Title: Armstrong v. Baltimore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Douglas M. Armstrong, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al., No. 107,
September Term, 2008.
MARYLAND OPEN MEETINGS ACT – LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF MAYOR &
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE ACTED IN VIOLATION OF OPEN MEETINGS ACT
– CITY COUNCIL’S SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE RENDERING
UNNECESSARY THE PRIOR OFFENDING ORDINANCE RENDERED MOOT OPEN
MEETINGS ACT VIOLATION
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-04-003107
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 107
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
DOUGLAS M. ARMSTRONG, et al.
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE, et al.
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
         *Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, specially
assigned)
Raker, 
Irma 
S. 
(Retired, 
specially
assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                            
Filed:   July 23, 2009
*Barbera, J., participated in the hearing and
conference of this case, but recused herself prior
to the adoption of this opinion.
1The “Petitioners” for the purposes of this appeal are Douglas M. Armstrong, Joan L.
Floyd, Howard B. McElwain, Jorge A. Gonzalez, F. Ernesto Kellum, Glen D. Gaddy, Jeffrey
Groden-Thomas, and Wendi Groden-Thomas, who, as a group of local residents opposed to
(continued...)
This case is one of several legal challenges brought by a group of residents of
Baltimore City’s Remington/Charles Village neighborhood against a developer and the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (“the City”) regarding the governmental approval
processes for a seven-story residential apartment building (Cresmont Loft) on Cresmont
Avenue.  Here we are concerned with the residents’ petition for judicial review challenging
the City’s Ordinance 04-659 (approving a parking lot for Cresmont Loft), on the basis that
the process by which it was enacted violated the Maryland Open Meetings Act.  For reasons
we shall explain, we conclude that the Open Meetings Act challenge, insofar as the challenge
seeks to undo the approval of the parking lot, is moot by virtue of the enactment of
subsequent legislation by the City rendering Ordinance 04-659 unnecessary as a matter of
law.  Although, as a result of this holding, we are not compelled to address the parties’
dispute over the award of attorney’s fees under the Open Meetings Act, we choose to
comment (albeit as dicta) on this dispute for the guidance of the parties and the trial court
when the latter considers the matter.
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.  Preceding the Instant Case
Cresmont Properties Ltd. (“Cresmont”) owns a 28,132 square-foot parcel of land (the
“Property”) located at 2807-35 Cresmont Avenue in Baltimore City.  Petitioners, a group of
local residents opposed to Cresmont’s development of the Property,1 challenged in various
1(...continued)
the Cresmont development, were the captioned plaintiffs of the Open Meetings Act Petition
for Judicial Review filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Md. Code, State
Government Art. § 10-501 to -512 (“Open Meetings Act”) (2004 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2008).
These plaintiffs may not be identical to those of the numerous other actions stemming from
the Cresmont development.  For the sake of clarity, we shall refer here to the plaintiffs
challenging the development throughout these numerous actions as “Petitioners.”
2Negative appeals are “[a]ppeals to prohibit buildings or uses, permits for which have
been approved or issued by the Zoning Administrator [of Baltimore City].”  See Department
of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, Rules Relative to Appeals from the Action of and
(continued...)
-2-
administrative and judicial fora three construction permits, as well as an occupancy permit,
issued by the City to Cresmont for construction and operation of an apartment building
known as Cresmont Loft.  A more fulsome history of the issuance of these permits and
challenges, than is necessary for the present litigation, is supplied in our opinion in the
companion case of Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, __ Md. __ , __ A.2d
__ (2009) (No. 106, September Term, 2008), filed today immediately prior to this opinion.
The present case derives from one of the Petitioners’ legal challenges to the third
construction permit and pertains specifically to the on-site parking lot.
1.  First Construction Permit
On 15 November 2002, the Zoning Administrator for the Baltimore City Department
of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) issued to Cresmont a permit to
construct a seven-story residential apartment complex consisting of twenty-six apartments
and a parking lot with thirty-three parking spaces.  At the time, the Property was a vacant lot.
Petitioners filed a negative appeal2 to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (the
2(...continued)
Applications Referred by the Zoning Administrator, para. 6.
3Section 10-504 of the Zoning Code of Baltimore City provides:
(a) In general.
In the Parking Lot Districts, no land may be used as a parking
lot nor may any building be razed so as to permit the use of the
land as a parking lot unless authorized by an ordinance of the
Mayor and City Council.
(b) Considerations.
This requirement is to permit the Mayor and City Council, while
considering the proposed ordinance, to consider and evaluate:
(1) the need for the parking lot; 
(2) the proposed appearance of the parking lot; and
(3) possible aesthetic damage to the area surrounding the
parking lot, with particular respect to the proposed
removal of historic or aesthetically valuable properties.
At the time Petitioners initiated their challenge premised on § 10-504 of the Zoning Code,
§ 10-501 of the Code defined “parking lot” as:
In this subtitle, “parking lot” means land used for the off-street
parking of 3 or more motor vehicles, together with the adjoining
and perimeter areas required by this subtitle or by any other law
of Baltimore City.
In January 2005, the City Council amended § 10-501’s definition of “parking lot,” an action
that has a direct bearing on the present case, as we shall explain.  See infra Part I.C.
-3-
“Board”).  They alleged, among other things, that the project violated § 10-504(a)3 of the
Zoning Code of Baltimore City (“the Code” or “ the Zoning Code”), which, at the relevant
-4-
time, required passage of an ordinance by the City to authorize the use of land as a parking
lot.  The Board ruled against Petitioners, reasoning that § 10-504(a) did not apply to
accessory off-street parking for newly-erected structures.  Construction of the building and
parking lot began in August 2003.
On 4 November 2003, however, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on Petitioners’
petition for judicial review, reversed the Board, concluding that the Code did not exempt
accessory uses from the requirements of § 10-504(a).  Shortly thereafter, the Director of
Permits for the DHCD revoked Cresmont’s construction permit.  The City, which sided with
Cresmont in the litigation, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the provision of the Code authorizing
judicial review was not in effect when the City filed its appeal.  Mayor of Balt. v. Armstrong,
No. 02096, September Term 2003 (filed 10 Aug. 2005).
2.  Second Construction Permit
The circumstances surrounding the second construction permit may be found in
Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, __ Md. __ , __ A.2d __ (2009) (No. 106,
September Term, 2008) (slip op. at 4-5).  Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that as a
result of administrative and judicial litigation over its issuance, a third construction permit
was issued.
B.  Ordinance 04-659 and the Third Construction Permit: The Present Litigation
The Property is located in the City’s Parking Lot District II, a special district created
4Section 10-503 of the Zoning Code provides, in considerable detail, for two Parking
Lot Districts, Districts I and II, identifying each specific street which borders the Districts.
5See supra note 3.  We are advised that construction of the Property has been
completed, the apartments leased, and the parking lot at issue is in operation and use by the
residents of the building.
-5-
by § 10-503 of the Zoning Code.4  At the times relevant to these proceedings prior to the
City’s amendment of § 10-501’s definition of “parking lot,” discussed infra, § 10-504 of the
Zoning Code prohibited land in Parking Lot District II from being used as a parking lot
“unless authorized by an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council.”5
Because of this requirement, on 27 October 2003, Bill 03-1228 (“the Bill”) was
introduced in the City Council.  The purpose of the Bill was to authorize, as a conditional
use, a parking lot on the Property.  After introduction, the Bill was assigned to the Council’s
Land Use and Planning Committee (“Committee”), after consideration by the Baltimore City
Planning Commission.  Following its consideration, in a staff report dated 4 December 2003,
the Commission stated:
The applicants are requesting this conditional use [B]ill because
several community residents have taken this project to court
regarding the use of an alley, and because they are concerned
about this same group challenging them regarding the Parking
Lot District provisions in the Zoning Code.  The City would not
normally require this conditional use ordinance because the
parking to be provided is accessory to the apartment building.
The applicants simply wish to ensure that they may proceed
with their project and are willing to provide the higher level of
scrutiny afforded the community in the ordinance process, if that
would speed the project’s implementation.
6Section 16-401 of the Zoning Code provided:
(a) In general.
The City Council may not place a bill proposing any zoning
legislation on its second reading calendar until:
(1) except as specified in subsection (b) of this section,
it has received written reports and recommendations from the
Board and the Planning Commission; and
(2) the bill has been considered by a committee of the
City Council, at a public hearing held in accordance with this
subtitle.
(b) Agency failure to report.
(1) If the Board or the Planning Commission fails to submit its
written report and recommendations within the period specified
in § 16-302 {“Agency reports and recommendations”} of this
title, the City Council may proceed without that report and
recommendations.
(2) However, the applicant may waive this time limit and
consent to an extension of the reporting period by giving written
notice of the waiver and consent to the President of the City
Council, with copies to the Board, the Planning Commission,
(continued...)
-6-
The staff report recommended that, before passage by the City Council, the Bill be amended
to provide that “the plans and landscaping plans [provided by Cresmont be] attached to, and
made part of the [B]ill.”
Sections 16-401 and 16-402 of the Zoning Code required, prior to action by the full
Council on the Bill, the Committee to consider the proposed conditional use at a public
hearing.6   Rules 10-9 and 10-10 of the Rules of the City Council required the Committee to
6(...continued)
and the Zoning Administrator.
Section 16-402 of the Zoning Code provided:
(a) Hearing required.
For a bill proposing any zoning legislation, the committee to
which the bill has been referred must conduct a hearing at
which: 
(1) the parties in interest and the general public will have
an opportunity to be heard; and
(2) all agency reports will be read.
(b) Public notice.
At least 15 days’ notice of the time, place, and subject of the
hearing must be given by each of the following methods, as
applicable:
(1) for all zoning legislation, by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City;
(2) for any legislative authorization, by posting on the
property in question; and
(3) for any change in the boundaries of a zoning district:
(i) by posting at a place within the district as the
Department of Planning designates;
and
(ii) by first class mail to the persons who appear
on the tax records of the City as the owners of the properties
subject to the change.
(c) Responsibility for notice.
The notices required by this section must be given by and at the
(continued...)
-7-
6(...continued)
expense of:
(1) in the case of a bill proposing any legislative
authorization, the applicant for that authorization; and
(2) in all other cases, the City Council.
7Rule 10-9 of the Rules of the City Council of Baltimore provided:
(a) In general.
Each committee must report to the Council on all bills on which
it has taken action.
(b) Options.
The report on each bill must be either:
(1) favorable;
(2) favorable with amendments;
(3) unfavorable; or
(4) without recommendation.
(c) Adoption.
A committee may adopt a report only on the affirmative vote or
written assent of a majority of all committee members.
Rule 10-10 provided:
(a) In general.
(continued...)
-8-
report the Bill to the City Council after acting on it.7  If the Committee proposed to amend
7(...continued)
The chair of the committee must report a bill to the floor of the
City Council at the next regular meeting after the committee’s
action on the bill.
(b) Exception.
Subsection (a) of this rule does not apply if:
(1) the committee otherwise directs; or
(2) the committee’s action on the bill was taken too late
to meet the next meeting’s deadline for submitting reports.
8Section 16-403 of the City Code provided:
(a) Rehearing required.
(1) Except as specified in subsection (b) of this section,
whenever a bill proposing any zoning legislation is amended
after the public hearing, another public hearing must be held on
the bill as amended.
(2) The requirements of this subtitle for notice and for reading
of agency reports apply to any additional hearing required by
this section.
(b) Exception.
An additional hearing is not required for:
(1) an amendment made in Committee; or
(2) any amendment that consists only of a change in
punctuation, grammar, or spelling and does not in any way alter
the substance of the ordinance.
-9-
substantively the Bill after the first hearing, it was required to hold another hearing.8
The Bill was the subject of a Committee public hearing on 4 February 2004.
9An affidavit in the record of a Council member reveals that a majority of Committee
members at the time was four members.
10This report included the signatures of the Committee Chair and three Committee
members who had not attended the 4 February 2004 hearing.  The “blue backing,” or reverse
side of the bill, contains the words “Committee report as of March 4, 2004 - Favorable as
amended.”
-10-
Although notice of the hearing had been duly posted at the Property and on the City’s
website, only the Chair of the Committee and one other Committee member were present at
the hearing on behalf of the Committee.9  That hearing lasted nearly three hours and was
attended by about forty-five other individuals, including some of the Petitioners.  During the
hearing, the Committee did not adduce or discuss site plans for the proposed parking lot.
According to an affidavit in the record filed by Joan L. Floyd, one of the Petitioners, “[a]t the
hearing, the chair of the Committee made a statement to the effect that the [opponents] of Bill
03-1228 could not expect there to be any further public meetings or hearings on Bill 03-
1228.”
No further public Committee hearing or work session was held in fact.  Rather, on 4
March 2004, in a report submitted to the City Council, the Committee recommended that the
Bill be enacted as amended.10  One of the amendments included a detailed site plan of the
parking area, a plan to which no reference was made at the 4 February hearing.  The site plan
had been obtained by the Committee subsequent to the public hearing, as had a follow-up
City agency report addressing the issue of accessibility to the neighbors’ garages impacted
potentially by the proposed development of the Property.  The report, conducted by a
-11-
Transportation Department employee, was intended to “advise the [Committee] regarding
existing and proposed rights-of-way between adjacent properties and the proposed
development site.”  It concluded that “the proposed development [will] not harm[]” access
to adjacent garages.  Petitioners contended that the measurements relied on in the report to
form the basis of its conclusion were erroneous.
The Committee’s method of amending and approving the Bill, after the 4 February
session, was through the collection of signatures of a quorum of mostly Committee members
who had not attended the hearing.  According to an affidavit of the Bill’s co-sponsor:
[] As is common practice in the City Council, a vote was
not taken at the Committee hearing with regard to the adoption
of a Committee Report on this [B]ill.  Instead, the method by
which the Committee adopted its March 4, 2004 Report of
“favorable as amended” with regard to Council Bill 03-1228
was through the collection of the written assent of at least a
majority of the Committee’s members - in this case the signature
of four Committee members, of which I was one.
[] As is common practice in the City Council, one of the
clerks circulated the [B]ill among the Committee’s members to
collect these four signatures.  There was never a second meeting
of the Committee after the public hearing held on February 4,
2004 with regard to this legislation.
Thus, the quorum of the Committee that recommended that the Bill be enacted as amended,
including the detailed site plan and in reliance on the agency report, did so: (1) without
having vetted the disputed agency report or detailed site plan before the public at the hearing;
(2) without having discussed the amendments suggested by members of the public at the 4
February meeting or explaining why they were rejected; and (3) without having presented
-12-
or discussed in open session the amendments made subsequently.  The only evidence of the
Committee’s deliberations and decision-making process were the signatures of the four
members who signed the backing of the Bill.
As a result of the Committee’s recommendation, the Bill was advanced to the full City
Council.  On 8 March 2004, the amended version of the Bill passed second reader.  On 15
March, Petitioners delivered to the City Council President a letter relating Petitioners’
position that the Committee approved “amendments that had not been the subject of a public
hearing” and “plans that did not meet minimum statutory requirements . . . and that
constituted an unlawful taking of the property of adjacent owners,” and that the Committee
acted on the basis of an “inaccurate and misleading agency report . . . without a public open
meeting of the Committee as required by the State Open Meetings Act.”  The letter asked the
Council President to “remedy the situation by taking immediate measures to void the action
of the City Council Land Use and Planning Committee on Bill 1228 and either withdraw the
[B]ill, or table it and schedule it for an open public re-hearing and Committee vote.”  No
direct response was forthcoming.  At the next City Council meeting, on 22 March 2004, Bill
03-1228 passed on the third and final reading.  On 25 March, it was signed into law as
Ordinance 04-659.
Petitioners filed a timely complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging
that the City violated Md. Code, State Government Art. § 10-501 to -512 (“Open Meetings
11Petitioners also filed a judicial review action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
challenging the passage of Ordinance 04-659 by the City Council.  Maryland Code, Article
66B § 2.09(a)(1) (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2008), provides that an appeal may be filed
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by any person aggrieved by a “zoning action” taken
by the City Council.  On 13 August 2004, the Circuit Court dismissed Petitioners’ suit,
reasoning that it did not have jurisdiction because Ordinance 04-659 did not constitute a
“zoning action.”  
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  The City moved to dismiss the
appeal in the intermediate appellate court, under Maryland Rule 8-602(a)(1), as an appeal
“not allowed by these rules or other law,” reiterating its argument that Ordinance 04-659 did
not constitute a “zoning action.”  The Court of Special Appeals agreed and dismissed the
appeal.  We remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court, noting that, because the
Circuit Court entered a final appealable judgment, the Court of Special Appeals had appellate
jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the first
instance.  Armstrong v. Baltimore City, Md., 390 Md. 469, 475, 889 A.2d 399, 403 (2006).
On remand, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court, concluding that
Ordinance 04-659 “ha[d] the characteristics of a conditional use.”  Armstrong v. Mayor of
Balt., 169 Md. App. 655, 672, 906 A.2d 415, 425 (2006).  Accordingly, the action of the City
Council was administrative in nature and subject to judicial review as a “zoning action.” Id.
at 674, 906 A.2d at 426.  On remand to the Circuit Court, the trial judge dismissed the
petition as moot, in light of adoption of the subsequent zoning ordinance text amendment,
Ordinance 04-855, see discussion infra, which amended the definition of a “parking lot” to
exclude accessory parking.  Petitioners again appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  That
case remains pending in the intermediate appellate court at this time.  Armstrong v. Mayor
of Balt., No. 01682, September Term 2008.
12Section 10-510 of the Open Meetings Act of the State Government Article provides:
(a) Scope of section. — (1) This section does not apply to the
(continued...)
-13-
Act”) (2004 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2008).11  The relief Petitioners sought included a declaration
that Bill 03-1228 and Ordinance 04-659 were void, that the City Council be enjoined from
issuing any permits pursuant to Ordinance 04-659, and that Petitioners be awarded
reasonable attorney’s fees.12  The City and Cresmont filed motions to dismiss on the ground
12(...continued)
action of: 
(i) appropriating public funds;
(ii) levying a tax; or
(iii) providing for the issuance of bonds, notes, or
other evidences of public obligation.
(2) This section does not authorize a court to void an
action of a public body because of any violation of this subtitle
by another public body.
(3) This section does not affect or prevent the use of any
other available remedies.
(b) Petition authorized. — (1) If a public body fails to comply
with § 10-505, § 10-506, § 10-507, § 10-508, or § 10-509(c) of
this subtitle any person may file with a circuit court that has
venue a petition that asks the court to: 
(i) determine the applicability of those sections;
(ii) require the public body to comply with those
sections; or
(iii) void the action of the public body.
(2) If a violation of § 10-506, § 10-508, or § 10-509(c) of
this subtitle is alleged, the person shall file the petition within 45
days after the date of the alleged violation.
(3) If a violation of § 10-505 or § 10-507 of this subtitle
is alleged, the person shall file the petition within 45 days after
the public body includes in the minutes of an open session the
information specified in § 10-509(c)(2) of this subtitle.
(4) If a written complaint is filed with the Board in
accordance with § 10-502.5 of this subtitle, the time between the
filing of the complaint and the mailing of the written opinion to
the complainant and the affected public body under § 10-
502.5(g) of this subtitle may not be included in determining if a
claim against a public body is barred by the statute of limitations
set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection.
(c) Presumption. — In an action under this section, it is
presumed that the public body did not violate any provision of
this subtitle, and the complainant has the burden of proving the
violation.
(d) Authority of court. — A court may:
(continued...)
-14-
12(...continued)
(1) consolidate a proceeding under this section with
another proceeding under this section or an appeal from the
action of the public body;
(2) issue an injunction;
(3) determine the applicability of this subtitle to the
discussions or decisions of public bodies;
(4) if the court finds that a public body willfully failed to
comply with § 10-505, § 10-506, § 10-507, or § 10-509 (c) of
this subtitle and that no other remedy is adequate, declare void
the final action of the public body;
(5) as part of its judgment:
(i) assess against any party reasonable counsel
fees and other litigation expenses that the party
who prevails in the action incurred; and
(ii) require a reasonable bond to ensure the
payment of the assessment; and 
(6) grant any other appropriate relief.
(e) Petition. — (1) A person may file a petition under this
section without seeking an opinion from the State Open
Meetings Law Compliance Board.
(2) The failure of a person to file a complaint with the
Board is not a ground for the court to either stay or dismiss a
petition.
-15-
that, because the Committee did not convene a quorum of its members to discuss the
proposed bill, the Open Meetings Act did not apply.  The Circuit Court rejected the City’s
and Cresmont’s position, concluding, in a written opinion, that the Committee’s actions with
regard to the passage of Ordinance 04-659 were in violation of the Open Meetings Act:
In this Court’s view, the Committee, in this case, violated
the Open Meetings Act in spirit and in fact.  The Committee
conducted business with a quorum of its members when it
circulated the Bill for signatures of members who were going to
vote in favor of sending the Bill to the City Council with a
favorable report.  This was done in private and away from the
public’s view, in violation of the essence of the Open Meetings
-16-
Act.  Community and Labor United For Baltimore Charter
Committee (CLUB) v. Baltimore City Board of Elections, 377
Md. 183, 186-87 (2003), and Md. Code Ann. State Govt[.] Art.,
§ 10-501.  Further evidence of this is highlighted by the fact that
the Bill was signed by three members who did not attend the
February 4, 2004 meeting.  The Committee sent the Bill to the
City Council and recommended it as “favorable as amended.”
By amending the Bill, a reasonable inference can be drawn that
there was discussion or should have been discussion among the
members of the Committee in order to enable a quorum to agree
to recommend the Bill.  At the February 4, 2004 meeting, the
Chair requested further information from the city agency who
conducted the access and egress of the alleys abutting the
parking lot.  There is no record that this information was
obtained.  But it is unlikely that the request of the Committee
Chair would have been be [sic] ignored by a city agency; and
that this information played no role in the Committee’s decision
to recommend the Bill.
While it is true a quorum is technically necessary to
qualify as a meeting, the contention that a quorum is necessary
to trigger the Act and open the meeting to the public is not the
case.  The totality of the circumstances surrounding each
meeting in light of the purpose of the Act and its importance to
the maintenance of a democratic society must be examined.  By
intentionally avoiding holding a meeting with the necessary
number of participants to establish a quorum, the Committee
cannot avoid compliance with the Act.  Md. Code Ann., State
Govt. Art., § 10-501(a).  The Legislature intended the Open
Meetings Act to allow the general public to view the entire
deliberative process.  Community And Labor United For
Baltimore Charter Committee (CLUB)[,] et al. v. Baltimore City
Board of Elections, et al., 377 Md. 183, 194 (2003).  The
Committee violated the Act by not performing “public business
. . . in an open and public manner[“], and not allowing citizens
to observe “the deliberations and decisions that the making of
public policy involves.”  Md. Code Ann., State Govt. Art., § 10-
501(a)(2)(ii).
* * * 
[The City and Cresmont] argue that it is the routine for
the City Council to circulate a Bill for signatures without
holding a meeting.  Merely because it is the practice of the City
-17-
Council does [not] give legal justification for violating the Open
Meetings Act.
* * *
The actions of the Committee, in the subject case, do not
involve minor changes, e-mail or “thinking out loud.”  This
matter involves actual deliberations on whether a bill should be
forwarded to the City Council as approved or disapproved.  If
the Act is only triggered by a meeting of a quorum at one time,
then it would be possible for public officials to conduct
business, by e-mail or in small groups, hold no meetings and
never be subject to public scrutiny.  A committee could hold a
meeting, without a quorum to “think out loud,” then circulate a
proposed Bill from member to member without the public being
permitted to observe any of the deliberative process.  This is not
consistent with the goal of the Open Meetings legislation as it
would not allow citizens to “observe the performance of public
officials and the deliberations and decisions that the making of
public policy involves.”  Md. Code Ann.[,] State Govt. Art.[,] §
10-501(a).  For these reasons, the Court finds that the
Committee did violate the Open Meetings Act.
Next, this Court must consider the relief Petitioners
request, that is, whether Bill 03-[1]128 and Ordinance 04-659
should be declared void in light of the violation.
* * *
The Open Meetings Act does not allow this Court to void
an action of a public body because there was a violation of this
subtitle by another public body.  Md. Code Ann., State Govt.
Art., § 10-510(a)(2).  Although the Committee serves the City
Council[, t]he Land Use and Planning Committee and the City
Council of Baltimore are separate public bodies.  The City
Council was free to conduct an inquiry and vote as it saw fit on
Bill 03-1228.
* * *
In the subject case, . . . the subsequent lawful actions of
the City Council cured the violation of the Open[] Meeting[s]
Act by the Land Use and Planning Committee; and therefore the
Petitioners’ request to declare the passage of Bill 03-1228 and
Ordinance 04-659 void is denied.
State Govt. [Art.,] § 10-510(d)(5) permits the award of
reasonable counsel fees to the party who prevails in the action.
In light of the Court’s ruling that there was a failure to comply
13The court left for subsequent determination the amount of the award of attorney’s
fees.  Footnote 8 of its Memorandum & Opinion stated that “[c]ounsel for Petitioners are to
submit an accounting to the Court for a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded.”
The open question of the amount of attorney’s fees does not deprive us of our jurisdiction to
decide the case before us.
In County Executive v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 479 A.2d 352 (1984), we explained that
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a claim for an attorney’s fee, while an
integral part of the remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is viewed as
a collateral matter from the § 1983 action; thus the claim for an
attorney’s fee may be brought following a final judgment in a §
1983 action.
Id. at 451 n.4, 479 A.2d at 355 n.4.
That resolution of the amount of the award under the fee-shifting provisions of a
statutory cause of action is a collateral matter separate from the merits of the underlying
claim, for purposes of determining appealability, was confirmed by this Court in Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079
(1986).  In Crawford, we concluded:
State courts which have considered the proper procedure
for dealing with counsel fee awards have reached varied
conclusions, but they generally take the position that trial courts
may award fees despite the fact that an appeal has been taken
from the judgment on the merits and is pending.
Id. at 40, 511 A.2d at 1099.
The Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue of unadjudicated attorney’s fees,
in a case substantially similar in procedural posture to the present case, in Larche v. Car
Wholesalers, Inc., 80 Md. App. 322, 562 A.2d 1305 (1989).  Appellees in Larche moved to
dismiss appellant’s appeal of his request for attorney’s fees pursuant to his Magnuson-Moss
Act claim because that claim was not resolved finally by the trial court.  Citing to Doe and
Crawford, the intermediate appellate court rejected appellees’ position, opining:
(continued...)
-18-
with the Open Meetings Act, counsel for Petitioners are awarded
reasonable counsel fees to be paid by [the City].[13]
13(...continued)
A claim for counsel fees as part of a suit under the
Magnuson-Moss Act is clearly analogous to a claim for counsel
fees in a § 1983 action.  In both types of action, an award of
counsel fees is not made by a jury but is entirely within the
discretion of the trial judge and, being dependent on the merits
of the claim, ordinarily would not even be considered until after
the verdict on the underlying action.  We hold, therefore, that a
claim for attorneys’ fees under § 2310(d)(2) of the Manguson-
Moss Act is collateral to the principal action so that an appeal
will lie from a final judgment on the underlying claim despite
the pendency of a decision on the attorneys’ fees claim.
Larche, 80 Md. App. at 327-28, 562 A.2d at 1308.
The conclusion that the award of attorney’s fees is a collateral matter for purposes of
appeal in certain actions has been extended to other contexts.  See Johnson v. Wright, 92 Md.
App. 179, 607 A.2d 103 (1992) (holding that, because an unadjudicated request for
attorney’s fees under Maryland Rule 1-341 was collateral to the merits of the actions between
the parties, the plaintiffs’ failure to appeal timely from the trial court’s resolution of the
parties’ claims on the merits deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the
appeal).  Thus, the consensus of Maryland appellate decisions is that, if a claim for attorney’s
fees derives from statute or rule, that claim is “collateral” to the subject matter of the merits
of the underlying substantive action, with the result that the continuing pendency of the claim
for attorney’s fees in the trial court does not deprive a ruling on the merits of the party’s
substantive claim of its status as an appealable judgment.  See also Blake v. Blake, 341 Md.
326, 670 A.2d 472 (1996) (The absence of any determination by the trial court on the wife’s
claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to Family Law Article § 12-103 did not deprive the court’s
9 August 1993 judgment of finality, such that  wife’s appeal was not timely because it was
not noted within 30 days of final judgment on the merits of the claims.); Gallagher v.
Gallagher, 118 Md. App. 567, 703 A.2d 850 (1997) (Circuit Court did not err by reducing
attorney’s fee award under Family Law Article § 11-110 to judgment after appellant had
noted his appeal to Court of Special Appeals because the reduction of the counsel fees to
judgment was a collateral matter).
-19-
(footnotes omitted).  Everyone was disappointed in some way or another with the trial court’s
rulings and, thus, all parties pursued appeals to the Court of Special Appeals.  Petitioners
argued that the Circuit Court should have “voided” Ordinance 04-659.  The City and
-20-
Cresmont argued that the Petitioners are not entitled to counsel fees.
On 2 July 2007, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion in the
matter.  A panel of the intermediate appellate court determined that, although the City
Council enacted Ordinance 04-855 in January 2005, which amended § 10-501 of the Zoning
Code and thereby made no longer necessary the attainment of an ordinance to establish an
accessory parking lot as a conditional use, as discussed infra, the present case was not moot.
The intermediate appellate court agreed with the Circuit Court that the Committee violated
the Open Meetings Act by recommending an amendment to Bill 03-1228 without first
allowing the public an opportunity to hear the reasoning behind the recommendation.
Further, the court agreed with the Circuit Court’s conclusion that when a legislative
committee meeting is closed to the public improperly, in violation of the Open Meetings Act,
the City Council may rectify the violation by itself holding a proper public meeting on the
bill.  Thus, the intermediate appellate court determined that the City Council’s subsequent
actions, taken at public meetings, “cured” the violation committed by its Land Use and
Planning Committee.  Finally, the panel disagreed with the Circuit Court’s determination that
Petitioners are entitled to counsel fees.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that,
because Petitioners did not achieve the relief they sought on the merits of their claims, they
may not be considered a “prevailing” party, as required under Md. Code, State Govt. Art. §
10-510(d)(5), and, therefore, may not be awarded counsel fees.  Armstrong v. Mayor of Balt.,
No. 01243, September Term 2005 (filed 2 July 2007).
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  The City, on the other hand, requested
14Petitioners’ successful Petition for Writ of Certiorari posed the following questions:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in ruling that in an
action to enforce the Open Meetings Act, the party who proves
an Open Meetings Act violation does not “prevail” within the
meaning of § 10-510(d)(5)(i) so as to be eligible for
consideration to receive an award of counsel fees?
2.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in ruling that, while a
City Council bill was advanced out of committee as a result of
private deliberations that violated the Open Meetings Act, the
City Council’s subsequent public passage of the bill is a non-
voidable final action?
3.  Did the Circuit Court err in ruling that the City Council and
its Committee are separate bodies within the meaning of § 10-
510(a)(2), so that the final action of the City Council may not be
voided when its Committee has violated the Open Meetings
Act?
The City’s Conditional Cross-Petition framed the following questions:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial
court’s refusal to void the City Council’s approval of an
accessory parking lot where, although the intermediate appellate
court agreed with the lower court that a Committee of the City
Council had committed an Open Meetings Act violation, it
(continued...)
-21-
that the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion be reported.  On 25 August 2008, the court
denied both requests.
On 9 September 2008, Petitioners filed with this Court a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.  The City and Cresmont filed answers to the Petition requesting its denial.  In its
response, the City also included a “Conditional Cross-Petition.”  On 10 November 2008, we
granted the Petitioners’ Petition and the City’s Cross-Petition.14  Armstrong v. Baltimore, 406
14(...continued)
found (as did the lower court) that the full City Council had not?
2.  Assuming the Court of Special Appeals was correct in
affirming the trial court’s refusal to void the City Council’s
 approval of an accessory parking lot, did the intermediate
appellate court nonetheless err in reversing the trial court’s
award of attorney’s fees to Petitioners?
15The proposed amended definition of “parking lot” in § 10-501 of the Zoning Code
provided:
In this subtitle, “parking lot” means land used for the non-
(continued...)
-22-
Md. 442, 959 A.2d 792 (2008).  Cresmont expressly declined to participate further in the
present litigation.
C.  Time Does Not Stand Still In City Hall:
Ordinance 04-855
While the litigation over Ordinance 04-659 was spiraling on, the City Council got
busy amending the Zoning Code to “clarify” whether a conditional use ordinance should be
required for accessory parking lots in the Parking Lot Districts.  On 20 October 2004, Bill
03-1219 was introduced in the City Council.  The Bill was titled “Zoning-Parking Lot
Districts-Clarification.”  Bill 03-1219 proposed to amend the definition of “parking lot” in
§ 10-501 of the Zoning Code by adding “non-accessory” to the statutory definition.  Thus,
under the amendment proposed in the Bill, it would no longer be necessary to enact a parking
lot ordinance under § 10-504(a) to approve the construction of off-street accessory parking
in the Parking Lot Districts15 in order to comply with § 10-20116 of the Zoning Code.
15(...continued)
accessory off-street parking of 3 or more motor vehicles,
together with the adjoining and perimeter areas required by this
subtitle or by any other law of Baltimore City.
Thus, the proposed change would exclude accessory parking lots from the ordinance
requirement of § 10-504 because the “parking lot” covered by § 10-504 would no longer
include accessory parking lots.
16Section 10-201 of the Zoning Code provides:
For all newly-erected structures and all newly-established uses
of land, accessory off-street parking facilities must be provided
for that structure and use, as required by this title.
17The proposed amendment from 1970 would have created an exception to the
requirement that the City Council approve parking lots for any parking lot on the same
property as, or within 300 feet of, a building served by the parking.
-23-
Also on 20 October 2004, the Land Use and Planning Committee of the City Council
held a hearing at which Bill 03-1219 was discussed.  At that hearing, Douglas M. Armstrong
(“Armstrong”), the lead Petitioner in this case and other cases related to the overall
controversy at the heart of this case, presented the Committee with a portion of the legislative
history of the Zoning Code, which indicated that, as part of a comprehensive recodification
process in 1970, the City Council declined adopting an amendment similar to the one
proposed in Bill 03-1219.17  On 15 November 2004, the City Council held a work session on
the Bill, and on 29 November 2004, approved the Bill.  The Bill became law as Ordinance
04-855, effective 1 January 2005.
On 30 December 2004, Armstrong filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City seeking a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 04-855 was invalid and an injunction
18Art. III, § 14(b) of the Baltimore City Charter provides: 
(b) Single-subject, title, and content requirements.
Every ordinance enacted by the City shall embrace but one
subject, which shall be described in its title, and no ordinance
shall be revived, amended or enacted by mere reference to its
title, but the same shall be set forth at length as in the original
ordinance.
-24-
prohibiting the City from permitting construction of parking lots pursuant to the terms of the
Ordinance.  The Circuit Court, on 31 October 2005, entered an order dismissing Armstrong’s
request for an injunction and declaring that Ordinance 04-855 was not invalid.
Armstrong pursued a timely appeal of the Circuit Court’s judgment to the Court of
Special Appeals.  He urged that the Circuit Court erred: (1) in ruling that Ordinance 04-855
was not invalid because the Ordinance violated the “one subject” rule contained in Article
III, section 14(b) of the Baltimore City Charter;18 (2) in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and granting the City’s motion to dismiss; and, (3) in failing to enter a proper
declaratory judgment.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  The intermediate appellate
court concluded that Armstrong was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the
question of the Bill’s titling and its compliance with section 14(b) of the City Charter is a
question of law.  Moreover, the titling of Bill 03-1219 complied with section 14(b) because
the title was not misleading and sufficiently apprised the public, including Armstrong, of the
purpose and contents of the Bill.  Thus, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that
Ordinance 04-855 was not invalid.  Armstrong v. Mayor of Balt., No. 02210, September
-25-
Term 2005 (filed 5 Oct. 2006).  We denied Armstrong’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 12
January 2007.  Armstrong v. Baltimore, 396 Md. 524, 914 A.2d 768 (2007).
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Mootness
The City advances a threshold position that Petitioners’ Open Meetings Act claim
regarding Ordinance 04-659 is moot.  The argument rests on the notion that Ordinance 04-
855 amended subsequently (and while the instant litigation was pending) the underlying text
of the Zoning Code and made it unnecessary for Cresmont to obtain a conditional use
ordinance to establish the accessory parking lot.  See supra Part I.C and note 15.  Under the
Yorkdale rule (from Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964), as
recently reaffirmed in Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals, 399 Md. 36, 922 A.2d
576 (2007)), because the present litigation was ongoing at the time Ordinance 04-855 was
enacted, the substantive zoning textual amendment applies retrospectively to this case, with
the result that Cresmont does not need a separate ordinance to sanctify the construction of
the parking lot associated with the Cresmont Loft.  We agree with the City.  Therefore, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals insofar as the intermediate appellate
court concluded that Petitioners’ claim on the merits is not moot.  
In Layton, 399 Md. 36, 922 A.2d 576, we reaffirmed the principal conclusion of
Yorkdale, that “legislated change of pertinent law, which occurs during the ongoing litigation
of a land use or zoning case, generally, shall be retrospectively applied.”  Id. at 38, 922 A.2d
at 577.  As there articulated:
-26-
In Yorkdale, the Court addressed a situation in which a
property owner (the Yorkdale Corporation) had negotiated the
reclassification of the zoning of its property in order to build an
apartment building.  Yorkdale also applied for a special
exception and variance.  The zoning commissioner granted
Yorkdale’s requests, with the exception of limiting the number
of units in the apartment building, i.e., the density of the zoning.
A neighborhood property owner appealed the Board’s decision
to the Circuit Court.  There, the question was “whether the
zoning ordinances . . . gave the zoning officials power to grant
a variance as to density.”  Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 123, 205 A.2d
at 270.  The Circuit Court found that the then-current law did
not authorize a variance in density.  Id. at 124, 205 A.2d at 270.
Yorkdale appealed to the Court of Appeals and, after argument,
but before a decision was issued, a bill was passed by the county
council modifying the law in respect to the granting of variances
as to density.  Id.  Upon becoming aware of this event, the Court
set the case for reargument.
In reaching its decision, the Yorkdale Court first stated
that:
“Maryland consistently has followed the
rule that ‘an appellate court is bound to decide a
case according to existing laws, even though a
judgment rightful when rendered by the court
below should be reversed as a consequence,’ as
Judge Markell, for the Court, repeated in
Woman’s Club v. State Tax Comm., 195 Md. 16,
72 A.2d 742 (or, it may be noted, even when a
judgment wrong when rendered is made right by
the change in the law).  See also for this
proposition that a change in the law after a
decision below and before final decision by the
appellate Court will be applied by that Court
unless vested or accrued substantive rights would
be disturbed or unless the legislature shows a
contrary intent, Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322; Day
v. Day, 22 Md. 530; Gordy v. Prince, 175 Md.
688, 7 A.2d 611; Cockerham v. Children’s Aid
Society, 185 Md. 97, 43 A.2d 197; and Tudor
19The Court in Layton noted that “[f]ollowing the Court’s decision in Yorkdale, [this
Court] ha[s] affirmed those principles in relation to land use and zoning cases several times.”
Layton, 399 Md. at 56, 922 A.2d at 587.  The cases the Court cited in which the Yorkdale
rule was applied included: Anne Arundel County v. Maragousis, 268 Md. 131, 299 A.2d 797
(continued...)
-27-
Arms Apts. v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342, 62 A.2d
346.”
Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 124, 205 A.2d at 271.  In discussing
several zoning cases in which this rule had been applied, the
Yorkdale court stated:
“It would seem to follow from the
decisions in Banner [v. Home Sales Co. D, 201
Md. 425, 94 A.2d 264 (1953)], Lake Falls [Ass’n
v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,
209 Md. 561, 121 A.2d 809 (1956)] and Grau [v.
Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,
210 Md. 19, 122 A.2d 824 (1956)] that an
applicant for rezoning to a more intense use of
his property, who has been successful before the
zoning authorities and the circuit court does not
acquire a vested or substantive right which may
not be wiped out by legislation which takes
effect during the pendency in this Court of the
appeal from the actions below.”
Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 126, 205 A.2d at 272.
Applying this reasoning to the case, and after analyzing
the legislative intent of the county in its enactment of the new bill
and determining that there was no evidence that the bill was not
to be subject to retrospective application, the Yorkdale Court held
that the change in the zoning law had made the case decided
under the old law moot.  Because the amended law had come into
effect during the course of litigation (i.e., while the appeal was
pending before a final judgment) the Court applied it
retrospectively and dismissed Yorkdale’s appeal.  Yorkdale, 237
Md. at 133, 205 A.2d at 276.19
19(...continued)
(1973); Dal Maso v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 Md. 691, 288 A.2d 119 (1972);
Springloch Area Citizens Group v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 252 Md. 717, 251
A.2d 357 (1969); Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Montgomery County Planning Board, 246 Md.
187, 227 A.2d 755 (1967); and Mandel v. Board of County Commissioners, 238 Md. 208,
208 A.2d 710 (1965).
-28-
* * *
Yorkdale and its progeny have never been overruled.
They are still good law and are determinative in evaluating
whether, in a land use or zoning case, a change in statutory law
taking place during the course of a litigated issue should have
retrospective application.  As discussed supra, we shall consider
zoning cases based upon the law as it exists at the time the case
is before us.
* * *
The 
Riverdale 
[Washington 
Suburban 
Sanitary
Commission v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md.
556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987)] Court was correct in the above
statement.  Ordinarily, we do construe statutes to operate
prospectively, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.
The Riverdale Court, however, did not address Yorkdale, the
exception to the general rule.  The Riverdale Court’s
“disapproval” of what it termed dicta from Janda [v. General
Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964), overruled in
part by Layton, 399 Md. at 63, 922 A.2d at 592] (a non-land use
and non-zoning case) does not affect the Yorkdale rule.  Any
disapproval of Janda’s fourth rule by the River[dale] Court was
made in the context of the statute at issue in that case, which had
no relation to land use and zoning issues.  The exception to the
general rule still stands.  In land use and zoning cases, the law
shall be applied as it is in effect at the time of argument.
Therefore, respondents’ reliance on Riverdale is misplaced.
* * *
For the aforementioned reasons, we reaffirm the Yorkdale
rule that a substantive change in relevant statutory law that takes
place during the course of the litigation of a land use or zoning
issue shall be retrospectively applied by appellate courts.
Layton, 399 Md. at 53-56, 58, 64-65, 70, 922 A.2d at 586-87, 589, 593-94, 596 (footnotes
-29-
omitted).  In the present case, there is no doubt that Ordinance 04-855 is relevant statutory
law concerning “a land use or zoning issue.”  As such, we apply here the Yorkdale rule, with
the result that the substantive change to the definition of “parking lot” in § 10-501 of the
Zoning Code applies retrospectively to the approval requirements for the parking lot at issue
here.
Applying the change enacted in Ordinance 04-855 retrospectively to the present case
renders moot Petitioners’ present challenge to the issuance of the parking lot authorization
to Cresmont without a validly enacted conditional use ordinance.  As we explained, supra
in footnote 15, Ordinance 04-855 amended the definition of “parking lot” in § 10-501 of the
Zoning Code to provide:
In this subtitle, “parking lot” means land used for the non-
accessory off-street parking of 3 or more motor vehicles,
together with the adjoining and perimeter areas required by this
subtitle or by any other law of Baltimore City.
(emphasis added).  Thus, the change excludes accessory parking lots from the separate
ordinance requirement of § 10-504 because the “parking lot” to which § 10-504 now refers
no longer would embrace accessory parking lots.  Simply put, the separate ordinance
requirement of Title 10 of the Zoning Code, the requirement that supported previously
Petitioners’ present challenge, no longer stands as a hurdle to Cresmont’s construction and
use of the parking lot here.  See, e.g., Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219-20, 935 A.2d 731,
736 (2007) (“A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case
comes before the Court or when there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could
20Section 1-102 of the Zoning Code defines “accessory”:
“Accessory use” or “accessory structure” means a use or
structure, respectively, that:
(continued...)
-30-
grant.” (citing Dep’t of Human Res. v. Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143, 919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007);
Att’y Gen. v. Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d
749, 752 (1979))).
B.  Petitioners’ Exceptions to Ordinance 04-855 Rendering
Their Challenge Moot
Petitioners advance three considerations which, they allege, spare their present
challenge from being moot: (1) the parking lot may not be “accessory”; (2) the parking lot
cannot be an “accessory” use to an unlawful or non-permitted structure; and (3) two other
sections of the Zoning Code act as a prohibition against non-permitted or unauthorized uses
of land or erection of structures from becoming permitted or made lawful due to subsequent
text amendments to the Zoning Code.  We reject Petitioners’ considerations for the reasons
that follow.
1.  Is The Parking Lot“Accessory”?
Petitioners assert that “[i]t is a fallacy to assume or presume that the parking for . . .
Cresmont [Loft] is ‘accessory,’” and that “[such a] determination cannot be made based on
the record of this matter.”  (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).  Petitioners’ apparent
position is that no determination has been made previously on this record as to whether the
parking lot at issue falls under the Zoning Code’s definition of “accessory.”20  Presumably,
20(...continued)
(1) serves and customarily is identical and subordinate to
the principal use or structure;
(2) is subordinate in area, extent, or purpose to the
principal use or structure;
(3) contributes to the comfort, convenience, or necessity
of occupants, business, or industry in the principal use or
structure served; and
(4) except in a planned unit development, is located on
the same lot as the principal use or structure served.
-31-
Petitioners want us to remand the case for that determination.  We decline the invitation.
Although Petitioners’ argument that the City has not decided this question is not
wholly untenable, it is in stark contrast to the intent and wording of Bill 03-1228, as well as
the 4 December 2003 staff report of the Baltimore City Planning Commission.  The
“Recitals” section of Bill 03-1228 provides:
Recitals
The applicant, Cresmont Properties LLC, is the owner of
2807 Cresmont Avenue, which is located in the Parking Lot
District.
The owner has obtained a building permit to construct a
26-unit apartment building on the property that includes a 33-
space accessory parking lot, and construction has commenced.
By long-standing administrative practice by the City,
required accessory parking uses do not require a Parking Lot
Ordinance.  Certain individuals are, however, contesting the
practice in court.
To expedite the development of the apartment building,
21As quoted, supra, in footnote 16, § 10-201 of the Zoning Code provides:
For all newly-erected structures and all newly-established uses
of land, accessory off-street parking facilities must be provided
for that structure and use, as required by this title.
-32-
the applicant requests that this Ordinance be granted.
(emphasis added).  Similarly, the Commission’s 4 December staff report stated:
The applicants are requesting this conditional use [B]ill because
several community residents have taken this project to court
regarding the use of an alley, and because they are concerned
about this same group challenging them regarding the Parking
Lot District provisions in the Zoning Code.  The City would not
normally require this conditional use ordinance because the
parking to be provided is accessory to the apartment building.
The applicants simply wish to ensure that they may proceed
with their project and are willing to provide the higher level of
scrutiny afforded the community in the ordinance process, if that
would speed the project’s implementation.
(emphasis added).  The obvious intent of Bill 03-1228, as embodied in the “Recitals” section
of the Bill, was to authorize Cresmont to proceed with its proposed development in
accordance with the requirements of the Zoning Code, in particular § 10-201, which required
accessory off-street parking to be provided for all newly-erected structures.21  Before
enactment of the change to the definition of “parking lot” in § 10-501 of the Zoning Code,
the City was required by § 10-504 to issue an ordinance approving the use of land as a
parking lot in the Parking Lot District—the District in which Cresmont’s development is
situated.  See discussion supra Part I.B.  Therefore, implicit in the City Council’s
understanding of the reason for enacting Bill 03-1228, as declared in the Commission’s staff
-33-
report, was the Council’s finding that the parking lot being approved and authenticated by
the Bill was accessory to the apartment building being constructed.  Nothing in the record
presented to this Court suggests that Petitioners challenged Bill 03-1228’s applicability to
the parking lot at issue here on the ground that the City Council’s finding that the parking lot
is accessory to the apartment building was erroneous, other than the bald assertions noted
here.
2.  Is The Parking Lot An Accessory Use
To a Non-Permitted Structure?
Petitioners next assert that
Apart from any and all other considerations, in order to
constitute a permitted “accessory” use under § 1-102 of the
Zoning [Code] . . . , a parking lot must serve a permitted
structure or use.  There is no such thing as lawful or permitted
“accessory” parking to an unlawful or non-permitted structure
or use.  Therefore, a threshold question to any determination of
whether the parking lot at 2807 Cresmont Avenue is “accessory”
or “non-accessory,” for purposes of any current or retrospective
application of the 2005 text amendment, is the legal status of the
structure or use allegedly served by the parking lot.  The City
has conveniently ignored this threshold question, which is the
subject of a separate case.
Even if the development at 2807 Cresmont Avenue were
to survive the [Petitioners’] Open Meetings Act and Judicial
Review challenges to the March 2004 conditional use
authorization which facilitated its construction, the legal status
of the principal structure and its use has been raised in the
[Petitioners’] separate action for judicial review relating to
permits issued in 2004.  That case is presently before this Court
as September 2008, No. 106.  In that case, the [Petitioners] rely
principally on a provision of the Baltimore City Zoning
Ordinance expressly prohibiting the construction and use of a
building far more than the number of families permitted under
-34-
the bulk regulations.  The [Petitioners] have diligently and
consistently pursued this issue since May of 2004.
Now that the separate action has reached this Court,
should the permits for the principal structure at 2807 Cresmont
Avenue and/or its use be deemed unlawful in that case, the
already-constructed parking lot and related structures (fencing,
light poles, etc.) would unquestionably constitute a “non-
accessory” parking lot and could not escape the prerequisite of
a lawfully granted conditional use authorization.  If the parties
hereto can agree on nothing else, they should at least agree that
“non-accessory” parking lots in the Parking Lot District require
conditional use authorization.
(emphasis in original) (citation and footnotes omitted).
Petitioners do not offer any authority, in the Zoning Code or other source, in support
of this assertion.  The short answer to Petitioners’ contention is that we ruled against them
today in their related, but separate, challenge to the apartment building as violating the
Code’s prohibition against the construction and use of a building for more than the number
of families permitted under the bulk regulations.  Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, __ Md. __ , __ A.2d __ (2009) (No. 106, September Term, 2008) (slip op. at 30-
38).  The disposition of that case settles before us the only contention pending that attacks
the legality of the apartment building on zoning grounds.
3.  Do Sections 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code Forestall Mootness?
Petitioners assert that two sections of the Zoning Code prohibit expressly retrospective
application to the Cresmont development of the text amendment enacted under Ordinance
04-855.  As this argument proceeds, application of the Baltimore City zoning scheme “as it
exists” does not moot the validity of the authorization to construct the parking lot granted by
22The entirety of § 3-306 of the Zoning Code provides:
(a) Unlawful preexisting uses and structures.
Any structure or use that is unlawfully existing:
(1) does not become lawful solely by the adoption
of this article or any amendment to it; and
(2) to any extent or manner that the unlawful
structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this
article, that structure or use remains unlawful.
(b) Lawful preexisting uses reclassified as conditional.
(1) If an existing lawful use is reclassified by this article
as a conditional use in the district in which it is located, the use
may be continued as a lawful conditional use subject to the
(continued...)
-35-
the City Council through Ordinance 04-659 in March of 2004.
The first section of the Zoning Code upon which Petitioners rely is § 1-202.  Section
1-202 provides:
Nothing in this article may be taken to be a consent, license, or
permit to:
(1) use any property;
(2) locate, erect, or maintain any structure or facility; or
(3) carry on any trade, industry, occupation, or activity.
Petitioners maintain that under § 1-202, “no text amendment to the Zoning [Code] may be
judicially determined to serve as, substitute for, or convey any construction or use permit.”
Second, Petitioners pin their hopes on § 3-306(a).  That section22 provides:
22(...continued)
conditions and restrictions previously imposed on it by law or
regulation.
(2) Any change to that use, including any expansion,
relocation, or structural altercation, is subject to the procedures
and requirements imposed by this article on conditional uses.
(c) Noncomforming uses.
If an existing lawful use is reclassified by this article or by any
amendment to it so that it no longer is allowed in the district in
which it is located, the use may be continued as a
nonconforming use subject to the provisions of Title 13 of this
article.
(d) Preexisting lot of record.
(1) This subsection does not apply in an Industrial
District.
(2) On a lot that was established before April 20, 1971,
a single-family dwelling may be established regardless of the
minimum lot area requirements imposed by this article, as long
as all other requirements of this article are met.
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(a) Unlawful preexisting uses and structures.
Any structure or use that is unlawfully existing:
(1) does not become lawful solely by the adoption
of this article or any amendment to it; and
(2) to any extent or manner that the unlawful
structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this
article, that structure or use remains unlawful.
23The predecessors to §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the current Zoning Code were adopted
as part of the 1971 comprehensive zoning effort by the City, and appeared in the 1971
Zoning Code at §§ 2.0-1(d) and 2.0-1(c), respectively.  The 1971 Code was reenacted in
1999.
