Title: People v. Brown

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HEATHER ROSE BROWN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S257631 
 
Third Appellate District 
C085998 
 
Shasta County Superior Court 
15F2440 
 
 
 March 2, 2023 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Cantil-Sakauye* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
S257631 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
Defendant Heather Rose Brown gave birth to a baby girl in a 
hotel room.  In the fifth day of her life, while lying face down 
between her sleeping parents who were both under the influence of 
heroin, Brown’s newborn daughter stopped breathing.  When 
Brown woke and noticed, she directed her daughter’s father to call 
911.  Brown administered CPR, following the dispatcher’s 
instructions, until the ambulance arrived.  Further efforts to 
resuscitate Brown’s daughter were unsuccessful.  An autopsy 
revealed traces of heroin-derived morphine and methamphetamine 
in the baby’s body fluids and the contents of her stomach. 
 
The District Attorney charged Brown with first degree 
murder and prosecuted the charge on the theory that Brown had 
poisoned her newborn daughter by feeding her breast milk after 
smoking heroin and methamphetamine.  The trial court instructed 
the jurors that to convict Brown of first degree murder they had to 
find she committed “an act” with the mental state of malice 
aforethought that was a substantial factor in causing her baby’s 
death and that she “murdered by using poison.”  The instructions 
did not require the jury to find that Brown acted with any 
particular, heightened mental state when she fed her baby her 
breast milk.  They thus allowed the jury to convict Brown of first 
degree murder if it found that she acted with malice — a mental 
state that normally would only support a conviction of second 
degree murder — and that poison was a substantial factor in 
causing her baby’s death.  Based on these instructions, the jury 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
convicted Brown of the first degree murder of her newborn 
daughter, for which the court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life 
in prison.    
 
Brown argues that the jury instructions were incomplete 
because they did not require the jury to find she fed her daughter 
her breast milk with a mental state equivalent in turpitude to the 
willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation that generally 
distinguishes first degree murder from second degree murder.  The 
Attorney General argues that the instructions were complete, 
because, in his view, proof that a defendant used poison is sufficient 
to elevate a murder to the first degree, without any proof of mental 
state beyond the showing of malice required for all murder 
convictions.  We conclude Brown has the better argument. 
 
When dividing the common law offense of murder into two 
degrees, the Legislature reserved for the first degree types of 
murders that are “cruel and aggravated” and thus “deserving of 
greater punishment” than other malicious or intentional killings, 
which are punishable only as second degree murder.  (People v. 
Sanchez (1864) 24 Cal. 17, 29 (Sanchez).)  From the beginning, 
those murders have included all murder “perpetrated by means of 
poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing.”  (1 Hittell’s Cal. Gen. Laws 
from 1850 to 1864, par. 1425, § 21 (1872) (Hittell’s); id. at par. 1423, 
§ 19.)   
 
We previously have interpreted this language to require proof 
of a mental state more culpable than the malice required for second 
degree murder, in keeping with the Legislature’s determination 
that murders perpetrated by these means warrant the greater 
punishment reserved for first degree murder.  For torture murder, 
the prosecution must show “wilful, deliberate and premeditated 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.”  (People v. Steger 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546 (Steger).)  For lying in wait murder, the 
prosecution must show the defendant performed the acts of 
watching, waiting, and concealment with the intent to take the 
victim by surprise to facilitate the infliction of injury likely to cause 
death.  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 (Webster); 
People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1149, fn. 10 (Gutierrez).)  
However, since in a typical first degree murder by poison case there 
is no question that the defendant acted with willfulness, 
deliberation, and premeditation, we have never addressed whether 
there is a mental state component of first degree poison murder.  
We now clarify that to prove first degree murder by means of 
poison, the prosecution must show the defendant deliberately gave 
the victim poison with the intent to kill the victim or inflict injury 
likely to cause death. 
The trial court’s instructions did not include this element of 
first degree poison murder.  This was error.  And because a rational 
jury could have concluded the prosecution did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Brown deliberately gave her newborn 
daughter the poisonous substances in her breast milk with the 
intent to kill her or inflict injury likely to cause her death, the error 
was prejudicial.  Accordingly, we reverse Brown’s first degree 
murder conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Trial Court Proceedings  
 
1.  Evidence of Events Leading to Baby’s Death 
In a recorded interview played for the jury, Brown told a 
police investigator she met her husband, Daylon Reed, when she 
was twenty years old.  Reed dealt and used drugs, including 
marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin, and soon after meeting 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
him, Brown began to use heroin.  A few months into their 
relationship, Brown learned she was pregnant.   Brown continued 
to use heroin during her pregnancy and occasionally also used 
methamphetamine.   
 
 
Brown had almost no prenatal care and she and Reed made 
no arrangements for their baby’s birth.  When Brown went into 
labor, the couple got a hotel room and Brown called a friend and 
asked her to find a midwife.  Brown’s friend called a friend of hers, 
a doula who had assisted a midwife with some deliveries, who 
agreed to attend the birth.  Brown smoked heroin while in labor, 
believing it would help with the pain, hiding that she was doing so 
from the doula and her mother, who also was present for the birth, 
by smoking in the bathroom. 
At trial, several witnesses testified that Brown said she did 
not want to give birth in a hospital because she was afraid that if 
she tested positive for drugs the baby would be taken away.  Reed’s 
sister Michelle testified that she had given birth to a baby boy at a 
local hospital not long after meeting Brown.   The baby experienced 
withdrawal, Child and Family Services became involved, and 
Michelle voluntarily relinquished custody.   
Brown’s daughter, Dae-Lynn Rose, appeared healthy at 
birth, but a couple days later began to appear ill.  The doula, 
Brown’s mother, and Brown’s father and stepmother all advised 
Brown and Reed to take the baby to a doctor, but they did not do 
so.  Brown admitted to the police investigator that she believed that 
if she gave birth at the hospital or took her baby to a doctor, her 
baby would be taken from her.  Nevertheless, Brown said she had 
been planning to take Dae-Lynn to a doctor on the day she died.   
Brown also admitted that after Dae-Lynn’s birth, she and 
Reed smoked heroin almost every day.  She said they smoked in 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
the bathroom so the baby would not inhale it.  When confronted, 
she admitted that she also smoked methamphetamine once during 
her daughter’s life.  
 
Brown fed Dae-Lynn both breast milk and infant formula.  
When Dae-Lynn was two days old, Brown searched for information 
on the internet about how to help newborns suffering from 
withdrawal.  She told the police investigator she continued to feed 
Dae-Lynn breast milk because she had read on the internet that 
when “babies were withdrawing” breast milk is “supposed to help 
ease ’em.”  When the investigator asked Brown whether she 
supplemented her breast milk with formula because she was afraid 
that the heroin she was using would pass into her breast milk, 
Brown responded, “Yes, and it wasn’t just that.  It was also the lack 
of milk that I was producing.”  When the investigator suggested to 
Brown that perhaps she had intentionally passed drugs to Dae-
Lynn in her breast milk to try to alleviate her withdrawal 
symptoms, Brown responded, “I never had that thought even come 
across my mind.” 
 
2.  Evidence Related to Baby’s Death 
Dae-Lynn died in the fifth day of her life.  In the early 
morning hours, Brown and Reed smoked heroin.  Later, Brown fed 
Dae-Lynn a couple of times, giving her breast milk and infant 
formula.  Mid-morning, Brown fell asleep, putting the baby face 
down between her and Reed on the hotel room bed.  Dae-Lynn woke 
up again once, crying, and Brown repositioned her so she was lying 
next to Brown, under Brown’s arm.  Around noon, a housekeeper 
woke Brown and Reed and told them they needed to go to the office 
and pay if they were planning to stay another night, but they fell 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
back asleep without paying.  Before falling asleep, Brown looked at 
Dae-Lynn, who was breathing normally. 
Around 1:00 p.m., hotel management woke Brown and Reed, 
telling them they had to leave unless they paid for another night.  
Brown went to the door to pay, then checked on Dae-Lynn.  Though 
the baby’s body was warm, she was not breathing.  Brown told Reed 
to call 911.  The dispatcher sent an ambulance and instructed 
Brown over the phone on how to administer CPR, which she did 
until paramedics arrived.  Shortly after arriving at the hospital, 
Dae-Lynn was pronounced dead.  
When the police investigator asked Brown later that day 
what she thought caused Dae-Lynn’s death, she said she thought 
maybe she had accidentally suffocated her daughter in her sleep.  
When he asked her whether she suffocated Dae-Lynn on purpose, 
she denied any intent to harm her daughter and expressed her love 
for Dae-Lynn and excitement about being a mom.  When the police 
investigator told Brown six months later, at the time of her arrest, 
that the autopsy report said her baby had died from exposure to 
methamphetamine and heroin, Brown responded: “[T]hat . . . kills 
me because I was only trying to help her.  I didn’t wanna try to 
harm my daughter at all.  I never would intentionally.”1 
 
3.  Jury Instructions 
 
The trial court instructed the jury that to find Brown guilty 
of murder, it must find she intentionally committed a prohibited 
act or intentionally failed to perform a required act “with a specific 
 
1  
The prosecutor put on several witnesses to testify about 
potential causes of Dae-Lynn’s death.  Brown raised a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence that Dae-Lynn’s death was caused 
by poison, which the Court of Appeal rejected.  This issue is not 
before us, and we express no view on it.    
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
intent and/or mental state” that would be explained in the murder 
instruction.  In the murder instruction, the court explained that to 
convict Brown of murder in the first or second degree, the jury had 
to find that she committed “an act” that was a substantial factor in 
causing the victim’s death with the mental state of malice 
aforethought.  As to the act requirement, the court further 
instructed that a parent’s “failure to act” in accordance with the 
duty to “provide care, obtain medical attention and protect a child 
. . . is the same as doing any . . . injurious act.”  As to the mental 
state requirement, the court explained that malice can be either 
express, meaning the defendant “unlawfully intended to kill,” or 
implied, meaning that: (1) “she intentionally committed an act,” (2) 
“the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous 
to human life,” (3) “[a]t the time she acted, she knew her act was 
dangerous to human life,” and (4) “she deliberately acted with 
conscious disregard for human life.”  The court elaborated: 
“[M]alice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the 
victim. . . .  It does not require deliberation or the passage of any 
period of time.” 
On the degree of murder, the trial court explained:  “If you 
decide the defendant committed murder, it is murder of the second 
degree, unless the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that it is murder of the first degree . . . .”  The trial court then 
instructed the jury on the additional finding it would have to make 
to convict Brown of first degree murder:  “The defendant is guilty 
of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant 
murdered by using poison.  Poison is a substance applied externally 
to the body or introduced into the body that can kill by its own 
inherent qualities.”  The court did not instruct the jury that it 
needed to find that Brown had any particular, heightened mental 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
state in giving the poison to the victim to find her guilty of murder 
in the first degree rather than in the second degree. 
 
4. Verdict and Sentencing 
The jury convicted Brown of the first degree murder by poison 
of Dae-Lynn, among other offenses not at issue.  The trial court 
imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for that count.  
 
B.  Court of Appeal Proceedings 
On appeal, Brown contended that the jury instruction on first 
degree poison murder was incomplete because it did not inform the 
jury that the defendant must administer the poison willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation.  In an unpublished opinion, 
the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, concluding:  “[I]t 
appears the People need only prove that the killing was caused by 
administration of poison, and that the killing was done with malice.  
Such a killing is first degree murder as a matter of law.” 2 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We granted review to determine whether, to prove first 
degree murder by poison, it is enough for the prosecution to show 
the defendant’s use of poison was a substantial factor in causing 
the victim’s death, or whether instead the prosecution must show 
the defendant acted with a particular mental state when using the 
poison, separate from the showing of malice that would support a 
conviction of second degree murder.  We also agreed to decide 
 
2  
We are not aware of any other case, and the Attorney General 
has cited none, in which an appellate court in this country has 
upheld a first degree murder conviction of a drug-addicted mother 
whose baby died after drinking breast milk containing controlled 
substances the mother had consumed. 
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
whether reversal of Brown’s first degree murder conviction would 
be required if we concluded the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct on the mental state required for first degree poison 
murder.  For the reasons discussed below, we hold that to elevate 
a murder to the first degree, it is not enough for the prosecution to 
prove the use of poison was a substantial cause of the victim’s 
death; instead, the prosecution must prove the defendant 
deliberately gave the victim poison with the intent to kill the victim 
or inflict injury likely to cause the victim’s death. Because we 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would 
have found Brown guilty of first degree murder had it been so 
instructed, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  
A.  Instructional Error 
A trial court must instruct on each element of a charged 
offense, even when the defendant does not propose a complete 
instruction or object to the court’s failure to provide one.  (People v. 
Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824.)  In this case, the trial court did 
not instruct the jurors that they were required to find Brown had 
used the poison with any particular, heightened mental state to 
convict her of murder in the first degree.  Rather, its instruction on 
the degree of murder permitted the jurors to find Brown guilty of 
first degree murder if they found that she committed murder and 
the use of poison was a substantial factor in causing her daughter’s 
death.  Under these instructions, second degree implied malice 
murder became first degree murder based on the act of using poison 
alone; the jury was not required to find that Brown acted with a 
more culpable mental state when feeding her daughter her breast 
milk.  
To determine whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct 
on the mental state element of first degree murder by poison, we 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
must first determine whether there is such an element.  Brown 
argues a poison murder is only in the first degree if the killer 
poisoned the victim on purpose, with the calculated deliberation 
and cold-blooded intent that renders first degree murder more 
deplorable than second degree murder, and that the trial court’s 
failure to instruct on this mental state was error.  The Attorney 
General disagrees, arguing that no instruction on the mental state 
specific to the act of poisoning was required because all murders by 
means of poison are categorically murders in the first degree.  In 
the Attorney General’s view, the act of using poison suffices to 
elevate an implied malice murder to the first degree. 
 
 
1.  Language, Context, and History of Penal Code  
 
 
Section 189 
  To resolve this dispute, we begin with an examination of the 
statutory language in its historical context.  Penal Code section 187 
defines “murder” as “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with 
malice aforethought.”  (Id., subd. (a).)3  Section 189 describes the 
two degrees of murder, defining first degree murder to include, in 
relevant part, “[a]ll murder that is perpetrated by means of a 
destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, 
knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal 
or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . .”  (§ 189, subd. 
(a).)  Second degree murder is defined by exclusion:  All murder 
that is not first degree murder is “of the second degree.”  (Id. subd. 
(b).)   
 
3  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
 This division of murder into two degrees — and the 
designation of murders by means of poison, lying in wait, and 
torture as kinds of first degree premeditated murder — has been 
part of California law since before the adoption of the Penal Code.  
California’s first murder statute, enacted in 1850, defined murder 
as “the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice 
aforethought, either express or implied” and provided only one 
penalty for murder: death.  (Garfielde & Snyder Compiled Cal. 
Laws, § 19 (1853); id., § 21.)  In 1856, the Legislature amended the 
statute to designate two degrees of murder.  (Stats. 1856, ch. 139, 
§ 1, p. 219; People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 168 (Wiley).)  
Death remained the only punishment for first degree murder; 
second degree murder was punishable by a term of imprisonment 
“not less than ten years and which may extend to life.”  (Hittell’s, 
supra, par. 1425, § 21; Wiley, at p. 168.)  As part of the 1856 
amendment, the Legislature designated as first degree murders 
those “perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or 
by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”  
(Hittell’s, supra, par. 1425, § 21.)  When the Legislature adopted 
the Penal Code in 1872, it carried over this division between first 
degree murder and second degree murder into section 189.  
Although other kinds of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” 
killing have been added to section 189 since its enactment, the 
relevant language — “[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by means 
of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first 
degree. . . ” — remains substantially unchanged to this day.  (1872 
Pen. Code, § 189.)  
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
Explaining the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 189, 
the California Code Commission4 noted that the division of murder 
into two degrees was based on the “manifest injustice” of inflicting 
the death penalty in cases involving killings that “differed greatly 
from each other in the degree of atrociousness.”  (Code commrs., 
note foll., Ann. Pen. Code, § 189 (1st ed. 1872, Haymond & Burch, 
commrs.-annotators) p. 82.)  The Commission’s notes quote with 
approval our 1864 opinion in Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. 17, in which 
we described the Legislature’s basis for distinguishing the two 
degrees of murder as follows: “In order to constitute murder of the 
first degree there must be something more than a malicious or 
intentional killing. . . . [¶]  In dividing murder into two degrees, the 
Legislature intended to assign to the first, as deserving of greater 
punishment, all murders of a cruel and aggravated character; and 
to the second all other kinds of murder which are murder at 
common law; and to establish a test by which the degree of every 
case of murder may be readily ascertained.  That test may be thus 
stated:  Is the killing wilful, (that is to say, intentional,) deliberate, 
and premeditated?  If it is, the case falls within the first, and if not, 
within the second degree.”  (Id. at pp. 28–29; see code commrs., note 
foll., Ann. Pen. Code, § 189, supra, at pp. 82–83.)  As to murders by 
poison, lying in wait, and torture, we observed that the Legislature 
considered the means used to “carry with them conclusive evidence 
of premeditation”5 because these means of killing, by their nature, 
 
4  
In construing the Penal Code of 1872, the Code 
Commissioners’ notes are entitled to substantial weight because 
the commissioners drafted the code.  (Keeler v. Superior Court 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 630.) 
5  
In later cases, we moved away from the concept of 
“conclusive” proof, referring instead to proof of murder by means of 
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
involve “the deliberate and preconceived intent to kill.”  (Sanchez, 
at pp. 29–30.)   
This history shows the Legislature specified that “[a]ll murder 
that is perpetrated by means of . . . poison, lying in wait, [or] 
torture . . . is murder of the first degree” because it considered such 
murders to be kinds of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing,” and as such deserving of the greater punishment reserved 
for first degree murders, which at the time of section 189’s 
enactment was death.  (§ 189, subd. (a); see People v. Milton (1904) 
145 Cal. 169, 170 (Milton) [the means of poison, lying in wait, and 
torture “furnish evidence of willfulness, deliberation, and 
premeditation” because the statute designates these means as 
kinds of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing”].)  In 
designating murders carried out by these means as first degree 
murder, the Legislature intended to require “something more” than 
the showing of a malicious or intentional killing required for second 
degree murder — something equivalent in turpitude to willfulness, 
deliberation, and premeditation.  (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. at p. 28; 
id. at p. 29.)6   
 
 
poison, lying in wait, or torture as “the functional equivalent of 
proof of premeditation, deliberation and intent to kill” (People v. 
Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 614 (Ruiz)), and observing that a 
showing of murder by one of these means “obviates the necessity of 
separately proving premeditation and deliberation . . . .”  (People v. 
Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 162.)  
6  
As noted, murder by means of poison, lying in wait, and 
torture all appeared in the statute at its inception.  (Pt. II.A.1, ante, 
at pp. 11–12.)  We express no opinion on other categories of first 
degree murder that the Legislature subsequently added to section 
189. 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
 
 
2.  First Degree Murder by Torture, Lying in Wait, and 
 
 
Other Means 
While an examination of the language of section 189 in its 
historical context reveals the Legislature’s intent to require proof 
of “something more” than malice to elevate a murder by means of 
torture, lying in wait, or poison to the first degree, it reveals little 
about what that “something more” might be.  (Sanchez, supra, 
24 Cal. at p. 28.)  For that, we turn to our case law.  We have never 
been asked to directly address what mental state in the 
administration of poison is required to elevate a poison murder to 
the first degree.  We have, however, addressed this question in the 
contexts of murder by torture and by lying in wait — the two other 
kinds of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” that section 
189 has listed as categorically “murder of the first degree” since its 
enactment.  In both contexts, we have concluded that more than 
malice is required; the defendant must have committed the 
designated act with a specific mental state that is equivalent to 
willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation.   
We discussed the mental state component of murder by 
means of torture in People v. Heslen (1945) 163 P.2d 21 (Heslen), 
concluding that “the requirement of an intent to cause pain and 
suffering” is implicit in the word “torture.”  (Id. at p. 27.)  Later, in 
People v. Tubby (1949) 34 Cal.2d 72, we emphasized that “[t]he 
dictionary definition [of torture] was appropriately enlarged upon 
by this court” in Heslen to include “intent . . . to cause cruel 
suffering.”  (Tubby, at pp. 76–77.)  We further elaborated on this 
definition in Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 546, explaining that 
first degree “murder by means of torture” is “murder committed 
with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme 
and prolonged pain.”   We reasoned: “In labeling torture as a ‘kind’ 
of premeditated killing, the Legislature requires the same proof of 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
deliberation and premeditation for first degree torture murder that 
it does for other types of first degree murder.”  (Ibid.)  We went on 
to explain: “It is not the amount of pain inflicted which 
distinguishes a torturer from another murderer, as most killings 
involve significant pain.  [Citation.]  Rather, it is the state of mind 
of the torturer — the cold-blooded intent to inflict pain for personal 
gain or satisfaction — which society condemns.  Such a crime is 
more susceptible to the deterrence of first degree murder sanctions 
and comparatively more deplorable than lesser categories of 
murder.”  (Ibid.)  Our holding in Steger thus rested on the premise 
that the requirement that the defendant have a mental state of 
“wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and 
prolonged pain” was necessary to preserve the distinction between 
calculated, deliberate murder, which is murder in the first degree, 
and other types of intentional or malicious killing, which are second 
degree murder.  (Id. at p. 546; id. at pp. 544–546 & fn. 2; see Wiley, 
supra, 18 Cal.3rd at p. 168 [torture designated as first degree 
murder in part because “the calculated nature of the acts causing 
death” make torture particularly reprehensible]; People v. Cole 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227 [same].) 
In People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92, we addressed the 
mental state question in the context of first degree murder by lying 
in wait.  We began by noting the need for interpretation of the 
statutory language before declaring that a “literal[]” understanding 
of the term lying in wait includes “[t]he elements of waiting, 
watching, and secrecy.”  (Id. at p. 101; id. at p. 100.)  Elaborating 
on this understanding, we since have established that “it is not 
sufficient to merely show the elements of waiting, watching and 
concealment.  It must also be shown that the defendant did those 
physical acts with the intent to take [the] victim unawares and for 
the purpose of facilitating [the] attack.”  (People v. Mattison (1971) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
4 Cal.3d 177, 183 (Mattison); see Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 448 [“The concealment required for lying in wait ‘is that which 
puts the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the 
factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant’s 
plan to take the victim by surprise’ ”]; People v. Laws (1993) 
12 Cal.App.4th 786, 795 (Laws) [lying in wait involves the “intent 
to watch and wait for the purpose of gaining advantage and taking 
the victim unawares in order to facilitate the act which constitutes 
murder”].)  We have also established that the defendant must act 
with a “ ‘wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause 
death,’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1148), and the period of 
lying in wait must be sufficient to show that the defendant had 
“ ‘ “a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation” ’ ” 
(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 202).   Only upon these 
specific showings of the defendant’s mental state in lying in wait 
do we consider the defendant to have acted with “the functional 
equivalent of” a premeditated, deliberate intent to kill (People v. 
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 764, 794 (Stanley)), such that “no further 
evidence of premeditation and deliberation is required in order to 
convict the defendant of first degree murder” (People v. Sandoval 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416).  
Thus, in both the torture-murder context and the lying-in-wait 
context, we have given content to the bare statutory requirement 
that a first degree murder be “perpetrated by means of . . . poison, 
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing.”  (§ 189, subd. (a).)  At the same time, we 
have emphasized that separate proof of premeditated intent to kill 
is not required in either context. (See Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 
at p. 1149 [lying in wait special circumstance requires “ ‘an 
intentional murder,’ ” whereas first degree murder requires “ ‘only 
a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
death’ ”]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 
(Davenport) [special circumstance can be “distinguished from 
murder by torture under section 189” because for the torture-
murder special circumstance “the defendant must have acted with 
the intent to kill”].)  Our narrow constructions of “torture” and 
“lying in wait” effectuate the Legislature’s understanding that a 
murder by these means involves, by its nature, a mental state more 
“cruel and aggravated” than malice — a mental state equivalent in 
turpitude to willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation — but 
that it need not involve the premeditated intent to kill.  (Sanchez, 
supra, 24 Cal. at p. 29; Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 546, fn. 2; 
Laws, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.)   
 
 
3.  First Degree Murder by Means of Poison 
 
This case brings to light the need for us to elaborate on the 
meaning of the phrase “murder . . . perpetrated by means of . . . 
poison,” just as prior cases have required us to elaborate on the 
meanings of “torture” and “lying in wait.”  (§ 189, subd. (a).)  Since 
first degree murder by poison shares a legislative history and 
purpose with first degree murder by lying in wait and by torture, 
it would be incongruous not to read a similar state of mind 
requirement — one equivalent in turpitude to willful, deliberate, 
premeditated intent to kill — into first degree poison murder.  
Latent ambiguity in the term “poison,” as in the terms “torture” 
and “lying in wait,” further suggests the need to clarify the mental 
state requirement.  The standard instruction the trial court gave 
in this case defines poison as “a substance, applied externally to 
the body or introduced into the body, that can kill by its own 
inherent qualities.”  (CALCRIM No. 521.)  But the use of a 
substance that is inherently capable of killing does not in and of 
itself render a murder particularly reprehensible.  (Cf. People v. 
Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 [vehicular homicide with 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
implied malice is second degree murder].)  And many poisonous 
substances can be used to help people in the correct quantities, 
circumstances, and applications.  (See, e.g., People v. Archerd 
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 615 (Archerd) [insulin]; People v. Jennings (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 616 (Jennings) [sedatives].)  Indeed, as one court has 
observed, “[a] fundamental tenet of toxicology is that the ‘dose 
makes the poison’ and that all chemical agents, including water, 
are harmful if consumed in large quantities, while even the most 
toxic substances are harmless in minute quantities.”  (Mancuso v. 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 56 F.Supp.2d 
391, 403.)  The knowing administration of a substance capable of 
causing death — even under conditions demonstrating a conscious 
disregard of that risk — does not show a state of mind equivalent 
to “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.”  (§ 189, subd. (a).)   
The Attorney General attempts to distinguish poison murder 
from murder by torture and lying in wait by arguing that poison is 
more closely analogous to the additional means of murder the 
Legislature designated as first degree murder after the Penal 
Code’s enactment: murders by means of “destructive device or 
explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, [or] knowing use of 
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor.”  He 
argues that torture and lying in wait are “methods” of murder, 
while poison (like a weapon of mass destruction) is a “mechanism” 
by which a murder may be committed.  This argument ignores the 
plain language of section 189, which does not distinguish between 
“methods” and “mechanisms,” but instead lists torture and lying in 
wait alongside poison as “means” of first degree murder.  It also 
ignores the legislative history of section 189, which originally listed 
poison, lying in wait, and torture as the three “means” of murder 
that are prototypical kinds of “wilful, deliberate, and premeditated” 
killing.  (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. at p. 28; id. at pp. 29–30.)  
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
Regardless of whether proof of the defendant’s mental state is 
required to elevate to the first degree a murder by means of 
destructive device, explosive, weapon of mass destruction, or 
armor-piercing ammunition — a question we do not reach in this 
case — their subsequent addition to section 189 does not provide a 
basis for distinguishing poison from lying in wait and torture with 
respect to the required mental state.  
 
That the Legislature would consider poison murder — like 
murder by lying in wait or torture — to be a kind of “wilful, 
deliberate, and premeditated” killing (Hittell’s, supra, par. 1425, § 
21) makes sense when we think of the typical poison murder, in 
which the defendant intentionally and surreptitiously administers 
a deadly dose of poison to an unsuspecting victim.  The poison 
murder cases we have decided to date generally follow this pattern.  
In People v. Albertson (1944) 23 Cal.2d 550 (Albertson), the 
defendant was accused of putting cyanide in vitamin capsules and 
mailing them to the victim with a letter advertising them as 
“ ‘ “vitalizing vitamin vigor.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 559; id. at p. 563.)  In 
Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d 615, the defendant injected two of his 
wives and his nephew with massive doses of insulin, causing 
diabetic shock.  (Id. at pp. 625–626, 631–635.)  In People v. Diaz 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 (Diaz), a nurse murdered 12 intensive care 
unit patients by injecting them with overdoses of lidocaine.  (Id. at 
pp. 517–518, 538.)  In People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81 (Catlin), 
the defendant murdered his wife and mother by giving them the 
highly toxic weed-killer paraquat.  (Id. at pp. 99–103.)  And in 
People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 (Blair), the defendant 
murdered his drinking companion by putting cyanide in a bottle of 
gin, carefully replacing the cap so the bottle appeared unopened, 
and having the bottle delivered to the victim by a mutual friend.  
(Id. at pp. 745–746.)  
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
Court of Appeal cases likewise follow this pattern.  In People v. 
Botkin (1908) 9 Cal.App. 244, the defendant murdered her lover’s 
wife by sending her a box of candy containing arsenic “with intent 
that [she] should eat thereof and be killed thereby.”  (Id. at p. 249.)  
In People v. Potigian (1924) 69 Cal.App. 257, the defendant gave 
arsenic to her stepdaughter “with intent to bring about her death.”  
(Id. at p. 264.)  And in People v. Cobler (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 375 
(Cobler), the defendant murdered her husband by slipping 
strychnine into a glass of milk and giving it to him to drink with 
his breakfast.  (Id. at pp. 377–379.)   
In each of these cases, the way the defendant carried out the 
poisoning left no question that the defendant deliberately gave the 
victim poison, if not with the intent to kill, at least with the intent 
to inflict injury likely to cause the victim’s death.  Perhaps for this 
reason, none of these cases directly addresses whether the 
prosecution must prove the defendant had a specific, heightened 
mental state in giving the victim the poison to elevate a poison 
murder to the first degree, and if so, what mental state the 
prosecution must prove.  Our case law does, however, provide some 
guidance on these questions.   
 
In Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pages 184–186, we addressed 
the distinction between second degree felony murder based on 
felony poisoning in violation of section 3477 and first degree poison 
murder, of which the jury had acquitted the defendant.  The 
 
7  
Mattison predated Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.), which amended section 188 to provide that except in the 
case of first degree felony murder, “in order to be convicted of 
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.  
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her 
participation in a crime.”  (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Senate Bill No. 1437 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2; Stats. 2018, c. 1015.) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
defendant argued that second degree poison murder is “legally 
impossible” because all murders in which poison caused the death 
are in the first degree.  (Mattison, at p. 180; id. at pp. 181–182.)  We 
rejected this argument, concluding that a jury could have properly 
found the defendant guilty of second degree felony murder by 
means of poison.  (Id. at p. 182.)  We reasoned that the difference 
between first degree murder by poison and second degree felony 
murder in violation of section 347 — which prohibits poisoning 
food, drinks, and medicine — is the state of mind with which the 
defendant gave the victim the poison.  (Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 
at p. 186.)  At the time, section 347 required the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant “ ‘willfully mingle[d] any poison with any 
food, drink or medicine, with intent that the same shall be taken 
by any human being to his injury . . . .’ ”  (Mattison, at p. 184, 
quoting Pen. Code, former § 347.)  We observed that “[b]y making 
it a felony to administer poison with the intent to cause any injury, 
the Legislature has evidenced its concern for the dangers involved 
in such conduct, and the invocation of the second degree felony-
murder rule in such cases when unforeseen death results serves 
further to deter such dangerous conduct.”  (Mattison, at p. 186.)  We 
emphasized, however, that “[t]o go further” and hold the 
commission of felony poisoning could both substitute for the 
required element of malice and elevate the murder to first degree 
“would make the use of poison serve double duty and result in 
criminal liability out of all proportion to the ‘turpitude of the 
offender.’ ”  (Ibid.; see Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 745 [observing 
that death resulting from a poisoning carried out with “intent to 
injure or intoxicate the victim” is second degree felony murder].)  
Drawing parallels to the lying in wait and torture contexts, we 
observed that “[w]hen it is contended that a killing was committed 
by poison it likewise must be established that the killing was 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
murder.  ‘[I]t is not enough to show that a poison was administered 
and that a death resulted.  If the poison was innocently given under 
the belief that it was a harmless drug and that no serious results 
would follow, there would be no malice, express or implied, and any 
resulting death would not be murder. [Citation.] If, however, the 
defendant administered poison to his victim for an evil purpose, so 
that malice aforethought is shown, it is no defense that he did not 
intend or expect the death of his victim.’ ”  (Mattison, supra, 
4 Cal.3d at p. 183.)   
 
The parties debate the significance of these observations.  
The Attorney General cites Mattison in support of his argument 
that a showing of implied malice in giving the victim poison is 
sufficient to elevate it to the first degree.  He would have us read 
Mattison as holding that if the prosecution proves the defendant 
administered the deadly poison with malice, the murder is 
categorically first degree murder.  Brown contends that Mattison’s 
observation that the poisoning must be done with an “ ‘evil 
purpose’ ” supports her construction of the statutory language as 
requiring something more than malice in the administration of the 
poison.  (Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 183.)  Mattison does not 
clearly support either position.   
 
In Mattison, we were not called upon to decide whether the 
prosecution must prove a state of mind in the administration of 
poison that is more culpable than malice for the murder to be in 
the first degree.  Instead, the question before us was whether the 
defendant had been validly convicted of second degree murder by 
means of poison.  (Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 180–182.)  We 
did not identify the specific mental state necessary to elevate a 
murder by means of poison to the first degree.  However, our 
holding rested on the premise that to be a first degree murder, the 
act of using poison must be carried out with a state of mind more 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
culpable than that associated with second degree murder on a 
felony murder theory, i.e., more culpable than “ ‘willfully 
mingl[ing] any poison with any food, drink or medicine, with intent 
that the same shall be taken by any human being to his injury 
. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 184.) 
While Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at page 186 made clear that to 
prove first degree murder by poison, the prosecution must show a 
mental state more culpable than willful administration of poison 
with intent to injure, our cases have also made clear it is not 
necessary to prove the defendant administered the poison with  
intent to kill.8  This rule emerged out of automatic appeals in death 
penalty cases, in which we distinguished first degree poison 
murder from the poison-murder special circumstance, which 
requires that “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim by the 
administration of poison.”  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(19).)  In Catlin, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at page 158, we relied in part on the special 
circumstance’s intent to kill requirement to reject the defendant’s 
challenge to the special circumstance as inadequately narrowing 
the class of death-eligible defendants.  We observed that first 
degree poison murder encompasses a broader class of defendants 
than the poison murder special circumstance because “[t]he special 
circumstance allegation, unlike the definition of first degree 
murder by poison, requires proof that the defendant intentionally 
killed the victim.”  (Ibid.)  In Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th 616, we 
relied on the special circumstance’s intent to kill requirement to 
reject the defendant’s claim that the jury’s “not true” finding on the 
poison murder special circumstance meant that “he could not have 
 
8  
As noted above, we have reached similar conclusions in the 
torture and lying in wait contexts.  (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 1148; Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 271.) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
been convicted of first degree murder by poison.”  (Id. at p. 639.)  In 
Jennings, parents intentionally gave three powerful sedatives to 
their five-year-old son, whom they had been starving and brutally 
beating.  (Id. at pp. 630–634, 640–641.)  The defendant — the 
child’s father — argued that because the jury had found the poison 
murder special circumstance “not true,” it could not have based its 
first degree murder verdict on a poison murder theory.  (Id. at 
p. 639.)  In rejecting this argument, we reasoned that the jury’s not 
true finding did not necessarily mean it had acquitted the 
defendant of first degree murder because a showing of intent to kill 
is not necessary to prove first degree murder when a murder is by 
means of poison.  (Id. at pp. 639–640.)9   
 
9  
The Attorney General relies on Jennings to argue that all 
that is required for a first degree poison murder conviction is a 
showing of malice.  He points out that, in distinguishing the special 
circumstance, we observed “the jury still could have reasonably 
found defendant guilty of first degree murder by poison” even if it 
did not find he acted with premeditated intent to kill “if it found 
that either codefendant acted with implied malice.”  (Jennings, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 640.)  It is true that Jennings addressed the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of first degree 
poison murder.  (Id. at pp. 639–641.)  But we were not presented 
with the question we now consider:  whether a showing of a mental 
state more culpable than malice in connection with administering 
the poison is required to elevate a murder by means of poison from 
the second degree to the first degree.  Read in this context, the 
portion of Jennings on which the Attorney General relies simply 
reiterates that separate proof of premeditated intent to kill is not 
required to establish that a murder by means of poison is in the 
first degree.  (See also Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 538 [rejecting 
defendant’s argument for reversal based on insufficient evidence of 
“premeditation and deliberation” on the ground that the evidence 
showed the murders “could not have been spontaneous acts” and 
observing that where “a murder is accomplished by means of 
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
In summary, the act of killing by poison may support a finding 
of a second degree murder, a first degree murder, or a special 
circumstance.  The distinguishing factor is the defendant’s mental 
state.  Like a murder by means of torture or lying in wait, a murder 
by means of poison is first degree murder when evidence of how the 
defendant carried out the poisoning demonstrates a mental state 
that is “the functional equivalent of proof of premeditation, 
deliberation and intent to kill.”  (Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 614; 
see Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. at p. 29 [in context of poison, lying in 
wait, and torture, the means used provide “conclusive evidence of 
premeditation”]; Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 546 [“same proof of 
deliberation and premeditation” required for torture murder as “for 
other types of first degree murder”].)  The use of poison, standing 
alone, does not fulfill this requirement unless it is carried out with 
a state of mind more culpable than the malice required for a second 
degree murder conviction, i.e., more culpable than either (a) 
intending to kill the victim without premeditation and deliberation 
(i.e., express malice), or (b) intentionally giving the victim poison 
knowing that doing so was dangerous to human life and with 
conscious disregard for human life (i.e., implied malice).  While no 
separate showing of premeditated intent to kill is required for first 
degree murder by poison (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 639–
640), the poisoning nevertheless must be carried out with a mental 
state more culpable than malice.  
 We now clarify that to prove a murder by poison is in the first 
degree, 
the 
prosecution 
must 
show 
that 
the 
defendant 
 
poison,” proof of premeditated and deliberate intent to kill is not 
required].) 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
deliberately10 gave the victim poison with the intent to kill the 
victim or inflict injury likely to cause the victim’s death.11  Reading 
this requirement into “murder . . . by means of poison” (§ 189, subd. 
(a)) ensures that a first degree poison murder is equivalent in 
turpitude to a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, without 
calling into question our prior cases holding that the prosecution 
need not separately prove premeditated intent to kill.12  As 
discussed, the fact that the defendant killed the victim with poison 
is not alone dispositive.  Instead, it is the defendant’s mental state 
in giving the victim the poison that determines whether the act is 
murder and if so, whether the murder is in the first or second 
degree.  A murder carried out by deliberately giving the victim 
poison with the intent to kill the victim or inflict injury likely to 
 
10  
In this context, “deliberately” means carefully weighing the 
considerations for and against a choice and, knowing the 
consequences, deciding to act.  (See CALCRIM No. 521.)   
11  
Brown proposes we hold that first degree poison murder 
“requires proof that defendant willfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation administered the poison” to the victim.  This does 
not quite capture the Legislature’s intent in designating poison 
murder as murder in the first degree.  A poison may be given 
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation with an intent to 
sicken, injure, or intoxicate the victim, or even with benign intent.  
(Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 745; Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 
p. 183.)  It is the defendant’s deliberately giving the victim the 
substance with the intent to kill the victim or inflict injury likely 
to cause the victim’s death that makes a poison murder equivalent 
in its “degree of atrociousness” to a premeditated murder.  (Code 
commrs., note foll., Ann. Pen. Code, § 189, supra, at p. 82; Milton, 
supra, 145 Cal. at pp. 170–171; Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. at p. 29.)  
12  
Proof that the defendant deliberately gave the victim poison 
with intent to kill is sufficient, though not necessary (deliberately 
giving the victim the poison with the intent to inflict injury likely 
to cause the victim’s death would also be sufficient), to elevate a 
murder to the first degree.   
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
cause the victim’s death is more “cruel and aggravated” than other 
“malicious or intentional killing[s]” both because such a killing 
involves preparation and planning and because the killer 
intentionally deprives the victim of any chance of escape or self-
defense.  (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal. at pp. 29, 28; id. at p. 30; see 
Catlin, 
supra, 
26 Cal.4th 
at 
p. 159 
[“The 
poisoner 
acts 
surreptitiously, thus avoiding detection and defeating any chance 
at self-defense, and often betrays the most intimate trust”]; cf. 4 
Blackstone Commentaries 196 [“Of all species of deaths the most 
detestable is that of poison; because it can of all others be the least 
prevented either by manhood or forethought”].)  Such calculated, 
deliberate murders are both “more deplorable than others” and 
more easily “prevented than others by the deterrent effect of severe 
penalties.”  (Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 545.)  It is these 
characteristics that the Legislature had in mind when it 
designated murder by means of poison as a kind of first degree 
murder, for which the only punishment at the time was death.  (See 
Code commrs., note foll., Ann. Pen. Code, § 189, supra, at p. 82 
[division of murder into degrees based on “manifest injustice” of 
imposing death penalty in cases that “differed greatly from each 
other in the degree of atrociousness”].)  A first degree murder 
conviction based on the mere “use of poison,” without proof of a 
mental state more culpable than malice, would “result in criminal 
liability out of all proportion to the ‘turpitude of the offender.’ ”  
(Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 186, italics omitted.)   
While the trial court’s instructions required the jury to find 
Brown acted with implied malice, they did not require the jury to 
find that Brown acted with any specific, heightened mental state 
in feeding Dae-Lynn her breast milk.  The instructions thus 
allowed the jury to convict Brown of first degree murder without 
finding she deliberately gave her newborn daughter poison with 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
the intent to kill her or inflict injury likely to cause her death.  
Indeed, they permitted the jury to convict Brown of first degree 
murder even if it believed Brown fed her baby the breast milk with 
the intent to bond with her, nourish her, treat her illness, or soothe 
her.  Such a conviction would not reflect a jury finding that, in 
giving the victim the poison, the defendant acted with the 
“calculated deliberation” or “cold-blooded intent” we require to 
elevate a murder to the first degree.  (Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 
p. 546.)   
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was required to 
instruct the jury that to find Brown guilty of first degree murder, 
it had to find that she deliberately gave her newborn daughter 
poison with the intent to kill her or inflict injury likely to cause her 
death.  Its failure to so instruct was error. 
 
B.  Prejudice 
 The omission of an element of an offense from a jury 
instruction violates “the right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution” by depriving the 
defendant of “a jury properly instructed in the relevant law.”  (In 
re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1224; see Neder v. United States 
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 12 (Neder).)  Having found such an error, we 
must “examin[e] the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
consider[] all relevant circumstances.”  (People v. Aledamat (2019) 
8 Cal.5th 1, 13 (Aledamat).)  Unless, based on this examination, we 
conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” we reverse the 
conviction.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see 
Neder, at p. 15.)   
In a more typical murder by poison case, in which a defendant 
is alleged to have surreptitiously put arsenic in candy, cyanide in 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
vitamin capsules, or strychnine in a glass of milk, the record is 
likely to supply overwhelming evidence that the defendant 
deliberately gave the victim poison and did so, if not with the intent 
to kill the victim, then at least with the intent to inflict injury likely 
to cause the victim’s death.  (See, e.g., Albertson, supra, 23 Cal.2d 
550; Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 745–746; Cobler, supra, 
2 Cal.App.2d at pp. 377–379.)  In this more typical fact pattern, 
this mental state element also is likely to be uncontested, such that 
if a trial court has omitted it from the first degree murder 
instruction, we may conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that 
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.”  
(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17; see People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
400, 417 [missing element error “is harmless when ‘the omitted 
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same 
absent the error . . .’ ”].) 
 
This case, however, is different.  Based on the record here, a 
rational jury — if properly instructed — could have concluded the 
prosecution had not met its burden to prove that Brown 
deliberately gave her newborn daughter poison.  (See Neder, supra, 
527 U.S. at p. 19.)  A rational jury could have given credence to 
Brown’s statement that the thought of feeding her daughter drugs 
via her breast milk had never “even come across [her] mind.”  
Moreover, evidence in the record would allow a rational jury to 
conclude the prosecution had not met its burden to prove that 
Brown fed her daughter her breast milk with the intent to kill her 
or to inflict injury on her that was likely to cause her death.  In 
response to questions from the police investigator about the cause 
of Dae-Lynn’s death, Brown expressed her love for her daughter 
and her excitement about being a mom.  And when the investigator 
told Brown the autopsy report showed that drugs caused her 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
daughter’s death, she responded:  “[T]hat . . . kills me because I was 
only trying to help her.  I didn’t wanna try to harm my daughter at 
all.  I never would intentionally.”  Evidence that Brown was afraid 
authorities would take her newborn daughter from her and that 
she tried to save her daughter’s life by summoning help and 
administering CPR could also support a reasonable doubt as to 
whether Brown intended to kill her daughter or to injure her in a 
way likely to cause her death.   
 
Indeed, the prosecutor did not argue Brown intended to kill 
or even harm her daughter.  Instead, her closing argument focused 
the jury’s attention on Brown’s failure to perform her parental 
duties by taking illegal drugs while pregnant, failing to get 
prenatal care, giving birth in a hotel room without proper medical 
assistance, failing to take her baby to the doctor immediately after 
birth, failing to take her baby to the doctor when she began to 
suspect her baby was showing symptoms of withdrawal, and 
feeding her baby her breast milk after smoking methamphetamine 
and heroin.  Addressing Brown’s mental state in administering the 
poison, the prosecutor argued that “the only difference between 
first degree and second degree is that first degree requires . . . the 
People prove the murder was done by using poison.”  At the 
conclusion of her argument, the prosecutor emphasized that “you 
can still love someone but act intentionally and prove that you are 
acting intentionally because you repeat the behavior, knowing the 
consequences are dangerous to human life, knowing them because 
you are a drug user.  You are an addict yourself.  Performing them 
with knowledge that this is going to be dangerous and repeating 
them over and over again.  You can still do all of that and love the 
person that you are doing them to.  It’s one of the horrible parts 
about being a human being.  And that’s exactly what she did in this 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
case.  And she did it by introducing poison into her daughter’s 
system.”    
The Attorney General contends any instructional error was 
harmless because, in his view, the evidence at trial established that 
Brown knew the drugs she was taking would pass into her breast 
milk, but she still intentionally fed her baby the breast milk.  The 
Attorney General’s argument is based on a misconception of our 
task.  In assessing prejudice in this context, the question is not 
whether there is evidence in the record that would support a jury 
finding of the missing element.  Instead, we ask whether we can 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that “the jury verdict would 
have been the same” had the jury been instructed on the missing 
element.  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17.)  If “the record contains 
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with 
respect to the omitted element,” the error is prejudicial.  (Id. at 
p. 19.)  The Attorney General’s argument also is based on an 
incorrect understanding of the omitted element.  As we have 
clarified, administering poison with malice only supports a 
conviction of second degree murder; for first degree murder, the 
prosecution must show the defendant deliberately gave the victim 
the poison with the intent to kill the victim or inflict injury likely 
to cause death.  The Attorney General’s contention that Brown 
knew the drugs she was taking would pass into her breast milk and 
intentionally fed her baby the breast milk despite this knowledge 
fails to address the central question: whether Brown deliberately 
gave the drugs to her baby with the intent to kill her or inflict 
injury on her likely to cause her death.  
On this record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have found Brown guilty of first degree murder 
had it been instructed that to do so, it had to find that she 
deliberately gave her newborn daughter poison with the intent to 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
kill her or inflict injury likely to cause her death.  The omission of 
this element from the jury instructions was prejudicial. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the 
mental state element of first degree murder by poison and because 
this error was prejudicial, we reverse the judgment.  We remand to 
the Court of Appeal with directions to return the case to the 
superior court for further proceedings consistent with our 
opinion.13  
 
 
 
13  
On remand, the superior court shall consider the potential 
applicability of recent sentencing reforms, including Assembly Bill 
No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 
Reg. Sess.).  (§§ 654, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (b)(6).)  Our disposition 
leaves intact Brown’s conviction of child abuse (§ 237A) with an 
enhancement for willful harm or injury resulting in the death of a 
child (§ 12022.95), along with her convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance for sale (Health & Safety Code, § 11351) and 
possession of marijuana for sale (id. § 11359, subd. (b)).  The parties 
debate whether there is a legal basis for the trial court to accept a 
reduction of the first degree murder conviction to second degree 
murder if the prosecution decides not to retry the first degree 
murder charge.   (See Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 553; Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 168.)  We express no view on this question. 
 
PEOPLE v. BROWN 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Brown 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 7/16/19 – 3d Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S257631 
Date Filed:  March 2, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Shasta 
Judge:  Stephen H. Baker 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant 
Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall, Catherine Chatman, Christopher 
J. Rench, Rachelle A. Newcomb, A. Kay Lauterbach and Cameron M. 
Goodman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Amicus Populi as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
David L. Polsky 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 118 
Ashford, CT 06278 
(860) 429-5556 
 
Cameron M. Goodman  
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-6330