Title: Ex Parte Moore

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

873 So. 2d 1161 (2003)
Ex parte John P. MOORE, Jr.
(In re Theresa v. Moore v. John P. Moore, Jr.)
1020256.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 3, 2003.
Don P. Bennett, Dothan, for petitioner.
W. Terry Bullard of Bullard & Bullard, L.L.C., Dothan, for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
In 2001, after 19 years of marriage, John P. Moore, Jr. ("the husband"), and *1162 Theresa V. Moore ("the wife") were divorced by the Houston Circuit Court, following the presentation of ore tenus evidence. The trial court divided the marital property and the debts of the marriage and awarded the wife $4,000 in monthly periodic alimony, "until such time as the [wife] has become employed in her profession as a nurse anesthetist, but for no longer than twelve months from the date of [the] judgment."
The wife appealed, arguing that the property division was inequitable, that the alimony award was insufficient, and that the trial court had exceeded its discretion by failing to award her an attorney fee. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment as to the award of periodic alimony and the division of the marital estate, stating its "conclu[sion] that the trial court's alimony award and its division of the marital estate, accumulated over the course of the ... marriage, was inequitable." Moore v. Moore, 873 So. 2d 1154, 1160 (Ala.Civ.App.2002). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as the judgment failed to award the wife an attorney fee, "conclud[ing] that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the wife an attorney fee." Id. at 1160.
The husband petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as that decision reversed portions of the trial court's judgment. We find that the trial court's award of periodic alimony and its property division were not plainly or palpably wrong. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as it reversed portions of the trial court's judgment.
Following the presentation of ore tenus evidence, the trial court, in its final judgment of divorce, stated the following findings of fact:
After making its findings of fact, the trial court made its award of periodic alimony and property division, which the Court of Civil Appeals accurately summarized:
"The trial court awarded the wife periodic alimony of $4,000 per month for 12 months, beginning on October 1, 2001, or until the wife was employed in her profession as a nurse anesthetist. The wife was awarded the beach condominium and its contents, the Robalo boat, the personal watercraft, and the 2000 [Chevrolet] Tahoe. She was awarded her jewelry and the furnishings of four rooms in the marital homethe kitchen, the living room, the master bedroom, and the front foyer. The wife was also given the use of the residence at 403 Dunleith Boulevard until she remarried or cohabited with a member of the opposite sex, in which event the property *1165 would be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. The husband was ordered to pay the indebtedness on the property at 403 Dunleith Boulevard. The wife was also awarded the house in which her mother was residing at 201 Dunleith Boulevard. The wife was ordered to pay the mortgage indebtedness on that property. The trial court's judgment provides that if the wife is ever in default on the mortgage payment for more than 60 days, the title to that property shall immediately vest in the husband.
Moore v. Moore, 873 So. 2d  at 1157-58.
The monthly mortgage payment on the residence at 403 Dunleith Boulevard is $1,250.
This Court recently stated the standard of review an appellate court must apply in reviewing a judgment awarding alimony and dividing property:
"`"A trial court's determination as to alimony and the division of property following an ore tenus presentation of the evidence is presumed correct. Parrish v. Parrish, 617 So. 2d 1036 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993). Moreover, issues of alimony and property division must be considered together, and the trial court's judgment will not be disturbed absent a finding that it is unsupported by the evidence so as to amount to an abuse of discretion. Id."
"`Morgan v. Morgan, 686 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1996)....
"`"The trial court has wide discretion over alimony and the division of property, and it may use whatever means are reasonable and necessary to equitably divide the parties' property. Grimsley v. Grimsley, 545 So. 2d 75, 77 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Its judgment is presumed correct and will not be reversed unless it is so unsupported by the evidence ... as to be unjust and palpably wrong. Grimsley, 545 So. 2d  at 76. However, that judgment is subject to review and revision. Moody v. Moody, 641 So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). This Court must consider the issues of property division and alimony together when reviewing the decision of the trial court, Albertson v. Albertson, 678 So. 2d 118, 120 (Ala.Civ.App.1996), and, because the facts and circumstances of each divorce case are different, this court must also consider the particular facts and circumstances of the case being reviewed. Murphy v. Murphy, 624 So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala.Civ.App.1993)."
*1166 "`Bushnell v. Bushnell, 713 So. 2d 962, 964-65 (Ala.Civ.App.1997).'"
Ex parte Foley, 864 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Ala.2003)(quoting Ex parte Drummond, 785 So. 2d 358, 360-61 (Ala.2000)).
"`"`[P]roperty divisions are not required to be equal, but must be equitable in light of the evidence, and the determination as to what is equitable rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.'"' Ex parte Durbin, 818 So. 2d 404, 408 (Ala.2001) (quoting Morgan v. Morgan, 686 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala. Civ.App.1996), quoting in turn Duckett v. Duckett, 669 So. 2d 195, 197 (Ala.Civ. App.1995)).
"`When dividing marital property, a trial court should consider several factors, including the length of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the future prospects of the parties; the source, type, and value of the property; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and the fault of the parties contributing to the breakup of the marriage .'
"Golden v. Golden, 681 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).
"`The purpose of periodic alimony is to support the former dependent spouse and to enable that spouse, to the extent possible, to maintain the status that the parties enjoyed during the marriage, until the spouse is self-supporting or maintaining a status similar to the one enjoyed during the marriage.'
Ex parte Foley, 864 So. 2d  at 1097-98.
The Court of Civil Appeals did not find that the trial court had exceeded its discretion. Instead, the Court of Civil Appeals "conclude[d] that the trial court's alimony award and its division of the marital estate ... was inequitable." Moore v. Moore, 873 So. 2d  at 1160. However, as stated above, the determination of what is equitable rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. "It is not for an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." Ex parte Durbin, 818 So. 2d 404, 409 (Ala.2001). The trial court's findings of fact clearly reflect its consideration of all relevant factors, and it appears that the Court of Civil Appeals substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. "We must remember that `[w]e are authorized to disturb the trial court's decision only if it is unsupported by the evidence and, therefore, is unjust and palpably wrong.'" Id. (quoting Grimsley v. Grimsley, 545 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989)).
Judge Crawley dissented from the Court of Civil Appeals' holding that the trial court's property-division and periodic-alimony awards were inequitable, and wrote:
"The wife received a substantial marital-property award. Although the monthly periodic-alimony payments of $4,000 from the husband were to end in 12 months, the trial court compensated for the lack of a monthly payment by awarding the wife the use of a $200,000 house on which the husband was ordered to pay the indebtedness and by ordering the husband to make the payments on the wife's $30,000 vehicle. The majority's reversal of the property-division and periodic-alimony awards constitutes, in my opinion, a substitution *1167 of this court's judgment for that of the trial court."
Moore v. Moore, 873 So. 2d  at 1161 (Crawley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We agree with Judge Crawley. Also, we note that the wife was relieved of responsibility for substantial marital debts. Indeed, her continuing responsibility was limited to the mortgage indebtedness on a residence occupied by her mother, who had proven her ability to pay at least $600 per month for the privilege of living there.
We conclude that the trial court did not exceed the limits of its discretion in its award of alimony or its division of the marital property. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that this judgment was plainly or palpably wrong. In reversing the trial court's judgment, the Court of Civil Appeals impermissibly reweighed the evidence. See Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 25-26 (Ala.2002).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's alimony award and its division of property were not plainly or palpably wrong. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as it reversed portions of the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for the Court of Civil Appeals to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  The trial court's findings do not include a paragraph numbered 13.