Title: People v. Roberts

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 97235, 97258 cons.-Agenda 3-November 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee and Appellee, v. TYREESE ROBERTS, Appellee and 							
Cross-Appellant and Appellant.
Opinion filed February 3, 2005. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Tyreese Roberts, was found guilty by a jury of two
counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996))
and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1996)). The circuit court of Cook County
sentenced him to natural life imprisonment for each count of first
degree murder and 20 years' imprisonment for each count of
aggravated battery with a firearm.
	The appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and
remanded the cause for a new trial, holding the trial court erred in
replacing a discharged juror with an alternate after deliberations had
begun. The appellate court did not address defendant's claim that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence. No. 1-01-2612 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23).
	We granted petitions for leave to appeal filed by both the State
and defendant (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and the appeals were
consolidated. In these appeals, we consider whether replacement of a
discharged juror with an alternate after a case is submitted to the jury
for deliberations is permissible under Illinois law. We hold
postsubmission replacement of a juror is permissible under limited
circumstances, and the decision whether to proceed in that manner is
within the discretion of the trial court. Based on the facts of this case,
we find the trial court abused its discretion in replacing a discharged
juror with an alternate after deliberations began.

I. BACKGROUND
	Defendant was charged with multiple offenses stemming from a
drive-by shooting. The charges included the first degree murders of
Salada Smith and Joshua Thomas and aggravated battery with a
firearm of Robert Carr and Derrick Wandrick.
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and
suppress evidence. Defendant claimed that police officers lacked
probable cause to arrest him and that a statement he made after the
arrest should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 454,
83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963). Following a hearing, the trial court found
the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for the charged
offenses and denied his motion.
	Defendant's first jury trial resulted in guilty verdicts on two
counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996))
and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS
5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1996)), but the trial court later granted
defendant's motion for a new trial because he did not receive a
ballistics report used by the State at trial. Defendant's second trial
ended in a mistrial because the jury was deadlocked.
	This appeal is from defendant's convictions following his third
jury trial. The jury for defendant's third trial was selected on Monday,
March 19, 2001. Twelve jurors and two alternates were selected, and
the jury began hearing evidence the next day. Prior to the presentation
of evidence, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were
prohibited from speaking to the parties or any of the witnesses, and
they were required to report immediately any attempt to discuss the
case with them to one of the deputies. The court also instructed the
jurors to inform one of the deputies if they experienced any personal
problems or were in doubt as to their rights or duties as jurors.
	On the charges at issue, the evidence, in pertinent part, showed
that a van approached Salada Smith, Joshua Thomas, Robert Carr and
Derrick Wandrick as they were standing in a gas station parking lot at
approximately 2 a.m. on June 22, 1997. Several gunshots were fired
from the open sliding door of the van. Salada Smith and Joshua
Thomas died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds they suffered
in this incident. Robert Carr and Derrick Wandrick survived their
gunshot wounds.
	Three witnesses at the scene were unable to identify the
occupants of the van. Police officers were later informed that a person
named Paris Williams may have been involved in these shootings.
When the officers located Williams, he informed them defendant was
one of the people involved in the shootings. The officers proceeded to
defendant's residence and arrested him. After he was arrested,
defendant gave a statement admitting he was the driver of the van.
	According to the testimony of Paris Williams, the occupants of
the van were part of a street gang. Defendant and Michael Phillips
were two of the gang members present when the shooting was
planned. The intended targets of the shooting were members of a rival
gang.
	On Wednesday, March 21, defendant called Michael Phillips to
testify. Phillips testified he and defendant were friends and grew up
together. Phillips admitted he was a gang member, but testified
defendant did not belong to a gang. Phillips denied having any
personal knowledge of this incident.
	The jury began deliberations at approximately 4 p.m. on
Thursday, March 22. The one remaining alternate juror was excused
after being admonished by the court not to discuss the evidence or any
aspect of the case with anyone. Sometime between 5:45 and 6 p.m.
that day, the jury sent a note to the court stating:
		"Dear Judge:
			***, one of our jurors, was contacted by Michael Phillips
on Tuesday outside of the courtroom prior to his appearance
in court.
			She brought this to our attention and we are bringing it to
you for a decision on what course of action if any may be
necessary.
			*Michael Phillips influenced her thinking in coming to a
decision in this case (possibly out of fear)[.]"
