Title: In Re: Damon M.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE
APPEALS -  PERMANENCY PLANNING HEARING -  An order amending a permanency plan
calling for reunification to foster care or adoption is immediately appealable pursuant to Md. Code
(1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.) § 12-303 (3) (x) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.   
 
District Court for Montgomery County (sitting as a Juvenile Court)
Case Nos. 6-J-98-0964A, J-98-450A and 541A, 
J-98-260A, 262A, 263A, J-98-1439A, 1438A, 1437A
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 45
   
 September Term, 2000
                                                                            
IN RE: DAMON M. 
IN RE: SHAUNNA E.
IN RE: BRIAN J. AND TONY J.
IN RE: MARCELLO K., LENNY M. AND
KESHYA K. 
                                                                            
         Bell, C.J.
         Eldridge
         Raker
         Wilner
         Cathell
         Harrell
         Rodowsky, Lawrence F.,        
                (retired, specially              
            assigned) 
                                  JJ.
                                                                          
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
                                                                            
Filed:   January 12, 2000
This consolidated appeal, consisting of four cases, involving seven children, all committed to the
care and custody of the Montgomery County  Department of  Health and Human Services (the respondent
  Prior to 1998, the responsibility for developing a permanency plan for a child in foster care was entrusted
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to the local department of social services.   Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) § 5-
525 (c) of the Family Law Article.  Before 1996, a plan developed by the local department was reviewed
by the court, together with the report and recommendation of the Foster Care Review Board, as a part of
the disposition review hearing the court was required to conduct.  Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol. ) §
5-544 (3) of the Family Law Article.  As a result of the amendment of the Juvenile Causes Act in 1996,
see Ch. 595, Laws of 1996, the juvenile court was mandated to “hold a hearing to review the
implementation of a permanency plan” for each child in foster care within 10 months of the disposition
hearing in which the CINA finding was made.   Md. Code (1996, 1997 Cum. Supp.) § 3-826.1 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.    It is of interest to note that the statute provided that if the child
was to be “continued in placement for a specified period,” then the court would have to determine “the
extent of compliance with the permanency plan.”  § 3-826.1 (d).  The subsequent amendment to § 3-
826.1, see ch. 539, Laws of 1998,  to make it conform with the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997 effected a significant change.   Now, the court has the responsibility for determining the
permanency plan, § 3-826.1 (a) (1) and  justifying the placement of children in out of home placements for
a specified period or on a long-term or permanent basis, § 3-826.1 (d), in addition to conducting periodic,
six month reviews.  § 3-826.1 (f).
 That section provides:
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“(f)(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the court shall conduct
a hearing to review the permanency plan no less than every 6 months until commitment is
rescinded.
“(ii) The court is not required to hold a review hearing every 6 months if
the court, at the permanency planning hearing or at a subsequent review
hearing, grants guardianship of the child to a relative or other person, or
determines that the child shall be continued in permanent foster care or
or the Department), and in foster care for at least one year, presents a single issue: whether a court order
amending a  permanency plan, determined  pursuant to  Md. Code (1996, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.)
§ 3-826.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and entered after a hearing to determine or
review that plan, is an immediately appealable order.  In each of the cases, the child or children had been
adjudicated, by the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County as a Juvenile Court, in need
of assistance (CINA), pursuant to Md. Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.,  2000 Supp.) § 3-812 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.     In three of the cases, In Re: Damon M., In Re:  Shaunna A., and In
Re:  Brian  and Tony J., the court entered its order amending the permanency plan  for the affected child
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or children from reunification with the child’s or children’s mother to either long term foster care or
permanent foster care,  after conducting periodic reviews of that plan, as required by § 3-826.1 (f).     In
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kinship care with a specific caregiver who agrees to care for the child on
a permanent basis.
“(2) At the review hearing, the court shall:
“(i) Determine the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
commitment;
“(ii)  Determine the extent of compliance with the permanency plan;
“(iii)  Determine the extent of progress that has been made toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating commitment;
“(iv)  Project a reasonable date by which a child in placement may be
returned home or placed for adoption or legal guardianship;
“(v)  Change the permanency plan if a change in the permanency plan
would be in the child’s best interest; and
“(vi)  Evaluate the safety of the child and take necessary measures to
protect the child.
“(3)  Every reasonable effort shall be made to effectuate a permanent placement for the
child within 24 months for the date of initial placement.”
 That section provides: 
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“(c) At the permanency planning hearing for each child in placement, the court shall:
“(1) Determine the permanency plan for the child, including whether the
child should be:
“(i) Returned to the parent or guardian;
“(ii) Placed with relatives to whom adoption or
guardianship is granted;
“(iii) Placed for adoption;
“(iv) Emancipated;
“(v) Because of the child’s special needs or
circumstances, continued in placement on a permanent or
long-term basis; or 
“(vi) Because of the child’s special needs or
circumstances, continued in placement for a specified
period.”
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the case of In Re:  Marcello, Lenny, and Keshya K., the court, pursuant to § 3-826.1 (c),  determined at
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the permanency planning hearing the permanency plan for the children, which was adoption.  In each case,
the mother noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.   The intermediate appellate court, in
 The petitioners’s contention is, at the same time, much broader and much narrower, referring simply to
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“orders emanating from permanency planning hearings.”  As we have seen, only the initial hearing following
a finding of CINA is a “permanency planning hearing,” § 3-826.1 (a), the subsequent hearings being
“hearings to review the permanency plan,” including the commitment itself.  § 3-386.1 (f).   In this appeal,
in three of the four cases, the order under review was passed after a review hearing and, in only one, after
the permanency planning hearing.  Moreover, in each of the cases under review, the order changed the
permanency plan from reunification to either foster care, long term or permanent, or adoption. 
Accordingly we need not, and, so, do not, address whether other orders that the court might pass after
such hearings are appealable.
 Two other bases for appealability of these orders were offered by the petitioners:  “the orders address
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issues which are substantially the same as those generated in review hearings under Md. Rule 11-115 (d),
the appealability of which has not previously been challenged” and the collateral order doctrine.   We find
merit in the argument we have referenced and, therefore, will not address the others.
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In Re: Damon M., 131 Md. App. 449, 749 A.2d 231 (2000), held that the court’s order was not a final
order and, therefore, dismissed the appeal.    By unreported opinions, the Court of Special Appeals
dismissed the other appeals on the authority of In Re: Damon M.    We granted certiorari, see In Re:
Damon M., 359 Md. 668, 755 A.2d 1139 (2000), and now reverse.
The petitioners argue that orders, emanating from “a hearing to review the  permanency plan” or
a permanency planning hearing, that change the permanency plan   from reunification with the parent are
appealable.     Noting the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals in In re Damon M., that there was
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no final judgment in that case because the trial court’s order “neither established conclusively nor effected
any actual change in Damon’s custody;  DHHS continued to maintain custody of Damon,” 131 Md. App.
at  458, 749 A.2d at 236, they maintain that, even if not final, the orders are appealable pursuant to Md.
Code (1974, 1998 Rep. Vol.)  § 12-303 (3) (x) of the  Courts & Judicial  Proceedings Article.   The
5
petitioners submits:
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“The orders in all the cases at bar clearly affected the terms of the original custody orders,
deprived the parents of their rights to have custody immediately or in the foreseeable
future, and generated a profound change in the ability of the parents to seek custody.
Moreover, in each of the cases, the court, as part of the permanency plan, ordered that
placement out of the parent’s home be continued, a decree necessarily denying the parent
custody.  As such, the orders, if not final, were clearly interlocutory orders subject to
appeal.”
The respondent sees the issue quite differently.  It argues that “an order changing the permanency
plan for a child in out-of-home placement does not give rise to any of the essential conditions of
appealability set forth in § 12-303 (3) (x)”; it certainly did not  deprive the parent of custody.   That, it
points out, occurred long before the review hearings and the permanency planning hearing that generated
these appeals.   Nor, the respondent maintains, does an order changing the permanency plan for a child
in out-of-home placement  change the terms of custody to bring the order within the § 12-303 (3) (x).  In
that regard, the respondent notes that a particular permanency plan does not carry with it a particular level
of visitation.   It asserts, in any event, that the respondents are not aggrieved by the orders appealed from,
their visitation rights having been unaffected thereby; the juvenile court ordered that the petitioners continue
to have visitation at a level consistent with the visitation they previously enjoyed.  Finally, the respondent
disputes the petitioner’s   assertion that an order changing the permanency plan for a child in out-of-home
placement generates “a profound change in the ability of the parents to seek custody.”  It believes that short
of a termination of their parental rights, there is no legal impediment to the petitioners’ seeking and obtaining
custody of their children.   
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments.  See Md. Code (1974, 1998
Repl.Vol.) § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides that “[A] party may
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appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil . . . case,” whether entered in the exercise of original, special,
limited, or statutory authority, unless “expressly denied by law.”  See also Md. Rule 2-602.  There are
exceptions to the final judgment appealability rule, however.  Section 12-303 is one.  It permits a party to
appeal certain enumerated interlocutory orders.   Relevant for our purposes is § 12-303 (3) (x), which
provides:
“A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit
court in a civil case:
*    *    *    *
“(3) An order:
      *    *    *    *
     “(x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his
child, or changing the terms of such an order.”
      *    *    *    *
Section 3-826.1 requires the court, not later than 11 months after a child found to be in need of
assistance has been placed in foster care, see also Md. Code (1989, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1997 Cum Supp.)
§ 5-501 (m) of the Family Law Article, to hold a permanency planning hearing to determine the
permanency plan for that child.  § 3-826.1 (a) (1).  At  that hearing, for each child in placement and in
determining the plan, the court is required to make certain decisions and findings, § 3-826.1 (c),
specifically,  whether the child should be: returned to the parent or guardian, § 3-826.1 (c) (1) (i); placed
with relatives to whom adoption or guardianship is granted, § 3-826.1 (c) (1) (ii); placed for adoption, §
3-826.1 (c) (1) (iii); emancipated, § 3-826.1 (c) (1) (iv); or because of the child’s special needs or
circumstances, continued in placement on a permanent or long-term basis or for a specified period.” § 3-
826.1 (c) (1) (v) and (vi).  There are restrictions on the court’s ability to continue a child in placement
because of the child’s special needs or circumstances.  § 3-826.1 (d).   That section prohibits the court
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from using that option 
“unless it finds that the agency to which the child is committed has documented a
compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interest of the child to:
“(1) Return home;
“(2) Be referred for termination of parental rights; or
“(3) Be placed for adoption or guardianship with a specified and appropriate relative or
legal guardian willing to care for the child.”   
Section 3-826.1 (f) mandates periodic reviews of the permanency plan by the court.  Subsection
(f) (1) (i) provides that such reviews will be “no less frequently than every six months until commitment is
rescinded.”   If, however, at the permanency planning hearing or a subsequent review hearing, the court,
inter alia, orders a child continued in permanent foster care, the court is no longer required to hold the
review hearings at six month intervals.   Subsection (f) (1) (ii).    As is true of the initial permanency planning
hearing, the court must make some determinations at the hearing to review the permanency plan.  § 3-826.1
(f) (2).   Among other things, in addition to determining whether the commitment remains necessary and
appropriate, subsection (f) (2) (i), and evaluating the  progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the
causes of the commitment, subsection (f) (2) (iii), the court is required to “[d]etermine the extent of
compliance with the permanency plan,” subsection (f) (2) (ii),  and to change it “if a change in the
permanency plan would be in the child’s best interest.”  Subsection (f) (2) (v).   
   The permanency plan is an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to expedite the
movement of Maryland’s children from foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangement.
  It provides the goal toward which the parties and the court are committed to work.    It sets the tone for
the parties and the court and, indeed, may be outcome determinative.    Services to be provided by the
local social service department and  commitments that must be made by the parents and children are
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determined by the permanency plan.   And, because it may not be changed without the court first
determining that it is in the child’s best interest to do so, the permanency plan must be in the child’s best
interest.   These are  the reasons,  no doubt, that the court is charged with determining the plan and with
periodically reviewing it, evaluating all the while the extent to which it is being complied with.
It is true, of course, that a parent will have lost custody before a permanency plan will have been
developed.   Nevertheless, once determined, because the permanency plan sets out the anticipated
permanent placement, to the achievement of which the “reasonable efforts,” required by § 3-826.1 (f) (3),
must and will be directed, it can not be totally divorced from the issue and, in point of fact and in a real
sense, actually is a part of it.    Moreover and in fact, when the plan is reunification, there necessarily is, on
the part of the court and, certainly, the parent, an expectation - more than a hope - that the parent will
regain custody.   That is, after all, the point of the plan and the reasonable efforts, including the provision
of services to the family, so necessary to achieving compliance. 
The amendment of the permanency plan to long-term or permanent foster care and adoption is a
change in the terms of the custody order, whenever it was passed.   The respondent acknowledges as much
when it argues: “In the absence of the permanency planning orders appealed here, the previous commitment
orders would have remained in effect and all of these children would have remained in the Department’s
custody.”   
The respondent asserts that the majority of states that have addressed this issue have concluded
that an order approving or revising a permanency plan is not appealable.  In support, it cites  Rita J. v.
Arizona Dept. of Economic Security, 1 P.3d 155 (Ariz. App. 2000); In re Interest of Sarah K., 601
8
N.W.2d 780 (Neb.1990); In the Interest of W.D. III and M.D., 562 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa, 1997) and  In
the Interest of H.R., 833 P.2d 619 (Colo. App., 1994).   In three of the cases, the court held that, to be
appealable, the order has to be final, see In the Interest of W.D. III and M.D., 562 N.W.2d at 185-86;
Rita J., 1 P.3d at 158; In the Interest of H.R., 833 P.2d at 620, and in each case the order sought to be
appealed was determined to be interlocutory, In the Interest of W.D. III and M.D., 562 N.W.2d at 185;
Rita J., 1 P.3d at 158; In the Interest of H.R., 833 P.2d at 621.  There apparently was no counterpart to
§ 12-303 (3) (x) in any of the States.
In In re Interest of Sarah K., after pointing out that to be appealable, a juvenile court order must
affect a substantial right, i.e. one that is an essential legal right, the court opined:
“[W]here an order from a juvenile court is already in place and a subsequent order merely
extends the time for which the previous order is applicable, the subsequent order by itself
does not affect a substantial right and does not extend the time in which the original order
may be appealed . . . .  Thus, a dispositional order which merely continues a previous
determination is not an appealable order . . . .”
601 N.W.2d at 783-84.    The court held that the order sought to be appealed “effect[ed] no change in
the parents’ status or the plan to which the parents and [the child] were previously subject,” id. at 785, and,
therefore, was not appealable.    
Clearly, the cases are distinguishable from the case sub judice.   We hold that an order amending
a permanency plan calling for reunification to foster care or adoption is immediately appealable.   In so
holding, we are not unmindful of the concern that there not be delay in these cases and that appeals will
slow the realization of permanency for children whose permanency plan amendments are appealed.  We
note, however, Md. Rule 8-207 (b) and suggest that, to the extent possible, appeals to the Court of Special
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Appeals from these kinds of orders proceed on an expedited basis.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.