Title: Matter of Estate of Reed

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Reed1989 WY 26768 P.2d 566Case Number: 88-137Decided: 01/31/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ROSS L. REED, DECEASED. SALLYE REED, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARGARET D. 
REED, EXECUTRIX AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROSS L. REED, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
C.S. 
Hinckley of Hinckley and Hinckley, Basin and Roy Stoddard, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

 
 
John J. 
Metzke of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee 
(defendant).

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is set 
forth by a daughter as a will contest between herself and her stepmother over 
her father's estate and questions the propriety of the dismissal of the 
daughter's contest to the Wyoming probate. The lash of their mutual ill 
will is well chronicled. The will, which disinherited the daughter in favor of 
the stepmother, was originally probated in California under The Independent 
Administration of Estates Act, Cal.Probate Code §§ 591-591.9 (West 1988)1 for a minimum estate (alleged 
$500). The will was then presented for admission in Wyoming as a foreign will 
to probate the mineral estate here valued in excess of $2 million. The trial 
court dismissed the daughter's amended complaint as failing to plead with 
particularity fraud, duress, menace, and undue influence as being both 
insufficient in text and too late in time to contest.

 
 

[¶2.]     The daughter 
(appellant) comprehensively raised several issues.2 We condense the issues to three 
dispositive bases: (1) whether the motion to dismiss was converted to a summary 
judgment; (2) whether the California probate is 
controlling over real property located in Wyoming; and (3) whether the notice given was 
insufficient. We reverse and remand.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     A resident of 
California at 
death, former Wyomingite Ross L. Reed died on March 29, 1984 leaving his second 
wife, Margaret D. Reed (appellee), as surviving spouse and Sallye Reed 
(appellant) as his sole surviving child from his first marriage. Ross L. Reed 
had amassed extensive property both in Wyoming 
and California with much of the California property held 
in joint tenancy which passed without probate. The remaining California assets of a stated value of $500 were 
transferred to appellee when the will was offered for California probate, to 
which appellant did not appear nor contest. Appellee, as personal representative 
of the estate, then offered the will as a foreign probated will in this 
jurisdiction under W.S. 2-11-101 through 2-11-303 to administer the extensive 
Wyoming 
mineral interests. The District Court of Uinta County, Wyoming admitted the will 
on October 4, 1985. Therefore, a notice was published in the Uinta County 
Herald. The notice, will, and Wyoming order 
admitting the will to probate were contendably mailed, not to appellant, but to 
a California 
attorney who had some years before represented appellant. No direct mailing to 
the heir is alleged or admitted. Eighteen months later, on April 21, 1987, 
appellee's Wyoming law firm was advised that 
appellant had not received notice of the Wyoming proceedings. This will contest was 
instituted on June 8, 1987 and it is from dismissal that this appeal 
ensued.

 
 
MOTION TO 
DISMISS

 
 

[¶4.]     Although originally 
undertaken as motions to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6) for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction; insufficient process; insufficient service 
of process; and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 
this matter was converted to a summary judgment character under W.R.C.P. 56 for 
our review by the district court's consideration of matters outside the 
pleadings such as affidavits and memoranda. See W.R.C.P. 12(b); Torrey v. 
Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986); Kirby Bldg. 
Systems, Inc. v. Independence Partnership No. One, 634 P.2d 342 
(Wyo. 1981); and Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Sierra Life Ins. Co., 599 P.2d 1360 
(Wyo. 1979). 
An extended recitation of summary judgment analysis will not be pursued, but at 
its foundation is the principle that a summary judgment should be granted only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Also, the record is examined in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion was sought. See Matter of Estate 
of Newell, 765 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1988); Frieden 
Construction, Inc. v. Lower & Company, 766 P.2d 527 (Wyo. 1988); Matter of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272 
(Wyo. 1988); and Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 
(Wyo. 1986). 
Thus, this case will be reviewed as a summary judgment decision with all 
favorable inferences favoring appellant in evidentiary 
analysis.

 
 
SITUS OF 
PROPERTY

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellee contends that 
the California probate is conclusive as to the 
validity and effect of the will for the ancillary administration3 of the Wyoming mineral estate. 
We disagree. Wyoming has been faced with this conflict of 
laws dilemma previously and held for many years that the lex loci rei sitae 
controls as to real property within this state. Justice Blume exhaustively 
examined this subject in In Re Ray's Estate, 74 Wyo. 317, 287 P.2d 629, 633-34 
(1955) (quoting Annotation, Decree of Court of Domicil Respecting Validity or 
Construction of Will, or Admitting it or Denying its Admission to Probate, as 
Conclusive as Regards Real Estate in Another State Devised by Will, 131 A.L.R. 
1023, 1026 (1941)) and summarized the situation: 

 
 
     "Subject to statutory 
provisions to the contrary, express or by construction, and a few cases to the 
contrary, some of which are explainable on statutory grounds, it may be stated 
generally that the great weight of authority favors the rule that a judgment or 
decree of a court of a decedent's domicil passing (expressly or by implication 
from admission to probate) upon the validity or construction of his will, 
devising real property in another state, is not conclusive as to that question, 
so far as it concerns such real property, in the courts of the other state, 
either upon parties or nonparties to the proceeding in which the judgment in the 
former state is rendered, whether considered under the full faith and credit 
provision or the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment or upon 
general grounds as to conclusiveness of judgments."

 
 
Consequently, 
for over forty-five years it has been "settled law that the devolution of real 
property in this state and the effect of the decedent's will must be determined 
by the laws of this state." In Re Ray's Estate, 287 P.2d  at 635. See also 
Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 
667 (Wyo. 1988); Matter of Miller's Estate, 541 P.2d 28, 33-34 (Wyo. 1975); In 
Re Estate of Gibbs, 73 Wyo. 425, 280 P.2d 556, 559-60 (1955); and In Re Smith's 
Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940). Justice Brown, dissenting in Matter of 
Estate of Harrington, 648 P.2d 556, 575 (Wyo. 1982), concisely explained that "[t]he 
rule exists because it is particularly important that there be certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result and ease in the determination and 
application of the law to be applied concerning transactions of land." An 
ascertainment of Wyoming law reveals that 
clearly through common law, Wyoming has adopted the lex loci rei sitae 
principle. Although not considered by either party in brief, that universal rule 
has been statutorily addressed by W.S. 2-6-1044 which 
provides:

 
 
     The meaning and legal 
effect of a disposition in a will is determined by the law of the state in which 
the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the 
application of that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise 
applicable to the disposition.

 
 

[¶6.]     The Reed will was 
executed in California without any provision stating which law should be 
applied; thus, California law must be examined to determine how real property 
located in California devolved under a foreign probated will would be treated. 
Our detour through California law need only be 
brief because California recognizes the lex loci rei sitae 
controls as to real property without any statutory modification. See In Re 
Estrem's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 563, 107 P.2d 36, 38 (1940); In Re Reynolds' Estate, 
217 Cal. 557, 20 P.2d 323, 325 (1933); In Re 
Bowditch's Estate, 189 Cal. 377, 208 P. 282, 283 (1922); Muth v. 
Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854 (1981); 
Thatcher v. City Terrace Cultural Center, 181 Cal. App. 2d 433, 5 Cal. Rptr. 396, 
407 (1960); In Re Brace's Estate, 180 Cal. App. 2d 797, 4 Cal. Rptr. 683, 686 
(1960); and In Re Estate of Patmore, 141 Cal. App. 2d 416, 296 P.2d 863, 865 
(1956). Consequently, with California law and 
Wyoming law substantially the same - the law of 
the situs of the real property controls - it is not necessary to pursue a 
further analysis of W.S. 2-6-104 nor determine if the public policy of 
Wyoming would 
be violated. Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971, 981 (Wyo. 1986); Matter of Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 647 n. 3 (Wyo. 1983). See Lipe v. 
Lipe, 728 P.2d 1124 (Wyo. 1986) for consideration of foreign 
jurisdiction interpretation of its own law. Historically, California was the source of much of the early Wyoming statutory law on probate as 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 70. 
See Rice v. Tilton, 14 Wyo. 101, 82 P. 577 
(1905).

 
 
NOTICE

 
 

[¶7.]     With determination that 
Wyoming law governs as to real estate, analysis 
is directed to the notice compliance for this probate under the Wyoming statutes.5 At the basis of the contest action 
and implicit in the district court's dismissal was the conclusion that the 
Wyoming notice 
published in the newspaper was sufficient to meet W.S. 2-7-2016. The propriety of any contest 
hinges on the validity of the notice which starts the three months limitation 
time for will contest. The sufficiency of the published notice is also 
dispositive as to any contended mailed notice under W.S. 2-7-205(a)7 because any notice allegedly sent 
to appellant was the same as the published notice. The published notice 
stated:

 
 
     You are hereby 
notified that on the 4th day of October, 1985, the Estate of the above named 
decedent was admitted to probate by the above named Court, and that Margaret D. 
Reed was appointed Personal Representative thereof.

 
 
     Notice is further 
given that all persons indebted to said Decedent or to said Estate are requested 
to make immediate payment to the undersigned at [Wyoming law firm].

 
 
     Creditors having 
claims against said Decedent or the estate are required to file them with the 
necessary vouchers, in the office of the Clerk of the District Court of said 
Court, on or before three months after the date of the first publication of this 
notice, and if such claims are not so filed, unless otherwise allowed or paid, 
they will be forever barred.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellee recognizes 
that this notice provision lacks comportment with the statute by not stating 
that any action to set aside the will must be filed within three months, but 
argues that substantial compliance is sufficient. Although we have never had an 
occasion to directly construe the required notice under W.S. 2-7-201, we 
disagree with appellee's position. Appellee solely relies on Hartt v. Brimmer, 
74 Wyo. 356, 
287 P.2d 645 (1955) to conclude her notice was sufficient. However, Hartt, 287 P.2d  at 648 is distinguishable in that there was no contention the notice was 
not published in accord with statutory mandate, and the parties signed a waiver 
to any required statutory mailed notice.

 
 

[¶9.]     The legislature in W.S. 
2-7-201 specifically outlined the elements that must be contained in a notice, 
and additionally provided a form which could be easily utilized. The statute is 
clear and precise. We cannot construe out the omitted requirements to constitute 
substantial compliance to meet the statutory mandate.

 
 

[¶10.]  Additionally, this situation is more 
egregious than the one this court faced in Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 
1983) involving a similar matter in a slightly different context where strict 
compliance was required. The sufficiency of the notice to start the thirty day 
period for filing a claim after rejection under W.S. 2-7-718 was questioned, 
since it arrived by ordinary and not certified mail, although acknowledged to be 
timely received by the creditor. In Hanson, this court held that the notice 
provisions in the probate code mandate strict compliance when dealing with 
creditors and a short period of limitations. While the time for setting aside a 
will is longer than thirty days, the notice of time to set aside the will is 
crucial and as final to an heir as to a creditor. Moreover, in Hanson, 
unquestionably, the creditor received notice albeit through an improper route. 
In the instant case, appellant denies ever receiving any notice which must be 
taken as true as this summary judgment stage when the record is viewed most 
favorably to her. Consequently, the district court erred as a matter of law in 
not requiring the notice to comply with W.S. 2-7-201, especially when a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether appellant ever received any actual 
notice.

 
 

[¶11.]  In summary, Wyoming law controls as to real property located within 
this state, and the Wyoming notice provisions were not strictly 
complied with. The "special public policy" of prompt settlement of estates 
cannot be achieved unless the published notice is initially statutorily 
sufficient to trigger the three months time. Hartt, 287 P.2d  at 653. No proper 
notice has yet been published sufficient to trigger the start of the three 
months time to file an action to set aside this will. Consequently, the district 
court erred in dismissing this contest action as filed too late. The complaint 
was not untimely, since it predated proper notice.

 
 
DISMISSAL 
FOR LACK OF PARTICULARITY IN PLEADING FRAUD

 
 

[¶12.]  The decision of the district court was 
premised on giving full faith and credit to the California proceeding. The district court 
stated that "[i]t seems clear that our statute requires full faith and credit to 
be given to wills duly admitted to probate in other jurisdictions." The 
recitation of factual events regarding California probate and notice of Wyoming 
probate may be interesting but immaterial, since we hold that issues of will 
validity as affecting Wyoming real estate will be determined in this Wyoming 
proceeding.

 
 

[¶13.]  As a proponent of the will, appellee only 
responded procedurally by a motion to dismiss and the substantive sufficiency of 
appellant's pleading to properly attack the will itself for undue influence or 
whatever was not presented for trial court decision.8 Consequently, pleading sufficiency 
of the complaint is not now considered. Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 
(Wyo. 
1976).

 
 

[¶14.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The Cal.Probate Code 
§§ 591-591.9 have since been repealed and are continued in §§ 10400-10503 (West 
Supp. 1989) without substantive change.

 
 

2 Appellant 
argumentatively phrased the issues as:

 
 
     1. Was this matter 
before the Trial Court as upon a Motion for Summary Judgment under Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12 and 56? * * *

 
 
     2. Does the record in 
this case clearly disclose numerous genuine issues of material fact, such that 
summary judgment in favor of Appellee (Defendant) was and is improper? * * 
*

 
 
     3. Are the California Probate 
Court proceedings totally irrelevant to any issue in 
this case, on any or all of at least all of the following 
grounds:

 
 
     (a) The decision (or 
non-decision) of the California Probate Court as to the validity of decedent's 
Will is not entitled to "full faith and credit" as to real estate located in 
Wyoming.

 
 
     (b) The decision (or 
non-decision) of the California Probate Court as to the validity of decedent's 
Will is not res judicata as to Appellant, because (1) the California Probate 
Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over title to real estate located in 
Wyoming, and (2) Appellant did not contest the Will in the California Probate 
Court, and therefore there was no trial on the merits in such court as to the 
validity of the Will.

 
 
     (c) Under 
well-established rules of Conflict of Laws, all the law of Wyoming governs as to the validity of a Will, insofar as 
it purports to affect title to real estate located in Wyoming.

 
 
     (d) The Wyoming three 
months' (after date of first publication of a proper Notice of Probate) statute 
of limitations as to timely commencement of a Will contest is, like statutes of 
limitations generally, to be interpreted and applied as a part of the law of the 
forum, as to Will contests commenced in Wyoming, relating to title to real 
estate located in Wyoming.

 
 
      (e) A genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the California Probate 
Proceedings are void because of the fraud of the Appellee.

 
 
     (f) A proper 
construction of Sections 2-11-101 et seq., W.S., required Appellee to comply 
with all of the notice provisions of the Wyoming Probate Code, just as though 
the Will had first and originally been admitted to probate by the Wyoming 
Probate Court, and thereby permitted Appellant thereupon to commence a Will 
contest.

 
 
     4. Was the publication 
of notice in the newspaper of the opening of the decedent's estate in the 
Wyoming Probate 
Court fatally defective for failure to comply with 
Section 2-7-201, W.S. in failing to state:

 
 
"Any action to set 
aside the Will shall be filed in the court within three months from the date of 
the first publication of this notice, or thereafter be forever barred"? * * 
*

 
 
     5. Did Appellee, as 
Personal Representative of the estate of the decedent in the Wyoming probate 
proceedings, fail to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the "reasonably 
ascertainable" last known address of Appellant, when Appellant resided in the 
same town in California as Appellee, Appellee was aware of this, Appellant's 
correct mailing address was set forth in the then current telephone directory of 
said town, but instead Appellee caused copies of the Notice and the Will of the 
decedent and Order of the Wyoming Probate Court admitting same to probate to be 
sent to an attorney in California who was not attorney of record for Appellant 
in the California probate proceedings, and was not attorney of record for 
Appellant in the Wyoming proceedings? * * *

 
 
     6. Did Appellee's 
failure to publish a proper Notice in the Wyoming newspaper, and failure to 
exercise due diligence in learning Appellant's "reasonably ascertainable" last 
known mailing address and mail copies of the Notice and Will and Order of the 
Wyoming Probate Court admitting same to probate, cause a result such that the 
three months' period for filing a will contest under Wyoming law never started 
to run? * * *

 
 
     7. Does the record in 
its entirety show that Appellant properly pleaded a claim upon which relief 
should be granted, as to the will contest issues? * * *

 
 
     8. Does the record in 
its entirety show that Appellant properly pleaded, and stated a claim upon which 
relief should be granted, as to the fraud of Appellee upon the California 
Probate Court, the Wyoming Probate Court and Appellant? * * 
*

 
 
     9. Did the notice of 
the California probate proceedings, with respect to Appellant, fail to meet the 
requirements of procedural due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, in that said notice was not reasonably calculated to 
inform in that it did not specify Appellant's right to bring a will contest, and 
the limitation of time within which said contest could be brought? * * 
*

 
 
     10. Did Appellee's 
admitted failure to comply strictly with the Wyoming Statutes as to the content 
of the Notice published in the Wyoming newspaper as to the commencement of 
proceedings in the Wyoming Probate Court upon the decedent's estate, together 
with Appellee's failure to use due diligence in ascertaining the "reasonably 
ascertainable" last known address of Appellant so that copies of the Notice and 
Will and Order of the Wyoming Probate Court admitting same to probate could be 
properly mailed to Appellant at Appellant's proper address, operate to deprive 
Appellant of procedural due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? * * *

 
 

3 The term "ancillary 
administration" does not connote a subordinate or inferiority to the domiciliary 
administration. Ancillary administration is simply the probate that occurs where 
a decedent had property but was not domiciled at the time of his death. First 
Nat. Bank of Brush, Colo. v. Blessing, 231 Mo. App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149, 151 (1936). Justice Blume, when faced with the terminology of principal 
administration and auxiliary administration, adopted a similar stance in In Re 
Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 683-84 (1940) (quoting Harvey v. 
Richards, 1 Mason 381 (Mass. 1818)) by explaining:

 
 
     "I have no objection 
to the use of the terms principal and auxiliary, as indicating a distinction in 
fact as to the objects of the different administrations; but we should guard 
ourselves against the conclusion, that therefore there is a distinction in law 
as to the rights of the parties. There is no magic in words. Each of these 
administrations may be properly considered as a principal one, with reference to 
the limits of its exclusive authority; and each might, under circumstances, 
justly be deemed an auxiliary administration. If the bulk of the property, and 
all the heirs and legatees and creditors were here, and the foreign 
administration were only to recover a few inconsiderable claims, that would most 
correctly be denominated a mere auxiliary administration for the beneficial use 
of the parties here, although the domicile of the testator were 
abroad."

 
 
See also Averill, Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, 
Guardianship & Trusts: A Comparison With The Uniform Probate Code - Part 
III, IX Land & Water L.Rev. 567, 568 (1974).

 
 

4 The district court 
and parties seemed to get tripped up by only applying W.S. 2-11-104 as the 
conflict of laws provision. W.S. 2-11-104 provides:

 
 
     If upon presentation 
it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the will has been duly proved, 
allowed and admitted to probate outside of this state and that it was executed 
according to the law of the place in which the same was made, or in which the 
testator was at the time domiciled, or in conformity with the laws of this 
state, it shall be admitted to probate, which probate has the same force and 
effect as the original probate of a domestic will.

 
 
While W.S. 2-11-104 is 
part of Wyoming's Uniform Foreign Probate Act, it is only a starting point and 
does not specify which law should be 
applied to the meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will once it is 
admitted to probate in Wyoming.

 
 

5 Although not a basis 
for our decision, it is interesting to note that in a California ancillary probate proceeding, the California notice 
provisions apply. In Re Clark's Estate, 148 Cal. 108, 82 P. 760, 766-67 (1905); Robertson 
v. U.S. Nat. Bank, 235 Cal. App. 2d 63, 44 Cal. Rptr. 871, 874 
(1965).

 
 

6 W.S. 2-7-201 
provides:

 
 
Upon admission of a 
will or an estate of an intestate decedent to probate and issuance of letters, 
the personal representative shall cause to be published once a week for three 
(3) consecutive weeks in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation in 
the county in which the probate is pending, a notice of admission of the will or 
estate to probate and of the appointment of the personal representative. The notice shall state that any action to 
set aside the probate of the will shall be brought within three (3) months from 
the date of the first publication of the notice or thereafter be barred. The 
publication shall include a notice to debtors to make payment and to creditors 
having claims against the decedent to file them with the necessary vouchers in 
the office of the clerk of court from which the letters were issued within three 
(3) months from the date of the first publication of the notice, or thereafter 
be forever barred. [Emphasis added.]

 
 

7 W.S. 2-7-205(a) 
provides:

 
 
The notice required in 
W.S. 2-7-201 shall, immediately upon the filing thereof, be mailed to the 
surviving spouse, if any, and to all of the heirs and beneficiaries named in the 
will of the decedent.

 
 

8 Broadly alleged, but 
not otherwise addressed by documentary evidence, are most nefarious goings on 
involving California will execution and probate 
proceedings.