Title: Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc. v. Hirayasu. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

4% FOR PUBLICATION *#*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

00 =~

 

eee

ALUMINUM. SHAKE ROOFING, INC.,
Plaintif# /Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,

  

vs Ea
OB on
ROY K, HIRAYASU, FRANCES N. MIRAYASY, Gale SO
Defendanee/Counterclaimants-Appellants. 22) =
ap 2 8

NO. 25012 al 3

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(Civ. No. 00-1-3672-12)

APRIL 12, 2006

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
AND ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

the defendants /counterclaimants-appellants Roy and

 

Frances Hirayasu (hereinafter, “the Appellants”) appeal from the
March 21, 2002 final judgment of the circuit court, the Honorable
Richard Pollack presiding, in favor of the plaintiff/counterclaim
Gefendant-appellee Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc. (hereinafter,
“ASR] and against the Appellants, awarding $26,328.65 in
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

on appeal, the Appellants contend that the circuit
court erred: (1) in ruling that Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
ch. 481¢ (1993), concerning door-to-door sales,’ did not apply to

{This case hinges on the following definitions contained in #RS
§ 481C-1, whicn provides:

(continued...
 

FOR PUBLICATION *#*

the Appellants’ claims and, on that basis, granting the motion

for judgment as 2 matter of law filed by ASR pursuant to Hawai't

*(,. continued)

onic chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise

requires:
a

®)

spoor-to-door sale” means (3) 2 sale of goods 0:

Gervices aelicited in person and signed By the buyer

See et SR than the seller's business address

Shown’on the contracts. +

fhe"term “asor-to-door Sale” does not include =

transaction

i" fade pursuant to price negotiations in the
Modree of a visit by the buyer to a retail
EGsiness establishment having « fixed permanent
Socation where the goods are exhibited or tl
Services are offered for sale on » continuing

1) Tn'asich the buyer hes initiated the contact and
the"goods oF services are needed to meet a bona
fide smmediste personal emergency of the Buyer,
Gnd che buyer furnishes the seller with
cree abtca' end suanee personal statenent sn
fe Buyer's nencwriting describing the situation
Etguiring immediate remedy and expressly
Ectnowledging and waiving the right to cancel
Zie"gale within three business days: oF

(444) Conducted and consummated entirely by mail or
Selephones and without any cther contact between
Ehe’Buyer and the seller ox its representative
Brice te delivery of the goods or performance of
fhe services: oF

liv) Inveieh the buyer bas initiated the contact and
Specifically requested the seller to visit the
Buyer's hone for the purpose of repairing or
pekESrming maintenance upon the buyer's personal
Begperey. 2 in the course of such a visit, the
Peller geile the buyer the right to receive
Sduitionel services or goods other than
ieelicenent parts necesserily used in performing
EnglSintcnance or in maxing the repairs, the
Sele of those additional goods or services would
fot fail wienin this exclusion.

 

 

  

 

 

(4) “Seller means any person, partnership, corporation,
[etociation, or other group, however organized, engaged in
the door-to-door sale of goods cr services.

(exghasis added.)
4+ POR PUBLICATION ***
gules of Civil Procedure (HACP) Rule $0(a);# and (2) in denying
the Appellants’ HACP Rule 50(a) motion as to ASR’s violation of
‘the same chapter.

For the reasons discussed infra in part 111, the
appellants’ arguments are ultimately unavailing. Accordingly, we

affirm the circuit court's judgment.

1. BACKGROUND
AL Ea yekaro4

The present matter arose out of a contract between ASR

 

and the Appellants to replace the roof of the Appellants’ hone-
The Appellants first encountered ASR and learned about
the roofing services it offered at @ February 2000 home show
conducted at the Neil Blaisdell Center, The appellant Roy
irayasu approached ASR’s president, Fred Rehm, at the booth and,
after discussing ASR’s product, gave Rehm his telephone nunber,
asking that Rehm cone to his home to provide an estimate. After
‘that meeting, the Appellants contacted Rehm again by telephone at
ASR’s warehouse to make an appointment to visit Rehm there. The
—_—_—_—_—_-
+ HRCP Rule $0(a) (2000) provides
(a) If during a trial by Jury a party has been fully heard on an
dssve {hs hele’ i2?no Legally” sufficient evicentiszy basis for a
Hiascnabie jury te find for that ‘the court my
geasonable J2°Y one against that party and may grant a motion for
getermine Us patter of lav against that party wich cegpect to 8 claim

juageent 28 ¢ t*connot under ehe controlling law be maintained or
seeeteoithout a favorable finding on that isue-

 

 

 

(2) Motions for judgment es a matter of Law may be made at, 20y
time were Sabelaaion ef the case to the Jury. Such a notion shall
SABE,E‘SES Sudgnent sought end the law and the facts on which the
Seeing’ party ss entitled to the judgment.
‘+44 POR PUBLICATION ***
two parties spoke at the warehouse, and Rehm agreed to go to the
Appellants’ hone later that afternoon to work up an estimate.
‘There is some dispute as to whether a contract was prepared prior
to the date that work was scheduled to begin, but, in any case,
on May 8, 2000, when ASR’s workers arrived at the Appellants’
home to begin installation of the roof, no contract had been
signed between the parties. The Appellants therefore asked to
speak with Rehn before work began. When Rehm arrived, the
parties entered the home to discuss the terms while the workers
waited outside. Following some discussion as to the materials to
be used and the terms of payment, the Appellants signed a
contract, and work commenced. Nevertheless, due to disputes
concerning the quality of the workmanship and the nature of the
warranty for the new roof, the Appellants subsequently asserted
that final payment was not due and owing. On September 25, 2000,
ASR brought a breach-of-contract action in the district court to
collect upon that debt. The Appellants counterclaimed on October
12, 2000 on four grounds: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation
of HRS ch. 481C, see supra note 1) (3) fraudulent
nisrepresentation; and (4) unfair and deceptive trade practices.
on December 4, 2000, the lawsuit was transferred to the circuit
court for a jury trial.
B. Brocedura) History Of The HES Ch, 4816 Claims

on Novenber 15, 2001, ASR filed a notion in Limine to
exclude claims based on HRS ch. 481C. The Appellants responded
with a memorandum in opposition on November 21, 2001. on

November 28, 2001, ASR followed with a trial memorandum regarding

4
 

+ POR PUBLICATION ***

the inapplicability of HRS ch. 481C to the Appellants’ asserted
claims. On Novenber 29, 2001, the Appellants filed a motion
under HRCP Rule 50(a) for a judgnent as a matter of law on this
jesue. Finally, on December 3, 2001, the Appellants filed a
nenorandun in opposition to a motion for judgment as a matter of
law apparently filed by ASR, although the record on appeal does

not contain any reference to ASR’s motion.

 

‘the circuit court conducted @ hearing on both partie
motions on Decenber 3, 2001 and granted a judgnent as a matter of
law in ASR's favor and against the Appellants. In its ruling,
the circuit court relied on Cooper vs Crow, $74 So. 24 438 (La
Ct. app. 1991) (holding that when a customer who evinced an
intention to purchase awnings invited the vendor to her home to
establish terms and price, the vendor did not “solicit” the sale
pursuant to the language of 16 C.F.R. pt. 429, containing federal
door-to-door sles regulations similar to HRS ch. 481¢), and
State v. Stereo Importers, 452 N.Y.S.24 835 (N.Y. Sup, Ct, 1962)
(holding that, where vendor used ad media to pronote off-site

 

Liquidation sales, under New York's door-to-door sales act vendor
did not “solicit” customers who made initial contact). The
circuit court determined that, by analogy, because the Appellants
Initiated contact with ASR, their claims did “not fall within the
purview of HRS chapter 481C because ASR did not solicit the sale
as required by this statute.” The circuit court noted that, in
41976 amendments to the bill that would become HRS ch. 481C, the
legislature renoved from the definition of door-to-door sales any

transaction “in which the buyer has initiated the contact.”
‘+#* FOR PUBLICATION ***

(Citing Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep, No, 25-76, in 1976 Senate Journal,

at 918.)

on March 21, 2002, following a jury verdict in favor of

ASR on all remaining counts, the circuit court entered final

judgment on all claims, including the HRS ch. 481¢ claims, in
favor of ASR and against the Appellants.

notice of

 

on March 25, 2002, the Appellants timely filed their
appeal to this court.
TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ud Ma mo

It Se well settled that a trial court's rulings
on motions for judgnent as 2 matter of law are
Feviewed da cave.
nen we review the granting of @ (motion for
judgnent as's matter of Las], we apply the sane
Rtandard as the trial court,
‘A Inotion for judgment as 2 matter of law) may
be granted only when after disregarding conflicting
‘giving te the non-noving party’s evidence
SIL the value to which it ie legally entitles, and
Indulging every Legitinate inference which may De
‘evidence in the nen-noving party's
feta no evidence to
Stpport s Jury verdict in his oF her favor.

 

   

 

Mivamoto v. Lum, 104 Hawai'i 1, 6-7, 84 P.3d 509, 514-515 (2004)

(internal
B.

citations omitted) .

retat. rut

wone interpretetion of 2 statute is a question of lew
reviewable ge nor." Gray v. Admin, Dir. of she Court,
Hava 138, 144, 931 Poza 360, 386 (2997). Furthermore,
Gur statutery construction ie guiged by established rules

linen construing a statute, our forenost obligation is
toascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from
the language contained in the statute itself. And we
hnust read statutory Language An the context of the
Sntire statute and construe it in a manner consistent
with its purpose.
w** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

linen there is doubt, dovbleness of meaning, oF
indistineiveness of uncertainty of an expression used
ine statute, an ambiguity existe °
Tnconseruing em ambiguous statute, ~[e)he
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
eae neng the contest, with which the ambiguous words,
Shttecs, Tend sentences say be compared, in order to
Bicertain their true meaning.” HAS § i-15(2)
Tilses1], Moreover, che courts may resort to
‘teinsle aids in determining the legislative intent.
Ske‘ gvense is the vse of legislative history as an
Shtorpeetive took

Gray, 64 Hawas's at 14

 

931 P.2d at $90. This court may
HSL’ Shaider “It]he reason and spirit of the law, and the
ease which induced the legislature to enact it <'. «to
GBeSSver ite true meaning. HRS § 2-25(2), “Laws in pert
SASSEISE Gr"upen the same subject matter, shall be construed
wee ieterence co each other. what is clear in one statute
wiv’oe" called upon in aid to explain whet is doubtful in
Gnethers” aS § 1-16 (1993).

 

    

 

State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai'i 1, 8-9, 946 P.2d 955, 962-63 (1997)
(some brackets and internal citations omitted) -

ings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Lay

 

In this jurisdiction, # trial court’s (findings
of fact (foFs)] are subject to the clesrly erroneous
Standard of review, “State vw. watch, 78 Haw. 307, 328,
bel pod Si, 22 {1993]- "an FoF is clearly exroneous
stheny “despite evidence to support the finding, the
WeSclaste’coure is dese with the definite and firm
2EEviceion that a mistake has been committed.” Id.

TAR" Conclusion ef Jaw (COL)] 18 not binging
upon an oppeliate court and is freely reviewable for
Yee cores B

me
Tquoeing
Pine een 115, e598 Poze 20, 28 (2992)). This court
Grdinasily reviews COLe under the right/wrong
SEEAGEESLY Tn"ee' Estate of Wolt, 75 Haw. 224, 232, 857
Fiza i985, 1359 (1993) -_ Thus, °*{a) COL that is
Ripported by the trial court's (FOFs] and that
EeeLGEee an application of the correct rule of Law
Will not be overturned.’ Egtate of Caraang, 74 Hew.
we 626-29, 851 2.28 at 326 (quoting Antac, ince, 7¢
Howes tis; 839 F.2d at 29). "However, @ COL that
presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed
Eiger the clearly erroneous standard because the
REECE SPCcnelusicns are dependent upon the facts and
SEEELEStees SF each snaivicual case.” Id. at 623,
Siprad ec 326 (quoting Batac, inc., 74 Haw, at 119,

pl2g ae 2s) (anternal quotation marks omitted! -

Save se Puratanl, 76 Heard 172, 179-80, 673 F.2d
Shy se-a8 (ssa)

  

 

6201 626, #51 P20 32i, 326 (1993)

 

 

 

 

 
‘4#* FOR PUBLICATION *#*

Allstate Ins, Co, v. Ponce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.3d 96, 104
(2004). (Some internal citations omitted.)

IIT. — piscussion

‘The Appellants assert that the circuit court erred in
ruling that the transaction did not fall within the purview of
HRS ch. 481¢ by incorrectly determining: (1) that there was @
blanket exclusion for “buyer-initiated transactions” under the

chapter; (2) that the chapter requires that the seller be

 

routinely engaged in door-to-door sales activities for its
protections to apply: and (3) that language in the chapter
granted the circuit court discretion in determining whether the
transaction in question qualified as a door-to-door sale.’
AL ita in ing ti A

Exe uyer=

‘The Appellants contend that the circuit court erred
when it: (1) ruled that, because the Appellants were the first
to initiate contact between the parties, ASR had not “solicited”
the transaction: and (2) therefore concluded that the Appellants’
clains did not fall within the purview of HRS ch. 481C. They

cite to Weatherall Aluminum eroducts Co, v. Scott, 139 Cal. Rptr.

) determination that this transaction did not fall within the
definition of a svor-tovdoor sale found in HRS S 401C-1, see gupra note 1,
Sirectly effects the ultimate outcome of the parties’ dispute. It is
GhulSpued that ASK did not comply with the detailed requirements of HRS
$'ieie-2 a5 te supplying the buyer with proper written notification of the
Sonaunar's right to cancel the transaction. That faiiure would, if HRS ch.
Geic were applicable to this transaction, directly lead to’a conclusion that
ASR bad engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices, pureuant to HRS
Sueice2. That, in turn, would render the contract unenforceable by the
Seller, under HRs $ 421074(b).
4+ FOR PUBLICATION ***
329 (Gal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a buyer's invitation to
visit the home to provide an estimate for hone improvenents did
not automatically divest the buyer of protections under
california’ s door-to-door sales laws), for the proposition that
the fact that a buyer initiates contact does not automatically
remove the transaction from the protections of HRS ch. 481¢. In
ite answering brief, ASR argues that “solicitation” inherently
requires an initial contact by the seller and thet buyer
initiated transactions are therefore outside the purview of the
chapter.

specifically, the Appellants contend that the circuit
court misconstrued the structure of HRS ch. 481¢ with regard to
wpuyer-initiated transactions” and overly relied on general
sunmary statements concerning such transactions contained in s
legislative connittee report, saz Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 25°
76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 918. To the extent the circuit
court relied in reaching its determination that ASR did not
solicit the Appellants on the fact that the Appellants made
jnitial contact, the Appellants are correct.

1. The structure of HRS ch, 4816

‘The Appellants note that HRS ch. 481¢ contains two
specific exclusions from its protections under cizcunstances in
which the buyer makes initial contact -- one for emergency
repairs and one for repair or maintenance of personal property.
gag HRS § 481C-1(6) (Li), (iv), supra note 1, The Appellants
‘contend that the circuit court’s interpretation of HRS ch. 4816

as excluding all buyer-initiated transactions would render these
e+ FOR PUBLICATION ***
two specific exclusions superfluous, thereby violating the rule
of statutory interpretation that requires courts to avoid
rendering any provision redundant or superfluous. See, S.Ge,
State vs Mucller, 102 Hawai'i 391, 395, 76 P.34 943, 947 (2003);
State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 145, 63 P.3d 1109, 1115
(2003); Coon v. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 25%
47 P.3d 348, 374 (2002).

RS § 481C-1(1) (A) (1) defines a door-to-door sale as “a
sale of goods or services solicited in person and signed by the
buyer at a place other than the seller's business address shown
on the contract.” See gupra note 1. The following section then
lists four exceptions that are not to be considered door-to-door
sales under the law, two of which involve buyer-initiated
transactions. See HRS § 481C-1(1) (8), supra note 1.
particularly enlightening is the last sentence of HRS
§ 481C-1(1) (B) (iv), which provides that if the buyer who made
{initial contact purchases any new goods or services in relation
to the repair or maintenance of his or her personal property, the
protections of HRS ch. 481¢ apply. These provisions demonstrate
by implication that, if the buyer initiates contact for something
other than “a bona fide personal emergency” or “for the purpose
of repairing or performing maintenance upon the buyer's personal
property,” the transaction falls within the definition of 2 door~
to-door sale, and the protections of this act apply. The mere
fact that a buyer has made the initial contact does not render
HRS ch. 481¢ automatically inapplicable to a contract negotiated

at the buyer's home.

10
#44 FOR PUBLICATION ***

his the court in Weatherall reasoned, in addition to
protecting homeowners from uninvited high-pressure sales pitches,
door-to-door sales laws such as HRS ch. 481¢ also serve to
protect consumers who may find themselves regretting making the

initial contact:

 

[A second and equally serious pressure arises «

 

 

 

fromthe fact chat the seller say be an intimidating
Eresence once inside the buyer's hone, A reluctant
Evyer can easily walk evay fron a seller's place of

 

Business, Sut ne cannct walk avay from his own hone,

pag he nay find that the enly practical way of getting

the Setlet to leave Le to agree to buy whatever the

Eehier de setuing., thie latter type of pressure may

EiLi¢ cegerdless of whether or not the buyer invited
yioveall av his residence.

 

139 cal. Aptr. at 331. As the Appellants argue, to establish a
blanket exclusion for any buyer-initiated transaction would allow
vendors to respond to trade show inquiries with high pressure
sales techniques at people’s hones without fearing the remedies
afforded under HRS ch. 481C, Given the focus of the chapter on
guarding against vendor coercion during at-home transactions, the
proper inquiry must focus on the presence of coercive pressure,
rather than on a blanket rule turning on which party initiated
contact. If negotiations occur in the hone, then the protections
of HRS ch. 481¢ are not automatically suspended merely because
the buyer initiated contact with the vendor, so long as the
totality of the circumstances establish a true effort to
“solicit” on the part of the vendor.

2. The 1976 senate committee report

In determining that buyer-initiated transactions fell
outside the purview of HRS ch. 481C, the circuit court also
relied on a summary of amendments to the draft bill contained in

a
+#4 POR PUBLICATION ***

the Senate Committee on Consumer Protection's report on Senate
pill 1780-76, which was ultimately codified as HRS ch, 481C. The
report stated in relevant part that the “Committee amended the
pill by removing from the definition of a door-to-door sale any
transaction: . . . (d) in which the buyer had initiated the
contact.” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 25-76, in 1976 Senate
Journal, at 918. The circuit court, however, misinterpreted the
legislature's intent behind the changes to the draft law.

By renoving the language regarding buyer-initiated
transactions from earlier general definitions of door-to-door
sales, while retaining them in the two specific exclusions
discussed gupra in part ITI.A.1, it appears that the legislature
Grafted the lew, not to exclude all buyer-initiated transactions,
put to include ali buyer-initiated transactions except those leid
out in two carefully crafted exclusions.‘ See also Hse. Stand.
comm. Rep. No. 778-76, in 1976 House Journal, at 1651
(recommending Senate Bill 1780-76 as 2 way of harmonizing federal
and state law on door-to-door sales, retaining those federal and
state provisions, respectively, thet offer the greater protection
to consumers) «

In light of the statutory provisions excluding two
specitic types of buyer-initiated transactions from the purview

«tn fact, that sane comittes amended the original bill to include
those buyer-initiated transaction exclusions, following February 11, 1976
snes ey tia the state Office of Consuner Protection suggesting the change.
ESSTECUY "EeSulttee an Conaueer fxotection cn Senate Bill 1760-76, ech state
Seb Sette eee tesion (iste (Eestinony of Gorden Uschi, Office of Consumer
Legis. Feguise wears $.0. 1780-76 ae introduced on January 26, 2976 with
Brovectionl; SSmgtS., ‘which the Senate Committee on Consuner Protection
senetSed as amended on Februery 20, 1376 and which contains the new, current
seererge with the exclusions. See 1976 Senate Journal at 106

 

12
s#* FOR PUBLICATION **#
of HRS ch. 481C, as well as the consumer protection policies
underlying it, the circuit court erred to the extent thet it
relied on the fact thet the buyer initiated the transaction to
determine that no solicitation had occurred.
8, The Circuit Court Erred In Requiring The Appellants To
lish That ASR Seau: Engaged or ~To= Door

Sales Activities.

HRS § 481C-1(4) defines a seller, for the purposes of
the chapter, as “any person, partnership, corporation,
association, or other group . . . engaged in the door-to-door
sale of goods or services.” See supra note 1. According to the
circuit court, the court in Cooper, facing similer language, held
that, inasmuch as there was no pattern of door-to-door sales,
there could be no solicitation under the terms of the law, The
circuit court similarly determined that, because the Appellants
failed to establish a pattern by ASR of engaging in door-to-door
sales, HRS ch, 481¢ could not apply

By the plain language of the statute, “sale” is couched
in the singular. Moreover, by its plain language, the statute
does not require the establishment of a pattern of door-to-door
sales activities. Rather it requires that the vendor in question
be involved in the activity defined as a door-to-door sale in HRS
§ 481C-1(1) (A): “a sale of goods or services solicited in person
‘and signed by the buyer at a place other than the seller's
business address shown on the contract.” While @ given
transaction may include activity that involves a pattern of door-
to-door sales, the law does not require such activity for the

buyer to receive its protections. This is perfectly consistent

13
#44 FOR PUBLICATION ##*
with the policies underlying HRS ch. 481¢. The concerns that
prompted the legislation are no less germane to a sale that is
not part of a vendor's ongoing schene or pattern of conduct. It
was therefore error for the circuit court to place the burden of
establishing such a pattern on the Appellants.

c. The Circuit Court Properly Applied The Prefatery
i ei 4B1C~

 

‘The Appellants contend that the circuit court
overreached its authority in applying the prefatory language
wunless the context or subject matter otherwise requires,”
contained in HRS § 48iC-1, to determine that, on the evidence
before it, the Appellants had failed to establish that the
transaction qualified as a door-to-door sale as defined by HRS
§ 491C-1(1) (A), see supra note 1. They assert that the
substantive provisions of HRS ch. 481¢ are plain and unambiguous
land accuse the circuit court of “wal]ving [this language] as
talisman to change the meaning of the statute.” ASR in turn
asserts that, based on the underlying facts, the circuit court
correctly exercised the discretion afforded by HRS ch, 481¢ to
determine that the chapter did not apply.

We hold that the circuit court correctly interpreted
the relevant provisions of HRS § 481C-1 in reaching its ultimate
conclusion.

The phrase “[i)n this chapter, unless the context or
subject matter otherwise requires” is found in only three other

Hawai'i statutes, and all preface statutory definitions of

14
+## FOR PUBLICATION *#*

terms.’ The legislative history underlying these acts is scant
‘and sheds no light on the reasoning behind the inclusion of the
phrase. Nevertheless, the phrase’s plein language clearly
affords @ measure of discretion to the court to examine the
totality of the circumstances in a particular case in light of
HRS ch. 481C’s underlying rationale and public policy.

In the present matter, the circuit court was faced with
the task of determining whether @ reasonable jury could find that
ASR “solicited” the Appellants within the meaning of HRS ch.
481C.* On the undisputed facts before this court, it cannot be
said that the cireuit court’s decision leaves us with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.

‘The Appellants approached ASR and requested a home
visit to discuss the suitability and cost of 2 copper roof. The
appellants contacted ASR again and visited the company warehouse
at least once prior to the start of work. ASR’s president

visited the Appellants at their home on several occasions to

+ Sap HRS $$ 454-1 (1992) ("Mortgage Brokers and Solicitors*), {76-1
tsopp. 2000) create sales"), end 56-1 (1999) ("Uniform Fidveiaries Act”).

4 there 4s a common thene in the case law of other Jurisdictions
that to “solicit” a transection requires 2 personal petition and an intent to
fhat 8S Gesise in, of to excite to-action, the individual being solicited.
Heo e Sebene Cenceas s. Aadae Excerpinating Cou, Inca, (55 8.8.26 602, 603
Sos Akron Fest Cepttthisting that the ters “implies personal petition and

see tunity addressed to a particular individual to do sone particular thing”)
(citing Black's aw Dictionary 1352, (sth ed. 1990)): ee

AEUES BARSSTSSSTSEIMy. i500) (o"soiicie’ means to move to action, te
cee eo cutein by asking, and inplies personal petition to a particular
Shatviduel to do a particular thing") (citing

neerastion®) Dictionary 216 is La

 

 

 

 

    

Tiee-a9- (sth ed.)
404 §.W.26 402, 405
tion ct. App. 1968) (relying on Websters rv to find the
wre Sreteaty meaning of aelicit to be "to awake OF excite action: to rouse =

seein nr te summons ce appeal to; to invite; allure”),

 

 

 

1s
‘FOR PUBLICATION **#

discuss the project with them. The two parties agreed on a date
for work to begin on a new roof, and Mr. Hirayasu took vacation
during that period in order to be at home to monitor the work.
It was not clearly erroneous for the circuit court to conclude
that ASR did not move the Appellants to action or importune then
to purchase the copper roof, such that the transaction was
“solicited” by ASR.’ See supra note 6.

whis court may affirm a judgment of the trial court on
any ground in the record which supports affirmance.” Tavlor-Rice
va State, 91 Hawas'l 60, 73, 979 P.2d 1086, 1099 (1999).
Notwithstanding the other errors discussed supra in parts
ITI.A-B, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment on the ground
that it correctly applied the discretionary language of HRS
§ 481C-1 in ruling that ASR did not “solicit” the Appellants so
as to bring this transaction under the provisions of HRS ch.

asic.

+ an contrast to the issue of excluding all buyer-initiated

transactions, ‘the cireust court properly relied on Cooper in its determination
that the facts of this case, like those in Cooper, dig not establish «
Solicitation by the vender as a matter of law. In both cases, there was
Substantial evidence chet, the buyer had decided to make the purchase before
{nitiating contact with the vendor and that the subsequent meetings wei
primarily

 

 

 

to consummate the transaction which (the buyer) initiated and
Solicited. {the buyer's] appointment to meet (the vendor] was
Simply co examine the premises in order to reach a final price for
the contrace and wes net in any way a solicitation. The [buyer]’s
[nvttacion to neet with (the vendor] Was not made for the purpose
of allowing [the vendor] to make ¢ "sales pitch,” but rather for
[tne parties] to discuss specific terms and prices after the
Geelsion to purchase had already been made.

 

 

Gooper, $74 So, 24 at 443.
16
 

FOR PUBLICATION *#*
IV. CONCLUSION

based on the foregoing analysis, we therefore affirm
the March 21, 2002 final judgment of the circuit court in favor
of Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc. and against the Appellants,

awarding $26,328.65 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

on the briefs:
Wesley D. Shimazu, for the

plaintif£/counterclaim

defendant appellee Seo

Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc

Ronald shigekane of Peat CUE OY
rae Mfongs Nishimoto, Sia &
Ritanure, For the defendents/ Yecowue

counterclaimants-appellants
Roy K. Hirayasu and
Frances N. Hirayasu

vv