Title: Fullen v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

122 Ariz. 425 (1979) 595 P.2d 657 Earl R. FULLEN, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Red River Land and Cattle Company, Respondent Employer, Aetna Insurance Company, Respondent Carrier. No. 13919-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 3, 1979. Rehearing Denied May 30, 1979. *426 Philips & Taylor by Christopher J. Philips, Phoenix, for petitioner. John H. Budd, Jr., Chief Counsel The Industrial Com'n of Arizona, Phoenix, for respondent. Lewis & Roca by Merton E. Marks, R. Kent Klein, Phoenix, for respondent employer and respondent carrier. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is a petition for review of a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the Commission's holding that a petition to reopen was not filed in time to cover an industrially related operation on petitioner's knee. We take jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 47(b), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. We must answer the following questions on appeal: Petitioner Earl R. Fullen injured his knee while stepping down from a piece of heavy equipment at his Douglas, Arizona, job on 5 September 1972. After treatment and surgery by Dr. W.E. George, a Phoenix orthopedic surgeon, a final award of a scheduled 30% left leg permanent disability was entered on 24 October 1974. By the middle of December 1974, it was apparent that more treatment was necessary. Dr. George's secretary, Jacqueline Manker, made attempts to contact the insurance carrier but "no one returned [her] calls." On 2 January 1974, Fullen's then attorney sent a letter to the Industrial Commission that read: The letter was not signed by Fullen and no written medical report was enclosed with the letter. The Commission received the letter on 6 January 1975. Dr. George performed further surgery on Fullen's injured knee on 7 January 1975. The Commission sent its form letter on 13 January 1975 to Fullen's address in Douglas and to his Douglas attorney advising by check mark before the appropriate paragraph: Although the Commission's letter stated that a proper form of petition to reopen was enclosed, in fact such form was not enclosed. Fullen thereafter retained other counsel. A petition to reopen upon the Commission's form, signed by Fullen, was filed on 28 January 1975. This petition was supported by a 24 January 1975 letter from Dr. George's office addressed to Fullen's Douglas attorney which read: "Dear Mr. Lerma: "As per your telephone request this is to certify that Mr. Earl R. Fullen did in fact have a total knee replacement, utilizing the geomedic prosthesis because of increasing pain in his left knee. Mr. Fullen was admitted to Good Samaritan Hospital on 1-5-75 and surgery was performed on 1-7-75. Several attempts prior to hospitalization was made to contact the carrier (Aetna) but no one returned my calls. I finally got to speak to Mr. Shippy and he said no action could be taken until you and the Industrial Commission gave them permission and ask them to do so. It is not questioned that Fullen's claim was meritorious. The carrier, however, questioned the Commission's jurisdiction to reopen the claim as of a date prior to the operation on 7 January 1975 because of the failure of Fullen to follow the proper procedure. The hearing officer agreed and held that the petitioner was entitled to benefits only after 29 January 1975, the date the petition to reopen was deemed properly filed by the Commission. Surgical and hospital benefits for the knee operation of 7 January were denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. We granted Fullen's petition for rehearing. WAS THE JANUARY LETTER SUFFICIENT? The hearing officer found: The Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act provides that injured workmen may petition for a reopening of their industrial claims. A.R.S. § 23-1061(H) states: The Industrial Commission has, pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-921(B), promulgated its own *428 rules of procedure. Rule 33[*] of its rules states in relevant part: The requirement in the rule that the petition be submitted on Commission forms and be signed by the petitioner is not required by the statute and there is nothing in the statute to prevent an attorney from filing a petition for and on behalf of his client. Fullen then is being denied the right to petition to reopen not because of the statute but because of additional requirements contained in the rules of the Commission. Our Court of Appeals has stated: The requirement that a petition must be signed by the workman and not his attorney is not in harmony with the statute. The Commission may not, by rule, restrict a workman's right to be represented by an attorney. Neither do we find that the workman may only petition on forms provided by the Commission. Using Commission forms would result, of course, in uniformity and would be the more desirable way of bringing notice to the Commission that the petitioner needed further medical attention. Commission forms, however, as was the case here, are not always timely available. Neither are they required by statute. The application of Commission Rule 33 to the facts of this case with the resultant finding that the petition of 2 January 1975 was ineffective goes beyond the legislative mandate. The Commission had adequate and timely notice and the petition was not, we believe, ineffective for the 7 January operation. ACCOMPANYING MEDICAL REPORT The statute quoted above, A.R.S. § 23-1061(H), provides that a petition to reopen shall be "accompanied" by a "statement from [the] physician setting forth the physical condition of the employee relating to the claim." The Commission has provided by rule that the medical report need not be filed contemporaneously with the petition and we agree. It may follow at a reasonable length of time and still be logically considered to have accompanied the petition. Quite often the medical report must *429 await surgery or further examination to be meaningful. To require a workman to defer needed medical attention until a report is filed would be contrary to the purposes of the Act and contrary to sound medical practice. We believe that as long as the medical report is filed within a reasonable time after the petition to reopen, it will be deemed to have accompanied the petition. WAS DR. GEORGE'S LETTER PROPER? As noted above, the statement of the physician was a letter signed by Dr. George's medical secretary. The following testimony concerning the letter of 24 January 1975 from Dr. George's office was taken from Dr. George: On cross-examination, Dr. George acknowledged that he had not dictated the letter to his secretary but that he "simply stated to her * * * the thought content of the letter and told her to compose it and send it off." It is unquestioned that the letter represented Dr. George's thinking at the time and he later completely and unequivocally ratified its contents. We believe that the letter is a "statement from a physician" within the meaning of the statute and the rule. CONCLUSION A remedial statute such as the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose in protecting its beneficiaries and compensating valid claims: Although Rule 33 may be "reasonable" on its face within the meaning of the rules-enabling statutes, A.R.S. §§ 23-1044(G) and 23-921(B), as applied to the petitioner in this case, it would require that we leave an injured workman victimized by a failure in technical pleadings by his attorney and doctor. To do so would be an exaltation of form over substance in a fashion long abandoned by our courts. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The award is set aside. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur. [*] Current version, A.C.R.R. R4-13-133.