Title: MARGARET LUCILLE LARGENT, n/k/a MARGARET L. WOLFE v. JOHN D. LARGENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARGARET LUCILLE LARGENT, n/k/a MARGARET L. WOLFE v. JOHN D. LARGENT2008 WY 106192 P.3d 130Case Number: S-07-0259Decided: 09/08/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
MARGARET LUCILLE 
LARGENT, n/k/a MARGARET L. WOLFE,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHN D. 
LARGENT,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Larry W. Harrington, 
Harrington Law Firm, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

William D. Hjelmstad, 
Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Margaret Wolfe and 
John Largent divorced in Washington.  Subsequently, Mr. Largent moved to 
Wyoming.  In an effort to collect back child 
support, Ms. Wolfe registered the divorce decree in Wyoming and requested 
confirmation and enforcement of that decree.  Mr. Largent did not file a response or 
request a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the decree, and the 
district court entered a default judgment in Ms. Wolfe's favor.  Mr. Largent moved to set aside the 
default judgment and the district court granted the motion.  The court ultimately denied confirmation 
and enforcement of the divorce decree.  
In this appeal, Ms. Wolfe challenges the district court's order setting 
aside the default judgment and the district court's decision to deny 
confirmation and enforcement of the decree.  We find no error in the district court's 
decision to set aside the default judgment.  We conclude, however, that the district 
court erred in its decision to deny confirmation and enforcement of the 
decree.  We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.

 
 
ISSUES

[¶2]           
Ms. Wolfe presents the 
following issues:

1.      Did the trial 
court err by allowing the Appellee to contest the validity or enforcement of the 
registered child support order outside the twenty-day contest period allowed by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-177 (LexisNexis 2003) and by refusing to preclude contest 
of a confirmed order pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-4-180?

2.      Did the trial 
court err in its application of W.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), in setting aside the 
confirmation and enforcement of the child support order and arrearages? 

3.      Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion by denying confirmation and enforcement of the child 
support order and arrearages?

FACTS

[¶3]           
Ms. Wolfe and Mr. 
Largent divorced in December of 1967 in Skagit County, Washington.  Ms. Wolfe was awarded custody of the 
couple's eight children subject to Mr. Largent's visitation rights.  The court ordered Mr. Largent to pay 
child support in the amount of "Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) per month for each 
child until each of said children reaches the age of Twenty-one years, is 
married or becomes self-supporting, whichever event first occurs."  Mr. Largent moved to Wyoming in 1978. 

[¶4]           
In December of 2000, 
Ms. Wolfe filed the divorce decree and a Verified Notice of Filing and Registration 
of Foreign Orders for Child Support in Wyoming district court.  She alleged that Mr. Largent owed back 
child support in the amount of $34,250.00.  Ms. Wolfe also filed Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause 
Why Defendant Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Failure to Pay Child 
Support.  The district court set 
a hearing date and ordered that Mr. Largent "show cause why [he] should not be 
held in contempt of court for having failed to pay court ordered child 
support."  The parties subsequently 
filed a Stipulated Motion for 
Continuance and the district court granted the motion.  The record does not reflect that a 
hearing was ever held.  Eventually, 
Ms. Wolfe filed a motion seeking dismissal without prejudice.  The district court granted the motion 
and dismissed the case without prejudice on July 18, 2002.

[¶5]           
Ms. Wolfe initiated a 
second action to enforce the divorce decree in Wyoming.  
In May 2004, she filed a Motion 
for Confirmation and Enforcement of Child Support Order and Arrearages.  The motion was accompanied by an Affidavit of Indebtedness for Child Support 
Arrearage.  In the motion and 
affidavit, Ms. Wolfe alleged that Mr. Largent owed $34,250.00 in arrearages and 
interest of $182,492.56 for a total of $216,742.56, as of February 12, 
2004.  Service of process occurred 
on May 21, 2004.  Mr. Largent did 
not file a response and Ms. Wolfe sought a default judgment.  The district court entered a judgment in 
Ms. Wolfe's favor on December 16, 2004 in the amount of $216,742.56, plus 
additional accrued interest.  The 
court ordered that Mr. Largent's income be garnished in the amount of $718.90 
per month.  Ms. Wolfe filed the 
order with the Social Security Administration, which then began deducting that 
amount from Mr. Largent's monthly social security benefits.  On December 15, 2005, Mr. Largent filed 
a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment 
and to Vacate Judgment.  The 
motion alleged several bases for relief pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b), including 
"[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."  Ms. Wolfe opposed the 
motion.

[¶6]           
The district court 
held a hearing on the motion.  Mr. 
Largent and his current wife both testified.  According to their testimony, Mr. Largent 
suffered a severe heart attack in 2004 that resulted in a hospital stay and a 
difficult six-month rehabilitation period.  
Mr. Largent spent most of his recuperation period in bed.  Mrs. Largent testified that she was 
served with the documents initiating the current proceeding during Mr. Largent's 
recuperation period.  She did not 
advise Mr. Largent that she had been served with the documents.  Instead, she put the documents aside, 
mistakenly believing them related to the earlier, dismissed action.  Mrs. Largent testified that Mr. Largent 
was "[i]n bed on oxygen.  I just got 
him out of the hospital, so he was in pretty bad shape" at the time of service. 
 Mr. Largent testified that he first 
became aware of Ms. Wolfe's action to collect child support when garnishment of 
his monthly social security benefits began.  Ms. Wolfe did not call any witnesses 
to testify or introduce any exhibits at the hearing.  Her primary contention at the hearing 
was that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the 
motion pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-180.  The district court rejected Ms. Wolfe's 
assertion that it lacked jurisdiction and, based upon a finding of excusable 
neglect, granted Mr. Largent's motion to set aside the default 
judgment.

[¶7]           
Subsequently, a 
hearing was held to address the merits of Ms. Wolfe's Motion for Confirmation and Enforcement of 
Child Support Order and Arrearages.  The details of that hearing are 
sparse.  It was not reported, and 
this Court is presented with a settled record pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  The district court's order settling the 
record notes that Mr. Largent testified to making some child support payments in 
the past, including a payment of $500.00, and $12,000.00 that was garnished from 
his social security benefits.

[¶8]           
On July 25, 2007, the 
district court entered an Order Denying 
Motion for Confirmation and Enforcement of Child Support Order and 
Arrearages.  The court 
found:

[Mr. Largent] met his 
burden of proving that there is a defense under the law of this state to the 
remedy sought by [Ms. Wolfe] . . . since the evidence presented at hearing 
indicates that the total support obligation requested is not a proper amount, 
that the amount of interest requested to be included in the support obligation 
is not correct, and since there have been payments made by [Mr. Largent] and 
withholding from [Mr. Largent]'s social security that have not been credited 
against the requested support obligation. . . .

[Mr. Largent] also met 
his burden of proving by evidence presented at hearing that there have been full 
or partial payments that have not been credited to the asserted child support 
obligation sought to be enforced in this matter. . . .

Based upon the 
findings . . . above, [Mr. Largent] has established defenses under Wyo. Stat. 
[Ann.] § 20-4-179(a)(v) and (vi), and accordingly, the request for confirmation 
of the registered order should be denied. 

Ms. Wolfe filed a 
timely appeal.

Jurisdiction

[¶9]           
In her first issue, 
Ms. Wolfe asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. 
Largent's W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment.  "Whether a court has jurisdiction is a 
question of law to be reviewed de 
novo."  SEG v. GDK, 2007 WY 203, ¶ 4, 173 P.3d 395, 395 (Wyo. 2007).

[¶10]       
The Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act (UIFSA), as adopted in Wyoming, generally provides a process allowing support 
orders from foreign jurisdictions to be enforced in Wyoming.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-4-139, et seq.  The foreign order is "registered" in 
this state when filed in district court.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-175(a); State ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John, 964 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 1998).  The foreign order must be accompanied 
by, among other attachments, a "sworn statement by the party seeking 
registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing 
the amount of any arrearage."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-4-174(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Once the order is registered, the court 
must notify the nonregistering party of its registration.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-177.  The nonregistering party may "contest 
the validity or enforcement of a registered order" by requesting a hearing 
within 20 days of service.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-4-178(a).  If the 
nonregistering party fails to request a hearing within the allotted time, "the 
order is confirmed by operation of law."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-4-178(b).  
"Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after 
notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any 
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-4-180.

[¶11]       
Because Mr. Largent 
did not request a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the 
registered order within 20 days of personal service, that order was "confirmed 
by operation of law."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
20-4-178(a), (b).  Ms. Wolfe 
contends that, as a result of the order's confirmation, the district court "did 
not have the power or jurisdiction to extend the twenty day period allowed by 
[the] UIFSA to contest registration of the Washington support order."  We disagree.

[¶12]       
Mr. Largent sought 
relief from the default judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b).  W.R.C.P. 55(c) states: "For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)."  W.R.C.P. 60(b), in relevant part, 
states: "On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 
party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect."  The Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure "govern procedure . . . in all actions, suits or 
proceedings of a civil nature and in all special statutory proceedings" and 
apply to civil actions to enforce a foreign support order.  W.R.C.P. 1.  Accordingly, the district court had 
jurisdiction to determine Mr. Largent's motion to set aside the default 
judgment.

W.R.C.P. 60(b)

[¶13]       
Ms. Wolfe next 
contends that the district court improperly granted Mr. Largent's motion for 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) relief.

The granting of relief 
pursuant to that rule is a matter of the exercise of discretion by the trial 
court, and appellate review is limited to the question of whether the trial 
court abused its discretion.  A 
court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an 
error of law, with the ultimate standard being whether or not the court could 
have reasonably concluded as it did.  
The appellant bears the burden of proof to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion and was clearly wrong in granting relief under W.R.C.P. 
60(b).  Absent such a showing, the 
relief awarded by the trial court should be upheld.

Dep't of Family Servs. 
v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 
1259-60 (Wyo. 
1997) (citations and paragraph break omitted).  We have previously noted 
that:

the exercise of 
discretion in granting or denying relief depends upon the facts of the 
case.  In making that decision, the 
district court is to consider whether the moving party established the 
articulated grounds [alleged in the motion] and demonstrated a meritorious 
defense.  Even so, the district 
court then must determine whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced and whether 
culpable conduct on the part of the defendant resulted in the 
default.

Jackson Hole Comm. 
Housing Trust v. Scarlett, 979 P.2d 500, 502 
(Wyo. 
1999).  "[T]his court has long 
recognized that default judgments are not favored in the law' and [i]t is 
preferable that cases be tried on their merits.'"  Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 997 
(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 
(Wyo. 
1992)).

[¶14]       
The trial court 
concluded at the hearing that any prejudice to Ms. Wolfe was "nominal."  The court reiterated this conclusion in 
its written order: "the Court finds some prejudice but not significant prejudice 
as all of the children are long ago emancipated and this is an action to collect 
arrearages."  Ms. Wolfe asserts that 
the court's finding was error.  She 
states in her brief that "[i]t is very difficult to convince the Appellant that 
the [t]rial [c]ourt's decision to take away her confirmed order and enforced 
child support is not prejudicial to her."  
Ms. Wolfe, however, takes the concept of prejudice too far.  She implies that it encompasses any 
negative consequence for the non-moving party.  "Setting aside a default must prejudice 
plaintiff in a more concrete way, such as loss of evidence, increased 
difficulties in discovery, or greater opportunities for fraud and collusion.'" 
Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also, e.g., Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 621 
(6th Cir. 1990).  Ms. 
Wolfe has not demonstratedor allegedthat her ability to litigate this case on 
the merits was compromised between the time the default judgment was entered and 
the hearing on the merits.  We find 
no error in the district court's determination that Ms. Wolfe would not be 
prejudiced by vacation of the default judgment.

[¶15]       
Ms. Wolfe also claims 
that the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Largent had a 
meritorious defense.  Pursuant to 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-4-179(a):

A party 
contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to 
vacate the registration has the burden of proving one (1) or more of the 
following defenses:

(i)         
The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting 
party;

(ii)        The 
order was obtained by fraud;

(iii)       The order 
has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later order;

(iv)       The issuing 
tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;

(v)        There 
is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy 
sought;

(vi)       Full or 
partial payment has been made; or

(vii)      The statute of 
limitations under W.S. 20-4-176 precludes enforcement of some or all of the 
arrearages.

[¶16]       
Mr. Largent asserted 
several defenses.  Primarily, he 
asserted that the amount of arrearages claimed by Ms. Wolfe was incorrect.  He alleged that he had made several 
support payments that were not properly reflected in the arrearage 
calculation.  He also alleged that 
at least one of the children had married prior to her 21st birthday, 
and that the arrearage should be calculated from the date of marriage rather 
than the 21st birthday.  
He contested the interest amount on the basis that it was calculated 
using an incorrect arrearage amount.  
He also asserted that the applicable statute of limitations barred 
Ms. Wolfe's claim for some or all of the arrearages.  Partial payment and the statute of 
limitations are explicitly listed as defenses to the enforcement of a foreign 
child support order pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-179(a)(vi) and (vii), and 
the district court found sufficient evidence to support those defenses.  The evidentiary record supports the 
district court's conclusion.  
Additionally, the decree specifically provided that the support 
obligation for each child terminated when the child reached the age of 
twenty-one, became self-supporting, or married.  The amount of interest owed is dependent 
upon the amount of child support arrearages.  If the arrearages claimed by Ms. Wolfe 
were incorrect, the interest calculation is also incorrect.  We find no error in the district court's 
determination that Mr. Largent demonstrated a meritorious 
defense.

[¶17]       
Ms. Wolfe also asserts 
that the district court incorrectly found Mr. Largent's negligence 
non-culpable.  The district court 
determined that Mr. Largent's testimony was "highly credible."  He testified that he had suffered a 
severe heart attack, and the documents were served during his recuperation 
period.  He did not know of those 
documents until the default judgment had been entered and his social security 
benefits were garnished.  Mrs. 
Largent testified that she thought the documents were related to the prior 
litigation.  As a result, she put 
them aside.  The district court 
concluded that "although [Mr. Largent] was negligent, [he] was not culpable 
because he had significant health problems complicated by financial ability 
being significantly impaired due to income withholding and his raising of his 
minor child."  Although Ms. Wolfe 
disputes this finding, she fails to support her argument with evidence from the 
record. The following is her entire argument on this 
issue:

The Defendant's 
failure had [sic] to contest the registration had nothing to do with the Social 
Security Withholding Order served seven months after the Notice of Registration 
was served.  The Defendant had made 
a decision that the matter had been resolved in prior litigation.  That was not [sic] a willful decision, 
purposely, and with a reckless disregard of the 
consequences.

Ms. Wolfe's bare 
assertion is insufficient to convince us that the district court erred in 
setting aside the default judgment.

Decision on the 
Merits

[¶18]       
In Ms. Wolfe's third 
issue, she contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
confirmation and enforcement of the Washington child support order.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-179(b) 
states:  

If a party presents 
evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a) of this 
section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered order, continue the 
proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence and issue other 
appropriate orders.  An uncontested 
portion of the registered order may be enforced by all remedies available under 
the laws of this state.

The phrase 
"appropriate orders" and the word "may" indicate that the district court has 
discretion to determine the proper remedy based upon the evidence 
presented.  See Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 627 (Wyo. 
1999); In re Est. of George, 2003 WY 
129, ¶ 10, 77 P.3d 1219, 1222 (Wyo. 2003).  
We therefore review for abuse of discretion.

[¶19]       
Ms. Wolfe contends 
that the district court erred in failing to enter an order determining the 
proper amount of arrearages and interest after providing Mr. Largent with credit 
for all payments made.  The 
Washington 
divorce decree provides:

[T]he defendant [Mr. 
Largent] shall pay to the plaintiff for the support and maintenance of the 
children the sum of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) per month for each child until 
each of said children reaches the age of Twenty-one years, is married or becomes 
self-supporting, whichever event first occurs.

The decree also 
specifically names all eight children.  
The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, filed with the divorce decree, provides the date of 
birth for each child.  Given this 
information, determination of the proper amount of arrearages and interest is a 
matter of mathematical computation.

[¶20]       
Mr. Largent, pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-179(a), had the burden of proving a defense to 
enforcement of the support order.  
Mr. Largent did not contest the validity of the divorce decree.  Instead, he asserted that the amount of 
arrearages and interest claimed by Ms. Wolfe was incorrect.  The district court found that Mr. 
Largent had made support payments that had not been included in the arrearage 
calculation.  Specifically, the 
court noted that Mr. Largent had made a payment of $500.00, and that $12,000.00 
had been garnished from his social security benefits and applied to his support 
obligation.  Rather than reduce the 
amount owed by Mr. Largent in light of the payments, however, the court 
determined that "the total support obligation requested [by Ms. Wolfe] is not a 
proper amount, [and] that the amount of interest requested to be included in the 
support obligation is not correct."  
The district court denied confirmation and enforcement of the Washington divorce decree 
in its entirety. 

[¶21]       
In determining whether 
the district court abused its discretion, it is important to keep in mind that 
Mr. Largent never contested the validity of the support order.  He also never claimed that he fully 
satisfied his support obligation.  
Mr. Largent merely contended that he did not owe the amount alleged by 
Ms. Wolfe.  The question we are now 
confronted with is whether the district court's decision to deny confirmation 
and enforcement of the support order in its entirety was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  We hold that it was 
not.  The timing and amount of 
partial payments are relevant in determining arrearages and calculating 
interest, and Mr. Largent is entitled to credit for all support payments he has 
made.  But partial payment is not a 
complete defense to confirmation and enforcement of a valid foreign support 
order.  Mr. Largent is not entitled 
to an order denying enforcement in Wyoming of 
the original Washington divorce decree based upon a defense 
of partial payment.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it entered the order 
denying confirmation and enforcement of the Washington divorce 
decree.

[¶22]       
In addition to credit 
for all support payments that have been made, the record suggests that Mr. 
Largent's child support obligation may be further reduced by other defenses not 
fully addressed or determined by the district court.  Although Mr. Largent raised a statute of 
limitations defense, the district court explicitly declined to rule on that 
question because it was unnecessary given the court's denial of confirmation and 
enforcement 
of the decree.  The record also 
suggests that at least one child may have married prior to her 21st birthday, thus terminating Mr. Largent's 
support obligation for that child on the date of the marriage.  On remand, the district court must 
determine the proper amount of arrearages that are still owing.  After 
deducting any amounts that cannot be collected due to the applicable statute of 
limitations, the district court must calculate the interest due on the remaining 
amount, and enter an appropriate order confirming and enforcing the Washington divorce 
decree.

[¶23]       
The order setting 
aside the default judgment is affirmed.  
We reverse the Order Denying 
Motion for Confirmation and Enforcement of Child Support Order and 
Arrearages, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.