Title: Commonwealth v. Wilbur W.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-12351 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILBUR W., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 10, 2018. - April 25, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Strict Liability.  Constitutional Law, Vagueness of 
statute, Equal protection of laws.  Due Process of Law, 
Vagueness of statute, Selective prosecution.  Selective 
Prosecution. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Essex County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 24, 2009. 
 
 
The case was tried before José Sánchez, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Joseph Maggiacomo, III, for the juvenile. 
 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Yale Yechiel N. Robinson, pro se. 
 
Robert F. Hennessy & Merritt Schnipper for Youth Advocacy 
Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Gary D. Buseck, Bennett H. Klein, & Patience Crozer for 
GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders & another. 
 
Marsha L. Levick, Riya S. Shah, & Lisa Swaminathan, of 
Pennsylvania, for Juvenile Law Center & another. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The crime of statutory rape, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23, is a strict liability offense.  To prove statutory rape, 
the Commonwealth is required to establish that the accused had 
sexual intercourse with a person who was less than sixteen years 
old at the time.  See Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 
158, 172 (2009).  As a matter of law, a person below the age of 
sixteen is deemed incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse.  
Therefore, lack of consent is not an element of the offense, and 
the intent of the accused is not relevant.  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23; Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 522 (1982).  When 
two minors have consensual sexual relations, both of whom are 
members of the class the statute is designed to protect, each 
has committed a statutory rape.  This case requires us to decide 
whether, as applied to a juvenile offender under the age of 
sixteen, a conviction of statutory rape was constitutional, 
where the juvenile maintains that he was involved in consensual 
sexual experimentation with another child. 
 
In 2009, a delinquency complaint issued against the 
juvenile, charging him with two counts of rape of a child by 
force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and dissemination of child 
pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29B.  At the time of the alleged 
offenses, the juvenile was twelve years old and the victim was 
eight years old.  Following a trial in the Juvenile Court, a 
3 
 
 
 
jury found the juvenile delinquent on the lesser included 
offenses of statutory rape.  The juvenile filed a notice of 
appeal from the adjudication of delinquency, and we allowed his 
motion for direct appellate review. 
The juvenile contends that enforcement of the strict 
liability statutory rape charge against him violates his Federal 
and State constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection.  He argues that imposition of criminal liability on 
a child for a strict liability offense, where the premise of the 
offense is that a child under sixteen lacks the capacity to 
understand and consent to the conduct, is fundamentally unfair.  
The juvenile maintains that a child under sixteen cannot be 
deemed to understand and assume the legal risks of engaging in 
sexual activity with another child under the age of sixteen, as 
the statute requires of an adult, and that the imposition of 
criminal responsibility for peer-aged sexual experimentation is 
contrary to the statutory purpose of protecting children from 
sexual abuse.  He also argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that he should have been considered a victim of statutory rape, 
and that the government wrongfully singled him out for 
prosecution.  The issues the juvenile raises as to 
experimentation among consenting juveniles are not before us in 
this case, where the victim testified that he was afraid and 
felt compelled to comply with the juvenile's demands.  
4 
 
 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that, as applied in these 
circumstances, enforcement of the statutory rape charge is 
constitutional, and affirm the adjudication of delinquency.1 
1.  Background.  To determine whether statutory rape is 
constitutional, as applied to the juvenile's conduct, we examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
See Commonwealth v. Oakes, 407 Mass. 92, 95 (1990); Commonwealth 
v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 370 (1978).  In the summer of 2009, 
the victim was an eight year old third grader, who lived with 
his father in a city near Boston.  The victim met the juvenile, 
who was twelve years old and a seventh grader, when the victim 
moved into the neighborhood earlier that year.  The victim and 
the juvenile became friends.  They played together at the park 
and with other children in the neighborhood, and they played 
video games at the victim's apartment.  Carol,2 who had been 
friends with the victim's mother, was his live-in caretaker.  
Carol also watched the juvenile on occasion, and the juvenile 
referred to her as "Grammy." 
On August 10, 2009, as he had on previous occasions, the 
juvenile visited the victim for a sleepover while the victim's 
                     
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services; 
the Juvenile Law Center and the Children and Family Justice 
Center; GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts; and Yale Yechiel N. Robinson. 
 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
5 
 
 
 
father was working a late shift.  During the evening, the victim 
and the juvenile went into the victim's bedroom to play a video 
game.  While both boys were on the bed taking turns using the 
video game controller, the juvenile told the victim to stand 
next to a bureau.  The bureau, which was "the same height as 
[the victim], maybe a little bit taller," was positioned on an 
interior wall adjacent to the bedroom door, such that, when 
standing in the space next to the bureau, the two boys were not 
visible from the doorway.  The victim did not want to do this, 
but complied because the juvenile told him to do it. 
The juvenile instructed the victim to "pull down [his] 
pants" so that he could put his "penis" in the victim's "butt."  
The victim was "shivering" and "scared."  He testified: 
Q.:  "And what did you think or feel when he told you that? 
 
A.:  "Like, I was kinda like shivering, like, scared." 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  And why were you scared?" 
 
A.:  " Because I didn't, like -- because I was, like, I 
didn't like, like -- like, I was scared because --" 
 
Q.:  "Did you want to do that?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
The juvenile pulled down his own pants, and told the victim 
to put his mouth on the juvenile's penis.  The victim complied 
for "two seconds" because the juvenile was "bigger," and he was 
afraid of what the juvenile would do to him.  The juvenile then 
6 
 
 
 
inserted his penis in the victim's "butt."  The victim testified 
that it hurt, and he almost cried.3 
 
Because the boys were too quiet, Carol announced she was 
entering the room to check on them.  The juvenile told the 
victim to get on the bed.  Both boys pulled up their pants and 
sat on the bed.  When Carol entered the room, she found them 
sitting on the bed playing the video game.  The victim did not 
say anything to Carol that night because he did not want the 
juvenile to punch him. 
The victim's father drove the victim to day camp the next 
morning.  Before leaving for camp, the victim ran into Carol's 
room to say goodbye, and she took his cellular telephone.  
Later, she found a photograph of a boy's penis on the cellular 
telephone.  When Carol picked up the victim from camp, she asked 
                     
 
3 The juvenile points out that the victim's testimony on 
cross-examination was not entirely consistent with his testimony 
on direct examination, or during an earlier sexual abuse 
intervention network (SAIN) interview, and the victim agreed on 
cross-examination that he had described certain events 
differently from how he had described them at the SAIN 
interview.  During cross-examination, specific portions of the 
victim's SAIN interview were introduced as prior inconsistent 
statements.  The juvenile notes that, in addition to testifying 
that he was scared because the juvenile was "bigger," and 
because the victim thought that the juvenile "might do 
something" if the victim did not comply, the victim also 
testified that the reason he complied was "to get [the juvenile] 
to stop asking"; that the juvenile did not hit or threaten the 
victim; and did not push the victim behind the dresser.  On 
cross-examination, the victim also testified somewhat 
differently about the juvenile's actions with his "butt," and 
whether the juvenile's act "hurt." 
7 
 
 
 
him about the photograph.  The victim told her that the juvenile 
had taken it.  Carol initially scolded the victim for having 
inappropriate photographs on his telephone, and told him that he 
"could get into a lot of trouble."  During the drive home, the 
victim asked, "Well, what does it mean when someone tries to put 
their private into your butt?"  Carol asked if someone had done 
that to him.  The victim "shook his head yes."  Carol asked, 
"Who?"  The victim answered that it was the juvenile.  Carol 
reported the victim's statements to the victim's father and the 
police. 
At the close of the evidence, the judge instructed the jury 
on rape of a child with force, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 22A, 
including the theory of constructive force, and the lesser 
included offense of statutory rape.  He also instructed the jury 
on dissemination of child pornography.  The jury returned 
delinquency findings on the lesser included offense of statutory 
rape, and found the juvenile not delinquent on the charge of 
dissemination of child pornography.  The judge sentenced the 
juvenile to three years of probation with special conditions.  
Following an evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed the 
juvenile's motion for relief from the obligation to register as 
a sex offender, pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), finding that 
the juvenile did not pose a risk of reoffending or a danger to 
the public. 
8 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The juvenile raises three arguments 
concerning the constitutionality of statutory rape where both 
the victim and the individual charged with the offense are 
juveniles.4  First, he contends that his adjudication of 
delinquency violates his right to the due process of law because 
the Legislature did not intend to impose strict liability on a 
person below the age of sixteen.  Second, he contends that 
statutory rape fosters arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
and is therefore void for vagueness.  Third, the juvenile 
contends that he was unfairly selected for prosecution in 
violation of his right to equal protection under the law.5 
                     
4 The juvenile did not assert these constitutional claims in 
the Juvenile Court.  As a general rule, we "decline to consider 
constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal in 
order to avoid an unnecessary constitutional decision" 
(quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Guzman, 469 Mass. 492, 500 
(2014).  Here, however, we exercise our discretion to resolve 
the constitutional issues because the record is fully developed, 
and the appeal presents important questions of public concern.  
See Gagnon, petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994). 
 
 
5 The juvenile also asserts error in the judge's decision to 
deny his motion for a required finding of not delinquent on the 
charge of rape of a child by force.  In denying the juvenile's 
motion for a required finding, the judge stated, "As to the 
forcible rape of a child, I will concede that the issue of 
constructive force is a close one, but based on the testimony I 
find that there is sufficient evidence to at least put that 
issue before the jury."  The juvenile argues that the evidence, 
considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was 
insufficient to prove the element of physical or constructive 
force.  Because the juvenile was acquitted of the charge, the 
issue whether the Commonwealth proved constructive force is not 
properly before us. 
9 
 
 
 
 
a.  Due process challenge.  General Laws c. 265, § 23, as 
appearing in St. 1974, c. 474, § 3, provides:  "Whoever 
unlawfully has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual 
intercourse, and abuses a child under [sixteen] years of age, 
shall be punished . . . ."  In Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 
Mass. 577, 581-585 (1977), and Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 170-
172, we traced the history of statutory rape from its English 
common-law roots to the most recent revisions of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23, in 1974.  Although G. L. c. 265, § 23, has evolved over 
time, our long-standing interpretation of the statute is that it 
imposes strict liability for anyone who engages in "sexual 
intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse" with a person who 
is less than sixteen years old.  See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 
Mass. 66, 70 (1895).  See, e.g., Miller, 385 Mass. at 522; 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 359 Mass. 509, 514-515 (1971).  
Accordingly, the only elements the Commonwealth is required to 
prove are "(1) sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual 
intercourse with (2) a child under sixteen years of age."  
Bernardo B., supra at 172, quoting Miller, supra. 
 
