Title: STATE v LEWIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 85-384 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 6 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS- CLYDE LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Allen Beck, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Judy Browning, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 23, 1 9 8 6 Decided: March 20, 1 9 8 6 Filed: !'MK 2 U' 1986 - C l e r k Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of the Court. Appellant, Lewis, appeals from his Yellowstone County District Court jury trial conviction and sentence of 30 years in the Montana State Prison. We affirm. The issues raised by defendant and a-ppellant are: 1. Whether the District Court erred in granting the State's motion in limine precluding introduction of evidence concerning defendant's physical condition? 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant put his victim in fear of immediate bodily injury? 3. Whether the District Court's jury instruction on direct and circumstantial evidence was proper? 4 . Whether defendant's sentence is disproportionate to any reasonable construction of the facts in the case? On June 8, 1984 at 1:00 a-.m. there occurred a robbery at a Kwik Way store in Fillings. Defendant, his brother, and two women spent the evening riding around the city and drinking. At approximately 1:00 a.m. they stopped at the Kwik Way. There is conflicting testimony as to what occurred next. According to the clerk on. duty that night, and other State ' s witnesses, defend.antl s brother Don entered the store and. a.sked about the price of beer. Don left and returned with the defendant. Both men went to the cooler and came out with a case of beer and two bottles of wine. As the clerk rang up the sale, he noticed. Don go to the door of the store and look outside. Suspecting that the men were about t o s t e a l t h e beer and wine, t h e c l e r k reached f o r a h a s e b a l l b a t kept beneath t h e counter. A t t h i s p o i n t Don s a i d something t o t h e defendant who then reached back with h i s arm, and brought h i s arm forward a s i f t o put something under h i s c o a t . With one hand under h i s c o a t , defendant t o l d t h e c l e r k t h a t he wasnY going t o pay f o r t h e beer and wine and t h a t he wanted what was i n t h e till. Although t h e c l e r k never saw a gun, he t e s t i f i e d t h a t he believed t h e defendant had a gun and f e l t threatened. The defendant's hand remained under h i s c o a t t h e rest of t h e time he was i n t h e s t o r e a s w e l l a s when he l e f t t h e s t o r e . While t h e robbery was occurring, two men i n a t r u c k pulled i n t o t h e s t o r e ' s parking l o t . The defendant saw t h e truck and t o l d t h e c l e r k he wanted t h e money f a s t . The c l e r k emptied t h e till, including a marked f i v e d o l l a r b i l l . The defendant took t h e money and t o l d t h e cl-erk not t o leave t h e s t o r e . Don took t h e beer and wine 2nd t h e two men f l e d t h e s t o r e . J e f f Reed, one of t h e persons i n t h e t r u c k , noticed t h e defendant running o r walking away from t h e s t o r e with one hand i n h i s coat pocket. The c l e r k grabbed Reed a s he entered t h e s t o r e , and asked him t o g e t t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e number of defendant's c a r . Reed observed t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e number, t h e c a r ' s make and color. They followed t h e c a r , b u t could not c a t c h it. A s t h e defendant and h i s b r o t h e r l e f t t h e s t o r e , and headed toward t h e i r c a r , one of th.e women i n t h e c a r , Diana Loomis, saw t h e defendant hand h i s b r o t h e r some money. The o t h e r woman i n t h e c a r , Cindy Sawyer, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e two men came running o u t of t h e convenience s t o r e and both of them screamed a t h e r t o g e t o u t of t h e r e . After leaving the st-ore, the defendant and his brother noticed that they were being followed. The brothers then handed Cindy Sawyer some items which she threw from the car. Shortly thereafter they were stopped by police. The police later recovered the beer, wine, and currency thrown from the car, including the marked five dollar bill. According to the testimony of defendant and his brother, who pled guilty to the robbery, the decision to rob the store was made unilaterally by Don 1,ewis. When the defendant and Don were at the counter, Don said he would not pay for the beer and wine and demanded money from the till. The defendant had nothing to do with initiating or carrying out the robbery. The reason he placed his hand under his coat was because of a physical condition causing him pain in the abdominal area. The defendant was angry with Don for robbing the store, and the two argued intensely about the robbery after leaving the Kwik Way. The first issue raised by the defendant is whether the District Court erred in granting the State's motion in limine precluding introduction of evidence concerning the defendant's physical condition. The defendant claims he suffers from abdominal problems causing him severe and continuous pain. He alleges that his physical condition explains why he had his hand under his coat during the robbery. Therefore, the evidence was relevant, and granting the State's motion in limine was prejudicial. to his defense. Defendant's argument is not persuasive. First, the District Court did not grant the State's motion in limine, it was denied. Instead, when the defendant attempted to elicit testimony from the defendant's mother concerning the nature of his illness, the State objected to the relevance of the testimony and the objection was sustained. Nevertheless, defendant's mother was allowed to mention throughout her testimony that defendant was ill. Second, the defendant and his sister were both allowed to testify concerning the specific nature of his illness, and the fact that defendant often placed his hand on his side because of the pain. Defendant further testified that if he did have one hand on his side during the robbery, it was because of his illness. We hold that evidence concerning defendant's physical condition was relevant, and it was error for the trial court to sustain the State's objection to the mother's testimony. ?.Jevertheless, the error was harmless. The defendant was still able to introduce abundant evidence concerning his physical condition through the testimony of his brother, sister, and himself. The jury chose not to believe the defendant, and there is substantial evidence on the record to support the jury's decision. Defendant's second issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant put his victim in fear of immediate bodily injury. The defendant was convicted of robbery under 45-5-401 (1) (b) , MCA. That section states: A person commits the offense of robbery if in the course of committing a theft he: (b) threatens to inflict bodily injury upon any person or purposely or knowingly puts any person in fear of immediate bodily injury . . .. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he placed the clerk in fear of immediate bodily injury. We disagree. There is amp1.e evidence in the record to support such a finding. The clerk testified that the defendant swiftly place6 h.is hand under his coat and demanded the money in the till.. The clerk stated that he believed the defendant had a gun and that his life was in jeopardy. The defendant's actions were sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant purposely or knowingly placed the clerk in fear of immediate bodily injury. The jury may use common experience to conclude that a particular situation would cause a person to experience fear. State v. Case (Mont. 1980), 621 ~ . 2 d 1066, 1069, 37 St.Rep. 2057, 2059-60. An actual weapon need not be used. See Criminal Law Commission Comments on 5 45-5-401, MCA. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant placed the clerk in fear of immediate bodily injury. The third issue on appeal is whether the District Court's jury instruction on direct and circumstantial evidence was proper. The trial court offered the following instruction regarding circumstantial evidence: There are two classes of evidence recognized and admitted in courts in the State of Montana. One is "direct evidence," and the other is "circumstantial evidence." In "direct evidence," the witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge of the main fact or facts to be proven, while "circumstantial evidence" is the proof of certain facts and circumstances in a given case from which the jury may infer other connecting facts which usually and reasonably follow according to the common experiences of mankind. The defendant objected to this instruction, and instead offered the following instruction which the trial court refused to give: Acts may be proven by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct testimony of eye witnesses, but the facts and circumstances in evidence should be consistent with each other and with the guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence. Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as means of proof. Neither is entitled to greater weight than the other. The trial court refused defendant's instruction because the case did not hinge upon circumstantial evidence. The District Court stated: There were only three people in that store at the time of the holdup. All three of them have testified, and that's direct evidence. We have addressed this issue before in State v. Gould (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 20, 42 St.Rep. 946, and State 77. Bean (1959), 135 Mont. 135, 337 P.2d 930. In those cases we held that an instruction such as that proposed by the defendant is only appropriate where all of the evidence is circumstantial. Where there is substantial. direct evidence, a district court may properly refuse to give such an instruction. Gould, 704 P.2d at 31-32; Bean, 135 Mont. at 137. The District Court instructed the jury on the definition of direct and circumstantial evidence, and on the equal weight of each. It was not error for the District Court in this case to refuse to give defendant's proffered instruction as there was substantial direct evidence of defendant ' s guilt. Finally, defendant argues that his sentence is disproportionate to any reasonable construction of the facts in the case. Defendant's sentence was within the permissable statutory range, and, in the absence of clear abuse of discretion is properly reviewed by the Sentence Review Division. Here, there was no abuse of discretion by the District Court, and this issue is a matter for the Sentence Review Division, and. not t h i s Court. S t a t e v. Beach (Mont. 1.985), 705 P.2d 9 4 , 107, 4 2 St.Rep. 1080, 1094. For t h e reasons s t a t e d above, we a f f i r m t h e conviction and sentence of t h e defendant. W e Concur: .