Title: Mersereau v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ADAM J. MERSEREAU v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 125Case Number: S-11-0194Decided: 09/26/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

 
ADAM 
J. MERSEREAU,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Converse County
The Honorable John C. 
Brooks, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Tara 
B. Nethercott and Gay V. Woodhouse, Woodhouse Roden, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Nethercott.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Pope.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
VOIGT, J., 
delivers the opinion 
of the Court; BURKE, J., files a concurring in part and dissenting in 
part opinion, in which KITE, C.J., joins.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      
The appellant, Adam J. Mersereau, was convicted of one count of 
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse of a minor.  In this appeal, he raises eight issues 
where he claims there was error in his trial.  After a careful 
review of the record, we cannot say that the appellant received a fair 
trial.  Therefore, we reverse the appellant’s convictions and 
remand for a new trial.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
1.    Whether the district court’s 
decision that the victim was competent to testify was clearly 
erroneous.
 
            
2.    Whether the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted computer forensic evidence and family photos into 
evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).
 
            
3.    Whether the district court commented 
improperly upon the weight of the evidence.
 
            
4.    Whether the district court erred when 
it determined that the appellant’s statement to Deputy Peech was 
given voluntarily.
 
            
5.    Whether plain error occurred when 
Deputy Peech expressed his opinion that the appellant was lying 
during the interview.
 
            
6.    Whether plain error occurred when the 
district court instructed the jury that there need be no corroboration of the 
victim’s testimony in order to convict the appellant.
 
            
7.    Whether the State presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain each of the convictions.
 
            
8.    Whether the appellant received 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
The details of the factual allegations underlying the convictions in 
this case are somewhat confusing and difficult to organize into a meaningful and 
understandable timeline.  Suffice it to say, the appellant was 
charged with one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a child, wherein it was 
alleged that the appellant anally penetrated his four-year-old stepson in the 
family car.  The charges were brought after the victim had 
been examined by the family’s physician assistant, a sexual assault nurse 
examiner, and a forensic interviewer.  While being interviewed 
by Deputy Peech with the Converse County Sheriff’s Department 
regarding the allegation, the appellant made statements that led to eight counts 
of second-degree sexual abuse of a child.  These charges 
alleged that the appellant had engaged in various instances of sexual contact 
with the victim while the appellant was giving the victim a bath.  
After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of all nine of the 
charges against him.  Due to the number of issues in the 
appeal, additional facts will be discussed when relevant.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Whether the district 
court’s decision that the victim was competent to testify was clearly 
erroneous
 
[¶4]      
One month before the trial began, the district court held a hearing to 
determine whether the victim, who was four years old at the time of the crimes 
and five years old at the time of trial, was competent to testify.  
The district court heard testimony from the victim, a forensic 
psychologist, and a psychologist hired by the appellant.  
Thereafter, the district court concluded that the victim was competent to 
testify.  The district court found specifically that the 
victim could recognize the difference between the truth and a lie and that he 
appeared to appreciate the need to testify truthfully, he had the ability to 
recall specific events and had the ability to speak about them, and he had the 
capacity to understand simple questions.  The appellant argues 
that the record does not support the district court’s decision and, instead, 
demonstrates that the victim was not competent to testify.
 
[¶5]      
This Court reviews a district court’s findings regarding the competency 
of a child to testify as follows:
 
It is a 
well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
However, when children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have 
held that once the child’s competency is called into question by either party, 
it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to 
determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown 
to be clearly erroneous.
 
English v. 
State, 
982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations and emphasis 
omitted).  We must give a considerable amount of deference to 
the trial court because it “is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, 
truth, and veracity of the 
witness[.]”  Gruwell v. State, 2011 
WY 67, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 223, 231 (Wyo. 2011).  
Therefore,
 
“[w]e do not presume 
to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a 
cold record.  The trial court sees the witness’ facial 
expressions, hears inflections in [his] voice and watches [his] mannerisms 
during examination.  These observations are a vital part of 
the ultimate ruling on competency.”
 
Id. (quoting Seward 
v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 32, 
76 P.3d 805, 819 (Wyo. 2003)).
 
[¶6]      
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence presume that “[e]very person is competent 
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these 
rules.”  W.R.E. 601.  “A person 
is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and 
narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before 
testifying.”  Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997).  Further, a witness’ intelligence, not 
his age, should guide a court in determining whether the witness is competent to 
testify.  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 
(Wyo. 1987).
 
[¶7]      
This Court has adopted a five-part test for the district courts to 
consider when determining whether a child is a competent witness.  
The district court must determine whether the child has:
 
(1) an understanding 
of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental 
capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to 
receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an 
independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words 
his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple 
questions about it.
 
Larsen v. 
State, 
686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984).
 
[¶8]      
In its decision letter, the district court analyzed the five-part test 
and determined that the victim was competent to testify.  The 
appellant argues, however, that the district court’s conclusions are not 
supported by the record.  After a careful review of the 
record, we agree with the appellant’s argument, and hold that the district 
court’s decision was clearly erroneous.  
 
[¶9]      
The district court concluded that the victim was able to differentiate 
between the truth and a lie, and that he “appeared [] to appreciate the need for 
him to testify truthfully.”  At the competency hearing, the 
victim properly recognized that it would “not be the truth” to say he was 
outside or in California during his testimony.  He also 
understood it was the truth to say he was currently in Wyoming.  
He properly stated that it was “not the truth” to say the prosecutor’s 
shirt was purple, while it would be the truth to say it was blue.  
The record clearly demonstrates that, when asked simple questions, the 
victim understood the difference between a truth and a lie.
 
[¶10]   
However, the question of whether the victim appreciated the need to 
testify truthfully is problematic.  At the competency hearing, 
the child was not asked by the district court, the prosecutor, or defense 
counsel whether he understood he was required to tell the truth in a 
courtroom.  Nor was he ever asked if he understood, from a 
moral perspective, why it is important to tell the truth and not to tell lies, 
especially in the courtroom.  The State points out that the 
forensic interviewer informed the victim that he needed to tell the truth during 
the forensic interview.  Unfortunately, that does not 
demonstrate that the victim understood and appreciated the need to tell the 
truth in the courtroom.
 
[¶11]   
Immediately before his trial testimony, the district court told the 
victim that he needed to tell the truth, and the victim responded that he 
understood.  However, we are not convinced, based upon the 
meager evidence at the competency hearing, that the victim truly did understand 
that obligation.  This is borne out by the fact that at the 
competency hearing and at the trial, the victim testified to verifiably untrue 
information, including how many family members and pets he had.  
In fact, the victim gave incorrect information about how many 
grandmothers, pets, and sisters he had immediately after being reminded by the 
district court that he needed to tell the truth.1  We also 
have significant concern that the victim’s imagination regarding his 
non-existent pets was intertwined with his testimony regarding the incident 
where the appellant allegedly anally penetrated him:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  
So you remember it was in the morning.  Were you in the 
car for a long time or not very long?
 
[VICTIM]:  
Very long.
 
            
Q.    Did your mom get mad that you were gone 
so long?
 
            
A.    No, she had a cat.
 
            
Q.    She what?
 
            
A.    She had a cat.
 
            
Q.    She had an [sic] a cat?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
            
Q.    Did you have a pet?
 
            
A.    A dog.  It was a 
boy.
 
            
Q.    A boy dog?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
            
Q.    Now, when you came home on that long 
trip with your dad, do you remember what you did when you got home?
 
            
A.    Yeah, fed the cat.
 
            
Q.    You fed the cat?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
Based upon all of 
these circumstances, we find that the district court’s decision finding the 
victim was competent to testify was clearly erroneous.  While 
the victim could identify the difference between the truth and a lie when asked 
direct questions about whether something was a truth or a lie, there is no 
evidence to support the conclusion that he understood the obligation to tell the 
truth while testifying.  
 
[¶12]   
We are aware that the district court and this Court determine only the 
competency of the victim, and not his credibility.  See 
Watters v. State, 2004 WY 
155, ¶ 18, 101 P.3d 908, 916 (Wyo. 2004).  
Here, the fact that the victim was telling verifiable untruths (that he 
knew were not true) on the witness stand has nothing to do with his credibility 
in this analysis.  Instead, it demonstrates that he, for 
whatever reason, was unable to appreciate the need to tell the truth in the 
courtroom.
 
[¶13]   
Further, we cannot find that this error was harmless.  
The victim was the only witness to the appellant’s criminal conduct, and 
without his testimony there was no allegation of the criminal conduct except 
through information provided to third parties.  We find that 
this lack of evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to the appellant that it 
warrants reversal of his convictions and a remand for a new trial.
 
[¶14]   
The appellant has also claimed that the victim’s testimony was tainted by 
his mother and the forensic interviewer.  Because this issue 
was not brought to the district court’s attention at the competency hearing, and 
because we are reversing for a new trial based upon the overreaching competency 
issue, we decline to address whether the victim’s testimony was 
tainted.  However, we will note that, based upon the record 
that is before this Court, it is not a far-fetched conclusion that the victim’s 
testimony was tainted.
 
[¶15]   
The victim’s mother testified that she believed that the statement, 
“Daddy put his peepee in my butthole,” may have evolved from an 
incident that occurred approximately six to seven months before the alleged 
sexual abuse was investigated by law enforcement.  She 
explained that, after watching a story on the news about stepparents molesting 
their stepchildren, she asked the victim “if daddy ever stuck 
[his] peepee in your butt hole.”  She also 
testified that, after the victim had been examined by the physician’s assistant, 
she called her sister and her sister-in-law and told each of them that the 
victim had said that “Daddy stuck his peepee in [his] butt 
hole.”  These conversations took place in front of the 
victim.  Further, the forensic interviewer focused on the same 
phrase during her interview of the victim.  She told the 
victim that his mother told her that “dad put his peepee in your 
butthole,” and used the phrase approximately thirty-five more times throughout 
the course of the interview.  While we are not holding that 
this evidence does, in fact, definitively demonstrate taint, we caution the 
district court that this is a significant issue that should be resolved if there 
is a retrial.
 
Whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted computer forensic evidence and 
family photos into evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b)
 
[¶16]   
Before the trial began, the district court considered whether the State 
could produce uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b).  Specifically, the State wanted to introduce several 
photos of the victim and his brother engaging in various innocent activities in 
the nude, images from the appellant’s computer which the State alleged to be 
child pornography, and evidence that the appellant visited several pornographic 
websites on the internet.  The district court heard testimony 
from the appellant’s wife and Agent Timmons, with the Division of Criminal 
Investigation.  After the hearing, the district court issued a 
decision letter, in which it determined the photos of the victim and his 
brother, and the fact that the appellant visited pornographic websites and that 
there was child pornography found on his computer were admissible, while the 
actual images of child pornography were too prejudicial to be 
admitted.
 
[¶17]   
We review a district court’s decision regarding the admission of 
uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) as 
follows:
 
We review claims of 
error concerning the improper admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence 
for abuse of discretion and will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a 
clear abuse.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 
131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 2006).  A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Id.  In this context, 
“reasonably” means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious.  
Id.
 
Rolle v. 
State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d 259, 264 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Bromley v. State, 2007 
WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206-07 (Wyo. 2007)).  
Even if a district court abused its discretion in admitting uncharged 
misconduct evidence, we must also determine whether the error was 
prejudicial.  Rolle, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d  at 264.  “'Error is prejudicial if there 
is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the defendant if the error had not been made.’”  Id. 
(quoting Vigil v. State, 2010 
WY 15, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010)).
 
[¶18]   W.R.E. 
404 prohibits the use of evidence of a defendant’s character or trait to prove 
that he acted in conformity with that character or 
trait.  W.R.E. 404(a) and (b).  
However, evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admissible to prove a 
defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”  W.R.E. 404(b).  Use 
of this type of evidence carries the risk of significant prejudice to the 
defendant and, therefore, we have developed a mandatory procedure before 
evidence may be admitted under W.R.E. 404(b):
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the 
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  
We do not apply this test on appeal; rather, it is intended to be 
conducted by the trial court.
 
. . . .
 
            
For proper appellate review of the admissibility of evidence 
under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court 
required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged 
misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why it is 
probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial . . . . 
 To make sure there is no doubt in the future that this is a 
required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of this opinion:
 
            
In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial 
court should consider the following factors:
 
1.    
How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?
 
2.    
Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the 
prior bad acts evidence?
 
3.    
Is other evidence available?
 
4.    
Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?
 
5.    
How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act?
 
            
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case 
on an improper basis.  In balancing against its probative 
value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court should 
consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central 
question whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  
The trial court should weigh these additional factors against the 
probative value of the evidence:
 
1.    
The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act.  The 
more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish 
the defendant for the prior act.
 
2.    
The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad 
act.  Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant 
for the prior act if the victim was especially vulnerable.
 
3.    
The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.  The more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood 
that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the defendant did it 
once, he probably did it again.
 
4.    
The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.  When the prior act is a more serious offense than the 
charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in 
a different and unfavorable light.
 
5.    
The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden 
inferences.  Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more 
probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted by 
Rule 404(b).
 
6.    
Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction.  The 
jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped 
punishment for the prior bad act.
 
Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 18, 27, 
57 P.3d 332, 340, 342-43 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶19]   
Here, the district court held a pretrial hearing on the matter and heard 
testimony regarding information found on the appellant’s computer, including 
photos of the victim and his younger brother in the nude, suspected child 
pornographic images of girls, and visits to 
pornographic websites.2  The State argued 
the photos of the victim and his brother in the nude, and apparently the images 
of suspected child pornography, would be properly introduced to show the 
appellant’s course of conduct and motive--namely his desire for “sexual 
intercourse with children” and that he “has a fetish with anal sex.”  
While the proper purpose for the admission of the websites was not clear 
from the State’s argument, the district court interpreted that motive was the 
alleged proper purpose.  Further, the State provided minimal 
explanation as to the balancing of the probative value of all of the evidence 
versus the potential for prejudice against the appellant.  The 
State simply stated that the information was “a big part of that puzzle” and was 
not unduly prejudicial.  The State further stated: “If the 
defense wants a limiting instruction not to consider child pornography for the 
wrong reason, I understand that, but they are relevant and probative, Your 
Honor.”
 
[¶20]   
Despite the State’s thin attempt to demonstrate why the evidence was 
admissible under W.R.E. 404(b), the district court engaged in a 
somewhat more thorough analysis in its decision letter.  The 
district court analyzed each piece of evidence individually, and gave some 
consideration to each of the Gleason factors.  After 
completing its analysis, the district court found that the photos of the victim 
and his brother and the fact that the appellant visited pornographic websites 
that might contain child pornography were admissible.  The 
district court concluded that the actual images that may be child pornography 
were too prejudicial for the jury to see, but the district court did allow 
testimony that child pornography was found on the computer.  A 
review of the record demonstrates that the uncharged misconduct evidence was 
substantially more prejudicial than probative in this case and, therefore, the 
district court abused its discretion in finding otherwise.
 
[¶21]   
With respect to the nude photos of the victim and his brother, the 
district court found that the State offered the photos to prove motive, which is 
a proper purpose.  The district court then found that the 
appellant’s possession of nude photographs of his children was relevant to show 
motive, considering that he was charged with sexually abusing his 
son.  When evaluating the probative value of the evidence, the 
district court found that it was clear that the appellant either took or 
possessed the photos of his children.  The district court also 
found that, while the appellant argued that the photos were normal photos that 
parents take of their children, it was for the jury to determine whether they 
were innocent or more sinister.  The district court determined 
that there was no other evidence available, because these were the only nude 
photos of the children.  The district court also found that 
the photos were taken in a relatively close period of time to the offenses the 
appellant was accused of committing.  With respect to the 
prejudicial nature of the photos, the district court concluded that the photos 
were not necessarily reprehensible, but could be prejudicial if the jury did not 
believe them to be innocent family photos, and that the children in the photos 
are sympathetic victims.  It determined that the photos were 
not very similar to the charged acts because they don’t show sexual abuse, and 
that the enormity of the charged crime is much more significant than any bad 
conduct demonstrated in the photos.  The district court 
recognized that the appellant had not been convicted of a crime associated with 
the photos and, while it recognized that there was a prejudicial danger 
associated with admitting the photos, that danger did not substantially outweigh 
the probative value of showing motive.  Finally, the district 
court stated that, if requested by the appellant, it would provide a jury 
instruction about the limited nature of the evidence.
 
[¶22]   
The district court then went on to find that the pornographic images from 
the computer were too prejudicial to be admissible.  
Importantly, the district court recognized that these images could not be 
“established definitely” as child pornography, although the images appeared to 
show minors engaged in sexual acts.  The district court also 
recognized that there was other evidence available to establish 
motive.
 
[¶23]   
Finally, the district court analyzed whether testimony regarding the 
pornographic websites was admissible.  Again, the district 
court found that the State sought to offer the evidence to show motive, which is 
a proper purpose, and the fact that the appellant was visiting websites that 
depicted child pornography was highly relevant to the charged 
offenses.  With respect to balancing the probative value 
versus the danger of unfair prejudice, the district court found that it was 
clear that the appellant viewed the aforementioned pornographic images, the 
appellant admitted that he visited pornographic websites, and the appellant did 
not dispute the issue on which the State was offering the evidence.  
The district court determined that the websites were the only evidence 
available to show that the appellant possessed child pornography, as the 
district court determined that the images themselves could not be 
admitted.  The district court also found that the evidence was 
not cumulative and there was nothing presented to show that the images were not 
recently downloaded.  Specifically in regard to prejudice, the 
district court recognized that viewing child pornography is reprehensible and 
there was some danger that the jury would be tempted to punish the appellant for 
that behavior.  While victims of child pornography are 
sympathetic, the district court believed that would be mitigated by the fact 
that the persons in the images were not parties in the case or was their 
identity known.  The district court recognized that possessing 
child pornography is quite different from sexually abusing a child and, although 
it is a serious crime, is not as serious as facing multiple counts of sexual 
abuse of a minor.  Finally, the district court found that the 
appellant had not been previously convicted of a crime for this behavior, and 
that any potential prejudice could be remedied through a jury 
instruction.  Therefore, the evidence was 
admissible.  
 
[¶24]   
Although the district court “applied” the Gleason test, some of 
the factors were not appropriately analyzed, and we cannot find that the 
district court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of any 
of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the potential unfair 
prejudice to the appellant.  This Court’s biggest concern is 
with the district court’s conclusion that the fact that the appellant visited 
pornographic websites was admissible.  First and foremost, the 
facts presented at the hearing did not establish that the pornographic websites 
the appellant visited actually contained child pornography.  
At the hearing, the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent 
testified as follows:
 
[PROSECUTOR].  
Did you visit any [sic] of those two web sites?
 
[WITNESS].  
Unfortunately, I could not, due to the state policy, we are on the state 
network, and my director would be involved in that, and I didn’t want 
that.
 
When defense counsel 
conducted a voir dire of the agent, it was reiterated that this 
agent actually had no independent knowledge of what images were found on these 
websites:
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL].  And you never visited this 
site?
 
            
[WITNESS].  No, I have not.
 
            
Q.    And is this talking about child girls 
or child boys?
 
            
A.    I have not visited the site, but this 
is what my co-workers mentioned that they described from the site from them 
seeing.
 
            
Q.    So you have no knowledge of the site at 
all?
 
            
A.    No.
 
            
Q.    And then let’s go back to the one above 
that.  It says www.slutload.com.watch, and it has a 
bunch of indecipherable letters and numbers.  And then it says 
incest/sex/video/family/taboo.  Have you ever 
visited ed [sic] that?
 
            
A.    No, I have not.
 
            
Q.    You don’t know what that does, 
correct?
 
            
A.    No, as I mentioned before, I don’t 
visit these sites from my state computer.
 
[¶25]   
These passages demonstrate that the DCI agent actually had no 
knowledge of whether the sites visited by the appellant contained any child 
pornography at all, and the agent had never visited the sites himself to see the 
content.  Instead, his testimony was based upon what he had 
“heard” from his co-workers.  In reality, this testimony was 
nothing more than speculation and was used to paint the appellant in a bad light 
in front of the jury.  The State was able to insinuate that 
the appellant regularly looked at child pornography when going to these 
websites, when there was no evidence showing that these websites actually 
contained child pornography.  Perhaps if it was certain that 
the websites did indeed contain child pornography, the admission of the evidence 
would be relevant and more probative than prejudicial.  
However, the fact that the appellant goes to pornographic websites does 
not tend to prove that he had a motive for sexually abusing the victim--a 
four-year-old boy.  See Simpson v. State, 
523 S.E.2d 320, 321, 322 (Ga. 1999) (“interest in sexual activity 
does not necessarily point to deviant behavior, even circumstantially[]” 
(internal citation omitted); “Under this rule, sexually explicit material cannot 
be introduced merely to show a defendant’s interest in sexual 
activity.  It can only be admitted if it can be linked to the 
crime charged.”).  Furthermore, the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from the testimony is that the appellant might be looking 
at child pornography on the internet.  This inference is 
substantially more unfairly prejudicial to the appellant than it is probative of 
anything in dispute.
 
[¶26]   
Further, this Court is troubled by the fact that so much of the district 
court’s analysis regarding the admissibility of the websites was based upon 
images the district court had already determined were inadmissible because they 
were too prejudicial.  The district court found that, because 
the images had been deemed inadmissible, there was no other evidence available 
to show that the appellant downloaded and possessed child 
pornography.  The question is not whether other evidence of 
the specific uncharged misconduct is available.  The question 
is whether there is other evidence of the proper purpose available--in this case 
motive.  Even if the district court had determined there was 
no other evidence of motive, we cannot find that visits to pornographic websites 
makes it more likely that the appellant has a “fetish with anal sex,” as alleged 
by the State at trial, or that he is sexually attracted to children, as alleged 
on appeal.
 
[¶27]   
This Court is additionally concerned that the district court relied upon 
the images of suspected child pornography in determining the admissibility of 
the websites.  While we commend the district court for 
recognizing the prejudicial nature of the images, the DCI agent 
still testified at trial that images of suspected child pornography were found 
on the computer.  It was apparently presumed that these images 
came from one of the websites discussed by the agent.  
However, our review of the record does not show a link between the two, 
and there was no testimony at the hearing regarding the actual source of the 
images.  The agent also testified that the images had not been 
affirmatively identified as child pornography, that he was not a certified 
forensic physician, and that he had no expertise in identifying child 
pornography.  Nonetheless, the State was able to make the 
assertion that the appellant looked at websites that contained child pornography 
(which was not conclusive) and he downloaded images of child pornography onto 
his computer (also not conclusive).  Again, while commending 
the district court’s attempt to mitigate prejudice by ruling the images 
themselves inadmissible, we are concerned that the jury heard that there were 
child pornography images but was not given any description of what the images 
contained.  Considering that the appellant was accused of 
sexually abusing his four-year-old son, it is quite possible the jury assumed 
the images were of small children, perhaps boys, engaged in sexual behavior, 
which is not what the images depicted.  Leaving theses facts 
to the imagination of the jury members likely was very prejudicial to the 
appellant.  Not only did the jury hear about information that 
put the appellant in a bad light, but it also left the jury to speculate about 
what the facts actually were.  This does not equate to a fair 
trial.
 
[¶28]   
Finally, the nude photos of the victim and his brother were not relevant 
or probative to show the appellant’s motive for assaulting the 
victim.  At the hearing, the State claimed the photos were 
relevant and probative to show the appellant had a “fetish with anal 
sex.”  On appeal, the State argued that the photos show that 
the appellant was sexually attracted to children--more specifically his 
child.  Unfortunately, neither party designated the photos as 
part of the record on appeal, which makes it much more difficult to determine 
whether these photos are more sinister than innocent family photos.  
The district court found that:
 
These images show the 
children taking baths or potty training.  Other images, 
however, are more disturbing.  Many of the offered images 
show E.A.M. and L.A.W. playing outdoors in the mud while 
nude, with mud smeared on the children’s body and genitalia.  
Others show [the appellant] sitting in the bathtub 
with L.A.W. on his lap.  At least three of the 
images focus on the children’s genitals or buttocks.  One 
picture shows a young child face down on a bed with his buttocks and hips 
extended up into the air.
 
Viewing this evidence 
in the light most favorable to admission, we still find that concluding these 
photos are relevant or probative to show that the appellant had a fetish with 
anal sex or that he was sexually attracted to the victim is 
far-fetched.  Perhaps if the photos depicted the victim 
engaging in some sort of inappropriate behavior dealing with the buttocks area 
or showed the appellant engaging in some sort of sexually suggestive activity 
with the victim, we would find a different result.  But the 
fact that even the district court leaves open the possibility that these photos 
may be innocent in nature demonstrates that an insinuation to the contrary would 
be more unfairly prejudicial to the appellant than what very minimal (if any) 
probative value the photos may have.
 
[¶29]   
We cannot find that admission of any of this evidence at trial was 
harmless.  The State did not present overwhelming evidence of 
the appellant’s guilt on the first-degree sexual abuse charge.3  While we find, 
as explained below, that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a 
conviction for first-degree sexual abuse, we also find that, if this evidence 
had not been admitted, there is a “reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the [appellant].”  
Rolle, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d  at 264 (quoting Vigil, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 
224 P.3d at 36).  This evidence put the appellant 
in an extremely bad light in front of the jury because of conduct in which he 
may or may not have engaged, and while we cannot say that the evidence had a 
definitive impact on the verdict, we cannot say that it did not affect the way 
the jury perceived him or the evidence.  For these reasons, we 
find that the admission of the websites and the photos of the victim and his 
brother, pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), was prejudicial 
error.
 
Whether the district 
court commented improperlyupon the weight of the evidence
 
[¶30]   
Immediately before the DCI agent testified about his forensic 
investigation of the appellant’s computer, the district court gave the jury the 
following instruction:
 
            
During the trial pictures of the alleged victim and his brother were 
allowed into evidence depicting them without their clothes on.  
I believe you are about to hear evidence that there were child 
pornography websites on the defendant’s computer.  This 
evidence is being admitted for a limited purpose.  If you 
ultimately find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or 
more of the charged acts, you may consider the evidence pertaining to the naked 
photographs or the websites for the limited purpose of considering the 
defendant’s motive, intent, knowledge, or presence or absence of mistake.[4]
 
The appellant argues 
that this instruction--specifically that the district court informed the jury 
that they would hear about child pornography websites--injected the district 
court’s opinion regarding the weight or quality of the evidence at the 
trial.
 
[¶31]   
The appellant did not object to the instruction when given by the 
district court at trial; therefore, our review is limited to a search for plain 
error.  Walker v. State, 2012 WY 1, ¶ 6, 
267 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Wyo. 2012).  “Plain error is 
established only 'when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as 
error, 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and 
3) the party claiming error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him.’”  Id. (quoting Black v. State, 
2002 WY 72, ¶ 7, 
46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002)).
 
[¶32]   
The record is clear that the district court’s instruction stated that the 
jury was going to “hear evidence that there were child pornography websites on 
the [appellant’s] computer[,]” satisfying the first part of the plain error 
standard.  With respect to the second part of the standard, 
the appellant argues that the district court expressed an opinion regarding the 
evidence to the jury.  The State counters that the district 
court’s comment did not relate to the weight or value of the evidence and, 
instead, “was the introduction of a limiting instruction to prevent the jury 
from improperly using the evidence.”  While we agree with the 
State that the general tenor of the instruction was meant to be a limiting 
instruction, we find that the district court’s comment that the jury would hear 
that there were child pornography websites on the appellant’s computer was a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.
 
[¶33]   
We have expressed that trial judges must “be careful and cautious and not 
comment on the evidence.  Phillips v. State, 
597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting In re Nelson’s Estate, 
72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)).
 
“We have repeatedly 
said that a judge, in the trial of a case before a jury, should abstain from 
expressing or indicating by word, deed or otherwise his personal views upon the 
weight or quality of the evidence.  Expressions of opinion, or 
remarks, or comments upon the evidence which have a tendency to indicate bias on 
the part of the trial judge, especially in criminal cases, are regarded as an 
invasion of the province of the jury and prejudicial to an accused.  
[Citations omitted.]”  Spear v. Commonwealth, 
213 Va. 599, 194 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Va. 1973).
 
Id.  
Here, the district court invaded the province of the jury by informing it 
that, before it heard any testimony from the DCI agent, it was going 
to hear evidence that there were child pornography websites on the appellant’s 
computer.  This statement was problematic because, as 
explained above, the evidence did not show that the appellant went to child 
pornography websites on his computer.  At best there was a 
factual dispute as to whether the websites actually did contain child 
pornography.  That issue should have been properly resolved by 
the jury.  However, the district court informed the jury that 
the websites did contain child pornography.  Therefore, the 
district court’s statement was improper and a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.
 
[¶34]   
We also find that the appellant was materially prejudiced by the district 
court’s statement to the jury.  Instead of the appellant being 
afforded the opportunity to dispute the evidence presented by the State, he was 
put at a significant disadvantage when the district court told the jury what the 
evidence was going to show.  This is particularly prejudicial 
here, considering that the evidence did not, in fact, show that the appellant 
was visiting child pornography websites on his computer.  We 
find that the district court’s statement to the jury constituted plain 
error.
 
Whether the district 
court erred when it determinedthat the appellant’s statement to Deputy 
Peechwas given voluntarily
 
[¶35]   
The appellant was interviewed immediately before and after his arrest by 
Deputy Peech with the Converse County Sheriff’s 
Department.  He claims that the statements he made during the 
interview were involuntary because he was fatigued, he was not free to leave, he 
was threatened by Deputy Peech, and he was subjected to coercive and 
psychological trickery when Deputy Peech appealed to his religious 
beliefs.  While the appellant filed in the district court a 
motion to suppress his statement as involuntary, the motion was based only upon 
the total length of time of the interview.  Thus, the 
substance of the appellant’s claim, as presented in his appeal, is being brought 
for the first time before this Court.  Therefore, we limit our 
review to a search for plain error.  Miller v. State, 
2009 WY 125, ¶ 10, 
217 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶36]   
It is clear from the record that the appellant was interviewed at length 
before and after his arrest, and the entire interview is part of the record on 
appeal before this Court.  Further, the incidents that 
occurred during the interview, which the appellant alleges make his statement 
involuntary, are found in the record, either during the interview or in the 
appellant’s testimony at trial.  Therefore, the first part of 
the plain error standard of review has been satisfied.
 
[¶37]   
It is a clear and unequivocal rule of law that statements made by a 
defendant may not be used against him unless those statements were made 
voluntarily:
 
            
Confessions, admissions, and statements are constitutionally required to 
be voluntary by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] of the United States 
Constitution and by Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478, 92 S. Ct. 619, 
621, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); Black v. State, 
820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 1991).  The voluntariness 
requirement has been a part of the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence since its decision in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 
542, 18 S. Ct. 183, 187, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897).  
Additional constitutional requirements concerning voluntariness were 
imposed by the Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), for custodial 
interrogations.
 
            
It is well established, however, that satisfying Miranda does not 
resolve the question of voluntariness.  A confession may be 
found involuntary because of the means used to obtain it.  
Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992, 88 S. Ct. 489, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1967); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 
600 P.2d 68, 69 (1979).  A confession which is the 
product of either mental or physical coercion by the government is untrustworthy 
and cannot be used for any purpose in the trial of the case.  
In Wyoming, the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, that a confession, admission 
or statement was given voluntarily.  Garcia v. State, 
777 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1989); Dodge v. State, 
562 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Wyo. 1977).  Admission of an 
involuntary confession offends due process, whether or not the defendant was in 
custody when the confession was given.  Black, 
820 P.2d  at 971. . . .
 
. . . .
 
            
Statements are made voluntarily if they are the product of a citizen’s 
free and deliberate choice rather than of governmental intimidation, coercion, 
or deception.  Bravo [v. State], 
897 P.2d [1303], 1305 [(Wyo. 1995)].  
“Involuntariness requires coercive state action, such as trickery, 
psychological pressure, or 
mistreatment.”  Withrow v. Williams, 
507 U.S. 680, 708, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1762, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing (Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 
(1986)).  We have held that voluntariness must proceed from 
the spontaneous suggestion of the citizen’s own mind, free from the influence of 
any extraneous disturbing cause.  Maki v. State, 18 
Wyo. 481, 487, 112 P. 334, 335 
(1911).  In State v. Jones, 73 Wyo. 122, 
276 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1954), we quoted from Wharton on Criminal 
Evidence that “even a slight inducement held out by such a person [in a position 
of authority] renders the confession involuntary.”  
Jones, 73 Wyo. at 144, 276 P.2d  at 455; see also 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1471, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (similarly holding that even a slight 
inducement will render a statement involuntary).  Jones 
quoted approvingly of a New Mexico decision:
 
When direct or 
implied promises made by the person in authority are shown “the law cannot 
measure the force of the influence thereby produced; neither can the courts 
determine in what degree they affected the mind of the accused and to what 
extent they entered into his decision to confess.  Hence, the 
rule is established that, . . . confessions which are made [under such 
conditions] must be excluded.”
 
Jones, 73 Wyo. at 141, 
276 P.2d  at 453 (quoting State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583, 584 
(1923)).  Our later decisions summarize that a confession 
offends due process if the suspect’s will was overborne by the police and the 
suspect’s capacity for self-determination was seriously impaired.  
Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 
1995).  In Wyoming, coercive police tactics violate the due 
process clause of WYO. CONST. Art. 
1, § 6 and statements elicited pursuant to these tactics may be 
suppressed.  Yung, 906 P.2d  at 
1035.  This Court has not yet decided whether coercion is a 
necessary predicate to finding that a confession is involuntary under our state 
constitution; however, coercive government activity is a necessary predicate to 
finding involuntariness within the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 
606.  Once the evidence establishes state actor coercion, a 
court must consider the effect of that coercion on the defendant’s choice to 
confess or make an admission or statement.  
Id.  Unless the court finds that coercive 
conduct caused the defendant to speak, the court must find the statement to be 
voluntary and the statement is admissible.  
Id.  We recognize that coercion can be mental as 
well as physical.  Id.  The use of 
tricks or factual misstatements in and of themselves does not render a 
confession involuntary.  Id.
 
. . . .
 
            
Relevant factors concerning the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation include:
 
whether the defendant 
was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether 
Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the 
defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant’s mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.
 
People v. 
Gennings, 
808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991); see also Yung, 
906 P.2d  at 1034; Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 
139-40 (Wyo. 1995); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 665 (Wyo. 
1993); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 386 (Wyo. 1992); 
Black, 820 P.2d at 971-72; Garcia, 
777 P.2d  at 607; Stone [v. State], 
745 P.2d [1344], 1348 [(Wyo. 1987)]; Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 1986).
 
Carter v. 
State, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 15, 
241 P.3d 476, 484-86 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting State v. Evans, 
944 P.2d 1120, 1124-26 (Wyo. 1997)).  
 
[¶38]   
The appellant argues that, under the totality of the circumstances of his 
interview, the statements he made to Deputy Peech were 
involuntary.  Specifically, he claims that he was fatigued at 
the time of the interview; before he was officially arrested he was not free to 
leave the interview; and he was subjected to psychological coercion and threats 
when Deputy Peech appealed to his religious beliefs.5  We find that 
none of these factors, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, 
rendered the statements he made in the interview involuntary.
 
[¶39]   
First, the appellant claims that he was tired when he arrived for the 
interview because he had only gotten approximately four hours of sleep the night 
before.  As pointed out in Carter, “[w]e have 
recognized that sleep deprivation . . . [is a] factor[] which can make a 
statement involuntary.”  Carter, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 16, 
241 P.3d  at 486.  The appellant in Burnett v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 2000), made a similar argument, 
claiming her statement was involuntary because she had gotten little sleep the 
night before.  We rejected this argument, however, explaining 
that even if she had gotten little sleep, it was not due to coercive state 
action.  Id.  The same is true 
here.  The appellant may have been tired from getting little 
sleep the previous night, but he has not alleged that the fatigue was due to 
coercive state action, nor has he provided us any case law that would suggest we 
should depart from out precedent in Burnett.
 
[¶40]   
The appellant next argues that he was not free to leave during the 
interview, which is a circumstance that shows his statement was 
involuntary.  For the first half of the interview, 
Deputy Peech clearly informed the appellant that he was not under 
arrest, and despite that fact, he still advised the appellant of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda.  While the appellant testified at 
trial that he asked Deputy Peech if he could leave and was told he 
could not, the recording of the interview does not give any indication that the 
appellant was not free to leave before he was arrested.  
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, he was not free to 
leave, there is no evidence that the statement was not made 
voluntarily.  As mentioned above, the appellant was informed 
that he had the right to remain silent and that he had the right to an 
attorney.  The appellant stated that he understood those 
rights, yet chose to speak with Deputy Peech.
 
[¶41]   
Finally the appellant claims that Deputy Peech subjected him 
to psychological coercion and threats by appealing to his religious 
beliefs.  Just short of two hours into the interview, 
Deputy Peech started making comments to the appellant regarding God, 
forgiveness, and leniency given to those who choose to tell the 
truth.  These statements included Deputy Peech 
telling the appellant that he wanted to be able to tell everybody that: 
“[Peech] looked in[to] [the appellant’s] eyes, [Peech] saw his 
soul, and he was telling the truth.  And [Peech] saw, 
similar, 'cuz no one can be the same as God, [Peech] saw similar 
to what God was seeing in him[.]”  Deputy Peech 
also told the appellant that he is “God’s Instrument.”
 
[¶42]   
No Wyoming case has dealt with the specific issue of whether an 
interrogator may use a suspect’s religious beliefs to attempt to elicit a 
statement.  However, courts from other jurisdictions have had 
the occasion to determine whether these types of appeals render a statement 
involuntary.  Some courts have looked disapprovingly upon the 
tactic, ultimately holding the statements inadmissible.  
See People v. Adams, 143 Cal. App. 3d 970, 989 
(5th Dist. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds 
by People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 995 n.5 
(1992) (“Religious beliefs are not matters to be used by governmental 
authorities to manipulate a suspect to say things he or she otherwise would not 
say.  The right to worship without fear is too precious a 
freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of 
the religious belief of individuals, including those accused of crime.”); 
State v. Wood, 128 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) 
(Strategically selecting an interrogator for the purpose of exploiting the 
religious relationship between the interrogator and the defendant was a 
violation of the defendant’s due process rights.).  A 
significant number of courts have held to the contrary that references to 
religion did not make a statement or confession involuntary.  
See State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833, 844 (Ariz. 
2006) (no evidence that the religious references caused the defendant’s will to 
be overborne); Noble v. State, 892 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Ark. 
1995), overruled on other grounds by Grillot v. 
State, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003) (An appeal to religious sympathies 
does not automatically make a statement involuntary--only upon a showing that 
his free will was overborne.); Rodgers v. Commonwealth., 
318 S.E.2d 298, 303 (Va. 1984) (Religious appeals are only one part 
of the totality of the circumstances.); State v. Loosli, 
941 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Idaho 1997) (Defendant’s will was not overborne 
when officers told him that he would not be forgiven by God if he did not tell 
the truth.).  
Regardless of whether 
the courts ultimately found the statements voluntary or involuntary, the cases 
all have one thing in common--the analysis focuses on the totality of the 
circumstances.
 
[¶43]   
We do not find that, under the totality of the circumstances of this 
case, the appellant’s free will was overborne by Deputy Peech’s 
statements regarding God, leniency, and forgiveness.  Perhaps 
if the record showed that the appellant had such a religious nature that his 
free will likely was overborne by the deputy’s claims that he could see into the 
appellant’s soul and that the deputy was “God’s Instrument,” we would be 
inclined to find this confession involuntary.  But that is not 
what the record shows.  Deputy Peech was not 
appealing to a specific religion or trying to appeal to particular 
vulnerabilities known to him.  Instead, the record shows that 
the appellant was twenty-three years old at the time, a high school graduate 
with some technical training, was gainfully employed, and supporting a family of 
four.  While the appellant now claims that he was extremely 
fatigued, there is nothing in the interview that shows that to be the 
case.  The appellant never asked to end the interview, or 
complained about being tired.  He also continually denied the 
allegations against him in the midst of the religious references made by Deputy 
Peech.  At the time the references were made, the 
appellant was aware that he was not under arrest and had been informed of his 
Miranda warnings.  During the interview, the appellant 
made statements that certainly were not in his best interest; however, we cannot 
say those statements were the product of “trickery, psychological pressure, or 
mistreatment.”  Carter, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 15, 
241 P.3d  at 485.  The appellant has failed to 
demonstrate that his statement was involuntary and in violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, and has thereby failed to demonstrate that plain error 
occurred.
 
Whether plain error 
occurred when Deputy Peechexpressed his opinion that the appellant 
was lyingduring the interview
 
[¶44]   
The appellant claims that the prosecutor improperly commented upon the 
credibility of the appellant in his opening and closing statements.  
He further claims that, at trial, Deputy Peech improperly 
expressed his opinion that the appellant was lying during the interview, which 
was exacerbated by the fact that the jury listened to portions of the interview, 
wherein Deputy Peech repeatedly accused the appellant of 
lying.  An analysis of this issue is somewhat complicated by 
the fact that defense counsel did not object to the opening and closing 
statements, nor did he object to the playing of portions of the interview for 
the jury at trial.  In fact, defense counsel actually played 
portions of the interview before the prosecutor did.  However, 
defense counsel did object to the following exchange at trial:
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  Mr. Peech, you say that total 
first day was roughly 4, 4 and a half hours?
 
            
[PEECH]:  Yes, sir.
 
            
Q.    Can you tell us why you went that 
long?
 
            
A.    He was not telling us the 
truth.  We would get a little truth -- he would deny stuff 
--
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.  This 
answer is speculative and is a guess.
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  I’m asking why he conducted the 
interview so long.  He can refrain from saying whether it was 
the truth or not.
 
            
THE COURT:  Well, insofar as the defendant admitted 
that he wasn’t telling the truth, you can answer that -- you can talk about 
that.
 
            
In terms of your general opinion, the jury will disregard any general 
opinions, because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.
 
            
With that ruling, go ahead.
 
Both parties submit 
that plain error is the appropriate standard of review, but neither party 
acknowledges that at least part of this claim was brought to the district 
court’s attention.  Nonetheless, we review the claim in its 
entirety under the plain error standard of review because, even under that 
onerous standard, we find the jury was exposed to improper comments regarding 
the appellant’s credibility, and those comments were unfairly prejudicial to the 
appellant.6
 
[¶45]   
First, we find that the record is clear as to the alleged 
error.  The statements made by the prosecutor clearly appear 
in the record, and the transcript reflects, as quoted above, 
Deputy Peech’s comment that the appellant “was not telling us the 
truth.”  With respect to the interview, the State argues that 
the portion of the interview played for the jury is not clearly reflected in the 
record and, therefore, we cannot make a determination on the issue.  
While the record does not pinpoint to the exact second what parts of the 
interview were played for the jury, the trial transcript reflects that the 
interview was played for the jury beginning at the one hour and thirty minute 
mark.  Further, defense counsel represented that approximately 
an hour and a half of the interview was going to be played.  
Therefore, we find that the record shows what portions of the interview 
were played for the jury.
 
[¶46]   
As pointed out in Sweet v. State, 2010 WY 87, ¶¶ 23-24, 
234 P.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Wyo. 2010), this Court has a long-standing 
rule that a witness may not give an opinion regarding the truthfulness or 
credibility of the accused, the victim, or any other witness.  
We find that this clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated here, 
although not in each circumstance raised by the appellant.  

 
[¶47]   
First, we do not find that the statements made by the prosecutor in his 
opening and closing statements were commenting upon the appellant’s 
credibility.  “We review allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct by reference to the entire record.”  Whitney v. 
State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 85, 
99 P.3d 457, 485 (Wyo. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  With specific regard to opening statements, we have 
said:  
 
An opening statement 
has a narrow purpose and scope.  It is to state what evidence 
will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to 
follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is 
not an occasion for argument.
 
. . . .
 
Further, the 
prosecutor’s opening statement should be confined to a statement of the issues 
in the case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the 
prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible.
 
Id. at ¶ 86, at 485-86 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
[¶48]   
Here, in his opening statement, the prosecutor stated: “Within two hours 
and 3 minutes, the [appellant] admits it.  After telling 
Mr. Peech several times he wasn’t being truthful, 
Mr. Peech kept asking, and ultimately the defendant told him he 
did.”  Although the statement somewhat focused on the 
appellant being untruthful, it was based upon what the evidence was going to 
show--specifically statements made by the appellant during the interview where 
he admitted he was not being truthful.  This was not a 
circumstance where the prosecutor was expressing his personal opinion on the 
appellant’s
credibility to the 
jury.  The prosecutor had a good faith basis that this 
evidence would be available, as the district court had previously ruled that the 
statement was made voluntarily.
 
[¶49]   
“Closing arguments must be based upon the evidence submitted to the 
jury.  The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to 
offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.”  
Whitney, 2004 WY 
118, ¶ 87, 99 P.3d  at 486.  The appellant 
complains that the following part of the prosecutor’s closing argument 
constituted a comment upon the appellant’s credibility:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  
Now, remember you heard parts of that interview.  You 
heard parts of that interrogation.  Officer Peech 
told him time and again, “Tell me the truth.  Tell me the 
truth.”  He said it over and over again.  
And put yourself into a reasonable person’s position under the 
circumstances.  I asked Dr. Denison, “If 
Officer Peech tells me that he’s the voice of God or, 'You need to 
confess to me as a representative of God,’ or whatever it was, can I tell him to 
fly a kite?  Can I tell him to pound sand? 
 . . . .”
 
A review of this 
passage in the context of the entire record, and specifically the rest of the 
closing argument, demonstrates that the prosecutor was responding to the 
appellant’s assertions that the statements he made in his interview were 
coerced.  The prosecutor was using the evidence presented at 
trial--through the statement itself and Dr. Denison’s testimony--that the 
appellant could have ceased the interview at any time and, thus, the statements 
were voluntary.  To that extent, we do not find that the 
prosecutor’s argument constituted a comment upon the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶50]   
However, we do find that Deputy Peech’s testimony was 
impermissible opinion evidence regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  On direct examination, Deputy Peech 
unequivocally testified that the interview lasted as long as it did because 
“[the appellant] was not telling us the truth.  We would get a 
little truth--he would deny stuff--.”  The State argues that 
Deputy Peech was actually trying to assert that the appellant 
himself had admitted to lying during the interview.  We 
disagree.  The transcript clearly demonstrates that his 
response to the question was that he believed the appellant was lying, and only 
after the district court advised the jury that it could not consider opinion 
testimony did Deputy Peech focus on the appellant’s 
statements.
 
[¶51]   
Considering the brief nature of the incident and the immediate 
instruction given by the district court, under most circumstances this error 
might be considered harmless.  However, here, 
Deputy Peech’s opinion was exacerbated when the jury listened to 
approximately an hour and a half of Deputy Peech’s interview with 
the appellant, where he constantly accused the appellant of being 
dishonest.  In Sweet, we held that playing an interview 
that contained these types of statements for the jury amounted to plain 
error.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶¶ 28-36, 
234 P.3d  at 1204-06.
 
[¶52]   
The State encourages this Court to adopt the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 
2005), that an audiotape of an interrogation or interview that contains repeated 
accusations that a suspect is lying should be admissible.  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that accusing a suspect of lying is a valid 
interrogation technique, is no different from an officer testifying that the 
defendant changed his story, and that a proper instruction would alleviate any 
danger associated with playing the interrogation.  Id. 
at 27, 29.  This is the same authority the State relied upon 
in advancing this same argument in Sweet, which we rejected.  
Sweet, 2010 WY 87, 
¶ 30, 234 P.3d  at 1205.  Just as in Sweet, 
Deputy Peech did not explain to the jury that accusing a suspect of 
lying is normal interrogation technique and that such an accusation does not 
mean that the suspect actually is lying.  Therefore, we find 
it unlikely that the jury would know why the appellant was accused of lying, 
other than he actually was lying.
 
[¶53]   
When determining whether material prejudice is present, we review the 
evidence in light of the entire record.  Pendleton v. 
State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008).  
 
When the error 
concerns the admission of improper evidence, among the considerations 
are:
 
(1) whether the 
evidence furnished important corroboration of other testimony; (2) whether it 
related to a material, consequential fact; (3) whether counsel relied on the 
evidence in argument; (4) whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the 
effect of any instructions given to the jury.  1 Weinstein’s 
Evidence, ¶ 103[06] (1986).
 
Zabel [v. State], 
765 P.2d [357], 362 [(Wyo. 1988)].  We have 
recognized that “perhaps the single most significant factor in weighing whether 
an error was harmful is the strength of the case against the 
defendant.”  Id. (quoting 3B Charles A. 
Wright, Nancy J. King, Susan R. Klein & Peter J. Henning, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 854 at 305 (2d ed. 1982)).
 
Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 31, 
234 P.3d  at 1205.  Here, the State’s case against 
the appellant was not particularly strong.  With the exception 
of two contested pieces of physical evidence, the entire case hinged on the 
victim’s allegations and the appellant’s denial of those 
allegations.  Therefore, the credibility of the victim and the 
appellant were of utmost importance in the jury deliberations in the 
case.
 
[¶54]   
Even though credibility was a major issue for the jury, we still express 
some reluctance to find prejudice.  This is based primarily on 
the fact that, while Deputy Peech’s troublesome testimony was given 
during the State’s direct examination, the interview tape was played while he 
was being cross-examined by defense counsel.  The State argues 
that the appellant should not be allowed to profit from his counsel’s strategic 
decision regarding the use of the interview.  The State argues 
that these facts are similar to those in Pendleton, where this Court 
found prejudice had not been established because defense counsel advocated for 
the admissibility of the interview recording.  See 
Pendleton, 2008 WY 36, ¶¶ 
12, 16, 17, 180 P.3d  at 217-18.  The appellant 
argues that this case is unlike Pendleton because defense counsel 
attempted to have the interview suppressed in its entirety and only used the 
interview after Deputy Peech commented upon the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶55]   
In Sweet, we recognized that prejudice can be established even 
where defense counsel relied upon an interview recording wherein the 
investigating officer repeatedly commented upon the credibility of the defendant 
and the victim.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 34, 
234 P.3d  at 1206.  We reasoned that, 
“[w]hile Sweet relied on the recorded interview to show his repeated 
denials of the deputy’s accusations, he had little choice since the court had 
denied his suppression motion.  In that respect, this case is 
distinguishable from Pendleton in which the defendant advocated for the 
admissibility of the recorded interview.”  
Id.  The situation here is similar to that in 
Sweet.  Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the 
interview, but was unsuccessful.  Therefore, defense counsel 
needed to do the best he could with potentially damaging information that he had 
previously tried to keep the jury from hearing.
 
[¶56]   
The difference here, of course, is that defense counsel, not the 
prosecutor, chose to play the recording for the jury.  
However, in its opening statement, the State told the jury that it would 
hear several portions of the interview, and during direct examination, 
Deputy Peech testified at length that the appellant told him that he 
was being untruthful and that he inappropriately touched the victim. 
 Generally, “we are not willing to second-guess counsel and 
suggest that a different strategy might have been more productive.”  
Pendleton, 2008 WY 
36, ¶ 17, 180 P.3d  at 218.  A review of the 
entire record in this case shows that, just as in Sweet, defense counsel 
was left with little choice but to attempt to exploit the interview after the 
district court denied the motion to suppress.  And while the 
appellant may have been the first to use the interview, we cannot say that he 
“advocated for its admissibility.”  Id. at ¶ 12, 
at 217.
 
[¶57]   
Under most circumstances, we may find that defense counsel’s active use 
of the interview would negate any prejudice to the appellant.  
But here, defense counsel was faced with two options: to cross-examine 
Deputy Peech knowing that he could not necessarily discredit any of 
his testimony because it technically was all contained in the interview; or use 
the interview in an attempt to demonstrate that the appellant’s “confession” was 
not quite as clear as Deputy Peech testified and to try to convince 
the jury that the interview was unfair and caused the appellant to “confess” to 
crimes he did not commit.  Both of these options exposed the 
jury to Deputy Peech’s “opinion” regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  While it is a close call, we find that, based 
upon the entire record in this case, there is a reasonable possibility that the 
outcome of the trial may have been more favorable absent 
Deputy Peech’s testimony regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  While an officer’s accusation that a suspect is 
lying may be an appropriate and effective interrogation technique, it has no 
place in a court of law. 
 
Whether plain error 
occurred when the district court instructed the jury that there need be no 
corroboration of the victim’s testimony in order to convict the 
appellant
 
[¶58]   
The appellant argues that the district court erred when it gave the jury 
Instruction 16A, which stated: “Corroboration of a victim’s testimony is 
not necessary to obtain a conviction for sexual assault.”  The 
appellant did not object to this instruction at trial and, therefore, we review 
for plain error.  Counts v. State, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 44, 
277 P.3d 94, 107 (Wyo. 2012).
 
[¶59]   
Since we have already found reversible error in several other issues in 
this appeal, we will simply note that this Court has previously found this 
instruction inappropriate and have cautioned the district courts to refrain from 
giving it.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 39, 
234 P.3d  at 1206; Garza v. State, 2010 WY 64, ¶ 21, 
231 P.3d 884, 891 (Wyo. 2010); Story v. State, 
721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1986).  On retrial of 
this case, the trial court shall not give this jury instruction.
 
Whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence tosustain each of the 
convictions
 
[¶60]   
The appellant claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
to sustain his conviction for first-degree sexual abuse of a child and for the 
eight counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a child.  
Although we are reversing all of the appellant’s convictions for various 
other grounds, “we must also determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant because, if the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law, Appellant is entitled to be acquitted on the 
charge, and the State may not re-try him.”  Jones v. 
State, 2011 WY 114, ¶ 19, 
256 P.3d 527, 534 (Wyo. 2011). 
 When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we use the following standard of 
review:
 
[W]e must determine 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  When 
considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence 
with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard 
the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not reweigh the evidence nor will we 
re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.
 
Counts, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 52, 
277 P.3d  at 109 (quoting Garner v. State, 2011 WY 156, ¶ 20, 
264 P.3d 811, 820 (Wyo. 2011)).
 
First-Degree Sexual 
Abuse
 
[¶61]   
The appellant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence 
to convict him of first-degree sexual abuse of a child.7  However, the 
appellant’s argument solely is based upon his belief that the jury gave improper 
weight to particular testimony or evidence.  As mentioned 
above, when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction, “[w]e will not reweigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the 
credibility of the witnesses.”  Counts, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 52, 
27 P.3d  at 109.
 
[¶62]   
When we review the evidence using the proper standard of review, we 
conclude that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction.  The victim, a four-year-old child at the time of 
the crime, testified that “[the appellant] put his wiener in my butt hole[,]” 
and that allegation was repeated during the sexual assault nurse examiner’s 
testimony when she explained that the victim said, “Daddy puts 
his peepee in my butt hole.  And it itches, and it 
scratches, and it hurts.”  The nurse also testified that, 
during her examination, the victim’s anus dilated instantly and she found a 
healing area on the anus.  In her opinion, these findings 
supported the victim’s allegation.  Additionally, a forensic 
analyst from the state crime lab testified that she tested a fluid on the 
victim’s pajama pants, which indicated the possible presence of blood on the 
pajamas.  There was a mixture of DNA in the spot, and she was 
unable to exclude the victim or the appellant as possible contributors to the 
DNA.  From this evidence, a rational trier of fact 
could find that the appellant engaged in sexual intrusion with the victim, who 
was his four-year-old stepson.
 
Second-Degree Sexual 
Abuse
 
[¶63]   
The appellant also argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to sustain his convictions for the eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse of a child.8  Specifically, 
the appellant claims that the State failed to prove that the appellant’s contact 
with the victim was “with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse[]” as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 
2011).  After a careful review of the record, we agree that 
the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant’s 
convictions for second-degree sexual abuse.
 
[¶64]   
While the appellant’s brief focuses on the lack of evidence demonstrating 
his contact with the victim was for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification 
or abuse, we are concerned with the fact that there is no evidence, other than 
the statements made by the appellant in his interview, to support a charge of 
second-degree sexual abuse.  Whether the State provided any 
evidence of criminal conduct, other than the appellant’s extrajudicial 
statement, is a legal issue that the appellant did not raise in his 
brief.  To that extent
 
[w]e are sensitive to 
the proposition that judicial restraint generally demands that we address only 
those issues properly before us and preserved for our review.  
We also know that it is within our jurisdiction to decide any case as 
justice may demand. . . .  [J]udicial efficiency 
strongly suggests the treatment of obvious matters in the first 
appeal.
 
Sheeley v. 
State, 
991 P.2d 136, 138 (Wyo. 1999).  Here, although not 
directly raised by the appellant, we believe this question is properly 
encompassed within the question of whether sufficient evidence was presented at 
trial to sustain the jury’s decision.
 
[¶65]   
In Wyoming, “independent proof of the corpus delicti 
must exist apart from a defendant’s extrajudicial confession or 
admission[.]”  Jones v. State, 2010 WY 44, ¶ 11, 
228 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2010).  See also 
Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 1199; Kolb v. State, 
930 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wyo. 1996); Betzle v. 
State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1021-22 (Wyo. 
1993); Konopisos v. State, 26 Wyo. 350, 354-55, 185 P. 355, 356 (Wyo. 
1919).  In Simmers, we identified what type of evidence 
must exist to prove a crime was committed:
 
[The] corroborating 
evidence need only consist of substantial evidence that the offense has been 
committed, so that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
 
[C]orroborating 
evidence is adequate if it supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to 
justify a jury inference of the truth of the confession.  The 
quantity and type of independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts 
of each case.  However, circumstantial evidence can be used to 
corroborate a confession.
 
Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1199 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).
 
[¶66]   
We have carefully analyzed all of the trial transcripts and cannot find 
any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that corroborates that the appellant 
ever engaged in any sexual contact with the victim, other than the conduct that 
was the basis of the first-degree count.  There was never an 
allegation made by the victim or his mother at trial, or to any of the multiple 
medical care providers or the forensic interviewer, that the appellant engaged 
in sexual contact with the victim.  There was no testimony 
indicating that the victim had been subjected to sexual abuse over a period of 
time.  Instead, all of the evidence, other than 
Deputy Peech’s testimony regarding the appellant’s interview, 
focused on the single allegation of penetration.  The State’s 
brief regarding the sufficiency of the evidence on this count also focuses only 
on the statements the appellant made in his interview with Deputy 
Peech.  Further, in its “Statement of the Facts” the 
State represents that: “All of the evidence incriminating [the appellant] for 
his second-degree sexual abuse of [the victim] came from his own statements to 
investigators.”  The appellant’s statements, on their own, are 
insufficient to uphold his convictions for second-degree sexual 
abuse.  Therefore, this Court reverses the eight counts of 
second-degree sexual abuse, and on remand the district court shall enter a 
judgment of acquittal on those counts. 
 
 
 
Whether the appellant 
receivedineffective assistance of trial counsel
 
[¶67]   
The appellant’s final claim is that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in three respects.  First, he claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not arguing at the competency hearing that the 
victim’s testimony was also tainted.  Second, he argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the appellant’s statement was 
involuntary for the reasons he has raised in this appeal. 
 See supra ¶¶ 35-41.  Finally, he 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 
instruction that would have instructed the jury to disregard any testimony 
regarding Deputy Peech’s opinion of the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶68]   
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel are reviewed de 
novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 
193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 2008).  There are two 
requirements the appellant must show before prevailing on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:
 
First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
 
Maier 
v. State, 2012 
WY 50, ¶ 24, 273 P.3d 1084, 1091 (Wyo. 2012) 
(quoting Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 
609 (Wyo. 1992)).
 
[¶69]   First, because we have found that 
the appellant is entitled to a new trial due to errors regarding the victim’s 
competency to testify, and error in Deputy Peech’s comments upon the 
appellant’s credibility, we need not consider whether the appellant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel for not raising the issue of taint at the 
competency hearing or requesting a jury instruction regarding 
Deputy Peech’s testimony.  Second, we find that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for challenging the voluntariness of the 
appellant’s statement based solely on the length of the interview, and not 
raising the issues of fatigue, threats, and psychological coercion.  
We considered those issues when we concluded that the appellant’s 
statements were given voluntarily.  See supra ¶¶ 
42-43.  Therefore, even if trial counsel had brought these 
issues to the attention of the district court, the motion would have been 
unsuccessful.  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to bring a motion that would have been denied.  
Carter, 2010 WY 
136, ¶ 15, 241 P.3d  at 484 
(citing Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶¶ 17-19, 
152 P.3d 376, 382-83 (Wyo. 2007) (If a suppression motion would have 
been brought, but denied, the defendant suffers no prejudice from the failure to 
bring such a motion.)).
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶70]   
As this Court has long recognized, the United States and Wyoming 
constitutions do not guarantee that a criminal defendant receive a perfect 
trial, but they do guarantee that he receive a fair trial.  
See Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97, ¶ 85, 
192 P.3d 36, 75 (Wyo. 2008); Haworth v. State, 
840 P.2d 912, 920 (Wyo. 1992); Janski v. 
State, 538 P.2d 271, 277 (Wyo. 1975).  When 
applying that maxim, many errors that may occur at trials are not so pervasive 
as to deprive a defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right.  
Unfortunately, we cannot say that is the case here.  
The appellant’s trial contained sufficient errors that it would be an 
affront to the criminal justice system to say this trial was fair.  
We must remember that:
 
“* * * Society wins 
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our 
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated 
unfairly.  An inscription on the walls of the Department of 
Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:  
'The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens 
in the courts.’” 
 
Sheeley, 
991 P.2d  at 139 (quoting Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Large v. State, 2008 WY 
22, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 2008)) (quoting Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)).
 
[¶71]   
We reverse the appellant’s convictions and remand to the district court 
for a new trial, consistent with this opinion.
 
 
BURKE, Justice, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, with whom 
KITE, Chief Justice, joins.
 
[¶72]   
Appellant identified eight appellate issues.  I 
disagree with the majority’s resolution of several of those issues.  
Ultimately, however, I agree that all of Appellant’s convictions must be 
reversed because of error related to the admission of evidence concerning the 
pornographic websites.9  Although 
Appellant’s convictions for Counts Two through Nine should be reversed, I cannot 
agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to 
support those convictions.  I will address that issue 
first.
 
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence (Counts Two through Nine)
 
[¶73]   
The jury convicted Appellant of eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse.  The majority applied the 
corpus delicti rule and concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the convictions.  As a result, Appellant 
cannot be prosecuted again for those alleged 
crimes.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 23, 
193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo. 2008).  I dissent from 
that portion of the majority opinion for two reasons: First, the 
corpus delicti rule was not raised by Appellant and should 
not be considered by this Court.  Second, if properly applied, 
the corpus delicti rule does not mandate reversal of the 
convictions. 
 
[¶74]   
As a general proposition, we address only those issues properly before us 
and preserved for our review.  Appellant’s contention that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the eight convictions for 
second-degree sexual abuse focused solely upon the sexual gratification element 
of the offense.  According to Appellant, “[T]here is no 
evidence that Adam touched L.W. with the requisite intent of sexual 
gratification.”  Appellant’s entire argument on this issue is 
less than one-half of a page.  Appellant never mentions the 
term corpus delicti, does not address how the rule is properly 
applied in cases such as this, and fails to provide the State with any notice 
that he is relying on the corpus delicti rule to support his 
claim.
 
[¶75]   
Appellant did raise the issue in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
filed after trial.  The district court denied the motion 
stating: 
 
The Defendant 
alleges, however, that such out of court confessions were not true, made under 
duress, and needed to be corroborated pursuant to Jones v. State, 
228 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
It should be first 
noted that the issue of corroboration was not raised at trial by way of a motion 
for judgment of acquittal or by any proffered jury instructions.
 
However, the Court is 
of the opinion that there was substantial corroborative evidence.
 
“Corroborating 
evidence is adequate if it supports the essential facts admitted to justify a 
jury inference of the truth of the confession.”  Jones v. 
State, 228 P.3d 870 (Wyo. 2010).
 
First, there were 
confessions by the Defendant to not 1 but 8 separate acts and the confessions 
were recorded.  Secondly, the jury concluded that there was 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had committed a 1st degree sexual assault on LAW. 
 Thirdly, there was undisputed testimony and pictures that the 
Defendant had indeed bathed and showered with LAW, which is where the sexual 
contact had allegedly occurred. 
 
Lastly, I believe the 
jury could conclude that Mrs. Mersereau had significant suspicions 
that some inappropriate conduct had occurred.
 
Danielle Mersereau’s 
decision to quiz LAW about whether his step-father had molested LAW based on a 
random TV show seems dubious at best.  Her decision to take 
LAW to a physician’s assistant for an exam would seem unnecessary if she were 
convinced nothing occurred.  Finally, LAW’s 
knowledge of the Defendant “sticking his peepee in my butthole”, 
does not seem to be an expression that a 5 year old would be familiar 
with.
 
The Court concludes 
that there was enough corroborating evidence to sustain a verdict on the 2nd degree 
claims.
 
Appellant does not 
challenge that ruling in this appeal.
 
[¶76]   
Because the issue was not raised by Appellant, the State has had no 
opportunity to address the issue, to identify corroborating evidence in the 
record, or to apply our precedent to the facts of this case.  
The majority reaches its decision without any input from either party on 
this issue.10  The danger of 
reaching the incorrect result without input from the parties is exacerbated by 
the case-specific nature of the corpus delicti 
rule:  “[C]orroborating evidence is adequate if it 
'supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference 
of the truth’ of the confession.  The quantity and type of 
independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts of each 
case.  However, circumstantial evidence can be used to 
corroborate a confession.”  Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1199 (quoting United States v. Clark, 
57 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1995)) (internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added).
 
[¶77]   
The situation presented here is, in many aspects, very similar to those 
reflected in Simmers and Betzle, relied upon by the 
majority.  In both cases, the defendant was convicted of 
sexual abuse crimes involving children.  In both cases, the 
defendant confessed to the crimes.  On appeal, both defendants 
relied upon the corpus delicti rule11 and contended that there was no 
independent corroborating evidence to support the confessions and the 
convictions.  In both cases, this Court rejected the 
argument.
 
[¶78]   
In Simmers, the defendant was convicted of twelve counts of 
second-degree sexual assault involving three victims.  In 
determining whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence, this Court did 
not find it necessary to specifically analyze the evidence for each crime 
charged.  We took a similar approach in 
Betzle.  In Betzle, 
the defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the 
second-degree, two counts of sexual assault in the third degree, and one count 
of taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with a child.  
The victim was a disabled, nine-year-old child with the mental ability of 
a four-year-old.12  During his 
interview with the police, the defendant admitted to several specific incidents 
of improper sexual contact.  We found that there was 
sufficient corroborating evidence:
 
In this case, the 
record discloses testimony by the victim’s mother that, when the victim returned 
from Betzle’s house, she would come home wearing different clothing, 
including one of Betzle’s shirts on one occasion.  
Both the victim’s mother and Betzle testified the victim 
stayed at his house all night on April 14-15, 1990.  The 
father of the victim testified that, around the first of May, the victim 
complained to him she had soreness in her crotch area. At the same time, the 
victim’s mother noticed a decrease in the victim’s appetite, she began to wet 
her pants and to complain of vaginal pain. The pediatrician who examined the 
victim testified she observed irritation and redness in the genital 
area.  The counselor of the victim noted that, when she took 
the victim to their interview room, the victim moved very close to the 
counselor, took her hand and walked with her without lagging behind which was 
unusual conduct for the victim.  These items of evidence in 
the record establish sufficiently for purposes of corroboration, the commission 
of the offense charged, and we hold there was, in this case, sufficient evidence 
of the corpus delicti to justify the introduction into 
evidence of Betzle’s confession.
 
Betzle, 
847 P.2d  at 1022.
 
[¶79]   
Using our decisions in Simmers 
and Betzle as a guide, and applying our standard of 
review which requires us to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, I would conclude that there is sufficient corroborating evidence to 
support the truth of the confession and the convictions.  The 
same evidence that supported the conviction on Count One corroborates the fact 
that Appellant was sexually attracted to the child.  He also 
had opportunity to commit the specific acts alleged in Counts Two through 
Nine.  Appellant is not a stranger to the child.  
He is his stepfather.  He had access to the 
child.  He regularly bathed with the child.  
There is evidence in the record suggesting that the child had been 
subjected to improper sexual contact over a period of time. 
 The forensic interviewer expressed concerns 
over L.W.’s knowledge of sexualized behavior given his young 
age.  Mother had taken L.W. to a doctor with 
concerns about L.W.’s sexual behavior one week prior to the incident 
alleged in Count One.  During that visit, Mother told the 
doctor of prior comments that the child had made regarding sexual contact by 
Appellant in December of the previous year.
 
[¶80]   
The evidence here is not distinguishable in degree from that presented in 
Simmers and Betzle.  There was no 
direct evidence other than the confession of the specific sexual assaults in 
Betzle.  Nor was there direct evidence of 
all of the specific sexual assaults in Simmers.  
Nonetheless, this Court found there was sufficient evidence to 
corroborate the trustworthiness of the confession.  This case 
is no different.  There is sufficient corroborating evidence 
to allow the jury to infer that the confession is trustworthy and, consequently, 
there is sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s eight convictions for 
second-degree sexual abuse.
 
Competency
 
[¶81]   
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s 
competency finding was clearly erroneous.  A finding is 
clearly erroneous and should be overturned only if this Court is “left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 
made.”  Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 17, 
228 P.3d 55, 59 (Wyo. 2010).  
I am not convinced 
that the district court erred in finding that L.W. was 
competent.
 
[¶82]   
From my perspective, the competency decision facing the district court 
was difficult.  The witness was very young and provided 
testimony that in many respects was troubling.  The child, 
however, also provided testimony that supported the district court’s competency 
determination.  The district court did not ignore the 
problematic testimony and specifically addressed it in its decision. 
 During the competency hearing, the district court also heard 
testimony from the therapist who had interviewed L.W. shortly after 
the alleged incident and a clinical psychologist called as a witness by 
Appellant.  The district court referenced the testimony from 
both of those witnesses in its decision.  The district court 
had the opportunity to observe the child testify during the competency hearing 
and at trial.  Ultimately, the district court concluded 
that L.W. was competent.  It summed up its 
reasoning in its Decision and Order on Witness Competency:
 
L.A.W. is 
currently five years old.  He was four-and-a-half when the 
alleged incident occurred.  At the competency 
hearing, L.A.W. was able to relate that he currently lived in 
California, and had previously lived in Wyoming.  He knew his 
age, his brother’s name, and, when asked to identify his mother, was able to 
point to the correct person.  He appeared to understand every 
question directed at him, although he occasionally gave an incorrect 
answer.
 
L.A.W. correctly 
identified his teacher, testified that he was in kindergarten, and that he flew 
on a plane to get to Wyoming.  L.A.W. was asked 
whether he understood the truth versus [an] untruth, and responded 
affirmatively.  When asked whether the statement “We’re 
outside now” is the truth or not the truth, L.A.W. replied “Not the 
truth.”  He responded similarly to questions about whether he 
was in California, and then in Wyoming.  L.A.W. 
seemed confused at some point, however.  For instance, when 
asked how many mother[s] he had, he said, “three.”  He said he 
had “four” fathers.
 
L.A.W. was 
asked about May 21, 2010, the day Defendant is alleged to have anally 
raped L.A.W.  He testified that he went to the 
park with his brother and father [Defendant], but that “it was 
closed.”  He first testified that they did not drive through 
the mud, but later said that his mother got [mad] because they drove the car 
through the mud.  L.A.W. then testified that they 
parked the car, and [he] sat on Defendant’s lap in the driver’s 
seat.  He honked the 
horn.  L.A.W. testified that while on Defendant’s 
lap in the driver’s seat, Defendant removed his pants, and that Defendant was 
not wearing pants, either.
 
L.A.W. testified 
that he does not remember, however, that Defendant raped him.  
He does not remember telling anyone that the event occurred, or 
demonstrating with dolls or pictures that the event happened.
 
Nicole Rosenberger, a 
therapist at the Children’s Advocacy Project, also testified.  
Ms. Rosenberger is the person who 
interviewed L.A.W.  Ms. Rosenberger testified 
that L.A.W. appeared to understand truth and untruth. She also 
testified that she did not observe any mental deficiency in 
L.A.W.
 
Dr. McCoy Haddock, a 
clinical psychologist in California, also 
testified.  L.A.W. is currently a patient of 
Dr. Haddock.  Dr. Haddock testified 
that L.A.W. has a vivid imagination and that his memory is easily 
“contaminated.”
 
Applying 
the Woyak factors, the Court is confident that the 
first factor is satisfied.  L.A.W. is able to 
understand truth and untruth, and recognize the difference.  
He appeared [to] the Court to appreciate the need for him to testify 
truthfully.  
 
The Court believes 
the second factor is also satisfied.  L.A.W. 
remembered the day of the incident, and recalled specific events.  
He was able to speak in detail about flooding inside the park; driving 
through mud; that his mother was angry with Defendant about driving through the 
mud; that he honked the horn on the car; and that he sat on Defendant’s lap 
while both of their pants were off.  His recollection appeared 
to be less clear when the questioning turned to whether Defendant raped him or 
not.  He testified that he did not remember telling anyone 
that Defendant inserted his penis [i]nto his anus.  
The Court is satisfied that L.A.W.’s memory is sufficient to 
testify about what happened on [May] 21, 2010.  His memory of 
that day appeared to the Court to be independent and detailed.  
He appeared to have the capacity to testify whether Defendant raped him 
or not.
 
As to the fourth 
factor, the Court is likewise satisfied that L.A.W.’s vocabulary is 
sufficiently advanced to express in words his memory of the 
occurrence.
 
And 
finally, L.A.W.’s testimony during the competency hearing clearly 
shows he clearly has the capacity to understand simple questions about the 
event.
 
The Court 
finds L.A.W. is competent to testify and be 
cross-examined.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶83]   
The district court also had occasion to address the competency issue 
after trial when the issue was raised again by Appellant in his motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  The district court denied the 
motion.  In addressing the competency issue, the district 
court ruled: 
 
The first issue is 
the competency of LAW to testify.  This was addressed before 
trial and LAW was found competent to testify.  At the 
competency hearing LAW did not say that his step-father had raped him, but did 
say they both had their pants off in the vehicle and that LAW was sitting on the 
Defendant’s lap during their ride around Glenrock on May 21, 2010.
 
At trial, however, 
LAW testified regarding that evening of May 21, 2010:
 
“Q. What did Daddy 
tell you not to tell her? (Mrs. Mersereau)
 
A.       
That he put his 
wiener in my butthole.”
 
The Court was 
convinced, both before and after trial that LAW was competent to testify, that 
he did so to the best of his ability even though it appeared likely that he was 
being subjected to some attempted influence by his family.
 
[¶84]   
In determining that the district court’s competency ruling was clearly 
erroneous, the majority relies upon excerpts from the testimony 
of L.W. regarding the number of family members and pets he 
has.  The problematic testimony was elicited during the 
competency hearing in response to questions from defense counsel.  
At that hearing, defense counsel only asked L.W. a few 
questions:
 
Q.        
L, can I ask you a couple of questions?
 
A.        
Yeah.
 
Q.        
How many grandmothers do you have?
 
A.        
One.
 
Q.        
How many sisters do you have?
 
A.        
Two.
 
Q.        
How many dogs do you have?
 
A.        
I don’t have dogs.
 
Q.        
How many cats do you have?
 
A.        
I have only four – wait.  Three cats.
 
Q.        
How many mothers do you have?
 
A.        
Four.
 
Q.        
How many fathers do you have?
 
A.        
Five.
 
Q.        
How many grandfathers do you have?
 
A.        
I don’t have any.
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: I have no further questions.
 
L.W.’s mother 
admitted at the competency hearing, and at trial, that she had suggested those 
questions to defense counsel.  At the competency hearing in 
response to questions from the State, she testified: 
 
Q.        
Did you tell your husband’s attorney what to ask him?
 
A.        
No. 
 
Q.        
You never did?
 
A.        
I told him things that L had been telling me.  
Stories.
 
Q.        
Like what?
 
A.        
Like having multiple dads.  One of his dads is a 
merman.
 
Q.        
So you told [Defense Counsel] some of the things that L told 
you?
 
A.        
Uh-huh.
 
Q.        
Why did you tell him?
 
A.        
To show that he has imagination, which he does.
 
She testified 
similarly at trial during cross-examination by counsel for the State:
 
Q.        
Ms. Mersereau, [Defense Counsel] asked if you would do 
anything.  Now those are the words you used, 
correct?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
Isn’t it true – you were here and testified in a previous hearing in this 
matter, correct?
 
A.        
Yes, the pretrial, yes.
 
Q.        
Isn’t it true that you told [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son 
that you knew might confuse him?
 
A.        
I do not believe they would confuse him, no.  

 
Q.        
You gave [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son, correct?
 
A.        
Yes, yes, sir, that I had gotten from my son, you know.
 
Q.        
Questions concerning what?
 
A.        
How many parents he has.  How many grandparents, how 
many siblings.
 
Q.        
Questions that you knew L got confused with, correct?
 
A.        
He wasn’t confused.  He was imagining.
 
Q.        
So you gave [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son that you knew he 
imagined?
 
A.        
I did not give him questions.  I told him some of L’s 
stories.
 
Q.        
You told him stories about things that L imagined before we had that 
hearing with L?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
Q.        
Correct?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
[¶85]   
It seems obvious that mother provided the questions to defense counsel in 
an effort to undermine L.W.’s competency.  It is 
also obvious that the answers are not correct.  The majority 
apparently concludes that those answers render L.W. incompetent as a 
matter of law.  The district court took a broader perspective 
and I am unable to find that the decision reached by the district court is 
clearly erroneous.  The district court did not ignore those 
answers.  It considered them, along with all of the evidence 
presented at the hearing, including its personal observations of L.W., in 
concluding that L.W. was competent.
 
[¶86]   
We have repeatedly recognized that the district court is in a far better 
position than this Court to make a competency determination.  
Our standard of review is appropriately deferential because we are 
limited to “reading a cold record” while the district court has the advantage of 
observing the witness during his testimony.  Under the clearly 
erroneous standard of review, we cannot substitute our judgment for the district 
court unless we are “firmly convinced” that an error was made.  

 
[¶87]   
In this case, the district court conducted an appropriate competency 
hearing, weighed the evidence, applied the five English factors, and 
explained its reasoning.  The district court confirmed its 
competency finding after trial in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  While this is a close case and others may come to 
a different conclusion, that is not the role we must play in the appellate 
process.  In this case, we should defer to the district 
court.  I would affirm the district court’s competency 
determination. 
 
Admission of Family 
Photos
 
[¶88]   
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred 
in permitting introduction of nude photos of L.W. and his brother 
into evidence.  The photos were not included in the appellate record and it 
is impossible for this Court to conduct an appropriate review of this 
issue.  Appellant raised this issue on appeal and bears the burden of 
providing this Court with the necessary 
record.  Roeschlein v. State, 2007 
WY 156, ¶ 28, 168 P.3d 468, 476 (Wyo. 2007).  This 
claim of error should be summarily denied.
 
[¶89]   
If we were to address the issue on the merits, I would find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling.  

 
“A trial court’s 
decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, 
and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  Leyva v. 
State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 
165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  “[A]s long as 
there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that ruling will 
not be disturbed on appeal.”  Id., quoting Sanchez 
v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 
142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).
 
Vigil v. 
State, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 
224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶90]   
The photos were offered by the State to establish motive.  
The motive in this case was Appellant’s sexual attraction to young 
children, and L.W. in particular.  This is a 
proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b).  The district court 
reviewed the photos, heard argument from counsel, and, after conducting the 
appropriate analysis, determined that the photos were admissible.  In its 
Decision and Order on Witness Competency, the district court applied the 
Gleason factors and explained:
 
These images show the 
children taking baths or potty training.  Other images, 
however, are more disturbing.  Many of the offered images 
show E.A.M. and L.A.W. playing outdoors in the mud while 
nude, with mud smeared on the children’s body and genitalia.  
Others show [the appellant] sitting in the bathtub 
with L.A.W. on his lap.  At least three of the 
images focus on the children’s genitals or buttocks.  One 
picture shows a young child face down on a bed with his buttocks and hips 
extended up into the air.
 
…
 
a.    
Proper 
Purpose
 
The State offers this 
evidence for motive, and that is indeed a proper purpose.
 
b.    
Relevance
 
The Court finds this 
evidence is relevant.  The fact that Defendant possessed, and 
apparently took, a number of nude photographs of L.A.W. 
and E.A.M. is highly relevant, considering the charges in this 
case.
 
c.    
Probative Value vs. 
Danger of Unfair Prejudice
 
…
 
Defendant does 
dispute the issue on which this evidence is offered, i.e. he contends 
that these pictures are innocent and the type normally taken by 
parents.  The Court disagrees.  The Court is 
of the opinion that these images are not simply pictures that parents typically 
take of their children.  Some of the pictures clearly focus on 
and emphasize the children’s nudity.  At the very least, the 
jury should be permitted to determine whether these images are in fact the type 
typically taken by parents, or something more sinister.  
Defendant will, of course, be free to argue to the jury that the images 
in fact are innocent, and simply the type of pictures parents normally take of 
their young children.
 
…
 
Regarding the 
prejudicial factors, the nude pictures of L.A.W. 
and E.A.M. are not reprehensible if Defendant is correct, and they 
are simply innocent pictures.  The pictures are prejudicial if 
the jury sees in them something other than the innocence attached by 
Defendant.  The children in the picture[s] are certainly 
sympathetic.  

 
[¶91]   
Without viewing the photos, it is impossible to disagree with the 
district court’s ruling.  Appellant contends the photos are 
innocent.  The State contends otherwise.  If 
the photos are “innocent,” it is difficult to understand how Appellant is 
prejudiced by admission of the photos.  If the photos are probative of 
motive, the State should be allowed to introduce the photos.  
In any event, the evidentiary significance of the photos is properly a 
question to be resolved by the jury.
 
Comment upon the 
Weight of the Evidence
 
[¶92]   
The instruction at issue was a limiting instruction requested by 
Appellant.  The instruction was read to the jury prior to the beginning of 
the testimony of Agent Timmons.  Because the instruction was 
requested by Appellant, we must apply the invited error doctrine.  
“As applied to jury instructions, the invited error doctrine provides 
that use of an instruction proposed by the appellant may not be grounds for 
reversal unless such was 'necessarily prejudicial.’”  Butcher v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo. 2005), 
quoting Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1230 (Wyo. 2000).  See also 
Bromley v. State, 2007 
WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 
2007); Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59, ¶ 20, 
155 P.3d 1024, 1030 (Wyo. 2007); Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 26, 
216 P.3d 505, 513 (Wyo. 2009).  I 
would find that Appellant has failed to satisfy that burden. 
 
[¶93]   
The majority did not apply the invited error standard of 
review.  In applying a basic plain error analysis, the 
majority finds prejudice because “the district court informed the jury that the 
websites did contain child pornography.”  The oral limiting 
instruction, however, was not the only jury instruction dealing with this 
issue.

[¶94]   
The jury was provided with Instruction No. 18 prior to 
deliberations.  That instruction states, in pertinent 
part:
 
Also, you heard 
evidence that there were suspected child pornography websites on the 
Defendant’s computer.  This evidence was admitted for a 
limited purpose.  … However, before you consider evidence of 
the photographs or the websites, it must be proven to you by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the Defendant viewed the photographs 
and/or websites.13  
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Appellant did not object to that 
instruction.  Jury instructions are to be viewed in their 
entirety and considered as a whole.  Burnett v. State, 
2011 WY 169, ¶ 14, 
267 P.3d 1083, 1087 (Wyo. 2011).  In light of the 
heightened burden facing Appellant under the invited error doctrine and the 
district court’s Instruction No. 18, I would conclude that Appellant has failed 
to establish that the challenged instruction was “necessarily prejudicial.” 

 
Improper Opinion 
Evidence
 
[¶95]   
In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that plain error occurred during 
trial when the prosecutor improperly commented upon the credibility of Appellant 
in his opening statement and closing argument.  The majority 
rejected that argument finding that the prosecutor was not expressing his 
opinion on Appellant’s credibility, but rather, was merely commenting upon 
evidence that would be, or was, produced at trial.  I agree 
with the majority’s resolution of that issue.
 
[¶96]   
The primary focus of Appellant’s fifth issue, however, involved the 
testimony of Officer Peech and a recording, played for the jury, of 
significant aspects of Appellant’s interview with law enforcement.  
The majority concludes that plain error occurred because 
Officer Peech provided “impermissible opinion evidence regarding the 
appellant’s credibility.”  The majority concludes that the 
prejudice prong of the test for plain error was satisfied because defense 
counsel was forced to play otherwise objectionable portions of the interview for 
the jury in order to respond to the improper opinion testimony.  
I disagree with this result for several reasons.
 
[¶97]   
First, Officer Peech was testifying as to facts.  
He was not providing opinion testimony regarding the veracity of 
Appellant’s statements.  Second, even if the testimony could 
be construed as improper opinion testimony, the district court responded to the 
objection by immediately providing the jury a cautionary 
instruction.  There was no prejudice to Appellant at that 
point.  Third, it was Appellant who introduced the 
objectionable excerpts from the confession, not the State.  
Fourth, the majority’s assertion that Appellant’s decision to introduce 
the interview evidence was forced by the brief comment of 
Officer Peech is not supported by the record.
 
[¶98]   
In order to prevail on his claim of plain error, Appellant must establish 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  
Appellant asserts, and the majority agrees, that the challenged testimony 
from Officer Peech was improper opinion testimony regarding the 
truthfulness of Appellant.  The State disagrees and contends 
that Officer Peech was referencing specific admissions of lying made 
by Appellant during the interview.  I am inclined to agree 
with the State.
 
[¶99]   
In order to evaluate Officer Peech’s testimony, it is 
essential to place it in context. Officer Peech was called as a 
witness by the State.  He provided background information 
regarding his law enforcement training and explained that he had become involved 
in the case at the request of the Department of Family Services.  
He testified that he contacted Appellant at his house and Appellant 
agreed to meet with him at the sheriff’s office.  Appellant 
arrived at the office a short time later and the interview 
commenced.  He advised Appellant that his stepson had made an 
allegation of sexual abuse against him.  He testified that 
Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs 
during any part of the interview.
 
[¶100] 
He then testified:  
 
Q:        
Now, during the course of that interview, say within the first hour or 
so, did Mr. Mersereau ever indicate whether he was telling the truth 
about what you were talking about?
 
A:        
He indicated that he was lying –
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection, speculative – pardon me, go 
ahead.
 
THE 
WITNESS:  He told me several times throughout the interview he 
was lying.
 
Q:        
How would he tell you that?
 
A:        
I confronted him a couple of times on some stuff that he lied about, and 
he admitted it was a lie and told me the truth.
 
            
A couple of times I – I put an imaginative scale on the table of 0 to a 
hundred or 0 to 10 and asked him where he was on that, and once he told me he 
was 30, and once he told me, I think, three.
 
Q:        
What were the scales, one being a lie and ten being the truth?
 
A:        
It was 0 being a lie and ten or a hundred being the truth.
 
[¶101] 
Officer Peech then related the admissions by Appellant 
regarding sexual contact that formed the basis of the charges alleged in Counts 
Two through Nine.  He testified that Appellant made the same 
admissions during the interview on the second day when Investigator Koss was 
present.  He testified about Appellant’s responses to 
questions regarding the incident on May 21 (Count One).  He 
testified about Appellant’s responses to his questions regarding anal sex and 
that questioning led to this exchange:
 
Q:        
When you say tried, had he had anal sex with her; did he tell 
you?
 
A:        
In the first interview initially we were talking about what Danielle told 
us that he tried to have anal sex with her and she was asleep.  
She felt like she needed to defecate, and she confronted him about that, 
and he denied it, and later he admitted.
 
Q:        
First he denied it, but later said that he had?
 
A: 
       Yes, sir.
 
Q:        
When did he admit that he had done it later?
 
A:        
Later in the interview.  Probably an hour and a 
half.  I don’t know.
 
Q:        
Mr. Peech, you say that total first day was roughly 4, 4 and a 
half hours?
 
A:        
Yes, sir.
 
Q:        
Can you tell us why you went that long?
 
A:        
He was not telling us the truth.  We would get a little 
truth – he would deny stuff –
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection.  This answer is 
speculative and is a guess.
 
[PROSECUTION]:  
I’m asking why he conducted the interview so long.  He 
can refrain from saying whether it was the truth or not.
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, insofar as the defendant admitted that he 
wasn’t telling the truth, you can answer that – you can talk about 
that.
 
            
In terms of your general opinion, the jury will disregard any general 
opinions, because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.
 
            
With that ruling, go ahead.
 
Q:        
My question, Mr. Peech, is why did you interview him for that 
long?
 
A:        
Because he admitted several times that he lied to us about facts that 
we were talking about.  And he admitted that he was lying 
on a scale, and that it just kept on taking us a little bit more time to get 
another truthful fact out of him and another truthful fact out of 
him.
 
Q:        
What he described?
 
A:        
To another truthful fact of what he described.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In context, it is apparent that 
Officer Peech was referring to the admissions Appellant had made 
regarding his lack of truthfulness.  Because 
Officer Peech was referring to admissions of Appellant, there was no 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. 
 
[¶102] 
More significantly, even if the comment of Officer Peech is 
viewed as improper opinion testimony concerning Appellant’s truthfulness, I am 
unable to find any prejudice caused by the brief exchange.  
The district court apparently recognized that the comment could be viewed 
either as a statement referring to the prior admissions of untruthfulness by 
Appellant, or improper opinion testimony concerning Appellant’s 
untruthfulness.  In response, the district court gave an 
appropriate cautionary instruction.  The majority concedes 
that “under most circumstances this error might be considered 
harmless.”   
 
[¶103] 
The majority finds prejudice, however, by concluding that this brief 
exchange forced Appellant to introduce the objectionable portions of the 
interrogation into evidence.  It is difficult to understand 
how the majority reaches that conclusion, and I find no support for it in the 
record.  Perhaps most troubling is the majority’s reference to 
the denial of the motion to suppress.  According to the 
majority, “defense counsel was left with little choice but to attempt to exploit 
the interview after the district court denied the motion to 
suppress.”  I agree with that statement, but the dismissal of 
a motion to suppress a confession should not result in a finding of plain error 
when the defense opts to introduce portions of the confession into 
evidence.  Here, the majority correctly found no error in the 
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.  In that 
confession, Appellant specifically admitted to the conduct that resulted in the 
charges described in Counts Two through Nine.  Although he 
denied the specific sexual act alleged in Count One, he also admitted to 
relevant facts concerning that alleged incident.  
 
[¶104] 
The State could properly introduce these admissions into 
evidence.  Appellant knew from the outset that he would have 
to confront that evidence at trial.  As a tactical decision, 
he opted to contest the voluntariness of the confession and the admissions at 
trial.  Counsel for Appellant indicated in opening statement 
that they would challenge the confession: “We are going to look at a confession, 
and we are going to look at how the police may have beat the defendant like a 
rented mule to elicit this so-called confession.” 
 
[¶105] 
In his pretrial memorandum, Appellant identified a forensic psychologist 
as a potential defense witness.  During trial, the 
psychologist testified for the defense.  His testimony 
encompassed the interrogation methods and the psychology of an accused in an 
interrogation setting.  He testified specifically as to 
Officer Peech’s interrogation techniques and the impact it may have 
had on Appellant.  In response to questioning from defense 
counsel, he testified that he did not hear Appellant admit to lying in the 
interview.  He opined that Appellant’s statements regarding 
the improper touching (Counts Two through Nine) were not admissions but merely 
speculation from Appellant as to how or why L.W. would have come up 
with the story of anal assault if it had not actually occurred.
 
[¶106] 
During the State’s examination of Officer Peech, and prior to the 
exchange challenged by Appellant, the State attempted to introduce a transcript 
of a portion of the interview into evidence.  Defense counsel 
objected:
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, this is just a piece of eight hours of 
interviews.  I would object.
 
            
If we are going to have the interview, we ought to put the whole 
interview in.  This is just one piece out of eight 
hours.  It doesn’t tell everything that happened.
 
            
And I have notes on this section.  I think there is an 
inaccuracy in here, and I would like to double-check that.
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, 7 – in the absence of a stipulation, 7 is 
hearsay.
 
Thereafter, the State 
did not attempt to introduce any written or recorded portion of the interview 
into evidence during its direct examination of Officer Peech.  
The recorded interview was introduced by Appellant during 
cross-examination of Officer Peech.14
 
[¶107] 
This case is vastly different than Sweet, relied upon by the 
majority.  In Sweet, the investigating officer provided 
improper opinion testimony concerning the veracity of a witness and the 
untruthfulness of the defendant.  Some of the objectionable 
opinion testimony occurred during the interrogation by police and some was 
introduced by direct testimony of the officer at trial.  
Significantly, all of it was introduced by the State.  
Id., ¶¶ 11-20, 234 P.3d  at 1198-1201.  

 
[¶108] 
In Pendleton, the objectionable opinion comments were made during 
the interrogation.  The State sought to introduce the 
evidence.  Defense counsel voiced no objection and urged 
introduction of the interview.  We rejected the defendant’s 
plain error contention, in part, because the defendant had advocated for the 
introduction of the evidence.  Id., ¶ 16, 
180 P.3d  at 217-18.
 
[¶109] 
Here, the State did not introduce any of the objectionable portions of 
the interview.  Appellant did not merely advocate for 
introduction of evidence.  In this case, Appellant introduced 
all of the objectionable portions of the interview in an effort to discredit the 
voluntariness of the confession.  It was a legitimate trial 
tactic and dovetailed with specific jury instructions consistent with the 
defense theory of the case.  Instructions 17 and 19 advised 
the jury:
 
Instruction No. 
17
 
Statements made by 
the Defendant to law enforcement officers shall be considered by you only if you 
first determine that such statements were made voluntarily, in whole or in part. 
Statements are made voluntarily if they are the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than by intimidation [or] coercion, or in reliance upon an express 
promise of special favor, leniency or benefit.  The fact the 
Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, the conduct of the officers 
during the interview, the apparent intelligence of the Defendant, his age and 
his experience with law enforcement are but a few of the factors you are to 
consider as part of the totality of the circumstances under which the statement 
was elicited.  In making this determination, you are to view 
those factors as a reasonable person would view them and not as the Defendant 
may claim to have perceived them.  
 
I[f] you find the 
statement is not voluntary, you must not consider it as evidence against the 
Defendant.  If you find it is voluntary, in whole or in part, 
you must consider only that [part] of the statement which you find to have been 
voluntary.
 
Instruction No. 
19
 
Evidence has been 
admitted that the Defendant made statements regarding the crimes charged. The 
Defendant contends that the statements were not truthful.  

 
Whether the 
Defendant’s statements, or any part thereof, were truthful is a question for the 
jury. 
 
Although the majority 
finds plain error in the receipt of the evidence, there was simply no basis for 
the district court to prevent introduction of the evidence when it was sought by 
Appellant.  It was sound defense strategy.  
It was not error to allow Appellant to pursue that line of 
defense.
 
[¶110] I 
am also concerned about the impact of this decision on future cases.  
Every defendant convicted of a crime based, in part, on evidence obtained 
during interrogation by law enforcement, can enhance his chances for a reversal 
on appeal merely by introducing at trial objectionable statements made during 
the interrogation.  While that may not be the result intended 
by the majority, application of this precedent will inexorably lead to that 
result.  
 
[¶111] 
In sum, I would find that Appellant has failed to establish plain 
error.  Appellant introduced the objectionable portion of the 
interview into evidence.  He was not forced to introduce that 
evidence because of the brief comment by Officer Peech.  
That comment could reasonably be viewed as a reference to specific 
admissions made by Appellant during the interview.  Even if it 
could be viewed as improper opinion testimony, the district court minimized any 
prejudice by immediately issuing a cautionary instruction.  
Admission of the interview evidence was consistent with the defense 
theory of the case employed from opening statement through closing 
argument.  We should reject Appellant’s claim of plain error 
for the same reasons we expressed in Pendleton:
 
As can be seen, the 
appellant relied heavily on the recorded interview, and this evidence was an 
important, if not vital, part of the appellant’s defense strategy. 
 She cannot have it both ways, and now claim that she was 
prejudiced by the inclusion of this evidence.  
 
Id., ¶ 16, 
180 P.3d  at 217-18.
 
FOOTNOTES
1At the 
competency hearing, the victim testified that he has one grandmother, two 
sisters, no dogs, three cats, four mothers, five fathers, and no 
grandfathers.  However, his mother explained that he has two 
grandmothers, no sisters, no cats, and two grandfathers.  At 
trial, the victim testified that he has no grandmothers, five dogs, two cats, 
two sisters, and one brother.  His mother thereafter testified 
that the victim has no cats, dogs, or sisters.
  2While the State 
is required to give a defendant notice of its intent to use evidence pursuant 
to W.R.E. 404(b), such a notice is not contained in the district 
court record.  However, it does not appear that the appellant 
objected to the evidence on the basis of a lack of notice, nor does he make that 
argument on appeal.  Therefore, we will presume that the State 
gave proper notice of its intent to use this evidence.  

  3On appeal, the 
State submits that the evidence of uncharged misconduct “pertained only to the 
single charge of first-degree sexual abuse.”
4This instruction 
exemplifies our concern with the imprecision in the admission of uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  This 
evidence was offered for the sole purpose of proving motive, yet the jury was 
instructed that it may be considered as proof of “motive, intent, knowledge, or 
presence or absence of mistake.”
5In his 
brief, the appellant also claims Deputy Peech threatened to tell the 
prosecutor that the appellant was a psychopath.  The appellant 
has not supported this claim with any independent argument, and essentially 
relies upon the same information as alleged regarding the religious 
psychological coercion.  As such, we consider it part of the 
alleged religious psychological coercion.
6The time 
may have come where this Court should re-evaluate its plain error review 
standard and consider whether it should not also include an analysis of errors 
that seriously affect the fairness of the trial or the integrity of judicial 
proceedings, whether or not the defendant is able to prove specific 
prejudice.  See Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error 
Rule--Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 1065 
(1994).  The underlying concept is that the failure to 
interpose a timely objection, for instance, may result in a forfeiture of that 
right, but forfeiture does not equate to waiver and it does not extinguish the 
error.  Id. at 1072.
7The appellant 
was charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
states:
 
(a)    
An actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree 
if:
 
(ii)    
Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and the actor 
is the victim’s legal guardian or an individual specified in W.S. 
6-4-402[.]
8The appellant 
was charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315 (a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
states:
 
(a)    
Except under circumstance[s] constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the 
first degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an actor commits the crime 
of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree if:
 
(iii)     
Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual 
contact with a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age and the actor 
is the victim’s legal guardian or an individual specified in W.S. 
6-4-402[.]
9I also 
agree that:  (1) There was sufficient evidence to support 
Appellant’s conviction on Count I; (2) Appellant failed to establish that his 
confession was involuntary; (3) It was error to give the “no corroboration of 
victim’s testimony is necessary” instruction; and (4) Appellant did not 
establish ineffectiveness of defense counsel. 
10I question 
the majority’s use of language from the State’s brief to imply that the State is 
conceding that there was no corroborating evidence to support the truth of the 
confession.  Because the issue was not raised, the State never 
addressed the issue and any statements by the State in its brief are necessarily 
taken out of context.
11Again, I would 
point out that, in this case, Appellant did not raise the 
corpus delicti issue.
12According to 
the Court: 
The victim in this 
case is a handicapped child.  She suffered from a malignant 
brain tumor for which she had been subjected to radiation therapy, chemotherapy, 
and surgery.  Although nine years old at the time of the 
alleged offenses, the victim’s mental ability was that of a four-year old or a 
four-year, eight-month old child.  She had been subjected to 
five surgeries which compounded her slowness, lack of coordination, speech 
problems, right-sided weakness and impaired long-term memory. 
 
Betzle, 
847 P.2d  at 1013.
13The word 
“suspected” was handwritten on the typed jury instruction.
14On redirect, 
the State introduced a brief portion of the interview into evidence without 
objection.  That portion of the interview is not challenged by 
Appellant, or relied upon by the majority in reaching its 
determination.  See majority opinion paragraph 54.
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

 
ADAM 
J. MERSEREAU,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Converse County
The Honorable John C. 
Brooks, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Tara 
B. Nethercott and Gay V. Woodhouse, Woodhouse Roden, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Nethercott.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Pope.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
VOIGT, J., 
delivers the opinion 
of the Court; BURKE, J., files a concurring in part and dissenting in 
part opinion, in which KITE, C.J., joins.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      
The appellant, Adam J. Mersereau, was convicted of one count of 
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse of a minor.  In this appeal, he raises eight issues 
where he claims there was error in his trial.  After a careful 
review of the record, we cannot say that the appellant received a fair 
trial.  Therefore, we reverse the appellant’s convictions and 
remand for a new trial.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
1.    Whether the district court’s 
decision that the victim was competent to testify was clearly 
erroneous.
 
            
2.    Whether the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted computer forensic evidence and family photos into 
evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).
 
            
3.    Whether the district court commented 
improperly upon the weight of the evidence.
 
            
4.    Whether the district court erred when 
it determined that the appellant’s statement to Deputy Peech was 
given voluntarily.
 
            
5.    Whether plain error occurred when 
Deputy Peech expressed his opinion that the appellant was lying 
during the interview.
 
            
6.    Whether plain error occurred when the 
district court instructed the jury that there need be no corroboration of the 
victim’s testimony in order to convict the appellant.
 
            
7.    Whether the State presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain each of the convictions.
 
            
8.    Whether the appellant received 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
The details of the factual allegations underlying the convictions in 
this case are somewhat confusing and difficult to organize into a meaningful and 
understandable timeline.  Suffice it to say, the appellant was 
charged with one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a child, wherein it was 
alleged that the appellant anally penetrated his four-year-old stepson in the 
family car.  The charges were brought after the victim had 
been examined by the family’s physician assistant, a sexual assault nurse 
examiner, and a forensic interviewer.  While being interviewed 
by Deputy Peech with the Converse County Sheriff’s Department 
regarding the allegation, the appellant made statements that led to eight counts 
of second-degree sexual abuse of a child.  These charges 
alleged that the appellant had engaged in various instances of sexual contact 
with the victim while the appellant was giving the victim a bath.  
After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of all nine of the 
charges against him.  Due to the number of issues in the 
appeal, additional facts will be discussed when relevant.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Whether the district 
court’s decision that the victim was competent to testify was clearly 
erroneous
 
[¶4]      
One month before the trial began, the district court held a hearing to 
determine whether the victim, who was four years old at the time of the crimes 
and five years old at the time of trial, was competent to testify.  
The district court heard testimony from the victim, a forensic 
psychologist, and a psychologist hired by the appellant.  
Thereafter, the district court concluded that the victim was competent to 
testify.  The district court found specifically that the 
victim could recognize the difference between the truth and a lie and that he 
appeared to appreciate the need to testify truthfully, he had the ability to 
recall specific events and had the ability to speak about them, and he had the 
capacity to understand simple questions.  The appellant argues 
that the record does not support the district court’s decision and, instead, 
demonstrates that the victim was not competent to testify.
 
[¶5]      
This Court reviews a district court’s findings regarding the competency 
of a child to testify as follows:
 
It is a 
well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
However, when children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have 
held that once the child’s competency is called into question by either party, 
it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to 
determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown 
to be clearly erroneous.
 
English v. 
State, 
982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations and emphasis 
omitted).  We must give a considerable amount of deference to 
the trial court because it “is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, 
truth, and veracity of the 
witness[.]”  Gruwell v. State, 2011 
WY 67, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 223, 231 (Wyo. 2011).  
Therefore,
 
“[w]e do not presume 
to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a 
cold record.  The trial court sees the witness’ facial 
expressions, hears inflections in [his] voice and watches [his] mannerisms 
during examination.  These observations are a vital part of 
the ultimate ruling on competency.”
 
Id. (quoting Seward 
v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 32, 
76 P.3d 805, 819 (Wyo. 2003)).
 
[¶6]      
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence presume that “[e]very person is competent 
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these 
rules.”  W.R.E. 601.  “A person 
is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and 
narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before 
testifying.”  Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997).  Further, a witness’ intelligence, not 
his age, should guide a court in determining whether the witness is competent to 
testify.  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 
(Wyo. 1987).
 
[¶7]      
This Court has adopted a five-part test for the district courts to 
consider when determining whether a child is a competent witness.  
The district court must determine whether the child has:
 
(1) an understanding 
of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental 
capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to 
receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an 
independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words 
his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple 
questions about it.
 
Larsen v. 
State, 
686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984).
 
[¶8]      
In its decision letter, the district court analyzed the five-part test 
and determined that the victim was competent to testify.  The 
appellant argues, however, that the district court’s conclusions are not 
supported by the record.  After a careful review of the 
record, we agree with the appellant’s argument, and hold that the district 
court’s decision was clearly erroneous.  
 
[¶9]      
The district court concluded that the victim was able to differentiate 
between the truth and a lie, and that he “appeared [] to appreciate the need for 
him to testify truthfully.”  At the competency hearing, the 
victim properly recognized that it would “not be the truth” to say he was 
outside or in California during his testimony.  He also 
understood it was the truth to say he was currently in Wyoming.  
He properly stated that it was “not the truth” to say the prosecutor’s 
shirt was purple, while it would be the truth to say it was blue.  
The record clearly demonstrates that, when asked simple questions, the 
victim understood the difference between a truth and a lie.
 
[¶10]   
However, the question of whether the victim appreciated the need to 
testify truthfully is problematic.  At the competency hearing, 
the child was not asked by the district court, the prosecutor, or defense 
counsel whether he understood he was required to tell the truth in a 
courtroom.  Nor was he ever asked if he understood, from a 
moral perspective, why it is important to tell the truth and not to tell lies, 
especially in the courtroom.  The State points out that the 
forensic interviewer informed the victim that he needed to tell the truth during 
the forensic interview.  Unfortunately, that does not 
demonstrate that the victim understood and appreciated the need to tell the 
truth in the courtroom.
 
[¶11]   
Immediately before his trial testimony, the district court told the 
victim that he needed to tell the truth, and the victim responded that he 
understood.  However, we are not convinced, based upon the 
meager evidence at the competency hearing, that the victim truly did understand 
that obligation.  This is borne out by the fact that at the 
competency hearing and at the trial, the victim testified to verifiably untrue 
information, including how many family members and pets he had.  
In fact, the victim gave incorrect information about how many 
grandmothers, pets, and sisters he had immediately after being reminded by the 
district court that he needed to tell the truth.1  We also 
have significant concern that the victim’s imagination regarding his 
non-existent pets was intertwined with his testimony regarding the incident 
where the appellant allegedly anally penetrated him:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  
So you remember it was in the morning.  Were you in the 
car for a long time or not very long?
 
[VICTIM]:  
Very long.
 
            
Q.    Did your mom get mad that you were gone 
so long?
 
            
A.    No, she had a cat.
 
            
Q.    She what?
 
            
A.    She had a cat.
 
            
Q.    She had an [sic] a cat?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
            
Q.    Did you have a pet?
 
            
A.    A dog.  It was a 
boy.
 
            
Q.    A boy dog?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
            
Q.    Now, when you came home on that long 
trip with your dad, do you remember what you did when you got home?
 
            
A.    Yeah, fed the cat.
 
            
Q.    You fed the cat?
 
            
A.    Yeah.
 
Based upon all of 
these circumstances, we find that the district court’s decision finding the 
victim was competent to testify was clearly erroneous.  While 
the victim could identify the difference between the truth and a lie when asked 
direct questions about whether something was a truth or a lie, there is no 
evidence to support the conclusion that he understood the obligation to tell the 
truth while testifying.  
 
[¶12]   
We are aware that the district court and this Court determine only the 
competency of the victim, and not his credibility.  See 
Watters v. State, 2004 WY 
155, ¶ 18, 101 P.3d 908, 916 (Wyo. 2004).  
Here, the fact that the victim was telling verifiable untruths (that he 
knew were not true) on the witness stand has nothing to do with his credibility 
in this analysis.  Instead, it demonstrates that he, for 
whatever reason, was unable to appreciate the need to tell the truth in the 
courtroom.
 
[¶13]   
Further, we cannot find that this error was harmless.  
The victim was the only witness to the appellant’s criminal conduct, and 
without his testimony there was no allegation of the criminal conduct except 
through information provided to third parties.  We find that 
this lack of evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to the appellant that it 
warrants reversal of his convictions and a remand for a new trial.
 
[¶14]   
The appellant has also claimed that the victim’s testimony was tainted by 
his mother and the forensic interviewer.  Because this issue 
was not brought to the district court’s attention at the competency hearing, and 
because we are reversing for a new trial based upon the overreaching competency 
issue, we decline to address whether the victim’s testimony was 
tainted.  However, we will note that, based upon the record 
that is before this Court, it is not a far-fetched conclusion that the victim’s 
testimony was tainted.
 
[¶15]   
The victim’s mother testified that she believed that the statement, 
“Daddy put his peepee in my butthole,” may have evolved from an 
incident that occurred approximately six to seven months before the alleged 
sexual abuse was investigated by law enforcement.  She 
explained that, after watching a story on the news about stepparents molesting 
their stepchildren, she asked the victim “if daddy ever stuck 
[his] peepee in your butt hole.”  She also 
testified that, after the victim had been examined by the physician’s assistant, 
she called her sister and her sister-in-law and told each of them that the 
victim had said that “Daddy stuck his peepee in [his] butt 
hole.”  These conversations took place in front of the 
victim.  Further, the forensic interviewer focused on the same 
phrase during her interview of the victim.  She told the 
victim that his mother told her that “dad put his peepee in your 
butthole,” and used the phrase approximately thirty-five more times throughout 
the course of the interview.  While we are not holding that 
this evidence does, in fact, definitively demonstrate taint, we caution the 
district court that this is a significant issue that should be resolved if there 
is a retrial.
 
Whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted computer forensic evidence and 
family photos into evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b)
 
[¶16]   
Before the trial began, the district court considered whether the State 
could produce uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b).  Specifically, the State wanted to introduce several 
photos of the victim and his brother engaging in various innocent activities in 
the nude, images from the appellant’s computer which the State alleged to be 
child pornography, and evidence that the appellant visited several pornographic 
websites on the internet.  The district court heard testimony 
from the appellant’s wife and Agent Timmons, with the Division of Criminal 
Investigation.  After the hearing, the district court issued a 
decision letter, in which it determined the photos of the victim and his 
brother, and the fact that the appellant visited pornographic websites and that 
there was child pornography found on his computer were admissible, while the 
actual images of child pornography were too prejudicial to be 
admitted.
 
[¶17]   
We review a district court’s decision regarding the admission of 
uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) as 
follows:
 
We review claims of 
error concerning the improper admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence 
for abuse of discretion and will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a 
clear abuse.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 
131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 2006).  A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Id.  In this context, 
“reasonably” means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious.  
Id.
 
Rolle v. 
State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d 259, 264 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Bromley v. State, 2007 
WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206-07 (Wyo. 2007)).  
Even if a district court abused its discretion in admitting uncharged 
misconduct evidence, we must also determine whether the error was 
prejudicial.  Rolle, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d  at 264.  “'Error is prejudicial if there 
is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the defendant if the error had not been made.’”  Id. 
(quoting Vigil v. State, 2010 
WY 15, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010)).
 
[¶18]   W.R.E. 
404 prohibits the use of evidence of a defendant’s character or trait to prove 
that he acted in conformity with that character or 
trait.  W.R.E. 404(a) and (b).  
However, evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admissible to prove a 
defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”  W.R.E. 404(b).  Use 
of this type of evidence carries the risk of significant prejudice to the 
defendant and, therefore, we have developed a mandatory procedure before 
evidence may be admitted under W.R.E. 404(b):
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the 
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  
We do not apply this test on appeal; rather, it is intended to be 
conducted by the trial court.
 
. . . .
 
            
For proper appellate review of the admissibility of evidence 
under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court 
required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged 
misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why it is 
probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial . . . . 
 To make sure there is no doubt in the future that this is a 
required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of this opinion:
 
            
In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial 
court should consider the following factors:
 
1.    
How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?
 
2.    
Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the 
prior bad acts evidence?
 
3.    
Is other evidence available?
 
4.    
Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?
 
5.    
How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act?
 
            
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case 
on an improper basis.  In balancing against its probative 
value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court should 
consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central 
question whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  
The trial court should weigh these additional factors against the 
probative value of the evidence:
 
1.    
The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act.  The 
more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish 
the defendant for the prior act.
 
2.    
The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad 
act.  Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant 
for the prior act if the victim was especially vulnerable.
 
3.    
The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.  The more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood 
that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the defendant did it 
once, he probably did it again.
 
4.    
The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad 
act.  When the prior act is a more serious offense than the 
charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in 
a different and unfavorable light.
 
5.    
The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden 
inferences.  Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more 
probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted by 
Rule 404(b).
 
6.    
Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction.  The 
jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped 
punishment for the prior bad act.
 
Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 18, 27, 
57 P.3d 332, 340, 342-43 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶19]   
Here, the district court held a pretrial hearing on the matter and heard 
testimony regarding information found on the appellant’s computer, including 
photos of the victim and his younger brother in the nude, suspected child 
pornographic images of girls, and visits to pornographic websites.2  The State argued 
the photos of the victim and his brother in the nude, and apparently the images 
of suspected child pornography, would be properly introduced to show the 
appellant’s course of conduct and motive--namely his desire for “sexual 
intercourse with children” and that he “has a fetish with anal sex.”  
While the proper purpose for the admission of the websites was not clear 
from the State’s argument, the district court interpreted that motive was the 
alleged proper purpose.  Further, the State provided minimal 
explanation as to the balancing of the probative value of all of the evidence 
versus the potential for prejudice against the appellant.  The 
State simply stated that the information was “a big part of that puzzle” and was 
not unduly prejudicial.  The State further stated: “If the 
defense wants a limiting instruction not to consider child pornography for the 
wrong reason, I understand that, but they are relevant and probative, Your 
Honor.”
 
[¶20]   
Despite the State’s thin attempt to demonstrate why the evidence was 
admissible under W.R.E. 404(b), the district court engaged in a 
somewhat more thorough analysis in its decision letter.  The 
district court analyzed each piece of evidence individually, and gave some 
consideration to each of the Gleason factors.  After 
completing its analysis, the district court found that the photos of the victim 
and his brother and the fact that the appellant visited pornographic websites 
that might contain child pornography were admissible.  The 
district court concluded that the actual images that may be child pornography 
were too prejudicial for the jury to see, but the district court did allow 
testimony that child pornography was found on the computer.  A 
review of the record demonstrates that the uncharged misconduct evidence was 
substantially more prejudicial than probative in this case and, therefore, the 
district court abused its discretion in finding otherwise.
 
[¶21]   
With respect to the nude photos of the victim and his brother, the 
district court found that the State offered the photos to prove motive, which is 
a proper purpose.  The district court then found that the 
appellant’s possession of nude photographs of his children was relevant to show 
motive, considering that he was charged with sexually abusing his 
son.  When evaluating the probative value of the evidence, the 
district court found that it was clear that the appellant either took or 
possessed the photos of his children.  The district court also 
found that, while the appellant argued that the photos were normal photos that 
parents take of their children, it was for the jury to determine whether they 
were innocent or more sinister.  The district court determined 
that there was no other evidence available, because these were the only nude 
photos of the children.  The district court also found that 
the photos were taken in a relatively close period of time to the offenses the 
appellant was accused of committing.  With respect to the 
prejudicial nature of the photos, the district court concluded that the photos 
were not necessarily reprehensible, but could be prejudicial if the jury did not 
believe them to be innocent family photos, and that the children in the photos 
are sympathetic victims.  It determined that the photos were 
not very similar to the charged acts because they don’t show sexual abuse, and 
that the enormity of the charged crime is much more significant than any bad 
conduct demonstrated in the photos.  The district court 
recognized that the appellant had not been convicted of a crime associated with 
the photos and, while it recognized that there was a prejudicial danger 
associated with admitting the photos, that danger did not substantially outweigh 
the probative value of showing motive.  Finally, the district 
court stated that, if requested by the appellant, it would provide a jury 
instruction about the limited nature of the evidence.
 
[¶22]   
The district court then went on to find that the pornographic images from 
the computer were too prejudicial to be admissible.  
Importantly, the district court recognized that these images could not be 
“established definitely” as child pornography, although the images appeared to 
show minors engaged in sexual acts.  The district court also 
recognized that there was other evidence available to establish 
motive.
 
[¶23]   
Finally, the district court analyzed whether testimony regarding the 
pornographic websites was admissible.  Again, the district 
court found that the State sought to offer the evidence to show motive, which is 
a proper purpose, and the fact that the appellant was visiting websites that 
depicted child pornography was highly relevant to the charged 
offenses.  With respect to balancing the probative value 
versus the danger of unfair prejudice, the district court found that it was 
clear that the appellant viewed the aforementioned pornographic images, the 
appellant admitted that he visited pornographic websites, and the appellant did 
not dispute the issue on which the State was offering the evidence.  
The district court determined that the websites were the only evidence 
available to show that the appellant possessed child pornography, as the 
district court determined that the images themselves could not be 
admitted.  The district court also found that the evidence was 
not cumulative and there was nothing presented to show that the images were not 
recently downloaded.  Specifically in regard to prejudice, the 
district court recognized that viewing child pornography is reprehensible and 
there was some danger that the jury would be tempted to punish the appellant for 
that behavior.  While victims of child pornography are 
sympathetic, the district court believed that would be mitigated by the fact 
that the persons in the images were not parties in the case or was their 
identity known.  The district court recognized that possessing 
child pornography is quite different from sexually abusing a child and, although 
it is a serious crime, is not as serious as facing multiple counts of sexual 
abuse of a minor.  Finally, the district court found that the 
appellant had not been previously convicted of a crime for this behavior, and 
that any potential prejudice could be remedied through a jury 
instruction.  Therefore, the evidence was 
admissible.  
 
[¶24]   
Although the district court “applied” the Gleason test, some of 
the factors were not appropriately analyzed, and we cannot find that the 
district court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of any 
of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the potential unfair 
prejudice to the appellant.  This Court’s biggest concern is 
with the district court’s conclusion that the fact that the appellant visited 
pornographic websites was admissible.  First and foremost, the 
facts presented at the hearing did not establish that the pornographic websites 
the appellant visited actually contained child pornography.  
At the hearing, the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent 
testified as follows:
 
[PROSECUTOR].  
Did you visit any [sic] of those two web sites?
 
[WITNESS].  
Unfortunately, I could not, due to the state policy, we are on the state 
network, and my director would be involved in that, and I didn’t want 
that.
 
When defense counsel 
conducted a voir dire of the agent, it was reiterated that this 
agent actually had no independent knowledge of what images were found on these 
websites:
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL].  And you never visited this 
site?
 
            
[WITNESS].  No, I have not.
 
            
Q.    And is this talking about child girls 
or child boys?
 
            
A.    I have not visited the site, but this 
is what my co-workers mentioned that they described from the site from them 
seeing.
 
            
Q.    So you have no knowledge of the site at 
all?
 
            
A.    No.
 
            
Q.    And then let’s go back to the one above 
that.  It says www.slutload.com.watch, and it has a 
bunch of indecipherable letters and numbers.  And then it says 
incest/sex/video/family/taboo.  Have you ever 
visited ed [sic] that?
 
            
A.    No, I have not.
 
            
Q.    You don’t know what that does, 
correct?
 
            
A.    No, as I mentioned before, I don’t 
visit these sites from my state computer.
 
[¶25]   
These passages demonstrate that the DCI agent actually had no 
knowledge of whether the sites visited by the appellant contained any child 
pornography at all, and the agent had never visited the sites himself to see the 
content.  Instead, his testimony was based upon what he had 
“heard” from his co-workers.  In reality, this testimony was 
nothing more than speculation and was used to paint the appellant in a bad light 
in front of the jury.  The State was able to insinuate that 
the appellant regularly looked at child pornography when going to these 
websites, when there was no evidence showing that these websites actually 
contained child pornography.  Perhaps if it was certain that 
the websites did indeed contain child pornography, the admission of the evidence 
would be relevant and more probative than prejudicial.  
However, the fact that the appellant goes to pornographic websites does 
not tend to prove that he had a motive for sexually abusing the victim--a 
four-year-old boy.  See Simpson v. State, 
523 S.E.2d 320, 321, 322 (Ga. 1999) (“interest in sexual activity 
does not necessarily point to deviant behavior, even circumstantially[]” 
(internal citation omitted); “Under this rule, sexually explicit material cannot 
be introduced merely to show a defendant’s interest in sexual 
activity.  It can only be admitted if it can be linked to the 
crime charged.”).  Furthermore, the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from the testimony is that the appellant might be looking 
at child pornography on the internet.  This inference is 
substantially more unfairly prejudicial to the appellant than it is probative of 
anything in dispute.
 
[¶26]   
Further, this Court is troubled by the fact that so much of the district 
court’s analysis regarding the admissibility of the websites was based upon 
images the district court had already determined were inadmissible because they 
were too prejudicial.  The district court found that, because 
the images had been deemed inadmissible, there was no other evidence available 
to show that the appellant downloaded and possessed child 
pornography.  The question is not whether other evidence of 
the specific uncharged misconduct is available.  The question 
is whether there is other evidence of the proper purpose available--in this case 
motive.  Even if the district court had determined there was 
other evidence of motive, we cannot find that visits to pornographic websites 
makes it more likely that the appellant has a “fetish with anal sex,” as alleged 
by the State at trial, or that he is sexually attracted to children, as alleged 
on appeal.
 
[¶27]   
This Court is additionally concerned that the district court relied upon 
the images of suspected child pornography in determining the admissibility of 
the websites.  While we commend the district court for 
recognizing the prejudicial nature of the images, the DCI agent 
still testified at trial that images of suspected child pornography were found 
on the computer.  It was apparently presumed that these images 
came from one of the websites discussed by the agent.  
However, our review of the record does not show a link between the two, 
and there was no testimony at the hearing regarding the actual source of the 
images.  The agent also testified that the images had not been 
affirmatively identified as child pornography, that he was not a certified 
forensic physician, and that he had no expertise in identifying child 
pornography.  Nonetheless, the State was able to make the 
assertion that the appellant looked at websites that contained child pornography 
(which was not conclusive) and he downloaded images of child pornography onto 
his computer (also not conclusive).  Again, while commending 
the district court’s attempt to mitigate prejudice by ruling the images 
themselves inadmissible, we are concerned that the jury heard that there were 
child pornography images but was not given any description of what the images 
contained.  Considering that the appellant was accused of 
sexually abusing his four-year-old son, it is quite possible the jury assumed 
the images were of small children, perhaps boys, engaged in sexual behavior, 
which is not what the images depicted.  Leaving theses facts 
to the imagination of the jury members likely was very prejudicial to the 
appellant.  Not only did the jury hear about information that 
put the appellant in a bad light, but it also left the jury to speculate about 
what the facts actually were.  This does not equate to a fair 
trial.
 
[¶28]   
Finally, the nude photos of the victim and his brother were not relevant 
or probative to show the appellant’s motive for assaulting the 
victim.  At the hearing, the State claimed the photos were 
relevant and probative to show the appellant had a “fetish with anal 
sex.”  On appeal, the State argued that the photos show that 
the appellant was sexually attracted to children--more specifically his 
child.  Unfortunately, neither party designated the photos as 
part of the record on appeal, which makes it much more difficult to determine 
whether these photos are more sinister than innocent family photos.  
The district court found that:
 
These images show the 
children taking baths or potty training.  Other images, 
however, are more disturbing.  Many of the offered images 
show E.A.M. and L.A.W. playing outdoors in the mud while 
nude, with mud smeared on the children’s body and genitalia.  
Others show [the appellant] sitting in the bathtub 
with L.A.W. on his lap.  At least three of the 
images focus on the children’s genitals or buttocks.  One 
picture shows a young child face down on a bed with his buttocks and hips 
extended up into the air.
 
Viewing this evidence 
in the light most favorable to admission, we still find that concluding these 
photos are relevant or probative to show that the appellant had a fetish with 
anal sex or that he was sexually attracted to the victim is 
far-fetched.  Perhaps if the photos depicted the victim 
engaging in some sort of inappropriate behavior dealing with the buttocks area 
or showed the appellant engaging in some sort of sexually suggestive activity 
with the victim, we would find a different result.  But the 
fact that even the district court leaves open the possibility that these photos 
may be innocent in nature demonstrates that an insinuation to the contrary would 
be more unfairly prejudicial to the appellant than what very minimal (if any) 
probative value the photos may have.
 
[¶29]   
We cannot find that admission of any of this evidence at trial was 
harmless.  The State did not present overwhelming evidence of 
the appellant’s guilt on the first-degree sexual abuse charge.3  While we find, 
as explained below, that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a 
conviction for first-degree sexual abuse, we also find that, if this evidence 
had not been admitted, there is a “reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the [appellant].”  
Rolle, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 9, 
236 P.3d  at 264 (quoting Vigil, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 
224 P.3d at 36).  This evidence put the appellant 
in an extremely bad light in front of the jury because of conduct in which he 
may or may not have engaged, and while we cannot say that the evidence had a 
definitive impact on the verdict, we cannot say that it did not affect the way 
the jury perceived him or the evidence.  For these reasons, we 
find that the admission of the websites and the photos of the victim and his 
brother, pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), was prejudicial 
error.
 
Whether the district 
court commented improperlyupon the weight of the evidence
 
[¶30]   
Immediately before the DCI agent testified about his forensic 
investigation of the appellant’s computer, the district court gave the jury the 
following instruction:
 
            
During the trial pictures of the alleged victim and his brother were 
allowed into evidence depicting them without their clothes on.  
I believe you are about to hear evidence that there were child 
pornography websites on the defendant’s computer.  This 
evidence is being admitted for a limited purpose.  If you 
ultimately find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or 
more of the charged acts, you may consider the evidence pertaining to the naked 
photographs or the websites for the limited purpose of considering the 
defendant’s motive, intent, knowledge, or presence or absence of mistake.[4]
 
The appellant argues 
that this instruction--specifically that the district court informed the jury 
that they would hear about child pornography websites--injected the district 
court’s opinion regarding the weight or quality of the evidence at the 
trial.
 
[¶31]   
The appellant did not object to the instruction when given by the 
district court at trial; therefore, our review is limited to a search for plain 
error.  Walker v. State, 2012 WY 1, ¶ 6, 
267 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Wyo. 2012).  “Plain error is 
established only 'when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as 
error, 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and 
3) the party claiming error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him.’”  Id. (quoting Black v. State, 
2002 WY 72, ¶ 7, 
46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002)).
 
[¶32]   
The record is clear that the district court’s instruction stated that the 
jury was going to “hear evidence that there were child pornography websites on 
the [appellant’s] computer[,]” satisfying the first part of the plain error 
standard.  With respect to the second part of the standard, 
the appellant argues that the district court expressed an opinion regarding the 
evidence to the jury.  The State counters that the district 
court’s comment did not relate to the weight or value of the evidence and, 
instead, “was the introduction of a limiting instruction to prevent the jury 
from improperly using the evidence.”  While we agree with the 
State that the general tenor of the instruction was meant to be a limiting 
instruction, we find that the district court’s comment that the jury would hear 
that there were child pornography websites on the appellant’s computer was a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.
 
[¶33]   
We have expressed that trial judges must “be careful and cautious and not 
comment on the evidence.  Phillips v. State, 
597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting In re Nelson’s Estate, 
72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)).
 
“We have repeatedly 
said that a judge, in the trial of a case before a jury, should abstain from 
expressing or indicating by word, deed or otherwise his personal views upon the 
weight or quality of the evidence.  Expressions of opinion, or 
remarks, or comments upon the evidence which have a tendency to indicate bias on 
the part of the trial judge, especially in criminal cases, are regarded as an 
invasion of the province of the jury and prejudicial to an accused.  
[Citations omitted.]”  Spear v. Commonwealth, 
213 Va. 599, 194 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Va. 1973).
 
Id.  
Here, the district court invaded the province of the jury by informing it 
that, before it heard any testimony from the DCI agent, it was going 
to hear evidence that there were child pornography websites on the appellant’s 
computer.  This statement was problematic because, as 
explained above, the evidence did not show that the appellant went to child 
pornography websites on his computer.  At best there was a 
factual dispute as to whether the websites actually did contain child 
pornography.  That issue should have been properly resolved by 
the jury.  However, the district court informed the jury that 
the websites did contain child pornography.  Therefore, the 
district court’s statement was improper and a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.
 
[¶34]   
We also find that the appellant was materially prejudiced by the district 
court’s statement to the jury.  Instead of the appellant being 
afforded the opportunity to dispute the evidence presented by the State, he was 
put at a significant disadvantage when the district court told the jury what the 
evidence was going to show.  This is particularly prejudicial 
here, considering that the evidence did not, in fact, show that the appellant 
was visiting child pornography websites on his computer.  We 
find that the district court’s statement to the jury constituted plain 
error.
 
Whether the district 
court erred when it determinedthat the appellant’s statement to Deputy 
Peechwas given voluntarily
 
[¶35]   
The appellant was interviewed immediately before and after his arrest by 
Deputy Peech with the Converse County Sheriff’s 
Department.  He claims that the statements he made during the 
interview were involuntary because he was fatigued, he was not free to leave, he 
was threatened by Deputy Peech, and he was subjected to coercive and 
psychological trickery when Deputy Peech appealed to his religious 
beliefs.  While the appellant filed in the district court a 
motion to suppress his statement as involuntary, the motion was based only upon 
the total length of time of the interview.  Thus, the 
substance of the appellant’s claim, as presented in his appeal, is being brought 
for the first time before this Court.  Therefore, we limit our 
review to a search for plain error.  Miller v. State, 
2009 WY 125, ¶ 10, 
217 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶36]   
It is clear from the record that the appellant was interviewed at length 
before and after his arrest, and the entire interview is part of the record on 
appeal before this Court.  Further, the incidents that 
occurred during the interview, which the appellant alleges make his statement 
involuntary, are found in the record, either during the interview or in the 
appellant’s testimony at trial.  Therefore, the first part of 
the plain error standard of review has been satisfied.
 
[¶37]   
It is a clear and unequivocal rule of law that statements made by a 
defendant may not be used against him unless those statements were made 
voluntarily:
 
            
Confessions, admissions, and statements are constitutionally required to 
be voluntary by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] of the United States 
Constitution and by Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478, 92 S. Ct. 619, 
621, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); Black v. State, 
820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 1991).  The voluntariness 
requirement has been a part of the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence since its decision in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 
542, 18 S. Ct. 183, 187, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897).  
Additional constitutional requirements concerning voluntariness were 
imposed by the Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), for custodial 
interrogations.
 
            
It is well established, however, that satisfying Miranda does not 
resolve the question of voluntariness.  A confession may be 
found involuntary because of the means used to obtain it.  
Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992, 88 S. Ct. 489, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1967); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 
600 P.2d 68, 69 (1979).  A confession which is the 
product of either mental or physical coercion by the government is untrustworthy 
and cannot be used for any purpose in the trial of the case.  
In Wyoming, the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, that a confession, admission 
or statement was given voluntarily.  Garcia v. State, 
777 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1989); Dodge v. State, 
562 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Wyo. 1977).  Admission of an 
involuntary confession offends due process, whether or not the defendant was in 
custody when the confession was given.  Black, 
820 P.2d  at 971. . . .
 
. . . .
 
            
Statements are made voluntarily if they are the product of a citizen’s 
free and deliberate choice rather than of governmental intimidation, coercion, 
or deception.  Bravo [v. State], 
897 P.2d [1303], 1305 [(Wyo. 1995)].  
“Involuntariness requires coercive state action, such as trickery, 
psychological pressure, or 
mistreatment.”  Withrow v. Williams, 
507 U.S. 680, 708, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1762, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing (Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 
(1986)).  We have held that voluntariness must proceed from 
the spontaneous suggestion of the citizen’s own mind, free from the influence of 
any extraneous disturbing cause.  Maki v. State, 18 
Wyo. 481, 487, 112 P. 334, 335 
(1911).  In State v. Jones, 73 Wyo. 122, 
276 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1954), we quoted from Wharton on Criminal 
Evidence that “even a slight inducement held out by such a person [in a position 
of authority] renders the confession involuntary.”  
Jones, 73 Wyo. at 144, 276 P.2d  at 455; see also 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1471, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (similarly holding that even a slight 
inducement will render a statement involuntary).  Jones 
quoted approvingly of a New Mexico decision:
 
When direct or 
implied promises made by the person in authority are shown “the law cannot 
measure the force of the influence thereby produced; neither can the courts 
determine in what degree they affected the mind of the accused and to what 
extent they entered into his decision to confess.  Hence, the 
rule is established that, . . . confessions which are made [under such 
conditions] must be excluded.”
 
Jones, 73 Wyo. at 141, 
276 P.2d  at 453 (quoting State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583, 584 
(1923)).  Our later decisions summarize that a confession 
offends due process if the suspect’s will was overborne by the police and the 
suspect’s capacity for self-determination was seriously impaired.  
Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 
1995).  In Wyoming, coercive police tactics violate the due 
process clause of WYO. CONST. Art. 
1, § 6 and statements elicited pursuant to these tactics may be 
suppressed.  Yung, 906 P.2d  at 
1035.  This Court has not yet decided whether coercion is a 
necessary predicate to finding that a confession is involuntary under our state 
constitution; however, coercive government activity is a necessary predicate to 
finding involuntariness within the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 
606.  Once the evidence establishes state actor coercion, a 
court must consider the effect of that coercion on the defendant’s choice to 
confess or make an admission or statement.  
Id.  Unless the court finds that coercive 
conduct caused the defendant to speak, the court must find the statement to be 
voluntary and the statement is admissible.  
Id.  We recognize that coercion can be mental as 
well as physical.  Id.  The use of 
tricks or factual misstatements in and of themselves does not render a 
confession involuntary.  Id.
 
. . . .
 
            
Relevant factors concerning the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation include:
 
whether the defendant 
was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether 
Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the 
defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant’s mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.
 
People v. 
Gennings, 
808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991); see also Yung, 
906 P.2d  at 1034; Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 
139-40 (Wyo. 1995); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 665 (Wyo. 
1993); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 386 (Wyo. 1992); 
Black, 820 P.2d at 971-72; Garcia, 
777 P.2d  at 607; Stone [v. State], 
745 P.2d [1344], 1348 [(Wyo. 1987)]; Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 1986).
 
Carter v. 
State, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 15, 
241 P.3d 476, 484-86 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting State v. Evans, 
944 P.2d 1120, 1124-26 (Wyo. 1997)).  
 
[¶38]   
The appellant argues that, under the totality of the circumstances of his 
interview, the statements he made to Deputy Peech were 
involuntary.  Specifically, he claims that he was fatigued at 
the time of the interview; before he was officially arrested he was not free to 
leave the interview; and he was subjected to psychological coercion and threats 
when Deputy Peech appealed to his religious beliefs.5  We find that 
none of these factors, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, 
rendered the statements he made in the interview involuntary.
 
[¶39]   
First, the appellant claims that he was tired when he arrived for the 
interview because he had only gotten approximately four hours of sleep the night 
before.  As pointed out in Carter, “[w]e have 
recognized that sleep deprivation . . . [is a] factor[] which can make a 
statement involuntary.”  Carter, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 16, 
241 P.3d  at 486.  The appellant in Burnett v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 2000), made a similar argument, 
claiming her statement was involuntary because she had gotten little sleep the 
night before.  We rejected this argument, however, explaining 
that even if she had gotten little sleep, it was not due to coercive state 
action.  Id.  The same is true 
here.  The appellant may have been tired from getting little 
sleep the previous night, but he has not alleged that the fatigue was due to 
coercive state action, nor has he provided us any case law that would suggest we 
should depart from out precedent in Burnett.
 
[¶40]   
The appellant next argues that he was not free to leave during the 
interview, which is a circumstance that shows his statement was 
involuntary.  For the first half of the interview, 
Deputy Peech clearly informed the appellant that he was not under 
arrest, and despite that fact, he still advised the appellant of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda.  While the appellant testified at 
trial that he asked Deputy Peech if he could leave and was told he 
could not, the recording of the interview does not give any indication that the 
appellant was not free to leave before he was arrested.  
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, he was not free to 
leave, there is no evidence that the statement was not made 
voluntarily.  As mentioned above, the appellant was informed 
that he had the right to remain silent and that he had the right to an 
attorney.  The appellant stated that he understood those 
rights, yet chose to speak with Deputy Peech.
 
[¶41]   
Finally the appellant claims that Deputy Peech subjected him 
to psychological coercion and threats by appealing to his religious 
beliefs.  Just short of two hours into the interview, 
Deputy Peech started making comments to the appellant regarding God, 
forgiveness, and leniency given to those who choose to tell the 
truth.  These statements included Deputy Peech 
telling the appellant that he wanted to be able to tell everybody that: 
“[Peech] looked in[to] [the appellant’s] eyes, [Peech] saw his 
soul, and he was telling the truth.  And [Peech] saw, 
similar, 'cuz no one can be the same as God, [Peech] saw similar 
to what God was seeing in him[.]”  Deputy Peech 
also told the appellant that he is “God’s Instrument.”
 
[¶42]   
No Wyoming case has dealt with the specific issue of whether an 
interrogator may use a suspect’s religious beliefs to attempt to elicit a 
statement.  However, courts from other jurisdictions have had 
the occasion to determine whether these types of appeals render a statement 
involuntary.  Some courts have looked disapprovingly upon the 
tactic, ultimately holding the statements inadmissible.  
See People v. Adams, 143 Cal. App. 3d 970, 989 
(5th Dist. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds by People 
v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 995 n.5 (1992) (“Religious 
beliefs are not matters to be used by governmental authorities to manipulate a 
suspect to say things he or she otherwise would not say.  The 
right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an 
invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious belief of 
individuals, including those accused of crime.”); State v. Wood, 
128 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (Strategically selecting an 
interrogator for the purpose of exploiting the religious relationship between 
the interrogator and the defendant was a violation of the defendant’s due 
process rights.).  A significant number of courts have held to 
the contrary that references to religion did not make a statement or confession 
involuntary.  See State v. Newell, 
132 P.3d 833, 844 (Ariz. 2006) (no evidence that the religious 
references caused the defendant’s will to be overborne); Noble v. State, 
892 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Ark. 1995), overruled on other grounds 
by Grillot v. State, 107 S.W.3d 136 
(2003) (An appeal to religious sympathies does not automatically make a 
statement involuntary--only upon a showing that his free will was overborne.); 
Rodgers v. Commonwealth., 318 S.E.2d 298, 303 (Va. 1984) 
(Religious appeals are only one part of the totality of the circumstances.); 
State v. Loosli, 941 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Idaho 1997) 
(Defendant’s will was not overborne when officers told him that he would not be 
forgiven by God if he did not tell the truth.).  
Regardless of whether 
the courts ultimately found the statements voluntary or involuntary, the cases 
all have one thing in common--the analysis focuses on the totality of the 
circumstances.
 
[¶43]   
We do not find that, under the totality of the circumstances of this 
case, the appellant’s free will was overborne by Deputy Peech’s 
statements regarding God, leniency, and forgiveness.  Perhaps 
if the record showed that the appellant had such a religious nature that his 
free will likely was overborne by the deputy’s claims that he could see into the 
appellant’s soul and that the deputy was “God’s Instrument,” we would be 
inclined to find this confession involuntary.  But that is not 
what the record shows.  Deputy Peech was not 
appealing to a specific religion or trying to appeal to particular 
vulnerabilities known to him.  Instead, the record shows that 
the appellant was twenty-three years old at the time, a high school graduate 
with some technical training, was gainfully employed, and supporting a family of 
four.  While the appellant now claims that he was extremely 
fatigued, there is nothing in the interview that shows that to be the 
case.  The appellant never asked to end the interview, or 
complained about being tired.  He also continually denied the 
allegations against him in the midst of the religious references made by Deputy 
Peech.  At the time the references were made, the 
appellant was aware that he was not under arrest and had been informed of his 
Miranda warnings.  During the interview, the appellant 
made statements that certainly were not in his best interest; however, we cannot 
say those statements were the product of “trickery, psychological pressure, or 
mistreatment.”  Carter, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 15, 
241 P.3d  at 485.  The appellant has failed to 
demonstrate that his statement was involuntary and in violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, and has thereby failed to demonstrate that plain error 
occurred.
 
Whether plain error 
occurred when Deputy Peechexpressed his opinion that the appellant 
was lyingduring the interview
 
[¶44]   
The appellant claims that the prosecutor improperly commented upon the 
credibility of the appellant in his opening and closing statements.  
He further claims that, at trial, Deputy Peech improperly 
expressed his opinion that the appellant was lying during the interview, which 
was exacerbated by the fact that the jury listened to portions of the interview, 
wherein Deputy Peech repeatedly accused the appellant of 
lying.  An analysis of this issue is somewhat complicated by 
the fact that defense counsel did not object to the opening and closing 
statements, nor did he object to the playing of portions of the interview for 
the jury at trial.  In fact, defense counsel actually played 
portions of the interview before the prosecutor did.  However, 
defense counsel did object to the following exchange at trial:
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  Mr. Peech, you say that total 
first day was roughly 4, 4 and a half hours?
 
            
[PEECH]:  Yes, sir.
 
            
Q.    Can you tell us why you went that 
long?
 
            
A.    He was not telling us the 
truth.  We would get a little truth -- he would deny stuff 
--
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.  This 
answer is speculative and is a guess.
 
            
[PROSECUTOR]:  I’m asking why he conducted the 
interview so long.  He can refrain from saying whether it was 
the truth or not.
 
            
THE COURT:  Well, insofar as the defendant admitted 
that he wasn’t telling the truth, you can answer that -- you can talk about 
that.
 
            
In terms of your general opinion, the jury will disregard any general 
opinions, because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.
 
            
With that ruling, go ahead.
 
Both parties submit 
that plain error is the appropriate standard of review, but neither party 
acknowledges that at least part of this claim was brought to the district 
court’s attention.  Nonetheless, we review the claim in its 
entirety under the plain error standard of review because, even under that 
onerous standard, we find the jury was exposed to improper comments regarding 
the appellant’s credibility, and those comments were unfairly prejudicial to the 
appellant.6
 
[¶45]   
First, we find that the record is clear as to the alleged 
error.  The statements made by the prosecutor clearly appear 
in the record, and the transcript reflects, as quoted above, 
Deputy Peech’s comment that the appellant “was not telling us the 
truth.”  With respect to the interview, the State argues that 
the portion of the interview played for the jury is not clearly reflected in the 
record and, therefore, we cannot make a determination on the issue.  
While the record does not pinpoint to the exact second what parts of the 
interview were played for the jury, the trial transcript reflects that the 
interview was played for the jury beginning at the one hour and thirty minute 
mark.  Further, defense counsel represented that approximately 
an hour and a half of the interview was going to be played.  
Therefore, we find that the record shows what portions of the interview 
were played for the jury.
 
[¶46]   
As pointed out in Sweet v. State, 2010 WY 87, ¶¶ 23-24, 
234 P.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Wyo. 2010), this Court has a long-standing 
rule that a witness may not give an opinion regarding the truthfulness or 
credibility of the accused, the victim, or any other witness.  
We find that this clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated here, 
although not in each circumstance raised by the appellant.  

 
[¶47]   
First, we do not find that the statements made by the prosecutor in his 
opening and closing statements were commenting upon the appellant’s 
credibility.  “We review allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct by reference to the entire record.”  Whitney v. 
State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 85, 
99 P.3d 457, 485 (Wyo. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  With specific regard to opening statements, we have 
said:  
 
An opening statement 
has a narrow purpose and scope.  It is to state what evidence 
will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to 
follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is 
not an occasion for argument.
 
. . . .
 
Further, the 
prosecutor’s opening statement should be confined to a statement of the issues 
in the case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the 
prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible.
 
Id. at ¶ 86, at 485-86 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
[¶48]   
Here, in his opening statement, the prosecutor stated: “Within two hours 
and 3 minutes, the [appellant] admits it.  After telling 
Mr. Peech several times he wasn’t being truthful, 
Mr. Peech kept asking, and ultimately the defendant told him he 
did.”  Although the statement somewhat focused on the 
appellant being untruthful, it was based upon what the evidence was going to 
show--specifically statements made by the appellant during the interview where 
he admitted he was not being truthful.  This was not a 
circumstance where the prosecutor was expressing his personal opinion on the 
appellant’s
credibility to the 
jury.  The prosecutor had a good faith basis that this 
evidence would be available, as the district court had previously ruled that the 
statement was made voluntarily.
 
[¶49]   
“Closing arguments must be based upon the evidence submitted to the 
jury.  The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to 
offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.”  
Whitney, 2004 WY 
118, ¶ 87, 99 P.3d  at 486.  The appellant 
complains that the following part of the prosecutor’s closing argument 
constituted a comment upon the appellant’s credibility:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  
Now, remember you heard parts of that interview.  You 
heard parts of that interrogation.  Officer Peech 
told him time and again, “Tell me the truth.  Tell me the 
truth.”  He said it over and over again.  
And put yourself into a reasonable person’s position under the 
circumstances.  I asked Dr. Denison, “If 
Officer Peech tells me that he’s the voice of God or, 'You need to 
confess to me as a representative of God,’ or whatever it was, can I tell him to 
fly a kite?  Can I tell him to pound sand? 
 . . . .”
 
A review of this 
passage in the context of the entire record, and specifically the rest of the 
closing argument, demonstrates that the prosecutor was responding to the 
appellant’s assertions that the statements he made in his interview were 
coerced.  The prosecutor was using the evidence presented at 
trial--through the statement itself and Dr. Denison’s testimony--that the 
appellant could have ceased the interview at any time and, thus, the statements 
were voluntary.  To that extent, we do not find that the 
prosecutor’s argument constituted a comment upon the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶50]   
However, we do find that Deputy Peech’s testimony was 
impermissible opinion evidence regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  On direct examination, Deputy Peech 
unequivocally testified that the interview lasted as long as it did because 
“[the appellant] was not telling us the truth.  We would get a 
little truth--he would deny stuff--.”  The State argues that 
Deputy Peech was actually trying to assert that the appellant 
himself had admitted to lying during the interview.  We 
disagree.  The transcript clearly demonstrates that his 
response to the question was that he believed the appellant was lying, and only 
after the district court advised the jury that it could not consider opinion 
testimony did Deputy Peech focus on the appellant’s 
statements.
 
[¶51]   
Considering the brief nature of the incident and the immediate 
instruction given by the district court, under most circumstances this error 
might be considered harmless.  However, here, 
Deputy Peech’s opinion was exacerbated when the jury listened to 
approximately an hour and a half of Deputy Peech’s interview with 
the appellant, where he constantly accused the appellant of being 
dishonest.  In Sweet, we held that playing an interview 
that contained these types of statements for the jury amounted to plain 
error.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶¶ 28-36, 
234 P.3d  at 1204-06.
 
[¶52]   
The State encourages this Court to adopt the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 
2005), that an audiotape of an interrogation or interview that contains repeated 
accusations that a suspect is lying should be admissible.  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that accusing a suspect of lying is a valid 
interrogation technique, is no different from an officer testifying that the 
defendant changed his story, and that a proper instruction would alleviate any 
danger associated with playing the interrogation.  Id. 
at 27, 29.  This is the same authority the State relied upon 
in advancing this same argument in Sweet, which we rejected.  
Sweet, 2010 WY 87, 
¶ 30, 234 P.3d  at 1205.  Just as in Sweet, 
Deputy Peech did not explain to the jury that accusing a suspect of 
lying is normal interrogation technique and that such an accusation does not 
mean that the suspect actually is lying.  Therefore, we find 
it unlikely that the jury would know why the appellant was accused of lying, 
other than he actually was lying.
 
[¶53]   
When determining whether material prejudice is present, we review the 
evidence in light of the entire record.  Pendleton v. 
State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008).  
 
When the error 
concerns the admission of improper evidence, among the considerations 
are:
 
(1) whether the 
evidence furnished important corroboration of other testimony; (2) whether it 
related to a material, consequential fact; (3) whether counsel relied on the 
evidence in argument; (4) whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the 
effect of any instructions given to the jury.  1 Weinstein’s 
Evidence, ¶ 103[06] (1986).
 
Zabel [v. State], 
765 P.2d [357], 362 [(Wyo. 1988)].  We have 
recognized that “perhaps the single most significant factor in weighing whether 
an error was harmful is the strength of the case against the 
defendant.”  Id. (quoting 3B Charles A. 
Wright, Nancy J. King, Susan R. Klein & Peter J. Henning, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 854 at 305 (2d ed. 1982)).
 
Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 31, 
234 P.3d  at 1205.  Here, the State’s case against 
the appellant was not particularly strong.  With the exception 
of two contested pieces of physical evidence, the entire case hinged on the 
victim’s allegations and the appellant’s denial of those 
allegations.  Therefore, the credibility of the victim and the 
appellant were of utmost importance in the jury deliberations in the 
case.
 
[¶54]   
Even though credibility was a major issue for the jury, we still express 
some reluctance to find prejudice.  This is based primarily on 
the fact that, while Deputy Peech’s troublesome testimony was given 
during the State’s direct examination, the interview tape was played while he 
was being cross-examined by defense counsel.  The State argues 
that the appellant should not be allowed to profit from his counsel’s strategic 
decision regarding the use of the interview.  The State argues 
that these facts are similar to those in Pendleton, where this Court 
found prejudice had not been established because defense counsel advocated for 
the admissibility of the interview recording.  See 
Pendleton, 2008 WY 36, ¶¶ 
12, 16, 17, 180 P.3d  at 217-18.  The appellant 
argues that this case is unlike Pendleton because defense counsel 
attempted to have the interview suppressed in its entirety and only used the 
interview after Deputy Peech commented upon the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶55]   
In Sweet, we recognized that prejudice can be established even 
where defense counsel relied upon an interview recording wherein the 
investigating officer repeatedly commented upon the credibility of the defendant 
and the victim.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 34, 
234 P.3d  at 1206.  We reasoned that, 
“[w]hile Sweet relied on the recorded interview to show his repeated 
denials of the deputy’s accusations, he had little choice since the court had 
denied his suppression motion.  In that respect, this case is 
distinguishable from Pendleton in which the defendant advocated for the 
admissibility of the recorded interview.”  
Id.  The situation here is similar to that in 
Sweet.  Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the 
interview, but was unsuccessful.  Therefore, defense counsel 
needed to do the best he could with potentially damaging information that he had 
previously tried to keep the jury from hearing.
 
[¶56]   
The difference here, of course, is that defense counsel, not the 
prosecutor, chose to play the recording for the jury.  
However, in its opening statement, the State told the jury that it would 
hear several portions of the interview, and during direct examination, 
Deputy Peech testified at length that the appellant told him that he 
was being untruthful and that he inappropriately touched the victim. 
 Generally, “we are not willing to second-guess counsel and 
suggest that a different strategy might have been more productive.”  
Pendleton, 2008 WY 
36, ¶ 17, 180 P.3d  at 218.  A review of the 
entire record in this case shows that, just as in Sweet, defense counsel 
was left with little choice but to attempt to exploit the interview after the 
district court denied the motion to suppress.  And while the 
appellant may have been the first to use the interview, we cannot say that he 
“advocated for its admissibility.”  Id. at ¶ 12, 
at 217.
 
[¶57]   
Under most circumstances, we may find that defense counsel’s active use 
of the interview would negate any prejudice to the appellant.  
But here, defense counsel was faced with two options: to cross-examine 
Deputy Peech knowing that he could not necessarily discredit any of 
his testimony because it technically was all contained in the interview; or use 
the interview in an attempt to demonstrate that the appellant’s “confession” was 
not quite as clear as Deputy Peech testified and to try to convince 
the jury that the interview was unfair and caused the appellant to “confess” to 
crimes he did not commit.  Both of these options exposed the 
jury to Deputy Peech’s “opinion” regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  While it is a close call, we find that, based 
upon the entire record in this case, there is a reasonable possibility that the 
outcome of the trial may have been more favorable absent 
Deputy Peech’s testimony regarding the appellant’s 
credibility.  While an officer’s accusation that a suspect is 
lying may be an appropriate and effective interrogation technique, it has no 
place in a court of law. 
 
Whether plain error 
occurred when the district court instructed the jury that there need be no 
corroboration of the victim’s testimony in order to convict the 
appellant
 
[¶58]   
The appellant argues that the district court erred when it gave the jury 
Instruction 16A, which stated: “Corroboration of a victim’s testimony is 
not necessary to obtain a conviction for sexual assault.”  The 
appellant did not object to this instruction at trial and, therefore, we review 
for plain error.  Counts v. State, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 44, 
277 P.3d 94, 107 (Wyo. 2012).
 
[¶59]   
Since we have already found reversible error in several other issues in 
this appeal, we will simply note that this Court has previously found this 
instruction inappropriate and have cautioned the district courts to refrain from 
giving it.  Sweet, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 39, 
234 P.3d  at 1206; Garza v. State, 2010 WY 64, ¶ 21, 
231 P.3d 884, 891 (Wyo. 2010); Story v. State, 
721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1986).  On retrial of 
this case, the trial court shall not give this jury instruction.
 
Whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence tosustain each of the 
convictions
 
[¶60]   
The appellant claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
to sustain his conviction for first-degree sexual abuse of a child and for the 
eight counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a child.  
Although we are reversing all of the appellant’s convictions for various 
other grounds, “we must also determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant because, if the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law, Appellant is entitled to be acquitted on the 
charge, and the State may not re-try him.”  Jones v. 
State, 2011 WY 114, ¶ 19, 
256 P.3d 527, 534 (Wyo. 2011). 
 When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we use the following standard of 
review:
 
[W]e must determine 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  When 
considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence 
with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard 
the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not reweigh the evidence nor will we 
re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.
 
Counts, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 52, 
277 P.3d  at 109 (quoting Garner v. State, 2011 WY 156, ¶ 20, 
264 P.3d 811, 820 (Wyo. 2011)).
 
First-Degree Sexual 
Abuse
 
[¶61]   
The appellant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence 
to convict him of first-degree sexual abuse of a child.7  However, the 
appellant’s argument solely is based upon his belief that the jury gave improper 
weight to particular testimony or evidence.  As mentioned 
above, when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction, “[w]e will not reweigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the 
credibility of the witnesses.”  Counts, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 52, 
27 P.3d  at 109.
 
[¶62]   
When we review the evidence using the proper standard of review, we 
conclude that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction.  The victim, a four-year-old child at the time of 
the crime, testified that “[the appellant] put his wiener in my butt hole[,]” 
and that allegation was repeated during the sexual assault nurse examiner’s 
testimony when she explained that the victim said, “Daddy puts 
his peepee in my butt hole.  And it itches, and it 
scratches, and it hurts.”  The nurse also testified that, 
during her examination, the victim’s anus dilated instantly and she found a 
healing area on the anus.  In her opinion, these findings 
supported the victim’s allegation.  Additionally, a forensic 
analyst from the state crime lab testified that she tested a fluid on the 
victim’s pajama pants, which indicated the possible presence of blood on the 
pajamas.  There was a mixture of DNA in the spot, and she was 
unable to exclude the victim or the appellant as possible contributors to the 
DNA.  From this evidence, a rational trier of fact 
could find that the appellant engaged in sexual intrusion with the victim, who 
was his four-year-old stepson.
 
Second-Degree Sexual 
Abuse
 
[¶63]   
The appellant also argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to sustain his convictions for the eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse of a child.8  Specifically, 
the appellant claims that the State failed to prove that the appellant’s contact 
with the victim was “with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse[]” as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 
2011).  After a careful review of the record, we agree that 
the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant’s 
convictions for second-degree sexual abuse.
 
[¶64]   
While the appellant’s brief focuses on the lack of evidence demonstrating 
his contact with the victim was for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification 
or abuse, we are concerned with the fact that there is no evidence, other than 
the statements made by the appellant in his interview, to support a charge of 
second-degree sexual abuse.  Whether the State provided any 
evidence of criminal conduct, other than the appellant’s extrajudicial 
statement, is a legal issue that the appellant did not raise in his 
brief.  To that extent
 
[w]e are sensitive to 
the proposition that judicial restraint generally demands that we address only 
those issues properly before us and preserved for our review.  
We also know that it is within our jurisdiction to decide any case as 
justice may demand. . . .  [J]udicial efficiency 
strongly suggests the treatment of obvious matters in the first 
appeal.
 
Sheeley v. 
State, 
991 P.2d 136, 138 (Wyo. 1999).  Here, although not 
directly raised by the appellant, we believe this question is properly 
encompassed within the question of whether sufficient evidence was presented at 
trial to sustain the jury’s decision.
 
[¶65]   
In Wyoming, “independent proof of the corpus delicti 
must exist apart from a defendant’s extrajudicial confession or 
admission[.]”  Jones v. State, 2010 WY 44, ¶ 11, 
228 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2010).  See also 
Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 1199; Kolb v. State, 
930 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wyo. 1996); Betzle v. 
State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1021-22 (Wyo. 
1993); Konopisos v. State, 26 Wyo. 350, 354-55, 185 P. 355, 356 (Wyo. 
1919).  In Simmers, we identified what type of evidence 
must exist to prove a crime was committed:
 
[The] corroborating 
evidence need only consist of substantial evidence that the offense has been 
committed, so that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
 
[C]orroborating 
evidence is adequate if it supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to 
justify a jury inference of the truth of the confession.  The 
quantity and type of independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts 
of each case.  However, circumstantial evidence can be used to 
corroborate a confession.
 
Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1199 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).
 
[¶66]   
We have carefully analyzed all of the trial transcripts and cannot find 
any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that corroborates that the appellant 
ever engaged in any sexual contact with the victim, other than the conduct that 
was the basis of the first-degree count.  There was never an 
allegation made by the victim or his mother at trial, or to any of the multiple 
medical care providers or the forensic interviewer, that the appellant engaged 
in sexual contact with the victim.  There was no testimony 
indicating that the victim had been subjected to sexual abuse over a period of 
time.  Instead, all of the evidence, other than 
Deputy Peech’s testimony regarding the appellant’s interview, 
focused on the single allegation of penetration.  The State’s 
brief regarding the sufficiency of the evidence on this count also focuses only 
on the statements the appellant made in his interview with Deputy 
Peech.  Further, in its “Statement of the Facts” the 
State represents that: “All of the evidence incriminating [the appellant] for 
his second-degree sexual abuse of [the victim] came from his own statements to 
investigators.”  The appellant’s statements, on their own, are 
insufficient to uphold his convictions for second-degree sexual 
abuse.  Therefore, this Court reverses the eight counts of 
second-degree sexual abuse, and on remand the district court shall enter a 
judgment of acquittal on those counts. 
 
 
Whether the appellant 
receivedineffective assistance of trial counsel
 
[¶67]   
The appellant’s final claim is that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in three respects.  First, he claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not arguing at the competency hearing that the 
victim’s testimony was also tainted.  Second, he argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the appellant’s statement was 
involuntary for the reasons he has raised in this appeal. 
 See supra ¶¶ 35-41.  Finally, he 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 
instruction that would have instructed the jury to disregard any testimony 
regarding Deputy Peech’s opinion of the appellant’s 
credibility.
 
[¶68]   
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel are reviewed de 
novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 
193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 2008).  There are two 
requirements the appellant must show before prevailing on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:
 
First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
 
Maier 
v. State, 2012 
WY 50, ¶ 24, 273 P.3d 1084, 1091 (Wyo. 2012) 
(quoting Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 
609 (Wyo. 1992)).
 
[¶69]   First, because we have found that 
the appellant is entitled to a new trial due to errors regarding the victim’s 
competency to testify, and error in Deputy Peech’s comments upon the 
appellant’s credibility, we need not consider whether the appellant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel for not raising the issue of taint at the 
competency hearing or requesting a jury instruction regarding 
Deputy Peech’s testimony.  Second, we find that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for challenging the voluntariness of the 
appellant’s statement based solely on the length of the interview, and not 
raising the issues of fatigue, threats, and psychological coercion.  
We considered those issues when we concluded that the appellant’s 
statements were given voluntarily.  See supra ¶¶ 
42-43.  Therefore, even if trial counsel had brought these 
issues to the attention of the district court, the motion would have been 
unsuccessful.  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to bring a motion that would have been denied.  
Carter, 2010 WY 
136, ¶ 15, 241 P.3d  at 484 
(citing Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶¶ 17-19, 
152 P.3d 376, 382-83 (Wyo. 2007) (If a suppression motion would have 
been brought, but denied, the defendant suffers no prejudice from the failure to 
bring such a motion.)).
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶70]   
As this Court has long recognized, the United States and Wyoming 
constitutions do not guarantee that a criminal defendant receive a perfect 
trial, but they do guarantee that he receive a fair trial.  
See Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97, ¶ 85, 
192 P.3d 36, 75 (Wyo. 2008); Haworth v. State, 
840 P.2d 912, 920 (Wyo. 1992); Janski v. 
State, 538 P.2d 271, 277 (Wyo. 1975).  When 
applying that maxim, many errors that may occur at trials are not so pervasive 
as to deprive a defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right.  
Unfortunately, we cannot say that is the case here.  
The appellant’s trial contained sufficient errors that it would be an 
affront to the criminal justice system to say this trial was fair.  
We must remember that:
 
“* * * Society wins 
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our 
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated 
unfairly.  An inscription on the walls of the Department of 
Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:  
'The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens 
in the courts.’” 
 
Sheeley, 
991 P.2d  at 139 (quoting Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Large v. State, 2008 WY 
22, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 2008)) (quoting Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)).
 
[¶71]   
We reverse the appellant’s convictions and remand to the district court 
for a new trial, consistent with this opinion.
 
 
BURKE, Justice, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, with whom 
KITE, Chief Justice, joins.
 
[¶72]   
Appellant identified eight appellate issues.  I 
disagree with the majority’s resolution of several of those issues.  
Ultimately, however, I agree that all of Appellant’s convictions must be 
reversed because of error related to the admission of evidence concerning the 
pornographic websites.9  Although 
Appellant’s convictions for Counts Two through Nine should be reversed, I cannot 
agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to 
support those convictions.  I will address that issue 
first.
 
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence (Counts Two through Nine)
 
[¶73]   
The jury convicted Appellant of eight counts of second-degree sexual 
abuse.  The majority applied the 
corpus delicti rule and concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the convictions.  As a result, Appellant 
cannot be prosecuted again for those alleged 
crimes.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 23, 
193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo. 2008).  I dissent from 
that portion of the majority opinion for two reasons: First, the 
corpus delicti rule was not raised by Appellant and should 
not be considered by this Court.  Second, if properly applied, 
the corpus delicti rule does not mandate reversal of the 
convictions. 
 
[¶74]   
As a general proposition, we address only those issues properly before us 
and preserved for our review.  Appellant’s contention that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the eight convictions for 
second-degree sexual abuse focused solely upon the sexual gratification element 
of the offense.  According to Appellant, “[T]here is no 
evidence that Adam touched L.W. with the requisite intent of sexual 
gratification.”  Appellant’s entire argument on this issue is 
less than one-half of a page.  Appellant never mentions the 
term corpus delicti, does not address how the rule is properly 
applied in cases such as this, and fails to provide the State with any notice 
that he is relying on the corpus delicti rule to support his 
claim.
 
[¶75]   
Appellant did raise the issue in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
filed after trial.  The district court denied the motion 
stating: 
 
The Defendant 
alleges, however, that such out of court confessions were not true, made under 
duress, and needed to be corroborated pursuant to Jones v. State, 
228 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
It should be first 
noted that the issue of corroboration was not raised at trial by way of a motion 
for judgment of acquittal or by any proffered jury instructions.
 
However, the Court is 
of the opinion that there was substantial corroborative evidence.
 
“Corroborating 
evidence is adequate if it supports the essential facts admitted to justify a 
jury inference of the truth of the confession.”  Jones v. 
State, 228 P.3d 870 (Wyo. 2010).
 
First, there were 
confessions by the Defendant to not 1 but 8 separate acts and the confessions 
were recorded.  Secondly, the jury concluded that there was 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had committed a 
1st degree sexual assault on LAW.  Thirdly, there 
was undisputed testimony and pictures that the Defendant had indeed bathed and 
showered with LAW, which is where the sexual contact had allegedly occurred. 

 
Lastly, I believe the 
jury could conclude that Mrs. Mersereau had significant suspicions 
that some inappropriate conduct had occurred.
 
Danielle Mersereau’s 
decision to quiz LAW about whether his step-father had molested LAW based on a 
random TV show seems dubious at best.  Her decision to take 
LAW to a physician’s assistant for an exam would seem unnecessary if she were 
convinced nothing occurred.  Finally, LAW’s 
knowledge of the Defendant “sticking his peepee in my butthole”, 
does not seem to be an expression that a 5 year old would be familiar 
with.
 
The Court concludes 
that there was enough corroborating evidence to sustain a verdict on the 2nd degree 
claims.
 
Appellant does not 
challenge that ruling in this appeal.
 
[¶76]   
Because the issue was not raised by Appellant, the State has had no 
opportunity to address the issue, to identify corroborating evidence in the 
record, or to apply our precedent to the facts of this case.  
The majority reaches its decision without any input from either party on 
this issue.10  The danger of 
reaching the incorrect result without input from the parties is exacerbated by 
the case-specific nature of the corpus delicti 
rule:  “[C]orroborating evidence is adequate if it 
'supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference 
of the truth’ of the confession.  The quantity and type of 
independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts of each 
case.  However, circumstantial evidence can be used to 
corroborate a confession.”  Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1199 (quoting United States v. Clark, 
57 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1995)) (internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added).
 
[¶77]   
The situation presented here is, in many aspects, very similar to those 
reflected in Simmers and Betzle, relied upon by the 
majority.  In both cases, the defendant was convicted of 
sexual abuse crimes involving children.  In both cases, the 
defendant confessed to the crimes.  On appeal, both defendants 
relied upon the corpus delicti rule11 and contended that there was no 
independent corroborating evidence to support the confessions and the 
convictions.  In both cases, this Court rejected the 
argument.
 
[¶78]   
In Simmers, the defendant was convicted of twelve counts of 
second-degree sexual assault involving three victims.  In 
determining whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence, this Court did 
not find it necessary to specifically analyze the evidence for each crime 
charged.  We took a similar approach in 
Betzle.  In Betzle, 
the defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the 
second-degree, two counts of sexual assault in the third degree, and one count 
of taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with a child.  
The victim was a disabled, nine-year-old child with the mental ability of 
a four-year-old.12  During his 
interview with the police, the defendant admitted to several specific incidents 
of improper sexual contact.  We found that there was 
sufficient corroborating evidence:
 
In this case, the 
record discloses testimony by the victim’s mother that, when the victim returned 
from Betzle’s house, she would come home wearing different clothing, 
including one of Betzle’s shirts on one occasion.  
Both the victim’s mother and Betzle testified the victim 
stayed at his house all night on April 14-15, 1990.  The 
father of the victim testified that, around the first of May, the victim 
complained to him she had soreness in her crotch area. At the same time, the 
victim’s mother noticed a decrease in the victim’s appetite, she began to wet 
her pants and to complain of vaginal pain. The pediatrician who examined the 
victim testified she observed irritation and redness in the genital 
area.  The counselor of the victim noted that, when she took 
the victim to their interview room, the victim moved very close to the 
counselor, took her hand and walked with her without lagging behind which was 
unusual conduct for the victim.  These items of evidence in 
the record establish sufficiently for purposes of corroboration, the commission 
of the offense charged, and we hold there was, in this case, sufficient evidence 
of the corpus delicti to justify the introduction into 
evidence of Betzle’s confession.
 
Betzle, 
847 P.2d  at 1022.
 
[¶79]   
Using our decisions in Simmers 
and Betzle as a guide, and applying our standard of 
review which requires us to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, I would conclude that there is sufficient corroborating evidence to 
support the truth of the confession and the convictions.  The 
same evidence that supported the conviction on Count One corroborates the fact 
that Appellant was sexually attracted to the child.  He also 
had opportunity to commit the specific acts alleged in Counts Two through 
Nine.  Appellant is not a stranger to the child.  
He is his stepfather.  He had access to the 
child.  He regularly bathed with the child.  
There is evidence in the record suggesting that the child had been 
subjected to improper sexual contact over a period of time. 
 The forensic interviewer expressed concerns 
over L.W.’s knowledge of sexualized behavior given his young 
age.  Mother had taken L.W. to a doctor with 
concerns about L.W.’s sexual behavior one week prior to the incident 
alleged in Count One.  During that visit, Mother told the 
doctor of prior comments that the child had made regarding sexual contact by 
Appellant in December of the previous year.
 
[¶80]   
The evidence here is not distinguishable in degree from that presented in 
Simmers and Betzle.  There was no 
direct evidence other than the confession of the specific sexual assaults in 
Betzle.  Nor was there direct evidence of 
all of the specific sexual assaults in Simmers.  
Nonetheless, this Court found there was sufficient evidence to 
corroborate the trustworthiness of the confession.  This case 
is no different.  There is sufficient corroborating evidence 
to allow the jury to infer that the confession is trustworthy and, consequently, 
there is sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s eight convictions for 
second-degree sexual abuse.
 
Competency
 
[¶81]   
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s 
competency finding was clearly erroneous.  A finding is 
clearly erroneous and should be overturned only if this Court is “left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 
made.”  Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 17, 
228 P.3d 55, 59 (Wyo. 2010).  
I am not convinced 
that the district court erred in finding that L.W. was 
competent.
 
[¶82]   
From my perspective, the competency decision facing the district court 
was difficult.  The witness was very young and provided 
testimony that in many respects was troubling.  The child, 
however, also provided testimony that supported the district court’s competency 
determination.  The district court did not ignore the 
problematic testimony and specifically addressed it in its decision. 
 During the competency hearing, the district court also heard 
testimony from the therapist who had interviewed L.W. shortly after 
the alleged incident and a clinical psychologist called as a witness by 
Appellant.  The district court referenced the testimony from 
both of those witnesses in its decision.  The district court 
had the opportunity to observe the child testify during the competency hearing 
and at trial.  Ultimately, the district court concluded 
that L.W. was competent.  It summed up its 
reasoning in its Decision and Order on Witness Competency:
 
L.A.W. is 
currently five years old.  He was four-and-a-half when the 
alleged incident occurred.  At the competency 
hearing, L.A.W. was able to relate that he currently lived in 
California, and had previously lived in Wyoming.  He knew his 
age, his brother’s name, and, when asked to identify his mother, was able to 
point to the correct person.  He appeared to understand every 
question directed at him, although he occasionally gave an incorrect 
answer.
 
L.A.W. correctly 
identified his teacher, testified that he was in kindergarten, and that he flew 
on a plane to get to Wyoming.  L.A.W. was asked 
whether he understood the truth versus [an] untruth, and responded 
affirmatively.  When asked whether the statement “We’re 
outside now” is the truth or not the truth, L.A.W. replied “Not the 
truth.”  He responded similarly to questions about whether he 
was in California, and then in Wyoming.  L.A.W. 
seemed confused at some point, however.  For instance, when 
asked how many mother[s] he had, he said, “three.”  He said he 
had “four” fathers.
 
L.A.W. was 
asked about May 21, 2010, the day Defendant is alleged to have anally 
raped L.A.W.  He testified that he went to the 
park with his brother and father [Defendant], but that “it was 
closed.”  He first testified that they did not drive through 
the mud, but later said that his mother got [mad] because they drove the car 
through the mud.  L.A.W. then testified that they 
parked the car, and [he] sat on Defendant’s lap in the driver’s 
seat.  He honked the 
horn.  L.A.W. testified that while on Defendant’s 
lap in the driver’s seat, Defendant removed his pants, and that Defendant was 
not wearing pants, either.
 
L.A.W. testified 
that he does not remember, however, that Defendant raped him.  
He does not remember telling anyone that the event occurred, or 
demonstrating with dolls or pictures that the event happened.
 
Nicole Rosenberger, a 
therapist at the Children’s Advocacy Project, also testified.  
Ms. Rosenberger is the person who 
interviewed L.A.W.  Ms. Rosenberger testified 
that L.A.W. appeared to understand truth and untruth. She also 
testified that she did not observe any mental deficiency in 
L.A.W.
 
Dr. McCoy Haddock, a 
clinical psychologist in California, also 
testified.  L.A.W. is currently a patient of 
Dr. Haddock.  Dr. Haddock testified 
that L.A.W. has a vivid imagination and that his memory is easily 
“contaminated.”
 
Applying 
the Woyak factors, the Court is confident that the 
first factor is satisfied.  L.A.W. is able to 
understand truth and untruth, and recognize the difference.  
He appeared [to] the Court to appreciate the need for him to testify 
truthfully.  
 
The Court believes 
the second factor is also satisfied.  L.A.W. 
remembered the day of the incident, and recalled specific events.  
He was able to speak in detail about flooding inside the park; driving 
through mud; that his mother was angry with Defendant about driving through the 
mud; that he honked the horn on the car; and that he sat on Defendant’s lap 
while both of their pants were off.  His recollection appeared 
to be less clear when the questioning turned to whether Defendant raped him or 
not.  He testified that he did not remember telling anyone 
that Defendant inserted his penis [i]nto his anus.  
The Court is satisfied that L.A.W.’s memory is sufficient to 
testify about what happened on [May] 21, 2010.  His memory of 
that day appeared to the Court to be independent and detailed.  
He appeared to have the capacity to testify whether Defendant raped him 
or not.
 
As to the fourth 
factor, the Court is likewise satisfied that L.A.W.’s vocabulary is 
sufficiently advanced to express in words his memory of the 
occurrence.
 
And 
finally, L.A.W.’s testimony during the competency hearing clearly 
shows he clearly has the capacity to understand simple questions about the 
event.
 
The Court 
finds L.A.W. is competent to testify and be 
cross-examined.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶83]   
The district court also had occasion to address the competency issue 
after trial when the issue was raised again by Appellant in his motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  The district court denied the 
motion.  In addressing the competency issue, the district 
court ruled: 
 
The first issue is 
the competency of LAW to testify.  This was addressed before 
trial and LAW was found competent to testify.  At the 
competency hearing LAW did not say that his step-father had raped him, but did 
say they both had their pants off in the vehicle and that LAW was sitting on the 
Defendant’s lap during their ride around Glenrock on May 21, 2010.
 
At trial, however, 
LAW testified regarding that evening of May 21, 2010:
 
“Q. What did Daddy 
tell you not to tell her? (Mrs. Mersereau)
 
A.       
That he put his 
wiener in my butthole.”
 
The Court was 
convinced, both before and after trial that LAW was competent to testify, that 
he did so to the best of his ability even though it appeared likely that he was 
being subjected to some attempted influence by his family.
 
[¶84]   
In determining that the district court’s competency ruling was clearly 
erroneous, the majority relies upon excerpts from the testimony 
of L.W. regarding the number of family members and pets he 
has.  The problematic testimony was elicited during the 
competency hearing in response to questions from defense counsel.  
At that hearing, defense counsel only asked L.W. a few 
questions:
 
Q.        
L, can I ask you a couple of questions?
 
A.        
Yeah.
 
Q.        
How many grandmothers do you have?
 
A.        
One.
 
Q.        
How many sisters do you have?
 
A.        
Two.
 
Q.        
How many dogs do you have?
 
A.        
I don’t have dogs.
 
Q.        
How many cats do you have?
 
A.        
I have only four – wait.  Three cats.
 
Q.        
How many mothers do you have?
 
A.        
Four.
 
Q.        
How many fathers do you have?
 
A.        
Five.
 
Q.        
How many grandfathers do you have?
 
A.        
I don’t have any.
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: I have no further questions.
 
L.W.’s mother 
admitted at the competency hearing, and at trial, that she had suggested those 
questions to defense counsel.  At the competency hearing in 
response to questions from the State, she testified: 
 
Q.        
Did you tell your husband’s attorney what to ask him?
 
A.        
No. 
 
Q.        
You never did?
 
A.        
I told him things that L had been telling me.  
Stories.
 
Q.        
Like what?
 
A.        
Like having multiple dads.  One of his dads is a 
merman.
 
Q.        
So you told [Defense Counsel] some of the things that L told 
you?
 
A.        
Uh-huh.
 
Q.        
Why did you tell him?
 
A.        
To show that he has imagination, which he does.
 
She testified 
similarly at trial during cross-examination by counsel for the State:
 
Q.        
Ms. Mersereau, [Defense Counsel] asked if you would do 
anything.  Now those are the words you used, 
correct?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        
Isn’t it true – you were here and testified in a previous hearing in this 
matter, correct?
 
A.        
Yes, the pretrial, yes.
 
Q.        
Isn’t it true that you told [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son 
that you knew might confuse him?
 
A.        
I do not believe they would confuse him, no.  

 
Q.        
You gave [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son, correct?
 
A.        
Yes, yes, sir, that I had gotten from my son, you know.
 
Q.        
Questions concerning what?
 
A.        
How many parents he has.  How many grandparents, how 
many siblings.
 
Q.        
Questions that you knew L got confused with, correct?
 
A.        
He wasn’t confused.  He was imagining.
 
Q.        
So you gave [Defense Counsel] questions to ask your son that you knew he 
imagined?
 
A.        
I did not give him questions.  I told him some of L’s 
stories.
 
Q.        
You told him stories about things that L imagined before we had that 
hearing with L?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
Q.        
Correct?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
[¶85]   
It seems obvious that mother provided the questions to defense counsel in 
an effort to undermine L.W.’s competency.  It is 
also obvious that the answers are not correct.  The majority 
apparently concludes that those answers render L.W. incompetent as a 
matter of law.  The district court took a broader perspective 
and I am unable to find that the decision reached by the district court is 
clearly erroneous.  The district court did not ignore those 
answers.  It considered them, along with all of the evidence 
presented at the hearing, including its personal observations of L.W., in 
concluding that L.W. was competent.
 
[¶86]   
We have repeatedly recognized that the district court is in a far better 
position than this Court to make a competency determination.  
Our standard of review is appropriately deferential because we are 
limited to “reading a cold record” while the district court has the advantage of 
observing the witness during his testimony.  Under the clearly 
erroneous standard of review, we cannot substitute our judgment for the district 
court unless we are “firmly convinced” that an error was made.  

 
[¶87]   
In this case, the district court conducted an appropriate competency 
hearing, weighed the evidence, applied the five English factors, and 
explained its reasoning.  The district court confirmed its 
competency finding after trial in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  While this is a close case and others may come to 
a different conclusion, that is not the role we must play in the appellate 
process.  In this case, we should defer to the district 
court.  I would affirm the district court’s competency 
determination. 
 
Admission of Family 
Photos
 
[¶88]   
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred 
in permitting introduction of nude photos of L.W. and his brother 
into evidence.  The photos were not included in the appellate record and it 
is impossible for this Court to conduct an appropriate review of this 
issue.  Appellant raised this issue on appeal and bears the burden of 
providing this Court with the necessary 
record.  Roeschlein v. State, 2007 
WY 156, ¶ 28, 168 P.3d 468, 476 (Wyo. 2007).  This 
claim of error should be summarily denied.
 
[¶89]   
If we were to address the issue on the merits, I would find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling.  

 
“A trial court’s 
decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, 
and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  Leyva v. 
State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 
165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  “[A]s long as 
there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that ruling will 
not be disturbed on appeal.”  Id., quoting Sanchez 
v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 
142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).
 
Vigil v. 
State, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 
224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶90]   
The photos were offered by the State to establish motive.  
The motive in this case was Appellant’s sexual attraction to young 
children, and L.W. in particular.  This is a 
proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b).  The district court 
reviewed the photos, heard argument from counsel, and, after conducting the 
appropriate analysis, determined that the photos were admissible.  In its 
Decision and Order on Witness Competency, the district court applied the 
Gleason factors and explained:
 
These images show the 
children taking baths or potty training.  Other images, 
however, are more disturbing.  Many of the offered images 
show E.A.M. and L.A.W. playing outdoors in the mud while 
nude, with mud smeared on the children’s body and genitalia.  
Others show [the appellant] sitting in the bathtub 
with L.A.W. on his lap.  At least three of the 
images focus on the children’s genitals or buttocks.  One 
picture shows a young child face down on a bed with his buttocks and hips 
extended up into the air.
 
…
 
a.    
Proper 
Purpose
 
The State offers this 
evidence for motive, and that is indeed a proper purpose.
 
b.    
Relevance
 
The Court finds this 
evidence is relevant.  The fact that Defendant possessed, and 
apparently took, a number of nude photographs of L.A.W. 
and E.A.M. is highly relevant, considering the charges in this 
case.
 
c.    
Probative Value vs. 
Danger of Unfair Prejudice
 
…
 
Defendant does 
dispute the issue on which this evidence is offered, i.e. he contends 
that these pictures are innocent and the type normally taken by 
parents.  The Court disagrees.  The Court is 
of the opinion that these images are not simply pictures that parents typically 
take of their children.  Some of the pictures clearly focus on 
and emphasize the children’s nudity.  At the very least, the 
jury should be permitted to determine whether these images are in fact the type 
typically taken by parents, or something more sinister.  
Defendant will, of course, be free to argue to the jury that the images 
in fact are innocent, and simply the type of pictures parents normally take of 
their young children.
 
…
 
Regarding the 
prejudicial factors, the nude pictures of L.A.W. 
and E.A.M. are not reprehensible if Defendant is correct, and they 
are simply innocent pictures.  The pictures are prejudicial if 
the jury sees in them something other than the innocence attached by 
Defendant.  The children in the picture[s] are certainly 
sympathetic.  

 
[¶91]   
Without viewing the photos, it is impossible to disagree with the 
district court’s ruling.  Appellant contends the photos are 
innocent.  The State contends otherwise.  If 
the photos are “innocent,” it is difficult to understand how Appellant is 
prejudiced by admission of the photos.  If the photos are probative of 
motive, the State should be allowed to introduce the photos.  
In any event, the evidentiary significance of the photos is properly a 
question to be resolved by the jury.
 
Comment upon the 
Weight of the Evidence
 
[¶92]   
The instruction at issue was a limiting instruction requested by 
Appellant.  The instruction was read to the jury prior to the beginning of 
the testimony of Agent Timmons.  Because the instruction was 
requested by Appellant, we must apply the invited error doctrine.  
“As applied to jury instructions, the invited error doctrine provides 
that use of an instruction proposed by the appellant may not be grounds for 
reversal unless such was 'necessarily prejudicial.’” Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 29, 
123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo. 2005), 
quoting Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1230 
(Wyo. 2000).  See also Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 
20,  ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 
(Wyo. 
2007);  Rawle 
v. State, 2007 WY 59, ¶ 20, 155 P.3d 1024, 1030 (Wyo. 2007); Snow v. 
State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 26, 216 P.3d 505, 513 (Wyo. 2009).  I would find that 
Appellant has failed to satisfy that burden. 
 
[¶93]   
The majority did not apply the invited error standard of 
review.  In applying a basic plain error analysis, the 
majority finds prejudice because “the district court informed the jury that the 
websites did contain child pornography.”  The oral limiting 
instruction, however, was not the only jury instruction dealing with this 
issue.

[¶94]   
The jury was provided with Instruction No. 18 prior to 
deliberations.  That instruction states, in pertinent 
part:
 
Also, you heard 
evidence that there were suspected child pornography websites on the 
Defendant’s computer.  This evidence was admitted for a 
limited purpose.  … However, before you consider evidence of 
the photographs or the websites, it must be proven to you by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the Defendant viewed the photographs and/or 
websites.13  
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Appellant did not object to that 
instruction.  Jury instructions are to be viewed in their 
entirety and considered as a whole.  Burnett v. State, 
2011 WY 169, ¶ 14, 
267 P.3d 1083, 1087 (Wyo. 2011).  In light of the 
heightened burden facing Appellant under the invited error doctrine and the 
district court’s Instruction No. 18, I would conclude that Appellant has failed 
to establish that the challenged instruction was “necessarily prejudicial.” 

 
Improper Opinion 
Evidence
 
[¶95]   
In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that plain error occurred during 
trial when the prosecutor improperly commented upon the credibility of Appellant 
in his opening statement and closing argument.  The majority 
rejected that argument finding that the prosecutor was not expressing his 
opinion on Appellant’s credibility, but rather, was merely commenting upon 
evidence that would be, or was, produced at trial.  I agree 
with the majority’s resolution of that issue.
 
[¶96]   
The primary focus of Appellant’s fifth issue, however, involved the 
testimony of Officer Peech and a recording, played for the jury, of 
significant aspects of Appellant’s interview with law enforcement.  
The majority concludes that plain error occurred because 
Officer Peech provided “impermissible opinion evidence regarding the 
appellant’s credibility.”  The majority concludes that the 
prejudice prong of the test for plain error was satisfied because defense 
counsel was forced to play otherwise objectionable portions of the interview for 
the jury in order to respond to the improper opinion testimony.  
I disagree with this result for several reasons.
 
[¶97]   
First, Officer Peech was testifying as to facts.  
He was not providing opinion testimony regarding the veracity of 
Appellant’s statements.  Second, even if the testimony could 
be construed as improper opinion testimony, the district court responded to the 
objection by immediately providing the jury a cautionary 
instruction.  There was no prejudice to Appellant at that 
point.  Third, it was Appellant who introduced the 
objectionable excerpts from the confession, not the State.  
Fourth, the majority’s assertion that Appellant’s decision to introduce 
the interview evidence was forced by the brief comment of 
Officer Peech is not supported by the record.
 
[¶98]   
In order to prevail on his claim of plain error, Appellant must establish 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  
Appellant asserts, and the majority agrees, that the challenged testimony 
from Officer Peech was improper opinion testimony regarding the 
truthfulness of Appellant.  The State disagrees and contends 
that Officer Peech was referencing specific admissions of lying made 
by Appellant during the interview.  I am inclined to agree 
with the State.
 
[¶99]   
In order to evaluate Officer Peech’s testimony, it is 
essential to place it in context. Officer Peech was called as a 
witness by the State.  He provided background information 
regarding his law enforcement training and explained that he had become involved 
in the case at the request of the Department of Family Services.  
He testified that he contacted Appellant at his house and Appellant 
agreed to meet with him at the sheriff’s office.  Appellant 
arrived at the office a short time later and the interview 
commenced.  He advised Appellant that his stepson had made an 
allegation of sexual abuse against him.  He testified that 
Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs 
during any part of the interview.
 
[¶100] 
He then testified:  
 
Q:        
Now, during the course of that interview, say within the first hour or 
so, did Mr. Mersereau ever indicate whether he was telling the truth 
about what you were talking about?
 
A:        
He indicated that he was lying –
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection, speculative – pardon me, go 
ahead.
 
THE 
WITNESS:  He told me several times throughout the interview he 
was lying.
 
Q:        
How would he tell you that?
 
A:        
I confronted him a couple of times on some stuff that he lied about, and 
he admitted it was a lie and told me the truth.
 
            
A couple of times I – I put an imaginative scale on the table of 0 to a 
hundred or 0 to 10 and asked him where he was on that, and once he told me he 
was 30, and once he told me, I think, three.
 
Q:        
What were the scales, one being a lie and ten being the truth?
 
A:        
It was 0 being a lie and ten or a hundred being the truth.
 
[¶101] 
Officer Peech then related the admissions by Appellant 
regarding sexual contact that formed the basis of the charges alleged in Counts 
Two through Nine.  He testified that Appellant made the same 
admissions during the interview on the second day when Investigator Koss was 
present.  He testified about Appellant’s responses to 
questions regarding the incident on May 21 (Count One).  He 
testified about Appellant’s responses to his questions regarding anal sex and 
that questioning led to this exchange:
 
Q:        
When you say tried, had he had anal sex with her; did he tell 
you?
 
A:        
In the first interview initially we were talking about what Danielle told 
us that he tried to have anal sex with her and she was asleep.  
She felt like she needed to defecate, and she confronted him about that, 
and he denied it, and later he admitted.
 
Q:        
First he denied it, but later said that he had?
 
A: 
       Yes, sir.
 
Q:        
When did he admit that he had done it later?
 
A:        
Later in the interview.  Probably an hour and a 
half.  I don’t know.
 
Q:        
Mr. Peech, you say that total first day was roughly 4, 4 and a 
half hours?
 
A:        
Yes, sir.
 
Q:        
Can you tell us why you went that long?
 
A:        
He was not telling us the truth.  We would get a little 
truth – he would deny stuff –
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection.  This answer is 
speculative and is a guess.
 
[PROSECUTION]:  
I’m asking why he conducted the interview so long.  He 
can refrain from saying whether it was the truth or not.
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, insofar as the defendant admitted that he 
wasn’t telling the truth, you can answer that – you can talk about 
that.
 
            
In terms of your general opinion, the jury will disregard any general 
opinions, because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.
 
            
With that ruling, go ahead.
 
Q:        
My question, Mr. Peech, is why did you interview him for that 
long?
 
A:        
Because he admitted several times that he lied to us about facts that 
we were talking about.  And he admitted that he was lying 
on a scale, and that it just kept on taking us a little bit more time to get 
another truthful fact out of him and another truthful fact out of 
him.
 
Q:        
What he described?
 
A:        
To another truthful fact of what he described.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In context, it is apparent that 
Officer Peech was referring to the admissions Appellant had made 
regarding his lack of truthfulness.  Because 
Officer Peech was referring to admissions of Appellant, there was no 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. 
 
[¶102] 
More significantly, even if the comment of Officer Peech is 
viewed as improper opinion testimony concerning Appellant’s truthfulness, I am 
unable to find any prejudice caused by the brief exchange.  
The district court apparently recognized that the comment could be viewed 
either as a statement referring to the prior admissions of untruthfulness by 
Appellant, or improper opinion testimony concerning Appellant’s 
untruthfulness.  In response, the district court gave an 
appropriate cautionary instruction.  The majority concedes 
that “under most circumstances this error might be considered 
harmless.”   
 
[¶103] 
The majority finds prejudice, however, by concluding that this brief 
exchange forced Appellant to introduce the objectionable portions of the 
interrogation into evidence.  It is difficult to understand 
how the majority reaches that conclusion, and I find no support for it in the 
record.  Perhaps most troubling is the majority’s reference to 
the denial of the motion to suppress.  According to the 
majority, “defense counsel was left with little choice but to attempt to exploit 
the interview after the district court denied the motion to 
suppress.”  I agree with that statement, but the dismissal of 
a motion to suppress a confession should not result in a finding of plain error 
when the defense opts to introduce portions of the confession into 
evidence.  Here, the majority correctly found no error in the 
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.  In that 
confession, Appellant specifically admitted to the conduct that resulted in the 
charges described in Counts Two through Nine.  Although he 
denied the specific sexual act alleged in Count One, he also admitted to 
relevant facts concerning that alleged incident.  
 
[¶104] 
The State could properly introduce these admissions into 
evidence.  Appellant knew from the outset that he would have 
to confront that evidence at trial.  As a tactical decision, 
he opted to contest the voluntariness of the confession and the admissions at 
trial.  Counsel for Appellant indicated in opening statement 
that they would challenge the confession: “We are going to look at a confession, 
and we are going to look at how the police may have beat the defendant like a 
rented mule to elicit this so-called confession.” 
 
[¶105] 
In his pretrial memorandum, Appellant identified a forensic psychologist 
as a potential defense witness.  During trial, the 
psychologist testified for the defense.  His testimony 
encompassed the interrogation methods and the psychology of an accused in an 
interrogation setting.  He testified specifically as to 
Officer Peech’s interrogation techniques and the impact it may have 
had on Appellant.  In response to questioning from defense 
counsel, he testified that he did not hear Appellant admit to lying in the 
interview.  He opined that Appellant’s statements regarding 
the improper touching (Counts Two through Nine) were not admissions but merely 
speculation from Appellant as to how or why L.W. would have come up 
with the story of anal assault if it had not actually occurred.
 
[¶106] 
During the State’s examination of Officer Peech, and prior to the 
exchange challenged by Appellant, the State attempted to introduce a transcript 
of a portion of the interview into evidence.  Defense counsel 
objected:
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, this is just a piece of eight hours of 
interviews.  I would object.
 
            
If we are going to have the interview, we ought to put the whole 
interview in.  This is just one piece out of eight 
hours.  It doesn’t tell everything that happened.
 
            
And I have notes on this section.  I think there is an 
inaccuracy in here, and I would like to double-check that.
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, 7 – in the absence of a stipulation, 7 is 
hearsay.
 
Thereafter, the State 
did not attempt to introduce any written or recorded portion of the interview 
into evidence during its direct examination of Officer Peech.  
The recorded interview was introduced by Appellant during 
cross-examination of Officer Peech.14
 
[¶107] 
This case is vastly different than Sweet, relied upon by the 
majority.  In Sweet, the investigating officer provided 
improper opinion testimony concerning the veracity of a witness and the 
untruthfulness of the defendant.  Some of the objectionable 
opinion testimony occurred during the interrogation by police and some was 
introduced by direct testimony of the officer at trial.  
Significantly, all of it was introduced by the State.  
Id., ¶¶ 11-20, 234 P.3d  at 1198-1201.  

 
[¶108] 
In Pendleton, the objectionable opinion comments were made during 
the interrogation.  The State sought to introduce the 
evidence.  Defense counsel voiced no objection and urged 
introduction of the interview.  We rejected the defendant’s 
plain error contention, in part, because the defendant had advocated for the 
introduction of the evidence.  Id., ¶ 16, 
180 P.3d  at 217-18.
 
[¶109] 
Here, the State did not introduce any of the objectionable portions of 
the interview.  Appellant did not merely advocate for 
introduction of evidence.  In this case, Appellant introduced 
all of the objectionable portions of the interview in an effort to discredit the 
voluntariness of the confession.  It was a legitimate trial 
tactic and dovetailed with specific jury instructions consistent with the 
defense theory of the case.  Instructions 17 and 19 advised 
the jury:
 
Instruction No. 
17
 
Statements made by 
the Defendant to law enforcement officers shall be considered by you only if you 
first determine that such statements were made voluntarily, in whole or in part. 
Statements are made voluntarily if they are the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than by intimidation [or] coercion, or in reliance upon an express 
promise of special favor, leniency or benefit.  The fact the 
Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, the conduct of the officers 
during the interview, the apparent intelligence of the Defendant, his age and 
his experience with law enforcement are but a few of the factors you are to 
consider as part of the totality of the circumstances under which the statement 
was elicited.  In making this determination, you are to view 
those factors as a reasonable person would view them and not as the Defendant 
may claim to have perceived them.  
 
I[f] you find the 
statement is not voluntary, you must not consider it as evidence against the 
Defendant.  If you find it is voluntary, in whole or in part, 
you must consider only that [part] of the statement which you find to have been 
voluntary.
 
Instruction No. 
19
 
Evidence has been 
admitted that the Defendant made statements regarding the crimes charged. The 
Defendant contends that the statements were not truthful.  

 
Whether the 
Defendant’s statements, or any part thereof, were truthful is a question for the 
jury. 
 
Although the majority 
finds plain error in the receipt of the evidence, there was simply no basis for 
the district court to prevent introduction of the evidence when it was sought by 
Appellant.  It was sound defense strategy.  
It was not error to allow Appellant to pursue that line of 
defense.
 
[¶110] I 
am also concerned about the impact of this decision on future cases.  
Every defendant convicted of a crime based, in part, on evidence obtained 
during interrogation by law enforcement, can enhance his chances for a reversal 
on appeal merely by introducing at trial objectionable statements made during 
the interrogation.  While that may not be the result intended 
by the majority, application of this precedent will inexorably lead to that 
result.  
 
[¶111] 
In sum, I would find that Appellant has failed to establish plain 
error.  Appellant introduced the objectionable portion of the 
interview into evidence.  He was not forced to introduce that 
evidence because of the brief comment by Officer Peech.  
That comment could reasonably be viewed as a reference to specific 
admissions made by Appellant during the interview.  Even if it 
could be viewed as improper opinion testimony, the district court minimized any 
prejudice by immediately issuing a cautionary instruction.  
Admission of the interview evidence was consistent with the defense 
theory of the case employed from opening statement through closing 
argument.  We should reject Appellant’s claim of plain error 
for the same reasons we expressed in Pendleton:
 
As can be seen, the 
appellant relied heavily on the recorded interview, and this evidence was an 
important, if not vital, part of the appellant’s defense strategy. 
 She cannot have it both ways, and now claim that she was 
prejudiced by the inclusion of this evidence.  
 
Id., ¶ 16, 
180 P.3d  at 217-18.
 
FOOTNOTES
1At the 
competency hearing, the victim testified that he has one grandmother, two 
sisters, no dogs, three cats, four mothers, five fathers, and no 
grandfathers.  However, his mother explained that he has two 
grandmothers, no sisters, no cats, and two grandfathers.  At 
trial, the victim testified that he has no grandmothers, five dogs, two cats, 
two sisters, and one brother.  His mother thereafter testified 
that the victim has no cats, dogs, or sisters.
  2While the State 
is required to give a defendant notice of its intent to use evidence pursuant 
to W.R.E. 404(b), such a notice is not contained in the district 
court record.  However, it does not appear that the appellant 
objected to the evidence on the basis of a lack of notice, nor does he make that 
argument on appeal.  Therefore, we will presume that the State 
gave proper notice of its intent to use this evidence.  

  3On appeal, the 
State submits that the evidence of uncharged misconduct “pertained only to the 
single charge of first-degree sexual abuse.”
4This instruction 
exemplifies our concern with the imprecision in the admission of uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  This 
evidence was offered for the sole purpose of proving motive, yet the jury was 
instructed that it may be considered as proof of “motive, intent, knowledge, or 
presence or absence of mistake.”
5In his 
brief, the appellant also claims Deputy Peech threatened to tell the 
prosecutor that the appellant was a psychopath.  The appellant 
has not supported this claim with any independent argument, and essentially 
relies upon the same information as alleged regarding the religious 
psychological coercion.  As such, we consider it part of the 
alleged religious psychological coercion.
6The time 
may have come where this Court should re-evaluate its plain error review 
standard and consider whether it should not also include an analysis of errors 
that seriously affect the fairness of the trial or the integrity of judicial 
proceedings, whether or not the defendant is able to prove specific 
prejudice.  See Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error 
Rule--Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 1065 
(1994).  The underlying concept is that the failure to 
interpose a timely objection, for instance, may result in a forfeiture of that 
right, but forfeiture does not equate to waiver and it does not extinguish the 
error.  Id. at 1072.
7The appellant 
was charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
states:
 
(a)    
An actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree 
if:
 
(ii)    
Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and the actor 
is the victim’s legal guardian or an individual specified in W.S. 
6-4-402[.]
8The appellant 
was charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315 (a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
states:
 
(a)    
Except under circumstance[s] constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the 
first degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an actor commits the crime 
of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree if:
 
(iii)     
Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual 
contact with a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age and the actor 
is the victim’s legal guardian or an individual specified in W.S. 
6-4-402[.]
9I also 
agree that:  (1) There was sufficient evidence to support 
Appellant’s conviction on Count I; (2) Appellant failed to establish that his 
confession was involuntary; (3) It was error to give the “no corroboration of 
victim’s testimony is necessary” instruction; and (4) Appellant did not 
establish ineffectiveness of defense counsel. 
10I question 
the majority’s use of language from the State’s brief to imply that the State is 
conceding that there was no corroborating evidence to support the truth of the 
confession.  Because the issue was not raised, the State never 
addressed the issue and any statements by the State in its brief are necessarily 
taken out of context.
11Again, I would 
point out that, in this case, Appellant did not raise the 
corpus delicti issue.
12According to 
the Court: 
The victim in this 
case is a handicapped child.  She suffered from a malignant 
brain tumor for which she had been subjected to radiation therapy, chemotherapy, 
and surgery.  Although nine years old at the time of the 
alleged offenses, the victim’s mental ability was that of a four-year old or a 
four-year, eight-month old child.  She had been subjected to 
five surgeries which compounded her slowness, lack of coordination, speech 
problems, right-sided weakness and impaired long-term memory. 
 
Betzle, 
847 P.2d  at 1013.
13The word 
“suspected” was handwritten on the typed jury instruction.
14On redirect, 
the State introduced a brief portion of the interview into evidence without 
objection.  That portion of the interview is not challenged by 
Appellant, or relied upon by the majority in reaching its 
determination.  See majority opinion paragraph 
54.