Title: Schaff v. Ray's Land & Sea Food Co., Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: MAY 9, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CINDY SCHAFF,
Personal Representative 
of
the Estate of Kevin Schaff, deceased,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
RAY'S LAND & SEA FOOD CO., INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
Respondent on Review.
(99CV0025; CA A110162; SC S48360)
	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 5, 2001.
	J. Michael Alexander, of Swanson, Lathen, Alexander &
McCann, P.C., Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.
	Christopher Hatfield, of Hurley, Lynch & Re, P.C., Bend,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	De Muniz, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Durham
and Riggs, JJ., joined.
	*Appeal from Jefferson County Circuit Court, Daniel A. Ahern, Judge. 173 Or App 170, 21 P3d 664 (2001).
		BALMER, J.
		This personal injury case requires us to determine
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
defendant.  Plaintiff is the personal representative of the
estate of Kevin Schaff, who died in a collision that Adam
Stockert allegedly caused.  Plaintiff claims that Stockert was
defendant's employee and that defendant is vicariously liable to
plaintiff for damages caused by Stockert's negligence.  The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendant, holding, as a
matter of law, that Stockert was an independent contractor,
rather than an employee of defendant, and that defendant
therefore could not be liable for injuries caused by Stockert's
negligence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. 
Schaff v. Ray's Land and Sea Food Co., 173 Or App 170, 21 P3d 664
(2001).  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS

		The historical facts relevant to the trial court's
decision are not disputed.  On June 2, 1998, Stockert was driving
a pickup truck that collided with a pickup truck that Schaff was
driving.  Both men died as a result of injuries from the
collision.  As noted, plaintiff filed this negligence action
against defendant arguing that, at the time of the collision,
Stockert was defendant's employee.
		Defendant is a closely held Oregon corporation with two
shareholders, Raymond Frank and his wife.  Frank purchased a
"Land & Sea Food Company" franchise in 1982, which allowed him to
use the registered "Land & Sea Food Company" trademark in Oregon. 
Shortly thereafter, he incorporated defendant.  The business
operates out of the Frank residence.  Defendant purchases meat
and fish products from brokers and resells those products. 
Defendant sells directly to some customers and, pursuant to
written "dealership" agreements, also sells at wholesale to
"dealers" who resell to ultimate customers.  Stockert was one
such "dealer."
		Stockert and defendant signed a "dealership agreement"
in January 1994.  Among other things, the agreement required
Stockert to purchase all his meat and fish products from
defendant, to promote the sale of defendant's products to
Stockert's customers "at times and in a manner within
[Stockert's] discretion," and to carry certain automobile
insurance.  The agreement also recited certain "understandings,"
including that Stockert had no authority to bind defendant to any
contracts or obligations; that all Stockert's costs, expenses,
obligations, and liabilities were "to be borne solely by
himself"; and that Stockert, as a "self-employed individual," was
subject to federal social security taxes and was not covered by
state or federal unemployment compensation or state workers'
compensation.  The agreement also contained the following
provision:
			"It is understood that [Stockert] is not an employee of
[defendant], but is an independent contractor in business
for himself. [Defendant] shall have no control over
[Stockert's] mode of doing business."
The agreement was terminable at will by either party.	
		Defendant supplied Stockert with a refrigeration unit
bearing the "Land and Sea Food Co." name, which Stockert placed
in the back of a pickup truck that he leased from his daughter. 
He used the truck and refrigeration unit to deliver products to
his customers.  Defendant also supplied Stockert with brochures
describing the products, which stated that the products "are
expressly packaged for and distributed by contracted 'LAND & SEA'
dealers."  Defendant's president, Frank, "trained" new dealers by
taking them on sales calls with him and, during that training,
generally advised new dealers on selling techniques and suggested
prices.  
		Stockert, however, was responsible for determining when
and how to work, how many products to purchase, and what prices
to charge to his customers.  His income was based on the
difference between what he charged his customers and his
expenses, which included the amounts that he paid defendant for
products.  Dealers selected and established their own routes and,
by informal oral agreement, generally did not sell in each
other's territory.  Stockert initially sold in the Eugene area,
but then decided to start a route in central Oregon.  Defendant
did not provide Stockert with a customer list, and defendant did
not have, and never asked for, a copy of Stockert's customer
list.  Stockert worked out of his home.  He had no listing as an
independent business in the yellow pages, did no advertising, and
had no workers' compensation insurance or employees.  
		Stockert typically would pick up products from
defendant weekly or as needed, and Stockert had little contact
with defendant other than when he purchased products.  Stockert
and other dealers did not, and were not expected to, report to
defendant on a regular basis other than when they purchased
products.  Although most of Stockert's income came from selling
defendant's products, he also purchased spices and vitamins
elsewhere at wholesale for resale to his customers.
II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW

		As noted, plaintiff alleged that defendant was
Stockert's employer, that Stockert was acting in the course and
scope of his employment when he negligently collided with Schaff,
and that defendant therefore was vicariously liable for Schaff's
injuries that Stockert had caused.  Defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that it had no liability because, as a
matter of law, Stockert was an independent contractor rather than
an employee.  Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
asserting that, as a matter of law, Stockert was an employee and
that partial summary judgment should be entered in plaintiff's
favor.  In the alternative, plaintiff opposed defendant's motion,
arguing that, if Stockert was not an employee as a matter of law,
a jury nevertheless could draw from the facts conflicting
reasonable inferences as to Stockert's status and, therefore,
that there were disputed issues of fact that precluded summary
judgment for defendant.  The trial court granted defendant's
motion and denied plaintiff's motion on the ground that, as a
matter of law, Stockert was an independent contractor.  As noted,
the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
III.  ANALYSIS

		Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  ORCP 47 C.  There is no
genuine issue as to any material fact if, "based upon the record
before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse
party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for
the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion
for summary judgment."  Id. (1)  On review of a motion for summary
judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the adverse party. 
Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 461, 31 P3d
421 (2001).
		As we explain in detail below, defendant may be held
vicariously liable for Stockert's negligence if defendant had the
right to control the manner in which Stockert performed services
for defendant.  Plaintiff argues that, although the historical
facts are undisputed, a jury could draw inferences from those
facts that would permit it to conclude that a right to control
sufficient to establish employee status existed in this case. 
Therefore, plaintiff argues, the trial court erred in granting
defendant's summary judgment motion, because there was a genuine
issue of material fact for the jury.  Defendant argues that the
trial court correctly concluded that Stockert was an independent
contractor as a matter of law.
		For the reasons that follow, we agree with defendant. 
Based upon the summary judgment record before us, viewed in a
manner most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that no reasonable
jury could conclude that defendant had a sufficient right to
control Stockert's performance for him to be considered an
employee.  We, therefore, conclude that Stockert was an
independent contractor as a matter of law. 
A.  The "Right to Control" Test
		 Whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor is a legal conclusion.  That conclusion, however,
depends on a factual determination of the extent to which the
purported employer has the right to control the performance of
services by the individual.  Jenkins v. AAA Heating & Cooling,
Inc., 245 Or 382, 386-87, 421 P2d 971 (1966).  In Jenkins, this
court stated:
	"While there is no simple measure of the extent to
which an employer may control a worker in the
performance of his task without creating a master-servant relationship, control over performance remains
the principal test.  The definition of a servant in the
Restatement (Second), Agency, § 220(1) (1958), is
generally accepted by most courts.  It reads:
		"'A servant is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the
performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control.'"
Id. (emphasis added).  See also Meskimen v. Larry Angell Salvage
Co., 286 Or 87, 91-92, 592 P2d 1014 (1979) (quoting Jenkins and
Restatement test); Jorgensen v. Richard, 266 Or 263, 265, 512 P2d
991 (1973) (quoting Restatement test); Wallowa Valley Stages v.
Oregonian, 235 Or 594, 598, 386 P2d 430 (1963) ("[T]he right of
the employer to control the workman is the basis most commonly
advanced for imposing liability upon the employer."); Kowaleski
v. Kowaleski, 235 Or 454, 458, 385 P2d 611 (1963) ("Right by the
master to control the conduct of the driver is the favorite
approach of the courts, including this court.").
B.  "Right to Control" Test and Role of the Jury
		The parties do not dispute that the right to control
test is applicable here. (2)  However, they disagree as to whether a
court may permit a jury to draw inferences from undisputed
historical facts regarding the right to control, when the
inferences that are drawn for all practical purposes will decide
the legal question whether an individual is an employee or
independent contractor.  In defendant's view, allowing the jury
to draw such inferences improperly would allow the jury to decide
a matter of law.
		Defendant correctly points out that an individual's
status as an employee or an independent contractor is a
conclusion of law and, as such, typically would not be a matter
for a jury to decide.  However, in some situations, that legal
conclusion will depend on the jury's determination of the facts
regarding an employer's right to control the manner and
performance of the work.  In cases in which the facts or
reasonable inferences support a conclusion that there is an
employer-employee relationship, this court allows the jury to
render a verdict as to the individual's employment status --
although a conclusion of law -- by way of resolving any
conflicting facts or inferences on the basis of proper
instructions. (3)  This court has acknowledged that "this practice
may not always lend itself to a fastidious application of the
rule that the jury decides fact and the court decides law." 
Wallowa Valley Stages, 235 Or at 600. (4)
		In Wallowa Valley Stages, for example, a driver who
distributed newspapers and solicited customers for a publisher
claimed that he was "self-employed" and that he received no
direction from the publisher on the manner in which he was to
perform services.  235 Or at 601-02.  However, the facts also
disclosed that "circulation representatives" of the newspaper
frequently visited the driver.  Those facts permitted an
inference that the newspaper exercised control over the driver's
method of operations which, in the court's view, was sufficient
to permit a jury to conclude that the driver was the newspaper's
employee.  In holding that the trial court properly submitted the
employee/independent contractor issue to the jury, this court
stated:
			"Whether or not a given person is the servant or the
contractor of another is ordinarily a question of law,
where the facts are clear.  Where the facts are in
dispute, however, it becomes necessary to submit at
least the questions of fact to the jury.  If more than
one inference may be drawn from the facts, the jury
makes the selection in arriving at a general verdict."  

Id. at 600.
		This court applied the same rule but reached the
opposite conclusion in Jenkins, when it affirmed a directed
verdict in favor of the putative employer, holding that an
individual was an independent contractor as a matter of law.  245
Or 382.  In that case, a salesman for the defendant's furnace-cleaning business had signed a contract explicitly stating that
he was an independent contractor.  This court refused to submit
to a jury the question of the salesman's employment status,
explaining that, although in Wallowa Valley Stages there had been
evidence that employer representatives had visited the driver
frequently, there was "no such evidence" in Jenkins.  Id. at 387. 
Thus, the court determined that there was no factual dispute for
the jury to decide, because the facts and reasonable inferences
drawn from them could not support a conclusion that the salesman
was the employee of the furnace-cleaning business.  Id.  In so
reasoning, the court reiterated its earlier holding:
	"As noted in Wallowa Valley Stages v. Oregonian, supra,
the question whether a given person is a servant or an
independent contractor ordinarily is one of law, if the
facts are not in dispute and if only one reasonable
inference can be drawn from the facts."
Id. at 386. (5)
		In summary, the foregoing discussion of this court's
case law establishes that whether an individual is an employee or
an independent contractor for vicarious liability purposes is a
question of law.  However, that legal conclusion ultimately
depends on a constellation of facts relating to the right to
control.  A jury or other factfinder must render a verdict on an
individual's employment status if the facts and any reasonable
inferences that the jury could draw from those facts support a
conclusion that the putative employer had the right to control
the putative employee's work performance.  See Wallowa Valley
Stages, 235 Or at 600 (jury selects between conflicting
inferences in arriving at general verdict).  If the facts and any
reasonable inferences that a jury could draw from those facts
would not support a conclusion that the putative employer had the
right to control the putative employee's work performance, then
there is no triable issue of fact, and a defendant is entitled to
have the issue decided as a matter of law.  Jenkins, 245 Or at
386.  The court's determination may come in the form of a ruling
on a motion for a directed verdict, as in Jenkins, or a ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, as here.
C.  Application of the "Right to Control" Test
		With those legal principles in mind, we turn once again
to the undisputed facts that were before the trial court on the
motion for summary judgment in this case.  The dealership
agreement described the relationship between Stockert and
defendant.  As noted above, the agreement recited that Stockert
was an independent contractor, not an employee of defendant; that
defendant had no control over Stockert's "mode of doing
business"; and that Stockert and defendant had no authority to
bind each other contractually.  Although terms such as those in a
dealer or distributor agreement are not dispositive of whether
the dealer is an independent contractor, they are evidence of
such a relationship.  Jenkins, 245 Or at 384-85.  In any event,
we see no inference that a jury could draw from the dealership
agreement in favor of plaintiff's position that defendant had a
right to control Stockert.
		Further, we do not think, based on the other facts in
the record, that a jury reasonably could infer that Stockert and
defendant operated in a manner inconsistent with the terms of
their agreement.  Frank testified that defendant exercised no
control over the manner in which Stockert conducted his business,
other than the requirement that Stockert not sell competing
products.  Stockert was free to conduct his business as he saw
fit.  There is no evidence that defendant visited Stockert or his
customers or decided how often Stockert worked.  Defendant did
not control the prices that Stockert charged, the quantity of
products he sold, the manner of sales, or the customers to whom
he sold.  Stockert was permitted to, and did, sell noncompeting
products that he purchased from wholesalers other than defendant.
		Neither could a jury draw inferences in favor of
plaintiff's position from the means by which Stockert earned
money from the sale of the products.  Stockert received no wages,
commissions, reimbursements, guarantees, or payments from
defendant.  His income consisted solely of the difference between
the amounts that he collected from his customers and his
expenses, which included the cost of products that he purchased
from defendant and other wholesalers.  Stockert paid all his own
expenses, including insurance, took all risk of loss on his
sales, and received all benefit of any gain.
		Plaintiff points to other facts.  She notes that
defendant was the exclusive supplier of meat and fish products to
Stockert and supplied him with a refrigeration unit and
promotional literature; that Stockert did not hold himself out as
a separate enterprise; that Stockert did not possess special
skills; and that Stockert worked for defendant for over four
years.  She argues that those facts and the reasonable inferences
that a jury could draw from them, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude
that defendant had a sufficient right to control the manner in
which Stockert conducted his sales to give rise to vicarious
liability.  
		We disagree.  Those facts provide an insufficient basis
to conclude that, "with respect to the physical conduct in the
performance of the services [Stockert was] subject to
[defendant's] control or right to control."  Restatement (Second)
of Agency, § 220(1) (1958).  Given the undisputed facts regarding
the financial arrangement between Stockert and defendant, and the
level of control that Stockert exercised over the manner in which
he undertook to the sell the products, we conclude that the facts
and inferences support only the conclusion that defendant did not
have a sufficient right to control Stockert such that he could be
considered an employee.
		The dissent contends that a jury could find that some
of the ten nonexclusive factors identified in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, section 220, are present and provide
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Stockert
was an employee of defendant.  See Kowaleski, 235 Or at 460-61
(discussing relevance of Restatement factors in determining
control); Schaff, ___ Or at ___ (De Muniz, J., dissenting, slip
op at 5-6) (setting out Restatement factors).  That conclusion is
inconsistent with this court's decisions which emphasize that
"control over performance remains the principal test," Jenkins,
245 Or at 387, and which hold that the absence of control may be
found, as a matter of law, despite evidence of one or more of the
subsidiary factors identified in the Restatement, see id. at 384-87 (describing evidence consistent with several Restatement
factors, but holding no "right to control" as matter of law). 
		The dissent's conclusion also is inconsistent with this
court's decision in Jenkins, the facts of which are strikingly
similar to this case.  As noted, Jenkins involved a traveling
salesman for a furnace-cleaning company.  245 Or 382.  Like
Stockert, he signed a contract as an independent contractor that
required him to purchase automobile insurance and prohibited him
from contracting on behalf of the company.  The contract also
prohibited the salesman from employing others or advertising,
although, like Stockert, he was free to sell other noncompeting
products.  The company provided the salesman with an order book
necessary to perform the work.  The relationship could be
terminated at will, and the salesman was free to work at a time
and in a manner in which he saw fit.  Id. at 384-86.  This court
concluded that the foregoing facts and the inferences a jury
could draw from them were insufficient to support the conclusion
that the company had a right to control the salesman and, thus,
that the salesman was not an employee.  Id. at 387.
		The facts and inferences that plaintiff and the dissent
claim are sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant had a
right to control Stockert are, in our view, not materially
different from those in Jenkins.  For example, plaintiff argues
that the facts and inferences support the conclusion that
defendant was Stockert's employee because
	"[t]here can be little question that neither Mr.
Stockert, nor the dealers in general, actually have a
distinct occupation or business.  They all work from
their homes, and Mr. Stockert made no pretense of
holding himself out as a separate enterprise.  He had
no cards, no advertisements, no yellow page listing, no
place of business, and no worker[s'] compensation
insurance."
We fail to see how those facts are distinguishable from the facts
in Jenkins, in which the salesman worked door to door or used a
telephone, and did no advertising of any kind.  245 Or at 384. 
Similarly, plaintiff argues that the fact that the relationship
between Stockert and defendant was terminable at will is
"consistent with an employer/employee relationship" and, thus,
could support a conclusion that such a relationship existed. 
Again, we fail to see the significance of that fact in light of
Jenkins, where the relationship between the salesman and the
furnace-cleaning company also was terminable at will.  Id. at
385.
		Indeed, to the extent that the cases are
distinguishable, the facts in this case show that defendant had
even less right to control its salesmen than did the defendant in
Jenkins.  First, the defendant in Jenkins reserved the right to
reject, for any reason, any order its salesmen had negotiated and
to refuse to pay commissions on those orders.  245 Or at 384.  In
this case, because of the nature of the relationship -- namely,
Stockert purchased the products that he sold -- defendant lacked
similar control over the transactions between Stockert and his
customers.  Second, the defendant in Jenkins informed its
salesmen that they were expected to make 10 to 12 sales a month. 
Id. at 385-86.  No similar expectations were placed on Stockert. 
It is undisputed that defendant had no requirement that dealers
devote even a minimum number of hours to selling products
purchased from defendant.  Finally, the defendant in Jenkins paid
its salesmen on commission and on a piece-work basis, a practice
that is at least consistent with an employer/employee
relationship.  Id. at 384.  Here, defendant did not pay Stockert
by commission or otherwise, but simply sold products to him for
resale.  The difference in compensation arrangements further
demonstrates that defendant had less of a right to control
Stockert's performance than the defendant in Jenkins had over the
performance of its salesmen. (6)
		Neither plaintiff nor the dissent suggests that Jenkins
was decided incorrectly.  Indeed, plaintiff does not cite Jenkins
in any of her briefing to this court, much less attempt to
distinguish it.  In light of both the factual similarities
between Jenkins and this case and, as noted above, the relevant
differences, we conclude that the same disposition is warranted
here.  The trial court properly concluded, as a matter of law,
that Stockert was not an employee of defendant.  Accordingly, the
trial court correctly granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
		DE MUNIZ, J., dissenting.
		In Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614, 43 P3d
1106 (2002), this court held that, as a matter of law, an
individual who owned and maintained his own truck, and who, along
with other owner-drivers, occasionally hauled onions for a farmer
to the processor, was a worker and the farmer a subject employer
under the workers' compensation statutes.  That conclusion was
based on this court's application of the judicially created
"right to control" and "nature of the work" tests.  I joined the
opinion in Rubalcaba, because I concluded that this court's cases
applying the "right to control" and "nature of the work" tests
compelled that result.  I am not willing, however, to do the
conceptual "about face" that the majority does here, to conclude
that plaintiff is not entitled to have a jury apply essentially
the same considerations in deciding whether, for purposes of
vicarious liability, there was a master-servant relationship
between defendant and Stockert.
		This case is only at the summary judgment stage.  Thus,
a jury must be permitted to decide whether there was a master-servant relationship between defendant and Stockert, sufficient
to impose vicarious liability, unless we can declare that, on
this record, "viewed in a manner most favorable to the
[plaintiff], no objectively reasonable juror could return a
verdict for the [plaintiff] * * *."  ORCP 47 C (emphasis added).
		The majority acknowledges the following:
		"In cases in which the facts or reasonable
inferences support a conclusion that there is an
employer-employee relationship, this court allows the
jury to render a verdict as to the individuals's
employment status -- although a conclusion of law -- by
way of resolving those conflicting facts or inferences
on the basis of proper instructions."
Schaff v. Ray's Land & Sea Food, Inc., 334 Or ___, ___, ___ P3d
___ (2002) (slip op at 9).
		However, having acknowledged the jury's role in
deciding whether vicarious liability should be imposed, the
majority proceeds to ignore it.  For the reasons that follow, I
respectfully dissent.
	 	This court "frequently [has] said or assumed that the
existence of a master-servant relationship is to be determined
according to whether the master had the right to control the
conduct of the alleged servant."  Peeples v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indust., Ltd., 288 Or 143, 146, 603 P2d 765 (1979).  The majority
follows that approach, concluding that, for purposes of vicarious
liability, the "right to control" test is the only test that
should be applied.  Schaff, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 8).  As I
point out below, that conclusion is dubious because, in earlier
tort cases, this court has indicated that a jury may consider
factors similar to those identified in the "nature of the work"
test in deciding whether to impose vicarious liability. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that the court should use only the
"right to control" test to determine whether the record presents
a dispute as to a material fact, the majority errs in its
application of that test.  There is evidence in the record, which
I list below, that would permit a juror reasonably to infer that
defendant had the "right to control" the performance of
Stockert's work.  
		First, defendant had the right to terminate the
employment relationship at any time without contractual
liability.  In Rubalcaba, this court emphasized that an
"employer's power to terminate [is] particularly strong evidence
of the right to control, because the 'effect of [the power to
terminate] possessed by the company required respondent to
conduct this operation at all times as it might please the
logging company and its manager.'"  Rubalcaba, 333 Or at 620
(citing Bowser v. State Indus. Accident Comm., 182 Or 42, 56, 185
P2d 891 (1947)) (emphasis added).  Although that same reasoning
should apply here, the majority accords no weight at all in this
case to the right to discharge. 
		 Second, defendant had economic control over Stockert
by requiring Stockert to purchase his entire meat and fish
requirements from defendant.  Defendant supplied the products to
Stockert on credit, which Stockert settled with defendant on a
30-day basis.  As security for the financial arrangement, the
contract required Stockert to prepay $1,000 to defendant.
		Third, defendant provided the most important equipment
necessary to perform Stockert's work by furnishing Stockert with
a $5,000 refrigeration unit with the name "Land and Sea Food Co."
on its side. 
		Finally, defendant supplied Stockert with brochures
describing the products, and defendant "trained" salesmen, like
Stockert, by taking them on sales calls and advising them of
effective selling techniques and suggested prices.
		A jury, considering those factors, reasonably could
conclude that defendant exercised a degree of control over the
manner in which Stockert performed his work, sufficient to
justify the imposition of vicarious liability. (7)  That is all that
ORCP 47 requires at this stage of the proceedings.  The majority
incorrectly concludes otherwise and deprives plaintiff of the
jury trial to which she is entitled. 
		 There is, however, more to this issue than the
majority acknowledges.  In the past, this court has commented
that, in determining the existence of a master-servant
relationship for purposes of vicarious liability, a jury may
consider the various factors outlined in Restatement (Second) of
Agency, section 220 (1958).  See Wallowa Valley Stages v.
Oregonian, 235 Or 594, 386 P2d 430 (1963) (so stating).  Section
220 provides:
		"(1) A servant is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect
to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to
control.
		"(2) In determining whether one acting for another
is a servant or an independent contractor, the
following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
		"(a) the extent of control which, by the
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of
the work;
		"(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business;
		"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
		"(d) the skill required in the particular
occupation;
		"(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for
the person doing the work;
		"(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
		"(g) the method of payment, whether by time or by
the job;
		"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer;
		"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and
		"(j) whether the principal is or is not in
business."
(Footnote omitted.)  
		In Wallowa Valley Stages, this court, referring to the
factors identified in section 220 of the Restatement, stated:
		"If the foregoing considerations are used in the
trial of jury cases, the trial court ultimately has to
tell the jurors, at least in a general way, how to
apply to the case at hand their affirmative or negative
answers to the Restatement tests.  They must arrive at
a general verdict based upon their decision that the
actor in a given case was, or was not, a servant. 
Thus, the trial courts understandably rely strongly
upon the element of control, or the right to control,
and in their instructions relate to the general concept
of control such other suggestions, like those found in
§ 220 of the Restatement, as they may see fit to use."  
235 Or at 599 (emphasis added).
		As applicable to this case, Wallowa Valley Stages
clearly established that, in determining whether the relationship
between defendant and Stockert is of a nature sufficient to
justify the imposition of vicarious liability, a jury is entitled
to consider, and may give some weight to, the factors outlined in
section 220 of the Restatement.  The factors outlined in section
220 of the Restatement closely parallel the "nature of work" test
that this court applied in Rubalcaba to hold as a matter of law
that the claimant was a worker and that the farmer was a subject
employer.  See also Woody v. Waibel, 276 Or 189, 554 P2d 492
(1976) (identifying and applying the "nature of the work" test
factors).		Here, a jury could find that a number of the factors
identified in the Restatement are present and, when considered
along with the primary right to control factors, are sufficient
to impose vicarious liability.  
		Evidence conforming to the Restatement factors include
the following:  Defendant is a corporation that sells meat and
fish products.  The sale of defendant's products to the public is
accomplished by salesmen, like Stockert, who sell to customers in
certain geographic areas. 
		Stockert was not engaged in a distinct occupation, as
usually is the case with independent contractors.  The skill used
in selling meat and fish products is typical of a route salesman,
and that relationship usually is one of master-servant.  Stockert
had no independent business listing in the yellow pages of the
telephone directory, did no advertising, and used business cards
identifying himself as "Adam Stockert, a representative of Land &
Sea Food Co."  (Emphasis added.)  Stockert had no employees of
his own.  At the time of Stockert's death, the relationship had
existed for four years.  Stockert carried commercial auto
insurance in the amount of $300,000, endorsed to show defendant
as an additional insured.
		In Wallowa Valley Stages, a jury had determined that
Badgett, who distributed Oregonian newspapers in eastern Oregon,
was an employee of the Oregonian for purposes of vicarious
liability.  On appeal to this court, the Oregonian contended
that, as a matter of law, Badgett was an independent contractor
and the jury should not have been permitted to decide the issue. 
In affirming the judgment against the Oregonian, the court
stated:
	"We do not hold that the amount of supervision
exercised in the case at bar was sufficient to
constitute Badgett an employee as a matter of law. 
Neither can we hold that Badgett was an independent
contractor as a matter of law.  We hold that there was
evidence from which the jury could draw its own
inferences on the matter."
235 Or at 602 (emphasis added).
		Conceptually, this case is indistinguishable from cases
like Wallowa Valley Stages.  The evidence of control and the
evidence consistent with the factors identified in the
Restatement are not, as a matter of law, sufficient one way or
the other to define the relationship between defendant and
Stockert.  However, the record does contain evidence that is
sufficient for a jury to decide whether the relationship is of
the type that justifies the imposition of vicarious liability.
That is all that is required under this court's cases. 
		Durham and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.



1. 	This case was pending in the trial court when a 1999
amendment to ORCP 47 C became effective; therefore, the amended
version of ORCP 47 C applies.  See Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville
Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 457-58, 31 P3d 421 (2001) (describing 1999
amendment and application to pending cases).  However, the 1999
amendment did not change the portion of ORCP 47 C quoted in the
text and does not affect the analysis in this case.

2. 	In her brief on the merits, plaintiff invites this
court to reconsider whether the traditional "right of control"
test used in the vicarious liability context should include a
broader "nature of work" test similar to that which is used in
cases arising under workers' compensation laws.  Compare
Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614, 627, 43 P3d 1106
(2002) (workers' compensation laws require court to consider
"nature of work" test and "right of control" test), with Peeples
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indust., Ltd., 288 Or 143, 146-47, 603 P2d 765
(1979) (questioning but acknowledging practice of using "right of
control" as only test for imposing vicarious liability). 
However, that is not the legal question that plaintiff presented
on review.  That question is:  "[W]hether * * * one's status as
an employee or an independent contractor is decided by the jury
when the facts are uncontroverted, but different inferences can
be drawn from those facts."  Moreover, nowhere else in her
petition for review did plaintiff articulate with specificity the
argument that she now seeks to advance.  Accordingly, we decline
to consider it.  See ORAP 9.05(b) (petition for review must
contain concise statement of legal question presented on review
and rule of law petitioner proposes to be established, if review
allowed); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or 537, 541 n 3,
17 P3d 473 (2001) (declining to consider issue not presented in
petition for review).

3. 	Defendant argues that this court announced a contrary
rule in Woody v. Waibel, 276 Or 189, 554 P2d 492 (1976).  In that
case, this court stated that, "where there is no dispute as to
what the arrangement is, the question of employee or independent
contractor is one of law for the court."  Id. at 192-93 n 3.  We
find Woody, a case decided with respect to workers' compensation
statutes, to be of limited relevance to our discussion of the
role of the court and jury in the context of common law vicarious
liability.  See, e.g., id. at 193 ("The criteria in the workmen's
compensation cases are keyed to the purpose of the workmen's
compensation laws.").  Moreover, contrary to defendant's
assertions, Woody did not change this court's practice in
vicarious liability cases of permitting a jury to decide between
conflicting reasonable inferences relating to the right to
control, drawn from undisputed facts, in arriving at a general
verdict.  See Meskimen, 286 Or at 91 (so demonstrating).

4. 	See also Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar
S. Gray, 3 The Law of Torts 340-41 (2d ed 1986) ("It is a
commonplace today that questions of law are for the court and
questions of fact for the jury, whatever the historical
vicissitudes of this notion may have been.  It is just as
commonplace, at least in the profession, that this statement has
never been fully true in either of its branches, and tells us
little or nothing that is helpful.").

5. 	We note that Jenkins and Wallowa Valley Stages
potentially are misleading in stating that the question of
employment status ordinarily is one of law.  Jenkins, 245 Or at
386; Wallowa Valley Stages, 235 Or at 600.  That question is
always one of law, but this court has determined that it must be
submitted to the jury when the underlying facts are in dispute or
more than one reasonable inference relating to the right to
control can be drawn from those facts.

6. 	In light of our comparison of the facts in Jenkins with
those here, we fail to comprehend how the dissent nonetheless
concludes that, in Jenkins, "there was a complete absence of
control" exercised by the defendant over its salesmen, without
reaching the same conclusion with respect to this case.  Schaff,
___ Or at ___ n 1 (De Muniz, J., dissenting, slip op at 4 n 1).

7. 	The majority relies extensively on this court's
decision in Jenkins v. AAA Heating, 245 Or 382, 421 P2d 971
(1966).  According to the majority "the facts of this case are
not materially different from those in Jenkins, * * *."  245 Or
at 308 (slip op at 16).  In that case, there was a complete
absence of control over the manner in which the salesmen did
their work.  All that the heating company did was provide an
order book and pay commissions for any order brought to the
company.  Here, as set out earlier, defendant had the right to
terminate the relationship at will, provided key equipment,
supplied brochures regarding the product and the product itself,
and bore some economic risk in the sale of the product.  Those
facts alone are sufficient to distinguish this case from Jenkins.