Title: Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist1983 WY 2656 P.2d 1144Case Number: 5694Case Number: 5694Decided: 01/06/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming

JOHNSTON'S FUEL LINERS, INC., 
APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

TOLTEC WATERSHED 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). No. 5694

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

Henry A. 
Burgess, Sheridan, for appellants. 

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee condemned 
appellants' land to construct a reservoir. The trial court entered an order 
granting condemnation and an order of award. A judgment on a jury verdict 
awarding just compensation for the land taken was also entered. This appeal is 
from both orders and from the judgment on the verdict.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants designate 
the issues on appeal:

"I. Appellee, Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District, was denied the right to condemn the land of 
Appellants, Associated Enterprises, Inc., Johnston's Fuel Liners, Inc., and 
Anabel Malmquist Michele, by reason of W.S. 1977, § 41-8-126, which prohibits 
impairment of existing water rights, appropriations or 
priorities.

"II. Appellee, Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District, was not authorized to condemn land initially for 
recreation contrary to W.S. 1977, § 41-8-102.

"III. The exercise of the 
right of eminent domain by Toltec Watershed Improvement District for 
supplemental water and recreation is not a public necessity, benefit, or 
advantage which justifies the taking of Appellants' land and impairing its 
existing water rights permits and appropriations for a 
reservoir.

"IV. The Verdict should 
be set aside and vacated as it is not supported by competent evidence and is 
contrary to the evidence.

"V. Proper interest was 
not awarded Appellants."

[¶4.]     Appellee Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District was established after a referendum, held pursuant 
to the Watershed Improvement District Act. Sections 41-354.1 to 41-354.26, W.S. 
1957 (Cum.Supp. 1971) (Now §§ 41-8-101 to 41-8-126, W.S. 
1977).

[¶5.]     The parties here have 
been involved in litigation for more than twelve years. In 1970 appellee sought 
a right to enter on to land owned by appellant Associated Enterprises, Inc. and 
leased by appellant Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc. to carry out foundation studies 
for a dam site. Appellants resisted, claiming that the Watershed Improvement 
District Act was unconstitutional because it violated the "one man, one vote" 
concept under the Wyoming and the United States Constitutions.1

[¶6.]     We held in Associated 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1069 
(1971), that the "one man, one vote" concept of equal protection under state and 
federal constitutions is not to be applied to entities such as watershed 
improvement districts and that the statute creating watershed improvement 
districts is not unconstitutional as offending such concept. The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed this decision. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743, 93 S. Ct. 1237, 35 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1973).

[¶7.]     In 1978 the parties 
were again before this court. In that action appellants here contested the 
authority of the State Engineer to grant appellees an extension of time to 
commence and complete construction of a reservoir. We affirmed the district 
court in its decision affirming the State Engineer granting such extension. 
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec 
Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1359 
(1978).

[¶8.]     In 1974 appellee filed 
a complaint to condemn 264.68 acres of appellants' land on which to construct a 
reservoir.2 Appellants appeal from the district 
court's order granting condemnation, order of award and judgment awarding 
compensation.

I

[¶9.]     Appellants' most 
compelling argument for reversal is their contention that § 41-8-126, W.S. 1977, 
constitutes a statutory limitation upon appellee's eminent domain authority. 
This statute provides:

"Nothing in this Act 
shall be so construed as to in any manner impair existing water rights, 
appropriations or priorities."

[¶10.]  Appellee says that appellants still have 
their water rights and priorities. Appellee contends that appellants' land was 
condemned as irrigated land and compensation was awarded on that basis, but that 
appellants still own the water rights. Appellants argue that this is a valueless 
property right. Appellants placed in evidence an affidavit that there was no 
land to which appellants' water rights could be transferred. Furthermore, 
appellants' water rights, if they have any left, are subject to being 
extinguished by nonuse.3

[¶11.]  Appellee says that its right to condemn 
appellants' land was determined by this court in a prior case between the same 
parties. In Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement 
District, supra, at 1363, we said we would not assume that the legislature would 
pass an act which would have no force or effect, because the legislature will 
not be presumed to intend futile things. We went on to say that appellants' 
interpretation of § 41-8-126, supra, would force a construction that would 
nullify the entire Watershed Improvement District Act:

"For the legislature to 
say, on the one hand, that a watershed district has the power of eminent domain 
to enable it to build dams and irrigation systems, while, at the same time 
limiting that right to only those situations in which no existing water rights, 
appropriations or priorities are impaired, would be inconsistent, impractical, 
and would have the effect of charging the legislature with the passage of a 
useless act. The rivers and streams of Wyoming are so completely appropriated that it 
is now virtually impossible to undertake construction of a reservoir without in 
some manner affecting an existing water right. The requirement under the 
statutory provisions for condemnation that this impairment must be compensated 
for in a just manner nullifies any equitable argument on the part of the prior 
appropriator."

[¶12.]  We also said in that case that the land 
to be taken would be compensated for as irrigated land, unless it could be shown 
that the water rights were to be transferred to a third party or transferred to 
other lands.4 

[¶13.]  Appellants vigorously contend that what 
we said in the 1978 case of Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec regarding 
eminent domain was dicta and not precedent. Appellants further contend that this 
court's decision in that case assumed facts not in the record. We will not 
review the issues and record in the 1978 case to determine whether what we said 
in that case was dicta. We are satisfied that the analysis is sound, and that it 
is applicable to this case, where the issue of appellee's right to condemn 
appellants' land is squarely before this court.

[¶14.]  It is difficult to see how the purposes 
of the Act could be accomplished without in some way affecting existing water 
rights. While the construction of a reservoir may be the key to a water 
improvement project, other facilities are also necessary. Canals, laterals, 
flumes and diversion structures must also be built. Construction of any of these 
facilities would have to affect existing water rights in some way. If we were to 
accept appellants' argument here and interpret § 41-8-126 literally, we would 
nullify the Act. "`The will or caprice of an individual would often defeat the 
most useful and extensive enterprises * * *'." 4 Clark, Waters & Water 
Rights, § 303.1, p. 72 (Allen Smith Company, 1970).

[¶15.]  Part of the problem here may be due to 
the feeling which a commentator said could apply to Wyoming law of water 
transfers, and which we think could also apply to the condemnation of property 
that has appurtenant water rights:

"* * * [I]t may be 
hazarded that the answer lies in a strong `heirloom attitude' of the Wyoming ranch and farm 
water user. He feels that water is his most precious asset, his heritage, his 
birthright. To sell it would be sinful. Laws against sin are much in favor. In 
part this attitude may come from a misunderstanding, a fear that stability of 
water rights is at stake, that water will be `taken' from irrigators without 
compensation, as may be done in some eastern states. * * *" 1 Land & Water 
Review, p. 73 (1966).

Here, appellants 
have been compensated for the untransferred water rights by being paid for 
irrigated land. We would venture a guess, therefore, that their real objection 
comes from a feeling that a "birthright" has been taken from them, and that no 
compensation for the loss of that "birthright" would be 
adequate.

[¶16.]  We can easily understand such an 
objection, but we do not believe that the legislature would provide for a 
comprehensive watershed improvement scheme in the 25 sections of the Act and 
then render it meaningless in one sentence. We hold that the prohibition against 
impairment of existing water rights, appropriations, or priorities contained in 
§ 41-8-126, supra, is not absolute and that the purpose of the statute is 
satisfied if just compensation is awarded. This holding is consistent with 
general condemnation law, although general condemnation law admittedly does not 
contain a provision identical to § 41-8-126.

II

[¶17.]  When this condemnation was commenced in 
1974 the purposes of the Watershed Improvement District Act 
were:

"The purposes of this act 
are to provide for the prevention and control of erosion, flood water and 
sediment damages, and the storage, conservation development, utilization, and 
disposal of water, and thereby to preserve and protect land and water resources, 
and protect and promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of 
this state." § 41-354.2, W.S. 1957 (Cum.Supp. 1975).

[¶18.]  In 1975 the following provision was added 
to the purposes of the Act:

"Recreational use may be 
included in conjunction with projects developed in compliance with the purposes 
of this act, but nothing in this act shall be interpreted to give initial power 
of condemnation for recreational purposes. * * *" § 41-354.2, W.S. 1957 
(Cum.Supp. 1971).

