Title: Baltimore v. Theiss

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case # 97027034/CL222734
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 123
September Term, 1998
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE
v.
DARLA J. THEISS
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Bell, C.J. and Rodowsky, J. concur
Filed: May 17, 1999
Appellant Mayor and City Council of Baltimore appeals from a verdict entered in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City in favor of appellee Darla J. Theiss.  Appellant claims the
trial court erred in finding appellant waived its right to object at trial with respect to the
admission of portions of the videotaped deposition of appellee’s expert medical witness.  The
trial court ruled that, based upon the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Davis v.
Goodman, 117 Md. App. 378, 700 A.2d 798 (1997), appellant waived its objections made
during the videotaped deposition because it failed to specify during the deposition the
grounds for its objections.  Appellant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  This Court
issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion before the intermediate appellate court heard
arguments in the matter to address the important issue raised by this appeal.
I.  Facts
Appellee Darla J. Theiss fell and broke her ankle while walking to her car from a
hardware store in the Brooklyn area of Baltimore.  Appellee filed a civil action in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City seeking damages from the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
appellant, for injuries she sustained as a result of the fall.  A jury found in favor of appellee,
awarding her $128,000 in damages. 
Dr. Mark S. Myerson, M.D., was one of the physicians who treated appellee and was
deposed on videotape as an expert medical witness for appellee.  During the deposition,
appellee’s counsel questioned Dr. Myerson at great length about his opinion as to appellee’s
injuries, possible treatments available to her, which treatment he would recommend, and
some estimates for the cost of the treatments.  When eliciting Dr. Meyerson’s testimony at
the deposition, appellee’s counsel often, but not always, failed to qualify questions seeking
 It is unnecessary to address in this opinion the nature of and requirements for
1
qualifying language in questions designed to elicit medical testimony.
- 2 -
the doctor’s opinion by asking whether his opinion was “within a reasonable medical
probability.”   Appellant’s attorney typically objected to the questions that lacked the
1
“reasonable medical probability” language, usually simply by stating the word “objection”
and without stating any grounds.  After one question, appellant’s counsel explained that he
was “objecting to the form of the question.”  In a few other instances, appellant’s counsel
gave grounds for objections unrelated to this appeal.  From the record, it appears appellee’s
attorney asked appellant’s attorney only once for his ground for objection, for which
appellant’s attorney gave a brief explanation.  This also was not related to the ground for the
objections at issue here.
At the beginning of the trial, appellant presented its objections to the trial judge.
Appellant stated that its ground for the objections was that the questions were not in proper
form because “counsel [asked] the doctor for the expert opinion without framing it as an
expert opinion with the proper terminology.”  The judge, based upon the Court of Special
Appeals’ holding in Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md. App. 378, 700 A.2d 798 (1997), found that
appellant had waived the objections and overruled all objections except for one, which is not
at issue in this appeal.  The videotaped deposition was played to the jury and, as noted
above, it found in favor of appellee.  
Appellant presents the following question for review:
Did the trial court err in overruling [appellant]’s objections to
- 3 -
deposition opinion questions, which would clearly have been improper if
asked at trial, for the reason that counsel for [appellant] had not set forth his
reasons for the objections during the deposition?
We hold that the trial court did not err and shall affirm.
II.  Discussion
The parties in this case rely mainly on the Maryland Rules governing deposition
testimony and the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md. App.
378, 403-04, 700 A.2d 798, 810 (1997).  Although application of the Maryland Rules clearly
leads to the result we reach today, see infra, the common law of this State, in place long
before the adoption of the rules, also supports our decision to affirm the trial court and our
holding that, when objecting during a deposition to questions, answers, or any other error or
irregularity that may be cured at the deposition, the objecting party must state the ground or
grounds for the objection or the objection is waived.
A. Maryland Common Law
As early as 1885, this Court recognized that the ground for an objection to deposition
testimony must be stated at the taking of the deposition along with the objection so “that
opportunity to change the form [of the question] might be given.”  Brown v. Hardcastle, 63
Md. 484, 495 (1885) (citing Kerby v. Kerby, 57 Md. 345, 361 (1882)).  In Brown, the
appellees objected at trial to certain testimony filed in the case because the question posed
at the pretrial proceeding was leading.  The trial court overruled the objection.  We affirmed
because appellees failed to state the ground for their objection when the question was asked
during the pretrial proceeding, stating: “All the exceptions to the testimony because of the
 The term interrogatories, as we perceive its use in Brown, referred generally to
2
questions.  The style of the time was to use the word interrogatory in its general sense.
 Kerby was a case for partition of real estate in which questions apparently were
3
propounded before a commissioner.  
 Kerby cited four cases in support of this proposition: Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v.
4
Shipley, 39 Md. 251 (1874); Jones v. Jones, 36 Md. 447 (1872); Smith v. Cooke, 31 Md. 174
(1869); Striker v. Todd, 13 Serg. & Rawle, 13.  Shipley, Jones, and Cooke were not clear as
to whether grounds for objections need be given in order to preserve them for later
proceedings, emphasizing instead the requirement that objections be made.  It is not clear
whether the stating of grounds for objections was at issue in these cases.  In Brown, however,
the Court, citing Kerby, which itself cited the earlier cases, clarified that objections and the
grounds therefor must be proffered to preserve the objection for the trial court to rule on in
later proceedings.
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leading character of the interrogatories  are overruled, because, at the time the interrogatory
[2]
was propounded, the ground of objection was not stated and noted, that opportunity to
change the form thereof might be given.”  Id.  In Kerby, the case cited and interpreted by the
Brown Court, we advised that objections to the form of questions posed before a
commissioner  must “be made at the time propounded, in order to give a chance for
3
correction into admissible form.”  Kerby, 57 Md. at 361.   We held:
4
So far as the interrogatories are alleged to be leading, and therefore
exceptionable, the objection comes too late.  Such objections being only as to
form, are always required to be made at the time propounded, in order to give
a chance for correction into admissible form.  The objection should have been
noted before the commissioner.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  It follows, therefore, that in depositions, in order
to afford an opportunity for correction, the alleged problem must be sufficiently stated at the
time the objection is made. 
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Over twenty-five years later, in Doggett v. Tatham, 116 Md. 147, 151, 81 A. 376, 378
(1911), we revisited the issue of objections to questions propounded during a deposition.
The Court first described the issue in that case:
The fourth exception raises a question with regard to which there is no
exact adjudication in this State.  The evidence of Charles A. Williams was
being taken in Virginia under the provisions of section 16 of article 35 of the
Code of Public General Laws.  The plaintiff was represented at the taking of
this evidence, but the defendant was not, and on the reading of the deposition,
the 15th question was objected to upon the ground that it was leading, though
no such objection appears to have been made or noted at the time when the
testimony was taken.  On behalf of the defendant it is urged that he was
entitled at the hearing [in court] to object to the question on the ground of its
leading character, and that it was his first opportunity to object because of the
expense to which the defendant would be subjected if compelled to be
represented by counsel at the taking of foreign depositions.
Id.  Disagreeing with defendant’s argument and noting the purpose of requiring the objecting
counsel to state the ground for the objection, the Court held:
[I]t has long been the recognized rule in this State, that where a question was
supposed to be objectionable upon this ground, the objection, and the reason
for it must be noted at the time [of the deposition], in order to afford the party
propounding the question an opportunity to reframe it in such form that it
would not be open to this objection.  The rule is a most salutary and wise one
if any regard is to be had for the rules of evidence, and the mere question of
convenience or expense to a party litigant can not be permitted to outweigh the
enforcement of the general rule.
Id. (emphasis added).  We have not overruled Doggett, Brown, or Kerby.  Thus, this Court
has required since at least 1885 that counsel objecting to questions asked during a deposition,
which are curable, must provide the grounds for the objections during the deposition.  
Our understanding of the common law is further supported by later cases that address
the requirement at that time for stating the grounds for objections at trial.  Prior to the
 Maryland Rule 2-517(a), which previously had been promulgated as Rule 522 and,
5
prior to that, Court of Appeals Rule 17, provides in part that “[t]he grounds for the objection
need not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party, or on its own initiative, so
directs.”
- 6 -
enactment of Maryland Rule 2-517 (and its predecessors),  which provides that grounds for
5
objection need not be given at trial unless requested, it appears that in order to preserve an
objection made at trial, the grounds had to be stated even absent any request.  In Iron Clad
Manufacturing Co. v. Stanfield, 112 Md. 360, 386, 76 A. 854, 860 (1910), a bare objection
was made to a question asked a witness.  Although it is not completely clear from the Court’s
opinion, it appears the question had been asked at trial.  We stated:
The record does not show that the grounds of the objection were stated when
it was made but it is now [on appeal] contended that it was objectionable
because it was leading and also because it asked the witness the very question
that the jury were to decide.  
It is too late now to raise for the first time the objection that the
question was leading.  That should have been raised below when the question
was asked so that the examining counsel could have put the inquiry in a proper
form if he desired to do so.  Poe’s Practice, sec. 274; Brown v. Hardcastle, 63
Md. 495; Kerby v. Kerby, 57 Md. 361.
Id.
In Iron Clad Manufacturing, we cited Brown and Kerby, both deposition cases, in
holding that the grounds for objections must be volunteered, even at trial.  We also cited
Brown and Kerby approvingly in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State ex rel. Black, 107
Md. 642, 653, 69 A. 439, 443 (1908).  In Black, we referred specifically to questions posed
and objections thereto made at trial.  We said:
 Apparently, a general exception was made at trial without specificity.  The term
6
“exception,” as used in the 1908 Black case, was the formal method then used for attempting
to preserve an adverse ruling for purposes of appeal.  After an adverse ruling the aggrieved
party asked the court clerk to note an exception to the ruling on the record.  At the conclusion
of the trial, all of the exceptions taken would constitute a Bill of Exceptions, which would
form the basis for appeal.   See Montgomery County v. McNeece, 311 Md. 194, 202-03, 533
A.2d 671, 675 (1987).  The Court in Black was speaking in the context of a mere general
objection and resulting general exception, holding that unless made with sufficient specificity,
the exceptions did not, even then, preserve the issue for appeal.
- 7 -
The . . . exceptions  are all urged in this Court solely upon the ground
[6]
that the questions objected to were leading questions, but it does not appear
from the record that this ground of objection was made in the trial Court, no
specific ground of objection being there made.  We think the objection to a
question as leading should be made at the time it is put, and before it is
answered.  Mr. Poe so states the rule in Poe’s Practice, sec. 261, and says,
“The reason is that if such an objection had been made at the time the question
was put, it could and probably would have been obviated, and it would not be
fair therefore to spring such objections afterwards.  This is especially the rule
in cases where testimony is taken under a commission.”  To sustain this text
he cites Smith v. Cooke, 31 Md. 174; Jones v. Jones, 36 Md. 447; Kerby v.
Kerby, 57 Md. 361 and Brown v. Hardcastle, 63 Md. 495.  Smith v. Cooke was
a case where the depositions were taken under a commission, and Kerby v.
Kerby and Brown v. Hardcastle were equity cases, where the rule is
established.  Jones v. Jones was a case in the Orphans’ Court where the
testimony was taken before lay Judges.  We have not found a case where the
testimony was taken orally at nisi prius, in which this question has arisen, but
we perceive no reason why the rule should not be the same in such cases, and
Mr. Poe plainly lends his authority to this view in the citation above.  These
exceptions therefore are not tenable on that ground.
By 1949, it was no longer necessary to proffer voluntarily at trial the grounds upon
which objections were based.  We said in Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Castranda,
194 Md. 421, 438, 71 A.2d 442, 449 (1950), citing Court of Appeals Rule 17, which had
been promulgated in 1945: “Under our present rules relating to appeals, it is ordinarily not
necessary to state the grounds for an objection, unless requested by the trial court.”  
