Title: Leon P. Szleszinski v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP3033 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Estate of Leon P. Szleszinski, by its Special  
Administrator and Darlene Szleszinski, 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
     v. 
Labor & Industry Review Commission, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Midwest Coast Transport, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Transhield Trucking and Transhield Leasing 
Company, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 229 
Reported at:  287 Wis. 2d 775, 706 N.W.2d 345 
(Ct. App.2005-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene D. Harrington   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Janice Rhodes, and Kravit, Hovel & Krawczyk, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Janice Rhodes. 
 
For the petitioners-appellants there was a brief by Matthew 
A. Biegert and Doar Drill, S.C., New Richmond, and oral argument 
by Matthew A. Biegert. 
 
 
 
2 
For the respondent-respondent the case was argued by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP3033  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV30) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Estate of Leon P. Szleszinski, by its Special  
Administrator, and Darlene Szleszinski, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor & Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Midwest Coast Transport, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Transhield Trucking and Transhield Leasing 
Company, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified 
and, as modified, affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Midwest Coast Transport 
("Midwest"), a commercial trucking company, seeks review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals1 reversing a decision 
                                                 
1 Estate of Szleszinski v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 229, 287 Wis. 
2d 775, 706 N.W.2d 345. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
2 
 
of the Labor and Industry Review Commission ("LIRC") that 
determined 
Midwest 
did 
not 
discriminate 
for 
reasons 
of 
disability against Leon P. Szleszinski ("Szleszinski"), an 
interstate 
commercial 
truck 
driver. 
 
Midwest 
prohibited 
Szleszinski, who suffered from Wilson's disease, from driving 
trucks leased to Midwest by Transhield Trucking and Transhield 
Leasing Company ("Transhield") after receiving a doctor's 
recommendation that Szleszinski be disqualified from driving 
commercial trucks interstate due to his diagnosis of Wilson's 
disease. 
¶2 
Szleszinski filed a disability discrimination claim 
under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act ("WFEA") against Midwest 
and Transhield.  Mr. Szleszinski died while his claim was 
pending, and his estate was substituted as complainant.2  The 
hearing examiner3 ruled in Szleszinski's favor.  LIRC reversed 
the hearing examiner's decision, concluding that the medical 
evaluation 
of 
the 
physician who recommended disqualifying 
Szleszinski 
was 
sufficiently 
"individualized" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c) (2005-06)4 of the WFEA, and 
                                                 
2 For consistency, this opinion will refer to both the late 
Leon P. Szleszinski and the Estate of Leon P. Szleszinski as 
"Szleszinski." 
3 The WFEA refers to persons who hear and decide WFEA 
complaints as "examiners" and not as "administrative law 
judges."  See Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4).  This opinion, therefore, 
will use the term "examiner." 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
3 
 
that Szleszinski could have challenged the evaluation under a 
dispute 
resolution 
procedure 
contained 
in 
United 
States 
Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations.  
¶3 
After the Washburn County Circuit Court, Honorable 
Eugene D. Harrington, affirmed LIRC's decision, the court of 
appeals reversed, concluding that Szleszinski was not required 
to seek a determination of medical qualification from the DOT 
under the dispute resolution procedure before initiating his 
WFEA disability discrimination claim because (1) "the WFEA does 
not 
require 
individuals 
to 
exhaust 
other 
administrative 
remedies," and (2) the DOT procedure was inapplicable in this 
case because it applies only in disputes between the driver's 
physician and the carrier's physician, and both physicians in 
this case were hired by Midwest.  Estate of Szleszinski v. LIRC, 
2005 WI App 229, ¶¶17-21, 287 Wis. 2d 775, 706 N.W.2d 345.  The 
court of appeals also concluded that the medical evaluation upon 
which Midwest relied was "insufficient . . . as a matter of law" 
because it was not "individualized" under the WFEA.  Id., ¶34.  
¶4 
Midwest sought review of the court of appeals' 
conclusion 
that 
Szleszinski 
was 
not 
required 
to 
seek 
a 
determination regarding medical qualification from the DOT under 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
4 
 
the dispute resolution procedure before filing his WFEA claim, 
and we granted review to address this issue.5   
¶5 
We 
conclude 
that 
a 
driver 
need 
not 
seek 
a 
determination of medical qualification from the DOT prior to 
filing a disability discrimination claim under the WFEA.  We 
also conclude that when a person's medical and physical 
qualifications to be an interstate commercial driver are 
material to a WFEA claim, and a dispute arises concerning those 
qualifications that cannot be resolved by facial application of 
the DOT regulations, such a dispute should be resolved by the 
DOT under its dispute resolution procedure.  We further conclude 
                                                 
5 The only issue on review before this court sought by 
Midwest 
is 
whether 
Szleszinski 
was 
required 
to 
seek 
a 
determination regarding his medical qualifications to be a 
commercial driver under 49 C.F.R. § 391.47 before filing his 
WFEA claim.  Midwest did not seek review of the court of 
appeals' conclusions that Dr. Windhorst's evaluation was neither 
a valid medical examination under the applicable DOT regulations 
nor 
an 
individualized 
evaluation 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(c) of the WFEA.  See Szleszinski, 287 
Wis. 2d 775, ¶¶33-36. 
The dissent asserts that the majority opinion disregards 
LIRC's decision and memorandum opinion, including LIRC's factual 
findings.  Dissent, ¶68-73.  The facts relied upon in our 
opinion are taken entirely from LIRC's February 26, 2004, 
findings of fact.  Yet, the issues the dissent wants to address 
were not included in Midwest's petition for review, and cannot 
now be raised or argued by Midwest as a matter of right.  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6).  See Ranes v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Wis. 2d 49, 54 n.4, 580 N.W.2d 197 (1998); 
State v. Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 228, 495 N.W.2d 669 
(1993).  "If an issue is not raised in the petition for review 
or in a cross petition, 'the issue is not before us.'"  Jankee 
v. Clark County, 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297 
(citation omitted).  We decline to reach issues not raised by 
the parties in this case. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
5 
 
that, under the WFEA's burden-shifting scheme, the carrier, not 
the driver, is the party that must seek a determination of 
medical and physical qualification from the DOT if the carrier 
intends to offer a defense that the driver was not qualified for 
medical reasons.   
¶6 
With regard to the issue before us on review, we 
therefore reverse the decision of LIRC and reinstate the hearing 
examiner's decision.  We remand to LIRC to reinstate the 
decision and order of the hearing examiner and to grant the 
award ordered by the hearing examiner in this case.6 
I 
¶7 
LIRC's February 26, 2004 decision contained the 
following findings of fact, which are undisputed.  In 1981, at 
the age of 22, Szleszinski was diagnosed with Wilson's disease, 
a disorder of the metabolism in which a person is unable to 
process copper normally.  The disease is marked by an increased 
output of copper in the urine, deposits of copper in the 
tissues, cirrhosis of the liver, pigmentation of the corneas, 
and degenerative changes in the central nervous system.   
¶8 
Szleszinski was employed as a truck driver for 15 
years prior to his death in March 1999.  Szleszinski had held a 
commercial drivers license since the early 1990s.  In June 1995, 
Szleszinski was hired as an over-the-road truck driver by 
                                                 
6 We note that the hearing examiner's order required that 
the award be offset by Szleszinski's earnings from other 
employment.  See Estate of Leon P. Szleszinski v. Transhield 
Trucking, ERD No. 199603914 (ERD, August 7, 2003). 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
6 
 
Transhield, which leases its trucks and drivers exclusively to 
Midwest.  Midwest transports semi-trailer loads of freight in 
interstate commerce.  Midwest required its drivers to be 
medically certified pursuant to federal motor carrier safety 
regulations.  At the time of his hiring, Szleszinski disclosed 
that 
he 
had 
Wilson's 
disease 
and 
provided 
documentation 
demonstrating he had passed a medical examination and was 
certified to drive under the applicable DOT regulations.  
¶9 
In March 1996, Midwest received reports from two 
different sources that Szleszinski was driving erratically.  
Both reports alleged that Szleszinski's truck was observed 
weaving in traffic, and one alleged it forced another onto the 
shoulder of the highway.  Szleszinski disputed that these 
incidents occurred.  Midwest suspended Szleszinski from driving 
and sought a medical evaluation to determine whether Szleszinski 
was physically fit to drive.   
¶10 Upon 
the 
recommendation 
of 
Occupational 
Health 
Associates of South Dakota ("OHA"), the company on which Midwest 
relied for medical evaluation of its drivers, Szleszinski was 
examined by Dr. Ali Choucair, a neuro-oncologist at the 
Marshfield Clinic.  In a report dated March 19, 1996, Dr. 
Choucair found an "established diagnosis of Wilson's disease 
with 
very 
mild 
demonstrated 
deficit 
on 
the 
neurological 
examination." 
 
He 
recommended 
an 
MRI 
scan, 
"detailed 
psychometrics," and a DOT road test.  He concluded, however, 
that "[Szleszinski's] deficit I do not believe is such that will 
prevent him from operating a motor vehicle."   
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
7 
 
¶11 Midwest then forwarded Dr. Choucair's evaluation and 
Szleszinski's medical records to OHA.  Dr. Dana Windhorst, the 
director of OHA's Department of Occupational Medicine, reviewed 
the records but did not personally examine Szleszinski.  On 
March 21, 1996, Dr. Windhorst issued a report which states, in 
relevant part: 
I 
have 
reviewed 
Mr. 
Szleszinski's 
records, 
specifically the note from Ali Choieair [sic], M.D., 
Neurologist . . . . 
 
As 
I 
understand 
it, 
Mr. 
Szleszinski has a 19-year history of Wilson's disease, 
with diagnosis confirmed at the Mayo Clinic.  The 
laboratory tests on Dr. Choieair's [sic] note was 
certainly consistent with Wilson's disease.  As far as 
I can see, there is no question that this is the 
confirmed diagnosis, at least based on the information 
available to me. 
The neurological examination did indicate some mild 
neurological deficits, specifically in the areas of 
coordination, 
and 
possibly 
some 
extrapyramidal 
problems as well.   
In addition, there is the history, apparently twice, 
of this driver being observed to swerve on the 
highway, 
suggesting 
some 
problem 
with 
functional 
coordination during his driving. 
Wilson's 
disease 
is 
a 
progressive 
neurological 
disease, and this is of grave concern, given the 
responsibilities of driving large commercial vehicles 
on the highways.  The Department of Transportation 
Conference on Neurological Disorders and Commercial 
Drivers, 
dated 
July 
1988, 
recommends, 
without 
exception, 
disqualification 
for 
individuals 
with 
confirmed diagnosis of Wilson's disease.  Putting all 
this together, I cannot make a recommendation for this 
individual 
to 
be 
medically 
certified 
for 
DOT 
licensure.  It is also my opinion that, regardless of 
the results of psychometric testing and MRI, that I 
would not change this recommendation.   
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
8 
 
The report of the Department of Transportation Conference on 
Neurological Disorders ("Conference Report") referenced in Dr. 
Windhorst's 
report 
recommended 
changes 
to 
49 
C.F.R. 
§ 391.41(b)(7), (8) and (9), the administrative rules concerning 
regulation 
of 
drivers 
with 
neurological 
disorders. 
 
The 
conference report's specific recommendation concerning Wilson's 
disease was not adopted by DOT rule makers.7  
¶12 Based on Dr. Windhorst's recommendation, on March 26, 
1996, Midwest informed Szleszinski that he would not be allowed 
to drive equipment leased to Midwest.  Because Transhield leased 
equipment exclusively to Midwest, this decision, in effect, 
ended Szleszinski's employment with Transhield.  
¶13 On April 5, 1996, Dr. Stanley Skinner, a neurologist 
at the Minnesota Clinic of Neurology, examined Szleszinski 
                                                 
7 The dissent repeatedly emphasizes this Conference Report 
relied upon by Dr. Windhorst, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Department of Transportation chose not to incorporate the 
Report's 
recommendation 
of 
unequivocal 
grounds 
for 
disqualification for persons with Wilson's disease in its rules.  
See dissent, ¶¶56-57, 62, 84-86. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
9 
 
regarding his employment with another trucking company.8  Dr. 
Skinner determined that the diagnosis of Wilson's disease should 
not affect Szleszinski's employment as a truck driver.  Dr. Gary 
A. Johnson reviewed an MRI of Szleszinski's head at his request 
and found that it was normal.  
¶14 Despite the adverse evaluation of Dr. Windhorst, 
Szleszinski's DOT certification was never suspended or revoked, 
and Szleszinski continued to work as a commercial truck driver.  
¶15 On October 3, 1996, Szleszinski filed a disability 
discrimination 
complaint with the Wisconsin Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations (n/k/a Department of 
Workforce Development ("DWD")) alleging Midwest and Transhield 
unlawfully terminated his employment because of his disability, 
Wilson's disease.  In an initial determination dated September 
15, 1997, and amended on February 18, 1999, an equal rights 
                                                 
8  Thus, Szelszinski received three medical evaluations, two 
from the carrier (Dr. Choucair and Dr. Windhorst) and one from 
his own physician, Dr. Skinner.  The DOT dispute resolution 
procedure discussed at length later in this opinion, 49 C.F.R. 
391.47, applies in disputes between a physician for the carrier 
and a physician for the driver.  See infra, ¶31.  Under the 
unique facts of this case, the dispute resolution procedure does 
not apply because (1) the court of appeals concluded that Dr. 
Windhorst's evaluation was not valid under the DOT regulations; 
(2) Midwest has not sought review of this conclusion; and (3) no 
dispute exists between the remaining valid evaluations of Dr. 
Choucair 
and 
Dr. 
Skinner 
regarding 
Szleszinski's 
medical 
qualifications.  See infra, ¶42 and n.18.  Nevertheless, we 
address the appropriate procedure for LIRC to follow in WFEA 
discrimination 
claims 
involving 
medical 
qualifications 
of 
drivers to provide guidance in future cases. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
10 
 
officer stated there was probable cause to believe Midwest and 
Transhield had discriminated against Szleszinski.  
¶16 On March 11, 1999, Szleszinski died.  On April 2, 
2002, the personal representative of the Estate of Szleszinski 
was substituted as the complainant in the matter.  
¶17 After a hearing, examiner Gary Olstad issued a 
decision dated August 7, 2003, determining that:  (1) Midwest 
was Szleszinski's de facto employer within the meaning of the 
WFEA; (2) Transhield was not Szleszinski's employer within the 
meaning 
of 
the 
WFEA; 
(3) 
Midwest 
discriminated 
against 
Szleszinski by terminating his employment because he had 
Wilson's 
disease; 
and 
(4) 
Transhield 
did 
not 
terminate 
Szleszinski's 
employment. 
 
Examiner 
Olstad 
dismissed 
the 
complaint 
against 
Transhield9 and ordered Midwest to pay 
Szleszinski back pay and benefits, plus reasonable attorney fees 
and costs.   
¶18 Midwest 
petitioned 
LIRC 
for 
review 
of 
Examiner 
Olstad's decision.  On February 24, 2004, LIRC issued a decision 
reversing the examiner's decision.  LIRC concluded that both 
Midwest and Transhield were employers within the meaning of the 
WFEA, and that Szleszinski had proven he was disabled within the 
meaning of the WFEA.  However, it further concluded Szleszinski 
failed to prove that Midwest had discriminated against him 
because of his disability.  LIRC also concluded that Dr. 
                                                 
9  Transhield's dismissal as a party to this action has not 
been challenged by Szleszinski.  Transhield is not a party to 
this review. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
11 
 
Windhorst's opinion was sufficiently "individualized" to satisfy 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c), and 
Midwest could reasonably rely on Dr. Windhorst's report to prove 
Szleszinski's disability was reasonably related to his ability 
to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of his 
employment.  LIRC noted that Szleszinski could have challenged 
Dr. Windhorst's medical evaluation by using a DOT dispute 
resolution procedure.  LIRC stated:  "It is important to note 
that [Szleszinski] was not required to helplessly accept Dr. 
Windhorst's 
refusal 
to 
medically 
certify 
him. 
 
Federal 
regulations provide an appeal mechanism [the DOT dispute 
resolution 
procedure] 
through 
which 
disputed 
DOT 
medical 
certifications can be reviewed."  
¶19 Szleszinski commenced an action in the circuit court 
seeking review of LIRC's decision.  In a memorandum decision 
dated October 19, 2004, the circuit court affirmed LIRC's 
decision.   
¶20 Szleszinski appealed the circuit court's decision.  
The court of appeals issued an opinion reversing LIRC on 
multiple grounds.  First, the court of appeals concluded that 
Szleszinski was not required to seek a determination regarding 
medical qualification from the DOT under its dispute resolution 
procedure before initiating a WFEA disability discrimination 
claim because "the WFEA does not require individuals to exhaust 
other administrative remedies."  Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, 
¶¶17-18.  Second, the court concluded that the DOT procedure did 
not apply in this case because the regulation concerns only 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
12 
 
disagreements between the "physician for the driver" and the 
"physician for the motor carrier," and the disagreement in this 
case was between Dr. Choucair and Dr. Windhorst, who were both 
physicians for Midwest.  Id., ¶¶19-21.  Third, the court of 
appeals affirmed LIRC's determination that Midwest was an 
employer within the meaning of the WFEA.  Id., ¶¶22-30.  Fourth, 
the court concluded that the DOT regulations require an in-
person examination of the driver and not just a paper review of 
the driver's medical history, rendering Dr. Windhorst's report 
"insufficient . . . as a matter of law."  Id., ¶¶32-34.  And, 
fifth, the court concluded that because Dr. Windhorst's report 
disqualified Szleszinski based solely upon a 1983 DOT study 
committee recommendation of automatic disqualification for a 
diagnosis 
of 
Wilson's 
disease, 
the 
doctor's 
report 
was 
insufficient under the WFEA, which requires a case-by-case 
assessment of each individual.  Id., ¶¶35-36.   
¶21 On October 27, 2005, Midwest filed a petition for 
review with this court.  Midwest's petition raised only one 
issue 
for 
review, 
whether 
a 
commercial 
driver 
who 
is 
disqualified by the carrier for a medical condition must seek a 
determination from the DOT under its regulations concerning his 
or her medical qualifications before bringing a disability 
discrimination claim under the WFEA.  This court granted 
Midwest's petition to address this issue.  This court also 
directed LIRC (which had not sought review of the court of 
appeals' decision) to file a brief addressing the issue raised 
by Midwest's petition.  
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
13 
 
II 
¶22 When reviewing the decision of an administrative 
agency, this court reviews the agency's decision and not the 
decision of the court of appeals or the circuit court.  Racine 
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 
86, ¶8 n.4, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  Our review is 
limited to (1) whether the agency kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether it acted 
arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably; and (4) whether the 
evidence was sufficient that the agency might reasonably make 
the order or determination in question.  Solie v. Employee Trust 
Funds Bd., 2005 WI 42, ¶23, 279 Wis. 2d 615, 695 N.W.2d 463 
(citation omitted).   
¶23 The 
issue 
presented 
in 
this 
review, 
whether 
a 
commercial driver who is disqualified by a carrier for a medical 
condition 
must 
seek 
a 
determination 
regarding 
medical 
qualifications from the DOT under the DOT's dispute resolution 
before bringing a disability discrimination claim under the 
WFEA, involves statutory interpretation, a question of law this 
court ordinarily reviews de novo.  See DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 
2007 WI 15, ¶10, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 727 N.W.2d 311.  However, this 
case involves review of an agency decision, and we often accord 
deference to an agency's legal conclusions.  Solie, 279 Wis.2d 
615, ¶25.  We apply one of three levels of deference to an 
agency's interpretation and application of law:  great weight 
deference, due weight deference, or no deference, depending upon 
the "comparative institutional qualifications and capabilities 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
14 
 
of the court and the administrative agency."  Racine Harley-
Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶13.   
¶24 Many 
of 
our 
prior 
cases 
reviewing 
LIRC's 
interpretation and application of the WFEA have applied great 
weight deference.  See, e.g., Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. LIRC, 
2004 WI 90, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343; Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, ¶28, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 
N.W.2d 651.  However, we conclude that the agency's decision in 
this case is not entitled to any deference.  As LIRC notes, the 
agency's view as to whether the WFEA should be interpreted to 
require a determination under federal law before an individual 
may pursue a claim under the WFEA concerns the scope of LIRC's 
own power and is therefore not binding on this court.  See Wis. 
Envtl. Decade v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 260 
N.W.2d 712 (1978) (citation omitted).  Furthermore, to the 
extent that this case involves interpretation of federal 
commercial carrier regulations, we owe no deference to LIRC's 
decision because LIRC has no special expertise interpreting and 
administering these regulations.  See DaimlerChrysler, ___ Wis. 
2d ___, ¶18.  
III 
¶25 In a disability discrimination claim under the WFEA, 
the complainant must initially prove the following:  (1) he or 
she has a disability within the meaning of the act; and (2) the 
employer's adverse employment action was on the basis of the 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
15 
 
complainant's disability.10  See Stoughton Trailers v. LIRC, 2007 
WI 105, ¶23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (citation omitted).  
See also Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1).  If the complainant meets its 
burden of proof as to both of these elements, the burden shifts 
to the employer to prove a defense under Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  
Under that section, the employer must show that its adverse 
action, while made on the basis of the complainant's disability, 
was not discriminatory under the WFEA.  Target Stores v. LIRC, 
217 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998).   
¶26 An employer may avoid a finding of discrimination by 
demonstrating that the person's disability renders him or her 
unqualified to adequately undertake the responsibilities of the 
employment.  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a).11  "In evaluating whether 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.322(1) provides that it is an act 
of employment discrimination "to refuse to hire, employ, admit 
or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment 
or 
labor 
organization 
membership 
any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation 
or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or labor 
organization membership because of any basis enumerated in 
s. 111.321."  Wisconsin Stat. § 111.321 prohibits employment 
discrimination from an employer, labor organization, employment 
agency, licensing agency or other person on the basis of, among 
other reasons, disability.  
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(2)(a) provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding 
s. 
111.322 
[relating 
to 
prohibited 
discriminatory 
actions], 
it 
is 
not 
employment discrimination because of disability to 
refuse 
to 
hire, 
employ, 
admit 
or 
license 
any 
individual, to bar or terminate from employment, 
membership 
or 
licensure 
any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate against any individual in promotion, 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment if the disability is reasonably related to 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
16 
 
an individual with a disability can adequately undertake the 
job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or 
licensed activity, the present and future safety of the 
individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if applicable, of 
the general public may be considered."  § 111.34(2)(b).  Such an 
evaluation must be made "on an individual case-by-case basis and 
may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment 
or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a 
particular class of individuals with disabilities."  Id.  
 
¶27 In this case, Midwest has not disputed that Wilson's 
disease is a disability within the meaning of the act, or that 
its decision to prohibit Szleszinski from driving equipment 
leased to Midwest was on the basis of Szleszinski's diagnosis of 
Wilson's disease.  The only matter in dispute is whether 
Szleszinski was physically qualified to operate a commercial 
motor vehicle.  
 
¶28 Federal DOT regulations address the minimum medical or 
physical qualifications for interstate commercial drivers, and 
where applicable, these regulations supersede any lesser state 
regulations.  See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395, 401, 
290 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided 
court, 101 Wis. 2d 169, 303 N.W.2d 668 (1981).  Under the DOT 
regulations, a commercial truck driver engaged in interstate 
commerce must pass a medical examination demonstrating that he 
                                                                                                                                                             
the individual's ability to adequately undertake the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment, membership or licensure. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
17 
 
or she is physically qualified to be a commercial driver.  See 
49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a).  Before concluding that a person is 
physically qualified to be an interstate commercial driver, the 
medical examiner must determine "that the driver does not have 
any physical, mental, or organic condition that might affect the 
driver's ability to operate a commercial motor vehicle safely."  
49 C.F.R. § 391.43(f).12  If the medical examiner concludes a 
driver is physically qualified, he or she must provide the 
driver and his or her employer with a copy of a certificate that 
so indicates.  49 C.F.R. § 391.43(g). 
¶29 A driver must be re-examined at least every 24 months, 
and whenever the driver's "ability to perform his/her normal 
duties has been impaired by a physical or mental injury or 
disease."  49 C.F.R. § 391.45(b)(1) and (c).  A driver carrying 
an otherwise valid medical examination certification may not 
drive if he or she becomes physically unqualified to do so.  See 
49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a).  A carrier that allows a driver to 
operate a commercial motor vehicle after the driver becomes 
physically unqualified is in violation of federal law.13  See 1 
                                                 
12 The federal regulations define a medical examiner as "a 
person 
who 
is 
licensed, 
certified 
and/or 
registered, 
in 
accordance with applicable State laws and regulations, to 
perform physical examinations."  49 C.F.R. § 390.5.  
13 As Midwest points out, federal statutes impose stiff 
penalties 
on 
employers 
who 
knowingly 
permit 
physically 
unqualified drivers to operate a commercial motor vehicle, 
including criminal prosecution, civil penalties and revocation 
of the carrier's authorization to do business.  See 49 U.S.C.A. 
§ 13905(c); 49 U.S.C.A. § 521(b).   
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
18 
 
William E. Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law 
§ 14.01 at 14-17 (3d ed. 2005).   
¶30 The 
DOT 
regulations 
enumerate 
several 
medical 
conditions 
for 
which 
a 
diagnosis 
results 
in 
automatic 
disqualification of a driver.  For example, a driver with 
insulin-dependent diabetes, epilepsy (with some exceptions), or 
myocardial infarction may not be medically certified to operate 
a commercial motor vehicle.  49 C.F.R. § 391.41.  Wilson's 
disease is not among the listed conditions for which diagnosis 
would preclude medical certification.  The regulations provide 
detailed guidelines for the physician examiner conducting a 
medical evaluation of a driver.  See 49 C.F.R. § 391.43.  
¶31 The DOT regulations also contain an administrative 
procedure to resolve conflicts between two medical evaluations. 
49 C.F.R. § 391.47.  Either the carrier or driver may initiate 
the procedure by application to the DOT's Director of the Office 
of 
Bus and Truck 
Standards and Operations.  49 C.F.R. 
§ 391.47(c), 
(d)(3). 
 
The 
regulation 
provides 
that 
"[a]pplications for 
determination 
of 
a 
driver's 
medical 
qualifications" must conform to certain requirements to be 
considered by the agency, including "proof that there is a 
disagreement between the physician for the driver and the 
physician 
for 
the 
motor 
carrier 
concerning 
the 
driver's 
qualifications."  49 C.F.R. § 391.47(b)(2).   
¶32 Midwest contends that Szleszinski was required to seek 
a determination regarding his medical qualifications from the 
DOT under its dispute resolution procedure before filing his 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
19 
 
disability discrimination claim under the WFEA.  Midwest asserts 
that because Szleszinski failed to seek such a determination 
from the DOT, his claim was properly dismissed by LIRC.  Midwest 
and counsel for LIRC both complain that the court of appeals' 
decision in this case will result in state hearing examiners, 
rather than federal regulators with expertise in interpreting 
the DOT regulations, deciding future disputes concerning medical 
qualifications of interstate commercial drivers. 
¶33 We agree with Midwest and counsel for LIRC that DOT 
regulators 
should 
resolve 
disputes 
concerning 
medical 
qualifications of drivers that cannot be resolved by facial 
application of the DOT regulations.  The DOT rules contain a 
procedure for the resolution of such disputes.  See 49 C.F.R. 
§ 391.47.  As the federal agency charged with licensing and 
regulating interstate commercial drivers, the DOT has special 
expertise in resolving such disputes.  By contrast, a state 
examiner hearing a WFEA complaint has no special expertise to 
resolve a technical dispute between two medical examiners 
concerning a driver's qualifications under the DOT regulations.   
¶34 We therefore conclude that if, in the context of a 
WFEA proceeding, a determination regarding a driver's medical 
qualifications is necessary to resolve a dispute concerning such 
qualifications that cannot be resolved by facial application of 
the DOT regulations, the determination should be made by the DOT 
under its dispute resolution procedure.  However, the fact that 
DOT regulators should resolve such disputes when they arise in 
the context of a WFEA claim does not mean that a determination 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
20 
 
of medical qualification must be made before a WFEA claim is 
filed, or that it is the driver's responsibility to seek such a 
determination.   
¶35 The dispute in this case concerning Szleszinski's 
medical qualifications arises in the context of his disability 
discrimination claim under the WFEA.  Here, the DOT dispute 
resolution procedure is relevant to an issue that is material to 
a discrimination claim under the WFEA, i.e., whether Szleszinski 
was qualified to be an interstate commercial driver.  
¶36 Under the WFEA, the employer carries the burden of 
proof on the issue of whether the complainant is qualified to 
adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of the 
employment.  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b).  A showing by an 
employer that an individual is not qualified by reason of 
disability to execute the responsibilities of a particular job 
is a defense under the WFEA to the complainant's prima facie 
case of discrimination.  Id.  In this respect, the WFEA differs 
from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires 
that the employee, not the employer, shoulder the burden of 
proof on the question of whether the employee is qualified to 
perform the essential functions of a job.  See, e.g., Weiler v. 
Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996). 
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that when a dispute exists 
between the physician for the driver and the physician for the 
carrier 
regarding 
the 
driver's 
physical 
and 
medical 
qualifications, it is the carrier, not the driver, who bears the 
burden of seeking a determination under the DOT dispute 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
21 
 
resolution 
procedure 
if 
the 
carrier 
intends 
to 
offer 
a 
qualification-based 
defense against the driver's claim of 
disability discrimination under the WFEA.14  A requirement that 
the driver seek a DOT determination before filing a state 
discrimination claim would be contrary to the burden-shifting 
scheme of the WFEA.  Moreover, such a requirement would prevent 
some drivers from filing legitimate WFEA claims before the 
statute of limitations has run.15   
¶38 We find the analysis of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bay v. Cassens Transport 
Company, 
212 
F.3d 
969, 
974-76 
(7th 
Cir. 
2000), 
to 
be 
instructive.  In Bay, a former commercial truck driver brought a 
                                                 
14 The dissent suggests that our determination of who has 
the burden of going forward in this action somehow punishes 
Midwest.  Dissent, ¶¶50, 66.  To the contrary, we do not 
construe requiring a party to follow our statutes as punishment. 
15 We note that our conclusion differs in part from that of 
LIRC in Hermann v. Ort Trucking Co., ERD No. 9301203 (LIRC, July 
1, 1994).  There, a trucking company's physician disqualified 
Hermann, a diabetic, because of high blood sugar levels, but 
Hermann's physician certified him to drive after concluding 
Hermann's blood sugar levels were acceptable.  Hermann filed a 
claim for disability discrimination under the WFEA.  LIRC 
dismissed Hermann's claim, holding that Hermann was required to 
seek a determination from the DOT under the dispute resolution 
procedure before filing a claim of disability discrimination 
under the WFEA.   
 
At oral argument in the present case, counsel for LIRC 
expressed the view that Hermann was wrongly decided to the 
extent that the Commission should not have dismissed Hermann's 
claim outright, but should have stayed the proceedings to permit 
the DOT to resolve the medical qualification dispute.  We agree 
with LIRC's counsel that the Hermann Commission should have 
sought a stay of the state proceedings to permit resolution of 
the medical qualification dispute by the DOT. 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
22 
 
discrimination claim under the ADA after Cassens' physician 
decertified him for a diagnosis of profound sinus bradycardia 
with near loss of consciousness, a heart condition requiring 
decertification under the DOT regulations.  Id. at 971-72.  Bay 
did not seek recertification under the DOT dispute resolution 
procedure.  Id. at 974.  The Bay court concluded that Bay's 
failure to seek recertification was fatal to his ADA claim based 
on the fact that, under the ADA, Bay carried the burden of 
showing that he was qualified to be a commercial driver.  Id. at 
973-74.  
¶39 Thus, under Bay, the party that bears the burden of 
proof on the issue of whether the driver is qualified is the 
party that carries the burden of seeking a determination from 
the DOT regarding medical qualification.  See id. at 973-74.  In 
a case under the WFEA, that party is the employer.  Accordingly, 
a carrier wishing to raise a defense based on the driver's 
medical qualifications must seek a determination from the DOT 
under the dispute resolution procedure when a legitimate dispute 
regarding 
the 
driver's 
qualifications 
exists 
between 
the 
driver's physician and the carrier's physician.  
¶40 We note that in some cases it may be unnecessary to 
obtain 
a 
determination 
regarding 
the 
driver's 
medical 
qualifications from the DOT if the issue is easily resolved by 
facial application of the DOT regulations.  For example, where 
the driver receives an undisputed diagnosis of a condition for 
which blanket disqualification of the driver is required under 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
23 
 
the regulations,16 the hearing examiner may simply conclude that 
the 
driver 
is 
unqualified 
by 
facial 
application 
of 
the 
regulations.17 
¶41 But 
where 
a 
dispute 
over 
a 
driver's 
medical 
qualifications cannot be resolved by facial application of the 
DOT regulations, the hearing examiner must either give the 
carrier the opportunity to seek a determination from the DOT 
regarding the driver's medical qualifications or seek sua sponte 
a determination from the DOT regarding the driver's medical 
qualifications.  The hearing examiner should stay the WFEA 
proceedings pending the resolution by the DOT of the medical 
qualification dispute.   
¶42 Because LIRC did not seek a determination from the DOT 
under its dispute resolution procedure, a remand directive from 
this court to LIRC to provide the carrier the opportunity to 
                                                 
16 We note that provisions in the DOT regulations requiring 
automatic disqualification for diagnosis of certain conditions 
are valid for purposes of claims under the WFEA, despite the 
fact that the WFEA requires assessment of an individual's 
qualifications on a "case-by-case basis" and "not . . . by a 
general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of 
 . . . a particular class of individuals with disabilities."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b).  The DOT's requirements prevail over 
lesser state provisions relating to the minimum qualifications 
of drivers.  Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395, 401, 290 
N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court, 
101 Wis. 2d 169, 303 N.W.2d 668 (1981). 
17 A hearing examiner may also be able to resolve a case 
without seeking a determination from the DOT where the driver 
can demonstrate that the employer's reliance on its doctor's 
medical determination was unreasonable or in bad faith.  See Bay 
v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 975 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000). 
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
24 
 
seek a determination from DOT would normally be in order.  Under 
the unique facts of this case, however, a remand order is 
unnecessary because the DOT dispute resolution procedure is 
inapplicable.  Under 49 C.F.R. § 391.47, a dispute must exist 
between a physician for the employer and a physician for the 
employee.  In this case, the court of appeals concluded that Dr. 
Windhorst's medical evaluation was invalid under the DOT 
regulations, and Midwest did not seek review of this conclusion.  
Because the remaining two medical evaluations of Dr. Choucair 
and Dr. Skinner both concluded that Szleszinski was qualified to 
drive, no dispute exists on review.18  We have addressed the 
                                                 
18 Our analysis in reaching the conclusion that the DOT 
dispute resolution procedure was inapplicable in this case 
differs from that of the court of appeals.  Before determining 
that Dr. Windhorst's examination was invalid under the DOT 
regulations, the court of appeals also concluded, as a threshold 
matter, 
that 
the 
DOT 
dispute 
resolution 
procedure 
was 
inapplicable 
because 
49 
C.F.R. 
§ 391.47 
applies 
only 
to 
disagreements between the physician for the carrier and the 
physician for the driver, and, in the view of the court of 
appeals, 
the 
disagreement 
in 
this 
case 
was 
between 
two 
physicians for the carrier (Dr. Windhorst and Dr. Choucair) 
only.  Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, ¶¶19-21.  However, the 
court of appeals failed to note that an evaluation was also made 
by a physician for Szleszinski, Dr. Skinner.  While Dr. 
Skinner's 
evaluation 
occurred 
one 
week 
after 
Midwest's 
employment decision and was therefore not available to Midwest 
at the time of its decision, Dr. Skinner's evaluation was still 
relevant to the issue of whether Szleszinski was medically 
qualified.  Thus, a disagreement (in fact, if not in law) 
existed between a physician for the carrier (Dr. Windhorst) and 
a physician for the driver (Dr. Skinner).  However, based on the 
court of appeals' conclusion not on review before us that Dr. 
Windhorst's evaluation was not valid, we conclude that no 
disagreement existed in law between a physician for the carrier 
and a physician for the driver.  
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
25 
 
proper procedure for LIRC to apply in WFEA discrimination cases 
involving medical qualifications of interstate truck drivers to 
provide guidance in future cases. 
¶43 We are sensitive to the importance of commercial 
driver standards in protecting the safety of the general public 
on the nation's highways.  Our decision protects the safety of 
the general public because the DOT regulations provide that once 
an application is submitted concerning a driver's medical 
qualifications, the driver shall be deemed disqualified until 
such time as a determination is made or an order is issued.  49 
C.F.R. § 391.47(f).  In other words, once the DOT dispute 
resolution application is submitted, the person cannot drive a 
commercial motor vehicle until it has been determined that he or 
she is physically qualified to do so.  Compare 49 C.F.R. 
391.41(a) with 49 C.F.R. § 391.47(f).  Our decision ensures that 
whenever 
a 
legitimate 
dispute 
regarding 
the 
medical 
qualifications of a driver arises in the context of a WFEA 
claim, it will be resolved in the same manner as would any such 
dispute——by resort to the proper federal authorities, with the 
driver being disqualified until a determination is made.19  
                                                 
19 The dissent asserts that this employment discrimination 
dispute involves the safety to the public.  Dissent, ¶50.  We 
agree.  Our decision removes from the road drivers involved in 
disputes regarding their medical qualifications until their 
disputes are resolved.  Thus, we fail to discern how this 
decision 
will 
"push 
or 
prod 
motor 
carriers 
into 
hiring 
commercial drivers who are unsafe at any speed."  See dissent, 
¶98.   
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
26 
 
¶44 Finally, we address the discussion of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies contained in the court of 
appeals' opinion.  Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, ¶¶17-18, 21.  
We do so to ensure that the law of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies does not become confused.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis.2d 
166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (stating that this court's 
primary function is that of law defining and law development).  
¶45 One rationale for the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Szleszinski did not have to seek a determination of medical 
qualification from the DOT was because "the WFEA does not 
require individuals to exhaust other administrative remedies."  
Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, ¶18.  The court of appeals further 
suggested 
that 
exhaustion 
of 
administrative 
remedies 
is 
necessary only when the legislature expressly requires it.  See 
id. 
 
("The 
legislature 
has, 
when 
it 
deemed 
exhaustion 
appropriate, expressly required utilizations of administrative 
remedies prior to initiating circuit court action.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. §§ 49.498(19)(a), 50.03(11)(a) and 801.02(7)(b).")  
We disagree. 
¶46 Generally, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine arises 
in the context of whether a plaintiff exhausted its remedies in 
an administrative proceeding before filing a lawsuit.  See, 
e.g., 
Wisconsin 
Collectors 
Ass'n, 
Inc. 
v. 
Thorp 
Finance 
Corp., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 47, 145 N.W.2d 33 (1966) ("[T]he 
exhaustion rule relates to judicial review of an uncompleted 
administrative proceedings . . . .").  Judicial interference is 
withheld until the administrative process has run its course.  
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
27 
 
Id. (citation omitted).  The context in which the court of 
appeals considered the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in this 
case, however, concerned whether a claimant involved in one 
administrative proceeding under the WFEA was required to exhaust 
his 
remedies 
in 
another 
administrative 
proceeding 
before 
bringing the WFEA claim.20  
 
¶47 The court of appeals' suggestion that legislative 
authorization is necessary for the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies to apply is simply incorrect.  While it 
is true that exhaustion of remedies is mandated by statute in 
some 
cases, 
see, 
e.g., 
Wis. Stat. §§ 49.498(19)(a), 
50.03(11)(a), and 801.02(7)(b), the rule of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is a "doctrine of judicial restraint" 
which developed in the common law and has been codified by the 
legislature in some settings.  See Nodell Inv. Corp. v. City of 
Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 416, 424, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977); see also 
State ex rel. Martin v. City of Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 568, 300 
N.W. 187 (1941) ("[W]here a specified method of review is 
prescribed by an act creating a new right or conferring a new 
power, the method so prescribed is exclusive and if [judicial] 
review is sought that method must be pursued.").  This court has 
frequently considered the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in 
cases in which no statute mandated exhaustion.  See, e.g., State 
                                                 
20 Considering exhaustion of administrative remedies in this 
context raises the following question:  If exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is required, which set of administrative 
remedies must be exhausted first?   
No. 
2004AP3033   
 
28 
 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 65 Wis. 2d 624, 635-
37, 223 N.W.2d 543 (1974); Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 
39, 63, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952); Ferch v. Schroedel, 241 Wis. 457, 
461, 6 N.W.2d 176 (1942).   
IV 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that a driver need not seek a 
determination of medical qualification from the DOT prior to 
filing a disability discrimination claim under the WFEA.  We 
also conclude that when a person's medical and physical 
qualifications to be an interstate commercial driver are 
material to a WFEA claim, and a dispute arises concerning those 
qualifications that cannot be resolved by facial application of 
the DOT regulations, such a dispute should be resolved by the 
DOT under its dispute resolution procedure.  We further conclude 
that, under the WFEA's burden-shifting scheme, the carrier, not 
the driver, is the party that must seek a determination of 
medical and physical qualification from the DOT if the carrier 
intends to offer a defense that the driver was not qualified for 
medical reasons.  
¶49 With regard to the issue before us on review, we 
therefore reverse the decision of LIRC and reinstate the hearing 
examiner's decision.  We remand to LIRC to grant the award 
ordered by the hearing examiner in this case.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and, as modified, affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶50 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Most employment 
discrimination disputes do not involve the safety of the public.  
This one does.  The effect of this case is to punish a trucking 
company that discontinued the services of an over-the-road 
commercial truck driver whom it believed posed an unreasonable 
risk on the highway.  Although the court appears to decide the 
case on narrow procedural grounds, it fails to confront 
important issues that transcend this dispute and adversely 
affect the motor carrier industry and the public at large.  
Because these issues require discussion, I respectfully dissent. 
BACKGROUND 
¶51 Leon P. Szleszinski (Szleszinski) was hired as a 
commercial 
truck 
driver 
by 
Transhield 
Leasing 
Company 
(Transhield) on or about June 21, 1995.  Transhield leased 
trucks and drivers to Midwest Coast Transport (Midwest), a large 
trucking company headquartered in South Dakota.  Midwest 
insisted on approving all drivers involved in its operations. 
¶52 To obtain Midwest's approval to work, Szleszinski 
submitted to a physical examination in accordance with Federal 
Motor 
Carrier 
Safety 
Regulations. 
 
This 
examination 
was 
completed on June 20, 1995, by Dr. L.D. Carlson, in Bruce, 
Wisconsin.  Szleszinski acknowledged to Dr. Carlson and his 
prospective employers that he had Wilson's disease, an uncommon, 
progressive neurological disorder.  Consequently, Midwest asked 
that additional medical records be sent to South Dakota for 
review by the independent Central Plains Clinic in Sioux Falls, 
which is part of Occupational Health Associates of South Dakota.  
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
2 
 
A physician's assistant at the clinic, Pat Farritor, signed off 
on Szleszinski's application. 
¶53 In March 1996, nine months later, Midwest received two 
separate complaints from the public about Szleszinski's driving.  
On March 8 a complainant from Watertown, Wisconsin, alleged that 
Szleszinski was "weaving all over his lane," then came into the 
complainant's lane forcing him onto the shoulder of Interstate 
Highway 
94. 
 
The 
complainant 
said 
Szleszinski 
also 
was 
tailgating and laying on his horn.  On March 12 a second 
complainant, from Bloomer, Wisconsin, claimed that Szleszinski 
was weaving in his lane and speeding on a highway near Eau 
Claire. 
¶54 Midwest promptly suspended Szleszinski until it could 
determine whether Szleszinski could safely operate his 16-wheel 
vehicle. 
 
Midwest's 
safety 
director, 
Lou 
Rogers, 
made 
arrangements for Szleszinski to be examined by Dr. Ali Choucair, 
a neuro-oncologist at the Marshfield Clinic.  Midwest had not 
worked with Dr. Choucair before.   
¶55 Dr. Choucair examined and interviewed Szleszinski on 
March 15, 1996.  Dr. Choucair's written report, dated March 19, 
reads in part: 
 
Mr. Szleszinski is a 36-year-old who is here for 
evaluation regarding his driving ability.  He is 
referred by Dr. [Conrad] Eastwold, but actually his 
referral came from Mr. Lou Rogers, safety manager 
where Mr. Szleszinski has been employed.  However, Mr. 
Szleszinski 
does 
not 
want 
me 
to 
send 
any 
correspondence 
to 
Mr. 
Lou 
Rogers. . . .  
Mr. 
Szleszinski would like a copy of this evaluation to go 
to the two gentlem[e]n noted below.  One of them, he 
tells me, is his supervisor and the other one is his 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
3 
 
attorney.  He had been seeing Dr. Eastwold at Rice 
Lake for management of Wilson's disease. 
 
The history as I have it was obtained in detail 
from the patient, who was also accompanied by his 
mother.  I have very scanty medical records from Dr. 
Eastwold.  The patient tells me that his diagnosis of 
Wilson's disease has been confirmed at the Mayo 
Clinic. 
 
The reason all of this came about is, according 
to Mr. Lou Rogers, that the patient had been seen 
driving a 16 wheeler, swaying over the highway.  The 
patient himself denies any difficulty whatsoever on 
the job. 
 
. . . .  
 
He tells me he was diagnosed as having Wilson's 
disease at age 17.  He at that time was having a 
physical for joining the military.  He was then 
referred to Dr. Harold Noran, a neurologist in 
Minneapolis, who saw him in July of 1981, and that is 
when the diagnosis was established.  However, the 
patient tells me that he had been to the Mayo Clinic 
two years ago by referral from Dr. Eastwold, and I 
have lab follow-ups subsequently. . . .  There are 
labs here for ceruloplasmin in June of 1990 which was 
2 (normals being 20-45) and urine copper was high at 
1024 (normals are 15-60).  He also had his liver 
enzymes checked, with a total bilirubin of 1.37, with 
a normal AST and a ceruloplasmin in June of 1992 of 4, 
again well below normal. 
 
The patient also has been known to have anxiety 
and an adjustment disorder for which he was once 
admitted in 1986. 
 
The patient was given the neurology questionnaire 
to fill out, which was reviewed with him in great 
detail. 
 
. . . .  
 
EXAM: A 36-year-old man. . . . He weighs 216 
pounds and is 69 inches tall.  Visual acuity 20/25 and 
20/40. 
 
. . . .  
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
4 
 
 
His detailed neurological examination is outlined 
on the neurological examination sheet, which is part 
of the permanent medical record.  He impresses me as 
being a very anxious gentleman.  He is, however, very 
cooperative.  He does have definite dysarthria and he 
has very mild masking of the face.  He has very mild 
stooping of his gait.  He does have diminished arm 
swing bilaterally.  He has mild difficulty with 
tandem. 
 
He 
has 
Kayser-Fleischer 
rings 
on 
his 
funduscopic exam.  He does have mild difficulty with 
finger-to-nose-to-nose. 
 
He 
also 
had 
very 
mild 
difficulty with heel-to-shin; again, this is really 
mild.  He has symmetrical hyperreflexia, but the toes 
are bilaterally downgoing.  He has no motor deficit on 
strength and a normal sensory exam in all detailed 
modalities.  The neurological exam is outlined on the 
neurological examination sheet, which is part of the 
permanent medical record. 
 
IMPRESSION: 1. Established diagnosis of Wilson's 
disease with very mild demonstrated deficit on the 
neurological examination. 
 
PLAN 
& 
DISCUSSION: 
As 
I 
told 
Leon, 
as 
a 
physician, I take the complaints from his safety 
manager as very serious.  I told him it is my 
responsibility to protect him as well as to protect 
others.  I told him the report that he was seen 
swaying on the highway is of serious concern to me, 
especially when he is driving an almost 70 or 80 ton 
truck.  I told him, by law, people who drive these 
vehicles need to demonstrate full ability of control.  
His deficit I do not believe is such that will prevent 
him from operating a motor vehicle.  However, I am 
seeing him only on one instance.  I have not had the 
opportunity to observe him.  I told him, however, it 
is my strong conviction that he should undergo an MRI 
scan of the head and that he should have formal 
detailed psychometrics done.  If he does well on these 
two, my next step would be to recommend that he have a 
road test by the DOT authorities.  This was explained 
to him in detail. 
 
Even though he gave me permission to speak to Mr. 
Lou Rogers, he would not give me permission to release 
information to him. 
 
. . . .  
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
5 
 
 
Created 3/19/1996 (emphasis added). 
 
¶56 When it received Dr. Choucair's report, Midwest 
sent it to Central Plains Clinic for review by the Medical 
Director, Dana J. Windhorst, a medical doctor with a master's 
degree in public health.  Dr. Windhorst's report, dated March 
21, 1996, reads as follows: 
 
I 
have 
reviewed 
Mr. 
Szleszinski's 
records, 
specifically the note from Ali Chou[c]air, M.D., 
Neurologist with St. Joseph's Hospital in Marshfield, 
Wisconsin.  I also discussed the case with Pat 
Farritor, P.A.-C.  As I understand it, Mr. Szleszinski 
has a 19-year history of Wilson's disease, with 
diagnosis 
confirmed 
at 
the 
Mayo 
Clinic. 
 
The 
laboratory 
tests 
on 
Dr. 
Chou[c]air's 
note 
was 
certainly consistent with Wilson's disease.  As far as 
I can see, there is no question that this is the 
confirmed diagnosis, at least based on the information 
available to me. 
 
The neurological examination did indicate some 
mild neurological deficits, specifically in the areas 
of coordination, and possibly some extrapyramidal 
problems as well. 
 
In addition, there is the history, apparently 
twice, of this driver being observed to swerve on the 
highway 
suggesting 
some 
problem 
with 
functional 
coordination during his driving. 
 
Wilson's disease is a progressive neurological 
disease, and this is of grave concern, given the 
responsibilities of driving large commercial vehicles 
on the highways.  The Department of Transportation 
Conference on Neurological Disorder[s] and Commercial 
Drivers, 
dated 
July 
1988, 
recommends, 
without 
exception, 
disqualification 
for 
individuals 
with 
confirmed diagnosis of Wilson's disease.  Putting all 
this together, I cannot make a recommendation for this 
individual 
to 
be 
medically 
certified 
for 
DOT 
Licensure.  It is also my opinion that regardless of 
the results of psychometric testing and MRI, that I 
would not change this recommendation. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
6 
 
 
¶57 The Conference report that was alluded to in Dr. 
Windhorst's letter reads in part as follows: 
 
The Office of Motor Carriers (OMC), Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), sponsored a conference on April 
7 and 8, 1988 to review the current standards for 
commercial motor vehicle drivers with neurological 
disorders.  Conference participants numbered twenty-
eight 
and 
included 
physicians 
and 
scientists 
experienced in the care of people with neurological 
disorders, and representatives from the motor carrier 
industry.  The current standard (FHWA regulations, 49 
C.F.R. [§] 391.41(b)(7, 8, 9) as established in 1971 
and 
revised 
in 
1983), 
permits 
qualification 
of 
individuals to drive a commercial vehicle if that 
person has no established medical history or clinical 
diagnosis of . . . any condition which is likely to 
cause loss of consciousness or the loss of ability to 
control 
a 
commercial 
vehicle, 
or . . . neuromuscular . . . disease 
such 
that 
the 
condition interferes with his/her ability to safely 
control and operate a commercial vehicle. 
 
The administrative rule applied to the commercial 
driver with neurological conditions was reviewed in 
light of the many advances in the diagnosis and care 
of neurological conditions that have accrued since 
1971. 
 
Four 
major 
categories 
of 
neurological 
conditions 
were carefully reviewed by four task 
forces, discussed at a plenary session, and following 
integration of all information presented, further 
discussed 
in-depth 
by 
members 
of 
the 
Steering 
Committee.1  The following summaries were prepared: 
 
. . . .  
Executive Summary——Progressive Neurological Conditions 
 
The task force felt that the current medical 
examination for commercial driving certification was 
inadequate 
in 
assessing 
neurological 
                                                 
1 The four major categories in the report were: I. Static 
Neurological 
Conditions; 
II. 
Progressive 
Neurological 
Conditions; III. Episodic Neurological Conditions I; and IV. 
Episodic Neurological Conditions II. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
7 
 
conditions. . . .  
For 
progressive 
neurologic 
disorders 
we 
recommend 
two 
categories 
for 
disqualification.  The first category includes chronic 
diseases 
that 
would 
unequivocally 
indicate 
disqualification: 
 
   
Dementia 
 
   
Motor neuron disease 
   
Malignant tumors of the central nervous 
system 
   
Huntington's disease 
 
   
Wilson's disease 
 
. . . .  
TASK 
FORCE 
II 
REPORT: 
PROGRESSIVE 
NEUROLOGICAL 
CONDITIONS 
 
. . . .  
EXTRAPYRAMIDAL DISORDERS WITH HYPERKINESIA. 
 
A 
broad 
range 
of 
movement 
disorders 
are 
characterized by excessive motor activity.  Patterns 
of motor activity include chorea, athetosis, dystonia, 
myoclonus and tremor.  Individually these disorders 
are rare but collectively they are not infrequent.  
When 
mild, 
such 
involuntary 
movements 
may 
not 
significantly impair motor function but when severe, 
coordination may be significantly impaired.  These 
involuntary movements are usually manifestations of 
diseases which in themselves may be disqualifying for 
commercial vehicle operation. . . .  
 
. . . .  
Disposition 
 
Due to the broad range of manifestations, the 
marked variety in intensity of manifestations from one 
individual to another, and the large number of 
diseases 
of 
which 
these 
hyperkinesias 
may 
be 
symptomatic, it is not possible to make a simple rule 
regarding disposition.  Each case must be evaluated on 
the ability of the individual to perform adequately in 
appropriate neurological tests to assess strength, 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
8 
 
dexterity and coordination.  A clear diagnosis of 
Huntington's 
disease 
or 
Wilson's 
disease 
is 
unequivocal grounds for disqualification. 
Conference on Neurological Disorders and Commercial Drivers, 
U.S. Dep't of Trans., Fed. Highway Admin. (July 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
 
¶58 On 
March 
26, 
1996, 
Midwest 
formally 
terminated 
Szleszinski's 
qualification 
to 
drive 
equipment 
leased 
to 
Midwest.2  Szleszinski immediately cancelled a scheduled MRI and 
additional examination with a doctor at the Marshfield Clinic.  
Instead, Szleszinski's attorney arranged for him to see a 
different doctor, Stanley A. Skinner, of the Minneapolis Clinic 
of Neurology.  In April 1996 Dr. Skinner issued a report, which 
reads in part: 
 
I did see your patient, Leon Szleszinski, today 
for follow-up of Wilson's disease, and particularly 
with respect to the patient's ability to drive a 
truck, etc.  This 36-year-old, right-handed, white 
male was diagnosed with Wilson's disease when he was 
about 17 years of age.  At that time the patient had 
increased 
dysarthria and hand tremors that were 
progressive.  He was found to have Kayser-Fleischer 
corneal rings and later was noted to have a maternal 
cousin who had been diagnosed with Wilson's disease in 
Chicago. 
 
Apparently 
blood 
and 
urine 
copper, 
ceruloplasmin and other data were obtained, which were 
all consistent with the diagnosis.  The patient was 
placed on penicillamine four times a day and his 
symptoms really relented.  He was told by his treating 
physician at the time that he had a very mild 
case. . . .  
 
The patient has driven a truck for 12 years.  
When he passed his truck driving examination, he 
passed for all varieties of trucks under different 
conditions.  Since that time he has had no truck 
                                                 
2 This action did not affect Szleszinski's ability to drive 
a commercial vehicle for a different company. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
9 
 
driving accidents3 and no speeding tickets.  He also 
works as a volunteer for the local fire department.  
The patient has no history of liver disease with 
respect to his Wilson's disease. . . .  
 
On examination this patient is awake, alert, 
attentive, with very mild dysarthria.  He is pleasant, 
smiling, 
straightforward, and easy to develop a 
rapport with.  He has no abnormalities of thought 
content of stream of thought.  He is fluent.  With his 
hands outstretched, the patient has almost no resting 
or postural tremor.  Perhaps only very mild terminal 
dysmetria is seen with finger-nose-finger examination; 
this is questionable.  He is good and strong in the 
four limbs.  His ocular motility is normal.  His 
visual fields are full.  His facies are symmetrical.  
The tongue protrudes in the midline with a normal gag.  
The fundi are benign.  The patient still has fairly 
striking Kayser-Fleischer corneal rings.  The reflexes 
are 2/4 at the biceps, triceps, knees and ankles.  The 
toes are downgoing.  The station and gait are judged 
to be normal.  The sensory examination to pinprick, 
light touch, position and vibration are normal in the 
four limbs. 
IMPRESSION: Treated Wilson's disease. 
. . . .  
At 
this 
point, 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
this 
examination and the patient's work status, I do not 
see that this diagnosis should have any influence 
whatsoever on the patient's occupation as a truck 
driver.  As far as I am concerned, Wilson's disease is 
treated 
extremely 
well, 
the 
patient 
is 
almost 
                                                 
3 Leon Szleszinski was involved in a fatal motor vehicle 
accident on March 15, 1995, in Maryland.  There is no evidence 
that Szleszinski was at fault in the accident.  On March 17, 
1995, Szleszinski told a doctor at the Shell Lake Clinic that he 
was hit by an oncoming car, his truck stopped when it hit a 
tree, he went to a hospital emergency room in Maryland, one of 
the occupants of the car was decapitated, and he wondered if the 
incident would haunt him for the rest of his life.  Szleszinski 
went to a Wisconsin attorney to represent him for his injuries.  
Szleszinski's Maryland accident is inconsistent with a statement 
that Szleszinski had no truck driving accidents over a 12-year 
period. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
10 
 
asymptomatic and should function quite well in his 
occupation.  About once a year, I think the patient 
should have liver tests, but even that may be overly 
compulsive.  Penicillamine may have side effects that 
can 
cause 
multiple 
weakness, 
a 
myasthenic 
type 
syndrome, or neuropathy, but I do not see any evidence 
of that at this time. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶59 In 
October 
1996 
Szleszinski 
filed 
a 
disability 
discrimination complaint under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act 
(WFEA).  He alleged that Midwest unlawfully terminated his 
employment 
because 
of 
his 
physical 
disability 
(Wilson's 
disease).  On September 15, 1997, an equal rights officer found 
probable 
cause 
to 
proceed. 
 
In 
1998, 
after 
discovery, 
Szleszinski amended his complaint. 
 
¶60 Szleszinski died on March 11, 1999, in Emlenton, 
Pennsylvania.  He was 39.  An autopsy was performed.  The 
coroner's certificate of death listed "cirrhosis of liver" as a 
consequence of "Wilson's disease" as the cause of death.  
Thereafter, 
Szleszinski's 
estate 
was 
substituted 
as 
the 
complainant in Szleszinski's equal rights action. 
 
¶61 Transhield, which had been brought into the case in 
the amended complaint, and Midwest moved to dismiss.  After the 
case was held under advisement for more than 30 months, the 
hearing examiner rejected the motion to dismiss and scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing for July 16, 2002, more than three years 
after Szleszinski's death.  
 
¶62 At that hearing, the examiner heard testimony from 
four witnesses and received multiple exhibits of medical and 
other 
records, 
including 
the 
reports 
from 
Drs. 
Carlson, 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
11 
 
Choucair, Windhorst, and Skinner.  No medical doctors testified 
at the hearing.  On August 7, 2003, almost 13 months after the 
hearing, the hearing examiner issued a decision and order 
supporting Szleszinski's claim.  Among his findings of fact, the 
hearing examiner found: 
5. 
Dr. Windhorst did not examine Szleszinski.  Dr. 
Windhorst opined that Szleszinski be disqualified 
from DOT licensure.  Dr. Windhorst based his 
opinion on Dr. Choucair's report as well as a 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
Conference 
on 
Neurological Disorder[s] and Commercial Drivers 
which recommended that anyone with a confirmed 
diagnosis of Wilson's disease [be] disqualified 
from driving commercially. 
6. 
Based 
upon 
Dr. 
Windhorst's 
report 
[Midwest] 
disqualified Szleszinski as a driver on March 26, 
1996.  There being no other work available 
[Transhield] terminated Szleszinski's employment 
at the same time. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶63 Among his conclusions of law, the examiner ruled that 
Midwest 
"discriminated 
against 
Szleszinski . . . when 
it 
terminated his employment because he was diagnosed with Wilson's 
disease." 
 
The 
hearing 
examiner's 
decision 
contained 
no 
discussion of his findings of fact or conclusions of law, but it 
noted that a transcript of the hearing was not prepared. 
 
¶64 Midwest and Transhield petitioned the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC) for review.  On February 24, 
2004, LIRC dismissed Szleszinski's complaint, concluding that he 
had failed to sustain his burden that he was terminated by 
respondents because of his disability.  LIRC's decision was 
affirmed by the Washburn County Circuit Court, Eugene D. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
12 
 
Harrington, Judge, but it was substantially reversed by the 
court of appeals.  Estate of Szleszinski v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 
229, 287 Wis. 2d 775, 706 N.W.2d 345. 
DISCUSSION 
 
¶65 The majority concludes that a person's medical and 
physical qualifications to be an interstate commercial truck 
driver are material to a claim under the WFEA.  Majority op., 
¶5.  However, according to the majority, a driver need not seek 
a determination of medical qualification from the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) prior to filing a disability 
discrimination claim under the WFEA.  In fact, under the WFEA's 
burden shifting scheme, the motor carrier, not the employee, 
must seek a determination from the DOT if the carrier intends to 
offer a defense that the driver was not qualified for medical 
reasons.  Id. 
 
¶66 LIRC came to a different conclusion on this issue, as 
it had in Hermann v. Ort Trucking Co., ERD No. 9301203 (LIRC, 
Dec. 13, 1994).4  In my view, LIRC's decision on this issue was 
correct.  But even if it was not, this court should not punish 
Midwest for following the law as it existed from Hermann to the 
time of the Szleszinski hearing.  After all, Midwest won the 
case before LIRC on the facts and the law. 
                                                 
4 Hermann v. Ort Trucking Co., ERD No. 9301203 (LIRC, Dec. 
13, 1994), involved two conflicting medical reports.  LIRC 
dismissed the employee's complaint, concluding that the employer 
"should not be held to have acted in violation of the Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment Act unless and until there has been a 
determination under the federal safety regulations that the 
complainant is qualified to drive, and the [employer] refuses to 
permit him to drive." 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
13 
 
 
¶67 In reviewing LIRC, the majority talks the talk, but it 
does not walk the walk.  The opinion states: "When reviewing the 
decision of an administrative agency, this court reviews the 
agency's decision and not the decision of the court of appeals 
or the circuit court."  Majority op., ¶22 (citing Racine Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶8 
n.4, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184).  This means, "we do not 
deal directly with the correctness of the court of appeals 
decision brought to us on review, nor do we give that decision 
any deference.  We review the decision of the commission."  West 
Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 438 N.W.2d 823 (1989).  
Moreover, we do not disturb the factual findings of the agency 
if they are supported by credible and substantial evidence.  
CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 570, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998).  
"Such findings of fact are conclusive if there is any credible 
evidence to support those findings."  West Bend, 149 Wis. 2d at 
117-18. 
 
¶68 The majority opinion departs from these familiar 
principles of law by disregarding LIRC's complete and persuasive 
decision and memorandum opinion.  LIRC made detailed findings of 
fact which show an impressive grasp of the entire record before 
the hearing examiner, including a newly prepared transcript of 
testimony.  For instance, LIRC found the following: 
 
1. 
Complainant 
was 
diagnosed 
with 
Wilson's 
Disease in 1981, when he was 22 years old.  Wilson's 
disease, 
or 
hepatolenticular 
degeneration, 
is 
a 
disease marked by an increased output of copper in the 
urine, deposits of copper in the tissues, cirrhosis of 
the 
liver, 
pigmentation 
of 
the 
cornea, 
and 
degenerative changes in the central nervous system.  
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
14 
 
Complainant's medical records state that, in July of 
1980, he reported to his physician that he had some 
tremors in his hands, particularly after working in 
the woods.  Complainant's medical records state that, 
in August of 1981, he was observed to have some ataxia 
(lack or loss of muscular coordination resulting in 
irregularity of muscular movements), and posturing of 
his hands; to have experienced a significant drop in 
test results over the last two years compatible with 
decreased cerebral function; and was prescribed the 
medication Penicillamine to relieve certain of the 
symptoms of Wilson's disease.  Complainant's medical 
records state, in May of 1986, that he was moderately 
mentally retarded secondary to Wilson's disease, and 
that he was on several medications, including some for 
treatment of psychiatric disorders.  Complainant's 
medical records state that, in 1989, complainant's 
mother reported that he suffered from "fits" due to 
Wilson's disease.  Complainant's medical records state 
that, in August of 1992, he complained that he could 
drive only 100 miles before becoming fatigued, he 
suffered from whole body weakness and was weaker than 
he was five years before, and he was having difficulty 
sleeping. 
¶69 There is no detail of this sort in the hearing 
examiner's decision, in the court of appeals' decision, or in 
the majority's decision.  When LIRC stated that "Complainant was 
diagnosed with Wilson's Disease in 1981, when he was 22 years 
old," it accurately summarized Szleszinski's early medical 
records which contradicted information that Szleszinski supplied 
to both Dr. Choucair and Dr. Skinner. 
¶70 Another finding of fact is revealing: 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
15 
 
 
6. 
As a 
result of these [complaints] and 
considering 
[Szleszinski's] 
diagnosis 
of 
Wilson's 
Disease, Jeffrey Gillespie, MCT's Vice President of 
Safety, 
required 
that 
complainant 
be 
medically 
evaluated.  On March 13, 1996, complainant was 
examined by Dr. Carlson.  The records of this visit 
state that complainant told Dr. Carlson that the 
weaving was caused by brake problems with his vehicle.  
Dr. Carlson recommended the complainant be examined by 
a neurologist. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶71 The statement about "brake problems" in the medical 
records appears to conflict with what Szleszinski told Dr. 
Choucair: "The patient himself denies any difficulty whatsoever 
on the job."  It is also at odds with the court of appeals' 
statement: "Szleszinski did not remember either incident."  
Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, ¶15. 
 
¶72 More 
significant, 
however, 
is 
LIRC's 
memorandum 
opinion.  The opinion quoted from Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and 
(c).5  It acknowledged Szleszinski's theory that Dr. Windhorst's 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c) reads: 
 
(b) In evaluating whether an individual with a 
disability can adequately undertake the job-related 
responsibilities of a particular job, membership or 
licensed activity, the present and future safety of 
the individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if 
applicable, of the general public may be considered.  
However, 
this 
evaluation 
shall 
be 
made 
on 
an 
individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a 
general 
rule 
which 
prohibits 
the 
employment 
or 
licensure of individuals with disabilities in general 
or 
a 
particular 
class 
of 
individuals 
with 
disabilities. 
 
(c) If the employment, membership or licensure 
involves a special duty of care for the safety of the 
general 
public, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
employment with a common carrier, this special duty of 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
16 
 
opinion "was based exclusively on the 1988 [Office of Motor 
Carriers] 
conference report," and therefore "violated the 
requirement of 111.34(2)(b) and (c) that evaluations be made on 
a case-by-case basis."  LIRC answered this "theory" and 
determined that: 
 
1. 
"[A]n individual assessment of complainant's 
medical condition was conducted both by Dr. Choucair 
and by Dr. Windhorst." 
 
2. 
"[C]ontrary 
to 
complainant's 
contention 
here, Dr. Windhorst did not rely exclusively on the 
1988 OMC conference report in his assessment of 
complainant's medical qualification to drive.  He 
specifically states in his letter to [Midwest] that he 
reviewed 
Dr. 
Choucair's 
report 
as 
well 
as 
the 
conference report, in reaching his conclusion." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶73 These factual conclusions are amply supported by the 
record.  Dr. Windhorst did not examine Szleszinski face-to-face.  
However, Dr. Windhorst not only read Dr. Choucair's evaluation 
of Szleszinski (after they had a face-to-face meeting), but also 
studied the "neurological examination sheet" that accompanied 
Dr. Choucair's report.  We know this because Dr. Windhorst 
writes in his letter that the "neurological examination did 
indicate some mild neurological deficits, specifically in the 
areas of coordination."  Dr. Windhorst discussed the case with 
                                                                                                                                                             
care may be considered in evaluating whether the 
employee or applicant can adequately undertake the 
job-related responsibilities of a particular job, 
membership 
or 
licensed activity.  However, this 
evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case 
basis and may not be made by a general rule which 
prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals 
with disabilities in general or a particular class of 
individuals with disabilities. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
17 
 
Pat Farritor, the physician's assistant who approved Szleszinski 
in June 1995.  The two may have had the medical records from 
both 1995 and 1996 for their discussion.  Dr. Windhorst also 
pointed to the two driving complaints and linked them to 
Szleszinski's possible coordination deficits.  Finally, Dr. 
Windhorst discussed the 1988 conference report that contained 
the unqualified recommendation that persons with a confirmed 
diagnosis of Wilson's disease not be approved.  Based on the 
reports he had, Dr. Windhorst concluded that Szleszinski had a 
19-year history of Wilson's disease, which is described in the 
conference report as a "progressive neurological" condition, 
meaning a condition that tends to become more severe over time.  
"Putting 
all 
this 
together," 
Dr. 
Windhorst 
made 
his 
recommendation. 
 
¶74 LIRC's factual findings were reversed as a matter of 
law by the court of appeals: 
 
1. 
"Szleszinski contends there is no factual or 
legal basis for LIRC's determination that Midwest had 
a 
valid 
safety 
defense . . . . 
 
We 
agree 
with 
Szleszinski." 
 
Szleszinski, 
287 
Wis. 2d 775, 
¶1 
(emphasis added). 
 
2. 
"To 
receive 
federal 
approval 
as 
an 
interstate 
carrier, 
49 
C.F.R. 
§ 391.43(a) 
states 
drivers' physicals 'shall be performed by a licensed 
medical examiner . . . .'  The results of the exam are 
then to be recorded on an exam form like the one 
included in the code.  49 C.F.R. § 391.43(f).  Both 
subsections, read together, imply drivers will have 
actual face-to-face contact with the doctor or other 
examiner.  Thus, it appears that under the operative 
Code language, a paper review of the driver's history 
is 
insufficient. . . .  
[W]e 
conclude 
Windhorst's 
'opinion' is an insufficient report as a matter of law 
under the Code, which requires actual examination of 
the patient.  Windhorst's opinion was merely a conduit 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
18 
 
for application of a Department of Transportation 
conference report that never became a regulation."  
Szleszinski, 
287 
Wis. 2d 775, 
¶¶33-34 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
3. 
"Windhorst's report is also insufficient 
under the WFEA because the act requires a case-by-case 
assessment of each individual.  Windhorst did not make 
an individualized determination about Szleszinski's 
ability to drive, but recommended disqualification 
simply because the Department of Transportation report 
said 
that 
all 
Wilson's 
patients 
should 
be 
disqualified. . . .  Windhorst had no plans to rely on 
individualized assessment of Szleszinski's abilities, 
when the Wilson's diagnosis was, in Windhorst's mind, 
determinative of the outcome."  Id., ¶35 (emphasis 
added). 
 
4. 
"We 
reiterate . . . that 
the 
federal 
regulations require a physical examination——something 
Windhorst did not provide.  His report . . . cannot be 
considered a valid basis for a determination of 
Szleszinski's fitness to drive."  Id., ¶36. 
 
5. 
"Because Windhorst's evaluation is invalid 
as a matter of law, it should not have been considered 
by Midwest in its qualification determination or by 
LIRC at the hearing.  Thus, there is no credible 
evidence to support the determination that Szleszinski 
was unfit to drive."  Id., ¶38. 
¶75 There is no way to hide the fact that the majority 
opinion is ratifying these extreme and, I believe, mistaken, 
holdings of the court of appeals.  First, the court of appeals' 
decision is published6 and thus is binding on the court of 
appeals, the circuit court, and LIRC.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  Second, the majority 
repeatedly references the court of appeals' opinion on these 
holdings.  See majority op., ¶¶3, 20, 41, and 42 n.18.  Third, 
                                                 
6 Estate of Szleszinski v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 229, 287 
Wis. 2d 775, 706 N.W.2d 345. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
19 
 
the majority specifically relies on the court of appeals' 
invalidation of Dr. Windhorst's opinion to deny relief to 
Midwest.  See majority op., ¶42.  Fourth, the majority opinion 
takes issue with the court of appeals' opinion on several 
points, but it does not take issue with these holdings.  Fifth, 
the decision of the court of appeals is modified and affirmed, 
but it is not modified on these mistaken holdings.  In short, 
these mistaken rulings stand.  They will appear as official 
interpretations of both Wisconsin law and federal regulation.7 
¶76 These mistaken holdings stand because the majority 
pretends they are not part of this case.  On the contrary, they 
are at the center of this case. 
¶77 If, in fact, the majority is reviewing the decision of 
the administrative agency——LIRC——it needs to explain why it 
never addresses any finding of fact or conclusion of law that 
LIRC made before it dismissed Szleszinski's complaint.  LIRC did 
not dismiss Szleszinski's complaint because he did not seek a 
determination of medical qualification from DOT prior to filing 
a disability discrimination claim.8  It dismissed his complaint 
because, based on all the evidence presented at the July 16, 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals decision in Szleszinski is presently 
cited 
in 
the 
2005-06 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.321; 
Equal 
Rights 
Decision 
Digest 
2006 
§ 123.45, at 111 (State of Wis., DWD 2006); Rose Ann Wasserman, 
Wisconsin Employment Law § 14-10 (Supp. 2007); 29 Mental and 
Physical Disability Law Reporter 810, 913 (Nov./Dec. 2005). 
8 Szleszinski's brief in the court of appeals states: "[T]he 
Commission did not base its decision on the fact that Mr. 
Szleszinski did not utilize the appeal mechanism set forth in 
the DOT regulations whereby disputed DOT medical certifications 
can be reviewed." 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
20 
 
2002, evidentiary hearing, Szleszinski failed to prove his 
discrimination claim.  As LIRC fully explained, it is not a 
violation of WFEA to take an employment action based on an 
individual's disability if his disability is reasonably related 
to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-
related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a).  Szleszinski failed to persuade LIRC 
that Midwest had not proved this defense. 
¶78 In 
its 
decision, 
LIRC 
interpreted 
and 
applied 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c).  These paragraphs were 
created by § 17, ch. 334, Laws of 1981.  They have been in 
effect since August 4, 1982.  They are a critical component of 
the WFEA.  Consequently, these paragraphs had been subject to 
LIRC's decision-making and oversight for more than 20 years when 
they were interpreted in Szleszinski's case in 2004.  LIRC 
should have been given great weight deference for its legal 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c).  See UFE, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  Its 
findings of fact under these paragraphs are conclusive if there 
is any credible evidence to support them.  West Bend, 149 
Wis. 2d at 117-18. 
¶79 The 
first 
issue 
with 
respect 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) is the meaning of the words "this 
evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis."  
LIRC concluded that Dr. Windhorst had made an individual 
assessment of Szleszinski's medical condition under the statute.  
The court of appeals held that "Windhorst did not make an 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
21 
 
individualized determination about Szleszinski's ability to 
drive."  Szleszinski, 287 Wis. 2d 775, ¶35.  Inasmuch as Dr. 
Windhorst (1) looked at some of Szleszinski's medical records, 
including evaluations and tests; (2) discussed his case with 
another professional; (3) considered recent complaints about 
Szleszinski's driving; and (4) cited a widely known professional 
report which dealt specifically with Wilson's disease, the court 
of appeals must have meant that Dr. Windhorst could not have a 
valid opinion unless he conducted a physical examination of 
Szleszinski face-to-face.  If this is the rule after this case, 
it 
will 
disqualify 
the 
expert 
opinion 
of 
all 
medical 
professionals who form opinions based on the examination of a 
person's medical records.  This cannot be the law. 
¶80 The 
second 
issue 
with 
respect 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) concerns the phrase "may not be made 
by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of 
individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class 
of individuals with disabilities."  LIRC determined that "Dr. 
Windhorst did not rely exclusively on the 1988 OMC conference 
report in his assessment."  Conversely, the court of appeals 
determined that Dr. Windhorst "recommended disqualification 
simply because the Department of Transportation report said that 
all Wilson's patients should be disqualified."  Szleszinski, 287 
Wis. 2d 775, ¶35.  Those opposing positions constitute a dispute 
over fact, and LIRC should win that dispute unless its 
determination is not supported by substantial and credible 
evidence.  It is. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
22 
 
¶81 Several 
observations 
should 
be 
made 
about 
the 
relationship between 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (Physical qualifications 
for drivers) and Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  The federal regulation 
has several categorical exclusions.  For instance, a person is 
physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that 
person: 
 
(3) Has 
no 
established 
medical 
history 
or 
clinical diagnosis of diabetes mellitus currently 
requiring insulin for control; 
 
(4) Has 
no 
current 
clinical 
diagnosis 
of 
myocardial 
infarction, 
angina 
pectoris, 
coronary 
insufficiency, thrombosis, or any other cardiovascular 
disease of a variety known to be accompanied by 
syncope, 
dyspnea, 
collapse, 
or 
congestive 
heart 
failure; 
 
. . . .  
 
(8) Has 
no 
established 
medical 
history 
or 
clinical diagnosis of epilepsy or any other condition 
which is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any 
loss of ability to control a commercial motor vehicle; 
 
. . . .  
 
(13) Has no clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. 
49 C.F.R. § 391.41. 
¶82 The 
federal 
rule 
thus 
conflicts 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(b) and (c), which prohibit the evaluation 
of a person for employment on the basis of a rule prohibiting 
the employment of "a particular class of individuals with 
disabilities."  There can be no dispute, however, that our 
statute cannot supersede the federal rule with respect to the 
regulation of persons who drive commercial motor vehicles and 
must have a valid commercial driver's license. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
23 
 
¶83 In 
fact, 
however, 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(c) 
specifically 
states: 
"If 
the 
employment . . . or 
licensure 
involves a special duty of care for the safety of the general 
public, including but not limited to employment with a common 
carrier, this special duty of care may be considered in 
evaluating whether the employee or applicant can adequately 
undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job."  
Dr. Windhorst made this very point in his letter when he wrote: 
"Wilson's disease is a progressive neurological disease, and 
this is of grave concern, given the responsibilities of driving 
large commercial vehicles on the highways."  (Emphasis added.)  
Szleszinski was driving a 70-80 ton truck across the country; he 
was not working behind a desk. 
¶84 The report of the 1988 Conference on Neurological 
Disorders and Commercial Drivers is nearly 50 pages in length.  
It was not officially adopted and incorporated into federal 
rules.  The report states that, "The contents do not necessarily 
reflect 
the 
official 
policy 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation."  However, the report was published by the 
Federal Highway Administration.  It is included in the appendix 
to William E. Kenworthy, 1 Transportation Safety and Insurance 
Law § 14.01(10) (2007).  Kenworthy writes as follows: 
 
DOT 
has 
issued 
several 
interpretive 
rulings 
delving in greater detail into the medical criteria 
for driving a CMV.  In addition, the FMCSA has held 
conferences at which specialists in certain medical 
fields were invited to develop criteria for use by 
medical examiners for evaluating these criteria.  So 
far, Conference Reports have covered the fields of 
cardiology, neurology, psychiatry, and respiratory 
disorders.  The Conference Reports were condensed for 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
24 
 
distribution 
to 
medical 
examiners 
who 
provide 
physicals for drivers.  The condensed texts, not 
published elsewhere, are reproduced in Appendix T 
(Medical Guidelines) to this Publication. 
 
To the author's knowledge, both DOT interpretive 
rulings and the Conference Reports are being enforced 
by FMCSA field agents, despite their unpublished and 
unofficial status.  Drivers have been pulled off the 
road 
and 
disqualified despite holding a current 
medical certificate.  Because these materials have 
never been adopted pursuant to a formal rule making 
conforming to the Administrative Procedures Act, they 
have only such legal weight as a court may find 
reasonable and persuasive as interpretive rules. 
Kenworthy, supra, at § 14.01(10). 
¶85 In Tate v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 268 F.3d 989, 
994 (10th Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals observed that: 
 
DOT's Medical Advisory Criteria are prefaced with 
a 
note 
indicating 
they 
are 
only 
advisory 
and 
nonbinding.  Nevertheless, the views of an agency such 
as DOT implementing a regulatory scheme designed to 
ensure 
the 
safety 
of 
our 
nation's 
highways 
"'constitute 
a 
body 
of 
experience 
and 
informed 
judgment'" to which employers may properly resort for 
guidance. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 
(2001)). 
¶86 The same principle applies to the Conference Report.  
It represents a body of experience and informed judgment among 
neurologists that should not be ignored.  Wilson's disease 
appears to affect a fairly small number of people.  Wilson's 
disease is a rare disorder, occurring at a rate of approximately 
30 cases per million births, or a birth incidence rate of about 
1 per 30,000 to 40,000 births.  See Ronald F. Pfeiffer, M.D., 
Wilson's Disease, in 27 Seminars in Neurology 2, 123 (2007).  
One doctor estimates that there are only 600 cases of the 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
25 
 
disease in the United States.  Id.  It is not surprising that 
there is no subsection in the Code of Federal Regulations for 
persons with Wilson's disease who apply for commercial motor 
vehicle permits. 
¶87 The court of appeals also holds that a doctor or other 
examiner must have face-to-face contact with an applicant to 
have a valid opinion about the person's qualification to drive a 
commercial motor vehicle.  This is clearly a matter of federal 
law.  More important, however, the court of appeals takes this 
proposition and applies it out of context.  A medical examiner 
who issues a certificate that a driver is medically qualified to 
drive a commercial vehicle may very well be required to conduct 
a face-to-face examination.  However, a doctor who recommends 
that a person not be approved to operate a commercial motor 
vehicle for a particular employer, may be able to make that 
determination on the basis of medical records.  For example, if 
an applicant's medical records show that the applicant has a 
categorically disqualifying medical condition, no useful purpose 
would be served by a personal examination. 
¶88 In my view, if we applied the familiar standards of 
review, we would affirm the decision of LIRC, and this case 
would be over.   
¶89 The majority opinion operates in a different universe: 
It ostensibly concerns itself with the narrow issue of which 
party must seek a determination from the DOT about the medical 
qualification of a person who wishes to drive a commercial motor 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
26 
 
vehicle.  As Szleszinski concedes, this is not the basis on 
which LIRC made its decision. 
¶90 The majority's ruling requires careful examination. 
¶91 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.322 provides that it is an act 
of employment discrimination: "(1) To refuse to hire, employ, 
admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from 
employment . . . any 
individual . . . because 
of 
any 
basis 
enumerated in s. 111.321."  Wisconsin Stat. § 111.321 includes 
"disability" as a prohibited basis for any act of employment 
discrimination.  However, "it is not employment discrimination 
because of disability to refuse to hire, employ, admit or 
license 
any 
individual . . . or 
terminate 
from 
employment . . . any 
individual . . . if 
the 
disability 
is 
reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately 
undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's 
employment."  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a).  "The employer bears 
the burden to prove this defense to a handicap discrimination 
claim provided the complainant first establishes that the 
condition at issue is a handicap within the meaning of sec. 
111.32(8) Stats., and that the employer discriminated on the 
basis of that handicap."  Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 164 
Wis. 2d 567, 594, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶92 An aggrieved person has 300 days after the alleged 
discrimination to file a complaint with the Equal Rights 
Division 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development.  
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
27 
 
Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1).9 
 
The 
complaint 
is 
then 
reviewed.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4)(b).  If the Department finds probable 
cause, the Department may serve a notice of hearing before one 
of its examiners, and then a hearing may be held.  Id. 
¶93 Considering 
that 
a 
truck 
driver 
who 
claims 
discrimination must show probable cause before obtaining a WFEA 
hearing and presumably would like a job in the meantime, it 
makes perfect sense for the employee to speed up the process and 
bolster his own case by applying to the DOT under 49 C.F.R. 
§ 391.47 for a determination.  Sooner or later, the employee 
must obtain a medical examiner's certificate and a high quality 
medical evaluation of the employee's medical status if the 
employee hopes to win his case. 
¶94 An employer would have no reason to utilize the DOT 
procedure 
until 
the 
employer 
knew 
a 
person's 
medical 
qualification was at issue.  This could take 300 days in 
Wisconsin.  The employer could not use the DOT procedure until 
the employer could show that "there is a disagreement between 
the physician for the driver and the physician for the motor 
carrier concerning the driver's qualifications."  49 C.F.R. 
§ 391.47(2).  Thus, an employee who withholds a conflicting 
medical report precludes the employer's ability to use the DOT 
procedure.  In any event, absolutely nothing in Wisconsin law 
requires an employer to prove his defense to a charge of 
                                                 
9 "A complaint which is deferred to the department by a 
federal or local employment agency with which the department has 
a worksharing agreement complies with the requirements of sub. 
(3) and is considered filed when received by the federal or 
local agency."  Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.03(5) (Nov., 2006). 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
28 
 
disability discrimination by going to the DOT.  Conflicting 
evaluations by two physicians would not begin to tell the DOT 
about Leon Szleszinski's lengthy medical history, which was 
obtained 
prior 
to 
the 
WFEA 
hearing 
through 
traditional 
discovery. 
¶95 In Hermann v. Ort Trucking Co., ERD No. 9301203 (LIRC, 
Dec. 13, 1994), LIRC said: 
[I]n 
view 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
complainant's 
qualification to drive is governed by the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and such regulations 
provide for resolution of disputes over conflicting 
medical evaluations[,] . . . the respondent should not 
be held to have acted in violation of the Wisconsin 
Fair Employment Act unless and until there has been a 
determination under the federal safety regulations 
that the complainant is qualified to drive, and the 
respondent refuses to permit him to drive. 
¶96 Placing the burden on the employee or prospective 
employee makes good sense and follows the law in federal 
Americans With Disabilities Act cases.  Harris v. P.A.M. 
Transp., Inc., 339 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2003); Campbell v. 
Fed. Express Corp., 918 F. Supp. 912, 918 (D. Md. 1996). 
¶97 If a case proceeds to a hearing, the burden of proving 
a defense falls to the employer.  But in some circumstances, the 
case should never proceed to a hearing because (1) the employee 
has no case; or (2) the employee has shown a good case and the 
employer has responded favorably.  The majority's rule does not 
require an employee to exhaust his administrative remedies; it 
forces the employer to exhaust an administrative procedure that 
it may not need. 
No.  2004AP3033.dtp 
 
29 
 
¶98 There is often a shortage of drivers in the motor 
carrier industry.  This decision may push or prod motor carriers 
into hiring commercial drivers who are unsafe at any speed. 
¶99 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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