Title: Keller v. Keller

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

287 S.E.2d 508 (1982) Karl L. KELLER and Leona G. Keller, his wife, et al. v. Dixie Ellen KELLER, William Ward Keller, Felnora Grace Keller, Charles Dicken Keller and Monica Kay Keller. No. 14866. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. February 24, 1982. Sponaugle & Sponaugle, George I. Sponaugle and George I. Sponaugle II, Franklin, for appellants. James E. Ansel, Moorefield, for appellees. *509 McHUGH, Justice: This action is before this Court upon the petition of Dixie Ellen Keller, et al., for an appeal from the final order of the Circuit Court of Hardy County, West Virginia. Pursuant to that order, entered on September 28, 1979, the circuit court entered judgment against the appellants in a civil action involving an interpretation and construction of the will of William Keller, deceased. This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel. The facts in this action are not in dispute. William Keller and his wife had eight children.[1] On August 7, 1942, a son of William Keller by the name of George W. Keller and the wife of George W. Keller adopted a son. That adopted son was renamed George Richard Keller. On April 7, 1959, William Keller, then a widower, executed a will. The provisions of that will at issue before the circuit court and this Court stated as follows: On March 15, 1961, William Keller executed a codicil to the will by which William Keller directed that a certain amount of money be given to a church. The provisions of that codicil are not relevant to the provisions in question of the will. *510 Both George W. Keller and his adopted son, George Richard Keller, predeceased the testator, William Keller. George W. Keller died on October 21, 1964, and George Richard Keller died on May 31, 1966. George Richard Keller was survived by six children, Dixie Ellen Keller, William Ward Keller, Felnora Grace Keller, Charles Dicken Keller, Monica Kay Keller and David Richard Keller. Those six children were defendants in the action before the circuit court and, with the exception of David Richard Keller, are the appellants before this Court. On May 9, 1970, William Keller died and the will and codicil were admitted to probate. Subsequent to the death of William Keller, a portion of his real estate was sold by the appellees, one-eighth of the proceeds from which sale, representing deceased son George W. Keller's share in the estate, was placed in escrow pending the outcome of this litigation. On October 10, 1978, the living brothers and sisters of George W. Keller and others instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Hardy County against the appellants, the six grandchildren of George W. Keller. In this action the plaintiffs, appellees before this Court, assert that they, rather than the appellants, are entitled to the one-eighth interest of George W. Keller in the estate of the testator, William Keller. Essentially, the appellees assert that the trust described in the will of the testator did not fail and that, as a result of the death of George W. Keller, the appellees became the beneficiaries of the trust. The appellants, on the other hand, contend that the trust never came into existence, and, consequently, the appellants, as successors to George W. Keller, are entitled pursuant to the will and by operation of law to George W. Keller's one-eighth interest in the estate. By order entered on September 28, 1979, the circuit court held that the appellants take nothing either from the estate of William Keller or from the proceeds of the sale of the testator's real estate. Specifically, the circuit court held that the will is ambiguous inasmuch as the will does not cover the factual situation in existence at the time of the testator's death. In holding in favor of the appellees, the circuit court in its opinion of July 9, 1979, stated as follows: .... In the final order of the circuit court, after stating that the appellants take nothing from the testator's estate, the circuit court divided George W. Keller's one-eighth interest in the proceeds from the sale of the testator's real estate among those children living at the time of George W. Keller's death and their successors.[2] *511 The appellants assert that pursuant to this State's anti-lapse statute, they are entitled to the one-eighth interest of George W. Keller in the estate of the testator and further to the one-eighth share of George W. Keller in the proceeds from the sale of the testator's real estate. That statute, W.Va.Code, 41-3-3 [1931] provides as follows:[3] Moreover, W.Va.Code, 41-3-4 [1931], during the period in question, provided as follows: In Hester v. Sammons, 171 Va. 142, 198 S.E. 466 (1938), the testator died in 1936 leaving a will in which his sister, Mary Bell Angell, was named as a beneficiary. In a separate clause in the will, the testator named another as residuary legatee. The provision of the will concerning Mary Bell Angell stated as follows: 198 S.E. at 466. In Hester, Mary Bell Angell predeceased the testator and left as her distributees two daughters and a son. The question in that action was whether the testamentary share of Mary Bell Angell should go to her distributees and their successors or to the residuary legatee named in the will. The will *512 was silent upon that question. Before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was an anti-lapse statute similar to the statute, W.Va.Code, 41-3-3 [1931], before this Court. In Hester, the Court applied the anti-lapse statute and held in favor of Mary Bell Angell's distributees and their successors. As the Court stated: 198 S.E. at 467. Clearly, one purpose of the will before this Court was that the testator, William Keller, intended to create a spendthrift trust for his son, George W. Keller. As recognized in Hoffman v. Beltzhoover, 71 W.Va. 72, 74, 76 S.E. 968, 969 (1913): "Spendthrift trust is the term commonly applied to those trusts that are created with a view of providing a fund for the maintenance of another, and at the same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapacity for self-protection." In Hoffman, this Court held in syllabus point 2 as follows: However, the beneficiary of that spendthrift trust, George W. Keller, predeceased the testator. No specific provision was expressed in the will in anticipation of the death of that beneficiary. Consequently, this Court must determine, as did the circuit court, what disposition should be made of the one-eighth interest of George W. Keller.[4] In making that determination, this Court recognizes that "[t]he cardinal rule in the construction of wills is that the testator's intention controls, unless it is contrary to some positive rule of law or principle of public policy." Emmert v. Old National Bank of Martinsburg, W.Va., 246 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1978). Often, judicial precedent is of little value in analyzing the language of wills.[5] Consequently, the courts turn to the many rules of construction which have evolved from litigation in this area. Nevertheless, the necessity of applying such rules of construction diminishes to the extent that the intention of the testator is readily apparent from a plain reading of the will. As this Court held in Syl. pt. 3, Couch v. Eastham, 29 W.Va. 784, 3 S.E. 23 (1887); "When the will affords no satisfactory clue to the real intentions of the testator, the court must from necessity resort to legal presumptions and rules of construction. But such rules yield to the intention of the testator apparent in the will, and have no application when the intention thus appears." Upon a careful consideration of the will of William Keller, this Court is in agreement with the Circuit Court of Hardy County that the testator intended that the *513 one-eighth share of George W. Keller would not extend to the appellants in the event of George W. Keller's death. Rather, we are of the opinion that, as the will indicates, such one-eighth share, because of George W. Keller's death, went to George W. Keller's brothers and sisters then living. Stated another way, we hold that this State's anti-lapse statute, W.Va.Code, 41-3-3 [1931], does not cause the share of George W. Keller to go to the appellants. The anti-lapse statute, W.Va.Code, 41-3-3 [1931], is applicable and operates for the benefit of the appellants, unless, as the statute provides, a "different disposition" be made or required by the will. We believe such "different disposition" was provided in the will and that the acquisition of the share in question by the appellees was required. This action, therefore, is unlike the Hester case, supra, in which case no different disposition of the testator's property could be discerned, and, because of the anti-lapse statute, the distributees of the deceased beneficiary acquired an interest. In this action, the appellants are not mentioned in the will. Moreover, all of the testator's children, including George W. Keller, are included in the will's residuary clause. All eight children of the testator are mentioned in that residuary clause by name. In a subsequent provision of the will, the testator stated: "I further direct that should George W. Keller die while the said trust fund is in existence that the said Trustee shall pay his funeral expenses from said fund and any balance remaining in said trust fund to pass outright to such of the brothers and sisters of said George W. Keller as are then living, share and share alike." W.Va.Code, 41-3-1 [1931], provides as follows: "A will shall be construed, with reference to the estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." Obviously, at the time of the death of the testator there was no reason to establish a spendthrift trust. George W. Keller had predeceased the testator. The trust provisions of the will had no specific application. However, we believe that the trust provisions of the will expressed a general intent that the brothers and sisters surviving George W. Keller would take his share. It is clear that had the trust been in existence after the death of the testator, such brothers and sisters, rather than the appellants, would have taken George W. Keller's share. For the above reasons, therefore, the final order of the Circuit Court of Hardy County is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. [1] The eight children of William Keller and his wife were as follows: Ann Keller Heishman, Helen Keller Ours, Mary Alice Keller Ruckman, Emma Keller Halterman, George W. Keller, Anton M. Keller, Karl L. Keller and Willie B. Keller. [2] The children of William Keller living at the time of George W. Keller's death were Ann Keller Heishman, Helen Keller Ours, Mary Alice Keller Ruckman, Emma Keller Halterman, Anton M. Keller and Karl L. Keller. After the death of George W. Keller, Anton M. Keller died leaving Trixie V. Keller, Phyllis Keller Michael, Robert A. Keller and Nellie C. Keller as devisees. Pursuant to the order of the circuit court, the devisees of Anton M. Keller shared in the distribution of George W. Keller's one-eighth share in the proceeds from the sale of the testator's real estate. It should be noted, however, that, as indicated in the record, the testator's son, Willie B. Keller, was not living at the time of the death of George W. Keller. As reflected in the order of the circuit court, the heirs of Willie B. Keller, namely William L. Keller, Branson G. Keller and Ralph K. Keller, did not share in George W. Keller's one-eighth share of the proceeds from the sale of the testator's real estate. [3] This State's anti-lapse statute, W.Va.Code, 41-3-3 [1931], is not new to statutory law. As the 1860 Code of Virginia provided: "If a devisee or legatee die before the testator, leaving issue who survive the testator, such issue shall take the estate devised or bequeathed, as the devisee or legatee would have done, if he had survived the testator, unless a different disposition thereof be made or required by the will." [4] As the syllabus point provides in Dingess v. Drake, 135 W.Va. 502, 64 S.E.2d 601 (1951): "Though the will is ambiguous, this Court will declare the meaning and give effect to the intention of the testator." [5] As Vol. 1 Harrison Wills and Administration § 246 (Michie 1960) states, in part: It has been said in quite a number of cases that judicial precedents are of little value in the construction of wills. It is fairly true, as has been said, that `No will has a twin brother.' This is correct, except in so far as the judicial precedents establish general rules of construction or furnish a generally accepted definition of words or phrases.