Title: Sarasota Alliance For Fair Elections, Inc., Etc., Et Al. v. Kurt S. Browning, Etc., Et Al.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-2074 
____________ 
 
SARASOTA ALLIANCE FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, INC., etc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
KURT S. BROWNING, etc., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[February 11, 2010] 
 
QUINCE, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 
968 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d 2007).  In its decision the district court ruled upon the 
following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
IS THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME OF THE FLORIDA ELECTION 
CODE SUFFICIENTLY PERVASIVE, AND ARE THE PUBLIC 
POLICY REASONS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG, TO FIND THAT 
THE FIELD OF ELECTIONS LAW HAS BEEN PREEMPTED, 
PRECLUDING LOCAL LAWS REGARDING THE COUNTING, 
RECOUNTING, AUDITING, CANVASSING, AND 
CERTIFICATION OF VOTES? 
 
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Id. at 654.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Florida Election Code 
does not preempt the field of elections law and answer the certified question in the 
negative.  As explained below, we quash that portion of the Second District‟s 
decision that finds preemption, but approve the court‟s conclusion that portions of 
the proposed amendment conflict with the Election Code.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections (SAFE), a political action 
committee, sponsored an amendment to the Sarasota County charter.  SAFE 
gathered 12,060 certified signatures of Sarasota County voters on petitions calling 
for a referendum on the proposed amendment.  The amendment set forth detailed 
election requirements to be implemented in Sarasota County effective January 1, 
2008.  The proposed amendment provides: 
 
Section 6.2A. Voter Verified Paper Ballot.  
 
(1) No voting system shall be used in Sarasota County that does not 
provide a voter verified paper ballot.  The voter verified paper ballots 
shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast and shall be the 
official record for purposes of any audit conducted with respect to any 
election in which the voting system is used.  While votes may be 
tallied electronically, subject to audit, no electronic record shall be 
deemed a ballot.  
 
 
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(2) Any electronic voting machine shall allow the voter to correct his 
or her ballot by rejecting overvoted ballots at the time of voting, when 
voting in person at the polling place.  
 
6.2B. Mandatory Audits.  In addition to Voting System Audits 
allowed in F.S. 101.591, the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections 
shall provide for mandatory, independent, random audits of the voting 
system in Sarasota County.  These audits shall consist of publicly 
observable hand counts of the voter verified paper ballots in 
comparison to the machine counts. The audits shall be conducted on 
Election Day or within 24 hours after the closing of the polls, in clear 
public view, by a reputable, independent and nonpartisan auditing 
firm.  These audits shall be conducted for a minimum of 5% of 
Sarasota County precincts, for 100% of the ballot issues in the 
selected precincts; and for a minimum of 5% of the total ballots cast 
in Early Voting periods, 5% of the total Absentee ballots, and 100% 
of any precinct where there are highly unusual results or events. In 
addition, audits of 5% of Provisional ballots shall be completed by the 
3rd day following the election, and audits of 5% of Military and 
Overseas (UOCAVA) ballots shall be completed within 24 hours of a 
primary election and within 10 days following a general election.  The 
random selection of precincts to be audited shall be made in a 
physical, non-electronic, public drawing at the Supervisor of Elections 
Office only AFTER machine tallies from the precincts have been 
made public.  This public drawing shall be made on an entirely 
random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in the 
County have an equal chance of being selected. If machine counts are 
unavailable for any reason, the voter verified paper ballots shall be 
counted by hand by the independent auditors and recorded as the vote 
count for that precinct.  Immediately upon completion of the audit, the 
persons conducting the audit shall furnish a copy of an audit to the 
Supervisor of Elections and the Board of County Commissioners and 
post the results for public view and copying at the Supervisor of 
Elections Office.  The audit shall be considered a Florida public 
record pursuant to Florida Statute 119.  
 
6.2C. Certification of Election Results.  No election shall be 
certified until the mandatory audits are complete and any cause for 
 
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concern about accuracy of results has been resolved.  Any 
discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts greater than 
1% or, if less than 1% but sufficient to change the outcome of any 
measure, shall initiate a comprehensive manual audit of the voter 
verified paper ballots in all precincts and of all Absentee, Provisional, 
and Military and Overseas (UOCAVA) ballots.  Such comprehensive 
manual audit shall be completed within 5 days after the election, with 
the exception of comprehensive audits of Military and Overseas 
ballots, which shall be completed within 5 days after a primary 
election, and within 10 days after a general election.  Audits shall be 
completed by a reputable, independent and non-partisan auditing firm 
as in 6.2B above.  A copy of these audits shall be retained for public 
view and copying at the Supervisor of Elections Office in addition to 
being given the County Commissioners.  These audits shall be 
considered Florida public records pursuant to Florida Statute 119. 
 
In August 2006, the Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County 
filed a complaint in circuit court seeking a declaration of the constitutionality of 
the proposed amendment.  The complaint named SAFE and Sarasota Supervisor of 
Elections Kathy Dent as defendants.  The Board was concerned that the 
amendment was preempted by the state election laws or was in conflict with those 
laws.  In turn, SAFE filed a petition for an emergency writ of mandamus, seeking 
an order compelling the Board and Supervisor Dent to include the amendment on 
the November 2006 election ballot.  The two cases were consolidated based on the 
Board‟s motion.  The Board subsequently amended its complaint to include Florida 
Secretary of State Kurt Browning as a defendant. 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the circuit court found that 
the proposed amendment was neither preempted by nor in conflict with Florida 
 
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law.  Thus, the circuit court concluded that the amendment was not 
unconstitutional in its entirety and ordered that it be submitted to the electorate. 
The Board did not seek a stay of the circuit court‟s final judgment.  The 
amendment was placed on the November 2006 ballot and approved by a majority 
of the Sarasota County electorate.  Secretary Browning and Supervisor Dent joined 
the Board in appealing the final judgment to the Second District Court of Appeal. 
 
On appeal, a majority of the Second District panel found that the Florida 
Election Code impliedly preempted the charter amendment in its entirety and that 
the provisions of the charter amendment also directly conflicted with the Florida 
Election Code.  Thus, the majority of the district court found the charter 
amendment to be unconstitutional.  The district court also certified the question 
quoted above as being of great public importance and this Court granted review on 
this basis. 
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
 
This case presents several issues, including whether the proposed 
amendment is preempted by the Florida Election Code, whether the amendment 
conflicts with the Florida Election Code, and, if so, whether any conflicting 
provisions are severable from the amendment.  We discuss each issue in turn 
below. 
 
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Under the Florida Constitution, counties operating under county charters, 
such as Sarasota County, “shall have all powers of local self-government not 
inconsistent with general law.”  Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const.  Further, the 
governing body of a charter county “may enact county ordinances not inconsistent 
with general law.”  Id.  There are “two separate and distinct ways” in which a local 
government enactment may be inconsistent with state law.  Lowe v. Broward 
County, 766 So. 2d 1199, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Tallahassee Mem‟l 
Reg‟l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1996)).  A local government enactment may be inconsistent with state law if 
(1) the Legislature “has preempted a particular subject area” or (2) the local 
enactment conflicts with a state statute.  Id. at 1206-07.  
Preemption 
Florida law recognizes two types of preemption:   express and implied. 
Express preemption requires a specific legislative statement; it cannot be implied 
or inferred.  See City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 
2006); Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 1018 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved in Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 
So. 3d 309 (Fla. 2008).    Express preemption of a field by the Legislature must be 
accomplished by clear language stating that intent.  Mulligan, 934 So. 2d at 1243.  
In cases where the Legislature expressly or specifically preempts an area, there is 
 
