Title: ZACHARIA CHARLES COHEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ZACHARIA CHARLES COHEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 78191 P.3d 956Case Number: S-07-0082Decided: 07/14/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ZACHARIA 
CHARLES COHEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna 
D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Appellant, Zacharia Charles Cohen, of one misdemeanor and five felonies.  Cohen challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain his convictions on two of the felonies, attempted first 
degree murder and aggravated assault and battery.  He also claims the district court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress evidence.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Cohen offers the 
following issues:1

 
 
I.          
Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove Appellant attempted to 
commit first degree homicide when there was no evidence of a substantial step 
towards committing first degree homicide.

 
 
II.         
Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove Appellant committed 
aggravated assault as charged by the State since there was no evidence of a 
substantial step towards committing aggravated assault.

 
 
III.        
Whether the district court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to 
suppress evidence seized after an illegal stop.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 2, 2006, 
agents of a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) Drug Task Force were 
conducting surveillance on Cohen's residence in Casper in an effort to find and arrest Cohen on 
a bench warrant.  The warrant was 
issued in a NatronaCounty drug case after Cohen failed to 
appear at his district court arraignment. During their surveillance, the agents 
observed a Caucasian male exit the residence and drive away in a white pickup 
truck. The truck stopped at a nearby convenience store where Special Agent Lonny 
TeBeest contacted the driver, Darwin Haselhuhn.  Haselhuhn was ultimately arrested on 
some traffic violations, and his vehicle was towed to E & F Wrecker 
Service.  Believing that Haselhuhn 
might lead officers to Cohen, Special Agent Tina Trimble asked personnel at E 
& F Wrecker Service to contact her when Haselhuhn attempted to retrieve his 
truck.  

 
 
[¶4]      Around noon the 
next day, March 3, E & F Wrecker Service notified Agent Trimble that 
Haselhuhn had arrived in a black Camaro to pay the storage fee, and that he was 
leaving to get the registration for the truck so it could be released.  Agent Trimble responded to the E & F 
Wrecker location, accompanied by Special Agent Kevin Norcross.  As the agents approached the business, 
they saw the black Camaro coming toward them, with Haselhuhn situated in the 
passenger seat.  Agents Trimble and 
Norcross followed the Camaro to the Mountain View Conoco, where both Haselhuhn 
and the driver  recognized by the agents to be Cohen  exited the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶5]      Agent Norcross 
approached the Camaro on foot while Agent Trimble maneuvered her unmarked car to 
block the vehicle from leaving.  
Agent Norcross contacted Cohen, who was back inside the vehicle sitting 
in the driver's seat, and identified himself.  Cohen immediately put the Camaro in gear 
and, as Agent Norcross reached inside the driver's window in an attempt to pull 
the keys out of the ignition, Cohen sped away, barely avoiding striking Agent 
Trimble's car.  As a result of 
Cohen's actions, Agent Norcross sustained minor injuries to both arms.  

 
 
[¶6]      Agent Trimble 
pursued Cohen, while Agent Norcross remained at the Conoco station with 
Haselhuhn.  Officers from other law 
enforcement agencies joined in the pursuit of Cohen.  Casper Police Officer Chris Wenberg, who 
had been listening to the events over the radio, positioned himself at McKinley 
and F Streets, anticipating that Cohen might be traveling that way.  A few minutes later, Officer Wenberg saw 
the Camaro approaching the area and he attempted, without success, to deploy his 
stop sticks to deflate its tires.  
Shortly thereafter, police found the Camaro abandoned at Jackson and B 
Streets.  A citizen reported that 
the driver of the vehicle, a white male wearing a gray shirt, had run away on 
foot.  

 
 
[¶7]      Officer Wenberg 
went to the location and, along with other officers, began a grid search of the 
area.  While driving southbound on 
McKinley 
Street, Officer Wenberg observed a SUV stopped on the 
right side of the street, between B 
Street and Yellowstone Highway, with its brake lights 
illuminated.  He then noticed a 
white male, wearing an orange sweatshirt and white hat, coming from between two 
houses on the left.  The man, who 
matched Cohen's physical description, crossed McKinley Street and entered the passenger 
side of the SUV.  The SUV then 
pulled away from the curb, prompting Officer Wenberg to activate his overhead 
lights and execute a stop of the vehicle.2  

 
 
[¶8]      Officer Wenberg 
approached the passenger side of the SUV and asked the passenger, later 
identified as Cohen, for identification.  
Cohen claimed to have no identification and stated his name was Shawn 
Davis.  When asked for his date of 
birth, Cohen provided a disjointed response that further raised the officer's 
suspicions.  Fairly convinced that 
the passenger was, in fact, Cohen, Officer Wenberg called for backup.  He then opened the passenger door and 
told Cohen and the driver to keep their hands where he could see them.  

 
 
[¶9]      Thereafter, 
Officer Wenberg saw Cohen move his left hand, which had been resting in his lap, 
toward his left side.  The officer 
placed his hand on Cohen's right arm and, once again, told Cohen to keep his 
hands where they could be seen, but Cohen tipped to the right and continued to 
move his left hand until it disappeared from view.  Officer Wenberg reached around Cohen and 
managed to grab Cohen's left wrist, but not before Cohen pulled a black Ruger 
.40 caliber semi-automatic pistol from the waistband of his pants.  In the ensuing struggle, Officer Wenberg 
dislodged the pistol from Cohen's grip, causing it to fly through the air and 
land in a cup holder located on the front console.  Officer Wenberg then pulled Cohen out of 
the SUV and onto the ground, where the struggle continued.  With the aid of other officers arriving 
at the scene, Cohen was eventually subdued and arrested.  

 
 
[¶10]   Shortly before Officer Wenberg's 
struggle with Cohen began, Casper Police Sergeant Mark Trimble arrived at the 
scene of the stop and positioned himself by the driver's side door of the 
SUV.  As Sergeant Trimble was 
monitoring the exchange between Cohen and Officer Wenberg, he noticed Cohen's 
left hand moving behind his back toward his waistband.  Sergeant Trimble pulled his gun from its 
holster and shouted, "He's reaching."  
He pointed his gun at Cohen and told him to stop.  Cohen did not heed the sergeant's 
commands and continued to move his left hand toward his back.  Sergeant Trimble then saw Cohen bringing 
his left hand forward, holding the grip of a black semi-automatic pistol.  

 
 
[¶11]   Police searched Cohen incident to 
his arrest and found $3,460.00, mostly in $100.00 bills, in his rear 
pockets.  An examination of the 
pistol disclosed that the safety was off, a live round of ammunition was in the 
chamber and the magazine was fully loaded.  
The only action needed to fire the pistol was a single pull of the 
trigger.  Police later searched the 
Camaro and found 14 grams of methamphetamine and 73 small plastic bags of the 
type used to package and distribute methamphetamine, which were secreted inside 
a camera bag.  

 
 
[¶12]   On March 21, 2006, Cohen made a 
telephone call from the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter to a friend.  As with all non-privileged inmate calls 
from the jail, that telephone call was tape-recorded.  During that conversation, Cohen related 
to his friend, "I was trying to get my gun cocked so I could blow his [Officer 
Wenberg's] fuckin teeth out the back of his head, but I didn't get a chance to 
do that."   

 
 
[¶13]   The State ultimately filed a 
six-count Information, charging Cohen with: recklessly engaging in conduct which 
placed Special Agent Kevin Norcross in danger of death or serious bodily injury 
(Count 1), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2007); 
attempting to cause bodily injury to Officer Chris Wenberg with a deadly weapon 
(Count 2), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); 
attempted first degree murder of Officer Chris Wenberg (Count 3), a violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a)(i) and 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2007); possessing a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent (Count 4), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007); possessing methamphetamine in an amount greater than 
three grams (Count 5), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007); and possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver (Count 
6), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  The aggravated assault and battery 
charge (Count 2) was accompanied by an habitual criminal enhancement under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  Cohen later filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence derived from the stop of the SUV, claiming it was the product of an 
unlawful seizure under both the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  Specifically, Cohen 
alleged Officer Wenberg lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop of the vehicle.  The district 
court disagreed and denied Cohen's suppression motion.

 
 
[¶14]   Cohen's jury trial commenced on 
October 16 and concluded on October 20, 2006.  The jury found Cohen guilty on all six 
counts and adjudged him to be a habitual criminal.  The district court sentenced Cohen to 
one-year confinement on Count 1, life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole on Counts 2, 3 and 4, and a term of imprisonment of 13 to 18 years on 
Counts 5 and 6.3  The district court ordered that the 
sentences on Counts 1, 5 and 6 be served consecutively to the life 
sentence.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
A.        
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶15]   Cohen contends the trial evidence 
is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted first degree murder and 
aggravated assault and battery.  
When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we view the evidence, 
and any applicable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light 
most favorable to the State.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 376, 383 (Wyo. 2007); Grissom v. 
State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo. 2005).  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence 
and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, 
¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  
To that end, we must presume that the jury resolved any conflict in the 
evidence in favor of the State.  
Id.  
It is not our task, let alone our place, to reweigh the evidence or 
reexamine the credibility of the witnesses.  Pacheco v. State, 2004 WY 160, ¶ 6, 102 P.3d 887, 889 (Wyo. 2004).  Our duty 
is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals could 
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id.; see also Grissom, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d  at 136; Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d  at 
689.

 
 

B.        
Attempted first degree murder

 
 
[¶16]   The jury found Cohen guilty of 
attempted first degree murder.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 defines the crime of attempt and states in pertinent 
part:

 
 

(a)    A person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if:

 
 
(i) With 
the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards commission of the crime.  A 
"substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime[.]

 
 
According 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a), "[w]hoever purposely and with premeditated 
malice . . . kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree."

 
 
[¶17]   Cohen contends his conviction 
cannot stand because the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's 
determination that he engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
completing his objective  the first degree murder of Officer Wenberg.  According to Cohen, his act of pulling 
the gun from his waistband was not strongly corroborative of an intention to 
commit first degree murder.  He 
suggests other possible motives for his act, such as simply attempting to 
distance himself from the weapon or procure his escape.

 
 
[¶18]   Whether a defendant has engaged in 
a substantial step toward the commission of a crime is a question of fact.  Each case, therefore, must be analyzed 
within the context of its individual facts and circumstances.4  Since the jury is the ultimate finder of 
fact, our only task in this case is to determine whether a "quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals could have found" conduct constituting a substantial 
step.  We have no reservations in 
upholding the jury's determination given the evidence on this 
issue.

 
 
[¶19]   Among the evidence considered by 
the jury was the fact that Cohen was resisting arrest, having already injured 
one officer, and leading officers on a high speed automobile chase.  When finally cornered, he gave false 
information.  Cohen refused to obey 
Officer Wenberg's instruction to keep his hands in plain sight and, instead, 
moved his left hand behind his back to retrieve a loaded and ready-to-fire 
handgun.  Even after Officer Trimble 
pulled his weapon and told Cohen to stop, Cohen continued to pull the weapon out 
from his waistband and bring it forward, with his hand firmly on the grip.  By his own admission, Cohen "was trying 
to get [his] gun cocked so [he] could blow [Officer Wenberg's] fuckin teeth out 
the back of his head."  The only 
reason Cohen could not complete his intended action of shooting Officer Wenberg 
was because of Officer Wenberg's prudent actions in grabbing Cohen and 
dislodging the weapon from his grasp.  
This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Cohen 
engaged in substantial conduct strongly corroborative of his intention to murder 
Officer Wenberg.

 
 
            
C.        
Aggravated assault and battery

 
 
[¶20]   Cohen was convicted of aggravated 
assault and battery under § 6-2-502(a)(ii)  attempting to cause bodily injury 
to Officer Wenberg with a deadly weapon.  
Cohen, once again, takes issue with the sufficiency of the evidence 
establishing the "attempt" element of the crime.  Cohen's argument is essentially the same 
as the one made concerning his attempted murder conviction  that his act of 
pulling the gun from his waistband was ambiguous and could not be construed as 
constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the intended 
crime.  Our response is likewise 
essentially the same.  If the facts 
and circumstances surrounding Cohen's drawing of a loaded gun are sufficient to 
sustain his conviction for the attempted murder of Officer Wenberg, they are 
likewise sufficient to sustain his conviction for attempting to cause bodily 
injury to the officer. 

 
 
Motion 
to Suppress

 
 
[¶21]   Cohen contends that Officer 
Wenberg's investigatory stop of the SUV was constitutionally infirm.  Relying primarily on the discrepancy 
between the gray sweatshirt5 he was reported to be wearing and 
the orange sweatshirt the male suspect was wearing when observed by Officer 
Wenberg, Cohen claims Officer Wenberg acted on a "hunch" and did not have a 
reasonable and sufficient basis for suspecting he was in the SUV before stopping 
it.  He therefore faults the 
district court for not suppressing the incriminating evidence obtained following 
the stop.6

 
 
[¶22]   When reviewing a district court's 
decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Hembree v. State, 2006 WY 127, ¶ 17, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004)).  We 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 
determination because it is in the best position to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions.  
Id.  When the district court does not make 
specific factual findings, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.  Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 413, 418 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure, however, is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  Id.; see also Hembree, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d  at 907, Campbell, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d  at 784.

 
 
[¶23]   Before discussing the merits of 
Cohen's complaint, we must address a preliminary matter.  In his motion to suppress in the 
district court, Cohen invoked both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution as grounds for 
suppressing the evidence.7  On appeal, Cohen bases his challenge to 
the legality of the stop exclusively on Fourth Amendment principles.  Although he references the Wyoming 
Constitution, he does not provide an independent state constitutional 
analysis.  We have consistently 
stated that the failure to present a proper argument supporting "adequate and 
independent state grounds' . . . prevents this court, as a matter of policy, 
from considering other than the federal constitutional principles at issue. . . 
."  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994), 
and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983)).  See also Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, 
¶ 15, 122 P.3d 201, 205 (Wyo. 2005); Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Wyo. 2003); Meek v. 
State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 7 n.2, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 n.2 (Wyo. 2002).  Accordingly, we will confine our 
analysis of Cohen's complaint to federal constitutional authority.  Vasser, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d  at 
993.

 
 
[¶24]   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and its progeny establish that a law enforcement 
officer may stop and temporarily detain a citizen if the officer has an 
objectively reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or may be 
committing a crime.  McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Wilson, 874 P.2d 
at 220).  Whether reasonable 
suspicion exists is determined as follows:

 
 
In order 
to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a . . . Terry or investigatory stop, "the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences [drawn] from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion."  Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 109 
(Wyo. 1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 21, 88 
S.Ct. at 1880); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  at 220.

 
 
"Reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is dependant upon both the content of 
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.  Both factors -- quantity and quality -- 
are considered in the totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture,' United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether 
there is reasonable suspicion."

 
 

Jelle v. 
State, 2005 
WY 111, ¶ 20, 119 P.3d 403, 411 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting McChesney, 988 P.2d at 
1075).

 
 
[¶25]   In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682 (Wyo. 1982), we held that 
a police officer's independent observations of an automobile and a suspect 
driving the car which matched descriptions by eyewitnesses was adequate for an 
investigatory stop.  Similarly, in 
Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 
1981), we concluded that the circumstances that occurred following a robbery, 
together with reasonable inferences made by an experienced police officer, 
furnished adequate grounds for an investigatory stop.  In Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 
(Wyo. 1981), 
police officers were given a description of a car used by two individuals to 
flee from the scene of a murder and the direction the car was traveling.  We held that the officers were justified 
in making an investigatory stop when a car fitting that description was 
spotted.

 
 
[¶26]   After reviewing the record in this 
case, we have no trouble concluding that Officer Wenberg possessed reasonable 
suspicion justifying the investigatory stop of the SUV.  The record discloses the following 
facts: (1) Officer Wenberg had been following the events over his police radio 
and knew there was a warrant out for Cohen's arrest; (2) Cohen was reported to 
be on foot in the area where the grid search was being conducted; (3) the radio 
reports indicated that Cohen ran west in the direction of McKinley Street after 
abandoning the Camaro; (4) Officer Wenberg saw a man cross McKinley Street 
heading west about twenty minutes after Cohen abandoned the Camaro; (5) the male 
suspect was sighted just a block away from the Camaro; (6) Officer Wenberg saw 
the suspect coming out from between two houses, not exiting a residence or other 
structure; (7) the officer knew from experience that this neighborhood normally 
had very little pedestrian traffic; (8) Officer Wenberg was somewhat familiar 
with Cohen's physical appearance from his participation in a drug investigation 
involving Cohen a few months earlier; (9) the suspect was the "right size and 
shape" of Cohen, although his clothing was a little different from the 
description transmitted earlier over the radio for Cohen; (10) the suspect 
matched the physical description of Cohen contained in a flier posted at the 
police station; and (11) Officer Wenberg observed the suspect enter the 
passenger door of the waiting SUV.  
Under the circumstances, Officer Wenberg was acting on more than a simple 
"hunch" when he stopped the SUV.  
The totality of these factors, along with rationale inferences, supports 
a reasonable suspicion that Cohen, the person police were searching for, was a 
passenger in the SUV.

 
 
[¶27]   In reaching this result, we have 
considered the clothing discrepancy noted by Cohen.  However, we find that the discrepancy is 
insufficient to defeat the existence of reasonable suspicion in light of the 
other factors present in this case.  
See Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 807-08 (Wyo. 1996) (discrepancy in clothing and vehicle driven by suspect 
and the person stopped held to be insufficient to defeat reasonable suspicion in 
view of other circumstances).  We 
hold that the investigatory stop of the SUV was constitutionally permissible 
under the circumstances.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   We find sufficient evidence in the 
record to support Cohen's convictions for attempted first degree murder and 
aggravated assault and battery. We also find that reasonable suspicion existed 
justifying the investigatory stop of the SUV in which Cohen was a 
passenger.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Cohen 
originally included a fourth issue that challenged the legality of his 
sentences.  At oral argument, Cohen 
withdrew the issue from this Court's consideration.

 
 

2The location 
of the stop was approximately one block west of the abandoned Camaro.   

 
 

3The district 
court determined that Counts 2, 3 and 4 merged for sentencing purposes as did 
Counts 5 and 6.

 
 

4We have 
reviewed the cases cited by the parties but, because each case is fact specific, 
they are of only slight relevance and need not be discussed in 
detail.

 
 

5The trial 
testimony indicates that Cohen was reported to be wearing a gray shirt, while 
the suppression hearing testimony indicates it was a gray 
sweatshirt.

 
 

6Cohen does 
not challenge, in any manner, the events that transpired after the stop of the 
SUV.

 
 

7The district court did 
not distinguish between the constitutional provisions in concluding the stop was 
proper.