Title: Carter v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TIMOTHY CARTER, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 134, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0808029143 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
Submitted: July 29, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 1, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 1st day of October 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Timothy Carter, was charged by indictment with 
two counts of Murder in the First Degree (one intentional, the other felony 
murder), Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony 
(“PFDCF”), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Attempted 
Robbery in the First Degree, and Conspiracy in the First Degree.  The 
charges arose from what the State aptly describes as “a botched robbery” by 
 
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Carter and three co-defendants in which the victim was killed by a gunshot 
to the left eye. 
 
(2) 
On November 30, 2009, Carter pled guilty to one count of 
Murder in the Second Degree and PFDCF.  After a presentence 
investigation, Carter was sentenced to a total of thirty-seven years at Level V 
followed by probation.  This appeal followed. 
 
(3) 
On appeal, Carter’s defense counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a 
brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) 
(“Rule 26(c)”).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Prior to 
the filing of the brief, Counsel, as required, informed Carter of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Carter of his 
right to supplement the brief and to respond to the motion to withdraw.  
Carter responded with a written submission for this Court’s consideration.  
The State has responded to the points raised in Carter’s submission as well 
as to the position taken by Counsel and has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
 
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Rule 26(c) is twofold.1  First, the Court must be satisfied that defense 
counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for 
arguable claims.2  Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the 
record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.3 
 
(5) 
Carter’s written submission raises issues concerning his 
sentence.  First, Carter asks the Court “to take another look at the facts of 
this case” and impose a sentence “that is not excessive.”  According to 
Carter, “the facts of [the] case make it a minimum mandatory case.”   
Second, Carter contends that he was sentenced based “solely” on his 
juvenile record.  Third, Carter contends that the sentencing judge 
misinterpreted the medical examiner’s report. 
 
(6) 
“Delaware law is well-established that appellate review of 
sentences is extremely limited.”4  In Delaware, “`[a]ppellate review of a 
sentence generally ends upon determination that the sentence is within the 
statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.’”5  “[I]n reviewing a sentence 
                                          
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
5 Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Del. 1989)).   
 
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within statutory limits, this Court will not find error of law or abuse of 
discretion unless it is clear from the record below that a sentence has been 
imposed on the basis of demonstrably false information or information 
lacking a minimum indicium of reliability.”6 
 
(7) 
The sentence imposed in Carter’s case was within the statutory 
limits.  The statutory range of incarceration for Murder in the Second Degree 
is fifteen years minimum mandatory up to life imprisonment.7  Carter was 
sentenced to thirty-three years suspended after thirty years for probation.  
The statutory range of incarceration for PFDCF is three years minimum 
mandatory up to twenty-five years.8  Also, any sentence imposed for PFDCF 
is mandatory, i.e., it must be served without suspension, good time or 
probation.9  Carter was sentenced to seven years. 
 
(8) 
There is no indication in the record that the Superior Court 
imposed Carter’s sentence “on the basis of demonstrably false information 
or information lacking a minimum indicium of reliability.”10  Rather, the 
transcript of the sentencing reflects that the Superior Court imposed sentence 
after appropriately considering the presentence report, the medical 
                                          
 
6 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 843. 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 635, 4205(b)(1). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A. 
9 Id.  
10 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 843. 
 
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examiner’s report, Carter’s participation in the underlying crimes, and his 
prior violent conduct, i.e., two prior robbery convictions/adjudications.11 
 
(9) 
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Carter’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Carter’s counsel made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and properly determined that 
Carter could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
   
 
 
                                          
 
11 See Massey v. State, 256 A.2d 271 (Del. 1969) (holding that Superior Court may 
properly consider defendant’s juvenile record when sentencing him as an adult in a 
robbery case). See SENTAC (Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission) 
Benchbook Statement of Policy No. 14 at 23 (2010) (defining aggravating factor 
repetitive criminal history as conviction or adjudication for the same or similar offense on 
two or more previous occasions); SENTAC Benchbook Statement of Policy No. 3 at 22 
(providing that offenses adjudicated at age 14 or older shall be counted in prior history).