Title: Rains v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

George T. RAINS v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-245                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 25, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- arguments not raised at trial not addressed on appeal. -
     - Arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for the
     first time on appeal; parties cannot change the grounds for an
     objection on appeal and are bound by the scope and nature of
     their objections and arguments presented at trial.

2.   Motions -- directed verdict -- general renewal of specific motion preserves
     sufficiency challenge for review. -- Where a defendant's first
     motion for directed verdict is specific regarding the missing
     proof, but his motion at the close of the evidence is merely
     a general renewal of the first motion, his challenge to the
     sufficiency of the evidence is preserved for appellate review;
     it is the opportunity of the trial court to first hear and
     address the parties' arguments that is of importance in
     determining whether the argument has been preserved for
     appeal; that both directed-verdict motions are not identical
     will not bar an appellant's argument on appeal.

3.   Motions -- directed verdict -- stating additional grounds in final motion
     does not bar review. -- Where appellant made specific motions for
     directed verdict at the end of the State's case and at the
     close of all the evidence, the fact that he stated additional
     grounds in his final motion did not bar appellate
     consideration of them; therefore, because appellant did not
     raise any issues on appeal that were not first presented to
     the trial court, the supreme court reached the merits of the
     sufficiency argument.  

4.   Motions -- directed verdict -- challenge to sufficiency of evidence --
     factors on review. -- On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is
     treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; the
     appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable
     to the State and considers only that evidence which supports
     the verdict; evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is
     sufficient to support a conviction if it is forceful enough to
     compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the
     other; the appellate court does not, however, weigh the
     evidence presented at trial, as this is a matter for the
     factfinder; nor will the court weigh the credibility of
     witnesses.

5.   Criminal law -- rape -- single crime rather than continuing offense. --
     Rape is not defined as a continuing offense; rather, it is a
     single crime that may be committed by either engaging in
     sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another
     person who is less than fourteen years of age; where the
     prosecutrix testifies as to multiple acts of rape of a
     different nature, separated in point of time, there is no
     continuing offense because a separate impulse is necessary for
     the commission of each offense.

6.   Criminal law -- rape -- uncorroborated testimony of victim will support
     conviction. -- The uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim,
     whether adult or child, is sufficient to support a conviction.

7.   Criminal law -- sexual abuse -- victim's testimony need not be
     corroborated. -- The victim's testimony need not be corroborated
     to demonstrate sufficient evidence of first-degree sexual
     abuse.

8.   Jury -- duty to resolve inconsistencies in testimony. --
     Inconsistencies in the testimony of victims are matters of
     credibility for the jury to resolve.

9.   Criminal law -- sexual abuse -- unnecessary for State to prove motive of
     sexual gratification. -- In cases of sexual abuse, it may be
     assumed that the defendant had sexual contact with the victim
     for the purpose of sexual gratification, and it is not
     necessary for the State to directly prove that he was so
     motivated.

10.  Criminal law -- sexual offenses -- State need not prove when and where
     each act occurred -- time not essential element. -- It is not
     necessary for the State to prove specifically when and where
     each act of rape or sexual contact occurred, as time is not an
     essential element of the crimes; it is rare that youthful
     victims of sexual abuse can provide exactness as to the time
     an offense occurred, and any discrepancies in the testimony
     concerning the date of the offense are for the jury to
     resolve.

11.  Criminal law -- attempted rape -- necessary proof. -- To prove a charge
     of attempted rape, it must be shown that the defendant's
     actions constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct
     intended to culminate in the commission of rape.

12.  Criminal law -- sexual abuse -- evidence sufficient to sustain convictions
     on two counts. -- The testimony of two of the victims was more
     than sufficient to prove that appellant engaged in an act of
     sexual gratification with the girls, who were both under the
     age of fourteen, involving the direct touching of his penis;
     the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions on two
     counts of first-degree sexual abuse.

13.  Criminal law -- rape -- evidence sufficient to sustain convictions on two
     counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. -- The children's
     testimony sufficiently established appellant's acts of deviate
     sexual activity against each child and the act of attempted
     penetration of one girl's vagina; the evidence was sufficient
     to sustain the convictions on two counts of rape on a specific
     date and one count of attempted rape.

14.  Criminal law -- rape -- evidence sufficient to sustain convictions on four
     counts of rape. -- The testimony of two of the victims was more
     than sufficient to sustain the convictions on four counts of
     rape involving deviate sexual activity against both children.

15.  New trial -- motion deemed denied if not resolved by trial court within
     thirty days. -- Where a posttrial motion, such as a motion for
     new trial, is not resolved by the trial court within thirty
     days from the date of its filing, it is deemed denied pursuant
     to Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. Rule 2. 

16.  New trial -- notice of appeal of denial untimely -- that part of appeal
     dismissed. -- Where appellant's motion for new trial was deemed
     denied as of November 3, 1996, and where he had thirty days
     within which to file a notice of appeal from that denial,
     which expired on December 3, 1996, it was of no benefit to him
     that the trial court belatedly denied the motion for new trial
     on February 24, 1997, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction
     to do so; because appellant did not file his notice of appeal
     of the order denying the motion for new trial until February
     26, 1997, the supreme court dismissed that part of the appeal.

     Appeal from Boone Circuit Court; Robert McCorkindale II,
Judge; affirmed.
     Buford Gardner, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant George T. Rains appeals the judgment of conviction
of the Boone County Circuit Court for six counts of rape, one count
of attempted rape, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. 
The trial court sentenced Appellant as a habitual offender to a
term of life imprisonment on each count of rape, sixty years'
imprisonment on the count of attempted rape, and two terms of
thirty years' imprisonment on each count of first-degree sexual
abuse.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2). 
Appellant raises two points for reversal.  We find no error and
affirm. 
     Appellant's convictions stem from his having engaged in sexual
acts with three minor victims, namely his son J.P., his
stepdaughter S.D., and his niece D.C.  The sexual acts occurred
over a period of time from June 1993 through February 1996, during
which time J.P. was five to seven years old, S.D. was six to eight
years old, D.C. was eight to ten years old, and Appellant was
thirty-six to thirty-nine years old.  The information charged that
on or about February 3, 1996, Appellant committed two counts of
rape, one count each against J.P. and S.D.  Also on or about
February 3, 1996, the information charged Appellant with the
attempted rape of S.D.  The four remaining counts of rape, charged
in the information as having occurred sometime between June 1993
and February 1996, involved two counts against J.P. and two counts
against S.D.  Specifically, as to the two counts against J.P., the
information charged that Appellant had made J.P. place his
(Appellant's) penis in the child's mouth and that Appellant had
also placed his penis in J.P.'s anus.  As to the two remaining
counts of rape against S.D., the information reflected that
Appellant had made S.D. place his (Appellant's) penis in her mouth
and that Appellant had also placed his tongue inside S.D.'s vagina. 
Lastly, the information charged Appellant with two counts of first-
degree sexual abuse for having engaged in sexual contact with S.D.
and D.C. on a date sometime between June 1993 and February 1996.  
                 I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
     For his first point for reversal, Appellant argues that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.  He contends
that the children's testimony was vague and unclear and that his
convictions were based upon the jury's passion, rather than the
evidence.  The State argues that this point is procedurally barred
because the grounds raised in Appellant's first motion for directed
verdict differed from those raised in his motion at the close of
all the evidence.  It is the State's contention that because
Appellant did not argue the lack of evidence of sexual penetration
or deviate sexual activity in his first motion for directed
verdict, that argument is not preserved for appeal.  We disagree. 
     It is well settled that arguments not raised at trial will not
be addressed for the first time on appeal, and that parties cannot
change the grounds for an objection on appeal and are bound by the
scope and nature of their objections and arguments presented at
trial.  Evans v. State, 326 Ark. 279, 931 S.W.2d 136 (1996).  Where
the defendant's first motion for directed verdict was specific as
to the missing proof, but his motion made at the close of the
evidence was merely a general renewal of the first motion, his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was preserved for
appellate review.  Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689,