Title: People v. Myles

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 4/26/12 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
S097189 
JOHN MYLES, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FSB10937 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant John Myles and a codefendant, Tony Tyrone 
Rogers, of the first degree murder of Fred Malouf (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 
and found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed 
while defendant and Rogers were engaged in the commission of robbery (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(A)).2  The jury also convicted defendant of the second degree 
robbery of two other victims (§ 211), and unlawful possession of a firearm (former 
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1) (now § 29800, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2010, ch. 711)).3  In 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated; references are to the provisions effective at the time of trial.   
2 
Outside of the jury‟s presence during the defense case, defendant admitted 
that he had suffered a prior felony conviction.  As a result of that admission, the 
jury was not called upon to determine the truth of a “second strike” allegation 
pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), or to decide whether 
defendant was a felon for purposes of the felon-in-possession charge under former 
section 12021, subdivision (a).   
3 
Codefendant Rogers also was convicted of one count of second degree 
robbery (§ 211), and the jury found true the allegations that he personally used a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2 
connection with the murder and robbery counts, the jury found true the allegations 
that defendant personally used a handgun.  (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)   
In a separate, subsequent proceeding, the same jury convicted defendant of 
the first degree murder of Harry “Ricky” Byrd, and found true the special 
circumstance allegation that defendant had been convicted of more than one 
murder and the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun in the murder.  
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 12022.5, subd. (a).)  After the penalty 
phase, it returned a verdict of death.  Defendant moved for new trial (§ 1181), and 
for modification of his sentence to life without the possibility of parole (§ 190.4, 
subd. (e)).  The trial court denied the motions and sentenced him to death.4  
Defendant‟s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, 
we affirm the judgment.   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
handgun in the commission of the murder and the robbery (§ 12022.5, 
subd. (a)(1)).  He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole 
consecutive to 10 years for the murder conviction.   
4 
The court also imposed an aggregate determinate sentence of 44 years 
eight months, for the robbery and felon-in-possession convictions and firearm-use 
findings, but ordered all but 11 years four months of that term stayed pursuant to 
section 654.  As discussed post, in part II.C.3., we order that the abstract of 
judgment be corrected in a minor respect with regard to the determinate term.   
 
3 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
a.  The murder of Harry “Ricky” Byrd5 
Juli Inkenbrandt was a methamphetamine user.  On April 11, 1996, she 
borrowed a neighbor‟s Buick sedan to drive her drug dealer friend, Jshakar Morris, 
and defendant to the West Side neighborhood in San Bernardino.  They told her 
they needed to “collect some money.”  Morris sat in the front passenger seat and 
defendant, whom Inkenbrandt did not know, sat in the backseat behind Morris.  
Inkenbrandt‟s one-year-old daughter was in a car seat to the left of defendant in 
the backseat.   
Inkenbrandt drove to an area known as California Gardens.  As she headed 
down Magnolia Avenue, defendant directed her to pull up to a group of young 
men who were talking in the front yard of a house.  Inkenbrandt stopped the car in 
the middle of the street and defendant yelled out of the left backseat window 
something to the effect of “You guys know Smoke?”  They shrugged their 
shoulders and said, “No.”  One member of the group, Harry “Ricky” Byrd 
(Ricky), suggested to defendant that he “[g]o check on the dark side.”  The young 
men then resumed their socializing.   
Defendant and Morris directed Inkenbrandt to continue driving.  
Unbeknownst to defendant and Morris, they passed Ricky‟s cousin, Gary Lee, 
who was standing outside talking with Darion “Smoke” Robinson.   
                                              
5  
As discussed more fully post, in part II.A.1., trial on the Ricky Byrd murder 
count was bifurcated from, and conducted subsequently to, trial on the charges 
stemming from the incident at the Pepper Steak Restaurant that occurred nine days 
after the Ricky Byrd shooting. 
 
4 
After several minutes of driving around, defendant directed Inkenbrandt to 
return to where the young men were gathered on Magnolia Avenue.  Driving in 
the same direction as at the time of the initial encounter, Inkenbrandt pulled the 
Buick closer to the group as defendant instructed.  Defendant again yelled to them 
from the left backseat window, this time asking whether they would “give Smoke 
a message for him.”  Ricky, who was leaning on the side of a friend‟s car that was 
parked between him and the Buick, replied, “Okay.  What‟s the message?”  
Defendant reached over the baby in the car seat, pointed two guns out the window, 
and fired twice.  The young men dropped to the ground for cover, and the Buick 
drove off.  Ricky suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his upper chest.  Another 
bullet struck the driver‟s seat headrest in the parked car.   
As Inkenbrandt sped away from the scene at defendant‟s direction, they 
again passed Gary Lee and Darion Robinson, who were still outside talking.  This 
time, defendant shot at them with what sounded to Lee like a .22-caliber revolver.  
The two men ducked behind a parked car until the Buick was gone.  They then 
pursued their assailant by car, but lost sight of the Buick as it headed toward 
Interstate 215.  However, Lee thought that he recognized the car and the driver, 
and he drove to an area where he believed he might find them.   
When defendant‟s group arrived back at Inkenbrandt‟s apartment complex, 
defendant and Morris instructed her to park behind the buildings.  Defendant then 
removed the shell casings from inside the vehicle and they left, telling Inkenbrandt 
to forget what she had seen.  Inkenbrandt used the Buick to run some errands.  On 
her return 15 to 20 minutes later she parked in her normal parking spot in front of 
the buildings.  Shortly after her arrival, defendant and Morris ran up to her, asking 
for a ride to an area where they sold drugs.  Inkenbrandt dropped them off as 
requested, then returned home, again parking in the front of the apartment 
complex.   
 
5 
At some point when the Buick was parked in front of the apartment 
complex, Lee and Robinson had driven by and located it.  Seeing no one in the 
Buick, they returned to Magnolia Avenue, where they discovered that Ricky had 
been fatally shot.  After hearing witnesses describe the car involved in that 
shooting, Lee realized that it was the same car from which shots had been fired at 
him.  When Lee led police officers to where he had spotted the vehicle, it was no 
longer there.  However, police were on the scene moments after Inkenbrandt 
returned to the apartment complex after dropping off defendant and Morris.  A 
witness from the Magnolia Avenue shooting was sitting in the back of an 
unmarked police vehicle and he identified the Buick and Inkenbrandt as the driver.  
When police then contacted Inkenbrandt in her apartment, she told them what had 
happened from “the beginning to the end.”  As she explained at trial, she talked 
with the officers about the incident because she “wasn‟t going down for a murder I 
didn‟t commit that they were stupid enough to do.”   
Approximately three weeks after the shootings, two other eyewitnesses 
attended a live lineup and identified defendant as the gunman.  They also 
identified him at trial.  Inkenbrandt likewise identified defendant, first by 
photograph, then at a live lineup, and finally at trial.  Although one other 
eyewitness to the shooting had never been asked to view a photographic array or 
attend a live lineup, he positively identified defendant at trial.   
Investigating officers searching the area where Ricky was shot recovered a 
live .380-caliber round of ammunition and a spent .380-caliber shell casing.  The 
.380-caliber round bore an “FC” headstamp and the casing had a Winchester 
headstamp.  During the investigation of the shooting, a search of a room at the 
Phoenix Motel in San Bernardino yielded defendant‟s fingerprints and clothing, 
along with eight live .380-caliber rounds of ammunition, one live .22-caliber 
round, and two expended .22-caliber shell casings.  One of the .380-caliber rounds 
 
6 
discovered in the motel room had an “FC” headstamp like the live round found at 
the scene where Ricky was shot.  And ballistics testing showed that the bullet that 
killed Ricky was of the same variety as bullets in the live .380-caliber rounds 
found at the scene of the shooting and at the Phoenix Motel.   
In connection with the subsequent shooting incident at the Pepper Steak 
Restaurant in nearby Colton, officers searched a vehicle parked in the lot of an 
apartment building in San Bernardino.  They found inside the trunk a Lorcin .380-
caliber semiautomatic handgun wrapped in a towel.  Although the prosecution‟s 
firearms expert could not state conclusively that the bullet that killed Ricky had 
been fired from the Lorcin, he expressed the view that it could have been.  The 
parties stipulated at trial that, if called to the stand, witnesses would testify that a 
person they believed to be defendant possessed a Lorcin semiautomatic handgun.   
b.  Robbery Murder at the Pepper Steak Restaurant 
Nine days after Ricky Byrd‟s murder, defendant, with 17-year-old Tony 
Tyrone Rogers, used a firearm to commit a robbery that led to another death.   
On April 20, 1996, Fred Malouf (hereafter sometimes Fred), his wife 
Donna Malouf (Donna),6 and Donna‟s mother went to the Pepper Steak Restaurant 
in Colton at around 8:00 p.m. for coffee.  Donna was an employee of the 
restaurant and had worked the morning shift that day.  Fred was a retired captain 
in the Colton Police Department.   
After the Malouf party sat down in a booth at the back of the restaurant, a 
waitress named Krystal Anderson walked over to say hello.  Donna testified at 
trial that moments later, defendant came running through the restaurant yelling, 
                                              
6  
At the time of trial, Donna Malouf had remarried and went by the name 
Donna Malouf Lawrence.   
 
7 
“It‟s a robbery.  I‟ll shoot.  Get your money out.”  He was holding a large 
semiautomatic gun in his right hand.  A mask came across his mouth and nose, 
and he was wearing a beanie on his head.   
Donna further testified that she immediately rose from the booth and started 
walking toward the kitchen because she knew that a gun was kept there.  Before 
she reached her destination, however, defendant ran up and grabbed her by the 
hair.  He yelled and cursed at her, wanting to know whether she was the manager 
and where the safe was located, and threatening to “blow [her] head off.”  Donna 
told him there was no manager and no safe.  According to Donna‟s testimony, 
defendant was yelling so hard that his mask slipped below his nose, and she could 
see all of his face except for his mouth and the top of his head.  He then wrapped 
his hand holding his gun around Donna‟s throat and dragged her by the hair into 
the kitchen.   
Donna noticed that three other employees and the codefendant, Tony 
Rogers, were inside the kitchen.  Rogers also was armed with a large 
semiautomatic gun, and he was wearing a hat but no mask.  Defendant directed 
Rogers to shoot Donna if she moved, then left the kitchen and returned to the 
dining area.  Several minutes later, Donna noticed Fred‟s face in the window of 
the kitchen‟s back door.   
Rogers ran toward the back door just as Fred was entering.  When Fred 
attempted to wrest control of Rogers‟s gun, a shot rang out.  Donna saw Fred fall 
back into the women‟s restroom.  Rogers then stood over Fred and shot him 
repeatedly.  At some point, Fred managed to remove his gun from his ankle holster 
and shoot Rogers in the upper chest.  Rogers screamed, “I‟ve been shot,” and ran 
past Donna to exit the kitchen and flee.   
Other restaurant employees and patrons gave varying accounts of the 
sequence of events prior to the shooting.  Krystal Anderson, the waitress who was 
 
8 
talking with the Maloufs at the outset of the robbery, testified that defendant 
dragged Donna by the hair and forced her into a booth, then pushed Anderson 
toward the cash register near the front of the restaurant by kicking her legs and 
hitting her.  When Anderson had trouble complying with defendant‟s repeated 
demands to open the register, he hit her in the stomach with his gun.  After she 
finally managed to open the register, defendant took out the money, which was 
mostly $5 and $10 bills.  Defendant then reached into Anderson‟s apron and 
removed her tips.  Another witness, Harold Lewis, was seated with his wife and 
grandson in a booth across from the cash register when defendant came into the 
restaurant waving his gun and demanding that everyone put their money on the 
table.  According to his testimony, defendant first dragged Donna to the cash 
register before grabbing the other waitress.  After taking the money from the till, 
defendant came up to Lewis, twisted Lewis‟s arm behind his back, and pointed the 
gun behind his ear.  He then took the billfold and money that Lewis had placed on 
the table.   
There were some discrepancies in the testimony of the eight witnesses 
regarding the events in the restaurant before the shooting.  But the witnesses 
testified consistently that after the shots were fired, defendant first ran back to the 
door leading to the kitchen and then fled through the front door of the restaurant.  
Three witnesses further testified that they saw defendant point his gun in the 
kitchen‟s passthrough window and heard it click, but that the gun did not fire.   
Officers responding to a dispatch regarding the robbery found Rogers 
hunched over on the sidewalk a short distance away.  There was a semiautomatic 
handgun lying next to him.  Rogers complained of a shotgun wound to the 
stomach and officers observed blood in his abdominal area.  He was handcuffed 
and transported to the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery.  Officers 
 
9 
took Donna to view Rogers in the hospital, where she identified him as the 
shooter.   
An autopsy showed that Fred was shot five times at close range, suffering 
gunshot wounds to his face, abdomen, knee, thigh, and wrist.  The fatal wound 
was the gunshot to the abdomen, which caused a small hole in the aorta that led to 
massive internal hemorrhaging.   
Officers investigating the crime scene discovered extensive evidence of 
gunfire in the kitchen area and restrooms, including 7 nine-millimeter cartridges, 
an expended bullet, and numerous bullet fragments.  Ballistics testing on the nine-
millimeter semiautomatic gun found next to Rogers at the time of his arrest 
showed that all of the cartridges found in the kitchen had been fired from his 
weapon.   
In the early morning hours the day after the shooting, officers contacted 
Rogers‟s 22-year-old cousin, Earl Williams, who was allowing Rogers to live with 
him.  Williams told the officers that Rogers associated with three large African-
American men, one of whom he identified as J-Dog, the name by which defendant 
was known.  Williams also took the officers to the San Bernardino apartment 
rented by Lateshia Winkler, where defendant occasionally stayed.  Police then 
brought Williams to the police station to question him about his possible 
involvement in the crimes.  He told officers that around 11:30 a.m. on the day of 
the shooting, defendant came to his apartment looking for Rogers, saying he 
needed “to talk to him about some cash flow.”  Williams told defendant that 
Rogers was socializing at a nearby apartment and defendant left.  When he 
returned to Williams‟s apartment with Rogers a short time later, Williams 
overheard defendant telling Rogers that he had been watching two places for the 
last two days and “we got to hit them before 8 o‟clock.”  Williams testified at trial 
that he did not recall most of what he had told the officers during the questioning.   
 
10 
Investigators also interviewed Lateshia Winkler, in whose apartment 
defendant occasionally stayed.  According to Winkler, defendant, Rogers, and 
another man whom she did not know left her apartment between 6:00 and 
6:30 p.m. on the evening of the shooting.  Defendant returned around 10:00 p.m. 
alone, two hours later than the time he said he would be home, and went straight to 
his bedroom.  He appeared to be high.  Winkler followed him, asking for an 
explanation but defendant stated angrily, “Don‟t start.  I‟ve got a lot of shit on my 
mind.”  Defendant then left the apartment for about 30 to 45 minutes.  Winkler 
also told officers that in a longer conversation later that same night, defendant 
stated that “his homeboy got shot in a robbery, either by somebody who worked 
there or somebody who was staking it out.”  The next day, while defendant was 
speaking with his mother by telephone, Winkler overheard defendant asking his 
mother, “What are they going to do?” and “Did he die?”  Later, he told Winkler 
that his friend had been shot and was at a nearby hospital in police custody.  Like 
Earl Williams, Winkler testified at trial that she did not remember most of what 
she told police during the interview.   
Both Williams and Winkler told police that they previously had seen 
defendant carry a handgun.  According to Winkler, defendant kept two loaded 
magazines on the headboard in his bedroom and stored the gun in the trunk of 
Winkler‟s 1973 Pontiac Firebird, which was parked in a lot close to her apartment.  
Police searched the trunk of her car and discovered a Lorcin .380-caliber 
semiautomatic handgun.   
During the investigation, several eyewitnesses identified defendant as the 
masked man who entered the front of the restaurant waving a large firearm and 
announcing that a robbery was in progress.  Donna picked defendant‟s picture 
from a photographic lineup, telling police she was “80 percent sure” that the 
photograph depicted the man who had forced her to go into the kitchen.  She also 
 
11 
identified defendant in a live lineup conducted about one week after the 
photographic lineup, and later again at trial.   
2.  Defense evidence 
a.  Defendant’s defense case  
Defendant presented no evidence at the Ricky Byrd murder trial.   
To cast doubt on the prosecution‟s evidence regarding the crimes at the 
Pepper Steak Restaurant, the defense called a number of the investigating officers 
who had interviewed prosecution witnesses.  For example, to undercut the 
evidence that defendant left Winkler‟s apartment with Rogers at approximately 
6:00 to 6:30 p.m. and returned alone and worried about his “homeboy,” the 
defense elicited from Sergeant Mark Owens discrepancies in Winkler‟s various 
accounts of these events.  Specifically, Winkler had told the officer that on the 
night of the crimes, defendant said only that his friend got shot while trying to 
commit a robbery and that it was not until the following day that defendant 
mentioned that one of his “homies” either killed somebody or got [himself] killed” 
by “some gang bangers.”   
The defense also emphasized the lack of physical evidence linking 
defendant to the crimes.  Sergeant Owens informed the jury that in his search of 
clothing associated with defendant he never found a ski mask or black cap, gloves, 
dark running suit, or any other article of clothing described by the eyewitnesses.  
He confirmed that Winkler told him defendant had about $20 in $1 bills and coins 
either on the night of the robbery or the day after, and that he knew that only $5 
and $10 bills had been taken from the restaurant‟s cash register.  The defense also 
elicited from Officer Leroy Valadez that Harold Lewis reported to him that there 
was approximately $500 hidden inside the wallet that defendant took from him.   
 
12 
Testimony by other officers highlighted discrepancies in the eyewitnesses‟ 
descriptions of the robber‟s clothing and firearm.  The defense also elicited from 
the officers that several of the eyewitnesses were unable to provide them with a 
description of the robber‟s facial features because his face was covered by a ski 
mask during the incident.   
The defense further challenged the prosecution‟s identification evidence by 
presenting testimony by an eyewitness identification expert.  Robert Shomer, 
Ph.D., described the various factors that reduce the accuracy of an identification, 
including life-threatening, unexpected and traumatic circumstances, age and racial 
differences between the eyewitness and the perpetrator, the manner in which the 
identification procedure is conducted, and the precision of the eyewitness‟s initial 
description.  According to Dr. Shomer, the more stressors present, the more 
difficult it is to later identify a person.  He also explained that the accuracy of an 
identification is further reduced when any substantial part of a person‟s face is 
covered, and that eyes are not a good feature for identifying a person because 
unlike ears, the mouth, the nose, and the hairline, eyes typically are not that 
distinctive.   
b.  Codefendant Rogers’s defense 
Rogers offered his own account of events at the Pepper Steak Restaurant.  
Rogers testified that he left his apartment with G-Dog and someone named Dee to 
drive to someone else‟s house.  He passed out as they drove around because he 
had been drinking beer and smoking marijuana.  When he awoke, they were in the 
Pepper Steak Restaurant‟s parking lot and Dee told him, “Homies went inside.”  
Rogers had to use the restroom.  When he opened the door to what he thought was 
the restroom, a man “came out of nowhere” and shot him in the chest.  In 
response, Rogers removed the gun that was tucked into his pants.  When he and 
 
13 
the man struggled for his gun, it fired accidentally and then kept firing.  He then 
ran out of the door to get help but passed out on the sidewalk.  Rogers denied 
going into the restaurant to commit a robbery or to “back up” G-Dog.   
According to Rogers, defendant was not involved in the robbery.   
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution’s case in aggravation 
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant committed six other 
criminal acts involving violence or a threat of violence, three of which occurred in 
the West Valley Detention Center where defendant was incarcerated while 
awaiting trial on the capital crimes.  Family members of the murder victims 
testified about how they were affected by their loved ones‟ deaths.7   
a.  Robbery at Denny’s Restaurant 
In October 1992, Mark Repman worked as the manager at the Denny‟s 
Restaurant in Victorville.  Repman testified that around 11:30 p.m. on October 28, 
defendant and two other African-American men entered the restaurant armed with 
pistols and a shotgun.  One of the men placed a gun to the back of Repman‟s head 
and ordered him to the office.  Repman complied with the man‟s demand to open 
the safe, handing over about $1,200 in cash.  Meanwhile, defendant pointed a 
shotgun at the restaurant customers and employees and ordered them down on the 
floor.   
Deputy Sheriff Matthew Kitchen testified that he responded to the report of 
a robbery in progress by stationing his vehicle on the freeway on-ramp near the 
                                              
7  
Defendant was permitted to absent himself from the penalty phase after a 
pretrial hearing at which he indicated to the court that he did not want to “act out” 
or “cause a scene.”  (§ 1043, subd. (b)(1).)   
 
14 
restaurant.  He spotted a car that matched the description of the assailants‟ vehicle 
and a high-speed chase ensued.  When the suspects‟ car failed to negotiate a 
freeway exit and crashed onto an embankment, two of the men jumped out of the 
vehicle and ran toward the railroad tracks.  California Highway Patrol Sergeant 
Steven Urrea testified that he took defendant into custody along the tracks and 
found money and a shotgun under a nearby bush.  The parties stipulated that 
defendant was convicted of second degree robbery in connection with this 
incident.  (§ 211.)   
b.  Shooting of Shawn Boyd 
Lieutenant Robert Miller of the Colton Police Department investigated a 
shooting that had occurred at the home of defendant‟s mother in February 1996.  
Miller testified that the victim, Shawn Boyd, told him that he was visiting 
defendant‟s mother on the evening of February 23.  Around 11:45 p.m., Boyd 
mentioned in conversation that he was doing well and had a job and new clothes.  
Defendant became jealous and agitated, telling Boyd to “get into the 
motherfucking room” and pointing to the master bedroom.  When Boyd resisted, 
defendant threatened to “plug” him.  He then shoved Boyd toward the bedroom, 
pulled out a handgun and shot him in the face.  Boyd ran through the bedroom and 
jumped from the second story through a glass window.  The prosecution‟s 
firearms expert at the guilt phases, William Matty, testified that the bullet 
recovered from the scene of that shooting was fired from the Lorcin handgun that 
was recovered from the trunk of Lateshia Winkler‟s car during the Pepper Steak 
Restaurant investigation.   
c.  Robbery at Thomas Realtors 
Thomas Realtors is a San Diego property management company.  
According to Jacqueline Graff, who worked as a receptionist there in April 1996, 
 
15 
most of the tenants‟ rent payments came into the office on the 3d and 4th of each 
month.  Graff testified that on April 3 around 2:20 p.m., two African-American 
men entered the office.  One of them, whose description matched that of 
defendant, put a gun to her head and demanded that she open the desk drawer and 
give him all of the money.  Graff explained that the owner had taken the money to 
the bank.  However, she complied with the robber‟s demands to open all of the 
drawers and he rifled through them, saying, “Somebody is going to die if I don‟t 
get the money.”  The assailants then turned their attention to Graff‟s coworker, 
Paul Baumhoefner, who had come to the lobby to see what the commotion was 
about.  Baumhoefner testified that the man with the gun held the weapon inches 
from his face, demanding money and backing him into his private office.  Like 
Graff, Baumhoefner explained that the owner was on his way to the bank, and he 
opened all of his desk drawers to show that there was no money inside.  He also 
pulled out a wad of money from his pockets, which the gunman grabbed before 
leaving the office and heading out the front door.  Baumhoefner then retrieved the 
owner‟s gun from another desk and ran out the door in pursuit.  He got into his 
truck and took off after a red sedan that bystanders had identified as the getaway 
car.  Baumhoefner eventually pulled up behind the car and noted its license plate 
number, then returned to the office and reported the number to responding 
officers.   
The commotion on the street near the scene of the robbery had attracted 
Thomas Stone‟s attention as he was driving by.  Stone testified that he saw 
bystanders pointing at a red car, which he followed as it made its way down 
various streets and alleys.  When the car stopped in an alley, a large African-
American man emerged from the passenger side and started shooting at Stone as 
Stone tried to back up, hitting his vehicle in several places.   
 
16 
The parties stipulated that two days after the incident, police located a 
sedan with a license plate number matching the one reported by Paul 
Baumhoefner, and that one of the four latent fingerprints recovered from the 
vehicle was positively identified as belonging to defendant.  The prosecution‟s 
firearms expert testified that the .380-caliber casings recovered from the scene of 
the shooting could have been fired from the Lorcin handgun, and that cartridges 
found in the alley were the same kind as those recovered from the scene of the 
Shawn Boyd shooting six weeks earlier.   
d.  Jail incidents 
Defendant was held at the West Valley Detention Center in Rancho 
Cucamonga while awaiting trial in the case.  In December 1996, eight months 
after his arrest, he had a violent outburst during a “shakedown” search of the unit 
where he was being housed.  Deputy Joseph Perea of the San Bernardino County 
Sheriff‟s Department testified that during the shakedown, when the inmates were 
lined up in front of their cells, defendant mumbled something under his breath as 
one of the deputies passed by him.  Perea and another deputy took defendant to the 
multipurpose room and asked him to sit down, but defendant did not comply.  
When Deputy Mark James intervened and attempted to push defendant down into 
his chair, defendant punched him on the left side of the face, rendering him 
unconscious.  Perea sprayed defendant with pepper spray, but defendant managed 
to throw a food cart at the officer, hitting him in the right arm.  Defendant then ran 
to a utility room, grabbed a push broom and started swinging it wildly.  The 
deputies managed to knock the broom out of defendant‟s hands by throwing 
plastic chairs at him, then attempted to tackle him, eventually getting defendant 
under control by handcuffing him and shackling his legs.   
 
17 
Defendant had a second violent confrontation with deputies five months 
later.  According to the testimony of Deputy Timothy Nichols, in May 1997, 
Deputy David Llewellyn ordered defendant to go into his cell and “lock it down” 
for disrespecting one of the deputies.  Defendant first disregarded the directive, 
then took a combative stance and responded, “Fuck you.”  Deputy Nichols sprayed 
him with pepper spray, but it had no effect.  Defendant then stepped toward the 
deputies, and he and Llewellyn started hitting each other with their fists.  When 
Nichols attempted to place defendant in a “choke hold,” defendant threw him off 
and punched him repeatedly on the side of the head and in the groin as he tried to 
get up off the ground.  Defendant then picked up Nichols and tried to throw him 
over the second-tier railing.  After releasing his hold on Nichols, defendant 
resumed fighting with Llewellyn until he was subdued by other deputies.   
A third incident occurred approximately one month before the start of the 
first guilt phase trial.  Deputy Alejandro Barrero testified that in November 2000, 
he removed from defendant a sharpened metal instrument known as a “shank.”  
The homemade shank had a cloth handle with a leash made of rope that would 
permit the user to retrieve the weapon in the event it slipped or was grabbed away.   
e.  Victim impact evidence  
i.  Ricky Byrd’s murder 
Ricky Byrd‟s father, Harry Byrd III, told the jury that when he was 
informed of his son‟s death, he fell to his knees and dropped the telephone in 
disbelief.  It was very difficult for him to see his son in a coffin.  Although Byrd 
had not seen Ricky in person for a year or two before the murder, he had spoken to 
him the previous weekend and Ricky was planning to come to Northern California 
to visit him the following week.   
 
18 
Ricky Byrd‟s grandmother testified that Ricky lived with her off and on for 
most of his life and that she was very close to him.  Her home was three houses 
away from the scene of the shooting and she heard the gunfire while she was in the 
backyard hanging up laundry.  Although she was grateful that the responding 
officer was performing CPR on Ricky, she knew when she saw him lying on the 
sidewalk that he was gone.  She further testified that little things around the house 
brought back memories of Ricky every day, as did the presence of Ricky‟s young 
son, Harry Byrd V, who was born shortly after Ricky‟s death.  She also informed 
the jury that on the day of the shooting, Ricky had applied for a job at UPS, and 
that he aspired to go to college to become a marine biologist.   
ii.  Fred Malouf’s murder 
Fred‟s wife Donna testified that she has been in weekly counseling to deal 
with her grief and anger.  She also told the jury that she had since remarried, but 
that “Fred was, and always will be, my life.”   
Fred‟s nephew testified about their close relationship and the profound 
influence his uncle had on him, especially on his decision to choose a career in law 
enforcement.  He also told the jury that his uncle had a great sense of humor and 
that during his retirement he “enjoyed life to the fullest” by hunting, fishing, 
prospecting, and spending time with the family.  He also organized annual family 
reunions so that the family could get together for an event other than a funeral.   
2.  Defense case in mitigation 
The defense had intended to present the testimony of three inmates who 
witnessed the May 1997 altercation between defendant and sheriff‟s deputies in 
the West Valley Detention Center.  Because calling the witnesses would have 
required a continuance of three to four weeks, however, over the prosecutor‟s 
 
19 
objection, the court permitted the defense to introduce the inmates‟ taped 
statements in lieu of their testimony.   
The inmates‟ recorded statements were played for the jury, who followed 
along with a written transcript.  Casey Whigman stated that “all hell broke loose” 
when Deputy Llewelyn pushed defendant for not “locking it down” as quickly as 
he wanted him to.  According to Linnard Roberson, the officers rushed defendant 
as he was on his way to his cell, and never asked him to stop.  Defendant was 
fighting, but he was defending himself, and the officers continued to beat him and 
“stomp[] his head into the pavement” even after he had been subdued.  Jack 
Dunnigan observed that before punches were thrown, one of the officers got “right 
up close in [defendant‟s] face” and pushed him.  He likewise saw the officers slam 
defendant‟s head into the concrete and stomp on him after he was handcuffed.   
The defense also presented testimony by David Call, the attorney who 
previously had represented defendant in the case.  Call explained to the jury that 
he had planned to present mitigating evidence regarding defendant‟s upbringing, 
but defendant refused to allow him to do so, saying he “would rather die than have 
his mother be disgraced in the courtroom.”8   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Denial of motion to sever the two murder counts  
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him 
of his right to a fair trial and other federal and state constitutional guarantees by 
denying his motion to sever trial on the Ricky Byrd murder charge from trial on 
                                              
8  
Neither party raises an issue regarding the admissibility of defendant‟s 
mitigating evidence.  We include these facts in the interest of completeness, and 
not as an endorsement of the trial court‟s rulings. 
 
20 
the charges relating to the homicide and robberies at the Pepper Steak Restaurant.9  
His claim fails, as we explain, post.   
a.  Background 
Defendant and Rogers each were charged with the murder of Fred Malouf 
and other crimes related to the incident at the Pepper Steak Restaurant.  Defendant 
also was charged with the murder of Ricky Byrd, a separate crime occurring nine 
days earlier that did not involve Rogers.  In November 1997, the court held a 
hearing on the prosecutor‟s motion to join defendant‟s and Rogers‟s cases for trial.  
The court granted the motion over the objection of Rogers‟s counsel, noting that 
the guilt phase would focus predominantly on the restaurant homicide and 
robberies and rejecting the argument that evidence regarding the Ricky Byrd 
murder charge would prejudice Rogers.  The court then considered defendant‟s 
                                              
9  
Defendant contends that the court‟s rulings violated his rights to due 
process, a fair trial, jury trial, a reliable determination of guilt and penalty, and 
fundamental fairness as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and their counterparts in the 
California Constitution.  He invokes the same constitutional provisions in almost 
every other claim raised in this appeal.  “In most instances, insofar as defendant 
raised the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of 
the constitutional arguments he now advances.  In each instance, unless otherwise 
indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind . . . that required 
no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do 
not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was 
asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as 
wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal 
consequence of violating the Constitution.  To that extent, defendant‟s new 
constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  “ „No separate constitutional 
discussion is required, or provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits 
necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or “gloss” raised for the 
first time here.‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811, 
fn. 8.)   
 
