Title: Greer v. Wiedenhoeft

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2188   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ardonis Greer, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wayne J. Wiedenhoeft, Administrator, Division of 
Hearings  
and Appeals, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 639, 825 N.W.2d 497 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2012 WI App 122  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 17, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 22, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles H. Constantine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Jennifer M. Severino and Servino Law Offices LLC, Racine, and 
oral argument by Jennifer M. Severino. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 19
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2188 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV952) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ardonis Greer, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wayne J. Wiedenhoeft, Administrator, Division 
of Hearings and Appeals, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 17, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State ex rel. Greer 
v. Schwarz, 2012 WI App 122, 344 Wis. 2d 639, 825 N.W.2d 497, 
that reversed the decision of the Racine County Circuit Court,1 
which had reversed a decision of the Division of Hearing and 
Appeals affirming the Wisconsin Department of Corrections' 
("DOC") revocation of Ardonis Greer's ("Greer") probation. 
¶2 
This case presents three issues for our review.  
First, we are asked to determine whether the issuance of an 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Charles H. Constantine presided. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
2 
erroneous discharge certificate deprived the DOC of jurisdiction 
to revoke Greer's probation, despite a validly imposed sentence 
to the contrary.  Second, we are asked to determine whether the 
DOC, in revoking Greer's probation, violated Greer's procedural 
or substantive due process rights.  Finally, we are asked to 
determine whether the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was 
empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer's 
probation. 
¶3 
Greer argues that the issuance of the discharge 
certificate was a "significant legal moment" that deprived the 
DOC of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.  Greer also argues 
that, in revoking his probation, the DOC violated both his 
substantive and procedural due process rights.  Finally, Greer 
argues that the DOC should be equitably estopped from revoking 
his probation. 
¶4 
The State argues that the DOC retained jurisdiction 
over Greer, despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge 
certificate.  The State further argues that Greer's due process 
rights have not been violated.  Finally, the State argues that 
equitable estoppel is not available in a certiorari action, and 
that even if it were available, Greer is not entitled to 
equitable relief. 
¶5 
We conclude that the DOC retained jurisdiction over 
Greer despite the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate.  
We further conclude that Greer's due process rights were not 
violated, and that equitable estoppel is not available in the 
No. 
2011AP2188   
3 
context of certiorari review.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On September 29, 2004, the State filed a criminal 
complaint2 charging Greer with one count of possession of THC 
with intent to deliver while armed as a repeater, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(h)2, 961.48(1)(b), and 939.63(1)(c) 
(2003-04), one count of maintaining a drug trafficking place 
while armed as a repeater, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.42(1), 
961.48(1)(b), and 939.63(1)(c) (2003-04), and one count of 
possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2) (2003-04). 
¶7 
On January 25, 2005, Greer pled guilty to possession 
with intent to deliver THC ("Count 1"), and possession of a 
firearm by a felon ("Count 3").  The charge of maintaining a 
drug trafficking place was dismissed, but read in for sentencing 
purposes.  The court ordered a presentence investigation report. 
¶8 
On March 14, 2005, Greer was sentenced to three years 
of imprisonment on Count 1, comprised of 14 months of initial 
confinement to be followed by 22 months of extended supervision.  
On Count 3, Greer was sentenced to six years of imprisonment, 
comprised of three years of initial confinement to be followed 
by three years of extended supervision, but the sentence was 
                                                 
2 While basic information regarding the charges Greer faced 
in Racine County Case No. 2004CF1184 is a part of this record, 
the facts supporting those charges are not.  The facts of 
Greer's initial conviction are thus not part of our review. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
4 
stayed and Greer was instead ordered to serve three years of 
probation consecutive to Count 1.  Greer was personally present, 
and represented by counsel, at both the plea hearing and the 
sentencing hearing.3 
¶9 
On September 28, 2007, Greer completed his sentence on 
Count 1 and began serving his period of probation.  Greer's 
supervising agent, however, erroneously informed him that he 
would be discharged from supervision after September 28.  
Subsequently, 
Greer 
was 
erroneously 
issued 
a 
discharge 
certificate4 dated October 3, 2007, which stated: 
You were sentenced to Wisconsin State Prisons. 
The department having determined that you have 
satisfied said sentence, it is ordered that effective 
September 28, 2007, you are discharged absolutely. 
. . . . 
Restoration 
of 
civil 
rights 
for 
felony 
convictions: 
This certifies that the following civil rights 
are restored to you: 
1.  The right to vote. 
2.  The obligation for jury duty. 
                                                 
3 While the transcript of the plea hearing and sentencing 
hearing are not a part of this record, Greer has conceded that 
he was present and represented at the hearings. 
4 The DOC issued Greer two discharge certificates, one 
discharging him with respect to Count 1 only, and the other 
discharging him absolutely.  Given that Greer had reached the 
end of his sentence on Count 1, it follows that the discharge 
certificate for Count 1 was properly issued.  Our review 
therefore concerns only the absolute discharge certificate. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
5 
The following civil rights are not restored to 
you: 
1.  Firearms may not be used or possessed unless 
a pardon, which does not restrict possession of 
firearms, is received from the governor. 
2.  Public office can not be held unless a pardon 
is obtained from the governor. 
In fact, Greer's consecutive probation was not set to end until 
September 28, 2010, three years later. 
¶10 On November 5, 2009, Greer was allegedly involved in 
an 
argument 
with 
his 
then-girlfriend 
Veronica 
Wilkerson 
("Wilkerson").  During the course of that argument, Wilkerson's 
nephew, Shawn Griffin ("Griffin"), entered the bedroom where the 
two were arguing and told Greer to get away from Wilkerson or he 
would call his father and the police.  Greer then displayed what 
appeared to be a silver handgun and implied that he would shoot 
Griffin's father and Wilkerson if Griffin made the calls.  
Police later recovered an airsoft pistol from the apartment.  
Greer subsequently admitted to holding the airsoft pistol while 
obscuring the orange tip in order to frighten Griffin. 
¶11 On November 6, 2009, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Greer, charging him with one count of felony 
intimidation of a witness using a dangerous weapon as a 
repeater, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.43(3), 939.50(3)(g), 
939.63(1)(b), and 939.62(1)(b) (2009-10),5 a class G felony; one 
count of second-degree reckless endangerment as a repeater, 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
6 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 941.30(2), 
939.50(3)(g), 
and 
939.62(1)(b), a class G felony; and one count of disorderly 
conduct as an act of domestic abuse using a dangerous weapon as 
a repeater, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 947.01, 939.51(3)(b), 
939.63(1)(a), 
973.055(1), 
and 
939.62(1)(a), 
a 
class 
B 
misdemeanor. 
¶12 On 
June 
25, 
2010, 
Greer 
pled 
no 
contest 
to 
intimidating a witness, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.43(3).  The 
court found him guilty and ordered a presentence investigation 
report.  In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed the other 
charges and penalty enhancers.  While preparing the presentence 
investigation, the DOC reviewed Greer's file and discovered that 
Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 
2004 conviction.  On September 2, 2010, police took Greer into 
custody on a DOC hold. 
¶13 On September 8, 2010, DOC Agent Leah Zeni ("Zeni") 
interviewed Greer.  In a written statement, Greer admitted that 
he had not reported during his consecutive probation, that he 
had threatened Griffin, and that he had violated the speed limit 
and consumed alcohol.  Greer wrote that he did not realize that 
he was still on probation. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶14  On September 16, 2010, the DOC initiated revocation 
proceedings against Greer, alleging he had violated the terms of 
his probation by failing to report for supervision, threatening 
Griffin, possessing a firearm, speeding, and consuming alcohol.  
Greer's revocation hearing was set for November 15, 2010. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
7 
¶15 On November 8, 2010, Greer filed a motion objecting to 
the jurisdiction of the DOC.  In his motion, Greer argued that 
the issuance of the discharge certificate deprived the DOC of 
jurisdiction to revoke him.  Relying on Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3)6 
and State ex rel. Rodriguez v. DHSS, 133 Wis. 2d 47, 393 
N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1986), Greer reasoned that the DOC has 
jurisdiction only prior to the expiration of a probationer's 
term of supervision, and that because Greer had been discharged, 
his term of supervision had ended.  Alternatively, Greer argued 
that he had been deprived of adequate notice as to the case 
under which the DOC was seeking revocation, because paperwork 
related to his revocation inconsistently appended the letters 
"A" and "B" to the case number.7 
¶16 On November 15, 2010, Greer received a revocation 
hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").  At the 
hearing, the DOC presented testimony from Griffin in support of 
revocation.  Griffin testified that during the argument between 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 304.072(3) provides: 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
s. 973.09(3)(b), 
the 
department preserves jurisdiction over a probationer, 
parolee or person on extended supervision if it 
commences an investigation, issues a violation report 
or issues an apprehension request concerning an 
alleged violation prior to the expiration of the 
probationer's, 
parolee's 
or 
person's 
term 
of 
supervision. 
7 It is undisputed that these lettering notations resulted 
from the DOC creating a new case number under which to hold 
Greer 
after 
discovering 
he 
was 
still 
on 
probation 
on 
September 1, 2010. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
8 
Wilkerson and Greer, he entered Wilkerson's bedroom and stated, 
"I'm gonna tell the police," and "I'm gonna tell my dad."  
Griffin testified that Greer responded, "I don't care."  Griffin 
stated that Greer then retrieved a gun and said "this is what I 
got for your dad" while cocking the weapon.  Griffin then stated 
"I'm gonna tell the police," to which Greer responded, "I would 
shoot your auntie and this is what I got for your dad" while 
once again cocking the weapon.  Griffin further testified that 
he was sure that the gun was real. 
¶17 Greer also testified at the hearing in opposition to 
revocation.  Greer stated that, while he was physically present 
at his March 14, 2005 sentencing hearing, he nonetheless 
believed that his probation was completed because he had been 
discharged through the issuance of the discharge certificate.  
Greer testified that he did not have "any acknowledgment of a 
consecutive or a concurrent" at the sentencing hearing, stating 
"[t]hose things are not definite to me."  He further admitted 
that he had threatened Griffin, but testified that he had used 
an "aerosol gun" and not a real pistol. 
¶18 On November 23, 2010, the ALJ issued his decision and 
ordered Greer's probation revoked.8  The ALJ rejected Greer's 
jurisdictional arguments, relying on Rodriguez and State v. 
Stefanovic, 215 Wis. 2d 310, 572 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997).  
The ALJ concluded that "[n]either an Agent nor clerk entering 
                                                 
