Title: Goins v. Goins

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc  
 
Kenneth D. Goins, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92672 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Lori D. Goins,  
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis 
Honorable Bryan L. Hettenbach, Judge 
 
Opinion issued July 16, 2013 
 
 
Kenneth Goins appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to section 452.355 
requiring him to pay $7,500 for appellate attorney fees incurred by Mr. Goins’ former 
wife, Lori Goins.   Mr. Goins asserts that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter an 
award of attorney fees, that section 452.355 is unconstitutionally vague, that the attorney 
fee award is excessive, and that the underlying child support judgment is void.    
 
 
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3, of the 
Missouri Constitution because Mr. Goins challenges the constitutional validity of a 
Missouri statute.  The judgment is affirmed.  
I. FACTS 
 
In 2003, the circuit court entered a judgment of dissolution ending Mr. Goins’ 
marriage to Ms. Goins.  Mr. Goins was ordered to pay child support and maintenance. 
 
In 2005 and 2006, Mr. Goins filed motions to reduce his child support obligations 
and to terminate maintenance.  In both cases, the trial court reduced Mr. Goins’ child 
support obligations but made no change to the maintenance obligation.  The court of 
appeals affirmed both judgments.  See Goins v. Goins, 224 S.W.3d 69 (Mo. App. 2007); 
Goins v. Goins, 369 S.W.3d 758 (Mo. App. 2012).  
 
On February 24, 2012, while Mr. Goins’ second appeal was pending, Ms. Goins 
filed a motion for attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to section 452.355.  Ms. Goins 
alleged that Mr. Goins was an attorney and was representing himself, that Mr. Goins had 
greater financial resources and that his appellate brief contained twelve points on appeal 
that were improperly phrased and difficult to analyze, causing her to incur more 
attorney’s fees.  Ms. Goins further alleged that as a result, she was substantially less able 
to pay for her attorney fees and costs than was Mr. Goins.   
  
The matter was heard on May 2, 2012.  The trial court ordered Goins to pay 
$7,500 of Ms. Goins’ attorney fees on appeal.  Goins appeals that judgment. 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The legal issue of the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.  City of 
Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 2008).  A statute's validity is 
presumed, and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes 
some constitutional provision.   Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006).  
III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Mr. Goins’ first point on appeal asserts that section 452.355 is unconstitutional to 
the extent that the statute grants the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction to enter an 
award of attorney fees on appeal while the appeal is pending.  Mr. Goins argues that the 
circuit court’s award of appellate attorney fees to Ms. Goins pursuant to section 452.355 
is unconstitutional because it amounts to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the 
circuit court.  This argument is without merit. 
 
   In relevant part, section 452.355.1 provides: 
 [u]nless otherwise indicated, the court from time to time after 
considering all relevant factors including the financial resources of 
both parties, the merits of the case and the actions of the parties 
during the pendency of the action, may order a party to pay a 
reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or 
defending any proceeding pursuant to sections 452.300 to 452.415 
and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal services rendered and 
costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding and after 
entry of a final judgment. 
 
“Section 452.355.1 permits the trial court to award attorneys’ fees on appeal of a 
dissolution decree.”  Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d 177, 196 (Mo. App. 2010)(quoting 
Groenings v. Groenings, 277 S.W.3d 270, 280 (Mo. App. 2008). 
 
The circuit court’s award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to section 452.335 is 
not an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  The court of appeals exercises general appellate 
jurisdiction over appeals from circuit court judgments.  Mo Const. art. V, sec. 3.  The 
court of appeals, by virtue of its superintending control over the circuit courts, also has 
jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.  The circuit court’s 
award of attorney fees in this case is not an appeal and it is not a writ.  It is, instead, an 
exercise of the circuit court’s “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and 
criminal.”  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 14(a).  Mr. Goins’ argument that section 452.355 
 
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authorizes an unconstitutional exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the circuit court is 
without merit. 
 
Mr. Goins also asserts the related argument that the award of attorney fees is 
unconstitutional because it is only the “appellate court that possesses subject-matter 
jurisdiction over all matters while a case is on appeal.”  Mr. Goins concludes that the 
circuit court’s “attempt to conjure up subject matter jurisdiction based upon section 
452.355 must fail as a matter of law.”  Mr. Goins cites this Court’s opinion in Spicer v. 
Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust, 336 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Mo. banc 2011), to 
support his argument.   
 
In Spicer, this Court noted that Rule 75.01 provides that “the trial court retains 
control over judgments during the 30-day period after entry of judgment and may, after 
giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, 
amend or modify its judgments within that time period.”  Id. at 468.  After the expiration 
of the 30 days provided by Rule 75.01, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction, unless a 
party timely files an authorized after-trial motion.  Id. at 688-689, citing Rule 81.05.  
Therefore, “[f]ollowing divestiture, any attempt by the trial court to continue to exhibit 
authority over the case, whether by amending the judgment or entering subsequent 
judgments, is void.”  Id. at 689.    
 
The circuit court’s award of attorney fees on appeal does not constitute an 
amendment of the dissolution judgment or the entry of a new dissolution judgment.  
Instead, the award of attorney fees in this case relates solely to the collateral matter of 
Ms. Goins’ right to pursue a statutorily authorized award of attorney fees on appeal 
 
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pursuant to section 452.355.  Missouri law has long recognized the validity of this 
practice because, as established above, the court’s appeals’ jurisdiction is limited to 
deciding appeals and issuing original remedial writs.  Thus, “the circuit court, and only 
the circuit court, has jurisdiction to consider and grant” an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to section 452.355.  Clarke v. Clarke, S.W.2d 192, 195 (Mo. App. 1998), citing 
Cascio v. Cascio, 485 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Mo. App. 1972); see also McCormack v. 
McCormack, 238 S.W.2d 858, 864 (Mo. App. 1951); State ex rel. Clarkson v. St. Louis 
Court of Appeals, 88 Mo. 135 (Mo. 1885)(appellate court had no jurisdiction in a divorce 
case pending on appeal to order the husband to pay the wife’s costs and attorney's fees on 
appeal).1  Mr. Goins’ point is denied.  
IV. Section 452.355 is not unconstitutionally vague 
 
In his second point, Mr. Goins asserts that section 452.355 is vague because it 
does not provide notice of the conduct it prohibits or define what must be pleaded and 
proven in order to justify an award of attorney fees.  Mr. Goins argues that the lack of 
guidance means that different judges will likely award different amounts of attorney fees 
in essentially identical cases.  Mr. Goins concludes that this amounts to unconstitutionally 
“arbitrary and discriminatory judgments for attorney fees.” 
                                                 
1 This does not mean that appellate courts have no authority to enter an award of attorney fees on 
appeal in other cases.  Appellate courts have the authority to award attorney fees on appeal but, 
in most cases, appellate courts remand the case to the trial court because the “trial court is better 
equipped to hear evidence and argument on this issue and determine the reasonableness of the 
fee requested.”  Berry v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 433  (Mo. banc 
2013)(quoting Rosehill Gardens, Inc. v. Luttrell, 67 S.W.3d 641, 648 (Mo. App. 2002)). 
 
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The void for vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that a statute that either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common 
intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its interpretation violates the first 
essential of due process of the law.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 
(1984).  The void for vagueness doctrine ensures that laws give fair and adequate notice 
of proscribed conduct and protects against arbitrary enforcement.  State v. Pribble, 285 
S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. banc 2009).  The doctrine applies not only to laws that proscribe 
conduct, but also to standardless penalties.  Id., citing, Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 44 (1991).   “The test for vagueness is whether the language conveys to a 
person of ordinary intelligence a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”  State v. Brown, 140 
S.W.3d 51 (Mo. banc 2004).  
 
Section 452.355 authorizes the circuit court to award attorney fees while taking 
into consideration “all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, 
the merits of the case and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action ….”  
The statute further authorizes the circuit court to award fees for “legal services rendered 
and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding and after entry of a final 
judgment.”   
 
The statute provides sufficient guidance so as to allow a person of ordinary 
intelligence to understand the standards to be applied by the circuit court in making an 
award of attorney fees.  Section 453.355 provides, in clear, concise language, that the 
circuit court is to consider all relevant factors, including financial resources, the merits of 
 
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the case, and the conduct of the parties.  The “conduct of the parties” is not defined, but 
given the context of the statute, it is obvious that conduct that would cause the other party 
to incur more attorney fees is a valid consideration.  The statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague.  This point is denied.  
V. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees 
 
In his third point on appeal, Mr. Goins asserts that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees because the award was against the weight of the 
evidence and he has no financial ability to pay.  Specifically, Mr. Goins argues that he 
should not be required to pay Ms. Goins’ attorney fees because his income is less than 
hers and he is financially responsible for more children than her.   
 
Parties to a domestic relations case are generally responsible for paying their own 
attorney’s fees.  Schubert v. Schubert, 366 S.W.3d 55, 75 (Mo. App. 2012).  As noted 
above, section 452.355.1 specifically authorizes the circuit court to award attorney’s fees 
after considering “all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, the 
merits of the case and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action.”   The 
trial court has broad discretion in awarding or denying a party's request for attorney's 
fees, and the Court will not overturn a trial court's order absent a showing that the trial 
court abused its broad discretion in ordering, or in refusing to order, one party to pay the 
attorney's fees of the other party.  Schubert, 366 S.W.3d at 75.   
 
The trial court is considered an expert as to the necessity, reasonableness, and 
value of attorney’s fees for both trial and appellate work.  Id., citing Potts v. Potts, 303 
S.W.3d 177, 196 (Mo. App. 2010).   The party seeking attorney’s fees on appeal must 
 
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show the extent of the necessary services to be rendered by counsel and the related 
expenses.  Id.  The court must consider the financial history of the parties since 
dissolution, debts of each party, and employment or non-employment income of each 
party.  Id.   The trial court is considered an expert on attorney’s fees and the court’s 
decision is presumptively correct.  Id.  The party contesting the award of fees bears the 
burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  Id. 
 
Mr. Goins has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Ms. Goins’ attorney’s fees on appeal. Mr. Goins is a licensed attorney and 
represented himself on appeal.  Ms. Goins, however, had to retain appellate counsel.  
There is evidence that Mr. Goins has more financial resources than Ms. Goins.  The fact 
that Mr. Goins was able to avoid attorney fees on appeal by representing himself, 
combined with his greater financial resources, rebuts Mr. Goins’ claim that the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Ms. Goins.  This point is denied.  
VI. The child support judgment is not “void” 
 
In his final point, Mr. Goins asserts that the judgment ordering him to pay child 
support is void because it was not based on his actual income, he did not get a hearing on 
his motion to modify maintenance and the wife’s affidavits regarding payments were 
void.  He requests that this Court find that the judgment was void.  The circuit court 
entered a judgment ordering Mr. Goins to pay $1,117.00 per month for the support of his 
two children.  The court of appeals affirmed that judgment.  Goins v. Goins, 369 S.W.3d 
758 (Mo. App. 2012).  This Court denied transfer.   
 
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Courts favor finality of judgments, so the concept of a void judgment is narrowly 
restricted.  Forsyth Fin. Grp., LLC v. Hayes, 351 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Mo. App. 2011).  A 
judgment is void under Rule 74.06(b)(4) only if the circuit court that rendered it (1) 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lacked personal jurisdiction; or (3) entered the 
judgment in a manner that violated due process.  Id.  In his point relied on and in the text 
of his argument, Mr. Goins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.  A challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence does not raise a jurisdictional or constitutional issue that 
would render a judgment “void.”  Instead, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
is simply an allegation of error that should be raised on appeal.  Mr. Goins challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal and lost.  This point is denied.  
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
 
All concur.