Title: Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 12/19/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1131094
____________________
Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham
v.
Alabama Surface Mining Commission and Shepherd Bend, LLC)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-13-902078)
PARKER, Justice.
The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the
Board") petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing
1131094
the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to vacate
its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface
Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying
action to Walker County; Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's
transfer motion.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts are undisputed.  ASMC is a State agency
responsible for administering and enforcing the Alabama
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1981, § 9-16-70
et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the ASMCRA").  ASMC maintains its
principal office in Walker County as required by § 9-16-73(h),
Ala. Code 1975.  On October 19, 2010, ASMC issued to Shepherd
Bend, an Alabama limited-liability company with its principal
office in Walker County, a surface-coal-mining permit ("the
permit").  The permit allowed Shepherd Bend to perform surface
coal mining in Walker County on approximately 286 acres; any
discharge of effluent from this mine would discharge into the
Mulberry Fork of the Black Warrior River or a tributary
thereof.
The Board, an Alabama public corporation with its
principal office in Jefferson County, operates a raw-water-
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intake facility within Walker County; this raw-water-intake
facility is approximately 4,200 feet downstream from the
nearest sediment-basin-discharge point as established by the
permit.  Water withdrawn by the Board from the raw-water-
intake facility is filtered, screened, and eventually pumped
to the Board's Western Filter Plant in Jefferson County for
distribution to the Board's customers.
On November 17, 2010, the Board filed an administrative
appeal challenging the issuance of the permit and requested a
hearing with a hearing officer of ASMC's Division of Hearings
and Appeals.  The hearing was held, and, on March 5, 2013, the
hearing officer affirmed the issuance of the permit.  Pursuant
to § 9-16-79(1)d., Ala. Code 1975, the Board then filed a
petition with ASMC for administrative review of the hearing
officer's decision.  ASMC took no action and, pursuant to § 9-
16-79(3)a., Ala. Code 1975, the Board's petition for
administrative review was deemed denied by operation of law 30
days after the petition was filed.
On 
May 
24, 
2013, 
after 
it 
had 
exhausted 
its
administrative 
remedies, 
the 
Board 
appealed 
ASMC's 
decision 
to
the circuit court.  In response, ASMC filed a "motion to
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dismiss and alternative motion to transfer," which Shepherd
Bend joined.  In its motion, ASMC argued that venue in
Jefferson County was not proper and, in the alternative, that,
even if venue was proper in Jefferson County, a transfer to
Walker County was nevertheless compelled by reason of the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest
of justice under § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, the forum non
conveniens statute.  On August 19, 2013, the Board filed a
response to ASMC's motion, arguing that venue in Jefferson
County was appropriate by virtue of § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975,
and § 41-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975.
On September 26, 2013, the circuit court entered an order
transferring the Board's action to Walker County.  The circuit
court's order stated, in pertinent part:
"Plaintiff asserts Walker County is an improper
venue as to ASMC under Alabama Code [1975,] §
41-22-20(b)[,] and as to Shepherd Bend under Alabama
Code [1975,] § 6-3-7.
"A. Transfer of ASMC claims under ... §
41-22-20(b). 
"Plaintiff claims transfer is improper as to
ASMC pursuant to ... § 41-22-20(b). Section
41-22-20(b) reads as follows: 
"'(b) All proceedings for review may
be instituted by filing of notice of appeal
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or review and a cost bond with the agency
to cover the reasonable costs of preparing
the transcript of the proceeding under
review, unless waived by the agency or the
court on a showing of substantial hardship.
A petition shall be filed either in the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County or in
the circuit court of the county in which
the agency maintains its headquarters, or
unless otherwise specifically provided by
statute, in the circuit court of the county
where a party other than an intervenor,
resides or if a party, other than an
intervenor, is a corporation, domestic or
foreign, having a registered office or
business office in this state, then in the
county 
of 
the 
registered 
office 
or
principal place of business within this
state.'
"....
"An agency of the state may only be sued in the
county of the official residence of such agency in
the absence of specific statutory authority to the
contrary. Ex parte Neely, 653 So. 2d 945, 947 (Ala.
1995); Alabama Youth Services Board v. Ellis, 350
So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. 1988). ASMC maintains its
principal office in Walker County as required by
Alabama Code [1975,] § 9-16-73(h).
"Appeal of Administrative decisions of ASMC are
governed by Alabama Code [1975,] § 9-16-79, which
states, 'Procedures for hearings and appeals under
this article shall be made as herein provided and in
accordance with such general rules and regulations
as the regulatory authority (ASMC) may prescribe.
These procedures shall take precedence over the
Alabama Administrative Procedure Act.' ([E]mphasis
added.) After then describing in considerable detail
what that procedure is to be, the statute adds: 'The
procedure provided in this article for hearings and
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appeals shall be exclusive except as otherwise
specified.' § 9-16-79(10) (emphasis added).
"Section 41-22-25(a)[, Ala. Code 1975,] of the
AAPA [the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act]
expresses the intent of the legislature as to how
the AAPA is to be construed and applied. This
section reads as follows:
"'(a) This chapter shall be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes. Except
as expressly provided otherwise by this
chapter or by another statute referring to
this chapter by name, the rights created
and the requirements imposed by this
chapter shall be in addition to those
created or imposed by every other statute
in existence on the date of the passage of
this chapter or thereafter enacted. If any
other statute in existence on the date of
the passage of this chapter or thereafter
enacted 
diminishes 
any 
right 
conferred 
upon
a person by this chapter or diminishes any
requirements imposed upon an agency by this
chapter, 
this 
chapter 
shall 
take 
precedence
unless 
the 
other 
statute 
expressly 
provides
that it shall take precedence over all or
some specified portion of this named
chapter.'
"Ala. Code § 41-22-25(a) (emphasis added). 
"The legislature expressed its unequivocal
intent that the rights created and requirements
imposed by the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act
shall be applicable only if another statute does not
expressly provide otherwise.
"The hearings and appeals procedure of ASMCRA §
9-16-79 refers to the AAPA by name and specifically
provides that the procedure embodied in ASMCRA takes
precedence over the AAPA. A clearer expression of
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legislative intent is not possible. Thus the venue
provisions of the AAPA have no application to the
present appeal arising under the provisions of
ASMCRA.
"Section 9-16-79 makes no specification of the
venue 
for 
securing 
judicial 
review 
of 
an
administrative order. Judicial review is invoked by
filing a notice of appeal 'in circuit court,' §
9-16-79(4)b. However, the absence of a specific
venue does not mean the case can be unequivocally
brought in any venue. In enacting statutes, the
legislature is presumed to know the state of the
existing law. See Wright v. Childree, 972 So. 2d
771, 778 (Ala. 2006). Therefore, the Court is
constrained to find the omission of a specific venue
provision within this section of ASMCRA was
intentional and that the legislature was content to
leave matters of venue of actions brought pursuant
to § 9-16-79 to the rules of venue applicable to
state agencies in the absence of a specific venue
statute. Ala. Code § 41-22-20 does not expressly
provide statutory authority for the filing of this
appeal in Jefferson County. To the contrary, ASMCRA
controls proper venue. There being no express
statutory authority to the contrary, an appeal of an
administrative determination of ASMC pursuant to §
9-16-79 may only be brought in the county of the
official residence of ASMC, which by statute is
Walker County. Ala. Code § 9-16-73(h)."
The circuit court also determined that venue was not proper in
Jefferson County under § 6-3-7.  However, for reasons
explained below, we need not consider that portion of the
circuit court's order.
On November 7, 2013, the Board filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus with this Court requesting that we vacate the
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1131094
circuit court's order transferring the case to Walker County. 
On May 22, 2014, this Court determined that the Court of Civil
Appeals had jurisdiction over the Board's petition and
transferred the matter to that Court.  On June 20, 2014, the
Court of Civil Appeals issued an opinion denying the Board's
petition.  See Ex parte Water Works Bd. of Birmingham, [Ms.
2130694, June 20, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). 
Pursuant to Rule 21(e), Ala. R. App. P., the Board then filed
a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.
Standard of Review
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper
means for challenging an order transferring an
action to another county. Ex parte Wilson, 854 So.
2d 1106, 1109 (Ala. 2002). '"[A] writ of mandamus is
an 
extraordinary 
remedy, 
which 
requires 
the
petitioner to demonstrate a clear, legal right to
the relief sought, or an abuse of discretion."' Ex
parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So. 2d 58, 62 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Ex parte Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 798
So. 2d 656, 660 (Ala. 2001))."
Ex parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, 978 So. 2d 12,
13-14 (Ala. 2007).
Discussion
The Board first argues that venue in Jefferson County was
proper under § 41-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, which is part of
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1131094
the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, § 41–22–1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975 ("the AAPA").  Section 41-22-20(b) provides:
"(b) 
All 
proceedings 
for 
review 
may 
be
instituted by filing of notice of appeal or review
and a cost bond with the agency to cover the
reasonable costs of preparing the transcript of the
proceeding under review, unless waived by the agency
or the court on a showing of substantial hardship.
A petition shall be filed either in the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County or in the circuit court
of the county in which the agency maintains its
headquarters, or unless otherwise specifically
provided by statute, in the circuit court of the
county where a party other than an intervenor,
resides or if a party, other than an intervenor, is
a corporation, domestic or foreign, having a
registered office or business office in this state,
then in the county of the registered office or
principal place of business within this state."
Section 41-22-25(a), Ala. Code 1975, a part of the AAPA,
states: 
"(a) This chapter shall be construed broadly to
effectuate 
its 
purposes. 
Except 
as 
expressly
provided otherwise by this chapter or by another
statute referring to this chapter by name, the
rights created and the requirements imposed by this
chapter shall be in addition to those created or
imposed by every other statute in existence on the
date of the passage of this chapter or thereafter
enacted. If any other statute in existence on the
date of the passage of this chapter or thereafter
enacted diminishes any right conferred upon a person
by this chapter or diminishes any requirement
imposed upon an agency by this chapter, this chapter
shall take precedence unless the other statute
expressly provides that it shall take precedence
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1131094
over all or some specified portion of this named
chapter."
(Emphasis added.)
In § 9-16-79, Ala. Code 1975, the ASMCRA expressly
provides that it shall take precedence over the AAPA: "These
procedures 
shall 
take 
precedence 
over 
the 
Alabama
Administrative Procedure Act."  See also § 9-16-79(10), Ala.
Code 1975 ("The procedure provided in this article for
hearings and appeals shall be exclusive except as otherwise
specified.").  Section 9-16-79 sets forth the extensive
hearings and appeals procedure of the ASMCRA.  Included in the
appeals procedure set forth in § 9-16-79 is the right of a
party to appeal to a circuit court after its administrative
remedies are exhausted.  § 9-16-79(4)b., Ala. Code 1975
("[A]ny party to the proceeding may secure a judicial review
thereof by filing a notice of appeal in circuit court. ... No
circuit court shall permit an appeal unless the person filing
such appeal has exhausted his administrative remedies as
provided by this article.").  However, absent from § 9-16-79
is a provision dictating to which circuit court a party may
appeal; in other words, § 9-16-79 lacks a venue provision.
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Because § 9-16-79 lacks a venue provision, we must look
elsewhere to determine where venue is proper in this case. 
The circuit court in the present case refused to consider the
AAPA to answer the venue question based on the language in §
9-16-79 
stating 
that 
"[t]hese 
procedures 
shall 
take 
precedence
over the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act."  For the same
reason, the Court of Civil Appeals also refused to consider
the AAPA in order to determine where venue was proper.  It
appears that the circuit court and the Court of Civil Appeals
concluded that, by indicating that the appeals procedure set
forth in § 9-16-79 takes precedence over the AAPA, the
Legislature forbade entirely consideration of the AAPA when a
party seeks judicial review by appealing a decision of the
ASMC pursuant to § 9-16-79(3)a.  See Ex parte Water Works Bd.
of Birmingham, ___ So. 3d at ___ ("The ASMCRA specifically
exempts appeals from the actions taken by or decisions of the
ASMC from the procedures outlined in the AAPA.").  The circuit
court and the Court of Civil Appeals have misinterpreted the
plain language used by the Legislature in § 9-16-79.
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In Billingsley v. State, 115 So. 3d 192, 196 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2012), the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying upon this
Court's precedent, stated:
"In Soles v. State, 820 So. 2d 163 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2001), this Court stated:
"'"The 
first 
rule 
of
statutory construction is that
the intent of the legislature
should be given effect. Ex parte
McCall, 596 So. 2d 4 (Ala. 1992);
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala.
1991). However, when possible,
the intent of the legislature
should be gathered 
from 
the
language of the statute itself.
Dillard, supra. Thus, where the
language of the statute is plain,
the court must give effect to the
clear meaning of that language.
Ex parte United Service Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501 (Ala. 1993);
IMED 
Corp. v. 
Systems 
Eng'g
Associates Corp., 602 So. 2d 344
(Ala. 1992)."
"'Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d
1365, 1376–77 (Ala. 1994). See also
Tuscaloosa 
County 
Comm'n 
v. 
Deputy
Sheriffs' Ass'n of Tuscaloosa County, 589
So. 2d 687, 689 (Ala. 1991) ("Words used in
[a] statute must be given their natural,
plain, ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language is used
a court is bound to interpret that language
to mean exactly what it says. If the
language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, then there is no room for
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judicial construction and the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature must be
given effect." (citations omitted)).'
"820 So. 2d at 164–65. 'Principles of statutory
construction instruct this Court to interpret the
plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it
says and to engage in judicial construction only if
the language in the statute is ambiguous.' Ex parte
Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ala. 2001). '[O]nly if
there is no rational way to interpret the words
stated will we look beyond those words to determine
legislative intent.' DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v.
Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala.
1998)."
Section 9-16-79 states that it takes "precedence" over
the AAPA.  The word "precedence" means "[t]he act or state of
going before; adjustment of place. The right of being first
placed in a certain order."  Black's Law Dictionary 1176 (6th
ed. 1990).  Further, "precedence" is defined in Webster's
dictionary as "the act, right, privilege, or fact of preceding
in time, place, order, or importance."  Webster's New
Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1416 (2d ed. 1983).  In other
words, according to the plain language used by the
Legislature, § 9-16-79 must be considered first, before the
AAPA.  The Legislature, however, did not state that § 9-16-79
was to be applied "exclusively," which means "in an exclusive
manner; to the exclusion of all others; only."  Webster's, at
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638.  The Legislature's use of the word "precedence" in § 9-
16-79 indicates that the AAPA may be considered but that the
appeals procedure set forth in § 9-16-79 must be given
precedence over any similar procedure in the AAPA.  Section 9-
16-79 does not state that the AAPA may not be considered in
any circumstance, as the Court of Civil Appeals and the
circuit court concluded.
Based on the flawed assumption that the AAPA cannot be
considered, ASMC and Shepherd Bend, relying upon Ex parte
Neely, 653 So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1995), and Alabama Youth Services
Board v. Ellis, 350 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. 1977), argue that
this Court should look to the general rule that venue in an
action against a State agency is proper in the county in which
the agency is headquartered.  However, the parties have not
directed this Court's attention to any authority indicating
that the general rule set forth in Neely and Ellis determines
venue when a party who has exhausted his administrative
remedies seeks judicial review.  Instead, this Court has
stated that the AAPA, specifically § 41-22-20, "provides the
procedure for soliciting judicial review of final 
decisions of
administrative agencies within the State."  Ex parte Worley,
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46 So. 3d 916, 919 (Ala. 2009).  Therefore, given that the
ASMCRA lacks a venue provision, we will look to § 41-22-20(b),
a part of the AAPA, to determine whether Jefferson County is
the appropriate venue for the Board's appeal.
Under the plain language of § 41-22-20(b), venue is
proper in Montgomery County, Walker County (the county in
which ASMC has its principal office), and Jefferson County
(the county in which the Board has its principal office). 
ASMC agrees with the above interpretation of § 41-22-20(b). 
Therefore, we conclude that venue was proper in Jefferson
County under § 41-22-20(b).
Having concluded that venue was proper in Jefferson
County under the ASMCRA and under § 41-22-20(b), we need not
consider the Board's argument that venue was proper in
Jefferson County pursuant to § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975.
ASMC and Shepherd Bend argue that, should this Court
determine that venue was proper in Jefferson County, transfer
of the action to Walker County was appropriate pursuant to §
6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides for transfers of
cases on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
We cannot consider this argument at this time.  Essentially,
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ASMC and Shepherd Bend are requesting that this Court issue a
writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to transfer the
action to Walker County based on the convenience of the
parties.  However, as set forth above, the circuit court
determined that venue in Jefferson County was improper and
transferred the action to Walker County on that basis. 
Accordingly, the circuit court did not consider ASMC's and
Shepherd Bend's forum non conveniens argument.  See Ex parte
Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, 978 So. 2d at 14 ("The
doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable only '[w]ith
respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate venue.' §
6–3–21.1(a) (emphasis added).").
Further, in order for ASMC and Shepherd Bend to prevail,
they must show that the circuit court had an imperative duty
to transfer the action to Walker County based on the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and that the circuit court refused to
do so.  See Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995) ("Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be
issued only where there is ... an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so
....").  ASMC and Shepherd Bend cannot meet this burden
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because the circuit court did transfer the action to Walker
County, albeit for a different reason.  Therefore, we will not
consider ASMC and Shepherd Bend's request for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to transfer the
action to Walker County based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Conclusion
The Board has demonstrated a clear legal right to the
relief it seeks; venue is proper in Jefferson County. 
Therefore, we grant the petition and issue the writ directing
the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action
to Walker County.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
17