Title: PAUGH v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAUGH v. STATE2000 WY 1619 P.3d 973Case Number: 98-358Decided: 08/02/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
HANNAH DAWN PAUGH, 
Appellant (Defendant)v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County The Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; and Diane Lozano, Assistant Public 
Defender.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul 
S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] Hannah Dawn 
Paugh (Paugh) presents this Court with a definitional question concerning the 
burglary statute. Her assertion is that a locked three-foot fishing reel display 
case in a department store is not a "separately secured or occupied portion" of 
a "building" within the meaning of Wyoming's burglary statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
6-3-301 (Lexis 1999).1 Paugh contends that the display 
case does not satisfy the statutory definition because it is not a "portion" of 
a "building," and her conviction of attempted burglary should be reversed. Other 
jurisdictions, which have addressed the "separately secured or occupied portion" 
language, have held that a display case of this nature does not fall within the 
burglary statute, and their view is supported by commentators and reason. We 
adopt the rationale of those authorities, based on the common law and statutory 
development of the crime of burglary, and we hold that to qualify as "separately 
secured or occupied," a room or container must be large enough to be occupied by 
a human being. It was impossible for the fishing reel display case to be the 
object of an attempted burglary by Paugh, and we reverse her 
conviction.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of Appellant, filed for 
Paugh:

Is a display case sitting 
on a counter, not attached to the building in any way, a portion of the building 
for the purposes of Wyoming's burglary statute?

a) Was the evidence that 
the State presented at trial insufficient, as a matter of law, to show Appellant 
aided and abetted an attempted burglary, because the State failed to show a 
burglary was attempted?

b) Did the district court 
improperly instruct the jury on the meaning of a "separately secured portion" of 
a building within the meaning of Wyoming's burglary 
statute?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issue is found in the Brief of Appellee, filed on behalf of the 
State:

Does a locked storage and 
display case lose its character as a "separately secured portion of a building," 
for purposes of Wyoming's burglary statute, by virtue of its not being fastened 
to the building?

[¶4] In February 
of 1998, Paugh and three other individuals went to the K-Mart store in Gillette. 
One of them, Kenneth Watson, intended to steal some fishing reels, but he needed 
assistance to help him avoid detection. Paugh agreed to be Watson's lookout. The 
fishing reels, with a retail price of $144.00 each, were in a locked, 
freestanding case, about three feet long, which sat on a counter in the sporting 
goods section of the store. Watson went to the hardware section of the store; 
took a pair of pliers from a package; and then returned to the sporting goods 
section intending to "pop the lock off" the fishing reel case. He attempted to 
"jimmy the lock" intermittently for about ten minutes. After Paugh told Watson 
that he was being observed by store security personnel, he abandoned his 
attempts to break into the case, left the pliers in the linen section, and 
walked toward the front doors of the store. Watson was detained by store 
security personnel for stealing the pliers, but when Watson showed the security 
personnel where the pliers were, they released him. Paugh and another woman also 
walked out of the store at that time.

[¶5] After 
releasing Watson, a security guard examined the lock on the fishing reel case. 
The lock was mangled and bent, and the guard called the sheriff's department. In 
the parking lot, a store security guard identified Watson, and the sheriff's 
office asked Watson to come back into the store where, after further 
interrogation, he was arrested. The investigating officer later located Paugh in 
Moorcroft with the other two individuals who were involved in the scheme. Paugh 
confessed to her role in the attempted theft, and she was charged with aiding 
and abetting in the commission of attempted burglary, by acting as a lookout, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-3-301(a) and (b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-1-201 
(Lexis 1999).2

[¶6] Following a 
two-day trial in August of 1998, Paugh's attorney filed a Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. Her attorney also challenged a jury instruction on the ground that 
unless affixed to the building, the display case could not be deemed a 
"separately secured" portion of a building and could not be the object of an 
attempted burglary. The challenged jury instruction 
stated:

[¶7] An 
enclosure within a building which is open to the public is a "separately secured 
portion" of the building within the meaning of the burglary statute if, from all 
of the attendant facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude 
that the building owner or occupant sought to restrict the public's access to 
items within it.

