Title: CONNIE PLYMALE, f/k/a CONNIE DONNELLY V. GAVIN DONNELLY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CONNIE PLYMALE, f/k/a CONNIE DONNELLY V. GAVIN DONNELLY2006 WY 3125 P.3d 1022Case Number: 05-1Decided: 01/06/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CONNIE 
PLYMALE, f/k/a

CONNIE 
DONNELLY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
GAVIN 
DONNELLY,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
M. Hunter, Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Devon 
O'Connell Coleman of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially concurring opinion, 
in which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Connie Plymale, 
f/k/a/ Donnelly (Mother) appeals an order denying her motion to reconsider an 
order granting abatement of child support in favor of Gavin Donnelly 
(Father).  We hold that a 
postjudgment motion to reconsider is a nullity under the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Any order ruling on such 
a motion is therefore void.  Having 
nothing to review, this appeal is dismissed. 

 
 
BACKGROUND

 
 
[¶2]      Mother and Father 
had two children through marriage.  
They subsequently divorced.  
Mother was given primary residential custody of the children during the 
school year.  Father was given 
primary residential custody of the children during the summer.  Father requested child support abatement 
from the district court for the time he had residential custody of the children 
during the summer of 2004.  The 
district court granted an abatement.  
No appeal was taken from the order granting the abatement.  

 
 
[¶3]      Four days after 
the order granting the abatement was filed, Mother filed a motion for the 
district court to reconsider its order.   The district court denied Mother's 
motion to reconsider.    
Mother appeals the order denying her motion to reconsider. 

  

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      While no party 
has raised the issue of jurisdiction, this Court has a duty to satisfy itself 
that it has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.  Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719, 721 (Wyo. 1997).  This Court has jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals only from final, appealable orders.  W.R.A.P. 1.04(a), 1.05; McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 
WY 111, ¶¶ 19-20, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo. 2001) (this Court has no jurisdiction 
to entertain appeal from non-final order).  
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court has jurisdiction only if 
the district court order denying Mother's postjudgment motion for 
reconsideration is a final, appealable order. 

 
 
[¶5]      The Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure provide various methods to obtain relief from judgment, such 
as those contained in Rules 50, 59 and 60, along with a direct appeal.  Conspicuously absent is a provision for 
a stand-alone "motion for reconsideration."  In point of fact, the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not recognize a "motion for reconsideration."1  Motions for reconsideration stem solely 
from unauthorized local practice.  
We have held that "[c]ourt rules have the force and effect of law and are 
construed in the same manner as statutes.  
Compliance with court rules is mandatory."  Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 
2004 WY 93, ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 796, 801 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 976 (2005) 
(internal quotation omitted).  The 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provide no authorization for a motion for 
reconsideration and none can be inferred therefrom.  Strict compliance with the rules 
requires that motions for reconsideration be considered 
nullities.

 
 
[¶6]      We acknowledge 
that, in prior appeals, we have reviewed the substance of motions for 
reconsideration in order to determine whether the motion serves as the 
functional equivalent of an authorized motion that defers the start of the 
appeal period.  See, e.g., Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719 (Wyo. 
1997) (in order to toll time, a motion to reconsider must be the functional 
equivalent of a motion to alter or amend judgment); Morehouse v. Morehouse, 959 P.2d 179 
(Wyo. 1998) (motion to reconsider that is not the functional equivalent of a 
motion to alter or amend judgment does not toll time).  However, in these prior appeals the 
exact question of the validity of a motion for reconsideration was not before 
us.  These prior opinions therefore 
contain no precedential authority on the issue at hand.

 
 
[¶7]      In any event, 
recognition by this Court, or a lower court, of a motion for reconsideration 
cannot alter the dictates of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  This Court has previously adopted the 
dissent of Justice Clark in Thompson v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 389, 84 S. Ct. 397, 
400, 11 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1964):

 
 
[T]he 
error of the trial judge in entertaining the motions could not be validated by 
the acquiescence of the Government. It is elementary that the parties cannot 
confer jurisdiction on the court.

 
 
            
We have said that untimely motions to amend the findings and for new 
trial are of no legal significance whatsoever because the limiting language of 
Rule 6(b) is "mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be extended regardless of 
excuse." United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 
80 S. Ct. 282, 288, 4 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1960). In my view we should abide by these 
rules or amend them, rather than emasculate them.

 
 
            
Rules of procedure are a necessary part of an orderly system of justice. 
Their efficacy, however, depends upon the willingness of the courts to enforce 
them according to their terms. Changes in rules whose inflexibility has turned 
out to work hardship should be effected by the process of amendment, not by ad 
hoc relaxations by this Court in particular cases. Such dispensations in the 
long run actually produce mischievous results, undermining the certainty of the 
rules and causing confusion among the lower courts and the bar. 

 
 

See 
Miller v. Murdock, 788 P.2d 614, 616-17 (Wyo. 1990) (cited with approval in Paxton Resources, L.L.C., ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 
at 801).  Henceforth, we will 
enforce the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as written and consider 
postjudgment motions for reconsideration, so denominated, a nullity.  To the extent any prior opinion suggests 
otherwise, it is expressly hereby overruled.

 
 
[¶8]      In addition to 
securing enforcement of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, a bright-line rule 
declaring postjudgment motions to reconsider nullities is supported by policy 
considerations.  The entertainment 
of motions for reconsideration is a waste of judicial resources.  In likewise determining that a motion 
for reconsideration is a nullity, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
explained:

 
 
            
Practical considerations also mandate and support our determination 
herein. Once again, this court as well as the lower courts are left in a 
procedural quagmire of trying to elevate a motion for reconsideration after a 
final judgment to the status of a motion for a new trial or as a motion for 
a directed verdict or the like. The courts have had the arduous task of trying 
to inspect each and every motion for reconsideration which is filed in the trial 
court after a final judgment, and try to decipher form over substance. This is a 
costly procedure, both financially and in manual labor, which, as in the present 
cause, results in a procedural morass which clouds the merits. Complications 
concerning the timeliness of appeal and whether the Court of Appeals is vested 
with jurisdiction when a motion for reconsideration is filed after a final 
judgment can and should be avoided. See Judge Krenzler's concurring opinion in 
North Royalton Edn. Assn. v. Bd. of Edn. (1974), 41 
Ohio App.2d 
209, at 251, 325 N.E.2d 901.

            
The application for a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment 
is simply a legal fiction created by counsel, which has transcended into a 
confusing, clumsy and "informal local practice." See Kauder [v. 
Kauder (1974), 38 Ohio 
St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797], supra, and Kent, Odds & Ends, 49 
Cleve. Bar J. 280.

 
 

Pitts v. 
Ohio Dep't of Transp., 423 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ohio 1981).  We agree.  In the past, this Court has expended 
great effort in determining with what rule of civil procedure a particular 
postjudgment motion for reconsideration can be equated.  Such effort can be easily eliminated by 
simply requiring parties to adhere to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and 
file a motion authorized under the rules.

 
 
[¶9]      Finally, the past 
practice of recognizing motions for reconsideration, besides being inefficient, 
has produced inconsistent results, with the right to appeal hanging in the 
balance.  Filing an authorized 
motion for postjudgment relief will eliminate uncertainty for all involved.  The filing by aggrieved parties of a 
motion that is properly designated under the rule authorizing the motion, such 
as Rule 50, 52 or 59, will ensure full appellate rights are preserved. 

 
 
[¶10]   The obvious consequence of 
categorizing a motion for reconsideration as a nullity is that "all judgments or 
final orders from said motion are a nullity."  Pitts, at 1107.  See also State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams County Bd. of 
Elections, 531 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ohio 1988).  We emphasize that this includes not only 
orders denying motions for reconsideration, but orders granting such motions as 
well.  Orders granting a motion for 
reconsideration, and any action taken pursuant to that order, are void.  Applying this principle to the present 
case, the district court's order denying Mother's motion to reconsider is void. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   Mother titled her postjudgment 
motion "Motion to Reconsider Order Allowing Abatement."  This Court will no longer look at the 
substance of such a motion but rather simply declare it a nullity based upon its 
denomination.  The district court 
order purportedly denying this motion is void.  There being no final appealable order to 
review, this appeal is dismissed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Federal 
courts consistently acknowledge that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
recognize a motion for reconsideration.  
See, e.g., Hatfield v. Board of County Comm'rs, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995) (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
recognize a "motion to reconsider.") (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 828 (1992)); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 
Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990) (same) (partially abrogated on other grounds, see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)).  Other jurisdictions have also reached 
the same conclusion under their rules.  
See, e.g., Fleming v. District of 
Columbia, 633 A.2d 846, 848 (D.C. 1993) ("A motion for reconsideration, by 
that designation, is unknown to the Superior Court's Civil Rules."); Hamilton v. Rybar, 724 P.2d 132, 133 
(Idaho 1986) ("the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a petition 
to reconsider") (partially abrogated on 
other grounds, see McIntire v. Orr, 834 P.2d 868 (Idaho 1992)); Wales v. Wales, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 38 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2003) ("motion to reconsider has no authorization in the Iowa 
Rules of Civil Procedure").

 
 
KITE, 
J., specially concurring, in which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 
[¶12]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority that the appeal must be dismissed because it was not taken from a 
final order.  I also agree the 
motion to reconsider was not an authorized post-trial motion under our 
rules.  Nor was it the functional 
equivalent of an authorized post-trial motion under our rules.  Therefore, had I authored the majority 
opinion, the result would be the same  dismissal of the appeal.  I have concerns, however, that the 
majority goes further than is necessary to reach that result and, in doing so, 
fails to give proper regard to stare 
decisis.  I also have concerns 
that the majority does not state clearly enough that the holding is to have 
prospective application only.  

 
 
[¶13]   The issue in this case is whether a 
motion for reconsideration, a motion that is neither authorized nor recognized 
under our rules, can extend the time for appeal.  This is the same issue we addressed in 
Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719 (Wyo. 1997).  We held a motion for reconsideration 
cannot extend the time for appeal unless the motion is the functional equivalent 
of a post-judgment motion authorized under our rules.  In Morehouse v. Morehouse, 959 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1998), we reiterated our holding in Sherman and extended it to conclude that 
a motion identified as a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was the 
functional equivalent of a  motion 
to reconsider, could not extend the time for appeal.  The rule of law established in those 
cases was that a post-trial motion, regardless of the name it is given, does not 
extend the time for appeal unless it articulates the grounds required for such a 
motion under our rules.  As recently 
as 2004, we reiterated that under the limited circumstances identified in 
Sherman, this 
Court will consider an appeal from a motion to reconsider.  Padilla v. State, 2004 WY 66, ¶ 6, 91 P.3d 920, 922 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶14]   In the present case, I agree 
dismissal is proper because the appeal was not taken from an order denying a 
motion that was the functional equivalent of an authorized post-judgment 
motion.  However, the majority goes 
further and holds:  "Henceforth, we 
will enforce the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as written and consider 
postjudgment motions for reconsideration, so denominated, a nullity."  This holding suggests that any motion 
delineated as a motion for reconsideration will be automatically a nullity, even 
if the content of the motion is the functional equivalent of an authorized 
motion under our rules.  To the extent that our prior cases held to the 
contrary, the majority concludes, they are overruled.

 
 
[¶15]   I do not disagree that a bright 
line rule might be helpful.  I also do not disagree that there are policy 
considerations that support such a bright line rule, including the difficulties 
inherent in deciphering whether a particular motion for reconsideration is the 
functional equivalent of an authorized motion for post-judgment relief.  However, as a practical matter, when we 
are assessing the timeliness of an appeal and determining whether a 
post-judgment motion has tolled the time for appealing, we will still need to 
consider the substance of the motion.  Even if a motion is denominated a 
Rule 59 motion, it must be a proper motion, stating new grounds and 
containing more than a recital or reference to the rule, in order to have a 
tolling effect.  Thus, our emphasis must still be on substance, rather than 
form, and we should not be constrained by the name a party puts on a particular 
pleading.  Consistent with our 
precedent, I believe this should be the rule for motions denominated "motion to 
reconsider," just as it necessarily must be the rule for motions identified as 
Rule 59 motions. 

 
 
[¶16]   Additionally, I am of the view that 
the majority opinion should have prospective application only, meaning it should 
apply only to motions filed after publication of this opinion.  To make it 
otherwise is unfair to litigants and attorneys who have relied upon Sherman and Morehouse.  Giving the opinion prospective 
application does not change the result in this case for the reasons previously 
mentioned.  Although the majority 
announces its ruling with the word "henceforth," it is not clear whether that 
means the ruling applies to all future appeals or to motions filed after 
publication of this opinion.  I 
believe the opinion should clearly state that it applies only to motions filed 
after publication of this opinion.