Title: State v. Brandolese

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
Opinion issued June 30, 2020 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC97697 
) 
MARK C. BRANDOLESE, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PETTIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Robert L. Koffman, Judge 
Mark C. Brandolese appeals from the circuit court’s judgment convicting him of 
one count of second-degree domestic assault and one count of armed criminal action.  
Brandolese raises six points of error, challenging the circuit court’s failure to disqualify a 
juror, the jury instruction submitted on self-defense, the circuit court’s response to the 
jury’s question regarding the mental state for domestic assault, and two evidentiary rulings. 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.1 
1 This Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. 
2 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 
Brandolese and C.E. resided together as roommates.  In March 2016, a neighbor 
called the police after C.E. appeared at the neighbor’s home with blood on his face.  C.E. 
repeatedly told the neighbor Brandolese hit him in the head with a cane.   
 
Officer Todd Nappe responded to the neighbor’s home and spoke to C.E., who 
appeared intoxicated.  C.E. stated Brandolese cut him, and his injuries were photographed.  
Officer Nappe also observed a cut across C.E.’s chest.  Officer Nappe followed a trail of 
blood from the neighbor’s home to the apartment where Brandolese and C.E. resided.   
When Officer Nappe spoke to Brandolese about the incident, Brandolese told 
Officer Nappe that, while he was asleep in a recliner, C.E. approached him and punched 
him in the face.  Brandolese woke up, grabbed his walking cane, and hit C.E. with it.  
Brandolese stated the altercation moved into the bathroom, at which point Brandolese 
pushed C.E. into a vanity mirror, causing it to break.  Brandolese admitted to Officer Nappe 
he “slashed” C.E. with a knife.  Officer Nappe did not observe any visible marks on 
Brandolese consistent with his account of being punched in the face; however, Brandolese 
had blood on his left hand.  Officer Nappe seized a blood-stained walking cane and a small 
folding pocket knife.     
 
Brandolese was arrested and charged with first-degree domestic assault, armed 
criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon.2  At trial, C.E. did not testify.  Brandolese 
asserted self-defense but submitted outdated and improper self-defense instructions to the 
                                              
2 The unlawful use of a weapon charge was dismissed prior to trial. 
3 
court.  The circuit court submitted to the jury a self-defense instruction tendered by the 
State that was also an outdated version of the pattern instruction.  The jury returned a 
verdict finding Brandolese guilty of a lesser-included offense, second-degree domestic 
assault, and armed criminal action.  The circuit court sentenced Brandolese as a prior and 
persistent offender to concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment for domestic assault and 
10 years’ imprisonment for armed criminal action.  Brandolese appeals.3 
I.
Juror Disqualification under Section 494.470.14
In his first point, Brandolese argues the circuit court plainly erred in failing to strike 
for cause Juror No. 16 because she was the sister of an assistant prosecuting attorney who 
participated in Brandolese’s case.  Brandolese claims Juror No. 16 was statutorily 
disqualified from serving on the jury pursuant to section 494.470.1, and the circuit court’s 
ruling violated his right to a fair and impartial jury requiring reversal of his conviction and 
a new trial.  
All parties agree that Juror No. 16 is related to Robert Anthony Farkas, who served 
as an assistant prosecuting attorney in Pettis County where Brandolese was convicted. 
Farkas signed the complaint charging Brandolese.  Docket entries indicate Farkas appeared 
on the State’s behalf in Brandolese’s case on March 22, April 12, and May 17, 2016.  On 
June 1, 2016, a grand jury indicted Brandolese.  Docket entries do not contain any reference 
3 Other relevant facts will be discussed as necessary in the appropriate sections of this 
opinion. 
4 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013 unless otherwise indicated. 
4 
to Farkas participating in the matter after Brandolese’s indictment was returned, and Farkas 
did not participate in Brandolese’s trial in May 2017. 
Phillip Sawyer, Pettis County’s elected prosecuting attorney, represented the State 
at Brandolese’s trial.  During jury selection, Juror No. 16 responded to a question posed by 
defense counsel about being a crime victim.  After Juror No. 16 gave her response to the 
question, the following exchange took place:  
[Defense Counsel]: I notice your last name.  Are you a relative of Tony [F]arkas? 
Juror 16: Yes. That’s my brother. 
[Defense Counsel]: So your brother is a prosecutor? 
Juror 16: Yeah. 
Neither party questioned Juror No. 16 further about her relationship with her brother, prior 
knowledge of the case due to the relationship, or whether the relationship would affect her 
ability to be
 fair and impartial. 
While asserting challenges for cause, Brandolese made a contemporaneous objection 
to Juror No. 16 being seated on the jury because she was Farkas’ sister, but he did not 
argue or claim Juror No. 16 was statutorily disqualified as authority for striking 
her.  The discussion was limited to Juror’s No. 16’s ability to be fair and impartial and 
included the following exchange: 
The Court:  Strikes for the defense? 
[Defense Counsel]:  Farkas’ sister, Number 16, I think she should go for 
cause.  
The Court:  Again, the question wasn’t asked – 
5 
[The State]:  There was no question. 
The Court:  -- to delve into why she couldn’t be fair.  It just -- all the question 
was, she’s Tony Farkas’ sister, nothing on why she can’t be fair.  I’m not 
taking that one for cause. 
[Defense Counsel]: Even though her beloved brother works for the 
prosecutor.  
The Court:  That’s great.  
[Defense Counsel]:  Okay. 
The Court:  I don’t even know if it’s a beloved brother.  I didn’t hear any 
evidence to that, either.  The questions that would prejudice her have not 
been asked.  She’s giving you something that causes you to strike her for 
preemptory challenge, I would agree, but for cause, I haven’t heard it. 
Overruled. 
Defense counsel did not use a peremptory strike to remove Juror No. 16, and she 
served on the jury.  Brandolese’s claim of error on this issue was not included in his motion 
for new trial and at no time during the proceedings before this appeal did Brandolese allege 
Juror No. 16 was statutorily disqualified from serving on the jury pursuant to section 
494.070.1.  Because Brandolese did not bring this alleged error to the circuit court’s 
attention, Brandolese’s claim is reviewed for plain error under Rule 30.20.5   
Standard of Review 
Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error.  State v. Cella, 
32 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. banc 2000).  Rule 30.20 alters the general rule by giving appellate 
courts discretion to review “plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in 
5 Brandolese concedes his claim of error was not preserved and seeks plain error review 
from this Court. 
6 
the discretion of the court . . . when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage 
of justice has resulted therefrom.”  Rule 30.20.  “Plain error review is discretionary, and 
this Court will not review a claim for plain error unless the claimed error ‘facially 
establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of 
justice has resulted.’”  Clay, 533 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. 
Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 1995), and Rule 30.20). “The plain language of 
Rule 30.20 demonstrates that not every allegation of plain error is entitled to review.”  State 
v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo. banc 2013).  “The plain error rule is to be used
sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise 
preserved for appellate review.”  State v. Jones, 427 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Mo. banc 2014). 
Unless manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice is shown, an appellate court should 
“decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20.”  Id. at 196.  Finally, “the defendant 
bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice entitling him to” plain error review. 
State v. Oates, 540 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 
650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006)). 
Analysis 
Section 494.470.1 provides, in pertinent part, “no person who is kin to … the injured 
party, accused, or prosecuting or circuit attorney in a criminal case within the fourth degree 
of consanguinity or affinity shall be sworn as a juror in the same cause.”  Brandolese argues 
his challenge to strike Juror No. 16 for cause should have been sustained pursuant to section 
494.470.1.  Brandolese contends the statute’s use of “prosecuting or circuit attorney” refers 
to any attorney representing the State who participated in the prosecution of the case, 
7 
 
making Juror No. 16 disqualified to serve on the jury.  The State contends “prosecuting or 
circuit attorney” as used in section 494.470.1 applies only to the elected prosecuting 
attorney, not assistant prosecuting attorneys.  Juror No. 16’s brother was not the elected 
prosecutor, so the State argues the statute does not disqualify Juror No. 16.  
This Court, however, need not decide whether the circuit court’s failure to sustain 
Brandolese’s challenge to strike Juror No. 16 for cause violated section 494.470.1 because 
Brandolese has not demonstrated the alleged error led to manifest injustice warranting plain 
error review.  Rule 30.20.  Assuming, without deciding, whether section 494.470.1 applies 
to the facts of this case and the circuit court erred in not striking Juror No. 16, Brandolese 
must still “facially establish[] substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or 
miscarriage of justice has resulted” to be entitled to plain error review and relief.  Clay, 
533 S.W.3d at 714; Oates, 540 S.W.3d at 863.  Although Brandolese claims the circuit 
court’s failure to disqualify Juror No. 16 pursuant to section 494.470.1 violated his right to 
a fair and impartial jury resulting in manifest injustice, there is no evidence or allegation 
beyond the alleged unpreserved error itself that Brandolese suffered an unfair or unjust 
trial.  Brandolese, therefore, has not met his burden to establish manifest injustice. 
To be sure, a juror who cannot be fair and impartial should be stricken for cause to 
ensure a fair and just trial.  State v. Clark-Ramsey, 88 S.W.3d 484, 488-89 (Mo. App. 2002).  
However, Brandolese does not allege nor demonstrate that Juror No. 16 was unfair or 
partial causing a manifest injustice in his trial.  Brandolese points to no statement by Juror 
No. 16 that she was biased or partisan due to her relationship with her brother, nor does he 
present any other evidence of unfairness, nor could he.  Juror No. 16’s only relevant 
8 
 
statement during jury selection responded to a question whether she was related to Farkas, 
and no further questions were posed to Juror No. 16 about her relationship with her brother 
or its effect on her ability to render an impartial and unbiased verdict.  Previously, this 
Court has not found reversible error after the defendant failed to ask the “obvious 
questions” to show prejudice by a member of the jury panel.  See State v. Walton, 796 
S.W.2d 374, 378-79 (Mo. banc 1990) (A juror who had “acquaintance and conversation” 
about the case “was not shown to have formed any opinion or to have been exposed to any 
facts indicating defendant’s guilt” because the exposure to the case “may have been 
prejudicial or may have been innocuous.”  To find prejudice “requires one to engage in 
assumptions not supported by the record.”); see also Grimm v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43, 49-
50 (Mo. 1957) (finding no error in refusing to strike a potential juror who was a longtime 
friend of the plaintiff and visited the plaintiff in the hospital while plaintiff was recovering 
from injuries that were at issue in the case).  Because Brandolese has not shown or even 
alleged Juror No. 16 was biased or unfair, he cannot establish manifest injustice warranting 
plain error review and relief.   
Moreover, Brandolese has not shown or even alleged that Juror No. 16 was aware 
of Farkas’ participation in Brandolese’s pretrial proceedings.  Juror No. 16’s only relevant 
statement responded to a question whether she was related to Farkas.  The question did not 
say or suggest Farkas participated in the prosecution of the case at any point.  The defense 
asked Juror No. 16 only to clarify that her brother is a prosecutor.  Brandolese and the 
dissenting opinion claim section 494.470.1 was violated not solely because Juror No. 16 
was related to an assistant prosecutor but also because Juror No. 16 was related to an 
9 
 
assistant prosecutor that participated in the prosecution of his case.6  This Court cannot 
presume or impute bias to Juror No. 16 without some evidence or suggestion the juror knew 
her brother was involved in an early stage of the prosecution.7  See State v. Miller, 56 
S.W.2d 92, 96 (Mo. 1932) (finding no prejudicial error in denying a new trial because “[a] 
juror cannot be prejudiced by a fact unknown to him”); State v. Chandler, 314 S.W.2d 897, 
900 (Mo. 1958) (finding no prejudicial error in denying a new trial when the source of 
presumed bias was unknown to the disqualified juror); Cf. State v. Stewart, 246 S.W. 936, 
939-40 (Mo. 1922) (holding no error in failing to disqualify a juror who was unaware he 
was distantly related to the victim).  “While the fact of relationship disqualifies the juror, 
it is really knowledge of such fact on the part of the juror that may be expected to and in 
fact does make such juror biased or prejudiced.” Miller, 56 S.W.2d at 96; see also 
                                              
6 Even during the discussion with the circuit court about Brandolese’s challenge for cause, 
the defense did not mention that Farkas briefly worked on the case more than a year before 
trial.  The challenge asserted only that Juror No. 16 should be stricken for cause because 
her brother worked “for the prosecutor.”  In fact, on review of the record on appeal, it is 
not clear whether the defense, the State, or the court knew Farkas participated in the 
preliminary proceedings of Brandolese’s case.  The challenge for cause was based solely 
on Juror No. 16’s relationship to an assistant prosecutor, not to an assistant prosecutor who 
participated in the case at hand.  But both Brandolese and the dissenting opinion would 
find the circuit court committed plain error as a result of this fact that was never brought to 
the court’s attention. 
7 The only presumption this Court’s prior holdings require is that Juror No. 16 was a fair 
and impartial juror.  This Court has stated jurors are presumed to have followed the 
instructions received from the court during trial.  State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo. 
banc 1995).  Instruction No. 1 instructed Juror No. 16 and the other members of the jury 
that their verdict “must be based only on the evidence presented to you in the proceedings 
in the courtroom.”  Further, Instruction No. 1 directly commanded jurors to “perform your 
duties without prejudice or fear, and solely from a fair and impartial consideration of the 
whole case.”  This Court, therefore, cannot presume Juror No. 16 was biased or partial in 
the absence of evidence supporting that conclusion; rather, this Court must presume she 
performed her duties as a juror fairly and impartially as Instruction No. 1 commanded. Id.   
10 
 
Chandler, 314 S.W.2d at 900.  While Juror No. 16 knew of her relationship to Farkas, the 
record does not show she knew of Farkas’ involvement in the case.  As this Court has 
explained, a juror cannot be prejudiced by a fact unknown to her.   
Brandolese argues and concedes that, but for her brother’s participation in his case, 
Juror No. 16 would have been eligible to serve as a juror pursuant to section 494.470.1.  
Implicit in this position is the supposition that if Juror No. 16’s brother had not participated 
in the case, Brandolese would have enjoyed a fair and impartial jury even though Juror   
No. 16 knew her brother worked in the same office that prosecuted Brandolese.  The 
injustice alleged by Brandolese, therefore, hinges on Farkas’ participation in Brandolese’s 
case – a fact unknown to Juror No. 16.  As Miller and Chandler instruct, however, it is the 
knowledge of the disqualifying fact that creates the injustice, not the mere existence of the 
fact.  Because there is no evidence Juror No. 16 knew her brother participated in the case, 
there is no basis warranting a finding of prejudice under this Court’s decisions in Miller 
and Chandler. 
 Nothing in the record before this Court establishes Juror No. 16 caused an injustice 
to Brandolese or prejudiced him.  Brandolese does not allege and presents no evidence of 
unfairness or impartiality from the juror in question.  In the complete absence of evidence 
showing bias or partisanship—or even evidence showing knowledge of the allegedly 
disqualifying relationship—Brandolese cannot establish manifest injustice.   
The dissenting opinion recognizes the alleged violation of section 494.470.1 is 
limited to plain error review because Brandolese failed to include the error in his motion 
for new trial.  Slip op. at 3.  Even after this recognition, the dissenting opinion fails to apply 
11 
 
Rule 30.20 framework and, instead, delves into a full merits analysis that relies on 
unnecessary interpretations of section 494.470.1 and constitutional and structural error 
arguments.  This position, however, ignores Rule 30.20’s exclusivity by jumping into a 
merits analysis without finding manifest injustice.  Such a conclusion is unsupported by 
this Court’s precedent and the language of Rule 30.20, which limits plain error review to 
situations “when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted 
therefrom.” 
 
 As previously stated, Rule 30.20 alters the general rule that this Court does not 
address unpreserved claims of error.  It is axiomatic, then, that the only way to review an 
unpreserved claim of error is to comply with Rule 30.20.  There is no alternative method 
for applying plain error review.  Based on the alleged error, the dissenting opinion, 
however, utilizes a different method to conduct plain error review of this claim.   
 
