Title: State v. Hale

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: August 14, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent,
	v.
CONAN WAYNE HALE,
	Appellant.
(CC 109604830; SC S45391)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgments of
conviction and sentences of death imposed by the Lane County
Circuit Court.
	Jack A. Billings, Judge.
	Argued and submitted January 7, 2003.
	Mary M. Reese, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  With her on the briefs was David E. Groom,
State Public Defender.
	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With her on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and
Jonathan Fussner, Timothy Sylwester, and Joanna L. Jenkins,
Assistant Attorneys General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	GILLETTE, J.	
	The judgments of conviction for aggravated murder on counts
20, 21, 27, 29, 35, and 37 are reversed, and the sentences of
death thereon are vacated.  The judgments of conviction for
aggravated murder on counts 19, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, and 36, and
the sentences of death thereon, are affirmed.  The case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
	*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		This case comes before this court on automatic and
direct review of defendant's judgments of conviction and
sentences of death.  ORS 138.012(1); ORAP 12.10(1).  Defendant
seeks reversal of his convictions and sentences of death for 13
counts of aggravated murder involving three victims, as well as
reversal of his convictions for five counts of kidnapping in the
first degree, one count of rape in the first degree, two counts
of sodomy in the first degree, one count of unlawful sexual
penetration in the first degree, and one count of sexual abuse in
the first degree.  In the alternative, defendant asks this court
to vacate his sentences of death and remand the case for
resentencing.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse six of the
13 convictions of aggravated murder and remand those charges to
the trial court for further proceedings.  We affirm the other
convictions and the sentences of death.  In addition, because we
agree with defendant that the aggravated murder convictions
involving the same victims merge, we also remand the remaining
convictions of aggravated murder for entry of a corrected
judgment reflecting three convictions for aggravated murder based
on alternative aggravating factors and imposing a single sentence
of death for each conviction.  
FACTS
		
		Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Compton, 333 Or 274, 276, 39 P3d 833, cert den, 123 S Ct 165,
reh'g den, 123 S Ct 653 (2002).  
		In late 1995, defendant, then 19, and his friend, Jon
Susbauer, then in his early twenties, began committing a series
of burglaries and robberies in the Eugene area.  As pertinent
here, on December 14, 1995, defendant and Susbauer broke into a
woman's home, stole several thousand dollars worth of her
property, and slashed a couch and a stereo speaker with a knife
before leaving.  
		At around midnight on December 16, 1995, defendant and
Susbauer drove up beside a car parked on an isolated road in a
remote wooded area in Eugene.  The men were in a silver,
Chevrolet Suburban that Susbauer had stolen a few weeks earlier. 
Two teenagers, Kara Krause and Jesse Jarvis, were in the parked
car.  The person on the passenger side of the Suburban got out,
approached the parked car, and knocked on the window.  He told
the couple that they were on his property but that they could
stay.  He then returned to the Suburban and Jarvis heard
laughter.  The Suburban drove off.  
		A few minutes later, Jarvis heard a man yelling. 
Jarvis got out of the parked car to investigate and, he later
testified, a man "jumped out of nowhere."  The man was large and
stocky.  He was dressed in dark clothing and wore a long coat. 
His head and face were covered with some kind of mask or scarf;
only his eyes were visible.  He carried something that looked
like a machete and was swinging it like a sword.  He spoke in a
low rough growl and threatened Jarvis with the machete.  He
ordered Krause out of the car and told them both to take
off their clothes and shoes.  When they had complied, the man
threw the couple's car keys, clothes, and shoes into the woods. 
The man forced Jarvis to lie on the ground and Krause to lie
across the hood of the car.  He threatened Krause with the blade
of the machete and sexually assaulted her. 
		Jarvis later told police that he thought that the
person who claimed to be the "property owner" and the rapist were
different people.  Weeks later, at two police lineups, Jarvis
identified Susbauer as the "property owner" and defendant
possibly as the rapist.  Krause was not able to identify the
rapist when shown the same lineups.  
		On December 19, 1995, defendant and Susbauer broke into
another house and again stole thousands of dollars worth of
property including, among other things, a rabbit-fur jacket, a
.38 caliber Taurus revolver with wooden grips, and 25 rounds of
ammunition for the revolver.  Before they left, they again
slashed the furniture with a knife.  
