Title: Hedge v. Campbell

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

192 Kan. 623 (1964)
389 P.2d 834
MAYNARD ALLEN HEDGE, Appellee,
v.
HENRY P. CAMPBELL, Sheriff, Leavenworth County, Kansas, Appellant.
No. 43,855

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 7, 1964.
Arthur E. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and William M. Ferguson, Attorney General, Robert J. Lewis, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Edward J. Chapman, Jr., County Attorney and Robert D. Beall, Assistant County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
No appearance for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is a habeas corpus proceeding.
The petitioner, Maynard Allen Hedge, will be referred to as plaintiff.
The respondent, Henry P. Campbell, sheriff of Leavenworth county, will be referred to as defendant.
Defendant has appealed from an order granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing plaintiff from custody.
The question presented concerns the construction of provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (G.S. 1949, 62-727 to 62-757). More specifically, the question concerns the sufficiency of a "demand" by a demanding state to support a warrant by the governor of this state for the extradition to such demanding state of a fugitive found in this state.
There appears to be no dispute as to the facts.
On July 3, 1962, upon his plea of guilty to the charge of larceny of an automobile, a felony, in the superior court of Los Angeles county, California, plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment 
While awaiting transfer to the California state prison plaintiff was *625 released by the California authorities into the custody of federal authorities to stand trial upon a charge pending against him in federal court. He was convicted in federal court and was imprisoned in the United States penitentiary in Leavenworth county.
His sentence on the federal charge was to expire on September 10, 1963, but the sentence of July 3, 1962, imposed by the California state court, would not have expired on September 10, 1963, the date of his scheduled release by the federal authorities.
In the meantime, on August 22, 1963, the governor of the state of California issued a requisition to the governor of this state in the form of a "demand" which requested that upon plaintiff's release by the federal authorities he be delivered over to an agent of the state of California for return to that state. The requisition alleged that plaintiff had "fled from the justice" of California and had "taken refuge" in this state, and that he was a "fugitive from justice." Accompanying the requisition were duly authenticated copies of the California state court proceedings showing the conviction of plaintiff in that state.
Pursuant to the requisition from the state of California, the governor of this state, on August 29, 1963, issued a warrant directing defendant sheriff to apprehend and deliver plaintiff fugitive into the custody of a named agent of the state of California. Pursuant thereto, upon plaintiff's release by the federal authorities, defendant took plaintiff into custody for delivery to the California authorities.
Immediately thereafter plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court of Leavenworth county, alleging that the state of California no longer had jurisdiction of him and, having served the sentence imposed by the federal authorities, he was entitled to his release.
The matter was heard on September 10, 1963, at which time all parties were present and introduced evidence. On September 13, 1963, the court granted the writ, and in doing so made the following findings:
From this judgment the defendant sheriff has appealed.
Article IV, Sec. 2, of the constitution of the United States in material part, states:
G.S. 1949, 62-728, being a section of our Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, reads:
*627 The next section, G.S. 1949, 62-729, the construction of which is here involved, reads:
In findings Nos. 7 and 8, above, the court found that the California authorities voluntarily released plaintiff into the custody of the federal authorities; that he had not escaped from confinement and had not broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole, and that the governor of California had not submitted to the governor of this state a statement that plaintiff had escaped from confinement or had broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole.
Defendant sheriff does not dispute the correctness of those two findings.
In finding No. 9, above, which is in the nature of a conclusion, and the correctness of which is the decisive point in this case, the basis of the court's decision appears to be that under the language of G.S. 1949, 62-729, when a person sought to be extradited has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime in the demanding state  as was the case here  the demand, in order to support the issuance of a warrant by the governor of this state, must state that the person sought to be extradited has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole.
We believe such construction of the statute is too narrow and that, carried to its ultimate conclusion, would be in violation of the above-quoted provision of the United States constitution and would completely thwart the very purpose of the extradition laws.
There can be no question but that with respect to the state of California  plaintiff is a fugitive from justice. In In re Martin, 142 Kan. 907, 52 P.2d 1196, it was said that where one commits *628 an offense in the demanding state and thereafter goes or is taken into another or asylum state, his motives in leaving or the reasons why he left the demanding state are immaterial. (p. 909.)
In Thompson v. Nye, 174 Kan. 750, 257 P.2d 937, it was held:
In Tines v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 471, 190 P.2d 867, it was said:
In Holden v. Hudspeth, 168 Kan. 194, 211 P.2d 64, it was said:
To the same effect see Ohrazada v. Turner, 164 Kan. 581, syllabi 3 and 4, 190 P.2d 413.
The statute, G.S. 1949, 62-729, is in the disjunctive, and provides for two alternative showings by the demanding state in order to secure extradition  that is, that the person is a fugitive from justice, or, having been convicted and sentenced, has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. Plaintiff had committed a crime in the state of California. The fact authorities of that state turned him over to the federal authorities for prosecution did not deprive California of jurisdiction over him when he completed the federal sentence. The fact he came into this state involuntarily makes no difference. While he did not "flee" *629 from California in the literal sense of the word, nevertheless, not having completed the sentence imposed by the state court of California, he, at the time of his release in this state by the federal authorities, was, as to the state of California, a fugitive from justice and therefore was subject to being returned to that state. The demand by the governor of California complied with the provisions of the mentioned statute and was sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant by the governor of this state. Pursuant to the command of that warrant, plaintiff was in lawful custody of defendant sheriff and the writ of habeas corpus was erroneously granted. The judgment is therefore reversed with directions to deny the petition for a writ.
FONTRON, J., not participating.