Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11671 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARQUISE BROWN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 12, 2016. - June 17, 2016. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of 
constitutional rights, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Hearsay, Common criminal enterprise, Joint 
enterprise, Telephone conversation, Relevancy and 
materiality.  Joint Enterprise.  Telephone.  Imprisonment, 
Inmate telephone calls.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Instructions to jury, Request for jury 
instructions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 6, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John T. 
Lu, J., and the cases were tried before Kimberly S. Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Gail S. Strassfeld for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney 
(Christopher M. Tarrant, Assistant District Attorney, with him) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant, Marquise Brown, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He also was 
convicted of illegally carrying a firearm, illegal possession of 
a loaded firearm, and illegal possession of ammunition.  On 
appeal the defendant asserts error in (1) the denial of his 
motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the theory of 
murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) the denial of his 
motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the admission 
in evidence of accusations by police during the interrogations 
of the defendant; (4) the admission of a statement of the 
codefendant1 under the joint venture exception to the hearsay 
rule; (5) the admission of recorded jailhouse telephone calls; 
(6) jury instructions on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty; and (7) jury instructions that precluded the jury from 
considering the defendant's youth as to various issues.  The 
defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the various 
errors requires a new trial, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
We affirm the convictions and decline to exercise our powers 
under § 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  Other details are reserved for discussion of specific 
                     
 
1 Yessling Gonzalez, the codefendant, was tried separately. 
3 
 
issues.  On the evening of June 19, 2009, the defendant, 
Yessling Gonzalez, and the victim, all friends, attended a party 
in an apartment complex in Marlborough.  The party ended after a 
neighbor complained about the noise.  One of the partygoers, 
Melody Downer, invited people, including the defendant and the 
victim, to her apartment, which was nearby.  While at Downer's 
apartment, the defendant placed his money and marijuana on a 
table.  Downer took the money, and Gus Landrum took the 
marijuana.  The defendant, however, believed the victim had 
stolen the items.  Later that night, at the apartment of another 
friend, the defendant accused the victim of stealing his money 
and his marijuana.  The two men, both age seventeen at the time, 
fought.  The altercation moved through the hallways of two 
separate floors of the building, and attracted many onlookers.  
The victim got the better of the defendant.  The victim then 
left, and the defendant's friends had to restrain the defendant 
to keep him from following the victim.  The defendant was angry 
and threatened to kill the victim, adding that he "didn't care 
if he spent the rest of his life in jail." 
 
At about 1:30 P.M. the next day, June 20, the defendant and 
Gonzalez returned to the Marlborough apartment complex with the 
defendant's girl friend and some friends after going to lunch.  
Thereafter, the defendant, Gonzalez, and the victim traveled 
together in Gonzalez's silver Volvo station wagon to Callahan 
4 
 
State Park in Framingham.  Surveillance photographs showed the 
Volvo and three occupants at 1:41 P.M. heading toward the park.  
Two men who had been mountain biking in the park saw the Volvo 
enter the parking lot at the park.  They described for police 
the three occupants, and a distinctive feature of the Volvo.  
Their descriptions generally matched the features and clothing 
worn by the defendant, Gonzalez, and the victim.  The defendant, 
Gonzalez, and the victim approached the entrance to a trail as 
the two mountain bikers left the parking lot.  The three men 
appeared friendly toward each other. 
 
At approximately that time an employee at a nearby farm 
heard two or three gunshots.  At 2:01 P.M. the Volvo appeared on 
a surveillance recording traveling away from the park with only 
two occupants.  Minutes later a hiker discovered the victim's 
body on a trail.  A bandana similar to one worn by Gonzalez was 
found on the trail between the victim's body and the parking 
lot.  The victim sustained two gunshot wounds.  The first was 
fired from behind, penetrating the right thigh, scrotum, and 
left thigh.  The second and fatal shot entered the front of the 
victim's chest and perforated his heart and left lung.  Gunshot 
residue on the victim's shirt indicated the second shot was 
fired from between three to five feet.  The trajectory of the 
second shot, together with abrasions on the victim's right knee, 
5 
 
suggested the victim was on his knees when the second shot was 
fired.  The murder weapon never was recovered. 
 
