Title: Byrd v. Dillard's, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

892 So. 2d 342 (2004)
Gerda BYRD
v.
DILLARD'S, INC.
1021439.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 2, 2004.
*343 Charles A. Hardin of Watson, deGraffenried, Hardin & Tyra, LLP, Tuscaloosa, for plaintiff.
Timothy A. Palmer, John Richard Carrigan, Brian R. Bostick, and Christopher A. Mixon of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Birmingham, for defendant.
PER CURIAM.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question to this Court pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P.: "What is the applicable limitations period for a claim brought under the [Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 25-1-20 through § 25-1-29]?" See Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir.2003). This Court accepted the certified question and now answers the question.
The facts of this case are stated in the Court of Appeals' opinion certifying the question:
331 F.3d  at 1261-63.
Byrd appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. That Court reversed the district court's determination that Byrd's claim under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA") was time-barred. Jones, supra. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the 180-day limitations period for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") was subject, under federal law, to "equitable tolling" because Byrd did not have sufficient knowledge of Dillard's alleged discriminatory action to file a claim within the 180-day time limit. Regarding Byrd's claim under the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the AADEA"), the Court stated:
Jones, 331 F.3d  at 1269.
The AADEA provides, in part:
Ala.Code 1975, § 25-1-29.
In construing any statute, it is the duty of this Court to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604, 607 (Ala.2002); Gholston v. State, 620 So. 2d 719, 721 (Ala.1993). The plain language of the AADEA reveals that the Legislature expressly adopted and incorporated the "statutes of limitations" applicable to claims brought under the ADEA. Ala.Code 1975, § 25-1-29. The use of the plural "statutes of limitations" should be given meaning.
Section 25-1-29 was drafted in face of two distinct deadlines in the ADEA, and it can be interpreted to give a logical field of operation to both deadlines. Specifically, the AADEA recognizes that an aggrieved person can file an action without being required to pursue an administrative remedy before filing the action. First, it failed to create an administrative agency to deal with claims made pursuant to the AADEA. Second, the AADEA expressly recognizes *346 that an action may be filed in a state court before one is filed in the federal court. See § 25-1-29 ("However, if an action is brought in the federal court, any action pending in the state court shall be simultaneously dismissed with prejudice."). Presumably, the Legislature contemplated that a plaintiff might file a claim in a state court under the AADEA before a claim in the federal court is ripe, as to which the right to sue under the ADEA is suspended pending review of the claim by the EEOC. Third, the AADEA states that "a plaintiff shall not be required to pursue any administrative action or remedy prior to filing suit under this article."
The express provisions in § 25-1-29, recognizing that exhaustion of an administrative remedy was not applicable in AADEA cases, coupled with the reference to "statutes of limitations," indicate that the Legislature intended that both the 180-day deadline and the 90-day deadline should be given a field of operation. Thus, we hold that the § 25-1-29 incorporates the statutes of limitations of the ADEA as follows:
(1) If a plaintiff files an AADEA claim in a state court within 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice, the applicable limitations period for filing a charge with the EEOC, then that plaintiff's claim is timely.
(2) If a plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC within 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice and thereafter receives notice that the EEOC has dismissed the charge, then that plaintiff's AADEA claim filed in the state court within 90 days after the EEOC's notice of dismissal of the charge is timely.
The implications of this construction on the case made the basis of the certified question are not before us.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.