Title: Huminski v. Lavoie

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Huminski v. Lavoie (99-330); 173 Vt. 517; 787 A.2d 489

[Filed 26-Sep-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 28-Nov-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-330

                             JANUARY TERM, 2000

Scott and Dana Huminski and	       }	APPEALED FROM:
Bennington Mail Shoppe	               }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Bennington Superior Court
                                       }	
John Lavoie, et al.	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 335-10-98Bncv

                                                Trial Judge: John P. Wesley

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Scott Huminski*(FN1) appeals from a superior court order
  dismissing his complaint  against defendants, the State of Vermont, State's
  Attorney William Wright, Deputy State's Attorney  John Lavoie, and
  probation and parole officer David Miner on the basis of sovereign
  immunity,  prosecutorial immunity, and insufficiency of the pleadings.  We
  reverse because  the trial court failed  to afford adequate notice of its
  intent to dismiss on these grounds, and remand for further  proceedings.

       As best as we can discern from the record, the underlying facts are as
  follows:  The State  charged plaintiff in district court with two counts of
  obstruction of justice under 13 V.S.A. § 3015.   The prosecutor accused
  plaintiff of threatening a potential witness, Michael Ryan, in a landlord-
  tenant action. Plaintiff entered into a plea agreement with the State. 
  Under the terms of the  agreement, count 1 was dismissed, and plaintiff
  pleaded no contest to an amended charge of  disorderly conduct on count 2. 
  The district court imposed a fine of $100 with a surcharge, which 
  plaintiff paid.  Under a collateral agreement between the parties,
  plaintiff agreed to dismiss without  prejudice two civil actions he had
  filed in superior court, one against the plaintiff in the original civil 
  action and another against Ryan.  Plaintiff also agreed not to refile a
  civil action in federal court  against several people, which had been
  dismissed with leave to amend the complaint and refile.  The  State agreed
  not to recharge plaintiff on count 1 as long as he did not pursue the three
  civil actions.

       Plaintiff moved to dismiss the two actions in superior court, but
  represented to the court that  he was doing so only because he had been
  threatened with arrest if he did not do so.  In the federal  suit,
  plaintiff's wife, who had been a plaintiff in the action prior to
  dismissal, filed an amended 

 

  complaint without plaintiff.  The State considered these actions
  inconsistent with the plea agreement,  and filed a motion to vacate the
  plea.  The court, Judge Corsones presiding, granted the State's  motion,
  vacated the plea agreement, and reinstated the two felony charges of
  obstructing justice.   Later, on motions seeking to vacate the order
  reinstating the charges, the court, Judge Hudson  presiding, concluded that
  the State had violated the plea agreement.  The court rejected the State's 
  argument that plaintiff had violated the plea agreement when his wife
  refiled in federal court, noting   that plaintiff's wife was not bound by
  the agreement between plaintiff and the State.  Moreover, the  court ruled
  that the State was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal
  constitution from  pursuing the two original charges for obstruction of
  justice.  The State appealed this ruling, which we  affirmed in State v.
  Huminski, No. 99-445 (Vt. Dec. 13, 2000) (mem.).

       In response to the court's initial reinstatement of the two felony
  charges, plaintiff filed this  action in superior court, alleging sixteen
  causes of action against defendants based on various actions  that
  plaintiff contends were part of a conspiracy against him and his wife
  designed to ruin them  financially.  The actions included allegedly
  obtaining perjured affidavits from police officers and  other witnesses to
  pursue criminal charges against plaintiff, as well as failing to prosecute
  those who  perpetrated crimes against plaintiff and his wife, negligent
  hiring, training and supervision,  conversion, and defamation.  Plaintiff
  also alleged that defendants employed their prosecutorial  power to
  interfere in various civil actions, and that defendants' actions were
  willful and malicious.

       Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
  under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6),  arguing that: (1) the claims against defendants
  Wright, Lavoie, and Miner were barred by the  doctrine of res judicata; and
  (2) the claim against the State was barred by sovereign immunity.  
  Submitted with the motion and memorandum of law was a copy of a federal
  district court order  dismissing the action that plaintiff's wife had filed
  against Wright, Lavoie and Miner on the grounds  that (1) plaintiff's wife
  had no standing to bring an action for violation of plaintiff's
  constitutional  rights, (2) the allegations were insufficient to support a
  claim for conspiracy, and (3) the Eleventh  Amendment barred the claim
  against the State.  Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss.     

       Without holding a hearing, the court issued a written decision
  granting the motion. The court  rejected defendants' res judicata argument,
  ruling that it was "plainly insufficient regarding the  present claims,"
  because the federal case was decided primarily on the ground that
  plaintiff's wife  had no standing to bring constitutional claims on behalf
  of a third party.  Nevertheless, although  defendants had never presented
  immunity defenses on behalf of the individual defendants, the court  
  dismissed the claims against defendants Wright and Lavoie because: (1)
  under 12 V.S.A. § 5602(a),  claims based on an act or omission of a state
  employee acting within the scope of his or her  employment must be brought
  against the State; and (2) Wright and Lavoie have absolute  prosecutorial
  immunity.  Additionally,  the court dismissed the claim of conversion
  because the  complaint alleged that the property was misappropriated by a
  police officer, who was not a named  defendant, and ruled that the
  allegations were insufficient to support the claim of conspiracy, or the 
  claim against Miner for interference with contractual relations.  Finally,
  the court dismissed the  claims against the State on the ground that there
  is no private analog for the governmental function  of prosecuting a
  criminal case.  Plaintiff appeals.

 

       We first consider the court's decision to dismiss the claims against
  the individual defendants.  In their V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion and
  accompanying memorandum, defendants did not assert any  immunity defense on
  behalf of the individual defendants.  Nor did defendants allege that
  plaintiff's  factual allegations fell short of stating a claim for relief,
  relying instead on the doctrine of res  judicata predicated on the federal
  court ruling.  Notwithstanding these omissions, the trial court  dismissed
  the claims against the individual defendants on the basis of immunity, an
  action that  amounts to a sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, without
  notice to plaintiff.  This was error.

       We have held that before the trial court may dismiss a complaint for
  failure to state a cause of  action on its own motion, the court must
  notify the parties of the proposed action, and afford an  opportunity to
  address the asserted grounds for dismissal, either in written form or at an
  oral hearing.  See Town of Westminster v. Hall, 139 Vt. 248, 250,