Title: Gerber v. McCall

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

175 Kan. 433 (1953)
264 P.2d 490
HERMAN A. GERBER and VIRGINIA GERBER, Appellees,
v.
J.D. McCALL, an individual doing business under the firm name and style of McCALL SERVICE STATION, Appellant.
No. 39,121

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 12, 1953.
Charles W. Lowder and Blake A. Williamson, both of Kansas City, argued the cause, and William Drennan, Otto Ziegelmeyer, James K. Cubbison and Lee Vaughan, all of Kansas City, were with them on the briefs for the appellant.
Joseph P. Jenkins, of Kansas City, argued the cause and Joseph Cohen, Charles S. Schnider, John E. Shamberg, Thomas E. Joyce and Norma Braly, all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This case is an aftermath of the Great Flood of 1951 in the valley of the Kansas (Kaw) River, and is an action to recover damages for the destruction by fire of plaintiffs' warehouse, alleged to have been the proximate result of defendant's negligent operation of his gasoline filling station after being warned of the imminence of a flood.
Defendant has appealed from an order overruling his demurrer to the second amended petition on the ground that pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Because of the nature of the question involved, the second amended petition, omitting the caption and prayer, will be set out in full:
In passing, we take note of the fact that in their brief plaintiffs state that in paragraph 3, supra, the reference to the "Armourdale District" is a typographical error and that "Argentine District" was intended.
The crux of defendant's contention is that under the circumstances alleged the probability of fire and explosion was too remote and very *436 highly improbable; that the fire was a direct result of a devastating flood  an Act of God  for which defendant is not liable; and that if defendant was in any manner negligent, which is denied, his negligence was too remote to be actionable.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend their damages were not the result of an Act of God for which defendant is not responsible, but rather, were the result of an act of negligence cojoined with an Act of God, which combined to produce the resulting damage.
In their briefs the parties make extensive arguments concerning actionable negligence, proximate cause, the doctrine of foreseeability of the consequences of one's acts with respect to remoteness, and negligent conduct coupled with Acts of God, and cite numerous authorities, among them being Cleghorn v. Thompson, 62 Kan. 727, 64 Pac. 605, 54 L.R.A. 402; Rodgers v. Railway Co., 75 Kan. 222, 88 Pac. 885, 121 Am. St. Rep. 416, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 658; Lewis v. Street Railway Co., 101 Kan. 673, 168 Pac. 856; Kroll v. Railroad Co., 106 Kan. 294, 187 Pac. 661; Richards v. Kansas Electric Power Co., 126 Kan. 521, 268 Pac. 847; Smith v. Mead Construction Co., 129 Kan. 229, 282 Pac. 708; Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, 176 P.2d 590; Atherton v. Goodwin, 163 Kan. 22, 180 P.2d 296, and Shideler v. Habiger, 172 Kan. 718, 243 P.2d 211.
No effort to review in detail what was said in those decisions will be made. Each stands upon its own footing as applied to the facts there involved. Without attempting to delve into the many facets of the principles here involved, we confine ourselves strictly to the question whether, under all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by plaintiffs' allegations, it can be said that a cause of action for negligence is stated.
As a starting point, reference is made to a few general rules laid down in the last of the above-cited authorities, the recent Shideler case:
In this connection we repeat, in substance, the very realistic question asked by defendant in his brief:
Could a person of ordinary caution and prudence, in the case at bar, early in the morning of July 13, 1951, and prior to the flood, even though notified "of the imminence of a flood," have foreseen that a flood of the greatest magnitude in the history of the state would occur; that it would reach the area where defendant's filling station was located; that by merely leaving the electricity on in the service station premises operated by him, and in which gasoline, lubricating oil, greases and other inflammable fuels were used and stored for the purpose of servicing automobiles and other vehicles, a flood, if it did occur, would not only reach the premises but would engulf and pass over or around them sufficiently deep and with sufficient force to cause inflammable material stored in "storage tanks of varying sizes" to somehow and in some manner rise to the surface and escape in such quantity and under such conditions as to come in contact with electric lights and signs, wiring and electrical equipment used in connection with the operation of the filling station, and that by merely coming into contact therewith a destructive explosion and fire would ensue, and that such fire would continue to burn and be carried by the flow of water away from the premises eastward and set fire to and destroy a warehouse building located east of defendant's property?
In our opinion the question must be answered in the negative. In the first place, this court takes judicial notice of the unprecedented magnitude of the flood in question and of its devastating effects and results. History has already recorded them. Viewing the matter in the light of "hindsight," it is undoubtedly a fact that everyone in the path of the flood, had he known of its proportions, would have taken steps and measures different from those which were taken. The trite, but familiar expression  "hindsight is always better than foresight," is all the more meaningful when that frailty of human nature is coupled with an Act of God such as occurred in the Kaw Valley on July 13, 1951.
Tested by the general rules quoted supra, we are unable to say that under all of the facts and circumstances the failure of defendant *438 to take measures "such as disengaging the master switch in said station or pulling the fuses out of the fuse box," constituted negligence. In fact, the acts of defendant, even though held to be negligent, were not the proximate or legal cause of plaintiffs' damage. The proximate cause of their damage was the flood!
The order of the lower court is therefore reversed with directions to sustain the demurrer to the second amended petition.