Title: Sallie T. v. Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3147 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Interest of Nadia S., a person  
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sallie T.,  
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human 
Services and Gloria S.,  
 
Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  212 Wis. 2d 694, 570 N.W. 46 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 18, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas P. Donegan 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
George N. Kotsonis and Law Offices of George N. Kotsonis, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by George N. Kotsonis. 
 
 
For the respondent, Milwaukee County DH&HS, the 
cause was argued by Debra M. Sciano, assistant district attorney, 
with whom on the brief was E. Michael McCann, district attorney. 
 
 
 
For the respondent, Gloria S., there was a brief 
and oral argument by Charles L. Glynn, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the guardian ad litem there was a brief by 
Lisa D. Walker, and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Michael J. Vruno, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3147 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Nadia S., a person  
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sallie T.,  
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County Department of Health and  
Human Services and Gloria S.,  
 
          Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUN 24, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Sallie T., 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 
affirming a circuit court order returning the petitioner's 
foster child to the biological mother.  The petitioner contends 
that the circuit court incorrectly determined that compliance 
with the return home conditions in a child in need of protection 
or services (CHIPS) dispositional order created a presumption 
that return home was in the child's best interests. Although the 
dispositional order has expired, we address the issue because it 
presents a matter of great public concern and offers an 
opportunity to provide guidance to the circuit courts.  We 
                     
1 Sallie T. v. Milwaukee County Department of Health and 
Human Services, 212 Wis. 2d 694, 570 N.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 
1997)(affirming decision of circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Thomas P. Donegan, Judge).  
No. 96-3147 
2 
determine that compliance with a dispositional order is not 
dispositive of a child's best interests.  Because the circuit 
court has lost competency to proceed in this matter, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The child at the center of this dispute, Nadia, was 
less than a year old when she was originally adjudged a child in 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.13(10),2 and removed from the home of her biological mother, 
Gloria. Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.38(4)(g),3 
the 
CHIPS 
dispositional 
order 
transferring 
Nadia's 
placement 
imposed 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § 48.13 indicates in pertinent part: 
Jurisdiction over children alleged to be in need of 
protection or services.  The court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in 
need of protection or services which can be ordered by 
the court, and: 
 
(10) Whose parent, guardian or legal custodian 
neglects, refuses or is unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, 
medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously 
endanger the physical health of the child . . . . 
 
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 
1995-96 volumes of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
3 Wis. Stat. § 48.38 indicates in part: 
(4) CONTENTS OF PLAN. The permanency plan shall 
include a description of all of the following: 
. . . . 
 
(g) The conditions, if any, upon which the child 
will be returned to his or her home, including any 
changes required in the parents' conduct, the child's 
conduct or the nature of the home.   
 
No. 96-3147 
3 
several conditions upon Gloria's conduct before return of the 
child could be contemplated.4 
¶3 
Approximately five years after Nadia's placement with 
Sallie, the Milwaukee County Department of Health and Social 
Services ("DHSS") filed a notice of change of placement pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 48.357,5 intending to return Nadia to Gloria.  
Without notice to Sallie the circuit court ordered Nadia 
returned to her biological mother. 
¶4 
Four days later, Sallie filed an objection to the 
ordered change of Nadia's placement and requested a hearing on 
                     
4 These conditions included cooperation with the Milwaukee 
County Department of Health and Social Services, maintenance of 
suitable 
household 
conditions, 
psychological 
evaluation, 
extensive visitation with the child, abstinence from alcohol and 
drugs, chemical dependency counseling, and a bar on physical 
discipline of her children.   
5 Wis. Stat. § 48.357 indicates: 
Change in placement.  (1) The person or agency 
primarily 
responsible 
for 
implementing 
the 
dispositional order, the district attorney or the 
corporation counsel may request a change in the 
placement of the child, whether or not the change 
requested is authorized in the dispositional order and 
shall cause written notice to be sent to the child or 
the child's counsel or guardian ad litem, parent, 
foster parent . . . .  Any person receiving the notice 
under this subsection . . . may obtain a hearing on 
the matter by filing an objection with the court 
within 10 days of receipt of the notice. . . .  If . . 
.the change in placement would remove a child from a 
foster home . . . the court shall permit the foster 
parent . . . to make a written or oral statement 
during the hearing or to submit a written statement 
prior to the hearing, relating to the child and the 
requested change in placement.   
No. 96-3147 
4 
the matter under Wis. Stat. § 48.64.6  The circuit court granted 
Sallie a hearing, but limited the scope of the hearing to that 
provided for in Wis. Stat. § 48.357.  After two appeals to 
determine the appropriate scope of Sallie's participation in the 
circuit court hearing, the circuit court finally held the Wis. 
Stat. § 48.64 hearing at issue before this court today. 
¶5 
At that hearing, the circuit court heard evidence that 
Gloria had met the conditions placed on her conduct by the 
dispositional order and also received a recommendation from the 
                     
6 While Sallie filed her objection after the circuit court's 
order was filed, the record reflects that DHSS mailed the 
mandatory notice to the foster parents of change of placement to 
the wrong address and the foster parents were unaware of the 
impending removal of Nadia from their home.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court ruled Sallie's objection to be timely.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.64 provides in pertinent part: 
(1m) FOSTER HOME, TREATMENT FOSTER HOME AND GROUP 
HOME AGREEMENTS.  . . . If a child has been in a 
foster home, treatment foster home or group home for 6 
months or more, the agency shall give the head of the 
home written notice of intent to remove the child, 
stating the reasons for the removal. The child shall 
not be removed before completion of the hearing under 
sub. (4)(a) or (c), if requested, or 30 days after 
receipt of the notice, whichever is later . . . . 
 
(4)(c)  The circuit court for the county where the 
child is placed has jurisdiction upon petition of any 
interested party over a child who is placed in a 
foster home . . . .  The circuit court may call a 
hearing . . . 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
reviewing 
any 
decision or order . . . involving the placement and 
care of the child.  If the child has been placed in a 
foster home, the foster parent may present relevant 
evidence at the hearing.  The court shall determine 
the case so as to promote the best interests of the 
child. 
No. 96-3147 
5 
assigned guardian ad litem that Nadia be returned to her 
biological mother.  Pursuant to the court of appeals decision, 
the circuit court also afforded Sallie an opportunity to present 
"relevant evidence."  However, over Sallie's objection the 
circuit court limited its definition of relevant evidence in 
this case to evidence centering on whether Gloria had complied 
with the conditions of return home in the dispositional order.  
The circuit court then determined that Gloria was in compliance 
with those conditions of the dispositional order and that it was 
in Nadia's best interests to be returned to her biological 
mother.  Accordingly, the court denied Sallie's objection to the 
change of placement.  Sallie appealed. 
¶6 
On March 5, 1997, five months after the circuit 
court's oral rejection of Sallie's objection to the change of 
placement, and three months after the court filed the written 
order, the CHIPS dispositional order governing Nadia's placement 
expired.  At that time, Nadia ceased to be an adjudicated child 
in need of protection or services. 
¶7 
The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the circuit 
court's denial of Sallie's objection to the notice of change of 
placement.  The court of appeals ruled that foster parents and 
biological parents are not on equal footing when considering a 
child's best interests under Wis. Stat. ch. 48, that the circuit 
court did not err in finding Nadia's change of placement to be 
in her best interests, since the court considered Gloria's 
compliance 
with 
the 
conditions, 
the 
guardian 
ad 
litem's 
recommendation, and the foster parent's evidence.  The appellate 
No. 96-3147 
6 
court also determined that the conditions of the dispositional 
order had been met, and that the testimony offered by Sallie was 
either not relevant or that the witnesses were improperly 
subpoenaed.  See Sallie T., 212 Wis. 2d at 712-13. 
I. 
¶8 
As an initial matter, we note that the most recent 
extension of the dispositional order governing Nadia's CHIPS 
status expired March 5, 1997, while the appeal of this matter 
was pending before the court of appeals.  Despite the pending 
appeal on the change of placement, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.075(4)(a)7 the circuit court could have extended the 
dispositional order beyond its expiration date.  However, the 
record does not reflect a subsequent petition for extension or 
the filing of a resulting order.  The State suggested to the 
court of appeals that no extension was requested because DHSS 
felt the child's return to her mother was warranted. 
¶9 
We have previously indicated that when a CHIPS 
dispositional order expires, the circuit court is no longer 
competent to consider issues arising in the context of the 
expired dispositional order.  See Green County Dep't of Human 
Services v. H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 654, 469 N.W.2d 845 
(1991)("In Interest of B.J.N."); State v. Dawn M., 189 Wis. 2d 
480, 485, 526 N.W.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1994)("In Interest of Leif 
E.N."); see also C.A.K. v. State, 147 Wis. 2d 713, 718, 433 
N.W.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1988).  Moreover, like issues of subject 
matter jurisdiction, a court's loss of competence to adjudicate 
a matter cannot be waived by the parties.  See Green County, 162 
No. 96-3147 
7 
Wis. 2d at 658.  "A dispositional order has no validity once the 
time period has elapsed."  Id. 
¶10  In this case the dispositional order governing Nadia's 
placement expired without extension.  The competence of the 
Milwaukee County circuit court expired on that same date; this 
case is moot.7 
 ¶11 Despite the mootness of this appeal, we are cognizant 
of the impact of a published court of appeals decision which 
affirms the circuit court's resolution of a frequently recurring 
situation involving an issue of significant public importance—
whether compliance with the conditions of a CHIPS dispositional 
order creates a presumption that it is in the child's best 
interests to be returned to the biological parents.  Despite our 
general refusal to consider moot cases, we will reach issues of 
"great public concern," Town of Germantown v. Village of 
Germantown, 70 Wis. 2d 704, 710, 235 N.W.2d 486 (1975), or cases 
where "the precise situation under consideration arises so 
frequently that a definitive decision is essential to guide the 
trial courts."  G.S., Jr. v. State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 
                     
7 The court of appeals considered the substance of this case 
based on a belief that "all three individuals . . . still need a 
decision on the merits."  Sallie T., 212 Wis. 2d at 698 n.2.  
That statement is erroneous.  The court of appeals mootness 
determination requires us to either concede that the case is not 
moot because the parties filed an appeal, a position which begs 
the mootness question, or to interpret Wis. Stat. ch. 48 to stay 
expiration of a dispositional order any time a decision 
affecting the running of that order is appealed, a position 
contrary to our precedent.  See Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 
649-51.  
No. 96-3147 
8 
N.W.2d 181 (1984).  This case presents both characteristics and 
we accordingly move to the merits of the legal question 
presented.8 
II. 
¶12 The issue presented for our consideration concerns the 
existence and effect of a legal presumption that a biological 
parent's compliance with conditions existing in a circuit 
court's CHIPS dispositional order automatically determines that 
a child's best interests are best served by returning the child 
to the biological family.  Revision or extension of a CHIPS 
dispositional order based on the best interests of a child is a 
matter left to the discretion of the circuit court.  See R.E.H. 
v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 647, 652-53, 305 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 
1981).  We will not reverse a circuit court's discretionary 
decision unless the circuit court erroneously exercises that 
discretion.  See State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 47, 422 N.W.2d 
913 (Ct. App. 1988).   
¶13 However, a proper exercise of discretion requires the 
circuit court to apply the correct standard of law to the facts 
at hand.  See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 
326 N.W.2d 727 (1982).  Because determination of the proper 
legal 
standard 
to 
be 
applied 
in 
this 
case 
requires 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 48, we conduct that part of our 
                     
8 Sallie also contends the circuit court applied the wrong 
best interests test and improperly barred relevant evidence and 
that the evidence does not support the court's rejection of her 
objection to the change of placement.  However, we decline to 
exercise our discretion to reach those issues.  
No. 96-3147 
9 
review de novo.  See McEvoy v. Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 
213 Wis. 2d 507, 517, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997).  We turn then to 
the case at hand. 
¶14 Sallie contends that the court erroneously applied a 
presumption that compliance by the biological mother with the 
return home conditions in the dispositional order demonstrates 
that the child's best interests is the return home.  The 
guardian ad litem agrees that no presumption exists, but argues 
that the circuit court reached its decision based on evidence 
beyond mere compliance with those conditions.  Similarly, 
neither Gloria nor the State argues in favor of a presumption.  
Rather, they claim that the circuit court acted based on all the 
evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
court's determination of Nadia's best interests.  Faced then 
with the parties' apparently uniform rejection of any form of a 
presumption based on the conditions in the dispositional order, 
we examine the record to determine what standard was actually 
applied by the circuit court. 
III. 
¶15 After 
a 
three-day 
"best 
interests" 
hearing, the 
circuit court rejected Sallie's objection to the notice of 
change of placement, indicating that: 
 
Based on all of the relevant evidence before me and 
all of the testimony before me, I am not granting the 
objection to the change of placement and, in fact, am 
allowing the change of placement to go forward as 
originally requested and put in place by the State.   
No. 96-3147 
10 
This statement read in isolation supports the arguments of the 
guardian ad litem, Gloria, and the State that the circuit court 
did not apply a presumption to the determination of Nadia's best 
interests. 
¶16 However, 
the record 
also 
includes 
the 
following 
statements by the court: 
 
To keep that child out of the home, it has to show 
that the conditions set by the Court have not been 
met.  If the conditions aren't met, they can extend 
that order for a reasonable period of time to give 
more time to the parent to meet the conditions, or the 
Court can determine if certain specified statutory 
provisions 
seem to 
be 
present 
. 
. 
. 
but the 
presumption is always to preserve the unity of the 
family whenever appropriate, and the means we use to 
effectuate that is to determine whether the parent has 
met the conditions set out in the order. . . . So far, 
I say the evidence shows she's met them.  You have to 
show me she has not. . . . 
 
Now, if you have evidence to show me those conditions 
haven't been met, therefore harming the best interest 
of 
this 
child, 
and 
therefore, 
telling 
me 
this 
placement shouldn't be made with the mother, I should 
hear that. 
 
If I find out that everything in this order really 
hasn't happened as has been testified to by this 
worker, then we have made a terrible mistake returning 
the child to the mother.  But, if those are the facts; 
if she went to parenting class; if she went to drug 
treatment; if she has cooperated with the Department; 
if she has done her visits; if she has done all she 
can to meet the conditions, we have no right to keep 
the child from her. . . . 
 
We have to state the conditions for the parent to 
meet.  If they meet them, we return the children to 
them. . . . If they fail to continue to perform, the 
child could be removed again.  But, there are minimal 
conditions we set.  When those conditions are met, the 
courts order return. 
No. 96-3147 
11 
¶17 Upon review, we are forced to conclude that these 
excerpts 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
considered 
compliance 
with 
the 
conditions 
of 
the 
court's 
CHIPS 
dispositional order to be the decisive factor in the court's 
"best interest" analysis.  Even though the court admittedly 
allowed the guardian ad litem to offer her recommendation in 
this matter, and even though the court also indicated that he 
was making his decision based on all of the relevant evidence 
before the court, the record demonstrates that the court felt 
obligated to return the child if the biological parent complied 
with the conditions imposed in the CHIPS dispositional order.  
Our interpretation of the circuit court's comments is buttressed 
by the court's limitation of Sallie's proffer of evidence to 
matters 
only 
addressing 
Gloria's 
compliance 
with 
the 
dispositional order. 
IV. 
¶18 Having established that the circuit court applied a 
presumption that compliance with the conditions mandates return 
to the biological parent, we are left to consider the validity 
of 
such 
a 
presumption 
under 
Wisconsin 
law—a 
presumption 
apparently rejected by all of the parties to this action.  This 
question is previously unaddressed by case law.  It requires us 
to examine the statutory chapters focusing on presumptions, Wis. 
Stat. chs. 891 and 903, and to review the legislature's specific 
directions to the circuit court under the terms of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 48. 
No. 96-3147 
12 
¶19 The most obvious places in which the legislature might 
have located such a presumption are Wis. Stat. chs. 891 and 903, 
both 
of 
which 
are 
confined 
to 
setting 
forth 
statutory 
presumptions and their rules of application.  Chapter 891 
includes 42 different types of presumptions ranging from the 
validity of documents to establishment of paternity.  Chapter 
903 provides a number of rules of application for presumptions 
in civil and criminal proceedings.  Neither chapter, however, 
creates a statutory presumption applicable to determinations 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 48 that compliance with the conditions of a 
CHIPS dispositional order is dispositive of a child's best 
interests.  Accordingly, we next consider the terms of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 48. 
¶20 The statutory context of the current proceeding at the 
circuit court level was a hearing granted as a matter of 
statutory right to foster parents upon the removal of a child 
from a foster home.  The governing statutory section, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.64(4)(c), allows the foster parents to present "relevant 
evidence" and requires the circuit court to determine "the best 
interests of the child."  The section does not provide the court 
with further guidance on the manner in which the best interests 
are to be determined. 
¶21 However, because the hearing arose as part of the 
foster parent's objection to DHSS's notice of change of 
placement under an existing dispositional order, the circuit 
court's determination is also governed by Wis. Stat. § 48.355, 
which sets forth the requirements for a dispositional order.  
No. 96-3147 
13 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)5 requires the court to include a 
permanency plan (involving conditions like the ones at issue 
here) in any dispositional order applied to a child adjudged in 
need of protection or services.  In executing that order, the 
circuit court is required to "employ those means necessary to 
maintain and protect the child's well-being which are the least 
restrictive of the rights of the parent or child and which 
assure the care, treatment or rehabilitation of the child and 
the family . . . ."  Once again, no reference is made in the 
statutory language to a presumption arising from compliance with 
the conditions.   
¶22 Admittedly, the conditions ordered are those "upon 
which the child will be returned to his or her home, including 
any changes required in the parents' conduct, the child's 
conduct or the nature of the home."  Wis. Stat. § 48.38(4)(g).  
Biological parents retain a constitutional right to raise their 
children.  See Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 562, 348 
N.W.2d 479 (1984).  Even where the child is removed from the 
biological home and conditions are placed on the return of the 
child,  "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents 
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not 
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 
have lost temporary custody of their children to the State."  
Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).  
However, we find it significant that the conditions imposed in 
the dispositional order reflect the court's assessment of 
changes that need to be made at the time of the order.  As such, 
No. 96-3147 
14 
those conditions reflect only an initial view of what changes 
are necessary for the court to consider returning the child to 
the biological home. 
¶23 Because 
additional 
issues 
not 
covered 
by 
the 
conditions of the dispositional order may have arisen in the 
home environment between the time of the order and the request 
for change of placement, blind reliance upon those conditions is 
insufficient to truly act in the best interests of the child.  
This point is well reflected by the statutory provisions 
indicating that the circuit court has the discretion to modify 
the conditions of the placement upon any request to change 
placement or extend or revise the dispositional order. See Wis. 
Stat. § 48.355(2e)(a)-(b). 
¶24 Moreover, implying a presumption from the conditions 
of the dispositional order would be inconsistent with the 
established purposes of Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  The legislature 
indicated its intent in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) when it declared 
that "the best interests of the child shall always be of 
paramount consideration . . . ."  To allow a court to ignore 
currently existing conditions in a child's potential home 
environment based on conditions imposed up to a year earlier 
would not be an effective method of promoting the best interests 
of the child.  While the legislature also expressed an intent to 
preserve the unity of the family "by strengthening family life 
through assisting parents," a goal fulfilled in part by the 
conditions imposed by the circuit court, return of the child is 
No. 96-3147 
15 
expressly subject to a determination that it is in the child's 
best interests.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).   
¶25 We 
acknowledge 
that 
in 
most 
cases 
in 
which 
a 
biological parent has successfully met the conditions of return 
the child can and should be returned to the parent.  Affected 
parents continue to maintain a constitutional right in the care 
and custody of their child unless the parental rights are 
terminated and that right cannot needlessly be impugned once the 
parent has complied with the demands made and strictures imposed 
by the reviewing court.  However, the circuit court can also not 
close its eyes to detrimental conditions impacting the welfare 
of the child which have arisen since the imposition of the 
controlling dispositional order and the conditions of return 
therein. 
¶26 Thus, we determine that the best interests of the 
child standard is to be defined in relation to the child and not 
to be used as a euphemism for the biological parent's compliance 
with the return home conditions of a dispositional order.  
Compliance with the conditions of a CHIPS dispositional order 
does not create a presumption that it is in the child's best 
interests to be returned to the biological parents.  Because the 
record 
indicates 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
such 
a 
presumption, we conclude that the circuit court erred.  However, 
because the circuit court in this matter has lost its competence 
to adjudicate matters concerning Nadia, we cannot remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Accordingly, 
the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
No. 96-3147 
16 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.