Title: State ex rel. Fenley v. Kyger

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO                               
     The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of                      
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,                      
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice                   
Thomas J. Moyer.                                                                 
     Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's                   
Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Attention:  Walter S.                      
Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative                         
Assistant.  Tel.:  (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010.                       
Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome.                            
     NOTE:  Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the                  
full texts of the opinions after they have been released                         
electronically to the public.  The reader is therefore advised                   
to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West                       
Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.                     
The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume                    
and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound                   
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.                                            
                                                                                 
The State ex rel. Fenley v. Kyger et al.                                         
[Cite as State ex rel. Fenley v. Kyger (1995),             Ohio                  
St.3d          .]                                                                
Mandamus to compel members of Oxford City Council to hold only                   
     open meetings and discontinue practice of conducting                        
     closed executive sessions -- Writ granted, when.                            
     (No. 94-2429 -- Submitted March 7, 1995 -- Decided May 10,                  
1995.)                                                                           
     In Mandamus.                                                                
     Relator, Joseph J. Fenley, a Miami University journalism                    
professor, in the company of his students, frequently attends                    
meetings held by respondents, members of Oxford City Council,                    
to allow his students to observe local government as issues of                   
public interest are discussed.  On October 4, 1994, respondents                  
held a regularly scheduled council meeting.  The printed agenda                  
for the meeting included provisions for two executive sessions,                  
one near the beginning of the meeting and one near its                           
conclusion.  Executive sessions were regularly scheduled for                     
each council meeting.  Council routinely adjourned its meetings                  
to conduct executive sessions from which the public and media                    
were excluded.                                                                   
     At the October 4, 1994 council meeting, relator advised                     
respondents that he believed that the council practice of                        
conducting private, executive sessions violated the open                         
meetings provision of the Oxford City Charter.  Respondents                      
instructed Stephan McHugh, the Oxford Law Director, to study                     
the issue and report his recommendations to council.  Later                      
during the October 4 meeting, respondents voted to adjourn the                   
meeting and hold an executive session, from which the public                     
and media were barred.                                                           
     At council's regularly scheduled meeting on October 18,                     
1994, McHugh advised council that the charter precluded                          
executive sessions and that he felt that executive sessions                      
could only be held for those matters involving attorney-client                   
privilege.  McHugh further suggested that a charter review                       
committee be established to consider a charter amendment                         
concerning the executive session issue.  Council defeated a                      
proposal to discontinue executive sessions, but did not hold an                  
executive session at the October 18 meeting.                                     
     The proposed agenda for council's November 1, 1994 meeting                  
contained a scheduled "Conference with Attorney" in the place                    
normally reserved for "Executive Session."  At  the November 1                   
meeting, respondents, with one member absent, voted to                           
substitute the phrase "Executive Session" for "Conference with                   
Attorney" on the printed agenda.  Respondents later adjourned                    
to an executive session for the specified purpose of                             
"conferring with our attorney about current litigation."                         
     Fenley filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus                         
compelling respondents to comply with the Oxford City Charter                    
by holding only open meetings, i.e., discontinuing its practice                  
of conducting executive sessions.  After respondents answered,                   
we granted an alternative writ, and the parties filed evidence                   
and briefs.                                                                      
                                                                                 
     Joseph J. Fenley, pro se.                                                   
     Altick & Corwin, Phillip B. Herron and Stephen M. McHugh,                   
for respondents.                                                                 
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  In order to be entitled to a writ of                           
mandamus, Fenley must establish a clear legal right to open                      
council meetings, a clear legal duty on the part of respondents                  
to provide open council meetings, and the lack of an adequate                    
remedy at law.  State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70                     
Ohio St.3d 65, 637 N.E.2d 1.                                                     
     Initially, relator notes that respondents have                              
"temporarily discontinued holding executive sessions."                           
However, although a case may be moot, a court may decide the                     
issues raised where they are capable of repetition, yet evading                  
review.  State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.                          
Donaldson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 173, 175, 586 N.E.2d 101, 102.                   
Since council meetings normally adjourn prior to the practice                    
of exclusion of the press and public being subjected to                          
judicial scrutiny, these cases are often technically moot.                       
State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Barnes (1988), 38                   
Ohio St.3d 165, 166, 527 N.E.2d 807, 809.  However, because of                   
the important issues concerning public rights, they are capable                  
of repetition, yet evading review.  Id.  Additionally, absent a                  
writ, it is evident that respondents will continue conducting                    
executive sessions, at least insofar as those sessions relate                    
to attorney-client matters.  Further, respondents agree that                     
this case should not be dismissed as moot.  Therefore, we                        
proceed to review the case on the merits.                                        
     As to Fenley's asserted clear legal right to open meetings                  
and respondents' clear legal duty to provide them, the Home                      
Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution governs the respective                   
roles of the state and its municipalities.  Section 3, Article                   
XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  "In matters of local                                  
self-government, if a portion of a municipal charter expressly                   
conflicts with parallel state law, the charter provisions will                   
prevail."  State ex rel. Lightfield v. Indian Hill (1994), 69                    
Ohio St.3d 441, 442, 633 N.E.2d 524, 526; Sections 3 and 7,                      
Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.                                                
     Section 2.06 of the Oxford City Charter provides that                       
regular meetings of council "shall be held as prescribed in the                  
Council rules, but not less frequently than twice each month"                    
and that "[a]ll meetings of Council shall be open to the                         
public."  The charter contains no exception to the                               
open-meetings requirement and  provides further in Section 1.03                  
that "[a]ll powers of the corporation shall be exercised in the                  
manner prescribed by this charter[.]"                                            
     Although the Oxford City Charter does not define                            
"meetings," we have defined similar language in city charters                    
as meaning "any assemblage of the city council or its                            
committees where a majority of members constituting the body                     
are in attendance and the gathering is arranged for the purpose                  
of discussing public business."  (Emphasis sic.)  Barnes,                        
supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Since private,                       
executive sessions are not authorized by the charter, they do                    
not constitute exceptions from the charter provision requiring                   
open meetings.  State ex rel. Craft v. Schisler (1988), 40 Ohio                  
St.3d 149, 150,  532 N.E.2d 719, 721.                                            
     Although R.C. 121.22, Ohio's sunshine law,  provides                        
several exceptions to the general requirement of open meetings                   
by allowing executive sessions in certain circumstances, R.C.                    
121.22 is not applicable where the charter supersedes it.  See                   
Fox v. Lakewood (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 528 N.E.2d 1254,                   
1257; 1 Gotherman & Babbit, Ohio Municipal Law (2 Ed.                            
Supp.1994) 9-10, Section 6.08(A).  Similarly, although Section                   
111.05 of the Oxford Administrative Code provides for                            
"authorized executive sessions" and states that council shall                    
comply with R.C. 121.22, the ordinance conflicts with the                        
charter and is ineffective.  Fox, supra.                                         
     Respondents concede that closed executive sessions are                      
generally prohibited by the Oxford City Charter open-meetings                    
provision.  Nevertheless, they urge this court to recognize the                  
common-law and statutory attorney-client privileges as                           
exceptions to the charter provision.  R.C. 121.22(G)(3) and (5)                  
recognize exceptions to the sunshine law for certain                             
attorney-client privilege matters.  However, R.C. 121.22 is                      
inapplicable here, since the charter requirement that council                    
meetings "shall be open to the public" prohibits any meeting,                    
regardless of its purpose, from being private.  Craft, Fox, and                  
Barnes, supra.1    City council is free to propose a charter                     
amendment providing for closed executive sessions concerning                     
attorney-client privilege and other matters.  See Craft and                      
Barnes, supra.                                                                   
     Accordingly, Fenley is granted a writ of mandamus ordering                  
respondents to open all of the council meetings, as required by                  
the Oxford City Charter.  This conclusion renders it                             
unnecessary to reach the state constitutional claim raised by                    
Fenley.  Barnes, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d at 167, 527 N.E.2d at                      
810; Fox, supra, 39 Ohio St.3d at 22; 528 N.E.2d at 1257.                        
                                     Writ granted.                               
     Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney,                        
Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.                                                   
                                                                                 
FOOTNOTE:                                                                        
     1   Assuming, arguendo, that R.C. 121.22 applied here,                      
council's apparent long-standing practice of scheduling                          
executive sessions as a regular part of each meeting would not                   
per se validate the executive sessions.  Council would still be                  
required to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 121.22(G) in order                  
to hold private executive sessions.  In other  words, an                         
executive session could only be held following a roll call vote                  
by a majority of a quorum of council to hold such session and a                  
specification by council on the record as to which one or more                   
of the excepted subjects set forth in R.C. 121.22(G) are to be                   
considered.  See, e.g., Vermilion Teachers' Assn. v. Vermilion                   
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Nov. 4, 1994), Erie App. No.                     
E-93-49, unreported,     Ohio App.3d    ,     N.E.2d.