Garrow, and with the Illinois State Police.
Douglas testified that he copied the contents of the file on the
Meyers Road transaction and turned it over to the police. In April
1994, Douglas learned that he had been stripped of his designation
as a special assistant attorney general, a title which Tollway
attorneys held at that time. The form terminating his position was
initialed by Howard and Hickman. Douglas testified that he
reported to Howard, a department head, and that the department
heads were given the freedom to operate as they saw fit. Douglas
was never told of any dissatisfaction with the quality of his work.
	Paul Olszewski testified that he was an assistant attorney
general for the Tollway whose responsibilities included drafting
contracts for real estate sales. Olszewski stated that, in 1992,
Howard assigned him to review the contract for the Meyers Road
property, People's Exhibit No. 12, and told him that his contact at
Waste Management was Roger Berres. Olszewski testified that,
before he reviewed the purchase price on the contract, he talked to
Ben Swislow, who voiced some concerns. Swislow advised
Olszewski that defendant was involved in the deal, that the
purchase price was to have been $4 million, and that there had
previously not been a broker involved in the deal.
	Olszewski reviewed the price and brokerage provisions of the
contract and noted that the stated purchase price, $3.8 million, was
essentially $4 million less the commission. When Olszewski
related this fact to Howard, Howard advised him that the purchase
price was $3.8 million and that the commission was over and
above that. Pursuant to this conversation with Howard, Olszewski
redrafted the paragraph dealing with the brokerage fees to provide
that the fees were independent of the sales price, that the purchaser
was to be solely responsible for the commission, and that the
purchaser would reimburse the seller for any costs involved in a
commission claim. Olszewski testified that he understood that the
Tollway had no brokerage agreement with anyone and drafted the
brokerage provisions to make it clear that the Tollway "was not on
the hook." Olszewski stated that, when he asked Howard about
Swislow's comments, Howard responded, " I don't know a thing
about it. It's Hickman's deal."
	Olszewski further testified that he reviewed the second draft
of the contract from Waste Management with Howard and noted
that the brokerage provisions had been changed back to the
original language. Howard appeared upset that the language had
been changed, but said that the Tollway would have to "live with
it." In Olszewski's opinion, this version was less acceptable than
the original because it contained a warranty from the Tollway that
the commission would not exceed $240,000, which created the
impression that the Tollway approved of the commission.
Olszewski testified that this version of the brokerage provision
was ultimately accepted in the final contract. Olszewski stated that
he never talked with Hickman about the contract and that he did
not deal with defendant on this transaction.
	Roger Berres testified that he had been employed by Waste
Management as an attorney and as director of real estate from
February 1981 until October 1996. During 1991 and 1992, Berres
reported to the corporate controller and was not a member of the
legal department; his duties involved real estate transactions.
Berres stated that he was involved in negotiating the purchase of
the Meyers Road property from the Tollway. In the late 1980s, he
had unsuccessfully negotiated with the Tollway in an attempt to
obtain an easement on the property. Berres noted that, at that time,
no broker was involved in the negotiations.
 	Berres testified that in May or June 1991, after Hickman had
become executive director of the Tollway, Berres renewed
negotiations over the property. Berres stated that Peter Huizenga,
from the board of directors of Waste Management, instructed him
to contact defendant, explaining that defendant was Hickman's
friend. Berres testified that Waste Management engaged defendant
as an attorney to assist them in negotiations with the Tollway.
Their arrangement was confirmed by a letter which instructed
defendant on how to document his time and expenses and how to
submit bills to Waste Management. Defendant did not dispute the
instructions or otherwise indicate that he would not abide by them.
Berres stated that Waste Management did not contemplate paying
defendant on a contingency basis.
	In June 1991, Berres called defendant and met with him and
Constantino, after which they met with Hickman over lunch to
discuss the Meyers Road property. Hickman referred Berres to
Swislow for further discussion. In later negotiations, defendant
took the lead for Waste Management, informing Berres of the
progress he was making.
	Berres testified that on July 8, 1991, he drafted a letter of
intent, People's Exhibit No. 1, in which the purchase price for the
property was $4 million and which did not mention either the
presence of a broker or a broker's fee. Berres sent the letter to
defendant for his review, as it was an accurate recitation of the
terms that Waste Management wanted to submit to the Tollway.
	Berres testified that he received People's Exhibit No. 2, the
July 17, 1991, letter on Tollway stationary from Hickman, which
directed Waste Management to include a broker's fee of 6% of the
purchase price, payable to Eagle, in their next proposal. Berres
stated that, before receiving this letter, he had not heard of Eagle
and was unaware that there was a broker involved in the deal.
Berres discussed the matter with an attorney in the ethics and
corporate compliance department of Waste Management. That
attorney told Berres the Tollway was entitled to direct that a
portion of its proceeds be paid to a broker and Waste Management
could accommodate that instruction. Berres testified that, in the
discussion, he speculated that perhaps Eagle had an institutional
relationship with the Tollway, even though he had not had any
contact with Eagle during the negotiations.
	Berres prepared a letter of intent, People's Exhibit No. 4, for
defendant's signature, showing the purchase price as $4,040,000
and deleting the reference to broker's fees. Berres explained that
this letter was in response to People's Exhibit No. 3, a proposed
letter of intent that defendant had prepared which contemplated
Waste Management's payment of the brokerage fee out of the
$4,040,000. Berres believed that Waste Management had not
engaged a broker and the letter should merely reflect the total
purchase price, allowing the Tollway to disburse the purchase
price as it wished. Berres testified that he faxed People's Exhibit
No. 4 to defendant, having copied and recreated defendant's
letterhead so that the letter would not have to be retyped for
defendant's signature and to insure that it would be in the correct
format.
	Berres identified People's Exhibit No. 6 as a letter dated July
30, 1991, from defendant to Hickman proposing a purchase price
of $3.8 million and payment of a $240,000 commission. Berres
stated that this was the final letter of intent between the parties.
However, because Berres was not used to having outside law firms
submitting the letters of intent for Waste Management, he sent a
second letter to Hickman that mirrored defendant's July 30 letter,
to round out the file. Berres testified that he did not insist that the
provisions regarding the final purchase price and commission be
included and did not recall whether he discussed those provisions
with defendant. Berres did not order or authorize that the invoice
from Eagle be sent to Waste Management.
	Berres further testified that the draft contract was sent to
Constantino for review and redrafting. Berres explained that he
objected to the Tollway's draft contract, People's Exhibit No. 13,
because it did not embody his understanding of the details of the
agreement; it provided that the commission was not part of the
proceeds due to the seller and was to be paid from the purchaser's
funds independent of the closing. Additionally, Berres objected to
the language that Waste Management was solely responsible for
the commission due Eagle and that Waste Management would
hold the Tollway harmless for the commission, because Waste
Management was not informed of the terms of the brokerage
agreement. Berres testified that Waste Management did not have
a contract or agreement with Eagle.
	After speaking with Olszewski, Berres and Constantino
submitted another draft of the contract deleting the objectionable
language. This version, People's Exhibit No. 19, included a
provision by which the Tollway warranted that the commission
would not exceed $240,000. Berres testified that this provision
was inserted based on his assumption that the Tollway knew the
terms of the brokerage agreement. Waste Management insisted
upon the inclusion of the "seller warrants" provision and it was
included in the final contract.
	Berres testified that he never knew that defendant was going
to receive $190,000 of the brokerage fee, and he would not have
agreed to the transaction if he had known of that fact. Berres did
not authorize a contingency fee arrangement with defendant, nor
did anyone at Waste Management tell him that defendant was
authorized to take a portion of the commission. Berres testified
that he did not know that defendant brought Eagle into the deal
and that Eagle was never the broker for Waste Management.
	On cross-examination, Berres testified that he did not recall
being asked a specific question about a contingency fee
arrangement during his testimony before the grand jury in 1994.
Berres explained that, if he told the grand jury that there was a
commission or percentage fee arrangement with defendant, he
either misunderstood the question or the transcript was in error,
because he was asked similar questions several times during that
testimony and had repeatedly stated there was no arrangement like
that. Berres did not recall telling the police that defendant's
relationship with Waste Management was not covered by a
contract and that defendant was "not a force in the deal." Berres
could not recall telling the police first that there was no broker in
the deal and then stating that he could not recall a broker. Berres
also did not recall telling the police that he discussed the payment
to Eagle with Olszewski or that he believed the payment to be the
Tollway's business.
	During further cross-examination, Berres denied that he was
"very disappointed" with the final purchase price, but
acknowledged his grand jury testimony that Waste Management
was hoping to acquire the property for far less and that they had
ended up paying more than the $3 or $4 per square foot for which
comparable properties had been selling. Berres explained that the
purchase price was dependent on the seller and the motivations of
the buyer.
	Berres also acknowledged that a bill submitted by defendant
referred to conversations with a real estate broker in July 1991, but
Berres denied that defendant mentioned the broker to him.
Although the bill was directed to Waste Management, Berres
explained that Constantino had handled the closing and that he
was unaware of the bill referencing a broker until it was drawn to
his attention by one of the prosecutors. However, by the time
Berres received this bill, the broker had already been included in
the deal and he would have had no reason to be suspicious of
defendant's speaking with a broker.
	Berres denied that he had attempted to renegotiate the price of
the property with Ben Swislow of the Tollway in November 1991,
or that he had told that to police. Berres admitted that while
defendant submitted his final bill to Waste Management in
November 1991, he had contacted defendant in January 1992,
about a related piece of property. Berres denied that he told
defendant to stop billing Waste Management because he knew that
defendant was going to receive compensation through the
brokerage fee, stating that he was not in the habit of requesting
billings from outside counsel. Berres acknowledged that
Constantino filed a transfer tax declaration listing the purchase
price of the property as $3.8 million, and that the warranty deed
filed with the county recorder showed that same purchase price.
Berres testified that $3.8 million was a correct statement of the
purchase price in his mind.
	Mark Tenney, a retired consulting engineer, testified that he
first met defendant in 1991. The two discussed whether defendant
could assist Tenney's firm in expanding its activities in the State
of Illinois, and defendant spoke of his ability to help the firm with
the Tollway. Tenney testified that defendant informed him that he
had a good relationship with Hickman and that he shared an office
with the Tollway's legal counsel, Frank Howard. Tenney's firm
ultimately entered into a consulting agreement whereby it paid
defendant a retainer of $5,000 per month for 24 months, with a
$30,000 bonus. This consulting contract also included a
percentage agreement, which was 6% of the net fees on two jobs
the firm performed for the Tollway, yielding defendant $80,000.
	Before Tenney's firm retained defendant, its contracts with
the Tollway totaled approximately $200,000; after defendant was
retained, the contracts with the Tollway totaled $3.3 million.
However, Tenney explained that the scope of his business
expanded greatly the year he hired defendant. Tenney testified that
defendant also introduced him to Peter Huizenga at Waste
Management, but this meeting did not result in any business for
the firm. Tenney also testified that it was a common industry
practice to use consultants to generate business and make contacts
with potential employers.
	John Garrow testified that he was the chairman and director
of the Tollway from 1991 to 1995. Garrow's was not a full-time
position: he spent 15 to 20 hours per week on his job. Garrow
testified that the Tollway board approved 600 to 700 contracts of
all types during the course of a year. Garrow did not read each
word in each contract, but relied on the recommendations of the
department heads who presented the contract. Garrow identified
People's Exhibit No. 26 as the April 30, 1992, resolution
approving the sale of the Meyers Road property to Waste
Management. Garrow stated that it was one of 69 resolutions
passed at that board meeting.
	Garrow testified that, in August 1991, he informed Hickman
that he had learned that defendant was approaching Tollway
suppliers saying he had a good relationship with the executive
director of the Tollway, Hickman, and he could get them business
with the Tollway. Hickman responded that this information was
news to him, that defendant was acting without his knowledge or
approval, and that it would have to stop. Garrow had also learned
from Hickman that Howard would be appointed as chief counsel
and that he was defendant's former law partner. Shortly after his
meeting with Hickman, Garrow met defendant for the first time.
Garrow testified that defendant told him "he had made some
mistakes," and that they would not happen again.
	Garrow further testified that, to his knowledge, the Tollway
did not have a broker in the Meyers Road property sale. He
explained that the board would have had to pass a resolution in
order to retain the services of a broker, and none was passed.
Garrow stated that when the board ratified the sales contract on
April 30, 1992, it had a $3.8 million purchase price. Garrow did
not know that on July 17, 1991, Hickman had represented to
Waste Management that the board would not accept a price of less
than $4 million. Garrow testified that he had no knowledge that
defendant was involved in the transaction, and did not know how
Eagle became involved or that Eagle did not have a contract with
Waste Management. Garrow also did not know that defendant had
received $190,000 from the transaction. Garrow testified that, had
he known these facts, he would not have voted in favor of the
resolution to sell the Meyers Road property. Garrow stated that the
deal was discussed in an executive session of the board at which
no mention was made of the broker's commission in the sale.
	Garrow testified that he first became aware of defendant's
involvement and of the broker's commission in October 1993,
when he was told by Robert Douglas. Garrow reported the
information to the state police. In April 1994, Garrow questioned
Hickman about Douglas' termination, and Hickman said that
Howard felt that Douglas was saying things detrimental to him
personally and that he was a "leaker."
	Garrow acknowledged that the minutes of the meeting
wherein this contract was approved reflected that the board had
been apprised of the items on the agenda and had ample
opportunity to consider and discuss each item. Garrow indicated
that he would have more carefully scrutinized a contract offered by
an outside supplier. He testified that he signed the contract
following passage of the resolution without having read it "real
carefully" or understanding it. If a contract had been approved by
the board, it was his practice to sign it without reading it. Garrow
explained that he often did not understand the details of contracts
presented to him, that is why he relied upon the recommendations
of the Tollway department heads. Garrow testified that he had no
reason to distrust either Hickman or Howard. Garrow "guessed"
that the commission had been paid by Waste Management. He
never received a copy of People's Exhibit No. 2, the letter from
Hickman to Waste Management requiring the insertion of Eagle
as broker.
	Joseph Haughey testified that he is a commander in the
Illinois State Police and is an attorney. In December 1993, he was
in charge of internal investigations and conducted the investigation
of this real estate transaction between the Tollway and Waste
Management. Haughey stated that he met with Garrow and
Douglas, who later provided him with documents relating to the
investigation. However, Haughey did not originally receive copies
of several of the State's exhibits.
	Haughey testified that in March 1994, he interviewed Ben
Swislow at the Tollway offices and attempted to interview Paul
Olszewski. Haughey stated that Howard insisted on remaining
with Olszewski, asserting that he represented the Tollway and its
employees. Haughey decided not to conduct the interview, but
requested a copy of the Tollway's file concerning the transaction.
Haughey testified that the documents he received from the
Tollway did not include copies of People's Exhibit Nos. 2, 6, 12,
and the last two pages of 11. He stated that Waste Management
failed to produce People's Exhibit Nos. 12 and the last two pages
of 11, but did produce Nos. 2 and 6. Eagle produced the last two
pages of People's Exhibit No. 11 and defendant turned over Nos.
2 and 11 when subpoenaed.
	Daniel Fusco testified that he is an attorney and was a member
of the Tollway's board of directors in 1991. He reviewed
contracts, sales, and purchase orders for the Tollway. Fusco stated
that any transaction over $10,000 was submitted to the board for
approval and that the board approved over 500 contracts annually.
The contracts were generally first presented at operations meetings
during which board members would have the opportunity to
question the staff in charge of each contract. Fusco testified that
the board relied on the Tollway staff, including its general counsel
and executive director, and did not read through every contract,
since many of them were standardized. Fusco stated that he would
be more involved with the real estate contracts because that was
his area of expertise. Fusco testified that the contract involved in
this case was not one which would have been quickly skimmed
over, as it was an important transaction.
	Fusco further testified that he recalled the sale of the Meyers
Road property and believed that he had voted to ratify the contract,
which had a purchase price of $3.8 million. Fusco stated that, at
the time of the board's vote, he had not seen Hickman's July 17,
1991, letter to Berres (People's Exhibit No. 2), was not aware that
Hickman represented to Waste Management that the Tollway
would not accept a purchase price of less than $4 million, and did
not know that defendant was to receive $190,000 of the
commission. Fusco testified that he would have asked more
questions had he known that defendant was receiving funds from
the transaction and that defendant's participation should have been
disclosed. Fusco stated that there had been a discussion about the
contract during an executive session of the directors and that when
one of the directors asked whether there was a commission on the
deal, Howard replied that there was. Fusco testified that he had
been comfortable with the purchase price.
	Don Zimmer testified that, in 1992, he was employed with a
consulting engineering firm which provided services for public
and private clients, including the Tollway. Zimmer stated that
Peter Huizenga recommended defendant to him as someone who
might be helpful to his business. Zimmer met with defendant, who
indicated that he was familiar with the Tollway's capital
improvement program and that he had relationships that could
position Zimmer's firm to win more Tollway contracts. Zimmer
testified that defendant specifically mentioned that Hickman was
one of the people at the Tollway with whom he had a good
relationship. Zimmer's firm hired defendant and paid him $5,000
per month for one year. Defendant introduced Zimmer to
Hickman. Zimmer stated that hiring lobbyists or consultants is not
uncommon to "open the door" for business opportunities.
	Arthur Philip, a member of the Tollway's board of directors,
testified that he was familiar with the sale of the Meyers Road
property. Phillip stated that he had voted in favor of the sale and
was familiar with the general terms of the deal, but that he had not
personally reviewed the contract. Phillip explained that he is not
a lawyer and relied on the Tollway's lawyer and staff for advice
concerning the merits of the deal. He had not been informed that
Eagle was participating in the transaction or that defendant was to
receive $190,000 of a $240,000 commission. Phillip testified that,
had he known these facts, he would not have voted in favor of the
sale. While Phillip was aware that the Meyers Road property had
been appraised for $2.265 million, he did not believe the Tollway
had received a "great deal" because Waste Management had paid
more per square foot for other properties than it paid the Tollway.
	Gayle Franzen testified that he was executive director of the
Tollway from 1981 to 1984. He was familiar with John Garrow,
Hickman and defendant and had been friends with defendant for
a number of years. Franzen testified that, in the summer of 1991,
Garrow approached him with concerns about the relationship
between defendant and Hickman. As a result, Franzen arranged a
lunch meeting to introduce defendant to Garrow. During the lunch,
defendant clearly indicated that he and Hickman were close
friends and admitted that he may have made mistakes with respect
to Hickman's position with the Tollway, but stated that he would
never embarrass Hickman. Franzen also testified that he met
defendant with Hickman and his family while vacationing on
Martha's Vineyard in the fall of 1993. Franzen stated that the
concerns about defendant's activities came from Garrow, not from
him.
	The parties stipulated that, if called, Robert Neal would testify
that he was a member of the Tollway's board of directors in 1992.
Neal was provided with the documents concerning the Meyers
Road transaction, but did not read the sales contract in detail
before voting in favor of it. Neal relied on the Tollway staff,
including the recommendations of the chief legal counsel. Neal did
not know of Eagle's participation in the transaction or defendant's
receipt of $190,000 through Eagle; had he known those facts, he
would not have voted to ratify the contract.
	The parties stipulated that, if called, Christopher Berg would
testify that, in 1991, he owned a consulting engineering firm and
was approached by defendant late that year. Defendant informed
Berg that he had a good relationship with Hickman and promised
that he could help Berg acquire Tollway work. Berg hired
defendant as a consultant and paid him $5,000 per month from
January 1992, continuing through the time of trial. Defendant
obtained business for Berg's firm from the Tollway as well as
other state agencies.
	The parties stipulated that, if called, Rob Petroelje would
testify that he was a part owner of SDI Consultants (SDI) and he
met defendant through Peter Huizenga. Defendant informed
Petroelje that he was a close friend of Hickman, knew other
officials at the Tollway, and could help SDI obtain Tollway
contracts, as well as promote the firm in the public sector.
Petroelje hired defendant as a consultant and paid him $2,000 per
month from May 1993 through July 1994.
	The parties also stipulated that the $190,000 check from Eagle
to defendant had been deposited and cashed through the checking
account of defendant's consulting firm. At the close of the State's
case, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the
trial court denied following extensive argument.
	Defendant presented certain evidence by means of stipulation.
If called, Lieutenant Michalski of the Illinois State Police would
testify that, on March 31, 1994, he interviewed Roger Berres at
Waste Management's offices and that Berres stated that defendant
was "not a force" in the Tollway deal. When asked whether
anyone was acting as a real estate broker for this transaction,
Berres vacillated between "no" and "I don't know." Berres further
said that he had not talked with anyone at Eagle and denied that
Waste Management had any involvement with Eagle. Berres stated
that he was unfamiliar with the term of the contract directing
Waste Management to pay the $240,000 fee to Eagle, and that
Paul Olszewski brought Eagle into the contract. Michalski asked
Berres if he felt the payment to Eagle was a legitimate business
practice, to which Berres replied that it may have been "a strategic
alliance or outsourccing [sic]."
	If called by the defense, Commander Joseph Haughey of the
Illinois State Police would testify that he interviewed Robert
Douglas on November 23, 1994, and Douglas stated that John
Garrow had requested that Douglas obtain documents from the
Tollway. Douglas subsequently asked Paul Olszewski for the
Meyers Road file under the ruse of having to research issues
relating to the annexation of the parcel. Haughey would further
testify that, during an interview with Roger Berres on April 13,
1994, Berres stated that he could not recall who put the initial
offer on the table for this transaction, and that either Olszewski or
Swislow of the Tollway introduced the brokerage fee. Later in the
interview, Berres told Haughey that he felt the fee was simply an
allocation of purchase price by the seller, and commented that
Waste Management was getting "squeezed" for $240,000 in the
negotiation. Finally, Haughey would testify that, in a November 4,
1994, interview, Berres stated that he prepared the July 23 letter of
intent using defendant's law firm letterhead "in the interest of
expediency and in order to strike the brokerage fee language, but
to include the $240,000 fee in the purchase price, which then
amounted to $4,040,000."
	It was also stipulated that Berres testified before the grand
jury that, sometime prior to receiving the July letter from
Hickman, he had made an offer "in the one and a half to two
million dollar range" for the property. Berres answered "yes" to
the question whether there was any commission or percentage fee
arrangement with defendant. Berres also testified before the grand
jury that he spoke to Olszewski to confirm that Eagle was the
Tollway's broker.
	In ruling, the trial court stated, inter alia, that the parties
seemed to agree that the key witness was Roger Berres and, with
regard to his credibility, noted that "lawyers do not make good
witnesses." The trial court found that the evidence showed that at
one point Waste Management was willing to, and did ultimately,
pay $4,040,000 for the property, $3.8 million going to the Tollway
and $240,000 to Eagle. The trial court found it apparent that if
Waste Management had known that they could have purchased the
property for $3.8 million, without the additional brokerage fee,
they would have done so, and that if the Tollway had been able to
get $4,040,000, they would not have rejected it. The trial court
therefore likened the $240,000 to a "shell game."
	The trial court further found that the testimony and documents
showed that defendant introduced Eagle into the transaction. The
July 8, 1991, letter from Berres to defendant, People's Exhibit No.
1, set forth a proposal of $4 million. In the July 17, 1991, letter,
People's Exhibit No. 2, faxed from Future Realty at the same
address as defendant's law office, Hickman acknowledges the $4
million offer, and states that it might take a little more for the
Tollway board of directors to approve the transaction. The court
noted that People's Exhibit No. 2 was also the first written
document "in which the broker is injected." The trial court found
that the relationship between defendant and Hickman was clearly
established and that the two men realized Waste Management had
a $4 million dollar offer on the table and the Tollway would accept
$3.8 million, as it was substantially over the appraised value. The
court therefore concluded that the $240,000 was "siphoned off" to
Eagle, with a portion ultimately being paid to defendant. The trial
court accordingly found defendant guilty on "Count 5, which is
theft in excess of $100,000.00."
	On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the State
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically,
defendant argued that the State failed to prove he made any
affirmative misrepresentation or that Waste Management relied on
any affirmative misrepresentation, and that the State failed to
prove ownership of the stolen property. The appellate court
rejected these arguments. No. 2-97-1194 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We now affirm the appellate court.
	In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
verdict on appeal, the relevant inquiry is "whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 231-32
(1997); People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1997). Under this
standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the
credibility of witnesses. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d  at 232. Indeed, it is
the responsibility of the trier of fact to "fairly *** resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. 
at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2789; Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 
at 38. This same standard of review applies regardless of whether
the evidence is direct or circumstantial (Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d at
232), and regardless of whether the defendant receives a bench or
jury trial (Howery, 178 Ill. 2d at 38).
	Applying this standard, we must reject defendant's claim that
he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this court,
defendant contends that the State failed to prove certain elements
of the offense, arguing that, while defendant helped Waste
Management obtain the Tollway's property "through influence,
relationships, and the power that comes from having large
amounts of available money," defendant's conduct "absolutely
does not offend Illinois' criminal provision involving theft by
deception." However, defendant's attempt to diffuse his guilt by
impugning the motives and integrity of the parties to this
transaction fails, where it does not obscure the fact that he, in
addition to helping Waste Management obtain the Meyers Road
property, took $240,000 which the evidence shows those parties
did not intend him to have.
	One commits theft by deception when he "knowingly ***
[o]btains by deception control over property of the owner" and
"[i]ntends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit
of the property." 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 1992); People
v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 55, 59 (1986); People v. Kaye, 154 Ill. App.
3d 562, 571 (1987). In order to convict a defendant of theft by
deception, the State must prove that: (1) the victim was induced to
part with money; (2) the transfer of the money was based upon
deception; (3) defendant intended permanently to deprive the
victim of the money; and (4) defendant acted with specific intent
to defraud the victim. See People v. Moran, 260 Ill. App. 3d 154,
160 (1994); People v. McManus, 197 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1096
(1990).
	We first address defendant's contention that the appellate
court erred in upholding defendant's conviction where Waste
Management, "the purported victim of [defendant's] theft, was,
under the State's theory, involved in the alleged scheme 'up to its
eyeballs' and where the trial judge made a factual finding that the
transaction at issue was not considered by its principals to be an
arm's length business deal." While defendant argues that these
"facts" preclude either a finding that deception occurred or that
any party gave money in reliance on any affirmative
misrepresentation, a careful review of the record shows that
defendant has taken these statements entirely out of context.
	While the State did acknowledge in closing argument that
Waste Management was "in this up to its eyeballs," defendant and
the State agree that this statement referred to Waste Management's
involvement in "influence-peddling." Thus, while admitting Waste
Management's knowledge of the close relationship between its
"consultant," defendant, and the Tollway's executive director,
Hickman, the State in no way imputed knowledge of the theft to
Waste Management. Rather, the prosecutor went on to argue in
closing that " to allege *** that Roger Berres knew about this and
went along with it, I submit to you, Judge, is absurd." The
prosecutor further argued that to accept defendant's theory, "they
would have to convince you that Waste Management was actually
able to pay [defendant] as a consultant, anything they want up
front and lawfully, [yet] would go this far out of their way to make
a crime out of it," by choosing "this incredible means of
smuggling their own money to their own lawyer or consultant."
	Defendant's assertion that the trial court found the principals,
Waste Management and the Tollway, were not involved in an
"arm's length transaction" is also a mischaracterization of the
record. It is obvious from an examination of the court's remarks
that the court was referring to the relationship between defendant
and Hickman, not between the principals. As previously stated, the
trial court found that if Waste Management had known it could
purchase the property for $3.8 million, it would have paid no
more, and that if the Tollway had known it could get $4,040,000
for the property, it would have done so. Thus, defendant has failed
to show that the trial court believed that Waste Management or the
Tollway were dealing at less than arm's length.
	Nor does the evidence presented at trial establish knowledge
of defendant and Hickman's plan by anyone involved except for
Blonstein and Erwood of Eagle and Howard, the Tollway's chief
legal counsel, who all testified under a grant of immunity. Instead,
the evidence showed that when Constantino, who knew that Waste
Management had not retained Eagle, reviewed the first draft of the
contract from defendant, he found the language regarding the
brokerage fee unacceptable, and asked Berres about it. Berres told
Constantino that "this was the way the Tollway wanted the
transaction," so Constantino created a draft contract placing the
responsibility for the broker's commission on the Tollway.
	When this document reached Olszewski at the Tollway, he
protested the language suggesting that Eagle might be the realtor
for the Tollway and that the Tollway approved the commission.
Olszewski attempted to redraft the contract to show that the
Tollway was not responsible for the realtor. That draft was sent to
Waste Management, where Constantino and Berres reviewed it
and found the language unacceptable because it made it appear
that Eagle was Waste Management's broker, which was not the
case. Berres and Constantino therefore changed the offensive
language, adding certain provisions including that "[s]eller
warrants that said commission does not exceed $240,000." When
this draft was sent to the Tollway, Olszewski again protested but
was told by Howard that they would have to "live with it." The
contract was ultimately signed in this form, with Waste
Management believing that it was paying to the Tollway's broker
a commission out of the purchase price due the Tollway, and the
Tollway believing that the broker's commission was to be paid by
Waste Management over and above the price it was receiving for
the land being sold.
	 Having found that, contrary to defendant's contention, Waste
Management and the Tollway were not willing participants in this
scheme, or "shell game," we return to the question of whether the
evidence presented at trial supports a finding that defendant
obtained the $240,000 by deception. The term "deception," for
purposes of the theft statute, means, inter alia, to knowingly
"[c]reate or confirm another's impression which is false and which
the offender does not believe to be true," or "[f]ail to correct a
false impression which the offender previously has created or
confirmed," or "[p]revent another from acquiring information
pertinent to the disposition of the property involved." 720 ILCS
5/15-4(a), (b), (c) (West 1992); see Davis, 112 Ill. 2d  at 59-60.
Here, the trial court found that the deception lay in the fact that the
land's purchase price was manipulated to divert funds from the
Tollway to defendant, while not substantially changing the total
amount of money Waste Management paid for the property. We
believe the evidence clearly established that defendant knowingly
participated in this deception.
	At trial, the State adduced the following facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom: In the spring of 1991, defendant retained
Eagle to act as the broker of record for the Meyers Road
transaction, meeting with Blonstein and offering him a "dream"
deal wherein Eagle would receive $50,000 and would not be
required to do any work. Thereafter, on July 8, 1991, Berres sent
a draft letter to defendant, People's Exhibit No. 1, in which Waste
Management offered $4 million to purchase the property and
which did not contain any provision for a broker's fee. Although
Eagle was never hired by either Waste Management or the
Tollway, People's Exhibit No. 2, Hickman's July 17, 1991, letter,
sent via defendant and the fax machine he routinely used at Future
Realty, directed Waste Management to include Eagle as the broker
and set the amount of commission at 6%. While there is no direct
evidence that defendant relayed Berres' $4 million offer to
Hickman, this July 17 letter references a Waste Management
"proposal of July 10, 1991," and there is no evidence in the record
of such a proposal other than Berres' July 8 letter. Additionally,
Hickman's letter responds: "My Board and I would react
negatively to any offer below four million dollars and it would
probably take a little more than that to gain our approval."
Moreover, the brokerage fee was set at $240,000, which is 6% of
$4 million. Thus, the trial court could reasonably infer that
defendant and Hickman, by creating a false impression that there
was a broker in the transaction entitled to be paid, manipulated the
price of the property to divert $240,000 to defendant while the
total price still appeared to be $4 million.
	Other evidence presented during trial indicated that defendant
confirmed the false impression that a legitimate broker was
involved by including in his billings to Waste Management
references to meetings and telephone calls with the broker.
Hickman, for his part, did not share with the Tollway's staff the
representations he had made in the July 17, 1991, letter, i.e., that
he had requested Eagle be included as the broker and paid a
commission, and that the Tollway would not accept less than $4
million for the property. Indeed, Hickman told the board, as
reflected in the final contract, that the Tollway would receive $3.8
million for the deal.
	The evidence also showed, as earlier detailed, that due to
defendant and Hickman's control of information between the
parties, Waste Management and the Tollway each believed the
broker to be working for the other. Finally, it was uncontroverted
that defendant received $190,000 of the commission which was
ostensibly to go to Eagle. Thus, the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that, through defendant's deceptive acts of
creating, confirming, and failing to correct false impressions made
to Waste Management and the Tollway which defendant knew to
be untrue, and preventing those parties from acquiring information
pertinent to the disposition of the sale proceeds, defendant
orchestrated and conducted a theft of $240,000 from the sale of the
Meyers Road property.
	Finally, defendant claims that he cannot be properly found
guilty of theft under count V of the indictment because that count
named only one victim, Waste Management, and the trial court
"insisted that restitution be paid, not to the identified victim, but
to [the Tollway]." However, we agree with the State that
defendant's argument is fatally flawed because he mistakenly
asserts that Waste Management was the only victim alleged in
count V.
	Defendant was convicted of count V of the indictment, which
reads, in pertinent part:
		"Joseph S. Kotlarz committed the offense of Theft Over
$100,000.00 in that the said defendant obtained, by
deception, control over certain property being $240,000,
said property being the property of Waste Management,
Inc., deposited into escrow for the purpose of purchasing
certain real property from the Illinois State Toll Highway
Authority, *** with the intent to deprive the parties
having a lawful interest in said funds, Waste Management
Inc. and the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority,
permanently of the benefit of said funds, in that said
defendant retained Eagle Real Estate Services, Ltd. for the
purpose of receiving the $240,000.00 pursuant to an
agreement that said defendant receive $190,000.00 while
Eagle Real Estate Services, Ltd. retained $50,000.00; in
violation of 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)." (Emphasis added.)
	 For purposes of the theft statute, an owner is defined as "a
person, other than the offender, who has possession of or any other
interest in the property involved, even though such interest or
possession is unlawful, and without whose consent the offender
has no authority to exert control over the property." 720 ILCS
5/15-2 (West 1992); see Moran, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 160; Kaye,
154 Ill. App. 3d at 571. A reading of count V makes it clear that
both Waste Management and the Tollway were named as owners
of "certain property being $240,000" by virtue of their "lawful
interest in said funds," that interest being that the funds had been
deposited into escrow by Waste Management "for the purpose of
purchasing certain real property from the [Tollway]." Thus, where
count V alleged that both Waste Management and the Tollway had
an "interest in the property involved," we find that it sufficiently
named both parties as victims of defendant's theft. See Kaye, 154
Ill. App. 3d at 571 (fact that defendant was paid alleged bribe with
money supplied by FBI rather than by victim did not prevent
victim from being "owner" of property within meaning of theft
statute, where victim's "interest" in bribe money was clear in light
of defendant's threats to him if he should fail to pay and his
capacity as middleman for FBI).
	Further, we agree with the State that it proved the funds at
issue were "released pursuant to and authorized only by the
contract," and that "[d]efendant had no authority to get the funds
here before both parties signed the contract." Therefore, the trial
court could properly find defendant was guilty of theft from both
parties. Additionally, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's restitution order; given the evidence that Waste
Management had made a $4 million offer for the land prior to the
insertion of deception into the contract negotiations, the court
could reasonably infer that the siphoned funds would have been
paid out to the Tollway.
	In conclusion, after viewing the above evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of theft by deception,
as charged in count V, proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues before this court that the lower courts erred
by expanding the theft by deception statute to "combat public
corruption." However, as we have found that defendant was
properly convicted of theft by deception, we need not address this
additional attempt by defendant to construe his conduct as simple
"influence peddling."
	Accordingly and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICES BILANDIC and McMORROW took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE dissents [without opinion].