Title: San Diego School Dist. v. Comm. on State Mandates

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/2/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL  
) 
DISTRICT,  
) 
 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S109125 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES, ) 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1, No. D038027 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant; 
) 
__________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
) 
Sup. Ct. No. GIC737638 
FINANCE,  
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest 
) 
 
and Appellant. 
) 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Article XIII B, section 6, of the California Constitution provides:  “Whenever the 
Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any 
local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local 
government for the costs of such program or increased level of service . . . .”1  (Hereafter 
article XIII B, section 6.)   
                                             
 
1  
The provision continues:  “except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide 
such subvention of funds for the following mandates:  [¶]  (a)  Legislative mandates 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
2
 
Plaintiff San Diego Unified School District (District), like all other public school 
districts in the state, is, and was at the time relevant in this proceeding, governed by 
statutes that regulate the expulsion of students.  (Ed. Code, § 48900 et seq.)  Whenever an 
expulsion recommendation is made (and before a student may be expelled), the District is 
required by Education Code section 48918 to afford the student a hearing with various 
procedural protections — including notice of the hearing and the right to representation 
by counsel, preparation of findings of fact, notices related to any expulsion and the right 
of appeal, and preparation of a hearing record.  Providing these procedural protections 
requires the District to expend funds, for which the District asserts a right to 
reimbursement from the state pursuant to article XIII B, section 6, and implementing 
legislation, Government Code section 17500 et seq.   
 
We granted review to consider two questions:  (1)  Are the hearing costs incurred 
as a result of the mandatory actions related to expulsions that are compelled by Education 
Code section 48915 fully reimbursable — or are those hearing costs reimbursable only to 
the extent such costs are attributable to hearing procedures that exceed the procedures 
required by federal law?  (2)  Are any hearing costs incurred in carrying out expulsions 
that are discretionary under Education Code section 48915 reimbursable?  After we 
granted review and filed our decision in Department of Finance v. Commission on State 
Mandates (Kern High School Dist.) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727 (Kern High School Dist.), we 
added the following preliminary question to be addressed:  Do the Education Code 
statutes cited above establish a “new program” or “higher level of service” under article 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
requested by the local agency affected;  [¶]  (b)  Legislation defining a new crime or 
changing an existing definition of a crime; or  [¶]  (c)  Legislative mandates enacted prior 
to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation 
enacted prior to January 1, 1975.”   
 
3
XIII B, section 6?  Finally, we also asked the parties to brief the effect of the decision in 
Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, on the present case.   
 
We conclude that Education Code section 48915, insofar as it compels suspension 
and mandates a recommendation of expulsion for certain offenses, constitutes a “higher 
level of service” under article XIII B, section 6, and imposes a reimbursable state 
mandate for all resulting hearing costs — even those costs attributable to procedures 
required by federal law.  In this respect, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal.   
 
We also conclude that no hearing costs incurred in carrying out those expulsions 
that are discretionary under Education Code section 48915 — including costs related to 
hearing procedures claimed to exceed the requirements of federal law — are 
reimbursable.  As we shall explain, to the extent that statute makes expulsions 
discretionary, it does not reflect a new program or a higher level of service related to an 
existing program.  Moreover, even if the hearing procedures set forth in Education Code 
section 48918 constitute a new program or higher level of service, we conclude that this 
statute does not trigger any right to reimbursement, because the hearing provisions that 
assertedly exceed federal requirements are merely incidental to fundamental federal due 
process requirements and the added costs of such procedures are de minimis.  For these 
reasons, we conclude such hearing provisions should be treated, for purposes of ruling 
upon a request for reimbursement, as part of the nonreimbursable underlying federal 
mandate and not as a state mandate.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal insofar as it compels reimbursement of any costs incurred pursuant to 
discretionary expulsions.   
I 
A.  Education Code sections 48918 and 48915 
 
We first describe the relevant provisions of two statutes — Education Code 
sections 48918 and 48915 — pertaining to the expulsion of students from public schools.   
 
4
 
Education Code section 48918 specifies the right of a student to an expulsion 
hearing and sets forth procedures that a school district must follow when conducting such 
a hearing.  (Stats. 1990, ch. 1231, § 2, pp. 5136-5139.)2   
 
In identifying the right to a hearing, subdivision (a) of this statute declares that a 
student is “entitled” to an expulsion hearing within 30 days after the school principal 
determines that the student has committed an act warranting expulsion.3  In practical 
effect, this means that whenever a school principal makes such a determination and 
recommends to the school board that a student be expelled, an expulsion hearing is 
mandated.4   
                                             
 
2  
For purposes of our present inquiry, section 48918, at the time relevant here (mid-
1993 through mid-1994) read essentially as it had for the prior decade, and as it has in the 
ensuing decade.  That provision first was enacted in 1975 (see Stats. 1975, ch. 1253, §4, 
pp. 3277-3278) as Education Code, former section 10608.  (This enactment apparently 
was a response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez (1975) 
419 U.S. 565, 581 (Goss) [recognizing due process requirements applicable to public 
school students who are suspended for more than 10 days].)  The statute was renumbered 
as Education Code, former section 48914 in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 2, pp. 3589-
3590) and was substantially augmented in 1977 (Stats. 1977, ch. 965, § 24, pp. 2924-
2926).  After relatively minor amendments in 1978 and 1982, the section in 1983 was 
substantially restated, further augmented, and renumbered as Education Code section 
48918 (Stats. 1983, ch. 498, § 91, p. 2118).  Amendments adopted in 1984 and 1988 
made relatively minor changes, and further similar modifications were made in 1990, 
reflecting the version of the statute here at issue.  Subsequent amendments in 1995, 1996, 
1998, and 1999 made further changes that are irrelevant to the issue presented in the case 
now before us.   
3  
The provision reads:  “The pupil shall be entitled to a hearing to determine 
whether the pupil should be expelled.  An expulsion hearing shall be held within 30 
schooldays after the date the principal or the superintendent of schools determines that 
the pupil has committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 48900.”  (Subdivision (b) 
of the latter statute presently includes — as it did at the time relevant here — the offense 
of possession of a firearm.)   
4  
Of course, if a student does not invoke his or her entitlement to such a hearing, and 
instead waives the right to such a hearing, the hearing need not be held.   
 
5
 
In specifying the substantive and procedural requirements for such an expulsion 
hearing, Education Code section 48918 sets forth rules and procedures, some of which, 
the parties agree, codify requirements of federal due process and some of which may 
exceed those requirements.5  These rules and procedures govern, among other things, 
notice of a hearing and the right to representation by counsel, preparation of findings of 
fact, notices related to the expulsion and the right of appeal, and preparation of a hearing 
record.  (See § 48918, subds. (a) through former subd. (j) (currently subd. (k).)   
 
The second statute at issue in this matter is Education Code section 48915.  
Discrete subdivisions of this statute address circumstances in which a principal must 
recommend to the school board that a student be expelled, and circumstances in which a 
principal may recommend that a student be expelled.   
 
First, there is what the parties characterize as the “mandatory expulsion 
provision,” Education Code section 48915, former subdivision (b).  As it read during the 
time relevant in this proceeding (mid-1993 through mid-1994), this subdivision 
(1) compelled a school principal to immediately suspend any student found to be in 
possession of a firearm at school or at a school activity off school grounds, and 
(2) mandated a recommendation to the school district governing board that the student be 
expelled.  The provision further required the governing board, upon confirmation of the 
student’s knowing possession of a firearm, either to expel the student or “refer” him or 
                                             
 
5  
See Goss, supra, 419 U.S. 565, 581; Gonzalez v. McEuen (C.D.Cal. 1977) 435 
F.Supp. 460, 466-467 (concluding that former Education Code section 10608 [current 
§ 48918] met federal due process requirements pertaining to expulsions from public 
schools); 7 Witkin, Summary of California Law (9th ed. 1988), Constitutional Law, 
§ 549, p. 754 (noting that Education Code section 48918 and related legislation were 
enacted in response to the decision in Goss).   
 