In recorded telephone calls from the jail where the 
defendant was being held pending trial, the defendant admitted 
to his grandmother that he was present during the killing, and 
that he knew who did it.  He told his grandmother during a 
subsequent call that "the devil was in me . . . [and] told me to 
get in [Gonzalez's] car."  In another telephone call the 
defendant told his girl friend that Gonzalez was the shooter. 
 
2.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant asserts 
error in the denial of his motion for a required finding of not 
guilty as to the theory of murder by extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  In particular, he maintains that the Commonwealth 
failed to present evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
any of the Cunneen factors had been established.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  He focuses 
on the factor that the killer took pleasure in, or was 
indifferent to, the victim's suffering.  Id.  When deciding 
whether a judge erred in denying a motion for a required finding 
of not guilty, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, and we ask if any rational trier of fact 
could have found that the requisite elements of the crime had 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). 
6 
 
 
Notwithstanding the defendant's contention that the medical 
examiner could not determine the order of the two gunshots, and 
her testimony that a gunshot wound to the chest could have 
produced death "instantaneous[ly]," the medical examiner 
testified that her "best estimate" was that the victim lived 
"minutes" after being shot in the chest.  This was supported by 
her testimony that the gunshot wound to the chest caused 
approximately three liters of blood to flow into the victim's 
chest cavity.  A jury could have inferred that death occurred 
minutes after the victim was shot in the chest. 
 
With respect to the order of the gunshots, a jury could 
have found that the first shot passed completely through the 
victim's thighs and scrotum while he was standing.  That bullet 
traveled at a slightly downward angle, or nearly parallel to the 
ground, which could explain why it was never found despite 
efforts through the use of a metal detector to locate it.  The 
medical examiner testified that the bullet that passed through 
the victim's scrotum likely would have been painful.  A jury 
also could have found that the victim then fell to his knees, 
bruising them, and that the defendant circled around the victim, 
looked him in the face, and fired the second bullet at close 
range into his chest. 
 
From this evidence, and from the evidence that the 
defendant was angry at the victim for beating him the day 
7 
 
before, the evidence of the defendant's threats to kill the 
victim even if it meant spending the rest of his life in prison, 
and the permissible inference that the defendant lured the 
victim to the park as a symbol of their restored friendship, the 
jury could have found that the defendant took pleasure in, or 
was indifferent to, the victim's suffering.  See Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 202 (2005) (jury could have found 
defendant was indifferent to victim's suffering based on 
inference that victim was kneeling and terrified by knowledge of 
what was coming before defendant shot him in face).  The jury 
also could have found that the victim was conscious of his 
suffering.  Thus, a jury could have found that the Commonwealth 
had established two of the Cunneen factors (only one is needed) 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 546 (2010) (one or 
more Cunneen factor must be proved).  There was no error in the 
denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty. 
 
3.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant asserts error in the 
denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police on 
June 21 and June 23, 2009.  He argues that he was in custody 
both times, and the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he validly waived his Miranda rights and 
that his statements were made voluntarily.  When reviewing the 
8 
 
denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e accept the judge's 
subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an 
independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of 
law."  Commonwealth v. Jiminez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002).  The 
defendant's focus is on the involuntariness of the Miranda 
waiver and the involuntariness of his statements.  The burden is 
on the Commonwealth to establish "beyond a reasonable doubt, in 
the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant's [Miranda] 
waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that his 
statements were voluntary."  Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass. 
348, 353 (2005).  We summarize the facts found by the motion 
judge. 
 
Early in the investigation police learned that the 
defendant and the victim had been involved in a fight on 
June 19, and that the defendant had accused the victim of 
stealing his marijuana and his cash.  Police obtained a video 
surveillance recording from the New England Primate Center, 
located close to where the victim's body was found.  The 
recording showed two vehicles, one, a silver Volvo, traveling to 
and from the vicinity of the shooting, before and after the time 
that the sound of gunshots had been reported to police.  On June 
21, two plainclothes detectives went to the apartment where the 
defendant was living.  The defendant answered the door.  He had 
a black eye, and explained that he received it in a fight.  The 
9 
 
detectives asked if they could enter, and the defendant obliged.  
There were two other adults, including Gonzalez, and three 
children in the apartment.  One of the detectives spoke to the 
defendant, who appeared to understand what the detective was 
saying.  He did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, and he agreed to go to the police station to speak to 
police.  He left with two other police officers who had arrived, 
and he did not appear unsteady on his feet or demonstrate any 
difficulty walking. 
 
One of the two detectives who originally arrived at the 
apartment remained.  He spoke to Gonzalez, asking for some 
identification.  Gonzalez said it was in his vehicle.  When they 
went to Gonzalez's vehicle, police noted that it was a Volvo 
station wagon.  He gave police some information as to his 
whereabouts at the time police believed the shooting took place. 
 
In the meantime, the defendant was en route to the 
Framingham police station in an unmarked police vehicle.  When 
they were a few blocks from the police station the defendant 
said he had to urinate very badly.  As they pulled up to the 
"side of the road" the defendant urinated in his pants.2  The 
                     
 
2 The defendant contests this finding, arguing that no 
officer testified to this.  The judge's finding appears to be 
clearly erroneous, as the officer on which this finding was 
based testified that this happened as they were "pulling into 
the side road that leads to the . . . side entrance [of the 
police station]" (emphases added).  However, the import of the 
10 
 
motion judge found that "[h]e urinated in his pants because he 
had to urinate very badly, and because he was very upset, 
although not visibly so, about being questioned about the 
killing of [the victim]."  Once at the station the officers 
brought the defendant to a bathroom, where he cleaned himself. 
 
At approximately 5 P.M. the defendant was brought to an 
interview room where he was advised of his right to have the 
interview tape recorded.  He declined in writing to have the 
interview recorded.  He was advised of the Miranda rights, and 
he was told that he could stop the interview at any time.  The 
defendant, who had prior experience with the criminal justice 
system -- having been previously arrested and prosecuted as a 
juvenile -- indicated he understood his rights and that he was 
willing to be interviewed. 
 
The interview lasted approximately one hour.  The defendant 
was "outwardly affable and cooperative although in emotional 
turmoil:  he was appropriately upset about being questioned 
about the killing."  The two police officers who interviewed him 
were not armed, having locked up their weapons earlier.  The 
defendant took three bathroom breaks and one cigarette break 
during the interview.  He denied being present when the victim 
                                                                  
judge's finding appears to be unaffected by this minor error.  
The uncontroverted testimony suggests that this occurred when 
they were very close to the police station, where the officers 
thought he could use the bathroom. 
11 
 
was shot.  He consented to the taking of a buccal swab for 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis.  At the end of the interview he 
was driven home, which took approximately fifteen minutes. 
 
The next day, June 22, two mountain bikers came forward 
with information regarding three men in a Volvo station wagon 
who entered the park as the bikers were leaving.  This occurred 
minutes before the shooting.  One of the bikers described a 
strip of body work on the front of the Volvo that did not match 
the rest of the vehicle.  A detective drove the men to the 
parking lot where Gonzalez's Volvo was parked.  That biker 
identified the Volvo as the same one he saw on June 20 at 
Callahan State Park. 
 
On June 23 three officers went to the defendant's apartment 
to ask him to go to the police station for questioning.  The 
defendant had been sleeping, but answered the door.  He agreed 
to go to the police station with them.  They "allowed" the 
defendant to change his clothes.  The defendant appeared 
cooperative and "more awake." 
 
Upon arrival at the station, he was taken to a small 
interview room where he was advised of his Miranda rights, and 
he was told that he could stop the questioning at any time.  The 
defendant said he understood his rights, and signed a waiver of 
rights form.  He also indicated that he did not want the 
interview recorded.  Police spoke to him for about fifteen 
12 
 
minutes, and told him there were contradictions between his 
account and what other witnesses had reported.  The defendant 
yelled at police, saying he was "done talking to you guys."  The 
interview ended, and a decision was made to arrest the 
defendant.  He asked why he had been arrested.  When told that 
it was for "murder," he said, "This is bullshit.  How can you 
charge me with murder, you don't even have a gun?"  This 
occurred between approximately 6:45 and 7 P.M. 
 
We first address the question of waiver.  The defendant 
claims that the interrogations on June 21 and June 23 were 
custodial, and that he did not waive his Miranda rights 
voluntarily.  The judge concluded that neither interrogation was 
custodial.  We need not resolve the question whether the 
interrogations were custodial because the judge also found that 
the defendant waived his Miranda rights on both occasions.  The 
significance of the custodial nature of an interrogation is that 
it triggers the necessity to give the Miranda warnings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 309 (2007).  Here, the 
warnings were given prior to questioning, and the defendant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights.  The defendant challenges only the voluntariness of his 
waivers, which we now address. 
 
Relevant factors to consider when deciding if a waiver of 
Miranda rights was voluntary include, but are not limited to, 
13 
 
"promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the 
defendant's age, education, intelligence, and emotional 
stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, 
physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion 
of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or police), and the 
details of the interrogation, including the recitation of 
Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86 
(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 
(1986), S.C., 403 Mass. 93 (1988).  With respect to the June 21 
interrogation, the defendant focuses our attention on his age 
(seventeen), the officers' alleged mistreatment of him in 
refusing to stop the vehicle to allow him to urinate, and not 
asking him if he would like to change his clothes. 
 
The judge considered the defendant's youth, the fact that 
he was upset about being questioned about the killing, and that 
he had urinated in the vehicle.  He also considered the fact 
that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, that he consented to going to the police 
station to be interviewed, that he had had some experience with 
the criminal justice system as a result of a prior arrest and 
prosecution in the Juvenile Court, that he was advised prior to 
questioning that he could stop the questioning at any time, that 
he appeared affable and cooperative at all relevant times, that 
the police officers were unarmed during the interrogation, that 
14 
 
he requested and received three bathroom breaks and a cigarette 
break, that the interview lasted approximately one hour, that 
the defendant denied any involvement in the killing, and that 
the defendant said he understood his rights and agreed to speak 
with police.  Although the defendant argues that the police 
mistreated him by not stopping the vehicle to allow him to 
urinate, the judge did not find there was mistreatment.3  Rather, 
the episode could be seen as an honest misunderstanding as to 
how badly the defendant needed to relieve himself -- 
particularly where the defendant urinated in the police 
officers' vehicle.4 
 
With respect to the June 23 interview, the defendant 
focuses our attention on alleged testimony that he tried to 
consult with his mother beforehand and that his mother wanted to 
be with him.5  Because the defendant was seventeen years old at 
                     
 
3 There was testimony that they were less than two blocks 
away from the police station when the defendant first said he 
had to urinate "really bad." 
 
 
4 There was uncontroverted testimony that the defendant did 
not complain of any discomfort at any time during the 
interrogation. 
 
 
5 The record indicates that police drove the defendant and 
his mother to the police station at the request of the defendant 
or his mother.  It is not clear who made the request.  Police 
told the defendant and his mother that they wanted to interview 
the defendant alone.  There was no further discussion on the 
matter. 
 
15 
 
the time, the "interested adult rule" was not applicable.6  See 
Commonwealth v. Considine, 448 Mass. 295, 297 n.7 (2007), and 
cases cited.  The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights.  
He acknowledged that he understood them, and he signed a written 
waiver after indicating his willingness to speak to police.  The 
judge correctly concluded that, in the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights. 
 
We turn to the question of the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements.  The factors considered when determining 
whether a statement was voluntary are the same as those used to 
determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary, even 
though the inquiries are separate and distinct.  See Jackson, 
432 Mass. at 85-86.  No single factor is determinative, and a 
statement will not be deemed involuntary due to the mere 
presence of one or more of the factors.  See Commonwealth v. 
Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 664 (1995), S.C., 426 Mass. 168 (1997).  
The defendant received, understood, and waived his Miranda 
rights on June 21 and June 23 prior to making any statement.  
There is no evidence that the police had taken an aggressive 
posture during the interrogation on June 21, or that they 
                     
 
6 The "interested adult rule" arose in the common law.  See 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134 (1983).  We 
recently have modified the rule, on a prospective basis, to 
include seventeen year old persons.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 
471 Mass. 161, 166-167 (2015). 
16 
 
engaged in any trickery or deceit, or that they offered the 
defendant any promise of leniency.  See id.  The interview 
lasted approximately one hour, interspersed with three bathroom 
breaks and a cigarette break -- not a particularly lengthy 
interrogation.  There is no evidence that the defendant's will 
was overborne by the questioning.  Id. at 663.  Moreover, the 
defendant held up under the circumstances, denying any 
involvement in the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 
Mass. 42, 54 (2016).  We conclude that there was no error in the 
determination that the June 21 statement was voluntary. 
 
The June 23 interrogation was somewhat different.  Police 
had interviewed several witnesses between June 21 and June 23.  
At this second interrogation they told the defendant that 
details in his June 21 statement were inconsistent with details 
given by other witnesses, and that they had reason to believe 
that he had not been truthful with them about where he had been 
and what had occurred on June 20.  The uncontroverted evidence 
suggests that it was the defendant, and not the officers, who 
assumed an aggressive tone.  He raised his voice and repeatedly 
demanded to see the gun, and to know who had contradicted his 
account of events.  After fifteen minutes, the defendant 
terminated the interview.  There is no indication that any 
statement he made was involuntary. 
17 
 
 
Finally, after his arrest the defendant said the murder 
charge was "bullshit" because police did not "have a gun."  This 
statement was not made in response to police questioning or its 
functional equivalent, see Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 
792, 796-797 (1997), but was a spontaneous statement that did 
not require suppression.  See Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 
1, 15-16 (2000).  There was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
 
4.  Admission of accusations that defendant lied.  The 
defendant argues that accusations by police officers during the 
interrogation of June 23 that he had lied during the 
interrogation of June 21 should not have been admitted where he 
denied those accusations.  Where he denied those allegations, he 
further contends that officers testified impermissibly about 
information they obtained from witnesses and used during the 
interrogation of June 23 to bolster their accusations that he 
had lied previously on June 21, and such testimony violated his 
constitutional rights of confrontation.  The defendant is 
correct.  See Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 360-361 
(2015), and cases cited.  Because there was no objection, we 
review under the standard of a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
18 
 
 
The "information" police obtained from people they 
interviewed in the course of their investigation was not 
repeated either during the June 23 interrogation or at trial.  
Police merely told the defendant that based on the results of 
their investigation they knew he had been at Callahan State Park 
with Gonzalez on June 20, 2009.  They confronted him with their 
belief, not with the details of what specific people had told 
them, or who those people where, and that is what the jury 
heard.  At worst, the conclusory assertion that the defendant 
and Gonzalez were together at the park at the time of the 
shooting was cumulative of other testimony that was admitted 
properly.  That other testimony includes the testimony about the 
defendant's expressed intent on June 19 to kill the victim; the 
testimony of the mountain bikers who roughly described the three 
men and the Volvo at the park shortly before the killing; the 
surveillance photographs showing the Volvo and three occupants 
approaching the park and minutes later showing the Volvo and two 
occupants leaving the park; the recorded telephone calls from 
the jail in which the defendant admitted to his grandmother that 
he was present during the killing, and in which he told his girl 
friend that Gonzalez was the shooter; and the statements to 
police that implied he knew they did not have the gun used to 
kill the victim.  The jury also heard evidence about the alibi 
he had first given police during the June 21 interview.  The 
19 
 
impact of this graphic direct evidence of the defendant's 
admissions and his actions far outweigh any prejudice in the 
testimony of the police officers.  The rather bland testimony in 
question was brief, and we are satisfied that it did not likely 
influence the jury's verdict.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
 
5.  Statement of Gonzalez.  Gonzalez did not testify, but a 
statement he made to police was admitted in evidence, over 
objection, under the joint venture exception to the hearsay 
rule.  In that statement Gonzalez said that he, the defendant, 
their girl friends, and the mother of one of the girl friends 
went to lunch on June 20.  After lunch, Gonzalez said he went to 
work, where he stayed until 9 P.M.  In the defendant's 
statement, he also said that they went to the restaurant and 
that Gonzalez drove them back to the defendant's girl friend's 
apartment, where he remained for the rest of the day.  The 
defendant argues that Gonzalez's statement falls outside the 
joint venture exception to the hearsay rule, and that it was a 
testimonial statement barred by the right of confrontation under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 
445 Mass. 1, 9 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006). 
 
We agree that Gonzalez's statement was not admissible under 
the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule.  The cases that 
20 
 
affirm the admission of joint venture hearsay statements after 
the commission of the crime generally rest on direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the coventurers had planned to 
conceal the crime or their involvement in the crime.  One 
example of this involves an inference that may arise from the 
telling of similar false stories.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 854 (2011); Commonwealth v. Brum, 
438 Mass. 103, 116 (2002); Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 
678, 680, 693 (2001).  Here, Gonzalez's account of his doings 
between 12:30 and 2 P.M. on June 20 and the defendant's account 
of his doings during the same time period were not similar, and 
in the absence of some evidence that they specifically concocted 
stories of the parting of their ways during that period of time 
to conceal their involvement in the crime, there was no basis 
for a jury to conclude that their respective alibis were 
conceived "in furtherance of" the goal of the joint venture.  
Silanskas, supra at 693.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) 
(2016). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that there is an alternative 
theory for the admissibility of Gonzalez's statement.  It argues 
persuasively that Gonzalez's statement was not hearsay because 
it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but as 
a "foundation for later showing, through other admissible 
evidence, that [it was] false."  Anderson v. United States, 417 
21 
 
U.S. 211, 219-220 (1974).  See Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. at 855; 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2016).  Both Gonzalez's and the 
defendant's statements about how they parted ways during the 
early afternoon of June 20 could be seen as false in light of 
the testimony of the mountain bikers, the video recording of 
Gonzalez's Volvo entering and leaving the park at about the time 
of the shooting, and the defendant's jailhouse telephone 
recordings.  Although Gonzalez's statement was "testimonial" 
under Crawford, the confrontation clause "does not bar the use 
of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing 
the truth of the matter asserted."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 
n.9.  See Pytou Heang, supra at 854-855. 
 
To the extent that the defendant asserts error in the 
admission of Gonzalez's statement as nonhearsay without a 
limiting instruction that it could not be used to establish the 
truth of the matter asserted, the claim is without merit.  Trial 
counsel declined any such instruction, preferring to leave the 
matter for closing argument.  The matter is deemed waived.  
There is no resulting substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice because both counsel brought out in closing that 
Gonzalez had lied, or was a liar.  We conclude that the judge 
did not err in admitting Gonzalez's statement. 
 
6.  Jailhouse telephone calls.  The defendant argues that 
the judge failed to evaluate the balance between relevancy and 
22 
 
prejudice when admitting two of six jailhouse telephone calls in 
evidence.  The defendant objected to the evidence.  We review 
under the prejudicial error standard.  See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 
468 Mass. 231, 239 (2014).  Whether the probative value of 
evidence outweighs, or is outweighed by, its potential for 
prejudice is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial 
judge.  Id. at 242. 
 
The first call occurred on June 26, three days after the 
defendant's arrest, and was between the defendant and his 
father.  The defendant can be heard considering his girl friend 
as an alibi witness.  The defendant contends that a jury could 
be confused by the interplay between this call and the judge's 
final instructions placing the burden of proof on the 
Commonwealth.  Specifically, the defendant suggests the jury 
might have believed that he had a burden to present witnesses 
but failed when his girl friend did not testify.  The other call 
about which the defendant complains, the sixth telephone call in 
the series, was between him and his grandmother.  He contends 
the call was too ambiguous to have any probative value, where he 
said the "devil was in me, for a little while . . . .  I think 
the devil told me to get in the car." 
 
Although juror confusion is a factor to be considered in 
weighing the potential prejudice of proffered evidence, see 
Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 53 (2013), here, the probative value of 
23 
 
the evidence in this case, in the context of other evidence, 
strongly suggested that the defendant had given police a false 
alibi and enlisted his girl friend to support his effort.  This 
was highly relevant evidence of consciousness of guilt that far 
outweighed any potential prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Mejia, 
88 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 237 (2015); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 20 
Mass. App. Ct. 902, 902 (1985). 
 
The defendant's musing in the sixth call about being 
possessed by the devil was highly probative of the issue of his 
knowledge, both before and during the shooting, that he was 
participating in a criminal act.  This also was relevant as 
rebuttal evidence to his claim at trial that, although he was 
present during the commission of the crime, he did not go to the 
park with any criminal intent and did not participate knowingly 
in a joint criminal venture with Gonzalez. 
 
With respect to the defendant's claim that the judge failed 
to weigh the probative value against the potential prejudice of 
this evidence, the record belies the claim.  The judge discussed 
the matter with counsel and redacted certain portions of the six 
telephone calls to eliminate juror confusion or prejudice.  
Trial counsel acknowledged that the judge's efforts had met his 
concerns.  We are satisfied that the judge properly exercised 
her discretion in this regard, and that admission of the 
telephone calls was not error.  See Rosa, 468 Mass. at 242. 
24 
 
 
7.  Jury instructions.  The defendant asserts error in two 
jury instructions.  The first is the judge's declining to 
instruct the jury that they could consider the defendant's youth 
on the elements of intent, knowledge, and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and on the issue of voluntariness of his statements.  
The defendant had requested an instruction that would have told 
the jury that "there was evidence that [the defendant] was a 
juvenile and therefore had less or a diminished capacity than an 
adult for making critical judgments."  The requested instruction 
directed the jury to find and apply diminished capacity to their 
determination of the question of the Commonwealth's burden of 
proving knowledge, intent, and the Cunneen factors insofar as 
they are elements of the crime of murder.  See Cunneen, 389 
Mass. at 227. 
 
Whether a defendant, because of youth, was incapable of 
forming the requisite intent, or possessing the requisite 
knowledge, or committing murder with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, is a question of fact.  In Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 
Mass. 51, 65-66 (2015), we said that the trial judge correctly 
excluded evidence that it was impossible for a juvenile to 
formulate the requisite intent to commit murder.  Here, the 
defendant's requested instruction would have gone even further 
than what the defendant in Okoro was not allowed to do.  The 
proposed instruction in this case essentially directed the jury 
25 
 
to accept, as a matter of law, that all juveniles lack the 
capacity to form the requisite criminal intent to commit murder.  
The defendant's requested instruction was not a correct 
statement of law, and it was properly rejected.7 
 
In Okoro, 471 Mass. at 66, we affirmed the trial judge's 
ruling that permitted the juvenile defendant to present expert 
testimony "regarding the development of adolescent brains and 
how this could inform an understanding of this particular 
juvenile's capacity for impulse control and reasoned decision-
making on the night of the victim's death" (emphasis added).  
Here, there was no comparable factual development of the record, 
by expert testimony or other evidence of mental impairment 
specific to the defendant at the time of the killing, and there 
was no evidence regarding adolescent brain development.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Fitzmeyer, 414 Mass. 540, 549 (1993) (absent 
evidence that defendant's medical problems resulted in condition 
that diminished his knowledge of what he was doing or impaired 
his ability to control his actions, defendant not entitled to 
instruction that evidence of his mental impairment at time of 
                     
 
7 The defendant's attempt to apply the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), is 
unavailing.  The Court's focus was on the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as it applied to sentencing and 
punishment of juveniles.  The Supreme Court did not discuss case 
law or statutory law addressing intent, knowledge, or deliberate 
premeditation as elements of a crime.  Id. at 2464. 
26 
 
crime should be considered in determining his culpability for 
murder in first degree).  Because there was no evidence as to 
the defendant's circumstances with respect to neurological 
issues and brain development, he was not entitled to the type of 
instruction that we approved in Okoro. 
 
There is no merit to the defendant's argument that the 
judge prevented the jury from considering his youth on the issue 
of the voluntariness of his statements.  The judge gave a humane 
practice instruction in which he told the jury that the 
voluntariness of any statement made by the defendant must be 
determined from the "totality of the circumstances."  This was a 
correct statement of the law.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 
Mass. 676, 688-689 (1977).  Moreover, trial counsel repeatedly 
emphasized the defendant's youth during closing argument, 
focusing on his being only seventeen years of age no fewer than 
six times.  There was no error. 
 
There also was no error in the judge's instruction that 
"police are under no legal obligation to give people seventeen 
years or older an opportunity to have a parent accompany him or 
her in a police interview."  This was a correct statement of the 
law at the time of trial.8  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 
                     
 
8 The Legislature changed the age until which a person will 
be treated as a juvenile from seventeen to eighteen, by enacting 
St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 7-27, which amended various sections of 
G. L. c. 119 (proceedings against delinquent children), 
27 
 
161, 165-167 (2015).  The instruction did not preclude the jury 
from considering the defendant's age when determining whether 
his statements were made voluntarily.  As noted above, trial 
counsel argued the point forcefully in his closing argument. 
 
The second assignment of error in the jury instructions 
concerns the instruction on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  The defendant faults the judge for declining to 
instruct the jury that they must be unanimous as to at least one 
of the Cunneen factors in order to find the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  We expressly have 
rejected the necessity of such an instruction, see Commonwealth 
v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 407 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 
(2014), and the defendant has offered nothing that persuades us 
otherwise.  The judge instructed the jury conformably with the 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (1999), which were 
applicable at that time. 
 
There is no merit to the defendant's assertion that the 
trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended his actions 
to be extremely atrocious or cruel.  The defendant did not 
request such an instruction, so our review is limited to a 
                                                                  
effective September 18, 2013.  The defendant made his statements 
in June, 2009.  The statutory amendment did not apply to him.  
See Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 165-167 (2015). 
28 
 
determination whether any error created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.  We 
have never said that a defendant must be shown to have had such 
an intent.  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 260 
(2013); Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 47 (2012), 
citing Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  In any event, we need not 
decide the question, as the defendant also was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation. 
 
8.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.9  We have reviewed the  
briefs and the entire record and discern no reason to reduce the 
degree of guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our powers 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
9 The parties did not brief the question, which we leave for 
another day, whether a juvenile convicted of murder in the first 
degree is entitled to plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and is subject to the gatekeeper provision of that statute; or 
whether such a defendant is not entitled to plenary review but 
is entitled to a right of appeal from the denial of all motions 
for a new trial.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 
507-510 (1993) (unique severity of mandatory life sentence 
without possibility of parole for conviction of accessory to 
murder in first degree justifies treatment under § 33E even if 
crime is not capital offense).