8 Greer's criminal conviction and written admissions served 
as proof of the conduct alleged in the notice of revocation. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
9 
information into a computer can void or nullify a valid court 
order."  The ALJ also rejected Greer's argument regarding 
adequate notice, stating "Mr. Greer[,] as all defendants in this 
state[,] was present at the time he was sentenced and would have 
directly heard the court sentencing him to prison and also to a 
consecutive three year period of probation." 
¶19 As to the allegations supporting revocation, the ALJ 
determined that the DOC had proven that Greer had threatened 
Griffin, and had proven that Greer consumed alcohol.  While the 
ALJ concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the allegation that Greer possessed a real handgun, Greer's 
admitted 
use 
of 
the 
airsoft 
pistol 
to 
threaten 
Griffin 
constituted an aggravating factor as to that allegation.  Having 
considered the alternatives, the ALJ concluded that revocation 
was necessary:  
I find revocation necessary to avoid undue 
depreciation 
of 
the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
proven 
violations and to protect the community from further 
criminal conduct by Mr. Greer.  Mr. Greer had engaged 
in serious new felony conduct.  He aggravated that 
criminal conduct by deliberately leading his victim to 
believe that he was in danger of being shot.  He needs 
to be held to account for that behavior and the 
community needs protection from it.  Mr. Greer 
proposes that his probationary term be tolled back to 
the beginning and he be continued on probation.  I 
find that proposal an inadequate response to his 
serious new criminal behavior.  I find no other 
alternative to revocation an appropriate response to 
his conduct. 
¶20 On December 8, 2010, Greer filed an appeal from the 
ALJ's decision with the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
("Division").  Greer once again asserted that the DOC lacked 
No. 
2011AP2188   
10 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation.  Greer argued that the ALJ 
erred when he equated Greer's circumstances with that of the 
defendant in Rodriguez.  Greer pointed out that in Rodriguez, 
the 
defendant 
never 
received 
a 
discharge 
certificate.  
Alternatively, Greer argued that the DOC lacked jurisdiction 
because it had not provided him adequate notice of his 
revocation.  Greer further objected to what he characterized as 
ex parte communication between the DOC and the ALJ prior to his 
hearing.  In addition to challenging the DOC's jurisdiction, 
Greer also argued that his due process rights were violated 
because the DOC failed to maintain accurate records, and that 
the 
DOC 
acted 
arbitrarily, 
capriciously, 
oppressively, 
unreasonably, and contrary to law. 
¶21 On December 22, 2010, the Division sustained the ALJ's 
decision and revoked Greer's probation.  The Division concluded 
that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate does not 
"deprive [the DOC] of jurisdiction, nor does it relieve the 
offender of liability for misconduct, particularly criminal 
offenses."  The Division found that the judgment of conviction 
"unambiguously decreed that Greer was to serve his probation 
term consecutive to the prison sentence."  The Division noted 
that "[a]s a practical matter, Greer would have been in court at 
sentencing and therefore knew, or should have known, that he was 
required to serve a consecutive probation term."  Citing 
Rodriguez, the Division further concluded that Greer "cannot 
seriously contend that a probationer can violate the criminal 
laws of this state without affecting his or her probationary 
No. 
2011AP2188   
11 
status."  The Division also determined that the communication 
between the DOC and the ALJ prior to the hearing was not 
improper, and that the ALJ's findings at the hearing supported 
revocation as an appropriate consequence of Greer's serious new 
criminal offense. 
¶22 On February 4, 2011, Greer filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari in the Racine County Circuit Court, seeking review 
of the Division's determination.  On February 9, 2011, the court 
issued the writ, agreeing to review the DOC's decision to revoke 
Greer's probation. 
¶23 Before the circuit court, Greer once again argued that 
the DOC lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation.  Greer 
renewed his argument that the DOC lost jurisdiction when it 
issued the discharge certificate.  Greer also continued to argue 
that his right to due process was violated because the DOC had 
negligently failed to maintain accurate records.  Finally, Greer 
argued 
that 
the 
DOC, 
the 
ALJ, 
and 
the 
Division 
acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously, oppressively, unreasonably, contrary 
to law, and contrary to the evidence of the record. 
¶24 The State argued that the DOC and the Division did not 
lose jurisdiction over Greer when the DOC issued the discharge 
certificate, and that Greer failed to establish that the 
decision to revoke his probation was arbitrary, capricious, 
oppressive, unreasonable, or contrary to law.  With respect to 
jurisdiction, the State argued that "[a] clerical error does not 
override [a] judge's authority" to impose probation in addition 
to a prison sentence, and neither should such an error "relieve 
No. 
2011AP2188   
12 
[an] offender for misconduct, particularly criminal offenses."  
The State further argued that, with respect to the DOC's alleged 
"arbitrary or capricious" conduct, Greer failed to establish 
that the actions of the DOC or the Division were arbitrary or 
capricious. 
¶25 On June 23, 2011, the circuit court reversed the 
decision of the Division.  The court concluded that, despite the 
issuance of the discharge certificate, the DOC continued to 
possess jurisdiction over Greer, and that neither the DOC nor 
the Division had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in revoking 
him.  The court further determined that the evidence supported 
Greer's revocation.  The circuit court nonetheless concluded 
that the DOC was equitably estopped from revoking Greer's 
probation.  The court stated "that revocation of probation under 
circumstances as unique as found here would violate the basic 
principles of decency and fairness."  The court concluded that 
"the DOC's issuance of the discharge certificate was legally 
significant and estopped it from seeking revocation." 
¶26 On July 25, 2011, the State moved the court to 
reconsider its decision.  The State argued that the court's 
decision to reverse Greer's probation revocation on equitable 
grounds was contrary to Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 
17, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470, which held that traditional 
certiorari review did not include consideration of equitable 
arguments. 
¶27 Greer opposed the motion for reconsideration.  Greer 
argued that, because one of the prongs of certiorari review is 
No. 
2011AP2188   
13 
whether the agency acted "according to law," the review 
implicated concepts of due process, decency, and fairness.  
Greer argued that the circuit court's decision to apply 
equitable principles was appropriate. 
¶28 On August 2, 2011, the circuit court denied the 
State's motion for reconsideration.  The court concluded that 
the State interpreted Winkelman too broadly, and that the 
language in Winkelman which purports to limit the court's 
equitable power in a certiorari action is dicta. 
¶29 On September 16, 2011, the State filed its notice of 
appeal. 
¶30 Before the court of appeals, the State argued that the 
DOC retained jurisdiction to revoke Greer, the DOC did not 
violate Greer's due process rights, the DOC and the Division 
acted according to law, and the decision to revoke Greer was not 
arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable because the evidence in 
the record supported revocation.  The State further contended 
that the circuit court lacked the power to grant equitable 
relief in a certiorari review. 
¶31 Greer argued that the DOC was deprived of jurisdiction 
because of the discharge certificate.  Greer also claimed that 
the DOC violated his due process rights when it revoked him 
despite failing to properly maintain its records and afford him 
adequate notice.  Greer further argued that equitable estoppel 
was an available remedy in a certiorari action such as Greer's. 
Finally, Greer contended that the decision to revoke him was 
No. 
2011AP2188   
14 
oppressive 
and 
unreasonable, 
and 
was 
unsupported 
by 
the 
evidence. 
¶32 On October 10, 2012, the court of appeals reversed the 
decision of the circuit court.  Greer, 344 Wis. 2d 639, ¶1.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the erroneous issuance of a 
discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to 
revoke Greer's probation because his court-ordered term of 
probation had not expired.  Id., ¶20.  The court further 
concluded, relying on Winkelman, that equitable relief was not 
available in a certiorari action.  Id., ¶22.  The court of 
appeals analyzed the circuit court's conclusions regarding 
"basic principles of decency and fairness" and considered those 
concerns already to be a part of the due process analysis.  Id., 
¶23.  The court of appeals, however, concluded that Greer's due 
process rights had not been violated.  Id.  The court of appeals 
concluded that, because Greer was physically present at his 
sentencing hearing, he could not reasonably believe that his 
probation was complete, and therefore, his due process rights 
were not violated.  Id., ¶¶24-25.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that, even though documents related to Greer's 
revocation referenced "A" and "B" case numbers, this did not 
deprive Greer of adequate notice, and therefore did not 
constitute a due process violation.  Id., ¶¶27-29.  Finally, the 
No. 
2011AP2188   
15 
court of appeals concluded that the Division's decision to 
revoke Greer was supported by the evidence.9  Id., ¶32. 
¶33 Greer petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 12, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶34 On certiorari review of a probation revocation, this 
court "review[s] the division's decision, not that of the trial 
court."  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 
566 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 579 
N.W.2d 698 (1998). 
¶35 Certiorari review of a probation revocation order is 
limited to four inquiries:  
(1) whether the [Division] acted within the bounds of 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to 
law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will, not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient 
that 
the 
[Division] 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
determination that it did.  
State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, ¶15, 257 Wis. 2d 40, 
654 N.W.2d 438 (quoting Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 628-29); see also 
Van Ermen v. DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978). 
¶36 Whether the Division kept within its jurisdiction and 
acted according to law are questions that we review de novo, 
without deference to the conclusions of the Division, the 
                                                 
9 Greer has not argued before this court that the evidence 
against him was insufficient to support revocation.  As a 
result, we assume Greer has conceded that the court of appeals' 
decision was correct in its determination on this point. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
16 
circuit court, or the court of appeals.  Tate, 257 Wis. 2d 40, 
¶16; Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 629. 
¶37 "When a court on certiorari considers whether the 
evidence is such that the [Division] might reasonably have made 
the order or determination in question, the court is not called 
upon to weigh the evidence; . . . ."  Van Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 
64.  The inquiry is limited to "whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the [Division's] decision.  It is the 
province of the [Division] to weigh the evidence in a revocation 
case.  A certiorari court may not substitute its view of the 
evidence for that of the [Division]."  Id. (citation omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶38 This case presents three issues for our review.  
First, we are asked to determine whether the DOC was deprived of 
jurisdiction when it erroneously issued a discharge certificate 
contrary to a validly imposed sentence.  Second, we are asked to 
determine whether the DOC violated Greer's procedural or 
substantive due process rights when it failed to accurately 
maintain its records.  Finally, we are asked to determine 
whether the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, possessed the 
power 
to 
equitably 
estop 
the 
DOC 
from 
revoking 
Greer's 
probation. 
A. Jurisdiction 
¶39 "[P]robation is a privilege extended to a convict by 
the grace of the state.  It is not a right."  State v. 
Simonetto, 2000 WI App 17, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 315, 606 N.W.2d 275 
(citation omitted); see also Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 248 
No. 
2011AP2188   
17 
N.W.2d 425 (1977).  In Wisconsin, the terms of probation are 
governed by statute, see Wis. Stat. § 973.09, and the statute 
details the circumstances under which a probationer is to be 
issued a discharge certificate: 
When the period of probation for a probationer 
has expired, the probationer shall be discharged from 
probation and the department shall do all of the 
following: 
(a)  If the probationer was placed on probation 
for a felony, issue the probationer one of the 
following: 
1.  A certificate of discharge from probation for 
the felony for which he or she was placed on probation 
if, at the time of discharge, the probationer is on 
probation or parole for another felony. 
2.  A certificate of final discharge if, at the 
time of discharge, the probationer is not on probation 
or parole for another felony. A certificate of final 
discharge under this subdivision shall list the civil 
rights which have been restored to the probationer and 
the civil rights which have not been restored to the 
probationer. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5).  The probation statute provides that a 
certificate of final discharge shall be issued when the "period 
of probation . . . has expired."  Thus, the jurisdiction of the 
DOC to supervise the probationer must also extend until the 
"period of probation . . . has expired." 
¶40 Consistent with Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5), the DOC's own 
administrative rules also provide that a probationer "shall be 
discharged upon the issuance of a discharge certificate by the 
secretary at the expiration of the term noted on the court 
order."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.17(2). 
No. 
2011AP2188   
18 
¶41 Pursuant to the statute and administrative code, the 
DOC possesses jurisdiction over a probationer until the end of 
the court-imposed term of probation.  It is undisputed that 
Greer was ordered to serve three years of probation, consecutive 
to his sentence on Count 1.  The court imposed a probation term 
which should have ended on September 28, 2010.  Thus, the DOC 
should 
have 
possessed 
jurisdiction 
over 
Greer 
until 
September 28, 2010.  Even though the DOC issued a discharge 
certificate to Greer on October 3, 2007, the DOC initiated 
revocation proceedings against Greer on September 16, 2010.  
Absent the issuance of the discharge certificate, there is no 
question that the DOC would have had jurisdiction to initiate 
revocation proceedings against Greer.  We conclude that the 
clear language of the statute and the code trump Greer's 
argument that the DOC lost jurisdiction to initiate revocation 
proceedings when it erroneously issued a discharge certificate 
to Greer. 
¶42  Greer argues that the erroneous issuance of the 
discharge certificate was a "significant legal moment" that 
deprived the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.  Greer 
relies principally upon two court of appeals' decisions to 
support this argument.  See Stefanovic, 215 Wis. 2d 310; 
Rodriguez, 133 Wis. 2d 47.  Neither decision, however, stands 
for the proposition that an erroneously issued discharge 
certificate can defeat a valid sentence imposed by a circuit 
court. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
19 
¶43 In 
Rodriguez 
the 
defendant, 
Alejandro 
Rodriguez 
("Rodriguez"), was convicted of child abuse and battery in 1981.  
133 Wis. 2d at 49.  Rodriguez's sentence was stayed, and he was 
ordered to serve a two-year probation term consecutive to a 
prison term he faced for a prior conviction.  Id.  In March of 
1985, 
Rodriguez's 
probation 
and 
parole 
agent 
erroneously 
informed him he would be discharged from supervision on April 6, 
1985, at the end of his sentence for the prior conviction.  Id.  
On April 30, 1985, Rodriguez committed an assault.  On May 20, 
1985, Rodriguez's agent notified him that the department 
considered him to still be on probation.  Id. at 49-50. 
¶44 The 
Department 
of 
Health 
and 
Social 
Services 
("Department") 
commenced 
revocation 
proceedings 
against 
Rodriguez.  Id. at 50.  Rodriguez argued that he had been 
discharged from supervision at the time of the assault.  Id.  
The hearing examiner determined that, because the circuit court 
had informed Rodriguez at his sentencing that he would be 
serving a two-year period of probation following the completion 
of his prison term, Rodriguez knew he was on probation and could 
not plausibly claim otherwise.  Id. 
¶45 On certiorari review, the circuit court reversed.  Id. 
at 51.  It concluded that the agent's erroneous statement had 
the effect of discharging the defendant from probation, and thus 
deprived the Department of jurisdiction to revoke him.  Id.  The 
court concluded that the Department was precluded from revoking 
the defendant's probation for conduct occurring while he was 
effectively discharged.  Id.  
No. 
2011AP2188   
20 
¶46 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that "[o]nce 
custody is transferred to the department, discharge from 
probation or parole under the release of the department occurs 
only 'upon the issuance of a discharge certificate . . . at the 
expiration of the term noted on the court order.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted).  The court further concluded that "[b]ecause 
no discharge certificate was produced for the child abuse and 
battery conviction, the department still had jurisdiction even 
given the agent's erroneous statement."  Id.  The court of 
appeals 
also 
noted 
that 
the 
"judgment 
of 
conviction 
unambiguously decreed that probation be served consecutive to 
the prison sentences," and the defendant had been "turned over 
to the custody of the department for purposes of serving both 
the prison sentence and the probationary term."  Id. (emphasis 
in original). 
¶47 Similarly, in the case at issue, it is equally clear 
that the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer.  The judgment of 
conviction imposed a prison sentence and a consecutive probation 
term.  Greer was placed in the custody of the DOC for the 
purpose of serving both.  Although in this case a discharge 
certificate was issued, it was not issued "at the expiration of 
the term noted on the court order" and was therefore legally 
invalid.  Like the agent's erroneous statement in Rodriguez, the 
erroneously issued discharge certificate did not have the effect 
of discharging Greer from probation. 
¶48 In 
Stefanovic, 
the 
defendant, 
Paulan 
Stefanovic 
("Stefanovic"), was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, 
No. 
2011AP2188   
21 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1995-96), on March 4, 1996.  
The trial court withheld sentence and instead ordered Stefanovic 
to serve a one-year term of probation.  215 Wis. 2d at 312.  As 
a condition of probation, the court also ordered Stefanovic to 
serve 30 days in jail.  Id.  Stefanovic appealed her conviction, 
and filed a motion for release pending appeal.  The court 
granted her motion and Stefanovic did not serve any of the jail 
time.  Id.  The court did not, however, stay Stefanovic's 
probation.  Id.  She completed her probation while her appeal 
was pending, and the DOC issued a certificate of discharge.  Id. 
¶49 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
subsequently 
affirmed 
Stefanovic's conviction and remanded the case to the trial 
court.  Id. at 312.  On remand, the trial court determined that 
Stefanovic should serve the jail term it had imposed as a 
condition of probation.  Id. at 313.  The court noted that "it 
had granted the stay of the jail term at Stefanovic's request 
and she should not be allowed to use her right to release 
pending appeal as a means to frustrate the court's sentence." 
Id.  Stefanovic appealed the court's decision to impose the jail 
term.  Id. 
¶50 The court of appeals reversed.  Id. at 320.  The court 
noted the "issuance of a discharge certificate is of significant 
legal moment."  Id. at 315-16.  Relying on Rodriguez, the court 
of appeals concluded that because "the trial court never 
modified or extended Stefanovic's probationary term" and that 
"[a]bsent such action, the department properly issued its 
No. 
2011AP2188   
22 
certificate of discharge to Stefanovic," the trial court lost 
jurisdiction over Stefanovic.  Id. at 316. 
¶51 While in Stefanovic, a discharge certificate was 
issued, that certificate was properly issued.  This is a 
critical distinction between Stefanovic and the case at issue.  
Unlike the case at issue, the defendant in Stefanovic had 
reached the end of her court-ordered probation term, and so the 
DOC's issuance of a discharge certificate was fully compliant 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(5) 
and 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DOC 
328.17(2).  By contrast, Greer had not reached the end of his 
court-ordered probation when the DOC issued the certificate in 
this case.  Thus, the discharge certificate issued to Greer 
could not have the effect of discharging him from his court-
ordered probation because his court-ordered probation was not 
complete. 
¶52 Both Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5) and Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.17(2) ensure that the DOC carries out the sentence imposed 
by the circuit court.  Allowing a clerical error by the DOC to 
preclude imposition of that sentence would be contrary to the 
purposes of these provisions and would undermine the finality of 
the court's judgment.  Indeed, even the circuit court itself has 
limited authority to modify a sentence and may do so only within 
"defined parameters," and "[a] court cannot base a sentence 
modification on reflection and second thoughts alone."  State v. 
Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶88, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451; State 
v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828.  
Generally, a circuit court may modify a sentence only if it 
No. 
2011AP2188   
23 
abused its discretion in imposing the sentence,10 or if a "new 
factor," unknown to the trial judge at the time of sentencing, 
has come to light.11  In any event, "adequate reasons" for the 
modification must be made known on the record.  State v. 
Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975). 
¶53 In sum, and with these limitations in mind, it is 
inconceivable that a sentence, validly imposed by a circuit 
court, could be undermined by a mere clerical error by an 
agency.  We conclude, therefore, that the DOC did possess the 
jurisdiction to revoke Greer's probation, and we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
B. Due Process 
¶54 In determining whether an agency acted "according to 
law," a court sitting in certiorari considers whether the 
agency's decision comports with due process.  See State ex rel. 
Curtis v. Litscher, 2002 WI App 172, ¶15, 256 Wis. 2d 787, 650 
N.W.2d 43; 
State 
v. 
Goulette, 
65 
Wis. 2d 207, 
215, 
222 
N.W.2d 622 (1974) (construing the phrase "acted according to 
law" to encompass due process and fair play). 
¶55 "The Due Process Clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions protect both substantive and procedural 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 278 
N.W.2d 850 (1979) (holding that a trial court may modify a 
sentence for abuse of discretion based upon its conclusion that 
the sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable). 
11 See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 563 
N.W.2d 468 (1997); State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 335 
N.W.2d 402 (1983). 
No. 
2011AP2188   
24 
due process rights."  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 
Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784. 
¶56 Greer argues that both his substantive and procedural 
due process rights were violated when his probation was revoked 
after being issued a discharge certificate.  Greer asserts that 
his right to substantive due process was violated when the DOC 
"failed to accurately maintain its records," as required by 
statute and administrative rule, and revoked him after his civil 
rights had been restored.  Greer argues that his right to 
procedural due process was violated when the DOC failed to give 
adequate notice that he remained on probation and failed to give 
him adequate notice of his revocation by using various case 
numbers on his revocation paperwork.  We reject both of these 
arguments and conclude, as did the court of appeals, that 
Greer's due process rights were not violated. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
¶57 Substantive 
due 
process 
provides 
protection 
from 
"certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions."  State v. 
Schulpius, 2006 WI 1, ¶33, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495.  "The 
test to determine if the state conduct complained of violates 
substantive 
due 
process 
is 
if 
the 
conduct 
'shocks 
the 
conscience . . . or interferes with rights implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Joseph 
E.G., 2001 WI App 29, ¶13, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137).   
¶58 "[L]iability 
for 
negligently 
inflicted 
harm 
is 
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due 
process."  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 
No. 
2011AP2188   
25 
(1998).  When analyzing a substantive due process claim, we 
therefore consider "whether the government officer's conduct was 
either 
a 
'deliberate 
decision[]' . . . or 
reflected 
the 
officer's 'deliberate indifference'" to the asserted liberty 
interest.  Schulpius, 287 Wis. 2d 44, ¶33 (citation omitted). 
¶59 Greer argues that his substantive due process rights 
were violated when the DOC "repeatedly fail[ed] to maintain 
accurate records" of his probation status.  Greer claims that 
the DOC's maintenance of its records was "reckless," and that 
its decision to revoke his probation on the basis of those 
records was "arbitrary and capricious."  Greer claims that he 
suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of his liberty as a 
result.  Greer's argument is unpersuasive. 
¶60 It is undisputed that the DOC failed to input Greer's 
probation into its record system, as required by Wis. Admin. 
Code § DOC 328.04(2)(n).  But Greer can point to no evidence in 
the record that indicates the DOC's administrative failure was 
deliberate or resulted from deliberate indifference.  Schulpius, 
287 Wis. 2d 44, ¶33.  At most, the DOC's failure to maintain 
accurate 
records 
constituted 
negligence, 
and 
it 
is 
well 
established that "negligently inflicted harm is categorically 
beneath the threshold of constitutional due process."  Lewis, 
523 U.S at 849. 
¶61 Further, the fact that Greer was revoked for new 
criminal conduct hardly "shocks the conscience."  Greer was 
serving a court-imposed probation term pursuant to a conviction 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  During that 
No. 
2011AP2188   
26 
probation period he was convicted of committing a felony by 
threatening a witness with what the witness believed was a 
pistol.  Revoking his probation under those circumstances, even 
accounting for the erroneously issued discharge certificate, can 
hardly be characterized as interference with the "rights 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."  Thus, Greer's 
right to substantive due process was not violated. 
2. Procedural Due Process 
¶62 "Procedural 
due 
process . . . requires 
that 
even 
though 'government action depriving a person of life, liberty, 
or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must 
still be implemented in a fair manner.'"  Laxton, 254 
Wis. 2d 185, ¶10 n.8 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 746 (1987)). 
¶63 In the context of probation revocation, procedural due 
process requires that the defendant be given:  written notice of 
the 
claimed 
violations 
of 
probation; 
disclosure 
to 
the 
probationer of the evidence against him; the opportunity to be 
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses; a neutral and detached hearing body; and a written 
statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and 
reasons for revocation.  State v. Burris, 2004 WI 91, ¶24, 273 
Wis. 2d 294, 682 N.W.2d 812; see also, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 782, (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 
No. 
2011AP2188   
27 
(1972).12  In some instances the probationer is also entitled to 
counsel.  Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. 
¶64 In this case, Greer received a written Notice of 
Revocation from the DOC that alleged five violations of the 
terms of his probation.  The notice included a disclosure of the 
evidence supporting those five alleged violations.  Greer was 
afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence and 
witnesses at his revocation hearing.  He was represented by 
counsel at that hearing and took the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.  The hearing was held before 
an administrative law judge, who subsequently produced a written 
statement of the evidence and reasoning that led him to conclude 
that revoking Greer's probation was appropriate.  Thus, all of 
the requirements of procedural due process in the context of 
probation revocation were met in this case. 
¶65 Greer nonetheless argues that his right to procedural 
due process was violated because he "did not receive proper 
notification of which case the DOC was seeking revocation."  
Greer bases this claim on the fact that the "Recommendation for 
Administrative Action" references "Case #04CF1184B," while the 
face sheet for the revocation packet lists "Case #04CF1184A," 
and the revocation hearing request and revocation summary simply 
                                                 
