Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SEADER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SEADER2003 WY 11976 P.3d 1236Case Number: 02-224Decided: 09/23/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                                                   

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

NEIL 
A. SEADER:

KIM 
SANDERSON and KIRK OLIVE,

Appellants(Respondents),

 

v.

                                                                                                

RONALD 
BATHRICK, duly appointed and

acting 
Personal Representative of the Estate

of  Neil Adam Seader, NEIL J. SEADER 
and

CHARLES 
LEE SEADER,

Appellees(Petitioners).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Megan L. Hayes and Stephen J. Jouard of Dwyer, Huddleson and Ray, P.C., 
Fort Collins, Colorado.

 
             
  

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Lance T. Harmon of Bailey, Stock & Harmon, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; 
and Matthew H. Romsa of Romsa Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
           
          

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; 
GOLDEN, 
Justice, filed a dissenting opinion with which HILL 
, 
Chief Justice, joined.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      The district court 
refused to apply the doctrines of equitable adoption, adoption by estoppel, and 
virtual adoption to avoid the operation of the anti-lapse statute.  The district court 
also concluded that the testator's will did not evidence an intention that the 
share of a predeceased devisee pass to that devisee's children.  The devisee's 
children appealed.  
We affirm.

 

            
1.         
Whether the doctrines of equitable adoption, adoption by estoppel, and 
virtual adoption are available under Wyoming law to allow the descendents of a 
predeceased stepchild to be considered lineal descendents of their 
step-grandfather under the anti-lapse statute?

2.         
Whether the district court erred in concluding that the testator's will 
did not evidence an intention that the share of a predeceased devisee pass to 
that devisee's children?

 

[¶2]      Julie L. Schroeder 
(Julie) was born on August 13, 1943 to Mary Allen Cirksana (Mary) and Louis 
Sylvester Burke.1  When Julie was two years old, Mary married 
Neil Adam Seader (Neil).  At the time of the marriage, Neil agreed to 
adopt Julie.  
Over the years, Neil voiced his intention to adopt Julie, and he treated 
her as if she were his natural daughter.  At one time, Mary and Neil discussed adoption 
with an attorney, but decided not to follow through because of the expense. Neil 
never did adopt Julie.  Nevertheless, she used the surname "Seader" 
as a youth.2

 

[¶3]      Neil and Mary had two 
sons, Neil J. Seader (Neil J.) and Charles Lee Seader (Charles).  Mary died in 1966, 
leaving her entire estate to Neil.  Julie had two children, Kim Sanderson (Kim) 
and Kirk Olive (Kirk).  In his Last Will and Testament, dated August 
30, 1996, after a few specific bequests, Neil left the residue of his estate to 
Neil J., Charles, and Julie.  Julie died on May 7, 2000.  Neil died on July 
10, 2000.

 

[¶4]      Neil's will was 
admitted to probate on July 21, 2000.  On May 2, 2001, the personal representative of 
the estate filed a Preliminary Report, Accounting and Petition for Distribution, 
in which he noted that Julie had predeceased Neil and he proposed distributing 
her one-third residuary interest to Kim and Kirk.  Subsequently, Neil J. filed an Objection to 
Preliminary Report, Accounting and Petition for Distribution, in which he 
contended that the testamentary devise to Julie had failed pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2-6-106 and 2-6-107 (LexisNexis 2003).3  Charles soon 
thereafter filed a similar objection.  That was followed by a Petition for 
Declaration of Status as Beneficiaries of Estate filed by Kim and Kirk.  Finally, Neil J. 
and Charles filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

[¶5]      On February 22, 2002, 
the district court issued its Order Granting Summary Judgment.  The district court 
concluded that the residuary devise to Julie failed because she predeceased Neil 
and she was not Neil's "grandparent" or a "lineal descendent" of Neil's 
grandparent, as required by the anti-lapse statute.4  The district court 
also held that Neil's will was clear and unambiguous and that it contained no 
indication that it was Neil's intention to have Kim and Kirk inherit their 
mother's share of the estate.  Several months later, the Order Approving 
Accounting, and Decree of Distribution incorporated the provisions of the 
summary judgment order.  This appeal followed.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      We recently 
reiterated our standard for review of summary judgments granted under W.R.C.P. 
56:

 

            
When a motion for summary judgment is before this court, assuming there 
is a complete record, we have exactly the same duty and materials as did the 
district court and must follow the same standards.  Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11 
(Wyo.2002).  
The propriety of granting summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  This court looks at the record from the 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all the 
favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions, and other materials appearing in the record.  Id.

            
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment.  If the movant 
carries this burden, the party opposing the summary judgment must come forward 
with specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 
(Wyo.2001).  A 
material fact has been defined as a fact upon which the outcome of the 
litigation depends in whole or in part.  Hoblyn, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11.

 

Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶¶ 10-11, 67 P.3d 627, 630-31 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
The Adoption Issues

 

[¶7]      Julie died two months 
before Neil died.  
Had she survived him, she would have taken one-third of his residuary 
estate under his will.  Had she been his biological daughter or his 
legally adopted daughter, her share of his estate would have gone to Kim and 
Kirk pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-106.  Likewise, had she been his biological 
daughter or his legally adopted daughter, and had he died intestate, her share 
of his estate would have gone to Kim and Kirk.5  She was not, 
however, legally adopted.  As a result, in an effort to take in her 
stead under Neil's will, Kim and Kirk now seek equitable recognition of adoptive 
status for their mother.6

 

[¶8]      We previously have 
held that "adoption at common law was unknown and, therefore, the adoption of 
minor children as well as the rights and liabilities emanating therefrom are 
governed by statutory provisions concerning descent, distribution, and 
adoption."  In re Randall's Estate, 506 P.2d 432, 432-33 (Wyo. 
1973).7  We also previously have held that substantial 
conformity with all statutory requirements is necessary to effectuate a legal 
adoption.  Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 
1988).  The present question is whether, under the 
circumstances of this case, equity should interpose itself where no legal 
adoption took place.

 

[¶9]      It will be helpful to 
preface our discussion of this issue with a consideration of the basic concepts 
that are involved, beginning with the meaning of "adoption."  Where, as in 
Wyoming, that term is not statutorily defined, the courts have supplied a 
definition:

 

In this regard, "adoption" has been defined by some courts 
as the establishment or creation of a legal relationship of parent and child 
between persons who were not so related by nature or law, whereupon the person 
adopted becomes the legal heir of his or her adopter, and the rights and duties 
of domestic relation with the adoptee's natural parents are terminated.  It has been said 
that adoption is the legal equivalent of biological parenthood, so that a decree 
of adoption renders the adoptee, for all intents and purposes, the child of the 
adoptive parent.

 

2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 1 at 
869 (1994) (footnotes omitted).8

 

[¶10]   In their Petition for Declaration of 
Status as Beneficiaries of Estate, Kim and Kirk set forth equitable adoption, 
adoption by estoppel, and virtual adoption as separate causes of action.  Where these 
doctrines have been recognized, however, they have largely been treated as 
interchangeable, and all are based on the same theory:  "[O]ne who had 
agreed to adopt a child during his life, but for some reason did not, for 
inheritance purposes alone, will be considered to have [. . .] adopted [the 
child]."  2 
Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, supra, § 43 at 
918-19.  Equitable adoption has been described as 
follows:

 

            
While a child to be adopted pursuant to an agreement between his natural 
parent and the adoptive parent cannot specifically enforce its adoption by the 
deceased adoptive parent, nevertheless, because of the agreement, he can obtain 
specific enforcement of the benefits that would accrue from such adoptionthis 
remedy is sometimes referred to as an equitable adoption.

            
The terms "equitable adoption," "virtual adoption," and "adoption by 
estoppel," have been used interchangeably by the courts.  Generally speaking, 
the theory of recovery in an equitable adoption case is founded upon either 
equitable principles or upon the theory of estoppel.  In the former it is 
a judicial remedy for an unperformed contract of legal adoption or, in the 
alternative, the ordering of specific performance of an implied contract to 
adopt.  The 
estoppel theory operates to preclude a party from asserting the invalidity of a 
status of an "adopted" child for inheritance purposes.  It has been said 
that a so-called "equitable adoption" is no more than a legal fiction permitting 
specific performance of a contract to adopt.  Furthermore, the descriptive phrase "adoption 
by estoppel" has been described as a shorthand method of saying that because of 
the promises, acts and conduct of an intestate deceased, those claiming under 
and through him are estopped to assert that a child was not legally adopted or 
did not occupy the status of an adopted child.

            
An adoption by estoppel is an equitable remedy to protect the interests 
of a person who was supposed to have been adopted as a child but whose adoptive 
parents failed to undertake the legal steps necessary to formally accomplish the 
adoption; the doctrine is applied in an intestate estate to give effect to the 
intent of the decedent to adopt and provide for the child.

            
The doctrine is predicated on principles of contract law and equitable 
enforcement of the agreement to adopt for the purpose of securing the benefits 
of adoption that would otherwise flow from the adoptive parent under the laws of 
intestacy had the agreement to adopt been carried out; as such it is essentially 
a matter of equitable relief.  Being only an equitable remedy to enforce a 
contract right, it is not intended or applied to create the legal relationship 
of parent and child, with all the legal consequences of such relationship, nor 
is it meant to create a legal adoption.  The need for the doctrine arises when the 
adoptive parents die intestate; the doctrine is invoked in order to allow the 
supposed-to-have-been adopted child to take an intestate share.  It is not 
applicable where the decedent dies testate.

 

2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, supra, § 
53 at 929-30 (footnotes omitted).  See also Rebecca C. Bell, Comment, Virtual Adoption:  The Difficulty of Creating an Exception to 
the Statutory Scheme, XXIX Stetson L. Rev. 415, 419-30 (1999) (comparing estoppel and contract as bases for 
the theory) and Harvey A. Schneider, Comment, Equitable 
Adoption:  A 
Necessary Doctrine?, 35 S. Cal. L. Rev 491, 492-96 (1962) (problems with contract theory).

 

[¶11]   Equitable adoption must be 
distinguished from adoption by contract, deed, or notarial act, a process 
recognized by statute in some jurisdictions.  Where such methods of adoption are 
legislatively sanctioned, they result in a legal adoption status that is no 
different from the status that arises from a decree of adoption in a judicial 
proceeding.  2 
Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, supra, § 43 at 918.  Equitable adoption, on the other hand, "is 
never viewed as the equivalent of a formal adoption, in terms of establishing a 
parent-child relationship, and is merely a status invented by courts of equity 
as a means of allowing a child in an appropriate case to enjoy part of the 
advantage of adoptive status."  18 Proof of Facts 2d, Equitable Adoption § 1 at 543 (1979).

 

[¶12]   The elements of equitable adoption are 
(1) an implied or express agreement to adopt the child; (2) reliance on that 
agreement; (3) performance by the natural parents in giving up custody; (4) 
performance by the child in living in the home of, and in acting as the child 
of, the adoptive parents; (5) partial performance by the foster parents in 
taking the child into their home and treating the child as their child; and (6) 
the intestacy of the foster parents.  Lankford v. Wright, 
347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1997); 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, supra, 
§ 54 at 932-33.  In granting summary judgment to Neil J. and 
Charles, the district court made no findings of fact in regard to any of these 
elements.  
Instead, summary judgment was granted on the ground that Wyoming has not 
recognized equitable adoption.  In this situation, we will assume that the 
facts favor Kirk and Kim, as the opponents of summary judgment, although we are 
troubled by the lack of verified facts in the record.

 

[¶13]   The majority of states recognize 
equitable adoption in one form or another, although the doctrine has been 
explicitly rejected in others.9  Almost exclusively, the application of the 
doctrine has been limited to intestate estates.  See, for example, 
Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61 (Alaska 1977); Estate of Wilson, 111 Cal. App. 3d 242, 168 Cal. Rptr. 533, 534 (1980); Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo. 
465, 463 P.2d 305, 306 
(1969); Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla.App. 1991); Roberts v. Caughell, 65 So. 2d 547, 547 (Fla. 1953); Franzen v. Hallmer, 404 Ill. 596, 89 N.E.2d 818, 821 (1950); and Lankford, 489 S.E.2d  at 
607.  It generally has not been applied to testate 
estates.  In re Estate of Wall, 502 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla.App. 
1987).  See also Rebecca 
C. Bell, supra, XXIX Stetson L. Rev. at 
435-39 (does not apply to testate estates, but only 
to intestate estates where the decedent's intent is unknown).10  In addition, the 
doctrine is generally limited to the equitably adopted person's attempt to 
inherit from an intestate adoptive parent, and is not used to enforce the right 
of the adoptee to inherit from collateral kindred nor to enforce the right of 
collateral kindred to inherit from the adoptee.  Heien v. Crabtree, 
369 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1963); Stanley P. Atwood, Comment, Virtual Adoption and Rights of Inheritance, XXI Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 312, 317 (1964).

 

[¶14]   Wyoming has not incontrovertibly 
recognized equitable adoption, even in intestate estates.  Three cases, 
however, deserve mention because they touch on similar or related issues.  In Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 24 
(1893), the mother of a child who had been abandoned by the 
father consented to the child's adoption by a childless couple.  Statutory adoption 
was pursued to completion, with the exception of the probate court's failure to 
enter the adoption order of record.  Id. at 25.  Upon the intestate 
death of the adoptive father subsequent to the death of the adoptive mother, the 
siblings of the deceased adoptive father sought distribution of his estate to 
themselves, claiming that the child's adoption was ineffective.  This Court reversed 
the district court's decree favoring the deceased's siblings on the ground that 
there had been substantial compliance with the adoption statutes.  Id. at 25.

 

[¶15]   Nugent has 
been cited for the following proposition:

 

The equitable adoption doctrine first appeared in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Missouri and Wyoming when these two 
pioneer states held that an agreement to adopt that did not fulfill the 
statutory provision of adoption could be enforced under the principles of 
equity.

 

Beth Ann Yount, Note, Lankford v. 
Wright:  
Recognizing Equitable Adoption in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 
2446, 2455 (1998) (footnotes omitted).  Our reading of Nugent leads us to the considerably more limited 
conclusion that the case merely stands for the proposition that substantial, 
rather than absolute, compliance with the adoption statutes is sufficient to 
create a legal adoption.  The emphasis in Nugent is upon legal adoption under a statutory scheme, 
not equitable adoption based upon an agreement.

 

[¶16]   Commentators have noted that courts 
have not always done well at distinguishing between contracts to adopt and 
contracts to make a will or leave an inheritance:

 

            
The courts often speak in terms of specific performance of the contract 
to adopt.  In 
according this remedy courts have sometimes failed to distinguish between a 
contract to leave a child's share of the adopting parent's estate to the adopted 
childwhich of course limits the right of the adopting parent to dispose of his 
estate by willand a contract to adopt, i.e., to 
comply with the statutory adoption procedure.  The latter type of contract leaves the 
adopting parent free to disinherit the adopted child just as he could disinherit 
a natural child.

 

Edward D. Bailey, Adoption "By 
Estoppel," 36 Tex. L. Rev. 30, 32-33 (1957); see also J.C.J., Jr., Note, 
Equitable Adoption:  They Took Him Into Their Home and Called Him 
Fred, 58 Va. L. Rev. 727, 729-30 (1972) ("Of course, a single case may involve both a 
contract to make a will and a contract to adopt, and courts sometimes fail to 
distinguish between them; but the essence of equitable adoption is the provision 
of a judicial remedy for an unperformed adoption agreement.") (footnote 
omitted).

 

[¶17]   Pangarova v. 
Nichols, 419 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 1966), is just such a case, largely because the parties, long 
before the matter got to court, blurred the distinctions between adoption and 
inheritance.  
In Pangarova, a man and his wife wrote 
numerous letters to their adult niece in Bulgaria, offering to adopt her and to 
make her their heir if she would come to Casper, Wyoming, to live with 
them.  Id. at 690.  The niece eventually did come to Casper and 
moved into the home of her uncle and his new wife, his first wife having 
died.  Id.  And the uncle did, indeed, make a will naming 
his niece as the sole beneficiary of his estate.  Id. at 
690-93.  
Unfortunately, the niece and the new wife did not get along, the niece 
moved out, and the uncle drafted a new will leaving everything to his new 
wife.  Upon the 
uncle's death, the niece filed an action seeking damages for breach of the 
contract to adopt her and to make her an heir.  Id. at 
693-94.

 

[¶18]   The district court directed a verdict 
against the niece.  
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, this Court emphasized that 
the alleged contract did not deal solely with adoption, but promised that the 
uncle would make the niece his heir.  We concluded that "[s]uch contracts are not 
uncommon in the case of minor children and are generally construed to impose 
upon the adoptive parent an obligation to make the child an heir, which equity 
will specifically enforce.'"  Id. at 695 (quoting R.P. Davis, Annotation, Specific Performance of, or Status of Child Under, Contract 
to Adopt Not Fully Performed, 171 A.L.R. 1315, 1318 (1947)).  This quoted language, taken from an 
annotation concerning enforcement of a contract to adopt, appears to be at least 
an indirect acceptance of the concept of equitable adoption.  However, the quoted 
language is followed immediately in the opinion by this sentence:  "Our difficulty 
here is that an adult is involved."  Pangarova, 419 P.2d  at 695.  Thereafter, we pursued neither that general 
issueadoption of an adultnor the specific issue of equitable adoption of an 
adult.  
Instead, we cited several cases where the contract being enforced in 
equity was not simply a contract to adopt, but also contained a promise to make 
the adoptee an heir.  
Id. at 695-96.11

 

[¶19]   On appeal after retrial, a jury verdict 
in favor of the niece was affirmed.  Nichols v. Pangarova, 
443 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 
1968).  While reference is made in the second opinion 
to "a contract that decedent would adopt her and make her his heir," the concept 
of equitable adoption is not directly discussed.  Nichols, 443 P.2d  
at 758.  Instead, the discussion focuses on "a 
contract to devise or bequeath property," "an oral contract to make a will," and 
"an agreement to will property."  Id. at 759, 761 
and 762.  In 
the final analysis, Pangarova is fundamentally not 
an equitable adoption case.

 

[¶20]   One other Wyoming case must be 
mentioned.  We 
have already cited Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d  at 552, for the proposition that substantial compliance with the 
adoption statutes is required for a legal adoption to occur.  The case also holds 
as follows:

 

            
Adoption in Wyoming is a statutory proceeding and cannot be accomplished 
by private contract.  
It is held that:  "If the relation of adoptive parent and child 
cannot be created by a private contract, it is equally certain that it cannot 
arise by estoppel."

 

Id. at 554 (quoting 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, § 8 (1962)).  Upon first reading, this language might 
appear to be an outright renunciation of the concept of equitable adoption 
(adoption by estoppel), but the facts and procedural status of the case indicate 
otherwise.  The 
appellant had filed a petition to adopt his fiancée's two children.  After the couple 
married, a decree was entered purporting to be a final decree of adoption.  The couple soon 
separated, however, and the appellant filed a petition to have the adoptions 
vacated.  He 
contended that the adoptions had been granted without compliance with statutory 
mandates.12  Matter of Adoption of 
AMD, 766 P.2d  at 551-52.

 

[¶21]   The district court held that the 
appellant was estopped from contesting the validity of the adoptions because he 
had invoked the jurisdiction of the court, because he had failed to show 
material misrepresentations, and because it was in the best interests of the 
children that the adoption be confirmed.  Id. at 552.  This is the context 
in which this Court, in agreeing with the appellant, held that the legal status 
of adoption may only be created by statutory compliance, and that estoppel 
cannot be applied to avoid statutory mandates.  Id. at 
553-54.  
Clearly, that holding had nothing to do with the traditional concept of 
utilizing equitable adoption to protect a promised inheritance in an intestate 
estate.

 

[¶22]   Matter of 
Adoption of AMD, like Nugent and Pangarova, left considerable doubt as to the status of 
equitable adoption in Wyoming.  Because the instant case also fails to 
resemble the typical situation in which the doctrine is applied, it will have 
the same effect.  
If Neil had died intestate, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003) would apply and his estate would have gone "[t]o his children surviving, 
and the descendents of his children who are dead . . .."  The "simple" 
question then would be whether to apply equitable adoption so that Julie would 
be considered Neil's child for purposes of intestate succession.  But that is not the 
question that is being asked in this case.  Neil did leave a will and he did make Julie a beneficiary.  Consequently, this 
case is quite unlike the usual equitable adoption case because its focus is not 
upon enforcing specific performance of a contract.  Instead, its focus 
is upon statutory construction.

 

[¶23]   Neither party presented this case below 
as a question of statutory construction, so the district court made no findings 
and reached no conclusions in that regard.  However, "[i]f the evidence in the record 
supports the summary judgment granted by the district court on any legal basis . 
. . we will affirm."  
Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 402 (Wyo. 
1997). Because the inter-related issues of adoption and the 
distribution of decedents' estates are purely statutory, we must apply our 
standard rules of statutory construction to the questions before us.13  We recently reiterated those rules at 
length:

 

            
"This court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's 
intent.  . . 
.  We begin by 
making an inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.  . . .  We give effect to 
every word, clause, and sentence and construe together all components of a 
statute in pari materia.  
. . .  Statutory interpretation is a question of 
law.  . . 
.  We review 
questions of law de novo without affording deference to the district court's 
decision."

Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 
82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 
(Wyo.2001).  If 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain 
meaning.  . . 
.  Only when we 
find a statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of 
statutory construction.  . . .  An ambiguous statute is one whose meaning is 
uncertain because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation.  . . .

            
"It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in 
light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished.  . . .  Furthermore, when 
we are confronted with two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose 
the one most logically designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the 
legislature was attempting to accomplish."

In re Collicott, 2001 WY 
35, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080 
(Wyo.2001).  We 
presume that statutes are enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of 
existing law, so we construe statutes in harmony with existing law, particularly 
other statutes relating to the same subject or having the same purpose.  . . .

            
Statutes must be construed so that no portion is rendered 
meaningless.  . 
. .  
Interpretation should not produce an absurd result.  . . .  We are guided by 
the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole.  . . .  Each word of a 
statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superfluous.  . . .  Further, the 
meaning afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless 
another meaning is clearly intended.  . . .  If the meaning of a word is unclear, it 
should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the statute's 
purpose.  . . 
.  We presume 
that the legislature acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one 
statute, but not in another.  . . .  If two sections of legislation appear to 
conflict, they should be given a reading that gives them both effect.

 

Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶¶ 9-10, 50 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Wyo. 
2002).  In addition, it is a well-known principle of 
law that courts are not free to legislate.  The first rule of statutory construction is 
that legislative intent, not a court's perception of fairness, controls.  State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 
1994); Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994).  It is not the court's prerogative to usurp 
the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said.  Barber v. State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725 
(1959).  The courts must follow, and cannot extend, 
statutory definitions.  State v. Weeden, 
17 Wyo. 418, 100 P. 114, 115 (1909).  For over a century, Wyoming courts have 
recognized that it is their duty only to interpret and declare what the law is, 
not to be responsible for its defects.  Hamilton v. Territory 
of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 131, 135 (1873).  And of specific importance to the instant 
case is the precept that exceptions not made by the legislature in a statute 
cannot be read into it.  State ex rel. 
Peterson v. Ellsworth, 59 Wyo. 288, 139 P.2d 744, 748 
(1943).  Courts should be particularly chary of 
applying equity to negate statutory intent.  Equity "arose in response to the restrictive 
and inflexible rules of the common law, and not as a means of avoiding 
legislation that courts deemed unwise or inadequate."  Lankford, 489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).

 

            
A court of equity has no more right than has a court of law to act on its 
own notion of what is right in a particular case; it must be guided by the 
established rules and precedents.  Where rights are defined and established by 
existing legal principles, they may not be changed or unsettled in equity.  A court of equity 
is thus bound by any explicit statute or directly applicable rule of law, 
regardless of its views of the equities.

 

Id. (quoting 27A Am.Jur.2d, Equity § 109 (1994)).

 

[¶24]   Kim and Kirk oversimplify the task 
presented to this Court.  They argue, correctly, that the question is 
whether their mother should be considered Neil's adopted daughter for purposes 
of the anti-lapse statute.  But they incorrectly characterize that 
statute as allowing the "children" of a predeceased "family member" to take the 
share of an estate that was bequeathed to the deceased family member under a 
will, but denying such treatment to "non-family members."  If that were the 
question, we would only have to determine whether Julie was a "family 
member."  But 
the statutory construct is much more complex than that.

 

[¶25]   Neil left the residuary portion of his 
estate to Julie, Neil J., and Charles.  Julie died before Neil did.  As applied to the 
facts of this case, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-107(b) provides that, if Julie's 
residuary devise lapsed, then the entire residue is to be divided equally 
between Neil J. and Charles.  Whether or not the devise to Julie lapsed 
depends on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-106, which provides, in effect, that if Julie 
is a lineal descendent of Neil's grandparent, the residuary devise to her did 
not lapse, and her share will go to Kim and Kirk.  The question is whether the legislature 
intended that result.

 

[¶26]   The phrase "lineal descendent" is not 
defined in the statute.  The word "lineal" connotes "a direct blood 
relative," and "lineal descent" indicates "[d]escent in a direct or straight 
line, as from father or grandfather to son or grandson."  Black's Law Dictionary 456, 941 (7th ed. 
1999).  "Lineal descent" is contrasted with 
"collateral descent," which refers to "descent in a collateral or oblique line, 
from brother to brother or cousin to cousin."  Id. at 456.  "With collateral 
descent, the donor and donee are related through a common ancestor."  Id.

 

[¶27]   The problem in the instant case, of 
course, is not that Julie was Neil's collateral relative.  The problem is that 
Julie was not the lineal descendent of Neil's grandparent either biologically or 
by legal adoption.  
Legislative intent is certainly clear that, had Julie been adopted, she 
would be considered Neil's child, and would then be a lineal descendent under 
the statutes.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-114(b) (LexisNexis 2003).  But, on its face, 
the anti-lapse statute just as clearly makes no provision for step-children or 
other persons who have not been legally adopted.  And in that regard, the words of the statute 
are not ambiguous.  
A lineal descendent is a lineal descendent.  We cannot create an 
ambiguity within the statute by asking whether we should apply an equitable 
doctrine to broaden the class of persons identified by the statute.14

 

[¶28]   The primary function of equitable 
adoption is to enforce a child's right to inherit from someone who promised, but 
failed, to adopt that child, and then died intestate.  Because the 
putative adoptive parent died without a will, there was neither a testamentary 
inheritance nor a testamentary disinheritance, either of which was an available 
option for the decedent (unless there was also a specific promise to make a will 
or leave an inheritance).  Equitable adoption is used to fill that 
intent "gap" by allowing the child to inherit as if she had been adopted.  Where a will has 
been made, however, there is no gap to be filled.  We know the decedent's intent from the terms 
of the will.  
In the instant case, we do not need equitable adoption to enforce Neil's 
intent to leave a portion of his estate to JulieNeil did that himself in his 
will.15

 

[¶29]   This case serves as a good example of 
why the doctrine of equitable adoption should not be applied to testate 
estatesthe result may negate both legislative and testamentary intent.16  The specific facts of this case also raise 
another consideration:  when the child seeking recognition of 
adoptive status is a step-child brought into the home by the marriage of her 
mother to the putative adoptive father, the inference does not necessarily 
follow that there was a promise to adopt.  A court may infer such a promise in cases 
where biological parents relinquish their child to others.  The same inference 
may not be appropriate, however, when a mother brings her child into the home of 
her new husband.  
In that situation, there may be an equal inference that the father-child 
or stepfather-stepchild relationship merely arose out of the domestic status of 
the parties.  
J.C.J., Jr., Note, supra, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 
737-38; George A. Locke, Annotation, Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption 
by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 26 at 65-67 (June 2003 Supp.).  See also, Rebecca C. 
Bell, supra, XXIX Stetson L. Rev. at 
430 and George C. Sims, Comment, Adoption by Estoppel:  History and Effect, XV Baylor L. Rev. 
162, 168-69 (1963).

 

            
As for the stepparent-stepchild relationship in this case, that 
relationship calls for particular circumspection before recognizing an equitable 
adoption.  
Courts have seldom applied the doctrine of equitable adoption or its 
equivalents to treat a stepparent as an adoptive parent.  . . .  One reason is the 
appreciation that it is in the public interest for stepparents to be generous 
and loving with their stepchildren.  Such conduct could be discouraged if a 
consequence of such kindness toward a stepchild would be the imposition on the 
stepparent of the legal incidents of parenthood, such as a duty to provide child 
support after divorce or a reallocation of the stepparent's estate after 
death.

 

Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 362 (N.M.App. 1998).

 

[¶30]   Finally, although it is part of the 
probate code chapter dealing with intestate succession, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-4-104 (LexisNexis 2003) should also be considered when determining the intent 
of the legislature as to the inheritance rights of children who have not been 
legally adopted:  
"Persons of the half-blood inherit the same share they would inherit if 
they were of the whole blood, but stepchildren and foster children and their 
descendents do not inherit."

 

            
Testamentary Intent

 

[¶31]   In their second issue, Kim and Kirk 
contend that the district court erred in concluding that Neil's will did not 
evidence an intention that their mother's share of his estate should go to 
them.  They 
argue that, even if the anti-lapse statute does not preserve the devise to her, 
this Court should give effect to Neil's intention, as provided by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-6-105 (LexisNexis 2003):

 

            
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal 
effect of his dispositions.  The rules of construction expressed in the 
succeeding sections of this article apply unless a contrary intention is 
indicated by the will.

We note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2003) also emphasizes the importance of testamentary intent:

(a)  This code shall be liberally construed and 
applied, to promote the following purposes and policies to:

. . .

(ii)  Discover and make effective the intent of a 
decedent in distribution of his property[.]

 

[¶32]   Before we address the parties' 
arguments as to testamentary intent, we will briefly review our standards for 
the construction of wills.  Consistent with the above statutory 
directives, "the intention of the testator must govern."  Hammer v. Atchison, 536 P.2d 151, 155 (Wyo. 
1975).  Furthermore, the intent of the testator must 
be ascertained solely from the meaning of the words used in the will.  Churchfield v. First Nat. Bank of Sheridan, 418 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wyo. 
1966); In re Boyd's Estate, 366 P.2d 336, 337 (Wyo. 
1961).  Where the will is clear and unambiguous, the 
court may not read into a will something the testator did not place there.  Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 81 (Wyo. 
1983); Kortz v. American Nat. Bank of 
Cheyenne, 571 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 
1977).  The courts will not supply words for the 
testator.  In re Lendecke's Estate, 329 P.2d 819, 822 (Wyo. 
1958).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-112 (LexisNexis 2003), 
which requires wills to be in writing, precludes ascribing to a testator any 
intention not expressed in the instrument itself.  Churchfield, 418 P.2d  at 1003; In re Boyd's Estate, 366 P.2d  
at 337.

 

[¶33]   In granting summary judgment to Neil J. 
and Charles on this issue, the district court made the following 
findings:

 

The Last Will and Testament of Neil Adam Seader is clear 
and unambiguous.  
Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the Last Will and 
Testament there is no indication that it was the decedent's intention to have 
Ms. Schroeder's children inherit the share Ms. Schroeder would have inherited 
had she survived the decedent.  To the contrary, such a provision is nowhere 
to be found within the Last Will and Testament.

 

[¶34]   The argument of Kim and Kirk that Neil 
intended for them to take their mother's share of his estate is contained in one 
paragraph of their appellate brief:

            
Under the will, Neil Adam Seader left the residue of his estate to three 
individuals.  
The will does not identify the relationship of any of these individuals 
to the testator and the testator made no distinction between them in the 
residuary clause.  
This evidences an intention that these three individuals be treated 
identically under the residuary clause.  In the specific bequest clause, the testator 
left his coins to the same three individuals equally, "share and share 
alike."  Again, 
evidence of an intention that these three be treated equally.  Finally, in the 
specific bequest clause, Julie Schroeder is given a Thomas Organ but the 
decedent's two biological sons are given nothing additional.  If this adds 
anything to the testator's intentions about Julie Schroeder, it is that she 
should be given preference over the biological sonscertainly not treated 
worse.

 

[¶35]   The specific provisions of the will 
upon which this argument is based read as follows:

 

            
SECOND:  
(SPECIFIC BEQUESTS) I make the following specific bequests:  (1) my Thomas Organ 
to Julie Schroeder; (2) the sum of $500.00 to Ronald Bathrick.  Also, (3) my coins 
in the safe deposit box to be divided equally among Charles Lee Seader, Neil J. 
Seader and Julie L. Schroeder, share and share alike.

            
THIRD:  
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, of every nature and 
description, real, personal or mixed, wheresoever the same may be situate, and 
whether acquired before or after the execution of this Last Will and Testament, 
and including is [sic] such rest, residue and remainder, any property over which 
at the time of my death I shall have the power of testamentary disposition, is 
directed to be sold and I give, bequeath and devise the proceeds to [be] divided 
to:

Neil J. Seader       Charles Lee 
Seader       Julie L. 
Schroeder

[Address]             
[Address]                     
[Address]

 

[¶36]   We agree with the district court that 
these provisions are clear and unambiguous and that they simply do not contain 
any hint of an intention on Neil's behalf that the bequest and devise to Julie 
should be exempt from the anti-lapse statute.  The will does not even refer to Julie as "my 
child" or to Julie, Neil J., and Charles as "my children."  There is nothing 
within the language of the will from which we can infer that Julie was intended 
to be considered a "lineal descendent."  It must be remembered that we cannot create 
an ambiguity within the will by application of the knowledge that Neil did not 
adopt Julie or by the assertions of others that he had allegedly previously 
intended to adopt her.

 

[¶37]   Even if we were to accept the 
contention that, at the time of his marriage to Julie's mother, Neil agreed to 
adopt Julie, that adds nothing to our assessment of Neil's testamentary 
intent.  An 
adopted child, like a natural child, could have been left out of the will 
altogether.  We 
would have to speculate to conclude that, because Neil included Julie in his 
will, he meant for the gifts to her to pass to her children if she predeceased 
him.  Such 
speculation is simply not justified; the terms of the will and the statutory 
provisions are equally unambiguous.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶38]   We decline to apply the doctrine of 
equitable adoption to affect the distribution of a testate estate.  Equity should not 
be available to countermand clear legislative mandates.  Adoption and 
probate are both statutory procedures, with formalities designed to ensure 
certainty.  
Where neither the applicable statutes nor the last will and testament are 
ambiguous, neither legislative intent nor testamentary intent depend upon resort 
to equity.  
Furthermore, there is no language within the unambiguous Last Will and 
Testament of Neil Adam Seader from which we can discern an intent that the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-6-106 and 2-6-107 not apply to the 
testamentary gift to Julie L. Schroeder.

[¶39]   The district court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment and Order Approving Accounting, and Decree of Distribution are 
affirmed.

 
GOLDEN, J., 
dissenting, with whom HILL, C.J., 
joins.

 

[¶40]      Because I believe there is room for equity under the unique 
facts of this case, I dissent.  With regards to the first issue, the 
application of the principles of equity to these facts, I disagree with the 
reasoning of the majority opinion.  The Wyoming Probate Code specifically 
provides that principles of equity should be applied to supplement Code 
provisions to the extent the equitable principles do not directly contradict 
express probate provisions.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(b) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The 
majority opinion finds such an express contradiction where I believe none 
exists.  The 
majority opinion relies heavily on a dissent in a North Carolina intestate 
succession case to support its reasoning, Lankford v. 
Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1997).  In Lankford, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court recognized and applied the doctrine of equitable 
adoption under a more standard set of facts, ultimately allowing a woman to 
inherit from the intestate estate of a woman who had held her out as her 
child.  Id. at 606-07.

 

[¶41]      The dissent in the North Carolina case was based upon a 
statute that is substantially different from Wyoming's statutes.  The North Carolina 
statute, included in the provisions governing intestate succession, provided 
that a person adopted in accordance with the adoption 
statutes is entitled by succession to any property by, through and from his 
adoptive parents.17  The dissent argued that the statute evinced a 
legislative policy decision that only those children 
legally adopted could inherit.  Id. at 608. 
Continuing this line of reasoning, the dissent interpreted the statute as a 
legislative mandate precluding the application of equitable adoption by courts 
for purposes of intestate succession.  

[¶42]      The majority in Lankford 
refused to accept the reasoning of the dissent, stating:

[W]e again note that an overwhelming majority of states 
that have addressed the question have recognized and applied the doctrine [of 
equitable adoption].  
More importantly, it is the unique role of the courts to fashion 
equitable remedies to protect and promote the principles of equity such as those 
at issue in this case.  We are convinced that acting in an equitable 
manner in this case does not interfere with the legislative scheme for adoption, 
contrary to the assertions of the dissent.  Recognition of the doctrine of equitable 
adoption does not create a legal adoption, and therefore does not impair the 
statutory procedures for adoption.

 

Lankford, 489 S.E.2d  at 607.  I believe that the majority in Lankford has the better argument, especially concerning 
the role of equity and the courts.  Equity is always available, and indeed is 
intended, to fill gaps in compliment with the law, whether common law or 
statutory law.

 

Equity follows the law except in those matters which 
entitle the party to equitable relief, although the strict rule of law be to the 
contrary. It is at this point that their paths diverge. As the archer bends his 
bow that he may send the arrow straight to the mark, so equity bends the letter 
of the law to accomplish the object of its enactment.

 

Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587, 591 (Mo. 1922).  A reading of the 
Wyoming Probate Code as a whole reveals that the legislature intends and expects 
Wyoming courts to apply equity when necessary to "discover and make effective 
the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property."  § 
2-1-102(a)(ii).

 

[¶43]      Thus, equity may be applied when necessary unless 
prohibited by an express probate provision.  The majority opinion finds such an express 
prohibition in the anti-lapse statute.  To save a bequest from lapsing, the 
anti-lapse statute requires the deceased devisee be a lineal descendant.  The majority 
opinion claims that the term "lineal descendant" is unambiguous and this Court 
cannot apply equity to "broaden the class of persons identified by the 
statute."  
"Lineal descendant" means no more, or less, than in a direct line, e.g. a child or grandchild.  The definition of 
"child" remains to be supplied.  In In re Cadwell's 
Estate, this Court quoted with approval a definition of "lineal descendant" 
that included "an adopted child."  26 Wyo. 412, 419-20, 186 P. 499, 501 (Wyo. 
1920).  "Child" 
is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301(v) (LexisNexis 2003) as including "an 
adopted child."  
No definition expressly states, or even implies, that the definition of 
"adopted child" is limited to a legally adopted child, to the exclusion of an 
equitably adopted child.  As such, I see no direct conflict in reading 
"equitably adopted child" into the definition of lineal descendant. 

 

[¶44]      Which brings me back to the initial enquiry  should equity 
be applied to these facts?  I would approach the question in a slightly 
different manner.  
Certainly this case does not present the standard set of facts for the 
application of equitable adoption.  Because Neil died testate, equitable adoption 
in the traditional sense does not apply.  The Wyoming Probate Code clearly directs that 
"[t]he intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal 
effect of his dispositions."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-105 (LexisNexis 
2003).  Thus, 
the critical inquiry is Neil's intentions as expressed in his will.

 

[¶45]      In determining the intent of a testator, it is important to 
note that the Wyoming Probate Code is set up as an "opt out" code.  In other words, the 
provisions of the probate code apply unless the testator evinces a contrary 
intention in the will.  Thus, the anti-lapse statute automatically 
applies unless the testator indicates otherwise in his will.  In this case, 
Neil's will provides no indication that he did not want the anti-lapse statute 
to apply.  
Thus, Neil's intent is for the anti-lapse statute to apply.  There is no 
question that if one or both of the biological sons had predeceased their 
father, their heirs would have taken "in place" of the deceased devisee.  

 

[¶46]      It is critical to note that the anti-lapse statute is not a 
statute of devise, but rather only limits the conditions upon which an 
inheritance will lapse.  The inheritance does not lapse if it is made 
to a lineal descendent.  If made to a lineal descendant, the "issue of 
the deceased devisee take in place of the deceased devisee."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-6-106 (LexisNexis 2003).  Thus, Kim and Kirk are not attempting to 
inherit in their own name or in their own right; they will only take in the 
place of Julie.  
It is still Julie's inheritance that is at stake.       

                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

[¶47]      Neil's will clearly indicated that he did want Julie to 
receive an inheritance from him.  The question is: did he want her to receive 
the inheritance as his daughter or as a non-relative?  The majority 
opinion decides the issue against Julie based upon the lack of any express 
language in the will referring to Julie as his daughter.  I believe this 
oversimplifies the process.  Neil never clarified anyone's status in his 
will.  I 
believe this lack of clarification renders the terms of the will ambiguous.  

 

[¶48]      "[T]the construction of the will is to be resolved by 
determining the intent of deceased as such appears from a full and complete 
consideration of the entire will when read in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances."  
Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971, 973 (Wyo. 
1986).  The 
circumstances in this case indicate that Neil consistently treated and referred 
to Julie as his daughter.  Julie was his wife's daughter.  When Julie's mother 
died, she left her entire estate to Neil, leaving nothing to Julie.  Then Neil executed 
his will, treating all three children equally in at least two provisions of the 
will, including the residuary clause.  I believe the family context creates a strong 
implication that Neil considered Julie his daughter, thus creating an ambiguity 
in his will requiring extrinsic evidence to resolve his true intent.

 

[¶49]      The complication in this case is that, even if Neil 
intended Julie to take as his daughter, Julie was never legally adopted by 
Neil.  Julie is 
legally not a lineal descendant of Neil.  I do not believe, however, that the inquiry 
is automatically at an end with the determination of Julie's legal status.  This case is 
presented to this Court as a plea to recognize Julie as adopted in equity.  If Julie is 
recognized as adopted in equity, for purposes of inheritance only, Julie would 
be a lineal descendant, her share would not lapse, and her children would take 
her share as her representatives.  This, I believe, is where there is room for 
the application of equity to affect Neil's testamentary intent.

 

[¶50]      This case was decided on summary judgment.  I would reverse and 
remand this case for further proceedings to determine Neil's testamentary 
intent.  
Starting with his will, we know Neil wanted Julie to inherit from him, 
but we do not know from the will what status Neil accorded Julie.  I believe the first 
issue to determine is if there is clear and convincing evidence to support 
equitable adoption.  
If there is not, the inquiry is at an end because Neil could not have 
considered Julie an adopted daughter.  Julie's share would thus lapse.  

 

[¶51]      If there is clear and convincing evidence supporting 
equitable adoption, then the question returns to Neil's testamentary 
intent.  Did 
Neil intend for Julie to take only if she survived him, or did Neil take for 
granted that Julie was his daughter and her inheritance would not lapse?  If it can be proven 
that Neil did want Julie to take as his daughter, then I believe it would be 
appropriate to apply the principle of equitable adoption, thus preventing 
Julie's share from lapsing.  This would then allow for Neil's testamentary 
intent to be fulfilled.  Applying principles of law and equity is 
exactly what this court is expected to do to "discover and make effective the 
intent of a decedent in distribution of his property."  
§ 2-1-102(a)(ii).

 

[¶52]      However, I note that many jurisdictions accept that 
"adoption by estoppel" precludes not just the foster parents but also their 
heirs from challenging the status of a child as equitably adopted.  See e.g. Shaw v. Scott, 252 N.W. 237 (Iowa 1934) (collecting cases); Fiske v. 
Lawton, 144 N.W. 455 (Minn. 1913).  In both Shaw and 
Fiske, the foster child predeceased the foster 
parents and the foster parents then died intestate.  The respective 
courts, after finding clear and convincing evidence of an agreement to adopt, 
estopped the heirs of the foster parents from challenging the status of the 
foster child as equitably adopted, thus clearing the way for the foster child's 
children to inherit their parent's share.

 

FOOTNOTES

1"Julie" is sometimes spelled "Julia" in the court file.

2None of the relevant motions, petitions, and legal 
memoranda in the record are verified or accompanied by sworn affidavits, perhaps 
because there does not appear to be any controversy as to the basic facts.  The facts stated 
herein are taken from the various pleadings and are set forth in the light most 
favorable to the appellants.

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-106 states:

If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendent of 
a grandparent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, 
fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the testator, 
the issue of the deceased devisee take in place of the deceased devisee and if 
they are all of the same degree of kinship to the devisee they take equally, but 
if of unequal degree then those of more remote degree take per stirpes.  One who would have 
been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testator is treated as 
a devisee for purposes of this section whether his death occurred before or 
after the execution of the will.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-107(b) states:

Except as provided in W.S. 2-6-106, if the residue is 
devised to two (2) or more persons and the share of one (1) of the residuary 
devisees fails for any reason, his share passes to the residuary devisee, or to 
other residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue.

4"In general, a devise or legacy left to a beneficiary in 
his individual capacity, and not jointly with others, will lapse upon his death 
prior to that of the testator, unless the testator has expressed a contrary 
intention, or unless a controlling statute otherwise dictates."  Matter of Stroble's Estate, 6 Kan.App.2d 955, 636 P.2d 236, 239 (1981).  See also 80 
Am.Jur.2d, Wills, §§ 1423-1430 (2002).

5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-114(b) (LexisNexis 2003) 
states:  
"Adopted persons may assume the surname of the adoptive parent.  They are entitled 
to the same rights of person and property as children and heirs at law of the 
persons who adopted them."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c) (LexisNexis 
2003) states, in pertinent part:

Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of any 
intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows:

(i)  To his children surviving, and the 
descendents of his children who are dead, the descendents collectively taking 
the share which their parents would have taken if living[.]

6Equitable adoption does not create an adoption; rather, it 
merely recognizes its existence for limited purposes.  Holt v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 685 S.W.2d 851, 858 
(Mo.App. 1984).

7Wyoming's adoption statutes are found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-22-101 through 1-22-203 (LexisNexis 2003).

8While adoption is not defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-101, which is the definitions section of Wyoming's adoption statutes, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-22-114, which sets forth the effects of adoption, contains 
language similar to that cited above:

(a)        Upon the 
entry of a final decree of adoption the former parent, guardian or putative 
father of the child shall have no right to the control or custody of the 
child.  The 
adopting persons shall have all of the rights and obligations respecting the 
child as if they were natural parents.

(b)        Adopted 
persons may assume the surname of the adoptive parent.  They are entitled 
to the same rights of person and property as children and heirs at law of the 
persons who adopted them.

9See 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, supra, § 
53 at 931-32 n.10-n.13; George A. Locke, Annotation, Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption 
by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 3, 359-66 (1980); Rebecca C. Bell, supra, XXIX 
Stetson L. Rev. at 417 n.12; Beth Ann Yount, Note, Lankford v. 
Wright: Recognizing Equitable Adoption in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 
2446, 2446 n.5 (1998); and J.C.J., Jr., Note, Equitable 
Adoption:  They 
Took Him Into Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 Va. L. Rev. 727, 727-28 n.7 
and n.10 (1972).

10But see Thomas v. Malone, 142 Mo.App. 193, 126 S.W. 522, 523-24 (1910), where an equitably adopted child was allowed to pursue a 
claim against a will as a pretermitted heir.  Further, some courts have begun to apply the 
doctrine to other claims, such as life insurance benefits, inheritance tax 
considerations, wrongful death actions, worker's compensation benefits, child 
support, and will contests.  George A. Locke, supra, 97 A.L.R.3d at 353.

11Hicks v. Simmons, 271 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1959) (oral promise to adopt and to leave adopting 
parents' property to adoptee); In re Gary's Estate, 
69 Ariz. 228, 211 P.2d 815, 818 (1949) (oral promise to feed, clothe, educate, and 
make heir); Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 96 S.E.2d 545, 546-50 (1957) (oral promise to adopt and to make heir to 
inherit as natural child); Fredrick v. Christensen, 
73 S.D. 130, 39 N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (1949) (legal adoption coupled with promise to make 
heir); In re McLean's Estate, 219 Wis. 222, 262 N.W. 707, 708 (1935) (no adoption promised, but oral promise to 
provide in will).

12The children had not lived in his home for six months, as 
required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111(a)(iii) (W.S. 1977).

13The adoption statutes and the probate code must be read 
together to determine legislative intent.  In re Cadwell's 
Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499, 500 (1920).

14That was the point of Chief Justice Mitchell's dissent in 
Lankford, 489 S.E.2d  at 608.

15Alternatively, what Kim and Kirk are asking this Court to 
do is to presume that Neil made his will in ignorance of the adoption statute 
and in ignorance of the anti-lapse statute, and that he actually intended a 
result opposite from the statutory results.  There is no evidence to support that 
theory.

16We are not herein determining whether equitable adoption 
may be applied in an intestate setting.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(b) (LexisNexis 
2003) allows for the appropriate exercise of equity in a probate case:  "Unless displaced 
by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity 
supplement the code provisions."  See Calista Corp., 
564 P.2d  at 61 n.18.

17N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-17 (2001).  Succession by, 
through and from adopted children

(a) A child, adopted in accordance with Chapter 48 of the 
General Statutes or in accordance with the applicable law of any other 
jurisdiction, and the heirs of such child, are entitled by succession to any 
property by, through and from his adoptive parents and their heirs the same as 
if he were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.