Title: Daulton v. Laughlin Bros. Drilling Company

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

387 P.2d 336 (1963) 73 N.M. 232 Dale W. DAULTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAUGHLIN BROS. DRILLING COMPANY and The Travelers Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. No. 7289. Supreme Court of New Mexico. December 2, 1963. Heidel & Swarthout, Lovington, for appellant. Girand, Cowan & Reese, Hobbs, for appellees. CHAVEZ, Justice. This is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant's workmen's compensation claim. Appellant's complaint alleged that, in the course of his employment with appellee's drilling company, he suffered an injury on a drilling rig in Lea County, New Mexico, injuring his back while removing and lifting a valve cap, and that, as a natural and direct result thereof, he suffered disability. Appellant further alleged that appellees had actual knowledge and notice of said injury. Appellees answered, admitting certain allegations and denying the remainder, and affirmatively alleged that they had no notice of a compensable injury under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case was tried by the court and during the cross-examination of claimant, the first witness, appellees moved that the case be dismissed because no written notice was given within 30 or 60 days after the accident and injury. The trial court granted the motion, and the order of dismissal recites that, during said cross-examination, appellees moved for an order of dismissal for the reason that, by appellant's own testimony, appellant admitted that his claimed accident did not occur in the presence of any superintendent, foreman or other agent in charge of the work at the time and place where the accident occurred; that he, the appellant, did not give written notice of the accident and injury to appellees within either 30 or 60 days; and that the appellant's claimed injury did not, nor did any other cause beyond appellant's control, prevent him from giving written notice to his employer as required by law. The trial court announced that the motion was well taken and granted the motion. From the order of dismissal, claimant appealed. Thus, we are brought to the point relied upon for reversal by claimant-appellant which is: That a claimant's admission, that his accident did not occur in his foreman's presence and that he gave no written notice, does not of itself preclude recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act; and that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing appellant's complaint during his cross-examination. Appellees contend that the trial court's action was proper since, by appellant's own admissions, he only casually mentioned his injury to his driller and tool pusher and did not mention the accident as *337 required by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The section of the Workmen's Compensation Act in question, § 59-10-13.4, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., provides: No contention is made by appellant that written notice was given, but he does contend that the employer had actual knowledge of the occurrence, as required in subsection B of the above quoted statute, even though the evidence discloses that at the time appellant was injured, the driller, Mr. Hurley, was upon the rig floor and could not see appellant; neither could appellant see the driller or the tool pusher, Mr. Shirley. Appellant's contention is based upon the testimony of appellant who, after testifying that he was removing some valve heads weighing about 40 pounds with two other employees, testified: Under this set of facts, appellant contends that his employer, through the driller, had actual knowledge of the occurrence and, as such, the dismissal by the trial court was erroneous and should be reversed. The actual knowledge required by the employer to excuse written notice was defined in Ogletree v. Jones, 44 N.M. 567, 106 P.2d 302, wherein we said: We again adhere to this position. Appellant, under the facts shown, did not give notice in writing, nor did the employer have *339 actual knowledge of the occurrence within the time limit. Thus, the trial court was correct in dismissing the action, since, as a matter of law, no notice was given. The holding in this case in no way conflicts with the case of Lozano v. Archer, 71 N.M. 175, 376 P.2d 963, wherein we said: Neither does it conflict with Winter v. Roberson Construction Company, 70 N.M. 187, 372 P.2d 381, where we said: The case of Buffington v. Continental Casualty Company, 69 N.M. 365, 367 P.2d 539, has been cited by both parties in support of their respective positions. In that case, the district court dismissed the action sua sponte at a pretrial conference on the basis of claimant's deposition, which appellee argued constituted an admission of all material facts barring recovery. We reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment, since there were factual issues to be resolved such as knowledge, notice, latent injury, and the date compensation was due. In Buffington, there were indications in claimant's deposition that the employer might have had actual knowledge of the accident. Finding no error, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and MOISE, JJ., concur.