Title: Murray v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

236 Ind. 688 (1957)
143 N.E.2d 290
MURRAY
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,475.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 17, 1957.
*689 James C. Cooper (former Public Defender), and Robert S. Baker, Public Defender, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Owen S. Boling and Richard M. Givan, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
*690 PER CURIAM.
On August 13, 1953, appellant, without benefit of counsel, entered a plea of guilty to a charge by affidavit that he committed the "abominable and detestable crime against nature with a beast," and was sentenced under Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 473, p. 584, being § 10-4221, Burns' 1956 Replacement, to the Indiana State Prison for a term of not less than two [2] nor more than fifteen [15] years.[1]
On January 20, 1956, appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis which, as amended, alleged, in pertinent parts, the following:
*691 To this amended petition the State filed a demurrer on the ground that the writ of error coram nobis did not state "facts sufficient to constitute legal grounds for vacating judgment." The demurrer was sustained and from a judgment on appellant's refusal to plead further, this appeal is prosecuted.[2]
The sole error assigned is that the judgment of the trial court in denying appellant's amended petition for the writ is contrary to law.
Appellant asserts that the commission of the act with which he was charged was not a crime within the meaning of § 10-4221, supra, because a chicken is not a "beast" within the meaning of such statute.
We concur with appellant that:
However, this court has recognized that the Legislature intended to include within the sodomy statute all acts which are included in the definition of "crime against nature."
In Glover v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 459, at pp. 463 and 465, 101 N.E. 629, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 473, it is said:
Speaking through Judge Myers in Young v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 221, at p. 225, 141 N.E. 309, concerning the statute here in question, this court said:
Again, in Connell v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 318, at p. 323, 19 N.E.2d 267, speaking through Judge Tremain, we said:
*693 And, finally, in Sanders v. State (1940), 216 Ind. 663, at pp. 664, 665, 25 N.E.2d 995, this court said:
We affirm the rule as concisely stated by Judge Tremain in Sanders v. State, supra.
With this rule in mind we proceed to consider whether the act committed by appellant falls within the purview of the statute.
Appellant contends that the term "beast" as used in § 10-4221, supra, does not include "fowl," and relies upon a definition in 10 C.J.S., p. 219, as follows: A beast is "Any four-footed animal, as distinguished from birds, reptiles, fishes, and insects."; and Wharton's Cr. Law, Vol. 1, § 756, p. 1038.
It is also said in 10 C.J.S., supra, that: "It has been said that the word `beast' is a generic term, and that it may be difficult to determine in all respects what animals the term `beasts' includes; ..." See also Culp v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1931), 303 Pa. 257, 154 A. 479, 480; Taylor v. State (1845), 25 Tenn. 285, 286.
Webster's International Dictionary, 2d Ed., defines a beast as 1. Any living creature; any animal; 2. Any four-footed animal, as distinguished from birds, reptiles, fishes and insects; 3. An animal;  distinguished from man.
In our opinion the term "beast" as used by the Legislature in § 10-4221, supra, is a generic term, used in contradistinction to "mankind" and was intended to include any living thing with which the crime, as defined *694 at common law and in the statute, could be committed, as distinguished from man.
Accepting either or both of Webster's definition of a beast as, "any living creature"  "an animal;  distinguished from man," our conclusion as to the meaning of the word "beast" as used in the statute defining sodomy, is supported by numerous authorities.
Under a statute concerning cruelty to animals, this court has held that a fowl, i.e., a goose was an animal. State v. Bruner (1887), 111 Ind. 98, 12 N.E. 103, 104.
A duck has been held to be an animal under an English statute pertaining to sodomy. Reg. v. Brown (1889), 24 Q.B. Div. 357, 358; 61 Law Times Reports, 594.
The word animal has been held to include (chickens) "game cocks"; People v. Klock (1888), 48 Hun. N.Y. 275, and other fowls: McPherson v. James (1896), 69 Ill. App. 337; Tate v. Ogg (1938), 170 Va. 95, 195 S.E. 496, 499; Huber v. Mohn (1883), 37 N.J. Eq. (10 Stew.), 432, 433; and all living creatures except human beings: State v. Bogardus (1877), 4 Mo. App. 215, 216; People v. Brunell (1874), N.Y., 48 How. Prac. 435, 447; Holcomb v. Van Zylen (1913), 174 Mich. 274, 140 N.W. 521, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607; Restatement, Torts, § 506, ch. 20.
In our opinion a chicken is a beast within the meaning of that term as used in § 10-4221, supra.
Appellant further asserts that "The broad definition of the sodomy statute of Indiana as adopted by our courts, violates the `due process clause' and `the equal protection of the law clause,' of Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as well as the equal privilege clause of Article 1, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Indiana, and the 13th and 12th sections of Article 1 of the Constitution of Indiana."
*695 This question is not discussed in the argument section of appellant's brief in the manner required by Rule 2-17(e) of this court, 1954 Edition, and it is, therefore, deemed waived. Gernhart v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 470, 472, 120 N.E.2d 265.
The judgment of the trial court is not contrary to law and it will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 143 N.E.2d 290.
[1]  Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 473, p. 584, being § 10-4221, Burns' 1956 Replacement, provides that the penalty should be two to fourteen years. However, this question was not raised either in the trial court or in this court.
[2]  No question has been raised by the State as to whether or not the writ of error coram nobis would lie under the circumstances as shown by this record.