Title: State v. Vance

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

177 S.E.2d 389 (1970)
277 N.C. 345
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Franklin VANCE.
No. 52.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 18, 1970.
*390 Atty. Gen., Robert Morgan and Staff Atty. Donald M. Jacobs, Raleigh, for the State.
Phin Horton, Jr., and Harold R. Wilson, Winston-Salem, for defendant.
BRANCH, Justice:
Defendant assigns as error the instructions of the trial judge concerning the defendant's wife's testimony as an interested witness. In this connection, the trial judge charged:
This assignment of error is without merit. Similar charges have been approved in State v. Barnhill, 186 N.C. 446, 119 S.E. 894; State v. Morgan, 263 N.C. 400, 139 S.E.2d 708; State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769. Neither was there prejudicial error in the trial court's failure to give a similar instruction as to possibly interested State's witnesses since defendant did not request such instruction on this subordinate feature of the trial. State v. Sauls, 190 N.C. 810, 130 S.E. 848.
Defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to correctly instruct the jury on his defense of alibi.
Defendant's evidence of alibi relates to a substantive feature of the case, so without tendering a special prayer he was entitled to an instruction as to the legal effect of his evidence, if it should be accepted by the jury. State v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17; State v. Spencer, 256 N.C. 487, 124 S.E.2d 175.
The sole reference to defendant's chief defense of alibi in the trial judge's instructions to the jury was the following:
In State v. Spencer, supra, the court's charge as to defendants' defense of alibi consisted of a statement to the effect that defendants contended they were not present when the crime was committed. This Court, holding the charge to be erroneous, stated:
The State contends that the charge on the defense of alibi is adequate when the entire charge is contextually interpreted. True, in other portions of the charge the court, without relating the charge to the defense of alibi, placed the burden of proof upon the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.
In no place in the charge was the jury told that defendant did not have the burden of proving the defense of alibi.
The doctine of contextual interpretation of a charge has been applied in proving inexact charges on alibi (State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, 174 S.E. 105, State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577, 64 S.E.2d 867), but only in cases where the court "expressly or substantially states that the burden of proving an alibi does not rest upon the defendant." State v. Allison, 256 N.C. 240, 123 S.E.2d 465. Here, the trial judge, in effect, only stated defendant's contention that he was not present at the time the crime was committed, without applying the law to the defendant's contention in any manner.
Failure to adequately charge on defendant's defense of alibi resulted in prejudicial error. State v. Spencer, supra; State v. Melton, supra; State v. Sutton, 230 N.C. 244, 52 S.E.2d 921.
Although defendant did not raise the point, we think it proper to observe that the trial judge in this capital case failed to instruct the jury as to the legal effect of a verdict of guilty of rape with recommendation of life imprisonment, which requires the court to pronounce a judgment of life imprisonment. Failure to so instruct is error. G.S. § 14-17; State v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 89 S.E.2d 789; State v. Cook, 245 N.C. 610, 96 S.E.2d 842.
Because of prejudicial error in the charge there must be a new trial.
New trial.