Title: Randolph v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13033 
 
LEROY J. RANDOLPH  vs.  COMMONWEALTH & another1 
(and a consolidated case2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 3, 2021. - July 16, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Scientific test, Buccal swab, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, 
Postconviction relief, Discovery, Appeal.  Homicide. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on August 19, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 13, 1984. 
 
 
Following review by this court, a postconviction motion to 
obtain a deoxyribonucleic acid sample, filed on December 16, 
2019, was heard by Christine M. Roach, J., and an appeal from 
that order was transferred to this court by order of Gaziano, J. 
 
 
Michael J. Traft for Leroy J. Randolph. 
 
 
1 Richard Randolph. 
 
2 Commonwealth vs. Richard L. Randolph. 
 
2 
 
Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Dennis Shedd for Richard Randolph. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  In December 1986, Richard Randolph was 
convicted of murder in the first degree following the killing of 
Brian Golden.  The petitioner in this case is Richard's nephew, 
Leroy J. Randolph.3  In 2020, Richard obtained a court order 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7, requiring Leroy to submit a 
saliva sample for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing to 
establish whether the DNA found on the murder weapon belongs to 
Leroy.  Leroy has appealed from the order.  For the reasons 
stated infra, we affirm. 
Statutory framework of G. L. c. 278A.  A defendant who has 
been convicted of a crime but asserts "factual innocence" may 
request postconviction forensic testing pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  An eligible defendant must 
engage in a two-step process beginning with a motion stage in 
which the defendant must present "information demonstrating that 
the analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator 
 
 
3 Because Leroy Randolph and Richard Randolph share the same 
surname, we use their first names for clarity. 
 
3 
 
of the crime in the underlying case," among other factors.4  
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b). 
If the judge finds that the preliminary requirements at the 
motion stage have been satisfied, a hearing will be scheduled, 
prior to which the Commonwealth must file a response including 
any objections to the requested analysis.  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 4 (c).  To prevail at the hearing, the defendant must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of the factors 
 
4 General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (b), requires that a defendant 
provide the following:  "(1) the name and a description of the 
requested forensic or scientific analysis; (2) information 
demonstrating that the requested analysis is admissible as 
evidence in courts of the commonwealth; (3) a description of the 
evidence or biological material that the moving party seeks to 
have analyzed or tested, including its location and chain of 
custody if known; (4) information demonstrating that the 
analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator 
of the crime in the underlying case; and (5) information 
demonstrating that the evidence or biological material has not 
been subjected to the requested analysis because:  (i) the 
requested analysis had not yet been developed at the time of the 
conviction; (ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of the 
conviction; (iii) the moving party and the moving party's 
attorney were not aware of and did not have reason to be aware 
of the existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; (iv) the moving 
party's attorney in the underlying case was aware at the time of 
the conviction of the existence of the evidence or biological 
material, the results of the requested analysis were admissible 
as evidence in courts of the commonwealth, a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the analysis and either the 
moving party's attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge 
denied the request; or (v) the evidence or biological material 
was otherwise unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
4 
 
enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b),5 including "that the 
requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence that 
is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  If the defendant seeks to analyze the DNA 
of a third party, G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c), also must be satisfied 
by demonstrating that the requested analysis "will, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, provide evidence material to the 
identification of a perpetrator of the crime."  "If such a 
showing is made, the court shall allow the requested forensic or 
scientific analysis, the results of which may be used to support 
a motion for a new trial."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 
799, 801-802 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 
505 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016). 
 
5 The defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence "(1) that evidence or biological material exists; (2) 
that the evidence or biological material has been subject to a 
chain of custody that is sufficient to establish that it has not 
deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with, replaced, handled 
or altered such that the results of the requested analysis would 
lack any probative value; (3) that the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis for 
any of the reasons set forth in [§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; (4) that 
the requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case; (5) that the 
purpose of the motion is not the obstruction of justice or 
delay; and (6) that the results of the particular type of 
analysis being requested have been found to be admissible in 
courts of the commonwealth."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6). 
5 
 
General Laws c. 278A, § 18, allows for appeals from orders 
allowing or denying a motion for forensic or scientific testing.  
However, as discussed in more detail infra, § 18 does not 
reference explicitly appeals sought by third parties. 
 
Background and procedural posture.  We summarize the 
relevant facts of the underlying criminal case and the motion 
judge's findings, reserving certain details for discussion of 
specific issues. 
 
