Title: Cooper v. Durham

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: August 25, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0965 
_________________________ 
 
Jacob Cooper  
 
v.  
 
Cody Durham 
 
 
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900166) 
 
 
MENDHEIM, Justice. 
 
 
 
Cody Durham commenced this action in the Jackson Circuit Court 
against Jacob Cooper, alleging breach of a purchase agreement between 
them involving the sale of Cooper's residence. Following a bench trial, the 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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trial court awarded Durham $79,000 in damages. Cooper appeals the 
judgment. We reverse and remand.  
I. Facts 
 
In August 2020, Durham saw a listing on the Facebook 
Marketplace social-media website advertising for sale Cooper's house and 
the two acres of real property on which the house is situated, located in 
Stevenson ("the subject property"). Both Durham and Cooper testified 
that Cooper's wife, Brandi, had listed the subject property on Facebook 
Marketplace. Durham and his wife went to look at the house, and 
Durham made an offer on the subject property the same day. Over text 
messages between Durham and Cooper on August 19, 2020, they agreed 
to a purchase price of $236,000, with Cooper paying the closing costs of 
$6,626, bringing the total amount owed by Durham to $229,374. They 
also agreed that the closing date would be September 21, 2020. Durham 
testified that he picked that date because his bank had informed him that 
"they needed four weeks to prepare the loan." 
On August 24, 2020, Durham and Cooper agreed via text messages 
to meet at a Jack's restaurant in Stevenson to sign the purchase 
agreement. Durham testified that he did not engage any realtor or lawyer 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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to help him with drafting the purchase agreement. Instead, he just 
searched for "residential purchase agreement" on the Google Internet 
search engine and used the first fillable form generated by that search. 
Durham admitted that he had filled in all the blank terms on the form 
contract and that Cooper had played no role in drafting the purchase 
agreement. On August 24, 2020, Cooper and Durham signed the 
purchase agreement in the Jack's restaurant parking lot. The purchase 
price was the previously discussed amount of $236,000, with Cooper 
paying the closing costs, and the closing date was listed as September 21, 
2020, at 5:00 p.m. 
According to the purchase agreement, Durham was financing the 
purchase through a Federal Housing Authority ("FHA") loan. One of the 
apparent conditions of Durham's FHA loan was that the loan would not 
be approved unless the subject property's appraised value was confirmed 
by a certified appraiser. On September 14, 2020, a certified appraiser, 
Adria L. Bradford, came to the subject property on behalf of Durham's 
lender. Bradford issued an appraisal ("the original appraisal") assessing 
the subject property's value to be $238,500, but that appraisal value was 
subject to the condition that a storage shed in Cooper's backyard needed 
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to be fixed or torn down. On the same date, Brandi Cooper sent Durham 
a text message relating that Bradford had told Brandi that the storage 
shed needed to be fixed or torn down and that, if it was not, the FHA loan 
would not be approved. Bradford also told Brandi that she would return 
to the subject property before closing to confirm for the lender that the 
storage shed had been fixed or removed. Brandi informed Durham that 
Cooper had told her that they "don't have the money" to fix or tear down 
the storage shed, so it would be up to Durham to take care of it. 
In the evening on September 14, 2020, Durham and Cooper 
exchanged text messages concerning the storage shed, and Durham 
stated that he would stop by the subject property to decide whether he 
would fix the storage shed or tear it down. On September 16, 2020, 
Durham stopped by the subject property to look at the storage shed.  
On September 19, 2020, Cooper sent Durham the following text 
message: 
"I guess we're gonna back out on selling you guys the 
house. The closing date has already been changed and you 
guys didn't show up today to look at the shed. Not trying to be 
rude, but I have already been through this and I don't plan on 
going through it again." 
 
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In the text conversation that followed Cooper's declaration, Durham 
stated that the closing could still occur within the next week so long as 
the storage shed was removed. Durham further stated that he was 
planning to come to the subject property the next day to take down the 
shed by burning it. Cooper responded that he was still "gonna back out" 
of the sale, after which Durham accused Cooper of "breach[ing] the 
contract." 
 
On November 9, 2020, Durham commenced this action against 
Cooper in the Jackson Circuit Court seeking specific performance of the 
purchase agreement, damages for breach of contract, and any other relief 
the trial court may deem appropriate. In his complaint, Durham alleged, 
among other things, that Cooper owned the subject property, that he and 
Cooper had executed the purchase agreement on August 24, 2020, and 
that the agreed-upon purchase price was $236,000. Durham attached a 
copy of the executed purchase agreement to his complaint. 
On December 1, 2020, Cooper answered Durham's complaint. In his 
answer, Cooper expressly admitted the allegations that he owned the 
subject property and that he and Durham had "entered into a contract on 
August 24, 2020, for the sale of Cooper's property at a price of 
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$236,000.00." Cooper also admitted that "he refuses to now accept 
$236,000.00 and now convey the property to Durham," and he admitted 
that "the parties entered into a valid, legal, and enforceable contract for 
the sale of land." However, Cooper denied that he had breached the 
purchase agreement. In his assertion of affirmative defenses, Cooper 
contended that Durham had "failed to perform under the contract," that 
Durham had "breached the contract," and that Durham had not suffered 
any damages. 
On June 23, 2021, a bench trial was held before Judge John H. 
Graham. The sole witnesses at the trial were Durham and Cooper. 
During their testimony, Cooper's wife Brandi was mentioned several 
times, including in reference to the facts that she had listed the subject 
property for sale, that she lived at the subject property with Cooper and 
their two kids, and that she had communicated directly with Durham 
concerning the appraiser's statements about the storage shed. During the 
trial, Durham argued that Cooper had prematurely backed out of the 
sale, and Cooper argued that removal of the storage shed was a 
contingency of the sale that was never satisfied. 
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On July 26, 2021, Judge Graham entered an "Order Granting 
Complaint for Specific Performance." In that order, Judge Graham held, 
among other things: 
"1. The express written real estate contract between 
[Durham] and [Cooper] is valid and enforceable. 
 
"2. Defendant Cooper breached the contract (via the 
'backing out' text message) and did so without a valid or 
lawful reason. 
 
"…. 
 
"5. Defendant Cooper 'backed out' and breached before 
the stated closing date. 
 
"6. The FHA loan problem identified by an appraiser 
(not the lender) was Plaintiff Durham's problem to solve, not 
Defendant Cooper's problem. It gave [Cooper] no legal reason 
to breach. It might have given [Durham] a legal reason, but 
not [Cooper]. 
 
"…. 
 
"10. The Court finds that the object of the contract is 
lawful and that the consideration is adequate. 
 
"11. The Court finds that [Durham] is entitled to the 
relief requested in the complaint and that specific 
performance of the real estate contract is the appropriate 
remedy in this case." 
 
Judge Graham ordered Durham to pay $236,000 to the clerk of the circuit 
court within 30 days of the entry of the order and to prepare a clerk's 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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deed conveying the subject property and to provide that deed to the clerk. 
The clerk would then deliver the money to Cooper, and Cooper was to 
convey the subject property to Durham. 
 
On August 9, 2021, Cooper filed a postjudgment motion seeking to 
alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order. In that motion, Cooper 
argued that the subject property was Brandi Cooper's homestead because 
she lived on the property with Cooper as his wife and that, as such, the 
subject property was protected by § 6-10-3, Ala. Code 1975, which 
provides in relevant part that "[n]o mortgage, deed or other conveyance 
of the homestead by a married person shall be valid without the 
voluntary signature and assent of the husband or wife …." Cooper further 
asserted that, based on § 6-10-3, "[w]ithout Mr. Cooper's wife's 'voluntary 
signature and assent' to the alienation of Mr. and Mrs. Cooper's 
homestead property, any conveyance would be void, including this 
Court's court-ordered conveyance." Cooper therefore insisted that the 
trial court was "without authority to order specific performance of the 
alienation of [Brandi's] homestead property, which, essentially, is the 
result of [the trial court's] orders." 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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On August 17, 2021, Durham filed a response in opposition to 
Cooper's postjudgment motion. Durham observed that Cooper had 
admitted in his answer to Durham's complaint: (1) that Cooper was the 
owner of the subject property and (2) that Durham and Cooper had 
entered a "valid, legal, and enforceable contract." Durham also observed 
that Cooper did not raise any affirmative defense related to preventing 
alienation of a homestead due to lack of consent from a spouse based on 
§ 6-10-3 until he filed his postjudgment motion. Given those facts, 
Durham contended that Cooper's defense was "too late" to matter in this 
case. 
 
On September 13, 2021, Judge Graham held a hearing on Cooper's 
postjudgment motion. In that hearing, Cooper's counsel contended that 
any judgment ordering specific performance was void pursuant to 
§ 6-10-3 but that "[a]ll other items in [the purchase agreement] are valid 
and enforceable, except for the fact that Mrs. Cooper cannot be alienated 
from her homestead property." He conceded that Cooper was the owner 
of the subject property and that the purchase agreement was a valid 
contract, but, he argued, specific performance was not a legal remedy 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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available in this situation. Durham's counsel contended that Cooper had 
waived any such defense.  
 
On November 5, 2021, Judge Graham entered an order granting in 
part and denying in part Cooper's postjudgment motion. In that order, 
Judge Graham upbraided Cooper's counsel for failing to raise any issue 
with respect to the antialienation principle in § 6-10-3 until filing the 
postjudgment motion, finding that Cooper's counsel had "violated the 
most basic principles of notice pleading and ha[d] done so in a way that 
[made] the court's Order of Specific Performance of a real estate contract 
potentially impossible, unrealistic, or problematic." Judge Graham 
expressly found that Cooper had "waived any and all defenses regarding 
ownership of the property or the validity of the [purchase agreement] by 
failing to raise any such defenses in his Answer, in any amendment to 
the Answer, or at trial." He also concluded that Cooper "lacks standing to 
raise any arguments about [Brandi's] homestead" because "[a]ny 
homestead interest and any related arguments belong to the unidentified 
female identified as the 'wife,' assuming she is [Cooper's] lawful wife, and 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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not 
[Cooper]."1 
Nonetheless, 
Judge 
Graham 
granted 
Cooper's 
postjudgment motion to the extent that his July 26, 2021, order had 
 
1We note that this Court has repeatedly stated that "'standing' is 
not a necessary or cognizable concept in private-law civil actions …." 
Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Water Works Bd. of Birmingham, 362 So. 3d 
1221, 1231 n.4 (Ala. 2022) (citing Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Alabama, 42 So. 3d 1216 (Ala. 2010)). 
 
We also observe, as we explained at length in Matherly v. Citizens 
Bank, [Ms. 1210396, Oct. 28, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022), that 
the notion that the antialienation principle in § 6-10-3 is entirely 
dependent upon whether the nonassenting spouse invokes it ignores "the 
interplay between §§ 6-10-3 and 6-10-40." Section 6-10-40, Ala. Code 
1975, provides:  
 
"When the homestead, after being reduced to the lowest 
practicable area, exceeds $5,000 in value and the husband or 
wife has aliened the same by deed, mortgage, or other 
conveyance without the voluntary signature and assent of the 
spouse, shown and acknowledged as required by law, the 
alienor or, if he or she fails to act, the spouse or, if there is no 
spouse or if he or she fails to act, their minor child or children 
may, by filing a complaint, have the land sold and the 
homestead interest separated from that of the alienee." 
 
As we noted in Matherly, a trial court may award a homestead 
interest to a nonassenting spouse "even though [the nonassenting 
spouse] did not invoke the remedy in § 6-10-40" when "otherwise [the 
nonassenting spouse] would not receive any compensation" because the 
purchase agreement at issue "was not entitled to protection under 
Article X, § 205, Ala. Const. 1901, and § 6-10-3, Ala. Code 1975." ___ 
So. 3d at ___.  
 
Moreover, we further explained in Matherly that, 
 
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granted the relief of specific performance, but Judge Graham denied 
Cooper's postjudgment motion "as to the factual findings in the court's 
[July 26, 2021,] Order, both general and specific. This includes the court's 
finding that [Durham] is entitled to relief in this case." Accordingly, 
Judge Graham reset the case to the active docket and ordered that the 
case would be retried, but, he ruled, "[t]he only issue remaining to be 
tried is the relief to which [Durham] is entitled, or not, and the damages 
to which [Durham] is entitled, or not." 
 
On March 30, 2022, Durham filed a pretrial motion in limine 
seeking the admission into evidence of an appraisal of the subject 
 
"if the alienated property exceeds the value of a 'homestead' 
defined in § 6-10-2, then the antialienation principle in 
Article X, § 205, and § 6-10-3 does not apply, and, therefore, 
the mortgage or conveyance is valid, but the nonassenting 
spouse is entitled to a homestead interest of $5,000 pursuant 
to § 6-10-40." 
 
___ So. 3d at ___. The value of a "homestead," as defined in § 6-10-2, Ala. 
Code 1975, is $15,000. It is undisputed that the subject property exceeds 
that value, and thus Cooper's conveyance of the subject property to 
Durham was not void under § 6-10-3.  
 
We realize that the Matherly appeal had not been decided at the 
time Judge Graham entered his November 5, 2021, order, and so neither 
he nor the parties had the benefit of the explanations about the 
homestead statutes provided in that decision. We simply make the 
foregoing observations to avoid any confusion in future cases. 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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property produced by Bradford on January 19, 2022 ("the new 
appraisal"). The new appraisal assessed the value of the subject property 
to be $315,000. The new appraisal's only comment on the storage shed 
was that "[i]n the previous appraisal the storage building was in need of 
repair. For this reason this building is given no weight in this 
assignment." Durham contended in his motion that the new appraisal 
was relevant "in connection with establishing damages at the 
continuation and conclusion of this trial." On April 5, 2022, Cooper filed 
an objection to Durham's motion in limine on the ground that the new 
appraisal was not relevant to the standard for measuring damages in this 
case because, he said, the proper legal standard was the difference 
between the contract price and the market value of the subject property 
at the date of the breach of the contract. 
 
On April 7, 2022, Judge Graham held a hearing concerning the 
damages to which Durham might be entitled to based on the previous 
finding that Cooper had breached the purchase agreement. First, the 
parties argued about the admissibility of the new appraisal. Durham's 
counsel contended that the new appraisal was relevant because the 
measure of damages  
SC-2022-0965 
 
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"on a seller breach … is that the damages recoverable for a 
breach are such as the natural and proximate consequence of 
the breach. You know, the proximate loss -- one of the 
proximate losses on this breach was that Mr. Durham lost the 
benefit of a big run-up in value in this area over the last 
18 months, and that's what this appraisal proves." 
 
Cooper's counsel contended that "the measure of damages for the breach 
of a land sale contract is the difference between a contract price and the 
market value -- and here's the key part -- at the date of the breach." Thus, 
Cooper argued that the new appraisal was irrelevant to the issue of 
damages because it did not address the value of the subject property on 
the date the breach of the purchase agreement occurred. Judge Graham 
concluded that Cooper's objection to the new appraisal "goes to the weight 
to be given the appraisal, not the admissibility of it, and it is admitted." 
 
In the same hearing, Judge Graham heard testimony from Durham 
in which he stated that he had not been able to purchase another 
residence and that he had not been able to find a residence in the same 
geographic area of comparable quality for a price similar to the purchase 
price agreed to in the purchase agreement. Durham testified that he and 
his wife had made an offer on one house, which had been accepted, but 
that the closing had not occurred. The price for that property was 
$275,000, but Durham testified that it was "[d]efinitely a lot lower 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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quality house for sure" than the subject property. Durham also briefly 
testified as follows concerning the new appraisal: 
"Q. [Durham's counsel:] Okay. Or in the alternative, you 
have heard mention of this appraisal that would tend to 
indicate that the Cooper home is $79,000 more valuable at the 
present than it was when you were supposed to buy it back in 
2020.  
 
"In the alternative, do you also request that $79,000? 
 
