Title: Peter Ogden Family Trust of 2008 v. Board of Review for the Town of Delafield

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP516 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. The Peter Odgen 
Family Trust of 2008 and The Therese A. Mahoney-
Ogden Family Trust of 2008, 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
     v. 
Board of Review for the Town of Delafield, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 381 Wis. 2d 161,911 N.W.2d 653 
PDC No:  2018 WI APP 26 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 14, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by R. Valjon Anderson, and Municipal Law & Litigation 
Group, S.C., Waukesha. There was an oral argument by R. Valjon 
Anderson. 
 
For the petitioners-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Paul W. Zimmer, and O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & Laing 
S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Paul W. Zimmer.  
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Realtors Association, Wisconsin Builders Association, and NAIOP-
WI by Thomas D. Larson, Madison. 
 
An amicus curia brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin Farm 
Bureau Federation, Cooperative and Waukesha County Farm Bureau 
by H. Dale Peterson, John H Laubmeier, and Stroud, Willink & 
Howard, LLC, Madison.  
 
 
2019 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP516 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV1707) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. The Peter Odgen 
Family Trust of 2008 and The Therese A. 
Mahoney-Ogden Family Trust of 2008, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Review for the Town of Delafield, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 14, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   In 2016, the Board of 
Review for the Town of Delafield reclassified two lots of land 
owned by The Peter Ogden Family Trust of 2008 and The Therese A. 
Mahoney-Ogden Family Trust of 2008 from "agricultural land" to 
"residential."  This reclassification resulted in a significant 
increase in property tax owed for the two lots.  The Board 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
2 
 
believed 
that 
to 
qualify 
for 
the 
"agricultural 
land" 
classification, the land must be farmed for a business purpose.1   
¶2 
The Ogdens sought certiorari review, and the Circuit 
Court for Waukesha County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge, sustained 
the Board's reclassification of the land as "residential."   
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
holding that a business purpose was not necessary for land to be 
classified as "agricultural land" for property tax purposes.2  
"Because 
the 
assessor's 
determination 
of 
the 
appropriate 
classification was driven by his erroneous understanding of the 
law[,]" the court of appeals ordered the circuit court to remand 
the cause to the Board to "assess the Trust property anew in a 
manner that is not inconsistent with" the court of appeals' 
decision.3  
¶4 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
¶5 
We agree with the court of appeals that a business 
purpose is not required in order for land to be classified as 
"agricultural land" for property tax purposes.   
                                                 
1 The Board members reached a tie vote with regard to 
whether the Assessor's reclassification should be overturned or 
sustained, and as a result, the reclassification stood. 
2 State ex rel. Peter Ogden Family Trust of 2008 v. Bd. of 
Review, 2018 WI App 26, 381 Wis. 2d 161, 911 N.W.2d 653. 
3 Id., ¶25. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
3 
 
¶6 
Based on the undisputed evidence presented to the 
Board,4 the two lots at issue are entitled to be classified as 
"agricultural land" as a matter of law.   
¶7 
Accordingly, we remand the cause to the Board for the 
limited purpose of affixing a value to the two lots that we 
conclude are entitled to be classified as "agricultural land."     
I 
¶8 
The Ogdens own three adjacent lots of land in the Town 
of Delafield.  Only two of those lots are at issue in the 
instant case.5  The smaller of the two lots is 4.6 acres, and the 
larger of the two is 7.76 acres. 
¶9 
From 2012 through 2015, the two lots were classified 
as "agricultural land" and "agricultural forest land."6  When the 
                                                 
4 Neither party asks this court to remand the cause to the 
Board to re-determine whether the proper classification is 
"residential" or "agricultural land."  The Board argues that we 
should classify the two lots as "residential" as a matter of 
law, while the Ogdens argue that we should classify the two lots 
as "agricultural land" as a matter of law. 
We agree with the parties that based on the record in the 
instant case, the appropriate classification of the two lots may 
be determined as a matter of law. 
5 The third lot contains the Ogdens' residence, and the 
Ogdens 
do 
not 
dispute 
this 
lot's 
classification 
as 
"residential." 
6 Much of the smaller lot and a portion of the larger lot 
contain untillable forest land.  From 2012 to 2015, during which 
time the portions of the lots being farmed by the Ogden's were 
classified as "agricultural land," the wooded portions of the 
lots were classified as "agricultural forest land."   
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
4 
 
two lots were classified as "agricultural land" in 2015, the 
assessed value of the lots was $17,100.  In 2016, however, tax 
assessor 
Judson 
Schultz 
reclassified 
the 
two 
lots 
as 
"residential."  When classified as "residential," the assessed 
value 
of 
the 
lots 
jumped 
to 
$886,000. 
 
Thus, 
the 
reclassification of the two lots from "agricultural land" to 
"residential" resulted in a significant increase in property tax 
owed by the Ogdens for the two lots.  The Ogdens filed an 
objection to the Assessor's reclassification with the Board, and 
an evidentiary hearing was held. 
¶10 At the hearing, the Ogdens maintained that the two 
lots should continue to be classified as "agricultural land."  
Peter Ogden testified that the two lots were primarily used to 
harvest apples and hay for food and fiber and to grow Christmas 
trees.  He explained that he grew apple trees on approximately 
one acre of the smaller lot.  On the larger lot, Mr. Ogden 
testified that he grew Christmas trees on approximately four to 
five acres.  He testified that the larger lot also contains a 
three-acre hayfield.  Mr. Ogden testified that a barn was built 
                                                                                                                                                             
The parties agree that if the relevant portions of both 
lots are classified as "agricultural land," then the wooded 
portions would necessarily be classified as "agricultural forest 
land," 
but 
if 
the 
relevant 
portions 
are 
classified 
as 
"residential," then the wooded portions would not be classified 
as 
"agricultural 
forest 
land." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1d.a. 
We agree with the parties, and therefore, we do not further 
discuss the issue.   
No. 
2017AP516   
 
5 
 
on the smaller lot and presented a Certified Survey Map that 
showed a second proposed barn on the larger lot.  Mr. Ogden 
concluded his testimony as follows: 
In conclusion, growing apple trees, Christmas trees 
and alfalfa, which is what I am doing on these two 
pieces 
of 
land, 
should 
all 
be 
considered 
an 
agricultural use as long as that is the primary use of 
that land.  As long as that is the primary use of that 
land.  That is the primary use of that land. 
¶11 Mr. Ogden presented aerial photographs of the two lots 
that showed the progression of the lots dating back to 2005.  
The 2013 picture shows a green hayfield, and the 2015 picture 
shows lines in the hayfield from when the hay was harvested.  
Mr. Ogden also presented ground photographs of the two lots.  
The pictures show apple trees and Christmas trees, each planted 
in orderly rows and individually staked out.7  The ground 
photographs also included several photographs of the pre- and 
post-harvest hayfield.  Mr. Ogden further presented over 100 
pages of expense reports, invoices, receipts, equipment rental 
agreements, and checks showing the Ogdens' farming expenses for 
the years 2011 through 2016.8 
                                                 
7 Therese Mahoney-Ogden testified that she and her husband 
staked out the trees because the Assessor told them to do so 
when he first classified the two lots as "agricultural land" in 
2012. 
8 While 
some 
of 
this 
documentation 
includes 
services 
performed 
on 
the 
Ogdens' 
residential 
lot, 
most 
of 
the 
documentation was for services performed on the two lots at 
issue. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
6 
 
¶12 The Ogdens called a local farmer, Lloyd Williams, as a 
witness.  Mr. Williams testified that he and Mr. Ogden have 
"farmed [the lots] since 2012.  We have plowed it.  We tilled 
it. . . . And if Mr. Ogden gets cattle some day, we will 
hopefully work out a shared agreement where we can continue to 
do this in the future."  Mr. Williams testified on cross-
examination that he "[a]bsolutely, without a doubt" planted hay 
in the Ogden's hayfield.  He elaborated that the Ogden's land 
had "extremely good soil" and that the Ogdens "fertilize it 
properly."  Mr. Williams explained that the three-acre hayfield 
"produces 150 bales per acre," totaling approximately 450 bales 
of hay from the entire field.  Mr. Williams also reaffirmed 
statements he made in a letter to Mr. Ogden dated three days 
before the hearing.  The letter was admitted into evidence at 
the hearing and stated:  "In 2012, we seeded alfalfa and brome 
grass and used it for cattle feed.  We have established a 
beautiful hay field that we have continually harvested every 
year.  We will again be harvesting the hay crop in 2016 . . . ." 
¶13 The Assessor also testified before the Board.  The 
Assessor explained the basis for his determination that the two 
lots were no longer entitled to the "agricultural land" 
classification: 
Now, the issue is that the Ogdens may say well, they 
have a tree orchard and they are doing it for ag use.  
I 
can't 
really 
substantiate . . . whether 
[Ms. 
Mahoney-Ogden] is doing it for personal or she is 
doing it for actual agricultural economic benefit, I 
can't determine that.  And that is why I am seeking 
and have asked for all of this documentation because——
No. 
2017AP516   
 
7 
 
and the same goes for the trees, the Christmas tree 
farm. 
 
. . . . 
Now, I am, okay, looking at this and going, okay, does 
the property taxpayer carry on an activity like a 
business.  Because that is what ag use is about.  Ag 
use is really for farmers; right?  It is about 
farming. 
And so, given that the physical evidence for me was 
difficult to substantiate[9], I went to documentation.  
And I mean, if you are going to be in ag use, I think 
you should be held to the same standards as the 
farmers are held to.  And I am sure that [Mr. 
Williams] files . . . a Schedule F profit and loss.  
And I mean if I were running a business, I would. 
 
. . . . 
[T]here should be a relationship between [Mr. Ogden 
and Mr. Williams] because they're [sic] supposed to be 
a transaction going on, per the contract.  So, there 
is just a bad feeling that I got.  You know, this is 
actually being done because there is no doubt, okay, 
there is a significant tax benefit that is going on 
for [the Ogdens] to be able to get the ag use. . . . I 
guess I was just looking for things to be much more 
clear-cut, everything flowing through because [Mr. 
Ogden] had set up this tree farm account. . . . I went 
through and I looked at the receipts and I tabulated 
the number of trees that the receipts were in there 
for.  And I mean, again, and if you are doing ag use, 
you're doing this to generate an income. . . . Well, 
if you are going to be in ag use, you're going to be 
in business and you better be on top of it.  I have my 
                                                 
9 The Assessor had previously testified that it may 
sometimes 
be 
difficult 
to 
obtain 
physical 
evidence 
of 
agricultural use because "when you have a pasture and somebody 
cuts it, unless I am there, okay, to actually see it, I really 
have a difficult time finding the physical evidence." 
Although the Ogdens invited the Assessor to view the two 
lots, the Assessor declined to do so. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
8 
 
own business. . . . I expected as a business person as 
somebody in ag use to be on top of it. 
 
. . . . 
And when I looked at the documentation, I just did not 
get a good feeling.  Me professionally that if 
somebody looked behind me that they would look at this 
and they would question whether this tree farm was 
being done actually for agricultural reasons, to 
generate a profit for business, or was it being done 
to obtain significant property tax savings. 
 
. . . . 
You know, unfortunately, the ag use program you would 
think it was really developed for the farmers.  In 
reality there are so many loop holes that people can 
take advantage.  If you truly knew what went on, you 
would shake your head. . . . And I have called into 
question things that, I guess, I felt professionally 
that I was obligated to do.  With that, in summary, I 
just am going to go back to ag use is for farmers.  Ag 
use is for business.  Okay.  If you want to get into 
it, okay, then you need to show that you are going to 
actually be doing a business. . . . So, all things to 
me just do not seem to be a business.  It seems to be 
an effort to make it look like a business. 
 
. . . . 
And I am——I want to make sure that if somebody looks 
behind me, that I am coming up with the right judgment 
on a situation.  And I gave the, you know, Ogden the 
benefit of the doubt because I let them in the ag 
program.  And understand somebody chooses to be in the 
ag program.  I don't force anybody.  That is their 
choice.  I inform them of the consequences.  I inform 
them especially if they are taking residential land 
and putting it in ag use that I am going to watch you 
closely because I know what the significant tax 
benefits are.  You dot your T's, you cross your 
things, there is nothing that I can do.  Developers do 
it all of the time.  Okay.  Farmers do it all of the 
time with residential land for individuals.  And there 
is nothing that I can do as long as they do it 
correctly.  The Ogdens simply didn't do it correctly.  
I am calling them.  I can't again dispute that they 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
9 
 
have planting [sic] things, but I do not think it's 
for ag use.  I do not think it's for business reasons. 
¶14 On cross-examination, the Assessor admitted that he 
knew there were individually "staked out" apple and Christmas 
trees planted "in clean rows" on the two lots.  Nonetheless, 
after doing some "soul searching," the Assessor concluded that 
he did "not believe based on the documentation . . . that this 
is ag use land."  
¶15 In sum, the Assessor believed that he could not 
conclusively determine whether the two lots were devoted 
primarily to agricultural use based on physical evidence of 
farming.  He then asked the Ogdens for documentation that might 
support an "agricultural land" classification for the two lots, 
but because the documentation, in his view, did not sufficiently 
show that the Ogdens "carr[ied] on [the] activity like a 
business," the Assessor concluded that the two lots were not 
entitled to be classified as "agricultural land."   
¶16 During deliberations, Board member Edward Kranick 
expressed that he had  
[not] seen where it's necessary to really have a 
business in all of these exhibits and in the guide for 
the board of review.  I have just seen that it's a 
use, 
that 
it 
has 
to 
be 
devoted 
primarily 
to 
agricultural use, and that it's being used in a way 
for agricultural use. 
 
. . . . 
[T]here 
is——Christmas——there 
are 
trees 
that 
are 
planted in a systemic [sic] way that appears to be in 
the use to be used eventually once they mature to be 
farmed and that the [hay is] being taken off and that 
there are orchards.  That is what I am hearing.  If I 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
10 
 
am not hearing that or if that is not what other 
people are hearing, please correct me or enlighten me.   
¶17 The chairman of the Board, Paul Kanter, engaged in the 
following exchange with counsel for the Board: 
[Kanter]: As to farming, you would agree that it's 
[sic] intent here is to protect a business concern, 
not 
horticulture 
as 
our 
ordinance 
defines 
horticulture . . . . 
[Counsel]: There does need——Actually in the assessor's 
manual it makes [a] distinction between gardens and 
actual crop production.  There does have to be some 
kind of a commercial interest in order for it to be 
separate from a personal garden where you're using it 
yourself.  You need to have some interest in actually 
selling the product. 
¶18 Board member Larry Krause stated that, in his view, 
the two lots do "meet the definition, very loose definition, of 
agricultural land."  But, Mr. Krause added that "we are bound to 
take the word of our assessor. . . . He has the final word." 
¶19 Board member Billy Cooley expressed concern that the 
Ogdens had "planted bird houses" in the hayfield resulting in a 
slightly decreased hay yield.10  Mr. Cooley characterized the two 
lots as a "gentleman's farm" befitting a horticulturalist, as 
opposed to a "farming operation."   
¶20 The Board's vote on whether to sustain the Assessor's 
reclassification of the two lots resulted in a tie:  Mr. Kanter 
and 
Mr. 
Kranick 
voted 
against 
sustaining 
the 
Assessor's 
reclassification of the two lots as "residential," while Mr. 
                                                 
