Title: In re A.L.S.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 153A20  
Filed 11 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.L.S. and M.A.W. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 
27 December 2019 by Judge Christy E. Wilhelm in District Court, Cabarrus County.  
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 
2020, but was determined upon the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant 
to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
E. Garrison White for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus County Department of 
Human Services. 
 
Adams, Howell, Sizemore & Adams PA, by Sarah M. Skinner, for appellee 
Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
Respondent-mother Tiffany K. appeals from orders entered by the trial court 
terminating her parental rights in her minor children A.L.S. and M.A.W.1  After 
careful consideration of respondent-mother’s arguments in light of the record and the 
applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s termination orders. 
                                            
1 A.L.S. and M.A.W. will, respectively, be referred to throughout the remainder of this 
opinion as “Allen” and “Maria,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the juveniles’ identities 
and for ease of reading. 
IN RE A.L.S. AND M.A.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 24 August 2018, the Cabarrus County Department of Human Services filed 
petitions alleging that Allen and Maria were neglected and dependent juveniles and 
obtained the entry of orders placing the children in nonsecure custody.  DHS alleged 
that respondent-mother had tested positive for the presence of cocaine and marijuana 
while pregnant with Maria.  On or about 17 May 2018, DHS received a report that 
Maria had tested positive for the presence of cocaine at birth and that there were 
concerns about the quality of the care that respondent-mother had been providing for 
the children.  Respondent-mother provided the name of an individual who was willing 
to serve as a temporary safety provider for Allen and Maria.  However, several 
problems developed with this safety placement, including an accidental shooting in 
the home, the existence of domestic discord and criminal activity, and the fact that 
the provider’s health difficulties interfered with her ability to provide adequate care 
for the children.  In addition, DHS alleged that, on 16 July 2018, respondent-mother 
had tested positive for the presence of cocaine and reported that she would be 
rendered homeless as a result of being evicted from her home.  Finally, DHS alleged 
that respondent-mother was on probation and had pending court dates in both 
Cabarrus and Rowan County involving multiple criminal charges. 
The juvenile petitions came on for hearing in the District Court, Cabarrus 
County, on 25 October 2018.  On 7 November 2018, Judge William G. Hamby, Jr., 
entered an order concluding that the children were neglected and dependent juveniles 
and ordering that they remain in DHS custody.  As a precondition to allowing her to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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reunify with the children, Judge Hamby ordered respondent-mother to complete a 
psychological and parenting capacity evaluation and a substance abuse assessment, 
to submit to random drug and alcohol screens, to complete a life skills assessment, to 
take advantage of a supervised weekly visitation plan, and to obtain and maintain 
suitable housing for herself and her children.  On or about 27 October 2018,2 
respondent-mother was arrested and charged with having committed multiple 
criminal offenses including giving fictitious information to a law enforcement officer, 
resisting a public officer, hit and run driving, and fleeing to elude arrest. 
After a review hearing held on 10 January 2019, the trial court entered an 
order on 20 February 2019 finding that respondent-mother had made little progress 
toward satisfying the requirements imposed upon her in the initial dispositional 
order.  Prior to her incarceration, respondent-mother had attended two of a possible 
six visits with Allen and Maria and had failed to maintain biweekly contact with 
DHS.  At this stage of the proceedings, however, the primary permanent plan for 
Allen and Maria remained reunification coupled with a secondary permanent plan of 
guardianship. 
                                            
2 As an aside, we note that the 20 February 2019 order states that respondent-
mother’s arrest occurred on both 24 October 2018 and 27 October 2018.  However, we are 
unable to determine that the actual date upon which respondent-mother was placed under 
arrest makes any material difference for the purpose of properly resolving the issues that 
have been raised for our consideration on appeal. 
IN RE A.L.S. AND M.A.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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After a permanency planning hearing held on 28 March 2019, the trial court 
entered an order finding that, due to respondent-mother’s incarceration, she had not 
made any progress in complying with the requirements that had been imposed upon 
her in the initial dispositional order and that it was not possible for the children to 
be returned to her care within the next six months.  In addition, the trial court noted 
that respondent-mother had entered pleas of guilty to numerous charges on 31 
January 2019 and had been sentenced to a term of thirty-two to fifty-six months 
imprisonment.  The trial court changed the primary permanent plan for Allen and 
Maria to one of adoption,  with a secondary permanent plan of reunification. 
On 10 July 2019, DHS filed motions seeking to have the parental rights of 
respondent-mother and the children’s unknown father terminated on the basis of 
neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the 
cost of the care that the children had received while in DHS custody for a continuous 
period of six months prior to the filing of the termination motions, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3); failure to legitimate the children, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5); dependency, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6); and willful abandonment, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  The 
termination motions came on for hearing before the trial court on 14 November 2019.  
On 27 December 2019, the trial court entered orders terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights in the children on the basis of neglect, dependency, and 
willful abandonment and determining that the termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights would be in the children’s best interests.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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(2019).  Respondent-mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s 
termination orders. 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court, 
respondent-mother challenges a number of the trial court’s findings of fact as lacking 
in sufficient evidentiary support.  In addition, respondent-mother challenges the 
lawfulness of the trial court’s conclusion that her parental rights in Allen and Maria 
were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) on the grounds that 
the trial court’s findings and the record evidence did not support a conclusion that 
the children were likely to be neglected in the event that they were returned to her 
care; that her parental rights in the children were subject to termination pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) on the grounds that the trial court had failed to explicitly 
find that her incarceration constituted a condition that rendered her incapable of 
parenting Allen and Maria for the foreseeable future; and that her parental rights in 
the children were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) on the 
grounds that the trial court’s findings and the record evidence did not support a 
conclusion that she had willfully abandoned them. 
According to well-established North Carolina law, the termination of a parent’s 
parental rights in a juvenile involves the use of a two-stage process.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-
1109, -1110 (2019).  “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of 
proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more 
grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.”  In re 
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A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) 
(2017)).  “If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in [N.C.G.S. §] 
7B-1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court 
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile[s] to terminate 
parental rights.”  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016). 
“This Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1109 ‘in order to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent 
and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law,’ with the 
trial court’s conclusions of law being subject to de novo review on appeal.”  In re 
N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2019) (citations omitted).  “Findings of 
fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and 
are binding on appeal.”  In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019).  
“Moreover, we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s 
determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.”  Id. 
at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 
133 (1982)).  In view of the fact that the existence of a single ground for termination 
suffices to support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child, see In re 
A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417, 421 (2019), we will focus our attention 
upon the validity of respondent-mother’s challenge to the lawfulness of the trial 
court’s determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children were 
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subject to termination on the basis of dependency pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6). 
According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), a trial court may terminate a parent’s 
parental rights in a juvenile based upon a finding that  
the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and 
supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a 
dependent juvenile within the meaning of [N.C.]G.S. 
[§] 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that 
the incapability will continue for the foreseeable future.  
Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of 
substance abuse, intellectual disability, mental illness, 
organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition 
that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the 
juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative 
child care arrangement. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).  A dependent juvenile is one who is “in need of assistance 
or placement because (i) the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian 
responsible for the juvenile’s care or supervision or (ii) the juvenile’s parent, 
guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the juvenile’s care or supervision and 
lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9) 
(2019).  “Thus, the trial court’s findings regarding this ground ‘must address both 
(1) the parent’s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the 
parent of alternative child care arrangements.’ ”  In re K.R.C., 374 N.C. 849, 859, 845 
S.E.2d 56, 63 (2020) (quoting In re L.R.S., 237 N.C. App. 16, 19, 764 S.E.2d 908, 910 
(2014)). 
IN RE A.L.S. AND M.A.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In its termination orders, the trial court found that respondent-mother had 
been incarcerated during a “majority of this case” and remained imprisoned at the 
time of the termination hearing.3  The trial court also found that respondent-mother 
had been arrested in October 2018 for “habitual felon, resisting public officer (3 
counts), fictitious information to an officer, failure to he[e]d light or siren, hit/run fail 
to stop, flee/elude arrest (3 counts), and reckless driving.”  In addition, the trial court 
found that, on 31 January 2019, respondent-mother had been sentenced to a term of 
thirty-two to fifty-six months imprisonment and had a projected release date of 18 
May 2022.  The trial court further found that, since January 2019, respondent-mother 
had identified at least six individuals as potential placements for Allen and Maria 
and that all of “these individuals [had either failed to] complete[ ] the information 
packet or [had] declined to move forward with the [home study] process.”  Moreover, 
the trial court found that, even though several home study requests had been 
submitted relating to potential relative placements, all of them had been rejected 
“due to either criminal history or unsafe environment or a response was never 
received from the requested family member.”  For that reason, the trial court found 
that there was not a proper alternative care plan in place for the juveniles and that 
“no other options” for the juveniles aside from adoption were actually available.  
                                            
3 The adjudicatory findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the separate 
orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Allen and in Maria are 
substantially similar and will be considered as if they were identical in this opinion in the 
interests of brevity. 
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Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of 
Allen and Maria so as to make them dependent juveniles as defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(9), that there was a reasonable probability that respondent-mother’s incapability 
would continue for the foreseeable future, and that respondent-mother lacked an 
appropriate alternative child care arrangement for the children. 
Respondent-mother has not challenged the lawfulness of the trial court’s 
determination that she lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement in 
her brief before this Court.  Instead, respondent-mother argues that the trial court 
erred by determining that she was incapable of providing for the care and supervision 
of Allen and Maria and that this incapability would continue for the foreseeable 
future.  We do not find respondent-mother’s arguments to be persuasive. 
As an initial matter, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by 
finding that her projected release date was 18 May 2022.  According to respondent-
mother, awarding credit for the time that she spent in pretrial confinement “results 
in a release date as early as 24 September 2021,” so that, at the time of the 
termination hearing, respondent-mother had “as little as [twenty-two] months and 
[ten] days remaining on her sentence, with no other charges pending.” 
At the 14 November 2019 termination hearing, a social worker testified that 
respondent-mother’s projected release date was May 2022.  However, a copy of the 
criminal judgment that had been entered against respondent-mother was admitted 
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into evidence and shows that respondent-mother had been sentenced to a term of 
thirty-six to fifty-six months imprisonment and awarded credit against the service of 
her sentence for 129 days of pretrial confinement.  As a result, as DHS now 
acknowledges, it appears that respondent-mother could possibly be released as early 
as September 2021, a date which is approximately twenty-two months after the date 
upon which the termination hearing was held.  Even so, we conclude that any error 
that the trial court might have committed in determining respondent-mother’s 
expected release date did not prejudice her chances for a more favorable outcome at 
the termination hearing.  See Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Servs., Inc., 124 
N.C. App. 332, 335, 477 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1996) (stating that, “to obtain relief on 
appeal, an appellant must not only show error, but that appellant must also show 
that the error was material and prejudicial, amounting to denial of a substantial right 
that will likely affect the outcome of an action.” (citation omitted)). 
At the time of the termination hearing, respondent-mother was not scheduled 
to be released from imprisonment for at least twenty-two additional months and 
potentially faced up to forty-two additional months’ imprisonment.  The fact that 
respondent-mother faces an extended period of incarceration regardless of the exact 
date upon which she is scheduled to be released provides ample support for the trial 
court’s determination that she was incapable of providing for the proper care and 
supervision of the children and that there was a reasonable probability that her 
incapability would continue for the foreseeable future.  See In re L.R.S., 237 N.C. App. 
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at 21, 764 S.E.2d at 911 (holding that, where the respondent-mother was not 
scheduled to be released from federal custody for at least an additional thirteen 
months at the time of the termination hearing and potentially faced another 30 
months of imprisonment, her “extended incarceration [was] clearly sufficient to 
constitute a condition that rendered her unable or unavailable to parent [the 
juvenile]”); see also In re N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. 722, 760 S.E.2d 49 (2014) (holding 
that, where the respondent-mother had been incarcerated since the juvenile had 
initially entered DSS custody, had been awaiting trial upon homicide and bank 
robbery charges for a period of two years, and did not have a scheduled trial date, the 
trial court did not err by determining that the respondent-mother was incapable of 
providing care for the juvenile and that there was a reasonable probability that her 
incapability to do so would continue for the foreseeable future).  For that reason, any 
error that the trial court might have committed in determining the exact length of 
respondent-mother’s period of incarceration constituted, at most, harmless error, 
with the trial court having sufficiently tied respondent-mother’s incarceration to the 
relevant statutory standard in its findings. 
In addition, respondent-mother argues that the trial court failed to explicitly 
identify a cause or condition that rendered her unable to provide care for the children 
as contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), with this contention resting upon the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals in In re Clark, 151 N.C. App. 286, 565 S.E.2d 245 
(2002), and In re J.K.C., 218 N.C. App. 22, 721 S.E.2d 264 (2012).  In In re Clark, the 
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Court of Appeals relied upon a prior version of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), which 
provided that a parent’s parental rights in a child were subject to termination in the 
event that the trial court found 
[t]hat the parent is incapable of providing for the proper 
care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile 
is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of  [N.C.]G.S. 
[§] 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that 
such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future.  
Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of 
substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, 
organic brain syndrome, or any other similar cause or 
condition. 
 
In re Clark, 151 N.C. App. at 288, 565 S.E.2d at 247 (emphasis added) (quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2001)).  In light of the applicable statutory language, the 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred by concluding that the 
respondent-father was incapable of providing for his daughter’s care, despite his 
incarceration, given that “[t]here was no evidence at trial to suggest that respondent 
suffered from any physical or mental illness or disability that would prevent him from 
providing proper care and supervision for [his daughter], nor did the trial court make 
any findings of fact regarding such a condition,” id. at 289, 565 S.E.2d at 247–48, and 
given the absence of “clear and convincing evidence to suggest that respondent was 
incapable of arranging for appropriate supervision for the child.”  Id. at 289, 565 
S.E.2d at 248. 
In In re J.K.C., the Court of Appeals relied upon In re Clark in affirming the 
dismissal of a termination petition that rested upon allegations of neglect and 
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dependency.  In re J.K.C., 218 N.C. App. at 25, 721 S.E.2d at 266-77.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that, even though the trial court had found that 
the respondent-father was incarcerated and that no relative was able to provide 
appropriate care for his children, “the guardian ad litem here did not present any 
evidence that respondent’s incapability of providing care and supervision was due to 
one of the specified conditions or any other similar cause or condition.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  As a result, in both In re Clark and In re J.K.C., the Court of Appeals ruled 
in favor of the parent based upon the failure of the petitioner to present any evidence 
that the respondent lacked the ability to provide care for his children as a result of 
one of the causes or conditions delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). 
The current version of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) differs from that at issue in In 
re Clark and In re J.K.C. by permitting a finding of incapability based upon 
“substance abuse, intellectual disability, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or 
any other cause or condition that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent 
the juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.”  
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2019) (emphasis added).  The current version of N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(6), unlike the version upon which the Court of Appeals relied in In re 
Clark and In re J.K.C., does not use the word “similar” to describe the other causes 
or conditions that suffice to support a finding of incapability.  In light of this alteration 
in the relevant statutory language, the trial court in this case was not required to 
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find that respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the children’s care based 
upon of the statutorily enumerated conditions or any other similar cause or condition. 
As the record reflects, DHS presented evidence tending to show that 
respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the care and supervision of Allen 
and Maria based upon a cause or condition encompassed within N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6) — the fact that the sentence of imprisonment that had been imposed upon 
her would not expire until at least twenty-two additional months from the time of the 
termination hearing.  See In re L.R.S., 237 N.C. App. at 21, 764 S.E.2d at 911.  Based 
upon this evidence, the trial court found as a fact that respondent-mother was 
incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and would continue to be 
incarcerated for the duration of her sentence.  The trial court’s conclusion that 
respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of 
Allen and Maria for the foreseeable future flows logically from the findings of fact 
that detail the nature and extent of her continued incarceration.  See Coble v. Coble, 
300 N.C. 708, 714, 268 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1980) (stating that “[e]vidence must support 
findings; findings must support conclusions; conclusions must support the [order]” 
and that “[e]ach step of the progression must be taken by the trial judge, in logical 
sequence; each link in the chain of reasoning must appear in the order itself”). 
 Thus, we hold the trial court did not err by determining that respondent-
mother’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination for dependency 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).  In addition, we note that respondent-mother 
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has not challenged the lawfulness of the trial court’s conclusion that termination of 
her parental rights would be in Allen’s and Maria’s best interests.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a).  As a result, for all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders 
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Allen and Maria. 
AFFIRMED.