Title: Int'l Villages, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

224 Kan. 654 (1978)
585 P.2d 999
INTERNATIONAL VILLAGES, INC., OF AMERICA and SIMEDO ENTERPRISES, INC., and LEONARD M. SLATER and EVELYN V. SLATER, Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al., and PLANNING COMMISSION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., Appellees.
No. 48,892

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 28, 1978.
Kenton C. Granger, of Anderson, Granger, Nagels and Lastelic, Chartered, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Gary L. Nafziger, County Attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court affirming the denial by a regional planning commission of appellants' applications for conditional use permits.
In its memorandum of decision the trial court made detailed findings as to the exact nature of the desired use of the property. These findings are not in dispute. The portion of the decision relevant to this appeal is as follows:
The ultimate issue in the case is whether the denial of the applications for conditional permits was unreasonable. The appeal to the district court was taken pursuant to K.S.A. 19-2926 which provides:
The appellants attack the judgment on both substantive and procedural grounds. To understand the issues, it is necessary to recount the manner in which this action developed.
The first hearing before the Jefferson County Regional Planning Commission on the applications was held September 23, 1975. Prior to the meeting International supplied Gerald Rose, the Planning Director, with all the data he requested. After the completion of the agenda, the Planning Commission went into "executive session." At first, the permits were approved. Later on, during the same session, the approval was withdrawn and the applications were tabled for "further study and discussion of conditions to be attached for approval." In accordance with the practice of the Planning Commission, International was not present at the "executive session." Mr. Rose advised International by letter as to what had transpired and stated he would contact International prior to the next meeting to discuss "some of the proposed conditions which will be stipulated." No such contact was made. The second hearing was held on October 28, 1975. At *659 the close of this hearing, the Commission again went into "executive session" and rejected the applications. The grounds for the denial appear in the memorandum opinion of the district court.
On appeal International attacks the manner in which the Planning Commission arrived at its ultimate decision. It complains that although the Planning Commission consists of seven members, only three of the members were present at both meetings. There is no showing that the Commission lacked a quorum at either meeting, but, rather, that some members were present at one meeting that were not present at the other meeting. This point is without merit.
International next contends that the "executive sessions" violated the Open Public Meetings Act, K.S.A. 75-4317, et seq. Subsequent to the meetings herein, K.S.A. 75-4318 was amended to exclude bodies deliberating matters relating to a decision involving quasi-judicial functions. Zoning change applications were held to be quasi-judicial in nature in Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978). There is some dispute as to whether International was excluded from attending the "executive sessions." Whether or not the "executive sessions" violated the Public Meetings Act does not void the actions taken and appellants raise the question only as evidence of "unreasonableness." The record has been reviewed and there is no showing the purpose of such sessions was to defeat or defraud International. The procedure of the Planning Commission was quite informal, but this does not vitiate its actions.
International contends that the Planning Commission did not have authority to issue flat denials of the applications. It contends it should have had an opportunity to comply with conditions or negotiate objected-to elements of the project. In support of this contention it cites Section 80.3 of the Jefferson County Zoning Regulations as follows:
Under this rationale, an application to establish a bawdy house could not be flatly denied. A planning commission may deny an application for a conditional use permit without stating any conditions for approval. If the applications for conditions are granted, then the approval may be conditioned on certain requirements *660 being complied with. An application may be denied in toto.
International next complains that the trial court considered evidence not before the Planning Commission.
The rules on reviewing evidence are summarized in Olathe Hospital Foundation, Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., 217 Kan. 546, 539 P.2d 1 (1975):
This court further elaborated in that decision at 560:
The trial court may take additional evidence that is relevant to the limited issues of reasonableness and legality of the order appealed from. Keeney v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 389, 394, 454 P.2d 456 (1969); Rickard v. Fundenberger, 1 Kan. App.2d 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977).
Much of the objected-to "new" evidence relates to testimony of *661 Planning Commission members as to what was considered by them in denying the applications. International, itself, presented evidence not before the Planning Commission. No abuse of discretion is shown in the admission of evidence.
This brings us to the ultimate issue of whether or not the denial of the applications for conditional use permits was unreasonable.
The trial court upheld the denials on the ground that there was ample evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that the project "[w]ould not be harmonious with the general objectives of the Master Plan."
From the findings of the trial court, which are supported by substantial competent evidence, the picture develops of a quiet county with a rather stable population which is suddenly "host" to thousands of transient pleasure seekers. This transformation arose by the creation of Lake Perry. County resources to handle such masses of humanity are stretched to the limit. The primary reason for the denial appears to be a concern about 850 landowners of temporary occupancy who own lots to be used for recreational purposes. Permanent structures and actual residency are not the purposes of ownership. Instead, the owners would use the lots as temporary locations for R.V. vehicles. Yet, these same lot owners are to be financially responsible for the maintenance of the streets, sewer system, water system, comfort stations, and other non-income producing amenities of the large project. The "Home Owners Association" is to collect sufficient sums from the 850 lot owners and International (for the unsold 150 lots) to maintain these public areas. Concern for the efficacy of such a system and the financial impact on the county if the system does not function is a legitimate concern. Under the totality of the circumstances, the denial of the applications was not unreasonable.
Other points raised are considered and found to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.