Title: Chambers v. St. Mary's School

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CHAMBERS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. ST. MARY’S SCHOOL, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Chambers v. St. Mary’s School (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Torts — Negligence — Violation of an administrative rule does not constitute 
negligence per se; however, violation may be admissible as evidence of 
negligence. 
The violation of an administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se; 
however, such a violation may be admissible as evidence of negligence. 
(No. 97-1967 — Submitted May 27, 1998 — Decided August 12, 1998.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No. 96-G-2013. 
 
Appellant, Earl Chambers, was employed by the Dairymen’s Milk Company 
as a delivery person.  Chambers delivered dairy products to appellee, St. Mary’s 
School (“St. Mary’s”). 
 
In the early morning hours of November 29, 1993, Chambers made a 
delivery to St. Mary’s.  Chambers testified that there was a light snowfall on the 
ground.  Chambers testified that prior to delivering the milk, he brushed the snow 
off the steps.  He further averred that he did not observe any ice and consequently 
began his delivery.  After taking the milk into the school, Chambers proceeded out 
the service entrance with empty crates and began down the steps, when he 
allegedly slipped on a quarter-inch-thick layer of ice. 
 
Subsequent to this fall, Chambers got up and finished making his deliveries 
to St. Mary’s.  However, this time Chambers “made sure [he] was over toward the 
railing in case [he] started to slip he could grab it.”  Chambers sustained back 
injuries in the fall. 
 
Chambers and his wife filed suit against St. Mary’s, alleging that St. Mary’s 
had failed to maintain its premises in a safe manner in violation of R.C. 4101.11, 
commonly known as the frequenter statute.  Specifically, Chambers asserted that 
 
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St. Mary’s should have (1) constructed an awning over the area, (2) installed 
appropriate gutters, (3) corrected an improperly sloped roof, and (4) properly 
cleared and salted the area to prevent an unnatural accumulation of ice and water 
from collecting on the steps. 
 
St. Mary’s filed a motion for summary judgment.  In opposition, Chambers 
asserted that his expert witness opined that St. Mary’s violated several sections of 
Ohio’s Basic Building Code (“OBBC”), including Sections 805.2 (exterior 
stairways shall be kept free of ice), 817.12 (exterior stairway shall be protected to 
prevent accumulation of ice and snow), 823.0 (means of egress lighting), and 
817.7 (stairway handrails).  Chambers asserted that violations of these sections of 
the OBBC were negligence per se.  Adopting the reasoning from St. Mary’s brief, 
the trial court granted summary judgment to St. Mary’s.1 
 
Chambers appealed, asserting, inter alia, that “[t]he court of common pleas 
erred, as a matter of law, by granting summary judgment against [Chambers] and 
in favor of [St. Mary’s].”  Under this assignment of error, Chambers argued that 
St. Mary’s “is liable under a negligence per se theory since appellee allegedly 
committed several violations of the Basic Building Code.”  In affirming the 
summary judgment for St. Mary’s, the appellate court held that a violation of the 
OBBC is not negligence per se because the OBBC is not a legislative enactment. 
 
Finding its judgment in conflict with Nemer v. Kerkian (Feb. 7, 1990), 
Summit App. No. 14143, unreported, 1990 WL 11714, and Carpas v. Carpas 
(Nov. 15, 1989), Summit App. No. 14043, unreported, 1989 WL 139457, the court 
of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict.  This cause is now before this 
court upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Gary B. Garson Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellants. 
 
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Quandt, Giffels & Buck Co., L.P.A., and Nita Kay Smith, for appellee. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs and Scott A. Richardson, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Michael R. Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Building Officials 
and Code Administrators. 
 
Hermanies, Major, Castelli & Goodman and Richard L. Goodman; and 
Michael R. Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  The issue certified for our review is “[w]hether a 
violation of the Ohio Basic Building Code may constitute negligence per se.” 
 
In order to recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, and 
(3) that the breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Wellman 
v. E. Ohio Gas Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 103, 108-109, 51 O.O. 27, 30, 113 N.E.2d 
629, 632; Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 198, 551 
N.E.2d 938, 943, overruled on other grounds, Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425.  Typically, a duty may be established by common 
law, legislative enactment, or by the particular facts and circumstances of the case.  
Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon (1954), 161 Ohio St. 367, 53 O.O. 274, 119 N.E.2d 440, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Where a legislative enactment imposes a specific 
duty for the safety of others, failure to perform that duty is negligence per se.  
Eisenhuth at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Application of negligence per se in a 
tort action means that the plaintiff has conclusively established that the defendant 
breached the duty that he or she owed to the plaintiff.  It is not a finding of liability 
 
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per se because the plaintiff will also have to prove proximate cause and damages.  
Pond v. Leslein (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 50, 53, 647 N.E.2d 477, 479. 
 
In Swoboda v. Brown (1935), 129 Ohio St. 512, 522, 2 O.O. 516, 521, 196 
N.E. 274, 278, this court stated: 
 
“The distinction between negligence and ‘negligence per se’ is the means 
and method of ascertainment.  The first must be found by the jury from the facts, 
the conditions and circumstances disclosed by the evidence; the latter is a 
violation of a specific requirement of law or ordinance, the only fact for 
determination by the jury being the commission or omission of the specific act 
inhibited or required.” 
 
“In other words, if a positive and definite standard of care has been 
established by legislative enactment whereby a jury may determine whether there 
has been a violation thereof by finding a single issue of fact, a violation is 
negligence per se; but where the jury must determine the negligence or lack of 
negligence of a party charged with the violation of a rule of conduct fixed by 
legislative enactment from a consideration and evaluation of multiple facts and 
circumstances by the process of applying, as the standard of care, the conduct of a 
reasonably prudent person, negligence per se is not involved.”  Eisenhuth at 374-
375, 53 O.O. at 278, 119 N.E.2d at 444. 
 
Thus, the application of negligence per se effectively reduces the elements 
that a plaintiff must prove in a negligence action.  Hernandez v. Martin Chevrolet, 
Inc. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 302, 304, 649 N.E.2d 1215, 1216.  Negligence per se is 
tantamount to strict liability for purposes of proving that a defendant breached a 
duty.  See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp. (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 250, 35 
O.O.2d 404, 417, 218 N.E.2d 185, 200 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
 
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Since the application of negligence per se effectively reduces the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof in a tort case, we must carefully examine whether an extension of 
negligence per se to violations of administrative rules is justified. 
 
In Eisenhuth, this court held that a violation of a “legislative enactment” 
was negligence per se.  Chambers asks us to extend the doctrine of negligence per 
se to violations of the OBBC, which constitutes administrative rules.  In order to 
make such a decision, we must determine whether there are any material 
differences between statutes and administrative rules which would preclude us 
from extending the application of negligence per se to violations of administrative 
rules. 
 
Legislative authority is vested with the General Assembly.  Belden v. Union 
Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  A legislative enactment, or statute, is initially 
introduced as a bill.  Section 15(A), Article II, Ohio Constitution.  The 
introduction of a bill is a manifestation of public policy, which is determined 
primarily by the General Assembly.  See State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
222, 223, 553 N.E.2d 672, 673-674. 
 
A bill may originate in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.  
Section 15(A), Article II, Ohio Constitution.  All bills are subject to debate, 
discussion, and amendment prior to being put to a vote.  Id.  Once all amendments 
are made, the bill must still be passed by a concurrence of a majority of members 
from both the Senate and the House of Representatives and be signed by the 
Governor before it becomes law. Sections 15 and 16, Article II, Ohio Constitution. 
 
Members of the General Assembly are accountable to their constituents 
because they are elected to office.  Section 2, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  If the 
constituents are unhappy with policy determinations made by members of the 
 
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General Assembly, they can change the makeup of the General Assembly at the 
voting booth.  Thus, in effect, citizens of the state may shape the nature of 
legislation. 
 
The legislative process and accountability are the cornerstones of the 
democratic process which justify the General Assembly’s role as lawmaker.  In 
contrast, administrative rules do not dictate public policy, but rather expound upon 
public policy already established by the General Assembly in the Revised Code.  “ 
‘The purpose of administrative rulemaking is to facilitate an administrative 
agency’s placing into effect a policy declared by the General Assembly in the 
statutes to be administered by the agency.’ ”  Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 47, 554 N.E.2d 97, 99, quoting Carroll v. Dept. of Adm. 
Serv. (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 108, 110, 10 OBR 132, 133, 460 N.E.2d 704, 706.  
Yet determination of public policy remains with the General Assembly.  State ex 
rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. for Summit Cty. (1929), 120 Ohio St. 464, 
479, 166 N.E. 407, 411-412, affirmed State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park 
Dist. for Summit Cty. (1930), 281 U.S. 74, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710.  
Administrative agencies may make only “subordinate” rules.  Belden v. Union 
Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 342-343, 28 O.O. 295, 301, 55 
N.E.2d 629, 635-636; see, also, Redman v. Dept. of Indus. Relations (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 399, 404, 662 N.E.2d 352, 357; Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. 
Ratchford (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 256, 259, 18 O.O.3d 450, 452, 416 N.E.2d 614, 
617. 
 
Unlike the legislative process, rulemaking by administrative agencies does 
not involve the collaborative effort of elected officials.  Directors of administrative 
agencies are appointed by the Governor.  R.C. 121.03.  It is these directors and/or 
their employees who propose and adopt administrative rules.  Administrative 
 
7
agencies have the technical expertise to compose such rules.  Farrand v. State 
Med. Bd. (1949), 151 Ohio St. 222, 39 O.O. 41, 85 N.E.2d 113.  However, 
administrative agencies have no accountability as do the members of the General 
Assembly.2 
 
The specific issue before this court is whether a violation of the OBBC is 
negligence per se.  However, our comparison of the legislative process and the 
rulemaking process dictates that we examine this issue in the broader context of 
whether violations of any administrative rules should require the application of 
negligence per se. 
 
If we were to rule that a violation of the OBBC (an administrative rule) was 
negligence per se, we would in effect bestow upon administrative agencies the 
ability to propose and adopt rules which alter the proof requirements between 
litigants.  Altering proof requirements is a public policy determination more 
properly determined by the General Assembly because the General Assembly, as 
opposed to administrative agencies, has the authority and accountability to dictate 
public policy.  Giving administrative agencies the ability to adopt such rules 
would be tantamount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, 
since administrative agencies cannot dictate public policy. 
 
Further, scores of administrative agencies propose and adopt perhaps 
hundreds of rules each year.  Considering the sheer number and complexity of 
administrative rules, a finding that administrative rules establish negligence per se 
could open the floodgates to litigation.  Strict compliance with such a multitude of 
rules would be virtually impossible.  In effect, it would make those subject to such 
rules the insurer of third parties who are harmed by any violation of such rules.3  
Only those relatively few statutes which this court or the General Assembly has 
 
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determined, or may determine, should merit application of negligence per se 
should receive such status. 
 
For all the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the violation of an 
administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se; however, such a 
violation of an administrative rule may be admissible as evidence of negligence. 
Stephens v. A-Able Rents Co. (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 20, 27-28, 654 N.E.2d 
1315, 1320. 
 
The OBBC constitutes administrative rules proposed and adopted by the 
Board of Building Standards, an administrative agency, whose members are 
appointed by the Governor.  Ohio Adm.Code 4101:2-1-03, R.C. 3781.07, and 
3781.10.  Therefore, a violation of the OBBC is not negligence per se.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
St. Mary’s in its motion for summary judgment argued that it owed no duty 
to Chambers for any risks associated with accumulations of ice and snow, or 
alternatively that even if St. Mary’s had a duty to Chambers because of an 
unnatural accumulation of ice, no liability attaches to St. Mary’s because it had no 
knowledge of the condition and the condition was open and obvious. 
2. 
Administrative rulemaking is subject to the conditions set out in R.C. 
119.01 to 119.13.  Generally, these conditions require that notice be given of a 
public hearing to be held on a proposed rule, where persons affected thereby may 
comment and present evidence pertaining to the unreasonable or unlawful effect of 
the rule.  R.C. 119.03(A).  The rule is then reviewed by the Joint Committee on 
 
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Agency Rule Review, which may, under certain circumstances, recommend that 
the General Assembly adopt a resolution invalidating the rule.  R.C. 119.03(I).  
Assuming that the rule is not invalidated at this point, it is still subject to 
invalidation at the next regular session of the General Assembly.  R.C. 
119.03(I)(2)(b).  If the rule is not invalidated at that session, then the agency may 
issue an order adopting the rule.  R.C. 119.03(D). 
 
These conditions provide constraints in rulemaking.  However, they do not 
elevate rulemaking to the status of lawmaking for purposes of applying negligence 
per se to violations of administrative rules. 
3. 
For example, Section 805.2 of the OBBC requires that all exterior stairways 
be kept free of ice and snow.  The language in this rule mandates removal of snow 
from steps without reference to any exceptions or a reasonableness standard.  An 
application of negligence per se to such a rule would essentially make a premises 
owner or occupier strictly liable for a slip and fall as soon as snow started to fall.  
It would be virtually impossible for a premises owner to comply with such a strict 
standard. 
 
In the case at bar, the snow fell in the very early morning hours just prior to 
Chambers’s arrival at St. Mary’s.  It is unreasonable to require St. Mary’s to keep 
a worker on call twenty-four hours a day to remove snow at a moment’s notice. 
 
This is a prime example of why negligence per se should not apply to 
administrative rules. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the 
majority.  Today the majority has determined that a violation of the Ohio Basic 
Building Code may never constitute negligence per se.  What is even more 
shocking is that the majority further holds that the extension of the doctrine of 
 
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negligence per se to violations of any administrative rules is never justified.  The 
breadth of the majority opinion is alarming and, in addition, is simply wrong!  To 
that end, the conclusions reached by the majority have disturbed well-settled law 
and have effectively overruled numerous decisions of this court. 
 
We have held time and time again that an administrative rule issued 
pursuant to statutory authority has the force and effect of law unless it is 
unreasonable or is in clear conflict with a statute governing the same subject 
matter.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Lindley (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
232, 234, 527 N.E.2d 828, citing Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Glander 
(1948), 149 Ohio St. 120, 125, 36 O.O. 471, 474, 77 N.E.2d 921, 924.  See, also, 
State ex rel. Kildow v. Indus. Comm. (1934), 128 Ohio St. 573, 580, 1 O.O. 235, 
238, 192 N.E. 873, 876.  Indeed, this court has also implicitly agreed that a 
tortfeasor may be negligent per se in violating a relevant administrative regulation.  
See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 316, 15 OBR 444, 
473 N.E.2d 827.  The majority, however, has turned a blind eye to these and other 
important cases decided by this court. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I must dissent. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.