Title: State v. Paul D. Hoppe

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 43 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1886-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Paul D. Hoppe,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 988, 632 N.W.2d 123 
(Ct. App.-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 22, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard Rehm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 43 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1886-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 79) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul D. Hoppe,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's order granting Paul 
Hoppe's motion to suppress statements he made to police officers 
during their investigation of the death of Jacqueline Simon, 
Hoppe's girlfriend.1  The State argues that the court of appeals 
erred in giving undue weight to Hoppe's condition when it 
concluded that Hoppe's statements were involuntary.  We agree 
                                                 
1 State v. Hoppe, No. 00-1886-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 28, 2001) (affirming an order of the circuit court 
of Columbia County, Richard Rehm, Judge). 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
2 
 
with the court of appeals that the circuit court's findings as 
to Hoppe's condition were not clearly erroneous and that, under 
the totality of the circumstances, Hoppe's statements were 
involuntary.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
I 
¶2 
On Saturday, March 6, 1999, shortly after 6:00 p.m., 
police were dispatched to Paul Hoppe's apartment to investigate 
a death.  The police found Hoppe sitting in the living room with 
Jacqueline Simon's body on the floor next to him.  Simon was 
Hoppe's girlfriend.  Hoppe appeared to be in poor physical 
condition.  He was shaking and was unable to walk on his own.  
Initially, because of Hoppe's long history of alcohol abuse, 
they thought he was intoxicated. 
¶3 
Hoppe was transported to the hospital but was not 
placed under arrest.  Blood tests at the hospital indicated that 
he was not intoxicated.  Rather, it was determined that Hoppe 
was suffering the effects of severe alcohol withdrawal.  Captain 
Kevin Manthey, the officer in charge of the investigation, who 
had known Hoppe for 25 years, asked and received permission from 
Hoppe for an interview. 
¶4 
Prior to the interview, a physician prescribed Librium 
to control possible delirium tremors.  However, the police asked 
a nurse who was preparing to administer the medication whether 
she could hold off the medication so they could interview Hoppe.  
The nurse was concerned about withholding the Librium, but she 
wanted to cooperate with the officers and thought it would be 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
3 
 
appropriate to delay administering the Librium as the police had 
requested. 
¶5 
Captain Manthey began the first interview with Hoppe 
at approximately midnight on March 6 and it ended about an hour 
and fifteen minutes later, at 1:14 a.m. on Sunday, March 7.  
This interview was tape-recorded.  During this interview, Hoppe 
was confused about the date and gave confusing and conflicting 
statements about his whereabouts and the events of the previous 
couple of days.  He denied harming Simon, and said that he found 
her dead at approximately 4:00 p.m. on Saturday.  Hoppe also 
said that he had gone to a local tavern on Saturday afternoon 
and drank six beers.  He insisted that he drank the beer even 
though Captain Manthey told him his blood alcohol level was .00.  
¶6 
During this first interview, Hoppe agreed to submit to 
a "voice stress test."  Hoppe had difficulty following the 
instructions 
for 
this 
test, 
repeatedly 
answering 
control 
questions truthfully when told to answer falsely, even though 
the officer gave him the actual false answers to repeat.  After 
being told three times how to answer the questions, Hoppe 
finally answered the control questions falsely, as instructed. 
¶7 
The next morning at 9:00 a.m., Dr. Frederick Bronson, 
Hoppe's treating physician, saw Hoppe and diagnosed him as 
suffering 
from 
chronic 
alcoholism, 
alcohol 
withdrawal, 
threatened delirium tremors, dehydration, electrolyte imbalance, 
and 
chronic 
brain 
syndrome 
secondary 
to 
alcohol 
abuse.  
According to Dr. Bronson, Hoppe was confused and remained 
confused for the first three or four days of his hospital stay. 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The police returned for a second interview with Hoppe 
at 2:15 p.m. on Monday, March 8.  During the 37-hour interval 
between the first interview and the second, the police placed no 
restrictions on Hoppe, his visitors, or his medical care.  
Before beginning the second interview, the police did not talk 
with any medical personnel about his condition.  The police 
reminded Hoppe that he had agreed they could come back and talk 
to him.  Hoppe acknowledged that this was correct.  When asked 
if he was taking any medications, Hoppe said "no" even though he 
was on Librium. 
¶9 
At the time of the second interview, police knew that 
Simon had died from a blow to the back of her head.  They also 
believed that she may have died on Friday, the day before her 
body was found.  In this second interview, which lasted an hour 
and forty-five minutes, the police asked Hoppe several questions 
about what he and Simon had done on Friday evening and whether 
they had had an argument that night.  He repeatedly denied that 
he had hit her or pushed her, and insisted that she was alive on 
Saturday morning.  During this interview, Hoppe disavowed that 
he had consumed six beers on Saturday, but stated that he had 
consumed brandy Saturday morning.  However, later in the 
interview he claimed that he had gone to a tavern and consumed 
six beers. 
¶10 This interview was also tape-recorded.  The tape 
reflects that Hoppe's voice was slurred and that he spoke slowly 
with long pauses.  The police acknowledged that at several 
points during the interview, Hoppe closed his eyes and did not 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
5 
 
answer.  Captain Manthey believed that at least a few times when 
Hoppe closed his eyes, he actually fell asleep.  Also, during 
this interview, it seems that Hoppe may have been experiencing 
hallucinations, for at one point Captain Manthey interrupted the 
interview to say, "There's no one else here, Paul." 
¶11 During this second interview, Dr. Timothy Hayes, a 
psychologist experienced in treating alcoholics, came to see 
Hoppe.  The police told him to return later.  Dr. Hayes did so 
at 5:00 p.m., approximately one hour after the police concluded 
the second interview.  After reviewing Hoppe's chart and talking 
to him, Dr. Hayes noted that Hoppe was in a somewhat delirious 
state, 
in 
and 
out 
of 
consciousness, 
and 
had 
difficulty 
concentrating.  He also concluded that Hoppe had short-term 
memory impairment and that his abstract reasoning, judgment, and 
problem-solving abilities were impaired.  He determined that 
Hoppe was either hallucinating or was delusional. 
¶12 Hoppe's former wife visited Hoppe at 8:30 p.m. on 
March 8.  She indicated that he was lethargic and falling 
asleep.  She also reported that his movements were delayed and 
his speech was slow. 
¶13 Medical personnel noted that Hoppe was confused during 
the night of March 8 and March 9, though he was oriented to 
person, time, and place.  However, on March 9 medical personnel 
reported that Hoppe remained confused. 
¶14 The police returned to the hospital for their third 
recorded interview with Hoppe at approximately 2:00 p.m. on 
March 9.  This interview lasted two hours.  At the start of this 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
6 
 
interview, the police asked a nurse to put Hoppe in a chair so 
he would be better able to stay awake.  It took two people to 
get Hoppe to his chair. 
¶15 By this time, the police had determined that Hoppe was 
not at the local tavern at all on Saturday.  Captain Manthey 
challenged Hoppe regarding his prior statements in that regard.  
After Manthey challenged him three times, Hoppe agreed that it 
was not the truth.  Hoppe stated that he told them that because 
he needed an alibi. 
¶16 Later during this interview, Hoppe said he could not 
remember whether some of the details he had previously told the 
officers about his and Simon's activities were truthful.  When 
Manthey told Hoppe that it appeared that Simon had been dead all 
day on Saturday, and may have died on Friday, Hoppe initially 
reasserted his previous statements that Simon was alive on 
Saturday. 
¶17 During this interview, Manthey raised emotional topics 
such as the death of Hoppe's parents, Hoppe's military service, 
and the death he saw in Vietnam.  He also discussed how Simon's 
family was feeling and their need for an answer as to what had 
happened to Simon.  He told Hoppe that, although he could not 
make any promises, he would tell the district attorney if Hoppe 
cooperated. 
¶18 By the close of the interview, Hoppe admitted that he 
and Simon had argued on Friday.  He said that she hit him and 
called him a "drunken old bum," and that he had hit her several 
times.  After she fell to the floor, he kicked her a number of 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
7 
 
times with at least one kick to the head.  Hoppe also briefly 
stated that during the fight Simon had driven away, but agreed 
that this was not true after Captain Manthey told him the 
neighbors said the cars had not been moved. 
¶19 Hoppe's former wife visited him again on March 9 
between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m.  During this visit, Hoppe insisted 
that there was a woman lying in his bed snoring.  After Hoppe's 
former wife repeated a number times there was no woman in his 
bed, Hoppe indicated he realized no one was there.  She 
described two other instances during that visit when Hoppe 
stated that he saw something that was not there.  Hoppe told her 
that he had informed the police that Simon was killed when they 
were driving to buy some alcohol.  He told them that she was 
killed when he went through a red light and a car struck their 
car.  When Hoppe's former wife reminded him that he did not 
drive, Hoppe said a taxi cab had driven them to get alcohol and 
the driver helped him walk back into his apartment and that is 
when he found Simon dead. 
¶20 Captain Manthey testified at the suppression hearing 
that during the three interviews Hoppe seemed confused about 
some things but not others.  Manthey believed that Hoppe's 
condition was the worst during the second interview.  Captain 
Manthey testified that he talked to Dr. Hayes after the second 
interview to determine whether Hoppe's grogginess would wear off 
in time for the third interview.  Dr. Hayes told Captain Manthey 
that if the grogginess did not alleviate by the next day, they 
would administer a CAT scan.  On March 9, however, Captain 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
8 
 
Manthey did not consult with any medical personnel to determine 
whether Hoppe's mental status had improved or whether a CAT scan 
had been ordered. 
¶21 Captain Manthey agreed that during the interviews he 
suggested scenarios to Hoppe and asked him leading questions.  
For example, he repeatedly told Hoppe that he was with Simon 
when she died.  He also repeatedly told Hoppe that he was not 
being truthful and that he believed there was deception in his 
answer when he denied harming Simon. 
¶22 Dr. Hayes testified that he visited Hoppe on March 8 
and March 10.  As previously noted, during the March 8 visit, he 
found Hoppe to be either hallucinating or delusional.  However, 
when he returned to see Hoppe on March 10, he noted that Hoppe 
was no longer delirious but remained confused.  Dr. Hayes opined 
that Hoppe had a condition called "confabulation" which meant 
that the person hides the things he or she cannot remember by 
adding details that sound logical but which are not necessarily 
true. 
¶23 He also testified that he had reviewed the transcripts 
of the three interviews and in his opinion, Hoppe did not 
understand everything that was going on during those interviews 
or what was in his best interest.  Dr. Hayes said that Hoppe was 
not competent to consent to being questioned and did not have 
the reasoning or understanding to withdraw his consent to 
questioning.  He explained that because of confabulation, Hoppe 
was susceptible to suggestions and would answer things in a 
certain way to please the questioner.  Though Dr. Hayes had not 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
9 
 
evaluated Hoppe's mental condition for purposes of legal 
competence as he would have for a competency hearing, he 
diagnosed Hoppe's condition on March 8 and again on March 10 as 
"dementia and alcohol delirium, the latter caused by alcohol 
withdrawal." 
¶24 At the suppression hearing, Dr. James Whitman, a 
psychiatrist who had listened to the tapes, reviewed Hoppe's 
medical records, and interviewed Hoppe several months after the 
police interviews, testified that Hoppe's condition on March 6 
through 
March 
9 
was 
severe, 
chronic, 
end-stage 
alcohol 
dependence; alcohol induced amnesiac disorder; alcohol induced 
psychotic disorder with delusions and hallucinations; alcohol 
withdrawal delirium; and alcohol related dementia (long-term 
decrease in cognitive functioning and memory which is present 
even after a person has recovered from alcohol withdrawal).  Dr. 
Whitman also pointed to several physical factors that influenced 
Hoppe's ability to track information, including his dehydration, 
decrease in blood sugar, and decrease in potassium. 
¶25 He noted that several of Hoppe's responses in the 
tapes indicated confabulation.  Further, he testified that a 
person who is confabulating is trying to tell the truth and is 
trying to be cooperative.  The likely result of being told he or 
she is lying is that the person would come up with a different 
answer, and that is what appeared to happen in the interviews.  
In Dr. Whitman's opinion, Hoppe's competency to consent to 
questioning was impaired from March 6 to March 9 and his ability 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
10 
 
to comprehend the circumstances was substantially impaired 
during that time. 
¶26 After reviewing the case law, including State v. 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1985), and United 
States v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the circuit court 
concluded that Hoppe's statements in the three interviews were 
involuntary.  The circuit court based its decision on Hoppe's 
personal characteristics, the conduct of the law enforcement 
officers, and the totality of the circumstances in which the 
questioning occurred. 
¶27 The court found that Hoppe was "very vulnerable and 
very susceptible" and that his significant impairments were open 
and obvious to the officers.  The court explained that "one only 
needs to listen to the audiotapes to note the impairment 
referred to by the doctors . . . ."  It described Hoppe's mental 
and physical condition as follows: "He had been dehydrated; he 
had been vomiting; he was suffering tremors; he was lethargic; 
he had slurred speech and difficulty tracking questions; his 
blood sugar had been low and he needed oxygen; he suffered some 
hallucinations . . . ." 
¶28 The circuit court acknowledged that the conduct of the 
officers did not include "egregious actions" like those that had 
led to suppression in other cases.  There were no threats, no 
force used, no explicit intimidation, no withholding of food or 
water, and no promises made except for noting cooperation with 
the district attorney.  It stated that Captain Manthey appeared 
to be uncommonly helpful to Hoppe during the course of the 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
11 
 
interviews.  The tone and manner of the questioning was not 
harsh. 
¶29 However, in light of Hoppe's condition, the court 
found that, under the totality of the circumstances, certain 
behaviors of the police constituted coercive pressures brought 
to bear on Hoppe.  Specifically, the court noted that the 
aggregate length of the interviews, five hours, and the absence 
of a Miranda2 warning should be considered.  It noted that over 
the course of the three interviews, the questioning of Hoppe 
became more accusative in presenting fact scenarios and more 
coercive.  The circuit court pointed to the last interview and 
found that there was an increase in the use of psychological 
pressure by raising emotional topics such as the death of 
Hoppe's parents, the concerns of Simon's family, and Hoppe's 
experiences in Vietnam.  It found that the police exhibited no 
concern regarding Hoppe's mental capacities and seemed to be 
"insensitive to the very obvious impairments being demonstrated 
by Mr. Hoppe during the course of questioning." 
¶30 While the court acknowledged that under different 
circumstances the police behavior may not be oppressive, under 
the circumstances of this case, they were.  The court noted that 
"[w]hile these techniques, under different circumstances, might 
not be considered oppressive, they reach a different level 
because of the circumstances under which the questioning 
occurred and because of the characteristics being demonstrated 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
12 
 
by Mr. Hoppe."  Under the totality of the circumstances, the 
circuit court concluded that the State had not met its burden to 
show that the statements given by Hoppe were voluntary, and 
Hoppe's motion to suppress was granted. 
¶31 The court of appeals affirmed.  It cited Clappes and 
State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1993), 
in support of its decision.  The court of appeals noted that the 
State was challenging the circuit court's findings.  It advanced 
that the proper question was whether, in view of the findings of 
the circuit court concerning Hoppe's condition, the police 
pressure on him was such as to exceed his ability to resist. 
¶32 The court of appeals rejected the State's suggestion 
that in the absence of explicitly egregious or coercive tactics 
of the police, Hoppe's statement must be found to be voluntary.  
Citing Xiong, the court of appeals stated that ". . . overt acts 
are not the sole criterion for coerciveness.  If there is 
evidence that police are taking subtle advantage of a person's 
personal characteristics, that may be a form of coercion."  
Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 534. 
II 
¶33 This case presents us with an opportunity to review 
whether statements made by a criminal defendant are inadmissible 
against 
the 
defendant 
when, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the pressures brought to bear on the defendant by 
representatives of the State exceeded the defendant's ability to 
resist.  In determining whether the statements at issue in this 
case are inadmissible, we must consider whether the court of 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
13 
 
appeals and the circuit court placed undue weight on Hoppe's 
condition and, as a result, erroneously concluded that Hoppe's 
statements were involuntary. 
¶34 The question of voluntariness involves the application 
of constitutional principles to historical facts.  We give 
deference to the circuit court's findings regarding the factual 
circumstances that surrounded the making of the statements.  
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1990); State v. 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1985).  However, 
the application of the constitutional principles to those facts 
is subject to independent appellate review.  Fulminante, 499 
U.S. at 287;  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 235. 
¶35 We first describe the standards for assessing whether 
Hoppe's statements were voluntary.  We then consider the State's 
arguments regarding whether the court of appeals and the circuit 
court placed undue weight on Hoppe's condition in concluding 
that Hoppe's statements were involuntary.  Finally, we apply the 
legal standards to the facts of this case and conclude that the 
State failed to satisfy its burden in proving that Hoppe's 
statements were voluntary. 
III 
¶36 If Hoppe's statements were involuntary, the admission 
of the statements would violate his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth  Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Rogers v. Richmond, 
365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961); see State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 
130, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).  A defendant's statements are 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
14 
 
voluntary if they are the product of a free and unconstrained 
will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the 
result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the 
pressures brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of 
the State exceeded the defendant's ability to resist.  Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d at 236; Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 364, 246 
N.W.2d 801 (1976); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 308, 128 
N.W.2d 645 (1964). 
¶37 The pertinent inquiry is whether the statements were 
coerced or the product of improper pressures exercised by the 
person or persons conducting the interrogation.  Barrerra v. 
State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 291, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980).  Coercive or 
improper police conduct is a necessary prerequisite for a 
finding of involuntariness.  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167; Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d at 239. 
¶38 We apply a totality of the circumstances standard to 
determine 
whether 
a defendant's statements 
are 
voluntary.  
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236.  The totality of the circumstances 
analysis involves a balancing of the personal characteristics of 
the defendant against the pressures imposed upon the defendant 
by law enforcement officers.  Id. 
¶39 The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant 
include 
the 
defendant's 
age, 
education 
and 
intelligence, 
physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with law 
enforcement.  Id.  The personal characteristics are balanced 
against the police pressures and tactics which were used to 
induce the statements, such as: the length of the questioning, 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
15 
 
any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under which the 
statements took place, any excessive physical or psychological 
pressure brought to bear on the defendant, any inducements, 
threats, methods or strategies used by the police to compel a 
response, and whether the defendant was informed of the right to 
counsel and right against self-incrimination.  Id. at 236-237. 
¶40 The balancing of the personal characteristics against 
the police pressures reflects a recognition that the amount of 
police pressure that is constitutional is not the same for each 
defendant.  When the allegedly coercive police conduct includes 
subtle forms of psychological persuasion, the mental condition 
of the defendant becomes a more significant factor in the 
"voluntariness" calculus.  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164; Xiong, 178 
Wis. 2d at 534.   
It is the State's burden to prove by a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence 
that 
the 
statements 
were 
voluntary.  United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 
1991); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 182, 593 N.W.2d 427 
(1999). 
IV 
¶41 The State contends that the court of appeals and the 
circuit 
court 
overemphasized 
Hoppe's 
mental 
status 
while 
minimizing the importance of what both courts acknowledge was 
not extreme misconduct.  It asserts that none of the faults 
found by the courts, when considered alone or as a whole, 
amounts to improper pressure on Hoppe.  In making these 
arguments, the State relies on Connelly and Clappes, in which 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
16 
 
statements were found to be voluntary because of the absence of 
coercive police conduct. 
¶42 In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer 
and stated that he murdered someone and wanted to talk about it.  
After being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights, the 
defendant detailed the story of a murder he committed and 
revealed the exact location of the murder.  The defendant was 
held overnight.  The next day he became visibly disoriented and 
was sent to a state hospital for evaluation.  A psychiatrist 
indicated that the defendant was following the "voice of God" in 
confessing to the murder.  He testified that the defendant 
suffered from a psychosis that interfered with his ability to 
make free and rational choices. 
¶43 The United States Supreme Court recognized that as 
interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological 
persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the 
defendant to be a more significant factor in the balancing test.  
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.  Essentially, the Court recognized 
that egregious police conduct is not necessary for a finding of 
involuntariness and that certain subtle pressures that are not 
coercive for an ordinary person could be considered coercive for 
a person who is suffering from mental difficulties.  The Court 
however qualified this with its conclusion that there must be 
police conduct causally related to the confession for the 
confession to be considered involuntary.  Id. at 167. 
¶44 Clappes involved a consolidated appeal that addressed 
two separate cases in which pretrial suppression orders were 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
17 
 
granted.  The defendant in each case was suffering from severe 
pain from injuries incurred in a car accident.  Each defendant 
was also intoxicated.  The police questioned each defendant for 
a short period of time not lasting more than three minutes.  The 
questioning focused on the identity of the persons in the car 
and the identity of the drivers. 
¶45 The Clappes court acknowledged that coercive police 
activity may arguably take subtle forms.  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 238.  However, in examining the police conduct in the cases 
before it, the court concluded that the conduct did not violate 
the due process clause.  Id. at 225.  It noted that merely 
asking an injured and intoxicated defendant questions for a 
brief period of time is generally not an impermissible, coercive 
police tactic. 
¶46 Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that 
some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to 
sustain a finding of involuntariness.  However, both of these 
cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be 
egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.  Rather, subtle 
pressures are considered to be coercive if they exceed the 
defendant's ability to resist.  Accordingly, pressures that are 
not coercive in one set of circumstances may be coercive in 
another set of circumstances if the defendant's condition 
renders him or her uncommonly susceptible to police pressures. 
V 
¶47 We turn next to apply the law to the findings of fact 
that the circuit court made in this case.  We first examine 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
18 
 
Hoppe's personal characteristics.  Hoppe was having significant 
mental and physical difficulties at the time of the interviews. 
The testimony before the circuit court described his condition. 
¶48 Hoppe 
was 
suffering 
from 
cognitive 
impairment 
associated with his chronic alcoholism.  He had deficits in his 
short-term 
memory 
and 
impairment 
of 
his 
reasoning 
and 
problem-solving abilities.  He was hallucinating.  He was 
confabulating, meaning that he was making up for his deficits by 
answering questions by stating what he thought sounded correct 
or reasonable.  Hoppe had a tendency during the questioning to 
adopt, over time, the scenarios suggested by Captain Manthey 
during the course of the interviews.  He had difficulty 
understanding 
the 
questions 
as 
evidenced 
by 
a 
need 
for 
repetition and long pauses between questions and answers.  He 
demonstrated difficulty following simple directions.  Hoppe had 
slurred speech and drifted off.  During the second and third 
interviews, he was on a Librium protocol, which reportedly can 
cause confusion. 
¶49 Hoppe's physical state was affected by his alcoholism 
and his state of alcohol withdrawal.  He was lethargic, 
dehydrated, had been vomiting, and suffered tremors.  Upon 
admission to the hospital, his blood sugar was low and he needed 
oxygen. 
¶50 Dr. Hayes believed that Hoppe was not competent to 
consent to questioning and not competent to withdraw his 
consent.  While Dr. Hayes' opinion in this regard is not a legal 
conclusion, it is a professional opinion that is relevant to the 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
19 
 
analysis of whether Hoppe's statements were the product of a 
free 
and 
unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of 
choice. 
¶51 The circuit court listened to the audiotape recordings 
of 
the 
interviews 
which 
supported 
the 
medical 
testimony 
regarding Hoppe's difficulties.  It noted that the State did not 
call any additional medical or psychological experts to testify 
regarding Hoppe's mental or physical condition.  The court 
concluded that Hoppe's mental and physical conditions made him 
"a very vulnerable and very susceptible subject" and that many 
of his impairments were open and obvious to the police officers.  
Finally, the court noted that Hoppe had little prior experience 
with the criminal justice system. 
¶52 The State quarrels with the factual findings of the 
circuit court and argues that Hoppe was not as mentally frail as 
the circuit court suggests.  However, there is support in the 
record for the circuit court's findings.  They are supported by 
the testimony of the various individuals that treated Hoppe, 
Hoppe's former wife, and the police officers.  The court's 
findings are further supported by the tape recordings and the 
transcripts of the interviews.  We do not find any of the 
court's findings of fact regarding Hoppe's mental and physical 
condition to be clearly erroneous. 
¶53 Admittedly, the facts in this case are somewhat 
unique.  The circuit court was able to consider expert testimony 
based in part on evaluations that occurred in the hospital 
between the interviews, rather than expert testimony based on 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
20 
 
evaluations that occurred weeks or months after the interviews 
took place.  In addition, the circuit court was able to listen 
to and evaluate the recordings of the interviews.   
¶54 Given Hoppe's personal characteristics, we now turn to 
the pressures and tactics used by the police officers during the 
interviews.  The questioning was for an aggregate period of 
approximately five hours over a three-day period. The longest of 
the three interviews was the third interview on March 9, lasting 
approximately two hours and during which the most significant 
incriminating statements were made. 
¶55 The questioning during the third interview was much 
more direct and accusatory than the prior questioning.  The 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
there 
was 
increased 
use 
of 
psychological pressure by using emotional topics such as the 
death of Hoppe's parents, the concerns of the family of the 
deceased, and Hoppe's prior military service in Vietnam.  The 
police asked leading questions and suggested scenarios of 
arguments and events.  The officers made little effort to 
consult with medical personnel to determine Hoppe's medical 
condition and capacity to be interviewed. 
¶56 Finally, no Miranda warnings were given to Hoppe.  
Although the circuit court ruled that the Miranda warnings were 
not required, the circuit court was correct to consider the 
absence of the warnings in its voluntariness analysis.  See 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 237. 
¶57 We agree with the circuit court that the question of 
voluntariness in this case is a very difficult one.  We are not 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
21 
 
dealing here with egregious or outrageous police conduct.  There 
were no threats or promises.  A relatively friendly tone was 
used in portions of the interviews. 
¶58 However, the totality of the circumstances standard 
does not require that egregious or outrageous police conduct be 
present.  As noted above, evaluating whether police conduct is 
coercive is dependent on the personal characteristics of the 
defendant.  The purpose of the balancing test is to determine 
whether the pressures created by the police conduct exceeded the 
defendant's ability to resist.  The court of appeals correctly 
explained that police coercion and a defendant's personal 
characteristics are interdependent concepts.  The greater the 
vulnerability of the defendant, the more easily the defendant 
may be coerced by subtle means. 
¶59 Though the court of appeals and the circuit court did 
not identify a single act by the police that was egregious, put 
together, 
the 
actions 
of 
the 
police 
and 
the 
personal 
characteristics of Hoppe indicate that Hoppe's statements were 
involuntary.  The tactics used and the pressures exerted by the 
police were subtle and certainly not improper if used in the 
questioning of a person whose personal characteristics did not 
make him or her uncommonly susceptible to police pressures. 
¶60 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's findings 
of fact regarding Hoppe's mental condition were not clearly 
erroneous.  The State did not satisfy its burden in proving that 
Hoppe's statements were voluntary.  Rather, we determine that, 
under the totality of the circumstances, given Hoppe's severely 
No. 
00-1886-CR   
 
22 
 
debilitated 
mental 
and 
physical 
condition, 
the 
coercive 
pressures exerted by police during these interviews exceeded 
Hoppe's ability to resist.  Accordingly, we determine that the 
statements were involuntary and we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
¶61 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  It is well-
established that "coercive police activity is a necessary 
predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  A 
confession will not be suppressed as involuntary unless there is 
an "essential link between coercive activity of the State, on 
the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the 
other."  Id., 497 U.S. at 165. 
¶62  To determine whether a confession is voluntary within 
the meaning of the due process clause, the "essential inquiry is 
whether the confession was procured via coercive means or 
whether it was the product of improper pressures exercised by 
the police."  State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, 401 
N.W.2d 759 (1987).  "The presence or absence of actual coercion 
or improper police practices is the focus of the inquiry because 
it is determinative on the issue of whether the inculpatory 
statement was the product of a 'free and unconstrained will, 
reflecting deliberateness of choice.'"  Id. (quoting Norwood v. 
State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 364, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976)). 
¶63  Voluntariness is determined by an examination of the 
"totality of the circumstances," which in turn "requires the 
court to balance the personal characteristics of the defendant 
against the pressures imposed upon him by police in order to 
induce him to respond to the questioning."  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 236.  Nevertheless, in the absence of coercive or otherwise 
improper police conduct, and a link between that conduct and the 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
confession, a court cannot conclude that a confession is 
involuntary within the meaning of the due process clause.  
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165; Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 240.  
"Therefore, because there is no support for the proposition in 
Wisconsin that the amount of pressure or coerciveness required 
can decrease to none, a defendant's personal characteristics, 
while certainly relevant to our analysis, are simply not 
dispositive of the issue of voluntariness."  Clappes, 136 Wis. 
2d at 240. 
¶64  There is no evidence of coercion or improper police 
conduct in this case.  The majority's conclusion that Hoppe's 
statements were involuntary turns entirely on the evidence 
regarding Hoppe's personal characteristics, in particular, his 
impaired mental and physical condition brought on by alcohol 
withdrawal.  The majority concludes that Hoppe's compromised 
mental and physical condition renders the otherwise non-coercive 
and completely proper police conduct in this case coercive and 
improper, 
making 
Hoppe's 
statements 
unconstitutionally 
involuntary.  Majority op., ¶¶59-60.  I cannot agree. 
¶65  The majority states that "[w]hen the allegedly 
coercive police conduct includes subtle forms of psychological 
persuasion, the mental condition of the defendant becomes a more 
significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus," Majority 
op., ¶40 (citing Connolly, 479 U.S. at 164). The majority has 
taken this statement from Connolly out of context, as the 
sentences on either side of the cited statement make clear.  The 
entire passage from Connolly is as follows: 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
Thus, the cases considered by this Court over the 
50 years since Brown v. Mississippi [the Supreme 
Court's seminal confession case] have focused upon the 
crucial element of police overreaching.  While each 
confession case has turned on its own set of factors 
justifying the conclusion that police conduct was 
oppressive, all have contained a substantial element 
of coercive police conduct.  Absent police conduct 
causally related to the confession, there is simply no 
basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
of 
due 
process 
of 
law.  
Respondent correctly notes that as interrogators have 
turned 
to 
more 
subtle 
forms 
of 
psychological 
persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of 
the defendant a more significant factor in the 
"voluntariness" calculus. But this fact does not 
justify 
a 
conclusion 
that 
a 
defendant's 
mental 
condition, by itself and apart from its relation to 
official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional "voluntariness." 
Connolly, 479 U.S. at 163-64 (internal citations omitted). 
¶66  The majority overstates Connolly's holding so as to 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
Hoppe's 
statements 
were 
constitutionally involuntary.  In so doing, the majority has 
allowed the personal characteristics of the defendant——here, 
mental and physical vulnerability 
associated 
with alcohol 
withdrawal——to overcome the absence of any police coercion or 
improper conduct for purposes of determining voluntariness. 
¶67  Connolly did not hold that a defendant's compromised 
or vulnerable mental condition can render non-coercive and 
proper police conduct coercive and improper, as the majority 
asserts.  Majority op., ¶43.  At best, Connolly suggests that a 
defendant's mental condition may become "a more significant 
factor" depending upon the presence of "more subtle forms of 
psychological persuasion."  Connolly, 479 U.S. at 164.  The 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Connolly 
reiterated 
unequivocally 
that 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
constitutional involuntariness requires "a substantial element 
of coercive police conduct."  Id. 
¶68  Our own confession case, Clappes (which cited and 
discussed Connolly), reinforces this requirement: "in order to 
justify a finding of involuntariness, there must be some 
affirmative evidence of improper police practices deliberately 
used to procure a confession."  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 239. 
¶69  There is no evidence of coercive or improper police 
conduct here.  The three police interviews with the defendant 
were spread out over three days, and none was inordinately long.  
There were no threats or promises, no force was used, no 
intimidation of any kind was applied, there were no harsh words 
or tone of voice, no withholding of food or water, and the 
circuit court found that the officer was "uncommonly helpful" to 
Hoppe during the interviews.  The circuit court found that the 
officer's questioning in the third interview did become more 
accusatory 
in 
nature, 
and 
it 
involved 
an 
increase 
in 
"psychological pressure" in that the officer referred to 
emotional topics such as the death of Hoppe's parents, concern 
about the victim's family, and Hoppe's service in Vietnam.  The 
circuit court also noted that there were no Miranda warnings 
given, which, although not required, is relevant to the issue of 
voluntariness.  The evidence also clearly establishes that 
Hoppe's physical and mental condition was compromised by severe 
alcohol withdrawal. 
¶70  Considered in its totality, and applying a de novo 
standard of review to the constitutional voluntariness issue, 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
see Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 235, I conclude that the police 
conduct in this case was not coercive or improper so as to 
render Hoppe's statements constitutionally involuntary.  The 
evidence that the officer's questions in the third interview 
were more accusatory than inquisitive, and the evidence that the 
officer referred to the death of Hoppe's parents, the concerns 
of the victim's family, and Hoppe's service in Vietnam, simply 
does not support a conclusion that the police coerced or 
improperly induced Hoppe's statements, even when considered in 
the context of Hoppe's compromised physical and mental condition 
and the absence of Miranda warnings. 
¶71  Given this absence of any evidence of police coercion 
or improper conduct, the State met its burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, see State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 
164, 182, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999), that the statements were 
voluntary and therefore admissible.  I would reverse the court 
of appeals and the circuit court.  
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
No.  00-1886-CR.dss 
 
1