Title: State ex rel. The Timken Co. v. Hammer

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. The Timken Co. v. Hammer, 95 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-1754.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. THE TIMKEN COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. HAMMER ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Timken Co. v. Hammer, 95 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-
1754.] 
Workers’ compensation — Violation of a specific safety requirement — 
Applicability of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) to straddle truck 
used to carry loads of pipe, lumber, and other long materials. 
(No. 2000-2292 — Submitted January 29, 2002 — Decided May 1, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-905. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In the early morning hours of June 3, 1995, longtime employee 
Jimmy J. Mujais, Jr., was moving steel bars with a straddle truck at the 
Gambrinus Steel Mill of his employer, the Timken Company, appellant.  A 
straddle truck is designed to carry loads of pipe, lumber, and other long materials.  
With its wide wheelbase and high clearance, it moves materials—as the name 
indicates—by straddling the material and hauling it in the large undercarriage 
located beneath the elevated cab. 
{¶2} 
On this particular vehicle—the number 40 Hyster—the cab was on 
the right side.  There was a mirror on the cab’s left side, but not the right.  
Claimant’s right-side view was further obstructed by Timken’s addition of parts 
to the vehicle’s right side. 
{¶3} 
Shortly after 6:00 a.m., Mujais was moving steel from the plant to 
an outdoor location.  He was moving approximately three to four miles an hour as 
he neared the door.  As he approached, he noticed two men to his right.  As he 
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made the right turn through the door, his view on that side was blocked by the 
parts added and he lost sight of the men.  He completed the turn only to be 
flagged down by a frantic coworker who told him that he had just run over 
someone. 
{¶4} 
Fellow employee Carl W. Hammer died of injuries received in that 
accident.  After a workers’ compensation claim was allowed, his widow, Mabel, 
appellee-claimant herein, sought an additional award, alleging that Timken had 
committed several violations of specific safety requirements (“VSSR”).  On 
January 5, 1998, appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio, through a staff hearing 
officer (“SHO”), granted the application. 
{¶5} 
Timken successfully moved for rehearing based on newly obtained 
evidence.  The second hearing occurred on January 25, 1999, and in a nine-page, 
single-spaced order, a second SHO found a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-
5-13(F)(1)(d), which reads: 
{¶6} 
“(F)  Powered industrial trucks. 
{¶7} 
“(1) General requirements. 
{¶8} 
“* * * 
{¶9} 
“(d) Trucks shall not be altered so that the relative positions of the 
various parts are different from what they were when originally received from the 
manufacturer, nor shall they be altered either by the addition of extra parts not 
provided by the manufacturer or by the elimination of any parts, except as 
provided in paragraph (F)(1)(e) of this rule.  Additional counterweighting of fork 
trucks shall not be done unless authorized by the truck manufacturer.” 
{¶10} In great detail, the SHO addressed the two primary issues 
presented—the applicability of the specific safety requirement and the causal 
relation between the undisputed alterations and the fatal accident.  The 
applicability of the rule was in dispute because of the absence of a definition 
within the Ohio Adm.Code for “powered industrial truck.”  As a result, Timken 
January Term, 2002 
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argued that (1) Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F) applied exclusively to forklifts; 
(2) absent an Ohio Adm.Code definition, the commission was required to use the 
definition supplied by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (“ASME”), 
which, according to Timken, excluded a straddle truck from its definition of 
“powered industrial truck”; and (3) the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) did not consider the straddle truck to be a powered 
industrial truck. 
{¶11} The commission rejected each contention.  Addressing Timken’s 
initial argument, the commission wrote: 
{¶12} “If the Industrial Commission had intended to limit 4121:1-5-13(F) 
only to ‘forklifts’ then the section would be entitled ‘forklifts’ and not ‘powered 
industrial trucks.’  One should note that sections preceding subsection (F) and 
those subsequent to it list different types of vehicles.  For instance, subsection (C) 
is entitled ‘general requirements for motor vehicles and mobile mechanized 
equipment[.]’  Subsection (D) refers to haulage vehicles and high lift rider trucks.  
Subsection (E) is entitled to ‘Motor vehicles used to transport employees.’  While 
the employer is correct in pointing out that 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) contains a 
specific reference to ‘fork trucks,’ the Staff Hearing Officer rejects the employer’s 
contention that the reference to ‘fork trucks’ means that this particular subsection 
applies exclusively to ‘fork trucks.’  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the 
reference to ‘fork trucks’ is meant to be included in the general category of 
‘Powered Industrial Trucks,’ given the fact the section is not entitled ‘fork trucks’ 
or ‘forklifts.’  It is reasonable to assume that due to this detailed list of coverage 
had the drafters of this rule intended 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) to apply only to 
forklifts it would have so stated.” 
{¶13} As to Timken’s second argument, the commission rejected the 
assertion that it was required to use the ASME definition.  Even if it were to use 
the definition, the commission rejected as conclusory and without foundation 
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testimony from a Timken witness that indicated that a straddle truck was excluded 
from the ASME definition.  To the contrary, it concluded: 
{¶14} “It should be noted that Section B56-1-1993 entitled ‘Safety 
Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks Appendix,’ on page 49 contains 
definitions of ‘forklift’ and ‘powered industrial truck.’  The definitions are as 
follows: 
{¶15} “ ‘Truck-forklift—a self loading truck, equipped with load carriage 
and forks for transporting and tiering loads.’ 
{¶16} “ ‘Truck-powered industrial—a mobile power propelled truck used 
to carry, push, pull, lift, stack or tier material.’ 
{¶17} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds the fact that ASME provided two 
different definitions for ‘forklift’ and ‘powered industrial truck’ defeats the 
employer’s earlier argument that ‘powered industrial truck’ is limited to ‘forklift 
truck.’  It appears that powered industrial trucks were meant to cover a much 
broader spectrum of vehicles than forklifts.  On file is page 26 of an industry 
instruction manual (chapter six-powered industrial trucks) which devotes an 
inclusionary section to ‘straddle trucks.’  P. 229 of that same manual indicates 
that a straddle truck is an industrial truck used to lift and carry large loads.  The 
Staff Hearing Officer finds that ‘straddle truck’ fits within the definition of a 
‘powered industrial truck’ since it is a ‘mobile powered propelled truck used to 
carry, push, pull, lift, stack or tier material.’ 
{¶18} “* * * 
{¶19} “* * * [T]he Staff Hearing Officer further notes that the ASME 
B56.1 Standard cited by the employer’s counsel would not apply to the Hyster 
straddle truck because the straddle truck has a 60,000 pound capacity (per the 
11/14/1997 affidavit of Robert D. Newman) and the ASME B.56.1 ‘scope’ 
section states that the scope of ASME 56.1 only applies to powered industrial 
trucks with a capacity up to 22,000 capacity.” 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶20} A second ASME description was also discarded: 
{¶21} “The employer further relies on ASME interpretation 1-28 for its 
proposition that the straddle truck in question is not a ‘powered industrial truck.’ 
{¶22} “This interpretation provides in part: 
{¶23} “ ‘Question:  What ASME or ANSI standards would apply to a 
machine that fits the following description? 
{¶24} “ ‘The machine is used for moving containers between railroad 
flatbeds[,] trailer trucks, and flatbed trailer trucks where these large containers 
are moved by rail and then by truck.  The function of this piece of equipment is to 
lift and move containers approximately 35 to 40 feet in length between flatbed 
railroad cars and flatbed trailer trucks.  These containers are quite heavy, 
weighing between 60,000 and 70,000 pounds. 
{¶25} “ ‘This piece of equipment is powered by a diesel engine.  It has 
hydraulic cylinders to operate the arms that lift and lower the containers.  The 
containers are either lifted by attachments to the top of the container or lifted by 
hanging hooks that connect to the underside of the containers. 
{¶26} “ ‘The containers, once attached to the machine, are lifted only 
about 5 ft. normally.  This piece of equipment can travel at a speed of 
approximately 15 mph and is not normally used on highways but is used on 
railroad transfer cars. 
{¶27} “ ‘Reply:  It appears that the piece of equipment described above is 
a type of straddle carrier or van container handler.  Neither of these types of 
vehicles is covered by the B56 Standards and we are not aware of any other 
standards that would apply.’ ” 
{¶28} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds the employer’s reliance on this 
interpretation to be misplaced.  The straddle truck that the employer uses carries 
large sections of steel, not containers.  It carries its load on internal lifting shoes 
and guides rather than cables.  See the Specification Sheet, dated October 1994, 
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for the straddle truck.  The Staff Hearing Officer also finds that Interpretation 1-
28 only applies to a container carrier capable of moving containers that are 35-40 
feet long.  The straddle truck in question is only 20 feet long.”  (Emphasis added 
by SHO.) 
{¶29} Turning finally to Timken’s OSHA assertion, the commission 
found: 
{¶30} “Lastly, the employer asserts, as one of its defenses, that the 
Industrial Commission should rely upon the outcome of the OSHA investigation 
with regard to the classification of the Hyster straddle at issue herein.  It should be 
noted that OSHA initially issued two citations and levied a fine of $10,000.  It 
appears that the OSHA citations were based upon a finding that the straddle truck 
in question was a ‘powered industrial truck.’  The employer asserted, on several 
occasions, the OSHA citation was vacated because OSHA conceded that the 
Hyster straddle truck was not a powered industrial truck.  * * * 
{¶31} “* * * 
{¶32} “* * * The Staff Hearing Officer finds this assertion to be 
disturbing for the simple reason that it is, at best, false, and, at worst, intentionally 
misleading.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that OSHA has never vacated the 
aforementioned citations based upon a finding that the straddle truck was not a 
powered industrial truck.  * * * [T]he citations were vacated for an entirely 
different reason.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶33} Having found that the rule applied to the straddle lift and that it 
was violated by the undisputed modification of the straddle truck, the commission 
turned to proximate cause.  Based on the testimony of driver Jimmy Mujais, the 
commission indeed found the requisite connection between the violation and the 
death, and ordered the maximum award.  Reconsideration was denied. 
{¶34} Timken petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County to 
issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order.  The court 
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of appeals rejected each of Timken’s arguments and denied the writ, prompting 
this appeal as of right. 
{¶35} All agree that the straddle truck had been altered.  Timken 
challenges the specific safety requirement’s applicability to the straddle truck and, 
alternatively, the finding of proximate causation.  Both objections lack merit. 
{¶36} As to the former, Timken makes two arguments.  Absent an Ohio 
Adm.Code definition for “powered industrial truck,” the commission, according 
to Timken, was compelled to accept ASME’s definition.  This is false.  Where a 
relevant term is left undefined by the safety code, its interpretation rests solely 
with the commission.  While the commission may rely on an outside definition, it 
is not required to do so.  State ex rel. Go-Jo Industries v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 529, 534, 700 N.E.2d 1264.  In the commission’s excellent order, as 
quoted earlier, the commission set forth the reasoning it used to determine that the 
straddle truck was a “powered industrial truck.”  It also went a step further in 
painstakingly explaining why it considered Timken’s interpretation and 
counterarguments unpersuasive.  No more is required. 
{¶37} Timken also argues that the points it raised created a reasonable 
doubt as to the regulation’s applicability and, in so doing, required the 
commission to interpret the rule in favor of the employer.  Timken states a correct 
proposition of law that does not apply here.  Because an award for a VSSR is a 
penalty, all reasonable doubts as to applicability must indeed be resolved in the 
employer’s favor.  State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 
170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216.  Timken, however, incorrectly presupposes that the 
introduction of any counterargument or contrary interpretation automatically 
raises a reasonable doubt as to interpretation.  This obviously is not so.  In this 
case, the commission found that Timken’s arguments lacked merit and did not, 
therefore, raise any doubt as to the applicability of the code section.  Accordingly, 
this contention, too, is rejected. 
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{¶38} Timken’s remaining propositions assume that the specific safety 
requirement is applicable.  It initially argues that (F)(1)(d)’s prohibitions are so 
vague as to offend due process.  Specifically, Timken argues that nothing in the 
specific safety requirement addresses line-of-sight hazards and that the rule 
therefore “fails to plainly apprise relator of its legal obligation, to wit, that it must 
protect its employees against whatever dangers may be posed by a partially 
obstructed line of sight.” 
{¶39} This assertion is meritless.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(1)(d) 
clearly prohibits the addition of any extra parts except as provided in section 
(F)(1)(e).  Timken’s additions did not fall under (F)(1)(e), so Timken was on clear 
notice that its alteration violated the specific safety requirement.  It does not 
matter that the hazard posed was not enumerated.  What matters is that the 
proscribed conduct was clearly set forth—i.e., acceptable alterations were 
enumerated and Timken’s was not among them. 
{¶40} Finally, Timken contests the finding of a causal relation between 
the alterations and the accident.  Its argument is based on the fact that no one 
could actually explain how the decedent happened into the path of a straddle 
truck.  That is immaterial.  As stated by the commission, the straddle truck’s 
driver testified that the added equipment caused him to lose sight of the decedent.  
Certainly, the commission was entitled to infer that had the driver been able to see 
the decedent, he would have made an effort to avoid him.  It was not, therefore, an 
abuse of discretion to conclude that the driver’s inability to see the decedent—
which was caused by Timken’s add-on equipment—resulted in the accident. 
{¶41} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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January Term, 2002 
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Day, Ketterer, Raley, Wright & Rybolt, Ltd., Darrell N. Markijohn and 
Stephen E. Matasich, for appellant. 
 
William F. Mikesell, for appellee Mabel Hammer. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
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