Title: Tamer v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

484 So. 2d 583 (1986)
Theodore B. TAMER, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 66711.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 6, 1986.
Ronald A. Dion of Entin, Schwartz, Dion & Sclafani, North Miami Beach, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
This cause is before us pursuant to the certification of a question of great public *584 importance from the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Tamer v. State, 463 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution.
Petitioner's probation was revoked based on evidence obtained following an investigatory stop. He argued on appeal that the evidence was improperly admitted at his probation revocation hearing because his initial detention was not founded upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and its progeny. The district court first determined that the exclusionary rule continues to be applicable to probation revocation hearings in Florida, but certified the following question:
Tamer, 463 So. 2d  at 1238-39.
The district court went on to hold that the initial stop of petitioner was valid. The essential facts were recounted as follows:
Id. at 1239. We agree with the district court that petitioner's detention was justified at its inception. Although none of the facts standing alone might give rise to a reasonable suspicion, taken together as viewed by an experienced police officer they provided clear justification for a brief detention. See United States v. Sharpe, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1568 n. 3, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985). As stated in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981):
Id. at 417-18, 101 S. Ct.  at 695 (citations omitted). We believe the circumstances observed by Officer Snyder, a seven-and-one-half-year veteran police officer, were sufficient for him to reasonably suspect petitioner of criminal activity. They were sufficient for the short investigatory stop which produced evidence sufficient for a probable cause arrest.
As we approve the district court's holding regarding the stop, we find it unnecessary in this case to answer the certified question. We prefer to address that question in a case wherein evidence is seized illegally. Accordingly we approve the decision of the district court in this case finding a valid investigatory stop.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ADKINS, J., concurs.
BARKETT, Justice, concurring.
I concur because the defendant had been detained only about thirty seconds when the officer learned that the tag on the station wagon had been reported stolen.
ADKINS, J., concurs.