Title: Walter Goldberg, Etc., Et Al. v. Florida Power And Light Company

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1942 
____________ 
 
WALTER GOLDBERG, etc., et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 7, 2005] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
We have for review Florida Power & Light Co. v. Goldberg, 856 So. 2d 
1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court’s 
decision in Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 863 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2003).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  As more fully discussed 
further herein, we quash the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and 
remand the case for reinstatement of the remitted final judgment as initially 
ordered by that court.   
 
 
 
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BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
 
The instant action arises from a decision of the Third District Court of 
Appeal reversing a judgment entered against Florida Power & Light (FPL) in 
connection with the wrongful death action concerning the death of the Goldbergs’ 
12-year-old daughter, Jill Goldberg.  FPL terminated power to a traffic light which 
resulted in a motor vehicle collision and the resulting death.  Initially, a Third 
District panel affirmed the trial court’s order denying FPL’s alternate motions for 
directed verdict and a new trial, but determined that the $37 million in damages 
awarded by the jury was excessive, and remanded the case for remittitur to $10 
million.  Thereafter, sitting en banc, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed 
the initial panel’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to direct a 
verdict and enter judgment in favor of FPL.  We quash this decision and reinstate 
the decision of the original Third District panel. 
The Goldbergs’ action arose from a traffic accident that occurred in the 
Village of Pinecrest on Friday, September 12, 1997, shortly after 5 p.m., which 
resulted in their daughter’s death.  Much earlier that day, weather had caused an 
electric line to come down in the rear of the Fishbein residence, a private home 
located on a side street (Southwest 122nd Drive), which intersects with 67th 
Avenue in Pinecrest.  The Fishbein residence is a large, walled home with a 
motorized gate in front.  The concerned homeowner notified law enforcement and 
 
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Officer Laricci of the Pinecrest police department responded to the scene at 
approximately 2 p.m.  Ray Woodard, an FPL repairman, who had responded to a 
call from the same residence approximately two weeks before this date, also 
responded and established that there was no power flowing through the downed 
line at this location.  Shortly after Woodard arrived on the scene, the Fishbeins left 
the residence.  At approximately 3 p.m., FPL through Woodard informed Officer 
Laricci that he was no longer needed at the scene and that he could leave the area.   
Ultimately FPL dispatched six trucks and seven repair personnel to the 
Fishbein residence and immediate area.  To prevent an occurrence referred to as 
“backfeed,” the FPL crew determined that they should deactivate power on an 
adjacent line which was connected to the same utility pole as the downed line.  To 
accomplish this task, the crew decided to de-energize the adjacent line by opening 
a fuse on the utility pole which was located near the Fishbein property, and 
positioned approximately 100 to 150 feet from the traffic light that controls the 
intersection of Southwest 67th Avenue1 and 120th Street, a major intersection in 
Pinecrest.  At 4:42 p.m., Woodard proceeded to the utility pole in question, opened 
the fuse and terminated power to the parallel line, rendering the traffic signal 
totally inoperable.  Despite numerous contrary factors, Woodard claimed that he 
                                          
 
1.  This section of 67th Avenue is also known as “Ludlam Road.”   
 
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did not actually know that the fuse also controlled the traffic signal at this 
intersection.   
Jill Goldberg was a passenger in a car driven by her mother, Rosalie 
Goldberg.  Shortly after 5 p.m., the Goldbergs were traveling north on 67th 
Avenue following a line of vehicles, none of which were stopping at the inoperable 
traffic light deactivated by FPL at the intersection of 67th and 120th.  Cynthia 
Sollie, who had traveled eastbound on 120th Street, stopped her Ford Expedition at 
this inoperable traffic light in an eastbound direction on 120th Street, but pulled 
out slowly onto 67th Avenue, attempting to find an opening in the flowing line of 
traffic proceeding along 67th Avenue on this rain-filled afternoon.  Sollie’s vehicle 
clipped the left rear of the Goldberg vehicle, causing it to rotate and slide in a 
northbound direction, into the southbound lane of travel on 67th Avenue.  The 
Goldberg’s vehicle was moving sideways at the time and was impacted on the 
passenger side by a Chevy Suburban traveling southbound on 67th Avenue.  Jill 
Goldberg was immediately airlifted from the intersection to the trauma center at 
Jackson Memorial Hospital where she died the next day. 
Walter Goldberg and Rosalie Goldberg, as personal representatives of the 
Estate of Jill Goldberg, filed this action seeking damages from FPL for wrongful 
 
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death and negligence.  The complaint alleged, in pertinent part,2 that FPL had a 
duty not to create a hazardous condition at the subject intersection by terminating 
power without providing for traffic control, or warning the appropriate 
governmental authorities or motorists when it was reasonably foreseeable that 
harm would occur absent traffic control.  The Goldbergs contended that as a result 
of FPL’s breach of this duty, traffic proceeded through the intersection in an 
uncontrolled manner and Jill Goldberg was killed.  FPL countered that it had no 
common law duty to the general public for the operation of traffic signals. 
After a week-long trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs, awarding the 
Goldbergs approximately $37 million in damages.  The jury verdict form reflected 
a finding of negligence on the part of FPL which was the legal cause of Jill 
Goldberg’s death, and no negligence attributable to either Cynthia Sollie or Rosalie 
Goldberg.  Pertinent to the instant analysis, FPL requested the entry of a directed 
verdict in its favor.  The trial court denied the motion, concluding that “ample 
evidence” had been presented that Woodard, FPL’s agent, should have known that 
                                          
 
 
2.  The complaint also alleged that FPL had represented to the Manager of 
the Village of Pinecrest that the company would notify the local government 
whenever it intended to terminate power to a portion of the Village, and thus 
assumed the duty to provide such advance notice.  FPL countered that it owed no 
contractual duty to warn the Village of Pinecrest because the traffic signal was 
inadvertently deactivated during the performance of emergency restoration work, 
not during a scheduled power outage.  Our decision rests on FPL’s common law 
duty to warn, and, consequently, we will not address whether or not FPL also had 
assumed an additional duty to notify the Village of Pinecrest of the power outage.   
 
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he was de-energizing the source of electrical power to the traffic signal, and that 
FPL’s failure to provide any type of warning concerning the intentional power 
interruption and the dangerous condition resulting at the intersection created a 
“reasonable foreseeable zone of risk to others” which gave rise to a duty to warn 
affected motorists.  On the issue of proximate causation, the trial court 
distinguished and refused to apply a line of cases generated within the Third 
District holding that a driver’s negligence in failing to treat an inoperable signal as 
a four-way stop as required by Florida law always constitutes an intervening 
superseding cause as a matter of law relieving the original negligent actor of 
liability.   
A three-judge panel of the Third District affirmed the trial court’s refusal to 
direct a verdict.  However, the Third District sitting en banc reversed the decision 
of the initial district court panel.  Issuing a brief opinion, the district court at that 
time relied solely on its decision in Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 785 
So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which this Court has since quashed based on 
later developing authority, see Martinez, 863 So. 2d at 1205, to conclude that FPL 
owed no common law duty whatsoever to Jill Goldberg.  The district court also 
invoked district precedent and determined that no negligence with respect to the 
operation of the traffic light could have been the legal or proximate cause of the 
accident because it was causally superseded as a matter of law by the actions of the 
 
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drivers involved in the collision.  Having determined that the Goldbergs could 
satisfy neither the duty nor proximate cause elements of their negligence action, 
the split en banc court concluded that FPL’s motion for directed verdict should 
have been granted and a corresponding judgment entered.  We granted jurisdiction 
in the matter, see Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 870 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2004) 
(table), and the instant review followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Legal Duty 
The determination of the existence of a duty of care in a negligence action is 
a question of law.  See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 
1992).  “The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant’s 
conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of 
harm to others.”  Id. at 502.  A duty may arise from multiple sources:  “(1) 
legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of 
such enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising 
from the general facts of the case.”  Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 
1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003) (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2).  The present case 
falls within the fourth category––the duty, if it exists, would arise from the general 
facts of the case.  Moreover, because the instant matter involves a motion by FPL 
for a directed verdict with an adverse jury verdict established, we must view the 
 
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facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Goldbergs.  See Irven 
v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 790 So. 2d 403, 407 (Fla. 2001).  Every 
“reasonable conclusion which may be drawn from the evidence” must also be 
construed favorably to the Goldbergs, and only where there is “no evidence upon 
which a jury could properly rely” in finding for the Goldbergs should FPL’s 
motion for a directed verdict be granted.  Id. at 406 n.2 (quoting Stokes v. Ruttger, 
610 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). 
In denying FPL’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court determined 
that FPL had a common law duty to warn of the hazardous situation it created 
when the company intentionally terminated the flow of power which rendered the 
traffic signal inoperable.  In response to FPL’s argument that the repairman, 
Woodard, did not realize he was deactivating the traffic signal, the trial court 
determined that there was “ample” evidence that he should have known that the 
wiring on the pole directly powered the traffic light.  In affirming that decision, the 
initial district court panel determined that “FPL’s employee took deliberate steps 
that he knew or should have known would turn off a traffic signal,” and that his 
action “created a foreseeable zone of risk to the driving public––the Goldbergs.”  
Goldberg, 856 So. 2d at 1027.  The district court initially concluded that “FPL had 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the motorists it placed at risk by this 
conduct.”  Id.   
 
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We agree that the facts of this case establish that FPL’s actions created a 
foreseeable zone of risk encompassing the motorists utilizing the intersection 
within this 100 to 150 feet of the critical location at 67th and 120th, and gave rise 
to a legal duty to warn motorists of the hazardous condition it created by 
deactivating the traffic signal.  See McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 (“[T]he trial and 
appellate courts cannot find a lack of duty if a foreseeable zone of risk more likely 
than not was created by the defendant.”). 3  As found by the trial court, there was 
                                          
 
3.  The concurring opinion does not agree that FPL had a duty to warn of the 
danger created by its disabling of the traffic light, and instead concludes that the 
company had the far greater singular duty to actually provide emergency traffic 
control until law enforcement arrived or until the traffic light was operable.  We 
acknowledge that in the instant matter FPL certainly would have been capable of 
providing emergency traffic control given the number of FPL personnel on scene, 
the training they received in traffic direction, and the equipment they had on hand 
to facilitate such measures.  We cannot agree, however, that all such scenarios 
impose a singular duty to provide actual emergency traffic control as opposed to 
adequately warning affected motorists of the hazard created by a dangerous 
condition.  One facing similar circumstances may adequately address the 
hazardous situation it created by employing any number of measures along a 
spectrum, some of which––such as the placement of road flares or the prior 
notification of local authorities––may obviate the duty to engage in actual traffic 
control.  The essential problem in this case is that FPL did nothing, despite its 
employee’s constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by his affirmative act. 
As explained in greater detail in this opinion, one who undertakes an action 
assumes the duty to perform the action non-negligently.  See Union Park Mem. 
Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1996) (determining that once a funeral director 
undertook to lead a funeral procession, he assumed a minimal duty to ensure that 
the procession proceeded safely).  On that basis, we are reluctant to impose a 
greater singular duty to provide actual emergency traffic control, and the liability 
that flows from that duty, in a situation such as this.  The better rule in a case such 
as this is to impose a duty to use reasonable care which may, depending on all 
relevant factors, require providing traffic control, but on other occasions sufficient 
 
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ample evidence that Woodard should have known that opening the fuse on the 
utility pole to prevent backfeed to the downed line would terminate power to the 
traffic signal.  Woodard admitted that he knew opening the fuse would cause a 
power outage “in the area.”  He also admitted that from his position at the utility 
pole, he had an unobstructed view of the traffic signal at 67th and 120th, which 
was no more than 150 feet away.  Woodard testified that he did not actually look in 
the direction of the signal, but that testimony was undermined by evidence 
showing that Woodard made two trips to the utility pole on the day of the accident 
during which he would have had a clear view of the traffic signal in question.4  
Indeed, the Goldbergs’ traffic signal expert testified that from where Woodard was 
positioned he should have even seen the traffic light go dark when he terminated 
power to the parallel line.   
Moreover, the utility pole itself had several characteristics clearly disclosing 
that the power for the traffic signal flowed from that location.  There was a 
distinctive concrete slab measuring five feet by five feet at the base of the pole 
                                                                                                                                        
warning to alert affected motorists of the hazardous situation created when the 
actor disabled the traffic light. 
 
 
4.  First, Woodard walked to the pole, and opened the fuse for the downed 
line to ensure that it was de-powered.  On this trip, he would have had an 
unobstructed view of the then-functioning traffic signal.  Woodard returned to the 
pole in his bucket truck to pull the second fuse to deactivate the parallel line.  
Again, from his position, he would have had a clear view of the then-inoperable 
signal.   
 
 
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with a metal plate in the center of it marked “Traffic Signal.”  Woodard confirmed 
that had he seen the concrete slab and metal plate, he would have known that the 
wiring on the pole controlled the traffic signal.  There was also a gray box located 
eight feet up the pole which contained a breaker for the traffic signal.  Sheldon 
Pivnik, the former chief of traffic signals and signs for Dade County, testified that 
a conduit ran from the signal breaker to the top of the pole where it was connected 
to FPL’s power lines, and that it was a “typical installation” uniformly identifiable 
as a service point for the traffic signal.  Woodard testified that on the day of the 
collision he did not inspect the pole or its base, and asserted that his view of the 
pole and base was obstructed by trees and leaves.  According to Pivnik, however, 
Woodard should have inspected the utility pole prior to disconnecting power, 
regardless of whether the pole was covered by foliage. 
The record also demonstrates that FPL had the capacity to institute even the 
most minimal of safety procedures prior to terminating power to the traffic signal.  
When Woodard arrived on the scene at the Fishbein residence, a uniformed officer 
from the Pinecrest police was also present.  This officer could have and would 
have easily assisted in making the intersection safe for travel, but Woodard advised 
the officer that he was no longer needed at the scene.  Even in the officer’s 
absence, FPL itself had more than ample, experienced personnel on the scene who 
were equipped with the items necessary to warn motorists of the inoperable traffic 
 
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light.  Upon analysis, the company had dispatched six trucks and seven repair 
people to this scene.  Woodard, who himself had 32 years’ experience with FPL, 
testified that on the day of the collision, he actually had beacons, hazard lights, 
flashing beacons, and portable two-way hand radios in his truck, none of which 
was ever employed and all of which remained unused.     
The facts clearly show without conflict that FPL also had sufficient time to 
initiate some necessary safety measures on the day of the accident.  Woodard 
arrived on the scene at 2:45 p.m., and confirmed that the downed line on the 
Fishbein property was not an immediate threat because there was absolutely no 
power running through it at that time.  The traffic signal was not deactivated until 
4:42 p.m., leaving the intervening two hours for the multiple crews to ascertain the 
possible ramifications of intentionally terminating power to the parallel line as part 
of the repair, and to implement some corresponding appropriate safety measures. 
The record also reflects that proper safety procedures would have called for 
FPL to simply notify the local authorities that it had or intended to de-power a 
traffic signal or take some small steps to warn affected motorists or both.  Expert 
testimony indicated that FPL should have and could have taken any of several 
minimal steps prior to deactivating the traffic signal, including simply notifying the 
local police department, placing cones or flares on the road, or notifying the public 
works department of the need for portable stop signs.  As Judge Cope correctly 
 
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stated in his opinion specially concurring with the initial district court decision, “It 
does not appear that FPL ever squarely contradicted the plaintiff’s expert’s 
assertion” regarding the applicable standard of care.  Goldberg, 856 So. 2d at  
1031. 5  Even FPL’s senior safety specialist agreed that even in an unplanned 
outage situation, an FPL employee would have an obligation to protect the public 
from the hazardous situation created when he knows his actions will terminate 
power to a traffic signal. 
Finally, the weather added to the hazardous driving conditions which were 
present at the time of the collision.  The accident occurred during the evening rush 
hour on a rainy, overcast day.  The FPL crew should have reasonably factored such 
conditions into determining how to proceed with the needed repair work.  See Clay 
Electric, 873 So. 2d at 1187 (determining that the company should have reasonably 
foreseen that proper maintenance of the street lights was necessary for the 
protection of the plaintiffs where the street light was located in a residential area 
along a major roadway that served as the pathway for a bus stop without the 
benefit of sidewalks).  This trap for the motoring public was created within 100 to 
150 feet from the source of the intentional de-energizing act. 
                                          
 
5.  Judge Cope further stated that FPL never established that the applicable 
standard of care would allow the company to rely exclusively on the provision of 
the Florida Statutes requiring drivers to treat inoperable traffic signals as four-way 
stops.  See Goldberg, 856 So. 2d at 1031.  
 
 
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An analogous question was presented in Palm Beach County Board of 
Commissioners v. Salas, 511 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1987), in which this Court was asked 
to determine whether a county work crew could be held liable for failing to take 
reasonably necessary steps at a maintenance site to protect the safety of passing 
motorists.  In that case, a survey crew had blocked a left turn lane, rendering the 
left turn signal perpetually red.  See id. at 545.  The crew failed to post signs 
prohibiting left turns from the remaining lanes.  See id.  A woman who attempted 
to turn from the far right lane collided with the plaintiffs in the intersection.  See 
id.  This Court held that the work crew had a duty to carry out its maintenance 
responsibilities in a non-negligent manner, and had a duty to warn the motoring 
public of any known hazards that the presence of the work crew, blocking of the 
turn lane, and accompanying deactivation of the turn signal had created.  See id. at 
547. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the First District in Robinson v. State 
Department of Transportation, 465 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).  There, the 
DOT had blocked the left turn lane to repaint arrows on the roadway, and thereby 
rendered the automatic light activator inoperable.  See id. at 1302.  The district 
court reversed the entry of a partial summary judgment in favor of the DOT, 
determining that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the 
DOT carried out its maintenance responsibilities in a non-negligent manner.  See 
 
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id. at 1304.  Important to the court’s determination was the fact that one of the 
drivers involved in the accident saw no caution signs, the posting of which was 
required by the DOT safety manual.  See id.; see also City of St. Petersburg v. 
Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982) (holding that governmental entities 
may be held liable for failing to provide the necessary warning or correction of a 
known dangerous condition). 
Applying those principles to the instant matter supports the conclusion that 
FPL had a clear duty to warn motorists of the hazardous situation it created by the 
deactivation of the traffic signal at the intersection of 67th and 120th.  As in Salas 
and Robinson, an entity––here FPL––engaged in an affirmative action that 
rendered a single, perceptible traffic signal inoperable.  Just as in those cases, this 
action by FPL agents created a hazardous condition and a foreseeable zone of risk 
for the motorists utilizing the affected intersection.  FPL was thus subject to a duty 
to use reasonable care in perfecting this repair and at least warn motorists of the 
hazardous situation it had created. 
FPL urges, however, that it has no common law duty to the public at large 
whatsoever to maintain the flow of electricity to traffic signals, and that any “duty 
to warn” argument is essentially and necessarily the flip side of the same coin in 
that it seeks to hold FPL liable for the consequences of the cessation of power to 
the signal.  Essentially, FPL posits that there is no distinction between the asserted 
 
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nonexistent duty to the public to maintain the flow of electricity to traffic signals in 
Pinecrest and the duty to warn of interrupted service.  FPL misapprehends the issue 
and misstates the duty issue.  FPL relies on an inapplicable line of cases in which 
some courts facing different facts have refused to impose a common law duty on 
electric utilities to ensure the supply of electricity to street lights and traffic signals.  
See Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) 
(determining that the utility company had not assumed a duty to the general public 
to ensure supply of electricity to traffic signals); Gin v. Yachanin, 600 N.E.2d 836 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that no duty to the general public emanates from 
the power company’s contract with the local government to provide service to 
traffic signals and street lights); see also Martinez v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 785 
So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (concluding that the public is only an 
incidental beneficiary to electric company's agreement with the local government 
to maintain streetlights), quashed, 863 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2003) (quashing district 
court decision and remanding for consideration in light of decision in Clay 
Electric); Levy v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 798 So. 2d 778, 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001) (determining that power company does not owe a duty to a noncustomer 
injured because its negligence rendered a traffic signal inoperable), notice invoking 
discretionary review filed, No. SC01-2786 (Fla. Dec. 17, 2001). 6 
                                          
 
6.  Clay Electric relied on many of the same cases in arguing that it owed no 
 
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However, the rule established in those cases has no application here, where 
after determining that no imminent threat existed, an FPL employee chose a 
deliberate hazardous repair action that he knew or should have known would 
deactivate a single, nearby, in-sight traffic signal, which controlled a very active 
intersection, without taking at least some minimal precautions to make safe the 
resulting hazard.  The cases cited by FPL simply reflect the established principle 
that the power company should not be held responsible every time power to a 
traffic signal ceases, a concept with which we do not disagree.  Certainly, in the 
event of an emergency mechanical failure, FPL may not know, or know in a timely 
manner, that service to a traffic signal has been interrupted.  Similarly, in a large-
scale power outage attendant to a hurricane or other act of God, numerous traffic 
signals may be deactivated rendering it impractical for FPL to implement safety 
precautions at all affected intersections.  Likewise, an FPL repairman faced with a 
truly emergent threat, such as downed live wires, may be forced to rapidly 
                                                                                                                                        
duty to maintain the street light at issue in that case.  Arenado and many of the 
other cases cited above rely on the principle articulated in H.R. Moch Co. v. 
Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928), in which the New York court 
held that the water company’s agreement to supply water to the city did not create 
a duty to the public at large to ensure an adequate supply of water to city fire 
hydrants.  This Court has distinguished the cases that relied upon Moch, stating 
that Moch was issued at a time when the undertaker’s doctrine was nascent and the 
courts did not have the benefit of modern authority pertaining to the “increased 
risk” and “reliance” factors of the undertaker’s doctrine, and that Moch appeared to 
adopt reasoning applicable to cases involving the installation as opposed to the 
maintenance of fire hydrants.  See Clay Electric, 873 So. 2d at 1188-89.   
 
 
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deactivate electric lines that power traffic signals without the time or resources to 
implement safety precautions. 
This case does not, however, present one of those scenarios.  Nor does 
FPL’s attempt to define the issue meet the facts here.  An FPL repairman acted in a 
deliberate manner that rendered a single, clearly perceptible traffic signal 
inoperative as part of the repair process.  Evidence demonstrates that the repair 
work with which he was faced was not truly an emergency.  The downed line 
which generated the need for repair was de-energized and located on a private 
residence that was unoccupied at the time of the incident and inaccessible to any 
passers by.  The decision to open the fuse on the utility pole––a decision that 
resulted in the termination of power to the traffic signal and the creation of a 
danger and enhanced zone of risk––was made to effectuate the repair of the 
downed line, not to cut power to live lines that would have posed a danger to 
anyone in the area.  Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the existence of an imminent 
threat to the public from the de-energized downed line with Woodard’s decision to 
wait two hours before deactivating the parallel line.  Finally, Woodard was not 
forced to handle this situation alone.  With six trucks and seven employees, FPL 
had ample resources already on the scene to initiate at least some minimal 
necessary safety procedures. 
 
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Under the facts of this case, it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that FPL 
owed a duty to warn affected motorists of the danger created and posed by the 
inoperable traffic signal.  The evidence presented at trial indicated that to satisfy a 
reasonable standard of care would have required FPL to notify the police 
department, place road flares, direct traffic, or take some other precautions 
reasonably necessary to alert and protect the safety of passing motorists.  Having 
performed none of these even elementary precautionary measures, FPL breached 
its duty. 
According to FPL, the sole duty it undertook in the instant matter was to 
repair the downed power line and it was free to do so in any manner it selected 
without regard to the consequences.  It asserts that this Court cannot impose upon 
the company a duty “once removed” from the duty FPL undertook to complete the 
restoration work in this case.  FPL further asserts that foreseeability alone is 
insufficient to create a legal duty, and that a special relationship between it and Jill 
Goldberg is necessary for imposition of a duty.  In support of that proposition, FPL 
cites a string of cases in which the duty to warn or make safe dangerous conditions 
arose from the special relationship between the parties or the defendant’s 
assumption of the duty in question. 
FPL’s argument simply ignores the well-established principle that in 
fulfilling its duty to repair the downed electric wire, it assumed the duty to do so in 
 
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a non-negligent manner.  See Salas, 511 So. 2d at 547; Robinson, 465 So. 2d at 
1304; see also Union Park Mem. Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1996) 
(determining that once a funeral director undertook to lead a funeral procession, he 
assumed a minimal duty to ensure that the procession proceeded safely); Sommers 
v. Smith & Berman, P.A., 637 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (concluding that a 
title company acting as a closing agent has a duty to conduct the closing in a 
reasonably prudent manner).  The company cannot viably argue that its duty to 
warn of a dangerous condition it created in the course of making the repair is “one 
step removed” from its original duty to repair the line.  Such a theory would 
unconscionably allow FPL to take any and all actions it desired to dispense with its 
maintenance and repair duties, regardless of the consequences.  For instance, as the 
Goldbergs respond, had the repair necessitated the excavation of a large ditch in 
the center of 67th Avenue, the law would not insulate FPL from liability for the 
failure to properly mark the hazard on the basis that its duty ended with digging the 
ditch to effectuate the repair, and that any steps to warn oncoming drivers would be 
“one step removed” from its legal duty.  The same logic applies here.  Under the 
facts presented, FPL owed a legal duty to warn the motorists traversing the 
intersection of 67th and 120th that it had deactivated the traffic signal.  
Proximate Causation 
 
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The issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact concerned with 
“whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially 
caused the specific injury that actually occurred.”  McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502; see 
also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 1998).  
This Court has stated that “harm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if prudent human 
foresight would lead one to expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially 
caused by the specific act or omission in question.”  McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503.  
The proper question is whether the individual’s conduct is “so unusual, 
extraordinary or bizarre (i.e., so ‘unforeseeable’) that the policy of the law will 
relieve the [defendant] of any liability for negligently creating this dangerous 
situation.”  Salas, 511 So. 2d at 547.  In this Court’s words, “The law does not 
impose liability for freak injuries that were utterly unpredictable in light of 
common human experience.”  McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503.  Where reasonable 
persons could differ as to whether the facts establish proximate causation, the issue 
must be left to the fact finder.  See id. at 504. 
 
A negligent actor such as FPL is not liable for damages suffered by an 
injured party “when some separate force or action is the active and efficient 
intervening cause” of the injury.  Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 
520, 522 (Fla. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Such an intervening cause 
supersedes the prior wrong as the proximate cause of the injury by breaking the 
 
- 22 -
sequence between the prior wrong and the injury.  However, “[i]f an intervening 
cause is foreseeable the original negligent actor may still be held liable.”  Id.  The 
question of whether an intervening cause is foreseeable is for the trier of fact.  See 
id.  In reaching this determination, the question is “whether the harm that occurred 
was within the scope of the danger attributable to the defendant’s negligent 
conduct.”  Id. (determining that a reasonable person would conclude that stopping 
a car on a multilane highway would create a risk that other cars would collide in an 
effort to avoid impacting the stopped vehicle); see also Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car 
Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977) (determining that it was reasonable to foresee 
the theft of an automobile left unattended with the keys in the ignition in a high 
crime area and the increased danger of injury to those using the highways should 
such theft occur).   
In overturning the jury’s determination in the instant matter and directing 
that a verdict and judgment be entered in favor of FPL, the Third District majority 
sitting en banc determined that even if FPL owed a legal duty to Jill Goldberg, the 
company’s negligence could not have been the proximate cause of the accident 
because it was “causally superseded by the actions of the drivers actually involved 
in the collision.”  Goldberg, 856 So. 2d at 1034.  The Third District provided no 
analysis of the facts undergirding its conclusion on the proximate cause issue, but 
simply cited to a line of its own cases in which it had relieved the initial tortfeasors 
 
- 23 -
of liability as a matter of law due to the plaintiffs’ negligence in failing to treat 
inoperable traffic signals as four-way stops as required by Florida law.   
This principle was first articulated in Metropolitan Dade County v. Colina, 
456 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).  There, the husband of a woman killed in an 
intersectional collision filed a negligence action against Dade County for the 
County’s failure to repair traffic signals rendered inoperable by a storm or place 
temporary traffic control signals at the affected intersections.  See id. at 1234.  The 
evidence in that case showed that as Colina approached the intersection, he stopped 
his vehicle, noticed two vehicles approaching to his left, realized that the vehicles 
might not stop, yet still decided to cross the intersection.  See id.  The Colinas’ 
vehicle was struck by one of the oncoming vehicles, resulting in Mrs. Colina’s 
death.  See id. 
The district court there held that the county’s failure to repair the traffic 
signal was not the proximate cause of the collision because the actions of the 
drivers constituted intervening causes.  Citing section 316.1235 of the Florida 
Statutes (1979), which required drivers to treat an inoperable traffic signal as a 
four-way stop, the district court stated that the oncoming driver failed to stop as 
required by law, and that Colina had breached his duty to proceed into the 
intersection only when reasonably safe to do so.  See id. at 1235.  On this basis, the 
district court concluded, “Any negligence on Dade County’s part simply provided 
 
- 24 -
the occasion for the actions of [the drivers], which together were the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Colina’s death.”  Id.  The district court concluded that reasonable 
persons could not differ on the question of whether the county’s failure to act was 
the proximate cause of Mrs. Colina’s death and that, as a matter of law, the 
county’s negligence was not the legal cause of the injury suffered. 
The Third District reached a similar conclusion in Derrer v. Georgia Electric 
Co., 537 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), another case involving an intersectional 
collision.  While it is not entirely clear from the text of the opinion itself, one of the 
drivers involved in the collision apparently asserted that she did not see the 
intersection where the collision occurred due to the inoperable traffic signal.  In 
determining that the inoperable signal was not the proximate cause of the collision, 
the district court reasoned that inoperable intersectional traffic lights do not cause 
automobile drivers to miss seeing the intersection where the light is located.  See 
Derrer, 537 So. 2d at 594.  Most recently, in Metropolitan Dade County v. Tribble, 
616 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the Third District held that a cab driver’s 
decision to disobey the rules governing the treatment of malfunctioning traffic 
lights constituted a “separate and unusual action rendering it a superseding and 
intervening cause of the accident.”  Id. at 60. 
To the extent Colina, Derrer, and Tribble establish that a plaintiff’s 
negligence in entering an uncontrolled intersection always constitutes an 
 
- 25 -
intervening and superseding cause as a matter of law, these cases are misdirected 
and in error.  Any such bright-line rule would contravene the well-settled principle 
that the issue of proximate cause, including whether there exists an intervening and 
superseding cause, is primarily a question of fact, and that when the facts are in 
dispute, the issue must be left to the fact finder.  See Vining, 386 So. 2d at 55 
(reversing summary judgment and stating that jury must ultimately determine 
whether it was reasonable for Avis to foresee the theft of a car and resulting danger 
to the driving public when the car was left in the company’s parking lot with the 
keys in the ignition).  Indeed, juries in similar contexts have rightly determined that 
a plaintiff’s negligence in negotiating an intersection or roadway does not 
necessarily constitute an intervening and superseding cause relieving the initially 
negligent party such as FPL of liability.  See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hernandez, 810 So. 2d 
1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing summary judgment granted on the basis that 
a driver’s decision to negotiate an obscured turn constituted an intervening and 
superseding cause relieving the contractor who placed concrete pipes near the 
intersection of liability); Dykes v. City of Apalachicola, 645 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1994) (reversing trial court’s conclusion that driver’s negligence in hitting a 
pedestrian constituted an intervening and superseding cause relieving the city of 
liability for allowing foliage to grow into the right-of-way); Grier v. Bankers Land 
Co., 539 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (reversing trial court determination that 
 
- 26 -
overgrown foliage adjacent to an intersection could not as a matter of law 
constitute the proximate cause of an accident).  Yet, the Third District relied on 
Colina, Derrer and Tribble to summarily conclude that FPL’s negligence in failing 
to warn affected motorists of the danger could not have been the proximate cause 
of the accident because it was causally superseded by the negligence of Rosalie 
Goldberg and Cynthia Sollie.     
In denying FPL’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court correctly 
reviewed the record evidence and determined that the accident was an entirely 
foreseeable consequence of FPL’s negligence in creating a dangerous condition of 
deactivating the traffic signal.  See Goldberg, 856 So. 2d at 1018.  In initially 
affirming the trial court’s decision, the original district court panel determined that 
the accident in the instant matter was not an “unpredictable event” and presented a 
“classic jury issue.”  Id. at 1027.  We agree with this analysis.  If an intersection is 
controlled by a traffic signal, it is usually because the intersection is heavily 
traveled, has line of sight obstructions, or has some other physical characteristic 
that renders stop signs or other traffic control devices impractical.  Thus, in the 
course of human events, it is certainly foreseeable that drivers approaching an 
intersection with an inoperable traffic light will fail to stop, despite the traffic law 
requiring drivers to treat the inoperable signal as a four-way stop.  See § 316.1235, 
Fla. Stat. (2003).  This is especially true in a case such as this in which the drivers 
 
- 27 -
approached an inoperable traffic signal at a busy intersection, during the rush hour, 
in inclement weather, and where traffic proceeded in one direction in an almost 
unbroken band.7  
Our decision in Salas is particularly instructive on the proximate cause issue 
presented here.  In that case, the Court considered whether the driver’s decision to 
make a left turn from the far right lane (an action which violated two traffic laws), 
superseded the county’s negligence in blocking the left turn lane without providing 
any markers or guidance regarding the inability to turn left at the intersection.  See 
Salas, 511 So. 2d at 547.  In the Court’s words: 
                                          
 
7.  Pinecrest’s traffic homicide detective testified to the commonality of this 
situation, stating: 
 
I’m sure you’ve driven down the road, and I do every day, that 
when there’s a light out, the flow of traffic that’s going when the light 
is out continues to go as long as the cars are consistent. 
If the oncoming section gets a break in traffic or one of the 
drivers, you know, decides that he’s going to break the chain, he 
nudges up until they gain possession of the lane and then they go until 
the other side gets a break. 
That’s the way it is here.  It’s been like that for sixteen years.  
The law was written many years ago.  The intersections today—I 
mean it’s just not practical. 
If we shut down the light at 104th Street or anywhere along 
South Dixie, four lanes in each direction, you’re not going to have at 
rush hour especially, 5 o’clock when this happened, four cars stop, 
four cars go. 
It’s just not going to happen.  It’s going to be chaotic.  That’s 
why police officers are put in intersections because there’s no control. 
 
 
- 28 -
We are of the view, and we so hold, that the county could have easily 
foreseen that blocking off the turn lane, and deactivating the turn 
signal and thus leaving motorists with no guidance on if or when they 
could turn left, personal injury to someone was not a remote 
possibility.  Blount’s actions were not so unforeseeable that the 
county should be relieved, as a matter of law and policy, of all 
liability. . . .  Blount's confusion at this busy and now more dangerous 
intersection was not some remote possibility, it was easily 
foreseeable.  The fact that Blount was negligent when she turned left 
does not render her action so bizarre, unusual or outside the realm of 
the reasonably foreseeable that the county’s actions did not also 
proximately cause the Salases’ injuries. 
Id. 
Similarly, here, the failure of a motorist to stop at the intersection of 67th 
and 120th was not “so bizarre, unusual or outside the realm of . . . reasonably 
foreseeable” behavior to relieve FPL of liability for deactivating the traffic signal 
without taking any precautions whatsoever to warn oncoming motorists.  This is 
particularly true where, as here, the collision occurred during rush hour at a busy 
intersection on rain-slicked streets when the Goldbergs were traveling in a line of 
northbound traffic in which no car stopped at the inoperable light.  Under the 
circumstances of this case, it was entirely foreseeable that motorists might not stop 
their vehicles at the inoperable traffic signal. 
Likewise, under the facts presented here, Cynthia Sollie’s negligence in 
pulling out onto 67th Avenue does not constitute an intervening and superseding 
cause that would relieve FPL of liability.  Evidence established that Sollie was 
aware of the inoperable signal and brought her vehicle to a stop as required by 
 
- 29 -
Florida’s traffic law.  Sollie testified8 that she looked to her right and left prior to 
proceeding into the intersection and saw no cars.  This testimony is supported by 
that of experts for both sides who noted the existence of line of sight obstructions 
at the subject intersection.9   
While certainly not factors within FPL’s control, the rain, the overcast skies, 
and the line of sight obstructions could be perceived by anyone in proximity of the 
intersection that day, including Woodard, and should have informed FPL’s 
decision with regard to how the repair work would be accomplished.  Indeed, while 
begrudgingly, FPL’s accident reconstruction expert even testified that if the light 
had been operational, or if someone had been in place to direct traffic, the accident 
probably would not have happened.  When viewed in light of the facts of the case, 
the negligence displayed by Rosalie Goldberg and Cynthia Sollie cannot be 
characterized as intervening and superseding causes as a matter of law totally 
relieving FPL of its responsibility for breaching its duty of care by creating the 
danger and zone of enhanced risk.  This is a case where reasonable persons could 
certainly differ as to the issue of proximate causation, and therefore, the issue was 
within the proper province of the fact finder.  Either the Colina line of cases 
                                          
 
8.  Sollie’s deposition testimony was read into the record.   
 
 
9.  FPL’s own accident reconstruction expert testified that if Sollie was 
stopped at the stop bar to the intersection, her view would have been obstructed, 
and there would have been only a “crack” of viewability in the direction from 
which the Goldbergs were traveling. 
 
- 30 -
establishes an erroneous rule of law, or the en banc court erred to the extent it 
interpreted these cases as creating an absolute bright-line rule governing the 
proximate cause question presented in cases where the plaintiff displays negligence 
in entering an intersection with an inoperable traffic signal. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we quash the en banc decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal and remand the case for reinstatement of the initial district 
court decision.  We disapprove Colina, Derrer, and Tribble to the extent described 
herein.  
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in result only. 
 
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case.  However, I do not 
join in the majority’s opinion because I do not agree that the duty on the part of 
Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) in this case was a duty to warn of the 
danger of the traffic lights being out.  The motorists driving through this 
intersection had a duty to know whether the traffic light was working, § 316.1235, 
Fla. Stat. (1997), and to observe the requirements of section 316.123(2), Florida 
 
- 31 -
Statutes (1997), if the traffic light was inoperative.  FPL had no duty to otherwise 
warn them about the light being inoperative. 
 
Moreover, whether the traffic light was operative was open and obvious, and 
a failure to warn about that fact did not cause this accident.  The record facts here 
are that Ms. Goldberg proceeded into the intersection without observing the light 
but, rather, only observed that the traffic ahead of her was moving forward.  Ms. 
Sollie apparently did observe that the traffic light was out. 
 
I agree with Judge Cope’s analysis in the district court panel’s decision: 
 
In the present case, however, it was necessary to shut off the 
power at this specific location in order to accomplish the repair.  The 
fact that this was the power supply for the nearby traffic signal was 
ascertainable from inspection of the pole.  There was ample time to 
arrange for someone to direct traffic, or to take other protective 
measures. 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Goldberg, 856 So. 2d 1011, 1031-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2002) (Cope, J., specially concurring).  Under the circumstances of this case, since 
FPL should have known that it was cutting off the traffic control at the intersection, 
FPL had a duty, in accord with McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 
(Fla. 1992), to provide emergency traffic control either until law enforcement 
arrived to provide traffic control or until the traffic light was operable.  Contrary to 
footnote 3 of the majority opinion, I would hold only that this was the duty which 
FPL had under the circumstances of this case.  My conclusion follows McCain, 
 
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593 So. 2d at 503 n.2, which states that a duty can arise from the facts of the case.  
My view is no more extensive than that holding in McCain. 
 
I agree with the majority that the issue of whether FPL’s failure to provide 
traffic control was a proximate cause of the accident was for the jury.  I conclude 
that the negligence of the motorists under these facts was joint and not an 
intervening cause.  Again, I agree with Judge Cope in his dissenting opinion to the 
en banc district court decision that the issue in this case was the comparative fault 
of FPL and the two motorists.10 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D00-63 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, Florida and Stuart Grossman of 
Grossman and Roth, P.A., Boca Raton, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Gary L. Sasso and Hunter W. Carroll of Carlton Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, 
Florida and Aimee Fried, FPL Law Department, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
                                          
 
 
10.  FPL did not raise in this Court an issue of whether a new trial should 
have been granted on the issue of comparative negligence.