Title: Keegan v. Lemieux Security Services, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Keegan v. Lemieux Security Services, Inc. (2003-341); 177 Vt. 575; 
861 A.2d 1135

2004 VT 97

[Filed 28-Sep-2004]

                                ENTRY ORDER

                                2004 VT 97

                     SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-341

                             MARCH TERM, 2004

Karen Keegan                         }           APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }           Chittenden Superior Court
                                     }  
Lemieux Security Services, Inc. and  }
Barr & Barr, Inc.                    }           DOCKET NO. 1465-01 CnC

                                                 Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Middlebury College Security Officer Karen Keegan was injured
  after entering a Barr & Barr, Inc. (Barr) construction site "to ensure the
  safety of" a trespasser.  In an attempt to grab the fleeing intruder, she
  slipped and fell, injuring her knee.  Alleging the accident resulted from
  Barr and Lemieux Security Services, Inc.'s (Lemieux) negligent failure to
  guard and maintain the security fence around the construction site, Keegan
  sued.  The Chittenden Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of
  defendants, finding they owed no duty to Keegan.  We affirm. (FN1)

       ¶  2.  In the fall of 2000, Middlebury College contracted with Barr to
  serve as a general contractor on a dormitory construction project in the
  middle of the campus.  Barr, not the College's security personnel, was
  responsible for safety within the site.  The College was concerned with
  keeping students away from construction site hazards and, as a result, Barr
  had a continuous six-foot chain-link fence installed to secure the majority
  of the project.  An unrelated excavation and paving project made it
  impossible to erect the security fence around a portion of the site, so
  Barr employed free-standing chain-link panels, saw-horse barriers, and
  caution tape to prevent entry to that area.  In spite of these barriers,
  unauthorized people on occasion used the construction site as a short cut
  across campus.  In response, Barr hired Lemieux to patrol the site on
  weekend evenings in the hope of further discouraging trespassers.

       ¶  3.   On the night of November 19, 2000, Keegan was conducting a
  routine patrol of College buildings when she saw four men dismantling the
  construction site barriers.  When she called out to them, they fled and
  eventually entered the construction site at a different point by going over
  the chain-link fence.  Allegedly to secure the safety of the trespassers,
  she radioed her supervisor and followed the four intruders into the
  construction site.  Keegan testified at her deposition that she knew the
  construction site was dangerous, slippery, and littered with construction
  debris.
 
       ¶  4.  Shortly after entering the site, Keegan saw another officer
  approaching her, chasing a young man later identified as Nicholas Atwood. 
  Keegan reached out to grab Atwood, but she slipped on the "wet ground . . .
  [and] construction material," injuring her knee, arm, and back.  Atwood
  continued through the construction site and climbed over an intact portion
  of the six-foot chain-link fence.  Keegan's colleagues followed Atwood over
  the fence, caught him, and tackled him onto the ground.  The officers then
  took Atwood to the campus security office, identified him as a non-student,
  gave him a trespass notice, and advised him that he could not come back on
  campus.  Keegan's injury required lateral release surgery, which left her
  with a permanent impairment to her knee.

       ¶  5.  Keegan collected worker's compensation for her injury and later
  filed suit against Barr and Lemieux.  She claimed that, but for Barr's
  negligent failure to provide sufficient fencing around the site and
  Lemieux's negligent failure to adequately patrol the site, she would not
  have needed to enter the construction site to secure the safety of the
  trespassers and would not have been injured.  Defendants filed motions for
  summary judgment on three separate grounds.  First, they argued that they
  owed no duty to maintain better fencing or greater security to protect
  Keegan from an injury she obtained while attempting to rescue trespassers
  on the site.  Second, Barr and Lemieux insisted that Keegan's claim was
  barred by the firefighter's rule.  Finally, they argued that Keegan could
  not show that their conduct was the proximate cause of her injury.

       ¶  6.  The superior court granted Barr and Lemieux's summary judgment
  motions, reasoning that when Keegan entered the construction site to rescue
  a trespasser, Barr and Lemieux's duty to Keegan was no greater than the
  duty owed to the trespasser.  The court held that, since an owner or
  occupier of land must refrain only from subjecting a trespasser to willful
  and wanton misconduct, Keegan failed "as a matter of law to show . . .
  breach of a duty owed her."  Relying on Bonney v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co.,
  800 F.2d 274, 279 (1st Cir. 1986), the court rejected Keegan's argument
  that an owner or occupier of land owes a duty to a rescuer independent of
  its duty to the person being rescued.  On appeal, Keegan argues that the
  trial court misconstrued the law when it held that Barr and Lemieux did not
  owe her a duty of care independent from that owed to the trespasser she was
  allegedly rescuing.  As explained below, we agree with the trial court.

       ¶  7.  Taking Keegan's allegations as true, as we must, Zukatis v.
  Perry, 165 Vt. 298, 300,