Title: State v. Gross

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GROSS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death sentence vacated and cause 
remanded for resentencing due to alternate-juror misconduct — 
Reversible error occurs where, over objection, an alternate juror 
participates in jury deliberations resulting in an outcome adverse to a 
defendant and either the state has not shown the error to be harmless or 
the trial court has not cured the error — Crim.R. 24(F). 
(No. 1999-1249 — Submitted February 26, 2002 — Decided October 30, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Muskingum County, No. CT 96-055. 
_____________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
Defendant-appellant, Tony R. Gross, appeals from a Fifth 
Appellate District judgment that upheld his convictions for aggravated murder, 
aggravated robbery, and having a weapon under disability.  For the following 
reasons, we affirm Gross’s convictions but reverse his death sentence and remand 
the cause for resentencing on the aggravated murder conviction. 
I. Facts 
{¶2} 
At around 3:00 a.m. on July 12, 1994, four juveniles were 
preparing to distribute the morning newspaper together when they observed a man 
who appeared to be using the restroom outside the Certified gas station in South 
Zanesville, Ohio.  The juveniles also noticed a yellow car with a black stripe on 
the side parked at the gas station. 
{¶3} 
While making their deliveries, the juveniles saw the same man 
drive the yellow car past them.  Suspicious, the juveniles informed Muskingum 
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County Deputy Sheriff Lieutenant Michael Lutz about the man while on their 
route.  One of the juveniles also tried to memorize the yellow car’s license plate 
number and later wrote it down.  At around 4:30 a.m., after finishing their paper 
route, the juveniles returned to a house near the gas station.  There, they again saw 
the yellow car and the same man whom they had observed earlier at the Certified 
station.  The man proceeded to break a lock off the men’s restroom door and enter 
the gas station.  One of the juveniles ran inside his home and called the police to 
report the break-in. 
{¶4} 
Within moments, Lieutenant Michael Lutz arrived at the gas 
station.  Lieutenant Lutz radioed the police dispatcher a description of the yellow 
car with a license plate of “Nora, Boy, Young, 718”—indicating that the plate 
read “NBY 718.”  This was similar to the juvenile’s description of the license 
plate as “NVB-718.” 
{¶5} 
The juveniles approached the gas station and watched as 
Lieutenant Lutz emerged from his police cruiser and walked to the restroom door.  
The man who had broken into the gas station came out of the bathroom and went 
to the front of the station, where he threw something away that sounded like metal 
when it hit the ground; the police later recovered a metal crow bar.  Lieutenant 
Lutz followed the man, who began to argue with the officer.  A fight ensued.  The 
deputy sheriff struck the man on the head several times with his flashlight, but 
then lost hold of the flashlight.  As the two men separated, Lieutenant Lutz 
reached for his gun, saying, “Don’t make me do this.”  Before the officer could 
retrieve his weapon, however, the man grabbed Lieutenant Lutz’s gun and fired 
twice, hitting the deputy sheriff in the head at least once.  Lieutenant Lutz fell to 
the ground.  As the juveniles watched, the man then walked up to Lieutenant Lutz, 
pointed the gun at the deputy sheriff’s head, and fired twice at point-blank range.  
January Term, 2002 
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The man then fled in the yellow car toward Zanesville.  One of the juveniles 
called 911 for an ambulance. 
{¶6} 
Several passing motorists observed portions of the incident.  One 
of them, Karen Wright, was driving on Maysville Pike on her way to work.  As 
she passed the gas station, Wright noticed Lieutenant Lutz and a man fighting.  
She slowed down but did not stop, intending to find a pay phone and call for help.  
Wright later informed officers who arrived on the scene that she had watched the 
officer’s assailant for approximately 30 seconds and that she could see his face.  
After hearing gunfire, Wright turned around in a parking lot down the road and 
returned to the gas station.  While Wright was waiting in the turn lane to enter the 
gas station, the yellow car nearly hit her vehicle as it pulled from the gas station 
and sped away. 
{¶7} 
At approximately the same time, Shawn Jones was also driving on 
Maysville Pike.  He had noticed the juveniles in the gas station parking lot and 
slowed his vehicle when he heard a gunshot.  He observed a man twice shoot 
Lieutenant Lutz in the face; Lieutenant Lutz was partially lying on the ground 
when the shooting occurred.  Jones drove to a SuperAmerica gas station down the 
road and told the clerk to call 911.  After going to work to inform his coworkers 
that he had to return to the scene, Jones returned to the Certified gas station and 
gave the police his statement. 
{¶8} 
Similarly, Sherry Fugate was driving to work when she noticed 
Lieutenant Lutz’s police cruiser behind the gas station.  While waiting at a traffic 
light further down the road, she saw police cars racing toward the gas station.  She 
also saw a yellow car come from the direction of the gas station.  As Fugate sat at 
a red light, the yellow car passed her on the right, ran the light, and traveled down 
Putnam Avenue onto Van Buren Street, before pulling into an alley behind a 
bakery.  Fugate saw only one person in the yellow car. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶9} 
By the time officers arrived at the gas station, Lieutenant Lutz had 
died.  A pathologist from the Franklin County Coroner’s Office later determined 
that he had died from three gunshot wounds to the head. 
{¶10} Ron Johnson was selling crack cocaine that morning from his 
house in Zanesville when Gross arrived in a yellow car.  The back of Johnson’s 
house sits on the alley into which Fugate had watched the yellow car disappear.  
Gross left his car running as he entered Johnson’s house.  Johnson noticed blood 
running from a cut on Gross’s head and gave the man a towel to wipe off the 
blood.  Gross then traded a .9-mm gun that he had for a $50 piece of crack.  As 
Gross left the house, he told Johnson to hide the gun because “it could be life or 
death.”  Johnson therefore proceeded to clean the gun of fingerprints and to empty 
approximately eleven shells from the weapon.  He noticed that the gun had blood 
on its handle.  After subsequently hearing that Gross had been arrested and 
charged with murder, Johnson initially hid the gun under rocks near the 
Muskingum River, then later retrieved the weapon and hid it in the woods near his 
home.  Based on information Johnson provided, the police eventually recovered 
the gun, which was stamped with Lieutenant Lutz’s unit numbers. 
{¶11} Also that morning, shortly after the shooting of Lieutenant Lutz, 
Village of South Zanesville Chief of Police Bob Van Dyne was given the license 
number that Lutz had communicated to the dispatcher and informed that the car 
was registered to Gross.  Van Dyne was familiar with Gross and drove to his 
trailer in South Zanesville.  After the dispatcher repeated the license number, Van 
Dyne realized that the vehicle in the driveway was Gross’s car.  He radioed for 
assistance. 
{¶12} Several other deputies arrived and set up a perimeter around 
Gross’s trailer.  One of the deputies found Gross lying in weeds near his trailer, 
wearing only pants with no shirt or shoes.  He had a recent head injury.  Gross 
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5 
eventually surrendered.  Because initial radio broadcasts had reported that two 
suspects were involved, the deputies conducted a one-minute protective sweep of 
Gross’s trailer to ensure that another suspect was not inside. 
{¶13} The deputies conducted a show-up identification.  Karen Wright 
identified Gross as the man she had observed fighting with Lieutenant Lutz and 
later identified Gross’s yellow car as the yellow car she saw.  Shawn Jones 
identified Gross as the man he saw shoot the deputy.  Only one of the juveniles, 
however, was able to select only Gross from a photo array of suspects, although 
he expressed some uncertainty.  A second juvenile identified five possible 
suspects, while another juvenile narrowed the photos to three suspects; both 
groups included Gross.  The fourth juvenile was unable to identify anyone from 
the group of photographs as the man at the gas station.  All four juveniles 
identified Gross’s car from photographs as the vehicle that they had observed at 
the gas station.  Sherry Fugate similarly identified Gross’s car as the yellow car 
that had passed her. 
{¶14} The Muskingum County Grand Jury issued a seven-count 
indictment against Gross.  Counts one and two charged aggravated murder, with 
each count carrying three death specifications—murder of a police officer, felony 
murder, and murder to escape detection for another offense—as well as firearm 
specifications.  Counts three through six charged Gross with having committed 
aggravated robbery; each carried a prior aggravated felony conviction 
specification and a firearm specification.  Count seven charged Gross with having 
had a weapon under a disability and carried a specification of a prior felonious 
assault conviction.  The matter proceeded to jury trial on the first six counts, while 
Gross waived a jury trial on count seven.  The jury found Gross guilty of all six 
counts and all the specifications that were before the jury, and the trial judge 
subsequently found Gross guilty of having a weapon while under disability and 
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the remaining specifications.  In addition to imposing terms of confinement, the 
trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed the death penalty. 
{¶15} Gross appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals.  That court 
affirmed his convictions and death sentence.  Gross again appealed, and the cause 
is now before this court upon his appeal as of right. 
II. Pretrial Issues 
A. Search Warrants 
{¶16} In his first proposition of law, Gross argues that the trial court 
erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant that 
relied in part on officer observations made during the initial, warrantless entry into 
his home.  Gross then contends in his second proposition of law that, because a 
second search warrant permitting the state to obtain clothes and blood, hair, and 
fingernail samples also depended in part on these officer observations, the trial 
court should have suppressed all evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant.  We 
conclude that neither proposition presents reversible error. 
{¶17} We need not resolve the issue of whether officer observations 
made during the initial, warrantless entry into Gross’s trailer could constitute 
grounds for a search warrant because, even assuming arguendo that they could 
not, the search warrants properly issued.  The United States Supreme Court has 
held that, after excising tainted information from a supporting affidavit, “if 
sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish 
probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid.”  United States v. Karo 
(1984), 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530.  See, also, United 
States v. Macias (C.A.10, 1999), 202 F.3d 283, 1999 WL 1244469 (unpublished 
opinion), quoting United States v. Snow (C.A.10, 1990), 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (“ 
‘An affidavit containing erroneous or unconstitutionally obtained information 
invalidates a warrant if that information was critical to establishing probable 
January Term, 2002 
7 
cause.  If, however, the affidavit contained sufficient accurate or untainted 
evidence, the warrant is nevertheless valid’ ”); United States v. Whitehorn (C.A.2, 
1987), 829 F.2d 1225, 1231, quoting United States v. Levasseur (E.D.N.Y.1985), 
620 F.Supp. 624, 631, fn. 2 (“ ‘[i]t is well settled that “[t]he ultimate inquiry * * * 
is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally 
obtained evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the 
independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show 
probable cause” ’ ”); State v. Booker (Nov. 20, 1989), Montgomery App. No. 
11255, 1989 WL 140201.  Here, the officers’ observations during the initial entry 
into Gross’s trailer are not critical to establishing probable cause.  Excising the 
observations, we conclude that the remainder of the supporting affidavit 
independently suffices to establish probable cause for the search warrants.  
Accordingly, Gross’s first two propositions of law are not well taken. 
B. Identifications 
{¶18} In his third and fourth propositions of law, Gross argues, 
respectively, that photographic and show-up identification procedures were 
unduly suggestive and produced unreliable pretrial and in-court identifications of 
Gross that the trial court should have excluded.  We again find no reversible error. 
{¶19} “The rationale for excluding a tainted pretrial identification is to 
protect the defendant from misconduct by the state.”  State v. Brown (1988), 38 
Ohio St.3d 305, 310, 528 N.E.2d 523.  Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a witness has been 
confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress her 
identification of the suspect if the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of 
the suspect’s guilt and the identification was unreliable under all the 
circumstances.’ (Emphasis added.)”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 
534, 747 N.E.2d 765, quoting State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 438, 588 
N.E.2d 819.  We have previously recounted those factors to be considered: “(1) 
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the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the 
witness’ degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of 
the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation.”  State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 284, 533 N.E.2d 682, 
citing Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 
140. 
{¶20} Here, Gross contends that the state subjected the juveniles who 
were present at the gas station to numerous viewings of Gross or Gross’s 
photograph before the photographic arrays and in-court identifications.  The 
totality of the circumstances, however, weighs in favor of admitting the 
identifications. 
{¶21} Only one of the four juveniles positively identified Gross from two 
photographic arrays.  That witness stated that he ranked the certainty of his 
pretrial identification of Gross as a “five” on a scale of one to ten, with ten 
equaling the most certainty.  On cross-examination, the juvenile then admitted 
that he had seen Gross’s picture in the newspaper and that his subsequent in-court 
identification had been a “three” on the certainty scale.  Of the remaining three 
juveniles, two could identify Gross only as part of a group that included other 
photographs—and one of these juveniles testified that, after failing to identify 
Gross in an earlier courtroom appearance, his at-trial identification of Gross 
depended in part on flashback dreams that he had been having in the interim.  The 
fourth juvenile made no identification. 
{¶22} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the identifications.  The juveniles’ accounts of the investigators’ procedures 
undercut Gross’s argument that impermissibly suggestive state action tainted the 
identification process.  To the contrary, the record reflects the state’s careful 
January Term, 2002 
9 
efforts to avoid suggestiveness.  The investigators showed the juveniles between 
30 and 100 photographs, and there is no evidence that the investigators made 
suggestions or comments to the juveniles, rushed them, or told them whether they 
had picked Gross’s photograph.  Moreover, the circumstances that Gross cites as 
suggestive—that the juveniles encountered media reports and saw Gross in the 
courtroom—go to the weight to be given the identifications, rather than their 
admissibility.  See Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d at 310-311, 528 N.E.2d 523 (holding 
that allegedly suggestive circumstances that did not constitute state action go to 
weight and reliability of testimony, not admissibility).  Even if we were to 
conclude that the trial court erred, however, no prejudice attached.  See id. at 311, 
528 N.E.2d 523.  Defense counsel conducted a probing examination of the 
circumstances surrounding both the photographic arrays and the identifications to 
allow the jury to assess the value of the juveniles’ testimony.  Given the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the photograph selection procedures and the 
identifications, we cannot say that reversible error exists. 
{¶23} Nor can we say that the show-up identification procedures 
constitute reversible error.  Several hours after the murder of Lieutenant Lutz, 
investigators took both Karen Wright and Shawn Jones to view Gross, who was in 
custody near the scene.  Neither witness spoke to the other.  From separate police 
vehicles, the witnesses observed Gross, who stood with his hands behind his back, 
between two officers.  Both Wright and Jones identified Gross at the scene, in 
court for a motion hearing, and at trial.  Gross complains that the trial court erred 
in admitting these identifications. 
{¶24} We agree with Gross that the show-up identification was 
suggestive.  We also reiterate that “ ‘[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to 
persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been 
widely condemned.’ ”  Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d at 284, 533 N.E.2d 682, quoting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.  But 
the ultimate focus in determining whether reversible error exists is not just on 
whether the practice was used, but on whether it was so suggestive as to create “ ‘ 
“a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” ’ ”  Id., quoting 
Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (quoting 
Simmons v. United States [1968], 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 
1247). 
{¶25} Our consideration of the Manson factors, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 
2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, leads us to conclude that there is not a “ ‘very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification’ ” in this case.  Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 
2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, fn. 8.  Both witnesses had time to view Gross during the 
commission of the crimes; both testified that they had focused their attention on 
him; both described him prior to the show-up identification; both were confident 
in their respective identifications (Wright, in fact, testified both at a pretrial 
motion hearing and at trial that she was 100 percent certain of her identification); 
and both identified Gross mere hours after witnessing the crime.  Although the 
show-up identification procedures were suggestive, the totality of the 
circumstances persuade us that the procedures did not create a substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the identifications. 
{¶26} We therefore reject Gross’s third and fourth propositions of law. 
C. Venue and Voir Dire Issues 
{¶27} In connection with his fifth proposition of law, Gross raises 
numerous issues related to venue or the selection of the jury.  We address each 
issue in turn. 
Change of Venue 
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11 
{¶28} Citing “overwhelming news coverage” and the fact that he “was 
charged with killing a beloved member of the community,” Gross argues that the 
jury was not free from outside knowledge or influence and bias.  As a result, 
Gross speculates, “[p]otential jurors were necessarily aware that the failure to 
impose the death penalty against [him] would be dealt with harshly in the media 
and in the community.”  Gross therefore argues that because an impartial jury was 
impossible, the trial court erred in denying his motion to change venue. 
{¶29} A motion for change of venue is governed by Crim.R. 18(B), 
which provides that “[u]pon the motion of any party or upon its own motion the 
court may transfer an action * * * when it appears that a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be held in the court in which the action is pending.”  We have recently 
reiterated that the rule “does not require a change of venue merely because of 
extensive pretrial publicity.  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 116-
117, 559 N.E.2d 710, 722-723.  Any decision on a change of venue rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  Id. at 116, 559 N.E.2d at 722.  ‘ “ ‘[A] careful 
and searching voir dire provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial 
publicity has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.’ ” ’  
Id. at 117, 559 N.E.2d at 722, quoting State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 
98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 262, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1051, vacated on other grounds (1978), 
438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.E.2d 1155.  A defendant claiming that pretrial 
publicity has denied him a fair trial must show that one or more jurors were 
actually biased.  Mayola v. Alabama (C.A.5, 1980), 623 F.2d 992, 996.  Only in 
rare cases may prejudice be presumed.  Id. at 997; see, also, Nebraska Press Assn. 
v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 554-555, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800-2801, 49 L.Ed.2d 
683, 694-695.”  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 463-464, 739 N.E.2d 
749. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶30} It is indeed true that “[p]retrial publicity can undermine a trial’s 
fairness.”  Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 117, 559 N.E.2d 710.  But Gross has failed 
to show that “the publicity in this case was so pervasive that it impaired the ability 
of the empaneled jurors to deliberate fairly and impartially.”  Treesh, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 464, 739 N.E.2d 749.  Here, as in Landrum, the trial court took effective 
steps to protect the defendant’s rights.  The record is replete with instances of the 
trial court questioning individual prospective jurors about their exposure to media 
coverage and their ability to function as fair, impartial jurors.  During the lengthy 
voir dire, the trial court excused over one hundred prospective jurors, often 
because they knew an individual involved in the case or because they had formed 
an opinion regarding Gross’s guilt or innocence that they could not set aside.  
Each empanelled juror, however, stated—without exception—that he or she had 
not formed an opinion about Gross’s guilt or innocence, or that he or she could 
put aside any such opinion, and that he or she could render a fair and impartial 
verdict based on the law and evidence presented.  We have previously explained 
that where “it appears that opinions as to the guilt of the defendant of those called 
for examination for jurors are not fixed but would yield readily to evidence, it is 
not error to overrule an application for a change of venue, in absence of a clear 
showing of an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Swiger (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 151, 34 
O.O.2d 270, 214 N.E.2d 417, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Gross has failed to 
demonstrate that any seated juror was not impartial.  Accordingly, we cannot say 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gross’s motion for change of 
venue. 
Limited Voir Dire 
{¶31} Gross argues that the trial court’s restrictions on and repeated 
interruption of voir dire impaired his ability to use peremptory challenges 
effectively to remove prospective jurors.  Gross also complains that the trial court 
January Term, 2002 
13 
summarily denied defense counsel challenges for cause without permitting 
counsel to ask appropriate followup questions.  We find no merit to these 
arguments.  “The scope of voir dire is within the trial court’s discretion and varies 
depending on the circumstances of each case.  Any limits placed thereon must be 
reasonable.”  (Citation omitted.)  State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 
529 N.E.2d 913.  See, also, State v. Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 345, 763 
N.E.2d 122.  Accordingly, “[n]o prejudicial error can be assigned to the 
examination of veniremen in qualifying them as fair and impartial jurors unless a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown.”  State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 
565, 715 N.E.2d 1144.  The transcript shows that the trial court was not unduly 
restrictive; to the contrary, the trial court balanced its obligation to control the 
inquiry with according counsel latitude in questioning the prospective jurors.  See 
State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 419, 613 N.E.2d 212, quoting State 
v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674 (“ ‘[a]lthough R.C. 2945.27 
affords the prosecution and defense the opportunity to conduct a reasonable 
examination of prospective jurors, * * * the trial court reserves the right and 
responsibility to control the proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 
2945.03, and must limit the trial to relevant and material matters with a view 
toward the expeditious and effective ascertainment of truth’ ”).  Voir dire lasted 
eleven days, encompassed over 2,500 pages of transcript, and, as we noted in our 
discussion on venue, featured extensive examination of the prospective jurors by 
the court, the state, and defense counsel.  Although the trial court limited certain 
areas of inquiry, these limitations were within the discretion of the court.  Nor do 
we find the trial court’s interaction with counsel unduly intrusive. 
Excusal of Jurors 
{¶32} Gross claims that the trial court erred in regard to excusing various 
prospective jurors.  First, he asserts that the trial court incorrectly excused jurors 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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who possessed objections to capital punishment but who were not unequivocally 
opposed to it under all circumstances.  Second, he argues that by failing to excuse 
jurors who stated that they would automatically impose a death sentence upon a 
conviction for murder, the trial court forced defense counsel to use peremptory 
challenges unnecessarily.  Third, he contends that the trial court failed to fully voir 
dire the seated jurors to determine whether their knowledge of the facts or persons 
involved would prevent a fair trial by an impartial jury.  Finally, he objects 
specifically to the trial court’s having excused prospective juror Catherine Decker. 
{¶33} The standard for our review of Gross’s complaints is well settled: 
“[A] court’s determination in a voir dire proceeding of a prospective juror’s 
fairness and impartiality constitutes reversible error only when it can be shown 
that the court, in conducting the examination, clearly abused its discretion.”  State 
v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323. 
{¶34} We find no reversible error in regard to Gross’s first two 
complaints.  Gross first argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in 
excusing jurors for cause, thereby eliminating many jurors who had expressed 
conscientious but not unequivocal objections to the death penalty.  Our decision to 
reverse his death sentence and remand for resentencing in Section IV(A), infra, 
renders Gross’s first argument moot. 
{¶35} Gross next asserts that the trial court improperly denied challenges 
for cause concerning jurors who stated that they could not consider mitigating 
evidence and would automatically vote to recommend imposition of the death 
penalty.  Gross identifies 19 prospective jurors who he asserts fit into this 
category.1  As a result of his need to prevent any of these individuals from sitting 
                                          
 
1.  Gross fails to identify with accuracy several of the events to which he assigns error.  His brief, 
for example, incorrectly states the names of several prospective jurors and cites transcript pages 
that do not contain what he represents occurred at that point in the proceedings.  We have reviewed 
the entirety of the transcript and have afforded Gross every benefit of the doubt in searching for 
January Term, 2002 
15 
on the jury, Gross argues, he had to exercise peremptory challenges that he could 
have reserved for other prospective jurors.  Again, given the need for 
resentencing, Gross’s argument is moot insofar as it pertains to the actual sentence 
he received.  Thus, we address Gross’s claim of error only to the extent that it 
could have deprived him of peremptory challenges that he could have used in an 
attempt to affect the first phase of the trial. 
{¶36} The record reflects that Gross’s asserted classification is 
unfounded.  Contrary to his representations, many of the 19 prospective jurors 
Gross identifies stated in response to further questioning—some emphatically 
so—that, despite any personal inclinations favoring capital punishment, they 
could, and would, follow the law in the sentencing phase.  It is well settled that “a 
prospective juror in a capital case may be excluded for cause if his views on 
capital punishment ‘* * * would “prevent or substantially impair the performance 
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ ”  State 
v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 305, 544 N.E.2d 622, quoting Wainwright 
v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, and Adams v. 
Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581.  See, also, State v. 
Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  Consistent with this rule is our holding that “even if a juror shows 
a predisposition in favor of imposing the death penalty, the trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in overruling a challenge for cause if the juror later states that 
she will follow the law and the court’s instructions.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Treesh, 90 
Ohio St.3d at 468, 739 N.E.2d 749, citing State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
502, 510, 653 N.E.2d 329.  The prospective jurors here fell into this category, and 
the record supports the trial court’s appropriate exercise of its discretion in 
refusing to excuse them for cause. 
                                                                                                                   
support for his argument. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶37} By joint agreement of the parties, the trial court excused for cause 
those identified prospective jurors who did express an inability to consider 
mitigation evidence.  And, of those remaining identified prospective jurors, the 
court excused one for cause solely at defense counsel’s urging and another by 
agreement of the parties based on that individual’s position as the county dog 
warden, a position they regarded as too closely aligned with law enforcement.  
Therefore, Gross is correct only in that some of the prospective jurors whom he 
later struck by peremptory challenge initially stated that they regarded capital 
punishment as the appropriate penalty for the intentional killing of another.  But 
Gross has not identified jurors who maintained that view and whom the trial court 
nevertheless permitted to remain as prospective jurors, thereby necessitating the 
use of a peremptory.  His claim that the trial court’s denials of challenges for 
cause prejudicially affected his use of peremptory challenges thus lacks support 
and credibility. 
{¶38} The record also contradicts Gross’s third complaint, that the trial 
court conducted an incomplete voir dire.  We have already recounted the trial 
court’s efforts to seat an impartial jury in our discussion on venue.  The trial court 
conducted a probing inquiry that addressed the issues of prospective jurors’ 
personal knowledge of the individuals involved in this case and the influence of 
media reports.  The court then permitted counsel for both sides to question the 
prospective jurors.  In the course of this three-pronged examination, all 
empanelled jurors indicated that they would be able to perform their duties as 
demanded by the law.  The fact that they had heard of the case does not obviate 
their stated willingness to function as impartial jurors.  “While fairness requires 
that jurors be impartial, jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues 
involved. State v. Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 235, 703 N.E.2d 286, 292.  
The trial court [is] entitled to accept [a juror’s] assurances that he would be fair 
January Term, 2002 
17 
and impartial and would decide the case on the basis of the evidence.  
‘[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’  
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853.”  State v. Jones 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 744 N.E.2d 1163.  Gross has failed to persuade us 
either that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in 
declining to excuse any jurors challenged for cause or in deciding that each of the 
seated jurors would serve impartially. 
{¶39} Finally, Gross argues that the trial court should not have granted 
the state’s challenge for cause in regard to Catherine Decker, a prospective juror.  
Gross asserts that Decker “did not express any reservations about the death 
penalty” and that “[t]he trial court excused her because of her role as a 
pharmacist.”  Excusing Decker because she was a pharmacist cannot constitute 
prejudicial error.  “[A]n erroneous excusal for cause, on grounds other than the 
venireman’s views on capital punishment, is not cognizable error, since a party 
has no right to have any particular person sit on the jury.  Unlike the erroneous 
denial of a challenge for cause, an erroneous excusal cannot cause the seating of a 
biased juror and therefore does not taint the jury’s impartiality.”  State v. Sanders 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 750 N.E.2d 90. 
Death-Qualification Process 
{¶40} Gross contends that the trial court and the state sought 
commitments from prospective jurors to sign a recommendation of death, thereby 
denying him a fair trial.  But our reversal of Gross’s death sentence renders moot 
Gross’s claim that he did not receive a fair and impartial sentencing jury.  See 
Section IV(A), infra. 
Jury Sequestration 
{¶41} Gross argues that because the trial court did not sequester the jury 
throughout the course of the trial, he was denied a fair trial.  The decision of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
whether to sequester a jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.  State 
v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 252-253, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768.  
See, also, State v. Osborne (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 135, 141-142, 3 O.O.3d 79, 359 
N.E.2d 78; White v. Maxwell (1963), 174 Ohio St. 186, 189, 22 O.O.2d 140, 187 
N.E.2d 878.  As in Maurer, the trial judge in the instant case routinely 
admonished the jury not to discuss the case or to read any news accounts about the 
matter.  The trial court was in the best position to gauge the atmosphere of the 
trial proceedings and to evaluate whether these instructions sufficed over 
sequestration.  Consequently, as in Maurer, “[w]e believe that the precautions 
taken, based in part on our finding that the pretrial publicity fell well short of 
justifying a change of venue, clearly demonstrate that the court’s decisio[n] 
relative to sequestration [was] not in error.”  Id., 15 Ohio St.3d at 253, 15 OBR 
379, 473 N.E.2d 768.  We cannot say that the trial court’s declining to sequester 
the jury throughout the trial was an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 
decision. 
III. Trial Phase Issues 
A. Evidentiary Issues 
{¶42} Gross asserts in his sixth proposition of law that the trial court 
erred in permitting the testimony of Ron Johnson, which placed Gross’s purchase 
of crack cocaine before the jury.  In his seventh proposition of law, Gross then 
claims prejudice from the admission of nine allegedly redundant autopsy 
photographs, three allegedly irrelevant photographs, and the flashlight.  He 
additionally claims that the trial court erred in permitting two individuals to testify 
as experts on atomic absorption testing.  Further, Gross argues in his eleventh 
proposition of law that the impermissible admission of victim-impact evidence 
created an emotional atmosphere that rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  
Finally, he claims in his twelfth proposition of law that there was insufficient 
January Term, 2002 
19 
evidence to support his convictions.  None of these propositions of law is well 
taken. 
“Other Acts” Testimony 
{¶43} The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial 
court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice.  State v. Issa 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 752 N.E.2d 904.  Therefore, we confine our inquiry 
to determining whether the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 
unconscionably in deciding the evidentiary issues about which Gross complains.  
See State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶44} Gross argues that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial 
“other acts” evidence—specifically, the testimony by Ron Johnson that Gross 
traded the murder weapon for crack cocaine.  But our review of the record 
indicates that Gross failed to timely object to Johnson’s testimony at trial.  
Accordingly, Gross has forfeited all but plain error.  See State v. Hartman (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 274, 281, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
626, 634, 653 N.E.2d 675. 
{¶45} Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court.”  We have previously explained that this rule “places three 
limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to correct an error despite the absence 
of a timely objection at trial”: (1) “there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a 
legal rule,” (2) “the error must be plain,” which means that it “must be an 
‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings,” and (3) “the error must have affected 
‘substantial rights,’ ” which means that “the trial court’s error must have affected 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
the outcome of the trial.”2  Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240.  
Further, the decision to correct a plain error is discretionary and should be made “ 
‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ”  Id., quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶46} We find no plain error here.  Evid.R. 404(B) provides that 
“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.”  We have previously held that this rule sets forth “an exception to the 
common law with respect to evidence of other acts of wrongdoing * * *.  The rule 
* * * contemplate[s] acts which may or may not be similar to the crime at issue.  
If the other act does in fact ‘tend to show’ by substantial proof any of those things 
enumerated, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, then evidence of the other 
act may be admissible.”  (Citations omitted.)  Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 
N.E.2d 682, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶47} By testifying as to the details of the crack transaction, Johnson 
placed the murder weapon in Gross’s possession, explained the sequence of 
events leading to its recovery and connection to Gross, and demonstrated Gross’s 
concern about discovery of the weapon.  His “could be life or death” comment 
reflects consciousness of guilt.  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 
161, 749 N.E.2d 226.  See, also, Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 283, 754 N.E.2d 
                                          
 
2.  We note—without deciding the issue in this case—that the phrase “affecting substantial rights” 
may not always be synonymous with “prejudicial.”  See Olano,  507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 
123 L.Ed.2d 508 (“There may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected 
regardless of their effect on the outcome”). 
January Term, 2002 
21 
1150.  And, similar to the defendant in Tibbetts, Gross was charged with 
committing aggravated murder while in the course of an aggravated robbery.  His 
desire for drugs was probative of a possible motive to steal and kill.  Id., 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226, citing State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 
61, 679 N.E.2d 686.  Therefore, because Johnson’s testimony concerning Gross’s 
postmurder visit to his house tended to show by substantial proof Gross’s motive 
and intent and Gross’s identity as Lieutenant Lutz’s killer, we cannot say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony under Evid.R. 404(B).  
Because there is no error, Gross has failed to satisfy the first prong of plain-error 
analysis. 
{¶48} Moreover, even if we were to decide that the trial court erred in 
permitting Johnson to testify as to why Gross was at his house, Johnson’s 
testimony as to everything but Gross’s purpose was proper.  And because the 
“other act” complained of here—purchasing crack cocaine—is of minor 
significance compared to the gravity of the aggravated murder counts against 
Gross, any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Tibbetts, 92 
Ohio St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226.  Gross has therefore also failed to demonstrate 
that the “error” would have affected the outcome of the trial, the third prong of 
plain-error analysis. 
Gruesome Photographs 
{¶49} Gross contends that the trial court erred in permitting the state to 
introduce nine autopsy photographs that were gruesome and repetitive.3  He 
further claims that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed any 
probative value.  Although Gross asserts that his trial counsel objected to the 
                                          
 
3.  Gross’s appellate brief states that the state showed the photographs as slides.  The exhibits 
themselves are photographs.  We have considered the potential prejudicial impact of both 
photographs and slides in determining any effect on the trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
photographs—he even directs our attention to two transcript pages said to contain 
the objection—the record reveals that Gross’s counsel objected at trial only to the 
timing of the formal admission of the photographs; counsel wanted to delay the 
admission of exhibits so any legal debate would not occur in front of the jury.  In 
fact, on one of the transcript pages Gross cites, his counsel stipulates to the 
admission of the nine photographs in question.  Consequently, Gross has forfeited 
all but plain error.  State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 265, 754 N.E.2d 
1129. 
{¶50} No plain error occurred.  The law regarding the admission of 
photographic evidence is well settled: 
{¶51} “Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 
121, 559 N.E.2d at 726; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 
473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus. Close-up photographs of 
victims’ injuries, even if gruesome, are admissible in capital cases if the probative 
value of the photographs outweighs the danger of material prejudice and if the 
photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in number.  Id.”  Treesh, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 483, 739 N.E.2d 749. 
{¶52} We have reviewed the nine photographs at issue, all of which 
depict the wounds Lieutenant Lutz suffered.  The photographs serve purposes that 
we have time and again found sufficiently probative to overcome their inherently 
disturbing nature.  They helped the jury appreciate the nature of the crimes, they 
illustrated the coroner’s testimony, and, by portraying the wounds, they helped to 
prove Gross’s intent and the lack of accident or mistake.  See Coley, 93 Ohio 
St.3d at 266, 754 N.E.2d 1129; Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 156-157, 749 N.E.2d 
226; State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 250-251, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  
Further, the fact that several of the photographs show the same wounds from 
January Term, 2002 
23 
varying distances does not automatically mean that they are repetitive.  Several of 
the photographs establish the location of a wound but fail to depict the wound as 
clearly as another photograph that presents a closer view of the wound—which in 
turn fails to establish the location of the wound as clearly as the more distant 
photograph.  Therefore, we conclude that, given the substantial probative value of 
the photographs and the fact that they were not particularly inflammatory, coupled 
with the consequent lack of any unfair prejudice to Gross, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.  See Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d at 265, 
754 N.E.2d 1129 (“Decisions on the admissibility of photographs are ‘left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court,’ ” quoting State v. Slagle [1992], 65 Ohio St.3d 
597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916).  See, also, Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 483-484, 739 
N.E.2d 749; Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 121, 559 N.E.2d 710; State v. Morales 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 513 N.E.2d 267.  Further, even if we were to say that 
because some of the photographs show several of the same wounds from varying 
distances—a characteristic that this court regarded as nonreversible error in State 
v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 9, 514 N.E.2d 407—there is no doubt that 
any such error here is harmless in regard to the guilt phase because of the 
abundant evidence against Gross.  See id.  See, also, State v. Moore (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 22, 32-33, 689 N.E.2d 1.  Gross has failed to satisfy at least the first 
and third prongs of our plain-error analysis. 
{¶53} Similarly, we find no plain error in regard to the three photographs 
that Gross claims are irrelevant.  Each photograph depicts Gross at the Bethesda 
Hospital emergency room following his apprehension and shows his head 
wounds.  Again, Gross failed to object to the admission of these photographs.  
Relevancy attaches to the photographs because they illustrate witness testimony 
regarding the head wound Gross sustained that morning, a wound that goes to his 
identity as the man who struggled with and ultimately killed Lieutenant Lutz.  Cf. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d at 266, 754 N.E.2d 1129.  Thus, we cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting photographic evidence of the head wound.  
To the extent that the photographs are repetitive, any such error is harmless in 
light of the abundant remaining evidence of guilt introduced at trial.  Moore, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 32-33, 689 N.E.2d 1; Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d at 9, 514 N.E.2d 
407.  Gross’s argument fails to satisfy at least the third prong of our plain-error 
inquiry. 
{¶54} Finally, Gross asserts that, because the autopsy photos were before 
the jury during both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase, “the court created a 
climate in which the jury was unable to dispassionately weigh the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors.”  Given our resolution of Gross’s 
argument concerning alternate-juror misconduct in Section IV(A), infra, this 
portion of Gross’s photographic-evidence argument is moot. 
The Flashlight 
{¶55} At trial, the state introduced a flashlight that belonged to 
Lieutenant Lutz, which, according to witnesses, the officer had used to strike 
Gross in the head during their struggle.  The state further introduced DNA test 
results indicating that material on the flashlight was consistent with six genetic 
markers present in blood obtained from Gross; the forensic scientist/molecular 
biologist who conducted the test testified that such a result would appear only 
once in every 6,900 Caucasians tested. 
{¶56} Gross argues that admission of the flashlight and test results was 
error because (1) the officer who retrieved the flashlight from the gas station did 
not use fresh latex gloves, (2) FBI testing found no genetic material on the 
flashlight, while subsequent testing by another lab did, and (3) the state failed to 
preserve a sample of the material for independent testing by the defense.  Gross 
concludes that such alleged errors failed to establish a chain of custody sufficient 
January Term, 2002 
25 
to satisfy Evid.R. 901(A)’s requirement of proper authentication of evidence as a 
condition precedent to admissibility. 
{¶57} We find no merit in Gross’s arguments.  As a general matter, “the 
state [is] not required to prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody.”  State v. 
Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 662, 693 N.E.2d 246.  Accordingly, “[a] strict 
chain of custody is not always required in order for physical evidence to be 
admissible.”  State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 389, 18 O.O.3d 528, 415 
N.E.2d 303.  The arguments that an officer failed to change gloves and that a 
second round of testing found previously undiscovered genetic material on the 
flashlight go to the weight to be afforded the evidence, not to the admission of the 
evidence.  See State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 360, 595 N.E.2d 915 
(“The possibility of contamination goes to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility”), overruled on other grounds, State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 390, 402-404, 686 N.E.2d 1112. Finally, the state represented to the court at 
sidebar that a sample of the material sufficient for testing remained available, and 
that it had informed defense counsel of this fact.  The trial court apparently 
credited this representation and denied a motion for a mistrial by Gross.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the flashlight and related test results over objection. 
Expert Testimony 
{¶58} Similarly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting testimony from two technicians from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Investigating and Identification.  Both technicians testified about the results of an 
atomic absorption test performed on Gross’s hands shortly after his arrest.  The 
test revealed gunshot residue on the back of Gross’s left hand.  Gross asserts that 
the trial court erred in finding the technicians qualified to present such scientific 
testimony. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶59} But the implicit substance of Gross’s argument—that it is unusual 
to find residue on the left hand of a right-handed individual—goes to the weight 
of the evidence and not to the qualifications of the expert witnesses.  Gross 
provides no substantive explanation as to why either technician was not qualified.  
Rather, he presents this court with unsupported conclusory statements challenging 
the expert’s findings and credentials (“Neither [technician] had the appropriate 
expertise to conduct this testing or [to] present their testimony or to give their 
opinions.  [Evid.R.] 602, 701, 702, 703.  Their testimony was neither within their 
personal knowledge nor was it rationally based on their perceptions nor helpful to 
the jury”). 
{¶60} Both technicians supplied their credentials during extensive voir 
dire.  “Pursuant to Evid.R. 104(A), the trial court determines whether an 
individual qualifies as an expert, and that determination will be overturned only 
for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 709 
N.E.2d 128.  We have reviewed the voir dire of both technicians and can discern 
no reason why, under the Evid.R. 702(B) standards for qualifying witnesses as 
experts, we should consider the trial court’s decision unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.  Gross’s conclusory argument is rejected. 
Victim-Impact Evidence 
{¶61} In his eleventh proposition of law, Gross argues that the admission 
of victim-impact evidence in both phases of the trial rendered the proceedings 
fundamentally unfair.  He cites the following as constituting such victim-impact 
evidence: statements by jurors that they knew Lieutenant Lutz or had encountered 
media coverage of the crime; autopsy photographs; testimony that Lieutenant 
Lutz’s son, who is also a police officer, had arrived at the scene of the crime; 
testimony by Karen Wright that when she returned to the gas station after hearing 
the gunshot, Lieutenant Lutz rolled over and looked at her before he died; the fact 
January Term, 2002 
27 
that officers were visibly emotional while testifying; and the admission of 
Lieutenant Lutz’s clothes and some personal items. 
{¶62} Nothing Gross identifies, however, presents us with reversible 
error.  Juror statements and exposure to media reports are not evidence.  We have 
already rejected Gross’s arguments in regard to these issues in our discussion of 
venue and voir dire.  We also find unpersuasive his arguments related to the 
autopsy photographs, Wright’s discovery of Lieutenant Lutz, and the admission of 
the victim’s clothes and personal belongings.  It is well settled that “[e]vidence 
relating to the facts attendant to the offense * * * is clearly admissible during the 
guilt phase.  As a result, we find that evidence which depicts both the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the murder and also the impact of 
the murder on the victim’s family may be admissible during both the guilt and the 
sentencing phases.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
435, 440, 650 N.E.2d 878.  Each of the items about which Gross complains 
establishes the circumstances of the crime.  See Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 420, 
613 N.E.2d 212 (holding that “the physical condition and circumstances of the 
victims are relevant to the crime as a whole” and are admissible as evidence 
illustrating the nature and circumstances of a crime). 
{¶63} We also find no merit in Gross’s complaint about an incidental 
mention of Lieutenant Lutz’s son, also a law enforcement officer.  The first law 
enforcement officer to arrive at the Certified gas station after the shooting testified 
as to his discovery of Lieutenant Lutz, the condition of the victim, and the fact 
that Lieutenant Lutz’s gun was missing.  After the officer testified that other 
officers had arrived and assumed his duties, the state asked, “What did you do 
then?”  The officer responded, without objection, “I went over to grab Matt.  He 
wanted to see his dad.”  The officer then explained that he left the gas station.  To 
the extent that the mention of the victim’s son can be said to constitute victim-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
impact evidence, we conclude that it does not constitute a violation of Gross’s 
constitutional rights.  The reference to the victim’s son was not detailed, not 
inflammatory, and not the focus of the testimony.  Viewing the facts of this case 
as a whole, we cannot say that these two sentences of testimony constitute 
prejudice.  See Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 420-421, 613 N.E.2d 212 (in 
determining whether prejudice exists, evidence that would cause a jury to 
empathize with a victim must be viewed against all of the facts of a case). 
{¶64} Finally, given our resolution of that portion of Gross’s fourteenth 
proposition of law concerning the penalty phase, see Section IV(A), infra, his 
arguments as to all evidence introduced during that phase are moot. 
{¶65} Accordingly, confining our inquiry to any victim-impact evidence 
introduced in the guilt phase, we find that any evidence that may have constituted 
victim-impact evidence did not prejudice Gross.  To the extent that testimony 
included emotional responses—such as testimony by officers—we agree with the 
court of appeals that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of an aggravated murder trial that 
does not include an element of strong emotion.”  Gross’s eleventh proposition of 
law is rejected. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
{¶66} In his twelfth proposition of law, Gross asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated murder, any of the aggravating 
specifications, and aggravated robbery.  He therefore argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant his Crim.R. 29 motions.  This argument is without merit. 
{¶67} “When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal 
conviction, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  Tibbetts, 92 
Ohio St.3d at 161-162, 749 N.E.2d 226, quoting State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio 
January Term, 2002 
29 
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, also, Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  When 
conducting this review, we do not weigh the evidence; rather, our inquiry is 
limited to whether reasonable minds could reach the conclusion reached by the 
trier of fact.  See Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 162, 749 N.E.2d 226; Treesh, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 484, 739 N.E.2d 749.  Issues concerning the weight given to the evidence 
and the credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact.  State v. DeHass 
(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶68} We begin with the essential elements of the crimes.  The state 
charged Gross with two counts of aggravated murder in violation of former R.C. 
2903.01(A) and (B).  This statute provided: 
{¶69} “(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and 
design, cause the death of another. 
{¶70} “(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while 
committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, 
aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.”  139 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 3. 
{¶71} The state also charged Gross with four counts of aggravated 
robbery in violation of former R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (2).  That statute provided: 
{¶72} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as 
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after 
such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following: 
{¶73} “(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in 
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶74} “(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another.”  
140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 590. 
{¶75} R.C. 2913.01(K)(1) in turn defines a theft offense to include “[a] 
violation of * * * 2911.13 [or] 2913.02.”  The state charged Gross with violations 
of both statutes.  R.C. 2911.13, the breaking-and-entering statute, provides: 
{¶76} “(A) No person[,] by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in 
an unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as 
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any felony. 
{¶77} “(B) No person shall trespass on the land or premises of another, 
with purpose to commit a felony.” 
{¶78} R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the theft statute, provided that “[n]o person, 
with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain 
or exert control over either the property or services * * * [w]ithout the consent of 
the owner or person authorized to give consent[.]” 
{¶79} The state further sought to prove the charged specifications.4  
Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Gross committed the aggravated murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, 
or punishment for another offense.  Under former R.C. 2929.04(A)(6), the state 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lieutenant Lutz was a peace officer 
as defined in R.C. 2935.01, that Gross knew or had reason to know this fact, and 
either that Lieutenant Lutz was engaged in his duties at the time of the offense or 
that Gross’s specific purpose was to kill a peace officer.  The definition of a peace 
officer includes “a sheriff [or] deputy sheriff.”  R.C. 2935.01(B).  Under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), the state also had to prove that Gross committed the aggravated 
                                          
 
4.  Gross’s appellate brief states that the state showed the photographs as slides.  The exhibits 
themselves are photographs.  We have considered the potential prejudicial impact of both 
photographs and slides in determining any effect on the trial. 
January Term, 2002 
31 
murder while “committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit * * * aggravated robbery,” and that Gross 
was either “the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, 
if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior 
calculation and design.”  All counts also carried a firearm specification, requiring 
that the state prove that Gross had a firearm on or about his person or under his 
control while committing the offense.  The state also had to prove that Gross had a 
prior aggravated felony conviction. 
{¶80} The evidence adduced at trial, construed in a light most favorable 
to the state, supports concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found that 
the state proved each necessary element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Four 
juveniles observed a man, whom one of them later identified as Gross, break a 
lock off a restroom door and enter the Certified gas station.  They also observed 
the man’s car, with one of them attempting to memorize the license plate.  The 
juvenile’s memorized plate number was similar to the plate number on Gross’s 
car. 
{¶81} Upon arriving at the gas station, Lieutenant Lutz radioed police 
dispatch a description of the car he found there, as well as the license plate 
number.  Both corresponded to Gross’s vehicle. 
{¶82} From different vantage points, the juveniles also observed Gross 
attack Lieutenant Lutz.  They watched as Lieutenant Lutz struck Gross in the head 
with a flashlight, as Gross took the officer’s firearm, and as Gross shot the deputy 
sheriff, wounding him.  Gross then walked up to the fallen officer and shot him 
repeatedly in the head, killing him, before fleeing in the yellow car. 
{¶83} Testimony by other witnesses confirmed these events and provided 
further identifications.  While Gross was attacking Lieutenant Lutz, motorist 
Karen Wright passed by the gas station.  She saw the men fighting, observed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
Gross’s face, and heard gunfire as she passed the gas station.  Similarly, motorist 
Shawn Jones saw the fight and watched as Gross—and only Gross—shot 
Lieutenant Lutz repeatedly, killing him.  Wright also saw Gross’s vehicle speed 
from the gas station as she returned to assist the officer.  Motorist Sherry Fugate 
testified that she watched a yellow car, which she later identified as Gross’s car, as 
it sped away from the gas station and into an alley that morning. 
{¶84} Ron Johnson, who lived in a house located off that same alley, 
testified that Gross came to his house that morning in the yellow car.  He 
explained how Gross traded a gun (later identified through serial numbers to be 
Lieutenant Lutz’s gun) for crack cocaine.  He also testified that Gross was 
bleeding from a head wound, and that Gross told him to hide the gun, because “it 
could be life or death.”  Johnson explained the sequence of events that led to his 
turning the gun over to the authorities. 
{¶85} Numerous officers testified concerning Gross’s capture.  The South 
Zanesville Chief of Police testified that he had arrived at Gross’s trailer and found 
the yellow car, still warm and bearing none of the condensation that a car not 
recently driven would have had.  After forming a perimeter around Gross’s trailer, 
officers found Gross hiding in nearby weeds.  He had a head wound that appeared 
to be fresh.  Shortly after Gross was taken into custody, Karen Wright identified 
Gross as the man she had seen fighting with Lieutenant Lutz.  Shawn Jones 
similarly identified Gross as the man he had watched murder the officer.  Both 
witnesses, as well as the juveniles, identified Gross’s car as the vehicle that they 
had seen at the gas station. 
{¶86} The state introduced all of this testimony at trial.  The state also 
introduced evidence demonstrating that Lieutenant Lutz was a deputy sheriff 
performing his duties at the time of his murder, facts that Gross did not contest.  
Two of the juveniles testified that Gross was the man they had observed.  Wright 
January Term, 2002 
33 
and Jones also again identified Gross.  The state further presented the testimony of 
a pathologist who had examined Lieutenant Lutz’s body, and who had determined 
that the officer died as a result of the gunshot wounds to his head.  Testimony 
regarding the serial number established that the gun recovered from Ron Johnson 
was Lieutenant Lutz’s gun.  Additional scientific evidence linked Gross to the 
crime.  Expert testimony established that it was “very probable” that a shoe 
recovered from Gross’s trailer matched a shoe print found on a toilet seat taken 
from the gas station restroom.  Material found on Lieutenant Lutz’s flashlight 
matched Gross’s DNA, and Gross’s head wound was consistent with the 
juveniles’ account of the fight.  Further, the results of an atomic absorption test 
revealed gunshot powder residue on Gross’s hand. 
{¶87} We also note that prior to sentencing, the state introduced into 
evidence without objection a certified copy of Gross’s prior 1980 conviction for 
felonious assault.  Because Gross challenges “all” of his convictions, we assume 
that his sufficiency challenge includes his conviction for having a weapon while 
under disability, which was tried to the court.  Under former R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), 
the state had to prove that Gross knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a 
firearm or dangerous ordnance after having been convicted of a felony of 
violence.  134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1966.  Felonious assault, a violation of R.C. 
2903.11, is such a felony.  R.C. 2903.11(B). 
{¶88} Given the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the trial court 
properly denied Gross’s Crim.R. 29 motions and that sufficient evidence exists to 
support the charge of having a weapon under a disability and related specifications 
tried to the trial court.  We find Gross’s twelfth proposition of law not well taken. 
B. Jury Instructions 
{¶89} In connection with his eighth proposition of law, Gross alleges that 
the trial court erred in five instructions given to the jury as part of the first phase 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
of the trial.  Because none of his arguments demonstrates reversible error, we find 
that this proposition is not well taken. 
{¶90} First, Gross argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
properly on purpose and causation.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
{¶91} “Purpose to kill is an essential element of the crime of aggravated 
murder. 
{¶92} “A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a 
certain result.  It must be established in this case that at the time in question there 
were [sic] present in the mind of the Defendant a specific intention to kill 
Lieutenant Michael Lutz. 
{¶93} “Purpose is a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious 
objective of producing a specific result.  To do an act purposely is to do it 
intentionally and not accidentally.  Purpose and intent mean the same thing. 
{¶94} “* * *  
{¶95} “No purpose—no person be [sic] may be convicted of aggravated 
murder unless he specifically intended to cause the death of another. 
{¶96} “* * *  
{¶97} “* * * Cause is an essential element of the offense.  Cause is an act 
or failure to act which in a natural and continuous sequence directly produces the 
death of a person and without which it would not have occurred. 
{¶98} “The Defendant’s responsibility is not limited to the immediate or 
most obvious result of the Defendant’s act or failure to act.  The Defendant is also 
responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences or results that follow in 
the ordinary course of events from the act or failure to act.” 
{¶99} Gross contends that the result of including “foreseeable” in this 
instruction was that the trial court “relieved [the state] of its burden to prove an 
essential element of the crime—specific intent to kill the victim.”  We disagree.  
January Term, 2002 
35 
This court has previously upheld a trial court instruction on causation that was for 
all practical purposes identical to the instant charge in State v. Jalowiec (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 220, 230-231, 744 N.E.2d 163.  There, we reaffirmed that “ ‘[a] single 
instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in 
the context of the overall charge.’ ”  Id. at 231, 744 N.E.2d 163, quoting State v. 
Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four 
of the syllabus.  See, also, Cupp v. Naughten (1973), 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 
S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368.  In both cases, when viewed in the requisite full 
context, the trial court’s instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that it could 
not convict the defendants of aggravated murder unless it found specific intent to 
kill.  “The instruction on foreseeable consequences does not constitute error * * * 
since other instructions given by the court limited any prejudicial effect.”  
Jalowiec, 91 Ohio St.3d at 231, 744 N.E.2d 163, citing State v. Getsy (1998), 84 
Ohio St.3d 180, 196, 702 N.E.2d 866.  See, also, State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 323, 331, 652 N.E.2d 1000; State v. Burchfield (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 261, 
262-263, 611 N.E.2d 819.  We therefore find the purpose and causation 
instructions sufficient. 
{¶100} We also find that the following trial court instruction does not 
constitute reversible error: 
{¶101} “If a wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a 
manner calculated to destroy life, the purpose to cause the death may be inferred 
from the use of the weapon.” 
{¶102} Gross argues that there is no statutory basis for such an instruction 
and that it is an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.  But we have recognized 
that “ ‘where an inherently dangerous instrumentality was employed, a homicide 
occurring during the commission of a felony is a natural and probable 
consequence presumed to have been intended.  Such evidence is sufficient to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
allow a jury to find a purposeful intent to kill.’ ”  State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 8, 14, 529 N.E.2d 192, quoting State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 
152, 512 N.E.2d 962.  The trial court’s use of “may” communicates that the jury 
was free to accept or reject a permissive inference; it does not communicate a 
conclusive presumption that “relieved the state of its burden of persuasion on the 
issue of criminal intent.”  See Price, 60 Ohio St.2d at 142, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 
N.E.2d 772.  See, also, Francis v. Franklin (1985), 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105 S.Ct. 
1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (“If a specific portion of the jury charge, considered in 
isolation, could reasonably have been understood as creating a presumption that 
relieves the State of its burden of persuasion on an element of an offense, the 
potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the charge as a 
whole. Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the 
extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created 
an unconstitutional presumption”); Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 
527-528, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (recognizing 
that jury charges that describe permissive inferences do not run afoul of 
constitutional protections against impermissible burden-shifting presumptions and 
conclusive presumptions).  Thus, we conclude that the jury instruction did not 
prejudice Gross. 
{¶103} Gross also attacks the trial court’s instruction defining “reasonable 
doubt” based on the definition set forth in R.C. 2901.05(D).  We have 
continuously rejected this argument.  See State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
403, 417, 739 N.E.2d 300; Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 33, 689 N.E.2d 1; Frazier, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 330, 652 N.E.2d 1000; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 
15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph eight of the syllabus. 
{¶104} Finally, Gross claims prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure 
to define for the jury key terms used in the instructions regarding R.C. 2929.04 
January Term, 2002 
37 
specifications.  He faults the trial court for not defining what constitutes “escaping 
detection” in its instruction that, if the jury reaches the third aggravated murder 
specification, it must then decide “whether the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant * * * committed the offense of aggravated 
murder for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment 
for another offense committed by the Defendant.”  Gross further faults the trial 
court for not requiring unanimity from the jury on the “other offense” and for not 
defining “principal offender.” 
{¶105} Gross timely objected on the issue of unanimity.  But there is no 
record of Gross’s timely raising his “escaping detection” and “principal offender” 
arguments to the trial court.  While the trial court permitted defense counsel to 
build a record of objections to the instructions after the jury retired to deliberate, 
those objections never included these specific arguments.  Accordingly, Gross has 
waived all but plain error for these arguments.  See State v. Underwood (1983), 3 
Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus; Crim.R. 30(A). 
{¶106} In regard to his lack-of-definition arguments, Gross has failed to 
establish plain error.  Because “terms of common usage * * * need not be defined 
for the jury,” State v. Riggins (1986), 35 Ohio App.3d 1, 8, 519 N.E.2d 397, the 
trial court’s failure to define “escaping detection” presents no error.  Moreover, 
we note that considering that Lieutenant Lutz arrived and found Gross in the gas 
station, the officer had already detected Gross.  We therefore cannot say that the 
lack of a detailed “escaping detection” instruction can constitute prejudice under 
the third prong of our plain-error inquiry when the unchallenged “escaping * * * 
apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense” qualifiers are more likely 
to have contributed to the jury’s verdict. 
{¶107} Nor does prejudice arise from the trial court’s failure to define 
“principal offender.”  Gross contends that the failure to define the term “relieved 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
the state of its burden of proof and denied Gross due process and a fair trial.”  The 
trial court should have defined “principal offender” for the jury.  See State v. 
Chinn (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 559, 709 N.E.2d 1166.  But the state’s theory of 
the case was that Gross acted alone in killing Lieutenant Lutz.  As in Chinn, 
“[t]here was no evidence to suggest that appellant, if he was present at the time of 
the aggravated murder, was anything but the actual killer.”  Id. at 560, 709 N.E.2d 
1166.  Thus, to have found Gross guilty under the state’s theory of the case, the 
jury necessarily must have found that Gross was the principal offender.  Gross has 
failed to satisfy the third prong of our plain-error analysis.  Given the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, “[t]he facts in this case fall far short of meeting 
the criteria for plain error.  We see no miscarriage of justice in this case.”  
Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d at 14, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332.  See, also, Barnes, 
94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶108} Last, we note that the trial court stated that it had sufficiently 
instructed the jury regarding unanimity.  We need not parse the trial court’s 
instructions to decide the issue because, even assuming error, the fact that the jury 
unanimously found Gross guilty of the “other offense” would render any such 
error harmless.  Cf. Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 40, 689 N.E.2d 1.  Accordingly, we 
reject Gross’s complaints regarding the guilt-phase jury instructions. 
C. Juror Misconduct 
{¶109} In his fourteenth proposition of law, Gross asserts that his 
convictions and death sentence were the result of juror misconduct.  Specifically, 
he argues that the trial court should have dismissed a juror for discussing the case 
outside the courtroom and for forming an opinion as to Gross’s guilt or innocence 
prior to deliberations, that this conduct necessitated that the trial court declare a 
mistrial, and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial or granted a new 
trial based on the participation of alternate jurors in the penalty-phase 
January Term, 2002 
39 
deliberations.  Gross also alleges that the trial court’s failure to correct these errors 
“deprived [him] of a full and fair opportunity to develop the full factual predicate 
for this error, thus depriving him of due process.” 
{¶110} We address here Gross’s claim that a juror had disobeyed the trial 
court’s instructions by discussing the case and forming an opinion before 
deliberations.  Although defense counsel had learned of an instance of alleged 
juror misconduct prior to closing arguments, counsel waited until just prior to the 
jury’s returning with its verdicts at the end of the guilt phase to bring the matter to 
the trial court’s attention.  In response, before the sentencing phase commenced, 
the trial court received testimony from Travis Gross, Gross’s nephew.  Travis 
testified that while attending a community picnic/fitness competition, he 
overheard one of the jurors discussing the trial from a distance of twenty-five to 
thirty feet away.  According to Travis, the juror had stated, when asked by another 
person how the trial was going, “It shouldn’t be much longer because I think he’s 
guilty.” 
{¶111} After receiving this testimony, the trial court then questioned the 
juror accused of misconduct.  The juror testified that while at the picnic, two 
people asked him about the case because they had heard that he was on the jury.  
He testified that he acknowledged that he was a juror but that he did not discuss 
the merits of the case.  The juror also specifically denied that he had told anyone 
that he had made up his mind about the case. 
{¶112} The trial court decided that the juror should remain part of the jury.  
In so doing, the trial court considered that Travis admitted that at the time of the 
alleged impropriety, he had been twenty-five to thirty feet away from the juror, in 
a crowded area where many people were talking, with ten to fifteen tables 
separating him from the juror.  The trial court also noted the juror’s specific denial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
of misconduct and that the juror had confirmed only that he was on the jury, a 
matter of public record. 
{¶113} Gross argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial over 
this issue.  But the record does not reflect that Gross ever moved for a mistrial on 
these grounds.  Rather, Gross merely asked that the trial court replace the juror 
with an alternate juror.  Accordingly, we review only the decision actually made 
by the trial court. 
{¶114} A trial court is permitted to rely on a juror’s testimony in 
determining that juror’s impartiality.  State v. Herring (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 
259, 762 N.E.2d 940, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 
940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, fn. 7.  Here, the trial court’s ruling reflects that the court 
believed the juror and apparently did not believe Travis.  As noted, issues 
concerning the weight given to the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are 
primarily for the trier of fact.  DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 
N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Cf. State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 329, 337-338, 715 N.E.2d 136 (acknowledging that a trial judge is in the 
best position to observe the demeanor and body language of prospective jurors 
and decide whether they can be impartial and follow the law).  Further, given the 
trial court’s rejection of Travis’s account, Gross has failed to demonstrate the 
requisite prejudice resulting from the alleged communication.  See State v. 
Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 233, 703 N.E.2d 286.  We thus cannot say 
that the trial court erred in declining to seat an alternate in place of the juror. 
{¶115} We reserve our discussion of Gross’s claim of alternate-juror 
misconduct during the penalty phase for Section IV(A), infra. 
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶116} In his thirteenth proposition of law, Gross argues that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel.  It is well settled that a reviewing court 
January Term, 2002 
41 
may not reverse a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel 
unless a defendant shows “first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, 
second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive 
defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  ‘To show that a defendant has been 
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must prove that 
there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the 
result of the trial would have been different.’  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.”  Treesh, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 489, 739 N.E.2d 749.  “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 
273, 750 N.E.2d 90, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  As part of this inquiry, “[a] reviewing court must strongly presume 
that ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance,’ and must ‘eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, * * * and * * * 
evaluate [counsel’s] conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.’ ”  Sanders, 
92 Ohio St.3d at 273, 750 N.E.2d 90, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶117} Applying this standard, we have reviewed Gross’s extensive list of 
his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, all of which we find meritless.5  Gross’s 
claim that counsel failed to engage in reasonable investigation and preparation 
must fail because the record before us does not reveal these alleged errors.  See 
State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 35, 752 N.E.2d 859, citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 274, 750 
N.E.2d 90.  And given our examination of defense counsel’s extensive 
                                          
 
5.  Given our reversal of Gross’s death sentence in Section IV(A), infra, those instances of alleged 
ineffective assistance that Gross cites as affecting the sentencing phase are moot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
questioning of prospective jurors, discussed supra, the record also fails to support 
Gross’s allegations that counsel were ineffective during voir dire.  Similarly, the 
record does not support Gross’s complaints that counsel failed to argue for a 
change of venue effectively (counsel sought to obtain a change vigorously), that 
counsel failed to counter the state’s challenges for cause (counsel did, and often 
joined the challenges), and that counsel failed to challenge the state’s use of a 
peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (counsel objected). 
{¶118} Gross also faults counsel for not requesting funds to employ expert 
investigators and witnesses (1) to challenge the state’s testing procedures of 
evidence, (2) to demonstrate the unreliability of eyewitness identifications, (3) to 
support his motions to suppress, and (4) to help provide an adequate defense in 
general.  To obtain such funds, however, Gross would have had to make a 
particularized showing of a reasonable probability that the requested expert would 
have aided his defense, and that the denial of the requested expert assistance 
would have resulted in an unfair trial.  See State v. Mason (1988), 82 Ohio St.3d 
144, 694 N.E.2d 932, syllabus.  Gross, however, has failed to demonstrate either 
proposition.  See, e.g., State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391, 721 
N.E.2d 52 (declining to find ineffective assistance based on failure to employ 
eyewitness identification expert because “[n]othing in the record indicates what 
kind of testimony an eyewitness identification expert could have provided.  
Establishing that would require proof outside the record, such as affidavits 
demonstrating the probable testimony.  Such a claim is not appropriately 
considered on a direct appeal”).  Thus, we cannot say that counsel was ineffective 
in this regard by employing only a psychiatrist, a mitigation specialist, and an 
investigator.  See Jalowiec, 91 Ohio St.3d at 236, 744 N.E.2d 163. 
January Term, 2002 
43 
{¶119} Further, we reject Gross’s allegation of ineffectiveness predicated 
on his claim that “[c]ounsel failed to properly and effectively demand that the 
State provide a detailed and descriptive Bill of Particulars.”  The record reflects 
that Gross’s original trial counsel (later replaced) filed a motion for a bill of 
particulars, that Gross’s second counsel obtained a trial court order for the state to 
supply the bill, and that the state complied.  Given that counsel was conducting 
extensive discovery during this process, we agree with the court of appeals that a 
more detailed bill of particulars was unnecessary. 
{¶120} Gross cites one instance in which counsel waived his presence 
without first obtaining an on-the-record waiver.  This occurred when the trial 
court gave prospective jurors a witness list so that they could mark on the list 
anyone they knew.  Without deciding that this was error, we conclude that Gross 
has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would 
have been different had he been present.  Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 489, 739 
N.E.2d 749.  See, also, Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d at 262, 762 N.E.2d 940; State v. 
Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 371-372, 738 N.E.2d 1208; State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 527 N.E.2d 844. 
{¶121} Finally, Gross asserts—often without explanation or elaboration—
perceived deficiencies ranging from counsel’s failure to suppress evidence, to 
challenge effectively the jury array, to move for a change of venue successfully, to 
object successfully to testimony and evidence, to cross-examine witnesses 
effectively, and to move for a change in the starting date of the trial.  We note that 
in many instances, such as in regard to the jury array issue, Gross overlooks that 
counsel mounted vigorous but unsuccessful challenges.  Counsel filed over fifty 
pretrial motions concerned with substantive aspects of the proceedings.  Gross’s 
allegations thus equate a lack of success with a failure to render effective 
assistance of counsel.  But we cannot say that the manner in which counsel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
conducted unsuccessful challenges falls below the wide range of what constitutes 
reasonable professional assistance.  Further, Gross ignores that counsel’s 
decisions often fell within the realm of trial strategy.  See Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 
at 296, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (failure to object can be legitimate tactical decision); 
Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d at 68, 752 N.E.2d 904, citing State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 31, 676 N.E.2d 82 (“Counsel is certainly not deficient for failing to raise 
a meritless issue”).  Gross also overlooks that minor missteps are not tantamount 
to ineffective assistance; a complaining defendant must still demonstrate 
prejudice.  See Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 347, 715 N.E.2d 136, quoting State v. 
Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (“ ‘[t]he failure to 
object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel’ ”).  None of the instances Gross cites, either individually or collectively, 
determined the outcome of the guilt phase of his trial.  See Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Gross’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel fail. 
IV. Penalty-Phase Issues 
A. Alternate-Juror Misconduct 
{¶122} As noted, Gross asserts in his fourteenth proposition of law that the 
trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial based on the 
participation of alternate jurors in the penalty-phase deliberations.  During the trial 
court’s sentencing recommendation instructions to the jury, the trial court also 
instructed the alternate jurors as follows: 
{¶123} “Now, there are five of you who have been selected as alternate 
jurors in this case.  You will retire to the jury room with the original panel of 12 
jurors.  However, you are instructed that you will in no way participate in the 
deliberations. 
January Term, 2002 
45 
{¶124} “You will listen and watch the deliberations, but under no 
circumstances are you to participate in said deliberations by discussing with the 
original jurors or among yourselves, or even make gestures during these 
deliberations.  You are there to listen and to watch only.  Again, under no 
conditions are you to engage in any conversations during any deliberations.” 
{¶125} The members of the jury and the five alternate jurors then retired to 
the jury room.  Subsequent events, however, revealed that at least one alternate 
did not follow the trial court’s instructions.  During deliberations, the jury 
foreman forwarded a signed note to the trial court that read: 
{¶126} “Question: Are the alternates allowed to play a game of cards with 
attention to the process in section [sic, session]?” 
{¶127} The trial court responded in the negative.  Just over two hours 
later, the jury foreman forwarded another signed note to the trial court: 
{¶128} “Question: One alternate is expressing his feelings about the other 
jurors in a manner that he thinks isn’t right.  Everyone is really tense about this.  
He feels things are going wrong and thinks some people are getting pressured in 
making decisions.  It’s to the point he thinks it [sic] wrong.  I on the other hand 
feel no one has been swayed by force.” 
{¶129} In response to this note, the trial court took sworn testimony, 
subject to examination by counsel, from the two bailiffs responsible for the 
sequestered jury.  Both bailiffs testified that during the jury’s deliberations, the 
jury foreman knocked on the jury room door and told the bailiffs, “It’s getting out 
of hand in here, the alternates are throwing pens and thing[s].”  One of the bailiffs 
told the foreman to put his concerns in writing; this concern constituted the 
second note set forth above.  At that point, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved 
for a mistrial.  The record reflects that the trial court decided to bring the jury and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
alternates back into the courtroom and repeat the instructions.  Before this 
occurred, however, the jury foreman sent the trial court another signed note: 
{¶130} “Question: Both people that were accused of being ‘pressured’ by 
the alternate told me when asked if they were pressured, that they did not feel that 
way. 
{¶131} “We have come to a decision.” 
{¶132} The record next indicates that, without following through on the 
plan to reinstruct the jury, the trial court brought the jurors and five alternates into 
the courtroom and received the recommendation that Gross be sentenced to death. 
{¶133} The foregoing scenario evinces error on the part of the trial court.  
In State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 751 N.E.2d 946, this court 
unanimously held that allowing alternate jurors to sit in on sentencing 
deliberations constituted error.  Id. at 439, 751 N.E.2d 946, citing United States v. 
Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  See, also, 
Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 531-533, 747 N.E.2d 765 (explaining that “[i]n an 
ordinary criminal case, Crim.R. 24[F] requires that any alternate juror not 
substituted for a regular juror be discharged when the jury retires”).  In both 
Jackson and Murphy, the respective defendants had failed to object to the 
presence of the alternate jurors.  We therefore confined our review to a plain-error 
analysis that does not presume prejudice.  Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 440, 751 
N.E.2d 946; Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 533, 747 N.E.2d 765.  Further, in both 
cases the facts presented no indication of actual harm to the defendant.  There 
was, for example, no showing by the defense that “the alternates disobeyed the 
court’s instructions [not to participate] by participating in the deliberations, either 
verbally or through body language, or that their presence chilled the deliberative 
process.” Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 533, 747 N.E.2d 765.  See, also, Jackson, 92 
January Term, 2002 
47 
Ohio St.3d at 440, 751 N.E.2d 946.  Thus, although error, the presence of the 
alternate jurors failed to constitute prejudicial error. 
{¶134} But the instant case is distinguishable from Jackson and Murphy.  
Here, Gross’s trial counsel did object to the presence of the alternate jurors in the 
sentencing deliberations.6  And here the record contains indicia of participation by 
alternate jurors that create a presumption of prejudice that the state has failed to 
rebut. 
{¶135} As we noted in Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 533, 747 N.E.2d 765, the 
United States Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n theory, the presence of 
alternate jurors during jury deliberations might prejudice a defendant in two 
different ways: either because the alternates actually participated in the 
deliberations, verbally or through ‘body language’; or because the alternates’ 
presence exerted a ‘chilling’ effect on the regular jurors.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 739, 
113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  Courts have construed the foregoing Olano 
language to mean that “evidence that an alternate juror participated in jury 
deliberations is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice.”  Manning v. Huffman (C.A.6, 
2001), 269 F.3d 720, 726.  See, also, United States v. Acevedo (C.A.11, 1998), 
141 F.3d 1421, 1424 (“[Olano] implied that once the alternate participates in any 
way—whether through words or gestures—prejudice is manifest”); United States 
v. Ottersburg (C.A.7, 1996), 76 F.3d 137, 140 (court conducted plain-error 
inquiry in case where alternates signed the jury form and explained that “the 
substantive participation of the alternates, once established, is sufficient to 
                                          
 
6.  In her separate opinion, Justice Resnick attempts to discredit defense counsel’s objection, 
stating that “[a]lthough appellant did raise on the record an objection to the alternate jurors’ 
presence in penalty-phase deliberations, the circumstances surrounding that objection * * * show 
that it was made in passing and was not emphasized.”  In the absence of authority for the concept 
that an objection lodged without sufficient vigor justifies a court’s deeming it forfeited, we must 
discount the dissenting view.  Likewise, in light of the objection, we dismiss the suggestion that 
Gross had somehow acquiesced in the presence of the alternate jurors. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
establish prejudice”).7  But, see, United States v. Myers (C.A.4, 2002), 280 F.3d 
407, 412. 
{¶136} Once Gross objected to the presence of the alternates in jury 
deliberations, the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate an absence of 
prejudice.  Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 
(discussing the government’s burden under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52[a]); Crim.R. 52(A).  
The state has failed to demonstrate the absence of prejudice, while Gross has 
pointed to specific evidence that at least one alternate inserted himself into the 
actual deliberations through intrusive verbal participation, while more than one 
alternate participated through nonverbal acts.  We cannot say that the last note 
from the jury foreman—the one in which he stated that the jurors whom the 
alternates accused of being pressured “did not feel that way”—cures either the 
involvement of the alternate set forth in the preceding note or the nonverbal acts 
of the alternates relayed through the bailiffs’ testimony.  Once the problems 
became known, the trial court needed to inquire about the extent and effect of the 
alternates’ participation.  See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 734 
N.E.2d 1237 (trial court conducted searching inquiry of juror to ascertain whether 
misconduct occurred and whether juror fully understood breadth of her duty and 
implications of polling prior to accepting jury verdict and polling jury). 
{¶137} Accordingly, we conclude that reversible error occurs where, over 
objection, an alternate juror participates in jury deliberations resulting in an 
outcome adverse to a defendant and either (1) the state has not shown the error to 
be harmless, or (2) the trial court has not cured the error.  Here, we find specific 
evidence of active disruption of the deliberative process that poses a significant 
                                          
 
7.  Justice Resnick’s dissenting analysis misses the distinguishing factor in Acevedo–that the court 
of appeals found no prejudice in that case because, unlike here, the ultimate verdict was the result 
of deliberations that were separate from the deliberations contaminated by the alternate jurors. 
January Term, 2002 
49 
risk of affecting jury functions—a risk that carries presumptive prejudice that the 
state has failed to counter.  Further, the trial court accepted the jury’s verdict 
regarding the death sentence without making any attempt to cure the apparent 
error.8  See Acevedo, 141 F.3d 1421 (trial court placed under seal the verdict in 
which alternate jurors participated, gave curative instruction, and had jurors 
redeliberate without alternates).  Such unaddressed evidence of disruption carries 
a presumption of prejudice. 
{¶138} We further note that the polling of the jury fails to remove the 
substantive due process concerns.  When polled, each juror confirmed only that 
the death sentence recommendation was his or her verdict.  Without more—such 
as the actions by the trial court in Hessler before the verdict in that case was 
reached—we cannot say that the polling here equates to an affirmation that each 
juror arrived at his or her verdict free from the improper influence of the 
alternates.  We are therefore confined to recognizing that in this case the 
substantive verbal and potentially substantive nonverbal involvement by the 
alternates establishes prejudice.9 
{¶139} To conclude otherwise would be to identify an error without 
recognizing means to determine whether prejudice occurred.  This is because we 
cannot now determine, for example, that the alleged physical act intrusions—the 
inexplicable pen throwing—exerted a chilling effect on the jury deliberations, or 
even constituted implicit threats against jurors, because a majority of this court 
has foreclosed fruitful inquiry in that regard by preventing a trial court from 
                                          
 
8.  Because the trial court and counsel refer to the jury’s sentencing recommendation as a 
“verdict,” we use those terms interchangeably here.  See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
108, 116, 734 N.E.2d 1237, fn. 2. 
9.  Justice Resnick states that “[t]he lead opinion, by not placing the trial judge’s decisions in 
proper perspective, portrays the practice as more extreme and unjustified than it actually was at 
that time.”  Yet, even understandably committed legal error entitles an aggrieved party to 
correction of the error. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
examining the alternate jurors following receipt of the verdict.  See Hessler, 90 
Ohio St.3d at 123, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (considering alternate juror part of the jury 
for purposes of the aliunde rule), following State v. Reiner (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
342, 731 N.E.2d 662, paragraph two of the syllabus (“Evidence received from an 
alternate juror, without other outside evidence, is insufficient aliunde evidence 
under Evid.R. 606[B] upon which a court may rely in order to conduct an inquiry 
of other jurors into the validity of a verdict”), overruled on other grounds (2001), 
532 U.S. 17, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158.  But, see, Reiner, 89 Ohio St.3d at 
360-361, 731 N.E.2d 662 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(expressing the view—prior to adhering to stare decisis in Hessler—that “the 
testimony of a discharged alternate juror is not categorically insufficient aliunde 
evidence for purposes of Evid.R. 606[B]”).  This and the presumed actual 
prejudice remove us from the realm of Remmer v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 
227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (holding that when improper contacts with a jury 
are discovered after a verdict, the trial court must hold a hearing to ascertain the 
effect of those contacts). 
{¶140} The extant question then becomes what remedy we must apply.  
Because the error is related only to sentencing and not to guilt, we reject Gross’s 
contention that he is entitled to a new trial.  We conclude instead that we must 
vacate Gross’s death sentence and remand this cause for resentencing.10  Cf. State 
v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 738 N.E.2d 1178. 
B. Moot Issues 
                                          
 
10.  In Section IV of her opinion, Justice Resnick attempts to take us to task for expressing no 
opinion on the merits or lack thereof of hypothetical ex post facto or retroactivity challenges to 
application of R.C. 2929.06(B) on remand.  We do not opine on the issues because no party has 
raised these points of law, and in fact no party could raise them, given that no court has applied the 
statute to Gross. 
January Term, 2002 
51 
{¶141} Our remand for resentencing moots Gross’s ninth, tenth, fifteenth, 
sixteenth, and seventeenth propositions of law.  These propositions addressed the 
effect of duplicative aggravating circumstances on the weighing process, the 
sentencing-phase jury instructions, the effect of alleged cumulative errors that 
included the foregoing sentencing-phase errors, the appropriateness of the death 
sentence in this case, and this court’s proportionality review, respectively.  Also 
moot is Gross’s eighteenth proposition of law, which challenged Ohio’s death-
penalty scheme on numerous constitutional grounds. 
V. Conclusion 
{¶142} We find that alternate juror misconduct necessitates that we vacate 
Gross’s sentence of death.  Having found no prejudicial error in regard to Gross’s 
convictions or remaining sentences, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
otherwise affirmed in all respects.  The cause is hereby remanded for 
resentencing. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, J., concur in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶143} I respectfully concur only in the judgment.  Crim.R. 24(F), both 
before and after amendment, required that the alternate jurors should have been 
discharged when the actual sworn jury retired to deliberate.  The rule was not 
followed and this, in and of itself, was error.  Given the clear dictates of the rule, 
nothing more needs to be said. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶144} As I stated in State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 564, 747 
N.E.2d 765 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), “allowing alternate jurors to be present during 
jury deliberations violate[s] the sanctity of the jury process.  See United States v. 
Virginia Erection Corp. (C.A.4, 1964), 335 F.2d 868, 872; Koch v. Rist (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 250, 252, 730 N.E.2d 963, 965.”  As the lead opinion explains, the 
juror misconduct that occurred during the penalty phase of this trial justifies a 
reversal of the death sentence.  Accordingly, I concur with that part of the lead 
opinion. 
{¶145} Whether there was juror misconduct during the guilt phase of the 
trial is less obvious, primarily because counsel unaccountably did not raise the 
issue.  What we do know is that the same alternate jurors who disrupted the 
penalty phase of the jury deliberations were present throughout the guilt-phase 
deliberations. 
{¶146} In Koch, despite the absence of specific factual allegations of 
misconduct, this court upheld a trial court’s grant of a mistrial based on an 
alternate juror’s presence in the deliberation room.  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d 250, 730 
N.E.2d 963.  We so held because the alternate juror was present throughout the 
deliberations, because of the possibility of nonverbal communication, and because 
of the difficulty of determining whether the alternate juror prejudiced the jury.  Id. 
at 252, 730 N.E.2d 963.  The same factors apply to this case, in the extreme.  
Here, five alternate jurors were present throughout deliberations.  Any of the five 
could have engaged in nonverbal communication, and determining whether the 
jury was prejudiced is exceedingly difficult, especially at this time.  Further, since 
Crim.R. 24(F)(2) provides that “[n]o alternate juror shall be substituted during any 
deliberation,” the presence of the alternate jurors in the deliberations could have 
January Term, 2002 
53 
served no useful purpose.  I believe that the sanctity of the jury was violated 
during the guilt-phase of the deliberations.  Accordingly, I dissent from the 
portion of the lead opinion that affirms the appellant’s conviction. 
__________________ 
 
RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶147} I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s convictions.  However, I 
disagree with the determination that appellant’s death sentence must be vacated 
and this matter returned to the trial court for resentencing.  Specifically, I believe 
that the record does not contain evidence of improper alternate-juror behavior of 
the type necessary to raise a presumption of prejudice.  Moreover, the record does 
not reveal indicia of improper alternate juror behavior sufficient to support a 
finding of actual prejudice to appellant. 
{¶148} The conclusion that the death sentence should be vacated is purely 
speculative and is a result of the lead opinion’s failure to place the narrow 
incidents focused on to support a supposed presumption of prejudice within the 
context of a long, emotionally charged and complex death-penalty trial.  When 
viewed from a perspective based on the trial as a whole, it is apparent that no 
prejudice occurred.  Therefore, I vigorously dissent, not only because the facts of 
this case necessitate it but also because affirmance on this issue is supported by 
case law and applicable legal standards. 
{¶149} Crim.R. 52(A) provides, “Any error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  In United 
States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 737, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, a 
case implicating Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), the United States Supreme Court observed 
that “[t]he presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of 
error that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
Because there is no prejudicial impact, we should affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals and go on to resolve the other issues found moot. 
{¶150} The lead opinion attempts to articulate standards for its analysis 
based on a presumption of prejudice and a resulting burden on the state to rebut 
the presumption.  However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the entire 
inquiry, since jury deliberations are confidential and conducted in secrecy, the 
state will virtually never be able to rebut a presumption of prejudice.  Therefore, 
as a practical matter, there is no difference between a presumption of prejudice 
and actual prejudice in these types of cases.  The standard the lead opinion sets 
forth, based on an apparent presumption of prejudice, is actually tantamount to a 
standardless inquiry into actual prejudice, and becomes little more than “we know 
it when we see it” or perhaps, “we think we know it when we think we see it” due 
to the lack of any concrete evidence of what actually occurred. 
{¶151} The lead opinion appears to discount the significance of the 
answers the jurors gave when they were individually polled after determining to 
recommend a death sentence.  The polling gave each juror a clear opportunity to 
state any disagreement with the jury’s final decision, and each juror distinctly 
stated that a death sentence was his or her true verdict.  The jurors’ answers in 
polling significantly weaken any presumption of prejudice that might attach to the 
deliberation proceedings and also make it apparent that no actual prejudice 
occurred. 
{¶152} Defense counsel did not enter on the record an objection to the 
alternates’ presence at the guilt-phase deliberations.  Furthermore, counsel waited 
to object on the record until after the sentencing deliberations had already 
commenced.  This could be viewed as substantial acquiescence in the practice the 
lead opinion focuses on in its search for prejudice.  The lead opinion fails to grasp 
January Term, 2002 
55 
that the reasons for this acquiescence must be comprehended to place the essence 
of appellant’s objection in its proper context. 
{¶153} Similarly, the trial judge’s decisions in this case to allow alternates 
to sit in on deliberations at both phases of the trial should not be considered in a 
vacuum.  Those decisions must be analyzed from a perspective that recognizes 
that the approach taken by the trial judge in this case was by no means unique and 
was consistent with the approach being taken at the time of this trial by many 
other trial judges.  The lead opinion’s impercipient analysis verifies the old adage 
that “hindsight is 20/20” in that the lead opinion totally fails to appreciate that 
only very recently has the extent of this practice come to light.  The lead opinion’s 
failure to appreciate the actual setting of the trial leads it to the inevitable and 
almost preordained conclusion that prejudicial error must have occurred. 
{¶154} For the specific reasons that follow, a close scrutiny of the entire 
trial record evinces insufficient evidence of prejudice, either presumed or actual, 
to require reversal. 
I 
Alternate-Juror Misconduct 
{¶155} The lead opinion begins its consideration of the section of its 
opinion titled “Alternate-Juror Misconduct” with the statement that “Gross asserts 
in his fourteenth proposition of law that the trial court erred in not declaring a 
mistrial or granting a new trial based on the participation of alternate jurors in the 
penalty-phase deliberations.”  However, this statement is misleading, since the 
fourteenth proposition, as reproduced in the Appendix to the opinion, actually 
reads:  “A capital defendant is entitled to a fair and reliable determination of his 
guilt and sentence by a jury that is properly instructed and that follows the court’s 
instructions.  Where the jury ignores the court’s admonitions and discusses the 
case outside of the jury room and where jurors intimidate other jurors there is a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
denial of due process and a fair trial in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10, and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution.” 
{¶156} In framing the alternate-juror issue in a way that best suits its own 
agenda, the lead opinion recasts this proposition to facilitate its analysis.  There 
are several problems with this approach. 
{¶157} In this fourteenth proposition of law, as in the fourteenth 
assignment of error raised in the court of appeals, appellant makes a claim that is 
generally based on juror misconduct.  This claim does not focus on the presence 
of alternate jurors in deliberations but rather on the alleged misconduct of 
individual regular jury members, and not the alternates.  In turning this 
proposition into one based on alternate juror misconduct in penalty-phase 
deliberations, the lead opinion uses it to justify placing a burden on the state to 
demonstrate an absence of prejudice — a burden that the lead opinion finds the 
state was unable to meet.  However, because the issue has never been articulated 
in this manner, the state never had an opportunity to meet this burden.  The lead 
opinion announces for the first time that the burden is on the state and then faults 
the state for failing to meet its burden of proof on a question that the state did not 
even know was being raised.  The way appellant actually raises this issue, along 
with a consideration of all relevant events that occurred at trial, reinforces the 
view that no prejudicial error is present in this case.  That conclusion is further 
reinforced by an inquiry into the reasons the alternates were in the jury room in 
the first place, discussed later in this opinion. 
{¶158} Furthermore, the federal cases cited by the lead opinion for its 
determination that prejudice is presumed in this case are distinguishable, since 
they focus on the actual substantive participation of alternates in deliberations, 
through such actions as signing a jury form.  In light of the fact that appellant’s 
January Term, 2002 
57 
argument in proposition of law number fourteen focuses on general juror 
misconduct and not specifically on the substantive participation of alternate jurors 
in deliberations, this case should be evaluated under an “actual prejudice” 
standard, and should not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. 
{¶159} Finally, even where alternates substantively participate in 
deliberations, the federal courts have not been as inclined to find prejudice and to 
overturn guilty verdicts as the lead opinion seems to indicate.  In United States v. 
Acevedo (C.A.11, 1998), 141 F.3d 1421, 1422-1423, the trial judge forgot to 
dismiss two alternates when the jurors retired to deliberate the defendant’s guilt, 
and the alternates fully participated in the deliberations and joined in a unanimous 
verdict of guilty composed of 14 votes.  When the problem came to light, the trial 
judge sealed that verdict without reading it, dismissed the two alternates, gave 
curative instructions, and sent the jury of 12 regular jurors back to deliberate 
again.  After only five minutes of deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict.  
On appeal, despite this obviously active and full participation by the alternates in 
the first deliberations, the court actually upheld the defendant’s conviction, 
finding insufficient prejudice to justify reversal.  The court did not speculate on 
the influence the alternates may have had on the jury during deliberations, as the 
lead opinion seems to do.  Even though the lead opinion in the case sub judice 
cites Acevedo, 141 F.3d at 1424, for the proposition that “[Olano] implied that 
once the alternate participates in any way—whether through words or gestures—
prejudice is manifest,” it is apparent that the Acevedo court did not find the 
prejudice to be sufficiently manifest in the situation it reviewed to reverse the 
conviction.  The Acevedo court upheld the conviction despite the fact that the 
alternates’ participation in that case was active and not subtle, unlike the alleged 
“participation” in this case. 
II 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
58 
Proceedings at Trial 
{¶160} Events earlier in the trial are relevant to the issue the lead opinion 
considers to be confined to the penalty phase.  The alternates involved in the 
incidents cited by the lead opinion were not strangers to the twelve members of 
the jury.  The alternates, along with the jury members, were part of an extensive 
voir dire to seat a jury, and they listened to the testimony of witnesses and sat 
through detailed presentations of evidence and arguments in the guilt phase of the 
trial, sat in on deliberations in the guilt phase without objection, heard evidence 
and arguments in the penalty phase of the trial, and sat in on deliberations at the 
penalty phase. 
A 
{¶161} The parties and the judge painstakingly endeavored to seat an 
impartial jury.  Voir dire covered eleven days and makes up approximately 2,500 
pages of transcript in the record.  The ensuing trial in this case was lengthy, with 
the state presenting numerous witnesses and the defendant calling several as well.  
The guilt phase of the trial started on July 30, 1996, and lasted ten days, 
concluding on August 12, 1996.  When the trial judge addressed the 12 members 
of the jury and the five remaining alternates prior to deliberations in the guilt 
phase on August 12, 1996, at the close of the evidence and arguments, the judge 
cautioned the jurors not to surrender their “honest convictions” for the sake of 
simply arriving at a verdict. 
{¶162} At that point, the judge specifically mentioned the five alternates, 
and stated that they would be going into the jury room with the 12 jurors.  He 
instructed the alternates to “in no way” participate in deliberations, told them 
several times that they were to listen and watch only, and counseled that “under 
no conditions are you to engage in any conversations during these deliberations.”  
The jury was then sent to the jury room to deliberate.  There is no evidence 
January Term, 2002 
59 
anywhere in the record that the defense attorney objected to the presence of 
alternates in guilt-phase deliberations, although the defense attorney raised various 
other issues through objections at that time. 
{¶163} The jury deliberated from 3:23 p.m. to 5:40 p.m., less than two and 
one-half hours, and reached its findings of guilty on all charges.  All five 
alternates and 12 jurors were present in the courtroom as the jury verdicts were 
announced.  The jury was polled on each charge, and all 12 jurors individually 
stated that their verdict on each count was “guilty.”  After the jury was polled, the 
trial judge informed the five alternates that they would be returning as alternates 
in the penalty phase.  There is no evidence in the record at this point in the 
proceedings of any misconduct or inappropriate behavior by any jury member or 
alternate juror. 
{¶164} On August 19, 1996, the trial judge held an afternoon session with 
the attorneys for both sides to put on the record earlier discussions of motions 
relating to the penalty hearing, which was to start the next day.  No participant in 
this session raised any issue regarding alternate jurors on the record. 
{¶165} The sentencing phase began on August 20, 1996.  Before the jury 
came in, some matters from the day before were entered on the record.  Also, 
appellant’s nephew was sworn in to testify about his claim that he had overheard a 
juror talking about the case a few days before the guilty verdict and that the juror 
implied that he had already formed the opinion that appellant was guilty.  The 
juror denied that he had said anything improper, and the trial judge refused to 
remove him as a juror.  The jury was then brought in, and the mitigation evidence 
and testimony, as well as appellant’s unsworn statement, were presented for the 
rest of the day’s session. 
{¶166} On August 20, 1996, the defense attorney submitted proposed jury 
instructions for the sentencing phase, stating that appellant did not “waive or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
60 
withdraw his objection to sending the alternate jurors back into the jury room 
during deliberations with the twelve regular jurors.”  Although this statement 
implies that an objection had already been made, this appears to be the first time 
the record contains any indication of any objection over the presence of alternates 
during deliberations. 
{¶167} The second day of the penalty phase began the morning of August 
21, 1996.  Outside the presence of the jury, several matters were discussed for the 
record, none of them relating to alternate jurors.  The jury came in and closing 
arguments were held.  The trial judge then instructed the jury for its penalty-phase 
deliberations.  Again, as in the guilt phase, he told them not to surrender their 
“honest convictions” simply to reach a verdict.  The five alternate jurors were told 
that they would retire to the jury room with the jury, and the trial judge instructed 
them in clear terms that they were not to participate in deliberations and were to 
listen and watch only. 
{¶168} The penalty-phase deliberations started at 10:59 a.m., and there 
was later a break for lunch.  There were still no objections made on the record to 
the alternates in the jury room at this point.  At 1:26 p.m., shortly after the lunch 
break ended, the jury foreman sent a question to the judge asking whether the 
alternates were allowed to play cards during deliberations.  The trial judge 
responded “[N]o.”  The jury foreman then sent a question out at 1:59 p.m. 
regarding the sentencing forms, and the trial court answered it.  Then, there were 
some discussions on the record among the judge, the defense attorney, and the 
prosecutor, with the defense attorney stating that he wanted to get some things on 
the record that had been discussed with the prosecutor and the judge, apparently 
off the record, in the last few days.  At this point, in the middle of several other 
matters not relevant to the alternate-juror issues, the defense attorney stated, with 
no elaboration, and with no comment on the point by either the judge or 
January Term, 2002 
61 
prosecutor, “I also object to sending the alternates back into the deliberation room, 
which was done here.”  At the close of the defense attorney’s recitation of all the 
issues he raised, the trial judge stated, “Overrule everything.”  This terminated the 
discussion without specifying any details on any point being denied. 
{¶169} At 3:31 p.m., the jury foreman passed a question to the judge:  
“One alternate is expressing his feelings about the other jurors in a manner that he 
thinks isn’t right.  Everyone is really tense about this.  He feels things are going 
wrong and thinks some people are getting pressured in making decisions.  It’s to 
the point he thinks it [sic] wrong.  I on the other hand feel no one has been swayed 
by force.”  Shortly thereafter, two bailiffs were sworn in and questioned on the 
record about conversations with the jury foreman.  One bailiff stated that the jury 
foreman had knocked on the door at 3:25 p.m. and told him, “It’s getting out of 
hand in here, the alternates are throwing pens and thing[s].”  The bailiff testified 
that he told the foreman to put it in writing and knock on the door again. 
{¶170} The specific statement about throwing pens apparently never was 
put in writing, but the note about the alternate expressing his feelings appears to 
have been a result of the conversation between the bailiff and the jury foreman.  
Based on the note and the bailiffs’ statements, the trial judge made a decision to 
bring the jurors into the courtroom to instruct them again, remarking that tension 
runs high in a trial like this. 
{¶171} Before the jurors could be returned, the foreman sent out a note at 
3:52 p.m.:  “Both people that were accused of being ‘pressured’ by the alternate 
told me when asked if they were pressured, that they did not feel that way.  We 
have come to a decision.”  Before the jury came in, the judge told the courtroom 
spectators that it would be an emotional moment when the jury’s decision was 
announced, and cautioned them to control themselves. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
62 
{¶172} At 3:59 p.m., the jury was brought in, along with the five 
alternates, and the jury’s recommendations of death on both counts were 
announced.  The jury was polled, as it was at the end of the guilt phase, with each 
individual juror verifying that it was his or her verdict that a death sentence should 
be imposed on appellant.  The trial judge thanked the jury for its service, 
observing that they had deliberated “some three and a half hours” and remarked 
that it had been a difficult case.  He specifically expressed his appreciation to the 
alternates for their efforts and also thanked them for their “patience” and 
“courtesy.”  The jury was then finally dismissed. 
{¶173} On October 18, 1996, the trial judge held a hearing on a motion for 
a new trial filed by appellant.  Among the issues raised in that motion, filed 
August 30, 1996, were several relating to alleged juror misconduct.  The judge 
dismissed that part of the motion because no supporting affidavits were supplied. 
B 
{¶174} The preceding facts reveal much about the trial beyond the narrow 
confines the lead opinion focuses on.  This was a high-profile case involving the 
cold-blooded killing of a deputy sheriff (with two of the shots fired point blank 
into the victim’s head) and tensions were running high.  As in any case where the 
death penalty is sought, the jury felt the weight of its responsibility.  It is 
eminently understandable that individuals could have trouble controlling their 
emotions in these circumstances.  The lead opinion’s myopic view of the record 
ignores the overall setting surrounding the trial. 
{¶175} Although appellant did raise on the record an objection to the 
alternate jurors’ presence in penalty-phase deliberations, the circumstances 
surrounding that objection, as indicated above, show that it was made in passing 
and was not emphasized.  The lead opinion keys on the fact that there was an 
objection to the practice in this case to distinguish it from similar cases finding no 
January Term, 2002 
63 
plain error when no objection was raised.  However, although appellant did 
technically raise an objection at trial, it is apparent from the relevant proposition 
of law and associated briefing that appellant on appeal has not targeted the 
presence of alternate jurors in penalty-phase deliberations as a basis for reversal, 
probably because of the way courts were applying the law on this issue at the time 
appellant’s brief was filed, which was before this court’s decision in State v. 
Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 747 N.E.2d 765. 
{¶176} Moreover, by not objecting to the presence of alternates in the 
earlier guilt-phase deliberations, appellant had already acquiesced in a practice 
that he formally objected to on the record only after penalty-phase deliberations 
had begun.  In addition, appellant filed no written motion specifying the reasons 
for the objection to alternates in penalty-phase deliberations.  While the record 
does indicate that some oral discussion of this issue with the trial judge must have 
taken place off the record, it is impossible to discern whether appellant argued the 
specifics of the issue to the trial judge.  All that appears in the record is a bare 
objection unsupported by any legal reasoning with no citation of any criminal rule 
or case law.  In light of appellant’s earlier acquiescence in allowing the alternates 
to sit in on guilt-phase deliberations, and the perfunctory manner in which the 
objection was presented, it was not surprising that the trial court overruled the 
objection at the penalty phase. 
{¶177} It does not appear at all clear that there was any activity that could 
be described as “participation” that is prejudicial to a defendant by the alternates 
detailed in the record of this case.  The cryptic notes written by the jury foreman 
and the statements relayed by the bailiffs reveal very little that could be actually 
termed participation.  It seems clear that alternates who are playing cards and 
throwing pens are not by those acts participating in deliberations.  In the absence 
of further elaboration on those activities, it seems fruitless to speculate one way or 
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the other on the impact those actions might have had on the deliberations of the 
jury. 
{¶178} Although an alternate was expressing his feelings about some 
jurors being pressured in deliberations, the record of course does not show any 
details, such as whether these sentiments were conveyed during a break or during 
the heat of the deliberations.  In addition, the substance of the alternate’s 
allegation was that others in the jury room (the regular jurors themselves) were 
being pressured; there is no indication that this alternate was participating in 
deliberations beyond expressing the view that others were (as the statement was 
relayed by the jury foreman) “getting pressured.” 
{¶179} While it is apparent that this alternate was thus violating the trial 
judge’s instructions “to listen and to watch only,” the alternate’s “participation” in 
this case is not of the type that should lead to a presumption of prejudice or the 
reversal of the death penalty.  Due to the aliunde rule, Evid.R. 606(B), which 
clearly should apply to any juror (whether regular or alternate) who is present in 
the jury room during deliberations despite the lead opinion’s protracted discourse 
to the contrary, any inquiry into what actually went on is foreclosed.  But, if we 
are going to speculate through applying an unanswerable presumption of 
prejudice, for all we know the alternate may have been against the death penalty 
and may have considered statements in favor of it as “pressuring” undecided 
jurors. 
{¶180} There is nothing in the record indicating that the jurors themselves 
felt pressured, and there are significant indications that they did not.  The jury 
foreman’s note regarding the alternate expressing his feelings reveals the 
foreman’s view that no one was being swayed, and the final note sent out by the 
foreman reveals that the jurors did not feel pressured.  The trial judge, who 
presided over this long and involved trial, made some inquiries and was satisfied 
January Term, 2002 
65 
that no undue pressure was asserted.  The jury was polled after the verdicts of 
death were reached, and each juror verified that his or her vote was for 
recommending the death sentence. 
{¶181} While it may have been preferable to question individually each 
juror and alternate in more detail at this point, the failure to do so was not error in 
these circumstances.  The trial court’s focus at this time was on whether there was 
misconduct or improper influence on the jury as a whole.  It is true that the 
alternate jurors in the jury room, like the jurors, played some role owing to their 
presence in the jury room in the overall inquiry into jury misconduct.  However, 
there were no specific reasons for the court to inquire into whether the alternates, 
by their mere presence in the jury room, had contaminated the deliberations, and 
appellant’s complaints at the time were not directed at that question.  Appellant’s 
fourteenth proposition of law approaches this entire situation in the same way that 
the trial judge did at the time the scenario actually unfolded.  The lead opinion 
drastically departs from that scenario in evaluating this proposition of law. 
{¶182} Finally, the alternates had been present at all previous stages of this 
trial and appellant raised no complaints on the record about their behavior until 
the series of events at the penalty-phase deliberations.  Anyone who has been 
present at or participated in an aggravated murder trial involving death 
specifications can readily appreciate the stress that was present during this final 
stage of the proceedings, and we should not be too hasty to presume prejudice 
merely because emotions were running high.  See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 120, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (heightened emotions and intense feelings are 
part and parcel of the jury-deliberation process). 
III 
Alternate Jurors’ Presence in Deliberations 
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{¶183} The lead opinion does not delve into the specifics of why the 
alternates were in the jury room, and thus does not explain the implications of 
former Crim.R. 24(F) and this court’s opinion in State v. Hutton (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 36, 559 N.E.2d 432, on the issue it reverses.  A consideration of former 
Crim.R. 24(F) and Hutton is essential to understand this case. 
{¶184} As the lead opinion recognizes, former Crim.R. 24(F) required on 
its face that alternate jurors must be discharged when the jury retires.  See State v. 
Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 531, 747 N.E.2d 765, and State v. Jackson (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 436, 438-439, 751 N.E.2d 946 (both of which found no plain error 
when alternate jurors sat in on deliberations and defendants failed to object).  The 
lead opinion fails to note, however, that this rule was judicially modified as it 
applies to capital cases in State v. Hutton, 53 Ohio St.3d at 46-48, 559 N.E.2d 
432, and paragraph three of the syllabus, to allow a trial judge to retain alternates 
after guilt-phase deliberations in case a regular juror becomes incapacitated before 
penalty-phase deliberations begin.  See Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 531, 747 N.E.2d 
765 (citing Hutton, 53 Ohio St.3d at 46-48, 559 N.E.2d 432, and paragraph three 
of the syllabus). 
{¶185} Crim.R. 24 has recently been amended, effective July 1, 2002, 
apparently to reflect the holding of Hutton.  Crim.R. 24(F)(2) now reads: 
{¶186} “Capital cases.  The procedure designated in division (F)(1) of this 
rule shall be the same in capital cases, except that any alternate juror shall 
continue to serve if more than one deliberation is required.  If an alternate juror 
replaces a regular juror after a guilty verdict, the court shall instruct the alternate 
juror that the juror is bound by that verdict.  No alternate juror shall be substituted 
during any deliberation.  Any alternate juror shall be discharged after the trial jury 
retires to consider the penalty.” 
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{¶187} According to the Staff Note to amended Crim.R. 24(F), dealing 
with alternate jurors, “The amendment effective July 1, 2002 divided division F of 
the previous rule into divisions (F)(1) and (F)(2).  Division (F)(1) [Non-capital 
cases] contains the substance of previous division (F), plus the inclusion of an 
exception for capital cases.  Division (F)(2) [Capital cases] was added to permit 
alternate jurors in capital murder cases to continue to sit as alternate jurors after a 
guilty verdict has been rendered.  If an alternate juror replaces a regular juror for 
the penalty phase of the trial, the trial judge shall instruct the alternate juror that 
the alternate juror is bound by the guilty verdict.”  (Brackets sic.) 
A 
State v. Hutton 
{¶188} It is apparent that Hutton generated a degree of confusion in both 
trial and appellate courts over its judicial modification of former Crim.R. 24(F) in 
capital cases.  The specific issue in this case as the lead opinion approaches it — 
the propriety of alternate jurors being present in the jury room during deliberations 
— was a subject of much misunderstanding until this court’s recent decision in 
Murphy offered some clarification.  See 91 Ohio St.3d at 532, 747 N.E.2d 765 
(“nothing in Hutton authorizes alternates who have not replaced regular jurors to 
be present during deliberations”) (emphasis sic).  It is impossible to grasp the 
extent of this misunderstanding without a detailed discussion of Hutton. 
{¶189} A capital trial involves essentially four different definable stages:  
(1) guilt-phase presentation of evidence and arguments, (2) guilt-phase 
deliberations, (3) penalty-phase presentation of evidence and arguments, and (4) 
penalty-phase deliberations.  Crim.R. 24(F), both before and after its recent 
amendment, authorizes alternate jurors to be present at the first stage.  Former 
Crim.R. 24(F), since it provided simply that alternate jurors who do not replace 
regular jurors “shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict,” on 
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its face required that alternate jurors would not be present at any of the final three 
stages.  If an alternate juror replaced a regular juror before the jury retired to 
deliberate, that juror could be present at the final three stages, but it was as a 
regular juror, and no longer as an alternate. 
{¶190} Recognizing that a capital case is different from other criminal 
cases, this court in Hutton held at paragraph three of the syllabus that former 
“Crim.R. 24(F) is not violated in a capital case where an alternate juror is 
substituted for another juror after the guilt phase verdict, but before deliberations 
begin in the penalty phase.”  53 Ohio St.3d 36, 559 N.E.2d 432.  With this 
holding, this court in Hutton authorized trial court judges to retain alternates in 
capital cases past the time that the jury retires to consider the guilt-phase verdict.  
There is no mention in the Hutton opinion of whether these alternates would sit in 
on, without participating in, the guilt-phase deliberations.  It is impossible to tell 
from the Hutton opinion whether the alternate who was retained in that case had 
been present at the guilt-phase deliberations, although as will be discussed 
subsequently, it may be safe to presume that the alternate was not. 
{¶191} To be precise, this court in Hutton was authorizing and upholding 
only the practice that occurred in the case before it, in which a juror was replaced 
with an alternate after the jury had found the defendant guilty and before the start 
of the penalty phase.  Id. at 44-45, 559 N.E.2d 432.  The extent of this court’s 
ruling in Hutton was only that alternates could be present at the penalty-phase 
presentation of evidence and arguments in a capital case, and if an alternate juror 
replaced a regular juror at that stage, then that alternate could be present at and 
participate in deliberations at the penalty phase, but as a regular juror and not as 
an alternate. 
{¶192} An important question in Hutton was whether an alternate who is 
retained while the jury reaches a guilty verdict in the guilt phase can be 
January Term, 2002 
69 
sufficiently familiar with the case that he or she is able to competently replace a 
removed juror who has fully participated in all proceedings to that point.  If the 
alternate has not participated in deliberations at the guilt phase, there is some fear 
that the alternate cannot be as fully informed and functioning a member of the jury 
as the continuing jurors.  It is important to note at this point that there is a 
difference between not participating in deliberations and being absent from 
deliberations. 
{¶193} Hutton did not specifically address the issue of alternate jurors 
sitting in on deliberations in either phase of a capital trial.  However, a very close 
reading of Hutton reveals that this court’s opinion included an assumption that 
alternate jurors in bifurcated cases who are retained after deliberations in the first 
phase begin would not be sitting in on deliberations in either phase. 
{¶194} First, the Hutton opinion discussed State v. Dodis (Minn.1982), 
314 N.W.2d 233, a murder case that under Minnesota law was bifurcated into a 
guilt phase and a mental-illness phase because the defendant raised mental illness 
as a defense.  As the Hutton court contemplated the reasons for and against 
fashioning a specific exception to Crim.R. 24(F) for capital cases, it cited Dodis in 
support of the idea that alternates could be retained between phases of a bifurcated 
trial.  The Hutton court characterized Dodis as finding that “[t]he alternate’s 
absence from deliberations on guilt was ‘of no consequence’ to his ability to 
deliberate on mental illness.”  53 Ohio St.3d at 46, 559 N.E.2d 432, quoting 
Dodis, 314 N.W.2d at 241. 
{¶195} Second, in its discussion of People v. Fields (1983), 35 Cal.3d 329, 
197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680, the Hutton court again implied that the alternate 
juror in a capital case who was retained once the first stage ended would not have 
been present in guilt-phase deliberations.  As support for not allowing an alternate 
to become a juror at the penalty phase, the Hutton court cited Fields, which 
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reasoned that such a juror would be joining a group that had already deliberated 
after the guilt phase, in which the group had conducted discussions and reached 
conclusions.  The Hutton court observed that this alternate “would be ‘ignorant of 
those discussions and conclusions.’ ”  53 Ohio St.3d at 46, 559 N.E.2d 432, 
quoting Fields at 351, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.  Obviously, if the 
alternate had sat in on guilt-phase deliberations, the alternate would not be 
“ignorant” of what went on during those deliberations. 
{¶196} Despite the inferences in Hutton that seem clear to us now in 
hindsight, it is an indisputable fact that many trial court judges relied on Hutton as 
authorization for alternate jurors in capital cases to sit in on deliberations, both at 
the guilt phase and the penalty phase, and that this view of Hutton was taken by 
the trial court judge in the instant case.  See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 
at 438-440, 751 N.E.2d 946 (practice was not plain error); State v. Murphy, 91 
Ohio St.3d at 531-533, 747 N.E.2d 765 (same); State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d at 
123, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (alternate sat in at deliberations but no objection at trial and 
defendant did not raise practice as error on appeal); State v. Henness (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 53, 72, 679 N.E.2d 686 (apparently no objection at trial; proposition of 
law challenging practice summarily rejected, id. at 56, 679 N.E.2d 686); State v. 
Voorhies (June 14, 1995), Guernsey App. No. 94-CA-8 (finding, based on Hutton, 
Crim.R. 24[F] not applicable to capital murder case, so no error when trial judge 
allowed alternate jurors to be present at guilt-phase deliberations in capital case in 
which jury did not recommend death penalty).  The fact that this was a common 
practice perhaps was why the defense attorney in the instant case did not object to 
the presence of alternates during guilt-phase deliberations.  In addition, defense 
attorneys in cases such as Jackson and Murphy did not object to the presence of 
alternates in deliberations at either phase. 
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71 
{¶197} It was not until 2001 in Murphy that this court definitively found 
that the practice was error.  Perhaps judges presiding over jury trials in the time 
between Hutton and Murphy reasoned that if the alternate was not allowed to sit in 
on guilt-phase deliberations, it would be too difficult for the alternate to fully 
participate at the penalty phase if called to replace a juror.  Although such an 
approach would be inconsistent with the Hutton court’s discussions of Dodis and 
Fields detailed above, there is other language in Hutton that could be interpreted 
to support that approach.  For example, Hutton stated that “the Fields court 
‘recognize[d] that unforeseen circumstances may require substitution of a juror at 
the penalty phase of a capital trial, even though the alternate did not take part in 
the guilt phase deliberations.’ ”  53 Ohio St.3d at 47, 559 N.E.2d 432, quoting 
Fields, 35 Cal.3d at 351, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680, fn. 9, citing People v. 
Green (1971), 15 Cal.App.3d 524, 528, 93 Cal.Rptr. 84.  If a trial judge failed to 
appreciate the difference between “not taking part” in deliberations and “not being 
present” at deliberations, this passage, read in isolation, could support a view that 
alternates could be present at deliberations without taking part in them. 
{¶198} Or perhaps the scope of Hutton’s holding on this issue was 
misunderstood.  In Voorhies, the court of appeals stated that in Hutton, this court 
set forth “reasons why it would not be appropriate to apply Crim.R. 24(F) to a 
capital murder case,” and proceeded to find that former Crim.R. 24(F) did not 
apply to capital cases, by virtue of Hutton.  That interpretation failed to appreciate 
that Hutton merely established a narrow exception to Crim.R. 24(F), and certainly 
not a carte blanche authorization to ignore the rule totally in capital cases. 
{¶199} The court of appeals’ decision in Voorhies, along with the trial 
scenarios in cases such as Murphy and Jackson, illustrate that it was a common 
practice to allow alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations in capital cases at 
the time the instant trial took place.  Thus, the instant trial is clearly 
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distinguishable from trials that have occurred since Murphy was decided.  The 
lead opinion, by not placing the trial judge’s decisions in proper perspective, 
portrays the practice as more extreme and unjustified than it actually was at that 
time.  The lead opinion’s presumption of prejudice is similarly distorted because 
much of the lead opinion’s apparent insight into this issue is based on this court’s 
observations in Murphy and Jackson, both of which were decided long after the 
trial in the instant case took place. 
{¶200} Current Crim.R. 24(F)(2), as amended, makes clear that alternate 
jurors in a capital case are to be discharged when the jury retires to consider its 
verdict in the penalty phase.  I believe that this part of Crim.R. 24(F)(2) is not 
inconsistent with the rule exception announced in Hutton.  Therefore, since the 
proper view of alternates’ positions in capital cases has not changed, the trial 
judge in this case erred in allowing alternates to sit in on jury deliberations. 
{¶201} However, one of the most compelling rationales behind Hutton 
was that, if no exception were made to former Crim.R. 24(F) for capital cases, 
discharging alternates after the guilt phase “would completely foreclose the state 
from obtaining the death penalty” if a regular juror became unable to serve in the 
penalty phase.  See 53 Ohio St.3d at 47, 559 N.E.2d 432.  But, see, R.C. 
2929.06(B), as amended effective September 21, 1996.  While Hutton, and now 
amended Crim.R. 24(F)(2), provide a procedure for replacing a juror with an 
alternate before penalty-phase deliberations, the problem remains that, if a juror 
becomes unable to serve after penalty-phase deliberations begin, the jury must be 
dismissed.  Hutton of course did not involve this scenario, and so that case did not 
consider it. 
{¶202} As will be discussed below, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure now address the replacement of a juror with an alternate during 
deliberations (although there is no special federal rule for bifurcated cases, see 
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73 
United States v. Johnson [C.A.7, 2000], 223 F.3d 665, 670; United States v. 
Webster [C.A.5, 1998], 162 F.3d 308, 345-347).  The approach of the Federal 
Rules on this point is worth considering, especially in bifurcated cases.  There are 
significant advantages to retaining an alternate juror during deliberations at both 
phases of a capital trial, and to being able to substitute that alternate during 
deliberations if a regular juror becomes unable to serve, just as there are 
advantages to allowing substitution of an alternate during deliberations in a 
regular trial.  Crim.R. 24(F)(2), which now provides that “[n]o alternate juror shall 
be substituted during any deliberation,” specifically forecloses the possibility of 
substitution of an alternate during deliberations in a capital case. 
{¶203} Amended Crim.R. 24(F)(2) does not specify where the alternates 
should be during the jury’s deliberations in the guilt phase.  In light of the obvious 
confusion that Hutton has generated on this issue, it may have been preferable for 
the amended rule to clearly state that the alternates should not sit in on those 
deliberations, although they are not to be dismissed at that point.  The alternates 
should be retained in a room separate from the jury and instructed not to discuss 
the case among themselves.  But, even though the amended rule does not 
specifically say so, it is apparent that alternate jurors should not sit in on 
deliberations.  This is a natural consequence of the exception to former Crim.R. 
24(F) announced in Hutton and clarified in Murphy (as discussed above) and also 
fully consistent with the spirit of the recent amendment resulting in Crim.R. 
24(F)(2). 
B 
Alternate Jurors and Federal Procedural Rules 
{¶204} Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure have been modified to address problems sometimes presented 
by the use of alternate jurors.  In civil jury trials in the federal system, the 
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provisions for alternate jurors in former Fed.R.Civ.P. 47(b) were discarded in 
1991.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 48 provides: 
{¶205} “The court shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not more than 
twelve members and all jurors shall participate in the verdict unless excused from 
service by the court pursuant to Rule 47(c).  Unless the parties otherwise stipulate, 
(1) the verdict shall be unanimous and (2) no verdict shall be taken from a jury 
reduced in size to fewer than six members.”  Ohio’s Civil Rules retain the concept 
of alternate jurors in Civ.R. 47(C):  “An alternate juror who does not replace a 
regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.”  
Obviously, Fed.R.Civ.P. 48 gives a federal trial judge much more flexibility in 
seating a jury and proceeding through to a final verdict in a civil case than our 
Civil Rules give an Ohio trial judge. 
{¶206} Two provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are 
relevant to this discussion.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) allows a jury of fewer than 12 
members to reach a decision if a trial judge dismisses a juror for just cause after 
deliberations have begun.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) provides: 
{¶207} “Jury of Less Than Twelve.  Juries shall be of 12 but at any time 
before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court 
that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be 
returned by a jury of less than twelve should the court find it necessary to excuse 
one or more jurors for any just cause after trial commences.  Even absent such 
stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the 
jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict 
may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors.” 
{¶208} For a collection of cases applying Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b), see 
Annotation, Constitutionality and Application of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 23(b), Allowing 11-Person Jury to Return Verdict Absent Stipulation to 
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75 
that Effect by Parties When One Juror Has Been Excused After Start of 
Deliberations (1992), 107 A.L.R.Fed. 508.  See, also, United States v. Gambino 
(C.A.3, 1986), 788 F.2d 938, 946-949, discussing the specifics of Fed.R.Crim.P. 
23(b). 
{¶209} In addition, effective in 1999, Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) was amended to 
specify a procedure whereby a trial judge can replace a juror with an alternate 
after deliberations have begun.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3) provides: 
{¶210} “Retention of Alternate Jurors.  When the jury retires to consider 
the verdict, the court in its discretion may retain the alternate jurors during 
deliberations.  If the court decides to retain the alternate jurors, it shall ensure that 
they do not discuss the case with any other person unless and until they replace a 
regular juror during deliberations.  If an alternate replaces a juror after 
deliberations have begun, the court shall instruct the jury to begin its deliberations 
anew.” 
{¶211} A recent federal court of appeals decision serves to illustrate some 
features of the Federal Criminal Rules mentioned above.  In United States v. 
Register (C.A.11, 1999), 182 F.3d 820, a criminal case involving federal drug 
trafficking and weapons charges, the trial judge did not dismiss the alternate jurors 
at the start of deliberations, as required by former Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) (and so 
violated the rule in effect at the time of trial), but instead ordered the alternates to 
wait in a separate room while the jury deliberated, instructing the alternates not to 
discuss the case among themselves.  After deliberations had started, the trial judge 
dismissed one of the regular jurors and substituted an alternate, ordering the jury 
to begin its deliberations again.  The jury then found the defendants guilty of some 
of the offenses they were charged on.  The court of appeals applied a harmless-
error test and affirmed the convictions because it found no prejudice to the 
defendants.  Id. at 842-843. 
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{¶212} The Register court found that the trial did not violate 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b), reasoning that that rule, by allowing for a jury of fewer than 
12 to render a verdict, does not specifically foreclose the option of seating 
alternates during deliberations if the trial judge so decides.  See id. at 843, fn. 34.  
The Register court also recognized that the proposed amendment to 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3), which had not yet been adopted at the time of trial, would 
have allowed a trial judge to employ exactly the procedure used by the trial judge 
in the case before it.  Id. at 843, fn. 36.  Thus, under the Federal Criminal Rules, 
the trial judge has the option of proceeding under Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) or 24(c) if 
a juror becomes unable to serve during deliberations.  The flexibility afforded by 
these rules appears to be a worthwhile innovation. 
{¶213} The federal system’s modification of its rules, both civil and 
criminal, attempts to address problems presented by complicated and protracted 
jury trials.  Whether civil or criminal, a lengthy jury trial presents special 
challenges that require more flexibility.  The federal rules mentioned above, at 
least as they relate to alternate jurors, address these special challenges, and Ohio 
should consider making similar revisions to our rules that implicate alternates, and 
to any related statutes, such as R.C. 2945.29. 
{¶214} In State ex rel. Columbus v. Boyland (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 490, 
492-493, 12 O.O.3d 401, 391 N.E.2d 324, this court found that the Ohio 
Constitution does not require that a jury in a criminal case be composed of 12 
persons.  That decision may indicate that our Crim.R. 23 could be amended in line 
with the federal criminal rules to allow juries of fewer than 12 to deliver verdicts 
in some situations.  Also, since our rules have no provision allowing for 
replacement of jurors during deliberations (a practice now specifically forbidden 
in capital cases by Crim.R. 24[F][2]), a long hard look at Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3) 
may be in order.  At the same time, our state’s recent amendment of Crim.R. 
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24(F), recognizing that capital cases merit specialized rules in this area, is 
noteworthy.  Further refinements of procedures specific to capital cases would not 
be incompatible with the adoption of some of the federal innovations discussed 
above relating to alternate jurors for all criminal cases. 
IV 
Is the Death Penalty an Option on Remand? 
{¶215} In vacating appellant’s death sentence and remanding this cause to 
the trial court for resentencing, the lead opinion makes no mention of what should 
happen on remand, and therefore does not discuss whether appellant remains 
eligible to receive a death sentence.  Specifically, the lead opinion does not 
address whether R.C. 2929.06(B) applies to this case.  There are two possible 
views to take of the lead opinion’s failure to cite that statute.  One is that the lead 
opinion believes that it does not apply to appellant’s case.  The other is that, even 
though the lead opinion does not cite the statute, it does apply on remand.  It is 
apparently up to the trial judge to determine which of these two views is the 
correct one. 
{¶216} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2929.06(B), effective in 1996, 
to require a trial court to seat a new penalty-phase-only jury in order to resentence 
an offender when an appellate court has vacated the original death penalty based 
on penalty-phase error in a jury trial death-penalty case.  See 1996 Sub.S.B. No. 
258, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10539, 10548.  That statute specifically lists death 
as one of the options that is now available at resentencing.  R.C. 2929.06(B) 
overruled this court’s holding in State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 
N.E.2d 744, syllabus, that death is not an option for resentencing in this situation, 
and answers the criticisms raised in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Penix that a 
defendant should face a new sentencing-phase-only jury in that situation, in which 
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the state may seek the death penalty.  See 32 Ohio St.3d at 375-379, 513 N.E.2d 
744 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
{¶217} It is apparent that, for the same reasons cited in Justice Holmes’s 
dissent in Penix, Section (A) of R.C. 2929.06 does not apply to the case sub 
judice.  See 32 Ohio St.3d at 375-376, 513 N.E.2d 744 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
Since Section (A) does not apply, Section (B) does on its face and would seem to 
authorize the state to seek a death sentence on remand. 
{¶218} The offenses appellant was convicted of were committed in 1994.  
On remand, an argument will surely be made that applying R.C. 2929.06(B), 
enacted two years after those offenses, would violate the constitutional 
prohibitions against ex post facto laws and retroactive laws.  No cases of this 
court interpret R.C. 2929.06(B), even though it was first effective six years ago.  
Its reach is limited to a small number of cases.  This case is one that seems to 
implicate all the conditions specified within the statute for its application.  
However, if it should violate prohibitions against ex post facto laws or against 
retroactive laws, R.C. 2929.06(B) would not apply. 
{¶219} While a majority of this court has never addressed R.C. 
2929.06(B), that statute has been cited in a dissenting opinion to support the 
apparent view that the statute can be applied to a situation such as this.  In State v. 
Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 763 N.E.2d 122, the offenses occurred in 
1992, the jury recommended death, and the trial court imposed the death sentence.  
A majority of this court affirmed the death penalty.  One justice authored a 
separate opinion, joined by another justice, expressing the view that the guilty 
verdict should be affirmed but the death penalty should be reversed.  Id. at 368-
372, 763 N.E.2d 122 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  The authoring justice reasoned that defense counsel’s ineffectiveness in the 
guilt phase in soliciting inadmissible, highly inflammatory testimony about the 
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79 
defendant had a carryover effect on the jury in the penalty phase, thereby requiring 
reversal of the death sentence.  Id. at 372, 763 N.E.2d 122.  The opinion 
concluded with the statement that, instead of affirming the sentence of death, this 
court should “remand the cause for rehearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.06(B), which 
provides for the trial court to impanel a new jury for a new mitigation and 
sentencing hearing in which this evidence would be excluded.”  Id. 
{¶220} Even though R.C. 2929.06(B) provides the options other than 
death that are available in this situation, i.e., life imprisonment without parole, life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years, and life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years, only those 
options available in 1994 may be imposed in this case.  See State v. Madrigal 
(2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 399, 721 N.E.2d 52; State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 253, 259-260, 699 N.E.2d 482, both considering the application of R.C. 
2929.03, which was amended effective July 1, 1996.  See 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
7136, 7454-7456, and 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752, 10926-10927.  Before that 
time, R.C. 2929.03 provided that the penalties available in a capital case were 
death, life with parole eligibility after serving thirty years, and life with parole 
eligibility after serving twenty years.  146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7815, 7816.  Thus, 
life without parole is not an option on remand in this case. 
{¶221} Since I do not agree with the determination to reverse appellant’s 
death sentence, it is my view that no remand for resentencing is necessary, and 
that R.C. 2929.06(B) is not applicable.  I simply point out that, given the way this 
court resolves this case, the applicability of that statute is a potentially troubling 
issue and should be addressed. 
V 
Conclusion 
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{¶222} For all the foregoing reasons, appellant’s sentence of death should 
not be reversed.  A presumption of prejudice is inappropriate in these 
circumstances.  In the absence of any demonstration of actual prejudice, I would 
find no reversible error, would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals on the alternate-juror question, and would proceed to decide the issues 
found moot by the lead opinion.  Since this court does not take that course of 
action, I dissent. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
APPENDIX 
{¶223} Proposition of Law No. I: Evidence obtained in an illegal search 
are fruits of the poisonous tree under the Fourth Amendment and Article [I], 
Section 14 of [sic] the Ohio Constitution.  The initial search of Tony Gross’ trailer 
was in violation of the Constitutions.  The fruits of this search should have been 
suppressed. 
{¶224} Proposition of Law No. II: A warrant issued on the basis of 
information obtained in an illegal warrantless search of a home violates the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.  Samples of blood, 
hair and fingernail scrapings taken from Tony Gross pursuant to such a warrant 
must be suppressed. 
{¶225} Proposition of Law No. III: The photographic identification and 
follow up procedures used with several witnesses were so suggestive that they led 
to unreliable pre-trial and in-court identification that subverted the fairness of the 
fact finding process at both the trial and penalty phases. 
{¶226} Proposition of Law No. IV: Show-up identification procedures 
used with witnesses Karen Wright and Shawn Jones were unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.  Neither of their 
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81 
in-court identifications of Tony Gross nor testimony concerning the prior 
identifications should have been admitted at trial. 
{¶227} Proposition of Law No. V: Gross was entitled to a fair and 
reliable determination of guilt or innocence as well as sentence by an impartial 
jury under Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The jury selection process here denied Gross such a fair 
and impartial jury. 
{¶228} Proposition of Law No. VI: Introduction of “other acts” evidence, 
except under limited, clearly defined circumstances denies a criminal defendant of 
a fair trial and due process.  The introduction of “other acts” evidence that Tony 
Gross dealt in “crack” caused undue prejudice, unfairly denied him due process, a 
fair trial, and a fair and reliable sentencing hearing in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶229} Proposition of Law No. VII: The evidentiary errors that pervaded 
the trial deprived to [sic] Gross of due process, a fair trial, and a fair and reliable 
sentencing determination. 
{¶230} Proposition of Law No. VIII: The jury must be given clear and 
legally correct jury instructions to [e]nsure a fair and reliable determination of 
guilt or innocence at the trial phase of a capital case. 
{¶231} Proposition 
of 
Law 
No. 
IX: 
Duplicative 
aggravating 
circumstances improperly tipped the weighing process, in violation of the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 
and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶232} Proposition of Law No. X: Jury instructions at the penalty phase 
must convey to the jury adequate information to adequately guide the jury’s 
exercise of its discretion.  The instructions here failed to provide the mandated 
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guidance in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as 
well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶233} Proposition of Law No. XI: Tony Gross was convicted and 
sentenced to death in a trial conducted in an emotional atmosphere based on 
victim impact evidence and argument in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments as well as Article [I], Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶234} Proposition of Law No. XII: Due process permits convictions 
only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The state failed to introduce 
sufficient evidence upon which to premise a conviction for aggravated murder, as 
well as the other charged crimes.  Tony Gross’ convictions and sentence of death 
deprived him of due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 15 [sic] of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶235} Proposition of Law No. XIII: A defendant in a capital 
prosecution is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel by the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  The performance of trial counsel fell far below the prevailing 
professional norms, and was therefore unreasonable, denying Gross the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
{¶236} Proposition of Law No. XIV: A capital defendant is entitled to a 
fair and reliable determination of his guilt and sentence by a jury that is properly 
instructed and that follows the court’s instructions.  Where the jury ignores the 
court’s admonitions and discusses the case outside of the jury room and where 
jurors intimidate other jurors there is a denial of due process and a fair trial in 
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as 
Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
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83 
{¶237} Proposition of Law No. XV: The convictions and sentence of 
death imposed upon Tony Gross violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution because of the cumulative effect of the errors throughout both phases 
of the trial, the pretrial preparation and litigation, the motion for a new trial and 
the appellate process. 
{¶238} Proposition of Law No. XVI: The death sentence is inappropriate 
in this case. 
{¶239} Proposition of Law No. XVII: Where proportionality review is a 
necessary component in the appellate review of a capital case, due process and 
equal protection are denied when the state courts’ review is limited. 
{¶240} Proposition of Law No. XVIII: The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article [I], 
Sections 2, 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution establish the requirements for a 
valid death penalty scheme.  Ohio’s statutory provisions governing the imposition 
of the death penalty do not meet the prescribed constitutional requirements and 
are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied to Tony Gross. 
__________________ 
D. Michael Haddox, Muskingum County Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellee. 
David C. Stebbins and S. Adele Shank, for appellant. 
_______________________