The juvenile contends that the imposition of strict 
liability for statutory rape, as applied to his case, violates 
due process rights secured by the United States Constitution and 
10 
 
 
 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.6  He maintains that the 
Legislature's decision to impose strict liability in cases of 
statutory rape rests on two related policies:  that vulnerable 
children need to be protected from the dangers of sexual abuse, 
and that adults assume the risk inherent in having sexual 
relations with a child who is younger than the statutory age of 
consent.  See Murphy, 165 Mass. at 69-70 ("it is deemed best to 
require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act 
comes within the legislative prohibition").  See also United 
States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1042 (1992) (statutory rape laws protect 
children from sexual abuse "by placing the risk of mistake as to 
a child's age on an older, more mature person").  The juvenile 
argues that, unlike an adult, an individual who is under the age 
of sixteen has limited capacity to make reasoned choices or to 
understand the consequences of his or her behavior.  As a 
result, he contends, the Legislature's rationale for imposing 
strict liability "make[s] little sense" when applied against a 
twelve year old engaged in peer-aged sexual experimentation. 
                     
 
6 A facial challenge, by contrast, would have required the 
juvenile to prove that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the statute would be valid.  See United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  This is a difficult burden to meet.  
"A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute 
is the weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least 
likely to succeed."  Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003). 
11 
 
 
 
 
i.  Standard of review.  Substantive due process prohibits 
governmental conduct that "shocks the conscience" or infringes 
on rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 583, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014).  "In substantive due process 
analysis, the nature of the individual interest at stake 
determines the standard of review . . . ."  Aime v. 
Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).  If a statute uses a 
suspect classification or implicates a fundamental right, we 
apply strict judicial scrutiny.  Goodridge v. Department of Pub. 
Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003).  See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough 
Reg. Sch. Dist., 468 Mass. 64, 75 (2014) (classifications based 
on gender, race, color, creed, and national origin considered 
suspect); Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011) 
("fundamental right is one that is deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  Under strict scrutiny analysis, a statute satisfies 
due process only when it is "narrowly tailored to further a 
legitimate and compelling governmental interest."  Aime, supra. 
 
When a statute is not subject to strict scrutiny in 
considering a substantive due process challenge, it is subject 
to rational basis review.  Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 153.  For due 
process purposes, a statute has a rational basis if it "bears a 
real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
12 
 
 
 
morals, or some other phase of the general welfare."  Goodridge, 
440 Mass. at 330.  See Gillespie, supra ("a statute is 
constitutionally sound if it is reasonably related to the 
furtherance of a valid State interest").  In reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute, we are mindful that "all 
rational presumptions are made in favor of the validity of every 
legislative enactment."  Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 
378, 379 (1950). 
The juvenile has not argued that imposition of strict 
liability for statutory rape violates a fundamental right,7 or 
that he was subject to a suspect classification.  We therefore 
examine his claim that the legitimate purposes of statutory rape 
                     
7 Two of the amicus briefs do urge application of a strict 
scrutiny standard of review in this case.  The youth advocacy 
division of the Committee for Public Council Services (CPCS) 
urges this court to apply strict scrutiny to its due process 
analysis based on the theory that enforcement of statutory rape 
liability implicates a minor's fundamental right of privacy.  To 
support this argument, the brief cites Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003), in which the United States Supreme 
Court extended constitutional privacy protections to "two adults 
who, with full and mutual consent from each other," engaged in 
same-sex intimate conduct.  In that case, however, the Court 
emphasized that the protected liberty interest did not extend to 
minors and did "not involve persons who might be injured or 
coerced."  Id. at 578.  In their joint amicus brief, GLBTQ Legal 
Advocates & Defenders and the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts rely on decisions in other States recognizing that 
statutory rape charges may interfere with a minor's protected 
right to privacy.  See B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258-260 
(Fla. 1995); In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 515-518 (2000).  We leave 
the issue whether enforcement of statutory rape laws implicates 
a fundamental privacy right of minors for another day, when it 
is properly raised, and fully briefed, by the parties.  See 
Pineo v. Executive Council, 412 Mass. 31, 35 n.6 (1992). 
13 
 
 
 
strict liability are not served by his adjudication of 
delinquency under the rational basis standard of review. 
 
ii.  Whether imposition of strict liability for statutory 
rape where the perpetrator is under sixteen offends due process.  
Although statutes that do not require proof of mens rea are 
disfavored, see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 
(1994), the Legislature is vested with wide latitude to declare 
what constitutes a crime; this includes the authority to create 
strict liability offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 
Mass. 163, 165 (2017); Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 
709 n.9 (1993); Commonwealth v. Alverez, 413 Mass. 224, 229-233 
(1992).  The Legislature's exercise of its authority to define 
strict liability offenses extends to imposition of strict 
liability for the offense of statutory rape.  "Strict criminal 
liability is not necessarily a denial of due process of law, and 
in the case of statutory rape it is not."  Miller, 385 Mass. at 
525.  See Commonwealth v. Knap, 412 Mass. 712, 715 (1992) (mens 
rea is general principle of jurisprudence and not 
constitutionally mandated in child sexual assault cases).  See 
also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-251 & n.8 
(1952) (recognizing that, while guilt generally requires proof 
of culpable mental state, exception imposing strict liability 
for sexual offenses against children, designed to protect 
children, is warranted). 
14 
 
 
 
We do not agree with the juvenile's argument that the 
Legislature did not intend to prohibit anyone from having sexual 
intercourse with a person below the age of sixteen.  The 
Legislature established an age of consent because children lack 
the maturity to "understand the physical, mental, and emotional 
consequences of intercourse."  See Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 
Mass. 10, 20 n.7 (1985).  More recently, we have noted that 
there is "no doubt" that the Legislature enacted statutory rape 
laws in order to "protect all children under sixteen years old 
from sexual abuse."  Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 171.  See 
Gallant, 373 Mass. at 583. 
Moreover, the facts in this case, considered in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, do not support the view, as 
the juvenile suggests, that this was a case of juvenile 
experimentation among peers rather than a case of sexual abuse.  
To the contrary, the record at trial indicates that the juvenile 
was the aggressor, who arranged the victim's position behind a 
dresser in order to avoid detection.  The jury were warranted in 
finding that the victim, a boy four years younger than the 
juvenile, complied with the juvenile's commands to stand next to 
the bureau, pull down his pants, and perform oral sex on the 
juvenile because he was frightened and did not want to risk 
disobeying the juvenile's instructions.  On the day after the 
incident, the victim displayed his immaturity by asking, "Well, 
15 
 
 
 
what does it mean when someone tries to put their private into 
your butt?"  Given this, the juvenile's characterization of the 
incident as that of consensual sexual experimentation is 
unavailing. 
The juvenile's arguments are unable to overcome the 
presumption that the Legislature acted reasonably and rationally 
in imposing strict liability for anyone who has sexual 
intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen.  There is a 
rational basis for protecting all children from sexual abuse, 
whether the offender is an adult or a juvenile under the age of 
sixteen. 
b.  Arbitrary enforcement challenge.  The juvenile argues 
also that G. L. c. 265, § 23, is unconstitutionally vague within 
the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  "The principles of 
the vagueness doctrine are well settled in our law."  
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 Mass. 245, 248 (2013).  Due process 
requires that criminal statutes "define the criminal offense 
[1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-403 (2010), quoting 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  See Grayned v. 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 
16 
 
 
 
Mass. 492, 499-500 (2003).  With respect to arbitrary 
enforcement, the United States Supreme Court has observed that 
"the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not 
actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine -
- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement."  Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 574 (1974).  See Kolender v. Lawson, supra at 358 
("where the [L]egislature fails to provide such minimal 
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep 
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections" [quotation and citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 414 (2015) (lack of 
reasonable guidelines for law enforcement encourages arbitrary 
arrests and prosecutions).  "It is well established that 
vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve . . . 
freedoms [under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution] must be examined in light of the facts of the case 
at hand."  Gallant, 373 Mass. at 581, quoting United States v. 
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975).  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 
Mass. 265, 271 (1983).  See also Bohmer, 374 Mass. at 371 n.6 
(1978) ("In the context of a vagueness challenge, the defendants 
have no standing to assert the rights of others"). 
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 395 Mass. 302, 303-306 (1985), 
for example, we considered a due process challenge on vagueness 
17 
 
 
 
grounds to the city of Boston's "sauntering and loitering" 
ordinance.  The ordinance prohibited sauntering and loitering 
"in such a manner as to obstruct . . . travellers."  Id. at 305.  
We concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and 
arbitrary because it failed to set "minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement."  Id. at 306.  Without standards to 
"distinguish between the lawful conduct of mere sauntering and 
loitering and that which escalates to obstructing travelers," 
police officers possessed unfettered discretion to decide which 
individuals to charge.  Id.  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 
360-361 (statute requiring individuals to carry "'credible and 
reliable' identification" unconstitutionally vague on its face 
"because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to 
describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect may do in 
order to satisfy the statute"); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156, 167-171 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance void for 
vagueness due to broad scope and imprecise terms); Commonwealth 
v. Sefranka, 382 Mass. 108, 110 (1980) (term "lewd, wanton and 
lascivious person" unconstitutionally vague). 
The juvenile's challenge on vagueness grounds focuses on 
the potential for arbitrary enforcement of the statutory rape 
statute.  He points out that, in instances of peer-aged, 
consensual sexual experimentation, the line between victim and 
offender is blurred.  He argues that, because this case involved 
18 
 
 
 
an incident of sexual experimentation, the Commonwealth's 
decision only to charge one of the willing participants with a 
criminal offense "is the very definition of discriminatory 
enforcement." 
The Commonwealth points out, correctly, that the juvenile 
is unable to demonstrate arbitrary enforcement in this case, 
involving a frightened eight year old being compelled by the 
commands of an individual four years his senior.  As the 
Commonwealth puts it, the juvenile's labeling of himself as both 
offender and victim "is belied by the inconvenient facts of the 
case."  We discern no hint of arbitrary enforcement here, 
because the prosecutor reasonably could have concluded that the 
juvenile was not a victim of a sexual assault.  Not only was 
there a four-year age gap between the juvenile, a seventh 
grader, and the victim, a third grader, but the juvenile 
initiated the encounter by instructing the victim to go where 
they would not be seen from the doorway.  The juvenile then 
ordered the victim to pull down his pants and to engage in oral 
and then anal intercourse.  The victim testified at different 
points that, although he complied with the juvenile's commands, 
he did not want to "do that," he was afraid of what the juvenile 
would do to him if he did not comply, he was "scared," and he 
was "shivering." 
19 
 
 
 
We are not persuaded by the cases from other jurisdictions 
upon which the juvenile relies.  See B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 
256 (Fla. 1995); In re D.B., 129 Ohio St. 3d 104, cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 1100 (2011); In the Interest of B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507 (2000).  We note, 
first, that these decisions are inapposite, as they involve 
consensual sexual relations between peer-aged minors.  In one 
case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that an adjudication of 
delinquency violated the juvenile's constitutional privacy 
interests "as applied to this [sixteen year old]."  See B.B., 
659 So. 2d at 260.  In so holding, the court noted that the 
State's sole interest was protecting the sixteen year old victim 
from "the sexual activity itself," as opposed to protecting her 
from sexual exploitation.  Id. at 259-260.  In another such 
case, an intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court vacated an 
adjudication of delinquency after concluding that a statute 
designed to protect younger children from exploitation was not 
intended to permit punishment of only one of two eleven year old 
boys, who both willing participated in experimental sexual 
intercourse.  See In the Interest of B.A.M., 806 A.2d at 894, 
898.  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Vermont's holding in In re 
G.T., 170 Vt. at 516-518, is inapplicable to nonconsensual or 
coerced sexual acts.8  We note also that, in another case where 
                     
 
8 The reasoning in another case cited by the juvenile, In re 
20 
 
 
 
the facts are similar to the situation here, the court in the 
other jurisdiction reached a conclusion similar to the one that 
we reach in this case.  See State v. Colton M., 366 Wis. 2d 119, 
128-129 (Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting juvenile's arbitrary 
enforcement claim where "record indicate[d] [the victim] was an 
unwilling participant that had to be bribed, coerced, or 
otherwise forced into sexual contact"). 
Although we agree with the juvenile's observation that it 
is possible that a juvenile under the age of sixteen could be 
both a victim and an offender in a statutory rape case, those 
circumstances are not presented here. 
 
c.  Selective enforcement challenge.  In addition, the 
juvenile also raises an equal protection claim.  He argues that 
he and the victim were similarly situated as children under the 
age of sixteen engaged in consensual acts of sexual 
experimentation.  In this view, the Commonwealth's decision to 
single him out for prosecution violated his equal protection 
rights secured by the Federal and State Constitutions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 229-230 
                                                                  
D.B., 129 Ohio St. 3d at 104-105, 108-109, is unclear.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that a prosecutor's 
decision to charge a juvenile was "the very definition of 
discriminatory enforcement," but did not discuss the factors 
that went into that decision.  See id. at 109.  Compare In re 
Welfare of B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 164 n.4 (Minn.), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 208 (2014) (declining to follow reasoning of 
In re D.B. because Ohio court did not address reason that 
prosecutor's charging decision was discriminatory). 
21 
 
 
 
(1983) (selective enforcement prohibited by Fourteenth Amendment 
and arts. 1 and 10 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). 
A district attorney is vested with "wide discretion in 
determining whether to prosecute an individual."  Commonwealth 
v. Washington W., 457 Mass. 140, 142 (2010), quoting Bernardo 
B., 453 Mass. at 167.  "This broad discretion rests largely on 
the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly 
ill-suited to judicial review.  Such factors as the strength of 
the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the 
[g]overnment's enforcement priorities, and the case's 
relationship to the [g]overnment's overall enforcement plan are 
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are 
competent to undertake."  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
607 (1985). 
Nonetheless, a prosecutor does not possess unbridled 
authority to charge a citizen with a crime.  Wayte, 470 U.S. at 
608.  "While some selectivity is permissible in criminal law 
enforcement, the Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions 
guarantee that the government will not proceed against an 
individual based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Washington W., 457 Mass. 140, 142.  See 
Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. at 229-230; Commonwealth v. King, 
374 Mass. 5, 20 (1977).  It is the judiciary's "solemn duty" to 
22 
 
 
 
redress prosecutorial overreaching.  Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 
161. 
In Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 168, we explained that a 
defendant raising "a collateral attack on prosecutorial 
decision-making" is required to make a "rigorous" showing in 
order to overcome "the presumption of prosecutorial regularity."  
Thus, the defendant bears the initial burden to "raise[] at 
least a reasonable inference of impermissible discrimination, 
including evidence that a broader class of persons than those 
prosecuted violated the law, . . . that failure to prosecute was 
either consistent or deliberate, . . . and that the decision not 
to prosecute was based on an impermissible classification such 
as race, religion, or sex" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Id.  If a defendant meets this prima facie showing, the case 
must be dismissed unless the Commonwealth is able to rebut the 
inference of selective prosecution.  Id.  A defendant raising a 
selective prosecution claim may do so "by introducing 
statistical evidence or other data demonstrating that similarly 
situated suspects or defendants are treated differently by the 
prosecutor on the basis of impermissible categorizations."  Id. 
Ordinarily, a defendant makes a threshold showing of 
selective prosecution before trial, and seeks discovery from the 
Commonwealth in order to advance his or her claim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 442 (2008).  In 
23 
 
 
 
Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 170, we addressed an allegation of 
gender-based selective prosecution where "the boy and the three 
[female] complaining witnesses appeared to have engaged in 
mutually consensual acts of oral sex . . . [and] all four 
children were under the age of consent."  Based on the 
juvenile's threshold showing, we held that the juvenile was 
entitled to discovery in order to conduct a further 
investigation concerning his selective prosecution claim.  Id. 
at 175-176. 
 
The juvenile raises his argument regarding selective 
prosecution for the first time on appeal.  Based on the evidence 
presented at trial, we conclude that he has not overcome the 
presumption that the prosecution was initiated in good faith.  
See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 894-895 (1978).  
Unlike the juvenile in Bernardo B., there is no showing here 
that the only distinction between the charged and uncharged 
participants in consensual sexual conduct was some type of 
impermissible classification such as gender, race, or religion.  
As stated, the trial record does not support the juvenile's 
contention that he and the victim were similarly situated 
children under the age of sixteen.  The record reveals that they 
were not.  The juvenile has not, therefore, raised a meritorious 
claim of selective prosecution.  We do not foreclose the 
possibility that, in some other case involving two juveniles, on 
24 
 
 
 
different facts, a juvenile might be able to present a valid 
claim of selective prosecution, but that is not this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring in the judgment).  Under G. L. 
c. 265, § 23, "[w]hoever unlawfully has sexual intercourse or 
unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under [sixteen] 
years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for life or for any term of years or, except as otherwise 
provided, for any term in a jail or house of correction."  
Sexual intercourse with a child is a strict liability life 
felony that requires registration as a sex offender unless the 
sentencing judge relieves the defendant or delinquent child of 
the obligation to register.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C (defining 
"sex offense" as, inter alia, "rape and abuse of a child under 
[§] 23"); G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (allowing judge to waive sex 
offender registration requirement where circumstances of offense 
and offender's criminal history indicate that offender "does not 
pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public").  In the 
absence of evidence of marriage,1 statutory rape requires proof 
of only two elements:  "(1) sexual intercourse or unnatural 
sexual intercourse with (2) a child under sixteen years of age."  
                     
 
1 A minor under the age of eighteen may lawfully marry in 
Massachusetts with the approval of a judge where the child's 
parents or legal guardian consent to the marriage.  See G. L. 
c. 207, § 25.  The word "unlawfully" in G. L. c. 265, § 23, 
suggests that sexual intercourse may be lawful where the 
defendant is legally married to the child under sixteen years of 
age.  See Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 130 (1981) 
("It is widely recognized that use of the word 'unlawful' in 
rape statutes signifies the incorporation of the common law 
spousal exclusion"). 
2 
 
 
 
Ante at    , quoting Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 
172 (2009).  A defendant may not assert as a defense that he or 
she reasonably believed that the child was sixteen years of age 
or older, because the Legislature intended to exclude mistaken 
belief as to the age of the victim as a defense to the crime.  
See Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 523-524 (1982).  In 
essence, where an adult has sexual intercourse with a young 
person, the adult acts at his or her peril in the event the 
young person turns out to be less than sixteen years of age.  
See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 69-70 (1895). 
 
Where a sixteen year old has sexual intercourse with a 
fifteen year old, there is no uncertainty in the law as to who 
has committed the rape and who is the victim of the rape, 
regardless of the circumstances of the sexual intercourse.  Even 
if the fifteen year old encouraged the sixteen year old to have 
sexual intercourse, only the sixteen year old has committed the 
crime; the law would not permit the fifteen year old to be 
charged with aiding and abetting the rape.  See Gebardi v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932) ("It is not to be 
supposed . . . that the acquiescence of a woman under the age of 
consent would make her a co-conspirator with the man to commit 
statutory rape upon herself").  See, e.g., United States v. 
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 
1021 (1988) ("When Congress assigns guilt to only one type of 
3 
 
 
 
participant in a transaction, it intends to leave the others 
unpunished for the offense").  But if that same fifteen year old 
were to engage in sexual intercourse with another fifteen year 
old, that fifteen year old is no longer treated under the law as 
a victim.  Indeed, under § 23, both fifteen year olds would be 
guilty of rape and abuse of a child -- each is both a 
perpetrator of rape and a victim of rape, and their fate depends 
entirely on whom the prosecutor chooses to prosecute because 
conviction only requires proof of sexual intercourse. 
 
The power of a prosecutor to determine who is a rapist and 
who is a victim in such circumstances is truly vast.  A survey 
conducted by the United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention found that 24.1 per cent of ninth graders and 35.7 
per cent of tenth graders reported having engaged in sexual 
intercourse.  See United States Centers For Disease Control and 
Prevention, United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance -- United States, 
2015, at 26 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/data/yrbs 
/pdf/2015/ss6506_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH88-VFCZ].  
Another study commissioned by the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services found that 8.1 per cent of females and 
12.5 per cent of males between the ages of fifteen and seventeen 
reported having engaged in oral sex but not sexual intercourse.  
See Copen, Chandra, & Martinez, United States Department of 
4 
 
 
 
Health and Human Services, Prevalence and Timing of Oral Sex 
with Opposite-Sex Partners Among Females and Males Aged 15-24 
Years:  United States, 2007-2010, Nat'l Health Statistics 
Reports, no. 56, at 5 fig. 2 (2012), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs 
/data/nhsr/nhsr056.pdf [https://perma.cc/47QX-MXBD].  In 
Massachusetts, a 2015 report surveying middle and high school 
students found that 14.2 per cent of ninth graders and 30.6 per 
cent of tenth graders reported having had sexual intercourse.  
See Department of Elementary and Secondary Education & 
Department of Public Health, Health & Risk Behaviors of 
Massachusetts Youth, Executive Summary, at 60 (2015), 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/behavioral-risk/youth-health-
risk-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC68-B4Y6].  Notably, 
23.8 per cent of the surveyed tenth graders reported having had 
sexual intercourse in the last three months.  See id.  The most 
common age of students enrolled in tenth grade in the United 
States is fifteen.  See J.W. Davis & K. Bauman, School 
Enrollment in the United States:  2008, at 6 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-564.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/2YYJ-YZDA] ("modal grade for [fifteen year olds] is 
tenth grade").2 
                     
 
2 See J.H. v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 292 n.3 (2018), 
citing United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Substance Use and Sexual Risk Behavior Among Teens (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/substance-use/pdf/dash-
5 
 
 
 
 
To be sure, some ninth and tenth graders are older than 
sixteen, and these studies are silent as to whether the sexual 
partners of these students were under or over sixteen years of 
age.  But we need not determine the precise percentage of 
Massachusetts children under sixteen years of age who have had 
sexual intercourse with another child who is under sixteen years 
of age to recognize that, conservatively estimated, prosecutors 
potentially have the ability to prosecute at least one in five 
ninth and tenth graders for rape and abuse of a child. 
 
 The court, in evaluating whether § 23 is 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
appropriately recognizes that the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
encompasses two separate concerns:  (1) fair notice, and (2) 
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.  "To satisfy due 
process, 'a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  Skilling 
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-403 (2010), quoting Kolender 
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  "Although the doctrine 
                                                                  
substance-use-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4H6-TL9P] 
("According to the 2015 National Youth Risk Behavior Survey 
. . . [forty-one per cent] of high school students have . . . 
had intercourse and [thirty per cent] of high school students 
are currently sexually active"). 
6 
 
 
 
focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary 
enforcement," the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
"that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is 
not actual notice, but the other principal element of the 
doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement."  Kolender, supra at 357-
358, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).  "Where 
the [L]egislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections.'"  Kolender, supra at 358, quoting Smith, supra 
at 575.  See Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 580 (1977) 
("laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them" 
in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
[citation omitted]). 
 
Generally, the concerns about fair notice and arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement go "hand in glove."  For example, 
where a statute made it a crime to fail to give a "'credible and 
reliable' identification" to a police officer, Kolender, 461 
U.S. at 353, the Supreme Court noted that the statute "vest[ed] 
virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to 
determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must 
be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause 
to arrest," id. at 358, and "confer[red] on police a virtually 
7 
 
 
 
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a 
violation."  Id. at 360, quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 
130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result).  Where 
another statute made it a crime to "saunter[] and loiter[] 'in 
such a manner as to obstruct . . . travellers'" (citation 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Williams, 395 Mass. 302, 305 (1985), 
we noted that the statute both "fail[ed] to provide a person of 
common intelligence with sufficient notice of the offending 
conduct," id., citing Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 164-165 (1972), and "fail[ed] to set minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement."  Id. at 306.  Here, however, the 
statute provides fair notice; any sexual intercourse with a 
person under the age of sixteen is a rape.  But the clarity of 
the crime does not obviate the danger of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement where both participants in the sexual 
intercourse are under the age of sixteen, and are therefore both 
rapists and rape victims. 
 
Historically, the crime of statutory rape used gender to 
distinguish the perpetrator of the rape (the male) from the 
victim of the rape (the female); until 1974, when G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23, was amended, only sexual intercourse with "a female child 
under 16 years of age" was a crime.  Compare St. 1974, c. 474, 
§ 3, with St. 1966, c. 291.  The 1974 amendment removed the word 
"female" and thereby eliminated any reference to the gender of 
8 
 
 
 
the victim in order to further the Legislature's interest in 
protecting all children from sexual abuse.  See Bernardo B., 453 
Mass. at 171.  But the Legislature's salutary interest in gender 
neutrality left no guidelines in § 23, not even minimal 
guidelines, as it is currently interpreted, to guide police and 
prosecutors in distinguishing the perpetrator of the rape from 
the victim of the rape when both participants in the sexual 
intercourse are under the age of sixteen. 
 
I emphasize the phrase "as it is currently interpreted" 
because the language of § 23 does provide a means clearly to 
distinguish the perpetrator of the rape from the victim, in that 
§ 23 provides that "[w]hoever unlawfully has sexual intercourse 
or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under 
[sixteen] years of age, shall be [guilty of a life felony]."  
(emphasis added).  Generally, it is a "cardinal principle" of 
statutory construction that courts "must give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute" (citation 
omitted).  Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 
(2014).  See, e.g., Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 
137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (noting that "surplusage canon" 
presumes "that each word [the Legislature] uses is there for a 
reason"); Matter of Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to 
Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 353, 358 (1977) ("established 
principle of statutory construction that every word in a statute 
9 
 
 
 
should be given meaning"); Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's 
Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 (1967) 
("[n]one of the words of a statute is to be regarded as 
superfluous, but each [word] is to be given its ordinary meaning 
. . . so that the enactment considered as a whole shall 
constitute a consistent and harmonious statutory provision 
capable of effectuating the presumed intention of the 
Legislature" [citation omitted]).  If we were to comply with 
this "cardinal principle" of statutory construction, a required 
element of proof for the crime of statutory rape would be a 
finding of "abuse." 
 
I recognize that we have not followed this "cardinal 
principle" with respect to this crime, and have not required 
proof of "abuse" as an element of the crime.  Our case law makes 
clear that, where the accused is over the age of sixteen, the 
prosecution need prove only the elements of sexual intercourse 
and the age of the victim, and need not prove a separate element 
of abuse.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Knap, 412 Mass. 712, 714 
(1992); Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 Mass. 10, 18 (1985); Miller, 
385 Mass. at 522.  The explanation derives from the historical 
evolution of the statute.  In 1692, the statute made it a crime 
punishable by death "[i]f any man shall unlawfully and carnally 
know and abuse any woman child, under the age of ten years."  
See Province Laws 1692-1693, c. 19, § 12.  Where the crime is 
10 
 
 
 
defined as carnal intercourse between a "man" and a girl under 
the age of ten years, it is understandable why courts did not 
read the statute to require a separate finding of abuse, because 
abuse would inevitably be suffered by a girl under the age of 
ten from sexual intercourse with a "man."  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 746 (1st ed. 1891) (defining "man" as "male of the 
human species above the age of puberty"); Black's Law Dictionary 
11 (2d ed. 1910) (defining "abuse . . . of a female child" as 
"[a]n injury to the genital organs in an attempt at carnal 
knowledge [i.e., sexual intercourse], falling short of actual 
penetration. . . .  But, according to other authorities, 'abuse' 
is here equivalent to . . . rape").  Between 1886 and 1898, the 
Legislature increased the age of consent from ten to thirteen, 
then to fourteen, and then to sixteen years of age.  Bernardo 
B., 453 Mass. at 171.  But the language of the statute -- 
"carnally know and abuse any woman child" -- was not altered.  
Nor did this language change when the statute was amended in 
1886 to delete "[i]f any man" and replace that phrase with 
"[w]hoever," which broadened the scope of potential perpetrators 
beyond post-pubescent "men."  St. 1886, c. 305.  Nor did this 
language change in 1974 when the word "female" was deleted, so 
that sexual intercourse with any child, male or female, under 
the age of sixteen became statutory rape.  In essence, "abuse" 
was not interpreted to be a separate element because the act of 
11 
 
 
 
sexual intercourse with a child alone was understood to 
constitute abuse, so abuse was implied as a matter of law. 
 
This interpretation of the statute is permissible where the 
defendant is over sixteen years of age and the victim is under 
sixteen, because it is plain then who is the perpetrator of the 
rape and who is the victim.  But this interpretation cannot 
survive where both participants in the sexual intercourse are 
under sixteen, because that would mean that, as a matter of law, 
both are deemed to have been abused.  Where the Legislature 
explicitly provides that the crime of statutory rape requires 
the abuse of a child, and where such abuse is not implicit in 
the act of sexual intercourse when both participants are under 
the age of sixteen, it is reasonable in these circumstances to 
require a finding of abuse as a separate and distinct element of 
the crime of statutory rape.  With such an element, the risk of 
arbitrary enforcement that arises from the absence in § 23 of 
even minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement when both 
participants in the sexual intercourse are under sixteen would 
be eliminated and the statute would be saved from constitutional 
infirmity. 
 
Because this would be a new interpretation of § 23, I would 
require proof of the element of "abuse" only prospectively, 
applying this requirement only to trials or pleas commenced 
after the date of this opinion.  I note that, although this is a 
12 
 
 
 
new interpretation of the elements of proof required to prove a 
violation of § 23 where both participants in the sexual 
intercourse are under the age of sixteen, I am aware of no 
statutory rape case in Massachusetts where both participants in 
the sexual intercourse were under the age of sixteen in which we 
were asked to consider whether abuse is implicit in the act of 
intercourse or must separately be proved under § 23.  The 
interpretation of the statute that treats the phrase "abuses a 
child" as meaningless surplusage or as implied as a matter of 
law has never before been analyzed by this court in this 
context. 
 
I concur in the judgment rather than dissent because I 
agree with the court that, based on the facts of this case, 
there is "no hint of arbitrary enforcement here, because the 
prosecutor reasonably could have concluded that the juvenile was 
not a victim of a sexual assault."  Ante at    .  The prosecutor 
charged the twelve year old juvenile with forcible rape of an 
eight year old.  Although the jury did not find the juvenile to 
be delinquent on that charge, and instead found him delinquent 
on the lesser included charge of statutory rape, the evidence 
was sufficient to support a finding of forcible rape.  I do not 
suggest that proof of force would be necessary for a finding of 
abuse.  But, where there is substantial evidence of the use of 
13 
 
 
 
physical or constructive force, the evidence would be more than 
sufficient to prove abuse. 
 
It is worth noting that the court's analysis regarding 
arbitrary enforcement is inconsistent with an interpretation of 
§ 23 that would conclude as a matter of law that both children 
have been abused solely because they engaged in the sexual 
intercourse.  By distinguishing between the perpetrator and the 
"victim," the court is essentially recognizing that, where both 
children who engaged in sexual intercourse were under the age of 
sixteen, the prosecutor may only charge with rape the child who 
was not abused and may not prosecute the child who was abused.  
In essence, using the rubric of the "victim," the court is 
requiring something akin to substantial evidence of abuse as a 
necessary predicate for a prosecution in these circumstances, 
but is not requiring a finding of abuse as an element of the 
offense that must be found by a jury. 
 
In sum, I agree with the court that, where both 
participants in the sexual intercourse are under the age of 
sixteen, the due process obligation to avoid arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement requires more than mere proof of 
sexual intercourse, which the court characterizes essentially as 
reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile is the 
perpetrator rather than the victim.  I differ with the court 
insofar as I would acknowledge that, in doing so, the court is 
14 
 
 
 
essentially recognizing that § 23 requires some finding of abuse 
where both participants in the sexual intercourse are under the 
age of sixteen, and that such a finding cannot be implied as a 
matter of law in such circumstances.  And, where abuse cannot be 
reasonably implied as a matter of law, I would make abuse an 
element of the crime that must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, rather than ask a judge to determine whether a 
"prosecutor reasonably could have concluded that the juvenile 
was not a victim of a sexual assault."3 
 
For all these reasons, I concur only in the judgment. 
                     
 
3 I do not address the defendant's argument regarding 
selective enforcement because I agree with the court that there 
is no evidence of it in this case.  The risk of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement under the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
is a due process claim; a claim of selective enforcement asserts 
an equal protection claim, and is subject to equal protection 
analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 168-
169 (2009).  "To bring a claim of selective prosecution 
successfully, the defendant bears the initial burden to 'present 
evidence which raises at least a reasonable inference of 
impermissible discrimination,' including evidence that 'a 
broader class of persons than those prosecuted violated the law, 
. . . that failure to prosecute was either consistent or 
deliberate, . . . and that the decision not to prosecute was 
based on an impermissible classification such as race, religion, 
or sex.'"  Id. at 168, quoting Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 
425, 437 (2008).  We have considered claims of selective 
prosecution where there was evidence that the prosecution 
engaged in impermissible discrimination based on race, see Lora, 
supra at 436-439; gender, see Bernardo B., supra at 173; and 
sexual orientation, see Commonwealth v. Washington W., 457 Mass. 
140, 147 (2010).  The juvenile here presents no evidence that 
his prosecution in this case was influenced by his race, gender, 
or sexual orientation, or by any other impermissible 
classification.