Title: MARTIN HERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARTIN HERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 33Case Number: S-09-0065Decided: 03/23/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
MARTIN 
HERNANDEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk Allan 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Martin 
Hernandez challenges his convictions on four charges relating to illegal 
drugs.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Hernandez presents two appeal issues.  
We will discuss them in this order:

 
 

1.            
Did 
the district court err when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained after a traffic stop, when the State did not meet its burden of proof 
to justify the warrantless search and seizure; and did plain error occur when 
the district court failed to address the appropriateness of the search and 
seizure after the initial stop?

 
 

2.            
Whether 
the cumulative effect of the State introducing irrelevant and prejudicial 
evidence, and the prosecutor making an inappropriate community protection 
argument, denied Mr. Hernandez his right to a fair trial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
February 7, 2008, Agent Ford of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 
interviewed two people in Rawlins, Wyoming, who had recently been arrested on 
illegal drug charges.  The two 
informed him that they had purchased methamphetamine several times from a man 
named James Moxley.  They agreed to 
cooperate with Agent Ford, and made a controlled purchase from Mr. Moxley, who 
was arrested after the transaction.  
He also agreed to cooperate, and told Agent Ford that he was purchasing 
methamphetamine from three men staying at a local motel.

 
 

[¶4]        
Agent 
Ford began conducting surveillance of the three men at the motel.  On February 19, 2008, the motel manager 
telephoned Agent Ford and told him that at least one of the men was planning to 
check out of the motel and leave town.  
Agent Ford contacted Deputies Craig and Rakoczy of the Carbon County 
Sheriff's Department and asked for their assistance.  Agent Ford then went to the motel, where 
he saw one of the men put something into a vehicle and drive away.  Agent Ford informed the Deputies which 
way the vehicle was going.  The 
Deputies spotted the vehicle, and as they watched, the driver turned a corner 
without signaling.  They made a 
traffic stop, and identified the driver as Mr. Hernandez.

 
 

[¶5]        
Agent 
Ford arrived soon after the traffic stop, and began questioning 
Mr. Hernandez.  Lieutenant 
Rosentreter of the Carbon County Sheriff's Department also arrived at the scene, 
bringing his drug-detecting dog.  
The dog alerted on the vehicle, indicating drugs inside.  The vehicle was searched, and the 
officers found a backpack containing approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine 
and 5 grams of cocaine, along with a digital scale, several razor blades, 
and packaging material.  Mr. 
Hernandez admitted that the backpack was his, and later admitted that documents 
in the backpack were his.

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Hernandez was arrested, and was found to be carrying several hundred dollars in 
cash.  He was charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance, one for methamphetamine and one 
for cocaine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2007), and with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to deliver, again one for methamphetamine and one for cocaine, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i).  
He was also charged with one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1042 and 
35-7-1031(a)(i).  The conspiracy 
charge was soon dismissed by the State, however, and Mr. Hernandez was 
bound over to the district court for trial on the remaining four 
counts.

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Hernandez filed a pretrial motion to suppress, claiming that he had been 
unlawfully stopped and, accordingly, that the evidence obtained in the 
subsequent search was inadmissible at trial.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion.  A jury trial 
commenced on October 8, 2008, and Mr. Hernandez was found guilty the next 
day.  On January 12, 2009, Mr. 
Hernandez was sentenced.  The 
district court merged the two counts relating to methamphetamine, and sentenced 
him to ten to twenty years on those charges.  It also merged the two counts relating 
to cocaine, and sentenced Mr. Hernandez to ten to twenty years on those 
charges, with the two sentences to run concurrently.  Mr. Hernandez filed a timely notice 
of appeal. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Issue 
1.  Denial of Motion to 
Suppress

 
 

[¶8]        
On 
appeal, Mr. Hernandez does not dispute that the officers stopped him after he 
failed to signal a turn, which was a traffic violation.  He concedes that "a traffic stop 
initiated by a law enforcement officer after personally observing a traffic 
violation is supported by probable cause and does not violate Article 1, Section 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution, regardless of the officer's primary 
motivation."  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 28, 
146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006); see also 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 
(1996).  However, Mr. Hernandez 
relies on the point that the "scope, duration, and intensity of the seizure, as 
well as any search made by the police subsequent to [a] stop, remain subject to 
the strictures of Article 1, Section 4, and judicial review."  Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d  at 501.  Any detention or search pursuant to a 
traffic stop must be "reasonable under all the circumstances."  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 31, 
117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶9]        
Mr. 
Hernandez does not affirmatively contend that his detention and search were 
unreasonable.  Rather, the thrust of 
his argument is that the prosecution presented absolutely no evidence about the 
scope, duration, or intensity of the detention and seizure, and thereby failed 
to meet its burden of showing that they were reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  The record reflects 
that the two officers at the hearing testified about the traffic stop and events 
leading to it, but neither testified about anything that occurred after the 
initial stop.  Mr. Hernandez is 
correct that the prosecution presented no evidence about the scope, duration, or 
intensity of his detention and search.

 
 

[¶10]     
But 
the record also shows why the prosecution did not present this evidence.  Mr. Hernandez's motion to suppress 
challenged only the validity of his initial stop, not the reasonableness of his 
detention or search.  The memorandum 
filed in support of his motion to suppress stated a single issue:  "that the officer lacked a valid basis 
to stop Mr. Hernandez."  It 
asked the district court to decide a single question:  "if the initial stop conforms to the 
standards created for a warrantless investigatory detention."  Both this memorandum and the "Corrected" 
memorandum filed later focused exclusively on the initial 
stop.

 
 

[¶11]     
In 
reliance on these memoranda, the prosecutor announced at the beginning of the 
hearing on the motion to suppress that she was "going to focus specifically on 
the stop, the traffic stop alone."  
The district court agreed that "the issue that we're all going to address 
here is the pretextual nature of this stop."  The prosecutor then said she had talked 
with defense counsel, and understood that "the argument from [the defense] 
perspective is they were going to stop Mr. Hernandez regardless of whether 
there was probable cause or not, and so it didn't even matter whether or not 
there was a traffic violation."  
When the prosecutor invited defense counsel to "Correct me if I'm wrong," 
defense counsel confirmed, "That is correct."  Later, defense counsel told the district 
court that "the whole premise of this suppression hearing is that illegal turn 
or not . . . this vehicle was pulled over because Agent Ford told them to pull 
it over."  Based on the evidence and 
arguments of counsel, the district court wrote in its decision letter that it 
had

 
 
determined 
that Deputy Craig was justified in stopping Hernandez due to the traffic 
violation that Deputy Craig watched Hernandez commit.  Hernandez makes no complaints beyond 
this initial stop.  Accordingly, the 
Court need not proceed further with its analysis.

 
 

[¶12]     
Both 
parties assert that, because Mr. Hernandez did not raise the issue of his 
detention and search with the district court, we should apply the plain error 
standard of review.  But this is not 
a case in which the issue was simply not raised below.  It is a case in which 
Mr. Hernandez, through his counsel, affirmatively represented to the 
district court and the prosecution that the reasonableness of his detention and 
search was not at issue.  "The 
doctrine of invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be 
heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the 
court or the opposite party to commit."  
Schott v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 
39 (Wyo. 1993).  "Generally, defense 
counsel must have solicited or otherwise acted affirmatively for the invited 
error doctrine to apply."  James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 393 (Wyo. 
2000).  The record in this case 
leaves no doubt that Mr. Hernandez's counsel made affirmative statements 
that induced the prosecutor not to present evidence about the detention and 
search, and the district court not to consider the issue of their 
reasonableness.  Applying the 
doctrine of invited error, we need not address this issue further.  Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 6 
n.5, 192 P.3d 137, 141 n.5 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
Issue 
2.  Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 

[¶13]     
Although 
Mr. Hernandez presents this as a single issue, it is better analyzed as three 
related claims.  First, he claims 
that the district court improperly allowed the prosecution to introduce 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of drug sales that did not directly involve 
Mr. Hernandez.  Second, he 
claims that the prosecution's closing argument included improper comments urging 
the jurors to help fight the drug problem in Rawlins and Carbon County.  Third, he claims that the combined 
effect of the irrelevant evidence and the prosecutor's inappropriate comments 
served to deny him a fair trial.  We 
will discuss each of these three claims in turn.

 
 

            
a.  Irrelevant and 
Prejudicial Evidence

 
 

[¶14]     
None 
of the evidence challenged by Mr. Hernandez on appeal was objected to at 
trial.  "We have stated repeatedly that an 
objection is not properly preserved on appeal unless the objection was made at 
trial."  Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 17, 
215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 
2009).  Consequently, we can reverse 
a trial court's decisions on the admission of this evidence only for plain 
error.  W.R.A.P. 9.05; W.R.Cr.P. 
52(b).  "Plain 
error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident 
alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, 
¶ 9, 184 P.3d 687, 692 (Wyo. 2008), quoting Talley v. State, 2007 WY 
37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Hernandez challenges certain evidence admitted during his trial as 
irrelevant.  W.R.E. 401 defines 
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Evidence that is not relevant is not 
admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  "In criminal cases, evidence is relevant 
when it tends to prove or to disprove an element of the charged crime."  Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 
1995).1

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
first evidence Mr. Hernandez characterizes as irrelevant is the testimony of 
Agent Ford.  Agent Ford related that 
he interviewed two people who had been arrested on drug charges.  They told him they had purchased drugs 
from Mr. Moxley, and agreed to participate in a controlled purchase from 
Mr. Moxley.  Agent Ford testified 
about the arrest of Mr. Moxley, who told him he was purchasing methamphetamine 
from three men who were staying at a local motel.  One of the three men turned out to be 
Mr. Hernandez.  In his brief, Mr. 
Hernandez argues that:

 
 
All 
of the evidence surrounding the arrest [of the two people and Mr. Moxley], and 
the subsequent investigation into the dealing of methamphetamine in Rawlins is 
completely irrelevant and is highly prejudicial.  The evidence did not go to an element of 
any of the crimes Mr. Hernandez was charged with, but instead served only 
to establish that there is a methamphetamine problem in Carbon 
County.

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Hernandez's characterization of the testimony is exaggerated.  In reality, Agent Ford's testimony 
related directly to the events culminating in the arrest of 
Mr. Hernandez:  the two 
arrested persons led to Mr. Moxley, and Mr. Moxley led to 
Mr. Hernandez.  A law 
enforcement officer's testimony about the course of an investigation leading to 
a defendant's arrest is not irrelevant evidence.  Evenson v. State, 2008 WY 24, ¶ 10, 
177 P.3d 819, 823 (Wyo. 2008) (Admissible testimony from a police officer 
"described the course of his investigation and how he became aware of [the 
defendant's] involvement in the fight.").  
In Agent Ford's testimony, he did mention the names of one or two other 
people peripherally involved with Mr. Moxley, and one other location where 
drug sales may have occurred.  
Although these were not directly related to Mr. Hernandez, they were 
no more than brief references to minor details.  They do not amount to a general 
discussion of a methamphetamine problem in Carbon County, as Mr. Hernandez 
claims.  We find nothing in the 
challenged portions of Agent Ford's testimony that should have been excluded as 
irrelevant.

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Hernandez also challenges testimony from Mr. Moxley about the amounts of 
methamphetamine he purchased from the three men at the motel.  Mr. Moxley explained that he was 
purchasing it for another unnamed person, who would then give Mr. Moxley a small 
amount of the methamphetamine.  
Contrary to Mr. Hernandez's claim, this evidence was not irrelevant 
evidence about the general methamphetamine problem in Carbon County.  It was about methamphetamine purchases 
made directly from Mr. Hernandez and his colleagues.  Mr. Hernandez was charged with 
possession of illegal drugs with intent to deliver.  Evidence of earlier deliveries tended to 
prove the element of intent to deliver.  
It was relevant and admissible evidence.

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Hernandez also challenges testimony that Mr. Moxley was "selling a lot of drugs" 
in Rawlins, to nine or ten people per day, at four or five times a day per 
person.  We agree with Mr. Hernandez 
that this testimony related more to a general drug problem in the community, and 
less to Mr. Hernandez.  But 
even if this evidence is irrelevant, the record reflects that it was not 
introduced by the prosecution.  It 
was introduced during defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Moxley.  The district court's admission of 
evidence elicited by Mr. Hernandez's own defense counsel, relevant or not, 
cannot serve as a basis for reversing Mr. Hernandez's 
convictions.

 
 

[¶20]     
Finally, 
Mr. Hernandez challenges testimony from Special Agent Nicholas Bisceglia, who 
testified that "Methamphetamine is a major problem" in Carbon County.  In isolation, this testimony seems 
irrelevant.  In context, it is less 
clearly so.  The main point of Agent 
Bisceglia's testimony was that, based on his experience, a person in possession 
of a relatively large amount of methamphetamine, a digital scale, packaging 
materials, and a substantial amount of cash is more likely a drug distributor 
than a drug user.2  To establish his level of experience, 
Agent Bisceglia testified that he investigated drug-related crimes on a daily 
basis, and that he had been involved in a large number of drug cases.  In this context, his comment about a 
methamphetamine problem in Carbon County was meant to show that there were many 
drug crimes for him to investigate, and to help establish his experience with 
drug distributors and users.

 
 

[¶21]     
Agent 
Bisceglia's comment might be considered relevant because it helped to establish 
his credentials, or irrelevant because it did not tend to prove any element of 
the charges against Mr. Hernandez.  
If an objection had been made, the district court could have exercised 
its discretion in deciding if it was relevant or irrelevant.  But defense counsel did not object, 
which may have been a sound strategic decision not to draw attention to Agent 
Bisceglia's brief and undramatic remark.  
"Under the plain error standard of review, we reverse a trial court's 
decision only if it is so plainly erroneous that the judge should have noticed 
and corrected the mistake even though the parties failed to raise the 
issue."  Causey, ¶ 19, 215 P.3d  at 293.  If the district court erred by not 
taking sua sponte action to strike 
Agent Bisceglia's remark, it was not so plainly erroneous as to justify a 
reversal of Mr. Hernandez's convictions.

 
 
            
b.  Prosecutor's Closing 
Argument

 
 

[¶22]     
In 
her closing argument, the prosecutor responded as follows to attacks on the 
credibility of Mr. Moxley:

 
 
Crimes 
conceived in hell, ladies and gentlemen, don't have angels for witnesses.  People who are involved in drug 
activity, people who are buying, people who are selling, people who are using 
are not going to be the cr¨me de la cr¨me 
of Rawlins.  We are not going to 
get those people here to tell you what's going on in the 
underworld.

 
 
We 
rely on people like Mr. Moxley who purge themselves when they get caught.  And there's no doubt he was caught.  And there's no doubt that he is giving 
information, and he contributed to the problem that Special 
Agent Bisceglia told you was all over the place in this town.  But we have taken care of 
Mr. Moxley.  He's been in 
jail.  He told you 
that.

 
 

And 
now we got [sic] to 
take care of somebody else, because methamphetamine is so bad, so prevalent here 
in Rawlins.  We are going to 
see the seedier side of human nature in cases like this.  It can't be avoided.  But don't be fooled that just because 
the defendant says we have Moxley and he's got an agenda and he's a snitch and 
what does he want out of this.  What 
difference does it make?  What 
matters is that he gave information to law enforcement which resulted in 
numerous arrests and numerous convictions.

 
 
We 
need the Moxleys, not because we want them using in our town, but because we 
want them telling us what's going on.  
It is a side of town that some of us just don't even know 
about.

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  On appeal, Mr. 
Hernandez challenges the emphasized comments as improper "community outrage" 
arguments.  Because 
no objection was made at trial, we again apply the plain error standard.  The quoted passage leaves the record 
clear about the incident alleged as error, so we turn to the question of whether 
the prosecutor's comments transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.

 
 

[¶23]     
They 
did.  The rule of law against 
community outrage arguments is clear and unequivocal.  "This Court has frequently admonished 
prosecutors to seek convictions by presenting evidence of guilt, rather than by 
arousing the passions and prejudices of jurors against societal evils."  Strange v. State, 2008 WY 132, ¶ 6, 
195 P.3d 1041, 1043-44 (Wyo. 2008); see 
also Evenson, 
¶ 22, 177 P.3d at 826-27; Burton 
v. State, 
2002 WY 71, ¶ 15, 46 P.3d 309, 314 (Wyo. 2002).  One example of an improper community 
outrage argument comes from Gayler v. 
State, 957 P.2d 855, 860-61 (Wyo. 1998):

 
 
Drugs, 
Ladies and Gentleman, is there a more insidious or terrible disease that affects 
our society today? It tears families apart; steals away our youth. It's ripping 
the seams of our nation. Costs the taxpayers millions of dollars. . . . 
Ladies and Gentleman, Lincoln County Law Enforcement is taking the war 
on drugs dead serious. They are not going to tolerate the delivery of 
methamphetamine or any drugs in this county. It doesn't matter if it's a small 
amount, like what we had here, or a large amount. We are not going to tolerate 
it. Absolutely not. . . .

 
 
This 
is your opportunity, as a jury, to take a stand with Lincoln County Law 
Enforcement and say that we will not tolerate drug dealers in our county. We 
will not tolerate it.

 
 
We 
provided this explanation of why that argument was 
improper:

 
 
The 
prosecutor's argument was obviously an appeal to the jury's sense of duty to 
help local law enforcement by convicting Gayler.  The argument was improper because it 
appealed to the jury's passion and prejudice against drug-related crimes.  Although a prosecutor is permitted a 
certain degree of latitude during closing arguments, he is not allowed to urge 
the jury to convict an accused on any basis other than that the evidence shows 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 

Id. 
at 861.

 
 

[¶24]     
It 
seems apparent that the prosecutor's comments in Mr. Hernandez's case were 
similar in nature to those in Gayler.  They urged the jurors to "take care of" 
Mr. Hernandez to help reduce the methamphetamine problem.  They appealed to the jury's passions and 
prejudice against illegal drugs.  
They asked the jury to convict Mr. Hernandez "because 
methamphetamine is so bad, so prevalent here in Rawlins," not because of the 
evidence against him.  

 
 

[¶25]     
We 
must also evaluate these comments in the context of the entire argument, and 
with reference to the entire record.  
Arevalo 
v. State, 
939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997).  It 
may be that the prosecutor's comments were not as lengthy or impassioned as 
those in Gayler.  They were not made as a separate 
argument, but fitted into an effort to rehabilitate Mr. Moxley's 
testimony.  These characteristics 
render the prosecutor's comments in Mr. Hernandez's case less blatantly 
objectionable, but do not neutralize their improper nature.  It may also be that the community 
outrage theme did not permeate Mr. Hernandez's trial as it did the trial in 
Strange.  There, we observed that "The type of 
community outrage or community protection theme that we disapproved in Gayler [was] rampant," having found it 
reflected in a pretrial conference, voir 
dire, the opening statement, the testimony of five witnesses, and the 
closing argument.  Strange, ¶ 9, 195 P.3d  at 
1047.  Still, the comments in 
Mr. Hernandez's case were not entirely isolated.  They echoed the prosecutor's opening 
statement promising evidence that Mr. Hernandez would sell methamphetamine 
to Mr. Moxley, who "would then sell it throughout this community."  They re-emphasized Agent Bisceglia's 
testimony that "Methamphetamine is a major problem" in Carbon County.  Considered in context, the prosecutor's 
comments remain improper community outrage or protection arguments, and they 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 

[¶26]     
Mr. 
Hernandez's argument falters, however, on the third prong of our plain error 
analysis.  Based on a fair reading 
of this record, we are unable to say that the prosecutor's comments materially 
prejudiced 
Mr. Hernandez.  Under the plain 
error standard, prejudice is found "if there is a reasonable probability that 
the verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant if the 
error had not occurred."  Evenson, ¶ 7, 177 P.3d  at 823.  The evidence against Mr. Hernandez 
was overwhelming.  There 
is no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's improper comments changed the 
jury's verdict.  

 
 

[¶27]     
As 
to the charges of being in possession of methamphetamine and cocaine, 
Mr. Hernandez's only defense argument was that the prosecution failed to 
prove that the illegal drugs belonged to him.  The evidence showed that, when Mr. 
Hernandez was arrested, the officers found methamphetamine and cocaine in a 
backpack that he admitted was his, along with documents that he admitted were 
his, inside of his car, which he had just been driving.  There is no reasonable probability the 
jury's verdict on the possession charges would have been different if the 
prosecutor had not made the improper comments.

 
 

[¶28]     
As 
to the charges of being in possession with intent to deliver, Mr. Hernandez's 
only defense was that Mr. Moxley was not a credible witness.  But even ignoring Mr. Moxley's 
testimony, the evidence showed that Mr. Hernandez was in possession of 
relatively large amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine, a digital scale, 
several razor blades, packaging materials, and several hundred dollars in 
cash.  Agent Bisceglia testified 
that these facts were more indicative of a person distributing drugs than of a 
person merely using them.  There is 
no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict on the possession with intent 
to deliver charges would have been different if the prosecutor had not made the 
improper comments.

 
 
            
c.  
Cumulative Error

 
 

[¶29]     
Finally, 
we turn to Mr. Hernandez's claim that the irrelevant evidence and the 
prosecutor's inappropriate comments combined to deny him a fair trial.  

 
 
The 
purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is "to address whether the cumulative 
effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to 
prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error."  McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, 
¶ 27, 155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007).  In conducting a cumulative error 
evaluation, we consider only matters that we have determined to be errors.  Id.  We will reverse a conviction only when 
"the accumulated effect [of the errors] constitutes prejudice and the conduct 
of the trial is other than fair and impartial.'"  Id. (quoting Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 462 (Wyo. 
1971)). 

 
 

Guy, 
¶ 45, 184 P.3d  at 701.  We have 
agreed with Mr. Hernandez that the prosecutor made improper remarks in closing 
argument, but concluded that the error was not prejudicial.  We have rejected Mr. Hernandez's 
claim that the district court erroneously allowed irrelevant evidence to be 
admitted at trial.  Because there 
was no error in the admission of evidence, there is nothing to change our 
conclusion that the prosecutor's improper remarks were not prejudicial.  There is no basis for reversing 
Mr. Hernandez's convictions due to cumulative error.

 
 

[¶30]     
We 
affirm.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶31]   
I respectfully dissent.  
I would reverse because the State's community safety argument in this 
case is virtually indistinguishable from the State's community safety argument 
that we found reversible in Strange v. 
State, 2008 WY 132, ¶¶ 6-9, 195 P.3d 1041, 1043-47 (Wyo. 2008).  After introducing evidence of rampant 
methamphetamine abuse within the community, the State argued in closing 
that:

 
 
. 
. . .  [Mr. Moxley] contributed to 
the problem that Special Agent Bisceglia told you was all over the place in this 
town.  But we have taken care of Mr. 
Moxley.  He's been in jail.  He told you that.

 
 
And 
now we got [sic] to take care of somebody else, because methamphetamine is so 
bad, so prevalent here in Rawlins. . . .

 
 
That 
is nothing more nor less than a plea to the jury to convict the appellant 
because of a community methamphetamine problem, rather than a plea to convict 
him because he is guilty of the particular crime charged.  Such a clear violation of our rule of 
law cannot be saved because of its contextthat being the attempt to give Mr. 
Moxley some credibilitybecause it was not necessary in that context and it 
added nothing to the context.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. 
Hernandez also challenges the evidence as highly prejudicial, but oddly enough, 
never cites or refers to W.R.E. 403, the rule of evidence that deals with 
unfairly prejudicial evidence.  He 
presents no analysis of whether the evidence was admissible or inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 403.  Instead, he 
relies on this statement in a federal decision:  "Where the evidence is of very slight 
(if any) probative value, it's an abuse of discretion to admit it if there's 
even a modest likelihood of unfair prejudice or a small risk of misleading the 
jury."  United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 424 
(9th Cir. 1992).  This federal case may be persuasive, but 
it is not binding authority here.  
It could be used to support an argument under Wyoming law, but should not 
be cited to the exclusion of W.R.E. 403.  
This makes us doubt that Mr. Hernandez intends to argue that the 
evidence should have been excluded under W.R.E. 403, and we will not analyze his 
argument that way.  Instead, we 
understand his argument to be that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, 
together with improper closing argument from the prosecutor, combined to deny 
him a fair trial.  We take up that 
contention later, but at this stage, consider only whether the evidence was 
inadmissible because it was irrelevant.

 
 

2In the transcript, 
Agent Bisceglia's testimony reads like the sort of opinion testimony generally 
given by an expert witness.  See W.R.E. 701, 702.  Agent Bisceglia was not formally offered 
or accepted as an expert.  During 
the instruction conference, however, the prosecutor offered an instruction 
designating Agent Bisceglia as an expert, defense counsel did not object, and 
the district court accepted the instruction.  We will overlook this incongruity 
because it was not an issue at trial and is not an issue raised on 
appeal.