Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1144.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1144 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SUMMERS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1144.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Multiple violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including charging or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee and 
failing to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal 
from employment—Six-month suspension with condition. 
No. 2011-0464—Submitted September 7, 2011—Decided March 22, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-037. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, William Lawrence Summers of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0013007, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1969 and is also licensed to practice in Kentucky. 
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{¶ 2} On April 12, 2010, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Summers 
with several violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his 
representation of a client who had been charged with multiple felony offenses.  A 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a 
hearing and issued a report, finding that Summers had (1) charged a clearly 
excessive fee, (2) failed to advise his client in writing that if he failed to complete 
the representation, the client might be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee, 
(3) failed to promptly refund the unearned portion of his fee at the time of his 
withdrawal from the representation, and (4) engaged in conduct that adversely 
reflects upon his fitness to practice law.  The panel recommended that Summers 
be suspended from the practice of law for six months and that the issue of 
restitution be resolved in fee arbitration or other court proceedings.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and its recommended 
sanction but also recommends that Summers be required to refund the full 
$15,000 fee to his client. 
{¶ 3} Summers objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct 
and argues that the recommended sanction and restitution are excessive and 
punitive.  We overrule Summers’s objections to the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct and overrule his objection with regard to the recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The panel and board found that the client, Anthony Bell 
(“Anthony”), was 19 years old when he was charged with multiple felony 
offenses for allegedly assaulting a police officer during a brawl in the stands at a 
professional baseball game between the Cleveland Indians and New York 
Yankees.  Bell, a resident of upstate New York who had no criminal record, 
insisted he was innocent; he maintains that position today. 
{¶ 5} Anthony and his family knew no one in Cleveland.  Acting on the 
referral of a bondsman, and with his family’s financial support, Anthony retained 
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respondent, William L. Summers, to defend him.  From the beginning of the 
representation, Anthony and his family never equivocated in expressing what they 
wanted from respondent:  exoneration of the charges. 
{¶ 6} Respondent’s first fee agreement with the Bell family was 
executed around the time of Anthony’s arraignment in late April 2008.  At the 
initial meeting, respondent secured an advance of $1,000 for expenses and a 
retainer of $2,500 from the family.  And “to do a favor for them, to be kind to 
them,” respondent agreed to reduce his hourly charge from $350 per hour to $250 
per hour.  Nonetheless, when Anthony’s family received respondent’s first 
invoice shortly after July 1, 2008, they discovered that respondent had charged 
them $350 per hour, the initial $2,500 retainer had been exhausted, they owed 
Summers an additional $2,500, and they were being charged for work performed 
by respondent’s associate, Aaron Baker, at the rate of $125 per hour. 
{¶ 7} Baker evidently had worked for respondent for years but had only 
been licensed to practice law for several months when respondent assigned him to 
this case.  Summers avers that Baker’s time was normally billed at $175 per hour 
but that Summers had also reduced Baker’s rate for this case. 
{¶ 8} Upon the Bells’ inquiry, Baker acknowledged the hundred-dollar-
an-hour billing discrepancy and assured them that the bill would be corrected.  
Rather than adjust the bill himself, Baker asked Anthony’s  mother to pay the 
corrected amount.  The Bell family never received an invoice with the correct 
billing rate and did not pay the erroneous invoice.  Respondent continued to 
represent Anthony for the next two months without a word about the nonpayment. 
{¶ 9} Less than one week before a pretrial hearing set for September 9, 
2008, however, respondent informed Anthony that he was in breach of the fee 
agreement and threatened to withdraw from his representation unless a new fee 
agreement was secured.  In doing so, respondent did not focus on the billing issue 
or nonpayment of fees as a reason for the alleged breach.  Rather, respondent 
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chastised Anthony’s parents for their “interference” with his representation and 
stated that “there was something standing in the way of him completing the 
case.”1   
{¶ 10} Anthony testified that he was scared out of his mind by Summers’s 
threat to withdraw.  His parents were worried about retaining new counsel; they 
did not think that they could afford to pay new counsel in addition to paying 
Summers’s fee.  The Bells therefore agreed to a new fee agreement—a flat-fee 
arrangement—with Summers. 
{¶ 11} The flat-fee agreement specified that Anthony and his family 
would pay $15,000 to respondent “in addition to any and all amounts already 
paid.”2  The agreement provided that the $15,000 was all that Anthony would 
owe, regardless of the time that respondent would spend on his behalf, including 
work through the investigation “and, if necessary, through the trial, and if 
necessary, sentencing, or other disposition of the case.” 
{¶ 12} In the fee agreement, respondent characterized the $15,000 fee as 
nonrefundable and, despite the requirements of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), did not 
advise the client and his family that they might be entitled to a refund of all or 
part of the fee if respondent failed to complete representation.  In fact, although 
Summers initially insisted that he had read each word of the retainer to Anthony 
and his parents and explained each paragraph to them, he later admitted that he 
had not read to them the paragraph about the fee not being refundable.  And, 
when Anthony’s mother subsequently sent an e-mail to Summers asking 
                                                     
 
1  At the time, respondent was in conflict with a private investigator he had retained to assist in 
Anthony’s case.  He believed that the investigator had performed unauthorized work in the case, 
made derogatory or negative statements to the Bells about him, and tried to refer Anthony and his 
parents to another attorney to represent them in the case.    
 
2  When the Bells questioned the initial bill sent by respondent, Baker’s response stated, “Our 
retainer on a case like this would typically be $15,000.  Because of your circumstances, we agreed 
to a heavily reduced retainer of $2,500, and agreed to bill you for our time as we went along.  This 
arrangement was based upon anticipated prompt payment.”     
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reasonable questions about the flat-fee retainer and what it meant, Summers 
responded with an e-mail that was, at best, impatient and intemperate, and at 
worst, scathing.  In that e-mail, he also stated that the $15,000 flat fee “will cover 
all of the Attorney fees for the matter to the end, regardless of what time we have 
to spend which is a benefit to you.  If you discharge us, you will however owe us 
for all of our time spent thus far, less the initial retainer.  You will also owe us for 
bringing the new Lawyer up to speed.”  (Underlining sic.)  
{¶ 13} Four months after extracting the flat-fee agreement, Summers’s 
representation abruptly ended.  After collecting $17,726.01 in fees, Summers first 
called Anthony in December and told him that “things weren’t looking good, and 
he was going to try to work out a plea.”  The following month, Summers 
screamed at Anthony’s father that he was “done” and “finished.”  After nine 
months of representing Anthony, Summers refused to continue the representation 
and then moved to withdraw, without securing a plea agreement for his client or 
otherwise finishing representation. 
{¶ 14} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that Summers 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a flat fee 
without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be 
entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not complete the 
representation).  We expressly reject Summers’s protestations that his failure to 
include the language was an honest mistake that arose from his use of a form 
document intended for use in Kentucky, where, he argues, such notification is not 
required. 
{¶ 15} The board also found that Summers violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee), 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund 
any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from employment), and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
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lawyer's fitness to practice law).  The board challenged respondent’s claim, and 
the testimony of two experienced criminal-defense attorneys, that he was entitled 
to the entire $15,000 fee based upon the hours he had spent on the case multiplied 
by his then hourly rate of $400.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) lists a number of factors that 
must be considered in determining whether a fee is reasonable.3  In determining 
that the fee was clearly excessive, the board noted that Summers had not 
interviewed any witnesses, the prosecutor had yet to turn over his responses to a 
discovery request, no motions to suppress had been filed, no trial date had been 
set, and Summers failed to complete the representation that he agreed to see 
through to trial or sentencing.  Moreover, the board found that Summers had 
fabricated reasons for discharging Bell, claiming that he and his parents were 
difficult to work with and had unrealistic expectations about his prospects for 
exoneration, as well as accusing them of attempting to suborn perjury. 
{¶ 16} Summers objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that the method he used to calculate his fee was appropriate, that relator 
could not prove that his fee was clearly excessive in the absence of expert 
testimony, that he substantially complied with the requirements of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(d)(3) by providing an itemized bill to justify his retention of the entire flat fee, 
and that because there is insufficient evidence to prove that his fee is clearly 
                                                     
 
3   Factors to be considered under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) include:   
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
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7 
 
excessive, there is also insufficient evidence to support a finding that he violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
{¶ 17} Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that these 
objections are without merit.  Although the time spent and the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer providing the services are factors to be 
considered in determining whether a fee is reasonable, they are not the only 
factors relevant to that determination.  Indeed, the rule identifies both the results 
obtained and the nature of the fee, be it fixed or contingent, as relevant 
considerations.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(4) and (8). 
{¶ 18} When a lawyer agrees to represent a client through the conclusion 
of the case for a flat fee, and that lawyer withdraws from representation without 
cause before the work is completed, he cannot retain the entire flat fee by 
resorting to a mathematical calculation of his billable hours.  To hold otherwise 
would leave clients at the mercy of lawyers who charge significant flat fees to 
provide complete representation only to withdraw when the demands of the case 
become too onerous.  While we recognize that Summers is entitled to be 
compensated for the services he has provided, the Bells are also entitled to receive 
a benefit for their flat-fee bargain. 
{¶ 19} Notwithstanding Summers’s insistence that he kept “copious” 
billing records, his invoices to the Bells had numerous errors and his billing was 
excessive for the amount of work completed. And, of course, he violated Ohio 
law with an illegal nonrefundable flat-fee agreement. 
{¶ 20} And as the board concluded, “Respondent took great pains during 
the hearing to portray the Bells as difficult people whose conduct made continued 
involvement with them impossible.  However, the panel simply does not believe 
Respondent’s allegations and concludes that his complaints regarding the Bells’ 
conduct are nothing more than a fabrication designed to convince the panel that 
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he had an acceptable basis for his eventual discharge of the Bells as clients.”  
Summers asserted several reasons for withdrawing. 
{¶ 21} First, he claimed that his investigator had taken the Bells to see 
another lawyer “to try and get him to take over the case.” 
{¶ 22} Second, Summers asserted that there were “several instances of 
situations where [the Bells] were just incredibly unreasonable. And they started to 
have times where they were not telling the truth, so it was a whole package that 
already started in August * * *.”   But when asked, under oath, what the Bells had 
lied about, Summers responded, “I don’t remember.”  Summers did complain that 
Anthony had lied about his cell phone not working. 
{¶ 23} Third, Summers claimed that he would answer Anthony’s 
questions about his defense only to be subsequently questioned by his parents 
about what he had said to Anthony.  He intimated that the Bells were interfering 
with his representation by second-guessing his decisionmaking.  The record does 
not support those contentions. 
{¶ 24} The Bells, who wanted their “son to have the best counsel 
possible” in a serious criminal case in which he faced incarceration, admit that 
initially they asked many questions of Summers in an effort to understand what 
was happening.  But after receiving the first invoice that showed minimal quarter-
hour billing for responding to even brief e-mails, the Bells insist that they ceased 
almost all communication with Summers.  As Mrs. Bell testified, when the family 
saw the charges they were incurring for communications, “pretty much all 
communications stopped from there.  We barely talked.” 
{¶ 25} Even after executing the flat-fee agreement, the Bells had nothing 
but incidental communication with respondent and “no meaningful discussions, 
communications, [or] correspondence of any kind.” 
{¶ 26} Anthony observed that Summers “did not take kindly to a simple 
question” from his mother, and thereafter Anthony asked few questions himself.  
January Term, 2012 
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He knew that it “became very expensive to communicate with [Summers], 
especially through e-mails.”  And Anthony was afraid to even take the time to 
read the flat-fee agreement because “we didn’t want to take too much of his time, 
to save money.” 
{¶ 27} Mrs. Bell also testified about respondent’s demeanor, describing 
how he “blew up” and exploded when she asked about the efforts to secure a 
video and video expert and how her husband was subjected to a “one-sided 
screaming fiasco by Mr. Summers” when he called to announce he was done with 
the case.  That call reduced her husband to tears and forced him to plead with 
respondent, “Don’t do this to my son.  Please don’t do this.  I’m begging of you, 
don’t do this.”  As Mrs. Bell said, “[W]e were treated * * * like low life.” 
{¶ 28} The fact that the Bell family asked questions of Summers did not 
make them obstructionist, difficult, or contemptuous.  Moreover, respondent 
knew, or should have known, that the Bells would ask questions of him.  
Summers met the Bell family at the outset of representation and included them as 
signatories in the retainer.  He knew that this family was committed to obtaining 
justice for their son but were inexperienced with the legal system.  Indeed, he 
promised them that their calls would be returned promptly, and he had no trouble 
depositing the checks they wrote to him for thousands of dollars in fees, even 
while he complained that they were “interfering” with the representation that 
those checks paid for by simply asking questions about the progress (or lack 
thereof) in the defense of their son. 
{¶ 29} Finally, Summers suggested that his withdrawal was necessary 
because of the Bells’ unethical conduct in asking him “to commit perjury on the 
stand.”  The specific context of that claim is not clear given the cryptic testimony 
Summers provided on that point, but Summers intimated that the Bells had 
identified a witness who would testify falsely about the incident at the ball game 
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in an effort to exonerate Anthony.  The Bells, however, denied any knowledge of 
that witness. 
{¶ 30} The board’s finding that respondent’s contentions had no merit is 
amply supported by the record.  Summers failed to establish that the Bells 
interfered with his representation or that the Bells monopolized his time with 
questions, acted dishonestly, or otherwise acted inappropriately.  Certainly, there 
is no support in this record for the scandalous claim that the Bells were suborning 
perjury.  The board found that Summers terminated representation of Bell 
“without justifiable cause.” 
{¶ 31} The affronts to the Bells and the profession did not stop with 
respondent’s withdrawal from representation. After withdrawing, respondent 
submitted a final invoice to Anthony and his family.  That invoice showed that an 
additional $2,586.49 was due.  Billing records support the board’s conclusion that 
Baker, not Summers, did much of the work on this case.  And respondent had the 
temerity not only to charge Anthony and his family $1,425 for preparing the 
motion to withdraw as Anthony’s counsel, but to then charge them for 
respondent’s work on his (Summers’s) complaint to a state agency claiming that 
the private investigator he hired had acted unethically in her relationship with the 
Bells. 
{¶ 32} Having carefully considered the record before us, we conclude that 
Summers’s objections are without merit and therefore adopt the findings of fact 
and misconduct of the board. 
Sanction 
{¶ 33} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
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listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 34} As aggravating factors, the board found that Summers acted with a 
dishonest and selfish motive, cooperated only grudgingly in the disciplinary 
process with an air of righteous indignation, was evasive and lied during his 
testimony at the panel hearing, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, harmed vulnerable clients, and failed to make restitution.  See BCDG 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i). Mitigating factors found by the 
board include Summers’s 41 years of practice without prior discipline and his 
good character and reputation apart from the underlying disciplinary offense, as 
demonstrated by approximately 50 letters from attorneys, judges, family 
members, and others. 
{¶ 35} Citing Summers’s conduct toward the Bells and his attitude 
throughout the disciplinary proceedings, the panel recommended that Summers 
serve an actual six-month suspension from the practice of law and that the issue of 
restitution be left to a fee arbitration or court proceeding initiated by the Bells.  
The board agreed that respondent should be suspended for six months but 
recommends that he be required to return the entire $15,000 fee to the Bells. 
{¶ 36} Summers objects to the recommended sanction, arguing that it is 
excessive and punitive in light of relator’s failure to submit any expert testimony 
or other evidence to establish a reasonable fee for the services he provided and the 
mitigating factors in this case. 
{¶ 37} To be sure, the record here is replete with letters from judges, 
lawyers,4 and family members who have experienced positive interactions with 
                                                     
 
4  One of the character letters was written by an attorney whom this court has publicly 
reprimanded for improper billing practices.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 
2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368. 
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Summers and who cite the contributions respondent has made to the bar and 
community and discuss his good reputation. 
{¶ 38} Here, there is no dispute that respondent has been highly 
successful around the state and the country in defending those charged with 
sensational and news-garnering crimes, and in what Summers boasts as “high 
profile, high-line cases.”  There is no suggestion that he has not served all of those 
clients quite well.  But this case is about the services he rendered in a far less 
public case, with a far less public client. 
{¶ 39} As Summers knew, Anthony suffered from a social-anxiety 
disorder, and he and his family were very troubled by the charges against him, 
which carried with them the specter of imprisonment.  Neither he nor his family 
was experienced with the law generally or the criminal-justice system 
specifically.  They had never before retained an attorney.  As characterized by the 
board, Anthony and his family were vulnerable and were “unsophisticated, 
working class people” who had to borrow the $15,000 flat-fee retainer from Mr. 
Bell’s employer to continue Summers’s representation.  The board found that 
after Summers was paid, “there was simply no more money to be had for legal 
fees and other defense costs.  Respondent knowingly left Tony Bell destitute 
* * *.”  Respondent left his client without representation and then added the insult 
of charging his client for the time spent preparing to withdraw from 
representation. 
{¶ 40} When confronted with the fact that the fee agreement violated 
Ohio law, respondent refused to admit any wrongdoing.  Instead, he averred that 
when meeting with the client and his family, he was simply confused and 
mistakenly accessed a flat-fee agreement that is authorized under the laws of 
Kentucky, where he also practices.  Respondent begrudgingly admitted that the 
agreement violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) but maintained that his error was a 
mere oversight.  He persists in this position even when confronted with the 
January Term, 2012 
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language of the agreement, which repeatedly referenced Ohio law rather than 
Kentucky law. 
{¶ 41} In short, rather than accepting any responsibility in this matter, 
respondent has blamed his clients and others.  The record amply demonstrates that 
he has been condescending to disciplinary counsel, that he only grudgingly 
cooperated with the disciplinary process, that he has shown “an attitude of 
righteous indignation,” and that his testimony was laced with “lies and 
evasiveness.”  On these points alone, the cases in which we decided to stay the 
suspensions of those who have previously appeared before us are clearly 
distinguishable. 
{¶ 42} In Dayton Bar Assn. v. Schram, 98 Ohio St.3d 512, 2003-Ohio-
2063, 787 N.E.2d 1184, we publicly reprimanded the respondent for charging an 
illegal fee in violation of former DR 2-106(A) and for failing to promptly pay 
client funds the client was entitled to receive in violation of former DR 9-
102(B)(4).  In that case, however, the respondent did not act with indignation and 
evasiveness in the disciplinary process.  To the contrary, she cooperated with the 
relator, agreed to participate in a fee-arbitration program, and after her client 
declined to participate in that program, made full reimbursement to her client 
approximately nine months before the deadline set for doing so.  Id. at ¶ 5.  And 
there was no suggestion that she had been disrespectful to her client, abandoned 
him without counsel, acted with a selfish or dishonest motive, or refused to 
acknowledge her wrongful conduct.  In light of those circumstances, the relator 
and the respondent entered a discipline-by-consent agreement, which this court 
adopted. 
{¶ 43} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Mills, 109 Ohio St.3d 245, 2006-Ohio-
2290, 846 N.E.2d 1253, we again confronted a lawyer who charged an excessive 
fee and committed other violations of the disciplinary rules.  But she, like the 
respondent in Schram, fully cooperated with the process and promptly remedied 
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at least some of the billing errors she had made.  Id. at ¶ 10, 18.  In those 
circumstances, we adopted the parties’ stipulations and agreed sanction, which 
included a one-year stayed suspension, the appointment of an attorney to monitor 
the respondent’s practice, and participation in a fee-dispute program.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 44} Two justices disagreed with the sanction imposed in Mills.  The 
dissenting judges believed that rather than forcing the respondent’s client to 
arbitrate the fee issue, the court should have ordered repayment.  “We have 
already found that respondent collected an excessive fee. Why should we require 
[the client] to obtain new counsel and go through further hassles to collect an 
overcharged fee?  We should conclude this matter now.”  Id. at ¶ 23 (Stratton, J., 
dissenting).  So, too, in this case. 
{¶ 45} The Bells have suffered enough.  The board has determined that 
William L. Summers violated Ohio law, charged an excessive and illegal fee, and 
fabricated mistruths about his clients. And he has shown disdain for the 
disciplinary process. 
{¶ 46} Having considered Summers’s misconduct and weighed the 
aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the sanctions imposed in comparable 
cases, we conclude that a six-month suspension and repayment of the $15,000 to 
the Bell family are the appropriate sanctions for the misconduct in this case. 
{¶ 47} In rendering our decision, we note that in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Jackson, 127 Ohio St. 3d 250, 2010-Ohio-5709, 938 N.E.2d 1021, we were 
presented with an attorney who had charged an excessive fee, refused to refund 
the unearned amount, and was dishonest during the disciplinary investigation, 
among other violations.  We emphasized the fact that although respondent had 
offered limited cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, his misconduct 
continued throughout the investigation and panel hearing outweighed his 
cooperation.  Id. at ¶ 26. We imposed a two-year suspension of his license, and 
stayed only six months of that suspension. Id. at ¶ 2.  Similar, continued 
January Term, 2012 
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misconduct is present in this case.  Although the underlying charges in this case 
are not as severe as those in Jackson, the respondent’s continued misconduct 
throughout the disciplinary proceedings is a significant aggravating factor that 
must be weighed heavily. 
{¶ 48} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-
Ohio-2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, the attorney charged excessive fees to his elderly and 
vulnerable clients.  We found that by “exploiting his incompetent wards * * * [the 
attorney] lessened public confidence in the legal profession and compromised its 
integrity.” Id. at ¶ 88.  We imposed a one-year suspension of the attorney’s 
license to practice law, with the last six months of the suspension stayed.  Johnson 
is instructive here because respondent similarly exploited a vulnerable client.  The 
Bells had no experience with the criminal-justice system, were not from 
Cleveland, and had limited financial means to pay large retainers.  In addition, 
Anthony suffers from an anxiety disorder. Respondent nevertheless charged the 
Bells a clearly excessive fee and then treated them in a manner in which they felt 
he regarded them as “low life.” 
{¶ 49} In light of the misconduct and aggravating and mitigating factors 
in this case, William Lawrence Summers is suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for six months.  Any application for reinstatement must include proof that 
Summers has made restitution of $15,000 to the Bell family.  Costs are taxed to 
Summers. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
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O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 50} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding that Summers’s 
conduct warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 51} In accord with the board’s recommendation, the majority has 
ordered that Summers serve an actual six-month suspension from the practice of 
law and that he be required to return the entire $15,000 fee to the Bells.  In 
determining the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, we have explained 
that “ ‘the primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, 
but to protect the public.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich, 116 Ohio St.3d 257, 
2007-Ohio-6040, 878 N.E.2d 6, ¶ 17, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 
103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53. 
{¶ 52} I offer no excuses for Summers’s conduct, which arose out of a fee 
dispute, but in sanctioning that conduct, I would accord greater weight to 
Summers’s long and distinguished career.  He has submitted letters from 6 current 
and former judges from Ohio municipal (Judge Connally), common pleas (Judges 
Burnside and Sutula), and appellate (Judge Rogers) courts, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court (Justice Keller), and the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio (Judge Lambros), from 30 attorneys, and from 13 lay people who 
attest to his integrity, his high moral values, and his excellent reputation in the 
legal community.  They speak of his strong commitment to the legal profession, 
his participation in a number of professional organizations, his pro bono work, as 
well as his hard work and dedication to his clients. 
{¶ 53} Based upon these attestations and the facts in this case, I conclude 
that Summers’s conduct is an isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished 42-
year legal career.  In my view, an actual suspension from the practice of law is 
unnecessary to protect the public from future harm, but rather is excessive and 
punitive in light of the mitigating factors in this case.  Therefore, I would impose 
a six-month suspension, all stayed, on the conditions that Summers commit no 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
further misconduct and submit to fee arbitration to determine the amount of 
refund, if any, owed to the Bell family. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., Michael L. Close, 
and Dale D. Cook, for respondent. 
______________________