Title: PEOPLE OF MI V NORMAN GRAY

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119756  
NORMAN GRAY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
I  
On November 15, 1998, an armed robbery occurred at a gas  
station in Livingston County.  The station owner recognized  
the robber as a regular customer.  Additionally, the crime was  
recorded by a surveillance camera.  The jacket worn by the  
robber bore the insignia of a local business. 
This  
information led police to this defendant within a few days, at  
which time the defendant was arrested and charged with armed  
robbery.  
Before the jury trial, the defendant filed a notice of  
alibi as required by MCL 768.20.  The defendant listed five  
 
witnesses, three of whom eventually testified at trial.  In  
cross-examining these witnesses, the prosecutor asked each  
whom they had told about the defendant’s alibi.  The  
prosecutor sought to impeach the witnesses by showing that  
they had not come forward before trial with exculpatory  
information about the defendant.  
The defendant was convicted by the jury of armed  
robbery.1  The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  
That Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in an  
unpublished per curiam opinion.  
II  
Of the issues raised on appeal by the defendant, only one  
merits discussion.  The defendant claims that there was a  
denial of due process, US Const, Am XIV, when the prosecutor  
implied, 
during 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
alibi 
witnesses, 
that  
the witnesses had had an obligation to come forward with their  
exculpatory evidence.  The defendant relies on People v Fuqua,  
146 Mich App 250; 379 NW2d 442 (1985), to support his claim  
that a proper foundation had not been laid for the impeachment  
of the alibi witnesses. In Fuqua, the Court stated:  
We note, however, that many jurisdictions 
which permit such an attack on the credibility of a 
defense alibi witness nevertheless recognize that 
an assumption that it is natural for a defense 
alibi witness to tell his or her story to the 
police 
is 
not 
always 
warranted 
and 
impose 
restrictions on the circumstances in which such an  
1 The defendant received a life sentence as an habitual  
offender, fourth offense. MCL 769.12.  
2  
 
attack may be made.  
* * *  
[B]efore the prosecutor is allowed to impeach 
an alibi witness for failure to come forward and  
tell his story to the police before trial, an 
adequate foundation must be laid.  There must be  
some showing, on the record, as to why it would 
have been natural for the alibi witness to relate  
his story to the police. [Id. at 255-256.]  
The Court in Fuqua, citing People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311; 428  
NYS2d 914; 406 NE2d 771 (1980), suggested that such an  
evidentiary foundation might require the prosecutor in  
appropriate instances to show that a witness was aware of the  
charges against the defendant, that the witness had reason to  
recognize that he possessed exculpatory information, or that  
the witness was familiar with how to make the information  
available to the police or prosecutor. [Id. at 255.]  
III  
We take this opportunity to overrule Fuqua and instead  
adopt the reasoning of People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489;  
552 NW2d 487 (1996).  In Phillips, the Court concluded that no  
special foundation is necessary before the trier of fact may  
be apprised that an alibi witness failed to come forward  
earlier with exculpatory information. The panel in Phillips  
at 494 observed:  
While we agree that the trier of fact can be 
assisted in this important task [of assessing the 
credibility of alibi witnesses] with information 
regarding the reasons that an alibi witness would 
have been more or less likely to come forward with 
alibi information before trial, we do not conclude  
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that the prosecutor must lay any particular 
foundation before questioning a witness who has not 
come forward before trial.  Presumably, if there 
are good reasons for a witness’ failure to come 
forward earlier, these will be brought out during 
the direct [or redirect] examination of the alibi 
witness by defense counsel.  
The Fuqua rule can only operate to deprive the trier of  
fact of relevant information about the credibility of an alibi  
defense by imposing the obligation upon the prosecutor to  
establish that it would have been natural for the witness to  
have come forward at an earlier time.  The rule fails to take  
into account the likelihood that a witness who would fabricate  
an alibi would also be likely to fabricate reasons for not  
having come forward earlier.  As the panel in Phillips further  
observed:  
The foundational rule of Fuqua would take this  
important issue [of the credibility of alibi  
accounts] from the factfinder in many cases. Under  
Fuqua, unless an alibi witness testifies in a  
fashion indicating that it would have been natural 
to come forward earlier, a prosecutor cannot  
impeach that witness by reference to the failure to 
come forward earlier.  However, a witness who would  
fabricate an alibi account would also likely 
fabricate reasons for failing to come forward 
earlier.  The prosecutor thus would be left without  
a foundation for impeaching the witness with  
respect to this issue or arguing that the witness’ 
failure to come forward earlier suggests the alibi 
story was a recent fabrication.  As a result, the 
factfinder would be left with no opportunity to 
consider the timeliness of the witness’ account in  
weighing the credibility of that account.  
A juror or other factfinder is certainly 
qualified to consider whether offered reasons for 
an alibi witness’ delay in coming forward make 
sense, ring true, or are otherwise persuasive.  The  
timeliness of an alibi account may be highly 
probative of its truthfulness; it may, in fact, be  
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the best or only way to determine whether the alibi 
is credible. A witness should not be able to take  
the timeliness issue from the factfinder by 
fabricating “good” reasons for not coming forward 
earlier. We conclude that the trial court did not  
err in overruling defense counsel’s objections to 
the cross-examination questions at issue. The  
credibility of an alibi witness, regarding both the 
alibi account and the failure to come forward  
earlier with that account, should not be taken from 
the jury through the imposition of any special 
foundational requirement. [Id. at 495-496.]  
We concur with this analysis.  
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to present a  
defense, but that right is not cloaked with protection from  
vigorous cross-examination.  A tardily raised or incredible  
claim of alibi may be challenged as part of the truth-seeking  
process that is a criminal trial. People v Hepner, 285 Mich  
631; 281 NW 384 (1938).  Where a defendant puts forth an alibi  
defense, that defense can be challenged by cross-examination  
concerning unexplained delays in its assertion or untruths in  
its substance.  
In the case at bar, the trial court properly allowed  
cross-examination 
of the witnesses who testified in support of  
defendant’s alibi defense.  The trier of fact must have the  
necessary information to assess the credibility of witnesses  
and determine the reliability of the evidence presented.  
IV  
The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the defendant’s  
conviction and sentence. We adopt the reasoning of Phillips  
and hold that it is unnecessary for a prosecutor to establish  
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any 
special 
foundation 
before 
cross-examining 
an 
alibi 
witness  
about the witness’ failure to have come forward with  
information at an earlier time.  
Affirmed.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
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