Title: JOHN G. JENKINS AND CAROL VOIGT JENKINS and JOHNSON COUNTY RANCH IMPROVEMENT #1, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company V. GERRY MILLER AND MARIE L. MILLER, Trustees of the Gerry and Marie Miller Living Trust, dated September 27, 2004, and MILLER SAND CREEK RANCH, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN G. JENKINS AND CAROL VOIGT JENKINS and JOHNSON COUNTY RANCH IMPROVEMENT #1, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company V. GERRY MILLER AND MARIE L. MILLER, Trustees of the Gerry and Marie Miller Living Trust, dated September 27, 2004, and MILLER SAND CREEK RANCH, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company2008 WY 45180 P.3d 925Case Number: S-07-0216Decided: 04/14/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JOHN G. 
JENKINS AND CAROL VOIGT JENKINS and JOHNSON COUNTY RANCH IMPROVEMENT #1, LLC, a 
Wyoming limited liability 
company,Appellants(Defendants),v.GERRY MILLER AND 
MARIE L. MILLER, Trustees of the Gerry and Marie Miller Living Trust, dated 
September 27, 2004, and MILLER SAND CREEK RANCH, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability 
company,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, District Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Kim D. 
Cannon and J. Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Cannon.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Dennis 
M. Kirven and Benjamin S. Kirven of Kirven and Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, Wyoming.  
Argument by Dennis M. Kirven.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, BURKE, JJ, and DONNELL, KAUTZ, 
DJJ.

 
 
DONNELL, 
District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, John 
G. Jenkins and Carol Voigt Jenkins ("Jenkins"), challenge the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Gerry and Marie Miller 
("Millers"), and sua sponte dismissal 
of Jenkins' counterclaim with respect to a private road easement. Millers had 
requested declaratory relief regarding an Easement Deed unilaterally recorded by 
Jenkins, the terms of which Millers disputed.  Jenkins counterclaimed for a declaration 
that the same Easement Deed was valid 
and, further, that the parties were bound by an historical oral agreement for 
easement.  The district court 
granted judgment in favor of Millers, concluding that Millers never accepted the 
Easement Deed and that there was no 
legally enforceable access to Millers' lands.  The court further dismissed Jenkins' 
counterclaim on the grounds that Jenkins were precluded from seeking such 
declaratory relief, as the decision to pursue an easement rested only with 
Millers, as potential grantees/dominant estate owners.  We reverse.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jenkins present 
the following issues for review:

 
 
1.   What are the limits on the court's 
discretion to dismiss a claim for declaratory judgment without reaching the 
merits?

 
 
2.   Does the license or easement holder 
have the exclusive right to pursue declaratory relief or pursue a statutory 
remedy?

 
 
3.   Does Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980), bar the 
Appellants' mandatory counterclaim for declaratory relief?

 
 
4.   Does the mere existence of a 
statutory procedure to condemn a private right-of-way under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
24-9-101 through 24-9-104 (LexisNexis 2007) bar the owner of the servient estate 
from bringing a declaratory action?

 
 
5.   Do material issues of fact preclude 
summary judgment as to whether the Appellees have an easement, irrevocable 
license, or a revocable license?

 
 
6.   Are there factual issues as to 
whether the Appellees accepted the benefits of the agreement and subsequently 
the recorded Easement Deed?

 
 
[¶3]      Millers present 
similar issues for review:

 
 
1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion in dismissing Appellants' Counterclaim for declaratory 
judgment?

 
 
2.   Did the district court properly 
apply the holding in Walton v. Dana 
in dismissing Appellants' Counterclaim for declaratory 
judgment?

 
 
3.   Does Appellees' Non-Acceptance of 
the Easement Deed and Corrective Easement Deed support the district court's 
grant of Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment?

 
 
4.   Does the district court's dismissal 
of Appellants' Counterclaim constitute harmless error?

 
 
5.   Does the foundational principle of 
equity preclude Appellants from advocating for an irrevocable 
license?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Jenkins own 
certain lands located in Johnson 
County, Wyoming.  Millers own adjacent lands and, 
historically, have accessed their property through Jenkins' property.  This access occurred over various routes 
until the early 1980s, when Betty Jenkins, Jenkins' predecessor in interest, 
orally granted Millers a "permanent easement" in exchange for Millers relocating 
their route and constructing, at Millers' expense, a gravel lane along the west 
boundary of Jenkins' property.  The 
parties agree that Millers and Betty Jenkins reached an agreement as to a 
permanent access easement though they dispute certain specific terms.  Since that date, Millers have used this 
road ("the gravel road") to access their property.

 
 
[¶5]      In 2004, Jenkins 
began considering a plan to subdivide their property for residential 
development.  Jenkins invited 
Millers to be included in the development project; Millers declined.  In any event, this project brought the 
issue of Millers' access to the forefront.  
On September 24, 2004, Jenkins unilaterally filed with the CountyClerk 
of Johnson County, 
Wyoming, an Easement Deed reflecting a grant of 
easement to Millers. Jenkins contend that the purpose of the Easement Deed was "to confirm the 
historical permission which had been granted by the Jenkinses [sic] to the 
Millers."  The Easement Deed described the location of 
the current gravel road and attached to Millers' land.  However, the Easement Deed also limited the use of 
the road to ingress and egress for Millers' domicile and for agricultural 
purposes only; prohibited access to any dwellings on Millers' land other than 
Millers' single residence; and imposed obligations to repair and maintain the 
proposed easement.  Finally, the Easement Deed restricted the width of 
the road to eighteen (18) feet.

 
 
[¶6]      Millers, unhappy 
with these restrictions, which they claim were never agreed upon, notified 
Jenkins of their objection, first, by letter sent February 7, 2005, and, second, 
by filing a Notice of Non-Acceptance of 
Easement with the CountyClerk of Johnson County, Wyoming, on April 21, 2005.1

 
 
[¶7]      On March 27, 
2007, Millers filed their Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment.  They 
sought a determination from the district court that they had not accepted the Easement Deed granted by Jenkins and 
that the Miller property was without legally enforceable access to a public road 
as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-104.  Jenkins answered and filed a 
counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking the inverse, namely that the 
court

 
 
declare 
the validity of the Easement Deed according to the terms of that deed as it was 
executed and recorded on September 24, 2004.  The Counterclaimants ask the Court to 
declare that it is an appurtenant easement in full force and effect providing 
access to the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the 
document.

 
 
[¶8]      On October 27, 
2006, Millers moved for summary judgment; Jenkins objected.  On May 21, 2007, the district court 
heard the matter and ruled from the bench.  
That ruling was memorialized in an Order dated July 9, 2007, which states, 
in part:

 
 
Plaintiffs 
are not required to come before this Court prior to petitioning the Board of 
County Commissioners for Johnson County for a private right of way pursuant to 
Wyoming Statute § 24-9-101 et seq.

 
 
There 
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning Plaintiffs' Non-Acceptance on 
the Easement Deed, filed September 24, 2004.

 
 
There 
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning Plaintiffs' Non-Acceptance of 
the Corrective Easement Deed, filed May 16 [sic], 2007.

 
 
The 
unilateral Easement Deed, filed September 24, 2004, and the Corrective Easement 
Deed, filed May 16 [sic], 2007, are null and void for lack of acceptance by 
Plaintiffs.

 
 
Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on non-acceptance of the unilateral Easement Deed, 
filed September 24, 2004, and unilateral Corrective Easement Deed, filed May 16 
[sic], 2007, should be granted, as Defendants have not demonstrated any genuine 
issues of material fact concerning non-acceptance of the purported easement, and 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on absence of legally enforceable access to 
Plaintiffs' lands should be granted, as Defendants have not demonstrated a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the lack of legally enforceable 
access, and Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
Defendants' 
Counterclaim for a declaratory judgment should be dismissed because the right to 
pursue an easement rests exclusively with the petitioners, and Defendants are 
precluded from bringing a declaratory judgment action.

 
 
Thus, 
the district court voided the Easement 
Deed and Corrective Easement 
Deed; declared Millers without legally enforceable access to their lands; 
and dismissed Jenkins' counterclaim.  
This timely appeal followed.

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 
[¶9]      While the parties 
present several issues for review, this Court need consider only  two:  first, whether the district court erred 
in granting Millers' motion for summary judgment to declare the Easement Deed null and void and to 
declare Millers without legally enforceable access to their lands; and, second, 
whether the district court erred in dismissing, sua sponte, Jenkins' counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment on the grounds that Jenkins were precluded from bringing an 
action to enforce an easement or to determine the validity of an alleged 
easement.

 
 
I.          
Grant of Millers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment

 
 
[¶10]   The Court first considers the 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Millers.  The district court's decision was 
two-fold:  first, that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to Millers' "nonacceptance" or 
rejection of the Easement Deed such 
that the Easement Deed was null and 
void and, second, that Millers were without legally enforceable access to their 
lands.

 
 
A.        
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶11]   "When reviewing an order granting a 
summary judgment motion, we consider the record de novo."  Hincks 
v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 
WY 12, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Knapp v. Landex Corp., 2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 
130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
B.        
Consideration of the Easement 
Deed, the Corrective Easement 
Deed, and Underlying Legally Enforceable Access

 
 
[¶12]   In specifically addressing the Easement Deed and the "unilateral 
easement" recorded by Jenkins, the district court stated:

 
 
[The] 
Court does not believe there is a material question of fact as to the acceptance 
of this unilateral agreement.  Based 
on that narrow area of law and question, there is no question of fact.  Therefore, the Court rules that the 
unilateral easement that was filed by Jenkins and the corrective easement is 
null and void, having been unaccepted by the Millers, and that based upon the 
reasons cited above, the Millers are not required to come to this court to 
enforce a potential oral agreement or easement or irrevocable license before 
they go to the county commissioners.

 
 
[¶13]   "An easement is 
an interest in real property that is covered by the statute 
of frauds," Turner v. 
Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76, 77 (Wyo. 1985) (internal 
citations omitted), meaning that, unless some exception to the statute of frauds 
applies, the easement must be in writing to be effective.2  As a natural corollary, "[a] grant of an 
easement is to be construed in accordance with the rules applied to deeds and 
other written instruments."  28A C.J.S. Easements § 57 (1996).  As such, Wyoming law holds that Millers, as grantees, 
must "accept" the offered easement as proposed by Jenkins for that easement to 
be valid and binding:

 
 

There 
are two essential elements to a legally binding delivery: 1) 
transferring possession of the deed by the grantor, and 2) acceptance of the deed by the grantee.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
" * * * 
The requisites of acceptance are the grantee's knowledge of delivery or tender 
of the deed, an intention to take the 
legal title to the property which the deed purports to convey, and the 
manifestation of such intention by some act, conduct, or declaration.  * * *

 
 
"Acceptance 
is primarily a matter of the grantee's intention; hence the significant inquiry 
is as to his intention as manifested by his words and acts.  Express words and positive acts are not 
necessary; intention to accept may be inferred from such conduct as retaining 
possession of the deed, conveying or mortgaging the property, recording the 
deed, or otherwise exercising the rights of an owner * * *."  23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 175, p. 196 
(1983).

 
 
. . . .

 
 

The 
"acceptance" of a deed, like that of its delivery, is a matter of intention, to 
be determined by acts and words of both the grantor and grantee.  Fitzpatrick v. Layne, 291 
Ky. 523, 165 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1942).  The delivery 
of a deed is the act by which the grantor divests himself, and the acceptance of 
the deed is the act by which the grantee vests himself with 
title to the property.

 
 

B-T, 
Ltd. v. Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307, 312-13 (Wyo. 1985) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶14]   Here, Millers argued that their 
February 7, 2005 letter and April 21, 2005 Notice of Non-Acceptance of Easement 
Deed were sufficient to demonstrate rejection of the September 24, 2004 Easement Deed and, thus, to invalidate 
it.  Jenkins argued that genuine 
issues of material fact precluded a determination as to Millers' acceptance or 
rejection of the Easement Deed and/or 
any underlying easement.  The 
district court agreed with Millers and concluded that they had not accepted the 
Easement Deed.

 
 
[¶15]   In favor of Millers, the facts 
demonstrate that their February 7, 2005 letter and April 21, 2005 Notice of Non-Acceptance of Easement 
Deed express an intent to reject the Easement Deed.  On the other hand, the record reveals 
that Millers, apparently in an attempt to have it both ways, continued their use 
of the gravel road, which use had continued consistently for over twenty 
years.  Clearly, this continued use 
was inconsistent with their denial of any prior agreement and their assertion 
that they did not have and never had any legally enforceable right to use the 
road   Further, Millers delayed 
more than four months before their first notification of their rejection of the 
Easement Deed.  Again, this calls into question their 
stated intent.  Clearly, the record 
could support a conclusion in favor of either party at this point.  Where there are genuine issues of 
material fact concerning Millers' intent and acceptance of the Easement Deed, the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment.  See, e.g., Hasvold v. Park County Sch. Dist. 
No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 24, 45 P.3d 635, 640 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶16]   More importantly, the parties, the 
district court, and this Court recognize that this litigation involved more than 
just the Easement Deed or Corrective Easement Deed; rather, "both 
parties asked the [district] court to declare the rights and status of Millers' 
access in light of the Easement Deed or 
other legally enforceable access."  
(Emphasis added.)  In this 
respect, Millers' declaratory judgment claim overlapped Jenkins' declaratory 
judgment counterclaim, which sought a declaration as to the validity of the 
underlying appurtenant easement agreement allegedly reflected in the Easement Deed.  Thus, the district court also was asked 
to determine whether Millers had any legally enforceable access, 
which request would encompass possibilities such as an irrevocable license or an 
oral easement falling outside the statute of frauds.

 
 
[¶17]   Even had this Court concluded that 
the district court appropriately granted summary judgment as to the effect of 
the Easement Deed, it is one thing to 
say that Millers timely and appropriately rejected the Easement Deed, but quite another to say 
that they had no legally enforceable access to their lands when there was, 
arguably, an oral easement or irrevocable license that they historically had 
accepted.  Indeed, the parties 
concede a process of negotiation whereby Millers and Betty Jenkins agreed to 
locate the gravel road in its current location in exchange for a grant of a 
"permanent easement."  This status quo existed for almost three 
decades before Millers decided that the gravel road no longer served their best 
interests.

 
 
[¶18]   Where reasonable inferences drawn 
from the parties' statements and actions create genuine issues of material fact 
as to the terms of an agreement, summary judgment is inappropriate.  See Ewing v. Hladky Constr., Inc., 2002 
WY 95, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wyo. 2002); Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 216 (Wyo. 2000).  
Given the debatable state of the record, summary judgment was 
inappropriate as to the issue of whether Millers are without legally enforceable 
access to a public road and whether, if some sort of easement or license is in 
effect, what the precise terms and conditions of that access are.  The district court erred in its grant of 
summary judgment.

 
 
II.         
Dismissal of Jenkins' Counterclaim for Declaratory 
Judgment

 
 
[¶19]   Next, we address the district 
court's sua sponte dismissal of 
Jenkins' counterclaim for declaratory judgment.  The court dismissed the counterclaim, 
stating that "the right to pursue an easement rests exclusively with the 
petitioners, and Defendants are precluded from bringing a declaratory judgment 
action." 

 
 
A.        
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶20]   Review of the dismissal of a 
counterclaim is de novo.  "This Court evaluates the propriety of a 
dismissal by employing the same standards and by examining the same material as 
the district court, without a presumption of correctness to the conclusions 
reached below."  Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyo., N.A., 
2005 WY 138, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 783, 787 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citation 
omitted).  We have addressed the 
standard of review regarding sua 
sponte dismissals:

 
 

Sua 
sponte motions 
to dismiss a complaint are recognized in Wyoming and upheld when the proper procedure 
is followed.  Osborn v. Emporium 
Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 241-42 
(Wyo. 1993).  According to our standard of review, we 
will sustain a dismissal of a [counterclaim] by a trial court 
only if it shows on its face that the [counterclaimant] was not entitled to 
relief under any set of facts.  In 
considering such a motion, the "facts alleged in the [counterclaim] are admitted 
and the allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
[counterclaimant]."  Dismissal is a 
drastic remedy and is sparingly granted.  Cranston v. Weston CountyWeed 
and Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254-255 (Wyo. 1992); Matter of Paternity of JRW, 
814 P.2d

1256, 
1259 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Mostert v. CBL 
& Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987) (citations 
omitted)).

 
 

Jackson v. 
Jackson, 961 P.2d 393, 395 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
B.        
Propriety of Dismissal of Counterclaim: A Grantor's Right to 
Declaratory Judgment Regarding the Validity of an 
Easement

 
 
            
i.          
Procedure for Sua Sponte 
Dismissal

 
 
[¶21]   Here, the district court dismissed, 
sua sponte, Jenkins' counterclaim for 
declaratory relief.  Sua sponte dismissals require adherence 
to a specific procedure:

 
 

The 
leading federal decision on sua sponte dismissals under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
is Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).  The Tingler court reviewed the 
sua sponte dismissal of a complaint on its merits, so federal 
jurisdiction was not in question.  The court found four reasons why a sua 
sponte dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is not favored.  First, the action places the court in the 
role of a proponent rather than an independent observer.  Second, plaintiffs are prejudiced 
because, unlike when a motion to dismiss is filed by a defendant, the plaintiff 
is given no opportunity to amend the complaint or make legal arguments against 
dismissal.  Pro se plaintiffs, 
unskilled in legal pleadings, are more likely to suffer acute prejudice.  Third, dismissal without service of 
process and notice is unfair to defendants because the sua sponte action 
of the court deprives the defendants of the opportunity to participate in the 
litigation process and places them in the position of having to chose:  whether to not participate in an appeal 
and risk an adverse decision; or, whether to participate in the appeal and make 
arguments based upon matters not in the factual record.  Fourth, the sua sponte dismissal 
ultimately wastes judicial resources.  The dismissal creates an opportunity for 
appeal based upon an incomplete record of pleadings and orders resulting in an 
inability to make a factual decision on the merits and limiting the appellate 
court to decisions on broad legal grounds.  Tingler, 716 F.2d  at 
1111.

 
 
Using 
its supervisory power, the Tingler court outlined a five-step procedure 
for dismissal of complaints, sua 
sponte:

 
 
(1) 
allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of 
[the court's] intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance 
to either amend his complaint or respond to the reasons 
stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua sponte 
dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or 
motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state [the court's] reasons for the 
dismissal.

 
 

Id. at 
1112.

 
 
In an 
exercise of this court's supervisory powers, Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2, we adopt the federal approach to sua 
sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) including the five-step process 
outlined in Tingler.  This process assures proper notice and 
opportunity to be heard, see Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986), and promotes 
a policy of deciding cases on their merits which is consistent with the general 
tenor of our procedural rules.  See Hill v. Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 
1992).  Restricting sua 
sponte dismissals is also consistent with the requirement of the Wyoming 
Constitution to maintain an open court 
system:

 
 

Osborn 
v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 241-42 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis added and footnote 
omitted).

 
 
[¶22]   The district court failed to follow 
this procedure.  As a matter of 
course, then, this matter must be remanded to the district court with directions 
to follow the procedural steps outlined in Osborn.  Id.; see also Jackson, 961 P.2d  
at 395.

 
 
            
ii.         
Consideration of Whether Jenkins, 
as Grantors, are Precluded from Bringing a Declaratory Judgment 
Action

 
 
[¶23]   The decision to remand this case 
based on the district court's improper grant of summary judgment as to Millers' 
declaratory judgment action does not address the propriety of the district court 
also dismissing Jenkins' counterclaim.  
The district court dismissed Jenkins' counterclaim in reliance on Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980), and the 
court's interpretation of that case as precluding Jenkins from seeking a 
declaratory judgment.  Specifically, 
the court concluded that "Defendants' Counterclaim for a declaratory judgment 
should be dismissed because the right to pursue an easement rests exclusively 
with the petitioners, and Defendants are precluded from bringing a declaratory 
judgment action."  Because we 
anticipate that the same substantive issue will arise on remand, it is 
appropriate to address the district court's conclusions at this 
time.

 
 
[¶24]   Historically, Wyoming's law concerning 
private roads and easements has been less than clear.  However, this Court has clarified that 
"landlocked" property owners cannot be forced to pursue legal remedies, such as 
a common law way of necessity or an implied easement, prior to seeking a private 
road pursuant to Wyoming's private road statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 
through 24-9-104.  See Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 887 (Wyo. 
2000) ("Section 24-9-101 contains no requirement that other forms of relief be 
pursued prior to seeking the relief available under its provisions"); Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 
(Wyo. 1995); 
Walton, 609 P.2d  at 
463-64.

 
 
[¶25]   The district court used this rule 
of law, combined with its conclusion that Millers lacked legally enforceable 
access to their lands, in holding that Jenkins were without authority to seek a 
declaratory judgment regarding the easement.  We agree with the district court's 
conclusion that Millers should be allowed to proceed with a private road 
proceeding where there is "no presently existing outlet to or 
connection with a public road[.]"  
Miller, 4 P.3d  at 887 
(emphasis in original).3  But this is not the case with which the 
court was presented nor can this rule of law logically extend to the conclusion 
reached by the district court.

