Title: State v. James E. Szulczewski

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1323-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
James E. Szulczewski,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 1, 561 N.W.2d 781 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 20, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Frankel 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Toni H. Laitsch and Laitsch & Zion, Madison and oral 
argument by Toni H. Laitsch. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
James E. Szulczewski, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Szulczewski, 209 Wis. 2d 1, 561 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1997), 
modifying and, as modified, affirming a judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, Mark A. Frankel, Judge.  
¶2 
The single, limited issue presented is whether a 
circuit court may stay execution of a prison sentence of a 
defendant who was found not guilty of a crime by reason of 
mental disease or defect (NGI) in a criminal case; was committed 
in that case to the Department of Health and Social Services 
(the DHSS) for custody, care and treatment under Wis. Stat. 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
2 
§ 971.17; and was not discharged from the NGI commitment at the 
time of conviction and sentence for a subsequent crime.1  
¶3 
We hold that under Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17, 973.15(1) and 
973.15(8)(a), a circuit court has the discretion to decide 
whether to stay execution of a prison sentence imposed on an NGI 
acquittee who is convicted of and sentenced for a crime while 
under the NGI commitment.  We therefore reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
to determine whether the defendant's sentence should be stayed. 
I 
¶4 
The facts are not in dispute for purposes of our 
review.  In 1975 the defendant, James E. Szulczewski, was found 
NGI of murder and attempted murder.  He was committed to the 
DHSS 
for 
custody 
and 
treatment 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.17(1), which governs the commitment, release and discharge 
of persons adjudicated NGI.  
¶5 
In 1995, while institutionalized in accordance with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.17, the defendant was convicted of assaulting 
another patient at 
the 
Mendota Mental Health 
Institute.2  
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 971.17(8) (1993-94) provides that "[t]he 
commitment, release and discharge of persons adjudicated not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect for offenses 
committed prior to January 1, 1991, shall be governed by s. 
971.17, 1988 stats., as affected by 1989 Wisconsin Act 31."  
The defendant was found NGI on charges of murder and 
attempted murder in 1975.  Further references to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17 in this opinion will be to Wis. Stat. (1987-88). 
2 The defendant was convicted of battery by a prisoner in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.20(1)(1991-92). 
Section 
§ 940.20(1) provides as follows: 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
3 
Although the defendant initially entered an NGI plea to the 
battery charge, he withdrew the plea prior to trial. 
¶6 
The circuit court sentenced the defendant to five 
years in 
prison on the 
battery 
charge and 
ordered him 
immediately transferred to the Department of Corrections (the 
DOC) for assessment and placement in the Wisconsin prison 
system.  
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court and the order of the circuit court denying the 
defendant's motion for sentence modification.3  The court of 
appeals concluded that immediate commencement of the defendant's 
prison sentence was required by Wis. Stat. § 973.15.4  
II 
¶8 
This case involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.17 and 973.15.  The issue of statutory interpretation 
                                                                  
Any prisoner confined to a state prison or other 
state, county or municipal detention facility who 
intentionally 
causes 
bodily harm 
to an 
officer, 
employe, visitor or another inmate of such prison or 
institution, without his or her consent, is guilty of 
a Class D felony. 
 
3 The circuit court ordered the prison sentence to be 
"concurrent" with the NGI commitment.  Relying on Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(2)(a), the court of appeals held that the words 
"concurrent with Not Guilty by Insanity commitment" be deleted 
from the judgment.  The defendant and the State agree with the 
court of appeals decision that a prison sentence cannot be 
concurrent with an NGI commitment because an NGI commitment is 
not a sentence as required by § 973.15(2)(a).  This issue is not 
before this court in the present case. 
4 Further references to Wis. Stat. § 973.15 in this opinion 
will be to Wis. Stat. § 973.15 (1993-94). 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
4 
presents a question of law.  See Carlson & Erickson Builders v. 
Lampert Yards, 190 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995).  
This court determines questions of law independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.  See id.  
III 
¶9 
Two statutory provisions are at issue in this case.  
The first is Wis. Stat. § 971.17, which governs the custody, 
care, treatment and discharge of an NGI acquittee committed to 
the DHSS.  Section 971.17(1) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
 
When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect, the court shall order him to 
be committed to the department [of health and social 
services] to be placed in an appropriate institution 
for custody, care and treatment until discharged as 
provided in this section. 
¶10 Chapter 971 of the Wisconsin statutes details the 
procedure for the discharge of an NGI acquittee from the DHSS 
and 
from 
placement 
in 
a 
mental 
health 
institution.  
Section 971.17 makes no provision for an NGI acquittee in the 
event the NGI acquittee, like the defendant in this case, is 
convicted of a crime while under a chapter 971 commitment.  
¶11 The second statute at issue in this case is Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15, two subsections of which come into play in this case. 
 Subsection (1) of § 973.15 states that except as otherwise 
provided in § 973.15, all sentences commence at noon on the day 
of sentence.  Section 973.15(1) reads as follows: 
 
Except as provided in s. 973.032, all sentences to the 
Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more. 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
5 
 Except as otherwise provided in this section, all 
sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence, but 
time which elapses after sentence while the convicted 
offender is at large on bail shall not be computed as 
any part of the term of imprisonment(emphasis added). 
¶12 The other subsection, Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a), sets 
forth exceptions to the rule that all sentences commence at noon 
on the day of sentence and provides that a sentencing court may 
stay the execution of a sentence of imprisonment in three 
circumstances:  (1) for legal cause, (2) to place the person on 
probation to the DOC under § 973.09(1)(a) or (3) for not more 
than 60 days.5 Although § 973.15(8)(a) states that a circuit 
court may grant a stay under one of these circumstances, it does 
not require the court to do so.  
¶13 In this case, the only exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(8)(a) to immediate commencement of a prison sentence 
which might arguably apply is the provision that a circuit court 
may stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment "[f]or legal 
cause."  Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a)1.  
¶14 In summary, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1) does not on its 
face 
authorize 
the 
discharge 
of 
an 
NGI 
acquittee 
for 
imprisonment upon sentence for a crime while § 973.15 requires 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a) provides as follows: 
The sentencing court may stay execution of a sentence of 
imprisonment . . . only: 
1.  For legal cause;  
2.  Under s. 973.09(1)(a); or 
3.  For not more than 60 days.  
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
6 
immediate imprisonment of a convicted defendant, with no 
exception made expressly for NGI acquittees.  A circuit court's 
imposition of an immediate sentence under § 973.15(1) would run 
counter to the requirement in § 971.17 that NGI acquittees be 
committed to the DHSS until discharged from the commitment under 
chapter 971.  Section 973.15(8)(a) does, however, provide that a 
circuit court "may" stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment 
for legal cause, a concept we discuss later in part IV.6  If 
commitment 
under 
§ 971.17 
constitutes 
legal 
cause 
under 
§ 973.15(8)(a), the courts would have the option to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment immediately or to stay execution of the 
sentence for NGI acquittees.   
¶15 In this case the defendant has not been discharged 
from the DHSS in accordance with chapter 971.  At the same time 
he is required to serve a prison sentence in accordance with 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(1) unless a circuit court, in the exercise 
of its discretion, authorizes a stay for legal cause under 
§ 973.15(8)(a)1.  
IV 
¶16 In this case three interpretations of the statutes are 
presented to the court: that of the court of appeals, that of 
the defendant and that of the State. 
                     
6 If we were to assume that commitment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17 constitutes "legal cause" and that § 973.15(8)(a)1 
mandates that a circuit court "must" stay execution of a 
sentence of imprisonment for legal cause, §§ 971.17 and 973.15 
would be compatible.  
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
7 
¶17 The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(1) clearly states that all sentences commence at noon 
on the day of sentence with no exception made for NGI 
acquittees.  Because it saw no conflict between the sentencing 
and NGI commitments statutes, the court of appeals declined to 
determine whether an NGI commitment constitutes legal cause for 
staying execution of a sentence of imprisonment.  
¶18 The defendant argues that Wis. Stat. § 917.17 provides 
the exclusive mechanism by which an NGI acquittee can be 
discharged from a chapter 971 commitment and that the circuit 
court's imposition of his prison sentence and his immediate 
transfer to a correctional facility were in violation of 
§ 971.17.  The defendant maintains that the circuit court's 
order directing immediate execution of the prison sentence 
contravenes the purpose of § 971.17, namely providing treatment 
for an NGI acquittee's mental illness and behavioral disorders. 
 See State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995).  
According to the defendant's interpretation of the statutes, 
§ 971.17 (governing discharge of NGI acquittees) has primary 
importance and § 973.15 (requiring immediate execution of a 
prison sentence) is inapplicable to NGI acquittees.  
¶19 The State, disagreeing with both the court of appeals 
and the defendant, views Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17 and 973.15 as 
conflicting and therefore in need of harmonization.  According 
to the State, the conflict arises because § 971.17 allows an NGI 
acquittee to be discharged from a chapter 971 commitment 
pursuant only to certain statutory procedures that were not 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
8 
followed in this case while § 973.15, although allowing a court 
to 
stay 
execution 
of 
a 
prison 
sentence 
under 
certain 
circumstances, requires immediate execution of a sentence.7 
¶20 The State urges this court to harmonize Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.17 and 973.15(1) by holding (1) that a prior NGI 
commitment is "legal cause" for which a sentence of imprisonment 
may be stayed, and (2) that a circuit court has discretion to 
determine whether an NGI acquittee should remain in the custody 
of the DHSS or be transferred to the custody of the DOC.8  
¶21 Under the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation 
statutes should be reasonably construed to avoid conflict.  See 
Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon Station, 101 
Wis. 2d 472, 489-90, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).  When two statutes 
conflict, a court is to harmonize them, see Bingenheimer v. 
DHSS, 129 Wis. 2d 100, 107, 383 N.W.2d 898 (1986), scrutinizing 
both statutes and construing each in a manner that serves its 
purpose.  See Caldwell v. Percy, 105 Wis. 2d 354, 361-262, 314 
N.W.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1981).  The principal objective of 
                     
7 The State observes that "[t]he court of appeals found no 
conflict, but it did not explain how these two statutes which 
purport to be self-contained procedures and make no reference to 
each other, can be construed to avoid a conflict.  It is 
difficult to envision a construction which avoids a conflict."  
Brief for State at 5. 
8 The defendant's brief also urges this interpretation of 
the statutes if the court does not accept the defendant's first 
proposed interpretation. 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
9 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature.  See Carlson, 190 Wis. 2d at 658.9   
¶22 The purpose of the NGI statute is, as the defendant 
states, two-fold:  to treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness 
and to protect the acquittee and society from the acquittee's 
potential dangerousness.  See Randall, 192 Wis. 2d at 833.  The 
criminal statutes and the resulting judgment of conviction and 
sentence are, on the other hand, designed to accomplish the 
objectives 
of 
deterrence, 
rehabilitation, 
retribution 
and 
segregation.10   
¶23 Adopting the court of appeals interpretation that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.15(1) 
supersedes 
§ 971.17 
would 
frustrate the 
treatment purposes of chapter 971.  
¶24 Adopting the defendant's interpretation that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17 supersedes § 973.15 would frustrate the goals of 
the criminal statutes.  Such an interpretation would undermine 
the deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution and segregation 
purposes of the criminal statutes. 
¶25 In criminalizing battery by a prisoner, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.20(1), the legislature expressed its intention that the 
criminal statute govern NGI acquitees and that the objectives of 
deterrence, 
retribution, 
and 
segregation 
apply 
to 
NGI 
                     
9 In this case the legislative history to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.17 and 973.15 does not aid us in interpreting the 
statutes. 
10 See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive 
Criminal Law § 1.5, at 30-36 (1986). 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
10
acquittees.11  Even if a criminal statute does not expressly 
govern the conduct of persons confined to mental health 
facilities, the language of many criminal statutes can be 
interpreted to govern the conduct of such persons.  It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended 
NGI acquittees to experience the consequences set forth in the 
criminal code.  It is also reasonable to conclude that the 
legislature intended to effectuate the goals of the NGI 
statutes, including treatment of an NGI acquittee's mental 
illness and behavioral disorders, even when an acquittee commits 
a subsequent criminal offense. 
¶26 We conclude that a circuit court can give effect to 
both statutes and to the objectives of the legislature if the 
statutes authorize the circuit court to make a reasoned 
determination about imposing or staying a prison sentence on the 
basis of the facts of each case. 
¶27 The legislature has authorized circuit courts to 
exercise this kind of discretion in staying sentences of 
imprisonment by providing in Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a) that a 
court may stay a sentence "[f]or legal cause."  The question in 
this case is whether an NGI acquittee's chapter 971 commitment 
constitutes "legal cause." 
                     
11 Persons committed to mental health institutions after 
being found NGI are considered prisoners for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.20(1).  See State v. Skamfer, 176 Wis. 2d 304, 308, 
500 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1993).  
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
11
¶28 In 
Wisconsin 
there 
is 
no 
precise 
or 
detailed 
definition of what constitutes "legal cause" for the stay of 
execution of sentence.  See State v. Braun, 100 Wis. 2d 77, 85, 
301 N.W.2d 180 (1981).  Legal cause refers to a stay based on 
the legality of the conviction or the duty to enforce the 
sentence, and has been explained as "good cause, having to do 
with the sentence itself, and not on grounds which have no 
relation to the action in which the sentence is pronounced and 
are more properly for the consideration of the governor, in whom 
the power to pardon is vested, rather than the judiciary."  
Drewniak v. State ex rel. Jacquest, 239 Wis. 475, 486, 1 N.W.2d 
899 (1942).12 
¶29 Historically, a stay pending appeal is a stay for 
legal cause.  See Reinex v. State, 51 Wis. 152, 8 N.W. 155 
(1881).  A stay to consolidate sentencing matters is also a stay 
for legal cause.  See Weston v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 136, 146, 135 
N.W.2d 820 (1965).  A stay for the purpose of personally 
                     
12 The essence of the phrase "legal cause" seems to be tied 
to institutional functions:  In granting a stay, a court may not 
exercise a power that belongs to the executive.  The simple 
reason for the circuit court's limited powers is that upon 
sentencing, the essence of the judicial process is complete and 
nothing remains for the court to do but to turn the defendant 
over to the executive authority for incarceration.  See  State 
v. Braun, 100 Wis. 2d 77, 85, 301 N.W.2d 180 (1981).  This 
principle of the limited power of a court to stay execution of a 
sentence and thus to interfere with the executive branch has 
been reaffirmed in several cases.  See, e.g., Donaldson v. 
State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 310, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980); Drinkwater v. 
State, 69 Wis. 2d 60, 66, 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975); Drewniak v. 
State ex rel. Jacquest, 239 Wis. 475, 484, 1 N.W.2d 899 (1942); 
In re Webb, 89 Wis. 354, 356-57, 62 N.W. 177 (1895). 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
12
accommodating a defendant, however, is not a stay for legal 
cause.  See Braun, 100 Wis. 2d at 85. 
¶30 Granting a stay of execution of imprisonment for an 
NGI acquittee is consistent with the teachings of these cases.  
The "legal cause" for granting a stay of imprisonment has to do 
with the sentence itself, not having to do with grounds 
unrelated to the action in which the sentence is pronounced.  
See Drewniak, 239 Wis. at 486.  A stay under the circumstances 
of this case is analogous to a stay to consolidate sentencing 
matters, which has been held to a be a stay for legal cause.  
See Weston, 28 Wis. 2d at 146.  The stay has nothing to do with 
personal accommodation of the defendant.  See Braun, 100 Wis. 2d 
at 85.  In addition, the decision to grant a stay for an NGI 
acquittee properly belongs to the judiciary in exercise of 
judicial discretion in sentencing rather than to the governor in 
exercise of the power to pardon.  See Drewniak, 239 Wis. at 486. 
  
¶31 We therefore conclude that the phrase "[f]or legal 
cause" in Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a)1 includes an NGI commitment 
pursuant to chapter 971 and that a circuit court may exercise 
its discretion in determining whether to stay execution of a 
prison sentence imposed on an NGI acquittee.   
¶32 This discretion is similar to the discretion a circuit 
court 
exercises 
when 
making 
any 
sentence 
decision. 
 
In 
exercising its discretion, a circuit court may determine that 
the purposes of both the criminal and NGI statutes are best 
served by allowing the defendant to remain in a mental health 
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
13
institution pursuant to the NGI acquittal.  In these cases Wis. 
Stat. § 971.17 is given primary importance.  This disposition 
may be appropriate, for example, in cases involving less serious 
crimes or defendants with serious mental illness or special 
treatment needs. 
¶33 In other cases a circuit court may determine that the 
goals of retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence and segregation 
are best served by committing the defendant to the custody of 
the DOC upon sentencing.  This disposition may be appropriate, 
for 
example, 
in 
cases 
where 
the 
crime 
requires 
severe 
punishment, where there is a need to deter both the particular 
defendant and the general NGI population, and where the 
defendant 
needs 
to 
be 
segregated 
from 
the 
general 
NGI 
population.  
¶34 Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17 and 
973.15 authorize a circuit court to determine whether a prison 
sentence of an NGI committee should be executed forthwith for 
deterrence, 
rehabilitation, 
retribution 
and 
segregation 
purposes, or whether the prison sentence should be stayed to 
achieve the objectives of § 971.17.13   
                     
13 Although no Wisconsin case law has defined prior NGI 
commitments as legal cause to stay execution of a prison 
sentence, 
other 
jurisdictions 
have 
recognized 
a 
stay 
as 
appropriate in situations involving an accused who is under a 
psychiatric commitment.  See Copeland v. Warden, 621 A.2d 1311, 
1313 (Conn. 1993); State v. Flemming, 409 A.2d 220, 225 (Me. 
1979).  These courts reached their decisions on grounds other 
than those upon which this decision is based.  
No. 96-1323-CR 
 
14
¶35 Because the circuit court in this case ordered 
immediate execution of the prison sentence without considering 
whether there was legal cause to stay the execution, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to determine whether the sentence should be 
stayed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
1