Title: People v. Hickey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 87286-Agenda 5-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ARTHUR DALE HICKEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 27, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Arthur Dale Hickey, appeals an order of the circuit
court of Will County dismissing his amended post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing and denying defendant's
requests to review and to test certain evidence. Because defendant
was sentenced to death for his underlying murder conviction, his
appeal lies directly with this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's orders.


BACKGROUND


	This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal. See
People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256 (1997). Therefore, we discuss
only those facts and evidence necessary to the disposition of this
appeal. Defendant's convictions arose from the murder of Jeff
Stephens and the sexual assault and attempted murder of Jeff's
wife, Heather, on November 25, 1991. That morning, Jeff got up
between 5 and 5:30 a.m. to go to work. He went downstairs to take
the garbage out to the end of the driveway for pickup. Shortly
thereafter, Heather heard yelling outside the house, followed by a
gunshot. Heather got up and began putting on her bathrobe. As she
was putting on her bathrobe, a man wearing a ski mask and
holding a gun came into the bedroom, forced Heather onto the bed
and tied her wrists to the bedposts. The man sexually assaulted
Heather, then later shot her in the side of her face. Heather said
that she tried not to look at her assailant while he was assaulting
her because she was frightened.
	Heather was never able to identify anyone as her attacker,
although she initially told the police that her attacker was in his
20s, was between 5 feet and 5 feet, 4 inches tall, weighed 130
pounds, had medium length, stringy blond hair and no facial hair.
At the time, defendant was 40 years old, 5 feet 6 inches tall,
weighed 180 to 190 pounds, had a full mustache, and dark hair on
his head with some grey in it. A composite sketch of the
perpetrator was prepared based upon Heather's description. The
officer that prepared the composite sketch testified that Heather
was in a great deal of pain and was being treated for a gunshot
wound at the time that she gave the description.
	Heather viewed numerous photo lineups and mug shots
following the assault, but never was able to identify her assailant.
Defendant's photo was included in some of the photo lineups
shown to Heather. Although Heather told the officer she thought
she would be able to identify the perpetrator if she saw him, she
also testified at trial that she was not certain of the man's hair
color and was not certain whether he had facial hair. She explained
that is was dark in the bedroom, she was under stress, and she was
not wearing her glasses. Without her glasses, Heather could see up
close but not far away.
	Heather was taken to Riverside Medical Center in Kankakee,
Illinois. A registered nurse collected samples from Heather for a
rape kit, including vaginal smears on slides and swabs. The nurse
also collected additional vaginal and rectal swabs. The samples, as
well as Heather's underwear and Jeff's sweatshirt, were sent to the
Illinois State Police's Joliet, Illinois, crime lab. The rape kit and
Heather's underwear then were sent to the State Police's Metro
East crime lab. There, blood and semen were detected on
Heather's underwear, and semen was detected on certain vaginal
and rectal swabs. After the samples from the rape kit and
Heather's underwear tested positive for the presence of semen,
they were sent to the State Police crime lab in Springfield, Illinois,
for DNA testing.
	David Metzger, a forensic scientist employed by the
Springfield crime lab in the DNA unit extracted DNA from the
evidence received, including a blood sample from Heather, a
vaginal swab, a swatch from Heather's underwear, a rectal swab
and swatch from Jeff Stephens' sweatshirt. During his testing of
the DNA, however, Metzger mistakenly exposed the DNA
evidence too long to restriction enzyme, which damaged the DNA
extractions to the point where they no longer were useable.
	Metzger then requested additional samples and obtained
Heather's underwear and the additional swabs containing semen.
Metzger extracted DNA from the samples and produced four
developed autoradiograms, or autorads, which indicated that the
suspect DNA was inconsistent with Jeff Stephens' DNA. The
suspect DNA could not be matched with anyone involved in the
case at the time.
	However, in April 1993, while defendant was incarcerated for
the criminal sexual assault of his stepdaughter, a preliminary
correlation was made between defendant's DNA and the DNA of
the perpetrator in the Stephens case by State Police indexing
personnel. Accordingly, blood samples were obtained from
defendant pursuant to a search warrant and were sent to Metzger.
Metzger ran a series of autorads with defendant's DNA. He then
ran a series of autorads on defendant's DNA and the DNA from
the suspect in the Stephens case, producing nine autorads. All nine
autorads showed a match between defendant's DNA and that of
the perpetrator in the Stephens case. The frequency of such a
match was 1 in 15 billion people.
	Thereafter, defendant was charged with the crimes. Following
a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder,
attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm,
aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion. At a
separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found defendant
eligible for the death penalty and found that there were no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the
death penalty. Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to death for
the murder and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60
years for the remaining offenses. On direct appeal, this court
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Hickey,
178 Ill. 2d 256 (1997). The United States Supreme Court denied
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Hickey v. Illinois, 524 U.S. 955, 141 L. Ed. 2d 742, 118 S. Ct. 2375 (1998).
	Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief and a motion for appointment of counsel. After counsel was
appointed, defendant's attorneys filed a motion to preserve DNA
evidence, which was granted. Defense counsel also served
subpoenas on the Will County sheriff and the State Police.
Counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief and
filed a motion to produce DNA evidence. The State filed a motion
to dismiss the amended post-conviction petition on the ground that
the matters raised therein either were matters of record or did not
raise issues of constitutional magnitude. Defendant then filed a
second amended post-conviction petition. The trial court denied
defendant's discovery motion, quashed his subpoenas, and
dismissed his second amended post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing. The trial court later denied defendant's
motion to reconsider. The instant appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a).


ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through
122-7 (West 1998)) provides a defendant with a means through
which he can challenge his conviction or sentence for violations
of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997). An action seeking post-conviction relief is a
collateral proceeding and not an appeal from the earlier judgment.
People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to
post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial
deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the
proceedings that produced the challenged conviction or sentence.
People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). The scope of post-conviction relief is limited, through considerations of waiver and
res judicata, "to constitutional matters which have not been, and
could not have been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett,
153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly, issues that a defendant
raised in his appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction, or
issues that could have been raised but were not, generally will not
be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Whitehead,
169 Ill. 2d 355, 370-71 (1996). An evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is warranted only where the allegations of the
post-conviction petition, supported by the trial record or
accompanying affidavits where appropriate, make a substantial
showing that a defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. All well-pleaded facts in the
petition and accompanying affidavits, if any, are taken as true for
the purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995). This
court reviews a circuit court's determination regarding the
sufficiency of allegations in a post-conviction petition de novo.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
	At the outset, we observe that with regard to each issue raised
by defendant, the State maintains that defendant has waived that
issue because he did not raise the issue on direct appeal, nor does
he now claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise those issues on direct appeal. Although any issue that
could have been presented on direct appeal but was not is deemed
waived, the doctrine of waiver will be relaxed where fundamental
fairness so requires, where the facts relating to the claim do not
appear on the face of the original appellate record, or where the
alleged waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate counsel.
People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). Upon review of the
pleadings and record in this case, we agree with the State that
defendant has waived the issues raised on appeal because those
issues could have been raised in his direct appeal. However,
because defendant makes the claim that due to the trial court's
rulings, his post-conviction counsel could not determine whether
defendant's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, we will
examine those issues under principles of fundamental fairness.



I. Discovery
	Defendant first contends that he was denied due process of
law when the trial court denied his production requests and
quashed his subpoenas. Defendant argues that the trial court's
ruling denied him a chance to investigate and present his post-conviction claims, such that his post-conviction counsel could not
certify in good faith that they had performed the duties imposed
upon them by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R.
651(c)).
	Defendant had filed a motion to produce DNA evidence
requesting the vaginal swab which formed the basis of comparison
to defendant's DNA sample. Defendant also sought items of
evidence recovered in the case which had not been tested,
including vaginal smears on slides from the rape kit, Heather's
blood sample, a Kool cigarette butt, and Heather's robe and
terrycloth gown. Defendant later amended his motion to produce
DNA evidence to request a sample of his blood taken in
connection with his arrest for the sexual assault of his
stepdaughter. Defendant also served a subpoena duces tecum on
the Will County sheriff seeking evidence logs which would show
the chain of custody of the DNA evidence and of defendant's
blood sample. In addition, defendant served a subpoena duces
tecum to the State Police seeking David Metzger's complete
personnel file. The circuit court denied defendant's discovery
requests and quashed the subpoenas to the Will County sheriff and
the State Police.
	Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible
error in violation of his constitutional rights when it quashed his
subpoenas and denied his discovery requests. Defendant claims
that based upon Heather Stephens' description of the perpetrator,
as well as the composite sketch prepared based upon Heather's
description, he cannot be the offender in this case. Defendant
argues that the DNA evidence in this case, which was critical to
his conviction, is suspect in light of Metzger's destruction of the
first samples and Metzger's "fortuitous" discovery of additional
samples. Defendant also questions the State's failure to test all the
evidence in this case, including Heather's robe and a Kool
cigarette butt. Defendant notes that Heather had initially told
police investigators that the perpetrator had ejaculated onto her
robe, although at trial she testified that although she first thought
the perpetrator did not ejaculate inside her, when she went to the
bathroom later, she saw what looked like sperm coming from her
vagina. Defendant also notes that neither Heather nor Jeff were
smokers, and defendant smoked only Camel cigarettes.
	In addition, defendant claims he should have been permitted
to investigate Metzger's background in light of Metzger's
destruction of the first samples in this case and the fact that
Metzger had been disciplined by the State Police shortly before he
testified in this case. Finally, defendant claims that his post-conviction counsel had a duty to investigate the possibility of
tampering with regard to his blood sample. Defendant states that
the Will County sheriff had taken two samples of his blood in
connection with the sexual assault of his stepdaughter, and
suggests that the Will County sheriff may have substituted those
samples with that of the offender in the Stephens case. Defendant
argues that his production requests were proper given that the
State has the exclusive control and custody of unexamined items
of crime scene evidence.
	Although neither the civil nor criminal discovery rules apply
to post-conviction proceedings, a circuit court nonetheless has
inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264
(2000). However, because post-conviction proceedings afford a
defendant only limited review, and because there is an opportunity
for abuse of discovery, a circuit court must be cautious in the
exercise of its authority to order discovery. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 415 (2000). A circuit court, then, should allow discovery
only if the moving party has demonstrated "good cause" for the
discovery request. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 264-65. Consequently, this
court has upheld a circuit court's denial of a defendant's discovery
request where that request went beyond the limited scope of post-conviction proceedings and amounted to, in essence, a "fishing
expedition." Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 415. A circuit court's denial of a
request for discovery in a postconviction proceeding will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 265.
	Upon review, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's discovery requests. Although
defendant claims that his discovery requests were narrow and
circumspect, we find that the requests amounted to nothing more
than a fishing expedition. Post-conviction proceedings are limited
to considerations of constitutional matters which have not been,
and could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v.
Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Here, the evidence requested
by defendant was known to exist at the time of trial, and the
questions regarding the evidence raised by defendant in support of
his discovery requests were all raised at defendant's trial.
	For example, police officers testified and were cross-examined concerning the chain of custody of the evidence in the
case, as well as the chain of custody regarding the samples taken
from defendant. With regard to the testing of evidence, an
employee of the State Police crime lab testified that the State
Police works on a deferred examination system with regard to
evidence, meaning that when there is a lot of evidence in a case,
the crime lab examines the best evidence first, then tests additional
evidence if further testing is needed. In addition, Metzger testified
and was cross-examined concerning his destruction of the first
samples in this case, as well as his testing of the additional
samples. Defendant's two expert witnesses criticized Metzger's
testing of the DNA samples, including his destruction of the first
samples. Defendant's experts also testified that Metzger's results
matching defendant's DNA to that of the perpetrator in the
Stephens case were not reliable.
	Defendant, however, denies that the discovery requests were
a fishing expedition, and argues that the discovery was necessary
in order for his post-conviction counsel to determine whether
defendant's trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective.
Likewise, defendant argues that his post-conviction counsel could
not certify that they had made the necessary amendments to
defendant's pro se post-conviction petition without the requested
discovery. This, however, is exactly the sort of fishing expedition
that is not permitted in post-conviction proceedings.
	In support of his claim, defendant cites this court's recent
decision in Fair. In Fair, the defendant was convicted of two
murders and was sentenced to death. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 259.
Following the defendant's conviction, it was discovered that the
judge who had presided over the defendant's trial and sentencing
had engaged in extensive criminal conduct and corruption during
the time before and after the defendant's trial. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at
260. This court held that the defendant was entitled to discovery
of evidence obtained by the Cook County State's Attorney during
the investigation of the trial judge in order to establish a nexus
between the judge's criminal conduct and the defendant's trial.
Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 267. We noted that because the trial judge had
pled guilty, all the evidence concerning the judge's criminal
conduct was in the exclusive control of the State, and it would be
virtually impossible for the defendant to establish a nexus between
the judge's criminal conduct and the defendant's trial without
access to that evidence. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 266.
	We find this case to be distinguishable from our decision in
Fair. As noted, the fact of the judge's corruption in Fair was not
discovered until some time after defendant had been convicted and
sentenced. Here, in contrast, all evidence sought by defendant in
his motion for DNA evidence and in his subpoenas was available
at the time of his trial. Defendant's subpoenas and discovery
requests, then, went well beyond the limited scope of a post-conviction proceeding and, therefore, were properly denied.
	Defendant also claims that the trial court's decision in this
case was "contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of" an order this
court entered in People v. Enoch, Nos. 59390, 70254, 83298 cons.
(November 17, 1998). In the order, this court allowed the
defendant's motion for stay of execution and remanded the cause
to the circuit court. In addition, the State was ordered to produce
the underlying data for DNA testing in the case and to provide
access to evidentiary material for independent testing.
	In defendant's motion for reconsideration, he attached the
relevant pleadings from the Enoch case to establish the similarities
between that case and his case. We have reviewed the pleadings
in that case and disagree with defendant that his case is similar. In
Enoch's case, DNA technology was not available, and thus was
not done, at the time of defendant's trial. In addition, in late 1996,
defense counsel noted that a critical piece of evidence used against
the defendant at his 1983 trial, a bloodstained and sweat-stained
shirt, was missing a swatch of fabric from the underarm. The State
admitted that the swatch had been taken from the shirt before the
defendant's 1983 trial, but denied the defendant's request to
perform DNA tests on the sweat stains. The defendant's counsel
had argued that the swatch of fabric constituted newly discovered
evidence supporting a claim of actual innocence.
	Here, in contrast to the Enoch case, DNA testing was
performed on the evidence at issue in defendant's trial. Further,
the evidence requested by defendant in his motion to produce, in
contrast to the evidence at issue in People v. Enoch, was known to
exist at the time of defendant's trial. Consequently, the trial court
in this case did not violate the spirit of this court's order in People
v. Enoch when it denied defendant's discovery request.
	We note, however, that defendant suggests that the trial court
committed reversible error because it did not allow defense
counsel to investigate defendant's claim that he is actually
innocent. Claims of actual innocence under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act require that the supporting evidence be "new,
material, noncumulative and, most importantly, ' "of such
conclusive character" ' as would ' "probably change the result on
retrial".' " People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996),
quoting People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 368 (1987), quoting
People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 134 (1984). Thus, in
Washington, this court found that the defendant's claim of newly
discovered evidence could be raised in the defendant's post-conviction petition to entitle the defendant to a new trial.
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475. The newly discovered evidence was
the affidavit of a woman who testified that she had been present
when her then boyfriend and a friend had shot the victim and had
fled to Mississippi for six years following the murder. Washington,
171 Ill. 2d  at 477.
	Although defendant in this case alleges that the evidence
requested in his discovery motions and subpoenas may go to a
claim of actual innocence, we note that none of the material sought
was new, material and noncumulative. Nor can we say that the
materials sought were of such conclusive character that it likely
would change the result upon retrial. Even though defendant
suggests problems with contamination of the second sample sent
to Metzger and suggests tampering with his blood sample, he
offers no evidence in support of these claims. Nor does defendant
establish how questions concerning Metzger's methods and
qualifications would change the result upon retrial. As noted, two
expert witnesses testified at trial on behalf of defendant criticizing
Metzger's methodology, qualifications and conclusions. Because
defendant has failed to show that his discovery requests were
necessary for the litigation of constitutional claims that were not
presented in the original proceedings, the trial court properly
denied those requests.


II. Testimony of Prosecution DNA Expert
	Defendant next contends that his amended petition for post-conviction relief raised numerous Brady violations with regard to
the testimony of David Metzger, the State's DNA expert witness.
Defendant claims that the prosecution violated Brady where it: (1)
permitted Metzger to testify falsely concerning his qualifications;
(2) suppressed evidence that Metzger had been reprimanded in the
past for sloppy or unprofessional work; and (3) suppressed
Metzger's written statement to the Will County sheriff explaining
how he had destroyed the first DNA samples. These claims arise
from information contained within Metzger's personnel file. Prior
to Metzger's testimony, defendant had moved for the disclosure of
Metzger's personnel file. The trial court reviewed Metzger's
personnel file in camera, but stated that it found no impeaching
information that required the file to be turned over to the defense.
The trial court stated, however, that it would impound the file and
include it in the record.
	Included within Metzger's personnel file was information
regarding a disciplinary incident. Metzger had been charged by the
State Police with stealing a microscope in January 1995. In May
1995, Metzger entered into a settlement agreement with the State
Police, which provided that Metzger would receive a 100-day
suspension without pay, would perform 120 hours of community
service, would forfeit his accrued vacation time, and during the
period of his suspension, would contact the research and
development program coordinator each day by telephone and
would not access work facilities without an escort. Shortly after he
had returned to work following his suspension, Metzger testified
in this case.
	In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), the United States Supreme Court set forth the
government's affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a
defendant. The general rule, as set forth in Brady, provides that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97. A defendant is not entitled to
relief under Brady unless he can establish that the evidence
improperly withheld was both favorable to the defense and
material.
	In this context, favorable evidence is material "only if there is
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). A reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 105 S. Ct. 
at 3383.
	With regard to defendant's claim that Metzger testified
falsely, defendant claims that the materiality element of Brady is
met where the prosecution's case included perjured testimony.
Specifically, defendant contends that Metzger committed perjury
when he testified that he was a DNA research coordinator and had
held that title for the previous five years, and when he testified that
he had been continuously employed by the State Police for the
previous 14 years. Defendant alleges that Metzger must have been
demoted to the position of DNA research coordinator, because the
personnel file showed that Metzger had held more senior
positions, including forensic science administrator and public
service administrator, shortly before he testified. In addition,
defendant argues that Metzger had not been continuously
employed by the State Police for the previous 14 years because he
had just returned to work following a 100-day suspension.
	It is well established that the State's knowing use of perjured
testimony in order to obtain a criminal conviction constitutes a
violation of due process of law. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326,
345 (1997). If there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the jury's verdict, a conviction
obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony must be
set aside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 345, citing People v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 491-92, 105 S. Ct. 3375,
3381-82 (1985). Likewise, where the State allows false testimony
to go uncorrected, the same principles apply. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 345, citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959). However, the State's obligation to correct false
testimony does not amount to an obligation to impeach its
witnesses with any and all evidence bearing upon their credibility.
People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 312-14 (1997).
	Contrary to defendant's claim, we find no evidence in the
record that Metzger committed perjury when he testified that he
had been a DNA research coordinator for the past five years.
Although defendant notes that Metzger held the titles of forensic
science administrator and public service administrator prior to
testifying in this case, we note that the job descriptions of both
positions were virtually identical, providing in relevant part that
Metzger "coordinates statewide integration of genetic marker
(DNA) technology into the forensic serology program; [and]
coordinates research efforts conducted by other forensic scientists
within the specialty area." (Emphases added.) It is clear from
Metzger's job description, then, that he was, in fact, a DNA
research coordinator. The fact that Metzger testified to his job
description rather than to his job title did not amount to perjury.
	Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that Metzger had
been demoted prior to testifying in this case. In fact, in connection
with the disciplinary incident, the Director of Central Management
Services for the State of Illinois sent Metzger a notice of approval
of written charges dated May 19, 1995. That notice had spaces to
be marked if discharge, demotion or suspension were part of the
settlement agreement. Although there was a mark in front of the
space for suspension, there were no marks in front of the spaces
for discharge or demotion.
	We likewise find no evidence that Metzger testified falsely
when he stated that he had been continuously employed by the
State Police for the previous 14 years. As noted above, the notice
of approval of charges established that defendant had been
suspended, but had not been discharged or demoted. We do not
equate a suspension with a termination, and thus cannot say that
Metzger committed perjury when he said that he had 14 years'
continuous employment with the State Police. Absent any
evidence of perjury then, defendant has failed to establish a Brady
violation with regard to Metzger's testimony concerning his
qualifications.
	Defendant's next claim with regard to Metzger's testimony is
that the State violated Brady because Metzger did not testify
concerning the terms of his settlement with the State Police.
Defendant argues that the terms of the settlement agreement were
both favorable to the defense and material. Defendant claims that
the evidence was material because there is a reasonable likelihood
"that the suppressed evidence that David Metzger was dishonored
and punished by the [State Police], and is a thief, could have
affected the outcome." Defendant contends that the evidence also
was favorable because that evidence could have been used to
impeach Metzger. Defendant maintains that the evidence at issue
would have shown Metzger's bias in favor of the government
because Metzger's natural bent would have favored law
enforcement, which would have been heightened because he
would have viewed his testimony against defendant as an
opportunity to make amends for his misconduct.
	Although defendant attributes great weight to Metzger's theft
of the microscope and the possibility that Metzger's settlement
with the State would establish his bias against defendant, we find
that any connection between Metzger's actions and his testimony
against defendant to be tenuous at best. This court has previously
found that any connection between Metzger's theft of a state-owned microscope and a DNA analysis prepared two years prior
to the theft was too remote and speculative to be used to impeach
Metzger. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).
	Here, the State Police brought administrative charges against
Metzger for an incident that occurred in January 1995, and the
settlement agreement was entered into in May 1995. Metzger
testified that he received the additional DNA samples in this case
on October 23, 1992, and ran tests on those samples which
indicated that an unknown assailant had committed the crimes. On
April 15, 1993, Metzger received blood samples from defendant.
Metzger then determined that defendant's DNA matched that of
Heather Stephens' assailant. Metzger testified in defendant's case
in October 1995.
	Although Metzger testified in this case after he had completed
his suspension period with the State Police, his testimony was
based upon a DNA analysis completed two years before the
disciplinary action regarding the microscope. Consequently, we
fail to see what incentive Metzger would have to fabricate DNA
evidence based upon disciplinary proceedings that had not yet
occurred. As in Bull, evidence concerning Metzger's settlement
agreement was too remote and uncertain to be used to impeach
Metzger. Accordingly, that evidence was neither material nor
favorable to defendant. Defendant, therefore, has failed to
establish a Brady violation with regard to that evidence.
	Similarly, we find that defendant's other Brady claims are not
supported by the record. Defendant alleges that the State
suppressed evidence that Metzger had been reprimanded in the
past concerning sloppy or unprofessional work, suppressed
evidence that Metzger was not certified in the use of DNA
methodology when he began work in this case, and suppressed
Metzger's statement explaining how he had destroyed the original
DNA evidence in the case. Defendant argues that the suppression
of all this evidence violated Brady because the prosecution's
ability to convict defendant of capital murder depended upon its
ability to convince the jury that Metzger was believable.
	The reprimand for sloppy and unprofessional work, however,
appears to be related to the destruction of the first DNA samples
in this case. That reprimand, then, would be neither material nor
favorable under Brady, as defendant's trial counsel knew that the
evidence had been destroyed. Defendant's trial counsel cross-examined Metzger concerning his destruction of the evidence. In
addition, defendant's expert witnesses were critical of Metzger's
destruction of the evidence in their testimony. Consequently, we
cannot say that had the reprimand been disclosed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
	Likewise, there is no evidence to support defendant's claim
that Metzger was not certified in DNA methodology before he
began work in this case. In fact, Metzger testified on cross-examination that he started doing DNA case work at the Illinois
State Police crime lab in August of 1992. When questioned
concerning whether he had taken a proficiency test prior to
conducting the DNA testing in this case, Metzger said that he had
taken such a test prior to August 1992, and explained that he knew
he had taken such a test because he "wouldn't have been allowed
to do DNA analysis unless I'm certified." The portion of
Metzger's personnel file cited by defendant in support of his claim
that Metzger was not DNA certified is date stamped June 2, 1992,
and states that "Mr. Metzger is working on becoming certified in
DNA methods." As this document is dated prior to August 1992,
we fail to see how it could have been used to impeach Metzger.
	Finally, with regard to defendant's claim that the State
suppressed Metzger's written statement to the Will County sheriff
explaining how he had destroyed the first DNA sample, the State
responds that there is no evidence that such a document exists.
Reference to a written statement appears in Metzger's handwritten
notes, which stated that the Will County sheriff wanted him to
provide a written explanation for the destruction of evidence.
There is no evidence, however, that Metzger ever actually wrote
the letter. In any event, such a letter merely would have been
cumulative of the evidence at defendant's trial. As the State
observed, Metzger testified at trial that the first DNA samples in
this case were destroyed when he left them in restrictive enzyme
too long. Defense counsel cross-examined Metzger concerning the
destruction of evidence, and defendant's expert witnesses
criticized Metzger's actions. While we agree with the State that
there is no evidence that Metzger ever wrote the letter, we note
that because the letter, if written, would have been cumulative of
the evidence at trial, such evidence was neither material nor
favorable under Brady.