12 Morrissey v. Brewer addressed procedural due process 
requirements in the context of parole revocation.  408 U.S. 471, 
489 (1972).  The United States Supreme Court extended the same 
requirements to probation revocation in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
No. 
2011AP2188   
28 
refer to "04CF1184."  We agree with the court of appeals that 
this argument is a "nonstarter." 
¶66 What Greer ignores is that all of the revocation 
documents refer to the same Racine County Circuit Court case 
number: 2004CF1184.  Greer concedes that he was physically 
present at the time of his sentencing on both counts in that 
case.  Greer has not sought resentencing or asserted that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at either his 
sentencing or his plea hearing.  As a result, Greer would have 
been aware that he had been convicted of two counts under that 
case number.  He would know that he had completed his sentence 
on Count 1, leaving only Count 3 standing.  Count 3 was the only 
count for which he was ordered to complete probation.  As a 
result, Greer had adequate notice of the circumstances of his 
revocation. 
¶67 When Greer previously raised this notice issue at his 
revocation hearing, the ALJ noted that "Mr. Greer[,] as all 
defendants in this state[,] was present at the time he was 
sentenced and would have directly heard the court sentencing him 
to prison and also to a consecutive three year period of 
probation."  The Division, in deciding his administrative 
appeal, explained that the judgment of conviction "unambiguously 
decreed that Greer was to serve his probation term consecutive 
to the prison sentence" and that "[a]s a practical matter, Greer 
would have been in court at sentencing and therefore knew, or 
should have known, that he was required to serve a consecutive 
probation term."   
No. 
2011AP2188   
29 
¶68 Under these facts, Greer indeed received proper notice 
of his revocation.  As the Division noted, Greer "cannot 
seriously contend that a probationer can violate the criminal 
laws of this state without affecting his or her probationary 
status."  In the case at issue, Greer's right to procedural due 
process was not violated. 
C. Equitable Relief 
¶69 Greer argues that the certiorari court was correct 
when it equitably estopped the DOC from revoking Greer's 
probation.  The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that 
equitable remedies were not available to a court sitting in 
certiorari review.  Greer, 344 Wis. 2d 639, ¶22.  We affirm the 
court of appeals. 
¶70 We addressed the availability of equitable relief in a 
certiorari action in Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, 
269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470.  In Winkelman, the Town of 
Delafield ("Town") zoning board required, as a condition on 
granting a variance allowing remodeling work on the Winkelmans' 
house, that the Winkelmans remove a rental home from their 
property.  Id., ¶¶4-6.  The Winkelmans sought certiorari review 
of the Town's decision in the circuit court.  Id., ¶7.  The 
certiorari court upheld the decision and the Winkelmans did not 
appeal.  Id. 
¶71 The Winkelmans subsequently failed to comply with the 
condition and the Town brought a motion requesting that the 
certiorari court order the Winkelmans to raze the house or allow 
the Town to do so.  Id., ¶8.  The certiorari court granted the 
No. 
2011AP2188   
30 
Town's motion and the Winkelmans appealed.  Id.  The court of 
appeals reversed, holding that the Town needed to obtain 
jurisdiction over the Winkelmans for the enforcement action by 
serving either a summons and complaint or an appropriate 
original writ.  Id., ¶9. 
¶72 The 
Town 
then 
filed 
a 
complaint, 
requesting 
forfeitures along with an order directing the Winkelmans to 
remove the rental residence.  Id., ¶10.  The Town moved for 
summary judgment, and the circuit court granted its motion.  
Id., ¶¶10-11.  The circuit court refused to hear the Winkelmans' 
equitable argument, concluding that it did not have the 
equitable power to deny injunctive relief in the context of an 
enforcement action.  Id., ¶11.  The Winkelmans once again 
appealed.  Id., ¶12. 
¶73 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision.  Id., ¶13; Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2003 WI App 
92, 264 Wis. 2d 264, 663 N.W.2d 324.  It determined that Forest 
Cnty. v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998), required 
consideration 
of 
the 
Winkelmans' 
equitable 
arguments.  
Winkelman, 269 Wis. 2d 109, ¶13.  Further, it rejected the 
Town's assertion that the Winkelmans had already made their 
equitable arguments during the initial certiorari review of the 
Town's zoning decision.  Id.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
remanded the case so the circuit court could hear the 
Winkelmans' equitable argument.  Id. 
¶74 This court affirmed, holding that when a governmental 
body seeks injunctive relief in the circuit court, the court has 
No. 
2011AP2188   
31 
the power to consider a property owner's equitable arguments 
against granting that relief.  Id., ¶28. 
¶75 In addressing the Town's argument that the Winkelmans 
had already presented their equitable arguments before the 
certiorari court, the court stated that "[t]he difficulty we 
have with the Town's position is its premise that certiorari 
review is a proper forum for consideration of the equities."  
Id., ¶30.  The court explained that "[b]y its nature, certiorari 
review is limited in scope.  Unless otherwise provided by 
statute, the traditional standards of common-law certiorari 
review apply."  Id.  The court further noted that it had 
"discovered no precedent that allows certiorari courts to sit in 
equity."  Id., ¶31.  The court thus concluded that the 
Winkelmans had not been afforded the opportunity to present 
their equitable arguments to the certiorari court.  Id., ¶30. 
¶76 Despite the pronouncement of this court in Winkelman, 
Greer nonetheless argues that equitable estoppel is available in 
a certiorari action.  Greer attempts to distinguish Winkelman by 
arguing that the Winkelman court was not reviewing the decision 
of the certiorari court, and that equitable estoppel is not 
limited to "claims brought in equity."  Greer's arguments are 
unpersuasive. 
¶77 While Greer is correct that equitable estoppel is not 
limited to "claims brought in equity," this does not mean that 
No. 
2011AP2188   
32 
equitable relief is available in a certiorari action.13  While 
the powers of a court sitting in certiorari are by definition 
limited, "[i]t is very difficult, if not impossible, to place a 
limit on the equity power of the court, so far as its protective 
feature is concerned."  State ex rel. Superior v. Duluth St. Ry. 
Co., 153 Wis. 650, 654, 142 N.W. 184 (1913).  Such broad power 
is incompatible with the limited nature of common-law certiorari 
review. 
¶78 Further, "[t]he basis of all equitable rules is the 
principle of discretionary application."  Wynhoff v. Vogt, 2000 
WI App 57, ¶13, 233 Wis. 2d 673, 608 N.W.2d 400 (quoting Mulder 
v. Mittelstadt, 120 Wis. 2d 103, 115, 352 N.W.2d 223 (Ct. App. 
1984));  see also Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 
2010 WI 44, ¶38, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294.  Appellate 
courts "apply the erroneous exercise of discretion standard in 
reviewing decisions in equity."  Wynhoff, 233 Wis. 2d 673, ¶13; 
see also Lueck's Home Improvement, Inc. v. Seal Tite Nat'l, 
Inc., 142 Wis. 2d 843, 847, 419 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶79 As we have stated, however, when reviewing certiorari 
actions, an appellate court reviews the agency's decision, not 
the decision of the certiorari court.  Warren, 211 Wis. 2d at 
                                                 
13 "[I]t has been consistently held by this court that in 
abolishing distinctions between the forms of actions the code 
has 
not 
abolished 
the 
essential 
differences 
between . . . actions for legal and those for equitable relief."  
Miller v. Joannes, 262 Wis. 425, 428, 55 N.W.2d 375 (1952); see 
also Columbia Cnty. v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 165 n.4, 288 
N.W.2d 129 (1980). 
No. 
2011AP2188   
33 
717.  This standard of review accords with the circuit court 
being limited to considering only: 
(1) whether the [Division] acted within the bounds of 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to 
law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will, not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient 
that 
the 
[Division] 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
determination that it did. 
Tate, 257 Wis. 2d 40, ¶15.  These "traditional standards of 
common-law certiorari review" reflect that, to the extent a case 
calls for the balancing of equitable principles, it is the 
agency 
and 
not 
the 
certiorari 
court 
that 
must 
exercise 
discretion. 
¶80 Even assuming that equitable estoppel was available in 
a certiorari action, however, it is not clear that Greer would 
be entitled to relief.  "[T]he test for equitable estoppel 
consists of four elements: (1) action or non-action, (2) on the 
part of one against whom estoppel is asserted, (3) which induces 
reasonable reliance thereon by the other, either in action or 
non-action, and (4) which is to his or her detriment."  Vill. of 
Hobart v. Brown Cnty., 2005 WI 78, ¶36, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 698 
N.W.2d 83 (citations omitted); Yocherer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
2002 WI 41, ¶25, 252 Wis. 2d 114, 643 N.W.2d 457. 
¶81 Here, to the extent that Greer relied on the discharge 
certificate, such reliance was unreasonable.  He was present at 
his sentencing, which put him on notice that he was to serve a 
consecutive probation term.  At a minimum this should have 
No. 
2011AP2188   
34 
caused Greer to question the issuance of a discharge certificate 
fully three years before he was to have completed his probation. 
¶82 Further, even if Greer could have reasonably relied on 
the erroneous certificate, he was still not entitled to commit 
another crime.  As the Division stated in affirming the ALJ, 
Greer "cannot seriously contend that a probationer can violate 
the criminal laws of this state without affecting his or her 
probationary status."  Greer thus cannot argue that any reliance 
on his part was detrimental. 
¶83 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
recently 
reached 
the 
same 
conclusion in a factually similar case.  Matamoros v. Grams, 706 
F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2013).  While Matamoros is procedurally 
distinct from the case at issue,14 its discussion of equitable 
estoppel is instructive. 
¶84 In 
Matamoros, 
the 
defendant, 
Jose 
Matamoros 
("Matamoros"), was sentenced to ten years in prison, to be 
followed by a three-year special parole term.  Id. at 785.  When 
he reached the end of his prison term, Matamoros' parole officer 
issued him a Notice of Discharge which explained that he was no 
longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission.  
Id. at 785-86.  Neither the Parole Commission nor the parole 
officer realized that Matamoros was still subject to the special 
parole term.  Id. at 786. 
                                                 
14 For example, the case involved both state and federal 
law, and the defendant was on parole and not probation.  
Further, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
declined 
to 
decide 
whether 
equitable estoppel was available as a remedy in an action on a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
No. 
2011AP2188   
35 
¶85 Matamoros 
subsequently 
participated 
in 
an 
armed 
robbery, for which he was convicted in Wisconsin state court and 
sentenced to prison.  Id.  Because he was on parole when he 
committed the robbery, the Parole Commission issued a warrant 
for Matamoros' arrest for violating the conditions of his 
release.  Id.  The arrest warrant was later lodged as a 
detainer.15  Id. 
¶86 Matamoros filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in federal court, arguing that the government should be estopped 
from enforcing the detainer because he was issued a Notice of 
Discharge informing him that he was no longer subject to the 
Parole Commission's supervision.  Id. at 789.  The district 
court rejected this argument, concluding that Matamoros could 
not satisfy all the elements of estoppel.  Id.  Matamoros 
appealed. 
¶87 The Seventh Circuit conceded that "the Notice of 
Discharge incorrectly stated that Matamoros was no longer 
subject to the Commission's supervision."  Id. at 794.  It held, 
however, that the erroneous issuance of the Notice of Discharge 
was "the result of mere negligence."  Id.  The court further 
concluded that "[u]ltimately, Matamoros' own criminal conduct is 
the basis for his continued incarceration and the detainer.  We 
find nothing unfair about this case that would justify the 
                                                 
15 "The purpose of the detainer is to make sure the U.S. 
Marshal is notified when Matamoros is discharged from his state 
prison sentence so he can be immediately taken into federal 
custody for a revocation of parole hearing."  Matamoros v. 
Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2013). 
No. 
2011AP2188   
36 
extreme remedy of applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
against the government."  Id. 
¶88 Similarly 
in 
this 
case, 
the 
basis 
for 
Greer's 
probation revocation was his own criminal conduct.  Under such 
circumstances it is difficult to find that the equities favor 
his release. 
¶89 In sum, we conclude that a circuit court sitting in 
certiorari cannot properly entertain equitable arguments.  As a 
result, the DOC cannot be equitably estopped from revoking 
Greer's probation. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶90 We conclude that the DOC retained jurisdiction over 
Greer despite the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate.  
We further conclude that Greer's due process rights were not 
violated, and that equitable estoppel is not available in the 
context of certiorari review.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
1 
 
¶91 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion devotes only two paragraphs to what is the main focus of 
Greer's argument: he was denied due process because he did not 
have notice that he was on probation.  Majority op., ¶¶67-68.  
The bulk of its analysis frames the due process issue as 
focusing instead on the Department of Correction's ("DOC") 
failure to accurately maintain records.  Id., ¶¶38, 56, 63-66.  
It downplays the fact that the DOC informed Greer on several 
occasions that his probation was complete, and suggests that 
Greer received due process because he was present at his 
sentencing hearing.  Id., ¶67.  
¶92 Ultimately, the majority determines that because Greer 
"knew or should have known" that he had not completed his 
probation term, "Greer's right to procedural due process was not 
violated."  Id., ¶¶67, 68.  It asserts that his presence at the 
sentencing hearing "should have caused Greer to question the 
issuance of a discharge certificate."  Id., ¶81.  
¶93 Although presence at sentencing would normally put a 
defendant on notice of the length of probation, when the DOC 
makes repeated representations to a defendant that his probation 
is complete, due process requires more.  Because I conclude that 
due process requires that Greer have adequate notice of his 
probationary status, and that the multiple representations that 
the DOC made to Greer indicating that his probation was complete 
deprived Greer of adequate notice, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
2 
 
¶94 On March 14, 2005, Greer pled guilty to two separate 
charges for which he received two separate sentences and terms 
of probation.  It is undisputed that the DOC failed to enter 
Greer's probation for the second conviction into its system.  As 
a result, even though under the sentencing scheme his discharge 
date should have been September 28, 2010, DOC records indicated 
a discharge date of September 28, 2007.   
¶95 According to DOC records, on September 11, 2007, 
Greer's probation agent apparently spoke with him regarding the 
discharge date of his probationary period.  Her notes read:  
[Greer] 
discharges 
from 
extended 
supervision 
on 
09/28/07 and will come in to the office tomorrow to 
sign a civil judgment for his unpaid court costs.  
Next Appointment: [Greer] will return to the office on 
09/12/07 at 4:00 to sign a civil judgment.  This will 
be his final appointment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶96 On September 12, 2007, Greer met with his agent to 
convert any remaining fees into a civil judgment.  Her notes of 
that meeting indicate that she again informed him that his 
discharge date was September 28, 2007: 
[Greer] reported to the office and signed his civil 
judgment. He was told that a letter will be sent to 
the courts and he will still be required to pay off 
his financial obligations but to the clerk of courts 
and some will be taken out in a tax intercept.  
[Greer] was reminded that even though this agent will 
no longer be seeing him he is still technically on 
supervision until midnight on September 28, 2007. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶97 Greer contacted his agent again on September 28, 2007, 
to confirm the date of his discharge.  In response to his 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
3 
 
request for confirmation, the agent's notes reflect that she 
again verified that his probation ended that very day at 
midnight: 
[Greer] called this agent and wanted to verify that 
his supervision was done today.  He was again told 
that technically he was still on until midnight but 
his paperwork had been signed off on and he did not 
need to see this agent.  He was told that when a copy 
of his discharge letter is received a copy will be 
mailed to his house so that he can have one for his 
records.  [Greer] thanked this agent for working with 
him and was wished luck for his future endeavors. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶98 Greer received a Discharge Certificate on October 3, 
2007, relating to his first conviction.  It informed Greer that 
"[t]he department having determined that you have satisfied said 
judgment, it is ordered that effective September 28, 2007, you 
are discharged from said judgment only." 
¶99 The same day, Greer received an absolute Discharge 
Certificate on DOC letterhead, signed by the Secretary of the 
DOC.  It informed Greer that "effective September 28, 2007, you 
are discharged absolutely." 
 
DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE 
ARDONIS F. GREER, #348377-A 
You were sentenced to Wisconsin State Prisons. 
The 
department 
having 
determined 
that 
you 
have 
satisfied said sentence, it is ordered that effective 
September 28, 2007, you are discharged absolutely. 
This 
discharge 
does 
not 
forgive 
your 
current 
(tentative) balance of unpaid supervision fees, in the 
amount of $210.00.  This amount is subject to 
supervision fees for your last month of supervision 
and 
any 
outstanding 
payments. 
 
The 
balance 
is 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
4 
 
(tentative) as a result of delayed supervision fee 
charges still to be posted. 
Failure to pay the full amount due may result in the 
taking of future Wisconsin income tax refunds or 
lottery winnings. 
Restoration of civil rights for felony convictions: 
This certifies that the following civil rights are 
restored to you: 
1.  The right to vote. 
2.  The obligation for jury duty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶100 Greer pled guilty to intimidating a witness on June 
25, 2010.  While conducting a presentence investigation for that 
conviction, 
the 
DOC 
noticed 
the 
error 
in 
its 
records.  
Subsequently, it revoked Greer's probation due to his new 
conviction. 
¶101 Based on the DOC's statements that his probation was 
complete on September 28, 2007, Greer asserts that his due 
process rights were violated when the DOC revoked his probation 
after that date.  He further contends that his due process 
rights were violated because the DOC used inconsistent numbers 
on his revocation paperwork. 
II 
 
¶102 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee the right to due process.  U.S. Const.  
amend. XIV, § 1; Wis. Const. Art. I, § 8.  As the majority 
notes, 
procedural 
due 
process 
requires 
government 
action 
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property to "be 
implemented in a fair manner."  Majority op., ¶62 (quoting State 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
5 
 
v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 
784). 
 
¶103 Central to procedural due process is notice.  Fairness 
requires that an individual have warning of what acts may lead 
to a loss of liberty.  United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 
(9th Cir. 1977).  As this court has previously explained: 
Because we assume that [persons are] free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he [or she] may act accordingly.  Such notice is 
a basic requirement of due process.  
Green v. State Elections Bd., 2007 WI 45, ¶20, 300 Wis. 2d 164, 
732 N.W.2d 750 (quoting Elections Bd. v. Wisconsin Manufacturers 
& Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999)).  
¶104 Due process rights apply not only to criminal 
prosecutions, but also to probation revocations.  Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 
411 
U.S. 
778, 
781-82 
(1973). 
 
Accordingly, 
probationers must be notified of the conditions of their 
probation before violations of such conditions can be used as 
grounds for revocation.  G.G.D. v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 292 
N.W.2d 853 (1980) (concluding that there is a "fundamental due 
process right to adequate notice of the conditions upon which 
the revocation of probation may be premised."); United States v. 
Ashland, Inc., 356 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2004) ("due process 
 . . . includes a right to have terms and conditions of 
probation that are sufficiently clear to inform it of what 
conduct will result in an infraction of probation"); United 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
6 
 
States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1987) ("due 
process requires that the probationer receive actual notice").     
¶105 This court has previously recognized that "the 
sufficiency of notice of [probation] conditions [is] crucial to 
the basic fairness of the system."  G.G.D., 97 Wis. 2d at 9.  
Logically, this notice requirement encompasses the length of 
probation, as well as the fact that an individual is on 
probation in the first place. 
 
¶106 The facts in this case demonstrate that Greer did not 
have adequate notice that he was on probation.  Greer met with 
his supervising agent on September 11, 2007, and was advised of 
a discharge date of September 28, 2007.  He met again with the 
agent the next day to convert any remaining fees into a civil 
judgment and she again told Greer he would be discharged on 
September 28, 2007.  When he called his supervising agent on 
September 28, 2007, she confirmed that his probation would be 
complete at midnight.  Greer then received an absolute Discharge 
Certificate stating it was effective September 28, 2007.  
 
¶107 The majority downplays these facts which underlie 
Greer's procedural due process arguments.  It suggests that 
Greer should have questioned his discharge date because he was 
present at his sentencing hearing which occurred over five years 
prior to the revocation.  Majority op., ¶81.  The majority 
ignores, however, that is exactly what Greer did. 
¶108  On September 28, 2007, Greer called his probation 
agent and asked the agent to verify the discharge date.  His 
agent confirmed that the date was accurate.  The majority does 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
7 
 
not indicate what else Greer should have done after being 
repeatedly advised, both verbally and in writing, that the 
discharge date was September 28, 2007.  What more would the 
majority expect that Greer do to uncover the fact that he was 
still on probation and that the absolute Discharge Certificate 
was erroneously issued? 
   
¶109 Despite the fact that Greer was told several times 
that he was discharged, the majority states that Greer "knew or 
should have known" that he was still on probation.  Majority 
op., ¶67.  However, the DOC is the agency charged with 
administering probation matters.  Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3).  Its 
rules require probation agents to maintain complete and accurate 
records for each offender.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(2)(j).  
It was the DOC and its agent that informed Greer his probation 
had been completed.  Where the agency charged with keeping 
probation records informed Greer not once, but multiple times 
that he had completed his probation, it appears fictitious to 
state that Greer "knew or should have known" that his probation 
was not complete.  Majority op., ¶67.  Contrary to the 
majority's assertion, it was not unreasonable for Greer to 
believe what he was repeatedly told by the DOC.    
   
¶110  As a consequence of the DOC's representations, Greer 
was unaware that he still had to comply with the conditions of 
his probation.  These included a ban on alcohol, a ban on 
voting, and required periodic reporting to his probation agent.  
Greer violated each of these conditions while he thought his 
probation was over.  Notably, one of the initial grounds given 
No.  2011AP2188.awb 
 
8 
 
for Greer's revocation was his admitted consumption of alcohol, 
an action he would not have known was prohibited.   
¶111 The other ground for Greer's violation was his new 
conviction.  The conviction was a result of a plea bargain Greer 
agreed to, unaware that it could have consequences beyond the 
bargained-for sentence.  We cannot know how Greer would have 
behaved had he been aware that he was still on probation.  
Admittedly, Greer should be punished for his new criminal 
behavior.  Greer was convicted for his new offense and received 
a separate sentence for it.   The question is not whether he 
should be accountable for his new criminal conduct.  Rather, the 
question is did he have notice that his actions could lead to a 
revocation of probation. 
¶112 "[T]he cardinal and ultimate test of the presence or 
absence of due process of law in any administrative proceeding 
is the presence or absence of the 'rudiments of fair play long  
known to our law." State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v.  
Wrabetz, 231 Wis. 147, 153, 285 N.W. 504 (1939).  Fairness 
requires that Greer have notice of his probationary status.  
¶113 I conclude that the multiple representations that the 
DOC made to Greer indicating that his probation was complete 
deprived Greer of adequate notice of his probationary status.  
Such 
notice 
is 
required 
to 
comport 
with 
due 
process.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.     
¶114 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.     
 
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