Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF KJD, minor child

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF KJD, minor child2002 WY 2641 P.3d 522Case Number: C-01-2Decided: 02/14/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION

OF KJD, 
minor child:

 

MTM, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

LD and 
ED, 

Appellees(Petitioners).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
MTM, Pro Se.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

            
Hardy H. Tate, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      Acting pro se, 
MTM (the father) appeals from an adoption without consent that terminated his 
parental rights to his daughter, KJD.  
The adoptive parents, appellees LD and ED, are KJD's maternal 
grandparents.1  The child's mother, KAD (the mother), is 
deceased.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion by the district court, we affirm the Final Decree of Adoption entered 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001).2

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      As appellant, the 
father's issues for review are not particularly well defined.  However, it is clear that he 
desires:

 

            
1.         
A jury trial concerning his parental rights.

 

            
2.         
A conflict of interest to be found in the grandparents' counsel taking 
part in the proceeding while counsel also served as a court 
magistrate.

 

            
3.         
Reversal of the Final Decree of Adoption.

 

[¶3]      The appellees 
(the grandparents) phrase the issues as:

 

1.         
Did the district court err or abuse its discretion in determining that 
clear and convincing evidence was presented to satisfy the statutory elements 
required to permit an adoption without consent of the parent or putative father 
under Wyoming Statute § 1-22-110(a)(v).

 

2.         
Did the district court err by denying appellant's demand for a jury 
trial.

 

3.         
Did a conflict of interest exist or was a Wyoming court rule violated by 
virtue of appellees' attorney serving as a court magistrate or court 
commissioner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      This appeal 
constitutes one more chapter in a saga that has been ongoing since 1992, 
involving the father, the Natrona County and the Sheridan County Departments of 
Family Services (DFS),3 the minor child KJD, and the 
grandparents.  KJD was born on 
November 27, 1987, in Birmingham, Alabama, and resided with her parents in 
Clanton, Alabama, until May 1992.  
Her father was arrested in May 1992 for possession of marijuana.  Shortly thereafter, her mother packed up 
her and KJD's belongings, and she and KJD left the state.  They were in Baltimore, Maryland, for a 
short period of time, and then made their way to Wyoming where the mother's 
father and brother lived.

 

[¶5]      During the four 
years KJD lived in Alabama with her parents, she remembers that her mother was 
often intoxicated and her father smoked marijuana.  She testified that her father once tied 
up her mother, abusing and hitting her.  
After an abuse/neglect report was filed in January 1988, the Alabama 
Family Services Department became involved with the family.  There were five reports concerning KJD 
as of February 1992.  The last two 
reports, received in February 1991 and February 1992, alleged that the father 
had physically abused and neglected KJD; however, the record does not indicate 
whether the abuse or neglect was substantiated or 
adjudicated.

 

[¶6]      The mother was 
incarcerated in Casper for public intoxication in May 1992.  After a juvenile court hearing on June 
2, 1992, KJD was placed in protective custody with DFS.4  Subsequently, the mother worked on her 
sobriety and tried to achieve the case plan goals developed for her by DFS.  DFS provided the mother with 
psychological treatment, alcohol treatment, and allowed her visitation with 
KJD.  The mother moved into a 
facility in Casper for mothers and children, where she continued her 
treatment.  She was able to stay 
sober for two months at a time, and came close to family reunification, but she 
would begin drinking again and reunification would not 
occur.

 

[¶7]      The father began 
his involvement with DFS in January 1993, after he learned that KJD had been 
placed in DFS' protective custody.  
He called DFS from Alabama stating his intention to regain custody of 
KJD.  The mother had advised DFS 
that she did not know who KJD's father was, and no father's name was listed on 
KJD's birth certificate.5  A DFS worker explained to the father 
that a home study on his Alabama residence would be necessary before placement 
could be made.  In compliance with 
the Interstate Compact for Placement of Children (ICPC), DFS initiated a home 
study on the father's Alabama residence on March 1, 1993.

 

[¶8]      The father 
hitchhiked from Alabama to Casper in March 1993.  He lived at the Central Wyoming Rescue 
Mission for several weeks, and again contacted DFS concerning custody of 
KJD.  He then moved into a tent at 
his place of employment, and DFS conducted a home study on this residence.  The mother informed DFS that the father 
had abused her and KJD, and she did not want KJD placed with the father.  DFS again discussed with the father the 
steps he would need to take in order to gain custody of KJD, but he was 
uncooperative and failed to follow through on all except one of the 
recommendations.6

 

[¶9]      DFS contacted 
KJD's maternal grandparents in the summer of 1993, and they agreed to have a 
home study conducted for possible placement of KJD with them.  In August 1993, the mother moved to 
Sheridan to live with LD and ED.  On 
October 5, 1993, DFS completed its home study on the father and denied placement 
of KJD with him because of his living environmenta tent rather than a 
single-family dwelling.  DFS 
completed its home study on the grandparents on September 22, 1993, and placed 
KJD with them on October 8, 1993.  
DFS received the ICPC home study regarding the Alabama residence on 
October 20, 1993, and placement was denied because the father no longer lived 
there.

 

[¶10]   The father continued to live in 
Casper from October 1993 to June 1994, but he had minimal contact with DFS.  He remained homeless, did not provide 
DFS with a phone number or address where he could be reached, did not attend 
individual and family counseling as recommended by DFS, and did not obtain any 
long-term employment, even though he was working odd jobs at this time.  The father did contact DFS for 
visitation with KJD, and he was allowed to see KJD in a supervised setting on a 
regular basis, one time per week for two hours.

 

[¶11]   KJD began counseling during this 
time at the Northern Wyoming Mental Health Center, as her step-grandmother felt 
KJD was exhibiting upsetting behaviors.  
KJD's counselor indicated that her "acting out" was related to visits 
with her father, and was attributable to anxiety stemming from things her father 
said to her as well as her fear of being forced to move to Alabama with 
him.  The father moved to Sheridan 
in June of 1994 to be closer to KJD.  
There were reports that he lived under a bridge, but he told DFS that he 
lived in a van next to his place of employment.  Meanwhile, the mother returned to Casper 
as she could not maintain her sobriety, which was a condition of living in her 
father's home in Sheridan.  She was 
subsequently killed in a pedestrian/motor vehicle accident in September 
1995.

 

[¶12]   On September 15, 1994, DFS met with 
the father to develop a case plan for reunification with KJD.  The plan included, among other things, 
that the father would attend parenting classes, attend individual and family 
counseling, continue to have supervised visits with KJD, obtain suitable housing 
for himself and KJD, and obtain suitable employment and adequate income to 
support them both.  The father 
stated in this meeting he intended that his employment would consist of suing 
three DFS workers for five million dollars each, and one worker for ten million 
dollars; the father felt that both he and KJD would be able to live adequately 
off these lawsuits.  The father did 
not sign this or any subsequent case plan developed by DFS to reunify him with 
his daughter.

 

[¶13]   A review of the case plan, with the 
continued goal of reunification, was made and the plan was updated on July 16, 
1996, because KJD was becoming upset by her visits with her father.  He gave her a hard time for taking 
medication for her attention deficit disorder, he came to the visits in an 
unkempt condition, and he was disrespectful with DFS and Court Appointed Special 
Advocate (CASA) workers.  The 
short-term goal for the father in the updated case plan was to make visitations 
with KJD more positive and enjoyable by not making any inappropriate comments to 
her.  It also included that the 
father would pay child support in the amount of fifty dollars per month, 
beginning August 1, 1996.

 

[¶14]   Another review of the case plan was 
undertaken on June 30, 1997.  The 
goal continued to be reunification, but first the father had to develop a better 
relationship with KJD.  DFS 
indicated that it would pay up to fifty-five dollars per hour for counseling for 
the father, but it would require monthly reports from his therapist regarding 
his counseling efforts.  The plan 
stated again that the father was to pay fifty dollars per month child 
support.  Furthermore, he was to 
follow the guidelines, which were essentially the same as had been set forth in 
a letter dated May 14, 1997, and which had been sent to his attorney.7  It also stated that KJD could request 
that no visitation take place, and if no progress was evident in three months 
(by the end of September 1997), DFS would request a court hearing to ask for 
permanent placement of KJD with the grandparents.  The father left for Florida in October 
1997 and did not return to Wyoming until July 1998.8

 

[¶15]   A further review on October 26, 
1999, changed the father's visitations to every other week for one hour, which 
were to be supervised by CASA workers.  
The father was to be responsible for a five-dollar payment to CASA to 
supervise each visit, and he was to treat the CASA staff with courtesy and 
respect.  The stated goals for the 
father were to attend counseling on a weekly basis to develop his parenting 
skills so that he could appropriately communicate with KJD, to be sensitive to 
her needs and feelings, and to learn to understand KJD's need for 
medication.  The father left the DFS 
office before this plan could be discussed with him.  He later returned but left again when 
his attorney could not be contacted.

 

[¶16]   On November 18, 1999, a 
dispositional/review hearing was held in the juvenile case.  The juvenile court ordered the father to 
"cooperate with the Department of Family Services and their case plan for 
reunification, which includes engaging in counseling and paying child support, 
and the father shall sign the case plan."

 

[¶17]   On November 30, 1999, a second 
meeting was held concerning the October 26th 
case plan.  The goal of this meeting 
was to secure a permanent living arrangement for KJD.  The plan was basically the same as the 
October plan, but DFS would pay for the father's counseling if he signed a 
release so that DFS could be informed of his progress.  The father refused to sign or comply 
with this plan.

 

[¶18]   DFS found the father uncooperative 
during its eight years of trying to develop a reunification plan with which he 
would agree and comply.  He also 
refused to pay child support even when he was repeatedly ordered to pay a 
minimal monthly amount.  The record 
indicates that, while living in Casper, he was employed with the Great Canadian 
Log Home Company, and while living in Sheridan, he worked at an auto body shop, 
yet he refused to pay child support.

 

[¶19]   On January 24, 2000, the juvenile 
court entered an Order for Placement continuing legal custody of KJD with DFS 
and physical custody with the grandparents.  On July 19, 2000, CASA sent a letter to 
the father notifying him that it would no longer supervise his visits with 
KJD.  The director stated, in 
part:

 

It is 
our responsibility to maintain a safe and secure atmosphere for the children we 
serve during all visits, which includes their emotional security as well as 
their physical safety.  Over the 
past year, you have consistently disregarded [KJD's] feelings even when she 
stated them openly.  You have 
instigated arguments and continued to approach inappropriate subjects with [KJD] 
during visits, including talking about legal issues and making negative comments 
about [ED and LD] . . ..  . . .  [A]fter the last visit this type of 
behavior reached a level that is intolerable.  . . .  We cannot allow supervised visitation to 
turn into a time for you to harass, demean and argue with [KJD] to the point she 
is so upset she cries.  Nor can we 
condone your show of blatant disrespect for our services and other service 
providers in front of [KJD].

 

[¶20]   On February 23, 2000, DFS signed a 
Consent to Adoption of KJD by her grandparents.  The grandparents filed the petition to 
adopt, which is the subject of this action, on March 21, 2000.  A hearing to the district court, without 
a jury, was held on January 22, 2001, and a Final Decree of Adoption of KJD by 
the grandparents was entered on February 14, 2001.  The father appeals the final decree of 
adoption.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶21]   It is within the power and 
discretion of a trial court to grant an adoption without parental consent, 
providing all statutory elements are met.  
"The power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within the 
discretion of the trial court."  
In re Adoption of SMR, 982 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Wyo. 1999).  An appellate court will not interfere 
with a district court's discretionary decision absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion.  Semler v. 
Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1996).  "In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  An 
abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances.'"  
Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)).  Assessing whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion involves determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the district court's decision.  
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995).  "A finding rendered without sufficient 
evidence, however, is erroneous and constitutes an abuse of discretion . . 
.."  Kennedy v. Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 
753 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Wyo. 1988)).  The burden is on the appellant to show 
such abuse.  Blake v. State, 
933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶22]   The father's first two allegations 
can be dealt with relatively quickly.  
The first concerns his demand for a jury trial in the adoption 
proceedings.  The district court did 
not commit any error in denying the father's repeated requests for a jury trial 
because there is no right to a jury trial in adoption proceedings under Chapter 
22 of Title 1 of the Wyoming Statutes.  
Adoption is entirely a statutory procedure and adoptions must be 
conducted in strict compliance with the governing statute.  In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 
Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 866 (1948).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-22-105 and 1-22-106 
(LexisNexis 2001) clearly contemplate that adoptions are to take place in a 
hearing before the court rather than a trial before a jury.9  Likewise, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110, 
the statute under which this particular adoption took place, provides for the 
court, not a jury, to make the findings necessary for an adoption to take place 
without consent.  As we have long 
recognized, it is not for this Court to decide what should have been said in a 
statute.  Barber v. State Highway 
Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725 (1959).  Had the legislature intended for there 
to be a right to a jury trial in adoption proceedings, it could have so 
provided, as it did in the statutes that govern termination of parental rights 
in non-adoption cases under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 (LexisNexis 
2001).

 

[¶23]   The father contends that denial to 
him of a jury trial in this case is unconstitutional.  We have previously held that the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was not incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment and is not applicable to state court proceedings.10  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 988 
(Wyo. 1984).  We have also determined that it is not 
unconstitutional to have different statutory standards for terminating parental 
rights under Title 14 of the Wyoming Statutes and allowing adoption without 
consent under Title 1 of the Wyoming Statutes, because the two acts do not have 
the same purpose, despite the fact that an adoption under Title 1 will have the 
effect of terminating parental rights by operation of law.  Matter of Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶24]   The father also relies on W.R.C.P. 
38 to support his demand for a jury trial.  
W.R.C.P. 38(a) states:

 

Issues 
of law must be tried by the court, unless referred as hereinafter provided; and 
issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only, or 
specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a 
jury trial be waived, or a reference be ordered.  All other issues of fact 
shall be tried by the court, subject to its power to order any issue to be tried 
by a jury, or referred.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  In the instant case, the 
hearing obviously was not for the "recovery of money only, or for specific real 
or personal property," so W.R.C.P. 38 adds nothing to the father's 
argument.

 

[¶25]   We conclude that no constitutional, 
civil, or statutory rights of the father were violated by the district court's 
decision to deny him a jury trial.

 

[¶26]   The father next asserts that a 
conflict of interest existed or a Wyoming court rule was violated by the 
grandparents' attorney serving as counsel for them while also serving the Fourth 
Judicial District as a court magistrate.  
At the hearing, the grandparents' attorney stipulated, first, that he was 
a magistrate in both the circuit court and the district court.  He then corrected himself to say that he 
was a court commissioner in both courts.  
While it is not made clear in the record, we will assume that his 
statements referred to the Fourth Judicial District Court and the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit Court, both of which cover Sheridan 
County.

 

[¶27]   In support of his argument, the 
father cited at trial and again in his appellate brief "part C . . . 2 and 3" of 
the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct and indicated that the portion of the Code 
that he was reading "concerns part-time judges and magistrates and such."  From his reference, it is clear that he 
was reading from a section at the end of the Code entitled "Application of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct."  The 
applicable section reads, in pertinent part:

 

            
C.        
Continuing Part-time Judge.A continuing part-time 
judge

 

            
* * *

 

            
(2)  except for a court 
commissioner, shall not practice law in the court on which the judge serves or 
in any court subject to appellate jurisdiction of the court on which the judge 
serves [and]

 

            
(3)  shall not act as a 
lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as judge or in any other 
proceeding related thereto.

 

Code of 
Judicial Conduct at 893.

 

[¶28]   We can automatically discount 
subsection (3) because there is no allegation anywhere in the record that the 
grandparents' attorney had served as a judge, magistrate or court commissioner 
in the instant proceeding or any related to it.  We can almost as readily discount 
subsection (2) because we find that, whether the grandparents' counsel acted as 
a court commissioner or a part-time magistrate, the Canon was not 
violated.

 

[¶29]   Under the Code, a continuing 
part-time judge is "a judge who serves repeatedly on a part-time basis under a 
continuing appointment, including a retired judge."  Code of Judicial Conduct at 871.  Section A of the "Application of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct" makes it clear that this definition applies to 
"[a]nyone . . . who performs judicial functions, including an officer such as a 
magistrate, court commissioner, special master or referee[.]"  Code of Judicial Conduct at 893.  Since section C(2) of the "Application 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct" exempts from its mandates only court 
commissioners, there is some suggestion that anyone called a magistrate, rather 
than a court commissioner, must abide by the Canon.  Code of Judicial Conduct at 893.  This is too narrow a reading of the 
Code.

 

[¶30]   The official commentary to section 
A of the "Application of the Code of Judicial Conduct" specifies how the Canon 
is to be applied:

 

The four 
(4) categories of judicial service in other than a full-time capacity are 
necessarily defined in general terms because of the widely varying forms of 
judicial service.  . . .  The determination of which category and, 
accordingly, which specific Code provisions apply to an individual judicial 
officer, depend upon the facts of the particular judicial 
service.

 

Code of 
Judicial Conduct at 893.  This 
guidance is consistent with the admonition contained in the Code's preamble that 
"[t]he Canons and Sections are rules of reason.  They should be applied consistent with 
constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and decisional law and 
in the context of all relevant circumstances."  Code of Judicial Conduct at 
870.

 

[¶31]   We can start the analysis of this 
issue by noting that there is no such thing in Wyoming as a district court 
magistrate.  District court 
commissioners, on the other hand, are provided for in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-3-301 
through 5-3-312 (LexisNexis 2001).  
In particular, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-312 establishes the limits upon a 
district court commissioner's practice of law:

 

            
No district court commissioner shall accept employment or retainer as an 
attorney-at-law, or give any advice as such in any action, cause or proceeding 
pending before him as such commissioner; and he shall not be authorized to act 
as such commissioner, or exercise any of the powers thereof, in any action, case 
or proceeding in which or as to the subject thereof he shall have been engaged, 
employed or retained as an attorney, or in reference to which and the subject 
thereof he shall have given any advice.

 

[¶32]   We interpret this statute and the 
Code of Judicial Conduct as authorizing an attorney who happens to be a district 
court commissioner to practice law in the court in which he has been appointed, 
in all cases except those specifically enumerated in the 
statute.

 

[¶33]   On July 1, 2000, the statutes 
regarding former county courts, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-5-101 through 5-5-175 
(Lexis 1999) were revised and renumbered as Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-9-101 through 
5-9-153 (LexisNexis 2001), and Article 2, concerning Magistrates of the Circuit 
Court, was added as Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-9-201 through 5-9-213 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5-5-162, judges of the county court could appoint as many commissioners or 
adjunct commissioners that public interest required.  Under the revised statutes, county 
courts became known as circuit courts and commissioners became known as 
magistrates.

 

[¶34]   The revised statutes recognize two 
types of magistrates:  full-time 
magistrates and part-time magistrates.  
There is no suggestion in the record that the appellees' counsel now is 
or has ever been a full-time magistrate, so we will consider only the part-time 
magistrate position.  In that 
regard, it is clear from a comparison of the statutes that the function of the 
part-time circuit court magistrate essentially is the same function once 
performed by the county court commissioner.  While the Code of Judicial Conduct has 
not been amended to take cognizance of these statutory changes, we find that the 
spirit and intent of both the statutes and the Code are best honored by 
considering a part-time circuit court magistrate to be the equivalent of a court 
commissioner for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) of section C of the 
Code quoted above.  As such, 
part-time magistrates are similarly exempted from the dictates of those 
subsections.

 

[¶35]   The final contention of the father 
is that the adoption should be reversed.  
His appellate brief contains little cogent argument or authority in 
regard to this issue, and in fact, it is difficult precisely to determine the 
nature of the father's complaint.  
There is a hint of a sufficiency of the evidence argument, but the 
father's primary concern seems to be that his "rights" were 
violated.

 

[¶36]   We have held that the right to 
associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty interest under the United 
States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 6, 7 and 36.  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d  at 
981; DS 
v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 
(Wyo. 1980).  We have also made it clear that we 
revere the family relationship:

 

"It may 
be that in matters such as this, lawyers, judges, parentsall of usshould 
digress from the ordinary course of things to contemplate how deeply seated the 
child-parent relationship is in the warp and woof of the American fabric.  In this matter, where the law must 
decide whether a child will be separated from [her father], we have looked to 
the Declaration of Independence for guidance."

 

Matter 
of GP, 679 
P.2d at 981 (quoting DS, 607 P.2d at 
919).

 

[¶37]   We do not take lightly the issue of 
adopting a child without a parent's consent.  "[A]doption statutes are strictly 
construed when the proceeding is against a non-consenting parent and every 
reasonable intendment is made in favor of the parent's claims."  Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).  Strict construction is mandated by the 
fact that parental rights are fundamental rights.  DS, 607 P.2d  at 918.

 

[¶38]   The record reflects that the father 
had knowledge as early as January 1993 that his daughter was being supported by 
DFS.  However, he has never 
substantially contributed to her maintenance.  The record indicates that the father had 
on occasion given money to his daughter, but the number of times this occurred 
or the exact amount is not known.  
It has been estimated to be approximately $100.00 over the last several 
years.  The record indicates that 
the father made no payments to the Clerk of the District Court, Natrona County, 
regarding child support for KJD.  He 
was requested to do so in his case plan for reunification dated July 16, 1996, 
with minimal payments of fifty dollars per month to begin on August 1, 
1996.

 

[¶39]   At the adoption hearing on January 
22, 2001, several people testified that the father had not paid child 
support.  When the first social 
worker was asked whether the father had paid support, she responded that he had 
not, and to her knowledge he had never paid child support.  This social worker also indicated that 
the father was not in agreement with the case plan because he did not want to 
pay child support.  KJD's 
step-grandmother testified that to her knowledge, the father had never paid 
child support, but that he had given KJD money at different times.  The guardian ad litem testified that at 
the dispositional/review hearing on November 18, 1999, where the district court 
ordered the father to pay child support, he basically told the district court 
that he would not.

 

[¶40]   We note that the father has the 
ability to earn money and to contribute to the maintenance of KJD.  The record indicates that prior to 
arriving in Wyoming, the father was a self-employed woodcutter for seven years, 
earning approximately $200.00 to $400.00 per month.  He was employed in Casper as a 
woodcutter at Great Canadian Log Home Company and he worked for an auto body 
shop in Sheridan.  However, the 
father refused to supply DFS with any information as to how much he earned while 
employed.

 

[¶41]   The father did not cooperate with 
DFS or comply with its case plans for reunification with his daughter.  He was well aware that his daughter 
could be returned to him if he would cooperate and comply with the case plans 
developed by DFS, yet he willfully chose not to do so.

 

[¶42]   This Court has defined willfully to 
mean:  "[I]ntentionally, knowingly, 
purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without justifiable 
excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently . . . or 
thoughtlessly.'"  Matter of 
Adoption of G.A.R., 810 P.2d 113, 118 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Matter of Adoption of 
CCT, 640 P.2d at 76).  The evidence is clear that the father 
willfully refused to pay child support and allowed KJD to be maintained by the 
State for over eight years; that he failed to provide a suitable home for KJD; 
that he failed to provide any information by which the proper amount of child 
support could be established; that he rejected endorsement of the case plans; 
and that he failed to raise any legitimate objection to the plans or propose any 
alternative plan.  The father acted 
contrary to the best interests of KJD, created conflicts during visitations, and 
threatened DFS and CASA workers.

 

[¶43]   For the foregoing reasons, we 
conclude as did the district court, that the father's actions were willful, and 
that he willfully permitted KJD to be maintained by DFS.  The father offers no justifiable excuse 
for his failure to contribute to the support of his daughter.  The district court did not err in 
finding this failure to be willful.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶44]   The evidence is sufficient to 
support the finding that the father willfully failed to contribute to the 
support of KJD for one year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, 
making it unnecessary to obtain his consent to the adoption.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting the adoption of KJD by her maternal grandparents.  The Final Decree of Adoption is 
affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1ED is KJD's 
step-grandmother.

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-22-110(a) reads, in pertinent part:

 

In addition to the exceptions contained 
in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written 
consent of a parent or the putative father if the court finds that the 
nonconsenting parent . . . [has]:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(v)  Willfully permitted the 
child to be maintained in or by a public or private institution or by the 
department of family services for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to 
the filing of the petition without substantially contributing to the support of 
the child[.]

 

The petition for adoption also contained 
an allegation under subsection (iv) of the statute, having to do with not 
bringing a child support obligation current, but the district court ruled in 
favor of the father on that issue and it is not now before this 
Court.

  3Throughout an 
approximate eight years, DFS offices in Natrona County and Sheridan County have 
been involved in this matter.  No 
distinction will be made herein between the two county DFS offices and, 
therefore, these agencies will be referred to collectively as 
DFS.

  4While it is not 
essential, it may be helpful to know the somewhat complicated history of this 
adoption proceeding and related cases.  
The juvenile case that resulted in KJD's placement with DFS began in the 
juvenile court of the Seventh Judicial District, in Casper, where it was 
assigned to Judge Park.  The case 
plans and case plan reviews discussed herein occurred within that case.  The adoption proceeding upon which this 
appeal is based occurred in the Fourth Judicial District, in Sheridan.  Judge Brackley, the sitting district 
judge in Sheridan, first was assigned to the adoption case.  He recused himself in July 2000, and 
assigned the case to Judge Kalokathis, who is from Cheyenne, due to perceived 
allegations made against Judge Brackley by the father.  In October 2000, Judge Kalokathis 
reassigned the case to Judge Brackley because he could not timely set a hearing 
on the petition.  Judge Brackley 
immediately assigned the case to Judge Spangler, a retired judge from 
Casper.  The father then promptly 
peremptorily disqualified Judge Spangler.  
In November 2000, Judge Spangler assigned the case to Judge Park, the 
Casper judge who presided over the juvenile case.  Venue remained in Sheridan and the case 
continued to be docketed as a Fourth Judicial District 
case.

  5The father filed 
a petition to establish paternity on August 4, 1994.  An Order of Paternity dated October 6, 
1994 established paternity of KJD in the father.

  6The father did 
attend a parenting class once he moved to Sheridan and provided DFS with 
verification of his attendance.

  7It is not clear 
from the record exactly when the father began acting pro se.  He initially had an attorney from April 
26, 1993, to October 19, 1993, when this attorney was asked to withdraw as the 
father wished to be represented by another attorney.  There is mention of counsel through May 
1997, and then the father left Wyoming in October 1997 and did not return until 
July 1998.

  8The record does 
not indicate what events, if any, occurred from July 1998 until the next case 
plan meeting in October 1999.

  9Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-22-105 provides for confidential, closed hearings in open court or in 
chambers, specifies those who may be in attendance, and makes no provision for 
jurors.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-106 
provides for a show cause hearing in cases where certain parties have not filed 
a consent to adopt, once again making no provision for a jury 
trial.

  10The Seventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows:

 

In Suits at common law, where the value 
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.

 

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution reads, in pertinent part:

 

No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.