Title: Commonwealth v. Baez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12394 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRANDON BAEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2018. - August 23, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Delinquent Child.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, 
Cruel and unusual punishment.  Due Process of Law, 
Sentence.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 20, 2016. 
 
 
A question of law was reported by Christopher J. Muse, J., 
to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Hennessy for the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney (Stacey 
Pichardo Corson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case presents the question whether, in 
light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), juvenile 
delinquency adjudications for violent offenses may serve as 
2 
 
predicate offenses for adults indicted under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G, the armed career criminal act (ACCA).1  We conclude that 
they may. 
 
Background.  At age eighteen, the defendant, Brandon Baez, 
was indicted for a violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), unlawful 
possession of a firearm.2  If convicted, and if he had no 
qualifying convictions for sentence enhancement, he would "be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 
two and one-half years nor more than five years, or for not less 
than [eighteen] months nor more than two and one-half years in a 
jail or house of correction."  G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6). 
 
The defendant had twice been adjudicated delinquent for 
crimes of violence as defined by the Legislature; therefore, the 
Commonwealth charged the defendant with violating § 10G.3  The 
ACCA mandates enhanced sentencing for adults who violate G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (h), and have "been previously 
                     
 
1 General Laws c. 269, § 10G, is sometimes referred to in 
our decisions and by the bar as the armed career criminal act 
(ACCA).  We therefore refer to § 10G in this opinion as the 
ACCA. 
 
 
2 The defendant was also indicted for carrying a loaded 
firearm.  G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  That count is not before us. 
 
 
3 Both adjudications resulted from the defendant's actions 
at age fifteen.  He was adjudicated delinquent by reason of 
armed assault to rob and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon and was again adjudicated delinquent by reason 
of assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  The dangerous weapon 
in each adjudication was a knife. 
3 
 
convicted of a violent crime or of a serious drug offense."4  
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a)-(c).  In other circumstances, we have 
determined that when the Legislature used the word "conviction" 
rather than adjudication, it meant to exclude juvenile 
delinquency adjudications.  See generally Commonwealth v. Connor 
C., 432 Mass. 635, 646 (2000) ("We adhere to our long-standing 
jurisprudence that an 'adjudication' that a child has violated a 
law generally is not a 'conviction' of a crime").  Here, the 
Legislature imported the definition of "violent crime" from 
G. L. c. 140, § 121, which includes "any act of juvenile 
delinquency involving the use or possession of a deadly weapon 
that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if 
committed by an adult."  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 
616, 631, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
Furr, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 155, 157-158 (2003). 
 
The ACCA creates a tiered system of punishment.  Those with 
one applicable conviction "shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for not less than three years nor more than 
[fifteen] years."  Those with two applicable convictions, such 
as the defendant, "shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than ten years nor more than [fifteen] 
                     
 
4 The Commonwealth is not alleging that the ACCA applies to 
the defendant because he was "previously convicted . . . of a 
serious drug offense."  We therefore do not decide whether the 
statute applies to juvenile adjudications for drug offenses. 
4 
 
years."  Those with three applicable convictions "shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 
[fifteen] years nor more than [twenty] years."  G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (a)-(c). 
 
While the defendant's current case was proceeding, a judge 
in the Superior Court raised sua sponte the issue whether using 
juvenile adjudications to enhance sentencing in the same manner 
as adult convictions violated due process rights5 and protections 
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
The judge invited the defendant to file a motion to dismiss on 
these grounds and reported the following question to the Appeals 
Court:  "Whether in light of Miller v. Alabama, [567 U.S. 460 
(2012)], a juvenile adjudication may be used as a predicate 
offense for enhanced penalties under G. L. c. 269, § 10G."  We 
subsequently allowed the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments and art. 26's comparable ban6 
include protections from excessive and disproportionate 
sanctions.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); 
                     
 
5 Although the judge mentioned due process concerns in his 
discussion with counsel, he did not raise that issue in the 
certified question, so we therefore do not address it. 
 
 
6 Article 26 prohibits the infliction of "cruel or unusual 
punishments." 
5 
 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655, 671 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  A punishment is 
unconstitutional if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks 
the conscience" (citation omitted).  Diatchenko, supra at 669.  
Proportionality concerns are especially acute when evaluating 
punishments for juveniles because "children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing."  Miller, 567 
U.S. at 471. 
 
In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory sentences of 
life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders 
convicted of murder.  We applied Miller's holding in Diatchenko, 
466 Mass. at 671, and "conclude[d] that the discretionary 
imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole on juveniles who are under the age of 
eighteen when they commit murder in the first degree violates 
the prohibition against 'cruel or unusual punishment[]' in art. 
26."  Miller, Diatchenko, and their progeny are controlling when 
evaluating the constitutionality of juvenile sentencing, but 
merely inform our understanding of the proportionality of adult 
punishment. 
 
"The essence of proportionality is that 'punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender 
and the offense.'"  Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 683 
6 
 
(2017).  We reached our conclusion in Diatchenko, in part, by 
considering the "unique characteristics of juvenile offenders."7  
Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 671.  Here, however, those 
characteristics are not relevant8 because the defendant is an 
adult.  If convicted, he would not be punished for his juvenile 
activity.  He would be punished for violating the law as an 
adult while having two applicable juvenile adjudications on his 
record. 
 
Without consideration of a juvenile offender's "diminished 
culpability," Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, the analysis of the 
proportionality of the punishment to the offense is 
                     
 
7 "Relying on science, social science, and common sense, the 
Supreme Court in Miller pointed to three significant 
characteristics differentiating juveniles from adult offenders 
for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis.  First, children 
demonstrate a '"lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking.'  Second, children '"are more vulnerable 
. . . to negative influences and outside pressures," including 
from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over 
their own environment"[;] and [they] lack the ability to 
extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.'  
Finally, 'a child's character is not as "well formed" as an 
adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely 
to be evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].'"  (Citations 
omitted.)  Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 660, quoting Miller, 567 
U.S. at 471. 
 
 
8 Even though these characteristics are not relevant to the 
constitutional analysis, if the defendant were to be convicted, 
the circumstances surrounding his underlying juvenile 
adjudications would be relevant to the judge's determination of 
what sentence to impose, as in any sentencing decision. 
7 
 
straightforward.9  The Commonwealth argues that § 10G's 
sentencing scheme considers "the fact that [the defendant] has 
not been rehabilitated."  The Commonwealth further notes, 
"[m]ore severe sentences are justified by recidivism."  Indeed, 
we have said as much when interpreting the ACCA.  See 
Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 468-469 (2016) (best 
interpretation of ACCA is one that "reflects and implements the 
principle that penal discipline can have [or should have] a 
reforming influence on an offender, with enhanced consequences 
if prior convictions and sentences do not have such an effect").  
"Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for 
increased punishment."  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 
(2003).  Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the 
purpose of the ACCA's enhanced sentencing scheme is to achieve 
the penological goals of deterrence and incapacitation.  Each is 
a justifiable objective of incarceration under the Eighth 
Amendment and art. 26.  "[A] second or subsequent offense is 
often regarded as more serious because it portends greater 
                     
 
9 Although not binding on our interpretation of art. 26's 
protections or the constitutionality of G. L. c. 269, § 10G, 
Federal courts have addressed a similar question and held that 
the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance sentences under the 
Federal armed career criminal act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  See United States v. Orona, 724 
F.3d 1297, 1309-1310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1034 
(2013); United States v. Mason, 435 Fed. Appx. 726, 730-731 
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). 
8 
 
future danger and therefore warrants an increased sentence for 
purposes of deterrence and incapacitation."  United States v. 
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 385 (2008).  The potential punishment 
is therefore constitutionally proportionate to the offender and 
the offense.10 
 
We therefore answer "yes" to the reported question, holding 
that qualifying juvenile adjudications may be used as a 
predicate offense for enhanced penalties under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
10 When evaluating Eighth Amendment and art. 26 claims, we 
also compare the challenged punishment with penalties imposed 
for more serious crimes within the Commonwealth, and assess 
whether the challenged punishment is comparable to penalties 
imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 684 (2017).  However, the 
reported question asks about the application of Miller, which is 
relevant only to the nature of the offender.  To opine further 
would be to analyze unnecessarily the ACCA's constitutionality.  
See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 234 (2007). 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court that it is not unconstitutional 
to use the adult defendant's two juvenile adjudications for 
separate "violent crime[s]," as defined in G. L. c. 140, § 121, 
as predicate offenses for enhanced sentences under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (b).  I write separately to encourage the Legislature to 
consider the wisdom and fairness of the mandatory minimum aspect 
of those enhanced sentences, especially where the predicate 
offenses were committed when the defendant was a juvenile. 
 
First, although the court here, as in other cases,1 refers 
to § 10G as "the armed career criminal act" or as applying to 
"armed career criminals," the statute does not contain these 
words, and the Legislature never gave the statute that name.  
See St. 1998, c. 180, § 71.  And that is for good reason, 
because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences 
under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized 
as armed career criminals.  "The term, 'armed career criminal,' 
derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum 
sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully 
possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) 
who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 
                     
 
1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 45 
(2011); Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 104 (2009). 
2 
 
'serious drug offense.'"  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 
616, 626 n.10, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012).  But under 
§ 10G, a single prior conviction of a "violent crime" or of a 
"serious drug offense" requires the imposition of a mandatory 
minimum sentence of no less than three years for anyone 
convicted of a crime under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or 
(h) -- provisions which include the offenses of carrying a 
firearm without a license and the illegal transfer of a firearm 
or ammunition.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a).  Two such prior 
convictions, as in this case, require the imposition of a 
mandatory minimum sentence of no less than ten years.  See G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G (b).  And, as illustrated by this case, the prior 
"violent crime" or "violent crime[s]" may have been committed 
when the defendant was a juvenile -- here, the defendant was 
only fifteen years old when he committed his two predicate 
offenses. 
 
The Legislature this year passed landmark criminal justice 
reform legislation that has begun the process of revisiting the 
wisdom and fairness of mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
offenses.  See St. 2018, c. 69 (eliminating mandatory minimum 
sentences for many low-level, nonviolent drug offenses).  As 
that process continues, and as the Legislature examines the 
wisdom and fairness of other mandatory minimum sentences 
(including the length of those mandatory minimum sentences), it 
3 
 
is important to recognize that many, perhaps most, of the 
defendants given mandatory minimum sentences as required by 
§ 10G are not reasonably characterized as armed career 
criminals, especially where their predicate crimes were 
committed when they were juveniles.