Title: Baggett v. Industrial Comm'n

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90385-Agenda 29-March 2001.
DARWIN BAGGETT, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION et al. (Marion Community School District No. 2, 
Appellee).
	This case requires us to examine the elements of proof
necessary to establish a viable workers' compensation claim for a
physical injury induced by job-related stress. Claimant, Darwin
Baggett, filed a claim alleging that workplace stress caused him to
suffer a heart attack, leading to extensive brain damage. While the
arbitrator found in Baggett's favor, the Industrial Commission
(Commission) rejected his claim. The circuit court of Williamson
County then set aside the Commission's findings. The appellate
court vacated the circuit court's order and reinstated the
Commission's decision. No. 5-99-0053WC (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	We allowed Baggett's petition for leave to appeal to
determine whether the Commission erred by requiring Baggett (1)
to prove that his injury occurred in the course of and arose out of
his employment by showing (a) a greater degree of stress than
coworkers, and (b) unusual and increased stress in the workplace
at the time of injury; and (2) to prove a strict, scientific causal
relationship between stress and the physical cause of injury. We
find that the Commission erred. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the circuit court's
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
	On March 13, 1990, Baggett, a high school industrial arts
teacher for the Marion school district (District), collapsed at work.
Baggett's collapse was caused by upper gastrointestinal tract
bleeding, resulting in reduced blood volume. The reduced blood
volume led to a myocardial infarction, cardiac arrest, and resulting
anoxic brain damage, rendering Baggett permanently and totally
disabled. Baggett then filed a claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998)).
On November 9, 1994, an arbitrator conducted a hearing on
Baggett's claim. Fourteen witnesses testified on Baggett's behalf,
including his wife, former students, fellow faculty members, and
friends in the community. In general, those witnesses testified
about Baggett's supervisory duties, other job demands, time
deadlines, and the hazardous nature of the construction activities
involving young students. Most of the witnesses confirmed that
Baggett worked under stressful conditions and stated that they
observed the effects of such stress upon Baggett.
	A number of witnesses supported the District's contention
that all teachers labored under varying degrees of stress. Witnesses
also observed that Baggett was not working under any
significantly different type of stress than other teachers and that
there was no change of stress demonstrated at or near the time of
the collapse. The District presented evidence that Baggett was a
nervous person in general, that Baggett was involved in substantial
nonschool activity contributing to his overall stress levels, and that
he may have been more susceptible to mental stress than his
coworkers.
	Five doctors provided varying medical testimony as to
whether stress caused Baggett's injury. Dr. Robert Morgan,
Baggett's family physician, testified that Baggett suffered from a
stomach disorder likely caused by stress. Dr. Clifford Talbert, Jr.,
a cardiovascular specialist, attended to Baggett at the hospital after
Baggett's collapse. Dr. Talbert explained that Baggett's heart
attack was caused by loss of blood resulting from a peptic ulcer.
Dr. Wilfred Lee, a gastrointestinal specialist, also examined
Baggett after the collapse. Dr. Lee concluded that stress can be a
causative factor of the bleeding but that the bleeding could have
also been caused by other factors.
	Dr. Ralph Graff, a specialist in gastrointestinal diseases and
disorders, reviewed Baggett's medical records and the depositions
of the other physicians, and indicated that Baggett's condition was
more likely a result of an acute ulcer in the upper gastrointestinal
area. Dr. Graff pointed out that in contrast to an acute ulcer, a
chronic ulcer would leave scars. The records showed no chronic
ulcer scars. Thus, Dr. Graff stated that the he needed to know the
precise location of the bleeding to find a causal connection
between the stress and the bleeding.
	Consistent with Dr. Graff's opinions, Dr. Virginia Weaver, a
specialist in occupational medicine, testified that she could not
find a causal connection between the stress and the bleeding
condition. Dr. Weaver testified that the medical records did not
conclusively indicate the precise location of the bleeding. Absent
medical documentation of the precise location of the bleeding, the
bleeding could have been caused by one of several factors. Dr.
Weaver also stated that no scientific studies on a population basis
showed a causal connection between stress and peptic ulcers.
	Upon hearing the preceding evidence, the arbitrator found that
Baggett's injuries arose out of, and were suffered in the course of,
his employment. Additionally, the arbitrator determined that
Baggett was entitled to benefits for permanent total disability and
medical expenses.
	The District rejected the arbitrator's decision and sought
review by the Commission. On April 3, 1997, the Commission
reversed the arbitrator's award, finding that Baggett failed to prove
either that he sustained an accidental injury arising out of, and in
the course of, his employment or that a causal relationship existed
between the accident of March 13, 1990, and his medical
condition of ill-being. Specifically, the Commission found as
follows:
		"The commission finds that [Baggett] failed to prove he
was subjected to a greater degree of emotional strain than
that to which all workers are occasionally subjected. The
evidence presented by [Baggett] failed to show that [his]
job provided unusual stress in general, and no increased
stress around the time of his collapse, on March 13,1990.
Therefore, the Commission reverses the [d]ecision of the
[a]rbitrator and finds that [Baggett] failed to prove an
accident arising out of and in the course of [his]
employment on March 13, 1990."
The Commission further found that:
		"[Baggett] failed to prove that his present condition of ill-being is causally related to [his] alleged injury on March
13, 1990. The evidence presented by [Baggett] failed to
show what the actual source of bleeding which
presumably occurred in the upper gastrointestinal tract
area was, or any scientific correlation between the stress
and the gastrointestinal bleeding. Therefore, the
commission reverses the [d]ecision of [a]rbitrator as to
causal connection and finds that [Baggett] failed to prove
that a causal connection exists between [the] alleged
accident on March 13, 1990, and [his] present condition
of ill-being."
Additionally, contrary to the express stipulation of the parties, the
Commission found that Baggett was not permanently and totally
disabled.
	On December 13, 1998, upon judicial review, the circuit court
set aside the Commission's order and adopted the arbitrator's
conclusions, finding that the Commission's decision contradicted
the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the circuit court
ruled that the Commission imposed improper standards of proof,
requiring Baggett to introduce evidence relating to issues of
increased and unusual stress, a scientific correlation between stress
and gastrointestinal bleeding, and the precise source of bleeding.
	The appellate court then reversed the circuit court's judgment
and reinstated the Commission's decision. In effect, the appellate
court limited its inquiry to whether the medical testimony
supported the Commission's determination. The appellate court
failed to address whether the Commission used improper standards
in reaching its decision. Two justices dissented and filed a
statement that this case involves a substantial question warranting
consideration by this court. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	We allowed Baggett's petition for leave to appeal to
determine whether the Commission erred by requiring Baggett to
(1) prove that his injury occurred in the course of and arose out of
his employment by showing (a) a greater degree of stress than that
experienced by coworkers, and (b) unusual and increased stress in
the workplace at the time of injury; and (2) prove a strict, scientific
causal relationship between stress and the physical cause of injury.
 
II. ANALYSIS 
	As a threshold matter, the parties disagree as to the proper
standard of review. Baggett argues that the Commission used
improper legal standards to make its factual determinations, and
therefore a de novo standard is appropriate. The District disagrees
and argues that the Commission did not consider improper factors.
Instead, the District contends that the Commission simply based
its decision on Baggett's failure to prove a greater degree of
emotional stress than experienced by the general public and a lack
of proof of the causal connection between the bleeding and stress.
Therefore, the District maintains that we should apply a deferential
standard.
	We agree with Baggett. Ordinarily, reviewing courts examine
the Commission's factual findings under a deferential standard.
See Saunders v. Industrial Comm'n, 189 Ill. 2d 623 (2000)
(addressing whether the Commission's decision contradicted the
manifest weight of the evidence). Whether a claimant must prove
certain elements to establish a compensable claim is purely a
question of law and it is therefore reviewed de novo. See P.R.S.
International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 234 (1998)
(stating that legal questions are reviewed without deference).
Thus, findings based on application of incorrect conclusions of
law are not entitled to deference.


A. The Element of an Injury in the Course of and Arising Out of
Employment


	To be compensable under the Act, the injury complained of
must be one "arising out of and in the course of the employment."
820 ILCS 305/2 (West 1998). An injury "arises out of" one's
employment if it originates from a risk connected with, or
incidental to, the employment, involving a causal connection
between the employment and the accidental injury. Parro v.
Industrial Comm'n, 167 Ill. 2d 385, 393 (1995). An injury is
sustained "in the course" of employment when it occurs during
employment, at a place where the worker may reasonably perform
employment duties, and while a worker fulfills those duties or
engages in some incidental employment duties. Parro, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 393. Although the ultimate determination of those issues
depends upon an assessment of the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, that assessment must be made under our
established legal standards. Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 38 (1987).
	In determining whether the injury occurred in the course of,
and arose out of, his employment, the District argues, Baggett
must show that his employment presented a greater degree of
stress than his coworkers experienced and that such stress reached
an unusual and increased level at the time of his injury. We
disagree.
	The case at bar involves a physical injury allegedly induced
by mental stress in the workplace. That sort of injury is one of
three "mental injury" types of cases commonly described as a
"mental-physical" injury. There are two other kinds of mental
injury cases: "physical-mental" and "mental-mental" injuries. A
"physical-mental" case involves a claim that physical stress is a
causative factor of a mental injury. A "mental-mental" case
involves a claim that mental stress is a causative factor of mental
injury. 2 A. Larson, Worker's Compensation Law §42.20 (2001).
	In each category of mental cases, a claimant must be engaged
in employment at the time and place of the precipitating cause of
the injury. Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361 (1977). A claimant must also prove that the injury
occurred because of a work-connected risk or because the
employment placed claimant at a risk of exposure exceeding that
of the general public. Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill. 2d  at
45.
	In County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 10 (1977),
this court examined the Orsini standard in a "mental-physical"
context. We affirmed an award of compensation to the widow of
a worker who died as a result of a heart attack. In part, we based
our decision on an expert's medical opinion that the claimant's
heart attack could have been caused by work-related stress during
the final week of a claimant's employment. We observed:
		"An accidental injury can be found to have occurred, even
though the result would not have obtained had the
employee been in normal health. [Citation.] If an
employee's existing physical structure gives way under
the stress of his usual labor, his death is an accident
which arises out of his employment. To come within the
statute the employee need only prove that some act or
phase of the employment was a causative factor of the
resulting injury.
			The mere fact that an employee might have suffered a
fatal heart attack, even if not working, is immaterial, for
the question before the Commission is whether the work
that was performed constituted a causal factor. [Citation.]
The sole limitation to the above general rule is that where
it is shown the employee's health has so deteriorated that
any normal daily activity is an overexertion, or where it is
shown that the activity engaged in presented risks no
greater than those to which the general public is exposed,
compensation will be denied. [Citations.]" (Emphases
added.) County of Cook, 69 Ill. 2d  at 17-18.
	Similarly, in Wirth v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Ill. 2d 475, 480-81 (1974), this court reversed the Commission's denial of benefits
to the widow of a worker who died of a heart attack. The Wirth
claim was supported by an expert's medical testimony that stress
from the employment was a causative factor of the heart attack.
The holding in Wirth was premised on a finding that the stress of
the worker's usual labor may be shown to be a cause of an
accident arising out of employment.
	Hence, County of Cook and Wirth both focus on a usual labor
standard in the workplace. Each case also confirms that the test for
stress is whether working conditions expose the worker to risks
greater than those facing the general public. County of Cook and
Wirth do not require claimants to show stress greater than that of
their coworkers, nor do those cases require increased and unusual
levels of stress at the time of injury.
	We stand behind our decisions in County of Cook and Wirth
and decline to impose any new requirements. Under the District's
rationale, a workforce as a whole could be uniformly and regularly
subjected to outrageous working conditions of extreme stress and
no single worker could sustain a claim for injury because all
coworkers were subjected to the same extreme levels of stress. We
refuse to extend County of Cook and Wirth to reach such a
misguided conclusion.
	We also disagree with the District's argument that our
decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 59 (1980), departed from the rules articulated in Cook County and
Wirth. Citing Vesco Ventilation & Equipment Sales v. Industrial
Comm'n, 168 Ill. App. 3d 959 (1988), Esco Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 376 (1988), and Flynn v. Industrial
Comm'n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 695 (1998), the District relies on our
observation in Sears that "[w]hen employment activities create a
higher than normal degree of stress, and that stress contributes to
the employee's death, the necessary causation is established."
(Emphasis added.) Sears, 79 Ill. 2d  at 67. We acknowledge that
Vesco, Esco, and Flynn interpreted Sears as requiring that
claimants show that they suffered a higher level of stress than their
coworkers, and we hereby reject that interpretation.
	The reference in Sears to "a higher than normal degree of
stress" merely relates to normal stress levels experienced by the
general public. Sears, 79 Ill. 2d  at 67. That phrase refers neither to
stress levels suffered by coworkers nor to an unusual or elevated
level of stress at the moment of injury. This conclusion is evident
because Sears specifically relied upon Cook County and Wirth and
neither of those cases pronounced that a claimant's stress level
must be compared to the level of stress of coworkers. Hence, we
read Sears in concert with Cook County and Wirth as continuing
the same requirement of proof of stress in the workplace as
compared to stress experienced by the general public.
	Here, our review of the record indicates that Baggett's injury
arose out of, and in the course of, his employment. The record
indicates that Baggett was under substantial stress at the time of
his injury. The members of Baggett's building trades class were
required to build houses under strict deadline pressures.
Furthermore, prior to Baggett's injury, the District eliminated one-half of the time he could spend with student workers. That change
required Baggett to complete the houses while working half-days
and with only one class instead of two. Then, the project was
delayed for reasons beyond Baggett's control and it was as much
as five weeks behind schedule.
	The record further indicates that Baggett's students were
inclined to horseplay and Baggett's disciplinary duties further
interfered with completing the home constructions within the
deadline. The record also indicated that Baggett's young students
worked around scaffolding, power tools, and other hazardous
construction conditions that intensified his responsibility to
supervise them closely. The District also required Baggett to
purchase materials for the project and ensure that they were
delivered to the construction site. Under the approaching
deadlines, Baggett became pale and tired. Baggett's wife testified
that he complained of substantial stress and expressed his concerns
about completing the project on time. She noticed his physical
decline and noted that he complained of gastrointestinal pain. With
those construction pressures looming, Baggett collapsed while at
work.
	We further conclude that Baggett's stress was different from
the stress generally experienced by the public. Baggett's
continuing stress over a period of time affected him cumulatively.
The stress became more severe and its effects more noticeable to
others as the project approached the completion deadline.
Baggett's continuing stress might be compared with physical
injuries occurring through repetitive physical work. Just as a
repetitive, physical motion can cause a compensable injury (see
Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill. 2d 524 (1987)), we find no reason to deny compensability for
continuing, mental stress that leads to physical injury. Given the
extensive pressures that Baggett was facing and, in particular, the
strict construction deadline, we conclude that Baggett's stress was
different from the stress generally experienced by the public. See
generally 2 A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law §44.05(4)(b)
(2001) (noting that "[i]n the successful cases [proving that
protracted mental stress lead to injury], there is also often to be
found some emergency, crisis, case backlog, special deadline,
unusually protracted negotiation, or work overload because of
shortages of help").
	We also reject the District's contention that Baggett should be
denied recovery because he was overly susceptible to stress. The
District argues that Baggett's family physician treated Baggett for
headaches and anxiety throughout an approximate 20-year period.
The District fails, however, to present a persuasive argument that
Baggett's condition was so deteriorated that any daily activity
would have caused his injury. Even if Baggett's susceptibility to
stress had been particularly high, we would still reject the
District's argument on this point. This court has always held that
an employer must accept the employee as it finds the employee.
Rock Road Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 37 Ill. 2d 123,
129 (1967); County of Cook, 69 Ill. 2d  at 17. Further, for purposes
of workers' compensation law, a critical distinction exists between
the everyday stress of life accumulating to the point that any daily
activity would have led to a specific injury and the everyday
mental stress of a work environment accumulating to the point that
any further work-related stress would lead to physical injury.
	In sum, we hold that the Commission erred by requiring
Baggett to establish that he was subjected to a greater degree of
emotional strain than his coworkers. Baggett also should not have
been required to prove that his job provided "unusual stress" or
that his stress was increased around the time of his collapse. The
Commission's finding that Baggett failed to prove an accident
arising out of, and in the course of, his employment was predicated
on an erroneous legal conclusion and it must therefore be set aside.



B. The Element of Causation
	Baggett also argues that the Commission erred when it
concluded that he failed to show the actual source of his bleeding
and that he failed to show a scientific correlation between his
work-related stress and his bleeding. In its order, the Commission
stated:
		"[Baggett] failed to prove that his present condition of ill-being is causally related to [his] alleged injury on March
13, 1990. The evidence presented by [Baggett] failed to
show what the actual source of bleeding which
presumably occurred in the upper gastrointestinal tract
area was, or any scientific correlation between the stress
and the gastrointestinal bleeding. Therefore, the
commission reverses the [d]ecision of [the a]rbitrator as
to causal connection and finds that [Baggett] failed to
prove that a causal connection exists between [the]
alleged accident on March 13, 1990, and [his] present
condition of ill-being."

1. Actual Source of Bleeding
	Baggett maintains that the Commission improperly required
him to prove "the actual source" of his bleeding. Baggett contends
that there is no dispute in this case that he suffered from a peptic
ulcer. Further, according to Baggett, the Commission's use of the
term "source" was synonymous with the term "location." Thus, in
Baggett's view, the Commission required him to prove the precise,
or exact, location of his ulcer in order to establish causation.
Baggett asserts that the relevant issue in this case is simply
whether the stress of his job was a causative factor of his bleeding
ulcer and not the precise location of that ulcer. Thus, Baggett
argues that the Commission "required [him] to prove what the law
does not."
	We agree with Baggett. If by using the phrase "source of the
bleeding" the Commission did indeed mean to require proof of
precise location of the ulcer, then the Commission has imposed an
improper standard of proof. See Williams v. Industrial Comm'n,
85 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1981). If, on the other hand, the Commission
meant that Baggett failed to prove that the source of the bleeding
was an ulcer, that finding is clearly against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Neither Dr. Weaver nor Dr. Graf, who testified for
the school district, opined that the bleeding was not caused by an
ulcer. Dr. Weaver did speculate over alternative sources of
Baggett's bleeding, such as gastritis or erosions in the stomach
area, a tear of the esophagus or reflux-esophagitis.  There was,
however, no evidence in the record to indicate that Bagget
experienced any of the conditions referred to by Dr. Weaver,
except for a peptic ulcer. 
	Dr. Graf testified that Baggett's condition was more likely
than not a result of an acute ulcer in the upper gastrointestinal area.
He was unable to offer an opinion that stress caused the bleeding
because he said he needed to know the precise location of the
bleeding to make that determination. Likewise, Dr. Talbot and Dr.
Lee, both of whom examined Baggett after his collapse, testified
that Baggett suffered from a peptic ulcer. Dr. Talbot further opined
that Baggett's heart attack was caused by loss of blood resulting
from the ulcer. This testimony is sufficient to show that, more
likely than not, Baggett had a peptic ulcer and it was the source of
his bleeding.

2. Scientific Correlation
	It is also unclear what the Commission meant when it stated
that Baggett failed to show "any scientific correlation between the
stress and the gastrointestinal bleeding." Baggett argues that the
Commission used the term "scientific correlation" to describe a
burden of proof. According to Baggett, the Commission required
Baggett to prove scientifically and conclusively that stress was a
causative factor of his bleeding. Baggett maintains that "scientific"
or "conclusive" proof is akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Baggett further contends that the appropriate test in this case is not
whether the evidence conclusively established that stress was a
causative factor of his bleeding; instead, the test is whether it is
more probably true than not true that on-the-job stress was a
causative factor. We agree.
	To receive benefits, Baggett is not required to provide
"conclusive" proof that stress was a causative factor of his
bleeding. Instead, Baggett must show that it is more probably true
than not true that (1) he had an ulcer and (2) that this ulcer was
aggravated by the stress of his employment. See, e.g., Johns-Mansville Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 171,
177 (1979) ("Compensation will be awarded if the employee can
show that the preexisting illness was aggravated or accelerated by
the employment").
	As noted above, the evidence of record in this case
establishes that Baggett suffered from a peptic ulcer. The evidence
further establishes that the stress of his employment aggravated
this ulcer. Dr. Morgan treated Baggett for years for headaches and
anxiety. In the autumn before his collapse, Baggett was treated for
stress-induced stomach pain. Baggett's doctor prescribed an
antispasmodic and a mild sedative. Baggett's physician continued
treating him for similar complaints until his collapse at work.
Baggett's gastroenterologist opined that stress might or could be
a cause of ulcers and that a peptic ulcer is a common cause of
upper gastrointestinal bleeding. Additionally, Baggett's wife
testified that his stress levels increased while his physical health
decreased as work-related pressures mounted. This evidence is
sufficient to prove that Baggett's present condition of ill-being is
causally related to his injury on March 13, 1990.

III. CONCLUSION
	The Commission's findings are erroneous as a matter of law
and must be set aside because the Commission required claimant
to establish improper elements of proof. We hold that in a
"mental-physical" injury case a claimant need not show stress
exceeding the stress of coworkers. Rather, a claimant need only
prove that the usual stress of the workplace is greater than the
stress experienced by the general public. We further hold that a
claimant need not prove increased or unusual stress at the time of
the injury, nor must a claimant demonstrate a sole, strict, scientific
correlation between stress and a physical injury. Finally, our
review of the record indicates that Baggett's injury occurred in the
course of, and arose out of, his employment and it was causally
related to work-related stress. Baggett's injury caused permanent
and total disability and he is entitled to benefits.
	For those reasons, we reverse the appellate court judgment.
Further, we affirm the circuit court judgment, reversing the
Commission's order and reinstating the arbitrator's award of
benefits to the claimant.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinions Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:
	The Marion school district petitioned for rehearing in this
case, arguing that, based on our decision in Daniels v. Industrial
Comm'n, No. 90318 (March 21, 2002), it was entitled to a new
Industrial Commission hearing because two of the commissioners
that heard Baggett's claim-Kane and Reichert-were unlawfully
appointed. In Daniels, a plurality opinion rendered just six days
after the opinion in this case, four members of this court agreed
that the appointments of Commissioners Kane and Reichert did
not comply with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)), and remanded the
matter for a new hearing before a properly constituted panel of
commissioners.
	In accordance with my dissent in Daniels, I remain firm in my
belief that the de facto officer doctrine should apply to all of the
decisions rendered by Commissioners Kane and Reichert, and
should apply equally to the Daniels and Baggett cases. Under the
de facto officer doctrine, the acts of Kane and Reichert as
commissioners are valid. Daniels, slip op. at 14 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting). However, based upon the fact that this court has
chosen to give Daniels a new hearing due to the now unlawful
appointments of Kane and Reichert, I can see no reason why this
court should not at least consider the argument of the Marion
school district that it, too, is entitled to a new hearing on the same
ground. Accordingly, like Justice Thomas, I would allow the
Marion school district's petition for rehearing.
	Less than three months ago, this court awarded employee
Pervis Daniels a new Industrial commission hearing because two
of the commissioners who heard his claim were appointed
unlawfully. Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, No. 90318 (March 21,
2002). As the Daniels plurality explained:
			"Where an administrative agency acts outside its
specific statutory authority, as the Commission did when
it appointed Kane and Reichart, it acts without
jurisdiction. Its actions are void, a nullity from their
inception. [Citation.] The appointment of Kane and
Reichart therefore had no legal effect." Daniels, slip op.
at 4.(1)
As it turns out, those same two commissioners also sat on the
panel that rendered the decision in today's case. In its petition for
rehearing, the employer in this case-Marion Community School
District No. 2-brings this fact to our attention and requests the
identical relief that this court awarded employee Daniels-namely,
an invalidation of the Commission's decision and a new hearing
before a lawfully constituted panel. This should not have been a
controversial request, for our entire common law system is
premised on the irreducible principle that identically situated
litigants must be treated alike. Remarkably, however, the same
court that awarded Daniels a new hearing has rejected the
District's request without comment.
	What could possibly explain this court's disparate treatment
of identically situated litigants? The answer is found in Justice
McMorrow's special concurrence in Daniels. In that special
concurrence, Justice McMorrow asserts that, although she agrees
with the plurality's conclusion Kane and Reichart were appointed
unlawfully, "[t]he decisions in which they participated are not
void." Daniels, slip op. at 10 (McMorrow, J., specially
concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial of
rehearing). Rather, because Kane and Reichart exercised the
duties of office under the color of lawful appointment, "[t]he
common law de facto officer doctrine operates to prevent
invalidation of [their] decisions." Daniels, slip op. at 10
(McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.)
(modified upon denial of rehearing). To this extent, the special
concurrence echoes Justice Fitzgerald's dissent. See Daniels, slip
op. at 15-17 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Unlike Justice Fitzgerald,
however, the special concurrence then insists upon having it both
ways. Indeed, after explaining why "the decisions rendered by
Kane and Reichart may be afforded de facto validity," the special
concurrence U-turns and declares that "the equities, on balance,
militate against application of the de facto officer doctrine in the
case at bar, to deny Daniels review by a properly constituted panel
of commissioners." Daniels, slip op. at 12-13 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial
of rehearing).
	So what, exactly, are the "equities" that compel vacating a
perfectly valid order of the Illinois Industrial Commission in
Daniels'-and only Daniels'-case? The special concurrence
explains:
			"The position I take in this opinion-permitting Daniels,
but no others, to have a new hearing-strikes an equitable
balance between the identified competing interests. By
permitting the claimant who brought the illegal
appointments to light to receive a new hearing, the
incentive to discover and pursue such illegality is
maintained. Once the matter has been litigated and
decided by the courts, however, the public interest in
uncovering and addressing illegality is served. At that
juncture, the public interest in preserving the validity of
a large multitude of commission decisions takes
precedence. Public policy and competing public interests
often require courts to draw equitable lines. That line is
best drawn in this case by permitting Daniels a new
hearing, but by applying the de facto officer doctrine to
maintain the validity of the decisions rendered by the
illegally composed commission in other cases." Daniels,
slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined
by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial of rehearing).
Thus, despite concluding that the decisions rendered by Kane and
Reichart are perfectly valid under the de facto officer doctrine,
Justice McMorrow ultimately concludes that "applying the de
facto doctrine to the plaintiff's case at bar *** would *** run
counter to a competing public interest-uncovering illegal
appointment procedures, thereby ensuring that administrative
agencies comply with the statutory mandates which govern them."
Daniels, slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring,
joined by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial of rehearing).
	This analysis is flawed in several respects. To begin with,
according to the special concurrence, the interest that is served by
"permitting Daniels, but no others, to have a new hearing" is the
public's interest in "having illegal actions uncovered, reported and
addressed by the courts." Daniels, slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial
of rehearing). But how is the public served by an arbitrary
suspension of the de facto officer doctrine in a single case? To be
sure, in Daniels, this court "uncovered" and "reported" the
illegality of Kane and Reichart's appointments, but this court by
no means "addressed" that illegality. Indeed, the denial of
rehearing in today's case confirms that this court emphatically
refuses to address it. Other than Pervis Daniels, no member of the
public will benefit from this court's determination that Kane and
Reichart were appointed unlawfully. From the public's
perspective, Kane and Reichart might as well have been appointed
lawfully, because all of their decisions but one are valid and
enforceable. Just ask the District.
	That said, the empty appeal to the "public interest" is by no
means the only flaw in the special concurrence's analysis.
Borrowing from the vocabulary of microeconomics, the special
concurrence asserts that, by arbitrarily singling out Daniels for
undeserved appellate relief, "the incentive to discover and pursue
[unlawful office holding] is maintained." Daniels, slip op. at 13
(McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.)
(modified upon denial of rehearing). But is it? The District, of
course, endeavored to pursue unlawful office holding and had the
door slammed in its face. And this reveals the flaw in the special
concurrence's theory of incentives. By dangling the prospect of
undeserved appellate relief before the public, this court is inviting
an indeterminate number of future litigants to pursue what, for all
but one of them, will be an empty exercise. Consider the
following hypothetical. The Chicago Tribune runs a story bearing
the headline, "Governor's appointment procedures called into
question." The very next day, and in direct response to the special
concurrence's invitation, 100 lawsuits are filed challenging the
validity of the decisions rendered by the officers in question.
Assuming the challenged decisions are de facto valid, only one of
those litigants will receive undeserved relief. This means that 99
other litigants, all of whom invested a great deal of time, grief,
and expense at the invitation of this court, will have done so in
vain. Given this reality, the rational litigant would not file suit
because, while bearing one hundred percent of the litigation's
costs, he or she would stand only a one percent chance of reaping
the litigation's benefit. Litigation is not a raffle, and appellate
relief should not be a door prize.
	For that matter, under the hypothetical facts set forth above,
how will this court decide who the lucky recipient of undeserved
appellate relief will be? Again, 100 lawsuits are filed on the same
day. Presumably, those cases will take varying amounts of time to
work their ways through the system. Will the door prize go to the
first to have his or her challenge adjudicated by the trial court?
Surely not, for this would punish litigants whose arguments are
more complex or whose cases are assigned to backlogged
courtrooms. The first case to be decided by appellate court? This
presents the same inequities that arise in the trial court. The first
petition for leave to appeal filed in this court? This is a possibility,
but this court often passes on an issue several times before finally
granting leave to appeal. The first petition for leave to appeal
allowed by this court? Maybe, but again, what if the first petition
allowed is not the first one filed? The answer, of course, is that
there is no answer, because courts should not be in the business of
singling out and conferring upon isolated litigants relief that the
law clearly prohibits.
	Finally, consider the additional incentives inspired by singling
out Daniels for undeserved appellate relief. As the special
concurrence concedes, Daniels' challenge to Kane and Reichart's
authority was procedurally defaulted "because Daniels failed to
challenge the validity of the appointments before the Board."
Daniels, slip op. at 14 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring,
joined by Freeman, J.) (modified upon denial of rehearing). Even
worse, as I pointed out in my Daniels dissent, Daniels also failed
to challenge the validity of the appointments before the circuit
court on administrative review. Daniels, slip op. at 18 (Thomas,
J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.). And if that
were not enough, by the time Daniels got around to raising the
issue in the appellate court, the factual basis for his claim arose
not from the record on appeal but from an affidavit from Daniels'
counsel that was attached without leave of court as an appendix to
Daniels' appellate court brief. Daniels, slip op. at 18 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.). Thus, in
singling out Daniels for unwarranted appellate relief, this court is
rewarding Daniels not only for advancing a losing argument on
appeal but also for procedurally defaulting that issue before two
separate tribunals and for injecting into his case matters wholly
outside the record. What type of incentive does this create?
	The bottom line is that there are only two legitimate means of
addressing the issue raised both by Daniels' appeal and the
District's petition for rehearing. Either the decisions rendered by
Kane and Reichart are de facto valid, in which case no one gets a
new hearing, or those decisions are void, in which case everyone
gets a new hearing. There is no middle ground, and in attempting
to forge one, this court breaches its fundamental duty to ensure
that the law is administered fairly and equally.
	I would grant the District's petition for rehearing.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in this
dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1I dissented in Daniels because I believed-and continue to
believe-that Daniels waived consideration of whether Commissioners
Kane and Reichart were lawfully appointed. See Daniels, slip op. at 17-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.).