The dissenting opinion suggests this Court’s plain error analysis does not apply if 
an unpreserved statutory or constitutional violation is serious enough because the alleged 
error, in and of itself, establishes manifest injustice.  This assertion has no basis in Rule 
30.20, which clearly states that, in the realm of plain error, it matters not what the claim of 
error is, only that the claim of error is unpreserved.  See Rule 30.20.  The dissenting 
opinion’s assertion is also belied by this Court’s plain error precedent, which regularly 
addresses both statutory and constitutional claims through its well-established plain error 
framework and not any altered standard.  See Grado v. State, 559 S.W.3d 888, 899-900 
(Mo. banc 2018) (applying plain error analysis to unpreserved constitutional claim of 
12 
 
error); see also State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 511-15 (Mo. banc 2017) (applying plain 
error analysis to unpreserved statutory claim of error).8 
Furthermore, this Court previously rejected the argument that constitutional 
violations are subject to a different plain error analysis in State v. Howard, 540 S.W.2d 86 
(Mo. banc 1976).  In Howard, the defendant sought plain error review after the circuit court 
commented on the defendant’s failure to testify during his jury trial.  Id. at 87.  On appeal, 
it was suggested that Howard was automatically entitled to plain error relief without 
establishing manifest injustice because of the egregious federal constitutional violation.  Id.  
This Court rightly refused this invitation, holding “[e]ven a federal constitutional error may 
be considered harmless.  We will continue to review all the facts and circumstances in each 
case and determine on a case-to-case basis whether manifest injustice has resulted from the 
alleged error.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  This Court then utilized plain error analysis 
to determine a manifest injustice occurred at Howard’s trial.  Id. at 87-88.  Therefore, 
Howard stands for the proposition that all errors—whether statutory, constitutional, 
                                              
8 The unpreserved claim of structural error alleged by the dissenting opinion also does not 
automatically warrant reversal without a showing of manifest injustice.  The dissenting 
opinion acknowledges the United States Supreme Court “has several times declined to 
resolve whether ‘structural’ errors—those that affect ‘the framework within which the trial 
proceeds,’ —automatically satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test.”  Puckett v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 (2009) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 
(1991)) (internal citation omitted).  Moreover, federal courts do not follow Rule 30.20 and 
apply a different standard for conducting plain error review than Missouri courts.  While 
the federal question remains open as to the application of plain error review to claims of 
structural error, this Court’s precedent on plain error review under Rule 30.20 is clear in 
requiring a showing of manifest injustice. 
13 
structural, or based in some other source—are subject to the same treatment under this 
Court’s plain error framework.    
To be sure, however, Brandolese suffered no constitutional infirmity when Juror 
No. 16 served on the jury even if she was statutorily disqualified.  The Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a fair and impartial jury.  State v. 
Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. banc 1998).  The constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury, however, does not itself require the exclusion of any juror within a certain 
degree of consanguinity or with another personal relationship to one of the parties.  See 
State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 915-16 (Mo. banc 1992).  Absent a federal constitutional 
violation, states have the power to decide whether an error in violation of state statute 
requires automatic reversal.  Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 (2009).   
  Rule 30.20 is the exclusive means by which an appellant can seek review of any 
unpreserved claim of error and said claim—no matter if it is statutory, constitutional, 
structural, or of some other origin—is evaluated by this Court’s plain error framework 
without exception.  A violation of section 494.470.1 or any juror qualification statute does 
not itself manifestly insinuate that a defendant received an unfair and unjust trial warranting 
plain error review and relief under Rule 30.20.9  Under plain error review, the defendant 
9  There are many other juror disqualification provisions beyond section 494.470.  Section 
494.425 contains a long list of disqualifications for prospective jurors.  Statutorily 
disqualified jurors include:  anyone under 21 years of age; a person who is not a resident 
of the area served by the court serving summons; a felon who has not had his or her civil 
rights restored; any person on active military duty; and a judge.  Absent evidence to the 
14 
 
still bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice if an unqualified juror serves on a 
jury. Oates, 540 S.W.3d at 863.  While an individual who meets the criteria for 
disqualification under section 494.470.1 should be disqualified and excused, failure to do 
so does not independently result in manifest injustice, especially where there is no evidence 
the juror knew of her relative’s involvement in the case.  Therefore, Brandolese is not 
entitled to reversal of his conviction and a new trial because the circuit court declined to 
strike Juror No. 16 for cause. 
II. 
Instructional Errors 
In Points II, III, and IV, Brandolese alleges the circuit court erred instructing the 
jury on self- defense and the definition of knowingly as used in a separate instruction.  
These claims of error, however, were not raised with the circuit court.  The self-defense 
instruction the circuit court gave at the State’s request was based on an outdated version of 
the pattern instruction.  While Brandolese objected to giving this instruction, he requested 
and proposed two separate self-defense instructions that, likewise, were outdated and 
improper.  During jury deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the court 
asking for a definition of “knowingly” as used in the second-degree domestic assault 
verdict director.  Without objection from Brandolese, the circuit court responded to the 
jury’s question with the following instruction:  “You are bound by the law as it has been 
presented to you. This is the only answer the Court is allowed to give you.” 
                                              
