Title: New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium (NJDPM) sued the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), challenging the DOC s promulgation of rules and procedures for carrying out capital sentences by lethal injection. In connection with that challenge, NJDPM requested that the DOC turn over various records related to lethal injection. Although it provided some of the records, the DOC claimed that a majority of the requested documents contained privileged information precluding disclosure. NJDPM is a grass roots association that attempts to effect change in New Jersey s death penalty through legislative, executive, and legal action. Kevin Walsh has served as NJDPM s legal counsel and Chairperson of NJDPM s Legal Committee since 2001. Walsh is a salaried and full-time employee of Fair Share Housing Center in Cherry Hill and performs his services for NJDPM strictly on a pro bono basis. Most of Walsh s NJDPM work is performed after work hours or on the weekends. In 2002, NJDPM filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division, seeking unrestricted access to the requested records under OPRA. Prior to the trial court s ruling on this request, the DOC voluntarily released a portion of the records to the NJDPM, withholding the rest as part of the deliberative-process privilege. Eventually, the trial court ordered the DOC to provide all or part of numerous other documents. Pursuant to OPRA s fee-shifting provision, Walsh applied for reasonable attorneys fees claiming that NJDPM was the prevailing party. He requested that the court award him payment for 89.5 hours of work on the OPRA privilege issues, including the time spent researching the OPRA, preparing descriptions of the requested documents, identifying ways to overcome the DOC s assertion of privilege, and drafting the initial fee application. Walsh argued that his reasonable hourly rate was $155, bringing the lodestar to $13,872.50. Furthermore, given the novelty of the OPRA, the DOC s substantial resources, the high risk of non-payment inherent in his pro bono arrangement with NJDPM, and the public value of the litigation, Walsh asked the trial court to enhance the lodestar by 30%. Finally, Walsh sought payment for an additional 70.3 hours spent on work related to his supplemental fee application, which included researching and drafting a brief that addressed various OPRA fee issues raised by the trial court. The total fee Wash requested was $29,135.75. The trial court found that NJDPM had prevailed but reduced the hours requested by Walsh on both the OPRA privilege issues and the supplemental fee request, then awarded 70% of that lodestar amount noting that NJDPM gained access to only 70% of the requested records. The court also determined that Walsh was entitled to only a 5% fee enhancement because NJDPM, by maintaining its own legal committee, was not in the position of having to attract competent counsel with the lure of a statutory fee award. The trial court s fee award was $8,351.57. The DOC appealed the trial court s award of an enhanced fee and NJDPM cross-appealed on the court s reduction of the lodestar. The Appellate Division vacated the trial court s order and remanded for a recalculation of attorney s fees. The Appellate Division panel, reasoning that fee enhancements should reflect both the contingent nature of the attorney s services and the legal risks inherent in the litigation, increased the fee enhancement to 25%. The panel concluded that a greater enhancement was proper because Walsh faced nonpayment unless he achieved a successful outcome and because he assumed a considerable risk of failure in view of the DOC s blanket claim of privilege. The panel also eliminated the trial court s 30% fee reduction, reasoning that Walsh obtained a full measure of success. The panel deferred to the trial court on the reduction in hours and on Walsh s hourly rate. The Supreme Court granted the DOC s petition for certification. HELD: When a portion of a claim sought in an OPRA case is ultimately rejected, that circumstance should be considered, along with other factors, to determine a reasonable award of attorneys fees. The trial court should conduct a qualitative analysis that weighs such factors as the number of documents received versus the number requested; whether the purpose of the OPRA was vindicated by the litigation; the novelty of the issue; the time and labor required to resolve the matter; and whether the representation precluded the attorney from undertaking other employment opportunities. If, after a consideration of the relevant factors, the court concludes that the requester has obtained a high degree of success, the requester should recover the full lodestar amount. 1. Fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only in rare circumstances. Generally, a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate to reach the lodestar. However, a simple lodestar calculation may sometimes be excessive depending on the success of the litigation. Therefore, courts can reduce the lodestar fee if the level of success achieved in the litigation is limited compared to the relief sought. (Pp. 15-18) 2. The Court has not established a per se requirement that there be a close relationship between recovery and fees awarded for services rendered. The mathematical approach comparing the total number of issues in the case with those actually prevailed on is rejected. Such a ratio provides little aid in determining the reasonable fee in light of all relevant factors. The critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Moreover, the Court will not rely on percentages of documents obtained, as suggested by the DOC, to determine whether a reduction of the lodestar is appropriate in an OPRA case. (Pp. 18-19) 3. The trial court relied on a quantitative analysis, simply awarding NJDPM s counsel a percentage of the lodestar that mirrored the number of documents obtained. Because of the DOC s position of a blanket privilege and the relative novelty of the OPRA, Walsh was forced to play a sort of blind-man s bluff in pursuing NJDPM s rights. His work on behalf of NJDPM on weekends and after normal business hours imposed additional limitations on Walsh s advocacy on behalf of his client. Under those circumstances and in view of his receipt of numerous documents from the DOC, Walsh achieved a high degree of success and should be compensated with an award of the full lodestar amount. The Court affirms the Appellate Division s elimination of the 30% fee reduction and orders on remand that Walsh be awarded 100% of the lodestar. (Pp. 19-21) 4. The fact that Walsh did not expect payment from NJDPM has no bearing on whether his fee award should be enhanced. The reasonable counsel fee is determined independently of the provisions of the client-counsel fee agreement. A counsel fee award in a fee-shifting case will not be reasonable unless the lodestar is adjusted to reflect the actual risk that the attorney will not receive payment if the suit fails. Enhancements should not be given as a matter of course, they are case sensitive. Ordinarily, enhancement of the lodestar will not be warranted in an OPRA case because the economic risk in securing access to a specific government record will be minimal. However, when a prevailing party has faced a substantial risk of nonpayment in its attempt to secure the release of a government record, enhancement may be appropriate based on circumstances in the case. (Pp. 21-22) 5. Under the totality of the circumstances here, a fee enhancement is proper. Walsh did not receive a fee from his client, the risk of failure was high because of the DOC s blanket assertion of privilege, and the documents sought related to an issue of public importance. Moreover, Walsh obtained an excellent result. The matter is remanded to the Law Division to determine the amount of the enhancement. On remand, the trial court should consider the public importance of the matter, the degree of success, the high risk of nonpayment and any other factors that support the request for enhancement. The court should also consider the arguments in opposition to enhancement. The Rendine requirements and standards for enhancement remain, except for the Court s qualification that enhancements are not a matter of right in an OPRA case. (Pp. 22-24) As MODIFIED, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for an award of the full lodestar fee and an enhancement that is in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins, concurs in the determination to award counsel for NJDPM the full lodestar but dissents from the view that a percentage enhancement of counsel s fee is appropriate under OPRA in this case. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, and WALLACE join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI S opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of New Jersey and DEVON BROWN, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. Argued February 28, 2005 Decided August 15, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 370 N.J. Super. 11 (2004). Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida and Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel). Kevin D. Walsh argued the cause for respondent. Thomas J. Cafferty and Arlen M. Turinchak submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Press Association (McGimpsey & Cafferty, attorneys). Neil M. Mullin submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Rutgers School of Law-Newark, New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center and New Jersey Institute for Social Justice (Smith Mullin, attorneys). JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires us to address once again the standards that govern an award of attorney s fees under a state fee-shifting statute. In this matter, the New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium (NJDPM) See footnote 1 sued the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) to challenge the DOC s promulgation of rules and procedures for carrying out capital sentences by lethal injection. In connection with its challenge, the NJDPM requested that the DOC turn over various records. Although it provided some of the records, the DOC claimed that a majority of the requested documents contained privileged information that should not be disclosed. The NJDPM sought complete access to the records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to 13. Before the trial court could rule on the NJDPM s claim, the DOC voluntarily released a portion of the records to the NJDPM. The court, however, ordered the DOC to provide all or part of numerous other documents. Claiming that the NJDPM was the prevailing party, the NJDPM s counsel applied for reasonable attorney s fees under the fee-shifting provision of the OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Finding that the NJDPM had prevailed, the trial court awarded 70% of the lodestar amount because the NJDPM gained access to only 70% of the requested records. The court also determined that the NJDPM s counsel was entitled to a 5% fee enhancement. The Appellate Division reversed, eliminating the 30% fee reduction after finding that the NJDPM s counsel achieved a full measure of success. New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep t of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (2004). The panel also increased the fee enhancement from 5% to 25%, noting that the NJDPM s counsel faced a high risk of nonpayment because he represented the organization on a pro bono basis. Id. at 17. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Appellate Division s holding that the attorney should receive 100% of the lodestar. Although we also conclude that the lodestar should be enhanced, we remand this issue to the trial court for a recalculation that is consistent with the guidelines set forth in our opinion. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of New Jersey and DEVON BROWN, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring and dissenting in part. Although I concur in the determination of the Court to award counsel for NJDPM one hundred percent of his lodestar, I cannot agree that a percentage enhancement of counsel s fee (already determined to be a reasonable hourly rate of reimbursement) is appropriate under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. The majority emphasizes that fee enhancement is not to be an expected award and that it is not preordained for a successful OPRA litigant. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22). However, in my view, the majority s judgment is not sufficiently discriminating in its evaluation of the appropriateness of fee enhancement in this OPRA litigation. I believe that the majority intends to discourage the award of enhanced fees for OPRA plaintiffs, however, it misapplies its own rule in this appeal. The use of an enhancement to a fee award under OPRA ought to be rare and compellingly justified. This OPRA appeal does not afford such justification. The Department of Corrections correctly argues that this case did not pose an economic contingency risk to counsel and his client that was remotely close to that which led to approval of enhancement of the fee paid under the fee-shifting provision of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1, in Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995). Rendine involved a traditional contingency fee case. That, however, is not what we have here. Here, a public interest attorney employed full time by the Fair Share Housing Center (FSHC) took on the instant litigation on behalf of NJDPM, a pro bono organization in which he has served for years in a leadership capacity and as its pro bono legal counsel. Although it is admirable that counsel worked beyond his normal workweek on this matter, it did not create a compelling economic risk for counsel or his pro bono client. Throughout, counsel remained employed full time. The risk that he might not have all or any of his time on this case reimbursed under an OPRA fee-shifting application does not equate to the degree of risk posed to an attorney retained on a contingency basis to pursue a difficult LAD action. The risk here was no different than the typical litigation risk posed under fee-shifting situations permitted under our Court Rules or pursuant to contract. The shifted fee, to be paid by the losing party, is a reimbursement of the attorney s reasonable fees. There is no enhanced bonus amount added to the attorney s fee. Similarly, in my view, there should be no sweetening of the reimbursed fees paid to cover the counsel expenses incurred by a successful OPRA litigant. That said, although I have severe misgivings that enhancement should ever be allowed in an OPRA fee-shift award, I would leave open for the time being the question whether there might arise a sufficiently compelling circumstance to justify enhancement of an attorney s fee under a reasonableness assessment. If in some extraordinary setting a fee enhancement under OPRA might be compellingly justified -- and I am hard pressed to speculate on when such a circumstance could arise -- a court should exercise restraint and keep any enhancement to a minimum. By necessity, an OPRA fee award can only be paid from public funds. That fact should be counterbalanced against any determination to enhance an already reasonable attorney s rate and should serve as strong incentive to keep the enhancement of fees in OPRA litigation rare, and the amount of any enhancement, should it ever be justified, small. Finally, I would add, because the majority opinion does not provide the trial courts with guidance on how to approach OPRA fee applications when the OPRA litigation is being used as an adjunct to other litigation, that the courts should be vigilant to prevent OPRA litigation, with its concomitant allowance of a reasonable fee award, from being manipulated into a mechanism to shift the costs of discovery from one party to another. In sum, I respectfully dissent from the award of an enhancement of counsel s hourly fee rate that already has been determined to be reasonable in amount. I concur fully in the determination to award NJDPM counsel one hundred percent of his lodestar in view of his substantial success in this matter. Justice Rivera-Soto joins in this opinion. NEW JERSEYANS FOR A DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of New Jersey and DEVON BROWN, in his official Capacity as the Commissioner Of the New Jersey Department Of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED August 15, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY