Title: MVA v. Aiken

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Brittany Faith Aiken, No. 69, Sept. Term 2009
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION - DRUNKEN DRIVING - PRIMA FACIE
CASE - In order to prove a prima facie case of drunken driving at an administrative hearing,
the Motor Vehicle Administration need not present any evidence of drunken driving other
than that found on the DR-15A Form.  On that form, a police officer and a test technician or
analyst declare and affirm that the officer had reasonable grounds to detain the driver and that
the analyst performed a test for alcohol concentration.  The technician or analyst also affirms,
under penalty of perjury, the blood alcohol concentration of the driver and that he or she
explained the testing procedure to the driver.  Such certifications are sufficient to prove a
prima facie case of drunken driving, absent the presentation of any evidence to the contrary.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 301535
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 69
September Term, 2009
MOTOR VEHICLE
ADMINISTRATION
v.
BRITTANY FAITH AIKEN
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
     Filed:   January 25, 2011
1 The text of this and other pertinent provisions of the Statute is set forth, infra.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references herein are to the current version of the
Statute, Maryland Code (2009 Repl. Vol.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, which
went into effect on October 1, 2008.  The subsections of the Statute at issue in the present
case have not been changed since the time of the events at issue.
We are called upon in this case to construe, once again, the provisions of Maryland
Code (2009 Repl. Vol.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article (“TR”), Maryland’s so-
called “implied consent, administrative per se law” (hereinafter, the “Statute”).1  The Statute
provides for automatic suspension of a driver’s license to drive if, inter alia, a test of the
driver’s blood alcohol concentration produces a “result indicating an alcohol concentration
of 0.08 or more at the time of testing[.]”  TR § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(1.).  The Statute entitles a
driver to challenge the order of suspension at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”).  At that hearing, the MVA must present a prima facie case for suspension of the
license.  The question we decide in the present case is whether, as part of that prima facie
case, the MVA must establish the validity of the test by providing evidence that the test was
administered by a “qualified person,” as that term is defined and employed in Maryland Code
(2009 Repl. Vol.), § 10-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), and that
the testing equipment was approved by a State toxicologist.  For the reasons that follow, we
hold that the Statute does not require the MVA to present such evidence at the administrative
hearing as part of its burden to present a prima facie case for suspension.
I.
At 12:48 a.m. on July 23, 2008, Maryland State Trooper Kolle stopped Respondent,
Brittany Faith Aiken, for traveling 77 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone on
2 The form includes, among other advice, the following:
You have been stopped or detained and reasonable grounds exist to believe
that you have been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under
circumstances requiring that you be asked to submit to a test under § 16-205.1
of the Maryland Vehicle Law.  In this situation, the law deems that you have
consented to take a test to measure the alcohol concentration or drug or
controlled dangerous substance content in your system. You may refuse to
submit to the test(s), unless you were in a motor vehicle accident resulting in
the death of or life-threatening injury to another person.
For a complete description of Form DR-15 and discussion of it, see Motor Vehicle Admin.
v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 249 n.3, 941 A.2d 1067,1071 n.3 (2008).
-2-
northbound I-270.  Trooper Kolle, upon talking to Respondent, detected a strong odor of
alcohol on her breath.  He conducted field sobriety tests, which Respondent failed.  Trooper
Kolle arrested Respondent on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and
transported her to the State Police barracks in Rockville.
When, as in the present case, an officer who has “stop[ped] or detain[ed]” a person
whom the officer “has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to
drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,” the officer is authorized under
the Statute to request the driver to submit to a chemical breath test.  See TR § 16-205.1(b)(2).
Trooper Kolle made that request of Respondent and informed her, also pursuant to the
Statute, see id., of her right to refuse to submit to the breath test and, if she did, the resulting
administrative sanctions.  Trooper Kolle gave Respondent Form DR-15, titled “Advice of
Rights DR-15,” which also sets out this information and other rights afforded a driver under
§ 16-205.1.2  Respondent agreed to submit to a chemical breath test and signed the DR-15
3 TR § 16.205.1(b)(3) provides in part that, when a test registers an alcohol
concentration higher than 0.08, “the police officer shall”: 
(i) Confiscate the person’s driver’s license issued by this State;
(ii) Acting on behalf of the [Motor Vehicle] Administration, personally serve
an order of suspension on the person; 
(iii) Issue a temporary license to drive;
(iv) Inform the person that the temporary license allows the person to continue
driving for 45 days if the person is licensed under this title [Vehicle Laws —
Drivers’ Licenses].
-3-
form.  
Sergeant Bowling of the Maryland State Police administered the breath test.  The
result of the test indicated Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.16 at the time of
testing.  Consequently, Trooper Kolle issued Respondent an Order of Suspension, in
accordance with subsection (b)(3) of the Statute.3  
Trooper Kolle and Sergeant Bowling then completed and signed Form DR-15A, titled
“Officer’s Certification and Order of Suspension.”  By signing the form, the troopers
affirmed under penalty of perjury that, inter alia:  Trooper Kolle had reasonable grounds to
believe that Respondent was operating her vehicle while impaired; Sergeant Bowling had
explained to Respondent the testing procedures and found her to be cooperative; Sergeant
Bowling administered the test using Intox EC/IR equipment; and, based on the test,
Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration was shown to be 0.16 at the time of testing.
Trooper Kolle and Sergeant Bowling made those sworn statements pursuant to subsection
4 TR § 16-205.1(b)(3)(viii) provides that the police officer shall:
Within 72 hours after the issuance of the order of suspension, send any
confiscated driver’s license, copy of the suspension order, and a sworn
statement to the Administration, that states:
1.  The officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had
been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any
private property that is used by the public in general in this State while under
the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by
any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by
a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in
violation of § 16-813 of this title;
2.  The person refused to take a test when requested by the police
officer, the person submitted to the test which indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing, or the person submitted to
the test which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time
of testing; and 
3.  The person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that
shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test
or takes a test that indicates an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the
time of testing is ineligible for modification of a suspension or issuance of a
restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) or (2) of this section.
-4-
(b)(3)(vii) of the Statute.4  Also pursuant to that subsection, the State Police forwarded to the
MVA Respondent’s driver license, the completed Form DR-15, and the completed Form DR-
15A.  
The show cause hearing
Respondent exercised her right to request a hearing before an ALJ, see TR § 16-
205.1(b)(3)(v)(1.), “to show cause why [her] driver’s license should not be suspended . . . for
test results indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing[.]”
Respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing.  The MVA appeared through its paper
-5-
record, which consisted only of Form DR-15 and Form DR-15A.  The MVA did not supply
two documents that, we surmise from comments of counsel, the ALJ, and, later, the Circuit
Court, are often included in such proceedings.  We refer to the Maryland State Police Form
33 (“MSP Form 33”), titled “Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol
Concentration,” which contains, inter alia, (1) a certification that the testing equipment is
approved, and (2) the Intox EC/IR testing strip produced during Respondent’s test, which
includes information related to the timing of the test and the identification of the testing
instrument.
The Statute expressly circumscribes the issues that can be litigated at the
administrative hearing.  The Statute provides in subsection (f)(7)(i) that “[a]t a hearing under
this section . . . the only issues shall be”:
1.  Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had
reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive
while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far
impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while
impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol
restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title;
2.  Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any
drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one more drugs and alcohol,
or a controlled dangerous substance;
3.  Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully
advised, as required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the
administrative sanctions that shall be imposed;
4.  Whether the person refused to take the test;
5.  Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing;
6.  Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing;
or 
5 See TR § 12-104(b) (authorizing the MVA to “adopt rules and regulations to carry
out:  (1) Those provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law that relate to or are administered and
enforced by the [MVA]; and (2) The provisions of any other law that the [MVA] is
authorized to administer and enforce”).
-6-
7.  If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver’s
license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle or held
a commercial driver’s license.
(Emphases added.)
The General Assembly has authorized the MVA to adopt rules and regulations to carry
out the provisions of the Statute.5  Among those regulations are two that pertain to
administrative hearings conducted pursuant to the Statute.  COMAR 11.11.03.07 (Subpoena)
permits a party to the administrative hearing to request issuance by the ALJ of “a subpoena
to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents,” which the ALJ has
the discretion to refuse “if the testimony or evidence to be offered:  (1) Is immaterial,
irrelevant, or unduly repetitious; or (2) Does not pertain to a genuine issue in the contested
case.”  COMAR 11.11.03.08 (Hearing) provides in part B (Evidence) the following, pertinent
to the present case:
(5) For the purpose of determining the accuracy of the test result indicating the
alcohol concentration of the licensee, the following breath testing instruments
shall be deemed reliable indicators of the alcohol concentration of a person:
(a) Breathalyzer Model 900;
(b) Breathalyzer Model 900A.;
(c) Intoximeter 3000; and
(d) Intox EC/IR.
(6) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the test result of a test of blood
or breath indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee is accurate.
(7) The reliability of breath testing instruments approved in §B(5) of this
regulation and the presumption established in §B(6) of this regulation may not
6 The record of the administrative hearing suggests that counsel for Respondent had
in hand at that hearing the MSP Form 33 and EC/IR test strip.
-7-
preclude a licensee from demonstrating that the specific breath testing
instrument used to test the alcohol concentration of the licensee was
malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused the test result
to be inaccurate.     
Respondent did not request, prior to the hearing, issuance of a subpoena for either
Sergeant Bowling or any of the MVA documents generated in her case.  Furthermore, during
her testimony at the hearing, Respondent did not contradict the certifications of Trooper
Kolle and Sergeant Bowling contained on the completed Form DR-15A.  
Respondent nevertheless made a motion for “No Action.” Respondent argued in
support of the motion that the MVA’s failure to produce the MSP Form 33 and the Intox
EC/IR testing strip precluded a finding that the MVA had established a prima facie case for
administrative suspension of her license.
Respondent argued that the sworn statement of Sergeant Bowling on the Form DR-
15A did not reflect “that the ECIR was working properly,” that “it hasn’t been shown that
there were two tests that was [sic] run,” and that the DR-15A form also “doesn’t show when
the twenty minute observation period was done or conducted, at all, which is obviously step
one of the test, at least according to the Regulations of the Toxicologist.”  Respondent also
pointed out that “[t]he test strip [which the MVA did not make part of the administrative
record][6] shows the twenty minute observation period; it shows the time when the
observation period started. . . .  And we can’t tell from what’s give[n] here whether the test
-8-
was administered properly.”  Respondent asserted that the MSP Form 33 would “certif[y]
that the equipment is approved by the toxicologist.  The certification that the MVA submitted
here says nothing about the testing equipment. . . .  And it doesn’t say here which test this
technician gave to my client. . . .  It just says ECIR.  It doesn’t give model number.”
Respondent argued that it cannot be known from the DR-15A whether the arresting officer,
rather than the test technician, had conducted the twenty-minute observation period, if one
even was conducted.  Finally, Respondent argued that “there’s no certification in the record
that the . . . administrator of the test is qualified under [§] 10-304 [of the CJP]” and no
certification of the machine.
Respondent relied on subsection (a)(2) of the Statute to argue that the MVA’s prima
facie case must include evidence of compliance with sections 10-302 through 10-309 of the
CJP.  Subsection (a)(2) provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts
to drive a motor vehicle on a highway . . . in this State is deemed to have consented, subject
to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving
or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol . . . .”
The ALJ stated for the record, and Respondent’s counsel agreed, that the motion for
“No Action” was being requested “because of the failure of the [MVA] to include the notice
to defendant [of] a test result (i.e., the MSP Form 33) and the test strip.”  The ALJ denied the
motion, reaffirming his ruling earlier in the hearing that “the failure, if there was one, would
be an affirmative defense and you would have to show if it wasn’t complied with.”  We infer
7 TR § 16-205.1(f)(8)(i) provides in pertinent part that:
After a hearing, the [MVA] shall suspend the driver’s license or privilege
to drive of the person charged under subsection (b) or (c) of this section if:
1.  The police officer who stopped or detained the person had reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under
the influence of alcohol . . . ;
2.  There was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol . . . ;
3.  The police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised, as
required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the administrative sanctions
that shall be imposed; and
(continued...)
-9-
that the ALJ was referring to Respondent’s failure to present any such evidence,
notwithstanding that the regulations provided Respondent with the means to do so.  The
decision of the ALJ also reflects his reliance on subsection (f)(7)(ii) of the Statute, which
states:
The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test technician or analyst
shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal, a test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing, or a test result indicating
an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing.  
The ALJ, noting that he “[hadn’t] heard anything which makes me believe that [the relevant
provisions of the CJP] weren’t followed,” ruled that “completion of the certification [on
Form DR-15A] is prima facie that there’s been a following of the rules.”  The ALJ concluded
that the completed DR-15A form satisfied the prima facie case because the form indicated
that Respondent had been advised properly of her rights and the alcohol concentration test
was administered in accordance with relevant regulations.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ complied with the requirements of the
Statute that certain findings be made.7  In particular, the ALJ found that an “officer requested
7(...continued)
4.  A. The person refused to take the test; or
    B.  A test to determine alcohol concentration was taken and the test
result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing.
-10-
that the Licensee take a test as defined in Maryland Transportation 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii) and
that she scored a .16 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”  As provided by subsection
(b)(1)(i)(2) of the Statute, the ALJ suspended Respondent’s driver’s license for 90 days.
Judicial review in the Circuit Court
Respondent filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a petition for judicial
review of the ALJ’s decision.  See Md. Code (2009 Repl. Vol), § 10-222(h) of the State
Government Article.  Respondent reduced the arguments she made before the ALJ to the
single contention that the MVA failed to make a prima facie case for license suspension
because there is no evidence in the record either that a “qualified person” administered the
test or that the testing equipment had been approved by a State toxicologist, as provided in
CJP § 10-304.  That section provides that a breath test “shall be administered by a qualified
person with equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners
Commission,” and defines “qualified person” as “a person who has received training in the
use of the equipment in a training program approved by the toxicologist under the
Postmortem Examiners Commission . . . .”  Respondent argued that, because the DR-15 and
DR-15A forms the troopers signed in the present case contain no such express certifications,
the ALJ should have sustained the motion for “No Action.”
-11-
The MVA, which was represented by counsel before the Circuit Court, disagreed with
Respondent’s interpretation of the Statute.  The MVA directed the court to the language of
TR § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii) (providing in pertinent part that the “sworn statement” of the officer
and test technician shall be prima facie evidence of a test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing) and argued that the DR-15A form that
was presented to the ALJ sufficed to establish a prima facie case for administrative license
suspension.
The Circuit Court agreed with Respondent’s view that the MVA’s prima facie case
must include evidence that a qualified person administered the test and that testing equipment
approved by the State toxicologist was used.  The court reversed the decision of the ALJ,
ruling that there was not “substantial and competent” evidence of those facts in the
administrative agency record.
The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Aiken, 409 Md. 47, 972 A.2d 861 (2009), to address the following question:
Where the evidence presented to the ALJ included prima facie evidence of a
test result in the form of a sworn statement by a test technician or analyst that
a driver had a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more,
as provided in TR § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii), did the circuit court err in finding a lack
of competent material and substantial evidence to support suspension of the
driver’s license on the ground that the record did not also include various other
evidence that is not required by the statute, specifically, (a) a certification that
the approved test equipment was used and that the technician or analyst is a
‘qualified person’; (b) the actual test strip used in the test; and (c)
corroboration of the test results on a separate form, MSP-33?
II.
-12-
The MVA asks us to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court on the ground that,
contrary to that court’s ruling, there exists substantial evidence supporting the administrative
suspension of Respondent’s license.  The MVA identifies the crux of the issue before us as
whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record of an un-rebutted prima
facie case for suspension of Respondent’s driver’s license.  In arguing that the record
presents a prima facie case, the MVA takes the position that “the sworn statement at the
bottom of the form [DR-15A] satisfies the statutory requirement [of the prima facie case]
under § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii).”  The MVA finds support for that position in the plain language
of the Statute, its legislative history, the statutory scheme of which it is a part, and this
Court’s cases on the subject.
Respondent counters with the arguments she made to the ALJ and the Circuit Court.
She argues that more is required of the prima facie case for administrative license suspension
under the Statute than was presented by the MVA in this case; specifically, the MVA is
obligated to present evidence (not included in the currently worded DR-15A certification)
that the test technician is a “qualified person,” as defined in CJP § 10-304(a)(3), and the
breath test was performed on “equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem
Examiners Commission,” as provided in CJP § 10-304(b)(1).  Respondent relies in support
of that argument on the reference in subsection (a)(2) of the Statute, which states in pertinent
part that the driver’s consent to the test is “subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-
309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”  For the reasons we shall
explain, the MVA has the better part of the argument.
8 SG § 10-222(h)(3) provides that a reviewing court may reverse or modify an
administrative decision of a state agency only if a “substantial right” of the petitioner may
have been prejudiced by an agency’s finding, conclusion, or decision that: 
(i) is unconstitutional; 
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision
maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light
of the entire record as submitted; or 
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
-13-
III.
Judicial review of administrative decision-making “is constrained.”  See, e.g., Motor
Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14, 997 A.2d 768, 775 (2010) (citing Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 256-57, 941 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2008)); see also Md. Code
(1984, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article (“SG”).8  The role
of the courts in administrative agency review can be summarized by the following:
A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory
decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence
in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and
to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.
In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides
whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion the agency reached.  A reviewing court should defer to the
agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the
record.  A reviewing court must review the agency’s decision in the light most
favorable to it; . . . the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed
valid, and . . . it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and
to draw inferences from that evidence.
Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our
opinions, a court's task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the
-14-
expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency.  Even
with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be
accorded the position of the administrative agency. 
Shea, 415 Md. at 14-15, 997 A.2d at 775-76 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This case involves the ALJ’s interpretation and application of the Statute, which the
MVA administers.  Accordingly, we will review the ALJ’s decision for legal correctness,
giving appropriate weight to the MVA’s interpretation of the Statute. 
IV.
The legal question we decide in this case requires us to discern the intent of the
General Assembly in enacting the Statute.  That undertaking 
begins with the language of the statute as the primary source of legislative
intent.  When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of
the statute and the result is not absurd, we have held that no further inquiry
into legislative intent is required.  Beyond plain meaning, the purpose of the
statute may be ascertained by examining the Legislature’s statement of a
statute’s purposes, and courts may consider other “external manifestations” or
“persuasive evidence” indicating the legislative intent.  The language of a
statute cannot be divorced from its context. [Thus], even where the language
of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by its context.  In short, the
statutory language must be construed in light of and governed by its context
within the overall statutory scheme.  An appellate court may consider evidence
such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it
passed through the Legislature, and its relationship to earlier and subsequent
legislation to ascertain the Legislature’s goal in enacting the statute.  
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57, 821 A.2d 62, 73-74 (2003) (citations
omitted).
Before addressing the particular question of statutory interpretation at issue here, we
restate the legislative purpose behind the Statute.  That purpose is “‘to reduce the incidence
-15-
of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol
concentration tests; the [S]tatute [is] not meant to protect drivers.’”  Shea, 415 Md. at 15-16,
997 A.2d at 776 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d
100, 108 (2007) (citing  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 374, 739 A.2d 58,
68 (1999))); accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 179, 844 A.2d 388, 397
(2004).  The Statute is remedial in nature, and its purposes, stated more particularly,
are, first, to help effectuate the administrative goals of the MVA in ridding
Maryland roadways of drunk drivers and, second, to encourage both general
compliance with Maryland law as well as specific fulfillment of the consent
to taking a properly requested chemical breath test implied by a motorist’s
entry upon and usage of this State’s roads.  
Richards, 356 Md. at 374, 739 A.2d at 68.  To that end, the General Assembly crafted the
Statute to provide for “speedy Administrative sanctions [that] would help the offender to
recognize the cause and effect relationship between the offense and the sanction which would
otherwise be weakened by lengthy delays in the court processes.”  Lytle, 374 Md. at 63, 821
A.2d at 77 (quoting Governor’s Legislative Office, “Positive Aspects of Administrative Per
Se,” House Bill 556 (1989)).  The procedures attendant to administrative license suspension
under the Statute, moreover, are “intended to be informal and summary in nature.”  Richards,
356 Md. at 376-77, 739 A.2d at 70.
The question before us deals with the prima facie case the Statute requires the MVA
to present at the administrative hearing.  The answer to that question is straightforward, and
is found in the plain language of subsection (f)(7)(ii) of the Statute.  To repeat, that
subsection provides:
9 TR § 16-205.1(b)(3)(viii) specifically applies to a police officer’s sworn statement.
With the exception of the grounds for detaining the driver, however, the required content
would seem also to apply to the sworn statement required of the test technician or analyst.
-16-
The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test technician or analyst
shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal, a test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing, or a test result indicating
an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing.    
The content of the “sworn statement” required by subsection (f)(7)(ii) is detailed in
subsection (b)(3)(viii).  See supra note 4.  That subsection provides that the “sworn
statement” the police officer is required to forward to the MVA must state in pertinent part
that the person detained on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol either refused
the test, or as here, “submitted to the test” and the test “indicated an alcohol concentration
of 0.15 or more at the time of testing.”  The Form DR-15A contains a “CERTIFICATION
OF POLICE OFFICER,” that includes in pertinent part the following preprinted language:
I certify under penalty of perjury that the contents of the foregoing document
[which recounts the officer’s reasonable grounds for detaining a person on
suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of
alcohol] are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and
belief, and after being fully advised of sanctions that shall be imposed as
provided in the Advice of Rights Form DR-15, the person described above (1)
refused to take a test to determine alcohol concentration when requested by
this officer, [or] (2) was tested and the test result indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more, as indicated above . . . . 
The preprinted language in the “CERTIFICATION OF TEST TECHNICIAN OR
ANALYST” portion of Form DR-15A sets forth all the components of the “sworn statement”
required by TR § 16-205.1(b)(3)(vii).9  The certification language states:  “I do solemnly
declare and affirm, under penalty of perjury, and upon personal knowledge that I performed
-17-
a test for alcohol concentration on the person described above and the test results were 0. __
from the Intox EC/IR.”  The certification contains boxes for the tester to check to indicate
whether the “Testing procedure was explained[,]” the “Person appeared in good health[,]”
and if there was a “Refusal-Insufficient Breath[,]” in which case the tester “further certif[ies]
that the driver refused to take a test when the driver failed to provide sufficient breath
samples for analysis.”  There follows space for the test technician to provide an
“EXPLANATION:  (Specify instructions issued and behavior of driver).”
In the present case, the certifications on the Form DR-15A were signed by Trooper
Kolle and Sergeant Bowling.  By his signature on the certification Trooper Kolle certified,
among other things, that Respondent was tested and the test result indicated a blood alcohol
concentration of more than 0.08.  Sergeant Bowling, in turn, certified, among other things,
that Respondent’s test produced a 0.16 blood alcohol concentration.
The DR-15A form containing the certifications of Trooper Kolle and Sergeant
Bowling satisfies the requirements of the subsection (f)(7)(ii) “sworn statement.”  That
subsection, moreover, could not be more plain in providing that the MVA’s prima facie case
requires only those sworn statements.
Notwithstanding the clarity with which the General Assembly has spoken in
subsection (f)(7)(ii) of the Statute, Respondent argues that the MVA also must establish that
the test result was obtained by a “qualified person” using equipment approved by the State
toxicologist, as set forth in CJP § 10-304.  As noted, Respondent relies for this proposition
on the prefatory language contained in subsection (a)(2) of the Statute that “[a]ny person who
-18-
drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway . . . is deemed to have consented,
subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving
or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol . . . .”  Respondent’s reliance on
this language is poorly placed, for any of several reasons.
To begin, the Statute, when viewed in its entirety, undercuts Respondent’s argument.
Although we have commented that the provisions of the Statute and CJP §§ 10-302 through
10-309 are to be read “in pari materia,” see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Dove, 413 Md. 70,
81, 991 A.2d 65, 71 (2010) (citing Lowry v. State, 363 Md. 357, 368-69, 768 A.2d 688, 694
(2001)); see also Lytle, 374 Md. at 43, 821 A.2d at 65 (quoting the language of subsection
(a)(2) of the Statute for the proposition that the “Transportation Article authorizes tests
‘subject to the provisions of  §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article’”), it does not follow from these observations that every subsection of
the Statute impliedly incorporates and requires compliance with one or more of those CJP
sections.  Tellingly, the Statute plainly identifies which of its many provisions require
compliance with the strictures of one or another of those sections of the CJP, and subsection
(f)(7)(ii) is not among them.
Subsection (c) of the Statute, which addresses testing for alcohol concentration of a
person who has been involved in an accident involving a death or serious bodily injury of
another person, provides that the officer, with the requisite reasonable grounds, may direct
the person to submit to a breath test or blood test or both, and, if the detaining officer so
10 Respondent’s “incorporation” argument is further belied by the inclusion in the
Statute of subsection (e), “Administration of tests.”  That subsection provides:
(1) The tests to determine alcohol concentration may be administered by an
individual who has been examined and is certified by the Department of State
Police as sufficiently equipped and trained to administer the tests.
(2) The Department of State Police may adopt regulations for the examination
(continued...)
-19-
directs, then “the provisions of § 10-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article shall
apply.”  Subsection (g) of the Statute (entitled “Withdrawal of initial refusal to take test;
subsequent consent”) also refers expressly to § 10-304 of the CJP.  That subsection states that
the ALJ, in determining whether a person properly withdrew his or her initial refusal and
consented to take the test, may examine a number of factors, among which are “[w]hether
a qualified person, as defined in § 10-304 of the [CJP], to administer the test and testing
equipment were readily available,” see (g)(3)(ii), and “[w]hether the delay in testing would
have interfered with the attention to other duties of the arresting officer or a qualified person,
as defined in § 10-304 of the [CJP],” see (g)(3)(iv).  
In contrast, subsection (f)(7)(ii) of the Statute, at issue in the present case, makes no
mention of the requirements of CJP § 10-304, much less that those requirements must be met
to establish a prima facie case for administrative license suspension.  If the General
Assembly intended for the prima facie case to include a showing that the test was
administered by a “qualified person,” as defined in § 10-304 of the CJP, “with equipment
approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission,” as further
prescribed by § 10-304, surely the General Assembly knew precisely how to do it.10
10(...continued)
and certification of individuals trained to administer tests to determine alcohol
concentration.
Notably, this subsection, like subsection (f)(7)(ii), does not refer to CJP § 10-304 or the
criteria set forth therein for a technician to be a “qualified person” to administer the test.
Comparison of subsection (e) of the Statute with CJP § 10-304(a)(3) indicates—consistent
with the Statute’s legislative purpose—the availability of separate administrative and
criminal proceedings, complete with separate protocols, standards, and procedures.  We
surmise, however, that, for practical purposes, police departments conform to the
requirements contained within CJP §§ 302 through 309 in conducting chemical breath tests
to ensure that the results can be used in both administrative and criminal proceedings.  
-20-
Our construction of subsection (f)(7)(ii) is further supported by the reasoning we
employed in Jones, 380 Md. 164, 844 A.2d 388, to reject a similar effort by a licensee to
require more of the prima facie case than is set forth in subsection (f)(7)(ii).  It was argued
in Jones that, when a person has refused to take a breath test, the MVA must establish at the
show cause hearing that the arresting officer complied with the requirement of CJP § 10-303,
which provides that the chemical breath test of the driver must be taken within two hours of
his or her apprehension.  Jones, 380 Md. at 175, 844 A.2d at 394.
We made several points in rejecting that argument.  We observed that the issues that
can be raised at the administrative hearing are limited to those grounds expressly set forth
in TR § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i), and that compliance with the two-hour testing window was not
listed as one of those cognizable issues.  Jones, 380 Md. at 177, 844 A.2d at 395-96.  We
also looked to subsection (f)(8)(i) of the Statute, which mandates suspension of the driver’s
license if the ALJ makes four expressly stated findings, none of which addresses the timing
of the test.  Jones, 380 Md. at 177-78, 844 A.2d at 396; see supra note 7.  Finally, we
-21-
observed that a “plain language interpretation limiting the (f)(7)(i) factors to those
specifically enumerated in the statute is in line with” the purpose of the Statute, which is to
provide “a swift penalty which is separate from any criminal penalties that may be imposed
for the driving offenses,” by implementing “procedures that would be an expedient and
effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.”  Jones, 380 Md. at 178-79, 844 A.2d
at 396-97 (citations omitted).  For those reasons, we held in Jones that compliance with the
two-hour window testing requirement set forth in CJP § 10-303(a)(2) is not required to be
a part of the MVA’s prima facie case for administrative license suspension.  Id. at 179, 844
A.2d at 397.
Much of the reasoning we employed in Jones serves equally well to rebut the
arguments Respondent presents here.  We begin with the final point made in Jones, that the
Statute “was written to provide, in cases of drunk driving, a swift penalty which is separate
from any criminal penalties that may be imposed for the driving offenses.”  Id. at 178, 844
A.2d at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Legislature furthers this
legislative purpose by providing that the prima facie case requires only the sworn statements
of the detaining police officer and the technician who administered the test, attesting to either
the person’s refusal to take the test, or a test result indicating a blood alcohol concentration
of 0.08 (or 0.15) or more at the time of testing.  Moreover, much as we reasoned in Jones,
the findings the ALJ must make before directing that the person’s license be suspended do
not include a finding that the testing was done by a “qualified person,” as defined in CJP §
10-304(a)(3), with equipment authorized by the toxicologist, as required by CJP § 10-
11 Read in its entirety, CJP § 10-304 mainly addresses criminal trials involving
alcohol-related offenses.  See, e.g., CJP §§ 10-304(c)(1)(iii)(3.) (“If the District Court is
deprived of jurisdiction under circumstances in which a defendant is entitled to and demands
a jury trial, or appeals from the District Court to a circuit court, the State is not required to
file a second notice.”); 10-304(d)(2)(i) (“If a defendant desires the toxicologist to be present
and testify at trial as a witness, the defendant shall file a request for a subpoena for the
toxicologist at least 20 days before the trial in the appropriate court.”).  (Emphases added).
-22-
304(b).11  All that is required under subsection (f)(8) in this regard is a finding by the ALJ,
in the case of a person who has taken the test, that “[a] test to determine alcohol
concentration was taken and the test result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more
at the time of testing.”  See (f)(8)(i)(4.). 
Even further support for our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to
incorporate the certification requirements of CJP § 10-304 in administrative license
suspension situations is found in the fact that license suspension occurs automatically, solely
on the basis of the test result as it appears on the DR-15A form, whenever a person opts not
to contest the test result.  It defies common sense to conclude, as Respondent evidently would
have us do, that the General Assembly places upon the MVA a greater burden of making out
a prima facie case for suspension when the driver requests a show-cause hearing than is
required when the driver does not seek to contest the certified test result.
Undeniably, in the present case, the MVA did not present to the ALJ the Intox EC/IR
strip produced during Respondent’s breath test.  That strip, we assume, would have identified
specifically the testing equipment used and theoretically have been useful in challenging the
12 We have noted that Respondent evidently had in her possession at the time of the
administrative hearing the test strip produced during her breath test.  See supra note 6.  The
information supplied on the test strip, later read into the record at the Circuit Court hearing,
confirms the certifications on the Form DR-15A.
13 We do not reach the question whether, once the licensee presents sufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption of reliability, the burden shifts back to the MVA to persuade the fact
finder that the test was reliable.  That question was not briefed by the parties, nor is it
otherwise presented in the record before us.
-23-
accuracy of the alcohol concentration test.12  Equally certain, however, is that Respondent,
and any other person in her position, was entitled to request from the ALJ, prior to the
hearing, a subpoena for production of the document.  See supra p. 6; COMAR 11.11.03.07.
In other words, Respondent and any similarly situated person is entitled to and has the
means with which to attempt to rebut the presumption of reliability of the breath test result.13
But the Statute does not mandate that the MVA establish the validity of the test, as part of
its prima facie case.  To the contrary, and for all the reasons we have discussed, the Statute
expressly provides that the technician’s and the officer’s sworn statements, without more,
establish a prima facie case of drunken driving, for purposes of administrative license
suspension.
V.
We have said that, in the present case, Sergeant Bowling administered the test, the
result of which indicated that Respondent had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16 at the
time of testing.  The sergeant signed the sworn certification on the Form DR-15A, attesting
to the facts that he performed the test, explained the procedures, and the test result from the
-24-
EC/IR instrument was 0.16.  Trooper Kolle also included the test results in his sworn
certification that appears on the Form DR-15A.  The MVA offered that form at the
administrative hearing and, based on the sworn statements in it, the ALJ correctly found that
the MVA had made a prima facie showing of Respondent’s drunk driving.  Because that
finding was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ properly suspended Respondent’s
license.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
F O R  
M O N T G O M E R Y  
C O U N T Y
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM
THE DECISION OF THE MOTOR
VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.  COSTS TO
BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.