Title: STATE v COLEMAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13296 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF YONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- DEWEY EUGENE COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses, Tolliver and Wright, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Forsythe argued, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana Lee Overfelt, Billings, Montana Submitted: March 1, 1978 Decided : APR 2 6 1978 Filed: \Pi? 2 c 1978 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e f i n a l judgment of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court, Rosebud County, following a jury t r i a l . Defendant was convicted of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, aggravated kidnapping, and sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, i n f l i c t - i n g bodily i n j u r y . O n J u l y 4 , 1974, Peggy Lee Harstad, 21 y e a r s of age, disappeared while d r i v i n g a l o n e from Harlowton t o Rosebud, Montana. She was l a s t seen a l i v e around 9:00 p.m. t h a t n i g h t a t Melstone, Montana. O n J u l y 5, 1974, h e r c a r was found w i t h i n a few m i l e s of her home, near Rosebud. On J u l y 7 , 1974, a ranch hand discovered a purse and o t h e r a r t i c l e s belonging t o Peggy Lee Harstad i n s i d e a c u l v e r t approxi- mately t e n m i l e s w e s t of h e r abandoned c a r . I n t h e developing i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an e l d e r l y couple informed t h e s h e r i f f of Rosebud County t h a t they had seen a black man and a w h i t e man h i t c h h i k i n g on J u l y 4 between Roundup and Forsyth, Montana a t about t h e t i m e of day Peggy L e e Harstad was d r i v i n g between t h o s e towns. Subsequently, t h e s e two men were i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e defendant, Dewey Eugene Coleman, a black man, and Robert Dennis Nank, a w h i t e man. O n J u l y 9 , 1974, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Rosebud County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e went t o t h e V e t e r a n ' s ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n H o s p i t a l i n Sheridan, Wyoming, where t h e s e men w e r e , t o q u e s t i o n them. Defendant and Nank admitted being i n t h e a r e a of Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s disappearance and h i t c h h i k i n g through Forsyth on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4th. O n August 6 , 1974, t h e F.B.I. l a b o r a t o r y provided a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t l i f t taken from t h e e x t e r i o r of t h e Harstad v e h i c l e and a sample f i n g e r p r i n t of ~ a n k . The F.B.I. a l s o r e p o r t e d a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t of defendant and a l i f t taken from a paper found i n H a r s t a d ' s purse. I n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h F.B.I. a g e n t s on August 1, 1974, defendant and Nank admitted s e e i n g t h e Harstad v e h i c l e abandoned on t h e road. When he was asked about h i s f i n g e r p r i n t i n t h e purse, defendant s t a t e d t h a t he found a p u r s e along t h e road they w e r e h i t c h h i k i n g . Vacuumings w e r e taken i n t h e Harstad v e h i c l e . These w e r e s e n t t o t h e F.B.I. l a b o r a t o r y f o r a n a l y s i s . They r e p o r t e d , on September 13, 1974, t h a t Negroid head h a i r s w e r e found i n t h e l o o s e h a i r s taken from t h e f r o n t seat. I n a d d i t i o n , two Negroid pubic h a i r s w e r e found i n t h e vacuumings. O n August 29, 1974, t h e decomposed body of Peggy L e e Harstad w a s found on t h e n o r t h bank of t h e Yellowstone River, j u s t w e s t of Forsyth, Montana. A f o r e n s i c patholo- g i s t , D r . John P f a f f , i d e n t i f i e d t h e remains a s Peggy Lee Harstad by t h e u s e of d e n t a l c h a r t s . Because of t h e s t a t e of decomposition of h e r remains, D r . P f a f f could n o t d e t e r - mine a cause of d e a t h . Since t h e i r o r i g i n a l questioning i n Sheridan, Wyoming, t h e defendant and Nank had moved t o Boise, Idaho, sometime i n August. A t t h e r e q u e s t of Rosebud County a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e Boise p o l i c e had k e p t t h e s e men under s u r v e i l l a n c e . O n October 16, 1974, t h e then Rosebud County a t t o r n e y , William Meisburger, and Undersheriff Graham u akin went t o Boise, Idaho t o f u r t h e r i n t e r r o g a t e defendant and Nank. he n e x t day, October 17, 1974, Meisburger and m akin went t o see t h e Boise p o l i c e . They t a l k e d t o D e t e c t i v e m rake of t h e Boise p o l i c e about bringing t h e defendant and ~ a n k t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n f o r questioning. They informed him of a l l t h e evidence they had connecting t h e defendant and ~ a n k w i t h t h e d e a t h of Peggy L e e Karstad. Detective Brake, s i n c e he had been doing some of t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e of t h e two men, knew about most of t h e evidence except about her body being found. A f t e r d i s c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h Meisburger and Makin, Detective Brake and a Detective Crowell went t o t h e a p a r t - ment where t h e s e two men w e r e l i v i n g . There t h e defendant and Nank w e r e placed under a r r e s t without a warrant f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n t h e d e a t h of Peggy L e e Harstad. A f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t and being placed i n custody, a r r e s t warrants and complaints were i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e of t h e peace f o r Rosebud County. The w a r r a n t s and complaint charged defendant and Nank w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Upon t h e i r a r r e s t , defendant and Nank w e r e advised of t h e i r r i g h t s . The defendant r e f u s e d t o waive h i s r i g h t s . Nank d i d waive h i s r i g h t s and, a f t e r being i n custody f o r a few hours, gave a f u l l confession. I n h i s confession, he implicated himself and t h e defendant. H e confessed t h a t they kidnapped, raped, and murdered Peggy L e e Harstad. Nank consented t o a s e a r c h of t h e i r apartment and c a r f o r t h e murder weapons he s a i d w e r e used i n t h e crime--namely, t h e i r motorcycle helmets and a rope. A s e a r c h warrant was obtained and t h e helmets and rope recovered. O n October 24, 1974, a motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e an Information i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Rosebud County, was requested and granted. The Information charged t h e defendant w i t h t h r e e counts: Count I, d e l i b e r a t e homicide; Count 11, aggravated kidnapping; and Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y . ~ e f e n d a n t plead n o t g u i l t y t o a l l counts. On January 3 0 , 1975, defendant moved t o suppress a l l confessions, statements and evidence, i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . A suppression hearing was held. Following t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a - t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge by t h e S t a t e and t h e assignment of t h e c a s e t o another judge, a second suppression hearing was held and d e f e n d a n t ' s motion denied. O n May 7 , 1975, t h e S t a t e e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n p l e a bargaining agreement w i t h Robert Nank. Under t h e t e r m s of t h e agreement, Nank agreed t o plead g u i l t y t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide and s o l i c i t a t i o n t o commit sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, and f u r t h e r agreed t o t e s t i f y a t d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l i n r e t u r n f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e aggravated kidnap- ping charge. O n May 19, 1975, d e f e n d a n t ' s then c o u r t appointed counsel made a n o r a l o f f e r of a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y i n r e t u r n f o r d i s m i s s a l of t h e aggravated kidnapping charge. O n May 2 3 , 1975, a w r i t t e n o f f e r of a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y was presented t o t h e c o u r t . I n t h i s o f f e r , defendant i n s i s t e d on maintaining h i s innocence. The S t a t e r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t a g u i l t y p l e a w i t h defendant maintaining h i s innocence. Following a change of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u r t appointed counsel, a change of venue from Rosebud County t o Custer County and f i n a l l y t o Yellowstone County, and o t h e r pre- t r i a l proceedings and motions, d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l commenced on October 2 3 , 1975, i n Yellowstone County. A t t r i a l , Coleman and Nank r e l a t e d o p p o s i t e s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t a s t o t h e i r involvement w i t h M i s s Harstad. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and Coleman w e r e t r a v e l i n g between Roundup and Forsyth on U. S . 12 on h i s motorcycle when they r a n o u t of gas. They then t r i e d t o h i t c h h i k e . H e s a i d t h a t one c a r stopped, b u t t h e e l d e r l y couple r e f u s e d t o g i v e them a r i d e . Nank s t a t e d t h a t M i s s Harstad stopped and gave them a r i d e . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t while d r i v i n g down t h e road, he reached over and turned t h e key on her c a r o f f and s t e e r e d t h e c a r t o a s t o p . H e s t a t e d t h a t he p u t t h e g i r l i n t h e back s e a t , took her c l o t h e s o f f , and attempted t o r a p e h e r , b u t f a i l e d , while Coleman drove t h e c a r . Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman then raped her w h i l e he held her f o o t , t e s t i f y i n g t h a t he had a f o o t f e t i s h . Nank s a i d t h a t they then went down by t h e Yellowstone River. H e c a r r i e d t h e g i r l , now f u l l y c l o t h e d , over h i s shoulder, while Coleman came from behind swinging h i s s i l v e r motor- c y c l e helmet by t h e c h i n s t r a p and crashed it a g a i n s t h e r s k u l l . Nank s a i d t h a t Coleman then took a yellow nylon rope and attempted t o s t r a n g l e her and asked Nank t o h e l p , b u t he d i d n o t s t r a n g l e her. Then they took h e r down t o t h e r i v e r and dumped her i n t o it. A s s h e was n o t dead, Nank held her head under water w h i l e Coleman held h e r l e g s . Nank then t e s t i f i e d t h a t they drove h e r c a r back toward Forsyth u n t i l it r a n o u t of gas. They removed some t h i n g s from t h e c a r and walked i n t o Forsyth. Nank l e f t Coleman i n Forsyth, hitchhiked w i t h g a s t o t h e motorcycle, and r e t u r n e d t o p i c k up Coleman. They then went t o t h e V. A. H o s p i t a l i n Sheridan where they stayed u n t i l going t o Boise. Defendant Coleman, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e motorcycle r a n o u t of g a s and they were r e f u s e d a r i d e , Nank suggested t h a t because Coleman was black and t h e r e w e r e few b l a c k s i n t h a t a r e a , he should go g e t t h e g a s alone. Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e he was s i t t i n g off t h e highway smoking, Nank g o t a r i d e . A f t e r s e v e r a l hours, Nank r e t u r n e d i n a c a r and, according t o Coleman, Nank was w e t , u p s e t and a c t i n g s t r a n g e . Coleman s a i d he was t o l d t o g e t t h e i r t h i n g s o f f t h e motor- c y c l e and g e t i n t h e c a r . When they both were i n t h e c a r , Nank advised Coleman t h a t he had k i l l e d a g i r l . The c a r r a n o u t of gas, and they s t a r t e d t o walk. Nank gave Coleman a purse t o c a r r y and l a t e r t o l d him t o g e t r i d of it. Coleman threw t h e purse i n t o a c u l v e r t . They then had b r e a k f a s t i n Forsyth, and Nank l e f t Coleman while he went t o g e t t h e motorcycle. Coleman a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t Nank threatened him i f he ever d i s c l o s e d any of these f a c t s . The t r i a l ended on November 1 4 , 1975. The jury returned g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on a l l t h r e e counts. O n November 21, 1975, t h e c o u r t sentenced defendant Coleman t o 1 0 0 years on Count I ( d e l i b e r a t e homicide); t o death by hanging on Count I1 (aggravated kidnapping); and t o 4 0 years on Count I11 (sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y ) . Defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied. A s t a y of execution has been granted pending t h i s appeal. Defendant r a i s e s 4 1 s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on appeal. W e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s e a l l e g e d e r r o r s w i t h i n t h e broader context of t h e i s s u e t o which they r e l a t e . W e w i l l r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s manner: 1. Whether t h e death penalty, imposed a s defendant's sentence f o r conviction on Count I1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ? 2. Whether defendant should have been sentenced f o r 40 years on h i s conviction under Count I I I ? 3 . Whether defendant's motion t o suppress t h e evidence obtained a f t e r h i s a r r e s t should have been granted? 4. Whether defendant's c o n d i t i o n a l o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y should have been accepted? 5. Whether defendant's motion t o dismiss t h e t h r e e counts of t h e Information should have been granted and whether t h e Information should have been amended a f t e r defendant's e n t r y of a plea? 6. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s second jury challenge should have been s u s t a i n e d ? 7. Whether t h e scope of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s cross-examination of t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s was improperly l i m i t e d ? 8. Whether Nank's competency a s a w i t n e s s should have been determined p r i o r t o h i s testimony? 9. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s , a t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , f o r l a c k of c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's testimony should have been granted? 10. Whether some of t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s w e r e allowed t o t e s t i f y improperly t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of defendant? 11. Whether t h e District Court p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury? 12. Whether c e r t a i n S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e admissible and whether d e f e n d a n t ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e p r o p e r l y refused? 13. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l should have been granted? I s s u e 1. Defendant argues t h a t h i s d e a t h sentence cannot s t a n d because it i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . H e r a i s e s two claims. The f i r s t i s t h a t two j u r o r s were excused f o r cause by t h e District Court based on t h e i r views of c a p i t a l punish- ment. Defendant argues t h a t t h i s i s i n v i o l a t i o n of Witherspoon v. I l l i n o i s , (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L Ed 2d 776. H i s second claim i s t h a t Montana's d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e , under which he was sentenced, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e . The Witherspoon r u l e i s t h a t a sentence of d e a t h cannot be c a r r i e d o u t i f t h e jury t h a t imposed o r recommended it was chosen by excluding p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s f o r cause simply because they voiced g e n e r a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . There i s an exception t o t h e r u l e . I t provides t h a t i f a prospective juror i s irrevocably committed t o voting a g a i n s t conviction because of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a death penalty, he may be properly excluded f o r cause and a sentence of death c a r r i e d out. I n t h i s case, defendant argues t h a t Witherspoon makes h i s death sentence i n v a l i d a s two j u r o r s were improperly excluded. W e disagree. W e hold t h a t t h e two prospective j u r o r s i n t h i s c a s e were properly excluded under t h e exception t o t h e general r u l e of Witherspoon. One juror s t a t e d t h a t no matter how s t r o n g t h e evidence of g u i l t was, he could n o t v o t e t o convict i f a death penalty could be imposed. The o t h e r juror s t a t e d t h a t she f e l t she could not l i v e with h e r s e l f i f she was on a jury t h a t convicted a person and t h a t person received a d e a t h sentence a s a r e s u l t . Thus, both of these j u r o r s were irrevocably committed t o voting a g a i n s t a conviction because defendant could r e c e i v e t h e d e a t h penalty. Their being excused f o r cause because of t h e i r i r r e v o c a b l e commit- ment a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h penalty does n o t i n v a l i d a t e defendant's death sentence. A t t h e t i m e of defendant's t r i a l , t h e death penalty s t a t u t e i n Montana f o r aggravated kidnapping was s e c t i o n 94- 5-304, R.C.M. 1947. It read: "A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e sentence of death following conviction of aggravated kidnapping i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e victim i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e criminal conduct." Defendant was sentenced t o death under t h i s s t a t u t e . This s t a t u t e was repealed by t h e 1977 s e s s i o n of t h e s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . Section 16, Chapter 338, Laws of Montana 1977. The new death penalty s t a t u t e s a r e codified a s sec- t i o n s 95-2206.6 t o 95-2206.15, R.C.M. 1947. The c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of Montana's p r e s e n t death penalty s t a t u t e s a r e n o t involved i n t h i s case. Section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, a s it e x i s t e d i n 1975, is a mandatory death penalty s t a t u t e . I n t h e l i g h t of r e c e n t U. S. Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , t h i s s t a t u t e i s unconstitu- t i o n a l on its f a c e , and defendant's d e a t h sentence thereunder cannot stand. I n 1976, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , r u l e d on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of mandatory death penalty s t a t u t e s . Woodson v. North Carolina, (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L ed 2d 944. The s t a t u t e before t h e Court was North Carolina's death penalty s t a t u t e . It provided t h e d e a t h sentence f o r a l l persons convicted of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. I n holding t h i s s t a t u t e unconstitu- t i o n a l , t h e Supreme Court s a i d : "* * * North C a r o l i n a ' s mandatory d e a t h penalty s t a t u t e f o r f i r s t - d e g r e e murder d e p a r t s markedly from contemporary standards respecting t h e imposition of t h e punishment of d e a t h and thus cannot be applied con- s i s t e n t l y with t h e Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirement t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s power t o punish ' b e exercised w i t h i n t h e 1 l i m i t s of c i v i l i z e d standards.'" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. a t 301, quothng from Trop v. Dulles, (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L ed 2d 630. I n two l a t e r c a s e s , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court a l s o I held mandatory d e a t h penalty s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t ~ t u t i o n a l . I Coker v. Georgia, (1977), U.S. , 97 b . C t . 2861, 53 I L ed 2d 982; Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, (197l7), U.S. , 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L ed 2d 637. I n Cokex t h e Court held u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a Georgia s t a t u t e r e q u i ~ i n g t h e imposi- t i o n of t h e death sentence f o r rape, when one^ o r more speci- f i e d aggravating circumstances were found t o be present. In Harry Roberts t h e Court held unconstitutional^ a Louisiana s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g t h e imposition of a d e a t h slentence f o r k i l l i n g a peace o f f i c e r . Concerning t h e Louisiana , s t a t u t e , t h e Court said: " * * * it i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e c a p i t a l sentencing d e c i s i o n allow f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whatever m i t i g a t i n g circumstances may be r e l e v a n t t o e i t h e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n d e r o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . Because t h e Louisiana s t a t u t e does n o t allow c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r i z e d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , it i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 U.S. a t 1996. The same problems t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n Woodson, Coker, and Harry Roberts a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e s t a t u t e under which defendant was sentenced i n 1975. I t i s a mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . Under t h i s s t a t u t e , i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s , a s it d i d i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t t h e v i c t i m of a n aggravated kidnapping d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e crime, t h e convicted defendant must be sentenced t o d i e . There i s no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o consider any m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. It only allows t h e c o u r t t o determine t h e aggravating circumstance of d e a t h . This i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible. To have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d d e a t h p e n a l t y , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court has e s t a b l i s h e d c e r t a i n neces- s a r y procedures. See: Gregg v. Georgia, (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 4 9 L ed 2d 859; P r o f f i t t v. F l o r i d a , (1976), 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L ed 2d 913; J u r e k v. Texas, (1976), 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L ed 2d 929. None of t h o s e r e q u i r e d procedures a r e p r e s e n t i n Montana's d e a t h penalty s t a t u t e a s it e x i s t e d i n 1974, nor w e r e they provided otherwise i n t h i s case. Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s d e a t h sentence cannot stand. I s s u e 2. Defendant was sentenced t o 40 y e a r s f o r Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y . This sentence was imposed pursuant t o s e c t i o n 94-5- 503 (3) , R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "If t h e victim i s l e s s than 16 years o l d and t h e offender i s 3 o r more years o l d e r than t h e victim o r i f t h e of fender i n £ licts bodily i n j u r y upon anyone i n t h e course of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, he s h a l l be imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any term of n o t l e s s than 2 years o r more than 40 years, except a s provided i n 95-2206.18." Defendant argues t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y upon Peggy Lee Harstad i n t h e course of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. Since t h a t i s s o , defendant argues t h a t h i s 4 0 year sentence i s erroneous. W e agree. The standard used t o measure jury determinations i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n t h i s s t a t e . S t a t e v. Pascgo, (1977), Mont. , 566 P.2d 802, 34 St.Rep. 657. The r u l e is t h a t questions of f a c t must be determined by t h e jury and given t h e required l e g a l minimum of evidence, t h i s Court on review w i l l not s u b s t i t u t e its judgment f o r t h a t of t h e jury. S t a t e v. Merseal, (1974), 167 Mont. 409, 538 P.2d 1364. The evidence i s examined t o determine i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e conviction when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e s t a t e . S t a t e v. Pascgo, supra; S t a t e v. Merseal, supra; S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976), Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270. Applying t h e s e standards here, we f i n d i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y i n t h e course of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e . The evidence shows t h a t defendant d i d commit sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defend- a n t d i d so. Negroid pubic h a i r s w e r e found i n t h e c a r . However, Nank d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y upon Peggy L e e Harstad while engaged i n sexual intercourse. The p a t h o l o g i s t , D r . P f a f f , s p e c i f i c a l l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t he found no evidence of p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o Peggy L e e Harstad d u r i n g h i s examination of t h e body. The S t a t e argues t h a t t h e evidence does show t h a t Peggy L e e Harstad was k i l l e d following her rape. his, they say, f i t s t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 93-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, t h a t bodily i n j u r y was i n f l i c t e d i n t h e course of t h e rape. W e a r e unconvinced. To s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y , t h e r e must be a showing of bodily i n j u r y a s t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l code, s e c t i o n 94-2-101 ( 5 ) , R.C.M. 1947. That s e c t i o n reads: "'Bodily i n j u r y ' means p h y s i c a l p a i n , i l l n e s s , o r any impairment of p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n and i n c l u d e s mental i l l n e s s o r impairment. " There i s no evidence showing t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d any such i n j u r i e s on Peggy L e e Harstad. Thus, t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d b o d i l y i n j u r y i n t h e course of committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent is n o t supported by any evidence and cannot s t a n d . Defendant should properly have been sentenced under s e c t i o n 94-5- 5 0 3 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, f o r committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. I s s u e 3. P r i o r t o t r i a l , defendant moved t o have suppressed t h e evidence s e i z e d i n Idaho--the motorcycle helmets and t h e rope. H e argues t h a t h i s a r r e s t without a warrant was unlawful because of a l a c k of probable cause t o a r r e s t . H e contends t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have probable cause t o a r r e s t him u n t i l a f t e r Nank's confession s e v e r a l hours a f t e r h i s a r r e s t . H e f u r t h e r claims t h a t Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d because Nank's confes- s i o n and consent t o t h e search w e r e involuntary. The D i s - t r i c t Court refused t o suppress t h e evidence. Defendant maintains t h i s was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and r a i s e s the same arguments on appeal t h a t he d i d i n t h e suppression hearing. W e f i n d t h e r e was probable cause t o a r r e s t defendant without a warrant. The l e g a l i t y of an a r r e s t is determined by t h e law of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e a r r e s t was e f f e c t e d . M i l l e r v. United S t a t e s , (1958), 357 U . S . 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L ed 2d 1332. I n t h i s case, s i n c e t h e a r r e s t took place i n Idaho, Idaho law must be applied t o determine t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a r r e s t . Detective Brake a r r e s t e d defendant and Nank i n Boise without a warrant f o r a d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n Montana. Idaho's general a r r e s t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 19- 603(3), I . C . , provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A peace o f f i c e r may make an a r r e s t i n obedience t o a warrant d e l i v e r e d t o him, o r may, without a warrant, a r r e s t a person: "3. When a felony has i n f a c t been committed and he has reasonable cause f o r believing t h e person a r r e s t e d t o have committed i t . " A n examination of Idaho law d i s c l o s e s no case determining whether a peace o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a person i n Idaho f o r a crime committed elsewhere, without a warrant, by t h e a u t h o r i t y given him i n t h i s s t a t u t e . Idaho, l i k e Montana, has adopted t h e Uniform Criminal E x t r a d i t i o n Act. There i s a provision i n t h a t a c t f o r a r r e s t s without a warrant of f u g i t i v e s from another s t a t e , which defendant and Nank a r e . This provision i s s e c t i o n 19- 4514, I . C . , which reads a s follows: "Arrest without a warrant.--The a r r e s t of a person may be lawfully made a l s o by an o f f i c e r o r a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n without a warrant upon reasonable information t h a t t h e accused stands charged with a crime punish- a b l e by death o r imprisonment f o r a term exceeding one (1) year i n t h e c o u r t s of another s t a t e ; b u t when s o a r r e s t e d t h e accused must be taken before a judge o r magistrate with a l l p r a c t i c a b l e speed and complaint must be made a g a i n s t him under oath s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e ground f o r t h e a r r e s t a s i n t h e l a s t sec- t i o n ; and t h e r e a f t e r h i s answer s h a l l be heard a s i f he had been a r r e s t e d on a warrant." The c o u r t s i n Idaho have n o t had occasion t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s s t a t u t e . Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have held t h a t t h i s provision of t h e Uniform Criminal E x t r a d i t i o n Act implies t h e n e c e s s i t y of some p r i o r c o u r t a c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e where t h e crime w a s committed, b u t t h e a c t i s n o t intended t o repudiate t h e common law r u l e t h a t an a r r e s t may be made on probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d person had committed a crime i n another s t a t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of lack of complaint o r warrant i n t h a t s t a t e . D e s j a r l a i s v. S t a t e , (1976), 73 Wis.2d 480, " I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s an o f f i c e r has no a u t h o r i t y t o a r r e s t without a warrant a f u g i t i v e from j u s t i c e from another s t a t e , even on t e l e g r a p h i c o r personal r e q u e s t of t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e demanding s t a t e . I n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s an a r r e s t may be made by an o f f i c e r without a warrant, a t l e a s t under c e r t a i n circumstances a s where t h e f u g i t i v e has committed a felony * * * ." 35 C.J.S. E x t r a d i t i o n , 512 (b) . These a r e matters l e f t wholly t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . Burton v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., (1917), 245 U.S. 315, 38 S.Ct. 108, 62 L.Ed. 314. Thus, t h e inquiry must be whether o r n o t Idaho recognizes t h e common law r u l e . I n our view Idaho law recognizes t h e common law r u l e t h a t an a r r e s t may be made without a warrant where t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r has probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h e person a r r e s t e d had committed a c r i m e i n another state. Defendant's a r r e s t was l e g a l i n t h i s c a s e a s Detective Brake had probable cause t o b e l i e v e defendant had committed a felony i n Montana. Under Idaho law, probable cause e x i s t s where t h e r e is such a s t a t e of f a c t s a s would lead a man of ordinary c a r e and prudence t o believe o r e n t e r t a i n an honest and s t r o n g sus- p i c i o n t h a t such person has committed a crime. S t a t e v. Polson, (1959), 81 Ida. 147, 339 P.2d 510; S t a t e v. Loyd, (1967), 92 Ida. 20, 435 P.2d 797. Here, Detective Brake knew Peggy Lee Harstad had disappeared on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4 , 1974. H e knew defendant and Nank had been seen together i n t h e a r e a of her disappearance on t h a t night. He knew t h e i r f i n g e r p r i n t s had been i d e n t i f i e d on her c a r and purse. H e knew Negroid head h a i r s and pubic h a i r s were found i n her c a r and t h a t defendant was a Negro. This c o n s t i t u t e d probable cause t o a r r e s t them. Next w e must look t o see i f t h e search of t h e apartment and c a r , where t h e helmets and rope w e r e recovered, was lawful. W e n o t e t h a t t h i s search was n o t t h e product of defendant's and Nank's a r r e s t . I t was based on Nank's consent t o t h e search. Defendant questions whether Nank's consent was f r e e l y given. However, defendant cannot a s s e r t any v i o l a t i o n s of Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The r u l e i n Montana is t h a t a defendant does n o t have standing t o challenge v i o l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of a co-defendant o r t h i r d p a r t y by law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s . S t a t e v. Braden, (1973), 163 Mont. 124, 515 P.2d 692. his r u l e i s based on Alderman v. United S t a t e s , (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L ed 2d 176. Therefore, we hold defendant cannot claim any v i o l a t i o n of Nank's Fourth mend- ment r i g h t s and h i s consent t o t h e search made it a lawful search. There was no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of defendant's motion t o suppress. I s s u e 4. Defendant claims t h e S t a t e refused t o p l e a bargain with him o r t o accept h i s c o n d i t i o n a l plea of g u i l t y because he i s a black man. H e claims it was because of h i s r a c e t h a t t h e S t a t e i n s i s t e d upon having a f u l l t r i a l i n t h i s case, where, upon conviction, a death sentence could be imposed. He argues it i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e S t a t e n o t t o p l e a bargain o r t o accept h i s o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y . H o w t h i s would be s o , defendant has n o t made c l e a r t o us. W e recognize t h a t a defendant may plead g u i l t y while maintaining h i s innocence, e s p e c i a l l y t o avoid a death sentence. Brady v. United S t a t e s , (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L ed 2d 747; North Carolina v. Alford, (1970), 400 U . S . 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L ed 2d 162. However, t h e s e cases d e a l with attempts t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a a f t e r it has been entered and d e a l with t h e voluntariness of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a of g u i l t y . These cases do n o t r e q u i r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r t h e prosecution t o accept a g u i l t y plea. The acceptance of a g u i l t y p l e a t o a charged o f f e n s e i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l court. Accordingly, w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e S t a t e ' s r e f u s a l t o p l e a bargain with defendant o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o accept h i s c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y while maintaining h i s innocence. I s s u e 5. Defendant contends t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion t o dismiss t h e Information f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e an offense. H i s argument is t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947, r e l a t i n g t o t h e form of a charge, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e charge t o be i n ordinary and concise language, and i n such a manner t h a t t h e defendant would know what was intended. H e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e Information i n t h i s case d i d not meet t h i s requirement. Defendant premises h i s argument on t h e S t a t e ' s attempt t o amend t h e Information a f t e r e n t r y of defendant's plea. He a l l e g e s t h a t t h e S t a t e , i n attempting t o amend t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o n . admitted t h e Information was d e f e c t i v e . The t r i a l c o u r t refused t o allow t h e Information t o be amended. However, t h e c o u r t i t s e l f amended Count 11, t h e aggravated kidnapping charge, t o add t h e words: " r e s u l t i n g i n t h e death of Peggy Lee Harstad." W e f a i l t o s e e how t h e S t a t e ' s attempt t o amend t h e Information a i d s t h e defendant i n claiming t h e Information i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The S t a t e by amending t h e Information was t r y i n g t o make it a b e t t e r Information. They w e r e n o t claiming it was i n s u f f i c i e n t a s it e x i s t e d . A n Information need only be s u f f i c i e n t t o a p p r i s e t h e accused of t h e n a t u r e of t h e crime charged. It need n o t be p e r f e c t . "It i s frequently s t a t e d , a s a general r u l e , e i t h e r with r e f e r e n c e t o s t a t u t o r y misdemeanors, o r t o s t a t u t o r y offenses generally, t h a t a charge i s s u f f i c i e n t which follows t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e c r e a t i n g t h e offense; and it has been held t h a t , i f accused i n s i s t s on g r e a t e r p a r t i - c u l a r i t y , it i s incumbent on him t o show t h a t from t h e obvious i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r known p r i n c i p l e s of law t h e p a r t i c u l a r case forms an exception t o t h e general r u l e . " 4 2 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations, §139(c). Montana follows t h i s general r u l e . A n Information t h a t properly charges an offense i n t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e describing t h e offense i s s u f f i c i e n t . S t a t e v. Randall, (1960), 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Shannon, (1933), 95 Mont. 280, 26 P.2d 380; S t a t e v. Haley, (1957), 132 Mont. 366, 318 P.2d 1084; S t a t e v. Duncan, (1957), 130 Mont. 562, 305 P.2d 761; S t a t e ex rel. Glantz v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1969), 154 Mont. 132, 461 P.2d 193. W e hold t h a t t h e Information f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e was s u f f i c i e n t . Each count followed t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e s f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947, aggravated kidnapping, s e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. 1947, and sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. A s f o r t h e amendment by t h e c o u r t t o Count 11, contrary t o defendant's contention, w e f i n d t h a t it w a s a proper amendment. S e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, a s it e x i s t e d i n 1975, allowed an Information t o be amended a s t o form a f t e r e n t r y of p l e a b u t n o t a s t o substance. Defendant argues t h a t t h e amendment t o Count I1 was one of substance. H e claims t h a t p r i o r t o t h i s amendment, he was n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e d e a t h penalty. W e d i s a g r e e . W e recognize t h a t any amendment t o an Information which charges a crime d i f f e r e n t i n penalty i s a m a t t e r of substance and impermissible. S t a t e v. F i s h e r , (1927), 79 Mont. 46, 254 P. 872; S t a t e v. Knight, (1963), 143 Mont. 27, 387 P.2d 22. H e r e , however, t h e amendment was one of form. Defendant knew from t h e v e r y beginning t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was going t o be sought. P r i o r t o t h e amendment t o Count 11, t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , upon a c o n v i c t i o n , could have been sought under e i t h e r Count I o r Count 11. The amendment simply l i m i t e d it t o Count 11. Furthermore, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant was n o t s u r p r i s e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was being sought. H e objected t o t h e amendment i n t h e lower c o u r t , b u t he d i d n o t a s k f o r any continuance a s a r e s u l t of it. H e c l e a r l y knew p r i o r t o t h e amendment t h a t t h e S t a t e was seeking t h e d e a t h penalty. I n any event, no l e g a l p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t e d from t h e amendment of Count I1 i n t h e l i g h t of our holding t h a t Montana's d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a s it e x i s t e d i n 1975 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I s s u e 6. O n October 20, 1975, defendant f i l e d a chal- lenge t o t h e jury panel claiming t h a t it was n o t drawn and summoned i n accordance w i t h t h e jury s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s . The c h a l l e n g e was made i n conformity w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s how a jury c h a l l e n g e i s t o be made. A f t e r a f u l l hearing on t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court dismissed t h e jury panel. The c o u r t then ordered a new panel of 60 j u r o r s be drawn and summoned t o appear f o r t r i a l on October 23, 1975. Defendant r a i s e d a second jury challenge t o t h i s panel. H e again argued t h a t t h e panel was n o t drawn and summoned i n accordance with t h e s t a t u t e s . The c o u r t denied t h e chal- lenge. Defendant, on appeal, claims h i s second jury chal- lenge should have been granted. W e disagree. Basically, defendant r a i s e s t h r e e arguments concerning why t h e jury panel t h a t t r i e d him was improperly drawn and summoned. F i r s t , he says t h a t t h e r e w e r e more numbers i n t h e jury box than names on t h e jury list. There w e r e 55,763 numbers i n t h e box and 44,765 on t h e l i s t . When a number was drawn higher than 44,765, it w a s returned t o t h e box. Defendant claims t h a t having more numbers i n t h e jury box than names on t h e jury l i s t f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply with t h e jury s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Section 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t each name on t h e jury list be assigned a number. Section 93-1404, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e numbers be placed i n t h e jury box i n such a manner t h a t they cannot be distinguished from each other. Neither of t h e s e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e be only a s many numbers i n t h e jury box a s names on t h e jury l i s t except t h e r e can only be one number f o r each juror. Defendant makes no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was more than one number f o r each juror. Therefore, w e hold t h a t having more numbers i n t h e jury box than names on t h e jury l i s t does n o t destroy t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e panel drawn. The purpose of t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e r e be no unfairness i n t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e jury. S t a t e ex rel. ~ e n n i n g s e n v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1959), 136 Mont. 354, 348 ~ . 2 d 143; I n r e Jury Box Capsules, (1967), 150 Mont. 583, 447 P.2d 687. W e f i n d no u n f a i r n e s s h e r e i n t h e drawing of t h e jury panel. Second, defendant complains t h a t t h e 200 j u r o r s drawn were n o t i f i e d by telephone by t h e District Court c l e r k t o see i f they would be a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r i a l on October 23, 1975. Sixty-one of t h o s e c a l l e d r e p l i e d they would be a v a i l a b l e . Defendant claims t h a t , i n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k excused 139 j u r o r s , and t h a t , under t h e law, t h e D i s t r i c t Court c l e r k may n o t excuse j u r o r s from jury duty. F u r t h e r , defendant claims t h a t t h e j u r o r s were allowed t o excuse themselves f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l cause i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e on being excused from jury duty. S e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court judge t o draw and summon a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s f o r a t r i a l when it i s necessary t o do so. This s e c t i o n f u r t h e r provides t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s may be n o t i f i e d by telephone by t h e c l e r k of c o u r t . I n t h i s c a s e , a f t e r dismissing t h e f i r s t jury panel, a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s w e r e needed. The District Court judge drew 200 numbers o u t of t h e jury box t o g e t a 60 member jury panel. H e authorized t h e c l e r k t o o r a l l y n o t i f y t h e j u r o r s . The c l e r k , a s s e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s , n o t i f i e d t h e j u r o r s by telephone. Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s claim t h a t n o t i f y i n g t h e j u r o r s by telephone was improper i s without m e r i t . S e c t i o n 93-1305, R.C.M. 1947, does d e a l w i t h t h e grounds f o r being excused from j u r y duty. It provides t h a t a j u r o r may n o t be excused f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l cause. On t h e r e c o r d t h a t i s b e f o r e u s , t h e r e i s no showing t h a t t h e c l e r k excused any of t h e j u r o r s c a l l e d . W e n o t e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge had ordered t h e c l e r k t o have a p a n e l of 60 j u r o r s f o r t h e t r i a l on October 23, 1975, which he d i d . F u r t h e r , t h e r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of a j u r o r t o appear, i f properly n o t i f i e d , w i l l n o t i n v a l i d a t e a subsequent t r i a l , a s a defendant has no r i g h t t o select a p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r , b u t has only a r i g h t t o r e j e c t a j u r o r . S t a t e v. Moran, (196311 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. Applying t h a t r u l e t o t h i s c a s e , w e hold t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l should n o t be i n v a l i d a t e d because 60 o u t of 200 j u r o r s appeared which was t h e s i z e of t h e panel ordered by t h e District Court. F i n a l l y , defendant argues t h a t t h e speed used i n s e l e c t i n g t h e jury denied him h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury panel. H e argues t h a t t h e jury panel d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t a c r o s s - s e c t i o n of t h e community a s most of t h e j u r o r s came from t h e w e s t s i d e of B i l l i n g s , Montana. The r u l e is t h a t a defendant has a r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y s e l e c t e d from t h e proper p l a c e and drawn and summoned according t o law. The s y s t e m a t i c and i n t e n t i o n a l exclusion of a class of persons o r a purposeful and d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o s e c u r e t h e jury from a l i m i t e d a r e a i n s t e a d of t h e e n t i r e county d e p r i v e s a defendant of fundamental c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t s . S t a t e v. Hay, (1948), 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232. I n Hay t h i s Court found t h a t t h e defendant f a i l e d - t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he had been deprived of h i s r i g h t t o have a jury taken from a c r o s s - s e c t i o n of t h e county by showing t h a t a l l members of t h e jury panel w e r e r e s i d e n t s of t h e county s e a t , i n t h e absence of a showing t h a t it was t h e r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t e design. I n t h i s case, t h e r e was no showing of d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o g e t a jury panel from only t h e w e s t s i d e of B i l l i n g s . W e hold t h a t t h e jury was s e l e c t e d i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with t h e law and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s claim t h a t he was denied a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury must f a i l . Issue 7. Defendant claims error in improperly restrict- ing his cross-examination of some of the State's witnesses. At the time of trial section 93-1901-7, R.C.M. 1947, governed the scope of permissible cross-examination. In substance it permits cross-examination as to any testimony elicited on direct examination or facts connected therewith and all other facts connected with the witness's testimony which tends to enlighten the jury on the question in controversy. State Highway Commission v. Bennett, (1973), 162 Mont. 386, 513 P.2d 5. We have examined the District Court's rulings concerning cross-examination of State's witnesses Ash, Schiffer and Nank, and find no error. The questions asked were either argumentative, immaterial or otherwise answered. Defendant also claims error in connection with his attempted cross-examination of State's expert witness Hippard from the F.B.I. laboratory concerning identification of the hairs taken from the Harstad vehicle and comparison of these hairs with defendant Coleman's hair. The District Court properly disallowed cross-examination of Hippard concerning his ability to identify hair from pictures as the witness testified that he could not look at a picture of a hair and identify it. Hippard testified on direct examination that the only way of identifying and comparing hair was by a comparison microscope which was the method he used. Although defendant offered to submit hair samples to Hippard, he did not speci- fically state how this would be done or offer to furnish a comparison microscope. The District Court did tell defendant to proceed with his cross-examination and that they were then through with the witness unless defendant himself c a l l e d him on d i r e c t , which defendant d i d n o t do. The matter of permitting experiments, t e s t s , and demonstrations i s one addressed t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e court. S t a t e v. London, (1957), 131 Mont. 410, 310 P.2d 571; S t a t e v. ~ e l l e r , (1952), 126 Mont. 142, 246 P.2d 817; S t a t e v. ~hompson, (1974), 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115. W e f i n d no abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n here under t h e o f f e r of t h e defendant and t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r u l i n g s . I s s u e 8. Defendant a s s i g n s e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of defendant's challenge t o Nank's mental competency a s a witness. A Montana s t a t u t e provides t h a t those of unsound mind cannot be witnesses. Section 93-701-3(1), R.C.M. 1947. It i s t h e function of t h e t r i a l judge t o determine t h e competency of a witness t o t e s t i f y . S t a t e v. Newman, (1923), 66 Mont. 180, 213 P. 805. There i s no presumption A t h a t a witness i s incompetent and t h e burden is on t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g t h e incompetency t o prove it. S t a t e v. Newman, supra. This defendant d i d n o t do. Furthermore, i f a witness i s s u f f i c i e n t l y competent t o understand and a p p r e c i a t e t h e nature and o b l i g a t i o n of an o a t h and can c o r r e c t l y n a r r a t e t h e f a c t s involved i n t h e case, he may t e s t i f y and t h e state of h i s mentality goes only t o t h e weight of h i s testimony and n o t t o its admis- s i b i l i t y . Martin v. Hover, (1921), 60 Mont. 302, 199 P. 694. W e f i n d no e r r o r by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h i s i s s u e . I s s u e 9. A t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s case, defendant moved t o dismiss t h e Information, o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a judgment of a c q u i t t a l f o r lack of corroboration of Nank's testimony. Corroboration of t h e testimony of one responsible o r l e g a l l y accountable f o r t h e same offense i s necessary t o s u s t a i n a conviction. Section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947. his s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s corroboration by evidence which tends t o connect t h e defendant with t h e commission of t h e offense, without t h e testimony of t h e person l e g a l l y accountable o r responsible. Defendant argues t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration of Nank's testimony t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. W e disagree. The r u l e on corroboration is s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Cobb, (1926), 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. I n t h a t c a s e , w e held t h a t t h e corroborating evidence may be supplied by t h e defendant o r h i s witnesses; it may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence; it need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of g u i l t ; and it need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o connect t h e defendant with t h e crime b u t must tend t o connect him with t h e crime. I n S t a t e v. Keckonen, (1938), 107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341, w e held t h a t where t h e a l l e g e d c o r r o b a t i v e evidence i s equally consonant with a reasonable explanation pointing toward innocent conduct on t h e p a r t of defendant, then such evidence does n o t tend t o connect him with t h e commission of t h e offense and i s i n t h e realm of speculation, n o t corroboration. Where t h e claimed corroboration shows no more than an opportunity t o commit a crime and simply proves suspicion, it i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration t o j u s t i f y a conviction upon t h e testimony of an accomplice. S t a t e v. Jones, (1933), 95 Mont. 317, 26 ~ . 2 d 341. Applying those r u l e s t o t h i s c a s e , w e hold t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t corroboration of Nank's testimony t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. The corroborating evidence is: he crack i n defendant's motorcycle helmet; a h a i r of Peggy ~ e e Harstad being on t h e rope belonging t o t h e s e men; t h e finger- p r i n t s on her c a r and i n her purse; t h e Negroid pubic h a i r s s i m i l a r t o defendant's and t h e Negroid head h a i r found i n her c a r ; and, t h e evidence t h a t defendant and Nank were seen together on t h e same road and a t approximately t h e same t i m e t h a t ' Peggy L e e Harstad disappeared. This evidence tends t o connect defendant with t h e commission of t h e offenses charged. It i s evidence of more than mere opportunity o r suspicion t h a t defendant committed these offenses. This evidence does n o t e s t a b l i s h any reasonable explanation pointing toward innocent conduct. W e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's d e n i a l of defendant's motion. I s s u e 1 0 . On appeal, a s a t t h e t r i a l , defendant r a i s e s o b j e c t i o n s t o c e r t a i n questions and answers e l i c i t e d from t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses. H e argues t h a t t h e s e a r e cumulative e r r o r s r e q u i r i n g r e v e r s a l . W e do n o t agree. H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o Nank's being allowed, on d i r e c t examination, t o t e s t i f y t h a t he had t o l d t h e same s t o r y concerning t h e crime t o t h e p o l i c e and t h e F.B.I. p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l . Defendant claims t h a t t h i s testimony was used t o b u t t r e s s and f o r t i f y Nank's testimony before h i s testimony w a s challenged. Basically, t h e questions t o Nank w e r e t o f i n d o u t i f Nank was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e t r u t h . This Court has held i n t h e p a s t t h a t t h e S t a t e may ask such questions on d i r e c t examination. S t a t e v. C o l l e t t , (1946), 118 Mont. 473, 167 P.2d 584. I n C o l l e t t , t h i s Court s a i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n allowing t h e witness t o answer a question a s t o whether he was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e t r u t h . The r a t i o n a l e i s t h a t while t h e answer i s i n t h e n a t u r e of a self-serving d e c l a r a t i o n , it i s only a reaffirma- t i o n of what t h e witness promises t o do when he takes t h e oath. W e believe t h i s approach i s sound and w i l l f o l l o w it here. W e hold t h e questions and answers a s t o Nank's p r i o r statements do not c o n s t i t u t e p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . Defendant then o b j e c t s t o an F.B.I. agent being allowed t o t e s t i f y about defendant's a t t i t u d e i n h i s interview with defendant a t Sheridan, Wyoming. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e agent t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant was evasive during questioning. W e agree t h a t t h i s was improper opinion evidence. However, technical e r r o r s o r d e f e c t s w i l l not provide a b a s i s f o r r e v e r s a l i n a criminal prosecution. S t a t e v. Gallagher, (1968), 151 Mont. 501, 4 4 5 P.2d 45. W e hold t h a t t h e admission of t h i s testimony was only a technical e r r o r and i s not a b a s i s f o r reversal. Next, defendant argues t h a t a F . B . I . f i n g e r p r i n t expert was allowed t o t e s t i f y on r e - d i r e c t examination beyond t h e scope of cross-examination. The questions t o which t h e defendant objected concerned t h e d a t e on which t h e F . B . I . laboratory received c e r t a i n f i n g e r p r i n t cards. The record reveals t h e r e was some confusion a s t o the d a t e s various f i n g e r p r i n t cards were received. Under those circum- stances, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o c l a r i f y t h e i s s u e on re-direct. F i n a l l y , defendant o b j e c t s t o witness Makin t e s t i f y i n g a s t o where he was t o l d c e r t a i n h a i r s came from. Defendant claims t h i s was hearsay. A n e a r l i e r witness, Ash, who was t h e declarant, t e s t i f i e d as t o where he found t h e h a i r s . Here, undersheriff Makin was t e s t i f y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e chain of evidence. He had received t h e h a i r s from Officer Ash, who t o l d Makin he obtained t h e h a i r s from t h e abandoned Harstad vehicle. Thus, t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of ~ s h was a p a r t of t h e chain of evidence. W e f i n d no cumulative e r r o r i n t h e testimony of t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant r e v e r s a l . I s s u e 11. Defendant o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s which were given t o t h e jury and o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were refused. W e f i n d t h e jury was properly i n s t r u c t e d . Defendant's f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 22. This i n s t r u c t i o n was t h a t i f t h e jury found defendant committed a homicide and no circumstances of m i t i g a t i o n , excuse o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n appears, they may i n f e r t h a t t h e homicide was committed knowingly and purposely. This i n s t r u c t i o n was based on s e c t i o n 95-3004(2), R.C.M. 1947. The i n s t r u c t i o n follows t h e s t a t u t e . Defendant argues t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n a s a s t a t u t o r y presumption i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , c i t i n g Leary v. United S t a t e s , (1969), 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L ed 2d 57. This c a s e provides t h a t t o have a v a l i d c r i m i n a l s t a t u - t o r y presumption, t h e presumed f a c t must more l i k e l y than n o t flow from t h e proved f a c t on which it depends. W e f i n d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e a r e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l l y v a l i d . The jury was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t they "may" f i n d knowledge o r purpose when t h e r e are no circumstances of m i t i g a t i o n , excuse, o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . They a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o f i n d t h i s . Thus, it i s n o t a conclusive presumption. The i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e do n o t v i o l a t e t h e Leary r e q u i r e - ment because a f i n d i n g of knowledge o r purpose would more l i k e l y than n o t flow from t h e proved f a c t t h a t a homicide was committed by defendant and where t h e r e w e r e no circum- s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , j u s t i f i c a t i o n , o r excuse. Defendant o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 26, which gave t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "knowingly", and f u r t h e r o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 1 6 , which d e a l t with c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and premeditation, was n o t given. I n s t r u c t i o n 26 was t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "knowingly" a s contained i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101(28), R.C.M. 1947. The p o r t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e and i n s t r u c t i o n defendant o b j e c t s t o is: "When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s an element of an offense, such knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a person is aware of a high p r o b a b i l i t y of its existence." Defendant argues t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n does n o t comply with t h e t r a d i t i o n a l requirements of criminal i n t e n t . That i s why, according t o defendant, h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16 should have been given a s it explained t h e criminal i n t e n t and premeditation neces- s a r y f o r a conviction of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. W e b e l i e v e t h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s giving of I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and r e f u s i n g t o give defendant's I n s t r u c t i o n 16. W e have considered t h e n e c e s s i t y of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on criminal i n t e n t and premeditation before. S t a t e v. Sharbono, (1977), Mont. , 563 P.2d 61, 34 St.Rep. 196. I n t h a t case, we found no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e a n i n s t r u c t i o n i d e n t i c a l t o defendant's o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16. There, w e held t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had changed t h e requirements of mens r e a . This Court s a i d , i n discussing t h e question of criminal i n t e n t : "Upon t h e whole it i s t h e person who means t o do t h e t h i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a crime, knows he is doing it, and knows t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l and u n j u s t i f i a b l e r i s k i n doing it, whose conduct warrants condemnation of t h e kind from which conviction r e s u l t s . " Sharbono, 563 P.2d a t 72. Therefore, w e f i n d t h e c o u r t properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o t h e "knowledge" required f o r a conviction i n I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and properly refused defendant's I n s t r u c t i o n 16. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10 w a s n o t given. This i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l s with t h e burden of proof. I t comes from S t a t e v. Halk, (1914), 49 Mont. 173, 1 4 1 P. The Court adequately i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury concerning t h e burden of proof i n I n s t r u c t i o n 4. Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g defendant's o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10. Next defendant complains t h a t h i s proposed I n s t r u c t i o n 1 4 on reasonable doubt was n o t given. W e b e l i e v e t h e c o u r t r i g h t f u l l y refused t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n c e t h e jury w a s adequately i n s t r u c t e d on reasonable doubt i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n s 5, 6 , 7 , and 10. Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n would have only been redundant, and, t h e r e f o r e , was unnecessary. Defendant contends t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 should have been given. This i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l t with t h e n o t having t o decide i n conformity with t h e g r e a t e r number of witnesses i f t h e i r testimony does n o t produce conviction i n t h e i r minds. Defendant argues t h a t with t h e number of witnesses t h e S t a t e produced, he was e n t i t l e d t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . W e disagree. W e must p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n defendant proposed was adequately covered i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 2. This i n s t r u c t i o n read i n p a r t : "You a r e n o t bound t o decide i n conformity with t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s of any number of witnesses, n o t producing conviction i n your minds, a g a i n s t a l e s s number o r a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r evidence s a t i s f y i n g your minds. The d i r e c t evidence of one witness who i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t is s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e proof of any f a c t i n t h i s case." This i s a standard Montana Jury I n s t r u c t i o n Guide i n s t r u c t i o n which c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s t h e law. The D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n r e f u s i n g defendant's o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 covering t h e same s u b j e c t . Next, defendant a l l e g e s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 35A should have been given. This i n s t r u c t i o n was on t h e l e s s e r included o f f e n s e of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Where t h e r e i s no evidence of m i t i g a t i o n t h a t would f i t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 94-5-103, R.C.M. 1947, t h e t r i a l c o u r t should properly r e f u s e t o i n s t r u c t on such crime. S t a t e v . Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315. I n viewing t h e record h e r e , w e f i n d no evidence of m i t i g a t i o n . This i n s t r u c t i o n was properly refused. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 40. This i n s t r u c - t i o n t o l d t h e jury t h a t sentencing was v e s t e d i n t h e c o u r t and t h e jury was n o t t o consider t h e p o s s i b l e punishment defendant could r e c e i v e i n reaching a v e r d i c t . Defendant's o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , and i n v o i r d i r e of t h e jury, t h e jury was l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e judge had d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing t h e d e a t h penalty. This i n s t r u c t i o n simply t o l d t h e jury sentencing was up t o t h e judge. The i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t s t a t e t h a t t h e judge can m i t i g a t e punishment. I t only s a y s t h a t he has t h e power t o impose punishment, which is c o r r e c t . It is where t h e jury is i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e v a r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t i e s of sentence t h a t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant e x i s t s . S t a t e v. Zuidema, (1971), 157 Mont. 367, 485 P.2d 952. This is n o t t h e case here. The i n s t r u c t i o n was proper. F i n a l l y , defendant o b j e c t s t o t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t form used on Count 11. The j u r y was s p e c i f i c a l l y asked t o f i n d i f Peggy Lee Harstad d i e d as a r e s u l t of t h e aggravated kidnapping. The j u r y found t h a t s h e d i d . Defendant argues t h a t Montana law does n o t provide f o r s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s by t h e jury. The jury was given g e n e r a l v e r d i c t s asking f o r a f i n d i n g of g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y on each count. The jury was t o make t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e element necessary f o r t h e imposition of t h e d e a t h penalty was p r e s e n t . Under t h o s e circumstances, t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g does n o t f a l l i n t o t h e v i c e of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . I t does n o t r e q u i r e a f a c t determination which could be used t o undermine t h e g e n e r a l v e r d i c t . Thus, t h e v e r d i c t forms w e r e permissible. I n any event, o u r holding on Montana's d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e r e n d e r s t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r n o n p r e j u d i c i a l . I s s u e 12. Defendant o b j e c t s t o some e x h i b i t s which w e r e admitted i n t o evidence and some of h i s own which w e r e refused admission. H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 20. This was a p i c t u r e of t h e a r e a i n which Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s body was found. I n t h e p i c t u r e , her decomposed body can be seen. Defendant argues t h a t t h i s p i c t u r e was p r e j u d i c i a l because it i s a gruesome photograph. H e claims t h a t any relevancy of t h i s photograph i s outweighed by i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . This Court has h e l d t h a t photographs which h e l p t h e jury understand t h e c a s e a r e admissible, b u t photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse t h e sympathies o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e jury a r e properly excluded. S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t , (1957), 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969. This Court went on t o s a y , i n t h a t c a s e , t h a t photographs may n o t be used i f intended t o inflame t h e minds of t h e jury r a t h e r than e n l i g h t e n them a s t o t h e f a c t s . W e a f f i r m t h e r u l e of t h e B i s c h e r t c a s e , b u t r e j e c t its a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s c a s e . I n B i s c h e r t , t h e photograph was extremely d i s t a s t e f u l and d i d n o t make a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e develop- ment of t h e f a c t s i n t h a t c a s e . This i s n o t t h e c a s e h e r e . W e have examined t h e photograph and f i n d t h a t it i s hazy, i n d i s t i n c t , and of poor q u a l i t y . Any gruesome c h a r a c t e r t h a t t h e photograph might otherwise possess i s l o s t i n i t s development and reproduction. The photograph is r e l e v a n t i n t h a t it shows t h e jury t h e a r e a i n which t h e body was found; and it corroborates Nank's testimony a s t o her being f u l l y clothed and a s t o where t h e body was. Under t h e circumstances here, t h e photograph's probative value outweighs i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . Defendant o b j e c t s t o t h e admission of two o t h e r photo- graphs, namely, S t a t e ' s Exhibits 4 1 and 43. These w e r e p i c t u r e s of t h e apartment building and t h e parking l o t i n Boise, where defendant and Nank were a r r e s t e d . Defendant argues t h a t t h e s e photographs w e r e i r r e l e v a n t and cumulative evidence. A s a general r u l e , photographs, when r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a person, place o r t h i n g , a r e admissible f o r t h e purpose of explaining and applying t h e evidence and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and jury i n understanding t h e case. Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., (1934), 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. The photographs of t h e apartment building and parking l o t helped t o d e s c r i b e t h e p l a c e where t h e defendant and Nank w e r e a r r e s t e d . These photographs showed where t h e helmets and rope were recovered. These photographs a s s i s t e d t h e jury i n understanding t h e a r r e s t and search i n Boise. They were properly admitted. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t o t h e admission of Nank's motorcycle helmet i n t o evidence. H i s complaint is t h a t t h e chain of evidence w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o t h e admission of t h e helmet and f u r t h e r complains t h a t he was n o t allowed t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o its admission. Defendant s t a t e s t h e r e was a problem with t h e chain of evidence i n t h a t t h i s helmet was labeled as belonging t o defendant and n o t ~ a n k . Since Nank, p r i o r t o t h e admission of t h e helmet, p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d it a s h i s , we f i n d t h e chain of evidence e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o its admission. The mismarked l a b e l i s of no consequence a s t h e l a b e l was n o t admitted i n t o evidence. W e recognize t h a t defendant might have been allowed t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o t h e admission i n t o evidence of t h e helmet b u t such was n o t required. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t such a v o i r d i r e would have produced a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . A t most, only a procedural e r r o r n o t a f f e c t i n g t h e m e r i t s was involved, and n o t a p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r r e q u i r i n g r e v e r s a l . S t a t e v. Heiser, (1965), 146 Mont. 413, 407 P.2d 370. Defendant f u r t h e r claims e r r o r i n admitting i n evidence t h e waiver of r i g h t s form given t o defendant i n Boise, which he refused t o sign. Defendant claims t h i s e x h i b i t was i r r e l e v a n t and should have been excluded a s cumulative evidence. W e can f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e admission of t h i s e x h i b i t . This e x h i b i t aided i n t h e jury i n understanding t h e events of t h i s c a s e t h a t occurred i n Boise, Idaho. It supported t h e testimony of t h e Boise d e t e c t i v e s a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e a r r e s t , t h e t i m e of t h e a r r e s t , and t h a t defendant w a s informed of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The e x h i b i t was properly admitted. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s Exhibits V, W, X and Y were refused. These e x h i b i t s were p i c t u r e s of t h e S t a t e ' s finger- p r i n t photos. They were enlargements and an overlay of them was made. By use of t h e overlay, defendant wanted t o show any d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s . Our review of t h e record i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant d i d n o t l a y a foundation, p r i o r t o moving f o r t h e admission of h i s e x h i b i t s , showing t h a t f i n g e r p r i n t s could be compared i n t h e manner defendant was attempting t o compare them. What defendant wanted t o do was t o show t h e jury by a c t u a l measurement t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e r i d g e s between a known p r i n t of defendant and t h e p r i n t found i n Peggy Lee Harstad's purse. A f i n g e r p r i n t cannot be compared i n t h i s manner. The same f i n g e r p r i n t w i l l produce d i f f e r i n g r e s u l t s with r e s p e c t t o a measurement between t h e r i d g e s depending upon t h e pressure applied i n making t h e p r i n t and t h e manner i n which t h e p r i n t was l e f t upon t h e surface. F i n g e r p r i n t s a r e compared by determining i f t h e same r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e p r e s e n t i n a known p r i n t and unknown p r i n t . These r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l n o t vary between t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n which an impression i s made on a surface. The r u l e is t h a t t h e determination of whether a proper foundation has been l a i d i n order t o introduce e x h i b i t s i n t o evidence rests with t h e lower c o u r t and its determination w i l l n o t be overturned u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Olsen, (1968), 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly excluded t h e e x h i b i t s because no proper foundation w a s l a i d f o r t h e i r admission. F i n a l l y , defendant claims t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g h i s E x h i b i t T showing some c a l c u l a t i o n s 1 as t o t h e height of t h e water l e v e l i n t h e Yellowstone River on J u l y 4 , 1974. This e x h i b i t was t o a i d defendant's argument t h a t Peggy Lee Harstad was n o t drowned i n t h e r i v e r a s Nank t e s t i f i e d she was. Defendant was t r y i n g t o prove t h a t t h e r i v e r , on ~ u l y 4 , 1974, was t o o deep, i n t h e a r e a where t h e body was found, f o r Nank and defendant t o be holding her under t h e water. This e x h i b i t w a s n o t admissble because of a lack of a proper foundation. Our review of t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h a t t h e witnesses who prepared t h i s e x h i b i t were never shown t o have t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o prepare such an e x h i b i t ; it was n o t made c l e a r how they a r r i v e d a t t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s they made of t h e height, flow, and volume of t h e r i v e r ; and, it was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e height of t h e r i v e r on J u l y 4 , 1974, were competent. Under such circumstances, t h e r e was no e r r o r i n denying t h i s e x h i b i t admission i n evidence. I s s u e 13. Following h i s conviction, defendant moved f o r a new t r i a l . One of t h e grounds defendant r a i s e d was t h a t a f t e r both s i d e s had r e s t e d t h e i r case, defendant was contacted by a witness who knew of defendant's good conduct and character. Defendant argues t h a t t h i s newly discovered evidence i s grounds f o r a new t r i a l under s e c t i o n 95-2101, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 . " I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l n o t be granted upon t h e ground of newly discovered evi- dence where it appears t h a t such new evidence can have no o t h e r e f f e c t than t o d i s c r e d i t t h e testimony of a witness a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l . I t i s only when it i s shown by competent and s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence t h a t a p p e l l a n t would n o t have been con- v i c t e d , but f o r t h i s evidence, t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l be granted f o r newly discovered evidence. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.)" S t a t e v. Schleining, (1965), 146 Mont. 1, 17, 403 P.2d 625. I n t h i s case, defendant's newly discovered evidence would only go t o d i s c r e d i t Nank's testimony and defendant has n o t shown t h a t t h i s evidence would make t h e d i f f e r e n c e between h i s being o r n o t being convicted i n a new t r i a l . Under those circumstances, w e w i l l follow t h e general r u l e i n finding no e r r o r i n t h e d e n i a l of defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l . W e have examined t h e subsidiary contentions of defendant and f i n d t h a t none would change our holdings i n t h i s case o r m e r i t s p e c i a l discussion i n t h i s opinion. The judgment of conviction on a l l t h r e e counts is affirmed. The sentences imposed f o r Counts I1 and I11 a r e vacated. The case i s remanded t o t h e District Court f o r resentencing on Counts I1 and 111. zL&g%& Chief J u s t i c e W e Concur: I , A ' - d/f 92-d dd>i<p J u s t i c e r" / d t t i n g i n t h e vacant s e a t Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the opinion but dissent as to the majority's disposition of Issue 2. The majority finds no substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that defendant inflicted bodily injury in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent. Section 94-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, provides: " * * * if the offender inflicts bodily injury upon anyone in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term of not less than 2 years or more than 40 years, except as provided in 95-2206.18." The majority freely admits "the evidence shows that defend- ant did commit sexual intercourse without consent" and the jury so found. Nor is there any quarrel that there is substantial evidence showing that defendant participated in the killing of Peggy Lee Harstad. These facts were proven to the jury despite the fact, as the majority notes, the pathologist could find no evidence of physical injury to her badly decomposed body. While the majority is unclear in what respect the State's proof was lacking, the State must have f5iled to prove either that (1) defendant inflicted "bodily injury" on the victim, or (2) the bodily ingury was inflicted in the course of the commission of the rape. Undoubtedly, there is substantial evidence that defendant inflicted bodily injury on the victim. As noted above, the evidence indicates defendant participated in causing her death. Certainly death is "bodily injury" within the meaning of the statute. That death is "impairment of physical condition" is so obvious that it deserves little comment. Section section 94-2-101(5), R.C.M. 1947. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. For example, a person who breaks the arm of the victim in the course of committing a rape can receive a 40 year sentence for the rape, but a rapist who kills the victim can receive no more than a 20 year sentence for the rape. I cannot believe the legislature intended that a rapist receive a lighter sentence because he did more harm to the victim than is required by the definition of "bodily injury". If death is, indeed, bodily injury, the only remaining requirement is that the death be inflicted "in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent". This phrase is explained in section 94-5-503(4), R.C.M. 1947: "An act 'in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent' shall include an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or cormnission." (Emphasis added.) Clearly there is substantial evidence to show the victim was killed in the "flight after" the commission of the rape. According to Nank's testimony, she was raped in her car, and then beaten and drowned nearby. Had she lived, she would have been able to identify defendant and Nank as the perpetrators. The jury cer- tainly would have been reasonable to infer that she was killed in an attempt to cover up the commission of the rape. The majority completely ignores the "flight after" language of the statute. In summary, I find substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that defendant inflicted "bodily injury" upon the victim "in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent". Her death supplied all the "bodily injury" required. Her death was inflicted in the course of committing the rape be- cause it was an integral part of the flight after the commission of the offense. This is precisely the type of conduct the statute was intended to punish to the most severe extent. I would affirm the imposition of the 40 year sentence. Justice ( k Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I agree with the majority opinion holding section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, to be unconstitutional. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court has prohibited mandatory death penalties because there is no allowance for consideration of mitigation. However, I would go yet another step and reverse the conviction because the second jury panel was not chosen in substantial compliance with the applicable statutes of calling in a new jury array. In fact, there was a complete failure to follow sections 93-1501 and 93-1509, R.C.M. The majority proceeds with this issue as though the District Court was only calling in additional jurors to complement the jury panel already legally in existence. The law involved is contained in Title 93, Chapter 15, entitled "Jurors--Drawing and Summoning for Courts of Record." Section 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, upon which the majority relies, is but one of the statutes covering the selection of juries. That section provides: "Obtaining additional jurors when necessary. Whenever it appears to a district judge that additional jurors will be needed for any term or trial - the judge shall draw as many numbers from jury box No. 1 as are necessary to secure the required number of additional jurors. Before drawing the numbers the judge shall by appropri- ate order designate the number of jurors needed, and, when the judge believes that securing the additional jurors from all of the county would cause unnecessary delay or expense then he may order the jurors selected from only a designated portion of the county, which portion shall never be less than the corporate limits of the county seat. If, in the selection of the additional jurors, a number is drawn and the jury list shows the person represented by the number to be a resident of an area outside the area designated by the court order then that number shall be returned to the jury box and a new number drawn. When the required number of names have been se- lected the judge may order the prospective jurors notified by telephone by the clerk of the court or he may order them summoned by the sheriff either by certified mail or by personal service." (Emphasis added. ) This statute allows additional jurors to be summoned by telephone (as one of the means of summoning a juror) where the jury array, then legally in existence, is not sufficient in number to complete the work of the court during the term of court. It does not apply where the legal existence of a jury array has been suc- cessfully challenged and it therefore becomes necessary to summon an entirely new jury panel--precisely what occurred in this case. The entire jury panel was excused because it was not summoned in compliance with the applicable statutes. The majority recognizes that this happened by stating: "* * * On October 20, 1975, defendant filed a challenge to the jury panel claiming that it was not drawn and summoned in accordance with the jury selection statutes. The challenge was made in conformity with section 95-1908, R.C.11. 1947, which states how a jury challenge is to be made. - - After a full hearing on the challenge, the Dis- trict Court dismissed the jury panel." (Emphasis added. ) Clearly, upon this dismissal, the jury panel was no longer legally in existence. If any more cases were to be tried during that jury term, an entire new jury panel had to be summoned. In such case sections 93-1501 and 93-1509, R.C.M. 1947, come into play. Section 93-1501, "Summoning of trial jury", provides: "At least once each year in each county when a civil or criminal case has been at issue and ready for trial for more than six (6) months and the plaintiff or defendant in such case has requested a jury trial or whenever the business of a district court requires the attendance of a trial jury for the trial of civil or criminal cases, and no jury is in attendance, the court must make an order directing a trial jury to be drawn and summoned to attend before said court. Such order must specify the number of jurors to be drawn, and the time at which the jurors are required to attend, which time may be at the same term in which the jurors are drawn, or at the next succeeding term, in the discretion of the court. And the court may direct that such causes, either criminal or civil, in which a jury may be required, or in which a jury may have been demanded, be continued and fixed for trial when a jury shall be in attendance." (Emphasis added. ) Thereafter, the statutes providing for the mechanics of selecting a jury panel (sections 93-1503 et. seq.) are followed until the requisite number of jurors is chosen from the jury list and jury boxes. After this is done, the jurors are then summoned in the manner as provided in section 93-1509, which provides: "The sheriff, as soon as he receives a list or lists of jurors drawn, shall summon the persons named therein to attend the court at the time mentioned in the order, by a written notice by certified mail to that effect addressed to them to the post-office address named in the jury list an2 deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid, except in cases where the district judge expressly directs that such service shall be made by giving personal notice, and shall return the list to the court at the opening of the regular session thereof, or at such session or time as the jurors may be ordered to attend, specifying the names of those who are summoned, and the manner in which each person was notified." (Emphasis added.) There can be no question that sections 93-1501 and 93-1509 must be followed in circumstances where a jury panel is not already legally in existence. Section 93-1512 applies only where for some reason there are not sufficient numbers on the original panel to complete the business of the court for the particular term involved. Here, the District Court entirely ignored sections 93-1501 and 93- 1509 and the majority has approved this bypass. The procedure actually used by the District Court is fraught with dangers and is hardly the procedure to be approved for summoning an entire jury panel when a man is on trial for his life. Here, a District Court, after dismissing an entire jury panel for procedural irregularities in the summoning process, com- mits an error equally as grave in allowing the clerk of court to obtain sixty willing jurors by calling them on the telephone. We have no idea of the actual number of jurors called before sixty of them agreed to sit. We do not know the exact procedure used by the clerk in calling the jurors. Did he go down the list alphabetically and continue calling until he obtained the required number of jurors? Did he call jurors in areas of Yellowstone County where, from previous experience, he determined it would be most likely to get an affirmative response? Did he in fact call most of the jurors first who lived on the west side of Billings, commonly known to be the area where "successful" people live? What did the clerk of court tell each person when he called? What ex- cuses did the potential jurors give if they stated they could not sit on the jury panel? Did they have a legal excuse for not ap- pearing? Did the clerk tell the jurors what excuses would be per- missible? We will never know the answers to these questions. Of one thing, however, I am certain. If it so happened that the sixty jurors ultimately serving were a true cross-section of the residents of Yellowstone County, it was an accident. It did not occur because the District Court scrupulously followed the law. Under these cir- cm~stances, it is a travesty to allow the conviction to stand. In State v. Fitzpatrick, (1977), Mont . , 569 P.2d 383, 358, 34 St.Rep. 736, 740, this Court stated: "This Court has long held the accused in a criminal prosecution is constitutionally guaranteed a trial by an impartial jury selected and drawn in accor- dance with the law. State ex rel. Henningsen v. District Court, supra; State v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925. Any material deviation or departure in pro- curing a jury has been held to constitute a denial of fundamental constitutional rights. State v. Porter, supra; State v. Groom, 49 Mont. 354, 141 P. 858; State v. Tighe, 27 Plont. 327, 71 P. 3; reversed on other grounds 35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981." (Emphasis added.) In the present case there was not only a material departure in procuring a jury, there was a total failure to follow the appli- cable law. Clearly, the defendant has been denied a fundamental constitutional right. For the foregoing reason I would reverse defendant's con- viction and order a new trial.