Title: STEPHEN BERNARD BARNES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEPHEN BERNARD BARNES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 62Case Number: No. S-10-0078Decided: 04/13/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.STEPHEN BERNARD BARNES V
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

STEPHEN 
BERNARD BARNES,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and David R. Hopkinson, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Hopkinson.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Stephen Bernard Barnes (Barnes), contends that his conviction for larceny should 
be reversed because the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by questioning 
witnesses using a technique wherein the prosecutor repeatedly asked Barnes if 
the witnesses against him were lying (or other similar words) when their 
testimony tended to contradict his.  
This tactic of the prosecutor persisted during closing argument.  Barnes' attorney did not object to the 
questions and did not ask for a curative instruction from the presiding 
judge.  On the basis of that issue, 
we will reverse and remand for further proceedings in the district court, 
consistent with this opinion.  
Barnes also contends that his defense attorney did not provide effective 
assistance of counsel.  Because we 
reverse on the basis noted above, we need not address his second 
issue.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Barnes raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.  Did 
the prosecutor commit misconduct when he cross-examined [Barnes] as to whether 
other witnesses were lying or mistaken? 

 
 
II. Was 
[Barnes] provided effective assistance of counsel?

 
 
The 
State's summary of the issues comports with that set out by Barnes, but 
qualifies Issue I as the "limited use" of such 
questioning.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Barnes had a 
history of alcoholism and mental disorders.  There is very little in the record about 
that other than Barnes' own testimony, but it is corroborated in part by medical 
records from the United States Veteran's Administration, Sheridan Medical 
Center.  Those records reveal only 
the medications prescribed to Barnes while he was a patient there.  Of particular interest here were these 
medications: oxycodone for pain; sertraline HCL (100 mg) for depression; 
sertraline TAB (150 mg) for depression; and trazodone for 
insomnia.

 
 
[¶4]      On or about 
September 9, 2008, Barnes was hitchhiking from Casper to Gillette.  Tom Jarrard (Jarrard) took note of 
Barnes because he had a United States flag tied around his possessions.  Jarrard made what he described as a 
"dummied up" decision to offer Barnes a lift, thinking he might be a returning 
Middle East war veteran trying to make his way home.  Barnes told Jarrard he was trying to get 
home (to Massachusetts) and that he was broke.  Jarrard offered Barnes some work on his 
nearby ranch digging a trench from a water well to an RV that was being used as 
a temporary ranch home.  At that 
site, Jarrard also had a blue flatbed pickup and a nicely restored sheepherder's 
wagon.  There was some 
canned/preserved food in the wagon and Jarrard provided Barnes with some 
additional fresh food.  Jarrard said 
that he would return in two or three days and assign additional work to Barnes, 
as well as bring more food.  Jarrard 
intended to employ Barnes for a couple of weeks.  Barnes testified that he had about 
$1,200.00 on him when he went to work for Jarrard.  Barnes testified that he did the work 
Jarrard asked him to do; Jarrard said he did not.

 
 
[¶5]      When Jarrard 
returned on September 12, 2008, Barnes was gone, as was the blue flatbed pickup, 
a television from the RV, a shot gun from the RV, an electric drill from the RV, 
and all the liquor that had been stored in the RV.  It was eventually discovered that all of 
the gasoline had been siphoned from the RV (maybe ¾ of a tank) and presumably 
put into the pickup, since Jarrard knew the pickup was very close to being empty 
on fuel.  He called the thefts into 
the Johnson County Sheriff and found out almost immediately that Barnes was 
already in custody in Laramie.

 
 
[¶6]      In the meantime, 
apparently late in the day on September 11, 2008, Barnes took all of his 
remaining medications, got drunk, and contemplated suicide by shooting himself 
with a shotgun he found on the premises.  
From this point forward, Barnes claimed he remembered nothing until 
September 13, 2008.  He left the 
worksite in the blue flatbed pickup (the keys were in it).  Although he claimed not to remember it, 
he stopped at Muddy Gap to buy gas.  
Because he did not have enough cash to pay the $135.00 fuel bill, he sold 
the shotgun from Jarrard's RV for $35.00 to a man named Ron Stoltenberg (Barnes 
apparently had a hundred dollar bill on him).  The date of this event is not identified 
in the record (Stoltenberg was not asked what date it occurred).  Stoltenberg later pawned the shotgun in 
Casper, and it was located there and included in the evidence in this 
trial.  

 
 
[¶7]      On September 12, 
2008, just after 3:00 p.m., Barnes was arrested for speeding (about 93 mph) on 
I-80 just east of Laramie.  He was 
driving from east to west toward Laramie.  
Once Barnes was stopped after a brief chase, the State Trooper assessed 
that Barnes was very drunk and he was arrested.  Barnes was questioned but he could 
remember virtually nothing of what he had done since late in the day on 
September 11th.

 
 
[¶8]      Of significance 
to the issues in this appeal, Barnes complained bitterly about the performance 
of his attorney and asked the district court for relief in the form of a new 
attorney.  Also, Barnes testified in 
his own behalf, and the principal thread of his testimony was that he remembered 
nothing from the time he became intoxicated on September 11th, until September 13th, when he woke up in the Albany County Detention 
Center.  During cross-examination, 
the prosecutor asked Barnes six times if witnesses were lying or mistaken when 
they did not agree with his testimony.  
In closing, the prosecutor described Barnes' defense as the "CRS defense" 
("I can't remember sh*t").  In his 
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor also spoke of Barnes' apparent 
contention that other witnesses were "lying."  We will fill in some gaps in this brief 
synopsis of the facts in our discussion, but the foregoing information provides 
adequate context for our remaining discussion.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
misconduct

 
 
[¶9]      In Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, 
¶ 15, 193 P.2d 228, 235-36 (Wyo. 2008) we held:

 
 
[W]e 
quote at length our holding in Jensen v. 
State, 2005 WY 85, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 
(Wyo.2005):

 
 
        
Turning to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Jensen, we note, 
generally, that a defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be 
cross-examined regarding his credibility just like any other witness.  Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1152-53 
(Wyo. 1988); MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 47 (Wyo. 1986); Porter v. 
State, 440 P.2d 249, 250 (Wyo. 1968).  
In Beaugureau [v. State, 2002 WY 160, 56 P.3d 626 (Wyo. 
2002)], however, we observed that there was a limit to the cross-examination of 
a criminal defendant:

 
 
Nonetheless, 
it is likewise error and misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a 
defendant using the "lying" or "mistaken" technique (i.e., well, then if 
"so-and-so" said "such-and-such," was he "mistaken" or "lying?").  Such questions are improper.  If the prosecutor merely asked 
Beaugureau about what other witnesses had to say, allowing the jury to draw its 
own conclusions, the cross-examination would not have been objectionable.  State v. Diggs, 272 Kan. 349, 34 P.3d 63, 72-73 (2001); State v. Manning, 
270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-3 (2001) ("Questions which compel a defendant or 
witness to comment on the credibility of another witness are improper.  It is the province of the jury to weigh 
the credibility of the witnesses."  
(collecting cases)); State v. 
Stevenson, 70 Conn.App. 29, 797 A.2d 1, 7-9 (2002) (Such questions are 
improper because they "require a defendant to comment on another witness' 
veracity ... invade the province of the jury, create the risk that the jury may 
conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the other 
witnesses lied, and distort the state's burden of proof.") (relying on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 234-39 (2002)) (collecting cases); also see State v. Walden, 69 Wash. App. 183, 847 P.2d 956, 959 (1993); and State v. 
Pitts, No. 47488-0-1, 2001 WL 1641225 at *4 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Dec.24, 2001) 
(per curiam) (use of word "lying" is misconduct; use of word "mistaken" merely 
objectionable).

 
 
            
Beaugureau, ¶ 17.  The reasoning for prohibiting this type 
of questioning was succinctly summarized by the Iowa Supreme 
Court:

 
 
[A] 
defendant who is asked whether another person lied is commenting directly on the 
other person's credibility.

 
 
      The issue then is 
whether any purpose is served in asking a defendant whether another witness is 
lying.  We think the predominant, if 
not sole, purpose of such questioning is simply to make the defendant look bad, 
as implied by the Maryland court's observation in [Fisher v. State, 128 Md.App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125, 1163 (1999)] that the accused's answer is unimportant.  * * *  The accused's answer is unimportant 
because the accused is in a no-win situation.  If the defendant says the other witness 
 is lying, then the defendant is put 
in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly unenviable state when 
the other witness is a law enforcement officer.  See [State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 
1992)] (holding such questions are improper because they put "the defendant in 
the untenable position of commenting on the character and motivations of another 
witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury").  If the defendant says a contradictory 
witness is not lying, then a fair inference is that the defendant is 
lying.

 
 
   But, as any trial lawyer knows, 
there may be many explanations for differing descriptions of the same 
event.  People have different 
perceptions of the same conversation that affect how and what they 
remember.  Perhaps there was a 
misunderstanding of what was said; perhaps one person was distracted and did not 
fully or correctly hear the words uttered by the other person.  People sometimes hear what they want to 
hear.  It is unjust to make the 
defendant give an opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that 
neither witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth.  It is also unreasonable to expect the 
defendant to sift through the variables of human communication to offer an 
alternative explanation for contradictions in witnesses 
testimony.

