Title: Bedford Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2844.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2844 
BEDFORD BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; ALEXANDER ROAD, L.L.C., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2844.] 
Taxation—Real property—Valuation—Recent, arm’s-length sale price is 
presumptive true value for taxation purposes—Board of Tax Appeals must 
consider and weigh evidence that sale price was not proper indicator of 
true value due to seller’s tax motivations—Proponent of using value other 
than sale price has burden of proving that sale price is not reflective of 
true value. 
(No. 2010-0339—Submitted June 20, 2012—Decided June 27, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2007-M-1059. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the owner of four 
contiguous parcels improved with 103,700 square feet of warehouse space 
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challenges an increase to the 2006 valuation of its property that was ordered by 
the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) at the instigation of the Bedford Board of 
Education (“school board”).  The BTA thereby reversed the decision of the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”), which had retained the auditor’s 
valuation of $3,713,500.  The BTA valued the property by using the allocated 
portion of the March 2006 sale price, which increased the valuation to 
$4,835,000. 
{¶ 2} On appeal the owner, Alexander Road, L.L.C., contends that it 
proved that the allocated sale price is not reflective of market value:  first, through 
testimony regarding the allocation, and second, by showing that two principal 
tenants departed from the premises at or shortly after the purchase.  It also argues 
in the alternative that if the sale price is held to furnish the criterion of value, the 
figure should be $4,698,700 rather than $4,835,000, reflecting the $136,300 
deduction for personal property set forth on the conveyance-fee statement.  The 
school board contests all of these assertions. 
{¶ 3} We hold that the BTA erred by ignoring and failing to weigh the 
significance of the testimony regarding the seller’s tax motivations in allocating 
the sale price to the subject property.  Because it is the duty of the BTA to weigh 
the evidence and determine the facts concerning valuation, we must remand for 
proper consideration of the effect of that testimony. 
{¶ 4} As for the departure of tenants, the BTA correctly found that 
vacancies that occurred after the transfer did not invalidate the allocated sale price 
as the criterion of value for the property. 
{¶ 5} Finally, we hold that if the BTA on remand finds once again that 
the sale price furnishes the criterion of value in spite of the testimony regarding 
the seller’s motivations, there should be no deduction for the value associated 
with personal property because the record contains no corroborating evidence for 
that allocation. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
{¶ 6} Based on these holdings, we affirm in part but vacate the decision 
of the BTA, and we remand for further proceedings. 
Facts 
{¶ 7} For tax year 2006, the auditor valued the four parcels that make up 
the subject property, which is land improved with warehouse buildings, at 
$3,713,500.  On March 29, 2007, the school board filed a valuation complaint that 
asserted the recent sale price of $4,698,700 (or $4,835,000, without the separate 
allocation to personal property) as the true value of the property. 
{¶ 8} The BOR held a hearing on August 28, 2007.  The school board 
cited the March 2006 sale as the basis for valuing the property.  In defense, the 
owner presented the testimony of Fred Scalese, a corporate vice president 
associated with the owner. 1   
{¶ 9} Scalese identified the Purchase and Sale Agreement, which 
covered two properties including the property at issue and which set forth an 
aggregate sale price of $7,400,000 with no allocation between the two properties.  
The sale contract explicitly provided for the transfer of personal property along 
with real property, but does not set forth an allocation of price as between these 
different assets. 
{¶ 10} Scalese also identified amendments to the sale agreement dated 
March 2006 that reduced the aggregate sale price by a total of $65,000.  In 
particular, the purchase price was reduced $50,000 in relation to the lease by an 
important tenant of the subject property.  Scalese testified that due diligence had 
revealed drastic limitations to the personal guarantee for lease payments for that 
tenant, which led to the grant of a $50,000 concession in sale price. 
                                                 
1  The school board contends that the court should not consider the audio tape of the BOR hearing 
because the property owner, as appellant before the court, failed to have a written transcription of 
the BOR hearing prepared pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.4(B).  The school board is mistaken; 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.4(B) imposes the requirement of a written transcription for a BTA hearing, not a 
BOR hearing. There was no BTA hearing in this case.  Since there is no rule violation, there is no 
basis for sanctioning the appellant by excluding its evidence. 
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{¶ 11} A settlement statement indicated the allocated price of $4,835,000 
for the property at issue, along with the conveyance-fee statement showing an 
allocated sale price of $4,835,000 for the property at issue with $136,300 further 
allocated to personal property. 
{¶ 12} Scalese then identified rent rolls showing tenancy on the property 
at issue as of January 2006 and then as of January 2007.  The rent rolls 
documented significant revenue loss by virtue of the departure of two important 
tenants.  Scalese pointed out that the rent rolls documented the departure of both 
of these tenants during 2006; their departure reflected about a $1,000,000 decline 
in value if the revenue loss were capitalized at 9 percent.  Alexander Road did 
succeed in replacing one of the two departing tenants, but the space was leased at 
a considerably lower rent. 
{¶ 13} Scalese testified that the seller allocated the sale price between the 
two properties and stated that the allocation reflected the seller’s “own internal 
needs to have you know their tax issues handled in such a way that they wouldn’t 
pay capital gains tax until they did whatever they needed to do with their 1031.”2 
Scalese also stated that the seller had acquired the two properties “as part of a 
multiple site acquisition.”  Scalese said that Alexander Road acquiesced in the 
allocation “as we had no choice.” 
{¶ 14} Scalese offered his opinion that the allocation did not reflect the 
relative value of the two properties.  He pointed to the general difficulty in leasing 
such space, but did not address the specific relative characteristics of the two 
properties that were bundled for sale in this case.  Scalese testified that no 
appraisals were performed in connection with the purchase. 
                                                 
2  By his reference to “1031,” Scalese is no doubt referring to Section 1031 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. 1031), which provides for nonrecognition and tax deferral of gain or 
loss that is realized from the exchange of qualified business or investment property for like-kind 
property. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
{¶ 15} Finally, Scalese testified that a personal property tax return had 
been filed that would document the propriety of allocating sale price to personal 
property.  But in spite of counsel’s statement that the personal property tax return 
would be submitted, the return is not in the record. 
{¶ 16} The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation, and the school board 
appealed.  At the BTA, the parties waived hearing and the school board filed a 
brief advocating adoption of the sale price as the value of the property.  On 
January 26, 2010, the BTA issued its decision, holding that the owner had not 
rebutted the presumptive propriety of using the allocated sale price as set forth on 
the conveyance-fee statement to value the property. 
Analysis 
{¶ 17} Because the true value of property is a “question of fact, the 
determination of which is primarily within the province of the taxing authorities,” 
we have held that we will “not disturb a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
with respect to such valuation unless it affirmatively appears from the record that 
such decision is unreasonable or unlawful.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. 
Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52, 239 N.E.2d 25 (1968), syllabus.  Moreover, as the finder 
of fact, “the BTA has wide discretion in granting weight to evidence and 
credibility to witnesses,” with the result that we will not reverse the BTA’s 
determination of evidentiary weight and credibility “unless we find an abuse of 
this discretion.”  Natl. Church Residence v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 397, 398, 653 N.E.2d 240 (1995). 
{¶ 18} On the other hand, although the BTA is responsible for 
determining factual issues, we “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that 
is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 
399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001).  
In particular, we have recognized that the BTA “has the duty to state what 
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evidence it considered relevant in reaching its determination,” and we thereby 
require that the BTA evaluate the evidence before it in making its findings.  
HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 282, 2009-Ohio-584, 903 N.E.2d 
1179, ¶ 34, 36. 
The BTA erred by failing to weigh the probative force of the witness’s 
testimony regarding the seller’s motivation in allocating the sale price 
1.  The owner has the burden to (i) rebut the allocation to  
real property on the conveyance-fee statement and (ii)  
support any deduction from real property 
{¶ 19} Our cases establish that “the best evidence of ‘true value in money’ 
is the proper allocation of the lump-sum purchase price and not an appraisal 
ignoring the contemporaneous sale.” Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 50 Ohio St.3d 129, 363 N.E.2d 722 (1977), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  But the validity of using the allocated sale price depends upon the 
propriety of the allocation; if the BTA finds that an allocation is not proper, or 
that a proper one is not possible based on the evidence before it, then the sale 
price is not determinative of value.  Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 66 Ohio St.3d 410, 414, 423 N.E.2d 75 (1981); compare W.S. Tyler 
Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision, 57 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 565 N.E.2d 826 (1991) 
(use of allocated sale price to value real property was affirmed where “no facts” 
before the BTA indicated an “improper” allocation that would “distort the true 
value of the subject property”).  Similar principles apply to the personal property 
tax.  Compare Tele-Media Co. of Addil v. Lindley, 70 Ohio St.2d 284, 436 N.E.2d 
1362 (1982) (an allocation of a lump-sum price for the purchase of business assets 
that was based on replacement cost and that comported with accounting principles 
established the value of the property) with Heimerl v. Lindley, 63 Ohio St.2d 309, 
408 N.E.2d 685 (1980) (an allocation of asset purchase price performed for the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
sole purpose of reducing the parties’ federal income tax liabilities was not 
probative of value). 
{¶ 20} The crucial issue that arises in proposing the use of an allocated 
sale price is the propriety of the allocation for tax-valuation purposes.  As a 
general matter, we have held that “the proponent of an allocation of sale price 
bears an initial burden of showing the propriety of the allocation,” a burden that 
consists of showing “corroborating indicia to ensure that the allocation reflects the 
true value of the property.”  St. Bernard Self Storage, L.L.C. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, ¶ 14, 17.  At 
first blush, this doctrine would suggest that the school board should shoulder the 
burden of proving the propriety of using the allocated sale price. 
{¶ 21} When, however, a school board advocates the use of the amount of 
sale price allocated to a particular parcel on a conveyance-fee statement, the 
burden of rebuttal rests on the owner because the owner is the party most likely to 
possess the information that could justify or refute the propriety of the allocation.  
FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 21, 24, 25, 27-29.  Thus, in 
FirstCal, we recognized that because it is the owner itself (or an entity in privity 
with the owner) who has actually reported the allocated sale price on the 
conveyance-fee statement, the owner should be initially bound by what it has 
reported.  Id. 
{¶ 22} Applied to the present case, these principles reveal at the outset a 
twofold burden of proof that falls on Alexander Road as owner.  First, Alexander 
Road must shoulder the burden to show that the $4,835,000 reported as total 
consideration on the conveyance-fee statement is an allocation that is not 
indicative of true value.  Second, as the proponent of allocating $136,300 to 
personal property, Alexander Road must point to corroborating evidence to 
support the allocation.  Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
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Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 565, 2011-Ohio-2258, 949 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 18 (“the burden 
of showing the propriety of” the allocation rests on “an owner who seeks an 
allocation of the sale price in order to reduce the valuation below the full sale 
price”). 
2.  The BTA failed to consider the effect of Scalese’s testimony 
regarding the motivations behind the allocation 
{¶ 23} In the present case, the BTA found that the “property owner has 
not presented evidence which calls into question the allocation made, except for 
the statement of its representative that the allocation was made at the behest of the 
seller.”  Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2007-M-
1059, 2010 WL 333044, *3.  Alexander Road contests the BTA’s finding in this 
regard in two distinct respects. 
{¶ 24} First, Alexander Road asserts that the allocation does not reflect 
true value because “it was not negotiated between the parties, [and] it was not 
determined at arm’s length.”  It is true that we have upheld the use of an allocated 
sale price in part because the allocation “was based on negotiations between the 
parties.”  W.S. Tyler Co., 57 Ohio St.3d at 49, 565 N.E.2d 826.  But just as the 
parties to a sale of real property can allocate for purposes that genuinely relate to 
the true value of the properties, they can also allocate for other purposes that may 
“distort the true value of the subject property” in a given case.  Id. 
{¶ 25} Tax considerations, for example, can affect an allocation in ways 
that make it unreflective of the value of the individual properties.  In an extreme 
case, the parties to a sale of multiple parcels of real property might allocate for the 
specific purpose of reducing real property taxes:  most of the sale price might be 
allocated to the parcel that was located in a taxing district with a lower millage.  
Other tax considerations have been recognized as significant in this regard, as we 
have acknowledged in the context of both real and personal property taxation.  
See Dublin City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 80 Ohio 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
St.3d 450, 451, 453-454, 687 N.E.2d 422 (1997) (use of allocated sale price to 
value property was rejected where testimony by a witness with personal 
knowledge of the sale indicated that the amount allocated to the property at issue 
had been artificially inflated for negotiation and tax-avoidance purposes); 
Heimerl, 63 Ohio St.2d at 309-310, 408 N.E.2d 685 (allocation of asset purchase 
price performed “for the sole purpose of reducing the parties’ federal income tax 
liabilities” is an allocation that is not probative of value, because it is “not 
intended to reflect the true value of the equipment component of the business”). 
{¶ 26} We are therefore unpersuaded by Alexander Road’s insistence that 
it was forced to accept the seller’s allocation.  It is elemental that the negotiation 
at arm’s length of the overall sale price is material to establishing the sale price as 
the criterion of value.  As part of that basic principle, the negotiation of an 
allocation may or may not reflect the parties’ determination of the relative value 
of different properties included in the same sale, depending on the specific 
motivations behind the allocation.  Accordingly, the negotiation of the allocation 
itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for concluding that the 
allocation reflects the value of the constituent properties. 
{¶ 27} This brings us to Alexander Road’s second assertion, which is a 
very different matter.  Alexander Road points to the testimony of Scalese, who 
asserted not only that the seller’s allocation was forced upon the buyer, but also 
testified that the seller’s allocation was driven by the seller’s desire to avoid tax 
on capital gains. 
{¶ 28} It is not difficult to envision how tax motives might make an 
allocation unreflective of relative market value.  As an example, a taxpayer could 
have an incentive to allocate more of the sale price to parcel A than parcel B in 
order to reduce the amount of gain realized and recognized with respect to the sale 
of parcel B.  And, as already discussed, the presence of such tax motivations has 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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been held to bar the use of an allocated sale price in a proper case.  Heimerl, 63 
Ohio St.2d at 312-313, 408 N.E.2d 685. 
{¶ 29} By blatantly ignoring this testimony, the BTA failed to consider 
whether it is sufficient to negate the validity of using the allocated sale price.  
When the BTA’s decision is “silent on the subject” of potentially material 
evidence, that silence makes the court “ ‘unable to perform its appellate duty,’ ” 
with the result that the proper course is to remand so that the BTA may afford the 
taxpayer the review of the evidence that is its due.  Dublin Senior Community L.P. 
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 80 Ohio St.3d 455, 462, 687 N.E.2d 426 (1997), 
quoting Howard  v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 37 Ohio St.3d 195, 197, 524 
N.E.2d 887 (1988). 
{¶ 30} The school board defends the BTA’s decision by citing our 
FirstCal decision, which was issued after the BTA’s decision in this case.  
FirstCal, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 426.  We find that 
FirstCal does not directly control the present case because the type of testimony 
presented in this case had no counterpart in FirstCal. 
{¶ 31} In FirstCal, multiple properties in various counties of Ohio and in 
other states were sold for a single sale price.  Id. at 6-7.  First the board of revision 
and then the BTA assigned a portion of the sale price as the value of the parcels 
located in Franklin County by (1) accepting the sale price reported on the 
conveyance-fee statement as the aggregate value of all the Franklin County 
properties and then (2) allocating the value to each parcel in the county using the 
ratio of individual-parcel value to aggregate value in accordance with the 
auditor’s original assessments.  Id. at 31. 
{¶ 32} In FirstCal, the owner’s witness did not address whether the 
allocation was indicative of true value.  Id. at ¶ 9.  Moreover, the owner’s 
objection centered on the absence of more specific evidence that the allocation 
reflected true value.  We rejected that contention, holding that under the 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
circumstances the owner had the burden to show the impropriety of the allocation 
for tax-valuation purposes.  Id. at ¶ 28-29, 31. 
{¶ 33} While FirstCal does articulate the starting point for the present 
case, it does not furnish guidance for evaluating the testimony offered by Scalese 
at the BOR hearing.  In this case as in FirstCal, it is the burden of Alexander 
Road as owner to present evidence negating the validity of using the allocated 
sale price.  But the FirstCal court simply did not confront a situation where a 
witness with some involvement in the transaction ascribed tax motives to the 
allocation.  The latter circumstance necessitates the remand in the present case. 
{¶ 34} We emphasize that we do not prejudge the disposition of the issue 
on remand.  The BTA will need to weigh the reliability and probative force of 
Scalese’s testimony by determining, among other things, the adequacy of the 
foundation for Scalese’s statement about the seller’s motives and whether Scalese 
stated with sufficient particularity a ground for declining to use the allocated sale 
price.  We hold only that the BTA has a duty to make these determinations within 
the exercise of its discretion as the finder of fact; we do not prescribe the outcome 
of the board’s deliberations. 
3.  Alexander Road presented no evidence corroborating 
the allocation to personal property 
{¶ 35} On its face, the conveyance-fee statement allocated $136,300 of 
the $4,835,000 consideration to “items other than real property,” which according 
to Alexander Road refers to the personal property that was transferred along with 
the warehouse space.  Alexander Road points out that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement expressly includes tangible personal property “located on or about the 
Land and the Improvements” as part of the sale.  Although Alexander Road seeks 
to avoid the use of the March 2006 sale price altogether, it argues in the 
alternative that the sale-price valuation of the realty should be $4,698,700 rather 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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than $4,835,000—i.e., the amount of $136,300 allocated to personal property 
should be deducted.  We disagree. 
{¶ 36} As an owner who “seeks an allocation of the sale price in order to 
reduce the valuation below the full sale price,” Alexander Road “bears the burden 
of showing the propriety of allocating some portion of that reported price to other 
assets.”  Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn., 128 Ohio St.3d 565, 2011-Ohio-2258, 
949 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 18.  We have clarified that this burden is not a heavy one, as our 
discussion in St. Bernard Self Storage, 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 
N.E.2d 85, ¶ 14, 17, suggests:  all that is required is some additional increment of 
corroborating evidence beyond the bare fact of allocation in the conveyance-fee 
statement itself.  Indeed, in Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn., we held that an 
allocation of $280,000 to personal property was justified on the basis of a written 
appraisal report prepared for a lender in conjunction with the asset sale, and we 
did so in spite of the absence of testimony by the appraiser.  Id. at ¶ 26-28.  In this 
case, Scalese referred to the personal property tax return and counsel made a 
commitment to submit it, but the return was apparently never produced. 
{¶ 37} Because the record is devoid of any corroborating evidence in 
support of the allocation of $136,300 to personal property, the BTA should (if the 
allocated sale price is used) disallow the deduction of $136,300 from the 
$4,835,000 sale price. 
The departure of key tenants does not, without more, 
impugn the propriety of the allocated sale price 
{¶ 38} Alexander Road contends that the default and departure of a key 
tenant, Window & Door Factory (and to a lesser extent the departure of the Tasty 
Baking tenant), constitute reasons to disregard the allocated sale price.  We hold 
that the evidence of tenant loss that Alexander Road presented falls short of 
proving the impropriety of the allocated sale price. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 39} Under the case law, the opponent of the allocated sale price has the 
burden of doing one of three things.  First, it could under general principles show 
that the entire transaction is not recent or at arm’s length or that by the nature of 
the particular transaction the sale price does not involve an aggregation of market 
prices of the constituent properties.  Compare Pingue v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 62, 64, 717 N.E.2d 293 (1999) (“It is only when the 
purchase price [of multiple parcels] does not reflect true value that a review of 
independent appraisals based upon other factors is appropriate”); see, e.g., Tanson 
Holdings, Inc. v. Darke Cty Bd. of Revision, 74 Ohio St.3d 687, 660 N.E.2d 1216 
(1996) (sale not at arm’s length).  Second, the opponent of the allocated sale price 
can show that “no readily and reasonably identifiable purchase price paid for [an 
individual property]” can be ascertained through allocation of the larger lump-
sum price.  See Consol. Aluminum Corp., 66 Ohio St.2d at 415, 423 N.E.2d 75.  
This category would encompass the situation where the motivations for an actual 
allocation—such as tax incentives—impugn the propriety of using that allocation 
for tax valuation, and no alternative method of allocation is proven to be accurate.  
See Dublin City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 80 Ohio St.3d at 451, 453-454, 687 
N.E.2d 422.  Third, the opponent of a proffered allocation of sale price could in 
theory prove that a different allocation of that sale price would better reflect the 
market value of the individual properties. 
{¶ 40} Alexander Road’s tenant-loss evidence accomplishes none of these 
objectives.  The taxpayer contests neither the arm’s-length character of the overall 
sale nor its recency,3  nor does it propose to prove that the aggregate sale price did 
                                                 
3  We have noted that an arm’s-length sale for tax-valuation purposes presupposes reasonably 
knowledgeable buyers and sellers.  See Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 129 Ohio St.3d 3, 2011-Ohio-2316, 949 N.E.2d 986, ¶ 22, fn. 2.  Because Alexander 
Road does not contest the arm’s-length character of the sale, its tenant-loss evidence will not be 
considered in support of an argument that the buyer lacked knowledge. Id. Nor does the tenant 
loss document any problem with the recency of the sale, since it apparently occurred after both the 
lien date and the sale, and recency is affected by events that occur between the lien date and the 
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not constitute the aggregate value of the two properties.  Additionally, Alexander 
Road’s evidence by itself does not tend to show an improper allocation; notably 
absent is any evidence regarding the value of the other property sold through the 
transaction, with the result that the tenant loss on the subject property cannot call 
into question the relative valuation of the properties in terms of the aggregate sale 
price.  Finally, the BTA correctly noted that the taxpayer received a $50,000 
concession in sale price because of the situation of a key tenant, thereby tending 
to negate its contention that its payment of allocated sale price constituted an 
overpayment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} The BTA acted reasonably and lawfully by (1) finding that the 
taxpayer presented no corroborating evidence in support of an allocation of sale 
price to personal property and (2) rejecting the taxpayer’s tenant-loss evidence as 
a basis for relief.  But the BTA erred by failing to determine the reliability and 
probative value of the testimony regarding the tax motivations of the seller in 
allocating the sale price.  We therefore vacate the BTA’s decision and remand so 
that the BTA may consider the foundational adequacy and probative value of that 
testimony and determine its effect on propriety of the allocation for purposes of 
valuing the property. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Kolick & Kondzer, Thomas A. Kondzer, John P. Desimone, and Michelle 
A. Yanok, for appellee, Bedford Board of Education. 
                                                                                                                                     
sale.  See Olentangy Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 
103, 2010-Ohio-1040, 926 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 12. 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
 
Sleggs, Danzinger & Gill Co., L.P.A., and Todd W. Sleggs, for appellant. 
______________________