Title: Kircos v. Holiday Food Center, Inc

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

424 Mich. 487 (1986)
381 N.W.2d 404
KIRCOS
v.
HOLIDAY FOOD CENTER, INC
Docket No. 76067.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
Decided February 18, 1986.
Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. (by Elizabeth J. Larin), for the plaintiff.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn (by Herschel P. Fink) for the defendants.
PER CURIAM:
Afflicted with trichinosis after eating contaminated pork, the plaintiff sued the market where he purchased the meat and the wholesaler that sold it to the market. These defendants were granted summary judgment by the circuit court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The plaintiff applies for leave to appeal.
Because we believe that the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief can be granted, we set aside the summary judgment, and we remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
I
The plaintiff alleges that he purchased fresh pork from the Holiday Food Center on or about July 1, 1981, and that this pork had been sold to Holiday Food Center by John Morrell & Co. The plaintiff says that the meat was contaminated with trichinella spiralis parasites and that he became ill after consuming the pork. He says that the pork "had been prepared in a reasonable and foreseeable manner." As to each defendant, he alleges negligence, breach of warranty, and violation of the statutory[1] obligation not to sell adulterated meat.
Defendant Morrell moved for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1),[2] asserting that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief *489 can be granted. Morrell based this assertion on four grounds: (a) "[a]pplicable federal rules permit sale of fresh pork without treatment for the destruction of trichinae," (b) "[t]he law of Michigan does not create any duty on the part of a wholesaler with regard to sale of pork containing trichinae," (c) "[a]ny implied warranty of fitness in the sale of fresh pork is limited to fitness for consumption when properly cooked, and not in a raw, partially or improperly cooked state," and (d) "[t]he Court may take notice that pork cooked in a normal or reasonable fashion will kill trichinae spiralis, and that any claim to the contrary is a physical and biological impossibility." Defendant Holiday subsequently joined in this motion.
The motion was granted by the circuit court, which relied upon Cheli v Cudahy Bros Co, 267 Mich 690; 255 NW 414 (1934),[3] for the principle that there is no duty to sell trichinosis-free pork. The circuit court took judicial notice that trichinosis can be prevented by cooking pork to 137° F, and said that summary judgment was appropriate unless the plaintiff could produce some facts to show that trichinella spiralis not only can be detected, but also killed without destroying the freshness of the meat:
II
After consolidating this case with a companion case that has not been appealed to this Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Popour v Holiday Food Center, Inc, 140 Mich App 616; 364 NW2d 764 (1985). In its opinion, the Court of Appeals likewise built much of its analysis on this Court's opinion in Cheli.
[2] Ibid.
[Popour, 140 Mich App 622-623.]
III
In the present case, the circuit court and the Court of Appeals have placed substantial reliance upon this Court's 1934 pronouncements in Cheli, concerning the feasibility of inspecting pork for trichinella spiralis and the beneficial effects of proper cooking of pork. Science and technology have, of course, advanced in the intervening half century. Our statements in Cheli about inspection and preparation of pork may be dated, and the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to so demonstrate below. In any event, they were statements of fact that were explicitly based upon *493 the record made in Cheli,[4] they were not statements of law to be given precedential effect in future cases.
Cheli does not foreclose this plaintiff's suit, and the circuit court erred in granting to the defendants summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1). Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted under the first paragraph of subrule GCR 1963, 117.2 and we remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. These proceedings may include consideration of a properly filed motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10),[5] but consideration of such a motion shall take place without reliance upon the factual statements made by this Court in Cheli.
IV
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we reverse the summary judgment granted the defendants under GCR 1963, 117.2(1). We remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
WILLIAMS, C.J., and LEVIN, BRICKLEY, BOYLE, and ARCHER, JJ., concurred.
RILEY, J.
I respectfully dissent because I am in accord with the determination made by the trial court and the affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with RILEY, J.
[1]  MCL 289.707(a), 289.716(a)(1); MSA 12.933(7)(a), 12.933(16)(a)(1).
[2]  See MCR 2.116(C)(8).
[3]  Overruled in part, Hill v Husky Briquetting, Inc, 393 Mich 136; 223 NW2d 290 (1974).
[4]  This Court stated in Cheli, "The testimony shows that there is no known, practicable or feasible method of determining whether hogs are infected with trichinae," and "[i]t seems well established by the evidence that the danger to the public is reduced to a minimum if the meat is thoroughly cooked." 267 Mich 693, 695.
[5]  MCR 1.102.