Title: Ruffin v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

420 So. 2d 591 (1982)
Mack RUFFIN, Jr., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 62631.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 29, 1982.
David Rubman, Bartow, and Asa D. Sokolow, Renee J. Roberts, Edward S. Kornreich and Elizabeth Shollenberger, New York City, for appellant.
*592 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Mack C. Ruffin appeals an order of the trial court denying his motions to vacate his judgment and sentence of death, for the appointment of an investigator and a psychiatrist, and for stay of execution. We affirm the thorough, well-reasoned order of the trial court entered by Circuit Judge John Booth, and we deny the motion for stay of execution.
Ruffin was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Karol Hurst who was twenty-one years old and seven months pregnant at the time she was murdered. She had been abducted by Ruffin and his accomplice Freddie Hall from a Pantry Pride grocery store parking lot and had been driven in her automobile to a secluded wooded area where Ruffin and Hall sexually abused her. She was pistol whipped on her neck, head, shoulder and body; was robbed of her pocketbook, wallet and checkbook; and was shot to death with a .38 caliber pistol in the back of the head while lying face down on the ground.
Ruffin appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and sexual battery and his sentence of death. This Court affirmed his convictions and death sentence. Ruffin v. State, 397 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1981). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Ruffin v. Florida, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 368, 70 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1981).
In June 1982, Ruffin filed motions to vacate his judgment and his death sentence, for the appointment of an investigator and psychiatrist and for discovery, and for stay of execution. On September 9, 1982, the governor signed a death warrant for the execution of Ruffin for the week of October 1-8, execution being set for October 6. After hearing, the trial court, in a detailed and explicit order addressing each of the points raised, denied Ruffin's motions.
The majority of the issues raised by Ruffin in his motion to vacate were issues raised and addressed in his direct appeal to this Court or which could have been raised in his first appeal and therefore are matters which will not support a collateral attack. Adams v. State, 380 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1980); Sullivan v. State, 372 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1979).
The remaining issues include, among others, Ruffin's assertion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial by his counsel's failure to call certain witnesses at the sentencing hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, in its order denying postconviction relief, explained:
The trial court correctly held that Ruffin failed to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Ruffin also contends that his death sentence should be reversed because the trial court and jury considered his conviction for the first-degree murder of Deputy Coburn in support of the aggravating circumstance that the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Ruffin points to this Court's decision in Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1981), wherein this Court directed the trial court to reduce Hall's conviction for the murder of Deputy Coburn to second-degree murder since the evidence in Hall's trial was not sufficient to prove premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall's conviction and death sentence for the first-degree murder of Hurst was affirmed. Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1981). Ruffin maintains that since there was insufficient evidence to support Hall's first-degree murder conviction for the killing of Deputy Coburn, there was likewise insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree murder. Therefore, he argues, the consideration of his aggravating factor in his case was erroneous, and he should receive a new sentencing hearing.
Ruffin received a life sentence for the murder of Deputy Coburn, and he appealed his conviction to the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District. The Fifth District affirmed his conviction, Ruffin v. State, 390 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and he sought no further review. The State responds that Ruffin, at the present time, stands convicted of the first-degree murder of Coburn and that the reversal in Hall is of no immediate avail to Ruffin. The trial court found that Ruffin's conviction of first-degree murder of Coburn was affirmed on appeal and that regardless of whether Ruffin is convicted of first-degree murder or second-degree murder, it is still the same aggravating circumstance as was found by the trial judge in his sentencing order. We hold that the trial court was correct in this determination.
Ruffin also challenges the imposition of the death sentence in his case on the basis of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Enmund v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). The trial court properly rejected this argument and correctly found Enmund distinguishable and inapplicable to Ruffin's case because Enmund was not present at the scene nor did he intend a killing or anticipate the use of lethal force. The trial court explained in its order denying postconviction relief:
The trial court's distinctions are clearly supported by the record and this Court's decision affirming Ruffin's judgment and sentence for the Hurst murder.
*595 We likewise reject Ruffin's challenges to the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty statute.
Accordingly, since Ruffin has failed to demonstrate any meritorious grounds for relief, we affirm the trial court's order denying Ruffin's motions to vacate, to appoint an investigator and psychiatrist, and for stay of execution.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion.
McDONALD, Justice, dissenting.
This entire episode, culminating in the homicide of Mrs. Hurst and her unborn child, was a detestable abomination that clouds one's objectivity in determining whether Ruffin should be relieved of the death penalty imposed against him. Nevertheless, I felt in the original appeal  and for the additional reason that I believe that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Enmund v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), applies to Ruffin  that as to Ruffin the death penalty is inappropriate. Ruffin was twenty-two years old, with no significant history of criminal conduct prior to the robbery-kidnap-slaying of Mrs. Hurst. While the record indicates that he had developed less than praiseworthy traits and willingly participated in the robbery, abduction, and rape of the victim, his uncontradicted statements claimed that he did not actively participate in the homicide. According to him, and this is not contradicted in his trial, the entire responsibility for the commission of the homicide belongs to his companion, Hall. There is no evidence that Ruffin took life, attempted to take life, or intended to take life. In Enmund the United States Supreme Court clearly declared that the death penalty is inappropriate for one not involved in the taking of a life.
Id, at ___ 102 S. Ct.  at 3376.
At best, Ruffin was a passive, as opposed to an active, participant. I think Enmund proscribes the death penalty for Ruffin. His sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years.
In the alternative, I feel that Ruffin is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because of ineffective assistance of counsel in that phase of the trial. His counsel presented no live evidence[*] in the sentencing proceeding despite a strong suspicion that Ruffin was under the domination of Freddie Hall and that his personal history has traits similar to those the United States Supreme Court felt appropriate in Eddings v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982). There is no reason evident why any reasonable counsel would not have done this.
[*]  He did put in the record a psychiatrist's report which contained some history of the defendant.