Title: State ex rel. The Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. THE RYANT COMMITTEE ET AL. v. LORAIN COUNTY BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. The Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 107.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit Lorain County Board of Elections from 
conducting a June 1 special election involving a zoning classification of land 
located in the city of Avon — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 99-941 — Submitted June 22, 1999 — Decided June 23, 1999.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
On March 2, 1999, intervening respondents Robert Barnhart and Avon 
Citizens Committee for Avon Commons (“Avon Citizens Committee”) filed an 
initiative petition proposing an ordinance amending the zoning classification of an 
85.8507-acre parcel of land located in the city of Avon from C-2 to C-3, which 
would permit greater commercial development of the land.  The petition consisted 
of one hundred twenty part-petitions, with a total of approximately 2,433 
signatures.  In their petition, the petitioners requested that the proposed ordinance 
be submitted to the Avon electors at a June 1, 1999 special election.  On the same 
date that Barnhart and Avon Citizens Committee filed the petition, representatives 
of relators, The Ryant Committee, a committee of Avon citizens, as well as certain 
individual Avon residents opposed to the proposed rezoning, photocopied the 
petition. 
 
On March 10, 1999, Avon Clerk of Council Patricia A. Vierkorn certified 
the sufficiency of the petition for purposes of the special election by determining 
that it contained two thousand thirty-nine valid signatures.  The Avon Charter 
required that the petition contain 1,959 valid signatures, i.e., thirty percent of the 
6,529 voters registered on the date of the last preceding general election, in order 
to be submitted to the electors at the requested June 1 special election.  Sections 1 
2 
and 5, Article X, Avon Charter.  Relators filed an objection with Avon City 
Council to the clerk’s determination of sufficiency. 
 
On March 22, 1999, Avon City Council considered the proposed zoning 
amendment ordinance, which had been designated as Ordinance No. 61-99.  After 
the law director noted that passage of the ordinance would subject it to a 
referendum, the city council rejected Ordinance No. 61-99 and instead passed 
Ordinance No. 62-99, which, in accordance with petitioners’ written request in 
their petition and the initiative provisions of the Avon Charter, submitted the 
proposed zoning amendment specified in Ordinance No. 61-99 to the electors for a 
June 1, 1999 special election.  On March 24, the city council transmitted certified 
copies of Ordinance No. 62-99 to respondent Lorain County Board of Elections for 
placement of the proposed rezoning ordinance on the ballot for the June 1 special 
election. 
 
Six days later, on March 30, relators filed a written protest against the 
petition with the board.  Relators alleged twenty-five separate errors concerning 
the clerk’s determination of sufficiency, including the following: 
 
“1) the Avon Commons Rezoning Petition does not contain the required 
number of valid signatures for a special election to be held on June 1, 1999; it 
contains less than 30% of the registered voters as of November 3, 1998; it contains 
less than 1,959 valid signatures; 
 
“2)  printed names were counted as valid signatures (ORC Section 
3501.38(B)); 
 
“ * * * 
 
“5)  signatures of non-registered electors or voters were counted (ORC 
Section 3501.38(A); 731.37; 3599.13); 
 
“6)  signatures with incorrect voting residence addresses were counted as 
valid registered electors or voters (ORC Section 3501.38(A) and (C); 3503.06); 
3 
 
“ * * * 
 
“10)  duplicate signatures were counted (ORC Section 3501.38(D); 
3519.06(E); 731.37; 3599.13); 
 
“11)  signatures were counted which were signed by someone other than the 
purported signature (ORC Section 3501.38(D); 731.37; 3599.13); 
 
“ * * * 
 
“13)  the circulator[s’] statements contai[n] erroneous signatur[e] total[s] 
(ORC Section 3501.38(E)); 
 
“ * * * 
 
“20)  signatures were counted for electors who were registered after 
November 3, 1998 (Avon City Charter Article 10, Section 1); 
 
“21)  the necessary conditions precedent for the submission of the petition to 
electors ha[ve] not been satisfied (Avon City Charter Article 10, Section 1); 
 
“22)  non-genuine signatures which do not match the voting registration 
records were counted (ORC Section 3501.38(A) and (C); 3503.06); 
 
“23)  alterations and corrections were made to the part-petitions (ORC 
Section 3501.38(I); 3519.06(C); 731.36(E)).” 
 
The vast majority of relators’ categories of error did not specify how many 
signatures were affected by each error, and relators additionally did not specify 
which signatures on which part-petitions they were challenging.  Relators also 
requested subpoenas for “individuals having testimony and evidence, and records 
and documents,” but did not inform the board of any specific individuals or records 
that they wanted subpoenaed. 
 
On April 13, the counsel for the board conducted a preliminary hearing in 
order to narrow the issues raised by the protest.  At the hearing, the board’s 
director noted that the board had determined that the petition contained two 
thousand seventy-five valid signatures, i.e., more than the 1,959 valid signatures 
4 
required for the June 1 special election.  She further stated that the board treated 
newly registered voters as valid petition signers if, in accordance with the criteria 
established by the Secretary of State, their registration cards were filed with the 
board on or before the time the petition was filed. 
 
At the preliminary hearing, intervening respondent First Interstate 
Development Company1 (“First Interstate”) objected to relators’ failure to specify 
their objections to the initiative petition in their protest and noted the following: 
 
“The problem is we have no idea which signatures on which petitions that 
[relators] find to be defective, and in order for us to prepare for the hearing to 
interview witnesses, to subpoena the appropriate witnesses, unless we know what 
specific part-petitions and signatures contained therein that [relators] are 
protesting, we have no basis to prepare.  And actually the Board has no basis to 
proceed on a protest hearing.” 
 
Relators responded that they would not provide this information until the 
board so ordered because they deemed the information to be their attorney work 
product.  At the same time that relators refused to divulge which specific 
signatures they claimed were invalid, they requested that a protest hearing be 
scheduled for April 27, rather than the May 10 date suggested by the board’s 
counsel. 
 
On April 15, the board, pursuant to its authority under R.C. 3501.11(J) to 
compel the production of evidence and in order to identify relators’ specific claims 
before conducting a protest hearing, requested that relators provide certain 
evidence by April 23.  Among other items, the board requested that relators 
identify which signatures were being challenged and the reasons for each 
challenge, and further requested the names and addresses of the persons who 
would testify and those whom relators wanted subpoenaed for the protest hearing.  
On April 23, relators provided a response to the board’s request for more specific 
5 
objections.  On May 3, the board’s counsel sent a facsimile copy of a preliminary 
protest investigation report in which the board’s director tentatively concluded that 
most of relators’ specified challenges were meritless.  On May 7, after the board’s 
previously imposed deadline had expired, relators notified the board that a 
handwriting expert would testify at the May 10 protest hearing. 
 
On May 10, the board conducted an initial protest hearing before two of its 
four members.  One of the board members had recused himself due to a conflict of 
interest and another member was not present.  The board proceeded with the 
hearing, and relators refused to have their expert testify because of the presence of 
only two board members.  The board’s counsel and director detailed the 
investigation of relators’ protest and concluded that even after excluding a few 
additional signatures based on relators’ protest, the petition had sufficient valid 
signatures to warrant submission of the rezoning issue to the electors at the June 1 
special election.  Two circulators testified that although they circulated part-
petitions in which a person signed for the person’s spouse, they did not knowingly 
allow these persons to sign for their spouses.  On the same date as the hearing, 
relators filed yet another protest, which specified additional signatures that they 
challenged. 
 
On May 20, the board held a final protest hearing, with a third member who 
had reviewed the May 10 transcript joining the two board members who had been 
present at the May 10 hearing.  At the hearing, relators’ handwriting expert 
testified that based on clear and convincing evidence, ten signatures on the petition 
were not written by the named individuals.  Four of these signatures had been 
previously invalidated by the board.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the board 
denied the protest and certified the rezoning issue for the June 1 special election 
ballot. 
6 
 
On May 13, i.e., seven days before the board’s final protest hearing, relators 
filed a complaint in this court for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents board 
and its members from conducting the June 1 special election.  Due to the proximity 
of the election (i.e., our expedited schedule for the submission of evidence and 
briefs under S.Ct.Prac.R. X[9] would not be completed until after the June 1 
special election) as well as relators’ allegations that the board had delayed ruling 
on their protest, we issued an entry impounding the ballots and ordering that the 
result be sealed and filed with the court.  85 Ohio St.3d 1491, 710 N.E.2d 276.  
Relators subsequently amended their complaint as a matter of course pursuant to 
Civ.R. 15(A) in order to allege that the board’s May 20 rejection of their protest 
and certification of the rezoning issue constituted an abuse of discretion and a clear 
disregard of applicable election law.  We permitted First Interstate, Avon Citizens 
Committee, and Barnhart to intervene as respondents.  85 Ohio St.3d 1494, 710 
N.E.2d 714.  Respondents filed motions to dismiss in addition to evidence and 
merit briefs.  First Interstate also filed a motion in limine to exclude some of 
relators’ evidence and a motion for sanctions. 
 
This matter is now before the court upon the evidence and briefs of the 
parties and the pending motions.  The June 1, 1999 special election was conducted 
and the sealed result was transmitted to the court on June 3. 
__________________ 
 
Grendell & Associates, L.L.P., and Timothy J. Grendell, for relators. 
 
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, pro se. 
 
Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerald A. 
Innes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Lorain County Board of 
Elections and its members. 
 
Brunner & Brunner Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Brunner, Edwin L. Kirby, Jr., 
and David R. Funk; Kahn, Kleinman, Yanowitz & Arnson Co., L.P.A., and Sheldon 
7 
Berns; Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., and J. Craig Wright, for intervening 
respondent First Interstate Development Company. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, P.L.L., Barbara R. Marburger and R. Todd Hunt, for 
intervening respondents Avon Citizens Committee for Avon Commons and Robert 
Barnhart. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Motions to Dismiss 
 
Respondents filed motions to dismiss this cause.  Respondents’ motions are 
meritless.  Respondents the board, its members, and First Interstate improperly 
attached to their motions and relied on evidence that is not contained in relators’ 
complaint or amended complaint.  State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985, 986-987.  In addition, these motions are 
generally inappropriate in expedited election cases filed in this court.  See State ex 
rel. Yiamouyiannis v. Taft (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 205, 206-207, 602 N.E.2d 644, 
645, construing former S.Ct.Prac.R. VIII(11).  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), the 
presentation of evidence and briefs on the merits in expedited election cases is 
provided in lieu of a S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) dismissal determination, making procedural 
motions normally inapplicable.  See State ex rel. SuperAmerica Group v. Licking 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 184-185, 685 N.E.2d 507, 509, 
quoting Staff Commentary to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Finally, after construing the 
allegations of relators’ amended complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom 
in their favor, we find that it is not beyond doubt that relators cannot prove a set of 
facts entitling them to the requested writ.  State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 142, 684 N.E.2d 1228; State ex rel. Lee v. Trumbull Cty. Probate 
Court (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 700 N.E.2d 4, 7.2  Therefore, we deny 
respondents’ motions to dismiss. 
8 
Prohibition; Specificity of Objections and Laches 
 
Relators request a writ of prohibition to, among other things, prevent the 
board and its members from announcing and certifying the June 1, 1999 election 
results.  We, however, need not address relators’ claims because of their failure to 
specify objections in their March 30, 1999 protest in accordance with R.C. 3501.39 
and their concomitant failure to act with the diligence and promptness required in 
election matters. 
 
The board has authority under R.C. 3501.11(K) and 3501.39 to determine 
the sufficiency and validity of municipal initiative and referendum petitions.  State 
ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 562, 564, 
701 N.E.2d 371, 372.  Like the municipal charter in State ex rel. Kennedy v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 37, 39, 75 O.O.2d 100, 102, 
346 N.E.2d 283, 285, the Avon Charter makes no reference to the board of 
elections, nor does it purport to negate the board’s duties and powers under R.C. 
3501.11(K) and 3501.39.  If the framers of the Avon Charter had intended to 
completely divest boards of elections, which are the local authorities best equipped 
to gauge compliance with election laws, of their authority to determine the 
sufficiency and validity of municipal initiative and referendum petitions, they 
would have done so with unambiguous language.  Cf. State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 231, 685 N.E.2d 754, 760.  In the absence of express 
language in a charter demonstrating a conflict with a statute, it is the duty of courts 
to harmonize the provisions of the charter and statutes relating to the same matter.  
State ex rel. Regetz v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 167, 170-
171, 648 N.E.2d 495, 498.  Here, council acted pursuant to its charter authority and 
that authority does not negate the board of elections’ statutory protest authority. 
 
R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) provides that a board of elections shall accept any 
petition unless a “written protest against the petition  * * *, naming specific 
9 
objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made by the election 
officials with whom the protest is filed that the petition violates any requirement 
established by law.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Relators’ March 30 protest filed with the board contained twenty-five 
separate challenges, most of which attacked the validity of petition signatures, but 
failed to specify the signatures involved in each challenge.  Relators had already 
copied the petition on March 2 and had filed a March 22 objection with city 
council concerning the clerk of council’s March 10 determination of sufficiency.  
The twenty-eight days between March 2 and March 30 provided ample time for 
relators to review the part-petitions and board records to formulate specific 
objections to specific signatures.  Instead, relators chose to include a laundry list of 
general, alleged defects.  In the absence of specific objections, the board, the 
petitioners, and First Interstate were left with one hundred twenty part-petitions 
containing over two thousand four hundred signatures and no notice of which 
specific signatures were being challenged and for what reasons. 
 
Relators’ general objections did not give the board, Avon Citizens 
Committee, and First Interstate sufficient notice of their claims.  As we observed in 
State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 302, 308, 686 N.E.2d 238, 243, “One of the evident purposes of [the 
specificity] requirement is to give notice to the petitioner and the opportunity to 
present evidence to rebut the objections specified.”  That purpose was not achieved 
here.  First Interstate expressly noted at the April 13 preliminary hearing its 
inability to properly defend against relators’ objections without knowing the 
specific part-petitions and signatures being challenged by relators.  Contrary to 
relators’ claims, the R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) specificity provision did not require them 
to divulge their work product or their evidence; it required them only to specify 
10 
which signatures out of over two thousand four hundred they were challenging and 
for what reasons.  Relators did not so specify in their March 30 protest. 
 
Therefore, relators did not comply with the R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) specificity 
requirement when they filed their March 30 protest, and they ultimately specified 
their objections twenty-four days later only when they were ordered to do so by the 
board. 
 
Due to relators’ initial failure to comply with R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) and other 
conduct, relators’ claims are barred by laches.  Extreme diligence and promptness 
are required in election matters.  State ex rel. Bona v. Orange (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 18, 20, 706 N.E.2d 771, 773.  By failing to initially file specific objections on 
March 30, relators necessitated the board’s preliminary hearing on April 13 as well 
as the board’s April 15 request for specific objections, to which relators provided a 
response on April 23.  Relators later refused to have their expert testify at the May 
10 protest hearing and submitted supplemental evidence challenging additional 
signatures on May 10, which was sixty-nine days after relators photocopied the 
petition and forty-seven days after the city council transmitted copies of Ordinance 
No. 62-99 to the board. 
 
By not promptly submitting a statutorily sufficient protest and by engaging 
in acts of gamesmanship that did not assist the board in its objective of 
expeditiously determining their challenges, relators commenced a sequence of 
dilatory actions that necessitated our order to impound the ballots for the special 
election.  If relators had acted with the requisite diligence, they would have been 
able to file an expedited election case that could have been submitted to the court 
pursuant to the expedited election schedule of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) well before the 
June 1 special election.  Instead, relators’ unjustified delaying tactics led to our 
impoundment order and resulted in prejudice to the electors of Avon.  In fact, 
relators’ actions have now circumvented application of our general rule that “ 
11 
‘election cases are moot where the relief sought is to have a name or an issue 
placed on the ballot and the election was held before the case could be decided.’ ”  
Bona, 85 Ohio St.3d at 21, 706 N.E.2d at 773-774, quoting In re Protest Filed by 
Citizens for the Merit Selection of Judges, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 102, 103, 551 
N.E.2d 150, 151.  Relators’ lack of diligence helped cause the late filing of this 
case, which rendered it impossible to have the parties’ evidence and briefs 
submitted under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) before the June 1 special election. 
 
Relators contend that any delay was caused by the board’s failure to conduct 
a timely protest hearing.  This contention is meritless.  Any additional delay by the 
board in failing to hold a protest hearing does not excuse relators’ delay in the 
submission of a proper protest and the election process.  State ex rel. Manos v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d at 563, 701 N.E.2d at 372; State ex 
rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 493, 700 
N.E.2d 1234, 1237.  In fact, much of the board’s delay was directly attributable to 
relators’ actions. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the writ because of laches.  Relators did 
not act with the requisite diligence in pursuing their protest to the initiative 
petition.  Because relators’ action is meritless, we also rescind our previous 
impoundment order and order the board to publicly declare the June 1 special 
election results.3 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
FOOTNOTES: 
12 
1. 
First Interstate Development Company is a real estate company that owns 
the rights to develop and an option to purchase the property that is the subject of 
the proposed rezoning. 
2. 
Because respondents board, its members, and First Interstate also filed 
answers, their untimely motions to dismiss are actually Civ.R. 12(C) motions for 
judgment on the pleadings.  Lee, 83 Ohio St.3d at 371, 700 N.E.2d at 7. 
3. 
Based on our holding, we need not address the remaining issues raised by 
the parties, and First Interstate’s motion in limine is moot.  We also deny First 
Interstate’s motion for sanctions. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only.  While I concur with the 
majority’s action in dismissing this case, I do so for an entirely different reason, 
and that necessitates this writing. 
 
By entertaining this action, which we do by dismissing the case on the basis 
of laches, I believe that the majority has failed to grasp what really happened in 
this case and, in the process, has completely missed the issue of the authority of the 
Avon City Council to do what it did and, conversely, this court’s lack of authority 
to, in this action for a writ of prohibition, review the council’s action.  Instead, the 
majority focuses on the citizen petition process, the Lorain County Board of 
Elections’ action or lack of action, no protest hearing, alleged invalid petition 
signatures, and laches.  In my judgment, none of these issues is dispositive because 
we need not and should not ever reach them. 
 
What really happened in this case is that the city council properly rejected 
the Avon Citizens Committee’s initiative petition (proposed Ordinance No. 61-99) 
as the council should have done, and the council did so pursuant to authority 
derived from the Avon City Charter.  Section 1, Article X of the Charter reads, in 
part, “[w]hen so submitted [an initiative petition] * * * the Council shall take final 
13 
action, either enacting, amending, or rejecting the proposed ordinance * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The council followed the charter and, in my view, for good 
reason rejected the ordinance proposed by the petitioners.  In part, the petitioners’ 
proposed ordinance (No. 61-99) stated that “the zoning classification of the 
Property consisting of 85.8507 acres * * * is hereby changed from C-2 to C-3 and 
that the Zoning Map of the City of Avon be hereby amended to reflect this 
change.”  Thus, with this language in the ordinance, if city council had passed the 
ordinance the change would have, if council had the authority to pass such an 
ordinance on this particular piece of property, taken effect in thirty days subject to 
referendum pursuant to Section 2, Article X of the Charter, and this is so 
notwithstanding that the petition provided that the matter was to be submitted to 
the electors for their determination.  At that point, had the foregoing occurred, the 
vote really would no longer be on an ordinance initiated by petition but would, in 
effect, be a referendum on the action of city council. 
 
To avoid all of this, the city law director obviously thought through the 
entire process and gave solid legal advice to his clients, the mayor and council 
members, who wisely followed that advice.  Council, after rejecting the ordinance 
proposed by the petitioners, then passed its own ordinance (No. 62-99), which 
properly submitted to the electors of the city of Avon the ultimate question of 
whether the zoning change should be granted.  This the council had every right and 
power to do and can do, as long as the proper procedures are followed, without 
interference by this or any court.  In fact, a city’s power of local self-government 
includes the right to call an election even to determine matters that are purely 
advisory in nature.  State ex rel. Bedford v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 
62 Ohio St.3d 17, 19, 577 N.E.2d 645, 647.  Thus, the Bedford court said that 
“[t]he city contends * * * that * * * (1) municipal elections on matters of local 
concern are within the powers of local self-government conferred by Section 3, 
14 
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and (2) these powers are self-executing.  
We agree.” 
 
Accordingly, the city council had the authority to proceed as it did.  Neither 
we nor any other person or entity has the authority to question, in prohibition or 
otherwise, such action of the council.  This original action should be dismissed as 
not stating a cause of action and, because the action seeks relief which we are not 
authorized to grant.  Because the ultimate result is the same, dismissal, I concur but 
only in the judgment of the majority. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  I would reach the merits and deny the writ.