 
 
   We also think the use of this 
tactic--asking the defendant whether another witness is lying--is incompatible 
with the duties of a prosecutor.  
Unfairly questioning the defendant simply to make the defendant look bad 
in front of the jury regardless of the answer given is not consistent with the 
prosecutor's primary obligation to seek justice, not simply a conviction.  Nor is such questioning consistent with 
the prosecutor's duty to the defendant to ensure a fair trial, including a 
verdict that rests on the evidence and not on passion or prejudice.  [State v. Casteneda-Perez, 61 Wash. App. 354, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (Wash.Ct.App.1991)] (holding prosecutor's questions asking 
witnesses whether other witnesses were lying was "contrary to the duty of 
prosecutors, which is to seek convictions based only on probative evidence and 
sound reason").

 
 

State 
v. Graves, 
668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 (Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
            
The admonition against asking the appellant whether other witnesses lied 
applies equally to asking any witness whether another witness has lied.  State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-01 (2001).  That is because 
such questions invade the province of the jury to determine witness 
credibility.  Id. The State clearly violated an 
unambiguous rule of law by asking both the appellant and Dr. Rogers whether 
other witnesses had lied.  The 
violation was more egregious during the cross-examination of the appellant, 
where there were many such questions.

 
 
[¶10]   In the Proffit case we reversed the defendant's 
convictions on eight counts of third-degree sexual assault, in part based on the 
immediate issue, in part on ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as many 
other contributing trial errors.  In 
Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, 116 P.3d 1088 (Wyo. 2005), we found a similar line of questioning to be harmless error 
and affirmed the convictions at issue in that case.

 
 
[¶11]   More recently, in Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, 
¶¶ 41-43, 228 P.3d 874, 888 (Wyo. 2010) we opined:

 
 
"Although 
a defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his 
credibility just like any other witness, there are limits placed upon the 
prosecutor."  Talley [v. State, 2007 WY 37], ¶ 10, 153 P.3d  at 260.  A witness may not 
comment on the truthfulness or veracity of another witness.  Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo. 
1999).  It is the jury's duty to 
resolve factual issues, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and determine 
the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 
1998).  It is error and misconduct 
for a prosecutor to ask a witness whether he thinks other witnesses are "lying" 
or "mistaken."  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, 
¶ 15, 193 P.3d 228, 235 (Wyo. 2008), citing Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 
56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
            
The State concedes that the questions by the prosecutor violated a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law.  It 
asserts, however, that Mr. Schreibvogel cannot establish that the misconduct 
resulted in unfair prejudice.  To 
determine whether unfair prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct has occurred 
this Court balances several factors:  
"1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the significance 
of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; 3) the strength of the 
State's evidence; 4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative 
measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense invited the misconduct."  Talley, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d  at 262.   When we apply these factors to the 
challenged testimony, we are unable to find unfair 
prejudice.

 
 
            
Although Mr. Schreibvogel testified and his credibility was at issue, we 
cannot say that he "invited the misconduct."   However, the misconduct here was 
not severe or pervasive.  The 
questioning, while improper, was brief and the prosecution did not draw 
attention to Mr. Schreibvogel's answers during closing argument.  The questions centered, not on the main 
issue of consent, but on the number of times Mr. Schreibvogel asked D.C. to go 
back to the salon and how he financed the fishing trip.  Mr. Schreibvogel did not request a 
cautionary instruction or other curative measure.  In closing argument, the prosecution 
reiterated that it was up to the jury to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.  After reviewing the 
entire record, we cannot conclude that had the prosecutor not employed the 
"were-they-lying" technique, a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict 
would have been more favorable to Mr. Schreibvogel.

 
 
[¶12]   We deem it useful to include here a 
portion of a specially concurring opinion authored by Justice Voigt (then Chief 
Justice) in the Schreibvogel 
case:

 
 
I 
concur in the result reached by the majority because stare decisis requires us to place upon 
the appellant the impossible task of proving prejudice in cases such as 
this.  The majority states the 
well-established law in Wyoming:  
"It is error and misconduct for a prosecutor to ask a witness whether he 
thinks other witnesses are lying' or mistaken.' "   See Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, 
¶ 15, 193 P.3d 228, 235 (Wyo. 2008);  Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, 
¶ 51, 169 P.3d 512, 528-29 (Wyo. 2007);  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, 
¶¶ 10-11, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007);  Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶ 20, 
116 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Wyo. 2005);  
and Beaugureau v. State, 2002 
WY 160, ¶ 17, 56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).  Yet the prosecutor in this case asked 
the appellant not once, but three 
times, whether another witness--the bartender, the victim, and the 
cellmate--was incorrect or mistaken.  
Perhaps the State would pay attention to the law if it bore the burden of 
proof as to the lack of prejudice.

 
 
.

 
 
My 
concern is that, while the harmless error rule certainly makes sense as a 
reasonable systemic tool, its actual application via a process that requires 
each appellant to prove that he or she has been prejudiced by prosecutorial 
misconduct, leaves the State nearly unfettered in its ability to do as it 
pleases, this Court's opinions to the contrary 
notwithstanding.

 
 

Schreibvogel, 
¶¶ 52, 54, 228 P.3d  at 890-91 (emphasis added).

 
 
[¶13]   In this case, the prosecutor 
repeated the error six times and intimated it many more:

 
 
Q.  Well, 
Mr. Jarrard has testified that you were told that you were not allowed in his 
motor home and that he locked it up.  
Do you recall that?

A.  I 
recall him saying that here, yes, sir.

Q.  But 
you don't have any recollection.  
Apparently you were remembering things on September 9th, but you are saying your memory has been wiped 
out since then?

A.  Mr. 
Jarrard never told me that then.

Q.  So he is not telling the 
truth?

A.  I 
am not going to say  well, he did not tell me that on the 9th, when we discussed what I was going 
to do and where I was going to stay.

Q.  Were 
the keys in the motor home?

A.  No.

Q.  How 
were you able to watch television there?

A.  The 
door was open.  The motor home was 
open.



Q.  You 
know you were seen by the people at the hospital in 
Laramie?

A.  I 
know I have been told that.  But I 
don't remember that.

Q.  Do you think Mr. Soltenberg is mistaken 
if he thinks you were not intoxicated or drugged up [at Muddy 
Gap]?

A.  I 
have no opinion on why he said what he says.  I just don't remember 
it.



Q.  Were 
you able to work while you were at Mr. Jarrard's?

A.  I 
did.  I did the task that he 
assigned to me to do.

Q.  Well, 
he said you didn't.  He said you did 
not finish it?

A.  Yeah, 
I did and it took me two days and the use of his front-end loader on his tractor 
to get it done.

Q.  So 
with all of the medications and all of the alcohol you were still able to get 
the work done?

A.  Yes.

Q.  And 
you were still remembering back then?

A.  Yes.

Q.  You 
told Mr. Jarrard back when you were remembering that you had no job and that you 
were broke?

A.  No 
sir.  That is not what I told 
him.

Q.  You 
did not tell him that?  You told him 
I have twelve hundred dollars in my pocket and I am on my way home.  I am not broke and I don't need a 
job?

A.  No, 
that is not what I told him.

Q.  So he is 
mistaken?

A.  Apparently, 
yes.

Q.  And 
it is your testimony again that the door was not locked on the motor home and 
you were given permission to use the restroom in his 
camper?

A.  Yes, 
sir.

Q.  And if he says that is not true, he is 
not telling the truth?

A.  I 
know what he said to me.  If he says 
different, I don't know how to say it, but yes, I would say 
yes.

Q.  Well, 
he said he locked up the motor home and told you to stay out of there and locked 
it and took the keys?

A.  No 
sir.

Q.  So he is 
lying?

A.  I 
am not going to say that.

Q.  So he is mistaken or has 
forgotten?

A.  Mistaken, 
yes.

 
 
[¶14]   In her argument to the jury, 
Barnes' defense attorney contended that the case was not about whether Mr. 
Jarrard was lying, or whether Barnes lying.  A careful examination of the record 
establishes that to be the case.  
Barnes' defense did not depend on establishing that Jarrard told lies, he 
defended on the basis that he was in a drug/alcohol induced blackout when he 
left Jarrard's ranch and was still in it when he was arrested (that time period 
appears to be less than 24 hours).  
However, in response to the defense's closing argument, the prosecutor 
made these comments pertinent to this issue:

 
 
            
[Defense attorney] said this is not Jarrard versus Barnes.  She is right.  Mr. Jarrard is a victim and the way the 
system works is the State brings the charges, not Mr. Jarrard.  And it is not a civil case.  But there is something to be said about 
they can't both be telling the truth.  
She said, did he leave the motor home open?  He said he did not.  He made it most specific that he locked 
it and he did not want him in the vehicles and he told him that.  He was very specific that he left him 
enough food.  And there are other 
things.  They can't both be telling 
the truth.  So either Mr. Barnes was 
lying when he said it was open and I had access to it, or Mr. Jarrard was 
lying.

            
The problem with Mr. Barnes, if he is going lie about that, and he has to 
lie about that to say why he has all of the things from Mr. Jarrard's motor 
home, if he is going to lie about that, if he is not credible on that, if he is 
lying about that, you can reasonably conclude he is not telling the truth and 
lying about the rest.

 
 
[¶15]   Barnes was the only witness called 
in the defense portion of the case.  
Given that his defense rested entirely on his own testimony, we conclude 
that the questioning methodology used by the prosecutor was prejudicial under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, and we reverse his conviction on that 
basis.  For this reason it is 
unnecessary for us to further consider the ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   Based upon the prosecutor's 
misconduct, we reverse the Judgment and Sentence of the district court and 
remand this matter to the district court.