Title: HARDING v. GLATTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HARDING v. GLATTER 2002 WY 12453 P.3d 538Case Number: 01-47Decided: 08/26/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

NEVINS 
HARDING,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

GEORGE 
THOMAS GLATTER and

JOANNE 
R. GLATTER,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ernest 
A. Roybal, Roybal Law Office, Cody, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Colin 
M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Nevins 
Harding appeals a judgment entered against him in a contract action.  George and Joanne Glatter argue that the 
appeal was not filed timely, leaving this Court without jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.  We agree with the Glatters 
and dismiss the appeal.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Harding 
presents these issues:

 

1.         
Whether the Appellees met their Prima Facie burden of clearly 
establishing that there was no issue of material fact involved as to whether the 
Appellant made telephone calls to the Internal Revenue Service in Worland, 
Wyoming and Ogden, Utah on the telephone of R.M. Harding in January and February 
of 1996.

 

2.         
Whether, if the Appellees made a Prima Facie showing that no genuine 
issue of the [sic] material fact existed concerning who made the mentioned 
telephone calls and what was discussed, did Appellant meet his burden of 
demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact did 
exist.

 

3.         
Whether the Trial Court erred in entering summary judgment because the 
evidence of the parties sets forth conflicting facts and resolution of the 
issues depends, at least in part, on the credibility of the 
witnesses.

 

4.         
Whether Summary Judgment is precluded due to the fact that contradictory 
inferences can be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts.

 

5.         
Whether the "Liquidated damages" clause of the Agreement is punitive in 
nature and, therefore, unenforceable as against the 
Appellant.

 

The 
Glatters present the issues as follows:

 

1.         
Was the Notice of Appeal untimely under Rules 1.03 and 2.07(a), W.R.A.P. 
so as to deny this Court jurisdiction over the issues raised by 
Appellant?

 

2.         
Has Appellant failed to adequately supply this Court with a record of the 
proceedings below so as to preclude a review of the lower court's 
decision?

 

3.         
Did the trial court properly grant Appellees' summary judgment on their 
claim that Appellant violated the parties' "confidentiality 
agreement"?

 

4.         
Did Appellant waive any right to assert that the liquidated damages 
provision of the confidentiality agreement was a penalty provision by failing to 
raise this argument in the trial court?

 

5.         
Is the liquidated damages provision of the Parties' agreement valid and 
enforceable?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
The 
parties to this appeal have been involved in previous litigation against each 
other.  The previous litigation 
culminated in a settlement agreement that contained several confidentiality 
provisions.  The Glatters brought 
the instant action alleging several causes of action all stemming from their 
claim that Harding violated a confidentiality provision.  The Glatters alleged, among other 
things, that they were entitled to damages pursuant to a liquidated damages 
clause in the settlement agreement.  
Harding answered and asserted several counterclaims against the 
Glatters.  

 

[¶4]           
A 
partial summary judgment was entered in November 1999 against Harding awarding 
damages to the Glatters pursuant to the liquidated damages clause.  The Glatters immediately filed a precipe 
for a writ of attachment and a precipe for a writ of execution.  The Glatters seized several horses, 
which prompted a motion to intervene from Cheri Bischoff.  Bischoff claimed she owned the horses 
seized by the Glatters.  Bischoff 
was allowed to intervene and the action proceeded based upon the initial 
complaint and counterclaims, and on Bischoff's "Petition to Quash the Writ of 
Execution and for Return of Property Wrongfully Seized" (Intervenor's Petition). 

 

[¶5]           
In 
November 2000, all remaining claims and counterclaims from the initial complaint 
and answer were dismissed.  On 
December 4, 2000, an "Order and Judgment" was entered disposing of all issues 
related to the Intervenor's Petition.  
On December 5, 2000, Harding, invoking W.R.C.P. 54(b), filed a "Motion 
for Entry of Final Judgment on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Claims and 
Counterclaims."  A "Final Judgment 
on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Claims and Counterclaims" was entered pursuant to 
Harding's motion on January 25, 2001 (Final Judgment).  Harding filed his notice of appeal on 
February 23, 2001, appealing the grant of partial summary judgment against 
him.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]           
The 
Glatters have questioned the jurisdiction of this Court to hear this appeal, 
claiming that the notice of appeal was not timely filed.  A notice of appeal must be filed "within 
thirty days from entry of the appealable order."  W.R.A.P. 2.01(a).  Failure to timely file a notice of 
appeal robs this Court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  W.R.A.P. 1.03.  The order being appealed from in this 
case is the order granting partial summary judgment against Harding entered in 
November 1999.  The central question 
we must answer is when did that order become appealable, thus triggering the 
running of the thirty-day time limit in which to file a notice of 
appeal.

 

[¶7]           
The 
order granting partial summary judgment was interlocutory and initially was not 
certified as appealable pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).1  Without such a certification, the order 
on the partial summary judgment was "subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties."  W.R.C.P. 
54(b).  The corollary of this rule 
is that, barring certification pursuant to Rule 54(b), all interlocutory orders 
become final and appealable once all the substantive claims of all the parties 
have been finally adjudicated and nothing is left for future consideration by 
the district court.

 

[¶8]           
The 
Glatters argue that there were no further issues outstanding between any of the 
parties as of the December 4 order.  
If this is true, then as of December 4, the litigation was ended.  All prior interlocutory orders became 
appealable as of December 4, 2000.  
Rule 54(b) no longer had any application to the case since all claims 
against all parties had been adjudicated.  
Thus, Harding's December 5 motion and the ensuing judgment entered were 
not only unnecessary, they were unauthorized under the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The motion and judgment 
were, in effect, nullities and had no affect on the time for filing a notice of 
appeal.  Harding's notice of appeal, 
filed in February 2001, was untimely, and this Court has no jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal.

 

[¶9]           
Harding 
does not seem to dispute that all issues as to all parties were determined as of 
the December 4 order.  Harding did 
not brief the issue.  His only 
statement on the issue came at oral argument when his attorney protested that he 
had never seen the December 4 order.  
Harding's attorney commented: "had I known about the other order, I would 
have simply relied on that order as the date when the final judgment was 
entered."  Given this concession, 
the only potential argument that might exist would stem from the statement at 
oral argument from Harding's attorney that Harding was unaware of the December 4 
order.  Obviously, however, we are 
given no cogent argument or pertinent authority as to how Harding's being 
unaware of the December 4 order affects the question of the timely filing of his 
notice of appeal.  We therefore 
refuse to consider any such potential argument.  VJL v. RED, 2002 WY 25, ¶¶20, 21, 
22, 39 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Wyo. 2002) (declining to address an issue unsupported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority).  
Given the state of the record and arguments before us, we determine that 
the order granting partial summary judgment against Harding became appealable on 
December 4, 2000.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶10]      
Pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 2.01(a), an appeal must be taken within thirty days from the entry 
of an appealable order.  Failure to 
timely file a notice of appeal constitutes a jurisdictional bar to appellate 
review.  W.R.A.P. 1.03.  The December 4, 2000, order, taken in 
conjunction with the previous orders in the case, constituted a complete 
adjudication of the rights and liabilities of all parties to the action.  The order granting partial summary 
judgment against Harding thus became appealable as of December 4, 2000.  Harding did not file his notice of 
appeal until February 23, 2001.  
This appeal is untimely and is therefore dismissed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1In fact, Harding attempted to appeal the order granting the partial 
summary judgment upon its initial entry but the appeal was dismissed without 
prejudice upon Harding's motion.