Title: V. L. Y. v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  February 10, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
V.L.Y.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A108068; SC S51000)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2004.
Kendra M. Matthews, of Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings. 
*On judicial review of Order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 188 Or App 617, 72 P3d 993 (2003). 
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This is a case of judicial review of an order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the board) that
designated petitioner as a "predatory sex offender" for purposes
of Oregon's sex offender community notification law, set out at
ORS 181.585 to 181.590.  Petitioner challenges the designation on
statutory and constitutional grounds.  We agree with petitioner
that the designation arose out of a statutorily impermissible
decisional process and, accordingly, reverse the board's order.  
In 1993, the legislature enacted a law requiring
agencies who supervise sex offenders to notify "appropriate"
persons when a parolee or probationer who has been designated as
a predatory sex offender is released into the community.  Or Laws
1993, ch 807, §§ 1 - 5.  The law, which has been amended on
several occasions since 1993, now appears at ORS 181.585 to
181.590.  The law authorizes the board to determine which of the
persons whom it releases on parole or post-prison supervision
should be designated as predatory sex offenders.  ORS
181.586(1)(a).  It then requires the agencies that supervise
persons so designated to notify "anyone whom the agency
determines is appropriate" about the designation.  Id.  
When the board first took on the task of identifying
predatory sex offenders, it adopted a decisional process that
relied, in part, on a "sex offender risk assessment scale" and
that did not allow for input from the potential designees. 
However, in Noble v. Board of Parole, 327 Or 485, 964 P2d 990
(1998), this court held that the board violated a parolee's due
process rights by designating him as a predatory sex offender
under that procedure.  We further held that due process required
the board to give a potential designee notice and an evidentiary
hearing before the designation takes place.  Id. at 498.
Shortly thereafter, and apparently in response to this
court's decision in Noble, the board adopted a new designation
scheme.  The new procedure, set out at OAR 255-060-0011
(2000), (1)
 began with the same sex offender risk assessment
scale that the board had been using.  The scale consisted of a
one-page checklist of items, some of which focused on past
criminal conduct (e.g., "multiple victims on current sex offense
conviction") and some of which described present characteristics
and behaviors (e.g., "takes full responsibility for offending
behavior" and "not in treatment").  The scale assigned each item
either a negative or a positive numeric value, depending on
whether the item was thought to increase or decrease the
probability that a convicted sex offender will reoffend.  The
scale designated a small number of the negative items as
"starred" factors and three other negative items as "override"
factors.  All the starred and override factors pertained to the
offender's criminal history. (2)
 
Applying the risk assessment scale to an individual was
a simple process of having a designated government employee check
the items on the scale that pertained to that individual.  The
results then were forwarded to the board, which used them to make
its predatory sex offender determination.  Under the rule, the
board was required to make a finding that the individual was a
predatory sex offender if the individual scored on three or more
starred factors or on any of the override factors.  The board
could make a predatory sex offender finding if the individual
scored at least negative 50 in total on the scale but had no
override factors and less than three starred factors.  OAR 255-060-0011(3) (2000).   
Under the board's rule, the amount of process that a
potential predatory sex offender designee received depended on
the category in which the risk assessment score placed the
potential designee.  The rule entitled individuals in the last-described category to a full evidentiary hearing prior to any
predatory sex offender finding.  OAR 255-060-0011(6)(a).  On the
other hand, individuals who scored on at least one override
factor or at least three starred factors were not entitled to a
hearing.  They were, however, entitled to receive notice of their
risk assessment score and an opportunity to submit written
objections.  If, after considering the individual's objections,
the board found that there was evidence to support at least three
starred factors or one override factor, it had to designate the
individual as a predatory sex offender.  OAR 255-060-0011(6)(b)
(2000). 
In the present case, the board initially designated
petitioner as a predatory sex offender under the board's old
designation procedures.  However, after the Noble decision
issued, the board chose to reevaluate petitioner using the
procedure described above.     
Upon applying that procedure, the board initially
concluded that it should designate petitioner as a predatory sex
offender because he had scored on an "override" factor -–
conviction for forcible rape.  The board retreated from that
rationale when petitioner demonstrated, in his written
objections, that the conviction was for statutory (not forcible)
rape.  However, petitioner also had scored on three "starred"
items –- for having a history of sex offense convictions other
than the current conviction, for using weapons or threats in the
crime that led to his current conviction, and for having a prior
nonsexual criminal history.  Although petitioner objected in
writing to the findings with respect to those items, the board
rejected those objections, along with other general objections to
the designation scheme.  The board then issued an order
designating petitioner as a predatory sex offender.    
Petitioner sought judicial review, arguing, inter alia, 
that the board had erred in refusing to consider evidence that
petitioner wished to offer showing that he now presents a low
risk of reoffending. (3)
  The board argued, in response, that
it lawfully could, and did, base its designation decision
entirely on objective facts drawn from petitioner's criminal
history.
A majority of the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
agreed with the board's theory and affirmed. (4)
  V.L.Y. v.
Board of Parole, 188 Or App 617, 72 P3d 993 (2003).  Although the
majority acknowledged that, under the relevant statute, a
predatory sex offender presently must "exhibit[ ] characteristics
showing a tendency to victimize or injure others," ORS
181.585(1)(a), it concluded that reliance on an individual's past
crimes is permissible, because such crimes are relevant to the
issue of whether a tendency to victimize others presently exists. 
Id. at 625.  The majority also opined that, because the statute
delegates to the Department of Corrections (the department) the
task of devising a scale that identifies the relevant
characteristics, it leaves that body free to devise a scale that
relies entirely on criminal history.  Id.  
Two dissenting opinions took the opposite view –- that
the inquiry into whether a person is a predatory sex offender for
purposes of the community notification statute necessarily is
concerned with an offender's present condition and is subjective,
and that the board therefore had no authority to limit itself to
an examination of the "objective" facts of an offender's criminal
history.  Id. at 639-46 (Edmonds, J., dissenting), 646-49
(Armstrong, J., dissenting). 
Although there are other issues in this case, the
foregoing one -- whether the board may look exclusively at past
convictions reported in petitioner's sex offender risk assessment
scale to determine whether an individual is a predatory sex
offender, even when a potential designee wishes to offer evidence
of his or her own on the subject -- is fundamental, and we
consider it first.  That issue, as all the members of the Court
of Appeals, both majority and dissent, recognized, is first of
all a matter of statutory construction, to be resolved using the
analytical paradigm set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under that
paradigm, we first consider the relevant statutory text and
context.  
ORS 181.585 provides:
"(1) For purposes of ORS 181.585 to 181.587, a
person is a predatory sex offender if the person
exhibits characteristics showing a tendency to
victimize or injure others and has been convicted of a
sex crime listed in ORS 181.594(2)(a) to (d), has been
convicted of attempting to commit one of those crimes
or has been found guilty except for insanity of one of
those crimes.
"(2) In determining whether a person is a
predatory sex offender, an agency shall use a sex
offender risk assessment scale approved by the
Department of Corrections or a community corrections
agency."
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 181.585(1) contains two clauses, each of
which has a distinct focus.  The second clause establishes an
objective criterion, viz., conviction (or its functional
equivalent) of one or more specified sexually related offenses. 
That criterion must exist in order to invoke first clause:  The
first clause states that a person "is" a predatory sex offender
if that person is one who has been so convicted and who
"exhibits" the requisite characteristics.  Thus, the first clause
defines the concept of a predatory sex offender in terms of a
present condition.  It follows, from that text alone, that the
board's designation of anyone as a predatory sex offender, in
order to be statutorily valid, must speak to that person's
present condition.  
It is significant, also, that ORS 181.585(1) speaks of
a person who "exhibits characteristics showing a tendency to
victimize or injure." (Emphasis added.)  A "characteristic" is
defined as "a trait, quality, or property or a group of them
distinguishing an individual, group, or type: that which
characterizes or is characteristic."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 376 (unabridged ed 2002).  A "trait" is "a
distinguishing quality (as of personal character)."  Id. at 2424. 
A "quality" is "a special or distinguishing attribute" and a
"property" is "a quality or trait belonging to a person or thing,
esp.: a quality peculiar to an individual person or thing."  Id.
at 1858, 1818.
A past act, such as a past crime, does not appear to
fit into any of the foregoing (admittedly, somewhat circular)
definitions.  A past act cannot describe a person or thing in the
way that present qualities, attributes, and traits do.  Although
a past crime may be a basis for inferring that one or more
traits, qualities, or "characteristics" presently exists, it does
not in itself qualify as a characteristic.
The state attempts to erase that distinction by
suggesting that past convictions can be a kind of characteristic. 
Along those lines, the state suggests that an individual may have
a "characteristic" of having used threats against a sexual
assault victim or the "characteristic" of having a prior sex
offense conviction.  But that suggestion is deaf to the ordinary
usage of the word "characteristic."  We may speak of an instance
of past conduct as being "in character" or "out of character"
(that is, consistent or inconsistent with a person's
characteristics), and a certain behavior may become a
"characteristic" of an individual if repeated often enough.  But
we ordinarily do not use the word "characteristic" to describe a
single incident in a person's life. 
Thus, ORS 181.585(1) appears to contemplate a board
determination that focuses on whether a potential designee
presently exhibits certain personal and social traits -- like
impulsiveness, alcoholism, social alienation, or a violent
disposition –- that are or may be associated with "a tendency to
victimize or injure others."  Obviously, the offender's past
conduct, including his or her past crimes, logically may be
relevant to that determination.  Indeed, the idea that a person
has a certain characteristic often arises out of a recognition
that the person's past behavior has been consistent over time in
some respect.  
The question here, however, is whether the statute
permits the board to determine that an offender exhibits the
required characteristics based solely on the fact of the 
offender's past convictions and without regard to other seemingly
relevant evidence.  The text of ORS 181.585(1) does not support
such a conclusion.  Neither does anything in that subsection
excuse the board from considering all the evidence that logically
is relevant to the issue that the board must decide, i.e.,
whether the offender presently exhibits the required
characteristics. (5)

The board argues that we must read the "exhibits
characteristics" requirement of ORS 181.585(1) in the context of
ORS 181.585(2), which directs the board to "use" a risk
assessment scale "approved by the Department of Corrections" in
determining whether a person is a predatory sex offender.  The
board contends that, by enacting ORS 181.585(2), the legislature
delegated to the department the task of "flesh[ing] out the
concept of 'exhibit[ing] characteristics showing a tendency to
victimize or injure others.'"  The board further contends that,
because its designation decision flowed directly from that broad
delegation, our review must be limited to determining whether the
designation comports with the general policy of the statute.  The
board concludes that there can be "little doubt" that designating
an individual as a predatory sex offender based on objective
aspects of their prior crimes comports with the more general
policy of ORS 181.585 to 181.590.
For convenience in evaluating that contextual argument,
we repeat the wording of ORS 181.585(2) here:
"In determining whether a person is a predatory
sex offender, an agency[, i.e., an agency charged by
the statute with the authority to make such a
designation,] shall use a sex offender risk assessment
scale approved by the Department of Corrections or a
community corrections agency."
It is important to recognize at the outset that, by its terms,
that subsection adds nothing to the definition of predatory sex
offender provided in subsection (1).  Certainly, there is no hint
in the statutory wording that the scale, the creation of which
the statute authorizes, is supposed to be a substitute for the
characteristics assessment process that the first subsection
directs the board to carry out.  Instead, the second subsection
merely directs the designating agency to "use" a particular
device, the sex offender risk assessment scale, in making the
determination contemplated by subsection (1).  The scale is not a
product of the board –- it is to be created or, at least,
"approved," either by the department or a "community corrections
agency."  Neither does the statute contain any substantive
criteria concerning what the department may and may not place in
and measure by the scale.  Subsection (2) simply directs the
board to "use" the scale, and that is all.
Neither is there anything about the definition in
subsection (1) that, when read together with subsection (2),
suggests a delegation of the sort that the board proposes.  We
note, in particular, that the phrase "exhibits characteristics
showing a tendency to victimize or injure others" is not like the
terms that we have identified as delegative in the past.  See,
e.g., Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217,
228, 621 P2d 547 (1980) ("good cause," "fair," "unfair," "undue,"
"unreasonable," all delegative terms ).  Instead, it appears to
be a completed policy choice that the board is obliged to carry
out.  Clearly, the authorization to the board to "use" a risk
assessment scale approved by the department does not transmogrify
that policy choice.  It simply requires the use of a tool to
assist the board in carrying out its task.
The Court of Appeals majority also found a delegation
(albeit a narrower one) in ORS 181.585(2), viz., a delegation to
the department to "develop a scale that identifies those
characteristics or combination of characteristics that 'show a
tendency to victimize or injure others.'"  V.L.Y., 188 Or App at
625.  Although seemingly closer to the mark (the majority opinion
appropriately describes the authority of the department in terms
of a risk assessment scale), that proposition does not authorize
the department to devise a scale that narrows or alters the
board's inquiry or require the board to limit its inquiry to a
scale that does not, in fact, relate to what the board is
supposed to measure.  Neither does ORS 181.585(2) contain any
suggestion that the department or the board may exclude evidence
that inherently is relevant to the intended inquiry.  The
statute's meaning, in that regard, is so clear from text and
context that there is no need to proceed to legislative history. 
When we consider the whole of ORS 181.585 in this plain
and objective way, it becomes apparent that the statute does not
authorize the board to permit a scale created or "approved" by
some other agency to serve as a substitute for the board's own
task.  The assessment of a potential predatory sex offender
designee's present tendency to victimize or injure others remains
work that the board must do, making such use of the assessment
scale as inheres in that scale's relevance to the inquiry.  The
legislative directive to "use" the scale can stand for no more
than that, unless this court ignores the substance of the task
that the first subsection of ORS 181.585 specifically and
unequivocally gives to the board. (6)

We turn, then, to the task of applying our conclusions
about the intended effect of ORS 181.585 to the majority's
delegation analysis.  The Court of Appeals' majority suggested
that the delegation inherent in ORS 181.585(2) is "broad enough"
to permit the department to develop a scale that relies solely on
previous convictions.  V.L.Y., 188 Or App at 626.  That
proposition is true, the majority contended, because it is clear
that an offender's previous convictions "bear on" or are
"logically relevant" to the question of whether he or she
exhibits the characteristics described in ORS 181.585(1).  Id.  
That line of reasoning obscures the issue. 
Petitioner's complaint is not that the risk assessment scale
treats certain aspects of past crimes as relevant to the
predatory sex offender designation, but that it treats those
facts (or combinations of facts) as conclusive in that regard
and, thus, excludes other evidence that is relevant to the issue. 
The question for this court, then, is whether the board
reasonably can use a scale that relies solely on objective and
easily ascertainable aspects of the offender's crime or crimes
and excludes other evidence of the offender's current behavior
and characteristics as the sole basis for determining that the
offender presently "exhibits characteristics showing a tendency
to victimize or injure others."  The answer to that question, in
our view, is "no." 
The Court of Appeals majority asserted that the board
"reasonably could conclude that an offender with a history of
multiple convictions for sexual assault 'exhibits characteristics
showing a tendency to victimize others.'"  V.L.Y., 181 Or App at
625 (emphasis supplied).  That statement is unobjectionable, as
far as it goes.  But, as the Court of Appeals majority used it,
the statement incorporates an unspoken assumption -- that the
prospective designee has had an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence of his or her current characteristics and
has failed to offer anything that outweighs an inference that
might arise out of his criminal history.  In our view, however,
where the prospective designee has had no such opportunity (as is
the case under the risk assessment scale at issue here), the
Court of Appeals majority's statement loses its analytical force. 
Unless the prospective designee is given such an opportunity
procedurally, the board's order will not be legally supportable.
We hold that, under the present statutory scheme, the
board erred in using a procedure that permitted it to rely
exclusively on the sex offender risk assessment scale in making
its predatory sex offender designation.  The board's order
therefore must be reversed. (7)

We add the following note of clarification, because the
import of this court's previous opinion in Noble does not appear
to have been fully understood by the board:  Under the present
statutory formulation of the predatory sexual offender
designation, any party facing such a designation, whatever the
reasons for that designation, must be accorded the basics of due
process.  Those basics, at a minimum, include notice and the
opportunity to be heard as to all factual questions at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  Noble, 327 Or at
498.  Because of the nature of the statutory inquiry assigned to
it (to determine whether a potential designee "exhibits
characteristics showing a tendency to victimize or injure
others"), the board is not at liberty to substitute a purely
documentary exercise for the hearing that any person faced with
such a designation is entitled to receive.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the board for further
proceedings.
1. In 2004, the board adopted yet another procedure for
identifying predatory sex offenders.  OAR 255-060-0011 (2004). 
The new rule refers to a different sex offender risk assessment
scale, the STATIC - 99, and requires the board to make a
predatory sex offender finding for inmates and offenders who
score four or more points on the scale.  The change in the rule 
has no effect on our analysis here.
2. Starred factors included: offender has history of
sexual crimes other than present offense; offender has history of
sex offense convictions other than present offense; offender was
stranger to the victim of his current offense; offender's current
offense had multiple victims; offender used weapons or threats in
current offense; and offender had prior nonsexual criminal
history.  Override items were: conviction for forcible rape;
offender uses weapon to harm victim in current conviction; and
male offender has criminal history of molesting boys.
3. Petitioner also argued that (1) due process entitled him to an evidentiary hearing
before the board issued a determination designating him as a predatory sex offender; (2) the
board must prove a determination that a person is a predatory sex offender for purposes of ORS
181.585 by clear and convincing evidence; (3) in making such a determination, the board must
employ a scale that is scientifically valid; (4) regardless of the standard of proof, the evidence did
not support a determination that petitioner is a predator sex offender; (5) applying the predatory
sex offender statute retrospectively violated the ex post facto prohibitions in the state and federal
constitutions; and (6) the statutory predatory sex offender scheme violates federal and state
constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual
punishment and federal guarantees respecting the right to privacy.   
4. The majority briefly considered and then rejected each of petitioner's other claims
of error.   
5. We would add that the evidence at issue here –- expert psychological evaluations
proffered by petitioner to the effect that he has a low risk for reoffending -- appears to be
logically relevant.
6. Nothing that we have found (or that the Court of Appeals majority or the parties
identified) alters the foregoing statement.  No statutory context calls into question our
interpretation.  And, once we recognize the inescapable and directive content of ORS
181.585(1)(a), nothing in the Court of Appeals majority's extensive consultation with legislative
history, see V.L.Y. v. Board of Parole, 188 Or App at 627-32 (describing history), demonstrates
anything to the contrary.
7. As noted, __ Or ___ n 3 (slip op at 5), petitioner has advanced a number of other
arguments against the board's order.  However, because petitioner may not face a further hearing
or, if he does face one, may prevail, we decline to consider petitioner's other arguments.