Title: GULF OIL CORPORATION v. WYOMING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND STORY OIL IMPACT COMMITTEE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GULF OIL CORPORATION v. WYOMING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND STORY OIL IMPACT COMMITTEE1985 WY 1693 P.2d 227Case Number: 84-82Decided: 01/04/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
GULF OIL CORPORATION, 
PETITIONER, 

v. 

WYOMING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION 
COMMISSION AND STORY OIL IMPACT COMMITTEE, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review from 
the District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Houston G. 
Williams and Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, and Michael C. Smith, Houston, Tex., for petitioner.

Joe Scott, Sp. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for respondent Wyo. Oil and Gas Conservation 
Com'n.

Rebecca W. 
Thomson of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for respondent Story Oil Impact 
Committee. 

Before 
THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, 
ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This petition for 
review concerns the authority of the respondent Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (Commission or WOGCC) to impose certain restrictions on the drilling 
activities of petitionerGulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) on federal 
land within this state. The Commission granted Gulf's application for a permit 
to drill a well on national forest land, subject to the condition that Gulf 
refrain from using its preferred access route through the village of Story, Wyoming. At issue is whether federal mining 
and environmental protection laws1 preempt this state's statutes and 
rules2 which allow the Commission to 
condition federally authorized drilling activities on the basis of identified 
environmental concerns. Gulf also asserts that, the federal preemption question 
aside, the Commission's order in this case is not supported by substantial 
evidence. We will affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     In compliance with 
state and federal regulationsGulf sought permission from both WOGCC and 
the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to 
drill a wildcat well3 in the Granite Ridge Field of 
Sheridan County. The proposed well concerns federally owned minerals in the 
BigHornNational 
Forest and is one of several exploratory drillings 
planned by Gulf in this field. Gulf proposed to obtain access to the well site 
via state highway and county road through Story. This proposed access, 
designated the southern route, would require extending the existing county road 
west of Story for about 3.8 miles over national forest land and property owned 
jointly by Gulf and Texaco, Inc.

[¶3.]     Respondent Story Oil 
Impact Committee (STOIC), composed of citizens of Story, filed a protest with 
WOGCC concerning the environmental consequences of Gulf's proposed well and 
access route. STOIC contended that the drilling and related activities would 
violate Rule 326 (Chapter III, Section 26) of the Rules and Regulations of the 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, which provides in 
part:

"The owner shall not 
pollute streams, underground water, or unreasonably damage the surface of the 
leased premises or other lands."4

The Commission, 
on its own motion, also raised the matter of Gulf's compliance with Rule 326, 
and a hearing was held on November 15, 1983.

[¶4.]     The testimony and other 
evidence presented at the hearing focused on the feasibility and environmental 
impact of various means of reaching the well site. Representatives from Gulf 
testified concerning five alternative means of access:

1. The proposed 
southern access road through Story; 

2. The northern 
access route - an extension of roadway from Gulf's existing well site on private 
property across national forest land, part of which is subject to Roadless Area 
Review and Evaluation (RARE II) by the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service;

3. The North 
Piney Creek route which would require the improvement of an existing county 
bridge;

4. Directional 
drilling from private property; and

5. Helicopter 
mobilization.

[¶5.]     STOIC offered and the 
Commission received into evidence the Environmental Assessment of the proposed 
well prepared by the BLM with technical assistance from the United States Forest 
Service.5 The Commission took notice of the 
ramifications of the RARE II program, pursuant to § 16-3-108(d), W.S. 1977, of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.6

[¶6.]     After considering the 
evidence presented at the hearing, WOGCC, on November 23, 1983, issued its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings 9 through 12 describe the 
consequences of using the proposed southern road:

"9. * * * [The southern 
road] will go from an elevation of about 5,250 feet to 6,960 feet in a little 
over two air miles and about 3.8 road miles. To state the obvious, it will be a 
very steep grade.

"10. Much of this road 
goes along a limestone cliff. There is a minimal amount of vegetation on it now 
and there is not likely to be more in the future. About 700 feet of this will be 
visible from 80 percent of Story, and an additional 1,000 feet of road will be 
visible from various points in the area. Much would be visible from Interstate 
Highway 90.

"11. The road will also 
run close to the Story Penrose Trail, as shown on Gulf Exhibit 2. This trail is 
a major access route for recreational purposes (hiking, birdwatching, hunting, 
and fishing) to various lakes, creeks, and the Cloud Peak Primitive Area in the 
BigHornNational 
Forest.

"12. Due to the extreme 
grade of the road and its crossing of the limestone cliff, it will be impossible 
to reclaim a considerable portion of the road. Some parts will be a permanent 
scar on the landscape."

Finding 21 sets 
out the problems associated with the alternate, northern 
route:

"21. * * * Much of this 
route is a private road through the land of an individual named Burns, or land 
owned by a corporation owned by Burns. As part of the arrangement to be able to 
use this route to [Gulf's existing well site], Gulf promised Burns that it would 
not extend this road into the nearby BigHornNational Forest. This road 
does cross some National Forest land and some land under the RARE II designation 
after leaving Burns' property. Though Gulf has the power of condemnation for an 
access road to an oil well, it has orally promised Burns it would not use 
condemnation against him."

Obstacles also 
exist with respect to the North Piney Creek route, as indicated in Finding 
20:

"20. Another alternative 
access would involve going along and crossing North Piney Creek. To do so, Gulf 
would have to improve a bridge across the creek to accommodate heavy truck 
traffic. The Sheridan County Commission has denied them permission to do 
so."

The Commission 
recognized the impossibility of directional drilling through 10,000 feet of 
granite (Finding 23), but found that Gulf had not ruled out the feasibility of 
helicopter mobilization as a means of access:

"19.Gulf objected to helicopter mobilization 
to drill the [proposed] well * * * because it was too expensive, too much 
equipment had to be moved, and it would be hazardous to carry explosives on the 
helicopters. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in their Environmental 
Assessment (EA) concluded that helicopter mobilization would have the least 
effect on the environment of any alternative. We make no finding of this nature. 
We do find that helicopter mobilization would not require building the southern 
access road with the resultant permanent scar on the mountain. The evidence does 
not reflect how expensive helicopter mobilization would be, the nature and 
amount of equipment that would have to be moved, the reason for having 
explosives on them, or how many trips with explosives would occur. We are not 
persuaded that helicopter mobilization is not a viable, technologically 
feasible, and appropriate means of access to the [proposed] 
well."

[¶7.]     The Commission 
concluded that the proposed southern access road to the drill site would leave a 
nonreclaimable scar on the side of the mountain and, therefore, constituted 
unreasonable land surface damage. The Commission further concluded that Gulf had 
failed to prove a lack of any reasonable alternative to the southern 
road:

"It appears there are 
other feasible alternatives discussed in the Environmental Assessment. We prefer 
to let the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, and Gulf consider 
these alternatives in the future. Before a permit would be granted for a route 
that would cause surface damage such as the southern route, the owner must prove 
to this Commission that there is no reasonable alternative. Gulf has failed to 
meet this burden of proof."

Accordingly, 
WOGCC approved Gulf's application for a permit to drill the well, subject to the 
condition that access be obtained by means other than the proposed southern 
route.

[¶8.]     Gulf timely filed a 
petition for judicial review of the Commission's order. The district court 
certified the case to this court pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. Additional 
facts pertinent to this case will be developed during our discussion of the 
issues.

ISSUES

[¶9.]     Gulf presents the 
following issues for our consideration:

"I. Are the actions of 
the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission in imposing conditions on a 
state permit to drill on federal surface to federal minerals pre-empted by the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?

"II. Does the Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission lack jurisdiction to impose any restrictions 
with respect to that portion of the proposed access road which lies on the fee 
property owned by Gulf Oil Corporation and its partner?

"III. If the jurisdiction 
of the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has not been pre-empted under 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, was its order in this 
matter arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by substantial 
evidence?"

Before 
addressing these issues, we must dispose of respondents' contention that this 
case should be dismissed as moot.

JUSTICIABILITY

[¶10.]  In their briefs, the Commission and STOIC 
call to our attention factual matters which have developed since the 
administrative hearing and which, respondents urge, render this petition moot. 
On March 16, 1984, the BLM approved Gulf's application for a federal permit to 
drill its proposed well, subject to the condition that access be achieved by the 
northern route. The permit expressly stipulates that Gulf not reach the drilling 
site through the village of Story. Gulf did not appeal this decision 
and the time for filing an appeal has elapsed.7 Therefore, respondents urge, Gulf 
must use the northern access route under the federal permit, and no decision by 
this court can alter that situation.

[¶11.]  As an additional reason for considering 
this petition moot, respondents note that an initial exploratory well drilled by 
Gulf in the Granite Ridge Field resulted in a dry hole. Based on this 
information, respondents postulate that Gulf no longer intends to drill the well 
at issue in this case. By maintaining its petition, Gulf seeks an impermissible 
advisory opinion from this court, respondents contend.

[¶12.]  We have often repeated the universal rule 
that a reviewing court will dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs 
which renders a cause moot and makes a determination of the issues unnecessary. 
Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 140 (1980); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones, 61 
Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993, 995 (1945). Appellate courts will not hand down decisions which cannot 
be given effect or which pertain to matters that may arise in the future. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1980); Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback, 
Wyo., 379 P.2d 828, 829 (1963).

[¶13.]  In determining whether events subsequent 
to the Commission's order render this case moot, we will examine all such events 
called to our attention by the parties to this petition. With respect to 
respondents' assertion that the federal permit irreversibly commits Gulf to the 
northern access route, we note that the BLM recently granted Gulf a 14-month 
suspension of operating and producing requirements under its lease agreement.8 The BLM approved this relief based 
on Gulf's contention that no reasonable access exists to its proposed well site, 
other than through Story. This tolling of Gulf's obligations to drill, as a 
result of perceived access problems, would be futile if the access route 
designated in the permit could not be changed.

[¶14.]  Without an exhaustive examination of the 
authority for the BLM's continuing jurisdiction and control over Gulf's mineral 
exploration on federal land, we note that 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) permits the 
modification of drilling requirements under leases committed, as here, to unit 
plans of development:9

"(j) For the purpose of 
more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or gas pool, field, or 
like area, or any part thereof (whether or not any part of said oil or gas pool, 
field, or like area, is then subject to any cooperative or unit plan of 
development or operation), lessees thereof and their representatives may unite 
with each other, or jointly or separately with others, in collectively adopting 
and operating under a cooperative or unit plan of development or operation of 
such pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof, whenever determined and 
certified by the Secretary of the Interior to be necessary or advisable in the 
public interest. The Secretary is 
thereunto authorized, in his discretion, with the consent of the holders of 
leases involved, to establish, alter, change, or revoke drilling, producing, 
rental, minimum royalty, and royalty requirements of such leases and to make 
such regulations with reference to such leases, with the consent on the part of 
the lessees, in connection with the institution and operation of any such 
cooperative or unit plan as he may deem necessary or proper to secure the proper 
protection of the public interest. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

Thus, we cannot 
accept respondents' contention that Gulf no longer has recourse to the federal 
government for purposes of modifying the access requirements specified in the 
permit issued by the BLM.

[¶15.]  As for respondents' hypothesis that an 
initial dry hole determines further exploration in the area, no evidence before 
this court establishes that Gulf has withdrawn its application for the required 
state permit or otherwise abandoned its plans to drill the proposed well. We 
will not speculate as to the effect of initial exploratory operations on Gulf's 
decision-making process, but must assume that Gulf intends to pursue the 
drilling program outlined in its permit application.

[¶16.]  We conclude that a decision by this court 
concerning the authority of WOGCC to proscribe the use of a particular access 
road will directly affect Gulf's rights and course of action with respect to its 
proposed drilling activities. Having determined that this cause is not moot, we 
turn to a consideration of the issues raised by 
petitioner.

FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION

[¶17.]  The United States Supreme Court recently 
reviewed the two general ways in which state law can be preempted by federal 
enactments:

"* * * If Congress 
evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that 
field is preempted. [Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983)]; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664 
(1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947). If 
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in 
question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with 
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and 
federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1963), or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941). Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, supra, [461 
U.S.] at 190, 103 S.Ct., at 1722." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation, ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 615, 621, 78 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984).

Gulf contends 
that the WOGCC order based on Rule 326, supra, is invalid under either 
analysis.

[¶18.]  Gulf takes the position that federal 
regulation of the environmental consequences of its proposed well and access 
route is extensive and, therefore, exclusive. Since federally owned minerals are 
involved, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., and 
associated regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 C.F.R. 
Part 3100, govern Gulf's activities. The United States Forest Service, 
Department of Agriculture, has jurisdiction over any surface disturbance caused 
by Gulf's drilling activities and road construction on national forest land. 16 
U.S.C. § 478 and 551; 36 C.F.R. Part 228. Further, the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 mandates that all federal laws and regulations be interpreted 
and administered in accordance with the policy of environmental protection. 42 
U.S.C. § 4332. SeeCabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears 
v. Peterson, 222 A.D.C. 228, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This 
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation leaves no room for the states to 
regulate the environmental effects of drilling activities on federal property, 
Gulf urges.

[¶19.]  Our examination of the federal 
legislation cited by Gulf compels a contrary conclusion. We find that Congress, 
far from excluding state participation, has prescribed a significant role for 
local governments in the regulation of the environmental impact of mineral 
development on federal land.

[¶20.]  We note at the outset that a state 
retains jurisdiction over national forest land within its boundaries and that 
the state is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on that land. Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2293, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 34, reh. denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S. Ct. 189, 50 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976). 
State police power extends over the public domain unless preempted by federal 
legislation enacted pursuant to the property clause.10 Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra.

[¶21.]  Two specific provisions in the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 187 and 189, indicate an absence of congressional 
intent to assert exclusive control over federal lands leased for mineral 
development. Section 187 provides in pertinent part:

"* * * Each lease shall 
contain provisions for the purpose of insuring the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, skill, and care in the operation of said property * * *. None of such 
provisions shall be in conflict with the laws of the State in which the leased 
property is situated."

Section 189 
protects the traditional rights of the states over federal 
land:

"* * * Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed or held to affect the rights of the States or other 
local authority to exercise any rights which they may have, including the right 
to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, 
property, or assets of any lessee of the United States."

The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon these provisions in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Company, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 829, 90 S. Ct. 80, 24 L. Ed. 2d 80, in upholding well spacing and forced pooling 
orders issued to federal lessees by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. The 
court concluded that the act itself refuted the lessees' argument that the 
federal government, by statutes and regulations, had effectively asserted 
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the exploration, development, and 
conservation of federal lands for oil and gas.

[¶22.]  Gulf contends that the myriad 
administrative regulations respecting the development of minerals on public 
property support its claim of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the matter. 
However, these regulations emphasize the viability of pertinent state rules. The 
Department of Interior requires that:

"All operations * * * 
shall be conducted to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the Federal 
lands and shall comply with all pertinent Federal and State laws * * *." 43 
C.F.R. § 3809.2-2.

The Department 
of Agriculture specifies that compliance with state mining laws can satisfy the 
federal requirement that all mining activities be conducted so as to minimize 
adverse environmental activities on national forest land. 36 C.F.R. § 
228.8(h).

[¶23.]  The National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, supra, and the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 
4371 et seq., expressly designate state and local governments as the principal 
protectors of environmental values. Section 4371(b)(1) and (2) 
provides:

"(b)(1) The Congress 
declares that there is a national policy for the environment which provides for 
the enhancement of environmental quality. This policy is evidenced by statutes 
heretofore enacted relating to the prevention, abatement, and control of 
environmental pollution, water and land resources, transportation, and economic 
and regional development.

"(2) The primary 
responsibility for implementing this policy rests with State and local 
governments."

This policy 
governs the interpretation and administration of all laws of the 
United 
States including the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 4332.

[¶24.]  The Idaho Supreme Court in State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 
791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976), referred to the states' role in the national scheme of 
environmental protection and concluded that federal mining laws did not preempt 
Idaho's Dredge Mining Act. Holders of federal mining claims in that case were 
operating on national forest land without the permit required by the state act. 
The state agency could deny a permit for environmental, recreational, economic, 
or other pertinent reasons. 554 P.2d  at 974. The Idaho court upheld this local effort to 
control the environmental aspects of mineral development on federal 
lands:

"We also fail to find 
preemptive qualities in the nature of the subject matter regulated. * * * 
Indeed, the preservation of the environmental quality of its lands is a subject 
particularly suited to administration by the states. Congress has recognized 
that even where extensive federal environmental legislation exists, the primary 
responsibility for implementing environmental policy rests with state and local 
governments. 42 U.S.C. § 4371(b)(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)." 554 P.2d  at 
976.

The Oregon Court 
of Appeals approved this reasoning in State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, 31 Or. 
App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190 (1977), rejecting a federal preemption challenge of that 
state's environmental regulation of mining activities on the public 
domain.

[¶25.]  We have found no cases striking down 
state regulations on the ground that Congress by enacting mining and 
environmental protection laws intended to occupy the field of environmental 
regulation of mineral development on federal land. This situation stands in 
sharp contrast to that encountered in Industrial Siting Council of the State of Wyoming v. Chicago and North 
Western Transportation Company, Wyo., 660 P.2d 776 (1983). There we noted 
that a number of courts had invalidated state attempts to regulate interstate 
common carriers as plainly inconsistent with the comprehensive federal 
regulatory scheme reflected in the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10901. 
In that case, we overturned a state permit requirement for interstate railroad 
construction, concluding that Congress, in granting the Interstate Commerce 
Commission pervasive authority over interstate carriers, had intended to abolish 
multiple regulation. Since neither the Mineral Lands Leasing Act nor the 
National Environmental Policy Act reflects a pervasive regulatory scheme or an 
intent to abolish state influence over mining activities on federal property, we 
conclude that WOGCC Rule 326, supra, does not infringe an area dominated by the 
federal government.

[¶26.]  Our finding that Congress has evidenced 
no intent to assert exclusive control over the environmental impact of mineral 
development on federal property does not end our inquiry. Rule 326, supra, is 
still preempted if it actually conflicts with federal law. Gulf cites two 
principal cases in which the courts have invalidated local regulation of mineral 
development on this basis: Ventura County 
v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd 445 U.S. 947, 
100 S. Ct. 1593, 63 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1980), and Brubaker v. Board of County 
Commissioners, El Paso County, Colo., 
652 P.2d 1050 (1982). 

[¶27.]  The courts in both of these cases 
concluded that the local regulations at issue prohibited an activity authorized 
by Congress. In Ventura County, the local government sought to enjoin 
the federal government's lessee from drilling for oil in the national forest 
without obtaining an open space use permit in compliance with local zoning 
ordinances. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the permit requirement 
impermissibly conflicted with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act and, therefore, 
could not be applied to the appellee, Gulf Oil 
Corporation:

"* * * Ventura seeks to 
prohibit further activity by Gulf until it secures an Open Space Use Permit 
which may be issued on whatever conditions Ventura determines appropriate, or 
which may never be issued at all. The federal Government has authorized a 
specific use of federal lands, and Ventura cannot prohibit that use, either 
temporarily or permanently, in an attempt to substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress." 601 F.2d  at 1084.

[¶28.]  In Brubaker v. Board of CountyCommissioners, El PasoCounty, supra, the county board had 
denied appellants a permit to mine on federal land because the proposed 
operations were inconsistent with the county's long-range plans and incompatible 
with uses on surrounding properties. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
board's action could not stand, as it obstructed the purposes and objectives of 
Congress:

"* * * The Board seeks 
not merely to supplement the federal scheme, but to prohibit the very activities 
contemplated and authorized by federal law. Such a veto power is not consistent 
with the Supremacy Clause." 652 P.2d  at 1056.

[¶29.]  In contrast to the zoning ordinances at 
issue in Ventura County and Brubaker, mining permit requirements 
designed to safeguard the environment have received favorable treatment in the 
courts. These latter regulations constitute legitimate means of guiding mineral 
development without prohibiting it.

"It is established that 
state or local regulation supplementing the mining laws is permissible. 
[Citations.] State and local laws that merely impose reasonable conditions upon 
the use of federal lands may be enforceable, particularly where they are 
directed to environmental protection concerns. [Citations.]" Brubaker v. Board of County Commissioners, 
supra, 652 P.2d  at 1059.

[¶30.]  In State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, supra, 
554 P.2d  at 974-975, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the state's Dredge Mining 
Act did not conflict with federal mining laws merely because the state act 
imposed more stringent requirements for protecting environmental values on 
federal property:

"Where there is a direct 
collision between state and federal legislation our task is simple, the federal 
legislation would preempt state legislation by reason of the supremacy clause, 
United States Const. art. VI, clause 2; [citation]. However, state regulation 
which is more stringent than that under the federal legislation is not the type 
of conflicting legislation described by this standard. See e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) (involving Minnesota pollution control requirements 
substantially more stringent than federal regulations). That is, the mere fact 
that federal legislation sets low standards of compliance does not imply that 
the federal legislation grants a right to an absence of further regulation. On 
the other hand, where a right is granted by the federal legislation, state 
regulation which rendered it impossible to exercise that right would be in 
conflict.

"We find no such conflict 
is presented by the provisions of the Idaho Act requiring a permit or the 
restoration of the land. Neither the requirement of obtaining a permit [n]or of 
restoring the land render it impossible to exercise rights specifically granted 
by the federal legislation, although they may make it more 
difficult."

The Idaho court rejected the 
argument that the state permit requirement interfered with the congressional 
objective of encouraging the development of valuable mineral deposits. The court 
noted that federal mining and environmental protection laws evidence an intent 
to minimize wherever possible the adverse effects of mineral development on 
environmental quality. Idaho's Dredge Mining Act harmonizes with this 
goal and, therefore, applies to operators on federal land in the state. 554 P.2d  
at 977.

[¶31.]  Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals in 
State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, supra, 
found no conflict between state environmental regulations and federal mining 
laws. The court distinguished Ventura 
County v. Gulf Oil Corporation, supra:

"* * * There the county 
by its zoning ordinance was attempting to prohibit Gulf Oil from conducting any 
and all oil exploration and extraction activities. Requiring the holder of a 
permit to mine on federal lands to obtain a permit under a state environmental 
protection law as in the case at bar is not the same as the banning of all 
mining activity as was the case in Ventura. [Citation.]" 570 P.2d  at 
1195.

[¶32.]  Granite Rock Company v. California Coastal 
Commission, 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1984), is a recent federal court 
decision finding no impermissible conflict between state mining requirements and 
either federal mining laws or forest service regulations. The court reasoned 
that the state's attempts to manage the environmental consequences of private 
mining on federal land did not amount to the "`local veto power,'" 590 F. Supp. 
at 1372, invalidated in Ventura County v. 
Gulf Oil Corporation, supra. The court refused to assume that the California commission 
would apply state permit requirements so as to render impossible the exercise of 
the applicant's rights under federal mining laws. Should that situation occur, 
the aggrieved party could seek to enjoin the enforcement of state regulations. 
The court noted the analogous objectives of the federal and state environmental 
regulations and concluded that compliance with state permit requirements did not 
prevent compliance with federal requirements.

[¶33.]  The reasoning in these cases concerning 
local environmental regulation applies to the restrictions imposed on Gulf by 
WOGCC pursuant to Rule 326, supra. The Commission has neither prohibited mineral 
development authorized by Congress nor mandated the use of a particular means of 
access. Instead, the Commission has granted Gulf a conditional permit to drill, 
based on its dual findings that the southern route inflicts unreasonable surface 
damage and feasible alternatives apparently exist. This action by WOGCC under 
Rule 326 implements the national policy of environmental protection by assuring 
that mineral development on federal property will be conducted so as to minimize 
the harm to surface resources.

[¶34.]  In summary, we find no intent by Congress 
to exclude states from regulating mining activities on federal land so as to 
safeguard environmental values. Neither do we find a direct conflict between 
Rule 326 and federal laws or objectives. We hold, therefore, that federal mining 
and environmental protection laws do not preempt WOGCC Rule 326, supra, or the 
enabling statute, § 30-5-104(d)(ii), supra n. 4. These state enactments provide 
valid authority for the Commission to condition Gulf's permit to drill on 
national forest land for federally owned minerals.

JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE 
PROPERTY

[¶35.]  Gulf contends that WOGCC lacks 
jurisdiction to prohibit the construction of an access road across fee property 
owned by Gulf and Texaco. However, Gulf cites no authority and presents no 
argument in support of this position.

[¶36.]  Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., requires the brief 
of an appellant to contain reasons and citations to appropriate authorities in 
support of all contentions:

"The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings * * *:

* * * * * * 

"(4) An argument. The 
argument may be preceded by a summary. The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on * * *."

We have invoked 
Rule 5.01(4) in the past and refused to consider issues inadequately presented 
for review. Zanetti v. Zanetti, Wyo., 689 P.2d 1116, 1122 (1984); Knadler v. 
Adams, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1983). Accordingly, we will not review this issue raised by 
Gulf without cogent argument and without proper citation. We merely note in 
passing that § 30-5-104(a), W.S. 1977, confers jurisdiction upon WOGCC over 
private property and persons.11

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S ORDER

[¶37.]  The Commission ordered Gulf to refrain 
from using the proposed southern road based on the conclusion that Gulf had 
failed to prove an absence of reasonable alternatives:

"* * * Before a permit 
would be granted for a route that would cause surface damage such as the 
southern route, the owner must prove to this Commission that there is no 
reasonable alternative. Gulf has failed to meet this burden of 
proof."

Gulf contends 
that no substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commission's 
conclusion and that the Commission's action is arbitrary and 
capricious.

[¶38.]  We note at the outset that Gulf, as an 
applicant for a permit to drill, bore the burden of proving to the Commission 
that its drilling operations would conform to the requirements of law. See Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company 
v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 
Wyo., 334 P.2d 519 (1959). Specifically, Gulf had to establish that its proposed activities 
would not cause the unreasonable surface damage prohibited by Rule 326, supra. 
Gulf recognizes the environmental degradation inherent in the southern road but 
argues that the uncontradicted evidence establishes the absence of any 
reasonable alternative to this harm. We do not agree.

[¶39.]  Our obligations in reviewing an 
administrative action following a hearing are well settled. We are bound to 
uphold an agency's decision which is supported by substantial evidence contained 
in the entire record. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), W.S. 1977;12 Mountain Fuel Supply v. Wyoming Public 
Service Commission, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878, 882 (1983); Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681, 689 (1982). We have defined substantial evidence 
to mean such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, 
Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976). Such evidence may be less than the weight of all the evidence, 
although it is more than a scintilla or suspicion of a fact. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School 
District No. 1 v. Spiegel, supra, 549 P.2d  at 1178. If substantial evidence 
supports a finding, the agency, in light of the expertise and experience of its 
members, appropriately determines the ultimate weight assigned to such evidence. 
Mountain Fuel Supply v. Wyoming Public Service 
Commission, supra, 662 P.2d  at 883.

[¶40.]  The record in the instant case 
establishes that WOGCC considered various alternatives to the proposed southern 
route, including helicopter mobilization, a northern access road, the North 
Piney Creek route, and directional drilling. The Commission concluded that Gulf 
had not ruled out the feasibility of either helicopter access or the northern 
road.

[¶41.]  At the hearing, the area drilling 
superintendent for Gulf testified that in his opinion access by helicopter was 
"totally unfeasible" in view of the problems encountered in drilling an earlier 
well in the vicinity. However, no evidence was presented as to the cost of 
helicopter mobilization, the nature and amount of equipment that would need to 
be moved, or the number of trips with explosives that would 
occur.

[¶42.]  The Commission received into evidence the 
environmental assessment of the drilling project, prepared by the Bureau of Land 
Management with assistance from the Forest Service. This document addresses 
helicopter mobilization at length and concludes that the method appears 
technically feasible, although more expensive than conventional means of 
access.

[¶43.]  Gulf officials testified as to two 
problems presented by use of the northern access route, an alternative which 
required extending a road used by Gulf to reach an existing well on private 
property in the area. First, Gulf representatives had promised the landowner, 
Burns Industries, not to extend the road into the national forest, as part of 
the consideration for access across the property. This concession by Gulf was 
apparently due to the owner's concern that the Forest Service would subsequently 
condemn the Gulf road and allow public access through the property to the 
national forest.

[¶44.]  The environmental assessment and 
accompanying maps indicate that use of the northern route would require 
upgrading an existing road on private 
property to the national forest boundary and two miles 
beyond:

"A feasible alternative 
to the southern route would be to extend this access road [from the existing 
well to the proposed well]. This would involve upgrading approximately 2 miles 
of existing road on private surface with realignments where existing road grades 
make it unfeasible to upgrade. The access route would then enter the BigHornNational 
Forest * * * and require that 2 miles of road [be] 
upgraded and 2.5 miles of new road construction. This existing access road is 
also known as the Kearney [L]ake Road." Environmental Assessment, 
supra.

This evidence 
before the Commission establishes the existence of a right-of-way across the 
Burns Industries property to the national forest and suggests the futility of 
any agreement between Gulf and the landowner not to construct such a 
road.

[¶45.]  A second obstacle to using the northern 
route, according to Gulf, was the fact that the projected road traversed federal 
land included in the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation program (RARE II). Gulf 
expressed concern that the Forest Service had closed this area to road 
construction.

[¶46.]  The Commission took notice of The Final 
Environmental Statement, Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, published in 
January, 1979, by the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. 
This document describes the allocation of land included in the RARE II study to 
wilderness, further planning, or nonwilderness areas. The RARE II land at issue 
in the instant case is designated as nonwilderness, open to mineral 
development.

[¶47.]  The environmental assessment depicts the 
affected RARE II land as a further planning area, but notes that mineral 
exploration is consistent with this designation as long as Gulf complies with 
the stipulations in its federal lease. Neither federal report confirms Gulf's 
contention that inclusion of an area in the RARE II program precludes road 
construction in that area.

[¶48.]  Although Gulf representatives testified 
as to the impossibility of reaching the proposed drill site by either helicopter 
mobilization or the northern route, federal reports before the Commission 
indicate the feasibility of these means of access. We conclude, therefore, that 
substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission's finding that Gulf 
failed to prove the absence of reasonable alternatives to the objectionable 
southern access road. We will not set aside the Commission's order based on that 
legally valid finding.

[¶49.]  The order of the Commission granting 
permission to drill, provided Gulf not use its proposed southern access route, 
is affirmed.

1 The MineralLands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 
et seq.; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et 
seq.; and the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4371 et 
seq.

2 Sections 30-5-101 
through 30-5-126, W.S. 1977, and rules promulgated by WOGCC pursuant to § 
30-5-104(c), W.S. 1977.

3 A wildcat oil well is a 
well in an area not known to be productive. Environmental Assessment for the 
Proposed Gulf's Granite Ridge 1-15-1D Oil and Gas Exploration Well, United 
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, p. 
1.

4 As authority for the 
promulgation of this rule, WOGCC cites § 30-5-104(d)(ii), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"(d) The commission has 
authority:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) To regulate, for 
conservation purposes:

"(A) The drilling, 
producing, and plugging of wells;

"(B) The shooting and 
chemical treatment of wells;

"(C) The spacing of 
wells;

"(D) Disposal of salt 
water, nonpotable water, and oil-field wastes;

"(E) The contamination or 
waste of underground water."

5 The Environmental 
Assessment was prepared under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) of the 
National Environmental Policy Act:

"The Congress authorizes 
and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: * * * (2) all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall -

* * * * * 
*

"(C) include in every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on -

"(i) the environmental 
impact of the proposed action,

"(ii) any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented,

"(iii) alternatives to 
the proposed action,

"(iv) the relationship 
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action should it be implemented."

6 Section 16-3-108(d), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(d) Notice may be taken 
of judicially cognizable facts. In addition notice may be taken of technical or 
scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge or information, data 
and material included within the agency's files. The parties shall be notified 
either before or during the hearing or after the hearing but before the agency 
decision of material facts noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to 
contest the facts noticed."

7 A party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Bureau of Land Management has 30 days in which to seek an 
administrative appeal, 43 C.F.R. § 4.701, and 90 days from the final 
administrative decision in which to petition for judicial review, 30 U.S.C. § 
226-2.

8 Regulations promulgated 
by the Department of the Interior provide for relief from production or 
operating requirements in federal leases. 43 C.F.R. § 
3103.4-2.

9 Gulf's federal 
application for a permit to drill specifies that the proposed well site is 
subject to the Granite Ridge Unit Agreement.

10 The second clause of 
Art. IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution provides:

"The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States * * 
*."

11 Section 30-5-104(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) The Wyoming oil and 
gas conservation commission * * * has jurisdiction and authority over all 
persons and property, public and private, necessary to effectuate the purposes 
and intent of this act."

12 Section 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), W.S. 1977 reads:

"(c) * * * The reviewing 
court shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

* * * * * 
*

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶50.]  I believe the majority opinion reaches 
beyond the stars in its effort to find existence of authority in the Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission to decide where access roads shall be 
constructed over privately or publicly owned lands under the guise of environmental 
control.

[¶51.]  Because the word "conservation" is in the 
name of the Commission, the majority opinion now gives the job of protecting the 
environment to the Commission. Quite a reach! First, the Commission's job is to 
"conserve" oil and gas and protect correlative rights - nothing else. And 
second, another agency is charged with environmental 
protection.

[¶52.]  The area of interest on the part of the 
Commission is defined in § 30-5-101 et seq., W.S. 1977. The entire thrust of the 
act is to prohibit "[t]he waste of oil and gas or either of them * * * as in 
this act defined" § 30-5-102(a), W.S. 1977. Waste is defined in § 30-5-101(a) as 
pertaining only to oil and gas without any reference to the environment. It 
speaks of "[p]hysical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil and 
gas industry," proper spacing of wells, flaring of gas, production in excess of 
transportation or storage facilities, prudent and proper operations, drilling to 
avoid or reduce the recoverable oil and gas, inefficient storing of oil and gas 
and dissipation of reservoir energy, etc. - all directed at eliminating waste, 
or at conservation of oil and gas. Inexco 
Oil Company v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1065 
(1971). Nothing is said with reference to an environmental impact or effect 
occasioned by access roads - or even of the environmental effect of the oil or 
gas field itself.

[¶53.]  The powers and duties given to the 
Commission are likewise directed to the same end. In § 30-5-104, W.S. 1977, its 
jurisdiction and authority is that "necessary to effectuate the purposes and 
intent of this act." Can anyone take an impartial look at the act and not 
conclude its purpose and intent is only to prohibit waste of oil and gas, and to 
protect correlative rights in oil and gas, or stated the other way - to conserve 
oil and gas? There is nothing in the act directed at general environmental 
protection.

[¶54.]  Correlative rights of those having an 
interest in oil and gas are protected by the Commission as an adjunct to the 
prevention of waste. Section 30-5-104 requires identification of ownership of 
wells, leases, tanks, etc., the filing of logs which are to be kept confidential 
for six months, and the establishment and regulation of units and pooling. The 
protection of correlative rights has nothing to do with the 
environment.

[¶55.]  The only reference in the act having any 
concern with the environment is § 30-5-104(d)(ii), quoted in fn. 4 of the 
majority opinion, and that concern is with disposal of oil field wastes and "contamination or 
waste of underground water" resulting from oil field activities. The entire 
subsection (ii) is directed to oil field activities relating to waste of oil and 
gas, to correlative rights of those interested in the oil and gas, and to water 
contamination and waste. It makes no reference to access roads or environmental 
"eye sores." If Rule 326 (Chapter III, Section 26) of the Rules and Regulations 
of the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission1 goes beyond the statute's 
perimeters, it goes beyond that authorized by law and amounts to an 
impermissible extension of the Commission's jurisdiction. There is no statutory 
authority for the provision in Rule 326 beyond that having to do with pollution 
of water, unless it is read to prohibit damage to land by oil waste being 
permitted to run onto the lands.

[¶56.]  And this brings us to the second basis 
for reversing this case. The job of protecting the environment has been 
legislatively given to another agency. The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (§ 
35-11-101 et seq., W.S. 1977) creates an agency to administer its provisions. 
The Act was designed to dovetail with the federal legislation on the subject. 
The legislature carefully defined that in which the created agency could act in 
control of the environment. If the incident here complained of was not included 
in that act, such was the legislative decision. Certainly, it is not intended 
that the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission should come in the back door and 
make environmental decisions entrusted to the agency set up to do 
so.

[¶57.]  In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 (1982), we noted an issue that was not before us 
relative to which agency, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission or the 
Environmental Quality Council, had authorization to control water discharge in 
connection with oil well activity. The issue in the case involved the 
availability of a declaratory judgment. We did quote the extensive definition of 
pollution set out in the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (§ 35-11-103(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977) and emphasized the language which provides 
that:

"`* * * This term does not mean water, gas or other 
material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil, or gas 
or water, derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a 
well * * *.'" (Emphasis in original.) 645 P.2d  at 
1165.

[¶58.]  The importance of the discussion in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
State, supra, as it pertains to this case, is the recognition that the 
Environmental Quality Council is recognized as having control over pollution of 
waters and of general environmental problems rather than the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, perhaps with the exception of water pollution resulting 
from oil well activity.

[¶59.]  I do not believe that we need to address 
the federal preemption issue. The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission had no 
jurisdiction over the question of whether or not an access road was improper on 
the basis of environmental injury.

[¶60.]  I would return the case to the Commission 
with directions to issue or deny the requested permits without consideration of 
environmental questions beyond water pollution from well activity. The 
environmental and other access problems should be addressed in another forum and 
in another manner.

1 Rule 326 provides in 
part:

"The owner shall not 
pollute streams, underground water, or unreasonably damage the surface of the 
leased premises or other lands."