Title: Reed v. Getter Trucking, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Reed v. Getter Trucking, Inc.1987 WY 51735 P.2d 1370Case Number: 86-273Decided: 04/28/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ralph 
REED, Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

GETTER 
TRUCKING, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant)

 
 
Charles 
W. Anderson of Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, P.C., for 
Appellant.

 
 
Thomas 
L. Sansonetti of Sheehan, Stevens & Sansonetti, for Appellee. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Ralph Reed 
filed an action in district court against appellee Getter Trucking, Inc. to 
recover the cost to repair or replace a machine lathe alleged to have been 
damaged during transportation by Getter Trucking. Reed has appealed from the 
order granting Getter Trucking's motion for summary 
judgment.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     During the latter part 
of May 1985, Reed purchased a Monarch lathe which was in excellent working order 
and capable of extremely precise machining at the time of the sale. On May 23, 
1985, a Getter Trucking driver, Ron Morgan, arrived in Englewood, Colorado, in a 
flatbed truck to transport the lathe to Gillette, Wyoming. The lathe was properly loaded on the 
flatbed of the truck under the joint supervision of Reed and Morgan. The lathe 
was secured on the flatbed by tightening chains around its legs, and a winch 
line was "snugly" attached to the lathe, with the approval of Reed, for safety 
purposes in case the tie-down chains came loose and the lathe began to fall off 
the truck onto the highway. Morgan stopped at the port of entry on the way to 
Gillette, where he "used the winch to re-snug the line to the lathe" after 
noticing that it had been loosened from the lathe. At the point of destination 
in Gillette, the lathe was removed from the flatbed of the truck with Getter 
Trucking's forklift, taken down a shale driveway while suspended in the air, and 
deposited just inside the door of Reed's workshop. Reed and his wife then moved 
the lathe to its final resting place by jacking it up and rolling it on steel 
rods. After the lathe was in place, Reed determined that the lathe bed was off 
by .005 of an inch, which variance made the machine inoperable and of no 
value.

 
 

[¶4.]     The court found from 
examining the affidavits of the parties and the deposition of Reed that Getter 
Trucking was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact in that the damage to the lathe may have 
been caused by any number of different factors and could not be related by a 
preponderance of the evidence to the fastening of the winch line to the 
lathe.

 
 

[¶5.]     Reed raises the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
"1. Did 
the exist[e]nce of genuine issues as to material facts as presented in the 
affidavits filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment in this case 
preclude the grant[ing] of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment?

"2. Does 
the conflict in the evidence concerning the causal relationship between the 
negligent operation of the winch on defendant's truck and the injury sustained 
by plaintiff's lathe constitute a genuine issue of material 
facts?

"3. Was 
it error to find that a preponderance of the evidence does not show that 
plaintiff's injury was caused by the operation of the power winch on defendant's 
truck on the lathe?

"4. Was 
the district court in error in not finding defendant liable without direct proof 
of particular negligent acts when the evidence shows that plaintiff's lathe 
became injured during the period that it was in defendant's sole 
custody[?]"

 
 

[¶6.]     In essence, Reed 
questions whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact which 
precludes summary judgment. We will discuss his issues in that 
context.

 
 

[¶7.]     It is a contradiction 
to find that Getter Trucking is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and also to find that Getter 
Trucking is entitled to judgment on the basis of a preponderance of the 
evidence. The most acceptable definition of the phrase "preponderance of the 
evidence" seems to be:

 
 
"Proof 
which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested 
fact is more probable than its nonexistence." Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 
599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1979) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
It is 
inescapable that there must be a genuine issue of fact in order to make a 
finding on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, we must 
answer the dispositive question of whether there is a genuine issue as to any 
material fact.

 
 

[¶8.]     Although Reed suggested 
for the first time in his brief that the damage to the lathe could have been 
caused by its placement on the flatbed, he consistently maintained in his 
deposition, in his opposing affidavit, and in oral argument that the damage must 
have occurred at the port of entry when Morgan used the winch to tighten the 
winch line, as the winch was the only one thing which had enough power to bend 
the cast iron bed of the lathe. Specifically, Reed contends that it is a 
permissible inference to find that the damage to the lathe was caused by 
excessive tightening of the winch line.

 
 
"When 
reviewing a summary judgment,

 
 
"'we 
look at the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, giving him every favorable inference which may be drawn from * * * * 
the * * * * material [contained] in the record.'" Sturman v. First National Bank, Wyo., 729 P.2d 667, 676 
(1986), quoting Wyoming Recreation 
Commission v. Hagar, Wyo., 711 P.2d 402, 404 
(1985).

 
 
See also 
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, 
Inc., Wyo., 735 P.2d 722 
(1987).

 
 
"'[E]ven 
though we must consider the record in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment and give him all favorable inferences 
to be drawn from the facts, any inferences drawn must be based on facts in the 
record. "An inference which is contrary to direct testimony is insufficient to 
support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists," [Blackmore v. 
Davis Oil Company, Wyo.,] 671 P.2d 
[334,] 337 [1983].' (Emphasis added.)" Sturman v. First National Bank, 729 P.2d  at 682, quoting Spurlock v. Ely, 
Wyo., 707 P.2d 188, 191 (1985).

 
 

[¶9.]     Morgan unequivocally 
stated in his affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment "that upon 
re-snugging the winch-line to the lathe, the tension on the winch-line was no 
greater than that applied to the lathe when it was first attached in Englewood, Colorado." There is no testimony in the record 
which contradicts this statement. This direct evidence obliterates Reed's 
inference. Without the inference, there is no genuine issue of material fact in 
this case, and Getter Trucking is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 

[¶10.]  Affirmed.