Late in the evening on December 20, defendant and
Susbauer were riding around in the stolen Suburban.  Susbauer was
driving.  They saw defendant's former girlfriend, Kristal
Bendele, (1) 15, her current boyfriend, Brandon Williams, 15, and
two other young people, Patrick Finley, 13, and Michael Black,
15.  Defendant and Susbauer drove toward them and parked the
Suburban.  Defendant got out of the Suburban.  He was wearing a
black trench coat and jeans.  Defendant offered the teenagers a
ride, which Bendele, Williams and Finley accepted.  Black
declined.  As Black walked away, he saw the Suburban slowly drive
off in a different direction.  
		The next afternoon, December 21, 1995, two men found
the nude bodies of Williams and Bendele at a logging landing on
McGowan Creek.  Bendele had been shot twice, once in the back and
once in the left temple.  Williams had been shot five times;
three shots were to the head and face, one to the chest, and one
to the back.  Finley, barely alive, also was lying nearby.  He,
too, had been shot twice, once in the head and once in the
shoulder.  Among other things, he was wearing the rabbit-fur
jacket that defendant and Susbauer had stolen in the earlier
burglary.  Finley died four days later without ever regaining
consciousness.
  		Police visited Susbauer at his home on December 24,
1995, and seized the .38 caliber Taurus revolver stolen during
the December 19 burglary.  On December 26, police searched
defendant's bedroom.  There, they seized a black trench coat and
a machete.  
		The Taurus revolver later was proved to be the murder
weapon; all the bullets recovered at the scene and from the
bodies of the victims had been fired from that gun.  Testing of
the grip of the revolver revealed a mixture of DNA patterns, the
most predominant of which matched that of Bendele.  Semen
obtained from Bendele's mouth, vagina, and anus was identified as
Susbauer's.  Semen on Bendele's shirt and on the rabbit fur
jacket that Finley was wearing was identified as defendant's. 
		Defendant and Susbauer both were charged with
aggravated murder and various other crimes in the murders of
Bendele, Williams, and Finley, in the assault on Jarvis and
Krause, and in the December 14 and December 19 burglaries. 
Susbauer agreed to cooperate and pleaded guilty to, among other
things, three counts of aggravated murder.  Thereafter, the
district attorney decided to seek the death penalty only against
defendant.  
		At the ensuing trial, defendant's theory was that
Susbauer was the rapist and killer and that he, defendant, merely
was in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Susbauer's story was
the opposite:  Defendant was the director of the abuse and
murderer of all the victims; Susbauer was a secondary -- and, in
part, unwilling -- accomplice.  The jury rejected defendant's
theory and convicted him of 13 counts of aggravated murder and
multiple noncapital crimes arising out of the burglaries and the
attack on Krause and Jarvis.  
		Defendant was sentenced on the noncapital crimes at the
conclusion of the guilt-phase trial.  The trial court then
conducted a penalty-phase trial on the aggravated murder
convictions.  In that proceeding, the jury determined that
defendant had acted deliberately in committing the murders, that
he posed a continuing risk to society, and that he should receive
a death sentence.  The trial judge then entered a sentence of
death. 
		On review, defendant raises 33 assignments of error,
most of which are not well taken and do not require separate
discussion.  We analyze defendant's arguments respecting those
assignments of error that do require discussion under three
headings:  pretrial issues, guilt-phase issues, and penalty-phase
issues.  
PRETRIAL ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
		Defendant raises eight assignments of error respecting
matters that he raised in pretrial motions.  Three of those
assignments raise constitutional challenges to the Oregon death-
penalty statute that this court previously has considered and
rejected.  Another presents a constitutional challenge to the
exclusion of convicted felons and nonregistered voters from the
jury pool that this court previously has considered and rejected. 
None of those assignments of error warrants additional
discussion.  
Defendant also demurred to the form of the indictment
in this case on the ground that the six aggravated murder counts
that alleged that he had committed murder to conceal the crime of
third-degree sexual abuse and to conceal the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime of third-degree sexual abuse (counts 20,
21, 27, 29, 35, and 37) were impermissibly vague. (2)  Specifically,
defendant argued to the trial court that 
		"[defendant] is entitled to notice of the
particulars of the offenses he is alleged to have
committed.  The offenses of sexual abuse in the third
degree * * * are not charged anywhere in the
indictment.  
