Title: MICHAEL R. OLSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MICHAEL R. OLSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 51698 P.2d 107Case Number: 84-70Decided: 04/11/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL R. OLSON, APPELLANT (APPELLANT/DEFENDANT),
v. 
THE STATE OFWYOMING, APPELLEE 
(APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
Sharon M. Rose 
of Vehar, Lehman, Beppler & Jacobson, P.C., Kemmerer, for appellant 
(appellant/defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., (argued), for appellee 
(appellee/plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
conviction of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor in 
violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"I. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of probable 
cause.

"II. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence as to the results of the Intoximeter 
test inasmuch as appellant's consent to the test was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made.

"III. Whether or not the 
court erred in denying appellant's motion in limine and allowing testimony 
concerning reports from `unknown' truck drivers.

"IV. Whether or not the 
court erred in instructing the jury that it was not necessary for the 
prosecution to prove unsafe driving."

FACTS

[¶4.]     A Wyoming highway patrolman 
was issuing a citation to a speeder on Interstate 80. A tractor trailer pulled 
up behind, stopped and the driver informed the officer that a car behind him was 
being driven erratically. Another truck driver pulled up and provided more 
information about that automobile. The patrolman turned on his CB and heard more 
discussion about the vehicle. The automobile in question went by; both truck 
drivers identified it as the vehicle they were describing earlier. The patrolman 
checked the speed of the car at 59 miles per hour. He followed the vehicle for 
approximately one mile down the highway and onto an exit ramp. The car was 
observed to weave slightly and to hug the inside of the ramp. The patrolman 
stopped the automobile. It was being driven by Michael Olson. The officer 
noticed the smell of alcohol and that Olson's eyes appeared to be bloodshot and 
watery. He asked Mr. Olson to perform two field sobriety tests; Olson did not 
perform these tests adequately.

[¶5.]     At that time the 
officer placed Olson in the patrol car, read him his "Miranda" rights, and gave 
some additional field sobriety tests. He then was arrested, charged with driving 
while under the influence (DWUI), and advised: "Your failure to submit to any 
test may result in the suspension of your license." Mr. Olson asked what would 
happen if he refused to submit to the test. The officer stated: "I advise your 
license to operate will be suspended." When Olson asked for how long, the 
officer replied that he did not know, that it was up to the motor vehicle 
department and asked again if Olson would submit to a test. Olson agreed to take 
the test. The results of the breath test showed a blood alcohol level of .12 
percent. Appellant Olson decided to get an independent blood test; however, he 
subsequently changed his mind.

[¶6.]     Appellant filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause to arrest, a motion in limine 
relating to the information given by the unidentified truck drivers, and a 
motion to suppress the Intoximeter test because the appellant did not knowingly 
and voluntarily consent to the test. The motion to dismiss and the motion to 
suppress were denied. The motion in limine was taken under 
advisement.

[¶7.]     After a trial by jury, 
appellant was convicted. The conviction was affirmed by district court and 
appealed to the supreme court.

PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
ARREST

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
the initial stop was illegal and, therefore, any evidence obtained as a result 
of that stop should not have been considered in determining probable cause for 
arrest. The arresting officer directly observed only that the vehicle was 
exceeding the speed limit, weaving slightly and hugging the exit ramp. Appellant 
contends that the officer did not stop him because of the speeding violation 
because he was not ticketed for that offense; and since the informant's 
information was not sufficient to provide a basis for even an investigatory 
stop, it was an illegal stop and the charge should be 
dismissed.

[¶9.]     The standards 
applicable to a confrontation between a citizen and a policeman investigating 
suspicious circumstances are stated to be:

"[I]n justifying the 
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. * * * And in making that assessment it 
is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

A policeman is 
not required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur merely 
because he lacks the necessary information required for probable cause to 
arrest. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). He may make an investigatory stop.

"An investigatory stop 
must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or 
is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.

"Courts have used a 
variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to 
authorize police to stop a person. Terms like `articulable reasons' and `founded 
suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance 
dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all 
that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole 
picture - must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the 
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
the particular person stopped of criminal activity." (Footnote and citations 
omitted.) United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981).

We have 
consistently applied these standards in Wyoming cases. A law enforcement officer may 
properly make an investigatory stop without probable cause to arrest. Lopez v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 682 (1982); Parkhurst v. State, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369 
(1981).

[¶10.]  Using the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, did the officer have sufficient reason to stop appellant? The patrolman 
testified that he was issuing a speeding citation when a truck driver pulled up 
behind and stated that a

"* * * Buick, silver or 
gray, coming eastbound * * * was all over the road, that they were trying to 
flag down a couple of girls in another car, * * * that this vehicle passed him 
on the left hand side [going into the] median * * * driving real crazy * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"He [said the] three 
occupants in the vehicle * * * were drinking.

* * * * * 
*

"[Then] another truck 
pulled up * * *[. The driver] * * * said [the car stopped] a few miles back, * * 
* [and] they * * *, all three of them got out of the car, put their beer bottles 
on top of the roof and were relieving [themselves].

* * * * * 
*

"[Then] the vehicle in 
question went by, [and the truck drivers] identified it * * * as the [same] 
vehicle they were describing * * * earlier. [It was] clocked * * * on radar * * 
* at 59 miles an hour [as it passed by. The speed limit in the area is 55 miles 
per hour.]

* * * * * 
*

"[The officer] fell in 
behind and followed it to the exit ramp where * * *

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [he] observed it 
to weave slightly * * * when it took the ramp * * * [and hug] the inside of the 
ramp [as it exited] * * *."

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that the informers' 
reports did not meet the "indicia of reliability" needed to justify the forcible 
stop of Olson. Adams v. Williams, 
supra. He cites Campbell v. Washington, Dept. of Licensing, 31 Wn. App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982), for the proposition that a police officer is 
not authorized to stop a vehicle in the absence of corroborative information. In 
that case, a passing motorist pointed to a vehicle and announced that it was 
being driven by a drunk driver. The police officer followed the vehicle but did 
not personally observe conduct which was indicative of driving while under the 
influence. The only statement upon which he could rely was conclusory. The court 
held that citizen informants, as opposed to professional police informants, are 
deemed presumptively reliable sources of information, but that the citizen 
report must also contain enough objective facts to justify pursuit and 
detention. State v. Wakeley, 29 Wn. App. 238, 628 P.2d 835 (1981). Campbell 
v. Washington, Dept. of Licensing, supra, contained no objective facts. 
Other courts have held that a report of objective facts may itself be sufficient 
and that personal observations of a police officer are not required for an 
investigatory stop. Marben v. State, 
Dept. of Public Safety, Minn., 294 N.W.2d 697 (1980); State v. Abadie, La., 
390 So. 2d 517 (1980).

[¶12.]  It is unnecessary for us to here decide 
whether the citizen reports were sufficient in themselves to justify an 
investigatory stop without independent corroboration. The officer did view a 
violation of the speeding law and erratic driving in the weaving and hugging of 
the exit ramp. The officer had a reasonable and articulate suspicion based upon 
a totality of the circumstances to investigate the Olson car further. The 
reports from the informers stated factual observations about the driving of the 
gray Buick, the activities of the occupants, and were generally 
non-conclusory.

[¶13.]  3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3 
(1978), p. 66, footnote 49 states:

"Consider W. 
Schaefer, The Suspect and Society 41-42 
(1967):

"`When writing opinions I 
have often been tempted to state the test of the reasonableness of police 
officer's conduct in terms of what the reaction would be if he had not done what 
he is charged with having done wrongfully. "If you would fire the officer for 
not doing what he did, then what he did was reasonable." * * I agree that it 
isn't a very stylish way of expressing the concept of reasonableness, and that 
somewhat circular reasoning is involved. But to me there is value in restating 
the question so that the whole problem may be seen.'"

[¶14.]  If the driving pattern of this car had 
continued, resulting in a highway fatality, society would be understandably 
shocked if the patrolman, under these circumstances, had not investigated these 
reports.

[¶15.]  Appellant also contends that there was 
not probable cause to make the arrest. He bases this argument on the theory that 
the field sobriety tests were necessary to establish probable cause. He urges 
this court to hold that a finding of probable cause is required before field 
performance tests may be administered. Appellant did not make a motion to 
suppress the field sobriety tests for lack of probable cause, nor did he raise 
this issue on appeal to district court. In his brief presented to the district 
court, appellant stated: "The officer then had the Appellant perform certain 
field sobriety tests which are not at issue herein."

[¶16.]  A defendant who wishes to preclude the 
use of evidence at trial which is obtained through a violation of his 
constitutional rights must act timely. Blakely v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 857 
(1975). The question was not presented to the trial judge nor to the district 
court. It does not rise to the level of plain error since a "clear and 
unequivocal rule of law" was not violated. Connolly v. State, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1008 
(1980). It, therefore, will not be considered on appeal.

KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 
CONSENT

[¶17.]  Appellant contends that the results of 
the Intoximeter test should have been suppressed because there was not a knowing 
and voluntary consent to the test. This is the third case to come before this 
court upon the question of what advice or information must be furnished to an 
arrested person asked to submit to a test to determine the alcohol content of 
his blood.

[¶18.]  In the first case, State v. Chastain, Wyo., 594 P.2d 458 
(1979), the driver was neither placed under arrest nor given any advice 
concerning his right to take or refuse the test under § 31-6-102(a), W.S. 19771 before the test was administered. 
Referring to § 31-6-102(a), we said that 

"(1) consent to a 
chemical test is given when one embarks upon the streets and highways of 
Wyoming, (2) 
the tests must be incidental to a lawful arrest for DWUI, and (3) before the 
test is given, some basic information must be given to a defendant." 594 P.2d  at 
462.

The basic 
information required to be conveyed to the arrested person was that his failure 
to submit to the chemical test may 
result in the suspension of his driving privileges.

[¶19.]  In the second case to come before this 
court concerning the same question, State 
v. Marquez, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1292 (1982), the driver was arrested and advised 
of his rights in accordance with the rule we announced in State v. Chastain, supra. The driver 
refused to submit to the blood alcohol test. Thereafter, pursuant to the 
provisions of § 31-6-102(c), W.S. 19772 his license was suspended. Section 
31-6-102(c) makes suspension of the driver's license of one refusing the test, 
mandatory upon the officer filing a sworn statement showing probable cause and 
that the driver refused the test. The arrested driver contended that the officer 
should have advised him that his license would be suspended if he refused the 
test, since this is what the statute contemplates and what actually occurs. We 
held in State v. Marquez that the 
arrested driver need only be advised that his license "may" be suspended upon 
refusal to submit to the test. We noted prophetically that "had [the officer] * 
* * told the driver that his driving privileges would be suspended * * * he may 
be in court claiming threats, intimidation, and duress." At 
1296.

[¶20.]  Here the officer, upon advising the 
driver that he was under arrest for DWUI, informed him in part as 
follows:

"Mr. Olson, * * * I am 
requesting that you submit to a chemical test of your breath, blood or urine. 
Your failure to submit to any test may result in the suspension of your 
license. Will you submit? You may go to the nearest hospital or clinic to secure 
a test at your expense or you may have the test administered by my agency at a 
place and by a person that we designate. Will you submit to a chemical test of 
your breath at our expense?" (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant 
concedes that the officer properly read the above statement from the implied 
consent law to him. After the officer had given this information, the following 
transpired:

"OLSON: What happens if I 
don't?

"OFFICER: I advise your 
license to operate will be suspended.

"OLSON: For how 
long?

"OFFICER: I really don't 
know. It's up to the motor vehicle department. Will you submit to a test? 

"OLSON: Yeah, I'll submit 
to a test." (Emphasis supplied.)

[¶21.]  Appellant contends that the statement, "I 
advise your license to operate will 
be suspended" was misleading, caused his submission to the test, negating a 
knowing and voluntary consent, and was contrary to our pronouncement in State v. Chastain, supra, and State v. Marquez, supra. In these kinds 
of cases we must recognize that fixed, rigid rules prohibiting officers from 
responding to questions are simply unworkable. Citizens are going to ask 
questions of officers concerning their rights in the operation of motor 
vehicles. An officer refusing to answer would be accused of being rude, 
uncooperative, insensitive and unfair in dealing with the driving public. To the 
extent, therefore, that State v. 
Chastain, supra, and State v. 
Marquez, supra, hold that a driver arrested and charged with DWUI may be 
told only that his license to drive 
"may be suspended," they are reversed. We hold now that if the arrested person 
is reasonably informed of his rights, duties and obligations under our implied 
consent law and he is neither tricked nor misled into thinking he has no right 
to refuse the test to determine the alcohol content in his blood, urine or 
breath, the test will generally be held admissible. In support of this holding, 
we note the following from State v. 
Marquez, supra:

"A fair reading of the 
entire implied consent law indicates that a person arrested for DWUI should be 
warned that his driving privileges will be in jeopardy unless he submits to a 
chemical test. We do not think precise words are determinative unless an 
arrested person can show that the language used by the arresting officer was 
misleading or was not entirely clear." 638 P.2d  at 1294.

[¶22.]  The officer here informed appellant of 
the statutory requirements concerning the implied consent provisions. He stated 
that he was arrested and requested he submit to a chemical test; that the 
failure to submit may result in the suspension of his license; that he could go 
to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure a test at his own expense or might 
have the test administered by the officer. He stated also that if he refused the 
test his license would be suspended and that the suspension time was up to the 
motor vehicle department. Section 31-6-102(c), W.S. 1977, supra, provides that 
upon receipt of the "officer's sworn report * * * the department shall suspend 
his operator's license." The officer was informing appellant that he would file 
the report. Appellant was not tricked or misled into taking the test. He was 
reasonably informed of his rights and duties under the implied consent law. 
There was no error in the admission of the test into 
evidence.

TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
REPORTS FROM THE TRUCK DRIVERS

[¶23.]  Appellant contends that the testimony by 
the officer at trial concerning reports from the truck drivers was hearsay, 
prejudicial and should not have been allowed. As the officer began testifying to 
these reports, appellant's counsel stated:

"Excuse me at this time 
Your Honor, would you please instruct the jury that this testimony as to 
anything the truck driver said is only for the purpose of showing what the 
officer's state of mind was and that it has nothing, it is not proper for the 
proof of what the truckers had to say?

"THE COURT: The jury is 
so instructed."

The officer 
testified that he had stopped on Interstate 80 to issue a citation; that a 
"trucker stopped to give * * * a report of the erratic driving" by a vehicle on 
the interstate, and then "a second tractor trailer stopped behind him * * * to 
advise * * [that the] same vehicle [was] operating erratically * * * a few miles 
behind * * *." As the vehicle went by, the truckers positively identified it as 
the vehicle they had reported being driven erratically.

[¶24.]  The admission of evidence at trial is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and absent a clear abuse will not 
be disturbed on appeal. Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294 
(1982).

"In criminal 
prosecutions, often the action of law enforcement agents would appear 
incomprehensible without evidence of information which had been given to them, 
and proof of what they have been told may be received for this purpose as 
against a hearsay objection." 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 417, 
p. 112.

A police officer 
is permitted to say he had the necessary information concerning possible 
criminal activity providing the statements are simply background information 
indicating that a police officer did not act without reason. United 
States v. Vitale, 596 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 
1979).

[¶25.]  The testimony is not considered hearsay 
because it is not offered to show the truth of the assertions but to show the 
officer's good faith and reasonable belief in the propriety of the action taken. 
Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021 (7th 
Cir. 1974). Testimony which explains why the police officer is at the scene of 
the crime is not hearsay. United 
States v. Gomez, 529 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 
1976).

"This court has held in 
situations similar to the present that the witness is limited to a statement 
that he took a particular action as a result of the information received and 
that it is not proper to allow the witness to testify concerning the conclusions 
of the informer that the defendant was guilty of a crime. * * * [The criminal 
investigator] did not testify, nor was he asked to do so, as to the conclusions 
of any informer as to the present defendant's involvement in the crime." State v. Turner, La., 392 So. 2d 436, 
440-441 (1980).

[¶26.]  Here appellant asked only that the jury 
be instructed that the testimony was being received for the limited purpose of 
showing the officer's state of mind at the time. The jury was so instructed. The 
testimony was properly admitted to show the reason the officer's attention was 
directed towards appellant's car. There was no error in the admission of this 
testimony.

INSTRUCTIONS

[¶27.]  Appellant contends that Instruction 9, 
which stated:

"You are instructed that 
it is not necessary for the prosecution in this case to show that the defendant 
did drive a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner, but that beyond a reasonable 
doubt the defendant did drive a motor vehicle at a time he was under the 
influence of an intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of 
safely driving said motor vehicle,"

allowed the jury 
to convict appellant of a drinking offense as opposed to a driving 
offense.

[¶28.]  In addition to Instruction 9, the jury 
was given Instruction 8 as follows:

"The manner in which a 
vehicle is being operated does not itself establish that the driver of the 
vehicle is or is not under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.

"However, the manner in 
which the vehicle is being operated is a factor to be considered in light of all 
the proved surrounding circumstances in deciding whether the person operating 
the vehicle was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a 
degree he was incapable of safely driving such vehicle."

Appellant 
conceded that this was a proper instruction, but contends that the combination 
of the two could lead to confusion of the jury.

[¶29.]  Instruction 9 adequately states the law 
as does Instruction 8. Instruction 9 informs the jury that it is not necessary 
to show that defendant did drive a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner. That was a 
correct statement of the law, for defendant may appear to be driving safely when 
he is so affected by intoxicating liquor that in an emergency he would be unable 
to adequately apply his brake, swerve or control his car. In this condition, he 
is incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle and is a danger to the public 
safety. It is not required that he first drive in an unsafe manner and perhaps 
become involved in an accident before arrest for DWUI is possible. As stated by 
appellee: "There is no requirement under * * * law that a lifeless and mangled 
body be pulled from the twisted wreckage of an automobile before an individual 
is arrested for drunk driving." Proof of unsafe driving is not required although 
such is competent evidence to be considered with all of the other evidence in 
determining whether the driver is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to 
a degree that he is incapable of safely driving.

[¶30.]  There being no error in instructing the 
jury nor error otherwise, the judgment of conviction of driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor is affirmed.

1 Section 31-6-102(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:

"Any person who operates 
a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is deemed to have given consent, 
subject to the provisions herein, to a chemical test of his blood, breath or 
urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if 
arrested and officially charged for an offense as defined by W.S. 31-129 [§ 
31-5-233]. The test or tests shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and shall be 
given as promptly as possible after the arrest and be administered at the 
direction of a law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe the 
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
upon a street or highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a 
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving the vehicle. The arrested 
person shall be told that his failure to submit to the chemical test may result 
in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle. The law 
enforcement officer shall further advise the arrested person that he may go to 
the nearest hospital or clinic and secure a test at his own expense or he shall 
have the test administered by a person at a place and in a manner prescribed by 
the law enforcement agency and at the expense of the arresting 
agency."

2 Section 31-6-102(c), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(c) If a person under 
arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a 
chemical test designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in subsection 
(a) of this section, none shall be given, but upon the receipt of the law 
enforcement officer's sworn report or statement that he had probable cause to 
believe the arrested person was driving or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a public street or highway while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving 
such vehicle, and that the person refused to submit to the test upon the request 
of the law enforcement officer, the 
department shall suspend his operator's license for a period of thirty (30) 
days subject to review as hereinafter provided." (Emphasis supplied.)