Title: Jackson v. Barla, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LORETTA JACKSON, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH BARLA, DELAWARE 
OFFICE OF ANIMAL WELFARE, 
DELAWARE DIVISION OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH, DELAWARE 
SOCIETY FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO 
ANIMALS, DELWARE SPCA, 
DELAWARE ANIMAL 
SERVICES, and DOES 1-100,1 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§   
§    No. 359, 2018 
§ 
§    Court Below—Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    C.A. No. N18C-05-282 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  February 8, 2019 
 
 
 
 
    Decided:  May 1, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that: 
                                          
 
1 These are the defendants below-appellees listed in the notice of appeal.  The defendants listed in 
the complaint are Joseph Barda, Delaware Division of Public Health Office of Animal Control, 
Delaware Animal Services, Delaware Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Delaware 
SPCA, Delaware Animal Services, and Does 1 through 100. 
2 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff below-appellant, Loretta Jackson, filed this notice of 
appeal from a Superior Court order dismissing her complaint after initial review 
because the Superior Court had previously dismissed her complaint alleging 
misconduct in the death of her dog in C.A. No. 16C-11-005.  After careful 
consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.  
(2) 
Both complaints arose from the death of Jackson’s pet Rottweiler 
sometime after an animal welfare officer2 came to her house on June 22, 2016.  On 
November 10, 2016, Jackson filed her first complaint against the Delaware Office 
of Animal Welfare and Joseph Barla.  Jackson alleged that Barla, an employee of 
the Delaware Office of Animal Welfare: (i) tied her dog to a storm drain; (ii) the dog 
suffered injuries; (iii) the dog was taken to a shelter on a pole with broken toe nails 
and was bleeding from the mouth; and (iv) the dog died as a result of Barla’s 
negligence.  Jackson sought $75,000 and punitive damages.  The defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was barred by sovereign immunity and 
the State Tort Claims Act.  The defendants also argued that Jackson failed to perfect 
service under 10 Del. C. § 3103(c). 
(3) 
Jackson filed a motion to amend her complaint, which the Superior 
Court granted.  Jackson filed an amended complaint against the Delaware Office of 
                                          
 
2 In this appeal, Jackson refers to this officer as Joseph Barda and Joseph Barla.  The appellees 
have identified the officer as Matthew Barba.  There does not appear to be any dispute that this is 
the same animal welfare officer.     
3 
 
Animal Welfare and Matthew Barba.  Jackson alleged that Barba, acting under the 
color of state law as an employee of the Delaware Office of Animal Welfare: (i) tied 
her dog to a storm drain and was rude to her 81-year-old mother; (ii) the dog suffered 
injuries; (iii) the dog was taken to a shelter on a pole with broken toe nails and was 
bleeding from the mouth; (iv) the dog died as a result of Barba’s failure to exercise 
reasonable care and Jackson’s mother died from undue stress; and (v) Jackson 
suffered mental anguish and undue stress.  Jackson sought $75,000 in nominal 
damages from each defendant, $100,000 in compensatory damages from each 
defendant, and $100,000 in punitive damages from each defendant.  The defendants 
filed another motion to dismiss. 
(4) 
In an order dated September 14, 2017, the Superior Court granted the 
motion to dismiss.  The Superior Court held that the complaint was barred by the 
State Tort Claims Act because Jackson failed to plead gross negligence with 
particularity.3  Jackson filed a notice of appeal, which was dismissed after she failed 
to pay the Superior Court record preparation fee.4 
(5) 
On May 31, 2018, Jackson filed a complaint against the Delaware 
Division of Public Health Office of Animal Control, Delaware Animal Services, 
Delaware Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Joseph Barda, Delaware 
                                          
 
3 Jackson v. Delaware Office of Animal Welfare, 2017 WL 4082756 (Del. Super. Ct. June 5, 2017). 
4 Jackson v. Delaware Office of Animal Welfare, 2018 WL 509341 (Del. Jan. 22, 2018). 
4 
 
SPCA, and Does 1-100.  Jackson again alleged that Barda caused her dog and mother 
to die, but also alleged that Barda was an employee of the Delaware SPCA, a private 
contractor of the State.  Jackson asserted claims for Gross and Culpable Negligence, 
Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity, Cruelty to Animals in Violation 
of 11 Del. C. § 1325, Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
Malicious Trespass, Abuse of Process, Wrongful Death of the Beloved Pet, 
Violation of Civil Rights, and Property Damages.  She sought compensatory and 
punitive damages and an injunction barring Barda from working with animals.  After 
initial review, the Superior Court dismissed the complaint on June 12, 2018.  The 
Superior Court found that it plainly appeared from the face of the complaint that 
Jackson was not entitled to relief because the Superior Court had previously 
dismissed her action alleging misconduct in the death of her dog.  Jackson filed this 
appeal on July 12, 2018. 
(6) 
On appeal, Jackson filed an opening brief with the caption from her first 
Superior Court case against Barla and the Delaware Office of Animal Welfare and 
the Superior Court civil action numbers for her first and second cases.  Jackson does 
not refer to the June 12, 2018 dismissal order on appeal.  Instead, she challenges the 
September 14, 2017 order dismissing her first complaint.  The time to challenge the 
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September 14, 2017 order has expired.5  Jackson timely appealed the September 
order in 2017, but that appeal was dismissed  in January 2018.  She cannot revive 
that appeal by appealing the dismissal of a subsequent complaint she brought against 
what appears to be the same State animal welfare agency under different names and  
a private entity or entities that she now claims to have employed the animal welfare 
officer based on a 2014 document describing the entities responsible for animal 
welfare at that time and before 2010.  At the time of the incident involving Jackson’s 
dog on June 22, 2016, the Office of Animal Welfare within the Department of Health 
and Social Services was responsible for the enforcement of all animal cruelty laws.6   
(7) 
The appellant’s failure to raise a legal issue in the text of the opening 
brief generally constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal.7  Even if Jackson did 
challenge the June 12, 2018 dismissal order in her opening brief, the Superior Court 
did not err in dismissing her second complaint arising from the death of her dog.  As 
this Court has recognized, 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is foreclosed from bringing a 
second suit based on the same cause of action after a judgment has been 
entered in a prior suit involving the same parties. Similarly, where a 
court or administrative agency has decided an issue of fact necessary to 
its decision, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of 
                                          
 
5 Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i) (providing that appeal of civil judgment must be filed within 30 days of entry 
of judgment upon the docket). 
6 16 Del. C. § 3031F(a) (amended effective February 3, 2016). 
7 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(iii); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
6 
 
that issue in a subsequent suit or hearing concerning a different claim 
or cause of action involving a party to the first case.8 
  
The Superior Court’s judgment that the State Torts Claim Act barred Jackson’s 
claims against the animal welfare officer and the Office of Animal Welfare is final.  
Jackson cannot relitigate that issue by naming different State agencies or claiming, 
without a good basis, that the animal welfare officer was not employed by the State 
as she originally alleged.  Absent the new allegation that the Delaware SPCA 
employed and trained the animal welfare officer, which is barred by Jackson’s 
previous allegations and the Superior Court’s September 4, 2017 ruling, Jackson 
failed to state a basis for any claim against the Delaware Society for Prevention of 
the Cruelty to Animals, the Delaware SPCA, and Does 1-100.  The Superior Court 
properly dismissed Jackson’s second complaint arising from the death of her dog.           
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
8 Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 535 (Del. 2000) (citations omitted).