Title: Peter D. Griffin v. Judy P. Smith

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 36 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2345, 02-1320 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Peter D. Griffin,  
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Judy P. Smith, Warden,  
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Micah E. Glenn,  
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Department of  
Corrections, Judy Smith, Warden, Oshkosh  
Correctional Institution, and David Schwarz, 
Administrator, Division of Hearings and Appeals,  
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael P. Sullivan and William J. Haese   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners-appellants there were joint briefs by 
Nathaniel 
Cade, 
Jr., 
and 
Michael 
Best 
& 
Friedrich 
LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Nathaniel Cade, Jr. 
 
For the respondent-respondent and respondents-respondents 
the cause was argued by James M Freimuth, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, 
attorney general. 
 
2004 WI 36 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   01-2345 & 02-1320 
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 4010 & 02 CV 3304) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Peter D.  
Griffin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Judy P. Smith, Warden,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Micah E.  
Glenn,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Department of  
Corrections, Judy Smith, Warden, Oshkosh  
Correctional Institution, and David  
Schwarz, Administrator, Division of  
Hearings and Appeals,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, William Haese, Judge and Michael Sullivan, Judge.  
Reversed.   
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   These cases are before the 
court on certification from the court of appeals.1  The 
petitioners, Micah E. Glenn and Peter D. Griffin, assert that 
they were denied effective assistance of counsel when their 
attorneys failed to timely file a petition for writ of certiorari 
seeking judicial review of an administrative appeal.   
¶2 
In its certification, the court of appeals states the 
issue as follows: 
Whether a [parolee] has a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel from a [parole] revocation 
decision when counsel promised to file a certiorari 
petition.2 
¶3 
While parolees have a right to counsel at the parole 
revocation hearing, we conclude that there is no administrative 
or statutory right to counsel to timely file for certiorari in 
the circuit court.3  However, we determine that the petitioners 
here are entitled to relief on equitable grounds because they 
                                                 
1 Micah E. Glenn appeals an order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, William Haese, Judge, denying his writ of 
habeas corpus. 
Peter D. Griffin appeals an order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Michael Sullivan, Judge, denying his writ of 
habeas corpus. 
2 Although the court of appeals refers to the underlying 
matters as "probation" revocations, they are actually parole 
revocations.  For the issues presented herein, however, our 
analysis applies to both. 
3 By "right to counsel," we mean assistance of counsel at 
state expense.  Probationers and parolees remain free to retain 
private counsel at the revocation hearing and all subsequent 
stages of appeal. 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
3 
 
timely requested counsel to file for certiorari review, counsel 
promised to do so, and as a result of counsel's failure to timely 
file, they were denied certiorari review.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the orders of the circuit courts dismissing the petitions 
for writ of habeas corpus, and remand with instructions to allow 
reinstatement of the petitioners' right to file for certiorari 
review. 
I 
 
¶4 
Glenn and Griffin were represented by counsel at their 
respective parole revocation hearings.  Following an adverse 
decision in each case, counsel timely filed an administrative 
appeal.  The Division of Hearings and Appeals rejected both 
appeals.  The petitioners allege that their counsel promised to 
file for certiorari review4 in the circuit court but failed to do 
so.   
¶5 
In Glenn's case, counsel failed to file the petition 
for writ of certiorari altogether.  In Griffin's case, counsel 
filed the petition, but it was dismissed as being outside the 45-
day time limit established by Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2) (2001-02).5  
                                                 
4 Certiorari review of a revocation decision consists of 
four inquiries: (1) whether the division kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its actions were arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable; and (4) 
whether the evidence permitted the division to reasonably make 
the order or determination in question.  State v. Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d 637, 652, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (citing State ex rel. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 566 N.W.2d 173 (1997)). 
5 All references are to the 2001-02 version of the Wisconsin 
Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
4 
 
Both petitioners subsequently sought habeas corpus relief in the 
circuit court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to timely file their petitions for certiorari review.  
The circuit courts denied their petitions for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
¶6 
Both petitioners appealed, and the court of appeals 
consolidated the cases.  It then certified the consolidated 
appeals to this court.  The specific facts in each case are set 
forth below. 
A. State ex rel. Glenn v. Litscher 
¶7 
Glenn 
was 
convicted 
of 
second-degree 
intentional 
homicide on October 17, 1995, and sentenced to seven years in 
prison.  He was paroled from that sentence on December 15, 1997. 
¶8 
On February 14, 2000, Glenn was involved in an 
altercation and subsequently charged with battery and criminal 
damage to property.  His parole agent initiated revocation 
proceedings and the administrative law judge revoked his parole 
on June 5, 2000.  On administrative appeal, Glenn claimed that an 
additional allegation, that he threatened to kill his girlfriend, 
was wrongly used as a ground for revocation because he did not 
receive notice of the allegation before the hearing.  The 
assistant administrator of the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
disagreed with Glenn, and affirmed his revocation on July 3, 
2000.   
¶9 
The decision upholding Glenn's revocation informed him 
that judicial review may be obtained by filing a petition for a 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
5 
 
writ of certiorari within 45 days of the decision to be reviewed.  
Around July 1, 2000, Glenn initially requested that his attorney 
file a petition for a writ of certiorari.   
¶10 On July 6, 2000, Glenn met with his attorney and again 
asked him to file for certiorari review.  Glenn's attorney 
requested a letter of facts and issues together with information 
regarding the additional allegation that Glenn had threatened to 
kill his girlfriend.  Glenn sent that letter on July 20, 2000.  
On July 27, 2000, Glenn's attorney assured him that he would file 
for certiorari review contesting the failure to give notice of 
the additional allegation of threatening to kill his girlfriend 
as grounds for revocation.  Glenn's petition for writ of 
certiorari was due on August 17, 2000.  His attorney never filed 
it.      
¶11 On December 26, 2001, Glenn submitted a pro se petition 
for writ of habeas corpus to this court.  He alleged that his 
attorney provided negligent and incompetent representation by 
failing to file a petition for certiorari review of the parole 
revocation decision despite promising to do so.  This court 
referred the petition to the Milwaukee County circuit court on 
February 19, 2002.  Glenn filed a motion with the circuit court 
for a Machner6 hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
                                                 
6 Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, trial counsel testifies 
as to his or her reasoning on the challenged action or inaction. 
 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
6 
 
¶12 The assistant district attorney filed a motion to 
dismiss Glenn's petition, and the circuit court granted it.  The 
court determined that Glenn was not entitled to relief based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel because no constitutional or 
statutory right to counsel exists for certiorari review of 
revocation decisions.  It further concluded that Glenn failed to 
demonstrate that his attorney's alleged deficiencies unduly 
prejudiced his case.  Glenn now appeals.     
B. State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith 
¶13 The other petitioner, Peter D. Griffin, was convicted 
for possession with intent to deliver cocaine base and possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine on December 10, 1991.  He was 
paroled on October 14, 1997.   
¶14 In August 2000, Griffin's parole agent found three bags 
of cocaine and a pager in Griffin's car.  The terms of Griffin's 
parole prohibited possession of these items.  At the revocation 
hearing on November 1, 2000, the administrative law judge revoked 
Griffin's parole.  Griffin appealed and the administrator of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals affirmed the revocation.  That 
decision contained a notice that judicial review may be obtained 
by filing a petition for writ of certiorari within 45 days of the 
date of the decision to be reviewed.   
¶15 Griffin's counsel filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari but missed the January 15, 2001, deadline by ten days.  
The attorney stated that his legal assistant had suddenly become 
ill, causing him to miss the deadline.  He then filed a motion 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
7 
 
for extension of the 45-day filing deadline, but it was denied 
because the court received that motion outside the 45-day limit.   
¶16 On May 19, 2001, Griffin filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, alleging he had been deprived of effective 
assistance of counsel during the appeal of his parole revocation 
decision.  Griffin argued that his attorney failed to timely file 
for certiorari review despite promising to do so.   
¶17 The circuit court dismissed Griffin's petition.  It 
concluded that parolees do not have a constitutional or common 
law right to counsel for certiorari review of an administrative 
appeal.  Griffin filed a motion to reconsider the order 
dismissing his petition.  The judge dismissed that motion and 
Griffin now appeals.    
II 
¶18 Resolution of the issue set forth in the certification 
by the court of appeals requires us to interpret portions of the 
administrative code, along with a statute.  The interpretation 
of an administrative rule or statute presents a question of law 
subject to independent appellate review.  State ex rel. 
L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, ¶11, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 
1; State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 
729. 
¶19 When interpreting an administrative regulation, we 
generally use the same rule of interpretation as applicable to 
statutes.  State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 905 
(1998). 
 
Our 
goal 
in 
statutory 
or 
administrative 
rule 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
8 
 
interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature or 
the rule maker.  See State ex rel. Staples v. Young, 142 
Wis. 2d 348, 353, 418 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1987).  Our duty to 
fulfill this intent requires that we uphold the separation of 
powers by not substituting judicial policy views for the views 
of the legislature or rule making authority.  State ex rel. 
Cramer v. Schwarz, 2000 WI 86, ¶18, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 
591. 
III 
¶20 We begin with the question certified by the court of 
appeals: 
Whether a [parolee] has a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel from a [parole] revocation 
decision when counsel has promised to file a certiorari 
petition.   
¶21 The habeas petitions here are predicated on the 
existence of a right to effective representation by counsel on 
certiorari review of an adverse administrative appeal.  In 
addressing the certified question, we note that this court has 
generally held that where a right to counsel exists, counsel 
must be effective.  See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 
Wis. 2d 246, 253, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996).  Thus, the relevant 
inquiry becomes whether there is a right to counsel to timely 
file for certiorari review of a parole revocation administrative 
decision.  
¶22 In this case, the petitioners do not contend that 
there is a constitutional right to counsel to file their 
petitions for certiorari review.  We agree.  The Supreme Court 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
9 
 
has not extended a per se Sixth Amendment right to counsel at 
revocation hearings or certiorari review of revocation decisions 
in part because probationers and parolees have a more limited 
due process right than those who have not yet been convicted of 
a crime.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).  
("Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage 
of a criminal prosecution . . . .")  A parole revocation is the 
product of an administrative proceeding and the mechanism for 
challenging the revocation is a writ of certiorari asking the 
court to review the administrative decision.  See Cramer, 236 
Wis. 2d 473, ¶28. 
¶23 Instead, the petitioners rely upon administrative and 
statutory authority to advance their position.  In their briefs 
to this court, they argue, "the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
plainly grants defendants a statutory right to counsel to pursue 
certiorari review of probation or parole revocation decisions."  
At oral argument, they further asserted that Wis. Stat. 
§ 977.05(6)(h) provides a statutory basis for the right to 
counsel 
throughout 
the 
revocation 
proceedings, 
including 
certiorari review in the circuit court.  We examine each of 
these arguments. 
¶24 Under Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3) (Sept. 2001), 
every parolee or probationer facing revocation has certain 
enumerated rights:  
(3) CLIENT'S RIGHTS.  The client's rights at the 
hearing include:  
(a) The right to be present; 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
10 
 
(b) The right to deny the allegation; 
(c) The right to be heard and to present witnesses; 
(d) The right to present documentary evidence; 
(e) The right to question witnesses; 
(f) The right to assistance of counsel; 
(g) The right to waive the hearing;  
(h) The right to receive a written decision stating 
the reasons for it based upon the evidence presented; 
and 
(i) The right to appeal the decision in accordance 
with sub. (8) 
Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3) (emphasis added).  
 
¶25 Subsection 
(8), 
in 
turn, 
provides 
for 
an 
administrative 
appeal 
of 
a 
revocation 
decision 
to 
the 
administrator of the Division of Hearings and Appeals.  It 
states: 
The client, the client's attorney, if any, or the 
department 
representative 
may 
appeal 
the 
administrative 
law judge's decision by 
filing 
a 
written 
appeal 
with 
arguments 
and 
supporting 
materials, if any, with the administrator within 10 
days of the date of the administrative law judge's 
written decision. 
Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8) (Sept., 2001). 
 
¶26 The 
petitioners 
assert 
that 
when 
"[r]ead 
conjunctively, § HA 2.05(3) and § HA 2.05(8) demonstrate that a 
parolee has the right to an attorney during the entire parole 
revocation process."  We disagree. 
¶27 Wisconsin Administrative Code § HA 2.05(8) outlines 
the appeals process for revocation proceedings.  Significantly, 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
11 
 
only one appeal is specified in its text: the initial ten-day 
administrative appeal.  We cannot find authority in the code to 
extend the right to assistance of counsel to the filing of a 
petition for certiorari review.  Indeed, the 45-day time limit 
for certiorari review is specified in a different statute 
altogether.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2).  As a result, we 
reject 
the 
petitioners' 
assertion 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative Code "plainly grants" them a right to counsel to 
file a petition for certiorari review. 
¶28 We next turn to the petitioners' argument that 
Wis. Stat. § 977.05(6)(h) provides a statutory basis for the 
right to counsel throughout revocation proceedings, including 
certiorari review.7  The statute provides: 
(h) The state public defender may not provide legal 
services or assign counsel in parole or extended 
supervision revocation proceedings unless all of the 
following apply: 
1. The parolee or person on extended supervision is 
contesting 
the revocation 
of parole or 
extended 
supervision. 
                                                 
7 Although the petitioners principally rely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 977.05(6)(h) as the statutory basis for their argument, they 
make reference in one paragraph in their reply brief to Chapter 
227.  Specifically, they cite language in Wis. Stat. § 227.53 
referring to "the party's attorney of record" as evidence that 
"the legislature seem[ed] to have contemplated an attorney's 
continued 
involvement 
when 
administrative 
proceedings 
are 
reviewed in circuit court."  This undeveloped reference sheds 
little light on the issue.  Further, we note that probation and 
parole revocation proceedings are not subject to the review 
provisions of Chapter 227.  State ex. rel. Hanson v. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 64 Wis. 2d 367, 377, 219 
N.W.2d 267 (1974). 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
12 
 
2. The department of corrections seeks to have the 
parolee or person on extended supervision imprisoned 
upon the revocation of parole or extended supervision.   
Wis. Stat. § 977.05(h).8  At oral argument, the petitioners 
relied upon this statute, in conjunction with Schmelzer, 201 
Wis. 2d at 253, to advance their position that they are entitled 
to an attorney at all stages of the revocation proceedings, 
including certiorari review. 
¶29 In Schmelzer, the defendant's attorney failed to file 
a timely petition for review of the court of appeals' decision 
affirming his conviction for second-degree sexual assault.  Id. 
at 249.  The issue was whether there is a statutory right to 
counsel in the preparation of a petition for review to this 
court.  Id.  Read together, we concluded that "Wis. Stat. §§ 
809.32(4)9 and 977.05(4)(j)10 create a right to counsel in 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 977.05(i) is the companion statute for 
prisoners on probation.  It states: 
The public defender may not provide legal services or 
assign counsel in probation revocation proceedings 
unless all of the following apply: 
1. The probationer is contesting the revocation of 
probation. 
2. The department of corrections seeks to have the 
probationer 
imprisoned 
upon 
the 
revocation 
of 
probation or a stayed sentence of imprisonment will be 
imposed on the probationer upon the revocation of 
probation. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(4) (1993-94) provides in 
part: 
If a fully briefed appeal is taken to the court of 
appeals and the attorney is of the opinion that a 
petition for review in the supreme court under s. 
809.62 would be frivolous and without any arguable 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
13 
 
petitions for review and cases before any court, provided that 
the counsel does not determine the appeal to be without merit."  
Id. at 253.  The petitioners interpret the phrase "cases before 
any court" to mean that they are entitled to counsel beyond the 
administrative appeal so long as their petitions for certiorari 
are not frivolous.   
¶30 The 
problem 
with 
the 
petitioners' 
reliance 
on 
Schmelzer begins with the statutory authority they cite.  As 
noted above, Schmelzer established a right to counsel from the 
reading together of two statutes: Wis. Stat. §§ 809.32(4) and 
977.05(4)(j).  Here, the petitioners rely solely on one statute, 
§ 977.05(6)(h), to advance this argument.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 
977.05(4)(j), Wis. Stat. § 977.05(6)(h) is not a statutory duty 
for public defenders to pursue the case of an indigent person; 
rather, it is a statutory restriction on when public defenders 
may not provide legal services.  Although we recognize that 
public defenders may be permitted to provide representation when 
the conditions of Wis. Stat. § 977.05(6)(h) are met, we fail to 
                                                                                                                                                             
merit, the attorney shall advise the defendant of the 
reasons for this opinion and that the defendant has 
the right to file a petition for review. . . . 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 977.05(4)(j) (1993-94) provides in 
part: 
[A]t the request of any person determined by the state 
public defender to be indigent or upon referral of any 
court, prosecute a writ of error, appeal, action or 
proceeding for habeas corpus or other postconviction 
or post-commitment remedy on behalf of the person 
before any court, if the state public defender 
determines the case should be pursued . . . .   
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
14 
 
see how the statute requires them to do so.  Indeed, when 
examining other statutes providing for the right to counsel, we 
note that the legislature has used affirmative and explicit 
language.11  Accordingly, we reject the petitioners' argument 
                                                 
 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 977.05(4) provides in part: 
(4) DUTIES.  The state public defender shall: 
 . . .  
(i) Provide legal services in: 
1. Cases involving persons charged with a crime 
against life under ss. 940.01 to 940.12. 
2. Cases involving persons charged with a felony not 
specified under subd. 1. 
3. Cases involving persons charged with a misdemeanor 
that 
is 
punishable 
by 
imprisonment 
but 
is 
not 
specified under subd. 1. 
4. Cases 
involving 
persons subject to 
emergency 
detention or involuntary civil commitment under ch. 
51.   
5. Cases involving children who are entitled to 
counsel or are provided counsel at the discretion of 
the court under s. 48.23 or 938.23. 
7. 
Cases 
involving 
paternity 
determinations, 
as 
specified under s. 767.52, in which the state is the 
petitioner under s. 767.45(1)(g) or in which the 
action is commenced on behalf of the child by an 
attorney appointed under s. 767.045(1)(c). 
(j) Subject to sub. 6(e) and (f), at the request of 
any person determined by the state public defender to 
be indigent or upon referral of any court, prosecute a 
writ of error, appeal, action or proceeding for habeas 
corpus or other postconviction or post-commitment 
remedy on behalf of the person before any court, if 
the state public defender determines the case should 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
15 
 
that by negative implication the language of § 977.05(6)(h) 
mandates a per se right to assistance of counsel for filing a 
petition for certiorari review of an administrative appeal. 
¶31 In sum, although the petitioners' argument to extend 
the right to counsel may appeal to common sense, we can find no 
administrative or statutory authority granting a right to 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
in 
their petition for 
a writ of 
certiorari.  It may be good policy, but we cannot substitute 
judicial policy views for the policy views of the legislature or 
rule making authority.  As a result, we conclude that there is 
no per se right to counsel to timely file for certiorari review.   
IV 
¶32 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
petitioners 
are 
not 
entitled to a per se right to counsel to timely file for 
                                                                                                                                                             
be pursued.  The state public defender must pursue the 
case of any indigent person entitled to counsel under 
s. 971.17(7)(b)1, or 980.03(2)(a). 
(jm) At the request of an inmate determined by the 
state public defender to be indigent or upon referral 
of a court under s. 302.113(9g)(j), represent the 
inmate in proceedings for modification of a bifurcated 
sentence under s. 302.113(9g) before a program review 
committee and the sentencing court, if the state 
public defender determines the case should be pursued. 
(k) Represent members of the staff of the office of 
the state public defender who are named as defendants 
in lawsuits arising from their duties within the 
office. 
 
The 
attorney 
general 
may 
also, 
if 
appropriate, represent such staff members in such 
litigation.  In cases where a member could be 
represented by either the public defender or the 
attorney general, the public defender shall determine 
who shall represent the member. 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
16 
 
certiorari review, our inquiry does not end there.  We must next 
examine if equity requires the granting of relief.   
¶33 We begin by noting that in some cases, a factual 
question may exist as to whether a revoked parolee timely asked 
counsel to file a petition for certiorari review, whether 
counsel promised to do so, and whether as a result of counsel's 
failure 
to 
timely 
file, 
the 
revoked 
parolee 
was 
denied 
certiorari review.  This may require an evidentiary hearing by 
the circuit court.   
¶34 In the present case, however, such a hearing is 
unnecessary. 
 
The 
petitioners' 
attorneys 
have 
accepted 
responsibility 
for 
missing 
the 
filing 
deadline 
for 
the 
certiorari petitions.  Moreover, the State has conceded that, 
"[u]nder these circumstances, Griffin and Glenn probably are 
entitled to reinstatement of the right to certiorari review of 
their parole revocations based on equitable grounds." 
¶35 The 45-day time limit for filing the petitioners' 
certiorari review is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.735.12  
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.735 provides in part: 
"An action seeking a remedy available by certiorari 
made on behalf of a prisoner is barred unless 
commenced within 45 days after the cause of action 
accrues.  The 45-day period shall begin on the date of 
the decision or disposition, except that the court may 
extend the period by as many days as the prisoner 
proves 
have 
elapsed 
between 
the 
decision 
or 
disposition and the prisoner's actual notice of the 
decision or disposition. . . ."   
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
17 
 
According to the statute, a prisoner's certiorari action is 
"barred" unless timely commenced.  Wis. Stat. § 893.735.  The 
45-day period begins on the date of the decision or disposition.  
Id.  However, the court may adjust the commencement of the time 
limit so that it does not start running until the prisoner 
receives actual notice of the administrative decision.  Id.  
This suggests that the legislature recognized, at least in one 
instance, that it would be inequitable to give less than the 
full 45 days provided for in the statute. 
¶36 When applying Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2), the court of 
appeals 
has 
also 
recognized 
equitable 
considerations.  
Specifically, the court of appeals has tolled the 45-day period 
when a prisoner submitted a letter to the prison mail custodian 
for mailing.  State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 
238, ¶¶13-14, 239 Wis. 2d 327, 620 N.W.2d 409.  It has tolled 
the 45-day period from the date on which a prisoner seeking to 
waive filing fees asks the department of corrections for the 
required trust account statement.  State ex rel. Walker v. 
McCaughtry, 2001 WI App 110, ¶16, 244 Wis. 2d 177, 629 N.W.2d 
17.  Moreover, it has tolled the 45-day period while it waited 
for the department of corrections to provide certification of 
the 
number 
of 
litigation 
dismissals 
the 
prisoner 
has 
                                                                                                                                                             
We have previously held that a person seeking relief from 
probation revocation by a writ of certiorari is a "prisoner" who 
must satisfy the timely filing requirements of § 893.735.  See 
State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 2000 WI 86, ¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 
473, 613 N.W.2d 591. 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
18 
 
accumulated.  State ex rel. Locklear v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 74, 
¶26, 242 Wis. 2d 327, 629 N.W.2d 30.   
¶37 Likewise, this court has required equitable tolling in 
other contexts where the failure to timely file an appeal was 
beyond the prisoners' control.  See State ex rel. Nichols v. 
Litscher, 2001 WI 119, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292; State 
ex. rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 
N.W.2d 427.  In Nichols, this court applied equitable tolling in 
a case where an inmate left his notice of appeal with the 
corrections officer in the mailroom at the prison, and missed 
the 30-day filing deadline because the notice was not mailed 
immediately.  247 Wis. 2d 1013, ¶4.  In Brown, we granted the 
same relief because we determined that the inmate was "similarly 
situated."  259 Wis. 2d 630, ¶37. 
¶38 We are mindful that in the above cases, the factual 
question of the proper tolling date generally could be resolved 
by the use of court records, department of correction records, 
or prison records.  Determining whether and when an attorney 
promised to file a certiorari petition may prove a more 
difficult task.  Nevertheless, we are unable to discern any 
reason why prisoners who retain counsel should be placed at a 
disadvantage simply because they relied on counsel's promise.  
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners are entitled to 
equitable relief when they timely ask counsel to file for 
certiorari, counsel promises to do so, and as a result of 
counsel's failure to timely file they were denied certiorari 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
19 
 
review.  Provided that the petitioners timely pursue relief, the 
45-day time limit for the filing of a writ of certiorari is 
equitably tolled as of the date that counsel promises to file for 
certiorari review. 
V 
¶39 The final question we consider is whether the tolling 
rule we adopt today should receive prospective or retroactive 
application.  In its brief, the State argues that to the extent 
this court grants relief, such a holding should not apply 
retroactively.  Rather, it urges that our holding should be 
limited to cases for which certiorari review is still available, 
but also encompassing Glenn and Griffin.  We agree. 
¶40 The 
State 
advances 
that 
we 
should 
employ 
the 
retroactive analysis used in Brown, 259 Wis. 2d 630.  There, we 
applied the three-pronged test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
U.S. 97 (1971) to the new tolling rule.13  Id., ¶15.  The test 
asks: 
                                                 
13 The concurrence of Justice Sykes asserts that this case 
should be governed by the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 
201 Wis. 2d 246, 258-59, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996).  Justice Sykes's 
concurrence at ¶64.  The parties' briefs neither cite to Teague 
nor discuss the application of its retroactivity analysis here.  
Likewise, the parties do not cite Schmelzer for the application 
of its retroactivity analysis.  Any reference to Schmelzer in 
the parties' brief is for an entirely different argument——what 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because the 
parties do not raise the issue addressed by the concurrence of 
Justice Sykes, and thus did not brief or argue the issue, we do 
not address it here. 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
20 
 
(1) Does the rule 'establish a new principle of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed?' 
(2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the 
operation of the rule in question? 
(3) Will retroactive application produce substantial 
inequitable results? 
Id., ¶15 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106). 
¶41 The first factor "inquires whether the new rule 
overruled past precedent or decided an issue of first impression 
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."  Id., ¶18.  We 
determine that this factor favors prospective application as our 
rule does not overrule past precedent, but rather decides an 
issue whose resolution was uncertain. 
¶42 The second factor examines whether retroactivity "would 
further or retard the operation of" the new rule or holding.  
Id., ¶21.  This too favors prospective application.  We agree 
with the State that in many cases, a challenge to revocation will 
have become moot because the period of reincarceration has been 
served.  Moreover, due to the passage of time, it would likely be 
difficult for courts to make such a fact-specific determination. 
¶43 The 
third 
factor 
involves 
consideration of 
"the 
equities of retroactivity."  Id., ¶25.  We determine that this 
also favors prospective application.  Here, we consider the 
interests that the State, crime victims, and the public have in 
the finality of the decision.  "Full retroactive application 
could produce inequitable results because it opens up cases that 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
21 
 
have long been thought by everyone, including crime victims, to 
have been final."  Id.  Additionally, as noted above, due to the 
passage of time, the parties may have difficulty in addressing 
whether and when an attorney has promised to file a certiorari 
petition. 
¶44 In the end, we agree with the State that our tolling 
rule should not apply retroactively, but rather "be limited to 
cases for which certiorari review is still available, but also 
encompassing Griffin and Glenn."  This limited application is 
consistent with our holdings in Schmelzer and Brown.  Schmelzer, 
201 Wis. 2d at 258-59; Brown, 259 Wis. 2d 630, ¶26.  "Such an 
approach permits some pro se prisoners to benefit from the new 
rule without the accompanying difficult proof problems which 
frustrate the operation of the rule."  Brown, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 
¶26.  Moreover, such a limited reapplication "recognizes the 
finality of case and the inequities that result from reopening 
cases thought to be long since closed."  Id.    
VI 
¶45 In sum, we conclude that although parolees have a right 
to counsel at the parole revocation hearing, they have no 
administrative or statutory right to counsel to timely file for 
certiorari in the circuit court.  However, we determine that the 
petitioners here are entitled to relief on equitable grounds 
because they timely asked counsel to file for certiorari, counsel 
promised to do so, and the failure to timely file led to 
dismissal of their petitions.  Accordingly, we reverse the orders 
No. 
01-2345 & 02-1320 
   
 
22 
 
dismissing the petitions for writ of habeas corpus, and remand 
with instructions to allow reinstatement of the petitioners' 
right to certiorari review.14 
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit courts are reversed 
and the causes remanded. 
 
                                                 
14 In Glenn's case, the court should toll the running of the 
45-day time limit as of the date that the attorney promised to 
file the petition for certiorari review, July 27, 2000.  In 
Griffin's case, the court shall accept as timely filed the 
petition it previously rejected for certiorari review.   
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately not to criticize the majority opinion for what it 
does say, but rather to point out what it does not say.  For the 
second time in three years, a majority of this court avoids 
addressing an issue of importance, namely, whether a parolee has 
a 
right 
to 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
when 
filing 
an 
administrative appeal to the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
from a parole revocation decision.   
¶47 Because this important issue affects many hearings and 
will arise again, and because the parties have briefed the 
issue, I conclude that the court should address it and hold that 
a right to counsel exists when filing an administrative appeal. 
I 
¶48 I would address the issue of the right to the 
assistance of counsel when filing an administrative appeal even 
though it is not dispositive.  To determine whether to address 
issues that are raised, argued, and briefed by the parties but 
are not necessary to the disposition of a case, I would apply 
the rationale for addressing the merits of a moot issue.  The 
court should decide an issue if it "(1) is of great public 
importance; (2) occurs so frequently that a definitive decision 
is necessary to guide circuit courts; (3) is likely to arise 
again and a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; 
or (4) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate review 
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
2 
 
because the appellate review process cannot be completed or even 
undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties."15 
¶49 A number of these factors militate in favor of 
deciding in the present case whether a parolee has a right to 
the assistance of counsel when filing an administrative appeal 
of a parole revocation decision.  The decision to revoke parole 
implicates the safety of the public and the fairness of the 
procedures and is of great importance to both the petitioner and 
the public.  Furthermore, parole revocation proceedings, and 
subsequent appeals, are a daily administrative matter. 
¶50 In addition, both petitioners and the State briefed 
the issue with sufficient thoroughness for this court to render 
a decision.16  I cannot agree with the majority opinion that we 
should save this question for yet another day. 
II 
¶51 Having concluded that the court should address the  
question of the right to counsel to file an administrative 
appeal, I now turn to answering the question.  A brief history 
of the litigation on this issue is informative. 
                                                 
15 State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 674 
N.W.2d 349. 
16 The petitioners argued for this right, relying on the 
dissenting and concurring opinions in State ex rel. Mentek v. 
Schwarz, 2000 WI App 96, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746 (Mentek 
I), and State ex rel. Mentek v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 32, 242 
Wis. 2d 94, 624 N.W.2d 150 (Mentek II), as well as on public 
policy grounds of the desirability of a bright line rule.  See 
Petitioners-Appellants' Brief at 23-47. 
The State also argued at length for the right to counsel at 
the final revocation hearing.  See Respondent's Brief at 18-22. 
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶52 The right to counsel for filing an administrative 
appeal was first addressed by the court of appeals in State ex 
rel. Mentek v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 96, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 
N.W.2d 748 (Mentek I).  In that case, counsel represented Mentek 
at his probation revocation hearing,17 but following an adverse 
decision, counsel wrote Mentek a letter stating that an appeal 
would have no merit.18  Mentek then filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the circuit court.19   
¶53 The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that 
Mentek had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.20  The 
circuit court granted the State's motion.21  In a split decision, 
the court of appeals concluded that Wis. Admin. Code § HA 
2.05(3)(f)22 does not grant a petitioner the right to counsel 
                                                 
17 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶4.   
18 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶5. 
19 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶6.  
20 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶8. 
21 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶8. 
22 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ HA 
2.05 
(3) 
(Sept. 
2001) 
enumerates a parolee's rights as follows: 
(3) CLIENT'S RIGHTS. The client's rights at the 
hearing include:  
(a) The right to be present;  
(b) The right to deny the allegation;  
(c) The right to be heard and to present witnesses;  
(d) The right to present documentary evidence;  
(e) The right to question witnesses;  
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
4 
 
beyond the probation revocation hearing.23  The dissenting 
opinion construed the Code as providing the right to counsel to 
file an administrative appeal.24 
¶54 On review of Mentek I, this court reversed the court 
of appeals' decision on narrow grounds.  State ex rel. Mentek v. 
Schwarz, 2001 WI 32, 242 Wis. 2d 94, 624 N.W.2d 150 (Mentek II).  
Instead of addressing Mentek's claim to counsel, this court 
focused on whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies should be applied to Mentek's certiorari action.25  This 
court 
held 
that 
although 
Mentek 
failed 
to 
exhaust 
his 
administrative remedies, the circuit court could still exercise 
jurisdiction over his petition for writ of certiorari.26 
 
¶55 I concurred in Mentek II, addressing the right-to-
counsel question left open by the majority opinion.  In doing 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) The right to the assistance of counsel;  
(g) The right to waive the hearing;  
(h) The right to receive a written decision stating 
the reasons for it based upon the evidence presented; 
and  
(i) The right to appeal the decision in accordance 
with sub.(8). 
23 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶17. 
24 Mentek I, 235 Wis. 2d 143, ¶25 (Brown, P.J., dissenting). 
25 Mentek II, 242 Wis. 2d 94, ¶2. 
26 Mentek II, 242 Wis. 2d 94, ¶17. 
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
5 
 
so, I adopted the reasoning of Judge Brown's dissent in Mentek 
I.27  
 
¶56 Both Judge Brown and I concluded that the most 
reasonable interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3) and 
§ HA 2.05(8)28 is that a parolee has the right to the assistance 
of counsel in filing an administrative appeal.  I will not 
repeat our reasoning here.  It is available in both published 
opinions. 
¶57 On my review of Mentek I and Mentek II, I am persuaded 
that Judge Brown and I were correct.  I am pleased to report 
that the State is now also persuaded of the correctness of these 
opinions and has adopted their reasoning and conclusions.   
¶58 After analyzing the Code and statutes, the State's 
brief concludes that "[a]lthough the State argued in Mentek that 
there is no right to counsel for filing an administrative 
appeal, 
the 
State 
now 
respectfully 
withdraws 
from 
that 
position."29  The State's brief asserts that "read together, Wis. 
                                                 
27 Mentek 
II, 
242 
Wis. 2d 94, 
¶19 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
28 Wisconsin Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8)(a) and (b) (Sept. 
2001) provide as follows: 
 
(8) 
Appeal. 
(a) 
The 
client, 
the 
client's 
attorney, if any, or the department representative may 
appeal the administrative law judge's decision by 
filing a written appeal with arguments and supporting 
materials, if any, with the administrator within 10 
days of the date of the administrative law judge's 
written decision. 
(b) The appellant shall submit a copy of the appeal to 
the other party who has 7 days to respond. 
29 Respondent's Brief at 25. 
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
6 
 
Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3) and (8) and Wis. Stat. § 977.05(6)(h) 
and (i) reasonably support the proposition that the statutory 
right to the assistance of counsel at a final revocation hearing 
extends to the assistance of counsel for timely filing an 
administrative appeal."30      
¶59 The State's brief points out three questions that may 
arise in the future if the court recognizes a statutory right to 
counsel 
to 
timely 
file 
an 
administrative 
appeal 
from 
a 
revocation.  The three questions the State's brief poses are as 
follows:  
If there is a statutory right to counsel to timely 
file an administrative appeal from a revocation, is 
there a companion right to effective assistance of 
counsel 
in 
the 
presentation 
of 
the 
substantive 
arguments and supporting materials on administrative 
appeal?  Moreover, must counsel always file an 
administrative appeal upon the parolee's request, even 
if counsel believes an administrative appeal would be 
meritless?  If the answers are yes, what standards of 
review apply, especially with respect to the question 
of 
prejudice 
from 
counsel's 
alleged 
deficient 
performance?31 
¶60 The State's brief carefully explains, however, that 
this court need not now decide the foregoing questions in the 
present cases.  The defendants in the present cases had, 
according to the State's brief, timely filed administrative 
appeals with the assistance of counsel, and neither parolee is 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the handling of an 
administrative appeal.32  
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Respondent's Brief at 26. 
No.  01-2345 & 02-1320.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶61 I agree with the State that answering the question 
about the right to counsel at an administrative appeal will 
doubtless produce further questions.  But experience shows that 
ignoring a question does not ordinarily make it go away.  Delay 
in answering the issue presented here and in Mentek I and Mentek 
II, only means uncertainty and additional expense and delay for 
the State and defendants.  
¶62 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the 
majority opinion should have reached the issue of whether a 
parolee has a right to the assistance of counsel when filing an 
administrative appeal of a revocation decision, and it should 
have concluded, as the State has, that such a right exists.   
¶63 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
 
Nos.  01-2345 & 02-1320.dss 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶64 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority's analysis of the right to counsel in this context, and 
also with its formulation of an equitable tolling remedy in the 
circumstances of the cases before the court.  On the issue of 
retroactivity, I agree with the majority's result but disagree 
with its analysis.  Retroactivity in the context of a collateral 
attack by habeas petition of a judgment already final is 
governed by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), and State 
ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 258-59, 548 N.W.2d 
45 (1996).  See State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, 
¶¶38-52, 
259 
Wis. 
2d 
630, 
658 
N.W.2d 
427 
(Sykes, 
J., 
dissenting).  The majority applies the retroactivity analysis of 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971), which the 
United States Supreme Court abandoned in Harper v. Virginia 
Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993), and which, in any 
event, does not govern collateral attack retroactivity analysis. 
¶65 Here, as in Brown, the parties did not brief the issue 
of Wisconsin’s continued reliance on Chevron Oil in light of 
Harper.  For that reason, and because the precise retroactivity 
question in this case (retroactivity in the context of habeas 
collateral attack) is governed by Teague/Schmelzer, we need not 
address here whether to conform our law to Harper.  It is also 
true 
that 
the 
parties 
did 
not 
brief 
Teague/Schmelzer 
retroactivity analysis.  In any event, because the majority has 
reached the same result that a Teague/Schmelzer analysis would 
yield, I respectfully concur.    
Nos.  01-2345 & 02-1320.dss 
 
2 
 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX, 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence.   
 
 
 
Nos.  01-2345 & 02-1320.dss 
 
 
 
1