Title: In Re Adoption of a Female Child

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

412 So. 2d 1175 (1982) In re ADOPTION OF A FEMALE CHILD. Hoyle L. MILLER v. E.K. ARRINGTON, Jr., and Judy Miller Arrington. No. 53043. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 31, 1982. Rehearing Denied May 5, 1982. Charles R. Brett, Tupelo, for appellant. *1176 Sandusky, Bailey, Fortenberry & Stephenson, Robert W. Bailey, Meridian, for appellees. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: E.K. Arrington, Jr., and his wife, Judy Miller Arrington, filed a petition for the adoption of Bridgette Samone Miller, the daughter of Judy Miller Arrington and Hoyle Miller, in the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County. Hoyle Miller, the natural father of Bridgette Samone Miller, did not consent to the adoption but vigorously opposed it. From a decree granting the adoption, Hoyle Miller appeals and assigns as error the following: 1. The trial court erred in overruling the respondent's motion to amend the bill of particulars; 2. The trial court erred in finding the respondent had abandoned the minor child. Hoyle Miller and Judy Miller Arrington were formerly husband and wife and Bridgette Samone Miller was born to this union on February 10, 1972. The Millers were divorced on February 19, 1974, with the mother being permanently granted the exclusive care, custody and control of the minor now sought to be adopted. By the decree of divorce, Hoyle Miller, the natural father, was enjoined from "bothering or molesting" either Mrs. Miller or the child of the parties in any manner whatsoever. We are unaware of the facts leading to the divorce but from that stated in Miller v. Miller, 323 So. 2d 533 (Miss. 1975), and some testimony in this record we ascertain that intense rivalry between the mother and father for the child began during its infancy. This is evidenced by a suit for separate maintenance, reconciliation, subsequent separation, and finally divorce. Sometime during this period the father removed the child to New Mexico without the consent or knowledge of the mother. This led to the child being returned to this state by the paternal grandmother at the request of the mother. Thereafter the child was again taken by the father which led to his arrest in Texas and the return of the child to its mother by the father's sister. This rivalry for the child has continued subsequent to the divorce as is evidenced by a long series of court battles instituted by the mother for child support payments. The father has never voluntarily made these payments but has only done so under the compulsion of contempt proceedings including periods of incarceration. Under these circumstances it cannot be stated that the father has conducted himself in an exemplary or even normal manner reflecting affection or love for his child. Whether this conduct was the result of the decree enjoining him from "bothering or molesting" either the mother or the child we do not know, but it does appear that such mandate in conjunction with the exclusive custody being granted the mother has been interpreted by both parties as denying the father any right of visitation with the child. Mrs. Arrington, presently resides in the City of Meridian with her husband, a teenage daughter by a marriage prior to her marriage to Miller, and Bridgette, whose custody she obtained in the divorce proceedings from Miller. Mrs. Arrington's attitude toward the father of Bridgette can best be portrayed, we think, by quoting from her testimony in part. After stating the father had never paid any support for the child unless compelled by court order and had never taken any legal proceedings to obtain visitation rights she stated that he had not seen the child since 1973, when Bridgette was one year old. Additionally she complained the father had never contributed anything to medical or dental bills of the daughter but admitted that she had never advised him of any illnesses though she could have done so. In response to questions: *1178 The trial court found that "the absolute failure of this father to pay any money over the long period of time constitutes abandonment and desertion," stating Whereupon the adoption was granted. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-7 (Supp. 1981), sets forth the criterion for termination of unfit parents' rights. In pertinent part it provides: The 1980 amendment of Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-7 with its additional requirements for abandonment or desertion did not alter the previous requirement of the older statute, Miss.Code 1942 § 1269-03, concerning abandonment and desertion. The preceding statutes were merely supplemented by additional requirements. The earlier statutes had been held by this court to require, in an adoption proceeding, either abandonment or desertion of the child preliminary to granting an adoption. In Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713 (1953), this Court stated: We reiterated this premise in Ford v. Litton, 211 So. 2d 871, 873 (Miss. 1968), stating, "Before the best interests of the child are to be considered, the court must find that the parent objecting to the adoption has abandoned or deserted such infant, or is mentally or morally or otherwise unfit to rear and train it." More recently, in the case of Yarber v. Dearman, 341 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1977), we held that before passing on an adoption, the court must find abandonment or unfitness, moral or otherwise, on the part of the natural parent. As indicated the appellant has not been an ideal father, but the record does not reveal that he is either mentally or morally unfit. Likewise, there is no evidence of abandonment, other than constant arrearages in child support payments, some of which were explained by his inability to pay following injuries in an automobile accident. Simply put there was no evidence that the father has evinced a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. In the Matter of the Adoption of Hall v. Hall, 202 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1967); Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. 2d 709 (1945). The circumstances portrayed by this record are unusual and regretable and possibly result from the arbitrary attitudes of both parents, but nevertheless the petitioners failed, in our opinion, to prove an abandonment of the child by the natural father. In view of this holding on the issue of abandonment, *1179 it is not necessary to address the question raised in appellant's assignment of error concerning a bill of particulars directed to the suitability of Mr. Arrington as an adoptive parent. REVERSED AND RENDERED. SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur.