Title: People v. Grant

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2022 IL 126824 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
(Docket No. 126824) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
ANDREW GRANT, Appellee. 
Opinion filed April 21, 2022. 
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, and Michael J. Burke 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Neville dissented, with opinion. 
Justice Carter took no part in the decision. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
In 2004, defendant, Andrew Grant, was convicted, by jury, of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(6) (West 2004)) and criminal sexual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assault (id. § 12-13(a)(1)). The trial court merged the counts and sentenced 
defendant to 14 years in prison. In 2013, defendant filed a motion for forensic 
testing of a hair that was discovered during a postassault examination of the victim. 
It was subsequently discovered that all the forensic evidence in defendant’s case 
was destroyed in 2007, pursuant to Peoria Police Department (PPD) policy. 
Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (judgment n.o.v.) on the grounds of PPD’s failure to fulfill its duty to 
preserve the forensic evidence as required by section 116-4 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-4 (West 2006)). The Peoria County 
circuit court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial or for a judgment n.o.v. 
¶ 2 
The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, vacated 
defendant’s conviction, remanded for further proceedings, and ordered a jury 
instruction at any retrial that the State failed to preserve potentially exculpatory 
evidence as required and that the jury may construe that fact against the State. This 
court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 
2020). For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 
and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶ 3 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
On March 11, 2004, defendant was charged, by indictment, with aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(6) (West 2004)) and criminal sexual 
assault (id. § 12-13(a)(1)). The indictment alleged that defendant knowingly 
committed an act of sexual penetration upon Z.G. by the use of force or threat of 
force, knowing Z.G. to be a physically handicapped person. 
¶ 5 
A jury trial was conducted on September 28, 2004. Evidence at the trial showed 
that Z.G. suffered from cerebral palsy and was legally blind, although she could 
discern some colors and shapes. Z.G. testified that in February 2004, she resided 
with her parents, her sister, her brother (Jeremy), and defendant—her uncle who 
was residing with her family. Z.G. testified that on the night of February 27, 2004, 
defendant “busted in the door, puts me down on the floor [sic] and start raping me 
[sic].” Z.G. testified that Jeremy heard some noise, “came busting in the door,” and 
asked defendant, “What are you doing in her room?” Z.G. testified that “the only 
thing I seen [sic], [defendant] jumped up, pulled up his pants [sic].” 
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¶ 6 
Jeremy testified that on the night in question he got up because he heard some 
noises in the house. He discovered that defendant was not on the couch where he 
usually slept and that Z.G.’s bedroom door was locked. Jeremy testified that he 
used a knife to unlock Z.G.’s bedroom door and, when he entered the room, Z.G. 
was undressed and defendant was pulling up his pants. Jeremy testified that 
defendant said, “Don’t tell.” Jeremy told his dad what happened, and defendant was 
ejected from the house. 
¶ 7 
Defendant testified that Z.G. told him that she had sex with Jeremy and, when 
he confronted Jeremy with “trying to have sex with your own sister,” Jeremy 
awakened the other household members and accused defendant of having sex with 
Z.G. Defendant testified that he was forced to leave the house. 
¶ 8 
Cathy Jackson Bruce testified that she is a sexual assault nurse who examined 
Z.G. Several swabs were collected during the examination. The parties stipulated 
that no semen was found on the swabs. Jackson Bruce also collected a single hair 
from Z.G.’s vagina and obtained scrapings from underneath Z.G.’s fingernails. The 
record reflects that forensic testing was conducted on neither the hair nor the 
fingernail scrapings. 
¶ 9 
The jury found defendant guilty of both counts. The circuit court merged the 
counts and sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual 
assault. Defendant asserted a claim of innocence through numerous appeals and 
postconviction filings but failed to obtain any significant relief. 
¶ 10 
On June 5, 2013, pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/116-3 
(West 2012)), the Illinois Innocence Project filed on behalf of defendant a motion 
for forensic testing of the hair and fingernail scrapings that were collected during 
the postassault examination of Z.G. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel 
indicated that defendant was withdrawing the request for testing of the fingernail 
scrapings and wished to have testing conducted solely on the hair. The circuit court 
denied defendant’s motion for forensic testing. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded, finding defendant satisfied the requirements of section 116-3. People v. 
Grant, 2016 IL App (3d) 140211, ¶¶ 14-28. The appellate court found that forensic 
testing had the potential to be materially relevant to defendant’s claim of actual 
innocence, remarking that, if the hair were tested and matched Jeremy, defendant’s 
credibility would be bolstered while Jeremy’s credibility would be undermined. Id. 
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¶ 26. The appellate court indicated that, although a nonmatch would not completely 
exonerate defendant, it could arguably support his actual innocence claim. Id. ¶ 27. 
¶ 11 
On remand, defense counsel was appointed, and a hearing was conducted on 
the motion for forensic testing. At the hearing, it was discovered that all the forensic 
evidence in defendant’s case was destroyed on February 28, 2007, pursuant to PPD 
policy. Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment n.o.v., asserting 
that, pursuant to section 116-4 of the Code, PPD was required to preserve the 
forensic evidence until defendant completed his sentence, including any period of 
mandatory supervised release. Defendant argued that he was denied due process by 
PPD’s failure to comply with section 116-4 of the Code and that PPD “inherently 
acted in bad faith by not following the law.” 
¶ 12 
The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s motion for a new trial or for a 
judgment n.o.v., arguing that the motion was untimely, as it was filed more than 30 
days after the jury’s verdict, and that section 116-3 of the Code did not allow for an 
attack on the underlying conviction, which the State argued must be advanced in a 
separate collateral proceeding for postconviction relief. 
¶ 13 
The circuit court denied both the State’s motion to dismiss and defendant’s 
motion for a new trial or for a judgment n.o.v., finding the destruction of the hair 
sample rendered it impossible to comply with the appellate court’s order for 
forensic testing. Moreover, the circuit court did not find the destruction of the 
evidence “was willful or there was a bad intent on the Sheriff Department [sic].” 
¶ 14 
On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed 
to represent defendant. At the outset, OSAD filed a motion pursuant to 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), seeking to withdraw on the grounds 
of the appeal presenting no meritorious issues. The appellate court granted OSAD’s 
Finley motion in an opinion, with one justice dissenting. See 2020 IL App (3d) 
160758, ¶ 10. Subsequently, OSAD moved to vacate the opinion and to be 
reinstated as counsel for defendant. The appellate court granted the motion, and the 
appeal proceeded. Id. 
¶ 15 
In a divided opinion, the appellate court majority observed that, although 
section 116-4 of the Code is silent of any consequences for the government’s 
noncompliance with the mandate to preserve forensic evidence, section 33-5 of the 
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Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) prescribes a felony penalty for intentional 
noncompliance with section 116-4. Id. ¶ 17 (citing 720 ILCS 5/33-5(a), (b) (West 
2006)). The majority determined, however, that the criminal consequence in section 
33-5 did not, by itself, render section 116-4 mandatory. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. 
¶ 16 
The majority proceeded to apply the mandatory-directory analysis, which 
determines whether the legislature intended for noncompliance with a particular 
procedural step to have the consequence of invalidating the governmental action to 
which the procedural requirement relates. Id. ¶ 19 (citing In re M.I., 2013 IL 
113776, ¶ 16, People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 51-52 (2005), and People v. 
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 516-17 (2009)). The majority identified the “particular 
procedural step” in this case as the requirement to preserve forensic evidence set 
forth in section 116-4 (id. ¶ 23) and identified the governmental action to which the 
procedural requirement relates as the continued incarceration of convicted 
defendants (id. ¶ 26), reasoning that the requirement to preserve evidence “is 
explicitly linked to that action,” as section 116-4 requires that the evidence be 
preserved only until a defendant’s sentence is complete (id.). The majority stated 
that section 116-4 sets forth a procedural requirement of preserving forensic 
evidence “that relates to the government’s continued imprisonment of convicted 
defendants” and, if 116-4 is construed as mandatory, noncompliance with that 
procedural requirement must result in the “invalidation of that governmental action, 
i.e., vacatur of the underlying conviction.” Id. 
¶ 17 
The majority stated that a procedural command to a government official is 
presumptively directory in nature, but that presumption is overcome “ ‘when the 
right the provision is designed to protect would generally be injured under a 
directory reading.’ ” Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 517). Applied here, 
the majority observed that section 116-3 of the Code allows convicted persons to 
request forensic testing on previously untested evidence in an attempt to prove their 
innocence (id. ¶ 28) and section 116-4 ensures that forensic evidence will be 
available for future testing (id. ¶ 29). The majority emphasized, however, that the 
potential for exoneration provided by section 116-4 is eliminated when the 
government fails to comply with the requirement to preserve evidence. Id. ¶ 30. 
Accordingly, the majority concluded that section 116-4 is mandatory, based on the 
importance of the right to test the evidence and the injury caused by noncompliance 
with the requirement to preserve the evidence. Id. ¶ 31. 
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¶ 18 
Having found section 116-4 mandatory, the majority observed that, although 
section 33-5 of the Criminal Code provides a consequence for noncompliance with 
section 116-4, that consequence only applies when noncompliance is intentional. 
Id. ¶ 32. The majority emphasized that, when noncompliance is negligent or 
reckless, there is no remedy at all. Id. The majority concluded that the deprivation 
of a defendant’s right to attempt to prove his own innocence was “of such a 
magnitude that the legislature must have intended a remedy.” (Emphasis added.) 
Id. Accordingly, the majority found PPD’s failure to comply with the statute must 
result in a vacatur of defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶ 33. 
¶ 19 
The majority recognized that vacating the conviction and remanding for a 
potential new trial was an imperfect remedy, given the inability to test the forensic 
evidence that was destroyed. Id. ¶ 36. Thus, in addition to vacating the conviction, 
the appellate court determined a partial cure would be to instruct the jury at any 
retrial that the State failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as required 
and that the jury may construe that fact against the State. Id. (citing Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 54 (1988)). 
¶ 20 
The dissenting justice in the appellate court noted that the legislature expressly 
provided a remedy for a violation of section 116-4 by indicating that intentional 
noncompliance constitutes a Class 4 felony, punishable by up to three years in 
prison. Id. ¶ 45 (Schmidt, J., dissenting) (citing 720 ILCS 5/33-5(b) (West 2006)). 
The dissent emphasized that, when considering consequences for noncompliance 
with section 116-4, the legislature presented neither a new trial nor a vacatur of a 
defendant’s conviction as an option. Id. Accordingly, the dissent asserted that, by 
ordering a vacatur of defendant’s conviction in this case, the majority crafted a 
judicial remedy that the legislature did not provide. Id. ¶ 46. 
¶ 21 
The dissent further stated that the jury instruction pursuant to Youngblood is 
inapplicable here because in Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the consequences of the State’s failure to preserve forensic evidence 
before trial and concluded that the pretrial destruction of potentially exculpatory 
evidence violates due process where the destruction was conducted in bad faith and 
merited the jury instruction on that basis. Id. ¶ 50. The dissent noted that here the 
destruction of the hair did not occur before defendant’s trial but after he was 
convicted. Id. Moreover, it was not established that the hair was destroyed in bad 
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faith. Id. For these reasons, the dissent concluded that a jury instruction under 
Youngblood would not be warranted at any retrial in this case. Id. This court 
allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). 
¶ 22 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 23 
The issue in this case is whether the legislature intended PPD’s destruction of 
forensic evidence after defendant’s trial and conviction but before he completed his 
sentence—a violation of section 116-4 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/116-4 (West 
2006))—to require a vacatur of defendant’s conviction. The issue is one of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law we review de novo. In re Christopher K., 
217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005). 
¶ 24 
In observing the well-established principles of statutory interpretation, this 
court’s primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 
Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062, 
¶ 16. The most reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent is the language of the 
statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When the 
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts may not depart from the 
statute’s terms (Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 
¶ 24) nor construe the statute other than by its plain language (People ex rel. 
Madigan v. Bertrand, 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 35). 
¶ 25 
“ ‘Under the guise of construction, a court may not supply omissions, remedy 
defects, annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, 
limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law so as to depart from the plain 
meaning of language employed in the statute.’ ” King v. First Capital Financial 
Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005) (quoting In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. 
App. 3d 305, 309-10 (2001)). Nor may a court, under the guise of construction, 
“correct” a perceived error or oversight by the legislature. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 
2d 36, 42 (2000). Moreover, “[i]n construing the provisions of a statute[,] it is not 
only proper, but often necessary, to consider the provisions of other statutes relating 
to the same subject matter for the purpose of determining legislative intent.” 
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 243 (1956). 
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¶ 26 
Turning to the statutes pertinent to this case, we observe that the United States 
Supreme Court established that postconviction access to forensic testing is not a 
constitutional right but a statutory right that is aptly governed by state legislatures. 
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 
72-74 (2009). To that regard, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the statutory 
right to postconviction forensic testing, provided in section 116-3 of the Code, 
which allows defendants to seek postconviction forensic testing when certain 
conditions are met. See 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2012). 
¶ 27 
To promote and to protect the right to forensic testing, section 116-4(a) of the 
Code provides: “Before or after the trial in a prosecution for,” inter alia, aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(6) (West 2004)) or criminal sexual 
assault (id. § 12-13(a)(1)), “a law enforcement agency *** shall preserve *** any 
physical evidence in their possession or control that is reasonably likely to contain 
forensic evidence, *** secured in relation to a trial.” 725 ILCS 5/116-4(a) (West 
2006). 
¶ 28 
Section 116-4(b) further provides: “After a judgment of conviction is entered, 
the evidence *** shall be securely retained by a law enforcement agency. *** 
Retention shall be until the completion of the sentence, including the period of 
mandatory supervised release for the offense, or January 1, 2006, whichever is later 
***.” Id. § 116-4(b). 
¶ 29 
Section 33-5(a) of the Criminal Code also serves to protect the right to forensic 
testing, as it declares it “unlawful for a law enforcement agency *** to intentionally 
fail to comply with the provisions of subsection (a) of Section 116-4 of the Code.” 
720 ILCS 5/33-5(a) (West 2006). Section 33-5(b) further provides that “[a] person 
who violates this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” Id. § 33-5(b). 
¶ 30 
Because section 116-4’s requirement to preserve forensic evidence is a statutory 
command to law enforcement agencies, we must determine whether that statutory 
command is mandatory or directory. In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776 ¶ 15. The 
mandatory-directory dichotomy determines the consequences of noncompliance 
with such a command. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 516. A statute is mandatory when 
“the intent of the legislature dictates a particular consequence for failure to comply 
with the provision.” Id. at 514. Conversely, “[i]n the absence of such intent[,] the 
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statute is directory and no particular consequence flows from noncompliance.” Id. 
at 515. 
¶ 31 
Here, the parties agree that the command in section 116-4 to preserve forensic 
evidence is mandatory, but they disagree on the consequences required for PPD’s 
violation of the command. The State asserts that section 116-4 is mandatory 
because the intent of the legislature dictates a particular consequence for 
noncompliance with the provision—felony liability for intentional violations as set 
forth in 33-5 of the Criminal Code. See id. at 514. In response, defendant 
acknowledges that the legislature’s prescription of felony penalties for intentional 
noncompliance with section 116-4 supports the conclusion that the legislature 
intended the statute to be mandatory, yet he contends that this is not the type of 
consequence required. 
¶ 32 
Defendant insists that violations of a mandatory statutory command must be 
remedied by a consequence that relieves the injurious effect of the violation and 
section 33-5 does not accomplish that. Defendant stresses that PPD’s failure to 
comply with the mandate to preserve the hair not only injured his right to 
postconviction testing, but it permanently eviscerated that right, for evidence that 
is destroyed may never be tested by a defendant who seeks to prove his innocence. 
Defendant thus argues that, to relieve the injury of PPD’s violation of the command 
to preserve the forensic evidence, he is entitled to a vacatur of his conviction and a 
new trial with an adverse-inference jury instruction. To substantiate this proposal, 
defendant contends that the government’s noncompliance with a mandatory 
statutory command must result in “the unconditional consequence of invalidating 
the governmental action to which the command relates.” According to defendant, 
the entry of a judgment of conviction “is the very event that triggers a law 
enforcement agency’s duty to” preserve the forensic evidence as section 116-4 
requires. Thus, defendant submits that his conviction is the governmental action to 
which the command to preserve evidence most clearly relates and is thereby subject 
to invalidation. 
¶ 33 
Defendant’s position is summarized by the appellate court, which stated that 
“[t]he question is not whether any consequence exists” but “whether the legislature 
intended the specific consequence of invalidating the governmental action at issue.” 
(Emphasis in original.) 2020 IL App (3d) 160758, ¶ 20 (citing In re M.I., 2013 IL 
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113776, ¶ 16, Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 51-52, and Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 516-17). 
The appellate court indicated that, although “section 33-5 plainly prescribes a 
consequence for failure to comply with section 116-4, that consequence *** does 
nothing to invalidate any governmental action.” Id. Dissatisfied with the 
consequence dictated by the legislature, the appellate court asserted that “the 
legislature must have intended a remedy.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 32. Accordingly, 
notwithstanding the express consequence set forth in section 33-5, the appellate 
court proceeded to “decide whether the legislature *** intended section 116-4 to 
be mandatory” by considering whether the legislature intended for violations of 
section 116-4 “to have the specific consequence of negating or vitiating the 
governmental action to which it relates.” Id. ¶ 22. 
¶ 34 
Defendant requests this court to likewise determine whether an invalidation of 
his conviction may be inferred as a consequence of PPD’s violation of section 116­
4. We decline to incorporate this principle into our analysis, as we need look no 
further than the plain language of section 116-4 to resolve the issue. Under the 
mandatory or directory question, section 116-4 of the Code is mandatory, as the 
legislature’s intent dictates a particular consequence for failure to comply with the 
requirement to preserve forensic evidence (Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 514; In re M.I., 
2013 IL 113776, ¶ 16), namely, felony liability for intentional noncompliance (720 
ILCS 5/33-5 (West 2006)). 
¶ 35 
The plain language of section 116-4 contains nothing to indicate that the 
legislature intended for the failure to comply with the statute to result in a vacatur 
of defendant’s conviction. Indeed, the legislative intent is further confirmed by the 
criminal liability set forth in section 33-5 of the Criminal Code for intentional 
noncompliance with section 116-4. This demonstrates that the legislature 
considered consequences for noncompliance with section 116-4 and expressly 
provided the consequence it deemed appropriate and the circumstances to which 
the consequence applies. See Petterson, 9 Ill. 2d at 243 (legislative intent further 
determined by considering provisions of other statutes relating to the same subject 
matter). Had the legislature intended to impose the consequence of a vacatur of the 
conviction—or any other consequence—for violations of section 116-4, it would 
have done so. 
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¶ 36 
We note that defendant cites Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 
and In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, in which this court considered whether the 
invalidation of a governmental action should be inferred as a consequence for 
noncompliance with a procedural step. However, that determination was required 
in those cases because the legislature did not dictate a particular consequence for 
noncompliance, nor was the legislative intent discernible from the plain language 
of the statutes. Conversely, here, we need not consider whether an invalidating 
consequence must be inferred, as the legislature made its intent clear by expressly 
dictating a consequence for violations of section 116-4. 
¶ 37 
Defendant also cites People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 183 (2005), in which 
this court held that strict compliance with the clerk’s obligation to send notice of 
the trial date to defendant via certified mail is a mandatory prerequisite to 
conducting a criminal trial in absentia where the defendant was not present in court 
when the matter was set for trial. This court reversed the defendant’s conviction 
and remanded for a new trial because the clerk failed to comply with the mandatory 
statutory command. Id. at 187. 
¶ 38 
Here, defendant notes that the statutory command in Ramirez was directly 
related to the proceeding that was invalidated by the violation of that command. He 
concedes that the connection between section 116-4 and his trial and conviction is 
more remote than the connection between the notice requirement and the 
defendant’s trial and conviction in Ramirez. Yet defendant asserts a connection 
indeed exists, as section 116-4 expressly references both the trial and the entry of a 
judgment of conviction. According to defendant, his conviction is the governmental 
action to which the command to preserve forensic evidence most clearly relates 
because the command is triggered once the conviction is entered. Thus, defendant 
concludes that his conviction is the governmental action subject to invalidation. We 
disagree. 
¶ 39 
Our holding in Ramirez was in the context of ensuring that the defendant’s 
constitutional rights were afforded all the necessary statutory safeguards. Id. at 184. 
We refuse to extend that holding to the context of this case where there is neither a 
constitutional implication nor a direct link between the statutory command and 
defendant’s trial and conviction. 
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¶ 40 
Furthermore, unlike Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, and 
In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, here, section 116-4 does not involve any procedural 
step to which a governmental action relates. Contrary to defendant’s claims, the 
requirement of posttrial preservation of forensic evidence is not a procedural step 
in the process of procuring a valid conviction. Although the testing of forensic 
evidence may yield results that could potentially support a claim of actual 
innocence, this does not suggest that there was any infirmity in the trial or the 
conviction. Nor does the posttrial preservation of forensic evidence affect the 
constitutional validity of the conviction. There is simply no relation between 
section 116-4 and defendant’s conviction, such that a violation of section 116-4 
undermines the conviction or renders it invalid. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s 
argument that his conviction is the governmental action to which the command to 
preserve evidence relates and is thereby subject to invalidation. 
¶ 41 
We refuse to add anything to the plain language of section 116-4, as this is the 
province of the legislature, which clearly considered consequences for violations 
of section 116-4 and dictated the consequence it deemed appropriate. We find the 
plain language of section 116-4 establishes that the legislature did not intend to 
prescribe a vacatur of defendant’s conviction as a consequence for violating the 
requirement to preserve forensic evidence and the appellate court erred in holding 
otherwise. 
¶ 42 
As a final note, we acknowledge that both parties assert positions on the 
application of the statutory canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. However, 
that canon is inapposite here, as we determined that the legislative intent is clear 
from the plain language of the statute. See People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 117 
(2005) (Expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is simply an aid of statutory 
construction” that “is applicable only to help ascertain the intent of the legislature 
when that intent is not clear from the plain language of the statute.”); Davis v. 
Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999) (courts need not 
delve into canons of statutory construction where the plain language is clear). 
¶ 43 
Having determined that the appellate court erred by ordering a vacatur of 
defendant’s conviction, we need not consider the State’s alternative issue of 
whether an adverse-inference jury instruction pursuant to Youngblood would be 
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appropriate at any retrial. 
¶ 44 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 45 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 
affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶ 46 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 47 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 48 
JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting: 
¶ 49 
The majority holds that defendant, Andrew Grant, is not entitled to posttrial 
relief despite the fact that the Peoria Police Department disposed of evidence in his 
case in violation of section 116-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) 
(725 ILCS 5/116-4 (West 2012)). I disagree. In my view, PPD’s violation of its 
statutory duty to preserve evidence requires vacatur of defendant’s conviction. 
¶ 50 
It is undisputed that PPD violated its obligation to preserve the evidence in 
defendant’s case. At issue in this appeal is whether the terms of section 116-4 are 
mandatory and, if so, whether defendant’s conviction must be vacated. Thus, the 
court is tasked with construing the language of section 116-4 and determining the 
result of PPD’s admitted statutory violation. 
¶ 51 
I. General Principles of Statutory Construction 
¶ 52 
As the majority recognizes, the question of whether a statutory command is 
mandatory or directory presents a question of law involving statutory construction. 
Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Public Health, 
2019 IL 124019, ¶ 16; In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 15 (citing People v. Robinson, 
217 Ill. 2d 43, 54 (2005)). Consequently, our review is de novo. Lakewood Nursing 
& Rehabilitation Center, LLC, 2019 IL 124019, ¶ 16. 
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¶ 53 
When construing a statute, this court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. ¶ 17. The best evidence of legislative intent 
is the language of the statute, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 
Id. A court will not depart from the clear and unambiguous terms set forth in a 
statute by reading into it terms or conditions that the legislature did not include. 
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24; People v. 
Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 17. Thus, courts will not inject or annex new provisions, 
supply omissions, or substitute different provisions, regardless of how desirable 
they may be. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154-55 
(1997); see also King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 
(2005). 
¶ 54 
II. Applicable Statutory Provisions 
¶ 55 
Section 116-4 is one of several provisions that govern the proceedings after trial 
on criminal charges. See 725 ILCS 5/116-1 et seq. (West 2012). Sections 116-1 and 
116-2 set forth the procedures under which a defendant may move for a new trial 
or in arrest of judgment. Id. §§ 116-1, 116-2. 
¶ 56 
Section 116-3 provides that, regarding a claim of actual innocence, a defendant 
may move for the performance of fingerprint, ballistic, or forensic DNA testing that 
was not available at the time of trial. Id. § 116-3(a). The court shall allow the testing 
under reasonable conditions that are designed to protect the State’s interests in the 
integrity of the evidence and the testing process. Id. § 116-3(c). 
¶ 57 
As a means of securing the right to seek such testing in certain types of cases, 
section 116-4 imposes a statutory duty that requires law enforcement agencies and 
their personnel to preserve any physical evidence that is reasonably likely to contain 
forensic evidence. Id. § 116-4(a). The obligation to preserve evidence exists both 
before and after trial. Id. After conviction, the evidence must be securely retained 
until the completion of the defendant’s sentence. Id. § 116-4(b). Also, following 
conviction, a law enforcement agency may petition the court for permission to 
dispose of evidence that has no significant value for forensic testing or where the 
death of the defendant has eliminated the need for preservation. Id. § 116-4(c). The 
court may order the disposition of evidence “if the defendant is allowed the 
opportunity to take reasonable measures to remove or preserve portions of the 
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evidence in question for future testing.” Id. § 116-4(d). Thus, as a whole, article 
116 generally serves to protect the rights of criminal defendants to seek posttrial 
relief, and it specifically enables them to obtain the testing of evidence to support 
claims of actual innocence in certain cases. In addition, this statutory scheme 
protects the interests of the State in preserving evidence before and after trial and 
in maintaining the integrity of evidence in cases where posttrial testing has been 
ordered. 
¶ 58 
III. Principles Governing the Mandatory-Directory Analysis 
¶ 59 
In general, it is presumed that statutory language issuing a procedural command 
to a government official is directory rather than mandatory. Round v. Lamb, 2017 
IL 122271, ¶ 13; see also People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 18; People v. 
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (2009). That presumption may be overcome in either 
of two circumstances: (1) when the statute includes negative language prohibiting 
further action in the case of noncompliance or (2) when the right the provision is 
designed to protect would generally be injured by a directory reading. Geiler, 2016 
IL 119095, ¶ 18; In re James W., 2014 IL 114483, ¶ 35; In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, 
¶ 17. The second circumstance arises in situations where the statutory command is 
intended for the protection of a citizen and a disregard of the command will 
generally injure the citizen’s right. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 56. 
¶ 60 
Courts employ the mandatory-directory analysis to determine the consequences 
of a failure to fulfill a statutory obligation. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 16; Delvillar, 
235 Ill. 2d at 516; Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 52. The mandatory-directory designation 
“ ‘simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step 
will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the 
procedural requirement relates.’ ” Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 51-52 (quoting Morris v. 
County of Marin, 559 P.2d 606, 611 (Cal. 1977)). 
¶ 61 
IV. Section 116-4 Does Not Specify a Particular Consequence 
¶ 62 
I agree that section 116-4 is mandatory, but I do so for a reason that differs from 
that cited by the majority. Contrary to the view expressed by the majority, section 
116-4 does not impose any consequence for noncompliance with the duty to 
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preserve evidence. That provision contains no negative language that can be 
construed as imposing a consequence for the failure to comply with its terms. 
Indeed, section 116-4 is entirely silent with regard to the impact of noncompliance. 
¶ 63 
Despite its recognition that courts will not add language to clear and 
unambiguous statutory provisions, that is precisely what the majority does in this 
case. The majority looks beyond the plain language of section 116-4 and finds that 
a consequence for violation of its terms is set forth in section 33-5 of the Criminal 
Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/33-5 (West 2012)). To support its 
conclusion, the majority relies on the proposition that courts can consider other 
statutes when seeking to ascertain legislative intent. Supra ¶¶ 25, 35 (citing 
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 243 (1956)). But that general rule of 
statutory construction has no application in this case. 
¶ 64 
In determining legislative intent, courts will look to related enactments only 
when the legislature’s intent is unclear—such as where the statutory language is 
ambiguous. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 33; In re Shelby R., 
2013 IL 114994, ¶ 39; People ex rel. Illinois Department of Corrections v. 
Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 24; Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension 
Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 509-12 (2007). Thus, a court may consider other statutes to 
ascertain the meaning or effect of ambiguous provisions but not to add new terms 
that do not exist in the statute. But a court “ ‘can neither restrict nor enlarge the 
meaning of an unambiguous statute.’ ” Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 
2014 IL 114271, ¶ 23 (quoting Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 448 (2002)). 
Rather, the privilege of altering the language of a clear and unambiguous statute is 
reserved to the legislature. 
¶ 65 
Here, the majority concedes that the language of section 116-4 is clear and 
unambiguous (supra ¶¶ 24, 53) but fails to acknowledge that no consequence for 
noncompliance is identified within its terms. Nothing in the language of that 
provision references the possibility of a criminal prosecution under section 33-5 of 
the Criminal Code. Yet, the majority has injected a consequence into section 116­
4 that the legislature did not include. This approach contravenes the principle that 
a court may not read into a statute limitations or conditions not explicitly set forth 
in the plain statutory language. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 23. 
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¶ 66 
Moreover, the majority’s reasoning is unsound because it does not comport with 
our established precedent governing the mandatory-directory dichotomy. This 
court has recognized that directory commands have consequences, but the relevant 
inquiry is whether a specific consequence is triggered by noncompliance with the 
statute. In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 16; Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 515. 
¶ 67 
A prosecution under section 33-5 is a separate and distinct proceeding that is 
wholly unrelated to defendant’s case. As such, it has no bearing on the proceedings 
in which the right applies. Section 116-4 proceedings relate to defendant’s 
conviction and the posttrial right to assert a claim for actual innocence that is 
supported by the testing of preserved evidence. While a section 33-5 prosecution 
may be considered to be a consequence suffered by the law enforcement officer, it 
is not the type of consequence that serves to vindicate the right of defendants 
protected by section 116-4. The potential for prosecution of law enforcement 
personnel does not invalidate the governmental action to which the procedural 
requirement in section 116-4 relates. As the appellate court observed, that 
governmental action is the continued incarceration of defendant despite the 
deprivation of his right to posttrial testing of preserved evidence, which precludes 
the use of that evidence to support a claim of actual innocence. 2020 IL App (3d) 
160758, ¶¶ 26, 28. 
¶ 68 
And the majority acknowledges that the focus of section 116-4 is on protecting 
the defendant’s right to obtain posttrial testing of evidence. Supra ¶ 26. A criminal 
prosecution under section 33-5 does nothing to advance that statutory purpose. The 
legislature’s recognition that official wrongdoing should be punished is laudable, 
but it does not incorporate a consequence within section 116-4 for the failure to 
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Therefore, the possibility of a criminal 
prosecution for intentional disposition of evidence, premised on section 33-5, is not 
a consequence for the violation of section 116-4. Rather, it is ancillary to the 
defendant’s statutory right to seek forensic testing. Because a section 33-5 
prosecution has no impact on the defendant’s case or his right to obtain the testing 
of preserved evidence, the majority’s conclusion is illogical. 
¶ 69 
Moreover, the majority’s analysis is flawed because section 33-5 applies only 
where the disposition of evidence is intentional. 720 ILCS 5/33-5 (West 2012). But 
the intentional disposition of evidence is just one of two ways in which section 116­
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4 can be violated. Section 116-4 prohibits any unauthorized destruction of evidence. 
It does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional conduct. In finding 
that the Criminal Code provides a consequence for the deliberate destruction of 
evidence, the majority ignores the fact that section 33-5 has no application in cases 
where evidence is unintentionally destroyed. Under the majority’s reasoning, it 
appears that half of section 116-4 is mandatory. The court’s decision does not 
explain how section 116-4 can be construed as mandatory in the absence of a 
consequence for unintentional disposition of evidence, nor does it offer any 
guidance as to how its interpretation would work in practice. The obvious answer 
is that it does not. 
¶ 70 
V. Section 116-4 Is Mandatory Based on the Right Protected 
¶ 71 
As noted above, a statutory command will be construed as mandatory when the 
right the provision is designed to protect would generally be injured under a 
directory reading. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 56. In this case, the right protected by 
section 116-4 is the right to obtain posttrial testing of evidence to support a claim 
of actual innocence. 725 ILCS 5/116-3, 116-4 (West 2012). The importance of that 
right and the injury that results from the failure to preserve evidence demonstrate 
that the legislature intended the terms of section 116-4 to be mandatory. 
¶ 72 
As noted by the appellate court, “section 116-3 has the unquestionable benefit 
of reducing the number of wrongfully convicted persons in prison,” and “[s]ection 
116-4 *** protects the efficacy of section 116-3 by ensuring that forensic evidence 
will actually be available for potential future testing.” 2020 IL App (3d) 160758, 
¶ 29. The appellate court also observed that “[t]he potential for exoneration 
afforded by section 116-4 vanishes when the government fails to comply [with 
section 116-4].” Id. ¶ 30. 
¶ 73 
Once evidence has been disposed of, no testing can be performed. The 
legislature has recognized the necessity for preservation of forensic evidence in the 
types of cases identified in section 116-4 precisely because the right to obtain 
posttrial testing is so important. I agree with the appellate court’s observation that 
“[w]here the State illegally destroys evidence, that right is fully and irreparably 
extinguished. The harm cannot be overstated.” Id. A directory reading of section 
116-4 under which noncompliance could be excused would severely hamper the 
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right to posttrial testing. Strict enforcement of the duty to preserve evidence is 
essential to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
¶ 74 
The circumstances of this case illustrate the point. Defendant is forever 
prevented from exercising his right to posttrial testing because PPD illegally 
disposed of the evidence in his case. And the same would be true for other 
defendants, regardless of whether the disposition is intentional or unintentional. 
¶ 75 
In light of the liberty interests at stake, section 116-4 must be construed as 
authorizing a remedy to defendants whose rights are infringed by the illegal 
disposition of evidence. Subjecting law enforcement personnel to the possibility of 
a criminal prosecution for the deliberate disposition of evidence may serve to deter 
such conduct. But it does not offer any relief to a defendant who is precluded from 
obtaining forensic testing of that evidence, nor does it serve the public’s interest in 
having criminal charges fully and fairly adjudicated. See id. (citing Wilkinson v. 
Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). 
¶ 76 
In my view, this court should hold that section 116-4 is mandatory because it 
protects an important right and that defendant is entitled to a remedy for the 
violation of its terms. Such a construction would ensure that all of the provisions in 
article 116 come together in a cohesive whole by providing the full array of posttrial 
relief contemplated by the legislature. 
¶ 77 
Given my disagreement with the majority on this issue, I strenuously urge the 
General Assembly to take additional steps to incorporate an explicit consequence 
within section 116-4 to safeguard the right to posttrial testing of evidence in the 
types of cases identified in that provision and to provide defendants a remedy when 
such evidence is disposed of by law enforcement personnel in violation of section 
116-4. In addition, I encourage the legislature to specify that a violation of section 
116-4 requires vacatur of the conviction of a defendant who has been denied the 
right to forensic testing of evidence that may form the basis of an actual innocence 
claim. 
¶ 78 
VI. Conclusion 
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¶ 79 
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s holding that defendant is not entitled to 
vacatur of his conviction based on PPD’s admitted violation of section 116-4. I 
cannot concur in the majority’s conclusion that the possibility of a criminal 
prosecution for the intentional disposition of evidence constitutes a “consequence” 
of noncompliance with that provision. Rather, section 116-4 is mandatory because 
the right protected by that provision generally will be harmed by a directory 
reading. I agree with the reasoning expressed by the appellate court and would 
affirm that court’s judgment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 80 
JUSTICE CARTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
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