Title: Brazell v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

570 So. 2d 919 (1990)
Tyrone Lloyd BRAZELL, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 73387.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 1, 1990.
Rehearing Denied December 19, 1990.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Celia A. Terenzio, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
*920 GRIMES, Justice.
We review Brazell v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), which certified the following question of great public importance:
Id. at 50. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Brazell was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell and the sale of cocaine. Following voir dire, the following colloquy occurred:
Brazell appealed his conviction on the ground that the court had failed to hold the hearing required by Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). In affirming the conviction, the Fourth District Court of Appeal relied upon its prior decision in Nava v. State, 450 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), appeal dismissed, 508 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1987), in which the court had sought to harmonize the requirements of Richardson with the longstanding rule that requires the party against whom a ruling of exclusion has been made to make a proffer of the proposed testimony so that the trial and the appellate courts may be able to evaluate its weight, relevancy, and competency in determining the effect of the exclusion. The Nava court ultimately held:
Id. at 609.
In Richardson, this Court held that when the state seeks to call a witness in violation of the rules of discovery, the trial judge should inquire whether the violation was inadvertent or willful, whether it was trivial or substantial, and what effect the violation had on the ability of opposing counsel to prepare for trial. The same requirements are applicable to a discovery violation by the defendant. Smith v. State, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979). The failure to hold a Richardson hearing is per se reversible error. Smith v. State, 500 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1986).
The thrust of our decisions is that when a party wishes to call a witness whose name has not been furnished to the other side, the trial judge has no alternative but to make the inquiries required by Richardson. In view of the prophylactic purpose intended to be served by this rule, we believe that it represents an exception to the general principle that one cannot complain of the exclusion of testimony in the absence of a proffer. Thus, we answer the certified question in the negative.
Because the rule places the burden upon the trial judge rather than the parties to initiate the Richardson hearing, the judge must be alerted to the necessity of doing so. In other words, before it can be said that reversible error has automatically occurred because no inquiries were made, there must be a clear showing of the need for a Richardson hearing. It is in this respect that we believe that Brazell has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
From the foregoing colloquy, it appears that Brazell had just informed his attorney about Taylor. There was no suggestion that Brazell's attorney would call Taylor as a witness or that Taylor's presence at the trial could even be obtained. Therefore, at this juncture it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to hold a meaningful Richardson inquiry. Until such time as the defense indicated that it wished to call Taylor as a witness, it could not be said that a discovery violation had occurred. Therefore, any Richardson inquiries were essentially irrelevant. In short, we hold that the foregoing colloquy was insufficient to trigger the necessity of conducting a Richardson hearing.
We disapprove of the decision in Nava and the reliance thereon by the district court of appeal in this case. However, we approve the decision below which affirms Brazell's conviction.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs in result only.
*922 KOGAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
KOGAN, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
In Richardson, this Court held that a trial court may exercise its discretion to sanction or not sanction the state for its noncompliance with discovery rules only after an adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances. Richardson, 246 So. 2d  at 775 (quoting Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)). At a minimum, the trial court must inquire whether the violation was inadvertent or wilful, whether it was trivial or substantial, and what effect the violation has had on the ability of opposing counsel to prepare for trial. Id. In Richardson, the error occurred when the state failed to tell defense counsel the name of a state witness, and the court denied the defense's objections on this matter without inquiry.
Later, in the case of Smith v. State, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979), the Court addressed a Richardson violation by defense counsel, like the one in the present case. The district court opinions under review in Smith are instructive. When first confronted with the issue on appeal, the Second District had recited the following facts:
Smith v. State, 353 So. 2d 205, 206-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (emphasis added), appeal after relinquishment of jurisdiction, 359 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), quashed, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979).
Later, when confronted with these same facts, this Court held that the failure to conduct a Richardson inquiry until one year after trial was so serious an error as to require a new trial. Smith, 372 So. 2d  at 89. In quashing the opinion of the district court, this Court did not hold that the failure of defense counsel to proffer the witness' testimony precluded appellate relief. To the contrary, we effectively held that even in the absence of a defense proffer the error required a new trial. Compare id. with Smith, 353 So. 2d  at 207.
Clearly, the facts and holding in Smith control the facts of the present case. The trial court below was not empowered to exercise its discretion until it had conducted a Richardson hearing, Richardson, 246 So. 2d  at 775, and the failure of counsel to proffer the testimony in question did not waive the issue on appeal. Compare Smith, 372 So. 2d  at 88-89 with Smith, 353 So. 2d  at 207. This is true whether the Richardson violation is committed by the state or by defense counsel.
Without any analysis, the majority opinion sub silentio recedes from Smith. I do not believe this is sound policy. The issue presented in this case does not involve a failure of the defense to object or make a proffer, but the failure of the trial court to properly exercise its discretion after the state has made its objection. Once a party  whether the state or the defense  has raised an objection, the trial court then is obligated to conduct the Richardson inquiry.
I agree with Smith that failure to do so is an abuse of discretion, whether or not the other party proffers the testimony of the witness in question. Indeed, a proffer may not even be necessary if an adequate inquiry is made into the factors described in Richardson. The error in the present case was precisely that the court failed to conduct even the most rudimentary of Richardson inquiries.
For these reasons, I concur in the negative answer to the certified question and the decision to disapprove Nava. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that Brazell failed to sufficiently alert the trial court to its obligations under Richardson. This holding is directly contrary to our own prior holding in Smith. Thus, I would *923 quash the opinion below and remand for new trial.