Title: People v. Lander

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 98433-Agenda 7-March 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							DONALD A. LANDER, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal, we consider whether: (1) defendant Donald A.
Lander's court-appointed attorneys were required to comply with
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), when his pro se
postconviction petition was not timely filed; and (2) the allegations in
defendant's pleadings were sufficient to establish the delay in filing
was not due to his culpable negligence. We hold that defendant's
attorneys were required to comply with Rule 651(c) in these
circumstances, and defendant failed to establish he was not culpably
negligent in the late filing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments
below and remand to the circuit court for further postconviction
proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND
	Defendant Donald A. Lander was convicted of aggravated
battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 1994)) and sentenced
to 18 years' imprisonment. In a decision filed on March 15, 2000, the
appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People
v. Lander, No. 3-98-0698 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). On August 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at his trial and on direct appeal. Defendant's postconviction
petition was accompanied by a motion for leave to file a late petition.
	In his motion, defendant alleged he spoke with a law clerk
employed by the prison and several "jailhouse lawyers" when he
arrived at Western Illinois Correctional Center (Western) in 1997.
Defendant was informed by these various individuals that he was
allowed three years after the date of the last court decision to file a
postconviction petition. The law clerk and jailhouse lawyers also
allegedly informed defendant that he could file affidavits with the
court and they would be treated as a postconviction petition.
Defendant alleged he filed affidavits in the trial court in December
1998 and March 1999, believing they would be treated as a
postconviction petition.
	Defendant further alleged he was transferred to Taylorville
Correctional Center (Taylorville) in May 2000. When he arrived,
defendant spoke with a staff member in the law library who stated law
clerks had not been available at the prison for the past six months.
Defendant then informed the prison librarian of the advice he had
received from the law clerk and jailhouse lawyers at Western. The
prison librarian confirmed defendant was allowed three years after the
date of the appellate court decision to file his postconviction petition
and that the affidavits he filed would be treated as a postconviction
petition. Defendant alleged he was unaware of the deadline for filing
a postconviction petition due to his lack of legal knowledge.
	At the first stage of the proceedings, the trial court found
defendant's pro se petition was not frivolous or patently without merit
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)). The court appointed two
attorneys to represent defendant. Defendant's appointed counsel then
filed an amended motion for leave to file a postconviction petition,
asserting defendant's pro se petition was in fact timely filed. In a
subsequently filed second amended motion prepared by defendant's
attorneys, defendant sought to withdraw his amended motion and
restated more specifically the allegations in his previous pro se motion
for leave to file a late petition. In particular, defendant alleged that in
October 1997, he spoke with a law clerk at Western who stated the
time for filing a postconviction petition did not expire until three years
after the last court rendered a decision. Defendant identified Harold
Anderson as an "inmate and jailhouse lawyer" at Western who stated
defendant could file affidavits that would be treated by the court as a
postconviction petition. Defendant alleged Kimberly Wells, Sherry
Wells, and Lori Ann Lander filed affidavits on his behalf in December
1998 and March 1999, asserting someone other than defendant was
responsible for the victim's injuries.
	The second amended motion also identified Dwayne Purble as the
"librarian or paralegal" in the Taylorville law library who advised him
that he had three years after the appellate court decision was issued to
file his petition and that the affidavits filed with the trial court would
be treated as a postconviction petition. Defendant asserted he was not
informed by his trial or appellate counsel of the deadline for filing a
postconviction petition, and he relied in good faith on the advice of
the only people available with purported knowledge of the law.
	No amended postconviction petition was ever filed. The State
filed a "motion to dismiss petitioner's second amended motion for
leave to file a late petition for postconviction relief." In its motion, the
State sought dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition as
untimely. Following a hearing, the trial court found the petition was
untimely and defendant had failed to establish the delay in filing was
not due to his culpable negligence. Accordingly, the trial court denied
defendant's second amended motion for leave to file a late
postconviction petition and granted the State's motion to dismiss
defendant's pro se petition.
	On appeal, defendant argued he was deprived of his right to
reasonable assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to comply
with Rule 651(c) and that he alleged sufficient facts to establish the
delay in filing his petition was not due to his culpable negligence. The
appellate court held the Rule 651(c) consultation requirement did not
apply in this case because counsel was required to argue successfully
the late filing was not due to defendant's culpable negligence before
the merits of the petition could be addressed. Therefore, counsel had
no obligation to consult with defendant to ascertain his claims of
constitutional deprivation until after the time bar was overcome. The
appellate court further noted counsel included specific dates and
names in the second amended motion in an effort to show the late
filing was not due to defendant's culpable negligence. According to
the appellate court, these actions demonstrated that counsel consulted
with defendant and made any necessary amendments to his petition as
required by Rule 651(c).
	In reviewing defendant's claim that he was misinformed by
various lay people concerning the filing deadline for his postconviction
petition, the appellate court held these allegations were insufficient to
demonstrate the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence.
The appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court. No. 3-02-0436 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a)).

II. ANALYSIS
	In this appeal, defendant contends the untimeliness of his pro se
postconviction petition did not excuse his attorneys from fulfilling
their duties under Rule 651(c) and that he was denied reasonable
assistance of counsel due to their failure to comply with the rule. The
State contends defendant's substantive claims could not have been
presented until the time bar was overcome and, therefore, his
attorneys had no obligation to comply with Rule 651(c) until they
were granted leave to file a late petition. The State also asserts the
actions of defense counsel were reasonable under the circumstances
and fulfilled the requirements of Rule 651(c).
	When a postconviction petition is dismissed without an
evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998). An indigent defendant is entitled to
appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings if the petition is not
summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS
5/122-4 (West 2000). A defendant is entitled only to the level of
assistance required by the Act, however, because the right to counsel
is wholly statutory and is not mandated by the Constitution. People v.
Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1999); People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 60 (1999). The Act requires postconviction counsel to provide a
"reasonable level of assistance" to a defendant. (Emphasis omitted.)
People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (1990).
	Supreme Court Rule 651(c) imposes specific obligations on
postconviction counsel to assure the reasonable level of assistance
required by the Act. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d  at 410. Rule 651(c) requires
that the record show counsel has: (1) consulted with the defendant
either by mail or in person to ascertain his claims of deprivation of
constitutional rights; (2) examined the record of the trial court
proceedings; and (3) made any amendments to the pro se petition
necessary for an adequate presentation of the defendant's contentions.
134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). Compliance with the duties set forth in Rule
651(c) is mandatory (People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 137 (2002)),
and may be shown by a certificate filed by postconviction counsel. 134
Ill. 2d R. 651(c). The failure to file a certificate showing compliance
with Rule 651(c) is harmless error if the record demonstrates that
counsel adequately fulfilled the required duties. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 
at 59 n.1.
	We hold that defendant's attorneys were required to comply with
Rule 651(c) despite the untimeliness of defendant's pro se petition.
We note this court has held the time requirement for filing a
postconviction petition is considered an affirmative defense that may
be raised, waived, or forfeited by the State. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101 (2002). A dutiful prosecutor may waive this defense at the
second stage of the postconviction proceedings if an untimely petition
demonstrates the defendant suffered a deprivation of constitutional
magnitude. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 101-02.
	Our holding in Boclair necessarily leads to the conclusion that
Rule 651(c) applies in these circumstances. In Boclair, we established
that the State may determine at the second stage of the proceedings
whether to raise or waive the affirmative defense of untimeliness. A
prosecutor would have no reason to waive this affirmative defense if
a meritorious constitutional claim is not presented in the petition. In
order to present defendant's constitutional claims adequately,
postconviction counsel must fully comply with the requirements of
Rule 651(c). Therefore, to assure the reasonable assistance of counsel
mandated by the Act, postconviction counsel must comply with Rule
651(c) and submit defendant's substantive claims to the State to give
the prosecutor an opportunity to determine whether they are sufficient
to merit the State's waiver of the affirmative defense of untimeliness.
Accordingly, the untimeliness of defendant's petition did not excuse
postconviction counsel from fulfilling their duties under Rule 651(c).
	In this case, counsel did not file a certificate showing compliance
with Rule 651(c) and the record does not demonstrate counsel fulfilled
the required duties. The only evidence in the record indicating counsel
may have consulted with defendant is contained in the second
amended motion seeking leave to file a late petition. The allegations
contained in that motion, however, only relate to the timeliness of the
petition and whether defendant was culpably negligent in the late
filing. Thus, even if these allegations are sufficient to show
consultation occurred, they clearly do not demonstrate that counsel
consulted with defendant to ascertain his claims of constitutional
deprivation as required by Rule 651(c).
	The failure to comply with the consultation requirement in itself
demonstrates noncompliance with Rule 651(c). Therefore, we need
not discuss whether counsel fulfilled the other duties under Rule
651(c). We conclude the performance of defendant's postconviction
counsel was unreasonable and fell below the level of assistance
mandated by Rule 651(c). This matter must be remanded to the circuit
court for further postconviction proceedings where defendant is
entitled to receive reasonable assistance of counsel.
	Defendant also contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his
petition as untimely at the second stage of the proceedings. Defendant
concedes his petition was filed outside the time limitation period of the
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000)), but argues he alleged
sufficient facts to show the delay was not due to his culpable
negligence. Defendant asserts his good-faith reliance on the advice of
"jailhouse lawyers," a prison law clerk, and a law librarian was
reasonable and cannot be considered culpable negligence. In response,
the State contends it was defendant's sole responsibility to ensure his
postconviction petition was timely filed and he could have determined
the applicable time period by a cursory review of the Act. According
to the State, defendant's reliance on the advice of lay people was
unreasonable and is not sufficient to show the late filing was not due
to his culpable negligence.
	When reviewing a motion to dismiss at the second stage of the
proceedings, we accept as true all factual allegations that are not
positively rebutted by the record. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168,
174 (2000). As previously stated, we review the dismissal of a
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing de novo.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89.
	Postconviction proceedings may not be commenced outside the
time limitation period in the Act unless the defendant alleges sufficient
facts to show the delay in filing was not due to the defendant's
culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000). In Boclair,
this court examined the meaning of the term "culpable negligence" in
the Act. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 106-08. In doing so, we reviewed
definitions of this term from several sources. These definitions
generally showed culpable negligence entails blameable neglect
involving " 'a disregard of the consequences likely to result from one's
actions.' " Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 106, quoting Black's Law Dictionary
1056 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, we concluded the culpable
negligence standard in the Act "contemplates something greater than
ordinary negligence and is akin to recklessness." Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 108.
	Defendant relies heavily on this court's recent decision in People
v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403 (2003), in arguing that the facts here show
the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. In Rissley,
the defendant alleged the attorney who represented him in his direct
appeal contacted him and informed him any postconviction proceeding
would have to be filed within three years after the date of his
conviction. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 417-18. In an attached affidavit, the
defendant's direct appeal counsel confirmed he gave the defendant this
advice. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 418. We found the defendant had no
reason to question the advice he received from his direct appeal
counsel. Based on this advice, the defendant reasonably believed he
had timely filed his petition. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 421. Applying the
standard from Boclair, we found the defendant's conduct could not
fairly be viewed as blameable and did not evince an indifference to the
likely consequences. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 421. Accordingly, we held
the defendant had established the delay in filing his petition was not
due to his culpable negligence. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 421.
	In this case, defendant alleged he received erroneous advice as to
the filing deadline for his petition from a law clerk employed by the
prison and several "jailhouse lawyers." This advice was subsequently
confirmed by Dwayne Purble, who was identified as a "librarian or
paralegal" at Taylorville. The remaining allegations in defendant's
pleadings do not pertain to the filing deadline or the reason for
defendant's late filing.
	We find that this case is distinguishable from Rissley. In Rissley,
the defendant was not culpably negligent in the late filing because he
reasonably relied on the advice of his attorney on direct appeal, a
person who had obvious expertise in legal matters and, in particular,
criminal appeals. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 421. In contrast, defendant did
not allege sufficient facts to show his reliance on the advice of
jailhouse lawyers, a prison law clerk, and a law librarian or paralegal
was reasonable. While defendant argues his reliance on the advice of
the law clerk and law librarian was reasonable because they were
employed in the prison library system, he did not allege in his
pleadings that these individuals were hired to assist inmates with
postconviction matters. Further, defendant did not allege the jailhouse
lawyers, law clerk or librarian had any particular training in
postconviction matters providing them with specialized knowledge of
the filing deadline for a postconviction petition. We cannot find
defendant's reliance on the advice of these individuals was reasonable
when there are no facts to show they had any specialized knowledge
in postconviction matters.
	Moreover, defendant alleged he sought advice concerning the
deadline for filing his petition from the librarian at Taylorville after he
had previously received advice on this same matter from jailhouse
lawyers and a law clerk at Western. Defendant's actions show he
questioned the advice he received from the jailhouse lawyers and law
clerk because he continued to seek other advice concerning the
deadline for filing his petition. Thus, defendant's own conduct
indicates his reliance on the advice of the jailhouse lawyers and law
clerk was not reasonable.
	It is well settled that all citizens are charged with knowledge of
the law. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 104, quoting Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 86 L. Ed. 2d 81, 93, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2529 (1985).
Ignorance of the law or legal rights will not excuse a delay in filing a
lawsuit. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 104-05, quoting Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 555 (1958). Thus, the sole obligation of knowing the time
requirements for filing a postconviction petition remains with the
defendant. Defendant's entrustment of this responsibility to jailhouse
lawyers, a prison law clerk, and a law librarian who had no proven
specialized knowledge in postconviction matters shows an indifference
to the consequences likely to follow from his actions.
	We caution that our determination in this regard is fact-specific
and is not amenable to an easily defined standard or rule. Rather, each
case must be examined on its own facts. Based on the specific facts of
this case, we conclude defendant's reliance on the advice of jailhouse
lawyers, a law clerk, and a law librarian is insufficient to establish the
delay in filing was not due to defendant's culpable negligence.
	Finally, defendant, in a brief and conclusory argument, asserts a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
Defendant claims allowing an exception to the time requirement for a
defendant who relies on the advice of an attorney, but refusing to
allow such an exception for those who rely on the erroneous advice
of prison law librarians or law clerks, results in a deprivation of his
right to equal protection.
	The equal protection guarantee requires the government to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In re Adoption of
L.T.M., 214 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (2005), quoting In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291,
309 (2001). State action is a prerequisite to invoking the equal
protection clause. L.T.M., 214 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	Defendant apparently argues the defendant in Rissley received a
benefit of counsel that was not available to him in this case. The legal
advice given by direct appeal counsel in Rissley, however, was purely
voluntary. See Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d  at 417-18. Defendant has been
treated the same as other defendants in not being appointed counsel
at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. We find the equal
protection clause does not apply in this case because there was no
state action resulting in dissimilar treatment.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of
defendant's postconviction petition. This matter is remanded to the
circuit court to allow defendant an opportunity to amend his
postconviction petition with the benefit of reasonable assistance of
counsel. The State will then have an opportunity to review
defendant's constitutional claims and determine whether to waive or
assert the affirmative defense of untimeliness.

Judgments reversed;
cause remanded with directions.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority that, despite the untimely filing of
defendant's postconviction petition, the consultation requirement of
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)) was not met in this
case and, therefore, that the cause must be remanded to the circuit
court. However, I do not agree with the majority's decision to address
the issue of whether defendant's delay in filing his postconviction
petition was due to his culpable negligence.
	As the majority explains, the reason why counsel must fulfill the
consultation requirement of Rule 651(c) in this case, and the reason
this cause must be remanded to the circuit court, is because a
challenge to the timeliness of a postconviction petition is an
affirmative defense that may be waived by the State. See slip op. at 5
("postconviction counsel must comply with Rule 651(c) and submit
defendant's substantive claims to the State to give the prosecutor an
opportunity to determine whether they are sufficient to merit the
State's waiver of the affirmative defense of untimeliness"). However,
since the State may elect upon remand to waive the untimeliness of
defendant's petition in this case (see People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89,
101-02 (2002), it is clearly premature for this court to be addressing
the issue of whether defendant was culpably negligent in filing his
petition. The remand proceedings have not yet occurred, defense
counsel has not yet consulted with defendant or made further
amendments to the postconviction petition, and the State has not yet
chosen to invoke the affirmative defense of untimeliness. That being
the case, that portion of the majority's opinion which addresses the
timeliness of defendant's petition and whether defendant was culpably
negligent is advisory. Advisory opinions are to be avoided. Oliveira
v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 157 (2002). Unlike the majority, I
would not address the question of whether defendant was culpably
negligent and I express no opinion on that issue.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial concurrence
and partial dissent.