Title: RICHARD GORDON BLOOMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD GORDON BLOOMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 88Case Number: S-09-0112Decided: 06/28/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RICHARD 
GORDON BLOOMER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found 
Appellant Richard Gordon Bloomer guilty of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
assault and battery, and also found him to be a habitual criminal.  Because Bloomer had three prior felony 
convictions, the district court imposed two life sentences.  Bloomer appeals his convictions, 
asserting claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He also challenges the 
legality of his life sentences.  We 
affirm Bloomer's convictions, but reverse his sentences.  We remand this case to the district 
court for resentencing.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Bloomer submits 
these issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Did the [district] court's failure to give any jury instruction on the 
presumption of innocence constitute plain error?

 
 
II.         
Did the State prove three prior felony convictions in support of the 
habitual criminal allegation?

 
 
III.        Under 
the circumstances of this case, can subsequent non-violent felonies be charged 
and tried before known earlier violent felony allegations in order to create 
habitual criminal liability?

 
 
IV.       Is it 
ineffective assistance of counsel to allow the [district] court to fail to 
instruct on the presumption of innocence and the right not to 
testify?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      A little after 
12:00 a.m. on August 24, 2002, two Burger King employees were robbed by a masked 
gunman as they approached the Pinnacle Bank in Cody to deposit the previous 
day's receipts.  During the robbery, 
the gunman brandished a black pistol and threatened the employees.  After taking the money, the robber 
ordered the employees to the ground and told them he would blow their heads off 
if they moved.  The employees stayed 
on the ground for a few minutes before fleeing the scene and reporting the 
robbery.  The victims were unable to 
identify the robber, and no suspects were identified by law enforcement at the 
time.  

 
 
[¶4]      Approximately two 
years later, law enforcement received information implicating Bloomer in the 
robbery.  On July 27, 2004, Eric Kin 
Choy, an inmate at the Adult Community Corrections Center in Casper, Wyoming, 
reported to Detective Juliet Wardwell of the Cody Police Department that Bloomer 
had committed the robbery along with Ian Parsons.  Detective Wardwell subsequently 
interviewed Parsons who admitted to driving the getaway car in the robbery and 
confirmed Bloomer's identity as the masked gunman.  

 
 
[¶5]      At the time the 
robbery information was developed, Bloomer was facing two felony drug charges in 
Park County.  He absconded to 
Montana, where he was arrested, convicted and ultimately sentenced in September 
2005 to seven years in prison for felony forgery.  While incarcerated in Montana, Bloomer 
petitioned to be returned to Wyoming to stand trial on the pending drug 
charges.  

 
 
[¶6]      Before his trial 
commenced on the drug charges, the State filed a Felony Information charging 
Bloomer with one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault 
and battery for his part in the instant robbery.  The State later amended the Information 
to include a habitual criminal sentence enhancement provision.  The enhancement was based on Bloomer's 
Montana forgery conviction and his convictions on the two Park County felony 
drug offenses.  

 
 
[¶7]      Bloomer's trial 
in this case commenced on January 13, 2009, and resulted in guilty verdicts on 
both charged offenses.  During the 
habitual criminal phase of the trial, the State presented evidence concerning 
the Montana and Park County convictions.  
That evidence established that Bloomer had been convicted of felony 
forgery in Montana in May 2005 and of two felony counts of possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance in Park County, Wyoming, in January 
2008.   The jury adjudged 
Bloomer to be a habitual criminal with three prior felony convictions.  Based on his habitual criminal status, 
the district court sentenced Bloomer to two consecutive life sentences.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Presumption 
of Innocence Instruction

 
 
[¶8]      Bloomer contends 
the district court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the 
jury on the presumption of innocence.  
Bloomer never requested an instruction on the presumption of innocence, 
nor did he object to the district court's failure to give one.  

 
 
[¶9]      Rule 30(a) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure states in relevant 
part:

 
 
 
 
No 
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless 
that party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection.

 
 

The 
purpose of this rule is to prevent unnecessary new trials caused by 
instructional errors that the trial court could easily have corrected if they 
had been brought to its attention at the proper time.  Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 966 (Wyo. 
1998).  In essence, the rule 
forecloses appellate review of the alleged instructional error in this case 
unless it rises to the level of plain error.  Id.; see also Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009); Scheikofsky 
v. State, 
636 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Wyo. 1981); W.R.Cr.P. 52(b); W.R.A.P. 9.05 ("[p]lain errors 
or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the trial court").  Under the plain error rule, Bloomer must 
demonstrate, by reference to the record, the existence of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which was transgressed in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way and resulting prejudice to a substantial right.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 91, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004); Hampton v. 
State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977).

 
 
[¶10]   In this case, no question exists 
that the district court failed to instruct the jury on the presumption of 
innocence.  However, Bloomer has not 
demonstrated that the district court's failure constituted an obvious 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  The cases cited by Bloomer do not 
establish a clear-cut rule of law, constitutional or otherwise, mandating that 
the jury be instructed on the presumption of innocence in every criminal 
trial.  See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1979) (per 
curiam); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978), and Slaughter v. State, 630 P.2d 517 (Wyo. 
1981).  To the contrary, the United 
States Supreme Court determined in Whorton that a criminal defendant is not 
automatically entitled to an instruction on the presumption of innocence, and 
that the failure to give one does not in and of itself violate the 
constitution.  Whorton, 441 U.S.  at 789, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2090.  While we believe the better 
practice is to give the instruction as a matter of course, the issue before us 
is whether plain error occurred as a result of the district court's failure to 
do so.  We cannot conclude from 
Bloomer's cited authorities that the district court's failure violated a clear 
rule of law and, consequently, we cannot conclude that plain error occurred in 
this instance.

 
 
Habitual 
Criminal Sentencing Enhancement

 
 
[¶11]   As previously noted, the jury 
determined Bloomer was a habitual criminal and, because he had been previously 
convicted of three felonies, the district court sentenced him to serve two 
consecutive life sentences.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2009) requires enhancement of a sentence if 
the defendant is a habitual criminal:

 
 
(a)       A person is 
an habitual criminal if:

 
 
(i)         
He is convicted of a violent felony; and

 
 
(ii)        He 
has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately 
brought and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

 
 
(b)       An habitual 
criminal shall be punished by imprisonment for:

 
 
(i)         
Not less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has 
two (2) previous convictions;

 
 
(ii)        Life, 
if he has three (3) or more previous convictions.

 
 
[¶12]   In this appeal, Bloomer presents 
two arguments challenging the legality of his life sentences.  Bloomer first contends the use of his 
Park County drug convictions was improper because those convictions were not 
"separately brought and tried" as required by § 6-10-201(a)(ii).  He further claims that, because the 
criminal acts underlying the Park County convictions were committed after the 
commission of the instant aggravated robbery and aggravated assault and battery 
offenses, the drug convictions cannot be used as a basis for the habitual 
criminal sentencing enhancement.  
Whether Bloomer's sentences amount to an illegal sentence is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  See Beyer v. State, 2008 WY 137, ¶ 7, 
196 P.3d 777, 780 (Wyo. 2008); Manes v. 
State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶13]   We need spend little time on 
Bloomer's first contention of error because the State concedes Bloomer's life 
sentences are illegal and must be corrected.  The State correctly points out that the 
charges leading to the Park County drug convictions were not "separately brought 
and tried" as mandated by § 6-10-201(a)(ii).  Accordingly, those convictions may only 
count as one previous conviction under the habitual criminal statute, thereby 
limiting the sentencing range on Bloomer's current convictions to that 
prescribed in § 6-10-201(b)(i).

 
 
[¶14]   As to Bloomer's second contention 
of error, this Court has previously considered and rejected a similar 
claim.  In Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360, 1365 
(Wyo. 1989), we held that the habitual criminal statute "does not require that a 
crime be previously committed, only that there be previous convictions."  We determined that it was the sequence 
of convictions, and not the sequence of the criminal acts, that was relevant to 
the operation of the habitual criminal statute.  Id.  We recently endorsed this holding in Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 58, 199 P.3d 1052, 1069 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶15]   Bloomer recognizes the force of 
these holdings, but urges us to reconsider them.  However, we are not persuaded by 
Bloomer's rather convoluted argument that our interpretation of § 6-10-201 is 
inconsistent with the statute's plain language and the intent of the Wyoming 
Legislature.  The fact that the 
legislature has not acted to alter this interpretation over the intervening 
years since Green reinforces the 
correctness of our determination.  
See Alpine Lumber Company, LLC, v. 
Capital West National Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 
2010).  We decline to usurp the 
doctrine of stare decisis by 
modifying or overruling Green and Smith, or limiting application of this 
authority in this case.1

 
 
[¶16]   In sum, we reverse Bloomer's life 
sentences and remand to the district court for resentencing.  Because the jury found, as a question of 
fact, that Bloomer's previous convictions existed, and because the record 
contains sufficient evidence of two prior "separately brought and tried" felony 
convictions that can be used as a basis for enhancing Bloomer's punishment on 
the instant convictions, we find it appropriate for the district court to simply 
resentence Bloomer in accordance with § 6-10-201(b)(i).  See Green, 784 P.2d  at 
1365.

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶17]   Bloomer contends trial counsel 
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Specifically, he faults counsel for not 
offering jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and on his right not 
to testify.  He insists counsel's 
failure to advance these instructions "serves no explicable purpose" and 
undermines confidence in the fairness and reliability of his 
trial.

 
 
[¶18]   Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact and, therefore, our review is de novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 2008).  To 
prevail on his claim, Bloomer must first establish that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient.  This 
requires a showing that counsel failed to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 18, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Hirsch 
v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 593 (Wyo. 2006)).  Bloomer next must demonstrate that 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  Under the prejudice prong, Bloomer must 
show there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient 
assistance, the outcome of his trial would have been different.  Dettloff, ¶¶ 18-19, 152 P.3d  at 
382.  The failure to make the 
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats 
an ineffectiveness claim.  Id.

 
 
[¶19]   We find it unnecessary to address 
the first prong of the ineffectiveness standard because Bloomer has not 
established he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged errors.  See Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 
21, 180 P.3d 212, 219 (Wyo. 2008) (if it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course 
should be followed).    
Bloomer's argument seems to be simply that the evidence against him was 
weak and counsel's failure to ensure the jury was properly instructed on these 
legal principles, because of the trial's outcome, was obviously 
prejudicial.  He does not provide 
any insight, within the context of the facts of this case, how counsel's alleged 
deficiencies actually prejudiced him.  
Suffice it to say, Bloomer's argument is insufficient to satisfy his 
burden of demonstrating that trial counsel rendered prejudicially deficient 
assistance.

 

[¶20]   Moreover, we are not convinced from 
our independent review of the entire record that counsel's alleged deficiencies 
adversely affected the outcome of Bloomer's trial.  Although no formal instruction was given 
on the presumption of innocence and Bloomer's right not to testify, the jury was 
thoroughly and repeatedly advised about these legal principles, as well of the 
State's burden of proof, by the prosecutor and defense counsel from voir dire 
through closing arguments.  The jury 
was also instructed by the district court that it must acquit Bloomer unless it 
determined from the trial evidence that all the elements of the charged crimes 
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In addition, and contrary to Bloomer's contention, the evidence of his 
guilt on the charged crimes was substantial.  This evidence included the testimony of 
Ian Parsons, who fingered Bloomer as the masked gunman and provided a detailed 
account of the events surrounding the robbery.  It also included the testimony of Eric 
Kin Choy, who recounted in detail his conversations with Bloomer wherein Bloomer 
admitted to committing the robbery.  
Considering the facts of this case, we are unable to conclude a 
reasonable likelihood exists that, but for counsel's alleged errors, Bloomer 
would have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   For the foregoing reasons, we 
affirm Bloomer's convictions.  
However, we hold that Bloomer's life sentences are illegal and reverse 
those sentences.  We remand this 
case to the district court for resentencing in accordance with the provisions of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(b)(i).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Bloomer urges us not to apply the holdings of Green and Smith in this case for the reason he was 
unjustly subjected to the habitual criminal sentence enhancement by the 
intentional actions of the prosecutor.  
Our review of the record, however, does not disclose any basis to support 
a conclusion the prosecutor intentionally delayed filing the instant charges for 
the purpose of compelling application of the habitual criminal statute, as 
Bloomer suggests.