Title: Nickel v. Carter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Nickel v. Carter, 104 Ohio St.3d 542, 2004-Ohio-6776.] 
 
 
NICKEL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CARTER, APPELLEE; FENTON ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Nickel v. Carter, 104 Ohio St.3d 542, 2004-Ohio-6776.] 
Civil procedure — Civ.R. 35(A) — A ruling on a Civ.R. 35(A) motion for 
an independent psychological examination is not a final appealable order. 
(No. 2004-0122 — Submitted October 26, 2004 – Decided December 17, 
2004.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County, No. OT-02-035, 
2003-Ohio-6977. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In the spring of 1999, Robin L. Carter reported alleged abuse of 
her niece to a guidance counselor at her niece’s school.  As a result of this report, 
appellee Lesley L. Nickel was tried for rape, gross sexual imposition, and sexual 
imposition.  Nickel was found not guilty on all charges. 
{¶ 2} After the trial, Nickel and his wife sued Carter for slander, 
malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and loss of consortium.  Carter denied 
the allegations in the Nickels’ complaint and counterclaimed for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
assault.  The trial court granted a pretrial motion to have Carter’s niece, the victim 
of the alleged abuse, submit to a psychological evaluation pursuant to Civ.R. 
35(A).  The niece appealed from the grant of this motion.  The court of appeals 
dismissed the appeal, determining that the trial court’s order was not final and 
appealable.  The court of appeals certified a conflict, asking:  “Is a ruling on a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Civ.R. 35(A) motion for an independent psychological examination a final and 
appealable order?” 
{¶ 3} This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
{¶ 5} R.C. 2505.02(B) states: 
{¶ 6} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶ 7} “(1)  An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in 
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
{¶ 8} “(2)  An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
{¶ 9} “(3)  An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new 
trial; 
{¶ 10} “(4)  An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to 
which both of the following apply: 
{¶ 11} “(a)  The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
{¶ 12} “(b)  The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims, and parties in the action. 
{¶ 13} “(5)  An order that determines that an action may or may not be 
maintained as a class action.” 
{¶ 14} Neither party contends that R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), (3), (4), or (5) 
applies to this case; accordingly, we will not discuss these provisions.  Turning to 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), the order issued by the trial court is not a “summary 
January Term, 2004 
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application in an action after judgment.”  Therefore, the issue before us turns on 
whether the order issued by the trial court is “[a]n order that affects a substantial 
right made in a special proceeding.” 
{¶ 15} In Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213, 
syllabus, we stated, “Orders that are entered in actions that were recognized at 
common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders 
entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.”  Each one of the claims 
asserted in the suit below — slander, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, loss 
of consortium, and assault — was recognized at common law.  None of the claims 
were specially created by statute.  We conclude that the order issued by the trial 
court was not issued in a special proceeding.  Accordingly, we hold that the ruling 
on the Civ.R. 35(A) motion for an independent psychological examination in this 
case was not a final and appealable order and affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellees Lesley and Lisa Nickel. 
 
Michael W. Sandwisch, for appellants. 
__________________