Title: Columbus Bar Assn.v. Peden

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5766.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5766 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. PEDEN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5766.] 
(No. 2012-0318—Submitted May 23, 2012—Decided December 7, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-094. 
_________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Peden of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0021233, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1983.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we indefinitely 
suspend Peden’s license to practice law, based on findings that Peden engaged in 
a pattern of misconduct involving multiple violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  The board also recommends that we require Peden to meet certain 
conditions prior to reinstatement of his law license.  We adopt the findings of 
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professional misconduct, the recommended sanction, and the reinstatement 
conditions. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In May 2008, we ordered a six-month stayed suspension of Peden 
for repeatedly overdrawing his client trust account, not maintaining a trust 
account for a period of time, depositing unearned client funds into his office 
operating account, failing to immediately refund an unearned fee, and failing to 
cooperate in the initial stages of the disciplinary investigation.  Columbus Bar 
Assn. v. Peden, 118 Ohio St.3d 244, 2008-Ohio-2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 3-4.  
Peden’s stayed suspension included one year of monitored probation, with a 
specific focus on his client trust account.  Peden was also diagnosed with a mental 
disability at this time, and we ordered that he provide periodic reports from his 
psychologist on his ability to competently and ethically practice law and that he 
remain in compliance with his contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (“OLAP”), which required his continued treatment.  Id. at ¶ 5-8. 
{¶ 3} On June 15, 2009, we found Peden in contempt and imposed an 
actual suspension for not paying the board costs from his disciplinary proceeding.  
Peden was reinstated on September 15, 2009, subject to the conditions of his 
stayed suspension.  Peden’s monitored probation has remained in effect since that 
time. 
{¶ 4} On December 6, 2010, relator, the Columbus Bar Association, 
filed a three-count complaint charging Peden with professional misconduct.  The 
complaint alleged that Peden (1) mismanaged his client trust account, (2) failed to 
return unearned fees, (3) failed to keep clients reasonably informed of their case 
status, (4) failed to provide competent and diligent representation, (5) failed to 
notify clients that his malpractice insurance had lapsed, (6) failed to notify clients 
of his suspension from the practice of law, (7) failed to provide reasonable notice 
January Term, 2012 
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of withdrawal of representation and to protect clients’ interests following 
withdrawal, and (8) failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 5} Relator filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2011, adding 
four more counts charging Peden with similar misconduct.1  Relator’s amended 
complaint also alleged for the first time that Peden had engaged in misconduct 
involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
{¶ 6} A panel of the board conducted a hearing.  The panel heard the 
testimony of eight witnesses, including Peden, and admitted 77 exhibits, 70 of 
which were submitted by relator.  The panel issued a report finding that Peden 
had violated 12 different Rules of Professional Conduct.  The panel recommended 
that Peden receive an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.  The panel 
also recommended that Peden fulfill several, specific conditions prior to being 
reinstated. 
{¶ 7} The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct, the 
indefinite suspension, and the reinstatement conditions. 
Misconduct 
Count Three—Trust-Account Overdrafts 
{¶ 8} On May 11, 2009, Peden overdrew his client trust account at Fifth 
Third Bank by $200.  Four days later, on May 15, he again overdrew his trust 
account, this time by $133.  On January 6, 2010, Peden overdrew this account a 
third time, by the sum of $19.81.  During the time of these overdrafts, Peden was 
under monitored probation by the relator.  Peden, however, did not contact his 
monitor during this time period. 
{¶ 9} Peden acknowledged during the board hearing that he had not 
maintained a client trust account for several months in 2009.  He reopened a trust 
                                                 
1 Relator elected not to proceed on Count Six of the amended complaint, and it is dismissed. 
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account with Chase Bank in June 2010.  But on March 29, 2011, less than four 
months before the board hearing, Peden overdrew this trust account by $88. 
{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing evidence, the board found that Peden had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to safeguard client funds in an 
interest-bearing client trust account, separate from lawyer’s own funds) and 8.4(h) 
(engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law).  We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count One—Willmore/Plaisted 
{¶ 11} On April 1, 2009, Peden agreed to represent Erin Willmore in a 
custody dispute involving her infant daughter.  Willmore was also a victim of 
domestic violence, and she wanted Peden to obtain a civil protection order on her 
behalf.  Peden and Willmore entered into a written fee agreement that required a 
$2,500 retainer and a rate of $225 per hour. 
{¶ 12} Willmore’s mother, Karen Plaisted, paid the fees on her behalf.  
During April 2009, Plaisted made five payments to Peden for attorney fees and 
costs totaling $2,178.  Peden deposited this money into his office operating 
account instead of his client trust account, even though some of this money had 
not yet been earned or paid out as case expenses.  The money received by Peden 
included $175 that was to be used to hire a process server.  Peden did not hire the 
process server and never repaid this money to Plaisted. 
{¶ 13} Peden only partially performed the services he was paid for.  Peden 
issued one billing statement to Plaisted, dated April 10, 2009, reflecting that he 
had earned attorney fees in the amount of $1,260 based on 5.6 hours of work on 
the case.  Plaisted made several requests for additional billing statements, but 
Peden never sent a further accounting.  He also failed to return repeated phone 
calls from Willmore and Plaisted, and he did not inform them of any work he may 
have done after April 10, 2009.  And Peden never returned any unearned money 
to Plaisted, despite promising that he would. 
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{¶ 14} In June 2009, Peden was found in contempt for not paying the 
board costs from his disciplinary proceeding and suspended from the practice of 
law.  Peden never informed Willmore of his suspension and made no attempt to 
return Willmore’s case file or have her case transferred to another attorney.  And 
once he was reinstated in September 2009, Peden did not contact Willmore about 
the status of her case. 
{¶ 15} In addition, Peden’s malpractice insurance lapsed during his 
suspension and was not renewed after he was readmitted in September 2009.  
Peden, however, failed to notify Willmore that he did not have malpractice 
insurance. 
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing conduct, the board found that Peden 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably 
informed of the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to respond to a 
client’s reasonable request for information), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to notify 
clients that malpractice insurance had lapsed), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to 
render an accounting of funds upon request of a client), 1.16(e) (requiring a 
lawyer who withdraws from employment to promptly return unearned fees), 
1.16(d) (withdrawing from representation without taking reasonable steps to 
protect the client’s interest), 1.15(a), and 8.4(h).2  We adopt these findings of fact 
and misconduct. 
Count Two—Culwell 
{¶ 17} In November 2008, Peden agreed to represent James C. Culwell in 
a divorce case.  No written fee agreement exists in the record, but according to 
                                                 
2 The board and panel reports cite Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d) and 1.6(d).  Likewise, the amended 
complaint cites Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d).  After reading the parenthetical descriptions following the 
citation of these rules, it is evident that the intended references were to Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) and 
1.16(d). 
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Peden, the agreed rate was $225 per hour.  Between November 2008 and June 
2009, Peden requested and received from Culwell a total of $4,925 in attorney 
fees and expenses.  Peden deposited all of this money into his office account, 
instead of keeping it in his client trust account until earned or paid out as 
expenses. 
{¶ 18} In January 2009, Peden filed a complaint for divorce on Culwell’s 
behalf. Culwell had paid Peden $179 specifically to cover the filing fee.  Despite 
this, Peden’s check to the trial court for the filing fee was returned for insufficient 
funds.  Peden never told Culwell that the check was dishonored, and Culwell did 
not learn of this until the trial court contacted him.  Because the filing fee 
remained unpaid, Culwell had to issue his own check to cover the fee.  Peden has 
never refunded the filing fee to Peden, and in the end Culwell paid the filing fee 
twice: once to Peden and once to the court. 
{¶ 19} On June 15, 2009, this court suspended Peden for contempt and 
ordered him to notify his clients in writing of the suspension.  Peden, however, 
did not send written notice of his suspension to Culwell at that time.  A hearing 
was scheduled in Culwell’s divorce case for June 24, 2009.  Culwell expected that 
Peden would contact him to discuss strategy for the hearing, and he made 
repeated calls to Peden’s office, which were not returned.  Peden finally called 
Culwell the evening before the hearing and told him for the first time that he had 
been suspended from the practice of law and could not attend the hearing.  Peden 
told Culwell that he had obtained a continuance of the hearing, but Peden never 
responded to further inquiries from Culwell and did not contact Culwell after his 
reinstatement to find out about the status of his case.  In fact, Peden did no work 
for Culwell after June 15, 2009, and Culwell had to hire another attorney to 
complete the case at a cost of $5,000.  Culwell’s new counsel entered an 
appearance in July 2009 and completed the case by November 2009. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 20} Peden provided two billing statements for work performed on 
Culwell’s case: one dated February 19, 2009, and the other April 3, 2009.  The 
bills reflect a total of $1,898.75 in attorney fees and other costs charged to 
Culwell.  Peden was unable to explain why the money Culwell paid him 
($4,925.00) and the amount billed for services and expenses ($1,898.75) differed 
by $3,026.25.  Culwell sent two requests to Peden for a final accounting of his 
bill.  Culwell received neither a response nor a refund. 
{¶ 21} In addition, Peden testified that he had no malpractice insurance 
while he represented Culwell.  Yet Peden did not inform Culwell about his lack of 
coverage. 
{¶ 22} The board found in regard to Culwell’s case that Peden violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.16(e), 
1.16(d), and 8.4(h).  We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count Four—Nessley 
{¶ 23} During the first week of November 2009, Rose and Nick Nessley 
hired Peden to represent them in an adoption proceeding.  Peden neglected, 
however, to tell the Nessleys that he did not have malpractice insurance when 
they retained him. 
{¶ 24} The Nessleys paid Peden a flat fee of $750 to complete the case 
and an additional $400 for filing fees.  Peden deposited both sums into his office 
account instead of his client trust account. 
{¶ 25} During their initial meeting, Peden told the Nessleys that he would 
have the adoption paperwork completed and ready to be filed by the end of 
November 2009.  After their initial consultation with Peden, the Nessleys made 
numerous attempts to contact him.  Peden did not respond to these inquiries until 
January 2010, when he asked for the $400 filing fee.  Mr. Nessley wrote a check 
to Peden on January 27, 2010, but Peden did not submit the adoption petition to 
the probate court until March 2010. 
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{¶ 26} Between the end of January—when Peden received the $400 filing 
fee—and early March, the Nessleys made several more unsuccessful attempts to 
contact Peden.  In May 2010, the probate court contacted Mrs. Nessley to tell her 
that Peden’s $400 check for the filing fee had been returned for insufficient funds.  
Mrs. Nessley contacted Peden, and he promised to refund $800.  Peden has never 
refunded the $800, nor has he made restitution to the Nessleys or the court for the 
$400 filing fee.  As a result of Peden’s neglect, the Nessleys were forced to hire 
new counsel to complete the adoption at additional cost. 
{¶ 27} The board found, and we agree, that in representing the Nessleys, 
Peden violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.16(e), 
and 8.4(h). 
Count Five–Petrovski 
{¶ 28} In March 2009, Verka Petrovski hired Peden to represent her in 
divorce proceedings.  The written fee agreement was for an hourly rate of $225.  
Between April 2009 and November 2010, Petrovski made installment payments 
to Peden totaling $6,260 for attorney fees and costs. 
{¶ 29} Peden deposited the initial payment of $1,675 into his client trust 
account on April 23, 2009.  Peden’s billing records for April 2009 indicate that he 
had worked a total of 4.25 hours on Petrovski’s case and, based on his charged 
rate of $225 an hour, that he had earned fees of $956.25.  Peden did no other work 
on her case until August 2010, so his client trust account should have contained 
$718.75 in unearned funds belonging to Petrovski.  Yet at the end of April 2009, 
Peden’s trust account showed an ending balance of $192.14.  By the end of May 
2009, the balance was $2.14. 
{¶ 30} As to the remaining installment payments made by Petrovski, none 
were deposited into Peden’s client trust account or otherwise maintained in trust 
until earned as fees or paid out for case expenses.  Peden provided one billing 
statement to Petrovski on November 8, 2010, reflecting that she had made 
January Term, 2012 
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payments of $4,950 instead of the $6,260 that she had actually paid, a discrepancy 
of $1,310.  The billing statement also indicated that Petrovski owed Peden $45, 
which was based on the difference between the fees Peden claimed to have earned 
($4,995) and the money that Peden claimed to have received from Petrovski 
($4,950).  Peden did not provide a final accounting to Petrovski, and he could not 
explain what happened to the $1,310 in unearned funds that was not reflected on 
the billing statement or maintained in his client trust account. 
{¶ 31} Peden also failed to keep Petrovski informed of the status of her 
case, but he repeatedly demanded more and more money from her.  According to 
Petrovski, every payday Peden would call her and ask for money to perform 
certain tasks.  Even though Peden continued to ask Petrovski to pay for work he 
supposedly had performed, he did little work on her case beyond filing her 
divorce action on August 24, 2010.  Petrovski was subsequently forced to hire 
other counsel to complete her case, at an additional cost of $7,000.  Petrovski 
demanded a refund from Peden, but he has not returned any money to her. 
{¶ 32} Peden was suspended from the practice of law during his 
representation of Petrovski, yet he did not inform her of his suspension.  Peden’s 
malpractice insurance also lapsed during this time, but he did not provide this 
information to Petrovski. 
{¶ 33} In regard to Petrovski’s case, the board found that Peden had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 
1.16(e), 8.4(h), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  We agree with the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count Seven—King 
{¶ 34} Peden agreed to represent Theresa King in obtaining the 
dissolution of her marriage.  King paid Peden a $1,000 retainer on June 23, 2010.  
Peden deposited this money into his office account and did not maintain the funds 
in trust until earned or paid out as case expenses. 
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{¶ 35} Peden represented King from June 2010 until April 2011. Peden 
had no malpractice insurance for the first eight months that he represented King, 
but he never advised her of his lack of coverage. 
{¶ 36} On September 2, 2010, Peden called King and urgently requested 
that she pay him $300 for filing fees.  She asked if it could wait until the next day, 
but Peden said he needed it that afternoon.  She wrote Peden a $300 money order, 
and Peden immediately deposited the money into his office account instead of his 
client trust account.  Moreover, Peden did not file King’s dissolution petition until 
March 2011, six months later. 
{¶ 37} From the time she retained Peden in June until the end of 
September 2010, King repeatedly attempted to contact Peden to ascertain the 
status of her case.  Peden did not promptly return her calls or provide any update 
on the status of her case.  On September 29, 2010, King sent Peden a letter asking 
for a refund of her $1,300.  Peden did not refund King’s money.  Peden eventually 
completed King’s case—seven months after receiving her letter—and she is no 
longer seeking a refund. 
{¶ 38} The board found that in representing King, Peden violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), and 1.15(a).  The board also found that 
relator did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Peden had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d), 1.16(e), and 8.4(h).  We adopt these findings of 
fact and misconduct with two exceptions. 
{¶ 39} King’s dissolution was not a complicated matter.  King’s husband 
did not contest the matter, and there were no children, no property, and no 
financial issues involved.  Even Peden agreed that this was a simple, uncontested 
case.  Yet it took nine months for Peden to file King’s petition for dissolution.  
Peden, in fact, admitted during the panel hearing that he did not work diligently 
on King’s case. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 40} The board, however, found that in light of King’s testimony, the 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Peden had failed to diligently 
pursue her case.  But King’s testimony reflects that she was clearly frustrated with 
the time it took for Peden to file her case and that this was a basis for filing her 
grievance.  King testified that she repeatedly called Peden between June and 
September 2010 to find out why her case was taking so long.  During one call, 
King asked for a refund so she could hire another attorney.  As mentioned 
previously, when Peden finally contacted King on September 2, he insisted that 
she immediately pay him $300 for filing fees.  King gave Peden the money that 
afternoon, but Peden did not file her case until six months later.  On September 
29, 2010, King sent Peden a letter requesting a refund because she was upset that 
there had been no activity on her case.  King even threatened to file a disciplinary 
grievance because of the delay, which she did in February 2011. 
{¶ 41} Accordingly, we find that the relator has proven that Peden failed 
to act with reasonable diligence in representing King, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.3.  Moreover, we find that Peden has engaged in conduct that adversely reflects 
on his fitness to practice law based on his failure to diligently pursue King’s case, 
respond to her inquiries, update her on her case status, notify her about his lack of 
malpractice insurance, and hold her money in trust, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h). 
Failure to Cooperate in Disciplinary Investigation 
{¶ 42} Relator served Peden with each client grievance and requested that 
he respond to the allegations.  Relator also served Peden with an investigative 
inquiry regarding the overdrafts of his client trust account.  Despite these requests, 
Peden did not respond or otherwise cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.  
Peden did submit to a deposition after being subpoenaed by relator.  But Peden 
failed to provide relator with various documents and information, despite his 
promises to do so. 
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{¶ 43} Because Peden repeatedly ignored the relator’s investigative 
inquiries, we agree with the board that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (requiring 
a lawyer to cooperate in an investigation of professional misconduct). 
Sanction 
{¶ 44} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the aggravating 
and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10. 
{¶ 45} In aggravation, the board found that Peden had (1) acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive, (2) engaged in a pattern of misconduct, (3) committed 
multiple offenses, (4) failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, (5) failed to 
make restitution, (6) committed prior disciplinary offenses, and (7) caused harm 
to vulnerable clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h), and 
(i). 
{¶ 46} As to mitigating factors, the board noted that Peden’s mental state 
loomed large over his case and his future.  In his prior disciplinary case, we found 
that Peden’s diagnosed mental disorder qualified as a mitigating factor under 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 118 
Ohio St.3d 244, 2008-Ohio-2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 5-9.  In the instant case, 
however, the board found that Peden submitted no evidence that his mental-health 
difficulties qualified as a mitigating factor.  The board found no other mitigating 
factors.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2). 
{¶ 47} The board recommended that Peden receive an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 48} The board also recommended that prior to reinstatement, Peden 
fulfill the following conditions: (1) provide proof of continuing and successful 
mental-health counseling and that he is fully competent to return to the practice of 
law, (2) demonstrate that he fully complied with his OLAP contract during his 
suspension, (3) attend a rigorous and comprehensive course in law-office 
management approved by relator, with renewed emphasis on client-trust-account 
January Term, 2012 
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management, (4) comply with all mandatory continuing-legal-education 
requirements imposed by this court, (5) pay the costs of this action as required by 
the court, (6) make full restitution, (7) comply with his suspension order in all 
respects, and (8) upon reinstatement, submit to a two-year probationary period 
during which he must (a) provide proof every six months that he is mentally 
competent to practice law, (b) be monitored by relator, (c) delegate the 
management of his client trust account to an independent professional trained to 
manage trust accounts, and (d) permit relator to monitor his trust account. 
Analysis 
{¶ 49} Peden objects to the board’s recommendation of an indefinite 
suspension.  He challenges the board’s findings of misconduct in each count, 
except count four (Nessley).  Peden argues that his conduct warrants either 
probation or a six-month suspension. 
{¶ 50} Peden specifically contends that he did not neglect his clients’ 
legal matters, mismanage his client trust accounts, or misappropriate client funds.  
He also asserts that the overdrafts of his client trust accounts were inadvertent and 
did not involve client money.  And Peden disputes the board’s findings regarding 
his failure to notify clients about his suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 51} Peden, however, has offered no evidence to support any of his 
claims.  This alone is sufficient grounds to reject his objections.  Moreover, Peden 
raised many of these same defenses before the board.  As here, Peden’s claims 
before the board were undercut by his failure to produce trust-account records, 
billing statements, or other financial documents that would account for the work 
performed for each grievant.  In contrast, the relator has submitted overwhelming 
evidence that Peden repeatedly failed to (1) safeguard client funds, (2) perform 
work diligently and competently, (3) return calls and update clients about their 
cases, (4) maintain malpractice insurance and notify clients about the lack of 
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coverage, (5) disclose his disciplinary suspension, (6) cooperate in the grievance 
investigations, and (7) make restitution to clients harmed by his misconduct. 
{¶ 52} In addition to his lack of evidence, Peden has not cited a single 
legal authority that would justify a lesser sanction.  In other cases involving the 
same misconduct as that committed by Peden, we have imposed indefinite 
suspensions.  Indeed, we imposed an indefinite suspension in Columbus Bar Assn. 
v. Boggs, 129 Ohio St.3d 190, 2011-Ohio-2637, 951 N.E.2d 65, under strikingly 
similar circumstances.  The misconduct in Boggs involved a pattern of 
misconduct involving several clients and multiple offenses, and included 
mishandling of a client trust account, improper accounting of trust-account funds, 
neglect of clients’ cases, failure to notify clients about lack of malpractice 
insurance, and a failure to make restitution.  And Boggs, like Peden, had a prior 
disciplinary record.  Unlike Peden, Boggs cooperated in the disciplinary process.  
Id. at ¶ 22-24. 
{¶ 53} Likewise, in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 
376, 2011-Ohio-774, 944 N.E.2d 677, we imposed an indefinite suspension on an 
attorney who had a prior disciplinary record, and who engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct involving multiple offenses, including neglecting entrusted legal 
matters and failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  
Moreover, Van Sickle and Peden are similar in that both suffered from a 
diagnosed mental condition but had not submitted evidence establishing that their 
condition qualified as a mitigating factor.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 54} Accordingly, we adopt the board’s recommendation and 
indefinitely suspend Peden from the practice of law.  Moreover, we order that 
before Peden is reinstated to the practice of law, he shall (1) provide proof of 
continuing and successful mental-health counseling and that he is fully competent 
to return to the practice of law, (2) demonstrate that he fully complied with his 
OLAP contract during his suspension, (3) comply with all mandatory continuing-
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
legal-education requirements imposed by this court, (4) as part of the general 
continuing-legal-education requirements under Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), attend a 
rigorous and comprehensive course in law-office management approved by 
relator, with renewed emphasis on client-trust-account management, (5) pay the 
costs of this action, (6) make restitution in the amount of $1,018 to Ms. Plaisted, 
$3,026.25 to Mr. Culwell, $1,150 to the Nessleys, and $1,330 to Ms. Petrovski, all 
within 30 days of this order, (7) comply with his suspension order in all respects, 
and (8) upon reinstatement, submit to a two-year probationary period during 
which he must (a) provide proof every six months that he is mentally competent 
to practice law, (b) be monitored by relator, (c) delegate management of his client 
trust account to an independent professional trained to manage trust accounts, and 
(d) permit relator to monitor his trust account.  Costs are taxed to Peden. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Lisa Pierce Reisz, Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha Clous, 
Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
John Joseph Peden, pro se. 
______________________