- 8 -
We addressed the old exceptions practice in Montgomery County v. McNeece, 311
Md. 194, 533 A.2d 671 (1987), in which we explained that Court of Appeals Rule 17 had
changed only appellate procedural rules with respect to the Court of Appeals and that
subsequent rule modifications were necessary to change the procedure for an appeal to an
in banc circuit court.  We first explained the common law exceptions practice:
The requirement of noting a contemporaneous exception in order to preserve
a question for later appellate review was firmly ingrained in the common law.
See McCormick on Evidence § 52, at 118-19 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).  The
reason for the rule of contemporaneous exception, and its interaction with the
additional requirement that a Bill of Exceptions be prepared and signed, were
set forth by Professor Milton D. Green in Basic Civil Procedure, 254-55 (2d
ed. 1979):
The purpose of a Bill of Exceptions was to bring before the
appellate court for review matters which otherwise would not appear
on the common law record due to the fact that there were no court
reporters to record the testimony and the proceedings at the trial.  This
was before the days of shorthand and recording devices.  After the
Statute of Westminster II if a litigant believed the court had erred in a
ruling, he could make it a matter of record by “saving his exception.”
For example, if counsel had objected to a question asked of a witness
and the court had overruled the objection and counsel thought the
ruling was erroneous, he could say, “If the court please, I desire to save
an exception to your honor’s ruling.”  The judge was then obliged to
stop the trial and call the scrivener who, with his quill pen, would make
a record on parchment. . . .  When this document was completed, it
would be signed by the judge.  During the course of the trial numerous
exceptions might be “saved.”  At the conclusion of the trial they would
be bound together and certified by the trial judge as the Bill of
Exceptions in the case, and they would be attached to and become a
part of the record on appeal.  Today, with modern methods of court
reporting, this antiquated method of preserving a record has become
obsolete and court rules make “exceptions” unnecessary.  (footnote
omitted). 
Id. at 202-03, 533 A.2d at 675 (alteration in original).  The Court went on:
- 9 -
With the advent of court stenographers and required verbatim accounts
of trial proceedings, the need for contemporaneous exceptions ceased to exist.
By the adoption in 1945 of Court of Appeals Rule 17, the “unnecessary and
outmoded formalit[y]” of noting exceptions to rulings or orders of the court
was ended.  Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 6-9, 209 A.2d 776 (1965).  Rule 17
provided that:
Formal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are
unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore
been necessary it is sufficient that a party at the time the ruling or order
of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action
which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the
court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an
objection does not thereafter prejudice him.  
The language of Court of Appeals Rule 17 was later incorporated into Md.
Rule 522, and in 1984 became part of Rule 2-517.
Id. at 204, 533 A.2d at 676 (alteration in original).  The Court then discussed the rule’s effect
on in banc circuit court appeals:
The modernization of appellate procedures accomplished by Court of
Appeals Rule 17 and successor rules, while fully effective for purposes of
ordinary appeals, had no effect on the procedure to be followed in appeals to
in banc courts.  Prior to 1984, Rule 510 remained in effect, specifically
requiring the reservation of issues by means of exceptions.  As a result, an
outmoded procedure remained to unnecessarily complicate in banc appeals.
Aggravating the situation was the fact that attorneys coming to the bar after
1945 were unfamiliar with the practice of noting formal exceptions to rulings
or orders — a practice that had been second-nature to their predecessors.
Because of the requirement that an exception be noted of record on the day the
point or question was decided, in banc appeals were essentially unavailable in
those cases in which a judge filed an order with the clerk and notified the
parties by mail.  Moreover, there was uncertainty concerning the time within
which an oral exception had to be reduced to writing and signed by the trial
judge.  See Faber v. Wolfe, 41 Md. App. 458, 397 A.2d 270 (1979), holding
that an oral exception must be reduced to writing within a “reasonable time.”
Compare Thomas v. Ford, supra, 63 Md. at 348.
- 10 -
Aware of these problems and taking cognizance of the footnote penned
by this Court in Washabaugh, supra, 285 Md. at 399, n. 6, 404 A.2d 1027, the
Rules Committee of this Court recommended substantial revision of Rule 510
so that the procedure for taking an in banc appeal would parallel, to the extent
possible, the procedure in taking an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
Rule 2-551, effective July 1, 1984, provided, in pertinent part:
When review by a court in banc is permitted by the Maryland
Constitution, a party may have a judgment or determination of any
point or question reviewed by a court in banc by filing a notice for in
banc review within the time prescribed by Rule 1012 for a filing of an
appeal.  Issues are reserved for in banc review by making an objection
in the manner set forth in Rules 2-517 and 2-520.
Id. at 204-05, 533 A.2d at 676 (footnotes omitted).
As we shall indicate, infra, despite suggestions to the Rules Committee that
preservation issues, as they relate to depositions, be made less stringent, those suggestions,
unlike the issues relating to in banc circuit court appeals, have not been accepted or
recommended; therefore, the common law rules have survived. 
B. Maryland Rules of Discovery
The Court of Appeals, in its rule-making capacity, adopted uniform rules of discovery
as part of the Maryland Rules in 1941.  See 1941 Md. Laws, Chap. 719; see also Md. Rules
2-401 to 2-434.  The Maryland Rules, including the rules relating to discovery, do not
preempt the entire field of discovery procedure.  Rather, common law principles not
expressly inconsistent with the Maryland Rules should be applied in conjunction with the
rules.  See Gardner v. Board of City Comm’rs, 320 Md. 63, 80, 576 A.2d 208, 216 (1990)
(“The revision of the Maryland Rules which became effective July 1, 1984, did not abrogate
all of the case law of pleading and practice which theretofore existed at law and in equity,
- 11 -
and the new Maryland Rules do not purport to state within their text the universe of
Maryland pleading and practice law.”).  Nothing contained in the Maryland Rules is
inconsistent with the common law rule stated in the cases we have discussed.  Finally, the
discovery rules are broad and comprehensive in scope and should be liberally construed.  See
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 405, 718 A.2d 1129,
1133 (1998); Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 460, 713 A.2d 962, 966 (1998).
Turning to the relevant discovery rules, Rule 2-415(g) provides:
All objections made during a deposition shall be recorded with the
testimony.  An objection to the manner of taking a deposition, to the form of
questions or answers, to the oath or affirmation, to the conduct of the parties,
or to any other kind of error or irregularity that might be obviated or removed
if objected to at the time of its occurrence is waived unless a timely objection
is made during the deposition.  An objection to the competency of a witness
or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony is not waived by
failure to make it before or during a deposition unless the ground of the
objection is one that might have been obviated or removed if presented at that
time. [Emphasis added.]
Because the doctor’s deposition testimony in the case before us was videotaped and used as
testimony at trial, Rule 2-416(g), relating to videotaped and audiotaped depositions, and Rule
2-419(a)(4), relating to the use of all depositions, also apply.  Rule 2-416(g) provides:
The officer shall keep a log of all objections made during the deposition
and shall reference them to the time shown on the clock on camera or to the
videotape or audiotape indicator.  Evidence objected to shall be taken subject
to the objection.  A party intending to offer a videotape or audiotape
deposition in evidence shall notify the court and all parties in writing of that
intent and of the parts of the deposition to be offered within sufficient time to
allow for objections to be made and acted upon before the trial or hearing.
Objections to all or part of the deposition shall be made in writing within
sufficient time to allow for rulings on them and for editing of the tape before
the trial or hearing.  The court may permit further designations and objections
 We emphasize that Rules 2-416 and 2-419(a)(4) do not alter, unless expressly
7
provided, Rules 2-411 to 2-415, which regulate generally the taking of depositions.  The
primary purpose of the videotape and audiotape provisions, as well as the provisions for
depositions upon written questions, Md. Rule 2-417, and depositions by telephone, Md. Rule
2-418, is to expand the methods available for the taking of depositions.  The videotape and
audiotape rules provide for additional methods of taking depositions; they do not supplant
the general rules or the underlying common law.  Therefore, Maryland Rule 2-416(g) (“A
party intending to offer a videotape or audiotape deposition in evidence shall notify the court
and all parties in writing of that intent . . . within sufficient time to allow for objections to
be made and acted upon before the trial or hearing.”  (emphasis added)), requires a
postdeposition, pretrial hearing for the court to rule on deposition objections.  This is
designed to replace in-court rulings on such objections.  The videotape and audiotape rules
are not a substitute for the common law requirement that the ground for an objection be made
at the deposition itself or risk being waived for subsequent proceedings.  Accordingly, the
procedure for obtaining court rulings on objections made during depositions, such as those
at issue here, generally apply only to objections properly preserved at the videotaped or
audiotaped deposition by stating the ground upon which the objection is based.
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as justice may require.  In excluding objectionable testimony or comments or
objections of counsel, the court may order that an edited copy of the videotape
or audiotape be made or that the person playing the tape at trial suppress the
objectionable portions of the tape.  In no event, however, shall the original
videotape or audiotape be affected by any editing process.
Rule 2-419(a)(4) states: “A videotape deposition of a treating or consulting physician or of
any expert witness may be used for any purpose even though the witness is available to
testify if the notice of that deposition specified that it was to be taken for use at trial.”  The
discovery rules relating to videotaped depositions do not supplant the general discovery
rules; rather, they supplement those rules.7
Rule 2-415 relates generally to deposition procedure and, as we stated above,
subsection (g) mandates the manner in which and under what situations an objection should
be made.  The Rule, which has been revised several times, was derived from portions of
 The Maryland Rules were significantly updated, revised, and renumbered in 1984.
8
- 13 -
former Rules 409, 411, 412, and 422.   Notwithstanding these several changes to the
8
deposition procedure rule over the years, Rule 2-415(g) and its predecessor rules relating to
objections have remained substantially the same.  For example, former Rule 412 c. 2.
provided: 
2. Waiver Unless Seasonable Objection. 
An error or irregularity occurring at the oral examination in the manner
of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath
or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties and an error of any kind which
might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, is waived unless
seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.
The substance of this deposition objection rule has remained the same, despite several
concerns raised in the past.  The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (“Rules Committee” or “Committee”), however, declined to recommend any
responsive changes to those concerns.  For example, minutes from various Rules Committee
meetings relating to Rule 2-415(g) indicate that proposals for modifying the Rule have been
considered.  The minutes of a January 16, 1987, meeting of the Rules Committee indicate
that the Committee was concerned in part with whether the regular deposition rules applied
to videotaped depositions and whether the failure to object at the taking of a videotaped
deposition constituted a waiver in light of the special videotape provisions that seemed to
permit delaying objections until the postdeposition, pretrial hearing.  A proposed change
considered by the Committee appeared to concern whether the Rule required “curable”
- 14 -
objections to be made at the deposition itself rather than later at the pretrial hearing:
Agenda Item 3.  Consideration of a policy question regarding Rules 2-416 (g)
and 2-419 (d).
____________________________________________________________
Ms. Richards, Chairman of the Discovery Subcommittee presented the
policy issue for the Committee’s consideration.  She informed the Committee
that she had received a letter from Henry I. Greenberg, Esquire asking the
Committee whether parties attending a videotaped deposition of an expert,
intended for use at trial, must make all objections at the deposition as if they
were at trial or the objections would be waived.  Ms. Richards explained that
the letter described a situation where certain objections, not made during the
deposition, were raised for the first time before trial.  The court allowed the
objections relying on Rule 2-419 (d) which provides in part that:
Subject to Rules 2-412 (e), 2-415 (g) and (i), 2-416 (g),
and 2-417 (c), an objection may be made at a hearing or trial to
receiving in evidence all or part of a deposition for any reason
that would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness
were then present and testifying.
Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 33 (Jan. 16, 1987).
After quoting the videotape rule and Rule 2-416(g), there was discussion of when
objections should be made under Rule 2-416(g).  The minutes reflect that Committee
member Mr. Melvin J. Sykes commented “that except for curable objections, a party is only
required to make objections within a sufficient time before trial so that the court can rule on
the objections.  He further noted that the court may also allow objections after the trial has
begun.”  Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
Mr. Albert D. Brault distinguished curable and noncurable objections, suggesting by
implication, as had Mr. Sykes, that curable objections were to be made during the deposition.
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The minutes reflect the following:
Mr. Brault remarked that videotape depositions of out-of-state experts
are used as a precautionary measure because trials are often subject to delays.
He added further that flexibility in the rule is important, and that the rule
should not require non-curable objections to be made during the course of the
deposition. 
Id. at 35 (emphasis added).  The Rules Committee decided no change to Rule 2-416(g) was
necessary.
Additionally, comments on file with the Rules Committee relating to Rule 2-415(g)
reflect that the Committee considered certain comments presented by James A. Biddison, Jr.
Mr. Biddison suggested Rule 2-415(g) be changed to provide that there would not be a
waiver of an objection even if no objection were made during the deposition.  He proffered
that the practice of requiring objections at depositions in order to preserve them for trial
caused depositions “to get bogged down and go off on a tangent and are broken up by
countless objections.  It is not like a situation in Court where you have a Judge to rule on
such objections.”  Comments to the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure on Maryland Rule 2-415(g) (Comment No. 58, James A. Biddison,
Jr.) (on file with the Rules Committee).  The Rules Committee declined to adopt Mr.
Biddison’s proposal or recommend it to the Court.
The history of Rule 2-415 reveals other instances in which the Rule was reviewed and
approved without substantive change.  As noted in a 1973 Rules Committee meeting, for
example, the Rules Committee considered several suggestions by the Baltimore Gas and
Electric Company, including the recommendation “that Rule 413 b be amended in an effort
 In Goodman, 117 Md. App. at 403 n.6, 700 A.2d at 810 n.6, the Court of Special
9
Appeals stated in footnote 6 that the parties had not directed it to any appellate decisions,
other than Collum v. Pierson, 411 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1987), that discuss the issue of whether
a party objecting to a question, answer, or irregularity at a deposition must specify grounds
for the objection.  Doggett, Brown, and Kerby, supra, appear to have addressed the issue and,
(continued...)
- 16 -
to discourage attorneys from objecting during the taking of depositions.”  Minutes of the
Court of Appeals Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, 3-4 (June 19,
1973).  The Committee “reasoned that such action would not have the desired effect and
therefore voted to [recommend] no change.  It was also felt that the matter was covered by
Rule 412 c which is a proper place for the subject.”  Maryland Rule 412 c. 2. contained
language similar to the present rule, see supra.  See also Minutes of the Court of Appeals
Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 (Sept. 12, 1980) (noting the
Rules Committee’s approval of former Rule 2-404(j)(3)(B), a predecessor to present Rule
2-415(g), with only an attempt to improve the style and language).  Although these comments
and minutes clearly are not determinative, they do lend some guidance as to the issues
brought to the Rules Committee’s attention and its ultimate decision to decline to recommend
any such changes to the deposition procedure rule.  It is clear that as far back as 1973, the
Rules Committee declined to recommend weakening the provisions concerning the waiver
of objections at depositions.
The Court of Special Appeals, as we have mentioned, examined Rule 2-415(g) and
the rules relating to videotaped depositions in Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md. App. at 396-404,
700 A.2d at 806-10, a case with facts strikingly similar to the case before us.   That case
9
(...continued)
9
moreover, have not been overruled.
- 17 -
involved the videotaped deposition of a doctor.  During the deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel
objected to many of the questions asked by opposing counsel, usually stating only
“objection” or “objection, move to strike.”  At trial, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the ground
for his objections was that the questions were not in proper form because the doctor was
asked to express his opinion, but was not asked whether his opinions were based on a
“reasonable degree of medical probability.”  Id. at 397, 700 A.2d at 807.  The judge
overruled the plaintiffs’ objections, stating that “to preserve an objection as to the form of
a question the objection at deposition must be specific so that opposing counsel would have
an opportunity to correct his mistake(s).”  Id. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that in order 
to preserve a deposition objection to any error or irregularity that might be
cured if a timely objection had been made at deposition, the objecting party
must state the ground for the objection before the conclusion of the deposition,
so that the opposing party will have a chance to cure or obviate the error or
irregularity.
Id. at 403-04, 700 A.2d at 810.  That court gave several reasons for its holding, but most
persuasive was the notion that
Rule 2-415(g) shows that the reason an objection to a defect [in any question
or answer that can be immediately cured] must be made, in a timely fashion,
during the deposition is so that the questioner will have an opportunity, during
the deposition, to clear up the problem.  The drafters of the rules did not wish
a litigant to be prejudiced by a slip of the tongue or any other error that could
be easily cured.  If it were sufficient merely to utter the word “objection” when
some flaw exists in a question or answer, that purpose oft-times would not be
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fulfilled.  For instance, a questioner, even if he or she is a well-trained lawyer,
may not know what “error or irregularity” needs correcting if a specific
objection is not made.  At deposition, attorneys can, and often do, object to
questions for invalid reasons or for no reason at all.  Moreover, counsel,
although they are not required to do so, often object to questions or answers
(e.g., answers containing hearsay) where the error or irregularity could not
possibly be corrected even if the problem were brought to the attention of
those in attendance at the deposition.  Given these well known realities, the
interpretation of Maryland Rule 2-415(g) advanced by appellants would allow
counsel at deposition to interpose scores of non-specific and frivolous
objections and then interpose a valid objection to a defect in a question that
could be immediately cured.  The barrage of frivolous objections might well
cause an opponent to overlook the defect in a question or answer that was
immediately curable.  Such an interpretation would not fulfill the purpose of
the rule and would run afoul of the requirement that the Maryland Rules be
interpreted to secure fairness in administration.
Id. at 400-01, 700 A.2d at 808-09 (brackets in original).  
In reaching its holding, the Court of Special Appeals recognized that one of the
primary goals of Rule 2-415(g) requiring the objecting party to specify the ground for his or
her objection to the curable errors and irregularities described in that rule is to provide the
questioner the opportunity to obviate the mistake while the deposition is taking place.
Indeed, in all of the previous versions of Rule 2-415(g), the language requiring an objection
to be made for any error “that might be obviated or removed if objected to at the time of its
occurrence” remains constant.  Implicit in this language is the purpose of making specific
objections: to correct the problem at that time.  Although the ground for the objection may
be obvious to both parties when the objection is made, often it may not or there might be
multiple grounds for the objection.  For instance, a question may be objectionable in form,
such as in the case sub judice, and quickly curable by the questioner rephrasing the question.
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At the same time, the question also may be irrelevant and not immediately curable and
therefore a matter properly to be ruled upon later by the trial court.  The questioning counsel
may recognize the relevancy problem but not the problem as to form.  Had the objecting
party simply advised the questioning counsel of the ground of the objection, such as stating,
“Objection; improper form of questioning a medical expert,” the questioning counsel might
have cured the defect by rephrasing the question, thus saving valuable time and resources
prior to or during trial. 
Even more important, unless an objector states with some specificity the nature of his
objection, rather than mimicking the general language of the rule, i.e., “objection to the form
of the question,” it is impossible to determine, based upon the transcript of the deposition
itself, whether the objection was proper when made or merely frivolous.  In other words,
when addressing the waiver issue, that is, whether the objection would have been curable if
it had been properly objected to and the ground stated, the trial judge normally is limited to
the ground for the objection made at the point in time when the deposition took place and
cannot consider a new reason given some months later at trial.  The trial judge’s waiver
determination depends upon whether, at the time the objection was, or could have been,
made, the objectionable matter was curable or noncurable.  If the matter was curable and the
nonquestioning party either failed to object, or failed to specify the basis of the objection,
the matter is waived.  If the matter was curable, properly objected to with the ground
specified, and not cured during the deposition, the objection is preserved.  Therefore, the
issue of waiver is frozen at the time of the deposition.  In order for the trial judge to
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determine whether the ground for objection was “one which might have been obviated or
removed if presented” during the deposition, a sufficient foundation for an objection
necessarily must have been proffered in order for the trial court to determine later whether
the question or irregularity could have been cured at the time of the deposition.  Unless
specific grounds for objections are proffered at the deposition, the Rule cannot operate as it
was intended: to permit at the deposition the curing of objectionable questions or other
irregularities.  Were we to change the common law and hold that grounds need not be stated
at the deposition, the objecting party would be afforded months or years before the trial
commences, in which he or she would have an opportunity to think up legitimate grounds
for the objection when, at the time it was made, such grounds were not obvious or intended.
The requirement that an objecting attorney state the ground or grounds for an
objection at a deposition also promotes the policy considerations behind the rules relating
to videotaped testimony and videotaped expert witness testimony.  In 1980, this Court
amended the Maryland Rules to provide for discovery rules specifically governing the taking
of depositions by videotape and audiotape recording devices.  As discussed, supra, Rule 2-
416(g) governs the technicalities for objections during a videotaped deposition and Rule 2-
419(a)(4) provides that the videotaped deposition of a physician or any expert witness may
be used for any purpose at trial, regardless of that witness’ availability.  Regarding its
recommendations with respect to adopting videotaped deposition rules, the Rules Committee
minutes reflect that it strove to promote the use of videotaped depositions in an effort to keep
litigation costs to a minimum and for the economy and convenience of the courts, parties,
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and expert witnesses.  For example, one individual expressed an opinion that 
permitting videotape depositions probably would work to the advantage of less
wealthy parties by making experts more available to them, in that an expert
would generally be more willing to testify in his office or at some other non-
court setting for a modest fee.  Furthermore, less of the expert’s time would
be necessary to acquire his testimony.
Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 5-6 (Mar. 7 & 8, 1980).  In a committee note to former Rule 413, as reflected in
the Committee’s Minutes, the Rules Committee stated: 
The Committee believes that considerations of economy and convenience in
arranging for medical and expert testimony, coupled with the ability of
videotape to convey most of the information and impressions available from
in-person testimony, justify the unrestricted use of videotape depositions as a
substitute for “live” testimony from such witnesses.
Id. at 12-13.  It is clear the drafters of the discovery rules relating to videotaped depositions
desired broad use of videotaped depositions in an effort to decrease the cost and time
associated with traditional deposition practices.
Holding that counsel objecting to certain questions, answers, and otherwise curable
irregularities in depositions need not specify the grounds for his or her objections would limit
the purpose and goals of the videotaped deposition rules and the discovery rules in general
and lead to unnecessary delays and costs.  For example, in the case at hand, appellant’s
counsel objected to the questions asked by appellee’s counsel, but failed to specify the
ground for his objection except on one occasion.  This same bare objection was entered
several more times at the deposition, and each time appellee’s counsel failed to include the
“reasonable degree of medical certainty” language to his subsequent questions.  Appellant
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only argued to the trial judge that these objections related to form; that is, appellant stated
for the first time at the postdeposition, pretrial hearing that appellee’s counsel neglected to
use language asking for the doctor’s opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
The error objected to by appellant is one of form because appellee’s counsel did not ask the
question using the language, or form, which appellant argues is required to elicit expert
opinion.  This is the type of objection contemplated under Rule 2-415(g).  Had appellant
specified the ground for his objection clearly enough so that appellee could have obviated
the error, the question might have been corrected while the expert remained available. 
“[S]andbagging” an opposing counsel by attempting to defer the issue of the proper form of
the question to a point in the process, immediately prior to the trial, when correction is
necessary but the witness is not available to answer a new, properly framed question, are
tactics contrary to the purposes for which the videotape deposition rules and Rule 2-415(g)
were designed to address.
III. Conclusion
We emphasize that the rule we espouse today is not new; the common law has
recognized this procedure since at least 1855.  The discovery rules codify policies and
procedures that have been in effect for nearly 145 years.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court
and hold that in order to preserve a deposition objection to “the manner of taking a
deposition, to the form of questions or answers, to the oath or affirmation, to the conduct of
the parties, or to any other kind of error or irregularity that might be obviated or removed if
objected to at the time of its occurrence,” Md. Rule 2-415(g), the party making the objection
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must state the ground or grounds for the objection with enough specificity that the attorney
asking the questions can reasonably address the problem and cure or obviate the
objectionable question, answer, or irregularity.  Otherwise, the objecting party, as to that
question, waives any objection to the admission of the question and answer at trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
- 1 -
Rodowsky, J., concurring.
I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the analysis in the Court's
opinion.  In my view the Court has greatly enlarged Maryland Rule 2-415(g) beyond its text,
beyond its proper construction, and beyond the way in which the circuit courts administer
the rule and in which litigators apply it.  Further, the Court bases its construction primarily
on policy reasons that are debatable and that encroach on the adversary system.
Maryland Rule 2-415(g) reads:  
"Objections.  All objections made during a deposition shall be recorded with
the testimony.  An objection to the manner of taking a deposition, to the form
of questions or answers, to the oath or affirmation, to the conduct of the
parties, or to any other kind of error or irregularity that might be obviated or
removed if objected to at the time of its occurrence is waived unless a timely
objection is made during the deposition.  An objection to the competency of
a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony is not
waived by failure to make it before or during a deposition unless the ground
of the objection is one that might have been obviated or removed if presented
at that time."
Nowhere does the rule expressly require that the ground of objection be stated for those
objections that would be waived if the objection is not made.  
- 2 -
The self-evident purpose of the rule is to expedite depositions.  There is no need to
object at all "unless the ground of the objection is one that might have been obviated or
removed if presented at that time."  The general rule is that objections are not even required
at a deposition; rather, they are deferred, to be made if and when the deposition testimony
is offered in evidence in court.  To add a requirement that the ground of the objection must
be stated at the deposition prolongs the deposition. 
Further, under the ordinary rules of construction, the meaning given part of a rule
should be consistent with the rules as a whole.  Rule 2-415(b) tells us that "[w]hen a
deposition is taken upon oral examination, examination and cross-examination of the
deponent may proceed as permitted in the trial of an action in open court."  In open court,
when an objection is made to the admission of evidence "[t]he grounds for the objection need
not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, so directs."
Rule 2-517(a).  Thus, if one looks beyond the literal wording of Rule 2-415(g) to the larger
context, one is directed to a conclusion that is contrary to that espoused by the Court today.
In 1986 the Board of Governors of the Maryland State Bar Association approved
discovery guidelines, and the guidelines were approved by the Conference of Circuit Court
Judges.  Annotated Code of Maryland (1999), 1 Md. Rules at 171.  The Maryland Discovery
Guidelines were revised by the Litigation Section of the Maryland State Bar Association in
February 1990.  Id.  Although the Maryland Discovery Guidelines "are not officially part of
the Maryland Rules and have not been adopted or approved by" this Court, we nevertheless
arranged to have them reproduced as part of the introduction to Chapter 400 of Title 2 of the
- 3 -
Maryland Rules because the "Guidelines, as revised, may be of significant value in
interpreting and applying" Chapter 400.  Id.  "Guideline 9:  Objections at Depositions" states
that "[a]ttorneys objecting to the form of the question at deposition are encouraged, if
requested, to state the reason for the objection."  This hortatory language is antithetical to a
mandatory statement of grounds that the Court today reads into Rule 2-415(g).  
Commentators on the Maryland Rules, as they relate to depositions, have not alerted
practitioners to any necessity for stating the grounds of those objections that are required to
be made at a deposition in order to avoid waiver.  See P.V. Niemeyer & L.M. Schuett,
Maryland Rules Commentary, Rule 2-415, at 281-82 (2d ed. 1992); P.W. Grimm, Taking
and Defending Depositions, A Handbook for Maryland Lawyers § 5.4, at 46-47 (1991).  
The majority opinion takes the position that references in Doggett v. Tatham, 116 Md.
147, 151, 81 A. 376, 378 (1911), Brown v. Hardcastle, 63 Md. 484, 495 (1885), and Kerby
v. Kerby, 57 Md. 345, 361 (1882), to stating at a deposition the ground for objection are to
be read into Maryland Rule 2-415(g), because those cases have not been overruled.  Any
such requirement, however, was eroded, in my opinion, by rules adopted by this Court on
November 1, 1945.  Md. Code (1939, 1947 Cum. Supp.), Appendix B.  Rule 10(c)(1) of the
rules relating to depositions of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure presented the
substance of the last sentence of present Rule 2-415(g), while deposition Rule 8(a) of the
then rules provided for oral examination of deponents to proceed as permitted at the trial.
Id. at 2032, 2034.  At the same time Rule 17 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals was added.
In connection with preserving the record for appeal it provided that, "[u]nless requested by
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the court, it is not necessary to state the grounds for objections to evidence except in
circumstances in which it would heretofore have been necessary to call attention to special
grounds for objection."   Id. at 1995.
In 1956, this provision in Rule 17 was moved to Rule 522 d 1 of the newly adopted
Maryland Rules of Procedure, which provided, "[u]nless requested by the court, it is not
necessary to state the grounds for objections to evidence."  Md. Code (1957) (adopted July
18, 1956; effective January 1, 1957).  The Committee Note following Rule 522 explains the
change from former Rule 17:
"The Committee eliminated the following words, following the word
'evidence' in subsection d 1:  '... except in circumstances in which it would
heretofore have been necessary to call attention to special grounds for
objection.'  This was the last part of the next to last sentence of Court of
Appeals Rule 17."
In 1984, Rule 522 d 1 was incorporated into newly adopted Rule 2-517(a).  Md. Rule
2-517(a) (1984 Repl. Vol.).
An additional complication in the majority's opinion arises from its repeated
references to the City's objections as going to the form of the questions, as if the issue
concerned the second sentence of Rule 2-415(g).  Assuming that an objection to the form of
a question may lie for some reason other than the question's leading nature, a question that
seeks to elicit a medical opinion, without stating the standard of reasonable medical certainty
(or probability) does not, in my opinion, present a defect of form.
The source of the problem is Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md. App. 378, 700 A.2d 798
(1997).  In Davis, the Court of Special Appeals summarily concluded, based on an opinion
- 5 -
of the Missouri Court of Appeals, that the above-described type of objection went to the
form of the question.  "An objection that questions put to an expert at deposition were not
framed in terms of 'reasonable medical certainty' has been held to be an objection to form.
See Turnbo by Capra v. City of St. Charles, 932 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. App. 1996)."  117
Md. App. at 397 n.4, 700 A.2d at 807 n.4.  The Davis court did not cite any Maryland law,
nor any other state or federal law, to support this statement.
In general, under Maryland law, expert medical witnesses are not required to render
their opinions with the talismanic words "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable
medical probability" in order for the opinion to be admissible.  However, where expert
opinion testimony is used to establish, for example, proof of causation or damages, such
evidence must be sufficiently probable and not be based on speculation or conjecture.  Pierce
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983); Kujawa v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 203-04, 167 A.2d 96, 99 (1961); Ager v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 420-21, 132 A.2d 469, 472-73 (1957).
An expert who states the opinion with "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable
medical probability" is, in effect, stating the degree of conviction with which the opinion is
held.  "This standard of 'reasonable' medical certainty, reflects an objectively well founded
conviction that the likelihood of one cause is greater than any other; it does not mean the
expert is 'personally certain' of the cause, or that the cause is discernable to a certainty."
Clifford v. United States, 532 A.2d 628, 640 n.10 (D.C. 1987) (citation omitted).
An expert opinion that is not rendered with reasonable certainty or reasonable
- 6 -
probability is not necessarily inadmissible.  For example, the opinion may be admissible
when, in conjunction with additional evidence, the combination amounts to sufficient
probable proof of causation.  Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 94, 51
A.2d 642, 646 (1947) ("The law requires proof of probable, not merely possible, facts,
including causal relations.  Reasoning post hoc, propter hoc is a recognized logical fallacy,
a non sequitur.  But sequence of events, plus proof of possible causal relation, may amount
to proof of probable causal relation, in the absence of evidence of any other equally probable
cause."). 
Thus, a question that asks a medical witness for an expert opinion, without asking for
the opinion to be stated with "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable medical
probability," is not a question improper in its form and insufficient to elicit the expert
opinion.  Rather, such a question asks for an expert opinion that might not be stated with the
requisite certainty or probability to be admissible, standing alone.  Admissibility is a
determination that is made by the trial court, Md. Rule 5-104(a).  Consequently, by using the
facts of this case to require a statement of grounds, the Court has moved beyond the easily
recognized leading question and, in effect, is applying the exception to the general rule in the
last sentence of Rule 2-415(g) to a matter of substance.  That raises a far-reaching policy
question. 
The policy reasons advanced in the majority opinion are fairly debatable, but I do not
believe that we should engraft this new requirement on Rule 2-415(g) without having the
Rules Committee expressly consider it, and without giving any opportunity to the Bar to
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comment on any such requirement.  One of the persistent problems in deposition practice is
the attorney who sets out to obstruct the deposition by interjecting repeated objections.  The
ultimate resort to control the obstructionist attorney, unfortunately, is an application for
sanctions.  Obtaining sanctions is difficult enough when the obstructionist attorney can
attempt to justify the conduct complained of by pointing to the vagueness of the requirement
that objections be made in order to avoid waiver where "the ground of the objection is one
that might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time."  The downside of the
Court's new requirement is that it gives the obstructionist attorney even more ammunition,
and more protection against sanctions, by requiring that grounds be stated.  The path down
which the Court today steers deposition practice also impacts the conscientious attorney.  I
can foresee attorneys, fearful that the rule of von Lusch v. State, 279 Md. 255, 263, 368 A.2d
468, 472-73 (1977), will be applied to the statement of grounds, advancing at the deposition
every conceivable ground of objection that might be considered as one that might be obviated
or removed at the deposition.  
Finally, I am concerned that the majority opinion weakens the adversarial system.
Under my interpretation of the requirements of Rule 2-415(g), the objecting attorney need
only object, and the examining attorney has the choice of moving on or backfilling to correct
any perceived deficiency.  Given the elusiveness of the standard, "unless the ground of the
objection is one that might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time," we
should not impose on objecting counsel the added burden of educating examining counsel
on deficiencies in the testimony that has been elicited.  Objecting counsel has a duty to
- 8 -
object to then curable deficiencies in the examination, examining counsel has a duty to
conduct the examination in a proper manner, particularly when the deposition testimony is
to be used in lieu of live testimony at trial, and the court has a duty to rule on the objections,
the grounds of which are stated when the parties are before the court.
In those instances in which objecting counsel chooses to state the ground for the
objection in order to be cooperative, counsel undoubtedly does so because counsel has
concluded that there is no detriment to the client.  But objecting counsel should not be forced
to assist opposing counsel in preparing the adversary's case, where objecting counsel
concludes that the client's legitimate interests require that the deposition proceed in literal
compliance with the Rule.
In the instant matter the difference between the majority's analysis and my analysis
does not alter the result.  The problem was cured when the deponent testified that all of the
opinions that he had expressed were held to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
Chief Judge Bell has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed
herein.
- 9 -
- 10 -
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Darla J. Theiss
No. 123, September Term, 1998
HEADNOTE:
A party objecting at a deposition to the form of a question, answer, or
other error or irregularity that might be obviated or cured during the
deposition must state the ground for the objection with specificity or
the objecting party waives any objection to the admission of the
question or answer at trial.
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