Title: Grady v. Cedar Side Inn, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: March 3, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

RICHARD GRADY,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
CEDAR SIDE INN, INC.,GEROLD J. SETTJE and 
SHIRLEY E. SETTJE,dba Mini-Mart of Vernonia,
	Petitioners on Review.
(CC C9508-47CV; CA A94545; SC S45627, S45628)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 12, 1999.
	Kenneth D. Bourne, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review Cedar Side Inn, Inc.
	Janet M. Schroer, of Hoffman, Hart & Wagner, Portland,
argued the cause for petitioners on review Gerold J. Settje and
Shirley E. Settje, dba Mini-Mart of Vernonia.  With her on the
briefs was Marjorie A. Speirs.
	Clayton H. Morrison, Beaverton, argued the cause for
respondent on review.  With him on the brief was Clayton Huntley
Morrison.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**
	KULONGOSKI, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
* 	Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court.
	154 Or App 622, 963 P2d 36 (1998).
**	Leeson and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		KULONGOSKI, J.
		Plaintiff seeks recovery from defendants for serving
alcohol to Joshua Lee Elliot (Elliot) while Elliot was visibly
intoxicated.  Elliot, while under the influence of alcohol, was
involved in a single-car accident causing injuries to plaintiff,
a passenger in Elliot's car.  At issue is whether plaintiff can
recover from defendants for his injuries, notwithstanding the
fact that he "participated in" Elliot's intoxication by
purchasing alcohol for Elliot.  The trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff appealed, and
the Court of Appeals reversed.  Grady v. Cedar Side Inn, Inc.,
154 Or App 622, 963 P2d 36 (1998).  We hold that, on the facts
alleged, plaintiff's participation in Elliot's intoxication does
not bar him from seeking recovery from defendants for his
injuries.
		On review of a summary judgment, we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case,
plaintiff.  Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 408, 939
P2d 608 (1997).  We review the record to determine whether a
genuine issue exists as to any material fact and whether the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  ORCP 
47 C; Jones, 325 Or at 413-14.
		Plaintiff was injured on August 29, 1993, while a
passenger in a car driven by Elliot.  Elliot lost control of the
car, and the car flipped over and crashed into a utility pole. 
Both plaintiff and Elliot were intoxicated at the time of the
accident.  
		Plaintiff and Elliot began drinking together around
11:00 a.m. after Elliot arrived at plaintiff's house in Vernonia. 
Each of them drank two or three beers from a 12-pack provided by
plaintiff while discussing their plans for the rest of the day. 
They left plaintiff's house together, taking with them the
remaining beer from the 12-pack.  When they left plaintiff's
house, Elliot had approximately $6 in his pocket, and plaintiff
had approximately $100.
		Plaintiff and Elliot continued to consume alcohol
throughout the day.  They finished the remaining beer from the
12-pack, drank about a "case" of beer with two women on a logging
road outside Vernonia, and consumed a pitcher of beer at Banks
Billiards later in the afternoon.  By that time, both men
believed that they were intoxicated, and neither remembers
clearly the events that followed. 
		Around 4:00 p.m., plaintiff and Elliot arrived at the
Crabtree Bar in Vernonia.  The Crabtree bartender refused to
serve them alcohol because they were visibly intoxicated. 
Instead, she served them food free of charge.  Plaintiff and
Elliot then left the Crabtree Bar and walked across the street to
defendant Cedar Side Inn.  Elliot's father remembers seeing both
plaintiff and Elliot drinking alcohol at the Cedar Side Inn, and
plaintiff recalls drinking four single shots of whiskey there.  
		After leaving the Cedar Side Inn, plaintiff and Elliot
drove to defendant Mini-Mart of Vernonia in Elliot's father's
car, which they had borrowed earlier that evening.  Neither
plaintiff nor Elliot recalls going to the Mini-Mart, but several
witnesses saw them there.  The store clerks claim that they did
not sell alcohol to plaintiff or to Elliot, but one witness
states that she saw the men leave the Mini-Mart carrying a 12-pack of beer.
		Approximately ten minutes after Elliot drove away from
the Mini-Mart in his father's car, with plaintiff as a passenger,
the car veered off the highway, struck a power pole, and flipped
over.  Police officers investigating the scene found a "half case
carton" of beer lying a few feet from the car.  The one beer
remaining in the carton was cool to the touch.  
		Neither Elliot nor plaintiff has any independent memory
of who purchased the alcohol that was consumed that day.  Elliot,
however, left the hospital after the accident with $6, the same
amount that he had started with, and plaintiff testified that he
was "the one that had the money, so if the beer would have got
purchased, it would have been from [sic] me." 
		Plaintiff asserted claims against defendants for
statutory liability under ORS 30.950 and common-law negligence
for serving alcohol to Elliot when Elliot was visibly
intoxicated.  Defendants moved for summary judgment under ORCP 
47 C on the grounds that: (1) as a matter of law, the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of liability under ORS
30.950 or common-law negligence; and (2) plaintiff was a
"participant party" to Elliot's intoxication or, at the least,
was not an "innocent third party" and, therefore, was barred from
recovery under any theory.  The trial court granted summary
judgment for defendants on all grounds.  Plaintiff appealed. 
		As noted, the Court of Appeals reversed.  That court
held that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was entitled as a third
party to maintain his action against defendants for their alleged
negligence in serving a visibly intoxicated patron other than
plaintiff, without regard to plaintiff's "innocence" or lack
thereof.  Grady, 154 Or App at 628-29.  The court also held that
the evidence in the record raised genuine issues of fact about
whether either or both defendants sold alcohol to Elliot while
Elliot was visibly intoxicated.  Id. at 632-33.  We allowed
defendants' petitions for review and now affirm.
		In his first claim for relief, based on a theory of
statutory liability, plaintiff alleges that the accident and his
personal injuries were the "foreseeable result of defendants'
violation of ORS 30.950 in serving * * * Elliot alcoholic
beverages while he was visibly intoxicated."  Plaintiff's second
claim for relief, based on a theory of common-law negligence,
alleges that his personal injuries were the "foreseeable result
of defendants' negligence in serving * * * Elliot alcoholic
beverages while he was visibly intoxicated when they knew or
should have known that he would operate a motor vehicle." 
		Defendants argue that plaintiff's complicity in
Elliot's intoxication defeats his ability to maintain a claim and
that otherwise applicable principles of comparative fault are
inapplicable in a case such as this.  The issue whether a
plaintiff can recover against an alcohol provider for injuries
caused by an intoxicated patron, notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff participated in or was in complicity with the
patron's intoxication by purchasing alcohol for him or her, is
one of first impression for this court.  
		The rule that defendants urge this court to adopt is
known in other jurisdictions as the "complicity doctrine."  That
doctrine precludes recovery by a third person bringing an action
to recover damages for injuries caused by an intoxicated person
if the third person contributes to the inebriate's intoxication. 
See, e.g., Baxter v. Noce, 107 NM 48, 50, 752 P2d 240 (1988)
(explaining recognition of complicity doctrine in other
jurisdictions).  A person contributes to the intoxication of
another, for example, either by purchasing alcohol for the
intoxicated person or by consuming alcohol with the intoxicated
person.  Id.  Many jurisdictions that recognize the complicity
doctrine consider it to be a complete bar to recovery, despite
the existence of comparative negligence statutes in the
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jamieson v. Harrison, 532 NW2d 779, 781
(Iowa 1995) (dram shop claim not subject to comparative fault
statute); Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd., 164 Ill 2d 80,
94-95, 646 NE2d 599 (1995) (in action under dram shop act,
complicity acts as complete bar and comparative negligence is
inapplicable); Herrly v. Muzik, 374 NW2d 275, 278-79 (Minn 1985)
(in action under dram shop act, complicity is absolute bar to
recovery despite amendment incorporating comparative negligence
statute).  But see Baxter, 107 NM 48 at 51 ("Complicity, while
superficially dissimilar, is only a hybrid form of contributory
negligence and is identical to it in application.").
		Defendants argue that this court should adopt the
complicity doctrine as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery.    
However, it appears to us that recognizing the complicity
doctrine in the context of cases that involve providing alcohol
to visibly intoxicated persons would reestablish contributory
negligence as a defense.  We decline to consider doing so,
because the legislature has made a contrary choice.  See ORS
18.470 (abolishing contributory negligence standard and replacing
it with comparative fault system); ORS 18.475 (abolishing
doctrine of implied assumption of the risk).  Under Oregon's
comparative fault regime, plaintiff's relative fault in causing
his own injuries, if any, is to be apportioned by the trier of
fact, rather than serve as a bar to recovery ab initio.  See
Coulter Property Management, Inc. v. James, 328 Or 164, 174, 970
P2d 209 (1998) (declining to revitalize contributory negligence
doctrine in landlord-tenant context).
		We turn to the question whether plaintiff otherwise is
barred, as a matter of law, from recovery under either his
statutory or common-law claims for relief.  We begin with
plaintiff's statutory claim under ORS 30.950 (1993). (1)  That
statute provided:
"No licensee, permittee or social host is liable
for damages incurred or caused by intoxicated patrons
or guests off the licensee, permittee or social host's
premises unless:
	"(1)	The licensee, permittee or social host has 
served or provided * * * alcoholic beverages to the
patron or guest while the patron or guest was visibly
intoxicated; and
	"(2)	The plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the patron or guest was served
alcoholic beverages while visibly intoxicated."
In Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or 33, 37, 672 P2d 697 (1983), this
court concluded that ORS 30.950 limits claims against alcohol
servers and providers to those brought by third parties.  We
based that conclusion on the legislative history of the statute,
noting that the focus of the legislature's discussion surrounding
the enactment of ORS 30.950 was liability to persons, like
plaintiff, injured by intoxicated motorists.  Id. at 37-40.  That
interpretation remains controlling, but it does not aid
defendants here.  
		Nothing in the text or context of ORS 30.950 suggests
that the legislature intended to limit liability under the
statute to claims made by "innocent" third parties.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (interpretation of statute begins with examination of text
and context).  As mentioned above, the legislative history of the
statute and the cases construing it focus entirely on liability
to third parties injured by intoxicated drivers, without
distinguishing between "innocent" and "non-innocent" third
parties.  See, e.g., Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 11, 16-23, 757 P2d
402 (1988) (discussing preexisting common law, the statutory
framework within which ORS 30.950 was enacted, and its
legislative history).  We find nothing in the statute itself, or
the cases construing it, to suggest that plaintiff is barred, as
a matter of law, from recovery under ORS 30.950.  
		Defendants argue in the alternative that, as a "social
host" under ORS 30.950, plaintiff also was "in violation" of the
statute and, consequently, is barred from recovery.  "Social
host" is defined as "one who receives guests, whether friends or
associates, in a social or commercial setting, in which the host
serves or directs the serving of alcohol to guests."  Solberg v.
Johnson, 306 Or 484, 490, 760 P2d 867 (1988).  Included within
that definition is someone who "ante[s] up per drink at a
tavern."  Id.  Under the facts of this case, the trier of fact
could find that plaintiff had "ante[d] up" for Elliot's drinks on
the night in question, making plaintiff a social host under ORS
30.950.  We do not agree, however, that plaintiff's status as a
social host -- if he indeed qualified as such -- prevents his
recovery under ORS 30.950.
		 ORS 30.950 subjects licensees, permittees, and social
hosts to liability to third parties for injuries caused by the
intoxicated patron or guest whom they served.  Plaintiff claims
that, under ORS 30.950, defendants are liable for serving alcohol
to Elliot while Elliot was visibly intoxicated.  That is exactly
the type of claim that the statute permits.  Although it is true
that Elliot could have brought a claim against plaintiff as a
social host under ORS 30.950, that does not mean that plaintiff
cannot use the same statute to maintain an action against
defendants.  See Solberg, 306 Or at 490 (defendant tavern keeper
can seek contribution from "social host" who had purchased the
alcohol).  Plaintiff's status as a social host -- again, if he
qualified as such -- in this case is relevant only insofar as it
pertains to the apportionment of relative fault by the trier of
fact; it does not preclude plaintiff's recovery under the
statute.  Consequently, we hold that plaintiff is not barred, as
a matter of law, from bringing a claim against defendants under
ORS 30.950.
		We turn now to plaintiff's claim for common-law
negligence.  In Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237, 243-44, 566
P2d 893 (1977), this court recognized a common-law claim against
alcohol providers on behalf of third parties injured in car
accidents that resulted from serving alcohol to patrons who were
visibly intoxicated.  This case involves a claim for injuries
arising from the very risk that concerned the court in Campbell: 
the intoxicated driver.  Although it is undisputed that plaintiff
was intoxicated on the night of the accident, plaintiff does not
allege liability for his injuries as a first party but, rather,
makes his claims as a third party injured as a result of Elliot's
intoxication.  Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that plaintiff is not precluded as a matter of law from
maintaining his common-law negligence claim for relief against
defendants. 		
		In summary, we hold that plaintiff is not barred as a
matter of law from pursuing either his statutory liability claim
under ORS 30.950 or his common-law negligence claim against
defendants.  Any complicity on the part of plaintiff in Elliot's
intoxication and any consequent apportionment of fault
attributable to plaintiff for his own injuries are issues to be
addressed by the trier of fact under Oregon's comparative fault
regime.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	The legislature amended ORS 30.950 in 1997.  Or Laws
1997, ch 841, § 1.  Those amendments apply only to claims arising
on or after March 15, 1998, and are not relevant to this case. 
Or Laws 1997, ch 841, §§ 2, 9.  All further references in this
opinion are to the 1993 version of the statute.