Title: Dubaniewicz v. Houman

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Dubaniewicz v. Houman (2004-306); 180 Vt. 367; 910 A.2d 897

2006 VT 99

[Filed 15-Sep-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 99

                                No. 2004-306


  Dennis J. Dubaniewicz, Executor of the         Supreme Court
  Estate of Michael P. Dubaniewicz
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Rutland Superior Court


  Robert Houman, Linda LaPenna,                  September Term, 2005
  St. John's Sporting Goods, Inc., 
  Thomas St. John and Dorothy St. John

  Richard W. Norton, J.


  Patrick M. Ankuda of Parker & Ankuda, P.C., Springfield, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Samuel Hoar, Jr. of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Burgess, D.J.,  Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff appeals the superior court's order
  denying him any damages for the default judgment he obtained in this
  wrongful death action.  We concur with the court's ruling that plaintiff is
  not entitled to damages for the decedent's alleged pain and suffering, but
  we conclude that the court erred by refusing to compensate plaintiff for
  funeral and burial expenses and by holding that the loss of companionship
  of an adult sibling is not compensable under the wrongful death act. 
  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter for
  further consideration in light of this decision.
   
       ¶  2.  Plaintiff is the executor of the estate of his brother, who
  died of a gunshot wound in March 1998.  The shooting was treated as a
  homicide, but no charges have been filed.  Believing that his brother was
  murdered by the two people living in his brother's home, plaintiff filed a
  civil suit in January 2000 against them and the owners of the sporting
  goods store that sold the weapon used to kill his brother.  The defendant
  who purchased the weapon was a convicted felon, and he was incarcerated
  after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
  Eventually, plaintiff settled his claims against the owners of the sporting
  goods store and obtained a default judgment on liability against his
  brother's house guests. The superior court held a hearing on damages in
  April 2004.

       ¶  3.  Following the hearing, the court ruled that plaintiff is not
  entitled to damages for (1) his brother's pain and suffering because
  plaintiff failed to present expert medical testimony or other evidence
  demonstrating that his brother did not die instantaneously; (2) the loss of
  his brother's future wages because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his
  brother ever financially supported his siblings; (3) the loss of his
  brother's society and companionship because loss of companionship of an
  adult sibling is not compensable under the wrongful death act; (4) burial
  expenses because they are not recoverable; and (5) certain losses related
  to the sale of the decedent's home because they were losses of the estate
  and not plaintiff as next of kin.

       ¶  4.  On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the superior court erred
  by denying damages for his brother's pain and suffering.  Plaintiff
  contends that the investigating state trooper's testimony suggesting that
  the decedent moved from one room to another in his home after being shot
  and before dying supported his claim for pain-and-suffering damages.  We
  agree with the superior court that the evidence in this case was too
  speculative to support an award for pain and suffering.
   
       ¶  5.  Plaintiff did not present any expert medical testimony
  regarding the nature of the wound or how long the decedent may have lived
  after he was shot.  The trooper expressed his belief that the decedent had
  moved himself rather than being moved after he was shot, but that testimony
  was only his best guess as to what happened.  There were no eyewitnesses. 
  No one could say whether the decedent died instantaneously, or, if not, how
  long he lived after he was shot.  Indeed, appellant himself concedes that
  no one knows what, if any, pain the decedent experienced.  Under these
  circumstances, we find no basis to overturn the superior court's refusal to
  award damages for pain and suffering.  Cf. Estate of Long v. Broadlawns
  Med. Ctr., 656 N.W.2d 71, 86 (Iowa 2002) (denying damages for pre-death
  mental and physical pain because estate failed to meet its burden of
  showing, by substantial evidence, that decedent was sufficiently conscious
  in extent and time to suffer pain).

       ¶  6.  Next, plaintiff argues that the superior court erred by failing
  to award him damages for the loss of his brother's companionship.  Our
  wrongful death statute allows the court or jury to "give such damages as
  are just, with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
  death, to the wife and next of kin or husband and next of kin, as the case
  may be."  14 V.S.A. § 1492(b).  In Mobbs v. Central Vermont Railway, 150
  Vt. 311, 315,