Title: Kemp v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Timothy Wayne KEMP v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-549                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 22, 1996


1.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency of -- factors on review.
     -- The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is
     whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
     verdict; substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough
     to compel a conclusion one way or another and which goes
     beyond mere speculation or conjecture; the court reviews the
     evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and
     considers only that evidence which supports the verdict;
     intent to commit murder may be inferred from the type of
     weapon used, and the nature, extent, and location of the
     wounds. 

2.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency of -- evidence was
     sufficient to show killings were premeditated and deliberated
     acts. -- Upon considering the doctor's testimony regarding the
     nature, extent, and location of the victim's wounds, the jury
     could have easily inferred that appellant fired the shots into
     the victims in a premeditated and deliberated manner; also
     significant was testimony that appellant admitted to killing
     three of the victims because he was angry at them for running
     him off and not letting his girlfriend leave with him, and a
     fourth because he was "at the wrong place at the wrong time";
     in light of this evidence, the appellee's proof was sufficient
     that the appellant's killings of the four victims were
     premeditated and deliberate acts.

3.   Jurisdiction -- territorial jurisdiction of lower courts in
     criminal trials discussed -- circuit courts limited to trying
     accusations of crimes which occurred in their counties or
     judicial districts. -- If the allegation of a charging
     instrument were that an offense occurred outside the
     territorial jurisdiction of the court, then a judgment
     rendered by the court would be void; a criminal trial must be
     held in the county in which the crime was committed, provided
     that venue may be changed, at the request of the accused, to
     another county in the judicial district in which the
     "indictment is found"; a circuit court is limited to trying a
     criminal case in the county in which the crime was committed
     unless the accused requests the trial be moved to another
     county which, in any case, must be a part of the judicial
     district served by the court; circuit courts are thus limited
     to trying accusations of crimes which occurred in the
     counties, or judicial districts, in which they sit. 

4.   Jurisdiction -- appellant's argument without merit -- no
     constitutional or legislative division of judicial district. -
     - Appellant's argument that the circuit judge was without
     territorial jurisdiction to hear the case was meritless; the
     electoral subdistricts contemplated in the Hunt Consent Decree
     were not judicial districts under Arkansas's Constitution and
     statutes; the Consent Decree clearly stated that the lines of
     existing judicial districts would not be disturbed except to
     the extent that electoral subdistricts were created; here
     there was no constitutional or legislative provision that
     divided the judicial district into two judicial districts and
     there was nothing in the plain language of Ark. Const. art. 7,
      17, that effected such a division.
  
5.   Jurisdiction -- reliance on case misplaced -- electorial
     subdistricts not intended to be self-contained judicial
     districts. --  Appellant's reliance on Riviere v. Hardegree,
     278 Ark. 167, 644 S.W.2d (1983) was misplaced; that case was
     clearly distinguishable in that it involved statutory
     interpretation of an act of the General Assembly; there has
     been no effort by the General Assembly to convert the
     electoral subdistricts created in Hunt into entirely separate
     and self-contained judicial districts with all the attendant
     ramifications. 

6.   Constitutional law -- Sixth Amendment rights not violated --
     judicial districts remained intact. -- Appellant's argument
     that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his
     prosecution in the First Division of Pulaski County Circuit
     Court was meritless; the new subdistricts were not perceived
     as having been created for reasons other than for the
     elections of minority judges; the judicial districts remained
     intact under state law and the state's judicial districts are
     the districts referenced in the Sixth Amendment as opposed to
     the electoral subdistricts established in the Hunt Consent
     Decree. 

7.   Jury -- proffered instruction omitted some of applicable law -
     - instruction properly refused. -- Where appellant's proposed
     jury instruction did not correctly state the law, the trial
     court did not err in refusing to give it.

8.   Jury -- jury instruction refused -- trial court's refusal to
     proffer instruction did not violate appellant's due process
     rights. -- Appellant's assertion that his federal and state
     due process rights were violated as a result of the trial
     court's refusal to give his proffered "imperfect self-defense"
     instruction was meritless; the trial court's refusal to give
     appellant's requested instruction did not eliminate appellee's
     burden to prove premeditated and deliberated murder beyond a
     reasonable doubt and the jury was instructed in this respect,
     and was also instructed on the lesser-included offenses of
     first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter;
     the evidence relating to the element of premeditated and
     deliberated murder was for the jury to weigh and evaluate in
     light of the appellee's burden to prove that intent beyond a
     reasonable doubt; as it was clear that this burden remained
     with the appellee, the trial court's refusal to give
     appellant's proffered instruction did not violate his due
     process rights.

9.   Jury -- standard for excusal of juror for cause -- when claim
     of error is preserved -- trial court's ruling not disturbed
     absent abuse of discretion. -- The standard for determining if
     a prospective juror should be excused for cause is whether the
     juror's views about the death penalty would prevent, or
     substantially impair, the performance of the juror's duties in
     accordance with the instructions and the oath taken; a claim
     of error relating to a challenge for cause is only preserved
     regarding jurors who actually sat on the jury after a
     challenge for cause was denied; in Arkansas, it is presumed
     that persons comprising the venire are unbiased and qualified
     to serve, it is appellant's burden to prove otherwise; a trial
     court's ruling on this issue will not be disturbed absent an
     abuse of discretion. 

10.  Jury -- juror fit to serve -- appellant's argument rejected. -
     - Upon examining the juror's remarks, the supreme court agreed
     that her answers did not render her unfit to serve on the
     jury; appellant's argument that the juror should have been
     excused for cause was rejected.

11.  Criminal law -- capital murder statute not unconstitutionally
     vague. -- Appellant's argument that the capital murder statute
     was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and
     Fourteenth Amendments because it provided no meaningful
     distinction between "premeditation and deliberation" and the
     definition of "purpose" in the first-degree murder statute had
     been previously made and rejected. 

12.  Mistrial -- mistrial discussed -- trial court has wide
     discretion in granting or denying -- attorneys given leeway in
     closing remarks. -- A mistrial is a drastic remedy to which
     the court should resort only when there has been an error so
     prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the
     trial, it should only be ordered when the fundamental fairness
     of the trial itself has been manifestly affected; the trial
     court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for
     a mistrial and its discretion will not be disturbed except
     where there is an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to
     the complaining party, an admonition to the jury usually cures
     a prejudicial statement unless it is so patently inflammatory
     that justice could not be served by continuing the trial;
     attorneys are given leeway in closing remarks.

 13. Mistrial -- prosecutor's statement not of such magnitude to
     require mistrial -- admonition to jury cured any prejudice. -- 
     Where the prosecutor's statement was not of such magnitude to
     require a mistrial, and, the trial court instructed the jury
     that closing arguments were not evidence, the admonition cured
     any prejudice.

14.  Criminal law -- mental capacity of accused to waive
     constitutional rights question of fact for trial court --
     intoxication alone will not invalidate statement. -- Whether
     an accused had sufficient mental capacity to waive his
     constitutional rights, or was too incapacitated due to drugs
     or alcohol to make an intelligent waiver is a question of fact
     for the trial court to resolve; the fact that the accused
     might have been intoxicated at the time of his statement,
     alone, will not invalidate that statement, but will only go to
     the weight accorded it.  

15.  Criminal law -- appellant's argument meritless -- trial court
     resolved issue against him. -- Appellant's argument that since
     he had consumed at least a case of beer in the eight to twelve
     hours prior to offering his statement, he was so intoxicated
     that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
     waive his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United
     States Constitution and Ark. Const. art. 2,  8, was
     meritless; the trial court had the duty to determine if
     appellant had sufficient mental capacity and did so.

16.  Appeal & error -- no authority cited for argument -- no
     prejudice found. -- Appellant's argument that the trial court
     erred in refusing to enjoin the prosecutor from claiming to
     represent "The People," as Arkansas has specifically rejected
     this formulation and prosecutions are made in name of the
     State, was meritless; appellant cited no authority nor did he
     make a convincing argument in support of his assertion of
     error; moreover, no prejudice was found in the trial court's
     failure so to enjoin the prosecutor; the court will not
     reverse in the absence of prejudice. 

17.  Motions -- motion to quash properly denied -- no prejudice
     shown. -- Where, prior to individual voir dire, the
     prospective jurors were asked some questions as a group and
     one prospective juror stated that his wife worked with someone
     who was related to one of the witnesses, particularly, "the
     girl that was hid in the closet," appellant's motion to quash
     the panel on the grounds that this statement was prejudicial
     was properly denied; at trial a witness testified that she hid
     in a closet in the trailer during the shootings; the appellant
     could not show he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. 

18.  Mistrial -- trial court's denial of proffered instructions
     proper -- leeway given to both sides during closing arguments.
     -- The trial court's denial of appellant's motion for
     mistrial, which was based on a remark made by the prosecutor
     during closing arguments was not error; appellant argued that
     the prosecutor's remarks were so misleading that a mistrial
     should be declared, the trial court denied the motion for
     mistrial, and refused appellant's request to admonish the
     jury; appellant cited no authority for his allegation of
     error; leeway is given to both sides during closing argument,
     the prosecutor was simply arguing her case to the jury; the
     trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
     appellant's motion for mistrial. 

19.  Evidence -- review of sufficiency of -- evidence of
     aggravating or mitigating circumstances should be submitted to
     jury. --  On appeal, the court reviews the sufficiency of the
     State's evidence in the light most favorable to the State to
     determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
     the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a
     reasonable doubt; whenever there is any evidence of an
     aggravating or mitigating circumstance, however slight, the
     matter should be submitted to the jury for consideration.

20.  Evidence -- "avoiding arrest" aggravating circumstance
     discussed -- purpose of. -- The statutory aggravating
     circumstance at issue is "apparently designed to deter
     deliberate murderous acts subversive of the criminal justice
     system in particular and social order in general, and to
     protect certain persons deemed especially important to the
     integrity of both, including law enforcement officers, prison
     guards, and actual or potential witnesses in judicial
     proceedings"; where the victim is not a law enforcement
     officer, the State must clearly show that prevention of
     detection and arrest for the offense was the dominant or only
     motive for the killing. 

21.  Criminal law -- "avoiding arrest" aggravating circumstance --
     murder committed in order to avoid arrest or eliminate 
     witness to another offense committed in connection with
     murder. -- A consequence of every murder is the elimination of
     the victim as a potential witness; however, avoiding arrest is
     not necessarily an invariable motivation for killing; a common
     thread in many of the supreme court's prior decisions
     involving the "avoiding arrest" aggravating circumstance is
     that the murder was committed in order to avoid arrest or
     eliminate a witness to another offense committed in connection
     with the murder.

22.  Evidence -- appellant never used force to remove girlfriend
     from trailer -- appellee's argument fatally flawed. --
     Appellee's assertion that, based on testimony by a friend of
     appellant, the jury could have inferred that appellant
     returned to the trailer for the purpose of retrieving his
     girlfriend, and that he shot and killed the four victims at
     issue in order to prevent them from having him arrested if he
     used force to remove her from the trailer, was not accepted by
     the court; the State's argument was contrary to the friend's
     testimony during the penalty phase and the record revealed no
     testimony at trial, from any witness, that appellant made any
     attempt to forcibly remove his girlfriend from the trailer, or
     that he shot and killed the four victims in order to prevent
     them from having him arrested if he used force to remove her
     from the trailer; moreover, appellant never used force to
     remove his girlfriend from the trailer; thus, the killings
     could not have been committed to avoid being arrested for an
     offense that did not occur; to accept appellee's argument
     would be to ignore the evidence of appellant's motive that is
     in the record -- that appellant killed the victims because
     they had run him off and kept his girlfriend and would not let
     him take her with him.  

23.  Evidence -- evidence as to one victim left room for inference
     that appellant killed stranger to avoid arrest -- submission
     of aggravating circumstance as to him alone proper. -- Where,
     with respect to the fourth victim, the jury could have taken
     into account a witness's testimony that appellant had stated
     to him that that victim was "in the wrong place at the wrong
     time," the jury could have inferred that appellant killed the
     man, a person he did not know, for no logical reason such as
     revenge or accident; thus, while there was insufficient
     evidence to support the submission of the "avoiding arrest"
     aggravating circumstance to the jury on the counts relating to
     the other three victims, the court found no error in the
     submission of this aggravator on the count relating to the
     fourth victim.

24.  Criminal law -- statutory harmless error analysis performed in
     penalty phase only if no mitigating circumstances found by
     jury -- jury found two mitigating circumstances on each count
     -- case reversed for resentencing. -- The statutory harmless
     error analysis in the penalty phase can be performed only if
     jury found no mitigating circumstances; here, the jury
     unanimously found two mitigating circumstances on each count:
     (1) appellant grew up in an environment of abuse and
     alcoholism, and (2) appellant grew up in an environment where
     his father provided an example of extreme violent reactions to
     situations; the case was reversed for resentencing on the
     counts relating to the first three victims.

25.  Criminal law -- victim-impact statute not void for vagueness -
     - State has legitimate interest in counteracting defendant's
     mitigating evidence. -- Arkansas's victim-impact statute, Ark.
     Code Ann.  5-4-602(4)(Repl. 1993), is not void for vagueness;
     the United States Supreme Court permits the States to
     authorize victim-impact testimony; the Court referred
     specifically to who might qualify as being impacted by a
     victim's death and to the State's legitimate interest in
     counteracting the defendant's mitigating evidence and in
     reminding the jury that the victim was a person "whose death
     represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his
     family"; thus, testimony may range from the victim's family to
     those close to that person who were profoundly impacted by his
     death; the court declined to hold Act 1089 of 1993 to be
     impermissibly vague.
 
26.  Criminal law -- victim impact statute -- statute not violative
     of Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-603--604. -- The victim impact statute
     does not conflict with Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-603 and -604
     (Repl. 1993), which direct the jury to determine whether
     aggravating circumstances exist, to weigh any aggravating
     circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and to
     determine whether the aggravating circumstances justify a
     death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt; the State has a
     legitimate interest in counteracting the defendant's
     mitigating evidence, there is nothing unfair about allowing
     the jury to bear in mind the specific harm caused by the
     defendant at the same time it considers the mitigating
     evidence introduced by the defendant; a State may legitimately
     conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact
     of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's
     decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be
     imposed.

27.  Criminal law -- victim-impact statute -- Eighth Amendment not 
     violated. -- Appellant's claim that the victim-impact statute
     was violative of the Eighth Amendment was without merit; the
     United States Supreme Court has held that "a capital sentencer
     need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the
     capital sentencing decision"; in so holding, the Court
     recognized that a contrary rule would force the states to
     adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury
     to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a
     certain kind or number of facts, or found more statutory
     aggravating factors than mitigating factors; the states are 
     not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that 
     fashion.

28.  Criminal law -- victim-impact statute -- statute not violative
     of Arkansas Constitution. -- Appellant's assertion that the
     victim-impact statute violated Art. 2,  9, of the Arkansas
     Constitution was groundless where he failed to present any
     argument showing why the court should interpret this provision
     in a manner contrary to that of the Eighth Amendment to the
     United States Constitution; while the Eighth Amendment erects
     no per se bar to the introduction of victim impact testimony,
     when evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that
     it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process
     clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for
     relief; after reviewing the victim-impact evidence presented,
     the supreme court determined that this line was not crossed.

29.  Criminal law -- victim-impact testimony allowed at trial --
     testimony not so unduly prejudicial that it rendered
     appellant's trial fundamentally unfair. -- Testimony by
     sisters of one victim about the loss they felt after their
     brother's death, testimony by the daughter and sister of two
     of the victims, and that of the sisters of a third victim was
     not so unduly prejudicial that it rendered appellant's trial
     fundamentally unfair. 

30.  Jury -- jury instruction properly refused -- non-model
     instructions given only in limited instances. -- Appellant's
     contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give to
     the jury his proffered penalty-phase instruction, which was
     not the model instruction, was meritless where the model
     instruction was sufficient; non-model instructions are to be
     given only when the trial court finds that the model
     instructions do not accurately state the law or do not contain
     a necessary instruction on the subject; it was not error to
     refuse the appellant's proffered instruction.  

31.  Jury instructions -- AMCI 2d 1509 Form 3 not violative of
     Eighth Amendment -- jury expressly allowed to list mitigating
     circumstances found by some, but not all, of its members. -- 
     Appellant's assertion that AMCI 2d Form 3 was violative of the
     Eighth Amendment because it was phrased in such a way so as to
     inform each juror that he or she could not consider evidence
     of a mitigating circumstance unless all other jurors
     unanimously agreed that the evidence supported the finding of
     the mitigating circumstance was rejected; Form 2, which
     accompanies AMCI 1509, expressly allows the jury to list
     mitigating circumstances which were found by some, though not
     all, of its members, Form 3 then allows the jury to determine
     if the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating
     circumstances; nothing in the forms indicates to the jury that
     a mitigating circumstance must be found unanimously before it
     may be considered in the weighing process.

32.  Criminal law -- assertions of error foreclosed by Blystone v.
     Pennsylvania. -- Appellant's assertions that the trial court
     erred (1) in refusing his proffered modified version of AMCI
     2d Form Three, which would inform the jury that they "may" but
     were not required to give death even if all the
     interrogatories were answered in the affirmative, and (2) in
     refusing to modify Form Three to read, "the aggravating
     circumstances, when weighed against the mitigating
     circumstances, justify beyond a reasonable doubt a sentence of
     death," were, as he conceded, foreclosed by the United States
     Supreme Court's decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania,