Title: Attorney Grievance v. Kinnane

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG 
No. 74
September Term, 2004
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
THOMAS W. KINNANE
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by  Bell, C.J.  
__________________________________________
Filed: December 23, 2005
1Md. Rule 16-751 (a) provides:
“(a) Commencement of Disciplinary or Remedial Action.
“(1) Upon Approval of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the
Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action in the Court of Appeals.
“(2)Conviction of Crime; Reciprocal Action. If authorized by Rule
16-771(b) or 16-773(b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals without
prior approval of the Commission. Bar Counsel promptly shall
notify the Commission of the filing. The Commission on review
may direct the withdrawal of a petition that was filed pursuant to
this subsection.”
Bar Counsel previously had filed a “Statement of Charges” against the respondent.
Adopted November 30, 2000, effective July 1, 2001, Maryland Rule 16-741 governs the
filing of “statements of charges.” It provides:
“(a) Filing of Statement of Charges.
“(1) Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel shall
file with the Commission a Statement of Charges if Bar
Counsel determines that:
“(A) the attorney either engaged in conduct
constituting professional misconduct or is
incapacitated;
“(B) the professional misconduct or the
incapacity does not warrant an immediate
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action;
“(C) a Conditional Diversion Agreement is
either not appropriate under the circumstances
or the parties were unable to agree on one;  and
“(D) a reprimand is either not appropriate under
the circumstances or (i) one was offered and
rejected by the attorney, or (ii) a proposed
reprimand was disapproved by the Commission
and Bar Counsel was directed to file a
Statement of Charges.”
The filing of the “statement of charges” triggered the peer review process, see Rules 16-
741(b), 16-742, and 16-743, which was competed prior to the filing of the Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action.
 Bar Counsel, with the approval and direction of the Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland, the petitioner, see  Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial
2Rule 1.5 (e) provides:
“(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made
only if:
“(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation;
“(2) the client agrees to the joint representation and the agreement is
confirmed in writing; and
“(3) the total fee is reasonable.”
 
3Rule 8.4 (b) and (c) provides that “[i]t is professional  misconduct for  a lawyer to:
...  commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects [and] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”
4Rule 16-752 provides, as relevant:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the
Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear
the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the
attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates
for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.” 
2
Action against Thomas W. Kinnane, the respondent, charging him with violations of various
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812.  The
Petition alleged, specifically, that the respondent violated Rules 1.5 (e) (Fees),2 and 8.4 (b)
and (c) (Misconduct).3     
We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-752,4 for hearing to the Honorable Ronald
A. Silkworth, a judge of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.   Following the hearing,
at which the respondent appeared and participated,  the hearing court made findings of fact,
5Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into
the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to
any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If dictated
into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be
filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the
conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each
party.”
3
see Rule 16-757 (c)5, as follows: 
“Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a Stipulation of Facts prepared by the parties. The Court
finds that the facts contained therein have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The
Stipulation states:
“The Respondent, Thomas W. Kinnane, Esquire (‘Respondent’) was admitted  to the
Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on June 5, 1996.  He is also admitted to the Virginia
Bar and District of Columbia Bar.
“Prior to becoming an attorney, Respondent was a uniformed officer in the United
States Secret Service for two years then a police officer in the Anne Arundel County Police
Department for eight years.
“While attending law school, Respondent began working for the law firm of
Alexander & Cleaver in Fort Washington, Maryland.  Once he was admitted to the Maryland
Bar, he became an associate of that firm, where he remained until February 2000. He then
practiced with another lawyer in the firm, Howes & Kinnane, P.C. and later became a solo
practitioner, with his office in Anne Arundel County. Throughout the course of his law
4
practice, Respondent has concentrated a significant portion of his practice representing
energy companies in connection with matters pending before government regulatory
agencies.
 “In or about 1998, while employed by Alexander & Cleaver, Respondent met
Andrew N. Chau, Esquire ( ‘Mr. Chau’), the manager of regulatory affairs for Shell Energy
Services (‘Shell Energy’).  Mr. Chau also held himself out to the Respondent and others as
an attorney.  Respondent performed legal services for Shell Energy and other similar clients
while at Alexander & Cleaver.  He continued to represent Shell Energy after leaving the
firm. Respondent's primary point of contact at Shell Energy continued to be Mr. Chau.
Respondent later performed work for Tractebel Power where Mr. Chau accepted
employment after leaving Shell Energy. During the course of his representation of Shell
Energy, Respondent submitted approximately 15 invoices for legal services. It was
Respondent’s practice to invoice Shell Energy for work after it was performed, rather than
to receive a retainer for future work.
“In or about July 2001, Respondent and Mr. Chau met in Washington, D.C., at Mr.
Chau's request. Mr. Chau informed Respondent that he had been authorized by Judith
Burow, vice president of Shell Energy, to pay Respondent a $70,000.00 retainer for future
work.  He instructed Respondent to prepare an invoice for that amount.  Respondent
prepared an invoice from Howes & Kinnane, P.C. to Shell Energy dated July 26, 2001.  The
description of services read, ‘Nevada regulatory and government relations activities, 2001
session and implementation.’ On August 8, 2001, Shell Energy paid $70,000.00 to
5
Respondent by electronic transfer.  Respondent held the $70,000.00 in the firm's escrow
account.  Respondent had never received a retainer from Shell Energy before this payment.
“On or about August 22, 2001, Mr. Chau called the Respondent.  He directed the
Respondent to take the entire retainer as a bonus for work he had done before at a discounted
rate, but to issue a check for $35,000.00 to Mr. Chau. Mr. Chau asked for the $35,000.00
payment to compensate him for referring future business from Shell Energy and its affiliated
companies as well as Tractebel Power.
“Respondent transferred $70,000.00 to the firm's operating account.  Respondent
issued a $35,000.00 check to Andrew Chau & Associates, P.C. on August 22, 2001.  The
statement accompanying the check indicated that it was for ‘professional fees: consulting’.
In fact, Mr. Chau provided no consulting services to Respondent or his firm.  Respondent
drew a check to himself for $35,000.00 from the firm's operating account.
“Howes & Kinnane, P.C. issued an invoice to Shell Energy on August 8, 2001. That
invoice identified the $35,000.00 payment to Andrew Chau as a ‘consulting fee’. Respondent
also issued a form 1099 to Mr. Chau, reporting the payment of the purported consulting fee.
Respondent claimed the $35,000.00 on his annual state and federal tax returns.
“In the fall of 2001, Respondent received a telephone call from Judith Burow and a
Mr. Estes of Shell Energy.  They informed the Respondent that the $70,000.00 payment had
not been authorized by Shell Energy. Mr. Chau called Respondent shortly afterward and
indicated that the invoice ‘might not have been approved’. Respondent believed this to be
an internal dispute among Chau and his supervisors at Shell Energy.
6Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides: 
“The petitioner has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and
convincing evidence. A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a
preponderance of the evidence.”
 
7Although the respondent had not been charged with violating Rule 1.8 (e), which proscribes
a lawyer’s providing financial assistance to a client, only Rule 1.5 (e), the hearing court’s conclusion
of law referred to Rule 1.8 (e), throughout.  That must be, and we so construe it as, a typographical
error.
6
“Mr. Chau was subsequently discharged by Shell Energy.  Criminal charges were
brought against both Mr. Chau and the Respondent.  Respondent was charged with felony
theft on April 30, 2003. Harris County (Texas) District Court entered a deferred adjudication
of guilt on July 11, 2003.  Respondent has paid restitution of $35,000.00, as well as a
$2,000.00 fine.  Respondent also provided all information he had to assist in the prosecution
of Mr. Chau.  Respondent has also cooperated fully with Bar Counsel’s investigation of this
matter.”
From the foregoing facts, which it found by clear and convincing evidence,  Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 266, 849 A.2d 423, 438 (2004), Rule 16-757 (b),6
the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated Rules 1.5 (e)7 and 8.4 (b) and (c),
as charged.  The Rule 1.5 (e) violation was established, it stated, by the evidence that the
respondent split his fee from Shell Energy with Mr. Chau, Shell’s in-house counsel.   Further
explaining, the hearing court pointed out:
7
“Mr. Chau performed no services to earn that portion of the fee. Respondent
has acknowledged that the payment was made at Mr. Chau's direction to pay
him to make future referrals of work to Respondent's firm. While Respondent
characterizes the payment as the equivalent of purchasing advertising with his
own funds received from clients' payments, that position is contradicted by
Respondent's billing statement submitted to Shell Energy, which disclosed that
$35,000.00 was paid to Chau for consulting services. The client never
authorized Respondent to share the fee with Mr. Chau. In fact, the payment was
an incentive for Mr. Chau to refer work to Respondent also from Tractabel
Power, a company unrelated to Shell Energy. Mr. Chau was not a member of
Respondent's firm. The division of fees was not in proportion to the work
performed since Mr. Chau was being compensated for making future referrals
of work. There was no written agreement between Respondent and Shell
Energy for Respondent and Mr. Chau to assume joint responsibility for the
work. The fee charged by Respondent was not reasonable because no services
were performed for the fee. Rather, it was a ‘bonus’ not authorized by the
client, but only offered by the corrupt employee who was seeking the improper
kickback of half of the fee. Respondent's conduct violated Rule 1.8(e) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.”
As we have seen, the respondent was charged with, and found guilty of, felony theft,
in respect of which he made restitution and paid a fine.   That criminal conduct, the hearing
court concluded, “reflects adversely on [the respondent’s] honesty, trustworthiness and
fitness as a lawyer.”   It also involved, the court noted and determined, dishonesty and
misrepresentation, proscribed by Rule 8.4 (c).    It elucidated:
“Respondent’s invoice for $70,000.00 retainer made no reference to the fact
that it was to be a retainer for future services.  Nothing on the bill would alert
the client to the fact that the payment requested was not for services already
performed. In fact, the charging of a retainer was inconsistent with
Respondent’s previous dealings with the client, who had only paid fees after
services were rendered.  Respondent then accepted that ‘retainer’ as a bonus for
work long since performed and paid for, solely on the authorization of the
client’s employee who was demanding that he split the ‘bonus’ with him
personally.   Particularly in light of the fact the client had never paid a bonus
to him before, the large amount of the payment, the fact the payment was
8
submitted for other purposes and the client had consistently insisted on paying
extremely low fees to the Respondent, Respondent could not reasonably have
believed that Mr. Chau had authorization from Shell Energy to pay a bonus to
Respondent, to be shared with Mr. Chau.  Respondent’s acceptance of the
$70,000.00 and his sharing of the unearned funds with Mr. Chau led to
Respondent[’s] entering a plea of guilty to felony theft and receiving a deferred
adjudication by the Texas court.   Respondent’s invoicing of the $70,000.00 fee
and his taking it as a fee at the direction of Mr. Chau to Shell Energy were
dishonest acts and crimes adversely reflecting on Respondent’s character and
fitness as an attorney.  His invoices, which did not reflect that the $70,000.00
was unearned and which described the $35,000.00 paid to Mr. Chau as a
professional fee for consulting services, were dishonest misrepresentations.
Respondent and Mr. Chau participated in a fraudulent scheme which
constituted felony theft in Texas.”
Unlike the Petitioner, which took no exceptions to the hearing court’s findings or
conclusions, the respondent filed Respondent’s Exceptions To The Findings Of Fact and
Conclusions Of Law.   In that pleading, he excepted to the hearing court’s conclusion that
he could not have believed reasonably that Mr. Chau had been authorized by Shell Energy
to pay him a bonus, “to be shared with Mr. Chau.”  There is not, he asserts, any evidence in
the record to support the conclusion, while, on the other hand, there is evidence to the
contrary, his testimony, “that [he] had no knowledge upon payment of the bonus that Chau
later required [be] split.” He also maintains that his actions, all of them - “providing invoices
and statements through normal channels; providing a 1099 Form to Chau; depositing and
processing the funds appropriately in firm accounts; and reporting the income on
respondent’s annual state and federal taxes,” – “indicate that he had a good faith belief that
the bonus was properly paid.”   
In further support of this exception, the respondent relies on the very fact that he took
8 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
9The hearing court ruled both that the Peer Review recommendations are irrelevant for any
material purpose and that admission of the Panel Report would violate Maryland Rule 16-723 (a),
which provides:
“(a) Confidentiality of Peer Review Meetings. All persons present at a peer review
meeting shall maintain the confidentiality of all speech, writing, and conduct made
as part of the meeting and may not disclose or be compelled to disclose the speech,
writing, or conduct in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding. Speech,
writing, or conduct that is confidential under this Rule is privileged and not subject
to discovery, but information otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not
become inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by reason of its use at the
peer review meeting.”
 
9
an “Alford plea,” 8 proffering that entering such a plea “reflects respondent’s good faith belief
that his conduct was appropriate and ... [his] evaluation of the risks and benefits of
proceeding to trial on the facts of the case, at a particular time, and in a particular distant
city.”   The respondent further finds it “noteworthy” that, notwithstanding the length of the
process and the hearing court’s conclusion in this regard and “the effects thereof on
respondent’s honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as an attorney,” Bar Counsel took no
preliminary action to terminate his practice, thereby “evidencing its apparent belief that
respondent’s actions do not, and have not, affected his ability to honestly and competently
continue to represent members of the public.”
The respondent’s second exception relates to the hearing court’s refusal to admit into
evidence the Peer Review Panel’s Report.9   Characterizing that ruling as erroneous, he notes
that the report was offered to clarify the record “with respect to how the formal Bar Counsel
petition ultimately was arrived at and filed with the Circuit Court” and that the filing of  them
10
was not recommended to Bar Counsel.
Maryland Rule 16-759 (b) governs review by this Court and, in particular, the
disposition of exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.   It
provides: 
“(1) Conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit
court judge's conclusions of law. 
“(2) Findings of fact. (A) If no exceptions are filed. If no exceptions are filed,
the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of
determining appropriate sanctions, if any. 
“(B) If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-
757(b).  The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact
challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due regard to
the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of
witnesses.”
The respondent’s first exception implicates Rule 16-759 (b) (1), because it involves
a conclusion of law drawn by the hearing court.   Those conclusions are reviewed de novo.
We do not agree, at the outset, that there are no facts to support the hearing court’s
conclusion of law.  Indeed, the hearing court enumerated the facts on which it relied: the
course of dealings between the client and the respondent, the failure of the bill for the
“retainer” to so characterize it  or, at least, “alert the client to the fact that the payment
requested was not for services already performed,” the large amount of the requested
payment, and, as indicated, the respondent took no exception to any of these findings of facts.
See Rule 16-759 (b) (2) (B).  Having reviewed the hearing court’s detailed and cogent
10Rule 16-743 (e) provides:
“(e) Recommendation. The Peer Review Panel may recommend to the Commission
that a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action be filed or make any
recommendation to the Commission that Bar Counsel may make under Rule 16-734
(a), (b), or (c). The Panel shall accompany its recommendation with a brief
explanatory statement.”
11
explanation and the facts on the basis of which its challenged legal conclusion was drawn,
we have no hesitancy in overruling the exception.
We shall also overrule the respondent’s exception to the hearing court’s refusal to
admit the Peer Review Panel’s Report.   Rule 16-743, the rule governing the Peer Review
process, makes clear the limited office that Panel performs.  It provides, as relevant:
“(a) Purpose of Peer Review Process. The purpose of the peer review process
is for the Peer Review Panel to consider the Statement of Charges and all
relevant information offered by Bar Counsel and the attorney concerning it and
to determine (1) whether the Statement of Charges has a substantial basis and
there is reason to believe that the attorney has committed professional
misconduct or is incapacitated, and, (2) if so, whether a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action should be filed or some other disposition is
appropriate. The peer review process is not intended to be an adversarial one
and it is not the function of Peer Review Panels to hold evidentiary hearings,
adjudicate facts, or write full opinions or reports.”
To be sure, although Rule 16-743 (e)10 permits the Peer Review Panel to make
recommendations to the petitioner to the same extent as could Bar Counsel, nevertheless, it
is the petitioner, as Rule 16-751 (a) makes clear, that determines whether, and what, charges
are to be filed; the Rule provides for the filing of charges upon approval or at the direction
of the petitioner.   Thus, whether Bar Counsel recommends the filing of charges or another
12
procedure is not only not dispositive, we agree with the hearing court, it is irrelevant.
Moreover, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-723, certain matters pertaining to the Peer
Review process are confidential.   Section (b) (2) of that Rule lists “the records and
proceedings of a Peer Review Panel” as among such matters.   The Report of the Peer
Review Panel qualifies as “records and proceedings [that] are confidential and not open to
public inspection [whose] contents may not be revealed by the Commission, the staff of the
Commission, Bar Counsel, the staff and investigators of the Office of Bar Counsel, members
of the Peer Review Committee, or any attorney involved in the proceeding.”
In Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108, 874 A.2d 897, 908 (2005), we
addressed an issue akin to, though certainly not identical to, the issue presented in this case.
There, the Respondent claimed that he had been denied the opportunity to impeach the
complainant in his case when the hearing court refused to allow him to cross-examine her
by introducing statements she made at the Peer Review Panel proceeding that he alleged were
inconsistent with certain statements she made at the evidentiary hearing before the hearing
judge.   Id. at 102, 874 A.2d at 904.   We rejected his argument, id. at 113-14, 874 A. 2d at
911-12, in the process delineating the nature and function of the Peer Review process:
“The Peer Review process features a panel of at least three individuals
comprised of a majority of attorneys and at least one member being a non-
attorney  that makes a preliminary determination as to whether formal charges
should be filed against the respondent attorney. ... [T]he Peer Review Panel
proceeding is an informal, nonadversarial meeting designed to allow Bar
Counsel, the respondent attorney, the complainant, and other invited persons
to meet and discuss the issues presented in the complaint in an environment
similar to a mediation process.... The Panel is not governed by any formal rules
13
of evidence, but must respect lawful privileges.... 
“The purpose of the Peer Review Panel is not principally to make
recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal charges.... If a Peer
Review Panel concludes that the complaint has a substantial basis indicating the
need for some remedy, some behavioral or operational changes on the part of
the lawyer, or some discipline short of suspension or disbarment, part of the
peer review process can be an attempt through both evaluative and facilitative
dialogue, (A) to effectuate directly or suggest a mechanism for effecting an
amicable resolution of the existing dispute between the lawyer and the
complainant, and (B) to encourage the lawyer to recognize any deficiencies on
his or her part that led to the problem and take appropriate remedial steps to
address those deficiencies. The goal, in this setting, is not to punish or
stigmatize the lawyer or to create a fear that any admission of deficiency will
result in substantial harm, but rather to create an ambience for a constructive
solution. The objective views of two fellow lawyers and a lay person, expressed
in the form of advice and opinion rather than in the form of adjudication, may
assist the lawyer (and the complainant) to retreat from confrontational positions
and look at the problem more realistically.
“If, however, after hearing statements, the Panel determines that the Statement
of Charges ‘has a substantial basis and that there is reason to believe that the
[respondent] attorney has committed professional misconduct or is
incapacitated, the Panel may ... make an appropriate recommendation to the
Commission or ... inform the parties of its determination and allow the attorney
an opportunity to consider a reprimand or a Conditional Diversion Agreement.’
The Panel is authorized to recommend to the Commission that either a Petition
for Disciplinary or Remedial Action be filed, the Statement of Charges be
dismissed, or that a Conditional Diversion Agreement or reprimand is
appropriate. Although the purpose of the Panel proceeding is not to generate
any formal findings of fact, the Panel must accompany its recommendation with
‘a brief explanatory statement.’”
Id. at 108-09, 874 A.2d at 908-09 (internal citations omitted).  We concluded, noting the
“comprehensive and sweeping language of Md. Rule 16-723(a)”:
“Despite the common sense appeal of permitting use of statements made during
the Peer Review process to expose later inconsistencies or intentional
misrepresentations, we conclude that the better course is to declaim, borrowing
14
and mutating somewhat a currently popular advertising slogan, ‘what happens
in Peer Review stays in Peer Review.’”
Id. at 113, 874 A. 2d at 911.    
Where there is no more than a recommendatory function, one that is not binding and
certainly not dispositive, there is even more reason to “insulate” Peer Review Panel Reports
from subsequent disclosure at later stages of the attorney discipline process.
While not excepting to the findings or the conclusions, the petitioner filed Petitioner’s
Recommendation For Sanction.   It seeks the respondent’s disbarment.   Stressing the hearing
judge’s characterization of the respondent’s conduct as “dishonest” and “crimes adversely
reflecting on respondent’s character and fitness as an attorney,” concluding that he
“participated in a fraudulent scheme which constituted felony theft in Texas,” the petitioner
relies on Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A. 2d 463, 488
(2001) and its progeny.  
The respondent has not specifically recommended a sanction.  It is obvious from his
exceptions and the prayers thereto - requesting the Court to “take such actions it deems
appropriate with respect to Bar Counsel’s petition and the Circuit Court’s findings and
Conclusions that will allow the respondent to continue his honorable service to the public and
exemplary representation of the Bar”-  that he opposes, and is urging something short,
perhaps quite a bit short, of disbarment.
The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is well settled:  to protect the public
and not to punish the erring attorney.   See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131,
15
167, 825 A. 2d 430, 451 (2003); Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519,
307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973) (“the purpose of disciplinary actions ... is not to punish the
offending attorney, as that function is performed in other types of legal proceedings, but it
is to protect the public from one who has demonstrated his unworthiness to continue the
practice of law)”   In Davis, we elucidated:
“Our consideration of the appropriate disciplinary measure to be taken in any
given case involving violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is guided
by our interest in protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal
profession. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800
A.2d 782, 789 (2002). The purpose of such proceedings is not to punish the
lawyer, but should deter other lawyers from engaging in similar conduct.
[Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.] Mooney, 359 Md. [56,] 96, 753 A.2d [17,]
38 [2000]. The public is protected when we impose sanctions that are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with
which they were committed. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md.
420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997).” 
 375 Md. at 166-67, 825 A. 2d at 451.
In Vanderlinde, we stated a general rule applicable to intentionally  dishonest conduct
in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances,  that disbarment is the usual
sanction for such misconduct. 369 Md. at 413-415, 773 A.2d at 485. We explained:
“Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional
dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic
character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer
almost beyond excuse.   Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an
attorney’s character.  Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.”
Id. at 418, 773 A. 2d at 488.
 In that case, the dishonest conduct was the respondent’s theft, over a period of time,
16
of  $3,880.67 from her employer, a community association, for whom she worked in a non-
legal capacity. Vanderlinde,  364 Md. at 381, 773 A.2d at 465.   In disbarring the respondent,
even though she had repaid the stolen funds, we noted the absence of mitigation, id. at 419,
773 A. 2d at 488, and concluded that no extenuating circumstances had been established by
the respondent’s medical evidence. Id.   What we said in a similar case, in which the
respondent submitted false documentation in connection with an insurance claim, just as
easily could be applied to the respondent in this case:  “Respondent’s dishonesty was willful,
intentional and for her own personal gain.. ‘Respondent’s dishonest and criminal conduct
was motivated by greed.’” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 600, 873 A.2d
1161, 1171 (2005).
The respondent’s conduct in this case is not mitigated; there are no compelling
extenuating circumstances. Accordingly, we adopt the petitioner’s recommendation and order
the respondent disbarred.
  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL
COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
AGAINST THOMAS W. KINNANE.