Title: Bloomer v. Gibson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Bloomer v. Gibson (2004-540); 180 Vt. 397; 912 A.2d 424

2006 VT 104

[Filed 20-Oct-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 104

                                No. 2004-540


  Robert A. Bloomer, Jr.                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Rutland Superior Court


  David A. Gibson, Esq.                          October Term, 2005


  Richard W. Norton, J.

  Robert A. Bloomer, Jr., Pro Se, Addison, Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Shannon A. Bertrand of Kenlan, Schwiebert & Facey, P.C., Rutland, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Teachout, Supr. J. and
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff, Robert A. Bloomer, Jr., brought this
  action against defendant, David Gibson, for malpractice in connection with
  his representation of plaintiff in a federal criminal case.  The action was
  eventually tried to court on a theory of breach of contract and resulted in
  a verdict for defendant.  On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred
  in denying him a trial by jury and in applying an "actual innocence"
  standard to his claims of malpractice and breach of contract.  We hold that
  the court properly decided that plaintiff waived his right to trial by jury
  and that plaintiff cannot recover the damages he seeks.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  In 1991, plaintiff was charged in a federal criminal
  prosecution, and, with the help of his father, retained the services of
  defendant, David A. Gibson, for representation relating to those charges. 
  Defendant engaged in substantial legal and factual investigation of the
  case, which eventually went to trial in April 1991.   The trial lasted two
  weeks, and a jury eventually found plaintiff guilty on all six of the
  federal charges.  The judge sentenced plaintiff to 121 months in federal
  prison.  Plaintiff appealed the conviction and sentence to the United
  States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; the government appealed the
  sentence.

       ¶  3.  The court of appeals upheld the conviction, United States v.
  Bloomer, 4 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1993), but found plaintiff's sentence had been
  improperly calculated and remanded for further sentencing.  Plaintiff was
  then sentenced to 188 months in federal prison, which was later affirmed. 
  United States v. Bloomer, 43 F.3d 1457 (2d Cir. 1994) (Table). 

       ¶  4.  Three years after his conviction, plaintiff filed a
  post-conviction-relief petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in
  which he argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel by
  defendant at trial in relation to an improper jury charge.  The district
  court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals found the trial
  court's jury charge on reasonable doubt was improper and remanded the case
  to the district court to determine if defendant's representation was
  ineffective. (FN1)  Bloomer v. United States, 162 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir.
  1998).  

       ¶  5.  On remand, in a brief entry order decision, the district court
  found that defendant had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for
  failing to object to the reasonable doubt instruction and, accordingly,
  granted plaintiff a new trial.  Pursuant to the new trial option, plaintiff
  elected to plead guilty to one count of the original indictment and was
  sentenced to time served, which amounted to approximately eighty-seven
  months in prison.  
   
       ¶  6.  Plaintiff brought this action against defendant in 1999,
  alleging that defendant committed malpractice in nine specified instances
  and acted "maliciously, grossly negligently and in utter disregard of the
  rights of plaintiff."  He alleged that as a result of defendant's
  malpractice he was "severely harmed, including spending 7 years in prison." 
  He sought both compensatory and punitive damages.  About ten months later,
  he moved to amend the complaint to include the following new grounds for
  relief:  intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract,
  and failure to maintain plaintiff's client file.  The court granted the
  motion with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
  claim, but denied it as to the other two claims.  As to the breach of
  contract claim, the court indicated that plaintiff had stated at the
  hearing on the motion that he added the claim solely to obtain the return
  of the fee his family paid defendant.  The court stated that return of the
  fee was part of the damages allowed for malpractice.

       ¶  7.  The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment with
  respect to plaintiff's malpractice claims. (FN2)  Recognizing that this
  decision left plaintiff without a claim for the return of the fees paid to
  defendant, the court reconsidered the denial of the motion to amend to add
  a breach of contract claim.  On May 6, 2001, plaintiff submitted an amended
  complaint alleging only breach of contract.  The complaint stated that
  "[i]mplicit in the agreement [between plaintiff and defendant] was that
  [d]efendant would perform with a minimum level of competence and diligence"
  and went on to itemize ten specific duties that defendant assumed.  It then
  stated that "[d]efendant failed to perform to the minimum standards as
  required by the agreement" and itemized thirteen different instances in
  which defendant's representation fell below minimum standards.  It asked
  for damages without specifying an amount.  The trial court denied
  defendant's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claims. 
  The case was tried to court over five trial days in 2004 and 2005. 
  Plaintiff appeals from the Rutland Superior Court decision of November 22,
  2004, granting judgment to defendant on the breach of contract counts.

       ¶  8.  On appeal, plaintiff argues that the superior court erred in
  holding that he had waived his right to a jury trial, and in repeating that
  holding in response to his amended complaint, and in adopting an actual
  innocence rule to grant judgment to defendant on plaintiff's breach of
  contract claims.  We address these issues.

       ¶  9.  It is undisputed that plaintiff had a right to trial by jury in
  this case.  Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 12; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 38; V.R.C.P.
  38(a).   To invoke the right, a plaintiff must demand a jury trial pursuant
  to our procedural rules.  See Muzzy v. Curtis, 127 Vt. 516, 517,