6
her to an alternative education program housed at a separate school site.6  (Compare this 
former provision with current Ed. Code, § 48915, subds. (c) and (d).)7   
                                             
 
6  
An earlier and similar, albeit broader, version of the provision — extending not 
only to possession of firearms but also to possession of explosives and certain knives — 
existed briefly and was effective for approximately two and one-half months in late 1993.  
That initial statute, former section 48915, subdivision (b) (as amended Stats. 1993, ch. 
1255, § 2, pp. 7284-7285), which was effective only from October 11, 1993 through 
December 31, 1993, provided:  “The principal or the superintendent of schools shall 
immediately suspend pursuant to Section 48911, and shall recommend to the governing 
board the expulsion of, any pupil found to be in possession of a firearm, knife of no 
reasonable use to the pupil, or explosive at school or at a school activity off school 
grounds.  The governing board shall expel that pupil or, as an alternative, refer that pupil 
to an alternative education program, whenever the principal or the superintendent of 
schools and the governing board confirm that:  [¶]  (1)  The pupil was in knowing 
possession of the firearm, knife, or explosive.  [¶]  (2)  Possession of the firearm, knife of 
no reasonable use to the pupil, or explosive was verified by an employee of the school 
district.  [¶]  (3)  There was no reasonable cause for the pupil to be in possession of the 
firearm, knife, or explosive.”   
 
As subsequently amended by Statutes 1993, chapter 1256, section 2, pages 7286-
7287, effective January 1, 1994, Education Code section 48915, former subdivision (b), 
read:  “The principal or the superintendent of schools shall immediately suspend, 
pursuant to Section 48911, any pupil found to be in possession of a firearm at school or at 
a school activity off school grounds and shall recommend expulsion of that pupil to the 
governing board.  The governing board shall expel that pupil or refer that pupil to a 
program of study that is appropriately prepared to accommodate students who exhibit 
discipline problems and is not provided at a comprehensive middle, junior, or senior high 
school or housed at the schoolsite attended by the pupil at the time the expulsion was 
recommended to the school board, whenever the principal or superintendent of schools 
and the governing board confirm the following:  [¶]  (1)  The pupil was in knowing 
possession of the firearm.  [¶]  (2)  An employee of the school district verifies the pupil’s 
possession of the firearm.”   
7  
The current subdivisions set forth a list of mandatory expulsion conduct broader 
than that set forth in former subdivision (b), and require a school board both to expel and 
refer to other institutions all students found to have committed such conduct.  The present 
subdivisions read:  “(c)  The principal or superintendent of schools shall immediately 
suspend, pursuant to Section 48911, and shall recommend expulsion of a pupil that he or 
she determines has committed any of the following acts at school or at a school activity 
off school grounds:  [¶]  (1) Possessing, selling, or otherwise furnishing a firearm.  This 
subdivision does not apply to an act of possessing a firearm if the pupil had obtained 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
7
 
This provision, as it read at the time relevant here, did not mandate expulsion per 
se8 — but it did require immediate suspension followed by a mandatory expulsion 
recommendation (and it provided that a student found by the governing board to have 
possessed a firearm would be removed from the school site by limiting disposition to 
either expulsion or “referral” to an alternative school).  Moreover, as noted above, 
whenever expulsion is recommended a student has a right to an expulsion hearing.  
Accordingly, it is appropriate to characterize the former provision as mandating 
immediate suspension, a recommendation of expulsion, and hence, an expulsion hearing.  
For convenience, we accept the parties’ description of this aspect of Education Code 
section 48915 as constituting a “mandatory expulsion provision.”   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
prior written permission to possess the firearm from a certificated school employee, 
which is concurred in by the principal or the designee of the principal.  This subdivision 
applies to an act of possessing a firearm only if the possession is verified by an employee 
of a school district.  [¶]  (2)  Brandishing a knife at another person.  [¶]  (3)  Unlawfully 
selling a controlled substance listed in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11053) of 
Division 10 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶]  (4)  Committing or attempting to commit 
a sexual assault as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900 or committing a sexual 
battery as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900.  [¶]  (5)  Possession of an 
explosive.  [¶]  (d)  The governing board shall order a pupil expelled upon finding that the 
pupil committed an act listed in subdivision (c), and shall refer that pupil to a program of 
study that meets all of the following conditions:  [¶]  (1)  Is appropriately prepared to 
accommodate pupils who exhibit discipline problems.  [¶]  (2)  Is not provided at a 
comprehensive middle, junior, or senior high school, or at any elementary school.  [¶]  
(3) Is not housed at the schoolsite attended by the pupil at the time of suspension.”  
(Stats. 2001, ch. 116.) 
8 
As the Department of Finance observed in an August 22, 1994, communication to 
the Commission in this matter, “nothing in [Education Code section 48915] . . . requires a 
district governing board or a county board of education to expel a pupil,” and even 
“unauthorized and knowing possession of a firearm, does not result in mandated 
expulsion.  Section 48915 subdivision (b) provides for the choice of the governing board 
to either expel the pupil in possession of a firearm, or refer the pupil to an alternative 
program of study. . . .” 
 
8
 
The second aspect of Education Code section 48915 relevant here consists of what 
we shall call the “discretionary expulsion provision.”  (Id., former subd. (c), subsequently 
subd. (d), currently subd. (e).)  During the period relevant in this proceeding (as well as 
currently), this subdivision of Education Code section 48915 recognized that a principal 
possesses discretion to recommend that a student be expelled for specified conduct other 
than firearm possession (conduct such as damaging or stealing school property or private 
property, using or selling illicit drugs, receiving stolen property, possessing tobacco or 
drug paraphernalia, or engaging in disruptive behavior).  The former provision (like the 
current provision) further specified that the school district governing board “may” order a 
student expelled upon finding that the student, while at school or at a school activity off 
school grounds, engaged in such conduct.9   
                                             
 
9  
Education Code, section 48915, former subdivision (c) (as amended Stats. 1992, 
ch. 909, § 3, p. 4226; amended and redesignated as former subd. (d) by Stats. 1993, ch. 
1255, § 2, pp. 7284-7285; further amended Stats. 1993, ch. 1256, § 2, p. 7287, and Stats. 
1994, ch. 1198, § 7, p. 7271) provided, at the time relevant here:  “Upon recommendation 
by the principal, superintendent of schools, or by a hearing officer or administrative panel 
appointed pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 48918, the governing board may order a 
pupil expelled upon finding that the pupil violated subdivision (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), or 
(l) of Section 48900, or Section 48900.2 or 48900.3, and either of the following:  [¶]  (1)  
That other means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly failed to bring about 
proper conduct.  [¶]  (2)  That due to the nature of the violation, the presence of the pupil 
causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others.”  (Italics added.)   
 
At the time relevant here, subdivisions (f) through (l) of section 48900 (as 
amended Stats. 1992, ch. 909, § 1, pp. 4224-4225; Stats. 1994, ch. 1198, § 5, pp. 7269-
5270) provided:  “A pupil shall not be suspended from school or recommended for 
expulsion unless the superintendent or the principal of the school in which the pupil is 
enrolled determines that the pupil has:  . . .  [¶]  (f)  Caused or attempted to cause damage 
to school property or private property.  [¶]  (g)  Stolen or attempted to steal school 
property or private property.  [¶]  (h)  Possessed or used tobacco, or any products 
containing tobacco or nicotine products . . . .  However, this section does not prohibit use 
or possession by a pupil of his or her own prescription products.  [¶]  (i)  Committed an 
obscene act or engaged in habitual profanity or vulgarity.  [¶]  (j)  Had unlawful 
possession of, or unlawfully offered, arranged, or negotiated to sell any drug 
paraphernalia, as defined in Section 11014.5 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶]  (k)  
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
9
B.  Proceedings under Government Code section 17500 et seq. 
 
Procedures governing the constitutional requirement of reimbursement under 
article XIII B, section 6, are set forth in Government Code section 17500 et seq.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
Disrupted school activities or otherwise willfully defied the valid authority of 
supervisors, teachers, administrators, school officials, or other school personnel engaged 
in the performance of their duties.  [¶] (l)  Knowingly received stolen school property or 
private property.”  (Italics added.)   
 
