Title: State v. Spratling

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

336 So. 2d 361 (1976)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
James Lee SPRATLING, Respondent.
No. 47421.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 28, 1976.
*362 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Spratling v. State, reported at 310 So. 2d 306 (Fla.App. 1, 1975), which purportedly conflicts with Smith v. State, 292 So. 2d 69 (Fla.App. 3, 1974).
On November 4, 1971, a four count information was filed against respondent charging him with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, kidnapping, and two counts of assault and battery. He plead guilty to two counts of assault and battery, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on probation for five years.
On January 4, 1974, respondent was arrested and charged with murder in the first degree. The police reports stated that the victim had been shot with a small caliber shotgun. The trial judge on January 10, 1974, issued a Rule to Show Cause directed to respondent charging that he violated condition "(e)" of his probation, which provides:
The Show Cause Order charged that respondent violated condition (e) "... in that he was arrested on January 4, 1974, at approximately 4:10 a.m. by Officer D.B. Sanders of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office charged with murder in the first degree. According to the Jacksonville Police Department offense report, the subject shot the victim, Genover Carter, black female, age 28, with a small caliber firearm just to the rear and above the right ear. The victim was shot in the bedroom of her residence located at 1479 Logan Street on the above date and between 3:30 and 3:45 a.m. She was pronounced dead on arrival at University Hospital."
Respondent was ordered to appear before the trial judge on January 24, 1974, to show cause why his probation should not be revoked. However, no hearing of probation was held at this time. Apparently defense counsel requested that the trial judge defer action on his Rule to Show Cause until after the murder case had been disposed of.
Respondent was tried for second degree murder on February 21, 1974, and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
At the conclusion of the jury trial immediately after the verdict of not guilty was returned, the trial judge announced:
The following colloquy then transpired:
Respondent appealed the revocation of his probation on the basis that he had not been accorded due process requisites. The District Court of Appeal, First District, agreed with respondent and opined:
We agree with the District Court that under the peculiar circumstances of the proceedings sub judice, respondent's probation revocation did not accord with due process requirements. In Smith v. State, which is distinguishable from the instant cause, wherein at the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the court entered a finding of guilty and concluded that the finding constituted an automatic violation of probation, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found that in light of the particular facts of that case, the criminal trial adequately fulfilled *364 the requirements of a probation revocation hearing, and explicated:
The above-described Rule Nisi issued by the trial judge ordered respondent to show why his probation should not be revoked for violation of condition (e) but did not include the actual charge for which probation was eventually revoked  carrying a pistol in violation of condition (f). Furthermore, respondent was not given notice that his trial at which he was acquitted would constitute a probation revocation hearing. Since respondent never received notice of the claimed violation of probation which was to serve as the basis for the revocation of his probation, he has not been afforded due process.
In the absence of stipulation or consent, the trial of the criminal case should not be construed as a probation revocation hearing but can be treated as such upon stipulation or consent made before or after the trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, and discharge the writ without prejudice to the right of the trial judge to initiate revocation proceedings after appropriate notice to respondent is made and such proceedings to be held in accordance with this decision.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and DREW (Retired), JJ., concur.