10 Mr. Ogden testified that he installed birdhouses "around" 
the hayfield, meaning around its perimeter, not in the middle of 
it. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
11 
 
Cooley and Mr. Krause voted in favor of sustaining the 
Assessor's reclassification.  Because of the tie vote, the 
Assessor's decision to reclassify the two lots as "residential" 
was sustained. 
¶21 The Ogdens petitioned the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court for certiorari review of the Board's decision.  The 
circuit court concluded that the two lots did not "pass the eye 
test," and dismissed the Ogdens' petition. 
¶22 The 
Ogdens 
appealed, 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed.  The court of appeals concluded that a business 
purpose was not necessary for land to be classified as 
"agricultural land" for property tax purposes.  The court of 
appeals 
further 
concluded 
that 
because 
the 
assessor's 
determination of the appropriate classification was driven by 
his erroneous understanding of the law, the proper disposition 
was to order the circuit court to remand the cause to the Board 
in order to "assess the Trust property anew in a manner that is 
not inconsistent with" the court of appeals' decision.11 
II 
¶23 The instant case arrives at this court for certiorari 
review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) (2015-16).12  In 
certiorari review under § 70.47(13), "we review the Board of 
Review's decisions, not the decisions of the circuit court or 
                                                 
11 Ogden Family Trust, 381 Wis. 2d 161, ¶25. 
12 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
12 
 
court of appeals, although we benefit from their analyses."13  We 
are confined to "the record made before the board of review,"14 
and our review is limited to deciding "whether the board's 
actions were (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) according to law; 
(3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its 
will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by evidence such 
that the board might reasonably make the order or determination 
in question."15 
¶24 Review in the instant case falls under the second 
factor:  the Ogdens claim that the Board did not act according 
to law because it based its decision on the erroneous belief 
that a business purpose was required in order for land to be 
classified as "agricultural land" for property tax purposes.  
Whether the Board acted according to law is a question of law 
that we decide independently.16  Resolving this question requires 
the interpretation of our statutes and administrative rules, 
                                                 
13 Thoma v. Village of Slinger, 2018 WI 45, ¶10, 381 
Wis. 2d 311, 912 N.W.2d 56; see also Sausen v. Town of Black 
Creed Bd. of Review, 2014 WI 9, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39. 
14 Saddle Ridge Corp. v. Bd. of Review, 2010 WI 47, ¶36, 325 
Wis. 2d 29, 784 N.W.2d 527. 
15 Sausen, 352 Wis. 2d 576, ¶6 (footnote omitted). 
16 Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 167 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 482 
N.W.2d 326 (1992); Lloyd v. Bd. of Review, 179 Wis. 2d 33, 36, 
505 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
13 
 
which is also a matter of law that we decide independently of 
the Board of Review, circuit court, and court of appeals.17   
III 
¶25 We conclude that when it based its decision on an 
erroneous belief that a business purpose was required in order 
for land to be classified as "agricultural land" for property 
tax purposes, the Board did not act according to law. 
¶26 Our analysis rests on the plain language of the 
applicable statutes and administrative rules. 
¶27 Our procedures for interpreting statutes are familiar, 
and they are equally applicable to the interpretation of 
administrative rules.18  "We begin with the statute's language 
because we assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in 
the words it used."19  "Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."20  If the statutory language 
yields a plain meaning, "we ordinarily stop the inquiry."21   
                                                 
17 Orion Flight Servs., Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 WI 
51, ¶¶16-18, 290 Wis. 2d 421, 714 N.W.2d 130. 
18 Id., ¶18; see also Wis. Stat. § 227.27(1). 
19 State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 
N.W.2d 315; see also State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct., 2004 WI 
58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
20 Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. 
21 Id. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
14 
 
¶28 The Ogdens claim that the two lots are entitled to be 
classified 
as 
"agricultural 
land." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1g. defines "[a]gricultural land"  as "land, 
exclusive of buildings and improvements and the land necessary 
for their location and convenience, that is devoted primarily to 
agricultural use."22   
¶29 The statute further defines the term "agricultural 
use" to mean "agricultural use as defined by the [D]epartment of 
[R]evenue by rule and includes the growing of short rotation 
woody crops, including poplars and willows, using agronomic 
practices."23 
¶30 The 
Department 
of 
Revenue, 
by 
rule, 
defines 
"agricultural use" to include both "[a]ctivities included in 
subsector 111 Crop Production, set forth in the North American 
Industry 
Classification 
System 
(NAICS),"24 
and 
"[g]rowing 
Christmas trees or ginseng."25  "Activities included in subsector 
                                                 
22 Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)1g. (emphasis added). 
23 Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)1i. (emphasis added). 
24 Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(1)(a) (June 2015) 
(emphasis added). 
25 Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(1)(c) (June 2015) 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
15 
 
111 Crop Production," include "growing apples" and "growing 
hay."26 
¶31 As the court of appeals correctly emphasized, it is of 
great import that the relevant statutes and administrative rules 
refer to "growing" the relevant crops——here, Christmas trees, 
apples, and hay——not marketing, selling, or profiting from 
them.27 
¶32 A business purpose is not required in order for land 
to be classified as "agricultural land" for property tax 
purposes.  No statute, administrative rule, or case law supports 
a business purpose requirement for the "agricultural land" 
property tax classification.28  To require a business purpose for 
land to be classified as "agricultural land" for property tax 
purposes would require the court to impermissibly insert such a 
                                                 
26 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), United 
States, 
1997, 
at 
86, 
90 
(emphasis 
added),  
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual
.pdf. 
27 Ogden Family Trust, 381 Wis. 2d 161, ¶6. 
28 Indeed, the Board appears to have largely abandoned its 
position that a business purpose is required in order for land 
to be classified as "agricultural land." 
The Board does make an undeveloped argument related to 
estoppel that it raised for the first time before this court.  
"As a general rule, we will not consider for the first time on 
appeal an issue not raised in the circuit court, particularly 
when, as here, the issue is undeveloped . . . ."  The Lamar Co., 
LLC v. Country Side Rest., Inc., 2012 WI 46, ¶31 n.15, 340 
Wis. 2d 335, 814 N.W.2d 159.  We decline to address the Board's 
undeveloped argument. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
16 
 
limitation into a clear and unambiguous set of statutory 
provisions and administrative rules.29 
¶33 The plain language of the applicable statutes and 
rules produces a clear and unambiguous meaning.  If the land is 
devoted primarily to "agricultural use" as defined by our 
statutes and rules, that use need not be carried out for a 
business 
purpose 
in 
order 
for 
the 
land 
to 
qualify 
as 
"agricultural land" for property tax purposes. 
IV 
¶34 Ordinarily, if the court "finds any error in the 
proceedings of the board which renders the assessment or the 
proceedings void, it shall remand the assessment to the board 
for 
further 
proceedings 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
court's 
determination . . . ."30   
¶35 Neither party urges this court to remand the cause to 
the Board to re-determine the proper classification of the two 
lots.     
¶36 The evidentiary record before the Board conclusively 
shows that the two lots are "devoted primarily to agricultural 
use," and thus, are entitled to be classified as "agricultural 
land." 
                                                 
29 See Lincoln Sav. Bank, S.A. v. DOR, 215 Wis. 2d 430, 446, 
573 N.W.2d 522 (1998). 
30 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13); Saddle Ridge, 325 Wis. 2d 29, ¶41 
n.22; see also Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶21, 
245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
17 
 
¶37 The phrase "[l]and devoted primarily to agricultural 
use" is defined by applicable provisions of the tax code.  These 
provisions of the tax code apply in the instant case because 
they "provide definitions and procedures" used by "municipal 
assessors 
to 
classify 
certain 
real 
property 
as 
agricultural . . . ."31   
¶38 The tax code, Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(4), 
defines "[l]and devoted primarily to agricultural use" to mean 
"land in an agricultural use for the production season of the 
prior year, and not in a use that is incompatible with 
agricultural use on January 1 of the assessment year."32   
¶39 Thus, a lot will constitute "land devoted primarily to 
agricultural use" if, during the applicable time period, the lot 
is primarily, that is, chiefly, put towards agricultural use.   
¶40 In the instant case, the applicable "agricultural use" 
to which the land is put is the growing of Christmas trees, 
apples, and hay.33   
¶41 Thus, the question presented is whether, during the 
production season of 2015, the two lots were chiefly put towards 
the growing of Christmas trees, apples, and hay; and whether, on 
January 1, 2016, the two lots were put towards a use that was 
                                                 
31 Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.04 (June 2015). 
32 Wis. Admin. Code DOR § Tax 18.05(4) (June 2015). 
33 See Wis. Admin. Code DOR §§ Tax 18.05(1)(a) & (1)(c) 
(June 2015); NAICS Manual, supra note 26, at 86, 90. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
18 
 
not incompatible with the growing of Christmas trees, apples, 
and hay.  
¶42 The evidentiary record confirms that the Ogdens met 
their burden of proving that the Assessor's reclassification of 
the two lots as "residential" was erroneous.34  The record 
demonstrates that, during the production season of 2015, the two 
lots were chiefly put towards the growing of Christmas trees, 
apples, and hay, and on January 1, 2016, the two lots were not 
put towards a use that was incompatible with the growing of 
Christmas trees, apples, and hay.   
¶43 As we detailed at length above,35 the Ogdens maintain a 
barn and a one-acre apple orchard on the smaller of the two 
lots, the remainder of the lot consisting of untillable forest.  
The apples trees are individually staked out and planted in 
clean rows.  The larger of the two lots contains a four- to 
five-acre Christmas tree farm and a three-acre hayfield.  The 
Christmas trees, like the apple trees, are individually staked 
out and planted in clean rows.  Mr. Williams testified at length 
that he and Mr. Ogden have consistently planted and harvested 
hay in the hayfield and planned to harvest the field again in 
2016.  Indeed, the Assessor admitted that he knew there were 
apple and Christmas trees growing on the property and that these 
trees were "staked out" "in clean rows." 
                                                 
34 Thoma, 381 Wis. 2d 311, ¶10; see also Sausen, 352 
Wis. 2d 576, ¶10. 
35 See supra ¶¶9-13 and accompanying footnotes. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
19 
 
¶44 The evidentiary record shows that the two lots are 
"devoted primarily to agricultural use."  Accordingly, we 
conclude as a matter of law that the lots are entitled to be 
classified as "agricultural land."  Remand for the purpose of 
re-determining the proper classification is unnecessary in the 
instant case. 
¶45 However, the Board is tasked with affixing a value to 
the two lots.  For that limited purpose, we remand the cause to 
the Board. 
V 
¶46 We conclude that a business purpose is not required in 
order for land to be classified as "agricultural land" for 
property tax purposes.  So long as land is devoted primarily to 
"agricultural use" as defined by our statutes and rules, that 
use need not be carried out for a business purpose in order for 
the land to qualify as "agricultural land" for property tax 
purposes. 
¶47 We further conclude that, under the circumstances of 
the instant case, the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
two lots at issue are entitled to be classified as "agricultural 
land."  Therefore, we remand the cause to the circuit court with 
instructions that the circuit court order the Board:  (1) to 
overturn the Assessor's assessment and classify the appropriate 
portions 
of 
the 
two 
lots 
as 
"agricultural 
land" 
and 
"agricultural forest land"; and (2) to affix a valuation to the 
two lots. 
No. 
2017AP516   
 
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By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  2017AP516.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶48 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that a business purpose is not required for land to 
be classified as "agricultural land" for property tax purposes 
and that the decision of the court of appeals should therefore 
be 
affirmed. 
 
I 
disagree, 
however, 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion that this court may classify the two lots at issue as 
"agricultural land" as a matter of law. 
¶49 The statute governing this court's review of the 
instant case states, in relevant part:  
If the court on the appeal finds any error in the 
proceedings of the board which renders the assessment 
or 
the 
proceedings 
void, 
it 
shall 
remand 
the 
assessment to the board for further proceedings in 
accordance with the court's determination and retain 
jurisdiction of the matter until the board has 
determined an assessment in accordance with the 
court's order.  
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) (emphasis added). 
¶50 The statute is unambiguous.  The majority determined, 
and I agree, that the Board of Review for the Town of Delafield 
acted in error because it based its decision on the belief that 
a business purpose was required in order to classify land as 
"agricultural land" for property tax purposes.  Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13), the assessment is therefore void and must be 
remanded to the Board for a new assessment, including a 
redetermination of the appropriate classification for the two 
lots.  
¶51 An assessment begins by properly classifying the land 
to be assessed.  The assessment process, as described by the 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual, requires real property to 
No.  2017AP516.rfd 
 
2 
 
"first be classified by use and then be assigned a value."1  
"Classification" of property is therefore not separate from its 
"assessment."  Instead, they are both part of the assessment 
process which, in this case, is now void.     
¶52 If there was any doubt about the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13), one need only look at our cases interpreting this 
statute.  In Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶¶ 20-
21, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141, this court stated:   
[T]he court may not conduct its own factual inquiry 
and may not admit any new evidence. . . .  The court 
will not make an assessment of the property; instead, 
if it finds any error that renders the assessment 
void, the court must set aside the assessment and 
remand 
to 
the 
board 
for 
further 
proceedings.  
(Emphasis added.)   
Further, in Waste Mgmt. of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kenosha Cty. Bd. 
of Review, 184 Wis. 2d 541, 566, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994), we 
emphasized that: 
A court's function is not to make an assessment 
of the real estate or to substitute its judgment for 
that of a board of review.  Instead, a court's duty is 
to set aside a board of review's determination if it 
finds upon the undisputed evidence that the assessment 
was not established in accordance with [Wis. Stat. §] 
70.32(1) . . . . 
¶53 By declaring as a matter of law that the two lots are 
entitled to be classified as "agricultural land" for property 
tax purposes, the majority exceeds the statutorily limited 
                                                 
1 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (2015) at 1-10; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1):  "Real property shall be valued by 
the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property 
assessment manual . . . ." 
No.  2017AP516.rfd 
 
3 
 
judicial review procedures applicable to certiorari review.  As 
we have previously declared:  "[o]n certiorari review, a court 
does not retry the facts . . . ."  Sausen v. Town of Black Creek 
Bd. of Review, 2014 WI 9, ¶ 46, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39.  
As noted by the court of appeals, the record below includes an 
abundance of testimony regarding whether apple trees, pine trees 
intended to serve as Christmas trees, and hay were in fact 
planted and growing on the Ogden's property.  See State ex rel. 
Peter Ogden Family Trust of 2008 v. Board of Review for Town of 
Delafield, 2018 WI App 26, ¶ 25, 381 Wis. 2d 161, 911 N.W.2d 
653.  This court may not, as the Board and the Ogdens request, 
review the evidentiary record before the Board and substitute 
itself as the fact finder as to whether the land was "devoted 
primarily to agricultural use."2  This is the job of the Board.  
¶54 We have found an error in the Board's proceedings that 
voids the assessment.  Accordingly, we are required to remand to 
the circuit court with instructions to remand to the Board to 
reassess the two lots anew, a process that includes both 
classification of property and assignment of a property's value. 
¶55 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶56 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
                                                 
2 As noted by the majority, the Board and the Ogdens both 
ask the court to review the record and classify the two lots as 
a matter of law.  Majority op., ¶ 6 n.4.  The Board asks us to 
classify the two lots as "residential" while the Ogdens assert 
that we should classify the two lots as "agricultural land."  
Id. 
No.  2017AP516.rfd 
 
4 
 
  
No.  2017AP516.rfd 
 
1