Title: Cameron v. Rollo

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Cameron v. Rollo (2013-169)
 
2014 VT 40
 
[Filed 25-Apr-2014]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject
to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before
publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@state.vt.us or by mail at: Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors
in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2014 VT 40
 
No. 2013-169
 
David Cameron 
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Franklin Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
Rhonda Rollo
December Term, 2013
 
 
 
 
Dennis
  R. Pearson, J.
 
David Cameron, Pro Se, St. Albans, Plaintiff-Appellant.
 
Rhonda Rollo, Pro Se, St. Albans, Defendant-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and
Crawford, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
CRAWFORD, J.   This case presents a single legal issue:  whether
the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital
property acquired during a marriage that ends in annulment.  We affirm the
decision of the civil division in this case that exclusive jurisdiction over the
parties' property division is conferred by statute to the family division.  
¶ 2.            
In 2011, wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Family Division of
the Franklin Superior Court.  Both parties represented themselves.  Following a
hearing in July, the family division determined that wife was still married to
her first husband at the time of her marriage to husband in March 2000.  Wife
had received divorce papers filed by her first husband and believed that their
marriage had ended in divorce.  Her belief proved to be incorrect. 
¶ 3.            
The family division initially ruled that the marriage between the
parties was void by operation of 15 V.S.A. § 511.  There were no children born
to the marriage.  The only issue was property division.  The court ordered
husband to prepare a list of personal property he wanted.  Wife was ordered to
turn over property belonging to husband.  
¶ 4.            
In August 2011, the family division changed its mind concerning the
distribution of property.  It ruled that "[s]ince the marriage was void at its
beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.  The
parties are referred to the civil division.  Either party may start an action
there. The family court's case is closed."  Husband followed these
instructions.  He has filed two small claims cases against his former spouse
seeking money damages for property he claims was his. 
¶ 5.            
The first small claims case concerned a utility trailer.  Husband
obtained a judgment for $2100 for conversion of the trailer by wife.  The
decision was affirmed by the civil division.  
¶ 6.            
The second small claims case concerned the various items of marital
property which he had described in the list he filed with the family division. 
His complaint stated: 
[Wife] removed items from my home in
Swanton around April of 2010.  In open court on June 18, 2012, she was a
witness in the docket S435-11 Fsc.  An attorney stated she had removed my
property and put it in storage.  She did not object.  I am moving forward now
[that] there is sworn testimony.  On July 11, 2011 in the docket 131-4-11 [wife]
was ordered to return all property to me.  To date nothing has been returned
and has not been accounted for.[1]

Following a merits hearing in June
2012, the small claims judge entered judgment in favor of wife.  Husband
appealed to the civil division, which held that the civil division and the
small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. 
Husband sought review in this Court.  We granted permission to appeal, noting
that we would only review the legal question of which court has jurisdiction to
distribute property under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 7.            
Our review of the civil division's dismissal on the grounds that the
family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of marital
property is de novo.  See Paige v. State, 2013 VT 105, ¶ 8, ___ Vt. ___,
___ A.3d ___ ("We review dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo.").
¶ 8.            
The authority of the family division to divide marital property is
derived from statute.  Section 751 of Title 15 authorizes the court, "[u]pon
motion of either party to a proceeding under this
chapter . . . [to] settle the rights of the parties to
their property, by including in its judgment provisions which equitably divide
and assign the property." 15 V.S.A. § 751(a).  "[T]his chapter" refers to
chapter 11 of Title 15, which encompasses annulment, divorce, and legal
separation.  The extension of the judicial remedy of property division to cases
of annulment lies within the authority of the Legislature.  No statutory
provision denies parties whose marriage is subject to an annulment access to
property division by the family division. 
¶ 9.            
The only objection to an order dividing property is conceptual.  By
statute, the marriage of a person "having a wife or husband
living . . . shall be void without decree of divorce or
other legal process."  15 V.S.A. § 511(a).  The decree of nullity
authorized by 15 V.S.A. § 519 is evidence of the invalidity of the
marriage, but the marriage is considered to be void from the outset and the
decree "will do no more than judicially declare what already exists in fact."  Cook
v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 380, 76 A.2d 593, 597 (1950), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).  This idea that a marriage annulled on
grounds of bigamy is void from its inception and therefore cannot support a
claim for property division underlies the family division's refusal in this
case to divide the parties' property.   
¶ 10.        
The Legislature has created exceptions to the premise that a void
marriage has none of the attributes of a legal marriage.  Children of an
annulled marriage are declared legitimate.  15 V.S.A. § 520.  Theoretical
arguments about whether a void marriage can give rise to legitimate offspring
fall before the obvious truth that children are hardly responsible for the
invalidity of their parents' marriage.  In an earlier era when children born
out of wedlock suffered legal infirmities and social disadvantage, children
born to void marriages were treated by the Legislature as fully legitimate. 
¶ 11.        
In the same way, the Legislature extended the remedy of property
division to the parties to an annulment when it provided for property division in
all cases filed under Chapter 11 of Title 15.  As this case demonstrates, over
the course of twenty years of void or voidable marriage, a couple accumulates
property at the same rate as other married couples.  The family division is
best suited to divide all of their property in a single proceeding virtually
identical to a divorce.  With a clear directive from the Legislature in hand,
there is no need to consider whether theories of putative spouse, equitable
division, and relative fault might also support a claim for property division. 

¶ 12.        
For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the civil division that the
family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of the parties'
marital property.  The prior order entered by the family division denying
property division in the annulment case was not appealed, but it was not
correct either.  Husband may have post-judgment remedies in that court.
¶ 13.        
The dissent joins us in recognizing that the family division mistakenly
denied the request for property division because the marriage was annulled. 
Where we disagree is whether this mistake opens the door to a series of civil
lawsuits over ownership and value of the marital estate.  The dissent argues
that principles of issue preclusion foreclose consideration of whether the
small claims court acted correctly in issuing a decision that effectively
divided marital property.  
¶ 14.        
This Court has long recognized that the statutory grant of jurisdiction
to the family division is exclusive and that there is no "overlapping
jurisdictionmatters that belong in family court may not be brought in superior
court."  Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 494, 808 A.2d 648, 650 (2002)
(mem.).  Section 31(1) of Title 4, recently enacted as part of the unification
of the judiciary, excludes from the civil division cases that are subject to
the jurisdiction of the family division.  This allocation of jurisdiction is
consistent with the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the family division
to hear domestic cases including "all annulment and divorce proceedings."  4 V.S.A.
§ 33(4).  
¶ 15.        
Our appellate decisions have varied in the enforcement of the boundary
between the family and civil division over property disputes.  In Tudhope v.
Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 178-80, 704 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1997), we rejected an
effort by an ex-spouse to bring a second lawsuit in the superior court (as the
civil division was then known) on property issues after the family court
entered a stipulated judgment order on these issues.  In Slansky v. Slansky,
150 Vt. 438, 442, 553 A.2d 152, 154 (1988), however, we permitted a claim of
conversion to proceed in the superior court after a divorce where one spouse improperly
removed the other from the family health insurance coverage.  The complexity of
human relations will continue to produce cases which fall on both sides of the
line.  The boundary, however, is clear when the issue is whether marital
property belongs to one spouse or the other.  As this case demonstrates,
confusion and uncertainty about whether a claim for the return of property
following a divorce or annulment can be the subject of subsequent litigation in
the civil division wastes the time of the parties and the courts.  In holding
that the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over the division of
marital property in such cases, we seek to discourage exactly the type of
collateral litigation filed in successive cases by this defendant.   
¶ 16.        
Finally, we consider the argument that although the family division
erred in dismissing the property division claim, the unappealed order is
binding upon the parties in subsequent cases under principles of collateral
estoppel.  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982) furnishes
well-established rules of decision concerning the recognition of a judgment by
another tribunal in a separate proceeding.  See Quinn v. Schipper, 2006
VT 51, ¶ 8, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.) (citing Restatement (2d) of
Judgments § 12 in holding that a husband could not collaterally attack
superior court's decision that family court, not superior court, had subject
matter jurisdiction to decide the husband's motion to enforce provision of
parties' separation agreement).  The general rule is that after a court has
rendered a judgment, the parties are precluded from litigating the question of
that court's subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation.  Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 12.  There is an exception for rulings which are
plainly beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.  See id.
§ 12(1) (parties may relitigate subject matter jurisdiction where subject
matter "was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining
the action was a manifest abuse of authority").  Although the family division's
mistake in this case was to deny its own jurisdiction rather than to extend it,
the principle is the same.  A fundamental mistake about the scope of a court's
jurisdiction does not require courts in subsequent cases between the same
parties to repeat the same error.  
¶ 17.        
We recognize the truth of the dissent's concern about the duplicative
litigation in this case.  The lower court decisions cannot be reconciled
because two of themthe denial of family division jurisdiction and the prior order
in the small claims appeal between the two former spouses concerning ownership
of their trailerwere mistaken.  Those cases are not before us.  In this case
in which we granted permission to appeal, however, the trial court acted
correctly in putting its foot down and enforcing the provisions of Title 4
which describe the separate jurisdiction of the civil and family divisions.  A
contrary decision affirming the small claims judgment in favor of wife might
have ended this particular case, but it would have invited more, not fewer,
overlapping cases in both courts.
Affirmed.
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 
 
¶ 18.        
DOOLEY, J., dissenting.   From time to time we get cases that
appear to be relatively small and unimportant but actually raise very
significant issues that require careful and full consideration.  In my opinion,
this is such a case.  To the majority this case is about subject matter
jurisdiction over property disputes in annulment actions, an issue that will
rarely, if ever, rise again.  In my opinion, this case is really about the
preclusive effect of subject matter jurisdiction determinations and the
treatment of litigants, especially those that are self-representedboth
subjects regularly appear and impact the justness of this Court's actions.  The
issue the majority chooses to address is legitimate, but the issues it largely
ignores are critical and command a different result.  Thus, I dissent.  
¶ 19.        
The concept that a court can act only when it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter in issue is fundamental to our justice system. 
Unfortunately, we have historically addressed subject matter jurisdiction with
great rigidity, allowing it to be raised at any time in a proceeding, including
right up to the end of an appeal, or even thereafter, and over and over again
with no finality.  Thus, a decision that the deciding court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction can be technically right, but undoing the decision
can create great injustice for parties who relied upon the apparent ability of
the court to adjudicate the controversy.  As discussed below, this is a case of
great injustice where the claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
almost a pure technicality.
¶ 20.        
We made a great stride forward in ensuring finality of judgments against
lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction claims where the question of subject matter
jurisdiction has already been litigated by adopting the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 12 (1982).  See Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51, ¶ 8, 180 Vt.
572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.).  Section 12 states that a judgment precludes
relitigation of subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation with three
exceptions.  Although I believe none apply, the majority has found that one
does: "The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's
jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of
authority."[2] 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12(1).  In considering the majority's
position, I note that the exception "applies in only the most limited
circumstances."  Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 136 P.3d 1, 9
(Ore. 2006).  The Reporter's Notes to § 12 states: "Cases involving plain
excess of jurisdiction are rare," citing a case in which a probate court
entered a declaratory judgment that a zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.  The
U.S. Supreme Court describes the standard as a judgment without even an
arguable basis or a clear usurpation of power.  United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (quotation omitted). 
¶ 21.        
The majority provides no analysis of how this case meets the standard of
§ 12(1) beyond its analysis that the family division was wrong and the
civil division was right.  Reducing the case to its essentials, plaintiff
alleges that the person to whom he thought he was married, defendant, stole his
property while he was incarcerated and he could not protect it.  She answers by
admitting that she had property belonging to plaintiff, and by responding that
some of the property was stolen by a third person during a break-in at her
house, other property was taken by a friend of plaintiff at plaintiff's request,
and some she has but is trying to give back to plaintiff.  One piece of
property was a utility trailer which, in a separate judgment, the civil
division found was sold without plaintiff's consent, meriting an award to
plaintiff of $2100.  The civil division in this case justified that decision as
proper because the trailer was required to be registered, "and was registered
only in [plaintiff's] name, thus it had at least some indicia of separate and
independent ownership, and it was not the type of item which is obviously joint
marital property."  By comparison, the court described the property in this
case as "various and sundry items which are typical of any decade-long
cohabitation, especially under the color of marriage."  The legal significance
of the expressed differences between these properties escapes me.  For both,
plaintiff alleged that defendant disposed of the property before any
divorce/annulment proceeding was filedthat is, that she committed the tort of
conversion, that the property was not available for distribution in the
annulment order, and that defendant did not contest that she had property
belonging to plaintiff.  
¶ 22.        
The civil division order concluded that 4 V.S.A. § 33(4), which gives
jurisdiction of annulment proceedings to the family division, includes
jurisdiction over the property of persons whose marriage is annulled.  It does
so in a four-page, single-spaced decision that includes citation to and
analysis of cases from six other jurisdictions.  The majority goes through our
statutes in detail to reach the same conclusion.  Neither addresses what this
action actually isa conversion action with respect to property owned by
plaintiff and possessed at one time by defendant but not in either's possession
at the time of the annulment.  I consider it debatable whether the conversion
action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the family division, but we
need not, and should not, reach that question.  See LaPlume v. Lavallee,
2004 VT 78, ¶¶ 8-9, 177 Vt. 526, 858 A.2d 255 (holding that plaintiff's
claim for money damages against former partner for retention of property was
conversion claim subject to jurisdiction of small claims court).  The
conversion theory was, of course, exactly the rationale under which the civil
division awarded plaintiff damages in the separate action regarding the utility
trailer.  See also Lord v. Smith, No. 543668, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 708, 2003
WL 294412, at *4-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2003) (concluding that court that
originally disposed of property during custody dispute between unmarried
parties lacked jurisdiction, but that plaintiff could not challenge
jurisdiction after it was final given that he agreed to jurisdiction at the
time, matter was fully litigated and any subsequent action would have been
heard in same superior court).
¶ 23.        
To say that the family division's ruling was "so plainly beyond the
court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of
authority" creates an exception to issue preclusion so broad as to eat up the rule
and bring us back to the days of raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over and over.  The family division ruling may have been wrong, but it is not a
manifest abuse of discretion, a clear usurpation of power, or a ruling without
an arguable basis.
¶ 24.        
There is another way to look at what occurred here, that the civil
division judge essentially rendered a horizontal appeal from the decision of
the family division judge.  In Economou v. Economou, we clearly
indicated our disapproval of horizontal appeals between superior court judges:
"To allow a subsequent irreconcilable ruling to stand would encourage litigants
in superior courts to delay proceedings already initiated while awaiting the
future assignment of a presiding judge they believed more likely to rule in
their favor.  The appellate process must proceed vertically, not sideways." 
133 Vt. 418, 421-22, 340 A.2d 86, 88 (1975); see also Kotz v. Kotz, 134
Vt. 36, 38-39, 349 A.2d 882, 884 (1975).  Although we have narrowed the holding
of Economou, we have not abandoned its rationale.  See Morriseau v.
Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 362-64, 670 A.2d 820, 823-24 (1995).  I recognize
that this "horizontal appeal" was done at the initiative of a judge, rather
than a lawyer or litigant, but this makes it even less acceptable.  There are
ways the system can work out different understandings of the law between judges
without giving inconsistent rulings.
¶
25.        
There are other important considerations that should affect how
we address this case.  Whether we apply preclusion represents a balancing of
the need for finality against the validity of the judgment for which finality
is sought.  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, cmt. a.  Here the need for
finality is compelling, and the interest in validity is almost nonexistent. 
Subject matter jurisdiction here is virtually a technicality.  We are dealing
with two divisions of the superior court.  No matter which division is
involved, the judge will come from the same pool, and the law applied will be
the same.  Indeed, it is possible that when plaintiff seeks to reopen in the
Franklin Family Division, he will appear before the same judge who dismissed
his case in the Franklin Civil Division.
¶
26.        
Two considerations demonstrate the extreme need for finality in
the small claims court.  The first is that the jurisdictional issue was raised
sua sponte by the judge in the appeal from the small claims decision; otherwise,
the case would have ended.  The Legislature has authorized small claims actions
to provide "a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for the determination"
of disputes involving less than $5000.  12 V.S.A. § 5531(a).  The Vermont
Judiciary, through the Court Administrator and the Trial Court Administrative
Judge, publishes a booklet to help litigants and prospective litigants
understand and use the small claims process.  The booklet asks and answers
basic questions like: "What is different about small claims cases?  You do not
need a lawyer.  Of course, if you wish, you may have one"; and "The papers you file and the procedures used at the
hearing are simple and don't involve many of the legal technicalities used in
other courts"; and "You can argue your side of the case in your own words and
present evidence to back it up."  Vt. Judiciary, Small Claims Cases in Vermont 1-2
(2013), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/GTC/civil/MasterDocumentLibrary/Small%20Claims%20Booklet.pdf. 
There is nothing simple, informal, or inexpensive about a process in which a
litigant has to spend years to get an answer to a straightforward dispute, pay
three filing feesfour under the majority's decisionand end up fighting pro se
a court decision that cites appellate decisions and statutes from six states
and a law review article.  Of all the places for the judge to interject
a legal issue involving subject matter jurisdiction, this should be the last.
¶ 27.        
The second consideration is that
the majority's decision enmeshes these parties in destructive litigation almost
without end when the dispute cries out for a resolution.  Defendant has alleged
that plaintiff is using litigation to control and harass her.  Under these
circumstances, virtually any final decision would be more just than continuous
technicality and indecision.  This case was over before the civil division
court decided to raise sua sponte a jurisdictional issue.  Neither party wanted
the result the civil division court has reached; both lost.
¶ 28.        
In my judgment, the majority has decided the least pressing question in
this case, failed to grapple with the most important question, and undercut the
modernization of the law of subject matter jurisdiction while affirming great
injury to the litigants.  We should act decisively here, hold that issue
preclusion prohibits courts from second-guessing each other's final judgments,
and ensure this kind of decision does not occur again.  From the failure of the
majority to do so, I respectfully dissent.  I am authorized to state that
Justice Robinson joins this dissent.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate Justice
 

[1]
 Docket number 131-4-11 Frdm is the action for divorce filed by wife that
resulted in the annulment.  Docket number S435-11 Fsc is Cameron v. Dick
Wright Ford, a small claims action filed by husband against an auto dealer
which made a set of duplicate keys to husband's truck at wife's request. 
[2] 
The exception does not specifically apply because the language covers the
situation where the court finds jurisdiction rather than the situation where it
does not.  The majority concludes that the policy behind the exception applies
in either situation, and I agree.