Title: Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90850-Agenda 32-September 2001.
SCHILLERSTROM HOMES, INC., Appellant, v. THE CITY OF 								NAPERVILLE, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 20, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiff, Schillerstrom Homes, Inc., a suburban real
estate development company, filed a complaint against the
defendant, the City of Naperville, alleging that the City willfully
failed to approve the plaintiff's final subdivision plat within a 60-day period as required by section 11-12-8 of the Illinois
Municipal Code. See 65 ILCS 5/11-12-8 (West 1998). The
plaintiff sought summary judgment and damages as provided by
section 11-12-8, as well as a writ of mandamus, directing the City
to approve and record the plat. The City filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's complaint. The Du Page County circuit court
granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, and the
appellate court reversed. No. 2-99-1258 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
	The central issue in this case is whether a state statute which
provides for a damage remedy is superseded by a similar home
rule ordinance which does not provide any remedy. We reverse the
appellate court, affirm the circuit court, and remand for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	In 1997, the plaintiff purchased a piece of residential property
in the City of Naperville. The plaintiff planned to raze a house on
the property, subdivide the property into two lots, and construct a
new house on each lot. Between January 1997 and May 1999, the
plaintiff met with City officials and took various steps toward
obtaining approval of its plat. The plaintiff submitted its final
subdivision plat and supporting documents to City planners, and
a month later, the planners recommended that the city council
approve the plat. On June 15, 1999, the city council considered
and rejected the plat, then recessed its meeting. After the
plaintiff's representatives left the meeting, the city council
reconvened to reconsider the plaintiff's plat. The city council
voted to table reconsideration of the plat until its July 20, 1999,
meeting. On July 20, the city council voted again to table
reconsideration of the plat until its August 17, 1999, meeting. On
August 9, 1999, the plaintiff notified the City that it would file suit
if the City failed to act on the plat within five days. The City did
nothing, and on August 17, 1999, the plaintiff filed a three-count
complaint against the City.(1)
	In its complaint, the plaintiff described its efforts to obtain
plat approval, as well as delays in the approval process attributable
to the City. The plaintiff's first count sought a "judgment of
mandamus" directing the city council to approve and record the
plat. The plaintiff's second count sought summary judgment under
section 11-12-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/11-12-8 (West 1998)), and its third count sought damages under
section 11-12-8 for the City's purportedly wilful failure to
approve the plat. In its third count, the plaintiff alleged that the
City adopted Ordinance 99-112 on July 6, 1999, which amended
its municipal code to establish minimum lot sizes larger than those
proposed by the plaintiff's plat.
	The City filed a motion to dismiss. The City asserted that the
plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the 60-day
period for approval had not run because the plaintiff failed to
submit a "requested site plan" for the plat. The City also asserted
that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the City
took action on the plat at its August 17, 1999, meeting. The
unapproved minutes of this meeting, attached to the City's motion
to dismiss, show that the City denied plat approval "because the
proposal does not meet the criteria of the Comprehensive Plan to
limit single-family density to 2.5 units per acre, because the
petitioner did not provided [sic] information on the proposed
homes which might have added validity to the petition, and
because the subdivision did not meet the criteria of Ordinance
99-112." The City finally asserted that counts II and III of the
plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because section 7-2-5:6
of the Naperville Municipal Code, a valid exercise of the City's
home rule powers, preempts section 11-12-8 of the Illinois
Municipal Code.
	In a written order, the trial court denied the City's motion. The
trial court specifically found:
			"A) Plaintiff provided Defendant with all Required
Documents pursuant to Naperville Ordinances as of June
10, 1999 and that Documents requested by Naperville
after June 10, 1999 were not required under the
Applicable Zoning Ordinances.
			B) That Plaintiff provided Defendant with Proper Five
(5) day Notice Pursuant to Applicable State Statutes and
that Naperville Failed to Act upon the Subdivision
Application prior to the expiration of the Five (5) day
Period.
			C) That Plaintiff Filed Suit in this Cause at or about
12:12pm on August 17, 1999 and by so doing divested
Naperville of the Jurisdiction to rule on the Subdivision
Application and therefore the City of Naperville's Denial
of the Subdivision Application on the evening of August
17, 1999 Is a Nullity because under the terms of the State
Statute the City lost Jurisdiction."
	On October 6, 1999, the trial court heard the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. The court again found that as of
June 10, 1999, the plaintiff had supplied the City with all
documents in support of the plat which were required by
municipal ordinances. The court also found that City authorities
failed to act upon the plat within 60 days and that the plaintiff gave
five days' written notice to the City before filing suit. The court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the 60-day and five-day requirements, reserved ruling on the issues of wilfulness and
damages, and ordered the Du Page County recorder to record the
plaintiff's plat. The court included Rule 304(a) language in its
order, and the City appealed.
	The appellate court held that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the plaintiff under section 11-12-8 of the
Illinois Municipal Code. The appellate court stated that the
General Assembly, in section 11-12-8, expressed no intention to
preempt or exclude home rule over subdivision plat approval:
		"Nothing prevented the City from enacting and following
its own ordinance to govern the processing of applications
for permission to subdivide or resubdivide property, even
if those ordinances conflict with section 11-12-8 of the
Municipal Code. Whether the City acted correctly under
its ordinances is not at issue in this appeal, as that
controversy is still pending in the trial court. We hold
only that, because the City Code applies to the exclusion
of section [11-12-8], the trial court erred in granting
plaintiff any relief on count II of its complaint."
	We granted the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. See 177
Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	Summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and *** the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
1998). Summary judgment can aid in the expeditious disposition
of a lawsuit, but it is a drastic measure and should be allowed only
"when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt."
Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). Our standard of review
is de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001).
	Home rule is predicated upon the assumption that problems
affecting municipalities and their residents should be met with
solutions tailored to local needs. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton
Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502 (1984); see 7 Record of Proceedings,
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1605 (hereinafter cited as
Proceedings) ("Local governments must be authorized to exercise
broad powers and to undertake creative and extensive projects if
they are to contribute effectively to solving the immense problems
that have been created by the increasing urbanization of our
society"). The home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution drastically altered the relationship between our state
and local governments, giving municipalities more autonomy to
chart the course of their own growth. Kanellos v. County of Cook,
53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (1972); see 21 Ill. Jur. Municipal Law §3:10, at
80 (1995). The essence of home rule power is set forth in section
6(a) of article VII:
		"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining
to its government and affairs including, but not limited to,
the power to regulate for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and
to incur debt." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(a).
Section 6(a) confers "the broadest powers possible." Scadron v.
City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992); City of Evanston
v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 107 (1981) (section 6(a) is
intentionally imprecise to allow great flexibility in the exercise of
home rule power); accord ILCS Ann., 1970 Const., art. VII, §6,
Constitutional Commentary, at 514 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(m) ("Powers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally").
	However, the General Assembly can expressly limit the
exercise of home rule power. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(h)
("The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the
exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home
rule unit"); see also 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2000) (a state statute
cannot preempt home rule power unless it contains "specific
language" which sets forth such a legislative intent). If the
legislature chooses not to act, a local ordinance and a state statute
may operate concurrently under article VII, section 6(i):
			"Home rule units may exercise and perform
concurrently with the State any power or function of a
home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by
law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or
specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(i).
Under section 6(i), home rule units can continue regulating
activities in their communities, even if the State also has regulated
such activities. See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors
Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 510-11 (1979). Thus, section 6(i) simply
eliminates the implied preemption of home rule power " 'by
judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.
[Citation.]' " Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d  at 186; accord City of Chicago
v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 519-20 (1998); Village of Bollingbrook
v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 142 (1994); see
7 Proceedings 1645 ("absent such an expression of intent, local
governments are left free to complement state activity"). Against
this constitutional background, we turn to the city ordinance and
the state statute at issue in this case.
	The plaintiff contends that the ordinance does not supersede
the statute. According to the plaintiff, the ordinance and the statute
do not conflict, but operate concurrently.
	Section 7-2-5:6 of the Naperville Municipal Code provides:
			"When the petitioner has supplied all drawings, maps
and other documents required by the City ordinances to be
furnished in support thereof, and if all such material meets
City requirements, the City Council shall approve the
proposed plat within sixty (60) days from the date of
filing application for approval of the final plat or within
sixty (60) days from the date of filing the last required
document, whichever is later. The applicant and the City
Council may mutually agree to extend the sixty (60) day
period." Naperville Municipal Code §7-2-5:6 (1998).
	One paragraph of section 11-12-8 of the Illinois Municipal
Code is strikingly similar to the ordinance:
			"When a person submitting a plat of subdivision or
resubdivision for final approval has supplied all drawings,
maps and other documents required by the municipal
ordinances to be furnished in support thereof, and if all
such material meets all municipal requirements, the
corporate authorities shall approve the proposed plat
within 60 days from the date of filing the last required
document or other paper or within 60 days from the date
of filing application for final approval of the plat,
whichever date is later. The applicant and the corporate
authorities may mutually agree to extend the 60 day
period." 65 ILCS 5/11-12-8 (West 1998).
	However, while the ordinance remains silent about a remedy
for violations of its provisions, the statute provides:
			"If the corporate authorities fail to act upon the final
plat within the time prescribed the applicant may, after
giving 5 days written notice to the corporate authorities,
file a complaint for summary judgment in the circuit court
and upon showing that the corporate authorities have
failed to act within the time prescribed the court shall
enter an order authorizing the recorder to record the plat
as finally submitted without the approval of the corporate
authorities. A plat so recorded shall have the same force
and effect as though the plat had been approved by the
corporate authorities. If the corporate authorities refuse to
act upon the final plat within the time prescribed and if
their failure to act thereon is wilful, upon such showing
and upon proof of damages the municipality shall be
liable therefor." 65 ILCS 5/11-12-8 (West 1998).
	The City responds that it intentionally omitted the remedy
provision of the statute from the ordinance using its home rule
power.
	This court has formulated a three-part inquiry for evaluating
the constitutionality of exercise of home rule power. First, we
must determine whether the disputed exercise of local government
power falls within section 6(a)-that is, whether the local
government's activity is a function pertaining to its government
and affairs. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d  at 508. If so,
we must determine whether the General Assembly has preempted
the use of home rule powers in this area. John Sexton Contractors
Co., 75 Ill. 2d  at 508. If not, we then must determine "the proper
relationship" between the local ordinance and the state statute.
John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d  at 508.
	An ordinance pertains to local government and affairs where
it addresses local, rather than state or national, problems. Citizens
Utilities, 158 Ill. 2d  at 138; see Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537, 540-41 (1975); see generally D. Baum, A Tentative Survey
of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U.
Ill. L.F. 137, 152-53.
			"Whether a particular problem is of statewide rather
than local dimension must be decided not on the basis of
a specific formula or listing set forth in the Constitution
but with regard for the nature and extent of the problem,
the units of government which have the most vital interest
in its solution, and the role traditionally played by local
and statewide authorities in dealing with it." Kalodimos,
103 Ill. 2d  at 501.
	Municipal development regulations, including the ordinance
at issue here, undoubtedly pertain to local affairs. See Carlson v.
Briceland, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 254 (1978) (zoning restrictions
pertain to local affairs); Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign,
24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of zoning problems
is left to the local exercise of plenary home rule power); accord
Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) ("Zoning lies primarily within the province of
the municipality"); La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County
of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46 (1957) (pre-1970 Constitution) ("It is
well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal
body to determine the use and purpose to which property may be
devoted"); see also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d  at 116 (city landlord-tenant ordinance was a proper exercise of home rule power).
.	Further, section 11-12-8 does not contain specific language
to preempt home rule under article VII, section 6(h). As the
appellate court here correctly stated: "Nothing in the Municipal
Code declares that section 11-12-8 prevents home rule units from
enacting and adhering to their own rules for the approval of
subdivision and resubdivision applications." Because the
ordinance here pertains to local government affairs, and because
the statute does not preempt home rule, we must decide the proper
relationship between these concurrent regulations.
	As we noted in Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d  at 503, this court has
upheld the right of local governments to enact their own solutions
to various local problems "in the face of less stringent or
conflicting State regulation, following a determination that the
State's expression of interest in the subject as evidenced by its
statutory scheme did not amount to an express attempt to declare
the subject one requiring exclusive State control." See, e.g.,
Roman, 184 Ill. 2d  at 520 (city ordinance which provided for a
more stringent sentence than state statute for assaults against the
elderly was a valid exercise of home rule power).
	The case before us, however, presents an opposite problem.
Here, municipal law is less restrictive than state law. The
ordinance mirrors the timing provision of the statute, but, unlike
the statute, does not provide for a damages remedy. The appellate
court assumed that the ordinance and the statute conflict, relying
upon Trettenero v. Civil Service Comm'n, 221 Ill. App. 3d 326
(1991), and Burgess v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners,
209 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1991). Trettenero and Burgess, however, are
inapposite. Those cases address municipal ordinances which
provide different remedies from those provided by relevant state
statutes, as opposed to no remedy at all.
	Our research has revealed only one instructive Illinois case. In
Budka v. Board of Public Safety Commissioners, 120 Ill. App. 3d
348 (1983), a Rosemont police officer was discharged by the
village board of public safety commissioners because he failed to
maintain his residence in the village. At that time, the Illinois
Municipal Code provided that a person was not eligible for
appointment to a municipal office unless that person had lived in
the municipality for one year, though the state statute sanctioned
ordinances allowing police officers to live outside the
municipality's corporate limits. A Rosemont ordinance provided
that applicants for public safety positions must have lived in the
village for at least six months. The ordinance also indicated that
Rosemont intended to supersede any inconsistent, nonpreemptive
state statutes. The officer filed a complaint against the board,
contending that the statute was superseded by the ordinance. The
trial court found that the village's residency requirement did not
apply to the officer, and the board appealed.
	The appellate court noted that Rosemont had not expressly
allowed officers to live outside the village and the ordinance did
not impliedly supersede the entire statute. Budka, 120 Ill. App. 3d
at 352.  The court observed that a reading of the ordinance clearly
demonstrated the village's intent to supersede the statute only to
the extent it conflicted with the preemployment requirements of
the ordinance. Budka, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 352. The court stated,
"We have not found any authority which requires a finding that an
ordinance which supersedes part of a statute necessarily
supersedes the entire statute. *** Rosemont has not exercised its
full power as a home rule unit, and in the absence of its exercise
of its constitutional power the State statute shall govern." Budka,
120 Ill. App. 3d at 352. The court concluded that the statute
required the officer to reside in the village and upheld his
discharge. Budka, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 353. Accord Demick v. City
of Joliet, 135 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("when [a]
local ordinance is silent to an issue addressed in the state statute,
the local ordinance may not necessarily supersede the entire
statute"); see also Provenzano v. City of Des Plaines, 256 Ill. App.
3d 458, 461 (1993) (upon repeal of a municipal ordinance
preemptively governing the mandatory retirement for firefighters,
the provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code resumed their effect).
	Here, the ordinance likewise remains silent about what
happens if the City allows the 60-day approval period to pass
without a decision on the plat. The statute simply fills that gap by
providing a recourse to stalled developers. The ordinance
complements the statute; it does not limit sub silencio statutory
remedies. Cf. United Citizens of Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to
Let the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 339 (1988) (under
the doctrine of construction in pari materia, two legislative acts
which address the same subject should be considered with
reference to one another, so that both sections may be given
harmonious effect). Accordingly, the appellate court erred in
concluding that the ordinance superseded the statute.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed;
cause remanded.
1.      1Du Page County Recorder J.P. Carney was originally named as a
defendant, but the plaintiff agreed to dismiss its claims against Carney
after the City filed its notice of appeal.