Title: Ex Parte Lewis

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

556 So. 2d 370 (1989)
Ex parte Marion Jerome LEWIS.
(Re Marion Jerome Lewis v. State).
87-1211.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 31, 1989.
Robert E. Clark of Clark, Deen & Copeland, Mobile, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Andy S. Poole, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to review petitioner's claim that the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ala.Code 1975, § 15-23-1 et seq.) was improperly and unconstitutionally applied, and that the trial judge erred in assessing the maximum fine allowed by the Act against the petitioner.
Petitioner was indicted on a charge of murder, and was convicted of manslaughter. The trial judge sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment, fined him $3,000, and assessed a $10,000 sum against him under the provisions of the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and that Court affirmed, without writing an opinion. Petitioner complied with the provisions of Rule *371 39(k), Ala.R.App.P., and raised two issues, one dealing with an alleged error in his trial, and the other concerning the proper application of the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act. We review only petitioner's claims concerning the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act.
In a multi-faceted attack upon the trial court's application of the Act, petitioner raises these questions:
1. Did the trial court improperly consider the noneconomic impact of the crime, such as emotional suffering by the victim's spouse and friend, in determining the amount of the victim compensation assessment?
2. Did the trial court err in construing the assessment to be a direct award by the court to the victim's family members and friend?
3. Was the trial court's consideration of the impact of the crime upon individuals not named in the Act as potential claimants error?
4. Could the trial court impose a $10,000 victim compensation assessment even though this sum exceeded the amount that a court could assess as a fine for manslaughter, a class C felony at that time?
5. Was the $10,000 assessment an "excessive fine" under the provisions of either the federal or the Alabama constitution?
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39(k), petitioner set out the following, which occurred in connection with the assessment made by the trial judge under the Victims Compensation Act:
"`THE COURT: But I do have to consider the impact on the victims also and I am considering that impact and there is no reason why the victim should suffer an impact without having it alleviated to some extent. This restitution in no way will make up for the personal loss that the ex-husband of the victim has suffered, that Ms. Hopkins has suffered, and that the victim's best friend, who is in court with us  what is your name, please, ma'am?
"`MS. HENDERSON: Gloria Henderson.
`"THE COURT: Gloria Henderson, yes, has suffered. So, I am going to stick with my order on the victim compensation assessment.
`"MR. COPELAND: For the record, we object to it. We object to Your Honor's considering the impact on the victim's family in terms of emotional suffering. We object to the 
"`THE COURT: No, I am simply saying that the compensation doesn't make up for that as it is. It goes in small part to compensating them pecuniarily.
"`MR. COPELAND: We object to it as erroneous, disproportionate, and constituting an excessive fine. [RT-276-277.]
"`* * * *
"`THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. [RT-278.]"
Before addressing the questions raised by petitioner, we deem it advisable and helpful in this case of first impression to review briefly the history and development of victim compensation legislation, in general, and the purpose of the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act, in particular.
Crime victim compensation is not new. It was a part of many ancient legal codes. Lesley J. Friedsam, in an article in the *372 Florida State University Law Review, sets out some of the historical origins of such laws:
"`If the robber is not caught, the man who has been robbed shall formally declare whatever he has lost before a god, and the city and the mayor in whose territory or district the robbery has been committed shall replace whatever he has lost for him.
"`If [it is a] life [that is lost], the city or the mayor shall pay one maneh of silver to his kinsfolk.'
L. Friedsam, "Legislative Assistance to Victims of Crime: The Florida Crimes Compensation Act," 11 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 859 (1984).
Most of the States now have crime victim compensation acts. The Alabama Legislature adopted our act in 1984. Act No. 84-658, 1984 Ala. Acts. Section 2 of the Act (codified at § 15-23-2) stated its purpose:
The theoretical justifications for victim compensation laws are: 1) public assistance to the sufferers; 2) the social obligation of the state to indemnify the victim of crime; and 3) the loss of the victim of crime as a judicial question.
*373 One commentator, who proposes a program of correctional restitution, comments on the purpose of victim compensation schemes, as follows:
Schafer, "Victim Compensation and Responsibility," 43 S.Cal.L.Rev 55, 65 (1970).
Having completed a short historical background and analysis of victim compensation schemes, we now address specifically petitioner's arguments.
First, we consider whether the trial court erred in considering the noneconomic impact upon the victim's family and friend in determining the amount of the assessment.
Petitioner argues that noneconomic loss or detriment to a victim's family, specifically noneconomic loss or detriment such as mental anguish or emotional suffering, is not a permissible factor for a sentencing judge to consider in making an assessment under the Act. He argues that § 15-23-8, which deals with awards of compensation to crime victims from a fund created by the Act, specifically authorizes compensation only for economic loss, which is specifically defined in § 15-23-3(11), and he argues that "non-economic loss or detriment," which is defined in § 15-23-3(12) as "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment and nonpecuniary damage," is not compensable.
The State argues that § 15-23-17(b), which was part of the Act, provides that any person convicted of or pleading guilty to a felony must pay an assessment of at least $25.00 and may be required to pay up to $10,000 and that the list of factors set out in § 15-23-17(b) is not an exclusive listing.
We agree with the State's argument. Section 15-23-17(b) provides:
Although the Legislature specifically listed several factors that a sentencing judge should consider, we find that this list is not exhaustive. The fact that the Legislature used the words "such as" indicates that the sentencing judge could consider factors other than those listed. The words "severity of the crime" contemplate that some crimes are more reprehensible than others and that they produce greater emotional suffering and societal disdain; therefore, we hold the trial judge was authorized to consider the fact that the crime was "severe" because of its noneconomic impact upon family, friends and society.
Second, we consider whether the trial judge was authorized to impose both a fine and an assessment under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, and also whether the assessment of the maximum amount in this case constitutes an "excessive fine" under the federal and state constitutions.
We hold that the trial judge was authorized to impose both a fine and an assessment under the Crime Victims Compensation Act and that the total amount of the fine and assessment does not constitute an "excessive fine."
*374 The $10,000 assessment and the $3,000 fine are both authorized, under the provisions of § 15-23-17(b) and § 13A-5-11, respectively.
Section 15-23-17(b) provides in pertinent part:
Section 13A-5-11(a)(3) provides:
The first sentence of § 15-23-17(b) clearly states that the victim compensation assessment is intended to be "[i]n addition to... other costs, penalties or fines imposed pursuant to law." The intent of the Legislature is plain and will be enforced.
Petitioner's arguments that the total amount of the fine and assessment constitutes an "excessive fine" have no merit. In a civil setting, in which punitive damages are recoverable for wrongful death, this Court has upheld substantial awards when the death was negligently, not intentionally, inflicted. See, e.g., Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1986), and Alabama Power Co. v. Cantrell, 507 So. 2d 1295 (Ala.1986), appeal dismissed, 486 U.S. 1028, 108 S.Ct 2008, 100 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1988).
We hold that the Legislature has the power to authorize both a fine and an assessment under the provisions of the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act, and that the amount of this particular assessment is not "excessive."
The last question we address is whether the judgment should be reversed on the basis that the trial judge was mistaken concerning the persons who would receive any amount that he assessed under the provisions of the Act.
The trial court was apparently mistaken concerning the method for payment of victim compensation when he stated that "there is no reason why the victims should suffer an impact without having it alleviated to some extent" and in further stating that "[t]his restitution will in no way make up for the personal loss that the ex-husband of the victim has suffered, that Ms. Hopkins has suffered, and that the victim's best friend, ... Gloria Henderson ... has suffered.... It goes in small part to compensating them pecuniarily."
Petitioner states that "[w]e can only speculate as to what [assessment] the trial court would have imposed had it been aware of the proper procedure by which claimants may obtain awards from the fund, but the court's erroneous rationale in imposing the Victims Compensation Act [assessment] leaves no alternative but to reverse the assessment and remand the matter for reimposition."
The State concedes that "[p]etitioner correctly states that the Crime Victims Compensation Commission administers the fund into which assessments are made and within its discretionary authority considers claims made [against] the fund," but argues that "[e]ven if the trial court's understanding of the nature and use of the assessment was incorrect, it does not alter the fact that the amount of the assessment is proper and within the statutory range."
The State contends that "[s]ince the Act does not restrict or limit the factors to be considered by the trial court, this does not warrant reversal of this case." We cannot agree with the State's argument on this point.
*375 Because the trial court was mistaken as to the applicable law, we cannot say with certainty that its assessment under the provisions of the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Act would have been the same; therefore, we must set aside that assessment and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further proceedings consistent with the law as set out in this opinion.
We do not hold that the trial court cannot impose the maximum assessment if such an assessment is consistent with the guidelines set out in § 15-23-17(b), as herein interpreted.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.