Title: In Interest of LDO

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of LDO1993 WY 111858 P.2d 553Case Number: C-92-8Decided: 08/24/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Interest of LDO, a 
Minor. LDO, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee (Plaintiff). 

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price II, J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, 
Asst. Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, Vance Haug, Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, 
Jennifer A. Kokoczka, Student Intern, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issue 
presented in this case is whether, because of the failure to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation of the juvenile concerning the 
underlying delinquency charge and the failure to move to suppress unlawful 
admissions prior to the hearing, a juvenile had the benefit of effective 
assistance of counsel in a juvenile proceeding. The juvenile presents collateral 
errors relating to abuse of discretion of the trial court in refusing to permit 
the suppression claim to be raised; plain error committed by permitting an 
illegal confession to be introduced; and a claim that the juvenile was 
improperly charged with delinquency because the underlying allegation was 
larceny of his own property. We hold counsel for the juvenile failed in his 
obligations by not investigating the circumstances surrounding the admissions 
made by the juvenile and by not submitting, in a timely manner, the appropriate 
motion to suppress the unlawfully obtained admissions. We conclude the juvenile 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel in connection with the 
adjudication of juvenile delinquency, and that adjudication must be reversed. We 
hold there was no abuse of discretion in the ruling that the suppression claim 
could not be raised at the hearing, and there is no substance to the claim of 
impropriety relating to larceny of the juvenile's own property. We do not reach 
the claim of plain error because of our reversal for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

[¶2]      LDO, in his Brief 
of Appellant, states these issues: 

I. Whether the lower 
court committed plain error by allowing an illegal confession, taken in 
violation of Miranda, to be admitted at trial.

II. Whether the lower 
court abused its discretion when it refused to grant defense counsel relief from 
failure to raise suppression issue pretrial, even after cause for such failure 
was demonstrated at trial.

III. Whether in light of 
the lower court's determination that cause for relief from failure to make 
pretrial suppression motion was not shown, it must be concluded that appellant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

IV. Whether appellant is 
not guilty of delinquency via a larceny charge because he took his own 
property.

The State of 
Wyoming, as appellee, offers this counterstatement of the issues:

I. Was any error 
committed by the juvenile court in allowing evidence of appellant's admissions 
of his guilt cured when appellant voluntarily testified to the same 
facts?

II. Did the juvenile 
court abuse its discretion when it refused to permit appellant to raise for the 
first time at trial a matter which is required to be raised by pretrial 
motion?

III. Did the failure by 
appellant's counsel to move to suppress appellant's admissions prior to trial 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel?

IV. Was the evidence 
sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that appellant was guilty of 
larceny?

[¶3]      In August of 
1992, LDO, a fifteen-year-old minor, ran away from a crisis center in Casper 
where he had been placed. He returned to Gillette and resumed living with his 
aunt and her family. LDO had lived with the aunt's family for about three years 
prior to his placement at the crisis center in Casper. On the afternoon of 
August 14, 1992, the aunt discovered LDO had not gone to his community service 
job, and she reported him to the police as a runaway. An officer went to the 
aunt's home for the purpose of obtaining a report from the aunt and, during the 
course of their discussion, the aunt noticed a CD player was missing from her 
home. The aunt had purchased the CD player for members of the family to use, and 
it had been placed in the bedroom LDO shared with the aunt's sons. The aunt told 
the officer LDO did not have permission to remove the CD player from the 
bedroom.

[¶4]      On the following 
day, the officer made a traffic stop and found LDO as a passenger in the 
vehicle. At that juncture, LDO was placed in custody as a runaway, and he was 
first taken to the police station. Later, he was transported to the Campbell 
County Detention Center. On August 16, an officer interviewed LDO about the CD 
player. The officer did not advise LDO of his constitutional rights in the form 
of a Miranda warning, or in any other way, prior to questioning him. LDO told 
the officer he had taken the CD player from the aunt's home without permission 
and had left it at a friend's house. The officer then went to the friend's house 
and retrieved the CD player. LDO then was interviewed again about the CD player, 
still without advice as to his constitutional rights, and he admitted he had 
asked his friend to pawn it.

[¶5]      At the 
adjudicatory hearing, after his admissions had been received in evidence, LDO 
testified and admitted the aunt had purchased the CD player. He also admitted he 
took it from the aunt's home, left it at a friend's house, and he did intend to 
pawn it. On October 27, 1992, LDO was adjudicated a delinquent minor within the 
meaning of WYO. STAT. § 14-6-201 (Supp. 1993).1 The thrust of the adjudication was 
that LDO had committed a delinquent act, to-wit: larceny in violation of WYO. 
STAT. § 6-3-402(a)(c)(iii) (1988).2 LDO was committed temporarily to 
the custody of the Department of Family Services, for placement at Sky Ranch, 
Buffalo, South Dakota. This appeal is taken from the adjudication.

[¶6]      The dispositive 
issue in this case is whether LDO had the benefit of effective assistance of 
counsel. A juvenile in delinquency proceedings has a right to the assistance of 
counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States,3 made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by WYO.CONST. art. 1, § 10.4 See also WYO. STAT. § 14-6-222 
(1986); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 
(1967).

[¶7]      The standard for 
appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the same 
under the state and federal constitutions. See Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606 
(Wyo. 1992); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984). The 
fact counsel was assigned does not satisfy the constitutional requirement; 
effective assistance must be provided by counsel in the preparation of the case 
for trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). The 
standard for review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel demands LDO 
demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, and LDO was 
prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance.

[¶8]      We first adopted 
this standard in Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986), and we recently had 
occasion to revisit it. In Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609, we summarized the 
two-prong test found in Strickland as follows:

First, the defendant must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, 
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 
(1984).

See also 
Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1993); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010 
(Wyo. 1993).

[¶9]      In Dickeson, we 
held the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. Counsel failed to 
attack an illegal seizure of Dickeson's diary; failed to move to suppress 
statements made by her after that seizure; and failed to object at trial to the 
introduction of the incriminating statements. We reversed Dickeson's conviction, 
noting we previously had reversed four criminal convictions because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.

[¶10]   The Supreme Court of the United 
States has articulated the duty of counsel to investigate in this 
way:

In other words, counsel 
has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a 
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference 
to counsel's judgments.

Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.

The court also 
said: "[I]nquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical 
to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, * * *." Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 691, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.

[¶11]   In this case, it is clear the 
attorney failed to contact LDO prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Counsel 
advised the court he had attempted to visit LDO in the Campbell County Detention 
Facility, but he was told LDO already had been sent to Buffalo, South Dakota to 
the Sky Ranch. Counsel acknowledged he could have contacted LDO in South Dakota 
by telephone, but he did not do so. If LDO had been interviewed, counsel readily 
could have ascertained LDO had made inculpatory statements to the police officer 
while he was in the Campbell County Juvenile Detention Center. In light of the 
exclusionary rules that pertain today, the follow-up question as to whether, 
prior to the interrogation, LDO had been advised of his constitutional rights 
pursuant to the Miranda decision was obvious. Counsel then would have been aware 
of the violation of LDO's constitutional rights and would have recognized that a 
motion to suppress was indicated.

[¶12]   LDO argues the juvenile court, in 
essence, found he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the court 
determined counsel failed to show cause for not moving to suppress the evidence 
prior to trial. Again, there is no dispute about whether a pre-trial motion was 
filed in this case. Counsel did not file the pre-trial motion to suppress the 
statements as required by WYO.R.CRIM.P. 12(b), which provides:

Pretrial 
motions. 
- Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without 
the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. Motions may 
be written or oral at the discretion of the judge. The following must be raised 
prior to trial:

* * * * * *

(3) Motions to suppress 
evidence; * * *.

The same rule 
makes provision for the failure to make a motion to suppress:

     Effect of failure to 
raise defenses or objections, or to make requests. - Failure by a party to 
raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to 
trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to subdivision (d), or prior to any 
extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute waiver thereof, but the 
court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

WYO.R.CRIM.P. 
12(g) (emphasis added).

These rules are 
specifically made applicable to juvenile proceedings by WYO.R.CRIM.P. 54(b), 
which provides:

Juvenile 
proceedings. - These rules shall 
apply in all juvenile cases involving allegations that a child is in need of 
supervision or delinquent.

[¶13]   The Supreme Court of the United 
States has ruled that a motion to suppress under FED.R.CRIM.P. 41(f) and 
12(b)(3) must be made prior to trial for procedural orderliness (Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)), and to avoid the interruption of the trial (Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939)). FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(b)(3) 
is identical to WYO.R.CRIM.P. 12(b)(3). FED. R.CRIM.P. 12(f) differs in only 
minor respects from the similar WYO.R.CRIM.P. 12(g). Several of the United 
States courts of appeals have held that a trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying relief for the failure to file a motion to suppress in a 
timely fashion when no cause was shown for the lateness of the motion. See, 
e.g., United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Coyote, 963 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d 743 
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 
1991).

[¶14]   The state courts in our sister 
jurisdictions, using similar criminal procedural rules as Wyoming, consistently 
have held that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, motions to suppress 
evidence must be made before trial. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 593 N.Y.S.2d 953 
(1993); People v. Broome, 187 A.D.2d 949, 590 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1992); State v. 
Dyer, 615 A.2d 235 (Me. 1992); Gillie v. State, 305 Ark. 296, 808 S.W.2d 320 
(1991); State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 844 P.2d 1364 (Ct.App. 1992); State v. 
Dwyer, 847 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App.W.D. 1992); State v. Karns, 608 N.E.2d 1145 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1992); O'Neal v. State, 199 Ga. App. 757, 406 S.E.2d 247 
(1991); People v. Goodwin, 207 Ill. App.3d 282, 152 Ill.Dec. 210, 565 N.E.2d 743 
(2 Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 137 Ill. 2d 668, 156 Ill.Dec. 564, 571 N.E.2d 151 
(1991).

[¶15]   The record in this case includes 
the following colloquy occurring during the adjudicatory hearing with respect to 
the motion to suppress:

COUNSEL FOR LDO: Okay. 
Excuse me.

     I want to object. 
Apparently from the testimony [LDO] is in custody. The officer knows what he's 
interrogating [LDO] for. I think it's incumbent on him to have advised [LDO] of 
his constitutional rights. That's the basis of my objection.

THE COURT: Sustained on 
that point.

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: 
Well, Your Honor, if he's going to make a motion to suppress, he's too late. 
That should have been raised.

THE COURT: He can't raise 
that now?

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: I 
don't believe so, not under the rules. If he's making a motion to suppress 
evidence.

THE COURT: What's your 
response to that, [LDO's COUNSEL]?

COUNSEL FOR LDO: Well, 
Your Honor, my response to this is that I have in fact received copies of a 
police report, but I was unable to contact [LDO] except by telephone. He had 
been taken to the Sky Ranch in South Dakota.

      On September 
11th I called the jail, asked if [LDO] was still there. I was told that he would 
probably be transported later in the day.

I arrived there at 9:50, 
and I was told that [LDO] had already gone and he was taken to 
Buffalo.

Took me a few days to get 
copies and, I was later informed that he was taken to the Sky Ranch in South 
Dakota.

Your Honor, there isn't a 
Miranda statement in this, but I don't think that, especially under the 
circumstances, that [LDO] has waived any constitutional protections. I think 
that they're fundamental, and I think that as a result if there, in fact, was no 
advisal finally or any consent to the discussion by [LDO] with this officer, 
that he's not entitled to testify with respect to the substance of the 
conversation under this custodial interrogation.

THE COURT: Well, I guess 
the question is whether or not in all instances a motion to suppress is 
necessary, counsel.

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: 
Well, Your Honor, the discovery stamp indicates these were given to [LDO's 
COUNSEL] on September 14th. I think the rule is that -

THE COURT: Which 
rule?

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: 
The rule governing suppression motions in the criminal code. I think it was Rule 
# 41. I don't know what it is denominated under the new rules. I think Rule # 12 
may govern motion practice.

But I think that if we're 
talking about a statement taken and Miranda, we're talking about a suppression 
motion. I think under the new rules those have to be raised in a timely manner 
or they're waived.

And, as I say, the 
discovery has been in [LDO's COUNSEL'S] possession since September 14th, and 
we're almost a month down the road.

THE COURT: Rule # 
12(b)(iii) says that motions to suppress evidence must be raised prior to 
trial.

     Rule # 41(g) says a 
motion for suppress evidence may be made in the court where the case is to be 
tried as provided in Rule 12.

I guess court has two 
specific concerns. One is if there were no Miranda rights given, would allowing 
the testimony in be plain error. And I suppose the second question is whether or 
not we have a potential of effective assistance of counsel for failure to make 
the motion.

     I guess I've never 
seen a case where the motion wasn't made in advance.

     So, I'll overrule the 
objection because it wasn't made prior to trial.

[¶16]   The juvenile court judge considered 
the objection to the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, but then overruled 
the objection because of the failure to make a timely motion to suppress. In 
effect, the court held that a motion to suppress must be made prior to 
the adjudicatory hearing unless good cause is demonstrated as to why the motion 
was not filed on time. The rule affords discretion to the court to grant relief 
from the failure to make the motion for good cause shown. In this instance, the 
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion because counsel for LDO did not show 
good cause, or any cause, for failing to make the motion prior to 
trial.

Our conclusion 
is that ineffective assistance of counsel has been demonstrated. Counsel should 
[¶17]            
have interviewed his client prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Had that 
been done, counsel would have known that a motion to suppress the inculpatory 
statements for failure to advise LDO of his constitutional rights was in order. 
If the admissions by LDO, which clearly were inculpatory, had been excluded from 
evidence, LDO might well have decided not to testify, and he would not have 
confirmed the information testified to by the interviewing officer.

[¶18]   In Dickeson, we agreed with the 
conclusion of the Supreme Court of the United States "that the failure to file a 
suppression motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per 
se." Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 610 (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)). It is necessary, in addition to the failure 
to file the motion, to evaluate that failure from the perspective of counsel at 
the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. Dickeson. 
We conclude LDO has demonstrated his counsel's performance was deficient for 
failure to investigate the circumstances surrounding his interrogation about the 
facts of the underlying charge and the failure to pursue the rule requirements 
with respect to a motion to suppress the unlawful information. LDO has 
demonstrated prejudice as a result of this failure and comes within the 
two-prong test articulated in Strickland. We hold LDO did not receive effective 
assistance of counsel in connection with his adjudication of juvenile 
delinquency, and that adjudication must be reversed. Such a failure to prepare, 
even in a juvenile proceeding, places at risk not only the rights of the 
juvenile, but the reliability of the adversarial process.

[¶19]   With respect to the collateral 
errors presented by LDO in his appeal, which include an abuse of discretion by 
the juvenile judge in refusing to permit the suppression claim to be raised; 
plain error by permitting the introduction of an illegal confession; and a claim 
that LDO was charged with delinquency because of an alleged larceny of his own 
property, we find no error. We have held, as discussed above, that there was no 
abuse of the discretion of the juvenile court in its refusal to permit the 
suppression claim to be raised. We do not address the claim of plain error 
because we have reversed with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. There is no substance to the claim of impropriety in adjudicating an 
underlying charge of larceny with respect to the CD player. Nothing in the 
record serves to demonstrate in any credible manner that LDO had any reason to 
believe he had a property interest in the CD player.

[¶20]   We agree with LDO's contention that 
the juvenile court, when it determined counsel had failed to show cause for not 
pursuing the pretrial suppression motion, in essence, found LDO had been denied 
effective assistance of counsel. Under the Strickland standard for reviewing 
ineffective assistance, LDO has demonstrated counsel's performance was 
deficient, and prejudice resulted. The adjudication of LDO as a juvenile 
delinquent is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 WYO. STAT. § 14-6-201 
(Supp. 1993) provides, in pertinent part:

(a) 
As used in this act:

* * 
* * * *

(xv) "Minor" means an 
individual who is under the age of majority;

* * 
* * * *

WYO. STAT. § 14-1-101(a) 
(Supp. 1993) defines age of majority:

Upon becoming eighteen 
(18) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority and as an adult 
acquires all rights and responsibilities granted or imposed by statute or common 
law, except as otherwise provided by law.

2 WYO. STAT. § 6-3-402 
(1988) provides, in pertinent part:

(a) 
A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another 
with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

* * 
* * * *

(c) 
Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, larceny is:

(iii) A misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00).

3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
provides as follows:

In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to * * * have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

4 WYO.CONST. art. 1, § 10 
provides as follows:

In 
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person 
and by counsel, * * *.