Title: MADISON v YUNKER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13741 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1978 A. P. MADISON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CAREY MATOVICH YUNKER, I n d i v i d u a l l y and a s E d i t o r of t h e Montana Kaimin, t h e University of Montana Student Newspaper; The Montana Kaimin; e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Edward T. Dussault, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Boone, Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam E. Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Calton & Stephens, B i l l i n g s , Montans Herron and Meloy, Helena, Montana P e t e r M. Meloy argud, Helena, Montana Bruce B. B a r r e t t argued, Missoula, Montana Richard Volinkaty argued, Missoula, Montana Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary Graham argued, Missoula, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Brinton Markle, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 5 , 1978 - r 3 7 g Decided: f i u l . 2 - e M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Missoula County, granting defendants' motion t o dismiss p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of a c t i o n f o r l i b e l and from t h e e n t r y of judgment f o r defendants. The p r e s e n t cause of a c t i o n a r o s e o u t of a purported l i b e l o u s p u b l i c a t i o n w r i t t e n by defendant Carey Matovich Yunker (Yunker) and published i n t h e October 8 , 1974 e d i t i o n of t h e Montana Kaimin, t h e University of Montana s t u d e n t newspaper. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h e e d i t o r i a l s t a t e s : "* * * One of t h e memos i s from A 1 Madison. H i s p o s i t i o n , d i r e c t o r of t h e University p r i n t shop, alone makes anything he would say on t h e matter suspect. A s w e l l , he i s a congenital l i a r , an incompetent whose own operation has l o s t $103,914.89 i n t h e l a s t four years. * * *" On December 9, 1974, Madison f i l e d a complaint a g a i n s t defendants i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court a l l e g i n g defendant Yunker, a c t i n g i n her capacity a s e d i t o r of t h e Montana Kaimin, d e l i b e r a t e l y and maliciously l i b e l e d p l a i n t i f f by publishing f a l s e defamatory statements. P l a i n t i f f pleaded noncompliance with s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, (Montana's r e t r a c t i o n s t a t u t e ) on t h e grounds t h a t s e c t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t h e purported l i b e l was n o t within t h e scope of s e c t i o n 64- 207.1. Madison prayed f o r judgment i n h i s favor and an award of s p e c i a l , general, and p u n i t i v e o r exemplary damages i n t h e aggregate amount of $102,000. O n December 30 and 31, 1974, defendants f i l e d motions t o dismiss Madison's complaint, pursuant t o Rule 1 2 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., on t h e grounds t h e complaint f a i l e d t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f could be granted and t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n over p a r t i e s i n a l i b e l a c t i o n u n t i l ad is on complied with s e c t i o n 64-207.1. The Univer- s i t y of ~ o n t a n a ' s motion t o dismiss w a s based upon t h e a d d i t i o n a l ground t h a t no claim had been f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e University of Montana pursuant t o s e c t i o n 82-4312, R.C.M. 1947. O n January 31, 1975, Madison f i l e d a motion t o d e f e r consideration of matters r a i s e d i n t h e consolidated motion of t h e University of Montana pending f i n a l determination of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1. Madison and t h e University of Montana s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 was a condition pre- cedent t o t h e maintenance of any a c t i o n f o r l i b e l . O n May 29, 1975, t h e District Court heard o r a l argument on defendants' s e p a r a t e motions t o dismiss. B r i e f s i n sup- p o r t of and i n opposition t o t h e motions t o dismiss were f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s . O n December 2 2 , 1976, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued an o r d e r granting defendants' motions t o dismiss on t h e grounds s e c t i o n 64-207.1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e 1972 Montana Constitution and Madison f a i l e d t o demand a r e t r a c t i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 64-207.1, defendants being e n t i t l e d t o "* * * an opportunity t o publish a r e t r a c t i o n t o m i t i g a t e a c t u a l o r compensatory damages, i f any." ~udgment was accordingly entered f o r defendants. The i s s u e s presented f o r review, a s s t a t e d by a p p e l l a n t Madison, are: 1. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r i n g a demand f o r r e t r a c t i o n a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o an a c t i o n f o r l i b e l , impose u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s upon personal l i b e r t i e s and r i g h t s guaranteed by A r t i c l e 11, 1972 Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e due process provision of t h e our tee nth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n ? 2. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, have any ap- p l i c a t i o n i n a l i b e l a c t i o n founded upon p u b l i c a t i o n of an obvious i n t e n t i o n a l falsehood? W e a r e handed f o r determination a c l a s s i c confrontation between b a s i c and treasured c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h e freedom of speech and p r e s s guaranteed under t h e F i r s t Amend- ment of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution, on t h e one hand, and t h e r i g h t s of a n i n d i v i d u a l t o be secure from defamation on t h e o t h e r . The p i v o t a l determination we must make i s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1. For on t h a t determination, a l l e l s e i n t h i s c a s e depends. I t r e q u i r e s , as we s a i d i n Granger v. T i m e , Inc. (1977) , - Mont. , 568 P.2d 535, 541, 34 St.Rep. 983, a "* * * c a r e f u l balanc- i n g of t h e F i r s t Amendment freedoms of speech and p r e s s , and t h e personal d i g n i t y i n t e r e s t s underlying t h e law of defama- t i o n " . A t t h e o u t s e t , w e set o u t i n f u l l t h e s t a t u t e which i s under a t t a c k : "64-207.1. Notice i n w r i t i n g t o publisher of l i b e l o u s o r defamatory matter--opportunity t o correct--defense and m i t i g a t i o n of damages. - - - - Before g c i v i l a c t i o n s h a l i be commenced on account of 3 libelous o r f a m a t o r y - publics- t i o n i n newspaper, magazine, p e r i o d i c a l , -- r a d i o o r t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n , o r c a b l e t e l e v i s i o n system, t h e l i b e l e d person s h a l l f i r s t g i v e those a l l e g e d t o be responsible o r l i a b l e f o r --- -- -- - t h e p u b l i c a t i o n a reasonable opport-to c o r r e c t t h e l i b e i o u s o r defamatory matter- Such opportunity s h a l l be z v e n by n o t i c e i n w r i t i n g specifying t h e a r t i c l e and t h e statements t h e r e i n which a r e claimed t o be f a l s e and defamatory and a statement of what a r e claimed t o be t h e t r u e f a c t s . The n o t i c e may a l s o state t h e sources, i f any, from which t h e t r u e f a c t s may be ascertained with d e f i n i t e n e s s and c e r t a i n t y . The f i r s t i s s u e of a newspaper, magazine o r p e r i o d i c a l published a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of one week from t h e r e c e i p t of such n o t i c e s h a l l be w i t h i n a reasonable t i m e f o r c o r r e c t i o n . I n t h e c a s e of r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s and c a b l e t e l e v i s i o n systems a broadcast made a t t h e same t i m e of day as t h e broadcast com- plained of and of at least equal duration, which is made within seven (7) days following receipt of such notice shall be within a rea- sonable time for correction. To the extent that the true facts are, with reasonable dili- gence, ascertainable with definiteness and certainty, only a retraction shall constitute a correction; otherwise the publication of the libeled person's statement of the true facts, of so much thereof as shall not be libelous or another, scurrilous, or otherwise improper for publication, published as his statement, shall constitute a correction within the meaning of this section. If it shall appear upon trial -- that the publication w a s a m e r -- honest mistake or misapprehension, then a - - correction, timay published, without comment, in a position and type as prominent as the - - -- alleged libel, or in a broadcast made at the same time of day as the broadcast complained of and of at least equal duration, shall con- stitute a defense against the recovery of any damages except actual damages, as well as being ---- competent and material in mitigation of actual damases to the extent the correction Kblished -- does2so mitigate them. " (Emphasis added. ) -- The pertinent part of the Fourteen Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "* * * No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Article 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, has several sec- tions which are pertinent to or have some significance in this case: "Section 3 . Inalienable rights. All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities. "Section 4. Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall denied the equal protectionof -- the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, - corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil o r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on account of r a c e , color, sex, c u l t u r e , s o c i a l o r i g i n o r con- d i t i o n , o r p o l i t i c a l o r r e l i g i o u s ideas. "Section 7. Freedom of speech, expression, and press. N o law s h a l l be passed impairing t h e freedom of speech o r expression. Every person s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r publish --- whatever --- he w i l l on any subject, being responsi- b l e f o r a l l abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . I n a l l s u i t s --- -- 7- and prosecutions f o r l i b e l o r slander t h e t r u t h -- thereof m a y be yiven i n evidence; and t h e jury, -- under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e court, s h a l l determine --- t h e law and t h e f a c t s . ----- "Section 16. The administration of j u s t i c e . Courts of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o every person, and speedy remedy afforded f o r every i n j u r y of person, property, or character. N o person s h a l l be deprived of t h i s f u l l l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r in- jury incurred i n employment f o r which another person may be l i a b l e except as t o fellow employees and h i s immediate employer who h i r e d him i f such immediate employer provides coverage under t h e Workmen's Compensation Laws of t h i s s t a t e . Right and j u s t i c e s h a l l be administered without s a l e , d e n i a l , o r delay. "Section 17. Due process of l a w . N o - person s h a l l be deprived of -- l i f e , l i b e r t y , o r propert withouFdue process -- of law." ( ~ m ~ h a z s supplizd.) It w i l l be noted t h a t s e v e r a l of t h e foregoing provisions of t h e Montana Constitution r e p e a t o r r e s t a t e l i k e provisions i n t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. For example, A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , provides t h a t no person s h a l l be denied t h e equal protection of t h e laws. A r t i c l e 11, Section 17, provides t h a t no person s h a l l be deprived of l i f e , l i b e r t y o r property without due process of law. Freedom of speech, of expression and of press is guaranteed i n Article 11, Section 7. These state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions, i d e n t i c a l o r nearly i d e n t i c a l with l i k e language i n t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and c e r t a i n l y i d e n t i c a l i n concept, each c o n s t i t u t e separate and enforceable c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s insofar a s t h e j u r i s - d i c t i o n of t h e S t a t e of Montana extends. Where s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions a r e i d e n t i c a l , each is enforceable i n its own r e s p e c t i v e sphere where those prin- c i p l e s a t t a c h . See, Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965), 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321; Emery v. S t a t e of Montana (1978), - Mont. , 580 P.2d 445, 35 St.Rep. 709. The competing freedoms which s e c t i o n 64-207.1 a f f e c t a r e found i n t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions. F i r s t and foremost of t h e a f f e c t e d provisions i s A r t i c l e 11, Section 7. Freedom of t h e p r e s s flowers i n t h e language "every person s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r publish whatever he w i l l on any s u b j e c t " , b u t t h e r e i s an accompanying thorn, "being responsi- b l e f o r a l l abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . " I t i s noteworthy t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t d e f i n e t h e c l a u s e "abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y " . However, on t h e books a t t h e t i m e of t h e adoption of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n was s e c t i o n 64-203, R.C.M. 1947, a d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l . That s t a t u t e follows : "Libel i s a f a l s e and unprivileged publica- t i o n by w r i t i n g , p r i n t i n g * * * which exposes any persons t o h a t r e d , contempt, r i d i c u l e , o r obloquy, o r which causes him t o be shunned o r avoided, o r which has a tendency t o i n j u r e him i n h i s occupation." W e may assume t h e r e f o r e t h a t an "abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y " would be any p u b l i c a t i o n t h a t would f i t t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i - t i o n of l i b e l . W e a r e f o r t i f i e d i n t h i s conclusion by t h e f a c t t h a t i n A r t i c l e 11, Section 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e s e c t i o n goes on t o say, " i n a l l s u i t s and prosecutions f o r l i b e l o r slander, t h e t r u t h thereof may be given i n evidence, and t h e jury, under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r - mine t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s . " W e determine, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t s u i t s f o r l i b e l are recog- nized and preserved i n t h e 1972 Montana Constitution. I t is proper t o t u r n now t o determine whether t h e r e i s anything i n t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution, re- garding freedom of the press, or the case law applying thereto, that allows the press a greater degree of freedom than the Montana Constitution, or prevents suits for libel such as contemplated by the Montana Constitution. We find from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 347, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L Ed 2d 789, that states may provide for libel actions, at least where the publication is libelous on its face: "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing con- cerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to repu- tation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At least this inclusion obtains where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputa- tion apparent'. This phrase places in perspec- tive the conclusion we announce today. Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual mis-statement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of a defamatory potential * * *." 418 U.S. at 347, 348. We next turn to consider how section 64-207.1 comports with Article 11, Section 7, respecting the freedom of the press which we have already set out in full, and the provi- sions of Article 11, Section 16, which provides that "courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character It is plaintiff's contention that the provisions of section 64-207.1 absolutely preclude a suit by a defamed individual and that the statutory requirement therein for written notice demanding a retraction is outside the provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution and an impermis- sible limitation or restriction on the constitutional right of action for libel. Defendants on the other hand contend that the statute does not bar suits for libel, but only sets forth a condition precedent to maintaining a suit; that the effect of section 64-207.1, once followed, is to mitigate damages; and further, that the provision for retrac- tion is in itself a remedy afforded by the statute to a libeled person. This Court has said that: "The underlying purpose of libel laws is to furnish a means of redress for defamation. Every person is entitled to enjoy his repu- tation unimpaired by false and defamatory remarks. An action for libel or slander is based upon a violation of this right which exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridi- cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. (Citations omitted.) " Lewis v. Reader's Digest (1973), 162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702. The legislature has defined what constitutes libel. Sec- tion 64-203. It has also determined who can be held liable for libel. Section 64-201, et seq., R.C.M. 1947. These statutes implement the constitutional mandate of Article 11, Section 7, 1972 Montana Constitution and also of Article 11, Section 16, of that Constitution, which provides that a remedy shall be available for injury to character. The District Court in this case dismissed Madison's com- plaint because Madison failed to give the required notice for retraction. It must be said that the District Court was simply following the statute, which allows no other interpre- tation. The statute begins with the words: "Before any civil action shall be commenced * * * the libeled person shall first give * * * notice to the libelor * * *." This requirement is in direct derogation of the clear and unam- biguous language of Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution, which mandates that the courts of this state are open to every person, and a remedy afforded for every injury to character. "* * * With reference to the subjects upon which the Constitution speaks, its declara- tions are binding upon the legislature (citing case). Constitutional provisions are conclusive upon the legislature and prevent the enactment of any law which extinguishes or limits the powers conferred by the Constitution (citing cases)." No11 and Kenneady v. Bozeman (1975), 166 Mont. 504, 507, 534 P.2d 880. We do not find that the "right" of a libeled individual to obtain a retraction under section 64-207.1 is in itself a remedy. Remedies for "injury of * * * character" are found in "courts of justice" which "shall be open to every person". In all suits for libel, "the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts". Article 11, Sections 7 and 16, 1972 Montana Constitution. Thus, the state constitution fixes the right to a remedy and where it may be sought. The legislature is without power to provide otherwise. We therefore hold section 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, uncon- stitutional in that it is in violation of the provisions which we have noted of Article 11, Sections 7 and 16, 1972 Montana Constitution. Having so held, there is no need for us to reach a deci- sion as to the additional objections made by Madison to sec- tion 64-207.1 that it violates the due process clauses of the Montana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough t o say t h a t w e have s u b s t a n t i a l doubts about t h e v a l i d i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 under those provisions a l s o , and t h a t w e r e s e r v e t o some f u t u r e t i m e as it may become necessary t o d i s c u s s those contentions. Nor a r e we required t o d i s c u s s t h e second i s s u e above s t a t e d , t h a t t h e s t a t u t e cannot apply t o an obvious falsehood. Having determined t h a t t h e s t a t u t e which brought about t h e d i s m i s s a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s s u i t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e must send t h i s cause back f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. I n doing s o , however, we a r e obliged t o s t a t e , f o r guidance of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s on l i b e l s u i t s and t h e damages obtainable t h e r e i n which now apply. I n doing s o , we can perhaps o b v i a t e , o r a t l e a s t ease, t h e f e a r s which w i l l rise i n t h e b r e a s t s of publishers, e d i t o r s , and broad- c a s t e r s upon p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s opinion. Although t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court has recognized t h a t a s t a t e may provide f o r l i b e l s u i t s (Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., s u p r a ) , t h e r e has been a s u b s t a n t i a l development i n cases from t h a t c o u r t which is i n i t s e l f a p r o t e c t i o n t o publishers because it l i m i t s t h e r i g h t t o damages. These r e s t r i c t i o n s on damages are i n themselves a d e t e r r e n t t o t h e barrage of l i b e l s u i t s t h a t publishers might otherwise f e a r . The development begins with New York Times Co. v. S u l l i v a n (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 1 1 L Ed 2d 686, 95 A L R 1912. There, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court found t h a t t h e dissemination of news was s o important t h a t news media should be protected from l i b e l judgments, and should a l s o be shielded from t h e i r own "self-censorship" brought about by f e a r of l i b e l s u i t s . The Supreme Court held t h a t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l could n o t recover on a claim f o r defamation unless " a c t u a l malice" had been present. Implied o r presumed malice was out. "Malice" meant publication of the defaming material with a "knowledge that it was false, or with reck- less disregard of whether it was false or not". The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that kind of malice with convincing clarity. The court found that the First Amendment permitted, on public issues, vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public officials. In Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L Ed 2d 125, the New York Times rule was extended to a public official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation. In Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker (1967), reported together in 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L Ed 2d 1094, reh.den. 389 U.S. 889 (1967), the court extended the New York Times rule to public figures. "Public figures" are defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra: "* * * For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of a special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment." 418 U.S. at 345. Finally, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court, while allowing states to provide for libel suits, erected a fence around the amount of damages recover- able: "We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitu- tional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no f a r t h e r than i s necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t involved. It i s necessary t o r e s t r i c t defamation p l a i n t i f f s who do not prove knowledge of f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s r e - gard f o r t h e t r u t h t o compensation f o r a c t u a l injury. W e need n o t define ' a c t u a l i n j u r y , ' a s t r i a l c o u r t s have wide experience i n framing appropriate jury i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t o r t actions. S u f f i c e it t o say t h a t a c t u a l i n j u r y i s not limited t o out-of-pocket l o s s . Indeed, t h e more customary types of a c t u a l harm i n f l i c t e d by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing i n t h e community, per- sonal humiliation, and mental anguish and suf- fering. Of course, j u r i e s must be limited by appropriate i n s t r u c t i o n s , and a l l awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning t h e i n j u r y , although t h e r e need be no evidence which assigns an a c t u a l d o l l a r value t o the injury. "We a l s o f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r allowing awards of punitive damages a g a i n s t publishers and broadcasters held l i a b l e under state- defined standards of l i a b i l i t y f o r defamation. I n most j u r i s d i c t i o n s jury d i s c r e t i o n over t h e amounts awarded is limited only by t h e g e n t l e r u l e t h a t they not be excessive. Consequently, j u r i e s a s s e s s punitive damages i n wholly unpre- d i c t a b l e amounts bearing no necessary r e l a t i o n t o t h e a c t u a l harm caused. And they remain f r e e t o use t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n s e l e c t i v e l y t o punish expressions of unpopular views. Like t h e d o c t r i n e of presumed damages, jury discre- t i o n t o award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates t h e danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike t h e former r u l e , punitive damages a r e wholly i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e s t a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t j u s t i f i e s a negligence standard f o r p r i - v a t e defamation actions. They a r e not compen- s a t i o n f o r injury. Instead, they a r e p r i v a t e f i n e s levied by c i v i l j u r i e s t o punish repre- hensible conduct and t o d e t e r i t s f u t u r e oc- currence. I n s h o r t , t h e p r i v a t e defamation p l a i n t i f f who e s t a b l i s h e s l i a b i l i t y under a l e s s demanding standard than t h a t s t a t e d by New York T i m e s may recover only such damages a s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate him f o r a c t u a l injury." 418 U.S. a t 349, 350. I n t h i s case, defendants have constantly r e f e r r e d t o Madison a s a "public o f f i c i a l " , apparently t o bring t h i s case under t h e umbrella of New York T i m e s Co. v. Sullivan, supra. W e a r e s k e p t i c a l t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e p r i n t shop a t t h e University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, is indeed a "public o f f i c i a l " . I n Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, it was held t h a t a lawyer was n o t a public o f f i c i a l , although he had taken on a prominent case and was by v i r t u e of h i s profession an o f f i c e r of t h e c o u r t . Likewise, it may be contended i n t h e r e t r i a l t h a t Madison i s a "public f i g u r e " . Whatever h i s s t a t u s , it i s a question f o r t h e jury t o d e t e r - mine, because of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision t h a t t h e jury under t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e c o u r t i s t h e judge of both law and f a c t . A r t i c l e 11, Section 7, 1972 Montana Constitution. With appropriate i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e jury can determine t h e s e matters and t h e i r s t a t u s i n any t r i a l , unless otherwise s t i p u l a t e d . I n t h i s case, t h e r e f o r e , applying t h e r a t i o n a l e of t h e cases of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court on damages f o r l i b e l , i f Madison i s considered t o be a p r i v a t e person, he must prove: (1) t h a t t h e published m a t e r i a l was f a l s e ; (2) t h a t defendants a r e chargeable with f a u l t i n t h e publication; and (3) t h a t a c t u a l i n j u r y t o him ensued, f o r which he may recover h i s a c t u a l damages. Moreover, ( 4 ) i f he proves t h a t t h e publica- t i o n was made by defendants with knowledge of its f a l s i t y o r i n r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t i e s t h e r e o f , he may recover p u n i t i v e damages f o r such malice, but such malice does n o t include h a t r e d , personal s p i t e , i l l - w i l l , o r a de- sire t o i n j u r e . New York Times Co. v. ~ u l l i v a n , supra; L e t t e r Carriers v. Austin (1974), 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 4 1 L Ed 2d 745. I f Madison i s a public o f f i c i a l o r p u b l i c f i g u r e , he may recover only i f he proves t h e threshhold f a c t t h a t t h e publica- t i o n was made with knowledge of its f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s - regard f o r i t s t r u t h o r f a l s i t y . He could then recover h i s a c t u a l and p u n i t i v e damages. We now, therefore, reverse the judgment and order of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint by the District Court and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings, consonant with this opinion. Costs to the plaintiff. We Concur: Chief Justice , Justice \ \ . ' - Hon. Leonard H . Langen, District Judge, sitting for Mr. Justice Harrison