 
"A. Yes." 
 
Following Durham's testimony, the parties again argued about the 
proper legal standard for measuring damages. During that discussion, 
Judge Graham concluded that measuring damages from the price 
Durham had offered on another house -- $275,000 -- was "speculative 
until [Durham] does close" on the property. 
 
On August 2, 2022, Judge Graham held another hearing to find out 
if Durham had closed on the property on which he had an accepted offer. 
Durham stated that "it hasn't closed yet because -- or the seller is wanting 
to put it off. He isn't ready to close on the house." Judge Graham then 
reiterated that he believed that measuring damages based on a sale that 
had not closed would be speculative, and Durham's counsel conceded that 
point. 
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On September 30, 2022, Judge Graham entered a "Final Order 
Amended and Restated Judgement for the Plaintiff." In that order, Judge 
Graham repeated many of the findings he had stated in his July 26, 2021, 
and November 5, 2021, orders. Additionally, Judge Graham stated, in 
part: 
"12. Plaintiff Durham asks the Court to punish 
Defendant Cooper for his 'bad' trial tactics, by imposing court 
costs and attorney fees upon him. Durham insists that the 
trial tactics employed by Cooper, referenced and explained 
more completely in the November 5, 2021, order, are a 
continuing breach of the contract and caused Plaintiff 
Durham to incur additional costs, losses, and damages. 
Plaintiff Durham says that [Cooper] misled the court and 
misled Durham. He says that much time was spent pursuing 
legal theories that correspond to Cooper's express admissions, 
tacit admissions, and intentional omissions, only to have the 
Defendant Cooper 'ambush' the Plaintiff Durham with 
defensive matters that Cooper should have … alleged in his 
first responsive pleading. Durham further complains that 
Cooper did so after more than a year in court, after an all-day 
trial, and after a judgment for [Durham]. Durham contends 
that doing so is a continuing breach of the contract and caused 
him to sustain additional loss, cost, and damage on a 
continuing basis. 
 
"13. The court is not one hundred percent on-board with 
this theory of damages. But the failure to plead or even 
mention during trial that Cooper was married and assert the 
defense that his wife did not join in the contract was 
ridiculous. Is it worthy of imposing damages under Rule 11, 
[Ala. R. Civ. P.]? Probably not. The request for damages is not 
proven to the legal standard or to the court's satisfaction. 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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Damages beyond the actual costs of the breach of contract are 
denied. 
 
"14. [Durham's] complaint and his request for relief are, 
therefore, GRANTED in part. 
 
"Upon consideration of the facts and the applicable law, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
 
"a. That the Plaintiff Durham is entitled to and is 
awarded a $79,000.00 judgment against the Defendant Jacob 
Cooper, for losses caused solely and exclusively by Defendant 
Cooper's breach, Defendant Cooper's continuing breach, for 
which execution may issue; 
 
"b. That any claim of any party not addressed herein is 
DENIED; and 
 
"c. That all costs, including the fees of the appraiser, are 
taxed against [Cooper], for which execution may issue." 
 
(Capitalization and emphasis in original.) 
 
On October 20, 2022, Cooper filed a postjudgment "Motion to Find 
Facts Specially" in which he asked the trial court to "state its findings of 
fact on how it derived the monetary award of $79,000.00." On October 21, 
2022, Judge Graham denied Cooper's motion without further elaboration. 
On October 28, 2022, Cooper filed what he styled as a "Motion to Finalize 
Order" in which he argued that Judge Graham's September 30, 2022, 
order was not final because the order charged the fees of the appraiser to 
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Cooper but did not "specifically state what [the] fees of the appraiser are." 
On October 31, 2022, Cooper appealed from Judge Graham's September 
30, 2022, order. On November 18, 2022, Judge Graham entered an order 
finding that the fees and expenses of the appraiser were $450 and taxing 
that amount against Cooper. 
II. Standard of Review 
"Because the trial court heard ore tenus evidence during 
the bench trial, the ore tenus standard of review applies. Our 
ore tenus standard of review is well settled. '"When a judge in 
a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment based on 
findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed 
correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain 
and palpable error."' Smith v. Muchia, 854 So. 2d 85, 92 (Ala. 
2003) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 
(Ala. 1996)). 
 
"'…. The ore tenus standard of review, succinctly 
stated, is as follows: 
 
"'"[W]here the evidence has been 
[presented] ore tenus, a presumption of 
correctness attends the trial court's 
conclusion on issues of fact, and this 
Court will not disturb the trial court's 
conclusion unless it is clearly erroneous 
and against the great weight of the 
evidence, but will affirm the judgment 
if, under any reasonable aspect, it is 
supported by credible evidence."' 
 
"Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 
791, 795 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 
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360 (Ala. 1977)). However, 'that presumption [of correctness] 
has no application when the trial court is shown to have 
improperly applied the law to the facts.' Ex parte Board of 
Zoning Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1994). 
 
"'The ore tenus standard of review extends to the trial 
court's assessment of damages.' Edwards v. Valentine, 926 
So. 2d 315, 325 (Ala. 2005). Thus, the trial court's damages 
award based on ore tenus evidence will be reversed 'only if 
clearly and palpably erroneous.' Robinson v. Morse, 352 So. 2d 
1355, 1357 (Ala. 1977)." 
 
Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 67-68 (Ala. 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
III. Analysis 
 
We begin our analysis by clarifying the fact that Cooper's appeal 
stems from a final judgment. In his October 28, 2022, "Motion to Finalize 
Order," Cooper appeared to contend that Judge Graham's September 30, 
2022, order -- the order from which Cooper appealed -- was not final 
because it failed to state the amount of the fees for the appraiser's 
services that were taxed against Cooper. However, "[g]enerally, '"[t]he 
assessment of costs is merely incidental to the [final] judgment...."' Ford 
v. Jefferson Cnty., 989 So. 2d 542, 545 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (quoting 
Littleton v. Gold Kist, Inc., 480 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985))." 
Regions Bank v. Lowrey, 101 So. 3d 210, 221 (Ala. 2012). Therefore, the 
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fact that one of the items taxed as costs against Cooper had not been 
specified at the time of the appeal did not render the trial court's 
September 30, 2022, order a nonfinal judgment.  
With the foregoing procedural issue clarified, we now address the 
core issue disputed by the parties in this appeal: the proper legal 
standard for measuring damages in this case.2 The parties' divergent 
positions on this issue are straightforward. Cooper contends that "[t]he 
trial court erroneously calculated the damages as being the difference 
between the September 2020 appraisal and the 2022 appraisal. The 
actual correct measure of damages is the difference between the contract 
price and the market value at the date of the breach." Cooper's brief, 
p. 13. Thus, Cooper asserts that the proper damages amount is $2,500: 
the difference between the purchase agreement price of $236,000 and the 
assessed market value of the subject property of $238,500 provided in the 
original appraisal. In contrast, Durham contends that "where a seller 
defaults the measure of damage is what the buyer has lost, i.e., the 
'benefit of his bargain' or[,] as some cases say, his 'expectancy damages' 
 
2Cooper does not contest in this appeal the trial court's conclusion 
that he breached the purchase agreement. 
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or 'expectation interest,' to put the buyer where he would have been had 
the contract been fully performed." Durham's brief, p. 28 (emphasis in 
original). Thus, Durham asserts that "[t]he trial court [correctly] found 
Mr. Cooper's breach resulted in losses to Mr. Durham of $79,000 (the 
difference in the September 2020 and January 2022 appraisals)." Id. at 
29.  
Radetic v. Murphy, 71 So. 3d 642 (Ala. 2011), is one of the many 
cases Cooper cites in support of his argument concerning the proper legal 
standard for measuring damages. Radetic explained: 
"It is well settled that '[t]he measure of damages for the 
breach of a contract for the sale of land is the difference 
between the contract price and the market value at the time 
of the breach.' Wilkens v. Kaufman, 615 So. 2d 613, 614 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1992). See also Duncan v. Rossuck, 621 So. 2d 1313, 
1315-16 (Ala. 1993) ('The measure of damages for the breach 
of a contract involving the sale of land is the difference 
between the contract price and the market value of the land 
on the date of the breach.'); Brett v. Wall, 530 So. 2d 797, 798 
(Ala. 1988) ('Of course, the measure of damages for the breach 
of a contract for the sale of land is the difference between the 
contract price and the market value at the date of the 
breach.'); Woodham v. Singletary, 545 So. 2d 78, 78 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1989) ('The measure of damages for the breach of a 
contract involving the sale of land is the difference between 
the contract price and the market value at the date of the 
breach.'); and Cook v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 59, 62 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1982) ('We readily agree that the measure of damages for the 
breach of a land sale contract is the difference between the 
SC-2022-0965 
 
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contract price and the market value at the date of the 
breach.')." 
 
71 So. 3d at 649-50 (emphasis added).  
The rule stated in Radetic fits the type of claim at issue in this case 
-- a breach of a contract involving the sale of real property -- and Radetic 
further makes it clear, with quotations from multiple supporting 
authorities, that the relevant market-value assessment is the value of 
the property at the time of the breach of the contract. In this case, the 
market-value assessment contained in the original appraisal meets that 
requirement.  
Durham attempts to push back against the rule pronounced in 
Radetic and numerous other cases by arguing that none of those cases 
involved situations in which the seller breached the contract. Durham 
does not dispute that when a buyer breaches a contract for the sale of 
real property, the damages are measured by the market value of the 
property on the date the breach occurred. Durham insists, however, that 
the proper standard for measuring damages is different when the seller 
breaches a contract for the sale of real property. Goolesby v. Koch Farms, 
LLC, 955 So. 2d 422, 427-28 (Ala. 2006), perhaps best summarizes the 
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legal standard for damages that Durham argues the trial court correctly 
applied in this case: 
"As a general rule, damages in a breach-of-contract 
action are '"that sum which would place the injured party in 
the same condition he would have occupied if the contract had 
not been breached."' Ex parte Steadman, 812 So. 2d 290, 295 
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Brendle Fire Equip., Inc. v. Electronic 
Eng'rs, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)). This 
measure is commonly referred to as a party's 'expectation 
interest.' 24 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 64:2, at 
22 (4th ed. 2002)." 
 
Durham contends that,  
 
"[h]ad Mr. Cooper honored his contract, Mr. Durham 
would today be the owner of a home that was in move-in 
condition in September 2020, for which he would have paid 
$236,000 then in accordance with the contract. At the time of 
the April 7, 2022 hearing on damages[,] the Cooper home had 
a market value of $315,000 according to the same appraiser 
who did the original appraisal. The difference is Mr. Durham's 
lost 'market gain.'" 
 
