Title: Commonwealth v. Williams

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 003033   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
HERBERT WILLIAMS, JR. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in reversing the circuit court's judgment on the ground 
that the failure to grant the defendant's request for a jury 
trial denied him a constitutional right. 
 
Herbert Williams, Jr., was indicted for robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58, for illegal use of a firearm in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, and for unlawful wearing of a 
mask in violation of Code § 18.2-422.  He was accused of robbing 
Dost M. Khan, a hotel desk clerk, at gunpoint.  Williams was 
convicted of all three offenses in a bench trial in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Alexandria.  The court sentenced Williams 
to a total of 13 years' imprisonment and suspended five years of 
that sentence. 
 
Williams appealed from his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals, which reversed and remanded the circuit court's 
judgment in a published opinion.  Williams v. Commonwealth, 33 
Va. App. 506, 515, 534 S.E.2d 369, 373 (2000).  The Court of 
Appeals concluded, among other things, that the circuit court 
erred when it refused to grant Williams' request for a jury 
trial.  Id.  The Commonwealth appealed from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
We do not state the evidence presented at trial because it 
is not relevant here.  However, we recite the procedural history 
of the case in the circuit court prior to trial because that 
history is important to an understanding of the issue in this 
appeal. 
 
The case was originally set for trial on March 4, 1997.  On 
Williams' motion, the case was continued to April 2, 1997, and 
Williams was released on bond.  Williams became a fugitive for 
six months and was arrested again in October 1997.  His trial 
was rescheduled for November 20, 1997. 
 
On that date, Williams moved for a continuance and signed a 
jury waiver form.  The jury waiver form stated that "I, the 
undersigned defendant hereby waive my right to a trial by jury, 
and request the court to hear all matters of law and fact in 
[this] case."  After the Commonwealth's attorney and the 
presiding judge also signed the jury waiver form, the court 
entered an order continuing the case to January 21, 1998.  The 
order noted that "the defendant, the Attorney for the 
Commonwealth and the Court signed the jury waiver form." 
 
On January 20, 1998, the day before trial, Williams again 
asked for a continuance.  The circuit court denied Williams' 
 
2
motion.  On the day of trial, Williams asked to be tried by a 
jury.  Williams stated that he had changed his mind about 
wanting a jury trial because his expert witnesses were not 
available on that date and some of his tape recorded statements 
had been "compromised" and "tampered with" in the editing 
process. 
 
Williams' counsel told the circuit court that he was not 
prepared for a jury trial.  He requested a continuance of the 
case, informing the circuit court that "[w]e are simply not 
prepared to go forward today . . . ."  The Commonwealth's 
attorney objected to a continuance, arguing that the tape 
recordings of Williams' conversations had been made available to 
defense counsel at an earlier date, and that any revisions were 
minor in nature.  The Commonwealth's attorney also noted that 11 
witnesses for the Commonwealth were present in court and ready 
to testify.  Finally, the Commonwealth's attorney informed the 
circuit court that the robbery victim was scheduled to leave the 
country the following week for a three-month visit to his native 
country. 
 
The circuit court denied Williams' request for a jury trial 
and his counsel's motion for a continuance.  The court noted 
that Williams could have requested a jury trial the previous day 
when he made a motion for a continuance. 
 
3
 
The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred when 
it refused Williams' request to be tried by a jury.  Williams, 
33 Va. App. at 515, 534 S.E.2d at 372-73.  The Court 
acknowledged that "[when] there has been a knowing, intentional 
and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial there is no 
absolute constitutional right to withdraw it."  Id. at 513, 534 
S.E.2d at 372 (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 
398-99, 345 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1986)).  However, the Court observed 
that "[i]n the instant case, the record does not reflect that 
the [circuit] court determined that [Williams] voluntarily and 
intelligently consented to trial without a jury."  Id.  The 
Court stated: 
In the present case, the [circuit] court never found 
that [Williams] voluntarily and intelligently waived 
his right to trial by jury.  The transcript of the 
hearing in which [Williams] signed the waiver is not 
before this Court.  The Commonwealth argues that 
because [Williams] did not include the transcript, the 
"waiver" argument must be rejected pursuant to Rule 
5A:8(b).  Because the continuance order, which 
referenced the "waiver," contains no finding that the 
jury waiver was voluntarily and intelligently entered, 
the transcript is not relevant.  A court speaks only 
through its orders. . . .  The order reflecting the 
hearing merely acknowledges that [Williams] signed the 
waiver and that the Commonwealth's attorney and the 
[circuit] court concurred. 
 
Id. at 514, 534 S.E.2d at 372. 
 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Williams did not 
effectively waive his right to a jury trial because the record 
failed to show that the circuit court found that his waiver was 
 
4
voluntarily and intelligently made.  Id. at 515, 534 S.E.2d at 
372.  The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Williams had an 
absolute right to a jury trial on the date he ultimately was 
tried.  Id. at 515, 534 S.E.2d at 372-73. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth first observes that the Court 
of Appeals based its holding on an issue that Williams did not 
preserve either at trial or on appeal, the question whether his 
jury trial waiver was voluntary.  The Commonwealth notes that 
Williams did not challenge the voluntary nature of his jury 
trial waiver until four months after his convictions and, on 
appeal, merely asked the Court of Appeals to consider the 
question whether the circuit court's failure to grant Williams a 
jury trial "violated his right to a jury under the Virginia and 
United States Constitutions."  Id. at 512, 534 S.E.2d at 372.  
Therefore, the Commonwealth contends that our review of the 
issue whether Williams' jury trial waiver was voluntary is 
procedurally barred under Rule 5:25, and that the circuit 
court's judgment must be reviewed to determine whether the court 
properly exercised its discretion in denying Williams' request 
to withdraw his jury trial waiver. 
 
In response, Williams argues that the issue whether his 
jury trial waiver was voluntary cannot be separated from the 
issue whether the circuit court improperly denied him a jury 
trial.  Williams contends that Rule 3A:13(b) requires that the 
 
5
voluntary nature of a jury trial waiver be reflected in the 
court's order memorializing that waiver.  Williams asserts that 
"[t]he record is devoid of these findings required by Rule 
3A:13," and that since the order of January 21, 1998 failed to 
make such findings, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try 
him without a jury.  We disagree with Williams' arguments. 
 
Initially, we conclude that the issue whether Williams' 
jury trial waiver was voluntary is not properly before us in 
this appeal.  In reaching this conclusion, we reject Williams' 
assertion that Rule 3A:13 imposes a jurisdictional requirement 
that the voluntary nature of a jury trial waiver be memorialized 
in a court order.  Rule 3A:13 provides, in relevant part: 
(b) . . . If an accused who has pleaded not guilty in 
a circuit court consents to trial without a jury, the 
court may, with the concurrence of the Commonwealth's 
attorney, try the case without a jury.  The court 
shall determine before trial that the accused's 
consent was voluntarily and intelligently given, and 
his consent and the concurrence of the court and the 
Commonwealth's attorney shall be entered of record. 
 
See Va. Const. art. I, § 8; Code § 19.2-257. 
 
This provision requires the circuit court to determine 
whether a defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives his 
right to a jury trial before proceeding to trial of the case.  
Once the circuit court has made the determination that the 
defendant's waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made, the 
court is required to enter in the record the defendant's consent 
 
6
to be tried without a jury.  The concurrence of the 
Commonwealth's attorney and the circuit court in the waiver of 
jury trial also must be entered in the record. 
 
By its terms, therefore, Rule 3A:13(b) does not require 
that the circuit court memorialize by order its determination 
that the defendant's jury trial waiver is voluntary and 
intelligent.  Instead, Rule 3A:13(b) requires that once the 
court has made this determination, the court shall enter in the 
record the defendant's agreement to be tried without a jury.  
See Va. Const. art. I, § 8; Code § 19.2-257. 
 
In the present case, the record shows that on November 20, 
1997, Williams signed a document stating, "I, the undersigned 
defendant hereby waive my right to a trial by jury, and request 
the court to hear all matters of law and fact in [this] case."  
The concurrence of the Commonwealth's attorney and the circuit 
court in the waiver was noted on the form by their respective 
signatures bearing that date.  The circuit court also entered an 
order on November 24, 1997, stating that Williams, the 
Commonwealth's attorney, and the court had executed the jury 
waiver form.  These entries in the record met the requirements 
of Rule 3A:13(b). 
 
We disagree with Williams' assertion that a different 
conclusion is required by prior decisions in which we have 
stated that "a court speaks only through its written orders."  
 
7
See, e.g., Berean Law Group, P.C. v. Cox, 259 Va. 622, 626, 528 
S.E.2d 108, 111 (2000); Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 94, 
501 S.E.2d 134, 140, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998); Davis 
v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996).  This 
language generally refers to instances when some conflict or 
ambiguity exists between the language expressed in a transcript 
and a court's order, when an order fails to reflect an action 
allegedly taken by one or more parties, or when a court's order 
fails to reflect compliance with a jurisdictional requirement.  
See, e.g., Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne Excavating, 
Inc., 260 Va. 137, 143, 530 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2000); Wagner v. 
Shird, 257 Va. 584, 588, 514 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1999); Robertson 
v. Superintendent of Wise County Corr. Unit, 248 Va. 232, 235 
n.*, 445 S.E.2d 116, 117 n.* (1994); Walton, 256 Va. at 94, 501 
S.E.2d at 140; Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 
770, 773 (1964). 
 
We also have used this language to emphasize the finality 
of court orders, which cannot be modified by later conduct of 
the parties that fails to result in a subsequent order 
suspending or vacating an initial order.  See, e.g., Berean, 259 
Va. at 626, 528 S.E.2d at 111; Davis, 251 Va. at 148-49, 466 
S.E.2d at 94.  Thus, we conclude that the language cited by 
Williams has no application here because the circuit court was 
not required to enter an order stating a finding that Williams' 
 
8
jury trial waiver was voluntary and intelligent, and there is no 
conflict or ambiguity in the record before us.  Moreover, the 
court's order of November 24, 1997 complied with the requirement 
of Rule 3A:13(b) that the consent of the defendant, the 
Commonwealth's attorney, and the circuit court to a waiver of 
jury trial be entered of record.  See Va. Const. art. I, § 8; 
Code § 19.2-257. 
 
If a defendant wishes to challenge the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of his jury trial waiver, he must state a 
timely objection on that basis in the circuit court.  Because 
Williams did not question the voluntary nature of that waiver 
until four months after he was tried and convicted of the 
present offenses, we conclude that he has not preserved that 
issue for appeal.  Rule 5:25; see Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 
Va. 127, 137, 547 S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001); Burlile v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 508, 544 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001); Lenz 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 467, 544 S.E.2d 299, 308 (2001); 
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 512 n.2, 537 S.E.2d 866, 
876 n.2 (2000). 
 
We are unable to consider Williams' request that we 
nevertheless examine the issue under the exception permitted by 
Rule 5:25 "to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice."  
Among other deficiencies in the present record, Williams failed 
to include on appeal to the Court of Appeals a transcript of the 
 
9
November 20, 1997 proceeding in which the circuit court accepted 
his jury trial waiver.  Without that transcript, we are unable 
to determine whether the circuit court conducted an adequate 
inquiry before accepting the waiver.  As we explained in Justis 
v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (1961), the 
circuit court's judgment is presumptively correct and the burden 
is on the appellant to present a sufficient record to permit a 
determination whether the circuit court committed an alleged 
error.  See also McDonald v. Nat'l Enters., Inc., 262 Va. 184, 
195, 547 S.E.2d 204, 211 (2001); White v. Morano, 249 Va. 27, 
30, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. 
App. 286, 296-97, 544 S.E.2d 870, 875-76 (2001). 
 
We next consider the central issue presented by the 
Commonwealth in this appeal, namely, whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the circuit court's failure to 
grant the defendant a jury trial was a denial of his 
constitutional right to trial by jury.  Citing Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 553, 238 S.E.2d 834 (1977), the 
Commonwealth argues that once a defendant has waived his right 
to a trial by jury, he does not have a constitutional right to 
withdraw that waiver.  The Commonwealth asserts that in the 
present case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Williams' request to withdraw his waiver because the 
request was untimely. 
 
10
 
In response, Williams asserts that his request for a jury 
trial was timely made because the circuit court did not find 
that the trial would have to be rescheduled to another day if 
the court granted Williams' request.  Williams contends that the 
circuit court abused its discretion in denying his request 
because the court stated only that Williams' request for a jury 
trial could delay the case for "several hours."  We disagree 
with Williams' arguments. 
 
The right of a defendant to a jury trial in a criminal case 
is secured by Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia.  
Thomas, 218 Va. at 554, 238 S.E.2d at 835.  However, once a 
defendant makes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of this 
right, his request to withdraw that waiver and be tried by a 
jury is subject to the circuit court's discretion.  Id. at 555, 
238 S.E.2d at 835. 
 
In Thomas, we stated the general rule regarding the 
withdrawal of a waiver of jury trial: 
 
Whether one accused of crime who has regularly 
waived a jury trial will be permitted to withdraw the 
waiver and have his case tried before a jury is 
ordinarily within the discretion of the [circuit] 
court.  The rule, as expressed in some cases, is that 
if an accused's application for withdrawal of waiver 
is made in due season so as not to substantially delay 
or impede the cause of justice, the trial court should 
allow the waiver to be withdrawn. 
 
 
The authorities are uniformly to the effect that 
a motion for withdrawal of waiver made after the 
commencement of the trial is not timely and should not 
 
11
be allowed.  Whether a motion for the withdrawal of a 
waiver of trial by jury made prior to the actual 
commencement of the trial of the case is timely 
depends primarily upon the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case.  Where there is no showing that 
granting the motion would unduly delay the trial or 
would otherwise impede justice, the motion is usually 
held to be timely.  In some cases, however, it has 
been held that a motion for withdrawal of a waiver of 
jury trial, although made prior to the trial, was not 
timely and was properly denied by the trial court, the 
decisions in these cases being based primarily upon 
the ground that granting the motion would have 
resulted in an unreasonable delay of the trial. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
In Thomas, we held that the circuit court abused its 
discretion when it denied the defendant's request to withdraw 
his previous jury trial waiver.  Id. at 556, 238 S.E.2d at 836.  
We based our conclusion primarily on the fact that the defendant 
made his request to withdraw the waiver 11 days before trial, 
and that there was no showing that granting the defendant's 
request would unduly delay the trial or impede the cause of 
justice.  Id. at 556, 238 S.E.2d at 835-36. 
 
Here, Williams' request for a jury trial was, in effect, a 
request to withdraw his previous jury trial waiver.  The facts 
before us are distinctly different from those in Thomas and 
support the circuit court's determination to deny Williams' 
request.  The case originally had been set for trial ten months 
earlier, and already had been substantially delayed during the 
several months that Williams remained a fugitive.  Further, 
 
12
Williams waited until the morning of trial to state his request 
for a jury trial, although he could have made this request at 
any time during the two-month period after the court granted his 
November 1997 continuance motion. 
 
Williams made his request shortly after the trial was to 
begin on Wednesday, January 21, 1998.  The circuit court 
informed the parties that if the case were to be tried by a 
jury, "it may take several hours to begin the case."  
Thereafter, Williams restated his request for a jury trial, and 
the Commonwealth's attorney opposed the request, informing the 
court that she intended to call 11 witnesses to testify in the 
case.  She further stated that Khan, the robbery victim, was 
leaving the United States the following Monday to return to his 
native country for three months. 
 
Under these facts, the circuit court was presented with the 
prospect that selection of a jury could not begin until late 
that day, Wednesday afternoon.  Given the number of witnesses 
that the prosecution intended to call in the case, the court had 
no assurance that the trial could have been concluded before 
Monday, when Khan intended to leave the country for a three-
month period.  Moreover, even if the Commonwealth's attorney 
presented Khan's testimony early in the case, there remained the 
possibility that Khan would be required as a rebuttal witness 
near the end of the trial. 
 
13
 
Based on these facts and circumstances, the record shows 
that if Williams had been allowed to withdraw his jury trial 
waiver and be tried by a jury, completion of the trial could 
have been substantially delayed and the cause of justice 
impeded.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Williams' request to be tried by 
a jury. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals' 
judgment and reinstate Williams' convictions in accordance with 
the circuit court's judgment order. 
Reversed and final judgment.
 
14