Title: SMITH v. PAIZ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SMITH v. PAIZ2004 WY 1484 P.3d 1272Case Number: 03-47Decided: 01/26/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

CONSTANCE 
SMITH and DONALD SMITH,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

DANIELLE 
J. PAIZ,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sue 
Davidson of Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Julie 
Nye Tiedeken of Tiedeken & Scoggin, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Constance and 
Donald Smith filed a negligence action against Danielle J. Paiz (Paiz) seeking 
to recover damages arising out of an automobile accident.  Prior to trial, the district court 
issued an order limiting the testimony of Connie Smith's (Smith) treating 
physicians to factual matters only because Smith had failed to timely designate 
them as expert witnesses.  Finding 
no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

 

[¶2]      Smith frames the 
issue on appeal as follows:

Was 
reversible error committed when the trial court prohibited the treating 
healthcare providers of Connie Smith from testifying to all facts of the 
condition and treatment of Connie Smith, including but not limited to diagnosis 
and prognosis?

 

Paiz 
phrases the issue differently:

Did 
the Trial Court abuse its discretion by prohibiting witnesses who had not been 
listed as experts from giving expert opinions on diagnosis, treatment and 
prognosis for [Smith] and limiting their testimony to factual 
matters?

 

[¶3]      On December 17, 
2001, Smith filed a negligence action against Paiz.  Smith alleged that Paiz negligently 
operated her motor vehicle causing an accident resulting in injury.  Smith's husband was also a party, 
claiming loss of consortium.  The 
district court issued a Scheduling Order, which required Smith to designate her 
expert witnesses:

 

The 
Plaintiff shall designate expert witnesses and provide the Defendant with a 
brief outline of the testimony of each expert by April 15, 
2002.

 

On 
April 15, Smith filed a Designation of Plaintiff's Expert naming one expert, Dr. 
Kanter.  Pursuant to the Scheduling 
Order, Paiz filed her Designation of Expert Witnesses on May 24, 2002.  Included in Paiz's designation were two 
of Smith's treating physicians, Dr. Fischer and Dr. 
Rangitsch.

 

[¶4]      On June 21, 2002, 
Smith filed her Pretrial Memorandum, which listed six of her treating physicians 
as witnesses:  Dr. Barnes, Dr. 
Vernon, Dr. Reckling, Dr. Greene, Dr. Rangitsch, and Dr. Fischer.  In the memorandum, Smith stated that 
these healthcare providers would testify about Smith's treatment and "current 
condition, and prognosis for her future health care needs."  Paiz responded with a Motion to Strike 
the named doctors as witnesses on the grounds that they had not been designated 
as expert witnesses pursuant to the court's Scheduling Order.  Paiz claimed the late designation 
prejudiced her because "all of [Smith's] strategy in the case and decisions with 
regard to [Paiz's] own expert witness designation and independent medical 
examinations" were based on Smith's designation of only Dr. Kanter as an expert. 

 

[¶5]      Paiz reiterated 
her position in a Supplement to Motion to Strike Witnesses, and Smith responded 
with a Memorandum in Opposition to [Smith's] Motion to Strike Witnesses.  Relying on W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4),1 Smith contended that she did not 
have to designate her treating physicians as expert witnesses because they had 
not acquired or developed their knowledge or opinions in anticipation of 
litigation or trial and, accordingly, were not experts.  She also argued that no prejudice 
attached to Paiz because of the failure to designate the treating physicians as 
experts.  Smith stressed that Paiz 
was in possession of all of her medical records and had deposed several of the 
witnesses.  Smith concluded that 
since Paiz had access to the records on which the treating physicians' opinions 
would be based and had the opportunity to depose each of them, she could not 
then claim prejudice.

 

[¶6]      On July 17, 2002, 
the district court issued its Order on Motions.  The court found that Smith's failure to 
properly designate the witnesses as experts precluded her from offering any 
opinion testimony requiring expertise from them.  The court ordered that the doctors could 
testify as fact witnesses about their treatment of Smith but, as fact witnesses, 
they were not allowed to provide expert opinions, including diagnoses, prognoses 
or determinations of causation requiring medical expertise.  The court did allow Smith to elicit 
expert opinion testimony from her two treating physicians, who had been 
designated as experts by Paiz, so long as a proper foundation was 
established.

 

[¶7]      The matter 
proceeded to trial and the jury found Paiz to be 60 percent at fault and Smith 
40 percent.  The jury set Smith's 
damages at $2,500, which was reduced to $1,500 under the comparative fault 
statute.  The jury set the damages 
of Smith's husband, Donald Smith, at zero dollars.  Smith has 
appealed.

 

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Smith contends 
that the district court erred in barring her treating physicians from providing 
expert opinions, including diagnoses, prognoses or any determination relating to 
causation requiring medical expertise.  
Pointing to W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), Smith argues that the test to determine 
whether a witness is an expert is whether the facts known and the opinions held 
by the witness were acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or 
trial.  Since her treating 
physicians acquired their knowledge and formed their opinions based on their 
relationship with her and not in anticipation of litigation or trial, Smith 
concludes that the witnesses were not "experts" and thus she was not required to 
designate them as such.  Smith 
argues that she was prejudiced by the exclusion of this testimony because her 
claims for pain and suffering and the necessity of future medical treatments 
could not be explained adequately to the jury without it.  She points out that Paiz had access to 
all of her medical records upon which the witnesses' testimony and opinions 
would be based and had deposed several of them.  Therefore, since Paiz knew the nature of 
the facts and the opinions based thereon that were to be provided by these 
witnesses, she could not have suffered any prejudice.

 

[¶9]      An "expert" 
witness is a witness entitled to give opinion testimony.  W.R.E. 702.2 Treating physicians may be fact 
witnesses, and if they offer an opinion, they may be expert witnesses also.  Their status depends on the content of 
their testimony:  If they only 
testify as to what they observed and did within the physician-patient 
relationship, then they would be fact witnesses; if, in addition to testifying 
to the facts, the treating physicians offered an opinion, then they would be 
expert witnesses.

 

[¶10]   What distinguishes a treating 
physician when testifying as an expert from an expert retained in anticipation 
of litigation or for trial is not the content of his or her testimony, "but the 
context in which he became familiar with the plaintiff's injuries that were 
ultimately the subject of litigation, and which form the factual basis for the 
medical opinion."  Schreiber v. 
Estate of Kiser, 989 P.2d 720, 723 (Cal. 1999).  The distinction between a treating 
physician and a retained expert is important only within the context of the 
discovery process.  Rule 26(b)(4) 
carves out an exception to the general rules established by Rules 26(a) and 
26(b)(1) with respect to expert opinion testimony acquired or developed in 
anticipation of litigation.  
Chakales v. The Hertz Corporation 152 F.R.D. 240 (N. Dist. Ga. 
1993).  Experts, such as treating 
physicians, who have information that was not developed or acquired in 
anticipation of litigation are subject to the general discovery provisions of 
Rules 26(a) and 26(b)(1).  Rule 
26(b)(4) provides limitations on the discovery of information from experts who 
acquired their knowledge specifically in anticipation for litigation or for 
trial.  The Rule provides different 
standards for discovery when the retained expert will be used as a trial 
witness, Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and when the retained expert was specifically 
employed for trial purposes but will not testify at trial, Rule 
26(b)(4)(B).  See 8 Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d §§ 2029-34 (1994 & 2003 
Supp.).

 

[¶11]   The federal district court in the 
aforementioned Chakales decision addressed a similar argument to that 
posited by Smith here.  That court 
observed:

 

Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence describes an expert as one who has 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [which] will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."  Fed.R.Evid. 702.  The rule provides further that "a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise".  Id.  Based on plaintiffs' description of the 
testimony expected to be given by the treating physicians listed in Attachment 
F-1 of the proposed Pretrial Order, plaintiffs clearly intend to elicit 
scientific opinion testimony, regarding a fact in issue, in order to assist the 
trier of fact, and intend to elicit such testimony from persons specially 
qualified to render such opinions.

 

Based 
on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the treating physicians at issue are 
"experts" pursuant to the applicable rule of evidence and that Rule 26(b)(4) 
does not alter in any way the definition of "expert" for purposes of 
discovery.  Indeed, even without an 
examination of case law, the clear language of the rule is at odds with 
plaintiffs' argument that it limits the definition of an expert to one whose 
opinion was acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.  That is, Rule 26(b)(4) addresses 
discovery of the opinions of experts that are "otherwise discoverable" and 
that were "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation."   By its own terms, the rule envisions 
the existence of experts whose opinions were not acquired or developed in 
anticipation of litigation.

 

Chakales, 
152 F.R.D.  at 245; see also Clark v. Raty, 48 P.3d 672 (Idaho 
2002); and Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 105 (N.D. Miss. 
1986).

 

[¶12]   In support of her position, Smith 
relies on our decision in Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 
1992).  In that case, the defendants 
appealed a district court protective order prohibiting them from deposing one of 
the plaintiff's treating physicians regarding his expert opinion on the issues 
of causation and standard of care.  
Id. at 1065-67.  The 
protective order limited the scope of the treating physician's deposition to the 
factual circumstances related to the plaintiff's condition and treatment.  The defendants argued that the doctor's 
expert opinion should have been discoverable because the plaintiff waived any 
privilege by filing suit.  After 
holding that the treating physician's opinion was not privileged, we 
nevertheless upheld the protective order based upon the circumstances of the 
case including the fact that the plaintiff had never designated the doctor as an 
expert witness for trial which made it unnecessary for the defendants to depose 
him regarding his expert opinion for purposes of cross-examination.  Id. at 1067.  We also noted that the doctor was a 
treating physician who was not "retained or specially employed" by the plaintiff 
in anticipation of trial, so his expert testimony was not discoverable under 
Rule 26(b)(4)(B).  
Id.

 

[¶13]   The Wardell case does not 
advance Smith's argument.  Indeed, 
our decision in that case merely serves to highlight the distinction that Rule 
26 draws between experts retained specifically in anticipation of litigation and 
other experts for discovery purposes.  
The treating physician was not designated by the Wardell plaintiff 
as an expert apparently because there was no intent to use the doctor as an 
expert witness during trial.  The 
treating physician could have been an expert witness but the plaintiff 
simply chose not to utilize him as such.  
That fact distinguishes Wardell from the situation at hand where 
Smith clearly intended to use her treating physicians in an expert witness 
capacity.

 

[¶14]   A treating physician is, by 
definition, an expert witness if asked to provide opinion testimony.  Rule 26(b)(4) is irrelevant and 
inapplicable and does not provide any justification for Smith's failure to 
timely designate her treating physicians as experts.  Rule 26(b)(4) does not somehow magically 
convert a treating physician offering opinion testimony into a lay witness.  Lee, 112 F.R.D.  at 107-08.  The record shows that Smith intended to 
elicit expert medical testimony from her treating physicians relating to 
diagnoses, prognoses and causation.  
The district court's Scheduling Order required Smith to designate her 
expert witnesses and provide Paiz with a brief outline of the testimony of each 
expert by April 15, 2002.  Smith 
failed to comply with the district court's order.

 

[¶15]   The question that remains is 
whether the district court's remedy  the prohibition on the treating physicians 
from testifying as to their opinions and restricting them to factual testimony  
was appropriate.  A ruling on the 
admission or exclusion of expert witness testimony based on a violation of a 
pre-trial order is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not overturn 
the decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.  Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 624-25 (Wyo. 1999); Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 237-38 
(Wyo. 1988).

 

"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 1986)).

 

Winterholler, 
989 P.2d  at 624-25 (quoting Rogers v. State, 971 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 
1999)).  In Winterholler, we 
set out the following factors for consideration when determining whether a 
party's supplementation of its disclosures after the conclusion of expert 
discovery is fair under the circumstances:

 

(1)       
whether 
allowing the evidence would incurably surprise or prejudice the opposing 
party;

 

(2)       
whether 
excluding the evidence would incurably prejudice the party seeking to introduce 
it;

 

(3)       
whether 
the party seeking to introduce the testimony failed to comply with the 
evidentiary rules inadvertently or willfully;

 

(4)       
the 
impact of allowing the proposed testimony on the orderliness and efficiency of 
the trial; and

 

(5)       
the 
impact of excluding the proposed testimony on the completeness of the 
information before the court or jury.

 

Winterholler, 
989 P.2d  at 628 (citing Dada v. Children's National Medical Center, 715 A.2d 904, 909 (D.C. 1998)).  The 
decision from which we adopted these factors explained their 
application:

 

The 
development of this list of factors represented an attempt to strike a balance 
between the "concern for judicial economy" and the "strong judicial and societal 
preference for determining cases on the merits." [Abell v. Wang, 697 A.2d 796, 800 (D.C. 1997)] (citing Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C. 1994)).    The list is not exclusive. The trial 
court may consider other factors that affect the balance in question, taking 
into account the status of the case at the time of the request to reopen 
[discovery].  For example, the third 
factor's reference to failure to comply with "evidentiary rules" does not 
preclude the court from considering failure to comply with other procedural 
requirements.  Similarly, the fourth 
consideration can be expanded to consider the orderliness and efficiency of not 
only the trial itself but also the court's overall handling of the case and, in 
appropriate situations, of the court's calendar.  In particular cases or circumstances, 
other factors may come into play.  
[Footnote omitted]

 

 
Within the analysis of "willfulness," for example, the court may consider the 
reasonableness of the party's explanation for failing to meet the deadline, as 
well as any pattern of noncompliance.  
See Abell, supra, 697 A.2d  at 802-03 (explaining that the 
plaintiff in that case "had no prior history as a dilatory plaintiff").  In addition, when considering whether 
allowing the evidence would incurably surprise or prejudice the opposing party, 
the court may consider the behavior of the opposing party in complying with 
scheduling orders.  Parties who have 
missed deadlines and been lax in complying with the scheduling orders themselves 
may have a difficult time convincing the court that they will be prejudiced by a 
delay caused by the opposing party, while parties who have been diligent in 
maintaining the schedule will have a stronger argument for prejudice.  See Abell, supra, 697 A.2d  at 802 
("The fact that defendants filed their own witness list late further mitigates 
the prejudice attributable to [plaintiff].").

 

Finally, 
as we explained in Abell, although "the trial court still must consider 
the totality of circumstances' of each case," the more rigorous and formal 
track on which civil cases are now placed allows "the trial court [to] accord 
greater weight than previously allowed for prejudice caused by delay to the 
overall administration of justice." Id. (citing Van Man v. District of 
Colombia, 663 A.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. 1995)).  As this court has 
explained,

 

[n]oncompliance 
with court orders and rules may cause the system to bog down and may adversely 
affect other litigants.  When a 
plaintiff is personally responsible for this type of delay, he or she prejudices 
not only the defendant but also the ability of other persons  persons that are 
doing what is necessary to follow the rules  to utilize the 
system.

 

Perry 
v. Sera, 
623 A.2d 1210, 1219 (D.C. 1993) (referring to a plaintiff's failure to comply 
with discovery orders).

 

Dada, 
715 A.2d  at 909-10.  Keeping these 
considerations in mind, we turn to the question before us.

 

[¶16]   The district court did not set out 
any reasons for its ruling restricting the trial testimony of Smith's 
undesignated experts.  Ideally, the 
court should have done so.  Nevertheless, support for the court's 
decision is clearly discernable from the record.  In her Motion to Strike Witnesses, Paiz 
set out how Smith's failure to designate her treating physicians as experts 
would prejudice her:

 

Counsel 
for Defendant made decisions with regard to who she would list as expert 
witnesses and decisions with regard to whether to conduct independent medical 
examinations based on Plaintiff's expert witness designation.  Dr. Kanter [Smith's sole designated 
expert] gave his opinion that there were several injuries and complaints which 
the Plaintiff has which he could not say were related to the accident in 
question.  Given Dr. Kanter's 
opinion, counsel for Defendant did not undertake any further discovery with 
regard to some of the unrelated problems which were treated by various 
doctors.  Plaintiff has now listed 
in her Pretrial Memorandum medical care providers to give expert witness 
testimony, including opinions with regard to her current condition and prognosis 
for the future.  It appears that she 
is going to use these witnesses to testify with regard to causation of the 
injuries.

 

 
It is unfairly prejudicial to now allow Plaintiff to designate five new expert 
witnesses which had not been previously designated and the Court should enter 
its Order striking said witnesses and disallowing any testimony from said 
witnesses.

 

Furthermore, 
in her Supplement to Motion to Strike Witnesses, Paiz noted that Smith had 
merely identified her treating physicians and indicated that they would provide 
expert testimony at trial but without setting forth a description of the 
substance of their testimony.

 

[¶17]   The prejudice identified by Paiz is 
manifest on the record.  Smith did 
not identify her treating physicians as experts within the time limits 
established by the Scheduling Order.  
Smith did not file a motion to allow a late designation of these 
witnesses on her volition and identified them only in response to an 
interrogatory from Paiz.  Smith 
never provided a "brief outline of the testimony" expected from her treating 
physicians as required by the Scheduling Order.  Furthermore, Smith's intent to use these 
witnesses as experts was not disclosed to Paiz until she filed her Pretrial 
Memorandum on June 21, 2002, barely a month before the scheduled trial date of 
July 30, 2002.  To require Paiz to 
prepare for the testimony of six additional experts within the time 
remaining for trial would be to impose an extraordinary and unreasonable burden 
upon her.  In contrast to the 
prejudice Smith's failure to timely designate her expert witnesses caused Paiz, 
the prejudice to Smith from the district court's decision to restrict testimony 
from those witnesses was slight.  
The court's order allowed the treating physicians to testify as fact 
witnesses.  Furthermore, Smith still 
had the testimony of her designated expert, and the court's order allowed Smith 
to use two of her other treating physicians who had been designated as experts 
by Paiz, so long as she laid the proper foundation. 

 

[¶18]   When we consider the foregoing 
within the context of the factors we have laid out, it is clear that given the 
nature and scope of Smith's noncompliance with the Scheduling Order, allowing 
Smith's witnesses to testify as experts would have "incurably prejudiced" 
Paiz.  Smith, on the other hand, 
possessed ample resources despite the court's ruling to present the merits of 
her claim to the jury, and so the prejudice to her was significantly 
mitigated.  It also weighs against 
Smith that there is the implication, contained within the record, that her 
motivation for using her treating physicians as experts appears to be due to the 
apparent weakness of the testimony concerning some of her medical claims that 
was proffered by her retained expert, Dr. Kanter.  In addition, we note that allowing the 
proposed expert testimony would have had a negative impact on the orderliness 
and efficiency of the trial given the minimal amount of time that remained 
between Smith's submission of her Pretrial Memorandum identifying her witnesses 
and commencement of the trial.  
Accordingly, we conclude that, under the circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion.

 

[¶19]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Rule 26. 
General provisions governing discovery.

            
. . . .

            
(b) Discovery scope and limits.  Unless otherwise limited by 
order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as 
follows:

. . 
. .

(4) 
Trial Preparation: Experts.  Discovery of facts known and opinions held by 
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) and 
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be 
obtained only as follows:

(A)    
(i) 
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each 
person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to 
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to 
state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to 
testify and a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion.

(ii) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert 
whose opinions may be presented at trial. Upon motion, the court may order 
further discovery by other means.  
Such deposition or other discovery is subject to such restrictions as to 
scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C), concerning fees 
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.

(B)    
A 
party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been 
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or 
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at 
trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to 
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other 
means.

(C)    
Unless manifest injustice would result:

(i)                   
The 
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable 
fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) 
and (b)(4)(B); and

(ii)                 
With respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) the 
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision 
(b)(4)(B) the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter 
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the 
expert.

  2Rule 702. 
Testimony by experts.

            
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.