Title: Hopper v. Garner

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Paul E. HOPPER v. Tom GARNER

96-1423                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 12, 1997


1.   Officers & public employees -- resignation of city officer -- when it may
     be withdrawn. -- Under Arkansas law, a city officer's resignation
     may be withdrawn anytime prior to its acceptance; whether the
     resignation was actually withdrawn is, however, an issue to be
     resolved by the trier of fact.

2.   Officers & public employees -- resignation of city officer -- sufficient
     evidence for jury to conclude that city attorney's resignation was never
     effectively withdrawn. -- Where, in a letter to the mayor and city
     council, appellant declared that he was withdrawing his
     resignation as city attorney and that he would take his seat
     at the next city council meeting "unless a majority of the
     members of the council agree that [he] should not," and where
     the council then voted to reject appellant's withdrawal of his
     resignation, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
     appellant's withdrawal was conditioned upon the city council's
     approval; the supreme court held that there was sufficient
     evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
     appellant's resignation was never effectively withdrawn.

3.   Constitutional law -- right to jury trial -- secured only in cases so
     triable at common law. -- The right to a trial by jury under Ark.
     Const. art. 2,  7, does not secure the right in all possible
     instances, but only in those cases that were so triable at
     common law.

4.   Constitutional law -- right to jury trial -- usurpation-of-office case --
     right exists if plaintiff makes claim for fees or emoluments. -- The
     supreme court has recognized that although there was no common
     law right to a jury trial in usurpation-of-office cases when
     the plaintiff merely requested ouster of the alleged usurper,
     such a right might exist if the plaintiff also made a claim
     for fees or emoluments. 

5.   Constitutional law -- right to jury trial -- usurpation-of-office case --
     trial court did not err in granting appellee jury trial. -- Where, in
     his complaint, appellant requested both the ouster of appellee
     from the office of city attorney and the fees and emoluments
     he received while holding the office, appellee's
     constitutional right to a jury trial was triggered; regardless
     of whether the amount of fees at issue were liquidated or
     disputed, the jury still had to decide the underlying factual
     issue of who was rightfully entitled to the office; therefore,
     the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err
     when it granted appellee his constitutional right to a jury
     trial.

6.   Jury -- instructions -- must be given if evidence supports. -- A trial
     court must give a jury instruction if there is some evidence
     to support it.

7.   Jury -- instructions -- evidence supported appellee's argument that
     appellant accepted incompatible position -- trial court's decision to
     instruct on resignation by implication affirmed. -- Where the facts
     suggested that appellant represented two criminal defendants
     in the city court, the supreme court concluded that there was
     evidence to support appellee's argument that appellant had
     accepted a position incompatible with the office of the city
     attorney and affirmed the trial court's decision to instruct
     the jury on resignation by implication. 

8.   Estoppel -- appellant's letter created genuine issue of fact on issue of
     conditional withdrawal of resignation -- no merit to factual challenge to
     estoppel instruction. -- Where appellant's letter to the mayor and
     city council created a genuine issue of fact as to whether his
     withdrawal was conditioned upon the city council's approval,
     the supreme court found no merit to his factual challenge to
     the trial court's instruction on resignation by implication.

9.   Appeal & error -- decision affirmed when argument is neither supported by
     legal authority nor apparent without further research. -- The supreme
     court has repeatedly admonished appellants that it will not do
     their research for them and that it will affirm when the
     appellant's argument is neither supported by legal authority
     nor apparent without further research; because appellant
     failed to provide a factual or legal basis for reversal, the
     supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the
     estoppel issue. 

10.  Contracts -- duress -- showing required. -- A party asserting duress
     must show that the duress resulted from the other party's
     wrongful and oppressive conduct and not by his own necessity;
     in addition, he must show that the wrongful conduct deprived
     him of his own free will and volition.

11.  Contracts -- duress -- appellant failed to present evidence that
     resignation was rendered under duress. -- Where appellant explained
     that he resigned only because he wanted to keep his promise to
     the mayor and did not contend that the mayor threatened him or
     did any other wrongful or oppressive act, the supreme court
     observed that appellant's desire to protect the integrity of
     his word was an extraordinary exercise of his free will and
     concluded that he simply failed to present any evidence that
     his resignation was rendered under duress; therefore, the
     supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling granting
     appellee's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
     duress and refusal to instruct the jury on the issue.

12.  Statutes -- construction -- "may" and "shall" distinguished. -- The use
     of the word "may" instead of "shall" indicates that a statute
     is permissive or discretionary rather than mandatory. 

13.  Officers & public employees -- city attorney -- second-class cities not
     required to fill vacancy in particular manner -- trial court correctly
     refused to give instruction on appointing authority. -- The supreme
     court concluded that it may be inferred that the legislature
     deliberately used "may" in Ark. Code Ann.  14-42-112(a)(2)
     (Supp. 1995) to designate that the mayor and city council
     could appoint a replacement city attorney or that the
     appointment could be made in some other manner; because the
     statute did not require second-class cities to fill a vacancy
     in the city attorney's office in any particular manner, the
     appellate court held that the trial court correctly refused to
     give appellant's proffered instruction regarding the
     appointing authority.


     Appeal from Izard Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge;
affirmed.
     Appellant, pro se.
     J. Scott Davidson and appellee, pro se, for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This appeal involves a dispute over who is the rightful city
attorney of Horseshoe Bend.  The appellant, Paul Hopper, filed a
usurpation-of-office action against the appellee, Tom Garner. 
The jury rendered a verdict for Garner, and Hopper appeals. 
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
     In 1994, Paul Hopper was elected city attorney of Horseshoe
Bend, Arkansas.  During litigation concerning another matter,
Hopper discovered that two people had trespassed on his property. 
Hopper asked the prosecuting attorney to file a criminal trespass
action against these individuals, but he refused.  Hopper could
not file the criminal action as city attorney because he was
personally interested in the case.  Therefore, Hopper asked Mayor
Charles Mowder to appoint a special city attorney to litigate the
case.     
     On Wednesday, October 4, 1995, Mayor Mowder appeared at
Hopper's office to discuss the matter.  When the mayor refused to
appoint a special attorney, Hopper offered, "If you will sign the
paperwork, I will give you an early Christmas present and resign
as city attorney on Friday."  Before leaving town the next
morning, the mayor administered the oath of office to the
appointed special city attorney who then filed the criminal
trespass action in municipal court.  
     Meanwhile, Hopper placed on the mayor's desk a letter of
resignation that said, "As we agreed last night, I hereby resign
my office as City Attorney effective at 4:00 o'clock p.m. on
Friday, October 6, 1995."  Later that afternoon, Hopper discussed
the matter with the chief of police who persuaded Hopper to
tender his resignation in person when the mayor returned on
October 6.  Hopper then removed his letter of resignation from
the mayor's desk.  On Friday, October 6, 1995, the mayor returned
to Horseshoe Bend and demanded that Hopper return his resignation
letter.  Hopper complied.
     On October 9, 1995, the mayor sent the following letter to
the special city attorney:

     Since Paul Hopper has seen fit to resign as of Friday,
     October 6, 1995 at 4:00 p.m. there will be no need for your
     acting as special city attorney and we therefore rescind the
     authority and oath administered on Thursday, October 5,
     1995.  The new city attorney will handle this as well as all
     other matters.
The prosecuting attorney volunteered to handle the city's affairs
pending the appointment of a new city attorney, and obtained a
nolle prosequi of the criminal trespass action. 
     On November 8, 1995, Hopper attempted to withdraw his
resignation by sending the following letter to the mayor and the
City Council:

     As my resignation was conditional and the condition was
     not met, and since the council has not accepted the
     resignation, I withdraw my resignation as City Attorney
     effective at 3:59 o'clock p.m. on October 6, 1995.  I
     am this date reclaiming the office.  At the council
     meeting on Monday, I will take my seat unless a
     majority of the members of the council agree that I
     should not. 
At the aldermen's request, Hopper did not appear at the next city
council meeting.  
     On November 15, 1995, the mayor hired Tom Garner as the new
city attorney.  The next day, Hopper informed Garner, the mayor,
and the city council that he objected to Garner's appointment
because he had effectively withdrawn his resignation.  The City
Council agreed to review the matter at its next meeting.  
     During the December 11, 1995, meeting, the city council
rejected Hopper's attempted withdrawal of his resignation.  The
council also adopted resolution 95-07 thereby approving the
November 15, 1995, appointment of Tom Garner as city attorney.
     In response, Hopper filed a usurpation-of-office action
under Ark. Code Ann.  16-118-105 (1987), requesting ouster of
Garner from the office and the fees and emoluments he received
while serving as city attorney.  Prior to trial, the parties
stipulated that Garner received $8,870.85 for his services as
city attorney.  The jury rendered a verdict for Garner, and
Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.
                  I. Withdrawal of Resignation
     For his first argument on appeal, Hopper claims that he is
the rightful city attorney of Horseshoe Bend because he withdrew
his resignation before it was accepted.  Hopper is correct that
under Arkansas law a city officer's resignation may be withdrawn
anytime prior to its acceptance.  Rider v. City of Batesville,
220 Ark. 31, 245 S.W.2d 822 (1952).  Whether the resignation was
actually withdrawn is, however, an issue to be resolved by the
trier of fact. Id. 
     During the trial, Hopper argued that he withdrew his
resignation in his November 8, 1995, letter to the mayor and city
council.  In this letter, Hopper declared that he was withdrawing
his resignation, and that he would take his seat at the next city
council meeting "unless a majority of the members of the council
agree that [he] should not."  (Emphasis added.)  The council then
voted to reject Hopper's withdrawal of his resignation.  Based on
these facts, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Hopper's withdrawal was conditioned upon the city council's
approval.  Thus, we hold that there was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that Hopper's resignation was
never effectively withdrawn.  Accordingly, we affirm on this
point.  
                   II.  Right to a Jury Trial
     Next, Hopper asserts that the trial court erred when it
granted Garner's request for a jury trial.  According to the
Arkansas Constitution, "the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard
to the amount in controversy."  Ark. Const. art. 2,  7.  The
right to a trial by jury does not secure the right in all
possible instances, but only in those cases that were so triable
at common law.  McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988); Dunn v. Davis, 291 Ark. 492,