Title: State v. John C. Brown

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 131 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP584-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
John C. Brown, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 44 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 691, 712 N.W.2d 899 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David A. Hansher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Randall E. Paulson, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak, Amelia 
L. Bizzaro, and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter J. Dickey and 
David E. Schultz, Madison, on behalf of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School, and there was oral argument by Walter J. 
Dickey. 
 
 
2006 WI 131
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP584-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2001CF5300) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John C. Brown, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision1 of the court of appeals affirming an order of 
the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Judge David A. Hansher, 
reconfining John C. Brown (Brown) to prison for three years 
following revocation of his extended supervision, and the 
court's order denying Brown's motion for reconsideration. 
¶2 
Brown contends that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it ordered Brown to serve three 
                                                 
1 State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 44, 289 Wis. 2d 691, 712 
N.W.2d 899. 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
2 
 
years 
of 
reconfinement 
in 
prison 
and 
denied 
Brown's 
postconviction motion for a reduction in reconfinement time.  In 
his postconviction motion, Brown argued that the court should 
follow the Department of Corrections (DOC) guidelines to 
determine the minimum custody necessary, that the court had not 
given sufficient deference to the DOC recommendations, and that 
a 
reconfinement 
sentence 
should 
comply 
with 
due 
process 
requirements and standards for exercising discretion.   
¶3 
Brown asks this court to reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision, 
and to remand his case for a new reconfinement hearing.  Brown 
further petitions this court to address what standard courts 
should 
apply 
when 
explaining 
and 
reviewing 
reconfinement 
decisions. 
¶4 
 The State of Wisconsin (State) asserts that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion and applied the 
appropriate standards in determining that Brown should return to 
prison 
for 
three 
years 
following 
revocation 
of 
extended 
supervision.  The State therefore asks this court to affirm the 
court of appeals, which affirmed the reconfinement orders of the 
circuit court.   
¶5 
Under the circumstances set forth, we hold that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion, when 
the court imposed three years of reconfinement.  Since this 
court has not, until now, set forth any guidelines as to the 
factors that should be considered in reconfinement hearings, we 
further hold that the circuit court adequately explained the 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
3 
 
basis for its reconfinement decision, when it stated that it 
believed the DOC's recommendation of one year, ten months, and 
thirty days was too low, that Brown had a cocaine problem, and 
that he would be a risk to the community if he were to be 
released after the DOC's suggested reconfinement period. 
¶6 
Under Truth in Sentencing, extended supervision and 
reconfinement are, in effect, substitutes for the parole system 
that existed under prior law.  A reconfinement hearing occurs 
after there has been an original sentencing and a revocation of 
extended supervision and is, therefore, closely akin to a 
sentencing hearing.    
¶7 
We do not intend to set forth a required checklist 
that must be followed in every instance.  Nevertheless, a 
circuit court, in demonstrating an exercise of discretion in a 
reconfinement decision, should consider many of the factors 
discussed herein when making reconfinement decisions, and should 
explain on the record those factors which are relevant to the 
circumstances of a particular case.  A circuit court should 
consider the recommendation from the DOC.  The court should also 
consider the nature and severity of the original offense, the 
client's institutional conduct record, and the client's conduct 
and the nature of the violation of terms and conditions during 
extended supervision, as well as the amount of incarceration 
necessary to protect the public from the risk of further 
criminal activity.  The court should impose the minimum amount 
of confinement which is consistent with the protection of the 
public, the gravity of the offense, and the defendant's 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
4 
 
rehabilitative needs.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 276, 
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  A circuit court also should consider the 
defendant's 
prior 
record, 
attitude, 
and 
capacity 
for 
rehabilitation, and the rehabilitative goals to be accomplished 
by reconfinement for the time period in question in relation to 
the time left on the defendant's original sentence.   
¶8 
We realize that not all of these factors will apply in 
every case.  We provide this listing not as a mandatory 
checklist, but as guidance to a circuit court in making what 
often is a difficult reconfinement decision.  For the reasons 
set forth herein, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
I 
¶9 
In October 2001 Brown was charged with armed robbery, 
threat 
of 
force, 
party 
to 
a 
crime, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§  943.32(1)(b) and (2) and 939.05 (1999-2000).  The 
charge arose from an incident in which Brown and a codefendant, 
Dejuan Rainey (Rainey), engaged in what was charged as a planned 
armed robbery of an individual, Robert Young (Young), in an 
alley.  Young told police that Brown came to his home and asked 
him to come to a gas station with him.  While Brown and Young 
were walking through an alley, Rainey pointed a gun at Young and 
demanded him to empty his pockets and place the items on the 
ground.  Brown picked up the items, and Young fled. 
¶10 Young encountered a squad car and told police of the 
robbery.  The police entered the alley and found Rainey and 
Brown in a vehicle driven by a third man, Christopher Blunt 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
5 
 
(Blunt).  The police stopped the vehicle and seized the gun and 
Rainey's possessions.  According to the criminal complaint, 
Blunt told police that he had been waiting in the vehicle while 
Brown and Rainey went to purchase marijuana from Young.  Rainey 
also told police that he and Brown were buying marijuana from 
Young.  Young denied the allegation that he was involved in 
dealing drugs.     
¶11 At the plea hearing, the prosecutor sought to amend the 
charge to theft-from-person, in part because of the allegations 
about Young's drug dealing.  The prosecutor stated, "I don't 
believe my own victim completely as to what happened, I seek an 
amendment."  As part of a negotiated plea agreement, the State 
reduced the charges against Brown to a charge of felony theft 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a)(1999-2000).  In January 
2002 Brown pled guilty to that reduced charge. 
¶12 The circuit court sentenced Brown to eight years, 
consisting of one year and seven months of initial confinement 
and six years and five months of extended supervision.  During 
sentencing, then Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Robert 
Crawford considered the gravity of the offense, and determined 
that it was serious enough to warrant confinement in prison.  
The court noted that Brown had planned the crime with two other 
men, and had lured the victim into the alley.  The sentencing 
court also considered the fact that Brown had family support, 
and had no prior criminal record, but the court decided that 
prison time was necessary to promote the goal of deterring 
further crime in the community.  The sentencing court also noted 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
6 
 
that Brown had a substance abuse problem, which was documented 
in the presentence investigation report. 
¶13  After serving his term of initial confinement, Brown 
was released to extended supervision on May 13, 2003.  Three 
months later, on August 23, 2003, police found Brown in 
possession of two cocaine rocks weighing .41 grams.  The DOC  
alleged that Brown had possessed, and attempted to deliver, 
crack 
cocaine 
in 
violation 
of 
his 
rules 
of 
community 
supervision.  Brown waived his right to a revocation hearing, 
and the DOC revoked Brown's extended supervision.   
¶14 A reconfinement hearing was scheduled in Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court.  As noted previously, the DOC recommended 
one year, ten months, and thirty days of reconfinement.  The DOC 
agent arrived at the recommendation by taking approximately 30 
percent of the remaining time on Brown's bifurcated sentence, 
which was six years, four months, and nineteen days. 
¶15 During Brown's reconfinement hearing, the circuit 
court stated: 
Well, the probation basically——or extended supervision 
is to make sure that——it's basically giving you a 
chance to follow the rules and regulations as set out 
by the State and to be free of criminal conduct.  
There's time hanging over your head.  You were warned 
when you were released from prison that if you commit 
another offense you'll go back to prison, and you 
committed it, and it's a serious crime here.  It's 
selling crack cocaine, and I understand you have a 
pending case with Judge Siefert.   
The Department looks at this grid and comes up 
with these, I think, ludicrously low recommendations, 
and I think this is too low.  The time available is 
six years four months and they're recommending I 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
7 
 
believe one year and ten months, and I think that's 
insufficient to send a message here.   
I think obviously you have a cocaine problem 
that's going to be with you for years.  It's going to 
be hard for you to beat it, and I think you're a risk 
to the community to be out in one year and ten months. 
And I don't know what Judge Siefert is going to 
do.  He may give you concurrent time or consecutive 
time.  That is between you, your attorney and Judge 
Siefert. 
But, based upon all the facts and circumstances of 
this case and the recommendations and the information 
before me, the court is going to sentence you to three 
years in the Wisconsin State Prison. 
¶16  Brown 
then 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, seeking a reduction in the reconfinement time 
imposed.  Brown argued that the circuit court had not given due 
weight deference to the DOC, that the court should look to the 
DOC's 
recommendations 
to 
determine 
the 
minimum 
custody 
necessary, and that a reconfinement decision should comply with 
due 
process 
requirements 
and 
standards 
for 
exercising 
discretion. 
¶17 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Brown's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, and Brown appealed.  The court of appeals 
upheld the circuit court's reconfinement orders, affirming the 
circuit court's decision that the circuit court need not give 
due weight deference to the DOC's recommendation.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that a circuit court has great discretion in 
matters of sentencing, and is not required to give due weight 
deference to recommendations of the DOC.  The court of appeals 
concluded that a reconfinement hearing is an extension of the 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
8 
 
original sentencing proceeding and, therefore, the court need 
not address at the reconfinement hearing all of the factors that 
would be addressed at the initial sentencing.  Brown then filed 
a petition for review by this court, which we granted. 
II 
¶18 This case involves review of a reconfinement decision, 
as well as interpretation of administrative regulations and 
criminal statutes.  The interpretation of an administrative rule 
or regulation and the interpretation of a statute are questions 
of law that we review de novo.  Hillhaven Corp. v. DHFS, 232 
Wis. 2d 400, 409, 606 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶19 The standards governing appellate review of an imposed 
sentence are well settled.  State v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶17, 
289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466.  A circuit court exercises its 
discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to 
determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.  
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535,  678 N.W.2d 
197.  This court stated in McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281, that 
"[a]ppellate judges should not substitute their preference for a 
sentence merely because, had they been in the trial judge’s 
position, they would have meted out a different sentence." 
¶20 A reconfinement hearing is certainly akin to a 
sentencing hearing and, therefore, both are reviewed on appeal 
to determine if there has been an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶23, 277 Wis. 
2d 400, 690 N.W.2d 452; see also State v. Odom, 2006 WI App 145, 
¶11, __ Wis. 2d __, 720 N.W.2d 695.  In the present case, we 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
9 
 
review a reconfinement decision, not a sentencing decision.  
However, in State v. Swiams, the court of appeals reasoned, "In 
light of the need for meaningful assessment of decisions that 
deprive persons of their liberty . . . we perceive no reason why 
a 'sentencing' under Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30 should not encompass 
reconfinement under Wis. Stat. § 302.13(9)(am)(2001-02)."  Id. 
at ¶23 (citing Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶19).  Moreover, in 
State v. Wegner, 2000 WI App 231, ¶7, 239 Wis. 2d 96, 619 N.W.2d 
289, the court of appeals held that the circuit court's duty at 
sentencing after revocation of parole, and the court's duty at 
the original sentencing, were the same.   
¶21 In the present case, the court of appeals quoted 
Wegner, 239 Wis. 2d 96, ¶7, stating, "'[W]e will review the two 
sentencing proceedings on a global basis, treating the latter 
sentencing as a continuum of the first.'"  State v. Brown, 2006 
WI App 44, ¶17, 289 Wis. 2d 691, 712 N.W.2d 899.  See also State 
v. Jones, 2005 WI App 259, ¶8, 288 Wis. 2d 475, 707 N.W.2d 876.  
In Wegner, the judge imposing the reconfinement sentence was the 
same judge who imposed the original sentence.  Treating the 
reconfinement hearing as a continuum of the sentencing hearing 
is logical when the same judge is presiding over both the 
original sentencing hearing and the reconfinement hearing.  
However, in many cases, one judge will preside over the original 
sentencing and a different judge will do the reconfinement 
hearing, as was the situation in Brown's case.  Under such 
circumstances, there is no continuum. 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
10 
 
¶22 We conclude that a reconfinement decision, like an 
initial sentencing 
decision, involves the circuit court's 
discretion, and we review the circuit court's decision to 
determine whether that discretion was erroneously exercised.  
See State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495, 506, 596 N.W.2d 375 
(1999).  An erroneous exercise of such discretion occurs 
"whenever it appears that no discretion was exercised in its 
imposition [of the sentence] or discretion was exercised without 
the underpinnings of an explained judicial reasoning process."  
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 278.  As long as the reconfinement court 
considered the relevant factors, and not irrelevant or improper 
ones, and the decision was within the statutory limits, the 
sentence will not be reversed, unless it "'is so excessive and 
unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to 
shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable 
people 
concerning 
what 
is 
right 
and 
proper 
under 
the 
circumstances.'"  Taylor, 289 Wis. 2d 34, ¶18 (citations 
omitted). 
¶23 Brown asserts that the circuit court should have given 
due weight deference to the DOC's recommendation of one year, 
ten months, and thirty days of reconfinement, because the DOC 
has expertise in dealing with violations during extended 
supervisions and with revocations.  The State argues that the 
circuit court was not required to give any particular weight to 
the DOC's recommendations.   
¶24 We agree with the State's position that the circuit 
court 
did 
not 
owe 
deference 
to 
the 
DOC. 
 
Although 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(at) (2003-04)2 requires the DOC to make a 
recommendation concerning the period of reconfinement, it does 
not indicate how the court is to treat that recommendation.  
Although the DOC's recommendation may be helpful, and should be 
considered by the circuit court in a reconfinement decision, 
that recommendation is not entitled to any deference.  In the 
context of a formal sentencing hearing, a sentencing court is 
not required to give any particular level of deference to the 
DOC's 
sentencing 
recommendations, 
which 
are 
included 
in 
presentence investigation reports.  See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.27(2)(Sept., 2006).  If the sentencing court deviates from 
the DOC's recommendations in a formal sentencing hearing, the 
court is not required to explain its reasons for doing so, as 
long as proper sentencing discretion is exercised.  See State v. 
Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 469, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990).  
¶25 Since a reconfinement hearing is closely akin to a 
sentencing hearing, the DOC's recommendation may be helpful and 
should be considered by a circuit court, but the court is not 
required to follow the DOC's sentencing recommendation in making 
a reconfinement decision.   
III 
¶26 Brown 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
failed 
to 
adequately explain its basis for imposing three years of 
reconfinement, and that an explanation was required under 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
12 
 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263, and Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535.  In 
McCleary, this court held that a sentencing judge is required to 
provide a "rational and explainable basis" for selecting the 
particular sentence imposed.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276.  We 
stated that "'[t]he sentence imposed in each case should call 
for the minimum amount of custody or confinement which is 
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the 
offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'"  Id. 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
In 
Gallion, 
this 
court 
reaffirmed 
McCleary's sentencing standards, and held that a circuit court 
must explain on the record how a sentence's component parts 
promote the sentencing objectives.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
¶46.  This court noted that sentencing objectives may vary from 
case to case, but that such objectives include the protection of 
the community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of 
the defendant, and deterrence of others.  Id., ¶¶40-41 (citing 
Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34 at 8-9 (1999)).  Brown's reconfinement 
hearing occurred prior to this court's decision in Gallion, and 
Gallion does not apply retroactively, but it is important to 
note that Gallion served to "reinvigorate" the principles set 
forth in McCleary.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶4; see also 
Taylor, 289 Wis. 2d 34, ¶17 n.9. 
¶27 The State asserts that a reconfinement decision is not 
a sentence and, therefore, the court need not explain how the 
reconfinement time imposed relates to the sentencing objectives 
as required by McCleary.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276.  As 
stated above, we conclude that a reconfinement hearing and a 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
13 
 
sentencing hearing are closely akin to one another.  We agree 
with the State's assertion that a reconfinement hearing differs 
from a sentencing hearing in several respects.  For example, a 
sentencing hearing focuses on primary sentencing factors, such 
as the gravity of the offense, protection of the public, and the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant, as well as deterrence.  
However, a main focus of a reconfinement hearing is the 
defendant's behavior since the imposition of the original 
sentence.  At a reconfinement hearing, the original sentence has 
already set the maximum period of time for which the circuit 
court can reconfine the defendant.  The court may not impose a 
reconfinement period that exceeds the time remaining on the 
original 
bifurcated 
sentence. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am).  
Additionally, at a reconfinement hearing, the individual's 
liberty at stake is not "the absolute liberty to which every 
citizen is entitled," but rather a "conditional liberty" that is 
dependent on the individual's observance of the rules of 
extended supervision.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
480 (1972). 
¶28 However, despite the differences between a sentencing 
hearing and a reconfinement hearing, the two hearings are 
closely akin to each other, because both determine whether a 
person should be sent to prison and for how long.  Swiams, 277 
Wis. 2d 400, ¶22.  The State argues that requiring a circuit 
court 
to 
provide 
reasoned 
explanations 
for 
reconfinement 
decisions will place an undue burden on the time of a circuit 
court.  However, the court of appeals rejected a similar 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
14 
 
argument in Swiams.  Id., ¶23.  In Swiams, the court of appeals 
noted that, other than the State's concern that to require a 
circuit court to explain fully a reconfinement order might take 
too much time, the State could not identify any adverse 
consequences that could flow from permitting defendants to seek 
"meaningful 
review" 
of 
reconfinement 
orders 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
ultimately rejected the State's "expediency-based justification 
for any truncation of the sentencing explanation to which every 
person deprived of his or her liberty is entitled."  Id.   
¶29 In light of the need for "meaningful assessment of 
decisions that deprive persons of their liberty," we agree with 
the court of appeals, and thus disagree with the State's 
argument, that requiring a circuit court to give reasoned 
explanations for reconfinement decisions will place an undue 
burden on the time of a circuit court.  Id.  The relatively 
small investment of time that a circuit court will expend in 
providing reasoned explanations for reconfinement decisions is 
far outweighed by the benefits of insuring meaningful review of 
reconfinement decisions and satisfying a defendant's procedural 
due process right "to be sentenced on the basis of accurate 
information."  State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 444, 
681 N.W.2d 479; see also Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 175, 
252 N.W.2d 347 (1977).     
¶30 Sentencing decisions are, and always have been, within 
the circuit court's reasonable exercise of discretion, yet there 
must also be safeguards in place, to insure meaningful appellate 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
15 
 
review of such exercise of discretion.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 
535, ¶¶17-18.  We recognize the need to provide the circuit 
courts with guidelines for deciding what amount of reconfinement 
is appropriate after revocation of extended supervision. 
¶31 In June 1998 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Truth-
in-Sentencing Part I, 1997 Wis. Act 283, which abandoned 
Wisconsin's indeterminate sentencing system in favor of a truth-
in-sentencing regime.  See Michael B. Brennan, Thomas J. Hammer, 
and Donald V. Latorraca, Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, 
75 Wis. Law. 10 (November 2002).  Then, as part of Truth-in-
Sentencing Part II, 2001 Wis. Act 109, the legislature took 
reconfinement authority away from administrative law judges, and 
specified that circuit judges were to determine the amount of 
reconfinement 
or 
reincarceration 
time 
upon 
revocation 
of 
extended supervision.  75 Wis. Law. at 53.   
¶32 Nonetheless, circuit courts may find guidance in Wis. 
Admin. Code § HA 2.05(7)(f)(Sept., 2001), which identifies the 
criteria that administrative law judges were to employ, prior to 
the enactment of 2001 Wis. Act 109, in determining the proper 
amount of reconfinement time after revocation of extended 
supervision.  These criteria are nearly identical to the 
criteria in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.06(6)(b)(Sept., 2001), that 
administrative law judges were to utilize under Wisconsin's 
former parole system, in determining the period of good time 
forfeiture or reincarceration following revocation of parole.  
¶33 Under the current system of extended supervision, the 
DOC has a duty under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(at) to make a 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
16 
 
recommendation to the court concerning the period of time for 
which 
an 
individual 
should 
be 
returned 
to 
prison 
after 
revocation of extended supervision.  Although the DOC has not 
yet promulgated administrative rules implementing its duty under  
§ 302.113(9)(at), the DOC's criteria for recommendations of 
periods of reincarceration or forfeited good time are codified 
in Wis. Admin. Code § 331.14(3)(b)(Oct., 2006).  The criteria 
that 
the 
DOC 
considers 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 331.14(3)(b) are nearly identical to the criteria that 
administrative law judges considered when making decisions about 
reconfinement or forfeiture of good time before the enactment of 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
Part 
II. 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§§  HA 
2.05(7)(f), 2.06(6)(b)(Sept., 2001).    
¶34 In making reconfinement decisions, we expect that 
circuit courts will usually consider the nature and severity of 
the original offense, the client's institutional conduct record,  
as well as the amount of incarceration necessary to protect the 
public from the risk of further criminal activity, taking into 
account the defendant's conduct and the nature of the violation 
of terms and conditions during extended supervision.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code §§  HA 2.05(7)(f), 2.06(6)(b)(Sept., 2001); Wis. 
Admin. Code § 331.14(3)(b)(Oct., 2006).  The reconfinement 
period imposed should be the minimum amount that is necessary to 
protect the public, to prevent depreciation of the seriousness 
of the offense, and to meet the defendant's rehabilitative 
needs.  Wis. Admin. Code § 331.14(3)(b); McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 
276.     
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
17 
 
¶35 State ex rel. Hauser v. Carballo, 82 Wis. 2d 51, 261 
N.W.2d 133 (1978), also identifies additional factors that 
provide some guidance to circuit courts in making reconfinement 
decisions. 
 
In 
Hauser, 
this 
court 
listed 
factors 
that 
administrative law judges were to consider in the determination 
of whether to forfeit a parole violator's good time credits 
under 
Wisconsin's 
former 
parole 
system. 
 
However, 
like 
reconfinement, the determination of whether to forfeit a parole 
violator's good time required a discretionary determination of 
"what balance of time between renewed incarceration and further 
parole [extended] supervision is most likely to protect society 
and at the same time to facilitate the violator's transition 
between prison and unconditional freedom."  Id. at 75. 
¶36 Other factors that may be relevant and appropriate, 
depending on the circumstances, for a circuit court to consider 
in making reconfinement decisions include consideration of the 
defendant's record, attitude, and capacity for rehabilitation, 
and the rehabilitative goals to be accomplished by imprisonment 
for the time period in question in relation to the time left on 
the violator's original sentence.  Id.   
¶37 We expect that a circuit court will apply those 
factors noted herein that are relevant and, aware of the 
principles set forth in McCleary, and again in Gallion, will 
provide, on the record, a reasoned basis for a reconfinement 
decision.  These factors are not a mandatory checklist, and we 
do not hold that a circuit court must examine each factor on the 
record in every case.  Rather, we list these factors in order to 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
18 
 
provide guidance for circuit court judges when determining 
appropriate reconfinement periods, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.     
¶38 The original sentencing transcript is an important 
source of information on the defendant that discusses many of 
the factors that circuit courts should consider when making a 
reconfinement decision.  The original sentencing transcript is 
readily available for a circuit court to examine, and those 
portions that are considered by the court to be relevant should 
be mentioned.  
¶39 We recognize that not all of the factors will apply in 
every case.  When making reconfinement decisions, it is 
appropriate for a circuit court to identify the general 
objectives of greatest importance, and describe the factors and 
circumstances relevant to those objectives.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 
2d 535, ¶41.  As this court noted in Taylor, we recognize that 
it is within the circuit court's discretion to decide what 
weight should be given to a particular factor in a particular 
case.  Taylor, 289 Wis. 2d 34, ¶43 (citing Cunningham v. State, 
76 Wis. 2d 277, 282, 251 N.W.2d 65 (1977)).  We are cognizant of 
the fact that "[h]ow much explanation is necessary. . . will 
vary from case to case." Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶39 (citing 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276). 
¶40 We urge the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the 
defendant to bring to the court's attention any factors and 
circumstances, which may be particularly relevant to the 
guidelines 
discussed 
herein. 
 
In 
their 
Non-Party 
Brief, 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
19 
 
Professors Walter Dickey, David E. Schultz, and Michael E. 
Smith, note that if circuit courts and busy lawyers are not 
encouraged to set forth on the record the facts and inferences 
for a sentencing decision, then they will be tempted to avoid 
doing so.  At oral argument, Professor Dickey further stated 
that, as advocates, lawyers should point out to the court what 
facts and circumstances are relevant at a sentencing or a 
reconfinement hearing. 
¶41 Since this court has not, until now, set forth any 
guidance as to the factors that circuit courts should consider 
in making reconfinement decisions, we hold that the circuit 
court, in this case, did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
when it ordered Brown to return to prison for three years.  As 
stated above, a reconfinement hearing and a sentencing hearing 
are closely akin to one another.  Sentencing is a discretionary 
act.  The term contemplates a process of reasoning.  McCleary, 
49 Wis. 2d at 277.  We will remand for resentencing or 
modification of a sentence only when an erroneous exercise of 
discretion clearly appears.  Id. at 278. 
¶42 The circuit court's statement at the reconfinement 
hearing indicated that the court was indeed acting as a 
decisionmaker and demonstrating a process of reasoning.  Brown 
asserts that he has a procedural due process right to be 
sentenced on the basis of true and correct information and to 
have his sentence adequately explained to him by the court.  See 
Greve, 272 Wis. 2d 444, ¶14.  Brown's procedural due process 
right was satisfied here.  The circuit court articulated 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
20 
 
sufficient reasons for imposing three years of reconfinement for 
Brown.  After examining the record and the information before 
it, 
presented 
by 
counsel 
for 
both 
sides, 
including 
the 
recommendation by the DOC, the circuit court concluded that 
three years of reconfinement was warranted.  The court explained 
that Brown posed a risk to the community, if he were to be 
released in one year, ten months, and thirty days as recommended 
by the DOC, and that the DOC's recommended time was insufficient 
to "send a message here."  The circuit court further explained 
that Brown had a "cocaine problem."  The circuit court came to 
the reasoned conclusion that "based upon all the facts and 
circumstances," three years was the appropriate amount of 
reconfinement time in Brown's case.   
 
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶43 Under the circumstances set forth, and our standards 
for review of the discretion of the circuit court in a 
sentencing decision, we hold that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion, when the court imposed 
three years of reconfinement.  Taylor, 289 Wis. 2d 34, ¶30.  
Since this court has not, until now, set forth any guidelines as 
to the factors that should be considered in reconfinement 
hearings, we further hold that the circuit court adequately 
explained the basis for its reconfinement decision, when it 
stated that it believed the DOC's recommendation of one year, 
ten months, and thirty days was too low, that Brown had a 
cocaine problem, and that he would be a risk to the community if 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
21 
 
he were to be released after the DOC's suggested reconfinement 
period. 
¶44 Under Truth-in-Sentencing, extended supervision and 
reconfinement are, in effect, substitutes for the parole system 
that existed under prior law.  A reconfinement hearing occurs 
after there has been an original sentencing and a revocation of 
extended supervision and is, therefore, closely akin to a 
sentencing hearing.   
¶45 We do not intend to set forth a required checklist 
that must be followed in every instance.  Nevertheless, a 
circuit court, in demonstrating an exercise of discretion in a 
reconfinement decision, should consider many of the factors 
discussed herein, when making reconfinement decisions, and 
should explain on the record those factors which are relevant to 
the circumstances of a particular case.  A circuit court should 
consider the recommendation from the DOC.  The court should also 
consider the nature and severity of the original offense, the 
client's institutional conduct record, and the client's conduct 
and the nature of the violation of terms and conditions during 
extended supervision, as well as the amount of incarceration 
necessary to protect the public from the risk of further 
criminal activity.  The court should impose the minimum amount 
of confinement which is consistent with the protection of the 
public, the gravity of the offense, and the defendant's 
rehabilitative needs.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276.  A circuit 
court also should consider the defendant's prior record, 
attitude, 
and 
capacity 
for 
rehabilitation, 
and 
the 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
22 
 
rehabilitative goals to be accomplished by reconfinement for the 
time period in question in relation to the time left on the 
defendant's original sentence.   
¶46 We realize that not all of these factors will apply in 
every case.  We provide this listing not as a mandatory 
checklist to be followed point by point, but as guidance to a 
circuit court in making what often is a difficult reconfinement 
decision.  For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2005AP584-CR   
 
 
 
1