Title: State v. Bridge

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

173 Kan. 13 (1952)
244 P.2d 195
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
ELVON LEROY BRIDGE, Appellant.
No. 38,488

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 10, 1952.
Elisha Scott, of Topeka, argued the cause, and John J. Scott and Kenneth Ray, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Harold H. Harding, county attorney, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Harold R. Fatzer, attorney general, J. Milton Sullivant, assistant county attorney, and Francis J. Donnelly, assistant county attorney, both of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
Appellant was duly charged in the district court of Wyandotte county with felonious intent, as defined by section 431 of our Crimes Act (chap. 21, art. 4, G.S. 1949). Upon a jury trial he was found guilty under section 435 of that act. He has appealed and contends the court erred by refusing to instruct on simple assault; that the verdict is contrary to law and not sustained by the evidence; that the court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial, and that the court misdirected the jury on material matters of law.
*14 The story of the assault may be stated as follows: The complaining witness, Roy Dempsey, and a Mrs. Alpha Seals, were employed at Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company in the Armourdale district in Kansas City. She got off from work there at 12:30 a.m. As shown by appellant's abstract the complaining witness testified:
Respecting that transaction Mrs. Seals testified as follows:
The above testimony was not materially modified by the cross-examination of the witness. It was the only testimony in the record which deals with the assault. Immediately after the shooting Dempsey drove to St. Margaret's Hospital, situated in the vicinity. There the doctor found that he had been shot in the right breast, the bullet having entered his body above the nipple and lodged in the right lung cavity. It was not removed from the lung because of the imminent risk involved in such an operation. He was released from the hospital six days later.
When Dempsey and Mrs. Seals reached the hospital the police were promptly notified. Two detectives soon came to the hospital and Mrs. Seals went with them to the scene of the tragedy. They found a Buick automobile about a block from where Dempsey had parked his car and near it the defendant was lying on his back on the ground. He was in his stocking feet. His shoes had been removed and placed on the floor of the automobile between the front and rear seats. A handkerchief was tied and hanging loosely about his neck. Defendant was in pain and was taken to the hospital. There three doctors operated on him and found that he had four gunshot wounds. He was treated and cared for at the hospital and was released on August 23, 1950. The morning after the shooting the officers re-examined the area where it occurred and found a pistol in a bunch of weeds situated between the Buick car and the place Dempsey had parked.
Defendant testified in his own behalf, admitted the Buick car belonged to him, and also that the pistol found by the officers belonged to him. He testified he had no recollection of the incidents; that the evening before he had been drinking beer and got pretty drunk; that he had an automobile mechanic working on his car, which work was not finished until late at night, and that he had no recollection of driving the car from the garage, or anything that occurred that evening until the next day when he was in the hospital. The detectives who found him the evening of the shooting and who saw him and talked with him soon after he was taken to the hospital observed no evidence of intoxication and found no odor of alcohol on his breath.
*16 The principal point urged by counsel for appellant for reversal is the refusal of the court to give a requested instruction on simple assault. They cite State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282, where it was held:
And in the opinion (p. 378) it was said:
In that case defendant was charged with first degree murder and found guilty as charged. Among other questions argued on appeal was the contention the court erred in failing to give instructions on the first or second degree of manslaughter. The court did give instructions on murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and manslaughter in the third degree and in the fourth degree. The court said (p. 378):
The rule there stated has been applied in many of our cases. It conforms to our statute (G.S. 1949, 62-1447), the pertinent parts of which read:
In State v. Mize, 36 Kan. 187, 13 Pac. 1, defendant was tried on a charge of assault and battery and was convicted of assault. The court instructed the jury:
Respecting this the court said:
*17 In State v. Powers, 92 Kan. 220, 139 Pac. 1166, defendant was prosecuted under what was then section 38 (now 431) of the Crimes Act and found guilty. On appeal it was contended that the court erred in not giving an instruction under section 42 (now 435) of the Crimes Act. The court held:
To the same effect, see State v. Young, 109 Kan. 526, 200 Pac. 285, and the cases cited (pp. 532, 533).
Counsel for appellant rely heavily upon the case of State v. Lanam, 140 Kan. 434, 36 P.2d 966, where, as here, defendant was charged under section 431 of the Crimes Act and found guilty under section 435. In that case the court gave instructions on both of those sections and also instructed on simple assault. Counsel say the court approved the instruction on simple assault. We think this court did no more than state a fact shown by the record, and that the simple assault instruction was not approved. The court said (p. 435):
In State v. Thyer, 143 Kan. 238, 53 P.2d 907, defendant, as here, was charged under section 431 of our Crimes Act and convicted under section 435. In the opinion (p. 243) it was said:
In State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746, 137 P.2d 133, it was held:
Under the evidence previously recited we see no room for an instruction on simple assault. The giving of such an instruction would have tended to confuse the jury and would have been erroneous.
*18 The contention that the instructions were confusing is not well taken. We have carefully examined them and find they were unusually clear and explicit. The evidence amply sustained the verdict. There was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.