Title: Golden Sands Dairy LLC v. Town of Saratoga

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1258 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Golden Sands Dairy LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Ellis Industries Saratoga, LLC, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Town of Saratoga, Terry A. Rickaby, Douglas 
Passineau, Patty Heeg, John Frank and Dan 
Forbes, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Rural Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 797, 899 N.W.2d 737 
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas B. Eagon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jordan J. Hemaidan, Daniel A. O'Callaghan, Joseph D. 
Brydges, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, with whom on 
the briefs were Brian G. Formella and Anderson, O'Brien, Bertz, 
Skrenes & Golla, Stevens Point.  There was an oral argument by 
Jordan J. Hemaidan. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Remzy D. Bitar and Arenz, Molter, Macy, Rifle & Larson SC, 
Waukesha, with whom on the brief was Paul G. Kent and Stafford 
Rosenbaum LLP, Madison.  There was an oral argument by Remzy D. 
Bitar. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the State of 
Wisconsin by Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor general, with whom 
on the brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Ryan J. 
Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral 
argument by Sopen B. Shah. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Agriculture 
Coalition by H. Dale Peterson, John J. Laubmeier, and Stroud, 
Willink & Howard, LLC, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Counties Association by Andrew T. Phillips, Rebecca J. Roeker, 
and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Towns 
Association 
by 
Richard 
Manthe 
and 
Wisconsin 
Towns 
Association, Shawano. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Municipalities by Daniel M. Olson and League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Local 
Business Amici by Christa O. Westerberg, Leslie A. Freehill, and 
Pines Bach LLP, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Realtors Association, Wisconsin Builders Association, Wisconsin 
 
 
3 
Manufacturers and Commerce, and NAIOP-WI by Thomas D. Larson and 
Wisconsin REALTORS Association, Wisconsin Builders Association, 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce and NAIOP-WI, Madison. 
 
 
2018 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1258 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV389) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Golden Sands Dairy LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Ellis Industries Saratoga, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Saratoga, Terry A. Rickaby, Douglas 
Passineau, Patty Heeg, John Frank and Dan 
Forbes, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Rural Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervenor. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   Wisconsin has long provided 
a vested right to build a structure upon the filing of a 
building permit application that strictly conforms to all 
applicable zoning regulations (the "Building Permit Rule")——a 
doctrine we reaffirmed last term in McKee Family I, LLC v. City 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
2 
 
of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, 374 Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.  
Golden Sands Dairy, LLC ("Golden Sands"), either owns outright 
(or is under contract to purchase) what collectively amounts to 
6,388 acres in and around the Town of Saratoga ("Saratoga")1 on 
which it seeks to operate a farm using the "farming full circle" 
model.2  Golden Sands obtained a building permit for seven farm 
structures.  Its building permit application identified the 
building site as 100 acres and the total farm as 6,388 acres.  
Further, Golden Sands included a map with its original building 
permit application that identified the precise land it would use 
for its farm and the location of the seven structures. 
¶2 
After 
Golden 
Sands 
filed 
its 
building 
permit 
application, Saratoga enacted its zoning ordinance that sought 
to prohibit agricultural uses such as those proposed by Golden 
                                                 
1 The record reveals that some of the 6,388 acres may be 
located outside Saratoga's zoning jurisdiction.  The dispute 
before us concerns only that portion of Golden Sands' land 
within 
Saratoga's 
zoning 
jurisdiction. 
 
Accordingly, 
our 
decision is limited to those portions of the 6,388 acres that 
are subject to Saratoga's zoning jurisdiction.  For simplicity's 
sake, we use "the Property" to describe those portions of the 
6,388 acres that are:  (1) specifically identified in the map 
attached to the original building permit application; and (2) 
within Saratoga's zoning jurisdiction. 
2 Golden Sands' planned farm has two components.  First, a 
dairy operation will raise cattle for milk production.  Second, 
a cropland operation will grow feed for the dairy cattle and 
food for human consumption.  The cropland will be fertilized 
with manure from the dairy operation.  Hence, the "full circle" 
occurs when crops are fed to the cattle and manure from the 
cattle is used to fertilize crops that will again become (in 
part) cattle feed. 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
3 
 
Sands.  Golden Sands argues that the Building Permit Rule 
extends to all land specifically identified in a building permit 
application.  Under its proposed modification of the Building 
Permit Rule, Golden Sands would have a vested right to use all 
of the Property for agricultural purposes.  Saratoga disagrees, 
arguing that Golden Sands' building permit is limited to vesting 
its right to build the seven structures identified in the 
building permit. 
¶3 
The issue in this case is one of first impression in 
Wisconsin:  does the Building Permit Rule extend to land 
identified in the building permit application as part of the 
project upon which no actual construction was planned?  The Wood 
County Circuit Court3 concluded that the Building Permit Rule 
does extend to all land identified in the building permit 
application, and consequently granted Golden Sands' motion for 
summary judgment.  The court of appeals, however, reversed, 
holding that the Building Permit Rule applies only to building 
structures, and not to use of land.  Golden Sands Dairy, LLC v. 
Town of Saratoga, No. 2015AP1258, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. April 13, 2017) (Golden Sands II).4 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Thomas B. Eagon presiding. 
4 We refer to the court of appeals' decision in this case as 
Golden Sands II because the court of appeals decided, in a prior 
case, whether Golden Sands' building permit application was 
sufficient such that Golden Sands was entitled to a writ of 
mandamus ordering Saratoga to issue the building permit.  See 
infra ¶10.  
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
4 
 
¶4 
We hold that the Building Permit Rule extends to all 
land specifically identified5 in a building permit application.  
Consequently, Golden Sands has a vested right to use all of the 
Property for agricultural purposes.6  Therefore, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
A.  Golden Sands' Building Permit Application 
¶5 
Golden Sands filed its original building permit 
application with Saratoga on June 6, 2012.  The application 
sought a permit to build seven structures on 92 acres.  Attached 
to the application was a map that shaded the parcels to be used 
                                                 
5 By "specifically identified," we mean that the building 
permit application, including attachments, must include a means 
to objectively determine the exact parcels of land at issue.  A 
legal description is preferable, but a map that objectively 
identifies the parcels at issue will also suffice.  
6 To be (perhaps painfully) clear, our holding that Golden 
Sands possesses a vested right to use the Property for 
agricultural purposes is grounded upon its building permit 
dispute with Saratoga and therefore does not (and cannot) grant 
Golden Sands a vested right to use the Property for agricultural 
purposes if Golden Sands is unable to obtain an ownership 
interest in any piece of the Property.  
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
5 
 
for the dairy structures in yellow and the parcels to be used as 
farmland in blue.7     
¶6 
Golden Sands included with the Application copies of 
applications for various state permits required to operate the 
farm.  Golden Sands was not required to provide copies of the 
state permit applications to receive a building permit from 
Saratoga, but rather did so as a "courtesy."  These state permit 
applications provided even greater detail as to Golden Sands' 
plans for its farming operation. 
B.  Applicable Zoning Regulations 
¶7 
At the time Golden Sands filed its initial building 
permit application (June 6, 2012), Saratoga did not have any 
zoning ordinances.  The only land use restriction in place was 
Wood County's zoning ordinance, which zoned the land as 
"unrestricted," meaning the land at issue could be used for any 
lawful purpose. 
¶8 
Saratoga started the process to regulate land use 
within its borders in 2007, when it began to assemble a 
comprehensive plan pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.1001(2) (2011-
                                                 
7 Golden Sands filed an amended application on July 17, 
2012.  This amended application identified the "Area Involved" 
as "100 acres of site and 6,388 acres total."  Attached to the 
amended application was a legal description of the 100 acres 
(which the circuit court subsequently found in actuality added 
up to 92 acres).  The parties treat the amended application as 
supplementing the original application rather than superseding 
it, and so do we.  We therefore refer to all application 
materials——the original application, the amended application, 
and all attachments thereto——collectively as "the Application." 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
6 
 
12).8  After completing a comprehensive plan, the next step for 
Saratoga was enacting a zoning ordinance.  However, towns do not 
possess zoning powers by default under Wisconsin law.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 60.22, 61.34(1).  Instead, a town must receive village 
powers from its electors9 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 60.22(3) 
before it may exercise zoning powers.  Saratoga's electors 
granted it village powers on September 24, 2012. 
¶9 
On July 19, 2012, during the time Saratoga was in the 
process of obtaining village powers, it passed a moratorium on 
issuing any building permit that was inconsistent with then-
existing land use.  This was two days after Golden Sands filed 
its amended building permit application. 
¶10 Upon receiving village powers, Saratoga passed a 
permanent zoning ordinance on October 17, 2012, which the Wood 
County Board ratified on November 13, 2012, and the Saratoga 
Town Board ratified the next day.  Under the permanent zoning 
ordinance, only two percent of the town——and none of Golden 
Sands' land——is zoned for agricultural use.  Therefore, Golden 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  We cite to the 
2011-12 version of the statutes because the events underlying 
this case occurred in 2012.  The 2007-08 and 2011-12 versions of 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1001(2) are substantively identical.  Compare 
§ 66.1001(2) (2007-08) with § 66.1001(2) (2011-12).  
9 Electors are "[e]very U.S. citizen age 18 or older who has 
resided in an election district or ward for 28 consecutive days 
before any election where the citizen offers to vote."  Wis. 
Stat. § 6.02(1). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
7 
 
Sands' planned operation does not conform to the zoning scheme 
enacted by Saratoga. 
C.  The Mandamus Action 
¶11 Saratoga provided two reasons for its refusal to issue 
the building permit requested by Golden Sands:  (1) the 
moratorium on building permits enacted on July 19, 2012, 
prohibited issuance of the permit; and (2) Saratoga deemed the 
Application incomplete.  Golden Sands then filed a mandamus 
action to compel Saratoga to issue the building permit.  The 
circuit court concluded that the Application was complete and 
complied with all zoning regulations in place at the time it was 
filed, and thus granted the writ of mandamus.  In response, 
Saratoga issued the building permit to Golden Sands.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  Golden Sands Dairy, LLC v. Fuehrer, No. 
2013AP1468, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2014) 
(Golden Sands I).  Saratoga did not file a petition for review 
from Golden Sands I, and thus the mandamus action is not subject 
to our review. 
D.  The Present Action 
¶12 Two weeks after filing the mandamus action, Golden 
Sands filed the present declaratory judgment action, asking the 
circuit court to declare that Golden Sands may use all the land 
specifically identified in the Application for agricultural 
purposes. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
Golden 
Sands 
sufficiently identified the parcels that it intended to use for 
farming in the Application.  Thus, the circuit court concluded 
that Golden Sands had a vested right to use the land 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
8 
 
specifically identified in the Application for agricultural 
purposes and granted Golden Sands' motion for summary judgment.  
The circuit court added that Golden Sands' vested right to use 
the land for agricultural purposes expires at the same time the 
building permit expires. 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed.  Golden Sands II, 
unpublished slip op., ¶2.  The court of appeals distinguished 
between the right to build a structure and the right to use 
land.  Id., ¶14.  It determined that the right to build a 
structure vests with the filing of a building permit application 
that strictly conforms to all applicable zoning regulations, but 
the right to use land vests with open and obvious use under the 
nonconforming use doctrine.  Id.  Based on this distinction, the 
court of appeals concluded that Golden Sands' building permit 
vested its right to build the structures, but not to use the 
other land identified in the building permit application for 
agricultural purposes.  The court of appeals concluded that 
because Golden Sands had not established a nonconforming use 
before Saratoga's zoning ordinance took effect, it could not use 
any of its land for agricultural purposes.  Id., ¶27.   
¶14 The court of appeals articulated a series of concerns 
with Golden Sands' proposed modification of the Building Permit 
Rule.  It did so in a series of questions: 
 "[H]ow many of the identified 6[,]388 acres are 
needed?" 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
9 
 
 "Why should all 6[,]388 acres obtain nonconforming 
use status simply because that amount of land was 
noted in the application?" 
 "What if a factual inquiry would show that Golden 
Sands needs substantially fewer than 6[,]388 acres to 
fully utilize its proposed farm buildings?" 
Id., ¶24.   
¶15 Golden Sands petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on September 12, 2017. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We review decisions granting summary judgment de novo.  
McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶27.  Summary judgment is proper where 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶17 Our analysis begins10 with a brief recitation of the 
Building Permit Rule.  We then consider whether the Building 
                                                 
10 We pause to clearly articulate the scope of our review.  
Since 
the 
events 
underlying 
this 
dispute 
occurred, 
the 
legislature enacted a statute that would govern the facts 
underlying this case, Wis. Stat. § 66.10015 (2013-14).  However, 
because § 66.10015 (2013-14) applies prospectively, see 2013 
Wis. Act. 74, § 2, it does not apply to this case——something the 
parties do not dispute.  Despite acknowledging that § 66.10015 
(2013-14) does not apply to this case, the parties, and many 
amici, nonetheless spend significant space in their briefs 
arguing how this case would be decided under the statute.  To be 
clear, we do not interpret, apply, or analyze § 66.10015 (2013-
14) in this decision.  Furthermore, our resolution of this case 
under the common law should not be read to intimate how courts 
should apply § 66.10015 (2013-14). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
10 
 
Permit Rule extends to land specifically identified in the 
building permit application.  Finally, we apply the Building 
Permit Rule to the facts of this case.  We conclude that the 
policies underlying the Building Permit Rule extend to any land 
specifically identified in the building permit application as 
part of the project.  Consequently, Golden Sands possesses a 
vested right to use the Property for agricultural purposes, 
consistent with the zoning regulations in place at the time 
Golden Sands filed the Application.  
A.  The Building Permit Rule 
¶18 Wisconsin is among the minority of United States 
jurisdictions that adheres to the Building Permit Rule, a 
bright-line rule vesting the right to use property consistent 
with current zoning at the time a building permit application 
that strictly conforms to all applicable zoning regulations is 
filed.  Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 32:3, at 
32-13——32-14 (2017). 
¶19 In contrast, the rule adopted in the majority of 
jurisdictions requires both a building permit and "substantial 
construction 
and/or 
substantial 
expenditures 
before 
rights 
vest."  Id. at 32-6.  This means that, under this rule, a 
landowner's building permit can be revoked if the property is 
rezoned——even if construction has already begun.  Folsom 
Invest., Inc. v. Scottsdale, 620 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Ariz. 
1985).  Courts applying the majority rule look for "substantial 
money expenditures, considerable contractual commitments, and 
extensive preparation[s]" to determine whether a landowner has 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
11 
 
vested rights to complete construction.  Id.  This determination 
requires extensive fact-intensive litigation.  Cribbin v. City 
of 
Chicago, 
893 
N.E.2d 
1016, 
1031 
(Ill. 
App. 
2008) 
("substantiality 
is 
a 
necessarily 
fact-intensive 
determination").  What constitutes "substantial" can vary from 
case to case.  See Prince George's Cty. v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. 
P'shp, 623 A.2d 1296, 1298, 1304-05 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
$2,000,000 in expenditures insufficient to vest rights in 
current zoning where construction was limited to pouring a 
footing). 
¶20 In a unanimous opinion affirming the court of appeals 
and agreeing with the circuit court, we reaffirmed our adherence 
to the minority, bright-line Building Permit Rule last term in 
McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶40. 
¶21 The Building Permit Rule is an exception to the 
general policy that "[p]roperty owners obtain no vested rights 
in a particular type of zoning solely through reliance on the 
zoning."  Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 381, 548 
N.W.2d 528 (1996).  The court of appeals based its analysis, in 
large part, on the nonconforming use doctrine.  Golden Sands II, 
unpublished slip op., ¶14.  The nonconforming use doctrine is 
implicated when lawful uses of land are made unlawful by a 
change in zoning regulations.  Des Jardin v. Greenfield, 262 
Wis. 43, 47-48, 53 N.W.2d 784 (1952).  However, under the 
nonconforming use doctrine, the landowner is allowed to continue 
using the land in the now-nonconforming fashion.  Id.  Neither 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
12 
 
party has argued, nor do we conclude, that the nonconforming use 
doctrine is implicated in the case at bar.11 
¶22 The Building Permit Rule grants the right to add or 
change a structure "when a property owner has applied for a 
building 
permit 
conforming 
to 
the 
original 
zoning 
classification."  McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶37 (citing Lake Bluff 
Hous. Partners v. City of S. Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 182, 
540 N.W.2d 189 (1995)).  Wisconsin adheres to this bright-line 
rule "because it creates predictability for land owners, 
purchasers, developers, municipalities[,] and the courts" by 
"balanc[ing] a municipality's need to regulate land use with a 
land owner's interest in developing property under an existing 
zoning classification."  Id., ¶43.   
¶23 The parties agree that the Building Permit Rule as 
stated in McKee is and should remain the law of Wisconsin.  
Accordingly, the parties also agree that Golden Sands possesses 
a vested right to build the seven structures as described in its 
building permit application.  The parties dispute the full scope 
of the rule; that is, whether the Building Permit Rule also 
grants Golden Sands the right to use the farmland specifically 
identified in the building permit application for agricultural 
purposes.  We turn next to consideration of this question. 
 
                                                 
11 For 
a 
larger 
discussion 
of 
the 
nonconforming 
use 
doctrine, see Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning ch. 12 
(2017). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
13 
 
B.  The Building Permit Rule Applies to All Land Specifically 
Identified in the Building Permit Application. 
¶24 In ascertaining the full scope of the Building Permit 
Rule, we are guided by the policies underlying the rule.  The 
primary advantage of the bright-line Building Permit Rule is 
"predictability 
for 
land 
owners, 
purchasers, 
developers, 
municipalities[,] and the courts."  McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶43.  
The rule adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions 
requires 
"substantial 
construction 
and/or 
substantial 
expenditures" even after receiving a building permit in order 
for rights to vest.  Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 32:3, at 
32-6.  We rejected the majority rule because the bright-line 
Building Permit Rule allows all parties involved to know exactly 
when rights vest:  "[M]unicipalit[ies have] the flexibility to 
regulate land use through zoning up until the point when a 
developer obtains[12] a building permit.  Once a building permit 
has been obtained, a developer may make expenditures in reliance 
on a zoning classification."  McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶43.  The 
                                                 
12 Though McKee sometimes speaks in terms of "obtaining" a 
building permit, submitting a building permit application that 
strictly conforms to all applicable zoning regulations is all 
that is necessary to trigger the Building Permit Rule.  McKee, 
374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶37 (emphasis added) ("The [Building Permit 
Rule] arises when a property owner has applied for a building 
permit conforming to the original zoning classification.");  
Lake Bluff Hous. Partners v. City of S. Milwaukee, 197 
Wis. 2d 157, 182, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995) (emphasis added) ("Lake 
Bluff obtained no vested rights[] because it never submitted an 
application for a building permit conforming to the zoning and 
building code requirements in effect at the time of the 
application."). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
14 
 
bright-line Building Permit Rule is simple for parties to 
interpret and courts to apply.  Conversely, the majority rule 
requires fact-intensive litigation and "create[s] uncertainty at 
various stages of the development process."  Id., ¶¶44-45. 
¶25 The court of appeals and Saratoga would disassociate 
the right to build structures under the Building Permit Rule 
from the right to use the land associated with the permit.  We 
respond to this by noting that over 30 years ago, the court of 
appeals aptly described the problem with parsing out parts of a 
business for land use purposes: 
Such 'piecemealing' of [the defendant's] activities is 
unrealistic in that it overlooks the true nature of 
the services he was providing.  In fact, [the 
defendant's] 
business 
consisted 
of 
various 
small 
marina 
and 
resort 
related 
activities 
which, 
in 
combination, assisted the business's survival and gave 
the enterprise its true resort and marina flavor.  
This synergistic action of [the defendant's] business 
activities vested his interest in their continuance. 
Waukesha Cty. v. Seitz, 140 Wis. 2d 111, 116, 409 N.W.2d 403 
(Ct. App. 1987).  While Seitz involved the nonconforming use 
exception, the principle it articulates is equally applicable to 
the Building Permit Rule because both achieve the same end——
protecting vested rights based on reasonable expectations.  See 
McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶42; Des Jardin, 262 Wis. at 47-48.  
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
15 
 
¶26 We conclude that the primary policy13 underlying the 
bright-line 
Building 
Permit 
Rule——predictability——is 
best 
advanced 
by 
applying 
the 
rule 
to 
all 
land 
specifically 
identified in the building permit application.  Such a rule 
ensures that all parties know when rights vest in what land:  
the time a building permit application that strictly complies 
with all applicable zoning regulations is filed.  This rule 
promotes judicial economy and ensures that "developer[s] may 
make expenditures in reliance on a zoning classification."  
McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶43. 
¶27 The "piecemealing" advanced by the court of appeals 
and Saratoga would require extensive litigation over how much 
land specifically identified in the building permit application 
is necessary, which neutralizes one of the primary reasons we 
adhere to the Building Permit Rule:  avoiding lengthy, fact-
intensive litigation.  See id., ¶44.  Further, for any business 
that requires land in addition to structures for its operations, 
a building permit is nearly worthless if the rights vested by 
virtue of obtaining a conforming building permit do not extend 
to the land necessary to put the structures to their proper use. 
                                                 
13 Considerations of policy are entirely appropriate when 
developing common-law doctrines.  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶63, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 
("[T]his court may mold and develop common-law doctrines to best 
effectuate the purpose for which they were designed . . . ."); 
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682, 292 N.W.2d 816 
(1980) ("The doctrine of immunity of municipal officers from 
civil liability also evolved in the common law of this state.  
[It] was developed on grounds of public policy . . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
16 
 
¶28 The court of appeals asked a number of questions 
raising some concerns about the amount of land Golden Sands was 
going to use.  These concerns, for purposes of the Building 
Permit Rule, are irrelevant to our analysis and provide a 
showcase as to one way the purpose of avoiding fact-intensive 
litigation is served by this bright-line rule.  As personally 
"curious" or "concerned" members of the court of appeals may be 
as to how much land will actually be utilized by Golden Sands, 
and for what purpose the utilization is to be had, there simply 
is no legal relevance to their inquiry.  Therefore, the purpose 
of the bright-line rule is served when judges focus their 
inquiry on that which is legally relevant, and avoid that which 
is not.  In the case at bar, the court of appeals' concerns are 
particularly unfounded because the circuit court held that 
Golden Sands' vested rights in the land expire when the building 
permit expires.  Thus, if Golden Sands overestimated the amount 
of land it needs to operate the farm, the land not in use at the 
time the building permit expires would not benefit from either 
the Building Permit Rule or the nonconforming use doctrine, and 
any future use would simply have to conform with Saratoga's 
zoning ordinances. 
¶29 The parties do not direct us to, nor did our research 
reveal, any cases from other jurisdictions that have considered 
this issue.14 However, we are able to utilize principles from 
                                                 
14 Saratoga cites two decisions from other jurisdictions for 
the proposition that the rights vested by building permits do 
not extend to associated lands, but both are distinguishable. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
17 
 
other jurisdictions that adhere to the Building Permit Rule in 
order to aid our analysis. Those jurisdictions emphasize that 
the rights vested by a building permit application are to 
develop the land, not merely build structures.  For example, the 
Building Permit Rule has been interpreted so that it "is well 
settled that a landowner has a vested right to develop land 
under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time the permit 
application is submitted."  Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cty., 
295 P.3d 1197, ¶28 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis added).  
Other courts have underscored the idea that, in the building 
permit context, use of the land follows use of the buildings.  
For example, "Georgia courts have concluded that property rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Deer Creek Developers, LLC v. Spokane Cty., the 
plaintiff obtained a site plan for a two-phase residential 
development, but obtained building permits for only the first 
phase.  236 P.3d 906, ¶6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).  After 
construction began on the first phase, the applicable zoning law 
was changed such that residential uses were prohibited in the 
area.  The court, applying the Building Permit Rule, held that 
the developer did not have vested rights to build the second 
phase because no building permit application was filed for the 
second phase.  Id., ¶¶29-30.  Conversely, in the present matter, 
Golden Sands specifically identified the entire project acreage 
in the Application. 
In Huff v. Des Moines, the plaintiff obtained a building 
permit to construct a trailer park, but never obtained the 
necessary permit to operate a trailer park.  56 N.W.2d 54, 55-56 
(Iowa 1952).  The court held that the plaintiff did not possess 
a vested right to operate the trailer park.  Id. at 95.  Huff is 
inapposite because the issue here is not whether Golden Sands 
possesses a vested right to permits necessary to operate its 
farm.  Rather, the issue before us is whether Golden Sands 
possesses a vested right to use the Property for agricultural 
purposes.   
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
18 
 
vest when a permit is actually issued for a particular land use 
and that a later, new zoning ordinance prohibiting that land use 
is not enforceable against the property owner."  Crown Media, 
LLC v. Gwinnett Cty., 380 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added); see also WMM Props., Inc. v. Cobb Cty., 339 
S.E.2d 252, 254 (Ga. 1986) (emphasis added) ("Once a building 
permit has issued, a landowner has a right to develop the 
property pursuant to that permit . . . .").  These opinions 
bolster our understanding that the proper scope of the Building 
Permit Rule includes the land, not merely the structures. 
C.  Application of the Building Permit Rule to Golden Sands. 
¶30 We first address a threshold issue, Golden Sands' 
ownership of the land.  "The vendee under a contract to purchase 
land is the equitable owner and is the 'owner' for many 
purposes.  We think that the vendee is an owner for the purpose 
of applying for a building permit . . . ."  Sheer v. Weis, 13 
Wis. 2d 406, 413, 108 N.W.2d 523 (1961) (footnote omitted).  
Though we cited only a single case in support of the proposition 
in 
Sheer, 
we 
have 
applied 
the 
doctrine 
in 
multiple 
circumstances.  Id. at 413 n.2 (citing Mueller v. Novelty Dye 
Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W. 881 (1956) (holding that creditor 
holding judgment against seller could not execute against 
property titled in seller's name because land was subject to 
valid contract to purchase)); Ritchie v. Green Bay, 215 Wis. 
433, 437, 254 N.W. 113 (1934) (tax exemption); Menominee River 
Lumber Co. v. Philbrook, 78 wis. 142, 146, 47 N.W. 188 (1890) 
(ejectment action). 
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
19 
 
¶31 Golden Sands specifically identified the Property in 
the Application.  The map attached to the original application 
provides an objective means to determine the specific land 
Golden Sands intends to use in order to build structures as well 
as cultivate, seed, fertilize, harvest, and otherwise maintain 
the land it will use for agricultural purposes.  The map 
highlights the Property in blue (agricultural land) and yellow 
(land on which the structures are to be built).   The map is 
based on a U.S. Geological Survey topographical map that 
contains details, such as county borders, roads, and latitude 
and longitude, that allow a person to objectively determine the 
borders of the shaded land.  Because the map provides an 
objective means to determine the contours of the Property and 
was attached to a building permit application that strictly 
conformed to all applicable zoning regulations, Golden Sands 
possesses a vested right to use the Property for agricultural 
purposes. 
¶32 Golden 
Sands' 
situation 
demonstrates 
how 
predictability is best served by vesting rights to all land 
specifically identified in a building permit application.  
Agriculture is the starkest example of a business that requires 
substantial land in addition to structures in order to operate.  
If Golden Sands' building permit served only to guarantee Golden 
Sands' right to build the structures for the dairy farm, the 
permit would be worthless because Golden Sands needs the 
agricultural land in order to make the farm work.   
No. 
2015AP1258   
 
20 
 
¶33 To separate structures from their associated land 
would be to allow zoning authorities to circumvent the Building 
Permit Rule by enacting restrictive zoning regulations on land 
that is necessary to give the buildings value.  Saratoga argues 
that Golden Sands is required to establish a nonconforming use 
in order to continue using its land for agricultural purposes.  
Under Saratoga's reasoning, Golden Sands could not be certain 
that its dairy would be allowed to operate until sometime after 
operations had actually commenced and sometime after Golden 
Sands had actually invested significant sums of additional 
money.  This is so because the nonconforming use doctrine 
applies only after the land use begins.  This uncertain result 
is exactly what the bright-line Building Permit Rule attempts to 
avoid.  McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶43 ("Once a building permit has 
been obtained, a developer may make expenditures in reliance on 
a zoning classification.").  Saratoga and the court of appeals 
would ignore that the "synergistic action of [Golden Sands'] 
business activities vested [its] interest in their continuance."  
Seitz, 140 Wis. 2d at 116. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We hold that the Building Permit Rule extends to all 
land specifically identified in a building permit application.  
Consequently, Golden Sands has a vested right to use the 
Property for agricultural purposes. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Today, the 
majority expands the Building Permit Rule to create vested 
rights to particular uses of land so long as the land is 
"specifically identified" in the building permit application.1 
¶36 This ill-advised expansion of the Building Permit Rule 
sacrifices the important public policies that the Building 
Permit Rule was designed to encourage, namely, "predictability 
for land owners, purchasers, developers, municipalities, and the 
courts."2 
¶37 The majority's expansion of the Building Permit Rule 
transforms what was once an easy-to-apply, bright-line rule into 
a rule requiring a case-by-case analysis of the applicant's 
specificity regarding both the description of the property 
included within the scope of the building permit application as 
well as the property's proposed use. 
¶38 Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶39 In the majority of jurisdictions, a building permit 
can be revoked if the property is rezoned after the permit is 
issued even if construction has already begun.  
¶40 In these jurisdictions, in addition to applying for 
and obtaining the building permit, land owners and developers 
must have incurred substantial expenditures or construction must 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶4. 
2 McKee Family I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶43, 
374 Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
2 
 
already be substantially underway in order for the land owners 
or developers to acquire the right to construct the proposed 
building despite the building's non-compliance with the new or 
amended zoning ordinance.3  
¶41 In contrast, Wisconsin is among the minority of 
jurisdictions that recognize a vested right to construct a 
building 
when 
the 
land 
owner 
submits 
a 
building 
permit 
application that strictly conforms to all applicable zoning 
ordinances in effect at the time the application is submitted.4  
This doctrine is referred to as the Building Permit Rule. 
¶42 Just last term, this court reaffirmed Wisconsin's 
adherence to the Building Permit Rule and explained the 
important policies that the rule promoted.  The court stated: 
Wisconsin applies the bright-line building permit rule 
because it creates predictability for land owners, 
purchasers, developers, municipalities and the courts.  
See, e.g., Guertin v. Harbour Assurance Co. of 
Bermuda, 
141 
Wis. 2d 622, 
634-35, 
415 
N.W.2d 831 
(1987) (explaining that bright line rules provide 
predictability and protect all parties).  It balances 
a municipality's need to regulate land use with a land 
owner's interest in developing property under an 
existing zoning classification.  A municipality has 
the flexibility to regulate land use through zoning up 
until the point when a developer obtains a building 
permit.  Once a building permit has been obtained, a 
developer may make expenditures in reliance on a 
zoning classification. 
                                                 
3 4 Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 32:3, at 
32-6 (5th ed. 2017). 
4 McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶37. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
3 
 
McKee Family I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶43, 374 
Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.5 
¶43 Underlying the Building Permit Rule is the notion that 
land owners and developers are proceeding on the basis of a 
reasonable expectation.6  That is, submitting a building permit 
application that conforms to the zoning or building code 
requirements in effect at the time of the application gives rise 
to the reasonable expectation that construction can proceed and 
expenditures can be made in reliance on the then-applicable 
zoning classification.7 
II 
¶44 In the instant case, the majority expands the Building 
Permit Rule to create vested rights to particular uses of land 
so long as the land is "specifically identified" in the building 
permit application. 
                                                 
5 Although the quoted language from 
McKee 
speaks of 
"obtaining" a building permit, the holding of McKee is that the 
land owner's right to construct a proposed building vests when 
the land owner "has submitted an application for a building 
permit that conforms to the zoning or building code requirements 
in effect at the time of application."  McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, 
¶4. 
6 McKee, 374 Wis. 2d 487, ¶42. 
7 At the time Golden Sands submitted its building permit 
application, the land at issue was enrolled in the DNR's Managed 
Forest Land program, which precluded agricultural uses, and 
Golden Sands was aware of the Town's efforts to rezone the land.   
One wonders how reasonable Golden Sands' expectations were 
given what it knew at the time it submitted its building permit 
application. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶45 The majority's expansion of the Building Permit Rule 
creates uncertainty in a previously predictable process in at 
least two ways. 
¶46 First, the majority announces that a particular use of 
land will be protected under the Building Permit Rule so long as 
the land is "specifically identified" in the building permit 
application.  While acknowledging that "[a] legal description is 
preferable," the majority says that a map may suffice as well.8   
¶47 The majority explains why the map submitted with 
Golden Sands' building permit application is sufficiently 
detailed to objectively identify the relevant land.9  Even 
accepting that proposition as true, the outcomes of future cases 
remain uncertain.  At what point will a map lack sufficient 
detail to "specifically identify" the land at issue?  Simply 
asking this question indicates that the majority has injected 
uncertainty into the application of the Building Permit Rule 
where it did not previously exist.   
¶48 In my view, requiring (as opposed to preferring) a 
legal description of the lands included in the building permit 
would eliminate this uncertainty, but it would also compel a 
ruling against Golden Sands because Golden Sands submitted in 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶4 n.5.  Golden Sands is fortunate that the 
majority is satisfied with a map, because Golden Sands did not 
provide a legal description of the total acreage it intended for 
use for its farming operation.  Instead, the only legal 
description provided by Golden Sands was the legal description 
of the land upon which the proposed buildings would be 
constructed. 
9 Majority op., ¶31. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
5 
 
its building permit application a legal description of only the 
land upon which the proposed buildings would be constructed. 
¶49 Second, and perhaps more importantly, how specific 
must the building permit application be with regard to the 
proposed use of the land specifically identified in the 
application? 
¶50 In the instant case, Golden Sands' building permit 
application did not include a great deal of detail about the 
overall proposal outside of the building site, and Golden Sands 
did not consult with the Town before filing its application.   
¶51 The majority points out that the building permit 
application included copies of applications for various state 
permits required to operate the farm that described Golden 
Sands' proposed farming operation in greater detail.  However, 
the majority acknowledges that "Golden Sands was not required to 
provide copies of the state permit applications to receive a 
building permit from [the Town], but rather did so as a 
'courtesy.'"10 
¶52 This 
acknowledgement 
raises 
an 
important 
but 
unanswered question:  Would Golden Sands' application be 
sufficient under the majority's expanded Building Permit Rule 
without the inclusion of the "courtesy" materials submitted to 
the Town?   
¶53 If the answer to this question is "no," that would 
seem to contradict the majority's conclusion that the "courtesy" 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶6.   
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
6 
 
materials were not required in order to vest in Golden Sands the 
right to use the land as described in those "courtesy" 
materials.11   
¶54 If the answer to this question is "yes," that would 
encourage 
land 
owners 
and 
developers 
to 
withhold 
from 
municipalities the specific details about how they intend to use 
the land.  Creating an incentive to provide less rather than 
more detail in the application process frustrates the paramount 
policy goal advanced by the Building Permit Rule——providing 
predictability to all parties. 
III 
¶55  The majority has erroneously expanded the Building 
Permit Rule beyond its traditional scope.  In doing so, it has 
undermined the rule's primary purpose of ensuring predictability 
in 
the 
development 
process 
for 
both 
developers 
and 
municipalities. 
¶56 Because the majority's expansion of the Building 
Permit Rule undermines the rule's fundamental purpose, I 
dissent. 
 
¶57 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
11 See majority op., ¶6. 
No.  2015AP1258.ssa 
 
 
 
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