Title: Rampton v. Barlow

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

464 P.2d 378 (1970) 23 Utah 2d 383 Calvin L. RAMPTON, Governor of Utah, and the State of Utah, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Haven J. BARLOW, President of the Senate of the State of Utah, and Lorin N. Pace, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. 11725. Supreme Court of Utah. January 19, 1970. *379 Sidney G. Baucom, Salt Lake City, for appellants. Rex J. Hanson and Merlin R. Lybbert, of Hanson & Baldwin, Salt Lake City, for respondents. ELLETT, Justice: This is a suit for a declaratory judgment brought by the Governor against the President of the State Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to have a determination of the validity of Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1969, insofar as that Act purports to confer on the two named defendants the power to appoint three members each to the newly created State Board of Higher Education. The bill provides for a board of fifteen members, nine of whom shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the consent of the senate and three each by the presiding officer of each house of the legislature. The parties disagree as to the interpretation to be placed upon the language of Article VII, Section 10, of our state Constitution, which reads: The Governor contends that he may appoint to all offices "which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for" [by the Constitution]. There is much argument as to whether the phrase "provided for" is a "prepositional phrase" relating to the noun [constitution] or to the words "by law," and as to whether the last clause of the section quoted above is a "dependent adjective clause" and as to whether the framers of the Constitution were familiar with the importance of the word "herein." It seems to us rather clear that the only meaning to be given to the clause is that the governor is to appoint to offices created by statute only when no method is provided by law for the election or appointment by someone other than the governor. Section 7 of the Organic Act creating the Territory of Utah provided: "The governor shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the legislative council, appoint all officers not herein otherwise provided for." This was the law at the time of the constitutional convention, and by omitting the word "herein" from the language of the Constitution the framers thereof must have intended that the appointment by the governor would apply to all offices created by statute unless a prohibition could be found in the Constitution itself or the statute creating the office otherwise provided. Let us consider some cases from other states. People ex rel. Walker v. Capp, 61 Colo. 396, 158 P. 143 (1916) involved a civil service act enacted by the legislature providing for appointments based on competitive examinations. Article IV, Section 6, of the Colorado Constitution is similar to that of Utah insofar as the part in question is concerned. The court in holding that the appointing power was not in the governor said at page 144: *380 The following statement from 29 Cyc. 1379 is applicable: Regardless of the construction which we place on the language in dispute herein, we have the same problem before us. Even by holding that the legislature can "otherwise provide" for an appointment, the question remains: Can the legislature reserve unto itself or confer upon its presiding officers, the power of appointment? Another section of our Constitution must be considered in this connection, and that is Article V, Section 1, which reads: We read in Black's Constitutional Law at page 78: "The legislature cannot lawfully usurp any of the functions confided by the constitution to the executive department, such as the power to make appointments to office." In Re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 596, 14 N.E.2d 465, 118 A.L.R. 166, 169, (1938), the statute provided that the majority of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court could, if their judgment so required, remove from office clerks of court; and since these officers were involved in the administration of justice judicial business that part of the statute was held constitutional. However, another part of the statute provided for removal of mayors of cities; and in holding that the legislature could not confer on the courts this power to remove, the court said: In the case of State ex rel. Collett v. Gorby, 122 Ind. 17, 23 N.E. 678 (1890), the office of director of the department of geology and natural resources was created, and the general assembly (legislature) of Indiana by election of its own members chose the defendant Gorby to fill the office. The plaintiff Collett was appointed by the governor. The question before the court was which party was entitled to hold the office. The court held: A Nevada statute gave judges the power to grant certificates of authority to ordained ministers to perform marriages. In Galloway v. Truesdale, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), the Nevada court held that the legislature could not confer the power upon the courts and that any attempt to do so would be a violation of the separation of the powers of the three divisions of government. The case of Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed. 845, (1928), involved the power of the legislature to vest the voting power of government-owned corporate stock in a committee consisting of the governor-general, the president of the senate, and the speaker of the house of representatives. The Supreme Court of the United States in holding the act to be in violation of the Organic Act said: In re Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939), dealt with a question of the validity of a proposed statute *382 which provided that a power of appointment was vested in the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives. The court held as follows: There is some authority holding that the legislature may reserve unto itself the power to appoint.[1] However, we think better reasoning avoids such a holding. In addition to the constitutional grounds, there are common-sense reasons which are obvious. If the legislative body may create offices and appoint thereto, then it could change the administrative set-up of a state government at will; while if the appointment to any new offices was not permitted to the legislature, the tendency to change and shuffle the administrative agencies would be lessened and would only be effected when there was a public need for it. The defendants point to a number of Utah statutes which create offices and provide for appointments other than by the governor. The practical construction placed on constitutional provisions, when long acquiesced in, is of aid to the courts in determining the meaning of the language of a constitutional provision, but it cannot be controlling so as to amend the Constitution by means of a series of mutual mistakes, and especially is this true where the language is otherwise clear. Some of the statutes referred to have reserved unto the legislature or to the officers thereof the right to make appointments.[2] The answer to that is simply this: Such assumed power of appointment has never before been brought before this court for determination as to its constitutionality. Under a pure democracy, where all of the people affected by a law are permitted to vote upon it, there is no need for a constitution, for the power of the people is behind every law which is enacted. In the town meetings of the early New England States, the same thing was more or less true. However, as population increased, it was not possible for all of the people to participate directly in the passage of laws. It therefore, became necessary in order for the people to maintain a control over the chosen representatives to give certain powers unto them and to retain other powers unto themselves by means of constitutions adopted by all the people of each state. In all the states and in the federal system as well, those delegated powers have been divided into three departments of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial; and to insure the stability and continuance of this form of government and to secure unto themselves enduring liberty and freedom from tyranny, the people wisely wrote into their constitutions provisions similar to our own Article V, Section 1, which absolutely prevent any person charged with powers properly belonging to one department from exercising *383 any of the functions appertaining to either of the others except where the power was expressly so granted in the Constitution itself. This is not to say that the power to appoint is not left in the courts and the legislature insofar as it relates to agents, clerks, and ministers engaged in the work pertaining to such branch of government, for to allow the executive to appoint the officers necessary to the carrying out of the functions of an independent branch or division of government would prevent that division from being independent. The holding in the case of State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244, 247 (1889), is in point: So much has been said and written about the powers belonging to the three departments of government that it would be trite to attempt to restate them. It will be enough to say that the legislative branch should make the law, the judicial branch should be confined to interpreting it and all other power must of necessity be vested in the executive branch, which is charged with the enforcement of the law, the protection of the state's property, and the looking after the health, welfare, and peace of the people. In order to perform these various executive functions, the chief executive will need the assistance of many agents, officers, and ministers. One of the functions of the executive department is the promulgation of education of the people under laws passed by the legislative department. By Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1969, the constitutionality of which in part is now questioned, the State Board of Higher Education is charged with the executive responsibility of carrying out the law as enacted. The legislature has performed all of its functions in providing the law and the funds by which the will of the people through the various legislators and senators has been effected. However, the statute attempts to go beyond the power granted to the legislature in that it authorizes the highest officer of each house to appoint three members to the board and requires an approval by the senate of the nine members to be appointed by the governor. The control of the board, which performs an executive function, is thus effectively placed in the control of the legislature. This court is of the opinion that insofar as the Act purports to allow three appointments to be made by each of the presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature, it is contrary to the provisions of Article V, Sec. 1, of the Constitution of Utah and is void. The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, reversed with directions to enter a declaratory judgment in accordance with this opinion. No costs are awarded. CROCKETT, C.J., and TUCKETT, J., concur. Further Opinion of Justice ELLETT: My concurring colleagues think that the opinion of the Court as above set out is sufficient for the decision of the issues of this case. However, it is my judgment that such is not the case and that it is proper and would be helpful for me to set forth in this "Further Opinion" my views on a matter which was raised in the complaint but not determined in the opinion. *384 (My concurring colleagues do not join in this further opinion.) Paragraph 1 of the prayer of the complaint is as follows: In my opinion we have only done half of our work by the above decision. We have said that the Act is void as it relates to the appointive power of the defendants, but we have not yet said that the plaintiff has the power to appoint subject to the consent of the senate the six members improperly appointed by the defendants Barlow and Pace. In fact, the concurring and dissenting opinions tend to cast grave doubts upon the validity of the entire act, and I want to make my position clear. This is a case of partial invalidity of a statute, and the law in that regard is set out in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 92 as follows: It is my opinion that our legislature was sincere when it stated the intent with which Chapter 138 L.U. 1969 was enacted. That intent is stated in Sec. 2 of the Act, which reads: To make sure that the purposes of the Act would not be thwarted by the decisions of the courts, the legislature by Sec. 27 *385 enacted a savings clause in the following language: It thus seems obvious to me that the purpose of attempting to reserve unto the presiding officers of the two houses the right to appoint three members each to the State Board of Higher Education was not a motivating factor in passing the statute. To impute to the legislature such a motive is to accuse them of being willing to forego legislation of tremendous importance to the people of this state as set out in Sec. 2, supra, unless they can do an unconstitutional act to wit: participate in a constitutionally executive function of the government. I cannot believe that the honorable members of our legislature would be so crass and politically motivated as to want us to hold the entire Act unconstitutional unless the appointments are to be made as specified in the act, and this is especially true where the Act provides that no more than eight of the fifteen members can belong to the same political party. Those honorable members specifically said that if any of the provisions of the Act as it applies to any person or circumstance be held invalid, that the remainder of the Act shall not be affected thereby. I am, therefore, led to the unalterable conclusion that the legislature intended to have a State Board of Higher Education consisting of fifteen members and that if the provision for the appointment of any member thereto be held invalid that Act would otherwise stand and that the appointment should be made according to the laws of this state. It, therefore, follows that nine of the fifteen members of the Board have been properly appointed and that there are six vacancies the appointment to which has not been lawfully made. Therefore, those six vacancies should be filled by appointment as provided in Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of Utah, to wit: by the Governor, by and with the consent of the senate. This to me is a reasonable interpretation to be placed upon the meaning of the statute, and it is one which gives life to the entire Act. Any other interpretation will cast doubt upon the validity of the Act and perhaps render it entirely impotent and of no force or effect. We are not asked by either party to hold the entire Act unconstitutional, and we should not do so indirectly or by implication. Our duty is to hold it constitutional if by any reasonable construction we can do so. Gubler v. Utah State Teacher's Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580, 2 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1948); Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948). CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring specially): I agree with the proposition that the attempt of the legislature to confer authority upon itself (its officers) to make appointments in the Executive Department, the effect of which could lead to legislative control of executive functions, is contrary to constitutional principles. And I am appreciative of the efforts of Justice Ellett in setting forth the reasoning and authorities which so demonstrate. But I think that, consistent with the principle of the separation of powers, and our own duty of judicial restraint arising therefrom, that the proposition just stated above fulfills the purpose of this case. Accordingly, I do not see either necessity or wisdom in making further observations or indulging in conjecture as to what other method of selection of the members of the Board of Higher Education, or whether the legislation would have been enacted at all, if the legislature had thought the method it did prescribe was improper. This is said notwithstanding the savings clause referred to. Such clauses are effective only as to separate provisions of an act which can stand independently. But if the parts of the Act are so interrelated that the voiding of one portion would so substantially change the nature of *386 the legislation that it cannot fairly be determined what the legislative intent would have been, nor whether the legislation would have been enacted, it is not within the prerogative of the court to rule that certain portions of the Act are invalid and assume that the legislature would have enacted other interrelated portions of the Act without them. See Carter v. Beaver County, 16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P.2d 440; Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, 370 P.2d 355; and State By and Through Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691. I therefore do not believe that under this act either the Legislature or the Governor can make the six appointments which were designated to be made by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. TUCKETT, Justice (concurring) CALLISTER, Justice (concurring in the result): HENRIOD, Justice (concurring and dissenting): [1] Lockwood v. Jordan, 72 Ariz. 77, 231 P.2d 428 (1951); In re Terrett, 34 Mont. 325, 86 P. 266 (1906), dicta holding legislature could impose the duty of appointing upon district judges. [2] Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sections 20-1-7.3, 37-4-3, 49-7-8, 63-5-2, 63-7-4, 63-26-2, 73-10-2. (Since amended.) [1] State By and Through Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 325, 445 P.2d 691 (1968); Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. One, 16 Utah 2d 280, 283, 399 P.2d 440 (1965); Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, 187, 370 P.2d 355 (1962).