Title: Citizens Bank, Farmington v. Robinson Bros. Wrecking

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

415 P.2d 538 (1966) 76 N.M. 408 The CITIZENS BANK, FARMINGTON, New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBINSON BROTHERS WRECKING, a Partnership, Defendant-Appellant. No. 7904. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 20, 1966. Marvin Baggett, Jr., Farmington, for appellant. Palmer & Frost, Farmington, for appellee. HENSLEY, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals. Appellee, The Citizens Bank, Farmington, New Mexico, filed its suit against Alfred Elliott and Robinson Brothers Wrecking, a Partnership, alleging that the defendant Alfred Elliott was in default under the provisions of a security agreement covering a pickup truck and further alleging that defendant Robinson Brothers Wrecking claimed an interest in the vehicle. Appellee further alleged that it was entitled to possession of the vehicle that was being wrongfully detained by the defendants, all to the appellee's damage in the amount of $500.00. The appellee filed its complaint, its affidavit in replevin, and its bond in replevin in the district court. On the same day, the clerk of the court issued a writ of replevin in the case to the sheriff for service. On the following day, the sheriff served the writ of replevin and a copy of the complaint on Elmer Robinson, one of the partners in Robinson Brothers Wrecking, and took possession of the vehicle, which was then delivered to the plaintiff. No process was ever served on the defendant Alfred Elliott. Approximately forty days after the service of the writ and a copy of the complaint, the clerk of the court issued and filed a certificate of default as to the defendant Robinson Brothers Wrecking. On the same day, a judgment was signed and filed, finding the issues in favor of the appellee and against the defendant Robinson Brothers Wrecking. Some two months after judgment, the defendant *539 Robinson Brothers Wrecking filed a motion to set aside the judgment, on the ground that it had never been served with a summons. From an order denying this motion, the defendant has appealed. The appellant and the appellee agree that no civil "summons" as provided by § 21-1-1(4) (b), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., was served upon the appellant. The sole contention made here by the appellant is that no summons having been issued and served, the court was without jurisdiction of the appellant and the judgment subsequently entered was void. The writ of replevin that was issued by the clerk and served by the sheriff and the sheriff's return are disclosed by the record to be in the following form: An examination of the writ of replevin and the sheriff's return discloses that the appellant was fully apprised of every pertinent fact that would have been made known to it had the statutory form of summons been employed. The form of the instrument served on the appellant would have been different, but the substance would have been the same. Section 21-1-1 (1), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., is as follows: The action of replevin is a statutory proceeding designed to take the place of the common law actions of replevin and detinue, Troy Laundry Machinery Co. v. Carbon City Laundry Co., 27 N.M. 117, 196 P. 745. In Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 149 P.2d 795, the proposition urged by the appellant was answered in reverse. There the plaintiff sued in replevin and caused a summons to be issued rather than a writ of replevin. In that case we stated: We conclude that the writ of replevin in an action of replevin accomplishes the same function in process, as does a summons in an ordinary civil action. The action of the trial court in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment is affirmed, and IT IS SO ORDERED. MOISE and COMPTON, JJ., concur.