Title: Commonwealth v. Wittey

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13239 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN B. WITTEY. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 10, 2023. - June 5, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  
Search and Seizure, Curtilage, Motor vehicle, Probable 
cause.  Probable Cause.  Self-Defense.  Evidence, Self-
defense, Age.  Duress.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 24, 2016. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Gregg 
J. Pasquale, J., and the cases were tried before Cornelius J. 
Moriarty, II, J. 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, John B. Wittey, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on theories of both deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, after he shot and 
stabbed the victim, John Williams, in the victim's home, 
2 
 
following his discovery of a romantic affair between the victim 
and the defendant's deceased partner.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that a State police trooper's examination of his vehicle, 
visibly parked in the driveway leading up to his house, 
constituted a warrantless search within the curtilage of his 
home.  He argues that his motion to suppress the evidence 
recovered pursuant to a search warrant following these 
observations wrongfully was denied.  He further asserts that 
this court should vacate or reduce his conviction of murder in 
the first degree under G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), based on the 
self-defense theory he presented at trial, and based on his age, 
the circumstances surrounding the killing, and his mental state 
at the time, which he suggests shows that he was acting under 
some degree of duress. 
 
We hold that the defendant's vehicle was not parked within 
the curtilage of his home and that, therefore, the trooper's 
observations of the vehicle did not constitute a search for 
constitutional purposes.  Discerning no error in the verdict of 
murder in the first degree after plenary review of the entire 
record, we decline to exercise our authority under § 33E to 
reduce the verdict or order a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We discuss the facts that the 
jury could have found, reserving some details for later 
discussion. 
3 
 
 
The victim was the president of a ham radio club,1 a golfer, 
a pilot, and a father.  He had a license to carry a firearm and 
occasionally would do so.  Judy Harris, the defendant's partner 
of over twenty years whom he considered to be his wife, was the 
vice-president of the ham radio club.  Harris and her grandson 
Anthony, whom she and the defendant raised, lived at the 
defendant's home.2  While Harris was in a relationship with the 
defendant, she had a years-long affair with the victim.  The 
victim and the defendant knew each other; there was conflicting 
testimony surrounding whether they were friends.  Harris was 
diagnosed with stage four ovarian cancer in 2012, from which she 
passed away in January 2016. 
On the evening of February 8, 2016, at around 9:30 P.M., 
Roberta Delorie, a friend of the victim, spoke with him by 
telephone and planned to meet him for breakfast the next morning 
at a restaurant.3  The victim was to pick her up at 10 A.M. the 
next morning.  That night, there was a snowstorm.  When it 
 
1 Ham radio also is known as amateur radio.  Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/amateur-radio [https: 
//perma.cc/WK4F-YB88]. 
 
2 The defendant also was a ham radio operator.  Anthony, who 
also was in the ham radio club, could not recall whether the 
defendant was a member but recalled the defendant going to 
meetings frequently. 
 
3 On her 911 call to the police, she identified the victim 
as her boyfriend. 
4 
 
snowed, the victim would go out each hour and measure the snow 
for his pilots' association. 
The next morning, on February 9, 2016, the victim did not 
arrive at Delorie's home as promised, which was unusual for him.  
When it neared 10:30 A.M. and the victim did not answer her 
calls, Delorie decided to drive to the victim's house, located 
on Glen Charlie Road in Wareham, using her son's car.  When she 
arrived, she parked in the victim's driveway and walked to his 
front door.  She entered the house with a key given to her by 
the victim. 
When she opened the door, she saw white matter hanging from 
the ceiling and a thick purple substance on the floor.  She 
noticed the victim on the floor, wearing boxer shorts and a T-
shirt, with a bulge underneath his shirt.  She also saw three 
bullets or casings near each other by the victim's feet.  She 
called 911 and listened to the dispatcher, who instructed her to 
leave the house without touching anything. 
Sergeant Walter Correia of the Wareham police department 
was the first officer on the scene.  He noted blood on the walls 
and floor, as well as casings on the floor.  Initially, he 
believed that the victim's death was the result of a suicide.  
He did not see a firearm, but believed that it could be under 
the victim's body.  The victim's body was a short distance, 
approximately six feet, from the doorway.  Correia remained 
5 
 
outside in order to maintain the scene as it was, and more 
officers and emergency medical service paramedics arrived at the 
scene. 
State police Lieutenant Leonard Coppenrath arrived at the 
victim's home as well.  There were two vehicles in the driveway, 
one belonging to the victim and the other belonging to Delorie, 
and there was freshly fallen snow on the ground.  When he 
arrived, Coppenrath traveled the perimeter of the property to 
look for footprints.  He only observed footprints traceable to 
first responders on the scene.  Until he arrived, the officers 
present ensured that no one else entered the home. 
State police Sergeant William Tarbokas, who is trained in 
tire tread examination, responded to the victim's home to 
perform analysis with personnel from crime scene services.  He 
found no fingerprints of value for identification purposes.  
Tarbokas saw that there was a third tire track underneath the 
middle of Delorie's car, which preserved the track from melting 
due to sunlight.  He took photographs of the third track to be 
used for comparison. 
In the kitchen area, behind the victim's body, officers 
located a beer bottle for a specific brand, Beck's, which bottle 
was on its side leaning against a scratch post for a cat.  
Coppenrath noticed three closely grouped gunshot wounds to the 
right side of the victim's head, just above his ear, and a 
6 
 
gunshot wound and stippling on the top of his head.  In addition 
to observing those gunshot wounds, Trooper David Collett noticed 
two more entrance wounds to the victim's back after pulling back 
his shirt, which had two holes in it.  Coppenrath observed a 
laceration on the victim's arm, and once the victim was turned 
over, he noticed a laceration to the victim's stomach area with 
"innards . . . protruding."  At that point, officers were aware 
that this was not a suicide, but a homicide.4 
Police recovered two live rounds and three spent shell 
casings surrounding the area of the victim's body.  They also 
recovered two bullet fragments, jacketed spent projectiles, 
which had been fired and were lodged in the flooring.  The 
victim owned several firearms, which were located in his home, 
in a closet.  Coppenrath testified -- despite the cat food 
 
4 The medical examiner testified that the victim died from 
multiple gunshot wounds and sharp force injuries, any of which 
potentially may have been fatal if left untreated.  She observed 
an entrance and exit gunshot wound and sharp force injury to his 
left hand, which fractured a bone in his hand; a graze gunshot 
wound on his left forearm; intestines protruding from a stab 
wound on his torso; an entrance gunshot wound in the middle of 
his chest; an entrance gunshot wound on his left hip; two 
entrance gunshot wounds on his back, one of which lacerated his 
right lung and exited through his chest; an entrance gunshot 
wound on the left side of his face, which perforated several 
organs; three entrance gunshot wounds to the right side of his 
head; and a gunshot wound to the top of his head.  Several 
projectiles were recovered in different parts of the victim's 
body, including his hand, hip, shoulder, spine, torso, and 
brain.  There was stippling on the victim's body suggesting that 
a firearm was fired at close range. 
7 
 
scattered on the floor of the victim's home, the bottle opener 
on the floor, and the watch that was detached at the hinge and 
on the floor -- that he did not believe the victim died in a 
struggle because there were a significant number of items in the 
kitchen area that were undisturbed. 
Trooper Jason Abramoski arrived at the scene and remained 
outside.  He canvassed the neighborhood, without success, in an 
effort to determine whether anyone had heard or seen anything 
unusual or maintained surveillance cameras that would have aided 
in the investigation.  As a result of a conversation between the 
victim's children and Collett on scene, Abramoski was dispatched 
to speak with the defendant.  After reporting to the Wareham 
police department, Abramoski went to interview the defendant at 
his home on Plain Street East in Berkley.  He took with him 
Detective William Dasilva from the Wareham police department and 
Sergeant David Bernard from the Berkley police department. 
When they arrived at the defendant's residence, Abramoski 
noticed two Toyota motor vehicles, a Yaris and a Sienna, in the 
driveway.  After Abramoski knocked, the defendant answered the 
door.  Abramoski asked the defendant whether the officers could 
speak to him about the whereabouts of the victim and the 
defendant's relationship with the victim; the defendant agreed 
and invited the officers inside. 
8 
 
The inside of the defendant's home was cluttered, unkempt, 
and dark.  Before they spoke to the defendant, the officers 
allowed him to go upstairs to let Anthony know that they were 
there and to get shoes.  The defendant began to tell the 
officers that he had met the victim through Harris, who had 
passed away about two weeks prior.  When Harris was ill, the 
victim frequently visited her during her treatments.  The 
defendant produced a printed e-mail message from a pocket of his 
shirt, and he indicated that he had discovered that the victim 
and Harris had been "a little bit more than just friends."  When 
asked to explain the message, the defendant stated that it made 
him upset, and he handed the printout to Abramoski.  The 
message, dated September 9, 2014, was written from Harris to the 
victim.  It revealed a sexual and romantic relationship between 
the victim and Harris, through which the victim got to know 
Anthony and Harris got to know the family of the victim.  The 
message further revealed that the victim had ended the 
relationship, which devastated Harris. 
After the defendant produced the e-mail message, Abramoski 
asked him if he would consent to recording the interview.  The 
defendant agreed, and they moved to another room so that the 
defendant could sit down.  During the recorded interview, the 
defendant explained that he found the e-mail message one week 
9 
 
after Harris passed away.5  The defendant stated that he was 
upset about the message and decided to go for a "joyride," 
leaving between 10 P.M. and 11 P.M. for Dover, New Jersey, 
returning in the early morning of February 9, 2016.6  He told the 
officers that he drove the Toyota Sienna on this trip. 
After the interview, the defendant agreed to go with the 
officers to the Berkley police department for a formal 
interview.  When he arrived at the police station and after 
being read the Miranda rights for a second time, he indicated 
that he would not like to make any statements.7  At the police 
station, the defendant gave the officers the clothing that he 
was wearing and consented to being photographed.  There was a 
Beck's bottle cap found in the pocket of the defendant's jeans.  
 
5 At some point in the investigation, officers found a 
printout of a second e-mail message from Harris's account, dated 
September 20, 2014, further detailing her anguish over the 
breakup with the victim and the victim's new girlfriend.  In an 
upper corner of the printout, there was a date stamp indicating 
that it had been printed on the day before the victim was found 
dead in his home. 
 
6 Anthony, who still lived in the defendant's home, stated 
that the defendant left in the evening of February 8, 2016, and 
did not return until the next day. 
 
7 This testimony was admitted at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress, but not the trial. 
 
10 
 
The defendant was allowed to leave and was picked up by his 
friend, Philip Dann.8 
Ruth Ragnaldsen Battaglini, a forensic scientist with the 
State police crime laboratory, conducted testing and analyzed 
the scene of the murder.  A significant number of presumptive 
tests conducted at the scene were positive for the presence of 
blood.  On February 9, 2016, while the defendant was at the 
Berkley police station, Battaglini observed his condition and 
noted that there was a reddened area on his right knuckles and a 
cut and scratch on his left hand.  On a screening test, the 
defendant's hands tested positive for the presence of blood.  
The defendant's vest, which he was wearing at the police 
station, tested positive for human blood on both the interior 
and exterior.  The defendant's sweater and jeans also tested 
positive for human blood.9  The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
 
8 Throughout his interactions with the defendant, Abramoski 
did not observe the defendant to be injured or have trouble 
walking.  Collett testified that at the time of the defendant's 
subsequent arrest on February 12, he did not observe any 
injuries to the defendant.  However, Collett was impeached with 
his grand jury testimony where he stated that there was redness 
on the defendant's right knuckle area, a cut on his left thumb, 
and a scratch on his left wrist. 
 
9 His shoes tested negative for the presence of blood. 
11 
 
obtained from a red-brown stain on the front of the defendant's 
sweater matched the victim's DNA profile.10 
Dann testified that when he picked up the defendant, the 
defendant's demeanor was subdued, which was different from 
earlier interactions he had had with the defendant.  After 
attempting to drop off the defendant at a residence in Pembroke 
where no one was home, Dann brought the defendant to his office 
to stay there for the evening.  During the drive, Dann asked the 
defendant "what was going on," and the defendant told Dann that 
his friend had gone missing and that the police brought him in 
to question him.  When asked if he "had anything to do with it," 
the defendant replied that Dann "didn't want to know anything 
about [it]."  At the office, the defendant told Dann that Dann 
did not want to be involved and that this was a "bad thing." 
Search warrants were issued in connection with the case, 
including those for the defendant's residence and the Toyota 
Sienna, which officers searched on February 10, 2016.  In the 
Sienna, officers found a case of Beck's beer containing three 
full beers, a Beck's beer bottle cap, a global position system 
(GPS) device, two rounds of nine millimeter ammunition, and two 
rounds of .44 Magnum ammunition, among other things.  Tarbokas 
 
10 The expected frequency of occurrence of the profile was 
approximately one in 3.418 quintillion related individuals (a 
quintillion is a one with eighteen zeros following it). 
12 
 
participated in the execution of the search warrants, and he 
observed the tires of both the Yaris and the Sienna.  The Yaris 
tires were much smaller in width and size than the impression 
photographed at the victim's home.  He took impressions from the 
tires on the Sienna, which were all of the same type.  Tarbokas 
opined that the tread marks from the Sienna were of the same 
class as those found at the victim's residence, concluding that 
the tread could have been made by a tire on the Sienna or any 
other tire with a similar design and size.  When screened for 
nonvisible or occult blood, the front driver's side exterior and 
interior door handles, front driver's side seat back and bottom, 
front driver's side seat belt, steering wheel, gear shift, car 
key, and remote tested positive for blood. 
Trooper Francis Driscoll, who participated in the execution 
of the search warrant for the Sienna, examined the files on the 
GPS located in the Sienna, attached to the windshield.  The 
files on the GPS showed that on the night of February 8, 2016, 
into the early morning of February 9, the Sienna was driven 
multiple times to and from the area surrounding the victim's 
residence.  The first activation of the GPS on February 8 was at 
7:33 P.M. and placed the Sienna on Seymour Street in Berkley.  
The Sienna was driven to the area of Glen Charlie Road in 
Wareham at 9:08 P.M., and driven back and forth on Glen Charlie 
Road until 9:29 P.M.  At 9:57 P.M., the Sienna returned to Glen 
13 
 
Charlie Road and remained to traverse the street until 10:09 
P.M.  The Sienna arrived back at the defendant's Plain Street 
East address in Berkley at 10:55 P.M. and began moving again at 
11:23 P.M.  At 12:01 A.M. on February 9, the Sierra arrived at 
Glen Charlie Road in Wareham for a third time, and ultimately 
came to a stop in an area four to six houses away from the 
victim's home at around 12:03 A.M.  After several minutes 
remaining stationary, the next activation of the GPS was at an 
address next to the victim's home at 12:10 A.M., after which the 
Sierra then traveled south and was switched off in Fairhaven at 
12:53 A.M. 
In the defendant's residence, officers secured fifteen 
empty Beck's beer bottles, as well as a piece of paper on top of 
a pile of papers with the name of the victim and a telephone 
number written on it.  The empty Beck's beer bottles in the 
defendant's garage, the full bottles in the Sienna, and the 
bottle found in the victim's home all had the same lot number.11  
Officers also found another piece of paper with the name "Trish" 
 
11 Brandon McGrath, a quality manager of a brewery that 
produces Beck's beer at some of its locations, explained the lot 
number on the bottles and stated that, operating at maximum 
capacity, 600 beers per minute in fifteen-minute increments 
would share the same lot number. 
 
14 
 
and a telephone number,12 as well as the name "Williams" and "121 
Charlie R or Rd." 
On February 12, 2016, a warrant issued for the defendant's 
arrest.  Officers executed the warrant at the home of the 
defendant's daughter.  When the officers confronted the 
defendant in the doorway of the home, he stated, "Oh, it looks 
like my ride is here." 
On March 18, 2016, Robert Costanzo and Andrew Campbell were 
assisting their friends John and Chrissy Nelson in cleaning out 
the defendant's cluttered home, specifically focusing on the 
garage.13  In a silver box in the garage, after unscrewing 
approximately twenty screws to the door of the box, John located 
two firearms and seven boxes of ammunition.14  They called 
police, who collected the firearms and ammunition.  The firearms 
later were confirmed to have been purchased by the defendant. 
One of the firearms was a revolver.  When it was recovered, 
it was loaded with six live rounds of .22 Magnum caliber 
ammunition.  The other was a nine millimeter Taurus 
 
12 Trish was a local nurse who cared for Judy in hospice. 
 
13 Chrissy is the defendant's daughter. 
 
14 When officers executed the search warrant on February 10, 
2016, the silver box was inaccessible because several items 
blocked the area. 
15 
 
semiautomatic pistol.15  The magazine, which was removed, 
contained one round of live ammunition; there was also one round 
of live ammunition in the chamber of the pistol.  The boxes of 
ammunition that were recovered were .22 Magnum and nine 
millimeter ammunition.  The revolver tested positive for the 
presence of blood on the interior of the barrel and the side of 
the firearm.  The DNA profile found on the side of the revolver 
matched the victim's DNA profile.16  Lieutenant John Conroy, the 
head of the ballistics unit for the State police in Lakeville, 
test fired both firearms, which fired properly.  It was Conroy's 
opinion, to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty, that the 
discharged shell casings found at the scene were fired from the 
nine millimeter Taurus semiautomatic pistol found at the 
defendant's residence.  He also analyzed a projectile recovered 
from the floor of the victim's residence, and his comparison to 
the test firing that he conducted was inconclusive.  He examined 
seven other projectiles recovered during the investigation, 
which were consistent in diameter with .22 caliber ammunition.  
 
15 In a revolver, unlike in a semiautomatic weapon, the 
discharged cartridge casings remain in the cylinder until they 
are manually removed; they are not ejected from the weapon on 
firing.  If there is a malfunction or jam in a semiautomatic 
weapon, then moving the slide to the rear to "rack the weapon" 
will eject a live round from the weapon without firing it. 
 
16 The expected frequency of occurrence of the profile was 
approximately one in 1.071 nonillion unrelated individuals (a 
one with thirty zeros after it). 
16 
 
Although he found several similarities with the test firing from 
the revolver recovered at the defendant's residence, he did not 
feel that there was "a sufficient agreement of individual 
markings" to opine to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty 
whether they were fired from that weapon. 
After the Commonwealth rested its case, the defendant 
testified.  The defendant met Harris in 1992; after six months 
of dating, she moved into his home and lived with him until her 
death in January 2016.  While Harris was sick, the defendant 
took her to her doctor appointments and the hospital, and took 
care of her at home.  The defendant testified that starting in 
2011, Harris became very hostile toward him until her death.  
During that period, the victim would come over four or five days 
per week. 
The defendant testified that on February 8, 2016, he found 
the printout of the e-mail message written from Harris to the 
victim in September 2014 in a laundry bag that he was cleaning 
out.17  When he first started reading, he thought the message was 
written to him, but he then realized that it was not when it 
referenced the recipient sleeping with two women.  After the 
defendant found the message, he began to try to find any other 
evidence of the affair to confirm it.  He then found a second e-
 
17 The defendant admitted on cross-examination that he lied 
about finding the letter a week before the murder. 
17 
 
mail message on Harris's account that confirmed the 
relationship.  The defendant was "astounded" and "so upset and 
angry [that he] wanted to confront [the victim] and ask him 
what's been going on the last five years."  He felt "doubly bad" 
because the victim treated Harris poorly. 
The defendant knew that the victim had purchased a house on 
Glen Charlie Road in Wareham, so he inputted the address into 
his GPS device and drove there, despite the severe snowstorm.  
When he got there, he did not recognize anything, so he turned 
around and drove home.  When he returned home, he found a piece 
of paper with the victim's address, which misidentified the 
street number by one.  According to the defendant, his intent 
was not to shoot the victim, but to determine "why he was so 
mean to [Harris], why he had destroyed her."  When he drove back 
to Glen Charlie Road, he could not see the street numbers on the 
houses or the mailboxes because they were covered in snow.  As 
he was driving farther up the road, he saw a sports car in the 
victim's driveway, which resembled the car that the defendant 
knew belonged to the victim. 
The defendant then "pulled in behind it and grabbed a 
bottle of Beck's beer and pounded on the door."  He testified 
that he brought two guns with him because the victim always was 
armed.  The victim, in his underwear, invited the defendant 
inside after the defendant told him that the defendant needed to 
18 
 
speak privately with him, and the victim handed the defendant a 
bottle opener to open his beer.  When the defendant told the 
victim that he knew about the affair and how the victim treated 
Harris, the victim "laughed in [the defendant's] face" and 
"badmouth[ed]" Harris.18  This "incensed" the defendant and made 
him "very angry."  The defendant then responded with something 
that "wouldn't have been very nice," and according to him, the 
victim went into the kitchen and then charged at the defendant 
with a knife. 
The defendant grasped each wrist of the victim, trying to 
hold the knife away from him, and they rotated around the 
kitchen in a "strange dance."  The defendant testified that the 
victim fell on top of him, and it seemed that the victim still 
had the knife and was trying to stab the defendant.  At the time 
of his arrest, the defendant was five feet, seven inches tall, 
and weighed approximately 170 pounds.  At the time of his 
autopsy, the victim was five feet, seven inches tall, and 
weighed 191 pounds.19 
 
18 The defendant testified on cross-examination that the 
victim "laughed in [his] face and then . . . made very 
disparaging remarks about my dear wife.  Remarks that were 
absolutely disgusting." 
 
19 The victim's son testified that the victim was six feet, 
two inches tall and weighed about 220 pounds.  The defendant 
emphasized that the victim was taller than him. 
19 
 
In response to the victim's attempt to stab him, the 
defendant took out his .22 caliber revolver and pulled the 
trigger six times, until there were no bullets remaining.  The 
defendant then pulled out the nine millimeter Taurus 
semiautomatic pistol and shot the victim twice as he was still 
trying to stab the defendant, got up, picked up his revolver and 
the knife, and left the home.  He drove to Dover, New Jersey, 
where he used to live. 
On cross-examination, the defendant claimed that the victim 
fell down on the knife, explaining his protruding intestines.  
The defendant stated that the knife "must have gone into [the 
victim's] stomach and come back out because he still had it in 
his hand" and continued to try to harm the defendant.  The 
defendant disposed of the knife in the trash at a gasoline 
station in Connecticut.  The defendant claimed that he was 
underneath the victim when he fired all of the shots. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on 
May 24, 2016, and arraigned on June 28 on charges of murder in 
the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm without a firearm identification (FID) 
card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); one count of unlawful possession 
of ammunition without an FID card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); three 
counts of a firearm violation with one prior violent crime, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a); and possession of a large capacity 
20 
 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  The defendant filed a motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from an alleged warrantless search 
in the curtilage of his home on July 19, 2018.20  An evidentiary 
hearing on the motion to suppress was held on November 20.  On 
January 7, 2019, the motion judge, who was not the trial judge, 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress with written findings. 
The trial began on September 30, 2019.  In closing 
arguments, the defense argued that the defendant acted in self-
defense in response to a struggle on the floor, and asked the 
jury to return a verdict of manslaughter.  The Commonwealth 
argued that the defendant acted "in cold blood with vengeance" 
when he "executed . . . [and] assassinated" the victim in his 
home, shooting the victim ten times without missing.21  The 
Commonwealth suggested that the defendant's story was 
"incredible."  On October 11, the jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on theories of both deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty, and also 
convicted him on the indictments charging unlawful possession of 
firearms and ammunition without an FID card and possession of a 
 
20 He also moved to suppress his statements to police, with 
which he does not take issue on appeal. 
 
21 The medical examiner testified that there was an eleventh 
"graze" gunshot wound on the victim's forearm. 
21 
 
large capacity firearm.22  The defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Curtilage issue.  On February 9, 2016, 
State police Trooper Donald Short responded to the defendant's 
residence to observe the Sienna in the driveway and to speak 
with Anthony.23  The defendant's residence is set back from a 
long driveway.24  A visitor approaching the front door of the 
home would have to walk up the driveway to get there, traveling 
along a walkway toward the front steps leading up to the main 
entrance of the home.  From the street, there was an 
unobstructed view of the Sienna; there was no gate around the 
driveway, no fence around the property, and no "no trespassing" 
signs posted around the property. 
At around 7:30 P.M., while the defendant was at the police 
station, Short pulled into the driveway, observed the Sienna in 
the driveway, and looked at the tread pattern on the tires.  The 
Yaris, also in the driveway, was parked farther down and closest 
to the garage; the Sienna was parked to the front left of it.  
 
22 The Commonwealth dismissed the three indictments charging 
a firearm violation with one prior violent crime. 
 
23 The relevant facts are taken from the testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress and photographs of the 
driveway, vehicles, and home admitted at the hearing. 
 
24 From a photograph taken from behind the parked Sienna, 
one can observe a relatively long driveway marked at the roadway 
by an unmarked police cruiser. 
22 
 
Both were parked toward the end of the driveway closest to the 
house.  Earlier that day, when Abramoski went to the defendant's 
home to speak with the defendant, he got within five to ten feet 
of the vehicles as he was walking up the driveway and to the 
front door. 
On the tread pattern of the tires on the Sienna, Short 
observed unique rain channels that appeared to be similar to the 
tread markings in the driveway at the victim's home.  Because it 
was dark, the tires would have had to be illuminated in order 
for Short to see them; he could not recall whether he used a 
flashlight or whether the area was illuminated in another 
manner.  In addition to examining the tire treads, Short looked 
inside the window of the Sienna and saw an open case of Beck's 
beer, a sleeping bag, and a "sea bag."25  He did not open the 
door or move the Sienna in any way. 
 
Short's observations were included in the affidavits 
supporting the search warrant applications for the defendant's 
residence, the Sienna, specified information on the defendant's 
cell phone, and the GPS found within the Sienna. 
 
The motion judge found that in walking to the front door of 
the home to speak with the defendant, Abramoski had to traverse 
the walkway to the front door leading from the end of the 
 
25 A "sea bag" is a type of bag "that the military used to 
store gear." 
23 
 
driveway.  "In so doing, Abramoski had to walk by an automobile 
parked on the defendant's property."  The motion judge also 
found that Short "needed to pass by an automobile in the 
driveway" to reach the front door of the house, and that Short 
"observed the tire treads as he walked by."  He ruled that the 
driveway was not part of the home's curtilage and that, 
therefore, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to the portions of the Sienna that Short observed. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the Sienna was parked 
within the home's curtilage.  He asserts that the motion judge 
erred in finding that the Sienna would have been visible from 
the street, as the driveway was long and the home was private; 
the motion judge erred in finding that one would need to walk 
past the Sienna to access the front door; and Short's intent to 
view the tire treads in the driveway favors the conclusion that 
it was an unlawful, warrantless search.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that the Commonwealth cannot demonstrate that the Sienna 
would have been searched in any event pursuant to the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the driveway was not within 
the curtilage of the home and therefore not entitled to 
protections under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  The Commonwealth further argues that the search 
24 
 
warrants would have been issued even excising the information 
obtained from Short's observations of the Sienna. 
 
In our review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, "we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 Mass. 48, 53 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137, 142 (2010).  
We "conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Torres, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 361 (2023), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rosario-Santiago, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 
171 (2019).  We do not consider the testimony at trial in 
reviewing the motion judge's ruling on the motion to suppress.  
Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 648 (2012).  "Where, as 
here, the issue is whether a search occurred within the 
curtilage of a home, 'we undertake our independent review 
cognizant that there is no "finely tuned formula" that 
demarcates the curtilage in a given case.'"  Leslie, supra, 
quoting Fernandez, supra.  There is no "bright line rule," and 
we must approach "curtilage questions on a case-by-case basis."  
Fernandez, supra at 143. 
 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment's protection of curtilage has long 
been black letter law."  Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 
1670 (2018).  The concept of curtilage "originated at common law 
to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house 
25 
 
the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded 
the house itself."  Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 428 Mass. 871, 873 
(1999), quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).  
Presently, the concept of curtilage is "used to define those 
areas to which Fourth Amendment protections extend."  McCarthy, 
supra.  If an area "is 'so intimately tied to the home itself' 
that 'an individual reasonably may expect that the area in 
question [will] be treated as the home itself,'" it will be 
considered part of the curtilage.  Id. at 874, quoting Dunn, 
supra at 300, 301.  In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court set 
out four factors to consider in determining whether a 
particularly described area qualifies as curtilage:  (1) "the 
proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home," (2) 
"whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding 
the home," (3) "the nature of the uses to which the area is 
put," and (4) "the steps taken by the resident to protect the 
area form observation by people passing by."  Dunn, supra at 
301. 
 
Generally, "[a] driveway 'may be private according to 
common law concepts of property, [but] it need not be for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Butterfield, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 928 (1998), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 392 Mass. 45, 49, cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 861 (1984).  Because a driveway is only a "semiprivate 
26 
 
area," the expectation of privacy a possessor of land may 
reasonably have in his or her driveway "will generally depend 
upon the nature of the activities [carried out there] and the 
degree of visibility from the street."  Butterfield, supra, 
quoting Simmons, supra at 48.  Applying the Dunn factors to a 
driveway may yield different results based on the circumstances 
present in each case. 
 
In Massachusetts, we have considered the surrounding 
circumstances in determining whether a driveway is a protected 
area under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14.  In Simmons, for 
example, where an officer and a victim stood in a driveway and 
looked for five minutes into a vehicle located between one and 
two feet from the driveway, directly across a path leading to 
the front door, we held that the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location where the vehicle was 
observed.  Simmons, 392 Mass. at 46-47, 49.  In so holding, the 
court relied on the facts that the vehicle was "clearly visible" 
from the busy roadway and the adjacent parking area, the 
driveway was not enclosed by any obstructions, there was an 
absence of "no trespassing" signs, and the driveway was the 
normal means of access to the home where visitors would traverse 
on the way to the front door.  Id. at 47, 49. 
 
Similarly, in Butterfield, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 928, the 
Appeals Court found that the defendant, on a walkway leading to 
27 
 
his home, and his vehicle, parked in the driveway, were not 
within the curtilage of the home.  Both the defendant and the 
vehicle were visible from the street; there was no evidence that 
the driveway was enclosed by trees, a fence, shrubbery, or other 
obstructions; and the walkway leading to the back door was one 
that a visitor naturally would use to reach the door.  Id. at 
928-929.  See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 254-255 
(2010), S.C., 464 Mass. 580 (2013) (vehicle outside curtilage 
where defendant's vehicle parked in driveway was visible from 
street; no trees, fences, gates, or "no trespassing" signs; and 
no measures taken to define area as curtilage); McCarthy, 428 
Mass. at 875 (visitor parking space not within curtilage of 
apartment where area in between apartment and space was open to 
tenants, visitors, delivery persons, and maintenance workers as 
common area).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 358 Mass. 771, 774-
775 (1971) (cellar not within curtilage of defendant's apartment 
where he did not have exclusive control of any part of it, as 
"[i]n a modern urban multifamily apartment house, the area 
within the 'curtilage' is necessarily much more limited than in 
the case of a rural dwelling subject to one owner's control").  
But see Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 794-795 (1975) 
(defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in apartment 
hallway where he did not share it with tenants or landlord as he 
was owner of building, door was locked, and buzzer system was 
28 
 
designed to exclude members of public); Commonwealth v. Pierre, 
71 Mass. App. Ct. 58, 61-63 (2008) (defendant had reasonable 
expectation of privacy in storage locker in basement of 
apartment building, and basement was within curtilage of 
defendant's apartment, despite unrestricted access to basement 
and lack of exclusive control). 
 
Conversely, in Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 144-145, the court 
held that the defendant's "narrow driveway, approximately the 
width of one vehicle and the length of two," was within the 
curtilage of his apartment.  The driveway directly was adjacent 
to the three-family home, in which the defendant lived on the 
first floor.  Id. at 144.  No one seeking to enter the home 
would have reason to walk on the driveway, and the police saw 
only vehicles associated with the defendant parked in the 
driveway, pointing to his exclusive use.  Id. at 144, 146.  
There was a fence separating the driveway from the neighboring 
building.  Id. at 145.  Although the vehicle was visible from 
the street, an observer of the inside of the car would have to 
depart from the path designed to lead to the front door, rather 
traveling along the side of the house down the driveway.  Id. at 
146.  In these circumstances, the driveway was within the 
curtilage of the defendant's home.  Cf. Leslie, 477 Mass. at 55-
57 (side yard was within curtilage where it was attached to 
porch, where it was enclosed by fence with house and porch, 
29 
 
where porch was used as extension of home, and where steps were 
taken to protect area from view); Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 
Mass. 756, 759 (1996) (fenced in back yard was within curtilage 
of home); Pierre, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 62-63 (locker in basement 
was within curtilage where stairs in defendant's kitchen linked 
apartment to basement and storage locker searched was subject to 
defendant's exclusive control); Commonwealth v. Hurd, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 12, 15-16 (2001) (defendant had reasonable expectation 
of privacy in cage located in back yard and partially enclosed 
by fence, where cage was not visible from public street or front 
yard, porch, or shed doors; officer's vantage point from 
driveway was not determinative where driveway was not normal 
access to front door). 
 
In Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670-1671, the Supreme Court held 
that a particular section of the driveway where the defendant's 
motorcycle was parked constituted curtilage.  In so holding, the 
Court described this portion of the driveway as sitting a few 
yards past the front perimeter of the house, enclosed on two 
sides by a brick wall the height of a vehicle and on the third 
side by the house.  Id. at 1670.  A side door provided direct 
access between this enclosed section and the house.  Id. at 
1670-1671.  A visitor would have no reason to enter the 
enclosure, as he or she would turn off toward a set of steps 
leading to the front porch before entering the enclosure.  Id. 
30 
 
at 1671.  The officer pulled off a tarp to expose the 
motorcycle.  Id. at 1668. 
 
Case law from the Federal circuits discussing driveways and 
a reasonable expectation of privacy reinforces the case-specific 
inquiry that the curtilage question demands.  A prominent factor 
in the analysis is whether the driveway freely is exposed to 
public view.  United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 
2007) ("If the relevant part of the driveway is freely exposed 
to public view, it does not fall within the curtilage").  Where 
so exposed, the balance tends to favor the determination that a 
defendant is not entitled to a Fourth Amendment protections in 
such an area.  See United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 
1194 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The openness and accessibility of a 
driveway to the public has been an important factor that courts 
have used to conclude that an owner does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and that police observations made from 
the driveway do not constitute a search").  "This holds true 
even where the relevant part of the driveway is somewhat removed 
from a public road or street, and its viewing by passersby is 
only occasional."  Brown, supra. 
 
The majority of Federal circuit cases discussing a driveway 
curtilage question have found that the area at issue was not 
part of the curtilage of the home or that, even if it was 
curtilage, it was not afforded the same protections.  See United 
31 
 
States v. Stephen, 823 Fed. Appx. 751, 755 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(driveway was not within curtilage of home where, although in 
close proximity to home, driveway was not gated, covered, 
enclosed, or partly enclosed; it did not serve as extension of 
defendant's home; occupants made no effort to conceal driveway 
from passersby; and it formed part of path visitors would take 
to walk to front door); United States v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450, 
456-457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 580 (2019) 
(driveway adjacent to home was not within curtilage where it was 
not enclosed, no steps were taken to obstruct view of passersby 
or vehicles on way to entrance of home, and other residents 
shared driveway); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 850 (2016) (driveway not curtilage 
despite proximity to residence because open to observation from 
street, and although fences encircled part of driveway, none 
blocked access or view from street, and no "no trespassing" 
signs or other attempts to protect privacy); Brown, 510 F.3d at 
65-66 (top of defendant's driveway adjacent to garage was not 
curtilage where, although close to home and not visible from 
public street, there were no barriers or signs discouraging 
public entry, and defendant allowed patrons of his business on 
property); Hatfield, 333 F.3d at 1194, quoting 1 W.R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-508 (3d ed. 1996) ("[W]hen 
the police come on to private property to conduct an 
32 
 
investigation . . . and restrict their movements to places 
visitors could be expected to go [e.g., walkways, driveways, 
porches], observations made from such vantage points are not 
covered by the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. French, 291 
F.3d 945, 953 (7th Cir. 2002) ("In the past we have held that 
public drives, sidewalks, or walkways [even those which lead to 
a rear side door] are not within the curtilage of the home when 
they are not enclosed by a gate or fence"); United States v. 
Ventling, 678 F.2d 63, 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1982) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy where officer drove into driveway and 
went to front door, noticed tire tracks in yard along driveway, 
and stopped to photograph them, as "a driveway and portion of 
the yard immediately adjacent to the front door of the residence 
can hardly be considered out of public view"); United States v. 
Humphries, 636 F.2d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
451 U.S. 988 (1981) (no violation of defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy where officer went onto driveway to 
examine license plate on vehicle, where vehicle was visible from 
street and driveway was not enclosed by fence, shrubbery, or 
barrier). 
Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, some cases have come 
to the opposite conclusion.  See United States v. Alexander, 888 
F.3d 628, 630-634 (2d Cir. 2018) (end of long driveway in front 
of shed was curtilage where it extended past back of house, 
33 
 
enclosed by fencing on three sides, and was used for hosting 
barbeques, despite visibility to public); United States v. 
Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 677 (8th Cir. 2011) (portion of unpaved 
driveway extending past rear of defendant's home was within 
curtilage of home where officers' observations were made just 
behind home, visitors would need to pass paved walkway leading 
to front door and door to carport to get there, driveway was 
enclosed on three sides by fence, and it contained items 
suggesting use for intimate activity associated with home); 
United States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 39-41 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 834 (2002) (portion of property was within 
curtilage where significant portion of driveway was far from 
public view, there was bend in long driveway, portion was 
enclosed by forest, and inhabitants made efforts to discourage 
mail delivery and visits). 
 
With this framework in mind, we apply the Dunn factors to 
this case. 
 
i.  Proximity.  The photographs indicate that the portion 
of the driveway where the Sienna was parked was close to the 
home.  Abramoski testified that both the Sienna and the Yaris 
were parked toward the end of the driveway, which was the 
portion closer to the home.  Although this Dunn factor leans in 
favor of the defendant, the remainder of the factors suggest 
that the Sienna was outside the curtilage of his home. 
34 
 
 
ii.  Enclosure.  The defendant's house is set back from a 
long driveway.  There was no testimony describing the precise 
length of the driveway, but the photographs admitted at the 
hearing allow a viewer to see an individual standing at the 
front of the driveway clearly from behind the Sienna, parked 
toward the end of the driveway.  The house and the driveway are 
flanked with trees on the left, right, and rear, as the 
defendant lived in a wooded area.  Despite the relative privacy 
surrounding the defendant's home, the Sienna was visible to 
passersby in the street, contrary to the defendant's assertion 
otherwise, and to visitors to the home who had to traverse the 
driveway to arrive at the front door.  There was no gate or 
fence around the driveway.  Despite the two-bay garage attached 
to the home, the Sienna was exposed on the driveway within from 
five to ten feet of the walkway.  See Simmons, 392 Mass. at 47, 
49; Stephen, 823 Fed. Appx. at 755.  Contrast Collins, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1670-1671 (motorcycle sitting on portion of driveway few 
yards past front perimeter of house, covered in tarp, and 
enclosed on two sides by wall and third side by house). 
 
The fact that the driveway to the home was located in a 
rural area does not command a finding that the driveway where 
the Sienna was parked was within the curtilage of the home.  See 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 411 Mass. 157, 162 n.5 
(1991) ("[A]n individual who lives on a relatively small public 
35 
 
road has no greater expectation of privacy than one who lives on 
a large public road.  Absent some effort to conceal the driveway 
from public view, the relative seclusion of the neighborhood 
does not heighten an individual's expectation of privacy in a 
driveway"). 
 
iii.  Use.  There was no testimony that the defendant used 
the driveway for anything other than parking cars.  As far as 
one can tell from the photographs, there are no items suggesting 
that the driveway "harbor[ed] those intimate activities 
associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home."  
McCarthy, 428 Mass. at 874, quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 n.4.  
See Commonwealth v. Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 902 (1984) (in 
determining whether porch part of curtilage, factor to consider 
is "whether the porch was furnished like a room in the interior 
of the house"). 
 
iv.  Steps taken to protect from observation.  Finally, the 
defendant took no steps to conceal the Sienna in the driveway, 
or any portion of the driveway, from observation.  As discussed 
supra, there was an unobstructed view of the Sienna from the 
street, there was no gate or fence around the driveway, and 
there was an absence of "no trespassing" signs posted around the 
property.  The fact that Short may have used a flashlight or 
another method to illuminate the tread marks on the tires of the 
Sienna does not transform his actions into a search for 
36 
 
constitutional purposes.  Commonwealth v. Blevines, 54 Mass. 
App. Ct. 89, 92 n.5 (2002), S.C., 438 Mass. 604 (2003) ("The 
trooper's action in shining a flashlight into the vehicle did 
not constitute a search"). 
 
The defendant argues that the motion judge clearly erred in 
finding that the officers needed to pass by the Sienna in order 
to reach the front door of the house.  It is difficult to 
conclude that this finding was clear error, because it depends 
on an interpretation of what the motion judge meant by "pass 
by."  "A judge's finding is clearly erroneous only where there 
is no evidence to support it or where the reviewing court is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 215, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 
(2007).  Abramoski testified at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress that he got within from five to ten feet of the Sienna 
as he was walking to the front door of the home.  Although the 
photographs are not conclusive on the matter because of the snow 
and the angles at which they were taken, in the clearest 
photograph one can observe wooden steps leading to the walkway 
on the far right of the Sienna, which appears to be closely 
aligned with the front perimeter of the house.  Based on that 
photograph, it seems that an average visitor walking to the 
front door would get close to the Sienna on his or her journey, 
37 
 
even supposing that the visitor would not be near enough to see 
inside.  It is irrelevant that Short went to the defendant's 
residence, in part, for the purpose of observing the Sienna in 
the driveway.  "The subjective intentions of police are 
irrelevant so long as their actions were objectively 
reasonable."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 462 n.7 
(2011).  This does not alter our conclusion that the driveway 
was not within the curtilage of the home. 
 
Even if we were to determine that the driveway where the 
Sienna was parked was within the curtilage of the home, excising 
that information from the search warrant affidavits, probable 
cause would remain to search the defendant's residence and the 
Sienna. 
"[R]egardless of the illegality of the initial entry and 
search, the evidence is admissible as long as the affidavit 
in support of the application for a search warrant contains 
information sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search the defendant's [residence and Sienna], apart from 
the observation of the [tire tread marks, the Beck's beer, 
and the sleeping bag]." 
 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 625 (2003).26  "It is a 
simple matter to exclude from the supporting affidavit all 
 
26 As indicated by the court's explanation in DeJesus, 439 
Mass. at 625, this is the more appropriate inquiry, rather than 
the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  If we 
were to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to this matter, 
the Commonwealth would meet both parts of the test.  Because of 
the other information contained in the affidavit, discussed 
infra, the search of the defendant's residence and vehicle was 
"certain as a practical matter."  Commonwealth v. McAfee, 63 
38 
 
information gained" by Short in relation to the Sienna on 
February 9 by excluding the following paragraph from the 
affidavits: 
"On Tuesday, February 9, 2016[,] Trooper Donald Short 
arrived at [the defendant's address] in Berkley.  Trooper 
Short observed a grey Toyota Sienna parked in the driveway.  
The driveway led you to the stairs, which led you to the 
front door of the residence.  The grey Toyota Sienna . . . 
has four tires with four rain channels and square treads on 
the outside of each tire.  This tire pattern is similar to 
the tire pattern found in the driveway at [the victim's 
address] in Wareham by Sgt. William Tarbokas . . . (Crime 
Scene Services Section).  Trooper Short observed from the 
driveway through the clear exterior windows of the Sienna 
an open case of Becks beer in the rear of the Sienna.  
There also was a sleeping bag and a green sea bag in the 
back of the Sienna.  The left rear passenger seat was 
pulled all the way forward against the driver's seat." 
 
Id.  The information remaining in the affidavits, which appear 
to contain largely identical facts, provided ample support for 
probable cause for the searches.27 
 
We summarize the information in the affidavits connecting 
the defendant to the murder of the victim.  When officers 
responded to the victim's residence, they noted identifiable 
tire tracks preserved in the snow from recent traffic.  The 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 467, 479 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Perrot, 
407 Mass. 539, 547 (1990).  Additionally, as Short's observation 
of the Sienna in the driveway was not a "search" in the 
constitutional sense, he did not act in bad faith by "conducting 
an unlawful search in order to accelerate discovery of the 
evidence."  McAfee, supra at 480, quoting Commonwealth v. 
O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 118 (1989). 
 
27 The affidavit for the GPS had additional facts, as it was 
discovered after the search of the Sienna. 
39 
 
victim's children, after being asked whether their father had 
any conflicts, told officers about the victim's relationship 
with Harris while she was living with the defendant.  The 
victim's daughter stated that the victim found it odd when the 
defendant invited him to the defendant's house for drinks after 
Harris's wake.  The officers checked the defendant's criminal 
record and saw that Harris had a restraining order against him 
in 2003 and that he had been convicted of assault and battery on 
an elderly disabled person in 2013, a case in which the victim 
was a witness. 
 
In the victim's home, there was one partially consumed 
Beck's beer bottle on its side under the kitchen table; the 
remainder of the beer in the victim's home was "Miller High 
Life" brand.  Nine millimeter ammunition and shell casings were 
found near the victim's body. 
 
When Abramoski arrived at the defendant's residence to 
speak with him, he noted two vehicles cleared of snow, the Yaris 
and the Sienna, both registered to the defendant.  The defendant 
stated that he knew the victim and met him through Harris.  He 
told the officers that he believed the victim and Harris to be a 
"little more than just friends," and produced the e-mail message 
that he discovered, readily available in his left shirt pocket, 
which, as detailed supra, revealed a years-long affair between 
the victim and the defendant's longtime girlfriend.  The 
40 
 
defendant stated that he discovered this message one week 
earlier. 
The defendant told officers that he spoke to the victim on 
the telephone on February 8, 2016, the day before the victim's 
body was discovered.  Despite allegedly finding the e-mail 
message one week earlier, the defendant claimed that he never 
brought this to the victim's attention on their telephone call.  
The affair made him very upset. 
 
On February 8, 2016, the defendant said that he left his 
house approximately between 10 P.M. and 11 P.M., in the severe 
weather, to go for a "joy ride" in his Sienna to Dover, New 
Jersey, because he was upset about discovering the relationship 
between the victim and Harris.  He stated that he stopped twice 
for gasoline and paid for everything in cash.  When he arrived 
at approximately 4 A.M., he took a nap in a store's parking lot, 
the location of which he could not recall, and slept for several 
hours.  He then visited his old neighborhood in New Jersey, of 
which he could not remember the exact location, and returned 
home.  He arrived home that day at 12 P.M.  Anthony confirmed 
that the defendant was not home from late on February 8 until 
February 9 at around 11 A.M. 
 
The defendant stated that he knew the victim's home was in 
Wareham, but did not know where exactly.  He initially told 
officers he never owned a handgun, but then claimed he may have 
41 
 
owned a nine millimeter handgun that he sold to an unknown party 
when his license expired.  The defendant was not concerned about 
the victim's whereabouts because "it was difficult to [still] 
consider the victim a friend" after finding the e-mail message.  
He told the officers that he drinks Beck's beer. 
"Probable cause requires a '"substantial basis" to conclude 
that "the items sought are related to the criminal activity 
under investigation, and that they reasonably may be expected to 
be located in the place to be searched at the time the search 
warrant issues."'"  Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521 
(2017).  From the information summarized above, the magistrate 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had recently 
unearthed a motive to murder the victim, lied about owning a 
nine millimeter gun at some point (where nine millimeter live 
rounds and casings were found by the victim's body), drank the 
same type of beer found in the victim's home near his body, and 
acted in a suspicious manner on the night of the victim's 
murder, with no record of his activities.  This information, 
without reference to Short's observations, provided ample 
support for probable cause to search the defendant's home and 
Sienna, where the GPS was subsequently discovered, for evidence 
relating to the defendant's murder of the victim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712-715 (2000) 
42 
 
(affidavit provided substantial basis to search defendant's home 
and car for evidence of murder of his wife). 
 
b.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that he is entitled to a new trial or a reduction of the verdict 
of guilty of murder in the first degree under our powers 
pursuant to § 33E.  As reason therefore, he asserts that an 
acquittal based on self-defense or a reduction to manslaughter 
would be more consonant with justice.  He also argues that his 
age, mental state, and the circumstances surrounding the killing 
support a reduction in the verdict.  We disagree and see nothing 
else in the record warranting the exercise of our extraordinary 
authority under § 33E. 
 
It is our duty, under § 33E, to "consider broadly the whole 
case on the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict 
is consonant with justice."  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 
338, 363-364 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 
721, 747 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018).  "This court's 
authority to reduce a conviction of murder in the first degree 
in the interest of justice 'should be used sparingly and with 
restraint.'"  Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 619-
620 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 824 
(2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  We reduce 
convictions "only in the most compelling circumstances."  
Billingslea, supra at 620.  Factors we have considered in 
43 
 
mitigating a verdict of murder in the first degree include, but 
are not limited to, whether the intent to kill was formed "in 
the heat of sudden affray or combat" or during a "senseless 
brawl"; whether the sequence of the killing reflects spontaneity 
rather than premeditation; whether the defendant brought a 
weapon to the scene; "whether the victim was the first 
aggressor"; whether the defendant and victim knew each other or 
were strangers, and the relationship between them; whether 
alcohol or drugs were involved; and personal characteristics of 
the defendant, such as age, family, disability, and lack of 
prior record (citations omitted).  Vargas, supra at 364-365. 
 
This case does not present a set of circumstances in which 
the defendant likely acted in self-defense to save himself from 
the victim's attack.  The defendant's testimony supporting such 
a theory was incredible, and justifiably, the jury rejected it. 
The evidence presented at trial strongly supported the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant, driven by anguish over 
the victim's affair with Harris, went to the victim's home in 
the early hours of the morning in the middle of a snowstorm with 
the intent to brutally kill him.  By the time of the trial, the 
defendant admitted that he lied to police and found the e-mail 
messages the day before the victim was found dead.  He drove to 
the area of the victim's house three times on the night of the 
murder, unassuaged when he could not locate the victim's home 
44 
 
the first two times.  He arrived at the victim's house with two 
firearms on his person.  The victim's attitude toward Harris 
made the defendant "very angry."  He was at the victim's home 
for only seven minutes. 
The victim's injuries reflected the product of rage.  The 
victim had ten gunshot wounds that penetrated his hand, torso, 
chest, hip, back, lungs, organs, and brain.  In addition, he had 
a graze gunshot wound on his left forearm and was stabbed in his 
abdomen to the point that his intestines protruded.  Even 
recognizing that the victim owned a large number of guns, the 
defendant's theory was that the victim came at him with a knife, 
falling on the knife and then pulling it out of the victim's own 
stomach and continuing to stab the defendant, all the while on 
top of the defendant as the defendant fired off the above-
mentioned shots.  There were only minor injuries located on the 
defendant's hands at the police station.  These facts do not 
comport with those that we have found justified a reduction in a 
verdict of murder in the first degree in the past.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 120 (2018) (where 
evidence "far from compelling," no ill will between defendant 
and victim, and no motive for killing, reduction warranted), and 
Vargas, 475 Mass. at 365-366 (jury rejected theory of deliberate 
premeditation, victim was initial aggressor, defendant 
reasonably could have feared victim, defendant swung knife in 
45 
 
wild manner and told third party to call 911, and killing was 
product of sudden combat and heat of passion), with Commonwealth 
v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 111-112 (2011) (although 
"senseless," defendant initiated, continued, and escalated 
brawl, which was fueled by animus, and defendant stabbed victim 
viciously and repeatedly). 
Similarly, there are no mitigating factors suggesting a 
reduction in the defendant's conviction.  Although it is 
regrettable that Harris was unfaithful to the defendant with the 
victim, this did not warrant the defendant's actions in 
response.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Ronchi, 491 Mass. 284, 295 (2023) 
(sudden oral revelation of infidelity does not satisfy objective 
element of something that would provoke reasonable person to 
kill his spouse). 
The defendant's older age does not warrant a reduction in 
his conviction under these facts.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 154 (2022) (declining to grant relief due 
to defendant's youth and immaturity where defendant was "twenty 
years old at the time of the stabbing and there [was] nothing in 
the record that indicate[d] that a reduction in the verdict on 
this basis [was] warranted"); Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 
663, 677 (2021) ("The fact that the defendant was nineteen at 
the time of the shooting is not alone enough for relief under 
§ 33E").  We decline to reverse the verdict on this basis, 
46 
 
especially in light of the fact that the defendant has a prior 
conviction for harming an elderly person -- this is not the 
first time the defendant acted in a violent matter. 
We reject the defendant's assertion that he was acting 
"under some degree of duress" at the time of the murder.  In 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 835 (2012), the court 
"reject[ed] duress as a defense to deliberately premeditated 
murder, murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
murder in the second degree," but left open the possibility that 
"in exceptional and rare circumstances of duress," the court may 
reduce a defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on 
§ 33E review.  The defendant did not act under duress in this 
case.  Duress "is not available to a person who recklessly puts 
himself in a position where coercion probably will be applied."  
Id. at 833.  It is 
"a present, immediate, and pending threat of such a nature 
as to induce a well-founded and reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily injury if the criminal act is not done, with 
no reasonable and available chance of escape, and where no 
person of reasonable firmness could have acted otherwise in 
the circumstances." 
 
Id. at 832-833.  Here, the defendant, on his own accord, walked 
into the victim's home armed with two guns in the middle of the 
night, angry about the victim's relationship with Harris.  He 
was under no threat to do so. 
47 
 
 
Having carefully examined the entire record, including, but 
not limited to, the photographs admitted at the trial, the 
defendant's statements to police, the expert testimony, and the 
issue with a juror in the middle of the trial, we have discerned 
no basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree or to order a new trial.  We decline to exercise 
our authority to do so. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Although it does not have any impact on 
the defendant's murder conviction, we vacate his convictions on 
the two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm without an 
FID card and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition 
without an FID card, consistent with our holding in Commonwealth 
v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 693-694 (2023) ("our holding applies 
prospectively and to those cases that were active or pending on 
direct review as of the date of the issuance of [New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)]").  
"[T]he defendant's rights under the Second Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution] and his rights to due process were 
violated when he was convicted of unlawfully possessing 
ammunition [and firearms] although the jury were not instructed 
that licensure is an essential element of the crime."  Guardado, 
supra at 693.  We need not vacate his conviction of possession 
of a large capacity firearm.  See id. ("we decline the 
defendant's suggestion that we extend this holding to the crime 
48 
 
of unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device").  We 
affirm the defendant's convictions of possession of a large 
capacity firearm and murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.