Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. James W. Frisch

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2638-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against James W. Frisch, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
James W. Frisch, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FRISCH 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part/dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2638-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against James W. Frisch, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
James W. Frisch, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, Attorney Christine Harris Taylor, that Attorney 
James W. Frisch be publicly reprimanded for his professional 
misconduct and that no costs be assessed against him.  Neither 
Attorney Frisch nor the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appealed from the referee's report and recommendation so our 
review has proceeded pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  Having fully 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
2 
 
reviewed the matter, we agree that a public reprimand is an 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline 
for 
Attorney 
Frisch's 
misconduct. 
 
We 
also 
determine 
that 
this 
case 
presents 
"extraordinary circumstances" under SCR 22.24(1m), and therefore 
conclude that Attorney Frisch should not be required to pay the 
full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶2 
Attorney Frisch was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1977.  For many years Attorney Frisch has worked as 
a prosecutor in both Sheboygan County and Milwaukee County.  He 
is currently an assistant district attorney in the Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's Office (MCDAO).  In his more than 30 
years of practice, he has never before been subject to 
professional discipline.   
¶3 
The referee concluded that the professional misconduct 
in this case was a result of Attorney Frisch's struggles with 
alcoholism.  According to the referee's report, there were 
concerns 
in 
Attorney 
Frisch's 
family 
about 
his 
alcohol 
consumption for a substantial number of years.  He sought help 
for stress and alcohol consumption, but despite these efforts, 
his drinking increased in the early 2000s.  Ultimately, his 
                                                                                                                                                             
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
3 
 
drinking progressed to the point that he was typically consuming 
significant amounts of alcohol after he arrived home from work. 
¶4 
The MCDAO's policy was that official case files were 
to remain in the office unless they were needed for use in 
court, and they were to be returned immediately upon completion 
of the court proceeding.  Like other members of the MCDAO, 
however, Attorney Frisch regularly took home case files on which 
he worked in the evenings.  He generally did this to transfer 
notes he had taken on other pieces of paper into the MCDAO case 
file or to review a file in preparation for upcoming court 
proceedings.  The referee concluded that this practice of 
working at home in the evenings had been essential to Attorney 
Frisch's ability to perform his job as a prosecuting attorney. 
¶5 
As 
Attorney 
Frisch's 
evening 
alcohol 
consumption 
increased, his ability to work at home decreased, causing him to 
fall farther and farther behind on his file management, 
especially in the latter half of 2004.  Thus, Attorney Frisch 
would take home every evening a sizable number of files with the 
intent to work on them after dinner but would not be able to get 
the work done.  In the morning he would take those files from 
his house back to his car, including those files on which he had 
been unable to work.  When he arrived at work, he usually took 
into the office only those files that he needed for that day's 
court proceedings, a few additional files that required work, 
and those files that he had completed the night before.  In 
addition, Attorney Frisch also kept some files in the trunk of 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
4 
 
his car that he considered to be low priority files.  Some of 
these files remained in his car for an extended period of time. 
¶6 
On January 3, 2005, Chief Deputy District Attorney 
Robert Donohoo spoke with Attorney Frisch about an inquiry he 
had received from the Brown Deer police department concerning a 
criminal complaint that had been executed by a police officer 
but had apparently not been filed ("the Brown Deer case").  
Attorney Frisch told Attorney Donohoo that he thought he had 
submitted the complaint and case file to the appropriate MCDAO 
staff members for the preparation and issuance of a summons to 
the defendant.  Attorney Frisch testified, without contradiction 
at the disciplinary hearing, that Attorney Donohoo questioned 
him about what had happened with the Brown Deer case file, but 
did not ask him where the file was or direct him to locate it.   
¶7 
A few days later, Attorney Frisch also received a 
memorandum indicating that he was required to appear at an MCDAO 
investigative interview regarding "possible violation[s] of 
office work rules" concerning three cases in which the circuit 
court had either dismissed the complaint or made critical 
comments because of Attorney Frisch's failure to provide 
discovery to the defendant. 
¶8 
Attorney Frisch testified that on one of the following 
two weekends he went through all of the MCDAO case files in his 
car in order to inventory them and ascertain what work needed to 
be done on them.  During this process he discovered in the trunk 
of his car the Brown Deer case file.  Attorney Frisch did not 
report to Attorney Donohoo that he had located the Brown Deer 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
5 
 
case file.  His intent was to review the file and report back to 
Attorney Donohoo before returning the file to the office.  The 
referee specifically found that "[a]t no time, either before or 
after [Attorney] Frisch found the Brown Deer case file in his 
trunk, did he intend to conceal the file from [Attorney] Donohoo 
or conceal from [Attorney] Donohoo the fact that the file had 
been in his car."   
¶9 
On January 14, 2005, Attorney Frisch met with Deputy 
District Attorney Jon Reddin for the investigative interview 
regarding the three cases with the discovery issues.  At the 
meeting, Attorney Frisch stated that he had been dealing with 
the stress of some family issues and admitted that he had been 
seeking 
counseling 
for 
alcohol 
and 
other 
issues 
for 
approximately a year.  Attorney Reddin adjourned the interview 
to allow Attorney Frisch to review the three case files and to 
obtain union representation. 
¶10 On January 21, 2005, an MCDAO employee discovered 
Attorney Frisch drinking in his car in the parking garage.  
MCDAO personnel subsequently removed from Attorney Frisch's car 
over 20 closed and open case files.  Among the files removed 
from the car was the Brown Deer case file. 
¶11 Over the next couple of months Attorney Frisch sought 
both inpatient and intensive outpatient treatment for alcohol 
dependence and withdrawal.  He then continued to receive 
periodic outpatient treatment. 
¶12 Attorney Frisch returned to work in March 2005.  He 
was assigned to in-custody intake court.  The investigative 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
6 
 
interview that Attorney Reddin had adjourned was not rescheduled 
at that time.   
¶13 In November 2005 Attorney Frisch had a relapse and 
readmitted himself for inpatient alcohol dependence treatment 
for several weeks.  After his discharge from the inpatient 
treatment program, he continued with outpatient treatment and 
counseling. 
¶14 An investigative interview was ultimately conducted in 
January 2006.  Following that interview, an MCDAO attorney 
prepared a report recommending that Milwaukee County District 
Attorney E. Michael McCann find that Attorney Frisch had 
intentionally concealed his professional incompetence from his 
supervisors and had intentionally concealed the Brown Deer case 
file from Attorney Donohoo.  District Attorney McCann rejected 
this recommendation.  In an August 2, 2006, disciplinary letter 
to Attorney Frisch, District Attorney McCann found only that 
Attorney Frisch had "failed to provide [the Brown Deer case 
file] to Chief Deputy Robert Donohoo."  District Attorney McCann 
suspended Attorney Frisch without pay for 22 working days and 
required that he enter into a "Last Chance Agreement." 
¶15 John Chisholm succeeded E. Michael McCann as Milwaukee 
County District Attorney on January 1, 2007.  District Attorney 
Chisholm testified in the disciplinary proceeding that because 
of Attorney Frisch's satisfactory work performance, he had not 
chosen to require Attorney Frisch to undergo alcohol testing, 
although he had the option to do so under the Last Chance 
Agreement.  He further determined that, in the absence of any 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
7 
 
additional violation by Attorney Frisch, he would lift the Last 
Chance Agreement at the end of the three-year period on 
August 2, 2009.  District Attorney Chisholm indicated that since 
he took office Attorney Frisch has not demonstrated any of the 
behavior or performance problems that he exhibited in 2004.  
Indeed, District Attorney Chisholm has been comfortable enough 
with Attorney Frisch's behavior that he has reassigned Attorney 
Frisch to a general crimes team that handles misdemeanors and 
general felonies.  District Attorney Chisholm testified that 
prosecutors on the general crimes team are required to assess 
each defendant for possible eligibility for a diversion program, 
and that he trusts Attorney Frisch to make those assessments and 
even to assist younger prosecutors in making those assessments. 
¶16 In her report the referee made a specific finding that 
Attorney Frisch's failures to complete work both during the work 
day and at home in the evening in 2004 and early 2005 were due 
to his physiological alcohol dependence.  She also found that 
there was no question in the record that Attorney Frisch has 
maintained complete sobriety since November 2005 and has 
regularly attended alcohol dependence meetings.  She further 
found that Attorney Frisch had paid expenses or incurred 
personal debt in the total amount of approximately $20,000 for 
the uninsured portion of his inpatient alcohol treatment. 
¶17 Attorney Frisch did not contest the allegations in 
Count 1 of the OLR's complaint that he violated SCRs 20:1.32 and 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
8 
 
20:3.23 by failing to act with diligence and promptness in 
handling the prosecutions assigned to him and by failing to take 
all actions reasonably necessary to expedite the litigation of 
those matters.  The referee concluded that Attorney Frisch had 
committed those violations. 
¶18 Attorney Frisch also did not contest the allegations 
in Count 2, which alleged that he had violated SCR 20:3.4(c)4 by 
failing to obey court orders to produce specified items of 
discovery in three cases, and that he had violated SCR 20:3.4(d)5 
by failing to comply with legally proper discovery requests in 
those cases.  The referee therefore concluded that the OLR had 
proven the allegations of Count 2. 
¶19 Count 3 of the complaint alleged that Attorney Frisch 
had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c),6 by concealing 
certain MCDAO case files in his car, including the Brown Deer 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:3.2 states that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of 
the client." 
4 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists; . . . ." 
5 SCR 20:3.4(d) states a lawyer shall not "in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party; . . . ." 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
9 
 
case file, and by making misrepresentations to Attorney Donohoo 
and others about those files.  On this count the referee 
concluded that the OLR had failed to meet its burden of 
presenting clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  She noted that 
there was no proof that Attorney Donohoo specifically asked 
about the location of the Brown Deer case file or directed 
Attorney Frisch to locate that file.  She further stated that 
Attorney Frisch had testified, without contradiction, that the 
reason the files were in his car was because he had been trying 
to keep up with his work by taking files home to work on them, 
but had been prevented from completing the necessary work by his 
consumption of alcohol in the evenings.  The evidence simply did 
not clearly and convincingly prove that Attorney Frisch had 
attempted to hide his handling of cases by concealing case files 
in his car. 
¶20 With respect to the level of discipline, the referee 
noted three aggravating factors.  First, Attorney Frisch 
admitted multiple violations.  Second, as a prosecutor with 
special responsibilities to victims of crime, Attorney Frisch's 
failure to follow discovery orders had caused harm to vulnerable 
individuals.  Third, Attorney Frisch had extensive experience in 
the practice of law at the time of his misconduct, having 
practiced for over 30 years. 
¶21 On the mitigating side of the ledger, the referee 
noted, among other things, that Attorney Frisch has never before 
been the subject of professional discipline and that his 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
10 
 
misconduct was not the result of dishonest or selfish motives.  
In 
addition, 
Attorney 
Frisch 
self-reported 
his 
alcohol 
dependence and his conduct to the OLR.  He ultimately admitted 
the violations alleged in Counts 1 and 2 of the OLR's complaint.  
The referee also noted that Attorney Frisch had already suffered 
a lengthy suspension from his job without pay and that he had 
remained subject to a "Last Chance Agreement." 
¶22 The referee also discussed the impact of Attorney 
Frisch's 
alcohol 
dependence 
on 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline.  She found that Attorney Frisch's failure to 
complete his work in 2004 and early 2005, including his failure 
to diligently and promptly prosecute his cases and to attend to 
discovery 
matters, 
was 
the 
result 
of 
his 
uncontrolled 
alcoholism, which had a deleterious effect on his health.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood, 122 Wis. 2d 610, 
617, 363 N.W.2d 220 (1985) (". . . in appropriate circumstances, 
the disease of alcoholism may properly be considered in 
mitigation of the severity of the discipline to be imposed for 
misconduct").  In addition, the referee pointed out that 
Attorney Frisch has successfully rehabilitated himself from his 
alcohol dependence for several years, which this court has also 
treated as a mitigating factor.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Fay, 123 Wis. 2d 73, 77, 365 N.W.2d 13 
(1985). 
 
Attorney 
Frisch 
also 
pursued 
treatment 
and 
rehabilitation at significant personal cost, checking himself 
into 
inpatient 
treatment 
facilities 
twice 
and 
expending 
approximately $20,000 of his own money to pay for the treatment.  
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
11 
 
Moreover, 
the 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Frisch's 
satisfactory job performance over the last several years 
demonstrated 
that 
he 
was 
unlikely 
to 
engage 
in 
similar 
professional misconduct in the future. 
¶23 Considering 
both 
the 
mitigating 
and 
aggravating 
factors, as well as other cases in which an attorney has been 
found guilty of failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness, the referee concluded that a public reprimand would 
be an appropriate level of discipline.   
¶24 Under our well-established standard of review in 
disciplinary proceedings, we will affirm a referee's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review a referee's conclusions 
of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  Finally, we determine the appropriate level of 
discipline given the particular facts of each case, independent 
of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶25 Having 
fully 
reviewed 
the 
matter 
under 
these 
standards, we accept the referee's findings of fact.  We note 
that neither party has appealed from the referee's report and 
recommendation or alleged that any factual finding was clearly 
erroneous.  In addition, a large portion of the referee's 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
12 
 
factual findings was based on a stipulation of facts that the 
parties read into the record at the disciplinary hearing. 
¶26 We also accept the referee's conclusions of law.  
There is no dispute at this juncture that Attorney Frisch 
committed the ethical violations alleged in Counts 1 and 2.  
With respect to Count 3, although it may have been possible to 
infer from the circumstances that Attorney Frisch kept files in 
his car in order to hide them from his supervisors at the MCDAO, 
it is equally possible to conclude that, given Attorney Frisch's 
condition and the specific facts of this case, he kept files in 
his car because, as he testified without contradiction, he 
intended to work on them at home in the evenings, but his 
alcohol consumption kept him from doing so.  It is also equally 
plausible that, given his alcohol dependence, Attorney Frisch 
simply forgot or put out of his mind which files were actually 
in his car at any time.  Thus, the OLR did not meet the required 
standard of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶27 Based on the violations proven by the OLR, we agree 
with the referee that the appropriate level of discipline is a 
public reprimand.  In a recent decision involving another 
prosecutor, we imposed a public reprimand where the attorney not 
only failed to obey discovery orders, but also made affirmative 
misrepresentations to a court about his compliance.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kohler, 2009 WI 24, 316 
Wis. 2d 17, 762 N.W.2d 377.  Attorney Frisch's failure to act 
with reasonable diligence and his failure to comply with 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
13 
 
discovery requests and orders are not more serious than making a 
misrepresentation to a judge after having failed to comply with 
discovery orders.   
¶28 In 
addition, 
in 
the 
present 
case 
the 
referee 
specifically found that Attorney Frisch's misconduct was a 
result 
of 
his 
physiological 
dependence 
on 
alcohol. 
 
Of 
importance in such a situation is the fact that Attorney Frisch 
acknowledged his problem with alcohol, reported it to the OLR, 
and sought intensive treatment for his alcohol dependence, at 
significant personal expense.  As the referee found, Attorney 
Frisch has detailed the steps he has taken and is taking to cope 
with his alcohol dependence, which have helped him to maintain 
complete sobriety for more than three years and to return to his 
position as a trusted member of the MCDAO.   
¶29 We now turn to the issue of costs.  The referee 
recommended that no costs be assessed against Attorney Frisch, 
reasoning that he had essentially stipulated to Counts 1 and 2 
and that he had prevailed on Count 3, the only disputed count.   
¶30 The OLR's statement of costs, however, recommended 
that the full amount of costs, $11,845.14, be imposed on 
Attorney Frisch.  The OLR pointed out that although Attorney 
Frisch had ultimately stipulated to certain facts prior to the 
disciplinary hearing and had testified at the hearing that he 
was not contesting Counts 1 and 2, his answer to the complaint 
had admitted only some of the factual allegations underlying 
Counts 1 and 2 and had sought dismissal of the complaint in its 
entirety. 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
14 
 
¶31 Attorney Frisch has objected to the imposition of any 
costs against him.  He contends that he admitted the violations 
alleged in Counts 1 and 2.  He states that he could have reached 
a stipulated resolution of this matter, except for the fact that 
the OLR required him to admit having violated SCR 20:8.4(c) and 
to consent to the imposition of a five-month suspension, which 
request he claims was due to the dishonest concealment charge.  
He 
emphasizes 
that 
he 
flatly 
denied 
any 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c), and the referee agreed with him that there was no 
violation of that provision. 
¶32 The court's general policy in disciplinary proceedings 
in which misconduct is found is to impose the full costs of the 
proceeding against the respondent attorney.  SCR 22.24(1m).7  We 
                                                 
7 SCR 22.24(1m) states: 
The court's general policy is that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the office of 
lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In cases 
involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, 
in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount 
of costs imposed upon a respondent.  In exercising its 
discretion regarding the assessment of costs, the 
court will consider the submissions of the parties and 
all of the following factors: 
(a) The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
(b) The nature of the misconduct. 
(c) The 
level of discipline sought by the 
parties and recommended by the referee. 
(d) The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
15 
 
have discretion, however, to reduce the amount of costs where we 
believe there are "extraordinary circumstances."  We conclude 
that this case presents "extraordinary circumstances" that 
warrant imposing less than the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding, although we do not agree with the referee's 
suggestion that no costs should be imposed.  Most importantly, 
Attorney Frisch conceded Counts 1 and 2, and he prevailed on the 
only count that was actually litigated at the disciplinary 
hearing, Count 3 alleging misrepresentation by Attorney Frisch. 
¶33 Under the first factor identified in SCR 22.24(1m)(a), 
the number of counts charged, contested, and proven, we note 
that the OLR initially charged Attorney Frisch with three counts 
of professional misconduct and sought to suspend his license to 
practice law for five months.  If only the first two counts had 
been alleged, the case could have been easily resolved by 
stipulation without the need for a hearing.  The referee found 
that Attorney Frisch had not contested the allegations in these 
counts.  Where a disciplinary matter is resolved by stipulation 
at the beginning of the proceeding, we have generally not 
imposed costs.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nussberger, 2009 WI 103, ¶¶18, 24, 321 Wis. 2d 576, 775 
N.W.2d 525 (not imposing costs and noting OLR’s policy is not to 
seek costs where respondent attorney enters into comprehensive 
stipulation); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Young, 2006 
                                                                                                                                                             
(e) Prior discipline, if any. 
(f) Other relevant circumstances. 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
16 
 
WI 109, ¶¶21-22, 296 Wis. 2d 36, 718 N.W.2d 717 (not imposing 
costs 
where 
respondent 
attorney 
entered 
into 
stipulation 
admitting misconduct even after a referee was appointed). 
¶34 However, the presence of the third count alleging that 
Attorney Frisch, an assistant district attorney, had engaged in 
"conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation" in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) effectively 
left Attorney Frisch with no viable course of action other than 
fully litigating the case in order to avoid a finding of a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and a possible lengthy suspension.  
Any finding of such a violation and the imposition of such a 
lengthy suspension 
would have greatly undermined Attorney 
Frisch's effectiveness as a prosecutor and could even have led 
to the termination of his employment.  He therefore was placed 
between the proverbial "rock and a hard place."  He could either 
give in to the OLR’s misrepresentation allegation and risk 
losing his livelihood or fight the misrepresentation charge and 
possibly face a large cost assessment even if he ultimately won 
on that count.  It was this forced choice that led to the 
litigation of the matter and caused most of the expenses to be 
incurred. 
¶35 At the end of that litigation process, however, the 
referee found that the OLR had not proven a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c) under the applicable burden of persuasion.  We have 
upheld that conclusion and have dismissed that count, meaning 
that Attorney Frisch has prevailed on the only count that 
necessitated a disciplinary hearing.  Moreover, the OLR has not 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
17 
 
appealed from the referee's recommendation of dismissal of that 
charge. 
¶36 With respect to the nature of the misconduct, the 
violations found by the referee and this court involved Attorney 
Frisch's lack of diligence as well as his failure to produce 
discovery and to comply with discovery orders.  While these 
incidents of misconduct are not inconsequential, they are 
clearly not of the same seriousness as the misrepresentation 
allegation on which Attorney Frisch prevailed. 
¶37 The difference in seriousness is borne out by the 
disparity between the level of discipline sought and the level 
of discipline recommended and imposed.  The OLR sought a five-
month suspension for all three counts.  After concluding that 
the OLR had not proven the misrepresentation count, the referee 
recommended, and we have agreed, that a public reprimand is the 
appropriate level of discipline. 
¶38 Although 
Attorney 
Frisch 
fully 
litigated 
the 
misrepresentation count, the OLR has not alleged that Attorney 
Frisch failed to cooperate with its investigation or this 
disciplinary proceeding.  Moreover, although Attorney Frisch has 
been practicing law for more than 30 years, he has never before 
been the subject of professional discipline. 
¶39 Finally, we note that Attorney Frisch has already been 
disciplined by his employer and has expended a substantial 
amount of his own money to promote his rehabilitation.  After he 
had to seek inpatient alcohol dependence treatment on two 
separate occasions in 2005, he was formally reprimanded by the 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
18 
 
district attorney and was suspended without pay for 22 working 
days, losing approximately a month's salary.  He also was 
required to enter into a "Last Chance Agreement," the violation 
of which could have resulted in the termination of his 
employment.  In addition to losing a month's salary, Attorney 
Frisch also expended more than $20,000 in treatment expenses in 
an effort, apparently successful so far, to effect substantial 
changes in his lifestyle and to return to a productive career. 
¶40 In light of all of these factors, we conclude that it 
would not be just to impose nearly $12,000 in litigation costs 
on Attorney Frisch.  Since the primary focus of the litigation 
in this case involved the misrepresentation count on which 
Attorney Frisch prevailed, we determine that it would be fair to 
require him to pay $1,500 in costs. 
¶41 This result is consistent with our decision in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Molinaro, 2009 WI 61, 318 
Wis. 2d 375, 769 N.W.2d 458.  In that case, the OLR charged 
Attorney Molinaro with 13 counts of misconduct.  The referee 
found that the OLR had not met its burden of proof as to five of 
those counts.  On appeal, we concluded that the OLR had also 
failed to prove a sixth count dealing with whether Attorney 
Molinaro had taken an excessive fee out of a settlement.  We 
upheld the referee's findings of misconduct on the other seven 
counts.  In our discussion regarding the issue of costs, we 
noted that, like the present case, the one count alleging an 
excessive fee was the "most hotly debated issue" in the case 
that "accounted for a substantial amount of the total time——and 
No. 
2007AP2638-D   
 
19 
 
resulting fees and costs——expended by the OLR in prosecuting" 
the matter.  Id., 318 Wis. 2d 375, ¶67.  In light of the 
dismissal of that count and other factors,8 we concluded that the 
cost amount should be reduced from nearly $24,000 to $12,000.  
We found such a substantial reduction appropriate even though 
the remaining counts of misconduct still warranted a 60-day 
suspension.  We likewise conclude that Attorney Frisch should be 
required to pay only a portion of the costs of this proceeding. 
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that James W. Frisch is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, James W. Frisch shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation $1,500 as the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of James W. Frisch to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall be suspended until further order of the court. 
                                                 
8 For instance, like Attorney Frisch, Attorney Molinaro had 
practiced 
law 
for 
more 
than 
30 
years 
without 
a 
prior 
disciplinary incident.  In addition, the discipline sought by 
the OLR against Attorney Molinaro, a two-year suspension, was 
substantially greater than the 60-day suspension that was 
ultimately imposed. 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I concur in the court's per curiam opinion 
relating to the Code violation and the discipline.  I dissent 
from the court's decision to reduce the costs imposed on 
Attorney Frisch.   
¶45 The court's opinion reducing the costs to be imposed 
ignores the applicable rule on costs, the facts of this 
particular case, and the court's precedents regarding the 
imposition of costs.  When those items are properly considered, 
the only reasonable conclusion is that the case does not present 
"extraordinary circumstances" that would justify a reduction in 
the costs assessed against Attorney Frisch, whose misconduct was 
the reason for this disciplinary proceeding.  Consequently, I 
dissent from the portion of the court's opinion regarding the 
imposition of costs. 
¶46 The Rule on Costs:  As the majority opinion notes, 
this court's general rule regarding the imposition of costs is 
to impose all of the costs of a disciplinary proceeding on the 
respondent attorney whose conduct necessitated the proceeding 
unless there are "extraordinary circumstances."  SCR 22.24(1m).  
¶47 SCR 22.24(1m) was adopted in 2006.1  It has an 
interesting history that should inform the imposition of costs 
in the present case.  Much of the history leading up to the 
adoption of the 2006 rule is described in my concurring opinion 
                                                 
1 See In the Matter of the Petition for Amendment to Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
relating 
to 
Cost 
Assessments 
in 
the 
Lawyer 
Regulation System, S. Ct. Order 05-01, 2006 WI 34, 287 
Wis. 2d xiii (eff. May 1, 2006). 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 
279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376.  
¶48 Until 1999, the court had levied less than full costs 
on the disciplined lawyer in only one case.  Beginning in 1999, 
numerous dissents varying "in length, vigor, and vitriol, as is 
each justice's prerogative"2 were filed, objecting to the 
imposition of full costs on the disciplined lawyer and instead 
favoring the shifting of these costs from the disciplined lawyer 
to the members of the bar.  The dissents, except those favoring 
the levying of costs on the basis of counts proved,3 offered no 
principles, criteria, or guidelines to assist the court in 
fairly and equitably exercising its discretion to levy less than 
full costs.  
¶49 The continuing controversy among the justices about 
the imposition of costs on disciplined lawyers resulted in the 
court's requesting that the Board of Administrative Oversight, 
in conjunction with the State Bar, develop a comprehensive 
approach regarding the assessment of costs in OLR matters for 
the court's consideration.  A petition for a rule regulating the 
                                                 
2 In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 
¶53, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376. 
3 For Justice Butler's recommendation allocating costs on 
the basis of counts proved, see In the Matter of the Petition 
for 
Amendment 
to 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
relating 
to 
Cost 
Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System, S. Ct. Order 05-01, 
2006 WI 34, 287 Wis. 2d xiii (eff. May 1, 2006) (Butler, J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
imposition of costs4 was filed and a survey of the bar on the 
issue was undertaken.5     
¶50 The rule proposed, but not adopted by the court, was 
that after the referee's report was filed, the OLR would submit 
to the referee the statement of costs, the respondent lawyer 
would file an objection, if any, and the OLR would then file a 
rebuttal.  The referee would recommend to the court the costs to 
be imposed on the lawyer after considering factors including 
"(a) the number of counts charged, contested and proven; (b) the 
severity of counts charged, contested and proven; (c) the level 
of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the 
referee; (d) the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary 
process; and (e) the respondent's ability to pay."  The supreme 
                                                 
4 In the Matter of the Petition for Amendment to Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
relating 
to 
Cost 
Assessments 
in 
the 
Lawyer 
Regulation System, S. Ct. Order 05-01, 2006 WI 34, 287 
Wis. 2d xiii (eff. May 1, 2006). 
5 The results of the 2005 Bench Bar Survey relating to the 
allocation of costs in attorney discipline cases are as follows:  
Most respondents split between continuing the current 
assessment policy (37%) and permitting apportionment 
of costs (36%).  Another 17% feel the Court should 
adopt the "English Rule," 9% feel it should it should 
adopt 
the 
"American 
Rule," 
and 
a 
handful 
of 
respondents checked a combination of methods.  Nearly 
one-half (47%) of judges feel the Supreme Court should 
continue its current assessment policy, while lawyers 
split between permitting apportionment of costs (37%) 
and continuing the current policy (33%). 
Executive Summary, State Bar of Wisconsin 2005 Bench-Bar Survey, 
at 
5 
(available 
at 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Research_and_Repor
ts&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=57903). 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
court was to consider the submissions of the parties and the 
recommendation of the referee.     
¶51 After 
a 
public 
hearing 
and 
open 
administrative 
conference, this proposed rule was NOT adopted by the court.  
The court refused to delegate to the referees the tasks of 
determining the imposition of costs or making recommendations 
about costs to the court.  The court had sound reasons for this 
position.  Referees do not know the full costs and attorney fees 
when the referees file their reports.  The referees do not have 
a statement of the attorney fees and cannot evaluate to what 
issues the attorneys devoted time.  Furthermore, the imposition 
of costs and fees by a single court would provide uniformity. 
¶52 The "cost controversy" among the members of this court 
culminated in the adoption of the present rule, over the 
dissents of Justices Prosser, Butler, and Roggensack. 
¶53 Nevertheless, 
referees 
continue 
to 
make 
recommendations about costs.  Indeed in the present case, the 
referee recommended that no costs be assessed to the attorney.  
The referee's full discussion about costs, without the benefit 
of OLR's statement of costs, is as follows: Attorney Frisch 
"admitted the factual allegations underlying Counts One and Two 
of OLR's complaint and has not disputed that those facts 
establish the violations asserted in those counts.  It is 
recommended 
that 
Count 
Three 
be 
dismissed. 
Under 
these 
circumstances, Frisch should not be required to pay OLR's costs 
and attorney fees in this matter.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Young, 2006 WI 109, ¶¶21-22, 296 Wis. 2d 36, 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
718 
N.W.2d 717."6 
 
The 
referee 
made 
no 
reference 
to 
"extraordinary circumstances." 
¶54 The court, including the dissenters, must follow the 
plain language of the rule adopted.  The rule the court adopted 
clearly sets forth the "general policy . . . that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, including 
the expenses of counsel for the office of lawyer regulation" 
upon the disciplined attorney.  The rule further explains that 
in cases involving "extraordinary circumstances," the court may 
exercise its discretion to reduce the amount of costs and fees 
imposed on the disciplined attorney.  The rule then lists 
several factors to guide the court's imposition of costs after 
the court finds "extraordinary circumstances."     
¶55 To 
impose 
less 
than 
full 
costs 
on 
the 
lawyer 
disciplined, 
the 
court 
must 
first 
find 
extraordinary 
circumstances.   
¶56 The majority fails to explain what the "extraordinary 
circumstances" are in the present case.  The rule does not 
define "extraordinary circumstances."  In interpreting statutes, 
rules, and other documents, the court is very fond of examining 
the dictionary to define words.  "Extraordinary" is defined in 
                                                 
6 The referee's reliance on Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Young, 2006 WI 109, ¶¶21-22, 296 Wis. 2d 36, 718 N.W.2d 717, is 
misplaced.  In that case, Attorney Young, the respondent lawyer, 
entered into a full stipulation with the OLR regarding the 
facts, the violation of the code, and the discipline.  A referee 
had been appointed before the stipulation was executed.  The OLR 
did not seek to impose costs on Attorney Young.  The referee 
recommended imposing costs on the lawyer.  This court concluded 
that under those circumstances no costs should be imposed on 
Attorney Young.    
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
the dictionaries as meaning beyond what is ordinary and usual; 
the word means "not usually associated with" the subject being 
discussed.   
¶57 The 
phrase 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" 
clearly 
requires the presence of factors that are not present in many 
disciplinary proceedings even though the phrase is incapable of 
being defined in a manner that encompasses all possible 
scenarios.  The majority opinion fails to demonstrate facets of 
the present disciplinary proceeding that are not often found in 
disciplinary cases.     
¶58 It is not extraordinary or unusual for the OLR to 
prosecute all misconduct counts for which the Preliminary Review 
Committee found "cause to proceed" and for the referee to 
conclude that one or more counts are not proved.  It is not 
extraordinary or unusual for a prosecutor to be unable to prove 
all counts even after a finding of probable cause.  There is no 
claim in the present case that the counts alleged by the OLR 
were wholly without prosecutorial merit or that OLR's pursuit of 
Count 3 was unreasonable, improper, or frivolous.   
¶59 The majority is interpreting and applying the rule as 
if the court had adopted the substance of the rule originally 
proposed and defeated.  If the majority wants to change the rule 
the court adopted, the majority has to do so using our rule-
making function, our quasi-legislative function, not our case 
deciding 
function. 
 The court is amending rules in an 
adjudication.  That's a no-no.  
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶60 At bottom, the instant proceeding arose out of 
Attorney 
Frisch's 
conduct. The rule adopted appropriately 
declares that the disciplined lawyer should bear to the extent 
he or she is able, except under extraordinary circumstances, the 
costs and attorney fees of the proceeding rather than the court 
transferring the costs to the other attorneys in the state who 
have not engaged in misconduct.  
¶61 The court is ignoring the plain text of SCR 22.24(1m), 
skipping over the need to find "extraordinary circumstances," 
and going straight to the factors that guide the court in 
imposing 
costs 
once 
the 
court 
has 
found 
extraordinary 
circumstances. 
¶62 The court order adopting the rule on costs provides 
for court review of the rule in the fall of 2010.  That will be 
the time to change the rule, if a majority of the court wishes 
to do so.  The rule should not be changed in this case.   
¶63 $1,500 Fee Not Based on Record:  Before I turn to the 
factors the court applies, I must point out that the majority 
opinion imposes $1,500 costs on Attorney Frisch.  No explanation 
is given for this number.  The number is not related to anything 
in the record.  How does this jibe with our numerous opinions 
saying that a court should explain its exercise of discretion?   
¶64 Just as the $1,500 has no basis in the record, the 
factors upon which the majority opinion justifies its reduction 
of costs have no basis in the record.     
¶65 Reduced Costs Not Justified:  First, the majority 
opinion states that Attorney Frisch conceded Counts 1 and 2.  
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
This statement is only partially true, misrepresents the record, 
and is misleading.  As the OLR points out, Attorney Frisch's 
answer to the OLR's complaint admitted only some of the facts 
underlying Counts 1 and 2.  His answer demanded dismissal of the 
complaint in its entirety.  Moreover, Attorney Frisch's own 
objection to costs also indicates that the issues surrounding 
Counts 1 and 2 were not fully resolved even after a factual 
stipulation had been reached prior to the disciplinary hearing.  
In his objection to costs, Attorney Frisch states that the 
stipulation "included substantially all of the facts on which 
OLR based Counts [1] and [2] of its complaint," and that at the 
hearing the OLR had "largely devoted its case to attempt to 
prove up Count [3]" (emphasis added).   
¶66 Thus, 
while 
Attorney 
Frisch 
may 
have 
conceded 
misconduct under Counts 1 and 2 by the end of the disciplinary 
hearing, his answer and cost objection undermine the majority's 
assertion that in the absence of Count 3 he would have entered 
into a comprehensive stipulation that would have avoided the 
necessity of the appointment of a referee and the incurring of 
legal fees by the OLR.  His answer indicates that even in the 
absence of Count 3, costs would have been incurred by the OLR 
and a referee.  Consequently, the majority's citation to the 
Nussberger and Young cases, in which no costs were imposed 
because the respondent attorney entered into a comprehensive 
stipulation at the beginning of a disciplinary proceeding, does 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
this 
case 
presents 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" justifying a reduction in costs. 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶67 Second, the majority points to the fact that Attorney 
Frisch prevailed on Count 3, which alleged a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c) and on which the bulk of the disciplinary hearing 
clearly focused.  Merely prevailing on one or more of the counts 
alleged in a disciplinary complaint, however, is not sufficient 
to support a reduction or proration of costs.   
¶68 Indeed, even when a respondent attorney has prevailed 
on five out of seven counts, we have refused to depart from our 
practice of assessing full costs against a respondent attorney 
who has been found to have engaged in some professional 
misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 
2005 WI 36, ¶¶29-30, 279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367.  Moreover, 
as was the case in Polich, there is no indication that Count 3 
in this case was without prosecutorial merit or that the costs 
incurred by the referee and the OLR in this matter were 
unreasonable or unnecessary.  The bottom line is that Attorney 
Frisch prevailed on one count, but was found to have committed 
the misconduct alleged in two other counts.  This does not 
qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance." 
¶69 In addition, while Attorney Frisch is to be commended 
for seeking treatment for his alcohol dependence and for paying 
for a significant portion of that treatment out of his own 
funds, his expenditure of substantial sums for treatment does 
not address who should be responsible for the costs incurred in 
this disciplinary proceeding——either Attorney Frisch or the 
general membership of the bar in this state (through annual 
assessments).  Since it was the misconduct of Attorney Frisch 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
10 
 
that caused the necessity of this disciplinary proceeding and 
the concurrent expenditure of time and money, I cannot conclude 
that his expenditure of personal funds for other reasons, even 
if commendable, should excuse him from responsibility for the 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding, with the result that 
those costs will be shifted to the other attorneys of this 
state. 
¶70 Precedent Contrary to Reduction of Costs:  In the 
present case, Attorney Frisch was found to have committed 
misconduct on two of the three original counts.  In several 
cases, one or more counts are dismissed and the full costs are 
imposed.  This case therefore is simply a matter of an attorney 
prevailing on one count while being found to have committed 
misconduct on other counts.  That is not an "extraordinary 
circumstance," and the court should follow its general policy of 
imposing full costs.  The costs of the proceeding against the 
attorney should not be foisted upon the lawyers in the state of 
Wisconsin. 
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2638-D.ssa 
 
1