Title: Marilyn R. Davis v. R C & Sons Paving, Inc.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 88 
Docket: 
And-10-696 
Argued: 
May 10, 2011 
Decided: 
August 11, 2011 
 
Panel:  
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ. 
Concurrence/ 
   Dissent: 
SILVER, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
MARILYN R. DAVIS 
 
v. 
 
R C & SONS PAVING, INC. 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Marilyn R. Davis appeals from a summary judgment in favor of 
R C & Sons Paving, Inc. entered in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, 
MG Kennedy, J.) on Davis’s complaint seeking relief for injuries she sustained 
when she fell in her employer’s parking lot, which R C & Sons had agreed to plow 
and sand.  On appeal, Davis contends that summary judgment was improper 
because the court erred as a matter of law in determining that R C & Sons owed 
her no duty of care.  We disagree with her contention and affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Marilyn R. 
Davis as the nonmoving party, are undisputed and established in the summary 
 
2 
judgment record.  See Bonney v. Stephens Mem’l Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 4, 
17 A.3d 123, 125. 
 
[¶3]  On the morning of February 23, 2009, Davis, an employee of St. 
Mary’s Regional Medical Center (SMRMC), was injured when she slipped and fell 
in a parking lot at SMRMC.  SMRMC had contracted with R C & Sons to plow 
and sand all of its parking areas, and to clean and salt all of its sidewalks.  At the 
time Davis was injured, R C & Sons was still plowing the parking lot but had not 
sanded it. 
 
[¶4]  In January 2010, Davis filed a two-count complaint against 
R C & Sons in the Superior Court.1  In the first count, Davis alleged that, as a 
“direct and proximate result” of R C & Sons’ negligence, she had “slipped on 
negligently treated or untreated ice,” and in the second count she alleged that 
R C & Sons breached its “duty of exercising reasonable care” to “provide 
reasonably safe premises.” 
 
[¶5]  R C & Sons subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on 
Davis’s claims, arguing that it did not owe Davis a duty of care.  In its supporting 
memorandum of law, R C & Sons stated: 
Although it is not entirely clear from the language of the Complaint, 
[Davis] appears to be alleging negligence against [R C & Sons] on the 
                                         
1  We presume that 39-A M.R.S. § 104 (2010) bars Davis from bringing a negligence action against 
her employer, the owner of the property.  
 
 
3 
basis of premises liability or as a third party beneficiary asserting her 
rights under the Agreement entered into between [R C & Sons] and St. 
Mary’s. 
 
R C & Sons, referencing section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(1981), asserted that it did not owe Davis a duty because she was not a “third party 
beneficiary” or an “intended beneficiary” of the snow removal agreement. 
 
[¶6]  In response, Davis argued that R C & Sons did owe her a duty of care 
as an intended beneficiary pursuant to section 302 of the Restatement.  Davis also 
asserted that R C & Sons owed her a duty because it negligently created a 
dangerous condition in the parking lot.2 
[¶7]  Following a hearing, the court granted a summary judgment in favor of 
R C & Sons.  The court first noted that if R C & Sons, as a non-possessor of the 
land, had negligently created a dangerous condition on the land, it could be held 
liable for the reasonably foreseeable harms caused by its negligence.  It held, 
however, that because there was no evidence that R C & Sons had affirmatively 
created the dangerous condition that led to Davis’s injuries, i.e., the snow and ice 
                                         
2  Davis alleged in Count II of her complaint that R C & Sons breached its “duty to provide reasonably 
safe premises,” which is the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land to those lawfully on the property.  
See Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, LP, 2010 ME 75, ¶¶ 10-11, 2 A.3d 276, 279; see also Poulin v. Colby 
Coll., 402 A.2d 846, 848-51 (Me. 1979).  In her response to R C & Sons’ motion for summary judgment, 
however, Davis acknowledged that R C & Sons did not own or possess the property in question, and 
instead argued that its duty to her and other persons using the parking lot was based on the hazardous 
conditions it created by failing to sand the parking lot.  At oral argument, Davis agreed that R C & Sons 
was not the possessor of the property. 
 
4 
that had accumulated in the parking lot, R C & Sons had no duty to protect Davis 
from that dangerous condition.  
 
[¶8]  The court also concluded, based on section 302 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, that “Davis failed to demonstrate that there is any genuine 
issue of fact with regard to her third-party beneficiary claim.”  Davis appeals the 
court’s entry of a summary judgment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 
evidence in the light “most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine 
whether the parties’ statements of material facts and the record evidence to which 
the statements refer demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Kurtz & Perry, P.A. 
v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ¶ 15, 8 A.3d 677, 680 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶10]  To survive a defendant’s motion for a summary judgment in a 
negligence action, a plaintiff “must establish a prima facie case for each of the four 
elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  Quirion v. 
Geroux, 2008 ME 41, ¶ 9, 942 A.2d 670, 673 (quotation marks omitted); 
cf. Ouelette v. Miller, 134 Me. 162, 166, 183 A. 341, 343 (1936) (“Actionable 
negligence arises from neglect to perform a legal duty.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
5 
 
[¶11]  Davis argues that the court erred in granting a summary judgment in 
favor of R C & Sons based on its determination that no tort duty existed.  Davis 
contends that R C & Sons owed her a duty of care because (1) she was a third-
party beneficiary of the contract between SMRMC and R C & Sons, and 
(2) R C & Sons negligently created a dangerous condition by failing to sand the 
parking lot after plowing it.  Whether a plaintiff is owed a duty of care and the 
scope of that duty are questions of law that we review de novo.  See Gniadek 
v. Camp Sunshine at Sebago Lake, Inc., 2011 ME 11, ¶ 17, 11 A.3d 308, 313; 
Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, LP, 2010 ME 75, ¶ 6, 2 A.3d 276, 278. 
A. 
Davis’s Claim of Duty Arising From Third-Party Beneficiary Status 
 
 
[¶12]  Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a 
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 
intention of the parties and either 
 
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of 
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or 
 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give 
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 
 
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended 
beneficiary. 
 
We have frequently applied this section to determine whether a plaintiff could 
assert a contract claim or enforce a contract as a third-party beneficiary.  See Fleet 
 
6 
Bank of Me. v. Harriman, 1998 ME 275, ¶¶ 6-10, 721 A.2d 658, 660-61; Devine v. 
Roche Biomedical Labs. (Devine II), 659 A.2d 868, 870-71 (Me. 1995); 
F.O. Bailey Co. v. Ledgewood, Inc., 603 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Me. 1992); see also 
Perkins v. Blake, 2004 ME 86, ¶¶ 8-9, 853 A.2d 752, 754-55; Stull v. First Am. 
Title Ins. Co., 2000 ME 21, ¶ 17, 745 A.2d 975, 981 (“Third parties to contracts are 
strictly limited in their ability to maintain an action under contract law.  A third 
party harmed by a breach may only sue for breach of contract if the contracting 
parties intended that the third party have an enforceable right.” (citation omitted)). 
 
[¶13]  Citing our decisions in Devine II and Denman v. Peoples Heritage 
Bank, Inc., 1998 ME 12, 704 A.2d 411, however, Davis argues that her status as an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the snow removal agreement between her 
employer and R C & Sons gives rise to a tort duty of care.  Given what appears to 
be confusion over some language from our decisions in Devine II and Denman, we 
take this opportunity to clarify that, in each case, we referred to section 302 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts when discussing contract claims, rather than 
tort claims. 
 
[¶14]  In Devine II, the plaintiff asserted a breach of contract claim against 
two laboratories, alleging that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contract 
between one of the laboratories and his former employer, and arguing that his 
employment had been terminated as a result of what he claimed was a falsely 
 
7 
positive drug test.  659 A.2d at 869; see also Devine v. Roche Biomedical Labs., 
Inc. (Devine I), 637 A.2d 441, 443-45 (Me. 1994).  Applying section 302 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, we concluded that the plaintiff could not 
proceed as a third-party beneficiary on his breach of contract claim.  Devine II, 
659 A.2d at 870-71. 
 
