Title: Decker v. Star Financial Group Inc.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-PL-305 
Cliff Decker and Wendy Decker, Individually and on 
Behalf of all others Similarly Situated, 
Appellants, 
–v– 
Star Financial Group, Inc., 
Appellee. 
Argued: November 3, 2022 | Decided: March 21, 2023 
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court 
 No. 02D02-2103-PL-116 
The Honorable Craig J. Bobay, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
21A-PL-2191 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Molter concur.  
Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 21 2023, 3:08 pm
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Slaughter, Justice. 
Plaintiffs, Cliff and Wendy Decker, have a checking account with Star 
Financial Bank, a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant, Star Financial 
Group, Inc. The Deckers, on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated, filed a class-action complaint alleging the Bank collected 
improper overdraft fees. Before the Deckers sued, the Bank added an 
arbitration and no-class-action addendum to the terms and conditions of 
the Deckers’ account agreement. After the Deckers sued, the Bank cited 
the addendum and responded with a motion to compel arbitration, which 
the trial court granted. We hold that the account agreement’s change-of-
terms clause did not allow the Bank to add the addendum. We reverse 
and remand. 
I 
A 
When the Deckers opened their checking account, they assented to an 
account agreement that detailed the terms and conditions of their 
relationship with the Bank. Of relevance here, the account agreement 
stated: 
(10) Amendments and Termination. We may change any 
term of this agreement. Rules governing changes in interest 
rates are provided separately in the Truth-in-Savings 
disclosure or in another document. For other changes, we 
will give you reasonable notice in writing or by any other 
method permitted by law. . . . Reasonable notice depends on 
the circumstances . . . . If we have notified you of a change in 
any term of your account and you continue to have your 
account after the effective date of the change, you have 
agreed to the new term(s).  
The account agreement did not mention arbitration, class actions, or 
dispute resolution at all.  
In October 2019, the Bank assessed the Deckers a $37 overdraft fee, 
which the Deckers argued was improper because their account was not 
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overdrawn. In June 2020, the Deckers’ counsel reached out to the Bank’s 
general counsel to discuss its fee practices. In August 2020, the Bank sent 
the Deckers an email that included their monthly bank statement. The 
Deckers are e-statement customers, meaning they directed the Bank to 
“send them their checking account statements and other notices and 
disclosures relating to the terms and conditions of their checking account 
via email.” The fourteen-page monthly statement contained: (1) ten pages 
detailing the prior month’s transactions; (2) one page of fees; (3) one page 
of check images; and (4) a two-page addendum to their account agreement 
providing that claims against the Bank were subject to arbitration and 
could be brought only in a customer’s individual capacity. The addendum 
noted that it would become effective within ten days if the Deckers 
retained their account with the Bank. The monthly statement did not 
summarize the agreement’s revised terms and conditions; it merely 
included the addendum at the end of the statement. The Deckers did not 
see or review the addendum, and they did not close their account with the 
Bank.  
B 
The Deckers later filed a class-action complaint against the Bank 
alleging improper overdraft fees. The Bank responded with a motion to 
compel arbitration based on the addendum. After a hearing, the trial court 
granted the Bank’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the 
Deckers’ complaint. The Deckers appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Decker v. Star Fin. Grp., 
Inc., 187 N.E.3d 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The Bank then sought transfer, 
which we granted, 194 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. 2022), thus vacating the appellate 
opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
II 
A 
Indiana has a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements. MPACT 
Constr. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 905 
(Ind. 2004) (citing Ind. CPA Soc'y v. GoMembers, Inc., 777 N.E.2d 747, 750 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). But our policy favoring arbitration comes with a key 
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qualification. A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration unless it 
has agreed to do so. Id. at 906 (citing AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)). Whether parties agreed to 
arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contract interpretation. Ibid. (citing AGCO 
Corp. v. Anglin, 216 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2000)). “The goal of contract 
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as 
reasonably manifested by the language of the agreement.” Reuille v. E.E. 
Brandenberger Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind. 2008) (citing First Fed. 
Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Mkts., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ind. 1990)). “[I]f the 
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain and 
ordinary meaning.” Ibid. (brackets in original) (quoting Cabanaw v. 
Cabanaw, 648 N.E.2d 694, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).  
We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Lake Imaging, 
LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 206 (Ind. 2022) (citing Schwartz 
v. Heeter, 994 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. 2013)). And we do not defer to a trial 
court’s decision on a motion to compel arbitration but likewise review it 
anew. Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind. 2021) (citing 
Med. Realty Assocs., LLC v. D.A. Dodd, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 871, 874 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2010)). 
B 
The Deckers raise three arguments on appeal: (1) the Bank buried 
notice of the addendum at the end of their monthly statement and thus 
did not provide the contractually required reasonable notice; (2) the 
account agreement’s change-of-terms clause did not allow the Bank to add 
the addendum; and (3) the continued use of their checking account did 
not manifest their assent to the addendum.  
For us to affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, the Bank must 
run the table on all three of the Deckers’ arguments. In contrast, the 
Deckers need win only one of their arguments for us to resolve the appeal 
in their favor. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the 
Deckers’ first and third arguments, we hold that the specific language of 
the account agreement’s change-of-terms clause did not permit the Bank 
to add the addendum. Thus, the addendum was not a valid amendment 
to the account agreement. 
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The agreement’s operative provision is Section 10, which allows the 
Bank to “change any term of this agreement.” The Bank proceeded here as 
if the account agreement’s change-of-terms clause gave it a blank check to 
amend the agreement any way it saw fit to fend off threatened litigation. 
But Section 10—which the Bank itself wrote—is not so elastic. This section 
does not say the Bank can change the agreement however it wants. If the 
Bank wanted such flexibility, it might have given itself the power to 
“change this agreement” as desired. Instead, the section is more limited in 
scope. It limits the Bank to changing “any term of this agreement.” Words 
matter. The difference between a far-reaching power to amend “this 
agreement” and the narrower power to amend “any term of this 
agreement” makes all the difference on this record. The latter—which 
governs here—limits the Bank to modifying the terms that existed in the 
original account agreement. Relevant here, the original agreement 
contained neither a general dispute-resolution provision nor a specific 
arbitration or no-class-action provision. Thus, there was not “any term” of 
that agreement the Bank could “change” to effectuate the result it sought 
here through its addendum. Because the original account agreement did 
not mention dispute resolution generally or arbitration or class action 
specifically, Section 10 did not permit the Bank to add such provisions by 
amendment. To conclude otherwise would violate Section 10.  
Case authority from elsewhere recognizes this key distinction. In Badie 
v. Bank of America, the California Court of Appeal held that a change-of-
terms clause allowing the bank to “change any term” of the original 
banking agreement did not permit the bank to add an arbitration clause 
when the original agreement did not mention arbitration. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
273, 277, 289 (Ct. App. 1998). The court reasoned that “whether the change 
of terms provision permitted the Bank to add the ADR clause . . . 
depend[ed] principally on what the parties intended by the word 
‘term[]’”. Id. at 285. The court used standard rules of contract 
interpretation to conclude that the change-of-terms clause was ambiguous 
because it was reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations. Id. at 
287. From this conclusion, the court construed the language against the 
bank, which drafted the agreement, and concluded that “the parties did 
not intend that the change of terms provision should permit the Bank to 
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add new contract terms that differ in kind from the terms and conditions 
included in the original agreement[].” Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).  
Here, following the reasoning of the Badie court, we agree that our case 
likewise turns on “what the parties intended by the word ‘term[]’”. Id. at 
285. But, unlike the Badie court, we conclude that the plain text of the 
change-of-terms clause allows us to resolve this case without resorting to 
an ambiguity analysis. In focusing on the word “term”, we must also give 
effect to the modifier “any”. The agreement did not define “any”; thus, we 
give the term its plain meaning. Reuille, 888 N.E.2d at 771 (quoting 
Cabanaw, 648 N.E.2d at 697). Using “any” shows that the agreement did 
not allow the Bank to add new terms that differed in kind from those 
included in the original account agreement. Instead, Section 10 allowed 
the Bank merely to change a specific kind of term by amendment—
namely, only those terms existing in the original account agreement. 
Because the original account agreement had no general dispute-resolution 
provision or specific arbitration or class-action provisions, the Bank could 
not add such provisions by amendment. Thus, the addendum was not a 
valid amendment to the account agreement.  
Our concurring colleague would hold that Sections 2 and 10 of the 
parties’ agreement independently authorize the Bank’s addendum. As for 
Section 2, he believes the Bank need only send customers a document 
“pertaining” to their account to establish a new agreement. We 
respectfully disagree. Section 2 says that the agreement, “along with any 
other documents we [the Bank] give you [the customer] pertaining to your 
account(s), is a contract that establishes rules which control your 
account(s) with us.” This provision is the vehicle by which the Bank can 
add or incorporate other documents to the agreement. But this provision 
alone is not sufficient to change the terms and conditions of their 
agreement. Here, the Bank did not even purport to rely on Section 2 to 
change its agreement with the Deckers. In its notice to the Deckers, the 
Bank relied on Section 10, citing the provision’s reasonable-notice 
requirement, and labeled the addendum as an “amendment” to the 
agreement: “PURSUANT TO SECTION 10 OF YOUR ACCOUNT 
AGREEMENT . . . REGARDING REASONABLE NOTICE FOR ANY 
AMENDMENT TO YOUR ACCOUNT AGREEMENT, THIS 
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ADDENDUM SHALL BE EFFECTIVE TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF MAILING OR ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION OF THIS 
ADDENDUM.” (Emphasis added). It is noteworthy that the only section 
for amending the account agreement is Section 10, titled “Amendments 
and Termination.” In contrast, the word “amendment” never appears in 
Section 2. Thus, because the Bank relied on Section 10 to add the 
addendum, that section governs whether this amendment is valid.    
As for Section 10, we have already explained why its first sentence—
entitling the Bank to “change any term” of this agreement—does not 
authorize the addendum here. The concurrence relies instead on Section 
10’s last sentence: “If we have notified you of a change in any term of your 
account and you continue to have your account after the effective date of 
the change, you have agreed to the new term(s).” This provision does not 
mean the Bank can add whatever “new term(s)” it wishes to the parties’ 
agreement without limitation. Such an interpretation has things 
backward. The phrase “new term(s)” is not the predicate but the 
conclusion. If the changed term is authorized (see Section 10’s opening 
sentence) and the customer does not close the account (see its closing 
sentence), then the changed term becomes a “new term” in the updated 
agreement. That is a far cry from saying that any “new term” is fair game 
and is necessarily a valid addition to an updated agreement. 
Given our dispositive conclusion that the agreement’s change-of-terms 
clause did not allow the Bank to add the addendum, we do not consider 
whether the Deckers received reasonable notice of the addendum or 
whether their continued use of their checking account manifested their 
assent to the addendum. 
*          *          * 
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
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A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L A N T S C L I F F A N D W E N D Y D E C K E R 
Irwin B. Levin 
Lynn A. Toops 
Vess A. Miller 
Lisa LaFornara 
Tyler Ewigleben 
Cohen & Malad, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
John Steinkamp 
John Steinkamp & Associates, P.C. 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Matthew R. Gutwein 
DeLaney & DeLaney LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E S T A R F I NA N C I A L G R O U P , I NC . 
Scott S. Morrisson 
Libby Yin Goodknight  
Kay Dee Baird 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R AM I C I CU R I A E I N D I A NA B A N K E R S A S S O C I A T I ON 
A N D I N D I AN A C R E D I T U N I O N 
Thomas W. Dinwiddie 
Daniel R. Kelley 
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-305 | March 21, 2023 
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Goff, J., concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court that the Deckers are not bound by the arbitration 
addendum to their account agreement. But I reach that conclusion for a 
different reason. In my view, the agreement—taken as a whole—permits 
the addition of an arbitration addendum. But, given the lack of reasonable 
opportunity to reject the addendum, the Deckers did not, as I see it, assent 
to a change in terms. 
I. The agreement, when read in full, permits the 
addition of an arbitration addendum. 
The Court concludes that, because the account agreement’s amendment 
clause (Section 10) limits the Bank to modifying the agreement’s existing 
terms, and because the original agreement contained neither an arbitration 
clause nor a class-action provision, the Bank acted beyond its contractual 
authority and “the addendum was not a valid amendment to the account 
agreement.” Ante, at 4–6. This conclusion, in my view, overlooks other 
pertinent terms of the agreement and rests on an overly narrow definition 
of “change.”  
To begin with, Section 2 identifies the principal document, “along with 
any other documents” a customer receives “pertaining to [the] account(s), 
[a]s a contract that establishes rules which control [the] account(s).” App. 
Vol. 2, p. 53 (emphasis added). Rather than operating as a mere “vehicle” 
which the Bank may use for amending the agreement under Section 10, as 
the Court proposes, ante, at 6, Section 2 acknowledges that additional 
terms may form part of the contract. And because the arbitration 
addendum unquestionably amounted to a document “pertaining to” a 
customer’s account, it may become part of the “contract that establishes 
rules which control” that account (upon the customer’s assent), the terms 
of which are then subject to further amendment under Section 10.  
Second, and independently, Section 10 itself stipulates that notification 
“of a change in any term,” and the customer’s continued use of the 
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account “after the effective date of the change,” constitute the customer’s 
assent “to the new terms” of the agreement. App. Vol. 2, p. 57 (emphasis 
added). This language, in my view, clearly contemplates the addition of 
novel terms by modification of the agreement’s existing terms. 
In short, when we “read all of the contractual provisions as a whole” 
and avoid “focusing on isolated [words or] phrases,” the agreement here 
permits the addition of an arbitration addendum. See DeHaan v. DeHaan, 
572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320, 1322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
II. The Deckers did not assent to the addendum by 
failing to close their account within ten days.  
An arbitration agreement, as with a typical contract, requires “offer, 
acceptance of the offer and consideration.” Reitenour v. M/I Homes of 
Indiana, L.P., 176 N.E.3d 505, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). A party’s assent “may be expressed by acts 
which manifest acceptance.” DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And, in 
certain circumstances, a party’s silence or inaction may likewise constitute 
assent. Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652, 657–58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes a party’s silence or 
inaction as acceptance in only three exceptional circumstances: (1) when 
the offeree takes the benefit of the offered services with reasonable 
opportunity to reject; (2) when the offeror has stated or given the offeree 
reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction 
and the offeree intends to accept the offer by remaining silent; or (3) when, 
because of previous dealings, it is reasonable that the offeree should notify 
the offeror if he does not intend to accept. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 69(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1981).  
While this Court has never applied section 69 of the Restatement, our 
Court of Appeals has relied on it when analyzing issues of contractual 
assent by silence or inaction, see, e.g., Mueller, 873 N.E.2d at 657–58, and 
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the Bank itself considers it a part of “Indiana law,” Appellee’s Br. at 39.1 
More importantly, adopting section 69, in the absence of statutory 
authority to the contrary, would, in my view, promote consistency in 
contracting practices among businesses and instill a greater sense of 
fairness among consumers in carrying out their contractual obligations, 
ultimately reducing the need for judicial intervention.  
Applying section 69 here, the Bank insists that (1) the Deckers “agreed 
to accept the benefits” of the Bank’s services by “continuing to use their 
checking account just as they had before the Arbitration Addendum went 
into effect,” and (2) the Bank “specifically told the Deckers that their 
silence or inaction would manifest their assent to the Arbitration 
Addendum.” Id.  
I find this argument unpersuasive.  
To begin with, the “mere fact that an offeror states that silence will 
constitute acceptance does not deprive the offeree of his privilege to 
remain silent without accepting.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 
cmt. c. The “case for acceptance is strongest” under the Restatement 
“when the reliance is definite and substantial or when the intent to accept 
is objectively manifested though not communicated to the offeror.” Id. 
And while an offeree’s “intent to accept is manifested only by silent 
inaction,” an “offeror who has invited such an acceptance cannot 
complain of the resulting uncertainty in his position.” Id. 
Here, the Deckers did nothing to show a “definite and substantial” 
reliance on the addendum, and, in my view, their short-term maintenance 
of the account—a mere preservation of the status quo—fails to show an 
objective manifestation of intent to accept the new terms. See id. Cf. Meyer 
v. Nat. City Bank, 903 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a 
customer assented to a credit card agreement where the agreement 
 
1 The Bank, nevertheless, apparently disapproves of reliance on the commentary to section 69. 
See Appellee’s Br. at 39 n.17. 
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expressly stated that use of the card constituted acceptance and the 
customer in fact used the credit card). 
Second, and more importantly, the “mere receipt of an unsolicited offer 
does not impair the offeree’s freedom of action or inaction or impose on 
him any duty to speak.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 cmt. a. 
Rather, there must be a “reasonable opportunity to reject” the offer. Id. § 
69(1) (emphasis added). And the “existence of a reasonable opportunity to 
reject” necessarily “requires affording the consumer a reasonable time 
period in which to exercise such rejection.” Restatement of Consumer 
Contracts § 3 cmt. 4 (Am. L. Inst., Tent. Draft 2019) (emphasis added).2 
What’s more, an opportunity to reject (or to terminate, which effectively is 
what the agreement here calls for) “is reasonable if it does not impose 
unreasonable cost, loss of value, or personal burden on the consumer.” Id. 
cmt. 6. Rejection or termination “is not feasible or practicable” if, for 
example, it “would impose a significant loss of value acquired by the 
consumer prior to the proposed modification; would force the consumer 
to incur a significant financial or other burden to enter a substitute 
contract; would squander a substantial investment in the relationship; or 
would undermine the consumer’s reasonable, forward-looking 
expectation from the relationship.” Id. 
Here, Section 12 of the agreement required the Deckers to review their 
August 2020 account statement with accompanying addendum within “30 
days from when the statement [was] first sent or made available to” them. 
App. Vol. 2, p. 58 (emphasis added). Requiring the Deckers to close their 
checking account within ten days of receiving that account statement 
clearly conflicts with Section 12, depriving the Deckers of a “reasonable 
 
2 The Restatement of Consumer Contracts is only a revised tentative draft. But this Court has 
relied on working drafts by similarly respected organizations for their authoritative 
exposition of the law. See, e.g., Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294, 1298–99 n.2 (Ind. 1985) 
(citing as persuasive authority the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers), as 
well as a “proposed draft” on the same subject by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws). 
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opportunity to reject” the offer.3 Cf. Mueller, 873 N.E.2d at 658 (holding 
that silence did not constitute acceptance where, among other things, 
offeror did not provide offeree a clear and timely mechanism for rejecting 
his services and offeror had performed all services by the time he sent the 
letter notifying him of terms). What’s more, closing the account on such 
short notice not only forces customers to change banks, but it also 
potentially exposes them to financial liability from, for example, fees 
incurred for missed automatic payments to vendors or utilities. 
Conclusion 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the Deckers are not bound by the 
arbitration addendum to their account agreement. However, I reach that 
conclusion not because the agreement prohibits the Bank from adding 
new terms but, rather, because the Deckers’ failure to close the account 
within ten days did not, in my view, constitute assent to the addendum. 
 
3 To be sure, the agreement specifies that the customer “agree[s] that the time you have to 
examine [the] statement and report to [the Bank] will depend on the circumstances.” App. 
Vol. 2, p. 58. But there’s nothing to suggest what those various circumstances would be, either 
in the agreement or in the August 2020 email notice.