Title: Lyden v. Winer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lyden v. Winer1994 WY 75878 P.2d 516Case Number: 93-240Decided: 07/27/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Larry 
LYDEN,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Ernest 
WINER,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
D. Whitaker and James R. McCarty, Casper.

Representing 
Appellee:

Rex 
O. Arney of Murane & Bostwick, Casper.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* 
Retired July 5, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      A social guest of 
landlord's tenant filed a negligence complaint against landlord to recover money 
damages for personal injuries suffered after he slipped on an area rug and fell 
down the basement stairs of landlord's rental. The social guest now appeals the 
district court's entry of summary judgment against him following its 
determination that landlord had not retained control of the premises upon which 
the social guest was injured.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant social 
guest presents the following issues for our review:

1. 
What duty of care, if any, is owed by the owner and occupant of a premises to a 
social guest of another occupant of the premises?

2. 
Assuming there was a duty under the facts of this case, was there a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Appellee breached that duty, and was 
Appellee entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

3. 
What duty, if any, is owed by the owner and occupant of a premises to a social 
guest of another occupant of the premises not to injure the guest by virtue of 
his own affirmative negligence?

4. 
Assuming there was a duty under the facts of this case, was there a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Appellee breached that duty, and was 
Appellee entitled to summary judgment?

[¶4]      Appellee landlord 
rephrases the issue as:

Did 
[appellee] as landlord have a duty to tenant['s] social guests for injuries 
occurring on the rented premises, and if so, is he liable as a matter of 
law?

FACTS

[¶5]      Appellee, Ernest 
Winer, owns a house located at 1241 South Jackson in Casper, Wyoming. In May, 
1992, he rented out the main floor of the residence to Carla Wise (Wise). He 
allowed tenant Wise use of the laundry facilities located in the basement, but 
retained the rest of the basement, consisting of an unfinished bedroom, utility 
room, storage room, bathroom, living room and bar, for himself. From May 23, 
1992, until August 20, 1992, although appellee kept his personal property in the 
basement, he lived primarily with his parents in Durango, Colorado, where he was 
working for his father.

[¶6]      On the evening of 
June 6, 1992, Wise went with a group of her friends, including appellant, Larry 
Lyden, to the Moonlight Lounge in Casper, where they played pool and had drinks. 
Later that evening, Wise invited the same group of friends to her residence 
where they continued socializing and drinking beer. After approximately one 
hour, Wise asked appellant to go to the basement with her to talk with two of 
their friends who had gone to the basement to rest. As appellant approached the 
stairway to the basement, he slipped on an area rug on the landing and fell down 
the stairs, striking his head on a support beam at the bottom of the stairwell. 
Early in May, 1992, appellee had placed the rug, which had no non-skid backing, 
on the landing to protect the parquet flooring.

[¶7]      On December 23, 
1992, appellant filed a complaint against appellee alleging appellee negligently 
maintained the stairwell causing appellant to sustain serious injuries. On 
October 4, 1993, the district court entered an order granting appellee's motion 
for summary judgment. The district court concluded that no genuine issues of 
material fact existed and that, as a matter of law, appellee did not retain 
control of the premises and, therefore, owed no duty of reasonable care to his 
tenant's social guests.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 1994); Lynch v. Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Wyo. 1993). A material fact is a fact which, if proven, would have the effect 
of establishing or refuting an essential element of the claim or defense 
asserted by the parties. Walsh v. Walsh, 841 P.2d 831, 833 (Wyo. 1992). 
"When reviewing the propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we review the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that 
party all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts." 
Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 894 (quoting Lynch, 861 P.2d at 1097). If a 
dispute exists over a material fact which leads to conflicting interpretations 
or if reasonable minds might differ, then summary judgment is improper. 
Walsh, 841 P.2d  at 834; Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372, 375 (Wyo. 
1988).

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      This court has 
adopted the general rule that

a 
lessor [will] not ordinarily be held liable for injuries by a defective 
condition of the premises which arose after the lessee had taken possession, or 
for a defective condition which existed at the time possession was delivered 
unless it was a latent defect which was known to lessor, or concerning which he 
should have known, and which he did not make known to 
lessee.

