Title: STATE v OLSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14533 IN T H E : SUPREME C O W O F THE STA'IE O F I'43NTANA 1979 STATE O F PDNTANA, Plaintiff a n d Respondent, -VS- RAYI'mJD L . OLSON, Deferdant a n d A p p e l l a n t . Appeal f m ; District Court o f t h e Nineteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert M . Holter, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : R . T . Randono, Great Falls, bbntana For R e s p o n d e n t : H o n . M i k e Greely, A t t o r n e y General, Helena, mntana Allen Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Mxkana William A . Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, mntana Submitted: March 26, 1979 Decided : 1 3 - t * Filed : M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal i s taken from a judgment denying Olson's p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e from t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l i n Warm Springs. Findings o f f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment w e r e e n t e r e d on August 1 4 , 1978, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of Lincoln County by t h e Honorable Robert M. H o l t e r . I n 1969 Olson w a s charged with two counts of rape. H e gave n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o r e l y on t h e defense of i n s a n i t y . The c a s e was submitted t o t h e jury and a g u i l t y v e r d i c t was r e t u r n e d . On appeal t h e judgments w e r e reversed and a new t r i a l was ordered. S t a t e v. Olson (1971), 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822. Before t h e second t r i a l t h e judge found Olson " n o t g u i l t y " by reason of i n s a n i t y and ordered him committed t o t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l on March 18, 1971. The committment o r d e r r e f e r r e d t o t h e d e p o s i t i o n s and testimony of D r s . I4iguel F. Gracia and Robert A. Wetzler, q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t s who had examined Olson. I n 1972 Olson walked away from t h e Warm Springs f a c i l - i t y and went t o Great F a l l s . From 1972 u n t i l 1977 Olson l i v e d i n G r e a t F a l l s w i t h h i s wife and family. H e obtained a job, had a telephone d i r e c t o r y l i s t i n g , and a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e a l l under h i s own name. H e joined both a l o c a l union and t h e l o c a l chapter of t h e Moose Lodge, a g a i n using his own name. On February 17, 1977, an o r d e r was e n t e r e d f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a bench warrant d i r e c t i n g : "IT I S HEREBY ORDERED: "That Bench Warrant i s s u e f o r t h e arrest of t h e captioned Defendant, Raymond LeRoy Olson, and t h a t he f o r t h w i t h be r e t u r n e d t o t h i s Court - f o r purposes of determining whether he should be r e l e a s e d from - custody -- of Warm s p r i n g s S t a t e ~ o s z t a l without B a i l . " (Emphasis added. ) Olson's period of residence i n Great F a l l s was n o t completely without i n c i d e n t . I n September o r October of 1976 Olson unexpectedly appeared i n t h e bedroom of one Karla White a t about 2:00 o r 3:00 a.m. while s h e was sleeping. Olson l e f t when t o l d t o , although, a s t h e S t a t e contends, t h e presence of White's male companion may have hastened h i s retreat. A year later on September 1, 1977, Olson a s s a u l t e d t h e same woman i n t h e e a r l y morning hours. I n t h i s a t t a c k , Olson grabbed White, knocked h e r down, and shoved h e r f a c e i n t o t h e concrete, t h r e a t e n i n g t o break h e r neck. Olson apparently d i d t r y t o snap White's neck b e f o r e dragging h e r o f f i n t o a vacant f i e l d . Although t h e r e was no sexual a s s a u l t , Olson's continuing p h y s i c a l a s s a u l t was i n t e r r u p t e d o n l y by t h e a r r i v a l of t h e p o l i c e . Olson claims he was u p s e t over White's treatment of h e r ex-husband, 3 l s o n ' s f r i e n d . This i n c i d e n t l e d t o Olson's a r r e s t and being charged with misdemeanor a s s a u l t and unlawful r e s t r a i n t . The charges w e r e u l t i m a t e l y dismissed. Although t h e order of February 17, 1977, d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e r e be a hearing t o determine Olson's s t a t u s and although he was taken t o K a l i s p e l l and held i n j a i l f o r a t least a week, t h e r e was no hearing and he was r e t u r n e d summarily t o t h e S t a t e Hospital. On December 27, 1977, Olson p e t i t i o n e d f o r r e l e a s e . H e was subsequently examined by D r . Hamilton C. Pierce and D r . George Gelernter, both q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t s , whose re- p o r t s w e r e introduced a s e x h i b i t s a t t h e hearing on August 3, 1978. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e e v a l u a t i o n s , Olson and h i s wife t e s t i f i e d and 35 letters of personal reference from Olson's supervisors, co-workers, and f r i e n d s were introduced a s e x h i b i t s without objection. F i n a l l y , an i n t e r i m s o c i a l h i s t o r y and a mental s t a t u s examination r e p o r t and evalua- t i o n prepared during Olson's confinement a t Warm Springs i n l a t e 1977 w e r e submitted on Olson's b e h a l f . The substance o f t h e s e r e p o r t s a s w e l l as o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n s by t h e two p r i v a t e p s y c h i a t r i s t s was t h a t Olson s u f f e r e d no mental i l l n e s s and should be r e l e a s e d . The S t a t e , i n opposing t h e 2 e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e , i n t r o - duced p a r t s of t h e p s y c h i a t r i c evidence from t h e 1970 r a p e t r i a l , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e testimony of D r . Wetzler, along with testimony from Karla White, t h e woman Olson a l l e g e d l y a t - tacked i n 1977. The District Court denied Olson's p e t i t i o n c i t i n g i n i t s f i n d i n g s t h e testimony of D r . Wetzler i n 1970 t h a t Olson had a "grave d e f e c t , a grave i l l n e s s , " t h a t t h e two i n c i - d e n t s involving Karla White were s i m i l a r t o t h e o r i g i n a l r a p e s , and t h a t Olson had received no p s y c h i a t r i c treatment s i n c e 1972. The f i n a l f i n d i n g and conclusion of t h e D i s - t r i c t Court were: "5. That t h i s Defendant i s now s u f f e r i n g from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which renders him unable t o c o n t r o l himself a t t i m e s and which r e s u l t s i n h i s being a danger t o t h e person of o t h e r s . "[Conclusions of Law] That t h e P e t i t i o n of t h e Defendant f o r r e l e a s e from t h e Montana S t a t e Nos- p i t a 1 should be denied by reason of t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s Defendant remains a danger t o t h e person of o t h e r s . " Olson w a s ordered returned t o W a r m Springs S t a t e Hos- p i t a l . From t h e d e n i a l of h i s p e t i t i o n , Olson appeals. Olson broadly a s s e r t s t h a t t h e i s s u e f o r review is whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h i s p e t i t i o n . The S t a t e breaks t h i s i s s u e down and a d d r e s s e s t h e p o i n t s Olson pursues: 1. Whether t h e t r a n s c r i p t of D r . W e t z l e r ' s testimony from t h e p r i o r t r i a l was admissible. 2 . Whether t h e District Court could r e l y on t h e testi- mony of t h e woman Olson a l l e g e d l y a t t a c k e d . 3. Whether t h e evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e District C o u r t ' s judgment. By t h i s appeal from t h e d e n i a l of h i s p e t i t i o n f o r release, Olson s p e c i f i c a l l y c h a l l e n g e s t h e u s e of t h e testi- mony of two w i t n e s s e s by t h e lower c o u r t : (1) t h e t r a n - s c r i b e d testimony of D r . Wetzler a s given i n Olson's 1970 r a p e t r i a l ; and ( 2 ) t h e testimony of Karla White a s t o two i n c i d e n t s involving h e r and Olson. W e w i l l consider t h e testimony of each s e p a r a t e l y . Testimony of -- D r . Wetzler. This testimony a s presented t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court by t h e S t a t e c o n s i s t e d e x c l u s i v e l y of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of W e t z l e r ' s testimony a t Olson's t r i a l i n 1970. This testimony was based on W e t z l e r ' s two-hour exam- i n a t i o n of Olson i n January 1970. W e t z l e r has n e i t h e r examined Olson s i n c e 1970, f i l e d any s o r t of updated evalu- a t i o n , nor d i d he appear a t t h e hearing on Olson's p e t i t i o n . I n s h o r t , t h i s t r a n s c r i b e d testimony r e l a t e s t o Olson's mental c o n d i t i o n a s of January 1970. Olson p e t i t i o n e d f o r r e l e a s e under s e c t i o n 95-508, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 46-14-301 through -304 MCA, which e s t a b l i s h e s t h e procedure f o r commitment t o and r e l e a s e from t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l a t Warm Springs following a c q u i t t a l on t h e ground of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . The p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t s e c t i o n c l e a r l y c a l l f o r a determination of t h e mental c o n d i t i o n of a committed person a s of t h e time of t h e p e t i - t i o n f o r release. E.g., s e c t i o n 95-508(1) (hearing " t o determine h i s p r e s e n t mental c o n d i t i o n " ) , ( 2 ) ( r e q u i r i n g t h e appointment of two p s y c h i a t r i s t s t o examine t h e person a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n ) , now s e c t i o n s 46-14-301(2) and 46- 14-302(2) MCA. Accord, Rouse v. Cameron (D.C. C i r . 1966), 373 F.2d 451, 461 n. 43; S t a t e v. Cuvelier (1978), 175 Conn. 100, 394 A.2d 185, 189; S t a t e v . F i e l d s (1978), 77 N . J . 282, 390 A.2d 574, 585; People v. G i l e s (Colo. 1976), 557 P.2d 408, 411-12. While perhaps t h i s Court has n o t decided t h e e x a c t q u e s t i o n presented by Olson, we have decided t h a t evidence of mental c o n d i t i o n a s of s e v e r a l y e a r s b e f o r e t h e comvis- s i o n of a crime, S t a t e v. Nee1 (1978), Mon t . , 580 P.2d 456, 459, 35 St.Rep. 833, 837, o r as of s e v e r a l y e a r s a f t e r t h e commission of a crime, S t a t e ex rel. Main v . D i s t r i c t Court (1974), 164 Mont. 501, 508-09, 525 P.2d 28, 32, i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t evidence of mental c o n d i t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of a c r i m e . The r e v e r s e i s a l s o t r u e : evidence of mental c o n d i t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e com- mission of a crime i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t evidence of mental c o n d i t i o n some e i g h t y e a r s l a t e r upon p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e . Powell v. F l o r i d a ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 579 F.2d 324, 330. W e a r e r e l u c t a n t , however, t o hold t h a t testimony of mental c o n d i t i o n a t t h e commission of a crime is always i n a d m i s s i b l e on t h e q u e s t i o n of mental c o n d i t i o n a t some p o i n t later upon p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e . For example, under s e c t i o n 95-508(1), now s e c t i o n 46-14-301(2) MCA, a person committed t o Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l following a c q u i t t a l i s e n t i t l e d t o a hearing w i t h i n 50 days of confinement t o determine h i s p r e s e n t mental condition. I n such cases, t h e earlier testimony may be h e l p f u l t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n evaluating t h e a c q u i t t e e ' s mental h e a l t h . People v. Turner (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 782, 379 N.E.2d 377, 379-80. A s t h e i n t e r v a l between t h e o r i g i n a l evaluation and t h e subsequent p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e lengthens, however, t h i s e a r l i e r testi- mony l o s e s i t s probative value. I n t h i s case, where e i g h t y e a r s elapsed between t h e o r i g i n a l evaluation and t h e sub- sequent p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e , with no intervening examina- t i o n by t h e witness, t h e probative value of t h e e a r l i e r testimony of t h e witness i n judging t h e p r e s e n t mental condition of Olson i s questionable. Our conclusion i s strengthened by t h e o t h e r testimony and evidence i n t h e record before t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Included i n t h i s evidence w e r e evaluations of Olson by o t h e r p s y c h i a t r i s t s o r psychologists. These evaluations, contrary t o t h a t of D r . Wetzler, were based on examinations of Olson i n l a t e 1977 and e a r l y 1978 a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o Warn Springs. The l a t e r evaluations a r e unanimous i n t h e i r findings t h a t Olson no longer s u f f e r s from any mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t and t h a t he should be released from confinement a t Warm Springs. Thus, i n t h e words of D r . Hamilton Pierce: " I n summary, I see no evidence of mental i l l n e s s i n t h i s p a t i e n t and I doubt i f he ever has had mental i l l n e s s t o t h e degree t h a t could be considered a cause of h i s a n t i s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . H e i s an i m - p u l s i v e person and he has r e l a t i v e l y weak c o n t r o l s which a r e weakened more by h i s tendency t o drink. I do not s e e him a s mentally ill now o r i n t h e p a s t . " D r . George Gelernter, a l s o of Great F a l l s , concluded: "At t h i s p o i n t , I f i n d no evidence of s e r i o u s emo- t i o n a l i l l n e s s . I n c a r c e r a t i o n a t t h e S t a t e Hospital would seem t o s e r v e no purpose o t h e r than custo- d i a l , s i n c e t h e r e i s no 'treatment' f a c i l i t y t h e r e t h a t would be meaningful t o him. I f t h e l e g a l as- p e c t s of h i s charges required i n c a r c e r a t i o n , it would s e e m more appropriate a t t h e S t a t e Prison i n D e e r Lodge i f t h e purpose i s purely i n c a r c e r a t i o n . " F i n a l l y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court had before it a packet of evaluations prepared by t h e p s y c h i a t r i c s t a f f a t Warm Springs. I n t h e s e evaluations, t h e examining s o c i a l worker, "question[ed] t h e appropriateness of [Olson's] c u r r e n t incarceration." The discharge summary signed by D r . Harry Xanthopoulos and o t h e r s s t a t e s : " S i g n i f i c a n t Findings: " I t was t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Forensic Region team t h a t he was s u f f e r i n g from no mental d i s o r d e r and t h a t he was n o t appropriately i n t h e h o s p i t a l . . ." The f i n a l diagnosis of Olson by t h e s t a f f a t t h e S t a t e Hospital s t a t e s t h a t he has no mental d i s o r d e r . Comparison of t h e p s y c h i a t r i c testimony presented by t h e S t a t e with t h a t presented by Olson leaves no p o s s i b l e conclusion o t h e r than t h a t Olson has e s t a b l i s h e d by a pre- ponderance of t h e p s y c h i a t r i c evidence t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o be released. Section 95-508(3), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-14-302(4) MCA. W e t h e r e f o r e proceed t o an examination of t h e testimony of Karla White. Testimony of - Karla White. Unlike t h e testimony of D r . Wetzler, t h e testimony of Karla White is n o t s u b j e c t t o a t t a c k on t h e b a s i s t h a t it i s n o t timely o r r e l e v a n t . Her testimony concerns i n c i d e n t s involving Olson which occurred w i t h i n about f i f t e e n months of h i s f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e . One of t h e s e i n c i d e n t s r e s u l t e d i n Olson's a r r e s t and r e t u r n t o Warm Springs. The testimony is undoubtedly damaging t o Olson's case. See, People v. G i l e s (Colo. 1976), 557 P.2d 408, 4 1 2 . Given our conclusion a s t o t h e c u r r e n t value of D r . Wetzler's 1970 testimony, however, t h e question becomes whether White's testimony, standing alone, j u s t i f i e s Olson's continued confinement a t Warm Springs. W e conclude t h a t it does not. White, a s noted e a r l i e r , t e s t i f i e d concerning two separate i n c i d e n t s involving Olson which occurred a year a p a r t . I n t h e f i r s t i n c i d e n t , Olson appeared uninvited i n White's bedroom i n t h e e a r l y morning. H e l a t e r explained he had been trying t o rouse White f o r about an hour and when he f a i l e d , he c a l l e d her mother who supposedly asked him t o check on her. Olson d i d leave when t o l d t o by White. The circumstances of t h i s incident and t h e manner of Olson's be- havior possesses only a s u p e r f i c i a l s i m i l a r i t y t o h i s sexual a t t a c k s i n 1970. The second i n c i d e n t t o which White t e s t i f i e d was t h e t i m e t h a t Olson suddenly appeared a s White was g e t t i n g o u t of her c a r , knocked her down, and pushed her face i n t o t h e concrete before dragging her t o a nearby vacant f i e l d where he continued t o p r e s s her face i n t o t h e g r a s s . White's recount of what Olson s a i d t o her during t h i s a t t a c k i s illuminating: "Q. What happened next? A. W e more o r less j u s t were talking. H e asked m e i f I knew why he w a s doing t h i s t o m e , and i f I wanted t o know, and I s a i d , 'Yes, I do.' ---- He s a i d he was doing -- it f o r m y - sister. " Q . What happened next? A. ----- He t o l d me t h a t it was not m e he was a f t e r anymore; t h a t it was m l ----- husband, and t h a t I should g e t up and run along towards t h e road and n o t t u r n around and j u s t run. " (Emphasis added. ) Again, t h e r e was no sexual a s s a u l t o r conduct of any kind. This incident a l s o i s very d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e e a r l i e r sexual a t t a c k s and apparently had f o r i t s motive not sexual a s s a u l t b u t revenge f o r a f r i e n d apparently wronged. Cf. S t a t e v. Hesse (1977), 117 N.H. 329, 373 A.2d 345, 347 (defendant, acquitted of a s s a u l t on a black man because of i n s a n i t y , assaulted a black man a f t e r escape from h o s p i t a l ) . Olson w a s charged only with simple a s s a u l t and unlawful r e s t r a i n t , both misdemeanors. Both charges were eventually dismissed. White's testimony a s w e l l a s Olson's s p e c i a l s t a t u s a t t h e t i m e of t h e a t t a c k leads us t o review t h e e n t i r e s t a t u - t o r y scheme f o r t h e commitment and r e l e a s e of persons ac- q u i t t e d of crime because of mental d i s e a s e o r defect. Olson's s p e c i a l s t a t u s of which we speak i s t h a t of an i n s a n i t y a c q u i t t e e on - de f a c t o self-imposed "probation" from Warm Springs f o r a period of over f i v e years from t h e t i m e he walked away from t h e S t a t e Hospital i n August 1972, u n t i l h i s a r r e s t on September 1, 1977. Our review i n i t i a l l y r e v e a l s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e s e s t a t - u t e s as t o whether criminal o r a n t i s o c i a l behavior alone warrants confinement a t Warm Springs. The Revised Commis- sion Comment t o s e c t i o n 95-508, R.C.M. 1947, governing r e l e a s e s t a t e s : ". . . It seems preferable t o make dangerousness t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r continued custody r a t h e r than t o provide t h a t t h e committed person may be discharged o r released when restored t o s a n i t y a s defined by t h e mental hygiene laws. Although h i s mental d i s - ease may have g r e a t l y improved, such a person may s t i l l be dangerous because of f a c t o r s i n h i s per- s o n a l i t y and background other than mental disease. Also, such a standard provides a possible means f o r t h e control of t h e occasional defendant who successfully feiqned mental disease t o gain an a c q u i t t a l . - The prescribed procedure p r o t e c t s both t h e public and t h e defendant by providing -- -- f o r an independent p s y c h i a t r i c examination of -- t h e defendant before a c t i o n on -- - a p p l i c a t i o n - f o r r e l e a s e , and then e i t h e r f o r summary favor- a b l e a c t i o n on t h e application o r a f u l l hear- ing." (Emphasis added. ) This comment, a s w e l l as t h e language of section 95-508 itself,would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e m e r e f a c t of Olson's criminal a s s a u l t on White i s reason enough t o warrant h i s continued confinement. The d e f i n i t i o n of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y contained i n s e c t i o n 95-501, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-14-101(2) MCA, i n d i c a t e s o t h e r - w i s e : " ( 2 ) A s used i n t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e t e r m 'mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ' does n o t i n c l u d e an abnormality manifested only by repeated c r i m i n a l o r other- w i s e a n t i s o c i a l conduct." The c o n f l i c t between t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s i s more apparent than r e a l , however. Obviously, t h e i n t e n t of t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s t o d e a l with a n exceptional c l a s s of people who, because of t h e i r mental c o n d i t i o n , a r e n o t t o be h e l d c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e f o r a c t s which otherwise would b e considered c r i m i n a l . S t a t e v. Taylor (1971), 158 Mont. 323, 331, 491 P.2d 877, 881. The c r u c i a l c r i t e r i o n f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s c l a s s i s possession of a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t excluding responsi- b i l i t y . S e c t i o n 95-501, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-14-101 MCA; Powell v. F l o r i d a ( 5 t h C i r . 1978), 579 F.2d 324, 332. C l e a r l y , under t h i s s t a t u t e , t h e m e r e commission of a crimi- n a l a c t does n o t p l a c e t h e a c t o r i n t h i s exceptional class; n e i t h e r should t h e mere commission of a c r i m i n a l a c t by a person once deemed t o be a member of t h i s c l a s s n e c e s s a r i l y b e construed a s evidence of h i s continued i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s c l a s s . I n Rouse v. Cameron (D.C. C i r . 1966), 373 F.2d 451, t h e Federal Court of Appeals was faced with a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n and a s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y scheme. That c o u r t concluded: ". . . A person i n v o l u n t a r i l y committed and con- f i n e d under D.C.Code § 24-301 i s e n t i t l e d t o re- l e a s e i f h e has 'recovered h i s s a n i t y and w i l l n o t i n t h e reasonable f u t u r e be dangerous t o himself o r o t h e r s . ' That t h e 'person s o confined has some dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s does n o t , standing a l o n e , warrant h i s continued confinement i n a government mental i n s t i t u t i o n under S 24-301 D.C.Code. - The . . . must -- b e r e l a t e d to o r a r i s e o u t o f a n abnormal mental c o n d i t i o n . ' " - --- 373 F.2d a t 459. (Emphasis added.) Accord, S t a t e v. Cuvelier (1978), 175 Conn. 100, 394 A.2d I n o t h e r words, t h e m e r e f a c t t h a t a person may have once been a c q u i t t e d on t h e b a s i s of i n s a n i t y does n o t f o r - ever a f t e r i n s u l a t e him from t h e s a n c t i o n s imposed under t h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system i n t h e e v e n t of f u t u r e c r i m i n a l o r a n t i s o c i a l conduct, a b s e n t some evidence t h a t h i s f u t u r e conduct i s somehow r e l a t e d t o h i s mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . People v. Dublin (1978), 63 111.App.3d 387, 380 N.E.2d 311 35; L e e v. Kolb (W.D. N.Y. 1978), 449 F.Supp. 1368, 1382. I n s h o r t , a sexual psychopath should n o t be a b l e t o r o b a bank, f o r example, and be automatically immune from c r i m i n a l punishment by v i r t u e of h i s e a r l i e r diagnosed i n s a n i t y . Neither should t h e f a c t t h a t he robbed t h e bank a u t o m a t i c a l l y b e taken a s evidence of h i s continuing sexual psychopathy. There must be some demonstrated r e l a t i o n between t h e two types of behavior. I n t h i s regard, t h e following d i s c u s s i o n i n Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness - and Mental I l l n e s s , 70 Yale L . J . 225, 237-38 (1960) i s informative: ". . . what d i s p o s i t i o n i s t o be made of those a c q u i t t e d by reason of i n s a n i t y who remain dan- gerous--whatever meaning w i l l be given t o t h a t word--but who have 'recovered s a n i t y ' a t l e a s t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they could no longer be held had they been c i v i l l y committed? Continued de- t e n t i o n would b e t h e s t a t u t o r y answer. -- But t o hold a p a t i e n t s o l e l y f o r p o t e n t i a l dangerous- n e s s would snap t h e t h i n l i n e between d e t e n t i o n f o r therapy d e t e n t i o n - f o r r e t r i b u t i o n . . . Not -- t o r e l e a s e such persons would i n e f f e c t be t o equate an undefined ' d a n g e r o u s n ~ s ' with an - -- undefined mental i l l n e s s . Since t h e r e can be no such equation, a d e c i s i o n n o t t o r e l e a s e s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of p o t e n t i a l dangerousness would be l i k e a d e c i s i o n n o t t o discharge a t u b e r c u l a r patient--though no longer infectious--because he is a p o t e n t i a l k i l l e r o r check-forger . . ." (Em- p h a s i s added.) Evidence t h a t Olson's a t t a c k on White w a s r e l a t e d t o h i s mental d i s o r d e r diagnosed i n 1970 i s lacking i n t h i s case. I n f a c t , had Olson f i r s t come t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e p o l i c e a s a r e s u l t of h i s a t t a c k on White and had he a t t h a t t i m e chosen t o r e l y on t h e defense of i n s a n i t y , t h e defendant would have been unsuccessful because everyone who examined him found no evidence of mental d i s o r d e r . Instead t h e evidence is t o t h e opposite e f f e c t . A l l of t h e p s y c h i a t r i c and psychological evaluations of Olson performed a f t e r h i s recommitment t o Warm Springs were made with f u l l knowledge of h i s a t t a c k on White. Even with t h i s knowledge, t h e s e e x p e r t s determined t h a t Olson suffered no mental d i s o r d e r a s of t h e time of t h e i r examination. I n t h i s connection, t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 95- 5 0 8 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-14-304 MCA, a r e r e l e - vant: " ( 4 ) I f , within f i v e ( 5 ) years a f t e r t h e c o n d i t i o n a l r e l e a s e of a committed person, t h e c o u r t determines, a f t e r hearing evidence, t h a t t h e conditions of re- l e a s e have n o t been f u l f i l l e d and t h a t f o r t h e s a f e t y of t h e person o r f o r t h e s a f e t y of o t h e r s h i s con- d i t i o n a l r e l e a s e should be revoked, t h e c o u r t s h a l l immediately order him t o be recommitted t o t h e super- intendent of Warm Springs s t a t e h o s p i t a l , s u b j e c t t o discharge o r r e l e a s e only i n accordance with t h e pro- cedure prescribed above i n subsections ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) . " A s noted above, Olson's s t a t u s a t t h e time of h i s a t t a c k on White on September 1, 1977, was unique. H e had walked away from Warm Springs i n August 1972 and had lived i n Great F a l l s f o r t h e next f i v e years. During t h i s period, Olson found a job, joined a union, joined t h e l o c a l Moose Lodge, and apparently e s t a b l i s h e d a more compatible, under- standing r e l a t i o n s h i 2 with h i s wife. The degree t o which Olson f i t i n t o t h e community i s a t t e s t e d t o by t h e 35 per- sonal reference letters from h i s employers, f r i e n d s , and mworkers admitted i n t o evidence a t t h e hearing. See, H i l l v. S t a t e (Fla. App. 1978), 358 So.2d 190, 205. I n a very r e a l sense, then, h i s s t a t u s was t h a t of a c o n d i t i o n a l , a l b e i t self-determined, r e l e a s e e , t h e condition frankly being t h a t he avoid c o n t a c t with t h e law. For t h e five-year period s p e c i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 95-508 ( 4 ) , Olson l i v e d up t o t h i s condition. W e recognize, of course, t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n i s n o t d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a person i n Olson's s t a t u s . Never- t h e l e s s , t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n enacting t h i s s e c t i o n was t o c r e a t e a t i m e l i m i t beyond which t h e S t a t e cannot automatically revoke t h e r e l e a s e of a person once committed t o Warm Springs and subsequently returned t o t h e community. Olson d i d s u c c e s s f u l l y l i v e i n Great F a l l s , under h i s self-imposed conditions, f o r longer than t h i s s t a t u t o r y time l i m i t . To t a k e him from h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y r e c r e a t e d l i f e and r e t u r n him t o an i n d e f i n i t e confinement i n Warm Springs on t h e s o l e b a s i s of a misdemeanor a s s a u l t charge carrying a maximum s i x month sentence offends t h i s i n t e n t . Therefore, w e think it was incumbent upon t h e S t a t e a t t h i s l a t e d a t e t o have come forward with stronger evi- dence than w a s presented t o show t h a t Olson continues t o s u f f e r from a mental d i s o r d e r r e q u i r i n g h i s renewed con- finement a t Warm Springs. The S t a t e apparently assumed t h a t it only had t o show t h a t Olson a t one time had a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t and t h a t more r e c e n t l y he had committed an a n t i s o c i a l a c t with- o u t having t o show a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two. This was an erroneous assumption. O n t h e evidence presented thus f a r , Olson has shown by a preponderance of t h e evidence he i s e n t i t l e d t o h i s r e l e a s e . It i s n o t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h i s Court, however, t o d i r e c t t h e release of persons committed t o Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital; t h a t power belongs t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. S e c t i o n 95-508, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 46-14-301 through -304 MCA; Application of Zion (1978), Mont. , 585 P.2d 1084, 1090, 35 St.Rep. 1475, 1482. Given t h e s e r i o u s - n e s s of t h e o f f e n s e s f o r which Olson was o r i g i n a l l y com- m i t t e d , t h e f a c t t h a t he has undergone no p s y c h i a t r i c t r e a t - ment s i n c e t h e t i m e of h i s " r e l e a s e " from t h e h o s p i t a l , t h e two i n c i d e n t s involving Karla White, and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S t a t e proceeded on an erroneous assumption a s t o i t s burden of proof i n t h e previous hearing, w e conclude t h a t t h i s cause must b e remanded f o r f u t h e r testimony on t h e s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n of whether Olson's a n t i s o c i a l behavior a s i l l u s - t r a t e d i n t h e i n c i d e n t s involving Karla White have any r e l a t i o n s h i p t o any mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t c u r r e n t l y s u f f e r e d by Olson. People v. Dublin (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 387, 380 N.E.2d 31, 35; Application of $filler (1974), 46 A.D.2d 177, 362 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633-34. The p o i n t t o be determined by t h e District Court i s whether Olson's p r e s e n t "dangerousness," i f any, i s r e l a t e d t o o r growing o u t of t h e abnormal mental c o n d i t i o n he e x h i b i t e d i n 1970. The m e r e f a c t t h a t Olson may have a tendency towards a n t i s o c i a l behavior i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant h i s con- t i n u e d confinement i n Warm Springs. See, H a r r i s v . United S t a t e s (D.C. 1976), 356 A.2d 630, 632. I f Olson does n o t s u f f e r from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which causes t h i s behavior, t h e r e i s no reason f o r continuing t o i n c l u d e him i n t h e exceptional c l a s s of people d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . Baxstrom v . Herold (1966), 383 U.S. 107, 114-15, 86 S.Ct. 760, 764-65, 1 5 L.Ed.2d 620, 625-26. The o r d i n a r y punish- ments of t h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system are adequate t o handle Olson's f u t u r e c r i m i n a l conduct, i n such circumstances. W e a l s o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e District Court i s n o t l i m i t e d t o e i t h e r recommit Olson t o Warm Springs o r r e l e a s e him unconditionally. S e c t i o n 95-508 g i v e s t h e District Court a u t h o r i t y t o r e l e a s e c o n d i t i o n a l l y persons committed t o t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l by p l a c i n g such c o n d i t i o n s a s it deems neces- s a r y on t h e release. But see, Application of Zion (1978), Mont. , 585 P.2d 1084, 35 St.Rep. 1475. On remand, t h e D i s t r i c t Court should n o t f o r e c l o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n d i t i o n a l r e l e a s e a s a proper means of balancing Olson's i n t e r e s t i n l i b e r t y a g a i n s t s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i o n from p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous persons. Application of Zion, 585 P.2d a t 1087, 35 St.Rep. a t 1478; H i l l v. S t a t e , 358 So.2d a t 209. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court denying Olson's p e t i t i o n f o r r e l e a s e i s reversed. The cause i s remanded f o r f u r t h e r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. W e concur: J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . I am aware of t h e d i f f i c u l t problem faced by t h e majority, and perhaps t h e s o l u t i o n presented i s t h e only one a v a i l a b l e . However, t h e time has come t o focus on t h e absurd p o s i t i o n s t h a t c o u r t s a r e now p u t i n when i n t e r - p r e t i n g t h e mental condition of defendants i n t r y i n g t o determine t h e i r criminal l i a b i l i t y . Appellant, a s noted i n t h e opinion of t h e majority and i n a p r i o r case before t h i s Court, i s a known r a p i s t . P r i o r t o , and noted i n our opinion i n S t a t e v. Olson (1971), 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822, he w a s charged with an a s s a u l t i n a county adjacent t o Lincoln County and allowed t o plead t o a lesser offense. The testimony of defense p s y c h i a t r i s t s i n t h e above case i n d i c a t e d t h a t he w a s e n t i t l e d t o t h e provi- s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 46-14-101 through 46-14-304 MCA (formerly s e c t i o n s 95-501 through 95-509, R.C.M. 1947). D r . Wetzler i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was a dangerous person who had: ". . . a grave d e f e c t , a grave i l l n e s s , a s e r i o u s problem of h i s i n a b i l i t y t o accept h i s own sexual f e e l i n g s any more than you o r I can perhaps accept o r c o n t r o l hunger . . . I cannot p r e d i c t t h e outlook. I would say it would be a grim and guarded one . . . Because of t h e long d u r a t i o n of h i s i l l n e s s and p a r t i c u l a r l y a s w e a r e again d e a l i n g with a p e r s o n a l i t i e s weakness, a p e r s o n a l i t y d e f e c t . . . Because he i s dangerous t o be a t l a r g e . H e has no c o n t r o l a t times. This is what w e are t a l k i n g about, h i s c o n t r o l , h i s d e f e c t , h i s i l l n e s s . I f he has shown t h e s e manifesta- t i o n s s i n c e 12, 1 4 y e a r s of age, and he i s now what, 27, 28, p l u s t h e evidence of t h e Min- nesota Multiphasic T e s t , w e have conclusive proof t h a t t h i s man needs t o be confined." With t h i s testimony before t h e c o u r t and a v a i l a b l e later f o r consideration by attending p s y c h i a t r i s t s , and with l i t t l e o r no treatment a t t h e S t a t e Hospital during t h e year he spent t h e r e , w e now have testimony before us t h a t he should have never been s e n t t o t h e S t a t e Hospital. I f t h a t i s t r u e , fraud was perpetrated on t h e c o u r t when it found a p p e l l a n t not g u i l t y by reason of i n s a n i t y . Had t h e t r i a l c o u r t not accepted t h i s testimony, a p p e l l a n t would have faced r e t r i a l and could have been convicted and sentenced t o a long t e r m i n t h e S t a t e Prison--from which escape i s con- siderably more d i f f i c u l t than it i s from t h e S t a t e Hospital. I n addition I am disturbed t h a t a p a t i e n t a t t h e S t a t e Hospital "designated a s dangerous" can walk away from t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n , with no n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e committing author- i t i e s , o r t o any of t h e law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e S t a t e . The r e s u l t i s t h a t w e have such a person a t l a r g e i n the S t a t e f o r a five-year period. Somewhere i n t h i s case, we have a complete breakdown of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e people of t h i s S t a t e . They a r e e n t i t l e d t o more protection-- p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e women of t h i s State--than has been exhi- b i t e d here. F a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e S t a t e Hospital a u t h o r i t i e s t o n o t i f y law enforcement o f f i c i a l s evidences, i n m y opinion, gross negligence and a r e c k l e s s disregard f o r t h e r i g h t s and safeguard of t h e public. A s a r e s u l t of such a c t i o n s by s t a t e o f f i c i a l s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s , persons injured by such inmates, o r t h e i r survivors, a r e seeking r e d r e s s a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e f o r i n j u r i e s done by t h e i n m a t e while a t large. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d gives guidance on t h e i s s u e of t h e duty owed any members of boards o r t h e responsible o f f i c i a l s a t i n s t i t u t i o n s who r e l e a s e such persons. Section 319, "Duty of Those i n Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities" s t a t e s : "One who takes charge of a t h i r d person whom he knows o r should know t o be l i k e l y t o cause bodily harm t o o t h e r s i f n o t controlled i s under a duty t o e x e r c i s e reasonable c a r e t o c o n t r o l t h e t h i r d person t o prevent him from doing such harm." The i l l u s t r a t i o n s t o Section 319 involve t h e negligent r e l e a s e of an i n f e c t i o u s p a t i e n t from a p r i v a t e h o s p i t a l with an i n f e c t i o u s d i s e a s e (based, i n t e r a l i a , on Missouri, K & T. R. Co. v. Wood (1902), 95 Tex. 223, 66 S.W. 449) and t h e escape of a homicidal maniac p a t i e n t due t o t h e negli- gence of guards employed by a sanitarium (based, i n t e r a l i a , on Austin W. Jones Co. v. S t a t e (1923), 1 2 2 M e . 2 1 4 , 119 A. 577). The S t a t e a s s e r t s it used Wetzler's 1970 testimony because Wetzler was o u t of s t a t e , r e s i d i n g i n t h e S t a t e of Washington, where he has h i s p r a c t i c e , and w a s t h e r e f o r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t e s t i f y . I n f a c t , D r . Wetzler has r e t i r e d and h i s records a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e a t t h i s time. I b e l i e v e t h e t r a n s c r i b e d testimony was c l e a r l y admis- s i b l e under s e c t i o n 95-1802(e), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46- 15-204 MCA, which provides t h a t t h e sworn t r a n s c r i b e d testi- mony of a witness, t h a t t h e defendant has been a b l e t o cross-examine, i s admissible i f t h e witness i s o u t of t h e s t a t e . S t a t e v. LaCario (1974), 163 Mont. 511, 518 P.2d 982; S t a t e v . Bouldin (1969), 153 Mont. 277, 456 P.2d 830; and S t a t e v. Zachmeier (1969), 153 Mont. 64, 453 P.2d 783. A s t o t h e presumption of continuing i n s a n i t y , Montana recognizes t h e common law presumption t h a t i n s a n i t y , once proved, i s presumed t o e x i s t . Appellant's a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e presumption ends a f t e r f i v e years i s wholly unfounded. Presumption must be judged on a case-by-case b a s i s ; t h e inference s t e a d i l y diminishes i n f o r c e with t h e l a p s e of t i m e a t a r a t e proportionate t o t h e q u a l i t y of t h e perma- nence belonging t o t h e thing i n question u n t i l it ceases. Sommer v. Wigen (1936), 103 Mont. 327, 62 P.2d 333; People v. Baker (1954), 4 2 Cal.2d 550, 268 P.2d 705; S t a t e V . Garver (1950), 190 O r . 291, 225 P.2d 771. The S t a t e w a s required t o prove t h a t Olson's i n s a n i t y w a s permanent and continuing. Wetzler's testimony c l e a r l y went t o t h a t question. The S t a t e was n o t t r y i n g t o pass t h e testimony o f f a s evidence of Olson's condition a t t h e t i m e of t h e hearing b u t a s testimony concerning Olson's former condition which was t o serve a s an explanation of h i s cur- r e n t actions. Olson was diagnosed i n 1970 as having a mental problem of long standing f o r which he was ordered t o be confined and t r e a t e d . Y e t one year a f t e r h i s commitment, Olson escaped from Warm Springs and f o r t h e f i v e years between 1972 and 1977 received no treatment. Thus, a p p e l l a n t has been essen- t i a l l y untreated f o r t h i s grave i l l n e s s ; a presumption t h a t it continues is appropriate. The S t a t e does n o t believe t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l testimony on i n s a n i t y i s always s u f f i c i e n t t o keep t h e person confined. I t was t h e combination of Wetzler's testimony, t h e a t t a c k on White, and t h e f a c t t h a t Olson had received no treatment which made t h e S t a t e ' s case. A s t o t h e use of Karla White's testimony, t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l s i m i l a r i t y between t h e 1969 rapes committed by Olson, t h e 1977 a t t a c k on White, and t h e 1976 appearance by Olson i n White's bedroom. While no sexual a s s a u l t took place, t h e r e may have been one had not t h e p o l i c e intervened i n one incident o r White n o t had a male companion i n t h e o t h e r . The 1969 rapes took place a t n i g h t when t h e victims' husbands w e r e away and a f t e r Olson had threatened t o harm t h e i r children. The a t t a c k on White a l s o occurred a t n i g h t , and appellant had inquired a s t o t h e whereabouts of her c h i l d and husband. Olson was required t o prove t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o release by a preponderance of t h e evidence. Appellant produced evidence t h a t he i s not mentally ill and t h a t he has adjusted t o community and family l i f e . The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, produced evidence t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s diag- nosed i n 1970 a s having a grave and s e r i o u s mental i l l n e s s , t h a t he had raped two women i n 1969, and t h a t he had perpe- t r a t e d an a t t a c k upon a woman i n 1977 t h a t was s i m i l a r , as f a r a s it went, t o t h e e a r l i e r rapes. The evidence a l s o showed t h a t a p p e l l a n t had received e s s e n t i a l l y no treatment f o r h i s mental i l l n e s s . Upon t h i s record, t h e D i s t r i c t Court was e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d i n determining, a s it d i d , t h a t a p p e l l a n t had n o t shown an e n t i t l e m e n t t o r e l e a s e by a preponderance of t h e evidence. Even ignoring t h e t r a n s c r i p t of Wetzler's testimony, t h e evidence shows t h a t Olson was a physical danger t o o t h e r s i n 1970 and remained s o i n 1977. A s s t a t e d i n t h e Revised Commission Comment t o s e c t i o n 95-508, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 46-14-301 through 46-14-304 MCA: ". . . It s e e m s p r e f e r a b l e t o make dangerous- ness t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r continued custody r a t h e r than t o provide t h a t t h e committed person may be discharged o r r e l e a s e d when r e s t o r e d t o s a n i t y a s defined by t h e mental hygiene laws. Although h i s mental d i s e a s e may have g r e a t l y improved, such a person may s t i l l be dangerous because of f a c t o r s i n h i s p e r s o n a l i t y and back- ground o t h e r than mental disease. Also, such a standard provides a p o s s i b l e means f o r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e occasional defendant who may be q u i t e dangerous b u t who s u c c e s s f u l l y feigned mental d i s e a s e t o g a i n an a c q u i t t a l . . ." This comment i s p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e based on White's uncontroverted testimony. I would a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. / \ J u s t i c e r