Title: In re Children of Crystal G.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 9 
Docket: 
Som-18-302 
 
 
 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 17, 2019 
Decided: 
January 24, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF CRYSTAL G. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Crystal G. appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court 
(Skowhegan, Benson, J.) terminating her parental rights to four of her children 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2017).1  
She contends that her counsel at the termination hearing was constitutionally 
ineffective in (1) failing to move for the trial judge to recuse on the ground that 
he also oversaw the domestic violence docket in which the mother participated 
and (2) failing to move for further findings of fact after the court adopted 
verbatim most of the Department of Health and Human Services’s proposed 
findings in its judgment terminating her parental rights.  The mother further 
contends that some of the court’s findings are not supported by the record and 
                                         
1  The fathers of the children had their parental rights terminated by separate judgments.  The 
fathers of three of the children did not appeal, and the appeal of the father of the fourth child is 
proceeding separately. 
 
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that the court erred in making a credibility determination concerning one of the 
mother’s witnesses.  We affirm the judgment. 
A. 
Recusal 
 
[¶2]  Contrary to the mother’s contention that her counsel was per se 
ineffective in failing to move for the trial judge’s recusal in the termination case 
because he also oversaw the domestic violence docket2 in which she was a 
participant, recusal in that circumstance is not automatically required in order 
to avoid the appearance of bias.3  See M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A) (“[a] judge 
shall . . . recuse . . . in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned”); State v. Atwood, 2010 ME 12, ¶ 21, 988 A.2d 981. 
 
[¶3]  As an initial matter, before the mother testified at the hearing her 
counsel did move for the judge to recuse on the ground that evidence the court 
heard in the termination proceeding might prejudice her in her criminal case.  
The court declined to recuse based on evidence it had not yet heard, ruling that 
                                         
2  A 2015 report prepared for the Judicial Branch explained that “[i]n Maine, domestic violence 
dockets are scheduled separately from traditional judicial hearings.  The model includes a consistent 
judge focusing on the perpetrators’ compliance with conditions of probation, including participation 
in a Batterer Intervention Program, fulfilling child support responsibilities, and engaging in ancillary 
services such as substance abuse treatment.”  Hornby Zeller Assocs., Inc., Domestic Violence Docket, 
Process and Recidivism Report at i (Sept. 22, 2015), Me. Judicial Branch website/Reports (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2019). 
 
3  The mother does not assert that the trial judge harbored an actual prejudice against her, only 
that these circumstances unavoidably gave the appearance that the judge might not be impartial. 
 
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if recusal were required at all it would be required in the criminal matter, not 
the child protective matter.  See Atwood, 2010 ME 12, ¶ 20, 988 A.2d 981 
(stating that “recusal is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court” 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
 
[¶4]  In any event, we have recognized that “rulings against a litigant or 
knowledge gained by a judge in a prior or related court proceeding, including 
impressions of a litigant’s personal history or credibility, are not sufficient 
grounds to recuse a judge in a subsequent matter.”  In re Nadeau, 2018 ME 18, 
¶ 15, 178 A.3d 495.  Absent a showing that the trial judge in this case could not 
be impartial, or reasonably be seen to be impartial, because of particular 
information he had learned in the criminal matter, the mother’s “mere belief 
that [the] judge might not be completely impartial is insufficient to warrant 
recusal.”  Atwood, 2010 ME 12, ¶ 21, 988 A.2d 981 (quotation marks omitted).  
Because the mother’s argument rests on an incorrect assertion that the trial 
judge in this case was required to recuse solely because he also oversaw her 
case in the domestic violence docket, she has not demonstrated that her counsel 
was deficient in failing to seek recusal on that ground and therefore has “failed 
to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel as is 
 
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required.”4  In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6, 194 A.3d 925; 
see In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 8, 172 A.3d 916. 
B. 
Factual Findings 
 
[¶5]  The mother next asserts that her counsel was ineffective in failing 
to move for further findings because (1) the court’s findings, largely adopting 
those proposed by the Department, demonstrate that it did not exercise 
independent judgment in making its findings; and (2) certain of the court’s 
findings were not supported by the record. 
 