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no problem with ascertaining what the Legislature intended.  Tallahassee Mem'l, 
681 So. 2d at 831. 
Florida‟s Election Code is contained in Title IX of the Florida Statutes.  
While the Election Code is extensive, encompassing chapters 97 through 106 and 
125 pages of the Florida Statutes, it contains no express language of preemption.  
Thus, we agree with the Second District that express preemption does not apply in 
this case.  However, “preemption need not be explicit so long as it is clear that the 
legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject.”  Barragan v. City 
of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1989).  Moreover, courts are “careful in 
imputing an intent on behalf of the Legislature to preclude a local elected 
governing body from exercising its home rule powers.”  Tallahassee Mem'l, 681 
So. 2d at 831. 
Preemption is implied “when „the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to 
evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong public policy 
reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted by the Legislature.‟”  
Phantom , 894 So. 2d at 1018 (quoting Tallahassee Mem'l, 681 So. 2d at 831).  
Implied preemption is found where the state legislative scheme of regulation is 
pervasive and the local legislation would present the danger of conflict with that 
pervasive regulatory scheme.  Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1077 
(Fla. 1984) (finding that the legislative scheme of the Public Records Act 
 
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preempted the law relating to production of records for inspection).  In determining 
if implied preemption applies, the court must look “to the provisions of the whole 
law, and to its object and policy.”   State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 486 (Fla. 
2006) (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).  
The nature of the power exerted by the Legislature, the object sought to be attained 
by the statute at issue, and the character of the obligations imposed by the statute 
are all vital to this determination.  Id.  
The Second District concluded that the Election Code establishes “a detailed 
and comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of elections in Florida, 
thereby evidencing the legislature‟s intent to preempt the field of elections law, 
except in those limited circumstances where the legislature has granted specific 
authority to local governments.”  Browning, 968 So. 2d at 646.  While we agree 
that Florida‟s Election Code is a detailed and extensive statutory scheme, we 
conclude that the Legislature‟s grant of power to local authorities in regard to 
many aspects of the election process does not evince an intent to preempt the field 
of election laws.  For example, chapter 101, which governs voting methods and 
procedures, gives the boards of county commissioners authority to create or change 
the voting precincts and to designate the polling places.  See §§ 101.001, 101.002, 
Fla. Stat. (2006).  The supervisors of elections of each county are authorized to 
draft written procedures to ensure the accuracy and security of elections, which are 
 
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subject to review by the Department of State.  See § 101.015(4)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. 
(2006).  The board of county commissioners, in consultation with the supervisor of 
elections, also has the authority to adopt an electronic voting system from those 
that have been approved by the Department of State.  See §§ 101.293, 101.5604, 
Fla. Stat. (2006).  Chapter 102, which contains procedures for conducting elections 
and ascertaining election results, also gives the supervisors of elections authority to 
appoint an election board of clerks and inspectors to conduct the elections at each 
precinct, to recruit poll workers, and to conduct training of the poll workers.  See 
§§ 102.012, 102.014, Fla. Stat. (2006). 
In analogous cases, Florida courts have not found an implied preemption of 
local ordinances which address local issues.  As even the Second District explained 
in the instant case, “[i]t generally serves no useful public policy to prohibit local 
government from deciding local issues.”  Browning, 968 So. 2d at 646.  For 
example, in Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas County, the Second District 
concluded that a local ordinance regulating businesses that sold fireworks was not 
preempted by state statutes regulating both the sale and use of fireworks.  894 So. 
2d at 1020.  The district court concluded that the fireworks statutes were not “so 
pervasive as to the field of the sale of fireworks” as to deprive local governments 
“of all local power in this regard.”  Id.  The court noted that the fireworks statutes 
addressed three topics:  defining the term fireworks; requiring the registration of 
 
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entities manufacturing or selling fireworks; and generally prohibiting the use or 
sale of fireworks with specified exceptions.  The court determined that this did not 
constitute a “pervasive scheme of regulation.”  Further, it found “no strong public 
policy reason that would prevent a local government from enacting ordinances in 
this area so long as they do not directly conflict” with the statutes.  Id.  In addition, 
the court noted, the statutes expressly delegated enforcement to local government, 
contemplated that counties would regulate outdoor displays of fireworks, and 
authorized the county boards to set and require surety bonds for people licensed by 
counties in connection with fireworks.  “It is difficult for a court to imply 
preemption of the entire field of „sale of fireworks‟ when the legislature 
affirmatively informs local government to act” in this area.  Id. at 1019. 
Similarly, in GLA & Assocs. v. City of Boca Raton, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal found that a statute regulating state permits for dune rehabilitation 
projects did not preempt a local ordinance regulating coastal construction permits.  
855 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  The court cited a statutory provision 
specifically requiring the Department of Environmental Protection to give 
deference to local setback requirements or building codes that were equal to or 
more strict than the state standards.  Id. at 282.  Thus, the statutory scheme 
specifically recognized that the need to control sand dune rehabilitation efforts may 
be greater in some counties than in others. 
 
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In the instant case, the Legislature clearly did not deprive local governments 
of all local power in regard to elections.  To the contrary, the Election Code 
specifically delegates certain responsibilities and powers to local authorities, 
including the choice of voting systems to be used in each locality as long as the 
system has been approved by the Department of State.  This statutory scheme 
undoubtedly recognizes that local governments are in the best position to make 
some decisions for their localities.  In light of this, we conclude that the Election 
Code does not impliedly preempt the field of elections law. 
Conflict 
As an alternative to the preemption issue, the Second District also concluded 
that the SAFE amendment conflicts with the Election Code.  Browning, 968 So. 2d 
at 649-653.  The test of conflict between a local government enactment and state 
law is “whether one must violate one provision in order to comply with the other.  
Putting it another way, a conflict exists when two legislative enactments „cannot 
co-exist.‟”  Laborers‟ Int‟l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 
1160, 1161 (Fla.1989) (quoting Laborers‟ Int‟l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. 
Burroughs, 522 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)) (citation omitted).  The 
Second District reviewed each section of the SAFE amendment, finding conflict 
with a number of provisions of the Election Code.  Browning, 968 So. 2d at 649.  
 
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In our analysis of the conflict issue, we consider each section of the amendment in 
turn and compare it to the provisions of the Election Code. 
Section 6.2A of the amendment provides that no voting system can be used 
in Sarasota County elections that does not provide a voter verified paper ballot.  It 
also provides that the voter verified paper ballots shall be the official record of the 
votes cast and while votes may be tallied electronically the electronic record is not 
deemed a ballot.  When the SAFE amendment was promulgated, touch-screen 
voting machines without a paper record were one of the voting systems that had 
been approved by the Department of State and were thus one of the systems that 
counties were authorized to choose.  The SAFE amendment was intended to 
prohibit the use of touch-screen machines in Sarasota elections.  
As Judge Davis explained in his dissenting opinion below, the Legislature 
adopted certain requirements that limit the choices of voting systems that are 
available to county commissions.  Browning, 968 So. 2d at 655 (Davis, J., 
dissenting); see also § 101.5606, Fla. Stat. (2006) (specifying that the Department 
of State shall not approve an electronic or electromechanical voting system unless 
it meets certain enumerated requirements).  These minimum requirements for 
voting machines that have been enumerated by the Legislature are simply 
“expanded by the additional standards that the [SAFE] amendment would impose.”  
Browning, 968 So. 2d at 655 (Davis, J., dissenting).  Thus, the Sarasota County 
 
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Commission could follow the additional standards of section 6.2A of the 
amendment without being in conflict with the minimum statutory requirements 
established by the Legislature.  See Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. 
Pete Beach, 940 So. 2d 1144, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“Rather than conflicting 
with the statutory framework, the proposed City charter amendments complement 
it . . . .”). 
Accordingly, we find no conflict between section 6.2A of the SAFE 
Amendment and the Florida Election Code.  However, even if there were a 
conflict, the issue would be moot.  The Legislature has subsequently amended the 
Election Code effective July 1, 2008, to provide that all voting in Florida (with the 
exception of persons with disabilities) must be “by marksense ballot utilizing a 
marking device for the purpose of designating ballot selections.”  § 101.56075(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2007); see also ch. 2007-30, § 6, at 326-27, Laws of Fla.  Thus, touch-
screen voting machines will no longer be permitted in Florida.  The Legislature has 
spoken on the exact issue on which the SAFE amendment sought to legislate and 
thereby rendered any potential conflict moot. 
 
Section 6.2B of the amendment requires “mandatory, independent, and 
random audits” of the Sarasota voting system.  These audits must be “publicly 
observable hand counts of the voter verified paper ballots in comparison to the 
machine counts.”  Under the 2006 Election Code, the Legislature had the authority 
 
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to determine whether to order an independent audit of a county‟s voting system.  § 
101.591(1), Fla. Stat. (2006).1  The statute did not establish any procedures for 
such audits nor preclude a county from conducting its own audit of its voting 
system.  Thus, at the time when the trial court and the district court considered the 
constitutionality of the amendment, there was no direct conflict with any audit 
provisions in the state Election Code. 
 
Section 6.2C of the amendment provides that no election can be certified 
until the mandatory audits in section 6.2B are completed and any accuracy 
concerns have been resolved.  This section also provides that if there is a 
discrepancy of one percent or more between the machine counts and the hand 
counts (or less than one percent if it is sufficient to change the outcome of any 
measure) there must be a comprehensive manual audit of all voter verified paper 
                                          
 
 
1.  We note that this statute was subsequently amended by the Legislature to 
require county canvassing boards to conduct a manual audit of the voting systems 
used in randomly selected precincts.  The statute requires the audit to take place 
immediately following the certification of each election, sets forth the procedures 
to be used in the audit, establishes a timeline for completion of the audit, and 
specifies the information to be included in the report that must be submitted to the 
Department of State.   See §101.591, Fla. Stat. (2008).  Further, the Legislature 
gave the Department of State authority to adopt rules relating to this audit 
procedure.  See §101.5911, Fla. Stat. (2008).  These statutes took effect on July 1, 
2008.  See ch. 2007-30, § 8, at 327-28, Laws of Fla.  To the extent that section 
6.2B of the SAFE amendment conflicts with these provisions, the state statutes 
would prevail.  See Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. Pete Beach, 940 
So. 2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. 2 DCA 2006) ( “Concurrent legislation by [local 
government] may not conflict with state law.   If conflict arises, state law 
prevails.”).  
 
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ballots in all precincts and all absentee, provisional, and military and overseas 
ballots.  This comprehensive “audit” must be completed within five days of a 
primary election and ten days of a general election.  The “audit” is to be conducted 
by an independent, nonpartisan auditing firm. 
 
While the SAFE amendment calls the discrepancy-triggered procedure in 
section 6.2C an audit, it is actually a manual recount.  All of the ballots are subject 
to a “manual audit” when there is a discrepancy of one percent or more between 
the machine counts and the “hand counts” of ballots conducted under the section 
6.2B random audits.  Moreover, the election result cannot be certified until these 
“audits” of all ballots in that particular race are completed and “any cause for 
concern about the accuracy of the results has been resolved.” 
 
We conclude that the procedure set forth in section 6.2C conflicts with the 
statutory provisions in the Election Code in several ways.  First, the Election Code 
specifies that the county canvassing board must certify the election results.  §§ 
102.071, 102.112, 102.151, Fla. Stat. (2006).  In contrast, the SAFE amendment 
provides for an independent auditing firm to complete the required audits before 
the election results may be certified.  Second, the Election Code requires election 
results to be certified by 5 p.m. on the seventh day after a primary election and by 
5 p.m. on the eleventh day following a general election.  § 102.112(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2006).   If the returns are not received by the Department of State by the time 
 
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specified, “such returns shall be ignored and the results on file at that time shall be 
certified by the department.”  Id. §102.112(3).  The SAFE amendment provides 
that no election results can be certified until the independent auditing firm 
completes its mandatory audits and “any cause for concern about accuracy of the 
results has been resolved,” without a date certain being specified.  Third, the 
Election Code provides for the county canvassing board to conduct a recount of the 
votes cast when the election margin is one-half of a percent or less.  However, the 
losing candidate has the option of requesting in writing that the recount not be 
conducted.  § 102.141(6), Fla. Stat. (2006).  Section 102.141(6) (a)-(c) also 
specifies how recounts are to be conducted and the votes tabulated.  The statute 
requires the Department of State to “adopt detailed rules prescribing additional 
recount procedures for each certified voting system, which shall be uniform to the 
extent practicable.”  Id. § 102.141(6)(d).  Pursuant to this authority, the Division of 
Elections has promulgated a number of regulations that provide detailed 
procedures for conducting recounts and for ascertaining voter intent.  See Fla. 
Admin. Code R. 1S-2.027, 1S-2.031.  In contrast, the SAFE amendment requires a 
complete recount if the discrepancy between machine counts and the hand counts 
are greater than one percent or less than one percent if it can change the outcome 
of the race.  These hand counts are to be conducted by an independent auditing 
firm, but there are no procedures specified for how the hand counts are to be 
 
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conducted.  Nor would an independent auditing firm be subject to the 
administrative rules enacted by the Division of Elections.  Thus, two separate 
entities could be handling the ballots during the same time period and employing 
different methods in ascertaining the results to be certified if the SAFE amendment 
is put into operation.2  Most notably, the Election Code provides that “no vote shall 
be received or counted in any election, except as prescribed by this code.”  § 
101.041, Fla. Stat. (2006).  Section 6.2C clearly conflicts with this directive. 
In light of these conflicts, we conclude that section 6.2C of the SAFE 
amendment “does not parallel or complement the Election Code, but rather 
conflicts with it.”  Browning, 968 So. 2d at 653.  “[C]oncurrent legislation by 
[local government] may not conflict with state law.   If conflict arises, state law 
prevails.”  Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. Pete Beach, 940 So. 2d 
                                          
 
 
2.   Section 101.572, Florida Statutes (2006), which authorizes public 
inspection of the official ballots, also provides that “no persons other than the 
supervisor of elections or his or her employees or the county canvassing board 
shall handle any official ballot or ballot card.”  The Second District cited this 
statute as evidence of the conflict between the SAFE amendment and the Election 
Code because individuals not authorized by statute to handle the ballots are 
required to conduct the audits for the certification of the election results under the 
amendment.  At oral argument, the attorney representing SAFE argued that the 
independent auditing firm could conduct the audits without touching the ballots.  
SAFE asserted that the supervisor of elections or his or her employees or the 
county canvassing board would be responsible for handling the ballots during the 
audits, as provided in section 101.572 when a public inspection of ballots is 
requested.  While this procedure would resolve any conflict between the Election 
Code and the SAFE amendment regarding the handling of the ballots, it does 
nothing to resolve the other conflicts regarding the certification of election results. 
 
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1144, 1147 (Fla. 2 DCA 2006) (quoting W. Palm Beach Ass‟n of Firefighters v. 
Bd. of City Comm‟rs, 448 So. 2d 1212, 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)).  Thus, section 
6.2C of the amendment is unconstitutional.  
Severability 
 
Finally, we must determine whether the unconstitutionality of section 6.2C 
requires that the whole SAFE amendment be struck down or whether this provision 
may be severed from the amendment.  SAFE correctly notes that section 8.4 of the 
Sarasota County charter provides that if any part of the charter is held to be invalid 
or unconstitutional it does not impair the validity of any other part.  However, the 
severability clause further provides that the invalidated provision is not severable if 
“it clearly appears that such other article or part thereof . . . is wholly or necessarily 
dependent for its operation upon the article or article or part thereof . . . held to be 
invalid or unconstitutional.”  Sarasota County, Fla., County Charter, Art. VIII, § 
8.5 (2000).  Thus, the determinative question is whether the other two sections of 
the SAFE amendment are necessarily dependent for their operation upon section 
6.2C.  We conclude that they are not.  Section 6.2A merely specifies that the voting 
system used in Sarasota County must provide a verified paper ballot and allow a 
voter to correct his or her ballot by rejecting overvoted ballots at the time of 
voting.  Section 6.2B provides for mandatory audits of the voting system.  These 
provisions are completely operational without the certification requirements in 
 
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section 6.2C.  Thus, we conclude that section 6.2C can and should be severed from 
the rest of the amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we approve in part and quash in part the 
Second District‟s decision in his case.  We also answer the certified question in the 
negative.  
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority in holding that the Florida Election Code does not 
preempt the field of election law and also that the certified question must be 
answered in the negative.  There is no clearly express preemption here, and the 
vast power vested in local authorities with regard to elections negates any basis for 
a determination that matters pertaining to election law have been preempted by 
implication.   
 
However, I do not agree that all matters pertaining to audits inherently 
conflict with the election code in effect at the time.  We have experienced many 
 
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difficulties with elections in recent years.  The claims and suggestions of 
equipment malfunctions undermine trust and confidence in the entire notion of 
democratic institutions.  This process is an essential element of a democratic 
society and forms the essence and foundation of our constitutional structure and 
institutions.  The importance of the accuracy of the process cannot be overstated 
nor can the need for accountability and credibility be overlooked. 
 
The majority and those who challenge local audit functions here search for 
reasons to find conflict with general law and engage in misnomers to justify a 
conclusion which undermines local autonomy and the need and demand for 
accuracy at the local level.  The audit concept is not a recount nor is it designed or 
structured to be a recount.  Audits simply address the accuracy of the function of 
the equipment implemented to conduct an election.  The audit requires and 
produces spot-type checks on equipment, not recounts with regard to the vote tally 
for any particular office or for any particular candidate.   
 
The majority expands the doctrine of preemption and would reach down and 
eliminate any local provision that may touch upon a subject that may be 
superficially addressed by general law.  The majority reads the permissive 
provision of general law that the Legislature may provide for an audit as 
preempting the entire concept of equipment accuracy, a premise that is both 
incorrect and one I cannot accept.  The fact that the Legislature may do something 
 
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at a future date, may appropriate funds at a future date, and may enter a specific 
directive at some unknown future date is not in my view inconsistent with local 
self determination of the accuracy of the equipment implemented at the local level.  
Cf. Dade County v. Dade County League of Muncipalities, 104 So. 2d 512, 518 
(Fla. 1958) (declining to declare constitutionally invalid a proposed amendment to 
the Dade County Home Rule Charter providing that the Legislature could amend 
or repeal the charter of any county municipality “by special act” where the Court at 
that time was not presented with a special act that would affect the powers of a 
municipality).   
Even though general law and local law may touch upon the same subject 
matter, local self determination is preempted and determined to be unconstitutional 
only when such provisions are actually inconsistent, which is defined under Florida 
law to be when compliance with one provision requires and operates in violation of 
the other.  See Laborers‟ Int‟l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 
2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 1989) (“[T]he test of conflict is whether one must violate one 
provision in order to comply with the other.” (quoting Laborers‟ Int‟l Union of N. 
Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 522 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987))).  Conflict 
of a constitutional magnitude is present only if there is an impossibility of the 
coexistence of the two laws asserted to be in conflict.  See Phantom of Brevard, 
Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 So. 3d 309, 314 (Fla. 2008) (“There is conflict between a 
 
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local ordinance and a state statute when the local ordinance cannot coexist with the 
state statute.”); State ex rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, 224 So. 2d 688, 692 (Fla. 
1969) (“The word „inconsistent‟ as used in this provision of the constitution means 
contradictory in the sense of legislative provisions which cannot coexist.”). 
 
Audits of equipment and recounts are not the same and the mere statement 
by the majority that they are the same does not make it so.  If local citizens demand 
that action be taken to protect and ensure the accurate operation of voting 
mechanisms which are administered on the local level that may not be ordered and 
required by the State or other local subdivisions, there is no legal “inconsistency” 
with general law at that time as that concept is interpreted and applied in the 
constitutional context of preemption.  See, e.g., Phantom of Brevard, 3 So. 3d at 
315 (holding local ordinance to be constitutional because dealers could comply 
with the ordinance without violating statutory law and “the county simply chose to 
legislate in an area where the Legislature chose to remain silent”); Burroughs, 541 
So. 2d at 1161 (holding that a Dade County ordinance did not constitutionally 
conflict with statutory law where the county merely imposed identical 
antidiscrimination requirements upon a broader class of entities than the State). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority‟s opinion that the Florida Election Code does not 
preempt the field of elections law and with answering the certified question in the 
negative.  I also concur with the majority‟s opinion that section 6.2C of the 
amendment is in conflict with the Election Code and, therefore, unconstitutional.  
However, unlike the majority, I also believe that sections 6.2A and 6.2B are in 
conflict. 
 
Section 6.2A is unconstitutional because the charter amendment provides 
voter-imposed restrictions on the Sarasota County Board of Commissioners not 
permitted by the statute authorizing the Board‟s choice of a voting system from 
any of the systems approved by the Department of State.3  See Bd. of County 
Comm‟rs of Dade County v. Wilson, 386 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1980) (declaring a 
proposed ordinance unconstitutional because it was in conflict with general law; 
the proposed ordinance would set millage rates through an initiative petition 
process rather than through the governing body of the county as required by 
statute).  The Election Code provides that “[t]he board of county commissioners of 
any county . . . may, upon consultation with the supervisor of elections, adopt, 
purchase or otherwise procure, and provide for the use of any electronic or 
                                          
 
 
3.  Contrary to the majority, I do not believe this issue is moot.  Unlike 
section 101.56075, Florida Statutes (2007), the charter amendment does not 
provide an exception to the paper ballot requirement for persons with disabilities.     
 
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electomechanical voting system approved by the Department.”  § 101.5604, Fla. 
Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).  Therefore, under the Election Code, the Board has 
the ability to choose any voting system approved by the Department of State.  
However, the charter amendment eliminates that ability.  The charter amendment, 
which is enacted by the electorate and not the board of county commissioners, 
restricts the Board‟s choice to only those voting systems “provid[ing] a voter 
verified paper ballot.”  Amendment § 6.2A(1).   Stated otherwise, section 6.2A and 
the Election Code conflict because section 6.2A states that the Board may not 
choose any system approved by the Department of State, while the Election Code 
expressly authorizes the Board to do so.       
 
Contrary to the majority, I agree with the Second District‟s analysis 
concluding that section 6.2B is in conflict with the Election Code.  See Browning 
v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 968 So. 2d 637, 649-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2007). 
 
Therefore, I agree with the Second District that the three sections of the 
charter amendment are unconstitutional.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D06-4339 
 
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(Sarasota County) 
 
Thomas D. Shults and Zachary L. Ross of Kirk Pinkerton, P.A., Sarasota, Florida 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Peter Antonacci and Allen Winsor of GrayRobinson, P. A., Tallahassee, Florida; 
Ronald A. Labasky and John T. LaVia, III of Young Van Assenderp, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen E. De Marsh, County Attorney, Frederick J. 
Elbrecht, Deputy County Attorney, and Scott T. Bossard, Assistant County 
Attorney, Board of County Commissioners, Sarasota, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents