Title: PRESBYTERIAN HOMES, SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC. v. City of Bradenton

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

190 So. 2d 771 (1966)
PRESBYTERIAN HOMES of the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a Non-Profit Corporation of Florida, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BRADENTON, Manatee County, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Appellees.
PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a Non-Profit Corporation of Florida, Appellant,
v.
MANATEE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
Nos. 34232, 34233.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 5, 1966.
Rehearing Denied November 3, 1966.
*772 Grimes, Grimes, Goebel & Parry, Bradenton, and Black, Cobb, Cole & Crotty, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
William J. Ray, Bradenton, for City of Bradenton.
Kenneth W. Cleary, of Schultz & Cleary, Bradenton, for Manatee County.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated cases are before us on appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court for Manatee County which held that Bradenton Manor, owned and operated by appellant, a non-profit corporation, as a home for elderly people, is not exempt from taxation under Section 16, Article XVI of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
The undisputed facts, as stated in the final decree, are:
Upon those facts the Circuit Court concluded the Bradenton Manor property was not held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 16, Article XVI of the Florida Constitution and, therefore, was not exempt from taxation.
The Court rejected appellant's argument that, although the property could not qualify under any one of the separate exemptions, it did qualify through a combination of all the exemptions, and held:
We agree.[1] The decision of the Circuit Court is, therefore, affirmed.
THOMAS, DREW, O'CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
THORNAL, C.J., dissents and agrees with ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ.
ROBERTS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the view of the majority for the reason that, in my opinion, it is not only erroneous but endangers the tax exempt status of every church-operated college, school or hospital in the state which make any charge for services. One of the great social problems of our day is the responsibility for caring for the physical needs of aged and infirm persons. We know from everyday experience even those with adequate funds have difficulty in finding a suitable place for physical care. It is indeed commendable that church institutions have entered this field and, in my opinion, it violates the letter and spirit of the Constitution of this State to subject the physical properties of the churches or their alter ego non-profit corporations to ad valorem taxes. It is not enough that the residents, where financially able, are requested to pay some part of the expense of their maintenance.
The facts in this case were recited in a rather verbose stipulation which I will not repeat in full, but will incorporate the parts pertinent to this opinion as follows:
In my opinion this case is directly on point with Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hospital, 66 So. 2d 285, in which this court held that a hospital, even though requiring the patients to pay specified amounts, was exempt from taxation, and in doing so said:
And again in Simpson, Tax Collector, Duval County, Florida v. Jones Business College, 118 So. 2d 779, this court approved an exemption of the business college which was a private non-profit corporation from ad valorem taxes, and in so doing said: 
The judicial philosophy expressed in the Orlando Osteopathic and the Jones Business College cases, and the cases to which they are anchored, fits the situation in this case like a glove, and it seems to me the majority view is a complete departure from that established philosophy. It is indeed unfortunate that such an institution (and others similar) will now be subjected to the heavy burden of ad valorem taxation while performing charitable and religious purposes, and which ad valorem taxation must necessarily be borne by either the elderly patients or the Presbyterian Church, or both. I am unable to see the distinction between the case sub judice and a church-operated college which charges *776 tuition, board and room, or a church-operated hospital which charges the customary room, board and other charges. Here the stipulation clearly established that the Presbyterian Homes of the Synod, a non-profit corporation, is the alter ego of the Presbyterian Church and is entitled to all of the exemptions which would be allowed if the title to the facilities were vested in the church rather than the church corporation.
I, therefore, dissent and would hold that the property is entitled to the exemption claimed.
THORNAL, C.J., concurs.
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting).
I fully agree to the dissenting opinion of Justice ROBERTS.
While the Bradenton Manor requires founders' fees and monthly maintenance in varying amounts from those elderly persons cared for in the Manor who are financially able to provide such fees and maintenance, this requirement alone does not nullify the overall religious and charitable attributes of the institution. In addito such fees and maintenance, supplemental donations from members of Presbyterian churches in Florida and from other sources are necessary to enable the Manor to meet the heavy expense entailed in providing for the care and comfort of elderly persons resident in the Manor in an atmosphere congenial to their religious faiths. The Manor, though requiring assistance from such fees, and maintenance, is nevertheless charitable in its overall program and operation and not a profit-making institution. In order to meet its initial capital improvement requirements, for which a large interest-bearing indebtedness was incurred, its sponsors necessarily had to require such payments from residents able to pay. It is thus spreading original costs of getting the institution under way among those now most able to contribute for such purpose. In future years it is to be reasonably expected that as the institution reduces its obligations it will be able to extend its benefits to others less able to pay. These necessary requirements for funding the initial costs of capital improvements in the formative years of the institution in addition to providing for operational expenses should not detract from the Manor's over-all characteristics as a continuing charitable institution, church sponsored, controlled and designed to provide care and comfort to elderly persons in their declining years. Merely because a portion of the expense of charitable and educational institutions must be provided in the form of fees, charges or tuition from those served, the same does not ordinarily defeat the allowance of the ad valorem tax exemption. The simple economics of many institutions which are granted exemptions contemplate that those who are directly served or who are the objects of benefits should contribute in some degree to the costs and expenses entailed in the operation of such institutions.
These expenses of the institution which elderly persons financially able are expected to pay is but one of the factors determinative of the character of the institution. As Justice Roberts so well points out, in the total spectrum this factor is greatly outweighed by other characteristics which clearly align the institution with those institutions and groups which have traditionally been granted ad valorem tax exemption.
Additionally, it appears to me that under our Constitution as it has long been interpreted, to disallow ad valorem tax exemption to the Bradenton Manor is to discriminate against it as a member of a recognized class of institutions and properties which have traditionally been allowed such exemption. The Christian Herald of January, 1966, in an article entitled "Should Church Property be Taxed?" points out *777 out that one of the potent arguments for continued exemption is that:
The article also relates that a Mrs. Madalyn Murray brought suit to nullify church property exemption in the state of Maryland. In dismissing her suit, according to the Christian Herald, the Maryland Circuit Court cited:
Florida, like Maryland, has long granted the same type of exemptions to similar groups as do most of the states. Unless and until the Constitution is revised and the Legislature prescribes narrower exemption standards and restrictions, I do not believe our Court should bellwether judicially in this field.
I think also that we should note the case of Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, cert. den. 183 So. 2d 211. The record presented to us in that case did not clearly establish the nexus between the Church and the home as does the record before us. Moreover, the former case was brought here by "conflict certiorari" rather than direct appeal, and we simply denied certiorari on jurisdictional grounds.
THORNAL, C.J., concurs.
[1]  Compare,

Hungerford Convalescent Hospital Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1963); Miami Battle Creek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939), with Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla.App.2d) cert. denied, Fla., 183 So. 2d 211 (1965).