Title: Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., 109 Ohio St.3d 1229, 2006-Ohio-3055.] 
 
 
FAIRCHILDS ET AL., APPELLEES, v. MIAMI VALLEY  
HOSPITAL, INC., APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc.,  
109 Ohio St.3d 1229, 2006-Ohio-3055.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2005-0929 — Submitted April 26, 2006 — Decided July 5, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
Nos. 20493 and 20542, 160 Ohio App.3d 363, 2005-Ohio-1712. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent.  I believe that we should prevent the unfair 
and abusive use of Civ.R. 41 now.  I agree with the dissenting judge below that 
the plaintiffs cannot nullify or dissolve a summary judgment decision, albeit 
interlocutory, by filing a Civ.R. 41(A) voluntary dismissal.  Therefore, I would 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and enter final judgment in favor of 
Miami Valley Hospital, Inc. (“MVH”). 
{¶ 3} The plaintiffs filed a complaint in this case against defendants 
Angela Landis and MVH.  On December 1, 2003, the trial court granted summary 
judgment (after converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment at the request of plaintiffs’ counsel) in favor of MVH and against 
plaintiffs on all claims.  Because claims remained pending against defendant 
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Landis, the trial court did not include Civ.R. 54(B) language signifying that there 
was no just reason for delay.  The trial court’s entry, however, did state that 
“MVH is hereby dismissed from the case sub judice.” 
{¶ 4} On January 26, 2004, the day that trial was scheduled to begin on 
the remaining claims against defendant Landis, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking 
the court to reconsider or set aside its decision granting summary judgment in 
favor of MVH.  Simultaneously, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal 
of the case without prejudice and subject to refiling pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A) 
against all party defendants — Angela Landis and MVH.  MVH responded with a 
request for a final judgment entry, seeking an order that the court’s decision 
granting the motion for summary judgment constituted a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 5} In a 19-page decision, the trial court granted MVH’s motion, 
concluding that the summary judgment decision became a final, appealable 
judgment when the plaintiffs filed the dismissal entry.  The trial court concluded 
that despite the dismissal entry’s language to the contrary, the plaintiffs’ voluntary 
dismissal applied only to the remaining defendant, Landis.  The lack of Civ.R. 
54(B) language did not leave the otherwise final judgment subject to a Civ.R. 
41(A) voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 
{¶ 6} The plaintiffs admit that they were frustrated with discovery in the 
original case.  They did refile the case a month later against both defendants.  By 
their own admission, they used the system to avoid the unfavorable judgment and 
start afresh. 
{¶ 7} In the refiled case, the plaintiffs settled with defendant Landis, and 
she was voluntarily dismissed.  MVH again filed a motion to dismiss that was 
converted into a motion for summary judgment.  The trial court granted the 
motion, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata. 
{¶ 8} The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that there was no final judgment in 
the first case that could constitute res judicata in the second case.  The court of 
January Term, 2006 
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appeals agreed, concluding that plaintiffs had properly dismissed both defendants 
in the original litigation, and that action prevented the interlocutory summary 
judgment from becoming a final decision in favor of MVH.  The appellate court 
acknowledged that that result might violate a sense of fair play.  Nevertheless, the 
court noted, the broad stroke of Civ.R. 41(A) authorizes a plaintiff to dismiss an 
action without prejudice at any point in the litigation prior to the commencement 
of trial. 
{¶ 9} This court intends to refer this matter to the Supreme Court’s 
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure in light of the potential for 
abuse of Civ.R. 41(A).  I agree that a rule amendment may be necessary.  
However, I believe that we should take action now to stop this abusive 
maneuvering by parties who want a second bite at the apple following an 
unfavorable interlocutory decision.  A party who believes that it was unfairly 
denied discovery to defend a motion for summary judgment may appeal from that 
decision, but that party is not entitled to refile the entire case. 
{¶ 10} In Denham v. New Carlisle (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 594, 716 N.E.2d 
184, we sanctioned a Civ.R. 41(A) voluntary dismissal of fewer than all of the 
defendants in a case, and we held that that dismissal caused an interlocutory 
summary judgment order in favor of the remaining defendant to become final and 
appealable.  I would hold that the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal applied to Landis 
only and extend the reasoning of Denham to finalize the summary judgment in 
favor of MVH.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Brannon & Associates and Dwight Brannon; and Lopez, Kemmer, Severt 
& Pratt Co., L.P.A., Jose M. Lopez, and Christopher D. Clark, for appellees. 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Neil F. Freund, and Vaseem S. Hadi, for 
appellant. 
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Volkema, Thomas, Miller, Burkett, Scott & Merry and Michael S. Miller, 
urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
______________________