[¶6]  We have said that “[a]lthough a verbatim adoption of the language 
of a proposed order or an adoption absent material change is disfavored 
because it would suggest that the court has not applied its independent 
judgment in making its findings and conclusions, courts may properly request 
and consider proposed orders from parties in crafting an order.”  In re Zoey H., 
2017 ME 159, ¶ 6, 167 A.3d 1260 (alteration and quotation marks omitted); 
see In re Marpheen C., 2002 ME 170, ¶ 7, 812 A.2d 972 (“[W]e recognize that 
fact-finding can be aided by parties submitting and trial courts considering and 
utilizing, where appropriate, draft findings of fact offered by either side.  The 
                                         
4  The mother has filed the affidavit required before we will review the existing record to see if it 
supports a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶ 8, 
172 A.3d 916. 
 
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key question is whether the court findings reflect the application of judgment 
by the court, and not simply one of the parties.”). 
 
[¶7]  Here, the court requested and received proposed findings from both 
parties.  Although the court adopted most of the Department’s proposed 
findings verbatim, we are satisfied that the alterations in the court’s 
termination order—most significantly the credibility determinations it made 
concerning particular witnesses and the mother herself—demonstrate “that 
the judgment is the result of the application of independent judicial thought to 
the process of making fact-findings and conclusions.”  In re Zoey H., 
2017 ME 159, ¶ 6, 167 A.3d 1260 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶8]  The mother also contends that her hearing counsel was ineffective 
in failing to challenge certain findings the court made that were unsupported 
by the record.  She does not argue that the evidence as a whole was otherwise 
insufficient to support the court’s judgment—stating that “[s]ufficiency of the 
evidence isn’t the point”—but rather highlights the unsupported findings as an 
indication that her counsel was ineffective in failing to contest them and that 
the court failed to exercise independent scrutiny when it accepted them.  If the 
court adopted some findings without record support, the mother reasons, then 
all of its findings are called into question. 
 
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[¶9]  Here, contrary to the mother’s contention, the findings that she 
identifies have some record support; beyond that, the weight to be accorded 
them was within the province of the trial court as fact-finder.5  See In re Child of 
Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 5, 194 A.3d 925 (“We review the District Court’s 
findings of fact for clear error.  Deference is paid to the District Court’s superior 
perspective for evaluating the weight and credibility of evidence.”  (alteration, 
citation, and quotation marks omitted)).  We therefore conclude that the 
absence of a motion for further findings does not make out a prima facie case 
of ineffective assistance on the part of the mother’s hearing counsel. 
C. 
Credibility Determination 
 
[¶10]  Finally, the mother argues that the trial court made an adverse 
credibility determination concerning one of her witnesses after taking 
                                         
5  The mother faults two substantive, detailed findings that were apparently drawn from the 
Department’s termination petitions.  Although she is correct in asserting that neither has record 
support for all of its details, their essence is supported.  Concerning the court’s finding regarding the 
mother’s medication management compliance, the caseworker testified that a note in the 
Department’s file indicated that the provider had requested that the mother report to him within six 
weeks due to a positive screen, and the caseworker did not believe that she had done so.  Concerning 
a finding that in November 2017 the mother was arrested “following a domestic violence incident 
where she was found to have been the perpetrator”—which could be read to mean that the law 
enforcement officer reached that conclusion, leading to the mother’s arrest—the guardian ad litem’s 
report referenced the incident and the mother admitted that it occurred, although she denied that 
she was the aggressor.  See In re Child of Troy C., 2018 ME 150, ¶ 9, 196 A.3d 452 (“Determinations 
regarding the weight and credibility to be assigned to evidence are squarely within the court’s 
province as fact-finder.”).  We conclude that given the court’s termination judgment viewed as a 
whole, the factual errors are harmless.  See In re Child of Ronald W., 2018 ME 107, ¶ 7 n.2, 
190 A.3d 1029 (“A factual error in a child protection order is harmless if it is highly probable that the 
error did not prejudice the parents or contribute to the result in the case.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
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improper judicial notice of two other child protective cases in which the 
witness had been involved.  When the Department requested that the court 
judicially notice the unrelated matters at the hearing—a request to which the 
mother did not object—the court gave no indication that it would do so; its 
termination judgment did not list the matters among those that it was noticing, 
and we therefore conclude that the court did not rely on that evidence in 
support of its termination determination, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(a); and the 
judgment did not discuss the witness, either favorably or unfavorably.  
Consequently, there is no error on this record.  See In re Child of Kaysean M., 
2018 ME 156, ¶ 8, --- A.3d --- (stating that when a party “objects to . . . evidence 
for the first time on appeal, we apply the obvious error standard of review” 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted)). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket numbers PC-2017-20, -49, -50, and -52 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY