Title: Enriquez v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
McClanahan, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
 
JEAN PAUL ENRIQUEZ 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
v. Record No. 110818 
March 2, 2012 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This is the most recent example in a series of cases 
involving convictions for the offense of driving or operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol where the 
accused is found in a drunken condition in a parked motor 
vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch.  In all but two of 
the cases, we sustained the convictions.  We will add this case 
to the list of sustained convictions. 
 
In a bench trial, the defendant, Jean Paul Enriquez, was 
convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266. 
Because this was a second offense for Enriquez within five 
years, the circuit court sentenced him pursuant to the mandatory 
provisions of Code § 18.2-270.  This resulted in a term of 
confinement in the city jail for twelve months and a fine of 
$500.00, with all but sixty days of the jail sentence suspended 
on condition of good behavior for two years.  The court also 
revoked Enriquez’s operator’s license for three years. 
 
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Enriquez appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia.  In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction.  Enriquez v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
0463-10-4 (April 5, 2011).  We awarded Enriquez this appeal.  
His sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him as matter of law of operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol. 
BACKGROUND 
 
About 3:00 a.m. on September 18, 2009, Thomas Feeney, a 
parking enforcement officer in the City of Alexandria, observed 
a Toyota automobile illegally parked in a bus stop in the 6000 
block of Lincolnia Road.  While seated in his cruiser, Feeney 
wrote a ticket for the offense.  When he approached the Toyota 
to place the ticket under the windshield wiper, he could hear 
the car’s radio playing, and he saw a man in the driver’s seat, 
apparently asleep.  After repeated efforts, Feeney was unable to 
arouse the man, and he called for help from the Police 
Department.  
 
Officer Aloysius Asonglefac and Sergeant May of the 
Alexandria Police Department were dispatched to the Lincolnia 
Road site for "trouble unknown."  Officer Asonglefac testified 
that when he arrived he found Enriquez "sleeping behind the 
wheel" of the Toyota parked in the bus stop. 
 
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Officer Asonglefac, Sergeant May, and Parking Enforcement 
Officer Feeney "knocked on . . . the driver's side window" and 
"the sun roof and roof" of the car without arousing Enriquez.  
Officer Feeney shone a flashlight on Enriquez's face, with no 
effect.  In two to three minutes, Enriquez awoke, and, after 
several requests, opened the side door window.  Officer 
Asonglefac "could smell a strong odor of alcoholic beverage" and 
"a strong odor of marijuana" coming from the car.  Enriquez 
appeared "confused," "didn't seem to [k]now where he was," 
thought "he was in Arlington," was "going to see his girlfriend" 
but was not sure "as to where his girlfriend was."  Officer 
Asonglefac administered field sobriety tests to Enriquez, but 
before the tests began he was asked whether he had been drinking 
that evening.  Initially, he said he had not been drinking but 
then stated that he had a “Long Island Iced Tea about an hour 
prior to [his] encounter" with the police.  When he failed the 
field sobriety tests, Officer Asonglefac placed him under arrest 
for driving under the influence.  
 
When he first approached the Toyota, Officer Asonglefac 
could hear the radio playing and "could see the light from the 
radio area."  He observed that the keys were in the ignition, 
but he could not recall whether the keys were in the "on" or the 
"off" position.  Neither could he remember who removed the keys 
 
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from the ignition, but he was certain that "[w]hen the keys were 
removed from the ignition, the radio went off." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Whether Enriquez operated his vehicle within the meaning of 
Code § 18.2-266 is a mixed question of law and fact which is 
reviewed de novo on appeal.  Upon appellate review, the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial 
court, in this case, the Commonwealth.  The judgment of the 
trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only 
upon a showing that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.  Nelson v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 212, 215, 707 
S.E.2d 815, 816 (2011). 
ANALYSIS 
 
As noted earlier, we have previously considered the 
question whether an intoxicated accused has driven or operated a 
motor vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266.  We upheld 
convictions in the following cases:  Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 
205 Va. 666, 667, 670, 139 S.E.2d 37, 38, 40 (1964) (drunk 
defendant found sitting at the steering wheel of a car, which 
was stuck in a ditch with the motor running, the car in gear, 
and a rear wheel spinning);  Nicolls v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 
257, 258, 259, 184 S.E.2d 9, 10, 11 (1971) (drunk defendant 
found slumped over steering wheel of car, which was parked on 
 
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hard surface of road with motor running, high beam lights on, 
and heater in operation); Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 
Va. 297, 298, 301, 217 S.E.2d 893, 894, 896 (1975) (drunk 
defendant found slumped over steering wheel of vehicle on a 
paved parking lot with motor running, headlights not on, car 
doors closed and locked); Lyons v. City of Petersburg, 221 Va. 
10, 11-13, 266 S.E.2d 880, 880-82 (1980) (drunk defendant found 
seated behind steering wheel of car but made no statement about 
his striking of an unoccupied parked car in the rear and pushing 
it 25 to 30 feet); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 212, 214-15, 
219, 707 S.E.2d 815, 815-16, 818 (2011) (drunk defendant found 
hunched over in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked on a cul-
de-sac with the radio playing and the ignition key in an "on or 
accessory position"); Rix v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 1, 1, 3, 714 
S.E.2d 561, 561-62 (2011) (drunk defendant exchanged seats with 
driver and was found by police sitting behind the steering wheel 
with keys in the ignition and the engine running).  
 
We reversed convictions in the following two cases:  
Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 240-41, 245, 315 S.E.2d 
242, 243, 245 (1984) (drunk defendant found standing in front of 
a pickup truck with the hood up, engine not running, and key not 
in ignition); Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va. 434, 
435-36, 438, 416 S.E.2d 435, 436, 438 (1992) (in early morning 
hours, drunk defendant found asleep behind steering wheel of car 
 
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parked on convenience store parking lot, engine and all other 
mechanical and electrical parts turned off, and key in the 
ignition, but arresting officer could not recall whether key was 
in the "on" or the "off" position.  In reversing, this Court 
said it would assume the key was in the "off" position.) 
 
Enriquez argues that his case is similar to Stevenson, but 
he complains that this Court has not "established a bright line 
rule to determine whether a person is operating a motor vehicle 
as a matter of law."  He is undoubtedly correct that we have not 
established a bright-line rule, so we will revisit the proper 
considerations in determining whether a person is operating a 
motor vehicle. In our consideration of the matter, we will turn 
for assistance to Code § 46.2-100 and to the dissenting opinion 
in Stevenson.  We will also refer to our decision in Williams.  
 
Code § 46.2-100 provides that " '[o]perator' or 'driver' 
means every person who either (i) drives or is in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is 
exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a 
motor vehicle."  (Emphasis added.)  
 
The dissenting opinion in Stevenson states in part as 
follows: 
 
Ordinary experience tells us that one in a drunken 
stupor in the driver's seat of a vehicle is likely to 
arouse abruptly, engage the motive power of the vehicle, 
and roar away imperiling the lives of innocent citizens.  
This sequence of events easily can occur where, as here, a 
 
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drunk is sitting behind the steering wheel of a motor 
vehicle alone, with the key already in the ignition.  From 
a mechanical standpoint, the vehicle is capable of being 
immediately placed in motion to become a menace to the 
public, and to its drunken operator.  
 
243 Va. at 439-40, 416 S.E.2d at 438-39.  (Compton, J., 
dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
We take this opportunity to state that the statutory 
definition of "operator" is controlling and that any individual 
who is in actual physical control of a vehicle is an "operator."  
We hold, therefore, that the dissenting opinion in Stevenson was 
correct, and in discerning whether an intoxicated person seated 
behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public roadway 
with the key inserted into the ignition switch of the vehicle is 
in actual physical control of the vehicle, the position of the 
key in the ignition switch is not determinative. 
 
In Williams, we stated that operating a motor vehicle 
included "manipulating the mechanical or electrical equipment of 
the vehicle . . . which alone, or in sequence, will activate the 
motive power of the vehicle."  216 at 300, 217 S.E.2d at 896.  
Although operating a motor vehicle may be proven by evidence of 
manipulation of the mechanical or electrical equipment, it need 
not be proven in that manner.  All that is necessary is evidence 
that the person is in actual physical control of the vehicle 
within the meaning of Code § 46.2-100. 
 
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From the foregoing, we establish the rule that when an 
intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a 
motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition 
switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, 
therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. 
 
The evidence in this case showed beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Enriquez was drunk, that he was seated behind the steering 
wheel of his vehicle on a public street, and that the key was in 
the ignition switch of the car.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
evidence was sufficient to  support a finding that Enriquez was 
in actual physical control of the vehicle, and to support his 
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Affirmed.