Title: Salveson v. Cubin

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Salveson v. Cubin1990 WY 49791 P.2d 581Case Number: 89-28Decided: 05/11/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
RONALD DEAN SALVESON, 
CO-ADMINISTRATOR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ANTHONY G. TUNTAS 
AND MAUREEN TUNTAS, CO-ADMINISTRATOR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF ANTHONY G. TUNTAS, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF MAUREEN TUNTAS AND ANNE TUNTAS, 
INDIVIDUALLY, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

FREDERICK W. CUBIN, M.D., 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry Leimback, J.

Robert N. 
Williams of Meyer & Williams, Jackson, and John H. Westover of O'Connor, 
Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A., Phoenix, 
Ariz., for appellants.

W. Thomas 
Sullins, II, of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, JJ., and RAPER, Retired 
Justice.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      The complaint of 
appellants initiating this action alleged that appellee, and others dismissed 
prior to trial, were negligent in medical care rendered appellants' decedent and 
asserted a claim for wrongful death and associated damages. A jury found 
appellee not negligent. This appeal charges error by the trial judge in denying 
a motion of appellants to designate an additional expert witness to examine 
office notes of appellee, such motion being filed long after the cut-off date to 
designate expert witnesses.

[¶2]      Appellants set 
out as issues on appeal:

     1. Did the plaintiffs 
in this medical malpractice action have an absolute right to call rebuttal 
witnesses for the purpose of challenging the integrity of the testimony of the 
defendant and of the defendant's office records, issues which were first raised 
by the defendant in the presentation of his case.

     2. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion five months before the then set trial date in refusing to 
permit the plaintiffs to procure an examination of the defendant doctor's 
records by a questioned documents expert and in denying the plaintiffs' motion 
to amend the pretrial order to name such questioned documents expert as a 
witness.

[¶3]      Appellee sets 
them out to be:

     A. Whether the trial 
court was correct in establishing pretrial deadlines for the designation of 
expert witnesses and in exercising its discretion enforcing the 
same.

     B. Whether the trial 
court was correct in refusing the testimony of plaintiffs' offered rebuttal 
expert witness, when such expert witness was not designated as a witness in the 
case, and when the proposed testimony was not proper rebuttal 
testimony.

[¶4]      At the pretrial 
conference held on June 4, 1987, the trial judge set deadlines for completion of 
discovery, to designate expert witnesses and list and exchange exhibits. By the 
same order, the case was set for trial in January 1988. Such trial date was 
continued and jury trial was eventually held October 31 through November 9, 
1988, against only appellee Cubin. The jury verdict favored appellee and the 
court entered judgment accordingly.

[¶5]      The pretrial 
conference order provided that the deadline for further discovery be November 1, 
1987 with a provision that plaintiffs (appellants) be allowed to list additional 
expert witnesses if they desired on or before July 1, 1987. Provision was made 
that application could be made after a cut-off date of "August 1, 1988 [sic] for 
additional time" and the court would consider the matter.

[¶6]      About March 17, 
1988, plaintiffs moved for "leave to designate additional expert witness and for 
leave to permit an expert documents examiner to examine defendant's [appellee's] 
original office notes."

[¶7]      Defendant 
objected asserting that plaintiffs' motion was out of time, to grant it would be 
violative of Rule 16, W.R.C.P. and Rule 601, Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts and further that the office notes had been testified to and about many 
times during discovery in not only the case before us now but a previous case by 
plaintiffs against an insurance company and others, which previous case had 
already gone to trial and judgment.

[¶8]      A pretrial order 
controls the subsequent course of action in a civil case. Rule 16, W.R.C.P.,1 cited and approved in Clouser v. 
Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1974). This court has further held that 
whether or not the parties in a particular case are required to abide with this 
direction in W.R.C.P., is a matter of broad discretion with the trial judge, 
Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 237 (Wyo. 1988), and any claims of error 
in that regard are examined under that standard. See also McCabe v. R.A. Manning 
Construction Company, Inc., 674 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983) to the same 
effect.

[¶9]      The trial court 
thoughtfully heard argument and applied practical reasoning to justify denial of 
appellants' motion to designate an additional expert witness. He noted that the 
doctor appellee's notes had gone through a previous trial and were in the 
custody of the court reporter and impressions on them could have been made 
during the course of reporter handling. He observed that the issues as drawn and 
considered by the appellee in trial preparation were different than an issue 
created by testimony of an expert documents examiner as to authenticity and 
appellee would be ambushed. The case had been settled to be tried on medical 
issues. This would destroy the purpose of the pretrial rule in that the order 
made well in advance of trial to control the course of the trial would become a 
nullity. The trial court at the trial refused a move on the part of appellants 
to use such an expert because, at this point, the appellee would really be 
ambushed in not having prepared to meet a new issue.

[¶10]   The question of use of an expert 
documents examiner arose when appellants first filed their motion to have 
examination by a documents examiner of appellee's original notes made by 
appellee during the course of decedent's medical examination by appellee and 
further sought authority to designate the examiner as an additional expert 
witness.

[¶11]   The trial judge made the following 
statement at that time:

     THE COURT: Well, upon 
further reflection, it seems to me that this is creating issues way beyond what 
was contemplated by the parties. It would open up a whole new aspect of the 
trial and of the examination of Dr. Cubin. It would require a whole different 
approach to the Defendant's presentation. It is a matter that, as I hear the 
further description, is purely a matter not developed at trial, the previous 
trial, but one that seems to be developed as an afterthought and could have been 
contemplated and dealt with during the discovery period.

[¶12]   We have then the following sequence 
of pertinent events:

1. Deadlines set at 
pretrial conference.

2. Several months after 
the deadline set for designating additional expert witnesses, appellants applied 
to the court to name an additional expert witness, a documents examiner, and in 
that connection permit examination of appellee's original notes by such expert 
witness.

3. Appellants' attempt at 
the close of appellee's evidence to call an expert documents examiner as a 
rebuttal witness.

[¶13]   We see then that the denial of 
rebuttal as indicated was based on the pretrial conference order which set the 
"subsequent course of action, unless modified at trial to prevent manifest 
injustice." There could have been a timely designation at the pretrial 
conference because by that time there had already been extensive discovery by 
both sides and a trial at which appellants showed concern in connection with 
appellee's medical notes. Appellee had been extensively cross-examined as to his 
method of making notes. This was not a matter of surprise to appellants but a 
situation that could have been avoided. There is no manifest injustice to 
appellants. The trial judge did not act on some whimsy or indiscretion, but 
acted with reason and lawfully, authorized by Rule 16, W.R.C.P.

[¶14]   On the other hand, the appellee 
would have been ambushed if the rebuttal testimony had been allowed at trial. He 
would not have had time to prepare a defense to the new issue raised by the 
testimony of an expert documents examiner. Appellee had the right to rely on 
appellants' failure to designate such a witness at the pretrial conference and 
the court's subsequent order denying appellants' motion to allow such 
designation. For the court to permit the testimony would have worked a manifest 
injustice on appellee.

[¶15]   The trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion. The die had been cast by the pretrial order when the issues and 
deadlines had been fixed but allowing a grace period in which the appellants 
could have acted to use the witness they sought.

[¶16]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 16 provides in 
pertinent part:

The court shall make an 
order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed 
to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the 
matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed 
of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered 
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to 
prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by 
rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as 
above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury 
actions or extend it to all actions. (Emphasis added.)