Title: Howard v. The Dallas Morning News, Inc.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Patricia Ann HOWARD and Richard Scott Howard
v. THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, INC.

95-938                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 1, 1996


1.   Judgment -- multiple parties -- factual underpinnings
     supporting Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification must be set out
     in trial court's order and abstracted. -- Under Ark. R. Civ.
     P. 54(b), the trial court must factually set forth reasons in
     the final judgment, order, or the record, which can then be
     abstracted, explaining why a hardship or injustice would
     result if an appeal involving fewer than all of the claims or
     parties is not permitted; the factual underpinnings supporting
     a 54(b) certification must be set out in the trial court's
     order, and the factual findings must be abstracted.

2.   Judgment -- multiple parties -- abstracted order reflected
     that trial court stated facts sufficient to justify entry of
     final, appealable order. -- The supreme court determined that
     the trial court, in its Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) order, did not
     merely track the language of the rule; the abstracted order
     reflected that the trial court had stated facts sufficient to
     justify the entry of a final, appealable order.

3.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- burden of proof on movant --
     respondent must meet proof with proof -- burden not improperly
     shifted. -- The burden of proving there is not a genuine issue
     of material fact is upon the summary judgment movant, and all
     proof submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to
     the party resisting the motion; however, once the movant makes
     a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the
     respondent must meet proof with proof showing a genuine issue
     of material fact; thus, if the trial court determined that
     appellee newspaper publisher had made a prima facie showing
     that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law,
     it was proper to require appellants to come forward with proof
     by showing a genuine issue of material fact, and this would
     not be an improper shifting of the burden of proof to them.

4.   Principal & agent -- creation and nature of relationship --
     trial court misstated law by declaring that appellants must
     provide proof that parties intended relationship to exist. --
     An agency relationship requires an agreement for the agent to
     act for the principal, or master; the agreement may be oral,
     written, or implied from the conduct of the parties; the
     supreme court found that the trial court misstated the law by
     declaring that appellants must provide proof that the parties
     intended the relationship to result, where the agreement was
     implied. 

5.   Principal & agent -- relationship does not depend upon intent
     of parties -- must be agreement but not necessarily contract.
     -- The relationship of agency does not depend on the intent of
     the parties to create it, nor the belief that they have done
     so; to constitute the relationship there must be an agreement,
     but not necessarily a contract, between the parties; if the
     agreement results in the factual relationship between them to
     which are attached the legal consequences of agency, an agency
     exists although the parties did not call it agency and did not
     intend the legal consequences of the relationship to follow.

6.   Master & servant -- relationship created through submission by
     one giving service to direction and control of one receiving
     it. -- The relationship of master and servant can be created
     although there is no mutual agreement to give and receive
     assistance; it is only necessary that there be submission by
     the one giving service to the direction and control of the one
     receiving it as to the manner of performance. 

7.   Master & servant -- independent contractor defined. -- An
     independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent
     employment, contracts to do work according to his own methods
     and without being subject to the control of the employer,
     except as to the results of the work; the right to control and
     not the actual control determines whether one is a servant or
     an independent contractor.

8.   Master & servant -- independent contractor -- right of control
     is principal factor in determining nature of relationship. --
     In making the determination whether a master-and-servant
     relationship or an independent contract exists, the right of
     control is the principal factor to be considered; the intent
     of the parties is not included among these factors.

9.   Appeal & error -- ruling affirmed if correct, even if reason
     given is wrong. -- A trial court's ruling will be affirmed if
     correct, even if the reason given for the decision is wrong.

10.  Master & servant -- creation of relationship -- question of
     responsibility not dependent upon existence of actual
     contractual relationship. -- The relation of master and
     servant between two persons may be shown by proving that the
     one performs services for the other; it would be difficult, in
     most of these cases, to prove the relation of master and
     servant except by the fact that the one is known to perform
     service for the other, or from their course of dealings; the
     relationship may be created by express contract, but this is
     not essential; it may be created as well by conduct that shows
     that the parties recognize that one is the employer, or
     master, and that the other is the employee or servant;
     moreover, when one is sought to be held responsible for the
     tortious act of another under the principle respondeat
     superior, the question of responsibility will not depend
     entirely upon the existence of some actual contractual
     relationship of master and servant; it is sometimes allowable
     to prove the relation of master and servant by the fact that
     one performs service for another. 

11.  Principal & agent -- agency becomes question of law where
     facts are undisputed -- appellants provided proof of genuine
     issue of material fact. -- Although agency is a question of
     fact ordinarily determined by the trier of fact, where the
     facts are undisputed, and only one inference can reasonably be
     drawn from them, it becomes a question of law; in the present
     case, appellants presented evidence of control by appellee
     newspaper publisher not only as to the results to be achieved
     but also as to certain details of the work; the supreme court
     could not say that only one inference could reasonably be
     drawn from the proof submitted by appellants as evidence of
     the extent of control appellee exercised over its
     distributor's carrier.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Morris W. Thompson, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Rose Law Firm, by: James H. Druff, for appellants.
     Ronquillo & DeWolf, L.L.P., and Wright, Lindsey & Jennings,
by:  Gregory T. Jones and Ainsley H. Lang, for appellees.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.April 1, 1996.   *ADVREP8*








PATRICIA ANN HOWARD AND RICHARD
SCOTT HOWARD,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, INC.,
                    APPELLEES,






95-938


APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. 93-1027,
HON. MORRIS W. THOMPSON, JUDGE,




REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                       Andree Layton Roaf


     Patricia and Robert Howard sued Dallas Morning News, Inc.
(DMN), a newspaper publisher, for injuries Patricia suffered in
April, 1991, when she was struck by a truck while she was walking
in a pedestrian crosswalk at the Little Rock Municipal Airport. 
The driver of the truck was making delivery of the Dallas Morning
News to the airport at the time of the accident.  The Howards also
sued Robert Mitchell, the driver, and Delivery Systems, Inc. (DSI),
the regional distributor for the Dallas Morning News.  The Howards
appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of DMN,
contending that 1) the trial court incorrectly applied the law of
agency in finding that they were required to show that Mitchell and
DMN intended to and did enter into a contractual relationship, and
that, 2) even if they were so required, there was ample evidence
from which an agency and contractual relationship might reasonably
be inferred.  We agree that the trial court erred in granting the
summary judgment and reverse.
                            1. Facts
     In July of 1989, DMN contracted with DSI to serve as
distributor of the Dallas Morning News in the Little Rock and Hot
Springs area.  The contract was titled "Independent Distributor
Agreement" and specified, in addition to such matters as prices and
quantities of papers to be sold to distributor, terms of payment,
area of distribution, and place of delivery, that the distributor
would "make efficient and prompt delivery of the newspaper to
purchasers in a manner satisfactory to them," which was defined as
reaching the reader by or before 6:30 a.m. each day, "prevent the
insertion in copies of the newspaper of any advertising and other
printed material," and "obtain new purchasers of the newspaper"
through reasonable solicitation and promotional methods.  The
agreement further provided, in a clause captioned "Independent
Contractor Relationship":
     It is agreed that the means of accomplishing the
     foregoing objectives are wholly within the selection and
     control of Distributor, that all facilities and personnel
     used in the work shall be under the sole control and
     direction of Distributor or his sub-contractors, that the
     Publisher shall have no right or voice with respect to
     the means employed by Distributor in accomplishing the
     foregoing objectives, the selection, control or direction
     of the persons engaged by Distributor in performing the
     work or the mode, manner or method used by Distributor in
     the performance of this Agreement, and that the legal
     relationship created by this Agreement and by the actions
     and conduct of the parties in the performance of this
     Agreement is that of independent contractor.  Distributor
     shall have no authority, and is hereby forbidden to
     employ or contract with any person on behalf of
     Publisher, and any and all contracts or arrangements made
     by Distributor in respect of the work contemplated by
     this Agreement shall be in the name of Distributor and
     for his account.

     The distributor was also required to keep and make available
to DMN, accurate and complete records with respect to all
purchasers of the newspaper, all employees and subcontractors of
distributor, and all other information needed by DMN to comply with
rules of the Audit Bureau of Circulations.  Although the agreement
was for one year and automatically renewed from year to year, it
could be terminated by either party with or without cause, upon 10
days written notice.
     In December of 1989, DSI contracted with David Mitchell to
serve as a "carrier" for DSI, by the execution of two separate
documents, an "Independent Contractor/Carrier Agreement" and a
"Delivery Systems Carrier Lease."   The Agreement provided that
Mitchell, as carrier, would procure from DSI and promptly deliver
newspapers along a specified route, and further recited:
          The means and facilities used for such purposes
     shall be selected and operated solely by the Carrier
     under his/her sole supervision, control and direction,
     and at his/her own cost and expense to the best interest
     of the Company and the faithful performance of this
     agreement.  It is expressly agreed that the Carrier is
     not an employee of the Company and he/she at all times
     occupies the position of an independent contractor in
     his/her relationship with the Company.  The Company is
     looking to the Carrier solely for the desired result of
     prompt receipt and delivery of newspapers.
The Agreement also required Mitchell to provide a substitute
carrier when he was unable to deliver the newspapers, prohibited
him from making alterations or insertions to the newspapers, and
allowed him to engage in other business pursuits if they did not
interfere with his contractual obligations to DSI.  The Agreement
was for 30 days, automatically renewed from month to month, and
could be terminated by Mitchell upon 20 days written notice or at
will by DSI without notice.  
     The Lease Agreement required Mitchell to lease from DSI
vending machines and a list of subscribers for his delivery route,
and contained clauses similar to the Independent Contractor/Carrier
Agreement regarding Mitchell's status as an independent contractor. 
The lease agreement further required Mitchell to provide
information weekly to DSI regarding each retailer and vending
machine on his route and to fill out forms provided by DMN and 
necessary for DMN to comply with regulations of the Audit Bureau of
Circulations.
     At the time of the accident, Mitchell was also delivering the
Wall Street Journal, National Sports Daily, Barron's, and the New
York Times pursuant to his agreement with DSI, and he was engaged
in a separate lawn-maintenance business.  Sometime after the
accident, DMN learned that Mitchell had destroyed or discarded 130
copies of the paper when he could not complete his route.  DMN
indicated to DSI that Mitchell should be terminated.  DSI's
response was to terminate its contract with DMN.
     After the trial court denied DSI's motion for summary
judgment, DMN also moved for summary judgment, asserting that no
contract existed between Mitchell and DMN, nor was Mitchell in an
employment relationship with DMN.  In support of its motion for
summary judgment, DMN submitted the agreements between Mitchell and
DSI and the agreement between DSI and DMN, affidavits of several
employees of DMN and the depositions of Joe Fox, President of DSI,
and a number of DMN employees.  The Howards submitted portions of
the deposition of Mitchell, several of the same depositions of DMN
employees submitted by DMN, and the depositions of two employees of
DMN's predecessor.  
     After granting DMN summary judgment, the trial court also
granted the Howards' motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to
Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b), so that they could appeal the dismissal of
DMN prior to trial.  DMN takes issue with the finality of this
order and asks that this appeal be dismissed.
                      2. Finality of Order
     We first address DMN's contention that the appeal should be
dismissed because there is not sufficient grounds for certification
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b).     
    In Franklin v. OSCA, Inc., 308 Ark. 409,