Title: Commonwealth v. Bateman

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10079 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENNIS M. BATEMAN. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     December 9, 2022. - July 17, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Conduct of government agents.  
Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory, Third-party 
culprit.  Perjury.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Conduct of government agents, Disclosure of 
evidence, Voir dire, Instructions to jury, Conduct of 
prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, Venue, Jury and jurors, 
Duplicative convictions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 8, 2005. 
 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on August 31, 2018, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
Amy Codagnone for the defendant. 
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In the early evening on April 16, 2005, Brandy 
Waryasz, who was seven months pregnant, was killed during a 
robbery at her place of employment, a gasoline station in 
2 
 
Deerfield.  Her viable, unborn son, who would have been named 
Dane Anthony Hall, also was killed.  Two years later, following 
a jury trial, the defendant, Dennis M. Bateman, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree for the killing of Waryasz, on 
theories of premeditation and felony-murder; murder in the first 
degree for the killing of Hall, on a theory of felony-murder; 
and armed robbery.  Now before us is the defendant's 
consolidated appeal from his convictions and from the subsequent 
denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims an extensive list of errors 
in connection with the trial and other proceedings below.  We 
affirm, except as to the armed robbery conviction, which, as the 
Commonwealth concedes, must be dismissed as it is duplicative of 
the felony-murder conviction for the killing of Hall.  We also 
have conducted a review of the record and fail to determine any 
ground for granting relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found,1 while reserving certain facts for discussion 
of the relevant issues. 
 
1 In our summary of facts that the jury could have found, we 
have considered the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Kostka, 489 Mass. 399, 400 
(2022).  In certain instances, we have included an 
identification of a particular actor -- for example, Brandy 
Waryasz, or the defendant -- in our description of a specific 
event or scene, although there was no direct evidence that the 
 
3 
 
On Saturday, April 16, 2005, twenty-one year old Brandy 
Waryasz, who was thirty to thirty-two weeks pregnant, was 
working a shift from 2 P.M. to 9 P.M. as the sole attendant at a 
gasoline station located in Deerfield.  The station had two 
islands for pumping gasoline, one self-serve and one full-serve, 
as well as a building housing two vehicle service bays and an 
adjoining retail office.  In the retail office, there was a 
customer service counter on which sat a cash register and a 
machine for processing credit card payments. 
At approximately 3 P.M., the defendant, a forty year old 
African-American man with a history of "crack" cocaine use, was 
at his home in neighboring Greenfield.  He was short on money, 
but his wife had gone away for the weekend and, in his own 
words, he was looking to "party."  With that in mind, he set off 
in his distinctive 1988 Ford Econoline van.  The van originally 
had been white, but the defendant had painted it using cans of 
black spray paint that he had purchased from the "paint guy" at 
a Greenfield automobile parts store.  As a result, the van had a 
faded, dark black or blue primer-like look to it.  The van's 
 
specified actor was Warysaz (or the defendant), because the 
evidence presented would have permitted the jury to draw that 
inference.  We also have included similar identifications of a 
vehicle as the defendant's van in this summary because, again, 
despite the lack of direct evidence to that effect, a rational 
jury could have inferred from the evidence presented that the 
vehicle in question was the defendant's van.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017). 
4 
 
engine leaked oil, such that it would leave stains behind when 
it stopped and made a loud knocking sound that became more 
pronounced as the van accelerated.  The van also had been 
equipped with an extended rooftop, as though it had been 
converted for camping or for transporting a wheelchair user. 
A little after 3 P.M., the defendant stopped at a 
Greenfield gasoline station and convinced the attendant to give 
him ten dollars' worth of gasoline on his "tab" because he had 
no money.  Next, he stopped at a Greenfield liquor store, where, 
at 3:30 P.M., he purchased a single can of beer for $1.25 and, 
as would be discovered later upon review of footage captured by 
the store's video surveillance system, stole a $4.49 bottle of 
liquor.  He then drove onto Interstate Highway 91 and headed 
south toward Springfield.  Eventually, however, he ended up at 
the Deerfield gasoline station.2 
The defendant had been to the Deerfield gasoline station 
before and, as he later revealed, was aware that it was not 
equipped with video surveillance cameras.3  He also was familiar 
 
2 The defendant originally told police he exited Interstate 
Highway 91 in Whately in search of a gasoline station because 
his van had "acted up" on the way to Springfield.  When police 
noted that there were gasoline stations closer to the Whately 
exit than the station in Deerfield, he amended his answer and 
suggested he "must have" exited in Deerfield. 
 
3 At a cookout two days later, the defendant stated that he 
had been at the Deerfield station on April 16 at around 5 P.M. 
 
5 
 
with Waryasz.  When he arrived, the defendant parked his van in 
front of the station building, not at the fuel pumps.  While it 
is unclear exactly when he arrived and whether he had left at 
one point and returned,4 several customers, whose presence was 
confirmed by credit card receipts processed between 6 P.M. and 
6:24 P.M., observed his "loud," "dark," "dull-colored" van with 
the "bad paint job" at the station.  As a security officer from 
a nearby school drove by on his rounds at 6:15 P.M. or 6:20 
P.M., he also observed the "black," "not shiny" van with the 
"raised roof," like "what a camper or handicapped van might 
have," parked in front of the station building. 
While at the station, the defendant raised the hood on his 
van, filled the oil in the engine, and secured a container of 
water from Waryasz, claiming that he might need it for his 
radiator.5  One customer, while fueling his vehicle at the self-
 
or 6 P.M., and that he expected to be "set up" for the murders, 
although he noted "that they wouldn't know who it was because 
there was no video cameras in the [station]." 
4 One self-serve customer recalled having seen the defendant 
in his van parked in front of the building at the station as 
early as 5 P.M.  While paying for his gasoline in the retail 
office, the customer overheard the defendant, from his van, ask 
Waryasz in a "loud, stern voice" whether she was "going to be 
there or not?"  To which she replied, "I don't know.  I'm not 
sure."  Another customer, meanwhile, "heard a quite loud noise" 
and saw the defendant's van enter the station at approximately 6 
P.M. 
 
5 The defendant told police that the van's engine had 
stalled out right as he pulled into the station.  While the 
 
6 
 
serve island, also saw the defendant walking around in the 
retail office, at one point even venturing behind the counter 
where the cash register was located, all while Waryasz was 
outside waiting on a full-serve customer.  Then, when the 
customer went inside to pay with his credit card, he heard the 
defendant ask Waryasz for change for a one-dollar bill, which 
caused her to open the cash register.  The defendant also asked 
Waryasz for a cigarette, noting that he had not had one "since 
[he] left Springfield."  Eventually, the self-serve customer was 
able to pay and went to depart.  As he drove out of the station, 
shortly after 6:24 P.M., Waryasz and the defendant were standing 
outside smoking cigarettes. 
By chance, the "paint guy" from the Greenfield automobile 
parts store, who well remembered selling the defendant the cans 
of black spray paint for his van, drove by the station minutes 
later, at approximately 6:30 P.M.  As he drove by, he recognized 
the defendant's "Ford Econoline conversion van" because of "the 
spray can paint job on it."  It was still parked in front of the 
station building.  He also saw Waryasz standing in the door to 
the retail office, facing the defendant who was standing outside 
 
engine did have a history of stalling if it overheated, it 
seemed to run when the defendant wanted it to, and witnesses who 
had been passengers in the van earlier on April 16 said it had 
been running fine. 
7 
 
in front of his van.  There were no other vehicles at the 
station. 
Over the next several minutes, during a lull in customers, 
the defendant attacked Waryasz, tightly wrapping a ligature -- a 
black nylon-like belt or strap -- around her neck and tying it 
in a knot in the rear.  He then left her lying in one of the 
station service bays, grabbed the cash register off the counter, 
put it in his van, and drove away.  Fresh oil stains were found 
on the pavement where his van had been parked. 
At approximately 6:42 P.M., another self-serve customer 
entered the retail office to pay for his gasoline.  Finding no 
one, he looked into the adjoining service bays and observed 
Waryasz's body on the ground.  He immediately called police, who 
responded along with emergency medical personnel.  However, it 
already was too late to save Waryasz.  The ligature had choked 
off Waryasz's airflow, rendering her unconscious within seconds 
and stopping her heart within minutes.  In turn, her viable 
unborn son was deprived of oxygen and died within minutes of his 
mother. 
The cash register and the $350 that had been in it were 
never recovered.  The defendant, meanwhile, had driven back to 
Greenfield, stashed his van in a parking lot behind a downtown 
building, and proceeded to "party" all night, at multiple 
locations, in the company of a series of different companions.  
8 
 
Over the course of the night, he was observed with "lots of 
money" and purchased, among other things, $250 worth of crack 
cocaine, which he and his companions proceeded to smoke.  Also, 
on more than one occasion that night, he asked people to make 
sure his family was taken care of "if anything happen[ed] to 
him" because he had "messed things up." 
In the days that followed, the defendant approached 
additional individuals and pressed them to confirm that he was 
in Greenfield at or about the time of the murders.  All those 
whom he approached, however, had seen him on April 16 before or 
after the time of the murders.6  He also proceeded to tell 
multiple people that he had been at the gasoline station on 
April 16 and that his fingerprints likely would be found on 
Waryasz's pocketbook; he claimed he had asked her for change and 
she allowed him to go into her pocketbook to get it, while she 
went outside to wait on a full-serve customer.7 
Two days later, during an interview of the defendant by 
police in connection with their investigation of the April 16 
station incident, the defendant told the interviewing officers 
that, while he was at the station, he and Waryasz engaged in 
 
6 The defendant was not seen back in Greenfield until 7 P.M. 
or shortly thereafter, when he made his first purchase of crack 
cocaine for the evening, at a cost of one hundred dollars. 
  
