Title: Giordano v. McBar Indus., Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
MARTHA R. GIORDANO,  
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF  
SCOTT ALEXANDER GIORDANO, DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 111771 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
JUNE 7, 2012 
McBAR INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Clarence N. Jenkins, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from a judgment in a wrongful death action, 
we consider whether the circuit court erred in holding that the 
exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act 
(the “Act”) bars a non-dependent individual who is not eligible 
to collect benefits under the Act from bringing an action in 
tort.  We further consider whether the circuit court erred in 
holding that this provision of the Act bars an action in tort 
against the supplier of a product used in the construction 
process. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Scott Alexander Giordano (“Scott”) and Martha R. Giordano 
(“Martha”) were married in 1999.  In December of 2007, the 
parties separated and Martha moved out of the marital home.  
Scott and Martha continued to live separately until August 2, 
2008, when the marital home was sold.  At that time, Scott moved 
in with Martha.  However, Scott and Martha continued to maintain 
 
2 
separate bank accounts and did not co-mingle funds or incur any 
joint debt. 
 
On August 8, 2008, Scott was hired as an insulator for 
McBar Industries, Inc. (“McBar”).1  At the time, McBar was the 
general contractor on a construction project in Chester, 
Virginia that involved the erection of a multi-story, mixed-use 
building.  The construction project required the use of several 
subcontractors and vendors.  McBar subcontracted with E.C. Couch 
Builder, Inc. (“Couch”) to construct and frame the building and 
A. Bertozzi, Inc. (“Bertozzi”) to hang drywall.  Bertozzi, in 
turn, hired Virginia Builder’s Supply, Inc. (“Builder’s Supply”) 
to deliver the drywall. 
 
On September 10, 2008, Scott was working on the first floor 
of the building while Builder’s Supply delivered approximately 
two tons of drywall and related supplies to the second floor of 
the building.  The placement of these materials caused the 
structure to fail; the first floor walls collapsed, bringing 
down the second floor and roof.  The collapse killed Scott.  
 
On October 9, 2008, Martha filed a claim for benefits with 
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) 
stemming from Scott’s death.  After hearing the evidence, a 
                     
 
1 Although there is evidence that Scott had been doing part-
time work for McBar prior to August 8, 2008, we need not 
consider that fact, as the length of time Scott was employed by 
McBar is not relevant to the present case. 
 
3 
deputy commissioner determined that Scott’s estate was entitled 
to funeral expenses as required under Code § 65.2-512(B).  The 
deputy commissioner further determined that Martha was not a 
dependent of Scott and, therefore, was not entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits. 
 
On March 23, 2010, Martha, as personal representative of 
her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death claim in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond against McBar, Couch, 
Bertozzi, and others.  On June 30, 2010, Martha amended her 
complaint to include Builder’s Supply as a defendant.  The 
defendants filed pleas in bar, arguing that Code § 65.2-307(A),2 
the exclusivity provision of the Act, barred Martha’s action.  
The circuit court determined that, because the Commission had 
jurisdiction over the present matter, the exclusivity provision 
applied.  Accordingly, the circuit court sustained the pleas in 
bar.3 
 
Martha appeals. 
                     
 
2 Code § 65.2-307(A) states: 
The rights and remedies herein granted to an 
employee when his employer and he have accepted 
the provisions of this title respectively to pay 
and accept compensation on account of injury or 
death by accident shall exclude all other rights 
and remedies of such employee, his personal 
representative, parents, dependents or next of 
kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of 
such injury, loss of service or death. 
 
3 The circuit court overruled the pleas in bar filed by 
defendants who are not parties to the present appeal. 
 
4 
ANALYSIS 
 
Martha argues that the circuit court erred in sustaining 
the pleas in bar because she was not a member of the class to 
whom the Act applies.  Specifically, Martha contends that 
because she is not a dependent of Scott she is not eligible for 
compensation under the Act.  Therefore, neither the Act nor the 
exclusivity provision apply to her. 
 
“The right to compensation under the work[ers’] 
compensation law is granted by statute, and in giving the right 
the legislature had full power to prescribe the time and manner 
of its exercise.”  Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 
407, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954).  The plain language of the Act 
establishes that the General Assembly clearly limited the 
applicability of the Act to injuries or death by accident 
“arising out of and in the course of” an individual’s 
employment.  Code § 65.2-300.  “When an employee sustains such 
an injury, the Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy 
available against the employer.”  Butler v. Southern States 
Coop., Inc., 270 Va. 459, 465, 620 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2005).  
Thus, contrary to Martha’s argument, the applicability of the 
Act does not turn on the compensability of the claim.  Rather, 
the compensability of the claim turns, in part, on the Act’s 
applicability. 
 
5 
 
Put simply, when the injury falls within the purview of 
Code § 65.2-300, the exclusivity provision applies.  See Butler, 
270 Va. at 466, 620 S.E.2d at 773 (“The exclusivity provision of 
Code § 65.2-307 applies only to an injury both ‘arising out of’ 
and ‘in the course of’ an individual’s employment”).  However, 
when the injury does not arise out of or occur in the course of 
the employment, the exclusivity provision does not apply.  See, 
e.g., Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 798, 20 
S.E.2d 530, 534 (1942). 
 
We have explained that “[a] particular claim may be non-
compensable [under the Act] for one of two reasons: (1) it does 
not fall within the purview of the Act, or (2) while within the 
purview of the Act, certain defenses preclude recovery.”  Adams 
v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 261 Va. 594, 598, 544 S.E.2d 354, 
356 (2001). 
[A] successfully asserted defense under the Act 
may render a particular claim non-compensable; 
however, there is a significant difference 
between a claim arising within the purview of the 
Act that is subject to defenses and a claim that 
is not within the purview of the Act at all.  In 
the former case, there is no recourse to common 
law remedies; in the latter case, there is. 
Id. at 599, 544 S.E.2d at 356. 
 
We further note that a number of jurisdictions have 
addressed similar situations and have come to the same 
 
6 
conclusion.4  The Supreme Court of Indiana’s analysis in McDonald 
v. Miner, 32 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. 1941), is particularly persuasive.5  
In McDonald, the decedent received fatal injuries as the result 
of an accident that arose out of and occurred in the course of 
her employment.  Id. at 885.  Her husband, who was not dependent 
upon the decedent for support, was awarded funeral expenses6 by 
the Industrial Board of Indiana.  Id.  He subsequently filed a 
wrongful death action against the decedent’s employer.  Id.  The 
                     
 
4 See Thol v. United States, 218 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954); 
Underwood v. United States, 207 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1953); 
Patterson v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 196 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1952); 
Smith v. Gortman, 403 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1991); Estate of Coates v. 
Pacific Eng'g, 791 P.2d 1257 (Haw. 1990); Morris v. W.E. Blain & 
Sons, Inc., 511 So. 2d 945 (Miss. 1987); Taylor v. Southeast-
Harrison W. Corp., 694 P.2d 1160 (Alaska 1985); Morrill v. J & M 
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981); Mullarkey v. Florida Feed 
Mills, Inc., 268 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1972); Stample v. Idaho Power 
Co., 450 P.2d 610 (Idaho 1969); Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 253 N.E.2d 373 (Ill. 1969); Maiuri v. Sinacola Constr. Co., 
170 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. 1969); Neville v. Wichita Eagle, Inc., 294 
P.2d 248 (Kan. 1956); Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., 147 P.2d 
199 (Or. 1944); Atchison v. May, 10 So.2d 785 (La. 1942); 
Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 198 So. 486 (Fla. 1940); 
Holder v. Elms Hotel Co., 92 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1936); Treat v. Los 
Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., 256 P. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927); 
Hilsinger v. Zimmerman Steel Co., 187 N.W. 493 (Iowa 1922); 
Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 114 N.E. 795 (N.Y. 1916); 
Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, 92 A. 354 (N.J. 1914).  See 
also, Liberato v. Royer, 126 A. 257 (Pa. 1924), aff’d, 270 U.S. 
535 (1926). 
 
5 Our version of the Act is based upon Indiana’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act, therefore, we have recognized that “the 
construction placed upon the Indiana law by the courts of that 
state merits our consideration.” Barksdale v. H.O. Engen, Inc., 
218 Va. 496, 499, 237 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977). 
 
6 The decedent did not immediately die as a result of her 
injuries.  As such, her husband was also awarded “compensation 
benefits accruing to the decedent between the time of her injury 
and death.”  McDonald, 32 N.E.2d at 885. 
 
7 
trial court dismissed the action, finding that the Industrial 
Board of Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction.  Id.  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the decision, explaining: 
This conclusion was predicated upon the theory 
that operation under the compensation law is 
optional with respect to both employer and 
employee; that the relationship arising therefrom 
is contractual in character; that the employee by 
acceptance has, in effect, contracted as to whom 
his dependents shall be, and that those who 
otherwise would be regarded as dependents under 
the wrongful death statute may not complain since 
there is no vested right in an action for 
wrongful death. 
Id. at 886-87 (citing Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 198 
So. 486 (Fla. 1940)). 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Scott was an 
employee of McBar and that his death was caused by an accident 
that occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment 
with McBar.  Clearly, the Act applies and the defense asserted 
by McBar before the Commission, that Martha was not a dependent, 
merely rendered the claim non-compensable.  As the Act applies, 
so must the exclusivity provision.  Butler, 270 Va. at 466, 620 
S.E.2d at 773. 
 
Martha next argues that she is not an employee as defined 
under Code § 65.2-101 because she is not eligible to receive 
compensation.  As the Act only applies to employees and 
employers, Martha contends that neither the Act nor the 
 
8 
exclusivity provision apply to her action as Scott’s personal 
representative.  Again, we must disagree. 
 
The Act provides a number of definitions for the term 
“employee.”  See Code § 65.2-101.  The definition of employee 
upon which Martha relies is: “The legal representative, 
dependents and any other persons to whom compensation may be 
payable when any person covered as an employee under this title 
shall be deceased.”  Id.  Martha’s argument focuses on the fact 
that she is not Scott’s legal representative and, having been 
deemed a non-dependent, she is neither a dependent nor an “other 
person[] to whom compensation may be payable.”  As such, she 
asserts that she cannot be considered to be an employee who has 
accepted the provision of the Act under Code § 65.2-307(A). 
 
However, the definition of employee relied upon by Martha 
specifically includes the phrase: “when any person covered as an 
employee under this title shall be deceased.”  By including this 
language, the General Assembly has clearly demonstrated its 
intent to look first to the status of the deceased employee when 
determining the applicability of the Act.  Thus, in the context 
of Code § 65.2-307(A), the “employee” in the present case was 
Scott.7 
                     
 
7 Indeed, when viewed in the context of Code § 65.2-307(A), 
the personal representative (Martha) and the employee (Scott) 
clearly must be different individuals. 
 
 
9 
 
Moreover, Martha’s reliance on this definition of employee 
is irrelevant to the issue in this case.  While the Act binds 
employers and employees, it also defines the categories of 
persons, in addition to the employee, who are bound by the 
agreement between employer and employee.  Even if Martha is not 
considered an employee under the Act, the language of Code 
§ 65.2-307(A) is clear and unambiguous that Scott, as an 
employee of McBar, accepted the rights and remedies of the Act 
as his exclusive remedy.  Martha brought a wrongful death action 
as Scott’s personal representative.  The plain language of Code 
§ 65.2-307(A) specifically precludes “all other rights and 
remedies” available to the personal representative of an 
employee who has accepted the provisions of the Act.  Thus, 
under the plain language of Code § 65.2-307(A), Martha’s 
wrongful death action is necessarily barred because she brought 
the action as Scott’s personal representative.8  Accordingly, we 
                     
 
8 We further note that, even if an action by a personal 
representative was not specifically barred by Code § 65.2-
307(A), no action would lie in the present case.  “A wrongful 
death action is a right of action to enforce a cause of action, 
both created by statute in derogation of the common law.”  Horn 
v. Abernathy, 231 Va. 228, 237, 343 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1986) 
(emphasis omitted).  “Statutes in derogation of the common law 
are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their 
operation by construction beyond their express terms.” 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 
S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965).  Under Code § 8.01-50(A), a wrongful 
death action is predicated on the ability of the deceased to 
maintain the action, had death not ensued.  There can be no 
dispute that, had Scott survived, he could not bring the 
 
10 
hold that the circuit court did not err in sustaining the pleas 
in bar as to McBar, Couch and Bertozzi. 
 
With regard to Builder’s Supply, however, Martha presents 
an additional argument: that the circuit court erred in holding 
that Builder’s Supply was not a “stranger” to the “trade, 
occupation, or business” of the general contractor (i.e. McBar).  
According to Martha, even if the exclusivity provision applies 
to McBar, Couch and Bertozzi, it cannot apply to Builder’s 
Supply as Builder’s Supply merely delivered the drywall and, 
therefore, was not actually part of the construction process.  
We agree. 
 
We have recognized that “[t]he exclusivity provision does 
not apply . . . to a common law action for an employee’s injury 
or death against an ‘other party.’ "  Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. 
Co., 260 Va. 406, 412, 537 S.E.2d 305, 307-08 (2000) (citing 
Code § 65.2-309). 
The remedies afforded the employee under the act 
are exclusive of all his former remedies within 
the field of the particular business, but the 
[A]ct does not extend to accidents caused by 
strangers to the business.  If the employee is 
performing the duties of his employer and is 
injured by a stranger to the business, the 
compensation prescribed by the act is available 
to him, but that does not relieve the stranger of 
his full liability for the loss . . . . 
                                                                  
underlying negligence action, as his exclusive remedy would have 
been under the Act. 
 
 
11 
Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 102, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75-76 (1946). 
 
Builder’s Supply argues that this case is similar to Bosher 
v. Jamerson, 207 Va. 539, 151 S.E.2d 375 (1966).  We disagree.  
In Bosher, the defendant was hired to deliver sand to a 
construction site and spread the sand to a specific depth.  Id. 
at 541, 151 S.E.2d at 376.  The sand served as the base for a 
concrete floor.  Id.  The defendant furnished its delivery 
person with a “dump truck equipped with chains on its tailgate 
that could regulate the spreading of sand.”  Id.  We determined 
that, under those facts, it was clear that the defendant was 
performing the trade, business or occupation of the construction 
company, and therefore was not an “other party.”  Id. at 543, 
151 S.E.2d at 377. 
 
The distinguishing factor between Bosher and the present 
case is that in Bosher the defendant was obligated to do more 
than just deliver sand; he was obligated to spread the sand in a 
specific manner using specialized equipment which constituted a 
step in the construction process.  Id. at 542-43, 151 S.E.2d 
377-78.  In the present case, Builder’s Supply was merely 
obligated to deliver drywall and place it in specific locations 
which did not constitute a step in the construction process.  
See Burroughs v. Walmont, Inc., 210 Va. 98, 168 S.E.2d 107 
(1969). 
 
12 
 
In Burroughs, the plaintiff was hired to deliver sheetrock 
and stack it in different rooms at a construction site.  Id. at 
99, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  As he was doing so, he was injured when 
he fell down an open stairwell.  Id.  We determined that the 
plaintiff was an “other party” to the trade, business or 
occupation of the construction company, explaining: 
The gathering of material is of course essential 
to the construction of a building.  So in a sense 
each supplier of material is engaged in the 
general contractor’s trade, business or 
occupation.  But a line must be drawn to 
determine who is an "other party" for the 
purposes of the Work[ers’] Compensation Act.  And 
persons who function solely as suppliers and 
deliverers of goods have been held “other 
parties.”  Perkinson v. Thomas, 158 Va. 699, 164 
S.E. 561 (1932); Garrett v. Tubular Prods., Inc., 
176 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Va. 1959); see Turnage v. 
Northern Virginia Steel Corp., 336 F.2d 837, 843 
(4th Cir. 1964). 
Id. at 99-100, 168 S.E.2d at 108. 
 
In the present case, the general manager of Builder’s 
Supply acknowledged that it merely supplied the drywall and 
placed it in locations specified by either McBar or Bertozzi.  
As we stated in Burroughs, “the stacking of sheetrock in the 
several rooms constituted the final act of delivery, not an act 
of construction.”  Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  Such actions 
do not transcend delivery and, therefore, Builder’s Supply was 
not engaged in the trade, business or occupation of McBar.  Id.  
Thus, we hold that Builder’s Supply was a stranger to the 
 
13 
business and the exclusivity provision of the Act does not apply 
to it.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in sustaining the 
plea in bar with regard to Builder’s Supply. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The exclusivity provision of the Act bars Martha’s wrongful 
death action against McBar, Couch and Bertozzi because Scott’s 
death was caused by an accident that occurred in the course of 
and arose out of his employment with McBar.  The bar does not 
apply to Builder’s Supply, however, as mere delivery of drywall 
is not within the trade, business or occupation of McBar.  
Therefore, Martha can maintain her wrongful death action against 
Builder’s Supply.  Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of 
the circuit court sustaining the pleas in bar filed by McBar, 
Couch and Bertozzi, reverse its decision sustaining the plea in 
bar filed by Builder’s Supply, and remand the matter for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded.