Title: Kenneth Grant v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC99-164
____________
KENNETH GRANT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[November 2, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999),
which expressly and directly conflicts with Adams v. State, 750 So. 2d 659, 662
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (reasoning that the “imposition of a sentence under both [the
prison releasee reoffender and the habitual felony offender] statutes constitutes
double jeopardy and is illegal”) and Thomas v. State, 745 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th
1However, Grant is consistent with decisions of the Third and First Districts addressing the
double jeopardy issue.  See Alfonso v. State, 761 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming
Alfonso’s conviction and sentence as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender in
all respects, but certifying conflict with Adams v. State, 750 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), on the
issue of whether the double jeopardy clause precludes such concurrent sentencing); Smith v. State, 754
So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (finding that such concurrent sentences do not violate double
jeopardy).  But cf. Walls v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1221 (Fla. 1st DCA May 17, 2000) (holding--
without implicating the double jeopardy provision--that, because “section 775.082(8)(c) only
authorizes the court to deviate from the PRR sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of
incarceration,” concurrent, equal habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender sentences are
not authorized).
2Specifically, Grant argued that the Act violates : (1) the single subject requirement; (2)
separation of powers; (3) the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment; (4) the proscription
-2-
DCA 1999) (holding that such concurrent sentences violate double jeopardy).1  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
MATERIAL FACTS
Kenneth Grant pled “no contest” to a charge of sexual battery (reserving the
right to seek appellate review of certain constitutional issues which he had
presented) and received concurrent sentences as a habitual felony offender
(pursuant to section 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1997)) and a prison releasee reoffender
(pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes) (1997)(the “Act”)).  The final
judgment and sentence reflects that Grant received one sentence of fifteen years as
a habitual felony offender (“HFO”), with a mandatory minimum term of fifteen
years as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”).  Before both the trial court and the
lower appellate court, Grant asserted that the Act was unconstitutional. 2  Some of
against vagueness; (5) substantive due process requirements; (6) equal protection; (7) the proscription
against ex post facto laws; and (8) double jeopardy (because it consists of
two separate sentences--as a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender--for a single
offense).
3Issues 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  With respect to issue no. 6, Grant acknowledged that the First
District held, in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v.
Cotton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S463 (Fla. Jun. 15, 2000), that the Act did not violate separation of
powers, and requested that the Court accord him whatever relief Woods received on this issue.  
-3-
these issues3 have already been resolved by this Court’s opinion in State v. Cotton,
25 Fla. L. Weekly S463 (Fla. June 15, 2000); those issues will not be revisited here. 
The Second District rejected all of Grant’s challenges.  
SINGLE SUBJECT
Grant first argues that the Act embraces multiple subjects in violation of the
single subject requirement of article III, section 6, Florida Constitution (providing
that every law “shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title").  Pursuant to this
requirement, there must be “a logical or natural connection” between the various
portions of a legislative enactment.  State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1993);
accord Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1991) (“The act may be
as broad as the legislature chooses provided the matters included in the act have a
natural or logical connection”).  The single subject requirement is satisfied if a
4The record reflects that, in a motion to declare the Act unconstitutional, Grant argued that
the Act violated constitutional provisions against double jeopardy.  Thereafter, when Grant entered his
plea and actually received two concurrent sentences as a prison releasee reoffender and as a habitual
felony offender for the single offense of sexual battery, he failed to renew this specific objection. 
However, such an alleged double jeopardy violation, if proven, would constitute fundamental error
which need not be preserved to be considered on appeal.  See generally Maddox v. State, 25 Fla. L.
Weekly S367 (Fla. May 11, 2000) (holding that an appellate court may, on direct appeal, correct as
fundamental error an unpreserved sentencing error which is patent and serious).
-4-
“reasonable explanation exists as to why the legislature chose to join the two
subjects within the same legislative act.” Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 4.   
Here, as observed by the Second District in the decision below, all of the
provisions of chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida (which created the Act) pertain to
reoffenders.  Accord Jackson v. State, 744 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999);
Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  Where, as here,  there is a
logical nexus between the statute’s various provisions, the single subject
requirement of the Florida Constitution has not been violated. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Next, Grant asserts that the two concurrent, fifteen-year sentences imposed
upon him for the single offense of sexual battery violate double jeopardy.4  The
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution “protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.”  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984). 
-5-
This protection is "designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of the courts is
confined to the limits established by the legislature."  Id. at 499. 
Relevant to this question, section 775.082(8)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997),
provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon proof from the state attorney that
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee
reoffender . . . such a defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing
guidelines and must be sentenced” in accordance with the Act.  Pursuant to section
775.082(8)(a)2.c., Florida Statutes (1997), the sentence provided for a felony of the
second degree is “a  term of imprisonment of fifteen years.”  However, section
775.082(8)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, further, that “[n]othing in this
subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration
as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law.”
