Title: Lillicrap v. Martin

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 86-443

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 1990


James J. Lillicrap             }              APPEALED FROM:
                               }
                               }               
      v.                       }              
                               }             Orleans Superior Court
Herbert L. Martin, M.D.,       }
University Assoc. in           }             DOCKET NO. S158-820sC
Neurology, Inc., J. Bishop     }
McGill, M.D., Warren L.        }
Beeken, M.D., Surgical         }
Associates Foundation, et al.  }


                 In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

     In light of the reargument heard in this case, Part IV of the July 14,
1989 opinion is stricken and a revised version is substituted in its stead.
There are no changes in the remaining sections of the opinion, nor in the
Court's order.


                                        BY THE COURT:


                                        ________________________________
                                        Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

                                        ________________________________
                                        John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                        __________________________________
                                        Frank G. Mahady, Associate Justice

                                        _________________________________
[ ]  Publish                            James L. Morse, Associate Justice

[ ]  Do Not Publish                     _________________________________
                                        Albert W. Barney, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                                        Specially Assigned
________________________________________________________________________________

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 86-443


James J. Lillicrap                           Supreme Court


      v.                                     On Appeal from
                                             Orleans Superior Court
Herbert L. Martin, M.D.,
University Assoc. in                         February Term, 1990
Neurology, Inc., J. Bishop
McGill, M.D., Warren L.
Beeken, M.D., Surgical
Associates Foundation, et al.


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Richard E. Davis and T. Christopher Greene of Richard E. Davis Associates,
  Inc., Barre, for plaintiff-appellant

S. Crocker Bennett II, and Michael I. Green of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc.,
  Burlington, for defendants-appellees Martin and University Associates In
  Neurology

Pierson, Affolter & Wadhams, Burlington, for defendants-appellees McGill and
  Surgical Associates Foundation

Robert D. Rachlin and Robert B. Luce of Downs Rachlin & Martin, Burlington,
  for defendant-appellee Beeken


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Mahady, D.J., and Barney,
          C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     MAHADY, J.
                         IV. The Repose Provision
     Defendant Warren L. Beeken, M.D., claims that plaintiff's cause of
action against him is barred by the repose provision in 12 V.S.A. { 521.
Section 521 provides in part that "actions to recover damages for injuries
to the person arising out of any medical or surgical treatment or operation
shall be brought within three years of the date of the incident or two years
from the date the injury is or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever occurs later, but not later than seven years from the date of the
incident."  (Emphasis added.)  This seven-year period is designated a
"repose period."  Plaintiff contends that the repose provision is
unconstitutional and so does not bar his suit.
     The action against Dr. Beeken is based on his alleged failure to
advise plaintiff to take Vitamin B-12 injections following plaintiff's
surgery in 1972.  If the repose provision of { 521 is valid and applicable,
plaintiff's action against Dr. Beeken is barred, since the negligent
treatment occurred more than seven years before the lawsuit against Beeken
was filed, in December of 1983.  Section 521 contains two exceptions to the
repose provision, but neither is applicable in the present circumstances. (FN1)
     Section 521 was enacted in 1978, effective July 1st of that year.
1977, No. 248 (Adj. Sess.).  At the time of the alleged malpractice, in
1972, the controlling statute of limitations was 12 V.S.A. { 512, which
contained no repose period, but limited actions for injury to the person to
"three years after the cause of action accrues."  The provision was amended
in 1976 to explain that "the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue as of
the date of the discovery of the injury."  1975, No. 248 (Adj. Sess.), { 2.
Under Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. at 521-26, 496 A.2d at 160-
61, this "discovery" rule is applied retroactively.  At the time of
defendant's negligent act, therefore, plaintiff had a right to sue his
physician for medical malpractice that could be exercised up to three years
after the date of discovery, with no final repose period.
     The statute of limitations applicable to any action, however, is
generally the one in effect at the date the cause of action accrued -- in
this case, 1982.  Cavanaugh, 145 Vt. at 521, 496 A.2d  at 161.  This general
rule must give way, of course, if its application would deprive plaintiff,
as he maintains, of his constitutional right to a remedy, under Chapter I,
Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution. (FN2)
     Article 4 provides:
          Every person within this state ought to find a certain
          remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries
          or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property
          or character; he ought to obtain right and justice,
          freely, and without being obliged to purchase it;
          completely and without any denial; promptly and without
                    delay; conformably (FN3) to the laws.
We stated recently that this provision "has never been held . . . to give
rise to a substantive constitutional right.  Instead, it has been treated as
the Vermont equivalent of the federal Due Process Clause."  Levinsky v.
Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 197, 559 A.2d 1073, ____ (1989).  Defendant Beeken
argues that because Article 4 creates no affirmative rights and because the
legislature has the power to modify or abolish a previously existing common-
law right, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,