Title: MARRIAGE OF SCHULTZ

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 81-431 I N T H E SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1982 I N RE T H E MARRIAGE OF D O R O T H E A J. SCBULTZ, P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant, - VS- JACOB SCHULTZ, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and. f o r t h e County o f Big Morn, The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Anderson, Edwards & Molloy, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Kronmiller and Seykora, Hardin, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : June 17, 1982 Decided: A U ~ U S ~ 11, 1982 Filed: BUG 11. 59fjz M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . A c t i o n commenced by wife seeking d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e and a p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n . P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone. F i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law were e n t e r e d A p r i l 22, 1981, followed by judgment. Appeal followed d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y to t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of couple I s p r o p e r t y . The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n were married i n 1936. For t h e 43-year d u r a t i o n of t h e i r m a r r i a g e t h e y farmed and ranched a t v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s i n s o u t h - c e n t r a l Montana. Respondent ( h e r e i n a f t e r J a k e ) h a s a second g r a d e e d u c a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t ( h e r e i n a f t e r Dorothea) was graduated from high s c h o o l . Due to t h e p a r t i e s 1 wide d i f f e r e n c e i n e d u c a t i o n s , Dorothea handled t h e management and f i n a n c e s of t h e o p e r a t i o n s while J a k e c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e day-to-day f u n c t i o n s . The r e c o r d shows b o t h J a k e and Dorothea were hard workers and attempted to make t h e b e s t of t h e i r debt-ridden b u s i n e s s . A t t h e t i m e a p p e l l a n t f i l e d h e r p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , and p a r t i e s were farming and ranching n o r t h of Hardin, Montana, on 160 acres known a s t h e home p l a c e which they purchased from Dorotheal s f a t h e r . Later, a n o t h e r 117 acres were purchased w i t h t h e h e l p of t h e i r son, Robert S c h u l t z , known a s t h e Orser P l a c e . The p a r t i e s improved and equipped t h e home p l a c e by borrowing s u b s t a n t i a l amounts of money from t h e FHA and t h e PCA. I n a d d i t i o n t h e y used funds which Dorothea r e c e i v e d i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t and from money i n h e r i t e d from h e r u n c l e . The p a r t i e s accumulated a herd of c a t t l e on t h e ranch which i n c l u d e d f o u r separate brands: 1. Bar D Lazy K , r e g i s t e r e d to Dorothea S c h u l t z ; 2. Lazy D J B a r , r e g i s t e r e d to J a c o b and Dorothea S c h u l t z ; 3 . Bar CB, r e g i s t e r e d to P a t r i c i a Thomas; 4. S l a s h CC, r e g i s t e r e d t o Robert and Dorothea S c h u l t z ; The ownership of t h e s e f o u r b r a n d s is d i s p u t e d . The Bar D Lazy K brand was f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1950 b y Dorothea S c h u l t z . I n 1971, Dorothea t r a n s f e r r e d t h e brand to a j o i n t brand w i t h J a k e upon r e q u e s t by t h e FHA to q u a l i f y f o r a l o a n . When t h e l o a n was r e l e a s e d J a k e a s s i g n e d h i s i n t e r e s t back t o Dorothea. The Lazy D J Bar is j o i n t l y owned by Dorothea and J a k e w i t h o u t d i s p u t e . The c a t t l e branded Bar C B were purchased i n 1961 b y Dorothea and t h e n s o l d to t h e d a u g h t e r P a t r i c i a Thomas. S i n c e t h e n t h e brand h a s always been r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e d a u g h t e r ' s name. When t h e brand Bar C B cows were calved-out through t h e y e a r s , some o f t h e c a l v e s were s o l d and t h e p r o c e e d s used by J a k e and Dorothea i n t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . The cattle branded S l a s h C C were purchased by Dorothea i n 1975. Dorothea o b t a i n e d a l o a n from t h e L i t t l e Horn Bank t o pay f o r t h e c a t t l e . When she c o u l d n ' t repay t h e l o a n , t h e s o n , Robert S c h u l t z , r e p a i d t h e bank and Dorothea g a v e him a b i l l of sale f o r t h e cattle. The c a t t l e were branded S l a s h CC and t h e brand was r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names of Robert and Dorothea S c h u l t z . I n t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w t h e c o u r t found t h e total n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s to be bet- ween $94,116.51 and $153,599.51. The d i f f e r e n c e i n amount is due t o d i f f e r e n t a p p r a i s a l s of t h e real estate and c a t t l e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g is as f o l l o w s : RECAP ASSETS R e a l P r o p e r t y $242,375.00 t o $276,060.00 L e s s sale of 59% i n t e r e s t - 59,000.00 - 59,000.00 Machinery Crops L i v e s t o c k Brand -Dz Brand 38,730.00 to 45,300.00 /CC Brand 9,450.00 t o 10,900.00 0 J Brand 16,500.00 to 18,650.00 - Check 8,729.33 t o -- 8,729.33 Sub-Total 355,614.33 to 415,097.33 L e s s $59,000.00, s a l e of 59% i n t e r e s t - 59,000.00 - 59,000.00 TOTAL ASSETS LIABILITIES FHA $180,030.17 L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Rank 14,722.65 M i s c e l l a n e o u s TOTAL LIABILITIES NET W O R T H OF PARTIES TOGETHER Assets $296,614.33 to $356,097.33 TOTAL I n t h e j udgmen t t h e District Court o r d e r e d : ". . . t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e marital estate, b o t h real and p e r s o n a l , i n c l u d i n g CB and /CC brand c a t t l e s h a l l be s o l d , and a f t e r payment o f a l l i n d e b t e d n e s s h e r e i n t h e n e t p r o c e e d s s h a l l be d i v i d e d between t h e p a r t i e s e x c e p t p e t i t i o n e r is e n t i t l e d to be p a i d $25,000 o v e r and above r e s p o n d e n t ' s s h a r e . . . " S a l e o f p r o p e r t y s e t f o r t h i n t h e p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l be accomplished by mutual agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d to t h i s C o u r t . I f no agreement is r e a c h e d , t h e c o u r t s h a l l set t h e g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e sale. The c o u r t would r a t i f y an agreement a l l o w i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s to r e t a i n t h e 'home p l a c e , ' i f t h e p a r t i e s can do so, g i v i n g r e s p o n d e n t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e marital estate .I' From t h i s judgment p e t i t i o n e r a p p e a l s . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r review are: 1. Whether t h e c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to i n c l u d e w i t h i n t h e marital estate and t o d i v i d e and o r d e r s o l d t h e cattle owned by and branded i n t h e names of t h e a d u l t c h i l d r e n , Robert S c h u l t z and P a t r i c i a Thomas. 2. Whether t h e c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n and a c t e d c o n t r a r y t o t h e e v i d e n c e when it included w i t h t h e marital estate t h e c a t t l e w i t h t h e w i f e ' s s e p a r a t e and p e r s o n a l b r a n d , B a r D Lazy K . 3. Whether t h e c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n f a i l i n g to g i v e t h e w i f e t h e r i g h t to purchase t h e home ranch b e f o r e sub- j e c t i n g it t o forced l i t i g a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h e District Court e r r e d by i n c l u d i n g t h e b r a n d s S l a s h CC and B a r CB, r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s names, i n t o t h e marital estate. There is no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e b r a n d , Bar CB is r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e name of t h e d a u g h t e r , P a t r i c i a Thomas, o r t h a t t h e brand, S l a s h CC is r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names of t h e son, Robert S c h u l t z and Dorothea S c h u l t z . A p p e l l a n t cites s e c t i o n 1-1-101, MCA: "A p e r s o n , f i r m or c o r p o r a t i o n i n whose name a mark or brand is recorded is e n t i t l e d to t h e e x c l u s i v e use of t h e mark or brand on t h e spe- cies of animal and i n t h e p o s i t i o n d e s i g n a t e d i n t h e r e c o r d . A copy of t h e record c e r t i f i e d b y t h e department is prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of t h i s r i g h t , -- and t h e c e r t i f i c a t e -- is also prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e -- t h a t t h e p e r s o n , f i r m or cor- --- p e r a t i o n e n t i t l e d t o u s e t h e mark or brand is ----- t h e e r - - o f a l l a n i m a l s on which it a p p e a r s i n t h e p o s i t i o n and on t h e s p e c i e s o f a n i m a l -- - - - - s t a t e d i n t h e c e r t i f i c a t e . I 1 (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) - T h i s s e c t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y enacted as S e c t i o n 5, Ch. 144 Laws of Montana ( 1 9 2 1 ) , c o d i f i e d as S e c t i o n 3305, R.C.M. 1921. The language h a s remained unchanged s i n c e its enactment. I n t h e case of S t a t e v. Keays ( 1 9 3 4 ) r 97 Mont. 404, 34 P.2d 855, t h i s C o u r t c i t e d t h e s e c t i o n and s t a t e d : "Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s mentioned i n t h e above s e c t i o n were t h e b e s t evi- dence of ownership, and t h a t it was e r r o r to admit t h e o r a l testi- mony o f R a f e s t y upon t h i s q u e s t i o n . It is t r u e t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s s p e c i f i e d by t h e s t a t u t e s would have been t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e . The admission of t h e oral t e s t i m o n y i n t h e p l a c e of s u c h c e r t i f i c a t e s d i d c o n s t i t u t e a t least a t e c h n i c a l e r r o r . " T h i s being a c r i m i n a l case, t h e Court found o t h e r grounds upon which w e could r e v e r s e . However, t h e r u l e t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t e is t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e of ownership h a s never been o v e r r u l e d . T h a t does n o t mean t h a t t h e presumption of ownership cannot be r e b u t t e d . I n Bohart v. Songer e t a l . ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 110 Mont. 405, 1 0 1 P.2d 64, w e s t a t e d : " [n] ow t h e recorded brand e s t a b l i s h e s prima facie proof of ownership on which such brand a p p e a r s . Of c o u r s e , t h e prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of ownership can be overcome by s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e o f t r a n s f e r o r r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a par- t i c u l a r animal." I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e of t r a n s f e r o r r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of t h e d i s p u t e d brands. The b r a n d s have always been i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s names and t h u s t h e c h i l d r e n are presumed t h e owners. Respondent now claims he h a s a n " i n t e r e s t 1 ' i n t h e d i s p u t e d b r a n d s because he f e d and watered t h e c a t t l e and took care of them on h i s l a n d . H e cites no a u t h o r i t y which s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h i s c l a i m o f ownership. Respondent acknowledged t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n were t h e r e g i s t e r e d owners of t h e b r a n d s and n e v e r c o n t e s t e d t h e i r ownership u n t i l t h e d i s s o l u t i o n p r o c e e d i n g . The r e c o r d shows t h e p a r e n t s s o l d c a l v e s from t h e d a u g h t e r ' s b r a n d , Bar CB, and t h e p r o c e e d s were used i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e r a n c h . The r e c o r d d o e s n o t show t h a t t h e d a u g h t e r was r e p a i d f o r t h e s e c a l v e s . Respondent c a n n o t a r g u e he w a t e r e d , fed and p a s t u r e d t h e c h i l d r e n ' s cattle w i t h o u t compensation as it seems t h e p a r e n t s u s e o f t h e p r o c e e d s from t h e d a u g h t e r ' s c a l f sales provided e q u i t a b l e payment. W e f i n d no merit i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s . A p p e l l a n t n e x t a r g u e s t h e District Court abused its d i s c r e - t i o n when it i n c l u d e d t h e w i f e ' s p e r s o n a l brand of cattle w i t h t h e marital estate. The s t a n d a r d f o r reviewing t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i n a d i s s o l u t i o n decreed by a D i s t r i c t Court is w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana. The apportionment made by t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on review u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n as m a n i f e s t e d by a s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f t h e marital a s s e t s r e s u l t i n g i n s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u s t i c e . I n R e Marriage of Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361, 364; I n R e Marriage of B l a i r ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 220, 583 P.2d 403, 405; Vivian v. V i v i a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 341, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074. The d u t y o f t h e District Court is to c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t o r y criteria and e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e marital assets. Each case must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y w i t h an eye to its uni- que c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n R e Marriage of Jacobson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . - - - , 600 P.2d 1183, 1186, 35 St.Rep. 1773, 1776; Aanenson v. Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -- Mont. , 598 P.2d 1120, 36 St.Rep. 1525, S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA s t a t e s : " I n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of a m a r r i a g e . . . t h e c o u r t , . . s h a l l . . . f i n a l l y e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s t h e - - property- and a s s e t s b e l o n g i n g - t o e i t h e r or b o t h , however - and whenever a c q u i r e d and whether t i t l e t h e r e t o - is i n t h e name o f the ---- husband or w i f e o r b o t h . I n making a p p o r t i o n m e n t , t h e c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e and [ o t h e r f a c t o r s ] . . . The c o u r t s h a l l also c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n or d i s s i p a t i o n of v a l u e of t h e r e s p e c t i v e estates -- and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f a - - spouse as a homemaker o r -- t o t h e f a m i l y u n i t . " ( Emphasis added. ) T h i s s e c t i o n makes it c l e a r t h a t t h e s o u r c e of and t i t l e to marital p r o p e r t y is i r r e l e v a n t as to t h e d i v i s i o n of such pro- p e r t y upon d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e . In Re Marriage of Brown, s u p r a . The s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y states t h e D i s t r i c t Court must e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e assets no matter i n whose name lies t i t l e or f o r what s o u r c e a c q u i r e d . The s e c t i o n is n o t ambiguous. When w e a p p l y s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, t h e r e l e v a n t case l a w to t h e District C o u r t ' s r u l i n g w e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n b u t r a t h e r a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e l a w . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s s e c t i o n 40-2-201, MCA, s u p p o r t s t h e wife I s claim of ownership t o h e r brand of c a t t l e , t h e B a r D Lazy K . T h i s s e c t i o n states, " N e i t h e r husband n o r wife h a s any i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e o t h e r , e x c e p t as mentioned i n s e c t i o n 40-2-102, b u t n e i t h e r can be excluded from t h e o t h e r ' s d w e l l i n g u n l e s s e n j o i n e d by a c o u r t . " S e c t i o n 40-2-201, MCA, d o e s n o t a p p l y i n a proceeding f o r d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y . A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had no i n t e r e s t i n h e r per- s o n a l brand of cattle and so expressed i n a b i l l of sale of which p u r p o r t e d to r e l i n q u i s h h i s i n t e r e s t i n v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h e m a r i t a l estate. S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, calls f o r an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e marital estate by t h e c o u r t , r e g a r d l e s s of however o r whenever a c q u i r e d o r i n whose name t h e p r o p e r t y is h e l d . I n Re Marriage of Houtchens ( 1 9 7 9 ) , ---- Mon t . ---- I 592 P.2d 158, 160, 36 St.Rep. 501, 503. Whether or n o t a par- t i c u l a r brand of cattle was r e g i s t e r d i n t h e w i f e ' s name, o r whether t h e r e was a q u e s t i o n a b l e b i l l of sale which passed a l l of t h e husband's p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y to t h e wife h a s no b e a r i n g on t h e d i v i s i o n of p r o p e r t y mandate of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. Aside from t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e c h i l d r e n ' s cattle i n t h e marital estate w e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n its pro- p e r t y d i v i s i o n . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h e District Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g to g i v e h e r t h e r i g h t to purchase t h e home r a n c h b e f o r e s u b j e c t i n g it to forced l i t i g a t i o n . Paragraph 5 of t h e D i s t r i c t Court ' s j udgmen t r e a d s as f o l l o w s : "5. S a l e of p r o p e r t y set f o r t h i n t h e pre- v i o u s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l be accomplished by mutual agreement of t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d to t h i s c o u r t . I f no agreement is r e a c h e d , t h e c o u r t s h a l l set t h e g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e sale. The c o u r t would r a t i f y an agreement a l l o w i n g P e t i t i o n e r to r e t a i n t h e 'home p l a n t i f par- t i e s can do s o , g i v i n g r e s p o n d e n t h i s p o r t i o n o f t h e marital e s t a t e . " I t does n o t appear t h a t forced sale of t h e ranch was t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e as t h e a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s . The District Court c l e a r l y allowed t h e p a r t i e s room to n e g o t i a t e a buy-out on t h e i r own terms. I t seems t h e p a r t i e s would have an i n t e r e s t i n nego- t i a t i n g t h e i r own terms a s they are i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to know what t h e y can a f f o r d and what t h e y f e e l t h e i r i n t e r e s t is worth. T h e i r i n c e n t i v e should be to avoid a forced sale which might n o t b e as f r u i t f u l as a sale from one p a r t y to t h e o t h e r . Here f o r c e d sale was n o t o r d e r e d u n l e s s t h e parties could n o t reach an agreement. W e f i n d no error i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g . For t h e above r e a s o n s , we remand t h e c a s e to t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o modify t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n by e x c l u d i n g t h e c h i l d r e n ' s c a t t l e from t h e m a r i t a l estate. W e concur: %bcwa4&-eQ C h i e f ~ u s t i c e K U...dL 4 i 9P~ul.""I, Justices /