Title: In re State Engineer Ruling No. 5823

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

ome ae

  
 
     
  

128 Nev., Advance Opinion 22
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN RE: NEVADA STATE ENGINEER. No. 52963
IRULING NO. 5823.

pouiticat-suspivision oF tHe FILED

swat 312012

   
   
    
    
   
    
 
 
 
   
  

ENGINEER, THE STATE OF
INEVADA, DEPARTMENT OF
(ONSERVATION AND NATURAL
IRESOURCES, DIVISION OF WATER
ESOURCES; ASPEN CREEK, LLC;
\AYTON VALLEY INVESTORS, LL
YON COUNTY: STANTON PARK
)EVELOPMENT, INC. CARSON
"‘AHOE REGIONAL HEALTHCARE:

& B LAND INVESTMENTS; DENNIS
SMITH: AND MARCIA BENNETT
MITH,

‘espondents,

 

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a petition for
judicial review of the State Engineer's ruling in a water rights action
whird (now Tenth) Judicial District Court, Churchill County: David A.
uff, Judge.

 

od and remanded,

 

hur E. Mallory, District Attorney, and Craig B. Mingay. Deputy
istrict Attorney, Churchill County.
for Appellant Churchill County.

 

12-1104

 
nee

  
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
  

|Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Don Springmeyer
ind Christopher W. Mixson, Las Vegas,
for Appellant Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.

|Allison, MacKenzie, Pavlakis, Wright & Fagan, Ltd. and Karen A.
IPeterson, Carson City,
for Respondent Carson Tahoe Regional Healtheare.

ICatherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Bryan L. Stockton,
IDeputy Attorney General, Carson City,
ffor Respondent Nevada State Engineer.

jeorge N. Benesch, Reno,
for Respondent Lyon County.

Holland & Hart LLP and Alex J. Flangas, Reno,
for Respondent R & B Land Investments.

M. Clouser & Associates, Ltd., and Justin M. Clouser, Minden,
for Respondents Dennis Smith and Marcia Bennett Smith.

w Offices of John P. Schlegelmilch, Ltd., and Sandra-Mae Pickens,
‘erington; Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Kisinger and Brent T.
‘olvet, Reno,

for Respondent Stanton Park Development, Inc.

‘eno,
nr Respondents Aspen Creek, LLC: and Dayton Valley Investors, LLC.

jrownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Gary M. Kvistad and Bradley
Herrema, Las Vegas: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck. LLP, and

[Michael A. Gheleta and Geoffrey M. Williamson, Denver, Colorado,

ior Amicus Curiae Town of Minden, Nevada,

 

 

 
as

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J

NRS 533.450(1) affords judicial review “in the nature of an
appeal” to “[a]ny person feeling aggrieved by any order or decision of the
State [Water] Engineer . .. affecting the person's interests.” ‘The appeal
“must be initiated in the proper court of the county in which the matters
affected or a portion thereof are situated.” Id. In this case, we consider
‘The district court held that

 

what the statute means by “matters affecte
the phrase refers to the point of diversion of the applicants’ existing or
proposed water rights, nobody else's. It further held that filing for review
in an improper county does not just misplace venue, a defect that may be
cured or waived, but defeats subject matter jurisdiction, requiring
dismissal, ‘Thus, since the protesters filed their appeals in Churchill
County, where their rights or interests allegedly would be affected, as
opposed to Lyon County, where the applicants’ groundwater
appropriations lie, the district court summarily dismissed. By then, NRS
'583.450(1)'s 30-day limit on seeking judicial review had passed,

We conclude that the district court read the statute too
restrictively, We therefore vacate the jurisdictional dismissal and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

L

A
‘This case concerns State Engineer Ruling 5823, allocating
groundwater rights in the Dayton Valley Hydrographic Basin (the Basin).
Most of the applications considered in Ruling 5823 asked to change the

 
 

point of diversion, place, and manner of use of existing groundwater
appropriations. However, two were for new groundwater appropriations.
‘The Basin lies wholly within Lyon County.

Appellants Churchill County and the Pyramid Lake Paiute
‘Tribe (the Tribe) protested the applications before the State Engineer.
‘They maintain that the Basin is “severely over-appropriated.” Because
the Basin’s groundwater is hydrologically connected to the surface waters
of the Carson River, which flows into the Lahontan Reservoir, they argued
to the State Engineer that approving the applications in Lyon County
would deplete these waters, in which they have an interest, in neighboring
Churchill County.

Churchill County holds decreed surface water rights in the
Carson River, but the Tribe does not. Nonetheless, the Tribe reasons that

the applications considered in Ruling 6823 affect its interests because

 

dopleting the Carson River surface water will decrease inflow into the
Lahontan Reservoir, In turn, Newlands Reclamation Project senior water
rights holders would be entitled to divert Truckee River surface water to
compensate for insufficient flows from the Carson River. ‘This water

flow into Pyramid Lake,

 

diversion would decrease the Truckee Rive
thus affecting the Tribe's interests,
In Ruling 5823, the State Engineer rejected both Churchill
County's and the Tribe's protests and granted all pending applications.
B
Churchill County and the Tribe appealed, invoking NRS
583.450(1), which reads in pertinent part as follows:

Any person feeling aggrieved by any order or
decision of the State Engineer, acting in person or
through the assistants of the State Engineer or
the water commissioner, affecting the person's

   

 
a

interests, when the order or decision relates to the
administration of determined rights or is made
pursuant to NRS 533.270 to 533.445, inclusive, or
NRS 533.481, 534.193, 535.200 or 536.200, may
have the same reviewed by a proceeding for that
purpose, insofar as may be in the nature of an
appeal, which must be initiated in the proper
court of the county in which the matters affected
or a portion thereof are situated, but on stream
systems where a decree of court has been entered,
the action must be initiated in the court that
entered the decree.

Deeming themselves “aggrieved” and the “matters affected or a portion
thereof" to be situate in Churchill County, the County and the Tribe filed
their appeals in the Third Judicial District Court in Churchill County. In
addition, the Tribe filed a separate appeal in the federal court that had
issued the decree governing use of Carson River water, United States v.

 

Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877, 879-81 (D. Nev. 1980),
affd_as modified, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Alpine decree), relying
on the clause of exception in NRS 583.450(1) (but on stream systems
where a decree of court has been entered, the action must be initiated in
the court that entered the decree”).!

‘The State Engineer responded to the ‘Third Judicial District,
Court appeals with a demand to change venue from Churchill to Lyon
County. At the time, the Third Judicial District comprised both Churchill
and Lyon Counties. In practical terms, therefore, all the State Engineer

sought was an intradistrict change of venue, from one county court to

'The Tribe's Churchill County petition describes its federal Alpine
decree court petition as “primary” to its “secondary” state court petition.

 
 

another, within the same judicial district? Respondents Aspen Creek,
LLC, and Dayton Valley Investors, LLC (collectively, Aspen Creek), went
further, filing a motion to dismiss that challenged subject matter
jurisdiction. Although some of the other respondents joined Aspen Creek's
motion to dismiss, the State Engineer did not, standing on his venue
challenge.

‘The motions to change venue and to dismiss both argued that,
under NRS 533.450(1), “the proper court of the county in which the
matters affected or a portion thereof are situated” was the Third Judicial
District Court in Lyon County, because that is where the applicants’ water
rights are or would be located. Not surprisingly, Churchill County and the
Tribe disagreed. In their view, NRS 533.450(1) by its terms (‘or a portion
thereof....") contemplates more than one possible forum and, in using the
8 but to

 

phrase “matters affected,” refers not just to an applicant's inte

 

a protester’s as well. Thus, the district courts in either Churchill County

or Lyon County could entertain their appeal

 

Similar arguments were made to the Alpine decree court on
motions to dismiss the Tribe's parallel federal appeal. The Alpine decree
court ruled before the district court in this case did. United States v,
Alpine Land & Resorvoir Co,, Case Subfile No. 3:73-cv-00203-LDG, Equity
No. 3:73-ev-00183-LDG (D. Nev. July 3, 2008) (Alpine 2008 order). It

*Effective January 1, 2012, Churchill County was removed from the
Third Judicial District to become the newly created Tenth Judicial
District. The Third and Tenth Judicial Districts now are single-county
districts, encompassing Lyon and Churchill Counties, respectively. 2011
Nev. Stat., ch. 316, § 1, at 1772-73.

   

 
os

 

accepted arguendo (as do we) that Ruling 5823 affected the Tribe's rights
in the Truckee River, as adjudicated in United States v. Orr Water Ditch
Co., Equity No. A-3 (D. Nev. 1944) (the Orr Ditch decree), due to the
alleged impact on the surface waters of the Carson River outlined above.
Nonetheless, the Alpine decree court rejected the Tribe's argument that
this qualified its appeal under the clause in NRS 533.450(1) providing,
“but on stream systems where a decree of court has been entered, the
action must be initiated in the court that entered the decree.” According
to the Alpine decree court, alleging that a State Engineer's ruling affects
federally decreed water rights does not thereby “confer jurisdiction” on the
decree court, Alpine 2008 Order, slip op. at 3. “Rather,” the court
continued, NRS 533.450(1) reposes exclusive jurisdiction in the court
where the applicant's actual or proposed water rights are located, meaning
in the context of Ruling 6823 “that such jurisdiction is in the proper court
in Lyon County, as that is the county in which the Dayton Valley
Hydrographic Basin is located.” Id, Accordingly, the Alpine decree court
dismissed the Tribe's appeal of Ruling 5823,

‘The district court in this case accepted Aspen Crock’s
invitation to take judicial notice of the Alpine 2008 order. It “agree[d]
with the Alpine court that it is the location of the water rights of the
th court hi

 

applicant that determines w!

 

jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from a State Engineer's decision.” Given the admitted fact that “[tJhe
rights granted or altered in State Engineer Ruling 5823 are located in
Lyon County,” it concluded that it did not have “subject matter jurisdiction
over thle] appeal.” Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the district court
deomed itself powerless to order a change of venue, and dismissed. It did
80 based on the pleadings and the State Engineer's written ruling, without

   

 
ano a

 

considering the administrative record, which had yet to be filed when its
order was entered.

From this order of dismissal, Churchill County and the Tribe
have appealed.

@

After the principal briefs in this appeal were filed, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Alpine 2008 order. United States v.
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co,, 385 F. App'x 770 (8th Cir, 2010), It did s0
based on United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
2010), The 2010 Orr Ditch decision rejects the proposition that the
location of the applicant's water rights determines jurisdiction under NRS
533.450(1), at least in cases where the protester’s allegedly affected rights
are federally decreed; it holds that “any allocation of groundwater rights
by the State Engineer that allegedly diminishes the Tribe's decreed water
rights comes within the clause of [NRS] 533.450(1) that provides for
appellate review ‘in the court that entered the decree.” Id, at 1160.°

20f note, the Tribe's appeal to the Alpine decree court of Ruling 5823
was not, as in Orr Ditch, an appeal to the court that established the
decreed water rights of the Tribe allegedly affected by the protested
groundwater allocation. See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 885 F. Appx at
771 (noting that the Tribe “relied in its challenge not on any right to
Carson River water,” adjudicated in the Alpine decree, “but on the
potential downstream impact of the allocations on the Tribe's decreed
rights to the Truckee River,” adjudicated in the Orr Ditch decree)
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit Alpine panel concluded that, “[cJonsistent
with our holding in Orr[ Ditch, 600 F.3d 1152], subject matter jurisdiction
exists over the Tribe's appeal from the State Engineer's Ruling
5823... insofar as the allocation of Dayton Valley Hydrographic Basin
groundwater rights is plausibly alleged to affect adversely the Tribe's
decreed water rights under the Orr Diteh Decree.” Id, at 772.

 

 

 

 
oe

   
   
  
   
   
  
   
    
 
 

‘This court requested and received further briefing on the
jimpact on this appeal of the decisions in Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 385
IP. App'x 770, and United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, as
jwell as the federal district court's order on remand from the Ninth Cireuit
jin United States v, Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D.
|Nev. 2011). See also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Nos
[3-78-ev-00183-LDG, 3:37-cv-00202-LDG, 2011 WL 2470627 (D. Nev. Jun.
17, 2011). We also asked the parties to clarify whether the interests of
IChurchill County and the ‘Tribe assertedly affected by Ruling 5823 derive
licom water rights that are decreed, permitted, or a combination of both, a

 

Jauestion the parties could not definitively answer given the limited record
javailable.*

IL
‘The sole issue presented by this appeal concerns subject

Jacking based

 

matter jurisdiction, which the district court determined wé
jon its reading of NRS 533.450(1), the pleadings, and State Engineer
[Ruling 5823. When decided on pleadings alone, “[slubject matter
jurisdiction [presents] a question of law subject to de novo review.” Ogawa

, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). “[Qluestions of
jstatutory interpretation” also receive de novo review. Bigpond v, State.
1128 Nev. —, 270 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2012).

4On motion by a respondent, this court struck the excerpts of the
ladministrative record in appellants’ appendix, as the administrative
lrecord was never filed with the district court. NRAP 30(g)(1) (the
lappendix [must] consist{] of true and correct copies of the papers in the
district court file”).

 

 
 

‘A decision of the State Engineer enjoys a presumption of
correctness. NRS 533.450(10). ‘The presumption does not extend to
“purely legal questions,” such as “the construction of a statute,” as to
which “the reviewing court may undertake independent review.” ‘Town of
Eureka v, State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 165, 826 P.2d 948, 949 (1992).
Even 60, this court recognizes the State Engineer's expertise and looks to
his interpretation of a Nevada water law statute
mandatory, authority. Id, at 165-66, 826 P.2d at 950. Put another way,
“{wJhile the State Engineer's interpretation of a statute [may be]
persuasive, it is not controlling.” Id; accord State v. State Engineer, 104
Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (1988).

A

Our analysis begins with NRS 533.450(1)'s text. See 2A
Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes_and_Statutory
Construction § 47:1, at 274-75 (7th ed. 2007) (The starting point in
statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the act and draw

 

persuasive, if not

inferences concerning the meaning from its composition and structure.”
(footnote omitted)); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 207
(New York 1920) Cwe do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means’)

NRS 533.450(1) starts out with an introductory grant clause
that gives “[alny person feeling aggrieved by any order or decision of the
State Engineer... affecting the person's interests” a right to judicial
review. (Emphasis added.) The phrase “any person” signifies
inclusiveness, not limitation. See Western Surety Company v_ ADCO
Credit, 127 Nev.__, _, 251 P.8d 714, 716-17 (2011). Read literally, and
without more, NRS 533.450(1)'s grant clause thus extends the right of
judicial review to applicants and protesters alike. Soe Howell v. State

10

 

 
ore

Engineer, 124 Nev. 1222, 1228, 197 P.3d 1044, 1048 (2008) ("so long as the
[State Engineer's] decision affects a person's interests that relate to the
administration of determined rights, and is a final written determination
on the issue, the aggrieved party may properly challenge it through a
petition for judicial review” under NRS 533.450(1)).

Having established a right of judicial review in favor of
applicants and protesters alike, the statute continues with its forum
clause. ‘This clause specifies that the judicial review proceeding “must be
initiated in the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or
1 portion thereof are situated.” NRS 533.450(1). “Must” is mandatory, a
distinguished from the permissive “may.” Fourchier v, McNeil Const. Co.
68 Nev. 109, 122, 227 P.2d 429, 435 (1951). ‘Thus, to obtain judicial review
under NRS 533.450(1), a “person” aggrieved “must” file the proceeding in
“the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a portion

thereof are situated.” But this does not signify, as the district court held,

 

 

that only a single court in a single county will do—much less that the
“matters affected” must be judged from the perspective of the applicant,
not a protester. On the contrary, the phrase “or a portion thereof”
contemplates multiple potential forums: If “a portion” of the “matters
affected” being situated in the forum county satisfies the statute, s0 too,
should the remainder of the “matters affected” qualify the counties in
which they are situated. Further, the forum clause’s use of “matters
affected” hearkens back to the language in the introductory clause that
grants judicial review to “[a}ny person feeling aggrieved by any order or
decision of the State Engincer . . affecting the person's interests.” NRS

a

 

 
ene

583.450(1) (emphasis added). Accepting that “[tJhe same words used
twice in the same [statute] are presumed to have the same meaning,” 24
Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, supra, § 46:6, at
249; see Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 94, 157 P.8d 697, 702 (2007), the
solipsistic view of the respondents that “matters affected” only refers to
their interests, not those of one or more protesters, is unreasonable, given
that the grant clause in the same sentence of the same statute gives “any
person” a right of judicial review of “any order or decision of the State
Engineer... affecting the person's interests.”

NRS 6533.450(1) continues with a clause of exception: “but on
stream systems where a decree of court has been entered, the action must

bbe initiated in the court that entered the decree.” ‘The statute's
introductory grant and forum clauses have been in place since 1915. 1915
Nev. Stat., ch. 253, § 1, at 384, The clause of exception was added in
1951, 1951 Nev. Stat., ch. 110, § 11,

reinforces the conclusion that NRS 533.450(1) contemplates more than one

t 140, ‘The clause of exception

 

possible forum—the decree court and other non-decree courts that
otherwise, without this clause, could potentially hear the appeal.

"The Legislature knew how to limit review to the county or counties
where the applicant's water rights lie, as it had done so in an earlier water
law. Cf, Compiled Laws of Nevada § 366, at 81 (Cutting 1900) (providing
that “an applicant feeling himself aggrieved by any endorsement made by
the Board of Water Commissioners ... may ... take an appeal therefrom
to the District Court of the county in which is situated the point of
diversion of the proposed appropriation”). ‘This language was not used in
the 1913 water law, 1913 Nev. Stat,, ch. 140, § 75, at 216, as amended in
1915, 1915 Nov. Stat., ch. 253, § 13, at 384, in the section that ultimately
became NRS 533.450(1).

2

 

 
cnn te

Nothing in NRS 533.450(1)'s text, in short, vests exclusive
jurisdiction in the court of the county where all or part of the applicant's
water rights lie (unless perhaps the clause of exception applies to the
applicant's rights, which isn't suggested here). Instead, the statute's
wording plainly contemplates more than one permissible forum,
depending on the location, nature, and origin of the interests assertedly
affected.

BR

Relying on the later-vacated order of the Alpine decree court,
Alpine 2008 Order, slip op. at 3, the district court concluded that NRS
583.450(1) is ambiguous and that the result produced by a literal reading

  

of NRS 583.450(1) was unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the
district court, like the Alpine decree court, relied primarily on the final
clause of exception that was added to NRS 533.450(1) in 1951.5 It did so
even though its jurisdiction was not invoked on the basis that it was a
decree court but, rather, under the general forum clause in NRS
533.450(1).

In the district court's words, “[tJhe Legislature clearly
intended [the clause of exception in] NRS 533.450(1) to confer continuing
and exclusive jurisdiction of State Engineer decisions that ‘affect’ water
rights on decreed stream systems on the one court that entered the

“The district court relied on the forum clause’s reference to “the
proper court of the county” to establish ambiguity as to whether NRS
583.450(1) meant to establish a single court with exclusive jurisdiction or
multiple potential forums. We interpret the reference to “the proper
court” as signifying venue, not jurisdictional limitations. See infra § ID.

13

 

 
one

 

he interests claimed to be affected by one decision
could be water rights on two different stream systems for which different
From this,
the district court concluded that, “[iJn order to accomplish the intended

 

decrees of court have already been entered by different courts,

exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from decisions deciding water rights on
st[rJeam systems, it is necessary to define the ‘matters affected’ by a State
Engineer[']s decision as the water rights of the applicant,” in both decree-
court and non-decree-court cases.

But limiting jurisdiction under NRS 533.450(1) to the court of
the county where the applicant's water rights lie creates its own problems
with multiple potential forums and creates an even more profound conflict
between a decree court's ongoing jurisdiction and a second court's
assumption of such jurisdiction—a conflict that the clause of exception in
NRS 533.450(1) seems designed to mitigate, to the extent possible, The
Ninth Circuit's recent Orr Ditch decision, 600 F.3d at 1154, 1159-61,
illustrates the problems perfectly,

As the 2010 Orr Ditch decision recognize:

matter jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the State Engineer is an

foderal “subject

 

odd amalgam,” a “highly extraordinary,” “unique jurisdictional
arrangement.” Id, at 1159 (quoting United States v. Alpine Land &
Reservoir Co,, 878 F.2d 1217, 1219 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989). In appeals of
decisions affecting federally decreed rights, jurisdiction rests not only on
NRS 533.450(1), but also “on the ability of a court of equity to enforce and
administer its decrees.” Id.; see State Engineer of NV v, South Fork Band
of Te-Moak, 339 F.3d 804, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the doctrine of
prior exclusive jurisdiction to affirm the trial court’s abstention ruling in a
federal suit to enforce Sixth Judicial District Court Humboldt Decree

“4

 

 
   
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
  
   
  
  
    

Jrights). To the extent an order or decision of the State Engineer affects a
Jprotester’s senior, federally decreed rights, the decree court has
jurisdiction over the appeal. Orr Ditch, 600 F.3d at 1160. Such
jurisdiction is limited, however, to assessing and, if appropriate, directing

 

ithe State Engineer to correct the adverse effect on the senior, federally
ldccreed rights. Id, To the extent an appeal asserts that state-decreed or
istate-permitted rights are adversely affected, jurisdiction lies in the
proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a portion
thereof are situated.” NRS 538.450(1); see Orr Ditch, 600 F.3d at 1160.

Orr Ditch focused on the jurisdiction of a federal decree court,

 

pursuant to the clause of exception in NRS 533.450(1). However, its
lnolding that a protester whose decreed rights are adversely affected by a
IState Engineer's order or decision can appeal to the decree court is
inconsistent with the district court’s decision in this case that the location
f the applicant's water rights determines subject matter jurisdiction in
this context—a
id

indeed, another panel of the Ninth Cireuit held in Alpine
, 885 F, App'x 770, when it reversed the Alpine 2008
der, While the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of a Nevada statute on a

 

   

wervoir Co,

imatter of state law does not constitute mandatory precedent, Custom
[Cabinet Factory of N.Y. v. Dist. Ct., 119 Nev, 51, 54, 62 P.3d 741, 742-43
(2003), overruled on other grounds by Winston Products Co. v. DeBoer,
1122 Nov. 517, 134 P.3d 726 (2006), we nonetheless respect such authority
jas persuasive. Carlton v, Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 584, 187 P.2d 558, 565
(1947), And more fundamentally, the 2010 Orr Ditch decision rests both
mn the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of NRS 533.450(1) and its
interpretation of its own unique jurisdiction as a federal decree court. To
jread NRS 533.450(1) as vesting exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the

15,

 

 
    
   
   
  
 
   
     
   
 
    
  
   
   
  

Jcourt of the county where all or part of the applicant's actual or proposed
lwater rights lie would create conflict with the 2010 Orr Ditch decision and,
jultimately, within NRS 583.450(1) itself, a result we reject.
c
Our holding that NRS 583.450(1) does not limit subject matter
jurisdiction according to the location of an applicant’s water rights is not
inconsistent with Jahn v, District Court, 68 Nev. 204, 73 P.2d 499 (1937),
Jalthough several respondents argue otherwise. Jahn grew out of the long-
Jrunning and contentious litigation by Humboldt Lovelock Irrigation, Light
|& Power Company (HLILP), which established the Pitt-Taylor Reservoirs,
mn the one hand, and the State Engineer and the United States, on the
ther, over the establishment of the Rye Patch Reservoir. Soe United
Co,, 97 F.2d 38, 99-42 (9th
(Cir, 1938); Gray Mashburn & W. T. Mathews, The Humboldt River
ication, at v-vii (1943); see also Carpenter v. District Court, 59 Nev.
J42, 73 P.2d 1310 (1937) (prohibiting the Humboldt County district court
from granting new trials in favor of noncontest claimants socking to
‘open the decree adjudicating rights to Humboldt River waters), aff'd on
'g, 59 Nev. 48, 84 P.2d 489 (1938),
‘The issue that divided the parties in Jahn was whether
HILILP could proceed under section 36% of the water law (now NRS
:38.220(1)) with a request that the decree court direct the State Engineer
act as HLILP demanded or was limited to, and should have initiated,
roceeding for review under section 75 (now NRS 633.450(1)). Jahn. 58
fev. at 206-08 (reprinting the parties’ arguments); id, at 211-12. 73 P.24
t 501-02. The court held that the remedy afforded by section 75 was

 

xclusive, and that HLILP could not proceed under section 36% or

ursuant to the inherent powers of the decree court, which was located in

16

 

 
onan

 

Humboldt County. Jahn, 58 Nev. at 213, 73 P.2d at 602 (‘As the water
law . .. does not contemplate such a procedure in the district court. as was
initiated by the company [HLILP], the law does not confer the right of
appeal from the order in question.’)

‘The Jahn opinion could have begun and ended there, since
HLILP had proceeded under section 36%, not section 75. The court offered
the following additional observation, however, on which several
respondents rely here:

In pursuing the remedy provided for in

section 75 of the water law (N.C.L., sec. 7961), itis

required that the proceeding for the remedy be

initiated in the proper court of the county in which

the matters affected, or a portion thereof, are

situated. Such matters in this case being situated

in Pershing county, the district court in and for

the county of Humboldt is without jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding.

Id, at 213, 78 P.2d at 502. This statement is dictum but does not assist
respondents in any event, as both HLILP's Pitt-Taylor Reservoirs and the
Rye Patch Reservoir are located in Pershing County, not Humboldt
County. See id, Thus, the statement quoted above from Jahn does not
support the applicant-based jurisdictional rule for which respondents

contend.”

