Title: State v. Timothy M. Secrist

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2476-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Timothy M. Secrist,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  218 Wis. 2d 508, 582 N.W.2d 37 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 2, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Patrick M. Donnelly, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2476-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Timothy M. Secrist, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 2, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The State of Wisconsin (State) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
reversing a judgment of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, 
Donald J. Hassin, Jr., Judge.1  The defendant, Timothy M. 
Secrist, 
was 
convicted 
of 
unlawfully 
possessing 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a controlled substance which is the 
active 
ingredient 
in 
marijuana. 
 
Before 
accepting 
the 
defendant's plea, the circuit court denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress physical evidence of the substance as well as 
accompanying paraphernalia, ruling that the evidence had been 
seized incident to a lawful arrest.  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that the arrest had not been supported by 
                     
1 State v. Secrist, 218 Wis. 2d 508, 582 N.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
2 
probable cause, and the subsequent seizure was therefore 
invalid. 
¶2 
The issue presented to the court is whether the odor 
of a controlled substance may provide probable cause to arrest, 
and, if so, when.  We conclude that the odor of a controlled 
substance provides probable cause to arrest when the odor is 
unmistakable and may be linked to a specific person or persons 
because of the circumstances in which the odor is discovered or 
because other evidence links the odor to the person or persons. 
 In this case, a police officer detected the strong odor of 
marijuana coming from the direction of the defendant inside an 
automobile.  The defendant was the operator and sole occupant of 
the automobile.  In these circumstances, the strong odor of 
marijuana provided probable cause to arrest the defendant.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
FACTS 
¶3 
On the Fourth of July, 1996, Andrew J. Szczerba, a 
city of New Berlin police officer, was directing traffic at the 
intersection of Moorland Road and Coffee Road in New Berlin, 
during an Independence Day parade.  Officer Szczerba was wearing 
his police uniform.  Between 2:00 and 2:15 p.m., the defendant 
drove up to the officer in a tan 1977 Chevrolet Impala to ask 
directions.  The driver's window was open.  The defendant was 
alone in his car.  The defendant was two to three feet from 
Officer Szczerba when he began asking directions.  The officer 
immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the 
automobile.  He recognized the odor from his police training and 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
3 
his frequent contact with marijuana over 23 years experience as 
a police officer. 
¶4 
After detecting the strong odor, Officer Szczerba 
directed the defendant to pull his car over to the side of the 
road.  The defendant complied.  Officer Szczerba approached the 
vehicle and told the defendant to get out of his car.  Officer 
Szczerba then placed the defendant under arrest for possession 
of marijuana. 
¶5 
Soon thereafter, several other officers arrived at the 
scene.  Officer Douglas Johnson conducted a search of the 
automobile and found a marijuana cigarette with an attached 
"roach clip" in the ashtray next to the driver's seat. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶6 
On September 16, 1996, the State of Wisconsin filed a 
criminal complaint charging the defendant with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (THC) in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 161.41(3r) (1993-94)2 and one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.573(1).3 
 The 
defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized 
following his arrest on grounds that the arrest was illegal.  
The court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which only Officer 
                     
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 The statutes were subsequently amended and renumbered to 
Wis. Stat. §§  961.41(3g)(e) and 961.573(1), respectively, by 
1995 Wis. Act 448, §§  262 and 313, effective July 9, 1996. 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
4 
Szczerba testified.4  The testimony included the following 
exchange between an Assistant District Attorney and Officer 
Szczerba: 
 
 
Q 
Was the window down when you were speaking 
to the subject? 
 
A 
Yes, it was. 
 
Q 
And as you were speaking to the subject, how 
far away were you from him approximately? 
 
A 
Probably within two – or probably within two 
feet of the subject, two or three feet. 
 
Q 
Okay.  And in speaking to him did you make 
any physical observations about him? 
 
A 
About him personally, not really. 
 
Q 
Okay.  Did you detect any type of odor at 
all? 
 
A 
Yes, I did.  I detected a strong odor of 
marijuana. 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q 
Officer, was there anything else other than 
the odor of what you believed to be marijuana that 
lead [sic] you to believe he may be under the 
influence of marijuana or some type of drug? 
 
A 
Like I said previously after I got him out 
of the car his balance might have been a little bit 
off, perhaps his speech was not slurred but maybe a 
little bit haulting [sic], but I hadn't met him 
before, so I'm not really sure what his normal pattern 
is. 
 
Q 
When you are talking about his speech, that 
was after you removed him from the car or when you 
first had contact with him? 
 
A 
I would say both. 
Tr. at pp. 11, 16. 
 
¶7 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the 
court asked the parties for their positions in writing.  At a 
                     
4 Officer Johnson was present at the hearing but did not 
testify because the defendant stipulated to the evidence seized.  
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
5 
later hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress.  The 
court found that Officer Szczerba smelled a strong odor of 
marijuana, that this odor was coming directly from the area 
where the defendant was seated in the automobile, and that the 
defendant was the only occupant of the vehicle.  Consequently, 
the court concluded that probable cause existed to arrest the 
defendant, and the subsequent search of defendant's automobile 
was conducted incident to a lawful arrest. 
 
¶8 
On March 17, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
defendant pleaded no contest to the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance.  The drug paraphernalia charge was 
dismissed and read in by the State. 
¶9 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the circuit  
court's decision, adopting the rationale in People v. Hilber, 
269 N.W.2d 159 (Mich. 1978), a case in which the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that while the odor of burned marijuana gives 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed, marijuana 
odor coming from a car is not enough to establish that its 
occupant was the person who smoked the marijuana.  The court of 
appeals found that as in Hilber, one element of probable cause 
to arrest was missing:  namely, that it was the defendant who 
probably committed the possession crime.  The court of appeals 
therefore concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from an 
automobile with a sole occupant does not establish probable 
cause to arrest. 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
6 
¶10 This court granted the State's petition for review on 
the issue of whether the odor of a controlled substance such as 
marijuana may provide probable cause to arrest. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
¶11 We turn first to the standards of review to be applied 
in this case.  In reviewing an order granting or denying a 
motion to suppress evidence, this court will uphold a circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2); State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 
137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  Nonetheless, the question whether 
the odor of marijuana constitutes probable cause to arrest "is a 
question of constitutional fact involving the application of 
federal constitutional principles which this court reviews 
independently of the conclusions of the circuit court."  State 
v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 684, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992). See 
also State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759 
(1987).  It is thus subject to independent review and requires 
an independent application of the constitutional principles 
involved to the facts as found by the circuit court.  See State 
v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987). 
ANALYSIS 
¶12 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution establish the 
right of persons to be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.5 
 
This 
court 
traditionally 
interprets 
the 
two 
                     
5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
7 
constitutional provisions in concert.  As a result, the 
development of search and seizure law in Wisconsin parallels the 
development of search and seizure law by the United States 
Supreme Court.  State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 389, 549 
N.W.2d 210 (1996).  Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, probable cause must exist 
to justify an arrest. 
¶13 It may be helpful at the beginning of our analysis to 
note the distinction between probable cause to search and 
probable cause to arrest.6  Generally, the same quantum of 
evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable 
cause to search or probable cause to arrest.  State v. Kiper, 
                                                                  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
 
6 A law enforcement officer may temporarily stop a person to 
investigate suspicious activity even without probable cause to 
search or arrest.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  See 
also Wis. Stats. § 968.24 (authorizing temporary questioning 
without arrest).  The defendant conceded in oral argument that 
there was sufficient evidence for a Terry stop. 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
8 
193 Wis. 2d 69, 82, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (citing 1 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
§ 3.1(b), at 544 (2d ed. 1987)).  However, while the two 
determinations are measured by similar objective standards, the 
two determinations require different inquiries.  Under an 
analysis of probable cause to search, the relevant inquiry is 
whether evidence of a crime will be found.  See 2 LaFave, Search 
and Seizure, § 3.1(b), at 7-8 (3rd ed. 1996).  Under an analysis 
of probable cause to arrest, the inquiry is whether the person 
to be arrested has committed a crime.  See id. 
¶14 This case involves both an arrest and a search 
incident to that arrest.  The primary focus must be on the 
lawfulness of the arrest. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
¶15 Had Officer Szczerba started out by conducting a 
search of the defendant's automobile after smelling the strong 
odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and then had used the 
evidence seized as the foundation for defendant's arrest, we 
would have an easier case in which probable cause for both the 
search and subsequent arrest would have been evident.   
¶16 This court has recognized that the warrantless search 
of an automobile is justified when a police officer has probable 
cause to believe that an automobile, found in a public place, 
contains 
evidence 
of 
a 
crime. 
 
No 
showing 
of 
exigent 
circumstances is required.  See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 
607, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997); State v. Weber, 163 Wis. 2d 116, 
137, 471 N.W.2d 187 (1991), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1097 (1994); 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
9 
State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 137-38, 423 N.W.2d 823 
(1988).  The unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from an 
automobile provides probable cause for an officer to believe 
that the automobile contains evidence of a crime.  Consequently, 
as the parties here concede, there would have been probable 
cause to search the defendant's car once the officer smelled the 
strong odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.7 
¶17 This conclusion is consistent with rulings in other 
jurisdictions.  For instance, in State v. Judge, 645 A.2d 1224, 
1228 (N.J. 1994), the court stated that "[a]n odor of burnt 
marijuana creates an inference that marijuana is not only 
physically present in the vehicle, but that some of it has been 
smoked recently."  The court in Judge concluded that the odor of 
marijuana is enough to provide probable cause to initiate a 
search.  Judge, 645 A.2d at 1228.  For federal cases in accord, 
see United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 874 (1995); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 
1294 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350 
(5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241 (6th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1989).  For 
state cases, see State v. Harrison, 533 P.2d 1143 (Ariz. 1975); 
                     
7 As a general rule, the government must obtain a warrant in 
order 
to 
conduct 
a 
search 
unless 
it 
can 
show 
exigent 
circumstances.  There is an "automobile exception" to this rule 
dating back to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).  
See discussion in State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 738, 
317 N.W.2d 484 (1982).  The issue in this case turns on whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support an arrest, not whether 
the police should have obtained a warrant.   
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
10
State v. Raymond, 516 P.2d 58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); State v. 
Zamora, 559 P.2d 195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Rogers v. State, 205 
S.E.2d 901 (Ga. App. 1974); State v. MacDonald, 856 P.2d 116 
(Kan. 1993); Hart v. State, 639 So. 2d 1313 (Miss. 1994); State 
v. Fuente, 871 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1994); State v. Daly, 274 N.W.2d 
557 (Neb. 1979); State v. Capps, 641 P.2d 484 (N.M. 1982), cert. 
denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Lozoya v. State, 932 P.2d 22 (Okl. 
Cr. 1996); Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1978); State v. Compton, 538 P.2d 861 (Wash. App. 1975).8 
 
¶18 The "quantum of evidence" that would provide probable 
cause for a search will not provide probable cause for an arrest 
unless the evidence of crime can be linked to a specific person. 
 In this case, the court must decide whether the odor of 
marijuana, which in the circumstances here would have justified 
a search of the defendant's automobile, is enough to justify 
arrest of the defendant.  
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
                     
8  Even a trained dog's smelling of controlled substances – 
in situations where a human being might not be able to detect 
the same odor – has been found to provide probable cause for a 
search.  "In light of the careful training which these dogs 
receive, an 'alert' by a dog is deemed to constitute probable 
cause for an arrest or search if a sufficient showing is made as 
to the reliability of the particular dog used in detecting the 
presence of a particular type of contraband."  1 LaFave, Search 
and Seizure, § 2.2(f), at 450 (3rd ed. 1996).  See, e.g., United 
States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 
F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th 
Cir. 1980). 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
11
¶19 "Probable cause is the sine qua non of a lawful 
arrest."  Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 681.  Probable cause to 
arrest is the quantum of evidence within the arresting officer's 
knowledge at the time of the arrest which would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably 
committed or was committing a crime.  Id.; State v. Koch, 175 
Wis. 
2d 
684, 
701, 
499 
N.W.2d 
152 
(1993); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.07(1)(d) ("A law enforcement officer may arrest a person 
when . . . [t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person is committing or has committed a crime.").  There must be 
more than a possibility or suspicion that the defendant 
committed an offense, but the evidence need not reach the level 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more 
likely than not.  Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 681-82.  Whether 
probable cause exists in a particular case must be judged by the 
facts of that case.  Id. at 682. 
¶20 In Mitchell, the court applied these principles to a 
set of facts much like the facts here.  One of the issues 
presented was whether probable cause existed to arrest the 
defendant based on the odor of marijuana and smoke inside a 
vehicle. 
¶21 The defendant in Mitchell argued that he was arrested 
solely on the basis of the odor of marijuana.  He contended that 
 the odor of burned marijuana merely indicates that marijuana 
had been present, while the odor of unburned marijuana indicates 
that marijuana is present.  Id.  Based on this distinction, the 
defendant argued that the odor of burned marijuana alone may not 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
12
establish probable cause to arrest.  We did not address that 
issue because the facts of the case revealed that there was 
smoke in the vehicle as well as marijuana odor.  Ultimately, we 
held that "[b]ased on the presence of both the odor of marijuana 
and the smoke, [the officer] had reason to believe that 
defendant, his passenger, or both had been smoking marijuana, 
and thus possessing, marijuana."  Id. at 684. 
¶22 The defendant in this case constructs a similar 
argument.  He asserts that because the odor was of burned 
marijuana, as opposed to burning or unburned marijuana, there 
was no indication as to when the marijuana had been smoked or by 
whom.  The defendant contends that the odor of smoke lingers and 
may establish that a crime has been committed but that this 
lingering smell is not enough to establish that the occupant of 
the vehicle was the person who smoked the marijuana.   
¶23 The defendant relies on Hilber, 269 N.W.2d 159, as did 
the court of appeals, to support  his argument.  In Hilber, the 
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the odor of burned 
marijuana did not provide probable cause to arrest. The court 
required that an officer's opinion regarding the length of time 
the odor of marijuana had been present be an informed opinion 
identifying a specific time frame in which the marijuana was 
burned.  Id. at 164.  The court stated: 
 
If an officer has been trained, or otherwise has 
become experienced, in determining the length of time 
marijuana odor has been present, and is able to state 
on the basis of such training or experience that the 
strength of the odor indicates a particular time frame 
and that his observation of the automobile in that 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
13
time frame or other circumstances are such as to 
justify the conclusion that the occupant was the 
person who smoked the marijuana, a conclusion that the 
occupant was the smoker would be reasonable. 
Id. at 164 n.13.  The court reasoned that the state did not 
discharge its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the 
officer's conclusion that it was the defendant who smoked the 
marijuana in the automobile because the officer had no training 
or experience to enable him to accurately determine whether 
marijuana was burned within a relevant time frame.  Id. at 165. 
¶24 The Hilber decision came out of a sharply divided 
court.  The complete facts of the case can be discerned only by 
reading both the Michigan Supreme Court's decision and the 
decision by the court of appeals.9  Although we respect the 
decision of our sister court, we cannot embrace it.  
¶25 Probable cause to arrest requires evidence that would 
lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the person to 
be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.  Because the 
requisite evidence need not even show that guilt is more likely 
than not, it does not compel the degree of technical certainty 
the Michigan court set out in Hilber.  In State v. Kiper, 193 
Wis. 2d 69, 83, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995), we stated that "probable 
cause 
eschews 
technicality 
and 
legalisms 
in 
favor 
of 
a 
'flexible, 
common-sense 
measure 
of 
the 
plausibility 
of 
particular 
conclusions 
about 
human 
behavior.'" 
(citations 
                     
9 See People v. Hilber, 245 N.W.2d 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1976).    
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
14
omitted).  Likewise, in State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 
739, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we said: 
 
In regard to probable cause, the supreme court has 
stated that '[the Court] deal[s]  with probabilities. 
 These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
[must] act.'  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175 (1949). . . .  Those factual and practical 
considerations are tested by whether they would lead 
any reasonable police officer to believe what was 
probable under the existing circumstances.  
¶26 In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983), the 
United States Supreme Court said with respect to probable cause: 
 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with 
probabilities. 
 
Long 
before 
the 
law 
of 
probabilities 
was 
articulated 
as 
such, 
practical 
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about 
human behavior; 
jurors as 
factfinders are 
permitted to do the same – and so are law enforcement 
officers.   
These cases demonstrate that an officer's conclusions must be 
reasonable under the circumstances, not technically certain. 
 
¶27 A half century ago, in Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 13 (1948), the Supreme Court observed that probable 
cause for a search warrant of a motel room could be based upon a 
distinct odor where the officer is "qualified to know the odor." 
 "Indeed," said the Court, "[odor] might very well be found to 
be evidence of most persuasive character."  Id.  The Fourth 
Amendment does not bar law enforcement officers from drawing the 
usual inferences which reasonable people draw from evidence. 
¶28 This same analysis applies to probable cause for 
arrest.  The majority rule in the United States is that in 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
15
appropriate circumstances, odor may serve as the basis or the 
principal basis for probable cause to arrest.  See, e.g., State 
v. Cooper, 636 P.2d 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Brunson v. State, 
940 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. 1997); People v. Nichols, 81 Cal. Rptr. 481 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969);  People v. Barcenas, 59 Cal. Rptr. 419 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); People v. Olson, 485 P.2d 891 (Colo. 
1971); Ford v. State, 377 A.2d 577 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); A 
Minor Boy v. State, 537 P.2d 477 (Nev. 1975); State v. Huff, 826 
P.2d 698 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hammond, 603 P.2d 377 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 
¶29 It is important in these cases to determine the extent 
of the officer's training and experience in dealing with the 
odor of marijuana or some other controlled substance.  The 
extent of the officer's training and experience bears on the 
officer's credibility in identifying the odor as well as its 
strength, its recency, and its source.  While corroboration by 
another officer is not required, corroboration can be helpful in 
firming up the reasonableness of the officer's judgments.  See 
Cooper, 636 P.2d at 127; Hammond, 603 P.2d at 378. 
¶30 What is imperative, however, is that the officer be 
able to link the unmistakable odor of marijuana or some other 
controlled substance to a specific person or persons.  The 
linkage must be reasonable and capable of articulation. 
¶31 Odor is defined as "the property or quality of a thing 
that affects, stimulates, or is perceived by the sense of 
smell."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1254 (3d ed. 1992).  The "thing" is the source of the 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
16
odor.  The odor which is a property or quality of that "thing" 
does not appear in a vacuum.  It always appears in some set of 
circumstances.  The nature of those circumstances may provide 
the additional basis for the linkage between the "thing" and a 
specific person.  Sometimes, proximity between odor and a person 
will 
provide 
the 
linkage 
necessary 
for 
probable 
cause.  
Sometimes it will not. 
¶32 In Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, the strong odor of 
marijuana combined with smoke in a vehicle pointed to defendant 
Mitchell, who was sitting in the driver's seat.  In Olson, 485 
P.2d 891, suspicious behavior followed by odor made the case.  
In Huff, 826 P.2d 698, odor and furtive gestures provided the 
connection.10 
¶33 We hold that the odor of a controlled substance may 
provide probable cause to arrest when the odor is unmistakable 
and may be linked to a specific person or persons because of the 
particular circumstances in which it is discovered or because 
                     
10 In Huff, the court wrote:  
. . . [P]robable cause to arrest the 
occupants of a car for possession of a 
controlled substance exists when a trained 
officer 
detects 
that 
the 
odor 
of 
a 
controlled substance is emanating from a 
vehicle. . . .  Other facts supportive of 
probable cause include furtive movements and 
lying to the police, both of which evidence 
consciousness of guilt.   
State v. Huff, 826 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)(emphasis 
supplied).  
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
17
other evidence at the scene or elsewhere links the odor to the 
person or persons.   
¶34 We believe a common sense conclusion when an officer 
smells the odor of a controlled substance is that a crime has 
probably been committed.  This state does not require that an 
officer establish with technical certainty that the controlled 
substance was used during a specific time.  Rather, the officer 
will have probable cause to arrest when the quantum of evidence 
within the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest would 
lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant 
probably committed or was committing a crime.  Mitchell, 167 
Wis. 2d at 681; Koch, 175 Wis. 2d at 701.  If under the totality 
of the circumstances, a trained and experienced police officer 
identifies an unmistakable odor of a controlled substance and is 
able to link that odor to a specific person or persons, the odor 
of the controlled substance will provide probable cause to 
arrest.  The strong odor of marijuana in an automobile will 
normally provide probable cause to believe that the driver and 
sole occupant of the vehicle is linked to the drug.  The 
probability diminishes if the odor is not strong or recent, if 
the source of the odor is not near the person, if there are 
several people in the vehicle, or if a person offers a 
reasonable explanation for the odor. 
¶35 Turning to this case, we conclude that the totality of 
the circumstances within Officer Szczerba's knowledge at the 
time he made the arrest would have led a reasonable police 
officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
18
crime.  To sum up, on a holiday afternoon, the defendant drove 
up to a uniformed police officer and asked him for directions in 
halting speech.  The officer, a trained veteran of the New 
Berlin police department with 23 years experience, immediately 
smelled a strong, unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from 
defendant's vehicle.11  The defendant was the sole occupant of 
the vehicle.  The trial court found that the odor of marijuana 
was coming from the area where the driver was seated in the 
vehicle.  These facts, taken together, constituted probable 
cause for Officer Szczerba to believe that the defendant had 
committed a crime.12  Because the defendant's arrest was grounded 
on probable cause, the search of his automobile incident to his 
arrest was valid.  The evidence should not have been suppressed. 
 Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
                     
11 The court of appeals declined to place the adjective 
"strong" in front of the word "odor", although the officer 
testified that he detected "a strong odor of marijuana."  It 
substituted the adjective "mere" which it borrowed from a 
Pennsylvania case.  Secrist, 218 Wis. 2d at 514, 515. 
12 A reasonably prudent person would not normally drive up 
to a uniformed police officer to ask directions when the 
person's car smelled strongly of marijuana.  While the defendant 
did not show a consciousness of guilt, his conduct was not 
prudent and suggested that his judgment was impaired.  No one 
contends that Officer Szczerba should have permitted this 
defendant to drive away.  The defendant contends that the 
officer should have stopped the vehicle, searched it for drugs, 
and then made an arrest.  This scenario would require us to 
approve the defendant's detention during the search while 
disapproving his arrest. 
No. 97-2476-CR 
 
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