Title: Zmijewski v. Wright

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Zmijewski v. Wright1991 WY 57809 P.2d 280Case Number: 90-285Decided: 04/19/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Leo Dale ZMIJEWSKI, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Jack L. Zmijewski, Appellant 
(Contestee),

v.

Marilyn R. WRIGHT, 
Appellee (Contestant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Reversed and 
remanded.

Floyd R. King of King 
& King, Jackson, for appellant.

Frank Hess, Jackson, for 
appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal questions 
the consequence to an estate when the personal representative fails to file a 
written rejection of a claim as required by W.S. 2-7-712(a) or notify the 
claimant by certified mail of the rejection as required by W.S. 2-7-712(d). The 
district court determined that noncompliance with the statutes creates an 
established obligation for payment by the estate and granted the creditor 
summary judgment for the entire claimed amount without right of contest in 
substance or amount.

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     The appellant presents 
the following issues:

I.

Did the court err in 
finding as a matter of law that if a claim is not rejected in compliance with 
Section 2-7-712, W.S. 1977, that it must be paid?

II.

Did the court err in 
granting judgment on the pleadings/summary judgment, thereby requiring the 
payment of a creditor's claim barred by the Wyoming statute of limitations and statute of 
frauds?

III.

Did the court err in 
finding that there was no factual dispute raised by the pleadings in granting 
summary judgment to the appellee?

[¶4.]     With a finding that a 
decision on the first issue is dispositive, we do not address the other 
appellate contentions.

[¶5.]     Leo Dale Zmijewski 
(Personal Representative), as the personal representative of the estate of Jack 
L. Zmijewski, published a Notice of Probate in the Jackson Hole News, beginning 
on April 12, 1989. Within a month, Marilyn R. Wright (Claimant) filed a 
creditor's claim against the estate for $10,144.14. Nearly a year later, the 
Personal Representative rejected all but a small portion of the claim and mailed 
a rejection for the remainder of the claim to the Claimant. This rejection came 
approximately two months after a contested hearing on the estate in which the 
district court had allowed the Claimant's claim. The Claimant filed a separate 
lawsuit in the district court on the claim.1 

[¶6.]     The Claimant contended 
the Personal Representative was barred from rejecting her claim because he had 
not complied with W.S. 2-7-712(a) and (d).2 Stating that the Personal 
Representative neither filed a written rejection with the clerk within thirty 
days after the expiration of the time for filing a claim as required by W.S. 
2-7-712(a) nor mailed the rejection by certified mail as required by W.S. 
2-7-712(d), Claimant concludes such failure made payment of the claim mandatory 
to be in effect a default judgment for a liquidated indebtedness. Cf. W.R.C.P. 
55; Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989 
(Wyo. 1989) and Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶7.]     The Personal 
Representative claims instead that his failure to comply with W.S. 2-7-712(a) 
and (d) does not prevent him from currently rejecting the claim but merely 
prevents the running of the thirty day period within which a suit must be filed 
for the rejected claim under W.S. 2-7-718.3

[¶8.]     The district court 
agreed with the Claimant and granted her summary judgment for the entire amount 
claimed, reduced only by the amount previously allowed and paid from the estate. 
The Personal Representative appeals.

[¶9.]     We review a summary 
judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and 
following the same standards. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989); Roybal v. Bell, 
778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989). Summary judgment is proper only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶10.]  Under our standard of review for summary 
judgments, a judgment is inappropriate if there was a genuine issue of material 
fact or if the prevailing party was not entitled to the judgment as a matter of 
law. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986). The issue presented here requires 
application of W.S. 2-7-712. Our construction of its provisions and effect 
begins with familiar rules of statutory interpretation and construction. If the 
language of a statute communicates a plain meaning to this court, that meaning 
will be applied. See Adobe Oil & Gas Corp. v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 676 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 
1984). At the same time, we construe all portions of an act with reference to 
one another to achieve consistency in effect for what appears to be the 
legislative purpose to the entire act. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 
(Wyo. 1985); United States v. 
Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 73 U.S. 385, 18 L. Ed. 830 (1867). "The 
proper course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best 
harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and 
objects of the legislature." Hartwell, 73 U.S.  at 396. 
This rule, since originally stated in 1867, remains foundational today for 
statutory construction.

[¶11.]  In Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 
1983), this court held that the failure to fulfill the requirements of W.S. 
2-7-712(d) prevents the triggering of W.S. 2-7-718 and therefore prevents the 
"running of the thirty-day period within which the claim must be filed." 
Id. at 1332. 
The rationale for such a holding was based upon the concept that the "statutory 
provision regarding to whom and the manner in which the rejection must be given 
was for the protection of the claimant; * * *." Id. See Marquam v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 913, 621 P.2d 190 (1980) and Mallicott v. Nelson, 48 Wn.2d 273, 293 P.2d 404 (1956). 
Consistent with the holding and rationale of Hanson, we hold that the failure to 
fulfill the requirements of W.S. 2-7-712(a), assuming no estoppel is present,4 merely prevents the triggering of 
W.S. 2-7-718 and the running of the thirty-day period in which a claim must be 
filed.

[¶12.]  Our decision is also consistent with the 
apparent preponderant view of other jurisdictions where late rejection is 
permitted in the absence of preclusion by estoppel concepts. A current case with 
similar facts is Matter of Estate of Roddy, 784 P.2d 841 (Colo. App. 1989). The 
failure of a proper denial notice resulted in the claim being "deemed allowed". 
However, while the estate was still open, a disallowance notice was given. The 
court found that the disallowance was proper and that the creditor had an 
appropriate time thereafter to contest.5 The case involved a claim for wages 
and services provided by the claimant to the decedent in late life.

[¶13.]  A similar result is attained in a series 
of Florida 
cases where the probate judge was given authority after the expiration of the 
time for rejection to further extend the opportunity to the personal 
representative or executor for good cause. Baldwin v. Lewis, 397 So. 2d 985 
(Fla.App. 1981); In re Oxford's Estate, 372 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.App. 1979), cert. denied 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980); Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Kirkwood, 
152 Fla. 59, 
10 So. 2d 743 (1942). In Baldwin, no notice to 
the personal representative herself was provided and this omission furnished 
good cause for delayed rejection where the trial court decision to the contrary 
was reversed on appeal.

[¶14.]  In Estate of Deitch, 92 Misc.2d 942, 401 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978), aff'd 67 A.D.2d 839, 412 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1979), the 
non-rejected claim totalled $514,513.58. The New York court held that failure to reject was 
only a prima facia allowance leaving other interested persons "at liberty to 
attack the claim." Id. 401 N YS.2d at 733. The basic thesis 
combines consideration for an orderly proceeding with recognition that the 
rejective time is for the protection of the estate in order to start statute of 
limitations suit time, Werning v. McFarland, 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851 (1967), 
and for the claimant to have the decision properly made. Marquam, 621 P.2d 190; 
Mallicott, 293 P.2d 404. See likewise Hanson, 668 P.2d 1331.

[¶15.]  Claimant cites two cases which we do not 
necessarily find to provide a contrary persuasion. Essentially, they reach a 
Hamilton status 
of changed condition or estoppel derived from delayed rejection notice. In 
Gladman v. Carns, 9 Ohio App.2d 135, 223 N.E.2d 378 (1964), the filed claim was 
neither allowed nor rejected and the claimant then gave a five-day notice to the 
executrix to take action or a suit would be commenced. The court first 
recognized the time constraints and failed responsibility of the estate and 
concluded, where the issue was the appropriateness of the form of the claim when 
initially presented:

     For obvious reasons, a 
fiduciary should not be permitted to accept a claim within the statutory period, 
hold it indefinitely, and then raise the statute of limitations as a defense 
because of some claimed defect in its form.

Id. 223 N.E.2d  at 381. The 
court's decision was based on an estoppel concept.

[¶16.]  The Idaho case of McKenney v. McNearney, 92 Idaho 1, 435 P.2d 358 
(1967), cited by Claimant, is similar. The rule stated was:

[I]t is * * * clear that 
the personal representative of the estate should not be permitted to profit 
because of the representative's own failure to reject a claim duly filed. * * 
*

It is a general rule of 
equity that a party will not be permitted to benefit by or take advantage of his 
own fault or neglect.

Id. 435 P.2d  at 360-61. The 
actual decision of the court was that lacking proper rejection, a bar to the 
claim was not created by time passage beyond the otherwise applicable three 
months after rejection statute.

     Viewing the benefit 
which would accrue both to respondent and the estate were we to hold that 
appellant's claim is now barred, we are constrained to the view that respondent, 
by failing to take any affirmative action relating to the claim as required by 
[Idaho 
statute], is equitably estopped from asserting that the claim is 
barred.

Id. 435 P.2d  at 
362.

[¶17.]  Finding no preclusive estoppel issue 
presented here, the summary judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceeding to determine the validity of the contested 
claim.

FOOTNOTES

1 There are some problems 
with the record in documentation since the probate file is not presented here. 
We do not disagree with the general legal statement made by Claimant in brief. 
"A court may take judicial notice of its own records in litigation that is 
interconnected with the case on review. Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745, 758 
(Okla. 1989)." 
Claimant then continues:

In paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 6 of the Order Granting Judgment on Pleadings/Motion for Summary Judgment, 
it is apparent that the District Court Judge must have taken judicial notice of 
Probate Action 1410.

The presented difficulty 
is that there is no record provided that the district court judicially noticed 
the probate file in this independent action and there is no documentation of 
what may have been judicially noticed provided here for our appellate review as 
a portion of the present record. LouisianaLand and Exploration Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, ___ P.2d ___ (Wyo. 1991) (No. 90-82, decided 
4/18/91).

2 W.S. 2-7-712 provides in 
pertinent part:

     (a) When a claim, 
accompanied by the affidavit required in W.S. 2-7-704, has been filed with the 
clerk, the personal representative shall allow or reject it and his allowance or 
rejection shall be in writing and filed with the clerk within thirty (30) days 
after the expiration of the time for filing claims.

* * * * * *

     (d) When a claim has 
been filed with the clerk and is rejected in whole or in part, the personal 
representative shall immediately upon rejection notify the claimant by certified 
mail.

We do not understand any 
of the computations included in the record or stated in the briefs establishing 
the proper last day to have filed the rejection and to serve the creditor in 
accord with this statute.

A Notice of Probate was 
published April 12, 19 and 26, 1989 (inaccurately stated as 1990). The 
creditor's claim was filed May 10, 1989. The record indicates that the Personal 
Representative allowed the sum of $794.53 of the claim, deducted real estate 
taxes of $242.31, paid $552.22 and, in some fashion, orally rejected $9,591.88. 
He did not then, however, file the statutory rejection of claim, W.S. 
2-7-712(a), or serve notice by certified mail, W.S. 2-7-712(d).

The expiration of the 
time for filing claims as recognized in W.S. 2-7-712(a) is established by W.S. 
2-7-201 to be three months after the date of the first publication which was in 
this case July 11, 1989. The time for filing the rejection came thirty days 
thereafter on August 10, 1989. In summary, the statutory time to file objections 
to claims is three months and thirty days from the date of the first publication 
of the creditor's notice.

Although the rejection 
was clearly not filed on time, we find in the record a designated last date for 
rejection of three months after the first notice and another contended date of 
three months after the third notice - July 11 and July 25 - neither of which is 
correct.

3 W.S. 2-7-718 
provides:

     When a claim is 
rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall bring suit in the proper 
court against the personal representative within thirty (30) days after the date 
of mailing the notice, otherwise the claim is forever barred.

4 Laches or estoppel which 
can be applied to avoid an injustice resulting from the personal 
representative's neglect or default (or usually the counsel for the estate) need 
not be addressed and was not briefed as an issue on appeal. Claimant retains a 
full opportunity to litigate the validity of her claim in the pending 
proceedings. Gladman v. Carns, 9 Ohio App.2d 135, 223 N.E.2d 378 
(1964).

5 
The Colorado court distinguishes Hamilton's Estate v. Egan, 
633 P.2d 1100 (Colo. App. 1981), where the belated rejection did not come until 
the estate was closed. The Hamilton court held that the probate court was 
not required to reopen the estate to litigate a belated rejection. See likewise 
Werning v. McFarland, 149 Mont. 137, 423 P.2d 851, 857 
(1967).