*To the extent this statement in Jahn may be read to hold that the
decree court lacks jurisdiction under section 75 to entertain appeals from
decisions affecting decreed rights—a point neither side argued in Jahn—
its holding was abrogated by the 1951 amendments that added the final
clause of exception to NRS 533.450(1). 1951 Nev. Stat., ch. 110, § 11, at
140. See also Orr Ditch, 600 F.3d at 1160 (construing the clause of
exception in NRS 533.450(1) as conferring jurisdiction on a decree court to
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mn

D.

We share the Ninth Circuit's solicitude for the “general

    
    
   
  
   
   
     
   
  

inciple of water law that a single court should have exclusive
jurisdiction over an interrelated system of water rights,” and its concern
‘ith the “practical difficulties” in vesting jurisdiction in more than one
wurt. Orr Ditch, 600 F.3d at 1160. “But thle former] principle, while
alid and important, is not an inviolable rule,” id., and the practical
lifficulties can be alleviated in significant part by recognizing that the
eral forum clause in NRS 689.450(1) addresses venue, rather than
subject matter jurisdiction, Compare NRS 13.050 (providing for change of
fenue in proceedings not brought in “the proper county”) with NRS.
33.165 (analogously recognizing and providing a “procedure when [an
nadjudicated) stream system [is located] in two or more judicial
istricts,” which is that the judges of the different courts shall decide
‘hich will be the decree court). Such an approach is consistent with the
Janguage in NRS 633.450(1's forum clause (the “proper court of the
wunty” where “the matters affected or a portion thereof are situated”),
hich speaks the language of venue, see NRS 13,010(2) (addressing venue
jn terms of “the county in which the subject of the action, or some part
hereof, is situated"); NRS 13.050 (lilf the county designated , .. be not
fhe proper county,” venue may be changed), rather than that of subject
atter jurisdiction. Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. _, __, 261 P.3d 163,

18,

 

 
 

168-69 (2011) (holding that Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1) vests general
jurisdiction in all district court judges equally and rejecting the argument
Ithat the Legislature can create family courts as district courts of limited,
Jnct general, jurisdiction), It also comports with the position taken by the
IState Engineer, who took a venue-based approach in the district court,
Jwhere he moved to change venue—not to dismiss—a position to which he
Jreturned in his supplemental brief to this court." See State v. State
[Engineer, 104 Nev. at 713, 766 P.2d at 266 ("While not controlling, [the
IState Engineer's] interpretation of a {water law] statute is persuasive.”)
We recognize that the general venue statutes refer to changing
the place of trial,” NRS 13.010; NRS 13.040; NRS 13.050; but see NRS
13.030 (addressing venue in actions involving counties in terms of place
he action was commenced), while review under NRS 533.450(1) is “in the
Jnature of an appeal.” However, this does not defeat their application in
this context. See NRS 533.450(8) (“The practice in civil cases applies to
he informal and summary character of such proceedings, as provided in
his

 

section.”). The general venue statutes apply to proceedings at the
ime they are initiated, not just to the eventual trial. ‘Thus, a change of
enue must be demanded “before the time for answering expires,” NRS
/13.050(1), and “[w]hen the place of trial is changed, all other proceedings
shall be had in the county to which the place of trial is changed. ...” NRS

‘In his supplemental brief, the State Engineer asserts that “the
yuestion before this Court [is] proper venue” and that, as the “ultimate
wuestion of what the nature or extent of the relative rights [of the
rrotesters] are under Nevada law” remains unresolved, this court should
“circumscribed in its language in ruling on the venue question.”

19

 
13.050(3). ‘This court has long drawn on procedures and law applicable to
civil actions generally in water law cases, to the extent consistent with the
governing statutes, see Carpenter v. District Court, 69 Nev, 48, 53, 84
P.2d 489, 491 (1938), aff'g on reh’g Carpenter v, District Court, 69 Nev. 42,
78 P.2d 1310 (1937). While the lack of a full record or a decision as to
venue by the district court prevents this court from deciding venue in this
opinion, on remand, the district court may, in deciding the motions to
change venue that remain, draw on NRS Chapter 1 to the extent
appropriate.
dL
In vacating the district court's jurisdictional dismissal and

remanding for a determination of venue, we do not address standing or

 

comity and do not decide the merits of Churchill County's and the Tril
claims that Ruling 5823 affects cognizable interests of theirs. We hold
simply that the district court erred in dismissing these appeals for want of

subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the location of the applicants’

water rights controls.

 

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