Title: CHRISTENSEN v. CARBON COUNTY, WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTENSEN v. CARBON COUNTY, WYOMING2004 WY 135100 P.3d 411Case Number: 04-44Decided: 11/09/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

CHET 
ALAN CHRISTENSEN,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

CARBON 
COUNTY, WYOMING, a County

of 
the State of Wyoming, by and through

its 
Board of County Commissioners,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Daniel B. Frank of Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Thomas A. Thompson and Brandon W. Snyder of MacPherson, Kelly and 
Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL and BROOKS, 
DJJ.

 

 

            
BROOKS, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      This case was 
brought by the appellee, Carbon County, Wyoming (Carbon County), against the 
appellant, Chet Alan Christensen (Christensen), alleging that Christensen was in 
violation of certain Carbon County zoning resolutions.  Carbon County sought injunctive relief 
as well as the imposition of civil fines against Christensen for keeping a 
junkyard and an illegal residence on his property.  After some limited discovery, the 
district court granted Carbon County's motion for summary judgment and enjoined 
Christensen from further zoning violations and assessed monetary 
penalties.

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      The issue now 
before this Court is whether there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
the existence of a junkyard and illegal residence that precluded summary 
judgment.  We find that issues of 
fact do exist and reverse and remand.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Christensen 
purchased a sixteen-acre tract of land in Carbon County in April of 2000.  The land had been zoned as ranching, 
agricultural, and mining under the Carbon County Zoning Resolution of 1972.  The subject property is separate and 
apart from Christensen's residence in Saratoga.

 

[¶4]      In 2001 and 2002, 
Carbon County notified Christensen that he was in violation of the zoning 
resolution in two particulars.  
First, it was alleged that Christensen had a junkyard on the 
property.  Second, Carbon County 
contended that Christensen had a residence on the property that was unrelated to 
ranching or agriculture and was therefore prohibited by the zoning 
requirements.

 

[¶5]      The factual 
record is comprised primarily of Christensen's deposition and the cease and 
desist letters to Christensen from Carbon County.  The deposition of Christensen indicates 
that he did have items on the property such as old water heaters and scrap iron 
that could properly be described as junk.  
Christensen's sworn testimony also discloses that he had a shed on the 
property that had water and electricity, but no septic or toilet 
facilities.  Christensen's father 
stayed in the shed on occasion for up to two weeks at a time in the 
summer.

 

[¶6]      On March 7, 2002, 
Carbon County sent a letter to Christensen requiring him to remove the junk from 
the property and remove the residential building (shed) from the property or 
face legal action.  Christensen's 
response was unsatisfactory to Carbon County, and on May 31, 2002, Carbon County 
filed suit alleging zoning violations pertaining to the junkyard and illegal 
residence.  Carbon County, 
thereafter, filed a motion for summary judgment attaching Christensen's 
deposition.  Christensen, who was 
then appearing pro se, filed a two-page brief without any supporting 
affidavits.

 

[¶7]      The district 
court granted Carbon County's motion, finding that the shed was an impermissible 
residence and that part of Christensen's property was a junkyard in violation of 
the Carbon County zoning resolution.  
The district court, therefore, issued an injunction prohibiting the 
illegal residential use and requiring immediate removal of the shed and the 
accumulation of junk.  At a separate 
hearing, the district court imposed civil penalties totaling $39,000.00, but 
suspended $29,000.00 if Christensen immediately complied with the district 
court's injunction.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]                              
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  . . .  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted.  . . .  The movant bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment.  If the movant carries his burden, the 
party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  . . .  This court evaluates the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials 
as the district court employed and used.  
We examine the record in the light most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion for summary judgment, and we give that party all the 
favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record.  We accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.

 

Metz 
Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 
2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      First, we must 
determine which Carbon County zoning resolution applies to this case.  Carbon County's initial complaint 
alleged a violation of the Zoning Resolution of 2000.  That resolution was ruled void by the 
district court on or about May 28, 2003, in an unrelated matter.  The parties agree that the Carbon County 
Zoning Resolution of 1972 became effective once the Zoning Resolution of 2000 
was invalidated.

 

[¶10]   During the pendency of this case, 
Carbon County enacted the Zoning Resolution of 2003.  Carbon County concedes that any 
restrictions contained in the 2003 Zoning Resolution that were more stringent 
than the 1972 Zoning Resolution would not be applicable to Christensen.  Therefore, as it pertains to this case, 
this Court believes, and the parties generally agree, that the 1972 Zoning 
Resolution is the applicable resolution.

 

            
Existence of Junkyard

 

[¶11]   We next turn to whether Christensen 
was operating a junkyard on his property within the meaning of the 1972 Zoning 
Resolution.  The 1972 Zoning 
Resolution defines junkyard with specificity.  The resolution mandates that, among 
other things, in order to qualify as a "junkyard," the property must be used 
"primarily for the collecting, storage, and sale of waste paper, 
rags, scrap metal, or other scrap or discarded material . . .."  Carbon County Zoning Resolution of 1972, 
§ 600.5 (emphasis added).

 

[¶12]   The record, at best, is silent as 
to whether there was any sale of junk.  
Specifically, Christensen stated in his deposition as 
follows:

 

Q.        
What's your intentions as to that iron you 
salvaged?

 

A.        Some 
if it I'm using to build the shed.  
I used  it's all framed up with pipe that I got out of that.  And what's left  I mean, some of it I'm 
going to use on that yet, and what's left I'm going to put in the garage and use 
it for different welding projects and jobs that I get and 
do.

 

Q.        So no 
intention to get rid of it.  You're 
going to salvage it and keep it 

 

A.        
Right.

 

Q.         for 
your own use.

 

A.        
Yes.

 

[¶13]   The zoning resolution clearly 
requires that junk be sold from the property.  From the foregoing, there is a strong 
inference that Christensen had no intention of selling the "junk."  Based on the 1972 Zoning Resolution, 
Christensen's property would therefore not qualify as a junkyard.  In any event, we believe there is at 
least a question of fact as to whether the property in question was a junkyard 
as that term is defined in the 1972 Zoning Resolution.

 

            
The Illegal Residence

 

[¶14]   We also believe that there is a 
question of fact as to whether the shed was an illegal residence.  The 1972 Zoning Resolution states that 
"[p]rimary residential uses not related to ranching and agriculture will not be 
permitted within this [RAM (ranching, agricultural, and mining)] district."  Carbon County Zoning Resolution of 1972, 
§ 300.  The resolution goes on to 
define primary residence as "[a] place used for residential purposes."  Id. at § 600.  There apparently is no definition of 
residential purposes contained in the 1972 Zoning 
Resolution.

 

[¶15]   It is clear from the deposition of 
Christensen that the shed was used sparingly as a place to sleep.  While it had some utilities, it had no 
toilet or septic facilities.  We 
believe that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether a shed without all 
normal utilities that was occasionally used for sleeping was truly "[a] place 
used for residential purposes."  
Id.

 

[¶16]   Second, the word "primary," as 
contained in the resolution, must have some meaning.  In interpreting a statute, we will 
assign words their ordinary and obvious meaning according to their arrangement 
and connection.  Fontaine v. 
Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo. 2000) 
(quoting Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 946 (Wyo. 1999)).  Black's Law Dictionary defines "primary" 
as "[f]irst; principal; chief; leading."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1190 (6th ed. 
1990).  Therefore, if the shed could 
be deemed a residence, there appears to be a question of fact as to whether it 
was "primarily" residential.

 

[¶17]   Finally, the resolution permits a 
residence that is related to ranching and agriculture.  Agricultural uses were defined in the 
resolution as "[l]and including necessary buildings and structure, which shall 
be used for agriculture including, but not limited to . . . grazing . 
. . pasturage . . . and animal . . . husbandry . . .."  Carbon County Zoning Resolution of 1972, 
§ 600.  In his deposition, 
Christensen stated that at various times, on the subject property, he cared for 
and ultimately sold a substantial number of calves.  Thus, if the shed could be deemed a 
residence, there is a question of fact as to whether it was related to 
agriculture.  Such a use would be 
permissible under the resolution.  
We believe, based on the foregoing, that there are multiple questions of 
fact in the record about the status of the shed that need to be 
resolved.

 

            
The Fine

 

[¶18]   Christensen contends that the fine 
that was levied by the district court was excessive and unreasonable.  This issue has been rendered moot by our 
finding that there are questions of fact as to whether or not Christensen's land 
constituted a junkyard and contained an illegal residence.  The fine must be set aside unless and 
until the factual issues pertaining to the status of the property are resolved 
against Christensen.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   We hold that there were genuine 
issues of material fact relating to whether or not Christensen maintained a 
junkyard and/or an illegal residence on his property, and that, therefore, the 
summary judgment granted by the district court is vacated, and this matter is 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.