Title: Commonwealth v. Almele

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11915 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARWAN M. ALMELE. 
 
 
July 12, 2016. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Evidence, Expert opinion.  Witness, 
Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Objection, Motion in limine, 
Striking of testimony. 
 
 
 
A jury in the District Court convicted the defendant of 
possession of a class B controlled substance, in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 34; and possession of class B and C controlled 
substances with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 32A (a) and 32B (a), respectively.  The Appeals Court 
affirmed the convictions, see Commonwealth v. Almele, 87 Mass. 
App. Ct. 218 (2015), and we allowed the defendant's application 
for further appellate review. 
 
 
Prior to the start of the trial, the Commonwealth filed a 
motion in limine seeking to introduce the opinion testimony of a 
police officer, Lieutenant Dennis Ledo, as an expert witness.  
The defendant objected to allowing Ledo to testify on the basis 
that the "expert opinion" that Ledo would offer was within the 
jury's common knowledge, and that any such testimony would be 
more prejudicial than probative.  At the conclusion of the voir 
dire hearing on the motion, the judge ruled that he would allow 
Ledo to testify as an expert.  The judge then noted "for the 
record" the defendant's objection for "the reasons as stated [by 
the defendant] plus any other reasons" and further stated that 
he was "preserving" the defendant's objection "even during the 
trial . . . so, we don't get into that situation where the 
Appellate Court reviews . . . [under] a heightened standard 
because there was no objection." 
 
2 
 
 
At trial, the prosecutor initially asked Ledo, 
hypothetically and on the basis of his training and experience, 
what significance it would have to him if a person had in his or 
her possession a certain quantity of prescription drugs packaged 
in a specific way.  The defendant objected.  The judge noted the 
objection and then gave the jury a detailed explanation of 
expert testimony, its purpose, and how the jury might consider 
that testimony.  The prosecutor then resumed questioning Ledo, 
and again asked for his opinion.  Ledo responded that his 
"opinion was that the . . . drugs that were found on the 
[d]efendant were intended for distribution."  Although the 
defendant objected to the initial question from the prosecutor 
that led to this testimony, he did not move to strike Ledo's 
answer as improper.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 
272-273 (2010), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 
Mass. 567, 571 (1985). 
 
 
In his appeal, the defendant argues, among other things, 
that Ledo impermissibly offered an opinion as to the defendant's 
guilt.  On the basis that the defendant did not "properly 
preserve[] his claim that the Commonwealth's drug expert 
erroneously intruded on the jury's function by offering his 
opinion of the defendant's guilt," the Appeals Court reviewed 
the claim "to determine whether a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice was created," rather than to determine 
whether, as the defendant argued, the error was prejudicial.  
Almele, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 224.  We agree with the Appeals 
Court that the defendant did not preserve the particular error 
about which he now complains, and that the error should 
therefore be reviewed to determine whether it created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass.    ,     (2016), which 
we also decide today, we elaborate on the circumstances in which 
a defendant's objection made in the context of a motion in 
limine might excuse the need for a contemporaneous objection at 
trial.  As we state in Grady, we will no longer distinguish 
between pretrial objections made on constitutional grounds and 
those made on other grounds -- an objection made in a motion in 
limine, regardless of its basis, will preserve a defendant's 
appellate rights regardless of whether the defendant objects at 
trial.  A significant limitation on the preservation of rights 
remains, however:  if a defendant fails to object to the 
admission of certain evidence at trial, his or her appellate 
rights are only "preserved" if the specific issue at trial was 
the same issue at the motion in limine stage.  See id. at    .  
The better practice, therefore, is for a defendant to object at 
3 
 
trial even if he or she has already raised an objection prior to 
trial. 
 
 
Additionally, and again as detailed in Grady, we caution 
judges against "preserving" or "saving" a defendant's rights at 
the motion in limine stage because doing so runs the risk of 
lulling a defendant into not voicing a necessary objection at 
trial.  Here, the defendant's "preserved" objection went to 
whether Ledo should be allowed to testify, i.e., whether expert 
evidence was necessary and more probative than prejudicial.  The 
objection at the motion stage was not to the specific testimony 
that Ledo might offer, but rather to him being allowed to 
testify at all.  See Grady, 474 Mass. at    .  Against that 
backdrop, it is reasonable to believe that when the judge stated 
that he was "preserving" the defendant's objection, and noted 
that he was doing so "in the event something happens and [an 
objection at trial] doesn't occur," he intended only that the 
defendant need not object, generally, at trial, to Ledo being 
called to testify as an expert.  The judge's statement cannot 
reasonably have been understood to mean that the defendant was 
being excused from objecting to any and all objectionable 
aspects of Ledo's testimony as it might unfold at trial. 
 
 
This is further demonstrated by the judge's instruction to 
the jury at the time of Ledo's trial testimony, an instruction 
that went to the nature and need for expert opinion testimony in 
general.  The judge, in other words, was addressing the issue of 
Ledo testifying at all, not the specifics of that testimony.  
Additionally, the judge's indication, at the motion in limine 
stage, that the judge was "preserving" the defendant's rights 
did not lull the defendant into thinking that he need not object 
-- he did object, when the prosecutor asked for Ledo's opinion, 
and the judge rightly overruled the objection because the 
question was not improper.  What the defendant failed to do, 
however, was to move to strike the very testimony that, on 
appeal, he argues was improper -- Ledo's answer, which 
impermissibly offered an opinion as to the defendant's guilt. 
 
 
We have thus reviewed the error to determine whether it 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, and, for 
essentially the reasons set forth in the Appeals Court's 
opinion, we too conclude that the error in question did not 
create such a risk.1  As to the other issues raised by the 
defendant, we also hold, again for the reasons given in the 
                                                 
 
1 Even were we to review the claimed error to determine 
whether it was prejudicial, the defendant would fare no better. 
4 
 
Appeals Court's opinion, that there was no error in permitting 
the jury to consider certain statements as made during the 
course of the joint venture, and that the evidence was 
sufficient to permit a finding that the defendant had engaged in 
that joint venture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
Patrick A. Michaud for the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.