At the time relevant here, section 48900.2 (Stats. 1992, ch. 909, § 2, p. 4225) 
provided:  “In addition to the reasons specified in Section 48900, a pupil may be 
suspended from school or recommended for expulsion if the superintendent or the 
principal of the school in which the pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has 
committed sexual harassment as defined in Section 212.5.  [¶]  For the purposes of this 
chapter, the conduct described in Section 212.5 must be considered by a reasonable 
person of the same gender as the victim to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to have a 
negative impact upon the individual’s academic performance or to create an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive educational environment.  This section shall not apply to pupils 
enrolled in kindergarten and grades 1 to 3, inclusive.” 
 
Section 48900.3 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1198, § 6, p. 7270), at the time relevant here, 
provided:  “In addition to the reasons specified in Sections 48900 and 48900.2, a pupil in 
any of grades 4 to 12, inclusive, may be suspended from school or recommended for 
expulsion if the superintendent or the principal of the school in which the pupil is 
enrolled determines that the pupil has caused, attempted to cause, threatened to cause, or 
participated in an act of, hate violence, as defined in subdivision (e) of [former] Section 
33032.5 [current section 233].”   
 
In addition, section 48900.4 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1017, § 1, p. 6196) provided, at the 
time relevant here: “In addition to the grounds specified in Sections 48900 and 48900.2, a 
pupil enrolled in any of grades 4 to 12, inclusive, may be suspended from school or 
recommended for expulsion if the superintendent or the principal of the school in which 
the pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has intentionally engaged in harassment, 
threats, or intimidation, directed against a pupil or group of pupils, that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to have the actual and reasonably expected effect of materially 
disrupting classwork, creating substantial disorder, and invading the rights of that pupil or 
group of pupils by creating an intimidating or hostile educational environment.”   
 
(All of these current provisions — sections 48915, subdivision (e), 48900, 
48900.2, 48900.3, and 48900.4 — read today substantially the same as they did at the 
time relevant in the present case.)   
 
10
Commission on State Mandates (Commission) (Gov. Code, § 17525) is charged with the 
responsibility of hearing and deciding, subject to judicial review by an administrative 
writ of mandate, claims for reimbursement made by local governments or school districts.  
(Gov. Code, § 17551.)  Government Code section 17561, subdivision (a), provides that 
the “state shall reimburse each . . . school district for all ‘costs mandated by the state,’ as 
defined in section 17514.”  Government Code section 17514, in turn, defines “costs 
mandated by the state” to mean, in relevant part, “any increased costs which a . . . school 
district is required to incur . . . as a result of any statute . . . which mandates a new 
program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning of Section 
6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution.”  Finally, Government Code section 
17556 sets forth circumstances in which there shall be no reimbursement, including, 
under subdivision (c), circumstances in which “[t]he statute or executive order 
implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal 
government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the 
mandate in that federal law or regulation.”   
 
In March 1994, the District filed a “test claim” with the Commission, asserting 
entitlement to reimbursement for the costs of hearings provided with respect to both 
categories of cases described above — that is, those hearings triggered by mandatory 
expulsion recommendations, and those hearings resulting from discretionary expulsion 
recommendations.  (See Gov. Code, § 17521; Kinlaw v. State of California (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 326, 331-333.)10  The District sought reimbursement for costs incurred between 
July 1, 1993, and June 30, 1994, under statutes effective through the latter date.   
                                             
 
10  
As observed by amicus curiae California School Boards Association, a “test claim 
is like a class action — the Commission’s decision applies to all school districts in the 
state.  If the district is successful, the Commission goes to the Legislature to fund the 
statewide costs of the mandate for that year and annually thereafter as long as the statute 
is in effect.”   
 
11
 
In August 1998, after holding hearings on the District’s claim (as amended in 
April 1995, to reflect legislation that became effective in 1994), the Commission issued a 
“Corrected Statement of Decision” in which it determined that Education Code section 
48915’s requirement of suspension and a mandatory recommendation of expulsion for 
firearm possession constituted a “new program or higher level of service,” and found that 
because costs related to some of the resulting hearing provisions set forth in Education 
Code section 48918 (primarily various notice, right of inspection, and recording 
provisions) exceeded the requirements of federal due process, those additional hearing 
costs constituted reimbursable state-mandated costs.11  As to the vast majority of the 
remaining hearing procedures triggered by Education Code section 48915’s requirement 
of suspension and a mandatory recommendation of expulsion for firearm possession — 
for example, procedures governing such matters as the hearing itself and the board’s 
decision; a statement of facts and charges; notice of the right to representation by 
                                             
 
11  
The Commission concluded that the costs incurred in providing the following 
state-mandated procedures under Education Code section 48918 exceeded federal due 
process requirements, and were reimbursable: (i) adoption of rules and regulations 
pertaining to pupil expulsions (§ 48918, first par. & passim); (ii) inclusion in the notice of 
hearing of (a) a copy of the disciplinary rules of the District, (b) a notice of the parents’ 
obligation to notify a new school district, upon enrollment, of the pupil’s expulsion, and 
(c) a notice of the opportunity to inspect and obtain copies of all documents to be used at 
the hearing (§ 48918, subd. (b)); (iii) allowing, upon request, the pupil or parent to 
inspect and obtain copies of the documents to be used at the hearing (§ 48918, subd. (b)); 
(iv) sending of written notice concerning (a) any decision to expel or suspend the 
enforcement of an expulsion order during a period of probation, (b) the right to appeal the 
expulsion to the county board of education, and (c) the obligation of the parent to notify a 
new school district, upon enrollment, of the pupil’s expulsion (§ 48918, former subd. (i), 
currently subd. (j); (v) maintenance of a record of each expulsion, including the cause 
thereof (§ 48918, former subd. (j), currently subd. (k); and (vi) the recording of expulsion 
orders and the causes thereof in the pupil’s mandatory interim record (and, upon request, 
the forwarding of this record to any school in which the pupil subsequently enrolls) 
(§ 48918, former subd. (j), currently subd. (k).   
 
12
counsel; written findings; recording of the hearing; and the making of a record of the 
expulsion — the Commission found that those procedures were enacted to comply with 
federal due process requirements, and hence fell within the exception set forth in 
Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), and did not impose a reimbursable 
state mandate.  The Commission further found that with respect to Education Code 
section 48915’s discretionary expulsions, there was no right to reimbursement for costs 
incurred in holding expulsion hearings, because such expulsions do not constitute a new 
program or higher level of service, and in any event such expulsions are not mandated by 
the state, but instead represent a choice by the principal and the school board.   
 
In October 1999, the District brought this proceeding for an administrative writ of 
mandate challenging the Commission’s decision.  The trial court issued a writ 
commanding the Commission to render a new decision finding (i) all costs associated 
with hearings triggered by compulsory suspensions and mandatory expulsion 
recommendations are reimbursable, and (ii) hearing costs associated with discretionary 
expulsions are reimbursable to the limited extent that required hearing procedures exceed 
federal due process mandates.  The Commission (defendant) and the Department of 
Finance (real party in interest, hereafter Department) appealed, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the judgment rendered by the trial court.   
II 
 
A.  Costs associated with hearings triggered by compulsory suspensions 
and mandatory expulsion recommendations  
 1.  “New program or higher level of service”?   
 
We address first the issue that we asked the parties to brief:  Does Education Code 
section 48915, former subdivision (b) (current subds. (c) & (d)), which mandated 
suspension and an expulsion recommendation for those students who possess a firearm at 
school or at a school activity off school grounds, and which also required a school board, 
if it found the charge proved, either to expel or to “refer” such a student to an alternative 
 
13
educational program housed at a separate school site, constitute a “new program or higher 
level of service” under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution, and under 
Government Code section 17514?   
 
We addressed the meaning of the Constitution’s phrase “new program or higher 
level of service” in County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46 
(County of Los Angeles).  That case concerned whether local governments are entitled to 
reimbursement for costs incurred in complying with legislation that required local 
agencies to provide the same increased level of workers’ compensation benefits for their 
employees as private individuals or organizations were required to provide for their 
employees.  We stated:   
 
“Looking at the language of [article XIII B, section 6] then, it seems clear that by 
itself the term ‘higher level of service’ is meaningless.  It must be read in conjunction 
with the predecessor phrase ‘new program’ to give it meaning.  Thus read, it is apparent 
that the subvention requirement for increased or higher level of service is directed to 
state mandated increases in the services provided by local agencies in existing 
‘programs.’  But the term ‘program’ itself is not defined in article XIII B.  What 
programs then did the electorate have in mind when section 6 was adopted?  We 
conclude that the drafters and the electorate had in mind the commonly understood 
meanings of the term — [(1)] programs that carry out the governmental function of 
providing services to the public, or [(2)] laws which, to implement a state policy, 
impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all 
residents and entities in the state.”  (County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.)   
 
We continued in County of Los Angeles:  “The concern which prompted the 
inclusion of section 6 in article XIII B was the perceived attempt by the state to enact 
legislation or adopt administrative orders creating programs to be administered by local 
agencies, thereby transferring to those agencies the fiscal responsibility for providing 
services which the state believed should be extended to the public.  In their ballot 
 
14
arguments, the proponents of article XIII B explained section 6 to the voters:  
‘Additionally, this measure: (1) Will not allow the state government to force programs 
on local governments without the state paying for them.’  (Ballot Pamp., Proposed 
Amend. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Spec. Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979) 
p. 18.  Italics added.)  In this context the phrase ‘to force programs on local 
governments’ confirms that the intent underlying section 6 was to require 
reimbursement to local agencies for the costs involved in carrying out functions 
peculiar to government, not for expenses incurred by local agencies as an incidental 
impact of laws that apply generally to all state residents and entities.”  (County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56-57, italics added.)   
 
It was clear in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, that the law at issue 
did not meet the second test for a “program or higher level of service” — it did not 
implement a state policy by imposing unique requirements upon local governments, but 
instead applied workers’ compensation contribution rules generally to all employers in 
the state.  Nor, we held, did the law requiring local agencies to shoulder a general 
increase in workers’ compensation benefits amount to a reimbursable “program or 
higher level of service” under the first test described above.  (Id., at pp. 57-58.)  The law 
increased the cost of employing public servants, but it did not in any tangible manner 
increase the level of service provided by those employees to the public.   
 
We reaffirmed and applied the test set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 
Cal.3d 46, in Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830 (Lucia 
Mar).  The state law at issue in Lucia Mar required local school districts to pay a 
portion of the cost of educating pupils in state schools for the severely handicapped — 
costs that the state previously had paid in full.   
 
We determined that the contributions called for under the law were used to fund a 
“program” within both definitions of that term set forth in County of Los Angeles.  
(Lucia Mar, supra, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835.)  We stated:  “[T]he education of handicapped 
 
15
children is clearly a governmental function providing a service to the public, and the 
[state law] imposes requirements on school districts not imposed on all the state’s 
residents.  Nor can there be any doubt that although the schools for the handicapped 
have been operated by the state for many years, the program was new insofar as 
plaintiffs are concerned, since at the time [the state law] became effective they were not 
required to contribute to the education of students from their districts at such schools.  
[¶]  . . .  To hold, under the circumstances of this case, that a shift in funding of an 
existing program from the state to a local entity is not a new program as to the local 
agency would, we think, violate the intent underlying section 6 of article XIII B. . . .  
Section 6 was intended to preclude the state from shifting to local agencies the financial 
responsibility for providing public services in view of . . .  restrictions on the taxing and 
spending power of the local entities.”  (Lucia Mar, supra, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835-836; see 
also County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 98 [legislation 
excluding indigents from Medi-Cal coverage transferred obligation for such costs from 
state to counties, and constituted a reimbursable “new program or higher level of 
service”].)   
 
We again applied the alternative tests set forth in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 
Cal.3d 46, in City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51 (City of 
Sacramento).  In that case we considered whether a state law implementing federal 
“incentives” that encouraged states to extend unemployment insurance coverage to all 
public employees constituted a program or higher level of service under article XIII B, 
section 6.  We concluded that it did not because, as in County of Los Angeles, 
(1) providing unemployment compensation protection to a city’s own employees was not 
a service to the public; and (2) the statute did not apply uniquely to local governments — 
indeed, the same requirements previously had been applied to most employers, and 
extension of the requirement (by eliminating a prior exemption for local governments) 
 
16
merely placed local government employers on the same footing as most private 
employers.  (City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 67-68.)   
 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in City of Richmond v. Commission on State 
Mandates (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1190 (City of Richmond), following County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, and City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, concluded 
that requiring local governments to provide death benefits to local safety officers, under 
both the Public Employees Retirement System and the workers’ compensation system, 
did not constitute a higher level of service to the public.  The Court of Appeal arrived at 
that determination even though — as might also have been argued in County of Los 
Angeles and City of Sacramento — such benefits may “generate a higher quality of local 
safety officers” and thereby, in a general and indirect sense, provide the public with a 
“higher level of service” by its employees.  (City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 
1190, 1195.)   
 
Viewed together, these cases (County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, City of 
Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, and City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190) 
illustrate the circumstance that simply because a state law or order may increase the costs 
borne by local government in providing services, this does not necessarily establish that 
the law or order constitutes an increased or higher level of the resulting “service to the 
public” under article XIII B, section 6, and Government Code section 17514.12   
                                             
 
12  
Indeed, as the court in City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, observed:  
“Increasing the cost of providing services cannot be equated with requiring an increased 
level of service under [article XIII B,] section 6 . . . .  A higher cost to the local 
government for compensating its employees is not the same as a higher cost of providing 
[an increased level of] services to the public.”  (Id., at p. 1196; accord, City of Anaheim v. 
State of California (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1484 [temporary increase in PERS 
benefit to retired employees, resulting in higher contribution rate by local government, 
does not constitute a higher level of service to the public].)   
 
17
 
By contrast, Courts of Appeal have found a reimbursable “higher level of service” 
concerning an existing “program” when a state law or executive order mandates not 
merely some change that increases the cost of providing services, but an increase in the 
actual level or quality of governmental services provided.  In Carmel Valley Fire 
Protection Dist. v. State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537-538 (Carmel 
Valley), for example, an executive order required that county firefighters be provided 
with protective clothing and safety equipment.  Because this increased safety equipment 
apparently was designed to result in more effective fire protection, the mandate evidently 
was intended to produce a higher level of service to the public, thereby satisfying the first 
alternative test set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.  Similarly, in 
Long Beach Unified School District v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 
173 (Long Beach), an executive order required school districts to take specific steps to 
measure and address racial segregation in local public schools.  The appellate court held 
that this constituted a “higher level of service” to the extent the order’s requirements 
exceeded federal constitutional and case law requirements by mandating school districts 
to undertake defined remedial actions and measures that were merely advisory under 
prior governing law.   
 
The District and the Commission assert that the “mandatory” aspect of Education 
Code section 48915, insofar as it compels suspension and mandates an expulsion 
recommendation for firearm possession (and thereafter restricts the board’s options to 
expulsion or referral to an off-site alternative school), carries out a governmental function 
of providing services to the public and hence constitutes an increased or higher level of 
service concerning an existing program under the first alternative test of County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.  They argue, in essence, that the present matter is more 
analogous to the latter cases (Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, and Long 
Beach, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 155) — both of which involved measures designed to 
increase the level of governmental service provided to the public — than to the former 
 
18
cases (County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 
51, and City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190) — in which the cost of 
employment was increased but the resulting governmental services themselves were not 
directly enhanced or increased.  As we shall explain, we agree with the District and the 
Commission.   
 
The statutory requirements here at issue — immediate suspension and mandatory 
recommendation of expulsion for students who possess a firearm, and the limitation upon 
the ensuing options of the school board (expulsion or referral) — reasonably are viewed 
as providing a “higher level of service” to the public under the commonly understood 
sense of that term: (i) the requirements are new in comparison with the preexisting 
scheme in view of the circumstance that they did not exist prior to the enactment of 
Statutes of 1993, chapters 1255 (Assem. Bill No. 342 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly 
Bill No. 342)) and 1256 (Senate Bill No. 1198 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 
1198)); and (ii) the requirements were intended to provide an enhanced service to the 
public — safer schools for the vast majority of students (that is, those who are not 
expelled or referred to other school sites).  In other words, the legislation was premised 
upon the idea that by removing potentially violent students from the general school 
population, the safety of those students who remain thereby is increased.  (See, e.g., Stats. 
1993, ch. 1255, § 4, pp. 7285-7286 [“In order to ensure public safety on school campuses 
. . . it is necessary that this act take effect immediately”]; Sen. Com. on Ed. (Apr. 28, 
1993), Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 342, p. 2 [noting legislative purpose to enhance 
public safety]; see also Assem. Com. on Ed. (July 14, 1993), Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
1198, p. 1 [noting legislative purpose to remove those who possess firearms from the 
general school population by increasing the frequency of expulsion for such conduct].)   
 
In challenging this conclusion, the Department relies upon County of Los 
Angeles v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1538 (Department 
of Industrial Relations).  In that case, the state enacted enhanced statewide safety 
 
19
regulations that governed all public and private elevators, and thereafter the County of 
Los Angeles sought reimbursement for the costs of complying with the new regulations.  
The Court of Appeal found that the regulations constituted neither a new program nor a 
higher level of service concerning an existing program under either of the two alternative 
tests set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.  The court concluded that 
the elevator regulations did not meet the first alternative test, because the regulations did 
not carry out a governmental function of providing services to the public; the court found 
instead that “[p]roviding elevators equipped with fire and earthquake safety features 
simply is not a ‘government function of providing services to the public.’ ”  (Department 
of Industrial Relations, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1546.)  Moreover, the court found, 
the second (“uniqueness”) test was not met — the regulation applied to all elevators, not 
only those owned or operated by local governments.   
 
The Department asserts that Department of Industrial Relations, supra, 214 
Cal.App.3d 1538, is analogous, and argues that the “service” afforded by mandatory 
suspensions followed by a required expulsion recommendation, etc., is “not qualitatively 
different from the safety regulations at issue in [Department of Industrial Relations].  
School districts carrying out such expulsions are not providing a service to the public 
. . . .”  We disagree.  Providing public schooling clearly constitutes a governmental 
function, and enhancing the safety of those who attend such schools constitutes a service 
to the public.  Moreover, here, unlike the situation in Department of Industrial Relations, 
the law implementing this state policy applies uniquely to local public schools.  We 
conclude that Department of Industrial Relations does not conflict with the conclusion 
that the mandatory suspension and expulsion recommendation requirements, together 
with restrictions placed upon a district’s resolution of such a case, constitute an increased 
or higher level of service to the public under the constitutional provision and the 
implementing statutes.   
 
20
 
Of course, even if, as we have concluded above, a statute effectuates an increased 
or higher level of governmental service to the public concerning an existing program, this 
“does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the program is a state mandate under 
California Constitution, article XIII B, section 6.”  (County of Los Angeles v. Commission 
on State Mandates (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 805, 818, italics added (County of Los 
Angeles II).)  We turn to the question whether the hearing costs at issue, flowing from 
compulsory suspensions and mandatory expulsion recommendations, are mandated by 
the state.   
 
2.  Are the hearing costs state-mandated?   
 
As noted above, a compulsory suspension and a mandatory recommendation of 
expulsion under Education Code section 48915 in turn trigger a mandatory expulsion 
hearing.  All parties agree that any such resulting expulsion hearing must comply with 
basic federal due process requirements, such as notice of charges, a right to 
representation by counsel, an explanation of the evidence supporting the charges, and an 
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence.  (See ante, 
fn. 5.)  But as also noted above, article XIII B, section 6, and the implementing statutes 
(Gov. Code, § 17500 et seq.), by their terms, provide for reimbursement only of state-
mandated costs, not federally mandated costs.  The Commission and the Department 
assert that this circumstance raises the question:  Do all or some of a district’s costs in 
complying with the mandatory expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 
constitute a nonreimbursable federal mandate?   
 
In the absence of the operation of Education Code section 48915’s mandatory 
provision (specifically, compulsory immediate suspension and a mandatory expulsion 
recommendation), a school district would not automatically incur the due process hearing 
costs that are mandated by federal law pursuant to Goss, supra, 419 U.S. 565, and related 
cases, and codified in Education Code section 48918.  Instead, a district would incur such 
hearing costs only if a school principal first were to exercise discretion to recommend 
 
21
expulsion.  Accordingly, in its mandatory aspect, Education Code section 48915 appears 
to constitute a state mandate, in that it establishes conditions under which the state, rather 
than local officials, has made the decision requiring a school district to incur the costs of 
an expulsion hearing.   
 
The Department and the Commission agree to a point, but argue that a district’s 
costs incurred in complying with this state mandate are reimbursable only if, and to the 
extent that, hearing procedures set forth in Education Code section 48918 exceed the 
requirements of federal due process.  In support, they rely upon Government Code 
section 17556, which — in setting forth circumstances in which the Commission shall not 
find costs to be mandated by the state — provides that “[t]he commission shall not find 
costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a 
local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that: . . .  (c) The 
statute or executive order implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs 
mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs 
which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation.”13   
                                             
 
13  
Government Code section 17556 reads in full:  “The commission shall not find 
costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a 
local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that:  [¶]  (a) The 
claim is submitted by a local agency or school district which requested legislative 
authority for that local agency or school district to implement the program specified in 
the statute, and that statute imposes costs upon that local agency or school district 
requesting the legislative authority.  A resolution from the governing body or a letter 
from a delegated representative of the governing body of a local agency or school district 
which requests authorization for that local agency or school district to implement a given 
program shall constitute a request within the meaning of this paragraph.  [¶]  (b) The 
statute or executive order affirmed for the state that which had been declared existing law 
or regulation by action of the courts.  [¶]  (c) The statute or executive order implemented 
a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal government, 
unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that 
federal law or regulation.  [¶]  (d) The local agency or school district has the authority to 
levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
22
 
We agree with the District and the Court of Appeal below that, as applied to the 
present case, it cannot be said that Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion 
provision “implemented a federal law or regulation.”  (Italics added.)  Education Code 
section 48915, at the time relevant here, did not implement any federal law; as explained 
below, federal law did not then mandate an expulsion recommendation — or 
expulsion — for firearm possession.14  Moreover, although the Department argues that in 
this context Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c)’s phrase “the statute” 
should be viewed as referring not to Education Code section 48915’s mandatory 
expulsion recommendation requirement, but instead to the mandatory due process 
hearing under Education Code section 48918 that is triggered by such an expulsion 
recommendation, it still cannot be said that section 48918 itself required the District to 
incur any costs.  As noted above, Education Code section 48918 sets out requirements for 
expulsion hearings that must be held when a district seeks to expel a student — but 
neither section 48918 nor federal law requires that any such expulsion recommendation 
be made in the first place, and hence section 48918 does not implement any federal 
mandate that school districts hold such hearings and incur such costs whenever a student 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
increased level of service.  [¶]  (e) The statute or executive order provides for offsetting 
savings to local agencies or school districts which result in no net costs to the local 
agencies or school districts, or includes additional revenue that was specifically intended 
to fund the costs of the state mandate in an amount sufficient to fund the cost of the state 
mandate.  [¶]  (f) The statute or executive order imposed duties which were expressly 
included in a ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide election.  [¶]  (g) The 
statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a crime or infraction, or changed the 
penalty for a crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to 
the enforcement of the crime or infraction.”   
14  
Subsequent amendments to federal law may alter this conclusion with regard to 
future test claims concerning Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion 
provision — see post, pages 24-26.   
 
23
is found in possession of a firearm.  Accordingly, we conclude that the so-called 
exception to reimbursement described in Government Code section 17556, subdivision 
(c), is inapplicable in this context.   
 
Because it is state law (Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion 
provision), and not federal due process law, that requires the District to take steps that in 
turn require it to incur hearing costs, it follows, contrary to the view of the Commission 
and the Department, that we cannot characterize any of the hearing costs incurred by the 
District, triggered by the mandatory provision of Education Code section 48915, as 
constituting a federal mandate (and hence being nonreimbursable).  We conclude that 
under the statutes existing at the time of the test claim in this case (state legislation in 
effect through mid-1994), all such hearing costs  those designed to satisfy the 
minimum requirements of federal due process, and those that may exceed those 
requirements — are, with respect to the mandatory expulsion provision of section 48915, 
state mandated costs, fully reimbursable by the state.15   
 
Against this conclusion, the Department, in its supplemental briefing, offers a 
wholly new theory, not advanced in any of the proceedings below, in support of its 
                                             
 
15  
In Exhibit 1 to its claim, the District presented the declaration of a San Diego 
Unified School District official, estimating that in order to process “350 proposed 
expulsions” during the period spanning July 1, 1993, to June 30, 1994, the District would 
incur approximately $94,200 “in staffing and other costs” — yielding an average 
estimated cost of approximately $270 per hearing during the relevant period.  It is unclear 
from the record how many of these 350 hearings would be triggered by Education Code 
section 48915’s mandatory expulsion provision (and constitute state-mandated costs 
subject to reimbursement under article XIII B, section 6), and how many of these 350 
hearings would be triggered by Education Code section 48915’s discretionary provision 
(and, as explained post, in part II.B, constitute a nonreimbursable federal mandate).   
 
We note that in the proceedings below, the Commission did not confine 
reimbursement only to those matters as to which the district on its own initiative would 
not have sought expulsion in the absence of the statutory requirement that it seek 
expulsion — and the Department has not raised that point in the trial court or on appeal.   
 
24
belated claim that all hearing costs triggered by Education Code section 48915’s 
mandatory expulsion provision are in fact nonreimbursable federal mandates, and not, as 
we have concluded above, reimbursable state mandates.  As we shall explain, we reject 
the Department’s contention, as applied to the test case here at issue (involving state 
statutes in effect through mid-1994).   
 
The Department cites 20 United States Code section 7151, part of the federal No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which provides, as relevant here:  “Each State receiving 
Federal funds under any subchapter of this chapter shall have in effect a State law 
requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than 1 
year a student who is determined to have brought a firearm to a school, or to have 
possessed a firearm at a school, under the jurisdiction of local educational agencies in 
that State, except that such State law shall allow the chief administering officer of a local 
educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a student on a case-by-case 
basis if such modification is in writing.”16   
 
The Department further asserts that more than $2.8 billion in federal funds under 
the No Child Left Behind Act are included “for local use” in the 2003-04 state budget.  
(Cal. State Budget, 2003-04, Budget Highlights, p. 4.)  The Department argues that in 
light of the requirements set forth in 20 United States Code section 7151, and the amount 
of federal program funds at issue under the No Child Left Behind Act, the financial 
consequences to the state and to the school districts of failing to comply with 20 United 
States Code section 7151 are such that as a practical matter, Education Code section 
48915’s mandatory expulsion provision in reality constitutes an implementation of 
federal law, and hence resulting costs are nonreimbursable except to the extent they 
                                             
 
16  
“Firearm,” as defined in 18 United States Code section 921, includes guns and 
explosives.   
 
25
exceed the requirements of federal law.  (See Govt. Code, § 17556, subd. (c); see also 
Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 749-751; City of Sacramento, supra, 50 
Cal.3d 51, 70-76.)  Moreover, the Department asserts, to the extent school districts are 
compelled by federal law, through Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion 
provision, to hold hearings pursuant to section 48918 in cases of firearm possession on 
school grounds, under 20 United States Code section 7164 (defining prohibited uses of 
program funds), all costs of such hearings properly may be paid out of federal program 
funds, and hence we should “view the . . . provision of program funding as satisfying, in 
advance, any reimbursement requirement.”  (Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 
727, 747.)   
 
Although the Department asserts that this federal law and program existed at the 
time relevant in this matter (that is, through mid-1994), our review of the statutes and 
relevant history suggests otherwise.  Title 20 of the United States Code, section 7151, and 
the remainder of the No Child Left Behind Act, became effective on January 8, 2002.  
The predecessor legislation cited by the Department — the Gun-Free Schools Act of 
1994 (former 20 U.S.C. § 8921(a)), although containing a substantially identical 
mandatory expulsion provision (id., § 8921(b)(1))17 — was not effective until July 1, 
1995 (108 Stat. 3518, § 3).  In turn, the predecessor legislation to that Act cited by the 
Department, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (former 20 U.S.C. 
§ 6301 et seq.)  as it existed at the time relevant here (July 1, 1993, through June 30, 
                                             
 
17  
The prior law stated:  “Except as provided in paragraph (3), each State receiving 
Federal funds under this chapter shall have in effect a State law requiring local 
educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than one year a student 
who is determined to have brought a weapon to a school under the jurisdiction of local 
educational agencies in that State, except that such State law shall allow the chief 
administering officer of such local educational agency to modify such expulsion 
requirement for a student on a case-by-case basis.”  (Pub.L. No. 103-382, § 14601(b)(1) 
(Oct. 20, 1994) 108 Stat. 3518.) 
 
26
1994) — contained no such mandatory expulsion provision.  Accordingly, it appears that 
despite the Department’s late discovery of 20 United States Code section 7151, at the 
time relevant here (regarding legislation in effect through mid-1994), neither 20 United 
States Code section 7151, nor either of its predecessors, compelled states to enact a law 
such as Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion provision.  Therefore, we 
reject the Department’s assertion that, during the time period at issue in this case, 
Education Code section 48915’s mandatory expulsion provision constituted an 
implementation of a federal, rather than a state, mandate.   
 
Although we conclude that all hearing costs triggered by Education Code section 
48915’s mandatory expulsion provision constitute reimbursable state-mandated expenses 
under the statutes as they existed during the period covered by the District’s present test 
claim, we do not foreclose the possibility that 20 United States Code section 7151 or its 
predecessor, 20 United States Code section 8921, may lead to a different conclusion 
when applied to versions of Education Code section 48915 effective in years 1995 and 
thereafter.  Indeed, we note that at least one subsequent test claim that has been filed with 
the Commission may raise the federal statutory issue advanced by the Department.18   
B.  Costs associated with hearings triggered by discretionary 
expulsion recommendations  
 
We next consider whether reimbursement is required for the costs associated with 
hearings triggered under discretionary expulsion provisions.  Again, we address first the 
issue that we asked the parties to brief:  Does the discretionary expulsion provision of 
Education Code section 48915 (former subd. (c), thereafter subd. (d), currently subd. (e)), 
which, as noted above, recognized that a principal possesses discretion to recommend 
                                             
 
18  
See Pupil Expulsions II (4th Amendment), CSM No. 01-TC-18 (filed June 3, 
2002).  This claim, filed by the San Juan Unified School District, asserts reimbursable 
state mandates with respect to, among numerous other statutes, Education Code section 
48915, as amended effective in 2002.   
 
27
that a student be expelled for specified conduct other than firearm possession (conduct 
such as damaging or stealing property, using or selling illicit drugs, possessing tobacco or 
drug paraphernalia, etc.), and further specified that the school district governing board 
“may” order a student expelled upon finding that the student, while at school or at a 
school activity off school grounds, engaged in such conduct, constitute a “new program 
or higher level of service” under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution, and 
under Government Code section 17514?   
 
We answer this question in the negative.  The discretionary expulsion provision 
of Education Code section 48915 does not constitute a “new” program or higher level of 
service, because provisions recognizing discretion to suspend or expel were set forth in 
statutes predating 1975.  (See Educ. Code, former § 10601, Stats. 1959, ch. 2, p. 860 
[providing that a student may be suspended for good cause]; id., former § 10602 (Stats. 
1970, ch. 102, § 102, p. 159 (defining “good cause”); id., former section 10601.6 (Stats. 
1972, ch. 164, § 2, p. 384 (further defining “good cause”).)19  Accordingly, the 
discretionary expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 is not a “new” 
program under article XIII B, section 6, and the implementing statutes, nor does it 
reflect a higher level of service related to an existing program.  (County of Los Angeles, 
supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.)   
 
The District maintains, nevertheless, that once it elects to pursue expulsion, it is 
obligated to abide by the procedural hearing requirements of Education Code section 
48918 and accordingly is mandated by that section to incur costs associated with such 
                                             
 
19  
As the Commission observed in its Corrected Statement of Decision in this matter:  
“The authorization for governing boards to expel pupils from school for inappropriate 
behaviors has been in existence since before 1975.  The behaviors defined as 
inappropriate under current law, subdivisions (a) though (l) of section 48900, 48900.2, 
and 48900.3, meet prior laws’ definitions of ‘good cause’ and ‘misconduct’ as reasons for 
expulsion.”  (Italics deleted.)   
 
28
compliance.  The District asserts that in this respect, section 48918 constitutes a “new 
program or higher level of service” related to an existing program under article XIII B, 
section 6 of the state Constitution and under Government Code section 17514.  We shall 
assume for analysis that this is so.20   
 
The District recognizes, of course, that under Government Code, section 17556, 
subdivision (c), it is not entitled to reimbursement to the extent Education Code section 
48918 merely implements federal due process law, but the District argues that it has a 
right to reimbursement for its costs of complying with section 48918 to the extent those 
costs are attributable to hearing procedures that exceed federal due process 
requirements.  (See Govt. Code, § 17556, subd. (c).)  The District asserts that its costs in 
complying with various notice, right of inspection, and recording requirements (see 
ante, fn. 11) fall into this category and are reimbursable.   
 
The Department and the Commission argue in response that any right to 
reimbursement for hearing costs triggered by discretionary expulsions — even costs 
limited to those procedures that assertedly exceed federal due process hearing 
requirements — is foreclosed by virtue of the circumstance that when a school pursues a 
discretionary expulsion, it is not acting under compulsion of any law but instead is 
exercising a choice.  In support, the Department and the Commission rely upon Kern 
                                             
 
20  
The requirements of Education Code section 48918 would appear to be “new” for 
purposes of the reimbursement provisions, in that they did not exist prior to 1975 and 
were enacted in that year and subsequently.  (See ante, fn. 2.)  The requirements also 
would appear to meet both alternative tests set forth in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 
Cal.3d 46, 56 — that is, by implementing procedures that direct and guide the process of 
expulsion from public school, the statute appears to carry out a governmental function of 
providing services to public school students who face expulsion; or, it would seem, 
section 48918 constitutes a law that, to implement state policy, imposes unique 
requirements on local governments.   
 
29
High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, and City of Merced v. State of California 
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 777 (City of Merced).   
 
In Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, school districts asserted that 
costs incurred in complying with statutory notice and agenda requirements for 
committee meetings concerning various state and federally funded educational programs 
constituted a reimbursable state mandate, because once school districts elected to 
participate in the underlying state and federal programs, the districts had no option but to 
hold program-related committee meetings and abide by the challenged notice and agenda 
requirements.  (Id., at p. 742.)  We rejected the school districts’ position, reasoning in 
part that because the districts’ participation in the underlying programs was voluntary, 
the notice and agenda costs incurred as a result of that voluntary participation were not 
the product of legal compulsion and did not constitute a reimbursable state mandate on 
that basis.  (Id., at p. 745.)21   
 
In reaching that conclusion in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, we 
discussed City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777.  In that case, the city wished either 
to purchase or to condemn, pursuant to its eminent domain authority, certain privately 
owned real property.  The city elected to proceed by eminent domain, under which it was 
required by then-recent legislation (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.510) to compensate the 
property owner for loss of “business goodwill.”  The city so compensated the property 
owner and then sought reimbursement from the state, arguing that the new statutory 
requirement that it compensate for business goodwill amounted to a reimbursable state 
mandate.  (City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 780.)  The Court of Appeal 
                                             
 
21  
We also proceeded to hold that in any event, because the school districts were free 
to use program funds to pay for the challenged increased costs, the districts had, in 
practical effect, already been given funds by the Legislature to cover the challenged 
costs.  (Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 748-754.)   
 
30
concluded that the city’s increased costs flowing from its election to condemn the 
property did not constitute a reimbursable state mandate.  (Id., at pp. 781-783.)  The court 
reasoned:  “[W]hether a city or county decides to exercise eminent domain is, essentially, 
an option of the city or county, rather than a mandate of the state.  The fundamental 
concept is that the city or county is not required to exercise eminent domain.  If, however, 
the power of eminent domain is exercised, then the city will be required to pay for loss of 
goodwill.  Thus, payment for loss of goodwill is not a state-mandated cost.”  (Id., at 
p. 783, italics added.)   
 
Summarizing this aspect of City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, in Kern 
High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, we stated:  “[T]he core point articulated by the 
court in City of Merced is that activities undertaken at the option or discretion of a local 
government entity (that is, actions undertaken without any legal compulsion or threat of 
penalty for nonparticipation) do not trigger a state mandate and hence do not require 
reimbursement of funds — even if the local entity is obliged to incur costs as a result of 
its discretionary decision to participate in a particular program or practice.”  (Kern 
High School Dist., at p. 742, italics added.)   
 
The Department and the Commission argue that in the present case the District, 
like the claimants in Kern High School Dist., errs by focusing upon the final result — a 
school district’s legal obligation to comply with statutory hearing procedures — rather 
than focusing upon whether the school district has been compelled to put itself in the 
position in which such a hearing (with resulting costs) is required.   
 
The District and amici curiae on its behalf (consistently with the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal below) argue that the holding of City of Merced, supra, 153 
Cal.App.3d 777, should not be extended to apply to situations beyond the context 
presented in that case and in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727.  The 
District and amici curiae note that although any particular expulsion recommendation 
 
31
may be discretionary, as a practical matter it is inevitable that some school expulsions 
will occur in the administration of any public school program.22   
 
Upon reflection, we agree with the District and amici curiae that there is reason to 
question an extension of the holding of City of Merced so as to preclude reimbursement 
under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 
17514, whenever an entity makes an initial discretionary decision that in turn triggers 
mandated costs.  Indeed, it would appear that under a strict application of the language 
in City of Merced, public entities would be denied reimbursement for state-mandated 
costs in apparent contravention of the intent underlying article XIII B, section 6 of the 
                                             
 
22  
Indeed, the Court of Appeal below suggested that the present case is 
distinguishable from City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, in light of article I, 
section 28, subdivision (c), of the state Constitution.  That constitutional subdivision, part 
of Proposition 8 (known as the Victims’ Bill of Rights initiative, adopted by the voters at 
the Primary Election in June 1982), states:  “All students and staff of public primary, 
elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend 
campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.”  The Court of Appeal below concluded:  
“In light of a school district’s constitutional obligation to provide a safe educational 
environment . . . , the incurring of [hearing] costs [under Education Code section 48918] 
cannot properly be viewed as a nonreimbursable ‘downstream’ consequence of a decision 
to [seek to] expel a student under [Education Code section 48915’s discretionary 
provision] for damaging or stealing school or private property, using or selling illicit 
drugs, receiving stolen property, engaging in sexual harassment or hate violence, or 
committing other specified acts of misconduct . . . that warrant such expulsion.”   
 
Building upon this theme, amicus curiae on behalf of the District, California 
School Boards Association, argues that based upon article I, section 28, subdivision (c), 
of the state Constitution, together with Education Code section 48200 et seq. and article 
IX, section 5 of the state Constitution (establishing and implementing a right of public 
education), no expulsion recommendation is “truly discretionary.”  Indeed, amicus curiae 
argues, school districts may not, “either as a matter of law or policy, realistically choose 
to [forgo] expelling [a] student [who commits one of the acts, other than firearm 
possession, referenced in Education Code section 48915’s discretionary provision], 
because doing so would fail to meet that school district’s legal obligations to provide a 
safe, secure and peaceful learning environment for the other students.”   
 
32
state Constitution and Government Code section 1751423 and contrary to past decisions 
in which it has been established that reimbursement was in fact proper.  For example, as 
explained above, in Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, an executive order 
requiring that county firefighters be provided with protective clothing and safety 
equipment was found to create a reimbursable state mandate for the added costs of such 
clothing and equipment.  (Id., at pp. 537-538.)  The court in Carmel Valley apparently 
did not contemplate that reimbursement would be foreclosed in that setting merely 
because a local agency possessed discretion concerning how many firefighters it would 
employ — and hence, in that sense, could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs 
to which it would be subjected.  Yet, under a strict application of the rule gleaned from 
City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, such costs would not be reimbursable for 
the simple reason that the local agency’s decision to employ firefighters involves an 
exercise of discretion concerning, for example, how many firefighters are needed to be 
employed, etc.  We find it doubtful that the voters who enacted article XIII B, section 6, 
or the Legislature that adopted Government Code section 17514, intended that result, 
and hence we are reluctant to endorse, in this case, an application of the rule of City of 
Merced that might lead to such a result. 
 
In any event, we have determined that we need not address in this case the 
problems posed by such an application of the rule articulated in City of Merced, because 
this aspect of the present case can be resolved on an alternative basis.  As we shall 
explain, we conclude, regarding the reimbursement claim that we face presently, that all 
hearing procedures set forth in Education Code section 48918 properly should be 
                                             
 
23  
As we observed in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 751-752, 
“article XIII B, section 6’s ‘purpose is to preclude the state from shifting financial 
responsibility for carrying out governmental functions to local agencies, which are “ill 
equipped” to assume increased financial responsibilities.’ ”   
 
33
considered to have been adopted to implement a federal due process mandate, and hence 
that all such hearing costs are nonreimbursable under article XIII B, section 6, and 
Government Code section 17557, subdivision (c).   
 
In this regard, we find the decision in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 
Cal.App.4th 805, to be instructive.  That case concerned Penal Code section 987.9, which 
requires counties to provide indigent criminal defendants with defense funds for ancillary 
investigation services related to capital trials and certain other trials, and further provides 
related procedural protections — namely, the confidentiality of a request for funds, the 
right to have the request ruled upon by a judge other than the trial judge, and the right to 
an in camera hearing on the request.  The county in that case asserted that funds 
expended under the statute constituted reimbursable state mandates.  The Court of Appeal 
disagreed, finding instead that the Penal Code section merely implements the 
requirements of federal constitutional law, and that “even in the absence of [Penal Code] 
section 987.9, . . . counties would be responsible for providing ancillary services under 
the constitutional guarantees of due process . . . and under the Sixth Amendment . . . .”  
(32 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.)  Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded, the procedural 
protections that the Legislature had built into the statute — requirements of 
confidentiality of a request for funds, the right to have the request ruled upon by a judge 
other than the trial judge, and the right to an in camera hearing on the request — were 
merely incidental to the federal rights codified by the statute, and their “financial impact” 
was de minimis.  (Id., at p. 817, fn. 7.)  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded, the 
Penal Code section, in its entirety — that is, even those incidental aspects of the statute 
that articulated specific procedures, not expressly set forth in federal law, for the filing 
and resolution of requests for funds — constituted an implementation of federal law, and 
hence those costs were nonreimbursable under article XIII B, section 6.   
 
We conclude that the same reasoning applies in the present setting, concerning the 
District’s request for reimbursement for procedural hearing costs triggered by its 
 
34
discretionary decision to seek expulsion.  As in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 
Cal.App.4th 805, the initial discretionary decision (in the former case, to file charges and 
prosecute a crime; in the present case, to seek expulsion) in turn triggers a federal 
constitutional mandate (in the former case, to provide ancillary defense services; in the 
present case, to provide an expulsion hearing).  In both circumstances, the Legislature, in 
adopting specific statutory procedures to comply with the general federal mandate, 
reasonably articulated various incidental procedural protections.  These protections are 
designed to make the underlying federal right enforceable and to set forth procedural 
details that were not expressly articulated in the case law establishing the respective 
rights; viewed singly or cumulatively, they did not significantly increase the cost of 
compliance with the federal mandate.  The Court of Appeal in County of Los Angeles II 
concluded that, for purposes of ruling upon a claim for reimbursement, such incidental 
procedural requirements, producing at most de minimis added cost, should be viewed as 
part and parcel of the underlying federal mandate, and hence nonreimbursable under 
Government Code, section 17556, subdivision (c).  We reach the same conclusion here.   
 
Indeed, to proceed otherwise in the context of a reimbursement claim would 
produce impractical and detrimental consequences.  The present case demonstrates the 
point.  The record reveals that in the extended proceedings before the Commission, the 
parties spent numerous hours producing voluminous pages of analysis directed toward 
determining whether various provisions of Education Code section 48918 exceeded 
federal due process requirements.  That task below was complicated by the circumstance 
that this area of federal due process law is not well developed.  The Commission, which 
is not a judicial body, did as best it could and concluded that in certain respects the 
various provisions (as observed ante, footnote 11, predominantly concerning notice, right 
of inspection, and recording requirements) “exceeded” the requirements of federal due 
process.   
 
35
 
Even for an appellate court, it would be difficult and problematic in this setting to 
categorize the various notice, right of inspection, and recording requirements here at issue 
as falling either within or without the general federal due process mandate.  The difficulty 
results not only from the circumstance that, as noted, the case law in the area of due 
process procedures concerning expulsion matters is relatively undeveloped, but also from 
the circumstance that when such an issue is raised in an action for reimbursement, as 
opposed to its being raised in litigation challenging an actual expulsion on the ground of 
allegedly inadequate hearing procedures, the issue inevitably is presented in the abstract, 
without any factual context that might help frame the legal issue.  In such circumstances, 
courts are — and should be — wary of venturing pronouncements (especially concerning 
matters of constitutional law).   
 
In light of these considerations, we agree with the conclusion reached by the Court 
of Appeal in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 805:  for purposes of ruling 
upon a request for reimbursement, challenged state rules or procedures that are intended 
to implement an applicable federal law — and whose costs are, in context, de minimis — 
should be treated as part and parcel of the underlying federal mandate.   
 
Applying that approach to the case now before us, we conclude there can be no 
doubt that the assertedly “excessive due process” aspects of Education Code section 
48918 for which the District seeks reimbursement in connection with hearings triggered 
by discretionary expulsions (see ante, footnote 11 — primarily, as noted, various notice, 
right of inspection, and recording rules) fall within the category of matters that are merely 
incidental to the underlying federal mandate, and that produce at most a de minimis cost.  
Accordingly, for purposes of the District’s reimbursement claim, all hearing costs 
incurred under Education Code section 48918, triggered by the District’s exercise of 
discretion to seek expulsion, should be treated as having been incurred pursuant to a 
 
36
mandate of federal law, and hence all such costs are nonreimbursable under Government 
Code section 17556, subdivision (c).24   
III 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed insofar as it provides for full 
reimbursement of all costs related to hearings triggered by the mandatory expulsion 
provision of section 48915.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it 
provides for reimbursement of any costs related to hearings triggered by the discretionary 
provision of section 48915.  All parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J.
                                             
 
24  
We do not foreclose the possibility that a local government might, under 
appropriate facts, demonstrate that a state law, though codifying federal requirements in 
part, also imposes more than “incidental” or “de minimis” expenses in excess of those 
demanded by federal law, and thus gives rise to a reimbursable state mandate to that 
extent.   
 
37
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 99 Cal.App.4th 1270 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S109125 
Date Filed: August 2, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Linda B. Quinn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Paul M. Starkey, Camille Shelton and Katherine A. Tokarski for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Pamela Smith-Steward, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Andrea Lynn Hoch, Assistant Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro and Susan R. Oie, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Jo Anne Sawyerknoll, Tad Seth Parzen, Jose A. Gonzales and Arthur M. Palkowitz for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Lozano Smith, Diana McDonough, Harold M. Freiman, Jan E. Tomsky and Gregory A. Floyd for California School 
Boards Association Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel (Sonoma) as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
38
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Paul M. Starkey 
Commission on State Mandates 
980 9th Street, Suite 300 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 323-3562 
 
Susan R. Oie 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
P.O. Box 944255 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5345 
 
Arthur M. Palkowitz 
4100 Normal Street, Room 2148 
San Diego, CA  92103 
(619) 725-5630 
 
Harold M. Freiman 
899 Northgate Drive, Suite 200 
San Rafael, CA  94903-3666 
(415) 459-3008