Title: Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12141 
 
LYNNE BLANCHARD & others1  vs.  STEWARD CARNEY HOSPITAL, INC., & 
others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2016. - May 23, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.3 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Constitutional Law, Right to petition 
government.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  Words, 
"Based on." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 24, 2013. 
 
 
Special motions to dismiss were heard by Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
                     
1 Gail Donahoe, Gail Douglas-Candido, Kathleen Dwyer, Linda 
Herr, Cheryl Hendrick, Kathleen Lang, Victoria Webster, and 
Nydia Woods. 
 
2 Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC; Steward Health Care 
System, LLC; and William Walczak. 
 
3 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Jeffrey A. Dretler (Joseph W. Ambash also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Dahlia C. Rudavsky (Ellen J. Messing also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Donald J. Siegel & Paige W. McKissock, for Massachusetts 
AFL-CIO, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the spring of 2011, following reports of abuse 
at the adolescent psychiatric unit (unit) of Steward Carney 
Hospital, Inc., then president of the hospital, William Walczak, 
fired all of the registered nurses and mental health counsellors 
who worked in the unit.  Walczak subsequently issued statements, 
both to the hospital's employees and to the Boston Globe 
Newspaper Co. (Boston Globe), arguably to the effect that the 
nurses had been fired based in part on their culpability for the 
incidents that took place at the unit.  The plaintiffs, nine of 
the nurses who had been fired, then filed suit against the 
defendants for, among other things, defamation. 
 
The hospital defendants4 responded by filing a special 
motion to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H, the "anti-SLAPP" statute.  A Superior Court judge denied 
the motion, concluding that the hospital defendants had failed 
                     
4 For convenience and, in particular, to distinguish them 
from other defendants who were named in the complaint but are 
not part of this appeal, we refer to Steward Carney Hospital, 
Inc. Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC, Steward Health Care System, 
LLC, and William Walczak as "the hospital defendants" or "the 
defendants." 
 
We refer to the plaintiffs as "the plaintiff nurses," "the 
nurses," or "the plaintiffs" interchangeably as well. 
3 
 
 
to meet their threshold burden of showing that the claim was 
based solely on their petitioning activity.  The hospital 
defendants filed an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court as 
of right.  See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521–522 (2002).  
The Appeals Court then reversed the motion judge's decision in 
part.  See Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. 97, 98 (2016).  We granted the parties' applications 
for further appellate review.  We conclude that a portion of the 
plaintiff nurses' defamation claim is based solely on the 
hospital defendants' petitioning activity.  The hospital 
defendants as special movants thus having satisfied in part 
their threshold burden under Duracraft v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 
427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998) (Duracraft), the matter must be 
remanded to the Superior Court where the burden will shift to 
the plaintiff nurses to make a showing adequate to defeat the 
motion. 
 
Under current case law, the plaintiff nurses, as nonmoving 
parties, could defeat the special motion only by showing that 
the hospital defendants' petitioning activity upon which a 
portion of the plaintiff's defamation claim is based was a sham, 
i.e., without a reasonable basis in fact or law, a showing that 
the record suggests may be difficult to make.  Insofar as the 
record also suggests the possibility that the plaintiff nurses' 
claim may not have been brought primarily to chill the hospital 
4 
 
 
defendants' legitimate exercise of their right to petition, 
however, the case underscores a long recognized difficulty in 
the statute.  It is one rooted in the fact that both parties 
enjoy the right to petition, including the right to seek redress 
in the courts.  The anti-SLAPP statute is meant to subject only 
meritless SLAPP suits to expedited dismissal, yet it nonetheless 
may be used to dismiss meritorious claims not intended primarily 
to chill petitioning. 
 
Because the statute as thus construed remains at odds with 
evident legislative intent, and continues to raise 
constitutional concerns, we take this opportunity to augment the 
framework set forth in the Duracraft case (Duracraft framework) 
by broadening the construction of the statutory term "based on."  
While a nonmoving party may still defeat a special motion to 
dismiss by demonstrating that the special movant's petitioning 
activity is a sham, we hold that a nonmoving party's claim also 
is not subject to dismissal as one solely based on a special 
movant's petitioning activity if the nonmoving party can 
establish that its claim was not "brought primarily to chill" 
the special movant's legitimate exercise of its right to 
petition.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161 (1998), quoting 1994 
House Doc. No. 1520.  On remand, the plaintiff nurses may 
attempt to make such a showing in satisfaction of their burden. 
5 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  The unit at Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., 
in Boston (hospital), is licensed by the Department of Mental 
Health (DMH) and the Department of Public Health (DPH).5  In 
April, 2011, there were four incidents involving alleged patient 
abuse or neglect at the unit.  The hospital immediately reported 
these incidents to DMH, DPH, and the Department of Children and 
Families.  DMH commenced an investigation into the incidents, 
and required that there be no new admissions to the unit.  DMH 
also considered revoking the hospital's license to operate the 
unit pending the hospital's response to the reports of abuse. 
 
The hospital soon placed all but a small number of unit 
employees, including managers, nurses, and mental health 
counsellors, on paid administrative leave.  It also hired Scott 
Harshbarger, then senior counsel at the law firm Proskauer 
Rose LLP, to conduct an investigation into the incidents, to 
recommend remedial actions, and to represent the hospital's 
interests in its dealings with the State agencies.  Upon 
concluding his investigation, Harshbarger recommended to Walczak 
that, in light of what he termed a "code of silence" amongst the 
unit's staff, "it would be prudent to replace the current 
                     
5 The unit typically treats mentally and physically 
challenged teenagers in "acute states," who are admitted from 
other facilities as a "last resort."  Many of them are under the 
custody of the Department of Children and Families and have 
little involvement with their families. 
6 
 
 
personnel in order to ensure quality care for these vulnerable 
patients." 
 
After reviewing Harshbarger's recommendation, Walczak 
informed each of the plaintiff nurses that he was terminating 
her employment.  The following day, he sent an electronic mail 
(e-mail) message to all hospital employees, which began by 
noting that the hospital "has a rich tradition of providing 
excellent care to [its] patients."  After providing the 
hospital's employees with credit for this successful commitment 
to patient care, the message continued, in relevant part: 
 
"Recently, I have become aware of the alleged 
incidents where a number of [hospital] staff have not 
demonstrated this steadfast commitment to patient care.  I 
have thoroughly investigated these allegations and have 
determined that these individual employees have not been 
acting in the best interest of their patients, the 
hospital, or the community we serve.  As a result, I have 
terminated the employment of each of these individuals." 
 
In a Boston Globe article about the incidents two days 
after the plaintiff nurses were fired, Walczak was quoted as 
saying that, when he read Harshbarger's report, he "decided to 
replace the nurses and other staff on the unit."6  Walczak said 
that the report recommended that he "start over on the unit" and 
that his "goal [was] to make it the best unit in the state."  
The article noted that Walczak "would not provide details of the 
                     
6 The article stated that Harshbarger had been investigating 
an employee's alleged sexual assault of a patient and 
"conditions on the 14-bed locked unit for extremely troubled 
teens." 
7 
 
 
alleged assault or patient safety concerns, or comment on why 
the entire staff was dismissed, given that the allegation 
involved one employee and one patient."  Approximately one month 
later, the Boston Globe published another article on the 
incidents at the hospital, quoting Walczak as stating that 
"[t]he Harshbarger report indicated it wasn't a safe situation" 
and stating that the report "underscored his decision to fire 
the entire staff of the unit." 
 
In June, 2011, DMH issued its reports on each of the four 
incidents.  The reports concerning the first three incidents 
concluded that there had been wrongdoing by a single mental 
health counsellor, while the fourth report concluded that 
unspecified staff on duty during the incident had acted 
improperly.7 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In May, 2013, in a five-count 
complaint brought against the hospital defendants, along with 
                     
7 In May, 2011, the union that represented the plaintiff 
nurses, the Massachusetts Nurses Association, filed grievances 
on behalf of each of the unit's nurses, including each of the 
plaintiff nurses.  Pursuant to the collective bargaining 
agreement between the hospital and this nurses association, the 
grievances were subject to arbitration.  The first arbitration 
involved five of the plaintiff nurses:  Douglas, Hendrick, Herr, 
Lang, and Woods.  The arbitrator found in favor of the nurses 
and ordered, inter alia, their reinstatement.  The hospital 
appealed from that ruling; the appeal is apparently still 
pending. 
8 
 
 
Harshbarger and Proskauer Rose LLP (Proskauer defendants),8 the 
plaintiff nurses claimed that the hospital defendants and the 
Proskauer defendants had each defamed them.  The plaintiff 
nurses alleged, in one count of their complaint, that the 
hospital defendants defamed them both by the e-mail message sent 
to hospital employees announcing their terminations, as well as 
by communications made to and published by the Boston Globe.  
The plaintiff nurses asserted that such statements falsely 
suggested that "after a thorough investigation, [Walczak] had 
determined . . . that each of the terminated plaintiffs had 
demonstrated inadequate commitment to patient care and that each 
had provided such deficient patient care that her employment had 
to be terminated."9 
 
In their defamation claim against the Proskauer defendants, 
the plaintiff nurses asserted that Harshbarger's preliminary and 
                     
8 The complaint also included a claim against the hospital 
defendants for violation of the healthcare provider 
whistleblower statute, G. L. c. 149, § 187, and plaintiffs Lang 
and Donahoe claimed that the hospital defendants retaliated 
against them for performing their obligations under the 
mandatory reporting statute, G. L. c. 119, § 51A.  In addition, 
all of the plaintiff nurses asserted a claim of intentional or 
reckless infliction of emotional distress against Harshbarger 
and Proskauer Rose LLP. 
 
9 The plaintiff nurses claimed that Walczak's "statements 
implied the existence of undisclosed facts, namely, that the 
decision to terminate each of the plaintiff nurses was based on 
her actions in connection with undisclosed incidents involving 
patients in the unit, which were known to Walczak and had been 
'thoroughly investigated.'" 
9 
 
 
final written reports had defamed them by falsely suggesting 
that they had "adhered to a 'code of silence,'" had failed to 
report "a variety of problems, . . . including misconduct," of 
which they were aware, and had been derelict in their duties in 
a number of other respects. 
 
Both sets of defendants responded by filing special motions 
to dismiss the defamation counts under the anti-SLAPP statute.  
See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.10  A Superior Court judge allowed the 
Proskauer defendants' special motion to dismiss, but denied the 
hospital defendants' motion.  The hospital defendants appealed.11  
The Appeals Court reversed in part, allowing the defendants' 
special motion to dismiss with respect to Walczak's comments to 
the Boston Globe, affirming the denial with respect to the e-
mail message, and denying the hospital's motion for attorney's 
fees and costs.  Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 98, 111 & n.14.  
We granted the parties' cross applications for further appellate 
review. 
 
3.  Discussion  a.  The anti-SLAPP statute.  The 
Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to counteract "SLAPP" 
                     
10 Both sets of defendants also filed motions to dismiss the 
other claims under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974).  At a hearing on the motions to dismiss, the defendants 
waived their motions under rule 12 (b) (6). 
 
11 Defendants Harshbarger and Proskauer Rose LLP filed a 
stipulation of dismissal prior to the proceedings in the Appeals 
Court, and they have no role in this appeal. 
10 
 
 
suits, defined broadly as "lawsuits brought primarily to chill 
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of 
speech and petition for the redress of grievances."  Duracraft, 
427 Mass. at 161, quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H.  See also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, v. Foytlin, 476 
Mass. 479, 488 n.14 (2017) (explaining catalyst for 
legislation).  The main "objective of SLAPP suits is not to win 
them, but to use litigation to intimidate opponents' exercise of 
rights of petitioning and speech."  Duracraft, supra.  To 
forestall such suits, the anti-SLAPP statute provides a 
"procedural remedy for early dismissal of the disfavored" 
lawsuits.  Id.  This remedy is the special motion to dismiss, 
which can be brought prior to engaging in discovery, and is 
intended to dispose of "civil claims, counterclaims, or cross 
claims" that are based solely on a party's exercise of its right 
to petition.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  The statute also 
mandates the award of attorney's fees to successful special 
movants.  Id. 
 
To prevail on such a motion, a special movant, such as the 
hospital defendants here, "must make a threshold showing through 
pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it 'are "based 
on" the petitioning activities alone and have no substantial 
basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.'"  
Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 865 (2010), quoting 
11 
 
 
Duracraft, supra at 167-168.  See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524  
(special movant must demonstrate that "the only conduct 
complained of is . . . petitioning activity").12  The anti-SLAPP 
statute defines a party's exercise of its right to petition 
broadly to include: 
 
"[1] any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
any other governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral 
statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; [3] 
any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration 
or review of an issue by a legislative executive, or 
judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; [4] any 
statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation 
in an effort to effect such consideration; or [5] any other 
statement falling within constitutional protection of the 
right to petition government." 
 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
 
If the hospital defendants are able to make a threshold 
showing that the plaintiff nurses' claim is based solely on the 
hospital defendants' petitioning activities, the burden shifts 
to the plaintiff nurses to establish "by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the [hospital defendants] lacked any reasonable 
                     
12 The statute also requires a special movant to demonstrate 
that it was exercising "its own right of petition" in both the 
statutory and the constitutional sense.  See Cardno ChemRisk, 
LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 486-489 (2017); G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H ("In any case in which a party asserts that the civil 
claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are 
based on said party's exercise of its right of petition under 
the [C]onstitution of the United States or of the 
[C]ommonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to 
dismiss"). 
12 
 
 
factual support or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning 
activity," Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-554 (2001), and 
that the hospital defendants' sham petitioning activity caused 
the plaintiff nurses "actual injury."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See 
Fustolo, 455 Mass. at 865. 
 
b.  Petitioning activity.  As part of its threshold burden, 
the hospital defendants must show that the conduct complained of 
constitutes the exercise of its right to petition.  See Baker, 
434 Mass. at 550.  The hospital defendants contend that the 
motion judge erred in determining that Walczak's communications 
to the Boston Globe and to the hospital employees did not 
constitute petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.  
The hospital defendants argue that Walczak's statements to the 
Boston Globe, and his e-mail message to all hospital employees, 
were the exercise of the hospital defendants' right to petition 
because such statements were made "in connection with an issue 
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding."13  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Given that DMH was considering whether to 
revoke the hospital's license to operate the unit when the 
statements were made, the hospital defendants contend that both 
communications were part of the hospital's efforts to maintain 
                     
13 The defendants do not contend that Walczak's 
communications fall under any of the other definitions of 
petitioning activity in the anti-SLAPP statute. 
13 
 
 
its license to operate the unit by demonstrating that it was 
taking remedial steps. 
 
The initial question before us is thus whether Walczak's 
communications to the Boston Globe and to the hospital employees 
were each made "in connection with" DMH's investigation of the 
incidents and its decision regarding the hospital's license to 
operate the unit, such that they constitute petitioning activity 
under the anti-SLAPP statute.  In determining whether statements 
constitute petitioning, "we consider them in the over-all 
context in which they are made."  North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. 
Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 862 (2009).  To fall 
under the "in connection with" definition of petitioning under 
the anti-SLAPP statute, a communication must be "made to 
influence, inform, or at the very least, reach governmental 
bodies -- either directly or indirectly."  Id., quoting Global 
NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 
605 (2005).  The key requirement of this definition of 
petitioning is the establishment of a plausible nexus between 
the statement and the governmental proceeding. 
The archetypical demonstration of this nexus involves a 
party's statement regarding an ongoing governmental proceeding 
made directly to a governmental body.  See, e.g., Office One, 
Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 123 (2002) (communications with 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seeking favorable outcome 
14 
 
 
constituted petitioning activity).14  Failing something this 
clear cut, courts look to objective indicia of a party's intent 
to influence a governmental proceeding.  See North Am. 
Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership, 452 Mass. at 862-863 
(statement was petitioning activity where context in which it 
was made suggested it was intended to influence governmental 
body).  This intent to influence is manifested in statements 
that are "closely and rationally related to the [governmental 
proceeding]" and "in furtherance of the objective served by 
governmental consideration of the issue under review."  Plante 
v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 159 (2005).  Contrast Global 
NAPs, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 607 (statements to newspaper 
containing oblique reference to defendant's petitioning activity 
not protected under anti-SLAPP statute); Burley v. Comets 
Community Youth Ctr., Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 823 (2009) 
(defendant failed to demonstrate "statements were made in 
conjunction with its protected petitioning activity . . . as 
opposed to being incidental observations that were not tied to 
the petitioning activity in a direct way" [quotations and 
citation omitted]). 
                     
14 Such activity also would fall under the first definition 
of petitioning activity in the anti-SLAPP statute.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H (defining petitioning activity as "any written or 
oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental 
proceeding . . . ."). 
15 
 
 
 
We turn to the two types of communications at issue here. 
 
i.  Statements to the Boston Globe.  Walczak's statements 
to the Boston Globe commented on DMH's inquiry into the 
incidents of abuse at the unit, and the hospital's attempts to 
address the situation.  Walczak's comments had a plausible nexus 
to DMH's investigation based on their content and the high 
likelihood that they would influence or at least reach DMH. 
 
Based on their content, it can be reasonably inferred that 
Walczak's statements to the Boston Globe were intended to 
demonstrate to DMH the hospital's public commitment to address 
the underlying problems at the unit.  It is undisputed that DMH 
was considering whether to revoke the hospital's license to 
operate the unit at the time that Walczak made his comments to 
the Boston Globe.  DMH's decision whether to do so turned on the 
hospital's implementation of remedial steps to prevent future 
incidents.15  The content of Walczak's statements directly 
addresses DMH's concern. 
 
In the first article, published on May 28, 2011, Walczak's 
statements implied that he had decided to terminate the nurses' 
employment as a remedial action, based on Harshbarger's 
                     
15 The then director of licensing at the Department of 
Mental Health (DMH) testified at an arbitration hearing 
regarding the nurses' claim for reinstatement to the unit that 
the decision whether to revoke the hospital's license to operate 
the unit centered on the hospital's "plan . . . to make [the 
situation] right." 
16 
 
 
recommendation.  He is quoted as stating that the Harshbarger 
report described "serious concerns about patient safety and 
quality of care on the unit" and that the report recommended he 
"start over on the unit."  Walczak's statements in the second 
article, dated June 22, 2011, noted that the Harshbarger report 
indicated "it wasn't a safe situation [at the unit]" and that 
the reports of additional incidents "required a much deeper look 
at what was going on in the unit."16  In both of these 
statements, Walczak emphasized that he was following the advice 
contained in the Harshbarger report in addressing the unit's 
problems. 
 
By making clear that the hospital was following 
Harshbarger's recommendations, the statements communicated to 
readers, likely including some of the licensing decision makers 
at DMH, that progress was occurring at the hospital, and that 
its license to operate the unit should not be revoked.  These 
statements were neither "tangential" nor "unrelated to 
governmental involvement," Global NAPs, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 607, but rather went to the heart of a government agency's 
decision whether to terminate the hospital's license to operate 
the unit.  The statements directly related to DMH's then-pending 
investigation and, in particular, to DMH's decision whether to 
                     
16 The article noted that, at the time, DMH had confirmed 
the first three incidents at the unit and was still 
investigating the fourth asserted incident of abuse. 
17 
 
 
pull the plug on the hospital's license for the unit.  Walczak's 
statements can fairly be said to have been "closely and 
rationally related" to DMH's investigation and "in furtherance 
of the objective" of the hospital's petitioning -- the 
preservation of the hospital's license to operate the unit.  
Plante, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 159. 
 
Walczak's statements, moreover, were issued in a manner 
that was likely to influence or, at the very least, reach DMH.  
He made his statements to the Boston Globe, a newspaper "widely 
circulated in Boston and throughout the Commonwealth."  Brauer 
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 54 (1966).  Decision 
makers at DMH, and members of the public wishing to weigh in on 
the licensing decision, could reasonably have been expected to 
read Walczak's statements.  The timing of Walczak's statements 
to the Boston Globe indicates, as well, a plausible nexus 
between the communications and DMH's licensure decision, the 
statements having been made while DMH's investigation was still 
ongoing. 
 
The plaintiff nurses contend that Walczak made the 
statements primarily to defend the unit's reputation to the 
public.  This goal, however, hardly can be seen as unrelated to 
the hospital's objective of convincing DMH to leave intact the 
hospital's license to operate the unit.  The greater the 
public's confidence in and support for the hospital, the more 
18 
 
 
complex any decision to revoke the hospital's license to operate 
the unit would become.  Ulterior motives, in any event, do not 
bear on the petitioning nature of the statements to the Boston 
Globe.  See North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership, 452 
Mass. at 863 ("the fact that . . . speech involves a commercial 
motive does not mean it is not petitioning").  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Walczak's statements to the Boston Globe were 
protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
ii.  Internal e-mail message.  In contrast, Walczak's e-
mail message to all hospital employees concerning the 
termination of the plaintiff nurses' employment was not 
petitioning activity.  Neither the content of the e-mail 
message, nor any evidence offered by the hospital defendants, 
suggests any audience for the message other than hospital 
employees.  The explanation of troubling events at their 
workplace that was presented to hospital employees in an e-mail 
message by the hospital's president has no plausible nexus to 
the hospital's efforts to sway DMH's licensing decision. 
 
In this regard, the defendants have not shown that the e-
mail message to employees had reached, or was reasonably likely 
to reach, DMH.  A private statement to a select group of people 
does not, without more, establish a plausible nexus to a 
governmental proceeding.  It stands to reason that statements 
cannot be "in furtherance of" petitioning the government if they 
19 
 
 
are not reasonably geared to reaching it.  Plante, 63 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 159.  The defendants have not shown that the hospital or 
someone on its behalf had forwarded the e-mail message to DMH or 
even had informed DMH that it had been sent to hospital 
employees.  Nor have the defendants shown that someone in the 
hospital's employ receiving the e-mail message reasonably would 
be expected to or did communicate its message to DMH.  Walczak's 
conclusory affidavit stating that he intended the e-mail message 
to come to DMH's attention17 does not indicate any mechanism 
through which the statement could arrive at the agency.18  See 
Burley, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 823-824 (defendants' message to 
employees was not petitioning activity despite defendants' 
contention that they intended message to be conveyed to police).  
                     
17 Walczak attested that he had sent the electronic mail (e-
mail) message "not only to communicate to the hospital employees 
what was happening, but to give assurances to the regulatory 
agencies" in the process of determining whether to revoke the 
hospital's license to operate the unit "that the deficiencies 
which ha[d] been reported on the [u]nit would not continue."  
Yet the defendants fail to establish that DMH likely would have 
encountered the message, let alone that what employees were told 
would influence DMH's decision concerning the hospital's license 
to operate the unit. 
 
18 The defendants also note that, in his affidavit, 
Harshbarger stated that he communicated to the general counsel 
of DMH, "the action [that the hospital's] leadership was taking 
in response to the [i]ncidents."  Harshbarger's summation of the 
hospital's efforts, however, does not affect the analysis of 
whether Walczak's e-mail message was intended to or did 
influence DMH. 
20 
 
 
Walczak's intent alone does not suffice in the circumstances to 
establish the requisite nexus. 
 
Moreover, nothing in the content of the e-mail message 
itself, stating in essence that the terminated nurses deviated 
from the hospital's "rich tradition of providing excellent care 
to [its] patients," suggests that it was intended to influence 
or reach DMH.  The e-mail message begins by lauding the 
hospital's "performance on national quality and safety 
standards," and notes that the "employees and caregivers at" the 
hospital are the reason for its exemplary performance.  Walczak 
then states that he had "thoroughly investigated" allegations 
concerning the incidents at the unit, "determined that [the 
plaintiff nurses] have not been acting in the best interest of 
their patients, the hospital, or the community we serve," and 
concluded by addressing the plaintiff nurses' termination.  
There is nothing in this text to suggest that it was intended to 
influence, inform, or reach anyone other than the hospital 
employees to whom an explanation of concerning events at their 
workplace was given. 
 
In light of this, we conclude that while Walczak's 
statements to the Boston Globe were protected petitioning 
activity, his e-mail message to hospital employees was not an 
exercise of the hospital defendants' right of petition. 
21 
 
 
 
c.  The meaning of "based on."  Given the foregoing, the 
hospital defendants take the view that they have met their 
threshold burden by showing that the portion of the defamation 
claim based on the Boston Globe articles is solely based on such 
petitioning activity.  They maintain that, if the nurses cannot 
show that this petitioning activity was, in essence, a sham, so 
much of their claim as asserts that the Boston Globe statements 
defamed them should be dismissed, with the plaintiff nurses made 
to pay a proportionate amount of the defendants' legal fees and 
costs.  The plaintiff nurses, in contrast, maintain that, 
because some of their unitary defamation claim rests on 
nonpetitioning activity, the hospital defendants fail to show 
that the defamation claim is solely based on the defendants' 
petitioning activity. 
 
Although we have said that a complaint should be evaluated 
count by count for anti-SLAPP purposes, see Wenger v. Aceto, 451 
Mass. 1, 9 (2008) (granting special motion to dismiss with 
respect to two specific counts in nonmoving party's complaint), 
we have not had occasion to consider whether, at the threshold 
burden stage, the special movant can meet its burden by showing 
that a portion of the nonmoving party's claim is based on 
petitioning activity.  Because the outcome of the threshold 
burden inquiry so often proves dispositive of the special 
motion, the permutations of that preliminary stage have largely 
22 
 
 
occupied the field of appellate consideration.19  This case 
involves yet another variation on that theme.  However, it also 
involves more than that. 
                     
19 Twelve out of the seventeen cases decided by this court 
and the majority of the cases decided by the Appeals Court that 
address the anti-SLAPP statute in depth have centered on the 
special movant's threshold burden.  This appellate jurisprudence 
has split the special movant's threshold burden into three 
parts.  First, the special movant must establish that its 
complained of conduct is petitioning activity.  See, e.g., 
Hanover v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters, 467 Mass. 
587, 590-595 (2014); Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 
394, 397-400 (2012); North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership 
v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 861-862 (2009); Cadle Co. v. 
Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 250 (2007); Global NAPs, Inc. v. 
Verizon New England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 606-607 
(2005).  Second, the special movant must establish that the 
activity is its own petitioning activity.  See, e.g., Cardno 
ChemRisk, LLC, 476 Mass. 485, 486 (2017); Fustolo v. Hollander, 
455 Mass. 861, 869 (2010); Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 
330 (2005).  Third, the special movant must demonstrate that the 
nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its petitioning 
activity.  See, e.g., Matter of the Discipline of Attorney, 442 
Mass. 660, 673-674 (2004); Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 
113, 121-123 (2002); Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 522-523 
(2002); McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 348 (2000); 
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 
(1998). 
 
Similarly, Appeals Court cases construing the anti-SLAPP 
statute center chiefly on the nonmoving party's threshold 
burden.  See Chiulli v. Liberty Mut. Ins., Inc., 87 Mass. App. 
Ct. 229, 234 (2015); Keystone Freight Corp. v. Bartlett Consol., 
Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 316 (2010); Brice Estates, Inc. v. 
Smith, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 394, 396-397 (2010); Burley v. Comets 
Community Youth Ctr., Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 823-824 
(2009); Dickey v. Warren, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 588-589 (2009), 
cert. denied, 560 U.S. 926 (2010); Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 Mass. 
App. Ct. 531, 537-538 (2009); Guiffrida v. High Country 
Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 243 (2008); Moriarty v. 
Mayor of Holyoke, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 442, 447-448 (2008); Fisher 
v. Lint, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 363-365 (2007); SMS Financial V, 
LLC v. Conti, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 745-747 (2007); Kalter v. 
23 
 
 
 
Each of the positions advanced by the parties as to what 
solely based on should entail at the threshold burden stage has 
some merit, but our resolution of that issue cannot reach or 
settle the deeper problem that is laid bare in this appeal.  
That problem is whether the plaintiff nurses' defamation claim 
is, in fact, a "SLAPP" suit at all.  Otherwise put, even if it 
were shown that the Boston Globe based portion of the nurses' 
defamation claim arises from and is, in that limited sense, 
solely based on their hospital employer's quite legitimate 
petitioning activity, it nevertheless remains unclear whether 
this qualifies as a disfavored "SLAPP" suit meriting early 
dismissal.  Under current case law, the inquiry ends without 
                                                                  
Wood, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 586-591 (2006); Global NAPS, Inc., 
supra at 603-607; Wynne v. Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 251-
255 (2005); Plante v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 157-161 
(2005); Adams v. Whitman, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 852-858 (2005); 
MacDonald v. Paton, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 294-295 (2003); 
Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 748-749 (2002). 
 
By contrast, only a handful of cases from this court 
address the nonmoving party's second-stage burden under the 
anti-SLAPP statute in a substantial way.  See Van Liew v. 
Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 36-41 (2016); Benoit v. Frederickson, 
454 Mass. 148, 153-154 (2009); Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 6-9 
(2008); Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524-525; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 
543, 553-554 (2001).  Similarly, only a smattering of Appeals 
Court opinions address substantively the nonmoving party's 
burden.  See The Gillette Co. v. Provost, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 133, 
137-140 (2017); Demoulas Super Mkts. v. Ryan, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 
259, 263-268 (2007); DiPiero v. Burke, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 
158-161 (2007); Garabedian v. Westland, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 
434 (2003); Donovan v. Gardner, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 599-601 
(2000); Vittands v. Sudduth, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 414-415 
(2000). 
24 
 
 
permitting confirmation that the fundamental statutory concern 
is satisfied, much like the proverbial unacknowledged elephant 
in the room.  To ensure that only "SLAPP" suits -- those without 
merit primarily brought to chill legitimate petitioning 
activities -- are subject to early dismissal and its attendant 
financial penalties, we conclude that the statutory term "based 
on" must be accorded broader meaning than it has at present. 
 
We turn first, then, to what the threshold burden demands 
of the special movant seeking early dismissal under the anti-
SLAPP statute.  In essence, the Duracraft framework imposes the 
threshold burden as an initial screening device, requiring the 
special movant to show in the first instance that the claims 
against it in fact arose only from its own petitioning 
activities.  It stands to reason that, in doing so, the special 
movant must take the adverse complaint as it finds it, and 
cannot fairly be expected to overcome the manner in which a 
nonmoving party has chosen to structure its complaint.  Thus, 
however reasonable it may have been for the nurses to frame 
their defamation claim against the hospital defendants as one 
count including two types of communications, we agree with the 
Appeals Court that, when ascertaining whether petitioning 
activity is the sole basis of a claim, the structure of the 
nonmoving party's complaint ordinarily cannot be dispositive of 
the matter.  See Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 111 n.13.  Were 
25 
 
 
it otherwise, nonmoving parties could undercut the anti-SLAPP 
statute and its salutary purpose by combining into a single 
count claims that are based on both petitioning and 
nonpetitioning activities.  Where, as here, the claim structured 
as a single count readily could have been pleaded as separate 
counts, a special movant can meet its threshold burden with 
respect to the portion of that count based on petitioning 
activity. 
 
That being said, the plaintiff nurses' contrary position as 
to the scope of the threshold burden finds support in Erhlich v. 
Stern, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (2009), which notes the 
considerable potency of the sweeping early dismissal remedy 
provided by the anti-SLAPP statute.  In an effort to assure that 
this remedy is confined only to suits meriting such harsh 
treatment, the Appeals Court construed the threshold burden 
strictly, stating that "the anti-SLAPP inquiry produces an all 
or nothing result as to each count the complaint contains . . . 
and the statute does not create a process for parsing counts to 
segregate components that can proceed from those that cannot."  
Id.  While, as explained, we depart from the Ehrlich view of the 
threshold burden, we recognize the well-founded concerns that 
underlie it and that prompt us now to revisit the Duracraft 
framework. 
26 
 
 
 
Under current law, there are only two ways for a nonmoving 
party, such as the nurses here, to resist the early dismissal of 
their claim as a "SLAPP" suit.  One way is to argue that the 
special movant has not met its threshold burden.  Failing that, 
the other way is to argue that the special movant's petitioning 
activity was not legitimate but instead a sham, i.e., lacking 
any reasonable basis in fact or law.  Because it is often 
difficult to make the latter showing,20 the dispositive issue 
tends to be whether the special movant's threshold burden has 
been met.  But, as this case illustrates, even where that burden 
has been met and the petitioning activity in question may be 
entirely legitimate, such inquiry is not entirely adequate to 
the task of determining whether the special motion should be 
allowed. 
 
Particularly in instances where, as here, the classic 
indicia of a "SLAPP" suit, see Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161-162, 
                     
20 Under current case law, in order to meet its second-stage 
burden under the anti-SLAPP statute, a nonmoving party must, in 
essence, demonstrate through pleadings and affidavits that there 
is no credible factual or legal basis for the special movant's 
petitioning activities.  See Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7; 
Wenger, 451 Mass. at 7-8.  Given the high bar for nonmoving 
parties that this generally represents, it is little wonder that 
the plaintiff nurses focused almost entirely on the hospital 
defendants' purported failure to meet their threshold burden.  
See Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 109 (concluding that 
plaintiff nurses did not attempt to make showing that hospital 
defendants' statements to Boston Globe were "devoid of factual 
or legal support" and thus failed to meet their second-stage 
burden). 
 
27 
 
 
appear to be absent,21 the present framework does not provide 
adequate means to distinguish between meritless claims targeting 
legitimate petitioning activity and meritorious claims with no 
such goal.22  It is only the former, the actual "SLAPP" suit, 
that the Legislature intended to stop early in its tracks.  The 
Legislature did not intend the expedited remedy it provided, the 
special motion to dismiss, to be used instead as a cudgel to 
forestall and chill the legitimate claims -- also petitioning 
activity -- of those who may truly be aggrieved by the sometimes 
collateral damage wrought by another's valid petitioning 
activity.  We are mindful that the threshold burden was itself 
crafted to address this underlying concern and its genesis 
accordingly remains instructive. 
                     
21 Contrast Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 476 Mass. at 480-483 & 
n.10, where the plaintiff nonmoving party, an established 
scientific consulting firm, brought defamation claims in two 
States against individual environmental activists of modest 
means, while not having brought such claims against parties of 
apparent financial capacity and public stature who had published 
similar allegedly defamatory statements.  Following its receipt 
of discovery from the individual defendants but before 
responding to the defendants' discovery requests, and during the 
pendency of the defendants' ultimately successful appeal from 
the denial of their special motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 
moved voluntarily to dismiss its lawsuit; the motion was denied.  
Id. at 483 n.8. 
 
22 The plaintiff nurses, for their part, maintain that they 
supported the goal of the hospital defendants' petitioning, 
which was to preserve the hospital's license to operate the 
unit. 
28 
 
 
 
The threshold burden, not appearing in the anti-SLAPP 
statute itself, was prudently imposed upon special movants as a 
means of bridging the discrepancy between the statute's evident 
purpose and its language and, thereby, of addressing 
constitutional concerns otherwise raised.  Duracraft, 427 Mass. 
at 167-168.  While the Legislature passed the anti-SLAPP statute 
to counteract "meritless" lawsuits brought to chill a party's 
petitioning activity, i.e., "SLAPP" suits, id. at 161, the 
Duracraft court realized that the "statutory language fails to 
track and implement such an objective."  Id. at 166.  See id. at 
163 ("In the statute as enacted, the Legislature . . . did not 
address concerns over its breadth and reach, and ignored its 
potential uses in litigation far different from the typical 
SLAPP suit"). 
 
The statute as written does not focus on ascertaining 
whether the nonmoving party's claim is in fact a "SLAPP" suit.  
Instead, it looks only to whether the special movant's own 
legitimate petitioning activity forms the basis of that claim.  
This leaves open the possibility that a special movant, whose 
legitimate petitioning activity forms the basis of a meritorious 
adverse claim that is not primarily geared toward chilling such 
petitioning, may nonetheless use the special motion to eradicate 
29 
 
 
that nonmoving party's adverse claim.23  As has long been 
recognized, this potential infringement of an "adverse party's 
exercise of its right to petition, even when it is not engaged 
in sham petitioning . . . has troubled judges and bedeviled the 
statute's application."  Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 166-167.24 
                     
23 The Illinois Supreme Court described the problem 
succinctly when addressing Illinois's anti-SLAPP law, which in 
many respects mirrors that of the Commonwealth.  The court 
wrote: 
 
"The sham exception tests the genuineness of the 
defendants' acts; it says nothing about the merits of the 
plaintiff's lawsuit.  It is entirely possible that 
defendants could spread malicious lies about an individual 
while in the course of genuinely petitioning the government 
for a favorable result.  For instance, in the case at bar, 
plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed him by making 
statements that plaintiff abused children, did not get 
along with colleagues, and performed poorly at his job. 
Assuming these statements constitute actionable defamation, 
it does not follow that defendants were not genuinely 
attempting to achieve a favorable governmental result by 
pressuring the school board into firing the plaintiff.  If 
a plaintiff's complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages 
from defamation or other intentional torts and, thus, does 
not constitute a SLAPP, it is irrelevant whether the 
defendants' actions were genuinely aimed at procuring 
favorable government action, result, or outcome" (footnote 
and quotations omitted). 
 
Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 53. 
 
24 Both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights provide a right to petition that includes 
the right to seek judicial resolution of disputes.  Sahli v. 
Bull HN Information Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 700-701 (2002) 
(noting "constitutional right to seek judicial resolution of 
disputes under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights").  See First Amendment ("Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to 
30 
 
 
 
To ameliorate this constitutional infirmity and to ensure 
that only "SLAPP" suits are subject to dismissal, the Duracraft 
court imposed upon special movants the burden of showing that 
the claims against them are "solely based on" protected 
petitioning activity.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 165, 167 
("Because the Legislature intended to immunize parties from 
claims 'based on' their petitioning activities, we adopt a 
construction of 'based on' that would exclude motions brought 
against meritorious claims with a substantial basis other than 
or in addition to the petitioning activities implicated").  The 
goal of this framework was to "distinguish meritless from 
meritorious claims, as was intended by the Legislature."  Id. at 
168. 
 
While the Duracraft framework limited the reach of the 
statute and mitigated the problem, subsequent experience has 
shown that it did not eliminate it.  The statute continues to 
permit, in certain circumstances, the expedited dismissal of a 
nonmoving party's meritorious claim that does not seek primarily 
to chill protected petitioning activity, i.e., non"SLAPP" suits.  
                                                                  
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); art. 11 
("Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character"); art. 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
("The people have a right . . . to request of the legislative 
body, by the way of . . . petitions . . . redress of the wrongs 
done them, and of the grievances they suffer").  See also 
Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 333. 
31 
 
 
The reason the statute can still "be misused to allow motions 
for expedited dismissal of nonfrivolous claims in contravention 
of the Legislature's intent," Matter of the Discipline of an 
Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 673 (2004), is its exclusive focus on 
the special movant's petitioning activity in determining whether 
the nonmoving party's claim is a "SLAPP" suit.  Without also 
considering the nonmoving party's claim, however, a court cannot 
adequately assess whether it is a meritless "SLAPP" suit aimed 
primarily at chilling a special movant's right to petition or, 
instead, a valid exercise of the nonmoving party's own right to 
petition. 
 
d.  Augmenting the Duracraft framework.  To ensure that the 
anti-SLAPP statute will "distinguish meritless from meritorious 
claims, as was intended by the Legislature," Duracraft, 427 
Mass. at 168, we once again narrow the problematic sweep of the 
statute by broadening the meaning of the term "based on."  A 
nonmoving party's claim is not subject to dismissal as one 
"based on" a special movant's petitioning activity if, when the 
burden shifts to it, the nonmoving party can establish that its 
suit was not "brought primarily to chill" the special movant's 
legitimate exercise of its right to petition.  See Duracraft, 
427 Mass. at 161, quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520.  In other 
words, a claim that is not a "SLAPP" suit will not be dismissed. 
32 
 
 
 
As a practical matter, the expedited special motion to 
dismiss will proceed as follows, still in essentially two 
stages, taking place early in the litigation and with limited 
discovery available only by leave of court.  See G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H.  At the first stage, a special movant must demonstrate 
that the nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its own 
petitioning activities.  This is the familiar Duracraft 
threshold inquiry, which will remain unchanged.  At the second 
stage, if the special movant meets this initial burden, the 
burden will shift, as it does now, to the nonmoving party.  The 
nonmoving party may still prevail, as at present, by 
demonstrating that the special movant's petitioning activities 
upon which the challenged claim is based lack a reasonable basis 
in fact or law, i.e., constitute sham petitioning, and that the 
petitioning activities at issue caused it injury.  G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H. 
 
If it cannot make this showing, however, the nonmoving 
party may henceforth meet its second-stage burden and defeat the 
special motion to dismiss by demonstrating in the alternative 
that each challenged claim does not give rise to a "SLAPP" suit.  
It may do so by demonstrating that each such claim was not 
primarily brought to chill the special movant's legitimate 
petitioning activities.  To make this showing, the nonmoving 
party must establish, such that the motion judge may conclude 
33 
 
 
with fair assurance, that its primary motivating goal in 
bringing its claim, viewed in its entirety, was "not to 
interfere with and burden defendants' . . . petition rights, but 
to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] 
defendants' alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts."  
Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 57.  The nonmoving party 
must make this showing with respect to each such claim viewed as 
a whole.25 
 
In applying this standard, the motion judge, in the 
exercise of sound discretion, is to assess the totality of the 
circumstances pertinent to the nonmoving party's asserted 
primary purpose in bringing its claim.  The course and manner of 
                     
25 At the first stage of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, courts 
assess whether the nonmoving party's claim is solely "based on" 
the special movant's petitioning activity in the sense that the 
nonmoving party's claim itself arises only from and complains 
only of that petitioning activity.  See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524.  
If the special movant meets this threshold burden, and the 
nonmoving party then fails to show that such petitioning 
activity was sham petitioning, the nonmoving party may now 
attempt to establish, under the augmented Duracraft framework, 
that its claim is not "based on" the special movant's legitimate 
petitioning activity because its primary motivating goal in 
bringing the claim was not to chill such petitioning.  Because 
at this stage the motion judge is to assess in a holistic 
fashion whether the claim at issue is a "SLAPP" suit, the 
nonmoving party's showing in this regard is as to the entirety 
of its claim.  Otherwise put, the plaintiff nurses on remand may 
attempt to demonstrate that their primary motivating goal in 
bringing a purportedly meritorious defamation claim against the 
hospital defendants -- alleging as defamatory both the e-mail 
message to employees and the Boston Globe articles -- was not to 
chill the hospital defendants' legitimate exercise of their 
right to petition government in aid of retaining the hospital's 
licensure of the unit. 
34 
 
 
proceedings, the pleadings filed, and affidavits "stating the 
facts upon which the liability or defense is based," G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H, may all be considered in evaluating whether the 
claim is a "SLAPP" suit.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161-162 
(listing classic indicia of "SLAPP" suits).26  A necessary but 
not sufficient factor in this analysis will be whether the 
nonmoving party's claim at issue is "colorable or . . . worthy 
of being presented to and considered by the court," see L.B. v. 
Chief Justice of Probate & Family Court Dept., 474 Mass. 231, 
241 (2016), i.e., whether it "offers some reasonable 
possibility" of a decision in the party's favor.  See 
Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 504 (1979). 
On remand, then, the plaintiff nurses may seek to 
demonstrate that the hospital defendants' petitioning activity, 
i.e., the statements in the Boston Globe article, lacks any 
reasonable basis in fact or law and caused the nurses injury.  
                     
26 This type of inquiry is not unknown in the anti-SLAPP 
context.  In Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 
Mass. 660, 674 (2004), an attorney facing disciplinary charges 
for allegedly attempting to influence a witness improperly 
responded by filing a special motion to dismiss.  Because we 
determined that bar counsel did not have an improper purpose in 
bringing charges against the attorney, we denied the attorney's 
special motion.  Id.  We based our conclusion on two factors: 
(1) bar counsel had "sought to sanction the respondent for 
'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,' 
an undoubtedly meritorious charge if a witness had been 
influenced by improper means;" and (2) "the less than careful 
means of communication employed by the respondent left his 
conduct at least open to the interpretation urged by bar 
counsel."  Id. 
35 
 
 
Failing this, under the augmented Duracraft framework, they may 
seek to establish that their defamation claim, viewed as a 
whole, is nonetheless not a "SLAPP" suit.  If the plaintiff 
nurses cannot meet their second-stage burden under the augmented 
framework, the hospital defendants' special motion to dismiss 
shall be allowed as to so much of the defamation claim as is 
based on the Boston Globe articles, and an appropriate award of 
attorney's fees and costs shall be made. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The denial of the hospital defendants' 
special motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation claim as to 
Walczak's statements to the Boston Globe is vacated.  In all 
other respects, the order is affirmed.  The matter is remanded 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.