21 
motion to sever trial on the Ricky Byrd murder charge from trial on the counts 
arising from the restaurant incident.  In denying that motion, the court observed 
that all of the charges involved crimes of the same class and were committed 
relatively close in time.   
Defendant later sought reconsideration of the court‟s ruling denying 
severance.  At the hearing on that motion, the court also considered defense 
counsel‟s alternative proposal to try defendant and Rogers before a single jury on 
the charges relating to the restaurant incident first and then, after the jury reached 
its verdicts on those counts, try defendant alone on the Ricky Byrd murder charge 
before the same jury and proceed to a penalty phase if necessary.  The court again 
denied the motion to sever counts, reiterating its prior observation that the charges 
arising from the separate incidents were the same class of crimes and finding that 
joinder would not create undue prejudice.  However, it granted the alternative 
request to bifurcate the guilt trial, concluding that the procedure proposed by 
defendant‟s counsel would not only prevent the potential for prejudice to 
defendant and Rogers, but also avoid the inefficiency of conducting separate trials.  
At a subsequent hearing, the court explained more specifically that the bifurcated 
guilt phase proceedings would alleviate the problem of the jury‟s hearing both 
murder charges at the same time and using each of them “to kind of supplement 
the other count.”   
Defendant renewed his motion to sever counts after the jury had rendered its 
guilty verdicts in the restaurant robbery-murder case, arguing that it was 
“fundamentally unfair” to have the same jury now hear the Ricky Byrd murder 
charge.  The court found no prejudice to defendant and no reason to depart from 
its earlier ruling.  As the court observed, the bifurcated procedure benefited 
defendant because the jury heard evidence and decided the potentially weaker of 
 
22 
the two cases first without having heard the evidence relating to the other shooting 
incident.   
b.  Defendant fails to show prejudice from joinder 
Defendant does not dispute that the restaurant murder and robbery charges 
and the Ricky Byrd murder charge were properly joined under section 954, which 
permits the joinder of “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes 
or offenses.”  (See also People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771 (Soper).)  The 
law favors the joinder of counts because such a course of action promotes 
efficiency.  (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220.)  A trial court 
has discretion to order that properly joined charges be tried separately (§ 954), but 
there must be a “clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the defendant‟s severance motion.”  (People v. Mendoza 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160.)  In assessing a claimed abuse of discretion, we assess 
the trial court‟s ruling by considering the record then before the court.  (Soper, 
supra, at p. 774; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575.)   
If the evidence underlying each of the joined charges would have been cross-
admissible under Evidence Code section 110110 had they been prosecuted in 
separate trials, “that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of 
prejudice and to justify a trial court‟s refusal to sever properly joined charges.”  
(Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775; see also People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
                                              
10  
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) states, “Nothing in this section 
prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, 
or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether 
a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful 
sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) 
other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”  
 
23 
830, 855.)  We doubt, however, that the evidence regarding these two separate 
incidents was sufficiently similar to support an inference of intent, motive, or any 
other fact in issue that would render the evidence cross-admissible, and respondent 
does not argue otherwise.  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403.)  As 
defendant observes, the intent and motive behind the restaurant incident was 
robbery while the Ricky Byrd shooting may have been motivated by a drug debt or 
some sort of personal vendetta against “Smoke.”   
We need not affirmatively decide, however, whether the evidence would 
have been cross-admissible in separate trials because, as defendant acknowledges, 
lack of cross-admissibility is not dispositive of whether the court abused its 
discretion in denying severance.  (§ 954.1; People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
336, 350 [“When two crimes of the same class are joined, cross-admissibility is 
not required”].)  To resolve the question of abuse of discretion, we must further 
inquire “whether the benefits of joinder were sufficiently substantial to outweigh 
the possible „spill-over‟ effect of the „other-crimes‟ evidence on the jury in its 
consideration of the evidence of defendant‟s guilt of each set of offenses.”  
(People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938; see People v. Thomas, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 350.)  To make that determination “[w]e consider [1] whether some 
of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; [2] 
whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so 
that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and [3] 
whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges 
converts the matter into a capital case.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 771, 798-799.)  “ „We then balance the potential for prejudice to the 
defendant from a joint trial against the countervailing benefits to the state.‟  
[Citation.]”  (Ibid.)   
 
24 
None of these considerations point to a potential for prejudice that 
outweighed the benefits of joint trial in this case.  As previously noted, at 
defendant‟s request, the trial court ordered the guilt phase of trial bifurcated so that 
the jury heard evidence and reached its verdicts in the restaurant case before 
considering the evidence regarding the Ricky Byrd homicide.  In the trial court‟s 
view, such a procedure both prevented the potential for prejudice and avoided the 
inefficiency of conducting separate trials.  We agree.  As the court observed in 
denying defendant‟s final severance motion before commencement of the Ricky 
Byrd homicide case, the jury heard evidence and decided the potentially weaker of 
the two cases without exposure to the evidence relating to the stronger murder 
charge.  As a result of this procedure, the risk of potential prejudice from joinder 
was small and it certainly was outweighed by the benefits of trial on all counts 
before a single jury.   
Defendant argues nonetheless that the evidence relating to the restaurant 
crimes was likely to inflame the jurors against him because the homicide victim in 
that case was a retired police officer who was killed while attempting to protect his 
wife.  We have recognized some potential for prejudice when the murder victims 
are police officers killed in the line of duty.  (See Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 
32 Cal.3d 932, 942 [“[c]ommunities undoubtedly have special hostility toward 
„cop killers‟ ”].)  The same concerns are not implicated here, however.  Moreover, 
we observe that the callous, cold-blooded killing of Ricky Byrd, who was shot 
down in front of his friends after innocently responding to defendant‟s request to 
“give Smoke a message,” was no less inflammatory than the events that unfolded 
at the restaurant.  Any potential for prejudice from evidence regarding the 
restaurant murder was lessened, furthermore, because the evidence of defendant‟s 
guilt of the Ricky Byrd murder was strong.   
 
25 
Noting that the Ricky Byrd homicide case, standing alone, did not involve a 
special circumstance, defendant asserts further that the court‟s refusal to sever 
counts converted that matter into a capital case.  There is no potential for prejudice 
under this factor, however.  As we recently explained in People v. Thomas, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at pp. 799-800, “[o]ur concern in such situations is whether joinder 
„would tend to produce a conviction when one might not be obtainable on the 
evidence at separate trials.  Clearly, joinder should never be a vehicle for 
bolstering either one or two weak cases against one defendant, particularly where 
conviction in both will give rise to a possible death sentence.‟  [Citation.]”  In the 
present case, the evidence supporting each of the murder cases was not weak and 
neither case posed the risk of an unjustifiable conviction.   
As defendant correctly points out, even when a trial court‟s denial of 
severance was not an abuse of discretion at the time it was made, we must reverse 
the judgment on a showing that joinder actually resulted in “ „ “gross 
unfairness” ‟ ” amounting to a denial of fair trial or due process.  (People v. 
Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 162.)  However, he fails to make such a showing 
here.  Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the restaurant homicide and robberies 
were no more “emotionally charged” and “inflammatory” than the Ricky Byrd 
murder charge, as previously discussed.  Nor does defendant explain why the trial 
court‟s instruction to jurors to decide the Ricky Byrd homicide case “separately 
and independently” from the counts at the earlier phase was insufficient to prevent 
a grossly unfair trial.  Given the bifurcation of trial of the two separate incidents, 
there was minimal risk, even absent such an instruction, that the jury would have 
considered the restaurant crimes as evidence supporting conviction in the Ricky 
Byrd case.  (See People v. Mendoza, supra, at p. 163 [rejecting the defendant‟s 
argument that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury not to 
consider evidence of one of the joined crimes as evidence of another offense].)  
 
26 
Defendant‟s claim that the denial of severance rendered his trial grossly unfair 
does not succeed.   
2.  Denial of defense motion for a “ski mask” lineup  
Prior to the start of trial, the defense moved for a live lineup at which the 
participants would wear ski masks to partially obscure their faces.  Defendant 
claims that the trial court‟s denial of that motion was an abuse of discretion and a 
violation of his right to due process and other constitutional protections.  We 
conclude there was no error.  
The record shows the following.  At a live lineup conducted on April 30, 
1996, 10 days after the restaurant crimes, four eyewitnesses to those crimes 
identified defendant as the perpetrator who was wearing a ski mask.  Four years 
later, the defense moved that the court order a live lineup at which the participants 
would wear ski masks.  At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that, 
as a matter of fundamental fairness, the eyewitnesses who identified defendant at 
the earlier lineup ought to be provided the opportunity to identify him while he 
was wearing a ski mask, which is how they described the perpetrator.  The court 
observed that it was incumbent on investigators to conduct the initial live lineup, 
which had occurred shortly after the shooting.  The court also noted that at that 
lineup, investigators adopted defense counsel‟s suggestion to have the participants 
wear a black knit cap pulled down to the forehead, covering their hair and ears.  In 
the court‟s view, the initial lineup amply protected defendant‟s due process rights 
and a second lineup was not required.  As the court pointed out, whether or not an 
eyewitness could pick out defendant in a ski mask four years after the incident 
would neither bolster nor cast doubt on his or her original identification.   
Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625 (Evans), held that the due 
process clause requires the trial court, in an appropriate case, to grant a 
 
27 
defendant‟s timely request for a pretrial lineup.  The right to a lineup is not 
absolute, however.  Rather, it arises “only when eyewitness identification is shown 
to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken 
identification which a lineup would tend to resolve.”  (Ibid.)  The decision whether 
to order a pretrial lineup rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  (Ibid.; 
see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 235-236.)   
Here, less than two weeks after the incident, eyewitnesses to the restaurant 
crimes viewed a live lineup.  To account for the fact that there was no opportunity 
for the eyewitnesses to observe the robber‟s hairstyle, and at counsel‟s behest, all 
of the lineup participants donned black watch caps that were pulled down to cover 
their hair, foreheads, and ears.  Some of the eyewitnesses identified defendant.  
Others identified a different individual or made no identification at all.  At trial, 
defense counsel cross-examined the eyewitnesses who had positively identified 
defendant at the live lineup, eliciting from them that the robber‟s face had been 
covered by the ski mask.  On this record, we agree with the trial court that 
defendant received due process.   
Defendant‟s real complaint appears to be that the initial lineup was 
suggestive and its results unreliable because, by presenting participants whose 
faces were not covered by ski masks, it failed to duplicate the conditions at the 
crime scene.  We note that Donna testified she was able to see most of defendant‟s 
face when his mask slipped down below his nose.  But even if it might have been 
proper for each of the lineup participants to wear a ski mask like the one worn by 
the perpetrator (United States v. Hinton (D.C. Cir. 1980) 631 F.2d 769, 774), there 
is no authority supporting the proposition that they were required to do so.  Even 
assuming that the participants at the initial lineup should have worn ski masks 
rather than knit caps, it would not establish defendant‟s right to a second pretrial 
lineup.  In considering the defendant‟s claim of a due process right to a pretrial 
 
28 
lineup in Evans, this court explained that the inquiry was not whether the receipt 
of identification evidence at trial is so unfair to the accused as to infringe due 
process but rather whether “the accused can insist that procedures be afforded 
whereby the weakness of the identification evidence, if it is in fact weak, can be 
disclosed.”  (Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 621-622.)  In this case, the original 
lineup adequately revealed to the defense the weakness of the eyewitnesses‟ 
identifications, and defense counsel vigorously challenged the evidence during 
cross-examination.  The court observed, and we agree, that a second lineup would 
do nothing to assist the defense in testing the reliability of the identifications.  The 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‟s request for a ski mask 
lineup.   
3.  Denial of the third request for substitution of counsel  
The trial court granted defendant‟s requests to replace his first two appointed 
counsel.  Ten months before the commencement of trial, when defendant sought to 
discharge his third attorney and substitute new counsel, the court denied the 
motion.  Defendant asserts that the trial court‟s refusal to grant his request for 
substitution of counsel constituted an abuse of discretion.  As we shall explain, the 
court‟s ruling was neither an abuse of discretion nor did it violate defendant‟s 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.   
a.  Background 
In February 2000, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on various 
motions.  Defendant addressed the court directly with regard to one motion, 
requesting an order for access to the law library.  Defendant explained that he 
needed library access in order to fully understand the proceedings and determine 
which motions he had a right to file.  He complained that his defense attorney, 
 
29 
Chuck Nacsin, had failed to properly advise him, advocate for him, and protect his 
rights.   
The trial court denied defendant‟s request for law library privileges on the 
ground that it was counsel‟s role to present motions on defendant‟s behalf.  The 
court added that Nacsin was one of the most experienced criminal defense 
attorneys in the county, and, in the court‟s view, always had demonstrated the 
highest degree of professionalism and competence.  The court also found, 
however, that defendant‟s expression of dissatisfaction with Nacsin suggested that 
he might be requesting substitution of counsel.  The court excused the prosecutor 
from the courtroom so that it could conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. 
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.   
At the hearing, defendant read into the record a written statement entitled 
“Request for a Marsden Hearing,” which set forth numerous accusations against 
Nacsin.  Specifically, he claimed that counsel was attempting to “railroad” him by 
refusing to provide discovery.  He also complained that counsel refused to 
interview the witnesses he had suggested and was not properly investigating issues 
that defendant brought to his attention.  For instance, defendant faulted counsel for 
failing to follow up on evidence indicating that a defense investigator and 
detectives from the Colton Police Department had sabotaged the investigation 
because they knew the victim Fred Malouf and evidence that investigative officers 
were threatening the witnesses.  Defendant also complained that counsel refused to 
file a motion for the release of police officer personnel files or to seek recusal of 
the court and the prosecutor on the ground that they likewise knew Fred Malouf.  
Defendant repeated his earlier allegations that Nacsin was not properly advising 
him regarding his rights or working in his best interests.  He also reiterated that he 
had no trust or faith in counsel and accused him of conspiring with the police and 
prosecutors to secure his conviction.  Defendant complained finally that Nacsin 
 
30 
visited him only once every two to three months and that Nacsin‟s law office 
refused to accept his collect calls.   
When defendant had finished reading his written statement, he indicated to 
the court that he was not actually making a Marsden motion at that time but rather 
seeking discovery, which he would review, and then would present his Marsden 
motion at a subsequent hearing.  Counsel objected to defendant‟s having access to 
discovery materials while in jail because of the risk that they would fall into the 
hands of jailhouse informants.  The court, however, directed counsel to provide 
defendant with all discovery and the transcripts of all proceedings that had 
occurred since his appointment as counsel of record.   
The hearing on defendant‟s eventual Marsden motion occurred four months 
later in June 2000.  Defendant repeated his earlier complaints that counsel was 
ignoring his requests to explore whether investigative officers were threatening the 
witnesses and falsifying evidence.  When the court asked Nacsin whether he had 
discussed those subjects with defendant, he replied that he had done so “many 
times.”  Nacsin also indicated that he was pursuing everything he could pursue in 
the case.  Defendant responded that he did not know what counsel was doing.  He 
also asserted that when he and counsel discuss the case, they “collide” and he 
cannot understand him.  As defendant further explained, “I got to be able to trust 
him, for us to have that attorney-client relationship.  And I don‟t trust him because 
I don‟t know . . . what he‟s doing.”   
The court found no basis for ordering substitution of counsel at that time and 
denied the Marsden motion without prejudice.  In the court‟s view, defendant‟s 
appointed counsel was “one of the more tenacious defense attorneys” to appear in 
his courtroom over the past 20 years, and the court was certain that if there was 
evidence suggesting that a witness had been threatened, counsel would vigorously 
pursue that point during cross-examination.  Defendant continued to express 
 
31 
frustration with attorney-client communications, saying that when he would ask 
counsel certain things about the proceedings, he would come away even more 
confused.  He also disclosed, however, that he wanted an opportunity to see if he 
and counsel could “come to some type of understanding” and “somehow see eye-
to-eye” before deciding to go through with his request for a new attorney.  
Although the court invited defendant to renew his Marsden motion after he had an 
opportunity to review additional discovery, defendant did not renew the motion.   
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that the court‟s denial of his request for substitution of 
counsel was an abuse of discretion because the complaints summarized, ante, were 
emblematic of a difficult, unproductive relationship between him and his counsel, 
which led to an irretrievable breakdown in their ability to work together that 
substantially impaired his constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.  We disagree, as explained, post.   
Established principles govern our assessment of whether the court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant‟s Marsden motion.  “Once a defendant is afforded 
an opportunity to state his or her reasons for seeking to discharge an appointed 
attorney, the decision whether or not to grant a motion for substitution of counsel 
lies within the discretion of the trial judge.  The court does not abuse its discretion 
in denying a Marsden motion „ “unless the defendant has shown that a failure to 
replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant‟s right to assistance of 
counsel.” ‟  [Citations.]  Substantial impairment of the right to counsel can occur 
when the appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation or when „the 
defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable 
conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citation].‟  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 912.)   
 
32 
Contrary to defendant‟s contention, none of his various complaints 
concerning counsel suggests an irreconcilable conflict between them.  Defendant‟s 
main grievance was that counsel refused to pursue his suggested motions and lines 
of investigation.  However, “ „[t]actical disagreements between the defendant and 
his attorney do not by themselves constitute an “irreconcilable conflict.” ‟ ”  
(People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 682; accord, People v. Cole (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1158, 1192.)  Although defendant complained that he did not know what 
counsel was doing, counsel informed the court that he and defendant had 
discussed defendant‟s suggestions “many times,” and that he was pursuing 
everything he could.  The court was entitled to credit counsel‟s representations in 
this regard.  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 912; People v. Smith (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 684, 696.)  Nor was an irreconcilable conflict shown by defendant‟s 
assertions that he did not trust his attorney and “collided” with him when they 
discussed the case.  As we explained in People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 
“If a defendant‟s claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an 
appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, 
defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment, and by a 
process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, 
which is certainly not the law.”  (Id. at p. 1246; see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 472, 489.)  Furthermore, “[a] trial court is not required to conclude that an 
irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has not made a sustained good faith 
effort to work out any disagreements with counsel . . . .”  (People v. Crandell 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860.)  Here, after defendant indicated his willingness to try 
to “come to some type of understanding” with counsel, the court reasonably could 
find that any asserted conflict between defendant and his attorney was not 
irreconcilable.  That conclusion was borne out by the fact that although the court‟s 
denial of the request for substitution of counsel was without prejudice, defendant 
 
33 
did not renew his Marsden motion.  As for defendant‟s complaint that counsel 
rarely visited him, such an allegation does not justify substitution of counsel.  
(People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 604.)  We conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the Marsden motion.   
4.  Disclosure of police officer personnel records 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion for an order directing the prosecution to 
provide the confidential personnel records of 10 law enforcement officers involved 
in the investigation of the crimes and his postarrest confinement in county jail.  He 
argued that the prosecutor was obligated to disclose the identified records because 
they amounted to favorable, material evidence within the meaning of Brady v. 
Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.  At a hearing on the motion, the court indicated 
that, in an abundance of caution, it found good cause to conduct an in camera 
review of the personnel records in issue to determine whether any of them showed 
complaints or disciplinary action involving improper conduct such as falsifying 
evidence or testifying falsely, or any other potential impeachment material that 
should be disclosed to the defense.  (See Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b); Pitchess v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; see generally People v. Gaines (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 172, 179 [summarizing the state law procedures by which a defendant may 
seek disclosure of police personnel records].)  The court conducted separate in 
camera hearings to review the files provided by the three different law 
enforcement agencies involved.  Neither defendant nor the prosecutor attended the 
hearings. 
The court ordered that the reporter‟s transcripts of each of the three hearings 
be sealed, but it announced its rulings in open court.  Specifically, the court 
indicated that it denied disclosure of the records of San Bernardino Police Officers 
Voss and Filson and Colton Police Officers Morenberg, Owens, and Schiller, 
 
34 
finding nothing in their personnel files that was likely to lead to any admissible 
impeachment evidence.  The court ordered that defense counsel be provided 
access to reports and handwritten notes by two San Bernardino Sheriff‟s deputies 
who claimed they were injured in the incident involving defendant at the jail, but it 
denied disclosure of the remaining files.   
The transcripts of the in camera hearings that the court ordered sealed have 
remained under seal.  Noting that neither the transcripts nor the documents 
reviewed by the trial court were made available to him or his appellate counsel, 
defendant requests that this court conduct an independent review of these 
materials.  He asserts that such review is necessary to ensure that the trial court‟s 
rulings did not infringe his right to due process.  Respondent does not oppose the 
request.   
“This court routinely independently examines the sealed records of such 
in camera hearings to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying a defendant‟s motion for disclosure of police personnel records.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285; accord, People v. 
Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 398.)  We have done so in this case. 
The sealed record at issue here includes a full transcript of the three 
in camera hearings, but not the actual personnel files that formed the basis of the 
trial court‟s ruling barring disclosure of most of the requested materials.  As 
defendant points out, the trial court refused appellate counsel‟s suggestion to 
include in the record on appeal the actual documents that it had reviewed during 
the in camera hearings.  We agree with the trial court‟s ruling that the transcript of 
the hearings was sufficient.  The sealed transcript that is before us, in which the 
court “state[d] for the record what documents it examined,” is adequate for 
purposes of conducting a meaningful appellate review.  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 1216, 1229.)   
 
35 
Having independently reviewed the sealed records, we conclude that the trial 
court‟s ruling refusing to disclose the requested personnel files except for the 
portions relevant to the May 1997 jail incident that involved defendant was neither 
an abuse of discretion nor a violation of defendant‟s due process rights.  (Pitchess 
v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
1031, 1042.)   
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Evidence of witness dissuasion 
Defendant claims that reversal is required because he was prejudiced by the 
admission of evidence that a prosecution witness at trial of the restaurant crimes 
had received a telephone call “from someone” that may have made her afraid to 
testify.  Although defendant is correct that the evidence could not be used by the 
jury to infer his consciousness of guilt, there was a proper, albeit limited, purpose 
for introducing the evidence and there is no merit to defendant‟s assertion that he 
was incurably prejudiced by its admission, as we explain, post.   
a.  Background 
Prosecution witness Karen King testified that for a two-week period in 
February 1996, prior to the restaurant crimes, defendant stayed with her and her 
boyfriend in the same Highland apartment complex where codefendant Rogers 
resided.  She told the jury that she recalled seeing a handgun in the apartment at 
the time, although she could not confirm that it belonged to defendant.  During 
direct examination, the prosecutor asked the witness whether she was afraid to be 
in court.  She answered, “No.”  The prosecutor then followed up by asking, “Did 
you receive a phone call from someone?”  The court sustained defense counsel‟s 
hearsay and discovery objections.  The prosecutor continued to question the 
witness, eliciting from her that although she was initially fearful of testifying, she 
 
36 
was no longer afraid.  At defense counsel‟s request, the court then conducted a 
sidebar conference to discuss the objected-to evidence.   
Outside the jury‟s presence, the prosecutor explained that the brother of 
King‟s boyfriend had called to tell her “that it would be better for her if she did not 
come to court and if she did not testify.”  The court agreed with defense counsel 
that the prosecutor should have disclosed this information to the defense before the 
witness‟s testimony.  When defendant‟s counsel further complained that the 
prosecutor‟s line of questioning implied that defendant made a threatening 
telephone call, the court suggested that defense counsel attempt to elicit from the 
witness during cross-examination that the call was not from defendant or 
codefendant Rogers.  The court also indicated that, on request, it would instruct 
the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.05 and 2.06, regarding the requirements for 
considering the suppression of evidence as tending to show a consciousness of 
guilt.  Defense counsel moved for mistrial, arguing that the admission of the 
telephone call evidence denied defendant his federal constitutional guarantees, 
including his rights to due process and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.  
The court denied the motion, finding that any prejudice would be diffused by 
cross-examination and a cautionary instruction expressly directing the jury not to 
infer defendant‟s guilt from evidence of an effort to suppress evidence.  The 
prosecutor added that he attempted to present the telephone call evidence solely 
for purposes of testing the witness‟s credibility.   
Defense counsel introduced the telephone call evidence during cross-
examination, and elicited from King that neither defendant nor Rogers had called 
her or had asked someone to call her.  In response to defense counsel‟s question 
whether she had been threatened, she replied, “Not threaten.  Just told me it would 
be best if I didn‟t testify.”  King also indicated that she was as reluctant to be on 
 
37 
the witness stand as she had been to speak with investigating officers five years 
earlier.   
Immediately following King‟s testimony on this point, the court instructed 
the jurors that “the phone call was not made” by either defendant or the 
codefendant, and informed them that “unless there was evidence to indicate they 
told someone to do that, which at this point there is not, it cannot be considered 
against either [of them].”  The court also explained to the jury, however, that the 
telephone call evidence could be considered in evaluating the credibility of the 
witness.   
The court instructed on the issue again before closing arguments, this time 
affirmatively directing the jury not to consider evidence of an attempt to suppress 
evidence “as tending to show any consciousness of guilt on the defendant‟s part.”   
b.  Discussion 
We agree with the trial court that there was a proper, albeit limited, purpose 
for the introduction of the evidence that someone called King attempting to 
dissuade her from testifying, which was its effect on King‟s credibility as a 
witness.  The fact that King came to court and took the witness stand 
notwithstanding the caller‟s advice tended to bolster her credibility.  (See People 
v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1142 [evidence that the defendant‟s sister 
offered the witness money to refrain from testifying was relevant to evaluating the 
witness‟s credibility]; cf. People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 870 [“[i]t is 
not necessarily the source of the threat — but its existence — that is relevant to the 
witness‟s credibility”].)   
Defendant argues that King‟s testimony was incurably prejudicial, and 
deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial, because the very fact the threatening 
call was made raised the inference that he had authorized it.  His contention is 
 
38 
unpersuasive.  As the record reflects, defense counsel affirmatively elicited from 
King that the caller did not threaten her or state that he was speaking on 
defendant‟s behalf, and the court instructed the jury that the telephone call 
evidence could not be considered against either him or his codefendant.  Under 
these circumstances, “[w]e think it highly unlikely the jurors understood they 
could infer defendant authorized or orchestrated [a] threat . . . .”  (People v. 
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670 [relying on similar grounds to reject the 
argument that evidence regarding the defendant‟s sister‟s attack on a prosecution 
witness posed a danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant authorized 
it].)  Defendant suggests that the trial court “left the door open” for the jury to 
infer that he was responsible for the threatening call when it instructed subsequent 
to King‟s testimony that “at this point” there was no evidence connecting 
defendant to the call.  The record shows, however, that at the close of evidence the 
trial court made clear to the jurors that they were not permitted to consider the 
telephone call evidence as tending to show defendant‟s consciousness of guilt.  
We presume jurors “generally understand and follow instructions.”  (People v. 
McKinnon, supra, at p. 670.)   
Defendant complains nonetheless that the court‟s instruction directing the 
jurors not to consider against him the evidence of the telephone call to King did 
nothing to dispel the inference of consciousness of guilt.  He urges this court to 
adopt the reasoning and result of a 1974 decision by the Indiana intermediate 
appellate court, which concluded that a new trial should have been granted in that 
case because testimony by a prosecution witness about having received threats and 
bribes was “so prejudicial to [the] defendant that no jury could be expected to 
apply it solely to the question of the credibility of the witness.”  (Keyser v. State 
(Ind.Ct.App. 1974) 312 N.E.2d 922, 924.)  Even were we to agree with the Keyser 
decision that the prejudice to the defendant in that matter could not be cured by an 
 
39 
instruction to disregard the improper evidence, the case is readily distinguishable 
from the present one in important respects.  In Keyser, the prosecution‟s entire 
case depended on the testimony of the witness who had been threatened.  (Id. at 
p. 924.)  Here, by contrast, King‟s testimony played but a minor role in 
establishing defendant‟s guilt of the restaurant crimes; at best, her testimony 
showed only that two months before the crimes defendant was associating with 
codefendant Rogers and carrying a firearm.  In Keyser, furthermore, the reviewing 
court intimated that the prosecutor‟s introduction of the improper testimony was 
calculated to prejudice the defendant.  (Ibid.)  The telephone call evidence at issue 
here, however, was admissible for the proper, limited purpose of assessing the 
witness‟s credibility.  Finally, in Keyser there was no evidence or instruction 
advising the jury that the defendant was not involved in the attempted bribe and 
threat.  In this case, the court expressly instructed the jury that defendant had no 
connection to the telephone call King received.  Given the slight significance of 
King‟s testimony and the absence of any evidence from which the jury could infer 
that the telephone call was made at defendant‟s behest, we reject defendant‟s 
assertion that the court‟s instructions were insufficient to overcome the assertedly 
prejudicial effect of King‟s testimony on this point.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant‟s motion for mistrial, and its ruling allowing the 
testimony for a limited purpose did not render defendant‟s trial fundamentally 
unfair.   
2.  Courtroom presence of the restaurant murder victim’s wife 
Defendant claims that the court abused its discretion and deprived him of his 
various constitutional rights when it allowed Donna, the restaurant murder 
victim‟s wife, to remain in the courtroom after testifying for the prosecution.  
There was no error.   
 
40 
a.  Background 
Prior to jury selection in the case, the court conducted a brief hearing on a 
defense motion to exclude witnesses during the course of trial, and the court 
agreed that witnesses should not hear the testimony of other witnesses prior to 
testifying.  The discussion, however, focused primarily on whether Donna Malouf 
Lawrence, the homicide victim‟s wife and a percipient witness to the incident at 
the restaurant, would be permitted to remain in the courtroom following her 
testimony.  After being informed that the prosecutor had advised Donna regarding 
appropriate courtroom demeanor, the court indicated that it would exercise its 
discretion to exclude from the courtroom any witness or spectator whose conduct 
would prevent either side from receiving a fair trial.  Nonetheless, defense counsel 
expressed his concern that Donna‟s presence during the guilt phase would affect 
the fairness of the possible penalty phase, at which Donna would be called to the 
witness stand to give victim impact testimony.  The court pointed out, however, 
that the same concern was present in any death penalty case in which victim 
impact witnesses were present during the guilt phase.  In the court‟s view, once 
Donna had testified, the rationale for excluding her from the courtroom no longer 
existed.  Although the court ruled that it would allow Donna to remain in the 
courtroom following her testimony, it reiterated that if it came to the court‟s 
attention that anyone in the courtroom engaged in inappropriate conduct, it would 
not hesitate to exclude such person from the proceedings.   
Without defense objection, Donna testified at the guilt phase of trial with the 
assistance of a victim-witness advocate.  At the prosecutor‟s request, the court 
instructed the jury regarding the support person‟s presence and role.11   
                                              
11  
The court instructed, “Ladies and gentlemen, the law provides that an 
alleged victim in a crime is allowed to have a support person with them in court 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
41 
Consistent with the court‟s earlier ruling, Donna remained in the courtroom 
after completing her testimony, sitting in the front row.  When the next 
prosecution witness had answered several questions on direct examination, 
defense counsel complained to the court outside the jury‟s presence that Donna 
had been nodding her head in agreement with the witness‟s answers.  The court 
indicated that it had not observed Donna nodding her head, but suggested that she 
be told to be more mindful of her gestures.  The prosecutor informed the court that 
he had done so.  Although the court overruled defense counsel‟s objection to 
Donna‟s presence, it stated it would monitor the situation and, if a problem arose, 
it would recommend that Donna sit in the back of the courtroom.   
Defense counsel renewed the objection to Donna‟s presence during the 
testimony of a prosecution witness who was describing the shooting of the victim, 
Fred Malouf.  As counsel pointed out, Donna was crying and being held by her 
support people, and he saw one of the jurors looking over at her and staring.  The 
court noted that it had been paying attention to Donna and agreed that she 
appeared upset.  It observed, however, that she was not making any disturbance.  
In the court‟s view, her conduct was no different from that in any other case in 
which family members of the victim exhibit some type of emotional reaction, and 
she had a right to be in the courtroom.   
b.  Discussion  
Defendant argues that the presence of a support person to assist Donna 
during her guilt phase testimony, coupled with Donna‟s nodding her head in 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
during testimony.  The support person is entitled to sit with them but is, obviously, 
not the witness and is not going to participate in any manner.”   
 
42 
agreement with prosecution testimony and “emotional outbursts” during trial, 
interfered with the jury‟s ability to deliberate and reach an unbiased verdict in 
violation of his right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and other constitutional 
guarantees.  Because defendant did not object when a victim-witness advocate 
accompanied Donna to the witness stand, he has forfeited that portion of his claim.  
(People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 641.)  We find no merit to his 
contention in any event.   
Defendant insists that he was prejudiced by the support person‟s presence on 
the witness stand while Donna testified because it created a false and distorted 
view of Donna‟s demeanor and tacitly vouched for the truth of her testimony.  We 
are not persuaded.  Section 868.5 permits prosecution witnesses in cases involving 
murder and other enumerated offenses to be attended in court by two support 
persons, one of whom may accompany the witness to the stand.  Absent improper 
interference by the support person, however, no decision supports the proposition 
that defendant advances here, that the support person‟s mere presence infringes his 
due process and confrontation clause rights.  “ „The presence of a second person at 
the stand does not require the jury to infer that the support person believes and 
endorses the witness‟s testimony, so it does not necessarily bolster the witness‟s 
testimony.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 641; see 
People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1076-1079; People v. Patten 
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1725-1733.)  Here, the record does not disclose any 
circumstances indicating that Donna‟s support person improperly influenced the 
jury‟s assessment of her testimony.  (See People v. Patten, supra, at pp. 1731-
1732.)  For instance, there is no description as to where the support person sat in 
proximity to Donna and whether she had physical contact with Donna during her 
testimony.  Nor is there any indication that the support person displayed emotion 
or gestures suggesting to the jury that she believed Donna‟s account of the 
 
43 
incident.  (Patten, supra, at pp. 1732-1733.)  Notably, the court informed the 
jurors that Donna was entitled by law to be attended by a support person during 
her testimony, and admonished them that the support person was “not the 
witness.”  This admonition, coupled with the court‟s instruction directing the jury 
to base its decision in the case solely on the evidence received at trial and not to be 
swayed by sympathy or prejudice, further undermines any suggestion of improper 
interference by the support person.  (People v. Ybarra, supra, at p. 1078.)  
Defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by the presence of a support person 
during Donna‟s testimony.   
Nor are we persuaded by defendant‟s argument that he was prejudiced further 
by Donna‟s nodding in agreement with prosecution witnesses and crying in court 
while being comforted by support persons.  Defendant posits that such conduct 
would have instilled in the jury powerful feelings of sympathy and revenge, 
leading to verdicts on guilt and penalty that were based, not on the evidence 
adduced at trial, but on emotion.  His claim of prejudice is unsupported by the 
record.   
A spectator‟s conduct is grounds for reversal if it is “of such a character as to 
prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict.”  (People v. Lucero (1988) 
44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022; accord, People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 369; see 
also Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 572 [spectator conduct violates the 
federal Constitution if it is “so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable 
threat to defendant‟s right to a fair trial”].)  The trial court has broad discretion to 
ascertain whether a spectator‟s actions were prejudicial.  (People v. Chatman, 
supra, at p. 369.)   
There is no showing that Donna‟s presence in the courtroom following her 
testimony prejudiced defendant.  During the hearing on Donna‟s continued 
courtroom presence, the court made clear its intention to exercise its discretion to 
 
44 
exclude any spectator whose conduct threatened the fair trial rights of either side.  
When later informed by defense counsel that he had seen Donna nodding her head 
in agreement with a prosecution witness, the court indicated that it would monitor 
her demeanor.  After defense counsel subsequently complained that one or more 
jurors were watching Donna being comforted by support persons during another 
witness‟s description of the shooting, the court stated that it had observed no 
impropriety.  The court acknowledged that Donna was upset but noted that she 
was not making a disturbance.  On this record, the court properly exercised its 
discretion in overruling defense counsel‟s repeated objections to Donna‟s presence 
in the courtroom.  Having observed the courtroom proceedings firsthand, the trial 
judge was in the best position to evaluate the impact of Donna‟s conduct in front 
of the jury.  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 87.)   
Defendant cites a number of out-of-state decisions reversing the judgments 
for spectator misconduct in support of his argument that the same result is 
warranted here.  We examined these identical cases in People v. Lucero, supra, 44 
Cal.3d 1006.  In rejecting the defendant‟s invitation to adopt the reasoning and 
result from those decisions, we concluded that none involved the “single isolated 
outburst” at issue there.  (Id. at p. 1023.)  We easily reach the same conclusion in 
this case, in which the conduct in question is even farther afield from the 
unrelenting, prejudicial disruptions at issue in the cited cases.   
3.  Circumstantial evidence instructions 
Defendant contends he was denied due process because the court‟s 
instructions explaining to the jury how to consider circumstantial evidence were 
contrary to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  We disagree. 
The court instructed at the two guilt phases with CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83:  
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt and the special 
 
45 
circumstance allegations, respectively.  In relevant part, both instructions informed 
the jury that if one interpretation of the circumstantial evidence “appears to you to 
be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the 
reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.”   
Defendant faults the instructions in two respects.  First, he argues that telling 
the jurors they must accept a guilt interpretation of the evidence “that appears to 
be reasonable” allows a finding of guilt based on proof less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39.)  We have repeatedly 
rejected the identical contention.  “When the questioned phrase is read in context, 
not only with the remaining language within each instruction but also together 
with related instructions, including the reasonable doubt instruction, it is clear that 
the jury was required only to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence 
and to accept a reasonable interpretation that was consistent with the evidence.”  
(People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144; accord, People v. Brasure (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1037, 1058; People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 415.)  Defendant 
acknowledges our prior decisions and urges us to reconsider them.  He offers no 
persuasive reason to do so.   
Defendant further criticizes CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83 for requiring the 
jury to draw an incriminatory inference when such an inference merely appears to 
be reasonable.  Specifically, he argues that imposing on the jurors a duty to accept 
an interpretation of evidence pointing to his guilt creates an impermissible 
mandatory, conclusive presumption.  (Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 
265-266.)  We repeatedly have rejected the same contention.  (People v. 
Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 144; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 942-
943.)  We do so again here for the reasons stated in those decisions.   
 
46 
4.  Failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication 
Defendant contends he was denied his state and federal rights to due process, 
fair trial, and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty by the absence of 
instructions explaining to the jury how voluntary intoxication may have affected 
his ability to form the specific intent necessary for conviction of the restaurant 
crimes.  Defendant acknowledges that, absent a defense request, the trial court had 
no duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication.  (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 263, 295; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120.)   
Even had defense counsel asked the court to give a voluntary intoxication 
instruction, however, none was required because there was no substantial evidence 
either that defendant was intoxicated or that intoxication affected his ability to 
“actually form[] a required specific intent.”  (§ 22, subd. (b); see People v. Roldan, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 715; accord, People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 677.)  Lateshia Winkler testified that defendant was high when he returned to 
her apartment around 10:00 p.m., after the incident at the restaurant.  She further 
explained on cross-examination that defendant was stumbling around and 
“shermed out,” meaning that he was under the influence of PCP.  During the same 
line of questioning, however, Winkler also indicated that defendant was “acting 
normal” before he left her apartment Saturday evening.  Defendant points to no 
evidence suggesting that he was intoxicated at the time of the crimes.   
C.  Penalty Phase and Sentencing Issues 
1.  Effect of antisympathy “instruction” 
Defendant contends that his death sentence must be reversed because the 
court‟s instruction misled the jury regarding the scope of its discretion in 
determining penalty.  We conclude that the jury was not misled.   
The complained-of “instruction” was part of the court‟s introductory remarks 
to prospective jurors during voir dire.  The court provided an overview of the 
 
47 
principles governing the guilt phase of the trial, such as the presumption of 
innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  It also explained the rule that the 
jury determine the facts of the case based on the evidence received at trial, stating 
as follows:  “It‟s a normal human reaction or a human emotion, you‟re going to be 
here during the course of this trial through the various phases, we get to all of 
those phases, for several weeks. . . .  [Y]ou‟ll be seeing Mr. Rogers, Mr. Myles, 
every day,” and their friends or family might be in the courtroom.  Likewise, the 
court pointed out, there might be friends or family of the victims, and a “normal 
human reaction would be to have some feelings of sympathy” for them.  The court 
indicated, however, that “what we‟re going to be asking you to do as jurors is to 
set aside any of those feelings of sympathy or empathy or compassion on either 
side and make an objective decision based solely on the facts and the law that 
I give you.”  (Italics added.)   
Emphasizing the italicized portion of the court‟s remarks, defendant contends 
that the jury was impermissibly instructed not to consider sympathy during the 
penalty phase.  Specifically, he complains that by referring to “the course of this 
trial through the various phases,” and indicating that “we get to all of those 
phases,” the court led the jury to believe that its “no sympathy” admonition was 
not limited to the determination of guilt.  He argues that because the directive was 
given before the presentation of any evidence in the case, including his penalty 
phase witnesses, the jurors would have disregarded critical mitigating evidence, 
which he was constitutionally entitled to have them consider.  
Having examined the record as a whole, including the court‟s instructions, 
we conclude that the jury was not misled into believing it could not consider 
sympathy when determining penalty.  (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 
1025; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 433-434; People v. Hernandez 
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 365-367.)  At the penalty phase, before the presentation of 
 
48 
evidence, the court instructed the jury that it was “free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value” it deemed appropriate to each of the statutory factors it was 
permitted to consider.  Immediately after that, the court directed the jury to 
“disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this 
trial which conflicts with that principle.”  The court made the same point again at 
the conclusion of trial, prior to closing arguments, this time adding a directive to 
disregard “any statements that may have been made during jury selection, where 
we talked generally about some of the guidelines and principles.”  Even assuming 
for argument that at this juncture some jurors may have misunderstood the role of 
sympathy in their penalty determination, the court‟s further instruction left no 
doubt that it was a proper consideration.  The court specifically informed the jury, 
“You were previously instructed at the guilt phase of the trial that sympathy or 
pity for the defendant should not influence your consideration of the evidence.  In 
this, the penalty phase of trial, the jury may properly consider sympathy or pity for 
the defendant in determining whether to impose life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.”   
Defendant asserts that it is unreasonable to conclude that jurors could or 
would disregard the “no sympathy” instruction.  We disagree.  In the course of 
rejecting a claim similar to the one defendant raises here, we previously have 
concluded that statements made at the time of jury selection did not “create such 
an indelible impression” that jurors were unable to follow the court‟s subsequent, 
specific instructions.  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.)  The same 
conclusion is warranted here.12  (See also People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 
                                              
12  
Respondent argues that defendant has forfeited his claim of error because 
he did not object below.  Defendant counters that the forfeiture rule does not apply 
when, as here, the court gives an instruction that incorrectly states the law.  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
49 
637 [jurors who were asked during voir dire whether they could set aside feelings 
of sympathy would not have remembered or been guided by that question two 
months later when making their penalty determination].)   
2.  Victim impact evidence 
As previously described, two members of each murder victim‟s family 
testified about their respective loved one‟s character and the effect that his death 
had on them personally.  Defendant claims that the victim impact evidence was 
outside the proper scope of aggravating evidence and unrelated to his moral 
culpability because there was nothing suggesting that he was aware of any aspect 
of the victims‟ lives.  Defendant acknowledges that we have repeatedly rejected 
the argument that characteristics of the victim that are unknown to the defendant 
should not be presented to the jury for its consideration at the penalty phase.  (See 
People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 219, fn. 17; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1153, 1183.)  He provides no persuasive reason for us to reconsider our 
prior pronouncements on this issue.13   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
(People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1012.)  We previously have not 
addressed whether a defendant is obligated to call to the trial judge‟s attention the 
type of alleged error being asserted here.  (See, e.g., People v. Howard, supra, 
44 Cal.3d at pp. 433-434 [rejecting the defendant‟s claim on the merits 
notwithstanding counsel‟s failure to object to the court‟s question to prospective 
jurors whether they would be willing to set aside sympathy].)  We need not decide 
the forfeiture issue, however, because even if defendant‟s claim was preserved for 
appeal, it clearly lacks merit on this record.  (People v. Champion and Ross (1995) 
9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6.)   
13  
For similar reasons, we reject defendant‟s further claim that the trial court 
erred by refusing defense counsel‟s request that the jury be instructed not to 
consider any victim impact evidence “unless it was foreseeably related to the 
personal characteristics of the victim that were known to the defendant at the time 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
50 
3.  Imposition of upper-term firearm enhancement  
In connection with each of the murder and robbery counts the jury found true 
the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun, within the meaning of 
section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1).  That provision allows for an additional 
sentence of 3, 4, or 10 years.  The court imposed the upper term of 10 years for 
each murder conviction and for one of the two robbery convictions.   
Defendant asserts that sentencing him with these upper term enhancements 
violated his Sixth Amendment jury trial right because none of the aggravating 
factors on which the court relied to impose them had been found true by the jury 
or admitted by him.  (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; People v. 
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825.)  We agree with defendant that the court erred 
when it selected the upper term enhancement on the Ricky Byrd murder count, 
relying on facts not found by the jury.  However, the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 holds that, under the Sixth 
Amendment, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Apprendi, supra, at p. 490.)  In Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 
296, the high court extended the scope of Apprendi by defining “statutory 
maximum” as the “maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  (Blakely, 
supra, at p. 303, italics omitted; see In re Gomez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 650, 656.)  
Applying Blakely, the court later held in Cunningham v. California, supra, 549 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
of the crime.”  Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court properly concluded 
that the proposed instruction was an incorrect statement of law.   
 
51 
U.S. 270, that California‟s determinate sentencing law did not comport with a 
defendant‟s Sixth Amendment jury trial right.  As Cunningham explained, “If the 
jury‟s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find 
an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is 
not satisfied.”  (Id. at p. 290.)  Because the aggravating circumstances necessary 
for imposition of an upper term “depend on facts found discretely and solely by 
the judge” (id. at p. 288), the “statutory maximum” prescribed in California‟s 
sentencing scheme is not the upper term but rather the middle term.  (Ibid.)   
Decisions by this court have further clarified the interplay between Sixth 
Amendment requirements and our determinate sentencing scheme.  People v. 
Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 held in relevant part that imposition of the upper term 
does not violate a defendant‟s jury trial right “so long as one legally sufficient 
aggravating circumstance has been found to exist by the jury,” or “has been 
admitted by the defendant.”  (Id. at p. 816.)  A companion case, People v. 
Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval), established that the erroneous 
imposition of an upper term is subject to federal harmless error analysis under 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.  (Sandoval, supra, at p. 838.)   
In adding the firearm use enhancement to the sentence for the murder of 
Ricky Byrd, the court chose the aggravated term “because of the use of two 
firearms and multiple shots and lack of any provocation.”  All of the identified 
aggravating factors were based on the evidence of the underlying crime, and none 
were established by the jury‟s verdict or admitted by defendant.  (Sandoval, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at pp. 837-838, 839.)  We therefore agree with defendant that the court 
violated his federal constitutional right to jury trial when it imposed the upper term 
for this enhancement.   
Defendant argues that the Cunningham/Black error was not harmless.  Under 
Sandoval, the pertinent inquiry is “whether, if the question of the existence of an 
 
52 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances had been submitted to the jury, the 
jury‟s verdict would have authorized the upper term sentence.”  (Sandoval, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 838.)  “[I]f a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, 
unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance 
had it been submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment error properly may be 
found harmless.”  (Id. at p. 839.) 
Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have found true all of the aggravating circumstances stated by 
the court had they been charged and submitted to the jury for its consideration.  
Eyewitnesses to the Ricky Byrd murder testified consistently with one another that 
when defendant yelled to their group from the backseat window of the car, asking 
whether they would “give Smoke a message for him,” Ricky approached the car 
and said, “Okay.  What‟s the message?”  They further testified that defendant then 
pointed two guns out the window and fired twice.  Defendant did not dispute this 
evidence.  Notably, he presented no defense case at the Byrd trial.  Nor did 
counsel challenge the evidence during closing remarks.  Indeed, in the course of 
arguing that defendant did not act with premeditation and deliberation, counsel 
asserted that defendant asked the group “quickly, just, „Give Smoke a message,‟ 
and boom boom.”  Counsel also argued that defendant had no intent to kill but 
rather was firing madly at a parked car and happened to hit the victim as he was 
ducking down behind it for protection after seeing the two guns.  Given the 
undisputed evidence regarding defendant‟s gun use, counsel‟s concessions, and 
that the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder rather than a lesser 
offense, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the same standard, the 
 
53 
jury also would have found the aggravating circumstances that defendant used two 
firearms, fired multiple shots, and had not been provoked.14 
D.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Scheme  
Defendant presents numerous challenges to the constitutionality of 
California‟s death penalty law that, as he acknowledges, are identical to those that 
previously have been considered and rejected by this court.  We decline his 
request to reconsider our prior conclusions here.  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 240, 303.)   
                                              
14  
The heading of defendant‟s claim of Cunningham/Black error in his 
opening brief refers to the court‟s imposition of upper term gun use enhancements 
relating to two counts, the Ricky Byrd murder and the robbery of Krystal 
Anderson.  However, neither his opening brief nor the reply provides citation to 
the record or legal argument concerning the Anderson robbery.  For this reason, 
we do not consider whether the court permissibly imposed the upper term 
enhancement in connection with that count.  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 983, 1029 [if the appellate brief presents no legal argument on a point, the 
reviewing court may treat it as waived and decline to consider it]; People v. 
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 846, fn. 9; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
764, 793.)   
 
We agree with defendant, however, that the abstract of judgment should be 
corrected with regard to these two convictions and their gun enhancements, and 
respondent does not argue otherwise.  The reporter‟s transcript indicates that, 
pursuant to section 654, the court stayed sentence on the Anderson robbery count 
and its associated enhancements.  With regard to the Ricky Byrd murder count, it 
ordered that imposition of the gun use enhancement not be stayed.  However, the 
abstract of judgment reflects a stayed sentence, rather than 10 years, for the 
enhancement on the Ricky Byrd murder count, and a term of 10 years, rather than 
a stayed sentence, for the enhancement on the Anderson robbery.  When an 
abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the trial judge‟s oral 
pronouncement of sentence, this court has the inherent power to correct such an 
error, either on our own motion or at the parties‟ behest.  (People v. Mitchell 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)  Accordingly, we order that the abstract of judgment 
be corrected to conform to the sentences actually imposed by the court.   
 
54 
1.  Aggravating and mitigating factors  
Defendant asserts that California‟s capital sentencing statute, with its unitary 
list of aggravating and mitigating factors, fails to guide the sentencer‟s discretion 
in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and their state 
constitutional counterparts.  We have concluded otherwise:  Section 190.3 is not 
constitutionally infirm for not specifying which factors are aggravating and which 
are mitigating, for not limiting aggravation to the specified aggravating factors, or 
for not defining the terms “aggravation” and “mitigation.”  (People v. Lee (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 620, 652; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 913; People v. 
Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1026.)  Nor do these asserted deficiencies 
impermissibly allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence, or its absence, in 
aggravation.  (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690; People v. Page 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 61.)15   
Defendant further contends that section 190.3‟s aggravating and mitigating 
factors violate the Eighth Amendment‟s proscription against the use of vague 
factors in the penalty phase weighing process.  (See Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 
U.S. 222, 235.)  We previously have rejected the same arguments defendant 
                                              
15  
Defendant complains that section 190.3‟s deficiencies also improperly 
allowed the prosecutor to characterize his age as an aggravating factor and to 
argue nonstatutory matters as evidence in aggravation.  He has forfeited this 
portion of his claim because he failed to object to the prosecutor‟s remarks.  
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 794.)  In any event, there is no merit to 
defendant‟s assertions.  Age can be a factor in aggravation.  (See People v. 
Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1349, fn. 25.)  Furthermore, according to the 
record, the prosecutor told the jury that evidence of defendant‟s age is “not really 
an aggravating or mitigating factor.”  And although defendant complains that the 
prosecutor relied on a nonstatutory factor when urging the jury to choose death 
because defendant “is still part of society,” the quoted remark does not appear in 
the reporter‟s transcript at the page number he cites, and our own review of the 
record discloses no such argument.   
 
55 
presents here:  Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits consideration of the 
circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor, is not impermissibly vague.  
(People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213-214; People v. Ervine (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 745, 810; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976.)  
Moreover, neither the use of the adjective “extreme” in “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” under factor (d), nor the absence of language explaining 
that these identified circumstances are mitigating rather than aggravating, renders 
that factor unconstitutionally vague.  Nor does the same asserted deficiency 
invalidate factor (h), regarding impairment due to mental disease, defect, or 
intoxication.  (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 598-599; People v. Kipp 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1138; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 968-969.)  
Finally, factor (i), the age of the defendant at the time of the crimes, is not 
unconstitutionally vague merely because it may be considered as a factor in 
aggravation or mitigation.16  (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 201-
202; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302.)  Defendant acknowledges that 
the high court upheld the constitutionality of factors (a), (b), and (i) in Tuilaepa v. 
California, supra, 512 U.S. 967.  He asserts, however, that although discrete 
factors may appear constitutional, the combined effect of all factors renders the 
entire scheme unconstitutional.  We have concluded to the contrary that section 
190.3 as a whole is not impermissibly vague.  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
                                              
16  
Defendant presents a catch-all argument, contending without any legal 
argument or explanation that all of the aggravating and mitigating factors are 
unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary, and that the jury‟s consideration of them 
results in unreliable sentences.  We do not address the remaining factors.  (People 
v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1129; see also People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 
Cal.4th 1, 51, fn. 14 [a matter asserted in a perfunctory manner is not properly 
raised].)   
 
56 
598, 688; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217; People v. Williams, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268.)   
2.  Procedural safeguards 
“The jury need not make written findings unanimously agreeing on the 
existence of aggravating factors and concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh the factors in mitigation, and that 
death is the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)  
Nor is there a constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on any burden 
of persuasion with regard to the penalty determination.  (People v. Gonzales and 
Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 328.)   
California‟s automatic appeals procedure is not unconstitutional on the 
ground that it fails to provide for intercase proportionality review.  (People v. 
Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 764.)   
Prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty 
does not create a constitutionally impermissible risk of arbitrary outcomes that 
differ from county to county.  (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 629; 
People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505.)   
3.  Narrowing function 
The various special circumstances listed in section 190.2 that render a 
murderer eligible for the death penalty are not so numerous or broad that they fail 
to genuinely narrow the class of persons subject to capital punishment.  (People v. 
Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 891.)  More specifically, the felony-murder and 
multiple-murder special circumstances adequately narrow the class of death 
eligible murderers.  (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 496, People v. 
Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 843; see also People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
 
57 
at p. 483 [to categorize multiple murderers as especially deserving of the death-
penalty is neither arbitrary nor irrational].)   
That the jury may consider the special circumstance finding as an 
aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (a), does not run afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment‟s narrowing requirement.  “[T]he aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances referred to in section 190.3 do not and need not perform a 
narrowing function.”  (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 102; see People 
v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 192.)  Nor does consideration of a special 
circumstance finding in aggravation permit the sentencer unbridled discretion that 
is weighted in favor of death.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 40-41; People 
v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1137.)  Nor does the use of a felony-murder 
special-circumstance finding as an aggravating factor subject the defendant to a 
greater likelihood of being sentenced to death than a defendant against whom 
some other special circumstance allegation has been found true.  (People v. Gates 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1189.)   
E.  International Law 
Defendant contends that the denial of his state and federal rights to due 
process and a fair and impartial trial in this case amounted to a violation of 
customary international law as informed by instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which 
requires that his convictions and sentence be set aside.  We reject the assertion.  
“Because defendant has failed to establish prejudicial violations of state or federal 
constitutional law, we need not consider whether such violations would also 
violate international law.”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567; accord, 
People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1098.)   
 
58 
F.  Cumulative Effect of Asserted Errors 
Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the asserted errors at the guilt 
and penalty phases rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of 
other constitutional rights.  Because we have concluded there was no error related 
to the capital offenses or their punishment, there is nothing to cumulate and, in any 
event, we reject his claim that any asserted cumulative effect warrants reversal.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
We order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform to the trial 
court‟s oral pronouncement that the Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), 
gun use enhancement relating to count 1 (murder of Harry “Ricky” Byrd) is 
10 years, and the Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), gun use 
enhancement relating to count 3 (robbery of Krystal Anderson) is stayed.  The 
judgment is affirmed as so corrected.   
 
  
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Myles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S097189 
Date Filed: April 26, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Michael A. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Annie Fraser, Jeffrey J. Koch and Holly D. 
Wilkens, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John F. Schuck 
Law Offices of John F. Schuck 
4083 Transport Street, Suite B 
Palo Alto, CA  94303 
(650) 856-7963 
 
Holly D. Wilkens 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2197