Title: Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George's County Council

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

The Town of Upper Marlboro v. The Prince George’s County Council, No. 55 September 
2021 Term.  Opinion by Hotten, J.  
 
LAND USE – JUDICIAL REVIEW – FINAL AGENCY ACTIONS   
 
 
Generally, an agency action is appealable only if it is final.  An agency action is final when 
it decides all questions of law and fact and leaves nothing further for the agency to decide.  
Willis v. Montgomery Cty., 415 Md. 523, 534‒35, 3 A.3d 448, 455–56 (2010).  Prince 
George’s County Council (“the Council”) passed a resolution, CR-72-2019, to consider 
whether to amend the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan by 
removing the historic designation of two schoolhouses in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.  
Following a public hearing, the Council passed a second resolution, CR-98-2019, that 
accordingly amended the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan.  
The Court of Appeals held that CR-72-2019 was not a final agency action because it merely 
initiated the process for determining whether to remove the historic designation of the two 
schoolhouses, leaving the final decision to be determined by a subsequent resolution and 
subject to the input and comment from the public. 
 
LAND USE – MINOR AMENDMENTS TO AN APPROVED ZONING PLAN – 
SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
 
The standard of review for an agency action, such as the passage of a resolution by the 
Council, depends on whether the agency acted in a legislative or quasi-judicial capacity.  
As a threshold issue, the Court determined that the Council acted in a legislative capacity 
in the passage of both CR-72-2019 and CR-98-2019 because the Council acted in its 
discretion and on public policy grounds.   
 
Judicial review of legislative actions is generally “limited to assessing whether the agency 
was acting within its legal boundaries[.] . . .”  Bucktail, LLC v. Cty. Council of Talbot Cty., 
352 Md. 530, 543, 723 A.2d 440, 446 (1999) (citation omitted).  Resolutions by the Council 
that affect land use and zoning must comply with the procedural requirements pursuant to 
Prince George’s County Code (“PGCC”) § 27-642.  An initiating resolution, such as CR-
72-2019, “shall set forth the purpose and scope of the proposed amendment[.] . . .”  PGCC 
§ 27-642(d).  The Court held that the Council acted within the legal boundaries of PGCC 
§ 27-642 by specifying that the scope and purpose of CR-72-2019 was limited to the 
“public planning objective” of redesignating the historical status of two schoolhouses.  The 
resolution did not exceed the legal boundaries of the statute by not providing further detail 
on the future uses of the two schoolhouses. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAL 19-40094 
Argued: May 10, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 55 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
__________________________________ 
 
THE TOWN OF UPPER MARLBORO  
 
v. 
THE PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 
COUNCIL 
__________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Eaves, 
Adkins, Sally D.,  
 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed:  August 1,  2022
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
2022-08-01 
13:21-04:00
 
Respondent, Prince George’s County Council (the “Council” or “District 
Council”),1 sought to remove two historic schoolhouses in Upper Marlboro, Maryland from 
the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan.  Pursuant to the 
procedures outlined in the Prince George’s County Code, on July 23, 2019, the Council 
passed an initiating resolution, CR-72-2019.  This resolution directed the Prince George’s 
County Planning Board of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission 
(the “Planning Board”) to initiate the process for considering whether to adopt a minor 
amendment that would remove the two schoolhouses from the County’s list of historically 
protected sites (the “minor amendment”).  Pursuant to the resolution, a joint public hearing 
was held on the proposed minor amendment, during which representatives of the Town of 
Upper Marlboro (the “Town”), Petitioner, argued against its adoption.  The Town, 
however, did not seek judicial review of CR-72-2019 itself.   
The Council ultimately adopted the minor amendment through a subsequent 
resolution, CR-98-2019, on November 19, 2019.  Within thirty days, the Town filed a 
petition for judicial review of CR-98-2019 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  
The Town asserted that CR-72-2019 did not properly set forth the purpose and scope of 
the proposed minor amendment as statutorily required.  Therefore, according to the Town, 
the adoption of the minor amendment in CR-98-2019 was arbitrary and capricious.  The 
 
1 “In situations involving zoning actions entirely within Prince George’s County, 
the County Council of Prince George’s County sits as the District Council.”  Grant v. Cty. 
Council of Prince George’s Cty., 465 Md. 496, 503, 214 A.3d 1098, 1102 (2019) (citing 
Md. Code Ann., Land Use (“Land Use”) § 22-101(b)). 
 
2 
 
circuit court ruled against the Town, finding that the adoption of CR-72-2019 and CR-98-
2019 was not arbitrary and capricious, and was supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.   
The Town subsequently appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed 
the circuit court on different grounds.  The intermediate appellate court determined that 
CR-72-2019 was an independently reviewable final agency action because it was an 
“administratively distinct” action by the Council.  Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince 
George’s Cty. Council, No. 0801, Sept. Term, 2020, 2021 WL 4169198, at *4 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. Sept. 14, 2021).  The court found that the Town forfeited its right to directly 
challenge CR-72-2019 because the Town failed to directly appeal within thirty days of the 
passage of the resolution.  The court declined to reach the merits of whether CR-98-2019 
was procedurally deficient because the challenge to CR-98-2019 was “based exclusively 
on alleged deficiencies with CR-72-2019.”  Id.  The court concluded that the Town cannot 
circumvent the thirty-day appeal window by bringing “an appeal of CR-72-2019 through 
CR-98-2019.”  Id. 
The Town filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted.  Town of Upper 
Marlboro v. Prince George’s Cty. Council, 477 Md. 149, 266 A.3d 990 (2022).  It presents 
the following questions for our review: 
I. Was CR-72-2019 a final appealable decision that had to be challenged 
within [thirty] days of finality as required by § 22-407 of the Land Use 
Article?  
 
 
3 
 
II. Was the Town’s appeal of CR[-]98-2019 [in]sufficient to challenge the 
deficiencies in CR-72-2019?[2]  
 
III. Was the decision of the County Council sitting as the District Council 
deficient in setting forth the purpose and scope of the minor amendment 
in the initiating resolution (CR-72-[2019]) as required by Section 27-642 
of the Prince George’s County Code? 
 
As explained in detail below, we answer each question in the negative.  The decision of the 
Court of Special Appeals is therefore affirmed on alternative grounds.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Relevant Facts 
 
Old Marlboro Primary School and Old Marlboro High School are properties located 
in Upper Marlboro, Maryland and owned by Prince George’s County.3  Until the contested 
actions of the Council, the two schoolhouses were listed on the 2010 Prince George’s 
County Historic Sites and Districts Plan and protected by the County’s historic 
preservation ordinances.  See Prince George’s County Code (“PGCC”) § 29-101, et seq.  
Old Marlboro Primary School is a one-story wood-frame Craftsman-style building 
 
2 For clarity in our response, we have slightly rephrased the second question 
presented, which originally asked: “Was the Town’s appeal of CR[-]98-2019 sufficient to 
challenge the deficiencies in CR-72-2019?” 
 
3 The two schoolhouses are adjacent to the Dr. William & Sarah Beanes Cemetery, 
another site listed on the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan.  
During the War of 1812, the British army captured Dr. William Beanes, a prominent 
physician and planter in Prince George’s County.  Francis Scott Key was sent to Baltimore 
to negotiate the release of Dr. Beanes.  Mr. Key was successful, but was detained during 
the British navy’s bombardment of Fort McHenry in Baltimore.  Inspired by the sight of 
the American flag still flying above Fort McHenry “by the dawn’s early light,” Mr. Key 
wrote a poem that became “The Star-Spangled Banner.” 
 
4 
 
constructed in 1896 as a replacement building for an earlier public school built for girls in 
1867.  The building was converted into a residence in 1921.  Old Marlboro High School 
was constructed in two phases in 1921 and 1934 and built in the Classical Revival-style.  
The two schoolhouses have been vacant since the early 2000s, and have deteriorated due 
to disuse and lack of maintenance since their historic designation in 2010. 
 
On July 23, 2019, the Council passed CR-72-2019, “[f]or the purpose of directing 
the [Planning Board] to initiate a minor amendment to the [2010] Historic Sites and 
Districts Plan[.]”  The resolution stated: 
WHEREAS, the District Council finds that there is a need to reevaluate the 
designation of Historic Sites 79-019-51 and 79-019-52 [i.e., Old Marlboro 
Primary School and Old Marlboro High School] for removal from the [2010] 
Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan; and  
 
WHEREAS, Section 27-642 of the Zoning Ordinance [of the Prince 
George’s County Code] establishes a process whereby the District Council 
may initiate certain minor amendments to an approved functional master 
plan; and  
 
WHEREAS, the Council finds that the proposed minor amendment is plainly 
authorized pursuant to Section 27-642, because the proposed amendment: (1) 
is limited to specific issues regarding public planning objectives; and (2) does 
not constitute an amendment which would require major transportation 
analysis and/or modeling, revised water and sewer classifications, and 
Adequate Public Facilities analysis; and  
 
WHEREAS, upon approval of this Resolution and, in accordance with 
applicable law, the proposed minor amendment to the [2010] Prince 
George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan shall be subject to all 
notice and public hearing requirements to seek public comment on the minor 
amendment.   
 
The resolution then stated that the Planning Board “is hereby directed to initiate a minor 
amendment to the [2010] Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan . . . to 
 
5 
 
remove the Old Marlboro Primary School . . . and the Old Marlboro High School[.]”  The 
resolution set a joint public hearing on the proposed minor amendment for September 17, 
2019. 
 
During the joint public hearing, the Town submitted testimony, a citizen’s petition, 
and a Town Resolution opposing the minor amendment.  Following the hearing, the 
Council and the Planning Board conducted additional public work-sessions on the 
testimony from the joint public hearing and recommendations regarding the minor 
amendment.   
On November 19, 2019, the Council passed CR-98-2019, which officially adopted 
the minor amendment removing Old Marlboro Primary School and Old Marlboro High 
School from the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan: 
A RESOLUTION concerning [t]he 2010 Historic Sites and Districts Plan for 
Prince George’s County – Minor Amendment . . .  
 
WHEREAS, on July 23, 2019, the District Council adopted CR-72-2019 for 
the purpose of initiating a minor amendment process to amend the [2010] 
Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan to remove the Old 
Marlboro Primary School (Historic Site 79-019-51) and the Old Marlboro 
High School (Historic Site 79-019-52) from the Inventory of Historic 
Resources[.] . . .   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the County Council of Prince 
George’s County, Maryland, . . . that in accordance with Sections 27-642 of 
the Zoning Ordinance, the following Minor Amendment to the [2010] Prince 
George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan, is hereby approved and 
incorporated as set forth fully within this Resolution[.] . . . 
 
Amend the [2010] Prince George’s County Historic Sites and District[s] 
Plan to remove the Old Marlboro Primary School, Historic Site 79-019-51, 
and the Old Marlboro High School, Historic Site 79-019-52, as described in 
Attachment A, and incorporated fully herein. 
 
6 
 
 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that any proposal for redevelopment of the 
subject property seek to retain historic building fabric from the two school 
buildings to the extent practicable and to commemorate the history of the 
property through interpretive signage or other visual elements; and 
 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Dr. William and Sarah Beanes 
Cemetery (Historic Site 79-019-22) be preserved in place and protected from 
any redevelopment of the subject property, including through delineation of 
an appropriate environmental setting[.] . . . 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Legal Proceedings 
A. Circuit Court Proceeding 
On December 17, 2019, the Town filed a petition for judicial review of CR-98-2019 
in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  The Town argued that the initiating 
resolution, CR-72-2019, failed to comply with the dictates of the Prince George’s County 
Code in setting forth the purpose and scope of the proposed minor amendment, and as a 
result, the Council’s decision to adopt the minor amendment in CR-98-2019 was arbitrary 
and capricious.  The Town argued that CR-72-2019, as an initiating resolution, was not a 
final agency decision and not directly judicially reviewable; therefore, it properly 
challenged CR-98-2019 by alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019.  The Council responded 
that CR-72-2019 was a judicially reviewable final agency decision, and because the Town 
challenged the adoption of the minor amendment solely based on alleged deficiencies in 
CR-72-2019, the Town waived its challenge by failing to directly appeal CR-72-2019 
within thirty days.  The Council also argued that it complied with the procedural 
requirements pursuant to the Prince George’s County Code when setting forth the purpose 
 
7 
 
and scope of the minor amendment, and its decision was supported by substantial evidence 
in the record and was not arbitrary and capricious. 
 
The circuit court did not directly address whether CR-72-2019 was a final agency 
action that should have been directly challenged by the Town, but ruled in favor of the 
Council, finding that the decision to adopt the minor amendment was not arbitrary and 
capricious, but was supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Specifically, the 
circuit court stated: 
An administrative decision is deemed arbitrary and capricious if it is made 
impulsively, at random, or according to individual preferences rather than 
motivated by relevance or applicable set of norms.  Thus, as long as the 
decision of the District Council was reasonably or rationally motivated, this 
Court must affirm its decision, as such decisions cannot be deemed arbitrary 
or capricious.  
 
The adoption of County Resolution 72-2019, the initiating resolution, and 
CR-98-2019, the resolution approving the minor amendment, was not 
impulsive, random, or based on an individual preference, and such adoptions 
were conducted under lawful and statutory authority.  They were subject to 
public notice and a deliberative process that is required under the law, further 
noting that substantial evidence test remains the ultimate consideration on 
judicial review and does not involve reweighing of the evidence that went 
before the Council.  This Council finds the District Court’s -- excuse me, the 
District Council decision was substandard by -- supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
 
*** 
 
For all the reasons I have outlined on the record, this Court is bound by the 
determination of the Prince George’s County Council, having found that it 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or based on erroneous conclusion of law, and 
it’s [sic] decision is hereby affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
B. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
The Town appealed the circuit court’s ruling to the Court of Special Appeals, which 
affirmed the circuit court on different grounds in an unreported opinion.  Town of Upper 
Marlboro, 2021 WL 4169198, at *5.  The intermediate appellate court held that the Town 
forfeited its right to appeal any procedural deficiencies in CR-72-2019 when it failed to 
bring an action within thirty days of its passage pursuant to Maryland Code, Land Use 
Article (“Land Use”) § 22-407(a)(2).  Id. at *3–4.  The court reasoned, relying on Colao v. 
County Council of Prince George’s County, 109 Md. App. 431, 436, 675 A.2d 148, 150 
(1996), aff’d, 346 Md. 342, 697 A.2d 96 (1997), that although CR-72-2019 and CR-98-
2019 were related and concerned the same properties, they were nonetheless 
“administratively distinct actions of the Council[]” and CR-72-2019 should have been 
independently appealed as a final agency action.  Town of Upper Marlboro, 2021 WL 
4169198, at *4.  The court held that “[t]he Town cannot circumvent the 30-day appeal 
requirement by bringing an appeal of CR-72-2019 through CR-98-2019.”  Id.  
Because the Court of Special Appeals found that the Town had waived its arguments 
alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019, it declined to reach the merits of whether that 
resolution adequately set forth the purpose and scope of the minor amendment.  Id. at *5.  
The court concluded that because “[t]he Town did not make any argument that CR-98-
2019 was arbitrary and capricious independent of the alleged defects in CR-72-2019,” the 
court “need not rule on whether the Council’s decision to adopt CR-98-2019 was supported 
by substantial evidence.”  Id. 
 
9 
 
DISCUSSION 
I.  
Contentions of the Parties 
A. Finality of an Agency Action 
The Town argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that CR-
72-2019 was a judicially challengeable final agency action.  The Town contends that it 
could not have appealed the passage of CR-72-2019 because the resolution was a non-final 
action that “contained no binding or regulatory effect,” and therefore, the Town could not 
establish any “aggrievement” to give the Town standing to challenge the resolution under 
Land Use § 22-407(a)(1).  The Town argues that the defect in the initiating resolution, CR-
72-2019, was a defect in the procedure for approval of CR-98-2019 and that it properly 
challenged the passage of CR-98-2019 by alleging a defect in CR-72-2019. 
The Council responds that the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that 
CR-72-2019 was a final agency action subject to judicial review, and that the Town waived 
its arguments based on CR-72-2019’s alleged deficiencies by not bringing its challenge 
within thirty days of the resolution’s adoption.  The Council asserts that the Town can only 
challenge whether CR-98-2019 was adopted within the boundaries of its statutory 
authority. 
B. Purpose and Scope of an Agency Action 
The Town argues that the Council did not comply with the procedure set forth in 
PGCC § 27-642 for adopting minor amendments.  Specifically, it contends that CR-72-
 
10 
 
2019 did not adequately set forth the purpose and scope of the proposed minor amendment 
pursuant to PGCC § 27-642(d).  The Town asserts that PGCC § 27-642(b) and (c) set forth 
permissible “purpose[s]” and “scope[s]” for minor amendments that must be included in 
an initiating resolution. The Town argues that CR-72-2019 did not adequately state or 
apply any facts that would satisfy those provisions. 
The Council responds that this Court need not reach the issue of purpose and scope 
because the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the Town waived this 
argument by failing to appeal CR-72-2019 within thirty days of its passage.  However, 
should this Court reach the issue, the Council argues that CR-72-2019 set forth the purpose 
and scope of the minor amendment pursuant to PGCC § 27-642(d).  Contrary to the 
position of the Town, the Council asserts that PGCC § 27-642(b) does not create a 
mandatory list of permissible purposes of minor amendments that must be expressly 
included in a resolution.  Even if the statute required express purpose and scope language, 
the Council argues that the purpose provided in CR-72-2019, “the need to re-evaluate and 
remove the historic designation” of the two schools, satisfied any statutory requirement.  
(Emphasis omitted). 
The Council likewise asserts that the scope of CR-72-2019 was limited as required 
by PGCC § 27-642(c) to “specific issues regarding public planning objectives, including 
public comment on the proposed minor amendment.”  (Emphasis omitted).  The Council 
 
11 
 
argues that the future use of the property is not necessary to discern the purpose and scope 
of the minor amendment. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
A. Waiver and Finality of an Agency Action 
The determination of whether an argument has been waived under a relevant 
statutory scheme, or whether a particular agency action is final for the purpose of judicial 
review, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  See Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Howard Cty., 381 Md. 646, 658, 851 A.2d 576, 583 (2004) (determining whether an 
administrative decision was final pursuant to a statute); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 
38, 48, 803 A.2d 482, 487 (2002) (“The viability of a legal cause of action is clearly a 
question of law which, as with all questions of law, this Court shall review de novo.”); 
Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc., 446 Md. 543, 551, 132 A.3d 866, 870–71 (2016) 
(“As with all questions of law, we review this matter de novo.”) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
367 Md. 418, 424, 788 A.2d 628, 631 (2002)).  
B. Purpose and Scope of an Agency Action 
The standard of review for an action of an agency such as the District Council 
depends on whether it is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature.  See Maryland Overpak 
Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 33, 909 A.2d 235, 245 (2006).  Judicial 
review of agency actions deemed to be legislative are generally “limited to assessing 
whether the agency was acting within its legal boundaries[.] . . .”  Bucktail, LLC v. Cty. 
 
12 
 
Council of Talbot Cty., 352 Md. 530, 543, 723 A.2d 440, 446 (1999) (quoting Dep’t of Nat. 
Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224, 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975)).   
By contrast, when the District Council acts in its quasi-judicial capacity, “the courts 
review the appealed conclusions by determining whether the contested decision was 
rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner.”  Id., 723 
A.2d at 446 (1999) (quoting Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. at 224, 334 A.2d 
at 523).  Quasi-judicial decisions are generally reviewed under the “substantial evidence 
test” which requires that the “determination of the zoning authority [] be upheld ‘if 
reasoning minds could reasonably reach the conclusion from facts in the record.’”  Cty. 
Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 510, 120 A.3d 677, 
688–89 (2015) (quoting Cremins v. Cty. Comm’rs of Washington Cty., 164 Md. App. 426, 
438, 883 A.2d 966, 973 (2005)).  
III. 
Analysis 
A. The Town’s Arguments Have Not Been Waived Because CR 72-2019 Was Not 
A Final Appealable Decision. 
Section 22-407(a) of the Land Use Article governs the procedure for judicial review 
of the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, pursuant to its 
zoning authority.  See Grant v. Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty., 465 Md. 496, 503, 
214 A.3d 1098,1102 (2019) (citing Land Use § 22-101(b)).  The statute in pertinent part 
provides: 
 
13 
 
(1) Judicial review of any final decision of the district council, including an 
individual map amendment or a sectional map amendment, may be 
requested by any person or entity that is aggrieved by the decision of the 
district council and is: 
 
(i) 
a municipal corporation, governed special taxing district, or 
person in the county; 
 
(ii) 
a civic or homeowners association representing property 
owners affected by the final decision; 
 
(iii) 
the owner of the property that is the subject of the decision; or 
 
(iv) 
the applicant. 
 
(2) A petition for judicial review under this subsection shall be filed in the 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County within 30 days after service of 
the final decision by the district council. 
 
*** 
 
Land Use § 22-407(a) (emphasis added).  At issue is whether CR-72-2019 constitutes a 
“final decision” within the meaning of Land Use § 22-407(a), so that a petition for judicial 
review should have been filed within thirty days after service of the decision by the 
Council.  
Land Use § 22-407(a) mandates that only final decisions of the District Council are 
judicially appealable.  The statute comports with the general rule of Maryland 
administrative law that “an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie 
only if the administrative order is final.”  Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation Admin., 348 
Md. 389, 407, 704 A.2d 433, 442 (1998); see also Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church, 375 
Md. 59, 74–75, 825 A.2d 388, 397 (2003) (“[I]n the absence of a statutory provision 
expressly authorizing judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions, and in the 
 
14 
 
absence of an interlocutory administrative decision with immediate legal consequences 
causing irreparable harm, the parties to the controversy must ordinarily await a final 
administrative decision before resorting to the courts[.]”) (cleaned up).   
This Court has clarified that “not every administrative order which determines rights 
and liabilities, or from which legal consequences flow, is final and thus subject to judicial 
review.”  Holiday Spas v. Montgomery Cty. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 315 Md. 390, 396, 554 
A.2d 1197, 1200 (1989).  Instead, “[t]o be ‘final,’ the order or decision must dispose of the 
case by deciding all question[s] of law and fact and leave nothing further for the 
administrative body to decide.”  Willis v. Montgomery Cty., 415 Md. 523, 535, 3 A.3d 448, 
455–56 (2010).  In simple terms, this Court has explained “[o]rdinarily an agency order is 
not final when it is contemplated that there is more for the agency to do.”  Kim v. 
Comptroller of Treasury, 350 Md. 527, 534, 714 A.2d 176, 179 (1998) (emphasis added).  
 
The purpose of the doctrine of finality relates to both judicial efficiency and 
authority.  In Driggs Corp., we explained: 
The salutary purpose of the finality requirement is to avoid piecemeal actions 
in the circuit court seeking fragmented advisory opinions with respect to 
partial or intermediate agency decisions.  Not only would a contrary rule 
create the real prospect of unnecessary litigation, as a party choosing to seek 
review of an unfavorable interlocutory order might well, if the party waited 
to the end, be satisfied with the final administrative decision, but the 
wholesale exercise of judicial authority over intermediate and partial 
decisions could raise serious separation of powers concerns. 
 
348 Md. at 407, 704 A.2d at 443; see also Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian’s Four 
Seasons at Kent Island, LLC, 443 Md. 199, 216, 115 A.3d 634, 644 (2015) (“The doctrines 
 
15 
 
of exhaustion and finality ‘share the common goal of preventing potentially unnecessary 
and premature disruption by the courts of the activities of administrative agencies.’”).4 
 
We have consistently applied the rule of finality to land use decisions of local 
governments.  See, e.g., Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 Md. 474, 485, 
27 A.3d 143, 149 (2011); K. Hovnanian, 443 Md. at 215, 115 A.3d at 643‒44; Smith v. 
 
4 In addition to arguing that CR-72-2019 did not meet the requirements of finality, 
the Town argued in its brief that CR-72-2019 was not judicially appealable based on the 
administrative law doctrine of exhaustion.  This argument was addressed and rejected by 
the Court of Special Appeals.  Town of Upper Marlboro, 2021 WL 4169198, at *4 (“The 
Town does not explain, however, what remedies it was required to pursue and exhaust 
before seeking judicial review of CR-72-2019.”).  The doctrine of exhaustion is “related to 
and somewhat overlaps the finality principle[]” and requires that “administrative remedies 
must be exhausted before bringing an action in court.”  Dorsey, 375 Md. at 76, 825 A.2d 
at 397.  We have explained that “[t]he doctrines of exhaustion and finality are ‘overlapping’ 
principles in that, ‘[i]f there is no final administrative decision in a case before an 
administrative agency, there is ordinarily no exhaustion of the administrative remedy.’”  K. 
Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC, 443 Md. at 216, 115 A.3d at 644 (quoting 
Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 Md. 474, 485, 27 A.3d 143, 149 
(2011)); Smith v. Cty. Comm’rs of Kent Cty., 418 Md. 692, 712 n.20, 18 A.3d 16, 28 n.20 
(2011) (“It may be said fairly that when a litigant fails to exhaust his or her administrative 
remedies, he or she seeks judicial review of an agency action that is not ‘final.’”). 
 
Adopting the reasoning of K. Hovanian, we conclude that the Town’s arguments of 
finality and exhaustion overlap.  The Town had not exhausted all of its administrative 
remedies following the passage of CR-72-2019 because there was an opportunity to oppose 
publicly the enactment of the minor amendment.  The opportunity to petition the Council 
to oppose enactment of the minor amendment provides an identical rationale for why CR-
72-2019 was not final: the Council could have been swayed by public opposition from the 
Town, and other interested parties, and could have decided to table the minor amendment.  
Otherwise, “courts would be performing the function that the legislature specified be done 
by the administrative agency[, and] courts might be called on to decide issues that would 
never arise if the prescribed administrative remedies were followed[.]”  Prince George’s 
Cty. v. Ray’s Used Cars, 398 Md. 632, 650, 922 A.2d 495, 505 (2007) (quoting Gingell v. 
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cty., 249 Md. 374, 377, 239 A.3d 903, 905 
(1968)); see also infra Part III.B. 
 
16 
 
Cty. Comm’rs of Kent Cty., 418 Md. 692, 712, 18 A.3d 16, 28 (2011); Dorsey, 375 Md. at 
75, 825 A.2d at 396; Prince George’s Cty. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 295, 418 A.2d 1155, 
1166 (1980); see also American Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt, 442 F.Supp. 3d 127, 
150 (2020) (observing that the rule of finality generally applies to land use plans). 
Applying the finality standard expressed above, we hold that CR-72-2019 was not 
a final agency action subject to judicial review.  CR-72-2019 was passed as an initiating 
resolution5 pursuant to PGCC § 27-642(a), which provides: 
Minor amendments of approved master, sector, functional plans and/or 
associated Development District Overlay Zones may be initiated by 
Resolution of the District Council, or by the Planning Board upon approval 
by Resolution of the District Council.  At the time of initiation, a joint public 
hearing date shall be scheduled to occur within 60 days, in accordance with 
the notice requirements set forth in Sections 27-644 (b)(2)(A) through 
Section 27-644 (b)(2)(D) of this Subtitle. 
 
The title of CR-72-2019 as an initiating resolution provides the first indication that there 
was more work for the Council to do before enacting the minor amendment.  In 
Renaissance Centro, we determined that a “straw vote” was not a final administrative 
decision “in light of the Board’s planned action to convene later and re-vote.”  421 Md. at 
490‒91, 27 A.3d at 152‒53.  Similar to a “straw vote,” which by definition is preliminary 
and presages a subsequent final vote,6 an “initiating” resolution represents the start of a 
 
5 Section 1017(c) of the Prince George’s County Charter defines “resolution” as “a 
measure adopted by the Council having the force and effect of law but of a temporary or 
administrative character.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
6 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), a “straw poll”—another 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
 
17 
 
process and implies subsequent action.  See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177‒78, 117 
S. Ct. 1154, 1168 (1997) (“for agency action to be ‘final’ . . . the action must mark the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision[-]making process[.]”) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added).  The plain text of PGCC § 27-642(a) supports this interpretation by 
requiring action by the Council after the passage of the initiating resolution: “Minor 
amendments . . . may be initiated by Resolution of the District Council[.] . . .  At the time 
of initiation, a joint public hearing date shall be scheduled to occur within 60 days[.] . . .”  
(Emphasis added). 
The substance of CR-72-2019 made no determination of whether to adopt the minor 
amendment and expressly left for the Council “more . . . to do[,]” Kim, 350 Md. at 534, 
714 A.2d at 179 (citation omitted).  In Kim, this Court found that a Tax Court ruling from 
the bench was not “final” because “more remained for the Tax Court to do, such as filing 
a written order and mailing it to the parties.”  Id., 714 A.2d at 179.  Similar to Kim, the 
Council had at least two remaining steps to complete before the minor amendment could 
become final: hosting a joint public hearing on the minor amendment within sixty days of 
the initiating resolution and voting to approve, approve with revisions, or disapprove the 
proposed minor amendment.  PGCC § 27-642(a) & (f).   
 
(. . . continued) 
name for a “straw vote”—is a “nonbinding vote, taken as a way of informally gauging 
support or opposition but usu. without a formal motion or debate; esp., an informal test of 
several people’s opinions to see what the general feeling about something is.” 
 
18 
 
The District Council and Planning Board took further action by holding additional 
public work-sessions on the testimony from the joint public hearing and recommendations 
regarding the minor amendment.  Rather than “leav[ing] nothing further for the 
administrative body to decide,” Willis, 415 Md. at 535, 3 A.3d at 455–56, regarding 
whether to adopt the minor amendment, CR-72-2019 initiated the process for deciding 
whether to adopt the minor amendment.  The decision to adopt the minor amendment was 
expressly left for subsequent council action, subject to community input and public 
response.  Considering the foregoing, our precedents on the doctrine of finality require a 
determination that CR-72-2019 was not a judicially reviewable final agency action.  
Our conclusion is bolstered when we consider CR-72-2019 in light of the purposes 
of the doctrine of finality to avoid unnecessary litigation and overreaching of the courts 
into the administrative process.  See Driggs Corp., 348 Md. at 407, 704 A.2d at 443.  As 
previously discussed, CR-72-2019 did not decide whether to adopt the minor amendment.  
The Council could have decided, after the joint public hearing and public work-sessions, 
not to adopt the minor amendment.  The Town presumably would have been satisfied with 
that decision and would not have sought judicial recourse.  Requiring the Town to appeal 
CR-72-2019 before the Town knew whether it would be satisfied with the ultimate decision 
of the Council risks unnecessary litigation.  Soley v. State Comm’n on Hum. Rel., 277 Md. 
521, 526, 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976) (“[T]o permit interruption for purposes of judicial 
intervention at various stages of the administrative process might well undermine the 
efficiency [of the administrative process, and] the courts might be called upon to decide 
 
19 
 
issues which perhaps would never arise [.] . . .”) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, 
permitting judicial review of an initiating resolution such as CR-72-2019 would require the 
courts to insert themselves into the administrative process before it has a chance to fully 
develop.  This “exercise of judicial authority over intermediate and partial decisions could 
raise serious separation of powers concerns.”  Driggs Corp., 348 Md. at 407, 704 A.2d at 
443. 
 
The holding of Colao, 109 Md. App. 431, 675 A.2d 148 (1996), does not mandate 
a different result.  In Colao, the petitioners sought to appeal the approval of two related 
zoning ordinances pertaining to two related parcels of land, but inadvertently left one of 
the two ordinances out of their appeal.  Id. at 440, 675 A.2d at 153.  The Court of Special 
Appeals determined that the petitioners’ challenge to one of the ordinances was not 
sufficient to challenge the related ordinance.  Id. at 449‒50, 675 A.2d at 157–58.  The 
intermediate appellate court explained that even though the ordinances concerned two 
related parcels, the “Council’s action approving [one ordinance] was ‘an order or action of 
an administrative agency’ that was administratively distinct from its action approving [the 
other ordinance].”  Id. at 450, 675 A.2d at 158.  The approval of the two ordinances in 
Colao were two administratively distinct final agency actions, involving two separate 
parcels of land.  Id. at 450–51, 675 A.2d at 157–58.   
 
The relationship between CR-72-2019 and CR-98-2019 is distinguishable from the 
relationship between the ordinances at issue in Colao.  Unlike the ordinances in Colao, 
CR-72-2019 and CR-98-2019 pertain to the same properties and address the same issue, 
 
20 
 
namely, whether those properties should lose their protected historic status.  As discussed 
in detail above, CR-72-2019 was an initiating resolution that by statute began a process 
culminating in the adoption of the minor amendment in CR-98-2019.  CR-72-2019 and 
CR-98-2019 were not “administratively distinct[,]” but two inextricably linked stages of a 
single administrative process.  Town of Upper Marlboro, 2021 WL 4169198, at *4.   
Assuming arguendo that CR-72-2019 and CR-98-2019 were administratively 
distinct actions, we would still hold that CR-72-2019 was not a final agency action subject 
to judicial review.  A determination that certain agency actions are administratively distinct 
does not mean, as a matter of law, that they are final for the purpose of review.  A “distinct” 
administrative decision must still resolve “all question[s] of law and fact and leave nothing 
further for the administrative body to decide.”  Willis, 415 Md. at 535, 3 A.3d at 455–56; 
see also Dorsey, 375 Md. at 75, 825 A.2d at 397 (noting that a decision is not final “simply 
[because it was made] by a Board or unit at the top of the administrative hierarchy”).   
CR-72-2019 was not a judicially reviewable final agency action.  Therefore, the 
Town was not required to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days of its passage 
to preserve its right to challenge the purpose and scope of CR-72-2019.   
B. CR-98-2019 Was a Final Agency Action Subject to Judicial Review and the 
Town Was Permitted to Challenge CR-98-2019 by Alleging Deficiencies in CR-
72-2019. 
 
Unlike CR-72-2019, however, CR-98-2019 was a judicially reviewable final agency 
action.  The parties do not argue otherwise.  CR-98-2019 adopted the minor amendment 
and left nothing more for the Council or Planning Board to decide regarding the matter.  
 
21 
 
See Willis, 415 Md. at 535, 3 A.3d at 455–56 (“To be ‘final,’ the order or decision must 
dispose of the case by deciding all question[s] of law and fact and leave nothing further for 
the administrative body to decide.”).  Unlike with the passage of CR-72-2019, when CR-
98-2019 was passed, the Town became certain of the Council’s decision regarding the 
historically protected status of the schools, and challenging CR-98-2019 would not have 
resulted in piecemeal or unnecessary litigation.  As CR-98-2019 was a judicially appealable 
final agency action by the Council, the Town correctly asserted its judicial challenge to the 
resolution’s passage within thirty days pursuant to Land Use Article § 22-407(a). 
 
Prince George’s County Code permitted the Town to challenge the passage of CR-
98-2019 by alleging procedural deficiencies in CR-72-2019.  PGCC § 27-642 outlines the 
process for adopting a minor amendment to an approved zoning plan:   
(a) Minor amendments of approved master, sector, functional plans and/or 
associated Development District Overlay Zones may be initiated by 
Resolution of the District Council, or by the Planning Board upon approval 
by Resolution of the District Council.  At the time of initiation, a joint public 
hearing date shall be scheduled to occur within 60 days, in accordance with 
the notice requirements set forth in Sections 27-644(b)(2)(A) through 
Section 27-644(b)(2)(D) of this Subtitle. 
 
(b) The minor amendment process may be utilized to:  
 
(1) advance the goals of an approved comprehensive plan, functional 
plan, or development district plan; or  
 
(2) safeguard the public safety health and welfare of citizens and 
residents within the plan area boundaries. 
 
(c) The scope of the minor amendment shall be limited to:  
 
(1) a geographic area which is not more than 50% of the underlying 
plan area, but not limited to a single property or property owner; 
 
22 
 
(2) limited to specific issues regarding public planning objectives; or 
 
(3) for the purpose of correcting errors in the text or maps in the 
applicable plan. 
 
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1) through (3), herein, the minor 
amendment process shall not be utilized for any amendment which 
would require major transportation analysis and/or modeling, revised 
water and sewer classifications, or any Adequate Public Facilities 
analysis. 
 
(d) The Resolution initiating a minor amendment shall set forth the purpose 
and scope of the proposed amendment, and shall state the date of the joint 
public hearing on the proposed amendment. 
 
(e) The Planning Board shall transmit a draft of the proposed amendment, a 
technical staff report analyzing the amendment, and the Planning Board’s 
recommendation on the Development District Overlay Zone amendment 
and/or the Planning Board’s adoption of the plan amendment within 30 days 
of the date of the joint public hearing. 
 
(f) Within 90 days of receipt of the Planning Board’s recommendation, the 
District Council shall approve, approve with revisions, or disapprove the 
proposed minor amendment. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
PGCC § 27-642 establishes an administrative process for adopting a minor 
amendment.  The process begins with an initiating resolution, such as CR-72-2019.  PGCC 
§ 27-642(a).  Next, the public must be given an opportunity to comment on the Council’s 
proposed minor amendment in a public hearing.  PGCC § 27-642(a) & (d).  The proposed 
amendment is concurrently reviewed by the Planning Board and its technical staff.  PGCC 
§ 27-642(e).  Finally, the Council must determine whether to adopt the proposed minor 
amendment by passing an enacting resolution, such as CR-98-2019.  PGCC § 27-642(f). 
 
23 
 
 
CR-72-2019 and CR-98-2019 bookend the process for passing a minor amendment.  
The passage of CR-72-2019 was a necessary element of the statutorily mandated process 
that permitted the Council to adopt the minor amendment in CR-98-2019.  We conclude 
that the Town could challenge the adoption of the minor amendment in CR-98-2019 by 
alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019. 
Although we find that the Town’s challenge to CR-98-2019 was both timely and 
cognizable, for the reasons explained below, the Town does not prevail on the merits of its 
procedural deficiency claim because the District Council complied with the statutory 
requirements for minor amendments under the Prince George’s County Code. 
C. CR-72-2019 Was Not Procedurally Deficient Because the Resolution 
Adequately Provided the Purpose and Scope of the Minor Amendment 
Pursuant PGCC § 27-642. 
 
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the Council acted in a legislative 
or quasi-judicial capacity when enacting CR-72-2019.  If the Council acted in a legislative 
capacity, we limit our review as to whether the Council acted within its legal boundaries.  
Linchester, 274 Md. at 224, 334 A.2d at 523; Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections, 345 Md. 477, 490 n.12, 693 A.2d 757, 763 n.12 (1997) (“Legislative or quasi-
legislative decisions of local legislative bodies or administrative agencies are, of course, 
not subject to ordinary judicial review; instead, they are subject to very limited review by 
the courts.”).  Conversely, if the Council acted in a quasi-judicial capacity, we apply the 
substantial evidence test to determine whether a reasoning mind would reach the decision 
of the Council based on facts in the record.  Bucktail, LLC, 352 Md. at 552, 723 A.2d at 
 
24 
 
450.  The line separating a legislative and quasi-judicial action often proves elusive.  In 
Bucktail LLC, we explained the distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial actions 
as follows: 
The determination of whether a local zoning authority is acting in an 
adjudicative or legislative manner is dependent upon the nature of the 
particular act in which it is engaged.  This determination is not based on 
whether the zoning decision adversely affects an individual piece of property 
but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general grounds. 
 
The difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not easily drawn; 
. . . adjudicative facts are facts about the parties and their activities, 
businesses and properties.  They usually answer the questions of who did 
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent, while legislative 
facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which 
help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.  The 
difference, broadly speaking, involves whether the decision is to be made on 
individual or general grounds. 
 
352 Md. at 545, 723 A.2d at 447 (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
 
 
We hold the Council’s decision to adopt the minor amendment to remove Old 
Marlboro Primary School and Old Marlboro High School from the 2010 Prince George’s 
County Historic Sites and Districts Plan through the passage of CR-72-2019 and CR-98-
2019 was a legislative action.  The Town conceded at oral argument that the Council was 
acting in its legislative capacity when adopting the minor amendment.7  Oral Argument at 
13:45, Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George’s Cty. Council, No. 55, September Term, 
2021 
(Md. 
2022), 
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/media/2021/coa20220
 
7 We express no opinion as to whether we would have reached the same conclusion 
without the concession of the Town. 
 
25 
 
510caseno55.mp4, archived at https://perma.cc/D946-KZQL (“[T]here’s two ways to 
designate historic properties in Prince George’s County.  One [] is quasi-judicial under 
Article 29 of the County Code, and the[] other is a legislative act.  This believe it or not, 
even though it is [confined] to one parcel, is a legislative act.”) (emphasis added).  The 
decision, while involving one parcel, appeared discretionary, made on general policy 
grounds pursuant to a legislative process, rather than made by adjudicating certain facts 
with respect to the properties.  See Bucktail, LLC, 352 Md. at 548, 723 A.2d at 448 (finding 
a zoning process to be adjudicative because the zoning process involved “applying the 
Zoning Ordinance standards to the particular facts of Bucktail’s property”).   
Our review is therefore limited to determining whether the Council acted within its 
legal boundaries when it adopted the minor amendment CR-72-2019.8  See Bucktail, LLC, 
352 Md. at 543, 723 A.2d at 446.  Whether the Council acted within its legal boundaries 
involves a determination of whether the Town complied with statutory procedure for 
adopting minor amendments to zoning plans pursuant to PGCC § 27-642.  Specifically, we 
must determine whether the initiating resolution adequately set forth a purpose and scope 
for the proposed minor amendment.  PGCC § 27-642(d). 
When interpreting a statute, this Court begins by:  
looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading 
the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is 
 
8  The circuit court did not determine whether the Council’s actions relative to CR-
98-2019 were legislative or quasi-judicial but presumed that the standard of review was the 
substantial evidence test relative to the Council’s actions.  Although the circuit court 
applied the substantial evidence test, it reached the correct conclusion regarding the merits 
of the Town’s claims. 
 
26 
 
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.  If the language 
of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s 
provisions and our analysis ends. 
 
Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 404–05, 978 A.2d 736, 747–48 (2009) (cleaned up).  In doing 
so, we “do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our 
interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.”  State v. Bey, 452 
Md. 255, 266, 156 A.3d 873, 878 (2017).  Instead, “plain language must be viewed within 
the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[,]” and we “presume that the 
Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body 
of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent 
possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.”  Id., 156 A.3d at 878–79. 
PGCC § 27-642(b)-(d) outlines the purpose and scope for the minor amendment 
process:  
(b) The minor amendment process may be utilized to:  
 
(1) advance the goals of an approved comprehensive plan, functional 
plan, or development district plan; or  
 
(2) safeguard the public safety health and welfare of citizens and 
residents within the plan area boundaries. 
 
(c) The scope of the minor amendment shall be limited to:  
 
(1) a geographic area which is not more than 50% of the underlying 
plan area, but not limited to a single property or property owner; 
 
(2) limited to specific issues regarding public planning objectives; or 
 
(3) for the purpose of correcting errors in the text or maps in the 
applicable plan. 
 
 
27 
 
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1) through (3), herein, the minor 
amendment process shall not be utilized for any amendment which 
would require major transportation analysis and/or modeling, revised 
water and sewer classifications, or any Adequate Public Facilities 
analysis. 
 
(d) The Resolution initiating a minor amendment shall set forth the purpose 
and scope of the proposed amendment, and shall state the date of the joint 
public hearing on the proposed amendment. 
 
(Emphasis added).   
 
 
While an initiating resolution must “set forth the purpose” of the proposed minor 
amendment, PGCC § 27-642(d), the statute does not prescribe a particular purpose.  The 
Town argues that a proposed minor amendment must adopt either of the two purposes 
provided in PGCC § 27-642(b).  Contrary to the Town’s assertions, PGCC § 27-642(b) 
does not require a minor amendment to fulfill either purpose.  The subsection states: “The 
minor amendment process may be utilized to . . .”  PGCC § 27-642(b) (emphasis added).  
According to the rules of construction pursuant to PGCC § 1-101(a)(16), the term “may” 
constitutes  “permissive and discretionary[]” language.  See Bd. of Phys. Quality Assurance 
v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 166, 848 A.2d 642, 648 (2004) (“The word ‘may’ is generally 
considered to be permissive, as opposed to mandatory language.”).  The plain language of 
PGCC § 27-642(b) does not require a minor amendment to either “(1) advance the goals 
of an approved comprehensive plan, functional plan, or development district plan; or (2) 
 
28 
 
safeguard the public safety health and welfare of citizens and residents within the plan area 
boundaries.”9   
 
In contrast, PGCC § 27-642(c) states that “[t]he scope of the minor amendment shall 
be limited to . . .” certain delineated limitations that are not relevant to the instant case.  
The Prince George’s County Code defines “shall” as “mandatory[.]”  PGCC § 1-
101(a)(30); see also State v. Rice, 447 Md. 594, 624, 136 A.3d 720, 738 (2016) (“We have 
held that the use of the word ‘shall’ is treated as mandatory unless ‘the context in which it 
is used indicates otherwise.’”) (quoting Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 547, 
399 A.2d 225, 230 (1979)).  Thus, unlike subsection (b), subsection (c) requires the scope 
of a minor amendment to be limited to its four enumerated provisions.   
 
CR-72-2019 adequately “set forth the purpose” of the minor amendment as required 
by PGCC § 27-642(d).  In the preamble, CR-72-2019 provided that “District Council finds 
that there is a need to reevaluate the designation of [Old Marlboro Primary School and Old 
Marlboro High School] for removal from the [2010] Prince George’s County Historic Sites 
and Districts Plan[.]”  The initiating resolution then stated its purpose for the minor 
amendment would be “to remove the Old Marlboro Primary School[] . . .  and the Old 
Marlboro High School” from the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts 
Plan.  (Emphasis added). 
 
9 We do not need to decide the full range of permissible purposes pursuant to PGCC 
§ 27-642(b) & (d).  Our task is limited to whether the Council exceeded the legal 
boundaries of the statute by proposing a minor amendment for the purpose of removing the 
historical designation of two schoolhouses. 
 
29 
 
 
Furthermore, PGCC § 27-642(d) did not require CR-72-2019 to specify either why 
the Council sought to remove the historic designation of the two schoolhouses, or how the 
schoolhouses would be utilized in the future.  The Town provides no statutory support for 
the proposition that PGCC § 27-642(b) & (d) demands particular factual detail regarding 
the “purpose” of a proposed minor amendment.  By stating that the proposed minor 
amendment was to remove the Old Marlboro Primary School and Old Marlboro High 
School from the 2010 Prince George’s County Historic Sites and Districts Plan, CR-72-
2019 adequately set forth the purpose of the minor amendment, as required under PGCC § 
27-642(d).   
 
CR-72-2019 likewise adequately “set forth . . . the scope” of the minor amendment 
pursuant to PGCC § 27-642(c) and (d).  CR-72-2019 provided:  
[T]he Council finds that the proposed minor amendment is plainly authorized 
pursuant to Section 27-642, because the proposed amendment: (1) is limited 
to specific issues regarding public planning objectives; and (2) does not 
constitute an amendment which would require major transportation analysis 
and/or modeling, revised water and sewer classifications, and Adequate 
Public Facilities analysis[.] 
 
CR-72-2019 complied with the circumscribed “scope” set forth in PGCC § 27-642(c) 
because it expressly stated that its purpose was limited “to specific issues regarding public 
planning objectives[.]”  The Town provides no statutory support for its assertion that CR-
72-2019 required any specific factual details regarding the “specific issues regarding public 
planning objectives[.]”  See PGCC § 27-642(c)(2).  Even if it did, CR-72-2019’s statement 
that the minor amendment concerned only the historic designation status of the two schools 
would be sufficient to demonstrate that the scope of the minor amendment was 
 
30 
 
appropriately limited under PGCC § 27-642(c)(2).  We therefore find that CR-72-2019 
adequately set forth the “scope” of the minor amendment as required by PGCC § 27-
642(d).   
CONCLUSION 
 
The Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that CR-72-2019 was a final 
agency action subject to judicial review, because the resolution merely initiated the process 
for determining whether to remove the historic designation of the two schoolhouses.  The 
Council made a final agency action through the passage of CR-98-2019.  As such, the 
Town did not waive its challenge to CR-98-2019, based on alleged deficiencies in CR-72-
2019, by failing to appeal CR-72-2019 within thirty days of its passage.  We do not agree 
with the Town, however, that CR-72-2019 was procedurally deficient.  We conclude that 
CR-72-2019 satisfied the statutory requirements set forth in PGCC § 27-642 for an 
initiating resolution for a minor amendment.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals on alternative grounds. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.