Title: Eric D. Bannister v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Joseph Leon Payne 
Austin, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
ARTURO RODRIGUEZ II 
Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
No. 03S04-0904-CR-166 
ERIC D. BANNISTER, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellees (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court, No. 03D02-0701-FC-91 
The Honorable Roderick D. McGillivray, Judge 
_________________________________ 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 03A04-0712-CR-749 
_________________________________ 
April 17, 2009 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
A police officer on patrol ran a computer check on the license plate of a car that crossed 
his view at an intersection, and learned that the owner‟s driving license was suspended.  The 
computer check also provided a physical description of the owner, and the officer later testified 
that this description approximated the characteristics of the driver whom he saw pass his view.  
The trial court held that the facts available constituted reasonable suspicion to warrant an 
investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment.  We affirm.   
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Apr 17 2009, 2:22 pm
 
2 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
On January 3, 2007, at about 10:30 p.m., Officer James Myers of the Columbus Police 
Department was parked in his squad car, headlights on, facing east on Spear Street at State Road 
11 in Bartholomew County.  (Appellant‟s App. at 12-13.)  A gray Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck 
passed in front of him, driving northbound on State Road 11.  (Appellant‟s App. at 13.)  Officer 
Myers then followed the truck and conducted a license plate check; the computer revealed that 
Eric D. Bannister was the registered owner, and that Bannister‟s driver‟s license was suspended 
for life because he was a habitual traffic offender.  (Appellant‟s App. at 13.)  The computer also 
revealed that Bannister was described as a male, around 5 foot 7, 165 pounds with brown hair.  
(Appellant‟s App. at 20; Tr. at 40.)   
 
Based on this information and Officer Myers‟ view of the driver as he passed, Officer 
Myers proceeded to stop the vehicle to determine whether the driver was Bannister.  (Appellant‟s 
App. at 11.)  The driver presented an Indiana identification card, which revealed that he was in 
fact Bannister.  (Tr. at 48.)  Bannister then informed Officer Myers that his driver‟s license was 
suspended, and Officer Myers placed Bannister under arrest.  (Tr. at 52.) 
 
The State charged Bannister with operating a motor vehicle after his driver‟s license was 
suspended for life, a class C felony under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 (2004).  Bannister filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence, asserting that his vehicle was stopped without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.  The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and ultimately denied it.  
The matter was tried to a jury, which found Bannister guilty.  The court sentenced him to six 
years, all suspended except for two years as a direct placement with community corrections.   
 
 
Bannister appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Bannister v. State, No. 03A04-
0712-CR-749 *2 (Ind. Ct. App. June 27, 2008), vacated.  We grant transfer and hold that they 
were right to do so.   
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Reasonable Suspicion 
 
 
Bannister‟s contention has been that Officer Myers‟ stop violated Bannister‟s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment:  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
 
The Supreme Court has declared that its “protections extend to brief investigatory stops 
of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrests.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).  Still, the Fourth Amendment is 
satisfied if the officer‟s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal 
activity “may be afoot.”  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective 
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity”).   
 
We review trial court determinations of reasonable suspicion de novo rather than for 
abuse of discretion, and “give due weight to inferences drawn from [the] facts by resident judges 
. . . .”  State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 n.1 (Ind. 2004) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).  We look at the “„totality of circumstances‟ of each case to see 
whether the detaining officer has a „particularized and objective basis‟ for suspecting legal 
wrongdoing.”  Id. at 438 (citations omitted).  The State has the burden to show that under the 
totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable.  Id.   
 
There is no contention in this case about the legitimacy of the license plate check.  The 
issue joined is whether Officer Myers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot at 
the time of the traffic stop.   
 
Bannister argues that “the arresting officer had no reason to stop the vehicle except that a 
registered owner of the vehicle was [a] suspended [habitual traffic violator].”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 
5.)  He specifically contends the stop in question was the first time Officer Myers had ever seen 
his vehicle and that Myers was unable to identify any characteristics of the driver.  (Appellant‟s 
 
4 
Br. at 6.)  Bannister further argues that it was not reasonable for a police officer to believe that a 
vehicle is being driven by a suspended driver just because the registered owner may have the 
vehicle registered in his name.  (Id.)1  The State argues that Officer Myers had reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle and investigate “because there was a general match of the [driver‟s 
description] with the license plate check.  (Appellee‟s Br. at 5.)   
 
In Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, the 
court held that the stop of a vehicle whose plate indicated the owner was a habitual traffic 
violator was proper where the officer could see the driver and determine that the driver matched 
the description of the owner.  By contrast, the court in Ritter v. State, 801 N.E.2d 689, 693 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, held it was proper to stop a vehicle to determine whether it was 
being driven by its owner, but said, “Had [the officer] been able to see the driver of the vehicle, 
and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, 
our result might have been different.”   
 
 
The pertinent facts in this case resemble those in Wilkinson, and we reach the same 
result.  The transcript discloses that when Myers obtained the information from the license plate 
check and discovered Bannister‟s driving privileges were suspended for life, he also received a 
physical description of Bannister.  (Tr. at 4.)  As we noted above, that report described Bannister 
as 5 foot 7, 165 pounds with brown hair.  Officer Myers‟ recalled that the person he saw driving 
the Chevrolet S-10 through the intersection was a male with brown hair.  (Tr. at 40.)  Myers 
judged the driver as neither real tall nor real short.  (Tr. at 42, 86.)  On cross-examination, 
counsel extracted a pretty wide range about the driver‟s possible height.  (Tr. at 86.)  Still, Myers 
testified that he saw the driver at a lighted intersection in clear weather.  (Tr. at 40-41.)  He 
judged that the driver “closely matched the description of Mr. Bannister.”  (Tr. at 9-10.)   
 
Under this evidence, we conclude that Officer Myers had reasonable suspicion to conduct 
an investigatory stop to determine whether it was Bannister driving the vehicle.  The stop was 
not a violation of Bannister‟s Fourth Amendment rights.   
                                                 
1 Cases posing similar questions are now pending, argued on January 15, 2009.  See Holly v. State, 888 
N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. granted, and Armfield v. State. 894 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008), trans. granted.   
 
5 
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.   
 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.