Title: State v. Rowan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
10AP1398-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tally Ann Rowan, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 7, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce   
 
JUDGE: 
James J. Duvall 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs and oral 
argument by Paul G. LaZotte, assistant state public defender. 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maura 
F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed Anne Bensky and Garvey, 
McNeil, & Associates, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2012 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2010AP1398-CR    
(L.C. No. 
2008CF32) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Tally Ann Rowan,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Pierce 
County, James J. Duvall, Judge.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case comes to us on 
certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
Rule 809.61 (2009-10).  It requires us to address two questions 
arising from Tally Ann Rowan's convictions.1  The first question 
                                                 
1 Rowan was convicted of battery to a police officer, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2) (2007-08); obstructing an 
officer, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.41(1); 
carrying 
a 
concealed weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23; operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration (PAC), contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and 
§ 346.63(1)(b). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
2 
 
concerns a condition imposed as part of Rowan's extended 
supervision, which she argues is overly broad and violative of 
her constitutional rights.  The certification asks us to 
determine "whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth 
Amendment [to the United States Constitution] or Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision 
that 
allows 
any 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
to 
search 
the 
defendant's person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any 
time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion."   
¶2 
The facts of this case are important to the circuit 
court's decision to impose the above condition on Rowan's 
extended supervision, as the circuit court noted.  Rowan's 
arrest and convictions resulted from an incident on March 13, 
2008, during which a police officer observed Rowan drive 
erratically, run a stop sign, and crash into a pole.  Rowan 
appeared intoxicated and agitated.  She cursed emergency 
responders, and asked them where her gun was while reaching 
toward the floor of her car.  Police later discovered a 
semiautomatic handgun and ammunition on the floor of the 
driver's side of Rowan's car.  Rowan was taken to the hospital 
for medical treatment and a blood draw, where she was placed 
under arrest.  At the hospital, Rowan was combative, cursing, 
spitting, and grabbing medical staff.  She threatened to kill 
the officers and medical staff in the emergency room, and 
further threatened to kill their families.  Rowan resisted a 
police officer who tried to restrain her, and seriously injured 
the officer's hand.  
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
3 
 
¶3 
The circuit court considered the nature of Rowan's 
crime——involving violence, threats, and a firearm——and Rowan's 
conduct prior to and during the trial.  The court stated, "The 
scope of persons that she threatened was quite expansive and 
shows at least at that point an unusual level of risk to the 
public while she was in this mind set."  Further, the court 
noted that Rowan was charged in a separate case with threatening 
a judge.  There was also testimony from a gun shop owner that 
Rowan had purchased several guns after the March 13, 2008, 
incident at issue and before she was sentenced.  In prescribing 
the search condition, the circuit court relied on these facts 
that reflect Rowan's history of violence and threats, which 
often involved firearms.   
¶4 
We hold that while the condition that the circuit 
court imposed on Rowan's extended supervision "may impinge on 
constitutional 
rights,"2 
it 
does 
not 
violate 
them. 
The 
supervision condition imposed in this case does not violate 
Rowan's constitutional rights because the circuit court made an 
individualized determination, pursuant to the circuit court's 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5), that the condition was 
necessary based on the facts in this case——involving violence, 
threats, and a firearm.  It conforms with the applicable two-
part test——that it is "not overly broad" and that it is 
                                                 
2 Edwards v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 84-85, 246 N.W.2d 109 
(1976). 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
4 
 
"reasonably 
related" 
to 
Rowan's 
rehabilitation.3 
 
It 
is 
instructive that the United States Supreme Court determined in 
Samson v. California4 that a suspicionless search of a prisoner 
who 
has 
been 
released 
but 
remains 
under 
supervision 
by 
corrections officials, which includes a person released under 
community 
supervision, 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  It based that conclusion on such persons' severely 
diminished privacy expectations and the State's great interest 
in preventing such persons from reoffending.5  The State relies 
on Samson in arguing that the condition here does not violate 
Rowan's constitutional rights.  Rowan counters that Samson's 
holding 
is 
distinguishable 
because 
it 
relied 
heavily 
on 
California's statute authorizing suspicionless searches, while 
the condition imposed here was made solely on a sentencing 
court's authority.  We hold that under the facts of this case, 
the condition imposed satisfies both parts of the applicable 
test and therefore does not violate Rowan's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Wisconsin 
Constitution Article I, Section 11. 
¶5 
The second question presented by this case concerns 
the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to Rowan's conviction 
for battery to a police officer.  One of the elements of that 
                                                 
3 State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 
N.W.2d 200; Edwards, 74 Wis. 2d at 84-85; Krebs v. Schwarz, 212 
Wis. 2d 127, 131, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1997). 
4 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
5 Id. at 852-53. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
5 
 
crime that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the 
officer who is the victim was "acting in an official capacity" 
at the time of the battery. Rowan argues that the evidence was 
insufficient on that element, because the evidence showed that 
the officer was assisting a nurse who was performing a medical 
procedure, which she claims is not what the officer is employed 
to do.  The State argues that in restraining a combative person 
who was under arrest, the officer was "acting in an official 
capacity" at the time of the injury.  Under the standard of 
review that applies to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, 
our 
review 
of 
the 
trier 
of 
fact's 
findings 
is 
highly 
deferential.  The jury heard that the officer was dispatched to 
the hospital by her employer; that she assisted fellow officers 
and medical staff with Rowan, a combative suspect who was under 
arrest for drunk driving; and that Rowan was at the hospital for 
a blood draw, without her consent, as part of the investigation 
of a crime.  Given the standard of review that governs this 
challenge, we are satisfied that the evidence presented to the 
jury, "viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction," 
is not "so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."6  
                                                 
6 State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶¶56-57, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 
681 N.W.2d 203 (footnotes omitted), states:  
The standard of review in determining whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction is 
that "an appellate court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
6 
 
¶6 
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The series of events that led to Rowan's convictions 
began when a police officer on patrol started following Rowan's 
vehicle after seeing her drive erratically and run a stop sign  
around 2 a.m. on March 13, 2008.  Moments later, Rowan crashed 
into a pole.  At the scene of the accident she appeared 
intoxicated and was highly agitated.  She cursed emergency 
responders and reached toward the floor while asking them where 
her gun was, apparently trying to locate the semiautomatic 
handgun that police later recovered from the floor on the 
driver's side of the vehicle, along with a box of ammunition.  
At the hospital where Rowan was taken for emergency medical 
treatment and a blood draw, she was placed under arrest and 
continued to be combative, cursing, spitting, grabbing medical 
staff, and threatening to kill them and their families.  Before 
the blood draw when a police officer stationed at the side of 
her hospital bed attempted to restrain her, Rowan resisted and 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the 
conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."   
Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is 
therefore very narrow. We give great deference to the 
determination of the trier of fact.  We must examine 
the record to find facts that support upholding the 
jury's decision to convict.  
 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
7 
 
seriously injured the officer's hand.  Rowan was charged with 
five counts related to the March 13 incident: in one case, she 
was charged with battery to a law enforcement officer7, 
obstructing an officer, and carrying a concealed weapon; in a 
second case, she was charged with OWI, third offense, and 
operating with a prohibited alcohol content (PAC).  A jury 
convicted Rowan on all counts.  For the battery conviction, 
which is the only conviction relevant to this appeal, Rowan was 
sentenced to one year and two months of initial confinement and 
three years of extended supervision.  Among the conditions of 
extended supervision imposed by the sentencing court was the 
condition that is the focus of this appeal:  that "[Rowan's] 
person or her residence or her vehicle is subject to search for 
a firearm at any time by any law enforcement officer without 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.20(2) (2007-08) states,  
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a law 
enforcement 
officer . . . acting 
in 
an 
official 
capacity and the person knows or has reason to know 
that the victim is a law enforcement officer . . . by 
an act done without the consent of the person so 
injured, is guilty of a Class H felony. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
8 
 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion."8  The circuit court 
noted, "I think the constitution would require the search be 
done in a reasonable manner."  
¶8 
It is helpful to a complete understanding of the 
circuit court's reasoning that we set forth an excerpt from the 
hearing on the post-conviction motion where the circuit court 
                                                 
8 The court had initially phrased the condition slightly 
differently.  At the sentencing, the court had stated that the 
conditions (as relevant to this appeal) were "No possession of 
firearms or ammunition" and "Defendant must consent to a search 
at any time." [R. 82] In response to a post-conviction motion by 
Rowan requesting that the conditions be modified to delete the 
consent-to-search requirement, the court stated on the record 
(and asked the clerk to verify the statement by reading it back 
to the courtroom) that the condition should be reworded to 
state, "The defendant's person or her residence or her vehicle 
is subject to search for a firearm at any time by any law 
enforcement 
officer 
without 
probable 
cause 
or 
reasonable 
[suspicion]."   
As counsel for Rowan acknowledged at oral argument before 
this court, it was evident in the context of the hearing that 
the circuit court intended for the term "law enforcement 
officer" to encompass agents who supervise persons on probation, 
parole or extended supervision.  The transcript of the hearing 
shows that Rowan's counsel said, "I would ask on behalf of Ms. 
Rowan that police officers and field staff of the Department of 
Corrections have to have reasonable suspicion.  The concern I 
have if it just states [']may search at any time for a 
firearm['] that as a practical matter would allow them to search 
at any time. There would be no kind of restrictions or no 
protection of her privacy. . . . "  (Emphasis added.)  In 
response, the circuit court states, in part, "The message I 
would rather have in Tally Rowan's mind is, I have no idea when 
they can come in, and they can come in to search for a firearm 
even without reasonable suspicion."  The court in its response 
made no distinction between the two categories mentioned by 
counsel.  
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
9 
 
put its analysis and the factual basis for the condition on the 
record: 
In this case, I think the argument is fair, if I was 
saying that with every case no matter what, [defendant 
is subject to] search for anything. What I’m going to 
do is modify that a little bit to say any law 
enforcement 
officer 
can 
search 
her 
person, 
her 
premises or any vehicle she is riding in at any time 
without probable cause to search for a firearm. Limit 
that infringement on her Fourth Amendment right to 
firearms. The reason why I’m tailoring is to balance 
her constitutional rights against achieving these two 
goals.  
This case is notable in certain respects. First of 
all, it did involve a firearm. It involved a concealed 
firearm carried in a vehicle. It was a concealed 
firearm that she threatened to use against an officer 
at a time when she had possession of it.  
She also threatened emergency personnel on the scene. 
She threatened the doctor in the emergency room. She 
threatened the officers in the emergency room. She 
threatened medical staff. She threatened the family of 
those persons. There is even a discussion about 
threatening somebody’s grandmother . . . .  The scope 
of persons that she threatened was quite expansive and 
shows at least at that point an unusual level of risk 
to the public while she was in this mind set.  
Many of those threats included threats to use a 
firearm. So it was specific to firearms as well. I 
note in passing that there were other cases involving 
threats to the judge. I just note that as being a 
continuation of threatening conduct and specifically 
threats to Judge Wing, which didn’t involve me. That 
was a continuation of a pattern of threatening 
behavior. I still don’t quite now know what the 
details of the threats were. It really doesn’t matter 
to me. She was convicted of those two crimes. So I 
note them as a continuation of that threatening 
conduct even while she was incarcerated.  
I think just having her know at any time she could be 
searched for the possession of a firearm, and if she 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
10 
 
would be in illegal possession, it could result in her 
return to confinement and will aid the rehabilitation 
goal because it will encourage her to not possess a 
firearm when she is returned to the community. I also 
note as a convicted felon she couldn’t possess one any 
way, but I’m not making this order because of her 
felony status. It’s because of the nature of the 
underlying offense and the facts specific to this 
particular case.  
(Emphasis added.) 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. THE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH CONDITION 
¶9 
The first question we address is a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a condition for a person released into the 
community under supervision, including those on probation, 
parole or extended supervision.  It is important to highlight 
the 
fact 
that, 
in 
the 
instant 
case, 
we 
analyze 
the 
constitutionality of an individualized supervision condition 
that applies only to Rowan and was imposed by a circuit court 
pursuant to its authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5)9 after the 
circuit court made an individualized determination that the 
condition was necessary based on the facts in this case——
involving violence, threats, and a firearm.  Rowan claims that 
the condition authorizing suspicionless searches of her person, 
vehicle and residence for a firearm violates her rights under 
the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.  
"Whether 
a 
seizure 
or 
search . . . passes 
statutory 
and 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(5) 
provides: 
"Extended 
supervision conditions. Whenever the court imposes a bifurcated 
sentence under sub. (1), the court may impose conditions upon 
the term of extended supervision." 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
11 
 
constitutional muster are questions of law subject to de novo 
review."  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137-38, 456 
N.W.2d 830 (1990).    
Both the fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
and Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantee 
citizens 
the 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court consistently follows the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the search and 
seizure 
provision 
of 
the 
fourth 
amendment 
in 
construing 
the 
same 
provision 
of 
the 
state 
constitution.  
Id. at 137 (internal citations omitted).   
¶10 The test set forth for analyzing the constitutionality 
of conditions of probation has two parts:  "[C]onditions of 
probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they 
[1.] are not overly broad and [2.] are reasonably related to the 
person's rehabilitation."10  A condition is reasonably related to 
the person's rehabilitation "if it assists the convicted 
individual in conforming his or her conduct to the law."11 It is 
also appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end result  
of encouraging lawful conduct, and thus increased protection of 
the public, when determining what individualized probation 
conditions are appropriate for a particular person.  See Edwards 
v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 83, 246 N.W.2d 109 (1976) (stating that 
probation "is granted with the goals of rehabilitation and 
protection of society in mind" and that a condition forbidding 
                                                 
10 Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶19; Edwards, 74 Wis. 2d at 84-
85; Krebs, 212 Wis. 2d at 131. 
11 Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶21. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
12 
 
association 
with 
co-defendants 
"was 
designed 
for 
[the 
defendant's] rehabilitation and the protection of society"); 
Krebs v. Schwarz, 212 Wis. 2d 127, 132, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Ct. App. 
1997) (finding constitutional a probation condition requiring an 
agent's approval for a sexual relationship on the grounds that 
"the condition is narrowly drawn and is reasonably related to 
[his] rehabilitation, as well as the protection of the public").  
See also State v. Brown, 2006 WI 131, ¶44, 298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 
N.W.2d 262 (stating that "[u]nder Truth-in-Sentencing, extended 
supervision and reconfinement are, in effect, substitutes for 
the parole system that existed under prior law").  While 
probation, parole and extended supervision are not the same in 
all respects, it is appropriate to analyze the condition of 
extended 
supervision 
at 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
under 
the 
Edwards/Oakley/Krebs test we have used previously to analyze the 
constitutionality of probation conditions.12  Probation, parole 
and extended supervision all involve persons under community 
supervision. 
¶11 Concerning the first part of the test, the fact that 
the condition authorizes suspicionless searches by any law 
                                                 
12 See 
Samson, 
547 
U.S. 
at 
847-50 
(determining 
the 
constitutionality of a search condition imposed on those on 
parole pursuant to the analysis from United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001), which examined the constitutionality of a 
search condition imposed on all probationers); see also State v. 
Koenig, 2003 WI App 12, ¶7 n.3, 259 Wis. 2d 833, 656 N.W.2d 499 
("[W]e conclude that authority relating to the propriety of 
conditions of probation is applicable to conditions of extended 
supervision."); State v. Fisher, 2005 WI App 175, ¶17, 285 Wis. 
2d 433, 702 N.W.2d 56 (same). 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
13 
 
enforcement officer for the duration of Rowan's extended 
supervision does not make the condition overly broad.  As noted 
above, in Samson, the United States Supreme Court addressed a 
much broader question than that presented in this case and 
upheld the constitutionality of a California statute13 that 
subjected all persons released on parole to suspicionless 
searches by "a parole officer or other peace officer at any time 
of the day or night."14  (Such searches were still subject to 
state law prohibiting "arbitrary, capricious or harassing" 
searches,15 and the legislature stated that it did not intend "to 
authorize . . . searches for the sole purpose of harassment."16)  
The California statute imposed this condition on anyone released 
from prison on parole, and Samson was released on parole when 
                                                 
13 Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (West 2000) states, "Any inmate 
who is eligible for release on parole . . . shall agree in 
writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer 
or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or 
without a search warrant and with or without cause."  We note 
that the condition at issue here does not require Rowan's 
consent or agreement to search, and makes Rowan's "person or her 
residence or her vehicle subject to search for a firearm at any 
time . . . ."  The circuit court initially described Rowan's 
supervision condition as "[c]onsent to search of your person, 
any premises you occupy or any vehicles you occupy at any time 
without probable cause."  The circuit court later modified the 
condition and removed the consent-to-search reference.   
14 Samson, 547 U.S. at 852, 856; Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a). 
15 Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 (quoting People v. Reyes, 968 
P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998)). 
16 Cal. Penal Code § 3067(d) states, "It is not the intent 
of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to 
conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment." 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
14 
 
searched pursuant to this law.17  The Supreme Court based its 
ruling on the proposition that persons on parole have "severely 
diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status 
alone," as well as a recognition that "a State's interests in 
reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and 
positive 
citizenship 
among . . . parolees 
warrant 
privacy 
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the 
Fourth Amendment."18   
¶12 Similarly, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin regulation that permits 
warrantless searches of a probationer's home by a probation 
officer if that officer has "reasonable grounds to believe" that 
the person possesses contraband.19  The Court concluded that 
these searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to "the 
special needs 
of 
Wisconsin's probation system," including 
permitting "probation officials to respond quickly to evidence 
                                                 
17 Samson, 547 U.S. at 846-47. 
18 Id. at 852-53. 
19 483 
U.S. 
868, 
870-71 
(1987) 
(internal 
quotations 
omitted). 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
15 
 
of misconduct" and "the deterrent effect that the possibility of 
expeditious searches would otherwise create."20   
¶13 While the Samson and Griffin decisions did not address 
the precise question presented here, their holdings support our 
analysis under the Edwards/Oakley/Krebs test and leave little 
doubt of the correct result in the context presented here.     
¶14 Rowan's extended supervision condition unquestionably 
impinges on her privacy more than the standard conditions 
imposed on persons on extended supervision by exposing her to 
search by law enforcement officers including agents supervising 
persons on probation, parole or extended supervision.  It 
further impinges on her privacy by eliminating the requirement 
that would otherwise apply to agents——i.e., that searches of 
supervised persons must be made "only in accordance with [the 
procedures set forth in Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21 (June 
1999)]."21  Even so, the aspects of the condition that are more 
                                                 
20 Id. at 875-76.  We note that the regulation at issue in 
Griffin, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21 (June 1999), allows only 
probation agents, not police officers, to conduct a search on 
the basis of reasonable suspicion that a probationer has 
contraband.  See State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, ¶¶36-38, 240 
Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781; State v. Jones, 2008 WI App 154, 
¶10, 314 Wis. 2d 408, 762 N.W.2d 106; see also infra ¶14 n.20.  
In contrast, this case involves an individual supervision 
condition that applies only to Rowan and allows any law 
enforcement officer to search her person, vehicle or residence 
without reasonable suspicion.  This opinion should not be 
construed as intended to modify Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21 or 
the above case law.    
21 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(1) states, 
General policy. A search of a client, the client's 
body contents or the client's living quarters or 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
16 
 
intrusive are still not overly broad such that they violate her 
protections under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 11.  
                                                                                                                                                             
property may be made at any time, but only in 
accordance with this section. 
(2) Personal search. (a) In this subsection, "personal 
search" means a search of a client's person, including 
but not limited to the client's pockets, frisking the 
client's body, an examination of the client's shoes 
and hat, and a visual inspection of the client's 
mouth. 
(b) A personal search of a client may be conducted by 
any field staff member:  
1. If the staff member has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the client possesses contraband;  
2. At the direction of a supervisor;  
3. Before a client enters and after a client leaves 
the security enclosure of a correctional institution, 
jail or detention facility; or  
4. When a client is taken into custody. 
(c) A written report of every personal search shall be 
prepared by the staff member who conducted the search 
and shall be filed in the client's case record. 
(3) Search of living quarters or property. (a) A 
search of an offender's living quarters or property 
may 
be 
conducted 
by 
field 
staff 
if 
there 
are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the quarters or 
property contain contraband or an offender who is 
deemed to be in violation of supervision. Approval of 
the 
supervisor 
shall be obtained unless exigent 
circumstances, such as suspicion the offender will 
destroy 
contraband, 
use 
a 
weapon 
or 
elude 
apprehension, require search without approval. 
(b) There shall be a written record of all searches of 
a client's living quarters or property.  
 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
17 
 
As the Samson Court made clear, persons in Rowan's position have 
diminished privacy expectations, and the State has greater 
interests in supervising them to prevent criminal conduct, and 
those two facts make searches reasonable that would otherwise 
not be: 
Examining the totality of the circumstances pertaining 
to petitioner's status as a parolee, "an established 
variation on imprisonment," including the plain terms 
of the parole search condition, we conclude that 
petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that 
society would recognize as legitimate. 
The State's interests, by contrast, are substantial. 
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State 
has an "overwhelming interest" in supervising parolees 
because "parolees . . . are more likely to commit 
future criminal offenses."  Similarly, this Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged that a State's interests in 
reducing 
recidivism 
and 
thereby 
promoting 
reintegration 
and 
positive 
citizenship 
among 
probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions 
that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Samson, 
547 
U.S. 
at 
852-53 
(internal 
citations 
and 
footnotes omitted). 
¶15 Additionally, even the dissent in Samson suggested 
that it would have upheld an individualized extended supervision 
condition such as the condition at issue here.  The Samson 
dissent indicated that it likely would have approved of a 
supervision condition allowing suspicionless searches if "a 
court or parole board imposed the condition at issue based on 
specific knowledge of the individual's criminal history and 
projected likelihood of reoffending, or if the State had had in 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
18 
 
place programmatic safeguards to ensure evenhandedness."22  That 
is precisely what the circuit court did in imposing the search 
condition for Rowan based on "the nature of the underlying 
offense and the facts specific to [her] particular case."  
Samson and Griffin upheld blanket search conditions authorized 
by statute to be applied to a whole class of persons on 
supervision.  Unlike Samson and Griffin, this case involves an 
individualized search condition that the circuit court, acting 
under 
its 
statutory 
authority 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(5), determined was necessary for Rowan specifically.     
¶16 In this case, the circuit court had evidence that 
Rowan had concealed a semiautomatic handgun unlawfully and had 
possessed ammunition for it as well.  At trial, the court heard 
an audio tape made of Rowan's lengthy threatening rant at the 
hospital, in which she specifically threatened to find and kill 
people, including a doctor, police officers, other members of 
the medical staff, and their family members.  The court heard 
testimony by a gun shop owner that between the time of the March 
13 incident and the day she was charged in the cases, Rowan had 
purchased several guns.  As the court noted, the pattern 
continued while this case was pending, Rowan was also charged in 
a separate case with threatening judges in comments she made 
while in jail.  The court went to some effort to articulate 
                                                 
22 Samson, 547 U.S. at 865 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
19 
 
carefully the specific factual basis for the search condition 
the court imposed and the boundaries of that condition. 
¶17 The court limited its authorization to searches "for 
firearms," and therefore by implication only to searches where a 
firearm could be concealed.  The circuit court further clarified 
that 
the 
search 
condition 
did 
not 
dispense 
with 
the 
constitutional requirement that "the search be done in a 
reasonable manner."23  Of course, the order is also limited in 
time to the length of Rowan's extended supervision.  In 
addition, though we examine the condition itself, noting that no 
actual search has yet been conducted, any search carried out 
pursuant to the condition would still, as the circuit court 
noted, be subject to constitutional challenge if it was 
conducted in an unreasonable manner.  For these reasons, the 
condition imposed by the sentencing court was limited so as not 
to be overly broad.  
¶18 We next turn to the second part of the test relating 
to 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
condition 
of 
extended 
supervision, including persons released on community supervision 
such as probation and parole.  We conclude that the condition 
                                                 
23 See supra ¶11 and note 14 (noting that Samson, 547 U.S. 
at 856, relied in part on the fact that California law 
prohibited "arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches" in its 
decision to uphold the suspicionless search condition under the 
California statute).  Here, in the State's oral argument, it 
emphasized that the circuit court ensured that law enforcement 
could not conduct harassing searches of Rowan by noting that the 
order did not change the constitutional requirement that all 
searches be conducted in a reasonable manner.  
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
20 
 
is, under the circumstances presented here, reasonably related 
to Rowan's rehabilitation.  A condition is reasonably related to 
a 
person's 
rehabilitation 
"if 
it 
assists 
the 
convicted 
individual in conforming his or her conduct to the law."24  It is 
also appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end result of 
encouraging lawful conduct, and thus increased protection of the 
public, when determining what individualized probation, extended 
supervision, 
or 
parole 
conditions 
are 
appropriate 
for 
a 
particular person.  Unsurprisingly, public safety is often 
mentioned25 in connection with the goal of rehabilitation: 
decreased criminality and greater public safety are logically 
connected to successful rehabilitation efforts.  The trial in 
this case included evidence of the defendant's repeated explicit 
threats 
to 
shoot 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
and 
medical 
professionals and their family members, as well as evidence of 
the handgun and ammunition recovered from her vehicle, where it 
had been unlawfully concealed.  In light of the circumstances 
that resulted in her conviction for battery to a law enforcement 
officer, the condition at issue was reasonably related to 
                                                 
24 Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶21. 
25 Edwards, 74 Wis. 2d at 83 (stating that probation "is 
granted with the goals of rehabilitation and protection of 
society in mind" and that a condition forbidding association 
with 
co-defendants 
"was 
designed 
for 
[the 
defendant's] 
rehabilitation and the protection of society"); Krebs, 212 
Wis. 2d at 128-29, 132 (finding constitutional a probation 
condition 
requiring 
an 
agent's 
approval 
for 
a 
sexual 
relationship on the grounds that "the condition is narrowly 
drawn and is reasonably related to [his] rehabilitation, as well 
as the protection of the public"). 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
21 
 
Rowan's rehabilitation, because her diminished right to be free 
from search was designed to assist her in "conforming [her] 
conduct to the law" by recognizing that her prior criminal 
conduct demonstrated a pattern involving guns and violent 
threats. Giving her an increased incentive to refrain from 
possessing 
a 
gun 
again 
was 
reasonably 
related 
to 
her 
rehabilitation. 
 
It 
is 
clear 
that 
Rowan's 
successful 
rehabilitation 
would 
also 
serve 
the 
interest 
of 
public 
protection and safety.  
¶19 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
condition was limited so that it was not overly broad and was 
reasonably related to Rowan's rehabilitation.  It was therefore 
permissible 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitution Article I, Section 11. 
 
B. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE OFFICER ACTING IN 
AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE BATTERY 
¶20 The second issue presented by this appeal is a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support one 
element of the crime of battery to a law enforcement officer.  
As we noted earlier: 
The standard of review in determining whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction is 
that "an appellate court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the 
conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."   
Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is 
therefore very narrow. We give great deference to the 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
22 
 
determination of the trier of fact.  We must examine 
the record to find facts that support upholding the 
jury's decision to convict.  
State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶¶56-57, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 
N.W.2d 203 (footnotes omitted). 
¶21 We agree with Rowan that the fact that an officer "is 
acting in an official capacity" is an element of the offense 
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
applicable jury instruction (Wis JI-Criminal 915) provides that 
officers are acting "in an official capacity when they perform 
duties that they are employed to perform."  Rowan argues that 
police officers "are not employed to assist hospital personnel 
in providing medical treatment" (App. Br. at 12).  She reasons 
that because the officer here restrained Rowan at the request of 
the nurse, who was attempting to do a medical procedure related 
to a blood draw, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction because the officer was not acting in an official 
capacity.  We consider the evidence that the trier of fact had 
before it in determining whether Officer Jennifer Knutson was 
acting in an official capacity when she was injured.  The jury 
heard that Knutson had been dispatched to the hospital by her 
employer, the River Falls Police Department, at the request of 
another officer who had witnessed the erratic driving, had seen 
the crash, and had assisted at the scene.  Knutson went to the 
hospital as requested.  The jury heard testimony from the 
emergency room doctor that when Rowan arrived by ambulance, she 
was "combative . . . fighting . . . spitting at me, threatening 
my life and my family's life as well as the life of others in 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
23 
 
the emergency room."  The jury heard testimony that Rowan was 
put under arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.  The 
jury heard testimony that while in the emergency room, Rowan 
received treatment for her injuries and was subjected to a blood 
draw to which she did not consent.  That procedure was 
supervised by the law enforcement officers present.  The jury 
heard testimony from another officer present that Knutson 
"assisted and [was] standing by with Ms. Rowan."  Given that 
Knutson was dispatched to the hospital by her employer and 
actively "assisted" other officers in restraining a combative 
suspect who was under arrest and under investigation for 
operating while intoxicated, we are satisfied that the evidence, 
"viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction," is not 
"so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, 
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."26  We are satisfied that there was evidence that 
supported the jury verdict that included the finding that 
Officer Knutson was acting in an official capacity at the time 
of the battery by Rowan.  
III. CONCLUSION 
¶22 The first question concerns a condition imposed as 
part of Rowan's extended supervision, which she argues is overly 
broad 
and 
violative 
of 
her 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
The 
certification asks us to determine "whether a sentencing court 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
[to 
the 
United 
States 
                                                 
26 Hayes, 273 Wis. 2d 1, ¶56. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
24 
 
Constitution] or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a 
condition 
of 
extended 
supervision 
that 
allows 
any 
law 
enforcement officer to search the defendant's person, vehicle, 
or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion."   
¶23 The facts of this case are important to the circuit 
court's decision to impose the above condition on Rowan's 
extended supervision, as the circuit court noted.  Rowan's 
arrest and conviction resulted from an incident on March 13, 
2008, during which a police officer observed Rowan drive 
erratically, run a stop sign, and crash into a pole.  Rowan 
appeared intoxicated and agitated.  She cursed emergency 
responders, and asked them where her gun was while reaching 
toward the floor of her car.  Police later discovered a 
semiautomatic handgun and ammunition on the floor of the 
driver's side of Rowan's car.  Rowan was taken to the hospital 
for medical treatment and a blood draw, where she was placed 
under arrest.  At the hospital, Rowan was combative, cursing, 
spitting, and grabbing medical staff.  She threatened to kill 
the officers and medical staff in the emergency room, and 
further threatened to kill their families.  Rowan resisted a 
police officer who tried to restrain her, and seriously injured 
the officer's hand.  
¶24 The circuit court considered the nature of Rowan's 
crime——involving violence, threats, and a firearm——and Rowan's 
conduct prior to and during the trial.  The court stated, "The 
scope of persons that she threatened was quite expansive and 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
25 
 
shows at least at that point an unusual level of risk to the 
public while she was in this mind set."  Further, the court 
noted that Rowan was charged in a separate case with threatening 
a judge.  There was also testimony from a gun shop owner that 
Rowan had purchased several guns after the March 13, 2008, 
incident at issue and before she was sentenced.  In prescribing 
the search condition, the circuit court relied on these facts 
that reflect Rowan's history of violence and threats, which 
often involved firearms. 
¶25 We are satisfied that while the condition that the 
circuit court imposed on Rowan's extended supervision "may 
impinge on constitutional rights," it does not violate them. The 
supervision condition imposed in this case does not violate 
Rowan's constitutional rights because the circuit court made an 
individualized determination, pursuant to the circuit court's 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5), that the condition was 
necessary based on the facts in this case——involving violence, 
threats, and a firearm.  It conforms with the applicable two-
part test——that it is "not overly broad" and that it is 
"reasonably 
related" 
to 
Rowan's 
rehabilitation. 
 
It 
is 
instructive that the United States Supreme Court determined in 
Samson v. California27 that a suspicionless search of a prisoner 
who 
has 
been 
released 
but 
remains 
under 
supervision 
by 
corrections officials, which includes a person released under 
community 
supervision, 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
                                                 
27 Samson, 547 U.S. 843. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
26 
 
Amendment.  It based that conclusion on such persons' severely 
diminished privacy expectations and the State's great interest 
in preventing such persons from reoffending.28  The State relies 
on Samson in arguing that the condition here does not violate 
Rowan's constitutional rights.  Rowan counters that Samson's 
holding 
is 
distinguishable 
because 
it 
relied 
heavily 
on 
California's statute authorizing suspicionless searches, while 
the condition imposed here was made solely on a sentencing 
court's authority.  We hold that under the facts of this case, 
the condition imposed satisfies both parts of the applicable 
test and therefore does not violate Rowan's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Wisconsin 
Constitution Article I, Section 11.   
¶26 The second question presented by this case concerns 
the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to Rowan's conviction 
for battery to a police officer.  One of the elements of that 
crime that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the 
officer who is the victim was "acting in an official capacity" 
at the time of the battery. Rowan argues that the evidence was 
insufficient on that element, because the evidence showed that 
the officer was assisting a nurse who was performing a medical 
procedure, which she claims is not what the officer is employed 
to do.  The State argues that in restraining a combative person 
who was under arrest, the officer was "acting in an official 
capacity" at the time of the injury.  Under the standard of 
                                                 
28 Id. at 852-53. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
27 
 
review that applies to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, 
our 
review 
of 
the 
trier 
of 
fact's 
findings 
is 
highly 
deferential.  The jury heard that the officer was dispatched to 
the hospital by her employer; that she assisted fellow officers 
and medical staff with Rowan, a combative suspect who was under 
arrest for drunk driving; and that Rowan was at the hospital for 
a blood draw, without her consent, as part of the investigation 
of a crime.  Given the standard of review that governs this 
challenge, we are satisfied that the evidence presented to the 
jury, "viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction," 
is not "so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."29 
¶27 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
By the Court.—Affirmed.
                                                 
29 Hayes, 273 Wis. 2d 1, ¶56. 
 
 
                                            No. 2010AP1398-CR 
 
 
 
 
1