Title: ROBERT LEROY SILER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT LEROY SILER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 73115 P.3d 14Case Number: No. 03-169Decided: 07/08/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                    
ROBERT LEROY SILER,                                 

                       
Appellant (Defendant),                                  

                                                                                                

                 
                    v.                                                        

                                                                                                

                  
THE STATE OFWYOMING,                             

                       
Appellee (Plaintiff).                                        

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Terry L. 
Armitage, Special Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and BROOKS, 
D.J.

 
 
 
 
  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In April 2003, a 
Sweetwater County jury found Robert Leroy Siler (the appellant) guilty of 
first-degree murder, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  On appeal, the 
appellant claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective at an evidentiary 
hearing on the appellant's suppression motion and for conceding the appellant's 
guilt at trial, that the district court failed properly to instruct the jury on 
the substantive elements of first-degree murder, and that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the appellant's pretrial request for substitute 
counsel.  We 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
1.         
Whether the appellant's trial counsel was ineffective at an evidentiary 
hearing on the appellant's suppression motion?

 
 
2.         
Whether the appellant's trial counsel conceded his guilt during voir 
dire, opening statement, and/or closing argument?

 
 
3.         
Whether the district court failed properly to instruct the jury on the 
elements of first-degree premeditated murder?

 
 
4.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
appellant's pretrial request for substitute counsel?

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The instant case 
essentially revolves around the interactions among three people on August 16 and 
17, 2002:  the appellant, Craig 
Cunningham (Cunningham), and Cheryl Ward (the victim).1  Cunningham and the appellant had been 
acquaintances since 1999.  The 
appellant and the victim had been involved in a rather tumultuous long-term 
romantic relationship.  Cunningham 
knew of the appellant's romantic relationship with the victim, but Cunningham, 
too, became romantically involved with the victim in June 2002.  Cunningham's relationship with the 
victim continued, "off and on," until August 13, 2002.  As of August 13, 2002, the victim had 
apparently returned to the appellant's residence.

 
 
[¶3]      Sometime after 
4:30 p.m. on August 16, 2002, Cunningham went out to cash his unemployment check 
and buy some beer.  He saw the 
appellant drinking at a local bar along the way, and Cunningham returned to his 
residence at about 8:30 p.m.  
Cunningham drank "a few more beers" and the appellant arrived at 
Cunningham's residence between 9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.  The appellant confronted Cunningham 
about his relationship with the victim, and Cunningham admitted that he and the 
victim had been "having sex."  The 
two argued back and forth for a period of time, and each man apparently 
expressed his love for the victim.  
Cunningham testified that at some point, the appellant displayed a 
bone-handled knife with a five- or six-inch blade, put the knife in the back of 
his truck, and returned with a "couple of beers."  The appellant had calmed down, according 
to Cunningham, and they each drank a beer.2

 

[¶4]      Cunningham 
testified that the appellant decided to confront the victim about her 
relationship with Cunningham, so the appellant drove Cunningham to the 
appellant's residence.  The victim 
was in the bathroom fixing her hair, and Cunningham overheard the appellant 
inform the victim that he had discovered the victim's affair with 
Cunningham.  According to 
Cunningham, the victim denied the affair and the appellant told her that 
Cunningham was present in the appellant's residence and if she did not believe 
the appellant, she could ask Cunningham.  
The appellant and the victim proceeded to argue for about five minutes 
and the appellant declared that he was "through" with the 
victim.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant and 
Cunningham left the appellant's residence between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.  The appellant drove Cunningham to a 
local bar, where, according to Cunningham, they had one or two drinks.3  The appellant then drove Cunningham to 
the Rage bar.  About an hour later, 
they left the Rage bar because the appellant "had his head down on the bar and 
this bartender wanted me [Cunningham] to get him out of there."  Cunningham woke the appellant up and 
testified that the appellant was able to exit the bar and get into his vehicle 
under his own power.  The appellant 
stated that he was "in no shape to drive" and neither, admittedly, was 
Cunningham.4  Nevertheless, Cunningham took the wheel 
of the appellant's vehicle and experienced some difficulty in starting the 
vehicle.  The appellant was able to 
tell Cunningham how properly to start the vehicle.

 
 
[¶6]      Cunningham drove 
the appellant back to the appellant's residence.  He estimated that they left the Rage bar 
at 12:00 a.m. or 12:30 a.m., but testified that it could have been later.5  At the appellant's residence, the 
appellant offered to let Cunningham stay the night and to take Cunningham home 
in the morning.  The appellant 
retrieved a blanket so that Cunningham could sleep on the couch; Cunningham 
drank another beer or two and went to sleep on one couch and the appellant went 
to sleep on a separate couch.

 
 
[¶7]      Meanwhile, the 
victim had called her friend JoAnn Richards (who had been drinking beer since 
noon that day) several times from the appellant's residence to see if Richards 
would pick her up, but Richards did not do so.  The appellant also called Richards at 
2:00 a.m.6  He asked whether Richards had picked up 
the victim and stated that he was with Cunningham, had been drinking beer, and 
was returning home.  Richards 
testified that, based on her prior interactions with the appellant, the 
appellant did not sound as if he was intoxicated.  The victim ultimately walked to 
Richards' residence, arrived shortly after 2:00 a.m., and consumed alcohol.  The victim left with some acquaintances 
between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.  The 
acquaintances attempted to drop the victim off at two different residences but 
no one was home, so the victim directed them to take her to the appellant's 
residence.

 
 
[¶8]      Cunningham 
testified that he was awakened at about 5:00 a.m. or 5:30 a.m. by the victim 
"straddling" him on the couch and kissing him.  Although he had been drinking "[q]uite a 
bit" the previous evening, Cunningham stated that he was not intoxicated, but 
was "[h]ung over."  The appellant 
woke up about the same time and, upon observing Cunningham and the victim, asked 
"Just what the f*** is going on?"  
The victim, according to Cunningham, told the appellant to "f*** 
himself."  The appellant was angry, 
walked back and forth in a "rampage," and told the victim to leave; the victim 
did not leave.  The appellant yelled 
at the victim for two or three more minutes.  Cunningham got up, put on his boots and 
sat in a chair next to the dining room table while the appellant and the victim 
continued to argue.  At some point, 
the victim sat in a separate chair and joined Cunningham at the dining room 
table.  The next thing Cunningham 
saw was the appellant enter the residence through the front door (presumably 
after retrieving the knife from the back of his truck) and, without saying 
anything, walk (in a "normal walk") straight towards the victim.  The appellant "reached over with his 
left hand, grabbed her . . ., bent her back a little bit in the chair" and 
stabbed her overhand "right square in the chest."  Cunningham asked the appellant "what the 
f*** he just did" and the appellant, according to Cunningham, responded "I just 
killed this f****** b****" and "If you don't believe me, check her pulse."  The appellant then offered Cunningham a 
ride home, and Cunningham said "I'm out of here" and left the appellant's 
residence.  Cunningham called 911 
from another house in the area within four to five minutes of the stabbing.  The record reflects that 911 received 
the call at 5:55 a.m.

 
 
[¶9]      Officer Jason 
Love responded to the 911 call and discovered the victim's body between two 
vehicles in the appellant's driveway.  
He observed marks at the scene indicating that someone dragged the 
victim's body from the appellant's residence to the driveway.  Officer Love spoke with Cunningham at 
about 6:20 a.m. or 6:30 a.m. and saw no signs that Cunningham was intoxicated at 
the time.  The victim was pronounced 
dead at the hospital at 6:48 a.m.

 
 
[¶10]   At 6:10 a.m. or 6:15 a.m. that 
morning, the appellant phoned his friend Mark Lacquement and requested a 
ride.  Lacquement encountered the 
appellant at about 6:45 a.m. or 6:50 a.m., at which time the appellant stated 
that he "might be going down this time" and believed the victim had been 
"stabbed or killed."  The appellant 
ended up back at Lacquement's garage and according to Lacquement, the appellant 
did not exhibit any signs of intoxication.  
JoAnn Richards similarly received a telephone call from the appellant at 
about 7:00 a.m.  The appellant twice 
stated that "he had killed" the victim.  
According to Richards, the appellant was calm and exhibited no obvious 
signs that he was intoxicated.  The 
appellant called Richards again between 7:30 a.m. and 7:45 a.m.  When Richards asked the appellant how he 
had killed the victim, he said that he had "stabbed" the victim "in the 
heart."  The appellant also called 
his father sometime prior to 9:00 a.m., and stated that the victim was dead and 
that he "killed her."

 
 
[¶11]   Law enforcement officers found the 
appellant hiding under a car in Lacquement's garage and arrested the 
appellant.  The appellant smelled of 
alcohol and stated that he had been drinking the previous evening, and officers 
observed dried blood on the appellant's hands.  A knife with blood on it was 
subsequently discovered in the appellant's kitchen sink, and an examination of 
the appellant's person did not reveal any injuries to the appellant's 
body.

 
 
[¶12]   Detective John Elliott interviewed 
the appellant at 9:29 a.m. on August 17, 2002.  During that interview, the appellant 
stated:

 
 
1.         
The appellant and Cunningham "ended up talking and become friends until 
[the victim] showed up and then shit happened;"

            

2.         
The appellant was on one couch, Cunningham was on another couch, and the 
victim came in drunk and tried to start a fight with the 
appellant;

            

3.         
The victim started "hugging and kissing on" Cunningham and the appellant 
repeatedly told her to leave his residence and the victim 
refused;

 
 
4.         
The appellant told Cunningham he was going to stab the victim and "don't 
f*** with me.  I says you're f****** 
with the wrong person;"

 
 
5.         
The appellant had the knife on his "side," "showed" the victim the knife 
and said "I'm going to do it and she says no you won't and I said watch" and 
after the second or third time the victim said "you won't do it" the appellant 
stabbed the victim with a hunting knifewhen asked if the appellant stabbed the 
victim "out of a fit of anger" or knew "the circumstances that [he would] be in 
because of" it, the appellant replied, "No I knew what was going to 
happen;"

 
 
6.         
The appellant then rinsed some of the blood off of himself and the knife 
and left the knife in his kitchen sink;

 
 
7.         
After he stabbed the victim and verified that she was dead, the appellant 
told Cunningham "you're the one that caused it" because Cunningham had been 
"having an affair" with the victimthe appellant didn't attack Cunningham 
because he "wanted to let him see what the f*** he's done to my 
life;"

 
 
8.         
The appellant tried to carry the victim to his pickup (but could not lift 
her into the pickup) and when he saw law enforcement arrive he "walked off;" 
and

 
 
9.         
Cunningham did not participate in stabbing the 
victim.

 
 
It is 
apparent from the interview that the appellant remained very bitter about past 
incidents between himself and the victim in which the appellant felt he had been 
unjustly arrested.

 
 
[¶13]   An autopsy revealed that the cause 
of the victim's death was a stab wound to the chest, and a forensic pathologist 
estimated that the victim died within two to five minutes of the stab 
wound.  The wound path proceeded 
"front to back and slightly downward" and the weapon used to inflict the wound 
perforated the right ventricle and right atrium of the victim's heart, 
perforated her pulmonary artery, and cut her coronary artery in half; according 
to the forensic pathologist, a "significant amount of force" was required to 
inflict a wound of this nature.  The 
victim's blood alcohol level at the time of her death was .284.  DNA testing confirmed that the dried 
blood on the appellant's right hand, the blood on the knife retrieved from the 
appellant's kitchen sink, and blood found at the appellant's residence, was the 
victim's blood.

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant was ultimately 
charged with first-degree premeditated murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101.  Two public defenders 
appeared on the appellant's behalf at trial.  On April 11, 2003, a SweetwaterCounty jury found the appellant guilty of 
that offense.  The district court 
sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life, and the appellant now appeals 
from the district court's judgment and sentence.

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant claims that his trial 
counsel were ineffective in two respects:  
(1) at an evidentiary hearing on the appellant's suppression motion; and 
(2) by conceding the appellant's guilt during voir dire, opening statement, and 
closing argument.

 
 

 
 
[¶16]               
            
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the 
following standard:

 
 
"When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  
The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment.  
Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 104; 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; 
Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) 
(Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  
In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render 
such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney' 
and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case.'  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo.1990).  The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.'  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064."

 
 

Asch [v. 
State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo.2003)] (quoting Becker v. 
State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2002); Reyna v. 
State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001); Chapman v. 
State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2001); Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo.2000)).  The burden of proving that counsel was 
ineffective rests entirely on an appellant.  Asch, at ¶ 11 (citing Barkell 
v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002)).  To satisfy his burden, an appellant must 
provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 
37, 76 P.3d 323, ¶ 37 (Wyo.2003) (citing Barkell, at ¶ 
13).

 
 

Duke v. 
State, 2004 
WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004).  We have further stated that the 
appellant

 
 
"must 
demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent that 
deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so 
serious as to undermine this court's confidence that the outcome was fair.  Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Wyo.1987); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo.1987); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145-47 (Wyo.1986)."

 
 

Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 394, 405 (Wyo. 
2004) (quoting Lower v. 
State, 786 P.2d 346, 349-50 (Wyo. 1990)).  
A failure to "make the required showing of either deficient performance 
or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  
Indeed, if "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 
course should be followed."  Id. at 697.

 
 
            
The Suppression Motion

 
 
            
A.  The Motion and 
Evidentiary Hearing

 
 
[¶17]   The appellant was interviewed by law 
enforcement the morning of August 17, 2002.  On March 11, 2003, the appellant's trial 
counsel filed a Motion to Suppress, challenging the voluntariness of the 
appellant's statements during that interview because the appellant "was 
intoxicated . . .."  
The district court held an evidentiary hearing March 27, 2003, at which 
hearing the prosecution called three witnesses:  Sheriff's Deputy Jason Love, Detention Officer 
Brad Freeman and Detective John Elliott.  The appellant's trial counsel cross-examined 
each of these witnesses, but did not call any additional witnesses on behalf of 
the appellant.  
The prosecution also offered several exhibits during the hearing 
(including a videotape of the appellant at the detention center, "book in" forms 
completed at the detention center, a "Miranda Rights" form and waiver, and the 
tape-recorded interview with the appellant), which exhibits the district court 
admitted into evidence.

 
 
[¶18]   Officer Love testified that he and 
another officer arrested the appellant for the instant offense at about 8:39 
a.m. on August 17, 2002.  The officers handcuffed the appellant's hands 
behind his back (each officer also had a hand on the appellant's arm for 
security purposes) and the appellant walked one hundred-fifty to two hundred 
feet to a patrol vehicle.  Officer Love detected a "slight odor" of 
alcohol on the appellant, but testified that the appellant walked "without 
difficulty" and did not stumble or stagger.  The appellant made a few statements on the way 
to the detention center and according to Officer Love, the appellant was logical 
and did not slur his speech.  At the detention center, Officer Love asked 
the appellant for basic information such as his height, weight, address, 
telephone number, birth date, social security number, occupation, and the 
appellant's father's address and phone number, which information the appellant 
provided without hesitation or confusion.  Officer Love then walked with the appellant to 
the sheriff's office for the interview and, according to Officer Love, the 
appellant did not exhibit any balance deficiencies while standing or 
walking.  
Officer Love testified that the appellant complied with the officers' 
directives at all relevant times, and Officer Love did not observe any signs 
that the appellant was intoxicated.  Officer Love interacted with the appellant 
twice after that day, and noted that the appellant's speech and mannerisms on 
the two subsequent occasions did not differ from what the officer observed on 
August 17, 2002.

 
 
[¶19]   Officer Freeman testified that at 9:10 
a.m. on August 17, 2002, he booked the appellant into the detention center.  Officer Freeman 
performed a "pat down" of the appellant's entire body for contraband and 
weapons, and asked the appellant several screening questions.7  According to Officer 
Freeman, the appellant did not stagger, lose his balance, or slur his speech at 
any time, and the appellant responded logically, accurately, and without 
hesitation to Officer Freeman's inquiries.  Officer Freeman did not smell alcohol on the 
appellant and saw "no signs of any kind" that the appellant was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; accordingly, Officer Freeman did not ask the 
appellant if he had consumed any alcohol and did not perform a breathalyzer test 
or a gaze nystagmus test.  Officer Freeman subsequently interacted with 
the appellant five times per week (between August 17, 2002, and March 27, 2003) 
and did not observe the appellant act any differently than he did August 17th.

 
 
[¶20]   Detective Elliott began interviewing the 
appellant in the sheriff's office squad room at 9:29 a.m. and concluded the 
interview at 9:46 a.m.8  By this time, the detective had spoken to 
"neighbors and such" who stated the appellant had been drinking "some" the 
previous evening.  
Detective Elliott examined the appellant's eyes, listened to his speech 
at the detention center, and observed the appellant walk; the detective 
concluded that the appellant was not intoxicated, nor did the detective observe 
any signs of intoxication during the interview.

 
 
[¶21]   The detective advised the appellant of 
his Miranda rights prior to the interview, and 
according to the detective, the appellant verbally indicated that he understood 
these rights and also later initialed and signed a "Miranda Rights" form9 indicating he understood, and agreed to waive, 
these rights.10  The detective tape-recorded the interview, and 
we have previously summarized the statements the appellant made during the 
interview.  The 
tone of the interview is perhaps best reflected by the detective's first 
substantive question to the appellant:  "Okay ah Robert would you like to tell me your 
side of the story, what happened?"  It is apparent from a transcript of the 
interview that the appellant was responsive and gave coherent, detailed answers 
to the detective's questions and that the appellant was able to converse with 
the detective.  
The following colloquy further illustrates the appellant's ability to 
understand the nature and consequences of his statements:

 
 
ELLIOTT:        So the 
argument was still in full bloom and going strong and-

 
 
SILER:            
Yes it was

 
 
ELLIOTT:        So then 
what happened?

 
 
SILER:            
I don't know if I dare say

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay.  What did ah, what 
did the guy with you do?

 
 
SILER:            
He says, well no I ain't, I ain't going to

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay. 
 So ah do you 
want to end this conversation or

 
 
SILER:            
Yeah, until I talk to an attorney.

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay

 
 
SILER:            
If, if they want to give me one if not I don't give a shit

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Alright, 
it's totally up to you if you want to [talk to] us but if you want [to] talk to 
an attorney we need to conclude this conversation right now.  You know what I 
mean?

 
 
SILER:            
I'm not trying, I'm not going to try and bail out of this, I'm guilty I 
know it

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay ah 
but do you want to stop the conversation now is what I'm asking.  I can't ask you any 
questions okay?  
What do you want to do?

 
 
SILER:            
Well in fact I'll tell you.  Piss on it.  I don't give a shit.  I got nothing to 
lose.

 
 
ELLIOTT:        So you 
don't want an attorney at this time?

 
 
SILER:            
No, piss on it.

 
 
Notably, the appellant also addressed his level of 
intoxication at the time of the stabbing (roughly almost four hours prior to the 
interview):

 
 
ELLIOTT:        . . .  Ah have you, had you 
been drinking all night?

 
 
SILER:            
No

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay had 
you been sleeping any?  
Prior to this happening?

 
 
SILER:            
In fact yeah.  
I slept about 2 hours.

 
 
ELLIOTT:        Okay.  Were you ah were you 
at that time intoxicated?  Did you feel like you were intoxicated, had 
you been drinking that much?

 
 
SILER:            
No

 
 
Detective Elliott did not specifically ask the appellant how 
much alcohol he had consumed the previous evening.

 
 
[¶22]   The district court ultimately denied the 
appellant's suppression motion.  The district court found that there was 
"evidence that the [appellant] may have consumed some alcoholic beverages the 
night before," but that the appellant was "calm, alert, attentive and 
responsive" and exhibited "no outward signs of being under the influence of 
alcohol to the extent contended by [his trial counsel]" during the interview; 
therefore, considering the applicable legal factors, the district court 
concluded that the State had "met its burden of proof in establishing that the 
statements of the [appellant] were made voluntarily."  The statements at 
issue were later admitted into evidence at trial.

 
 
                        
B.  Discussion

 
 
[¶23]   On appeal, the appellant argues that his 
trial counsel were ineffective because at the suppression hearing, they did not 
present "any of the significant information [they] possessed" in support of the 
suppression motion.  
The appellant contends that the following evidence was "strongly 
supportive of [his] intoxication" and if his trial counsel had presented the 
evidence at the suppression hearing, the district court would have granted the 
suppression motion:

 
 
1.         In 
his 5:55 a.m. 911 telephone call, Cunningham indicated that the appellant and 
the victim had been drinking.  The appellant claims that Cunningham also 
testified at trial that the appellant was "quite intoxicated" the evening prior 
to his interview with law enforcement.

 
 
2.         The 
appellant's trial counsel stated to the district court at trial that a bartender 
from the Rage bar would testify that the appellant was "extremely intoxicated" 
and passed out in the bar the evening of August 16th.  However, the 
bartender apparently said that she did not serve the appellant any drinks and 
served Cunningham "maybe one drink."

 
 
3.         The 
appellant's trial counsel also stated to the district court at trial that the 
victim's daughter would testify that she awakened the appellant at 5:00 a.m. 
August 17th; she observed a "strong odor" of alcohol and the appellant was 
"passed out . . .."  
When the daughter asked the appellant where the victim was, the appellant 
stated that the victim was "sleeping" even though the victim was not at the 
appellant's residence at the time.

 
 
According to the appellant, the admission of his confession 
into evidence at trial further prejudiced him in that the prosecution relied 
heavily on his statements to establish the requisite premeditation for 
first-degree murder.11

 
 
[¶24]   Generally, the

 
 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Wyoming Constitution Article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that 
confessions be voluntary. A statement that is obtained by coercion is not 
trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made it.  A defendant is 
deprived of the right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is 
admitted at his trial.  
A statement is considered to be voluntary if the defendant of his own 
free and deliberate choice, and not because of intimidation, coercion or 
deception, makes it.  
The prosecution has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a defendant's statement is voluntary.  Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 48 (Wyo.1999).[12]

 
 

Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, ¶ 9, 25 P.3d 507, 510 (Wyo. 2001).  
"In determining voluntariness, a court examines the totality of the 
circumstances that existed when the statements were made."  Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 716, 722 (Wyo. 
2003).  
Factors that a trial court may consider in making that determination 
include:

 
 
"[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of 
the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper 
influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during 
the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time the statement 
is made[,]"

 
 
. . .;

 
 
"whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave 
and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation 
and whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; 
whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else 
prior to the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the 
course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or 
implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style 
employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and 
place of the interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition 
immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational 
background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the 
criminal justice system."

 
 

Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Wyo. 1997); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991) and People v. 
Pearson, 725 P.2d 782, 783 (Colo. 1986)).

 
 
[¶25]   Intoxication from alcohol

 
 
does not per se establish involuntariness.  State v. Baker, 4 Kan.App.2d 340, 606 P.2d 120, 123 
(1980); and State v. Tucker, 32 Wash. App. 83, 645 P.2d 711, 713 (1982).  
Instead, for intoxication to render a confession involuntary, the 
impairment must be so great as to deprive an individual of a capacity to 
understand the meaning of his statements.  See Lee v. State, 
Okla.Crim., 700 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1985).  Even though a defendant appears intoxicated, 
the fact that he understood what he was doing, carried on a conversation and 
responded to questions will render the statements admissible.  State v. Curry, 127 Ariz.App. 1, 617 P.2d 785, 787 
(1980).  The 
proper inquiry regarding intoxication is whether a confession cannot be said to 
be the product of rational intellect and free will because of extreme 
intoxication.  
State v. Corona, 60 Ore.App. 500, 655 P.2d 216, 219-220 (1982).

 
 

Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Wyo. 1987).  
We have also stated:

 
 
"The general rule applicable to confessions obtained from 
persons under intoxication has been well stated to the effect that proof that 
the accused was intoxicated at the time he confessed his guilt of crime will 
not, without more, bar the reception of the confession in evidence.  But if it is shown 
that the accused was intoxicated to the degree of mania, or of being unable to 
understand the meaning of his statements, then the confession is inadmissible.' 
. . ."

 
 
. . .

 
 
"Lack of awareness or understanding alone might be 
sufficient to exclude a confession in the rare case where it clearly appears 
that at the time of the confession the confessant was so intoxicated as to lack 
mental capacity, that is, he was unable to appreciate the nature and 
consequences of his statements.  This, no doubt, is the mania' referred to in 
the older cases."

 
 

Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1006 
(1972) (quoting People v. 
Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 226 N.E.2d 305, 308, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967)).  Indeed, the key question remains:

 
 
"Is the confession the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker?  If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may 
be used against him.  
If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due 
process."

 
 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961)).  See also Hannon v. 
State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 51, 84 P.3d 320, 340 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶26]   The totality of the circumstances based 
on the testimony and exhibits received at the suppression hearing, when 
considered in light of the aforementioned factors, clearly supported the 
district court's findings and conclusion that the appellant's confession was 
voluntary.13  The additional evidence the appellant has 
referenced on appeal is somewhat more specific and probative of the appellant's 
level of intoxication the evening prior to his interview with Detective 
Elliott.14  However, the appellant has not established on 
appeal that, had the evidence been presented at the suppression hearing, there 
was a reasonable probability that his statements would have been declared 
involuntary.15  The additional evidence simply does not 
sufficiently undermine the district court's findings and conclusion based on the 
evidence presented at the hearing.

 
 

[¶27]   While the "voluntariness of a 
confession is a question to be determined by considering the facts of each 
case," Stone, 745 P.2d  at 1348, it is worth noting that we have affirmed the denials of 
suppression motions in cases involving much stronger evidence of intoxication at 
the time of questioning (even considering the additional evidence at issue in 
the instant case).  
For example, in Lonquest, 495 P.2d  at 
580-81, the defendant's "extremely high" blood alcohol content 
was .374 one and one-half hours before his confession.  Testimony at the 
suppression hearing revealed that the defendant had been informed of his Miranda rights, that he

 
 
gave lucid and responsive replies to questions, that he had 
no hallucinations or delusions, that he recognized people, and that he corrected 
and in some cases argued . . . about correct statements, particularly when [it 
was] suggested to defendant that this killing had occurred on the spur of the 
moment and not as the result of a plan to kill [the] deceased.

 
 

Id. at 580.  Both parties also presented expert testimony 
on the issue.  
Id. at 
582.  We 
concluded that "there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial judge could 
base his finding that the confession was knowingly and voluntarily made."  Id. at 582.

 
 

[¶28]   In Stone, 
745 P.2d  at 1347, the

 
 
rather lengthy suppression hearing, which resulted in 
admission of the challenged statements, involved six state witnesses and two 
witnesses for appellant.  Those witnesses were aware that at the time 
of appellant's arrest, he experienced a certain degree of intoxication.  . . . [A]ppellant's 
blood alcohol level at about 7:50 the morning of the shooting was at or between 
0.15 and 0.20.  
Appellant was not questioned before 7:04 a.m. on the 19th of May because 
Chief Wilcock believed him to be too intoxicated.  At the time of appellant's questioning, a 
slight odor of alcohol was detected.  According to the Chief appellant answered 
questions intelligently and his speech was not slurred.  He did not appear 
to be intoxicated.  
Appellant did not stagger, stumble or fall and walked without 
assistance.  
The Chief said he would not have questioned appellant if he had been 
significantly intoxicated.

 
 

After evaluating the applicable legal authority and noting 
that it would "be improper for the trial court to rely exclusively on blood 
alcohol level," this Court concluded that the "trial court made a factual 
determination and legal conclusion that under the totality of the circumstances, 
appellant's statements were given voluntarily and were not rendered inadmissible 
because of intoxication" and that "the trial court properly admitted the 
statements of appellant into evidence."  Id. at 1348.  See also Gordon v. State, 2004 WY 105, ¶¶ 15-17, 97 P.3d 64, 68-69 (Wyo. 2004); Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 
128-30 (Wyo. 1980); and Hernandez v. State, 587 P.2d 1094, 1095-96 (Wyo. 1978).16  We find the evidence in the instant case 
equally convincing that the appellant's confession was voluntary despite his 
consumption of alcoholic beverages during the previous evening.

 
 
            
Concession of Guilt

 
 
[¶29]   The appellant also asserts that his 
trial counsel were ineffective because they conceded the appellant's guilt to 
the jury during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument.  The appellant 
claims that he did not consent to this approach at trial because:  (1) he entered a 
"not guilty" plea; (2) he stated at a pretrial hearing on his request for 
substitute counsel that he wanted his attorneys to find out "what 
. . . happened" and was concerned that his attorneys had made "no 
attempts to establish any proof that I did it or that I did not do it;" and (3) 
expressed similar concerns at a post-trial hearing on the appellant's request 
for substitute counsel at sentencing.17  According to the 
appellant, this is one of the rare cases in which we should presume that he was 
prejudiced by his attorneys' approach and grant him a new trial.

 
 
[¶30]   The remarks at issue appear at several 
different places in the record.  We will quote extensively from the record in 
order to provide the entire context of these remarks.  During voir dire, 
one of the appellant's attorneys was questioning a juror who indicated 
alcoholism in her family might affect her ability to be an impartial juror.  The appellant's 
attorney informed the prospective juror that alcohol consumption might "affect 
the degree of severity of the particular crime in this case" and further 
stated:

 
 
Okay.  So consequently, when you look at the case 
from an overall perspective, understanding that in this case we're not denying 
that our client actually killed [the victim] at all, we're not denying that at 
all, but in this particular case the defense really revolves around what degree 
of guilt is in this particular case, based upon the amount of alcohol use that 
my client had that particular night.  That's our case.  

 
 
. . .

 
 
            
. . . So based upon that, as you sit here now  you know that [the 
appellant] is not guilty.  He's presumed to be innocent.  As we sit here now, 
he's not guilty.  
So consequently, as you sit here, you can put that aside and judge this 
case fairly and impartially, can't you?

 
 
The following later occurred in response to this 
exchange:

 
 
            
[Appellant's trial counsel]:  . . . First off, could I see a raise of hands 
from the prospective jurors, as we sit here today before taking any evidence in 
the case, how many people think that [the appellant] is guilty as he sits here 
today?  How 
many people think he's innocent?

 
 
            
Okay, sir?

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
[Prospective Juror]:  Your attorney there, the guy in the pencil 
tie, said this morning that there's no doubt that your client killed the 
woman.  I 
didn't get that out of the newspaper or hear it on the radio, I heard it from 
him.

 
 
[Appellant's Trial Counsel]:  . . . You will not hear from the defense that 
[the appellant] did not stab [the victim].  What you'll hear is that there are varying 
degrees when someone's actions take a human life.  The State legislature has said there's first 
degree homicide, second degree homicide and manslaughter, depending on the facts 
and the circumstances of that defendant's actions.

 
 
Okay.  So I guess my point is, as we sit here today, 
no evidence has been put on as to the elements of first degree homicide, which 
are more than just a stabbing of someone.  So based upon that, wouldn't it be a fact, 
does anybody disagree, that he's innocent until the State proves him 
guilty?  Does 
anybody disagree with that?

 
 
            
[A prospective juror] had talked about that the defense and the State had 
to prove to him their side of the case.  [Prospective Juror], do you still think that 
[the appellant] has to put on evidence if the State does not prove their side of 
the case, their elements of the crime?

 
 
. . .

 
 
[Appellant's Trial Counsel]:  Do you understand, I guess, the point I was 
making, that the State has to prove every element of the crime that is charged, 
and that in addition to [the appellant] stabbing [the victim], there's different 
elements for that first degree homicide, and until the State meets their burden, 
that my client is innocent of that charge?  Do you have any qualms or disagreements about 
that?

 
 
. . .

 
 
[Appellant's Trial Counsel]:  I just have a few more questions.  [The prosecutor] 
had brought up questions revolving around domestic violence.  And in this case, 
[the appellant] stabbed [the victim,] who was his girlfriend.

 
 
[¶31]   One of the appellant's attorneys made 
the following remarks during his opening statement:

 
 
            
No, I'm not going to stand up at this point or any point in this trial, 
or nor will [co-counsel], and look each of you in the eye and tell you that [the 
appellant] did not stab [the victim].  I'm not going to tell you that his actions 
did not take the life of another human being.  The evidence is overwhelming that his actions 
did take that life.  
[The appellant] took a hunting knife and he stabbed [the victim.]  There was a witness 
to the stabbing, as [the prosecutor] stated.  [The appellant] fled and [the appellant] 
confessed to the police that, yes, he did stab [the victim].  . . .

 
 
            
. . . The reason we're here is not to decide if [the appellant] is guilty 
of stabbing [the victim.]  He did stab her.  The reason we're 
here is that the State and the prosecutor has charged [the appellant] with first 
degree homicide.

 
 
            
Now, there are several other charges that [the appellant] could have been 
charged with or that you as the jury could find him guilty of.  . . . 

 
 
            
. . . I'm sure we've all heard that term, "manslaughter."  And I will submit 
to you that that's what the evidence will show in this case.  Not a first degree 
homicide, as [the] prosecutor . . . states, a crime of passion.  

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
But also, I submit to you that after listening to the evidence and the 
evidence of [the appellant's] drunkenness on that morning and his lack of sleep, 
his toxic relationship with [the victim], in this argument, that rage that was 
fueled by jealousy from this newly formed triangle of love, fueled intensely by 
jealousy and intoxication, that these factors led [the appellant] into this 
rage, to the state of mind where jealousy and anger  not at this point alcohol 
consuming him, but jealousy and anger and rage.

 
 
            
These factors and the evidence you will hear, the evidence that you will 
see this week, I submit will not lead you to first degree homicide, as the State 
wants you to believe, but will lead you to what the State Legislature has said 
was manslaughter, a crime of passion.  Thank you.

 
 
[¶32]   During his closing argument, one of the 
appellant's attorneys again stated more than one time that the appellant 
"stabbed" the victim, in addition to the following:

 
 
            
It's important to note at the outset that in my opening statement I told 
you that I would not stand up here and look each and every one of you in the 
eye, and that I was not going to tell you [the appellant] did not stab [the 
victim].  . . 
.

 
 
            
So right at the outset we told you what this case was about.  . . .

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
. . . the heat of passion.

 
 
            
That's what the case is about.  It's what our story is about, our movie.  We're no 
fluff.  We're 
talking about a love triangle.  We're talking about a limited amount of 
durational time here.  
When you apply the facts of our movie, of the Manslaughter case with the 
law, you come to one conclusion, that [the appellant] is guilty, yes, but he is 
guilty of a crime of passion, heat of passion.  He'[s] guilty of Manslaughter.  Thank You.

 
 
[¶33]   An attorney

 
 
undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding 
"important decisions," including questions of overarching defense strategy. Strickland [v. Washington], 466 U.S. [668] at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052 [80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)].  That obligation, however, does not require 
counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to "every tactical decision."  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988) (an attorney has authority to manage most 
aspects of the defense without obtaining his client's approval).  But certain 
decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such 
moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate.  A defendant, this 
Court affirmed, has "the ultimate authority" to determine "whether to plead 
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal."  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  Concerning those 
decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent 
to the recommended course of action.

 
 
            
A guilty plea, we recognized in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), is an event of signal significance in a 
criminal proceeding.  
By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives constitutional rights that 
inhere in a criminal trial, including the right to trial by jury, the protection 
against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one's accusers.  Id., at 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709.  While a 
guilty plea may be tactically advantageous for the defendant, id., at 240, 89 S. Ct. 1709, the plea is not simply a 
strategic choice; it is "itself a conviction," id., 
at 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, and the high stakes for the defendant require "the utmost 
solicitude," id., at 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709.  Accordingly, 
counsel lacks authority to consent to a guilty plea on a client's behalf, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 6-7, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1966); moreover, a defendant's tacit acquiescence in the decision 
to plead is insufficient to render the plea valid, Boykin, 395 U.S., at 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709.

 
 

Florida v. Nixon, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 551, 
560, 160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004).

 
 
[¶34]   The United States Supreme Court has 
stated:

 
 

Cronic recognized a narrow exception to Strickland's holding that a defendant who asserts 
ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate not only that his attorney's 
performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced the 
defense.  Cronic instructed that a presumption of prejudice would 
be in order in "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that 
the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified."  
[United 
States v. Cronic,] 466 U.S. [648] at 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039 [80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984)].  The Court elaborated:  "[I]f counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the 
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."  Id., at 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039; see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-697, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 
152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002) (for Cronic's presumed 
prejudice standard to apply, counsel's "failure must be complete").  We illustrated just 
how infrequently the "surrounding circumstances [will] justify a presumption of 
ineffectiveness" in Cronic itself.  In that case, we 
reversed a Court of Appeals ruling that ranked as prejudicially inadequate the 
performance of an inexperienced, under-prepared attorney in a complex mail fraud 
trial.  466 
U.S., at 662, 666, 104 S. Ct. 2039.

 
 

Nixon, 125 S. Ct.  at 562.  In Wyoming, we have set forth the 
following analytical framework:

 
 
            
Although we ordinarily adhere to the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled 
with prejudice, there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances . . . 
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect 
in a particular case is unjustified."  United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 
104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), . . .  The complete denial of counsel is one such 
circumstance.  
Cronic, 
466 U.S.  at 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039.  Another 
exists where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing."  Id.  . . . Where such 
circumstances are shown to exist, prejudice will be presumed without inquiry 
into the actual performance at trial.  Id.  Wyoming recognizes this narrow line 
of cases in which prejudice is presumed.  Olsen v. State, 
2003 WY 46, ¶ 75, 67 P.3d 536, ¶ 75 (Wyo.2003) (citing Herdt v. State, 816 P.2d 1299, 1301-02 (Wyo.1991)).

 
 
            
Among the many jurisdictions that have applied the Cronic test, a number, including Wyoming, have done so in cases 
involving a concession of guilt by the defendant's counsel.  Olsen, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536.  Such a concession, 
it is reasoned, constitutes a failure on the part of defense counsel to subject 
the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing . . ..

 
 
            
Under the Cronic analysis, concessions of 
guilt by counsel are deemed per se prejudicial where such concessions amount to 
a failure on the part of defense counsel to subject the prosecution's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing.  In the words of the Brown court, it is only where the record as a whole 
demonstrates that counsel acted less like an adversary and more like an advocate 
for the state that a breakdown in the adversarial process occurs rendering the 
outcome of the proceeding unreliable and violating the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  Brown [v. Rice], 
693 F. Supp. 381 [(W.D.N.C. 1988)].

 
 

Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶¶ 38-39, 56, 76 P.3d 323, 337, 341 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

[¶35]   We considered a nearly identical issue 
in Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 
2003).  Olsen was convicted of "capital/first degree 
murder and robbery" for killing three people and robbing a bar.  Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 67 P.3d  at 546, 
547.  Olsen 
confessed that he had killed the three victims to his mother and also several 
different times to law enforcement.  Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8-9, 67 P.3d  at 
548-49.  Olsen 
entered a not guilty plea.  Id. at ¶ 11, 67 P.3d  at 
549.  At trial, 
his counsel told the prospective jury panel during voir dire that

 
 
Olsen admitted his guilt, and the single issue before them 
was whether he had committed first degree murder or second degree murder.  Defense counsel 
explained that intoxication was a defense to first degree murder, and he 
intended to show that Olsen did not premeditate the murders.

 
 

Id. at ¶ 14, 67 P.3d  at 550.  In particular, counsel stated:

 
 
            
"Ladies and gentlemen, before we start I'm going to tell you, I'm going 
to admit to you, that the issue in this case will not involve who did the 
shootings.  
That won't be the issue.  We admit, ladies and gentlemen, that Martin 
Olsen shot all three of the individuals concerned in this case; Emma McCoid, 
Kyle Baumstarck, Art Taylor.  That he did that on the evening of January 
the 20th, we admit that, that he shot them.  They were facedown and he shot them in the 
back of the head.  
That he took money from that establishment and he left.  He was ultimately 
captured near Buffalo.  We admit all those 
facts, ladies and gentlemen, they are facts.  They are there.  He's confessed to 
it . . ..  He's 
not only confessed to police officers he's confessed to his mother.

 
 
            
So before we start, I wanted to get that on the table. That won't be an 
issue.  
Okay.  
Do all of you understand then what I just told you?  Do all of you 
understand that?  
What will be an issue in this particular case, ladies and gentlemen, is 
the degree of guilt.  
That's why we're here."

 
 

Id. at ¶ 70, 67 P.3d  at 563.

 
 
[¶36]   The jury was ultimately instructed on 
first-degree murder, felony murder, second-degree murder, aggravated robbery, 
simple robbery, and larceny.  In its closing argument, the defense attacked 
the State's evidence, emphasized the evidence as to Olsen's intoxication, and 
asked the jury for a verdict of second-degree murder.  Id. at ¶ 19, 67 P.3d  at 
551.  The jury 
found Olsen guilty of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder, three 
counts of felony murder, and aggravated robbery, and sentenced Olsen to 
death.  
Id. at 
¶ 56, 67 P.3d  at 559.

 
 
[¶37]   On appeal, Olsen argued that his 
"counsel conceded his guilt without pursuing the affirmative defense [of not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency]."  Id. at ¶ 70, 67 P.3d  at 
564.  
After resolving that issue,18 we further 
stated:

 
 
            
Our independent review requires that we examine whether trial counsel's 
admission of guilt to the shootings violates the rule that "the admission by 
counsel of his client's guilt to the jury[ ] represents a paradigmatic example 
of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a presumption 
of prejudice."  
United 
States v. 
Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1511 (10th Cir.1995).  Wyoming recognizes that there are 
cases of deficient performances where prejudice is presumed.  Herdt v. State, 816 P.2d 1299, 1301-02 (Wyo.1991).  . . .

 
 
. . .

 
 
The Eighth Circuit has considered similar facts and 
concluded that admitting the act but denying the requisite mental state by an 
intoxication defense to first degree murder charges is not the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea.  Nielsen v. Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th 
Cir.1995); Parker v. Lockhart, 907 F.2d 859, 861 
(8th Cir.1990).  
We agree with that analysis and find that the concession here was, 
tactically, a reasonable attempt to avoid a first degree murder conviction in 
light of Olsen's several confessions that he had shot the victims.  We find no 
error.

 
 

Olsen, 2003 WY 46, ¶¶ 75-76, 67 P.3d  at 565-66.

 
 

[¶38]   We find that the circumstances in the 
instant case are quite similar to the circumstances in Olsen.  "Whether such an admission [of guilt] 
actually occurred is necessarily fact-intensive."  United States v. 
Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1511 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 882 (1995).  In the instant case, the appellant was 
charged with first-degree premeditated murder and entered a "not guilty" plea to 
that charge.  
The evidence that the appellant stabbed and killed the victim was 
overwhelming:  
(1) Cunningham witnessed the stabbing; (2) the appellant stated to 
Lacquement that the appellant "might be going down this time" and believed the 
victim had been "stabbed or killed"; (3) the appellant confessed to Richards 
multiple times that he killed the victim and also stated that he "stabbed" her 
"in the heart"; (4) the appellant confessed to his father that he killed the 
victim; (5) the appellant confessed to Detective Elliott in a tape-recorded 
statement that he stabbed the victim, left the knife in his kitchen sink, and 
verified that the victim was deadthe appellant further stated that Cunningham 
did not participate in the stabbing; and (6) the victim's blood was identified 
on the appellant's right hand, and on the knife found in the appellant's kitchen 
sink.  The 
appellant acknowledges that "[t]here can be no question that this was a 
difficult case" for his trial counsel.

 
 

[¶39]   It is apparent from the record that, 
facing this evidence, the appellant's trial counsel sought to avoid a 
first-degree murder conviction by admitting that the appellant stabbed and 
killed the victim, undermining the requisite mental state for first-degree 
murder due to the appellant's intoxication,19 and asking 
the jury for a verdict of manslaughter based on the circumstances surrounding 
the stabbing.  
We concluded in Olsen that a nearly identical 
approach was "not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea" and that it was, 
tactically, "a reasonable attempt to avoid a first degree murder conviction in 
light of Olsen's several confessions that he had shot the victims."20  Olsen, 2003 WY 
46, ¶ 76, 67 P.3d  at 566.  See generally also, 
for example, Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 835 (2000); United States v. 
Johnson-Wilder, 29 F.3d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1994); and State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235, 1239-41 (Fla. 2001).  "The fact that [the appellant's] theory was 
ultimately unsuccessful does not require a holding that he did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel."  Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 822 (Wyo. 1996).

 
 

[¶40]   We add that the instant case is not the 
kind envisioned by United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), wherein the appellant's trial counsel completely or 
entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 
testing.  In 
fact, trial counsel in the instant case:

 
 
1.         
Filed several pretrial motions and succeeded in excluding some 
potentially damaging testimony.

 
 
2.         
Presented an opening statement, during which statement counsel emphasized 
the evidence he expected would tell the "rest of the story" (as opposed to the 
prosecution's version), including the severity of the appellant's drinking 
problem, the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the victim, 
the appellant's drinking leading up to the stabbing, and the circumstances 
surrounding the stabbing.

 
 
3.         
Made numerous trial objections.

 
 
4.         
Cross-examined most of the trial witnesses, and cross-examined Cunningham 
extensively regarding his intoxication level during the relevant time period, 
how much alcohol the appellant had consumed and his resulting level of 
intoxication, a potential inconsistent prior statement to law enforcement, and a 
potential contradiction between Cunningham's testimony and that of a bartender 
as to Cunningham's demeanor August 16.

 
 
5.         
Made a motion for a judgment of acquittal.

 
 
6.         
Presented a closing argument, during which argument counsel recited the 
presumption of innocence and the applicable burden of proof, referenced the 
second-degree murder and manslaughter jury instructions, attacked the manner in 
which the prosecution presented its case (equating it to a "bad movie" that the 
prosecution attempted to overcome by presenting its case so that it would be 
more appealing to the jury), emphasized the appellant's extensive alcohol 
consumption in general and on the night in question, emphasized Cunningham's 
demeanor and extensive drinking on the night in question, emphasized the 
victim's intoxicated state, and concluded with a detailed argument (including 
the appellant's mental state at the time of the stabbing) as to why the 
circumstances surrounding the stabbing did not support "premeditation" as 
opposed to "heat of passion."

 
 

[¶41]   The district court characterized the 
appellant's trial defense as "competent and emphatic."  See generally Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 
1207-08 (10th Cir. 2004) and Cooks v. Ward, 
165 F.3d 1283, 1293-96 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 834 (1999).

 
 

[¶42]   The appellant does not further analyze 
this issue pursuant to the Strickland standard.  See Sincock, 2003 WY 115, ¶¶ 39, 57-59, 76 P.3d  at 337, 
341-42.

 
 

 
 
[¶43]   The appellant argues that the district 
court failed properly to instruct the jury on the premeditation element of 
first-degree murder.  
According to the appellant, the jury instructions given to the jury in 
the instant case were "misleading, incomplete, inadequate and confusing" because 
the

 
 
"premeditation" instruction . . . emphasized that 
premeditation implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the 
intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which results in death, 
but did not inform the jury that [the appellant] also had to have deliberated upon the intent 
or design to kill, which cannot happen in "an interval, however brief."

 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  The appellant claims the jury instructions in 
the instant case "do not explain that a person can have the intent to kill, but 
not have the 
rational and reflective intent to commit premeditated murder""the decision to 
kill must be made after careful thought and deliberation and it cannot be a 
rash impulse.'"  
(Emphasis in original.)  The appellant cites to a California pattern jury instruction quoted from 
a California case,21 Black's Law Dictionary definitions of 
"deliberate," a Tennessee 
case, and an Arizona case as examples of how a 
jury should be instructed.  He concludes that

 
 
[s]o long as this Court continues to adhere to the notion 
that "premeditation" "implies an interval, however brief, between the formation 
of the intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which results in 
death," a notion not specified by the Wyoming Legislature, without any regard to 
"deliberation," state prosecutors will continue to charge an otherwise second 
degree murder case, or manslaughter, as first degree murder, and juries will 
continue to render guilty verdicts for first degree murder, even as common sense 
tells oneself that such cases are not what the Wyoming Legislature intended as 
first degree homicide.

 
 
            
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶44]               
            
"It is . . . well established that a trial court has a duty to instruct a 
jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case at issue.  A trial court is 
given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions 
correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, 
reversible error will not be found.  Instructions must be considered as a whole, 
and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and 
considered in isolation.  Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶ 9 
(Wyo.2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 
(Wyo.2000).

 
 
            
Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the 
instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and 
prejudiced the defendant.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000).  Prejudicial error must be demonstrated, and 
prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the 
jury with respect to the proper principles of law.  Wilson 
v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000).  Further, a failure to instruct properly on an 
element of a crime does not constitute plain error where evidence of the 
defendant's guilt is overwhelming.  Id."

 
 

Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 4, 79 P.3d 526, 529-30 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Black v. 
State, 2002 WY 72, ¶¶ 4-7, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶45]   The appellant did not object to the 
jury instructions relevant to this issue at trial, nor did the appellant propose 
any alternative jury instructions to the district court consistent with his 
appellate argument on this issue.  We therefore apply the plain error standard 
of review:

 
 
            
"First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be 
error.  Second, 
appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated 
in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.  Last, the appellant must prove that he was 
denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him."

 
 

Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 
2001) (quoting In Interest 
of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo. 1988)).

 
 
            
Discussion

 
 
[¶46]   The district court instructed the jury 
in the instant case on the elements of first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, and manslaughter.  The appellant's contentions concern the 
substantive jury instructions on first-degree murder.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(a) provides, in pertinent part, that whoever "purposely and with 
premeditated malice . . . kills any human being is guilty of murder in 
the first degree."  
The jury instructions given on first-degree murder in the instant case 
provided, in pertinent part:

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Murder in the First Degree, as charged in 
this case, are:

 
 
1.  On or about the 17th day of August, 2002;

 
 
2.  In Sweetwater 
County, Wyoming;

 
 
3.  The Defendant, [the appellant];

 
 
4.  Purposely; and

 
 
5.  With premeditated malice;

 
 
6.  Killed [the victim].

 
 
            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the defendant guilty.

 
 
            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12

 
 
            
"Premeditated malice" means that the Defendant thought about and 
considered the idea of killing before the act which caused death was committed, 
and that the act which caused death was done with intent to kill and without 
legal justification or excuse.

 
 
            
"Premeditated" implies an interval, however brief, between the formation 
of the intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which results in 
death.

 
 
            
"Purposely" means intentionally.

 
 
            
"Malice" means the state of mind in which an intentional act is done 
without legal justification or excuse.  The term "malice" conveys the meaning of 
hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.

 
 
These instructions mirror W.Cr.P.J.I. §§ 21.01A, 21.01B, 
21.01C, and 21.01D (2004).22

 
 

[¶47]   We recently considered a nearly 
identical argument in Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶¶ 
41-44, 98 P.3d 857, 873-74 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
Pena argues that the instructions as given could allow a 
jury to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder simply because the 
defendant had the intent to kill.  Pena argues the instructions did not inform 
the jury that a person could have the intent to kill but still not be guilty of 
first degree murder because he did not have the required rational and reflective 
thought necessary for premeditation.  If the jury instructions had adequately 
defined premeditation, Pena continues, then there is the possibility that the 
jury would have found that the State had not carried its burden of proving 
premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
The jury instructions, however, were taken directly from 
the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.  Pena did not object to the jury instructions 
at trial.  The 
jury was instructed "premeditated malice' means that the defendant thought 
about and considered the idea of killing before the act which caused death was 
committed, and that the act which caused death was done with intent to kill and 
without legal justification or excuse."  We are unsure from the argument presented in 
Pena's opening brief if Pena is ignoring the jury instruction requirement that 
the defendant "thought about and considered the idea of killing before the act" 
or if Pena simply concludes that the phrase "thought about and considered" is 
not sufficient to adequately inform the jury that something beyond mere intent 
to kill is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of first-degree murder.  Pena only argues 
that the jury instructions failed to instruct the jury that it had to find 
something beyond the intent to kill to find first degree murder.

 
 
In another sufficiency of the evidence case, Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1979), this Court 
stated that:

 
 
"The defendant's argument is better designed for jury 
consumption than an appellate court's.  A failure on the part of the State to prove 
malice and premeditation are principally urged by defendant.  Malice can be 
presumed from use of a firearm.  Goodman v. State, 
Wyo.1977, 573 P.2d 400, 414.  The word premeditated' when used in 
reference to first-degree murder, implies an interval, however brief, between 
the formation of the intent or design and the commission of the act.  State v. Riggle, 1956, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, reh. den. 76 
Wyo. at 63, 300 P.2d 567, cert.den. 
352 U.S. 981, 77 S. Ct. 384, 1 L. Ed. 2d 366; Loy v. State, 
1919, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796."

 
 

Collins, at 1292.  The pattern jury instructions reflect the 
decision in Collins.  This is still the law in Wyoming:

 
 
"In Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 493, 
we reiterated the meaning of premeditation:

 
 
It [premeditation] is the "thinking over, deliberating 
upon, weighing in the mind beforehand, resulting in a deliberate intention to 
kill which constitutes the killing murder in the first degree."  Parker v. State, 24 Wyo. 491, 502, 161 P. 552, 555 
(1916).  
Premeditation may be inferred from the facts and circumstances.  Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 206 (Wyo.1986); Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 407 (Wyo.1977).'

 
 
Persons convicted of premeditated murder often have 
questioned what amount of time is required in thinking over' or deliberating 
upon' for juries to find that sufficient premeditation existed.  Our rule is:

 
 
Premeditation need not have existed for any given length 
of time before the act, it being sufficient that it existed at the time of the 
act; and the intent and the act may be as instantaneous as successive 
thoughts.  Sandoval v. People, 117 Colo. 588, 192 P.2d 423 
(1948).'

 
 

Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 207 
(Wyo.1986)).  
See also Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 17 
(Wyo.1993); Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1292 
(Wyo.1979)."

 
 

Hightower v. State, 901 P.2d 397, 403 (Wyo.1995).  We think the jury 
instruction adequately conveys the definition of premeditation under Wyoming law.

 
 
Besides a suggestion that Wyoming should adopt California jury instructions, Pena presents no 
cogent argument and cites to no pertinent authority that we should change the 
law of premeditation in Wyoming.  The jury was 
adequately instructed on the meaning of the definition of premeditation as it 
currently exists under Wyoming law, and there 
was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of first degree murder.

 
 
(Footnote omitted.)

 
 

[¶48]   Pena apparently argued in his reply 
brief that "Wyoming's law of premeditation is 
incorrect and should be clarified."  Pena, 2004 WY 
115, ¶ 44 n.6, 98 P.3d  at 874 n.6.  We responded as follows:

 
 
In his reply brief he presents the argument in a direct 
attack of the jury instructions under the plain error standard.  Pena did not frame 
a challenge to the jury instructions in his opening brief.  A reply brief is 
not the place for an appellant to present new issues.  It certainly is not 
the place to raise a new issue of constitutional magnitude.  Even if this Court 
were to address the issue, there would be no need for this Court to make a 
definitive decision regarding the exact definition of premeditation.  The evidence in 
this case supports any definition that the defense might argue.  Pena retrieved his 
rifle and loaded it telling his wife he was going to kill her.  He then carried the 
rifle around with him for at least a half hour as he continued a heated argument 
with his wife.  
It can reasonably be inferred that Pena had plenty of time to 
premeditate, deliberate or otherwise think about and consider killing his 
wife.  The 
portion of the reply brief presenting argument on the definition of 
premeditation is stricken as being violative of W.R.A.P. 7.03.

 
 

Id.

 
 

[¶49]   In the instant case, the appellant 
similarly appears to ignore the fact that the jury was instructed in Instruction 
No. 12 that the appellant was required to have "thought about and considered the idea of killing before 
the act which caused death was committed,"  that the act which 
caused death was done with intent to kill and without legal justification or 
excuse, and that premeditation implies an interval, however brief, between the 
formation of the intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which 
results in death.  
(Emphasis added.)  As we said in Pena, this was a correct statement of existing law in 
Wyoming.  Pena, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 43, 98 P.3d  at 874.  See also Duke, 
2004 WY 120, ¶ 77, 99 P.3d  at 951.  Nor has the appellant sufficiently 
articulated how the evidence in the instant case, when viewed according to the 
jury instructions given, was susceptible to the kind of jury confusion alleged 
by the appellant.  
Accordingly, the appellant has not established that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, and not merely 
arguable, way and has not demonstrated the requisite prejudice.23

 
 

 
 

[¶50]   The appellant claims that the district 
court abused its discretion by denying the appellant's pretrial request for 
substitute counsel.  
The appellant sent a letter to the district court dated February 14, 
2003.  In the 
letter, the appellant requested a change in counsel for several reasons.  The district court 
held a hearing on March 6, 2003, during which hearing the appellant presented 
his concerns and trial counsel responded to the concerns.  The district court 
characterized the difficulties between the appellant and counsel as a 
"deterioration in communication," denied the appellant's request, and ordered 
the appellant to communicate "with [his] attorneys in a reasonable 
fashion."  The 
district court noted that it was evident from the court file that counsel had 
"worked on [the appellant's] case, but they need to talk to you and you need to 
talk with them, and you also need to listen to them."  Having carefully 
reviewed the record and the applicable legal standard found in Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶¶ 27, 30, 43 P.3d 551, 
560-61 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 899 
(2002), we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the appellant's request for substitute counsel at that 
time.

 
 
[¶51]   Affirmed.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Cunningham was 
admittedly an alcoholic during the relevant time period and indicated that he 
had thirteen prior convictions in Utah for driving while under the 
influence.  At 
least one of these offenses was a felony, for which Cunningham served time in 
prison.  
Cunningham testified at trial that he and the appellant were "heavy 
drinkers."  The 
appellant's father confirmed that the appellant had a "bad" drinking 
problem.

   2Cunningham's neighbor testified that she heard 
the appellant and Cunningham arguing about 9:15 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. The appellant 
was "very angry" and yelling, but at some point the situation calmed and 
Cunningham and the appellant began to talk in normal tones.

  3The bartender 
testified that Cunningham and the appellant were at the bar for fifteen or 
twenty minutes and they each drank a beer.  According to the bartender, the appellant 
remained standing the entire time he was in the bar; the appellant "walked 
straight" and "talked straight."

  4Cunningham 
testified that he did not recall the two drinking at the Rage bar and that to 
this point in the evening he personally observed the appellant consume maybe 
five or six beers.

  5Officer Jason 
Love testified that when he interviewed Cunningham the next morning, Cunningham 
stated that they had "[q]uite a few" drinks at the Rage bar, the appellant was 
"pretty drunk," and they left the bar at 2:30 a.m.

  6Cunningham 
testified that he remembered the appellant making a phone call while driving 
from the Rage bar to the appellant's residence.

  7Officer Freeman 
noted on a "book in" form that the appellant did not appear disoriented, 
confused or unconscious, and did not exhibit any signs of alcohol or drug 
influence.

  8For contextual 
purposes, trial testimony indicated that the appellant and Cunningham left the 
Rage bar between 12:30 a.m. and 2:30 a.m., the appellant admittedly slept for 
two hours in the interim, and the stabbing occurred at roughly 5:40 a.m.

  9The appellant's 
hands were bagged at the time of the interview to preserve potential blood 
evidence, and the appellant actually initialed and signed the "Miranda Rights" 
form at 10:40 a.m., about an hour after Detective Elliott actually advised the 
appellant of his Miranda rights.  A handwritten notation on the form, which 
notation was initialed by the appellant, states that he was informed of his 
rights prior to giving the statement but signed the form after the paper bags 
were removed from his hands.

  10In addition to 
initialing each right listed on the "Miranda Rights" form, the form contained 
the following advisement:

 
 
I HAVE READ 
THIS STATEMENT OF MY RIGHTS AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT MY RIGHTS ARE.  I AM WILLING TO 
MAKE A STATEMENT AND ANSWER QUESTIONS.  I DO NOT WANT A LAWYER AT THIS TIME.  I UNDERSTAND AND 
KNOW WHAT I AM DOING.  
NO PROMISE OR THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ME AND NO PRESSURE OR COERCION OF 
ANY KIND HAS BEEN USED AGAINST ME.

 
 
  11The appellant 
does not argue that any ineffectiveness of counsel or other error occurred at 
trial with respect to the voluntariness issue.

  12"Once the 
State has met its burden and rebutted the presumption of involuntariness, the 
defendant may be required to present evidence demonstrating the involuntariness 
of his statements.'"  
Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 
(Wyo. 1999)).

  13Our standard 
for appellate review of the denial of a suppression motion is as follows:

 
 
A trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress 
a statement on the grounds that it was made involuntarily is reviewed de novo.  In conducting such a review, we defer to the 
trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  This Court 
considers all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence 
and to assess the credibility of witnesses.

 
 

Lara, 2001 WY 53, ¶ 
9, 25 P.3d  at 510.

  14It is 
perplexing that the appellant's trial counsel did not present this evidence at 
the suppression hearing, but the record is silent as to why that did not 
occur.

  15A reasonable 
probability "is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 
of the trial."  
Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 81, 67 P.3d 536, 567 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

            
The appellant's burden to show prejudice resulting from the alleged 
ineffectiveness of counsel at the suppression hearing is akin to the showing 
required for failing to file a suppression motion:  "[p]rejudice to a 
defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been 
granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, "only a limited amount of 
evidence was available to the prosecution to support a conviction."'"  Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Lancaster v. 
State, 2002 
WY 45, ¶ 59, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002) and Dickeson v. 
State, 843 P.2d 606, 612 (Wyo. 1992)); and see Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 821 (Wyo. 1996).  See also Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1080-81 
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).

  16See also, for example, Boggs v. Bair, 892 F.2d 1193, 
1198-99 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940 (1990); Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 (Alaska 
1980); State v. Rowe, 479 A.2d 1296, 
1299 (Me. 1984); State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 
330 N.W.2d 462, 466-67 (1983); Wanda Ellen 
Wakefield, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing that 
Voluntariness of Confession or Admission was Affected by Alcohol or Other 
Drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419 (1983 and Supp. 2004); and 3 William 
E. Ringel, Searches 
& Seizures Arrests and Confessions § 25:15 (2d ed. 2005).

  
17The record is not conclusive as to whether the 
appellant consented to the particular approach at issue.  At a pretrial 
hearing on the appellant's request for substitute counsel, the appellant was 
concerned that his counsel had "made no attempts to establish any proof that I 
did it or that I did not do it."  Amidst the discussion of several concerns 
expressed by the appellant, one of the appellant's attorneys mentioned that a 
"conflict in what type of defense, whether it's a trial on the merits that [the 
appellant] is not guilty or if it would be a defense of a lesser included 
offense" can "[s]ometimes . . . present communication problems."  In addition, 
co-counsel responded as follows to the appellant's concern that he had only met 
with that attorney one time:

 
 
            
. . . I'm not required to meet with him on a daily basis, weekly 
basis.  He's 
never made any request to meet with me.  I've met with [co-counsel] many, many times 
about this case, been in contact with it.  Basically I've done jury instructions on this 
case, I've done an investigation, directed investigators on this case, and just 
because I haven't met with him doesn't mean anything.

 
 
. . .

 
 
. . . [I]f the Court relieves us, we'll just have to get 
new counsel and they're going to have exactly the same kind of problems with 
[the appellant] that we have because, obviously, [the appellant] wants to go on 
a different direction than his confession, what the evidence indicates, and 
wants to go on a different direction on his trial.  . . .

 
 
. . . [W]e're doing everything we possibly can for [the 
appellant].  
We're investigating his case, we're doing jury instructions, we're 
getting ready for trial.  And we're simply just not doing what he wants 
us to do with it, but that's a problem that's going to exist down the line.

 
 
It is not clear from this discussion whether the object of 
the tension between counsel and the appellant was solely the extent of the 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the stabbing (although we note 
that the evidence that the appellant himself stabbed the victim was 
overwhelming, counsel represented that an investigation had been conducted and 
perhaps the appellant was simply not aware of the extent of that investigation 
due to communication issues between counsel and the appellant, the appellant 
acknowledged during the hearing that the public defender's investigator had 
recently personally assisted him, and the appellant did not specify during the 
hearing precisely what he wanted), or whether it also encompassed a 
misunderstanding or miscommunication as to how to defend the case in general, 
the particular trial strategy at issue on appeal, or other unknown issues 
resulting from counsel's consultations with the appellant.  The referenced 
remarks were very general in nature and were expressed in "piecemeal" fashion, 
further impairing this Court's ability to evaluate the circumstances.

 
 
At a hearing on the appellant's post-trial request for 
substitute counsel at sentencing, the appellant stated that his counsel

 
 
sent [him] the 
opening statement and I disagreed with that.  He was going to print up two more, two 
different ones, supposed to show me them.  He didn't show me copies of them prior to the 
trial . . ..

 
 
And then we go to the trial, he's got  he comes up with 
this, "[the appellant] is guilty of this, you know, of killing [the victim,]" 
and tells the jury not to accept this statement and that it's just hearsay.

 
 
"I do not 
remember what happened the evening of this incident or the morning, and I've . . 
. tried to tell both of my attorneys that from the very start.  And I asked for 
help to try and find out what did happen because I have no recollection of what 
. . . went on."  
Counsel responded that he was

 
 
stuck because 
there's attorney/client privilege and anything I say that would go against what 
[the appellant] says, is going to be detrimental to him.  . . .  I've taken this 
abuse for eight months.  I poured my heart and soul into that trial 
and everything was great after my closing statement, and now things have 
changed."

 
 
It is not clear 
from this discussion what, substantively, was contained in the opening statement 
referenced by the appellant, to which part of that opening statement the 
appellant objected, whether a new strategy or opening statement was subsequently 
developed, or precisely what counsel had discussed with the appellant in this 
regard.  
Further, trial counsel's remarks indicate that he would dispute the 
appellant's version of what occurred to some unknown extent, and that all seemed 
to have been well between counsel and the appellant during the trial until the 
appellant received an unfavorable verdict.

 
 
            
It does not appear that the appellant requested a hearing on this issue 
pursuant to Calene 
v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993) in order to establish a more complete 
record.  We 
note that issues of this nature often traverse a very fine line.  We have previously 
explained the duties of defense counsel to his client, as well as the manner in 
which conflicts of this nature could be better preserved in the record.  See Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1040-41 (Wyo. 2000).

  18In the context 
of this particular issue, we noted that because "neither the record nor this 
appeal suggest otherwise, we assume that Olsen consented to a trial strategy of 
admitting during voir dire to shooting the victims either to avoid the death 
penalty through convictions for second degree murder or to reduce culpability in 
the sentencing phase."  Olsen, 2003 WY 
46, ¶ 71, 67 P.3d  at 564.

  19The jury was 
instructed that if they found

 
 
that the 
defendant, at the time of the offense was suffering from self-induced 
intoxication to such a degree that there is a reasonable doubt in your minds 
whether the defendant possessed the mental ability to form premeditated malice 
necessary for First Degree Murder, then you should find the defendant not guilty 
of the crime of First Degree Murder.

  20The appellant 
attempts to distinguish Olsen and the legal 
authority cited therein because the appellant "did not make multiple 
confessions," he made "one confession to law enforcement, while most likely 
still highly intoxicated," and Cunningham "was a long-term alcoholic who was 
intoxicated, and whose story did not even match the details of" the appellant's 
confession.  
The appellant also emphasizes that the instant case is not one in which 
the appellant actually testified at trial and admitted that he stabbed the 
victim.  
However:  
(1) the record reveals that in addition to Cunningham's eyewitness 
testimony regarding the stabbing, the appellant confessed that he stabbed and/or 
killed the victim to his father, to two friends, and to law enforcement; (2) we 
note that Cunningham's testimony was also consistent with the appellant's 
statement to law enforcement in many ways, and nothing in the record undermines 
the reliability of his testimony that the appellant stabbed and killed the 
victim; and (3) Olsen did not testify at his trial (Olsen, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 550).

  21The appellant 
argues that we should "adopt the definitions and jury instructions used in 
conjunction with" this California authority because the Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 494-95 (Wyo. 1992) decision quotes from 
People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423, 441 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1037 
(1989) for the proposition that the killing must be 
the result of "a preexisting reflection'" after "careful thought and weighing 
of considerations . . ..'"

  22Clearly, the definition of "malice" does not take into 
account our discussion of the term in Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶¶ 16-33, 64 P.3d 104, 
109-114 (Wyo. 2003), which was published only two months before the trial in 
this case, but no issue has been raised in that regard.

 
 
  23As an 
extension of this argument, the appellant also merely asserts that the evidence 
at trial was insufficient to prove that the appellant deliberated prior to 
stabbing the victim and in a one-sentence argument that if the burden was on the 
appellant to object to, or propose alternative, jury instructions, the 
appellant's trial counsel "was ineffective . . .."  These conclusory 
statements can hardly be deemed cogent argument.