Title: DeVault v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

254 Ind. 546 (1970)
261 N.E.2d 232
DeVAULT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 769S149.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed August 24, 1970.
*547 Bernard M. Tetek, Gerald N. Svetanoff, of Gary, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Mark Peden, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant, J.N. Maroules, Sonia Moles and John Balenovich were charged by indictment in the Criminal Court of Lake County, Indiana, with the crime of conspiracy to commit forgery. The indictment in pertinent part reads as follows:
Thereafter each of the defendants separately moved for separate trials and the prayer was granted.
Thereafter, the defendant DeVault filed a motion to take depositions of his co-defendants Maroules, Moles and Balenovich which petition was granted by the court.
The cause was set for trial with respect to the appellant for October 21, 1968, on which date appellant appeared in person and by counsel, waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial by jury began on October 21, 1968, and ended on October 22, 1968. At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, the appellant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty which directed verdict the court refused to order. The defendant *549 did not put any witnesses on the stand and rested, and at which time the State rested.
The jury after deliberating returned its verdict, which in pertinent part reads as follows:
Filed in Open Court October 22, 1968."
Thereupon the court ordered that the Probation Department of the court should make a pre-commitment investigation as to said defendant and a written report of such investigation be filed with the court.
Thereafter, on the 31st day of October, 1968, the prosecuting attorney and defendant in person and by counsel appeared in open court, the report of the pre-commitment investigation was submitted to and considered by the court and the court having examined the same, pursuant to the verdict of the jury, rendered judgment to the effect that the defendant be sentenced and committed to the custody and control of the Warden of the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than two (2) nor more than fourteen (14) years from said date, that he make his fine to the State of Indiana in the penal sum of $2500.00 and that he pay the costs of the prosecution. The court further found the defendant to be sixty (60) years of age. Thereupon the defendant moved the court to withhold execution of the sentence that the defendant might file appropriate motions for an appeal, which motion was by the court sustained and the execution judgment withheld pending the filing of the motions of the defendant.
Appellant's motion for a new trial consists of eleven pages of record and, therefore, in the interest of brevity only the *550 heading of the separate paragraphs of the grounds are shown here. Ground One reads as follows:
Ground Two reads as follows:
Ground Three reads as follows:
Ground Four reads as follows:
Ground Five reads as follows:
*551 Ground Six reads as follows:
Ground Seven reads as follows:
This again refers to the overruling of the objection of defendant and is of the same tenor as Four, Five and Six preceding this objection. Grounds Eight reads as follows:
This objection again is of the same tenor as that heretofore set out in grounds numbered Four, Five and Six. Objection Nine:
This objection again is of the same tenor to that propounded at grounds Four, Five, Six and Seven immediately preceding. Ground Number Ten reads as follows:
Following the motion for a new trial a memorandum was filed therewith, which memorandum omitting heading, formal parts and signature reads as follows, to-wit:
Our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that:
To the motion for new trial filed by the appellant the State of Indiana filed its Answer which omitting heading, formal parts and signature reads as follows, to-wit:
The court overruled appellant's motion for new trial on the 8th day of April, 1969.
Appellant's Assignment of Error is the single specification reading:
The State called a total of six witnesses to testify in this case, the first of whom was James Mixon, the gentleman in whose favor the order here in question was issued. Mr. Mixon testified that he was not on relief at the time this order was issued, did not receive any of the food stuffs supposedly purchased thereunder or any money therefor and that the signature purportedly his, appearing on said purchase order, was not *557 his signature and that he had not signed the same. That was all the witness knew about the transaction.
Thereafter, the State called Bart Zandstra as a witness who appeared and took the stand and testified that he was the County Auditor of Lake County, Indiana, since January 1, 1963. That as Auditor he kept certain public records, including those relating to the Calumet Township Trustee's office. He identified State's Exhibit No. 2 as being a claim filed by the Calumet Township Trustee's office for Poor Relief. He testified that the notation made by his office on that form was:
Upon cross examination by defendant's counsel the following questions and answers were produced by the cross examination of this witness:
The State then called to the witness stand Mr. Donald A. Wilhelm, who was a field examiner for the State Board of Accounts. This witness testified as to the general procedure followed in making investigations and then got to the case at hand. He testified that the signature on the voucher was not that of Mr. DeVault, in other words that Mr. DeVault did not sign it. In response to the question "You wouldn't say that he had conspired with some other person in regard to this voucher?" the witness said, "No, sir."
Appellant's co-defendants, Sonia Moles, Jerry Maroules and John Balenovich, had testified prior thereto and their evidence is summarized in the memorandum attached to the motion for a new trial and hence need not be here repeated.
The conspiracy statute under which the appellant was charged is found in Acts of 1905, Chapter 169, Section 641, page 584, being Section 10-1101, Burns Indiana Annotated Statutes, which reads as follows:
*559 As stated in appellant's brief, the essentials necessary to constitute a conspiracy under the statute are stated as follows:
In summarizing it is apparent that the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the accused agreed and united with another person or persons for the purpose of committing the felony described in the indictment and not another offense unspecified in the charge. Johnson v. State (1935), 208 Ind. 89, 194 N.E. 619; Shonfeld v. State (1942), 219 Ind. 654, 40 N.E.2d 700; Mattingly v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 326, 145 N.E.2d 650. (2) The conspiracy with which the accused is charged is based upon more than just suspicion of guilt. Thus, the showing of a mere relationship or association between the accused and others is not enough to sustain a conviction. Coughlin v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 393, 92 N.E.2d 718; Mattingly v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 326, 145 N.E.2d 650; Scott v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 667, 154 N.E.2d 107; Hutcheson v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 345, 192 N.E.2d 748.
In the case at bar there was no evidence whatever to show the existence of a conspiracy on the part of the appellant and any of the witneses. No conversations took place between the *560 alleged co-conspirators and the appellant with regard to such purchase order; the appellant did not sign it; the appellant did not share in any of the proceeds obtained from it; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that appellant ever knew of the existence of such order until after the indictment in this case was returned. Furthermore all of the alleged co-conspirators specifically denied that they conspired with the appellant to forge the purchase order which was the subject of the indictment against the appellant. They also testified that there was no discussion by them or either of them and the appellant with respect to the purchase order here involved.
The State for reasons best known to the prosecuting attorney saw fit to place co-conspirators upon the stand to testify against the appellant, having done so the State in effect vouched for the accuracy and truth of the testimony to be adduced by those witnesses and is thereby bound by their evidence. In fairness to the State we wish to state that there was no attempt on the part of the State to impeach the testimony of these witnesses and therefore the evidence of such witnesses stands unchallenged.
This Court has previously held "A verdict based merely upon suspicion, opportunity, probability, conjecture, speculation, and unreasonable inferences of guilt gleaned from the vague circumstances in the record of the evidence * * * cannot be upheld and must be reversed." Manlove v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 70, 232 N.E.2d 874; Durham v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 555, 238 N.E.2d 9.
Other errors and irregularities raised by the motion for a new trial need not and are not here considered for the reason that the record in this cause requires that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and remanded.
This cause is, therefore, reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.
*561 Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur; Hunter, C.J., dissents.
NOTE.  Reported in 261 N.E.2d 232.