Importantly, section 775.082(8)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1997), reflects the intent of
the Legislature “that offenders previously released from prison who meet the
criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided
in this subsection.”  (Emphasis added.)  
The legislative intent, as expressed in these provisions, is clear.  As we held
in Cotton:
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[W]hen the Act is properly viewed as a mandatory minimum statute,
its effect is to establish a sentencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible
for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or
any other provision of law," the court may, in its discretion, impose
the harsher sentence.  See § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). 
Cotton,  25 Fla. L. Weekly at S466.  It is no different to impose, on a qualifying
defendant, a PRR mandatory sentence concurrently with a longer HFO sentence
than to impose a mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm concurrently
with a longer HFO sentence.  Cf. Jackson v. State, 659 So. 2d 1060, 1063
(Fla.1995) (holding that a defendant could receive a minimum mandatory sentence
for possession of a firearm to run concurrently with an HFO sentence for offenses
occurring within a single criminal episode).  The Second District recognized this
similarity in its decision in this case.  See Grant, 745 So. 2d at 522. 
The First District, in Smith v. State, 754 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000),
applied the same analogy.  In Smith, the defendant was convicted of robbery and
sentenced to thirty years as a habitual felony offender, with a concurrent fifteen-
year mandatory minimum term as a prison releasee reoffender.  The First District
found that this did not violate double jeopardy:
In the PRR Act, the Legislature wrote, “Nothing in this
subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of
incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084, or any
other provision of law.” Sec. 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997).  We find
that this subsection allows a trial court to impose an HFO sentence on
a PRR when the defendant qualifies under both statutes.  It does not
5The Fifth District apparently agreed with the Adams analysis.  See Thomas v. State, 745 So.
2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(holding that it was a violation of double jeopardy to impose a
concurrent 30-year sentence under the violent career criminal statute, section 775.084(1)(d), Florida
Statutes, with a 15-year term of imprisonment under the Act)(citing Adams).
-7-
require a trial court to choose between one or the other.  When a
defendant receives a sentence like the one in this case, the PRR Act
operates as a mandatory minimum sentence.  It does not create two
separate sentences for one crime.
Smith, 754 So. 2d at 101; see also Alfonso, 761 So. 2d at 1231 (affirming the
defendant’s conviction and sentence in all respects, and certifying conflict with
Adams “on the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause precludes sentencing
of a defendant as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender”). 
We agree with the conclusion of the First, Second and Third Districts that the
imposition of an applicable longer, concurrent term of imprisonment with a PRR
mandatory minimum sentence does not violate double jeopardy. 
The concern expressed by the Fourth District in Adams5 is based upon an
erroneous analysis of the interplay between the two recidivist statutes.  The Fourth
District reasoned that,  by sentencing the defendant “to the first fifteen years as a
PRR, for which no gain time is credited, appellant would only accumulate the gain
time in the last fifteen years [of his concurrent 30 year HFO sentence], and would
serve 12.75 additional years, or 27.75 years minimum, which would deprive him of
allowable gain time under the HFO statute.”  Adams, 750 So. 2d at 660 (emphasis
-8-
added).  We disagree with this interpretation.  Where a defendant is convicted of a
single offense which qualifies for a sentence longer than an applicable mandatory
minimum established by the Legislature, and the Legislature has authorized
imposition of such longer sentence in the act creating the mandatory minimum, gain
time would still accrue with respect to the non-PRR sentence during the
overlapping time that both the mandatory minimum sentence and a portion of the
longer sentence are being served; however, such gain time would obviously apply
only to the longer sentence, and not to the mandatory minimum.  This result both
ensures that no sentence longer than that authorized by law will be imposed, and
fulfills the intent of the Legislature that qualifying offenders be punished to the
“fullest extent of the law,” including imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. 
Applying these principles here, as established in Cotton, the Legislature’s
intent both to provide a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to the
Act and to allow for imposition of the greatest sentence authorized by law is clear. 
Because Grant qualified as a prison releasee reoffender and the State sought
sentencing pursuant to the Act, the trial court was required to impose the
mandatory minimum with respect to Grant’s sexual battery offense.  See 
§ 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).  Further, as Grant concedes, with
applicable gain time provisions, the HFO sentence imposed here could have
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terminated before the mandatory minimum sentence would have been served. 
Therefore, had the trial court failed to impose a PRR mandatory minimum sentence
concurrent with any applicable longer HFO sentence, this potentially could have
defeated the intent of the Act, resulting in reversible error.  Cf. State v. Calzada-
Padron,  708 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (reversing downward departure
sentence of 364 days in the county jail where the trial court erred in failing to
impose a three-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on the qualifying
defendant, as required by section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1993)); Kelly v.
State, 359 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (setting aside illegal sentence of twenty
years imprisonment for sexual battery where thirty years was required by section
775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes). 
While imposition of equal concurrent sentences thus did not violate double
jeopardy principles, it did, nonetheless, violate the express provisions of the Act. 
As recognized by the First District in Walls, 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D1222, because
“section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act’s]
sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration,” a trial court is
“without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual
felony offender statute,” even where such sentence is imposed concurrently with
the PRR sentence.  Thus, the trial court erred in imposing two concurrent, equal
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sentences in this case, not because such sentencing violated double jeopardy, but
because it is not authorized by the Act.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Grant also asserts that the PRR classification is not rationally related to the
legislative goal of imposing enhanced punishment upon offenders who commit a
new violent offense after release from incarceration and, therefore, violates equal
protection.  Specifically, he contends that the Act draws no rational distinction
between offenders who serve county jail sentences and those who commit the same
acts and yet serve short prison sentences; between those who commit a new
offense on the third anniversary of release from prison and others who commit a
similar offense three years and a day after release; and between offenders who
commit enumerated felonies within three years after their release from the Florida
state prison system and those who were recently released from federal prison, local
jails or other state prisons.  In King v. State, 557 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990),
a similar argument was rejected in the context of an equal protection challenge to an
early recidivist statute which was claimed to have created inequitable classes (which
were underinclusive) because it applied only to those whose prior offenses were
committed in the State of Florida.  See King, 557 So. 2d at 902 (rejecting an equal
protection challenge to Florida’s rewritten HFO act,  finding that the classification
-11-
created by the statute had “some reasonable basis and thus does not offend the
constitution simply because it may result in some degree of inequality”) (citing Bell
v. State, 369 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1979) (reflecting that the “mere failure to prosecute
all offenders is no ground for a claim of denial of equal protection”)).  As observed
by the Fifth District in King, “[e]qual protection does not require a state to choose
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking it at all.”  Id. at  902
(citing In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1980)).  “It is not a
requirement of equal protection that every statutory classification be all-inclusive.” 
Rather, the statute must merely apply equally to members of the statutory class and
bear a reasonable relationship to some legitimate state interest.”  LeBlanc v. State,
382 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted). 
The Legislature “has wide discretion in creating statutory classifications, and
there is a presumption in favor of validity.”  State v. Leicht, 402 So. 2d 1153, 1154
(Fla. 1981) (citations omitted).  A statutory classification will be deemed to violate
equal protection only if it causes “different treatments so disparate as relates to the
difference in classification so as to be wholly arbitrary.”  In re Estate of  Greenberg,
390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted).  As we have stated in a different
context, where, as here, no suspect classification is involved, “the statute need only
bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Some inequality or
-12-
imprecision will not render a statute invalid.”  Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital,
440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla.1983). 
Here, the challenged Act does bear that reasonable relationship.  In Cotton,
we determined that the Act embodies a legitimate scheme for effectuating the
apparent legislative purpose:
The criteria included in the Act encompass those recidivists
who have shown either a repeated or an escalating pattern of criminal
behavior, reflecting resistance to prison's prospectively deterrent
effect. While the Act's classification scheme does not differentiate
based upon the character of the releasee's prior crimes, it does focus
on the character (and severity) of the latest criminal conduct, together
with the fact that recent imprisonment did not dissuade the defendant
from engaging in the qualifying offense. Thus, for this particular set of
"violent felony offenders" (meaning, in this context, those offenders
who commit any of the Act's enumerated felonies), the legislative goal
of preventing the commission of additional serious crimes is
accomplished by providing enhanced incapacitation, through longer
prison terms. 
25 Fla. L. Weekly at S466.  Specifically, we held that the “‘substantive penological
policies announced’ by the Florida Legislature in enacting this statute are
legitimately furthered by the structure of the Act.”  Id.
Here, the classification of a “prison releasee reoffender” as one who
commits an enumerated crime “within 3 years of being released from a state
correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private
vendor,” § 775.082 (8)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1997), does not appear to be wholly
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arbitrary.  Rather, such classification is reasonably related to the legitimate state
interest of preventing  violent crimes committed by “recidivists who have shown
either a repeated or an escalating pattern of criminal behavior, reflecting resistance
to prison's prospectively deterrent effect.” Cotton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly at S466.  As
stated by the Fourth District in Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585, 589 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1999), review granted, 761 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2000):
The Act's classification and increased punishment for prison
releasee reoffenders is rationally related to the legitimate state interests
of punishing recidivists more severely than first time offenders and
protecting the public from repeat criminal offenders.  Limiting the
Act's application to releasees who commit one of the enumerated
felonies within three years of prison release is not irrational.
Consistent with decisions of the First, Second and Fourth Districts,  and with our
own analysis in Cotton, we again conclude that the Act does not violate equal
protection principles.
EX POST FACTO
Last, Grant contends that “the only way to save the statute from ex post facto
application is to hold that it is prospective only to those inmates released after its
effective date.”  This argument is without merit, and has been rejected not only by
the Second District herein, but also by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts.  See
Chambers v. State, 752 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(rejecting ex post facto
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argument where Act applied to criminal conduct which occurred after the effective
date of the Act), review granted, No. SC00-416 (Fla. May 23, 2000); Gray v. State,
742 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act
and agreeing with the Fourth District’s ex post facto analysis in Plain v. State, 720
So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)), review granted, 751 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2000);
Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that the Act was not an
ex post facto law as applied to a defendant who was released from prison before the
Act became effective, but who committed a felony enumerated in the Act after its
effective date and within three years after being released), review denied, 727 So. 2d
909 (Fla. 1999).  As the appellate court here noted, the rationale governing the
outcome in Plain applies equally here:
In this case, the Act increases the penalty for a crime committed
after the Act, based on release from prison resulting from a conviction
which occurred prior to the Act.  It is no different than a defendant
receiving a stiffer sentence under a habitual offender law for a crime
committed after the passage of the law, where the underlying
convictions giving the defendant habitual offender status occurred
prior to the passage of the law.  Under those circumstances habitual
offender laws have been held not to constitute ex post facto law
violations.  
Plain, 720 So. 2d at 586, quoted in Grant, 745 So. 2d at 522. 
The Act increases
the penalty for a crime committed after its enactment, based upon release from a
term of imprisonment resulting from a conviction which occurred prior to the Act. 
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A habitual offender sentence is not an additional penalty for an earlier crime;  rather,
it is an increased penalty for the latest crime, which is an aggravated offense
because of the repetition.  See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); accord
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901) (finding that a statute which
imposes a punishment only on future crimes is not ex post facto, even though a
conviction prior to the statute results in increased punishment).  As the United
States Supreme Court has held, "enhanced sentencing for recidivism does not
violate ex post facto principles despite the fact that the prior offenses forming a
basis for enhancement occurred prior to enactment of the enhancement provision." 
Rollinson, 743 So. 2d at 587 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992)); see
also Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 782, 119 So. 380, 385 (Fla. 1928) (observing that,
“[b]ut for the commission of the subsequent offense, the enhanced penalty would
not be imposed”); cf. Raulerson v. State, 609 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1992)(rejecting ex
post facto challenge to the violent habitual felony offender provisions of section
775.084, Florida Statutes).  
Nor is Grant’s argument that the Act applies only to inmates released after its
effective date persuasive.  See Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1998) (rejecting a claim that the Act did not apply to those inmates released
prior to the Act's effective date because, even though section 944.705(6)(a), Florida
-16-
Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice of the Act, a
separate provision, section 944.705(6)(b), allows a trial court to impose an
enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether this notice has been given).  
Here, the Legislature indicated that the Act was enacted both because “the people
of this state and the millions of people who visit our state deserve public safety and
protection from violent felony offenders who have previously been sentenced to
prison and who continue to prey on society by reoffending,” and because “the
Legislature finds that the best deterrent to prevent prison releasees from committing
future crimes is to require that any releasee who commits new serious felonies must
be sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration allowed by law, and must serve
100 percent of the court-imposed sentence.”  Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida. 
The Legislature’s intent to apply the Act to all qualifying defendants who commit
an enumerated offense after the Act’s effective date is clear.  See § 775.082(8)(a)1.,
Fla. Stat. (1997) (defining “prison releasee reoffender” as “any defendant who
commits or attempts to commit” one of the felonies enumerated in 775.082(8)(a)1
“within three years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by
the Department of Corrections or a private vendor”)(emphasis supplied). 
Therefore, Grant--who meets the definition of a “prison releasee reoffender,” and
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who committed an enumerated felony after the effective date of the statute--was
properly sentenced under the Act to fifteen years in the Department of Corrections.
Based upon the foregoing, we approve the decision of the Second District in
Grant to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion, and quash that portion of
the decision which upheld the imposition of two equal concurrent sentences
pursuant to the Act and the habitual felony offender statute.  We remand this case
to the Second District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but on different grounds.  I
adhere to my belief that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is unconstitutional as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in article II, section 3 of
the Florida Constitution.  See State v. Cotton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S463 (Fla. June
15, 2000)(Quince, J., dissenting).  Because that act is unconstitutional, it cannot be
the basis for the sentence imposed in this case.  The only appropriate sentence here
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is the habitual offender sentence.  I would remand for resentencing as a habitual
offender only.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Second District - Case No.2D98-04943
(Pinellas County)
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Douglas S. Connor, Assistant
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent