Title: State v. Lamb

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Lamb  (96-252); 168 Vt. 194; 720 A.2d 1101

[Filed 31-Jul-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 96-252

State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

Lawrence V. Lamb                                  September Term, 1997

Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

       James P. Mongeon, Rutland County State's Attorney, and Lamar Enzor,
  Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.   Defendant Lawrence Lamb appeals his conviction of
  operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  23
  V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).  He contends that the trial court erred by: (1)
  denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from an investigatory stop
  of his vehicle based upon information supplied by an unnamed informant; and
  (2) admitting the results of a Datamaster infrared breath test.  We affirm.

       The essential question before the Court is whether, considered in
  their totality, the circumstances justified a brief investigatory stop
  based in part upon an unnamed informant's tip that defendant was driving
  while intoxicated.  We conclude that the detention was amply justified
  because (a) the investigating officer had corroborating information that
  could only have come from a knowledgeable insider, (b) the officer knew
  that defendant had been arrested previously for DUI, and (c) the offense of
  DUI presented an imminent risk of injury to the suspect or the public.

 

                                     I.

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, State v. McGee, 163
  Vt. 162, 164-65,