Title: State v. Akin

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

404 P.2d 134 (1965) 75 N.M. 308 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George AKIN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 7691. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 19, 1965. *135 Neal & Neal, Hobbs, for appellant. Earl Hartley, Atty. Gen., Wayne C. Wolf, Frank Bachicha, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee. COMPTON, Justice. The appellant was convicted of the crime of selling marijuana in violation of § 54-7-14, N.M.S.A., 1953. At the trial he offered no testimony or other evidence in his behalf but moved for a directed verdict by reason of entrapment. The motion was denied. His tendered instructions on the defense of entrapment also were refused. Thereafter, upon a verdict of guilty, the appellant was sentenced and he appeals. The sole question before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction on the defense of entrapment. It is the appellant's position that the testimony of the State's witness William B. Allen, a New Mexico State Police sergeant in charge of the narcotics division, was sufficient to sustain his theory of entrapment which should have been submitted to the jury, and that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to so instruct the jury. The testimony of the witness Allen may be summarized as follows: He had been with the narcotics squad about 2 years during which time he had become acquainted with the special language or idioms used by persons engaged in the sale and use of narcotics in New Mexico. It is customary for the state police to use informers in connection with their work related to narcotics. Allen first got the impression that the appellant might be peddling dope in the Hobbs, New Mexico, area from an informer, a known narcotics user, who introduced him to the appellant as a robber on parole or a person of low repute of some nature. Allen's purpose in getting introduced to the appellant was to set up an illegal sale of marijuana, if the appellant was in the business. Allen's introduction to the appellant took place at the latter's house in Hobbs on March 18, 1962. On this occasion the parties drank beer together and Allen, in addition to paying the appellant fifty cents a can for beer, purchased marijuana from a roomer in appellant's house known as "Stooge" Goodson. During the course of their conversation Allen asked the appellant "if he had anything" meaning, in the language used by those engaged in narcotics traffic, did he have any narcotics. The appellant replied "Man, I don't keep that stuff none of that stuff around the house," but indicated that he had some stashed away out in the country. The second meeting took place at the appellant's house on March 23, 1962. At this time Allen, the informer, the appellant and his wife, and the roomer Goodson, drank whiskey together. They also smoked marijuana, except Allen who only pretended to do so. Again Allen purchased marijuana from Goodson, in the presence of the appellant, but did not ask the appellant if he had any for sale. The third meeting between Allen and the appellant took place the following day, on March 24th, outside of the Sunshine Club in Hobbs. In response to Allen's query "if he had anything" the appellant replied "Man I ain't got nothing. We smoked them all up last night and I won't have anything until the man gets in tonight or tomorrow and Stooge doesn't have anything either." The fourth and last meeting between Allen and the appellant was at the latter's house on March 31, 1962. At that time Allen took with him a fifth of the appellant's favorite whiskey. The record indicates he had taken whiskey there on one of his previous visits. Present were Allen, the informer, the appellant and his wife. First, they all drank some of the appellant's whiskey and then they drank a substantial portion of that which Allen had taken. As to what occurred on the date, Allen testified: Allen then testified he paid $5.00 for the match box of marijuana. Unquestionably, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if there is evidence to support that theory. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312, 78 A.L.R.2d 908; State v. Jones, 52 N.M. 235, 195 P.2d 1020. This is true whether the issue is fairly raised by evidence adduced by the State or by the defendant. State v. Heisler, 58 N.M. 446, 272 P.2d 660. Entrapment as a valid defense under certain circumstances was recognized by this court in State v. Roybal, 65 N.M. 342, 337 P.2d 406. In sustaining the trial court's refusal in that case to instruct on the defense of entrapment, we said: See also Sandoval v. United States, U.S.C.A., 10th Cir., 285 F.2d 605, and Bush v. United States, U.S.C.A., 10th Cir., 218 F.2d 223. Also, in Roybal, we stated that while suspected persons can be tested by being offered an opportunity to transgress the law, they may not be put under any extraordinary temptation or inducement, and cited United States v. Wray, D.C., N.D. Ga., 8 F.2d 429, wherein, with respect to the question of what constitutes undue persuasion or enticement, the court said, in part: In this connection see also Ryles v. United States, U.S.C.A., 10th Cir., 183 F.2d 944; People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal. App. 2d 437, 288 P.2d 588; Commonwealth v. Kutler, 173 Pa.Super. 153, 96 A.2d 160. We are aware, as pointed out by the appellant, that the facts in State v. Roybal, supra, as well as in some of the other cases cited, were much simpler and less time-consuming than those present here, and that the acts with which the Roybals were charged and convicted, i.e., operating a game of chance and allowing a game of chance to be operated on the premises, were already in progress when the officers arrived. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that a suspected crime be in the process of being committed in order to show a predisposition to commit that crime. Nor does the necessity of having to resort to a greater degree of subterfuge, or to exercise more persistence in making inquiries to set up an illegal sale of marijuana, without more, constitute evidence of illegal entrapment. The evidence here shows nothing more than offers by Allen to the appellant of an opportunity to commit the act which Allen in good faith believed he was committing or willing to commit. The suggestion that the evidence that Allen supplied the appellant with his favorite brand of whiskey would support a finding of undue inducement is without merit. The testimony is undisputed that the appellant not only dealt in the illegal sale of beer, but drank beer and whiskey of his own as well as that furnished by others. The appellant next contends that the only evidence of the appellant's predisposition to sell marijuana is the testimony of Allen regarding conversations between the parties. It suffices to say this testimony is unchallenged in the record. Finding no evidence of entrapment, we conclude that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on that defense. The judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and MOISE, JJ., concur.