Title: JAMES WALTER LAYTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES WALTER LAYTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 1150 P.3d 173Case Number: 05-152Decided: 01/09/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JAMES WALTERLAYTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty 
Director, Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director, and Rickey D. Turner, Jr., 
Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.   Argument by Mr. 
Turner.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant James 
Walter Layton appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury found 
him guilty of five felonies.  
Layton 
seeks to have his convictions reversed based on a claimed violation of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers.  
Layton 
also challenges the validity of the district court's order requiring him to pay 
restitution for a stolen jeep and the personal property that was inside the 
jeep.  We affirm.  

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Layton presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Whether all charges should have been dismissed under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers.

 
 
II.          
Whether the district court erroneously ordered restitution for the stolen 
vehicle which was recovered and the items within the vehicle which Appellant was 
never charged, nor admitted to, stealing.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Around midnight 
on August 11, 2003, Highway Patrol Trooper Theodore Bair encountered Layton at Fremont Toyota in Lander, Wyoming, as Layton was trying to steal a Pontiac Firebird. 
 The two men fought as Trooper Bair 
tried to apprehend Layton, but Layton managed to escape 
and flee.  Layton then stole a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was parked in 
front of a nearby trailer house and drove it to Davenport, Iowa, where he disposed of the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶4]      On August 25, 
2003, the State of Wyoming charged Layton with four felonies arising out of the 
incident at Fremont Toyota: (1) burglary based on Layton's unlawful entry into 
the Pontiac Firebird with the intent to commit a larceny, a violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005); (2) attempted larceny of the 
Pontiac Firebird, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003);1 (3) property destruction based on 
Layton's breaking of one of the Firebird's windows in order to gain entrance 
into the vehicle and steal it, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and 
(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003); and (4) attempted first degree murder of Trooper 
Bair, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101(a), 6-1-301 and 6-1-304 
(LexisNexis 2005).  The murder 
charge was accompanied by a habitual criminal enhancement pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).    

 
 
[¶5]      By the time the 
State located Layton he was serving a prison 
sentence in an Oregon penitentiary.  The State filed a detainer2 against him for the pending 
criminal charges.  Layton eventually requested final disposition of the 
Wyoming 
charges under Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
("IAD").  On January 14, 2004, the 
State accepted temporary custody of Layton under the IAD for the purpose of 
prosecuting him on the pending charges.  

 
 
[¶6]      Before a 
preliminary hearing was held on the charges,3 the State filed an amended 
information that contained eight criminal charges.  The amended information enhanced the 
original burglary count to aggravated burglary as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-301(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) (Count 1), and included the felony larceny and 
felony property destruction counts that were contained in the original 
information (Counts 2 and 3).  It 
also charged Layton with five additional counts: robbery based on the attempted 
larceny of the Firebird and the bodily injuries inflicted on Trooper Bair (Count 
4), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(i) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005); 
attempted interference with a peace officer based on Layton's efforts to take 
Trooper Bair's firearm during their fight (Count 5), a violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-5-204(c) (LexisNexis 2005); burglary based on Layton's 
unlawful entry into the Jeep Cherokee with the intent to steal the vehicle 
(Count 6), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 
2005); felony larceny for the theft of the Jeep Cherokee (Count 7), a violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003); and wrongful 
taking or disposing of property based on Layton's disposing of the Jeep in Iowa 
(Count 8), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The charges of aggravated 
burglary and robbery (Counts 1 and 4) were accompanied by a habitual criminal 
enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005).  Layton ultimately waived 
his preliminary hearing on the charges and was bound over to district 
court.   Layton appeared for 
arraignment on May 26, 2004, and the district court set his trial date for 
October 12, 2004.  

 
 
[¶7]      On September 9, 
2004, Layton 
filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice, claiming a 
violation of his speedy trial and due process rights under the IAD.  After a hearing on the motion, the 
district court dismissed with prejudice Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the amended 
information because of a violation of the 180-day speedy trial requirement of 
the IAD but declined to dismiss the remaining counts.4  In its ruling, the district court drew a 
distinction between the charges upon which the State's detainer was lodged and 
for which Layton was returned to Wyoming to stand trial (Counts 1 through 3, 
hereinafter "detainer charges") and those which were not the subject of that 
detainer (Counts 4 through 8, hereinafter "non-detainer charges").5  Relying on United States v. Sanders, 669 F.2d 609 
(9th Cir. 1982), and Espinoza 
v. State, 949 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App. Ct. 1997), the district court ruled that 
the 180-day time limit imposed by the IAD was inapplicable to the non-detainer 
charges.  

 
 
[¶8]      Layton's trial commenced 
as scheduled on October 12, 2004.  
After a two-day trial, the jury found Layton guilty on all five counts.6  The district court sentenced Layton to a combined prison term of not less than 
twenty-two and one-half (22½) years and not more than twenty-five (25) years, to 
be served consecutive to his Oregon sentence, and ordered him to pay 
restitution in the amount of $24,902.80.  
This appeal followed. 

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers

 
 
[¶9]      Layton claims the district 
court erred in holding that the 180-day time limit provided by Article III of 
the IAD was not applicable to the non-detainer charges, Counts 4 through 8.  Layton contends that the provision applies to 
those offenses because they arose out of the same criminal transaction as the 
original criminal charges referenced by the State's detainer.7  In this regard, Layton places significance 
on the fact that both the detainer and non-detainer charges were incorporated in 
the same charging document.  
Layton's 
claim is best described as an argument for a generous interpretation of the 
180-day rule and the dismissal provision of the IAD.  We reject Layton's argument.

 
 
[¶10]   The question whether the district 
court erred in its determination that the IAD does not apply to the non-detainer 
charges is a question of statutory construction, which we review de novo.  Odhinn v. State, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 13, 82 P.3d 715, 719 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
recently stated:

 
 
In 
construing statutes, our aim is to effectuate legislative intent.  Director of Office of State Lands & 
Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003).  If the language is sufficiently clear, 
we do not resort to rules of construction.  
Id.  We apply our general rule that we look 
to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is 
unambiguous.  Id.  We also construe a statute so as to give 
effect to all of its provisions.  
Id.

 
 

Odhinn, ¶ 14, 
82 P.3d  at 719.

 
 
[¶11]   The IAD is a congressionally 
sanctioned compact among forty-eight states.  Id., ¶ 17, 82 P.3d  at 720 
(citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148, 121 S. Ct. 2079, 150 L. Ed. 2d 188 (2001)).  The IAD 
provides an expeditious, simplified method of orderly disposition of charges 
pending in one state against a person imprisoned in another state.  Id.  Wyoming's version of the IAD is contained in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 (LexisNexis 2005), and states in relevant 
part:

 
 
Article 
III

 
 

(a)               
 Whenever a person has entered upon a term 
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and 
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in 
any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the 
basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial at the next term of court[8] after he shall have caused to be delivered to 
the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for 
a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; 
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance. . . .

 
 
            
* * * *

(d)  Any request for final disposition made 
by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for 
final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the 
basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to 
whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically 
directed. . . .

 
 
                                    
* * * *

 
 
Article 
V

 
 
                                    
* * * *

 
 
(c)  . . . [I]n the event that an action on 
the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has 
been lodged is not brought to trial within the periods provided by this act, the 
appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or 
complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or 
effect.

 
 
(d)  The temporary custody referred to in 
this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the 
charge or charges contained in one (1) or more untried indictments, informations 
or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for 
prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same 
transaction.

 
 
[¶12]   It is clear from the language of § 
7-15-101 that its speedy trial provisions apply exclusively to "untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which  detainers have been lodged against the 
prisoner."  By its terms, the 
180-day time period, and thus the dismissal requirement, is limited to pending 
charges upon which the detainer is based.  
There is nothing in the language of § 7-15-101 which mandates dismissal 
of non-detainer charges after 180 days, including those charges arising out of 
the same criminal transaction as the charges forming the basis for the 
detainer.  Our review of § 7-15-101, 
coupled with decisions from other courts interpreting similar IAD provisions, 
convinces us that neither the 180-day time period in Article III(a) nor the 
dismissal provision in Article V(c) applies to non-detainer same transaction 
offenses, as Layton claims.  See United States v. Sanders, 669 F.2d 609, 
610 (9th Cir. 1982) (180-day time limit of IAD 
applies only to charges pending at the time the detainer is filed); Morrison v. State, 611 S.E.2d 720, 
723-24 (Ga. App. 2005) (speedy trial provision of IAD inapplicable to 
non-detainer charges); State v. 
Taylor, 776 A.2d 1154, 1174-75 (Conn. 2001) (IAD not applicable to 
non-detainer charges); State v. 
Crawford, 737 A.2d 366, 368-69 (Vt. 1999) (IAD does not preclude prosecution 
for non-detainer charges arising out of the same criminal conduct); People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 
(Colo. 1998) (speedy trial provision of IAD does not require dismissal of 
non-detainer charges); Espinoza v. 
State, 949 S.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Tex. App. 1997) (neither 180-day rule nor 
dismissal provision of IAD applies to non-detainer same transaction charges); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 679 A.2d 1284, 
1288-89 (Pa. 1996) (non-detainer charges not subject to dismissal under 180-day 
rule of IAD).  

 
 
[¶13]   In this case, the detainer lodged 
against Layton 
concerned the offenses charged in the original felony information and retained 
in the amended information.  The 
charges upon which Layton was ultimately 
convicted, Counts 4 through 8, were filed after he requested final disposition 
of the initial charges under Article III(a) and was transferred to Wyoming to stand trial.9  Since Counts 4 through 8 were not 
charges which "formed the basis for the detainer," the 180-day time limit of the 
Article III(a) was not implicated.  
Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss those 
charges.

 
 

Restitution

 
 
[¶14]   The district court ordered 
Layton to pay 
$24,902.80 in restitution, which included $22,477.00 to the owner's insurance 
company for the stolen Jeep Grand Cherokee and $395.00 to the owner for the 
personal items that were inside the Jeep at the time it was stolen.  Layton attacks the district court's restitution 
order on two grounds.  First, 
Layton argues that the district court erred in 
requiring him to pay the full amount of the loss incurred by the insurance 
company because the insurance company sold the Jeep for salvage value after 
recovering the vehicle in Iowa.10  Layton contends that the restitution order 
should be reduced by the salvage amount received by the insurance company.  Second, Layton argues that the district court erred in 
ordering him to pay restitution for the personal items inside the Jeep.  Relying on Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646 (Wyo. 
2000), Layton 
contends that the district court had no authority to award restitution for the 
personal items because he neither admitted to nor was found guilty of stealing 
those items.

 
 
[¶15]   Layton's first argument concerns a factual 
challenge to the total amount of restitution awarded on the Jeep.  Layton did not challenge the factual basis for 
the restitution order in the district court and, consequently, we will review 
his claim only for plain error.  Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo. 2003).  Plain 
error exists when the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law in an obvious way resulting in a denial of a 
substantial right and material prejudice.  
Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 
871 (Wyo. 2000); Merkison v. State, 
996 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Wyo. 2000).  
Layton's 
second argument involves the district court's authority to make an award of 
restitution.  This claim presents a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Penner, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d  at 1048; Merkison, 996 P.2d  at 
1141.

 
 
[¶16]   Layton's complaint regarding the amount of 
restitution awarded on the Jeep turns on whether the insurance company actually 
sold the vehicle at salvage value.  
The only reference in the record to such a sale, upon which Layton's entire claim is 
based, is an offhand remark by the vehicle's owner during her trial 
testimony.  During direct 
examination, the prosecutor asked the victim, "So what happened with your 
Jeep?"  The victim answered, "to my 
knowledge, they have since probably sold it for salvage value."  In our view, the victim's answer is, at 
best, mere speculation as to what happened to the Jeep after it was found in 
Iowa.  There is no clear evidence in the record 
that the insurance company in fact sold the Jeep for salvage value.  Consequently, we have no evidentiary 
basis upon which we can conclude that the district court's restitution order is 
erroneous as a matter of law.

 
 
[¶17]   We also find no merit in Layton's contention that 
the district court exceeded its authority in ordering restitution for the 
personal items in the Jeep.  A trial 
court's authority to order restitution from a criminal defendant is detailed by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2005), which reads in relevant 
part:

 
 
(b)  In every case in which a claim for 
restitution is submitted, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution 
owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's 
criminal activity, and shall include its determination of the pecuniary damage 
as a special finding in the judgment and conviction . . . 
.

 
 
"Criminal 
activity" is defined as "any crime for which there is a . . . verdict of guilty 
upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime 
which is admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 
[¶18]   In Van Riper, we reversed a restitution 
award arising out of criminal activity for which the defendant neither admitted 
nor was convicted.  In that case, 
Van Riper was charged with one count of escape from official detention, four 
counts of burglary, three counts of larceny and one count of property 
destruction.  Two of the larceny 
counts concerned the theft of a pickup truck and the personal property that was 
inside the truck.  Following a 
preliminary hearing, four of the counts were dismissed, including the count 
charging him with larceny of the personal property.  He later pled guilty to escape and one 
count of burglarizing an aviation hangar, and the remaining charges, including 
the theft of the pickup, were dismissed.  
The trial court ordered Van Riper to pay restitution not only for the 
property taken from the hangar but also for the personal property taken from the 
pickup although Van Riper denied taking the property and the counts charging him 
with larceny of the pickup and the personal items were dismissed.  Van Riper, 999 P.2d  at 647-48.  Under the facts of that case, we held 
that the trial court lacked authority to order restitution for the value of the 
personal property.  Id. at 
648.

 
 
[¶19]   The facts of this case are 
distinguishable from Van Riper.  In that case, Van Riper's convictions on 
burglary and theft charges involving the aviation hangar gave the trial court no 
basis for concluding he had stolen property from a vehicle that he neither 
admitted taking or been convicted of taking.  Here, on the other hand, Layton admitted to 
stealing the Jeep and a jury convicted him of felony larceny for taking the 
Jeep.  When Layton stole the Jeep, he 
stole the items that were contained therein.  Thus, in this case, there is a direct 
relationship between the claimed loss and the criminal conduct.  Further, unlike Van Riper, Layton never denied taking 
the personal property and, at sentencing, never contested the restitution 
requested on the stolen items.  
Under the circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that the value of 
the personal property located in the Jeep was part of the damages resulting from 
Layton's 
criminal activity.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103(b).  We hold that the 
district court acted within its authority in awarding restitution for the 
personal items inside the Jeep.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed in all respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In some 
instances, we refer to the 2003 version of the applicable statutes because the 
statutes were amended in 2004.

 
 

2A detainer 
is "a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a 
sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another 
jurisdiction."  Odhinn v. State, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 4 n.1, 
82 P.3d 715, 717 n.1 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct. 703, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981)) (quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 

3The circuit 
court granted three continuances of the preliminary hearing at Layton's 
request.

  

4The court 
determined that Layton had been in custody for 254 days and found no basis for 
tolling enough time to reduce the period back to 180 
days.

 
 

5The district 
court found that Counts 1 through 3 were derived from, if not identical to, 
three of the charges included in the original information, and that Counts 4-8 
were entirely new and distinct charges.

 
 

6The State 
dismissed the habitual criminal enhancements on Counts 1 and 4 after the jury 
returned its verdict.

  

7Layton also claims that the 
non-detainer offenses are the same as those dismissed by the district court 
pursuant to the IAD.  Layton, however, provides 
no legal analysis to support this claim.  
Consequently, we will not consider it further.  See Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 12, 
125 P.3d 269, 274 (Wyo. 2005) (this Court will not consider claims unsupported 
by cogent argument and citation to legal 
authority).

 
 

8Although the 
statute states that final disposition is required "at the next term of court," 
this Court applies the federal requirement of 180 days.  Odhinn, ¶ 19, 82 P.3d  at 
721.

 
 

9We find no 
significance in the fact that both the new and the old charges were incorporated 
in the same charging document, rather than separate 
documents.

 

10The insurance company 
paid $3,592.78 to the owner and $18,884.22 to the owner's bank to cover the 
balance of the loan on the Jeep. The district court's oral pronouncement at 
sentencing is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the owner or the insurance 
company should be reimbursed.  
However, the judgment and sentence specified that Layton was to reimburse 
the insurance company for its loss.  
On appeal, Layton does not contest the amount paid by the 
insurance company nor does he question the insurance company's status as a 
"victim" for purposes of the restitution award.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2005).