Title: MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-541.] 
 
*Reporter’s Note: This cause was decided on January 24, 2018, but was released to the public on 
February 12, 2018, subsequent to the resignation of Justice William M. O’Neill, who participated 
in the decision. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-541 
MDM HOLDINGS, INC., APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-541.] 
Taxation—Real-property valuation—R.C. 5715.19(D)—Property owner properly 
invoked continuing-complaint jurisdiction of county board of revision over 
owner’s challenge to county fiscal officer’s valuation of property—Board 
of Tax Appeals’ decision affirming dismissal of complaint reversed and 
cause remanded. 
(No. 2015-1065—Submitted September 26, 2017—Decided January 24, 2018.*) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2015-60. 
____________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal involves a taxpayer’s challenge to the taxable value 
assigned to its property for tax year 2012.  The taxpayer did not file a new complaint 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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for the 2012 tax year, but rather relied upon the continuing-complaint jurisdiction 
provided for in R.C. 5715.19(D).  The Board of Tax Appeals held that the claim 
was barred because the taxpayer waited too long to notify the board of revision that 
it wished to pursue a continuing complaint for tax year 2012.  We reverse.  The 
time limitation imposed by the BTA is contrary to the plain language of R.C. 
5715.19(D). 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} On March 5, 2012, MDM Holdings, Inc. (“MDM”), filed a complaint 
before the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”), seeking a reduction in 
valuation of its property from $688,300 to $463,000 for the 2011 tax year.  After a 
hearing, the BOR reduced the value to $605,000 in a decision issued on May 13, 
2013.  MDM appealed to the BTA on June 11, 2013, and the BTA issued an order 
granting MDM’s request for a voluntary dismissal on February 19, 2014.  BTA No. 
2013-1619, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1205 (Feb. 19, 2014). 
{¶ 3} That short recitation of facts establishes our key dates.  A March 5, 
2012 complaint for the 2011 tax year was not resolved by the BOR until May 12, 
2013.  Because the BOR issued its decision more than 90 days after the complaint 
was filed, the continuing-complaint provision of R.C. 5715.19(D) was triggered.  
Pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(D), if a taxpayer already has a complaint under review 
regarding a particular parcel, and a board of revision does not determine that 
complaint within 90 days, the taxpayer need not file complaints in succeeding years 
regarding that same parcel as long as the original complaint is unresolved.  Thus, a 
county board of revision retains jurisdiction to determine a real-property-valuation 
dispute for a given tax year even if the taxpayer has filed no formal complaint for 
that year.  E.g., 1495 Jaeger, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 2012-Ohio-2680, 970 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 4} On January 15, 2015, MDM filed a request letter with the BOR asking 
it to conduct a hearing on the value of the property for tax year 2012; submitting 
January Term, 2018 
 
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such a letter to the board of revision is sufficient to invoke the BOR’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to the original complaint.  See Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 305, 306, 720 N.E.2d 517 (1999); AERC Saw Mill 
Village, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 44, 2010-Ohio-4468, 
936 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 5} The BOR dismissed the request letter based on a 30-day rule 
formulated by the county.  Under that rule, a request letter asserting a continuing 
complaint is barred if it has not been filed within 30 days of the final decision 
rendered in the proceeding on the original complaint.  Therefore, the BOR related, 
the request letter had to be filed within 30 days of the BTA’s February 19, 2014 
disposition of the original complaint regarding tax year 2011. 
{¶ 6} On appeal, the BTA affirmed the dismissal, finding that the request 
letter was untimely—but on a different theory.  The BTA held that the request letter 
was untimely because it had not been filed by the end of 2014, i.e., by the end of 
the year in which the BTA’s final determination of the 2011-tax-year complaint 
was rendered.  MDM appealed to this court. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} The question before us is whether the BOR has continuing-complaint 
jurisdiction over MDM’s challenge to the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer’s 
valuation of the subject property for tax year 2012.  The relevant statute, R.C. 
5715.19(D), reads: 
 
If a complaint filed under this section for the current year is not 
determined by the board within the time prescribed for such 
determination [i.e., the 90-day period set forth in R.C. 5715.19(C)], 
the complaint and any proceedings in relation thereto shall be 
continued by the board as a valid complaint for any ensuing year 
until such complaint is finally determined by the board or upon any 
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appeal from a decision of the board.  In such case, the original 
complaint shall continue in effect without further filing by the 
original taxpayer * * *. 
 
{¶ 8} Under the plain language of the statute, the BOR has jurisdiction to 
consider the valuation of MDM’s property for tax year 2012.  The proceedings 
before the BOR for the 2011 tax year began in March 2012 with “a complaint filed 
under this section” and did not conclude until June 2013, i.e., not “within the time 
prescribed for such determination.”  Thus, the BOR had continuing-complaint 
jurisdiction over the 2012 tax year—2012 was an “ensuing year” in which the 
complaint was not yet resolved.  Therefore, the original complaint “continue[d] in 
effect without further filing by the original taxpayer” for tax year 2012. 
{¶ 9} The BTA held that MDM filed its request letter too late to invoke the 
BOR’s continuing jurisdiction.  But, as we recently held in Life Path Partners, Ltd. 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio___, ___ N.E.2d 
____, “nothing in [R.C. 5715.19(D)] authorizes the BOR to dismiss a continuing 
complaint for lack of timeliness.”  Such a deadline is contrary to the plain language 
of the statute, which provides that until the original complaint is resolved, the 
complaint “shall continue in effect without further filing by the original taxpayer.” 
{¶ 10} In Life Path, the BTA had held that the taxpayer failed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the BOR because it did not submit its request letter by March 31 of 
the year following the year when the original complaint was finally determined, i.e. 
by March 31, 2013, when the original complaint was finally resolved at the BTA 
in 2012.  (A taxpayer filing an original complaint protesting the valuation of a 
property pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(A) must file the complaint by March 31 of the 
year succeeding the tax year in question.) 
{¶ 11} Here, the rule imposed by the BTA was narrower—the taxpayer 
must make its continuing-jurisdiction request by the end of the year that the original 
January Term, 2018 
 
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complaint is resolved; the BTA held that since the original complaint for tax year 
2011 was resolved in February 2014, MDM had to request the BOR’s continuing 
jurisdiction by December 31, 2014.  The BTA cited a statement from this court in 
AERC as authority for that determination; it wrote that “in AERC, * * * the court 
stated that the original complaint ‘continues as a valid complaint through the year 
in which the final decision* * * is rendered.’ ”  (Emphasis and second ellipses sic.)  
B.T.A. No. 2015-60, 2015 Ohio Tax LEXIS 2480, *5-6 (June 2, 2015), quoting 
AERC, 127 Ohio St.3d 44, 2010-Ohio-4468, 936 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 12} But this reasoning does not survive a scrutiny of the facts in AERC 
itself.  In AERC, 2006 was the year in which the complaint for tax year 2002 was 
finally determined.  After the auditor retroactively carried over the stipulated 2002 
value to 2005, AERC invoked its continuing complaint as to 2005 by submitting a 
request for a hearing to the BOR in May 2007.  BTA Nos. 2007-A-764 and 2008-
A-157, 2009 WL 2846576, *1 (Sept. 1, 2009), rev’d and remanded, 127 Ohio St.3d 
44, 2010-Ohio-4468, 936 N.E.2d 472.  We upheld jurisdiction. 
{¶ 13} Likewise, in Columbus Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio St.3d 305, 720 N.E.2d 
517, we found that a request letter invoked the board of revision’s jurisdiction even 
though it was submitted to the board in the year after the final year during which 
the proceedings on the earlier complaint were pending.  In that case, 1996 was the 
year in which the 1993 complaint was finally determined; the request letter 
asserting the continuing complaint for 1996 was submitted in 1997.  Id. at 306.  
Under the BTA’s theory, the request letter in that case should have been submitted 
by the end of 1996, but we held that there was jurisdiction to consider the request 
even though it was submitted the following year.  Thus, even before this court’s 
recent holding in Life Path, the BTA’s rationale in this case was inconsistent with 
both the plain language of the statute and with our caselaw. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 14} Neither the BOR nor the BTA nor this court may establish a deadline 
contrary to the plain language of the statute.  The BOR had jurisdiction to consider 
MDM's request for tax year 2012. 
 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 15} Because the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction pursuant to 
R.C. 5715.19(D), we reverse the BTA’s decision affirming the BOR’s dismissal.  
We remand the cause to the BOR for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
FISCHER, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Karen H. Bauernschmidt, and 
Nicholas Ray, for appellant. 
 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Saundra Curtis-Patrick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Cuyahoga 
County Fiscal Officer and Cuyahoga County Board of Revision. 
_________________