Title: Tony Tortorich v. Pam Tortorich

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Tony TORTORICH v. Pam TORTORICH

97-884                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 30, 1998


1.   Divorce -- chancellor's order of alimony arrearages proper --
     letter opinions part of court's findings. -- The chancellor
     did not err when holding appellant owed alimony arrearages
     between the months of August 1, 1994, and August 1, 1996,
     where the chancellor's remand order specifically incorporated
     her earlier opinion letters as a part of the court's findings
     and designated them as "further orders of the court"; one of
     the chancellor's letter opinions dated October 23, 1995,
     stated that the appellee was entitled to alimony based upon
     the appellant's continued practice of oral surgery until her
     death or remarriage, or until she established an earning
     capacity; clearly, the chancellor's order directed appellant
     to pay monthly alimony payments of $2,000 that were to
     continue past July 31, 1994, and until appellee's death or
     remarriage or until appellee established an earning capacity;
     thus, the arrears in alimony, insurance premiums, and child
     support found by the chancellor for the months commencing on
     August 1, 1994, were in accordance with her orders. 

2.   Divorce -- cases cited by appellant inapplicable -- appellee
     never accepted other county's venue. -- While the two cases
     cited by appellant, like the case here, involved parties who
     had filed different but related marital actions in separate
     chancery courts, the marital couples in those two earlier
     cases entered their appearances in the respective actions and
     venue was not an issue; here, appellee unwaveringly adhered to
     her objection questioning the second county chancery court's
     venue; venue is a procedural matter, not a matter of subject-
     matter jurisdiction; only absent any objection does a trial
     court have the power to render a binding judgment even though
     venue was not proper.

3.   Venue -- issue of jurisdiction of person -- when writ of
     prohibition will issue. -- The venue issue is characterized as
     one of jurisdiction of the person, the improper assertion of
     which, in that instance, justifies issuance of a writ of
     prohibition; the supreme court commonly issues writs of
     prohibition when venue is improperly laid, and has said that
     the situation is the equivalent of a lack of jurisdiction of
     the person; in these circumstances when venue or jurisdiction
     of the person is not waived by the defending party, the trial
     court, which erroneously assumes venue or jurisdiction of a
     person, has no power or authority to act.

4.   Venue -- second chancery court had no power to issue order --
     original county's orders remained effectual. -- The second
     county's chancery court had no authority to act or proceed
     with appellant's divorce action against appellee, accordingly
     the orders issued by the chancellor from the county where the
     action was originally filed, that were entered on December 15,
     1993, February 2, 1996, and February 28, 1997, remained
     effectual and controlling throughout all the parties'
     proceedings and appeals.

5.   Divorce -- Ark. Code Ann.  9-12-303(a) and (c) (Repl. 1993) -
     - had statute been followed action could have been avoided. --
     The supreme court emphasized the General Assembly's enactment
     of Ark. Code Ann.  9-12-303(a) and (c) (Repl. 1993), and
     pointed out that if this statute had been followed, the two
     chancery courts' conflicting orders could have been avoided;
     under the plain language of  9-12-303(c), once a plaintiff
     spouse has filed for (1) absolute divorce, (2) limited
     divorce, or (3) separate maintenance, the defendant spouse can
     no longer go to a different court (division or county) to file
     any one of the three named marital-related actions; instead,
     the defendant spouse, regardless of his own county of
     residence, must file any new marital cause of action in the
     same action the plaintiff spouse already initiated.  


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Robin L. Mays, Chancellor;
affirmed.
     Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoon, Ltd., by:  Phil
Campbell and Dorcy Kyle Corbin, for appellant.
     Linda D. Shepherd, P.A., by:  Linda D. Shepherd and Allison R.
Wooten, for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     This case is the third appeal involving Tony and Pam
Tortorich.  Tortorich v. Tortorich, 324 Ark. 128, 919 S.W.2d 213
(1996) (Tortorich II); Tortorich v. Tortorich, 50 Ark. App. 114,