Title: Anderson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMEEL ANDERSON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 199, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1812001967 (N) 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   September 30, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 18, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jameel Anderson, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The State has moved 
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Anderson’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
In October 2019, Anderson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) and two counts of second-degree 
assault.  The charges arose from an incident on November 20, 2018, during which 
Anderson shot a person with whom he had had an altercation and a bystander.  The 
2 
 
victims were both transported to the hospital in critical condition and required 
extensive medical treatment and multiple surgeries.  As part of the plea, Anderson 
agreed to seek no less than five years of unsuspended prison time, and the State 
agreed to seek no more than ten years of unsuspended prison time.  After receiving 
sentencing memoranda and mitigation information, including a mitigation report and 
the report of a psychological examination that concluded that the events surrounding 
the shooting incident supported a finding of extreme emotional distress, on 
December 13, 2019, the Superior Court sentenced Anderson to ten years of 
imprisonment for PFDCF and to eight years of imprisonment, suspended for two 
years of probation, for each assault count. 
(3) 
Anderson filed an unsuccessful motion for modification of sentence.  
On February 22, 2022, he filed a motion seeking correction of an illegal sentence 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  The Superior Court treated it as a motion 
for sentence modification and denied it as both meritless and repetitive, and 
Anderson has appealed to this Court. 
(4) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence under Rule 
35(a) for abuse of discretion.1  To the extent the claim involves a question of law, 
we review the claim de novo.2  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, 
 
1 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
2 Id. 
3 
 
violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which 
it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by 
statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of 
conviction did not authorize.3  
(5) 
Anderson concedes that the applicable minimum-mandatory sentence 
for the PFDCF offense was five years based on his criminal history.4  He asserts that 
his PFDCF sentence is illegal because the sentencing judge did not sufficiently 
explain the aggravating factors resulting in the upward departure from the minimum-
mandatory sentence, as required by 11 Del. C. § 4204(n).5  More specifically, he 
argues that Section 1447A(c) imposed an enhanced minimum-mandatory sentence 
based on Anderson’s criminal history, so the Superior Court was required to identify 
additional aggravating factors to explain the ten-year sentence that it imposed. 
(6) 
The appeal is without merit.  As an initial matter, Anderson filed the 
motion for correction of illegal sentence more than two years after the imposition of 
sentence.  This Court has previously construed a motion for sentence correction 
based on the sentencing judge’s failure to explain the reasons for departing from the 
 
3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4 Opening Brief at 9; see also State v. Anderson, I.D. No. 1812001967, Sentencing Transcript, at 
4:10-11, 31:11-16, 33:4-8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2019).  The applicable version of Section 
1447A established a minimum-mandatory sentence for PFDCF of five years for a person with two 
prior felony convictions.  11 Del. C. § 1447A(c) (effective May 24, 2018, to June 24, 2019). 
5 See 11 Del. C. § 4204(n) (“Whenever a court imposes a sentence inconsistent with the 
presumptive sentences adopted by the Sentencing Accountability Commission, such court shall 
set forth on the record its reasons for imposing such penalty.”). 
4 
 
Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) guidelines as a claim that the 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner that must be raised within ninety days of 
sentencing.6  Absent extraordinary circumstances, which Anderson has not 
identified, his motion was untimely.   
(7) 
In any event, Anderson’s argument that the Superior Court did not 
sufficiently explain its reasons for exceeding the minimum-mandatory sentence is 
not persuasive.  Section 4204(n) provides that “[w]henever a court imposes a 
sentence inconsistent with the presumptive sentences adopted by the Sentencing 
Accountability Commission, such court shall set forth on the record its reasons for 
imposing such penalty.”7  The presumptive sentence for a class B violent felony such 
as PFDCF is between two and five years, and the SENTAC Benchbook also 
recognizes the five-year minimum-mandatory sentence established in Section 
1447A(c) for  a defendant with two predicate felony convictions.8   
(8) 
The court provided a detailed statement of its reasons for imposing the 
ten-year sentence in this case.  The sentencing judge observed that he had taken into 
account the aggravating factors as set forth in the State’s sentencing memorandum,9 
 
6 Richmond v. State, 2022 WL 2276282, at *2 (Del. June 22, 2022). 
7 11 Del. C. § 4204(n); see also Gibson v. State, 2020 WL 7213227, at *2 (Del. Dec. 3, 2020) 
(stating that Section 4204(n) “imposes a statutory duty upon a sentencing judge to state on the 
record the reasons for any sentence that falls outside the SENTAC presumptive sentence”). 
8 SENTAC Benchbook 2019, at 38, 39, 43, available at https://cjc.delaware.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/61/2019/01/Benchbook-2019.pdf.  We refer to the 2019 version of the Benchbook 
because Anderson was sentenced in 2019.  Gibson, 2020 WL 7213227, at *1 n.1. 
9 State v. Anderson, I.D. No. 1812001967, Sentencing Transcript, at 27:16-20, 29:21-30:1. 
5 
 
which included prior violent criminal conduct and the fact that Anderson had been 
conditionally released from Level V confinement less than a month before the 
shooting (implicating various SENTAC aggravating factors, including custody 
status at the time of the offense, need for correctional treatment, and lack of 
amenability to less-restrictive sanctions).10  The judge also emphasized the “dire” 
consequences to the two victims and that “[t]he consequences here could have been 
even worse, they could have been fatal, there could have been two dead 
individuals.”11  The judge also recognized the mitigating factors and suggested that 
he had “struggle[d] with whether to exceed the recommended sentence by the State” 
because of the “serious” nature of the offense.12  But weighing the aggravating 
factors, the mitigating factors, and defense counsel’s extensive presentation, the 
court imposed the ten-year sentence recommended by the State.13  We conclude that 
the court sufficiently explained on the record its reasons for the sentence that it 
imposed.14 
 
10 See State v. Anderson, I.D. No. 1812001967, Docket Entry No. 45, State’s sentencing 
memorandum (filed Dec. 11, 2019); SENTAC Benchbook 2019, at 132 (listing aggravating and 
mitigating factors). 
11 State v. Anderson, I.D. No. 1812001967, Sentencing Transcript, at 29:8-11. 
12 Id. at 29:16-20. 
13 Id. at 29:21-30:19. 
14 Cf. Lloyd v. State, 2022 WL 4372760, at *3 (Del. Sept. 22, 2022) (affirming denial of motion to 
correct illegal sentence because sentencing judge had sufficiently explained upward departure 
from SENTAC guidelines). 
6 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice