Title: State v. Halverson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP858-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brian L. Halverson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 389 Wis. 2d 554,937 N.W.2d 74 
PDC No:2019 WI App 66 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 29, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven R. Cray   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Megan Sanders-Drazen, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sarah L. Burgundy. 
 
 
2021 WI 7 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP858-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CM83) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian L. Halverson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 29, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court with directions.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   You have "a right to remain 
silent."  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  So 
begins the ubiquitous Miranda warnings, procedural safeguards 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
mandated 
must 
be 
administered to suspects prior to any "custodial interrogation."  
Id.  If the warnings are not given, any statements made are 
inadmissible in court.  Id. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The question in this case concerns the scope of 
"custody" for purposes of Miranda.  The defendant, Brian L. 
Halverson, was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an 
officer regarding an incident at Halverson's prior correctional 
institution.  During the short call, the officer asked Halverson 
about an inmate's missing property, and Halverson admitted that 
he took and destroyed the property.  No Miranda warnings were 
given.  Halverson argues that his statements must be suppressed 
because he was in custody as an inmate in jail, and therefore he 
also was most assuredly "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. 
¶3 
In a 1999 case, this court agreed.  State v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999).  Relying on 
United States Supreme Court precedent, we held "that a person 
who is incarcerated is per se in custody for purposes of 
Miranda."  Id. at 355.  In 2012, however, the United States 
Supreme Court clarified this is not what federal law requires.  
In Howes v. Fields, the Court concluded that the Constitution 
contains no such per se rule.  565 U.S. 499, 508 (2012).  The 
Court emphasized that "custody" for purposes of Miranda is a 
term of art; it is not consonant with the inability to leave or 
with incarceration generally.  Id. at 508-09.  Whether a suspect 
was "in custody" depends on an inquiry of the totality of the 
circumstances, looking to the degree of restraint and coercive 
nature of the interrogation.  Id. at 509. 
¶4 
Recognizing that the federal constitutional landscape 
does not support his argument, Halverson asks this court to 
readopt the per se rule, this time relying on the Wisconsin 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
3 
 
Constitution.  We decline Halverson's request.  While this court 
need not always follow federal constitutional interpretation in 
lockstep, we conclude that neither the Wisconsin Constitution 
nor the purposes underlying the Miranda warnings support a 
judicially-created rule treating all incarcerated individuals as 
"in custody."  In the alternative, Halverson contends that his 
incriminating statements should be suppressed because he was "in 
custody" under the traditional Miranda custody test.  We 
disagree and conclude that Halverson was not in custody for 
purposes of Miranda. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Brian L. Halverson was an inmate in the Vernon County 
Jail when Officer Matthew Danielson called and requested to 
speak with him.  Officer Danielson was investigating a claim of 
theft and destruction of property at Stanley Correctional 
Institution that occurred when Halverson was incarcerated there.  
Halverson returned the call and admitted to the crimes.  The 
State charged Halverson with one count of criminal damage to 
property and one count of misdemeanor theft, both as a repeater.  
Halverson filed a motion to suppress his statements in part on 
the grounds that he was not read his Miranda warnings.   
¶6 
During the suppression hearing, Officer Danielson 
testified that he called the Vernon County Jail the morning of 
September 27, 2016, and requested to speak to Halverson.  He 
received a call back within ten minutes from a deputy at the 
jail who put Halverson on the phone.  Officer Danielson began 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
4 
 
the call by introducing himself, explaining the purpose of the 
call, and asking if Halverson knew the individuals who were 
involved in the incident at Stanley Correctional Institution.  
When questioned initially, Halverson stated that he believed the 
items were inadvertently placed in the garbage.  But when asked 
about two letters admitting his guilt that Halverson wrote to 
the victim and another inmate, Halverson's tone shifted.  While 
calm at the outset, Halverson began yelling.  He ultimately 
admitted to Officer Danielson that he took and destroyed the 
property.  The entire phone call lasted no more than five 
minutes.  Officer Danielson testified that, for his part, his 
tone was calm and normal throughout the call.  Halverson was not 
read his Miranda warnings, Officer Danielson explained, because 
while "he was in custody somewhere else for something else," 
Halverson was not "in custody with me."   
¶7 
The circuit court relied on Officer Danielson's 
uncontested testimony as factual background, but it granted 
Halverson's motion to suppress.1  The circuit court concluded it 
was bound to apply Armstrong's per se rule that incarcerated 
individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes.  The State 
moved for reconsideration. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Steven R. Cray, Chippewa County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
5 
 
¶8 
At 
the 
reconsideration 
hearing, 
Vernon 
County 
Sheriff's Deputy Matthew Hoff testified.2  Deputy Hoff did not 
specifically remember the call.  Instead, he testified regarding 
the standard operating procedures at the Vernon County Jail, 
testimony the circuit court accepted as credible.   
¶9 
When an inmate at the jail receives a phone call, the 
inmate can choose whether to take or return the call.  If an 
inmate wishes to do so, a deputy escorts the inmate from his pod 
to 
the 
jail's 
community 
room. 
 
The 
community 
room 
is 
approximately 15-by-25-feet in size and doubles as the jail 
library.  The deputies visually monitor the inmate through 
observation glass, but they cannot hear what occurs in the 
community room and the calls are not recorded.  Once the call is 
complete, the inmate is escorted back to his pod.  The inmate is 
not handcuffed at any point during this process. 
¶10 Following the hearing, the circuit court denied the 
State's motion for reconsideration, once again concluding it was 
bound to follow the per se rule in Armstrong and suppress 
Halverson's statements.   
¶11 The State appealed and the court of appeals reversed.  
The court of appeals held that the per se rule adopted by this 
court in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United 
States Supreme Court in Howes, and it declined to readopt the 
                                                 
2 Deputy Hoff was subpoenaed to appear at the initial 
suppression hearing, but he did not appear.  The circuit court 
reserved the right for the parties to provide Deputy Hoff's 
testimony at a reconsideration hearing. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
6 
 
per se rule under the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. 
Halverson, 2019 WI App 66, ¶65, 389 Wis. 2d 554, 937 N.W.2d 74.  
It further concluded that Halverson was not in custody for 
purposes of Miranda under the totality of the circumstances.  
Id., ¶66.  We granted Halverson's petition for review and agree 
with the court of appeals. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 The issues in this case center on the nature of 
"custody" for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings 
must be administered.  Halverson contends he was in custody for 
two 
independent 
reasons. 
 
First, 
Halverson 
argues 
all 
incarcerated individuals should be deemed "in custody" for 
purposes of Miranda solely due to their incarceration.  Although 
the United States Supreme Court rejected a per se rule to this 
effect, he asks us to adopt this approach under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Second, if we decline that request (as we do), 
Halverson asserts the totality of the circumstances nonetheless 
demonstrates he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.  We 
begin with the constitutional backdrop underlying these claims, 
and then address the merits of each in turn. 
 
A.  The Law of Miranda 
¶13 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  In Miranda, the Supreme Court created a 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
7 
 
set of procedural safeguards, enforced by the remedy of 
exclusion, aimed at "protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination."  Withrow v. Williams, 507 
U.S. 680, 691 (1993).  These safeguards were proposed in 
response to four cases consolidated before the Court.  Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 491-99.  All four concerned the questioning of a 
defendant by a law enforcement officer, detective, or district 
attorney in a police station where the defendant was isolated 
from the outside world and eventually orally admitted to the 
underlying crime after at least two hours of questioning.  
Id. at 491-98.   
¶14 The Court has explained that these warnings, and the 
evidentiary penalty for failing to administer them, constitute a 
prophylactic rule that extends beyond the requirements of the 
constitutional text itself.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the 
Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment 
itself.  It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth 
Amendment violation.").  Instead, Miranda is a judicially 
instituted effort to protect against self-incrimination by 
creating an unrebuttable legal presumption of coercion whenever 
the warnings are not administered.  Id. at 306 n.1 ("A Miranda 
violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a 
bright-line, 
legal 
presumption 
of 
coercion, 
requiring 
suppression of all unwarned statements."). 
¶15 This 
anti-coercion 
objective 
is 
central 
to 
understanding the reach and limits of the Miranda requirements.  
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
8 
 
This goal explains why the Court established what it called 
"custodial interrogation" as the trigger for administration of 
these warnings.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("[T]he prosecution 
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.").  The issues 
before us center on what makes an interrogation "custodial." 
¶16 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
"custody" for purposes of Miranda is not equivalent to a 
dictionary definition of the term.3  Rather, "custody" in the 
context 
of 
Miranda 
"is 
a 
term 
of 
art 
that 
specifies 
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious 
danger of coercion."  Howes, 565 U.S. at 508-09.   
¶17 The Miranda custody analysis proceeds in two steps.  
First, courts "ascertain whether, in light of 'the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation,' a 'reasonable person 
[would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.'"  Id. at 509 (alteration in original) 
(quoted sources omitted).  This requires examining the totality 
of the circumstances, including relevant factors such as "the 
location of the questioning, its duration, statements made 
during the interview, the presence or absence of physical 
restraints during the questioning, and the release of the 
                                                 
3 Colloquially, "custody" is defined as "[t]he state of 
being detained or held under guard, especially by the police."  
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 462 (3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
9 
 
interviewee at the end of the questioning."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
The 
inability 
to 
leave 
and 
terminate 
the 
conversation, however, is not enough on its own to trigger the 
need for Miranda warnings.  Id.  This inquiry "is simply the 
first step in the analysis, not the last."  Id.  "[T]he freedom-
of-movement 
test 
identifies 
only 
a 
necessary 
and 
not 
a 
sufficient condition for Miranda custody."  Maryland v. Shatzer, 
559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010).  Instead, courts proceed to the second 
step in the custody analysis where they ask "whether the 
relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive 
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in 
Miranda."  Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. 
   
B.  Incarceration and "Custody" Under Federal Law 
¶18 Application of these principles in the context of 
incarceration has not always been clear.  In 1999, this court 
addressed whether an inmate should have received Miranda 
warnings when questioned for an offense unrelated to his 
incarceration.  Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331.  We examined federal 
cases and our cases interpreting federal precedent and held 
"that a person who is incarcerated is per se in custody for 
purposes of Miranda."  Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 355.   
¶19 In 2012, however, the United States Supreme Court 
reached the opposite conclusion.  Howes, 565 U.S. at 508.  In 
that case, the defendant was in jail when escorted to a 
conference room where two armed sheriff's deputies questioned 
him for between five and seven hours about allegations pre-
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
10 
 
dating his time in prison.  Id. at 503.  Fields was uncuffed and 
told several times that he could leave and return to his cell.  
Id.  The door to the conference room was open and shut at 
different times during the questioning.  Id.  Fields ultimately 
confessed.  Id.  At no point during the questioning, however, 
was he read his Miranda warnings.  Id. at 504.   
¶20 On these facts, the Court expressly rejected a 
categorical rule that questioning an inmate is custodial.  
Id. at 505.  Instead it reviewed and re-emphasized the two-step, 
totality-of-the-circumstances custody inquiry established in 
prior cases.  Id. at 509.  Using that analysis, it reasoned that 
incarcerated individuals are not automatically in custody for 
purposes of Miranda.  Id.  The Court offered three reasons to 
support its conclusion——all centering on whether the environment 
necessarily contains the same coercive pressures that animated 
the Court's holding in Miranda.  Id. at 511-12.  First, 
questioning an incarcerated person does not involve the same 
kind of shock accompanying someone arrested in the first 
instance, and therefore the coercive pressures are substantially 
diminished.  Id. at 511.  Second, incarcerated individuals have 
far less pressure to speak with the hope of securing release.  
Id.  They know that when the questioning is finished, they will 
remain incarcerated.  Id.  Finally, incarcerated individuals 
know that their questioners "probably lack authority to affect 
the duration of [their] sentence."  Id. at 512.  Therefore, the 
Court held that incarceration alone does not necessarily 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
11 
 
implicate the same anti-coercion interests that motivated the 
Court's prophylactic efforts in Miranda.  Id.4 
¶21 In this case, the court of appeals correctly deduced 
that it was bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Howes rather than our earlier decision in Armstrong.  
Halverson, 389 Wis. 2d 554, ¶34.  As we explained in State v. 
Jennings, "The court of appeals must not follow a decision of 
this court on a matter of federal law if it conflicts with a 
subsequent controlling decision of the United States Supreme 
Court."  2002 WI 44, ¶19, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  
Accordingly, we recognize that the Court's decision in Howes 
functionally overruled Armstrong's per se rule. 
 
C.  Incarceration and "Custody" Under the Wisconsin Constitution 
¶22 Bereft of a per se determination that incarceration 
produces Miranda custody under federal law, Halverson asks us to 
adopt a per se rule in reliance on the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Constitutional interpretation is a question of law we review 
independently.  Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 
WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  In interpreting the 
                                                 
4 Three justices dissented in part.  The partial dissent did 
not object to the majority's analysis rejecting a per se rule.  
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 517 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Rather, it asserted 
that Miranda warnings should have been given to this particular 
suspect 
because 
he 
was 
"subjected 
to 
'incommunicado 
interrogation . . . in a police-dominated atmosphere.'"  Id. at 
518.  Thus, even the partial dissent aimed its analysis at 
honoring "the Fifth Amendment privilege Miranda was designed to 
safeguard."  Id. at 519. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
12 
 
Wisconsin Constitution, we focus on the language of the adopted 
text and historical evidence including "the practices at the 
time the constitution was adopted, debates over adoption of a 
given 
provision, 
and 
early 
legislative 
interpretation 
as 
evidenced by the first laws passed following the adoption."  
Id., ¶28 n.10.   
¶23 While we must follow the United States Supreme Court 
on matters of federal law, we have an independent responsibility 
to interpret and apply the Wisconsin Constitution.  Jennings, 
252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶¶18, 38.  Fulfilling our duty to uphold the 
Wisconsin Constitution 
as written 
could yield conclusions 
affording greater protections than those provided by the federal 
Constitution.  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977).   
¶24 That said, this court has underscored that any 
argument based on the Wisconsin Constitution must actually be 
grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Roberson, 2019 
WI 102, ¶56, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 ("[T]he question 
for a state court is whether its state constitution actually 
affords greater protection."); Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶¶38-
39 (explaining that any upward departure from the standards 
based on the federal Constitution announced by the Supreme Court 
"must itself be grounded in requirements found in the state 
constitution or laws").  "A state court does not have the power 
to write into its state constitution additional protection that 
is not supported by its text or historical meaning."  Roberson, 
389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶56. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
13 
 
¶25 Halverson recognizes that Miranda warnings are a 
prophylactic tool fashioned to protect the privilege against 
self-incrimination, a right independently protected in both 
constitutions.  Halverson therefore asks this court to create an 
expanded prophylactic to protect a person's rights under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.5   
¶26 The self-incrimination clause of Article I, Section 
8(1), adopted before incorporation of federal protections 
against 
the 
states 
via 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
is 
substantively identical to the Fifth Amendment.  It provides in 
relevant part:  "No person . . . may be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 8(1).6  We have generally interpreted Article I, 
Section 8 consistent with the protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment.  State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
906 N.W.2d 684.7  Halverson provides no textual or historical 
                                                 
5 In support of this request to create an expanded 
prophylactic, Halverson points to our decision in State v. Knapp 
where we expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule beyond its 
federal corollary.  2005 WI 127, ¶2, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899.  However, Knapp does not suggest anything about 
whether this court should adopt Halverson's proposed rule in 
this case.   
6 Article I, Section 8, originally provided in relevant 
part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 8 (1848).  It was later amended to add "or herself."   
7 See also State v. Edler, 2013 WI 73, ¶¶29-30, 350 
Wis. 2d 1, 833 N.W.2d 564 (acknowledging an exception to this 
general rule yet nevertheless "declin[ing] to extend the meaning 
of Wisconsin Constitution Article I, Section 8 in this situation 
so as to provide different protection than the Fifth Amendment 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
14 
 
basis to suggest any meaningful difference between the two 
provisions meriting an expanded judicially-created prophylactic 
rule.  Nor do we see any basis in the Wisconsin Constitution for 
Halverson's request.8 
¶27 Instead, Halverson focuses chiefly on the argument 
that incarceration inherently creates the kind of custodial 
circumstances meriting Miranda warnings.  We agree, however, 
with the Supreme Court's determination in Howes that a per se 
rule does not serve the anti-coercion purposes of Miranda.  
Interrogation of incarcerated individuals does not always 
present the "same inherently coercive pressures as the type of 
station house questioning at issue in Miranda," nor would an 
inmate always be unable to terminate questioning.  Howes, 565 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the United States Constitution"); State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, 
¶55, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 ("Article I, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution provides the same protections prior 
to charging a suspect as does the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution."); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 411, 193 
N.W. 89 (1923) ("Sec. 8 corresponds in substance with art. V and 
sec. 11 is identical with art. IV, respectively, of the 
amendments to the United States constitution."); Thornton v. 
State, 117 Wis. 338, 340, 93 N.W. 1107 (1903) ("This rule and 
practice of the common law was crystallized and expressed in the 
fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States in 
words identical with those above quoted from sec. 8, art. I of 
our own constitution."). 
8 Certainly 
nothing 
in 
the 
text 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution supports Halverson's request.  To the extent any 
historical evidence may assist Halverson's case, he has not 
presented those arguments here, nor will we develop them for 
him.  See Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our 
neutral role to develop or construct arguments for parties; it 
is up to them to make their case."). 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
15 
 
U.S. at 509.  As we conclude below, Halverson's circumstances do 
not even satisfy the standard requirements for custody under 
Miranda's framework.  Further, no facts in Halverson's case 
indicate coercion or anything close to it.  And that is the 
whole point of requiring Miranda warnings in the first place.  
In other words, Halverson's case exemplifies the problem with 
his proposed rule.  Officer Danielson's questioning of Halverson 
simply does not raise the specter of coerced admissions.  More 
to the point, Halverson's relatively benign and distanced 
interaction demonstrates that incarceration alone lacks the 
inherent dangers of the station-house interrogation.  This was 
why the United States Supreme Court rejected the per se rule in 
Howes, and Halverson offers no strong reasons to diverge from 
this rationale.   
¶28 In short, nothing in Article I, Section 8(1) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution suggests this court should deem all 
incarcerated individuals "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.  
Neither the purposes of Miranda warnings nor the text and 
history of the Wisconsin Constitution support Halverson's 
invitation to adopt his proposed per se rule. 
 
D.  Miranda "Custody" Applied to Halverson 
¶29 Halverson has an alternative argument——namely, that he 
was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda under the prevailing 
two-step inquiry examining the totality of the circumstances.  
In conducting this analysis, we accept the circuit court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
16 
 
Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶28, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609.  
Whether those facts support a determination of custody for 
purposes of Miranda is a question of law we review de novo.  Id.   
¶30 As previously explained, custody for purposes of 
Miranda first requires an objective determination of whether the 
suspect was free to move and terminate the interview.  Howes, 
565 U.S. at 509; Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶31.  Relevant 
factors include "the location of the questioning, its duration, 
statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of 
physical restraints during questioning, and the release of the 
interviewee at the end of the questioning."  Howes, 565 U.S. at 
509 (citations omitted); see also Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶32 
("Such factors include:  the degree of restraint; the purpose, 
place, and length of the interrogation; and what has been 
communicated by police officers.").  Regarding the degree of 
restraint, "we consider:  whether the suspect is handcuffed, 
whether a weapon is drawn, whether a frisk is performed, the 
manner in which the suspect is restrained, whether the suspect 
is moved to another location, whether questioning took place in 
a police vehicle, and the number of officers involved."  
Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶32.  
¶31 Unlike Miranda challenges in most cases, Halverson's 
interview occurred over the phone.  The State argues, and we 
agree, that interrogation by phone call is unlikely to rise to 
the level of Miranda custody.  This is so because a phone call 
will rarely present objective circumstances where a reasonable 
person 
would 
believe 
he 
is 
not 
free 
to 
terminate 
the 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
17 
 
interrogation.  A suspect can end questioning at any time simply 
by hanging up.  To our knowledge, no court has concluded that a 
telephonic interrogation triggered Miranda custody.9  The fact 
that Officer Danielson's interview occurred by phone strongly 
weighs against a determination of Miranda custody. 
¶32 The length of the interview reinforces the same 
conclusion.  Officer Danielson testified that his conversation 
with Halverson lasted "a few minutes, maybe three, four."  This 
is far afield from the five- to seven-hour questioning in Howes, 
which the Supreme Court found did not trigger a determination of 
custody for purposes of Miranda.  Howes, 565 U.S. at 503.  
Similarly, in State v. Lonkoski, we observed that a 30-minute 
timeframe weighed against determining the defendant was in 
Miranda custody.  2013 WI 30, ¶31, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 
N.W.2d 552.  The less-than-five-minute interview here similarly 
supports the State's argument. 
¶33 Halverson responds that unlike the defendant in Howes, 
he was not informed that he could terminate the interview at any 
time.  This failure, he contends, is fatal to the State's 
                                                 
9 See Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 
2005) (holding the defendant was not "in custody" when he was 
asked questions over the phone); State v. Mills, 293 P.3d 1129, 
1136 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (concluding "[t]he overall length, 
form, and circumstances of the voluntary, transcontinental 
telephone interview simply do not rise to the level of being so 
long, so draining, or so fierce as to be problematic under 
Miranda"); State v. Denton, 792 P.2d 537, 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990) (determining the defendant who was in jail at the time of 
the phone call was not in custody for Miranda purposes because 
he was free to terminate the phone call at any time).   
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
18 
 
argument.  Such a disclosure is certainly relevant to the 
inquiry, but it is not mandatory.  The question remains whether 
a reasonable person in Halverson's situation would feel free to 
terminate 
the 
interview. 
 
According 
to 
the 
unchallenged 
testimony of Deputy Hoff, Halverson had the choice whether to 
return Officer Danielson's call in the first place.  Halverson 
did so.  Officer Danielson began the call by explaining why he 
was calling, and Halverson chose to continue the conversation.  
Officer Danielson testified that he kept his tone calm and 
neutral during the interview, even after Halverson became more 
animated.  We observe nothing in the record suggesting the brief 
phone interview was no longer optional after it began.  Under 
these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to 
terminate the interview by hanging up the phone at any time. 
¶34 Halverson's physical environment also shows he was 
free to terminate the call.  When Halverson elected to return 
Officer Danielson's call, the record suggests a deputy escorted 
Halverson from his pod to the jail's community room, which 
doubled as a library.  Then, although visually observed during 
the interview, Halverson spoke to Officer Danielson alone and 
without physical restraints.  The record does not reveal any 
restraint upon Halverson any more than in his daily life as an 
inmate.   
¶35 For many of the same reasons, proceeding to the second 
step 
of 
the 
custody 
analysis, 
we 
conclude 
Halverson's 
environment did not "present[] the same inherently coercive 
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in 
No. 
2018AP858-CR 
 
19 
 
Miranda."  Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; see also Bartelt, 379 
Wis. 2d 588, ¶33.  He spoke to Officer Danielson over the phone 
in the jail's community room where he was alone, without 
physical restraints, and could sit or stand at will.  The 
interview lasted less than five minutes, and during that time 
Officer Danielson kept his tone calm.  These circumstances are 
nowhere close to the kind of coercive pressures of station-house 
questioning that sparked the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda. 
¶36 In light of all of these factors, especially the fact 
that this interview occurred over the phone, we conclude that 
Halverson was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 We decline Halverson's invitation to adopt a per se 
rule that incarcerated individuals are necessarily "in custody" 
for purposes of Miranda.  Applying the standard two-part test, 
we conclude Halverson was not "in custody" when Officer 
Danielson interviewed him by phone regarding the missing 
property.  Halverson's motion to suppress should have been 
denied, and we remand with directions to the circuit court to do 
so. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with 
directions. 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶38 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in full.  I write separately to address the 
petitioner's reliance on State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 
700 
N.W.2d 899. 
 
Because 
the 
Knapp 
court's 
interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution lacks any mooring in text or history, this court 
should restore the original meaning of this constitutional 
provision. 
¶39 The procedural posture of the Knapp case is somewhat 
unusual, with this court having had two separate opportunities 
to decide it.  The defendant, Matthew Knapp, was suspected of 
killing a woman with a baseball bat.  Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
¶¶3-5.  Following the incident, an officer visited Knapp at his 
apartment to arrest him, and requested the clothes he was 
wearing the night of the murder.  Id., ¶8.  Knapp pointed to a 
sweatshirt containing human blood, which the officer seized.  
Id., ¶9.  During this exchange, the officer intentionally 
withheld Miranda warnings in an effort to procure the physical 
evidence.  Id., ¶¶14-15.  The State charged Knapp with first-
degree intentional homicide, after which he filed a motion 
seeking to suppress the physical evidence obtained at the scene 
of the arrest.  The circuit court denied the motion.  On appeal, 
this court reversed the circuit court's suppression ruling, 
holding that physical evidence must be suppressed if it was 
procured while intentionally violating Miranda.  State v. Knapp, 
2003 WI 121, ¶1, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881 (Knapp I). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶40 The State appealed the Knapp I decision to the United 
States Supreme Court.  The Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case back to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in light 
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (plurality opinion).  Wisconsin 
v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004).  In Patane, the Court held that 
the failure to give Miranda warnings does not "require[] 
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but 
voluntary statements."  Patane, 542 U.S. at 633-34.  The Court 
explained that, within this context, "[t]here is simply no need 
to extend (and therefore no justification for extending) the 
prophylactic rule of Miranda."  Id. at 643. 
¶41 On remand, despite the United States Supreme Court 
declining to create an expanded prophylactic under the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin Constitution's analog to 
the Fifth Amendment——Article I, Section 8——affords greater 
protections than the United States Constitution.  In particular, 
using different reasoning than its first decision but arriving 
at substantially the same conclusion, the second Knapp court 
held that, "[w]here physical evidence is obtained as the direct 
result of an intentional Miranda violation, . . . [Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution] requires that the 
evidence must be suppressed."  Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶2 (Knapp 
II).  The Knapp II court articulated that, "[i]t is the 
prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford greater 
protection to the liberties of persons within its boundaries 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
under the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by the United 
States Supreme Court."  Id., ¶59 (quoting State v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977)).  According to the 
Knapp II court, although the text of Article I, Section 8 and 
the Fifth Amendment are "virtually identical," other factors 
weighed in favor of expanding state constitutional protections 
beyond those afforded under the Fifth Amendment.  Id., ¶62.  
More specifically, the Knapp II court invented the sanction of 
suppressing evidence because the officer's "conduct at issue was 
particularly repugnant and require[d] deterrence."  Id., ¶75.  
The Knapp II court also invoked the "preservation of judicial 
integrity" as a basis for contriving a different meaning for 
Article I, Section 8 than the United States Supreme Court gives 
the nearly identical Fifth Amendment.  Id., ¶¶75-83. 
¶42 Knapp II represents an unprecedented departure from 
the traditional tools employed by this court in interpreting the 
Wisconsin Constitution.1  Halverson's reliance on that case to 
request an expanded prophylactic to protect the privilege 
against self-incrimination indicates it is time for this court 
                                                 
1 "Before Knapp, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had repeatedly 
held that in the absence of a meaningful difference in language, 
intent, or history, the state constitution's Declaration of 
Rights should be interpreted in conformity with the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of parallel provisions in 
the Bill of Rights.  The language of the state constitutional 
right 
against 
compulsory 
self-incrimination 
is 
virtually 
identical 
to 
the 
Self-Incrimination 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment; the court had declined many previous invitations to 
interpret the state right more expansively than its federal 
counterpart."  The Honorable Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Marq. Law., March 2006, at 59-60. 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
to revisit Knapp II's holding.  As we noted in Roberson, "states 
have the power to afford greater protection to citizens under 
their constitutions than the federal constitution does."  State 
v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶56, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.  
Critically, however, "[a] state court does not have the power to 
write into its state constitution additional protection that is 
not supported by its text or historical meaning."  Id.  
Restoring the proper method of interpreting Article I, Section 8 
is imperative if this court takes seriously its oath to uphold 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  The question for this court is not 
whether 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
should 
afford 
greater 
protections, 
but 
whether 
it 
"actually 
affords 
greater 
protection[s]."  Id. (emphasis added).  Rather than applying the 
actual constitutional meaning of Article I, Section 8, the Knapp 
II court instead breathed its policy preferences into this 
provision.  It was quite transparent about doing so.  "[T]he 
court accepted the defendant's invitation to——as the court put 
it——'utilize . . . the Wisconsin Constitution to arrive at the 
same conclusion as in Knapp I.'  This language is revealing for 
its pure, unvarnished result-orientation."  The Honorable Diane 
S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Marq. 
Law., March 2006, at 60. 
¶43 Despite acknowledging that the text of Article I, 
Section 8 and the Fifth Amendment are "virtually identical," the 
Knapp II court nevertheless engaged in judicial gymnastics to 
justify its disregard for these textual similarities.  Knapp, 
285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶58-62.  The only permissible avenue for 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
deviating from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment would be uncovering a historical meaning 
of Article I, Section 8 different from the original public 
meaning of its federal counterpart.  The Knapp II court failed 
to do so.2  To be sure, the Knapp II court did note that, 
"shortly after Wisconsin earned statehood," this court declared 
that "no person is compelled to give evidence against himself, 
or to testify to any matter tending to criminate himself."  Id., 
¶63 (citing Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 823, 733 (1854)).  This 
case, however, says nothing to suggest the historical meaning of 
Article I, Section 8 is any different than its federal analog, 
                                                 
2 Justice Rebecca Dallet's concurrence suffers from the same 
shortfalls as the court's decision in State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 
127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (Knapp II).  Exposing the 
policy-making of the Knapp II court, Justice Dallet notes that 
the court "reached [the] conclusion [in Knapp II] for two 
important reasons:  to deter bad police behavior and to preserve 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
judiciary." 
 
Concurring 
op., 
¶54.  
Overstepping the constitutional boundaries of the judicial role, 
Justice Dallet then charges that "[t]o abandon Knapp II is to 
abandon this court's long history of upholding the Wisconsin 
Constitution's protection against overbearing law-enforcement 
practices."  Id., ¶57.  While it is the court's responsibility 
to faithfully apply the protections constitutionally preserved 
for Wisconsin citizens, this court is confined to interpreting 
what the Wisconsin Constitution actually says rather than 
imposing particular justices' policy preferences.  Whether or 
not this court thinks it is a good idea to "deter police 
behavior" or sanction "overbearing" police practices is simply 
irrelevant in ascertaining whether the Wisconsin Constitution 
actually affords heightened protections as compared to the 
United States Constitution.  Only the text of the constitutional 
provision and its original meaning may resolve this question.  
State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶56, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813.  Imposing judicial policy preferences in the name of 
a 
constitutional 
provision 
that 
does 
not 
reflect 
them 
constitutes an exercise of judicial will and encroaches on a 
purely legislative prerogative. 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
nor does the Knapp II court even attempt a historical analysis 
to support such a theory.  Instead, Knapp II pivots to declaring 
that rights under Article I, Section 8 are "sacred" and 
construed in favor of private citizens.  Id.  This analysis 
falls 
far 
short 
of 
substantiating 
the 
Knapp 
II 
court's 
conclusion that Article I, Section 8 embodies heightened 
protections, especially for a provision that repeats the federal 
text nearly verbatim. 
¶44 Instead of exploring the meaning of the Wisconsin 
Constitution's text, as Roberson instructs, Knapp II relied 
heavily upon the view that the officer's conduct was "repugnant" 
and "require[d] deterrence," and that this court needed to 
"preserv[e] . . . judicial integrity."  Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
¶¶75, 79.  Judicial policy goals, however estimable, cannot 
alter the meaning of the state constitution.  "It is simply not 
compatible with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they 
ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is."  
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  The judiciary 
must exercise its judgment, not its will.  These principles do 
not reflect a novel approach to constitutional interpretation 
but form the core of the Founders' conception for the judicial 
role.  See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The 
judiciary . . . can take no active resolution whatever.  It may 
truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
judgment.").  "It is, in other words, the judge's job to employ 
not his own will but the traditional tools of legal analysis[.]"  
Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 195 (1st ed., 
2019). 
¶45 The 
Knapp 
II 
court 
discarded 
these 
venerable 
principles, impermissibly factoring into its analysis what a 
majority 
of 
justices 
believed 
was 
"not 
tolera[ble]" 
and 
importing a non-textual, ahistorical consequence in reaction to 
"the police deliberately ignoring Miranda's rules as a means of 
obtaining 
inculpatory 
physical 
evidence." 
 
Knapp, 
285 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶72.  Neither "repugnant" facts nor intolerable 
actions have anything to say about the meaning of the privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution or the remedies for its violation; they are solely 
justifications for the exercise of judicial will. 
¶46 In this case, the court correctly determines that 
Halverson fails to provide a "textual or historical basis to 
suggest any meaningful difference between the two provisions 
meriting an expanded judicially-created prophylactic rule."  
Majority op., ¶26.  The same was true in Knapp II.  Article I, 
Section 8 states, in part, that "[n]o person may be held to 
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and no 
person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of 
punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal witness against 
himself or herself."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  Wisconsin's 
clause mirrors the Fifth Amendment:  "[no person] shall . . . be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
During 
Wisconsin's 
constitutional 
ratification, 
the 
people 
adopted many provisions that closely parallel their federal 
counterparts, including——as relevant for Miranda——the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination.  See Ray A. Brown, The 
Making of the Wisconsin Constitution: Part II, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 
23, 58 (1952). 
¶47 With 
this 
understanding, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
repeatedly held that the clauses embodying the privilege against 
self-incrimination in the state and federal constitutions are 
interpreted in lock-step.  In State v. Ward, for example, this 
court held that, in regard to the waiver of Miranda rights prior 
to criminal charging, "Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides the same protections . . . as does the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."  2009 WI 60, 
¶55, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  See also State v. Edler, 
2013 WI 73, ¶30, 350 Wis. 2d 1, 833 N.W.2d 564 ("We decline to 
extend the meaning of Wisconsin Constitution Article I, Section 
8 in this situation so as to provide different protection than 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.").  Knapp 
II is the only case to depart from Wisconsin's longstanding 
approach to interpreting Article I, Section 8 and the Fifth 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
Amendment in consonance.3  But Knapp II offered no foundation for 
abandoning the court's well-established understanding of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the remedy for its 
breach. 
¶48 Knapp II's holding lacks any foundation in the text or 
historical meaning of the constitutional language it construed.  
It rests solely on judicial policy preferences rather than the 
law and was rendered without any textual analysis or historical 
examination of the controlling language of the constitution.  
While 
state 
constitutional 
provisions 
may 
afford 
greater 
protections 
than 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
the 
constitution itself must actually provide them.  Although a 
majority of this court may prefer certain constitutional 
protections for criminal suspects, it remains the prerogative of 
the people of Wisconsin to bestow them.  Because Article I, 
Section 8 does not require suppression of evidence obtained as 
the result of voluntary statements made by a criminal suspect 
from whom the reading of Miranda rights was withheld, only a 
constitutional amendment could create this remedy.  The court in 
                                                 
3 In her concurrence, Justice Dallet maintains that to 
interpret Article I, Section 8 in consonance with the Fifth 
Amendment is "to ignor[e] [this court's] robust tradition of 
independently 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."  
Concurring op., ¶57.  Not so.  Of course "states have the power 
to 
afford 
greater 
protections 
to 
citizens 
under 
their 
constitutions than the federal constitution does."  Roberson, 
389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶56.  But the constitution must actually do so—
—not because a justice desires such protections, but because the 
people do.  Neither the Knapp II court nor Justice Dallet 
performed an analysis of the text or original understanding of 
Article I, Section 8 necessary to support their proffered 
interpretation of that constitutional provision. 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
Knapp II acted beyond its authority in devising it.  Its holding 
should be overturned.  I respectfully concur. 
¶49 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶50 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  As the 
majority aptly recognizes, neither the United States nor the 
Wisconsin Constitution supports a judicially created, per se 
rule by which all incarcerated persons are in custody for 
purposes of Miranda.1  I write separately to emphasize that the 
Wisconsin Constitution was never intended to be interpreted in 
lockstep with the United States Constitution.  Indeed, when it 
comes to certain individual liberties, particularly the right 
against self-incrimination, this court has long held that the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides greater protection than its 
federal counterpart. 
I 
¶51 As long ago as 1855, we recognized that "[t]he people 
of this state shaped our constitution, and it is our solemn 
responsibility to interpret it."  See Attorney Gen. ex rel. 
Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 (*567), 786 (*757) (1855).  In 
order to protect individual liberties, this court "will not be 
bound by the minimums . . . imposed by the [United States] 
Supreme Court."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 
N.W.2d 210 (1977); see also State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 
¶¶99-101, 
389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 
(Dallet, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(noting 
this 
court's 
160-year 
history 
of 
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution as granting protections 
over 
and 
above 
those 
recognized 
in 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution).  The individual liberties protected by the 
Wisconsin Constitution, especially the right against self-
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
incrimination, are fundamental to our liberty and must be 
staunchly guarded by this court: 
The rights intended to be protected by [Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution] are so 
sacred, and the pressure so great towards their 
relaxation in case where suspicion of guilt is strong 
and evidence obscure, that it is the duty of the 
courts to liberally construe the prohibition in favor 
of private rights, and to refuse to permit those first 
and doubtful steps which may invade it in any respect. 
Thornton v. State, 117 Wis. 338, 341, 93 N.W. 1107 (1903) 
(emphasis added).  Even before the exclusionary rule became 
obligatory upon the states pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961), we held that evidence seized in violation of 
the right against self-incrimination must be excluded from 
trial, thus elevating the right to one of substance rather than 
a 
mere 
"form 
of 
words."2 
 
See 
Hoyer 
v. 
State, 
180 
Wis. 407, 415-16, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  We explained that there 
was "no reason in logic, justice, or in that innate sense of 
fair play," that evidence obtained in violation of one's right 
against self-incrimination should be treated any differently 
than that obtained in violation of one's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Id. at 417 (reasoning that 
both constitutional guarantees were of "equal standing and 
value"). 
¶52 It was therefore no surprise when, nearly a century 
after Hoyer, we held in State v. Knapp (Knapp II), 2005 
WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, that the Wisconsin 
                                                 
2 Silverthorne 
Lumber 
Co. 
v. 
United 
States, 
251 
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
Constitution requires the suppression of physical evidence 
obtained via an intentional Miranda violation.  Id., ¶2.  The 
facts of Knapp II are particularly egregious.  Detective Timothy 
Roets arrived at Matthew Knapp's apartment ostensibly to arrest 
him for consuming alcohol, a parole violation.  But in reality, 
the arrest was the start of Roets's investigation into Knapp for 
a woman's murder the night before.  When Knapp saw Roets, he 
picked up the phone to call his attorney.  Knapp eventually hung 
up the phone and let Roets in; Knapp informed Roets that he had 
been attempting to call his attorney.  Without reading Knapp his 
Miranda warnings, Roets asked Knapp about the clothes he had 
been wearing the night before.  Knapp pointed to a pile of 
clothes on the floor, which contained a bloody sweatshirt.  
Roets collected those clothes and formally placed Knapp under 
arrest.  During continued questioning by Roets, Knapp twice said 
that an attorney told him not to talk to the police and that he 
would not write or sign a statement without an attorney.  Roets 
never read Knapp the Miranda warnings.  Id., ¶¶7-10. 
¶53 At a Miranda-Goodchild hearing,3 Roets admitted that he 
deliberately did not inform Knapp of his Miranda rights.  Roets 
testified he was concerned that Knapp, who had requested an 
attorney, would refuse to make a statement once he learned of 
his rights.  So, "to keep the lines of communication open," 
                                                 
3 At a Miranda-Goodchild hearing, the court adjudicates the 
admissibility of evidence obtained contrary to the right against 
self-incrimination.  See State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶25, 262 
Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798; State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 
27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
Roets purposefully withheld the Miranda warnings prior to 
questioning Knapp about his clothing.  Id., ¶¶13-14. 
¶54 This court held that, under Article I, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, the exclusionary rule bars the 
prosecution from introducing at trial the "physical fruits"——in 
Knapp II, 
the 
bloody 
sweatshirt——of 
a 
deliberate 
Miranda 
violation.  We reached this conclusion for two important 
reasons:  to deter bad police behavior and to preserve the 
integrity of the judiciary.  First, we reasoned that the 
Constitution could not abide such repugnant police conduct.  
Id., ¶75.  We recognized that holding otherwise would send law 
enforcement 
the 
wrong 
message; 
that 
it 
was 
"better 
to 
interrogate a suspect without the Miranda warnings than to use 
legitimate means to investigate crime."  Id., ¶77 (quoted source 
omitted).  The Constitution, however, does not permit law 
enforcement to intentionally disregard its personal-liberty 
guarantees in order to obtain evidence. 
¶55 Second, we noted that the judicial system maintains 
its reputation as a fair and neutral arbiter only if it holds 
all parties to the same constitutional standards.  Id., ¶79.  
Safeguarding Wisconsinites' constitutional rights means ensuring 
that 
those 
rights 
are 
protected 
throughout 
the 
entire 
prosecutorial 
process. 
 
But 
that 
process 
would 
be 
"systematically corrupted" if we were to allow into the 
courtroom evidence obtained by unconstitutional "investigatory 
shortcuts."  Id., ¶81.  Indeed, just as "[i]t is not too much to 
expect law enforcement to respect the law," it is not too much 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
to expect the same of this court.  See id. ("[F]air play 
requires the players to play by the rules, especially those 
players who enforce the rules."). 
II 
¶56 Neither party has asked us to overturn Knapp II.  In 
fact, at oral argument, the State expressly told the court that 
it was "not asking for Knapp II to be overturned."4  And, as the 
majority rightly points out, "Knapp [II] does not suggest 
anything" about how the court should resolve Halverson's case.  
Majority op., ¶25 n.5. 
¶57 Yet Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence calls 
on the court to overturn Knapp II anyway, ignoring our robust 
tradition 
of 
independently 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.5  But to do so would not only erode Wisconsinites' 
                                                 
4 https://wiseye.org/2020/09/14/wisconsin-supreme-court-
oral-argument-state-v-brian-l-halverson/, at 33:22. 
5 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence charges that 
Knapp II is out of step with the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment in United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (plurality op.).  This assertion 
rests 
on 
a 
thin 
reed. 
 
See 
generally 
Yale 
Kamisar, 
Postscript:  Another Look at Patane and Seibert, The 2004 
Miranda 
"Poisoned 
Fruit" 
Cases, 
2 
Ohio 
St. 
J. 
Crim. 
L. 97, 97-107 (2004). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
constitutional 
protections 
by 
sanctioning 
flagrant 
and 
deliberate due-process violations, it would also take a step 
toward making our own Constitution redundant with the federal 
one.  See Lynn Adelman & Shelley Fite, Exercising Judicial 
Power:  A Response to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's Critics, 91 
                                                                                                                                                             
Patane is a plurality opinion with only three Justices 
concluding 
that, 
in 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
context, 
the 
exclusionary rule could never reach non-testimonial "fruits" 
obtained as the result of a Miranda violation.  Patane, 542 U.S. 
at 633-34.  That rationale was explicitly disavowed by the two 
concurring Justices.  Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Instead, the concurrence applied a balancing test much like the 
one used in the Fourth Amendment context, counterbalancing "the 
concerns underlying" the Miranda rule against the "other 
objectives of the criminal justice system."  Id. at 644.  A 
majority of the Justices in Patane thus agreed that a balancing 
test, and not the plurality's absolute rule, was the proper 
approach.  See 1 Robert P. Mosteller et al., McCormick on 
Evidence § 176 (8th ed. 2020) (noting that a majority of the 
Patane 
Court 
"agreed 
that 
whether 
the 
Miranda 
federal 
constitutional exclusionary requirement should and would extend 
to fruit of the poisonous tree depended on balancing the value 
of excluding fruit as a means of deterring conduct violating the 
constitutional provision against the costs of doing so"). 
As the Court did in Patane, we engaged in a balancing 
analysis in Knapp II; we just reached a different conclusion.  
See State v. Knapp (Knapp II), 2005 WI 127, ¶¶33-43, 72-81, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.  That result is justified by the 
stark contrast between the egregious violation in Knapp II and 
the excusable Miranda error in Patane.  Compare Knapp II, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶7-10, with Patane, 542 U.S. at 635 (plurality op.) 
("Detective Benner attempted to advise respondent of his Miranda 
rights but got no further than the right to remain silent.  At 
that point, respondent interrupted, asserting that he knew his 
rights, 
and 
neither 
officer 
attempted 
to 
complete 
the 
warning.").  Other states have also examined Patane but afforded 
broader protections under their state constitutions.  See, e.g., 
State v. Vondehn, 236 P.3d 691 (Or. 2010) (en banc); State v. 
Peterson, 923 A.2d 585 (Vt. 2007); State v. Farris, 849 
N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 2006); Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198 
(Mass. 2005). 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
Marq. L. Rev. 425, 443-44 (2007) (observing that the state 
legislature has "historically failed to regulate the conduct of 
law 
enforcement," 
leaving 
it 
to 
the 
courts 
to 
prevent 
constitutional abuses); see also Jeffrey Sutton, 51 Imperfect 
Solutions 
47-83 
(2018) 
(cautioning 
states 
to 
avoid 
"lockstepping," particularly in the criminal-procedure context).  
To abandon Knapp II is to abandon this court's long history of 
upholding 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
protection 
against 
overbearing law-enforcement practices, even if those practices 
meet the federally mandated minimum requirements.  See Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 171-72; Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407; see also Sutton, supra 
at 47-83. 
¶58 Federal courts interpret the federal constitution.  We 
have the final say on ours.  Bashford, 4 Wis. at 786 (*757).  
And for nearly a century, we have held that, in comparison to 
those protected by the federal constitution, the individual 
liberties enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution are rights "of 
substance rather than mere tinsel."  See Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 415.  
We should keep it that way. 
¶59 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2018AP858-CR.rfd 
 
1