	The court brought the jurors into the courtroom and instructed
them to stop their deliberations. The court then questioned the juror
(hereafter, the excused juror) who had been contacted by Phillips
outside the presence of the other jurors. The excused juror stated she
spoke with Michael Phillips outside the courthouse two days earlier,
on Tuesday night. She spoke with Phillips for approximately 25
minutes while she was waiting for a ride and Phillips was trying to hail
a cab. She had never met Phillips prior to this conversation. They did
not talk about the trial, and she did not know why Phillips was there.
She did not know Phillips was a witness in the case until he testified
on Wednesday. She was "shocked" when Phillips was called to testify.
The excused juror stated Phillips did not threaten her during their
conversation. She nonetheless felt she could not be fair and impartial
because she had a conversation with Phillips and he later testified in
this case.
	In response to questioning by defense counsel, the excused juror
stated Phillips kept looking at her when he testified and she became
nervous. After Phillips testified, the other women on the jury asked
her why she was "looking like that." At that point, the excused juror
mentioned her conversation with Phillips to all of the other women on
the jury.
	The excused juror stated the jury began deliberating the next day.
The jury voted twice after they went into the jury room, and she voted
"not guilty" both times. According to the excused juror, the other
jurors knew she was nervous. The other jurors told her that she should
inform the court about her conversation with Phillips, but they did not
tell her that she should be removed from the jury.
	The trial court then questioned the other 11 jurors individually.
The juror who wrote the note stated the excused juror did not tell him
that Phillips influenced her out of fear. Rather, one of the other jurors
said that the excused juror was afraid for her life or "something to that
effect." Based on this information, he wrote that Phillips influenced
the excused juror "possibly out of fear."
	Ten of the other jurors stated they were aware of the
conversation between the excused juror and Phillips, and they did not
believe Phillips had threatened her. Several of these jurors believed the
excused juror felt some fear or anxiety as a result of her conversation
with Phillips because he stared at her during his testimony and because
she and Phillips both lived on the west side of Chicago. Two of the
female jurors stated the excused juror told them she also encountered
Phillips on Wednesday night in the stairway after his testimony. The
excused juror and Phillips did not speak to each other on that
occasion. Each of these 10 jurors stated the conversation between the
excused juror and Phillips would not influence his or her ability to be
fair and impartial in this case.
	The remaining eleventh juror stated she was not aware of the
contents of the note, but she was aware that the excused juror had
spoken to someone and was afraid. She stated her knowledge of this
information would not influence her ability to be fair and impartial.
	After speaking with the other 11 jurors, the court again
questioned the excused juror. The excused juror stated she was afraid
that she could possibly encounter Phillips in the future because they
both lived on the west side of Chicago. She indicated she could not be
impartial given these circumstances. At that point, the trial court
dismissed the excused juror from the jury for cause.
	Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting the remaining
jurors could not be impartial given their knowledge of the interaction
between the excused juror and Phillips. In ruling on the motion, the
trial court noted there was no evidence that Phillips threatened the
excused juror, the jurors indicated they did not believe Phillips did
anything wrong, and each of the jurors stated this event would not
influence his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Based on those
findings, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.
	The trial court then called the 11 remaining jurors into the
courtroom. The court informed them the excused juror had been
dismissed by agreement of the parties and the alternate juror would be
recalled the following day. The court instructed the jurors that they
should not discuss the dismissal when they resumed deliberations.
	The following morning, the court questioned the alternate juror,
who stated she had not discussed the facts of this case with anyone,
and she had not formed an opinion about the case. The court then
called the other 11 jurors into the courtroom, and the jury was
resworn. The trial court instructed the jury to "begin your
deliberations from the start, to begin them anew." The record does not
indicate the time the reconstituted jury began deliberating, but it does
show the jury found defendant guilty of the offenses at 9:30 that
morning.
	On direct appeal, defendant argued: (1) his confession should
have been suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (2)
the replacement of the excused juror after submission violated section
115-4(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/115-4(g) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 434(e) (134
Ill. 2d R. 434(e)); and (3) the jury as a whole was biased as a result of
the conversation between the excused juror and Phillips. The appellate
court held the replacement of the excused juror after submission was
contrary to section 115-4(g) and Supreme Court Rule 434(e). The
court then analyzed two prior Illinois appellate court cases, People v.
Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d 810 (2001), and People v. Henderson, 45 Ill.
App. 3d 798 (1977), that found such an "irregularity" did not require
reversal in the absence of prejudice to the defendant. The appellate
court found the facts of this case indicated defendant was prejudiced
as a result of the juror-replacement procedure. Relying on United
States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999), the appellate
court further held replacing the excused juror with an alternate juror
violated defendant's constitutional right to jury unanimity. The
appellate court therefore reversed defendant's convictions and
remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial. The appellate
court did not address defendant's other contentions, finding they were
not necessary to the disposition of the appeal.
	We allowed petitions for leave to appeal filed by both the State
and defendant (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and consolidated the appeals.
In appeal No. 97235, the State contends the appellate court erred in
reversing defendant's convictions because the substitution of the
alternate juror during deliberations did not violate section 115-4(g) or
Supreme Court Rule 434(e), and his constitutional right to jury
unanimity was not violated by the substitution. Defendant cross-appealed in appeal No. 97235, claiming the juror substitution resulted
in a denial of his right to a fair trial by an unbiased jury. In appeal No.
97258, defendant contends the appellate court erred in failing to
address his claim that his motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence should have been granted.

II. ANALYSIS
	We are asked to interpret section 115-4(g) of the Code (725
ILCS 5/115-4(g) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 434(e) (134
Ill. 2d R. 434(e)). Each provides for replacement of a discharged juror
with an alternate before final submission of a cause to the jury. We
must decide whether those provisions allow replacement after
submission. The State contends the juror-replacement procedure
employed by the trial court is not contrary to section 115-4(g) or Rule
434(e), and that the court acted within its discretion in replacing the
excused juror with the alternate juror because the replacement ensured
defendant received a fair trial by an impartial jury. In response,
defendant argues the use of alternate jurors after a case is submitted
to the jury is prohibited by section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e).
	We review de novo the construction of a statute as a question of
law. People v. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d 182, 188-89 (2004). In construing
a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34 (2004). If we
can determine the legislative intent from the plain language of the
statute, we will give that intent effect without resorting to other
interpretive aids. Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d  at 35. We will not depart from
the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations,
or conditions that are in conflict with the express legislative intent.
Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89 (1996). Further,
a court may not inject provisions that are not found in a statute.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154-55
(1997). The rules of statutory construction also apply to interpretation
of our supreme court rules. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395,
404 (1998).
	Section 115-4(g) and Supreme Court Rule 434(e) allow trial
courts to direct the selection of alternate jurors after impaneling a jury.
725 ILCS 5/115-4(g) (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d R. 434(e). The key
language in both of these provisions, for purposes of this appeal, is as
follows: "If before the final submission of a cause a member of the
jury dies or is discharged he shall be replaced by an alternate juror in
the order of selection." 725 ILCS 5/115-4(g) (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d
R. 434(e).
	The plain language of section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e) provides
for mandatory replacement of a juror who dies or is discharged before
submission of a case to the jury. The replacement of a discharged
juror after submission is not addressed in any way by these provisions.
Certainly, there is no express language in section 115-4(g) or Rule
434(e) barring replacement of a juror after submission.
	Defendant advances, however, several arguments in support of
his contention that section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e) prohibit
replacement of a juror after submission. First, defendant argues that
because the statute and rule provide for replacement of a juror with an
alternate only before submission, the absence of a similar provision for
postsubmission juror replacement indicates an intent to bar that
process. Thus, according to defendant, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is violated by construing the statute and the rule to
allow for replacement of jurors after submission.
	The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius means " 'the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.' " Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d  at 44, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990). This
maxim is simply an aid of statutory construction, not a rule of law, and
is subordinate to the primary rule that the legislative intent controls in
interpreting a statute. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300,
319 (2002); Bridgestone/Firestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 153. This maxim is
applicable only to help ascertain the intent of the legislature when that
intent is not clear from the plain language of the statute.
Bridgestone/Firestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 153.
	The plain language of section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e)
mandates replacement of discharged jurors prior to submission. This
language does not, however, indicate an intent to preclude the use of
alternate jurors after submission. There is no indication from the plain
language of these provisions that the legislature intended to govern
the entire subject of the use of alternate jurors. Thus, the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not support defendant's
contention because the plain language of these provisions does not
indicate an intent to prohibit use of alternate jurors after submission. 	Defendant also argues section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e), as
criminal provisions, must be strictly construed in his favor, and
nothing may be implied from these provisions beyond their literal
meaning. Like the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the rule that penal statutes should be construed to afford lenity to the
accused is only applicable where the statute is ambiguous. People v.
Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995); People v. Hobbs, 86 Ill. 2d 242,
246 (1981). Since the plain language of section 115-4(g) and Rule
434(e) is not ambiguous, this aid of construction is not applicable.
Moreover, this rule does not assist defendant because a literal reading
of the provisions at issue results in an interpretation that they only
apply to replacement of discharged jurors before submission and do
not prohibit postsubmission replacements.
	Finally, defendant asserts 14 other jurisdictions have reviewed
statutes or rules similar to section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e) and
found their provisions prohibit substitution of alternate jurors after
submission. A review of the cases cited by defendant for this
proposition reveals that 11 of those cases involved statutes or rules
specifically requiring the discharge of alternate jurors after submission.
See Cantrell v. State, 265 Ark. 263, 266, 577 S.W.2d 605, 607
(1979); People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 586-87 (Colo. 1989);
Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1284-85 (Del. 1991); Bulls v.
United States, 490 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1985); State v. Wideman, 69
Haw. 268, 269, 739 P.2d 931, 932 (1987); James v. State, 14 Md.
App. 689, 698-99, 288 A.2d 644, 650 (1972); People v. Dry Land
Marina, 175 Mich. App. 322, 328, 437 N.W.2d 391, 393-94 (1989);
State v. Hutton, 53 Ohio St. 36, 46, 559 N.E.2d 432, 444 (1990);
Brigman v. State, 350 P.2d 321, 322-23 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960);
State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Cuzick, 11 Wash. App. 539, 541, 524 P.2d 457, 458-59 (1974). Unlike the
provisions interpreted in these cases, section 115-4(g) and Rule
434(e) do not specifically require discharge of alternate jurors after
submission. We find this difference in language is critical. A provision
expressly requiring discharge of alternate jurors after submission
clearly indicates a legislature's intent to preclude the use of alternate
jurors after submission. In contrast, the plain language of our statute
and supreme court rule does not indicate an intent to prohibit the use
of alternate jurors after deliberations. Accordingly, these authorities
are of limited persuasive value in construing our statute and rule.
	Defendant also cites Sotola v. State, 436 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. App.
1983), and Woods v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 312, 152 S.W.2d 997
(1941), in support of his contention that other jurisdictions have
reviewed statutes or rules similar to ours to prohibit postsubmission
substitution. In Sotola, the court did not interpret any provision on
this subject. The court stated Florida did not have any statutory or
procedural authorization for postsubmission substitution and
concluded "[i]n the event of timely objection, it should not be done."
Sotola, 436 So. 2d  at 1009. In Woods, the court interpreted language
that is not similar to our statute or rule to prohibit postsubmission
substitution. Woods, 287 Ky. at 315-16, 152 S.W.2d  at 999.
	In the remaining case cited by defendant, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreted language similar, but not identical, to that contained
in our statute and supreme court rule. See State v. Lehman, 108 Wis.
2d 291, 321 N.W.2d 212 (1982). The statute interpreted in Lehman
provided in relevant part: "If before the final submission of the cause
a regular juror dies or is discharged, the court shall order an alternate
juror to take his place in the jury box." (Emphasis omitted.) Lehman,
108 Wis. 2d at 302, 321 N.W.2d 2d at 217. The statute did not
contain language requiring discharge of alternate jurors at the time the
case was submitted to the jury. The court stated it appeared the
legislature intended the statute to control the entire subject of use of
alternate jurors. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d at 305, 321 N.W.2d  at 219.
Therefore, Lehman found the Wisconsin statute did not allow
substitution of a juror during deliberations. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d at
305-06, 321 N.W.2d  at 219-20. The court further held that
substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations was reversible
error absent consent by the defendant to the substitution. Lehman,
108 Wis. 2d at 313, 321 N.W.2d  at 222-23. In a subsequent case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court explained the opinion in Lehman was based
primarily on the public policy concern that a fair trial required
participation of all jurors in all jury deliberations and postsubmission
juror substitution violated that policy. State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d
370, 386-87, 418 N.W.2d 804, 811 (1988).
	In this case, we base our decision on the plain language of our
statute and rule. See Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d  at 35 (we will rely solely on
the plain language of a statute if the legislative intent can be
determined from that language). As previously stated, we find the
plain language of our statute and rule does not indicate an intent to
prohibit the use of alternate jurors after submission. It is not evident
from these provisions that alternate jurors may only be used before
submission. Accordingly, we reject the policy rationale in Lehman and
adhere to the plain language of our statute and rule.
	We also note that when postsubmission substitution is found to
be erroneous, most jurisdictions have not required reversal unless the
defendant was prejudiced by the error. See State v. Sanchez, 129
N.M. 284, 291, 6 P.3d 486, 493 (2000) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, most courts have found a per se rule of reversal is not
necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
	In sum, when the language of a statute or rule is unambiguous,
the only legitimate function of courts is to enforce the law as written.
Bridgestone/Firestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 154. We conclude the plain
language of section 115-4(g) and Rule 434(e) applies only to the
mandatory replacement of a juror before deliberations and does not
prohibit postsubmission replacement of a juror.
	In the absence of a specific prohibition of postsubmission juror
replacement, we find this question should be viewed as a matter within
the trial court's discretion. Matters relating to jury selection and
management are generally within the discretion of the trial court. See
People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 553 (2002) (deciding a challenge
of a prospective juror for cause); People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502,
541 (2000) (determining jury instructions); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (giving a Prim instruction to a deadlocked jury
and the timing of the instruction); People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 163
(1998) (deciding jury's request for transcripts of witness testimony);
People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 (1997) (allowing evidentiary
items in the jury room); People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994)
(determining the manner and scope of voir dire examination); People
v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 305 (1992) (replacing a juror with an
alternate before submission); People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 283
(1979) (declaring a mistrial due to the length of deliberations).
	In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the
primary consideration must be the potential prejudice to the defendant
as a result of the postsubmission replacement. We find our appellate
court's decisions in Hayes and Henderson instructive in analyzing the
potential prejudice to a defendant in these circumstances. In Hayes, a
juror was replaced by an alternate during deliberations when it was
discovered the juror could not adequately follow the evidence because
he had significant difficulty understanding the English language.
Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 814. The appellate court did not address
whether replacement of the juror during deliberations was prohibited
by section 115-4(g) or Supreme Court Rule 434(e). Instead, the court
focused on whether the defendant was prejudiced by the juror-replacement procedure. The court concluded the replacement of the
juror during deliberations, while "irregular," did not require reversal
because the defendant was not prejudiced by this procedure. Hayes,
319 Ill. App. 3d at 817-18. In finding the defendant was not
prejudiced, the appellate court noted the alternate juror was
discharged for only 2½ hours before being recalled, he had not
discussed the case with anyone after being discharged, he had not
formed an opinion about the case, and the jury was admonished to
begin deliberations anew after the alternate was recalled. Hayes, 319
Ill. App. 3d at 818.
	Similarly, in Henderson, the appellate court held, absent a
showing of prejudice, the replacement of a juror after deliberations
was at most an "irregularity." Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 805. The
court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the substitution
because the alternate did not talk about the case with anyone except
his wife after he was released, he and his wife did not express opinions
about the case to each other, and he had not formed an opinion about
the case. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 805-06. The court also noted
the jury deliberated for 2½ hours before the regular juror suffered a
heart attack, and the reconstituted jury reached a verdict after
deliberating for five hours. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 806. The
court, noting that the defendant acquiesced in the juror replacement,
concluded the alleged error did not constitute plain error because the
defendant was not prejudiced by the procedure. Henderson, 45 Ill.
App. 3d at 805.
	Federal case law is also instructive in determining whether a
defendant has suffered prejudice in these circumstances. Prior to 1999,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) provided that alternate
jurors who did not replace a regular juror were to be discharged when
the jury commenced deliberations. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999). Like
the other jurisdictions cited above, federal courts adopted the view
that postsubmission replacement violated the plain language of this
rule. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d  at 420; United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1985). The federal courts employed a
harmless error analysis to postsubmission juror replacement, focusing
on the risk of prejudice to the defendant from the substitution. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d  at 420; United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448
(11th Cir. 1987); Josefik, 753 F.2d  at 587. In discussing the risk of
prejudice, federal courts expressed concern that the other jurors may
have already formed positions or opinions in the absence of the
alternate juror and then exerted pressure on the alternate to ratify the
predetermined verdict. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d  at 420 (citing United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1981), and 2 C.
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure §388, at 392-93 (1982)). The
federal courts considered several factors in evaluating prejudice,
including the length of the deliberations before and after the
substitution, whether the trial court instructed the reconstituted jury
to begin its deliberations anew, and whether the court ensured the
alternate juror had not discussed the case with anyone and had not
been exposed to outside influences about the case after discharge.
Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420-21; Josefik, 753 F.2d  at 587. The
federal rule was subsequently amended to allow trial courts discretion
to retain alternate jurors after submission and to replace a regular
juror with an alternate during deliberations. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3)
(2002).
	We acknowledge that substitution of an alternate juror during
deliberations involves substantial potential for prejudice, thus
requiring trial courts to review carefully the matter and take significant
precautions to avoid prejudice before allowing substitution. In
determining whether a defendant was prejudiced, we will consider the
totality of the circumstances, including: (1) whether the alternate juror
and the remaining original jurors were exposed to outside prejudicial
influences about the case; (2) whether the original jurors had formed
opinions about the case in the absence of the alternate juror; (3)
whether the reconstituted jury was instructed to begin deliberations
anew; (4) whether there is any indication that the jury failed to follow
the court's instructions; and (5) the length of deliberations both before
and after the substitution. See Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 818;
Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 805-06; Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at
420-21; Josefik, 753 F.2d  at 587. We also acknowledge the
importance of guarding the privacy and secrecy of a jury's
deliberations. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 522, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993). Thus, trial courts
must be careful to avoid inquiring as to jurors' specific views on the
case.
	Given the facts of this case, we find defendant was prejudiced by
the replacement of the excused juror with the alternate juror. First,
according to the excused juror, all of the other female jurors were
informed the day before deliberations began of her contact with
Phillips. Based on that statement, we must conclude the female
alternate juror knew of the contact between the excused juror and
Phillips because the alternate juror was not excused from the jury until
the case was submitted for deliberations. The alternate juror was not,
however, questioned about her knowledge of the contact between the
excused juror and Phillips when she was recalled to serve on the jury.
Therefore, the court did not ensure the alternate juror was not biased
due to outside influence.
	Additionally, several of the jurors believed the excused juror was
nervous or in fear as a result of her contact with Phillips. Despite this
concern, the jurors did not inform the trial court of this situation until
6 p.m. the following day, after the jury had deliberated for
approximately two hours. Given the excused juror's admitted
nervousness concerning her contact with Phillips, we believe the jurors
should have recognized this as a problem requiring the immediate
attention of the court. This is particularly true because the jurors were
instructed that they were prohibited from speaking to witnesses and
they should inform one of the deputies if they had personal problems
or were in doubt as to their duties as jurors. This court has previously
held the failure of jurors to bring an outside influence to the trial
court's attention may be indicative of a lack of appreciation for their
responsibility as jurors. People v. Jones, 105 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1985).
We conclude the failure of the jurors to notify promptly the court of
this contact may be viewed as a lack of appreciation for their duties.
	Further, the two votes by the original jurors indicate defendant
was prejudiced by the juror replacement. The record shows the 11
original jurors voted twice before the case was submitted to the
reconstituted jury. Thus, these 11 jurors formed and declared their
opinions about this case before the reconstituted jury deliberated. The
environment of the reconstituted jury would be inherently coercive for
the alternate juror because the other jurors had already determined
their views on the case. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153,
1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (there is an inherent coercive effect on an
alternate juror who joins a jury that has already decided the accused
is guilty).
	We note that the record does not indicate the time the
reconstituted jury began deliberating. Therefore, the record is
insufficient to allow consideration of the length of deliberations before
and after the substitution as a factor in the prejudice inquiry.
	In sum, this case vividly illustrates the concern the federal courts
have articulated regarding replacement of a juror with an alternate
during deliberations. The two votes by the original jury show the 11
original jurors clearly formed positions in the absence of the alternate
juror. Based on these circumstances, we agree with the appellate court
that defendant was prejudiced by the replacement of the excused juror
with the alternate juror after submission. The trial court therefore
abused its discretion in proceeding in this manner and defendant is
entitled to a new trial.
	A review of the record shows the evidence was sufficient to
prove defendant guilty of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. We
therefore conclude there is no double jeopardy impediment to a new
trial. See People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 535 (1997); People v.
Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 215 (1995). We have made no conclusion as
to defendant's guilt that would be binding on retrial. See Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d  at 535.
	Finally, we need not consider the other claims raised by the
parties concerning jury unanimity and jury bias because we have
concluded defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the error in
replacing a juror with an alternate during deliberations.
	We also need not consider defendant's contention that his
confession should have been suppressed because it is not necessary to
the disposition of this appeal.
	III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's
judgment reversing defendant's convictions and remanding the matter
for a new trial.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.