Title: Commonwealth v. Lally

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-09926 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THOMAS LALLY. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 6, 2015. - March 3, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Prior consistent 
statement, Prior misconduct, Subsequent misconduct.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel, Argument by prosecutor, Redaction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 21, 2003. 
 
 
The case was tried before Charles M. Grabau, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on June 16, 2010, was heard by 
Kenneth J. Fishman, J. 
 
 
 
Catherine J. Hinton (Charles W. Rankin with her) for the 
defendant. 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendant, Thomas Lally, was convicted by 
jury of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
2 
 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  Represented by 
new counsel, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based 
on claimed errors at trial:  (1) admission of deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) evidence;2 (2) admission of an audiotape of prior 
consistent statements made by the Commonwealth's principal 
witness, a cooperating codefendant; (3) admission of a 
cooperating codefendant's plea agreement without proper 
redaction; (4) admission of prior bad act evidence; and (5) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for improperly advising the 
defendant to testify and for failing to call surrebuttal 
witnesses.3  A judge of the Superior Court who was not the trial 
judge denied the defendant's motion after an evidentiary 
hearing.  The defendant appealed and it was consolidated with 
his direct appeal, which raises the same issues.  We affirm the 
order denying the defendant's motion for new trial as well as 
the defendant's conviction, and we discern no basis to exercise 
our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was indicted for conspiracy to commit 
murder, but that charge was placed on file. 
 
 
2 The defendant also argues that he was deprived of a fair 
trial due to prosecutorial misconduct in this regard. 
 
 
3 The defendant also argued in his motion for a new trial 
that counsel was ineffective with respect to joint venture 
instructions and certain motions.  The judge rejected those 
claims, and the defendant does not dispute that decision on 
appeal. 
3 
 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving other facts for later discussion.  On 
December 19, 2001, the defendant hit the victim with a frying 
pan and tea kettle and then suffocated her until she died.  He 
moved her body to the bottom of a staircase and made it appear 
to be an accident. 
 
The night before the murder, the defendant slept at the 
victim's house with two friends, Jason Weir and the victim's 
great-nephew, Anthony Calabro.4  The victim, eighty-four years 
old at the time of her death, owned a three-family house in 
Quincy.  She lived in the second-floor apartment with Anthony, 
who had moved in with the victim the summer before the murder.5  
Anthony was an intended beneficiary of her estate when she died. 
 
Weir was sixteen at the time of the murder, four years 
younger than the defendant and two or three years younger than 
Anthony.  Both Weir and the defendant lived with their own 
parents, although Weir had lived with the defendant for a few 
months during the summer of 2000.  The defendant and Weir both 
desired to move out of their parents' homes.  During the fall of 
2001, the defendant stayed at the victim's house approximately 
five nights per week and Weir stayed there on the weekends. 
                     
 
4 Because Anthony Calabro shares a surname with the victim, 
we refer to him by his first name. 
 
 
5 Anthony's grandmother lived in the first-floor apartment 
and his uncle lived in the third-floor apartment. 
4 
 
 
The defendant often commented about how he and Anthony 
could kill the victim and get her money.  Specifically, the 
defendant said, "Wouldn't it be funny if we pushed her down the 
stairs and got her money?"; "We can kill her and no one would 
find out"; and that he could "knock her over the head with a 
blunt object and then place her at the bottom of the stairs to 
make it look like an accident."  The defendant referred to the 
victim as a "bitch," a "cunt," and a "douchebag." 
 
On the day of the murder, the defendant, Weir, and Anthony 
woke at approximately noon.  That afternoon, the defendant 
obtained the victim's frying pan and told Weir, "Today's the 
day."  Anthony went outside with the defendant's dog.  The 
victim saw the defendant enter the kitchen with her frying pan 
and scolded him for taking her things without asking.  She put 
the frying pan in the pantry.  The defendant retrieved it and 
then used it to hit her on the head.  Next, he hit her on the 
head with a tea kettle, put his hand over her mouth and nose to 
suffocate her, and said, "Just go.  Anthony wants it this way." 
 
Weir testified that he did not assist the victim because he 
was afraid, "freaking out," and crying.  The defendant told him, 
"We all wanted this house" and "we're in it together," and then 
told Weir to help him move the body to the steps.  At the 
defendant's urging, Weir helped move the victim down the front 
stairs, which were infrequently used.  Weir testified that he 
5 
 
only helped with the first few steps before he "[c]ouldn't do 
it" anymore.  The trio got in the defendant's vehicle and 
Anthony drove Weir home.  During the ride, the defendant said 
that they needed to "bury the stuff" -- referring to the frying 
pan and tea kettle used in the attack, and a floor mat, some pot 
holders, and a newspaper from the victim's house -- at 
Meadowbrook Pond in Norton. 
 
Anthony and the defendant later returned to the victim's 
home; just before midnight, a 911 call was placed reporting that 
an elderly woman had fallen down.  When the police arrived, the 
deceased victim was lying at the bottom of the stairs.  Anthony 
and the defendant were upstairs in the victim's home.  The 
defendant had a welt on his nose, fresh scratch marks on his 
right cheek, and a bite mark on his arm.  He explained to police 
that he received the injuries during a fight with Anthony the 
prior evening. 
 
A State police trooper noted suspicious circumstances in 
connection with the claim that the deceased had fallen down the 
stairs, including dust covering the handrail, the absence of 
blood on the wallpaper or stairwell although the victim suffered 
significant blood loss, and a urine stain that was not 
anatomically correct for the position of the body.  Conversely, 
there were conditions consistent with a fall -- the deceased was 
wearing footwear that was in "deplorable shape" and there was a 
6 
 
large trash bag next to her that she could have been carrying at 
the time.6  He requested a full autopsy. 
 
The medical examiner performed a rape kit to help to 
determine the cause of death, which included taking hair 
samples; DNA samples from the mouth, vagina, anal region, and 
anus; and fingernail clippings and scrapings.  He noted blunt 
trauma to the top of her head, a fracture of the seventh 
cervical vertebra, rib and clavicle fractures, and injuries to 
her left hand.  After determining that the majority of the 
victim's injuries were consistent with a fall, he ruled the 
cause of death as blunt neck trauma and the manner of death as 
"fall down stairs."7 
 
The defendant told Weir, "We fooled everybody," and told 
another friend that it was a "perfect crime."  He gave friends 
varying explanations for the scratches on his face, telling some 
that he received the scratches during a fight with Anthony and 
others that his dog scratched him. 
 
In March 2002, Anthony wrote two checks totaling $5,000 to 
the defendant and two checks totaling $8,000 to Weir.  He also 
purchased a truck for the defendant and spent approximately 
                     
 
6 Two neighbors and Weir testified that the victim routinely 
walked down the back stairs to remove her trash using small 
bags. 
 
 
7 The medical examiner explained that the injury to the top 
of the victim's head was not consistent with a fall. 
7 
 
$50,000 on equipment for a band that Weir was in.  The three 
regularly stayed at the victim's home until shortly before it 
was sold, in July, 2002.  Anthony received approximately 
$250,000 in proceeds from the sale. 
 
In the summer of 2002, Weir was with a friend near 
Meadowbrook Pond and saw the frying pan, the tea kettle, two pot 
holders, and the welcome mat out in the open.  After telling the 
defendant about what he had observed, the two went to 
Meadowbrook Pond and the defendant threw the objects in the 
water. 
 
In October, 2002, Weir's close friend, James Morel, 
commented that it was a "coincidence that [the victim] wound up 
the same way [the defendant] said she was going to."  Weir then 
told Morel about the murder.  Morel alerted the Norton police to 
the information he had received about the victim's death.  State 
police Trooper Brian Brooks met with Morel and asked him to wear 
a wire and meet with Weir again.  Morel agreed.  When Morel next 
met with Weir, the police followed them for three hours and 
recorded the pertinent parts of their conversation. 
 
During the meeting, Weir told Morel that the defendant had 
killed the victim, and although he helped move the body and 
clean up, he did not participate in the killing.  Weir guided 
Morel to Meadowbrook Pond and pointed to the location where the 
items were disposed of after the murder.  Morel later 
8 
 
accompanied police to the pond and the police recovered a 
welcome mat, two pot holders, the top of a tea kettle, and 
newspaper with a December, 2001, date.  Subsequently, the police 
drained the pond and found a tea kettle and a bent frying pan. 
 
Based on this information, Weir and the defendant were 
arrested on October 25, 2002, and charged with murder in the 
first degree.  Weir agreed to cooperate with police in exchange 
for having his charge reduced to manslaughter with a prison 
sentence of ten years. 
 
DNA profiles for the defendant, Weir, Anthony, and Morel 
were compared to male DNA found on three samples from the 
victim's rape kit:  fingernail scrapings, fingernail clippings, 
and a perianal swab.  In the initial testing, all four were 
excluded as contributors to the perianal swab, which had been 
contaminated with male DNA from the State police crime 
laboratory.  Weir, Anthony, and Morel were excluded as 
contributors to the fingernail scrapings and the fingernail 
clippings, but the defendant could not be excluded from either. 
 
The defendant testified that Weir killed the victim and 
that he received the injuries observed by police the night of 
the murder when he attempted to intervene on the victim's 
behalf.  His stepsister testified to examples of Weir's behavior 
that made her nervous and his stepfather testified to numerous 
arguments between Weir and the defendant. 
9 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  The primary issue at 
trial was whether the defendant or Weir killed the victim.  On 
appeal, the defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the 
evidence at trial.  Rather, he contends that because the 
asserted trial errors deprived him of a fair trial and that 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, the judge wrongly 
denied his motion for a new trial. 
 
Where the defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial has been consolidated with his direct appeal, we 
review both pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Commonwealth v. 
Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 323, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 
(2015), citing Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 145 (2014).  
Under § 33E, we review the denial of the defendant's new trial 
motion "to determine whether there has been a significant error 
of law or other abuse of discretion," McGee, supra at 146, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Robideau, 464 Mass. 699, 702 (2013), and 
whether any such error creates a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 
779, 781 (2012). 
 
Where the defendant's claims are based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and none of the asserted errors was 
preserved at trial, our § 33E review does not consider "the 
adequacy of trial counsel's performance" under the rubric of 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Commonwealth 
10 
 
v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 
(2014).  Instead, we give the defendant the benefit of a more 
lenient standard that focuses more narrowly on whether there was 
error and, if so, whether any such error "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id.  The burden of proving 
ineffectiveness rests with the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 755 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. 
Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 90 (2004). 
 
2.  DNA evidence.  Relying on Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 
Mass. 840, 851-853 (2010), in which we held that nonexclusion 
DNA results must be presented with statistics explaining the 
significance of that evidence, the defendant challenges the 
admission of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and Y-
chromosome short tandem repeat method (Y-STR) results.  He 
argues that the DNA evidence was erroneously admitted under 
Mattei because the PCR result was admitted without any 
accompanying statistical references to the significance of the 
results, and the Y-STR evidence was admitted with inadequate 
statistical information.  He contends also that the prosecutor 
compounded these errors by misstating the DNA evidence in the 
opening statement and closing argument.  In addition, the 
defendant argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in connection with the admission of the DNA evidence.  
More specifically, he contends that defense counsel was 
11 
 
ineffective for failing adequately to inform himself about the 
admissibility of such evidence, failing to object to or 
otherwise seek exclusion of the evidence, and failing to cross-
examine the Commonwealth's DNA expert competently. 
 
a. DNA evidence at trial.  At trial, Jeffrey Hickey, a 
former DNA analyst with Cellmark Diagnostics laboratory, which 
later became Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), testified that the 
defendant could not be excluded as a contributor to DNA samples 
taken from the victim's fingernail scrapings and fingernail 
clippings.  He analyzed the DNA using two methods.  First, he 
performed PCR testing, which compares thirteen regions of the 
DNA taken from the victim against submitted profiles to 
establish primary and secondary profiles and determine whether a 
suspect could be excluded as a contributor.  Because the PCR 
test results were inconclusive for the fingernail clippings, 
Hickey also performed Y-STR testing, which separates male DNA 
and is frequently used when the analyst is unable to create a 
primary profile from the mixture of male and female DNA. 
 
From the fingernail scrapings, PCR testing showed that the 
sample was a mix of male and female DNA, the primary DNA profile 
was from the victim, a "few secondary types" of DNA were 
located, and the defendant "could not be excluded as a potential 
source" of those secondary profiles.  Hickey did not provide 
statistical information to demonstrate the relevance of this 
12 
 
nonexclusion PCR evidence, explaining that Cellmark does not 
provide statistics on secondary profiles. 
 
From the fingernail clippings, PCR testing was inconclusive 
in that no primary or secondary profiles could be determined.  
Once Hickey extracted only the male DNA, however, he was able to 
produce a Y-STR profile containing twelve regions of DNA.  He 
testified that the male profile created from Y-STR testing "came 
back to match [the defendant] at all of those regions that we 
tested."  Hickey provided context for this result through 
statistical analysis, wherein he compared the results of the Y-
STR testing to a database of known DNA profiles and determined 
that the profile occurred in one out of 1,311 Caucasian males, 
and zero out of 1,108 African-American males, and zero out of 
894 Hispanic males.  He explained that Y-STR statistics are 
"quite different" from PCR results -- where you can see numbers 
in the "billions [or] trillions."  In PCR testing, "a match 
across all of those regions" would allow an expert to opine with 
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that a DNA profile 
belongs to a specific person.  Conversely, with Y-STR testing, 
DNA results cannot discriminate among members of the same 
paternal line and the statistical likelihood is never any 
greater than the database available for comparison. 
 
Hickey also testified to contamination of the perianal 
swab.  Specifically, he stated that the defendant, Weir, 
13 
 
Anthony, and Morel were excluded as sources of DNA.  Because the 
swab did not match any of the submitted male profiles, the State 
police crime laboratory asked Hickey to analyze whether the 
sample could have been contaminated by employees of Cellmark or 
the crime laboratory.  The swab was consistent with the DNA 
profile of a male employee working at the crime laboratory.  The 
contaminating employee testified that he had handled all samples 
that were taken from the victim.  Additionally, the employee 
explained a pretrial revision to his DNA analysis.  He testified 
that he first identified the presence of seminal fluid from the 
vaginal and perianal swab.  However, he later updated his 
findings to identify the fluid as P-30, which is a protein that 
can be found in urine. 
 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Hickey focused on the 
contamination and Hickey's testimony at trial that the defendant 
"matches" the Y-STR profile, noting that Hickey stated in his 
report that the defendant could not "be excluded" as a source of 
the DNA in the fingernail scrapings, not that there was a match.  
Counsel's cross-examination of the crime laboratory employee 
highlighted the contamination and change in identification from 
seminal fluid to the P-30 protein. 
 
The prosecutor commented on the DNA evidence in her opening 
statement and closing argument.  In her opening statement, she 
told the jury that the evidence would prove that the defendant 
14 
 
was the "major contributor" to the right fingernail clippings 
and that Weir and Anthony were excluded.  In her closing, she 
argued that Weir and Anthony were excluded as contributors under 
both tests, and that the defendant could not be excluded from 
either.  She continued that the reference to nonexclusion was a 
matter of "semantics," because Cellmark does not "use the term 
'match'" for Y-STR testing, but "if you look at it, you'll see 
all the numbers from [the defendant] correspond to the 
fingernail clippings." 
 
b.  Posttrial DNA evidence.  At the motion hearing, the 
defense presented testimony from Dr. Michael J. Bourke, a 
forensic scientist retained in 2005 by trial counsel and in 2009 
by postconviction counsel, and from trial counsel for the 
defendant.  Dr. Robin Cotton, the former Cellmark laboratory 
director, testified for the Commonwealth. 
 
As to the PCR evidence from the fingernail scrapings, the 
defendant argued that it was error to admit the evidence without 
statistics.  In that regard, the defense presented evidence that 
Bourke alerted trial counsel in a pretrial memorandum to the 
lack of statistics, advised that "the correct statistic to 
perform on mixed samples is the combined probability of 
inclusion," and questioned the admissibility of such evidence 
without statistics.  The memorandum noted that the statistical 
information was important because the "small to limited number 
15 
 
of loci . . . , and the fact that these loci are mixtures, will 
result in very modest random match probabilities."  Cotton 
likewise testified that testing only a "few" loci could provide 
probabilities that are "very much smaller" than the large 
numbers calculated using a full profile.  She also testified 
that statistical information could have been provided at the 
time of the 2006 trial if requested; however, the information 
was not routinely provided when the applicable report was 
written. 
 
As to the Y-STR results, the defendant argued that DNA 
results from the Y-STR testing were erroneously admitted without 
a "confidence interval" allowing for population frequency 
calculation.  The results were presented using a method known in 
the field as the "counting method," which describes the 
frequency in which a DNA match is found in a given database.  A 
"confidence interval" adjusts that result to account for 
sampling errors and identical profiles being passed through a 
paternal line, and thus increases the likelihood that the same 
profile could be found in a population.8  See Scientific Working 
                     
 
8 Dr. Michael J. Bourke testified that there are several 
methods available to calculate a confidence interval.  Under the 
"division by three" method that he used around the time of trial 
and the ninety-five per cent calculation suggested by the 
defendant, Bourke testified that the results of the confidence 
interval calculation generally produces a result showing that it 
is approximately three times more likely that a DNA profile may 
16 
 
Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Y-Chromosome Short Tandem Repeat 
(Y-STR) Interpretation Guidelines, 11 Forensic Science 
Communications, Federal Bureau of Investigations (Jan. 2009) at 
§ 5.3 (Y-STR Guidelines).  Bourke testified that the counting 
method results "would be misleading without the confidence 
interval correction."  He did not advise counsel about Y-STR 
deficiencies, but testified that he would have had he been 
asked.  Cotton testified that a confidence interval could have 
been calculated at the time of trial, but Y-STR testing was in 
its infancy at the time of the 2005 report and Cellmark's policy 
did not provide for such a calculation. 
 
The motion judge rejected the defendant's claims, 
concluding that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that any 
attempt to exclude the DNA evidence would have been successful 
because the defendant did not establish that the Commonwealth, 
if challenged, would have been unable to provide the requested 
statistical information for either the PCR or Y-STR results.  
The judge concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective 
because questioning the DNA evidence was not likely to 
accomplish "something material for the defense" in light of the 
defense theory that Weir, not a stranger, was the real culprit, 
and the case "did not hinge on DNA evidence."  Additionally, 
                                                                  
be found in a population than the number produced by the count 
method. 
17 
 
although the judge found that the prosecutor did misstate the 
evidence, he concluded that the error was unlikely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion where the evidence was "not 
central to the Commonwealth's case." 
 
c.  Analysis of the DNA claims.  Although Mattei was 
decided four years after the trial in this case, our holding was 
based on reasoning that dated back to 1991, when we required 
that DNA results indicating a DNA "match" include accompanying 
evidence of the likelihood of that "match" occurring.  See 
Mattei, 455 Mass. at 850, citing Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 
Mass. 218, 222 n.7 (1991).  We held that it was error to present 
nonexclusion DNA results from PCR testing without statistics, 
especially where the jury heard evidence of "match" statistics 
placing the likelihood of occurrence in the quadrillions and 
quintillions, because the jurors could be misled into thinking 
that the nonexclusion DNA results are similarly conclusive.  
Mattei, supra at 848 n.17, 853.  We explained that DNA evidence 
is "of little or no value without reliable evidence indicating 
the significance."  Id. at 850-851.  Moreover, we noted that 
nonexclusion evidence presented without statistics could be even 
more prejudicial than match evidence because jurors could be 
misled into thinking that nonexclusion results are as 
18 
 
significant as the large numbers typically applicable to match 
results.9  Id. at 856. 
 
i.  PCR evidence.  We first review the defendant's claim 
that it was error to admit the nonexclusion results from the PCR 
evidence without statistical information providing context for 
that result.  The Commonwealth argues that there was no error 
because counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to 
challenge the DNA evidence and, even if it was unreasonable, 
statistical information could have been provided had the DNA 
evidence been challenged on that ground.  We agree with the 
defendant and reject the Commonwealth's argument for two 
reasons.  First, Hickey testified at trial that there were only 
"a few secondary types" of DNA identified by the PCR testing.  
Although neither side presented evidence at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial of what the actual statistics in this 
case would show, both experts agreed that the frequency of a 
random match probability based on the limited number of loci 
available in this case would be "modest" or small.  Where the 
jury heard evidence that PCR testing could result in "numbers in 
the billions, trillions," but did not hear that the results in 
                     
 
9 Prior to the defendant's trial, other jurisdictions 
required reliable statistics for nonexclusion results.  See, 
e.g., Dayton v. State, 54 P.3d 817, 818-820 (Alaska App. 2002) 
(remanding for reliability determination of database used to 
demonstrate required statistics to accompany nonexclusion 
testimony). 
19 
 
this case (with less than a full profile) could be significantly 
less, we cannot say that it was reasonable not to explore the 
actual statistics before making a decision whether to challenge 
the evidence.  Second, even if the Commonwealth could have 
provided statistics had the DNA evidence been challenged on that 
ground, defense counsel "might have accomplished something 
material for the defense" by challenging the evidence -- namely, 
the jury would have been presented with statistical evidence of 
small probabilities instead of an inference that the numbers 
could be "in the billions, trillions," or the evidence would 
have been excluded.10  See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 
109, 115 (1977).  See also Mattei, 455 Mass. at 856. 
                     
 
10 Although the defendant's burden in demonstrating 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file an 
evidentiary motion has been stated as a requirement to 
demonstrate that the motion would likely have been granted, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 599 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983), the proper 
question is whether filing of the motion "might have 
accomplished something material for the defense."  See 
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977); 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 99 (1974).  In this 
case, the Commonwealth asserts that it would have presented 
statistical evidence if the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
results were challenged, and the record reflects that such 
evidence would have shown "very modest random match 
probabilities" that are "very much smaller" than the large 
numbers often presented with PCR testing.  Accordingly, even if 
a motion in limine to exclude the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
evidence would have been unsuccessful because the Commonwealth 
could have provided the statistical information, the result of a 
challenge would have accomplished something material for the 
defense.  Satterfield, 373 Mass. at 115.  See Mattei, 455 Mass. 
at 852 (lack of nonexclusion statistics could mislead jury into 
20 
 
 
Because this error is intertwined with the defendant's 
other challenges relating to the DNA evidence, we reserve our 
discussion regarding prejudice until after we discuss the 
remaining claims. 
 
ii.  Y-STR evidence.  The defendant next argues that the Y-
STR results should not have been admitted without a confidence 
interval.  We disagree.  Our case law requires that nonexclusion 
DNA evidence be presented to a jury with "reliable accompanying 
evidence as to the likelihood that the test could not exclude 
other individuals in a given population" so that the jury can 
"evaluate the meaning of the result."  Mattei, 455 Mass. at 852.  
See Commonwealth v. Evans, 469 Mass. 834, 851-852 (2014) 
(applying Mattei to Y-STR testing).  This requirement was 
satisfied because the counting method was a reliable method for 
providing such evidence at the time of trial.11  Although 
                                                                  
believing results are similarly significant to "exceedingly 
infinitesimal random match probabilities" routinely presented 
with match results).  Moreover, the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth would not have been able to produce the statistics 
in a timely manner if trial counsel had objected during Hickey's 
testimony.  Whether or not this factual assertion is valid, 
counsel's failure to challenge the PCR results satisfied the 
first prong of the test for ineffective counsel, even if it was 
unlikely that a motion in limine would have been granted.  
Saferian, supra at 96 (first prong analyzes whether counsel's 
behavior fell "measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer"). 
 
 
11 Dr. Robin Cotton testified that scientific literature at 
the time of trial endorsed the use of the "count" method.  
Although Bourke provided evidence that scientific literature 
21 
 
guidelines now suggest the use of a confidence interval to make 
the statistics from the counting method more conservative, see 
Y-STR Guidelines, supra,12 the counting method as explained in 
Hickey's trial testimony provided sufficient context for the 
results. 
 
Hickey provided context for the Y-STR nonexclusion result 
by providing the database frequency counts to the jury and 
explaining that "count" information is limited because it is 
only as good as the entries in the database and a Y-STR profile 
is identical through a paternal line.  Although a confidence 
interval is more favorable to defendants because it corrects for 
limitations with the counting method,13 the "count" evidence was 
                                                                  
existed at the time of trial discussing the use of confidence 
intervals with Y-STR testing, the defendant did not establish 
that confidence intervals were routinely used at that time. 
 
 
12 At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the 
defendant introduced an article written in 2007 that recommends 
the use of a confidence interval calculation to "correct for 
possible sampling error" after a count has been done.  The 
defendant also submitted guidelines promulgated in 2009 by the 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, an influential 
source in the forensic community, which suggests that a "count 
without a confidence interval is acceptable as a factual 
statement regarding observations in the database" but a 
"confidence interval corrects for database size and sampling 
variation" and provides methods to calculate a confidence 
interval if such is applied.  See Scientific Working Group on 
DNA Analysis Methods, Y-Chromosome Short Tandem Repeat (Y-STR) 
Interpretation Guidelines, 11 Forensic Science Communications, 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (Jan. 2009) at § 5.3. 
 
 
13 Using the Caucasian database in this case as an example, 
the confidence interval calculation increases the likelihood of 
22 
 
not unreliable, nor was it likely to mislead jurors into 
thinking that the probability of another person contributing the 
male DNA in the fingernail clippings was diminutive.  The 
purpose of requiring statistical evidence is to allow the jury 
to evaluate the significance of DNA results.  Evans, 469 Mass. 
at 851, quoting Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 409-
410 (2011).  There was no error because the "count" evidence 
provided the required context.14 
 
iii.  Prosecutor's statements regarding DNA evidence.  We 
agree with the motion judge that the prosecutor misstated 
evidence in her opening statement and closing argument.  The 
prosecutor's assertion in the opening statement that the 
defendant could not "be excluded" as the "major contributor" to 
the fingernail clippings was inconsistent with Hickey's 
testimony that the defendant could not be excluded as a 
contributor to the mixed profile.  Likewise, the claim in the 
closing argument that the difference between nonexclusion in Y-
STR testing and a "match" is a "matter of semantics" conflicted 
with Hickey's testimony.  Hickey explained to the jury the 
meaning of "nonexclusion" in Y-STR testing by describing the 
                                                                  
a match in the population from one in 1,311 profiles to one in 
443. 
 
 
14 We now encourage, without deciding whether it is 
required, the use of a confidence interval when reporting Y-STR 
nonexclusion testimony. 
23 
 
significant limitations that are not applicable to PCR testing, 
where the word "match" is used.  The defendant did not object, 
and the jury were instructed that the opening statement and 
closing argument were not evidence. 
 
iv.  Cross-examination regarding DNA evidence.  We reject 
the defendant's claim that trial counsel's cross-examination 
regarding the DNA evidence was ineffective.  Counsel testified 
that he "completely shifted focus" from the lack of statistics 
accompanying the PCR results because Bourke told him that the 
defendant's DNA was found on the samples.15  Instead, he made a 
tactical decision to highlight mistakes in investigation, such 
as contamination, and to argue that the DNA found on the victim 
did not belong to the defendant.16  We review a tactical or 
strategic decision by trial counsel to determine whether the 
decision was "'manifestly unreasonable' when made."  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), quoting 
                     
 
15 The defendant disputed that this statement was actually 
made, describing it at the motion hearing as a 
"miscommunication."  The motion judge did not make any findings 
about whether this statement was made, but he did credit trial 
counsel's testimony that this statement affected his evaluation 
of the DNA evidence.  The motion judge determines matters of 
credibility.  Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 224 (2005), 
citing Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 16 (1971). 
 
 
16 Although trial counsel averred that his failure to file a 
motion in limine or conduct additional cross-examination was not 
tactical, his testimony, explaining that he changed his trial 
strategy after speaking with Bourke, suggests otherwise.  The 
motion judge did not make any findings in this regard. 
24 
 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442, 845 (2006).  There 
were significant concerns with the evidence that counsel could 
have highlighted -- contamination and initial findings of 
seminal fluid that were later revised -- and counsel was faced 
with the damaging fact that his client could not be excluded as 
a contributor of the DNA found on the victim's fingernails while 
Weir, the only third-party culprit in the case, was excluded.  
We determine whether a decision was manifestly unreasonable by 
"search[ing] for rationality in counsel's strategic decisions, 
taking into account all the circumstances known or that should 
have been known to counsel in the exercise of his duty to  
provide effective representation to the client and not whether 
counsel could have made alternative choices."  Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. at 674-675, citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 
227-228 (2005).  Although the PCR evidence should not have been 
admitted without statistics, counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to cross-examine on this issue or about the Y-STR 
results in light of the advice he had received from his expert 
and the risk of highlighting the DNA evidence after Weir was 
excluded as a contributor.17 
                     
 
17 Trial counsel retained Bourke to educate him regarding 
DNA and, after counsel had worked closely with Bourke on a 
number of issues before trial, Bourke did not advise counsel 
that there was any issue with the Y-STR evidence.  Bourke may 
not now suggest that counsel was at fault for failing to ask 
about specifics of Y-STR results, a testing method in its 
25 
 
 
v.  Prejudice.  Although the admission of the PCR results 
without statistics was erroneous, the defendant is not entitled 
to a new trial on this ground.  The defendant argues that he was 
prejudiced because the PCR evidence without statistics created a 
grave risk of misleading the jury into believing that the 
defendant was the only possible contributor of the male DNA 
found on the victim's fingernail scrapings and that landscaping 
activities or her physical contact with others as a former 
hairdresser were other possible explanations.  Applying the test 
"whether [the] error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion," Wright, 411 Mass. at 682, the defendant's claim of 
prejudice is easily dismissed.  The possibility that the DNA 
evidence could have come from an unknown third party was of 
limited value where the defendant named Weir as the culprit and 
where fresh scratches on the defendant's face the night of the 
murder supported an inference that it was actually the 
defendant's DNA that was found on the victim's fingernails.  
Both the PCR evidence and the properly admitted Y-STR evidence 
                                                                  
infancy at the time, without having alerted counsel to any 
potential issues.  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 
676 (2015) (expert's failure to correct counsel's approach after 
consultation permits assumption that trial counsel's strategy 
was acceptable).  Moreover, counsel sent a copy of the 
defendant's motion for discovery of tests employed and data 
results to Bourke before filing it, asking him if counsel should 
request anything else.  Counsel testified that he stopped 
considering a challenge to the DNA after Bourke told him that 
DNA found on the victim belonged to the defendant. 
26 
 
excluded Weir as a contributor to any of the DNA found on the 
victim.  Thus, we can discern no prejudice where the result of 
any confusion that could have occurred was of limited value to 
the defendant and, more importantly, the Commonwealth presented 
substantial other evidence against the defendant. 
 
The defendant argues that the erroneously admitted DNA 
evidence was "critical" because it corroborated Weir's testimony 
naming the defendant as the killer and, for that reason, was 
prejudicial.  We disagree.  First, the defendant gave a version 
of the cause of the scratches on his face to police on the night 
of the murder that was different from the one he testified to at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Montecalvo, 367 Mass. 46, 52 (1975) 
(intentionally false and misleading statements to police 
demonstrate consciousness of guilt).  Additionally, the 
defendant, not Weir, said prior to the murder that he could kill 
the victim in a manner that was almost exactly the same way that 
she died.  The defendant told another friend after the murder 
that it was a "perfect crime."  Lastly, it was the defendant, 
not Weir, who was present at the victim's apartment when the 
police arrived on the night of the murder.  Unlike Mattei, 455 
Mass. at 856, where the DNA evidence was "crucial," the 
Commonwealth provided strong corroborative evidence that the 
defendant had committed the murder.  Accordingly, there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
27 
 
 
The prosecutor's misstatements, which insinuated to the 
jury that the probability of "nonexclusion" in Y-STR results was 
as significant as a "match" in PCR results, compounded the error 
in the admission of the PCR results but added nothing to the 
prejudice calculus sufficient to raise it to a level that would 
entitle the defendant to relief.  In reviewing whether a 
prosecutor's misstatements require reversal, we consider "(1) 
whether the defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error 
was limited to collateral issues or went to the heart of the 
case; (3) what specific or general instructions the judge gave 
to the jury which may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) 
whether the error, in the circumstances, possibly made a 
difference in the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 
Mass. 266, 285 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 
119, 130-131 (2013).  Here, the prosecutor's misstatements do 
not require reversal because trial counsel did not object, the 
judge's instructions mitigated the errors, and the comments were 
not likely to influence the jury's conclusion where, as the 
motion judge found, this "case did not hinge on the DNA 
evidence."  See Wood, supra. 
 
 3.  Admission of Weir's prior consistent statements.  The 
defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in 
28 
 
introducing the audiotapes between Weir and Morel,18 which 
included statements made by Weir naming the defendant as the 
assailant, asserting that he was "in shock" during the attack 
because he never expected it to happen, and limiting his role to 
moving the victim down the stairs and helping to clean up.  
Moreover, Weir indicated on the tape that the defendant 
suggested another murder.  In his motion for new trial, the 
defendant argued that "the tapes added nothing by way of 
impeachment, other than showing Weir's tone of voice," because 
trial counsel effectively cross-examined Weir prior to playing 
the tapes.  The motion judge rejected the defendant's claim, 
concluding that it was not manifestly unreasonable to introduce 
the tapes because "some, if not all, of Weir's statements" would 
have been admissible after the defendant opened the door through 
impeachment.  On appeal, the defendant concedes that the tapes 
were "unflattering" to Weir and therefore disputes that it was 
inevitable that the prosecutor would have played the tapes. 
 
"Impeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught 
with a host of strategic considerations, to which we will, even 
on § 33E review, still show deference."  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
446 Mass. 709, 715 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  "Failure to use a particular method of 
                     
 
18 Before trial, counsel moved to suppress the tapes.  When 
unsuccessful, counsel decided to introduce the entirety of the 
tapes for impeachment purposes. 
29 
 
impeachment does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 696 (2014).  
"[A]bsent counsel's failure to pursue some obviously powerful 
form of impeachment available at trial, it is speculative to 
conclude that a different approach to impeachment would likely 
have affected the jury's conclusion."  Hudson, supra, quoting 
Fisher, supra. 
 
Trial counsel explained that he made a tactical decision to 
introduce the entirety of the tapes because he thought it was 
important for the jury to hear Weir "bragging about what a good 
liar he was and how he could beat a polygraph," and to "hear the 
inflection in his voice" when talking about the murder -- that 
he "laughed" and "joked" about the killing.19  We agree with the 
motion judge that counsel's decision was not manifestly 
unreasonable.  The Commonwealth's case hinged on Weir's 
testimony as it was undisputed that only three people were 
present at the time of the murder -- the defendant, Weir, and 
the victim -- and the defendant and Weir were each pointing the 
finger at the other.  Thus, impeaching Weir's version of events 
was paramount to the defendant's case. 
                     
 
19 Although trial counsel noted that, in hindsight, it may 
have been helpful to redact portions of the tape, at the time of 
trial, he decided "in spite of the effect that the prior 
consistent statement could have had on Weir's testimony," that 
"it was important to hear the whole thing."  He stated that his 
decision was guided by the need to impeach Weir, noting that 
"[t]here was nothing more important." 
30 
 
 
The tapes allowed trial counsel to impeach Weir in multiple 
ways.  First, the tapes impeached Weir's credibility through 
specific examples of Weir's prior misconduct that may not 
otherwise have been admitted.  For example, Weir told Morel that 
he stole $250 per day while working at a doughnut shop.20  The 
prosecutor objected to playing the full tapes on this ground, 
but the trial judge admitted the evidence because trial counsel 
made the tactical decision to offer bad acts of both the 
defendant and Weir that were discussed on the tapes.  Although 
"specific acts of misconduct of a witness, not material to the 
case in which [he] testifies, are ordinarily inadmissible on 
cross-examination to impeach [his] credibility," Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 310 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. 
LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 151 (1993), admissibility "lies in large 
measure in the discretion of the trial judge," LaVelle, supra at 
152, quoting Commonwealth v. McGeoghean, 412 Mass. 839, 841 
(1992).  Although trial counsel impeached Weir with this 
information before playing the tapes, the trial judge had 
allowed the bad act evidence because of counsel's decision to 
play the tapes in full.21 
                     
 
20 The tapes also contained Weir's statements referencing a 
prior arrest, a theft from a "guitar center," and other 
incidents of "B & Es" and "larceny." 
 
 
21 The prosecutor noted that she did not object to this line 
of questioning because of the judge's ruling. 
31 
 
 
Next, the tapes revealed the inflection in Weir's voice 
when talking about the murder and Weir's boasting about his 
ability to lie.  For example, Weir testified that he only helped 
move the victim's body down a couple of the stairs before 
telling the defendant, "I'm not doing this, man, this is all 
you"; but he told Morel that moving the victim's body downstairs 
was "just like lugging a fuckin' bag of potatoes."   
Additionally, Weir told Morel that he could pass a polygraph 
test by "creat[ing] an alternative persona," becoming "a 
different person," and training to "make yourself believe that 
you're someone else." 
 
The defendant argues that the prior consistent statements 
strongly bolstered Weir's credibility because the statements 
were made to a friend.  Offsetting that consideration, however, 
was evidence contained on the tapes demonstrating Weir's motive 
to lie to Morel.  Weir told Morel that he was asked whether he 
and the defendant "killed a lady and then threw her down the 
stairs," a question he suspected arose from Anthony telling a 
friend about the murder.  Considering that Weir told Morel 
numerous times that there was no proof he was at the victim's 
home the day of the murder, and he could only get caught if one 
32 
 
of the three started talking, the rumor implicating Weir in the 
murder provided motive to diminish his involvement.22 
 
The defendant also takes issue with trial counsel playing 
the portion of the tape containing Weir's statement that the 
defendant suggested murdering a "bum."  The context of this 
statement, however, is just as, if not more, harmful to Weir as 
the defendant because Weir immediately followed that statement 
with the admission that he, not the defendant, then assaulted 
the individual. 
 
Although the tapes included statements detrimental to the 
defendant and Weir's prior consistent statements, they provided 
numerous benefits for impeaching Weir's version of events, and 
counsel's strategic choice of method for impeachment was not 
manifestly unreasonable.  See Johnston, 467 Mass. at 696. 
 
4.  Admission of Weir's unredacted plea agreement.  At the 
start of the trial, the judge granted the defendant's motion to 
redact the word "truthfully" from Weir's plea agreement in two 
out of three instances.  During trial, however, trial counsel 
introduced the unredacted plea agreement, noting that he would 
not publish it to the jury until it was properly redacted.  The 
final version submitted to the jury did not have "truthfully" 
redacted.  The judge instructed the jury at least twice that it 
                     
 
22 Shortly before the tapes were played, Weir testified that 
he did not remember hearing this rumor. 
33 
 
was the jury's responsibility to determine whether Weir was 
truthful, regardless of the fact that Weir made an agreement to 
be "truthful." 
 
The defendant argues that the unredacted plea agreement 
violated his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution by providing "extraneous matter" 
to the jury and that trial counsel was ineffective in this 
respect.  The Commonwealth does not dispute that failure to 
redact was an error, but argues that the error did not prejudice 
the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 262 
(1989) ("Repeated references to [a] witness's obligation to tell 
the truth should [be] deleted" from plea agreement). 
 
The defendant's arguments are unavailing.  The two 
references to "truthful" were not extraneous because they were 
cumulative of the one permissible reference.  See Commonwealth 
v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 247-248 (2010), remanded by 133 S. 
Ct. 55 (2012), aff'd, 464 Mass. 580 (2013) (information not 
extraneous when cumulative of evidence at trial).  Moreover, any 
prejudice created by the error was minimized by the judge's 
clear and forceful instructions to the jury that it was "solely 
for the jury to determine" credibility and "whether Mr. Weir's 
testimony [was] truthful or not."  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 
436 Mass. 488, 502 (2002) ("effect of [clear and forceful] 
charge was to dispel any implication inherent in the agreement 
34 
 
that the prosecutor warranted that [the witness] was telling the 
truth").  Accordingly, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice created by the failure to redact the two 
extra references to "truthful" on Weir's plea agreement.  Id. 
 
5.  Testimony regarding the defendant's bad acts.  The 
defendant next argues that the prosecution improperly attacked 
his character through bad act evidence and that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object.  The defendant points to two 
specific examples:  (1) several witnesses testified, in essence, 
that the defendant, Anthony, and Weir "trashed" the victim's 
home after her death and it became in "disarray"; and (2) the 
victim's sister-in-law, who was seventy-eight years old at the 
time of trial, testified that the defendant told her to go "f" 
herself. 
 
Although evidence of prior or subsequent bad acts "may not 
be offered to prove bad character or criminal propensity, such 
evidence may be admitted for another purpose where its probative 
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 815, cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 947 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 
Mass. 635, 641 (2002).  See Commonwealth v. Source One Assocs., 
436 Mass. 118, 129 & n.13 (2002) (principles regarding prior bad 
act evidence applicable to subsequent acts).  Bad act evidence 
may be admitted to show "a common scheme, pattern of operation, 
35 
 
absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent or motive."  
Commonwealth v. Gollman, 436 Mass. 111, 113-114 (2002), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).  Postcrime 
conduct "must be connected with the facts of the case or not be 
too remote in time" to be sufficiently probative.  Commonwealth 
v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 434 (2001), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 (1994). 
 
Without deciding whether the trial judge would have 
sustained an objection to this evidence, the motion judge 
concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
object because the evidence "could not have had appreciable 
significance to the jury's verdict" in light of the evidence 
concerning the "brutal killing of an eighty-four year old woman 
in her home and [the defendant's] methodical actions to make her 
death seem accidental."  We agree. 
 
We discern no error in admission of evidence of the 
condition of the victim's home and the handling of her personal 
possessions.  See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. at 466-467 
(postcrime spending habits relevant to motive and ability to 
"pursue . . . lifestyle freely" after obtaining "control of her 
inheritance").  Moreover, the evidence was correspondingly 
damaging to Weir.  The neighbors testified that they often saw 
the defendant and Weir staying at the home after the murder and 
indicated that both were responsible for the damage.  We assume, 
36 
 
without deciding, that the admission of the defendant's 
statement to the victim's sister-in-law was error.23  We agree, 
however, with the motion judge that this singular comment was 
not likely to affect the jury's verdict where, in addition to 
evidence of the brutal killing, the jury heard evidence that the 
defendant called the victim a "bitch," a "cunt," and a 
"douchebag," and that he made jokes about her death. 
 
6.  Defendant's decision to testify.  The defendant argues 
that it was manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to advise 
him to testify because testifying allowed impeachment through 
evidence of prior inconsistent statements he made the night of 
his arrest.  Counsel acknowledged he was aware of the statements 
but advised the defendant to testify because he believed the 
defendant was innocent and it was the only way to fully present 
the defense that Weir had committed the murder.  The motion 
judge rejected the defendant's claim because of the "strength" 
of the Commonwealth's case. 
                     
 
23 The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was relevant to 
the defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder because 
the defendant's interaction with the victim's sister-in-law 
demonstrated his attitude toward residents at the victim's home.  
The case cited by the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 
Mass. 799 (2014) is inapposite.  In Riley, supra at 818, bad act 
evidence relating to three children all "living in the same 
household [with] no evidence that the defendant treated any of 
his children in a noticeably different manner" was relevant to 
the state of mind regarding only one child.  In this case, 
however, the defendant's actions were toward a relative living 
in a separate apartment within the same building. 
37 
 
 
Where the Commonwealth has a strong case against the 
defendant and advising the defendant to testify may provide the 
only "realistic chance" at acquittal, such advice is not 
manifestly unreasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 
135, 147 (2009).  Additionally, trial counsel testified at the 
motion hearing that he had had many conversations with the 
defendant about whether to testify and that the defendant 
decided to testify after counsel advised him that it was 
ultimately his decision.  The defendant's informed and voluntary 
decision to testify undermines his claim.  Commonwealth v. 
LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 716 (2003).  Advising the defendant to 
testify to his version of events was not manifestly unreasonable 
where compelling evidence corroborated Weir's version. 
 
7.  Prior consistent statements.  The defendant testified 
that he told three friends that Weir had killed the victim.  
During a voir dire, one of those friends testified that the 
defendant said, "[Weir] did it," in front of her and another of 
the friends during the month following the murder.24 
 
The defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call two of the friends as surrebuttal witnesses to 
testify to the defendant's prior consistent statements.  Counsel 
                     
 
24 The voir dire was held because trial counsel sought to 
have the self-serving statements admitted.  The trial judge 
excluded the evidence because there was insufficient evidence 
that Weir had heard the statement. 
38 
 
testified at the motion hearing that he thought that the 
witnesses, based on their trial testimony, may be hostile to the 
defendant.  He conceded however, that the decision not to call 
them was not well thought out.  The motion judge rejected the 
defendant's claim after finding that the decision was strategic 
and concluded that it was not manifestly unreasonable.  We 
agree. 
 
8.  Cumulative effect of the asserted errors.  Last, the 
defendant contends that even if the asserted errors do not 
warrant reversal of his convictions when considered 
independently, their combined effect nonetheless gives rise to a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We reject 
this argument.  Even if we were to agree that all of the 
challenged evidence should not have been admitted, the 
Commonwealth presented other substantial evidence corroborating 
Weir's testimony:  the defendant's presence at the victim's home 
the night of the murder; the scratches on his face and varying 
explanations for the cause; his frequent precrime references to 
killing the victim, sometimes stating the exact method that 
occurred; and his postcrime statement that it was the "perfect 
crime." 
 
9.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
39 
 
§ 33E, and we discern no basis on which to grant the defendant 
relief. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction of murder in the 
first degree is affirmed.  The order denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial is also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.