Title: McClain v. Circuit Court

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1452 
____________ 
 
MARTIN J. MCCLAIN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
HON. JEFFREY H. ATWATER, etc.,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 21, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This case arises from the denial of a motion for reimbursement of 
investigative fees in a capital postconviction proceeding, where the investigative 
fees exceeded the statutory cap for investigative expenses by an additional $1,844.1
                                         
 
1.  Because the order concerns the payment of certain fees that were incurred 
during a postconviction death penalty proceeding filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851, this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 
3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution.  See also Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Freeman, 
921 So. 2d 598, 598 (Fla. 2006). 
  
The Florida Department of Financial Services (DFS) denied payment based solely 
on the fact that the expenses exceeded the statutory cap for investigative expenses.  
DFS takes the position that it is without authority to pay the amount in excess of 
 
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the statutory cap unless authorized by court order.  Neither DFS nor the State 
objects to the payment of the expenses, and there is no contention that the 
investigative expenses were unnecessary or unreasonable.   
We reverse the trial court’s order because the trial court improperly focused 
on whether this was an “ordinary” capital case, as opposed to reviewing whether 
there were “extraordinary or unusual circumstances” that required defense counsel 
to exceed the statutory cap for investigative expenses.  Based on a review of the 
record, we conclude that counsel’s actions and the expenses incurred were 
reasonable and necessary and that the case presented “extraordinary or unusual 
circumstances” that required defense counsel to exceed the statutory cap for 
investigative services.  
FACTS 
Because the investigative expenses at issue were incurred in investigating 
new facts that counsel claimed established doubt about the defendant’s guilt, we 
briefly review the facts.  The defendant, Thomas James Moore, was convicted of 
robbing and killing Johnny Parrish, with whom he was friends, based on the 
following: 
On January 21, 1993, at about 3 p.m., Moore sat outside Parrish’s 
house drinking with the victim.  Moore claims that two other youths, 
Clemons and Gaines, approached the house.  Moore claimed he saw 
the pair chase a neighborhood youth named “Little Terry” with a gun 
earlier that day, but Clemons denied it at trial.  Clemons and Gaines 
testified that they had a conversation with Moore about robbing 
 
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Parrish.  Clemons said he agreed to go in the house with Moore, and 
Gaines was to be the lookout.  Gaines said he stood outside but did 
not see either man go in.  He said he heard two shots and then saw 
Clemons come out of the house and go back in.  When Gaines started 
to walk away, Clemons caught up with him and told him Moore had 
shot Parrish. 
Clemons said that when he and Moore went into the house, 
Moore pulled out a gun.  Moore asked Parrish where his money was 
and then shot him when he got no response.  Later, neighbors saw 
smoke in Parrish’s house and ran in and pulled out Parrish.  Parrish 
was already dead when exposed to the fire, and a fire investigator, 
Captain Mattox, said that there were two separate fires in the house, 
both of which were intentionally set. 
A witness named Shorter testified that Moore brought him a 
bag of clothes and asked him to burn them.  Shorter also testified that 
Moore told him he had shot Parrish and set fire to the house.  Shorter 
stated that Moore said he shot Parrish twice, that Clemons ran out of 
the house, and that Moore took the top off a lawn mower he found and 
set it on fire to clean the house of fingerprints.  Shorter did not call the 
police but did call his mother, who called the police. 
A jail inmate, Jackson, testified that Moore told him that he did 
not mean to kill Parrish but had to because Parrish would recognize 
him.  Another neighbor, Dean, testified that Moore asked him to rob 
Parrish.   
 
Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1997).  The jury recommended a 
sentence of death, and the judge followed this recommendation.  After Moore 
unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief, this Court affirmed the denial of 
postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  See 
Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 202 (Fla. 2002).  
 
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On September 10, 2003, Martin McClain was appointed as registry counsel 
for Moore and later executed a contract with DFS.2  In 2005, McClain contracted 
with private investigator Daniel Ashton to work on Moore’s case.  Ashton obtained 
all of the prior records in the case and reviewed the files, compiling a list of 
witnesses to interview.  He subsequently conducted numerous interviews with 
various individuals, including people who had been incarcerated with Moore’s 
codefendants, Vincent Gaines and Carlos Clemmons,3
                                         
 
2.  McClain was initially appointed to represent Moore in an appeal from the 
denial of relief on a claim premised on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 when they were first 
arrested for the murder of the victim in this case.  A number of individuals stated 
that Gaines and Clemmons had made incriminating statements to them shortly after 
they were arrested.  Based on the newly discovered evidence that Ashton 
uncovered, McClain filed a successive postconviction motion on January 26, 2006.  
The trial judge, Judge John D. Southwood, ordered an evidentiary hearing, which 
was held on March 22, 2011—over five years after the successive motion was 
filed.  Before the hearing, McClain requested that Ashton locate the witnesses 
needed for the hearing and interview them again to ensure their testimony had not 
changed.   
 
3.  In the record before this Court, Clemmons’ name is spelled as 
“Clemmons” but on direct appeal, it is spelled “Clemons.” 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, McClain presented four witnesses who asserted 
that they were incarcerated with Clemmons and Gaines in juvenile detention, 
during which time either Clemmons or Gaines made incriminating statements 
shortly after the murder.  David Hallback testified that he knew Clemmons when 
they were incarcerated together because they attended the same school.  During 
their incarceration, Clemmons admitted that he and Gaines went to the victim’s 
house because they knew that there was a safe in the victim’s house and the victim 
sold moonshine; however, Clemmons and Gaines had to wait for Moore to leave 
because Moore was the victim’s best friend and would not have “let them do that.”   
Mandell Rhodes testified that while he was incarcerated with Gaines and 
Clemmons, Clemmons told Rhodes that although he was the one who killed the 
victim, he was going to blame the crime on the oldest guy because the State had 
given Clemmons an escape since he was so young.  Rhodes also testified that 
Gaines and Clemmons had used a chrome handgun, but Rhodes did not know the 
caliber.   
Raimundo Hogan testified that when he was at the juvenile facility with 
Clemmons and Gaines, Gaines told him that during a robbery, Clemmons shot the 
victim with a .38 handgun that had been stolen from a black Mustang.  In addition, 
Clemmons said they were going to blame a “nobody,” meaning that he did not 
 
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have family or friends that would “get some get-back” after they blamed him for 
the crime.   
Charles Simpson testified for the defense as well, asserting that when he was 
incarcerated in the juvenile facility with Clemmons and Gaines, both of whom he 
knew, Clemmons said the “older guy took the rap.”  In addition, Simpson testified 
that he saw Clemmons pull a chrome .38 handgun on another individual about a 
day before the murder.  Defense counsel also called Michael Dean, who had 
testified at the trial.  Dean stated that he was at the victim’s house, but after he 
went home, he saw Vincent Gaines standing outside the victim’s house.   
Wilhelmina Moore, the defendant’s mother, testified that a few years after 
Moore was convicted of the murder, a trial witness named Chris Shorter 
approached her at a neighborhood service station while she was pumping gas and 
said, “I don’t mean no harm, but I had to do what I had to do because I had to think 
about my children.”  She refused to talk to him and kept the information to herself 
because she was not sure whether the information would help or hurt her son.  
McClain then called John Jackson, who was Moore’s prior postconviction 
attorney at Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-North (CCRC-North).  Jackson 
discussed his unsuccessful attempts to find Gaines and numerous other witnesses 
that he wanted to interview.  Finally, defense investigator Ashton testified as to the 
investigation that he performed and the interviews that he conducted in connection 
 
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with the case.  Ashton also testified that he spoke with codefendant Gaines in 2005 
and that Gaines provided some statements that were inconsistent with his trial 
testimony, including his admission that on the day of the murder, he and 
Clemmons chased a person named Little Terry around a park with a chrome-plated 
.38 handgun that was stolen from a black Mustang at the Imperial Estates 
Apartments three weeks prior.   
After the defense rested, the State called Carlos Clemmons, who denied 
having a gun, denied telling anybody that he was setting up an adult, denied telling 
anybody that he stole a gun from a Mustang, and denied that he ever told anybody 
that Moore was innocent.  Vincent Gaines was the State’s final witness.  He also 
denied that he told anybody that Moore was innocent and denied that he and 
Clemmons committed the crime by themselves.  While he admitted that he had 
chased Little Terry, he denied chasing him with a gun.  At the conclusion of the 
evidence, the trial judge stated as follows: 
I have to make a decision as to whether or not—I don’t necessarily 
have to determine the truthfulness of any or all of these witnesses.  I 
will tell everybody, for what it’s worth, that all of this testimony 
concerns me.  Okay?  I’m not at this point in time ready to absolutely 
disregard all of the testimony I’ve heard.  I may.  But the cumulative 
effect concerns me . . . .  So for whatever that’s worth to you. 
 
After the evidentiary hearing, McClain filed a motion for reimbursement of 
counsel, also requesting that the court issue an order directing the payment of his 
investigative fees including the additional $1,844 fees at issue in this case.  In the 
 
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motion, McClain asserted that the investigative fees exceeded the statutory cap 
because the fees were based on six years of investigation and included interviews 
with a significant number of witnesses who had been incarcerated with Clemmons 
and Gaines in the juvenile facility in 1993.  In addition, he asserted that 
investigative services were necessary to prepare for the March 2011 hearing—a 
hearing that also required lengthy testimony from the investigator himself, who 
was one of the main witnesses.   
 
The Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit heard the motion for 
reimbursement, even though he was not the judge who presided over the 
postconviction proceedings.  At the hearing, McClain relied on his motion for 
reimbursement and the record in the case, including the transcript of the March 
2011 hearing before Judge Southwood.  In denying the motion for reimbursement, 
the chief judge recognized that while DFS and the State Attorney’s Office did not 
object to the request, their positions were not binding on the court.  In relevant 
part, the trial court then analyzed the claim as follows: 
 
5.  In order for this Court to approve the excess fees, such fees 
must be reasonable pursuant to Florida Statute § 27.711(13); 
 
6.  In order for the attorney to be entitled to the excess fees, this 
Court must also find that “extraordinary circumstances” exist, as 
required by Florida Statute § 27.711(6); 
 
7.  This Court finds that this is an ordinary capital post-
conviction case, involving an evidentiary hearing, and that the 
Defendant has not established that extraordinary or unusual 
circumstances existed that would have warranted an extra $1,844.00 
 
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investigator’s fees over and above the $15,000 already spent, as 
required by Florida Statute § 27.711(6). 
 
McClain seeks review of this order.4
ANALYSIS 
 
 
As both DFS and McClain recognize, the issue before this Court is whether 
this postconviction capital case presents extraordinary or unusual circumstances 
that would permit a departure from the statutory fee guidelines in order “to ensure 
that an attorney who has served the public by defending the accused is not 
compensated in an amount which is confiscatory.”  Makemson v. Martin Cnty., 
491 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Fla. 1986). 
In 1998, the Legislature enacted sections 27.710 and 27.711 of the Florida 
Statutes, which provide for a statewide registry of private attorneys who are 
available to represent indigent death row defendants in postconviction proceedings 
and establish the fee schedule that must be adhered to by private attorneys.  The 
fee schedule provided in section 27.711(4) increased the fees that an attorney could 
receive in capital postconviction proceedings, and section 27.711(5) provided 
additional fee provisions pertaining to obtaining the assistance of an investigator: 
 (5) An attorney who represents a capital defendant may use the 
services of one or more investigators to assist in representing a capital 
                                         
 
4.  After this motion for reimbursement was denied, the trial court 
subsequently denied the motion for postconviction relief.  Moore seeks review of 
the denial of relief in a separate appeal.  See Moore v. State, No. SC12-459. 
 
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defendant.  Upon approval by the trial court, the attorney is entitled to 
payment from the Chief Financial Officer of $40 per hour, up to a 
maximum of $15,000, for the purpose of paying for investigative 
services. 
 
§ 27.711(5), Fla. Stat. (2011).5
In Olive v. Maas, 811 So. 2d 644, 653 (Fla. 2002), this Court held that trial 
courts are authorized to award fees in excess of the statutory schedule set out in 
section 27.711 in capital cases “where extraordinary or unusual circumstances 
exist.”  The Court stressed that at the heart of the matter was an indigent 
defendant’s right to competent and effective representation—a right that could be 
in jeopardy if counsel could not be reasonably compensated for the legal services 
he or she was required to provide under the statutory fee limit.  Olive, 811 So. 2d 
at 653.  In further support, the Court recognized that even the staff analysis to the 
statutory provisions explicitly acknowledged that the statutory fee caps “do not 
prevent a court from ordering payment above the maximum authorized” where 
unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist in capital collateral cases.  Id. at 653-
54 (quoting Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 2054 Staff Analysis 7 (March 
   
                                         
 
5.  Section 27.711 has been amended at various times, including the amount 
of compensation to which defense counsel is entitled under section 27.711(4).  
However, since its introduction, subsection (5) has remained substantially the 
same, including providing a $15,000 statutory cap for investigative fees.  The only 
difference is that the Legislature amended this provision to state that defense 
counsel seeks payment from the Chief Financial Officer now, as opposed to the 
Comptroller. 
 
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17, 1999), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/1999/Senate/bills/ 
analysis/pdf/SB2054.cj.pdf).  Thus, as we held, the Legislature incorporated the 
standard set forth in Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1115, into section 27.711 by 
“patently acknowledg[ing] that unless room is made to allow compensation in 
excess of the fee caps, a statutory framework may run afoul of this Court’s 
precedent in Makemson and its progeny.”  Olive, 811 So. 2d at 654; see also Maas 
v. Olive, 992 So. 2d 196, 204 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a trial court has the 
authority in appropriate capital collateral cases involving extraordinary 
circumstances to award compensation in excess of the statutory fee schedule but 
noting that the caps would be exceeded only where “counsel requests additional 
compensation due to extraordinary and unusual circumstances, the trial court issues 
an order awarding such fees, and there is competent, substantial evidence in the 
record to support fees in excess of the statutory limit”).   
In this case, because the chief judge decided McClain’s motion for 
reimbursement of counsel based upon his review of the record and transcripts and 
did not take testimony, the order at issue does not involve credibility 
determinations or factual findings.  Instead, as the order at issue is based entirely 
on written evidence, we examine the ruling in the same manner as any other order 
determining an issue of law on settled facts—whether the applicable issue of law 
was correctly decided, a de novo standard of review.  See Philip J. Padovano, 
 
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Florida Appellate Practice, § 19:2 at 358 n.5 (2013 ed.); Bosem v. Musa Holdings, 
Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010) (stating that pure issues of law are reviewed de 
novo).   
Here, the chief judge correctly recognized that an attorney may be entitled to 
fees beyond the statutory maximum when “extraordinary circumstances” exist.  
However, the judge then denied the motion, summarily finding that Moore’s case 
presented “an ordinary capital postconviction case, involving an evidentiary 
hearing.”  The judge did not elaborate on his ruling or provide any statement to 
indicate that he considered the defendant’s right to effective representation and the 
attorney’s right to fair compensation.   
In denying the motion for reimbursement, the judge made the same error as 
occurred in White v. Board of County Commissioners of Pinellas County, 537 
So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 1989), where the trial court misunderstood our prior 
precedent and applied it in such a manner that it required defense counsel to show 
that the case was sufficiently complex.  A review of the Court’s precedent shows 
that this Court explicitly rejected the premise that in order to obtain fees beyond 
the statutory limit, counsel must show that the case itself is more complex.  This is 
because even in “routine” capital cases, an attorney may be required to spend his or 
her time in a manner that is disproportionate to the maximum allowable fee.  Id. at 
1380.   
 
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Instead, the proper focus of the court’s review should be “on the 
‘defendant’s right to effective representation rather than the attorney’s right to fair 
compensation,’ ” reviewing what was reasonable in light of an attorney’s 
professional obligation to provide services to the indigent defendant.  Olive, 811 
So. 2d at 653 (quoting Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1114).  Then, the court must 
perform an “as applied” analysis to determine whether the statutory cap would be 
confiscatory of the attorney’s time, energy, talent, and resources under the 
circumstances of the particular case.  Id. at 654. 
In turning to the facts presented here, nothing within the judge’s decision 
shows that the court below used an “as applied” analysis or that it considered the 
individual circumstances of this case, such as focusing on whether the expenses 
were necessary in fulfilling the role of defending Moore and whether requiring 
McClain to pay for investigative fees out of his own pocket would be confiscatory.   
Our review of the record shows that McClain was entitled to reimbursement.  
First, the issue involved here was McClain’s reimbursement for investigatory 
expenses in finding numerous witnesses who provided similar statements that 
shortly after the codefendants were arrested, the codefendants admitted that they 
were responsible for the murder but blamed the crime on Moore.  Specifically, 
investigator Ashton uncovered four witnesses who were incarcerated with the 
codefendants shortly after they were arrested for the murder and these witnesses 
 
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testified to similar statements.  Moreover, investigator Ashton also talked to one of 
the codefendants (Gaines) in 2005, during which Gaines allegedly admitted that on 
the day of the murder, he and codefendant Clemmons chased a boy around Grand 
Park with a chrome-plated .38 handgun that Clemmons possessed.  This statement 
was consistent with some of the other witnesses’ statements that Clemmons had a 
chrome gun and that he had used it shortly before the murder.  This was strong 
evidence that initially prompted Judge Southwood to remark, “all of this testimony 
concerns me.”  In focusing on the defendant’s right to effective representation, the 
investigatory fees at issue here were both reasonable and necessary in order to 
fulfill McClain’s role as Moore’s defense counsel. 
Second, as is clear from the testimony presented at the hearing, the 
investigator had to conduct substantial investigation to discover the evidence at 
issue.  In fact, initial postconviction counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
he had wanted to interview these witnesses earlier but was unable to discover their 
locations.  Investigator Ashton was able to track down various potential witnesses 
who were incarcerated with the codefendants as juveniles in 1993, and when he 
interviewed them, they provided exculpatory evidence.  Based on the success of 
the investigation, defense counsel filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief based on the newly discovered evidence and then presented a total of eight 
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.  At the time the postconviction motion was 
 
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filed, the investigative fees did not exceed the statutory maximum.  However, since 
the evidentiary hearing did not occur until over five years later, the investigator 
was required to relocate the witnesses and ensure that their testimony had not 
changed.  
Third, investigator Ashton was required to testify—both as to the work that 
he performed in connection with this case and as to the incriminatory statements 
that codefendant Gaines made when Ashton first interviewed him in 2005.  Again, 
this additional investigatory work was important to Moore’s defense. 
As a final consideration, McClain asserts that in this case, he did not exhaust 
the statutory fees to which he would be entitled and that he could have performed 
the investigatory services himself.  However, by having an investigator perform 
these services, he actually saved the State money.  In particular, under the statutory 
framework, if McClain would have undertaken such tasks, he would be entitled to 
$100 per hour for his time, see § 27.711(4), Fla. Stat. (2011) (setting the statutory 
rate for attorneys at $100 per hour), but by delegating the tasks to an investigator, 
he saved the State $60 per hour, see § 27.711(5), Fla. Stat. (2011) (setting the 
statutory rate for investigators at $40 per hour).  
All of the above considerations can be considered unusual circumstances 
and would justify exceeding the statutory cap in this case.  Mandating that counsel 
must personally bear the expense of investigatory fees beyond the cap is contrary 
 
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to our prior decisions where we have consistently discussed that inadequate 
funding would cause counsel to face “an economic disincentive . . . to spend more 
than a minimum amount of time on the case.”  Freeman, 921 So. 2d at 600.  Such a 
result is even more troubling where the evidence uncovered to support a 
postconviction motion is relatively strong on its face and requires an evidentiary 
hearing in order for the judge to make necessary credibility decisions.  In light of 
the attorney’s professional obligation to his indigent death-sentenced client and the 
need to engage in extended investigation to uncover witnesses that could cast 
doubt on the defendant’s guilt, we conclude that the circumstances of this case 
were extraordinary or unusual circumstances that required defense counsel to 
exceed the statutory cap.  
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the 
motion for reimbursement in excess of the statutory limit.  We therefore reverse 
the trial court’s order and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to 
grant the motion in accordance with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which LABARGA and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only. 
POLSTON, C.J., dissents. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. 
 
I write separately to stress the fact that although the amount in dispute in this 
case is comparatively small for a fee dispute issue, this case illustrates several 
problems with the statutory scheme for registry counsel handling postconviction 
cases.6
First, it highlights the fact that the investigatory fee schedule set forth in 
section 27.711(5), Florida Statutes (2011), has not been increased since it was first 
introduced over fourteen years ago.  While the Legislature took a necessary step by 
enacting a fee schedule in section 27.711 that more fully ensures the constitutional 
right to effective representation of counsel in capital cases, it may now be an 
appropriate time for the Legislature to review the statutory schedule for fees and 
expenses paid to registry counsel handling death penalty cases.  If the Legislature 
provides for a set fee schedule but does not revisit this schedule for decades, this 
increases the risk that the statutory framework set up by the Legislature will 
become “so out of line with reality that [it] materially impair[s] the abilities of 
   
                                         
 
6.  Last year, the Legislature also eliminated the statutorily created 
Commission on Capital Cases that served as an oversight commission for 
postconviction cases handled by registry counsel.  See ch. 2011-131, § 1, Laws of 
Fla.  
 
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officers of the courts to fulfill their roles of defending the indigent.’ ”  White v. Bd. 
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Pinellas Cnty., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 1989) (quoting 
White v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Pinellas Cnty., 524 So. 2d 428, 431 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1988) (Lehan, J., dissenting)).   
In death penalty cases, the consequences of underfunding the defense are 
clearly significant.  While the Legislature should be commended for establishing a 
system designed to ensure that all death penalty defendants have assigned 
postconviction counsel paid for by the State, the Legislature should also 
periodically review such fee structures to ensure that the statutory fee limitations 
are realistic and permit attorneys to hire qualified investigators who can perform a 
comprehensive investigation.   
Second, the circumstances of this case exemplify the problems that flowed 
from the Legislature’s elimination of one of the capital collateral regional offices, 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-North (CCRC-North), and the redistribution 
of the cases assigned to that office.  After CCRC-North could no longer represent 
Moore, Martin McClain, a private attorney, was appointed and undertook a 
significant amount of work in order to be familiar with all of the necessary facts of 
the case so that he could fully represent the defendant.  McClain is well-known to 
this Court as an attorney who explores all avenues for his clients and has 
 
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succeeded on occasion in discovering evidence that has led to exoneration, a new 
trial, or at the very least to raising questions as to a defendant’s guilt.  
Upon being retained, McClain determined that it was necessary to hire an 
investigator, who likewise was required to review the record completely so he 
could find witnesses to support the relevant claims.  The elimination of CCRC-
North means that capital defendants in this region do not have a full-time 
investigator, but are required to retain investigators on an hourly basis.  When an 
investigator must take time at the outset to become familiar with the case, this 
reduces the remaining available fees for investigating the claims at issue.  Thus, 
defense counsel must ensure that the investigator carefully limits time spent to 
uncover potentially meritorious claims in order to keep fees within specified limits.  
Clearly, in order to promote the fair and impartial administration of justice, defense 
counsel must be able to follow credible leads that might cast doubt on the guilt of 
the defendant. 
Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not point out that part of the reason the 
expenses exceeded the cap in this case was because of the delay in holding an 
evidentiary hearing.  While the reasons for that delay do not appear in this record, 
this Court has been vigilant in ensuring that all postconviction cases are timely 
processed and a delay of years—or even months—is contrary to the interests of 
justice. 
 
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I therefore urge the Legislature to consider whether the statutory fees need to 
be increased.  Moreover, I recognize that the Legislature is currently considering 
whether to re-establish CCRC-North and believe that this case supports the notion 
that the elimination of CCRC-North and redistribution of its cases may not have 
served the benefits that the Legislature was hoping to achieve.  
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with the result reached by the trial court because I conclude that there 
is no statutory authority for making the additional payment sought here for 
investigative services and no basis for determining the statutory limitations to be 
unconstitutional.  I therefore dissent. 
 
The proper disposition of this case is governed by two simple and 
incontestable points.  First, section 27.711(5), Florida Statutes (2012), 
unequivocally establishes “a maximum of $15,000, for the purpose of paying for 
investigative services” in postconviction death cases.  (Emphasis added.)  Second, 
there is “no constitutional right to representation in postconviction relief 
proceedings,” and accordingly no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel.  State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 407 
(Fla. 1998). 
 
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Since there is no constitutional requirement for the State to provide 
postconviction counsel, there is no constitutional basis for requiring the State to 
spend public funds beyond the level determined by the Legislature to be 
appropriate for the benefit of a capital defendant seeking postconviction relief.  If 
the State could constitutionally decline to provide any postconviction counsel for 
death-sentenced defendants, I cannot fathom how there can be a constitutional 
mandate that the State provide such a defendant with investigative services costing 
in excess of the statutory cap of $15,000. 
 
To be sure, the majority in this decision treads along on a path where the 
Court has trod before in Remeta v. State, 559 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1990), and Olive v. 
Maas, 811 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2002).  I would recede from those decisions as 
seriously flawed violations of the separation of powers.  I therefore would affirm 
the order on review. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Donald R. Moran, Jr., Chief Judge - Case No. 93-1659-CF 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Lori L. Jobe and Richard T. Donelan, Jr., Florida Department of Financial 
Services, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
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