Title: Fuller v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Gerald D. Fuller v. State of Maryland, No. 62, September Term, 2006.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – APPEAL: 
Petitioner, Gerald Davis Fuller, was found guilty of first-degree murder, and sentenced to
imprisonment for the balance of his natural life, in 1979.  Later that year, Fuller pled guilty to first-
degree rape and robbery with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to imprisonment for the balance
of his natural life, concurrent with the sentence he was then serving.  Fuller has remained
incarcerated since that time.  Two years ago, Fuller filed a Petition for Commitment to the Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Administration pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article of the
Maryland Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.).  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied
the petition, and Fuller appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the denial of Fuller’s
petition was not appealable and dismissed the appeal.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
the denial of a petition under Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article is not appealable.  The
Court determined that because a petition for commitment, unlike a motion for modification, initiates
a statutory cause of action separate from the conviction that can be filed repeatedly and because the
General Assembly did not proactively and clearly confer the right of appeal to petitioners denied
relief under Section 8-507, no right to appeal existed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 62
September Term, 2006
GERALD D. FULLER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Wilner
Cathell
Battaglia
Greene
Bloom, Theodore G. (retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:    March 13, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this 
opinion.
1
At the time Fuller filed his petition, Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article
provided:
(a) Applicability. — This section applies only to a defendant for
whom:
(1) No sentence of incarceration is currently in effect; and
(2) No detainer is currently lodged.
(b) In general. — Subject to the limitations in this section, a
court that finds in a criminal case that a defendant has an alcohol
or drug dependency may commit the defendant as a condition of
release, after conviction, or at any other time the defendant
voluntarily agrees to participate in treatment, to the Department
for treatment that the Department recommends, even if:
(1) The defendant did not timely file a motion for
reconsideration under Maryland Rule 4-345; or
(2) The defendant timely filed a motion for reconsideration
under Maryland Rule 4-345 which was denied by the court.
(c) Prerequisites. — Before a court commits a defendant to the
Department under this section, the court shall:
(1) Offer the defendant the opportunity to receive treatment;
(2) Obtain the written consent of the defendant:
(i) To receive treatment; and
(ii) To have information reported back to the court;
(3) Order an evaluation of the defendant under § 8-505 or §
8-506 of this subtitle;
(4) Consider the report on the defendant's evaluation; and
(5) Find that the treatment that the Department recommends to
be appropriate and necessary.
(d) Services. — (1) The Department shall provide the services
required by this section.
(2) A designee of the Department may carry out any of the
Department’s duties under this section if appropriate funding is
provided.
(e) Admission to facility. — (1) A court may not order that the
(continued...)
The case sub judice presents this Court with the task of determining whether an order
denying an inmate commitment to a drug treatment program pursuant to Section 8-507 of the
Health-General Article1 is appealable.  Because we hold that it is not, we shall affirm the
(...continued)
defendant be delivered for treatment until the Department gives
the court notice that an appropriate treatment program is able to
begin treatment of the defendant.
(2) The Department shall facilitate the prompt treatment of a
defendant.
(f) Supervision of defendant. — For a defendant committed for
treatment under this section, a court shall order supervision of
the defendant:
(1) By an appropriate pretrial release agency, if the defendant is
released pending trial;
(2) By the division of parole and probation under appropriate
conditions in accordance with §§ 6-219 through 6-225 of the
Criminal Procedure Article and Maryland Rule 4-345, if the
defendant is released on probation; or
(3) By the Department, if the defendant remains in the custody
of a local correctional facility.
(g) Transportation. — A court may order law enforcement
officials, detention center staff, Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services staff, or sheriff's department staff within
the appropriate local jurisdiction to transport a defendant to and
from treatment under this section.
(h) Withdrawal of consent. — The Department shall promptly
report to a court a defendant's withdrawal of consent to
treatment and have the defendant returned to the court within 7
days for further proceedings.
(i) Habeas corpus. — A defendant who is committed for
treatment under this section may question at any time the
legality of the commitment by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
(j) Duration; extension; termination. — (1) A commitment
under this section shall be for at least 72 hours and not more
than 1 year.
(2) On good cause shown by the Department, the court, or the
State, the court may extend the time period for providing the
necessary treatment services in increments of 6 months.
(3) Except during the first 72 hours after admission of a
defendant to a treatment program, the Department may terminate
(continued...)
-2-
(...continued)
the treatment if the Department determines that:
(i) Continued treatment is not in the best interest of the
defendant; or
(ii) The defendant is no longer amenable to treatment.
(k) Release. — When a defendant is to be released from
treatment under this section, the Department shall notify the
court that ordered the treatment.
(l)(1) Leaving facility without authorization. — (1) If a
defendant 
leaves 
treatment 
without 
authorization, 
the
responsibility of the Department is limited to the notification of
the court that ordered the defendant's treatment as soon as it is
reasonably possible.
(2) Notice under this subsection shall constitute probable cause
for a court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant.
(m) Obligations of Administration. — Nothing in this section
imposes any obligation on the Department:
(1) To treat any defendant who knowingly and willfully declines
to consent to further treatment; or
(2) In reporting to the court under this section, to include an
assessment of a defendant's dangerousness to one's self, to
another individual, or to the property of another individual by
virtue of a drug or alcohol problem.
(n) Credit against sentence. — Time during which a defendant
is held under this section for inpatient evaluation or inpatient or
residential treatment shall be credited against any sentence
imposed by the court that ordered the evaluation or treatment.
(o) Authority of court to order treatment not limited. — This
section may not be construed to limit a court's authority to order
drug treatment in lieu of incarceration under Title 5 of the
Criminal Law Article.
Md. Code (1982, 2000 Repl. Vol., 2004 Supp.), § 8-507 of the Health-General Article.
In 2006, the General Assembly amended Section 8-507, and as currently enacted, it
provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general. — Subject to the limitations in this section, a
(continued...)
-3-
(...continued)
court that finds in a criminal case that a defendant has an alcohol
or drug dependency may commit the defendant as a condition of
release, after conviction, or at any other time the defendant
voluntarily agrees to participate in treatment, to the Department
for treatment that the Department recommends, even if:
(1) The defendant did not timely file a motion for
reconsideration under Maryland Rule 4-345; or
(2) The defendant timely filed a motion for reconsideration
under Maryland Rule 4-345 which was denied by the court.
* * *
(c) Reports of defendant’s records. — Immediately on receiving
an order for treatment under this section, the Department shall
order a report of all pending cases, warrants, and detainers for
the defendant and forward a copy of the report to the court, the
defendant, and the defendant's last attorney of record.
* * *
(e) Admission to facility. — (1) A court may not order that the
defendant be delivered for treatment until:
(i) The Department gives the court notice that an appropriate
treatment program is able to begin treatment of the defendant;
(ii) Any detainer based on an untried indictment, information,
warrant, or complaint for the defendant has been removed; and
(iii) Any sentence of incarceration for the defendant is no longer
in effect.
Md. Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.), § 8-507 of the Health-General Article.  
The 2006 amendments did not affect the issue presented in this case – whether an
order denying commitment under Section 8-507 is appealable.  All references, therefore, to
Section 8-507 are to the current provisions, unless otherwise noted.
-4-
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.  Introduction
2
The Order provided:
Upon the aforegoing Petition for Commitment to the Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Administration, pursuant to Health General
Article, Section 8-507(B)(1)-(2), after a fair and full
(continued...)
-5-
In 1978 and 1979, the Petitioner, Gerald Davis Fuller, was indicted for first-degree
murder, first-degree rape, and robbery with a deadly weapon charges.  On July 12, 1979, a
jury found Fuller guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for the
balance of his natural life, with credit for time served.  Later that year, Fuller pled guilty to
first-degree rape and robbery with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to imprisonment for
the balance of his natural life, concurrent with the sentence he was then serving.  Fuller
remains incarcerated.
Two years ago, Fuller, acting pro se, pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General
Article, filed a Petition for Commitment to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration with
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in which he alleged that he had an untreated 38-year
history of alcohol and drug abuse, and that he was both an alcoholic and a heroin user “in a
system which is infested with alcohol and drugs.”  Fuller contended that throughout his 27-
year incarceration, he had demonstrated a need for, and requested but received, only limited
and inadequate care, supervision, and treatment for his substance abuse addictions and that
this failure had impeded his complete rehabilitation.  
On March 15, 2005, Judge Clifton J. Gordy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
denied the petition.2  Fuller noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting three
2
(...continued)
consideration of all the facts and circumstances it is this 7th day
of March, 2005;
ORDERED that Defendant’s Petition for Commitment to the
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration is hereby DENIED.
3
The questions presented to the Court of Special Appeals were:
1.  Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s
denial of a petition for commitment pursuant to Health-General
Article § 8-507?
2.  Did the circuit court err by not articulating its reasons for
denying the petition?
3.  Assuming arguendo that the circuit court correctly
interpreted and applied the law, did it abuse its discretion by
denying the petition?
4
Rule 4-345 states:
(continued...)
-6-
questions for review.3  Fuller contended, in addition to arguing that the judge abused his
discretion by denying Fuller’s petition and erred by not articulating his reasoning, that the
Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under either the final
judgment rule or the collateral order doctrine.  In a reported opinion, Chief Judge Joseph F.
Murphy, writing for the court, held that the denial of Fuller’s petition was not appealable and
dismissed his appeal.  Fuller v. State, 169 Md. App. 303, 900 A.2d 311 (2006).  In reaching
its conclusion, the court determined that nothing in Section 8-507, or its legislative history,
reflected that a direct appeal would lie from the denial of a petition for commitment under
Section 8-507.  Id. at 308-09, 900 A.2d at 314.  Further, the court remarked that the denial
of Section 8-507 petitions are similar to the denial of Rule 4-3454 motions for modification
4
(...continued)
(a) Illegal Sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.
(b) Fraud, Mistake, or Irregularity.  The court has revisory
power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.
(c) Correction of Mistake in Announcement. The court may
correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if
the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves
the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding.
(d) Desertion and Non-support Cases.  At any time before
expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and
non-support of spouse, children, or destitute parents, the court
may modify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the
defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court
imposes.
(e) Modification Upon Motion.  (1) Generally.  Upon a motion
filed within 90 days after imposition of a sentence (A) in the
District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected or has been
dismissed, and (B) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal
has been filed, the court has revisory power over the sentence
except that it may not revise the sentence after the expiration of
five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on
the defendant and it may not increase the sentence.
Md. Rule 4-345.
-7-
of a sentence, and cited Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965), for the
proposition that no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion for modification of a
sentence.  The court also explicitly addressed the collateral order doctrine, deeming it
“inapplicable to the case at bar because this Court no longer has jurisdiction to review the
final judgments of conviction to which the order at issue is allegedly ‘collateral’.”  Fuller,
169 Md. at 310-11, 900 A.2d at 315-16.
We granted Fuller’s petition for writ of certiorari, which presented the following
5
Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may
appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case
by a circuit court.  The right of appeal exists from a final
judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special,
limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the
right of appeal is expressly denied by law.  In a criminal case,
the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution
of sentence has been suspended.  In a civil case, a plaintiff who
has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final
judgment.
Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Fuller conceded in his brief that none of the exceptions contained in Section 12-302
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article are applicable in the present case.
-8-
question for our review:
Is a denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse
treatment pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General
Article an appealable order? 
Fuller v. State, 394 Md. 478, 906 A.2d 942 (2006).  We shall hold that the denial of a
petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Section 8-507 of the
Health-General Article is not an appealable order.
II.  Discussion
Fuller contends that the Circuit Court’s Order denying his petition for commitment
under Section 8-507 is appealable as a final judgment under Section 12-301 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article 5 because the denial resolved the issue contained in the petition
and left no further action for the circuit court to take.  Alternatively, Fuller argues that the
6
Fuller also analogizes the denial of his Section 8-507 petition to the denial of a motion
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 (b), asserting it is the equivalent of Rule
4-345 (e).  We, however, in Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997), analyzed
Rule 4-345 (b), the predecessor to 4-345(e), in juxtaposition to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35 (b), and noted that, despite similarities in the language between the two rules,
“there are significant differences between the current Maryland rule and its federal
counterpart,” such that the federal rule and accompanying “federal decisions do not embody
the appropriate rationale for interpreting [the] Maryland rule.”  Id. at 434, 438, 701 A.2d at
424, 426.
7
Fuller does not contend, however, that his Section 8-507 petition is a collateral
challenge to his sentence under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which “established a
comprehensive scheme providing a remedy for challenging collaterally the legality of
incarceration under conviction of crime and sentence of death or imprisonment therefor.”
Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 22, 400 A.2d 406, 407 (1979).  Section 7-102 of the Criminal
Procedure Article, entitled “Right to begin proceeding,” states:
(continued...)
-9-
order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it conclusively determined
an important issue, otherwise unreviewable, which is completely separate from the merits of
the underlying action.  Fuller also analogizes the denial of his petition to the denial of a
motion for modification of a sentence under Rule 4-345 (e),6 contending that our decisions
in State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999), and Herrera v. State, 357 Md. 186,
742 A.2d 517 (1999), lead to the conclusion that an appeal of the denial of a motion to
modify a sentence is appealable.  Further, Fuller suggests that the rationale for refusing to
allow appellate review of the denial of a motion for modification – because the decision is
discretionary – was obviated by this Court in Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 785 A.2d 756
(2001).  He also contends that the appeal of the denial of his petition is not barred by the Post
Conviction Procedure Act. 7
7
(...continued)
(a) In general. — Subject to subsection (b) of this section, §§
7-103 and 7-104 of this subtitle and Subtitle 2 of this title, a
convicted person may begin a proceeding under this title in the
circuit court for the county in which the conviction took place
at any time if the person claims that:
(1) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
the State;
(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
(3) the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law; or
(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack on a
ground of alleged error that would otherwise be available under
a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common
law or statutory remedy.
(b) Requirements to begin proceedings. — A person may begin
a proceeding under this title if:
(1) the person seeks to set aside or correct the judgment or
sentence; and
(2) the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated
or waived in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any
other proceeding that the person has taken to secure relief from
the person's conviction.
Md. Code (2001), § 7-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
-10-
The State, conversely, argues that the Circuit Court’s Order denying Fuller’s petition
for commitment under Section 8-507 is not appealable.  The State contends that the denial
of Fuller’s petition did not constitute a final judgment because it did not determine and
conclude Fuller’s rights or deny him the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights.
The State also argues that the collateral order doctrine is inapplicable because the denial of
Fuller’s petition did not resolve an important issue and that the issue was not completely
separate from the merits of the underlying action.  Additionally, the State maintains that the
-11-
denial of Fuller’s Section 8-507 petition is akin to the denial of a motion for modification,
but that our decisions in Kanaras and Herrera did not alter the general rule that a sentence
not alleged to be illegal is generally not appealable, citing Costello v. State, 237 Md. at 464,
206 A.2d at 812, and Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 175 A.2d 775 (1961), as viable.  The State
also argues that the Post Conviction Procedure Act precludes Fuller’s appeal of the denial
of his petition.
In Maryland, the right to seek appellate review is statutory; the Legislature can
provide for, or preclude, the right of appeal.  See Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.),
Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“The right of appeal exists
from a final judgment entered by a court . . . unless . . . the right of appeal is expressly denied
by law.”); State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 596, 870 A.2d 196, 205 (2005), quoting State v.
Green, 367 Md. 61, 77, 785 A.2d 1275, 1284 (2001) (“[Q]uestions of appealability have
today become entirely governed by statutes.”); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 147, 422 A.2d
1021, 1024 (1980) (“We begin our consideration by recognizing that any right of appeal, in
either a civil or criminal case, must find its source in an act of the legislature.”).  The
statutory provision at issue, Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article, does not include
any provision regarding appealability.  
An appeal, ordinarily, must await the entry of a final judgment.  See Maryland Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), Section 12-302 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article.  To
be a final judgment, the decision “must be so final as to determine and conclude rights
involved, or deny the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and
-12-
interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.”  Sigma Reproductive Health Center v.
State, 297 Md. 660, 665, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983); Gittings v. State, 33 Md. 458 (1871).
One exception to the final judgment rule is the collateral order doctrine, that “applies to a
‘narrow class of orders, referred to as collateral orders, which are offshoots of the principal
litigation in which they are issued and which are immediately appealable as “final
judgments” without regard to the posture of the case’.”  Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 266-
67, 747 A.2d 1199, 1203 (2000) (citations omitted). 
The case sub judice raises the issue of whether the denial of a petition under Section
8-507 of the Health-General Article is appealable.  Fuller and the State both assert that the
denial of his Section 8-507 petition for commitment to a drug treatment program is analogous
to the denial of a motion for modification under Rule 4-345 (e).  While Fuller contends that
the denial of a motion for modification is appealable, the State argues that the denial of a
motion to modify is not directly appealable when the motion does not challenge the legality
of the sentence.  Both Fuller and the State cite to our opinions in State v. Kanaras, 357 Md.
at 170, 742 A.2d at 508, and Herrera v. State, 357 Md. at 186, 742 A.2d at 517.
In Kanaras, we had the occasion to explore the interaction between the Post
Conviction Procedure Act and the appealability of the denial of a motion to correct an
allegedly illegal sentence under Rule 4-345 (a).  Judge John C. Eldridge, writing for this
Court, elucidated that the appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence was not precluded by the Post Conviction Procedure Act, explicitly overruling
Wilson, 227 Md. at 99, 175 A.2d at 776, which had held that a motion to correct an illegal
8
Maryland Rule 744 (a), as applied in Wilson, stated:  “The court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time.”  Md. Rule 744 (a).
9
In reaching our conclusion in Wilson, we distinguished Roberts v. Warden of
Maryland Penitentiary, 206 Md. 246, 111 A.2d 597 (1955), in which we had determined that
the right to appeal the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 10 (a) of
the Maryland Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure, the predecessor of Rules 744 (a) and
4-345 (a), existed before the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act.  Roberts, 206
Md. at 255, 111 A.2d at 601.  Rule 10 (a) provided that “[t]he Court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time.”  Md. Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure 10 (a).
In Roberts, we relied upon Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 109 A.2d 96 (1954), in
which we determined that an appeal lies from an order overruling a motion to correct an
illegal sentence:
In Maryland all judgments are under the control of the court
during the term in which they are entered, an during that time
the court has inherent power to strike out or modify judgments
in both civil and criminal cases.  In this State no appeal lies from
an order striking out a judgment, but an appeal lies from an
order overruling a motion to strike out a judgment, as the
liability of the defendant is thereby fixed and determined, and if
he had no right of appeal therefrom he would be without a
remedy.
Madison, 205 Md. at 431, 109 A.2d at 99.
-13-
sentence under former Maryland Rule 744 (a),8 the precursor to Rule 4-345 (a), is a statutory
remedy within the meaning of the Act, and thus the denial of such motion is not appealable,9
and reconciling Costello, 237 Md. at 469-70, 206 A.2d at 815, which cited Wilson for the
proposition that “the Post Conviction Procedure Act provides that no direct appeal lies from
the denial of a motion by the trial court for modification or reduction of the sentence”:
The Court in Costello, however, did more than “indicate” its
-14-
views on the merits.  It discussed in detail the merits, held that
the trial judge had not erred in imposing sentence, and
concluded:  “We have considered all of the appellant’s
contentions, and find no violation of any of his constitutional or
legal rights.”  More significantly, instead of dismissing the
appeal as was done in Brady and Wilson, the Court in Costello
“affirmed” the trial court’s judgment.  Interestingly, the judge
who had authored the Brady opinion for the Court dissented in
Costello, not on the ground that the appeal should have been
dismissed, but on the ground that the appellant had been
illegally sentenced and that, therefore, the judgment below
should be reversed.
Kanaras, 357 Md. at 177, 742 A.2d at 513.
In our determination that an appeal from the denial of a Rule 4-345 (a) motion to
correct an illegal sentence was not precluded by the Post Conviction Procedure Act, we
stated that our rule-making authority did not render the Maryland Rules equivalent to a
statute enacted by the General Assembly, that a Rule 4-345 (a) motion was not an
independent separate cause of action, and that a motion to correct an illegal sentence does
not necessarily challenge the validity of incarceration:
The reason for the non-appealability holdings . . . was the view
that a motion to correct an illegal sentence, authorized by Rule
4-345(a), is a “statutory remed[y] . . . for challenging the validity
of incarceration under sentence of . . . imprisonment” within the
meaning of subsection (e) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act,
Art. 27, § 645A(e).  As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in
Valentine, 305 Md. at 123, 501 A.2d at 854, however,
“a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a
‘statutory’ remedy. Statutes are enacted by the
General Assembly of Maryland.  The Maryland
Rules are adopted by the Court of Appeals. As the
Wilson court noted, the Maryland Constitution
does provide that rules adopted by the Court ‘shall
have the force of law until rescinded, changed or
-15-
modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by
law.’  Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 18(a).
Nonetheless, the fact that the Maryland Rules
have the force of law does not mean that a rule is
a statute.”
Furthermore, the language of the Post Conviction Procedure Act
obviously refers to separate common law or statutory causes of
action, such as habeas corpus or coram nobis actions which are
separate civil actions.  It is doubtful that this Court's
rule-making authority would extend to the creation of a separate
cause of action.  In any event, there is no indication in the
language or history of Rule 4-345 that the court intended to
create a separate cause of action.  While a motion under Rule
4-345 may be made at any time, it is part of the same criminal
proceeding and not a wholly independent action.  The Rule
simply grants the trial court limited continuing authority in the
criminal case to revise the sentence.
In addition, subsection (e) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act
refers to habeas corpus, coram nobis, or statutory actions “for
challenging the validity of incarceration . . . .”  A motion under
Rule 4-345(a), however, is not specifically or exclusively
designed to challenge the “validity” of incarceration.  There may
be illegalities in a sentence which have nothing to do with the
validity of the incarceration.
Consequently, we hold that the language of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act does not preclude an appeal from a circuit court’s
ruling under Rule 4-345.
Kanaras, 357 Md. at 182-84, 742 A.2d at 515-16 (citations omitted).
Section 7-107 of the Post Conviction Procedure Act precludes appeals in cases “in
which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of death or
imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ of coram nobis or by invoking
a common law or statutory remedy other than this title.”  Maryland Code (2001), Section 7-
107 of the Criminal Procedure Article.  Although the State asserts that Fuller is challenging
the validity of his incarceration, we agree with Fuller that he is not challenging the validity
10
As we have stated heretofore, we are analyzing the current provisions of Section 8-
507.  Fuller would even have less of a basis to challenge the denial of his petition under the
pre-2006 version of Section 8-507 based upon the analogy to a motion to correct an illegal
sentence because Section 8-507 was only applicable if “(1) No sentence of incarceration is
currently in effect; and (2) No detainer is currently lodged.”  Md. Code (1982, 2000 Repl.
Vol., 2004 Supp.), § 8-507 (a) of the Health-General Article.
-16-
of his incarceration but rather asking to serve part of his sentence in a Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene facility where he would receive better drug treatment.
In Herrera, decided the same day as Kanaras, we exercised appellate jurisdiction over
the denial of a motion for modification of a sentence, under former Rule 4-345 (b).  Herrera’s
motion for modification, however, had challenged the legality of his sentence, and upon this
premise we applied Kanaras to permit an appeal, stating that “[u]nder our holding[] in . . .
State v. Kanaras, supra, there was no illegality or infirmity in Herrera’s sentence which
required the Circuit Court to grant relief under Rule 4-345.”  Herrera, 357 Md. at 189, 742
A.2d at 519 (emphasis added).  Therefore, under our jurisprudence the denial of a motion to
correct an illegal sentence, in the form of a motion for modification, is appealable.
Fuller equates the denial of a petition for commitment under Section 8-507 to the
denial of a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, and argues that we should sua
sponte exercise appellate jurisdiction, relying upon Kanaras, 357 Md. at 170, 742 A.2d at
508.  Here, however, there is no appellate jurisdiction.  Fuller’s Section 8-507 petition is not
akin to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, because it constitutes a statutory cause of
action that is separate from his conviction.10  See Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 182 n.6, 840
A.2d 715, 722 n.6 (2004) (“We observe that . . . motions to correct an illegal sentence occur
-17-
as ‘part of the same criminal proceeding and not a wholly independent action’ . . . .”), citing
Kanaras, 357 Md. at 183, 742 A.2d at 516.
Fuller, nonetheless, asserts that the denial of his Section 8-507 petition could be
analogized to the denial of a motion for modification under Rule 4-345 (e), and contends that
such orders are appealable under our opinions in Kanaras, Herrera, and Greco v. State, 347
Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997).  Conversely, the State argues that because our holdings in
Kanaras and Herrera did not overrule Costello, the principal we iterated therein – “no direct
appeal lies from the denial of a motion by the trial court for modification or reduction of the
sentence” – remains authoritative.  Costello, 237 Md. at 469-70, 206 A.2d at 815, citing
Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964).  We disagree with both Fuller
and the State.  We disagree with the State’s rationale relying upon Costello and Gleaton, that
a decision left to the discretion of the trial court judge is not reviewable on appeal, because
that justification was obviated in Merritt, 367 Md. at 17, 785 A.2d at 756, in which we
examined the appealability of the denial of a motion for a new trial.  Judge Eldridge, again
writing for this Court, stated:
Initially, we flatly reject the State’s argument . . . that the denial
of a motion for new trial is absolutely unreviewable on appeal
except for the situation where the trial judge has failed to
exercise any discretion. . . . [T]he Maryland case law governing
appellate review of rulings on motions for new trials has
changed and evolved over the years.  Moreover, language from
older cases has sometimes been carelessly repeated in more
recent cases without taking into consideration the changes in the
law.  The State’s argument in the case at bar, however,
represents an effort to change the present law, to adopt a rule
from the past, and to require that our most recent cases on the
-18-
subject be overruled.  This we decline to do.
The early opinions of this Court clearly took the position that a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial was not subject to
appellate review under any circumstances. . . .
* * *
[T]he principle that rulings on motions for new trial were
unreviewable on appeal appears to have been simply an
application of the more general rule, adhered to by appellate
courts at an earlier time, that any trial court ruling on a
discretionary matter was insulated from appellate review.
Id. at 24-25, 785 A.2d at 760-61 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, we have alluded to the possibility that the denial of a motion for
modification may be appealable under the final judgment rule in dicta in Greco, 347 Md. at
423, 701 A.2d at 419.  The issue presented in Greco was whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider a motion for modification more than ninety days after conviction, but
within ninety days of the granting of a previous motion for modification.  We answered the
question affirmatively, rejecting the rationale that trial judges need to be “protect[ed] . . .
from continual and repeated requests to modify sentences.”  Id. at 436, 701 A.2d at 425.  We
further remarked, though, “[i]f the motion is denied, the defendant is finished – he or she may
not file another motion for reconsideration.”  Id. (emphasis added).
The denial of a Section 8-507 petition for commitment, however, is not analogous to
the denial of a motion for modification.  Unlike a motion for modification, a petition for
commitment does not affect the length of a sentence, only where a portion of it is to be
served.  It also initiates a statutory cause of action separate from the conviction, and may be
11
The habeas corpus statute provided:
[I]f any person . . . shall be or stand committed or detained as
aforesaid for any crime, or under any colour or pretence
whatsoever, unless it be for treason or felony, plainly expressed
in the warrant of commitment, the prisoner or person detained,
not being convict or in execution of legal process, or any one on
his behalf, may complain to the chancellor, or any judge of the
court of appeals, or of the county courts of this state, or to the
chief justice of the court of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery
for Baltimore County, who, at the request of such prisoner or
person detained, or other person on his behalf . . . to award and
grant a habeas corpus, to be directed to the officer or other
person in whose custody the party committed or detained shall
be, returnable immediately before the said chancellor, judge, or
chief justice, and upon service thereof as aforesaid, the officer
or person in whose custody the party is so committed or
detained, shall, within the times before respectively limited,
bring the prisoner or person detained before the said chancellor,
judge or chief justice, before whom the writ is made returnable,
or in case of his absence, before any other of them, with the
return of the writ, and the true causes, if any, of the commitment
or detainer, and thereupon the chancellor, judge or justice,
before whom the prisoner shall be brought, shall, within two
days thereafter, discharge him or her from imprisonment, taking
his or her recognizance, with security, in any sum, according to
the direction of the chancellor, judge or justice, having regard to
the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offence,
for his or her appearance in the county court the term following,
or in some other court where the offence is properly cognizable,
as the cause may require, and then also certify the same writ,
(continued...)
-19-
filed repeatedly “at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to participate in
treatment.”  These two characteristics render the Section 8-507 petition more akin to habeas
corpus actions, which came into being statutorily in Maryland in 1809.
The original habeas corpus statute,11 derived from the English common law, In re
11
(...continued)
with the return thereof, and the said recognizance, into the said
court where such appearance is to be made, unless it appear to
the chancellor, judge or justice, that the party so committed is
detained upon a legal process, under a warrant out of some court
that hath jurisdiction of criminal matters, or by some warrant
signed with the hand of any of the said judges or justices, or
some justice of the peace, for such matter or offence for which
by law the prisoner is not bailable, or if it shall appear that such
person is detained without any legal warrant or authority, such
chancellor, judge or justice, shall immediately release and
discharge such person from such illegal detention or restraint.
1809 Md. Laws, Chap. 125 (emphasis in original).  The court of “oyer and terminer” referred
to a court with the authority to “hear felony and treason cases,” and the court of “gaol
delivery” referred to a court with the authority to “hear all criminal cases of those held in
county jails.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (8th ed., 1999).
-20-
Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 607, (1880), was similarly silent as to the appealability of denials of
petitions for relief, as is Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article.  In addressing the
appealability of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute, this
Court had held that there was no right to appeal its denial.  Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500
(1866); In re Coston, 23 Md. 271 (1865); Bell v. State, 4 Md. (Gill) 301 (1846).   In Coston,
In re Coston, and Bell, we opined that the denial of a habeas corpus petition was not
appealable because the decision was left to the discretion of the trial judge – a rationale we
later rejected in Merritt  – and because a denial was not a final judgment in as much as the
petitioner had the ability to repeatedly apply for a writ of habeas corpus.  In In re Coston, we
stated:
Among the reasons assigned for this conclusion are, that the writ
of habeas corpus, is a proceeding summary in its character,
12
“Toties quoties” is a Latin phrase meaning “as often as.”  Black’s Law Dictionary
1528 (8th ed., 1999).
-21-
addressed to the discretion of the Judge or tribunal, to whom the
application is made, so far as the discharge of the party is
concerned; a proceeding where, in many cases, the evidence
upon which the judgment is founded cannot be presented to the
appellate court, and is not final and conclusive upon the party
applying for the writ, as he may prefer a similar application to
any other Judge or court of the State.
23 Md. at 272 (emphasis added).  See also Bell, 4 Md. (Gill) at 304 (remarking that the
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition did not have any of the characteristics of an appealable
final judgment because it “is not final and conclusive upon the party applying for the writ;
as he may prefer a similar application, to any other Judge or Court of the State”).  Later, in
Coston, 25 Md. at 500, we commented that the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was not a final judgment because it does not “deprive the petitioner of the right of petitioning
again”:
Although the petition should be released by the order of the
Judge or court to whom he made application, if that order is
subject to revision and reversal by an appellate court, the final
judgment, to be of any avail, must deprive the petitioner of the
right of petitioning again; whereas, the right of petitioning for
a habeas corpus, is unlimited in its nature, and the application
may be renewed toties quoties,[12] as long as the petitioner is
confined, and a Judge or court can be found to whom he may
address his prayer for relief.
Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
In 1945, however, the General Assembly provided an aggrieved party with the
statutory right to appeal the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or from a “final
13
The subsequent history of the right to appeal the denial of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was thoroughly discussed in our opinion in Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634,
574 A.2d 898 (1990).
-22-
order of the Court” in habeas corpus proceedings:
The aggrieved applicant may appeal to the Court of Appeals
from the refusal to issue a writ or from a final order remanding
him or dismissing the proceedings; and the Attorney General or
the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City or the County in which
such application was presented may appeal on behalf of the
State.
1945 Maryland Laws, Chapter 702; Maryland Code (1945), Article 42, Section 3C.13  This
statutory enactment, providing a petitioner the ability to seek appellate review of a denial of
a petition for habeas corpus, was analyzed by then-retired former Chief Judge Charles
Markell in Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and by Appeal, in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, when he stated:
The Act of 1945 provided that the “aggrieved” applicant might
appeal to the Court of Appeals from refusal to issue the writ or
from a final order remanding him or dismissing the proceedings
and that the Attorney General or the State’s Attorney might
appeal on behalf of the state.  The general right of appeal under
the Act of 1945 was equally applicable to the petitioner and the
state.  However, the nature of habeas corpus procedure makes it,
in operation, one-sided against the prosecutors.  Before 1945,
the petitioner in effect had the right of 36 appeals by applications
to every other judge in the state.  One judge might set at naught
the judgment of 36 other judges by releasing on habeas corpus
a prisoner whom the other judges would not release.  The
petitioner still has 36 such appeals besides an appeal to the
Court of Appeals.
* * * 
The result[] and the evident purpose[] of the Act[] of . . . 1945
-23-
[has] been to put an end to long-standing abuse of the writ and
to preserve the writ for its historical objects as a bulwark of
liberty.  This has been done by . . . giving a general right of
appeal, thus substituting authoritative statements of law for the
action of 37 judges, of equal authority, not subject to review by
any higher court.  The right of appeal, given without
prepayment of costs, is as freely available to either party as the
writ itself.