[¶15]  Denman involved a pedestrian who slipped on snow and ice on a 
public sidewalk that abutted property owned by a bank.  1998 ME 12, ¶ 2, 704 
A.2d at 413.  Pursuant to a municipal ordinance, the bank was responsible for 
removing snow and ice from the public sidewalk, and it hired a maintenance 
company to perform those responsibilities.  Id.  On the day the plaintiff was 
injured, the maintenance company had not shoveled or sanded the sidewalk.  Id.  In 
addition to the negligence claims she alleged against the bank and the maintenance 
company, the plaintiff asserted a breach of contract claim against the maintenance 
company, claiming that she was a third-party beneficiary of the maintenance 
contract between the company and the bank.  Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 704 A.2d at 414-15.  We 
identified section 302 of the Restatement as “[t]he controlling law” to determine 
whether the plaintiff could proceed as a third-party beneficiary on her contract 
claim against the maintenance company, and held that she failed to generate a 
genuine issue of fact relating to whether the bank intended that she receive 
 
8 
enforceable rights as an intended beneficiary of the maintenance contract pursuant 
to section 302 of the Restatement.3  Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 704 A.2d at 414-15. 
 
[¶16]  A clear distinction must be drawn “between actions which sound in 
contract and those which sound in tort.”  Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 
443 A.2d 932, 938 (Me. 1982) (noting that tort obligations and contractual 
obligations “create separate and distinct predicates of liability”).  In contract 
actions, “[c]ontractual recovery is predicated in the first instance upon a 
consensual obligation between two or more parties.”  Id.  On the other hand, tort 
recovery “does not rest upon a consensual relationship between the parties”: 
[I]n tort, liability is grounded upon the status relationship between the 
parties.  The status relationship which constitutes the predicate for tort 
recovery is entirely independent from and, indeed, foreign to any 
notions of the consensual features which form the basis of contractual 
liability. 
 
Id. (citation omitted); see also McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 923 
(Me. 1973) (“In tort, special consent, or contract, arrangements are not of the 
essence of, but are rather coincidental to, the origin of duties.” (quotation marks 
omitted)); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 92, at 655-56 
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  A tort duty involves “the question of whether 
                                         
3  We also affirmed the court’s grant of a summary judgment in favor of the bank and the maintenance 
company on the plaintiff’s negligence claims because neither defendant “possessed” the public sidewalk 
simply by maintaining it, and there was no genuine issue of material fact suggesting that any affirmative 
act by either defendant had created a hazard.  Denman v. Peoples Heritage Bank, Inc., 1998 ME 12, 
¶¶ 4-7, 10-11, 704 A.2d 411, 413-15. 
 
 
9 
the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff.”  
Trusiani v. Cumberland & York Distribs., Inc., 538 A.2d 258, 261 (Me. 1988) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶17]  Here, Davis did not allege a contract claim against R C & Sons in her 
complaint, and she is not seeking to enforce the snow removal agreement between 
R C & Sons and SMRMC.  As a result, her asserted status as a third-party 
beneficiary of the agreement is immaterial.4 
B. 
Davis’s Claim of Duty Arising From Negligent Creation of a Dangerous 
Condition 
 
 
[¶18]  Davis also contends that a duty of care arose because R C & Sons 
negligently created “the dangerous condition of untreated ice, covered by a thin 
skim of obscuring snow” by failing to treat the ice after plowing the area. 
 
[¶19]  In 1997, we recognized that a non-possessor of land “who negligently 
creates a dangerous condition on the land may be liable for reasonably foreseeable 
harms.”  Colvin v. A R Cable Services-ME, Inc., 1997 ME 163, ¶ 7, 697 A.2d 1289, 
1290.  In Colvin, we held that a non-possessor defendant who installed a utility 
                                         
4  In any event, the record clearly demonstrates that Davis is not an intended third-party beneficiary of 
the agreement between SMRMC and R C & Sons for the following reasons: first, there is no language in 
the agreement demonstrating an intention to give employees of SMRMC enforceable rights in the 
agreement as intended beneficiaries; and, second, there is no evidence of circumstances indicating “with 
clarity and definiteness” that SMRMC intended to benefit its employees.  Devine v. Roche Biomedical 
Labs. (Devine II), 659 A.2d 868, 870 (Me. 1995); accord Denman, 1998 ME 12, ¶ 9, 704 A.2d at 414-15.  
Thus, the court’s determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact relating to Davis’s claim 
that she was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between her employer and R C & Sons was 
entirely correct. 
 
10 
service box at an apartment building could be held liable for injuries sustained by a 
tenant whose knee struck the service box.  Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 7, 697 A.2d at 1290.  We 
rejected the defendant’s argument that it did not owe the tenant a duty because it 
was not the owner or possessor of the apartment building, and stated that “[t]he 
reasonable foreseeability of injury to others from one’s acts or from one’s failure to 
act raises a duty in law to proceed in the exercise of reasonable care.”  Id. ¶ 7, 
697 A.2d at 1290 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶20]  Similarly, in 2008, we concluded that a non-possessor defendant who 
removed and reattached awnings to a hotel did owe a duty to the plaintiff and other 
hotel patrons “to not cause an unreasonably dangerous condition through his work 
on the awnings.”  Quirion, 2008 ME 41, ¶¶ 4, 11, 942 A.2d at 672-73.  We 
determined, however, that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the 
non-possessor on the plaintiff’s negligence claim because there were no genuine 
issues of material fact demonstrating that the non-possessor had breached that 
duty, or that any such breach had been a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.  Id. ¶ 11, 
942 A.2d at 673. 
 
[¶21]  In this case, the question presented is whether R C & Sons, as a 
non-possessor of land, created a dangerous condition by failing to sand the 
SMRMC parking lot after plowing it and therefore owed Davis a duty of care.  
Although it is clear that a non-possessor who negligently creates a dangerous 
 
11 
hazard may be liable for reasonably foreseeable harms, in cases involving injuries 
sustained as a result of the annual risks posed by winter weather, it is particularly 
important to consider whether the dangerous hazard was created by the 
non-possessor’s actions or by the natural accumulation of snow or ice.  In 
determining the existence and scope of a duty in cases involving injuries sustained 
as a result of snow and ice conditions, we are informed by the annual risks created 
by the relatively harsh winters in Maine and recognize that requiring landowners or 
non-possessors “to fully protect against hazards created by snow and ice [is] 
simply impracticable.”5  Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶¶ 17-18, 22, 930 
A.2d 1016, 1020-22. 
 
[¶22]  Here, the “precipitating cause” of the hazardous conditions in the 
parking lot was weather.  Id. ¶ 31, 930 A.2d at 1025.  By plowing the snow in the 
parking lot, R C & Sons did not create the layer of ice that remained beneath the 
snow.  See id. ¶ 30 n.13, 930 A.2d at 1025 (stating that the plowing contractor “did 
not create the dangerous situation” on the town road, given that “the danger was 
created by the natural accumulation of ice and snow”); see also Espinal v. Melville 
                                         
5  We have previously acknowledged that “an individual’s common law duty will extend only so far in 
negligence actions related to winter weather, and we have on multiple occasions defined, limited, [or] 
restricted this duty.”  Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶¶ 19, 30-32, 930 A.2d 1016, 1021, 1024-25; 
cf. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 2001 ME 37, ¶¶ 11-16, 767 A.2d 310, 314-15; Denman, 
1998 ME 12, ¶¶ 4-7, 10-11, 704 A.2d at 413-15; Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 529, 535-36 (Me. 1973); 
Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 103-06 (Me. 1972); Ouelette v. Miller, 134 Me. 162, 164-66, 183 
A. 341, 342-43 (1936); Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat’l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 405-06, 139 A. 82, 83 (1927); 
Quimby v. Boston & Me. R.R. Co., 69 Me. 340, 341-42 (1879). 
 
12 
Snow Contrs., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 773 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 2002) 
(holding that, “[b]y merely plowing the snow, [a contractor] cannot be said to have 
created or exacerbated a dangerous condition”).  In other words, the actions taken 
by R C & Sons did not create the ice hazard that led to Davis’s fall.  Because Davis 
failed to generate a genuine issue of fact demonstrating that R C & Sons 
negligently created a dangerous condition, and she alleges no other grounds in her 
statement of material fact to support the imposition of a duty of care, summary 
judgment was properly granted in favor of R C & Sons. 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SILVER, J., with whom JABAR, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
 
[¶23]  I concur with the majority as to Marilyn R. Davis’s claim of 
third-party beneficiary status and further agree this cause of action should be 
analyzed in tort rather than contract.  Majority Opinion ¶¶ 11-18.  However, I 
respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority’s opinion.  I would hold 
that because the hospital parking lot was used around the clock, R C & Sons had a 
duty to remove snow and ice, similar to the duty we held that the defendant 
 
13 
landowner had in Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 2001 ME 37, ¶ 13, 
767 A.2d 310, 314.   
[¶24]  It makes no sense to remove any legal duty at precisely the moment a 
snow and ice removal business begins to respond to the triggering storm, simply 
because the business had no hand in causing the storm.  I would hold that 
R C & Sons had a duty “to reasonably respond to a foreseeable danger posed 
to . . . invitees by a continuing snow or ice storm.”  Id.  This duty is consistent with 
that expressed in section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which 
states:  
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if  
 
(a) 
his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such 
harm, or 
 
(b) 
he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the 
third person, or 
 
(c) 
the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
 
[¶25]  We have held that if a duty exists, “the question of whether there was 
a breach of the standard of care would ordinarily be a question for a fact-finder, not 
susceptible” to summary judgment.  Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶ 12, 
 
14 
930 A.2d 1016, 1020.  The facts presented in this record are not amenable to 
summary judgment on the issue of breach because it is not at all clear what 
R C & Sons did in response to the storm as it unfolded.  The parties should also 
be permitted to develop the record concerning the time from when Davis entered 
the parking lot to when she emerged from her car.  Davis testified that R C & Sons 
was in the midst of plowing the parking lot but had plowed the area where she 
parked and where she fell just outside her car.  She testified that there was still a 
snow cover in that area.  There was no sand or salt where she fell, but there was ice 
underneath the snow.  The factual record is minimal regarding the steps 
R C & Sons took in response to the storm or actions it either took or did not take 
before this storm that may have affected the layer of ice beneath the most recent 
snow.  I would hold that (1) R C & Sons had a duty to respond, see Budzko, 
2001 ME 37, ¶ 13, 767 A.2d at 314; (2) the nature of that duty was more rigorous 
because this was a hospital parking lot and therefore likely under regular use at all 
times by many people, see id.; (3) the issue is whether R C & Sons breached its 
duty to respond to the storm, see Alexander, 2007 ME 108, ¶ 12, 930 A.2d at 1020; 
and (4) the facts regarding whether it breached its duty have not yet been 
developed.  I would therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand 
the case for further development of the facts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Attorneys for Marilyn Davis: 
 
Sheldon J. Tepler, Esq.   (orally) 
Christian J. Lewis, Esq. 
Hardy, Wolf & Downing, P.A. 
186 Lisbon Street 
PO Box 3065 
Lewiston, Maine  04243-3065 
 
 
Attorneys for R C & Son Paving Company: 
 
Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq.   (orally) 
Kristina M. Balbo, Esq. 
Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC 
415 Congress Street 
PO  Box 4600 
Portland, Maine  04112-4600 
 
 
 
 
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-6 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY