Title: Giardina v. Williams

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

512 So. 2d 1312 (1987)
Joe GIARDINA
v.
Kathryn WILLIAMS.
86-76.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 26, 1987.
Rehearing Denied August 7, 1987.
Phil Joiner, Birmingham, for appellant.
Walter Cornelius, Birmingham, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal involves a right of redemption, pursuant to Code 1975, § 40-10-82 and § 40-10-83, of property sold at a tax sale. The trial court held that Kathryn Williams, the record title holder was entitled to redeem the property. We affirm.
Joe Giardina filed a bill to quiet title against Williams, alleging that he owned the property under a tax deed, based on a 1972 tax sale for unpaid 1971 ad valorem taxes owed by Williams. The land in question is a vacant undeveloped lot located in Birmingham, Alabama. Williams denied the material allegations of the complaint and denied that Giardina was in the quiet, peaceful, and actual possession of the property.
Giardina filed a motion for summary judgment; Williams filed a motion to ascertain the amount required for her to redeem. After a hearing on these motions, the trial court denied Giardina's motion for summary judgment, and granted Williams's motion to ascertain the amount to redeem, and set the amount to be paid by her at $3,068.47. Giardina filed a motion to correct the prior order, or, to set the case for trial, which the trial court denied. Giardina then appealed.
The trial court entered the following judgment on the motion for summary judgment and the motion to ascertain the amount to redeem:
"Such possession was not cut off by the adverse possession of the plaintiff, tax purchaser. The facts are undisputed that neither party has been in actual possession of the property since 1972. The plaintiff's claim to adverse possession rests on payment of taxes on the property for more than 10 years prior to the commencement of this action. Section 6-5-200(a), Code 1975 provides three alternatives for establishing adverse possession, one of which is having the land listed for taxation for ten years prior to the commencement of the action. Even *1314 assuming that the plaintiff has had the land listed for taxation for the necessary period, and not merely paid the taxes thereon, each of the three alternative methods set out in Section 6-5-200(a) must be supported by all the requisite elements of adverse possession, including actual occupancy. [Jones v. Jones, 423 So. 2d 158 (Ala.1982) ]. Since there is no dispute between the parties that no one has been in actual occupancy of the land, the plaintiff as a matter of law has not established adverse possession necessary to cut off the defendant's right to redeem subject realty.
We are of the opinion that the trial court's decree in this case correctly states the law. Code 1975, § 40-10-83, has as its purpose the preservation of the right of redemption in the owner, within a time limit, if the owner has retained possession. O'Conner v. Rabren, 373 So. 2d 302 (Ala. 1979). The character of possession does not have to be actual and peaceable; it may be constructive or scrambling. Where there is no real occupancy of the land, constructive possession follows the title of the original owner and can be cut off only by the adverse possession of the tax purchaser. Hand v. Stanard, 392 So. 2d 1157 (Ala.1980). Code 1975, § 40-10-82, provides a bar to redemption where the tax purchaser can show continuous adverse possession for three years after he is entitled to demand a tax deed. Stallworth v. First National Bank of Mobile, 432 So. 2d 1222 (Ala.1983).
The trial court found that neither party had been in actual possession of the property since 1972; therefore, we agree with the trial court that Giardina has not established the three years' adverse possession necessary to cut off Williams's right to redeem. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JONES, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.