Title: Schmitt v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Poff, S.J. 
 
JOHN YANCEY SCHMITT 
 
v.  Record No. 003010   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
    Record No. 010007 
June 8, 2001 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
William R. Shelton, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death sentence imposed on John Yancey Schmitt, along with 
his several non-capital convictions. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
Schmitt was indicted for capital murder based on the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Earl Shelton 
Dunning during the commission of a robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(4).  Schmitt also was indicted for armed entry of a 
bank with the intent to commit larceny, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-93; two counts of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-
58; and three counts of use of a firearm, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1. 
 
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial conducted under 
Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury convicted Schmitt of all the offenses 
charged.  In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed his 
punishment for capital murder at death based on a finding of 
"future dangerousness," and for the other offenses at 
imprisonment for a total of 118 years.  The trial court 
sentenced Schmitt in accordance with the jury verdict. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of Schmitt's death 
sentence with his appeal of the capital murder conviction.  Code 
§ 17.1-313(F).  We also certified Schmitt's appeal of his 
convictions for the non-capital offenses from the Court of 
Appeals and consolidated that appeal with his capital murder 
appeal.  Code § 17.1-409. 
II.  GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE 
 
We will state the evidence presented at trial in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the 
trial court.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 
S.E.2d 872, 877 (2001); Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 
502, 537 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2000).  On February 17, 1999, Earl 
Shelton Dunning was shot and killed while working as a security 
guard at the Bon Air branch of NationsBank (the bank) on Buford 
Road in Chesterfield County.  About a month before Dunning was 
killed, Schmitt had robbed this same bank and, after that 
robbery, the bank had hired Dunning to work as a security guard. 
 
Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 1999, a man entered 
the bank wearing dark sunglasses and a bulky jacket.  He kept 
his head lowered and appeared to scan the interior of the bank.  
Bank manager Sara Parker-Orr testified that she was "nervous" 
about this man because he was wearing sunglasses inside the bank 
 
2
on a "really cloudy day."  Dunning was outside the bank and, 
after the man went inside, Dunning entered the bank and walked 
across the lobby to stand at the end of the "teller line" in 
which customers were waiting. 
 
The man stood in the teller line behind several customers.  
Parker-Orr watched him leave his place in line and walk toward 
Dunning.  When the man was within "a foot or so" of Dunning, 
Parker-Orr heard two gunshots and then heard someone scream, 
"[G]et down, get down." 
 
The man next approached Parker-Orr's teller window and 
banged on the counter yelling, "Money, give me money," and "[I]f 
I don't get money, I'm going to kill everybody."  Parker-Orr 
opened her cash drawer and threw money into a black plastic bag 
that the robber was holding. 
 
The robber continued to bang on the counter demanding "more 
money."  He announced that he would give the tellers "ten 
seconds" to give him more money, and began counting backward 
from the number "ten."  By the time he reached "nine," teller 
Marlene Austin was "throwing money in the bag."  Parker-Orr also 
gave him money from a third teller's drawer.  When she told the 
robber that she had no more money to give him, the robber left 
the bank. 
 
The bank's security camera system recorded photographs of 
Schmitt approaching the end of the teller counter and standing 
 
3
at a teller window holding a bag and pointing a gun.  None of 
the witnesses who testified at trial saw the actual shooting of 
Dunning, and the shooting was not recorded by the bank's 
security camera system.  However, Parker-Orr, Austin, and Kelli 
Konstaitis, another teller, all identified a photograph of 
Schmitt recorded by the bank's security camera system as 
depicting the man who robbed the bank that day. 
 
After Schmitt left the bank, witnesses telephoned the "911" 
emergency response number and attended to Dunning, who was lying 
on the floor.  By the time emergency medical personnel arrived, 
Dunning was dead.  The witnesses in the bank testified that they 
did not touch or see anyone else touch Dunning's gun or its 
holster.  Dunning's gun was found in its holster, which was 
closed and snapped. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Dunning was killed as a result of 
a gunshot wound to his chest.  The bullet entered the right side 
of Dunning's chest, causing significant injuries to the aorta, 
and exited from the right side of his back. 
 
After the murder and robbery, Schmitt registered at a 
Williamsburg hotel the same day under the name "R. Napier."  The 
hotel desk clerk testified that Schmitt asked for directions to 
the local shopping areas, and that when Schmitt later returned 
to the hotel, his hair was a different color.  Schmitt paid cash 
for a three-day stay at the hotel. 
 
4
 
Captain Karl S. Leonard of the Chesterfield County Police 
Department identified Schmitt after reviewing the photographs 
taken by the bank's security camera system.  Two days after the 
murder and robbery, on February 19, 1999, Leonard learned where 
Schmitt was staying in Williamsburg.  The James City County 
Tactical Team surrounded Schmitt's hotel room, and a crisis 
negotiator, Lieutenant Diane M. Clarcq of the James City County 
Police Department, attempted to persuade Schmitt to surrender.  
About 10:30 a.m. the following morning, Schmitt surrendered and 
was taken into police custody. 
 
Leonard obtained a search warrant for Schmitt's hotel room, 
where a satchel, a handgun, a box of shotgun shells, a black 
leather jacket, and a variety of newly purchased clothing items 
were seized.  Inside the satchel was $27,091 in cash, most of 
which still bore "bank bands" identifying the money as coming 
from the Bon Air branch of NationsBank. 
 
John H. Willmer, a firearms and tool mark examiner employed 
by the Virginia Division of Forensic Science, qualified as an 
expert witness on the subject of firearms.  Willmer testified 
that he examined the handgun found in Schmitt's hotel room and 
the cartridge casings and bullets found in the bank.  He stated 
that based on his examination, the cartridge casings and bullets 
had been fired from this handgun.  Willmer also tested the 
handgun and items of Dunning's clothing to establish the 
 
5
distance of the firearm from Dunning at the time of the 
shooting.  Based on these tests, Willmer concluded that the 
pattern of gunpowder residue found on Dunning's clothing 
indicated that when Dunning was shot, the distance between him 
and the firearm muzzle was between 12 and 36 inches. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of Schmitt's criminal record.  Between 1992 
and 1996, Schmitt was convicted twice of possession of marijuana 
with the intent to distribute, and also had convictions of 
receiving stolen property, possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, and possession of marijuana.  Schmitt was on 
probation for some of these offenses at the time of the capital 
murder and robbery.  He had failed to keep the conditions of his 
probation requiring him to have regular drug tests and to meet 
with his probation officer and, as a result, a capias had been 
issued for his arrest prior to both bank robberies. 
 
In the earlier robbery of the bank on January 19, 1999, 
Schmitt and another man had stolen over $65,000.  Schmitt was 
armed with a sawed-off shotgun in that robbery.  The 
Commonwealth presented evidence that before the first robbery, 
police were called to investigate an argument between Schmitt 
and a girlfriend involving a shotgun, and that Schmitt had 
 
6
"sawed off" the barrel of the gun the night before the first 
bank robbery. 
 
The Commonwealth also presented evidence of a tape 
recording of a telephone conversation between Schmitt and a 
friend in which Schmitt described the present offenses.  In 
addition, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the "drug 
dealer lifestyle" that Schmitt had been leading in the months 
before he committed the present offenses. 
 
The Commonwealth presented testimony from Dunning's family 
and friends concerning the impact of Dunning's murder on them.  
Dunning's mother and brother testified that in January 1999, a 
month before his murder, Dunning had retired from the United 
States Army after over 20 years of service, and that he had 
received many commendations honoring his bravery and leadership 
while in military service.  The Commonwealth also presented 
testimony that Dunning had three children and that he had 
planned to marry in March 1999.  Several bank employees 
testified that during the few weeks that Dunning worked at the 
bank, he had developed close relationships with his fellow 
employees that demonstrated extraordinary thoughtfulness and 
generosity. 
 
Schmitt presented testimony from the crisis negotiator, 
Lieutenant Clarcq, that Schmitt had expressed remorse over the 
killing during the negotiations culminating in his surrender.  
 
7
In addition, Schmitt presented testimony from a medical 
specialist dealing with adolescent addiction who testified 
generally concerning the effects of drug addiction and 
withdrawal.  However, this specialist had never treated or 
evaluated Schmitt.  Schmitt also presented testimony from his 
juvenile probation officer, friends, and family members who 
described Schmitt as courteous and respectful when he was not 
under the influence of drugs. 
IV.  ISSUES WAIVED OR DEFAULTED 
 
Schmitt raises on appeal the following issues that are 
procedurally defaulted from consideration in this Court: 
 
1.  Schmitt did not ask the trial court to strike 
prospective juror James J. Goodin for cause based on Goodin's 
statements concerning the death penalty.  Therefore, Schmitt has 
waived his objection to the seating of this juror.  Rule 5:25.1
 
2.  Schmitt did not object in the trial court to the 
exclusion of prospective jurors Linda Miles and Leo Gibbs based 
on their statements expressing objections to the death penalty.  
Schmitt also did not argue in the trial court that by excluding 
                     
 
1Schmitt asserts that his later motion objecting to the 
seating of the entire panel was sufficient to preserve this 
issue.  That motion, however, merely referenced "all the reasons 
stated in our objections to particular jurors," and Schmitt had 
stated during the voir dire of Goodin that he had no objection 
to Goodin serving as a juror.  Thus, Schmitt's motion was 
insufficient to preserve for appeal any objection to Goodin 
serving on the jury. 
 
8
Miles, Gibbs, and others, the court adopted a "pattern of 
seating pro-death penalty jurors."  Because Schmitt failed to 
make these objections in the trial court, he has waived these 
issues on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
3.  Schmitt did not argue in the trial court that the 
capital murder charge should be struck on the ground that the 
charge encouraged the jury to impose harsher sentences for the 
non-capital offenses.  Since Schmitt failed to raise this 
argument in the trial court, he has waived the issue on appeal.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
4.  Schmitt filed a pre-trial motion to bar admission 
during the penalty phase of the trial of evidence of his 
unadjudicated conduct.  Prior to the trial, the court reserved 
ruling on the motion.  During the penalty phase proceedings, 
Schmitt did not object to the testimony of several witnesses 
concerning Schmitt's unadjudicated conduct.  Because Schmitt 
failed to object contemporaneously to the admission of this 
evidence, Schmitt has waived this objection on appeal.  Rule 
5:25. 
 
5.  Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in allowing 
the jury to consider the issue of "future dangerousness."  In 
the trial court, Schmitt argued that the "future dangerousness" 
aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and violates the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  However, on brief, he refers 
 
9
solely to his motion presented to the trial court with regard to 
this issue.  Schmitt's references to arguments that he made in 
the trial court are insufficient and amount to procedural 
default of this issue.  Burns, 261 Va. at 319, 541 S.E.2d at 
881; Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 336, 513 S.E.2d 634, 
638, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 
256 Va. 471, 478, 506 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1998), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 812 (1999). 
 
6.  At the conclusion of his brief, Schmitt sets forth an 
additional argument "relating to all assignments of error" that 
the alleged errors violated his constitutional rights.  However, 
Schmitt failed to specify in what manner his rights were 
violated with respect to each assignment of error.  
Consequently, this argument is waived, and we will not consider 
it on appeal.  See Burns, 261 Va. at 318, 541 S.E.2d at 880; 
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 57, 60 
(1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999) (citing Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 451, 423 S.E.2d 360, 364 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993)). 
V.  ISSUE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Schmitt raises an argument that we have resolved in a 
previous decision.  Since we find no reason to modify our 
previously expressed view, we reaffirm our earlier holding and 
reject the following argument: 
 
10
 
The trial court erred in admitting "victim impact evidence" 
because it is not relevant to the jury's sentencing decision in 
a capital murder case.  Rejected in Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 
Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 480 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
829 (1995) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991)). 
VI.  JURY SELECTION 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to strike certain prospective jurors for cause based 
on their alleged biases in favor of the death penalty.  Schmitt 
also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to strike one prospective juror who formerly was 
employed as a bank teller.  Finally, Schmitt argues that the 
court abused its discretion in striking for cause one 
prospective juror who stated that her objection to the death 
penalty would prevent her from voting to impose it.  We disagree 
with Schmitt's arguments. 
 
A prospective juror should be excluded for cause based on 
the juror's views about the death penalty if those views would 
substantially impair or prevent the performance of the juror's 
duties in accordance with his oath and the court's instructions.  
Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 173, 477 S.E.2d 270, 277 
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997) (citing Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).  On appellate review, we give 
 
11
deference to the trial court's determination whether to retain 
or exclude a prospective juror because the trial court is able 
to see and hear each member of the venire respond to the 
questions posed.  Thus, the trial court is in a superior 
position to determine whether a prospective juror's responses 
during voir dire indicate that the prospective juror would be 
prevented or impaired in performing the duties of a juror.  
Lovitt, 260 Va. at 510, 537 S.E.2d at 875; Vinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), 
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000).  A trial court's decision 
regarding the selection or exclusion of jurors will be upheld on 
appeal unless it is shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Id. 
 
In conducting our review, we consider a prospective juror's 
entire voir dire, rather than isolated statements made by the 
prospective juror.  Id.  In the present case, when prospective 
juror Darlene W. Temple was asked, "generally speaking," about 
her views on the death penalty, she responded that she was "in 
favor" of the death penalty.  When asked whether there was "any 
particular type of crime in which you think a death penalty 
would be appropriate," Temple responded, "[P]remeditated, 
brutal, planned, and [sic] I'm going to kill you kind of 
murder."  In response to a question whether she could fairly 
weigh the options of death or life imprisonment even in that 
 
12
category of cases in which she considered the death penalty to 
be appropriate, Temple answered in the affirmative. 
 
Similarly, prospective juror William A. Chewning was asked 
to assume that a defendant had been convicted of capital murder, 
that the Commonwealth had proved "vileness" or "future 
dangerousness," or both, and that the jury had "listened to all 
the evidence[] [in] mitigation and aggravation."  When asked 
whether he would "automatically vote for the death penalty" 
under these circumstances, Chewning stated, "I think I would, 
yes."  Chewning was then asked to state his understanding of the 
jury's function after finding a defendant guilty of capital 
murder.  Chewning responded: 
[T]he Commonwealth presents you with evidence[] 
[whether] they were violent crimes or [whether] he 
would be able to in the future commit more violence 
and malice.  And if you did find it, then the death 
penalty should be justified, but if it's not so 
strong, the evidence, then you might give him a life 
sentence. 
 
In addition, Chewning responded in the affirmative when asked 
whether he would be able "to fairly listen to that evidence 
before deciding whether to give [a defendant] the death penalty 
or a life sentence." 
 
Prospective juror Mary T. Richardson stated that she 
previously transferred from a job as a bank teller because she 
was afraid to work in a bank that had been robbed several times.  
When asked whether this experience would affect her ability to 
 
13
be an impartial juror, Richardson responded, "I can't say that 
it will or that it won't," and she later added, "I want to 
listen to all the facts before I ma[k]e any decision.  But 
knowing that, you know, I've had that fear when I worked at a 
bank, I might let that sway [me].  I don't know."  When asked 
whether she could "put aside that bias" and base her decision on 
the evidence in this case and on the law as instructed by the 
trial court, Richardson responded that she could do so "because 
the case would not be about me." 
 
The above responses are illustrative of the entire voir 
dire testimony of these prospective jurors, which contains no 
indication that the trial court abused its discretion in 
accepting their statements that they could fulfill the duties of 
jurors in the trial of the case.  The responses of prospective 
jurors Chewning and Temple indicated that they could consider 
both the death penalty and life imprisonment in sentencing a 
defendant for capital murder.  Prospective juror Richardson 
indicated that she could fairly evaluate the evidence, follow 
the court's instructions, and not be influenced by her 
experience as a bank teller because the present case was not 
"about" her.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to strike these jurors for 
cause. 
 
14
 
In contrast, prospective juror Lyn S. Carroll advised the 
trial court that she had "moral, religious, or conscientious 
objections to voting for the death penalty," and indicated that 
she did not think she "could ever vote [for] or consider the 
death penalty."  Carroll also acknowledged that she could not 
foresee any circumstance under which she "would consider voting 
for the death penalty."  We conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in striking Carroll from the jury panel 
because her responses demonstrated that her personal objections 
to the death penalty would have substantially impaired or 
prevented her from carrying out her duties as a juror.  See 
Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 176; Barnabei, 252 Va. at 
173, 477 S.E.2d at 277; Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 
134-35, 410 S.E.2d 254, 262-63 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
946 (1992). 
 
Schmitt next argues that the trial court erred in limiting 
his questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire regarding 
their views on the death penalty.  In support of his argument, 
Schmitt identifies three portions of the voir dire record in 
which the trial court limited his attempts to have prospective 
jurors respond to hypothetical questions concerning the death 
penalty, and contends that he should have been "allowed latitude 
in probing the juror's true position." 
 
15
 
We find no merit in this argument.  In the identified 
portions of the voir dire examination, Schmitt improperly asked 
the prospective jurors to speculate regarding whether they would 
automatically impose a death sentence for certain types of 
killings or under certain hypothetical circumstances.  These 
questions were posed without any reference to the prospective 
jurors' ability to consider the evidence and the court's 
instructions in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 
 
In addition, the record demonstrates that the trial court 
allowed Schmitt considerable latitude in questioning members of 
the venire concerning their beliefs on the death penalty.  Thus, 
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
restricting Schmitt's questions during voir dire, and that the 
questioning allowed by the trial court assured the removal of 
those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the 
death penalty.  See Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 89, 472 
S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997); 
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 277-78, 427 S.E.2d 411, 
418, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 386, 400-01, 422 S.E.2d 380, 389-90 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993). 
 
Schmitt next argues that the trial court improperly asked 
leading questions of prospective jurors during voir dire to 
"rehabilitate" them and to make them "appear to qualify" for 
 
16
service on the jury, without probing these jurors for their true 
opinion or bias.  Schmitt contends that the trial court 
improperly used these responses to its questions to "offset or 
override" other responses elicited by his counsel. 
 
We do not reach the merits of this argument because Schmitt 
did not object to any particular question posed by the trial 
court to any individual member of the venire.  See Rule 5:25.  
Instead, he raised only a general objection after 14 potential 
jurors had been questioned by the parties and the court, and 
again referred to that general objection at the conclusion of 
all the voir dire testimony in the case.  These general 
objections were based on Schmitt's assertion that the trial 
court acted "inappropriate[ly]" by asking prospective jurors 
whether they could fairly consider both sentencing alternatives, 
thereby "hindering [Schmitt's] opportunity to get valid 
responses." 
 
Such general objections were insufficient to preserve this 
issue for appeal.  While a party may state an objection to any 
question posed by a trial judge during voir dire, including an 
objection that the trial judge improperly has asked a leading 
question, the objection must be stated in a timely manner with 
reference to the precise question at issue.  Therefore, a 
defendant may not assert on appeal that the trial judge has 
asked improper questions during voir dire unless he first has 
 
17
given the judge a timely opportunity to rule on the merits of 
such objections and to take any necessary corrective action.  
See Hodges v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 316, 317-18, 191 S.E.2d 794, 
795 (1972). 
VII.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motions to strike the capital murder charge and that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support his 
conviction on that charge.  Schmitt contends that certain 
physical evidence supports a reasonable hypothesis that the 
shooting occurred during a struggle and was unintentional, 
thereby negating the element of premeditation.  Schmitt relies 
on the evidence of powder residue on Dunning's jacket, the 
location of the bullet hole in the jacket, as well as the 
evidence of blood on Schmitt's left hand and the location of the 
bullet casings "to the left of where the defendant would have 
been."  We disagree with Schmitt's arguments. 
 
The issue of premeditation is a question to be resolved by 
the finder of fact.  Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 749, 
529 S.E.2d 570, 585, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 488 
(2000); Weeks, 248 Va. at 477, 450 S.E.2d at 390; Clozza v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 134, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).  The intent to kill need not 
exist for any specific period of time before the actual killing.  
 
18
Id.  To establish the element of premeditation, the Commonwealth 
need only show that the intent to kill existed for a moment 
before the fatal act was committed.  Id.
 
The evidence showed that Schmitt entered the bank armed 
with a loaded and concealed weapon.  After Dunning came inside 
the bank and stood near the end of the teller line, Schmitt left 
his place in that line and walked directly to the location where 
Dunning was standing.  Without saying anything, Schmitt fired 
two shots, one of which hit Dunning in the chest.  After the 
shooting, Schmitt shouted, "get down," and threatened to "kill 
everybody" if he did not get some money. 
 
We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to establish 
the element of premeditation.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence supported a 
conclusion that Schmitt intended to kill Dunning from the moment 
that Schmitt left his place in the teller line and began to 
approach Dunning.  At this point, he possessed a concealed, 
loaded weapon, which he used to shoot Dunning at close range 
within seconds of departing from his place in the teller line. 
 
Schmitt's contrary argument relies largely on speculation, 
rather than on reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence.  Moreover, the jury was entitled to reject his view of 
the evidence and conclude that he acted with premeditation when 
he fired the shot that killed Dunning.  Therefore, we conclude 
 
19
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
determination of guilt on the capital murder charge. 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
permit the crisis negotiator, Lieutenant Clarcq, to testify 
regarding statements Schmitt made to Clarcq about the robbery 
and shooting.  These statements included Schmitt's admission 
that he robbed the bank and a statement that he did not intend 
to kill Dunning but shot him during a struggle.  Schmitt 
contends that these statements were admissible as a declaration 
against his penal interest.  We disagree. 
 
Schmitt's statements to Clarcq do not qualify as 
declarations against his penal interest.  This exception to the 
hearsay rule allows out-of-court statements that tend to 
incriminate a declarant to be received in evidence upon a 
showing that the declaration is reliable and that the declarant 
is presently unavailable.  Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 
408, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1978).  Underlying this exception is 
the presumption that individuals have a strong interest in 
protecting themselves and thus do not often make statements that 
expose themselves to criminal liability unless those statements 
are true.  See Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 461, 61 
S.E.2d 318, 326 (1950); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 743-
44, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923).  When the declarant has made an 
incriminating statement that is contrary to his self-interest, 
 
20
this "element of self-interest" functions as "a reasonably safe 
substitute for the oath and cross-examination as a guarantee of 
truth."  Newberry, 191 Va. at 461, 61 S.E.2d at 326 (citing 
Hines, 136 Va. at 744, 117 S.E. at 847). 
 
Here, however, the chief portion of the statement that 
Schmitt sought to have admitted was a self-serving denial of his 
criminal intent on the capital murder charge.2  Schmitt's 
statement that he shot Dunning during a struggle is not contrary 
to Schmitt's self-interest but instead promotes the goal of 
protecting himself from criminal liability for capital murder.  
For this reason, as a threshold matter, the statement is not a 
declaration against penal interest.3  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the trial court did not err in refusing Schmitt's request 
to admit evidence of these statements made to Lieutenant Clarcq. 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in refusing his 
tendered jury instruction concerning the Commonwealth's alleged 
failure to produce as witnesses two bank customers who were 
shown in a bank camera photograph standing behind Schmitt in the 
                     
 
2Schmitt cannot plausibly argue that he was prejudiced by 
the trial court's refusal to admit that portion of his statement 
to Clarcq that admitted his culpability in the robberies. 
Moreover, this portion of his statement to Clarcq was cumulative 
evidence of his guilt on the robbery charges.  See Harrison v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 585, 423 S.E.2d 160, 165 (1992). 
 
3Based on our disposition of this assignment of error, we 
need not address whether Schmitt's declaration was reliable or 
whether his decision not to testify made him "unavailable" for 
purposes of the hearsay exception on which he relies.  
 
21
teller line.  The refused instruction stated that the 
Commonwealth's "unexplained" failure to produce these witnesses 
raised a presumption that their testimony would be unfavorable 
to the Commonwealth. 
 
We find no merit in this argument.  The granting of such an 
instruction in a criminal case is improper.  Russell v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 833, 836-37, 223 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1976).  
The rationale underlying this rule is plain.  The Commonwealth's 
burden of proof does not include the duty to produce all 
witnesses possibly having some knowledge of a case, and a 
criminal defendant need not prove anything or call any witnesses 
in his defense.  Id.; see Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 
330, 337 S.E.2d 715, 721 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 
(1986); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 66, 69, 147 S.E.2d 
730, 732 (1966).  Thus, the trial court properly refused the 
instruction at issue. 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury that "[i]t is permissible to infer that every person 
intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her 
acts."  Schmitt contends that this instruction effectively 
created an improper presumption that "negated or diminished the 
effect of the presumption of innocence."  We disagree with 
Schmitt's argument. 
 
22
 
This instruction did not establish an improper presumption 
but merely stated a permissive inference.  Kelly v. 
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 359, 374, 382 S.E.2d 270, 278 (1989).  
Unlike conclusive or burden shifting presumptions regarding a 
defendant's criminal intent, which are constitutionally invalid, 
the present instruction did not require the jurors to draw any 
inference or alter the Commonwealth's burden of proving 
Schmitt's criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; see 
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983); Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979). 
VIII.  SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES 
 
Schmitt argues that the admission into evidence of the tape 
recording of the telephone conversation between him and his 
friend, Clifford Sauer, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights because Sauer acted as a "police agent" during the 
conversation.  In response, the Commonwealth asserts that 
Schmitt's failure to comply with the notice requirements of Code 
§ 19.2-266.2 in the trial court bars consideration of this issue 
on appeal.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
Code § 19.2-266.2 requires that, in the absence of good 
cause shown and in the interests of justice, all motions seeking 
suppression of evidence based on an alleged violation of the 
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments be made in writing, not later 
than seven days before trial.  Schmitt does not dispute that he 
 
23
failed to comply with these statutory requirements, and he does 
not argue on appeal that he satisfied the good cause exception 
provided in the statute.  Since Schmitt has failed to meet these 
statutory requirements, he has waived on appeal his argument 
regarding the admissibility of the tape recording.  See Upchurch 
v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 48, 51, 521 S.E.2d 290, 291-92 
(1999). 
 
Schmitt argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
admit evidence concerning prison life and the security features 
of a "maximum security" prison in the Commonwealth to rebut the 
Commonwealth's contention of Schmitt's future dangerousness.  He 
asserts that in a capital murder sentencing, such evidence is 
relevant to the issue whether a defendant will pose a future 
threat to society. 
 
We conclude that Schmitt's argument has no merit, given the 
sentencing phase evidence presented by the Commonwealth.  In 
that portion of the trial, the Commonwealth did not present 
evidence concerning prison security or the nature of prison 
confinement imposed on a defendant who has been convicted of a 
capital murder offense.  Therefore, Schmitt's proffered evidence 
was not admissible to rebut any particular evidence concerning 
prison security or prison conditions offered by the 
Commonwealth. 
 
24
 
In addition, Schmitt's proffered evidence was inadmissible 
to rebut the Commonwealth's contention that he would commit 
future acts of violence.  As we explained in Burns: 
[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether [the defendant] 
could commit criminal acts of violence in the future 
but whether he would. . . . In other words, a 
determination of future dangerousness revolves around 
an individual defendant and a specific crime.  
Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life 
in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that 
inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of 
future dangerousness such as that presented in this 
case. 
 
261 Va. at 339-40, 541 S.E.2d at 893. 
 
Schmitt also argues that the trial court erred in refusing 
three supplemental jury instructions, each of which advised the 
jury that a life sentence would be imposed if the jury could not 
unanimously agree on a penalty.  Schmitt asserts that these 
instructions were tendered after "the jury's deliberations 
became extended," and contends that the instructions were 
correct statements of the law and should have been given at that 
stage of the jury's deliberations.  We disagree with Schmitt's 
arguments. 
 
The trial court properly refused the proffered 
instructions.  As we have explained in earlier decisions, such 
instructions concern a procedural matter that is not an 
appropriate subject for a jury instruction.  Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 318, 384 S.E.2d 785, 799 (1989), 
 
25
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (quoting Justus v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S.E.2d 87, 92 (1980), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982)); see also Pruett v. Commonwealth, 
232 Va. 266, 279 n.6, 351 S.E.2d 1, 9 n.6 (1986), cert. denied, 
482 U.S. 931 (1987).  Instructions of this nature also 
constitute an open invitation for the jury to avoid its 
responsibility and to disagree on the sentence that a capital 
murder defendant should receive.  Id.; see also Eaton v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 257, 397 S.E.2d 385, 398 (1990), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). 
 
Schmitt next argues that the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant a mistrial or to give curative instructions to the jury 
based on allegedly inflammatory comments made by the prosecutor 
in his closing argument.  The prosecutor's comments at issue 
concerned: (1) Schmitt's use of a stolen gun when the 
Commonwealth earlier had stipulated that the gun was not stolen; 
(2) Schmitt's prior "shotgun assault" on his girlfriend; and (3) 
the "wonderful life" in prison Schmitt would have were he 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Schmitt asserts that the trial 
court's failure to take corrective action in this regard denied 
him a fair trial and violated his due process rights.  We 
disagree with Schmitt's arguments. 
 
The record shows that after Schmitt objected to the 
Commonwealth's improper reference to his use of a stolen gun, 
 
26
the Commonwealth acknowledged its mistake and the trial court 
granted a curative instruction.  The court told the jury that 
the parties had stipulated that "[t]he weapon was not stolen, 
but [that Schmitt] was a convicted felon when he came into 
possession of it."  When the prosecutor then stated to the jury 
that "your recollection of the evidence is what counts in this 
case," Schmitt again objected, contending that this argument 
effectively suggested that the jury could ignore the trial 
court's curative instruction.  In response to this objection, 
the trial court stated again that there was no evidence that the 
gun had been stolen. 
 
We will presume that a jury has followed the trial court's 
prompt and explicit curative instructions, unless the record 
clearly shows that the jury disregarded the instructions.  
Beavers, 245 Va. at 280, 427 S.E.2d at 420; Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 908 (1990).  Here, the trial court promptly gave 
explicit curative instructions after Schmitt timely objected to 
the prosecutor's remarks, and the record does not show that the 
jury disregarded the curative instructions.  It is well 
established that a judgment will not be reversed for a statement 
of counsel that the court promptly directs the jury to disregard 
unless there is a manifest probability that the improper 
comments were prejudicial to the defendant.  Kitze v. 
 
27
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 283, 288, 435 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1993) 
(citing Saunders v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 294, 303, 237 S.E.2d 
150, 156 (1977)).  We hold that the record fails to show a 
manifest probability of prejudice, and we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in its response to the 
objections raised and in denying Schmitt's motion for a mistrial 
related to those objections. 
 
We do not reach the merits of Schmitt's arguments 
concerning the trial court's failure to give a curative 
instruction or to grant a mistrial regarding the prosecutor's 
comment on Schmitt's prior "shotgun assault" on his girlfriend, 
and on the "wonderful life" that he would experience in prison.  
Schmitt did not make a request for a curative instruction or a 
mistrial at the time either of these remarks were made, but 
waited until after the jury had retired to place the issues 
before the trial court in the form of a motion for a mistrial.  
Unless a defendant has made a timely motion for a cautionary 
instruction or for a mistrial, we will not consider his 
assignments of error alleging that improper remarks were made by 
the prosecutor.  Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 394-95, 
464 S.E.2d 131, 140-41 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 
(1996); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 82, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
679, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 26, 38, 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990).  A motion for a 
 
28
mistrial is untimely and is properly refused when it is made 
after the jury has retired from the courtroom.  Breard, 248 Va. 
at 82, 445 S.E.2d at 679; Cheng, 240 Va. at 39, 393 S.E.2d at 
606. 
 
Schmitt also asserts that the trial court erred in 
"allowing" the prosecutor to argue, in support of a death 
sentence, that the jury should not "trust the system that can be 
so easily manipulated by the defendant."  However, we do not 
reach the merits of this argument because Schmitt failed to 
object to the argument at the time it was made.  Rule 5:25.  
Also, since Schmitt did not request a mistrial based on this 
remark, we do not consider his argument that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant a mistrial on this ground.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Schmitt next argues that the trial court erred in allowing 
the Commonwealth to present evidence regarding the "vileness" 
statutory aggravator, and in allowing the jury to consider this 
factor.  Schmitt contends that the evidence of "vileness" was 
insufficient as a matter of law, and that although the jury did 
not render its sentence of death based on the "vileness" 
predicate, the arguments concerning "vileness" were prejudicial 
to the jury's consideration of his "future dangerousness."  We 
disagree with Schmitt's arguments. 
 
A finding of "future dangerousness" rests upon different 
considerations than a finding of "vileness."  We will presume 
 
29
that a jury has followed the trial court's instructions setting 
forth the separate considerations for determining each 
aggravating factor unless the record clearly shows that the jury 
disregarded these instructions.  See Beavers, 245 Va. at 280, 
427 S.E.2d at 420; Spencer, 240 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 619. 
Here, the jury rejected a finding of "vileness" and based 
Schmitt's sentence of death solely on the "future dangerousness" 
predicate.  Schmitt has pointed to nothing in the record 
suggesting that the jury failed to follow the trial court's 
instructions, and the jury's rejection of the "vileness" 
predicate indicates that it considered this aggravating factor 
separately as the law requires. 
 
We next consider Schmitt's argument that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the jury's finding of "future 
dangerousness."  Schmitt contends that neither his prior 
criminal record nor that record combined with evidence of his 
unadjudicated conduct was sufficient to support such a finding.  
He asserts that this fact "is particularly true" given that his 
"society" for the rest of his life would be a "close custody" 
prison.  We disagree with Schmitt's arguments. 
 
Under Code § 19.2-264.2, the death penalty may not be 
imposed unless the trier of fact finds one or both of the two 
aggravating factors that we have referred to as "vileness" and 
"future dangerousness."  Lovitt, 260 Va. at 516, 537 S.E.2d at 
 
30
878; Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 347, 468 S.E.2d 98, 
111-12, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996).  In the present case, 
the jury found "future dangerousness," meaning "there is a 
probability that [Schmitt] would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society."  Code § 19.2-264.2. 
 
We have held that the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
capital murder may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a 
finding of "future dangerousness."  See Lovitt, 260 Va. at 516, 
537 S.E.2d at 878; Roach, 251 Va. at 348, 468 S.E.2d. at 112; 
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).  Here, Schmitt murdered 
Dunning, an innocent security guard, to facilitate a robbery and 
to avoid being apprehended at the robbery scene.  The jury was 
entitled to find that this violent, premeditated action was 
strong evidence that Schmitt is a dangerous person who would 
commit future criminal acts of violence. 
 
The jury also was entitled to consider Schmitt's criminal 
record.  As we have stated, this record includes two convictions 
of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and receiving 
stolen property.  After being released from confinement in 1997, 
Schmitt was placed on probation.  Based on his failure to comply 
with drug testing requirements and to report to his probation 
 
31
officer, Schmitt was charged with violating his probation and 
failed to appear in court to answer those charges.  Further, 
during the time leading up to the present offenses, Schmitt had 
been "working" as a drug dealer. 
 
Significantly, the jury also was allowed to consider the 
fact that Schmitt had committed another armed robbery less than 
one month prior to the present offense.  This evidence, in 
addition to evidence of the present crimes, demonstrated that 
Schmitt did not refrain from violent criminal behavior, even 
after having experienced incarceration and having received the 
benefit of probation supervision. 
 
We find no merit in Schmitt's argument that the evidence of 
his "future dangerousness" was insufficient because his 
"society," after receiving a sentence of life imprisonment for 
capital murder, would have been a "close custody" prison.  Code 
§ 19.2-264 does not limit the jury's consideration to a type of 
"prison society," and we will not rewrite the statute to 
restrict its scope in that manner.  Lovitt, 260 Va. at 517, 537 
S.E.2d at 879.  Therefore, we conclude that the evidence of the 
present offenses and of Schmitt's prior criminal behavior is 
sufficient to support the jury's finding of "future 
dangerousness." 
 
We next consider Schmitt's argument that the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on certain "facts" in 
 
32
alleged mitigation of the present offenses.  Those "facts" 
included a statement that the capital murder was committed while 
Schmitt was under the influence of controlled substances, that 
Schmitt had shown remorse for his actions, and that a term of 
life imprisonment would be served without parole. 
 
We conclude that the trial court properly refused Schmitt's 
proposed instruction.  Since the trial court separately 
instructed the jury that imprisonment for life in this case 
excluded the possibility of parole, the portion of the disputed 
instruction that also contained this information was 
repetitious.  See Burns, 261 Va. at 343, 541 S.E.2d at 895; Gray 
v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 351, 356 S.E.2d 157, 178, cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).  The remainder of the disputed 
instruction was properly refused because a defendant who has 
been convicted of capital murder is not entitled to a jury 
instruction that emphasizes any particular mitigating factors.  
Burns, 261 Va. at 343, 541 S.E.2d at 895; George v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 283, 411 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992). 
X.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
Passion and Prejudice
 
Under Code § 17.1-313(C), we review the death sentence 
imposed on Schmitt to determine whether it (1) was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
 
33
factor; or (2) is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.  Schmitt argues that the sentence was based on 
passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness because the Commonwealth 
improperly was permitted to argue that Schmitt's crime satisfied 
the "vileness" aggravating factor in the absence of a sound 
legal basis for making that argument.  Schmitt also asserts that 
no evidence was presented of any prior violent conduct on his 
part that resulted in harm to any person, or of him having 
caused "the slightest difficulty" during his previous 
incarcerations. 
 
In addition, Schmitt contends that the jurors' passions 
were improperly inflamed by evidence of his tape-recorded 
conversation with Clifford Sauer and by the testimony of 
Dunning's family.  Schmitt also argues that the prosecutor 
engaged in an intentional effort during closing argument to 
raise the jurors' passions by making improper comments to 
encourage them to vote for the death penalty.  We find no merit 
in Schmitt's arguments. 
 
First, the jury's rejection of the "vileness" aggravator 
demonstrates that the death sentence was not affected by the 
prosecutor's argument regarding "vileness."  In addition, the 
jury fixed sentences of 35 years each on the two charges of 
robbery when it could have sentenced Schmitt to life 
 
34
imprisonment for each charge.  These sentencing decisions show 
that the argument and evidence concerning the "vileness" 
aggravator did not inflame the passions of the jury. 
 
Second, since the "victim impact" testimony and Schmitt's 
own tape-recorded conversation were properly received as 
evidence in the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was 
entitled to consider this evidence in making its sentencing 
determination.  Likewise, Schmitt's criminal record and his 
conduct during prior periods of incarceration were also evidence 
properly presented to the jury, which was permitted to accord 
that evidence whatever weight it deemed proper. 
 
We also conclude that the record fails to demonstrate that 
the prosecutor's comments during closing argument resulted in a 
death sentence that was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.  Moreover, based on 
our independent review of the record, we find no evidence that 
any such impermissible factor was present or influenced the 
jury's sentence. 
Excessiveness and Proportionality
 
Schmitt argues that his sentence is excessive and 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  He 
asserts that only one capital murder defendant in Virginia, the 
defendant in Roach, received the death penalty for a murder that 
resulted from a single gunshot wound in the absence of torture 
 
35
or other aggravating factor.  Schmitt thus contends that juries 
have not generally imposed the death penalty for crimes similar 
to Schmitt's, but instead generally impose life imprisonment for 
such offenses. 
 
In conducting our proportionality review, we do not isolate 
our consideration to any particular prior case, but must 
determine whether "other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction 
generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar 
crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant."  Lovitt, 
260 Va. at 518, 537 S.E.2d at 880; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 654, 683, 529 S.E.2d 769, 786, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
121 S.Ct. 432 (2000) (quoting Jenkins, 244 Va. at 461, 423 
S.E.2d at 371).  Thus, we reject Schmitt's invitation to focus 
solely on the method in which the murder was accomplished in 
this case, because to do so would ignore our statutory mandate 
to conduct our review with full consideration of both the crime 
and the defendant.  See Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). 
 
We have compared the record in the present case with the 
records of other capital murder cases, including those in which 
a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.  We also have 
examined the records of all capital cases reviewed by this Court 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E).  Since the jury imposed the 
death sentence based on the "future dangerousness" predicate, we 
 
36
give particular consideration to other capital murder cases in 
which the death penalty was obtained under that predicate. 
 
We observe that juries in this Commonwealth, with some 
exceptions, generally have imposed the death sentence for 
convictions of capital murder based on a finding of "future 
dangerousness" in which the underlying qualifying crime was 
robbery.  See, e.g., Lovitt, 260 Va. 497, 537 S.E.2d 866; Orbe 
v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 519 S.E.2d 808 (1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000); Roach, 251 Va. 324, 468 S.E.2d 98; 
Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 
452 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995); Swann, 247 
Va. 222, 441 S.E.2d 195; Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
311, 448 S.E.2d 638 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995); 
Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636 (1993), 
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 (1994); Yeatts, 242 Va. 121, 410 
S.E.2d 254; Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990); Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 
Va. 240, 372 S.E.2d 759 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 
(1989); Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988).  Based on this 
review, we hold that Schmitt's death sentence is neither 
excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed by other 
 
37
sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 
court.  Having reviewed Schmitt's death sentence pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-313, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 
Record No. 003010 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 010007 — Affirmed. 
 
38