Title: State ex rel. Smith v. Frost

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Smith et al. v. Frost, Judge, et al. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Frost (1995),    Ohio St.3d        .] 
Mandamus compelling judge to vacate permanent injunction prohibiting Licking 
County Board of Commissioners from proceeding with hearings on 
annexation petitions filed by relators and village of Granville and 
ordering commissioners to proceed on the annexation petitions -- Writs 
granted, when. 
(No. 95-1707 -- Submitted October 10, 1995 -- Decided November 22, 1995.) 
 
In Mandamus. 
 
Relator Gebhard W. Keny owns property in Granville Township 
(“township”), Licking County, Ohio, which is adjacent to Newark, a municipal 
corporation also located in Licking County.  On October 31, 1994, relator 
Harrison W. Smith, Jr., in his capacity as Keny’s agent, filed a petition pursuant to 
R.C. 709.02 with respondent Licking County Board of Commissioners 
(“commissioners”) to have the property annexed to Newark.   Under R.C. 709.031, 
the commissioners scheduled a hearing on the annexation petition for January 9, 
1995.   On November 2, 1994, the village of Granville (“village”) filed a petition 
pursuant to R.C. 709.15 with the commissioners requesting annexation of all of 
the township, which includes Keny’s property, to the village. Under R.C. 
 
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709.16(A) and 709.031, the commission set the village’s annexation petition for 
hearing on January 17, 1995.     
 
On November 7, 1994, certain electors in the village and township filed a 
petition pursuant to R.C. 709.45 with the Licking County Board of Elections 
(“board”) seeking the election of  a merger commission to consider the merger of 
the village with unincorporated property in the township, including Keny’s 
property.     
 
On December 13, 1994, the village filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief against the commissioners in the Licking County 
Court of Common Pleas seeking to prohibit them from proceeding with hearings 
on the annexation petitions previously filed by relators and the village. On 
December 30, 1994, respondent Judge Gregory L. Frost issued a  preliminary 
injunction against the commissioners, barring them from hearing Keny’s 
annexation petition.  On March 3, 1995, Judge Frost permanently enjoined the 
commissioners from holding any further proceedings on the annexation petition 
filed by relators.  Judge Frost also enjoined the board from placing the village’s 
annexation issue before the voters or otherwise acting on the village’s annexation 
 
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petition “until a vote on the merger issue has occurred and until further order” of 
the court.   
 
Relators filed a timely appeal from Judge Frost’s judgment to the Court of 
Appeals for Licking County.  After Judge Frost and the court of appeals denied 
relators’ motions for stay of the injunction pending appeal, relators commenced 
this action requesting the court to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus 
compelling Judge Frost to vacate the permanent injunction and ordering the 
commissioners to proceed to process relators’ annexation petition. 
 
Respondents filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  The village has filed a motion to 
intervene and a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. 
____________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Duke W. Thomas and Bruce L. Ingram, for 
relators. 
 
Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott A. 
Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Judge Frost and 
Licking County Board of Commissioners. 
 
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Downes & Hurst and Rufus B. Hurst, for intervening respondent village of 
Granville. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  As a preliminary matter, the village has filed a motion to 
intervene.  The village claims that it is entitled to intervene as of right under 
Civ.R. 24(A)(2), because it possesses “an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and [it] is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to 
protect that interest” and the village’s interest is not “adequately represented by 
the existing parties.”  The village has an interest relating to the property which is 
the subject of the action, since it instituted the action which led to the permanent 
injunction entered by Judge Frost that relators seek to vacate in this mandamus 
action.  Our disposition of relators’ mandamus action may impair the village’s 
ability to protect its interest.  Finally, the village has met its minimal burden to 
establish that its interest may not be adequately represented by the current 
respondents.  See, generally, McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 
93-94, Section 4.37.  Therefore, consistent with the liberal construction generally 
accorded Civ.R. 24 in favor of intervention, the village’s motion to intervene is 
 
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granted and its accompanying Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss will be 
considered by the court.  See State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 245, 247, 594 N.E.2d 616, 619. 
 
As to the dismissal motions filed by respondents and the village, 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) provides that “[a]fter the time for filing an answer to the 
complaint or a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court will either dismiss the case 
or issue an alternative or a peremptory writ, if a writ has not already been issued.”  
In determining whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that relators can prove no 
set of facts warranting relief, after all factual allegations of the complaint are 
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relators’ favor.  Civ.R. 
12(B)(6); State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 
N.E.2d 1128, 1129. 
 
In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators have to establish (1) a 
clear legal right to vacation of the permanent injunction entered by Judge Frost 
and an order compelling the commissioners to proceed on relators’ annexation 
petition, (2) a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Judge Frost and the 
 
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commissioners to so act, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  State ex 
rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 65, 637 N.E.2d 1, 2. 
 
In considering relators’ claim that Judge Frost lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the village’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and issue a 
permanent injunction, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, 
and a party challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.  
State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 
1112.  However, where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction over the cause, mandamus or prohibition will lie to prevent any future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.  State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell (1990), 
50 Ohio St.3d 182, 553 N.E.2d 650; State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155, 157; State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 
Ohio St.2d 326, 330, 59 O.O.2d 387, 389, 285 N.E.2d 22, 24. 
 
“There are three primary methods of municipal annexation set forth in R.C. 
Chapter 709.  Annexation of territory to a municipal corporation on the application 
of landowners (‘landowners petition’) is controlled by R.C. 709.02 to 709.12.  
 
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Annexation of territory to a municipal corporation on the application of that 
municipal corporation (‘municipal petition’) is controlled by R.C. 709.13 to 
709.21.  The merger, or annexation to each other, of two or more municipal 
corporations, or of a municipal corporation and the unincorporated area of a 
township, on the submission of merger petitions (‘merger petitions’), is controlled 
by R.C. 709.22 to 709.34 (annexation) and R.C. 709.43 to 709.48 (merger).”  State 
ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 352, 354, 513 
N.E.2d 769, 771. 
 
Relators’ petition, filed on October 31, 1994, was a landowner’s annexation 
petition and the village’s November 2, 1994 petition was a municipal annexation 
petition.  The merger petition was filed on November 7, 1994, subsequent to both 
annexation petitions.  Respondents and the village rely on R.C. 709.48 and Davis 
v. Northampton Twp. Trustees (Oct. 22, 1986), Summit App. No. 12608, 
unreported, in support of their contention that Judge Frost did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to enjoin the commissioners from proceeding on 
the annexation petitions because of the merger petition. 
 
R.C. 709.48 provides: 
 
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“On and after the date on which a petition is filed with the board of 
elections under section 709.45 of the Revised Code for the election of a merger 
commission for the merger of one or more municipal corporations and the 
unincorporated territory of a township, no petition for the annexation of any part 
of the unincorporated territory of the township shall be filed with a board of 
county commissioners under section 709.03 or 709.15 of the Revised Code, until 
one of the following occurs: 
 
“(A) The question of forming a merger commission is defeated at the 
election provided for under section 709.45 of the Revised Code by a majority of 
the electors of any one of the municipal corporations or the unincorporated 
territory in which the election is held. 
 
“(B) The merger commission elected pursuant to section 709.45 of the 
Revised Code fails to reach agreement on conditions of merger no later than the 
seventy-fifth day prior to the next general election after the commission was 
elected. 
 
“(C) The conditions of merger agreed upon by the merger commission are 
defeated by a majority of the electors of any one of the municipal corporations or 
 
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the unincorporated territory of the township in which the election on the 
conditions is held.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Under R.C. 709.48, after a petition is filed with a board of elections for 
election of a merger commission for the merger of a municipal corporation and the 
unincorporated territory of a township, there is a clear legal duty upon a board of 
commissioners to refuse to accept for filing any petitions for annexation of land 
located within the township until the merger procedure has been exhausted.  
Toledo, supra, at syllabus; Ambrose v. Cole (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 355, 13 OBR 
436, 469 N.E.2d 906.  However, as conceded by respondents and the village, R.C. 
709.48 is silent as to annexation petitions filed prior to the filing of a merger 
petition.  R.C. 709.48 does not preclude a board of county commissioners from 
proceeding to consider the merits of the annexation petitions filed by relators and 
the village, which were filed before the merger petition.  Nevertheless, 
respondents assert that “[a]lthough the language of R.C. 709.48 appears to permit 
a board of county commissioners to proceed with an annexation petition filed 
before a merger petition, pertinent case law in Ohio reaches the contrary result,”  
citing Davis in support of this proposition.  In Davis, the Court of Appeals for 
Summit County affirmed the judgment of a common pleas court declaring that the 
 
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merger of a township into a municipal corporation divested it of authority to 
proceed on an annexation petition filed prior to the filing of the merger petition. 
 
Davis followed Bd. of Commrs. of Lorain Cty. v. Elyria (1962), 174 Ohio 
St. 135, 21 O.O.2d 393, 187 N.E.2d 33, where the court held that “[w]here the 
Secretary of State issues a declaration that a village has achieved the status of a 
city during the pendency of an annexation proceeding concerning the village and a 
city such change in status divests the Board of County Commissioners of 
jurisdiction of the annexation proceeding.”  Id. at syllabus.  The court in Bd. of 
Commrs. of Lorain Cty. stated at 138-139, 21 O.O.2d at 395, 187 N.E.2d at 35: 
 
“The jurisdiction which attached when the proceeding was instituted was 
valid jurisdiction to conduct an annexation proceeding involving annexation of 
part of a village to a city.  The subject matter over which the board had jurisdiction 
as to annexation related only to annexation of part of a village to a city and not as 
to part of a city to another city.  When North Ridgeville changed its status, the 
subject matter of the annexation was changed also, and because of the statutory 
differences in the annexation proceedings the change of status of North Ridgeville 
from a village to a city divested the board of its jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, and any further action taken by the board would have been a nullity.” 
 
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Contrary to respondents and the village’s assertions, Davis held only that a 
completed merger divests a board of county commissioners from proceeding on a 
pending, previously filed annexation petition.  Nothing in R.C. 709.48, Davis, or 
Bd. of Commrs. of Lorain Cty. prevents a board of county commissioners from 
proceeding on an annexation petition where a subsequently filed merger petition 
has not yet culminated in a completed merger.  See R.C. 709.45 to 709.47.  The 
foregoing authorities do not support the proposition that the mere filing of a 
merger petition during the pendency of an annexation proceeding before a board 
of county commissioners constitutes a change of conditions divesting the 
commissioners of jurisdiction to proceed on the annexation petition(s). 
 
Therefore, as to the issues of clear legal right and clear legal duty, “[w]hen a 
duty is enjoined by statute upon an administrative board to hear and decide an 
issue within a specific time limitation, it is mandatory that the board act 
accordingly, unless to do so would lead to an inevitable conflict with rights which 
are superior to those of the party for whose benefit the duty is to be discharged.”  
State ex rel. Hannan v. DeCourcy (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 73, 47 O.O.2d 193, 247 
N.E.2d 465, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Under R.C. 709.031, the 
commissioners were required to conduct a hearing on relators’ annexation petition 
 
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no later than ninety days after the petition was filed in the office of the county 
auditor.  When a board of county commissioners defers consideration of 
landowners’ annexation petitions pending a vote of electors on a municipal 
annexation petition, a writ of mandamus will lie to compel the commissioners to 
consider the annexation petitions in the order in which they should have been 
considered had the time limitations been followed initially.  Holcomb v. Summit 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 241, 16 O.O.3d 278, 405 N.E.2d 262.  
As in Holcomb, relators have established a clear legal right to have the 
commissioners proceed on their annexation petition and a corresponding clear 
legal duty on the part of the commissioners to do so. 
 
As to the issue of whether relators’ appeal from Judge Frost’s permanent 
injunction constitutes an adequate legal remedy which precludes extraordinary 
relief in mandamus, where a special statutory procedure like that provided for 
annexation is available, actions for declaratory judgment and injunction cannot be 
used to bypass the statutory procedure.  State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 572 N.E.2d 1387, 1389; 
see, also, Galion v. Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emp., Ohio Council 8, AFL-
CIO, Local 2243 (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 620, 623, 646 N.E.2d 813, 815.  “[S]ince it 
 
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is always inappropriate for courts to grant declaratory judgments and injunctions 
that attempt to resolve matters committed to special statutory proceedings, their 
decisions should always be reversed on appeal, except when they dismiss the 
actions.  *** [T]his [is] tantamount to a holding that courts have no jurisdiction to 
hear [the] actions in the first place ***.”  Albright, supra, 60 Ohio St.3d at 42, 572 
N.E.2d at 1389; Staffilino Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1993), 86 Ohio 
App.3d 247, 250, 620 N.E.2d 256, 257.  This lack of jurisdiction is patent and 
unambiguous, rendering the adequacy of appeal as an alternative  remedy 
irrelevant.  Albright, supra, 60 Ohio St.3d at 43, 572 N.E.2d at 1389.  The only 
injunction provided for by the pertinent statutes as to relators’ annexation petition 
is that provided by R.C. 709.07 following the commissioners’ hearing and order 
granting the petition.  Since the appeal is from a judgment which Judge Frost 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter, the adequacy of that 
remedy is immaterial.  Lewis and Albright, supra. 
 
Based on the foregoing, relators can prove a set of facts entitling them to the 
requested relief in mandamus.  Respondents and the village’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motions are overruled.  Since the pertinent facts are uncontroverted, we issue  a 
peremptory writ of mandamus compelling Judge Frost to vacate his March 3, 1995 
 
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permanent injunction, and further ordering the commissioners to proceed on the 
annexation petitions filed by relators and the village. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., CONCUR.