	Defendant raises three additional issues with regard to
Metzger's personnel file. Defendant claims that: (1) he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyers were denied
access to those files; (2) he was denied his right to present a
defense when his attorneys were denied access to Metzger's
personnel file; and (3) he was denied his right to confront
witnesses in violation of the Illinois Constitution and the United
States Constitution when his attorneys were denied access to his
personnel file.
	As noted, this court has had an opportunity to address
Metzger's misconduct as to the microscope vis-a-vis his testimony
in a criminal case. In People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998),
Metzger also testified as the prosecution's DNA expert. On direct
appeal of the defendant's conviction and death sentence in that
case, defendant argued that he had been denied a fair trial because
the trial court had barred cross-examination of Metzger concerning
his disciplinary record with the State Police. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at
205. The disciplinary record concerned the same incident at issue
in this case, Metzger's theft of a State Police microscope and the
subsequent settlement agreement. There, as here, the defendant
argued that Metzger's disciplinary record established his motive
to testify falsely or to embellish his testimony to please the State
Police because he remained under a cloud of disgrace and had
perilous job security, so that he would be strongly motivated to
testify falsely in a biased manner in defense of his performance.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 206. The defendant claimed he had the right to
cross-examine Metzger regarding his biases, interests or motives
to testify falsely. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 206.
	This court agreed with the trial court that Metzger's
disciplinary record would have been inadmissible to impeach him,
noting that the record was too speculative and remote to infer that
Metzger had something to gain or lose by his testimony. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 207. Metzger had completed and reported his DNA
analysis two years before the disciplinary event, and testified one
year after the event. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 207. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in barring the cross-examination of Metzger
concerning his disciplinary record. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 207.
	Following Bull, this court again addressed a defendant's right
to cross-examine a State expert witness with regard to the theft of
a state-owned microscope. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592 (2000).
In Sims, the State's DNA expert, Phillip Sallee, entered into a
predisciplinary agreement with the State Police in connection with
his theft of a state-owned microscope. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 624.
Like Metzger, Sallee's agreement required him to perform
community service, to be suspended from work without pay, and
to forfeit vacation benefits. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 624. The circuit
court granted the State's motion in limine to bar evidence of the
predisciplinary agreement. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 624. The defendant
argued that because Sallee was performing DNA testing in his case
at the time that he was the subject of disciplinary proceedings,
Sallee "had a motive to curry favor with his employer by giving
results favorable to the State's case." Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 626. The
defendant therefore argued that the circuit court erred when it
barred him from impeaching Sallee with evidence of the
predisciplinary agreement. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 624.
	This court affirmed the circuit court's order granting the
motion in limine, noting that any incentive on Sallee's part to
fabricate DNA evidence because of his disciplinary proceedings
was remote and uncertain. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d  at 627-28. We noted:
		"Defendant's contention is that Sallee had a motive to
fabricate DNA results which implicated defendant because at
the time of the DNA testing, Sallee was facing disciplinary
proceedings in the State Police crime lab. For this contention
to be correct, a number of assumptions would have to be true.
For example, it would have to be assumed that, having been
discovered stealing microscopes and with his livelihood in
jeopardy, Sallee's immediate reaction would be to start
fabricating evidence in a case which he was currently working
on; that Sallee would begin fabricating evidence, with all the
attendant risks of doing so, even though he did not yet know
whether defendant's case would be tried, or whether some
other disposition, such as defendant pleading guilty or being
exonerated by other evidence, would occur; that Sallee would
risk fabricating evidence even though he did not yet know if
he would, in fact, be called to testify at defendant's trial; that
he would risk fabricating evidence even though by doing so,
he would be helping only the prosecutors in St. Clair County,
who would have no control or 'leverage' over the disciplinary
proceedings in the crime lab in Springfield; and that he would
risk fabricating evidence as a means of lessening his
administrative discipline even though the crime lab might
reasonably be expected to be concerned about its reputation
and integrity, and, therefore, might not look favorably upon
one of its employee's fabricating evidence." Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 
at 627.
	Similar assumptions have to be true in this case in order to
establish a connection between the theft of the microscope and
Metzger's DNA analysis. Moreover, in contrast to Sims, where
Sallee was performing DNA testing at the time he was subjected
to disciplinary proceedings, Metzger prepared his DNA analysis
two years prior to his testimony in defendant's case, rendering the
likelihood that Metzger would fabricate evidence even more
uncertain and remote. For that same reason, defendant's attempt
to distinguish Bull on the ground that Metzger testified in this case
shortly after he had returned to work following his suspension,
fails. Even if Metzger testified in this case shortly after he returned
to work following his suspension, his testimony was based upon
an analysis prepared more than two years prior to his theft of the
microscope.
	Defendant also attempts to distinguish Bull and Sims on the
grounds that: (1) the evidence in this case was not overwhelming;
and (2) Metzger had destroyed the first DNA sample during
testing. Neither factor, however, renders the connection between
Metzger's DNA analysis and his disciplinary incident any less
speculative or remote. For that reason, we find that defendant was
not denied an opportunity to present a defense or to cross-examine
a witness when his attorneys were denied access to Metzger's
personnel file. It further follows that defendant was not denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys were not
permitted to review the personnel file.



III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
	Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney failed to
conduct an adequate investigation into mitigation evidence and
failed to develop mitigation evidence sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty.
	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant first must establish
that his counsel's performance was so deficient that his
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. Once a defendant establishes that his counsel's performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he also must
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. With regard to mitigating evidence,
defense counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation into
the mitigating evidence he will present at a defendant's capital
sentencing hearing, or he must have a sound reason for failing to
make a particular investigation. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500,
541 (1999). Nonetheless, courts reviewing trial counsel's
decisions regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence are
highly deferential. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 513-14
(1998).
	Strategic choices made by defense counsel following a
thorough investigation into the law and facts relevant to a
defendant's plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514. Thus, an informed decision by defense
counsel not to present certain mitigating evidence can be a valid
strategic choice, entitled to judicial deference, where the evidence
potentially is damaging to the defendant. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514.
Where the lack of mitigating evidence presented at a defendant's
trial is not attributable to strategy, but instead to counsel's failure
to properly investigate mitigating evidence and to prepare a
defense, such deference is not warranted. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
514.
	At the second stage of defendant's death penalty hearing in
this case, the State presented evidence in aggravation that
defendant began sexually abusing his stepdaughter, Michelle
Adermann, when she was nine years old. The sexual abuse
continued until Michelle was 17 years old. Defendant also
attempted to sexually abuse his other stepdaughter, Christine
Adermann. Both Christine and Michelle told the officer
investigating the sexual abuse that defendant had a violent temper.
David Hickey, defendant's son and the half brother of Christine
and Michelle, also told the officer that defendant had a violent
temper and frequently threatened Michelle. Defendant was
arrested for the offense of criminal sexual assault based upon the
incident with Michelle, and pled guilty to a felony count of sexual
assault. On cross-examination, the officer said that defendant had
admitted having a sexual relationship with Michelle, but had
claimed that Michelle had initiated sexual intercourse twice
because she was being grounded. The State also introduced
evidence that defendant had a prior burglary conviction.
	Harold Barnes, a social worker, testified on defendant's behalf
at the sentencing hearing. Barnes had been retained by defense
counsel to investigate mitigating evidence in defendant's case. In
connection with that investigation, Barnes interviewed 16
members of defendant's family and 21 neighbors and friends of
defendant. Barnes testified that defendant was the fourth of six
children born to Chester and Opal Hickey. When defendant was
three years old, he was stricken with polio and had to wear a brace
on one leg for two years. When defendant was around seven years
of age, his mother began suffering nervous breakdowns and was
hospitalized on a number of occasions. Defendant received poor
to average grades and dropped out of school in high school.
	Defendant was active in the Nazarene church during his
adolescence. Defendant fell in love, got married and had two
children, but eventually divorced because his wife was unfaithful.
Sometime after his divorce, defendant began working for a salvage
company. While working for that company, defendant and a man
named William Conner both fell into a well. Because Conner was
stunned as a result of the fall, defendant held onto Conner until
help arrived and they were rescued.
	Barnes said that defendant was convicted of burglary in 1978
and served seven months of confinement. During that time, he was
a model prisoner. Barnes testified that everyone felt that defendant
had learned from his mistakes. Sometime after he was released
from prison, defendant married Linda Adermann and treated her
three minor children as his own. Linda eventually left defendant,
and left her children behind in defendant's care.
	Defendant was sentenced to the Illinois Department of
Corrections in 1992 for the sexual assault of Michelle Adermann.
During his incarceration, defendant received only one ticket for
breaking rules, when he was late for a class. Barnes explained that
this was "incredible" because penal institutions have so many
rules. Barnes testified that he had done an exhaustive search of
defendant's background and found nothing to suggest violent
behavior on defendant's part.
	Defendant's younger sister, Diana Clover, also testified on
defendant's behalf. Diana testified that defendant supported Linda
Adermann's children financially and cared for them after Linda
left him. Diana said that she currently was caring for Christine
Adermann and David Hickey and said that both children loved
their father.
	Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to contact any professionals, such as school personnel,
social service personnel, or psychological experts, and in failing
to obtain defendant's medical records, school records, social
service records or prison records. Defendant claims that school
records would have revealed that defendant was a poor student,
not an average student. In addition, the records would have
revealed that defendant suffered from hearing and speech
impairments. Defendant further claims that the mental illness of
defendant's mother and the physically abusive environment in
which he was raised were grossly minimized. Defendant also
contends that there was evidence that defendant suffers from
neurological deficits and is borderline retarded. Defendant argues
that evidence concerning his neurological and mental deficits
would have diminished defendant's culpability for his crimes.
	Defendant argues that his trial counsel also was ineffective for
failing to present evidence concerning the risk of defendant's
future dangerousness. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel
should have asked William Conner to testify that defendant had
saved his life. Defendant claims that but for counsel's failure to
introduce the foregoing testimony, the outcome of defendant's
capital sentencing hearing would have been different.
	In support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to present mitigating evidence, defendant attached two
affidavits to his amended post-conviction petition. The first
affidavit was from Alice Washington, a forensic social worker
employed by the State Appellate Defender's office. Washington
testified that defense counsel "seriously minimized the mental
illness" of defendant's mother, noting that defendant's sister once
observed her mother eat wallpaper off the wall. In addition,
Washington stated that both of defendant's parents were extremely
abusive. Washington also stated that defendant was a poor student
who was socially promoted from second through eighth grade, and
that he had hearing and speech impairments. Washington further
claimed that defendant's medical records revealed that defendant
had symptoms that were consistent with post-polio syndrome,
which can have a profound physical and neurological impact.
Finally, Washington stated that defendant had been examined by
Dr. Harry Gunn, and was found to have a full scale IQ of 73,
which is borderline retarded.
	The second affidavit attached to defendant's post-conviction
petition was the affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D., a
clinical and forensic psychologist. Cunningham stated that
"important perspectives" regarding defendant's risk of violence in
prison could have been presented at his sentencing hearing.
Cunningham based the violence risk assessment on actuarial data
that capital offenders have a low rate of institutional violence. In
addition, defendant had multiple factors which would be expected
to reduce his prison violence risk. These factors included his age,
his prior adaptation to prison, the absence of violent disciplinary
write-ups during his incarceration, the absence of prison gang
involvement, and his continued relationship with his family.
Cunningham opined that defendant's violence risk assessment
could have been critically important mitigating evidence.
	Based upon the information contained within the affidavits of
Washington and Cunningham, defendant argues that this case is
similar to People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). In Morgan,
this court held that defense counsel's failure to investigate and
present mitigating evidence failed to satisfy the reasonably
objective standard of Strickland and that the deficient performance
of defense counsel was so prejudicial that the defendant was
denied a fair sentencing hearing. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 548-49.
	Defense counsel in Morgan was told of the defendant's
seizures and related medical problems shortly after counsel was
retained. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 542. In his opening statement
during the defendant's sentencing hearing, defense counsel told
the court he would present evidence regarding medical problems
the defendant had suffered and still suffered. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 
at 542. The defendant attached affidavits to his post-conviction
petition indicating that defense counsel had not contacted the
affiants during trial and never asked defendant's family for
potential mitigating evidence or witnesses. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
543. Defense counsel also failed to inquire about defendant's
family history, which showed defendant's abusive and violent
childhood. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 543. In finding that defense
counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we
noted that the trial judge indicated that his sentence was clearly
influenced by the lack of evidence in mitigation. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 549.
	We find this case to be distinguishable from Morgan. Here,
Barnes interviewed 16 members of defendant's family and 21
neighbors and friends of defendant during his investigation into
mitigating evidence. Contrary to defendant's claim that defense
counsel did not present evidence that defendant did poorly in
school, we note that Barnes did testify that defendant was a poor
to average student and dropped out of school entirely in high
school.
	Nor do we agree that defense counsel "seriously minimized
the mental illness" of defendant's mother. Barnes testified that
defendant's mother began having nervous breakdowns when
defendant was seven, and was hospitalized several times as a
result of those nervous breakdowns. Although defense counsel did
not present evidence suggesting that defendant's parents were
abusive, we note that evidence of a defendant's turbulent
childhood is not inherently mitigating. People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000). A sentencing authority might regard such
evidence as aggravating, especially if the evidence suggests that
the defendant might present a danger in the future. Montgomery,
192 Ill. 2d  at 673. Further, the jury was told that defendant had
saved the life of William Connor. Connor's testimony in this
regard, then, would have been cumulative. See People v. Brisbon,
164 Ill. 2d 236, 248 (1995) (counsel not ineffective for failing to
introduce cumulative testimony).
	In addition, nothing in the record suggests that defense
counsel was aware or should have been aware that defendant may
have suffered brain damage or "post-polio syndrome." There is no
evidence to suggest that defense counsel was aware at the
sentencing hearing that defendant may have suffered brain
damage. Defendant never made any claim that he was mentally ill
or insane at the time of the crimes. Moreover, we find defendant's
reliance on Washington's affidavit to be misplaced. Washington,
who was not a medical doctor, stated that "[a] review of
[defendant's] medical records (which the defense did not obtain)
and an interview with [defendant] reveal symptoms which are
consistent with Post-Polio Syndrome. The late effects of polio can
have a profound physical and neurological impact." Washington
also claimed that defendant had been examined by Dr. Harry
Gunn, a psychologist, and had achieved a full scale IQ of 73,
which is borderline retarded. The State responds that post-polio
syndrome is a muscular problem, not a neurological problem.
	Washington's affidavit is speculative at best. As noted, she
was not a medical doctor and thus was not qualified to determine
whether defendant had a neurological problem. In addition, we
observe that in the report prepared by Dr. Gunn, Dr. Gunn clarifies
that with regard to defendant's IQ test, "there are questions about
the validity since [defendant] had only one free hand." Given the
speculative nature of Washington's affidavit, as well as the fact
that defendant never placed his sanity or mental condition at issue,
we cannot say that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to pursue evidence that defendant may have suffered some
type of brain damage or post-polio syndrome.
	We also have examined the reports of Dr. William Adair and
Jonathan Hess, a clinical neuropsychologist, which were attached
to defendant's motion to reconsider. We find nothing in these
reports to suggest that defendant's trial counsel should have
investigated or presented evidence of defendant's possible brain
damage. "A sentence will not be vacated on speculation of what
a mental examination may have revealed, when the defendant
failed to raise the issue of his mental condition." Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 252.
	Finally, we find no evidence to support defendant's claim that
his counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence regarding
the risk of defendant's future dangerousness. The affidavit of
Mark Cunningham was prepared approximately three years after
defendant was sentenced. Although defendant maintains that the
information contained within Cunningham's affidavit was based
upon data available at the time of defendant's sentencing, we
cannot say that counsel was ineffective in failing to gather such
"actuarial data." In any event, defense counsel did introduce
evidence that defendant was a model prisoner when he served time
on his burglary conviction and had received only one ticket since
his 1992 incarceration, which was "incredible." Barnes also
testified that he had done an exhaustive search of defendant's
background and found nothing to suggest that defendant was
violent. Nonetheless, the jury apparently found that defendant's
good behavior in prison did not offset the aggravating factors. It is
well established that a defendant's good behavior in prison is
insufficient to offset the aggravating evidence against the
defendant. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 495 (2000).
	We find nothing in the record to establish that defendant's
trial counsel was ineffective with regard to the mitigating evidence
presented on behalf of defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in dismissing this claim without an evidentiary hearing.
IV. Defendant's Absence from a Portion of Juror Deliberations
	Defendant next claims that he was denied his constitutional
right to due process, to the effective assistance of counsel, and his
right to a reliable sentencing hearing, under the fifth, sixth, eighth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. V, VI, VIII and XIV), because he was not present
in court when the trial jury sent out five notes during its
deliberations. In the notes, the jury requested numerous items of
evidence. The trial court's written response to the notes did not
address some of the requested items and, with regard to other
items, told the jury that the items were not evidence and that the
jury should recall the testimony concerning those items. In
addition, with regard to requests for witness testimony, the trial
court told the jury that no transcripts were available. Defendant
contends that he could have had some input into the nature of the
communication with the jury, so that his absence from the
courtroom violated his constitutional rights.
	A criminal defendant has a general right to be present at every
stage of his trial. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 201 (1998).
However, the situations where a defendant's rights under the
Illinois and the United States Constitutions are violated due to the
denial of his right to be present at every stage of his trial are
limited. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 201. It is only where the defendant's
absence results in the denial of an underlying substantial right that
error is committed. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 201. Thus, defendant's right
to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) would be
implicated only where the defendant's absence resulted in the
denial of a fair and just trial. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 201.
	A defendant, then, " 'is guaranteed the right to be present at
any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome
if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' "
People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 83 (1990), quoting Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987). Consequently, if it does not appear that a
defendant's absence resulted in an unfair trial, a defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated by his absence. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 83.
	Although defendant claims that he could have had some
"input" into the nature of the communication with the jury,
defendant has not alleged or established how his absence from the
courtroom when the jury sent out five notes denied him a fair and
just trial. As in Bean, "[d]efendant's argument is based on broad
principles and is not adapted to the specifics of this case." Bean,
137 Ill. 2d  at 84. We find nothing in the record indicating that
defendant's presence would have contributed to the fairness of the
procedure. Because the fairness of defendant's trial was not
affected by defendant's absence from this portion of the trial,
defendant was not denied his due process rights.



V. Death Penalty Instructions
	Finally, defendant claims error with regard to the jury
instructions submitted at his trial. Defendant claims that those
instructions were unconstitutionally vague and confusing, in
violation of his right to due process. Defendant further claims that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his trial
attorneys failed to tender alternative jury instructions.
	In support of this claim, defendant cites studies conducted by
Professor Hans Zeisel and by Professor Shari Diamond, which
purported to test the ability of potential jurors to comprehend
Illinois death penalty instructions. Defendant concedes that this
court previously has found that the conclusions of both Professor
Zeisel and Professor Diamond did not establish that the Illinois
death penalty instructions were constitutionally infirm. See People
v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 93 (1998); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1996). Defendant also concedes that this court
previously has declined to reconsider its views concerning the
Zeisler and the Diamond studies. See Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30;
People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 468 (1998). Nonetheless,
defendant has asked this court to reconsider the Illinois death
penalty instructions in light of the recent renewed concerns
regarding the procedural safeguards in place with regard to the
imposition of death.
	We decline the invitation to reconsider our views concerning
the Zeisler and Diamond studies. Aside from raising general
concerns about procedural safeguards surrounding the imposition
of the death penalty, which this court has addressed in its
comprehensive new rules governing capital cases, defendant has
failed to set forth any argument persuading this court to reexamine
its views concerning the Zeisler and Diamond studies.
	Defendant also makes a related claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel where his trial attorneys did not
tender alternative jury instructions. As noted, to establish that
counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must show that
counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the
counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Defendant argues
that his trial counsel was ineffective in accepting jury instructions
which half of tested subjects misunderstood, and further argues
that had his counsel tendered alternative instructions, the result of
his sentencing hearing would have been different.
	We disagree. As discussed, this court has rejected the studies
concluding that half of the tested subjects misunderstood the death
penalty instructions. Consequently, defense counsel was not
deficient in failing to tender alternative jury instructions.



NEW SUPREME COURT RULES
	As a final matter, we address the issues raised in the dissents.
The Chief Justice, in his dissent, makes the dire statement that the
system for capital punishment has collapsed. While we certainly
are aware of those cases in which a defendant had been convicted
and sentenced to death, but later was exonerated and released from
prison, we do not infer from these cases that the entire system has
collapsed. The Governor declared a moratorium on future
executions after several death row defendants were exonerated.
We do not infer from the moratorium, however, that every capital
trial has been unreliable and that all appellate review has been
haphazard.
	Chief Justice Harrison, also contends that this case illustrates
the shortcomings of the system because the DNA evidence used to
convict defendant was of dubious validity. Citing this court's
opinion on direct appeal, Chief Justice Harrison notes that the
"quality assurance standards of the laboratory were questionable.
Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 271 [hereinafter Hickey I]." Slip op. at 36
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting). He further notes that the "discovery of
additional samples raised suspicions" and that "[v]irtually all of
the samples had degraded or were of poor quality. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 272." Slip op. at 36 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
	Taking the Chief Justice's dissent at face value, the
uninformed reader might justifiably assume that, in Hickey I, this
court made affirmative findings as to the "dubious validity"of the
DNA evidence. Indeed, the Chief Justice supports his assertion as
to the "dubious validity" of this evidence with pinpoint citations
to Hickey I. What the Chief Justice fails to point out, however, is
that the cited portions of Hickey I come not from this court's
holding but rather straight from the mouths of defendants' experts.
See Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 271-72. The Chief Justice conveniently
ignores the portions of Hickey I summarizing the State's expert
witness, who testified that the Illinois State Police laboratory
procedures and protocol were scientifically valid and that there
was no evidence of degradation of the DNA in this case. Hickey,
178 Ill. 2d  at 270-71.
	Given the conflicting expert testimony as to the quality of the
DNA evidence, the issue became one for the jury to decide.
Indeed, this court noted as much in addressing defendant's claim
that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), holding that the
issues defendant raised concerning the caliber of Metzger's work,
"including laboratory protocol and the manner in which it was
followed, the various quality control and quality assurance
measures which Metzger employed, and the possible
contamination or degradation of the DNA samples," go to the
weight of that evidence. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 279. In convicting
defendant, the trial jury, as the trier of fact, apparently found the
testimony of the State's expert witnesses to be more credible than
the testimony of defendant's expert witnesses, a finding which this
court affirmed on direct appeal. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
now relies upon the testimony of the defendant's trial experts as
providing factual support for the reversal of defendant's
conviction.
	We recognize that Chief Justice Harrison strongly and
sincerely disagrees with the majority's conclusion concerning
retroactive application of the new supreme court rules. The
strength of that conviction, however, hardly justifies a conscious
effort to pass off the controverted testimony of certain defense
experts as the official position of this court.
	That said, throughout the years, this court and the General
Assembly have worked to include additional safeguards to the
many protections awarded a criminal defendant. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 
at 216. To that end, this court recently adopted a comprehensive
set of new rules governing capital cases. The Chief Justice
interprets these rules as establishing "[a] new, irreducible
standard," such that any conviction obtained prior to the adoption
of the rules cannot stand. Slip op. at 38 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting). Under that analysis, the failure to follow the new rules
establishes a per se constitutional violation warranting relief under
the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998)). The problem with this
interpretation is that if we were to assume that a violation of the
new rules amounted to a per se constitutional violation entitling a
defendant to post-conviction relief, then we would have to assume
the converse to be true: that adherence to the new rules would
preclude post-conviction relief because a defendant could not
show a constitutional violation. This conclusion is contrary to both
the spirit and the letter of the Act.
	Both dissents find that the new rules are of such constitutional
magnitude that retroactive application of the rules is required. The
Chief Justice states that the new rules "are so essential to the
fairness and accuracy of capital cases" that any conviction
obtained under the old rules cannot stand. Slip op. at 39 (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Kilbride concludes that the new
rules "establish a watershed rule of criminal procedure" which
"implicate the fundamental fairness and the accuracy of a trial."
Slip op. at 39-40 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). These conclusions,
however, are at odds with the rules themselves, which provide that
the new rules are immediately effective, "except when in the
opinion of the trial, Appellate, or Supreme Court the application
of the amended provisions in a particular case pending at the time
the amendment becomes effective would not be feasible or would
work an injustice, in which case former procedures would apply."
See 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 411, 412, 416, 417. If the new rules in fact were
of the constitutional magnitude proposed by dissents, the new
rules would not, and indeed could not, contain a provision
allowing a court, in its discretion, to apply the former rules. Quite
simply, the positions taken by the dissents are at odds with the
plain language of the new rules.
	Nonetheless, based upon the dissents' findings that the new
rules set a new constitutional standard, the dissents conclude that
because the new rules had not been enacted at the time of
defendant's conviction and sentencing, defendant's conviction and
sentence must be vacated, and the cause must be remanded "for a
new trial in conformity with our new rules." Slip op. at 40
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting). In fact, the Chief Justice would have
this court vacate all convictions in capital cases which were
obtained prior to March 1, 2001, the effective date of the new
rules. Such a result was never intended by this court in adopting
the rules.
	The new rules governing capital cases create rules of
procedure. The safeguards set forth in the new rules are broader
than the constitutional rights they protect. A violation of
procedures designed to secure constitutional rights should not be
equated with a denial of those constitutional rights. This court
could decide to repeal the new rules, or we could further amend
the rules to delete some provisions and to add others, something
we could not do if those rules established constitutional rights. The
new rules do not set a constitutional standard. Alleged violations
of rules of procedure which do not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights do not warrant post-conviction relief. People
v. Hangsleben, 43 Ill. 2d 236, 238 (1969).
	In support of his proposition that the new rules establish a
"watershed rule of criminal procedure," Justice Kilbride cites the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57, 109 S. Ct. 1060,
1076 (1989). However, that our new rules "establish a watershed
rule of criminal procedure" is not, under Teague, the linchpin of
retroactivity. In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that
decisions establishing new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on
collateral review unless the new rule either (i) places certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal-law-making authority to proscribe, or (ii) requires the
observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. Teague, 489 U.S.  at 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 353, 109 S. Ct.  At 1073. This court has adopted the Teague test. See People
v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990).
	As noted, the new rules of this court are not of constitutional
dimension in and of themselves. They function solely as devices
to further protect those rights given to defendants by the federal
and state constitutions, such as, for example, the right to counsel
and the right to a fair trial. Our new rules were designed to help
remedy some of the problems that were perceived to be the root
cause of past erroneous convictions. For example, most reversals
occur because of (i) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (ii)
prosecutorial misconduct which deprives a defendant of a fair trial,
and (iii) trial judge error. Recognizing this, this court adopted rules
designed to minimize these problems in future. These rules
therefore help to avoid future reversals based on instances of
constitutionally incompetent representation and improper
prosecutorial conduct, among other things. Notwithstanding the
promulgation of these rules, errors will occur. These errors may
well require reversal-not because the rules themselves were
violated-but because certain fundamental constitutional violations
occurred. It is the departure from constitutional principles that
make a criminal proceeding unreliable, not failure to observe rules
of this court. For this reason, we do not believe that the rules can
or should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a
Teague analysis.
	Moreover, Justice Kilbride states that Rule 714, which
imposes standards on attorneys who will appear in capital trials,
"implicitly eliminates a defendant's right to proceed pro se in a
capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995)." According to Justice Kilbride, this fact is reason
alone to find that the new rules are "of significant constitutional
dimension" Slip op. at 40 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Justice
Kilbride further maintains that, contrary to Coleman, capital
defendants do not enjoy the right to self-representation.
	The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), held that
the right to counsel provided by the sixth amendment (U.S. Const.,
amend. VI) includes within it the right to self-representation in
criminal trials. In addition, a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to refuse state-provided counsel if the choice
to proceed on his or her own is made intelligently and voluntarily.
Faretta, 422 U.S.  at 821, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 573-74, 95 S. Ct.  at 2534.
In Illinois, our state constitution provides similar protections to
defendants and likewise protects a defendant's right to self-representation. This court has rejected the notion of forcing a
capital defendant who elects to proceed pro se to be represented by
counsel. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995). In so holding,
we cited expressly to Faretta. To hold, as the dissent would, that
Rule 714 overrules Coleman would call into question the
legitimacy of Faretta. As this court stated in People v. Simpson,
Nos. 85084, 86926 cons. (September 27, 2001), slip op. at 29, "the
new rules create neither a constitutional standard that overrules
established constitutional rights nor invalidate prior decisions
upholding those rights."
	In light of the above, we do not believe that the rules can or
should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a Teague
analysis.
	Finally, we note that the Chief Justice cites to our recent case
of People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, No. 90114 (June 21, 2001), in
support of his contention that the new rules should be applied here.
We believe the Chief Justice's position is wide of the mark. The
capital proceeding at issue in Bakalis was in the pretrial stage
when the matter was brought to this court. During the pendency of
the appeal in this court, the new rules took effect. Certainly the
rules, to the extent applicable, will govern a case in that procedural
posture as well as any other case now coming to trial in the circuit
courts of this state. As such, the Bakalis case is inapposite.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing and denying defendant's discovery
requests, is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an
order setting Tuesday, January 15, 2002, as the date on which the
sentence of death shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed
in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000).
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of this mandate
to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is now confined.



Affirmed.
	The system for imposing capital punishment in Illinois has
collapsed. Trial proceedings had become so unreliable and
appellate review so haphazard that the Governor was eventually
forced to step in and declare a moratorium on future executions.
That moratorium, announced on January 31, 2000, remains in
effect. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 432 (2000) (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting).
	Legislative and executive branch committees are investigating
whether the failures in our death penalty law can be remedied or
whether the death penalty should simply be abolished.(1) As we
await their conclusions, our court has formed its own committee
to examine the problem. Based upon the work of that committee,
we have adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the
conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.
With certain exceptions, the new rules took effect March 1, 2001. 
	The new rules clarify the duty of prosecuting attorneys
(amended Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
establish mandatory programs to improve the knowledge and skill
of trial judges who may be called upon to preside over capital
cases (Rule 43), extend criminal discovery rules to capital
sentencing hearings (Rule 411), and impose on the State a duty to
make a good-faith effort to identify material or information which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or reduce his punishment
(Rule 412). The rules also create a new set of procedures that must
be followed in capital cases. Among theses are rules which require
the State to give prompt notice of its intention to seek or reject
imposition of the death penalty, limit eligibility to serve as defense
counsel to attorneys who meet stringent new minimum
qualifications, authorize discovery depositions in capital cases,
mandate case management conferences after the State has
disclosed its intention to seek the death penalty, and obligate the
State to certify before trial that it has complied with its disclosure
duties (Rule 416). In addition, new pretrial disclosure rules are
imposed with respect to DNA evidence (Rule 417).
	As the committee comments to these rules indicate, they are
designed "to ensure that capital defendants receive fair and
impartial trials and to minimize the occurrence of error in capital
trials." 188 Ill. 2d R. 416, Committee Comments, at lxxii. These
are objectives that were clearly not being met under the old law.
Indeed, in many cases under the old law, there was no longer even
a pretense of fairness or accuracy. A majority of this court
expressly conceded the inherent unreliability of the system. People
v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 215-18 (1998). Utter ineptitude was
accepted as adequate representation. People v. Rissley, No. 82536,
slip op. at 11 (March 15, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
Appeals were illegally and summarily dismissed. People v.
Kokoraleis, M.R. 15833, Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 11,
at 4-7 (June 2, 1999).
	The case before us today illustrates many of the system's
shortcomings. Defendant is a polio victim with hearing and speech
impediments whose intelligence is borderline retarded. The
surviving victim's initial description of her assailant bore no
similarity to defendant, and when asked to identify defendant later,
she stated that she had never seen him before. People v. Hickey,
178 Ill. 2d 256, 263-64 (1997). No fingerprints, shoe impressions
or fiber evidence connected defendant to the crime. The murder
weapon was not linked to him. A man seen by the victims'
automobile after the crime did not resemble defendant. Hickey,
178 Ill. 2d  at 264-67, 273-74.
	What convicted defendant was DNA evidence. The DNA
evidence used against him, however, was of dubious validity. The
quality assurance standards of the laboratory were questionable.
Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 271. The initial samples were destroyed
through mishandling. The discovery of additional samples raised
suspicions. Virtually all of the samples had degraded or were of
poor quality. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 272. In addition, the State
employee who performed the tests was reprimanded for sloppy and
unprofessional work, was found to have been dishonest, and was
disciplined for stealing state property.
	Despite the weaknesses in the State's case, the jury convicted
defendant and he was sentenced to death. Despite the array of
problems that developed before and during defendant's trial, the
majority has found a way to affirm the conviction and sentence.
The formal process was honored. If the capital punishment debacle
of the last few years has taught us anything, however, it is that
adherence to the formal process, as it existed under the old law,
can produce results that seem rational but are, in fact, completely
unreliable.
	In addressing the shortcomings of the past, the new supreme
court rules for capital cases reflect a basic shift in this court's
conception of what is necessary to provide capital defendants with
a fair trial. Our tolerance for prosecutorial gamesmanship and
professional incompetence has evaporated. From now on, the
success of prosecutors will be gauged by how well they cooperate
in the search for truth and justice, not by the number of
convictions they secure. It cannot be any other way. The old
priorities do not work. When convictions are prized above justice,
innocent men are sentenced to die. It has happened too often in
Illinois It must stop.
	The evidence presented to our committee and the committee's
subsequent recommendations have persuaded us that the
procedures contained in the new rules are indispensable for
achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Those
procedures will not necessarily assure that error will be eliminated
from every murder case in which the State seeks the death penalty.
Without them, however, no capital proceeding can be deemed
reliable.
	As a general rule, changes in the law which are procedural in
nature, as these rules are, apply to all cases pending on direct
review without regard to whether the claims arose before or after
the change in the law occurred. People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 162
(1996), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000); Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education, 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 (1980). That is unquestionably so where the new law
expressly defines its temporal reach to include pending cases. See
Commonwealth Edison v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38
(2001) (where legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal
reach of an amended statute should be, that expression of
legislative intent must be given effect absent a constitutional
prohibition).
	The same is true of rules promulgated by this court. Our court
has the authority to specify the particular date new rules or
amendments to rules take effect. If we so specify, the effective
date of the new rules "shall be as ordered." 188 Ill. 2d R. 3(g).
Once the effective date has been reached, the new rules are
applicable to all cases pending on direct review, even cases which
commenced before the rules were enacted. That is so because, as
with new procedural statutes, rules of court which are procedural
in nature have retroactive application. See Jarmon v. Jinks, 165 Ill.
App. 3d 855, 863 (1987).
	Because rules of procedure apply retroactively, we have not
hesitated to apply our new rules governing capital cases to cases
coming before us on direct review. See People ex rel. Birkett v.
Bakalis, No. 90114, slip op. at 2 (June 21, 2001). We should take
the same approach in cases such as this one which come before us
in the context of post-conviction proceedings.
 	A court's adoption of new rules of court governing criminal
procedure is analogous to its issuance of a judicial opinion
recognizing new rules of criminal procedure. Where the court
issues an opinion announcing new rules of criminal procedure and
the rules are of constitutional dimension, the new rules may be
invoked by other defendants in other cases on collateral review
where such rules implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the trial. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997).
To qualify for application under this principle, the new rules must
be aimed at improving the accuracy of trial and be of such
importance that they alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to a fair trial. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831
(1990). For the reasons previously discussed, the new rules
governing capital cases plainly meet this requirement. They
represent a basic and unprecedented shift in our conception of
what we must do to afford defendants a fair trial in death penalty
cases and to assure that the results of such trials are consistently
reliable. A new, irreducible standard has been set.
	Now that the new standard is in place, we cannot countenance
any conviction or sentence in a capital case where the standard has
not been followed. If the new rules are so essential to the fairness
and accuracy of capital cases and if we are serious about our
intention to improve the reliability of capital proceedings, we must
disavow any presumption as to the fairness and accuracy of death
penalty cases prosecuted under the old law. The only presumption
to be made at this point is that any conviction and sentence
obtained without the aid of the new rules is invalid. Because the
defendant in the case before us was tried, convicted and sentenced
without the benefit of the new rules, his conviction and sentence
should therefore be vacated and the cause should be remanded to
the circuit court for a new trial in conformity with our new rules.
	Even if defendant were not entitled to a new trial, I still could
not join in the majority's opinion. For the reasons set forth in my
partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). At a minimum,
defendant's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the
cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/ 9-1(j) (West 1994).



	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
	I agree with Chief Justice Harrison's conclusion that the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases should be applied
retroactively. Like many other capital convictions tried under the
old rules, defendant's conviction in this case remains suspect
because it was obtained through procedures that were inherently
unreliable and did not adequately protect a defendant's
constitutional rights. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 714, Committee
Comments, at cxiii (acknowledging "problem" in capital trials
under old system and the need to safeguard fairness and accuracy).
In remedying this monumental wrong, the new rules establish a
watershed rule of criminal procedure (see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57, 109 S. Ct. 1060,
1076 (1989)), particularly with regard to the new mandatory
minimum eligibility standards established by Rule 714 for the
Capital Litigation Trial Bar (see 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 714(a) through
(g)).
	While imposing substantial standards on capital attorneys,
Rule 714, on its face, provides no exception to these standards for
defendants who choose to represent themselves. As a result, Rule
714 implicitly eliminates a defendant's right to proceed pro se in
a capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), on that point. For this reason alone, contrary to the
majority's conclusion, the new rules are of significant
constitutional dimension. Moreover, by imposing minimum
standards on capital attorneys and establishing other procedural
safeguards for capital cases, the new rules implicate the
fundamental fairness and the accuracy of a trial, thus necessitating
retroactive application. Teague, 489 U.S.  at 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 
at 356-57, 109 S. Ct.  at 1076; People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,
220-21 (1997); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990).
	Those who disagree with my conclusion will undoubtedly
argue that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562,
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), afforded all defendants the right to proceed
at trial without counsel. Faretta did not, however, decide whether
the right of self-representation applies to capital defendants. In
fact, Faretta was decided in 1975 when the death penalty was
unconstitutional. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972). Thus, I disagree that we are
constrained by Faretta to hold that capital defendants possess a
federal constitutional right to self-representation. See People v.
Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 287 (2001) (while bound to follow the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States, we are not bound to extend those decisions
to issues not specifically decided). More importantly, a broadening
of the Faretta right to encompass capital defendants is
fundamentally at odds with the stated purpose of the new rules of
assuring the accuracy and fairness of capital trials. The problems
pro se defendants pose to the accuracy of trials were partially
articulated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158,
170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932):
		"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
Therefore, in view of the significant number of capital defendants
who have been defended with the assistance of counsel and
erroneously convicted, I cannot countenance the notion that a pro
se capital defense is sufficiently competent in the face of the most
serious proceeding in our criminal justice system.
	In rejecting the conclusion that the new rules should apply
retroactively, the majority partially relies upon a curious rationale,
namely, that to accept Chief Justice Harrison's view would mean
that the simple "adherence to the new rules would preclude post-conviction relief because a defendant could not show a
constitutional violation." Slip op. at 31. The majority incorrectly
assumes this conclusion to be a natural extension of Chief Justice
Harrison's view that nonadherence to the new rules is a per se
constitutional violation. As the committee comments indicate, the
new rules were designed to minimize, not eliminate, the
occurrence of errors. 188 Ill. 2d R. 416, Committee Comments, at
lxxii. Plainly put, adherence to the new rules will not result in the
trial of every capital case occurring without constitutional error.
Unfortunately, errors of constitutional dimension will continue to
occur, including the types alleged to have occurred in this case.
Therefore, under Chief Justice Harrison's view of the new rules,
post-conviction petitions would continue to be a viable means for
aggrieved defendants to bring to light alleged violations of their
constitutional rights.
	The dire need for the establishment of the minimum
safeguards established by the new rules is evidenced by two
capital cases recently reviewed by this court: People v. Rissley,
No. 82536 (March 15, 2001), and People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506 (2001). As detailed by Chief Justice Harrison, the appointed
defense counsel in Rissley was woefully unqualified and
unprepared to represent a capital defendant. Rissley, slip op. at 51
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Witnesses at the post-conviction
hearing testified that, among other slightly less egregious conduct,
defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress; conducted no
investigation; slept through some of the proceedings; and
persuaded the defendant into pleading guilty while the late-appointed co-counsel was out of town attempting to prepare
defense testimony. See Rissley, slip op. at 20-51 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting). Even though Chief Justice Harrison's dissent in
Rissley may be read as critical of the prosecutor, I view the record
in that case as partially illustrating the extreme difficulties faced
by all parties when an untrained, appointed defense attorney is
allowed to defend a capital defendant. The conduct of the
appointed defense counsel in Barrow was no less objectionable. In
that case, among other transgressions, the attorney failed to present
any defense whatsoever. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d  at 520. Thus, the new
rules were promulgated to remedy such fundamental problems as
were presented in each of these cases.
	At a bare minimum, the resolution of the retroactivity issue
should have been more fully addressed by this court following the
submission of supplemental briefs on the issue. If we are to err, we
should err on the side of caution. Unless we are confident that a
capital defendant, or any defendant for that matter, has received a
fair trial with competent counsel, we should not proceed without
being fully apprised of the applicable legal arguments. Our sense
of decency as a humane society demands no less than prudence in
the face of the ultimate criminal penalty of death. For these
reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
		Through this dissent, I express no opinion regarding the
propriety of the death penalty, nor do I express any opinion in
relation to the other issues raised by Chief Justice Harrison's
dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).
 



1.       1In the interim, the deterrent effect of the death penalty has been
brought into serious question. Preliminary statistics compiled by the
Illinois State Police show that during the first three quarters of 2000,
when the Governor's moratorium took effect and executions were
halted, the murder rate in Illinois actually declined by 9.7% as compared
to the same period a year earlier. By contrast, the overall crime rate
declined by only 2.5%.