Title: TETON BUILDERS v. JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TETON BUILDERS v. JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY2004 WY 147100 P.3d 1260Case Number: 03-230Decided: 11/29/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

TETON 
BUILDERS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

JACOBSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

a 
Utah corporation, as agent for and acting on

behalf 
of FS JACKSON HOLE DEVELOPMENT

COMPANY, 
and LLC, LOUIS DREYFUS

PROPERTY 
GROUP, INC.,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Heather 
Noble and John A. Brazinski, Jackson, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Andrea 
L. Richard and John A. Coppede of Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons, LLP, 
Cheyenne, WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court order refusing to reopen a matter involving the validity 
of a construction lien.  In particular, appellant Teton Builders 
contends that it was not afforded due process with respect to the hearing 
regarding appellee Jacobsen Construction's petition to strike and release Teton 
Builders' lien.  We affirm.  

 

 

 

[¶2]      Teton Builders 
sets forth the issue on appeal as:

 

Whether the district court erred in refusing to reopen a judgment 
under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure for denial of due 
process when the judgment was based [on] argument and evidence presented in a 
hearing held on three and a half hours' notice to Teton Builders and its counsel 
and at that hearing Teton Builders' counsel was unable effectively to 
cross-examine witnesses appearing telephonically because those witnesses claimed 
not to have documents related to Teton Builders' lien.[1]
 

Jacobsen Construction phrases the issues:
 

I.  Whether 
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide this appeal when Appellant 
failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal pursuant to Wyo.R.App.P. 
2.01.

 

II.  Whether 
Appellant was deprived of due process when afforded an opportunity to challenge 
Jacobsen's Petition to Strike and Release Lien.

 

 
 

 

 

[¶3]      Teton Builders 
acted as a subcontractor for Jacobsen Construction on a construction project 
located in Jackson, Wyoming.  
Thereafter, when Teton Builders threatened to file a mechanic's lien 
concerning its work on the project, counsel for Jacobsen Construction sent a 
letter to Teton Builders' counsel advising that if a lien was filed, Jacobsen 
Construction would seek to have the lien stricken and released as a frivolous 
lien under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-311 (LexisNexis 2003).2  
Despite this letter, Teton Builders filed its lien on April 9, 2003.  True to its word, on April 28, 2003, 
Jacobsen Construction filed a Petition for Expedited Proceedings to Strike and 
Release Lien. 

 

[¶4]      The district 
court entered an order setting a hearing on the matter for May 14, 2003, at 1:30 
p.m.  The hearing was conducted 
telephonically before a district court commissioner wherein Jacobsen 
Construction offered the testimony of two witnesses.  Teton Builders presented no 
witnesses.  Ultimately, the district 
court entered an order striking and releasing the lien on May 23, 2003.  This order also required Teton Builders 
to pay Jacobsen Construction the sum of $1,000.00 as damages and awarded 
Jacobsen Construction its attorney fees and costs.3  
Also, on May 22, 2003, Jacobsen Construction gave notice that it had 
recorded a corporate surety bond in an amount equal to one and one half times 
the amount of the lien filed by Teton Builders with the Teton County 
Clerk.4

 

[¶5]      On June 16, 2003, 
Teton Builders filed a Motion for New Trial.  In this motion Teton Builders asserted 
it received insufficient notice of the hearing on the petition to strike and 
release the lien and that the telephonic hearing conducted did not allow Teton 
Builders an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses presented.  Following hearing, the district court 
denied the motion finding that it was not timely filed.  On August 25, 2003, Teton Builders then 
filed a Motion to Reopen Judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).  This motion asserted the same arguments 
made in Teton Builders' Motion for New Trial.  The district court also denied this 
motion.  Teton Builders appealed the 
denial of this motion and filed its Notice of Appeal on October 7, 2003. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      In DMM v. 
DFH, 954 P.2d 976, 978 (Wyo. 1998), we stated:

 

            
"The granting or denying of relief pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to the 
question of whether there has been an abuse of discretion."  State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. 
RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989).  
When a judgment is attacked pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), however, there is 
no question of discretion in granting or denying reliefeither the judgment is 
void, or it is valid. Id. Once that determination is made, the trial 
court must act accordingly.  
Id.  "A judgment is 
not void merely because it is erroneous.  
It is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with 
due process of law."  Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 2nd § 2862, at 326-29 (1995) 
(footnotes omitted); see also, In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1110 
(Wyo. 1989).

 

Upon 
application, the court in Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 
1994) recognized:

 

            
This court has indicated on a number of occasions that a judgment may be 
void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if entered in a manner inconsistent with due 
process.  See, e.g., V.T.A., 
Inc., 597 F.2d at 224-25; Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Ohio (In re 
Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig.), 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S. Ct. 516, 42 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1974).  
We ultimately rejected the due process arguments asserted in the cited 
cases because fundamental procedural prerequisitesparticularly, adequate notice 
and opportunity to be heardwere fully satisfied.  Here, in contrast, the Secretary was not 
given any notice that her EAJA liability, already resolved by stipulated order, 
would be redetermined in the proceeding on plaintiff's second motion for 
attorney fees and, given plaintiff's express reliance on § 406(b), had no reason 
whatsoever to anticipate this development.  
Accordingly, the Secretary did not oppose the motion, which to all 
appearances was primarily a matter between plaintiff and counsel.  Under the circumstances, entry of the 
resultant order under the EAJA, which everyone involved concedes was an 
improbable mistake, cannot be deemed consistent with due process.  Therefore, relief was not only 
appropriate but mandatory under Rule 60(b)(4).

 

 

 

 

[¶7]      In its appellate 
brief, Jacobsen Construction contends that this court does not have proper 
jurisdiction to review this case because Teton Builders did not timely file its 
notice of appeal.  Previously during 
this appeal, Jacobsen Construction filed with this court a Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.  
After careful review of the motion, this court denied the motion, 
entering its order on May 17, 2004.  
As this court has already made its determination concerning Jacobsen 
Construction's jurisdictional claim, this court will not further address the 
issue. 

 

 

[¶8]      Teton Builders 
avers that it was not given sufficient notice of the time of the hearing on the 
petition.  Specifically, Teton 
Builders contends that because it was given only three and one half hours 
notice, it did not have sufficient time to prepare to present evidence on the 
numerous factual and legal issues raised.  
Teton Builders thus asserts that it was deprived of a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.   We 
do not agree.

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
29-1-311 (b)(i) mandates that a hearing on a petition to strike and release a 
lien must occur "no earlier than six (6) nor later than fifteen (15) days 
following the date of service of the petition and order on the person claiming 
the lien."  Teton Builders was 
served with Jacobsen Construction's petition to strike and release the lien by 
mail on April 28, 2003.  Thereafter, 
apparently applying the language set forth in § 29-1-311, along with W.R.C.P. 
6(d), the district court determined that a hearing should be held on the 
petition sometime prior to May 16, 2003, and entered an order setting the 
hearing on the matter for May 14, 2003, at 1:30 p.m.5

 

[¶10]   Teton Builders argues that because 
the district court's order was only facsimilied to both parties three and one 
half hours prior to the hearing, it was severely prejudiced in its preparation 
for the hearing. We do not find this argument persuasive.  Teton Builders admits that it actually 
received the petition by mail on April 30, 2003.  The petition made it clear that it was 
filed pursuant to § 29-1-311, and that statute explicitly sets forth hearing 
scheduling requirements.  Teton 
Builders was also unarguably put on notice as early as April 3, 2003, that 
Jacobsen Construction would file a petition under § 29-1-311 should a lien be 
filed by Teton Builders when Jacobsen Construction sent a letter to Teton 
Builders stating as much.  

 

[¶11]   Teton Builders further agues that 
the § 29-1-311 hearing timeline only begins to run after both the petition 
and order have been properly served because § 29-1-311 
contemplates that, upon filing of a petition, the court is to issue an order to 
show cause, which may be issued ex parte, setting the matter for 
hearing.  Hence, Teton Builders 
claims that the earliest the hearing in this case could have been set was May 
20, 2003.  However, regardless of 
the district court's procedure in scheduling the hearing, the fact remains that 
Teton Builders had actual notice that a hearing would soon take place and thus 
was given an adequate opportunity to prepare for the hearing.  Moreover, it is important to note that 
the hearing was set by the district court only after consulting with counsel for 
both parties.  In doing so, the 
district court took into account the hearing scheduling deadline set forth by § 
29-1-311 and the schedules of all involved, including Teton Builders' counsel's 
plans to be out of town on May 15 and 16, 2003.  It is therefore somewhat specious for 
Teton Builders to now complain that it did not receive sufficient notice of the 
scheduled hearing.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Teton Builders was given adequate notice of the hearing and thus was 
afforded due process with respect to such notice. 

 

[¶12]   Teton Builders also contends that, 
because the hearing on the petition was held telephonically, it was denied the 
right to effectively cross-examine witnesses.  Therefore, Teton Builders asserts that 
it was denied its right to due process and the district court's order on the 
petition should be considered void.  
This court has previously determined that telephonic participation in a 
hearing is adequate for due process.  

 

            
In Murray v. Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 (Wyo. 1995), we held 
that:

 

            
The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State 
of Wyoming each provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.  
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;  
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6. "It is basic that, before a property interest 
can be terminated, except in emergency situations, due process must be afforded 
to litigants in the form of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" 
Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 997 
(Wyo. 1989)) (emphasis in original).  
It would have been a simple matter to allow Peter to participate in the 
divorce hearing via conference call.  
Peter, however, was denied his day in court.

 

We repeated that finding in a different, but not distinguishable, 
context in Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 47-48 (Wyo. 1995) (it is abuse of 
discretion for trial court to modify visitation provisions of divorce decree 
without affording incarcerated father an opportunity to be heard or otherwise 
providing for development of an evidentiary record).  We note here that in Glenn v. 
Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1993), we affirmed an order modifying the child 
support obligation of an individual who had been sentenced to life in the 
penitentiary.  The opportunity to be 
heard was not at issue in that case because the appellant was allowed to 
participate by telephone conference call. Also see Throndset v. 
Hawkenson, 532 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1995), and In Interest of F. H., 
283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979) (prison inmate's right to appear satisfied by 
appearance through counsel or by deposition); Barnes v. Fucci, 563 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1990) (imprisoned mother entitled to appear for 
termination of parental rights hearing); Smith v. Alaska Department of 
Revenue, 790 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Alaska 1990) (no right for prisoner to be 
heard where there are only legal issues, but no factual dispute); Whitney v. 
Buckner, 107 Wash. 2d 861, 734 P.2d 485, 488 (1987) (prisoners must be 
afforded a meaningful opportunity to prosecute their domestic relations 
actions);  Clemans v. 
Collins, 679 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Alaska 1984) (hearing required to determine 
indigent prisoner's ability to pay child support while incarcerated). 

 

RPM v. 
State, Dep't of Family Servs., Div. of Public Assistance and Soc. 
Servs., 917 P.2d 169, 170 (Wyo. 1996) (footnote omitted).  
Teton Builders was afforded the opportunity to fully participate in the 
hearing and to present argument concerning the petition.  Where parties to an action have 
participated to the extent that they deem desirable in the hearing and where 
there has been no attempt made to inhibit testimony of witnesses or argument of 
counsel and the parties were cognizant of the issues and the positions of their 
adversaries, such a hearing has been conducted in a constitutionally and 
statutorily fair manner.  
Mortgage Guaranty Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509, 518-19 
(Wyo. 1981).  

 

[¶13]   Moreover, although Teton Builders 
claims that it was unable to properly cross-examine the witnesses called by 
Jacobsen Construction by way of having them review and answer questions 
concerning certain documentation, it should be noted that Teton Builders could 
have presented such evidence by calling its own witnesses at the hearing.  Teton Builders simply chose not to take 
this tact.  Consequently, we hold 
that Teton Builders had a real and substantial opportunity to present and 
contest those issues surrounding the petition.  

 

[¶14]   Finally, even if we assume that 
Teton Builders was not allowed an effective opportunity to participate in the 
hearing, it should be recognized that any issue involving the validity of the 
district court's order, particularly with respect to the release and striking of 
the lien itself, was effectively rendered moot when Jacobsen Construction 
recorded an adequate corporate surety bond.  Subsequently, the district court entered 
an order approving the bond posted and directing that the lien be deemed 
satisfied on June 24, 2003.  This 
was followed by a satisfaction of lien being recorded with the Teton County 
Clerk on June 26, 2003.  Therefore, 
even if it is determined that Teton Builders was denied due process with respect 
to the hearing, this result must be considered harmless error. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶15]   For the reasons stated, we affirm 
the order of the district court denying Teton Builders' Motion to Reopen 
Judgment. 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1W.R.C.P. 60(b), entitled "Relief 
from judgment or order," states, in pertinent part: 

 

(b) 
Other Reasons.On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void[.]  

 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 29-1-311 (LexisNexis 2003) provides, in applicable 
part:

 

(b)  Any 
person whose real or personal property is subject to a recorded claim of lien 
who believes the claim of lien is invalid under subsection (a) of this section, 
was forged, or that the person claiming the lien knew at the time of filing the 
lien was groundless, contained a material misstatement or false claim, may 
petition the district court of the county in which the claim of lien has been 
recorded for the relief provided in this subsection.  The petition shall state the grounds 
upon which relief is requested, and shall be supported by the affidavit of the 
petitioner or his attorney setting forth a concise statement of the facts upon 
which the motion is based.  . . . 
.  Upon the filing of the petition 
the following shall apply:

 

(i)  The 
court may enter its order, which may be granted ex parte, directing the person 
claiming the lien to appear before the court at a time no earlier than six (6) 
nor later than fifteen (15) days following the date of service of the petition 
and order on the person claiming the lien, and show cause, if any, why the 
relief provided in this subsection should not be granted;

 

(ii)  The 
order shall clearly state that if the person claiming the lien fails to appear 
at the time and place noted, the claim of lien shall be stricken and released, 
and that the person claiming the lien shall be ordered to pay damages of at 
least one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or actual damages, whichever is greater, 
and the costs incurred by the petitioner, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees;

 

(iii)  The 
order and petition shall be served upon the person claiming the lien by personal 
service, or, where the court determines that service by mail is likely to give 
actual notice, the court may order that service be made by mailing copies of the 
petition and order to the person claiming the lien at his last known address or 
any other address determined by the court to be appropriate.  Two (2) copies shall be mailed, postage 
prepaid, one by ordinary first class mail and the other by a form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt showing when and to whom it was delivered.  The envelopes shall bear the return 
address of the sender;

 

(iv)  If, 
following a hearing on the matter the court determines that the claim of lien is 
invalid under subsection (a) of this section, was forged or that the person 
claiming the lien knew at the time of filing the lien was groundless or 
contained a material misstatement or false claim, the court shall issue an order 
striking and releasing the claim of lien and awarding damages of one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or actual damages, whichever is greater, costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees to the petitioner to be paid by the person claiming 
the lien[.]

 

3On 
September 16, 2003, after Jacobsen Construction submitted an itemized statement 
of attorney fees and costs, the district court awarded Jacobsen Construction 
attorney fees in the amount of $5,697.00, plus costs in the amount of $91.04. 

 

4Subsequently, 
on June 24, 2003, the district court entered an Order Approving Bond and 
Directing Satisfaction of Lien.  
Pursuant to the order, a Satisfaction of Lien was recorded with the Teton 
County Clerk on June 26, 2003.  

 

5W.R.C.P. 
6(d) provides:

 

(d)  Additional 
time after service by mail.Whenever a party has the right or is required to 
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the 
service of a notice or other paper upon the party, and the notice or paper is 
served upon the party by mail or by delivery to the clerk for service, three 
days shall be added to the prescribed period, provided however, this rule shall 
not apply to service of process by registered or certified mail under Rule 
4(l)(2).