Title: Smith v. South

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

283 P.2d 1073 (1955) 59 N.M. 312 Lottie SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bryan SOUTH, Defendant-Appellee. No. 5883. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 18, 1955. *1074 Dee C. Blythe, Clovis, for appellant. Mears & Mears, Portales, for appellee. COMPTON, Chief Justice. The parties were divorced on May 12, 1945, in the State of Washington. The decree awarded the care, custody and control of their minor child to appellant and directed appellee to pay $30 monthly for her support. Subsequently, they established residence in New Mexico, and appellant, having remarried, brought this action to collect $870, arrearages allegedly due her under the decree of the Washington Court. Shortly thereafter, on June 8, 1949, the parties entered into an agreement which expressly provides that appellant waives her claim to any amount previously due for child support under the Washington judgment, and that custody of the child be given to appellee each year during the school term. It also provides that during June, July and August the mother was to have her custody and appellee was to pay $25 per month for her support. On the same day the agreement was presented to and approved by the court. Later, on April 14, 1954, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the agreement and to enforce the decree of the Washington Court. The motion alleges that appellee had then defaulted to the extent of $3,490. She further alleges that the agreement was induced by fraud and that there had been a failure of consideration. As an alternative, she sought reimbursement in the amount of $3,000 for money which had been expended by her in the support of the child while appellee was in default. Defendant answered, denying the material allegations. He alleges that he complied with all the terms of the agreement; that on or about June 1, 1951, he sent the child to her mother in Florida; that thereafter appellant changed her address and that he was unable to locate them; that he had no knowledge of their whereabouts until the child telephoned him from Houston, Texas, and that he sent funds for her; that at all times he has shown proper parental care toward the child; that on February 15, 1954, appellant arbitrarily assumed full time custody of her. He then prayed that custody be awarded to him. At the conclusion of the hearing on the merits, the court made the following findings and conclusions: Appellant challenges first the jurisdiction of the trial court to make the order of June 8, 1949, and next, the validity of the order since the agreement was not incorporated therein. That the Washington judgment is entitled to the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution, art. 4, § 1, cannot be questioned, but it is res judicata only as to points and matters of fact in issue in that cause and which were essential to a decision. Hollingsworth v. Hicks, 57 N.M. 336, 258 P.2d 724; Adams v. Cox, 55 N.M. 444, 234 P.2d 1043; Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636, 142 A.L.R. 1237. We held in Adams v. Cox, supra, that to make matters res judicata, there must be an identity of subject matter, causes, parties, character of persons for and against whom claim is made. While the parties are the same, obviously, there is neither identity of subject matters nor causes. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the New Mexico Court and asserted a willingness to be bound thereby, appellant is in no position to complain. While it would have been better practice to incorporate into the order the stipulation upon which the order was based, nevertheless, the order is equally effective as if it had been done. In Emrich v. McNeil, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 126 F.2d 841, 843, 146 A.L.R. 1146, commenting upon the failure of the trial court to incorporate into the decree the agreement of the parties, the court said: The annotator at 154 A.L.R., § 11 a(1), p. 449, summarizes the holdings of the courts, as follows: Concerning child custody, the Washington decree is not conclusive for all time. In this jurisdiction, the welfare of the child, wherever it may be found, is the controlling consideration and the courts will not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction if warranted by changing circumstances. State ex rel. Hockenhull v. Marshall, 58 N.M. 286, 270 P.2d 702; Bassett v. Bassett, *1076 56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487; State ex rel. Day v. Parker, 55 N.M. 227, 230 P.2d 252; Cook v. Brownlee, 54 N.M. 227, 220 P.2d 378; Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918, L.R.A. 1915B, 154. The next question requires a remand of the cause because the court failed to make specific findings and conclusions on a material issue. Whether appellee had defaulted in support payments pursuant to the order of the court, dated June 8, 1949, was a question left undetermined. Appellant testified that appellee was in default; conversely, appellee testified that he had promptly made all payments required of him. Both parties tendered specific findings and conclusions on the issue, which were refused. The applicable statute is § 21-1-1 (52), (B), 1953 Comp., District Court Rule 52 (b). The rule reads: In State National Bank of El Paso, Tex. Cantrell, 46 N.M. 268, 127 P.2d 246, 249, is Court, in discussing the rule, said: Also see Laumbach v. Laumbach, 58 N.M. 248, 270 P.2d 385. Other questions not presently material to a decision are presented on appeal. The cause will be remanded with instructions, after due notice to the parties, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, solely upon issues incident to or consequent on appellee's default, if any, and render appropriate judgment thereon. Objections and exceptions to the proceedings may be made by the parties and if aggrieved by rulings thereon, provisions of paragraph 10, Rule XIV of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, relating to supplemental transcripts on second appeal will be available to them. The judgment is otherwise affirmed, and It Is So Ordered. LUJAN, SADLER and KIKER, JJ., concur. McGHEE, J., dissenting in part. McGHEE, Justice (dissenting in part). Too many questions posed by this appeal are left unanswered in the majority opinion. In this case issues were made and evidence was tendered and received as to the amount of payments made, the amounts claimed to be due, the arrangement for custody and the respective blame of the mother and father in the matter of the failure of the father to have actual custody of Bonita under the provisions of the court approved agreement. Findings of fact and conclusions of law on the points were requested by each of the parties. The trial court made no findings respecting the culpability of the parties as to the custody situation and did not pass upon the legal propositions. In my view, aside from the factual question as to the culpability of the parents, there are properly before this Court the following questions of law: What is the basis on which the default of the defendant is to be determined? Has the Washington decree spent its force with the approval of the agreement of the parties made subsequent thereto; or, upon default by the father upon the agreement, if such be found, is the Washington decree reinstated? Or is the monetary default of the father to be arrived at on the basis of $25 per month for the summer months during which the mother was awarded custody under the approved agreement? And what about the months during the school years when the mother had actual custody of the child, but custody under the approved agreement was to be in the father? Could it be said there was a tacit agreement to accept the $25 per month set for the summer months as support during the winter or school months that the mother cared for Bonita, or should the mother recover on an alternative basis of quantum meruit, or recover nothing at all for such months? None of these questions, except possibly by implication the one about the force of the Washington decree, have been answered. Not only were these matters litigated, but they formed the substantial issues of the trial. It is possible that a determination of the correct legal principles controlling these questions might disclose that culpability of the parents is not the decisive factor in determining liability for support, in which event this case perhaps could have been remanded only for the trial court to compute the arrearages, and that would be the end of it. As the trial court may make findings and conclusions objectionable to one side or the other, with no direction in these matters, and as the legal questions appear to me to be properly before us on this appeal, it seems wrong to direct the plaintiff and defendant to bring them back on a second appeal. I must, therefore, dissent from the refusal of the majority to pass upon these important questions.