Title: Woodfin v. Bender

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 03/31/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
_________________________
1150797
_________________________
Randall Woodfin et al.
v.
General Bender et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-11-904600)
MAIN, Justice.
Members of the Birmingham Board of Education and the
superintendent 
of 
the 
Birmingham 
City 
School 
System
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants")
appeal the Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment in favor of 24
1150797
"classified employees"1 of the Birmingham Board of Education
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the plaintiffs").2 
The trial court held that the plaintiffs' salaries had been
miscalculated and awarded them monetary relief.  The
defendants argue, among other things, that they are entitled
to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims.  We agree that the
defendants are entitled to immunity.  For that reason, the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its
judgment is void.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 
Facts and Procedural History
On December 30, 2011, numerous classified employees of
the Birmingham Board of Education ("the Board") sued the
Board, the Board's members in their official capacities, and
the superintendent of the Birmingham City School System, in
his official capacity.  The plaintiffs claimed that when the
1"Classified employees" are support personnel who are not
required to have a professional-educator certificate, i.e.,
non-teachers.
2Those 24 employees are:  Scott Armstrong, Larry Batain,
General 
Bender, 
Odessa 
Beville, 
Abram 
Bolden, 
Harold
Childress, Freddie Clark, Walter Cook, Gwendolyn Cotton,
Beverly Crosby, Vince Eaton, Lillie Edmond, Lucius Gregg,
Edward Ingram, Eloise Gray Ingram, Paul Marzette, Sharon
Miles, Kelvin Newsome, Frances Rowser, Anthony Taylor, Vickie
Townes, Nathaniel Walton, Jacqueline Welch, and Phyllis
Williams.
2
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Board adopted a new salary schedule in August 2004, existing
employees, including the plaintiffs, were not reassigned to
the proper "steps" on the new salary schedule and, thus, that
their wages were miscalculated.  Specifically, in their
amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged:
"... Defendants adopted 
a 
new 
pay 
schedule about
August of 2004.
"... The [Board] instituted a policy of
assigning employees to pay steps correspondent to
the total number of years of service. Through the
implementation of the new schedule and pay policy,
defendants determine salary rates on the basis of
total years of experience.
"... Defendants did not implement the new pay
schedule with existing employees who occupied
positions encompassed by the new pay schedule and
policy in August 2004. Rather, the defendants
continued to pay plaintiffs at their present rates
of pay that did not recognize their years of
experience.
"... With the implementation of the new 16-step
pay 
schedule, 
defendants 
failed 
to 
make
corresponding 
adjustments 
to 
plaintiffs' 
step
assignments to reflect prior experience in the like
manner to the pay rates set for the new supervisory
hires or their newly promoted peers. As a result,
defendants place the newly hired or newly promoted
personnel at pay steps above the veteran employees.
Hence, the new hires and newly promoted employees
now make substantially more money than their more
experienced peers.
"... Despite numerous meetings and discussions
with the defendants pointing out the mistake and the
3
1150797
obvious 
pay 
inequity, 
the 
defendants 
have
stubbornly, willfully, arbitrarily and maliciously
refused to adjust plaintiffs' salary to reflect
total years of experience. Defendants have made no
effort to correct the ministerial error of assigning
plaintiffs to the proper pay step to reflect years
of experience."
It is undisputed that in August 2004 the Board
implemented a new salary schedule that included multiple pay
"steps."  The then current employees were placed on the step
of the new salary schedule that most closely approximated
their then current pay, and none of those employees received
a reduction in pay.  The plaintiffs argued that current
employees were assigned to a step on the new salary schedule
that most closely corresponded to their then current rate of
pay.  They argued that each employee should have been assigned
to the step that directly corresponded to his or her years of
experience, which, they say, would have resulted in a
significant pay increase for each of the plaintiffs. 
According to the plaintiffs, the Board's official policy
stated that an employee's "step" on the new pay schedule must
correspond to the employee's total years of experience. 
Further, according to the plaintiffs, assigning each employee
to the step that corresponded with his or her years of
4
1150797
experience was a ministerial act, and the defendants had no
discretion in determining each employee's salary step.  The
plaintiffs contended that, because the defendants did not
assign the plaintiffs to "steps" that corresponded to their
years 
of 
experience, 
the 
plaintiffs' 
salaries 
were
miscalculated and incorrect payments were made on their
behalfs to the Retirement System of Alabama, which resulted in
reduced pension benefits for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' claims are based on the following
language found in the "introduction" to the salary schedule
that was first adopted by the Board in August 2004:
"Certified salaries (teacher) in the salary
schedule 
are 
based 
on 
years 
of 
experience,
degree/certification and/or assignment. Effective
February 1, 1996, certified employees (teachers)
were approved to be paid on their highest degree,
regardless of the teaching assignment. Years of
experience are categorized as 'STEPS' on the
schedule. Experience for teachers will be granted
based on public education in this system, other
public education experience in the State of Alabama,
or other public education experience outside the
state. It is the responsibility of the employee to
submit the appropriate information pertaining to
experience, degree/certification and to verify the
receipt of the accurate salary."
(Emphasis added.)
5
1150797
In 
their complaint, the 
plaintiffs requested declaratory,
mandamus, 
and 
injunctive relief. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
plaintiffs
requested that the defendants be directed to pay the
plaintiffs at the proper rate of pay reflecting their years of
experience, that the trial court "issue a 
declaratory judgment
finding that the defendants' purported actions of inequitably
paying [the plaintiffs] shall be corrected such that all
employees' salaries shall be based upon their years of
experience," and that the trial court "declare[] that the
plaintiffs are entitled to back pay and adjustment of their
current salary to reflect years of service."  Further, the
plaintiffs alleged that the "defendants' actions constitute
unlawful, unreasonable, capricious, and arbitrary conduct and
represent an abuse of the defendants' official power and
discretion" and that "the Board's failure and refusal to
establish proper salary schedules which include length of
service steps for all classes of employees does not entail a
discretionary act but rather is the ignoring of a duty exacted
by law."
The trial court dismissed the Board from the case on the
basis of State immunity but allowed the action to proceed
against the defendants in their official capacities.  After
6
1150797
conducting a bench trial, the trial court found that the
plaintiffs' salaries had been miscalculated and awarded them
the monetary relief they requested.  The defendants appealed.
Discussion
On appeal, the defendants argue, among other things, that
they are entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. 
The plaintiffs respond that "the Birmingham Board of 
Education
must follow its own duly adopted salary schedule. An employee
can sue when the school system fails to do that; and immunity
does not bar monetary relief in such a case." Plaintiffs'
brief, at 30.  Further, the plaintiffs argue that "state
sovereign immunity does not bar an order against official
capacity defendants, regarding proper payment for work
actually performed, including proper placement on the salary
schedule." Id., at 34. 
"[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant
in any court of law or equity." Article I, § 14, Ala. Const.
1901.  "Section 14 immunity is more than a defense; when
applicable, it divests the trial courts of this State of
subject-matter jurisdiction." Alabama State Univ. v. Danley,
[Ms. 1140907, April 8, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2016).
Concerning § 14 immunity, this Court has stated: 
7
1150797
"'The wall of immunity erected by § 14
is nearly impregnable.  Sanders Lead Co. v.
Levine, 370 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So.
2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1983); Hutchinson v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 288
Ala. 20, 24, 256 So. 2d 281, 284 (1971).
This immunity may not be waived.  Larkins
v. Department of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 363 (Ala.
2001) ("The State is immune from suit, and
its immunity cannot be waived by the
Legislature 
or 
by 
any 
other 
State
authority."); Druid City Hosp. Bd. v.
Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1979)
(same); Opinion of the Justices No. 69, 247
Ala. 195, 23 So. 2d 505 (1945) (same); see
also Dunn Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of
Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372, 175 So. 383
(1937).  "This means not only that the
state itself may not be sued, but that this
cannot be indirectly accomplished by suing
its officers or agents in their official
capacity, when a result favorable to
plaintiff would be directly to affect the
financial status of the state treasury."
State Docks Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403,
405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932) (emphasis
added); see also Southall v. Stricos Corp.,
275 Ala. 156, 153 So. 2d 234 (1963).'
"Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142
(Ala. 2002)."
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 872-73
(Ala. 2004).
"Section 14 immunity is not absolute; there are
actions that are not barred by the general rule of
immunity.
8
1150797
"'[C]ertain actions are not barred by § 14.
There are six general categories of actions
that do not come within the prohibition of
§ 14: (1) actions brought to compel State
officials to perform their legal duties;
(2) actions 
brought 
to enjoin State
officials 
from 
enforcing 
an
unconstitutional law; 
(3) 
actions 
to 
compel
State officials to perform ministerial
acts; (4) actions brought against State
officials under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6–6–220 et seq.,
seeking construction of a statute and its
application in a given situation; (5) valid
inverse 
condemnation 
actions 
brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity; and (6) actions
for injunction or damages brought against
State officials in their representative
capacity and individually where it was
alleged that they had acted fraudulently,
in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in
a mistaken interpretation of law. See
Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.,
937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex
parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala.
1980)); Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert
Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008)
(holding 
that 
the 
exception 
for
declaratory-judgment actions applies only
to actions against State officials).  As we
confirmed 
in 
Harbert, 
these 
"exceptions" 
to
sovereign immunity apply only to actions
brought against State officials; they do
not apply to actions against the State or
against State agencies.  See Alabama Dep't
of Transp., 990 So. 2d at 840–41.'
"Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 1254,
1256–57 (Ala. 2008).  The sixth 'exception' to § 14
immunity was restated in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.
3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013), as follows:
9
1150797
"'(6)(a) actions for injunction brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity 
where 
it 
is 
alleged
that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a
mistaken interpretation of law, Wallace v.
Board of Education of Montgomery County,
280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967), and
(b) actions for damages brought against
State 
officials 
in 
their 
individual
capacity where it is alleged that they had
acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
their 
authority, 
or 
in 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of law, subject to the
limitation that the action not be, in
effect, one against the State. Phillips v.
Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989).'"
Ex parte Hampton, 189 So. 3d 14, 17-18 (Ala. 2015).
"'These actions are sometimes referred to
as "exceptions" to § 14; however, in
actuality these actions are simply not
considered to be actions "'against the
State' for § 14 purposes."  Patterson v.
Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala.
2002). This Court has qualified those
"exceptions," noting that "'[a]n action is
one against the [S]tate when a favorable
result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the
State, or would result in the plaintiff's
recovery of money from the [S]tate.'" 
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895
So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Shoals
Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311,
1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)) (emphasis added
in Jones).'  
"Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc.,
990 So. 2d 831, 840 (Ala. 2008)." 
10
1150797
Vandenberg v. Aramark Educ. Servs., Inc., 81 So. 3d 326, 332
(Ala. 2011).
"'To determine whether an action against a State
officer is, in fact, one against the State, this
Court considers
"'"whether 'a result favorable to the
plaintiff would directly affect a contract
or property right of the State,' Mitchell
[v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806 (Ala.
1992)], whether the defendant is simply a
'conduit' 
through 
which 
the 
plaintiff 
seeks
recovery of damages from the State, Barnes
v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala. 1988),
and whether 'a judgment against the officer
would directly affect the financial status
of the State treasury,' Lyons [v. River
Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257] at
261 [(Ala. 2003)]."
"'Haley [v. Barbour County], 885 So. 2d [783] at 788
[(Ala. 2004)].  Additionally, "[i]n determining
whether an action against a state officer is barred
by § 14, the Court considers the nature of the suit
or the relief demanded, not the character of the
office of the person against whom the suit is
brought."  Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 67–68
(Ala. 1980).'"
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1130-31 (Ala. 2013)
(quoting Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990
So. 2d 831, 839-40 (Ala. 2008)).
In the present case, we note that the plaintiffs did not
"seek[] construction of a statute and its application in a
given situation." See Hampton, 189 So. 3d at 18.  Instead, the
11
1150797
plaintiffs sought a construction of the Board's policy and 
monetary relief.  Thus, the declaratory-judgment "exception"
to § 14 immunity does not apply. See Ex parte Town of
Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1211 (Ala. 2006) (stating that
"[t]he exception afforded declaratory-judgment actions under
§ 
14 
generally 
applies 
only 
when 
the 
action 
seeks
'construction of a statute and how it should be applied in a
given situation,' Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 230, 250 So.
2d 677, 679 (1971), and not when an action seeks other
relief").  Nevertheless, in addition to seeking declaratory
relief, the plaintiffs sought mandamus and injunctive relief. 
In 
Alabama 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
v. 
Harbert
International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008), this Court
stated:
"Generally, mandamus relief is available in
certain situations to compel a State officer to
perform the ministerial act of tendering payment of
liquidated or certain sums the State is legally
obligated to pay under a contract. State Highway
Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So. 2d 872, 875
(Ala. 1991); see also [Alabama Agric. and Mech.
Univ. v.] Jones, 895 So. 2d [867] at 877-79 [(Ala.
2004)](describing as 'well-established [the] rule
that a writ of mandamus will issue to compel payment
of only such claims as are liquidated' and noting
that prior caselaw had held 'that payment for goods
or services, for which the State had contracted and
accepted, could be compelled by mandamus'); and
State Bd. of Admin. v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 124,
12
1150797
117 So. 757, 760 (1928) ('the claim asserted
[against the State was] for an amount fixed or
determinable by the terms of the contract of sale,'
and was 'definite and certain, ... and not an
unliquidated claim, in the sense that would render
mandamus unavailable').
"We 
find our 
opinions in 
Milton Construction Co.
v. State Highway Department, 568 So. 2d 784 (Ala.
1990) ('Milton I'), and State Highway Department v.
Milton Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991)
('Milton II'), dispositive on this issue. In Milton
I, the plaintiff, Milton Construction Company, asked
the trial court to declare the disincentive clause
of 
an 
'incentive/disincentive-payments provision' 
in
two highway-construction contracts it had entered
into 
with 
ALDOT 
(then 
called 
'the 
Highway
Department') void and unenforceable as a penalty.
Milton Construction further asked the trial court to
order the defendants –- the State, ALDOT, and
ALDOT's director –- to pay it the amounts of
'disincentive 
payments' 
ALDOT 
had 
allegedly
wrongfully withheld. On appeal, this Court held that
the 'disincentive clause' in the contracts was 'void
as a penalty and therefore unenforceable,' 568 So.
2d at 791, and remanded the case.
"On return to remand, the defendants claimed
that § 14 barred the trial court from ordering them
to pay the money they had withheld from Milton
Construction under the void disincentive clause. In
Milton II, this Court disagreed, stating:
"'It is true that § 14 of the
Constitution prevents a suit against the
state as well as suits against its
agencies. See Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.
2d 81 (Ala. 1989); Rutledge v. Baldwin
County Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1986).
However, this Court has also recognized
that 
there 
are 
certain 
established
exceptions to the protection afforded the
state 
or 
its 
agencies 
by 
sovereign
13
1150797
immunity. See Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d
65, 68 (Ala. 1981). Among those recognized
exceptions are actions brought to force
state employees or agencies to perform
their legal duties. Id. See also Nix and
Vercelli, Immunities Available In Alabama
For 
Cities, 
Counties 
And 
Other 
Governmental
Entities, And Their Officials, 13 Am. J.
Trial Advoc. 615 (1989).
"'... Once the Highway Department has
legally contracted under state law for
goods or services and accepts such goods or
services, the Highway Department also
becomes legally obligated to pay for the
goods or services accepted in accordance
with the terms of the contract. It follows
that this obligation is not subject to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and is
enforceable in the courts. See, e.g.,
Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41 (Ala.
1982); State Board of Administration v.
Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757
(1928).
"'It 
is 
undisputed 
that 
Milton
Construction has already rendered the
services called for under the contract.
Consequently, we hold that this lawsuit is
not barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, because it is in the nature of an
action to compel state officers to perform
their 
legal 
duties 
and 
pay 
Milton
Construction for services contracted for
and rendered. Gunter, supra; Roquemore,
supra.
"'For 
example, 
in 
Roquemore 
the
Highway 
Department 
contracted 
with
Roquemore to purchase hay. After Roquemore
had delivered a substantial amount of hay
to the Highway Department, it refused to
accept any further deliveries of hay and
14
1150797
refused to pay for the hay that it had
already 
received. 
Roquemore 
petitioned 
this
Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the
State Board of Administration and the
Highway Department to pay him for the hay
that he had delivered. This Court held that
the writ was proper and was not barred by
the 
doctrine 
of 
sovereign 
immunity 
because,
under the applicable statutes, the Highway
Department could not refuse to pay for
goods that it had already accepted. This
Court held that the suit in Roquemore was
one to force a state agency to perform its
legal duty, i.e., to force the Highway
Department to pay for the hay that it had
already accepted. Likewise, in this case,
Milton Construction's action against the
Highway Department is not barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.'
"Milton II, 586 So. 2d at 875. This Court thus
upheld the trial court's judgment holding that the
moneys withheld under the disincentive clause were
due to be paid to Milton Construction.
"Like the plaintiff in Milton I and Milton II,
Harbert contended that a provision in a contract
with ALDOT was void as a penalty. Harbert thus
sought mandamus relief directing that State officers
pay the funds withheld by ALDOT. The trial court
agreed and, like the trial court in Milton II,
ordered that the withheld funds be paid. In their
initial brief on appeal, the Governor and the
director do not appear to contest the trial court's
holding that the liquidated-damages provision was
unlawfully applied in this case. Thus, under the
authority of Milton II, the trial court's mandamus
relief directing that the funds withheld as
liquidated damages are due to be returned to Harbert
is affirmed. See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co.,
353 So. 2d 779, 783 (Ala. 1977) (agreeing with the
trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions
interpreting a contract between a State agency and
15
1150797
a contractor 'as calling for payment of the disputed
sum' and affirming the issuance of the writ of
mandamus to compel State officers to tender
payment)."
990 So. 2d at 842-44.
Further,
"the trial court can generally, by writ of mandamus,
order State officers in certain situations to pay
liquidated damages or contractually specified debts.
The payment of these certain, liquidated amounts
would be only a ministerial act that State officers
do not have the discretion to avoid. [Alabama Agric.
and Mech. Univ. v.] Jones, 895 So. 2d [867] at 878-
79 [(Ala. 2004)];[State Bd. of Admin. v.] Roquemore,
218 Ala. [120] at 124, 117 So. [757] at 760
[(1928)]. Furthermore, although the payment of the
funds 'may ultimately touch the State treasury,'
Horn v. Dunn Bros., 262 Ala. 404, 410, 79 So. 2d 11,
17 (1955), the payment does not 'affect the
financial status of the State treasury,' Lyons [v.
River Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257] at 261
[(Ala. 2003)], because the funds 'do not belong to
the State,' Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v.
Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1180, 1190 n.6 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005) (two-judge opinion), and the State
treasury 'suffers no more than it would' had the
State officers originally performed their duties and
paid the debts. Horn, 262 Ala. at 410, 79 So. 2d at
17. The trial court may not, however, award
retroactive relief in the nature of unliquidated
damages or compensatory damages, because such relief
affects a property or contract right of the State.
Stark [v. Troy State Univ., 514 So. 2d 46 (Ala.
1987)]; Williams [v. Hank's Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
699 So. 2d 1230 (Ala. 1997)]; Roquemore; J.B.
McCrary Co. v. Brunson, 204 Ala. 85, 86, 85 So. 396,
396 (1920) ('mandamus will not lie to compel the
payment of unliquidated claims'); and Vaughan [v.
Sibley, 709 So. 2d 482 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)]. ...
16
1150797
"Although 
the 
trial 
court 
cannot 
award
compensatory damages or unliquidated damages in this
case, the trial court does have the ability to
compel State officers who are acting arbitrarily and
capriciously to properly perform their duties.
Stark, 514 So. 2d at 50 (holding that an action
seeking to compel State officers who are acting
arbitrarily to perform their legal duties 'will not
be barred by the sovereign immunity clause of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901'); McDowell-Purcell,
[Inc. v. Bass,] 370 So. 2d [942] at 944 [(Ala.
1979)] ('If judgment or discretion is abused, and
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
mandamus will lie to compel a proper exercise
thereof.'); St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside,
272 Ala. 294, 296, 128 So. 2d 333, 334 (1961)
('Injunctive action may be maintained against a
state official, if the official is acting beyond the
scope of his authority or acting illegally, in bad
faith, or fraudulently.') ...."
Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 845-46.
As Justice Murdock correctly noted in his special
concurrence in Harbert:
"[I]t becomes critical ... to recognize that the
reference in the cases cited in the above-quoted
passage from the main opinion to claims that are
'liquidated,' when considered in context, are
references not merely to claims for amounts that
have been reduced to sums certain, but claims as to
which there is no room for dispute as to liability,
i.e., whether the amounts at issue are owed."
990 So. 2d at 849 (Murdock, J., concurring specially).
Harbert and the cases cited therein dealt with contracts.
In Ex parte Bessemer Board of Education, 68 So. 3d 782 (Ala.
2011), however, a public-school teacher sued the members of
17
1150797
the Bessemer Board of Education in their official capacities,
alleging 
that 
her 
statutory 
pay 
increase 
had 
been
miscalculated.  This Court stated that "it is undisputed that
the Bessemer Board members have a statutory duty to pay [the
teacher] 
the 
appropriate 
salary 
increase 
under 
[the 
statute]."
Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 68 So. 3d at 790 (emphasis added). 
Thus, this Court held that § 14 immunity did not bar the
teacher's claim because, it reasoned, the members of the
Bessemer Board of Education had a legal duty to pay the
teacher the correctly calculated pay increase under the
statute, and the payment of that salary increase was a
ministerial act that involved no discretion. 68 So. 3d at 790-
91.
Therefore, in the present case, assuming that a school-
board policy should be treated like a contract or a statute,3
3The Court of Civil Appeals has stated:
"'A board of education must comply with the policies
it adopts.' Ex parte Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 824 So. 2d 759, 761 (Ala. 2001). 'Salaries
are a matter of school board policy. Once the Board
adopts a policy, it is bound to follow that policy
until the policy is modified or amended by the Board
in accordance with the procedures set forth in [§
16-1-30, Ala. Code 1975].' Beverly v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 678 So. 2d 113, 115 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1995) (citations omitted)."
18
1150797
the issue is whether the defendants acted arbitrarily in
interpreting and implementing the Board's policy.  If they did
not act arbitrarily, they are entitled to § 14 immunity. 
Specifically, the issue in the present case is whether the
language in the introduction to the salary schedule
unambiguously created a legal duty for the defendants to
assign then classified employees to steps on the salary
schedule that directly corresponded to their years of service
when they were converted to the new salary schedule.  If so,
the payment of the claimed backpay and benefits would be a
ministerial act the defendants had no discretion to avoid, and
§ 14 would not bar the plaintiffs' claims insofar as they seek
to compel the defendants to pay the backpay and benefits.  In
that situation, this action would not be an action seeking
damages from the State but, rather, an action to compel the
performance of a ministerial act, and the payment would not
effect a property right of the State because the funds would
not belong to the State.
Limestone Cty. Educ. Ass'n v. Limestone Cty. Bd. of Educ., 880
So. 2d 446, 450 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(footnote omitted).  See
also Ex parte Etowah Cty. Bd. of Educ., 584 So. 2d 528, 530
(Ala. 1991) ("It is well recognized that the School Board is
bound to follow its adopted policies.").
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1150797
The 
above-cited 
decisions 
contemplate 
a 
lack 
of
discretion by State officials when there is no dispute that a
particular payment is required.  However, in the present case,
there is a legitimate dispute as to whether the Board's policy
required the defendants to assign existing classified
employees to steps on the new salary schedule that directly
corresponded to their years of service rather than to their
then current rate of pay when they were converted to the new
salary 
schedule. 
 The defendants' 
interpretation 
and
implementation of the policy was not arbitrary.  The sentence
upon which the plaintiffs rely simply states: "Years of
experience are categorized as 'STEPS' on the schedule." 
Neither that sentence nor the sentences that surround it say
anything specifically about how to initially place existing
employees on the new salary schedule.  Furthermore, the
paragraph containing that sentence refers only to "certified"
employees or "teachers," not classified employees like the
plaintiffs.  Therefore, the defendants did not exceed their
discretion or act arbitrarily when they interpreted and
implemented the policy with regard to initially placing
classified employees on the new salary schedule.  Thus, the
defendants cannot be compelled to accept the plaintiffs'
20
1150797
interpretation.  Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to
§ 14 immunity, and the trial court was divested of subject-
matter jurisdiction over this case. 
Conclusion
Because 
the 
trial 
court 
lacked 
subject-matter
jurisdiction, its judgment is void, and the appeal is
dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Bolin,* Parker, Murdock, Shaw, and Bryan, JJ., concur in
the result.
*Although Justice Bolin was not present at oral argument
in this case, he has listened to the audiotape of the oral
argument.
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1150797
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result.  The main opinion quotes from
cases such as Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert
International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 840 (Ala. 2008), and
Ex parte Bessemer Board of Education, 68 So. 3d 782 (Ala.
2011), from which can be drawn the proposition that the bar of
§ 14, Ala. Const. 1901, immunity does not prevent a court from
requiring a State official to pay an undisputed sum-certain
debt for goods or services accepted by the State.  The main
opinion follows its discussion of these cases, however, with
the following statement:
"[T]he issue is whether the defendants acted
arbitrarily in interpreting and implementing the
Board's policy.  If they did not act arbitrarily,
they are entitled to § 14 immunity." 
___ So. 3d at ___.  Elsewhere, the main opinion suggests that
the issue is whether a State official can be said to have
"exceed[ed] his discretion" in making a decision about the
payment of an alleged debt.  ___ So. 3d at ___.
The latter standards -– arbitrariness and excess of
discretion -- are not the equivalent of the principles
governing such cases as Harbert and Bessemer.  Nor have those
latter standards ever been articulated previously in our
22
1150797
precedents.  Instead, the principle suggested by cases such as
Harbert and Bessemer is simply whether the amount owed is
undisputed in the sense and for the reasons referenced above. 
If it is not, then there is immunity, regardless whether the
State official's decision regarding it might, in retrospect,
be deemed by a court of law to have been "arbitrary" or "in
excess of the official's discretion." 
For that matter, to accept the latter standards seems to
me to be a major step toward outright abolishment of § 14
immunity in relation to suits against State officials.  When
a decision is challenged by an alleged creditor on the ground
that the State official's decision is contrary to law (or the
facts), such error is too easily framed by a litigant and a
court alike as one that was "arbitrary" or in "excess" of the
official's discretion.  Indeed, our cases have equated
decisions that are simply contrary to the law as ones that are
arbitrary or in excess of discretion.  E.g., Corner Stone
Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. MVMG, LLC, 170 So. 3d 626, 630 (Ala.
2014) ("'"A court exceeds its discretion when its ruling is
based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when it has acted
arbitrarily without employing conscientious judgment, has
exceeded the bounds of reason in view of all circumstances, or
23
1150797
has so far ignored recognized principles of law or practice as
to cause substantial injustice."'"  (quoting Wright Therapy
Equip., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 991 So. 2d
701, 705 (Ala. 2008), quoting, in turn, Edwards v. Allied Home
Mortg. Capital Corp., 962 So. 2d 194, 213 (Ala. 2007))
(emphasis added)).  Such a step is a bridge farther than even
this writer has previously suggested.  Compare Alabama State
Univ. v. Danley, [Ms. 1140907, April 8, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. 2016) (Murdock, J., concurring specially in case no.
1140907 and concurring in the result in case no. 1141241)
(suggesting that there should not be § 14 immunity as to
claims for moneys owed for conforming goods or services
tendered to, but not yet accepted by, the State).
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1150797
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).  
I concur in the result.  "In limited circumstances the
writ of mandamus will lie to require action of state
officials.  This is true where discretion is exhausted and
that which remains to be done is a ministerial act." 
McDowell–Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala.
1979).   Under Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert
International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008), and the
numerous cases cited in it, as discussed in the main opinion, 
when a plaintiff seeks payment of money from the State, the
"limited circumstances" in which a writ will lie to compel
payment depends on whether the amount sought is "certain" and
the State's obligation to pay is "undisputed."  If there is
doubt as to those, the analysis ends and § 14 bars the action. 
In the instant case, the parties dispute the proper
interpretation of the new salary schedule at issue.  In
McDowell–Purcell, we held that a writ of mandamus will not lie
to compel a State official "to exercise his discretion and
apply the ascertained facts or existing conditions under [a]
contract so as to approve payment to [a plaintiff] according
to [the plaintiff's] interpretation of the contract rather
than his."  370 So. 2d at 944.  Here, the Board members have
25
1150797
not exhausted their discretion, and they cannot be compelled
to accept the plaintiffs' interpretation of the salary
schedule.  A suit against the State, i.e., the Board members
in their official capacities, is untenable in this case.  
Bryan, J., concurs.  
26