Title: STATE v McKENZIE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 13011 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1976 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Barney Reagan argued, Cut Bank, Montana Charles L. Jacobsen argued, Conrad, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John F. North, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Douglas Anderson argued, County Attorney, Conrad, Montana Submitted: September 3, 1976 - - - '! 7 Decided: 3 1 6 - . - . - Filed: \. M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal i s from the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County, following a j&ry verdict of g u i l t y t o the crimes of deliberate homocide and aggravated kidnapping. Punishment under the codes of Montana f o r each crime: death. Lana Harding was a 23 year old r u r a l school teacher i n Pondera County. On the morning of Tuesday, January 22, 1974, she f a i l e d t o appear a t school. A t the Pioneer School teacherage, where she lived, t h e bed was found i n a disheveled condition. The s h e r i f f of Pondera County was called and o f f i c e r s were dispatched t o the school, arriving there mid-morning. Investigation t h a t day revealed (1) a red tennis shoe belonging t o Lana j u s t outside the school, (2) a drag t r a i l from the teacherage t o a nearby road, (3) blood near the end of t h e drag trail ( l a t e r identified a s Lam's type and Rh f a c t o r ) , and (4) a wristwatch belonging t o Lana was found i n the same area a s the blood. Lana Harding w a s last seen i n Conrad, some t h i r t e e n miles from the teacherage, on Monday, January 21, 1974 a t about 5:00 p.m. Defendant had recently moved i n t o the community and w a s working for the K & K Wholesale Seed Co. located approximately three miles from t h e Pioneer School teacherage. Within a day o r so before January 21, defendant made arrangements t o buy a 1948 black Dodge pickup, recognizable t o most inhabitants of t h e area due t o the f a c t it had belonged t o one owner f o r a long period of time. O n January 21, 1974, defendant worked on the pickup a f t e r work. H e w a s seen leaving the K & K Wholesale Seed Co. a t approxi- mately 6 : 4 5 p.m., driving the black pickup and headed towards h i s place of residence, which was not f a r from the teacherage. The pickup was seen about 7:00 p.m. about a mile from the teacherage. Approximately an hour and twenty minutes l a t e r , a t about 8:00 p.m., defendant knocked on the door of the Pearson farm residence, located across the road from the teacherage. He asked f o r assistance i n s t a r t i n g h i s Dodge pickup. It w a s l a t e r determined the pickup was parked on the road where the drag t r a i l ended and where the blood and watch were found on the following day, January 22. A t the Pearson residence defendant asked directions t o h i s own residence and from there c a l l e d h i s wife t o say he was coming home. Don Pearson pulled the pickup and got it s t a r t e d and l a t e r noted defendant did not drive on t o h i s place of residence. Shortly thereafter the pickup w a s seen being driven toward the d r i l l s i t e where the body was l a t e r located. O n the morning of January 23, Wednesday, the body of Lana Harding was found a t a location called the " d r i l l s i t e f ' i n the area of K & K Wholesale Seed Co. The body was clothed only i n a s h i r t , sweater and bra and it w a s draped over the tongue of a grain d r i l l . She had been severely beaten about the head and body. The forensic pathologist who examined the body t e s t i f i e d the death blow was one t h a t was delivered t o the head and l a i d open the r i g h t side. A rope was t i e d around her neck and there was evidence she had been strangled with it but pressure had been released so she did not d i e of strangulation. Entangled i n her h a i r was a c o i l of wire, l a t e r shown t o have come from a r o l l of wire found i n the back of the Dodge pickup. I n the course of the search f o r the body and the investi- gation of the murder a number of items were found and later received i n t o evidence t h a t were incriminating against defendant: 1) A pair of gloves worn by defendant a t work on January 21 and found i n a f i e l d not f a r from where the body was discovered, the gloves had human blood on them. 2) Overshoes found about a quarter mile away had type 0 human blood and brain tissue on them, impressions on the soles matched the heels of the boots l a t e r taken from defendant's home. 3) Lana Harding's purse was found near where the overshoes were recovered. As a result of the investigation by the sheriff and h i s deputies, l a t e on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 22 the county attorney f i l e d a complaint before the justice of the peace and obtained a warrant for the a r r e s t of defendant and a search warrant. Thereafter, defendant was arrested on an assault charge a t h i s home. The Dodge pickup was seized and impounded. Human blood was found i n the bed of the pickup and on the springs; the back end of the pickup had been recently sprayed with black paint; the spray paint was identified by F.B.I. experts as identical t o a spray paint brand named "Weekend". This brand was not available i n the Conrad area. A can of the black spray paint was found i n the cab of the pickup and another was l a t e r found a t defendant's home. After seizing the truck and taking it t o Conrad, several items were found i n the back of the pickup. A c o i l of wire, l a t e r identified by F.B.I. experts as having been connected t o and broken away from the c o i l of wire found i n deceased's hair; and an exhaust manifold that had been painted black. O n the mani- fold was found human blood of the same type and Rh factor as Lana's along with brain and cortical tissue. D r . John Phaff, who examined the body and the manifold t e s t i f i e d the manifold could have i n f l i c t e d the f a t a l blow. A t the d r i l l s i t e , where the body w a s found, a piece of brass from a water pump was found. The p r i o r owner of the Dodge pickup t e s t i f i e d t h i s piece of brass was i n the back of the pickup when defendant took possession of it on January 19, 1974. Several co-workers a t the K & K Wholesale Seed Co. t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t defendant on January 21 had s a i d he broke i n every new vehicle by engaging i n sexual intercourse i n the newly acquired vehicle. Several days before he said he had intercourse with country school teachers; t h a t they were naive, he could teach them, and they were easy t o get. Defendant appeals h i s conviction of g u i l t y and presents 25 issues on appeal i n an unprecedented b r i e f of over 500 pages accompanied by two volumes of appendixes, plus a 75 page reply b r i e f . Also f i l e d was an amicus curiae b r i e f from the N A A C P on the death penalty. For t h e purpose of c l a r i t y and brevity the 25 issues w i l l not necessarily be discussed i n order, some w i l l be consolidated, but a l l w i l l be considered. The 25 specifications of e r r o r l i s t e d by defendant are: 1. The court erred i n denying defendant's motion t o suppress and i n holding section 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1947, constitutional. 2. The court erred i n refusing t o grant defendant's motion t o withdraw plea o r defendant's motion t o enforce plea. bargaining agreement of December 23, 1974. 3. The court abused i t s discretion i n requiring defendant t o put witnesses on out of order and erred i n refusing defendant's proposed exhibits 1-12, 13A,13B, 14 -23, 24, 24A,25, 25A, 27, 28, 30 and 31. 4 . The erred in admitting into evidence state's exhibits { I 6 - 11, which were postmortem photographs of the victim's body. 5. The trial court erred in admitting state's exhibit #97, over defendant's objection. 6. The court erred in allowing persons in the audience to record the closing argument of counsel for the state, over objection. 7. The court erred in granting the state's motion to endorse 58 additional witnesses on the amended information on the first day of trial. 8 . The court erred in not enforcing its own order requiring the state to furnish defendant with the statements of its witnesses. 9. The court erred in allowing experts to testify as to results of tests run on items which were subsequently admitted into evidence, and erred in admitting opinion testimony concerning proposed exhibits not yet admitted into evidence. 10. The court erred by refusing to grant defendant's motions to disqualify district judges. 11. The court erred in allowing the state to file its amended informations and denied defendant a speedy trial. 12. The court erred in defining "torture", giving the question of torture to the jury; and defendants rights were pre- judiced by giving Instructions { I 23,29 and 54. 13. The court erred in giving preliminary instructions numbered 1 through 28, over objection. 1 4 . The court erred in giving of additional instructions 29 through 54, over objection. The court erred in directing the use of statutory presumptions to supply proof of material elements of the offenses charged. 15. The court erred in submitting to the jury verdict forms not in accordance with the requirements of the law. 16. The court erred in refusing defendant's proposed instructions. 17. The court erred in denying defendant the right to allow defendant to voir dire on mental disease or defect. 18. The court erred in refusing to allow the defendant's psychiatrist to be present in the courtroom during the testimony of the state's rebuttal witnesses. 19. The court erred in denying defendant's "Amended Motion for Protective Order and Other Appropriate Relief" and in holding section 95-1803 constitutional. 20. The evidence presented at trial does not support the verdicts. 21. The court erred by basing its judgment and sentence upon an erroneous "Findings, Conclusions, Sentence and Order". 22. The court erred by refusing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial. 23. The trial court erred in adopting or demonstrating a partisan attitude toward defendant, thereby denying him a fair trial. 24. The doctrine of cumulative error constitutes reversible error, by denying defendant a fair trial. 25. The court erred in imposing the sentence of death. At the outset, we consider the contention that the assessment of the death penalty violates the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the 1972 Montana Constitution. While the original briefs of the s t a t e and defendant relied on Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L ed 2d 346 (1972) arguments, l a t e r briefs received by t h i s Court rely on five United States Supreme Court cases released on July 2, 1976, covering punishment statutes of five states: 1) Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S. L.W. 5230; 2) P r o f f i t t v. Florida, 44 U.S.L.W. 5256; 3) Jurek v. Texas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5262; 4) Woodson v. North Carolina, 44 U.S.L.W. 5267, and 5) Roberts v. Louisiana, 44 U.S.L.W. 5281. Therefore, we w i l l discuss Montana's statutes i n l i g h t of the holdings i n the five l i s t e d United States Supreme Court cases. Following Furman Montana enacted i t s new criminal code of 1973, which revised i t s capital punishment statutes t o provide a mandatory death sentence for the crimes of "deliberate homocide" and "aggravated kidnapping", unless the t r i a l court found "mitigating circumstances". These Montana statutes were i n effect on January 21, 1974, the date of the kidnap murder of Lana Harding: "94-5-102. Deliberate homicide. (1) Except as provided i n section 94-5-103 (1) (a) , criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide i f : "(a) it i s committed purposely o r knowingly; or "(b) it i s committed while the offender i s engaged i n o r i s an accomplice i n the commission of, o r an a t - tempt t o commit, or f l i g h t a f t e r committing o r attempting t o commit robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, arson, burglary, kidnaping, felonious escape o r any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force o r violence against any individual. "(2) A person convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide s h a l l be punished by death as provided i n section 94-5-105, or by imprisonment in the s t a t e prison for any term not to exceed one hundred (100) years." "94-5-103. Mitigated deliberate homicide. (1) Criminal homicide constitutes mitigated deliberate homocide when a homicide which would otherwise be deliberate homicide i s committed under the influence of extreme mental o r emotional s t r e s s for which there i s reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation o r or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation. " ( 2 ) A person convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed forty ( 4 0 ) years." "94-5-104. Negligent homicide. ( 1 ) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently. " ( 2 ) A person convicted of negligent homicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed ten (10) years." "94-5-105. Sentence of death for deliberate homicide. ( 1 ) When a defendant is convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide the court shall impose a sentence of death in the following circumstances, unless there are mitigating circumstances: " ( a ) The deliberate homicide was committed by a person sewing a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison; or " ( b ) The defendant was previously convicted of another deliberate homicide ; or " ( c ) The deliberate homicide was committed by means of torture; or " ( d ) The deliberate homicide was committed by a person lying in wait or ambush; or " ( e ) The deliberate homicide was committed as a part of a scheme or operation which, if completed, would result in the death of more than one person. " ( 2 ) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection ( 1 ) and regardless of circumstances, when a defendant is convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide under subsection (1) ( a ) of section 94-5-102 in which the victim was a peace officer killed while performing his duty the court shall impose a sentence of death." The provision of section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, providing for the "mitigating circumstances" was amended out of the statute by Sec. 1, Ch. 126, Laws of 1974. The amendment became effective March 11, 1974 and was - not in effect at the time of the death of Lana Harding. Under Montana's capital punishment statutes the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of a crime for which the death penalty may be imposed, leaving to the trial judge the imposition of the sentence after consideration of "mitigating circumstances" . Following the jury's verdict in the instant case, the trial judge ordered and received a presentence investigation report and thereafter heard defendant's motion for mitigation. The sentencing procedure in Title 95, Chapter 22, R . C . M . 1947, requires the individual characteristics of the person convicted be con- sidered. Review of the sentence imposed is provided for by Title 95, Chapter 25, R.C.M. 1947. In the trial court's findings of fact regarding defendant's motion for mitigation, the court held: "2. That both of the offenses of which the defendant has been found guilty are of equal gravity and serious- ness under the law, both being mandatorily punishable by death, unless there are mitigating circumstances. "3. That there is nothing in the evidence of the case, nor in the presentence investigation, nor in the character, nature, or background of the defendant, nor in any other manner presented to the Court which mitigate his conduct or the sentence required by law. "8. That the prognosis for change in and rehabilitation of persons with anti-social personality disorders such as defendant's is so unlikely and minimal as to be practically non-existent. "9. That the defendant must never be allowed to be free in and endanger society again * * * [or] be turned loose to menace society again * * *." On appeal defendant argues that the death sentence here imposed violates his constitutional rights because there was no jury participation of any kind in the determination of the sentence. He cites in support the five United States Supreme Court cases decided July 2, 1976, heretofore listed, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L ed 2d 630; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U . S . 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L ed 2d 776; Furman v. Georgia, supra. - 10 - We turn now to consideration of the above cited cases in applying them to Montana's statutes with particular emphasis on the question of whether "jury participation in the sentence" is a necessity for constitutionality. This Court has long held that the presumption of constitutionality attaches to all statutes coming before this Court. State v. Parker, 161 Mont. 394, 506 P.2d 850; State v. Henrich, 162 Mont. 114, 509 P.2d 288; Harrison v . City of Missoula, 146 Mont. 420, 407 P.2d 703. The United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5230, 5234, 5242, held "the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution." It then said, referring to its decision in the early case of Furman: I I In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." Following the Furman decision Montana revised its capital punishment statutes to be in compliance with the holding in that case. Considering the three state statutes in the cases upheld by the United States Supreme Court, we find the provisions of the Texas statute come closest to sections 94-5-105 and 94-5-303, R.C.M. 1947. Texas, as noted in Jurek v. Texas, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5262, 5263, 5266, provides for a bifurcated sentencing procedure in which the jury is the sentencing authority and it must answer two (sometimes three) questions which in effect go to aggravation: 1 . Whether the conduct of defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 2 . Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 3 . If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. The Court in Jurek then went on to observe that any law allowing the sentencing authority to consider aggravation only would not meet constitutional standards. It observed that in answering the second question the question of mitigation was presented and held: "We conclude that Texas' capital-sentencing procedures, like those of Georgia and Florida, do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. By narrowing its defini- tion of capital murder, Texas has essentially said that there must be at least one statutory aggravating circum- stance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may even be considered. By authorizing the defense to bring before the jury at the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances relating to the indivi- dual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing jury will have adequate guidance to enable it to perform its sentencing function. By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposi- tion of, death sentences under law . ' I While the Montana statutes do not provide for the jury in the bifurcated sentencing procedure, we find they are within the Gregg and Jurek decisions. Under Montana statutes the sentence of death in the instant case was rested to a narrowly defined type of murder or kidnapping. The statute provided the sentencing judge consider mitigating circumstances. In addition, appellate judicial review is provided. We note further, in considering mitigation, that Montana has the Sentence Review Division which reviews all sentences at the request of the defendant. The Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court is provided for by Chapter 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and includes sections 95-2501 through 95- 2504, R.C.M. 1947. Pursuant to the above this Court activated the Sentence Review Board on December 1, 1967. Since its inception it has been composed of three ( 3 ) di~trict court judges and the statute provides that no judge may sit on a case before the Board in which he was the sentencing judge. Under the provisions of Montana law a person convicted is immediately made aware of his right to appear before the Board and a schedule is set up for his appearance, with counsel if desired. The Board may affirm, decrease or increase the sentence. Also, Chapter 26, of Montana's Code of Criminal Procedure provides for post-conviction hearing. Section 95-2608, R . C . M . 1947, permits an appeal to this Court by either the petitioner or the state. See: State v . Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873; State v. Henrich, 162 Mont. 114, 509 P.2d 288; State v. Heyward, 152 Conn. 426, 207 A.2d 730; Anno. 168 A.L.R. 706. Directing our attention to the judicial sentencing, and defendant's argument against it, we find that no prohibitions in any of the five cases appear against judicial sentencing. While the United States Supreme Court speaks to the desirability of a bifurcated jury sentencing, it speaks clearly in Proffitt v. Florida, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5256, 5259 about judicial sentencing. It held: "The basic difference between the Florida system and the Georgia system is that in Florida the sentence is determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury. This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital case can perform an important societal function, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U . S . 510, 519 n.15, but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required. And it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and, therefore is better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases. I I Footnote 10, appended to the above quote reads: "See ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives & Procedures 51.1, Commentary, pp. 43-48; President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Task Force Report: The Courts 26 (1967). See also - , ante, pp. 32-33. In the words of the Florida Court, ' a trial judge with experience in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the case against the standard criminal activity which can only be developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants.' State v . Dixon, 283 So.2d, at 8 . " Here, defendant argues that Article 11, Section 28, 1972 Montana Constitution no longer expressly authorizes the legisla- ture to provide for the death penalty as did Article 111, Section 24, 1889 Montana Constitution. The failure to reenact the authorization might have significance had not the Constitutional Convention given the people of Montana the option of adopting into the 1972 Constitution language expressly prohibiting the enactment of the death penalty. The people of Montana voted for 147,023 and against 77,733, to retain the death penalty. Such a vote, so recently, negates any argument the death penalty violates contemporary standards of decency. Defendant argues that even if a judicial sentence procedure is approved, that Judge Nelson failed to follow the criteria found necessary to consider before approving a death sentence. We do not agree. As previously noted, this case was tried prior to the United States Supreme Court's latest considerations of the death penalty, and therefore before any set pattern of matters that a jury must consider in death cases, here Judge Nelson did, in his findings, consider in general those matters the Supreme Court found necessary. A reading of the findings clearly shows the conduct of the defendant that caused the death was done deliberately, with reasonable expectation that death would result. H e used a rope around her neck that could have killed the victim had he not crushed her head with instruments he had i n the truck---all done i n a sexual attack on the victim. Judge Nelson, prior t o sentencing, had a thorough presentence report compiled on defendant which indicated t h i s was not h i s f i r s t encounter with the law. Defendant was a former parolee a t the time of the murder having been convicted i n 1970 of the crime of aggravated assault on another woman. That woman was found brutally beaten, clad only i n a blouse crawling alongside a road. Defendant received a three year sentence for that crime, was paroled a f t e r some s i x months i n the prison, but returned t o prison a f t e r numerous parole violations. I n 1972 he was again paroled a s safe t o be a t large i n society. That parole had expired three months before the present crime. The findings and conclusions found no circumstances that mitigated defendant's conduct. In addition, Judge Nelson found defendant should never be allowed t o be free i n and endanger society again. While there is no specific finding there was no provoca- tion, none was ever alleged. The findings note that the conduct of defendant i n k i l l i n g Lana Harding was unreasonable, and without any mitigating circumstances. While w e have referred solely t o the holding i n Jurek v. Texas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5262, we c a l l attention t o the opinion i n Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230, wherein the United States Supreme Court approved a bifurcated procedure i n Georgia. There the s t a t e supreme court approved the death penalty in an armed robbery and murder case where the trial judge, at the penalty stage, in- structed the jury it could recommend either a death or life imprisonment sentence on each count. Further, the jury was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances, if any, as presented by the parties, and that the jury could not impose a death sentence unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt ( 1 ) that the murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of other felonies (i.e. armed robbery) ; ( 2 ) that he committed the murder for the purpose of receiving the victim's money, or ( 3 ) that the murder was "outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" in that it "involved the depravity of the mind of the defendant". In Gregg the jury found the first and second of these aggravating circumstances and returned a sen- tence of death. Here, the trial judge found all three ( 1 ) that the murder was committed in the commission of a felony; ( 2 ) a sexual attack on the victim, and ( 3 ) "it was a brutal, conscienceless, torture rape and deliberate killing of a human being." We note too, that this Court looks at the total record during its review to determine whether the sentence was influenced by passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; whether the evidence supports the finding of a statutory aggravating circum- stance; and, whether the death sentence is excessive or dispropor- tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. We affirm, as did the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Florida and Texas in the most recent United States Supreme Court cases. We find no merit to defendant's argument that Article 11, Section 22, 1972 Montana Constitution prohibits the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. First, the vote of the people of Montana indicated that they did not intend by ratifying the 1972 Constitution, that any section thereof would abolish the death penalty. In addition, a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Gregg did not find the imposition of the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment1'. We next discuss defendant's issue on probable cause. This issue is broken down into six sub-issues by defendant: 1. Was there probable cause for the arrest and search warrant to issue? 2 . Were the facts supporting probable cause made under oath or affirmation and reduced to writing? 3 . Was the search warrant a general warrant? 4 . Was there a consent search or a search incident to arrest? 5. Is section 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1947, constitutional? 6. Was defendant entitled to suppression? We find no merit in defendant's contention there was no probable cause for the arrest or search warrant. This Court in State ex rel. Garris v. Wilson, 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 15, con- sidered federal case law and the long standing rule in this juris- diction on probable cause for arrest and search warrants, noting: "IWe reach this decision by application of the following standards: only a probability of criminal conduct need be shown. " I Far more was shown here! See: State v. Troglia, 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L ed 2d 637. Defendant argues the search warrants must fall on the basis of failure on the part of the county attorney to swear or affirm and reduce the testimony t o writing. H e r e l i e s on State ex r e l . Townsend v. D i s t . C t . , Mont . 543 P.2d 193, 32 St.Rep. 1163; and Petition of Gray, 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. W e find neither case factually applicable here. Article 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, provides : 'I* * *No warrant t o search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue * * * without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced t o writing." In Townsend nothing was reduced t o writing. Here, there is an affidavit signed by the county attorney and made a part of both warrants. A t a l a t e r date, defendant argues the justice of the peace failed t o follow the r i t u a l s of the swearing. County Attorney Nelson l a t e r t e s t i f i e d he asked the Justice of the Peace "if he was sworn." Defendant argues the county attorney made the affidavit only facts obtained from Jerry Hoover, a deputy sheriff of Pondera County, who had been a t the scene of the crime as part of the investigating team. This i s not a true picture of what took place before Justice of the Peace Wolfe a t the time the county attorney gave the affidavit and obtained the warrants. O n September 30, 1974, a hearing on the defendant's motion t o suppress was held before Judge Robert J. Nelson. Testifying were Sheriff Hammermeister, h i s deputy, Jerry Hoover, Justice of the Peace Robert Wolfe and County Attorney David H. Nelson. The arguments of defendant's counsel were directed to the lack of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. A summary of the testimony shows Justice of the Peace Wolfe t e s t i f i e d he customarily swears a l l witnesses though he did not r e c a l l swearing i n the county attorney, he considered him sworn. Deputy Hoover t e s t i f i e d he came into town about 4:30 p.m. on January 22, 1974, with directions t o go to the county attorney's office; that he helped the county attorney prepare the affidavit and he then went before Justice of the Peace Wolfe and gave sworn testimony i n support of the issuance of the warrants. County Attorney Nelson t e s t i f i e d he had been a t the scene with the sheriff and his deputies during the afternoon and j u s t prior t o h i s coming town t o get the warrants issued. A t the hearing, he said i n answer t o a question of what knowledge he had of the facts: "A. Well, without looking a t the affidavit now ---I think the f i r s t paragraph or two is m y state- ment as t o what I determined, that she was missing and may have been the victim of foul play but of what nature we didn't know a t the particular time, and that she resided a t the teacherage." In addition, the county attorney examined Deputy Hoover before the Justice of Peace as t o facts he learned during the investiga- tion. Here, unlike Gray there was sworn testimony by the county attorney and deputy sheriff i n addition t o the affidavit and the combination thereof established probable cause. The f a c t that defendant had been parked a t the roadside near the school the night before had been established by the Pearsons, who assisted defendant i n getting the truck moved. It was there that the victim's watch was found i n a pool of blood by the investigating officers before going t o town t o get the warrants. See: Lindley v. State, 0kl.Cr. (1956), 294 P. 2d 851. This, i n our opinion i s a sufficient showing of probable cause t o issue the warrants. Defendant next attacks the specificity of the search warrant, alleging that under the search warrant issued, a blanket seizure resulted. Examination of the warrant indicates that both the house and the vehicle were t o be searched. Though an e r r o r on the vintage of the black Dodge pickup (1950 instead of 1948) appeared, t h a t i s of l i t t l e significance. S t a t e ex r e l . Flournoy v. Wren, 108 Ariz. 356, 498 P.2d 444. A l l p a r t i e s knew t h e pickup involved. A l l t h a t i s needed t o meet t h e requirements of s p e c i f i c i t y i s t h a t the o f f i c e r with reasonable e f f o r t , can ascertain the automobile intended t o be searched, and i t s owner, i f possible. Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106. Defendant c i t e s case authority t h a t some seven c r i t e r i a a r e needed f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a motor vehicle--owner, make, model, year, color, motor number and license number. Here the a f f i d a v i t f o r the search warrant answers f i v e of the seven l i s t e d c r i t e r i a and it was s u f f i c i e n t l y specific. Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 399, 255 S.W. 76; Hatley v. S t a t e , 72 Okla. C r . 69, 113 P.2d 396. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t the items seized were not covered by the language "any other contraband a r t i c l e s " , i s without merit. The language used comes within the holding of t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 467 P.2d 692. Next we consider the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of section 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : "The burden of proving t h a t the search and seizure were unlawful s h a l l be on the defendant." W e find no merit i n defendant's contention t h i s subsection i s unconstitutional. W e note defendant c i t e s no authority f o r h i s position and therefore f a i l s t o overcome the presumption of consti- t u t i o n a l i t y . United States v. Keleher, 2 F.2d 934, r e l i e d upon by defendant, i s not applicable t o the f a c t s here, W e note t h a t Montana's s t a t u t e section 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1947, is patterned a f t e r Chapter 38, 5 114-12(b), Ill. Code of Criminal Procedure, which s t a t e s i n part: "* * * The judge s h a l l receive evidence on any issue of f a c t necessary t o determine t h e motion and the burden of proving t h a t the search and seizure were unlawful s h a l l be on the defendant * * *.If Here, such a hearing was held by the t r i a l court and defendant f a i l e d i n h i s e f f o r t . People v. Normant, 25 Ill.App.3d 536, 323 N.E.2d 553; S t a t e v. T r i t z , 164 Mont. 344, 522 P.2d 603. For the purpose of brevity we w i l l combine and discuss defendands specifications of e r r o r 10 and 20 together, i n view of the f a c t they a r e directed a t the alleged p a r t i a l i t y of the t r i a l court and i t s f a i l u r e t o grant a new t r i a l due t o i n s u f f i - ciency of the evidence. This was a protracted p r e t r i a l case. The case began o f f i c i a l l y i n the d i s t r i c t court of the ninth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Pondera, on January 24, 1974. Some 89 docket e n t r i e s l a t e r , the case was sent t o Cascade County on December 4, 1974 on a motion f o r change of venue. During t h i s period Judge McPhillips presided u n t i l September 19, 1974 when he was disqualified and Judge Nelson of the eighth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, assumed jurisdiction. The f i r s t entry i n the record of the eighth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t is December 6, 1974, the l a s t i s numbered 181 and dated December 9, 1974. W e c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s record i n view of t h e a t t a c k made on the p a r t i a l i t y of Judge Nelson. Defendant used h i s only motion f o r substitution against the o r i g i n a l t r i a l judge and now complains t h a t he got i n t h a t judge's place a judge whose "extrajudicial knowledge" made him biased and pre- judiced. To t h i s argument we find no merit. Judge R. J. Nelson was and i s one of the senior t r i a l judges of t h i s s t a t e . He came t o the bench i n 1957 a f t e r an active career as a t r i a l attorney. He w a s one of three d i s t r i c t judges chosen t o serve on the l e g i s l a t i v e authorized committee t h a t completely revised the substantive and procedural criminal law of t h i s s t a t e , a task t h a t took some ten years. He has been the senior judge i n h i s d i s t r i c t f o r most of h i s j u d i c i a l career and serves i n one of Montana's busiest j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s . Here, Judge Nelson, of necessity, had t o hear and consider many motions and make rulings and the f a c t t h a t he did not please defendant does not indicate bias and prejudice against defendant. The presumption is t h a t h i s rulings were correct o r they would have come t o t h i s Court's attention. His membership on the Criminal Law Commission indicates a willingness t o perform an affirmative obligation of j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s t o work f o r the im- provement of the l a w and j u d i c i a l administration. H i s a c t i v i t i e s come within the Canons of j u d i c i a l conduct. Defendant next argues Judge Nelson should have disqualified himself i n t h a t he gained e x t r a j u d i c i a l knowledge of the case from plea bargaining, c i t i n g United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L ed 2d 778. That case is not applicable f o r t o e s t a b l i s h b i a s o r prejudice under t h e holding of Grinnell the judge's opinion as t o the merits of t h e case had t o come from some source other than the knowledge obtained from the judge's participation i n the case. Here, whatever knowledge Judge Nelson gained was during the course of t h i s case. W e find Judge Nelson correctly construed the law and i n the motions where he ruled against defendant, there i s no b i a s indicated. W e have held i n numerous cases i n weighing the sufficiency of t h e evidence t h a t the court is not the t r i e r of the f a c t , the jury i s , and following conviction i f there i s substantial evidence t o support the judgment the presumption is i n favor of the judgment. S t a t e v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827; S t a t e v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761; S t a t e v. Gleim, 1 7 Mont. 17, 41 P. 998. Here there i s abundant evidence t o support the verdict. Specifications of e r r o r 6 and 24 appear t o be a shotgun attempt i n defendant's a t t a c k on Judge Nelson i n h i s e f f o r t t o "cumulate" a record of alleged e r r o r s t h a t would lead t h i s Court t o reverse and order a new t r i a l . During closing arguments, i n what defendant c a l l s a "partisan audience", tape recordings were taken. Defendant objected but Judge Nelson did nothing t o stop the recording. Defendant f a i l s t o convince t h i s Court, and f a i l e d t o convince the t r i a l court, t h a t such a c t i v i t i e s on the p a r t of persons i n the audience v i o l a t e any canon of j u d i c i a l conduct o r merit further consideration of the matter by t h i s Court. Defendant's specification of e r r o r 24 argues, i n h i s words, whether alleged e r r o r which might be termed "harmless error" cumulated i n t o prejudicial e r r o r ? Defendant alleges the doctrine of cumulative e r r o r was established i n Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 87 S. C t . 824, 1 7 L ed 2d 705, 709; Krulewitch v. United S t a t e s , 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. ? , 93 L ed 790; Kotteakos v. United S t a t e s , 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L ed 1557. He a l s o argues the con- cepts of "harmless error" and "cumulative error" a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d and should be applied here. Defendant begins h i s argument on appeal noting t h a t he has s e t f o r t h 25 specifications of e r r o r , h i s b r i e f is 514 pages i n length, with an appendix of some 800 pages. He then s t a t e s i f he had s e t f o r t h a l l of the e r r o r , the b r i e f would have been absurd. He then admits t o "plowing ground" but argues such should not detract from the thesis and legal effect. This argument is without merit for we find no reversible error. Defendant's specification of error 4 and 5 object t o certain photographs which were introduced into evidence as being gruesome and inflammatory o r otherwise prejudicial. The basic rule on photographic evidence i n Montana as stated i n State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 261, 405 P.2d 978, is : 'I* * * Photographs are admissible for the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the court and jury i n understanding the case. Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. When the purpose of an exhibit i s t o inflame the minds of the jury or excite the feelings rather than - - t o enlighten the jury as t o any fact, it should be ex- cluded. State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 * * * * ' I Here, the photographs i n question f a l l into three categories: 1) photographs of the body taken a t the " d r i l l site"; 2) autopsy photographs taken by the pathologist; and 3) a single photograph of a can of spray paint i n a suitcase. I n each instance these photographs meet the above t e s t , they were relevant and were useful and necessary i n explaining the evidence and assisting the court and jury i n understanding the case. (1) The photographs taken a t the site where the body was found were used by the pathologist t o show creases i n the body which were not present a f t e r the body had been moved and which tended t o show how long the body had been a t the s i t e . 2) The autopsy photographs, taken i n color and then printed i n black and white, were used by the pathologist t o show the nature of the wounds and explain the evidence which formed the basis of h i s opinion a s t o the size and configuration of the weapon which was used t o i n f l i c t the wounds. 3) The photograph of the can of spray paint i n the suitcase was used t o show the defendant had i n h i s possession a type of paint which was not available i n the area stores. Defendant finds prejudice from t h i s photograph i n the implication of f l i g h t that could a r i s e from the f a c t the paint was i n a suitcase. Defendant had been i n custody for some time prior t o the time these photographs were taken. This alleged prejudice could have been easily explained away i n cross-examina- tion, and there was no intent t o excite feelings with t h i s photograph which was i n no way gruesome. It was properly admitted. Defendant argues i n specification of error 2 that there was an enforceable plea bargain made and requests that it be specifically performed. A s the factual basis of t h i s argument defendant alleges counsel for the s t a t e and defendant met and concluded that a guilty plea would be entered t o deliberate homicide and aggravated assault with a 50 year and 20 year sentence t o be imposed respectively. The next day counsel met with the presiding judge and obtained h i s approval. A date, about a week l a t e r , was s e t for the entry of the plea of guilty. A few days prior t o the day s e t for entry of the plea, defendant was informed the deal was off. The s t a t e agrees with the basic factual description of the events, except that it s t a t e s it was always i t s intent t o get the reaction of the victim's parents and the sheriff before making any f i n a l agreement and no bargain would be completed without the approval of these parties. This approval was not obtained and defendant was notified the deal was off. Defendant argues that Santobello v. N e w York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L ed 2d 427, stands for the proposition that plea bargains are enforceable. There a plea had been entered. Santobello i s not applicable, f o r the f a c t s i t u a t i o n is f a r d i f f e r e n t than here. Specification of e r r o r 2 i s without merit. Defendant's specifications of e r r o r 3, 7, 8 and 9 allege 1) the f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of the court t o enforce i t s order r e l a t i n g t o the giving of copies of witness' statements t o the fendant, 2) prejudice a r i s i n g from the addition of 58 new witness' names t o the Information on the day of trial, 3) prejudL- c i a 1 , i n t e r f e r e n c e with the order of the presentation of defendant's case, 4) f a i l u r e i n the chain of possession of evi- dence and prejudice a r i s i n g from t h e presentation of expert opinion p r i o r t o the introduction i n t o evidence of the evidence which was the b a s i s f o r t h a t expert opinion. These specifications a r e f a c t u a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d and must be viewed against the basic policies and the s t r u c t u r e of the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure. That code i n sections 95-1801(d) (1) , (d) (2) and 95-1804(a), R.C.M. 1947, provide the basic discovery tools. Section 95-1804(a), provides : "On motion of a defendant i n any criminal case made p r i o r t o t r i a l the court s h a l l order the s t a t e t o furnish the defendant with a copy of any w r i t t e n con- fession o r admission and a l i s t of the witnesses t o i t s making. I f the defendant has made an o r a l confession o r admission a l i s t of witnesses t o i t s making s h a l l be furnished. I' This provision by i t s mandatory language e n t i t l e s the defendant a s a matter of r i g h t , upon motion, t o statements he made. It requires no showing of good cause. Section 95-1801 ( d ) ( l ) , provides: "Upon motion of e i t h e r party and upon showing of good cause, the court may issue a subpoena p r i o r t o the t r i a l directing any person other than t h e defendant t o produce books, statements, papers and objects before the court a t a t i m e p r i o r t o the t r i a l o r p r i o r t o the time when they a r e t o be offered i n evidence and the court may, upon t h e i r production, permit the books, statements, papers o r objects or portions thereof t o be inspected, copied, or photographed by the parties and their attorneys." The Revised Commission Comment discussing t h i s section points out : "The discovery allowed under subsection (d) is a two-part mechanism for gathering information. Under paragraph (1) either party may require a third person, other than the defendant, through the use of a subpoena (section 93-1501-3), t o produce certain a r t i c l e s . The only restriction i s that good cause must be shown. This allows what i s sometimes referred to as a "fishing expedition1' --- but only where third parties are con- cerned. * * *" Section 95-1801(d) (2) , provides : "Upon motion of the defendant, within a reasonable time before t r i a l , the court may, upon a showing of good cause, a t a time and place designated by the court, order the prosecution t o produce prior t o t r i a l for inspection, photographing o r copying by the defendant, designated books, statements, papers,or objects obtained from the defendant or others by the prosecution which are material, relevant and necessary t o the prepara- tion of the defendant's case." The Revised Commission Comment as t o t h i s portion of the section states: "The second paragraph permits discovery by the defendant or the prosecution with the additional requirement that the object desired must be "material, relevant and necessary t o the preparation of the case." This comment points out that the showing necessary t o get access t o material i n the hands of the prosecutor is greater than i s required t o get a t material i n the hands of third parties. Against t h i s background, and with the recognition that i n most criminal cases i n Montana discovery is conducted on a more informal basis without resort t o the motion and hearing pro- cedures outlined above, t h i s Court finds the allegation of error based on a delay of approximately a week i n compliance with the demand made by defendant a f t e r the t r i a l had begun, t o be without merit. Defendant claims that he had made two prior demands upon the county attorney for t h i s material. These demands were i n the form of l e t t e r s t o the county attorney. They made a number of specific requests and then made a general request for "* * * copies of any documentary o r physical items which you w i l l rely on for proof of any fact * * *.I1 The second l e t t e r expressed the defense counsel's opinion that the s t a t e was not going t o provide t h i s information as requested. This l e t t e r was dated August 20, 1974. O n January 13, 1975, a f t e r t r i a l began, defendant f i l e d a demand and motion requesting that a l l statements taken by the prosecution from a l l witnesses be turned over t o defendant demanding immediate compliance. The court granted defendant's motion even it was not made "within a reasonable time before trial'' as required by section 95-1801(d)(2), and stated: "Before a witness takes the stand, other than your foundation witnesses, that you [the s t a t e ] are proceeding with now, furnish them [defense counsel] with such copies a s you have that are not your work product a s such, and before they [the witnesses] take the stand, he is going t o be given an opportunity t o t a l k with each witness, particularly those that have been endorsed just the other day * *.I' (Bracketed material added). The time it took for the s t a t e t o gather, s o r t , and copy the requested material during the presentation of the s t a t e ' s case i n chief was reasonable. The court prevented any prejudice by allowing defendant t o interview the witnesses prior t o t h e i r taking the stand. W e note that the s t a t e complied with the specific requests made by defendant i n the August l e t t e r s , and that the reports received from the F.B.I. and the autopsy report were forwarded t o the defendant soon a f t e r they were received and months prior t o the August requests. Defendant also alleges the addition of the names of 58 new witnesses to the Information on the day trial began was error. The pertinent section of the Code of Criminal Procedure is section 95-1803 ( a ) ( I ) , which reads : " ( a ) List of Witnesses: " ( 1 ) For the purpose of notice only and to prevent surprise, the prosecution shall furnish to the de- fendant and file with the clerk of the court at the time of arraignment, a list of the witnesses intended to be called by the prosecution. The prosecution may, any time after arraignment, add to the list the names of any additional witnesses, upon a showing of good cause. The list shall include the names and addresses of the witnesses .I1 The Revised Commission Comment on this section points out: "Section 95-1503 (d) of Chapter 15 requires the state to endorse the names of the witnesses for the state on the indictment or information. The motion under this section permits the defendant to get a list at any time, probably after arraignment and before trial. i an^^ times the state does not know before it files the indictment or information all the witnesses it may call. "Further, this provision allows the addition of names not only prior to trial, but after the trial has commenced. As the trial progresses, the showing which is necessary to establish 'good cause' should be more stringent. At any time, the judge may allow a continuance (section 95- 1708) it if should appear necessary in the interest of justice." In State v. Campbell, 160 Mont. 111, 500 P.2d 801, the person whose name was added was the victim of the assault and the Court there found no serious claim of surprise and pointed out that while defendant objected he made no effort to ask for a continuance, In State v. Rozzell, 157 Mont. 443, 486 P.2d 877, the district court judge recognized there was the possibility the witnesses that were added would surprise the defendant and offered to continue the trial until the defendant had had a chance to interview all the new witnesses, but this was refused. These cases clearly indicate that the proper procedure where surprise is claimed from the addition of the new witness names i s t o ask for a continuance so that defendant may prepare. I n the present case, defendant objected t o the addition of the witnesses based on surprise and inability t o prepare the defense but never requested a continuance. The d i s t r i c t court i n granting the s t a t e ' s request for the addition of the new witness names cautioned: "* * * and i n granting t h i s motion, it must be understood before any of these witnesses is allowed t o t e s t i f y , the defendant must be given an opportunity t o have h i s counsel t a l k with them, examine them * * *." The witnesses added were not prejudicial t o defendant. The addition of the names of the F.B.I. agents did not surprise defendant, he knew the content of t h e i r testimony from the reports he had received several months earlier. A l l of the r e s t of the additional witnesses who were actually called t o t e s t i f y were employees of Wright Chevrolet. These persons' testimony was a part of the chain of possession of the evidence seized from the truck. The remainder of the witnesses whose names were added but who were not called t o t e s t i f y , were named because they could, i f need be, corroborate the testimony of the already l i s t e d witnesses, lay further foundation, o r t e s t i f y about the weather and temperature i n the area on the dates in question. I n i t s order, the court was careful t o provide defendant with the protection against surprise and t o ensure the defendant was able t o prepare for the testimony. Defendant was i n no way prejudiced by the addition of these witnesses. Before allowing the addition of the new witness names the court examined the county attorney to determine the reason for the addition of each new witness and t o find out the nature of each of the witness' testimony in the presence of defendant's counsel, so that defendant was apprised of the basic nature of the testimony. Defendant alleges error because he had t o make an out- of-order presentation of h i s case-in-chief during the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief.There is no question that the usual order of t r i a l may be departed from in the proper case. Section 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947, states: "When the s t a t e of the pleading requires it, or i n any other case, for good reasons, and i n the dis- cretion of the court, the order prescribed i n the l a s t section may be departed from." W e note that the a r t f u l phrase "good cause" is not used, rather there must be "good reasons" for the departure of the usual order of the t r i a l . Defendant' s difficulty arose from the fact the F .B .I. agents who were t o t e s t i f y i n t h i s case were scheduled t o t e s t i f y i n several other cases i n other s t a t e s and the judge would not require them t o remain for the duration of the t r i a l , nearly three weeks, unless there was good reason t o keep them. The court requested defendant make an offer of proof t o show why these persons should not be relased from t h e i r subpoenas a f t e r defendant opened h i s case-in-chief and examined them during the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief. Defendant argued that no reasonable offer of proof could be made u n t i l the completion of the s t a t e ' s case- in-chief. This may w e l l have been true prior t o enactment of the l i b e r a l discovery procedures i n the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, however, defendant had examined the F.B.I. reports; he had examined the physical evidence; and he had a l i s t of the proposed exhibits that were t o be put into evidence. I f there was some reason t o require the F.B.I. agents t o remain defendant would know it a t the time of t r i a l . N o showing of such need was made and the judge i n a proper exercise of h i s discretion and for good reasons allowed the agents t o leave a f t e r they had t e s t i f i e d as part of the defendant's case- in-chief, i n the middle of the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief. Defendant also objects that certain expert opinion was permitted t o be given prior to the completion of the chain of possession of the evidence upon which t h i s opinion was based. This again involves the F.B.I. agents. The judge allowed them t o give t h e i r opinion as t o the evidence they had examined, which had not a s yet been admitted i n evidence, because there was a portion of the chain of possession which had not been established. It i s within the discretion of the court t o allow pinion t o be given, conditioned on the subsequent production and admission of the evidence which forms the basis of the opinion. Risken v. Northern Pac. Ry., 137 Mont. 57, 350 P.2d 831; Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263, It i s clear a f t e r a careful examination of the chain of possession of the evidence, that there was a proper basis for the admission of the evidence i n t h i s case. The necessary evidence which served t o complete the chain of possession was supplied, thus there was no prejudice t o defendant. Defendant's specifications of error 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 concern instructions. Defendant objects that the extensive preliminary instructions given by the court were i n error, that it was error to give them prior t o the introduction of evidence, that the remaining instructions given a f t e r the presentation of evidence were in error, and the court failed t o give the jury verdict forms which covered a l l possible verdicts. The preliminary instructions were the usual instructions given on t h e r o l e of the jury. I n addition, included were a number of instructions which s e t out the elements of the various crimes of which defendant was accused, and s e t out s t a t u t o r y definitions of terms used. ~ o n t a n a ' s criminal code i s written i n c l e a r plain language which serves well a s t h e basis f o r instructions t o the jury. There was no e r r o r i n incorporating the e n t i r e Information i n t o t h e preliminary instructions, f o r it too is basically i n s t a t u t o r y language merely inserting the defendant's name and the victim's name i n the proper places and enumerating t h e weapons used. The language i s not inflammatory but i s a s n e u t r a l a s language d e t a i l i n g t h e charges involved here can be. Examina- t i o n of the instruction defining reasonable doubt and the burden of proof show proper statements of t h e l a w . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t language i n the instruction which defines the degree of proof necessary as being t h a t which con- vinces the mind "to a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e charge, no more and no less" f a l l s i n t o the type of e r r o r found i n S t a t e v. Taylor, 163 Mont. 106, 515 P.2d 695. I n Taylor, the s t a t e ' s burden was defined using the phrase "only such proof a s may'' which impliedly l i m i t s consideration of some of the evidence and which could be interpreted t o l i m i t the burden of proof. Here, the nature of the subjective judgment t o be made by the jurors i s being s e t f o r t h and the language "no more and no less'' merely emphasizes the nature of the judgment and i n no way diminishes it. The Court finds no e r r o r t o the prejudice of defendant from the f a c t the extensive preliminary instructions were given p r i o r t o the introduction of evidence i n the case. Defendant concedes that section 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947 gives the court the power t o vary the order of t r i a l set out i n section 95-1910, R.C.M. 1947, for good reasons. The present case was b u i l t entirely on circumstantial evidence. Some of the counts charged were complex and not easy to understand. For example, the second homicide count was a felony homicide which had as alternative felonies, sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. The aggravated assault alternative had as alternate aggravating factors, serious bodily injury or bodily injury with a weapon, l i s t i n g as alternative weapons a rope o r a heavy object. It was for good reasons that the judge instructed the jury as to the basic elements of a l l the offenses charged, so the jury could have some.understanding of the complex circum- s t a n t i a l evidence t o be presented. In a less complex case which was not based only on circumstantial evidence, such preliminary instructions might not be necessary and there would not be the required good reasons for varying the usual order of the t r i a l , but here it was acceptable t o do so. Defendant objects that the instruction defining torture incorrectly defines that term. The instruction s t a t e s : "Whoever purposely assaults another physically for the purpose of inflicting cruel suffering upon the person so assaulted for the particular purpose of enabling the assailant t o either: "(a) extort anything from such person; "(b) o r t o persuade such person against h i s o r her w i l l , o r "(c) t o satisfy some other untoward propensity of the assailant * * *.Ir The term "untoward propensity" i s defined i n the same instruction as meaning "any perverse, wrong, bad or corrupt inclination o r tendency." A number of California cases have adopted a similar definition of torture. People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, 917, states: "Murder is perpetrated by torture 'when "the assailant's intent was t o cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or t o satisfy some other untoward propensity." People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51,54; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 177, 163 P.2d 8.' People v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 561, 241 P. 2d 224, 227." The language of the instruction proposed by defendant is an exact quotation from the opinion of an e a r l i e r California case, People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d 21,27. See: 165 P.2d 250, 27 Cal.2d 520. That case dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence t o support a finding of murder by torture and while there is no r e a l conflict between the two instructions, the one given by the court i s i n the general language which does not comment on the evidence and which breaks the elements down and s e t s the various purposes out i n the alternative for a clearer and more understandable statement of the law. The instruction given i s a proper one and certainly the better of the two proposed instructions. People v. Wiley, (Calif. Oct. 4, 1976) 554 P.2d 881. Defendant objects t o the remaining instructions given a f t e r the presentation of evidence. Most of the objections a r e aimed a t the method of proof of the s t a t e of mind element of the charges against the defendant. It i s clear that i n the usual case the juror must rely on h i s normal mental processes t o deter- mine i f the defendant did an act "purposely o r knowingly". Here, the court in an extensive and thorough s e t of instructions outlined the normal course of the inferences that a r i s e and how they a r i s e and carefully defined the terms used i n these instructions. I n t h i s case, based a s it was on circumstantial evidence e n t i r e l y , it was proper t o give these instructions. Defendant argues the verdict forms provided t h e jury do not cover a l l the possible verdicts and t h a t they amount t o special verdicts. Defendant submitted instructions and verdict forms which covered the offenses of mitigated deliberate homicide and unlawful r e s t r a i n t . It i s c l e a r , as s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Gray, 152 Mont. "'The submission of a lower offense i s j u s t i f i e d only when the evidence on some b a s i s would support a finding t h a t the defendant i s innocent of t h e higher offense and g u i l t y of the lower."' See also: S t a t e v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 149 P. 279. I n t h i s case there w a s no such evidence and the instructions on the l e s s e r offenses were properly not given. The verdicts given t h e jury were general verdicts asking f o r a finding of g u i l t y o r not g u i l t y and requesting the jury t o make the additional finding t h a t the element necessary f o r the imposition of the death penalty was present. This f a c t u a l finding does not f a l l i n t o the vice of a special verdict because it does not require a f a c t determination which could be used t o undermine t h e jury determination. Defendant claims e r r o r because h i s instructions were not given. Careful examination indicates f o r the most p a r t , the subject matter of these instructions was covered by t h e court's instructions. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s instructions on mental s t a t e and mental disease and defect misstate the law and the instructions on t h e elements of the crimes charged add an element t h a t is not required. I n specifications of e r r o r 17 and 19, defendant makes an extensive a t t a c k on the Montana provisions f o r notice of mental defect o r disease and the mental defect o r disease pro- visions i n the Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 95-501 through 509 and section 95-1803(d). These arguments were an-. swered by t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . Sikora v. D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897. This general broadside a t t a c k loses much of i t s force when i t is recognized t h a t the United States Supreme Court promulgated and Congress, a f t e r c a r e f u l consideration, approved Rule 12.2, Notice of Defense Based on Mental Condition of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which nearly is i d e n t i c a l t o the procedure attacked. It should be again emphasized t h e purpose of the s t a t u t e i s f o r notice and t o prevent surprise and t o eliminate the necessity f o r a con- tinuance of a t r i a l when the defense is raised. The f a c t of the notice does not amount t o a plea and it could not be used i n any way as evidence i n the t r i a l on the merits. The provisions merely provide f o r advance notice of the i n t e n t t o r e l y on such defense so t h a t the s t a t e may prepare. S t a t e v. Olson, 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822, upheld the s t a t u t o r y section t h a t places upon the defendant the burden t o prove by a preponderance of the testimony the existence of mental defect o r disease. I n the i n s t a n t case defendant was i n no way prejudiced because none of defendant's instructions were refused based on a court finding t h a t defendant could not meet t h i s burden. S t a t e v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864, found the reciprocity required. Indeed, under t h e Montana procedure i n section 95-505(5) t h a t requires a copy of t h e psychiatric examina- t i o n be sent t o counsel f o r the defendant, it is impossible t o have a secret rebuttal witness on t h i s matter. Defendant knows who the s t a t e ' s witnesses are and through the report he knows the content of their testimony as well. There is no need for fear of self-incrimination during the psychiatric examination, for section 95-509 protects the defendant i f incriminatory information i s gained during the examination. Defendant refused t o give the notice as required by the statute. H e claims prejudice because he was not allowed t o voir dire on the subject of mental defect o r disease. However, a t the time he wished t o voir dire he had not complied with the notice and the issue could not a t that time be presented t o the jury. The court was correct i n refusing t o allow the voir dire. Defendant alleges error because h i s expert on mental defect o r disease was not allowed t o be present during the s t a t e ' s presentation of i t s rebuttal experts on t h i s matter. Earlier i n the t r i a l , defendant argued for a ruling from the court that rebuttal witnesses should be excluded from the courtroom during the presentation of the case. The judge ruled against t h i s request. Defendant alleges t h i s was an abuse of discretion t o the prejudice of defendant. However, the s t a t e ' s witnesses finished a t the end of the day and defendant's rebuttal began the next day. There was time t o inform the defense expert of any additional information not in the report made by these ex- perts, which the defense already had, and t o prepare the rebuttal testimony. There was no prejudice from t h i s minor inconsistency on the part of the judge. The alleged error i n f i l i n g the fourth Information i s without merit. The f i l i n g follows the directions s e t out by t h i s Court i n State ex r e l . McKenzie v. District Court, 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1211, therefore there was no error i n the Information o r i t s filing. Defendant was not denied h i s right t o a speedy t r i a l . While it i s true that approximately 350 days elapsed between the f i l i n g of the charges and the beginning of t r i a l , mas a long enough period to s h i f t t o the s t a t e the burden of explaining the delay and showing the the absence of prejudice. Fitzpatrick v. C r i s t , 165 Mont. 382, 388, 528 P.2d 1322; State v. Keller, Mont . ,=l?.2d 1013, 33 St.Rep. 795,798. The s t a t e ' s explanation for the delay, which included defendant's several appearances in t h i s Court, the d i f f i c u l t i e s arising from the defendant's refusal t o plead, the d i f f i c u l t i e s which arose be- cause t h i s was the f i r s t homicide committed under the new Montana Criminal Code and under the new capital punishment scheme, is satisfactory t o t h i s Court. Much of the time can i n fairness be charged t o neither party, but it i s clear that it aided both parties t o better prepare for the t r i a l , t h i s being a complex circumstantial case. This advantage outweighs any anxiety defendant might have suffered. Defendant asserts error i n the t r i a l court's Findings, Conclusion, Sentence and Order. The errors referred t o a r e essentially c l e r i c a l errors i n the body of that document. A mistaken citation of the subsection l e t t e r i n section 94-5-105, R.C.M. 1947, which was caused by the amendment which numbered the section i s an example. This document is not i n error i n respect t o the factual or legal basis of any of i t s findings and t h i s Court finds no prejudice i n the c l e r i c a l errors. Finding no reversible e r r o r , the judgment i s affirmed. dge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e Gene B. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell concurring: I concur i n the r e s u l t reached by the majority. However, with respect t o the issue of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the death penalty, the majority opinion r e l i e s too heavily on tenuous analogy t o the s t a t u t o r y schemes of other s t a t e s analyzed i n Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230; P r o f f i t t v. Florida, 44 U.S.L.W. 5256; and Jurek v. Texas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5262, a l l decided July 2, 1976. I n m y view the precise application of Montana s t a t u t e s t o the imposition of the death penalty is l e f t i n a dense fog. This concurring opinion attempts t o describe the constitutional application of the Montana s t a t u t e s . The cumulation of majority opinions i n Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 Sect. 2726, 33 L ed 2d 346 (1972), led t o considerable confusion among the several s t a t e s ' l e g i s l a t u r e s which desired to retain a constitutionally viable death penalty. In some jurisdictions Furman was read as requiring a strictly mandatory death sentence for certain classes of proven crimes. This view was laid to rest by the decisions in Roberts v. Louisiana, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5281, and Woodson v. North Carolina, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5267, (both decided July 2, 1976), and by this language in Gregg at pp. 5240 and 5242, 4 4 U.S. L.W.: "Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. I I In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information." (Emphasis supplied). Thus, statutory schemes which impose the death penalty in a wholly mandatory or wholly discretionary fashion do not pass constitutional muster. I believe the Montana laws effective at the date of the crimes in the instant case are in that constitutionally permissible middle ground between unbending mandatory death sentences and unbridled discretion in the imposition of death sentences. To ensure that death sentences are not "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,310) the United States Supreme Court in its most recent pronouncements on the subject, seems to have established three general criteria which are requisite to a valid death penalty statutory scheme. See e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 4 4 U.S.L.W. 5262, 5266. First, there must be at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before a death sentence may even be considered. Second, the defense must be afforded the opportunity to bring before the sentencing body at a separate sentencing hearing any mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant. Third, there must be available prompt judicial review of the sentencing decision by a court of statewide jurisdiction, providing a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposi- tion of death sentences under law. The death penalty statutes under attack in the instant case, sections 94-5-105 and -304, R.C.M. 1947, as they existed at the time of the crimes, satisfy the first criterion set forth above. The death sentence cannot be imposed unless one of six aggravating circumstances is found by the trier of fact to exist. The majority opinion herein adequately shows that this condition was found in the instant case. The second criterion, that mitigating circumstances be reviewed at a separate sentencing hearing, is satisfied by two separate statutory provisions: First, both death penalty statutes provide that the court "shall" impose a sentence of death "unless there are mitigating circumstances". Defendant urges that the "unless" clause may purport to circumscribe the sentencing judge's authority, but that there are no guiding standards nor sources of information provided for. This argument ignores the second statutory provision relevant here, that is, the presentence in- vestigation and report provisions. Section 95-2203, R.C.M. 1947, requires a written presentence investigation report to be delivered to and considered by the sentencing court in felony cases. Section 95-2204, R.C.M. 1947, provides the report shall contain information respecting "the characteristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities of the defendant; his criminal record and social history; the circumstances of the offense; * * * and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the community." The report provides the sentencing authority with whatever circum- stances may exist in mitigation of the defendant's conduct. Reading the two provisions together, the sentencing court is required to consider mitigating circumstances, and is required to consider the presentence investigation report which must contain any matters relevant to mitigation. In addition, all sentencing courts are directed by section 95-2201, R.C.M. 1947, to perform their sentencing functions "to the end that persons convicted of a crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs and potentiali- ties". This mandates the imposition of sentences which are not disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Finally, the defendant is authorized to seek a hearing to present to the court his testimony and evidence in mitigation of punishment. Prompt judicial review of death sentences is provided for by appeal to this Court, as well as appeal to the Sentence Review Division. This Court determines the legality of the sentence imposed, State v . Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873, while the review division is designed to determine the appropriateness of the sentence with respect to the individual offender and particular offense. In summary, although Montana's statutory scheme is unlike those approved by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, I can see no substantive failure of Montana's statutory scheme to comply with constitutional standards. Our system is neither wholly mandatory nor wholly discretionary. There are precise statutory requirements for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and a procedure for flushing out the facts with respect to such circumstances. There is appellate review at two levels, insuring that the sentence is both legal and proportional to the nature and class of the crime. In short, I believe that the statutory scheme in existence at the time of the crimes herein, affords defendant the procedural safeguards necessary to protect his substantive right to be sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice. Justice. Honorable Robert J. Boyd, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e Wesley Castles, dissenting: While I concur with much t h a t has been said by the majority of the Court i n affirming the conviction of the defendant, I must respectfully dissent from the majority i n sustaining the lower court i n the matter of the admission i n t o evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s exhibits numbered 6 through 1 1 which was specification of e r r o r number 4 i n the appellant's b r i e f . P l a i n t i f f ' s exhibit number 6 was a colored photograph of the victim's body taken a t the place of discovery. P l a i n t i f f ' s exhibit number 7 was a colored enlarged close-up of t h e victim's face. P l a i n t i f f ' s exhibit number 8 was a black and white autopsy photo of the victim's face. P l a i n t i f f ' s exhibit number 9 was an eight by ten autopsy photo of the victim's face showing the head p a r t i a l l y shaved with gaping wounds. Exhibit number 10 was a black and white autopsy photograph showing the shaved s k u l l and gaping wounds. P l a i n t i f f ' s exhibit number 1 1 was a black and white autopsy photo showing the bloody face of the victim with brain t i s s u e protruding from the wound. A t the outset it i s noted t h a t there w a s no issue f o r the jury a s t o the f a c t of death o r the i d e n t i t y of the victim f o r t h i s had been stipulated by and between counsel. The majority recognizes the requirements l a i d down i n Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025, and S t a t e v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969, of "relevance" and "necessity", but then completely ignores the testimony of D r . John Pfaff t h a t he could render h i s opinion without reference t o the photographs. The photographs were sdmlcredly gruesome and the court w a s Chereiore placed i n t o the unenviable position of weighing the probative value of the offered photographs with the a f f e c t t h a t the photos were bound t o have on the jury. This i s particularly so of exhibits 9 and 10 which were taken during the autopsy by D r . John Pfaff and a f t e r the head of the victim had been shaved. These were admitted even though D r . Pfaff had "Q. (By M r . Reagan) D r . Pfaff, you did conduct t h i s autopsy? A. Yes S i r . Q . And you a r e here prepared t o t e s t i f y i n t h i s Court t o t h i s jury a s t o the r e s u l t s of your autopsy? A. Yes. . And you a r e prepared t o render c e r t a i n opinions based upon your expertise, and your autopsy, a s t o t h e i n j u r i e s suffered and the cause of death? A . I am. 'Q. And i s it possible f o r you t o so t e s t i f y and render hose opinions i n t h i s court today without these photo- graphs? A . It is possible f o r m e t o , yes sir. Q . And you would be able t o do so? A. To the best of m y a b i l i t y . "Q. And you would, without the photographs, be able t o c e s t i f y and render an opinion a s t o the type and scope of the i n j u r i e s and t o the probable cause of death? A. L can t e s t i f y t o the best of m y a b i l i t y i n answer t o the questions t h a t a r e put t o me. 'Q. The point I a m trying t o make, you have observed the wounds? A . Yes s i r . Q . And based upon your observation of those wounds and other t e s t s conducted by you, you a r e prepared t o render an opinion a s t o the cause of death? A. I am. ' Q . And t o do t h a t , you could do t h a t without the use ~f those photographs? A . I could do t h a t without these photographs. 'MR. REAGAN: Objection t o these photographs, not only based upon a l l of the objections he l i s t e d i n P6, but further grounds these particular photographs a r e gruesome and not necessary f o r the purpose of e l i c i t i n g the t e s t i - mony from t h i s p a r t i c u l a r witness. "'L'HE COURT: Overruled; he may answer. The exhibit may be admitted ." It is apparent from the holding of t h i s Court i n Bischert t h a t i f t h e pictures of a homicide victim made subsequent t o death a r e gruesome o r ghastly and carry danger of prejudice, they a r e inadmissible unless they a r e relevant t o some material issue and wnuld reasonably a s s i s t the jury i n the determination of the defendant's g u i l t , and t h i s relevancy must outweigh t h e danger t h a t the jury would s u b s t i t u t e emotion f o r reason f o r a b a s i s of i t s verdict. I n the case a t bar, there was no reason f o r the introduction of the photos, there was no issue o r controversy a s t o the cause of death. Additionally, the photographs taken during the autopsy reveal matters such as the shaved head of t h e victim which were not the handy work of the defendant, and could under the circum- stances serve no other purpose than t o arouse the emotions and passions of the jury. A s s t a t e d i n B i s c h e r t , 131Mont. 152, 160: "Here, where the pathologist was f u l l y able t o explain h i s findings without the use of the photographs, t h e i r purpose could only arouse the human feelings of the jury without aiding them i n further understanding of the crime charged." I would hold t h a t t h e t r i a l court abused its discretion i n the admission of these photographs and by reason thereof prejudice resulted and a reversal should be had. Judge, s i t t i n g f o r ~ u s t i c e Wesley Castles.