		"The indictment does not say who is or were the
victims of the offense of sexual abuse in the third
degree.  That's not set forth anywhere in the
indictment.  There are three decedents who are all
potential victims of that crime.  There's also Jonathan
Susbauer, who is claiming to be a victim of some sort.  
		"The indictment does not say in what county the
offense of sexual abuse in the third degree was
committed.  The indictment does not say when the
offense of sexual abuse in the third degree was
committed.  The indictment does not say who the
perpetrator or perpetrators of the offense of sexual
abuse in the third degree are or were.  
		"* * * * *
		"* * * This indictment can't go to the jury in the
form it's in, suggesting that some sexual abuse in the
third degree was committed somewhere at sometime by
some persons and allowing the jury to return a verdict
of guilty to that count without agreeing among
themselves what sexual abuse we're talking about * * *."
Defendant asked the court to send the matter back to the grand
jury for clarification of the specific facts and circumstances
that constituted third-degree sexual abuse in each of the
aggravated murder counts in which that crime was the aggravating
factor. (3)  The state responded by arguing that an indictment is
sufficient if it tracks the wording of the statute, which the
indictment in this case did.  The trial court denied the
demurrer.  									
This court addressed a similar issue in State v.
Lotches, 331 Or 455, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US 833
(2001).  There, the defendant was charged with three counts of
aggravated murder of one victim, based on three separate
aggravating factors:  that the murder was committed "in the
course of and in the furtherance of and in the immediate flight
from" the crime of attempted robbery; that the murder was
committed "in the course of and in the furtherance of and in the
immediate flight from" the crime of attempted second-degree
kidnapping; and that the murder was committed in an effort to
conceal the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of attempted
murder.  The defendant in Lotches asserted that the state and
federal constitutions, as well as a state statute, give criminal
defendants the right to be informed of the charges against them (4)
and argued that the aggravated murder charges in the indictment
failed to meet that standard because they failed to state the
particular elements and circumstances that made up the offenses
charged.  Specifically, he contended that the vagueness of the
aggravated murder charges in the indictment impermissibly would
force the trial court and the defendant to guess what factual and
legal theories the grand jury had used, and impermissibly would
permit the state to shift theories of the case after indictment. 
The defendant in Lotches had not demurred to the indictment, but
nonetheless argued on direct review that the trial court should
have stricken the aggravated murder charges on its own motion.  
		In considering that matter, this court observed that
the defendant had not been charged with attempted second-degree
kidnapping, although facts adduced at trial would have supported
more than one such charge.  Moreover, the indictment itself
indicated that the defendant was alleged to have committed more
than one attempted robbery and more than one attempted murder,
each involving more than one victim.  Under those circumstances,
this court stated, the defendant "would have been entitled to
require the state to specify which particular facts and
circumstances made up the underlying crimes on which the charges
of aggravated murder were based."  Id. at 465.  
		However, the court did not go on to indicate precisely
the manner in which the defendant was entitled to receive the
information that he sought.  In the final analysis, the court
declined to overturn the indictment in Lotches on the ground that
the deficiency of the aggravated murder counts was error apparent
on the face of the record because, normally, objections to the
sufficiency of the indictment not timely raised are waived, and
because this court previously had stated repeatedly that an
indictment that tracks the wording of the statute is sufficient. 
Id. at 465-66.   
		In this case, by contrast, defendant timely raised the
issue by demurring to the indictment.  Accordingly, this case
presents squarely the question left unanswered in Lotches, viz.,
whether defendant was entitled to require the state to make the
indictment more definite and certain, and, consequently, whether
the trial court's failure to grant defendant's demurrer was
error. 
Lotches proceeded with its analysis on the basis that
omitting the specifics of certain alleged underlying offenses in
the indictment might be error, but it never was required to, and
did not, so hold.  We continue to agree with defendant that, in
this case, where the record would support more than one incident
of third-degree sexual abuse, defendant was entitled to know the
state's precise theory of the case and which facts and
circumstances the state was relying on to support the aggravated
murder counts.  However, we do not agree that requiring the trial
court to sustain defendant's demurrer to the indictment is the
proper (or only) vehicle for ensuring that defendant obtains the
information that he seeks.  Defendant had other avenues available
to him for acquiring that information, such as later moving the
court to require the state to elect a specific incident of third-degree sexual abuse, or requesting special jury instructions that
clarify the matter. (5)
In light of the foregoing, we now confirm that, as this
court so many times has held, an indictment generally is
sufficient if it charges an offense in the words of the statute. 
See, e.g., State v. Fair, 326 Or 485, 490, 953 P2d 383 (1998)
(stating and relying on rule; indictment for racketeering
sufficient although did not set out specific nexus between
predicate offenses); State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 596-97, 789 P2d
1352 (1990) (aggravated murder; indictment alleging aggravating
factor of concealment of other crimes sufficient, although did
not set out elements of such other crimes).  Here, there is no
question that the indictment used the words of the pertinent
aggravated murder statute; in fact, it went on to allege the
underlying offenses.  That was sufficient. (6)  We find no error. (7) 
		We have considered defendant's other assignments of
error respecting pretrial matters.  None is well taken.  We turn
to defendant's assignments of error pertaining to the guilt phase
of the trial.
GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

		Defendant advances nine assignments of error directed
at the guilt phase of the trial.  
		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's exclusion
of testimony that, in 1990, Susbauer had been the subject of a
"high-risk felony stop," in which a police officer ordered
Susbauer to lie face down on the ground.  Defendant contended
that that evidence was relevant to establish that it was
Susbauer, not defendant, who was the main perpetrator of the
crimes in the Jarvis/Krause attack and in the McGowan Creek
murders.  That is so, according to defendant, because, in both
those criminal episodes, the perpetrator commanded the male
victims to lie face down in a prone position.  Defendant claimed
that the fact that Susbauer had experienced being ordered to lie
face down makes it more likely that he was recreating his prior
experience of power and powerlessness, and was the perpetrator of
both criminal episodes.  
		The prosecutor objected to the admission of that
testimony on the grounds that is was irrelevant and "it's other
crimes."  The trial court sustained the objection.  
		The state seems now to concede that the proffered
testimony has some "minimal relevance."  Instead, in its argument
in support of the trial court's ruling, it focuses exclusively on
establishing that the testimony amounted to "other crimes"
evidence, which is inadmissible under OEC 404(3).  OEC 404(3)
provides:
	"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."
The state contends that the police officer's testimony amounts to
propensity evidence -- that is, the state asserts that defendant
offered the testimony to show that, because Susbauer once was
ordered to the ground, he is more likely to be the person who
ordered the male victims to the ground.  Indeed, defendant
himself has stated that that is the reason that he offered the
evidence.  However, that reason does not turn the evidence into
inadmissible propensity evidence.  In fact, it is not evidence
that is subject to analysis under OEC 404(3) at all.  
		OEC 404(3) precludes the admission of evidence of a
person's prior "crimes, wrongs or acts" to prove the character of
that person to show that he or she later acted in conformity with
them.  The fact that a police officer once ordered Susbauer to
lie face down is not itself a "crime" or a "wrong" or an "act" of
Susbauer's, and we cannot see how it would tend to prove
Susbauer's character in any event.  More importantly, defendant
did not attempt to establish that Susbauer acted in conformity
with his own prior act of lying face down.  The proffered
evidence does not fit within any category of what is known as
"other crimes" evidence under OEC 404(3), and that rule does not
provide a basis for excluding it.  
		However, notwithstanding the state's apparent
concession as to relevance, we conclude that the proffered
evidence is irrelevant and, therefore, was inadmissible. 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."  OEC 401.  Defendant claims that evidence
of Susbauer's earlier experience during the "high-risk felony
stop" tends to make it more probable that he was the perpetrator
of Jarvis/Krause attack and the McGowan Creek murders.  We do not
see the connection.  In order to conclude from the fact that
Susbauer had been ordered by a police officer to lie face down on
one occasion five years earlier that Susbauer was the perpetrator
of those crimes, a jury would have to make a series of
inferential leaps that lack any factual predicate.  For example,
the jury would have to infer that people who have had that
experience are more likely than those who merely have read about
it or seen it on television or in films to realize the
intimidating nature of such an act, or that Susbauer, in
particular, was scarred from the experience and wanted to inflict
a similar experience on someone else, or even that evidence that
might help to explain a person's motivation for acting in a
particular way can be used to prove that the person in fact did
act in that particular way.  None of those inferences is
warranted in this case.  As a matter of law, the evidence was not
relevant.  It follows that the trial court did not err in
excluding it.  
Defendant's next four assignments of error concern the
trial court's failure to ensure jury unanimity on many of the
charges of aggravated murder. (8)   With respect to counts 20, 21,
27, 29, 35, and 37, which are based on the underlying crime of
third-degree sexual abuse, defendant contends that the trial
court should have identified for the jury the factual
circumstances surrounding those crimes, including a particular
instance of third-degree sexual abuse involving a particular
perpetrator and victim, or that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that it must agree unanimously on the same
incident of third-degree sexual abuse in order to find defendant
guilty of aggravated murder as charged in those counts. 
Defendant makes identical arguments with respect to those
aggravated murder charges that are based on the commission of the
crime of murder (counts 26, 28, 34, and 36).  He argues there
that the trial court erred when it failed to ensure jury
unanimity on the factual circumstances underlying those crimes,
either by identifying for the jury a particular murder or by
instructing the jury that it must agree unanimously on the same
murder before convicting him on those charges.  
		With respect to each of the charges of aggravated
murder committed to conceal the crime of third-degree sexual
abuse, the trial court instructed the jury generally that, to
find defendant guilty, it would have to find that he
intentionally caused each victim's death "in an effort to conceal
the crime of sexual abuse in the third degree."  The court also
instructed the jury with respect to the elements of the crime of
third-degree sexual abuse.  Similarly, with respect to those
counts charging defendant with aggravated murder committed to
conceal the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of third-degree sexual abuse, the court merely told the jurors that, to
find defendant guilty, they would have to find that defendant
intentionally caused each victim's death "in an effort to conceal
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of sexual abuse in
the third degree."  
		The court did not identify the victim or surrounding
circumstances of the underlying crimes of third-degree sexual
abuse with respect to any of the aggravated murder charges based
on that underlying crime.  Nor did the trial court instruct the
jury that, to convict defendant of an aggravated murder charge
based on third-degree sexual abuse, all jurors had to agree that
the murder had been committed to conceal a single incident of
sexual abuse, upon which they all agreed, committed against a
single victim.  Likewise, with regard to the counts alleging
concealment of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of
third-degree sexual abuse, the trial court did not tell the
jurors that, to return a guilty verdict, they all had to agree on
the identity of at least one perpetrator.  
		On the counts of aggravated murder based on the
underlying crime of murder, the court gave similar instructions;
it simply told jurors that, to find defendant guilty, they had to
agree that he intentionally caused the victim's death "to conceal
the commission of the crime of murder" or "to conceal the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime of murder."  As with the
aggravated murder counts based on third-degree sexual abuse, the
court did not instruct the jury that, to convict, all jurors had
to agree on the same underlying crime of murder or the same
perpetrator. 
		In a combined argument, defendant asserts that evidence
at trial could have supported more than one instance of third-degree sexual abuse, by more than one perpetrator, and more than
one murder by more than one perpetrator.  He argues that, under
those circumstances, there was a strong possibility of jury
confusion and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the trial court
to identify the facts and circumstances of the crimes of sexual
abuse or murder with respect to each count of aggravated murder,
and to instruct the jurors that, in addition to everything else
that is required, they must agree unanimously on the underlying
crime to convict defendant on a particular count of aggravated
murder based on that crime.  
		Defendant concedes that he did not object at trial to
the instructions on the aggravated murder counts in any of the
foregoing respects.  However, he contends that this court held in
Lotches that specificity with respect to the facts and
circumstances of the crimes underlying each aggravated murder
charge is required to meet the constitutional jury unanimity
requirements.  Further, he argues that the error is one of law
and is not reasonably in dispute.  Accordingly, defendant urges
this court to exercise its discretion to review the error as
apparent on the face of the record.  
		In Lotches, this court addressed a similar problem.  As
discussed above, the defendant in Lotches was charged with three
counts of aggravated murder for killing one individual.  One
count alleged that the defendant intentionally murdered the
victim "in the course of and in the furtherance of and in the
immediate flight from" the crime of first-degree robbery.  A
second count alleged that the murder was committed in connection
with the crime of attempted kidnapping.  A third count alleged
that defendant committed the murder to conceal the identity of
the perpetrator of attempted murder.  Defendant was not charged
with the first-degree robbery that the state later claimed was
the basis of the aggravated murder charge, but he was indicted on
and convicted of a charge of first-degree robbery involving a
different victim.  Defendant was not charged with attempted
kidnapping at all, but he was charged with two counts of
attempted murder, involving two different victims.  The trial
court did not identify for the jury the victim or attendant
circumstances of any of the underlying felonies, nor did it
instruct the jurors that all had to agree on the same set of
underlying facts in order to convict the defendant on each count. 
In that case, as in the present, the defendant did not object to
the instructions as given.  
		The court in Lotches began by examining whether the
instructions given to the jury were adequate.  The court observed
that, in State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 780 P2d 725 (1989), this
court overturned the aggravated murder conviction of a defendant
who had been charged with that crime based on two separate
aggravating factors, because the trial court had instructed the
jury that it was not required to agree unanimously on any
particular theory, so long as some combination of the 12 jurors
agreed that one or the other or both of the alleged aggravating
factors had been proved.  In Lotches, the court stated that,
under Boots, the unanimous jury rule "requires that the jury
agree as to just what defendant did to bring himself within the
purview of the particular subsection of the aggravated murder
statute under which he was charged."  Lotches, 331 Or at 468-69
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Applying that rationale to
the aggravated murder charges at issue in Lotches, the court held
that, "because the aggravated murder instructions that were given
did not either limit the jury's consideration to a specified
underlying felony or require jury unanimity concerning a choice
among alternative felonies, each instruction carried the danger
that this court had condemned in Boots."  Lotches, 331 Or at 469. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that, "[a]s a legal matter, the
jury instructions were erroneous."  Id.  
		In the present case, defendant was not charged with
third-degree sexual abuse, but there was evidence to support a
finding that either defendant or Susbauer (or both) committed
that crime under several different theories.  Similarly, there
were three murder victims and two possible perpetrators of that
crime.  We agree with defendant that, because the instructions
that the jury was given with respect to each of the aggravated
murder counts based on the crimes of third-degree sexual abuse
and murder did not either limit the jury's consideration to a
specific instance of third-degree sexual abuse or murder,
committed by a particular perpetrator against a particular
victim, or require jury unanimity concerning a choice among
alternative scenarios, each instruction carried an impermissible
danger of jury confusion as to the crime underlying each count. 
As in Lotches, the jury instructions with respect to counts 20,
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, and 37, were erroneous. 
		We turn to consider the state's argument that any
errors in the jury instructions were harmless.  In that regard,
we examine whether it is possible at this stage of the proceeding
to determine whether all 12 of the jurors agreed on the victim,
perpetrator, and attendant circumstances of the crimes underlying
the aggravated murder charges.  Id. at 470-71.  
		The state contends that the jury's unanimous verdicts
on other counts demonstrate the required degree of unanimity so
as to render each of the jury instruction errors harmless.  We
agree with the state that the trial court's errors with respect
to counts 26, 28, 34, and 36, in failing to identify the victim
and perpetrator of the underlying crimes of murder, were
harmless.  That is so because the jury unanimously convicted
defendant of aggravated murder on counts 19, 25, and 33.  As to
those counts, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
		"In this case, to establish the crime of
aggravated murder, in Count 19, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that * * * [defendant]
intentionally caused the death of Kristal Rene Bendele,
another human being, and Brandon Matthew Williams and
Patrick Finley, other human beings, in the same
criminal episode.
		"* * * * *
		"In this case, to establish the crime of
aggravated murder, in Count 25, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: * * *
that [defendant] intentionally caused the death of
Brandon Matthew Williams, another human being, and
Kristal Rene Bendele and Patrick Finley, other human
beings, in the same criminal episode. 
		"* * * * *
		"In order to establish the crime of aggravated
murder, in Count 33, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that * * * [defendant] intentionally
caused the death of Patrick Finley, another human
being, and Kristal Rene Bendele and Brandon Matthew
Williams, other human beings, in the same criminal
episode." 
Pursuant to those instructions, the jury was required to find
that defendant intentionally caused the death of each of the
victims and both of the other victims in the same criminal
episode.  Thus, the fact that the jury unanimously convicted
defendant on those counts proves that all 12 jurors believed that
defendant was responsible for all three murders.  The fact that
Susbauer may have shared responsibility for those murders does
not alter that analysis.  The verdicts on counts 19, 25, and 33
establish that the jury could not have been confused with respect
to either the victims or the perpetrator of the crime of murder
in those counts that alleged that defendant committed murder to
conceal the crime of murder and to conceal the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime of murder (counts 26, 28, 34, and 36).  
		The same cannot be said for those aggravated murder
counts alleging the predicate crime of third-degree sexual abuse
(counts 20, 21, 27, 29, 35, and 37), however.  As noted,
defendant was not charged with that predicate crime, but the
state presented evidence at trial that would have supported
various theories making defendant liable for committing it. 
Under some of those theories, defendant was the perpetrator;
under others, Susbauer was.  Bendele, Williams, and Susbauer
himself were possible victims.  In addition, defendant was
charged with, and convicted of, first-degree sodomy for his
conduct with respect to Bendele.  
		With respect to each count of aggravated murder
predicated on the crime of third-degree sexual abuse, the jury
was required to agree unanimously on all material facts
constituting that underlying crime.  However, in the absence of
explicit jury instructions, it is impossible to determine
whether, in convicting defendant of a particular count of
aggravated murder based on concealing the commission or the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime of third-degree sexual
abuse, each individual juror in fact had in mind the same victim,
perpetrator, and surrounding circumstances making up that crime. 
It follows that the errors in the jury instructions with respect
to counts 20, 21, 27, 29, 35, and 37 were not harmless.  
		In Lotches, this court held that a trial court's
failure to instruct the jury fully respecting the counts of
aggravated murder predicated on an underlying felony was error
apparent on the face of the record.  Id. at 472.  The court
stated that each of the prerequisites for such a determination
was present:  the issue of what must be included in jury
instructions is a question of law; what was or was not included
in the instructions actually given is easily ascertainable
through examination of the record; and, in light of this court's
previous holding in Boots, the error was obvious.  Therefore, the
court in Lotches reversed the defendant's convictions of
aggravated murder for the two counts for which the court
concluded that the error was not harmless.  Id.  The same
reasoning is applicable here.  Accordingly, notwithstanding the
defendant's failure to object to the instructions at trial, we
conclude that defendant's convictions of aggravated murder on
counts 20, 21, 27, 29, 35, and 37 must be reversed, and the case
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings respecting
those counts. 
		Our conclusion with respect to those counts does not
affect defendant's seven remaining convictions of aggravated
murder, however.  Accordingly, we have considered the balance of
defendant's assignments of error respecting the guilt phase.  We
find none to be well taken and, therefore, we affirm defendant's
seven remaining aggravated murder convictions.  We turn to
consider defendant's assignments of error relating to the penalty
phase of his trial. 
PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

		Defendant makes many assignments respecting the
evidence offered, the jury instructions given, and the law
applied during the penalty phase.  We have considered each and
determine that all but one either is not preserved, is not well
taken, or has been answered by previous decisions of this court
or by the United States Supreme Court.  Discussion of those
assignments of error would not benefit defendant, the public, the
bench, or the bar.  We turn to the one assignment of error that
appears to be well taken.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it
entered multiple judgments and sentences of death for the
aggravated murder of Bendele, when it entered multiple judgments
and sentences of death for the aggravated murder of Williams, and
when it entered multiple judgments and sentences of death for the
aggravated murder of Finley. (9)  Defendant asserts that, under this
court's decision in State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d 901
(2000), a defendant properly may be charged with multiple counts
of aggravated murder based on the existence of multiple
aggravating factors, id. at 31, but, in the event of conviction
on those charges, only one judgment should be entered for each
murdered person, which judgment would enumerate each of the
separate aggravating factors, id. at 37.  Defendant acknowledges
that he did not object to the imposition of multiple judgments
and multiple sentences of death, but argues that this court
should review the error as apparent on the face of the record.  
The state concedes that the judgment entered is
erroneous, and we agree.  We remand the case for entry of
corrected judgments of conviction reflecting defendant's guilt on
the charges of aggravated murder with respect to each victim. (10) 
Each judgment should enumerate separately the aggravating factors
on which each conviction was based.  Further, each judgment
entering a single conviction for aggravated murder for each
victim should impose a single sentence of death.  
		We have considered all defendant's assignments of error
and every argument made in support thereof.  Any assignment of
error or argument not discussed in this opinion either has been
discussed by this court in previous cases and resolved against
defendant, was not preserved for review, or is not well taken. 
Further discussion of the issues would not benefit defendant, the
public, the bench, or the bar. 
		The judgments of conviction for aggravated murder on
counts 20, 21, 27, 29, 35, and 37 are reversed, and the sentences
of death thereon are vacated.  The judgments of conviction for
aggravated murder on counts 19, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, and 36, and
the sentences of death thereon, are affirmed.  The case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  



1. Defendant had had a sexual relationship with Bendele
the year before, when she was 14. 		

2. Defendant was charged in three separate counts (one for
each murder victim) with aggravated murder, based on each of two
theories of responsibility for aggravated murder under ORS
163.095(2)(e).  That statute provides that aggravated murder
includes murder "committed in an effort to conceal the commission
of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a
crime."  

3. Third-degree sexual abuse is defined in ORS 163.415 as
follows: 
		"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in
the third degree if the person subjects another person
to sexual contact and:
		"(a) The victim does not consent to the sexual
contact; or
		"(b) The victim is incapable of consent by reason
of being under 18 years of age.
		"(2) Sexual abuse in the third degree is a Class A
misdemeanor."    
In the present case, defendant was not charged with committing
third-degree sexual abuse, but there was evidence that would
support multiple theories of responsibility for third-degree
sexual abuse by defendant.  Codefendant Susbauer testified that,
on the night of the McGowan Creek murders, Susbauer kissed and
fondled Bendele, a nonconsenting person under the age of 18, and
that both he and defendant raped and sodomized her.  Susbauer
claimed that defendant forced him to commit those sexual acts
with Bendele, thus making him an additional victim of sexual
abuse.  Susbauer testified that defendant forced Bendele to
perform fellatio on Williams, a person under the age of 18, thus
making Williams another victim of sexual abuse.

4. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that, 
	"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; * * *." 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that, 
	"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; * * *."  
In addition, ORS 132.550(7) requires indictments to contain,
among other things, 
	"[a] statement of the acts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and
in such manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended."

5. In the present case, the instructions that the court
gave the jury on the aggravated murder counts did not contain any
specifics respecting the underlying crimes, nor did they instruct
the jury that, to convict, all jurors had to agree on the same
underlying crime and the same perpetrator.  Defendant did not
object to the instructions in any way that is pertinent to the
present discussion.

6. Defendant argues that we should follow State v. Sanders, 280 Or 685, 688-90, 572 P2d 1307 (1977), and conclude
that the indictment was insufficient.  In that case, the court,
after acknowledging the ordinary rule, nonetheless held that an
indictment for burglary that alleged only that a person
unlawfully had entered a building "with the intent to commit a
crime therein" was insufficient, because it failed to identify
which crime or crimes were contemplated.  That requirement
relates only to the genre of the underlying offense, however. 
Sanders does not stand for the further proposition that an
indictment, after stating, for example, that a burglary defendant
entered a building with intent to commit theft, also must state
which object or objects within the building the person intended
to steal.

7. In this connection, defendant also contends that a
similar argument could be made concerning the sufficiency of the
aggravated murder charges that alleged that he committed murder
to conceal the crime of murder (counts 26 and 34) and to conceal
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of murder (counts 28
and 36).  Defendant concedes that his demurrer did not address
those counts but asks, nonetheless, that this court reverse his
convictions on those counts as well.  It follows from our
conclusion with respect to the the counts to which defendant did
demur that such a result is not warranted.  

8. Defendant does not contend that these assignments of
error pertain to counts 19, 25, and 33, which alleged that
defendant intentionally caused the deaths of Bendele, Williams,
and Finley, respectively, "in the course of the same criminal
episode that involved the murder of another victim."  Therefore,
his convictions on those counts stand, regardless of this court's
decision with respect to these assignments of error.  

9. As noted above, the jury found defendant guilty of 13
counts of aggravated murder (several counts for each victim), and
the court imposed 13 sentences of death.  As discussed ante, we
conclude that the trial court committed reversible error with
respect to six of those counts.  The discussion in the text
pertains to the remaining seven convictions for aggravated murder
and the seven sentences of death.  

10. In light of our holding of reversible error with
respect to those aggravated murder counts based on the underlying
crime of third-degree sexual abuse, only one aggravated murder
count remains based on the murder of Bendele and entry of a
corrected judgment is unnecessary.  However, the remaining
convictions based on the murder of Williams, counts 25, 26, and
28, should be merged into a single conviction, as should the
remaining convictions based on the murder of Finley, counts 33,
34, and 36.  The court should then reimpose the death sentence on
each of those convictions.