Title: Quenby Corp. v. FRANK H. CONNER COMPANY

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

158 S.E.2d 18 (1967) 272 N.C. 208 QUENBY CORP. v. FRANK H. CONNER COMPANY, Original Defendant; Monroe Mechanical Contractors, Inc.; Arrow, Inc.; Winecoff Electric Co., Inc.; W. J. Sullivan; and Interstate Roofing Co., Inc., Additional Defendants. No. 547. Supreme Court of North Carolina. December 13, 1967. *20 Richardson & Dawkins by Koy E. Dawkins, Monroe, for additional defendant appellant, Monroe Mechanical Contractors, Inc. Grier, Parker, Poe & Thompson by William E. Poe and Gaston H. Gage, Charlotte, for additional defendant appellant, Interstate Roofing Co., Inc. Gardner, Connor & Lee by D. M. Connor, Wilson, for original defendant appellee, Frank H. Conner Co. Brown, Brown & Brown by Charles P. Brown, Albemarle, for additional defendant appellees, Winecoff Electric Co., Inc. and W. J. Sullivan. PLESS, Justice. An anomalous situation is presented in this case. Five subcontractors were made new partiesfour of them demurred. The fifth filed an answer setting up a counterclaim against the original defendant, the contractor. The plaintiff moved to strike so much of the original defendant's further answer that in a practical sense it amounted to a motion to strike it in its entirety. This motion was denied, and plaintiff excepted but did not appeal. From adverse rulings upon the demurrers of the new parties, two defendants did not except. The other two, Interstate and Monroe, excepted and appealed. It is apparent that the plaintiff and three of the subcontractors are content to have their litigation adjudicated in this action. If so, that was their right. The other two, Interstate and Monroe, by this appeal demonstrate their desire for different and separate methods. Even though it would be desirable to make a uniform ruling as to all five defendants, who occupy similar legal positions, we can rule only as to those who properly present their appeals. But with no uniformity of action by five who are uniformly affected by the ruling of the lower court, we are required to make what might appear as an incongruous decision. The demurrers of the two appealing defendants are well taken. First because no claim has been made against them. "There must be in the first place, of course, a claim asserted by the original defendant which, tested by the substantive rules discussed in the preceding section, makes out a prima *21 facie case on the pleading for relief over in favor of the original defendant, or third-party plaintiff, against the third-party defendant." 1 McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure (1964 pp.), § 722.5, pp. 77 and 78. McIntosh further says in Footnote 19.21 at page 78: While Conner alleged in its further answer that Interstate had furnished "extras" to the extent of $6,427.53 and that Monroe had furnished them in the amount of $8,475.30, it asked no relief against them. On the contrary, it alleged that the plaintiff was indebted to it and to Interstate and Monroe in these amounts; that the plaintiff had refused to pay therefor, liens had been filed against the plaintiff's property for the alleged indebtedness and prayed judgment against the plaintiff for them. The tenor of the further answer was that Conner and the subcontractors had no controversy against each other but had a common cause against Quenby. Even had there been a dispute between Conner and its subcontractors, it would not be germane to the plaintiff's cause of action because there is no allegation by the plaintiff of privity of contract existing between the additional party defendants and the plaintiff. In fact, the contract says: "Nothing contained in the contract documents shall create any contractual relation between any subcontractor and the owner." This Court said in Moore v. Massengill, 227 N.C. 244, 41 S.E.2d 655, 170 A.L.R. 147, in reference to G.S. § 1-73: G.S. § 1-69 provides: Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 238 N.C. 254, 77 S.E.2d 659, was an action in which the Gaither Corp. alleged it had contracted with Skinner to construct a building for it, and that the defendant had used faulty and defective materials in the construction of the roof and demanded damages in an amount sufficient to replace the defective roof. Skinner denied the allegations and alleged that he had subcontracted the construction of the roof to one C. R. Hopkins and that if it were defective, that Hopkins was responsible to the plaintiff and to the defendant and prayed that Hopkins be made a party to the action. The clerk granted the prayer, and Hopkins entered a special appearance and moved that he be dismissed from the action. The lower court allowed the motion, and Skinner appealed. It can be seen that the situation in that case was similar to the one under consideration here. The Court speaking through Devin, C. J., said: In Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Waters, 255 N.C. 553, 122 S.E.2d 387, Parker, J., now C. J., speaking for the Court said: In Johnson v. Scarborough, 242 N.C. 681, 89 S.E.2d 420, it was said: For the reasons above stated and based upon the authorities cited, we are of the opinion that the demurrers of the two appealing defendants should have been sustained and the cross action dismissed as to them. Reversed.