[¶8] The jury 
returned its verdict finding Paugh "guilty" on August 18, 1998. The district 
court imposed a split sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-13-107 (Lexis 1999), 
pursuant to which Paugh was to serve ninety days in the Campbell County 
Detention Center and then be subject to supervised probation for sixty months. 
The district court stayed Paugh's ninety-day incarceration pending the outcome 
of this appeal, but ordered the execution of the supervised probation period. 
Paugh timely appealed her conviction.

[¶9] We have 
defined the obligation of a district court with respect to jury instructions in 
a criminal case in this way:

[¶10] The duty 
of the trial court is to present in the instructions to the jury the law 
applicable to the issues actually raised by the evidence. Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1981). It is well settled that a trial court is given wide 
latitude in instructing the jury; and as long as the instructions correctly 
state the law and the entire charge to the jury adequately covers the issues, 
reversible error will not be found. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 
1987). The instructions are to be viewed in their entirety and read together to 
determine if this obligation is met. Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo. 
1983).

[¶11] Baier v. 
State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995). The standard that requires a jury 
instruction to be a correct statement of the law had endured for almost 
seventy-five years. Richey v. State, 28 Wyo. 117, 205 P. 304, 309 
(1922).

[¶12] The 
accuracy of an instruction to the jury is purely a question of law which we 
review de novo. If the instruction fails to correctly state the law, reversible 
error exists. Baier, 891 P.2d  at 756. In this case, to determine whether the 
jury was properly instructed, it is necessary to interpret the meaning of the 
phrase "separately secured or occupied portion thereof" found in the burglary 
statute. This is a question of law, and we review it de 
novo.

[¶13] Ryan v. 
State, 988 P.2d 46, 63 (Wyo. 1999); French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1027 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶14] Paugh 
argues that the word "portion" in the phrase "separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof" refers to a part of the whole. She contends this language 
requires that the enclosure referred to in the challenged jury instruction must 
be attached to the building or occupied structure, in essence a fixture. Because 
the display case was moveable and not attached to the building in any way, she 
insists the display case was not a "portion" of the building. In response, the 
State asserts that the language should be broadly interpreted. The State argues 
for rejection of the "fixture rule," asserted by Paugh, and urges instead a 
broad, functional approach under which the burglary statute would encompass a 
range of enclosures. See Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 712, 714-15 (Wyo. 1995) and 
Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221, 227 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 842 (1977). 
We conclude that neither argument is persuasive in light of the evolution of the 
burglary statute from its common law inception.

[¶15] At common 
law, burglary had as its essential purpose the protection of the habitation of 
an individual. In a remarkable article, Professor Lauer has traced the history 
of the common law offense of burglary through the several legislative enactments 
in Wyoming. Theodore P. Lauer, Burglary in Wyoming, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 
721 (1997). In England, the essence of the offense was an invasion of the 
dwelling, both at common law and in subsequent legislative enactments. Id. at 
723-30. This same concept was imported to America with later statutes expanding 
the protection from dwelling house to other kinds of structures, including 
business buildings. Id. at 730-32. In 1962, the Model Penal Code was promulgated 
by the American Law Institute as a summarization of prevailing notions regarding 
criminal offenses. Lauer, supra, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. at 732. Article 221 
of the Model Penal Code addresses the crime of burglary, and it is defined in 
Section 221.1(1):

"A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the 
premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or 
privileged to enter. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary 
that the building or structure was abandoned."

Lauer, supra, 32 
Land & Water L. Rev. at 732.

[¶16] A parallel 
statement of the propositions is found in C.S. Parnell, Annotation, Burglary: 
Outbuildings or the Like as Part of "Dwelling House," 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834-35 
(1955):

[¶17] It is 
evident that the offense of burglary at common law was considered one aimed at 
the security of the habitation rather than against property. That is to say, it 
was the circumstance of midnight terror aimed toward a man or his family who 
were in rightful repose in the sanctuary of the home, that was punished, and not 
the fact that the intended felony was successful. Such attempted immunity 
extended to a man's dwelling or mansion house has been said to be attributable 
to the early common-law principle that a man's home is his castle. The jealousy 
with which the law guarded against any infringement of this ancient right of 
peaceful habitation is best illustrated by the severe penalties which at common 
law were assessed against a person convicted of burglary, even though the 
enterprise, except for the essential elements of breaking and entering a mansion 
house or dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony therein, was 
unsuccessful.

[¶18] (Footnotes 
omitted.) Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 255-56 (3d ed. 
1982) states:

That every man's house is 
"his castle" is a concept that has been echoed down through the ages and the 
social interest in the security of the "castle" has its origin in antiquity; for 
just as an animal or a bird resents any intrusion into its place of abode, so no 
doubt did primitive man. The terms commonly used to indicate the place are 
"dwelling" or "dwelling house," but the "word `dwelling' imports a human 
habitation," and as a matter of common law, burglary is strictly an offense 
against the habitation.

[¶19] (Footnotes 
omitted.) See Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 460 A.2d 61, 69 (1983), cert. 
granted, 350 Md. 280, 711 A.2d 871 (1998), reversed on other grounds, 357 Md. 
170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999).3

[¶20] Beginning 
in territorial days, Wyoming recognized not only the importance of protecting 
people in their homes, but in their businesses as well. The earliest reported 
Wyoming burglary case, Territory of Wyoming v. Conley, 2 Wyo. 331, 333 (1880), 
involved a railroad handcar house. The majority agreed a handcar house fell 
within the definition of "any other closed enclosure."4 Id. at 
334-35.

[¶21] In 
Wyoming, as in many states, the development of case law addressed the meaning of 
the term "building." Seventy years later, this Court again considered the 
"building" portion of the burglary statute.5 In State v. Crouse, 69 Wyo. 85, 237 P.2d 481, 484-85 (1951), we held that a nearly collapsed powerhouse with no 
roof, one end and two sides absent, did not qualify as a building. Justice Blume 
concluded that although a functioning powerhouse may be a building, the 
destroyed powerhouse in this case was not a building. Id. at 485. This Court 
espoused the view that a house or building must have walls on all sides and a 
roof. Id. at 484. Thus, the common law concern with burglary as relating to 
human habitation continued.

[¶22] By 1957, 
the burglary statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-129 (1957), had been amended to 
read:

(A) Whoever, 
intentionally enters, or attempts to enter, any of the following places without 
the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or 
commit a felony therein may be imprisoned not more than fourteen (14) 
years:

(1) Any building or 
dwelling; or

(2) An enclosed railroad 
car; or

(3) An enclosed portion 
of any automobile, vehicle, or aircraft; or

(4) A locked enclosed 
cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or

(5) A room within any of 
the above.

(C) For the 
purpose of this section, entry into a place during the time when it is open to 
the general public is with consent. 

[¶23] Under this 
version of the statute, this Court addressed the term "building" in Ash, 555 P.2d  at 226-27. Ash involved entry of an enclosure attached to a liquor store, 
which consisted of a temporary wooden frame covered by plastic sheeting and a 
cement floor. Id. at 226. The enclosure had room for a person to move around. 
This satisfied the term "any building" because it served the basic purpose of an 
enclosure. Id. at 227. The distinction whether something qualifies as a building 
is not on the materials or methods of construction, but whether the building is 
"`protected from intrusion or trespass by some sort of material. §" Id. (quoting 
McCabe v. State, 1 Ga. App. 719, 58 S.E. 277, 278 (1907)).

[¶24] In 1973, 
the law was amended to include a locked or sealed 
building:

Whoever, at any time, 
unlawfully breaks and enters, or attempts to unlawfully break and enter, into 
any locked or sealed dwelling house, office, storehouse, warehouse, church, 
meeting house, or building used for the purpose of religious worship, car 
factory, tool house, freight house, station house, depot, railroad car, cave or 
cavern, courthouse or other public building, or other building whatsoever, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail not more 
than one year or [fined] a fine of not more than $500 or 
both.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-130 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1975). The following year, this Court struck as 
unconstitutional Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-130 for vagueness because it failed to 
distinguish between essentially innocent conduct, breaking and entry for legal 
excuse, and criminally culpable conduct, criminal breaking and entry. State v. 
Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1974).

[¶25] In 
amending the burglary statute by the enactment of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 
1982, the legislature enacted the "separately secured or occupied portion" 
language. Effective July 1, 1983, the statute provided:

6-3-301. 
Burglary.

(a) A person is guilty of 
burglary if, without authority, he enters or surreptitiously remains in a 
building, occupied structure or motorized vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

(c) A person may not be 
convicted both for burglary and for the offense which it was his purpose to 
commit after the entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the 
additional offense is a violent felony.

[¶26] Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 75, § 3 (1982). Prior to its effective date, the legislature further 
amended Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a), so that it read:

(a) A person is guilty of 
burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or felony therein.

[¶27] Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 171, § 3 (1983). The parallel nature of some phrases with the Model 
Penal Code is obvious.

[¶28] In 1985, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 was amended to read as it currently does. We decided 
Smith, 902 P.2d  at 713 under this version of the statute. Smith involved a 
semi-trailer, without wheels and without back doors, used for storage at a 
construction site. Id. at 712. Even though it was not completely enclosed by 
four walls and a roof, we held the semi-trailer was a building and therefore 
could be burglarized. Id. at 715. In Smith, we adopted the functional analysis 
from Ash that since the semi-trailer was planted firmly on the ground and was 
designed to shelter property, this Court held it qualified as a building under 
the statute. Id. at 715.

[¶29] The 
Wyoming legislature has not defined the term "separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof," and we look to other sources to consider what this phrase 
means. Our statute adopted this language from the Model Penal Code § 221.1(1). 
The Model Penal Code defines "occupied structure" as "any structure, vehicle or 
place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on 
business therein, whether or not a person is actually present." Model Penal Code 
§ 221.0 at 60. The comments to the Model Penal Code § 221.1 explain that the 
premises protected by the burglary statute include "a building or occupied 
structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof." Model Penal Code 
§ 221.1 cmt. 3(b) at 71. The Model Penal Code comment explains that this 
language "takes care of the situation of apartment houses, office buildings, 
hotels, steamships with a series of private cabins, etc., where occupancy is by 
unit." Model Penal Code § 221.1 cmt. 3(b) at 73. Implicit from this listing of 
examples is the proposition that a separately secured portion of a building be 
able to accommodate the presence of a human being.

[¶30] Although 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 also does not define "occupied structure," it is 
defined elsewhere in the statutes to mean a structure or vehicle whether or not 
a person is actually present:

(A) Where any person 
lives or carries on business or other calling;

(B) Where people assemble 
for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or 
public transportation;

(C) Which is used for 
overnight accommodation of persons; or

(D) In which a person may 
reasonably be expected to be present.

[¶31] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(v) (Michie 1997). In our view, there is very little reason to 
believe that the phrase "separately secured" would be intended to describe any 
different portion than the phrase "separately * * * occupied * * 
*."

[¶32] This 
common law concern for protecting places occupied by people has also been 
recognized by several states. We consider, for example, the treatment of this 
issue in Washington, Iowa, Montana, and New Mexico. In State v. Deitchler, 75 Wn. App. 134, 876 P.2d 970, 971-72 (1994), the Washington Court of Appeals held 
that a container similar to the fishing reel display case at issue here did not 
qualify as a building. In Deitchler, the defendant placed his hand inside an 
evidence locker located at a police station. The locker was ten inches high, ten 
inches wide, and perhaps two feet deep with a six-inch long and one-inch wide 
slot. Id. at 970. The trial court ruled the evidence locker was a unit 
separately secured, thus a separate building under Wash. Rev. Code § 
9 A. 04.110(5).6 Deitchler, 876 P.2d  at 971. On 
appeal, the court determined "[b]y negative implication, [that] a structure or 
space within a larger building will not be a `separate building' unless the 
larger building has `two or more units separately secured or occupied[,] § and 
the structure or space being considered is one of those `units[.] §" Id. The 
court concluded the evidence locker was neither a unit of the police station nor 
separate building, therefore the burglary charge could not be sustained. Id. at 
971-72. In the recent case of State v. Miller, 90 Wn. App. 720, 954 P.2d 925, 
930 (1998), the Washington Court of Appeals held that a structure too small for 
a human being to live in or do business in was not a "building" or a "structure" 
under the burglary statute. Miller entered a 24-hour self-service car wash and 
broke several coin boxes and took the money. Id. at 927. Because the car wash 
was open to the public, his entry and remaining was lawful, therefore he could 
not be charged for burglary. Id. Although the state maintained Miller remained 
unlawfully when he formed the intent to commit a crime, the court rejected this 
reasoning because it was unsupported by case law or statute. Id. at 928. Intent 
was irrelevant and did not establish unlawful entry. To support the holding, the 
court cited to Deitchler where the judge "concluded that a structure or space 
within a large building is not a separate building unless the large building has 
`two or more units separately secured or occupied' and the structure or space 
being considered is one of those `units.'" Miller, 954 P.2d  at 930 (quoting 
Deitchler, 876 P.2d at 971). Under this interpretation, the separate stalls and 
coin boxes in Miller occupied by a single tenant and not consisting of two or 
more units separately secured or occupied, did not substantiate the burglary 
charge. Miller, 954 P.2d  at 930. Finally, we note "burglary is ordinarily 
considered only in the context of a structure large enough to accommodate a 
human being." Miller, 954 P.2d  at 930; Deitchler, 876 P.2d  at 970. "A structure 
too small for a human being to live in or do business in is not a `building' or 
`structure' for the purpose of burglary." Miller, 954 P.2d  at 930; Deitchler, 
876 P.2d  at 971.

[¶33] By 
statute, Iowa specifically addresses the storage and safekeeping of anything of 
value. Iowa Code Ann. § 702.12 (West 1993) includes within the phrase in the 
burglary statute "occupied structure" overnight accommodation, storage or 
safekeeping for anything of value, whether or not a person is actually present. 
This section continues:

[¶34] However, 
for purposes of Chapter 713, a box, chest, safe, changer, or other object or 
device which is adapted or used for the deposit or storage of anything of value 
but which is too small or not designed to allow a person to physically enter or 
occupy it is not an "occupied structure."

[¶35] Iowa Code 
Ann. § 702.12. In State v. Williams, 409 N.W.2d 187, 187 (Iowa 1987), the 
defendant was convicted of burglary of a topper-enclosed pickup truck because it 
qualified as an occupied structure under the burglary statute. The camper shell 
was three feet high, with side windows and a rear door. Id. at 187. Williams 
entered the shell through the back door and handed two tires to a co-defendant 
outside. That constituted burglary. Id. Williams readily conceded the enclosed 
pickup truck bed was sufficiently large enough to allow a person to enter or 
occupy it, thus he could not qualify under the size exception in Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 702.12. Williams, 409 N.W.2d  at 188-89. Based on the plain language of the 
statute and the defendant's concession, the court affirmed the burglary 
conviction. Id. at 189.

[¶36] Under the 
Montana burglary statute, "[a] person commits the offense of burglary if he 
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in an occupied structure with the purpose 
to commit an offense therein." Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-204(1) (1999). Previous 
statutes established that to constitute burglary, an act must have been directed 
against an occupied structure. The new code is not as technically restrictive, 
but it does require the structure entered to be occupied, suited for human 
occupancy or night lodging of persons or for carrying on business. This in 
effect limits the burglary statute's application to those situations where human 
life is at the greatest risk. Recently, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a 
conviction because a prison's maximum-security cellblock satisfied the 
definition of "occupied structure" under the Montana statute. State v. Gollehon, 
262 Mont. 293, 864 P.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1993). Gollehon maintained the unit was 
"one single building, and that no sections of the building constitute a separate 
occupied structure apart from the remainder of the unit." Id. at 1261. 
Therefore, he contended, he could not be charged with burglary. The Montana 
Supreme Court emphasized that each separately secured block was intended for 
human occupancy and although no prisoners were previously convicted for burglary 
within the prison, the plain and clear language contemplates that burglary can 
occur if there is unauthorized entry within the block. Id.

[¶37] New Mexico 
has extensively addressed burglary, specifically defining the term 
"structure."7 In State v. Sanchez, 105 N.M. 619, 
735 P.2d 536, 537, cert. denied, 105 N.M. 618, 735 P.2d 535 (1987), two 
defendants, Landlee and Sanchez, challenged their burglary convictions, arguing 
entry into separately secured portions of buildings otherwise open to the public 
did not qualify as unauthorized entry. Landlee entered the loading dock area of 
an auto parts retail store without authorization. Sanchez entered a hospital 
office where he stole a purse containing cash, credit cards and other valuables. 
Id. at 537. The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the convictions applying a 
more liberal and broader interpretation, securing property and protecting 
possessory rights. Id. at 537-39.

[¶38] Two years 
later, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held a soft drink vending machine did not 
satisfy the definition of a structure in the burglary statute. State v. Bybee, 
109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316, 318 (1989). Three vending machines, each with a 
locked door and money change box, were outside a grocery store and not anchored 
or attached to the building. Id. at 316. Looking to common law and the expansion 
of the term "structure" to include possessory rights and define prohibited 
space, the court determined the legislature did not intend a soft drink machine 
to fall within the burglary statute. Id. at 318. "Although the legislature may 
include specific objects or places under the proscription of the burglary 
statute, the court may not enlarge or amend the statute by judicial fiat." Id. 
at 319. Absent specific language in the statute evincing the intent to include 
such structures under the statute, the court was unable to affirm the 
conviction. Id. at 318.

[¶39] In State 
v. Gregory, 117 N.M. 104, 869 P.2d 292, 292 (1993), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215, 
870 P.2d 753 (1994), Gregory entered a post office lobby open to the public and 
removed mail from a mailbox. The back of each box opened into the post office 
mail sorting room, which was not open to the public. Id. at 292. The court held 
that removing mail from a post office box constituted burglary because the box 
opened into the sorting room for the mail, which the court held was a separately 
secured area. Id. at 293. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that 
it was physically impossible to enter the sorting room through the mailbox 
opening, therefore burglary was impossible. Id. Under New Mexico law, the size 
of the box is irrelevant. Id. See State v. Jacobs, 102 N.M. 801, 701 P.2d 400, 
401-04 (1985) (burglary accomplished by lowering bomb through roof of vent). 
Unlike the vending machine in Bybee, the post office box was not an isolated 
structure and encompassed both the boxes and the sorting area, thus the burglary 
occurred when Gregory entered the separately secured area. Gregory, 869 P.2d  at 
293.

[¶40] Based on 
the similar language and intent of the four states discussed above, we conclude 
that the "separately secured" language is considered in conjunction with the 
"occupied portion," and to be susceptible to burglary the "separately secured" 
portion must be large enough to be occupied by a human being. This is consistent 
with the original purpose of the common law to protect 
people.

[¶41] We are 
urged by Paugh to adopt the "fixture rule" espoused by Professor Lauer in his 
article. Lauer, supra, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. at 758. We are satisfied that 
the adoption of the fixture rule would afford disparate treatment to similar 
containers depending upon the fortuity of attachment to the structure. This 
would result in disparate treatment of individuals who were involved in 
essentially the same misconduct. This we are loath to do.

[¶42] Based on 
the common law origins of the burglary statute, both in Wyoming and other 
jurisdictions, we hold the burglary statute was designed primarily to protect 
not only those places where people sleep, but also those places that a person 
could occupy. If the purpose of the burglary statute was to protect people 
within dwellings or places of business, then the area in which the crime can be 
committed must be large enough to admit a human being. It is clear that the 
display case, even though secured with a lock, was not large enough to 
accommodate a human being. We will not extend the burglary statute to include 
those situations in which a person enters a building open to the public and then 
enters a container that is too small to accommodate a human being. We hold the 
display case is not a "separately secured or occupied portion" of a building, 
and we reverse Paugh's conviction.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-301 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) 
A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

(b) 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-201 provides:

(a) 
A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who 
counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is 
an accessory before the fact.

(b) 
An accessory before the fact:

(i) 
May be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a 
principal;

(ii) May be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted either before 
or after and whether or not the principal offender is indicted, informed 
against, tried or convicted; and

(iii) Upon conviction, is subject to the same punishment and penalties as 
are prescribed by law for the punishment of the 
principal.

3 Several 
states have recognized the increased seriousness of burglary when it is a 
dwelling of habitation versus a building or a business. This is based on the 
concept that the more serious burglary charge is intended to protect people 
while in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight as 
opposed to protecting property in buildings such as stores, businesses offices 
or garages. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 30-16-3 (Michie 1994) (burglary in third degree involves dwelling house 
whereas burglary in fourth degree involves any other structure); N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 140.20 (McKinney 1999) (burglary in third degree involves building whereas 
burglary in second degree involves dwelling); Tex. Code Ann. 30.01 (West 1994) 
(habitation versus building); and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1998) (burglary in 
third degree unless involves dwelling, in which event the felony is second 
degree).

4 Section 38 
at 254 of the Criminal Laws of Wyoming (1876) defined 
burglary:

Every person who shall willfully and maliciously and forcibly break and 
enter, or willfully and maliciously without force (the door or any window being 
open), enter into any dwelling house, kitchen, office, shop, storehouse, 
warehouse, malt house, stilling house, banking house, hotel, saloon, mill, 
pottery, factory, water craft, church or meeting house, railroad car, or any 
other close enclosure * * * shall be deemed guilty of burglary * * 
*.

5 At that 
time, Wyo. Comp. St. § 9-309 (1945) read:

Whoever, at any time, breaks and enters, or attempts to break and enter, 
into any dwelling house, automobile or other motor vehicle, kitchen, smokehouse, 
outhouse, shop, office, storehouse, warehouse, mill, distillery, brewery, 
pottery, factory, barn, stable, schoolhouse, church, meeting-house, or building 
used for the purpose of religious worship, car-factory, tool house, freight 
house, station house, depot, railroad car, sheep wagon, tent, court house, or 
other public building, or other buildings whatsoever, with intent to commit a 
felony, or with intent to steal property of any value, is guilty of 
burglary.

6 "`[I]f, 
with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, [one] enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle [or a dwelling,] §" 
"`[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree'" under Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9 A. 52.030(1) (West 1998). Deitchler, 876 P.2d  at 971. Aside from its ordinary 
meaning, a "building" "`includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway 
car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for 
carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods; each 
unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or 
occupied is a separate building.'" Deitchler, 876 P.2d  at 971 (quoting Wash. 
Rev. Code § 9 A. 04.110(5) (West 1998)) (emphasis 
added).

7 The New 
Mexico burglary statute provides:

Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, 
aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to 
commit any felony or theft therein.

A. 
Any person who, without authorization, enters a dwelling house with intent to 
commit any felony or theft therein is guilty of a third degree 
felony.

B. 
Any person who, without authorization, enters any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft 
or other structure, movable or immovable, with intent to commit any felony or 
theft therein is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3 (Michie 1994)