Title: Cario v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TODD V. CARIO,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 380, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. IN99-01-0177W
§
§
Submitted: March 26, 2002
  Decided:   April 2, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and
STEELE, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc).
O R D E R
This second day of April 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Todd V. Cario, filed this appeal
from the July 26, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his second
motion for modification of sentence.  We affirm in part and reverse in part
and remand this matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings in
accordance with this Order.
2
(2)
In this appeal, Cario claims that the Superior Court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a modification of the conditions of his
sentence and by using a pre-printed form to render its decision.  Cario
contends that the sentencing order is ambiguous because it requires him to
complete an outpatient drug/alcohol program, among other things,1 while
failing to impose any period of probation.
(3)
In November 1999, Cario pleaded guilty to Escape in the
Second Degree as a lesser-included offense of Escape After Conviction.
He was sentenced as an habitual offender to four years imprisonment at
Level V.2  In February 2000, Cario filed a motion to modify his sentence,
which, in March of 2000, was denied by the Superior Court.  In June
2001, Cario filed a second motion to modify his sentence, which the
Superior Court denied in July 2001.
(4)
In its July 26, 2001 order, the Superior Court gave two
reasons for its denial of Cario’s motion—first, that it was time-barred
because it was filed more than ninety days following the imposition of
                                                          
1The sentencing order also imposes the following additional conditions: substance abuse
evaluation, payment of all monetary assessments, mental health evaluation,
participation in a prescribed treatment program, treatment for hepatitis, payment of the
cost of extradition, completion of the residential drug/alcohol program, and submission
to random drug testing.
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2001).
3
sentence3 and, second, that it provided no additional information
warranting a modification of the sentence.  While the Superior Court was
correct that the motion was filed more than ninety days following the
imposition of sentence, we conclude that the sentencing order requires
modification and remand this matter to the Superior Court for that purpose.
While the sentencing order imposes a sentence of four years incarceration
at Level V, it fails to impose the statutorily-required, six-month period of
probation.4  The Superior Court should modify its sentencing order to add
the mandatory probationary period as well as any clarification of the
conditions of sentence necessitated by that addition.
(5)
In light of our holding, we do not reach Cario’s claim that the
Superior Court should not have used a pre-printed form to render its
decision.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  This matter is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with
this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained.
                                                          
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4204(l) (2001); Nave v. State, 783 A.2d 120, 122 (Del.
2001).
4
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice