Title: Samuel Passante v. Agway Consumer Products Inc.

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 58  
Samuel Passante et al.,
            Appellants, 
        v. 
Agway Consumer Products, Inc., 
&c.,  
            Defendant, 
Mullen Industrial Handling Corp.,
et al.,
            Respondents.
W. Bradley Hunt, for appellants.
Jeffrey F. Baase, for respondent Mullen Industrial
Handling Corp.
Janet D. Callahan, for respondent Rite-Hite
Corporation.
PIGOTT, J.:
Samuel Passante, an employee of Agway Consumer
Products, Inc., doing business as G & P Fresh Pac, was injured
while using a mechanical dock leveler at the company's warehouse
in DeWitt.  The dock leveler was manufactured by Rite-Hite
Corporation and sold to G & P by Mullen Industrial Handling Corp. 
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The dock leveler at issue here is a mechanical platform designed
to provide a ramp between a loading dock and the bed of a truck
or tractor trailer.  When not in use, the dock leveler is flat
and part of the loading dock floor.  It rises to match the height
of the load bed, so as to enable forklifts or pallet trucks to
move in and out of the trailer.
Once activated, the platform of the leveler swings up,
and a hinged lip at its edge also moves up -- from a pendent
position perpendicular to the platform to a position in which it
forms an extension of the platform -- in order to meet the
trailer bed.  The operator then walks towards the edge of the
leveler platform and, if his weight is sufficient, forces the
platform down -- toward the trailer bed -- so that the lip
catches the trailer floor.  This is known as "walking down" the
leveler.  Once the hinged lip has engaged the bed of the trailer,
it provides a transition between the loading dock floor and the
trailer bed.  However, the lip is designed to rotate back into
its pendent position if it is not supported, and the parties do
not dispute that a person standing on an unsupported lip will
fall.  A Rite-Hite instruction sheet was posted on a wall in the
loading dock area, which, among other things, warned operators
not to walk on the lip of a dock leveler when "walking down" the
leveler.
  
According to Rite-Hite's design engineer, the leveler
here was designed for a "150 pound walkdown," meaning that a
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person who weighs about 150 pounds would be able to bring the
leveler platform down to the requisite height by simply walking
to the edge of the platform.  Passante, who weighed 140 pounds,
testified that he was not heavy enough to force the leveler
platform down to the trailer bed without standing on the hinged
lip.  Moreover, Joseph Panebianco, the G & P assistant facility
manager and a heavier man, testified that he too was unable to
"walk down" the leveler successfully without standing on the lip.
Mullen had offered to sell G & P a system manufactured
by Rite-Hite, called "Dok-Lok", that secures a tractor trailer to
the loading dock and includes a warning system so that workers
know when they can safely enter the trailer and drivers know when
they can safely pull away.  G & P declined to buy a Dok-Lok
system, instead relying on wheel chocks -- wedges placed beneath
or behind a truck's wheels to prevent movement.  Panebianco
testified that he decided against Dok-Lok partly because it would
require having an operator and also because a driver who "doesn't
use his head and drives off" while a Dok-Lok is engaged would in
his opinion tear the bumper from his trailer.
Passante's accident occurred when he was "walking down"
the dock leveler in order to get the platform to rest on a
trailer.  He was standing on the hinged lip of the leveler as it
made contact with the trailer bed.  Unbeknownst to Passante, the
driver of the tractor-trailer had not completed the process of
parking, and no chocks were in place.  Passante remained standing
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on the hinged lip for a "split second" after completing the "walk
down."  At that moment, the driver began to move the tractor-
trailer forward and, without the support of the trailer bed, the
lip fell to its pendent position, causing Passante to fall onto a
cement and steel grate, sustaining injury.
Passante and his wife commenced this action, against G
& P, Rite-Hite and Mullen, alleging, among other things, that the
dock leveler Mullen sold to G & P was defectively designed by
Rite-Hite because it lacked equipment restraining the tractor
trailer or securing it to the loading dock while the dock leveler
was in use, and lacked a system to warn the operator when it was
safe to enter the trailer or, in the alternative, notifying the
driver that a dock leveler was in position.  The Passantes also
allege that Mullen negligently failed to warn G & P of the danger
that movement of a tractor-trailer during the operation of a dock
leveler would cause the it to collapse.  The complaint also
alleged manufacturing defects, negligent installation and
maintenance, and breach of warranty.  Rite-Hite cross-claimed
against Mullen.  
Following discovery, Mullen moved for summary judgment,
attaching deposition transcripts and various other documents,
including a Rite-Hite sales brochure describing its Dok-Lok
trailer restraint systems.  The brochure vividly described the
dangers faced by the operators of dock levelers when tractor
trailers are unsecured.  Rite-Hite described the space between
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loading dock and trailer bed -- the space bridged by its dock
levelers -- as a warehouse's "Danger Zone."
"Every time a lift truck impacts the ramp,
crosses [the Danger] Zone, and enters a
trailer, the trailer can inch forward.  When
it moves too far, or departs prematurely, the
lift truck and driver can tumble into the gap
with disastrous results. . . .  The impact of
a lift truck moving in and out of the trailer
during loading operations causes the trailer
to inch forward slightly -- even with the
brakes set and the wheels chocked.  When the
trailer moves beyond the reach of the
leveler's lip, the lip falls, leaving a large
gap.  The lift truck and operator may then
topple off the leveler or trailer and onto
the driveway. . . .  [In another common
scenario] the truck driver, assuming loading
operations are completed, pulls away without
warning.  This unexpected departure from the
dock can cause the forklift and operator to
be thrown onto the driveway."
The brochure noted that wheel chocks were ineffective
and expensive, and recommended one of its Dok-Lok systems to
ensure the safety of dock leveler operators.
In opposition to Mullen's motion, plaintiffs submitted
the affidavits of a mechanical engineer and an industrial
engineer.  The mechanical engineer, noting the testimony from
Passante and Panebianco to the effect that they could not get the
dock leveler to operate without standing on its lip, had
inspected the dock leveler involved in the accident.  Even with a
body weight of 180 pounds, the mechanical engineer was unable to
urge the dock leveler to a horizontal position.  The engineer
concluded that, at 140 pounds, Passante would not be able to
impel the dock leveler down simply by "walking down" to the edge
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of its platform.  "As a result," he observed, "it was necessary
for Samuel Passante, as well as for Joseph Panebianco, to
position themselves on the extended lip in order for the
equipment to achieve its operational goals."  The mechanical
engineer, noting that "the unscheduled departure of a tractor
trailer is a known risk in the materials handling industry,"
concluded that "with a reasonable degree of engineering
certainty, the equipment created an unreasonable risk of harm to
the operator both from falls from the collapsing lip, as well as
from falls caused by the unscheduled departures of tractor
trailers."
The industrial engineer's opinion was that the
"warnings positioned on the wall, remote from the pull-chain
which initiates the operation of the mechanical dock leveler in
question, would not effectively remind the operator of the
dangers associated with walking on the extended lip of the
equipment. . . .  To properly warn the operator, . . . a warning
medallion connected to the links of the pull-chain directly at
the point of operation was necessary. . . .  Additionally, . . . 
some type of safety striping or demarcation of the lip itself was
necessary to fully advise the operator as to the specific dangers
involved in the steps he was taking during the operation of the
equipment, to wit approaching the end of the platform and
stepping onto the hinged lip itself."
The industrial engineer also noted that neither Rite-
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1 Supreme Court had dismissed the Passantes' complaint as
against G & P, after the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of New York determined that the action against
G & P was barred by reason of workers' compensation.
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Hite nor Mullen had provided G & P with instructions for
adjusting the dock leveler for operators of different body
weights or with a warning that "operation outside of the
parameters of 150 pound nominal walk down weight [i.e. the
inability of someone weighing approximately 150 pounds to "walk
down" the dock leveler without standing on the lip] indicates
that the equipment is not operating properly."  The industrial
engineer concluded "with a reasonable degree of engineering
certainty, this lack of properly placed warnings combined with
the complete lack of warnings or instructions to the proper
operating capacity of the equipment, creates an unreasonable risk
of harm to the operator." 
Supreme Court denied Mullen's motion, finding questions
of fact concerning defective design and failure to warn.  The
Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the Passantes' complaint
as against Mullen in its entirety (294 AD2d 831).  Two dissenting
Justices would have held that the defective design and failure to
warn claims survived summary judgment.
After the Appellate Division's decision, Mullen moved
for summary judgment dismissing Rite-Hite's cross-claims and
Rite-Hite sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint.1  Supreme Court dismissed Rite-Hite's cross-claims
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without prejudice on condition that Rite-Hite "may assert its
cross-claims in the event of a reversal or modification in
plaintiff's favor" of the Appellate Division's order by this
Court.  Supreme Court also required plaintiffs to consent to
judgment dismissing their action should this Court affirm the
Appellate Division's order.  Plaintiffs appealed, pursuant to
CPLR 5601 (d), bringing up for review the Appellate Division's
order.  We now modify the judgment appealed from and the
Appellate Division's order, and reinstate the causes of action
for defective design and failure to warn.
Mullen and Rite-Hite rely on our decision in
Scarangella v Thomas Built Buses, Inc. (93 NY2d 655 [1999]). 
There, as here, plaintiff argued that a product was defectively
designed insofar as it did not incorporate, as standard
equipment, a particular safety feature.  In Scarangella,
plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, was injured
when a school bus struck her, while being operated in reverse in
a bus parking yard.  The distributor that sold the bus to the
defendant school bus company had offered, as an optional safety
feature, an alarm that would automatically sound when a driver
shifted the bus into reverse gear.  The bus company chose not to
buy this equipment because the alarms were noisy and the buses
were parked in a yard in a residential neighborhood where noise
pollution was an issue.   
We held that a product that fails to incorporate safety
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equipment is not defective, as a matter of law, 
"where the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom show that: (1) the buyer is
thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the
product and its use and is actually aware
that the safety feature is available; (2)
there exist normal circumstances of use in
which the product is not unreasonably
dangerous without the optional equipment; and
(3) the buyer is in a position, given the
range of uses of the product, to balance the
benefits and the risks of not having the
safety device in the specifically
contemplated circumstances of the buyer's use
of the product.  In such a case, the buyer,
not the manufacturer, is in the superior
position to make the risk-utility assessment,
and a well-considered decision by the buyer
to dispense with the optional safety
equipment will excuse the manufacturer from
liability."  (93 NY2d at 661 [emphasis in
original].) 
Because all three of the factors were present, a
departure from strict liability was justified in Scarangella. 
First, defendant was a highly knowledgeable consumer, experienced
in operating school buses and aware of the dangers and of the
availability of the optional alarm (id.).  Second, defendant's
buses were used in reverse only in the parking yard (i.e. where
there were no school children or other nonemployee pedestrians),
so that the risk of harm from the absence of a back-up alarm was
not substantial.  Moreover, the bus drivers were instructed to
use caution and to sound their regular horns when reversing.  (93
NY2d at 661-662.) Third, the bus company, rather than the
distributor, "was in a position to assess the efficacy of
alternative safety measures in its operational rules and training
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of drivers.  The buyer had the ability to understand and weigh
the significance of costs associated with noise pollution and
neighborhood relations, given the particular suburban location of
the parking lot, against the anticipated, foreseeable risks of
operating buses in a parking lot without a back-up alarm device
or safeguard."  (Id. at 662.)  Because all three factors were
present and plaintiff created no triable issues with respect to
her claim that the absence of a back-up alarm was a design
defect, the bus company was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.  
Here, it is conceded that the first Scarangella
principle is met; G & P was knowledgeable about dock levelers and
knew that Dok-Lok was available as an option.  However,
defendants' further reliance on Scarangella is misplaced because
they have not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law relative to the second factor.  
Defendants have not shown that the dock leveler would
normally be used in circumstances in which the product is not
unreasonably dangerous without a trailer restraint system such as
Dok-Lok.  Indeed, the Rite-Hite brochure, submitted by Mullen
itself in its summary judgment papers, describes, as a pervasive
risk, the danger that a tractor trailer will inch forward "even
with the brakes set and the wheels chocked" or be driven forward
inadvertently, with the result that a dock leveler operator falls
from the leveler or trailer.  Moreover, defendants have not
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refuted -- whether by expert affidavits or by deposition
testimony -- the opinion of the mechanical engineer that the dock
leveler, because of its collapsing lip, posed an unreasonable
risk of harm to its operator.  
In Scarangella, the risks associated with a bus
reversing were limited because the buses only reversed when they
were in the parking yard and the people in the yard -- mostly
other bus drivers -- could carry on their tasks and avoid contact
with the reversing buses simply by exercising caution.  There was
nothing about the buses, engaged in normal reverse driving, that
would make them unreasonably dangerous.  By contrast, the record
here supports plaintiffs' position that a dock leveler, of the
design involved here, creates a substantial risk of harm as
normally used.  This is because the dock leveler has a hinged lip
that collapses if not supported, and yet the lip is an extension
of the platform the operator must "walk down" in order to adjust
the leveler to the correct height.  Indeed the record evidence
suggests further that operators of average weight or less must
step onto the lip in order to "walk down" the leveler.  If so,
the dock leveler lip posed a risk to operators that could not be
avoided simply by cautious operation.  
We conclude that defendants have not demonstrated the
absence of material issues of fact with respect to whether normal
circumstances of use exist in which the dock leveler is not
unreasonably dangerous without a trailer restraint system. 
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Consequently, the second Scarangella factor is not satisfied, and
the defective design cause of action should be reinstated. 
Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss
the third Scarangella factor.  
Finally, there are triable issues of fact as to the
sufficiency of the warnings concerning this equipment.  An
instruction sheet was posted on a wall in the loading dock area
that included a warning not to walk on the lip of a dock leveler
when "walking down" the leveler; and Passante was aware that the
lip would begin to collapse during a "walk down" if the operator
did not complete the "walk down" quickly enough.  However, the
instruction sheet contains no warning that it is dangerous to
remain on the lip, even momentarily, after it has engaged the
trailer bed.  Passante himself was familiar, from a loading dock
where he had worked previously, with a different design of dock
leveler in which the hinged lip did not collapse.  Moreover,
plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of an industrial engineer who
opined that the posted warning was insufficient and that a
warning at the point of operation as well as striping or
demarcation of the lip itself were necessary to remind the
operator of the dangers of standing on the lip.  
Thus, on this record, we cannot conclude as a matter of
law that Passante was fully aware of the danger of standing on
the dock leveler lip after it had engaged the trailer bed, or
that site-of-operation warnings of the type recommended by the
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industrial engineer would have been superfluous.  "[I]n cases
where reasonable minds might disagree as to the extent of
plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard, the question is one for the
jury" (Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232, 241 [1998]). 
Therefore, the cause of action for failure to warn should also be
reinstated.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from and the order
of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be
modified, without costs, in accordance with this opinion, and, as
so modified, affirmed.
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Samuel Passante and Josephine Passante v Agway Consumer Products,
Inc., et al.
No. 58
SMITH, J.(dissenting):
In Scarangella v Thomas Built Buses (93 NY2d 655
[1999]), we held that a seller of equipment whose buyer refused
to purchase an optional safety feature is, under certain
conditions, immune from a claim that the product without the
safety feature was defectively designed.  This case is
essentially a duplicate of Scarangella, and the majority has
overruled Scarangella without saying so.
I
Rite-Hite manufactured, and Mullen sold, dock levelers. 
Rite-Hite also manufactured, and Mullen also offered for sale, a
safety device known as a "Dok-Lok," which locks a truck to the
loading platform, to prevent the truck from driving or rolling
away while the dock leveler is in use.
Undoubtedly, both Rite-Hite and Mullen would have been
delighted to sell the Dok-Lok to plaintiff Samuel Passante's
employer, G & P, or to any other customer.  A Rite-Hite sales
brochure, quoted by the majority (majority op at 5), recommended
this safety device with the enthusiasm typical of such
literature, and Mullen gave G & P quotations for three different
Dok-Lok models.  But even the cheapest of these models -- a
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manual device that might not have prevented this accident -- was
expensive; it would have added more than 50% to the cost of the
dock leveler.  The automatic models would have more than doubled
the cost.
G & P was not interested in buying a Dok-Lok.  The G &
P employee responsible for this decision explained his reasons:
"Q.  Did you consider the use of dock-lock
equipment at this facility?
"A.  Not really, because, there again, for
our type of facility, you know, I mean, it
really didn't seem to be something that works
well in our type of a facility.
"Q.  Why do you say that?  What is the basis
of your conclusion in that regard?
"A.  Basically, a lot of our trucks are in
and out relatively quickly, and they are
quite often, my understanding with that type
of equipment, you almost always have to have
someone who is on the dock all the time to
release -- and my understanding with that
type of equipment, there is an arm that comes
down and catches the trailer, basically holds
the trailer in.  Number one, you have got to
have someone, who is going to be operating
that type of equipment.  In our type of
operation, you know, it is not feasible. 
And, number two, my experience with that type
of equipment is that it really doesn't hold
the truck in.  If the thing comes down on
your ICC bumper and the driver in the truck
drives off, he just drives off and wrecks his
bumper.  It's been my experience, where I
have seen some of this equipment, that if the
driver doesn't use his head and drives off,
all he ends up doing is tearing the heck out
of the back of his trailer.  So, I guess, I'm
not convinced that it really works well, and
it certainly doesn't seem to work well in
this particular facility."  
The majority today holds that Rite-Hite and Mullen may
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be sued for not overruling the buyer's objections and insisting
that G & P purchase a dock leveler either with the Dok-Lok or not
at all.  As we held in Scarangella, this holding cannot be
justified.  Under circumstances like these, whether safety
equipment should be bought is a decision for the buyer, not the
seller and not the courts. 
II
The defendant in Scarangella was a seller of school
buses.  It "offered buyers as an optional safety feature a back-
up alarm that would automatically sound when a driver shifted the
bus into reverse gear" (93 NY2d at 657).  It sold several buses
to the plaintiff's employer, a bus operator, which "chose not to
purchase this optional equipment" (id.).  The plaintiff was
injured when a bus backed into her, and claimed that the absence
of the alarm was a design defect.  We held that this claim could
not be presented to the jury.  
In an effort to lend predictability to litigation of
this kind, we set out "some governing principles for cases where
a plaintiff claims that a product without an optional safety
feature is defectively designed because the equipment was not
standard" (id. at 661).  We said:
"The product is not defective where the
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
show that: (1) the buyer is thoroughly
knowledgeable regarding the product and its
use and is actually aware that the safety
feature is available; (2) there exist normal
circumstances of use in which the product is
not unreasonably dangerous without the
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optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in a
position, given the range of uses of the
product, to balance the benefits and the
risks of not having the safety device in the
specifically contemplated circumstances of
the buyer's use of the product."
(Id.)
These principles require dismissal of plaintiff's
design defect claim here.  G & P, as the majority concedes, was
knowledgeable about dock levelers and knew that the Dok-Lok was
available.  It is no less true in this case than it was in
Scarangella that "there exist normal circumstances of use in
which the product is not unreasonably dangerous without the
optional equipment."  And G & P was in as good a position as the
buyer in Scarangella to balance benefits and risks.
According to the majority, the second Scarangella test
is not met here because "[d]efendants have not shown that the
dock leveler would normally be used in circumstances in which the
product is not unreasonably dangerous without a trailer restraint
system" (majority op at 10).  This is a misstatement, or at best
a confusing paraphrase, of what Scarangella said.  Under
Scarangella, the second question is not whether equipment "would
normally be used" without unreasonable danger; it is whether
"there exist normal circumstances of use" where the danger is not
unreasonable.  In other words, if there exist buyers who use the
product normally and can forego the safety feature without
unreasonable risk, the judgment as to which buyers ought to do so
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is left to the buyers themselves.
Here, the record shows that circumstances did exist
where a dock leveler without a Dok-Lok was reasonably safe in
normal use.  Indeed, the use of the system at the loading dock
involved in this case was not unreasonably dangerous.  The danger
that a truck would roll away was absent here, because the ground
on which trucks parked sloped uphill.  (For this reason, the
majority's discussion of wheel chocking is irrelevant.)  And the
risk of what actually happened -- a driver's decision to move his
truck while someone was standing at the edge of the dock leveler
-- could have been eliminated by a simple precaution: G & P could
have instructed its employees not to use the dock leveler until
they had confirmed that the truck's motor was off.  Thus this
case is not different from Scarangella, where the buyer's
employees "were instructed as part of their training not to
operate buses in reverse except in the yard" and "were also
instructed to exercise caution and sound their regular horns when
backing up" (93 NY2d at 662).
The third Scarangella test, which the majority does not
discuss, is also met here.  G & P, which loaded merchandise onto
trucks from loading docks as a routine part of its business, was 
"in a position ... to balance the benefits and the risks ... in
the specifically contemplated circumstances" of its own use of
the dock leveler.  In fact, it did balance those benefits and
risks, as the above-quoted testimony of its decision-maker shows. 
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If the buyer struck the wrong balance, there is no good reason to
hold the manufacturer and seller liable.
III
The majority also concludes that plaintiffs' failure-
to-warn claim can withstand summary judgment.  I do not agree. 
Of course it is true, as it is in every case, that more and
better warnings could possibly have been given; and it is true,
as it is in almost every case, that plaintiffs' expert has opined
that more and better warnings should have been given; but we need
not decide whether this is enough to raise a jury question on the
issue of negligent failure to warn, for it is abundantly clear
that no warning could have prevented this accident (see Gebo v
Black Clawson Co.,92 NY2d 387, 394-395 [1998]).
The majority suggests that a warning might have made a
difference because Mr. Passante "was familiar, from a loading
dock where he had worked previously, with a different design of
dock leveler in which the hinged lip did not collapse" (majority
op at 12).  But the majority fails to mention that, during the
five months he worked at G & P, Mr. Passante had hundreds of
experiences with the Rite-Hite dock leveler and learned that the
hinged lip on that equipment did collapse.  He testified:
"Q.  How did you know that [the lip] would
drop if you didn't go out there fast enough?
"A.  I pulled the chain I don't know how many
hundreds of times, and if you didn't walk it
out there fast enough, the lip would just go
down.  There was nothing to hold it up until
it hit the truck.
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"Q.  So prior to your accident on January
16th, 1997, you knew, sir, didn't you, that
the lip was designed to fall freely?
"A.  Yeah."
It is mystifying how, in the face of this testimony,
the majority "cannot conclude as a matter of law that Passante
was fully aware of the danger of standing on the dock leveler
lip" (majority op at 12).
IV
I think both the majority's holdings are wrong.  But
the more troubling of the two is the evisceration of Scarangella,
which I fear will have real economic consequences.  The
predictability that was offered until today to manufacturers and
distributors of equipment in this State is gone, and the result
can only be an increase in cost -- in the cost of liability
insurance, and in the cost of safety features that buyers will no
longer have the option to refuse.  In much of this State, our
economy struggles in the best of times, and these are not the
best of times.  Decisions like today's can only make things
worse.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate Division
brought up for review modified, without costs, in accordance with
the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.  Opinion by
Judge Pigott.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick and Jones
concur.  Judge Smith dissents in an opinion in which Judges
Graffeo and Read concur.
Decided May 5, 2009