Title: Matter of TRG

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of TRG1983 WY 67665 P.2d 491Case Number: C-83-1, C-83-2Case Number: C-83-1, C-83-2Decided: 06/14/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Child Known as TRG, a minor. JHL, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

BMG, Appellee 
(Petitioner). Nos. C-83-1, C-83-2

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Kenneth R. 
Marken, Casper, 
for appellant.

Robert Monteith, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE, and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal concerns a 
case in which the district court judge, over the objection of the natural 
mother, entered judgments awarding temporary - and then, as a sanction, 
permanent - custody of a 19-month-old child to BMG, a putative father whom the 
court found to be the parent of the child. These findings, holdings and 
judgments were made and entered contrary to the statutes provided for such 
matters. This being so, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and the 
judgments are therefore void.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On April 12, 1982 the 
appellee BMG, putative father, filed a petition under the Wyoming Uniform 
Parentage Act, §§ 14-2-101 through 14-2-120, W.S. 1977,1 for the purpose of adjudicating the 
existence of a father/child relationship between himself and TRG, the minor 
daughter of JHL, the appellant-respondent mother and for the further purpose of 
deciding who should have custody of the child. Appellee was not the presumed 
natural father of the child, as contemplated by § 14-2-102, W.S. 1977.2

[¶4.]     At the time the 
petition was filed, TRG was approximately 19 months old and had - since birth - 
resided with JHL, her natural mother. On April 13, 1982, a notice of setting 
issued from the district court scheduling an "informal" hearing, under § 
14-2-108, W.S. 1977, for 9:00 a.m., May 10, 1982, the purpose of which was, 
according to the notice, to conduct the "informal hearing as to the question of 
paternity." It was further provided that the petitioner's motion for temporary 
custody would be heard immediately thereafter.

[¶5.]     Appellant mother's 
first attorney received the notice of setting and mistakenly informed his client 
that the hearing was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. rather than 9:00 a.m. on May 10. 
Appellant appeared with her attorney at 10:00 a.m. that day, only to learn that 
a judgment had been authorized and was entered, holding and providing that BMG 
was the natural father of the minor child and that it was in the child's best 
interest that temporary custody be vested with him. The Sheriff of Natrona 
County was ordered to deliver the child to BMG, the putative 
father.

[¶6.]     No record of these 
proceedings was kept as required by statute. § 14-2-108, W.S. 1977.3 Therefore, for purposes of this 
appeal, this court is forced to proceed upon the assumption that there is no 
testimony or evidence supportive of the judgment which emanated from the 
proceedings of May 10, 1982.

[¶7.]     The attorney for the 
mother filed motions to vacate, stay, and amend the judgment, and to vacate the 
award of temporary child custody. On May 28, 1982 appellant's motions were 
brought before the district court but were denied on the grounds that the 
appellant had failed to produce evidence showing there to be a factual basis 
upon which she might prevail if the judgment were vacated, and for the further 
reason that she had yet to deliver the child to the petitioner in accordance 
with the judgment of May 10, 1982.

[¶8.]     Meanwhile, on May 13, 
1982 the putative father filed a petition to cite the mother for contempt of 
court for having failed to deliver the child to him. Further, he had his lawyer 
employ the services of a private investigator to conduct surveillance of the 
child's mother and the members of her family, all for the purpose of determining 
the whereabouts of the child.

[¶9.]     On June 16, 1982, the 
little girl was seized from her babysitter by the Natrona County Sheriff and 
delivered to the putative father. At a hearing on June 24, 1982, the district 
court judge found appellant in contempt of court for "willfully disobeying" the 
order of May 10, 1982 and ordered that, prior to any final hearing in the 
matter, she would have to pay the putative father's attorney's fees and 
investigator's fees in the amounts of $1,645.12 and $2,638.69, 
respectively.

[¶10.]  On May 18, 1982 appellee's counsel served 
interrogatories upon the mother's attorney. The first lawyer's services were 
terminated on June 1, 1982 whereupon he forwarded the interrogatories to the 
mother's second attorney. The answers to the interrogatories had not been filed 
by August, in consequence of which failure to respond the attorney representing 
the putative father filed a motion to compel discovery. On September 14, 1982 a 
hearing was held via telephone conference call with the court together with the 
lawyers for both the petitioner and the respondent, at which time the mother was 
directed to answer the interrogatories no later than September 24, 1982. Despite 
her full cooperation, the mother's lawyer failed to serve the answers to 
interrogatories upon appellee's counsel as ordered by the court. During a second 
conference call with the court and opposing counsel on November 12, 1982, the 
mother's attorney confessed that the fault for failing to answer the 
interrogatories was entirely his and that his client was absolutely blameless. 
Unimpressed with this state of affairs, the district court judge thereupon 
entered a default against the appellant and awarded permanent custody of the 
child to the appellee as a sanction for her failure to answer the 
interrogatories. A final order was filed December 16, 
1982.

[¶11.]  On December 23, 1982 appellant's [¶11.] attorney, who in all 
respects has pursued the best interests of his client and who ably brings this 
appeal in the mother's behalf, filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. 
A notice of setting was issued by the clerk of the district court on December 
28, setting the motion for hearing on January 27, 1983. In order to perfect her 
appeal from the court's final order filed December 16, 1982, appellant filed a 
notice of appeal on December 30, 1982.

[¶12.]  At the motion hearing of January 27, 
1983, the district judge held that the child's mother was prohibited from taking 
an appeal from the court's order filed December 16, 1982 while the motion to set 
aside the default judgment was pending, for the reason that her filing of the 
notice of appeal had the effect of depriving the district court of jurisdiction. 
The district court went on to hold that it would hear no arguments and take no 
evidence in support of the appellant's Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.4 motion and dismissed the motion by 
order dated February 1, 1983. Present at the hearing were the appellant and the 
attorney who failed to file the response to interrogatories. This attorney would 
have testified, had he been given the opportunity, that the mother fully 
cooperated with him in preparing answers to the interrogatories, not once, but 
twice, and that through his sole neglect the answers had not been filed and 
served upon the putative father. Had it been permitted, the testimony would have 
further shown that appellant had no knowledge of the continuing controversy 
concerning the interrogatories despite her repeated and mostly unsuccessful 
attempts to contact her lawyer with respect to the status of her 
case.

[¶13.]  A second notice of appeal was thereafter 
filed, notifying of the appellee's intention to appeal the trial court's order 
of February 1, 1983.

[¶14.]  The appellant identifies the issues on 
appeal as follows:

"A. Whether a putative 
father in a paternity action filed under the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act is 
entitled to an award of temporary custody?

"B. Whether the Appellant 
was properly found in criminal contempt of court and properly ordered to pay 
Appellee's costs as a result of her failure to obey an order of the lower court 
which was void ab initio?

"C. If temporary custody 
may be awarded to a putative father in a paternity action, did the District 
Court abuse its discretion in awarding temporary custody in this case to the 
Appellee and/or in failing to grant Appellant's Motion to Vacate, Stay, or Amend 
the temporary custody award?

"D. Whether the District 
Court erred in entering a default judgment against the Appellant by which 
permanent custody of the child was transferred to the Appellee as a sanction for 
failure to answer Appellee's interrogatories?

"E. Whether the filing of 
a Notice of Appeal by Appellant removed jurisdiction from the District Court to 
hear Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment?"

[¶15.]  We will reverse and direct that the 
district court will forthwith enter its order, the burden of which will be that 
the child TRG is to be returned to her mother at once. All trial court orders 
and judgments, commencing with the court's "Judgment" of May 10, 1982, are 
hereby held to be void and of no force and effect.

The Order of May 10, 
1982

[¶16.]  As noted above, on April 12, 1982 the 
putative father BMG petitioned the court under the Wyoming Uniform Parentage 
Act, supra, asking the court to adjudicate him to be the father of the minor 
child TRG and to award him custody. The judge signed a notice setting May 10, 
1983 at 9:00 a.m. as the appointed time when an "informal" hearing would be had 
"in accordance with W.S. § 14-2-108," to decide the paternity question and to 
hear arguments on the appellee's motion for temporary 
custody.

[¶17.]  The hearing was set for 9:00 a.m., but 
the mother's attorney thought it was scheduled for 10:00 a.m., and even though 
he so informed the court, this made no mitigating impression on the judge and 
that day the following "Judgment" was signed and entered upon the 
record:

"JUDGMENT

"THIS MATTER coming 
before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Custody, and the 
Petitioner appearing in person, and with his attorney of record, and the 
Guardian ad Litem appearing, but the respondent failing to appear, the Court 
proceeded to hear the matter; after hearing the matter and reviewing the file, 
the Court FINDS:

"1. That the Court has 
personal jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter by virtue of the 
respondent's residence in Natrona 
County, Wyoming, with 
said minor child.

"2. That respondent has 
failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on Petitioner's motion for 
temporary custody.

"3. That the Petitioner 
is the natural father of [TRG], a minor child; respondent is the natural mother 
of said minor child.

"4. That it would be in 
the best interests of said minor child to award the temporary care, custody and 
control of said minor child to the Petitioner during the pendency of this 
action.

"5. That the Natrona 
County Sheriff's Department should make every reasonable effort to forthwith 
deliver said minor child to the Petitioner.

"IT IS, THEREFORE, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

"1. Petitioner, [BMG], 
should be, and he hereby is, declared to be the natural father of [TRG], a minor 
child.

"2. That the care, 
custody and control of [TRG], a minor child, should be, and it hereby is, 
awarded to Petitioner, [BMG] during the pendency of this 
action.

"3. That the Natrona 
County Sheriff's Department should be, and it hereby is, directed to use every 
reasonable effort to forthwith deliver said minor child to the 
Petitioner.

"Dated this 10th day of 
May, 1982.

"BY THE 
COURT:

"[signed] Dan Spangler 
"

JUDGE

"APPROVED AS TO 
FORM:

"[signed] Robert A. 
Monteith, 

"ROBERT A. 
MONTEITH,

"Attorney for 
Petitioner

"[signed] Richard H. 
Peek,

 "RICHARD H. PEEK,

"Guardian ad 
Litem"

[¶18.]  The hearing with respect to which the 
mother was notified was - as the court's notice of setting indicates - to be 
held in compliance with § 14-2-108, W.S. 1977. The relevant part of that section 
provides:

"Informal hearing; refusal of witnesses 
or parties to testify; testimony of physician.

"(a) As soon as 
practicable after an action is brought to declare the existence or nonexistence 
of the father and child relationship, an 
informal hearing shall be held. The court may order that the hearing be held 
before a referee. The public is barred from the hearing. A record of the proceeding shall be 
kept. (Emphasis added.)

[¶19.]  Even though this section of the statute 
provides that "a record of the proceeding shall be kept," this was not done. 
Further, the statute gives the court no authority either to award temporary 
custody of a minor child to the petitioning party or to enter an order declaring 
a parent and child relationship. The most that can come from an informal 
"pretrial hearing" is a "recommendation for settlement" as provided by § 
14-2-111, W.S. 1977 which - if agreed 
to by the parties - could culminate in an order settling the paternity, 
custody and support issues, but which - if not agreed to - can only result in an 
order recommending settlement by dismissal or compromise by agreement according 
to the terms of the statute. The recommendation is, by statute, bound to take 
into account the best interest of the child in light of the factors enumerated 
in § 14-2-113(e).5 The statute provides for other 
incidental matters.

[¶20.]  Section 14-2-111, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"Recommendations for 
settlement; acceptance or refusal thereof; dismissal based on blood 
tests.

"(a) On the basis of the 
information produced at the pretrial hearing, the judge or referee conducting 
the hearing shall evaluate the probability of determining the existence or 
nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial and whether a 
judicial declaration of the relationship would be in the best interest of the 
child. On the basis of the evaluation, an 
appropriate recommendation for settlement shall be made to the parties which may 
include any of the following:

"(i) That the action be 
dismissed with or without prejudice;

"(ii) That the matter be 
compromised by an agreement among the alleged father, the mother and the child, 
in which the father and child relationship is not determined but in which a 
defined economic obligation is undertaken by the alleged father in favor of the 
child and, if appropriate, in favor of the mother, subject to approval by the 
judge or referee conducting the hearing. In reviewing the obligation undertaken 
by the alleged father in a compromise agreement, the judge or referee shall 
consider the best interest of the child in light of the factors enumerated in 
W.S. 14-2-113(c), discounted by the improbability as it appears to him of 
establishing the alleged father's paternity or nonpaternity of the child in a 
trial of the action. In the best interest of the child, the court may order that 
the alleged father's identity be kept confidential and may designate a person or 
agency to receive from the alleged father and disburse on behalf of the child 
all amounts paid by the alleged father in fulfillment of obligations imposed on 
him; or

"(iii) That the alleged 
father voluntarily acknowledge his paternity of the child.

"(b) If the parties 
accept a recommendation made in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, 
judgment shall be entered accordingly.

"(c) If a party refuses 
to accept a recommendation made under subsection (a) of this section and blood 
tests have not been taken, the court shall require the parties to submit to 
blood tests if practicable. Thereafter the judge or referee shall make an 
appropriate final recommendation. If a party refuses to accept the final 
recommendation, the action shall be set for trial.

"(d) The guardian ad 
litem of the child may accept or refuse to accept a recommendation under this 
section.

"(e) The informal hearing 
may be terminated and the action set for trial if the judge or referee finds it 
unlikely that all parties would accept a recommendation he might make under 
subsections (a) or (c) of this section.

"(f) If the scientific 
evidence resulting from the blood tests conclusively shows that the defendant 
could not have been the father, the action shall be dismissed." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶21.]  Given the facts of this case, the notice 
to the mother and the applicable statutes, the only orders that could have 
emanated from the court are:

(1) an order continuing 
or resetting the informal hearing and/or

(2) a contempt citation 
to punish respondent for her tardiness;

(3) a recommendation from the court which 
could provide:

(a) the action be 
dismissed and/or

(b) the matter be 
compromised by agreement of the parties where the parental relationship is not 
determined but an obligation of support for the child and/or the mother is 
undertaken by the putative father. The recommendation - if it provides for child 
support - will have taken the factors contemplated by § 14-2-113(e), supra n. 5, 
into account;

(c) the recommendation 
may include a finding which says that the alleged father voluntarily 
acknowledged his paternity of the child; or

(4) if the parties accept 
the recommendation of the court, an order will be entered consistent 
therewith;

(5) if the parties do not 
accept the court's recommendation, blood tests will be ordered, if they have not 
previously been taken, after which the judge (or referee) will make a final 
recommendation. If either party refuses to accept the final recommendation, the 
action will be set for trial;

(6) if the blood tests 
show that the petitioner ("defendant") could not have been the father, then the 
action shall be dismissed.

[¶22.]  The court made no such "recommendation 
for settlement" as is contemplated by this section of the statute. Since none 
was made, the mother of course had no opportunity to accept or reject it. The 
record does not disclose what - if any - evidence of parenthood the court heard. 
We have no idea whether blood tests of the parties were or were not taken. We do 
not know what - if any - evidence of the child's wellbeing was made available to 
the judge. We do know that the applicable statutes were not followed in any 
material respect, and, once the mother had missed her May 10 court appointment 
by one hour (due to the fault of her attorney), she was never again given the 
opportunity to testify or introduce her evidence, or to refute any of the 
petitioner's evidence, and she was not given the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses.

[¶23.]  Notwithstanding the clear directives of 
the statutes discussed above, the court entered its May 10 "Judgment" 
determining paternity and temporary custody, in violation of these statutes and, 
hence, that "Judgment" is void and of no force and effect.

[¶24.]  At common law, a putative father could 
not bring an action for paternity. A v. 
X, Y and Z, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1222 (1982); 
Blanton v. Warn, Wyo., 444 P.2d 325 (1968). It must therefore 
be assumed that, since Wyoming's Uniform Parentage Act gives the 
biological father a cause of action, § 14-2-104(c), it is, therefore, in 
derogation of the common law. If that is so, the statutes must be strictly 
construed and carefully adhered to. State 
v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543 (1982); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 
Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). As applied to this case, these rules say that, since common law gave 
the putative father no right of action but Wyoming's Uniform Parentage Act does 
give him a cause of action which permits him to establish the parent-child 
relationship, the statutes which authorize the proceedings in such matters must 
be carefully and strictly followed in order to give effect to the intention of 
the legislature.

[¶25.]  Even though the putative father has a 
right of action under the Wyoming Parentage Act, that right of action must be 
exercised in conformity with the statute, and courts will not be permitted to 
enlarge upon the statutory rights therein contained.

[¶26.]  We said in Lo Sasso v. Braun, Wyo., 386 P.2d 630, 632 
(1963):

"As stated in State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 
Ariz. 206, 349 P.2d 774, 776, it is a universal rule that courts will not 
enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its 
express provisions."

[¶27.]  The issue then becomes this: What is the 
effect of the court's acting outside the authority granted by the statute? That 
is, when the court so acted - which it did - was it without jurisdiction so that 
its May 10 order was rendered void?

[¶28.]  In State ex rel. Yohe v. District Court 
of Eighth Judicial District in and for Natrona County, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545, 
548 (1925), we said:

"`Though the Court may 
possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-matter and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of 
procedure and in the extent and character of its judgments.'" (Quoting from 
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. Ed. 914 (1876).) (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29.]  In 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), § 
354, "Judgments in Excess of Jurisdiction," the author says at p. 
733:

"`It is well settled by 
the authorities that a judgment may be void for want of authority in a court to 
render the particular judgment rendered though the court may have had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.'" (Quoting from Pyeatt v. 
Estus, 72 Okla. 160, 179 P. 42, 45, 4 A.L.R. 1570 (1919).)

The text goes on 
to say, at pp. 733-734:

"* * * Nevertheless in 
the actual rendition of the judgment, the court must remain within its 
jurisdiction and powers. For it is the power or authority behind a judgment, 
rather than the mere result reached, which determines its validity and immunity 
from collateral attack. A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's 
authority is error correctable on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or 
for that matter a correct, decision where the court in rendering it oversteps 
its jurisdiction and power is void and may be set aside either directly or 
collaterally."

At p. 735 the 
author says:

"* * * If the court is 
exercising special statutory powers, the measure of its authority is the statute 
itself, and a judgment in excess thereof is null and void * * 
*."

As to statutory 
authority, we said in State ex rel. Yohe 
v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District in and for Natrona County, 
supra, 238 P. at 550:

"If the measure of a 
court's authority depends upon and is limited by statute, a judgment that, by 
the face of the record proper, is shown not to be in substantial compliance with 
mandatory provisions of the statute, or contrary to the limitations or 
conditions precedent therein expressed, is void * * *."

We said 238 P. 
at 549:

"Where it is clear that a 
court has no power under the law, to render a particular judgment under any 
circumstances, the judgment is doubtless void * * *."

Effect of a Void 
Judgment

[¶30.]  It is said in 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 
49, "Void judgments," pp. 347-349:

"A void judgment is not 
entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences 
of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by 
anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal 
in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding force or 
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair, or create 
rights, nor can any rights be based thereon.

"Although it is not 
necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed or vacated, it is 
open to attack or impeachment in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at 
any time or place, at least where the invalidity appears upon the face of the 
record. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to 
those who seek to enforce it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are 
themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any 
purpose.

"In short, a void 
judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be 
if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the parties litigant in the 
same position they were in before the trial."

[¶31.]  We cited this rule with approval in Wunnicke v. Leith, 61 Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274 (1945) and again in Olson v. 
Leith, 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342, 345 (1953).

[¶32.]  In Emery v. Emery, Wyo., 404 P.2d 745, 749 
(1965), we said:

"A void judgment is not 
binding. It confers no rights * * *."

[¶33.]  This court has the power to vacate a void 
judgment. We said in Emery v. Emery, supra, 404 P.2d at 
749:

"As stated in 30A 
Am.Jur., § 693, p. 659, the power of a court to vacate a void judgment is 
regarded as inherent and independent of any statutory authority. In the same 
text, on , it is indicated that even though a void judgment is a nullity, a 
court will not permit it to encumber the record and will vacate the ineffectual 
entry thereof on proper application at any time. Also, in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 
267, pp. 480-481, it is said under or apart from statutory provisions, 
invalidity of a judgment void for want of jurisdiction, as distinguished from a 
judgment merely voidable or erroneous, is ground for vacating it - at least if 
such invalidity is apparent on the face of the record."

[¶34.]  In the case at bar, the court's authority 
was "limited by statute," but this authority was exercised in excess of the 
statutorily defined limitation upon its power and, thus, in excess of its 
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to render a particular 
judgment. State ex rel. Yohe v. District 
Court of Eighth Judicial District in and for Natrona County, supra; Padlock 
Ranch, Inc. v. Washakie Needles Irr. Dist., 50 Wyo. 253, 61 P.2d 410 (1936). 
In consequence, all of the district court's orders and judgments are void and of 
no force and effect, commencing with the judgment of May 10, 
1982.

[¶35.]  TRG will be re-delivered to the custody 
of her mother JHL forthwith and the district court will make and enter all such 
orders as are necessary to give effect to the directives contained in this 
opinion.

[¶36.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 14-2-104(c), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"An action to determine 
the existence of the father and child relationship with respect to a child who 
has no presumed father under W.S. 14-2-102 may be brought by the child, the 
department of health and social services, the mother or personal representative 
of the child, the personal representative or a parent of the mother if the 
mother has died or is a minor, a man 
alleged or alleging himself to be the father, or the personal representative 
or a parent of the alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor." 
(Emphasis added.)

2 Section 14-2-102, W.S. 
1977 reads:

"Presumption of 
paternity; rebuttal thereof. "(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of 
a child if:

"(i) He and the child's 
natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born 
during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is 
terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a decree of separation is 
entered by a court; or

"(ii) Before the child's 
birth, he and the child's natural mother attempted to marry each other by a 
marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted 
marriage is or could be declared invalid; and:

"(A) If the attempted 
marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the child is born during the 
attempted marriage or within three hundred (300) days after its termination by 
death, annulment or divorce; or

"(B) If the attempted 
marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is born within three 
hundred (300) days after the termination of cohabitation; 
or

"(iii) After the child's 
birth, he and the child's natural mother married or attempted to marry each 
other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the 
attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid; and:

"(A) He has acknowledged 
his paternity of the child in writing filed with the state office of vital 
records services; or

"(B) With his consent, he 
is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate; 
or

"(C) He is obligated to 
support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order; 
or

"(iv) While the child is 
under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child.

"(b) A presumption under 
this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and 
convincing evidence. If two (2) or more presumptions arise which conflict with 
each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic controls. A presumption is rebutted by a 
court decree establishing paternity of the child by another 
man."

3 See discussion of this 
statute infra this opinion.

4 Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. 
provides:

"Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On motion, and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is vased has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within one (I) year after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided in sections 
3-3801 [§ 1-16-401], 3-3805 [repealed, § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977], and 3-3810 [§ 
1-16-408], W.C.S. 1945, or to grant relief to a party against whom a judgment or 
order has been rendered without other service than by publication as provided in 
section 3-3802 [§ 1-16-402], as amended. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, 
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, 
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action."

5 Section 14-2-113(e), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(e) In determining the 
amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during 
which the duty of support is owed, a court enforcing the obligation of support 
shall consider all relevant facts including:

"(i) The needs of the 
child;

"(ii) The standard of 
living and circumstances of the parents;

"(iii) The relative 
financial means of the parents;

"(iv) The earning ability 
of the parents;

"(v) The need and 
capacity of the child for education including higher 
education;

"(vi) The age of the 
child;

"(vii) The financial 
resources and the earning ability of the child;

"(viii) The 
responsibility of the parents for the support of others; 
and

"(ix) The value of 
services contributed by the custodial parent."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶37.]  I agree with the majority of the court 
that the statutory proceedings (§ 14-2-108, W.S. 1977) were not followed by the 
district court in connection with the informal hearing held on May 10, 1982, and 
that the judgment resulting therefrom was void.

[¶38.]  I also note that the judgment did not 
direct the mother to do anything, let alone turn the child over to the sheriff. 
Accordingly, the mother could not properly be held in contempt of court for 
disobeying the directions of the judgment.

[¶39.]  In view of these preliminary factors, the 
entry of a default judgment was an abuse of discretion. It may be in the best 
interest of the child that its custody and control be with the putative father, 
but a child's well being is so paramount in these cases that those things which 
affect it should be determined on their merits. To allow a default judgment to 
stand against the mother, based on procedural impropriety for which she has no 
fault, is an abuse of discretion. The court could not reasonably conclude as it 
did in entering the default judgment and in allowing it to stand. In doing so, 
it acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances. Such is an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶40.]  I would reverse and remand the case with 
instructions to vacate all orders and judgments entered therein; to enter an 
order returning care, custody and control of the child to the mother pending 
further proceedings; and to undertake proceedings pursuant to § 14-2-101, et 
seq., W.S. 1977, at the point whereat an informal hearing is 
set.

[¶41.]  I realize that I reach the same place as 
does the majority opinion, but I do so with a little more particularity as to 
the contempt order and as to the default.