Title: State v. Shabazz

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Shabazz (98-276); 169 Vt. 448; 739 A.2d 666

[Filed 06-Aug-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-276

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Bahiyod Shabazz                     	         June Term, 1999

Robert Grussing III, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier,  for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Charles S. Martin of Martin & Associates, Barre, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Defendant appeals from a voluntary manslaughter
  conviction, claiming  the district court erred by instructing the jury that
  either of two forms of implied intent to kill, the  intent to do serious
  bodily injury and the extreme indifference to human life, satisfy the
  intent  element of voluntary manslaughter.  We affirm.  

       The incident occurred in the early morning hours of November 11, 1996,
  when Joel  Martin, ultimately the victim, knocked on the door to Mary
  Brooks's apartment.  Defendant is  Mary Brooks's brother and was inside her
  apartment at the time.  When Brooks answered the  door, Martin, disguised
  with a mask and a wig, pulled out what appeared to be a gun and  demanded
  either crack cocaine or money - according to differing testimony at trial. 
  Brooks and  defendant left the apartment with Martin, ostensibly to go to
  another apartment to retrieve crack  cocaine or money.  Defendant picked up
  a knife as they left the apartment.  A struggle ensued in  the hallway,
  moving eventually outside into the parking lot.  During the scuffle,
  Martin's mask  fell off.  Brooks and defendant both knew Martin.  Again,
  testimony varied regarding whether 

 

  defendant first stabbed Martin before or after Brooks managed to grab the
  gun and figure out that  it was a plastic, toy gun.  Brooks began hitting
  Martin with the gun and yelling that someone  should call the police.  By
  this point, defendant was on top of Martin in the parking lot.  Martin  was
  saying "let me up and I'll leave," and, when Brooks said to let him go,
  defendant got off   him.  Martin stood up, ran approximately twenty yards
  and then fell down.  At the emergency  room, no pulse could be detected,
  and Martin was declared dead.  A subsequent autopsy revealed  that he died
  from a stab wound to the heart.

       Defendant was charged with murder.  At trial, he argued that he
  stabbed Martin in self  defense.  The State argued that defendant stabbed
  Martin after learning the gun was plastic  because he wanted to send a
  message not to try to rob crack dealers.  In addition to instructing  the
  jury on the doctrine of self defense, the trial judge gave the following
  charge on the lesser  included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

          The question is whether, as a result of that provocation, the 
     defendant actually intended to kill Joel Martin.  That is what we refer 
     to as an expressed intent.  And an intent to kill may also consist of 
     what is called an implied intent.  It may be shown by proof that the 
     defendant acted with intent to cause great bodily harm, or it may be 
     proven that he acted in wanton disregard of the likelihood that his 
     behavior might naturally cause death or great bodily harm.

          So that there are three ways that the State may prove or - and must 
     prove intent.  The - those are an actual intent to kill or an intent 
     to cause great bodily harm or a wanton disregard that the likelihood that 
     his acts would cause death or great bodily harm.  Now, wanton disregard 
     means that the State must prove that the defendant actually knew that the 
     likelihood - of the likelihood that his conduct might naturally cause 
     death or great bodily harm, and nonetheless, engaged in the act of 
     stabbing Joel Martin with a knife.

          The defendant - for this to be proven, the defendant must actually 
     or subjectively be aware that his conduct posed a very high risk of 
     death or serious bodily injury to the victim.  This intent element 
     pertains to the state of mind or thoughts of the defendant's mind at or 
     about the time of the alleged acts in question.  Consideration of the 
     mental elements requires you to examine and determine what was going on 
     in the mind of the defendant at the time of the events in question, and 
     then to decide whether the State has convinced you beyond a reasonable 
     doubt that the defendant did, in fact, have the required intent at that 
     time.

 

  Defendant properly preserved his objection to the instruction, and the
  instant appeal followed. 
 
       On appeal, defendant claims that only involuntary manslaughter may be
  premised on an  intent implied either from an indifference to human life or
  an intent to do serious bodily injury.  He asserts that voluntary
  manslaughter requires an actual, express intent to kill.  

       In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the
  instructions as a whole  were misleading or inadequate to aid the jury's
  deliberations.  We will assign error only where  the instructions undermine
  our confidence in the verdict.  See State v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 245, 250,