Durham's brief, p. 38. 
 
There are several intractable problems with Durham's argument. 
First, despite Durham's assertion that a different legal standard for 
measuring damages applies depending on whether it is the buyer or the 
seller who breaches a contract involving the sale of real property, our 
cases have never drawn any such distinction. As Radetic stated: "'[T]he 
measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of land is the 
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difference between the contract price and the market value at the time of 
the breach.'" 71 So. 3d at 649 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Durham fails to cite a single case involving a sale of real property that 
indicated that a different standard for measuring damages applies in 
seller-breach cases as opposed to buyer-breach cases. 
Second, the cases Durham cites and quotes from for the legal 
standard permitting what he calls "expectancy damages" did not involve 
contracts for the sale of real property. Goolesby concerned the recovery of 
chattels, specifically chickens raised on a poultry farm. Shorter Bros. v. 
Vectus 3, Inc., 343 So. 3d 508, 516 (Ala. 2021), involved the sale of trucks 
and trucking routes. Similarly, Mannington Wood Floors, Inc. v. Port 
Epes Transport, Inc., 669 So. 2d 817, 822-23 (Ala. 1995), was a case 
concerning two truck-hauling contracts. Ex parte Steadman, 812 So. 2d 
290, 295 (Ala. 2001), concerned a breach of a contract to perform a 
complete title search on property. Med Plus Properties v. Colcock 
Construction Group, Inc., 628 So. 2d 370, 377 (Ala. 1993), concerned a 
contract for the construction of a building. Brendle Fire Equipment, Inc. 
v. Electronic Engineers, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), 
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involved a contract to furnish planned and programmed background 
music.  
The unifying element of the foregoing cases cited by Durham is that 
they were cases involving contracts for goods or services, not contracts 
for the sale of real property. Sometimes, in cases involving the breach of 
a contract for goods or services, damages may be recovered not just to put 
the nonbreaching party in the position the party would have been in if 
the contract had been fulfilled, but also to allow the nonbreaching party 
to recoup lost profits. As this Court explained in Med Plus Properties, in 
such cases there is 
"an ambiguity in the phrase 'lost profit,' as it is used in the 
case law to denote an item or element of damages recoverable 
in an action for breach of contract. The phrase 'lost profit' has 
been used either to designate an item of what is often called 
'general' or 'expectancy' damages, or to designate a form of 
'consequential damages.' One commentator has observed: 
 
"'Many claims for consequential damages 
are claims for loss of profits. The term profit is 
sometimes used loosely to refer to any gain the 
plaintiff would have made but for the contract 
breach. But some gains, such as gains in a simple 
market transaction, are not profits in the sense 
that income from business operations are profits. 
On the contrary, if the breach of contract causes 
the plaintiff to lose a market gain, the claim is 
merely one for general damages as to which no 
special proof requirements attach.' 
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"3 Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 12.4(3), at 71 (2d ed. 1993); 
see also id. § 12.20(1)." 
 
628 So. 2d at 376.  
As Cooper observes in his reply brief, Durham is trafficking in the 
above-described ambiguity in attempting to use the legal standard for 
measuring damages stated in those goods-and-services contract cases. 
"While Durham may call his damages 'expectancy damages,' Durham is 
practically advocating for consequential damages, i.e., lost profits, on 
what Durham 'could have' sold the house for in 2022." Cooper's reply 
brief, p. 2 (emphasis in original). The problem with that measure of 
damages in this context, as Cooper also correctly observes, is that "[t]here 
was no testimony that would have shown that the parties expected real 
estate values to go up considerably in value. Durham did not testify that 
he had expected property to dramatically increase during the pendency 
of litigation." Cooper's reply brief, p. 5. Indeed, Durham's argument 
misapplies the "expectancy damages" standard even on its own terms. 
"Alabama law is well settled that the damages awarded in an 
action for breach of contract should be an amount sufficient to 
return the nonbreaching party to the position he would have 
occupied had the breach not occurred. Aldridge v. Dolbeer, 567 
So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Ala. 1990). '[T]he damages claimed must 
be "the natural and proximate consequences of the breach and 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been within the 
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27 
 
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was 
made."' Aldridge, 567 So. 2d at 1269-70 (citations omitted)." 
 
HealthSouth Rehab. Corp. v. Falcon Mgmt. Co., 799 So. 2d 177, 183 (Ala. 
2001) (emphasis added). See also Ex parte Steadman, 812 So. 2d at 295 
(explaining that "[t]he damages sought also must have been in the 
contemplation of the parties when they made the contract"). The fact that 
the market value of the subject property substantially increased two 
years after execution of the purchase agreement was not a natural and 
probable consequence of the breach, and there is no evidence indicating 
that such an increase was within the contemplation of Durham and 
Cooper at the time they executed the purchase agreement.3 Of course, 
that is because the subject property's market value just as readily could 
have plummeted in the two years that succeeded Cooper's breach.   
Durham is correct that the general standard for remedying a breach 
of contract is returning the nonbreaching party to the condition or 
position he or she would have occupied if the breach had not occurred. 
 
3We note that there also was no testimony from Durham indicating 
that, if the sale had occurred in September 2020, as the purchase 
agreement stipulated, Durham even would have contemplated selling the 
subject property in January 2022 in order to realize the financial benefit 
the trial court awarded Durham in this case. 
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However, because of the unique nature of real-property transactions, 
ordinarily the only remedy that can return the nonbreaching party to the 
position that the party would have occupied if the breach had not 
occurred is specific performance. See, e.g., Downing v. Williams, 238 Ala. 
551, 554, 191 So. 221, 222-23 (1939) ("[T]he principle which underlies 
specific performance of a contract relating to real estate, without regard 
to quantity, quality or location is that 'a specific tract is unique and 
impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.'" (quoting 
2 Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 360 cmt.a (Am. Law Inst. 
1932))). That is precisely why the law presumes that damages are not an 
adequate remedy for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real 
property. See, e.g., § 8-1-47, Ala. Code 1975 ("It is to be presumed that 
the breach of an agreement to transfer real property cannot be 
adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation and that the breach of an 
agreement to transfer personal property can be thus relieved."). But if 
the remedy of specific performance is not appropriate -- as Judge Graham 
determined in his November 5, 2021, order and as he reaffirmed in his 
September 30, 2022, order -- then the legal standard for measuring 
damages on a breach of a contract involving the sale of real property must 
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be specific about the point in time to be used for determining the 
nonbreaching party's original position. Our cases are unequivocally clear 
that the legal standard is "'the difference between the contract price and 
the market value at the time of the breach.'" Radetic, 71 So. 3d at 649 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). 
A fallback position argued by Durham for why it was appropriate 
for the trial court to determine damages by using the market value of the 
subject property at the time of the damages hearing, rather than at the 
time of the breach of the purchase agreement, is that Cooper's litigation 
tactics during the trial constituted a kind of continuing breach of the 
purchase agreement. See, e.g., Durham's brief, p. 37 (arguing that 
"Mr. Cooper's breach, based on excuses the trial court found were 
'without a valid or a lawful reason,' … borders on bad faith, especially 
given his surprise 'homestead' defense that he raised only after being 
ordered to specifically perform his contract.").  
One problem with that contention is that this Court rejected a very 
similar theory in Brett v. Wall, 530 So. 2d 797, 798 (Ala. 1988): 
"Of course, the measure of damages for the breach of a 
contract for the sale of land is the difference between the 
contract price and the market value at the date of the breach. 
Cook v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 59 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), citing 
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30 
 
Howison v. Oakley, 118 Ala. 215, 23 So. 810 (1898). While the 
plaintiffs do not argue with this proposition of law, their 
position is that the breach here continued to the date of the 
trial, and thus that their evidence of the market value of the 
lot as of the date of trial satisfied their burden of proof on that 
issue. 
 
"But, plaintiffs chose to treat the contract itself as 
breached by initiating this suit because, as plaintiffs alleged, 
'[d]efendant has failed and refused to perform the obligations 
and undertakings imposed upon him by the agreement.' 
Plaintiffs further alleged substantial damages and prayed for 
an award of 'such damages as may be found to have been 
suffered by them.' Although plaintiffs also alleged their 
willingness and ability to perform the agreement, that 
allegation did not extend until trial the time for determining 
the liability of the defendant in damages." 
 
(Emphasis added.) The Brett Court concluded that the usual measure of 
damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real property 
applied despite the plaintiffs' assertion of a continuing breach. 
"The plaintiffs' evidence adduced a reasonable market 
value of the lot on February 11, 1987, the date of trial. There 
was no evidence of the reasonable market value as of the date 
of the breach, i.e., March 31, 1986. … Thus, it is clear that 
there was a failure of proof on the element of damages 
essential to plaintiffs' recovery. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in concluding that, because the testimony established 
'that the lot has a value, a fair market value, today of $90- to 
$95,000, it would appear the difference in value as of the time 
of this contract and the time of this judgment would be the 
sum of $15,000.00.' (Emphasis added.)" 
 
Brett, 530 So. 2d 799.  
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Similar to the plaintiffs in Brett, Durham contends that Cooper's 
breach continued through the date of the damages hearing. But, just as 
the Brett Court concluded, the reality is that Durham chose to treat the 
purchase agreement as breached by initiating this action on November 9, 
2020, and, thus, the trial court could not rely upon the theory of a 
continuing breach to justify using the assessment of the subject 
property's market value around the time of the damages hearing for 
determining the appropriate amount of damages.4 See also Woodham v. 
Singletary, 545 So. 2d 78, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (concluding that "the 
trial court erred in awarding damages based on evidence of the property's 
 
4For further support, Durham cites Duncan v. Rossuck, 621 So. 2d 
1313 (Ala. 1993), contending that in that case this Court approved a trial 
court's admission of "an appraisal done 19 months after the breach as 
relevant to the issue of value at the time of the breach." Durham's brief, 
p. 29 n.4. However, in Duncan, this Court once again reiterated that 
"[t]he measure of damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale 
of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value 
of the land on the date of the breach." 621 So. 2d at 1315-16. Moreover, 
the Duncan Court approved the admission of the postbreach appraisal 
because, in "undisputed testimony," the appraiser "expressed the opinion 
that, based on the commercial real estate market conditions between 
August 1990 -- the date of breach -- and April 1992 and assuming no 
substantial improvement or deterioration, the value of the property 
would have been approximately the same in August 1990 as in April 
1992." Id. at 1316. In short, that appraisal was deemed relevant only 
because it reflected the value of the property in question on the date of 
the breach. Thus, Duncan supports Cooper's position, not Durham's. 
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value after the breach" when the evidence consisted of a completed sale 
of the property three months after the breach). 
Another problem with Durham's contention that Cooper's litigation 
tactics constituted a kind of continuing breach of the purchase agreement 
is that that contention was expressly rejected by Judge Graham in his 
September 30, 2022, order. As we recounted in the rendition of facts, 
Judge Graham observed in that order that Durham had argued that 
Cooper's delay in asserting a defense based on the principle of 
antialienation of a homestead "is a continuing breach of the contract and 
caused him to sustain additional loss, cost, and damage on a continuing 
basis." But Judge Graham stated that he was "not one hundred percent 
on-board with this theory of damages," concluding that that theory "for 
damages is not proven to the legal standard or to the court's satisfaction. 
Damages beyond the actual costs of the breach of contract are denied." 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Judge Graham expressly awarded damages on 
the basis of what he deemed to be the actual loss Durham sustained from 
Cooper's breach of the purchase agreement, not based on any allegedly 
dilatory legal tactics employed by Cooper. In other words, Judge Graham 
did not base his assessment of damages on Cooper's actions subsequent 
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to the breach of the purchase agreement; rather, he based the award of 
$79,000 upon Durham's argued standard for measuring "expectancy 
damages." 
Durham also argues that Judge Graham's award of damages was a 
"determination of fact [that] was within the [trial] court's discretion." 
Durham's brief, p. 32. However, as we just noted, Judge Graham clearly 
based his damages award on Durham's asserted legal standard for 
measuring damages, i.e., the standard expressed in Goolesby, and 
thereby rejected Cooper's asserted legal standard for measuring 
damages, i.e., the standard expressed in Radetic. That determination was 
an application of the law to the facts. As we recounted in section II of this 
opinion, a presumption of correctness does not apply when a trial court 
is shown to have improperly applied the law to the facts. See, e.g., 
Radetic, 71 So. 3d at 650 ("Because the trial court improperly applied the 
law to the facts, the ore tenus rule does not apply."). 
In a last-ditch effort to avoid a reversal, Durham, at the end of his 
brief, tacitly admits to the dearth of on-point legal authorities for his 
position, stating: "Mr. Cooper may argue there are no cases specifically 
allowing 'benefit of the bargain' or 'expectancy' damages where the 
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contract at issue is for real property and the seller refuses to perform." 
Durham's brief, p. 44. Undaunted, Durham suggests that this "Court 
should either limit or overrule the line of cases such as Radetic v. Murphy 
… and others that Mr. Cooper cites in his principal brief … to the extent 
that these opinions might be read to deny a real property buyer the 
proper measure of damages for a seller's breach" because, he says, "there 
is no reason in law or logic why a real property seller should have a 
different potential liability for refusing to perform than sellers in non-
realty transactions." Id. at 45.  
However, as we have already explained, the law does treat 
contracts involving the sale of real property differently precisely because 
of the unique nature of the purchase, ordinarily favoring the remedy of 
specific performance for that reason. Moreover, as this opinion also has 
noted, our courts have never applied different legal standards for 
measuring damages for a breach of a contract involving the sale of real 
property based on which party breaches the contract. Finally, it makes 
eminent rational sense to measure such damages from the date the 
breach occurs rather than from the date a judgment happens to be issued, 
for it is only at the former date it can be said with any certainty that the 
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nonbreaching party is placed in the same financial position he or she 
would have been if the breach had not occurred. Cf. Garrett v. Sun Plaza 
Dev. Co., 580 So. 2d 1317, 1320 (Ala. 1991) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that "the injured party is not to be put in a better position by a recovery 
of damages for the breach than he would have been in if there had been 
performance"). For all the foregoing reasons, we decline Durham's 
entreaty to overrule Radetic and the numerous other cases that have held 
that "'[t]he measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the sale 
of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value 
at the time of the breach.'" 71 So. 3d at 649 (citation omitted). 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court misapplied 
the law to the facts by measuring Durham's damages based on the 
difference between the contract price and the subject property's assessed 
market value in the new appraisal because the proper legal standard for 
measuring damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real 
property is the difference between the contract price and the subject 
property's market value at the time of the breach. Accordingly, we 
reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause with 
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36 
 
instructions for the trial court to enter a judgment awarding damages 
based on the correct legal standard.5 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook, 
JJ., concur. 
 
Bryan, J., concurs in the result. 
 
 
5Our decision pretermits any need to determine whether the trial 
court erred by admitting the new appraisal into evidence.  
 
We also note that Durham's request at the end of his brief that we 
"should remand the case so that Mr. Durham can pursue specific 
performance if he chooses" is misplaced. Durham's brief, p. 46 (emphasis 
omitted). Judge Graham determined in his November 5, 2021, order, and 
he reaffirmed in his September 30, 2022, order, that specific performance 
was not an appropriate remedy in this case. Even though, as we observed 
in footnote 1, that determination may not have been legally correct, 
Cooper's appeal does not question that conclusion and Durham did not 
file a cross-appeal challenging Judge Graham's judgment in that respect. 
Accordingly, we are not at liberty to reverse that portion of the trial 
court's judgment. See, e.g., Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 
643 (Ala. 2003) ("'[T]he law of Alabama is well-settled on this point. In 
the absence of taking an appeal, an appellee may not cross-assign as error 
any ruling of the trial court adverse to appellee.'" (quoting McMillan, Ltd. 
v. Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., 512 So. 2d 14, 24 (Ala. 1987))).