Title: State v. Rucker

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Terrence Michael Rucker, No. 28
September Term 2002
[Criminal Law: Miranda - Whether Rucker was  in “custody” for purposes of Miranda when,
while getting into his vehicle in a shopping center parking lot he was stopped by three
officers who took his license and registration and asked whether “he ha[d] anything he [was]
not suppose[d] to have.”   Held: The totality of the circumstances of this case did not create
the type of custodial environment which requires that Miranda warnings be given prior to
questioning.]  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 28
September Term, 2002
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
TERRENCE MICHAEL RUCKER
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J. and  Eldridge, J., dissent
Filed:   April 14, 2003
Based on a tip provided by a confidential source that respondent Terrence Michael
Rucker (hereinafter “Rucker”) was involved in narcotics trafficking, police stopped and
questioned him in a shopping center parking lot.  As Rucker was stepping into his vehicle,
a uniformed officer parked his patrol car behind it, approached Rucker, and asked for his
license and registration.  Rucker complied, and within moments, two more officers appeared.
One of those officers asked Rucker whether “he had anything he was not supposed to have.”
Rucker stated that he did, and upon further inquiry, admitted to having cocaine.  After the
police found cocaine on Rucker, he was arrested and charged with possession of  a controlled
dangerous substance with intent to distribute and other offenses.  Prior to trial, Rucker moved
to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom, arguing that police should
have read him Miranda rights before making their inquiries.  Although the suppression court
and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, we do not.  We hold that because Rucker was not
in “custody” for purposes of Miranda when he was stopped and questioned in the shopping
center parking lot, his admissions should not be suppressed for his not having received the
prescribed warnings.  Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Background
Two witnesses testified at the suppression hearing in the instant case: Detective
Melvin Powell and Corporal Anthony Grimes, both from the Prince George’s County Police
Department.  According to Detective Powell, on December 31, 2000, a confidential source
informed him that the source knew of several persons, including Rucker, who were
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distributing crack cocaine in the Capitol Heights and Forestville areas of Prince George’s
County.  The source described Rucker as “dark complected, about six foot tall, a hundred and
eighty-five pounds, [with] a short hair cut.”  The source also told Detective Powell that
Rucker “owned a burgundy Tahoe” and provided the detective with a “a partial tag of the
Tahoe.”  In addition, the source told Detective Powell that on January 2, 2001, Rucker would
be at a shopping center in Forestville at 5:20 in the evening, that he would be driving the
burgundy Tahoe, and that he would be carrying “a quantity of crack cocaine.”  Consequently,
Detective Powell, the source, and a fellow detective by the name of Piazza drove to the
shopping center. 
Shortly after Detectives Powell and Piazza, and the source arrived at the shopping
center, Detective Powell spotted a burgundy Tahoe parked “in front of the Athletic USA
store, exactly where the confidential source said it would be.”  About three minutes later,
Detective Powell saw an individual approaching the vehicle, who was identified by the
source as Rucker.  Detective Powell then contacted Corporal Grimes, who was in the vicinity
in his patrol car, and asked the Corporal to stop Rucker.  
Corporal Grimes parked his patrol car behind the burgundy Tahoe.  There was no
vehicle occupying the space in front of the Tahoe at the time.  As Rucker was getting into
the driver’s side of the Tahoe, Corporal Grimes called to him in an attempt to get his
attention, walked up to him, and requested Rucker’s license and registration.  Rucker asked,
“what’s going on,” the Corporal just repeated his original request, and Rucker subsequently
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complied.  Corporal Grimes was uniformed and armed, but his weapon was not drawn, and
he “made no physical contact with” Rucker. 
After Rucker gave his license and registration to Corporal Grimes, Detectives Powell
and Piazza arrived.  Detective Powell “walked right up” to within two feet of Rucker “and
started asking him questions.”  Detective Piazza, who was “maybe a step behind” Detective
Powell and Corporal Grimes, although still in the immediate area, had stepped away from
Rucker.  Detective Powell asked Rucker “if he had anything that he was not supposed to
have.”  Rucker responded, “[Y]es, I do, it’s in my pocket.”  Detective Powell asked what it
was, and Rucker responded, “cocaine.”  Detective Powell testified that he then placed Rucker
in the “prone” position against the Tahoe and eventually recovered “two large rocks of
cocaine” from Rucker’s pocket.  Rucker then was placed formally under arrest.  “[T]he entire
incident . . . from the time we picked up the source,” according to Detective Powell, lasted
no more than one hour.
After hearing the officers’ testimony and argument from counsel, the Circuit Court
granted Rucker’s motion to suppress his statements and the tangible evidence found during
the search of his person.  In an oral opinion, the judge observed that “everybody concedes,
both from the State and defense side, that there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Rucker
unless one takes into account his statements” and made the following detailed findings of
fact:
Detective Grimes was not involved in the case directly.  He was summonsed
to the scene to go ahead and make a stop . . . .  I use the word stop because
1
Section 12-302 provides in pertinent part: 
(c) In a criminal case, the State may appeal as provided in this subsection.
* * * 
(3) (i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in §
643B of Article 27, and in cases under §§ 286 and 286A of
Article 27, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court
that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return
of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Maryland,
or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
-4-
clearly that’s what happened; he confronted Mr. Rucker as Mr. Rucker was
getting into his vehicle, asked him to basically step outside, regardless of how
it’s stated, provide license and registration.  And as Detective Powell testified,
that was apparently being done when Detective Powell approached the
defendant.  Detective Rucker we know - or Detective Powell has testified, as
did Officer Grimes, that Officer Grimes was in uniform at the time and clearly
one can assume, although it’s not testified to, that he was armed at the time,
albeit, we know nobody had drawn a weapon.
While Detective – Officer Grimes had the defendant in his presence,
Detective Powell approached the defendant, and at this point in time says
something to the effect do you have something on your person that you’re not
suppose to, at which point in time the defendant said yes.  And we know from
this point, forward the defendant’s person was seized after he confided that he
had cocaine on his person. 
Based upon those findings, the judge determined that the “detention of Mr. Rucker
for all intents and purposes” was “an arrest” and concluded that “there was no basis for
Detective Powell to go up to the defendant’s person and start making inquiry without first
mirandizing him.”  
The State filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Maryland Code, § 12-302 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.),1 and the Court of Special
(ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the
defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no
more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall
be diligently prosecuted.
(iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the court
that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the
evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is
substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal
shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the
time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court.
Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final.
-5-
Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion.  Although the intermediate appellate court
determined that the police had initiated a valid Terry stop because they “had a reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop appellee ” based on the information provided by the confidential
source, it also concluded that “what occurred after the stop changed the character of the
event.”  According to the Court of Special Appeals, “[T]he events in the shopping mall
parking lot exceeded an investigatory stop under Terry, and became the functional equivalent
[to] a de facto arrest,” requiring Miranda warnings.
We granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 369 Md. 301, 799 A.2d 1262
(2002), to consider the following question:
Where the police very briefly detained Rucker on a public street
without any display of force, should the Court of Special
Appeals’ decision, which found “the functional equivalent of a
de facto arrest” for purposes of Miranda and accordingly
affirmed the grant of Rucker’s suppression motion, be
summarily reversed in light of this Court’s opinion in In re
David S. , 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 (2002)?
-6-
For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that Rucker was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda when he was stopped and questioned in the shopping center parking lot and so was
not entitled to the procedural warnings prescribed by that case.  Consequently, we shall
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
II.
Standard of Review
Our review of an order granting a motion to suppress evidence is ordinarily “limited
to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”  Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447,457, 788
A.2d 646, 651 (2002)(citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)).
In conducting our analysis, we view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, which in this
case, was Rucker.  Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000).  We pay
deference to the trial court’s factual findings, upholding them unless “they are clearly
erroneous.”  Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651-52 (citing Wengert v. State, 364 Md.
76, 84, 771 A.2d 389, 394 (2001)). “[We] must make an independent constitutional
evaluation,” however, “by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts and
circumstances of the case.”  Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651 (citing Wilkes v. State,
364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001); Stokes v State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d
612, 615 (2001); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 489, 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997)).
In determining whether there was custody for purposes of Miranda, we accept the trial
court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509, 514-15, 551
-7-
A.2d 875, 877 (1989).  “We must, however, make an independent constitutional appraisal
of the record to determine the correctness of the trial judge’s decision concerning custody.”
Id. at 515, 551 A.2d at 878.
III.
Discussion
Over twenty years ago, this Court explained that, “[a] determination of whether
custodial questioning has occurred requires, in the first instance, a finding that the defendant
was in ‘custody,’ as that term is defined in the Miranda opinion.”  Whitfield v. State, 287
Md.124, 137-38, 411 A.2d 415, 423-24 (1980).  The Miranda opinion, however, gave little
guidance as to what it meant by “custody”, only cryptically stating that “custodial
interrogation”  is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).  Consequently, as
Judge Digges, speaking for the Court, observed in Whitfield, the determination of whether
there has been “custodial interrogation” has “been described as ‘probably the most difficult
and frequently raised question in the wake of Miranda.”  Id. at 126, 411 A.2d at 417 (quoting
Kamisar, “Custodial Interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda, Criminal Law and the
Constitution: Sources and Commentaries 335 (1968)).  
Turning to face that task, the 
Whitfield 
Court reasoned that, “[d]eciding when a person
has been significantly deprived of his freedom of action so as to be in custody within the
meaning of Miranda depends on the factual setting surrounding the interrogation in each
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case.”  Id. at 139, 411 A.2d at 424.  “The majority of courts which have explicitly addressed
this question,” we noted, “have adopted an objective reasonable person approach to
determining custody.”  Id. 411 A.2d at 425 (citations omitted).  As to that approach, we
explained that 
custody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a reasonable
person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of
action or movement under pressures of official authority. 
* * *
[T]he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator but
upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in
which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
movement is restricted by such interrogation.
Id. at 140, 411 A.2d at 425 (quoting Myers v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 537, 240 A.2d 288, 290
(1968))(emphasis added).  We further stated that
in the absence of actual arrest, ‘custody for purposes of Miranda
occurs when something [is] said or done by the authorities,
either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of
their questioning, which indicates that they would not have
heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so.
Id. at 140-41, 411 A.2d at 425 (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir.
1969)).  “[S]ome actual indication of custody must exist, such that a reasonable person would
feel he was not free to leave and break off police questioning.”  Id. at 141, 411 A.2d at 425.
We then set forth factors that may be relevant to a determination of custody for purposes of
Miranda, stating that a court should consider
those facts intrinsic to the interrogation: when and where it
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occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present,
what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of
actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to
actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at
the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a
suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the
interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got
to the place of questioning -- whether he came completely on his
own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police
officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation --
whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested --
may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a
reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the
questioning. 
Id.  (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)).
Since Miranda, and since our opinion in Whitfield, the Supreme Court has refined
what it meant by “custody.”  In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517,
3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that, “[a]lthough the
circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is
‘in custody’ for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” (per curiam)(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.492,
495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)).  Seven years later, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335 (1984), the Court declared, “It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’” (quoting Beheler,
463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1279.)  The court also emphasized that
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“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation.”  Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336.  That definition
of custody was reiterated by the Court in Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct.
1526, 128 L.Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (per curiam), where it explained, in language echoing that of
Beheler, that “[i]n determining whether an individual [is] in custody, a court must examine
all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there [was] a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.’”  Id. at 322, 114 S.Ct. at 1528-29, 128 L.Ed 2d at 298.
Further, the Court reemphasized that the “determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”  Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529, 128
L.Ed.2d at 298.  Review of the objective circumstances to determine custody was reinforced
as recently as 1995 when the Court decided Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct.
457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995), in which Justice Ginsburg speaking for the Court stated: 
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first,
what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players'
lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an
objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "[was] there a
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest." 
Id. at 112, 116 S.Ct. at 465, 133 L.Ed.2d at 394 (footnote and citations omitted)(emphasis
-11-
added).
As a result of the Supreme Court’s refinement of the definition of custody, subsequent
cases from other state courts of last resort have iterated that custody exists when there is a
“‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.”  See, e.g., State v. Spreitz, 945 P.2d 1260, 1274 (Ariz. 1997); Fairchild v. State, 76
S.W.3d 884, 890 (Ark. 2002); People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 470 (Cal. 1998); People v.
Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002); State v. Pinder, 736 A.2d 857, 872 (Conn. 1999);
Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 456 (D.C. 2002); Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568,
573 (Fla. 1999); Cook v. State, 561 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Ga. 2002); State v. Ketchum, 34 P.3d
1006, 1023 (Haw. 2001); State v. Doe, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 ( Idaho 2002);  Loving v. State,
647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995); In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1996); State
v. Maise, 805 So.2d 1141, 1149-50 (La. 2002); State v. Higgins, 796 A.2d 50, 54 (Me. 2002);
Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Mass. 2001); State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d
1, 3 (Minn. 1998); State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (N.C. 1997); State v. Sabinash, 574
N.W.2d 827, 830 (N.D. 1998); State v. Biros, 678 N.E.2d 891, 904 (Ohio 1997); State v.
Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 240 (R.I. 2002); State v. Hoadley, 651 N.W.2d 249, 256 ( S.D.
2002); State v. M unn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 498 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144,
1146 (Utah 1996); State v. Willis, 494 A.2d 108, 117 (Vt. 1985); State v. Post, 826 P.2d 172,
178 (Wash. 1992); State v. George, 408 S.E.2d 291, 297 (W. Va. 1991); State v. Swanson,
475 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Wis. 1991). 
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In the present case, the question, then, is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest in the situation before
us.  The State contends Rucker was not in custody, and in support of that contention, argues
that Rucker was detained pursuant to a routine Terry stop, and that the stop, contrary to the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals, did not develop into a “de facto” arrest.  Rucker
counters by arguing that the police were not justified in making the stop because they lacked
reasonable suspicion.  Even if the stop was justified, however, Rucker claims that he still was
in custody for purposes of Miranda and, therefore, was entitled to the safeguards prescribed
by that case.
For the reasons discussed hereinafter, we conclude that under the circumstances of
this case, the stop of Rucker was a brief investigatory stop and had remained so when Rucker
told the police that he had cocaine.  Rucker was not in custody for purposes of Miranda
because he was not restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest.  Accordingly,
Miranda warnings were not required before the police asked Rucker whether he had anything
illegal.
Rucker’s contention that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, is without
merit.  In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme
Court established that police may conduct brief investigatory stops if “there is a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity.”  Nathan v. State,
370 Md. 648, 660, 805 A.2d 1086, 1093 (2002).  Reasonable suspicion is an elusive concept;
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the Supreme Court “has deliberately avoided reducing it to a uniform set of legal rules.”  Id.
at 663, 805 A.2d at 1095 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151
L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)).  What is clear, however, is that although it is “a less demanding
standard than probable cause,” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct.
673, 675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)); see also David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612
(reasonable suspicion is “a common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual
and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act”)(quoting,
Stokes, 362 Md. at 415, 765 A.2d at 616), a stop can be considered a Terry stop even if the
information the police have could more than satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001)(rejecting district court’s conclusion
that a stop was not a valid Terry stop because officers had probable cause to arrest defendant
and must have intended to do so).
What is also clear is that reasonable suspicion may arise from information provided
by an informant.  See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380, 146
L.Ed.2d 254, 262 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417, 110
L.Ed. 2d 301, 310 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32
L.Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 289, 753 A.2d 519, 528 (2000);
State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 379, 568 A.2d 48, 56 (1990); Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430,
437, 572 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1990); Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 657, 537 A.2d 235, 242 (1988);
Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 608, 420 A.2d 270, 276 (1980).  Information furnished by an
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informant must be sufficiently reliable in order to provide reasonable suspicion justifying an
investigatory stop.  White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 110 L.Ed. 2d at 309.  In
determining reliability, we look at the “totality of the circumstances.”  White, 496 U.S. at
328, 110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)(adopting Gates’ “totality of circumstances” test for reasonable
suspicion analysis even though Gates dealt with whether tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant)); Lemmon, 318 Md. at 379, 568 A.2d at 55; Lee, 311 Md. at 654-55,
537 A.2d at 240.  In looking at the totality of the circumstances, we consider an informant’s
“veracity, reliability,” and his or her “basis of knowledge.”  White, 496 U.S. at 328, 110 S.Ct.
at 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 76 L.Ed. 2d
at 543).  Rather than being treated independently, these factors must be viewed as interacting
components in the totality of the circumstances analysis: “a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the
other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”  Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 76
L.Ed. 2d at 545.  
Rucker contends that the tip in the instant case failed to provide police with reasonable
suspicion because there was no evidence as to the source’s basis of knowledge, reliability or
veracity.  In support of that contention, Rucker points out that the source had not provided
information to the police in the past, and asserts that the police’s corroboration of the details
of the tip failed to exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability because the verified information was
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“commonly available to any number of persons.”  Rucker’s arguments are without merit.
That the source had not provided police with information in the past is offset by the fact that
the source was known to the police, and by the quantity and quality of details provided by
the informant’s tip, many of which were later verified by police.  
Whether a source is known to police or not is highly probative in determining whether
the tip provided by the source is reliable enough to amount to reasonable suspicion.  Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. at 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260; (“Unlike a tip from a known
informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her
allegations turn out to be fabricated . . . an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.”)(citations and internal quotations omitted).  The
source in the instant case was not anonymous; the source actually went with the police to the
shopping center when they stopped Rucker.  
Also important in determining the reliability of a tip is the amount and type of details
provided therein.  White, 496 U.S. at 328-32, 110 S.Ct. at 2415-17, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308-10
(concluding that anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion, noting the high level of
details in tip, later verified by police, as well as predictive nature of details); Gates, 462 U.S.
at 242-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2334-36, 76 L.Ed.2d at 550-53 (stating that the level of detail in an
anonymous letter, later verified by police, as well as the fact that the details pertained to
future actions not easily predicted, provided probable cause to support a search warrant);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 332
-16-
(1959)(stating that warrantless search and seizure was legal because when officer had
verified most details provided by informant, officer “had ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that
the remaining unverified bit of [the informant’s] information – that [the defendant] would
have the heroin with him  – was likewise true”); Lee, 311 Md. at 655, 537 A.2d at 241
(determining that information from anonymous source provided reasonable suspicion, and
in doing so, reasoning that a “good deal of specific information [was] reported to police,”
which they were able to verify, and that the information related to “future actions of third
parties”).  In the instant case the source gave very detailed information.  With respect to
Rucker’s physical appearance, the source told police that he was “dark complected, about six
foot tall, a hundred and eighty-five pounds, [with] a short hair cut.”  The source also told
Detective Powell that Rucker “owned a burgundy Tahoe” and provided the detective with
“a partial tag of the Tahoe.”  In addition, the source told Detective Powell that on January
2, 2001, Rucker would be at a shopping center in Forestville at 5:20 in the evening, that he
would be driving the burgundy Tahoe, and that he would be carrying “a quantity of crack
cocaine.”  The detail here is further compelling because it is predictive, and thus, contrary
to Rucker’s assertion, the fact that Rucker would be at a specific shopping center parking lot
on a particular day and at a particular time in the future, is not information that would be
commonly known to a number of people.  Thus, in light of the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the information provided by the confidential source was sufficiently reliable
so as to provide the police with reasonable suspicion to stop Rucker.  
-17-
The Court of Special Appeals, however, found that the scope of the stop was
unreasonable and, therefore, had become a “de facto arrest.”  The State contends that the
intermediate appellate court erred in so concluding, and argues that the court’s decision
should be “summarily reversed in light of [our] opinion in In re David S. , 367 Md. 523, 789
A.2d 607 (2002).”  We agree that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that
Rucker was subjected to a “de facto” arrest, but not necessarily because of our decision in
In re David S. 
In that case, “several police officers conducted a ‘hard take down’” of David S.  Id.
at 539, 789 A.2d at 616.  “The officers, with their weapons drawn, forced respondent to the
ground and placed him in handcuffs.”  Id. They did so because one of the officers had
previously observed David S. place an object into his waistband that the officer suspected
was a gun. Id. Under those circumstances, we held that “the stop was a legitimate Terry stop,
not tantamount to an arrest.” Id. We explained that although the officer’s conduct was a
“severe form of intrusion,” it was “not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could
have suspected the respondent posed a threat to their safety.”  Id.  at 539-40, 789 A.2d at 616.
The State asserts that in light of the “severe form of intrusion” that we allowed in David S.,
the circumstances of the present case surely did not amount to an arrest.  The facts of David
S. are inapposite, however.
The only reason we found the detention in David S. “not unreasonable” was because
the police believed that David S. had a gun in his waistband. id. at 539, 789 A.2d at 616.
-18-
Balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion,” we concluded that the hard take
down was warranted in order to protect the officers’ safety.  Id. at 533, 539, 789 A.2d at 612-
13, 616 (quoting, United States v. Hursley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83
L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)).  Nonetheless, David S. is valuable to our analysis, because it discusses
principles for determining whether a Terry stop has matured into an arrest.
In David S., we stated that, “[i]n evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop, the
Supreme Court adopted a dual inquiry: ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.’” Id. at 532-33, 789 A.2d at 612.  Further,  “[i]n
determining whether an investigatory stop is in actuality an arrest requiring probable cause,
courts consider the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”  Id. at 535, 789 A.2d at 614.  In so doing,
“no one factor is dispositive.” Id. The stop must be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first  place.” Id. at 533, 789 A.2d at 612.
The officers in the instant case stopped Rucker and asked him whether he had
anything illegal after learning from a confidential source that Rucker would be at a shopping
center parking lot at 5:20 p.m. on January 2, 2001, that he would be driving a burgundy
Tahoe, and that he would be carrying cocaine.  One officer parked his cruiser behind
Rucker’s vehicle and asked Rucker for his license and registration.  Moments later, two
detectives approached, one of whom asked a single question, namely, whether Rucker had
-19-
anything that he should not have.  Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals,
these circumstances did not amount to an arrest.  Rather, the conduct of the officers in
effectuating the stop was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.”  Id.  They stopped Rucker to determine whether he had
cocaine, and there was nothing unreasonable about the way in which they did so.  Thus,
Rucker’s detention began as a brief investigatory stop, and remained so when Rucker
admitted to having cocaine. 
Our inquiry, however, is not at an end, for Rucker contends that even if his detention
amounted only to a brief, investigatory stop, he was still entitled to Miranda warnings.  In
support of that contention, Rucker maintains that a person may be in custody for purposes
of Miranda even though the person has not been arrested.  This is so, according to Rucker,
because the distinction between a “brief, investigatory stop” and an “arrest” under the Fourth
Amendment turns on the reasonableness of police conduct in light of all the circumstances,
whereas a custody determination for purposes of Miranda focuses on how a reasonable
person in the suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation.  We have
determined, however, that Rucker’s detention, before he admitted to having cocaine,
amounted to nothing more than a brief, investigatory stop.  The Supreme Court, and this
Court, have declared that brief, investigatory stops are not custodial for purposes of Miranda.
In  Berkemer, the Supreme Court concluded that a “routine traffic”stop, because it is
more like a Terry stop than an arrest, does not require Miranda warnings. 469 U.S. at 440,
-20-
104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 334-35.  In so concluding, the Court reasoned that traffic
stops, are “presumptively temporary and brief,” id. at 437, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d at
333, and that the “circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the
motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.”  Id. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 3149, 82
L.Ed.2d at 333.  Although there is still an “aura of authority” during a traffic stop, the Court
found that that aura is diffused because, “most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public.”
Id. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d at 334.  “This exposure to public view,” the Court
explained, “both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means
to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist’s fear that, if he does not
cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.” Id.  Thus, the Court concluded that “the
atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less ‘police dominated’ than
that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself . . . and in the
subsequent cases in which we have applied Miranda.” Id. at 438-39, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-50,
82 L.Ed.2d at 334.  The Court, however, did qualify its conclusion that brief investigatory
stops do not require Miranda warnings, stating that, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.”  Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 335.  In making the custody
determination, the Court reiterated that the proper inquiry is whether there was a restraint on
freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest, and that “the only relevant
-21-
inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his
situation.”  Id. at 441-42, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336.  
Various federal courts, both before and after Berkemer was decided , have concluded
that brief investigatory detentions similar to the detention in the instant case do not constitute
custody for purposes of Miranda.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 218-19 (1st
Cir. 1999)(holding that officers’ stop of defendants, based on tip and personal observations,
was not custodial as it occurred on public highway, only one officer questioned each of the
defendants, no physical restraint was used, the stop was brief, and the questions asked were
few and specifically directed to the justification for making the stop); United States v. Wyatt,
179 F.3d 532 , 536-37 (7th Cir. 1999)(declining to find custody when, based on tip and
independent investigation, officers identified bank robbery suspect in bar and asked suspect
to step outside where he was questioned and frisked in well-lit public area with no use of
physical restraint); United States v. Guerrero-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir.
1996)(holding there was no custody when INS agents, during course of investigation to find
illegal aliens, sought, encountered, and questioned defendant “outdoors, in a public place,
without displaying firearms”); United States v. Grady, 665 F.2d 831, 833-34 (8th Cir.
1981)(holding there was no custody when officer asked defendant in liquor store to
accompany officer to parking lot and asked him if counterfeit bills belonged to him).    
In light of the teachings of Berkemer, this Court decided in McAvoy, that the
defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to being asked to perform field sobriety
-22-
tests after a traffic stop.  314 Md. at 510, 551 A.2d at 875.  In that case, a Maryland State
Trooper was forced off the road at night when the defendant, while turning onto the road at
an intersection, swept into the Trooper’s lane. Id. at 510-11, 551 A.2d at 875.  After stopping
the defendant, the Trooper asked him if he was aware of the sign at the intersection
prohibiting right turns on red. Id. at 511, 551 A.2d at 875-76.  Because the defendant insisted
there was no such sign, the Trooper suggested that they return to the intersection, and both
did so driving their respective vehicles.  Id. at 511, 551 A.2d at 876.  Once there, as they
were parked in a lighted parking lot, the Trooper noticed the defendant had watery eyes, a
flush complexion, and the odor of alcohol on his breath. Id. Consequently, he asked the
defendant to perform some field sobriety tests.  After failing those tests, the Trooper placed
the defendant under arrest for driving while intoxicated.  Id.  The Circuit Court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress; he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at 513, 551 A.2d at 877.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and so did we. Id.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Berkermer, we declared that the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s traffic stop, “were not of a kind likely to exert
pressure upon McAvoy sufficient to impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination.”  Id. at 516, 551 A.2d at 878.  Although the stop in McAvoy was of a longer
duration, we reasoned that it was still “brief and non-threatening.” Id.  We paid particular
note to the facts that the defendant returned to the intersection in his own car, that the parking
lot was open to the public, and that it was well lit.  Id. at 516-17, 551 A.2d at 878; see also
-23-
Jones v. State, 132 Md. App. 657, 666-72, 753 A.2d 587, 592-95 (2000)(discussing
Berkemer and concluding that questioning during brief investigative stop on public street
while potential eyewitness brought to scene not custodial for purposes of Miranda).
The circumstances of the instant case were no more coercive.  Rucker was subjected
to a brief investigatory stop; his freedom of movement was not curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest.  Rucker was not isolated in a police-dominated atmosphere
when he was questioned by police.  Indeed, it was 5:20 in the evening in the public parking
lot of a local shopping center.  Additionally, the detention was brief.  According to Detective
Powell, the entire incident, beginning when the detectives picked up the informant and
ending when Rucker gave his statement, lasted less than one hour.  There were three officers
on the scene, but Corporal Grimes stepped away from Rucker when Detectives Powell and
Piazza approached.  Although the Corporal did take Rucker’s license and registration, their
return was not conditioned upon Rucker’s cooperation with the police, and no officer ever
told Rucker that he would not return the documents.  Further, of the three officers, only one
of them asked Rucker a single question before he admitted to having cocaine, namely,
whether he had anything that he should not have.  Moreover, no officer drew any weapons,
and Rucker was not handcuffed or actually physically restrained until after he admitted to
having cocaine.
Consequently, Rucker’s detention was more like a routine traffic stop than an arrest,
and after the stop, he was not, as stated by the Supreme Court in Berkemer, “subjected to
-24-
treatment that render[ed] him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes,” which would have
“entitled him to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” 468 U.S. at 440, 104
S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 335.  Indeed, the question asked of him was no more coercive
than asking a motorist whether he or she has been drinking or is in possession of weapons
or drugs, which are permissible to ask without Miranda warnings.  See  McAvoy, 314 Md.
at 510, 551 A.2d at 875.  Moreover, other jurisdictions have declined to find “custody” for
purposes of Miranda when, like here, a brief, investigatory stop is conducted in a public
place. 
Thus, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Rucker was not entitled
to Miranda warnings when he was stopped and questioned.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.   CASE REMANDED TO
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
GRANTING 
RESPONDENT’S 
MOTION 
TO
SUPPRESS, AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
RESPONDENT. 
Dissenting Opinion follows:
-25-
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 28
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
TERRENCE MICHAEL RUCKER
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J., in which Eldridge, J.
joins.
Filed:    April 14, 2003
2
  The Court of Special Appeals did not agree entirely with the trial court’s reasoning,
however.   In its unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that, although the
initial stop was based on “a reasonable articulable suspicion” and, thus,  pursuant to Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968),  “the events in the shopping
mall parking lot exceeded an investigatory stop under Terry, and became the functional
equivalent to a de facto arrest,” requiring that the warnings prescribed in  Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966)   be given before questioning
of the respondent began.  By contrast, the trial court concluded that “there was no basis for
Detective Powell to go up to the defendant’s person and start making inquiry without first
mirandizing him.”   This conclusion was based on the following factual findings: 
“Detective Grimes was not involved in the case directly.  He was summonsed
to the scene to go ahead and make a stop . . . .  I use the word stop because
that’s what happened: he confronted Mr. Rucker as Mr. Rucker was getting
into his vehicle, asked him to basically step outside, regardless of how it’s
stated, provide license and registration.  And as Detective Powell testified, that
was apparently being done when Detective Powell approached the defendant.
Detective Rucker we know - or Detective Powell has testified, as did Officer
Grimes, that Officer Grimes was in uniform at the time and clearly one can
assume, although its not testified to, that he was armed at the time, albeit, we
know nobody had drawn a weapon.
“While Detective – Officer Grimes had the defendant in his presence,
Detective Powell approached the defendant, and at this point in time says
something to the effect do you have something on your person that you’re not
supposed to, at which point in time the defendant says yes.  And we know
from this point, forward the defendant’s person was seized after he confided
that he had cocaine on his person.”
Thus, the intermediate appellate court and the trial court agreed on the issue of whether there
was an arrest.
The majority errs in the case sub judice because it does not give the proper amount
of deference to the trial court’s determination, inherently fact-based, appropriately affirmed
by the Court of Special Appeals,2 that, when questioned by the police, Terrence Michael
Rucker, the respondent, had been detained, was in custody, which detention “for all intents
and purposes” was “an arrest.”   Instead, the majority substitutes its judgment for that of the
trial court and “finds” that no custodial interrogation took place warranting the giving of
3
  The State conceded at the suppression hearing that there was nothing that the
respondent did or said that elevated the reasonable and articulable suspicion to probable
cause.  In fact, the State admits that the respondent’s incriminatory statement is the sole basis
for his arrest and subsequent search.
-2-
Miranda warnings.  Moreover, of great significance to it is the fact that the respondent’s
incriminatory admission was in response to a single question asked by one of the detectives
during a “Terry stop.”   Thus, the majority “hold[s] that Rucker was not in custody for
purposes of Miranda when he was stopped and questioned in the shopping center parking lot
and so was not entitled to the procedural warnings prescribed by that case.”  State v. Rucker,
___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2003) [slip op. at 6].    Viewed in their entirety, and
in context, I am satisfied that the events that occurred in the parking lot of the shopping mall,
and especially the manner in which the stop was orchestrated and effected, did far exceed an
investigatory Terry stop. Thus, I agree with the trial court and the intermediate appellate
court, the evidence seized from the respondent must be suppressed.3   Accordingly, I dissent
I.
As the majority correctly points out, an appellate court’s review of an order granting
a motion to suppress evidence ordinarily is “limited to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing.”  See ___ Md. at ___, ____ A.2d at ____ [slip op. at 6], (quoting Carter
v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788 A.2d 646, 651 (2002), which in turn cited  Ferris v. State,
355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)).  And, while, as the majority points out, id. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 6], “[w]e make an independent constitutional evaluation by
reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts and circumstances of the case,”
-3-
Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651 (citing Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569 774 A.2d
420, 429 (2001); Stokes v State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001); In re Tariq
A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 489, 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997)), as the majority further acknowledges,
“we pay deference to the trial court’s factual findings, upholding them unless ‘they are
clearly erroneous.’” Id., citing Carter v. State, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651-652.
Furthermore, we  are required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably may
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion.  Id.,
citing Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 524 (2000).  As I shall demonstrate,
the majority all but disregards these principles in practice; it pays only lip service to them in
deciding this case.
Miranda warnings  need not be given before asking the defendant any questions unless
the defendant is in custody.   In Miranda, the Court characterized “custodial interrogation”
as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”    Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 ,16 L. Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966).    Thus,
the threshold inquiry, and determination, in every case involving the issue of the propriety
of giving or not giving Miranda warnings is whether there was, in that case, a custodial
interrogation.    Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 137-38, 411 A.2d 415, 423-24 (1980).  
“[T]he inquiry,” we have said, “is a highly fact-specific one,” Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356,
377, 735 A.2d 491, 502 (1999), and the test, an objective one, involves assessing the totality
-4-
of the circumstances of an encounter or interrogation from the perspective of a reasonable
person.  Id. at 376, 735 A.2d at 501; Whitfield, 287 Md. at 139, 411 A.2d at 425. Factors that
may be probative when applying the test in the context of the case sub judice were recently
identified and discussed in Ferris:
“the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and
whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a
different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was
informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the
person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person's
documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical
contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free
to leave.”
355 Md. at 377, 735 A.2d at 502, citing United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1275-76
(7th Cir. 1993);  United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989).     
To be sure, as we acknowledged in Ferris, 355 Md. at 374, 735 A.2d at 500, “a seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389
(1991).   On the other hand, Bostick recognizes, id. at 437, 111 S. Ct. at 2387, 115 L. Ed.2d
at 400, as have we, that “[i]f the police, in some way, communicate to a reasonable person
that he or she was not free to ignore the police presence and go about their business, then the
Fourth Amendment is implicated.”  Ferris, 355 Md. at 375, 735 A.2d at 501.  We have
explained:
“A seizure can occur by means of physical force, or show of authority along
with submission to the assertion of authority. [California v.] Hodari D., 499
U.S. [621,] 625-26, 111 S. Ct. [1547,]1550 [,113 L. Ed.2d 690, 696-697
-5-
(1991)] (noting that police officers could affect a seizure of a person by either
physical force or by a show of authority along with submission to the assertion
of authority); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.
16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (‘Only when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a “‘seizure’ has occurred.’”).  If a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave, no seizure occurred.  Conversely, if a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to stay, a seizure took place.  The focus,
then, is ‘whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111
S. Ct. at 2387.  The key inquiry has also been characterized as whether ‘the
police conduct would “have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’”   Id.
at 437, 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
569, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1977, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988)).”
Id. at 375-76, 735 A.2d at 501.  We made a similar point, albeit under quite different
circumstances, in Whitfield.   In that case, we observed that custody for Miranda purposes
exists: “‘[i]n the absence of actual arrest, [when] something [is] said or done by the
authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning,
which indicates that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect
to do so.’” 287 Md. at 140-41, 411 A.2d at 425, quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540,
545 (2d Cir. 1969).  
Detectives Powell and Piazza, having come to the shopping mall parking lot where
the respondent was, and his vehicle parked, and rather than stopping the respondent
themselves, summonsed a uniformed officer who was in the vicinity in his patrol car, and had
him to do so.  The manner in which that officer made the stop and the detectives’ subsequent
appearance and involvement are quite telling and instructive.   The uniformed officer,
-6-
Corporal Grimes, parked his patrol car behind the respondent’s vehicle.   As the respondent
was about to get into the driver’s side of his vehicle, Corporal Grimes called to him to get
his attention and then walked up to him, demanding the respondent’s licence and registration.
Naturally wanting to know why a uniformed officer would demand his license and
registration when he was not operating the vehicle, the respondent responded, “what’s going
on.”   Rather than respond to that reasonable question, the Corporal simply repeated the prior
demand.  The respondent gave the corporal his license and registration.  After Corporal
Grimes had the respondent’s license and registration, Detectives Powell and Piazza came on
the scene.  Detective Powell “walked right up” to within two feet of Rucker “and started
asking him questions,” while Detective Piazza, “maybe a step behind” Detective Powell
remained in the immediate area, as did Corporal Grimes.     It was under these circumstances
that the respondent responded to Detective Powell’s inquiry whether “he had anything that
he was not supposed to have,” with an incriminating, “yes, I do, it’s in my pocket,” later
identifying “it” as cocaine.
Having heard the testimony and having had the opportunity to assess the witnesses’
credibility, the trial judge found:
“Detective Grimes was not involved in the case directly.  He was summonsed
to the scene to go ahead and make a stop . . . .  I use the word stop because
that’s what happened: he confronted Mr. Rucker as Mr. Rucker was getting
into his vehicle, asked him to basically step outside, regardless of how it’s
stated, provide license and registration.  And as Detective Powell testified, that
was apparently being done when Detective Powell approached the defendant.
Detective Rucker we know - or Detective Powell has testified, as did Officer
Grimes, that Officer Grimes was in uniform at the time and clearly one can
-7-
assume, although its not testified to, that he was armed at the time, albeit, we
know nobody had drawn a weapon.
“While Detective – Officer Grimes had the defendant in his presence,
Detective Powell approached the defendant, and at this point in time says
something to the effect do you have something on your person that you’re not
suppose to, at which point in time the defendant says yes.  And we know from
this point, forward the defendant’s person was seized after he confided that he
had cocaine on his person.”
As we have seen, the trial judge concluded that the respondent had been, for all intents and
purposes, arrested.    In short, the court determined that the respondent was in custody when
Detective Powell asked the question that elicited the incriminatory response.   The Court of
Special Appeals essentially agreed, quibbling only with whether a stop, properly limited and
effected, could have been made.
Whether a suspect is in custody, has been arrested or subjected to a de facto arrest is
inherently a question of fact, properly decided by the trial court.  In McAvoy v. State, 314
Md. 509, 551 A.2d 875 (1989), the issue, raised at the suppression hearing, was whether
Miranda warnings were required to be given to a drunk driving defendant before he was
asked to perform  field sobriety tests. Id. at 510, 551 A.2d at 875.    We accepted  the finding
of the trial judge that the defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when the
tests were conducted, noting that the trial court heard conflicting testimony bearing on the
issue, resolving the conflicts in that testimony in favor of the State.  Id. at 514, 551 A.2d at
877.    This was required by well settled principles: the credibility of a witness is primarily
for the trier of fact to decide, and findings of fact of a trial judge are accepted unless clearly
4
  Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides
“(c) Action Tried Without a Jury.  When an action has been tried without a jury, the
appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.  It will not set
aside the judgement of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and
will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
witnesses.”
-8-
erroneous.  Id. at 514-515, 551 A.2d at 877, citing Maryland Rule 8-131(c).4  We recognized,
however, citing In Re Anthony F., 293 Md. 146, 152, 442 A.2d 975, 979 (1982),  that
“[a]rmed with the facts properly found by the trial judge, we must . . . make an independent
constitutional appraisal of the record to determine the correctness of the trial judge’s decision
concerning custody.”  McAvoy, supra, 314 Md. at 515, 551 A.2d at 877-878 (emphasis
added).”   The majority agrees with the McAvoy approach, indeed, relies on it, having cited
to that case with approval, on this very point.
In the instant case, whether the respondent was in custody when he made the
incriminatory remark was the critical issue to be decided at the suppression hearing.
Detective Powell and Corporal Grimes testified at that suppression hearing.  In this case,
because there was no actual arrest until after the recovery of the cocaine, the question to be
answered was whether the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would have felt
that he or she was in custody.  After, evaluating the testimony adduced at the hearing, the
trial judge found that the respondent was in custody, thus either rejecting that which
supported that he was not or drawing inferences from the evidence that supported the factual
conclusion that the trial judge made.  Put another way, the trial judge found that the officers’
conduct in the parking lot exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop under Terry, and was,
5
Clearly, the stop of the respondent is distinguishable from a routine traffic stop.  The
respondent was stopped and ordered to produce identification before even entering, not to
mention operating, his vehicle.   His wanting to know what was going on was, therefore,
understandable and required an answer.   At least as important, routine traffic stops typically
do not result in the arrival of plain clothed detectives, to whom the stopping officer defers
-9-
in actuality, a de facto arrest, thus triggering the respondent’s entitlement to Miranda
warnings. The trial court’s determination is entitled to deference and, in any event, should
not easily be ignored.
    Although it professes to do so, the majority  fails to accept the trial court’s findings
of fact and, in fact, views the sequence of events surrounding the respondent’s arrest quite
differently than did the trial court.   As characterized by the majority, the police-respondent
encounter was not at all coercive:
“Rucker was subjected to a brief investigatory stop; his freedom of movement
was not curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.  Rucker was not
isolated in a police-dominated atmosphere when he was questioned by police.
Indeed, it was 5:20 in the evening in the public parking lot of a local shopping
center.  Additionally, the detention was brief.  According to Detective Powell,
the entire incident, beginning when the detectives picked up the informant and
ending when Rucker gave his statement, lasted less than one hour.  There were
three officers on the scene, but Corporal Grimes stepped away from Rucker
when Detectives Powell and Piazza approached.  Although the Corporal did
take Rucker’s license and registration, their return was not conditioned upon
Rucker’s cooperation with the police, and no officer ever told Rucker that he
would not return the documents.  Further, of the three officers, only one of
them asked Rucker a single question before he admitted to having cocaine,
namely, whether he had anything that he should not have.  Moreover, no
officer drew any weapons, and Rucker was not handcuffed or actually
physically restrained until after he admitted to having cocaine.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 22-23]. According to the majority, therefore: 
“Rucker’s detention was more like a routine traffic stop than an arrest,[5] and
upon their initiation of questioning.  
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after the stop he was not, as stated by the Supreme Court in Berkemer [,v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)], ‘subjected
to treatment that render[ed] him “in custody” for practical purposes,’ which
would have ‘entitled him to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.’   Indeed, the question asked of him was no more coercive than
asking a motorist whether he or she has been drinking or is in possession of
weapons or drugs, which are permissible to ask without Miranda warnings.”
Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 23] (citation omitted).    
Thus, rather than as a  demand, as the trial court undoubtedly construed it, the majority
characterizes the directive from Corporal Grimes to the respondent as a request, a
characterization that it continues to use even  when Corporal Grimes utterly failed to respond
to, and, in fact, ignored, the respondent’s request for an explanation.  The majority
emphasizes that, when the police approached,  no vehicle was occupying the space in front
of the respondent’s vehicle, that Detective Piazza, Detective Powell’s partner, “had stepped
away from Rucker,”  that, although uniformed and armed, Corporal Grimes’ weapon was not
drawn, and he “made no physical contact with” the respondent and that “the entire incident
. . . from the time we picked up the source” lasted no more than one hour.    In addition, that
the police had possession of the respondent’s license and registration is deemed unimportant
because, the majority surmises, there being no statement by the police to that effect, “their
return was not conditioned upon Rucker’s cooperation with the police, and no officer ever
told Rucker that he would not return the documents.”   The majority, in other words, views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, rather than the respondent, the
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prevailing party on the motion.    
 Notwithstanding that they are never determined to be clearly erroneous, the majority
all but ignores, and certainly does not apply, the facts as found by the trial court, and
undoubtedly critical to its determination that the stop was tantamount to an arrest: the
respondent was stopped by a uniformed officer under orders from the detectives; his license
and registration were in the possession of Corporal Grimes and, so, he was a captive;  his
vehicle was partially blocked by Corporal Grimes’ police cruiser; his inquiry as to what was
going on was ignored; he was “surrounded” by three police officers; and he was not told he
was free to leave.   
I think it is abundantly clear, having accepted and reviewed the facts found by the trial
court and considering the totality of the circumstances, that the respondent never thought for
a moment that he was free to leave or could refuse to answer Detective Powell’s questions.
Today’s holding is yet one more step in the erosion of the right to be free from unlawful
searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration
of Rights. Over time, the gradual eroding of constitutional freedoms portend serious
consequences for individual liberty.  Over one-hundred years ago, Mr. Justice Bradley
writing for the Court warned:
“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form;
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure.  This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed.  A close and literal construction deprives them of half their
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efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more
of sound than in substance.  It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.” 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S. Ct. 524, 535, 29 L.Ed. 746, 754 (1866).  
Doing my part to prevent further erosion of those protections, I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court
for Prince George’s County. 
Judge Eldridge joins in the views expressed herein.