 
 
[¶26]   The Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act ("the Act") authorizes Wyoming courts to "declare rights, status 
and other legal relations whether or not further relief 
is or could be claimed."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-37-102 (LexisNexis 
2007).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
states,

 
 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written 
contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.

 
 

See also 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-37-107 (LexisNexis 
2007).  The purpose of the Act is 
"to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 

[¶27]   "A declaratory judgment action may 
be brought to determine the right to an easement, or determine the relative rights of 
parties affected by an easement, 
or whether an easement has been created."  22A 
Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 
156 (2003).4  Nothing in the Act, Wyoming's private road statutes, or Wyoming law dictates that 
the owner of a servient estate is precluded from seeking declaratory relief as 
to the validity or establishment of an easement or as to the rights of parties 
surrounding a disputed easement.  
This Court has said repeatedly that Wyoming is concerned about making the 
private road process an economic and convenient one for landlocked property 
owners and, thus, does not require 
those individuals to seek an adjudication of other potential means of legally 
enforceable access prior to proceeding into the private road process where that 
access is not "presently existing."  
See, e.g., Wagstaff v. Sublette 
County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 79, 82-83 (Wyo. 
2002); Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 
1998) ("[W]e have noted that the 
legislature intended the procedure under the statute to provide in a local forum 
a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method to 
obtain a means of access to property"); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1980).  
However, Wyoming also recognizes the rights of property 
owners whose lands will be subjected to the imposition of private roads.  Such property owners should have the 
right to determine the status of alleged or potential existing legally 
enforceable access through their lands even where those rights have not yet been 
adjudicated and, hence, are not "presently existing."5  To hold that Walton v. Dana precludes the exercise of 
a right that clearly exists pursuant to the Act simply goes too far.  Jenkins were 
entitled, either as plaintiffs bringing a claim or defendants bringing a 
counterclaim, to have the district court adjudicate their legal rights relative 
to the disputed but potential legally enforceable access.  The court erred in dismissing their 
counterclaim.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   The district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Millers, both in its determination that there were 
no issues of fact regarding Millers' acceptance of the Easement Deed and in its conclusion that 
there were no issues of fact regarding Millers' lack of legally enforceable 
access to their lands.  The district 
court further erred in dismissing Jenkins' counterclaim on the grounds that 
Jenkins, as alleged grantors of an easement, were without authority to seek a 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of that easement or their rights 
thereunder.  This matter is reversed 
and remanded to the district court for further proceeding consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1On May 21, 2007, Millers filed a Notice of Non-Acceptance of Corrective 
Easement Deed, in response to Jenkins' filing of Corrective Easement Deed on May 15, 
2007.

 
 

2Wyoming's 
statute of fraud provides:

 
 
(a)   In the following cases every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

(i)     Every agreement that by 
its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof;

(ii)     Every special promise 
to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
person;

(iii)    Every agreement, promise or 
undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promise to 
marry;

(iv)    Every special promise by an 
executor or administrator, to answer any demand out of his own 
estate;

(v)    Every agreement or contract 
for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one (1) 
year;

(vi)    To charge any person upon, or 
by reason of a representation or assurance concerning the character, conduct, 
credit, ability, trade or dealings of another, to the intent or purpose that 
such other may obtain thereby, credit, money or goods.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 
2007).

3Presently 
existing legally enforceable access is different from potential legally enforceable 
access.  The former apparently 
requires previous adjudication as to the legal enforceability of the 
access.

 
 

4"The 
owner of the servient estate may seek a declaration of the scope of use of an 
easement, or may seek protection against misuse of the servitude, in tort, and 
seek extinguishment of an easement for excessive use.  The servient owner also can bring an 
action for negligence and wrongful entry, alleging misuse of easement."  25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 
109 (2004).

 
 

5To 
preclude a servient estate landowner from seeking declaratory relief would have 
the effect of denying him any reliance upon an easement he believed to be 
binding.  In other words, a 
landowner with a potentially enforceable easement could decide he simply no 
longer preferred that route and, instead, seek a private road.  This Court has emphasized that "a 
landlocked landowner is not entitled to seek whatever road he desires or is most 
convenient to him."  Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo. 
1991).