The victim and his wife lived in an apartment below 
Richard's mother's residence.  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 415 
Mass. 364, 365 (1993).  Following an evening of drinking, 
Richard, Leroy, and other Randolph family members confronted the 
victim's wife, resulting in an altercation between the two 
families.  Id. at 364-365.  From the third-floor landing, the 
Randolphs threw various items at the victim, including a knife 
that struck the victim in the eye and killed him.  Id. at 365.  
Richard was accused of throwing the knife, and at trial the jury 
found him guilty of murder in the first degree.6  Id. 
 
Richard filed his first motion for a new trial in 1991, 
supporting his contention that he was misidentified as the 
perpetrator with additional witnesses' claims that Leroy had 
 
6 Richard also was convicted of assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A; and 
armed assault in a dwelling, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18A. 
6 
 
confessed to having thrown the knife.  Id. at 367-368.  The 
motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and the denial 
was affirmed, as were his convictions, in 1993.  Id.  In 2000, 
Richard filed a second motion for a new trial alleging errors in 
certain of the jury instructions; that motion also was denied.  
Although a single justice allowed his "gatekeeper" petition to 
appeal from the denial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the 
denial itself ultimately was affirmed.  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 303 (2002). 
In 2019, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, Richard sought and 
obtained leave to analyze DNA left on the murder weapon.7  The 
testing revealed that a match between Richard's DNA and DNA 
recovered from the murder weapon is extremely unlikely.  Richard 
subsequently filed a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c), 
seeking a DNA sample from Leroy to determine whether Leroy's DNA 
is present on the knife; Leroy, who was served with a copy of 
the motion, filed an opposition.  Following a nonevidentiary 
hearing in which Leroy participated, the motion was allowed.  
Leroy subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the Superior 
Court pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 18.  Due to uncertainty 
 
7 The initial analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
collected from the knife pursuant to G. L. c. 278A in 2017 was 
inconclusive.  In 2019, a new testing method called 
probabilistic genotyping was used, which is better suited for 
analyzing samples that contain more than one person's DNA. 
7 
 
regarding his right to appeal under § 18 from an order allowing 
a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c), Leroy additionally 
filed a petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  A single justice consolidated the appeals and reported the 
case to the full court to resolve the threshold procedural 
question as well as the substantive issue presented on appeal. 
Discussion.  1.  Procedure for third party appealing G. L. 
c. 278A order.  Before turning to whether the motion allowing 
the third-party DNA sample to be collected from Leroy properly 
was allowed, we consider the proper procedure for bringing such 
an appeal.  As discussed infra, G. L. c. 278A, § 18, is the 
appropriate avenue of appeal for Leroy as a third party to (and 
subject of) the c. 278A order at issue. 
As with all questions of statutory interpretation, we begin 
with the language of the section in question.  "[S]tatutory 
language should be given effect consistent with its plain 
meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do 
so would achieve an illogical result."  Commonwealth v. 
Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019), quoting Sullivan v. 
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  General Laws c. 278A, 
§ 18, provides: 
"An order allowing or denying a motion for forensic or 
scientific analysis filed under [c. 278A] shall be a final 
8 
 
and appealable order.  If the moving party[8] appeals an 
order denying a motion for forensic or scientific analysis 
the moving party shall file a notice of appeal with the 
court[9] within [thirty] days after the entry of the 
judgment." 
 
The first sentence of the section makes clear that an order 
"allowing or denying" a motion under G. L. c. 278A is "final and 
appealable."  However, the second sentence prescribes an appeal 
mechanism (i.e., filing a notice of appeal within thirty days) 
only for a "moving party" who appeals from "an order denying a 
motion."  The section is silent as to whether the same mechanism 
applies to a third party seeking review of an order allowing a 
motion requiring him or her to provide a DNA sample pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278A.10 
"As a general rule, only parties to a lawsuit, or those who 
properly become parties, may appeal from an adverse judgment."  
Corbett v. Related Cos. Northeast, 424 Mass. 714, 718 (1997).  
 
8 General Laws c. 278A, § 1, defines a moving party as a 
"person who files a motion under this chapter." 
 
9 Under Mass. R. A. P. 3 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1603 (2019), the notice of appeal is to be filed "with the clerk 
of the lower court," here, the Superior Court. 
 
10 General Laws c. 278A, § 18, technically does not apply 
here because Leroy is appealing from an order allowing a motion 
for discovery pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c), not an order 
allowing a motion for forensic analysis pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (a).  However, we see no reason not to apply to 
discovery orders the appellate mechanism for forensic analysis 
orders.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 482 Mass. 830, 833 n.6 
(2019). 
9 
 
See G. L. c. 231, § 113 ("A party aggrieved by a final judgment 
of the superior court . . . may appeal therefrom to the appeals 
court . . ." [emphasis added]).  However, "[t]here are limited 
circumstances in which a nonparty has been permitted to appeal 
from a judgment, despite its failure to intervene, for example, 
where a nonparty has a direct, immediate and substantial 
interest that has been prejudiced by the judgment, and has 
participated in the underlying proceedings to such an extent 
that the nonparty has intervened 'in fact.'"  Corbett, 424 Mass. 
at 718.  Here, we conclude that a third party who is ordered to 
provide a DNA sample pursuant to G. L. c. 278A has a right to 
appeal from that order, even where, as here, he or she has not 
intervened in the case. 
 
To begin, as noted supra, the first sentence of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 18, states plainly that whether a motion under 
c. 278A is allowed or denied, that decision is appealable.  It 
is true that the section thereafter references only the moving 
party with respect to appealing from a c. 278A order.  However, 
where the motion has been allowed, the moving party has 
prevailed and would have no reason to appeal.  Rather, only a 
person aggrieved by an order allowing a c. 278A motion, e.g., 
the Commonwealth or a third party from whom a DNA sample is 
sought, would be motivated to take an appeal in an attempt to 
have the order reversed.  To hold that orders allowing c. 278A 
10 
 
motions are appealable but that third parties aggrieved by such 
orders may not appeal from them would be an "absurd" and 
"unreasonable" result that "could not be what the Legislature 
intended."  Wassilie, 482 Mass. at 573, quoting Ciani v. 
MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  Cf. Corbett, 424 Mass. at 
721-722 (disallowing nonparty appeal where allowing appeal 
"would be in conflict with the express wishes of the 
Legislature"). 
Indeed, elsewhere in c. 278A the Legislature provided third 
parties with the right to participate in proceedings under 
c. 278A in order to protect their interests.  Under G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (c), the court may order discovery of biological 
materials "after notice to . . . any third party from whom 
discovery is sought, and an opportunity to be heard."  Just as a 
third party is entitled to protect his or her interests by 
participating in the motion hearing, we conclude that he or she 
is entitled to appellate review of an allowance of a c. 278A 
motion before being obligated to produce a DNA sample. 
 
Practical considerations also dictate allowing a nonparty 
to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  Barring a right to appeal 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 18, a third party would have to 
attempt to invoke our extraordinary superintendence power under 
11 
 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.11  To succeed, the third party would have to 
establish not only the absence of an alternative remedy, but 
also "a substantial claim of violation of [his or her] 
substantive rights."  Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. 
v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990), quoting Dunbrack 
v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 504 (1986).  Obtaining relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is no easy task.  We have emphasized 
that "[e]ven where an alternative avenue of review is 
unavailable, . . . no party 'should expect this court to 
exercise its extraordinary power of general superintendence 
lightly.'"  Aroian v. Commonwealth, 483 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2009).  
Moreover, with regard to the relief sought here, we previously 
have stated that "the taking of a buccal swab itself, without 
more, is not a substantial bodily intrusion warranting 
interlocutory review under G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Commonwealth v. 
Bertini, 466 Mass. 131, 138 (2013), citing Gilday v. 
Commonwealth, 360 Mass. 170, 171 (1971).  Thus, if a third party 
had no right to appeal under G. L. c. 278A, § 18, for all 
practical purposes he or she would be denied the right to appeal 
altogether.  In addition, requiring a third party seeking to 
 
11 General Laws c. 211, § 3, empowers this court to, among 
other things, "correct and prevent errors . . . if no other 
remedy is expressly provided." 
12 
 
appeal from a c. 278A order to proceed under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
would place all such cases in this court in the first instance, 
whereas the Appeals Court addresses c. 278A appeals brought by 
moving parties.  We see no sensible reason for such disparate 
treatment.12 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that third 
parties who are ordered to provide biological materials pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278A must be permitted to take an appeal in the 
ordinary course before doing so. 
As to the process a third party must follow, the 
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure state that where no 
particular process for appeal is "otherwise provided [for] by 
statute or court rule," parties must follow the ordinary 
appellate procedure, i.e., "fil[e] a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the lower court," pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 3 (a) (1), 
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1603 (2019), "within [thirty] days 
after entry of the . . . appealable order . . . appealed from."  
Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019).  
 
12 We also note that requiring a third party to seek relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, rather than taking an appeal as 
of right, would add considerable delay to what the Legislature 
intended to be a relatively straightforward process.  See 
Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 301 (2017) ("The 
Legislature intended G. L. c. 278A to make postconviction 
forensic testing easier and faster than it had been for 
defendants who sought such testing in conjunction with motions 
for new trials pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 [2001]"). 
13 
 
Accordingly, the process of appealing from an order pursuant to 
c. 278A is the same for both a third party and a moving party. 
 
2.  Need for third party to obtain leave under gatekeeper 
provision before appealing G. L. c. 278A order.  Because this 
case involves an underlying conviction of murder in the first 
degree that long since has been affirmed after plenary review, 
we also must consider whether a third party seeking to appeal 
from an order allowing a motion under c. 278A is obligated first 
to obtain leave to do so pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  That statute provides in relevant part:  
"If any motion is filed in the superior court after rescript, no 
appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such 
motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice of the 
supreme judicial court on the ground that it presents a new and 
substantial question which ought to be determined by the full 
court" (emphases added). 
At first blush, this language could be read to require 
leave from a single justice in order to take an appeal, 
regardless of the nature of the motion or the party seeking to 
appeal.  Indeed, we have required both defendants and the 
Commonwealth to file gatekeeper petitions in order to appeal 
from decisions on a variety of motions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 319 (2011) (Commonwealth's appeal from 
allowance of motion for new trial); Lykus v. Commonwealth, 432 
14 
 
Mass. 160, 162 (2000) (defendant's appeal from denial of motion 
to correct sentence); Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 
579 (1992) (Commonwealth's appeal from allowance of motion for 
new trial); Commonwealth v. Davis, 410 Mass. 680, 683-684 (1991) 
(defendant's appeal from denial of postconviction motion for 
funds for scientific testing of physical evidence). 
 
However, in our view, where a third party is ordered to 
provide biological material under c. 278A, that party is 
entitled to take an appeal as of right, without first seeking 
leave from a single justice under the gatekeeper provision of 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  To a great extent, the same considerations 
supporting a third party's right to appeal despite the lack of 
unambiguous authorization in G. L. c. 278A, § 18, similarly 
convince us that such an appeal must be as of right, even in 
cases of murder in the first degree.  In particular, requiring a 
third party to convince a single justice that his or her appeal 
"presents a new and substantial question" is at odds with the 
easier and faster proceeding contemplated by c. 278A.  Although 
we are confident "that single justices faced with gatekeeper 
applications under § 33E will allow cases to proceed to the full 
court in all meaningful matters," Smith, 460 Mass. at 322, we 
must acknowledge that if such an application is denied, that 
decision is final and unreviewable, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 477 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. 
15 
 
McGrath v. Massachusetts, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018), leaving third 
parties with no appeal at all.  Moreover, the gatekeeper 
provision exists "in recognition of the fact that the defendant 
already has received plenary review in the direct appeal."  
Smith, supra at 321.  Unlike the defendant and the Commonwealth, 
a third party did not participate in that plenary review.  There 
is no justification for depriving a third party of an appeal 
when he or she is brought into the case many years later. 
In addition, the gatekeeper statute applies only to cases 
of murder in the first degree.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  If we 
were to require a third party to file a gatekeeper application 
in this instance because the underlying conviction is murder in 
the first degree, he or she would be treated differently from a 
third party ordered to produce biological materials in 
connection with a conviction of any other crime who would be 
entitled to appeal, as of right, to the Appeals Court without 
any obligation to obtain leave from a single justice of this 
court.  Here again, we see no sensible reason for this disparate 
treatment of similarly situated third parties.  For all these 
reasons, we conclude that a third party need not file an 
application pursuant to the gatekeeper provision in order to 
appeal from the allowance of a motion under c. 278A, but rather 
may take an appeal, as of right, to the Appeals Court. 
16 
 
3.  Merits of G. L. c. 278A order.  As for the merits of 
the motion judge's order, where, as here, the motion judge was 
not the trial judge, we review claims of error independently 
because "we regard ourselves as in as good a position as the 
motion judge to assess the . . . record."  Commonwealth v. 
Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 299 (2017), S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  Leroy 
argues that Richard did not meet his burden under either G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) or (c), to demonstrate that Leroy should be 
required to provide a buccal swab.  We disagree. 
a.  Sufficiency of facts supporting request for scientific 
analysis.  To satisfy G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), the moving party 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient 
facts to meet six criteria outlined in the statute.  Moffat, 478 
Mass. at 297-298.  The six criteria are 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not been 
subjected to the requested analysis for any of the reasons 
set forth in clauses [§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
17 
 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the obstruction 
of justice or delay; and 
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of analysis 
being requested have been found to be admissible in courts 
of the Commonwealth." 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6).  In reviewing motions for 
forensic testing under G. L. c. 278A, we are mindful that the 
Legislature enacted the statute in order to remedy wrongful 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Linton, 483 Mass. 227, 234 (2019).  
As such, we construe the language of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), in 
a manner that is generous to the moving party.  Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 136 (2015). 
General Laws c. 278A, § 7 (b) (2), requires the moving 
party to establish by a preponderance of the evidence "that the 
evidence or biological material has been subject to a chain of 
custody that is sufficient to establish that it has not 
deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with, replaced, handled 
or altered such that the results of the requested analysis would 
lack any probative value" (emphasis added).  See, e.g., Linton, 
483 Mass. at 235-236 (chain of custody burden not met where 
three or more people had touched item to be tested and it had 
been stored in suboptimal conditions). 
Leroy first contends that the knife against which his DNA 
would be analyzed was not kept in a chain of custody such that 
18 
 
any results would be sufficiently probative.13  He claims that 
multiple people either did touch or likely may have touched the 
knife after the culprit threw it at the victim.14  He posits that 
the subsequent handling of the knife created a mixture of DNA 
from multiple individuals, thereby increasing the level of 
uncertainty associated with any potential match. 
Leroy's arguments regarding the knife's chain of custody 
largely are speculative.  The record supports Leroy's contention 
that the victim's wife and a single detective touched the knife 
without gloves following the murder.  All other assertions about 
other individuals handling the knife are not supported by the 
record.15  See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 493-
494 (2016) (parties' speculation about state of evidence not 
 
13 Richard argues that Leroy lacks standing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the showings under § 7 (b), and the motion judge 
expressed doubt on this point as well.  We share this doubt, 
particularly as to any issue concerning the chain of custody of 
the knife or the analysis of the DNA found thereon.  That 
analysis was conducted -- and Richard was excluded as a 
contributor to the DNA on the knife -- before Richard moved to 
obtain Leroy's DNA sample.  We need not resolve this issue 
today, however. 
 
14 Leroy notes that the victim's wife retrieved the knife 
from the victim's body immediately following the murder.  He 
argues that it also was handled by at least two detectives, a 
criminalist, trial attorneys, and potentially members of the 
jury. 
 
15 The motion judge noted in her decision that the court's 
docketed records of these proceedings from 1986 are very minimal 
and that little is known about the use of the knife at trial. 
19 
 
dispositive).  The motion judge found no routine handling of the 
knife in the record to undermine the requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (2), and we see no reason to disturb her 
findings. 
In any case, it is not clear that the alleged handling of 
the knife would render subsequent DNA analysis devoid of any 
probative value.  In Linton, 483 Mass. at 235-236, we affirmed a 
judge's ruling on a motion under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, denying DNA 
testing of evidence on the basis of an insufficient chain of 
custody where the evidence had been touched by three or more 
people and was improperly stored.  This finding was based, in 
part, on expert testimony that Y-chromosome short tandem repeat 
(Y-STR) DNA testing of an object that had been touched by three 
or more people would preclude a finding of material results.  
Id.  Here, in contrast, Richard intends to use a probabilistic 
genotyping method of DNA testing that, unlike ordinary DNA 
testing, is said to be able to provide results even in cases 
where complex mixtures of DNA are present.  Thus, Richard has 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that such 
testing would not "lack any probative value."  G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (2). 
b.  Sufficiency of showing that requested materials will 
provide evidence material to identification.  The allowance of a 
motion for forensic or scientific analysis generally requires, 
20 
 
inter alia, a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the "requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  In contrast, a third party 
can be ordered to produce biological materials only where the 
"party seeking discovery demonstrates that [such materials] 
will, by a preponderance of the evidence, provide evidence 
material to the identification of a perpetrator of the crime" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c).  Thus, where a third 
party's interests are at stake, the Legislature requires greater 
certainty that the biological materials produced by the third 
party will be material to the underlying criminal case. 
Leroy argues that Richard did not satisfy the heightened 
standard to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the requested DNA sample "will . . . provide evidence material 
to the identification of a perpetrator of the crime" under G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (c).  We disagree. 
Although the burden under § 7 (c) is higher than that under 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4), the moving party need not 
demonstrate that the requested biological material conclusively 
will identify the perpetrator.  Rather, the moving party must 
21 
 
establish a link between the material to be tested and the 
perpetrator.  See Clark, 472 Mass. at 137-138.16 
Here, a limited number of people were involved in the brawl 
that precipitated the murder, and one of those individuals must 
have thrown the knife at the victim.  The result of the recent 
DNA testing of the knife excluding Richard tends to demonstrate 
that he may not have been the culprit.  Further, a witness 
testified that she saw the knife in the air, saw it strike the 
victim, and then immediately looked up and saw only Leroy at the 
top of the stairs.  Additionally, the record suggests that at no 
point other than the time of the killing would Leroy have had 
access to the knife.  In addition, some witnesses have claimed 
that Leroy admitted that he threw the knife.  Leroy denies 
making any such admission, but at this juncture, neither we nor 
the motion judge need resolve this credibility dispute.  It is 
enough for present purposes that there is a basis to believe 
that Leroy handled the knife on the day of the murder, that is, 
that the DNA previously found on the knife could be Leroy's. 
 
16 Leroy contends that in Commonwealth v. Linton, 483 Mass. 
227 (2019), we held that where material has been handled by 
three or more people, any DNA testing would be immaterial to 
identifying the perpetrator of the crime.  Id. at 236.  Even if 
Linton did establish such a "three-person" rule, that case 
involved a motion for traditional Y-STR testing, not the 
currently proposed probabilistic genotyping. 
22 
 
Given these circumstances, a result matching Leroy's DNA to 
that located on the knife would make it more probable that he 
threw the knife at the victim.  Contrast Moffat, 478 Mass. at 
300 (connection insufficient between material to be tested -- 
cigarette butts found 200 yards from body three days after 
shooting -– and perpetrator, such that testing would not help to 
identify perpetrator).  The motion judge properly found that 
Richard established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
analysis of Leroy's DNA "will . . . provide evidence material to 
the identification of a perpetrator of the crime."  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (c). 
4.  Constitutional claims.  Leroy contends on appeal that 
the order to provide a DNA sample violates his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 because his DNA sample could be 
used against him in a future prosecution.  Relying on Jansen, 
petitioner, 444 Mass. 112 (2005), the motion judge ruled that 
Leroy's constitutional rights would not be implicated because no 
State action would be involved in the search; i.e., the DNA 
sample was being sought not by the Commonwealth, but by Richard.  
See id. at 119-120. 
We note that Leroy does not challenge this ruling,17 but 
instead focuses on how his DNA sample might be used by the 
 
17 Even assuming that the court order for Leroy's DNA sample 
amounted to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
23 
 
Commonwealth at a later time.  Although this is a legitimate 
concern, the issue before us today is the propriety of the order 
allowing the sample to be collected.  It would be premature for 
us to take up the question whether Leroy's DNA properly may be 
used as evidence against him in a future prosecution.18  We note, 
however, that Leroy is free to request, in the Superior Court, 
that his DNA be produced subject to an appropriate protective 
order.19  See G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c). 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court allowing 
Richard's motion to obtain a DNA sample from Leroy is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
and art. 14, it would be justified by probable cause.  The judge 
found that the DNA sample "will, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, provide evidence material to the identification of a 
perpetrator of the crime."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c).  Such a 
finding is more than the probable cause finding required for the 
Commonwealth to obtain a buccal swab from a third party.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kostka, 471 Mass. 656, 659 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 Mass. 113, 119 (2006) (Commonwealth 
must establish probable cause to obtain buccal swab from third 
party).  See also Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 774 
(2020) (preponderance of evidence is higher standard than 
probable cause). 
 
18 The Commonwealth has made no representations regarding 
whether it will seek to use the DNA sample at some point in the 
future. 
 
19 In their briefs, Leroy requests that we issue a 
protective order prohibiting the Commonwealth from using his DNA 
sample to prosecute him, and Richard indicates that he has no 
objection to such an order.  In our view, however, such a 
request is better presented to the motion judge in the first 
instance.