Medlock 
v. Van Wagner, 
625 P.2d 207, 208 (Wyo. 1981). An exception to this rule applies to areas of the 
rented premises over which the landlord retains control. 49 AM.JUR.2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 805 (1970); Medlock, 625 P.2d  at 208, n. 2. 
The rule imposing a duty of reasonable care upon the landlord for those areas 
over which he retains control is stated generally as:

[W]here 
the owner of the premises leases parts thereof to different tenants, and 
expressly or impliedly reserves other parts thereof, such as entrances, halls, 
stairways, porches, walks, etc., for the common use of different tenants, it is 
his duty to exercise reasonable care to keep safe such parts of which he so 
reserves control, and if he is negligent in this regard, and a personal injury 
results by reason thereof to a tenant or to a person there in the right of 
the tenant, he is liable, provided that the injury occurs while such 
part of the premises is being used in the manner intended.

49 
AM.JUR.2d Landlord and Tenant, supra, at 760-61. (Emphasis added). See 
Also Kitchens v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 531, 536 (M.D.Ala. 1985) 
("Where a landlord has retained control, he has the duty to maintain the common 
areas in a reasonably safe condition in order to avoid liability for injury to 
tenants or their guests."); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Landlord's 
Liability for injury or Death Due to Defect in Areas of Building (Other than 
Stairways) Used in Common by Tenants, 65 A.L.R.3d 14, 35-36 (1975 & 
Supp. 1993) ("[I]n most jurisdictions a landlord is considered to owe a duty to 
his tenants and to those standing in the right of the tenant, to exercise 
reasonable care to make and keep reasonably safe those common areas of the 
building over which the landlord retains control for the use of his 
tenants.")

[¶10]   As noted in the statement of the 
rule above, when the landlord retains control of the premises or a portion 
thereof, he owes the same duty of care to both the tenant and a person on the 
premises by right of the tenant. This rule and the justification for the rule 
are explained as follows: 

[The 
lessor's] position is closely analogous to that of a possessor who permits 
visitors to enter for a purpose of his own; and those who come in the course of 
the expected use may be considered his invitees, as a good many courts have 
held. He is therefore under an affirmative obligation to exercise reasonable 
care to inspect and repair such parts of the premises for the protection of the 
lessee; and the duty extends also to members of the tenant's family, his 
employees, his invitees, his guests, and others on the land in the right of the 
tenant, since their presence is a part of the normal use of the premises for 
which the lessor holds them open. * * * The duty does not extend to intruders 
who come for a purpose for which the building is not open and provided, and such 
individuals are at best licensees.

W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 440-41 (5th 
ed. 1984).

[¶11]   Whether a landlord has retained 
control over a portion of the leased premises is a question of fact. Andres 
v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apartments, 777 F.2d 670, 672 (11th Cir. 1985); 
Kitchens, 604 F. Supp.  at 536; Kuhn v. General Parking Corp., 98 
Ill. App.3d 570, 54 Ill.Dec. 191, 195-96, 424 N.E.2d 941, 945-46 (1981). See 
also Hape v. Rath, 492 P.2d 974, 977 (Wyo. 1972) (remanding for submission 
to the trier of fact the question whether the landlord had assumed the duty of 
maintaining the stairs).

[¶12]   "To show control in the landlord 
there must be evidence from which the trier of fact can infer that the tenant 
surrendered his right to exclusive possession and control." Erhardt v. 
Lowe, 596 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Mo. App. 1980). As we noted earlier, a question 
of fact, or the inferences to be drawn from a fact or facts, will not be taken 
from the trier of fact unless reasonable minds could not 
differ.

[¶13]   A survey of the numerous cases 
discussing whether a landlord has retained control over a portion of the rented 
premises reveals no clear rule governing when, as a matter of law, the landlord 
has retained control. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 
1963) (holding that whether the landlord retained control was a question of fact 
for the jury where porch roof of farmhouse collapsed, and although neither party 
disputed that landlord did not regularly stay at the farmhouse, parties did 
dispute whether the landlord retained certain portions of the premises for own 
use); Black v. Fiandaca, 98 N.H. 33, 93 A.2d 663 (1953) (holding a 
question of fact existed concerning whether the landlord or the tenant 
maintained control over the attic where tenant was permitted to store items in 
the attic along with the landlord's items, the only access to the attic was 
through the tenant's apartment, and the landlord usually sought the tenant's 
permission before accessing the attic); Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 
344 P.2d 301 (1959) (holding a question of fact existed concerning control over 
a porch which collapsed where the porch was used only by the injured tenant, but 
the supporting structure of the porch also supported a porch and steps for other 
apartments in the complex); Campagna v. Cozzi, 59 Ill. App.2d 208, 207 N.E.2d 739, 741 (1965) (holding a question of fact existed concerning control of 
a porch where lease was silent as to control, the porch could be accessed 
through two different apartments, and each tenant family used only their own 
side); but see Mackey v. Allen, 396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965) 
(upholding summary judgment for the landlord on question of control of basement 
where the landlord did not have a key to the basement and visited once a month, 
borrowing the tenant's key so he could clean the basement, although he was under 
no duty to do so).

[¶14]   Appellant argues that the district 
court, in determining that storage of appellee's property in the basement of the 
rented premises could not, as a matter of law, establish control of the 
premises, erred in failing to consider other relevant factors which at least 
raised a genuine question of fact concerning the issue of control. We 
agree.

[¶15]   The district court relied upon 
Erhardt, in reaching its conclusion. It concluded:

The 
claim that Defendant-landlord still had control of the premises due to his 
storing some property in the basement is no good. Erhardt v. Lowe, supra, 
stated that the mere fact landlord retains a key to the premises does not 
establish as a matter of law that the landlord has control or possession. The 
same can be said for Defendant-landlord storing some property in the basement in 
this particular case.

We 
cannot agree with this interpretation of Erhardt. In Erhardt, the 
trial court's determination that the landlord had not retained control was a 
finding of fact reached only after a bench trial; the determination was not made 
as a matter of law in a summary judgment setting. Erhardt, 596 S.W.2d  at 
490.

[¶16]   While Erhardt does hold that 
a landlord's possession of a key to the rented premises will not, per se, 
establish the landlord's control, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not hold 
that possession of a key to the rented premises would never be enough to 
establish control. Erhardt, 596 S.W.2d  at 491. That court, in upholding 
the trial court's finding that the landlord had not retained control, instead 
confirmed that the question was one of fact, and that possession of the key was 
one factor to consider, in light of all the circumstances, to determine control. 
Erhardt, 596 S.W.2d  at 491.

[¶17]   Likewise, whether landlord's 
control of the premises may be inferred from the facts present in this case is a 
question for the trier of fact. Storage of appellee's property in the basement 
of the rented premises is but one factor to consider, and we cannot conclude, as 
a matter of law, that appellee relinquished his control over the common areas of 
the rented premises by working out of town for the summer. Other facts from 
which the jury may infer the landlord retained control over the landing and 
stairwell include:

· 
the only access to the basement where landlord was storing his property was 
through the front door, over the parquet floor, and down the 
stairs;

· 
landlord bought and placed the area rug (without a non-skid backing) on the 
landing to protect the parquet floor; and

· 
landlord had a key and access to the premises, without tenant's permission, 
throughout the months he spent in Colorado.

We 
thus reverse and remand for a determination by the trier of 
fact.

[¶18]   As noted earlier, if the trier of 
fact determines that appellee landlord retained control of the rented premises, 
or the portion in question, then appellee owes the same duty of care to both the 
tenant and her social guest. We need not, therefore, address the applicability 
of our recent decision in Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993), 
abrogating the common law distinctions between invitees and 
licensees.

CONCLUSION

[¶19]   Landlord owes a duty, to his tenant 
and any person on the premises by right of the tenant, to exercise reasonable 
care in maintaining those areas of the rented premises over which he retains 
control. Whether appellee landlord retained control over any area of the 
premises is a question of fact, and, in this case, a genuine question of fact 
does exist.

[¶20]   We reverse the decision of the 
district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.