Title: Bailey v. Turnbow

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
GILBERT R. BAILEY 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 060713  
          January 12, 2007 
 
LINDA D. TURNBOW, EXECUTRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF ANNERBELL BREWER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
Russell I. Townsend, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
In this case, the chancellor held that a deed to real 
property had been procured by undue influence and set the deed 
aside.  That holding was premised upon the chancellor’s 
finding that a confidential relationship existed between the 
grantor and the grantee, giving rise to a presumption of undue 
influence, which the grantee had failed to rebut.  This appeal 
questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support that 
finding. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
In accordance with familiar principles, the pertinent 
facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the party 
prevailing at trial, Linda D. Turnbow, the Executrix of the 
Estate of Annerbell M. Brewer.  Annerbell M. Brewer was a 
widow who had lived alone in her home in the City of 
Chesapeake after her husband’s death in 1989.  She had no 
children, but had twelve nieces and nephews.  Two of these 
resided near her and helped her in various ways during her 
 
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widowhood.  Her niece, Mary B. Crawford, handled her financial 
affairs from 1993 until Mrs. Brewer’s death.  Mrs. Crawford 
arranged for the services of caregivers for her aunt, ensured 
that her bills were paid, balanced her checkbooks and, in the 
last year of Mrs. Brewer’s life, maintained a joint checking 
account with her.  Mrs. Crawford’s husband testified that his 
wife spent the majority of her time in looking after Mrs. 
Brewer’s business affairs in the year before she died.  On 
several occasions while recuperating from serious illnesses, 
Mrs. Brewer temporarily lived with the Crawfords until she was 
well enough to return home. 
 
Mrs. Brewer also had a close relationship with a nephew, 
Gilbert R. Bailey, who was a builder and developer.  Bailey 
had been close to his aunt as a child.  Mrs. Brewer and her 
husband had bought a house from Bailey’s parents and later 
exchanged it for a piece of land Bailey owned, on which Bailey 
built a house for the Brewers in 1963.  Mrs. Brewer still 
lived in that house at the time of her death.  That property 
is the subject of this suit.  Bailey “kept the repairs up on 
the house” and Mrs. Brewer became dependent upon him for 
transportation in her later years.  There is no evidence, 
however, that she relied on him for any advice or assistance 
with regard to her business or financial affairs. 
 
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In 1989, Mrs. Brewer executed her last will in which, 
after two legacies, she left the residue of her property to 
her husband and, if he should not survive her, to her twelve 
named nieces and nephews in equal shares.  The will named one 
of the nieces, Linda Dee Turnbow, as executrix if Mrs. 
Brewer’s husband should not survive her.  Mr. Brewer died soon 
after the will was executed. 
 
On June 14, 1997, Mrs. Brewer “signed herself into [a] 
nursing home for 30 days.”  She was then 82 years old.  She 
stayed nearly two months, but often went home with Ann Bailey, 
Gilbert Bailey’s wife, during the day, returning to the 
nursing home at night.  On about August 7, 1997, Mrs. Brewer 
called Ann Bailey and said that she was “signing herself out” 
of the nursing home and “wanted to come home.”  Ann Bailey 
sent an employee to pick Mrs. Brewer up and take her home.   
Thereafter, Mrs. Brewer spent some nights in the Bailey home 
and some nights in her own home, but during the last month of 
her life resided primarily with the Baileys.  During that 
time, Ann Bailey helped her with such physical needs as meals, 
seeing to her medications and helping her to bathe.  Mary 
Crawford, however, continued to handle her financial affairs.  
Mrs. Brewer died on October 15, 1997. 
 
Soon after she had left the nursing home, Mrs. Brewer 
went with Gilbert Bailey to the office of the Department of 
 
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Motor Vehicles and transferred the title of her automobile to 
the joint ownership of herself and Bailey.  Later, she told 
Bailey that she wanted to transfer the title of her house to 
him as well.  He testified that she said that “she wanted to 
do her house just like she’d done the car so that she would 
have it, and then at her death, I would own it.”  Bailey 
testified that he asked her several times thereafter if she 
was sure that was what she wanted to do and she said “that’s 
what she wanted.”  She explained that she wanted the house to 
remain in the family, and that she wanted Bailey to keep it 
and ultimately pass it on to his young grandson. 
 
Bailey consulted his attorney, who prepared a deed of 
gift, conveying Mrs. Brewer’s property to Gilbert Bailey in 
fee simple, but reserving a life estate in Mrs. Brewer.  
Bailey picked up the deed from the attorney’s office and took 
it to his home.  On September 4, 1997, Mrs. Brewer came into 
the house after a drive with Ann Bailey and asked him whether 
he had the deed.  He showed it to her, read it in full to her, 
and asked her if it was what she wanted.  She replied that it 
was “exactly what she wanted” and signed it in the presence of 
a notary public who was employed by the Baileys and was 
working in the office they maintained in the basement of their 
home. Bailey subsequently had the deed recorded. 
 
5
 
After Mrs. Brewer’s death, Linda Dee Turnbow qualified as 
executrix under Mrs. Brewer’s will and filed this suit against 
Gilbert Bailey.  Her bill of complaint asked that the deed be 
set aside and alleged undue influence, fraud, “intentional 
interference with inheritance,” unjust enrichment, decedent’s 
lack of mental capacity, conspiracy and forgery.  The 
chancellor sustained a demurrer to the count alleging 
“intentional interference with inheritance” on the ground that 
no such cause of action exists in Virginia. 
 
The chancellor heard the evidence ore tenus at a five-day 
trial, took the case under advisement and filed a letter 
opinion dismissing all the Executrix’ claims except undue 
influence.  The chancellor ruled that the complainant had 
failed to carry her burden of proving forgery, that there was 
no credible evidence that Mrs. Brewer was mentally 
incapacitated in any way, and that the evidence did not 
support the Executrix’ allegations of fraud, unjust enrichment 
or conspiracy.  The chancellor further held that the Executrix 
had failed to prove undue influence with respect to the 
transfer of title to Mrs. Brewer's motor vehicle.  The 
chancellor ruled, however, that the Executrix had carried her 
burden to prove a confidential relationship between Bailey and 
Mrs. Brewer giving rise to a presumption of undue influence, 
which Bailey had failed to rebut, in the procurement of the 
 
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challenged deed.  The chancellor entered a final decree 
setting aside and canceling the deed.  We awarded Bailey an 
appeal.  
Analysis 
 
Applying familiar principles of appellate review, we will 
accept the chancellor’s findings of fact unless they are 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.  Friendly 
Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33, 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 
(2004).  In that case, we restated the principles of law 
applicable here: 
 
A court of equity will not set aside a contract 
because it is “rash, improvident or [a] hard 
bargain” but equity will act if the circumstances 
raise the inference that the contract was the result 
of imposition, deception, or undue influence.  To 
set aside a deed or contract on the basis of undue 
influence requires a showing that the free agency of 
the contracting party has been destroyed.  Because 
undue influence is a species of fraud, the person 
seeking to set aside the contract must prove undue 
influence by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 
Direct proof of undue influence is often 
difficult to produce.  In the seminal case of 
Fishburne v. Ferguson, 84 Va. 87, 111, 4 S.E. 575, 
582 (1887), however this Court identified two 
situations which we considered sufficient to show 
that a contracting party’s free agency was 
destroyed, and, once established, shift the burden 
of production to the proponent of the contract.  The 
first involved the mental state of the contracting 
party and the amount of consideration: 
 
   [W]here great weakness of mind concurs with 
gross inadequacy of consideration, or 
circumstances of suspicion, the transaction 
 
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will be presumed to have been brought about by 
undue influence. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
The second instance Fishburne identified arises 
when a confidential relationship exists between the 
grantor and proponent of the instrument: 
 
   [W]here one person stands in a relationship 
of special confidence towards another, so as to 
acquire an habitual influence over him, he 
cannot accept from such person a personal 
benefit without exposing himself to the risk, 
in a degree proportioned to the nature of their 
connection, of having it set aside as unduly 
obtained. 
 
Id. at 31-32, 597 S.E.2d at 38-39 (internal citations 
omitted. 
 
Because the chancellor found no evidence to support 
a finding of weakness of mind on Mrs. Brewer’s part, his 
holding must rest entirely upon the second condition 
discussed by Fishburne:  the existence of a “confidential 
relationship” between the parties to the deed.  Although 
the law in other jurisdictions differs, in Virginia we 
have adhered to the view that a close family 
relationship, even the relationship of parent and child, 
will not, alone, give rise to a confidential relationship 
creating a presumption of undue influence.  Nuckols v. 
Nuckols, 228 Va. 25, 36-37, 320 S.E.2d 734, 740 (1984).  
Instead, for the presumption to arise, the party 
asserting it must establish, by clear and convincing 
 
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evidence, an agency relationship in which one party is 
bound to act for the benefit of another and can take no 
advantage to himself,∗ or between family members when one 
member bears also an attorney-client relationship to 
another member, or "when one family member provides 
financial advice or handles the finances of another 
family member."  Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 34, 
597 S.E.2d at 40 (emphasis added).  See also 
Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 812-13, 528 
S.E.2d 714, 718 (2000). 
 
Tested by that standard, the evidence in the present 
case is insufficient to support the chancellor’s finding.  
The only evidence of financial advice or assistance to 
Mrs. Brewer by a family member was that given by Mary 
Crawford, not by Bailey.  The chancellor expressly found 
that the transfer of title to Mrs. Brewer’s car was free 
of undue influence.  The only other business relationship 
between the parties to the deed shown by the evidence was 
the exchange of lands between them in 1963 and Bailey’s 
construction of the Brewers’ home.  There was no evidence 
                     
∗ The Executrix did not allege or prove an attorney-client 
or agency relationship between the parties to the deed and the 
chancellor made no such finding. Accordingly, we confine our 
holding to the chancellor’s finding that a confidential 
relationship had been shown. 
 
 
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indicating that to have been anything other than an arms-
length business transaction.  A mere commercial 
relationship, even where the parties like and trust each 
other, is insufficient to establish a confidential 
relationship.  Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 34-
35, 597 S.E.2d at 40.  Because the complainant failed to 
present evidence sufficient to establish a confidential 
relationship, no presumption of undue influence arose to 
shift the burden of production to Bailey. 
Conclusion 
 
Because we find the chancellor’s decision to be 
unsupported by the evidence, we will reverse the decree 
appealed from and enter final judgment in favor of 
Bailey. 
Reversed and final judgment.