Title: Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
STANLEY WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S239686 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B264944 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC559720 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
July 22, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
S239686 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), 
commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, allows defendants 
to request early judicial screening of legal claims targeting free 
speech or petitioning activities.  We consider two questions 
concerning the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to certain 
claims arising in the employment context. 
The primary question before us concerns the statute’s 
application to employment discrimination and retaliation 
claims.  Here, a journalist alleges that his employer denied him 
promotions, gave him unfavorable assignments, and ultimately 
fired him for unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory reasons.  
Some courts of appeal, including the court in this case, have 
concluded the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be used to screen 
claims alleging discriminatory or retaliatory employment 
actions.  We hold otherwise.  The statute contains no exception 
for discrimination or retaliation claims, and in some cases the 
actions a plaintiff alleges in support of his or her claim may 
qualify as protected speech or petitioning activity under section 
425.16.  In such cases, the plaintiff’s allegations about the 
defendant’s invidious motives will not shield the claim from the 
same preliminary screening for minimal merit that would apply 
to any other claim arising from protected activity.  The 
defendant employer in this case has shown plaintiff’s claims 
arise in limited part—though not in whole—from protected 
activity.  The employer is therefore entitled to a determination 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
of whether those limited portions of plaintiff’s claims have 
sufficient potential merit to proceed. 
The second question concerns the application of the anti-
SLAPP statute to the journalist’s claim that defendant defamed 
him by privately discussing the alleged reasons for his 
termination with potential employers and others.  We conclude 
that this claim need not be screened for merit because these 
privately communicated remarks were not made in connection 
with any issue of public significance, as the statute requires.  
(See § 425.16, subds. (a), (b)(1), (e)(4).)  We thus affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
Plaintiff Stanley Wilson began working for Cable News 
Network, Inc., in 1996, and wrote and produced stories for the 
network for more than 17 years.  During his tenure, Wilson 
covered matters of general public importance, including 
multiple presidential elections, the Bush v. Gore controversy, 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, and Hurricane Katrina.  For 
his work, Wilson attained recognition in the field, receiving 
three Emmy awards and many other journalism honors. 
In 2004, Wilson, who is African American and Latino, 
began raising concerns about the network’s treatment of 
African-American men.  He also took a five-week paternity leave 
after the birth of his twin children in 2013.  According to Wilson, 
the network rewarded him with menial assignments and denied 
him promotions in favor of younger and less experienced White 
candidates. 
Wilson’s tenure came to an end in 2014, after Wilson 
drafted a story covering the unexpected retirement of Los 
Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca.  An editor reviewing the draft 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
flagged several passages that appeared similar to another news 
organization’s published story.  Citing concerns about 
plagiarism, the network placed Wilson on leave of absence and 
ultimately fired him. 
Wilson filed suit against Cable News Network, Inc., 
various affiliated corporate entities, and his supervisor.  (For 
simplicity’s sake, we will refer to defendants collectively as 
CNN.)  Wilson’s complaint contains seven causes of action, six 
of 
which 
challenge 
CNN’s 
alleged 
discrimination 
and 
retaliation.  Specifically, Wilson alleges he was denied 
promotions, given unfavorable assignments, and ultimately 
fired because of his race and other protected characteristics,1 as 
well as in retaliation for exercising his right to make complaints 
about discrimination and his right to take parental leave.  (See 
Gov. Code, §§ 12940, 12945.2.)  He further alleges wrongful 
termination in violation of the public policy against employment 
discrimination and retaliation.  (See Gantt v. Sentry Insurance 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1089–1097.)  In his seventh and final 
cause of action, Wilson alleges that CNN defamed him by telling 
prospective employers and others that Wilson had committed 
plagiarism in violation of CNN’s standards and practices. 
CNN filed an anti-SLAPP motion.  (§ 425.16.)2  It argued 
that the first six causes of action arose, in whole or in part, from 
                                        
1 
Wilson was 51 when he was fired.  His wife had a medical 
condition.  On these facts, Wilson alleges CNN discriminated 
against him because of his age and association with a disabled 
person.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 12926, subd. (m), 12940, subd. (a).) 
2  
An anti-SLAPP motion seeks to strike a “[s]trategic 
lawsuit against public participation,” that is, a “SLAPP.”  (See 
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 
Cal.4th 1106, 1109 & fn. 1.) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
Wilson’s termination, and CNN’s decision to fire Wilson was in 
furtherance of its right to determine who should speak on its 
behalf on matters of public interest.  CNN further argued that 
the defamation cause of action arose from protected speech 
because its statements as to whether Wilson met CNN’s 
editorial standards in reporting on a matter of public interest 
furthered CNN’s exercise of free speech rights.  The trial court 
agreed with these arguments, concluded that Wilson had not 
shown any of his claims had minimal merit, and granted the 
motion. 
A divided Court of Appeal reversed.  (Wilson v. Cable News 
Network, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 822, review granted Mar. 1, 
2017, S239686 (Wilson); see id. at p. 840 (dis. opn. of Rothschild, 
P. J.).)  The majority held the trial court erred in granting the 
motion to strike Wilson’s employment discrimination and 
retaliation claims because the claims arose from “defendants’ 
allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory conduct against him, 
not the particular manifestations of the discrimination and 
retaliation, such as denying promotions, assigning him menial 
tasks, and firing him.”  (Id. at p. 836.)  Reasoning that 
discrimination and retaliation do not qualify as protected 
activity, even when committed by a news organization, the 
majority concluded the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply.  (Id. 
at pp. 834–837.)  The dissent disagreed, urging that the claims 
arose from CNN’s decision about who would report the news on 
its behalf, a decision in furtherance of CNN’s exercise of free 
speech rights.  (Id. at pp. 840–842 (dis. opn. of Rothschild, 
P. J.).)  The majority and dissent likewise disagreed over the 
treatment of Wilson’s defamation claim:  The majority thought 
the trial court was wrong to strike the claim, while the dissent 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
took the opposite view.  (See id. at pp. 837–840; id. at pp. 845–
846 (dis. opn. of Rothschild, P. J.).) 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in this case added to a 
growing divide over whether, in an employment discrimination 
or retaliation case, the employer’s alleged motive to discriminate 
or retaliate eliminates any anti-SLAPP protection that might 
otherwise attach to the employer’s employment practices.3  We 
took review to answer that question and to address the 
application of the anti-SLAPP statute to Wilson’s related 
defamation claim. 
                                        
3  
Compare Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2017) 13 
Cal.App.5th 851, 861, 863–864 (basis for a retaliation claim is 
the defendant’s unprotected retaliatory motive for an adverse 
action, not the adverse action itself), review granted November 
1, 2017, S244148; Nam v. Regents of University of California 
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1187–1193 (basis includes the 
defendant’s retaliatory motive) with Symmonds v. Mahoney 
(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1108 (alleged “discriminatory 
motive” does not “negate[] protections that otherwise would 
apply to the defendant’s conduct” under the anti-SLAPP 
statute), review granted April 24, 2019, S254646; Daniel v. 
Wayans (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 380 (courts should focus on 
allegations of conduct, not motive, because “ ‘ “[c]auses of action 
do not arise from motives; they arise from acts” ’ ”), review 
granted May 10, 2017, S240704; Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting, 
Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520 (same); Tuszynska v. 
Cunningham (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 257, 268–269 (same); see 
also San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State 
University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 104 
(in a self-dealing case, concluding the underlying conduct, not 
the alleged motive, is the basis), review granted August 16, 
2017, S242529. 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
II. 
Enacted by the Legislature in 1992, the anti-SLAPP 
statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless 
lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and 
petition on matters of public concern.  (See § 425.16, subd. (a); 
Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619; 
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 
192.)  To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to 
strike claims “arising from any act of that person in furtherance 
of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 
A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps.  
“Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of 
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] 
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.  
[Citations.]  If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff 
must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal 
merit.’ ”  (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).)  If the plaintiff 
fails to meet that burden, the court will strike the claim.  Subject 
to certain exceptions not relevant here, a defendant that 
prevails on a special motion to strike is entitled to attorney fees 
and costs.  (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) 
Because the Court of Appeal determined CNN had failed 
to carry its initial burden, we are here concerned only with the 
first step of the analysis.  The defendant’s first-step burden is to 
identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and 
demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  A “claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence 
of liability or a step leading to some different act for which 
liability is asserted.”  (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)  To 
determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts 
must “consider the elements of the challenged claim and what 
actions by the defendant supply those elements and 
consequently form the basis for liability.”  (Id. at p. 1063.)  
Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown 
any of these actions fall within one or more of the four categories 
of “ ‘act[s]’ ” protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 53, 66.) 
CNN relies on section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), which 
protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest.”4  Whether Wilson’s claims arise from activity 
protected by this provision is a matter we consider de novo.  
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067), evaluating the context and 
content 
of 
the asserted activity 
(FilmOn.com 
Inc. 
v. 
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 144–145, 149).  
III. 
Wilson’s intentional discrimination and retaliation claims 
are the centerpiece of his complaint.  To prove unlawful 
discrimination, Wilson must show he was a member of a 
                                        
4  
The other parts of subdivision (e) shield statements and 
writings made in connection with official proceedings or in 
public on matters of public interest.  (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–
(3).) 
 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
protected class; was performing competently in the position he 
held, and suffered an adverse employment action such as 
termination or demotion; and that other circumstances suggest 
a discriminatory motive.  (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 
24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)5  To prove unlawful retaliation, Wilson 
must likewise show CNN subjected him to adverse employment 
actions for impermissible reasons—namely, because he 
exercised rights guaranteed him by law.  (See Yanowitz v. 
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [retaliation 
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act]; Rogers v. County 
of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 491 [retaliation for 
taking family leave].)  Finally, Wilson’s wrongful termination 
claim turns on proof that Wilson was terminated and the reason 
for the firing violates public policy.  (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 
supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1089–1090.)6  In sum, all of Wilson’s 
                                        
5  
These are the elements of a disparate-treatment claim of 
discrimination—that is, a claim of “intentional discrimination 
against one or more persons on prohibited grounds.”  (Guz v. 
Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 20.)  A 
plaintiff may also raise other theories of discrimination or 
harassment, each of which has different elements.  (See ibid. 
[recognizing disparate-impact theory of discrimination, that is, 
the theory “that regardless of motive, a facially neutral 
employer practice or policy, bearing no manifest relationship to 
job requirements, in fact had a disproportionate adverse effect 
on members of the protected class”]; Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 1035, 1043 [quid pro quo harassment]; Lyle v. Warner 
Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279 
[hostile work environment harassment].)  Wilson does not rely 
on any of those theories here. 
6  
The same is true of the sixth claim for declaratory relief, 
which is derivative of the other five.  The complaint alleges an 
actual controversy as to whether CNN’s decision to terminate 
Wilson was motivated by discrimination. 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
employment-related claims depend on two kinds of allegations:  
(1) that CNN subjected Wilson to an adverse employment action 
or actions, and (2) that it took these adverse actions for 
discriminatory or retaliatory reasons.  The critical threshold 
question before us is whether such claims can ever be said to be 
based on an “act . . . in furtherance” of speech and petitioning 
rights under section 425.16, subdivisions (b)(1) and (e)(4).  The 
Court of Appeal answered no.  We disagree. 
A. 
Whether it is unlawful for a person to perform a particular 
action or engage in a particular activity often depends on 
whether the person has a good reason for doing it—or, at least, 
has no bad reason for doing it.  For example, it is ordinarily 
perfectly lawful for a person to possess a screwdriver, but to 
possess one for the purpose of burglarizing a house is a criminal 
offense.  (See Pen. Code, § 466.)  It is likewise lawful to file a 
lawsuit—even a meritless one—but to do so for the sake of 
impoverishing an enemy constitutes the tort of malicious 
prosecution.  (See Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 
Cal.3d 43, 49–51.)  The laws proscribing intentional 
discrimination and retaliation in employment and other areas 
belong to this category of prohibitions.  It is ordinarily perfectly 
permissible for an employer to decide not to hire, not to promote, 
or to fire an employee.  The employer may not, however, act 
based on “the race, religious creed, color, national origin,” or 
other protected characteristic of the employee (Gov. Code, 
§ 12940, subd. (a)), or because the employee has exercised 
certain rights guaranteed by law, including the right to 
complain about discrimination (e.g., id., subd. (h)). 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
This feature of the antidiscrimination and antiretaliation 
laws has led some appellate courts, including the Court of 
Appeal in this case, to conclude that discrimination and 
retaliation claims fall outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  The appellate court here reasoned that because the 
adverse employment actions Wilson alleged would have been 
perfectly lawful in the absence of CNN’s discriminatory or 
retaliatory motive, Wilson’s claims must be based on CNN’s 
unprotected discrimination or retaliation—and not “the 
particular manifestations of the discrimination and retaliation, 
such as denying promotions, assigning him menial tasks, and 
firing him.”  (Wilson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 836, rev. 
granted.)  On this view, it does not matter that one of these 
“particular 
manifestations” 
might 
otherwise 
qualify 
as 
protected speech or petitioning activity.  If the plaintiff alleges 
the defendant acted for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons, 
the plaintiff’s allegation of illicit motive will defeat any 
argument for anti-SLAPP protection. 
This view cannot be squared with either the statutory text 
or our precedent interpreting it.  It is true that a cause of action 
for intentional discrimination would be incomplete without 
allegations of a discriminatory motive.  But a cause of action for 
discrimination would likewise be incomplete without allegations 
of concrete adverse action.  (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.)  For pleading purposes, both are 
necessary elements; neither is privileged over the other.  It 
follows that even if a plaintiff’s discrimination claim can be said 
to be based in part on the employer’s purported wrongful 
motives, it is necessarily also based on the employer’s alleged 
acts—that is, the various outward “manifestations” of the 
employer’s alleged wrongful intent, such as failing to promote, 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
giving unfavorable assignments, or firing.  (Wilson, supra, 6 
Cal.App.5th at p. 836, rev. granted; see Black’s Law Dict. (6th 
ed. 1990) p. 25, col. 2 [defining “act” as the “external 
manifestation of [an] actor’s will” and, more generally, as “an 
effect produced in the external world by an exercise of the power 
of a person objectively, prompted by intention”].)  Under the first 
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, that is the end of the story, for 
it is the defendant’s acts that matter.  (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) 
[protecting “any act of that person” in furtherance of particular 
rights]; Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 [at the first step of the 
anti-SLAPP inquiry, courts must “consider the elements of the 
challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply 
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability,” 
italics added].)  If the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s 
claim are of the sort protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, then 
anti-SLAPP protections apply. 
Resisting this conclusion, Wilson contends that “the basis 
of CNN’s alleged liability is not staffing or hiring for a news 
position, but discriminatory treatment and actions.”  But the 
discriminatory treatment and actions Wilson alleges in support 
of his claims are actions related to the staffing of CNN’s 
newsroom.  The argument thus boils down to an assertion that, 
for purposes of the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court 
must accept Wilson’s allegation that the challenged personnel 
actions were taken for discriminatory reasons and are therefore 
unlawful.  (See Wilson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 836, rev. 
granted.)  This is not how the anti-SLAPP statute works.  In 
deciding an anti-SLAPP motion, a court must at the second step 
“ ‘accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff.’ ”  
(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 
269, fn. 3, italics added.)  But we have never insisted that the 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
complaint’s allegations be given similar credence in the face of 
contrary evidence at the first step.  Such conclusive deference 
would be difficult to reconcile with the statutory admonition 
that courts must look beyond the pleadings to consider any party 
evidentiary submissions as well.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) 
Nor does the anti-SLAPP statute require a defendant to 
disprove allegations of illicit motive.  At the first step of the 
analysis, the defendant must make two related showings.  
Comparing its  statements and conduct against the statute, it 
must demonstrate activity qualifying for protection.  (See 
§ 425.16, subd. (e).)  And comparing that protected activity 
against the complaint, it must also demonstrate that the activity 
supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims.  (Id., subd. 
(b)(1); see Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 620 [“A defendant satisfies the first step of the 
analysis by demonstrating that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff 
claims to have been injured falls within one of the four 
categories described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]’ 
[citation], and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that 
conduct [citation].”].)  At this stage, the question is only whether 
a defendant has made out a prima facie case that activity 
underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily protected (City of 
Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420; Simpson 
Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 21), not 
whether it has shown its acts are ultimately lawful. 
We so held in Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82.  
There, the plaintiffs urged that the defendant’s petitioning 
activity should receive no protection because it was not a valid 
exercise of speech and petitioning rights, the defendant having 
previously waived the right to engage in the activity.  We 
disagreed.  We acknowledged that the preamble to the statute 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
does reflect a purpose to protect the “valid exercise” of speech 
and petition rights.  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  But the Legislature’s 
expression of “a concern in the statute’s preamble with lawsuits 
that chill the valid exercise of First Amendment rights does not 
mean that a court may read a separate proof-of-validity 
requirement into the operative sections of the statute.  
[Citations.]  Rather, any ‘claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s 
acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the 
context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s [secondary] burden to 
provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s 
case.’ ”  (Navellier, at p. 94; see City of Montebello v. Vasquez, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 422–425 [lawfulness of activity generally 
addressed in the second step].)  To conclude otherwise would 
effectively shift to the defendant a burden statutorily assigned 
to the plaintiff.  (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) [if acts are protected, 
it is for the “plaintiff [to] establish[] that there is a probability 
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim”].) 
Consistent with this understanding, at the first step of the 
anti-SLAPP analysis, we routinely have examined the conduct 
of defendants without relying on whatever improper motive the 
plaintiff alleged.  For example, in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. 
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, we considered whether claims 
for malicious prosecution could be subject to an anti-SLAPP 
motion.  The plaintiff urged that filing an action without 
probable cause was not activity in furtherance of constitutional 
speech and petition rights, and so such claims should be exempt.  
We rejected the argument.  That the claim arose from the filing 
of a lawsuit, protected First Amendment activity, was alone 
dispositive; allegations that the suit was filed without probable 
cause—or, for that matter, based on a malicious motive—were 
irrelevant at the first step, and mattered only at the second step.  
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
(Id. at pp. 739–740; see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 291–292.) 
The same was true in Park.  There, when considering 
“what actions by the defendant supply [the] elements” of a claim 
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063), we determined a 
discrimination suit arose from the decision to deny the plaintiff 
tenure and examined whether that decision was protected, 
without reference to the alleged discriminatory motive (id. at 
pp. 1071–1072).  And in Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th 610, we considered whether claims for 
intentional interference with contract and prospective economic 
advantage arose from protected activity.  The claims rested in 
part on the defendants’ lobbying the city council and lobbying on 
behalf of the city.  These acts were lawful, considered on their 
own, but alleged to be wrongful because taken with the intent to 
disrupt existing and potential contractual relations.  We 
examined whether the acts themselves were protected, without 
ever suggesting that the plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongful 
motive were sufficient to remove the lobbying activity from the 
statute’s aegis.  (See id. at pp. 628–630.)7 
                                        
7 
Many courts of appeal, too, have correctly recognized that 
the text of the anti-SLAPP statute and our precedent require a 
court at the first step to examine the defendant’s actions without 
regard to the plaintiff’s allegations about the defendant’s 
motives.  (Symmonds v. Mahoney, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 1106–1108, rev. granted; San Diegans for Open Government 
v. San Diego State University Research Foundation, supra, 13 
Cal.App.5th at p. 104, rev. granted; Daniel v. Wayans, supra, 8 
Cal.App.5th at p. 380, rev. granted; Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 
Cal.App.4th 41, 53–54; DeCambre v. Rady Children’s Hospital-
San Diego (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1, 22, disapproved on another 
ground in Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1070; Hunter v. CBS 
 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
To be clear, we do not hold that a defendant’s motives are 
categorically off-limits in determining whether an act qualifies 
as protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.  We hold 
only that the plaintiff’s allegations cannot be dispositive of the 
question.  In some cases (including this one, as we explain 
below), whether the defendant’s act qualifies as one in 
furtherance of protected speech or petitioning will depend on 
whether the defendant took the action for speech-related 
reasons.  Nothing in the statutory scheme prevents the 
defendant from introducing evidence establishing such reasons.  
But there is an important difference between permitting the 
defendant to present evidence of its own motives in an effort to 
make out its prima facie case of protected activity and treating 
a plaintiff’s allegations of illicit motive as a bar to anti-SLAPP 
protection, as Wilson would have us do here. 
To conclude otherwise would effectively immunize claims 
of discrimination or retaliation from anti-SLAPP scrutiny, even 
though the statutory text establishes no such immunity.  As 
originally drafted, “[n]othing in the statute itself categorically 
exclude[d] any particular type of action from its operation.”  
(Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 92.)  And although 
subsequent amendments to the statutory scheme have added 
exclusions (see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.17; Simpson Strong-Tie 
                                        
Broadcasting Inc., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520; People ex 
rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 
823; Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012) 
204 Cal.App.4th 65, 83, disapproved on another ground in Park, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1070; Tuszynska v. Cunningham, supra, 
199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 268–269; Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 
196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1186; Gallanis-Politis v. Medina (2007) 
152 Cal.App.4th 600, 612–613, fn. 8.) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
Co., Inc. v. Gore, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 21–22), there are none 
for discrimination or retaliation actions.  Nor can we infer that 
failure to include such an exception was a legislative oversight.  
After all, a meritless discrimination claim, like other meritless 
claims, is capable of “chill[ing] the valid exercise of the 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 
redress of grievances.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a); see Ingels v. 
Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1064 [upholding strike of caller’s age 
discrimination claim against call-in radio talk show].) 
Wilson, echoing the Court of Appeal, expresses concern 
that if the plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory motives are 
not considered at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, 
“ ‘most, if not all, harassment, discrimination, and retaliation 
cases [will be subject] to motions to strike.’ ”  (Wilson, supra, 6 
Cal.App.5th at p. 835, rev. granted, quoting Nam v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189.)  This 
result would impose substantial burdens on discrimination and 
retaliation plaintiffs, who would be compelled to establish the 
potential merit of their claims at an early stage of the litigation, 
generally “without the benefit of discovery and with the threat 
of attorney fees looming.”  (Nam, at p. 1189; accord, Bonni v. St. 
Joseph Health System, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 864, rev. 
granted; see Wilson, at p. 835.) 
The concern is overstated.  We see no realistic possibility 
that anti-SLAPP motions will become a routine feature of the 
litigation of discrimination or retaliation claims.  The anti-
SLAPP statute does not apply simply because an employer 
protests that its personnel decisions followed, or were 
communicated through, speech or petitioning activity.  A claim 
may be struck under the anti-SLAPP statute “only if the speech 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not 
just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act 
for which liability is asserted.”  (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 1060.)  Put differently, to carry its burden at the first step, 
the defendant in a discrimination suit must show that the 
complained-of adverse action, in and of itself, is an act in 
furtherance of its speech or petitioning rights.  Cases that fit 
that description are the exception, not the rule. 
A brief survey of the case law illustrates the point.  For 
example, in Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 
Cal.App.4th 611, 624–625, the court denied a government 
agency’s motion to strike an employee’s discrimination claim 
because the claim arose from various actions that had 
culminated in the employee’s constructive discharge, even 
though the complaint also mentioned statements critical of the 
plaintiff’s performance.  In McConnell v. Innovative Artists 
Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 176–
177, the plaintiffs sued over the modification of their job duties 
and subsequent termination in retaliation for their filing 
lawsuits; that these allegedly retaliatory acts were conveyed in 
writing did not render them protected.  And in Department of 
Fair Employment & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road 
Apartments, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1284–1285, the 
plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims arose from a 
landlord’s failure to accommodate a disability by giving 
sufficient time to seek alternative housing, not the unlawful 
detainer action the landlord filed. 
In the relatively unusual case in which the discrimination 
or retaliation defendant does meet its first-step burden of 
showing that its challenged actions qualify as protected activity, 
the burden shifts to the plaintiff.  But the plaintiff’s second-step 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
burden is a limited one.  The plaintiff need not prove her case to 
the court (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1123); the bar sits lower, at a 
demonstration of “minimal merit” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 89).  At this stage, “ ‘[t]he court does not weigh 
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.  Its inquiry is 
limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient 
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to 
sustain a favorable judgment.  It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence 
as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to 
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ”  
(Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940, quoting Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 376, 384–385; see Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) 
True, in the absence of discovery, even this reduced 
barrier could pose particular difficulties for discrimination and 
retaliation plaintiffs, whose claims depend on assertions of 
motive that are peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge.  
But “[c]ourts deciding anti-SLAPP motions . . . are empowered 
to mitigate their impact by ordering, where appropriate, ‘that 
specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding’ the motion’s 
pendency.”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 66, quoting § 425.16, subd. (g).)  A court 
exercising its discretion to grant or deny a motion under section 
425.16, subdivision (g) should remain mindful that the anti-
SLAPP statute was adopted to end meritless suits targeting 
protected speech, “not to abort potentially meritorious claims 
due to a lack of discovery.”  (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. 
v. Gilbane Building Co., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 949.)  Where a 
defendant relies on motive evidence in support of an anti-SLAPP 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
motion, a plaintiff’s request for discovery concerning the 
asserted motive may often present paradigmatic “good cause.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (g).) 
With careful attention to the limited nature of a plaintiff’s 
second step showing, and to granting discovery in appropriate 
cases, courts can mitigate the burden of anti-SLAPP 
enforcement on discrimination and retaliation plaintiffs, even if 
they cannot eliminate it altogether.  If the Legislature believes 
the residual burden is unnecessary or excessive, it certainly can 
adjust the statutory scheme, as it has before.  We cannot, 
however, rewrite the statute to create an exception the 
Legislature has not enacted. 
In sum, we conclude that for anti-SLAPP purposes 
discrimination and retaliation claims arise from the adverse 
actions allegedly 
taken, 
notwithstanding 
the 
plaintiff’s 
allegation that the actions were taken for an improper purpose.  
If conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is 
protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis has been carried, regardless of any alleged 
motivations that supply other elements of the claim.  We 
disapprove Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra, 13 
Cal.App.5th 851, review granted, and Nam v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, to the 
extent they are inconsistent with this conclusion. 
B. 
With these principles in mind, we return to the allegations 
in Wilson’s complaint.  Wilson alleges a range of adverse 
employment actions, but the most prominent is CNN’s decision 
in January 2014 to terminate him.  Expressly or implicitly, 
Wilson’s firing supplies an element of the first six claims in the 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
complaint.  These claims thus all arise—at least in part—from 
this adverse action.  (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057.)  We 
therefore begin by considering whether firing Wilson qualifies 
as an act in furtherance of CNN’s right to free speech.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (b)(1).) 
CNN is a cable and Internet news organization.  Its 
publication of news concerning matters of public interest is an 
exercise of free speech rights secured by the state and federal 
Constitutions.8  CNN does not contend the termination of 
Wilson’s employment is itself speech.  But to insulate the 
exercise of free speech rights against chilling litigation, the 
Legislature has defined protected activity to include not only the 
act of speaking, but “any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of” constitutional speech rights on matters of public 
interest.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  CNN makes two arguments 
for application of that provision here.  First, it argues that its 
selection of content producers is conduct in furtherance of its 
exercise of speech rights.  Second, it argues that its decision to 
                                        
8  
See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (publication of Internet content entitled to 1st 
Amend. protection); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC 
(1994) 512 U.S. 622, 636 (“Cable programmers . . . engage in and 
transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the 
speech and press provisions of the First Amendment”); Leathers 
v. Medlock (1991) 499 U.S. 439, 444 (“Cable television provides 
to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment.  It is 
engaged in ‘speech’ under the First Amendment, and is, in much 
of its operation, part of the ‘press.’ ”); Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
page 1071 (“The reporting of news, whether in print or on air, is 
constitutionally 
protected 
free 
speech.”); 
California 
Constitution, article I, section 2, subdivision (a) (“Every person 
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects . . . .”). 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
enforce its journalistic standards by terminating a writer for 
alleged plagiarism constitutes conduct in furtherance of 
protected activity. 
The anti-SLAPP statute provides no explicit guidance for 
evaluating these arguments.  Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), 
does not define precisely how, or to what extent, conduct must 
further the exercise of speech or petition rights to merit 
protection.  At a minimum, the subdivision shields expressive 
conduct—the burning of flags, the wearing of armbands, and the 
like—that, although not a “written or oral statement or writing” 
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(3)), may similarly communicate views 
regarding “matters of public significance” (id., subd. (a)).  (See, 
e.g., Texas v. Johnson (1989) 491 U.S. 397, 404–406 [flag 
burning]; Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 
505–506 [armbands].)  Indeed, the legislative history suggests 
expressive conduct was foremost in the Legislature’s thinking 
when subdivision (e)(4) was added.9  But the text’s reference to 
                                        
9  
The provision was inserted in 1997, five years after 
original enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute.  The committee 
reports are uniform in describing the motivation for the 
provision.  Proponents asserted “that the constitutional right of 
free speech and petition also includes constitutionally protected 
expressive conduct.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 12, 1997, 
p. 4; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 23, 1997, p. 4.)  The Legislature agreed and 
sought to codify the principle that expressive conduct, like 
expressive speech, is protected activity.  (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296, supra, pp. 3–4; Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1296, supra, p. 4; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 12, 1997, p. 4.) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
acts “in furtherance” of speech or petitioning rights can also 
reasonably be read to extend to at least certain conduct that, 
though itself containing no expressive elements, facilitates 
expression. 
A news organization’s hiring or firing of employees—like 
virtually everything a news organization does—facilitates the 
organization’s speech to some degree.  But it does not follow that 
everything the news organization does qualifies as protected 
activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.  The First Amendment 
does not immunize news organizations from laws of general 
applicability “simply because their enforcement . . . has 
incidental effects on [the press’s] ability to gather and report the 
news.”  (Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991) 501 U.S. 663, 669.)  
We likewise do not read the anti-SLAPP statute to call for 
preliminary screening of every claim that might be brought 
against a news organization, merely because the claim might 
have incidental effects on the organization’s operation.  The 
question we must consider is whether, and when, a news 
organization’s selection of its employees bears a sufficiently 
substantial relationship to the organization’s ability to speak on 
matters of public concern to qualify as conduct in furtherance of 
constitutional speech rights. 
1. 
We begin with the first, and broader, of CNN’s two 
arguments:  that its decisions to hire or fire writers and other 
content 
producers 
categorically 
qualify 
as 
conduct 
in 
furtherance of its speech rights.  The argument rests on two 
basic propositions.  One, the right of a news organization to 
speak includes the right to exercise editorial control and 
judgment—that is, the right to choose what news it will report 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
and how the news will be reported.  (Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo (1974) 418 U.S. 241, 258.)  And two, an entity can 
act and speak only through the individuals that comprise and 
represent it.  The law thus recognizes that, to exercise certain 
First Amendment freedoms, such as the right of free exercise of 
religion, an entity “must retain the corollary right to select its 
voice.”  (Petruska v. Gannon University (3d Cir. 2006) 462 F.3d 
294, 306; see ibid. [ministerial exception to federal employment 
discrimination 
law]; 
accord, 
Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171, 185 
[“it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s 
determination of who can act as its ministers”].) 
But in the area of press freedoms, it has long been 
established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a 
news organization absolute control over who may write, report, 
or even edit on its behalf.  (Associated Press v. Labor Board 
(1937) 301 U.S. 103, 130–133 (Associated Press).)  In Associated 
Press, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged the 
respondent news organization with unlawfully discharging an 
editorial employee for engaging in union activity and ordered 
the employee reinstated.  Challenging the NLRB’s order on First 
Amendment grounds, the news organization urged that 
“whatever may be the case with respect to employees in its 
mechanical departments it must have absolute and unrestricted 
freedom to employ and to discharge those who . . . edit the 
news.”  (Id. at p. 131.)  The Supreme Court rejected this as an 
“unsound generalization” (ibid.), noting that the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and a free press afford “[t]he publisher 
of a newspaper . . . no special immunity from the application of 
general laws” (id. at p. 132; see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human 
Rel. Comm’n (1973) 413 U.S. 376, 382–383; Shulman v. Group 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 239).  Regulation of 
the press’s labor practices was permissible, provided it left 
untrammeled “the full freedom and liberty of the petitioner to 
publish the news as it desires it published or to enforce policies 
of its own choosing with respect to the editing and rewriting of 
news for publication.”  (Associated Press, at p. 133.) 
Courts in various contexts have applied these principles to 
distinguish 
between 
permissible 
regulation 
and 
unconstitutional interference with a newspaper’s editorial 
judgment.  In Passaic Daily News v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
736 F.2d 1543, 1549, for example, the court held that the NLRB 
could order the reinstatement of a newspaper columnist 
unlawfully discharged for engaging in union activity, though it 
drew the line at compulsory future publication of his weekly 
column.  In McDermott v. Ampersand Pub., LLC (9th Cir. 2010) 
593 F.3d 950, in contrast, the court invalidated an NLRB order 
requiring reinstatement of news reporters and editors, but it did 
so because these individuals had been discharged for “union 
activity directed at pressuring the newspaper’s owner and 
publisher to refrain from exercising editorial control over news 
reporting”; the court explained that under the circumstances, 
relief “in support of union activity aimed at obtaining editorial 
control poses a threat of violating” the newspaper’s First 
Amendment editorial rights.  (Id. at p. 953; but see id. at 
pp. 968–971 (dis. opn. of Hawkins, J.) [injunction ordering 
reinstatement does not risk 1st Amend. infringement].)  In 
Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers (Wn. 1997) 936 P.2d 1123, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
partially invalidated a statute prohibiting discrimination 
against employees for political participation because, in its 
judgment, the nature of the regulation directly interfered with 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
the plaintiff newspaper’s ability to maintain journalistic 
integrity and credibility by restricting its employees’ political 
activism.  (Id. at p. 1133; but see id. at p. 1133 (dis. opn. of 
Dolliver, J.) [“The First Amendment does not give a newspaper 
immunity from general laws absent a showing of interference 
with the newspaper’s right to determine what to print.”].)10 
The considerations raised in these cases differ, but the 
bottom line is this:  Not every staffing decision a news 
organization makes—even with respect to those who write, edit, 
or otherwise produce content—enjoys constitutional protection.  
As a general rule, application of laws prohibiting racial and 
other forms of discrimination will leave the organization with 
“the full freedom and liberty” to “publish the news as it desires 
it published.”  (Associated Press, supra, 301 U.S. at p. 133.)  It 
follows that, also as a general rule, a legal challenge to a 
particular staffing decision will have no substantial effect on the 
news organization’s ability to speak on public issues, which is 
the anti-SLAPP statute’s concern. 
Like most general rules, this one does admit of exceptions.  
Indeed, Wilson himself acknowledges that in some instances a 
news organization’s hiring decisions could qualify as conduct in 
furtherance of the organization’s constitutionally protected 
speech on matters of public interest.  He agrees, for example, 
                                        
10  
As another example, in Hausch v. Donrey of Nevada, Inc. 
(D.Nev. 1993) 833 F.Supp. 822, 832, the federal district court 
rejected a newspaper’s First Amendment defense to the 
employment discrimination claim of a managing editor based on 
failure to promote her to the position of editor, reasoning that 
the application of antidiscrimination laws did not burden the 
newspaper’s “ability to control the content and character of their 
newspaper’s message.” 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
that a television producer’s decision about whom to cast in a 
program can constitute part of the message conveyed, thus 
meriting anti-SLAPP protection.  (Cf. Hunter v. CBS 
Broadcasting Inc., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 [holding 
that choice of on-air employee to speak on behalf of news 
organization furthers organization’s exercise of speech rights].)  
Likewise, the decision to hire or fire an employee who is vested 
with ultimate authority to determine a news organization’s 
message might well have a substantial effect on the 
organization’s ability to speak as it chooses on matters of public 
concern.  Lawsuits directed at influencing the selection of 
individuals who wield that type of ultimate authority could chill 
participation in the discussion of public issues, as surely as suits 
targeting the act of speaking itself.  But not so with other 
employees in a newsroom who may contribute to, but lack 
ultimate say over, their employer’s speech.  (See Manson v. 
Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. (E.D.Ark. 1999) 42 F.Supp.2d 856, 
865 [“A reporter has no free-standing First Amendment right to 
have her articles published by a privately-owned newspaper for 
which she works.”].)  Suits over the hiring and firing of such 
employees—without more—pose no comparable threat to the 
exercise of editorial discretion. 
As the movant, CNN has the burden of showing Wilson’s 
role bore such a relationship to its exercise of editorial control 
as to warrant protection under the anti-SLAPP statute.  CNN 
has failed to make that showing.  CNN does not contend that as 
a field producer Wilson had authority to decide what CNN would 
air.  Instead, CNN relies solely on Wilson’s part-time role as a 
writer for its website, a comparatively minor part of his duties.  
But CNN does not demonstrate that Wilson, in his capacity as a 
writer, had authority to determine what would appear on CNN’s 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
website.  Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate the contrary.  
Wilson’s work was vetted and reviewed by others who did have 
editorial power, and who decided whether his work should—or 
in the case of the Baca story, should not—be published by CNN.  
As far as the record shows, Wilson was one of countless 
employees whose work contributes to what a large news 
organization like CNN says about the issues of the day, but was 
not among those who appear on-air to speak for the organization 
or exercise authority behind the scenes to determine CNN’s 
message.  CNN’s decisions concerning which assignments to 
give Wilson and whether to continue employing him, without 
more, had no substantial relationship to CNN’s ability to speak 
on matters of public concern.  It follows that a claim based on 
these decisions, without more, falls outside the reach of the anti-
SLAPP statute. 
2. 
CNN’s second, and narrower, argument focuses on its 
specific asserted reason for terminating Wilson—his alleged 
plagiarism—rather than his general role as a content producer.  
In support of its motion, CNN submitted numerous declarations 
attesting that it became aware of possible plagiarism by Wilson, 
investigated the possibility, and elected to terminate Wilson 
based on its findings.  CNN’s declarations also detail CNN’s 
prohibition against plagiarism, its policy of sanctioning 
employees who engage in plagiarism, and the editorial controls 
CNN has in place to ensure plagiarism will not occur. 
Wilson acknowledges his termination followed an 
investigation into plagiarism, though he disputes CNN’s 
conclusions and claims the plagiarism rationale was pretextual.  
We need not, however, determine whether Wilson plagiarized, 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
or whether any plagiarism was a true motive for his 
termination.  The question is only whether CNN has made out 
a prima facie case that activity underlying Wilson’s claims is 
protected.  (City of Montebello v. Vasquez, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 420; Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 21.) 
CNN’s plagiarism rationale for terminating Wilson evokes 
a line of cases concerning the right of news organizations to 
maintain and enforce standards of journalistic ethics.  In 
Newspaper Guild, etc. v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 1980) 636 F.2d 550 
(Newspaper Guild), the D.C. Circuit held that a newspaper’s 
code of ethics—unlike other terms of employment—is not the 
proper subject of mandatory collective bargaining.  It explained:  
“[P]rotection of the editorial integrity of a newspaper lies at the 
core of publishing control.  In a very real sense, that 
characteristic is to a newspaper or magazine what machinery is 
to a manufacturer.  At least with respect to most news 
publications, credibility is central to their ultimate product and 
to the conduct of the enterprise. . . .  [¶]  . . . [A] news publication 
must be free to establish[,] without interference, reasonable 
rules designed to prevent its employees from engaging in 
activities which may directly compromise their standing as 
responsible journalists and that of the publication for which 
they work as a medium of integrity.”  (Id. at pp. 560–561, fns. 
omitted.)  The Washington Supreme Court would later draw on 
this reasoning to invalidate the state’s political participation 
law as applied to a newspaper that had adopted rules against 
employees’ 
political 
activism. 
 
(Nelson 
v. 
McClatchy 
Newspapers, supra, 936 P.2d at pp. 1131–1132.)  “Editorial 
integrity and credibility,” it held, “are core objectives of editorial 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
control and thus merit protection under the free press clauses.”  
(Id. at p. 1131.) 
We need not precisely delineate the reach of the relevant 
constitutional principles here.  (City of Montebello v. Vasquez, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 421–422.)  The only question before us is 
whether, as CNN argues, its decision to terminate Wilson for 
plagiarism was conduct “in furtherance of” the organization’s 
speech rights within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions 
(b)(1) and (e).  We conclude it was. 
Online and on air, CNN covers myriad “matters of public 
significance.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  Its broadcasts and 
publications include extensive “speech in connection with a 
public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (Id., § sub. (e)(4).)  
CNN presented evidence tending to show that its ability to 
participate meaningfully in public discourse on these subjects 
depends on its integrity and credibility.  Plagiarism is 
universally recognized as a serious breach of journalistic ethics.  
Disciplining an employee for violating such ethical standards 
furthers a news organization’s exercise of editorial control to 
ensure the organization’s reputation, and the credibility of what 
it chooses to publish or broadcast, is preserved.  These objectives 
lie “at the core” of the press function.  (Newspaper Guild, supra, 
636 F.2d at p. 560; see id. at p. 561.)  CNN has made out a prima 
facie case that its staffing decision was based on such 
considerations, and that such decisions protect the ability of a 
news organization to contribute credibly to the discussion of 
public matters.  The staffing decision thus qualifies as “conduct 
in furtherance” of CNN’s “speech in connection with” public 
matter.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
But CNN’s invocation of journalistic ethics only takes it so 
far.  The lone act CNN justifies as motivated by the need to 
enforce editorial standards forbidding plagiarism is its 
termination of Wilson.  CNN’s own evidence demonstrates that 
it was unaware of any potential plagiarism until a few weeks 
before Wilson was let go.  CNN has thus carried its first-step 
burden only insofar as Wilson’s employment-related claims 
arise from his termination.  To the extent Wilson’s causes of 
action include claims of illegal discrimination and retaliation 
based on other acts—passing him over for promotions, menial 
assignments, and so on—these causes of action will survive, 
even if the termination-specific claims are stricken.  (See Baral 
v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 393–394 [anti-SLAPP motions 
target only those claims within a cause of action that rest on 
protected activity].) 
Because the Court of Appeal concluded CNN had wholly 
failed to meet its first-step burden, it did not address whether 
Wilson’s termination claims must be stricken, or whether they 
instead have the requisite minimal merit to proceed.  We 
remand on these claims so the Court of Appeal may address that 
issue in the first instance. 
IV. 
We turn next to Wilson’s defamation claim.  According to 
the complaint, CNN told third parties, including prospective 
employers, that Wilson “had plagiarized . . . passages in the 
Baca story and thereby violated CNN standards and 
practices.”11  Wilson’s declaration also describes a statement by 
                                        
11  
Wilson’s complaint alleges the statements to those outside 
the company on information and belief.  No contextual details 
are provided. 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
a CNN human resources manager, at a meeting with Wilson and 
Wilson’s supervisor, defendant Peter Janos, that Wilson had 
plagiarized.  Wilson and CNN disagree over whether these 
statements were “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of [free 
speech rights] in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  We conclude they were 
not. 
A. 
In contrast to Wilson’s employment-related claims, 
Wilson’s defamation claim is based on CNN’s speech rather than 
any tangible action.  A casual reader of the anti-SLAPP statute 
might wonder whether this makes a difference, since unlike the 
other provisions of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, subdivision 
(e)(4) refers to “conduct,” not “statement[s].”  But courts 
(including this one) have generally assumed that this reference 
to “conduct” includes oral or written statements,12 and a closer 
reading of the statute reveals why the assumption is correct.  
The 
reason 
is 
straightforward: 
 
Section 
425.16, 
subdivision (e)(1), (2), and (3), each describe circumstances in 
which a “written or oral statement or writing” is eligible for 
protection as an “act” in furtherance of speech or petitioning 
rights—when the statement is made before an official 
proceeding, made in a public place on a public issue, and so on.  
Subdivision (e)(4) extends protection to “any other conduct” that 
                                        
12  
See, e.g., FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 149 (applying § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) to statements); 
Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
pp. 621–628 (same); McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 
154 Cal.App.4th 97, 109–111 (same); Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 
Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (same); Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 
Cal.App.4th 883, 897–898 (same). 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
meets the requirements specified in that subdivision.  Even 
though the word “conduct” is often used, particularly in the First 
Amendment context, in contradistinction to “speech,”  the use of 
the phrase “other conduct” (ibid., italics added) indicates the 
Legislature regarded the acts of speaking or writing identified 
in the preceding provisions as “conduct” too.  It follows that 
“conduct” in subdivision (e)(4) is intended to embrace speech, as 
well as tangible action.  To the extent there is any doubt, we 
construe the statute broadly to achieve its purposes.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (a).) 
The harder question concerns precisely what kinds of 
speech are covered by subdivision (e)(4).  Unlike its neighboring 
subdivisions—which define protected conduct “not only by its 
content, but also by its location, its audience, and its timing” 
(FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 143)—the “catchall” provision of subdivision (e)(4) contains 
“no similar contextual references to help courts discern the type 
of conduct and speech to protect” (id. at p. 144).  But when a 
general provision follows specific examples, as subdivision (e)(4) 
follows subdivision 
(e)(1) 
through 
(e)(3), 
we 
generally 
understand that provision as “ ‘ “restricted to those things that 
are similar to those which are enumerated specifically.” ’ ”  
(Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 
743; accord, FilmOn.com Inc., at p. 144.) 
The common thread that runs through subdivision (e)(1) 
through (e)(3) is that each provision protects speech that 
contributes to the public discussion or resolution of public 
issues—a thread that also ties these provisions together with 
the 
statute’s 
stated 
purpose 
of 
furthering 
“continued 
participation in matters of public significance.”  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (a).)  It follows that a defendant who claims its speech was 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
protected as “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of [free 
speech rights] in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest” (id., subd. (e)(4)) must show not only that its 
speech referred to an issue of public interest, but also that its 
speech contributed to public discussion or resolution of the issue 
(see FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
pp. 150–152; City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 
Cal.App.4th 191, 217–218; Wilbanks v. Wolk, supra, 121 
Cal.App.4th at p. 898). 
B. 
CNN argues its statements were in connection with three 
issues of public significance:  Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee 
Baca’s retirement, Wilson’s plagiarism, and the general subject 
of journalistic ethics.  Considering each in turn, we conclude 
Wilson’s defamation claim does not arise from speech on “a 
public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)) 
that contributed to public discussion of that issue. 
Sheriff Baca’s retirement was indeed a matter of public 
interest.13  But Wilson’s claim does not rest on statements CNN 
                                        
13  
The sudden, unexpected retirement of a public official 
(Mather & Sewell, Sheriff Lee Baca’s retirement:  ‘Very shocking 
and 
very 
surprising,’ 
L.A. 
Times 
(Jan. 
7, 
2014) 
 [as of July 22, 2019]), who 
later was convicted of obstructing the FBI investigation into 
inmate abuse in county jails (Stevens, Ex-Los Angeles Sheriff 
Lee Baca Is Sentenced to 3 Years in Prison, N.Y. Times (May 12, 
2017) 
 [as of July 22, 
2019]), was a chapter in an ongoing scandal that implicated 
public concerns such as government misfeasance and prison 
 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
made about that subject; it rests instead on statements about 
the reason for Wilson’s termination.  The story Wilson wrote 
could have been about some other topic entirely—the state of 
global financial markets, gardening tips, or anything else under 
the sun—and his defamation claim would be the same.  CNN’s 
alleged statements, although they tangentially referenced 
Sheriff Baca’s retirement, did not contribute to any public, or 
even private, discussion of that subject.  It follows that the 
defamation claim does not arise from statements made “in 
connection with” any public issue related to Sheriff Baca’s 
retirement.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 
CNN contends the actual subject of its statement, Wilson’s 
professional competence and the reasons for his termination, is 
also an issue of public interest.  But not every employment 
dispute—even at a prominent news organization—is a matter of 
public significance.  Certainly some individuals may be so 
prominent, or in such a prominent position, that any discussion 
of them concerns a matter of public interest.  (See McGarry v. 
University of San Diego, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)  But 
absent unusual circumstances, a garden-variety employment 
dispute concerning a nonpublic figure will implicate no public 
issue.  (See, e.g., Baughn v. Department of Forestry & Fire 
Protection (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 328, 337–339; Albanese v. 
Menounos (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 923, 934–937; Carpenter v. 
Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 472; Olaes v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510–
1511; Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical 
                                        
reform.  All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by 
year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 113–119; Rivero v. 
American 
Federation 
of 
State, 
County 
and 
Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 919–929.)  
Workplace misconduct “below some threshold level of 
significance is not an issue of public interest, even though it 
implicates a public policy.”  (Rivero, at p. 924.) 
Based on the evidence CNN presented in support of its 
motion, Wilson is not a figure so prominently in the public eye 
that any remark about him would qualify as speech on a matter 
of public concern.  CNN cites as proof of Wilson’s prominence the 
numerous stories Wilson’s lawsuit and the Court of Appeal 
decision generated.  This reliance is unavailing:  “[T]hose 
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create 
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.”  
(Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979) 443 U.S. 111, 135.)  Nor does 
Wilson’s own evidence of his awards make him a person of such 
notoriety that a statement about the reason for his termination 
would necessarily concern an issue of public interest (cf. 
McGarry v. University of San Diego, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 110 [reasons for dismissing prominent university football 
coach of public interest]). 
CNN argues the Court of Appeal erred by making Wilson’s 
status as a figure in the public eye a necessary component of any 
showing that CNN’s statement about him was protected 
activity.  But the Court of Appeal did no such thing.  Rather, the 
court held that if Wilson were a figure in the public eye, that 
status could be a sufficient basis to conclude statements about 
him would be on a matter of public interest.  (Wilson, supra, 6 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 832–833, rev. granted.)  Other grounds might 
also have justified that conclusion even if Wilson were not well-
known.  (Ibid.)  We hold likewise:  that a statement is about a 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
person or entity in the public eye may be sufficient, but is not 
necessary, to establish the statement is “free speech in 
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–146; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of 
Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 621.) 
CNN’s final argument is that, even if Wilson is not a figure 
in the public eye, discussion of his termination implicates a 
larger issue that indisputably is of public interest—journalistic 
ethics.  This argument rests on “what might be called the 
synecdoche theory of public issue in the anti-SLAPP statute” 
(Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc. 
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 34):  that the discussion of a 
purported lapse on the part of one of its writers is equivalent to 
a conversation about the ethical lapses of all journalists 
everywhere.  But for anti-SLAPP purposes, as courts have long 
recognized, “[t]he part is not synonymous with the greater 
whole.”  (Ibid.)  Contrary to arguments that various defendants 
have pressed over the years, “[s]elling an herbal breast 
enlargement product is not a disquisition on alternative 
medicine.  Lying about the supervisor of eight union workers is 
not singing one of those old Pete Seeger union songs (e.g., ‘There 
Once Was a Union Maid’).  And . . . hawking an investigatory 
service is not an economics lecture on the importance of 
information for efficient markets.”  (Ibid.; accord, FilmOn.com 
Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152; Consumer 
Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 
Cal.App.4th 595, 601; Rivero v. American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, supra, 105 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 919, 924.) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
Similarly, here, CNN’s alleged statements about an 
isolated plagiarism incident did not contribute to public debate 
about when authors may or may not borrow without attribution.  
“What a court scrutinizing the nature of speech in the anti-
SLAPP context must focus on is the speech at hand, rather than 
the prospects that such speech may conceivably have indirect 
consequences for an issue of public concern.”  (Rand Resources, 
LLC v. City of Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 625; see Consumer 
Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc., supra, 107 
Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [“If we were to accept [defendant’s] 
argument that we should examine the nature of the speech in 
terms of generalities instead of specifics, then nearly any claim 
could be sufficiently abstracted to fall within the anti-SLAPP 
statute”].)  To sweep in a claim about falsehoods made regarding 
a nonpublic figure, where the falsehoods do not contribute in any 
meaningful way to discussion or resolution of an ongoing matter 
of public significance, would do nothing to advance the statute’s 
stated purpose of shielding defendants from meritless lawsuits 
designed to chill speech and petitioning on matters of public 
interest or controversy.  (See § 425.16, subd. (a).) 
Relevant, too, is the private context of the alleged 
statements.  Granted, private communications may qualify as 
protected activity in some circumstances.  (FilmOn.com Inc. v. 
DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 146; Navellier v. Sletten, 
supra,  29 Cal.4th at p. 91.)  But the private context eliminates 
any possibility of protection under section 425.16, subdivision 
(e)(3), for example, and here makes heavier CNN’s burden of 
showing that, notwithstanding the private context, the alleged 
statements nevertheless contributed to discussion or resolution 
of a public issue for purposes of subdivision (e)(4).  (See 
FilmOn.com Inc., at pp. 146, 150–151.) 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
This case does not resemble other cases in which speech 
concerning the actions of individual nonpublic figures has been 
held to contribute to ongoing debate on a public controversy.  For 
example, in Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 712–713, we 
considered the case of two scholars who had investigated a 
claimed instance of repressed memory recovery and who had 
published and lectured on the case study to urge caution in 
acceptance of such memories.  We had no difficulty concluding 
the scholars’ speech concerning the lessons they drew from their 
case study was entitled to anti-SLAPP protection; the speech 
contributed to discussion of a matter of ongoing public debate.  
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in M. G. v. Time Warner, Inc. 
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623 held that a magazine article and 
television program addressing “the general topic of child 
molestation in youth sports,” a significant public issue, were 
protected, even though the article and program illustrated their 
discussion with examples of specific instances of misconduct.  
(Id. at p. 629.)  No comparable connection between Wilson’s 
alleged misconduct and any public issue is present here. 
For these reasons, we conclude CNN’s privately 
communicated statements about Wilson’s purported violation of 
journalistic ethics do not constitute “conduct in furtherance of 
. . . the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 
public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (e)(4).)  
V. 
CNN has failed to carry its first-step burden with respect 
to many of Wilson’s claims, but it has met that burden with 
respect to those claims based on the termination of his 
employment.  CNN is therefore entitled to preliminary 
WILSON v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
screening of those claims to determine whether they have 
minimal merit.  We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment in 
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 6 Cal.App.5th 822 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S239686 
Date Filed: July 22, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Mel Red Recana 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Lisa L. Maki, Lisa L. Maki, Jennifer Ostertag; Shegerian & Associates, Jill P. McDonnell 
and Carney R. Shegerian for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
FEM Law Group and F. Edie Mermelstein for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs and Anthony N. Kim for California Taxpayers Action Network as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, Adam Levin, Aaron M. Wais, Jolene Konnersman and Christopher A. Elliott 
for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Rochelle Wilcox and Dan Laidman for Los Angeles Times 
Communications LLP, CBS Corporation, NBCUniversal Media, LLC, American Broadcasting Companies, 
Inc., Fox Networks Group, Inc., California News Publishers Association and First Amendment Coalition as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy B. Rosen, Felix Shafir and Ryan C. Chapman for California Hospital Association 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jill P. McDonnell 
Shegerian & Associates 
225 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 
Santa Monica, CA  90401 
(310) 860-0770 
 
Adam Levin 
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp 
2049 Century Park East, 18th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 312-2000