7 No fingerprints belonging to the defendant were recovered 
from Waryasz's pocketbook. 
9 
 
"horse play" with a belt or strap that she pulled out from under 
the counter:  "She was flinging the thing at me and I was 
grabbing it and pushing it back and stuff like that."  Police, 
however, had yet to publicly disclose that Waryasz had been 
strangled.8  Unwittingly, the defendant had revealed that he had 
knowledge about the details of the crime, and the murder weapon 
(i.e., the ligature) in particular, that only the perpetrator 
would have, and also that he was concerned about fingerprint or 
other forensic testing that ultimately might link him to the 
same. 
Later in the investigation, a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
profile was generated from biological material found on the ends 
of the ligature where it had been tied behind Waryasz's neck.  
The profile was analyzed and found to contain a mixture of DNA.  
The defendant's DNA matched the major profile in that mixture.  
The probability that the DNA profile of a randomly selected 
African–American individual would match the major profile was 
approximately one in 605 quadrillion of the African-American 
 
8 The defendant first told an officer about the alleged 
"horse play" with "a black belt" while outside smoking a 
cigarette during a break in an interview on April 18, 2005.  At 
the time, the officer did not know how Waryasz had been 
murdered.  The defendant then made a point of repeating the 
story about "playing around" with a "black, long, thin belt-like 
strap" to another officer who drove him home from the interview.  
The second officer was aware that Waryasz had been strangled. 
10 
 
population.  A quadrillion is a million times the population of 
the world. 
The defendant also was a potential contributor to a mixture 
of DNA recovered from clippings of Waryasz's fingernails.  The 
probability of a randomly selected, unrelated individual having 
contributed DNA to the mixture was approximately one in 207,000 
of the African-American population.  Along with fresh abrasions 
found on Waryasz's elbow and knee, the DNA on her fingernails 
suggested that Waryasz had attempted to fend off the defendant's 
attack. 
2.  Procedural history.  On July 8, 2005, the defendant was 
indicted for the murders of Waryasz and her unborn child, Hall, 
as well as for armed robbery.  On May 25, 2007, after a twelve-
day jury trial, he was convicted on all charges.  The defendant 
timely appealed.  Eleven years later, on August 31, 2018, he 
filed a motion for a new trial, in which he made many of the 
same arguments raised here on appeal.  The motion was remanded 
to the Superior Court.  On August 30, 2019, after an evidentiary 
hearing, the same judge who presided at the trial denied the 
motion in a written decision that included detailed findings of 
fact.  The defendant appealed from the decision, and that appeal 
11 
 
was consolidated here with the direct appeal from his 
convictions.9 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where, as here, we 
consider the "defendant's direct appeal from a conviction of 
murder in the first degree together with an appeal from the 
denial of a motion for a new trial, we review the whole case 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 
763, 768 (2018).  "We therefore review raised or preserved 
issues according to their constitutional or common-law standard 
and analyze any unraised, unpreserved, or unargued errors, and 
other errors we discover after a comprehensive review of the 
entire record, for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020).  An 
error creates a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice if it was "likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion" (citation omitted).  Id.  We address the defendant's 
arguments in the order presented. 
2.  Statements to jailhouse witnesses.  Before he was 
indicted, the defendant was being held in the Franklin County 
 
9 On December 4, 2020, the defendant filed a second motion 
for a new trial in this court.  The motion was remanded to the 
trial judge for disposition.  The defendant sought to stay 
further consideration of the present appeal until that motion 
was decided, but we denied the request.  The defendant has 
included in his brief filed in this appeal arguments made in 
that second motion for a new trial.  Those arguments are not 
part of the present appeal. 
12 
 
house of correction after an arrest on other charges.  While 
there, he made incriminating statements relative to the murders 
to two fellow detainees, Anthony Bogacz and Debric Sweeney, both 
of whom subsequently testified at the murder trial pursuant to 
cooperation agreements.  Prior to trial, the defendant moved for 
voir dires of these two witnesses and to exclude their testimony 
on grounds that they were acting as agents of the government 
when the statements were made and, thus, violated his right to 
counsel.  The trial judge denied the motion.  In his subsequent 
motion for a new trial, the defendant again raised and expanded 
on the claim, but the trial judge again denied the motion 
following an evidentiary hearing.  The defendant claims the 
judge erred on both occasions.  We disagree. 
We review the relevant background.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, which was limited to the issue whether Bogacz was a 
government agent, the defendant called, among others, the lead 
trial prosecutor and two State police investigators, Detective 
Lieutenant John Gibbons and Sergeant Danial Wildgrube, both of 
whom had testified at trial.  Based on his assessment of their 
testimony and credibility, as well as on his assessment of the 
evidence and credibility of the relevant witnesses from the 
trial, the trial judge made certain findings.  See Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 370 Mass. 746, 752–753 (1976) (trial judge entitled to 
rely on knowledge and evaluation of evidence from trial in 
13 
 
deciding motion for new trial).  We accept those findings where 
they are supported by substantial evidence and defer to the 
judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tate, 490 Mass. 501, 505 (2022).  We pay special 
deference to the judge's findings in this case because he also 
presided over the trial.  See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 
327, 334 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 840 (2016).10 
On April 20, 2005, Bogacz and Sweeney were arrested as part 
of a large law enforcement operation targeting drug dealers and 
users in Greenfield, and thereafter were detained at the house 
of correction.  A week later, on April 27, 2005, Gibbons and 
Wildgrube went to visit with Bogacz, having learned from sources 
that he had supplied drugs to the defendant.  During the 
interview, Bogacz confirmed that, in fact, he had sold the 
defendant crack cocaine on five successive days, including a 
$150 sale on April 16, hours after the murders.11  No promises, 
rewards, or inducements were provided to Bogacz during the 
interview. 
 
10 We have supplemented the trial judge's findings with 
undisputed evidence from the record that is not contrary to the 
judge's rulings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 431 (2015). 
 
11 The defendant previously purchased one hundred dollars' 
worth of crack cocaine from another dealer immediately after the 
murders. 
14 
 
On May 3, 2005, six days after the officers' visit to 
Bogacz, the defendant was arrested on charges of larceny under 
$250, G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), and being a common and notorious 
thief, G. L. c. 266, § 40, in connection with his theft of the 
$4.49 bottle of liquor on the afternoon of April 16.  Upon his 
arrest, he was taken to the district attorney's office in 
Greenfield, provided with his Miranda rights, and interviewed by 
Gibbons and another member of the State police.  During the 
interview, the defendant's attorney called and advised him not 
to speak any further, whereupon the interview ended.  The 
defendant was then booked, arraigned, and held at a house of 
correction.12 
A day or two later, the defendant saw Bogacz walking by his 
cell and called out.  Bogacz, who had been unaware of the 
defendant's arrival, went over, and the two proceeded to engage 
in conversation, during which the defendant pressed Bogacz to 
act as an alibi witness and tell police that he had seen the 
defendant between 4 P.M. and 6 P.M. on the day of the murders.  
The following day, they talked again at the defendant's cell.  
The defendant was emotional and said that "he was fucked, and if 
 
12 The defendant was arraigned in the District Court on the 
larceny-related charges on May 4, 2005, and held subject to 
$10,000 cash bail.  On May 19, 2005, after being indicted on the 
same charges, he was arraigned in the Superior Court and again 
held subject to $10,000 cash bail. 
15 
 
[Bogacz] did[ not] help him out he was going to spend the rest 
of his life in jail."  He told Bogacz that he knew Waryasz and 
had gone to the station with the intention of convincing her to 
play along with his plan to rob the station to "get money for 
coke," but, when she refused, he murdered her.  The defendant 
suggested that he had been drunk, and it was all just an 
accident.  Bogacz refused to go along with the defendant's plan; 
he and the defendant had conducted their drug transaction on 
April 16 late at night after the murders, not between 4 P.M. and 
6 P.M. 
On May 5, 2005, Bogacz placed a telephone call to Gibbons 
from the house of correction to report that the defendant had 
asked him to provide an alibi and to request a transfer out of 
the house of correction, away from the defendant; however, 
Gibbons was not available.  The next day, May 6, Bogacz managed 
to reach Gibbons by telephone, told him that the defendant now 
had confessed to the murders, and again requested a transfer.  
Gibbons told Bogacz he would come down to talk to him.  When 
Gibbons and Wildgrube arrived at the house of correction later 
the same day, they informed Bogacz that they could not offer him 
any promises, rewards, or inducements.  As a result, Bogacz 
refused to talk to the officers without his lawyer.  Concerned 
for his own safety, he also continued to request a transfer, 
away from the defendant. 
16 
 
On June 28, 2005, Bogacz, now accompanied by his lawyer and 
having been transferred out of the house of correction, met with 
Gibbons and Wildgrube and provided them with the details of what 
the defendant had told him.  No promises, rewards, or 
inducements were provided to Bogacz at that time; however, 
approximately two years later, on April 27, 2007, Bogacz and the 
Commonwealth did enter into a cooperation agreement.  In return 
for Bogacz's testimony at the defendant's trial, the 
Commonwealth agreed to take his cooperation into consideration 
in resolving criminal matters pending against him, not to 
proceed against him on a pending indictment for being a habitual 
offender, and not to use against him any statements he made at 
the trial regarding selling crack cocaine to the defendant in 
the hours after the murders.  Pursuant to the agreement, Bogacz 
testified at the trial regarding that drug transaction and the 
statements made by the defendant in the house of correction. 
As for Sweeney, he had no contact with authorities 
regarding the defendant until June 1, 2005.  At that time, 
Sweeney disclosed to Gibbons and another State police officer 
details of interactions he had had with the defendant several 
weeks earlier, shortly after the defendant's arrival at the 
house of correction.  Sweeney knew the defendant, having sold 
him crack cocaine two days before the murders.  When they later 
encountered one another in the house of correction, they fell 
17 
 
into conversation, during which the defendant mentioned that 
police considered him a person of interest in connection with 
the murders.  The defendant admitted to Sweeney that he had been 
at the gasoline station on April 16 -- claiming his van had 
broken down -- and that he and Waryasz knew one another and were 
"playing around and stuff."  He further explained that he was 
having trouble establishing his whereabouts at the time of the 
murders, and asked Sweeney to help him out by lying and saying 
he was at Sweeney's house drinking beers and watching television 
on April 16 between 4 P.M. and 6 P.M.  After initially agreeing, 
Sweeney changed his mind and declined to sign a written 
statement that the defendant prepared.  When he did so, the 
defendant became angered and threatened to tell police about the 
time Sweeney had sold him crack cocaine unless Sweeney relented 
and signed the statement.  When Sweeney continued to refuse, 
however, the defendant said, "I'm not going to use you, just 
forget it." 
Following the June 1 interview, Sweeney had no further 
contact with authorities regarding the defendant and the murders 
until May 2007, when he received a summons to appear and to 
testify at the defendant's trial.  On May 17, 2007, Sweeney 
entered into a cooperation agreement, whereby he agreed to 
testify at the defendant's trial in return for the 
Commonwealth's agreement to take into consideration his 
18 
 
cooperation in resolving criminal matters pending against him, 
and not to use against him any statements he might make at the 
trial regarding his sale of crack cocaine to the defendant.  At 
the trial, Sweeney testified about that drug sale, as well as 
about the statements and threat made by the defendant in the 
house of correction. 
a.  Agents of the government.  The defendant first argues 
that the statements he made while in the house of correction 
should have been suppressed because Bogacz and Sweeney were 
acting as government agents at the time and, thus, violated his 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as well as his invocation of his right to counsel 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).  When 
a right to counsel attaches or is invoked, as the case may be, 
"government agents may not 'deliberately' elicit statements from 
a defendant outside the presence of counsel."  Commonwealth v. 
Foxworth, 473 Mass. 149, 157 (2015), citing Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  "This rule applies not only 
to overt interrogation by government officers, but also to 
'indirect and surreptitious' interrogation by persons acting as 
government agents."  Foxworth, supra, citing Commonwealth v. 
Harmon, 410 Mass. 425, 428 (1991).  "Whether someone is an agent 
of the government . . . depends on the circumstances of each 
19 
 
case."  Foxworth, supra.  While we accept the trial judge's 
findings of fact absent clear error, we independently apply 
constitutional principles to determine whether Bogacz and 
Sweeney were government agents.  See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 
Mass. 275, 280-281 (2017). 
"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly defined 
the point at which agency arises."  Commonwealth v. Murphy, 448 
Mass. 452, 460 (2007).  At the very least, "there must be some 
arrangement between the Commonwealth and the informant before 
the informant's actions can be attributed to the Commonwealth."  
Caruso, 476 Mass. at 282.  Put another way, "where there is an 
'articulated agreement containing a specific benefit,' an agency 
relationship has been established."  Murphy, supra at 460, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 394 (1999).  
Accordingly, someone "who is paid by the government for 
incriminating evidence" or "who receives a promise of the 
recognition of cooperation" and thereafter deliberately elicits 
statements from a defendant is a government agent.  Foxworth, 
473 Mass. at 157, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 
271 (1980), and Reynolds, supra at 394 & n.7.  The agreement or 
promise need not be express, and, instead, "may evolve[] by 
implication from the conduct of the parties" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Foxworth, supra at 158.  With that said, 
"someone who has not entered into any agreement with the 
20 
 
government, and who reports incriminating evidence to police out 
of conscience or even an unencouraged hope to curry favor is not 
acting as a government agent" (citation and quotations omitted).  
Id. 
The defendant argues that the government sowed the seeds 
for Bogacz and Sweeney to act as agents when, at the police 
station on April 20, 2005, police asked individuals arrested 
during the large drug sweep whether they had information 
regarding the April 16 murders of Waryasz and Hall.  As an 
initial matter, however, there is no evidence in the record 
before us that either Bogacz or Sweeney was questioned about the 
murders when they were arrested on April 20.  Even assuming they 
were, mere knowledge of the government's desire for information 
about a crime does not turn an individual into a government 
agent.  See Harmon, 410 Mass. at 430 (where only action 
attributable to government was suggestion that inmate "keep his 
ears open" when around defendant, no agency relationship 
established).  Again, some express or implied agreement or 
arrangement promising rewards or inducements in return for 
information is required.  See Murphy, 448 Mass. at 465 
(jailhouse witness was government agent where he had "specific 
agreement" with prosecutor to file motion to reduce sentence on 
provision of "substantial assistance" to government).  As of 
April 20, therefore, Bogacz and Sweeney, at most, had 
21 
 
unencouraged hope that they could curry favor with the 
government by providing information regarding the April 16 
murders. 
For an agency relationship to exist, the agreement or 
arrangement between the government and the witness, be it 
express or implied, must have arisen prior to the elicitation of 
information from the defendant.  See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 282 
("No agency relationship exists in the absence of a prior 
arrangement between the Commonwealth and the informant").  In 
Sweeney's case, he did not meet or communicate with anyone from 
the government until he was visited by Gibbons and another State 
police officer on June 1, 2005, weeks after the defendant had 
asked him for an alibi and then threatened him when he refused 
to do so.  Accordingly, even if Sweeney reached an agreement or 
arrangement with the government at the June 1 meeting, a 
proposition not supported by evidence, no agency relationship 
existed at the material time. 
As for Bogacz, he had three relevant interactions with the 
government.  First, there was his April 27, 2005, meeting with 
Gibbons and Wildgrube at the house of correction,13 but no 
 
13 The defendant maintains that an agency relationship 
already existed between Bogacz and the government by the time of 
the April 27, 2005, interview, based on two prior occasions when 
Bogacz had provided information to authorities.  Some twenty-
five years earlier, in the 1980s, Bogacz had provided 
 
22 
 
promises, rewards, or inducements were offered to him at that 
time.  Accordingly, no agency relationship arose from that 
meeting.14 
Bogacz next communicated with police on May 4, 2005, when 
he called Gibbons by telephone from the house of correction, 
seeking to provide information on an unrelated narcotics matter.  
Gibbons responded that he would pass on the information to the 
officers working on that matter.  He also told Bogacz that he 
had talked to the assistant district attorney and passed on the 
information Bogacz had provided on April 27 regarding his sale 
of crack cocaine to the defendant.  The defendant attaches great 
significance to this, but the mere assurance that information 
has been or will be passed along does not create an agency 
relationship.  See Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 320 
 
information to Gibbons after being arrested for a series of home 
burglaries, although Gibbons did not provide Bogacz with 
anything in return for that information and did not speak to 
prosecutors on Bogacz's behalf.  In addition, twelve years 
earlier, in 1993, Bogacz had cooperated with the Hampden County 
district attorney's office after being arrested in connection 
with a bank robbery.  Bogacz's prior interactions with the 
government, however, do not serve to establish that he was a 
government agent in 2005.  See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 282 (fact 
that informant provided information in past does not establish 
agency relationship). 
 
14 There is no evidence that, at the April 27 meeting with 
Bogacz, Gibbons or Wildgrube "tipped off" that the defendant 
would soon be arriving at the house of correction.  Of course, 
even if they had, that alone would not have been enough to 
establish that Bogacz was a government agent.  See Harmon, 410 
Mass. at 430. 
23 
 
(2001) (no agency relationship where trooper made no promise and 
merely said she would take information to district attorney's 
office).  Gibbons did not tell Bogacz that the assistant 
district attorney was prepared to provide anything in return for 
past or future information.  Instead, Gibbons, who had been 
directed by the assistant district attorney not to offer any 
promises, rewards, or inducements to Bogacz, merely reported, 
"[W]e're going to see what your status is."  In other words, 
Bogacz's status with the government had not changed.  Notably, 
there was no mention during the May 4 telephone call of the 
defendant's presence at the house of correction, even though he 
had arrived there by that time, or any suggestion from Gibbons 
that Bogacz should track the defendant down and probe for 
information about the murders.  In the end, therefore, there was 
nothing about the May 4 telephone call that transformed Bogacz 
into a government agent. 
Finally, there was Bogacz's May 5 telephone call, in which 
he was looking to report to Gibbons on the defendant's initial 
request for an alibi and to express his own desire for a 
transfer out of the house of correction.  Gibbons was not 
available to take the telephone call, however, and the State 
trooper who answered merely suggested that he would have Gibbons 
"get in touch with" Bogacz.  No promises, rewards, or 
inducements were offered to Bogacz during this extremely brief 
24 
 
exchange.15  Nor was there anything about the telephone call that 
gave rise to an implied agreement or arrangement with the 
government.  As the May 5 telephone call was the last contact 
Bogacz had with anyone from the government before the defendant 
confessed to the murders, there is no basis for concluding that 
Bogacz was acting as an agent of the government when that 
occurred.16 
The defendant has further argued that the statements made 
to Bogacz and Sweeney should have been excluded because they 
were the product of an unethical ruse orchestrated by the 
prosecutor.  Specifically, he maintains that the prosecutor had 
him arrested on May 3, 2005, on "dubious legal grounds" for the 
 
15 The defendant suggests that the State trooper who 
answered the telephone on May 5, 2005, somehow agreed to 
transfer Bogacz out of the house of correction in return for the 
information he was prepared to provide.  We disagree.  The call 
lasted only a matter of seconds, during which the trooper seemed 
intent on simply taking a message for Gibbons and ending the 
conversation. 
 
16 Having concluded that Bogacz and Sweeney were not 
government agents when the defendant made the inculpatory 
statements, we need not consider whether the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment or art. 12 right to counsel had attached by that time 
with respect to the murders and armed robbery.  Nor need we 
consider whether the defendant's invocation of his Miranda right 
to counsel at the May 3 postarrest custodial interrogation 
continued to protect him at the time, and in the circumstances, 
that the statements were made. 
 
25 
 
theft of the bottle of liquor,17 rather than for the murder of 
Waryasz and Hall, so that he could be detained in the 
"informant-rich environment" at the house of correction and 
preyed upon for information about the murders without fear of 
violating his right to counsel with respect to those more 
serious charges.  To be sure, it would be a violation for the 
government to intentionally create a situation likely to induce 
a defendant to make incriminating statements in the absence of 
counsel after the right to counsel has attached.  See Caruso, 
476 Mass. at 281-282, citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 274; Harmon, 410 
Mass. at 428.  However, even if the defendant had established 
everything else necessary to advance his argument as formulated, 
he still would have to establish that Bogacz and Sweeney were 
government agents when the statements at issue were made.  See 
Henry, supra at 270-275 (statements suppressed where inmate, who 
was government agent, engaged defendant, fellow inmate in same 
prison, in conversation).  Again, this he has failed to do. 
 
17 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the "liquor 
bottle" case, arguing that there was no probable cause for the 
charges of larceny under $250 and being a common and notorious 
thief.  A Superior Court judge (not the trial judge in the 
present case) denied the motion, having expressly concluded that 
there was probable cause to initiate the charges.  The defendant 
did not seek an interlocutory appeal from that ruling; 
eventually, the case was nol prossed after he was convicted of 
the murders. 
26 
 
Having viewed the entire record, we are satisfied that the 
Commonwealth did not engage "in any conduct in contravention of 
its 'affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that 
circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the 
right to counsel.'"  Caruso, 476 Mass. at 284, quoting Murphy, 
448 Mass. at 467.18  The testimony of Bogacz and Sweeney was 
properly admitted. 
b.  Undisclosed evidence.  The defendant next argues that 
he must be granted a new trial for what he alleges is the 
Commonwealth's failure to produce specifically requested 
exculpatory information relevant to the jailhouse witnesses.  To 
prevail on these claims, he must show that the undisclosed 
evidence existed and was exculpatory, he made a specific request 
for it, the prosecution failed to produce it, and a "substantial 
basis exists for claiming prejudice from the nondisclosure."  
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 412 (1992).  See 
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 650 (2019), S.C., 490 
Mass. 1002 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 
 
18 While we "have recognized that art. 12 may provide 
broader protection of the right to counsel than the Sixth 
Amendment in circumstances in which 'the informant has an 
articulated agreement with the government that contains a 
specific benefit or promise,'" Caruso, 476 Mass. at 281 n.3, 
quoting Murphy, 448 Mass. at 467, we did not ascertain a reason 
to extend such protection in Caruso, and we conclude that it is 
not warranted in the circumstances in this case. 
27 
 
575, 582 (2018) (burden can be met by showing "reasonable 
possibility" that "nondisclosed evidence would have made a 
difference").  The verdict and judgment must be set aside unless 
the reviewing court's "conviction is sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."  
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 24–25 (1978), quoting 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).  We review each 
claimed violation. 
i.  Undisclosed Sweeney evidence.  As Sweeney acknowledged 
at trial, he had pleaded guilty in November 2005 -- prior to 
entering into his cooperation agreement -- to five counts of 
distributing cocaine and had been sentenced to eighteen months 
in a house of correction, followed by three years of probation.  
At the time of the defendant's trial, Sweeney no longer was 
incarcerated but was still on probation.  After trial, the 
defendant learned that a notice of surrender and hearing for an 
alleged violation of probation had issued on April 19, 2007, due 
to Sweeney's failure to report to his probation officer since 
March 27, 2007.  No hearing resulted, and Sweeney's probation, 
from which he timely was discharged on May 4, 2009, was not 
revoked.  Based on this information, the defendant alleges that 
Sweeney was facing revocation of his probation at the time he 
testified on May 17, 2007, and that there was an undisclosed 
deal between the prosecution team and probation service to keep 
28 
 
the violation hanging over Sweeney's head as motivation to 
cooperate.  The assertion is purely speculative and contradicted 
by documents in the record, which indicate that the violation 
was disposed of the same day it issued, and that Sweeney met 
with his probation officer the following day.19  There is 
insufficient evidence, therefore, to establish that, in the 
circumstances, the alleged undisclosed evidence was indeed 
exculpatory. 
Also, as we have counselled, the "proper route for [a] 
defendant to obtain prior convictions of prospective witnesses 
from the Commonwealth is by requesting the judge to order the 
probation [service] to produce them."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
437 Mass. 84, 95 (2002), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (2), 
378 Mass. 874 (1979).  The trial judge here offered to help the 
defendant in that regard at the outset of trial.  And while the 
record reveals that the prosecutor agreed to assist when defense 
counsel alerted the trial judge to the fact that he "may" need 
to ask the probation service to "run off some records" on "some 
people," there is insufficient evidence to suggest that anything 
 
19 Wildgrube wrote a report documenting that he served 
Sweeney with a subpoena to appear for the defendant's trial 
while Sweeney was meeting with his probation officer on 
April 20, 2007.  As the defendant would have it, this is proof 
of both the prosecutor's knowledge of the probation violation 
and coordination between the prosecution team and the probation 
service with respect to the alleged undisclosed deal.  This 
assertion, however, appears to be based only on speculation. 
29 
 
was deliberately withheld, never mind that an alleged probation 
violation by Sweeney was purposely concealed.  The same is true 
with respect to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed 
to produce Sweeney's complete criminal record from South 
Carolina. 
There is no doubt that Sweeney was an important witness for 
the prosecution and that his testimony was helpful to the 
Commonwealth's case.  But it is also true that several other 
witnesses provided similar testimony, i.e., that they were 
approached by the defendant following the murders and pressed to 
help him with an alibi.  The jury also heard about Sweeney's 
extensive criminal record and his strong incentive to testify 
against the defendant to avoid being prosecuted, yet again, for 
selling crack cocaine.  Accordingly, even if it could be 
established that Sweeney had additional incentive to cooperate, 
to avoid revocation of his probation or obtain leniency in South 
Carolina, the defendant has failed to establish that there is a 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion had that been disclosed.  We are sure that such an 
error, if it even occurred, had no influence, or had but very 
slight effect, on the jury. 
ii.  Undisclosed Bogacz evidence.  The defendant claims 
that the Commonwealth failed to disclose prior to trial that 
Bogacz had provided Gibbons with information many years earlier, 
30 
 
in the 1980s, in another case.  According to Gibbons's 
undisputed testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the motion 
for a new trial, however, he did not provide Bogacz with any 
promises, rewards, or inducements on that occasion and did not 
speak to prosecutors on Bogacz's behalf.20  The undisclosed 
information, therefore, was not exculpatory in nature and did 
not need to be disclosed.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 
Mass. 222, 232 (2015) (evidence of understanding or agreement 
between government and witness is exculpatory evidence and must 
be disclosed). 
The defendant also asserts that the Commonwealth failed to 
disclose that Bogacz was the subject of a pending drug 
investigation at the time he testified at trial.  The sole basis 
for this assertion is a statement by a prosecutor, made at 
Bogacz's sentencing hearing one month after the defendant's 
trial, that there had been an investigation of drug use at the 
Hampshire County house of correction the last time Bogacz was 
detained there, and that Bogacz had refused to provide a drug 
screen.  As a result, the prosecutor was not certain that Bogacz 
would be welcomed at the facility.  It is not at all evident 
from this, however, that Bogacz was the subject of a pending 
drug investigation at the time he testified, or that the 
 
20 Gibbons testified on cross-examination at trial that he 
had known Bogacz "for quite some time." 
31 
 
prosecutor in the defendant's case was aware of it or that 
Bogacz had been promised leniency in the event that the drug 
investigation revealed he had engaged in further criminal 
activity. 
Although he was not essential to the Commonwealth's case in 
light of all the other evidence connecting the defendant to the 
murders, Bogacz, being the only witness to testify that the 
defendant confessed to the murders, was not an insignificant 
witness.  Still, the jury heard about his long criminal history 
and strong desire to testify against the defendant in return for 
leniency on his pending charges.  He admitted on cross-
examination that he could be a good liar; that there was no way 
for the jury to determine whether he was telling the truth; that 
he had cooperated previously, in 1993, to avoid doing "heavy 
time" on a charge; and that he would not hesitate to turn in his 
mother, father, sister, or brother to again avoid doing "heavy 
time," this time on his pending habitual offender charge.  In 
sum, the jury already had ample evidence from which to question 
Bogacz's motives and credibility.  As such, even if the 
undisclosed evidence was as the defendant suggests and had been 
disclosed, the defendant has not shown a reasonable possibility 
that it would have made a difference.  Again, we conclude that 
it would have had no influence, or would have had very slight 
effect, on the jury. 
32 
 
iii.  Undisclosed audio recording.  Prior to trial, the 
Commonwealth failed to produce the audio recording of the 
defendant's interview with police on May 3, 2005, following his 
arrest for the theft of the liquor bottle.  As the Commonwealth 
concedes, this was a violation of its mandatory discovery 
obligations.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), as 
amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) (requiring production of "[a]ny 
written or recorded statements, and the substance of any oral 
statements, made by defendant").  The Commonwealth, however, did 
not attempt to use statements from the May 3 interview at trial.  
Nor has the defendant suggested that any exculpatory information 
was contained in the interview.  Instead, he suggests that the 
nondisclosure deprived him of the ability to point to his 
invocation of his right to counsel during the May 3 interview 
when he moved to exclude the statements made to Bogacz and 
Sweeney.  However, the record reveals that the defendant was 
armed with that information well before he moved to exclude his 
statements to the two jailhouse witnesses.21  Moreover, even if 
 
21 When the defendant was arrested on May 3, 2005, he also 
was cited for certain criminal motor vehicle infractions.  In a 
December 27, 2006, memorandum of decision and order denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss those charges, a District Court 
judge discussed the interview that took place at the district 
attorney's office in Greenfield following the arrest:  "[Gibbons 
had a] conversation with the defendant about another criminal 
matter and informed him relative to this other matter of his 
Miranda rights . . . .  At first the defendant said he wanted to 
 
33 
 
he had needed the audio transcript for that purpose, it is moot 
given our conclusion that Bogacz and Sweeney were not acting as 
government agents when the statements were made.  No prejudice 
has been shown. 
c.  Denial of request for voir dire.  The defendant next 
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial 
judge refused his pretrial request for voir dire of Bogacz and 
Sweeney.  More specifically, he argues that due process and the 
right to a fair trial require, upon request, a voir dire of any 
witness testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement before 
being allowed to testify at trial because such a witness is 
inherently unreliable.  This argument need not detain us long, 
for this court already has "recognized that testimony pursuant 
to a plea or cooperation agreement, founded on a promise of 
truthful cooperation, and the agreement itself are admissible" 
(quotation, citation, and alterations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Cruz, 442 Mass. 299, 310 (2004) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that witnesses testifying pursuant to promises of consideration 
by Commonwealth should have been excluded on ground that 
testimony was "irretrievably unreliable").  We have, however, 
established guidelines for use when such a witness testifies to 
 
talk.  However, . . . Gibbons then received a telephone call 
from Bateman's attorney, who asked him not to talk to the 
defendant.  As a result the questioning then stopped." 
34 
 
minimize any risk that the jury will believe the witness because 
the Commonwealth, in effect, appears to have vouched for the 
truthfulness of the testimony.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 
406 Mass. 257, 264-266 (1989).  The trial judge here properly 
followed those guidelines and instructed the jury on three 
separate occasions that Bogacz and Sweeney had a personal 
interest in the case that was different from the ordinary 
witness, that the Commonwealth had no greater ability than the 
jury to know whether Bogacz and Sweeney were testifying 
truthfully, that it was solely for the jury to decide whether 
those witnesses had been truthful, and that their testimony 
should be scrutinized with caution and weighed with great care.  
That is all that was required. 
The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to exclude 
the testimony of Bogacz and Sweeney without conducting a voir 
dire, after finding that the submission in support of the motion 
was insufficient.  Having reviewed the submission, we cannot say 
that this constituted an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rodwell, 394 Mass. 694, 698-699 (1985), S.C., 432 Mass. 1016 
(2000) (judge did not abuse discretion in denying motion to 
suppress without evidentiary hearing where affidavit presented 
no facts supporting theory of suppression).  As to Bogacz, the 
issue of a voir dire effectively became moot after he testified 
at trial and the trial judge, in response to the motion for a 
35 
 
new trial, subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
whether he was a government agent. 
With respect to Sweeney, the trial judge denied the request 
for an evidentiary hearing in support of the motion for a new 
trial after determining that, once again, the defendant had 
failed to establish that there was a substantial issue whether 
he was a government agent.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 
Mass. 235, 240 (2011) (judge may rule on motion for new trial 
without evidentiary hearing if no substantial issue raised by 
motion or affidavits); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (same).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 826 (2014) (motion judge 
who also was trial judge may use knowledge and evaluation of 
evidence at trial in determining whether to hold evidentiary 
hearing on motion for new trial).  Having reviewed the 
defendant's allegations concerning Sweeney, as discussed in part 
2.b.i, supra, we cannot say that the trial judge committed "a 
significant error of law or other abuse of discretion" (citation 
omitted).  Upton, 484 Mass. at 162 (reversals for denial of 
evidentiary hearing on motion for new trial are "particularly 
rare"). 
3.  Perjured testimony.  The defendant contends that the 
prosecutor allowed multiple witnesses to commit perjury during 
the trial and failed to take steps to correct it.  "The 
36 
 
Commonwealth may not present testimony at trial 'which [it] 
knows or should know is false.'"  Commonwealth v. Ware, 482 
Mass. 717, 721 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 
469, 490 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 747 
n.23 (2022).  "Nor may the Commonwealth, 'although not 
soliciting false evidence, allow[] it to go uncorrected when it 
appears.'"  Ware, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Hurst, 364 
Mass. 604, 608 (1974).  However, "[m]inor inconsistencies do not 
constitute falsities."  Forte, supra at 491.  The prosecutor 
also does not have a "duty to try the defendant's case for him 
by attempting to impeach the testimony of the Commonwealth's own 
witnesses with . . . documents in the defense counsel's 
possession."  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 363 (2004). 
The defendant asserts that Gibbons lied, and the prosecutor 
failed to correct him, on multiple occasions during the trial.  
The trial judge, whose credibility determinations we defer to, 
found in his decision denying the motion for a new trial that, 
while Gibbons's testimony at trial and at the evidentiary 
hearing on the motion for a new trial "was not entirely 
consistent, the inconsistencies fail to evince dishonesty."  
Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the trial judge's 
finding was clearly erroneous.  For example, the defendant 
maintains that, on cross-examination, Gibbons lied when he 
answered "no" to the question whether Bogacz had ever called and 
37 
 
tried to get hold of him.  By the time Gibbons testified, 
however, Bogacz had already taken the stand and acknowledged 
that he called Gibbons.  The defendant also had received in 
pretrial discovery transcripts of the telephone calls Bogacz 
made to Gibbons but chose not to confront Gibbons with them.  
The defendant also claims that Gibbons lied on cross-examination 
when he denied that Bogacz had an agreement with the government, 
and that the prosecutor again made no effort to correct him.  
Only moments earlier, however, Gibbons had testified that he was 
aware of the agreement Bogacz had signed with the district 
attorney's office.  Also, Bogacz already had testified 
extensively about his agreement.  In short, there is no reason 
to believe that Gibbons was being deceitful on these and other 
occasions identified by the defendant.22 
 
22 The defendant also suggests that Gibbons lied when, on 
direct examination, he testified that four witnesses had 
"identified" the defendant's van as the one they had seen at the 
gasoline station when either shown a photograph of it or driven 
by the defendant's house to view it.  In fact, the witnesses had 
expressed varying degrees of certainty:  the van in the 
photograph looked "similar" to the one seen at the station; the 
van in the photograph "could be" the one and was the "same type 
and boxy" style; the van in the photograph was "recognized" as 
and "very well could be the van" seen at the station; and the 
van viewed in the defendant's driveway "looked very much like 
the same vehicle."  All of this, however, came out during the 
testimony of the respective witnesses.  On this occasion, 
defense counsel also confronted Gibbons on cross-examination 
with exactly what the witnesses had said.  We have no concern, 
therefore, that the jury were misled. 
38 
 
At trial, the prosecutor also elicited testimony from 
another State police trooper to the effect that the defendant 
initially had agreed to provide police with the container of 
water Waryasz had given him in case he needed it for his 
radiator, but later claimed he could not find it.  According to 
the defendant, the container had been found by police at the 
gasoline station, meaning the prosecutor's suggestion that he 
had concealed it was deliberately misleading.  There was, as the 
defendant suggests, a plastic container visible on the counter 
where the cash register used to be in one of the police 
photographs taken at the scene, as well as testimony from one 
witness about a windshield washer fluid container being 
recovered from the same location.  From this evidence, the 
defendant could have asked the jury to infer that this was the 
same container that Waryasz had provided to him.  He did not.  
Even if he had, however, it is not clear that it would have been 
helpful, because there is no dispute that he told police he took 
the container with him when he left the station:  "I said, can I 
take it and she said, yeah, go ahead and just take it.  So I put 
it in the back of the van . . . ."  Moreover, if either side had 
suggested that the bottle found on the counter was the container 
in question, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to 
have inferred that the defendant left it there in his haste to 
flee the scene with the cash register.  No matter, the trial 
39 
 
judge did not err when he found that the prosecutor's 
questioning of the State trooper did not deliberately mislead 
the jury. 
Having reviewed the defendant's allegations of perjury, we 
have no concern that false or misleading testimony affected the 
judgment of the jury.23 
4.  DiGiambattista instruction.  When the defendant was 
first interviewed by police on April 18, 2005, approximately the 
first hour of the interview was not audio recorded.  Instead, 
police drafted a written statement based on what the defendant 
revealed during that hour, which the defendant reviewed, signed, 
and then read aloud so that it could be audio recorded.  Both 
the recording and the written statement were admitted at trial.  
As a result of the police's failure to audio record the initial 
hour of the interview, however, the defendant requested that the 
jury be instructed pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 
442 Mass. 423 (2004).  The trial judge agreed and provided such 
an instruction, but the defendant claims it was incomplete and 
failed to apprise the jury that they could consider the lack of 
a recording when trying to assess the reliability of testimony 
 
23 To the extent the defendant did not object at trial to 
the alleged false or misleading testimony, we have reviewed it 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, see 
Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 504 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018), and concluded that there was 
none. 
40 
 
regarding statements allegedly made by the defendant during the 
interview.  We review for prejudicial error.24  See Commonwealth 
v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) (where "issue was 
properly preserved, we review to determine whether we can be 
certain that the improper instruction did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect" [citation and quotation 
omitted]). 
In DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 447-448, we held, in an 
exercise of our supervisory powers, that 
"when the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's 
confession or statement that is the product of a custodial 
interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of 
detention (e.g., a police station), and there is not at 
least an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, 
the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury 
instruction advising that the State's highest court has 
expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded 
whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury that, because 
of the absence of any recording of the interrogation in the 
case before them, they should weigh evidence of the 
defendant's alleged statement with great caution and care." 
 
Here, the trial judge instructed the jury: 
"Now, our Supreme Judicial Court has expressed a preference 
that interrogations be recorded whenever practicable.  An 
unrecorded statement does not present to the jury evidence 
 
24 The Commonwealth asserts that the defendant failed to 
preserve his objection to the DiGiambattista instruction after 
the charge to the jury.  While the record is not altogether 
clear, it appears that the defendant raised an objection to the 
perceived defect in the instruction during the charge 
conference.  We conclude, therefore, that the objection was 
preserved.  See Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 97 (2000) 
(issue preserved where defense counsel requested instruction at 
charge conference but failed to object after instruction was not 
given). 
41 
 
of the totality of the circumstances, but instead only 
presents the jury with an abbreviated summary of those 
circumstances and the interrogating officer's recollection 
of the highlights of those circumstances.  Consequently, 
when the Commonwealth introduces evidence of a defendant's 
statement that is a result of a custodial interrogation or 
an interrogation at a place of detention, and there is not, 
at least, an audiotape recording of the complete 
interrogation, the jury should use great caution when 
trying to assess the totality of the circumstances. 
 
"You are advised that the absence of a recording permits, 
but does not compel, you, the jury, to conclude that the 
Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
"If the Commonwealth satisfies its burden that the 
statement was made freely, voluntarily and as a product of 
his own free will and rational mind, then you may consider 
the statement in your evaluation of the evidence." 
 
We have never required the use of precise language when 
providing a DiGiambattista instruction.  See Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 801 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 
(2011).  Nor do we do so now.  As noted above, we have required 
that a judge "tell the jury both that (1) the State's highest 
court prefers that custodial interrogations be tape recorded, 
whenever practicable, and (2) where there is not at least an 
audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the jury 
should weigh the defendant's statements with great caution and 
care."  Id.  In addition, "[w]here voluntariness is a live issue 
at trial and the humane practice instruction is given, we also 
require that the jury be instructed 'that the absence of a 
recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude that 
42 
 
the Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Id. at 800 n.26, quoting DiGiambattista, 
442 Mass. at 448.  Here, while it would have been preferrable 
for the trial judge to have more clearly tied the warning to 
weigh unrecorded statements with "great caution and care" to the 
issue of reliability, as well as voluntariness, the instruction 
adequately conveyed that message and hit on all three points of 
emphasis from DiGiambattista.  The message also had been 
conveyed throughout the trial.  On cross-examination, Gibbons 
testified that it was a violation of office policy not to have 
recorded the interview, that he told the State police troopers 
conducting the interview to stop once he learned they were not 
recording it, and that there was no way for the jury to know the 
questions or responses without a recording.  Defense counsel 
then repeated those points in closing argument. 
The instruction satisfied DiGiambattista, and to the extent 
there were any even arguable deficiencies, we are certain that 
they did not influence the jury, or, at most, had but very 
slight effect.25 
 
25 We have not considered whether the April 18, 2005, 
interview of the defendant amounted to a custodial interrogation 
or whether the district attorney's office where it was conducted 
amounted to a place of detention.  See DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 
at 447 (preference for recording applies where confession or 
statement is product of custodial interrogation or interrogation 
occurs at "place of detention [e.g., a police station]"). 
43 
 
5.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant claims that 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument.  
The claim is without merit. 
The defendant claims that the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence by arguing to the jury that (1) the defendant's DNA was 
under Waryasz's fingernails; (2) the defendant had turned his 
van around before leaving the gasoline station to make it easier 
to load the cash register; and (3) Waryasz "put her hand on her 
abdomen in death and hug[ged] her child in death."  The 
evidence, however, established that (1) the defendant was "a 
potential contributor" to the mixture of DNA recovered from 
Waryasz's fingernails, with a random selection probability of 
one in 207,000; and (2) witnesses who observed the defendant's 
van parked in front of the station building had it facing in 
opposite directions, with the "paint guy" -- the last person to 
see it prior to the murders -- testifying that it was parked 
facing out, toward the street, meaning the large side door of 
the van was facing the building.  Clearly, therefore, the first 
two statements to which the defendant objects were reasonably 
grounded in the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 
12, 21-22 (2011) (prosecutor entitled to suggest inferences to 
be drawn from evidence, which "need not be inescapable, just 
reasonable and possible").  The third statement is a closer 
call. 
44 
 
"[P]rosecutors are entitled to argue forcefully for the 
defendant's conviction" (citation and quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017).  However, 
"an improper inference that unfairly invite[s] the jury to 
decide the case based on sympathy for the victim" cannot be 
tolerated.  Id. at 646.  Certainly, the prosecutor's statement 
suggesting that Waryasz was hugging her child in death had the 
potential to invite sympathy for the victim.  Having said that, 
the evidence did establish that when Waryasz's body was found in 
the service bay, her right arm was down to her side, and her 
right hand was on her abdomen.  Accordingly, while close, we 
cannot say that the remark crossed the line; it was properly 
inferred from the evidence and did not unfairly invite sympathy 
in a case that, inescapably, involved the murder of a pregnant 
woman. 
The defendant further suggests that the prosecutor 
impermissibly commented on the defendant's prearrest, pre-
Miranda silence by noting, for example, that the defendant 
failed to disclose his purchases of crack cocaine when, during 
his police interviews, he provided accounts of his whereabouts 
on the day of the murders.  The argument, however, "fails for 
the simple reason that the defendant did not exercise his right 
to remain silent."  Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 283 
(1992).  The prosecutor, therefore, was "entitled to comment on 
45 
 
the defendant's statement and to compare it to the evidence in 
the case."  Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 551 (2003). 
6.  Change of venue.  Shortly before trial, the defendant 
moved, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 37 (b) (1), 378 Mass. 914 
(1979), for a change of venue on grounds that pretrial publicity 
had been "so overwhelming and prejudicial" in Franklin County 
that he could not obtain an impartial trial.  The trial judge 
deferred ruling on the motion until he could determine whether 
there was an inability to empanel a jury, and then denied it, in 
a ruling issued from the bench, after the jury had been 
empanelled within two days.  In his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant again claimed that he had been "presumptively 
prejudiced" by the media coverage of his case, and, thus, that 
he was entitled to a new trial.  The trial judge again 
disagreed, this time in his written decision.  On appeal, the 
defendant challenges the trial judge's rulings. 
"The Sixth Amendment and art. 12 guarantee the right of a 
criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury."  
Commonwealth v. Mack, 482 Mass. 311, 315 (2019), citing 
Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 462 (2011), and Skilling 
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377 (2010).  When a defendant 
believes that pretrial publicity has been so extensive as to 
violate this right and warrant a change of venue, he "has the 
burden to establish the 'solid foundation of fact' necessary to 
46 
 
support a grant of the motion."  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 
Mass. 395, 405 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 
Mass. 461, 476 (2010).  "The mere existence of pretrial 
publicity, even if it is extensive, does not constitute a 
foundation of fact sufficient to require a change of venue" 
(citation omitted).  McCowen, supra.  "To establish prejudice 
stemming from extensive pretrial publicity or settled community 
opinion, the defendant must show either presumptive prejudice or 
actual prejudice."  Hoose, supra at 405-406, citing Toolan, 
supra.  Here, the defendant has not alleged that the pretrial 
publicity caused actual prejudice to infect the jury, only that 
it caused the jury to be presumptively prejudiced against him. 
"A trial judge should exercise [the] power to change the 
venue of a trial with great caution and only after a solid 
foundation of fact has been first established" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  McCowen, 458 Mass. at 476.  At the same 
time, the trial judge has "substantial discretion" in deciding 
the motion, and we review his ruling for an abuse of that 
discretion.  Toolan, 460 Mass. at 463.  See Skilling, 561 U.S. 
at 378 n.11 (trial "court calls on the necessity of transfer are 
granted a healthy measure of appellate-court respect").  "In 
evaluating the risk of prejudice posed by pretrial publicity, we 
give careful attention to the evaluation of the trial judge, 
especially one who, as here, presides in the county where the 
47 
 
crime occurred and is familiar with the nature and pervasiveness 
of the pretrial publicity."  McCowen, supra. 
"Presumptive prejudice occurs when the jury pool in the 
community has been so tainted by pretrial publicity that the 
entire venire may be presumed prejudiced regardless of the 
specific voir dire procedures utilized."  Hoose, 467 Mass. at 
406, citing Toolan, 460 Mass. at 463.  It "exists only in truly 
extraordinary circumstances," Toolan, supra, where the "trial 
atmosphere is . . . 'utterly corrupted' by media coverage."  
Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 221 (2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013), quoting Skilling, 561 U.S. at 380.  
While not exclusive, "[t]wo factors play a central role in 
creating the presumption of prejudice.  First, the nature of the 
pretrial publicity, specifically whether it is both extensive 
and sensational, is a highly significant factor.  Second, 
whether the judge was in fact able to empanel jurors who appear 
impartial is the factor of primary importance" (citations and 
quotation omitted).  Hoose, supra.  See Toolan, supra 
(identifying other possible factors, like size of community, 
content of news stories, time between peak media coverage and 
trial, and any evidence from verdict itself, such as acquittal 
on any charges).  Here, the trial judge considered the relevant 
factors and concluded that the defendant had failed to sustain 
his burden of showing that the venire was presumptively 
48 
 
prejudiced by pretrial publicity.  Having reviewed the same 
record, we conclude that this was not an abuse of discretion. 
The publicity was not extensive.  In support of his motion 
for a new trial, the defendant submitted a total of fifty-eight 
"articles" published prior to May 11, 2007, the day the jury 
empanelment was finalized.26  The articles, mostly from a local 
newspaper, appear to have been located through a computer 
archival search.  There is no evidence of how widely distributed 
any of the articles were.  Of the fifty-eight articles, thirty-
six were published between May 4, 2005, the date of the 
defendant's arraignment on the liquor bottle-related charges, 
and August 24, 2005, days after he was arraigned in the Superior 
Court on the murder charges.  The others were published over the 
next twenty-plus months.  As the trial judge noted, "publicity 
is not extensive where the nature of the coverage becomes more 
factual and the frequency of coverage decreases in the time 
period between the crimes and jury empanelment."  Hoose, 467 
Mass. at 406, citing Morales, 440 Mass. at 541.  Certainly, that 
was the case here.  Even in Franklin County, where it has been 
 
26 While media coverage continued during the trial, the 
judge questioned the seated jurors at the start of each day 
about exposure to publicity and instructed them at the end of 
each day to avoid reading, hearing, and talking about the case.  
Every day, the jurors confirmed that they had followed his 
instructions.  "Absent evidence to the contrary, jurors are 
presumed to follow the judge's instructions."  Toolan, 460 Mass. 
at 468 n.25. 
49 
 
suggested the population at that time was approximately 70,000, 
the publicity was not, as the defendant suggests, all-consuming 
and constant.  Cf. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 381. 
The publicity also was not sensational.  "Publicity is 
sensational when it contains emotionally charged material that 
is gratuitous or inflammatory, rather than a factual recounting 
of the case."  Hoose, 467 Mass. at 407.  The articles consisted 
almost exclusively of factual recountings.27  They largely 
tracked events in the case, reporting on what was revealed in 
open court.  Many were logs of activity on all cases scheduled 
in a court on a given day, buried in which were extremely brief 
references to the defendant (or his wife).  The articles 
dedicated to the defendant's case, meanwhile, were full of 
redundant restatement of facts.  Some articles noted that 
Waryasz was pregnant, well-liked, and now missed by those close 
to her.  There also were references to the defendant's criminal 
history, his drug habit, and the withdrawal of his attorney.  
And while the defendant suggests that the pretrial publicity was 
sensational due, in part, to the fact that this was an 
interracial murder, only five of the articles either directly or 
 
27 Early on, in an article dated May 10, 2005, there was a 
report that vandals had painted the words "baby killer" on cars 
outside the defendant's house.  The alleged act was, without 
question, emotionally charged, gratuitous, and inflammatory.  
The article reporting on it was not. 
50 
 
indirectly referenced his race, and three of those references 
were in quotes from the defendant, his wife, and a third party 
who was protesting outside the court house on behalf of the 
defendant.  As the trial judge rightly concluded, this mostly 
"fact-based publicity . . . is not the sort of sensational 
publicity that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice."  
Id., citing Morales, 440 Mass. at 540, and United States v. 
Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
845 (1990). 
The defendant also failed to establish that it was 
practically impossible to empanel an impartial jury.  "We have 
measured this practical impossibility by looking to the 
percentage of the venire that was dismissed for cause as a 
result of prejudice from exposure to pretrial publicity."  
Hoose, 467 Mass. at 407-408, citing Morales, 440 Mass. at 541.  
"Although we have not identified a specific percentage of 
dismissals that will trigger the presumption, we have held that 
dismissal of as much as forty-two per cent of the venire is not 
sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the entire venire 
was tainted by pretrial publicity."  Hoose, supra at 408, citing 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 515 (1993).  As the 
trial judge observed in his decision denying the motion for a 
new trial, "It took only two days to empanel [sixteen] jurors.  
In that process, [fourteen] of 150 potential jurors were excused 
51 
 
due to prejudice from pretrial publicity, and [the defendant] 
had four unused peremptory challenges."28  That is a rate of less 
than seven percent.  It is not a rate that would cause "a shadow 
of doubt [to] be cast over the remaining venire members such 
that the prejudice of the remaining venire members may be 
presumed."  Hoose, supra, citing Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1181-1182.  
The defendant has failed to establish presumptive prejudice. 
7.  Juror impartiality.  The defendant argues that his 
right to an impartial jury was violated by the seating of a 
particular juror.  Following an individual voir dire with the 
prospective juror, the trial judge found him to be impartial.  
When neither the Commonwealth nor the defendant exercised a 
peremptory challenge, the juror was then seated on the jury and, 
eventually, chosen as the foreperson.  "[W]here a defendant 
fails to challenge a juror for cause, the questions of the 
impartiality of that juror and the adequacy of voir dire are 
waived" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Heywood, 484 Mass. 
43, 45 (2020).  Therefore, "we review to determine whether there 
was error, and, if so, whether it created a substantial 
 
28 "Generally, a defendant's failure to exhaust his 
peremptory challenges weighs against finding that prejudice 
necessitated a change of venue."  Toolan, 460 Mass. at 466 n.22, 
citing Morales, 440 Mass. at 543, and Delle Chiaie v. 
Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 527, 532 (1975). 
52 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 
460 Mass. 683, 689-690 (2011). 
We begin with the relevant parts of the voir dire.  After 
the prospective juror confirmed that he would be able to keep an 
open mind, decide the case solely on the facts introduced during 
trial, and give both sides a fair trial, the following exchange 
took place: 
Q.:  "Would the fact that the [d]efendant is African-
American and the alleged victims white affect your ability 
to decide this case fairly and impartially?" 
 
A.:  "No, it would not." 
 
Q.:  "Do you believe that African-American males are more 
likely to commit crimes than individuals from other racial 
or ethnic backgrounds?" 
 
A.:  "Yes, I believe they probably are." 
 
Q.:  "Why is that?" 
 
A.:  "By statistics, from what I've read; not just more 
likely to commit crimes, more likely to be victims.  There 
apparently is more crime in the African-American community 
in my opinion." 
 
Q.:  "Having that information, would that affect your 
ability in deciding the facts in this case?" 
 
A.:  "No, no, because it doesn't have anything to do with 
this specific case." 
 
Q.:  "Now, are you conscious of any feelings of racial bias 
or prejudice which might tend to influence your decisions 
in this case?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
53 
 
The defendant claims that the trial judge erred, in responding 
to the prospective juror's answer regarding the likelihood of 
African-American males to commit crimes, by failing to conduct 
further inquiry to ensure that the prospective juror was 
impartial.  We disagree. 
 
"The presence of even one juror who is not impartial 
violates a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ralph R., 490 Mass. 770, 
780 (2022).  Accordingly, while a "trial judge is accorded 
considerable discretion in the jury selection process and his 
finding that a juror stands indifferent will not be disturbed 
except where juror prejudice is manifest," the judge "must be 
zealous to protect the rights of an accused" when seeking "to 
ferret out possible juror bias" (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 629-630 (2006). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 448 (2019), we 
provided the following direction for trial judges: 
"Where a prospective juror has expressed or formed an 
opinion regarding the case, or has an interest, bias, or 
prejudice related to the unique situation presented by the 
case, the judge must satisfy him- or herself that the 
prospective juror will set aside that opinion or bias and 
properly weigh the evidence and follow the instructions on 
the law.  Otherwise, removal of the prospective juror is 
clearly appropriate in the interest that persons actually 
prejudiced not be seated on the jury even if it tends to 
skew an otherwise balanced panel. 
 
"Where, on the other hand, a prospective juror has 
expressed an opinion or world view based upon his or her 
54 
 
life experience or belief system, rather than asking him or 
her to set it aside (which is difficult if not impossible 
to do), a judge must determine whether, given that 
particular opinion, the juror nevertheless is able to be 
impartial in the case to be tried."  (Citations and 
quotations omitted.) 
 
Id. at 448-449.  The trial judge here conducted the voir dire 
consistent with these directions.29 
After the prospective juror disclosed his belief that 
African-American males are more likely to commit crimes, the 
trial judge did not ask him to set that belief aside but, 
rather, asked whether, notwithstanding that belief, he would be 
able to decide the case based on the facts.  He answered in the 
affirmative.  The trial judge also asked whether he was aware of 
feelings of racial bias or prejudice that might tend to 
influence his decisions in the case, to which he answered in the 
negative.  The trial judge, therefore, appropriately focused on 
whether, given the prospective juror's particular belief, he 
nevertheless would be able to be impartial in the defendant's 
case.  Having done so, we cannot say that the trial judge, who 
had the benefit of personally interacting with and observing the 
prospective juror, committed an abuse of discretion, never mind 
a substantial miscarriage of justice, in declaring him 
impartial.  See Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 639 
 
29 We note that Williams was issued twelve years after the 
trial judge conducted the voir dire here. 
55 
 
(2002) (decision whether to accept declaration of "juror that he 
or she is disinterested lies within the broad discretion of the 
trial judge").  See also Commonwealth v. Mattier (No. 2), 474 
Mass. 261, 274-275 (2016).30 
8.  Third-party culprit evidence.  At trial, the defendant 
offered evidence to suggest that an individual named Anthony Cox 
could have been the murderer and that police had not done enough 
to explore that possibility.  The evidence was weak at best.  
The evidence was offered through the testimony of Cox's former 
girlfriend, who stated that she had been home cleaning her car 
on April 19, 2005, when Cox approached carrying license plates 
to his vehicle, a white Ford Explorer.  She then opened the 
trunk of her car and he put them in.  She never saw Cox's 
vehicle again. 
Police had interviewed Cox on May 2, 2005, on a prompt from 
the defendant's wife.  He was cooperative and voluntarily 
 
30 The defendant likens the prospective juror here to the 
one in Clark, 446 Mass. at 628-629, who disclosed during voir 
dire "that she believed African–Americans as a group were more 
likely to commit crimes because of their economic status than 
people of other racial or ethnic groups."  In that case, we held 
that the prospective juror should have been excused for cause 
because, when asked whether her belief would affect her ability 
to be impartial, she said that it "would depend on the person's 
circumstances," and the trial judge did not ask further 
questions to clarify that "ambiguous" answer.  Id. at 630.  The 
answers of the prospective juror in this case unambiguously 
indicated that he could be impartial.  Clark does not control 
here. 
56 
 
submitted a buccal swab and a palm print.  His fingerprints did 
not match any found at the gasoline station.  He also was 
excluded as a source of the DNA mixture found on Waryasz's 
fingernails.  And while he "could have been a potential 
contributor of the minor DNA identified on" the ends of the 
ligature, the State police chemist who conducted the analysis 
testified that it was only at a random selection probability 
rate of one in two, meaning that Cox was among the fifty percent 
of the African-American population who could not be excluded as 
a potential contributor.  There also was no evidence to suggest 
that Cox ever owned a dark-colored van, that a white Ford 
Explorer had ever been associated with the murders, that anyone 
had seen Cox at the gasoline station on April 16, or that anyone 
had described an individual matching his height and weight as 
having been there that day. 
Against that backdrop, the defendant argues that the trial 
judge erred when he refused to allow Cox's former girlfriend to 
testify that, at unspecified times, Cox verbally threatened her, 
including threatening to kill her, and once choked her with his 
hands.  To admit prior bad acts of an alleged third-party 
culprit, a defendant must show that "the acts of the other 
person are so closely connected in point of time and method of 
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of the 
defendant as the person who committed the crime.  In addition, 
57 
 
the shared act must be 'particularly distinguishing,' rather 
than commonplace or ordinary" (citations, quotation, and 
alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 
716-717 (1998).  Having reviewed the issue independently, as the 
exclusion of third-party culprit evidence is of constitutional 
dimension, see Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), 
S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008), we concur with the trial judge; the 
alleged acts of domestic or relationship abuse were not 
connected clearly either in time or in method to the acts at 
issue here, namely, strangulation with a ligature in aid of a 
robbery. 
Subsequently, the defendant included in his motion for a 
new trial the ground that he had newly discovered evidence of 
further violence on the part of Cox.  Specifically, in 2017, ten 
years after the defendant's trial, the defendant's investigator 
spoke with a woman who reported that Cox had assaulted and raped 
her because he suspected she was an informant and threatened to 
kill her because she was a witness against him.  According to 
the investigator's report, the woman alleged that Cox choked 
her, pressed a screwdriver to her neck, and punched her during 
the rape.  Records indicate that Cox was indicted in connection 
with the incident on November 18, 2005, and later pleaded guilty 
to indecent assault and battery, assault and battery, and 
threatening to commit a crime.  At the plea hearing, however, 
58 
 
the prosecutor made no reference during the presentation of the 
anticipated evidence to Cox having choked the victim, and Cox 
did not admit to having done so. 
"Where a defendant moves for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that the 
evidence is in fact newly discovered; the newly discovered 
evidence is credible and material; and the newly discovered 
evidence casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction" 
(citation and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 
486 Mass. 617, 640 (2021).  The trial judge concluded that, as 
with the prior evidence he had excluded at trial, the defendant 
had not shown that the "newly discovered" evidence of Cox's 
assault and battery was so closely connected in time and method 
to the acts at issue here.  See Hunter, 426 Mass. at 716-717.  
Again, we concur.  The newly discovered evidence was not 
material and does not cast genuine doubt on the justice of the 
defendant's conviction.  See Teixeira, supra.  The trial judge, 
therefore, did not abuse his discretion or commit some other 
error of law in denying the request for a new trial.  See Moore, 
489 Mass. at 749 (identifying standard of review).31 
 
31 The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in not 
ordering a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that the 
defendant suggests points to a member of Waryasz's family as the 
murderer.  He also argues that the trial judge erred by denying 
the request without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  The 
 
59 
 
9.  Armed robbery.  Except where a conviction of murder in 
the first degree is based on a theory in addition to a theory of 
felony-murder, a separate conviction of an underlying felony is 
duplicative of the felony-murder conviction.  See Commonwealth 
v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 148 (2009); Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 
Mass. 199, 200 n.1 (2004).  The defendant's conviction of murder 
in the case of Waryasz was based on an additional theory, but 
the conviction of murder in the case of Hall was not.  As the 
Commonwealth concedes, therefore, the armed robbery conviction 
is duplicative and must be vacated, and the charge must be 
dismissed. 
10.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
suggests that the evidence of his guilt was "not overwhelming" 
but, rather, "either explained by him, or conspicuously absent, 
even contradicted."  He also suggests that the trial was so 
"infected" with errors as to have denied him due process and 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We 
disagree in all respects.  Having reviewed the entire record 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no basis to set aside or 
 
trial judge denied the requests, having found the defendant's 
claim to be "specious" and "no more than speculation heaped upon 
speculation, without any substantial basis in fact."  We could 
not agree more; the alleged newly discovered evidence is so 
speculative as to not bear repeating here.  The trial judge did 
not abuse his discretion or commit some other error of law in 
either denying a new trial, see Moore, 489 Mass. at 749, or an 
evidentiary hearing, see Upton, 484 Mass. at 162. 
60 
 
reduce the verdicts of murder in the first degree or to order a 
new trial.32 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
convictions of murder in the first degree and the order dated 
August 30, 2019, denying the defendant's first motion for a new 
trial, and we vacate and set aside the conviction of armed 
robbery.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
dismissal of the armed robbery indictment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
32 The defendant has identified several "substantive errors" 
that he suggests were "compounded by ineffective assistance of 
counsel" and require a new trial, discovery, or an evidentiary 
hearing.  Many of these arguments are moot given our findings 
and conclusions elsewhere in this opinion.  To the extent that 
these arguments have not been discussed, they were not 
overlooked; we have considered them carefully and concluded that 
they lack merit and do not warrant further discussion.