Judge Charles Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and by
Appeal,  101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1157, 1162-63 (1953) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
The General Assembly, then, in the history of habeas corpus petitions, proactively and
clearly conferred the right of appeal to petitioners denied relief, whereas this Court had
refused appellate review because the petition in issue could have been filed repeatedly.  This
was not done in Section 8-507 when petitioners were given the opportunity to repeatedly file
their suit.  We generally presume that the Legislature acts with full knowledge of prior and
existing law, legislation, and policy, Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 692-93, 861 A.2d 727,
732 (2004); Bingman v. State, 285 Md. 59, 65, 400 A.2d 765, 768 (1979); Bowers v. State,
283 Md. 115, 127, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (1978), and obviously could have provided an
appellate remedy for the denial when a petition could be repeatedly filed.
Fuller also asserts that he has the right to appeal the denial of his Section 8-507
petition because it is a final judgment, citing to In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md.
573, 458 A.2d 75 (1983), and In re Special Investigation No. 231, 295 Md. 366, 455 A.2d
442 (1983), for the proposition that if a motion is the only matter pending before a court, that
-24-
court’s ruling thereupon is a final judgment and therefore is immediately appealable.
In In re Special Investigation No. 231, as part of an investigation pertaining to certain
health care providers, the Attorney General had issued several subpoenas; four of the
individuals issued subpoenas sought to be represented by the same attorney.  The State
attempted to use the Code of Professional Responsibility to prevent their joint representation.
295 Md. at 367, 368, 455 A.2d at 442, 443.  After the motion to disqualify the attorney was
denied, we stated that the denial was a final judgment, and heard the merits of the appeal:
We have consistently held that a final judgment from which an
appeal will lie is one which settles the rights of the parties or
concludes the cause.
In this case the proceeding consisted only of a motion to
disqualify the attorney in question.  Once the motion was denied
there was nothing more to be done in this particular case.  There
was nothing else before the court.  There was nothing pending.
Hence, we conclude that the order of the trial judge here settled
the rights of the parties and terminated the cause.  Thus, it was
a final judgment.
Id. at 370, 455 A.2d at 444 (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, however, the denial of Fuller’s petition did not settle Fuller’s
ability to seek commitment pursuant to Section 8-507 for substance abuse treatment.  Under
Section 8-507, a petition may be filed at any “time the defendant voluntarily agrees to
participate in treatment.”  Thus, petitions may be filed repeatedly and the denial of a single
petition does not preclude Fuller from filing another.
In In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. at 573, 458 A.2d at 75, the issue was
whether the grant of a motion to obtain the return of financial records from a grand jury
-25-
constituted a final judgment.  Relying on our decision in In re Special Investigation No. 231,
we noted that “[o]nce that motion was granted there was nothing more to be done in this
particular case” because the documents would have been returned to the petitioner, and out
of the grand jury’s control.  In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. at 575, 458 A.2d
at 76 (emphasis added).  The return of the final records to the petitioner, thus, “settled the
rights of the parties and terminated the cause” for good.  Id.  In the case sub judice, again,
the denial of Fuller’s petition did not settle his rights under Section 8-507 for good because
his ability to seek commitment under the statute was not terminated.
Fuller also argues that the denial of his Section 8-507 petition is appealable under the
collateral order doctrine exception to the final judgment rule.  The collateral order doctrine
“treats as final and appealable a limited class of orders which do not terminate the litigation
in the trial court.”  Jackson, 358 Md. at 266, 747 A.2d at 1202.  To fall within the exception,
the decision must “conclusively determine the disputed question; resolve an important issue;
be completely separate from the merits of the action; and be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.”  Id. at 266-67, 747 A.2d at 1203 (emphasis added).
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the collateral order doctrine was
inapplicable in the present case, asserting:  “The ‘collateral order doctrine’ is inapplicable
to the case at bar because this Court no longer has jurisdiction to review the final judgments
of conviction to which the order at issue is allegedly ‘collateral’.“  Fuller, 169 Md. at 310,
900 A.2d at 315.  Moreover, after iterating the requirements of the collateral order doctrine,
the court remarked:  “The denial of a post-sentence petition for commitment to ADAA is
-26-
simply not ‘an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action’.”  Id. at 311,
900 A.2d at 316.  In this we disagree; the statute creating the ability to petition for
commitment for substance abuse treatment created a separate and independent cause of
action from the merits of the conviction.  Nevertheless, we do agree that the collateral order
doctrine does not confer upon Fuller the ability to appeal because the disputed question was
not conclusively determined, based upon the fact that a Section 8-507 petition can repeatedly
be filed “at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to participate in treatment.”
Fuller’s rights under Section 8-507 were not completely settled by the denial of his petition,
and the collateral order doctrine is not applicable.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, we hold that an order denying an inmate
commitment to a drug treatment program pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General
Article is not appealable.
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.