Title: RICHARD DOUGLASS V. THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF WYOMING, AND THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD DOUGLASS V. THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF WYOMING, AND THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION2008 WY 77187 P.3d 850Case Number: S-07-0110Decided: 07/09/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RICHARD 
DOUGLASS,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OFWYOMING, AND THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellees,(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Timothy 
C. Kingston of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; 
Ryan Schelhaas, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard Douglass 
sought review in the district court of a decision by the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) denying him a salary increase.  After allowing him the opportunity to 
show why his petition for review should not be dismissed for late filing, the 
district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Mr. Douglass appealed, claiming there 
was no final agency action starting the 30 days for filing a petition for review 
or, alternatively, if there was final agency action, the district court erred in 
dismissing his petition because he showed excusable neglect.  We reverse. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Douglass 
presents the following issues:

 
 
            
1.         
Have the Appellees made a "final agency decision," triggering the 
Appellant's deadline to file a petition for review?

 
 
            
2.         
Was there "excusable neglect" justifying the Appellant's filing of his 
Petition for [R]eview [63] days after the Appellees' "final agency 
decision"?

 
 
            
3.         
Did the District Court commit reversible error of fact and law when it 
dismissed the Appellant's Petition for Review?

 
 
WYDOT 
states the issue as follows:

 
 
            
Did the district court correctly dismiss Douglass' untimely Petition for 
Review?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Douglass was 
employed by WYDOT.  On February 1, 
2006, WYDOT reclassified his position but did not increase his salary.  Beginning in April of 2006, Mr. Douglass 
attempted to appeal the salary decision through the chain of command.  Apparently, his efforts were not 
successful and, on September 21, 2006, he filed a written grievance with WYDOT's 
director, John Cox, requesting that his salary be increased due to the 
reclassification.  In accordance 
with the State of Wyoming Personnel 
Rules (personnel rules), Mr. Cox designated Pat Collins, 
WYDOT assistant chief engineer, to consider the grievance.1  

 
 
[¶4]  By memorandum dated October 24, 2006, 
Mr. Collins informed Mr. Douglass that he was recommending a salary 
increase.  Mr. Collins also told Mr. 
Douglass that he was recommending retroactive payment to Mr. Douglass of the 
amount of the increase from the time his position was reclassified.  

 
 
[¶5] One 
week later, Mr. Collins sent Mr. Douglass an e-mail advising him that the 
Wyoming Department of Administration and Information (A&I) had reviewed his 
decision and concluded that Mr. Douglass was not entitled to the salary 
increase.  Mr. Collins apologized 
and stated, "I will continue to look at this, and want to discuss it with 
you."  According to Mr. Douglass, he 
and Mr. Collins had several subsequent discussions concerning his salary and Mr. 
Collins did not advise him then, or at any time, that A&I's conclusion was 
the final word on his grievance.  
Rather, Mr. Douglass understood that WYDOT was still considering his 
grievance.  Mr. Douglass received no 
further written communication from WYDOT concerning his grievance.  

 
 
[¶6]  On November 30, 2006, Mr. Douglass wrote 
a letter to A&I requesting the establishment of a grievance committee to 
hear his salary complaint.  By 
letter dated December 15, 2006, A&I denied his request.  Sixty-three days later, on February 16, 
2007, Mr. Douglass filed a petition in district court for review of WYDOT's 
decision to deny his salary increase request and A&I's decision to deny his 
grievance committee request.  Mr. 
Douglas attached Mr. Collins' October 24, 2006, letter and A&I's December 
15, 2006, letter to his petition.

 
 
[¶7] The 
district court entered an order to show cause why the petition should not be 
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction pursuant to W.R.A.P. 2.01.2  Mr. Douglass responded, claiming 
excusable neglect under W.R.A.P. 12.04, which provides:

 
 
(a) In a 
contested case, or in an uncontested case, even where a statute allows a 
different time limit on appeal, the petition for review shall be filed within 30 
days after service upon all parties of the final decision of the agency . . . 
.

(b) Upon 
a showing of excusable neglect the district court may extend the time for filing 
the petition for review, said extension not to exceed 30 days from the 
expiration of the original time prescribed in paragraph 
(a).

 
 
[¶8] 
Neither WYDOT nor A&I filed a response.  The district court dismissed Mr. 
Douglass' petition without a hearing, finding that A&I's December 2006 
letter denying the grievance committee request was the final agency decision; 
the time for seeking judicial review had expired; and Mr. Douglass had not shown 
excusable neglect justifying an extension of time.  Mr. Douglass appealed from the district 
court's order dismissing his petition.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]  The district court dismissed Mr. 
Douglass' petition for review for want of jurisdiction.           
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.  SEG v. GDK, 2007 WY 203, ¶ 4, 173 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶10]  In deciding that it lacked jurisdiction, 
the district court made the following determinations:  A&I's letter constituted final 
agency action starting the time for filing a petition for review; Mr. Douglass' 
petition was not filed within 30 days of the letter; and, Mr. Douglass failed to 
show excusable neglect entitling him to an extension.  We give no special deference to these 
conclusions.  Pinther v. State Dep't of Admin. and Info., 
2007 WY 56, ¶ 6, 155 P.3d 196, 197 (Wyo. 2007).  Instead, we review the case as if it had 
come directly to us from the administrative agency.  Id.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]  WYDOT contends that the district court 
properly dismissed Mr. Douglass' petition for review because, upon determining 
that the petition was untimely, the court did not have jurisdiction.  Mr. Douglass asserts that there was no 
final agency "action," only "inaction."  Therefore, he asserts, either his 
petition was premature and the matter should be remanded to WYDOT for a final 
decision, or his grievance should be deemed to have been denied after a 
reasonable time and his petition for review was timely from the deemed denied 
date.  

 
 
[¶12]  The filing of a timely, properly 
authorized, petition for review of administrative action is mandatory and 
jurisdictional.  Chevron  
U.S.A., 
Inc., v. Dep't of Revenue, 2007 
WY 62, ¶ 7, 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 2007).  Whether a petition is timely under 
W.R.A.P. 12.04 depends upon whether it is filed "within 30 days after service 
upon all parties of the final decision of the agency."  Thus, the parties are correct that the 
first question we must consider is whether there was a final agency 
decision.  

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Douglass contends that after he 
received Mr. Collins' e-mail informing him that he was not entitled to a salary 
increase (but that Mr. Collins would "continue to look at this"), he and Mr. 
Collins did, in fact, continue to meet and discuss the matter and neither Mr. 
Collins nor WYDOT ever gave him a final answer.  He further contends that A&I's 
letter denying the grievance committee did not advise him that it was a final 
determination and also did not advise him of his right to appeal or the deadline 
for filing an appeal.  Mr. Douglass 
asserts that when A&I denied his grievance committee request, he understood 
WYDOT was still considering his salary increase and had not made a final 
determination.  Mr. Douglass 
contends that by February 2007, when he still had heard nothing, he filed a 
petition for review.  

 
 
[¶14]  WYDOT addresses Mr. Douglass' argument 
in a footnote in its brief.  WYDOT 
claims first that Mr. Douglass is estopped from asserting the December A&I 
letter was not a final agency decision because the assertion contradicts his 
earlier position that he was seeking review of the December A&I letter.  WYDOT claims second that the A&I 
letter constituted the final agency decision because, pursuant to Chapter 12, §§ 
5(d) and 5(e) of the personnel rules and Pinther, ¶ 3, 155 P.3d  at 197, the 
denial of a grievance committee is the last step in the grievance process and 
starts the time for filing a petition for review.  

 
 
[¶15] 
 It is clear from the record that 
Mr. Douglass sought review of both WYDOT's decision that he was not entitled to 
a salary increase and A&I's letter denying his request for a grievance 
committee.  We do not find his 
assertion that the A&I letter was not a final agency decision contradictory 
to his petition seeking review of the A&I letter.  Mr. Douglass is not estopped from 
seeking review of both agency actions and then making the argument that the 
district court erred in dismissing his petition because there was no final 
agency action by WYDOT and the A&I letter was not the final agency decision 
for purposes of W.R.A.P. 12.04.

 
 
[¶16]  We turn to the question of whether 
either Mr. Collins' e-mail or A&I's letter constituted final agency action 
within the meaning of W.R.A.P. 12.01 and 12.04.  The latter provision is quoted 
above.  W.R.A.P. 12.01 provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
To the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district 
court is available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a 
final decision of an agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in 
fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in 
fact by a rule adopted by that agency, may obtain such review as provided in 
this rule.  All appeals from 
administrative action shall be governed by these rules.

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  This was not a contested 
case and Mr. Douglass did not claim he was adversely affected by an agency 
rule.  Therefore, Mr. Douglass' 
right to judicial review arose from the alleged adverse effect of "agency action 
or inaction."  We begin with 
consideration of the last written communication Mr. Douglass received from 
WYDOT, Mr. Collins' e-mail.  

 
 
[¶17]  This Court has said:  "A final administrative order is one 
ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished.  If the agency retains the matter for 
further action, the order is not final."  
MGTC, Inc. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 735 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 2002 WY 151, 55 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2002).  Thus, in MGTC, a contested case concerning the 
proper method for calculating the surcharge adjustment on a gas balancing 
account, this Court held that an agency order requiring the parties to submit 
documentation showing what refund, if any, was due from MGTC was not a final 
agency decision.  In contrast, in Ebzery v. City of Sheridan, 982 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Wyo. 1999), we held that minutes from an agency meeting, rather than 
a written order entered six weeks later, constituted the final agency decision 
because the minutes unequivocally granted the variance requested, the agency 
adopted findings which were dictated into the record at the close of the 
meeting, the agency did not inform the parties the matter was subject to further 
consideration, and there was nothing left to accomplish after the meeting.  See also Exxon, ¶ 30, 55 P.3d  at 722.     

 
 
[¶18]  In the present case, it was not at all 
clear that Mr. Collins' e-mail ended the proceedings and left nothing further to 
be accomplished.  The full, unedited 
text of the e-mail follows:

 
 

From:             
Pat Collins

To:                  
Douglass, Rich

Date:              
Tue, Oct 31, 2006  5:52 
PM

Subject:        
Grievance

 
 
Rich:

 
 
Just 
tried to call you.  Please call me 
asap.  A&I HR reviewed my 
decision and said the August 2005 pay table I used was never in effect, and that 
I should have compared 2004 and 2006.  
This effectively negates my decision, as this comparison shows the entry 
at BA01B in 04 to be higher than the entry at PC01 in 06.  My sincere apology.  I will continue to look at this, and 
want to discuss it with you.

 
 
[¶19]  At the time he received the e-mail, Mr. 
Douglass previously had received Mr. Collins' letter, two and one-half pages in 
length and written on WYDOT stationary, notifying him that he, as the WYDOT 
director's designee, was recommending the salary increase.  The e-mail, while notifying Mr. Douglass 
that A&I had effectively negated Mr. Collins' decision, also advised Mr. 
Douglass that Mr. Collins would continue to look at the issue and wanted to 
discuss it further, suggesting that the matter was not closed as far as WYDOT 
was concerned.  In his affidavit, 
which WYDOT did not refute, Mr. Douglass averred that he and Mr. Collins had 
several subsequent discussions about the increase and Mr. Collins did not advise 
him that WYDOT had made a final decision.  
Mr. Douglass did not receive any further written communications from 
WYDOT informing him of its final decision.  
Mr. Douglass averred that he believed WYDOT was still considering the 
matter.  Under these circumstances, 
we hold that Mr. Collins' e-mail did not constitute the final agency decision 
for purposes of W.R.A.P. 12.04. 

 
 
[¶20]  Despite having not received a final 
decision from WYDOT, Mr. Douglass wrote to A&I and requested the 
establishment of a grievance committee to hear his salary complaint.   Chapter 12, Section 5(e) addresses 
grievance committees:

 
 
(e) If 
the decision of the agency head or the designee is unsatisfactory to the 
employee and if the grievance involves a written reprimand, a disciplinary 
suspension or an involuntary reappointment, the employee may, within ten (10) 
days of the date of the decision, request the establishment of a Grievance 
Committee.  Other matters may be considered by a 
Grievance Committee at the discretion of the State Human Resources 
Administrator.   All 
requests shall be submitted, in writing, to the State Human Resources 
Administrator and shall include the nomination of an individual to serve as a 
Grievance Committee member.  

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  Pursuant to this provision, 
the decision whether to grant Mr. Douglass' request for a grievance committee 
was discretionary because his grievance involved a salary dispute and not a 
reprimand, suspension or reappointment.  
A&I's human resources administrator exercised his discretion and 
denied Mr. Douglass' request.  We 
must decide whether the denial of his request for a grievance committee 
constituted "the final agency decision" starting the time for filing a petition 
for review in district court.  

 
 
[¶21]  The personnel rules do not clearly state 
what happens in the grievance process after A&I's human resources 
administrator denies a request for the establishment of a grievance committee to 
consider a matter other than a reprimand, suspension or reappointment.  Chapter 12, Section 5(h)(ii) clearly 
provides that a decision made by a grievance committee is final unless the 
grievance involves a disciplinary suspension or dismissal in which case the 
employee is entitled to a personnel appeal hearing pursuant to Chapter 12, 
Section 6.   Section 6 also clearly provides that a 
decision after a personnel appeal hearing is final.  These provisions do not apply to Mr. 
Douglass.  His grievance did not 
involve the issues necessary to invoke Section 6; his request for a grievance 
committee under Section 5 was denied and so no decision was made by a grievance 
committee.  Nowhere do the rules 
state that A&I's decision to deny a request for a grievance committee is a 
"final agency decision." 

 
 
[¶22]  Chapter 12, Section 5(d) provides in 
pertinent part: 

 
 
A 
decision by the agency head or the designee shall be the final step in the 
grievance procedure unless the grievance involves a dispute in accordance with 
Section 5(e) of this chapter.  

 
 
Reading 
this provision together with Chapter 12, Section 5(e), it appears that the final 
step in the administrative grievance process is the decision by the employee's 
agency, unless the grievance is one entitling the employee to a grievance 
committee decision.  Thus, in Mr. 
Douglass' case, the last step would have been WYDOT's final decision to grant or 
deny his request for a salary increaseif WYDOT had issued one.   We have already determined that Mr. 
Collins' e-mail to Mr. Douglass did not constitute "the final agency decision" 
within the meaning of W.R.A.P. 12.04(a).  Thus, there was no final agency decision 
starting the 30 days for filing a petition for review.

 
 
[¶23]  WYDOT argues that the A&I letter was 
the final agency decision because it ended the grievance process and, in Pinther, ¶ 8, 155 P.3d  at 198, this 
Court treated a similar grievance committee denial as a final agency 
decision.  Mr. Pinther was an 
employee of A&I.  He sought a 
job reclassification and salary increase.  
An A&I supervisory employee advised him in writing that his salary 
was within the fair and equitable range for the classification and would not be 
increased.  The supervisor also 
informed him that he could file a grievance with the department head. 

 
 
[¶24]  Mr. Pinther submitted a grievance to the 
head of A&I.  They met, 
discussed Mr. Pinther's grievance, and Mr. Pinther sent a follow-up letter. 
 His agency head did not respond and 
so Mr. Pinther requested a grievance committee, which A&I's human resources 
administrator denied.  Mr. Pinther 
filed a petition for review in district court where the denial was upheld.  He then appealed to this Court claiming 
that A&I's department head, the human resources administrator and the 
district court denied him the benefit of a hearing, the opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses and due process.  

 
 
[¶25]  We held that the personnel rules did not 
entitle Mr. Pinther to a hearing and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses 
when he presented his grievance to the human resources administrator; rather, 
the decision to establish a grievance committee was discretionary.  Id.  Given the evidence showing that Mr. 
Pinther actually received a 9.5% salary increase, we further held there was no 
abuse of discretion in denying his request.  Id. 
¶ 9, 155 P.3d  at 198.  We also 
concluded that Mr. Pinther did not make an adequate showing that under the 
circumstances he was due more process than he received.  Id., ¶ 10, 155 P.3d  at 198.         

 
 
[¶26] 
 In Pinther this Court was not asked to 
decide whether A&I's denial of a grievance committee constituted the final 
agency decision for purposes of W.R.A.P. 12.04.  The issue Mr. Pinther presented was 
whether he was entitled to a hearing and the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses at each stage of the grievance process, that is, before the A&I 
department head, the A&I human resources administrator and the district 
court.  We held that he was 
not.  Although the denial of a 
grievance committee was treated as the final agency decision, the question was 
not raised or decided by this Court. 

 
 
[¶27]  Moreover, in Pinther the agency supervisor clearly 
denied Mr. Pinther's request for a salary increase.  In contrast, Mr. Collins initially 
informed Mr. Douglass that he was recommending a salary increase and then later 
told him by e-mail that A&I had negated his decision.  However, he also said he would continue 
to look at the issue.  Unlike Mr. 
Pinther, Mr. Douglass never had a formal decision from anyone in his agency 
unequivocally denying his request.  

 

 
 
[¶28]  Additionally, Mr. Pinther's agency 
supervisor advised him concerning the next step in the appeal process, thereby 
signaling the end of that phase of his grievance.  In contrast, Mr. Collins did not inform 
Mr. Douglass of the next step in the process.3  The fact that he did not, combined with 
his statement that he would continue to look at Mr. Douglass' request, 
reasonably could have led Mr. Douglass to believe that his request was still 
under consideration.  

            
 

[¶29]  It is also of some significance that the 
agency Mr. Pinther worked for was A&I thus, the agency that denied his 
request for a salary increase was the same agency that denied his request for a 
grievance.  Under those 
circumstances, it seems clear that Mr. Pinther's agency had reached a final 
decision.  Mr. Douglass, however, 
worked for WYDOT, which gave him equivocal responses to his salary increase 
request.  Under these circumstances, 
A&I's subsequent denial of a grievance committee did not clearly inform Mr. 
Douglass that WYDOT was no longer considering his request.   

 
 
[¶30]  We hold that neither Mr. Collins' e-mail 
nor A&I's letter constituted the final agency decision within the meaning of 
W.R.A.P 12.04.  Under most 
circumstances, the conclusion that there was no final agency decision would mean 
this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case and must dismiss the 
appeal.  As Mr. Douglass points out, 
however, this Court has held that after a reasonable time an agency's inaction 
is deemed a denial.  Whiteman v.      Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 984 P.2d 1079 
(Wyo. 1999). 
  We hold that the period from October 31, 
2006, (the date of Mr. Collins' e-mail) to February 16, 2007, (when Mr. Douglass 
filed his petition for review), a period of over 90 days, constituted a 
reasonable time; we deem WYDOT's inaction during that time to be a denial of Mr. 
Douglass' salary increase request.  Thus, Mr. Douglass' petition for review 
was timely.  We reverse the order 
dismissing the petition and remand to the district court for consideration of 
his administrative appeal.   The parties shall comply with W.R.A.P. 
12.07 in transmitting the agency record to the district court. 

 
 
[¶31] 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyoming State Personnel Rules, 
Chapter 12, Section 5(d) provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
      Within seven (7) 
days of receiving the written grievance, the agency head or his/her designee and the appropriate management 
employee shall hold a conference with the employee to resolve the dispute and 
render a decision, in writing, to the employee . . . 
.

 
 

2W.R.A.P. 
2.01 is applicable to appeals from trial courts to appellate courts.  It provides as 
follows:

 
 
   Rule 2.01. How and 
when taken; cross-appeals and dismissals.

  
 (a) An appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall be taken by 
filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
from entry of the appealable order and concurrently serving the same in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 5, Wyo. R. Civ. P., (or as provided in 
Wyo. R. Cr. P. 32 (c) (4)). The pro se filing of a notice of appeal by an inmate 
confined in a penal institution is additionally subject to the provisions of 
Rule 14.04. Within five days of the filing of the notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the trial court, a copy of the notice of appeal shall also be filed 
with the clerk of the appellate court, and in a criminal case upon the office of 
public defender and the office of attorney general.

       (1) Upon a 
showing of excusable neglect, the trial court in any action may extend the time 
for filing the notice of appeal not to exceed 15 days from the expiration of the 
original time prescribed, provided the application for extension of time is 
filed and the order entered prior to the expiration of 45 days from entry of the 
appealable order; appellant shall promptly serve appellee a copy of the order 
extending the time. If such an order is issued, it shall be appended to the 
notice of the appeal.

        (2) 
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a 
notice of appeal within 15 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal 
was filed.

  (b) If an appeal has not been docketed 
with the appellate court, the parties, with the approval of the trial court, may 
dismiss the appeal by stipulation filed in that court, or that court may dismiss 
the appeal upon motion and notice by appellant.

 
 

3It is of 
some interest that A&I also did not inform Mr. Douglass concerning his 
rights in its letter denying his request for a grievance 
committee.