Title: Burr v. Department of Corrections

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 130 
Docket: 
Ken-19-512 
Argued: 
September 17, 2020 
Decided: 
November 5, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
DOUGLAS BURR 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
[¶1]  Douglas Burr, an inmate at the Maine State Prison, appeals from a 
judgment entered by the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in which 
the court vacated a disciplinary decision of the Department of Corrections but 
concluded that the court lacked authority to enjoin the Department from 
engaging in unconstitutional practices related to solitary confinement pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-169).  We conclude that 
(1) the Maine Constitution’s strong mandate regarding separation of powers 
does not preclude an award of injunctive relief on a § 1983 claim against the 
Department and (2) restoration of Burr’s “good time,”1 which he lost while he 
                                         
1  “Good time” is a popular descriptor for the deduction of days per month from sentences that 
prisoners in the custody of the Department of Corrections can earn based on good conduct and 
fulfillment of responsibilities while in custody.  See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 2307-2311 (2020). 
 
2 
was in nondisciplinary segregation, is not a remedy available through judicial 
review of the Department’s disciplinary action against Burr.  We therefore 
remand for the court to order the restoration of good-time credit for the period 
of nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for Burr’s § 1983 claim, for the court 
to determine whether Burr is entitled to additional injunctive relief, and for the 
court to consider whether to award Burr attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1988 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-169). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following chronological summary includes facts found by the 
court, which are supported by competent evidence admitted at trial, and 
procedural events, which are supported by the record of the administrative and 
court proceedings.  See Wuestenberg v. Rancourt, 2020 ME 25, ¶ 8, 
226 A.3d 227; Carryl v. Dep’t of Corr., 2019 ME 114, ¶ 2, 212 A.3d 336. 
 
[¶3]  Douglas Burr is serving a fifty-nine-year sentence at the Maine State 
Prison.  Sometime before June 2014, the prison’s Inner Perimeter Security 
Team began investigating Burr and his wife for trafficking in prison contraband.  
In June 2014, a corrections corporal completed a disciplinary report alleging 
that Burr had engaged in trafficking. 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  Burr was placed on “Emergency Observation Status” (EOS) in 
June 2014 pending further investigation.  After he left EOS, Burr was held in 
“restrictive housing” for approximately twenty-two months.  For the first ten 
months, he was held in the most restrictive status at the prison (administrative 
segregation), and for the next twelve months, he was held in the next most 
restrictive status (the Administrative Control Unit (ACU)). 
 
[¶5]  In administrative segregation, he occupied a cell measuring eight 
feet by twelve feet and was given meals through a slot in the door.  Two days 
per week, he was in the cell for twenty-four hours.  He had five hours per week 
of recreation time, though he remained in restraints.  He had three showers, 
one “no contact” visit, and one phone call each week.  The unit was chaotic, with 
prisoners yelling, banging on doors, throwing feces, harming themselves, and 
being subjected to forcible extractions from their cells for their behavior. 
 
[¶6]  In July 2014, while Burr was in administrative segregation, a 
disciplinary hearing on the trafficking charge was held.  Burr presented no 
witnesses and offered no defense due to the possibility of criminal charges.  A 
disciplinary segregation sanction of twenty days and a fine of $100 were 
imposed, and Burr lost twenty days of good-time credit against his sentence.  
Upon Burr’s appeal, the Department affirmed this decision in August 2014. 
 
4 
 
[¶7]  On September 4, 2014, Burr filed the complaint at issue here in the 
Superior Court.  In that complaint, he sought, in Count 1, judicial review of the 
disciplinary decision, see M.R. Civ. P. 80C, and, in Count 2, an injunction, for 
violations of his civil rights, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, requiring the Department 
and several named Department actors2 to stop holding Burr in segregation, 
along with attorney fees.3 
 
[¶8]  Although a captain in the Department recommended Burr’s release 
from administrative segregation in August 2014, December 2014, and 
January 2015 so that Burr could serve his disciplinary time, the deputy warden 
rejected those recommendations. 
 
[¶9]  By April 2015, Burr had been transferred to the ACU, which 
provided for increasing privileges as a prisoner progressed through levels.  
There, Burr was allowed a radio, a hot pot, longer visits, and more phone calls.  
He was returned to the general population in March 2016.  During the entire 
                                         
2  The named defendants are Rodney Bouffard, Troy Ross, Mark Engstfeld, Kenneth Vigue, Harold 
Abbott, and David Allen. 
3  Burr also asserted a third count, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and 
attorney fees against Corporal Mark Engstfeld for falsifying a disciplinary report in violation of Burr’s 
civil rights.  The court ultimately entered a summary judgment for Engstfeld on that count, and 
because that count is not at issue on appeal, we do not discuss it further. 
 
5 
period of segregation, he was not accruing credit against his sentence for good 
time. 
 
[¶10]  In handling Burr’s Rule 80C action and § 1983 claim concerning 
these events, the court entered an order on cross-motions for summary 
judgment in January 2017.  On Count 1, the court granted Burr’s Rule 80C 
petition for review and vacated the disciplinary decision and accompanying 
sanctions, ordering the Department to expunge Burr’s disciplinary record and 
restore lost good-time credit.  On Count 2, the court requested additional 
briefing with respect to the mootness of the § 1983 claim given that Burr was 
no longer in segregation. 
 
[¶11]  After receiving additional materials from the parties, the court 
concluded that the exception to mootness for questions of great public concern 
applied and that summary judgment could not be entered on the § 1983 claim 
because there were questions of material fact.  Although the Department filed 
a “supplemental” motion for summary judgment in August 2017, the court 
denied that motion in January 2018, and a trial was held on June 11 
and 12, 2019. 
 
[¶12]  Burr and multiple employees of the Department testified, as did an 
expert in criminal justice management, and the court admitted documentary 
 
6 
evidence of the Department’s actions and policies.  Because the Department had 
already afforded Burr the specific relief that he sought in his complaint by 
releasing him from segregation, Burr asked for different relief4 in his post-trial 
brief—an injunction against multiple practices, including “[h]olding an inmate 
in Administrative Segregation as a security risk without developing objective 
criteria for the individual’s release as a security risk” and “[r]equiring that an 
individual confess to a violation of the Prison’s disciplinary rules before being 
released from Administrative Segregation.” 
 
[¶13]  The court ultimately found that there was no evidence that Burr 
had been violent or threatened violence to anyone before his confinement in 
restrictive housing or that he had engaged in any misconduct during the 
twenty-two months he spent segregated from the general population.  Based 
on a detailed summary of testimony, the court found that the Department had 
made extensive changes to its segregation practices since Burr had been held 
in segregation, in large part due to a Frontline documentary on the conditions 
in the prison. 
                                         
4  Burr filed no motion to amend the complaint, but the Department does not argue on appeal that 
an amended complaint was necessary.  See M.R. Civ. P. 15. 
 
7 
 
[¶14]  The court decided that Burr’s due process rights had been violated 
because 
• the process for reviewing his segregation status had not been meaningful, 
• he could not know what he had to accomplish to leave restrictive 
confinement, 
• even important decisionmakers could not agree on why he was kept in 
segregation for so long or what portion of his segregation was 
disciplinary, and 
• it was inappropriate to hold him in segregation coercively until he 
admitted misconduct. 
The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to order the Department 
to adopt policies prohibiting holding a person in segregation to extract an 
admission or limiting the number of days during which a person may be held in 
segregation.  The court held that, “given the significant changes that have taken 
place at MSP,” requiring the Department to return Burr’s good-time credit and 
vacating the fine imposed by the prison—the remedies it had granted on the 
Rule 80C count—were the only remedies it could grant Burr.  Based on its 
conclusion that Burr was not entitled to any relief on his § 1983 claim, the court 
entered judgment on that claim for the Department and the other named 
defendants. 
 
[¶15]  Burr moved for additional findings of fact and to alter or amend 
the judgment, requesting judgment in his favor on the § 1983 claim, an award 
 
8 
of attorney fees on that claim, and the restoration of good-time credit for the 
period of his nondisciplinary segregation.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e).  The 
court clarified, in an order entered in December 2019, that (1) it was ordering 
the restoration of Burr’s good-time credit for the entire time he spent in both 
disciplinary and nondisciplinary segregation as part of the Rule 80C relief and 
(2) attorney fees could not be awarded on the § 1983 claim pursuant to 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1988 because Burr had not “prevailed” in obtaining injunctive 
relief pursuant to § 1983.  In all other respects, the court denied Burr’s motion. 
 
[¶16]  Burr timely appealed from the judgment.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 
(2020); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶17]  We here consider (A) whether the court is precluded from entering 
injunctive relief because of the provision in the Maine Constitution mandating 
separation of powers and (B) whether the court’s restoration of good-time 
credit for periods of nondisciplinary segregation exceeds the scope of remedies 
available through Burr’s administrative appeal and can be granted only as a 
§ 1983 remedy. 
 
9 
A. 
Availability of Injunctive Relief 
 
[¶18]  Burr argues that the court misinterpreted our opinion in Bates v. 
Department of Behavioral & Developmental Services, 2004 ME 154, 
863 A.2d 890, to preclude the relief he requested, especially given that the 
decision in Bates did not reach issues of separation of powers and concerned 
the appointment of a receiver upon a contempt motion.  He argues that the law 
provides redress, including an order enjoining the Department from violating 
the Constitution, for significant due process violations. 
 
[¶19]  The Department contends that courts may intercede in agency 
policymaking only in extraordinary circumstances not present here.  It argues 
that there is no ongoing or persistent constitutional violation to be remedied 
and that injunctive relief is not guaranteed by § 1983. 
 
[¶20]  “We review issues of constitutional interpretation de novo.”  
Goggin v. State Tax Assessor, 2018 ME 111, ¶ 20, 191 A.3d 341 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The authority of the courts of the State of Maine is defined in the 
Maine Constitution, which establishes three separate branches of government: 
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.  Me. Const. art. III, § 1.  The 
Constitution enforces the separation of powers by providing: “No person or 
persons, belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the 
 
10 
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted.”  Me. Const. art. III, § 2.  The Maine Constitution 
thus bars Maine courts’ exercise of executive or legislative power, and we have 
held that the separation is “much more rigorous” than the bar imposed by the 
United States Constitution upon the federal courts’ exercise of nonjudicial 
power.  Bates, 2004 ME 154, ¶ 84, 863 A.2d 890 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶21]  For these reasons, “courts are reluctant to interfere with penal 
control and management.”  Raynes v. Dep’t of Corr., 2010 ME 100, ¶ 13, 
5 A.3d 1038 (quotation marks omitted).  The oath for judicial office “does not 
confer a roving commission to seek out and correct violations.  Judges must also 
adhere to the constitutional limitations on judicial power.”  Dep’t of Corr. v. 
Superior Ct., 622 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Me. 1993).  For instance, courts may not 
“directly interfere[] with the performance by the agency of its statutory 
[investigatory] duties.”  New England Outdoor Ctr. v. Comm’r of Inland Fisheries 
& Wildlife, 2000 ME 66, ¶ 11, 748 A.2d 1009 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶22]  Based on the constitutional separation of powers, we held that a 
trial court that imposed conditions on two convicted sex offenders’ sentences 
lacked the power to do so because the court “had before it no vehicle that 
invoked a supervisory power over the Department of Corrections.”  Dep’t of 
 
11 
Corr., 622 A.2d at 1132-33, 1135.  We stated in a footnote, however, that actions 
in which injunctive relief against the Department may be ordered “would 
include actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”  Id. at 1135 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶23]  In Bates, which the Superior Court relied on here, we concluded 
that the appointment of a receiver to operate the Augusta Mental Health 
Institute was inappropriate because “less intrusive remedies should have been 
attempted” first.  2004 ME 154, ¶¶ 36, 87, 863 A.2d 890.  As we stated, “A court 
is justified in appointing a receiver when more common remedies, such as 
injunctive relief or contempt proceedings, have failed to achieve the objectives 
of a court order.”  Id. ¶ 86 (emphasis added).  Although we mentioned the 
separation of powers, we did not decide the case on that basis, instead holding 
that the “appointment of a receiver to operate and direct the affairs of AMHI 
was not a sustainable exercise of discretion.”  Id. ¶¶ 82-87.  Bates, like 
Department of Corrections, supports the conclusion that injunctive relief can be 
an appropriate remedy for a civil rights violation in a § 1983 claim. 
 
[¶24]  Federal courts have similarly observed that, although there are 
limits on the capacity of a court to enjoin corrections practices, injunctive relief 
is not precluded altogether.  “It is . . . important that federal courts abstain from 
imposing strict standards of conduct, in the form of injunctions, on prison 
 
12 
officials in the absence of a concrete showing of a valid claim and 
constitutionally mandated directives for relief.  The courts should not get 
involved unless either a constitutional violation has already occurred or the 
threat of such a violation is both real and immediate.”  Rogers v. Scurr, 
676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added); see Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“[J]udicial powers 
may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation.  Remedial 
judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of [local] 
authorities whose powers are plenary.  Judicial authority enters only when 
local authority defaults.”). 
 
[¶25]  Due to the risk that an injunction “would produce too much 
interference with prison administration and leave too little discretion in the 
hands of prison officials who must deal with the very difficult issues of security 
within their institutions,” Rogers, 676 F.2d at 1214, injunctive relief, although 
not forbidden in federal courts, must be limited in its scope.  Compare Thomas 
v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming an injunction 
that had a prospective effect on one inmate only), with Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343, 361-64 (1996) (vacating an injunction that was overly intrusive 
into the minutiae of prison operations). 
 
13 
 
[¶26]  Applying Maine’s more rigorous separation of powers, see Bates, 
2004 ME 154, ¶ 84, 863 A.2d 890, entering an injunction in this case to establish 
a specific policy on the number of days that a person can be held in segregation 
would constitute an intrusion on agency rulemaking.  See Me. Const. art. III, § 2; 
Dep’t of Corr., 622 A.2d at 1132-33, 1135; 5 M.R.S. §§ 8051-8073 (2020); 
34-A M.R.S. § 1402(3) (2020).  It would be difficult to enunciate a constitutional 
limit on days in segregation that would apply in all circumstances.  See 3 Joseph 
G. Cook & John L. Sobieski Jr., Civil Rights Actions ¶ 11.18[D] (2020) (stating that 
“prisoners placed in punitive segregation should not be held 
a 
disproportionately long time compared to the offense committed” and that 
“administrative segregation may be imposed for an indefinite period as long as 
the least restrictive means are employed”). 
 
[¶27]  On the other hand, we see no obstacle to an injunction prohibiting 
the Department from placing or keeping prisoners in segregation solely for the 
purpose of coercing an admission to wrongdoing.  The court concluded that the 
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied and that the practice 
violated due process and served no legitimate criminological purpose—a 
conclusion to which the Department acceded at trial.  See Raynes, 2010 ME 100, 
¶ 19, 5 A.3d 1038 (“‘[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
 
14 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.’” (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987))).  Similarly, the court could enjoin the Department from holding an 
inmate in segregation without developing, communicating, and applying 
objective criteria for the inmate to obtain release from segregation—another 
constitutional violation identified by the trial court.  To enjoin that conduct in 
the future would not affirmatively create a new administrative regulation 
without the proper rulemaking process but rather would enjoin specific 
conduct that the court found unconstitutional—a power that rests with the 
judiciary.  See Dep’t of Corr., 622 A.2d at 1135 & n.4; Hunt v. Bartman, 
873 F. Supp. 229, 251-52 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (permanently enjoining state 
education agencies and officials from persisting in conduct violating the 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and ordering them to implement 
compliant procedures).  Such injunctive relief only defines what is prohibited 
and leaves it to the Department to decide how to comply. 
 
[¶28]  Moreover, the trial court has, in effect, granted injunctive relief in 
the form of its order restoring Burr’s good-time credit for the entire period 
during which he was in some type of segregation.  Although we are remanding 
to enable the court to determine whether additional injunctive relief is 
 
15 
appropriate, we do not express any view as to how the court should respond.  
The court’s finding that the Department has eliminated the practices of which 
Burr complained is well supported in the evidence, and the court may decide 
that no additional injunctive relief is called for.5  Because changes in practice do 
not necessarily reflect changes in policy, however, the court may decide that 
injunctive relief is necessary to ensure that constitutionally prohibited 
practices do not recur. 
B. 
Restoration of Good-Time Credit for the Period of Nondisciplinary 
Segregation 
 
[¶29]  Burr argues that the court’s order for the restoration of 
twenty-two months of lost good-time credit establishes that he prevailed on his 
§ 1983 claim because his Rule 80C claim challenged only the Department’s 
disciplinary decision, which resulted in disciplinary segregation for just twenty 
days.  We agree. 
                                         
5  “Three factors must be met for a court to grant a permanent injunction: (1) the party seeking 
the injunction would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) such injury 
outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the opposing party; and (3) the 
public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction.”  Stanton v. Strong, 
2012 ME 48, ¶ 11, 40 A.3d 1013 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  “Irreparable injury 
is defined as injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.”  Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep't 
of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 2003 ME 140, ¶ 10, 837 A.2d 129 (quotation marks omitted).  “A plaintiff 
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement 
but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.”  Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. 
Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
16 
 
[¶30]  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court may, on appeal 
from an agency decision, 
A. Affirm the decision of the agency; 
 
B. Remand the case for further proceedings, findings of fact or 
conclusions of law or direct the agency to hold such proceedings or 
take such action as the court deems necessary; or 
 
C. Reverse or modify the decision if the administrative findings, 
inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
 
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
 
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
 
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
 
(4) Affected by bias or error of law; 
 
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole 
record; or 
 
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion. 
 
5 M.R.S. § 11007(4) (2020). 
 
[¶31]  Section 1983 allows individuals to bring “an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”  42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.  Attorney 
fees cannot be awarded unless a party prevails in the § 1983 action.  See 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1988(b) (providing, with respect to a § 1983 claim, that “the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
 
17 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” (emphasis added)).  “[W]hen no 
relief can be awarded pursuant to § 1983, no attorney’s fees can be awarded 
under § 1988.”  Camps Newfound/Owatonna Corp. v. Town of Harrison, 
1998 ME 20, ¶ 7, 705 A.2d 1109 (quotation marks omitted); see generally 
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 600, 605 (2001) (holding that the term “prevailing party” does 
not include “a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a 
court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result 
because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s 
conduct” and stating that “prevailing” requires an “alteration in the legal 
relationship of the parties”). 
 
[¶32]  Burr’s initial pleading plainly differentiates between seeking 
judicial review of the Department’s disciplinary action and seeking injunctive 
relief for separate violations of his constitutional rights.  Count 1, brought 
pursuant to Rule 80C, was focused on the disciplinary proceeding that resulted 
in the July 2014 imposition of discipline on Burr—a decision that was affirmed 
by the Department in August 2014.  Count 2 asserted civil rights violations 
based on conduct in the disciplinary action and conduct that was well outside 
 
18 
the scope of that proceeding.  Burr alleged in Count 2 that the named 
defendants’ actions 
in placing Douglas Burr on Emergency Observation Status, placing 
him in solitary confinement in the Special Management Unit, failing 
to follow their own Department Policies and Procedures, and 
taking disciplinary action against Douglas Burr were arbitrary and 
capricious and violated Douglas Burr’s federally protected rights. 
 
 
[¶33]  The trial court explicitly found that “important decision-makers 
could not agree on when [Burr] was in disciplinary segregation, when he was 
in administrative segregation, and what exactly he had done to justify his 
separation from general population for such an extended time.”6  The court’s 
finding acknowledges that all parties considered Burr to have been in 
nondisciplinary segregation for a substantial period of time for undefined 
reasons. 
 
[¶34]  Because only disciplinary segregation was at issue under Burr’s 
Rule 80C petition, the court’s restoration of good-time credit lost during 
nondisciplinary segregation could only have been granted as a remedy on the 
§ 1983 claim.  The Department has not challenged either the trial court’s 
                                         
6  In its judgment, the court also referenced expert opinion that the prison officials had articulated 
no reason for keeping Burr in segregation and summarized the testimony of the Commissioner of the 
Department of Corrections who was serving at the time of Burr’s segregation that the rationale for 
segregating Burr until he admitted to trafficking did not make sense and did not serve a legitimate 
criminological purpose. 
 
19 
findings of constitutional violations beyond the disciplinary proceeding 
findings or the remedy of restoration of all lost good-time credit, both of which 
are amply substantiated in the record. 
 
[¶35]  We therefore vacate the portions of the court’s judgment denying 
injunctive relief, restoring good-time credit for the period of Burr’s 
nondisciplinary segregation pursuant to his Rule 80C petition, and entering 
judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claim, and remand for the court to 
(1) determine whether injunctive relief should be awarded; (2) enter judgment 
in Burr’s favor on his § 1983 claim; (3) order, as a remedy for the constitutional 
violations alleged in his § 1983 claim, the restoration of good-time credit for the 
period of Burr’s nondisciplinary segregation; and (4) consider awarding 
attorney fees pursuant to § 1988. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated to the extent that the court 
(1) concluded that it was prohibited from 
entering injunctive relief on the § 1983 claim, 
(2) restored good-time credit for the period of 
nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for 
Burr’s Rule 80C claim, and (3) entered judgment 
for the defendants on the § 1983 claim.  
Remanded for the court to (1) enter judgment 
for Burr on the § 1983 claim, (2) order the 
restoration of good-time credit for the period of 
nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for 
Burr’s § 1983 claim, (3) determine whether Burr 
 
20 
has established entitlement to other injunctive 
relief, and (4) consider an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to § 1988. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eric M. Mehnert, Esq. (orally), Hawkes & Mehnert, PC, Orono, for appellant 
Douglas Burr 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jason Anton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellees Department of 
Corrections et al. 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-57 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY