Title: ROOT v. ROOT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROOT v. ROOT2003 WY 3665 P.3d 41Case Number: 01-137Decided: 03/13/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
    

 

TERRY 
A. ROOT,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

PAMELA 
POTTER ROOT,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

George 
L. Simonton and M. Jalie Meinecke of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Terry A. Root 
(the husband) and Pamela Potter Root (the wife) were married for almost eighteen 
years during which time the wife obtained a medical degree. After acquiring a 
pathology business in Cody and practicing there for several years, the wife 
filed for divorce. The trial court divided the marital property, including the 
value of the pathology business, equally between the parties. The husband 
appeals the trial court's division of property contending the value of the 
pathology business was too low and he was entitled to a larger share of the 
marital property because of the financial support he provided and the career 
sacrifices he made to further the wife's medical education.1  We affirm the trial court's property 
division and remand the matter for conformation of the Decree of Divorce with 
the decision letter. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The husband 
presents these issues for resolution:

 

            
I.  Whether the Court abused its discretion in determining the 
value of the business as its decision was not supported by the evidence at 
trial.

 

            
II.  Whether the Court abused its discretion in accepting 
opinion testimony from [the wife's] expert, as he was not qualified as an 
expert, and had done no substantive review of the value of the 
business.

 

            
III.  Whether it was error for the Court not to take career 
sacrifices into account when determining property 
distribution.

 

            
IV.  Whether it was error for the Court to allow [the wife] to 
deduct over three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month for child support 
calculation purposes where such sum is clearly includable in her income pursuant 
to §20-2-303(a)(ii)&(iii).

 

The 
wife frames the issues in the following manner:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining the 
value of Big Horn Basin Pathology?

 

            
II.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in considering 
the expert testimony?

 

            
III  Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in the manner in which it determined the marital sacrifices 
issue?

 

            
IV.  Did the court properly consider the parties['] financial 
affidavits in determining the child support calculations?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The applicable 
standard of review requires we consider only the evidence in favor of the 
successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant to 
the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
record.  Belless v. Belless, 
2001 WY 41, ¶6, 21 P.3d 749, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001).  For this reason, we consider the facts 
in a manner most favorable to the wife as the prevailing party in the trial 
court.

 

[¶4]      The husband and 
the wife married on July 16, 1983.  
At the time, the husband worked for the United States Forest Service as a 
wildlife biologist and expressed an interest in attending law school.  The wife was a licensed practical nurse, 
held a degree in journalism, and intended to go to medical school.  She had saved some money to fund her 
medical school costs prior to meeting and marrying the husband.  In the spring before the marriage, the 
husband took steps to apply to law school but did not pursue this career option 
any further.  The wife applied to 
medical school.  After the marriage, 
she attended Creighton University Medical School in Nebraska through the 
University of Wyoming contract program which pays a portion of the student's 
school costs in exchange for a commitment to practice in Wyoming for a period of 
time upon graduation.  The husband 
took a series of jobs which were essentially lateral transfers in order to 
remain close to the wife while she attended school.  The wife gave birth to three children 
while she was attending medical school.  
Both spouses contributed to the family's living expenses, the husband 
through his full-time work and the wife through her intermittent, part-time 
work. The wife graduated from medical school in 1989 and completed her residency 
in 1994 at which time the family moved to Wyoming.

 

[¶5]      The husband took 
a job at the National Elk Refuge in Jackson Hole, and, because the wife could 
not find suitable employment in Jackson, she and children moved to Cody where 
she commenced work for a pathologist at Big Horn Basin Pathology, Inc.  In 1996, the wife entered into an 
agreement with the pathologist to purchase his business for $30,000 to be paid 
over five years.  Also in 1996, the 
husband moved to Cody and took a job with the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service as well as developing a radon detection and control business and doing 
some consulting for Integrated Pest Management.  The husband also worked at various times 
for the pathology business as secretary/treasurer, general business manager, and 
bookkeeper.  The purchase price of 
the pathology business was completely paid by July of 
1999.

 

[¶6]      The couple's 
marital difficulties began in 1988, and they attended marriage counseling.  In early September of 1999, the wife's 
friend told her that the husband was preparing to file for divorce.  The wife responded by filing for divorce 
against the husband on September 8, 1999.  
In October 1999, approximately one month after the divorce action was 
filed, the parties jointly applied for a loan to purchase the residence the 
husband was living in at the time of the divorce trial.  In the loan application, signed by both 
the husband and the wife, the pathology stock was listed with a value of 
$30,000.  In January 2000, the 
husband ceased working for the pathology business.

 

[¶7]      The parties 
vigorously litigated the appropriate and equitable division of property during a 
three-day divorce trial held in February 2001.  Both parties submitted expert testimony 
regarding the manner in which the pathology business should be appraised.  The wife's expert provided no opinion as 
to the specific value of the business; however, he did testify the value should 
be determined by adding the accounts receivable, discounted for monthly 
fluctuations and expenses, to the value of the hard assets.  He contended there was no "blue sky" or 
good will because the business was wholly dependent on the wife's medical 
expertise.  The wife testified the 
hard assets were worth $30,000, and a summary of the business records from July 
1, 1999, through October 31, 2000, prepared in response to discovery requests 
indicated the accounts receivable were $72,481.50 without deductions for 
expenses.  She acknowledged that one 
piece of equipment had been purchased for $40,000 since the acquisition of the 
business, but she did not believe it was worth very much on resale.  The husband's expert estimated the 
accounts receivable and the value of the good will based on the annual gross 
income generated and industry statistics to value the business at $394,772.  The trial court determined the business 
was worth $50,000 and awarded $25,000 of that amount to the husband. The 
remainder of the marital estate was also divided equally between the husband and 
the wife.  We observe, although not 
raised by the parties, the Decree of Divorce did not reflect the $25,000 award 
to the husband and did not appear to comply with W.R.C.P. 58(a) which requires 
both parties approve orders as to form.  
The wife, however, does not contest that the husband should receive the 
$25,000.  The husband appealed 
contending the trial court erred by undervaluing the pathology business and not 
awarding him a larger proportion of the marital property to compensate him for 
his contributions to, and sacrifices for, the wife's medical career. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      We have often 
acknowledged:

 

There 
are few rules more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the proposition 
that the disposition of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  Judicial 
discretion is made up of many things, including conclusions reached from 
objective criteria, as well as exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We are required to 
ask ourselves whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and 
whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or 
capricious.

 

Holland 
v. Holland, 
2001 WY 113, ¶8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001).  As noted above, we consider the 
prevailing party's evidence to be true and give every reasonably drawn inference 
to it while we disregard all conflicting evidence.  Hensley v. Hensley, 896 P.2d 115, 115 (Wyo. 1995) (per curiam).  
Further, property divisions are complex and therefore require the trial 
court, in its discretion, to assess what is right under the circumstances while 
considering the respective merits and needs of the parties.  McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 
¶15, 24 P.3d 1162, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  
"An abuse of discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the 
conscience of this court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that 
reasonable people cannot abide it."  
Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶12, 40 P.3d 1228, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Expert Witness Testimony

 

[¶9]      On appeal, the 
husband contends, for the first time, the wife's expert, Lawrence McGovern, was 
not qualified to provide an expert opinion regarding the value of the 
business.  It is interesting to note 
the husband actually tried to retain Mr. McGovern as his expert prior to 
trial.  Further, the husband made no 
objection to this witness' qualifications or expertise prior to or during 
trial.  See Alexander v. 
Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶21, 47 P.3d 206, ¶21 (Wyo. 2002); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).  He did make a number of objections to 
Mr. McGovern's testimony on the basis that Mr. McGovern lacked foundation for 
his opinions, and the trial court, for the most part, overruled these 
objections.  We generally will not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal.   Parsons v. Parsons, 2001 WY 62, ¶13, 
27 P.3d 270, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001); Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶22, 22 P.3d 861, 
¶22 (Wyo. 2001).  Furthermore, as we 
remarked in Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 
1993):

 

Had 
an objection been posed to the expertise of this witness on the ground that [he] 
lacked the qualification or training essential to an expression of an opinion as 
an expert in [his] field or if voir dire had been requested with respect to 
[his] qualifications, as a party must do to assign as error the lack of 
expertise, we would have a more adequate record to consider.  

 

[¶10]   Mr. McGovern was an independent 
consultant who provided advice to a variety of medical concerns, including 
Harvard Medical School, regarding the acquisition and sale of  medical practices and physician 
recruitment.  Although Mr. McGovern 
did not have a college degree, he had over fourteen years of practical 
experience in the acquisition and operation of medical practices and had worked 
in administration in the medical field since the 1970s.  He also had knowledge of the medical 
communities in northwest Wyoming and adjacent areas of Montana.  Given that evidence, we cannot conclude 
the trial court abused its discretion by permitting him to testify.  Unless an expert witness is clearly 
unqualified, questions concerning the nature of his qualifications normally go 
to the weight accorded the witness' testimony rather than the admissibility of 
his testimony.  Seivewright v. 
State, 7 P.3d 24, 31 (Wyo. 2000).

  

 

[¶11]   The husband failed to persuade the 
trial court that the pathology business was worth  substantially more than the purchase 
price plus the value of the hard assets.  
In this appeal, he asks this court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court.  To do so, we must 
be convinced the trial court abused its broad discretion in dividing the marital 
property.  After a careful review of 
the record, we are not convinced any such abuse of discretion occurred.  The husband alleges the trial court's 
findings do not provide sufficient detail concerning the court's reasoning 
regarding the value of the pathology business.  This argument lacks merit because the 
record does not reflect a request for special findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
52(a)2 was ever made.  Without such a request, we presume the 
trial court made all appropriate findings supported by the 
evidence.

 

A 
failure of a court to mention the specific factors does not mean that they were 
not considered.  In the 
absence of special findings of fact, this court considers that the judgment of 
the trial court carries with it every finding of fact necessary to support the 
judgment and decree.  It is 
not a function of this court to divide property in the first instance. 

            

Barney 
v. Barney, 
705 P.2d 342, 345 (Wyo. 1985) (citations omitted & emphasis added); see 
also Parsons, 2001 WY 62, ¶11.  

 

[¶12]   We agree the record must contain 
sufficient evidence to support the court's distribution of property.  Bricker v. Bricker, 877 P.2d 747, 
751 (Wyo. 1994).  We have held the 
trial court does not abuse its discretion when it values contested property 
within the range of both parties' appraisals.  McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 7 (Wyo. 2000).  We have also 
held, when the value of the parties' business property is questioned, even 
though an appraisal "may" be helpful, it is not absolutely necessary.  Bricker, 877 P.2d  at 751; 
Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 737 (Wyo. 1982).  In this instance, the trial court's 
value of $50,000 was reasonable when considered in light of the 
evidence.

 

[¶13]   Approximately one month after the 
divorce action was filed, the husband signed a loan application in which he and 
the wife listed the value of the pathology stock at $30,000.  The mortgage application form provided, 
immediately preceding the parties' signatures:

 

I/We 
certify that the information provided in this application is true and correct as 
of the date set forth opposite my/our signature(s) on this application and 
acknowledge my/our understanding that any intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation(s) of the information contained in this application may result 
in civil liability and/or criminal penalties . . . and 
liability for monetary damages to the Lender, its agents, . . . and 
any other person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any 
misrepresentation which I/we have made on this application.  

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The parties made this 
application in order to purchase the residence the husband was living in at the 
time of the divorce trial.  The 
husband contends the wife completed the application, and he did not read 
it.  However, he did certify the 
information was correct and directly benefited from the loan which funded the 
purchase of his personal residence. 

 

[¶14]   The wife contended the value of the 
business should be determined by adding the accounts receivable, properly 
discounted for expenses, to the value of the hard assets.  She testified outstanding accounts 
receivable were approximately $72,000, the acquisition price was $30,000, and 
assets purchased after acquisition were not of significant value.  While arguing expenses must be 
considered and deducted from the accounts receivable, the wife did not provide 
the court with the amount of those expenses. 

 

[¶15]   The husband's expert, Richard 
Holdren, took an entirely different tack contending industry data supported a 
much higher value based upon the business' gross annual income, which was over 
$500,000 in 1999 and over $750,000 in 2000, and the good will.  While Mr. Holdren was certainly 
qualified to perform an appraisal of a pathology business, having performed 
approximately 1,500 such appraisals nationwide, he had no knowledge of the 
business climate for a pathology business in Wyoming in general, or specifically 
in the Big Horn Basin.  He admitted 
he did not have all the financial information he usually relied on to value such 
a business, such as accurate records of accounts receivable and expenses, and he 
had to estimate certain figures from trade sources.  In addition, he admitted his evaluations 
usually exceeded the actual sales price for the businesses by twenty percent and 
were usually inflated by twelve percent for a sales commission.  Despite his lack of knowledge of the 
local market conditions for a pathology practice, he calculated a good will 
value for the business of $206,243.33 and incorporated this figure with his 
other computations to conclude the business was worth $394,772.  The trial court discounted Mr. Holdren's 
opinion as follows:

 

The 
Big Horn Basin Pathology business is awarded to [the wife].  It has a reasonable fair market value of 
$50,000. [The wife] shall pay [the husband] $25,000 for his share.  I do not find that there is any 
"goodwill" value to this business.  
Its income is solely dependent upon the work and skills of [the 
wife].  These are not assets that 
can be sold to another physician.  
For the most part, the business contracts can be terminated by either 
party on short notice.  Their value 
cannot be transferred but depends upon the efforts and skills of the physician 
in charge of the business.  
[The husband's] expert did not have sufficient information 
to deliver a persuasive opinion as to [the] value of the 
business.  He did not consider the 
purchase price paid by [the wife].  He did not have any comparable sales 
figures nor any offers to purchase this business.  When the parties applied for a loan in 
October of 1999, they valued the business at $30,000.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶16]   A failure of proof by a party upon 
whom the burden of proof rests must accrue to the benefit of the party who 
opposes the issue.  Klatt, 
654 P.2d  at 737; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 
1978).  The wife came forward with 
evidence, though perhaps not overwhelming in nature, of the value of the 
business.  Once the wife made a 
prima facie showing, the evidence was entitled to stand unless 
controverted.  Ferguson v. 
Ferguson, 481 P.2d 658, 659 (Wyo. 1971).  If evidence was available which would 
have refuted this proof, it was incumbent upon the husband to produce it at the 
trial.  Id.  This is the essence of our adversarial 
process.  The husband's expert was 
not provided all the information necessary to make a more credible 
appraisal.  The trial court 
discounted his opinion for this reason.  
It is reasonable to infer that the husband, as the former 
secretary/treasurer and business manager, had knowledge of the business and what 
records would exist regarding the value.  
The husband asserts the wife thwarted his efforts to obtain the detailed 
financial information necessary to perform a more thorough analysis.  The wife contends she had no independent 
knowledge of the details of the business finances and she advised the husband he 
could obtain any information he required from the accountant and the current 
business manager.  The husband's 
counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the husband did not 
pursue a motion to compel in order to obtain the necessary financial information 
though the action had been pending for over a year. 

 

[¶17]   The husband's complaint that the 
trial court completely disregarded accounts receivable in its determination of 
value is unfounded.  The $50,000 
value exceeded both parties' estimates of the value of the "hard assets" by 
$20,000; consequently, we can infer some value for the accounts receivable was 
included.  A reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence supports some deduction from the estimated 
accounts receivable for expenses and uncollectable accounts.  The court made a reasonable judgment 
given the limited help it received from the parties in determining the exact 
amount of those deductions.  In 
addition, if the husband's valuation of $394,772 is reduced to account for the 
thirty-two percent padding that his expert conceded may have occurred in his 
appraisal and to exclude the $206,243.33 good will value rejected by the trial 
court, only $62,201.63 remain.  The 
trial court's value of $50,000 is well within the range of that number and the 
wife's number.

 

[¶18]   In Holland, 2001 WY 113, the 
husband similarly complained about the district court's division of marital 
property and argued the court should have explained a portion of the award to 
the wife which appeared to be intended to balance the disparity created by the 
award of an investment account to the husband. This court 
responded:

 

Husband 
contends that this Court must be able to ascertain with certainty what the basis 
for that $135,000.00 payment is.  
The contrary is true.  
Husband had the burden of demonstrating that the evidence adduced before 
the district court did not support the property distribution as a whole.  This he has failed to 
do.

 

2001 
WY 113, ¶9.  We find ourselves in 
the same predicament here. The husband, despite not requesting findings pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 52(a), complains that the trial court did not explain the basis for 
its determination of the value for the business.  However, the record contains adequate 
evidence to support a value in the range of the court's finding, and the trial 
court found the husband's evidence of a higher value to be unpersuasive. Given 
those facts, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining the pathology business was worth $50,000.  

 

C.        
Equitable Division of Marital Estate

 

[¶19]   The husband contends he facilitated 
the wife's efforts to obtain her medical degree by supporting her while she went 
to medical school, at the expense of his own career, which allowed her to 
ultimately earn substantially more money than he was earning.  He described accepting lateral transfers 
instead of promotions in order to remain close to the wife and support her and 
their family during her schooling.  
He claimed he was the primary financial support and caretaker for the 
family during this time and he gave up attending law school because the parties 
could not marry and pursue both careers at the same time.  The husband claims his deference to the 
wife's career resulted in her earning approximately $143,500 annually while he 
was earning approximately $57,450 annually from his federal employment ($44,450) 
and his part-time employment with the pathology business ($13,000).  On this basis, he argues the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to consider awarding him more than half of the 
marital assets to offset the sacrifices he made and the corresponding 
detrimental impact to his earning capacity. 

 

[¶20]   Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2001):

 

[T]he 
court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just 
and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the 
condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the 
property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit 
of either party and children.  

 

The 
decision letter dispels the husband's accusation the court arbitrarily refused 
to consider his argument and instead reflects the court carefully considered his 
position and sets out the explicit reasons why the court concluded the facts did 
not support an increase in the proportion of the property awarded to the 
husband:

 

[The 
husband] is not entitled to any reimbursement for career changes and 
adjustments.  These are the 
compromises which are made by virtually every party to a marriage.  [The wife] could just as well claim that 
she would have entered a more lucrative specialty if she had been single.  [The husband] does not cite any law 
which allows a party to receive compensation for what he or she might have been 
able to earn as a single person.  

 

[The 
husband] is not entitled to reimbursement for [the wife] having obtained a 
medical degree during the marriage.  
This is not a case where [the wife] filed for divorce shortly after 
graduation and left [the husband] without significant income or assets.  Both parties had college degrees at 
marriage.  [The husband] has a good 
job.  Both benefitted from [the 
wife's] medical degree.  [The 
husband] received compensation as an employee of the pathology business.  They have accumulated a substantial 
amount of property.

 

[¶21]   We have long recognized the trial 
court possesses a great amount of discretion in dividing marital property.  Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶14.  Just and equitable division of property 
is just as likely not to be equal.  
Id.; Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 2000).  The trial court should consider all 
facts and circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the marriage in dividing 
a couple's marital assets.  
Hall, 2002 WY 30, 
¶14; Carlton, 997 P.2d  at 1034.  

 

[¶22]   In this case, the trial court 
attempted to split the marital assets as equally as possible and ordered 
payments be made between the parties to balance the awards when the actual value 
of a hard asset granted to one party was disparate from the value of a similar 
asset granted to the other.  By way 
of example, the trial court awarded the marital home to the wife and awarded a 
residence of lower value to the husband.  
However, it ordered the wife to pay the husband the $71,465 difference 
between the values of the two homes.

 

[¶23]   The trial court was not persuaded 
that the husband's support for the wife's education made a significant 
difference in the equities and concluded the circumstances were not similar to 
the Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984), case where a 
husband, who had been supported financially by the wife in pursuit of his 
professional education, filed for divorce immediately after graduation.  In this case, the evidence showed both 
parties assisted in supporting the family during the medical school years, and 
the trial court found, in the years since the wife graduated from medical 
school, the husband benefited equally from the income she earned as a result of 
her medical degree. 

 

[¶24]   We decline to micromanage the 
disposition of marital property by the trial courts.  Suffice it to say, it is clear the trial 
court in this case tried to divide the marital property in half by awarding 
assets and cash of $331,822 to the husband and $321,897 to the wife. We are 
unable to identify any manifest abuse of discretion in the division of this 
marital estate.  Carlton, 
997 P.2d  at 1032.

 

 

[¶25]   The Decree of Divorce fails to set 
forth the $25,000 cash award to the husband for his share of the business as 
described in the decision letter.  
The appropriate procedure for drafting and approving orders is provided 
in W.R.C.P. 58(a) (emphasis added):

 

            
(a)  Presentation.  
Subject to the provisions of Rule 55(b) and unless otherwise ordered by 
the court, written judgments or orders shall be presented to the court within 20 
days after its decision is made known.  
Before submitting the judgment or order, the party drafting it 
shall seek to secure the written approval as to form of the other parties.  If, within 10 days, approval as to form 
is not obtained, the party drafting the form of judgment or order may forward 
the original to the court and serve a copy on the other parties with a notice 
advising objections must be made within 10 days.  If no written objection is timely filed, 
the court may sign the judgment or order.  If objection is filed, the court will 
resolve the matter with or without a hearing.  A party objecting shall submit an 
alternative form of judgment or order with the objection.

 

[¶26]   The decision letter indicates the 
court asked the wife's attorney to prepare the order, though we cannot discern 
the author from the face of the document nor does the document have a place for 
the parties to sign to indicate their approval as to form.  The findings and conclusions must be 
contained in an order signed by the judge and entered upon delivery to the clerk 
of court.  W.R.C.P. 58(c).  The decree awards the business to the 
wife without mentioning the $25,000 payment to the husband for his share of the 
value of the business.  The 
provisions of W.R.C.P. 58(a) are intended, at least in part, to avoid just this 
kind of procedural gaffe by ensuring both parties review and approve the 
proposed order before it is sent on to the trial court for signature.  If there is an objection, the court can 
resolve it with notice to all parties.  
In this instance, the parties do not raise and, we presume, inadvertently 
overlooked the omission of the $25,000 award from the Decree of Divorce.  The trial court undeniably intended for 
the husband to receive that amount for his one-half interest in the pathology 
business.  For this reason, we 
remand the case to the trial court with instructions the Decree of Divorce be 
conformed to include the $25,000 award to the husband.

 

[¶27]   Affirmed in all substantive 
respects and remanded for conformation of the Decree of Divorce consistent with 
this opinion. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1The parties stipulated to remand of the child support issue, and this 
court issued an order on February 14, 2002, remanding the matter to the trial 
court.

 

2W.R.C.P. 52(a) provides:

 

(a) General and Special Findings by Court.  Upon the trial of questions of fact by 
the court, or with an advisory jury, it shall not be necessary for the court to 
state its findings, except generally for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one 
of the parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the 
view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law 
involved in the trial, in which case the court shall state in writing its 
special findings of fact separately from its conclusions of law;  provided, that without such request the 
court may make such special findings of fact and conclusions of law as it deems 
proper and if the same are preserved in the record either by stenographic report 
or by the court's written memorandum, the same may be considered on appeal.  Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review.  The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court.  
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of 
motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in 
subdivision (c) of this rule.