[¶19.]  Appellants submit that recreational use 
cannot be included in the project since the statute in effect when the complaint 
was filed was silent regarding recreational use. The complaint for condemnation 
did not mention condemning for recreational use, nor did the appellee's 
condemning resolution. However, the "Watershed Work Plan for the Upper North 
Laramie River," which appellee and numerous state and federal agencies produced 
in 1967, does provide for recreation, among other things. It was always 
contemplated that the reservoir would be "multiple 
purpose."

[¶20.]  When the complaint was filed, the Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission had an agreement that appellee would condemn land 
sufficient to store 520 acre feet of water with 60 surface acres for a fishery. 
In November, 1974, appellee and the Game and Fish Commission cancelled their 
agreement, apparently because it became obvious that the Game and Fish 
Commission had no standing to condemn land.

[¶21.]  The 60 acres and 520 acre feet of water 
are included in the total land to be condemned for the reservoir for irrigation 
purposes. Appellee states that the reservoir would be the same size whether or 
not recreation was included as a purpose. Appellants do not disagree. The 
recreational use provision, nevertheless, contemplates that the reservoir would 
not be drained for irrigation purposes, so that an active fishery would be 
maintained. The recreational use included in the project contemplates, then, 
that there will always be at least a 60 acre lake in the 
reservoir.

[¶22.]  The provision for recreation in 
appellee's project was not put there to benefit fishermen from Colorado and elsewhere. 
Most likely, appellee's motivation was that it could receive substantial 
financial assistance from the federal government by providing for recreation. 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1004 (1982 Supp.). This is a motivating factor in all major reservoir 
constructions in the state.

[¶23.]  The Watershed Improvement District Act 
now specifically authorizes the inclusion of recreation purposes in a project. 
See § 41-8-102, W.S. 1977. At no time did appellee purport to initially condemn 
for recreational purposes. Recreational purposes were at all times incidental to 
the principal objective of appellee's project. For these reasons we hold that 
the condemnation proceedings complied with the Watershed Improvement District 
Act.

III

[¶24.]  Because the power of eminent domain is 
based on sovereign or public necessity, property taken must be put to a public 
use. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 71.1 (3rd Ed.Rev. 1963) Courts make the 
decision whether a use is public, keeping in mind that the decision should be 
influenced by local conditions. Rindge Co. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S. Ct. 689, 67 L. Ed. 1186 
(1923). Courts generally decide whether a use is public by looking at the facts 
surrounding the subject. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 25 S. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed. 1085 (1905).

[¶25.]  Appellants argue that this project will 
not benefit the public. They contend that after their 264.68 acres of land are 
condemned and inundated, there will be less irrigated land than before the 
taking. While the evidence showed that because of the condemnation action, 
264.68 acres will be inundated and taken out of production, the evidence also 
established that production on other lands in the district will increase and 
more than make up for the land taken out of production.

[¶26.]  Appellants contend that the project does 
not benefit the public because only a few landowners will benefit. Individual 
landowners in the Toltec Improvement District will be the principal 
beneficiaries of the project, but it is not essential that the entire community, 
nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy or participate in any 
improvement to constitute a public use. Rindge Co. v. County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 262 U.S.  at 707, 43 S. Ct.  at 692, 67 L. Ed.  at 1192. We said in Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, 
Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 250, 131 P. 43, 57 (1913), that the 
taking of land for an irrigation ditch in the western 
states,

"* * * has been upheld as 
for a public use, regardless of the number of acres or distinct tracts or farms 
to be irrigated or the number of independent owners, such taking being held 
permissible for the purpose of irrigating land owned by a single individual. 
[Citations.]"

[¶27.]  It follows that under the facts of this 
case, the taking can be upheld as for a public use if there is some benefit to 
the public from the taking. There are features in the plan designed to benefit 
the public. These features are a land treatment measure, which will control 
erosion and sedimentation rates; flood prevention; 600 fishermen-days annually; 
attraction of people to other recreation facilities in the area; and help in 
stabilizing the economy in the community.

[¶28.]  Appellants also argue that the project is 
not economically feasible, which is to say that the project is not cost 
effective, and that public funds should not be expended on a "loser."5 They contend that if the project is 
not economically feasible, then it is not a project for which the right of 
eminent domain should be exercised. We are precluded, however, from considering 
the feasibility issue because of res judicata. The federal district court for 
the District of Wyoming considered this issue and others, and filed its 
memorandum opinion and judgment dated November 3, 1980 (No. C78-173B), deciding 
against appellants here.6

[¶29.]  We considered the doctrine of res 
judicata in a recent case.

"Res judicata is the term 
applied to the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and 
their privies; and, as to them, it constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. [Citation.] The sum 
and substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially decided is 
finally decided. [Citation.] It is a doctrine of universal law diffused through 
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence. It is a public policy principle 
arising through the necessity and interest of society that there be an end to 
litigation. [Citation.]" Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395, 398 
(1982).

[¶30.]  The federal district court was a court of 
competent jurisdiction. Appellants here were plaintiffs and appellee was an 
intervenor, so that all the parties were involved. Arguably, the cause of action 
and the subject matter are not entirely identical, because more issues were 
litigated in federal court than appellants are trying to litigate here. In the 
case here, appellants' principal reason for contending that the project is not 
economically feasible is that an incorrect interest or discount rate was used. 
In the federal case the accuracy of the interest or discount rate was litigated 
and determined against appellants here. In the federal action appellants here 
also complained of the inadequacy of an environmental impact statement. In the 
federal case it was also determined that "satisfactory assurances" had been 
given that the sponsors of the project would pay the nonfederal share of the 
project costs.

[¶31.]  We hold that the action in the federal 
district court, because of res judicata, barred the state district court from 
considering the issue of economic feasibility, and bars this court from 
considering it. The original pleadings in this case, of course, did not raise 
the issue of res judicata. By agreement, the condemnation action abated until 
the judgment was entered in the federal case, which occurred in November, 1980. 
Thereafter, this case proceeded and the state district court entered its order 
of taking in February, 1981. We do not know that the state district court 
mentioned the doctrine of res judicata; however, its application is implicit in 
the court's order of condemnation. 

[¶32.]  In Issue No. III appellants again discuss 
some of the matters raised in Issues I and II. We have addressed these matters 
and will not repeat our analysis and resolution of them.

IV

[¶33.]  Appellants contend that the jury's 
compensation award is not supported by competent evidence and is contrary to the 
evidence. The verdict of the jury was as follows:

"1. We, the jury, find 
the fair market value of all the land of the Defendants before the condemnation 
of the easement for Plaintiff's reservoir on February 11, 1981, was: 
$705,000.

"2. We, the jury, find 
the fair market value of the land of Defendants after the condemnation on 
February 11, 1981, was $618,000:

"3. We, the jury find the 
just compensation to be paid to Defendants is: $87,000."

[¶34.]  We said in Continental Pipeline Company 
v. Irwin Livestock Company, Wyo., 625 P.2d 214, 216 
(1981):

"We have held that where 
there is a partial taking of property, as here, which will result in damages to 
the remainder not taken, the amount of just compensation to be awarded for that 
`taken or affected' is determined by application of the `before and after' rule, 
i.e. just compensation is the difference between the fair market value of the 
entire parcel before the taking and that after the taking. 
[Citations.]"

[¶35.]  It appears here that the case was tried 
and submitted to the jury on the correct method of arriving at just 
compensation. The form of their verdict is also proper. Appellants concede that 
the appraisers called by appellants and by the appellee were both "qualified as 
expert witnesses and were competent to opine as to the true value of the 
property taken."

[¶36.]  Appellants' expert witness, Joe Dunford, 
using a market approach, testified that just compensation should be $140,000. 
Using an alternative cost approach, he testified that just compensation should 
be $137,000. Just compensation, in the opinion of appellee's expert witness, 
John Butler, was $50,164. While the jury award of $87,000 was within the range 
of testimony, it was not exactly what either of the witnesses had testified to. 
Appellants apparently urge this court to adopt a rule requiring the jury award 
to correspond exactly to what a witness testified. We know of no such rule, nor 
do we think such a rule would be sound.

[¶37.]  Appellants do not make it clear whether 
they are contending that the verdict here should be set aside because of 
averaging or because it was a quotient verdict. They quote Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, which addresses both matters:

"* * * Even though within 
the range of the testimony, if the award represents an averaging of the 
conflicting appraisals, it is improper. Quotient verdicts have been rejected on 
the ground that they foreclose consideration of estimates in excess of or below 
such figure. * * *" 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 17.1[4], pp. 17-24 
(1981).

[¶38.]  Appellants conjecture that in arriving at 
its verdict the jury took the difference between Dunford's just compensation 
figure of $137,000 and subtracted Butler's figure of just compensation of 
$50,164, then rounded to even figures and came up with $87,000 as just 
compensation. It does not appear that the jury averaged the three figures of 
just compensation given by the different appraisers. If the jury had averaged 
the three figures the result would have been $91,388. If the jury had averaged 
the highest and lowest figures, the result would have been 
$93,582.

[¶39.]  In true quotient verdicts members of the 
jury agree in advance that each juror will specify a figure he recommends and 
all figures will be added together and the sum divided by the number of jurors, 
and that all jurors are bound to accept the quotient obtained as their verdict. 
Security Mutual Finance Corporation v. Harris, 288 Ala. 369, 261 So. 2d 43 
(1972). The basic policy against quotient verdicts is that one or more jurors, 
by resorting to extreme figures, could force an unfair verdict. Southern Ry. Co. 
v. Williams, 113 Ala. 620, 21 So. 328 (1897). On the face of 
the verdict here there is no indication that it is a quotient verdict, nor is 
there any evidence to that effect.

[¶40.]  This verdict, then, appears to be a 
compromise. We will not upset a verdict merely because the jury may have 
compromised, if the verdict was within the range of the testimony and if it 
appears that the verdict was the jury's true verdict.

"* * * A true verdict is 
the voluntary conclusion of the jury after deliberate consideration, and it is 
none the less [sic] a true verdict because the respective jurors may have been 
liberal in concessions to each other, if conscientiously and freely made. * * *" 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, supra, 21 So.  at 329.

V

[¶41.]  Appellants contend that the interest 
award was improper, and that they were entitled to interest on the $87,000 from 
February 11, 1981, until April 15, 1982. The record is not clear regarding the 
sequence of events culminating in the award of interest. The appraisal was filed 
in August, 1981. The order of award contemplated by Rule 71.1(i), Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, was filed on October 22, 1981.7 The deposit of $73,075 was made 
before the order of award, since the order recites that $73,075 had been 
deposited to appellants' credit with the clerk of the district court, which 
place of deposit was approved by the court. Appellants acknowledged that they 
were aware of the deposit at the time of the first pretrial conference in 
September, 1982, at which time they could have withdrawn the deposit and used it 
any way they desired.

[¶42.]  Rule 71.1(i), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Order of award - The 
district judge, upon filing of the certificate of appraisers under subdivision 
(h) above, or upon entry of the jury verdict under subdivision (j) below, and 
upon receiving due proof that such compensation and separate sums * * * have 
been paid * * * or have been deposited to the credit of such parties in the 
county treasury, or other place for that purpose approved by the court, shall 
make and cause to be entered an order describing the real or personal property 
taken, the compensation ascertained, and the mode of making compensation or 
deposit thereof as aforesaid. * * * Upon the entry of such order, the plaintiff 
shall have such rights in the condemned property as are granted to him by the 
statutes of this state authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain 
by plaintiff and which have been the subject matter of his 
action."

* * * * * 
*

[¶43.]  Rule 71.1(1), W.R.C.P., provides in part, 
"* * * Interest shall not accrue as to the sum deposited by the plaintiff from 
and after the time the deposit becomes available for distribution to the 
defendant or defendants. * * *" For that reason, appellee cannot be charged 
interest on the $73,075 which was available to appellants.

[¶44.]  Rule 71.1(1), W.R.C.P., further provides, 
"* * * If the compensation finally awarded to any defendant exceeds the amount 
which has been paid to him on distribution of the deposit, the court shall enter 
judgment against him and in favor of the plaintiff for the deficiency. * * *" 
The jury returned its verdict of $87,000 on January 20, 1982. The amount of the 
verdict was $13,925 more than the amount deposited by appellee for appellants' 
benefit. The trial judge then added an award of interest on the $13,925 
deficiency from the date of the jury verdict, January 20, 1982, at the rate of 
ten percent.

[¶45.]  Rule 71.1(1), W.R.C.P., is silent about 
interest on the deficiency. We believe, however, that interest is proper so that 
just compensation is complete. We hold that where the jury award exceeds the 
amount initially deposited to the credit of the condemnee, the condemnee is 
entitled to interest on the difference between amounts of just compensation 
fixed at the time of the order of award (time of taking) and later increased by 
the jury, measured from the date of the order of award. Venable v. Lee, 141 Ga. 
App. 159, 233 S.E.2d 3 (1977).8

[¶46.]  Therefore, appellants are entitled to 
interest on the difference of $13,925 between the award of the appraisers and 
the amount assessed by the jury, and in this respect the judgment is modified to 
allow appellants interest on said sum from October 22, 1981, the date of the 
order of award.

[¶47.]  Affirmed as 
modified.

FOOTNOTES

1 Under the Watershed 
Improvement District Act only landowners are entitled to vote in the referendum 
and their vote is weighted according to the number of acres they own. § 
41-8-109, W.S. 1977.

2 The case here was 
commenced October 1, 1974; however, proceedings were held in abeyance until the 
issues raised in the 1978 case were resolved. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1359 
(1978).

3 Section 41-3-401(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Where the holder of 
an appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. * * *" See also § 41-3-402(a), W.S. 
1977.

4 Section 41-3-107, W.S. 
1977, provides in part:

"(a) The state board of 
control is hereby authorized, upon the written petition of the owner, or owners 
of an adjudicated water right, or water rights appurtenant to lands submerged or 
to be submerged * * * to issue amended certificates of appropriation of water 
and to change the point of diversion and means of conveyance for such 
adjudicated appropriations of water for the irrigation of other lands in the 
state of Wyoming outside of the reservoir basin in lieu of the submerged land, 
without loss of priority;

* * * * * 
*

"(c) The owner or owners 
of lands coming under the provisions of this act [§§ 41-3-107, 41-3-109] may 
sell or convey such lands submerged or to be submerged by any such reservoir 
with provisions in the deed or other conveyance that the water rights 
appurtenant thereto may be detached and transferred as provided 
herein."

5 According to the project 
plan, substantial public funds will be used. Also it is contemplated appellee 
will obtain a loan from the Farmers Home Administration (Public Law 566, 83rd 
Congress, 68 Stat. 666, as amended, 16 U.S.C.A., § 1001 et seq. (1982 
Supp.)).

6 That case is presently 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.

7 Appellants contend that 
an order of award was entered February 11, 1981. This order was an "Order 
Granting Condemnation and Appointing Appraisers." It was not the "Order of 
Award" contemplated by Rule 71.1(i), W.R.C.P., and could not have been, because 
the land had not been appraised.

8 There are cases holding 
that deposit or tender of an amount eventually found insufficient does not 
prevent a recovery of interest on the entire amount awarded the owner. 
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Nos. 401, 403, 405 East Seventh Street, Del., 
189 A.2d 421 (1963); and City of Winston-Salem v. Wells, 249 N.C. 148, 105 S.E.2d 435 (1938).

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶48.]  I dissent because I believe (1) that the 
jury award did not compensate appellants for all of that taken, i.e. it did not 
consider compensation for the taking of appellants' water rights, and (2) that 
the award was not supported by competent evidence.

I

[¶49.]  The only evidence as to value came from 
two appraisers, one testifying for each side. Each appraised the property for 
livestock ranch use. They recognized that the land taken had high priority water 
rights and was irrigated land. They considered the irrigable nature of the land, 
but they did not consider the value of the water rights in computation of just 
compensation.

[¶50.]  Land should be valued at its highest and 
best use. Irrigated land has a higher value in most instances than pasture land. 
The fact that this land was recognized as irrigable and so valued does not mean 
that the water rights were included in the valuation. Even if land was not 
irrigated, if it were irrigable and thus have a higher and best use than that to 
which it was being put, the appraisal should be on the basis of irrigable land, 
i.e. for the highest and best use. Compensation for irrigated land is not 
compensation for the water rights. The legislature recognized the distinction in 
providing authority to move the water rights to another location in event of 
condemnation. Section 41-3-107, W.S. 1977.

[¶51.]  In this instance, neither court nor 
counsel presented the issue of compensation for the water rights to the jury.1 Ordinarily, this would cause us to 
go no further with the issue. However, compensation for the water rights and the 
impracticability for transferring them surfaced previously in the long judicial 
examination of this matter, and we said in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Toltec Watershed Improvement District, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1978) 
that:

"* * * The requirement 
under the statutory provisions for condemnation that this impairment must be 
compensated for in a just manner nullifies any equitable argument on the part of 
the prior appropriator." (Emphasis added.)

The quotation 
was in connection with a discussion and ruling on whether or not the reservoir 
would "impair" appellants' water rights, particularly in view of the legislative 
direction in connection with watershed improvement districts 
that

"Nothing in this act [§§ 
41-8-101 to 41-8-126] shall be so construed as to in any manner impair existing 
water rights, appropriations or priorities." Section 41-8-126, W.S. 
1977.

[¶52.]  I believe that, having decided that the 
water rights in this case are a proper subject for condemnation and having made 
compensation for them one of the grounds for the holding in the first appeal of 
this case, the statement that they "must be compensated for" should have been 
complied with when the condemnation was finally 
accomplished.

"Private property shall not be taken for private use 
unless by consent of the owner, except for * * * reservoirs * * * nor in any 
case without due compensation." (Emphasis added.) Article 1, § 32, Wyoming 
Constitution.

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
or private use without just compensation." (Emphasis added.) Article 1, § 33, 
Wyoming Constitution.

II

[¶53.]  The jury award is not founded on valid 
valuation evidence. As noted, the only evidence of value came from two 
appraisers, one for each side. Appellants' appraiser, using an animal unit 
approach to valuation, placed a value on the ranch before the taking at 
$730,0002 and after the taking at $590,0003 resulting in just compensation of 
$140,000. Appellee's appraiser, using a per acre valuation approach, placed a 
value on the ranch before taking at $700,500.4 To reach his after value, he 
testified to the potential for cabin sites and attributed a benefit value 
therefrom, resulting in an after value of $650,336 and $50,160 just 
compensation.5

[¶54.]  The appraisement by appellee's appraiser 
was faulty in including a benefit value in his computation inasmuch as his 
computations were made on a per acre basis. Appellee's condemnation power 
results from § 41-8-113(a)(iii), W.S. 1977, which directs that it is to be "in 
the manner provided by law for the condemnation of private property for public 
use." Thus, the rule of damages applicable to this case 
is:

"In estimating the 
compensation for all property actually taken, the true value thereof, at the 
time of the appraisement, shall be allowed and awarded; and in estimating the 
compensation for damages occasioned to other portions of the claimant's 
property, not actually taken, the value of the benefits, or advantages, if any, 
to such other lands may be deducted therefrom." Section 1-26-203, W.S. 1977.6

[¶55.]  Under this rule, the benefits can be set 
off only against the damages to lands of appellants other than that taken - not 
against the value of the property actually taken for which "the true value 
thereof * * * shall be allowed and awarded." See 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 
8.6207 and 8.6211[51]; Orgel on Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain § 64 
(2d ed. 1953); State 
Highway Commission v. Rollins, Wyo., 
471 P.2d 324 (1970). By allocating value on the basis of acreage taken, as done 
by appellee's appraiser, benefits cannot be subtracted therefrom under the 
aforesaid rule of damages. Accordingly, the jury could not properly consider the 
testimony of appellee's appraiser.

[¶56.]  Therefore, the only proper testimony on 
value before the jury was that of appellants' appraiser. Since the jury did not 
make an award in conformance therewith or within the scope of the valuation 
testimony, the jury's award cannot stand. There was no substantial evidence in 
support of the award.

[¶57.]  For one or both of these reasons, I would 
reverse and remand for a new trial as to the amount of just compensation to be 
paid to appellants.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellants' counsel 
mentioned in opening statement that transfer of the water rights was impossible 
as a practical matter.

2 Rounded off from 
$728,750 (275 animal units at $2,650).

3 Rounded off from 
$642,836 (225 animal units at $2,625).

4 Rounded off from 
$700,511 (on an acreage and use basis).

5 Appellants' appraiser 
considered the possibility of cabin sites as too speculative to compute in 
connection with his animal unit approach to valuation.

6 This section was 
repealed by the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act (Ch. 174, S.L. of Wyoming 1981) which 
became effective July 1, 1981. The repeal will not apply to this case which was 
then pending. Section 8-1-107, W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent 
part:

"If a statute is repealed 
or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect pending actions, 
prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal. * * *"