Title: STATE v PASCGO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13379 I N T H E S U P F t E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS. BEN PASCGO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Honorable James Freebourn, judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Stimatz and Engel, Butte, Montana Joseph C. Engel, 111, argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Gary Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Nadine S c o t t argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: June 3, 1 9 7 7 Decided : JUL 2 0 1 9 7 7 FILED : JJJL i! 0 1 9 7 7 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of b u r g l a r y e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, S i l v e r Bow County. He received a s i x y e a r sentence i n the Montana S t a t e Prison with two y e a r s suspended. Defendant i s f r e e on bond pending t h i s appeal. I n e a r l y morning of March 10, 1975, p o l i c e o f f i c e r s responded t o a b u r g l a r alarm t r i g g e r e d a t O s s e l l o l s Furniture S t o r e i n Butte, Montana. Arriving a t O s s e l l o l s within two o r t h r e e minutes, t h e o f f i c e r s noticed one s e t of f o o t p r i n t s i n t h e snow leading t o a garage door on t h e north-east end of t h e s t o r e . It appeared t o t h e o f f i c e r s a second person had walked d i r e c t l y i n t h e f o o t p r i n t s of the first, and t h e r e were no f o o t p r i n t s leaving t h e building. Two panels were knocked out of t h e garage door. One of the broken panels was about t h r e e f e e t o f f t h e ground, but t h e o f f i c e r was unable t o crawl through it, due t o a t h i n metal locking b a r t h a t c u t h o r i z o n t a l l y a c r o s s t h e opening. A t e l e v i s i o n s e t blocked t h e opening i n t h e lower panel a t t h e bottom of t h e door, b u t t h e o f f i c e r s were a b l e t o e n t e r t h e b u i l d i n g through t h i s opening by pushing t h e t e l e v i s i o n s e t a s i d e . The o f f i c e r s turned on t h e l i g h t s i n t h e s t o r e and saw defendant crawling behind a r u g rack. They found another man, Harold I a P i e r , l y i n g i n a p i l e of rugs on t h e f l o o r . Both men were taken i n t o custody and charged with burglary under s e c t i o n 94-6- 204(1), R.C.M. 1947. LaPier subsequently plead g u i l t y i n a s e p a r a t e proceeding. Defendant admitted a t t r i a l he e n t e r e d t h e b u i l d i n g unlawfully b u t denied he intended t o commit any felony t h e r e i n . Defendant Is version of t h e i n c i d e n t is: Defendant, h i s g i r l f r i e n d , and LaPier had been d r i n k i n g a t various Butte e s t a b l i s h - ments. While a t t h e Dry Gulch Bar, near O s s e l l o l s , defendant noticed LaPier was missing and was informed he had l e f t t h e b a r with a s t r a n g e r ; presumably t h e y had gone t o defendant's c a r where an e x t r a b o t t l e was stashed. When LaPier f a i l e d t o r e t u r n t o t h e b a r a f t e r about f i f t e e n minutes, defendant became con- cerned and went out t o t h e c a r looking f o r him. Defendant knew LaPier was on probation f o r a previous burglary and tended t o g e t i n t o t r o u b l e when he was drinking. &Pier was n o t i n t h e c a r , but t r a c k s could be seen leading t o O s s e l l o l s . Defendant followed t h e t r a c k s , found t h e broken panels i n t h e garage door, and e n t e r e d O s s e l l o ' s with t h e purpose of g e t t i n g LaPier out of t h e b u i l d i n g . He found LaPier a s l e e p i n a p i l e of rugs, b u t a t t h a t time t h e p o l i c e a r r i v e d . Defendant panicked and t r i e d t o hide, but was apprehended by t h e o f f i c e r s . LaPier t e s t i f i e d he e n t e r e d t h e b u i l d i n g with an unknown man t o b u r g l a r i z e t h e s t o r e ; t h a t he pushed t h e t e l e v i s i o n set a g a i n s t t h e lower panel of t h e garage door; and he l o s t t r a c k of h i s accomplice and f e l l a s l e e p . LaPier maintained defendant had nothing t o do with t h e planning o r commission of t h e burglary. Defendant contends t h e following s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r r e q u i r e a r e v e r s a l of h i s conviction: I. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a continuance was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r ; 11. The evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a convic- t i o n of t h e crime of burglary. S p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r I. Defense counsel made an o r a l motion, j u s t before t h e jury was s e l e c t e d , t o continue t h e t r i a l u n t i l a l a t e r d a t e . Defendant intended t o c a l l Dale Miller, t h e person responsible f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n and maintenance of t h e alarm system a t Q s s e l l o ' s , but M i l l e r l e f t t h e s t a t e j u s t before t h e t r i a l was t o commence. M i l l e r ' s testimony was desired t o show t h e alarm system was a c t i v a t e d only by motion i n t h e s t o r e , thus leaving open t h e possibility LaPier and h i s a l l e g e d accom- p l i c e could have remained i n t h e s t o r e f o r a period of time before defendant a r r i v e d and before t h e alarm was t r i p p e d . Defendant contends M i l l e r l e f t t h e s t a t e t o avoid t e s t i f y i n g because t h e owner of O s s e l l o ~ s threatened t o obtain a new alarm system i f M i l l e r revealed t h e i n t r i c a c i e s of t h e o l d system i n c o u r t . The owner t e s t i f i e d t h a t while he had s t a t e d he might change t h e system, he had n o t threatened t o take h i s business away from M i l l e r . Section 93-4910, R.C.M. 1947 s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A motion t o postpone a t r i a l on grounds of t h e absence of evidence s h a l l only be made upon a f f i d a v i t showing t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e evidence expected t o be obtained, and t h a t due d i l i g e n c e has been used t o procure it.* * *'I Here, no a f f i d a v i t was f i l e d t o show e i t h e r t h e materi- a l i t y of t h e proposed evidence o r t h a t due d i l i g e n c e was exercised. Counsel had represented defendant from March 10, 1975, through an e n t i r e previous t r i a l on t h e same matter, which r e s u l t e d i n a hung jury. The t r i a l involved h e r e began February 10, 1976, and while a subpoena was issued, it was not served on the prospective witness. The g r a n t i n g of a continuance is within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . S t a t e v. Paulson, 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339; S t a t e v. Kuilman, 1 1 1 Mont. 459, 110 P.2d 969. In view of defendant's f a i l u r e t o comply with s e c t i o n 93-4910, it cannot be s a i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e continuance. S t a t e v. Moorman, 133 Mont. 148, 321 P.2d 236. S p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r 11. Defendant contends t h e evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction of burglary i n t h a t t h e r e was no showing defendant intended t o commit an offense within t h e building. The standard of t h i s Court t o measure jury determination is s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Merseal, 167 Mont. 409, 415, "This Court remains evermindful of one funda- mental r u l e - - t h a t queBtions of f a c t must be determined s o l e l y by t h e ,3ury, and t h a t given a c e r t a i n l e g a l minimum of evidence, t h i s Court on review w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of the jury. * * * "On appeal we examine t h e evidence t o determine whether t h e v e r d i c t i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. I n s o doing, we view t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e S t a t e . " See a l s o : S t a t e v. Farnes, Mon t . , 558 P.2d 4'7% 33 St.Rep. 1270; S t a t e v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827. Therefore, t h i s Court is l i m i t e d t o an examination of t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o the s t a t e and a determination of whether t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support d e f e n d a n t ' s conviction. While defendant's story, i f believed, would lead t o a conclusion he was n o t g u i l t y of t h e crime of burglary, t h e jury was n o t r e q u i r e d t o b e l i e v e t h e testimony of defendant o r t h e testimony of LaPier. Several f a c t o r s tend t o support t h e j u r y ' s conclusion: 1. Defendant was found i n O s s e l l o l s Furniture S t o r e a t 1:42 a.m. h i d i n g from the p o l i c e . Cases from o t h e r j u r i s - d i c t i o n s have recognized t h e obvious inference t h a t a person found unlawfully on t h e premises of another i n t h e nighttime i s t h e r e f o r the purpose of committing a t h e f t . S t a t e v. Hopkins, 1 1 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486; Ex p a r t e Seyfried, 74 Idaho 467, 264 P.2d 685; People v. Henderson, 138 C . A . 2d 505, 292 P.2d 267. 2. A t e l e v i s i o n s e t had been pushed up a g a i n s t t h e opening i n t h e lower panel of t h e garage door, 3. Defendant's version of t h e i n c i d e n t was c o r r o b r a t e d only by h i s f r i e n d LaPier. No t r a c k s were seen leaving t h e building, no o t h e r person was found i n t h e building, and defendant himself s t a t e d t o the p o l i c e t h a t he and LaPier were t h e only I people i n t h e building. 4. There was c o n f l i c t i n g testimony regarding t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of anyone gaining entrance through t h e broken upper panel. If defendant could n o t have e n t e r e d t h e b u i l d i n g through t h e upper panel, it eould be i n f e r r e d he was i n s i d e t h e b u i l d i n g when t h e t e l e v i s i o n s e t was placed t o block t h e opening i n t h e lower pane 1. While defendant argues t h e r e was no d i r e c t proof o f i n t e n t t o commit a t h e f t from O s s e l l o ' s , t h e r u l e has long been e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t use of c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence is a n acceptable and o f t e n convincing method of proving c r i m i n a l i n t e n t . A s we r e s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Farnes, Mont . , 558 P.2d 472, 475, 33 S t .Rep. 1270, c i t i n g S t a t e v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 110, 'I I ~ h e element of felonious i n t e n t i n every contested c r i m i n a l case must n e c e s s a r i l y be determined from t h e f a c t s and circumstances of t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, -- t h i s f o r t h e reason t h a t c r i m i n a l i n t e n t , being a s t a t e of mind, is r a r e l y s u s c e p t i b l e of d i r e c t o r p o s i t i v e proof and t h e r e f o r e must u s u a l l y be i n f e r r e d from t h e f a c t s t e s t i f i e d t o by witnesses and t h e circumstances a s developed by t h e evidence." * * "'The question of i n t e n t i s a question f o r t h e jury 1 11 The jury considered t h e evidence along with d e f e n d a n t ' s version of t h e i n c i d e n t and concluded defendant had t h e i n t e n t t o commit an offense within t h e b u i l d i n g . There was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h a t conclusion. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. We Concur: