Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1554.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1554 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. KEALY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1554.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules — 
Substantial mitigation — 18-month license suspension, partially stayed. 
(No. 2009-1535 — Submitted December 1, 2009 — Decided April 12, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-075. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John C. Kealy of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0031331, has been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio since 
1970.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends 
that we suspend respondent’s license to practice law for 18 months, with six 
months stayed, based on its findings that he failed to carry out a contract of 
employment with Ben Davis and neglected several matters during the 
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representation.  Further, respondent failed to cooperate in relator’s subsequent 
investigation and, in doing so, knowingly misrepresented certain facts.  In 
addition, respondent improperly borrowed $20,000 from another client, John 
Krawulski, from whom he had obtained a power of attorney, and after 
Krawulski’s death, he failed to disclose the loan in the inventory prepared while 
also serving as executor for Krawulski’s estate.  We accept the board’s findings 
regarding this professional misconduct, but due to mitigating factors, we modify 
its recommended sanction to that recommended by the panel and impose an 18-
month suspension with 12 months stayed. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, charged 
respondent with violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, the Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
(requiring a lawyer to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation).  A panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the case, found that 
respondent had committed professional misconduct, and recommended an 18-
month suspension with 12 months stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
but recommended an 18-month suspension with six months stayed. 
Misconduct 
Count I: The Davis Matter 
{¶ 3} On May 6, 2000, Ben Davis was cited for causing an automobile 
accident involving another driver.  On May 2, 2002, the United Services Auto 
Association (“USAA”), the other driver’s insurance carrier, sued Davis on a 
subrogation claim, seeking to recover approximately $13,000 as a result of that 
accident.  Respondent undertook Davis’s representation and filed an answer and 
                                                 
1.  Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before 
and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility.  When both the former and current rules are 
cited for the same act, the allegation constitutes a single ethical violation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
counterclaim.  But the counterclaim alleged damages for injuries to Davis caused 
by the other driver, and respondent never joined the other driver as a party to that 
litigation.  Additionally, he never responded to USAA’s requests for admissions 
or to its motion to dismiss the counterclaim.  And on January 16, 2003, 
respondent failed to appear for the final pretrial hearing.  Thereafter, neither 
respondent nor Davis appeared for the scheduled trial on May 7, 2003, and as a 
result, the trial court entered a default judgment against Davis in the amount of 
$13,609.08. 
{¶ 4} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that in failing to 
properly represent his client, respondent had violated 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an 
entrusted legal matter), DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a 
contract of employment with a client), and 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing 
or damaging a client).  We accept the board’s findings as to this representation. 
Count II: Failure to Cooperate and Knowing Misrepresentation 
{¶ 5} In October 2007, an investigator for the Cleveland Metropolitan 
Bar Association interviewed respondent regarding the Davis matter.  During that 
meeting, respondent told the investigator that he had never received notices of the 
pretrial or trial dates in the Davis case when, in fact, he had received written 
notices from the court. 
{¶ 6} As a result of respondent’s deception, the board found clear and 
convincing evidence that he had violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a 
disciplinary matter) and 8.4(h) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  We also accept these findings of the board. 
Count III: The Krawulski Matter 
{¶ 7} Respondent began representing John Krawulski in early 2002.  In 
November 2003, Krawulski developed serious medical problems and signed a 
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general power of attorney authorizing respondent to act for him.  Krawulski also 
executed a last will and testament naming respondent as executor of his estate.  
On or about August 23, 2004, respondent and his wife borrowed $20,000 from 
Krawulski, evidenced by a promissory note agreeing to repay the loan.  
Respondent signed the check from Krawulski’s account to himself and his wife 
under the durable power of attorney.  Krawulski died on January 10, 2005, and on 
February 4, 2005, respondent filed an application in the Cuyahoga County 
Probate Court to administer Krawulski’s estate.  In the application, however, 
respondent failed to disclose the $20,000 promissory note.  On July 26, 2005, 
Krawulski’s heirs filed a motion to remove respondent as the estate’s executor.  
The next day, respondent filed an inventory and appraisal in connection with the 
estate and again failed to disclose the existence of the promissory note.  
Krawulski’s heirs filed exceptions to the inventory and appraisal, and on 
September 1, 2005, respondent resigned as executor of the estate.  The 
administrator of the Krawulski estate subsequently filed a complaint in probate 
court against respondent alleging breach of fiduciary duty and seeking an 
accounting.  The new executor filed suit against respondent in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and 
negligence.  Respondent and the estate ultimately settled both complaints for 
$45,000. 
{¶ 8} As a consequence of violating his fiduciary duties as attorney and 
executor of Krawulski’s estate, the board found clear and convincing evidence 
that respondent had violated DR 1-102)(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5), and 5-104(A) 
(entering into a business transaction with a client when the lawyer and client have 
differing interests).  We accept these findings. 
Sanction 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 9} Respondent does not object to the board’s findings, but seeks a 
lesser sanction.  Relator had initially recommended an 18-month suspension with 
12 months stayed, but now seeks an 18-month suspension with six months stayed, 
in accord with the board’s recommendation. 
{¶ 10} Respondent has breached duties to his clients and to the public.  In 
determining the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, “we consider the 
duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney’s mental state, 
the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and sanctions imposed 
in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-Ohio-
5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44.  We weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to 
decide whether circumstances warrant a more lenient or exacting disposition.  See 
Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg”).  Because each disciplinary case involves unique facts and 
circumstances, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule and may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining which sanction to impose.  Id. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
board weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B). 
{¶ 12} Regarding aggravating factors, the board determined that 
respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct and that he refused to completely 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct (although he admitted to engaging 
in the actions that form the basis of the misconduct).  BCDG Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c) and (g).  The board also found troubling the fact that he was not 
initially forthcoming in the investigation of his ethical infractions and that he 
caused actual harm to his clients.  BCDG Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e) and (h). 
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{¶ 13} Regarding mitigating factors, the board noted that respondent was 
64 years old at the time of the hearing, had been admitted to the practice of law in 
1970, and has not been subject to any prior discipline.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a).  Additionally, the board noted that respondent has been active with 
the local legal aid society for 25 years and does a “staggering amount” of pro 
bono work.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  It noted that respondent is also active 
in his community, with a long history of volunteer work for his church, local 
charities, and other organizations.  Id. 
{¶ 14} We accept the board’s findings as to the aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
Sanctions Imposed in Similar Cases 
{¶ 15} We have considered sanctions in cases similar to that of the 
respondent.  In Cincinnati Bar Association v. Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-
Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 618, we imposed a two-year suspension with the last year 
stayed on conditions, where an attorney had engaged in misleading one client 
about the status of her driver’s license suspension and other traffic citations, failed 
to perform his duties as counsel for that client and two others, failed to return 
unearned fees to all three of these clients, and failed to cooperate in two of the 
ensuing disciplinary investigations.  Id. at ¶ 2.  As aggravating factors, we 
accepted the board’s findings that the attorney had engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct and had caused all three clients harm, had failed to respond during 
relator’s investigations until compelled by subpoena, and did not fully accept 
responsibility for his misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 41.  As mitigating factors, we accepted 
the board’s findings that the attorney had no prior disciplinary record, that he had 
a debilitating sleep disorder, and that he had received favorable character and 
competence assessments by three judges.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 16} In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Peters (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 348, 349, 721 
N.E.2d 26, we suspended an attorney for 18 months with the final 12 months 
January Term, 2010 
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stayed on the condition that he submit to a monitoring program, based on neglect 
of an entrusted legal matter and commingling his client funds with his own.  As 
mitigating factors, we accepted the board’s findings that the attorney had not been 
previously disciplined by the court, had freely admitted his wrongdoing, and 
showed remorse for his misconduct.  Id. 
{¶ 17} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004-Ohio-
2835, 810 N.E.2d 426, we suspended an attorney for two years, with 18 months 
stayed on the condition that the attorney engage in no further misconduct, based 
on the attorney’s violations of 12 Disciplinary Rules, including DR 1-102(A)(4), 
and Gov.Bar. R. V(4).  As aggravating factors in the case, the board found that the 
attorney’s client had been harmed by his misconduct and that he had acted 
entirely from selfish motives.  Id. at ¶ 33.  As mitigating factors, the board found 
that the attorney had practiced law for 37 years and had never before been 
disciplined for professional misconduct, that his misconduct was directed against 
only one client, and that he cooperated appropriately with his disciplinary 
investigation.  Id. at ¶ 32.  Although the Akron Bar Association sought the 
attorney’s disbarment, we accepted the board’s recommendation of a more lenient 
sanction, stating that the attorney’s 37 discipline-free years of practice, in 
combination with the depth of remorse he expressed in the proceedings before the 
court, convinced us that he would not repeat his transgressions.  (Holder did not 
live up to our expectations and was disbarred on December 27, 2006.) 
{¶ 18} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-
862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, we suspended an attorney for one year, with six months 
stayed on conditions for committing professional misconduct by, among other 
things, neglecting two clients’ cases, helping a client violate a civil protection 
order, filing an unapproved dismissal entry, borrowing money from a client, and 
misusing his client trust account.  Id. at ¶ 2.  The board found one aggravating 
factor in the case – that the attorney had committed multiple offenses.  As 
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mitigating factors, the board found that the attorney had no previous disciplinary 
record, had made restitution, and had submitted recommendations as to his good 
character and reputation apart from the underlying conduct.  Id. In accepting the 
board’s findings, which we stated weighed in favor of leniency, we also noted that 
the attorney had acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct and had 
expressed genuine remorse. 
Disposition 
{¶ 19} Based on a review of the aggravating and mitigating factors in this 
case, we conclude that respondent’s misconduct warrants a sanction more severe 
than that imposed in Markovich, but less exacting than that imposed in Larson.  
While we recognize respondent’s grievous misconduct, we note that he has 
worked in private practice for 39 years with no prior disciplinary record, has 
settled and paid all claims owed to his clients, thereby alleviating their loss, has 
provided extensive pro bono work with the Legal Aid Society for 25 years, and 
has volunteered for his church, charities, and other community organizations.  
This long history and other mitigating circumstances provide a basis to modify the 
board’s recommended sanction to conform with what relator originally sought and 
what the panel recommended.  Accordingly, respondent is suspended from the 
practice of law in the state of Ohio for 18 months, with 12 months stayed, on the 
condition that he commit no further misconduct.  If respondent fails to comply 
with the terms of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the full 
18-month suspension. 
{¶ 20} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J.,2 and O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
                                                 
2.  The late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer participated in the deliberations in, and the final 
resolution of, this case prior to his death. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 21} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in regard to the 
sanction imposed on respondent.  Respondent neglected a client matter, resulting 
in a default judgment being entered against the client.  He improperly obtained a 
loan from another client who had hired respondent to execute a last will and 
testament, a will that named respondent as executor of the estate.  Both of these 
charges are serious in their own right, but respondent’s misconduct is 
compounded by the pattern of dishonesty and deceit he exhibited.  Respondent 
attempted to deceive the investigator from the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association who interviewed respondent about the client matter he neglected.  In 
the other matter, respondent did not disclose the loan he received from the client 
when he applied for authority to administer the client’s estate and again failed to 
disclose the client’s loan to him in the inventory and appraisal of the estate. 
{¶ 22} I conclude that due to the dishonesty displayed by the respondent, 
he should serve a more severe suspension than that imposed by the majority.  The 
mitigating factors in this case do not warrant modifying the board’s recommended 
sanction.  I would therefore adopt the recommendation of the board and impose 
an 18-month suspension with six months stayed. 
 
O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
R. Jeffrey Pollock and Erin K. Walsh, for relator. 
Leonard A. Spremulli, for respondent. 
______________________