Title: Oken v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Steven Howard Oken v. State of Maryland
Nos. 5 and 27, Sept. Term, 2001
Apprendi v. New Jersey does not invalidate Maryland capital punishment law.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 89CR3102
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Nos. 5 and 27
September Term, 2001
______________________________________
STEVEN HOWARD OKEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge, and Raker, JJ., dissent
______________________________________
Filed:   December 14, 2001
Fourteen years after he sexually assaulted and murdered Dawn Garvin in her home
in Baltimore County, almost eleven years after he was convicted of that murder and
sentenced to death by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, nine years after we
affirmed both the murder conviction and the sentence of death, and five years after we
concluded in his appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief that no error warranting
relief was committed, Steven Howard Oken is back before us, seeking a new sentencing
hearing.  This time, he claims that, by reason of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Maryland’s capital
punishment law, under which he was sentenced, is in violation of both the Federal and State
Constitutions.  He urges that, for a number of reasons, Apprendi renders the statutory scheme
invalid, that the Supreme Court’s decision, filed in 2000, applies retroactively to his case, and
that he should be excused from his failure to raise the argument he now makes to us at his
trial, in his direct appeal, or in any of the earlier applications for post-conviction or habeas
corpus relief.
For the reasons that we recently stated in Borchardt v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d
___ (2001), we conclude that Apprendi is not applicable and does not invalidate the State’s
capital punishment law.  We therefore do not need to reach the question of whether that
decision should be applied retroactively to Oken’s case or whether Oken waived any right
to present the complaints that he claims emanate from Apprendi.
1
Oken has been convicted of murdering two other women as well – Lori Ward in
Maine and Patricia Hirt in Baltimore County.  We do not address those murders or
convictions in this case.
2 
Oken also received a life sentence for the first degree sexual offense and two
consecutive terms of twenty years for the burglary and handgun convictions.
-2-
BACKGROUND
On November 1, 1987, Oken sexually assaulted and murdered Dawn Garvin in her
home in Baltimore County.1  In light of his plea of not criminally responsible, the trial
was bifurcated, with the question of guilt or non-guilt being taken up first.  On January
18, 1991, after a trial on four counts arising from the incident, a jury in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County found Oken guilty of first degree murder, first degree sexual
assault, burglary, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence.  On January 21, 1991,
Oken elected a bench trial on the criminal responsibility issue, and, after a hearing on that
matter, Judge James T. Smith found that he was criminally responsible on all four counts.
The same jury that resolved the issue of guilt then found that he was a principal in the
first degree in Ms. Garvin’s death and sentenced Oken to death on the first degree murder
conviction.2
On September 17, 1992, this Court, on direct review of the judgments entered
against him, overturned the burglary conviction for lack of sufficient evidence but
affirmed the other convictions and the sentence of death.  See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628,
612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S. Ct. 1312, 122 L. Ed. 2d 700
(1993) (Oken I). 
-3-
On October 19, 1993, Oken filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County pursuant to Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 645A, alleging
that, for over 50 various reasons, his conviction, sentence, and confinement were
unlawful and unconstitutional under both the Federal and Maryland constitutions.  On
May 5, 1994, the court (Judge Dana Levitz), applying the test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), found that trial
counsel’s decisions regarding Oken’s defense fell within the ambit of the objective
standard of reasonableness in the profession and that a substantially different outcome
would not have occurred had counsel acted differently.  Judge Levitz stated:
“Petitioner’s trial counsel . . . did an admirable job
considering the case he was faced with and the problems
Petitioner presented.  Petitioner’s appellate counsel also did a
fine job in presenting a weak case to the court of appeals.  It is
also clear from the transcript that Judge Smith went out of his
way to ensure Petitioner received a fair trial. . . . In fact, the
fine performances by all involved in this case makes
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence all the more credible.”
State v. Oken, No. 89CR3102, slip op. at p. 29-30 (Balt. County Cir. Ct. May 5, 1994);
R., Case No. 27, at 1461-62.
Oken sought leave to appeal, which we granted.  We found no error, however, and
thus affirmed the denial of relief.  See Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 681 A.2d 30 (1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079, 117 S. Ct. 742, 136 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1997) (Oken II).  Oken
thereafter filed a Motion For Reconsideration, which this Court denied on July 25, 1996. 
-4-
On February 27, 1997, Oken filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.  See Oken v. Nuth, 30 F. Supp. 2d 877,
879-80 (D. Md. 1998) (detailing the procedural history of Oken’s habeas corpus petition,
including Oken’s motion to declare Maryland a non-opt-in State under the Anti-Terrorism
and Death Penalty Act).  The District Court rejected his complaints and denied relief.  See
Oken v. Nuth, 64 F. Supp. 2d 488, 513-14 (D. Md. 1999).  That decision was later
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  See Oken v. Corcoran, 220
F.3d 259, 271 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 121 S. Ct. 1126, 148 L. Ed. 2d
992 (2001) (Oken III).
On February 21, 2001, Oken filed two separate motions in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County – one, a motion to reopen his post-conviction case and the other a
motion to correct an illegal sentence and award him a new sentence hearing.  Both were
grounded on the assertion that the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), rendered his
sentencing proceeding invalid.  In the post-conviction case, Oken argued that the
indictment returned in his case was structurally defective in that it failed to state the first
degree sexual offense as an aggravating factor or that Oken was a principal in the first
degree.  R., Case No. 5, at 5-7.  He contended further that, under the standards set forth in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), Apprendi
provided a “watershed rule of law” and therefore applied retroactively to his case.  R.,
Case No. 5, at 7-9.  For these reasons, Oken contended his sentence was illegal.  After a
-5-
hearing, Judge Levitz denied the motion, concluding that Apprendi had no application to
the Maryland capital sentencing law.  Tr., Levitz, at p. 16 (March 21, 2001). 
In his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Maryland Rules 4-345
(a) and (b), Oken contended that Apprendi invalidated Maryland’s death penalty scheme.
He urged that the maximum penalty for first degree murder was life imprisonment, with
or without parole, and that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was a
“fact” which increased that penalty to death.  R., Case No. 5, at 39-40.  Therefore, as the
weighing process was neither charged in the indictment nor proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, he urged his sentence was illegal.  Id. at 48.  In arguing the motion, he posited,
“Our argument is, . . . , that any fact which increases the prescribed range of penalties
must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  Tr., Smith, at p. 3 (March 21, 2001) (emphasis added).  As support, Oken cited
several Federal drug cases in which Federal courts overturned sentences based on
Apprendi where a judge’s finding of a particular fact increased a defendant’s mandatory
minimum sentence or the alleged fact was not contained in the indictment.  Id. at pp. 5-6,
13-15.  His argument was that, to pass muster under Apprendi, the indictment must
“include the capital murder language,” allege that the defendant is a principal in the first
degree, and allege further the aggravating circumstances upon which the State intends to
rely.  Id. at p. 15.  Because the indictment in his case did not contain these key elements,
Oken argued that the indictment was structurally defective.  Id. at p. 17.
-6-
On February 23, 2001, Oken, pro se, filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to
Maryland Rule 4-331(b), claiming that the indictment in his case was mistaken or
irregular based on the rule of law announced in Apprendi.  R., Case No. 5, at 64.  He
repeated his complaint about the failure of the indictment to allege the capital nature of
the offense, the aggravating factors, and his principalship, but added that the notice of
intention to seek the death penalty, delivered to him after the indictment was filed,
constituted a constructive, and invalid, amendment to the indictment.  Id. at 71-73.
On March 21, 2001, following a hearing on the motion to correct illegal sentence
and for a new sentencing hearing, Judge James T. Smith denied relief, concluding, as had
Judge Levitz, that Apprendi did not invalidate Maryland’s capital punishment law.  He
determined that the statute did not create a new “element” to the crime of first degree
murder that was required to be alleged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Tr., Smith, at p. 26 (March 21, 2001).
Finally, as to the Motion for a New Trial based on mistake or irregularity, Judge
Smith found that jurisdiction was not proper, and alternatively, and for the same reason
stated with respect to the motion to correct illegal sentence, Apprendi did not apply.  Id. at
pp. 28, 30.
Oken sought leave to appeal the decision of Judge Levitz denying his motion to
reopen the post-conviction case, which we granted, and he filed a direct appeal from
Judge Smith’s rulings denying the motions to correct illegal sentence and for new trial.  
-7-
Iterating, extending, and clarifying the arguments he made below, Oken presents
five arguments to us, some of which have sub-parts.  He contends:
(1) In light of Apprendi, the Maryland death penalty statute is
unconstitutional on its face because it provides that a sentence of death may be imposed if
the State proves that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors by only a
preponderance of the evidence.  In this regard, he argues that, under the Maryland statute,
the court or jury must make additional findings of fact beyond those found in the verdict
of guilty and those additional findings “serve to increase the range of punishment the
defendant faces, thereby implicating Apprendi.”  He asserts further that the weighing
process, itself, is a factual determination and thus a “finding” for purposes of Apprendi.
Because Maryland employs a weighing process, he urges that, as a matter of due process,
the determination that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors must be
made beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) In light of Apprendi, the indictment was defective because it failed (i) to
name Oken as a principal in the first degree, and (ii) to list the aggravating factors upon
which a sentence of death was to be based.
(3) Apprendi must be applied retroactively to his case, even on collateral
review, because Apprendi “represents a watershed rule of Constitutional law that
fundamentally alters the standard of proof and the manner in which capital sentencing
hearings are to be conducted in this State.”
-8-
(4) If Apprendi does apply to the death penalty statute but is not to be
applied retroactively, special circumstances exist which excuse Oken’s failure to raise the
standard of proof issue on direct appeal or in previous post-conviction proceedings.
(5) In light of the “spirit of Apprendi” and as a matter of fundamental
fairness, this Court should hold, under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
that no sentence of death is permissible unless the finder of fact unanimously finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors; i.e.,
that we should apply his interpretation of Apprendi as a matter of State Constitutional
law.
As noted at the beginning of this Opinion, we recently held in Borchardt v. State,
supra, that Apprendi does not serve to invalidate the Maryland death penalty law – that,
whether good policy or bad, the legislative judgment to establish preponderance as the
standard for weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors does not constitute a
violation of due process of law.  That holding controls and disposes of this case.
Because, on the basis of Borchardt, we reject Oken’s first contention, we need not
address any of his other arguments.  The rulings of the Circuit Court on the issues before
us are affirmed.
JUDGMENTS 
IN 
NOS. 
5 
AND 
27
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
-9-
Bell, C.J., Eldridge, J., and Raker, J., dissent for the reasons set forth in the
dissenting opinion of Raker, J., in Borchardt v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2001).