Title: James Ronald Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2121-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
James Ronald Gaddis, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
La Crosse Products, Inc., f/k/a 
La Crosse Footwear, Inc. 
and Transcontinental Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JAN 19, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   James Gaddis requests review of a 
decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the Circuit 
Court for La Crosse County, Peter G. Pappas, Judge, which denied 
La Crosse Products, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
The issue presented is whether Gaddis' failure to sign a summons 
that was served with a signed complaint constitutes a fundamental 
defect depriving the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over 
La Crosse Products.  Because we conclude that an unsigned summons 
served with a signed complaint constitutes only a technical defect 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
2 
and that there is no prejudice in this case, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
The procedural facts giving rise to this case are undisputed. 
 Gaddis commenced a personal injury action pro se against 
La Crosse Products.  He filed a signed complaint, but attached it 
to an Illinois summons form which he had altered to include the 
relevant Wisconsin information.  Instead of personally signing the 
summons as required by Wis. Stat. § 801.09(3) (1993-94),1 Gaddis 
obtained the signature of the deputy clerk of courts, which the 
Illinois form required.  Gaddis' typewritten name and address also 
appeared on the summons. 
 
La Crosse Products answered and, as an affirmative defense, 
asserted that the summons did not comply with the signature 
requirement of § 801.09(3).  Gaddis subsequently signed and filed 
an amended summons and complaint, but the statute of limitations 
had lapsed in the meantime.2  La Crosse Products then filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the original 
                     
     1  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated.  Section 801.09(3) states in relevant 
part: 
 
The summons shall be subscribed with the handwritten 
signature of the plaintiff or attorney with the addition 
of the post-office address at which papers in the action 
may be served upon the plaintiff by mail . . . .  
     2  In his amended complaint, Gaddis added as a defendant 
La Crosse Product's insurer, Transcontinental Insurance Company.  
The circuit court later ruled that the amended complaint was 
untimely as against Transcontinental and dismissed it from the 
case.   
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
3 
complaint on the grounds that the summons was defective.  The 
trial court denied the motion, holding that Gaddis' failure to 
sign the summons constituted a technical defect and therefore it 
was sufficient for the court to acquire personal jurisdiction over 
La Crosse Products. 
 
The court of appeals granted La Crosse Products' leave to 
appeal from the nonfinal order and reversed the trial court in a 
summary order.  Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, Inc., No. 94-2121-
FT, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1995).  It concluded 
that the case was controlled by McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990).  The 
court of appeals read McMillan-Warner to require both a signed 
summons and a signed complaint in order to confer jurisdiction on 
the court.  Gaddis, slip op. at 2-3. 
 
The sole question presented is whether an unsigned summons 
served with a signed complaint precludes a circuit court from 
obtaining 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
defendant. 
 
The 
determination of the required contents of a summons under 
§ 801.09(3) involves statutory interpretation.  See American 
Family Mut. Ins. v. Royal Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 529, 481 
N.W.2d 629 (1992) (determining what constitutes authentication of 
a summons involves statutory interpretation).  This is a question 
of law that this court reviews independently of the lower courts. 
 Id. 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
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4 
 
Section 801.09(3) sets forth the specific requirements of a 
summons in relevant part as follows: 
The summons shall be subscribed with the handwritten 
signature of the plaintiff or attorney with the addition 
of the post-office address at which papers in the action 
may be served upon the plaintiff by mail . . . . 
The original summons filed by Gaddis in this case was defective 
because it lacked his handwritten signature.  However, the fact 
that the summons was defective does not end our inquiry. 
 
This court has recognized that the question of whether a 
defect is fatal to the court's jurisdiction depends upon whether 
the defect is fundamental or technical.  Dungan v. County of 
Pierce, 170 Wis. 2d 89, 94-95, 486 N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1992), 
citing American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 532-33.  This court stated 
the proper test as follows: 
  Defects are either technical or fundamental--where the 
defect is technical, the court has personal jurisdiction 
only if the complainant can show the defendant was not 
prejudiced, and, where the defect is fundamental, no 
personal jurisdiction attaches regardless of prejudice 
or lack thereof. 
American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533.  The burden is on the party 
alleged to have served the defective pleading to show that the 
defect was technical and did not prejudice the defendant.  Id.  
The existence of prejudice is only relevant once the complainant 
has demonstrated that the error was technical.  Id. at 534-35.   
 
The issue in American Family was whether service of an 
unauthenticated copy of an authenticated summons and complaint is 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
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5 
sufficient to meet the requirements for proper commencement of an 
action under Wis. Stat. § 801.02.  Id. at 527.  Section 801.02(1) 
states: 
Commencement of action.  (1) A civil action in which a 
personal judgment is sought is commenced as to any 
defendant when a summons and a complaint naming the 
person as defendant are filed with the court, provided 
service of an authenticated copy of the summons and of 
the complaint is made upon the defendant under this 
chapter within 60 days after filing.  
The court concluded that the failure to comply with the 
requirements of § 801.02(1) constitutes a fundamental error.  In 
doing so the court noted that Wisconsin courts have consistently 
held that procedural errors involving § 801.02 are fundamental 
defects that deprive the circuit court of personal jurisdiction.3 
 American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 530-31; Dungan, 170 Wis. 2d at 
95. 
 
However, the American Family court also recognized that 
Wisconsin courts have allowed for nonprejudicial technical errors 
where the defect relates to the content or form of the summons. 
American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 530-32.  For example, in Canadian 
Pac. Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice Hydraulics, 86 Wis. 2d 369, 272 N.W.2d 
                     
     3  See Danielson v. Brody Seating Co., 71 Wis. 2d 424, 238 
N.W.2d 531 (1976) (failure to properly serve a person authorized 
to accept service on behalf of a corporate defendant was a 
fundamental defect); Mech v. Borowski, 116 Wis. 2d 683, 342 N.W.2d 
759 (Ct. App. 1983) (service of an unauthenticated summons and 
complaint was a fundamental defect); Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 441, 434 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988) (failure to name a 
defendant in the summons was a fundamental defect). 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
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6 
407 (Ct. App. 1978), the plaintiff's summons omitted the direction 
that the defendant must answer the complaint within 20 days as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 801.09(2)(a).  Upon finding that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the omission, the court of appeals 
concluded that the defect was not jurisdictional.  Id. at 374. 
 
Similarly, in Dungan, the pro se plaintiff signed the summons 
but directed the defendant to serve its answer on the plaintiff's 
attorney. This constituted a violation of § 801.09(3), which 
requires an attorney's signature if the plaintiff is represented 
by counsel.  Dungan, 170 Wis. 2d at 94.  The court held that the 
defect in the summons was technical and not fundamental:  "We 
cannot conclude that designating an agent other than a pro se 
plaintiff for the receipt of service is so fundamental a deviation 
from the statutory requirement that it should be classified as a 
fundamental defect."4  Id. at 97. 
 
A majority of the court of appeals in this case based its 
summary reversal of the trial court's denial of La Crosse 
Product's motion for judgment on the pleadings on McMillan-Warner. 
 In that case, the trial court struck the plaintiff's amended 
                     
     4  Courts have also held that errors committed by the clerk 
of courts are technical in nature.  J.M.S. v. Benson, 91 Wis. 2d 
526, 531, 283 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1979) (clerk's failure to stamp 
the case number on copies of the amended summons and complaint 
held to be minor inconsequential inaccuracy).  See also Schlumpf 
v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 511, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980) (case 
number typed on summons and complaint different from stamped 
number held to be "hypertechnical error"). 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
summons and complaint because they were not properly subscribed as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 802.05.5  Because no other summons and 
complaint had been served on the defendant within 60 days, as 
required by § 801.02(1), the circuit court concluded that it did 
not have jurisdiction over the defendant.  McMillan-Warner, 159 
Wis. 2d at 590. 
 
The court of appeals in McMillan-Warner concluded that the 
failure 
to 
sign 
the 
summons 
and 
complaint 
was 
not 
a 
"nonjurisdictional technicality."  McMillan-Warner, 159 Wis. 2d at 
593.  The court went on to hold that "the circuit court acquires 
subject matter jurisdiction or competency to act when a properly 
subscribed summons and complaint is filed with the court."  Id. at 
594.  A majority of the court of appeals in the present case 
relied on this language to conclude that "both a properly signed 
summons and a properly signed complaint are necessary to confer 
jurisdiction."  Gaddis, slip op. at 3.  
                     
     5  Section 802.05 states in relevant part: 
 
Signing of pleadings, motions and other papers; sanctions.  
(1) (a) Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall contain the name, state 
bar number, if any, telephone number, and address of the 
attorney and the name of the attorney's law firm, if 
any, and shall be subscribed with the handwritten 
signature of at least one attorney of record in the 
individual's name.  A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall subscribe the pleading, motion or other 
paper with the party's handwritten signature and state 
his or her address.  
 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
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8 
 
We agree with the trial court and Judge Sundby, who wrote a 
concurrence in this case and who also wrote McMillan-Warner, that 
McMillan-Warner can be properly distinguished from the present 
facts.  In McMillan-Warner, both the summons and complaint were 
unsigned.  Here, Gaddis signed the complaint and served it with 
the unsigned summons. 
 
This factual distinction is significant when considering that 
the McMillan-Warner court based its conclusion on § 802.05.  As 
the court of appeals properly recognized, "The purpose and effect 
of [§ 802.05] is simply to place a professional obligation on the 
attorney as an officer of the court to satisfy himself that there 
are grounds for the action, defense or motion."  McMillan-Warner, 
159 Wis. 2d at 593, citing Charles D. Clausen & David P. Lowe, The 
New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters 801 to 803, 59 
Marq. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1976).  This purpose is fulfilled where, as 
here, Gaddis signed the complaint and served it with the summons.  
 
The complaint constitutes a pleading that sets forth a 
plaintiff's substantive claims.  In contrast to the complaint, the 
summons is a form document which merely serves to give notice to 
the defendant that an action has been commenced against him or 
her.  American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 530.  Therefore, a signed 
complaint served with a summons "constitutes a certificate that 
the attorney or party has read the pleading . . . [and it] is 
well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
9 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a). 
 
La Crosse Products argues on review that the legislative 
history of §§ 801.09(3) and 802.05(1)(a) reveals an intent by the 
legislature to give greater weight to the summons than mere notice 
when attached to a signed complaint.  Further, because § 801.09(3) 
was changed to expressly require the plaintiff's signature, 
La Crosse Products asserts that disregarding this directive would 
render the statute meaningless.  We disagree. 
 
This court is unpersuaded that the legislative history shows 
that the legislature intended to give the summons greater 
significance when it changed § 801.09(3).  No legislative history 
is cited that indicates what greater significance the summons now 
has beyond mere notice.  If the legislature had intended to change 
the long-standing notice purpose of the summons, it no doubt would 
have indicated that in a more specific manner than simply 
requiring the summons to be signed.  We also note that courts 
subsequent to the legislature's amendment of § 801.09(3) have 
reiterated that the purpose of the summons is notice.  See e.g., 
J.M.S. v. Benson, 91 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 283 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Wis. 2d 406, 297 N.W.2d 18 
(1980); Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 441, 444, 434 
N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
Further, while it is true that the legislature intended that 
the summons be signed, it does not automatically follow that the 
failure to do so results in the court losing jurisdiction.  Under 
that rationale, all defects that fall short of the express 
statutory language would be considered fundamental defects.  Such 
a rule ignores this court's recognition in American Family of the 
distinction between a technical and a fundamental defect. 
   
Gaddis 
suggests 
that 
whereas 
defects 
arising 
under 
§ 801.02(1) are fundamental, defects arising under § 801.09 are 
merely technical, citing Dungan.  Contrary to Gaddis' suggestion, 
the American Family court did not articulate a bright-line rule 
that all defects under § 801.09 are technical, and we expressly 
decline to do so here.   
 
We conclude that the failure to personally sign a summons, 
like the omission of the 20-day answer notice in Canadian Pacific 
and the improper designation of an agent for receipt of service in 
Dungan, constitutes a technical defect, provided that the summons 
is served with a signed complaint.  Because La Crosse Products 
concedes that they were not prejudiced by the defect, the summons 
and complaint were sufficient for the circuit court to acquire 
personal jurisdiction.  See American Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533. 
 
Our conclusion that Gaddis' failure to sign the summons 
constituted 
merely 
a 
technical 
defect 
is 
consistent 
with 
Wisconsin's tradition of avoiding dismissal of an action based on 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
11 
technical errors and omissions, as codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(1)6.  Canadian Pacific, 86 Wis. 2d at 372.  Similarly, 
this court has held that "the entire tenor of modern law is to 
prevent the avoidance of adjudication on the merits by resorting 
to 
dependency 
on 
nonprejudicial 
and 
nonjurisdictional 
technicalities."  Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 511, 288 
N.W.2d 834 (1980), quoting Cruz v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 442, 449, 260 
N.W.2d 692 (1978).  We conclude that the defect here is precisely 
the type of nonprejudicial technicality that should not prevent 
Gaddis from having his day in court. 
 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
                     
     6  Section 805.18(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any 
error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which 
shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse 
party. 
 
No. 94-2121-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2121-FT 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
James Ronald Gaddis, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
LaCrosse Products, Inc., f/k/a 
 
 
 
LaCrosse Footwear, Inc., and 
 
 
 
Transcontinental Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
(No Cite)       
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse 
 
JUDGE: 
PETER G. PAPPAS 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Terence R. Collins, Thomas E. Knothe and Cameron, 
Collins & Quillin, Ltd., LaCrosse and oral argument by Terence R. 
Collins. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Robert D. 
Johns, Jr. and Johns & Flaherty, S.C., LaCrosse and oral argument 
by Robert D. Johns, Jr.