Title: Commonwealth v. Lucas

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11830 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MELISSA LUCAS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2015. - August 6, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press, Elections.  
Statute, Validity. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 11, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Duffly, J. 
 
 
 
Peter Charles Horstmann for the defendant. 
 
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Andrew Sellars & Christopher Bavitz for New England First 
Amendment Coalition & others. 
 
H. Reed Witherby, Matthew R. Segal, & Sarah R. Wunsch for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Russell C. Reeves, Kathryn M. Harrison, & Austin C. Reeves, 
pro se. 
 
Ilya Shapiro & Gabriel Latner, of the District of Columbia, 
& David Duncan for Cato Institute. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This case concerns the constitutionality of 
G. L. c. 56, § 42 (§ 42), which criminalizes certain false 
statements about political candidates or questions submitted to 
voters.1  Melissa Lucas was charged with violating the statute 
after her political action committee published brochures 
criticizing a candidate for public office.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we conclude that § 42, on its face, is inconsistent 
with the fundamental right of free speech guaranteed by art. 16 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Accordingly, the 
statute is invalid and the criminal complaint charging Lucas 
with violating it must be dismissed.2 
                                                          
 
 
1 General Laws c. 56, § 42 (§ 42), provides: 
 
 
"No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made 
or published, any false statement in relation to any 
candidate for nomination or election to public office, 
which is designed or tends to aid or to injure or defeat 
such candidate. 
 
 
"No person shall publish or cause to be published in 
any letter, circular, advertisement, poster or in any other 
writing any false statement in relation to any question 
submitted to the voters, which statement is designed to 
affect the vote on said question. 
 
 
"Whoever knowingly violates any provision of this 
section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six 
months." 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts; the Cato 
Institute; the New England Legal Foundation; the New England 
First Amendment Coalition, Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, 
Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association, Hearst 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  In October, 2014, Jobs First Independent 
Expenditure Political Action Committee (PAC) published and 
distributed brochures urging voters to vote against Brian 
Mannal, the incumbent candidate for State Representative for the 
Second Barnstable District.  In the brochures, the PAC made 
several statements about Mannal, including: 
"Brian Mannal chose convicted felons over the safety of our 
families.  Is this the kind of person we want representing 
us?"; 
 
"Helping Himself:  Lawyer Brian Mannal has earned nearly 
$140,000 of our tax dollars to represent criminals.  Now he 
wants to use our tax dollars to pay defense lawyers like 
himself to help convicted sex offenders"; and 
 
"Brian Mannal is putting criminals and his own interest 
above our families." 
 
 
On October 21, 2014, approximately two weeks prior to the 
general election, Mannal responded by filing an application for 
a criminal complaint in the Barnstable Division of the District 
Court Department against Lucas, the PAC's chairwoman and 
treasurer.  In the application, Mannal alleged that Lucas 
published knowingly false statements designed to defeat Mannal's 
candidacy in violation of § 42.  Mannal held a press conference 
announcing the filing and published a media advisory further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Television, Inc., New England Newspaper and Press Association, 
Inc., and New England Society of Newspaper Editors; and Russell 
C. Reeves, Kathryn M. Harrison, and Austin C. Reeves. 
 
4 
 
detailing the reasons for the criminal complaint against Lucas 
and suggesting that the brochures "could put her behind bars." 
 
On October 27, 2014, Lucas filed a motion to dismiss the 
application on the ground that § 42 is an unconstitutional 
restraint on free speech.  A probable cause hearing was 
scheduled for November 20, 2014 -- approximately two weeks after 
the general election.  Mannal won reelection by a margin of 205 
votes.  After the election, Lucas and the PAC filed an emergency 
motion for a preliminary injunction in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking to have 
the probable cause hearing stayed and § 42 declared 
unconstitutional.  At the preliminary injunction hearing, the 
PAC presented evidence that it had refrained from airing a radio 
advertisement as a result of Mannal's application and that it 
would continue to refrain from certain political advocacy until 
the constitutionality and scope of § 42 were clarified.3  A judge 
in the Federal court denied relief pursuant to the doctrine of 
abstention.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) 
                                                          
 
 
3 The withheld advertisement stated:  "As a mother, I'm 
worried about how State Rep. Brian Mannal is making my family 
less safe.  He filed a bill to make GPS monitoring optional for 
some sex offenders.  That's a bipartisan public safety law that 
he's trying to undo.  Then, he sponsored a bill to help sex 
offenders qualify for taxpayer funded lawyers.  That's the last 
thing I want my tax dollars spent on.  I want a State 
Representative who will keep my family safe -- not help sex 
offenders.  And that's why I'm voting against Brian Mannal." 
 
5 
 
("national policy forbid[s] federal courts to stay or enjoin 
pending state court proceedings except under special 
circumstances").  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit affirmed. 
 
After a transfer of venue in the State criminal 
proceedings, a probable cause hearing was held in the Falmouth 
Division of the District Court Department on December 18, 2014 -
- more than one month after the election.  Following the 
hearing, a clerk-magistrate issued a criminal complaint formally 
charging Lucas with two counts of violating § 42.  Lucas has not 
yet been arraigned and there has not been a ruling on her motion 
to dismiss.  In February, 2015, Lucas filed a petition in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief from 
the criminal complaint on the ground that § 42 is 
unconstitutional.  The single justice stayed the underlying 
criminal proceedings and reserved and reported the matter to the 
full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Threshold questions.  The Commonwealth 
argues that we should decline to address the constitutionality 
of § 42 in this case.4  The Commonwealth's first argument is that 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Commonwealth is represented in this proceeding by the 
Attorney General pursuant to G. L. c. 12, § 3.  The district 
attorney handling the prosecution of Lucas declined to file a 
brief, but submitted a letter requesting that the court 
determine the constitutionality of § 42. 
 
6 
 
the extraordinary relief afforded by G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
unavailable because Lucas has an alternative remedy in the form 
of a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint.  See, e.g., Maza 
v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996) ("request for 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied where the 
petitioning party has or had adequate and effective avenues 
other than G. L. c. 211, § 3, by which to seek and obtain the 
requested relief").  This argument is unpersuasive because, 
"where, as here, a single justice of this court reserves and 
reports an interlocutory matter to this court, we grant the 
litigant full appellate review."  Burke v. Commonwealth, 373 
Mass. 157, 159 (1977). 
 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that we should 
dismiss the complaint against Lucas on statutory, rather than 
constitutional, grounds because the statements at issue were 
opinions outside the scope of § 42.  See Cole v. Westinghouse 
Broadcasting Co., 386 Mass. 303, 312, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1037 (1982) (opinions could not be proved false and therefore 
were not actionable as libel); Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 
32 (1951) (political advertisement was "customary type of 
hortatory appeal commonly made to voters at election time" and 
not actionable).  The Commonwealth recites the familiar rule 
that we decline to consider the constitutionality of a statute 
that does not criminalize a defendant's conduct.  See, e.g., 
7 
 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 467 Mass. 371, 381 (2014).  Yet, in 
some contexts, resolving a case on narrower grounds may serve to 
perpetuate the chilling of speech protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 16, as 
amended by art. 77 of the Amendments.  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 373 (1978).  As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed, this concern may be 
particularly acute in the context of an election: 
"It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on 
elections only in the weeks immediately before they are 
held.  There are short timeframes in which speech can have 
influence.  The need or relevance of the speech will often 
first be apparent at this stage in the campaign.  The 
decision to speak is made in the heat of political 
campaigns, when speakers react to messages conveyed by 
others.  A speaker's ability to engage in political speech 
that could have a chance of persuading voters is stifled if 
the speaker must first commence a protracted lawsuit.  By 
the time the lawsuit concludes, the election will be over 
and the litigants in most cases will have neither the 
incentive nor, perhaps, the resources to carry on, even if 
they could establish that the case is not moot because the 
issue is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 
 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 334 
(2010), quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To 
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). 
 
These observations have substantial force here.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that § 42 proscribes only statements of fact as 
opposed to opinion and the statements at issue constituted 
opinion, a political candidate was nonetheless able to use those 
statements as the basis for an application for a criminal 
8 
 
complaint (and ultimately for its issuance).  The candidate then 
used the application as a political tool not only to discredit 
the statements but also to persuade the PAC to refrain from 
airing a political advertisement shortly before the election.  
Although Lucas filed a motion to dismiss the application, Mannal 
already had won the election by a narrow margin by the time of 
the probable cause hearing.  Thus, even if the application had 
been dismissed, the damage was already done.  See 281 Care Comm. 
v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 & n.12 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1550 (2015) ("State has constructed a process 
that allows its enforcement mechanisms to be used to extract a 
cost from those seeking to speak out on elections, right at the 
most crucial time for that particular type of speech.  And if 
the allegations turn out to be unfounded, there is no 
possibility of timely remedy" [citation omitted]). 
 
Importantly, this precise scenario is capable of repetition 
yet constantly evading review on the Commonwealth's theory that 
§ 42 does not apply to the particular facts of a given case.  
This is so because anyone may initiate a complaint under § 42 
and, in so doing, create lingering uncertainties of a criminal 
investigation and chill political speech by virtue of the 
process itself.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("threat of criminal 
prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker 
9 
 
from making true statements, thereby 'chilling' a kind of speech 
that lies at the First Amendment's heart").  See also Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) 
(political organization had standing to challenge 
constitutionality of statute criminalizing false campaign 
speech).  Because "a statute which chills speech can and must be 
invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated," 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336, we decline to dismiss this 
case on statutory grounds without first considering whether the 
statute is, in fact, constitutional. 
 
b.  Constitutionality of § 42.  i.  Protection of political 
speech.  Our constitutional system "presupposes that right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.  To 
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon 
it our all.'"  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964), quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).5  As a general proposition, therefore, 
any attempt by the government to restrict speech "because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content" is 
                                                          
 
 
5 See art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as 
amended by art. 77 of the Amendments ("The right of free speech 
shall not be abridged"); First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (First Amendment) ("Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech"). 
 
10 
 
presumptively invalid and the burden is on the government to 
establish its constitutionality.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543-
2544, quoting Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 
U.S. 564, 573 (2002).  See Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall 
River, 444 Mass. 188, 197 n.12 (2005).  These principles have 
their "'fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered 
during a campaign for political office."  Arizona Free Enter. 
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 
(2011), quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989).  See generally Opinion of the 
Justices, 387 Mass. 1201, 1202 (1982), quoting Colo v. Treasurer 
& Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 558 (1979) ("criteria which have 
been established by the United States Supreme Court for judging 
claims arising under the First Amendment . . . are equally 
appropriate to claims brought under cognate provisions of the 
Massachusetts Constitution"). 
 
Yet, the fact that "speech is used as a tool for political 
ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle 
of the Constitution."  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 
(1964).  Statements made during the fervor of a political 
campaign may fall within those "well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
11 
 
problem."6  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–572 
(1942).  See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 268-269.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the campaign speech proscribed by 
§ 42 falls within two of these classes:  fraud, see Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), and defamation, see New York 
Times Co., supra at 283; and is, thus, not entitled to 
constitutional protection.  We disagree.  The fact "that these 
areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content 
. . . [does] not [mean] that they are categories of speech 
entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made 
the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content" (emphasis omitted).  R.A.V. 
v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-384 (1992).  In others words, 
statutes that proscribe both protected and unprotected speech 
are not categorically removed from constitutional scrutiny.   
 
The Commonwealth's interest in preventing and punishing 
election fraud remains relevant to the inquiry into the 
                                                          
 
 
6 Within these classes of unprotected speech, which include 
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to 
criminal conduct, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-
470 (2010), "'the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly 
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no 
process of case-by-case adjudication is required,' because 'the 
balance of competing interests is clearly struck.'"  Id. at 470, 
quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-764 (1982). 
 
12 
 
statute's constitutionality.  See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).  But any legitimate 
interest in preventing electoral fraud must be done by narrowly 
drawn laws designed to serve those interests without 
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.  Id.  
The elements of fraud are "[1] a false representation of 
material fact, [2] with knowledge of its falsity, [3] for the 
purpose of inducing the plaintiffs to act on this 
representation, [4] that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the 
representation as true, and [5] that they acted upon it to their 
damage."  Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 
455 Mass. 458, 471 (2009).7  Section 42 plainly does not require 
a showing of reliance or damage.  See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 
2554 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Fraud statutes, for example, 
typically require proof of a misrepresentation that is material, 
upon which the victim relied, and which caused actual injury").  
Contrast Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 
Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003) (law targeting fraudulent 
charitable solicitations fell within fraud exception where it 
required "demonstrat[ion] that the defendant made the 
representation with the intent to mislead the listener, and 
succeeded in doing so").  Thus, the fact that § 42 may reach 
                                                          
 
 
7 See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 352 Mass. 636, 644-645 (1967) 
(larceny by false pretenses has same elements). 
 
13 
 
fraudulent speech is not dispositive, because it also reaches 
speech that is not fraudulent.8  See United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 316 n.2 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("fact 
that fraud is a separate category of speech which independently 
lacks First Amendment protection changes the analysis with 
regard to such proposals, although it does not necessarily 
dictate the conclusion.  The Court has placed limits on the 
policing of fraud when it cuts too far into other protected 
speech").  Consequently, § 42 does not fit within the 
categorical exception for the regulation of fraudulent speech.  
See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384. 
 
The Commonwealth's attempt to shoehorn § 42 into the 
exception for defamatory speech is similarly flawed.  "To 
prevail on a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must establish 
that [1] the defendant was at fault for the publication of a 
false statement regarding the plaintiff, [2] capable of damaging 
                                                          
 
 
8 The Commonwealth contends that fraudulent speech may 
nonetheless be unprotected absent a showing of concrete harm 
where the speech threatens "the integrity of Government 
processes."  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 
(2012).  However, the Commonwealth has not established that the 
range of speech proscribed by § 42 poses an actual and 
substantial threat to the electoral process.  See 281 Care Comm. 
v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1550 (2015) ("reliance upon 'common sense' to establish 
that the use of false statements impacts voters' understanding, 
influences votes and ultimately changes elections, is not enough 
on these facts to establish a direct causal link between [the 
statute] and an interest in preserving fair and honest 
elections"). 
 
14 
 
the plaintiff's reputation in the community, [3] which either 
caused economic loss or is actionable without proof of economic 
loss."  White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 442 
Mass. 64, 66 (2004).  Additionally, a defamatory statement 
against a candidate for public office is actionable only if is 
made with "actual malice."9  Lane v. MPG Newspapers, 438 Mass. 
476, 479 (2003).  See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283 
(civil); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74 (criminal).  Although § 42 is 
capable of reaching such defamatory statements, it is also 
capable of reaching statements regarding ballot questions and 
statements by a candidate about himself designed to enhance his 
own candidacy, i.e., statements that clearly are not defamatory.  
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 352 n.16 
(1995), quoting People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 180 (1987) ("A 
public question clearly cannot be the victim of character 
assassination").  As a result, § 42 does not fit within the 
categorical exception for the regulation of defamatory speech.  
See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384. 
 
Finding no historical exception into which § 42 may 
comfortably fit, we next consider whether the statute imposes a 
restraint on the content of protected speech.  "A statute is 
                                                          
 
 
9 Actual malice means either knowledge that the statement 
made was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false or 
not.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 
15 
 
content neutral only if 'it is justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech.'"  Opinion of the Justices, 
436 Mass. 1201, 1206 (2002), quoting Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  Section 42 proscribes false 
statements whose content is designed to affect candidates and 
ballot issues.  Because the "applicability of the [statute's] 
requirements can only be determined by reviewing the contents of 
the proposed expression, the [statute] is a content-based 
regulation of speech."  Opinion of the Justices, 436 Mass. at 
1206.  Accordingly, § 42 is presumptively invalid and the 
Commonwealth bears the heavy burden of establishing its 
constitutionality.  See Mendoza, 444 Mass. at 197 n.12. 
 
ii.  Level of scrutiny.  The parties dispute the level of 
constitutional scrutiny that we should apply to § 42.  Lucas 
argues that strict scrutiny is appropriate because the statute 
regulates the content of protected speech.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 
(2000) ("As we consider a content-based regulation, the answer 
should be clear:  The standard is strict scrutiny").  The 
Commonwealth advocates for an intermediate level of scrutiny; 
that is, whether the statute "advances important governmental 
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does 
not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further 
those interests."  Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal 
16 
 
Communications Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).  The United 
States Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny in a 
variety of contexts, including content-neutral regulations, 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968); 
prohibitions on commercial speech, Thompson v. Western States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); and "reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions" on voting, Burdick v. Takushi, 
504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788 (1983).  The Commonwealth's position is that 
intermediate scrutiny is required here as well, in light of 
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 
2551-2552, which it casts as the narrowest and therefore 
controlling opinion in that case.  See Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 169 n.15 (1976) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent 
of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . .'"). 
   
In Alvarez, six justices of the Supreme Court agreed that 
the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime to claim falsely 
receipt of the Congressional Medal of Honor, violated the First 
Amendment.  Alvarez, supra at 2543, 2551.  The justices did not 
agree, however, as to the appropriate level of constitutional 
17 
 
scrutiny.  A plurality of four justices concluded that because 
the statute regulated the content of protected speech, it was 
subject to the "most exacting scrutiny."  Id. at 2548, quoting 
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 
512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).  In contrast, the two concurring 
justices concluded that the more flexible intermediate level of 
scrutiny was appropriate because the statute did not encroach on 
a subject matter that traditionally has called for strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 2552.  In light of this reasoning, we find it 
doubtful that the concurring opinion of two justices in Alvarez 
abrogated the well-established line of First Amendment precedent 
holding that content-based restrictions of political speech must 
withstand strict scrutiny.  Accord 281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at 
782 (concluding that Alvarez did not alter level of scrutiny 
applied to regulation of political speech).  See, e.g., Arizona 
Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2817, quoting 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 ("'Laws that burden political 
speech are' accordingly 'subject to strict scrutiny'"); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("a content-based restriction on 
political speech in a public forum . . . must be subjected to 
the most exacting scrutiny" [emphasis omitted]).10 
                                                          
 
 
10 Following oral argument in the present case, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Reed v. Gilbert, 135 
S. Ct. 2218 (2015).  That case involved a signage regulation 
that treated categories of signs differently depending on their 
18 
 
 
In any event, we need not enter that fray because, under 
our Declaration of Rights, the applicable standard for content-
based restrictions on political speech is clearly strict 
scrutiny.  See Bachrach v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 382 
Mass. 268, 276 (1981) ("As a substantial restriction of 
political expression and association . . . the legislation at 
bar should attract 'strict scrutiny'").  See also First Nat'l 
Bank v. Attorney Gen., 362 Mass. 570, 587 (1972) ("Legislature 
has the power to regulate elections in order to prevent bribery, 
fraud and corruption to the end that the people's right to vote 
may be protected. . . .  But such regulation must be narrowly 
drawn to meet the precise evil sought to be curbed").  See 
generally Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 713 
(2012), quoting Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
content.  Id. at 2224-2225.  The Court observed that the 
regulation was "content based on its face. . . .  It defines 
'Political Signs' on the basis of whether a sign's message is 
'designed to influence the outcome of an election.'"  Id. at 
2227.  The Court held unanimously that the regulation violated 
the First Amendment.  See id. at 2232.  See also id. at 2236 
(Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).  Although three of the 
concurring justices questioned the application of strict 
scrutiny, six justices agreed that strict scrutiny was the 
proper standard.  See id. at 2236, 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  See also id. at 2231 ("obvious content-based 
inquiry does not evade strict scrutiny review simply because an 
event [i.e., an election] is involved").  The Reed case casts 
additional doubt on the Commonwealth's position in the present 
case that the Supreme Court would apply intermediate scrutiny to 
the content-based restriction of political speech imposed by 
§ 42. 
 
19 
 
Mass. 83, 89 n. 8 (1983), S.C., 393 Mass. 819 (1985) ("we have 
rejected the assertion that art. 16 can 'extend no further than 
the comparable provisions of the First Amendment'").  "We adhere 
to the principle that this court will exercise its independent 
judgment to uphold the cherished protections of the Declaration 
of Rights as a matter of State constitutional law."  Mendoza, 
444 Mass. at 201.  Accordingly, we now turn to whether § 42 can 
withstand strict scrutiny under art. 16. 
 
iii.  Scrutiny under art. 16.  In order for § 42 to 
withstand strict scrutiny, the government must establish that 
the statute is both "necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end."  Opinion 
of the Justices, 436 Mass. at 1206, quoting Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).11  
The Commonwealth argues that it has a compelling interest in the 
maintenance of free and fair elections.  As a general matter, we 
agree.  See art. 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
("All elections ought to be free"); Opinion of the Justices, 385 
Mass. 1201, 1206 (1982) ("Commonwealth unquestionably has a 
compelling interest in the over-all regularity of the election 
process"); Anderson v. Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 193, appeal 
                                                          
 
 
11 Although we decide this case under art. 16, we draw on 
First Amendment jurisprudence insofar as it is instructive of 
the application of the strict scrutiny standard. 
 
20 
 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 951 (1978) ("Commonwealth has a substantial, 
compelling interest in assuring the fairness of elections and 
the appearance of fairness in the electoral process").  See also 
Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 ("A State indisputably has a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process").  
We also agree that this interest includes efforts by the 
government to thwart political corruption, voter intimidation, 
and election fraud.  See Cepulonis v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930, 935-936 (1983).  See also Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  
However, the Commonwealth "does not have carte blanche to 
regulate the dissemination of false statements during political 
campaigns," 281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at 787, and its "claim that 
it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise 
decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be 
viewed with some skepticism."  Id., quoting Eu, supra at 228. 
 
In this case, such skepticism is well founded, as the 
Commonwealth has not established that § 42 actually is necessary 
to serve the compelling interest of fair and free elections.  
Suppose, for example, that a candidate makes the following false 
statement at a preelection debate:  "I received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor."  This constitutes (1) a false 
statement, (2) made about a candidate, (3) designed to aid that 
candidate win an election, and therefore a crime pursuant to 
21 
 
§ 42.  Such a result raises serious doubts about the 
constitutionality of § 42 in light of Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 
2551 (striking down on First Amendment grounds Federal statute 
criminalizing false Medal of Honor claims).  Alvarez teaches 
that the criminalization of such falsehoods is unnecessary 
because a remedy already exists:  "the simple truth."  Id. at 
2550. 
 
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied this same 
principle to conclude that statutes broadly suppressing false 
statements about candidates or ballot questions cannot withstand 
strict scrutiny for the simple reason that "[o]ur constitutional 
election system already contains the solution to the problem 
that [such statutes are] meant to address."  Rickert v. Public 
Disclosure Comm'n, 161 Wash. 2d 843, 855 (2007) (en banc).  That 
solution is counterspeech.  See id. (" In a political campaign, a 
candidate's factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, 
and correction by, the erring candidate's political opponent" 
[quotations and citations omitted]); 281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at 
793 ("Especially as to political speech, counterspeech is the 
tried and true buffer and elixir").  Governmental efforts to 
supplant political counterspeech with the specter of 
incarceration date back to the earliest years of our 
constitutional democracy.  The Sedition Act of 1798, c. 74, 1 
Stat. 596, enacted by Congress just seven years after the 
22 
 
ratification of the First Amendment, made it a crime to 
"knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, 
uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of the United States 
. . . with intent to defame the said government . . . or to 
bring [it] . . . into contempt or disrepute."  Id. at § 2.  In 
1799, the Legislature issued a declaration of support for the 
Sedition Act.  Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the 
Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 45 Am. J. Legal Hist. 154, 172 (2001).  In the 
election of 1800, however, the unconstitutionality of the 
Sedition Act was a prominent theme in Thomas Jefferson's 
successful campaign for the presidency.  See Amar, The Bill of 
Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1149-1150 (1991).  
As the Supreme Court has observed, history has proven Jefferson 
right.  See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 274-276.  The fabric 
of jurisprudence woven across the years following the passage of 
the Sedition Act and, indeed, § 42 has illustrated vividly that 
the importance of preserving "the freedom to think for 
ourselves," Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356, must be elevated 
over even those well-intentioned laws that have the effect of 
"censoring pure speech or speakers in order to 'improve the 
quality' or 'increase the fairness' of public debate."  
Bachrach, 382 Mass. at 281, quoting Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 
23 
 
Term Forward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1980). 
 
The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish these principles 
with the rather remarkable argument that the election context 
gives the government broader authority to restrict speech.  The 
opposite is true.  See, e.g., Weld for Governor v. Director of 
the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 407 Mass. 761, 769 
(1990), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("First 
Amendment rights of speech and association have their 'fullest 
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office'"); Anderson, 376 Mass. at 191 
n.14 ("open discussion of political candidates and elections is 
basic First Amendment material.  Government domination of the 
expression of ideas is repugnant to our system of constitutional 
government").  See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) 
("the speech at issue is 'at the core of our electoral process 
and of the First Amendment freedoms,' . . . an area of public 
policy where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith" 
[citation omitted]).  Thus, in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 
92, 92 (1975), we struck down a similar statute, G. L. c. 56, 
§ 41, which made it a crime to distribute anonymous pamphlets 
"designed to aid or to defeat any candidate for nomination or 
election to any public office or any question submitted to the 
voters."  We observed that there was "significant authority that 
24 
 
a disclosure requirement relating to election pamphlets cannot 
survive a First Amendment challenge," Dennis, supra at 98, 
notwithstanding the government's constitutional interest in 
ensuring fair and free elections.  See art. 9. 
 
Equally remarkable is the Commonwealth's reliance on the 
Citizens United case to defend greater restrictions on election 
speech.  In that case, the Supreme Court departed from precedent 
to strike down on First Amendment grounds a Federal statute 
restricting the ability of corporations to make political 
expenditures from general treasury funds.  Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 318-319, 372.   The Commonwealth contends that, as a 
result of this decision, heavily funded groups are now able to 
skew political discourse so as to render counterspeech an 
ineffective remedy for falsehood.12  Regardless of the essential 
impact of Citizens United on the democratic process, that 
decision does not provide any support for reducing the 
constitutional protection afforded core political speech. 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that the use of calculated falsehoods and 
vitriolic rhetoric to sway elections long predates the Supreme 
Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010).  The election of 1800, discussed supra, is 
particularly notable in this regard, with supporters of Thomas 
Jefferson referring to John Adams as a "hideous hermaphroditical 
character which has neither the force or firmness of a man, nor 
the gentleness and sensibility of a woman," and supporters of 
Adams referring to Jefferson as "the son of a half-breed Indian 
squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father."  Shugerman, The 
Golden or Bronze Age of Judicial Selection?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 
Bull. 69, 74 (2015). 
 
25 
 
 
Latching on to language from McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349,  that 
"[t]he state interest in preventing fraud and libel . . . 
carries special weight during election campaigns," the 
Commonwealth points out that § 42 reaches falsehoods far more 
insidious and difficult to discredit on the eve of an election 
than, for example, the lie uttered in Alvarez.  Accordingly, the 
argument goes, § 42 is necessary because, in contrast to 
Alvarez, the shortened time frame of an election may render the 
truth an ineffective remedy.  This point is well taken, but 
nonetheless fails because, like the statute at issue in 
McIntyre, § 42 is not narrowly tailored.  McIntyre, supra at 357 
(striking down on First Amendment grounds State statute 
prohibiting anonymous political leafletting). 
 
Section 42 applies not only to elections of public 
officers, but also to ballot issues.  See McIntyre, supra at 
351-352.  It may be invoked as soon as one announces his or her 
candidacy -- not merely on the eve of the election.  Cf. id. at 
352 ("It applies not only to leaflets distributed on the eve of 
an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, but also 
to those distributed months in advance").  It reaches not only 
those statements that are widely disseminated through commercial 
advertisement, but also those exchanged between two friends 
engaged in a spirited political discussion in a local pub.  Cf. 
id. at 351 ("It applies not only to the activities of candidates 
26 
 
and their organized supporters, but also to individuals acting 
independently and using only their own modest resources"); 
Alvarez, supra at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("the 
prohibition may be applied where it should not be applied, for 
example, to bar stool braggadocio or, in the political arena, 
subtly but selectively to speakers that the Government does not 
like").  Moreover, as reflected in the Medal of Honor 
hypothetical, it applies to a broad range of content that does 
not pose a realistic threat to the maintenance of fair and free 
elections.  Cf. McIntyre, supra at 351 ("Although these 
ancillary benefits are assuredly legitimate, we are not 
persuaded that they justify [the statute's] extremely broad 
prohibition").  Thus, the more apt observation from McIntyre is 
this:  "The State may, and does, punish fraud directly.  But it 
cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by indiscriminately 
outlawing a category of speech, based on its content, with no 
necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented."  
Id. at 357.  See State ex rel. Public Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 
Vote No! Comm., 135 Wash. 2d 618, 630 (1998) (en banc) ("the 
State asserts McIntyre impliedly suggested laws prohibiting 
false political statements are constitutional.  However the 
inference to be drawn from McIntyre is just the opposite"). 
 
As the facts of this case demonstrate, the danger of such 
breadth is that the statute may be manipulated easily into a 
27 
 
tool for subverting its own justification, i.e., the fairness 
and freedom of the electoral process, through the chilling of 
core political speech.  See First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 
362 Mass. 570, 587-588 (1972), quoting United States v. Congress 
of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 155 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring) ("A statute which, in the claimed interest of free 
and honest elections, curtails the very freedoms that make 
possible exercise of the franchise by an informed and thinking 
electorate, and does this by . . . serving as a prior restraint 
upon expression not in fact forbidden as well as upon what is, 
cannot be squared with the First Amendment").  See also Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. at 2550 ("suppression of speech by the government can 
make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so"); 281 Care 
Comm., 766 F.3d at 796 ("statute itself actually opens a 
Pandora's box to disingenuous politicking"); 119 Vote No! Comm., 
135 Wash. 2d at 626, 627, quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 352 n.16  
("a well-publicized, yet bogus, complaint to the [commission] on 
election eve raises the same concern [as 'an eleventh-hour 
anonymous smear campaign']"). 
 
The Commonwealth suggests that we could curb this danger by 
narrowly construing § 42 to regulate only fraudulent and 
defamatory speech.  Although the statute could be narrowly 
construed in some respects, it is not amenable to the 
construction proposed by the Commonwealth, see Blixt v. Blixt, 
28 
 
437 Mass. 649, 674 (2002), quoting School Comm. of Greenfield v. 
Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 79 (1982) ("It is our duty 
to construe statutes so as to avoid such constitutional 
difficulties, if reasonable principles of interpretation permit 
it");13 and even if we were to read the statute narrowly to 
encompass only knowingly false statements of fact, the 
distinction between fact and opinion is not always obvious and, 
evidently, was not obvious to the clerk-magistrate who issued 
the criminal complaint in this case.  See King v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 709 (1987) ("it is much easier to 
recognize the significance of the distinction between statements 
of opinion and statements of fact than it is to make the 
                                                          
 
 
13 For example, although the language of the statute does 
not expressly limit its reach to false statements of fact, we 
could imply such a limitation from the principle that an opinion 
cannot be proven false.   See Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 
748, 756 (2000) ("subjective statements of opinion . . . were 
not susceptible of being proven false").  Similarly, although 
the statute does not expressly require that the publisher of the 
statement know of its falsity, we could imply such a limitation 
from the principle that statutes criminalizing speech should be 
construed to include a scienter requirement.  See Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 471 Mass. 138, 143 (2015).  What we will not do, 
however, is interpret the statute in a way that is plainly 
contrary to its language.  See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 
674 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2013), quoting Mile Rd. 
Corp. v. Boston, 345 Mass. 379, 383, appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 
541 (1963) ("A statute, of course, must be construed, if 
possible, to avoid serious constitutional doubts.  This 
principle, however, does not authorize the judiciary to supply 
qualifying words not fairly to be imported from the actual 
language of the statute").  As explained above, the plain 
language of § 42 criminalizes an array of false statements that 
extend well beyond fraud and defamation. 
 
29 
 
distinction in a particular case").  "[S]uch a determination 
itself may be viewed [by the electorate] as a sanction by the 
State" [quotation and citation omitted].  Susan B. Anthony List, 
134 S. Ct. at 2346. 
 
Moreover, even in cases involving seemingly obvious 
statements of political fact, distinguishing between truth and 
falsity may prove exceedingly difficult.  Assertions regarding a 
candidate's voting record on a particular issue may very well 
require an in-depth analysis of legislative history that will 
often be ill-suited to the compressed time frame of an election.  
Thus, in the election context, as elsewhere, it is apparent 
"that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas -- that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, 
and that truth is the only ground upon which [the people's] 
wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution."  Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 415 
Mass. 258, 268 (1993), quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  See 281 Care Comm., 
766 F.3d at 796 ("citizenry, not the government, should be the 
monitor of falseness in the political arena"). 
 
The foregoing problems make it all the more concerning that 
anyone may file an application for a criminal complaint under 
§ 42.  See 281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at 790.  The risk inherent 
30 
 
in such an environment is that an individual, unconstrained by 
the ethical obligations imposed on government officials, will 
file an unmeritorious application "at a tactically calculated 
time so as to divert the attention of an entire campaign from 
the meritorious task at hand of supporting or defeating a ballot 
question [or candidate]."  Id.  See Susan B. Anthony List, 134 
S. Ct. at 2345 ("Because the universe of potential complainants 
is not restricted to state officials who are constrained by 
explicit guidelines or ethical obligations, there is a real risk 
of complaints from, for example, political opponents").  See 
generally Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 comment 1, 426 Mass. 1397 (1998) 
("prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice").  
As was the case here, by the time of the probable cause hearing 
the election may well be over and the damage will be done.  See 
281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at 792.  Thus, even under a narrow 
construction, there is a genuine risk that the operation of § 42 
will cast an unacceptable chill on core political speech.  The 
statute cannot withstand strict scrutiny.14 
 
3.  Conclusion.   We conclude that § 42 cannot be limited 
to the criminalization of fraudulent or defamatory speech, is 
neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to advancing the 
                                                          
 
 
14 To the extent that a contrary conclusion could be drawn 
from our passing reference to § 42 in Opinion of the Justices, 
363 Mass. 909, 916 (1973), that conclusion is overruled. 
 
31 
 
Commonwealth's interest in fair and free elections, and chills 
the very exchange of ideas that gives meaning to our electoral 
system.  For all of these reasons, we hold that § 42 is 
antagonistic to the fundamental right of free speech enshrined 
in art. 16 of our Declaration of Rights and, therefore, is 
invalid.  Accordingly, the criminal complaint charging Lucas 
with violating § 42 must be dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.