Title: Allen v. Walker County

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

199 So. 2d 854 (1967)
Nelson ALLEN
v.
WALKER COUNTY et al.
6 Div. 368.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 1, 1967.
*855 Bankhead, Petree & Savage, Jasper, for appellant.
Curtis, Maddox & MacLaurin, Selman & Beaird and Elliott, Elliott, O'Rear & Robinson, Jasper, for appellees.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Nelson Allen, as Probate Judge of Walker County, as a taxpayer of Walker County, and individually; James Dewey Odom, as Tax Assessor of Walker County, and as a taxpayer of Walker County, and individually; and Dewalt D. Russell, as a taxpayer of Walker County, filed a declaratory action to determine the constitutionality of Act No. 63, enacted as a local act by the legislature, and approved 23 April 1963. See 1963, Acts of Alabama, Vol. 1, p. 224.
It was contemplated by its sponsors that Act No. 63, supra, was processed in the legislature as a local act pursuant to Amendment CXXVII (127) of our Constitution, which amendment was approved by the electorate on 17 December 1957, and *856 proclaimed ratified on 27 December 1957. Said amendment is as follows:
"COURT COSTS AND FEES, ALLOWANCES, ETC., OF OFFICERS OF WALKER COUNTY.
In February and March 1963, notices that a bill would be introduced in the legislature was published for three consecutive weeks in the Mountain Eagle, a newspaper of general circulation in Walker County, said notices reading:
(Italics ours.)
Thereafter what is now Act No. 63, supra, was enacted by the legislature, and approved by the Governor, as aforesaid.
In the hearing below John Lynn, Comptroller of Walker County, testified that his office is essentially the same as the office formerly known as County Treasurer. As Comptroller, he maintains the funds of Walker County in twenty-six accounts, the general fund account being the largest.
Lynn further testified that the records of his office as Comptroller are but an extension of the records of the County Treasurer before the latter office was abolished, and that he had received from the Probate Judge during the period 17 January 1965 to 15 January 1966, funds in the amount of approximately $58,000, and had paid to the Probate Judge during this period from the general fund $23,799.49 for clerk hire, plus a payment of $11,900 as salary of the Probate Judge.
The payment for clerk hire included the salaries of the four regular clerks and the salaries of additional clerks serving during the rush season of six weeks in the fall.
Mr. Odom, the Tax Assessor, testified that during the years 1964 and 1965, his clerk salary expenses had been approximately $11,000 for each year.
Judge Allen testified that he was elected to his office after Act No. 63, supra, was passed; that he receives his salary check drawn by Mr. Lynn, the Comptroller, and pays the monies received by his office to the Comptroller.
The evidence further shows that after the proposed bill was advertised, Judge Allen and Mr. Odom had conferences with the Representatives and the Senator from Walker County. Mr. Odom informed the legislators that he could not operate the *858 Tax Assessor's office with one clerk, and requested $11,000 per annum for clerk hire for his office.
Judge Allen testified that he told the legislators he could not operate the Probate Office with four clerks as provided in the proposed bill as advertised; that he might operate the office with $22,000 provided for clerk hire, but $25,000 should be provided.
In 1964 Judge Allen was paid $21,437.00 for clerk hire.
There was introduced in evidence Act No. 388, passed and approved in 1957, which Act abolished the office of County Treasurer and established in lieu thereof the office of County Comptroller.
There was also introduced in evidence Amendment L of our Constitution, which was proclaimed ratified in 1944. This amendment, applicable to public officers in Walker County, provides in general that the legislature may place the Probate Judge, Tax Assessor, Sheriff, and other named county officers on a salary, with the fees collected by such officers to be paid into the treasury, the balance of said funds or savings to be used for old age pensions in Walker County.
After the hearing below, the court entered a decree upholding the constitutionality of Act No. 63. Judge Allen thereupon perfected an appeal from such decree and judgment. Citations of appeal were duly served upon the respondents in the proceedings below, and also upon James Dewey Odom, one of the complainants below. Odom has not joined in the appeal. The complainant, Dewalt D. Russell, was stricken as a party complainant during the progress of the hearing.
Under appropriate assignment of errors, appellant has argued the unconstitutionality of Act No. 63 in a number of aspects.
Appellant contends that Act No. 63 differs from the proposed Act as advertised, and therefore offends Section 106 of our Constitution.
First, counsel argues that the proposed Act provided that the Probate Judge should not be allowed more than four full time clerks, and the Tax Assessor should be allowed only one full time clerk, whereas Act No. 63, without specifying the number of clerks to be allowed these officials merely provides that the Probate Judge should be allowed an amount not to exceed $21,000 per annum, and the Tax Assessor $9,200 per annum for clerical help.
It is to be noted that the amounts allowed the Probate Judge and the Tax Assessor annually for clerical help are substantially the amounts expended by these officials in previous years for clerical help. Further, it is apparent that these stated amounts for clerical help were fixed in the bill after the officials had conferred with the Walker County legislators and protested respectively that the Probate Court could not efficiently operate with four clerks, nor the Tax Assessor's office with one clerk.
The notice of the bill began with the preamble that "* * * a bill substantially as follows will be introduced in the Legislature * * *" (Underlining ours.)
As stated in Christian v. State, 171 Ala. 52, 54 So. 1001:
An enlightening statement as to the compliance of a bill, as ultimately passed, with the terms of a bill as advertised, is set forth in First National Bank of Eutaw v. Smith, 217 Ala. 482, 117 So. 38, as follows:
It is our conclusion that the variance between the bill as advertised, and the bill as enacted, is not of sufficient substance as to affect the validity of Act No. 63.
Another contention of the appellant as set forth in his briefs is:
This argument overlooks the provision in the Act as advertised to the effect that the governing body of Walker County shall provide each officer with sufficient clerks, deputies, and assistants, etc. (Section 2 of Act No. 63 as advertised.)
Section 2 of Act No. 63 is to like effect, except that the salary to be paid the jail cook and the secretary for the sheriff's office are specified in Act No. 63. What we have written, supra, we consider applicable to this contention.
A more serious question is presented by appellant's argument as to the validity of the proviso found in Sections 4 of Act No. 63, and of the advertised bill, which reads:
It is appellant's contention that such proviso goes beyond the limitations to be found in Amendment 127. With this contention we are in accord. A reading of Amendment 127 shows that in the event the legislature sees fit to exercise the discretion vested in it to place the named officers of Walker County on a salary, then they must provide "that the costs, fees, * * * and allowances collected by such officers shall be paid into the county treasury from which their salaries and office expenses shall be paid."
Having placed the sheriff on a salary, the legislature could not, in the face of Amendment 127, permit him to retain the allowances and mileage expenses which it sought to do in the proviso.
However, the fact that this proviso may be constitutionally invalid does not necessitate declaring the remaining portions of Act No. 63 invalid, since the proviso is easily separable from the remaining portions of the Act.
The real and dominant purpose of Act No. 63 was to place certain county officials of Walker County on a salary, and to provide for the operation of such offices from the fees and allowances of such offices *860 which were to be paid into the general fund of the county. This is clear from the captions and contents of both the advertised bill and Act No. 63.
Section 6 found in both the Act as advertised and in Act No. 63, provides that the provisions of the Act are severable, and "If any part of the Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the part which remains."
The word "part" does not mean an entire section, or the entire Act, but a separable clause, sentence, or provision. Ex parte Pea River Power Co., 207 Ala. 6, 91 So. 920.
The effect of an invalid provision in an act, where such provision is separable from the remaining portions is stated in Springer v. State ex rel. Williams, 229 Ala. 339, 157 So. 219:
We recognize that a separability clause should be given effect, where possible, to save legislative enactment (Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, at p. 25, 18 So.2d 810), that is, if the invalid portion is not so intertwined with the remaining portions that such remaining portions are rendered meaningless by the extirpation, in which event it must be assumed that the legislature would not have passed the enactment thus rendered meaningless. Ward v. State ex rel. Lea, 224 Ala. 242, 139 So. 416.
We also note that Section 34, Title 11, Code of Alabama 1940, pertaining to fees allowed sheriffs, contains a concluding provision that:
Again, in those sections of our Code relating to the feeding of prisoners in jail (Title 45, Secs. 142 et seq.), we find Section 146 reading:
In view of the general law of this state as evidenced by these above code sections, it would appear that in addition to being beyond the limits of Amendment 127, supra, the proviso now being considered would be violative of Section 104 of our Constitution, which is to the effect *861 that the legislature shall not pass a special, private, or local law:
We hold that that portion of Section 4 of Act No. 63, supra, attempting to permit the retention by the sheriff of the allowances therein specified, is constitutionally invalid. We further hold, however, that such portion of Act No. 63 is separable and that the invalidity of such proviso does not affect the validity of the remaining portions of Act No. 63.
The decree of the lower court upholding the validity of Act No. 63 is due to be affirmed except in that aspect relating to the proviso found in Section 4 of Act No. 63, which we have discussed above. The judgment is therefore remanded to the lower court for modification of the decree to this extent. Otherwise the decree is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.