Title: Gillespie v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 119
September Term, 2001
______________________________________________
THOMAS EDWARD GILLESPIE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________________
Filed:    August 7, 2002
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references to § 561A are
references to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.) Art. 27, § 561A, which
provides as follows:
“(a) Definitions. -- 
(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. 
(2) ‘Local official’ means an individual serving in a publicly elected office
of a local government unit, as defined in §§ 10-101(d) of the State
Government Article. 
(3)(i) ‘State official’ means a State official as defined in §§ 15-102 of the
State Government Article.
(ii) ‘State official’ includes the Governor, Governor-elect, Lieutenant
Governor, and Lieutenant Governor-elect. 
(4) ‘Threat’ includes: 
(i) A verbal threat; or 
(ii) A threat in any written form, whether or not the writing is signed, or if it
is signed whether or not the writing is signed with a fictitious name or any
other mark. 
(b) Threats generally. -- A person may not knowingly and willfully make a
threat to take the life of, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon a State or local
official. 
(c) Sending or delivering threats. -- A person may not knowingly send,
deliver, part with the possession of, or make for the purpose of sending or
delivering a threat prohibited under subsection (b) of this section. 
(d) Penalty. -- A person who violates any provision of this section is guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or both.” 
Thomas Edward Gillespie, petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for St.
Mary’s County of threatening a State official in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.) Article 27, § 561A.  In this case we are asked to decide whether an
assistant state’s attorney is a State official under the statute.1  We shall hold that an assistant
state’s attorney is not a State official, as defined by § 561A.  Accordingly, we shall reverse.
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I.
On March 12, 2001, petitioner appeared in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County
for a bail review hearing on a pending violation of probation.  After the assistant state’s
attorney for St. Mary’s County informed the court of petitioner’s criminal record, the court
ordered him held without bond.  While Corporal Donna Rustin, a correctional officer, was
escorting petitioner to the holding area, petitioner stated, “I’m going to kill him.”  When
Corporal Rustin asked whether petitioner was referring to the judge, petitioner responded that
he was referring to the assistant state’s attorney.  Petitioner then stated, “When I get out I will
kill him.  He didn’t have to pull my record out and show the judge!” 
The State filed a statement of charges in the District Court of Maryland alleging that
petitioner had threatened a State official in violation of Article 27, § 561A.  Petitioner was
convicted in the District Court of Maryland and noted a timely appeal to the Circuit Court
pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.) § 12-401(c)(1) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.  On November 27, 2001, the Circuit Court, sitting without
a jury, found petitioner guilty of threatening a State official in violation of § 561A and
sentenced him to a term of incarceration of one year, six months suspended, with six months
probation upon release.  We granted certiorari to answer the question of whether an assistant
state’s attorney is a State official for purposes of § 561A.  Gillespie v. State, 367 Md. 722,
790 A.2d 673 (2002).  
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II.
The question whether an assistant state’s attorney is a State official for the purposes
of § 561A is one of statutory interpretation.  We have often stated that the paramount rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.  See, e.g.,
Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000).  The starting point in the first
instance is the plain language of the statute.  See Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 606, 728 A.2d
180, 184 (1999); Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458
(1997).  We view the words of a statute in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the
manner in which they are most commonly understood.  See Whiting Turner Contracting Co.
v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 783 A.2d 667 (2001).  If the words of a statute are clear and
unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends and we need investigate no further, but simply
apply the statute as it reads.  Id. at 301, 783 A.2d at 670.  We neither add nor delete words
to an unambiguous statute in an attempt to extend the statute’s meaning.  Id. at 302, 783 A.2d
at 671.  We interpret statutes to give every word effect, avoiding constructions that render
any portion of the language superfluous or redundant.  See Blondell v. Baltimore City Police
Department, 341 Md. 680, 691, 672 A.2d 639, 644-45 (1996); N. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995).  This Court has also applied the
principle of “inclusio unius est exclusion alterious,” the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another, to the interpretation of statutes.  See Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540,
554, 663 A.2d 1318, 1325 (1995).   
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III.
Article 27, § 561A, the statute at issue in the case before us, provides as follows:
“(a) Definitions. -- 
(1) In this section the following words have the meanings
indicated. 
(2) ‘Local official’ means an individual serving in a publicly
elected office of a local government unit, as defined in §§ 10-
101(d) of the State Government Article. 
(3)(i) ‘State official’ means a State official as defined in §§ 15-
102 of the State Government Article.
(ii) ‘State official’ includes the Governor, Governor-elect,
Lieutenant Governor, and Lieutenant Governor-elect. 
(4) ‘Threat’ includes: 
(i) A verbal threat; or 
(ii) A threat in any written form, whether or not the writing is
signed, or if it is signed whether or not the writing is signed with
a fictitious name or any other mark. 
(b) Threats generally. -- A person may not knowingly and
willfully make a threat to take the life of, kidnap, or inflict
bodily harm upon a State or local official. 
(c) Sending or delivering threats. -- A person may not knowingly
send, deliver, part with the possession of, or make for the
purpose of sending or delivering a threat prohibited under
subsection (b) of this section. 
(d) Penalty. -- A person who violates any provision of this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is
subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not
exceeding $2,500 or both.”  
(Emphasis added).
We must decide whether an assistant state’s attorney is a State official under § 561A.
Subsection 561A(a)(3)(1) states that a “State official” means a State official as defined in
Maryland Code (1957, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.) § 15-102(ll) of the State Government
Article, a subsection of the Maryland Public Ethics Law.  Section 15-102 defines “State
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official” as follows:
“(ll) State official. – ‘State official’ means:
(1) a constitutional officer or officer-elect in an executive unit;
(2) a member or member-elect of the General Assembly;
(3) a judge or judge-elect of a court under Article IV, § 1 of the
Constitution;
(4) a judicial appointee as defined in Maryland Rule 16-814;
(5) a State’s Attorney;
(6) a clerk of the circuit court;
(7) a register of wills; or
(8) a sheriff.”
The plain language of § 15-102(ll)(5) states that “a State’s Attorney” is a State official
(emphasis added).  “A” is singular, not plural.  This language suggests that the legislature
meant to refer to a single official, not the official and all of that official’s appointees.  
The State urges that an assistant state’s attorney is a “constitutional officer” under §
15-102(ll)(1).  Under this construction of the statute, however, § 15-102(ll)(5) would be
superfluous; the statute would protect a State’s Attorney under both § 15-102(ll)(1) and § 15-
102(ll)(5).  Such an interpretation is contrary to this Court’s long-standing practice of
interpreting statutes to give every word effect and avoid constructions that render any portion
of the language superfluous or redundant.  Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 341 Md.
680, 691, 672 A.2d 639, 644-45 (1996).
We are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md.
275, 558 A.2d 399 (1989), is determinative in the case before us.  Rucker, a civilian
bystander, was shot after a car chase involving Harford County Sheriffs and Maryland State
Police.  He filed suit against the county and State officers in the United States District Court
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for the District of Maryland.  The Deputy Sheriffs moved to dismiss a portion of the
complaint on the basis that any suit against them in their official capacities was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment because they were State employees or officials.  The District Court
certified the following two questions to this Court: 
“1. Whether the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County
are employees of the State of Maryland or of Harford County?
 
2. Whether Harford County or the State of Maryland is obligated
to fund the expenses associated with claims for liability
involving the Harford County Sheriff, the Deputy Sheriffs or the
Sheriff's office, including the cost of liability insurance, the
costs of defending suits brought against them and the payment
of any settlements and judgment?”
Id. at 277-78, 558 A.2d at 400. 
The issue in Rucker, then, was whether, for the purpose of determining civil liability,
the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County were employees of the State of Maryland,
not whether the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriffs were State officials.  We stated that “the Sheriff
and Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County are officials and/or employees of the State of
Maryland,” id. at 281, 558 A.2d at 402, but our focus was on assigning liability, not on who
was a State official under the State Ethics Law.  See id.  We explicitly stated that we were
not concerned with the distinction between employees and officials: 
“The certified question asks us whether the Sheriff or Deputy
Sheriffs of Harford County are ‘employees’ of the State of
Maryland or of Harford County. Strictly speaking, sheriffs and
deputies might be categorized as public officials rather than
employees. A number of this Court's decisions have drawn
distinctions between officers or officials and employees.  In
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Duncan v. Koustenis, the Court noted that public officials
include those who ‘can be called on to exercise police powers as
conservators of the peace.’  This Court has held that sheriffs are
public officials. Deputy sheriffs arguably qualify as public
officials in that they ‘can be called on to exercise police powers
as conservators of the peace.’  The certified question, however,
is not concerned with this distinction.” 
Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281 n.2, 558 A.2d 399, 402 n.2 (1989) (citations
omitted).  Therefore, Rucker sheds little, if any, light on the issue of whether an assistant
state’s attorney should be considered a State official for the purposes of § 561A.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
ST. MARY’S COUNTY REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH
I N S T R U C TI O NS 
TO 
DIS MIS S  
T HE
STATEMENT OF CHARGES.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY ST. MARY’S COUNTY.