contrary, manifest injustice does not automatically result if a statutorily disqualified juror 
serves on a jury.  If this Court were to hold otherwise, appellate courts would be required 
to grant relief under plain error review any time a defendant raises the disqualifying fact 
for the first time on appeal regardless of whether a challenge for cause was made.  
15 
Point II alleges the circuit court erred in not modifying sua sponte the self-defense 
instruction submitted to the jury to remove initial aggressor language or, in the alternative, 
to include a definition of the term “initial aggressor.”  Point III alleges the circuit court 
erred in not modifying sua sponte the same self-defense instruction to include the option 
of non-deadly force as well as to include proper language and guidance regarding 
permissible use of deadly force.  In Point IV, Brandolese alleges the circuit court erred in 
failing to define the term “knowingly” following the written question from the deliberating 
jury.  Brandolese requests plain error review of all three allegations of instructional error. 
Standard of Review 
“Instructional error requires reversal when the error is ‘so prejudicial that it deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial.’” State v. Sanders, 522 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Mo. banc 
2017) (quoting State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 511-12 (Mo. banc 2011)); see also State v. 
Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 229 (Mo. banc 2006).  “All prejudicial error, however, is not 
plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear.” State v. 
Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted).  But even if the instructional error is evident, obvious and clear, the defendant 
must “demonstrate that the trial court so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury as to cause 
manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Cooper, 215 S.W.3d 123, 125 (Mo. 
banc 2007).  Moreover, “plain error review is discretionary,” and “this Court will not use 
plain error to impose a sua sponte duty on the trial court to correct Defendant’s invited 
errors.”  State v. Bolton, 371 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Mo. banc 2012). 
16 
Analysis 
Point II 
Brandolese alleges the circuit court plainly erred in not modifying sua sponte the 
State’s non-compliant jury instruction either to remove “initial aggressor” language or to 
provide a definition of “initial aggressor.”  He supposes the jury’s verdict would have 
differed without the initial aggressor language, or if the court had provided a definition of 
“initial aggressor.” 
Because Brandolese requested the circuit court commit error by submitting 
improper and non-compliant self-defense instructions, he is not entitled to plain error 
review of this matter.  Failure to submit a mandatory instruction is reversible error under 
plain error review when the instruction is requested by the defendant and refused by the 
circuit court.  State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 281 n.9 (Mo. banc 2002).  However, a party 
invites error by submitting a patently incorrect instruction.  “It is axiomatic that a defendant 
may not take advantage of self-invited error or error of his own making.”  State v. 
Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 632 n.6 (Mo. banc 2001) (alteration omitted).   In State v. Bolden, 
this Court declined to conduct plain error review and impose a sua sponte duty to modify 
a self-defense jury instruction when the defendant invited the error by agreeing to the 
instruction. 371 S.W.3d at 805-06.  Brandolese did not agree to the self-defense instruction 
submitted by the circuit court, but he invited error by requesting and proposing outdated 
and improper self-defense instructions.  While the case here can be distinguished from 
Bolden, this Court similarly should “not use plain error to impose a sua sponte duty on the 
trial court” to instruct the jury properly when the very instructions Brandolese requested 
17 
the circuit court submit invited and would have caused the circuit court to commit 
instructional error.  Id. at 806.  
Even if this Court were to exercise its discretion and conduct plain error review, it 
cannot find manifest injustice—let alone an “evident, obvious, and clear” error—for failing 
to modify an instruction that does not erroneously state the law.  See Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 
at 607-08.  The Notes on Use for the approved pattern self-defense instruction provide the 
initial-aggressor language should be excluded only if “there is no evidence that the 
defendant was the initial aggressor or provoked the incident.” See MAI-CR 3d 306.06 and 
MAI-CR 3d 306.06A, Notes on Use 4(a) (emphasis added).  If there is evidence the 
defendant was the initial aggressor, the self-defense instruction should include the initial-
aggressor language.  Id.  The evidence the State elicited that Brandolese had no visible 
marks on his face consistent with being punched in the face suggest Brandolese, not C.E., 
was the initial aggressor or provocateur in the altercation and supported submitting the 
initial aggressor language.  Similarly, Brandolese cannot establish manifest injustice for 
the lack of definition of initial aggressor.  Mere speculation as to what might have occurred 
if the term were defined is not sufficient to establish manifest injustice.  See State v. 
Goodwin, 43 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Mo. banc 2001).  Therefore, Brandolese fails to show how 
the circuit court’s instruction with the undefined initial aggressor language constituted 
evident, obvious and clear error resulting in manifest injustice.   
Point III 
In his third point, Brandolese alleges the circuit court erred in not sua sponte 
modifying the self-defense instruction as it pertains to the use of deadly force.  Brandolese 
18 
argues the instruction submitted to the jury failed to reflect that the issue of whether he 
used deadly force was in question under the facts of the case.  He contends the term 
“non-deadly” should have been included in the instruction; he also complains of various 
other non-substantive deviations from the pattern instruction.  Notably, the instructions 
Brandolese proposed and submitted to the circuit court also deviated from the pattern 
instruction with respect to these issues.  
Brandolese fails again to make the required showing warranting relief under plain 
error review.  As in Bolden, this Court does not wish to impose a duty on the circuit court 
to modify sua sponte a jury instruction when the instruction Brandolese submitted deviated 
from the pattern instruction and invited the court to err in the manner claimed on appeal. 
Bolden, 371 S.W.3d at 806.   
In addition, the submitted instruction did not erroneously state the law.  The 
instruction omitted the term “non-deadly” and other language from the approved patterned 
instruction when describing the use of force in self-defense but accurately explained the 
facts the jury must find “for a person lawfully to use force in self-defense.” MAI-CR 3d 
306.06 (eff. 1-1-07); MAI-CR 3d 306.06A (eff. 1-1-09).  While the non-compliant 
instruction submitted by the circuit court did not suggest whether the force Brandolese used 
was deadly or non-deadly, the language and guidance in the instruction did not deviate 
from the substantive law.  Therefore, Brandolese cannot establish an evident, obvious, and 
clear error that resulted in manifest injustice solely through non-substantive variation in 
the language of the self-defense instruction. 
19 
Point IV 
In his fourth point, Brandolese alleges the circuit court plainly erred in its response 
to the deliberating jury’s request for a definition of “knowingly” as used in the verdict 
director for second-degree domestic assault.  This verdict director required the jury to find 
Brandolese “knowingly caused physical injury to” C.E.  The instruction did not, however, 
define “knowingly.”  The jury asked the court for a definition, noting the verdict director 
for the lesser-included offense of third-degree domestic assault included a definition of 
“recklessly.”  After conferring with the parties, the court answered, “You are bound by the 
law as it has been presented to you. This is the only answer the Court is allowed to give 
you.” 
  “The response to a jury question is within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and the practice of exchanging communications between the judge and jury is not 
commended.”  State v. Guinn, 58 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Mo. App. 2001) (citing State v. 
Taylor, 408 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Mo. 1966)).   “Responses that simply refer the jury to the proper 
instructions already given are not improper.” State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 752 (Mo. 
banc 1997).  The Notes on Use for the approved pattern instruction for second-degree 
domestic assault provides the term “knowingly” as used in the instruction “may be defined 
by the court on its own motion and must be defined upon written request in proper form by 
the state or by the defendant.”  MAI-CR 3d 319.74, Notes on Use ¶8 (emphasis added). 
20 
Neither party requested the term be defined before the instructions were read to the jury. 10 
Therefore, the verdict director was in proper form when read to the jury.  When jury 
instructions are correct, a court may respond to a jury’s question by instructing the jury to 
be guided by those instructions.  State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 134 (Mo. banc 1998). 
Brandolese fails to show an error that is evident, obvious, and clear or a manifest 
injustice from the circuit court’s response.  Because the verdict director was correct, the 
court’s response to the jury’s question was not improper.  Furthermore, Brandolese only 
speculates that the definition of “knowingly” would have changed the outcome of the jury’s 
deliberation in his favor.  This speculation does not give rise to manifest injustice.  See 
Goodwin, 43 S.W.3d at 820.   Therefore, the circuit court’s response to the jury’s question 
does not warrant relief under plain error review.   
III.
Exclusion of Evidence
Brandolese contends the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the 
testimony of a defense witness about the victim, C.E.’s, “reputation” for violence.  At trial, 
Brandolese’s counsel informed the circuit court he intended to call another roommate of 
C.E. as a witness.  The witness would testify that, on a specific occasion after the altercation
with Brandolese, C.E. drank heavily and acted violently toward the witness. Brandolese 
argued this evidence would support his claim of self-defense because the witness would 
show C.E.’s “modus operandi” of drunkenness and violence.  Outside the presence of the 
10 In response to the jury’s question, the State orally requested the circuit court provide the 
approved pattern instruction definition for “knowingly,” but Brandolese did not join in this 
request. 
21 
jury, the witness testified in an offer of proof that he lived with C.E. for about a month and 
a half after C.E. was assaulted by Brandolese.  The witness recounted that he once tried to 
pour out C.E.’s liquor and C.E. reacted by attacking the witness.  The prosecutor objected 
to witness’s proffered testimony, and the circuit court excluded the testimony. 
Standard of Review 
The circuit court has broad discretion in admitting evidence at trial, and error will 
be found only for a clear abuse of this discretion.  State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 729, 737 
(Mo. banc 1997).  This Court will find a circuit court abused its discretion only when a 
ruling is  
clearly against the logic and circumstances then before the court and is so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack 
of careful consideration; if reasonable persons can differ about the propriety 
of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion.  
State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Mo. banc 1997) (alteration omitted).  This Court 
“reviews the trial court ‘for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was 
so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’”  State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 
73 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 452 (Mo. banc 1999)). 
“Trial court error is not prejudicial unless there is a reasonable probability that the trial 
court’s error affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. 
Analysis 
“[T]he trial court may permit a defendant to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior 
specific acts of violence of which the defendant had knowledge, provided that the acts 
sought to be established are reasonably related to the crime with which the defendant is 
22 
charged.”  State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 1991) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, evidence of a victim’s “reputation for turbulence and violence is admissible as 
relevant to show who was the aggressor and whether a reasonable apprehension of danger 
existed.”  State v. Gonzales, 153 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting State v. 
Buckles, 636 S.W.2d 914, 923 (Mo. banc 1982)) (emphasis added).  However, reputation 
evidence must be through “general reputation testimony, not specific acts of violence.”  Id. 
(quoting Buckles, 636 S.W.2d at 923).  Additionally, the defendant must show he or she 
knew of the victim’s reputation for turbulence and violence.  State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 
714, 731 (Mo. banc 2002). 
Here, the witness’s testimony did not offer general reputation evidence.  Instead, the 
testimony offered pertained only to a specific act of violence that took place after the 
assault.  Whether C.E. committed a specific act of violence after the altercation in this case 
is not relevant to the question of C.E.’s reputation for violence or Brandolese’s reasonable 
apprehension of harm during the altercation.  Under Rutter, a specific act of violence would 
be admissible only if offered to demonstrate a basis for Brandolese to fear C.E.  The 
incident in the witness’s testimony that took place after the charged assault, however, could 
not possibly form the basis for Brandolese’s fear of C.E.  Furthermore, because the 
proffered testimony was not general reputation evidence, it could not be admitted to 
support a theory that C.E. was the initial aggressor.  See Gonzales, 153 S.W.3d at 313. 
Because the witness’s testimony described only one specific act by C.E. after the 
charged incident in this case had occurred, the circuit court acted within its discretion in 
excluding the witness’s testimony. 
23 
IV.
Hearsay
Brandolese argues the circuit court committed plain error in allowing hearsay 
evidence that violated his Confrontation Clause rights.  Brandolese complains of several 
incidents involving supposed hearsay testimony, but these claims of error were not raised 
or made to the circuit court in the motion for new trial and, therefore, are not preserved for 
appellate review.     
Standard of Review 
“Unpreserved issues can only be reviewed for plain error, which requires a finding 
that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted from the trial court error.” 
In re Care & Treatment of Braddy, 559 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal 
quotations omitted).11   
Analysis 
“A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted and that depends on the veracity of the statement for its value.”  State 
v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. banc 2006).  “Hearsay statements generally are
inadmissible.”  State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Mo. banc 1997).  Additionally, 
a testimonial out-of-court statement is not admissible against the defendant under the 
Confrontation Clause unless the requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), are met.  State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 147-48 (Mo. banc 2007).12  
11 The standard for plain error is more thoroughly set forth in the discussion of Point I. 
12 Crawford requires exclusion of testimonial, out-of-court statements that are otherwise 
admissible unless the witness is unavailable at trial and the defendant previously had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  541 U.S. at 53-54. 
24 
The first incident for which Brandolese alleges error involves the neighbor witness’s 
volunteered statement that C.E. told her Brandolese repeatedly hit him with a cane.  The 
following exchange took place during the neighbor’s testimony: 
Q. Okay. When you called 911, …what did you tell them; what were you aware
of?
A. …[The victim] kept telling me over and over and over that…[Brandolese] hit
him in the head with a cane.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection.  
The Court: What’s your objection?  
[Defense Counsel]: Hearsay, and that’s not hearsay. 
[The Prosecutor]: Excited utterance.  
[Defense Counsel]: It’s not an excited utterance.  
The Court: Are you objecting or not?  
[Defense Counsel]: I am objecting. 
[The Prosecutor]: Excited utterance. He showed up at her house and told her what 
was going on and to call 911. 
[Defense Counsel]: I think you should—  
The Court: I think I’m going to sustain that. 
The circuit court sustained the objection on which Brandolese bases his claim of error. 
Therefore, no error—let alone evident, obvious, and clear error—exists. 
Later, the circuit court overruled a hearsay objection by Brandolese during Officer 
Nappe’s testimony.  The prosecuting attorney asked whether Officer Nappe developed an 
idea of what happened at the scene: 
25 
Q. Did you develop some form of an investigation or some form of an idea what
transpired by talking to [the victim]?
A. Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, hearsay. 
The circuit court overruled this objection.  Brandolese suggests this was an error that is 
evident, obvious, and clear.  However, the question does not ask for hearsay, nor did the 
officer’s response repeat an out-of-court statement.  Officer Nappe testified only that he 
formed an idea of what had taken place after he spoke with C.E.  Therefore, Brandolese 
fails to establish any error in the circuit court’s ruling, let alone an evident, obvious, and 
clear error, nor does he make a showing of manifest injustice. 
Finally, the circuit court overruled a hearsay objection by Brandolese when the State 
asked Officer Nappe how he knew C.E. was cut by a knife and Officer Nappe said C.E. 
told him Brandolese slashed him with a knife.  Immediately following this question, the 
State asked Officer Nappe if he spoke with Brandolese about the knife.  Officer Nappe 
responded he had and testified Brandolese said he had “sliced the victim with a knife.” 
Brandolese did not object to this portion of Officer Nappe’s testimony.   
“The improper admission of hearsay evidence requires reversal [only] if such 
evidence is prejudicial.”  Saint Louis Univ. v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Mo. banc 
2009).  “Confrontation Clause violations are subject to the harmless error test found in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).”  State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 667 
(Mo. banc 2007).  “A complaining party is not entitled to assert prejudice if the 
challenged evidence is cumulative to other related admitted evidence.”  Saint Louis Univ., 
26 
321 S.W.3d at 292.  “Cumulative evidence is additional evidence that reiterates the same 
point.”  Id.  “Evidence challenged on constitutional grounds that is cumulative of other, 
properly admitted evidence cannot have contributed to a defendant’s conviction and so is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Mo. App. 
2007); see also State v. Bell, 274 S.W.3d 592, 595-96 (Mo. App. 2009) (finding admitting 
an examiner’s testimony about a doctor’s opinions was harmless error because the evidence 
was cumulative).  Plain error review “requires a finding that manifest injustice or a 
miscarriage of justice has resulted from the trial court error.”  State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 
292, 300 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 167 (Mo. banc 2011)). 
In light of subsequent testimony regarding Brandolese’s own statement to Officer 
Nappe, whether the circuit court may have erred in allowing the officer to testify regarding 
C.E.’s statement in this instance is immaterial.  Brandolese cannot show that the error was
outcome-determinative and resulted in manifest injustice if later testimony demonstrated 
the same fact.  See Saint Louis Univ., 321 S.W.3d at 292.  For this reason, Brandolese is 
not entitled to relief due to the circuit court overruling his objection to the testimony. 
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
_____________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge
Wilson and Fischer, JJ., concur; Russell, J., concurs in part and in result and concurs in 
part in dissenting opinion in separate opinion filed; Draper, C.J., dissents in separate 
opinion filed; Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur in opinion of Draper, C.J. 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
        ) 
     ) 
Respondent, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
No. SC97697 
     ) 
 MARK C. BRANDOLESE 
     ) 
     ) 
Appellant. 
     ) 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT AND CONCURRING IN 
PART IN DISSENTING OPINION 
I agree with the principal opinion’s analysis concluding that Mark Brandolese did 
not meet his burden establishing manifest injustice and that any violation of section 
494.470.11 did not constitute plain error.  I respectfully disagree, however, with the 
principal opinion’s failure to find a violation of section 494.470.1.   I agree with the 
dissenting opinion’s analysis concluding that, for purposes of section 494.470.1, the 
legislature intended the meaning of “prosecuting attorney” to encompass assistant 
prosecuting attorneys, and, as a result, Juror No. 16 was disqualified from serving on 
Brandolese’s jury under section 494.470.1.  But, for the reasons indicated in the principal 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013 unless otherwise specified. 
2 
opinion, Brandolese failed to meet his burden demonstrating manifest injustice or 
prejudice, and the circuit court’s violation of section 494.470.1 did not constitute plain 
error.  Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC97697 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MARK C. BRANDOLESE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
The principal opinion’s holding, which condones kin of the assistant prosecuting 
attorney sitting in judgment on a case in which the assistant prosecuting attorney actively 
participated in, surely has legal scholar Sir William Blackstone spinning in his grave.  Not 
only is this holding unsupported by centuries-old precedent, Missouri caselaw, or a proper 
reading of section 494.470.1, RSMo Supp. 2013, under this Court’s rules of statutory 
construction, but it places burdens upon a defendant that are not required by the statute and 
reaches a patently absurd result.1   Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013 unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2 
 
Juror Disqualification under Section 494.470 
 
In his first point, Mark C. Brandolese (hereinafter, “Brandolese”) argues the circuit 
court plainly erred in failing to strike Juror No. 16 for cause because she was the sister of 
a Pettis County assistant prosecuting attorney, Robert Anthony Farkas (hereinafter, 
“Farkas”), who participated in Brandolese’s case.  Brandolese claims the circuit court’s 
ruling violated his right to a fair and impartial jury and section 494.470.1.  
Standard of Review 
“When the defendant is aware of facts which would sustain a challenge for cause, 
he [or she] must present [the] challenge during the voir dire examination or prior to the 
swearing of the jury, otherwise, the point is waived.”   State v. Marr, 499 S.W.3d 367, 376 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting State v. Goble, 946 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997)).   
“The rule requiring contemporaneous objections to the qualifications of jurors is well 
founded.  It serves to minimize the incentive to sandbag in the hope of acquittal and, if 
unsuccessful, mount a post-conviction attack on the jury selection process.”  State v. 
Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. banc 1991). 
While asserting challenges for cause, Brandolese made a contemporary objection to 
Juror No. 16 being seated on the jury because she was Farkas’ sister and characterized 
Farkas as Juror No. 16’s “beloved brother [who] works for the prosecutor.”  Although 
Brandolese did not cite section 494.470.1 in his timely objection, he plainly and 
unequivocally informed the circuit court he believed Juror No. 16 should be struck for 
cause due to her kinship with Farkas.  In State v. Amick, 462 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Mo. banc 
2015), this Court found a strikingly similar objection—which occurred when an improper 
3 
 
juror substitution occurred—was timely and specific enough to preserve the error, even 
though defense counsel failed to cite the specific statute at issue.  Here, the undisputed facts 
show Brandolese did not wait to raise Juror No. 16’s qualification to sit as a juror until his 
appeal.  The record unmistakably demonstrates that, prior to the jury being seated, 
Brandolese fully informed the circuit court his objection to Juror No. 16 sitting on the jury 
was due to her kinship with Farkas, who undisputedly worked for the prosecuting 
attorney’s office trying his case.  However, because Brandolese did not include this claim 
of error in his motion for new trial, he is entitled only to plain error review.  State v. Perry, 
548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. banc 2018).   
 
“This Court always has the discretion to engage in plain error review of issues 
concerning substantial rights, especially constitutional rights ….”  State v. Rice, 573 
S.W.3d 53, 73 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting State v. Brooks, 304 S.W.3d 130, 136 n.2 
(Mo. banc 2010)).  In applying plain error review, the principal opinion reframes the actual 
legal issue Brandolese presents and scarcely addresses section 494.470.1 or a defendant’s 
substantive, constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.  The principal opinion must 
ignore section 494.470.1 to reach its desired result because confronting the statute’s plain 
language undermines the principal opinion’s entire rationale that there was no manifest 
injustice in allowing Juror No. 16 to participate in deciding his fate.2 
                                              
2 The principal opinion relies on State v. Howard, 540 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. banc 1976), as 
rejecting a different plain error analysis when constitutional rights are at issue.  In Howard, 
the defendant asserted relief always should be given under plain error when a constitutional 
error is implicated.  Id. at 87.  This Court rejected that argument, finding it was appropriate 
to “determine on a case-to-case basis whether manifest injustice has resulted from the 
alleged error.”  Id.   I do not advocate for automatic reversal in every instance; however, I 
4 
 
Brandolese’s claim involves a question of statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law this Court reviews de novo.  State v. Richey, 569 S.W.3d 420, 423 
(Mo. banc 2019).  “It is a basic rule of statutory construction that words should be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning whenever possible.”  State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 
510 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. 
banc 2013)).  “This Court must presume every word, sentence or clause in a statute has 
effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous language.”  Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 
S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 2013).  “This Court may not add language to an unambiguous 
statute.”  Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 511.  
The Right to an Impartial Jury 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury.  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Missouri Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to a “trial by an impartial jury of the county.”  Mo. Const. art. I, 
sec. 18(a).  Further, in Theobald v. St. Louis Transit Co., 90 S.W. 354, 359 (Mo. 1905), 
this Court recognized: 
Under our system of jurisprudence there is no feature of a trial more 
important and more necessary to the pure and just administration of the law 
than that every litigant shall be accorded a fair trial before a jury of his 
countrymen, who enter upon the trial totally disinterested and wholly 
unprejudiced.  
                                              
believe this specific case demonstrates Brandolese’s constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury was violated when Juror No. 16 was not struck for cause due to her kinship 
with Farkas, resulting in a manifest injustice. 
5 
 
“To qualify as a juror, the venireperson must be able to enter upon that service with 
an open mind, free from bias and prejudice.”  State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 915 (Mo. 
banc 1992).  “A defendant is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors before he [or she] 
makes peremptory challenges ….”  State v. Lovell, 506 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. banc 1974).  
“[E]rrors in the exclusion of potential jurors should always be on the side of caution.”  
State v. Walton, 796 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Mo. banc 1990) (alterations in original) (quoting 
State v. Draper, 675 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Mo. banc 1984)).  Failure to sustain a meritorious 
challenge for cause to excuse a biased or prejudiced venireperson constitutes prejudicial 
error.  State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. banc 1991). 
“Before statehood and up to 1835 [Missouri] had only one statute dealing with the 
competency of jurors.”  State v. Thomas, 174 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo. 1943).  The statute 
“said nothing about any disqualification of jurors because of kinship between them and the 
litigants.”  Id.  In 1835, the legislature adopted Missouri’s first criminal code, which 
contained the first statute to address juror competence in criminal cases:   
When any indictment alleges an offence [sic] against the person or property 
of another, neither the injured party, or any person of kin to him, shall be a 
competent juror on the trial of such indictment, nor shall any person of kin 
to the prosecutor or defendant, in any case, serve as a juror on the trial 
thereof.   
 
Art. VI, sec. 8, RSMo 1835 (emphasis added).  “The clear purpose” of this provision was 
“to secure fair and unprejudiced jurors.”  State v. Stewart, 246 S.W. 936, 939 (Mo. 1922) 
(construing this statute’s successor section 4011, RSMo 1919). Although the constitutional 
right to a fair and impartial jury does not require the exclusion of jurors within a certain 
degree of consanguinity to a prosecuting attorney, Missouri has chosen to provide this 
6 
 
protection for more than 185 years.3  The 1835 statute has been recodified several times, 
but the language disqualifying kin of “a prosecutor” remained virtually identical until 1989, 
when the legislature adopted section 494.470, which addresses juror competence in both 
criminal and civil cases.4   
Section 494.470 
Section 494.470.1 provides in pertinent part, “no person who is kin to … the injured 
party, accused, or prosecuting or circuit attorney in a criminal case within the fourth degree 
of consanguinity or affinity shall be sworn as a juror in the same cause.”  Brandolese argues 
his challenge to strike Juror No. 16 for cause should have been sustained because, as 
Farkas’ sister, she was disqualified pursuant to section 494.470.1 from serving on the jury 
in that Farkas was a prosecuting attorney in the same cause.  Brandolese contends 
                                              
3 The principal opinion cites Ervin for the proposition “the constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury does not itself require the exclusion of any juror within a certain degree of 
consanguinity or with another personal relationship to one of the parties.”  Slip op. at 13.  
Ervin does not so state or hold.  Further, Ervin is inapposite in that it concerned striking a 
juror who was an acquaintance of the victim and an investigating officer.  Ervin, 835 
S.W.2d at 915-16.  Hence, the juror was not related by consanguinity or engaged in a 
relationship with a party to the case. 
4 In 1989, the legislature also enacted section 494.425, which sets forth instances in which 
person are ineligible from serving on juries due to age, citizenship, residency, prior felony 
convictions, certain mental or physical limitations or infirmities, active service in the armed 
forces, and being a judge in a court of record.  The principal opinion expresses concern that 
failure to disqualify individuals under section 494.425 automatically would result in 
reversal if this Court adopted my position regarding section 494.470.1.  However, the 
rationale underlying disqualification under 494.470.1 is based on centuries-old precedent 
specifically addressing the unique relationship kinfolk have with one another such that bias 
and prejudice resulting from that relationship are presumed as will be discussed below.  
Hence, this rationale has no logical application to the individuals disqualified under section 
494.425. 
 
 
7 
 
“prosecuting attorney” refers to any attorney representing the state who participated in the 
prosecution of the case.   
The principal opinion declines to address this issue or Brandolese’s arguments that 
his fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury was violated.  Instead, the principal 
opinion focuses on whether Brandolese could demonstrate Juror No. 16’s participation 
resulted in a manifest injustice.  The principal opinion’s analysis puts the proverbial cart 
before the horse.  The simple fact Juror No. 16 was allowed to participate as a member of 
the jury, and whatever influence she may have brought to bear during deliberations, is the 
error, not whether the jury’s verdict was manifestly unjust. 
Construing section 494.470.1’s plain language reveals the patently absurd result that 
occurs in adopting the state’s position and condoning Juror No. 16’s participation in this 
matter.  Had Farkas remained the attorney of record and Juror No. 16 was on the 
venirepanel, the principal opinion would condone her sitting in judgment in the absence of 
a showing she was biased or prejudiced.  Hence, I feel it is important to analyze 
section 494.470.1 to further demonstrate the flaws in the principal opinion’s manifest 
injustice rationale.  
The state seeks to narrow the definition of prosecuting attorney to refer to the 
attorney’s position as the elected prosecuting attorney of the county in which a defendant’s 
trial takes place.  The state supports its construction by citing several provisions in 
chapter 56, which regulates the election, qualification, conduct, salary, and retirement 
benefits of the elected prosecuting attorney and any appointed assistant prosecuting 
attorney.  The state also relies on section 56.060.1, which confers upon the elected 
8 
 
prosecuting attorney the power to commence and prosecute all civil and criminal cases 
within his or her county.  The state argues, because the elected prosecuting attorney is the 
only individual authorized to commence a criminal cause, this is the only way to construe 
“prosecuting attorney” in section 494.470.1.   
 
The legislature needs to delineate between elected and assistant prosecuting 
attorneys when conferring these duties, powers, and compensation.  However, this 
delineation is not intended to employ chapter 56’s statutory distinctions to eviscerate a 
defendant’s 
fundamental, 
constitutional 
right 
to a fair and impartial 
jury when 
disqualifying a prosecuting attorney’s kin from jury service.  This narrow reading also 
ignores the unique role the elected prosecuting attorney and his or her assistant prosecuting 
attorneys play in the criminal justice system.  “A prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial 
officer entrusted and charged not only with the important responsibility to prosecute 
vigorously and fearlessly in behalf of the state but also with the no less positive obligation 
to see that every defendant so prosecuted nevertheless is accorded a fair trial.”  State v. 
Selle, 367 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Mo. 1963) (internal citation omitted).  “Their duty is not to 
seek convictions at any cost, but to see that justice is done and that defendants receive fair 
and impartial trials.”  State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Mo. banc 
1994) (emphasis added).  This Court recognized, “An assistant or deputy prosecuting 
attorney legally appointed is generally clothed with all the powers and privileges of the 
prosecuting attorney; and all acts done by him in that capacity must be regarded as if done 
by the prosecuting attorney himself.”  State ex rel. Nothum v. Walsh, 380 S.W.3d 557, 565 
n.9 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Falbo, 333 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Mo. banc 1960)). 
9 
 
Moreover, limiting the meaning of prosecuting attorney to the elected prosecuting 
attorney would render the words “in the same cause” meaningless because the elected 
prosecuting attorney participates in every criminal cause by virtue of his or her charging 
power.  It cannot be stated strongly enough that, under this faulty logic, had Farkas 
remained the assistant prosecuting attorney assigned to try Brandolese’s case when it went 
to trial, the state believes Juror No. 16 would be qualified to serve on the jury despite her 
kinship with Farkas because Farkas was not the elected prosecuting attorney.  Construing 
the statute in this manner defeats the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 494.470.1, 
which this Court has acknowledged as securing fair and unprejudiced jurors who are 
disinterested in the cause.  Stewart, 246 S.W at 938.  To read section 494.470.1 as splitting 
hairs between whether kin of elected or assistant prosecuting attorneys are qualified jurors 
would fly in the face of federal and state constitutional imperatives requiring criminal 
defendants to be tried by an impartial jury.   
Not only should a jury which hears a criminal case and which has great power 
be impartial in fact, but also if we are to hold true our ideals and retain the 
confidence of the community, the jury should also give every outward 
appearance of impartiality.   
 
 
State v. Carter, 544 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Mo. App. St. L. Dist. 1976) (quoting State v. 
Holliman, 529 S.W.2d 932, 942 (Mo. App. St. L. Dist. 1975)). 
The fair administration of justice and the avoidance of impropriety should compel 
this Court to find the plain meaning of prosecuting attorney “in the same cause” includes 
the elected prosecuting attorney by virtue of his or her power to commence the 
prosecution—in this case, Phillip Sawyer’s role in conducting the trial as the elected 
10 
 
prosecuting attorney—and assistant prosecuting attorneys who otherwise participate “in 
the same cause.”   This reading gives effect to all the words within the statute without 
adding any additional language to qualify “prosecuting attorney.”  It effectuates the 
purpose of the statute by prohibiting kin of these participants who have an interest in the 
outcome of the litigation from serving as jurors.  Most importantly, it safeguards a 
defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and avoids even the appearance of 
impropriety. 
By construing the entire statute, including the words “in the same cause,” this Court 
would avoid the state’s other concern that Brandolese wishes to read section 494.470.1 to 
strike the kin of all assistant prosecuting attorneys.  Kin of any assistant prosecuting 
attorney would not be disqualified automatically unless the assistant prosecuting attorney 
participated “in the same cause.”  Had Farkas never signed the complaint charging 
Brandolese nor appeared on the state’s behalf during the pretrial proceedings, Juror No. 16 
could be qualified to sit on Brandolese’s jury if it were shown she could be fair and 
impartial.  However, because Farkas was a prosecuting attorney “in the same cause” by 
virtue of signing the complaint and appearing at three pretrial hearings on the state’s behalf, 
I maintain Juror No. 16 was disqualified from serving on Brandolese’s jury under 
section 494.470.1. 
Inquiry into Bias, Prejudice, or Partiality 
To support its finding Brandolese did not demonstrate a manifest injustice occurred, 
the principal opinion essentially finds that, even if section 494.470.1 is construed to include 
disqualifying assistant prosecuting attorneys’ kin, Brandolese’s claim still fails because he 
11 
 
did not inquire whether Juror No. 16’s kinship with Farkas would affect her ability to be 
fair or impartial.  The principal opinion repeatedly faults Brandolese for failing to develop 
a record Juror No. 16 was biased and partial due to her relationship to Farkas.  Hence, not 
only does the principal opinion require Brandolese to demonstrate plain error and resulting 
manifest injustice, which is burdensome under ordinary circumstances, but the principal 
opinion constructs additional hurdles the legislature never contemplated.  Hence, 
Brandolese’s and every defendant’s burden is raised to an even higher standard than legally 
required.  Moreover, the principal opinion repeatedly conflates section 494.470.1’s 
language disqualifying Juror No. 16 as a competent juror because she is kin to Farkas with 
questioning a potentially qualified juror about the ability to be a fair and impartial juror 
generally and striking that juror due to bias.   
It is inconsequential the record contains no evidence of Brandolese questioning 
Juror No. 16 about any potential bias because section 494.470.1 does not require 
Brandolese to question or otherwise demonstrate Juror No. 16 could not be fair or impartial 
before she could be struck for cause.  Section 494.470.1’s plain language requires 
disqualification as a matter of law based on the juror’s kinship with a prosecuting attorney, 
not merely in those instances where the juror’s bias or partiality can be demonstrated.   
The principal opinion’s declaration that this Court cannot presume bias or prejudice 
in the absence of Juror No. 16’s actual knowledge her brother participated in Brandolese’s 
prosecution is wholly unsupported by centuries of caselaw.  In Thomas, this Court 
discussed the history and underlying rationale for section 494.470.1’s predecessor statutes.  
This Court recognized, “‘The rule seems to be settled that under the common law a juror 
12 
 
was disqualified if related to either of the parties  [by] … consanguinity or affinity...; and 
that this was a ground of ‘principal’ challenge  that is, of challenge on the ground of 
presumptive prejudice alone, without any showing of actual prejudice.”  Thomas, 174 
S.W.2d at 340.   
The common law theory of such principal challenges was that the fact of 
relationship spoke for itself without proof of actual prejudice, ‘for that’ as 
Lord Coke put it, ‘the law presumeth that one kinsman doth favor another 
before a stranger’; or, as one decision says, because ‘blood is thicker than 
water.  
 
 
Id. at 341-42 (internal footnote omitted).  Thomas cited Sir William Blackstone’s 
commentary that jurors could be challenged for bias or partiality, and “[a] principal 
challenge is such, where the cause assigned carries with it prima facie evident marks of 
suspicion, either of malice or [favor]:  as, that a juror is of kin to either party within the 
ninth degree ….”  3 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *363 
(Lewis Ed. 1767).  Bias has been implied to relatives of trial participants for centuries.  
Notably, in United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 49, 50 (D. Va. 1807), Chief Justice John 
Marshall asked, “Why is it that the most distant relative of a party cannot serve upon his 
jury?”  Chief Justice Marshall concluded “the law suspects the relative of partiality; 
suspects his mind to be under a bias, which will prevent his fairly hearing and fairly 
deciding on the testimony which may be offered to him.”  Id.  Hence, “[i]t is a universal 
rule that the relationship of a juror to one of the parties in a lawsuit disqualifies the juror.  
The question of whether he [or she] is biased or prejudiced is of no concern.”  State v. 
Miller, 56 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Mo. 1932) (emphasis added); see also State v. Chandler, 314 
S.W.2d 897, 900 (Mo. 1958) (“In a proper case on timely objection a juror within the 
13 
 
prohibited relationship should be excluded on the ground of presumptive prejudice which 
is the basis of the prohibitory statute.”).  Accordingly, the presumptive prejudice or bias of 
a juror who is kin to a prosecuting attorney does not turn on whether the defendant 
preserved the issue for appeal.  The prejudice is inherent from the kinship between the juror 
and the prosecuting attorney, which automatically disqualifies the juror from serving in the 
same cause because it violates a defendant’s substantive, constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury. 
This general principle has been recognized when applying Sixth Amendment 
protections to the defendant’s right to an impartial jury as well: 
[I]n certain instances a hearing [or questioning] may be inadequate for 
uncovering a juror’s biases, leaving serious question whether the trial court 
had subjected the defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.  While each case must turn on its own facts, there 
are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias.  
Some examples might include … that the juror is a close relative of one of 
the participants in the trial …. 
 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S. Ct. 940, 948, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 
984-85 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing this country’s extensive history of recognizing 
presumed juror bias in which prejudice must “be inferred from [a] juror’s relationships”); 
United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 145 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing “[i]t is well settled 
that the Sixth Amendment, like the common law, under some circumstances presumes bias 
when the relative of a party in a case serves on his or her jury in a criminal trial.  Indeed, 
consanguinity is the classic example of implied bias.”) (internal citations and footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added)).   
14 
 
The principal opinion wishes to place a prosecuting attorney’s kin on equal footing 
with mere acquaintances or jurors who have no familial connection to any party, despite 
the statute’s clear, unequivocal intent to disqualify kinship jurors from being seated.  This 
position is not supported by caselaw, especially when contrasted with cases in which jurors 
who had a non-kinship relationship with a prosecuting attorney were questioned to 
determine whether they possessed bias resulting from that relationship.  See State v. 
Shoemaker, 183 S.W. 322, 324 (Mo. 1916) (juror who was “well acquainted with the 
prosecuting attorney and his assistants” qualified to serve after stating “he would try the 
case fairly according to the law and evidence”); State v. Grant, 394 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. 
1965) (lifelong friend and former client of prosecuting attorney questioned regarding the 
ability to be fair and impartial); State v. Arnette, 686 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984) 
(acquaintances of county prosecuting attorney gave unequivocal answers and demonstrated 
no bias).   
The principal opinion treats Juror No. 16 as though she is an ordinary juror, whom 
a defendant must demonstrate is biased before being struck, and requires this Court to 
presume the seated juror followed the circuit court’s instructions to be fair and impartial.  
However, Juror No. 16 is not an ordinary juror.  She is the sister of an assistant prosecuting 
attorney who actively participated in this case; therefore, pursuant to section 494.470.1, 
she was required to be disqualified.  What seems to be wholly lost on the principal opinion 
is that pursuant to section 494.470.1, she should not have been seated; therefore, whether 
she followed the circuit court’s instructions is irrelevant.  Contrary to the principal 
opinion’s assertion, neither the statute nor caselaw requires Brandolese to question 
15 
 
Juror  No. 16 regarding the quality of her relationship with Farkas or whether she could be 
fair and impartial before requesting she be struck for cause or before demonstrating a 
manifest injustice occurred.   
Knowledge of the Juror and the Circuit Court 
The principal opinion also finds Brandolese cannot demonstrate manifest injustice 
because he did not show or allege Juror No. 16 was aware of Farkas’ participation in the 
pretrial proceedings.  Again, the principal opinion ignores the statute’s plain language, 
which does not premise kinship disqualification on knowledge of a relative’s participation 
in the cause, only knowledge they are kin to a prosecuting attorney.  Cf. Stewart, 246 S.W. 
at 939-40 (holding no error in failing to disqualify a juror who was unaware he was 
distantly related to the victim); Miller, 56 S.W.2d at 96 (holding if “it is conclusively shown 
that a juror, so related, did not learn of such [familial] relationship until after verdict, there 
is no good reason why a new trial should be granted.  A juror cannot be prejudiced by a 
fact unknown to him.”) (emphasis added).  Further, the principal opinion mischaracterizes 
the holdings in Miller and Chandler to support its argument Juror No. 16 could not be 
biased or prejudiced because she had no knowledge of Farkas’ participation in the case.  
Miller and Chandler focus on the juror’s knowledge of the kinship relationship, not 
knowledge their kin participated in a particular case to find prejudice.   
I believe the same reasoning applies to principal opinion’s assertion the circuit court 
may not have been aware of Farkas’ participation in the early stages of Brandolese’s case.  
The circuit 
court is presumed to know the law regarding 
section 494.470.1’s 
disqualification provision.  Amick, 462 S.W.3d at 415.  Brandolese developed a record 
16 
 
Juror No. 16 was Farkas’ sister, Farkas was an assistant prosecuting attorney, and the 
docket entries confirm Farkas’ appearance on the state’s behalf at three hearing dates in 
the early stages of the prosecution.  This case “illustrates the wisdom of trial judges erring 
on the side of caution in ruling on challenges for cause in criminal cases where a 
replacement can be easily obtained for a prospective juror of doubtful qualifications.”  State 
v. Stewart, 692 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. banc 1985).5   
Manifest Injustice Occurred 
I believe the circuit court’s failure to sustain Brandolese’s challenge to strike for 
cause Juror No. 16 violated section 494.470.1 and amounted to error that was evident, 
obvious, and clear.  I further assert Brandolese demonstrated a manifest injustice occurred 
warranting relief under Rule 30.20. 
In Missouri, “[f]ailure to strike an unfit juror is structural error ….”  Dorsey v. State, 
448 S.W.3d 276, 299 (Mo. banc 2014).  In Weaver v. Massachusetts, --- U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 
1899, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), the United States Supreme Court clarified the structural 
error doctrine, explaining:   
The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain 
basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any 
criminal trial.  Thus, the defining feature of a structural error is that it 
‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being 
‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’  For the same reason, a structural 
error ‘def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards.’ 
                                              
5 Given the small legal community in Pettis County with only one circuit judge, I find it 
disingenuous to continue to assert the state and circuit court were unaware of Farkas’ 
participation in this case without Brandolese bringing the docket sheets to the circuit 
court’s attention.  Moreover, Sawyer, the elected prosecuting attorney who tried this case, 
surely reviewed the case file when preparing for trial and became aware which of his 
assistant prosecuting attorneys previously worked on the case. 
17 
 
 
Id. at 1907-08 (alterations in original) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-
310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)); see also State v. Strong, 263 S.W.3d 636, 
647 (Mo. banc 2008).  The United States Supreme Court recognized there are “at least 
three broad rationales” for the structural error doctrine, which include: 
First, an error has been deemed structural in some instances if the right at 
issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but 
instead protects some other interest[;] ….  [s]econd, an error has been deemed 
structural if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure[;] …. [and] 
[t]hird, an error has been deemed structural if the error always results in 
fundamental unfairness.  
 
 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.  In Strong, this Court found, 
Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its 
function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal 
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.  One such structural 
defect is the trial by an adjudicator who is not impartial.  Therefore, where a 
criminal defendant is deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury, 
prejudice therefrom is presumed.   
 
Strong, 263 S.W.3d at 647 (internal citations and quotations to Fulminante omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
When determining the remedy for structural error, the United State Supreme Court 
took into account the nature of the error, when or if an objection was raised, and at what 
point during the post-trial proceedings the error was raised.  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910-
12.  Weaver affirmed when “there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct 
appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s 
actual ‘effect on the outcome.’”  Id. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
7, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)).  However, when the error is unpreserved and 
18 
 
raised on collateral attack, such as in a post-conviction relief proceeding, the defendant 
must demonstrate prejudice because the United States Supreme Court was concerned with 
“the systemic costs of remedying the error” at a time in which “[t]he finality interest is 
more at risk.”  Id. at 1912.   
The United States Supreme Court has not, however, resolved whether unpreserved 
structural errors automatically satisfy the requirement of plain error review that the error 
resulted in prejudice.  Rather, the Supreme “Court has several times declined to resolve 
whether ‘structural’ errors—those that affect ‘the framework within which the trial 
proceeds,’ automatically satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test.6  Puckett v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 129, 140-41, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.29 266 (2009) (internal 
citation omitted) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).  Hence, the United States Supreme 
Court expressly reserved the question of whether structural error automatically satisfies the 
prejudice requirement for plain error review.7 
                                              
6 The third prong of the federal plain error test is whether the plain error “affected the 
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he [or she] must 
demonstrate that it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”  Puckett, 556 
U.S. at 135 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 
L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 
7 Weaver involved a defendant who did not object to his trial being closed to the public 
during voir dire, during the trial, or on direct appeal, but instead, raised defense counsel’s 
failure to object as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1905.  
In finding the defendant had to demonstrate prejudice for this structural error, the United 
States Supreme Court expressed concerns with sandbagging and the circuit court’s 
inability to remedy the error at the time it occurred or after direct appeal.  Id. at 1912.  It 
bears repeating that, in this case, Brandolese made a contemporaneous objection with the 
circuit court about his challenge to Juror No. 16 sitting on the jury before the jury was 
seated and raised this issue on direct appeal, which alleviates the United States Supreme 
Court’s reservations. 
19 
 
The principal opinion seeks to expand Brandolese’s burden to show a manifest 
injustice occurred when challenging the failure to strike a juror under section 494.470.1 to 
demonstrate bias or partiality of the juror being challenged.  Setting aside the fact failing 
to strike an unfit juror constitutes structural error, the principal opinion cites no caselaw 
requiring a defendant to overcome these additional burdens.  The principal opinion is 
unable to do so because section 494.470.1’s plain language does not require a 
demonstration of bias or partiality to obtain relief.   
In In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Braddy, 559 S.W.3d 905, 916 
(Mo. banc 2018), the defendant moved to strike a juror for cause who possibly displayed 
bias, the strike was overruled, and the defendant failed to preserve the issue.  This Court 
held the failure to strike the juror “did not result in a manifest injustice as he was not shown 
to be unqualified under either section 494.470.1 or section 494.470.2.”  Id.  (emphasis 
added).  The implication in Braddy is that if the defendant 
had demonstrated 
disqualification under section 494.470.1, as Brandolese has done, this Court would have 
found a manifest injustice occurred.   
Hence, I contend the circuit court’s failure to strike Juror No. 16 constituted 
reversible error resulting in a manifest injustice.  Brandolese was deprived of his 
fundamental, constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury because a disqualified juror 
sat in judgment of his case.  I would reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the 
cause for a new trial. 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, CHIEF JUSTICE