Section 2.0-1(d) of the 1971 Code provided:
d.  Ordinance Not a Permit.  Nothing contained in this
ordinance shall be deemed to be a consent, license, or permit to
use any property, or to locate, erect, or maintain any structure or
facility or to carry on any trade, industry, occupation, or activity.
Section 2.0-1(c) of the 1971 Code provided:
c.  Unlawfully Existing Structures and Uses.  No structure
or use which was not lawfully existing at the time of the
adoption of this ordinance shall become or be made lawful
solely by reason of the adoption of this ordinance; and to the
extent that, and in any manner that, said unlawful structure or
use is in conflict with the requirements of this ordinance, said
structure or use remains unlawful hereunder.
24Petitioners premise much of their theory on the basis that the parking lot at issue was
constructed pursuant to an ordinance, Ordinance 04-659, which was later determined by the
(continued...)
-37-
Petitioners argue that, by enacting §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a),23 the City Council made a
“legislative choice” to restrain itself from being able (1) to approve unlawfully a developer’s
application for a conditional use authorization—here the parking lot ordinance, Ordinance
04-659—to allow construction to commence, and then (2) later amend the zoning text so as
to relieve the need for its prior action.  This application should be an exception to the
Yorkdale rule, so it goes, because the operative effect of these sections is to prevent
subsequent text amendments to the Zoning Code from legitimating previously enacted, but
unlawful, authorizations to construct developments.24
24(...continued)
Circuit Court to have been enacted in violation of the Maryland Open Meetings Act.  See
supra Part I.B.
25See supra note 23.
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The City retorts that Petitioners misinterpret the intention of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a)
of the Zoning Code.  With regard to § 1-202, the City contends that its plain meaning is
simply that the existence of the Zoning Code, wherein lists of various uses of land are
authorized (either as of right or by way of application to the Board or the City Council) does
not eliminate the need for the use or structure to be in compliance with all other applicable
laws and regulations, including obtaining the proper permits, or, in certain cases, obtaining
a license or any other approval made necessary by some other pertinent part of the Baltimore
City Code.  The City describes that every decision by the Board recites similar language to
inform applicants that even if an instant application is approved, the applicant, at a minimum,
yet must obtain a permit from the pertinent authority.
With regard to § 3-306(a), the City imagines the logical extension of Petitioners’
interpretation to mean that any structure or use unlawful at the time of the 1971
recodification of the Zoning Code25 (or any amendment thereafter) remains unlawful even
if the Zoning Code is changed subsequently to permit such a structure or use.  Petitioners’
interpretation, thus stated, is inconsistent with the legislative choice of the word “solely” in
§ 3-306(a)(1), or with § 3-306(a)(2)’s provision that “to any extent or manner that the
unlawful structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this article, that structure or
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use remains unlawful.”  A more logical reading of “solely” in subsection (a)(1) and the
language of subsection (a)(2), according to the City, is that if a structure or use once
prohibited is then made a permitted use, pursuant to a text amendment, the amendment does
not otherwise free the structure or use from compliance with other requirements of the
Zoning Code.
The City illustrates its interpretation of these sections:
A hypothetical example of how this might work follows.
Assume for the moment that in 1971 retail uses were prohibited
in certain districts of the City but that the owner of a property in
such a district was nonetheless using the property for retail.
Assume also that in 1971 the City Council, as part of its
comprehensive rezoning of the City in that year, made retail a
permitted use in the hypothetical property’s zoning district.
Under [Petitioners’] theory of the meaning of § 3-306, the use
of the property at issue would remain unlawful notwithstanding
the change and the property would be forever locked into the
prior zoning scheme.  This was surely not the intention of the
drafters of the 1971 Zoning Code.  After all, when they
comprehensively rezoned the City in 1971, they specifically
intended that their changes would eliminate the prior zoning
scheme. [Petitioners’] theory would contravene that intention.
The City’s theory of the meaning of [§ 3-306(a)] is that
if the hypothetical use independently violated some other
provision of the Zoning Code that had not been changed—e.g.,
setback requirements, floor area ratio, etc.—the use or structure
would remain unlawful and would still have to adhere to this
other requirement.  Viewed in such manner, the City’s theory
gives specific meaning to the use of the word “solely” in § 3-
306(a)(1) as well as the inclusion of the language in § 3-
306(a)(2) as part of the provision.
(emphasis in original).
We agree with the City’s interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code.
26As iterated previously, § 1-202 of the Zoning Code provides:
Nothing in this article may be taken to be a consent, license, or
permit to:
(1) use any property;
(2) locate, erect, or maintain any structure or facility; or
(3) carry on any trade, industry, occupation, or activity.
(continued...)
-40-
Although we are sympathetic to the Petitioners’ position here because Ordinance 04-659, the
ordinance pursuant to which the parking lot was constructed actually, later correctly was
found to have been enacted in violation of the Maryland Open Meetings Act, Petitioners’
interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) is misguided.  Use of the word “solely” in subsection
(a)(1) of § 3-306 indicates an intention on the part of the City Council that any change to the
Zoning Code that authorizes a structure or use that was not authorized properly under the
Code prior to the text change does not otherwise free that use or structure from compliance
with any other pertinent requirements of the Code.  Subsection (a)(2) affirms this intention
by advising expressly that regardless of whether a change in the text of the Code authorizes
the use or structure, that use or structure remains unlawful so long as it is in conflict with the
other requirements of the Code.  Also, § 1-202 simply provides that the text of the Zoning
Code does not eliminate the need for the applicant to comply with the other requirements of
the Baltimore City Code, including obtaining the proper permits, and any other approvals
from the appropriate authorities, as provided in the City Code.26  Were we to agree with
26(...continued)
Section 1-202 seems to indicate that the change implemented by Ordinance 04-855 to the text
of the Code does not eliminate the need for compliance with other requirements imposed by
the Baltimore City Code, including the proper permits.  Because the Circuit Court did not
void Ordinance 04-659, the ordinance pursuant to which the permit for the parking lot was
issued, in Petitioner’s Open Meetings Act challenge, it would appear that the permit for the
parking lot issued to Cresmont pursuant to Ordinance 04-659 remains valid.
27Petitioners seek to limit the effect of their interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-
306(a)—that subsequent text amendments to the Zoning Code do not legitimate unlawful
preexisting uses and structures—by narrowing that interpretation to situations in which the
preexisting use or structure was constructed pursuant to an approval later found to be invalid.
See supra Part I.B and note 24.  For the same reasons articulated above, we find this
interpretation contradictory to the intention and purpose of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a).
-41-
Petitioners’ interpretation, any change in the zoning text would not apply to any unlawful
preexisting uses or structures to which the change in the text would be applicable.  For
obvious practical reasons, illustrated in the City’s hypothetical, this is a result with which we
cannot agree in the face of Yorkdale and Layton.27
C.  Attorney’s Fees under the Maryland Open Meetings Act
Although we conclude that, under the Yorkdale rule, Petitioners’ challenge to the
validity of the City Council’s authorization of the parking lot in Ordinance 04-659, in light
of the Council’s subsequent enactment of Ordinance 04-855, is moot, this is so only insofar
as their challenge seeks to undo the validity of the parking lot at the Cresmont complex.
Whether Petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees and, if so, how much those fees should be,
as awarded generally by the Circuit Court upon its conclusion that Petitioners’ proved that
the Committee’s process leading to the adoption of Ordinance 04-659 violated the Maryland
Open Meetings Act, is a separate and collateral consideration that remains to be decided
-42-
finally by the trial judge.  As noted at the outset of this opinion, we are not compelled here
to reach the parties’ questions in this regard, because of our holding as to mootness; however,
we shall comment (admittedly as dicta) on the issue for guidance when this matter is
considered by the trial judge.  
The Maryland Open Meetings Act is found in the State Government Article in Title
10, Subtitle 5, §§ 10-501 to -512.  See, e.g., Md. Code, State Gov’t Art. § 10-512 (“This
subtitle may be cited as the ‘Open Meetings Act.’”).  The Act provides, in § 10-510(c), that
“[i]n an action under this section, it is presumed that the public body did not violate any
provision of this subtitle, and the complainant has the burden of proving the violation.”  Md.
Code, State Gov’t Art., § 10-510(c).  Subsection (d) of § 10-510 grants the following powers
to a court hearing an action brought by a complainant alleging that a public body violated the
Act:
A court may:
(1) consolidate a proceeding under this section with
another proceeding under this section or an appeal from the
action of the public body;
(2) issue an injunction;
(3) determine the applicability of this subtitle to the
discussions or decisions of public bodies;
(4) if the court finds that a public body willfully failed to
comply with § 10-505, § 10-506, § 10-507, or § 10-509 (c) of
this subtitle and that no other remedy is adequate, declare void
the final action of the public body;
(5) as part of its judgment:
(i) assess against any party reasonable counsel
fees and other litigation expenses that the party
who prevails in the action incurred; and
(ii) require a reasonable bond to ensure the
payment of the assessment; and 
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(6) grant any other appropriate relief.
Md. Code, State Gov’t Art., § 10-510(d).  In the present case, the Circuit Court determined
that Petitioners proved that the Committee acted in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  As
part of its judgment, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees generally, pursuant to § 10-
510, to Petitioners.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s award of
attorney’s fees.  The intermediate appellate court opined that, because Petitioners “did not
obtain any of the relief that they requested,” Petitioners were not “prevailing” parties under
§ 10-510(d)(5)(i), and thus did not qualify for an award of attorney’s fees.  For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals regarding the award of
attorney’s fees.
Section 10-510(d)(5)(i)’s provision for an attorney’s fees award in Open Meetings Act
violation claims has been addressed by both Maryland appellate courts on several occasions.
In Malamis v. Stein, 69 Md. App. 221, 516 A.2d 1039 (1986), the Court of Special Appeals
considered “whether a trial judge must award attorney fees and other litigation expenses to
the prevailing party” in an action brought pursuant to the Open Meetings Act.  Id. at 222, 516
A.2d at 1040.  The appellants in Malamis filed a petition in the Circuit Court challenging the
actions of the Allegany County Board of Education in reaction to the flooding of one of the
county schools.  Id. at 222-23, 516 A.2d at 1040.  The flooding of the school necessitated its
closing and the reassignment of its students to other schools in Allegany County.  Id. at 222-
23, 516 A.2d at 1040.  Three days after the flooding incident, a meeting was held involving
Board officials, parents, and students to discuss the relocation assignment options.  Id. at 223,
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516 A.2d at 1040.  During the meeting, the School Superintendent informed those assembled
that the final decision regarding reassignment of students would be made at a closed meeting
to be held later that day.  Id. at 223, 516 A.2d at 1040.  At the closed meeting, a final decision
was reached, and that decision was ratified subsequently at a regularly scheduled public
meeting.  Id. at 223, 516 A.2d at 1040.
Appellants alleged that the closed afternoon meeting violated the Open Meetings Act.
Id. at 223, 516 A.2d at 1040.  They sought a declaration holding that the Board’s decision
was invalid, an injunction against implementation of the plan, and an award of “the cost of
this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  Id. at 223-24, 516 A.2d at 1040-41.  The
trial court found that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by having the closed hearing.
Id. at 224, 516 A.2d at 1041.  Consequently, the trial judge ordered the Board to conduct an
open meeting for the purpose of adopting a plan of reassignment for the students.  Id. at 224,
516 A.2d at 1041.  He did not void, however, the plan in effect, which was to remain in effect
until a new plan was adopted.  Id. at 224, 516 A.2d at 1041.  Concerning appellants’ request
for attorney’s fees, the trial judge ruled:
The Act provides that the Court as part of its judgment may
assess against any party reasonable counsel fees that the party
who prevails in the action incurs.  The Court finds that while the
Board failed to comply with the Sunshine Act its actions were
not taken in bad faith nor with an intention to deceive the public.
Rather, the Board acted to deal with an emergency situation in
an expedited fashion and thereby overlooked statutory
requirements.  Therefore, the Court declines to award counsel
fees in this case.
Id. at 224, 516 A.2d at 1041.
-45-
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, rejecting
appellants’ position that the award of attorney’s fees was mandatory upon finding a violation
of the Open Meetings Act.  The intermediate appellate court, applying the rules of statutory
construction, resolved that the provision in the Act regarding attorney’s fees is clear: “the
legislature intended that trial judges determine, in their discretion, whether the circumstances
warrant the award of attorney’s fees or other expenses of litigation.”  Id. at 227, 516 A.2d at
1042.  Concerning the standard of review for that trial court decision, the Malamis court
added:
We do not find the denial of attorney fees and other
expenses to be an abuse of discretion.  Where the trial judge has
discretion to award attorneys fees, his or her exercise of that
discretion will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.  See
Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md.App. 122, 127, 485 A.2d 270 (1985).
Moreover, the exercise of that discretion is “presumed to be
correct until the attacking party has overcome such presumption
by clear and convincing proof of an abuse.”  Langrall, Muir &
Noppinger v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 401, 384 A.2d 737
(1978).  See I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 19-
20, 344 A.2d 65 (1975).  No such clear and convincing proof
has been presented here.  Accordingly, neither the trial judge’s
finding that the Board did not act in bad faith or to deceive the
public, nor his reliance on such finding to support his refusal to
award attorneys fees is clearly erroneous.
Id. at 227-28, 516 A.2d at 1042-43 (footnote omitted).
Over a decade later, this Court decided Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n v. Baltimore
County, 347 Md. 125, 699 A.2d 434 (1997).  There, the issue was whether the Baltimore
County Board of Appeals was required by the Open Meetings Act to deliberate in open
session when considering an appeal from a hearing officer’s approval of a land development
28The trial court ruled that the petitioner proved that the Board of Appeals was
required to deliberate in open session, and that, by failing to do so, the Board acted in
violation of the Open Meetings Act.  Wesley Chapel, 347 Md. at 136, 699 A.2d at 439.  The
trial court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings, thereby effectively
voiding the Board’s prior decision, and ruled that the County had to pay petitioners’ counsel
65% of his attorney’s fees.  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the
Open Meetings Act was not applicable to the Board’s actions because review of a
development plan is not a “zoning matter” within the meaning of § 10-503(b)(2) of the Act.
Id.  This Court reversed the intermediate appellate court, concluding that review of a
development plan is a “zoning matter” within the meaning of the statute.  Id. at 127, 699
A.2d at 435.  We declined to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court, however,  because of
that court’s failure to make specific findings reflecting whether the statutory conditions to
void an action taken in violation of the Act were present, and because it was not clear
whether the issue of attorney’s fees, in light of the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment on
the merits of the applicability of the Open Meetings Act, was properly before the Court.  Id.
at 149-50, 150 n.14, 699 A.2d at 446, 446 n.14.
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plan.  Id. at 127, 699 A.2d at 435.  We concluded that the Open Meetings Act applies to
consideration of development plans, and, thus, required the board to deliberate in open
session.  Id.  On the issue of attorney’s fees, the Court declined to affirm the trial court’s
award of attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioner, however, because the trial court’s
judgment did not comport with the findings required for the relief sought under the Open
Meetings Act.28  Nevertheless, the Court provided instructive guidance to assist the trial court
in its reconsideration of the attorney’s fee issue:
Although, as we have indicated, an assessment of attorney’s fees
under § 10-510(d)(5) does not depend on a finding of
willfulness, the animus of the board, if any, would certainly be
a factor to consider.  We do not believe that the Legislature
intended for such assessments to be automatic upon a finding of
a violation, for that would require the diversion of scarce public
funds for fee-shifting purposes merely because a public body
guessed wrong on the eventual outcome of a legal issue.  Courts
considering fee assessments need to take into account, among
29The Public Information Act is codified at §§ 10-611 to -628 of the State Government
Article.
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other things, whether, how, and when the issue of a closed
session or other prospective violation was presented to the
public body, the basis, if any, the public body gave for
concluding that its action was permissible under the Act,
whether that basis was a reasonable one under the law and the
circumstances, whether the amounts claimed are reasonable, and
the extent to which all parties acted in good faith.  The circuit
court will have an opportunity to do that and to make
appropriate findings when the case is remanded to it.
Id. at 150, 699 A.2d at 446 (footnote omitted).
In 1999, the Court of Special Appeals visited again § 10-510’s attorney’s fees
provision, in Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 125 Md. App. 125, 724 A.2d 717
(1999).  Andy’s Ice Cream brought an action against the Salisbury Zoo Commission, Inc.,
asserting that the Commission, in a closed meeting, failed to comply with the Public
Information Act29 and the Open Meetings Act in the course of awarding a food concession
contract to Andy’s competitor.  Id. at 131, 724 A.2d at 719-20.  Andy’s sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the Commission’s decision to award the contract to the
competitor.  Id. at 131, 724 A.2d at 720.  All parties sought attorney’s fees.  Id.  The Circuit
Court concluded that there was no Open Meetings Act violation because the Act did not
apply to the Commission.  Id. at 159, 724 A.2d at 733.  No attorney’s fees were awarded to
any party.  Id. at 131, 724 A.2d at 720.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment
of the Circuit Court with regard to the Open Meetings Act, concluding that the Act was
applicable to the Commission, and that the Commission violated the Act by making the
30Petitioners also rely on the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Suburban Hospital,
Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission, 125 Md. App. 579, 726 A.2d 807
(1999), vacated, 364 Md. 353, 772 A.2d 1239 (2001), in support of their position.  The
pertinent facts of that case do not warrant recitation here because, on 28 June 1999, we
granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the intermediate appellate
court.  See Md. Health Res. v. Suburban Hosp., 354 Md. 570, 731 A.2d 969-71 (1999).  On
5 June 2001, however, we issued an Order vacating the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals and remanding the case to the intermediate appellate court with directions to vacate
the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the case to the Circuit Court
with directions to dismiss the action on the grounds of mootness.  Md. Health Res. Planning
Comm’n v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 364 Md. 353, 353-54, 772 A.2d 1239, 1239 (2001).
Notwithstanding questionable reliance on the reported decision of the Court of Special
Appeals on the merits of the Open Meetings Act claim under those circumstances, we find
that the intermediate appellate court set forth accurately the policy underlying the pertinent
requirements of the remedies provided in § 10-510(d):
The Commission’s arguments fail in several respects.
First, the requirement that a public body must have acted
“willfully” only applies to attempts to void the public body’s
(continued...)
-48-
award decision in a closed meeting.  Id.
Regarding the issue of the appropriate remedy for violation of the Open Meetings Act,
the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, because the City Council of Salisbury could not
delegate lawfully to the Zoo Commission the discretionary power to award the franchise at
issue, there was “no need to declare the final action of the [C]ommission void pursuant to the
provisions of § 10-510(d)(4).”  Id. at 159, 724 A.2d at 733-34.  With regard to the issue of
attorney’s fees, however, the intermediate appellate court informed the trial court that, on
remand, “it would be appropriate to re-consider the issue of attorneys’ fees as to th[e Open
Meetings Act] issue.”  Id. at 167, 724 A.2d at 737.
A close examination of these cases30 suggests to us that the Court of Special Appeals
30(...continued)
acts.  The circuit court interpreted “willfully” as “knowingly,”
and then found that the Commission had therefore not willfully
violated S.G. §§ 10-505, 506, 507, or 509(c).  Because of this
conclusion, the trial court refused the discretionary option,
offered to it by S.G. § 10-510(d)(4), of voiding the
Commission’s actions.
State Government § 10-510(d)(2), (3), (5), and (6),
however, which provide for injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
attorneys’ fees, and “any other appropriate relief,” respectively,
do not require the same finding that the public body “willfully
failed” to comply with the Open Meetings Act that § 10-
510(d)(4) requires.  See Wesley Chapel Bluemount Association,
et al. v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125, 149, 699 A.2d 434
(1997).  In addition to being apparent on the face of § 10-510(d),
this is evident from the public policy reality that enjoining a
public body’s action, or issuing a declaratory judgment action,
will be less disruptive and more conducive to a balance between
citizen complaints and government efficiency than would be
voiding the public body’s actions.  Simply put, under the Open
Meetings Act, injunctions and declaratory relief are available for
a lower threshold of violation than that needed to void a public
body’s action.
Suburban Hosp., Inc., 125 Md. App. at 590, 726 A.2d at 812.
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erred in the present case when it concluded that, for the purposes of § 10-510(d)(5)(i)’s
provision for the award of attorney’s fees, a party bringing an action alleging an Open
Meetings Act violation must obtain the relief it requests on the merits of its claim in order
to be deemed the “prevailing” party.  In none of the three cases on point did an appellate
court of this State interpret the qualifier “prevails” in § 10-510(d)(5)(i) to mean that a party
had to achieve the relief it requested on the merits of its claims.  In fact, in two of the cases,
the appellate courts acknowledged implicitly that, because the petitioners/appellants proved
31In Wesley Chapel, we directed the remand of the case to the trial court to reconsider
whether the requisite circumstances for awarding either or both of two remedies, voiding the
government body’s offending action and awarding attorney’s fees to the petitioners, were
satisfied.  In so doing, this Court highlighted the separate findings and determinations the
trial court should reach in resolving the two possible remedies.  See Wesley Chapel, 347 Md.
at 149-50, 699 A.2d at 446.  In Andy’s Ice Cream, the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that the trial court’s reconsideration of the voidability issue was not necessary, but,
nevertheless, it would be appropriate for the trial court to reconsider Andy’s claim for
attorney’s fees.  See Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc., 125 Md. App. at 167, 724 A.2d at 737.  The
Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Malamis is not inconsistent.  Although the
intermediate appellate court did not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the governmental
body’s actions violated the Open Meetings Act, it agreed with the trial judge’s decision not
to award attorney’s fees to appellants because such a remedy was not warranted under those
circumstances.  See Malamis, 69 Md. App. at 227-28, 516 A.2d at 1042-43.
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that the actions taken by the pertinent governmental bodies violated the Open Meetings Act,
the trial courts in those cases, on remand, could consider the issue of attorney’s fees separate
and distinct from any other relief sought by the petitioners/appellants.31
Of greater consequence, the intermediate appellate court’s decision here conflicts with
the purpose and goals of the Open Meetings Act.  We discussed in Wesley Chapel the
intention at the heart of the Act:
This case is governed by four sections of the State Open
Meetings Act, codified as Maryland Code (1995 Repl.Vol.), §§
10-501 through 10-512 of the State Government Article.
Section 10-501 recites the legislative policy behind the Act.  It
begins by declaring essential to the maintenance of a democratic
society that, except in special and appropriate circumstances,
public business be performed in an open and public manner and
that citizens be allowed to observe the performance of public
officials and the deliberations that go into the making of public
policy.  It then expresses the truism that the ability of the public
to attend and report on meetings of public bodies and to witness
their deliberations ensures the accountability of government and
increases the faith of the public in government.  That legislative
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policy undergirds and pervades the Act and necessarily sets the
general direction for its interpretation.
Wesley Chapel, 347 Md. at 127-28, 699 A.2d at 435.  With regard to the enforcement
provision of the Act, § 10-510, we stated:
[Section 10-510] provides for enforcement of the Act.  Section
10-510(b) allows a person adversely effected by an alleged
violation of the Act to file a petition in the circuit court to
determine the applicability of the Act, to require the public body
to comply with the Act, and to void an action of the public body
taken in violation of the Act.  Section 10-510(d) permits the
court to issue an injunction and determine the applicability of
the Act but allows it to void the action complained of only if it
finds that the public body “willfully failed to comply” with the
Act and that no other remedy is adequate. § 10-503(d)(4).  As
part of its judgment, whatever it may be, the court is permitted
under § 10-510(d)(5) to assess against any party reasonable
counsel fees and other litigation expenses that the party who
prevails in the action incurred and to require a reasonable bond
to ensure payment of the assessment.  Section 10-510(d)(5) does
not, on its face, require a finding of willfulness as a precondition
to the assessment of counsel fees and litigation expenses.
Id. at 128-29, 699 A.2d at 436 (emphasis added).  Thus, a goal of the Act is to ensure that
public business be performed in an open and public manner, to the end that such discourse
increases both the accountability of government and the faith of the public in that
government.
One of the means by which the Legislature chose to reach this goal was to authorize
enforcement of the Act’s provisions by persons “affected adversely,” including, among
others, granting those persons the potential to be awarded attorney’s fees if they “prevail[]
in the action.”  Md. Code, State Gov’t Art. § 10-510(b)(1), (d)(5).  In light of the Act’s goals
32This interpretation entails that the non-governmental challenger “prevails” by
proving that the governmental body acted in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  See Md.
Code, State Gov’t Art., § 10-510(c) (“In an action under this section, it is presumed that the
public body did not violate any provision of this subtitle, and the complainant has the burden
of proving the violation.”).
33We note that under § 10-510(d), the three other substantive remedies a court may
grant are: (2) to issue an injunction; (4) to void the public body’s action upon a finding of
willful failure to comply with the relevant sections of the Act; and (6) to grant any other
appropriate relief.  Md. Code, State Gov’t Art., § 10-510(d).
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and purpose, as described above, we interpret the qualifier “prevails” as being determinable
according to the parties’ respective success litigating the seminal Open Meetings Act
violation claim,32 regardless of the specific remedies sought, or whether any or all of those
remedies are achieved.  To conclude otherwise that the non-governmental party qualifies as
a “prevailing” party only if that party obtains an injunction, a declaration of invalidity of the
legislative act, or achieves other remedies following establishment of the merits of its
foundational claim seems to us to run counter to the intent of the Act for two reasons.
First, if the non-governmental party sought any remedy other than attorney’s fees, the
intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of “prevails” would seem to limit the discretion
of trial judges to award attorney’s fees to the non-governmental party to only those actions
in which the non-governmental party succeeded in securing all of the substantive relief
sought.33  Such a limitation conflicts with prior judicial interpretations of § 10-510(d), which
make clear that discretion remains with trial judges with regards to § 10-510(d)(5)(i)’s
provision for awarding attorney’s fees.  See Wesley Chapel, 347 Md. at 129, 699 A.2d at 436
(“As part of its judgment, whatever it may be, the court is permitted under § 10-510(d)(5) to
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assess against any party reasonable counsel fees and other litigation expenses that the party
who prevails in the action incurred and to require a reasonable bond to ensure payment of the
assessment.”); Malamis, 69 Md. App. at 227, 516 A.2d at 1042 (“[T]he legislature intended
that trial judges determine, in their discretion, whether the circumstances warrant the award
of attorney’s fees or other expenses of litigation.”).  Our ruling here does not mean
necessarily that it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny attorney’s fees to
a litigant who proves a violation of the Act.  Each case will rise or fall on its own unique
circumstances and the trial court’s articulated or discernable exercise of discretion.
Second, because the remedy of voiding the public body’s action under § 10-510(d)(4)
requires a finding that the public body willfully failed to comply with the pertinent sections
of the Act, in those cases in which the non-governmental party seeks that remedy, under the
intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of “prevails,” the non-governmental party would
not be eligible for attorney’s fees unless willfulness was found.  That interpretation was
rejected by this Court in Wesley Chapel, where we made clear that the willfulness standard
is not applicable to analysis of the challenging party’s request for attorney’s fees.  See Wesley
Chapel, 347 Md. at 129, 699 A.2d at 436 (“Section 10-510(d)(5) does not, on its face, require
a finding of willfulness as a precondition to the assessment of counsel fees and litigation
expenses.”).
Finally, our interpretation of “prevails” most befittingly incorporates § 10-510(c)’s
provision that “[i]n an action under this section, it is presumed that the public body did not
violate any provision of th[e Act], and the complainant has the burden of proving the
34We pause to address briefly the cases relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals,
as well as the City, in support of the position that “prevails” in § 10-510(d)(5)(i) should be
interpreted in terms of whether the complainants obtain the relief they requested.  In reaching
its judgment, the Court of Special Appeals relied mainly on three cases which held, in their
respective contexts, that plaintiffs could not be considered “prevailing” parties because they
did not receive any of the relief they sought on the merits.  See Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (holding that,
with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiff’s action under the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the term
“prevailing party” does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (holding that, with respect to the
plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action for vindication
of civil rights, “a plaintiff [must] receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before
he can be said to prevail”), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995); Settlemire v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals, 898 A.2d 902, 907 (D.C. 2006)
(holding that, in a government employee’s pursuit of an appeal to the Office of Employee
Appeals, “a party’s interest in pursuing litigation in order to be awarded attorney’s fees
cannot by itself create the requisite live controversy ‘where none exists on the merits of the
underlying claim’”).
In addition to Hewitt and Buckhannon Board & Care Home, the City points to three
similar cases upon which it relies.  See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)
(holding that, with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiff’s action
under the Clean Air Act, “absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is
not ‘appropriate’ for a federal court to award attorney’s fees under § 307(f) [of the Clean Air
Act]”); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757-58 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that, with
(continued...)
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violation.”  Md. Code, State Gov’t Art.., § 10-510(c) (emphasis added).  In light of § 10-
510(c), to conclude other than as we do here would violate one of the cardinal rules of
statutory interpretation of “ensur[ing] that ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Jackson v. State, 408 Md. 231, 236-37,
969 A.2d 277, 281 (2009) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 9, 962 A.2d 374, 378 (2008)).34 Accordingly, the Circuit Court for
34(...continued)
respect to the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiff’s action under the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, “[i]t seems apparent from these passages that
Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has
prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims”); S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21
F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that, with respect to the plaintiffs’
claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiffs’ action under the Education of the Handicapped Act,
the dismissal of the appeal for prudential reasons as moot prevents the plaintiffs from being
found prevailing parties, with the result that plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees as provided in the Act).
We recognize the similarity between the discretionary language of § 10-510(d)’s
provision for awarding attorney’s fees and the discretionary language employed by Congress
interpreted in the cases enumerated above.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (“In any
action to enforce a provision of . . . the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, or section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).  The Court of Special Appeals and the City,
however, do not articulate why § 10-510(d)(5)(i)’s “prevails” should be interpreted similarly
to the precedents noted above, other than by noting the similar language in the respective
statutes.  Neither the City nor the intermediate appellate court addressed or mentioned § 10-
510(c)’s explicit presumption in actions under the Open Meetings Act—that the public body
did not violate any provision of the Act—including why that presumption should have no
bearing on the Legislature’s intended meaning of “prevails.”  Additionally, the Court of
Special Appeals previously rejected an attempt to liken § 10-510(d)(5)(i) to comparable
provisions in federal statutes:
We do not take lightly appellants’ approach to the issue
of attorney fee awards pursuant to § 10-510[(d)](5)(i).  We
recognize, however, as we must, that the federal cases relied
upon by appellants involve an act and issues unlike that
presented here.  These cases involved litigation brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 and
attorneys fee awards sought pursuant to the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See,
e.g.[,] Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76
L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (relationship between success in the Civil
(continued...)
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34(...continued)
Rights litigation and the amount of the fee award); Coen v.
Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 27 (5th Cir.1981)
(definition of “prevailing party” as used in § 1988); Bagby v.
Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 414 (3rd Cir.1979) (same, and the
appropriateness of the fee award in that case).  We further are
aware that the legislative history of § 1988, which, like § 10-
510[(d)](5)(i), uses discretionary language, at least in part,
accounts for the interpretation placed upon the act by the Courts
which have considered it.  See, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429,
103 S.Ct. at 1937.  We have been provided with no comparable
legislative history for § 10-510[(d)](5)(i).  There is, moreover,
a significant difference between the rights, the abridgement of
which the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is designed to prevent[,] and
those which are sought to be protected by the [Open Meetings
Act].  Thus, there is a rational basis for interpreting the fee
award provisions differently.
Malamis, 69 Md. App. at 228-29, 516 A.2d at 1043 (footnotes omitted).
35That the Circuit Court did not render a finding on the issue of willfulness is rendered
moot by our decision in this case.  Cf. Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc., 125 Md. App. at 159, 724
A.2d at 733-34 (“[I]n light of our decision on the issue of delegation, . . . there will be no
need to declare the final action of the [C]ommission void pursuant to the provisions of § 10-
510(d)(4).”).
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Baltimore City must resolve finally its general attorney’s fees award.35
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO
DISMISS THE APPEALS; COSTS TO BE
PAID a BY PETITIONERS AND b BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL.