Title: Aviation Administration v. Noland

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 15
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
MARYLAND AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
v.
CLIFTON F. NOLAND
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        *Eldridge 
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   May 10, 2005
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
This is an action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision
terminating the employment of a state governmental employee.  The Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, while accepting the administrative findings of fact as being
supported by substantial evidence, reversed the administrative decision on the ground
that the termination sanction for the employee’s misconduct was “arbitrary.”   The
Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed.  Both courts relied upon
an earlier Court of Special Appeals’ case, Maryland State Retirement Agency v.
Delambo, 109 Md. App. 683, 675 A.2d 1018 (1996).  We shall reverse, shall direct that
the administrative decision be affirmed, and shall overrule Maryland State Retirement
Agency v. Delambo, supra.
I.
The respondent Clifton F. Noland was a paramedic employed by the Maryland
Aviation Administration, which is a unit of the Maryland Department of
Transportation.  The basic facts concerning Noland’s employment history and the
incident leading to his termination were undisputed.  They are set forth in the opinion
of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sharonne R. Bonardi as follows:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
“Having considered the evidence presented, I find the following
facts by a preponderance of the evidence:
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“1.
At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Employee
[Clifton F. Noland] was employed as an Airport Advanced Life
Support Provider with the Maryland Aviation Administration.
“2.
The Employee began employment as an Airport
Advanced Life Support Provider on December 14, 1988.  During
the period 1989-1992, in a range of superior, satisfactory, and
unsatisfactory, the Employee received satisfactory on his
performance evaluations.  In 1993 and 1994, he received superior
ratings.  From 1995-1998, in a range of far exceeds, exceeds,
meets, below, and far below, the Employee received an exceeds
standards rating.
“3.
On May 1, 1997, THRS [Transportation Service Human
Resources System of the Maryland Aviation Administration] issued
a Workplace Violence policy.  On November 6, 1997, the
Employee signed an Employee Acknowledgment Receipt
acknowledging that he received a copy of TSHRS Workplace
Violence policy and was required to familiarize himself and
comply with that policy as a condition of employment.
“4.
On March 30, 1999, the Employee and Paramed ic James
Clopein were working the ‘D’ shift within the Fire Rescue and
Safety unit at the Baltimore Washington International (‘BWI’)
Airport.  At 12:21 a.m., the Consolidated Dispatch Center (‘CDC’)
received a call from Police Officer Reed, Maryland Transportation
Authority Police (‘MTA’) requesting an ambulance to assist in
transporting a combative psychiatric prisoner (‘Patient’) to the
North Arundel Hospital.  The CDC immediately dispatched a two-
member paramedic team consisting of the Employee and Paramed ic
Clopein.
“5.
Before entering the MTA police station, both the
Employee and paramedic Clopein placed latex gloves on their
hands and then took a stretcher and portable radio into the police
station.
“6.
The police officers informed the paramedics that the
combative patient was spitting and drinking water from the toilet
in his cell.
“7. The Employee returned to the ambulance to retrieve
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protective face shields.  He located two face shields in the vehicle
and brought them back to the police station.
“8.
When the Employee returned to the police station, the
police officers opened the cell to remove the Patient.  As the police
officers were opening the cell, the Patient spit fluid onto one of the
police officer’s face, neck, and chest.
“9.
The Employee and Paramed ic Clopein requested that the
Patient be placed face-down on the stretcher.  The police officers
restrained the Patient with handcuffs and placed the Patient on his
back onto the stretcher rather than face-down as requested.  The
Employee placed a face shield onto the Patient.  Both the Employee
and Paramed ic Clopein strapped the Patient to the stretcher, and
with the assistance of the police officers, began carrying the patient
from the police station.
“10.
The Patient, while spitting and screaming “f— you” and
other expletives, dislodged the face shield and spit at the
Employee.  The Patient also threatened to kill the Employee,
Paramed ic Clopein, and the police officers present.  The Employee
struck the Patient in the face with closed fist and then reattached
the face shield onto Patient’s face.  The police officers and
Paramed ic Clopein observed the blow to the Patient’s face and
made no comments regarding the Employee’s actions.
“11.
The Employee and Paramed ic Clopein exited the police
station and were pushing the stretcher to the ambulance when the
Patient again dislodged the face shield and spit at the Employee.
The Employee once again hit the Patient in the face with a closed
fist and reattached the face shield onto the Patient’s face.
Paramed ic Clopein observed the hit.  A police officer was also
present when the Employee struck the Patient this time as well.
“12.
During the incident, the Employee had a portable radio
in one hand but never used the radio to strike the Patient.
“13.
Both hits were with the Employee’s closed fist and
neither caused bruising, swelling, or any other visible injury to the
Patient.
“14.
The blows were to prevent the Patient from spitting and
-4-
to protect the police officers and the paramedic team from possible
exposure to a communicable disease.
“15.
The Employee, Paramed ic Clopein, and a police officer
transported the Patient to North Arundel Hospital without further
incident.
“16.
The Employee and Paramed ic Clopein did not report the
incident to the North Arundel Hospital staff.”
When Noland and Clopein returned to BWI, Clopein, as the non-driving
paramedic and pursuant to established internal agency practice, completed and filed a
Maryland Ambulance Information System Report and a BWI Fire and Rescue Service
Report, but, as found by the ALJ, he “did not include any statements regarding the
Employee’s act of twice striking the Patient.”  In addition, upon returning from the
Hospital to BWI, Noland and Clopein failed to report Noland’s act of twice striking the
patient either to the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Coordinator, or to the Shift
Supervisor, or to the Shift Comman der.
The ALJ further found that, later in the day of March 30, 1999, “Paramedic
Clopein described the incident to Paramedic Fayer, the EMS Coordinator, and
informally asked if the incident should have been reported.  Paramed ic Fayer informed
Paramed ic Clopein that he should have reported the incident.  Paramed ic Fayer
immediately informed Francis Jester, Division Fire Chief, . . . of the incident, and Fire
Chief Jester advised Paramedic Fayer to obtain written statements from both the
Employee and Paramedic Clopein and forward the reports to the shift commander.”
Noland completed his report on April 3, 1999, and submitted it to Paramed ic Fayer and
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the Division Fire Chief on the same day.  Clopein completed and submitted his report
on April 15, 1999.
According to the ALJ’s findings, “[a]ll BWI paramedics and emergency medical
personnel operate under the medical license of Dr. Phillip Phillips, BWI, FRS Medical
Directo r.”  Dr. Phillips was informed of the striking incident on April 15, 1999, and,
that same day, suspended Noland from operating under Dr. Phillips’s medical license.
On the next day, the Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services System
suspended for one year Noland’s paramedic license for twice striking the patient.  Also
on April 16, 1999, the BWI Airport Fire Department began an investigation of the
incident.  The investigation was competed on April 20, 1999, and Clopein was
suspended without pay for five days for failing to report the incident.  Noland, on
April 22, 1999, was suspended without pay pending the disposition of charges for his
termination as an employee with the Maryland Aviation Administration.  Following the
completion of the investigation, Noland was informed on July 2, 1999, that charges for
termination of his employment and disqualification for future employment with the
Maryland Aviation Administration, based upon his striking a patient twice and failing
to report the incident, had been filed against him.
Noland filed a timely appeal to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings,
and a hearing was held before ALJ Bonardi on January 27, 2000, and continued on
March 6, 2000.  The ALJ on April 20, 2000, filed an extensive opinion containing
findings of fact as summarized above, conclusions of law, and a proposed decision.
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1
The ALJ described the Workplace Violence Policy, which Noland received in 1997, as follows:
“The policy states that all employees have the right to work in an
environment that is free from harassment, threats, intimidation, or
violence.  (7L1.1.)  It is the policy of the Department that such
behavior, in any form, will not be tolerated in the workplace or in
connection with employment.  (7L1.2.)  The policy defines violence
or a violent act as a physical force or verbal abuse exerted for the
purpose of intimidation, or for the purpose of harming, damaging, or
causing injury to persons or property.  (7L3.5.) During the course of
employment with the Department, no employee shall commit any
violent act against any person.  (7L4.1)”
The ALJ concluded that Noland did not violate “Management’s Workplace Violence
Policy” because “he did not strike the Patient out of anger, but rather to prevent or
reduce possible exposure to an infectious disease,” and that his “actions were not done
for the purpose of intimidation, or for the purpose of harming, damaging, or causing
injury to persons or property.”1  ALJ Bonardi, after a detailed review of COMAR
regulations, the “Manual of Maryland Medical Protocols for Cardiac Rescue
Technicians and Emergency Medical Technicians-Paramedic,” and the expert testimony
at the hearing, further concluded as follows:
“I conclude as a matter of law that the Employee used excessive
force when twice striking the restrained Patient.  COMAR
11.02.08.06B(10). I also find as a matter of law that in striking the
Patient and failing to report the incident, the Employee violated a
written policy and committed an act of misconduct and that act
could have caused loss or injury to the State.  COMAR
11.02.08.06B(6), 
C OMAR 
11.02.08.06B(8 ), 
C O M AR
11.02.08.06B(12).  Those charges are therefore sustained.”
With regard to the appropriate sanction, the ALJ recommended a suspension rather than
termination of Noland’s employment, stating:
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“Management can terminate an employee for conduct
amounting to one or more of the enumerated causes for
termination.  COMAR 11.02.08.06B.  Management has established
that the Employee has violated three (3) of the six (6) causes of
termination set forth above.  Thus, the Management has met its
burden of persuasion and can terminate the Employee.  The
Employee argues that Management should apply its progressive
discipline policy and not impose the termination.  Management
counter-argues that progressive discipline is discretionary.
Management is correct that it is not required to implement the
Progressive Discipline Policy (‘Policy 7G’) (Emp. Exhibit 6.)  The
policy states that in some cases a particular form of discipline may
be bypassed depending on the severity or number of violations,
documentation, or the employee’s work history.  (7G 4.3) After
Chief Allen met with Employee Relations and the MAA Attorney
general, Management concluded that the Employee’s actions were
so severe that termination was warranted.
* * *
“The Employee has not been disciplined for any reason in the past
years while employed by the MAA.  The Employee has received
‘superior’ or ‘exceed standards’ in his performance evaluations
since 1993.  Also, Chief Pace testified that after completing the
investigation, he orally recommended that the Employee be
suspended for thirty days.  In considering the Employee’s action,
his work history, and the recommendation of the Investigator Chief
Pace, the Employee’s Motion to Modify the Penalty of Termination
is GRANTED.  I propose that the appropriate sanction is to
suspend the Employee without pay.  The period of suspension
began April 22, 1999 and continues until the Employee’s
paramedic license is reinstated by MIEMSS.”
The Maryland Aviation Administration filed, with the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Manag ement, exceptions to the ALJ’s proposed decision,
and the exceptions were considered by a designee of the Secretary who rendered an
-8-
opinion and a final administrative decision on July 27, 2000.  The designee “adopt[ed]
the 41 findings of fact the ALJ made” and “sustained” the ALJ’s conclusions of law
with one “exception.”  The “exception” was that the designee concluded that Noland’s
actions constituted a violation of the “Management’s Workplace Violence Policy.”  The
designee explained:
“The Maryland Aviation Administration . . . filed an exception
to the ALJ’s conclusion that the employee did not violate the
employer’s workplace violence policy.  The ALJ read into the
policy the requirement that someone must act out of anger to
violate the policy, and in this case the employee was concerned for
his safety and did not act out of anger.  Consequently, in the view
of the ALJ, the employee did not violate the policy.  However, I
disagree, as a matter of law, with the reasoning of the ALJ.
Striking a restrained and handcuffed patient with a closed fist is
not acceptable, and is an unjustified act of violence.  The trouble
in the ALJ’s reasoning lies in the fact that someone may be
motivated by fear, yet his actions could still be intimidating,
harming or damaging.  The fact that Mr. Noland twice struck the
patient with a closed fist2 leads to the inference that while one of
the purposes was to stop the patient from spitting, the means of
doing so was to intimidate the patient, through the escalation of the
event from a verbal warning to the introduction of force, to get him
to stop spitting.  See footnote 2, supra.  Indeed, the ALJ elsewhere
found that the striking of the employee was an unwarranted and
excessive use of force.  ALJ proposed opinion, page 19.  Hence,
because the use of force was unwarranted and excessive, the policy
on workplace violence also was violated.3
* * *
“2 In his incident report, admitted as part of MAA exhibit #4,
Mr. Noland said that he twice ‘struck’ the patient on the lower jaw and
that he first told the patient not to spit any more.  When the verbal
warnings failed, force was introduced.
“3 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the workplace
violence policy was not violated, the other violations, found by the
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Administrative Law Judge are sufficient to support Mr. Noland’s
termination.  In other words, the ultimate conclusion of this opinion
would be the same.”
The Secretary’s designee disagreed with the ALJ’s recommended sanction,
saying (footnote omitted):
“Penalty determinations are judgment calls within the discretion of
the employing agen cy.  We will not disturb a choice of penalty
within the agency’s discretion unless the severity of the agency’s
action appears unwarranted in light of all factors.  That choice does
not appear unwarranted here.
“I recognize that Mr. Noland’s performance was satisfactory or
better, and indeed exceeded standards in recent years.  It was
uncontested that Mr. Noland had a good overall history, had a good
attendance record, had a good disciplinary record, had good work
habits, and got along well with his co-workers.  It is clear that all
of these factors are in his favor.  However, they do not outweigh
the severity of what he did.
“It was the testimony of Dr. Phillips that it is never warranted
to strike a patient.  Chief Allen said the same thing.  While
Noland’s record was unquestionably good, and would mitigate
ordinary misconduct, what management in effect was saying was
that even a stellar record was irrelevant based on the facts of the
incident.  (For similar reasons, management chose not to impose
progressive discipline: it concluded that the offense was serious
enough to warrant immediate termination.)”
* * *
“Indeed, the actions were severe enough so that Mr. Noland’s
license was suspended for a year by the Maryland Emergency
Medical Service Systems.  In the State Personnel Management
System statute ‘wantonly careless conduct or unwarrantable
excessive force in the treatment or care of an individual who is a
client, patient, prisoner, or any other individual who is in the care
or custody of this State’ is a cause for automatic termination.  State
personnel and Pensions Article § 11-105(8).  The statute is a
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2
Prior to this discussion of the Delambo factors, the Secretary’s designee dealt with a legal issue
which had been raised concerning the scope of the Delambo case, and particularly whether it applied
to the type of misconduct here involved.  Although the designee indicated that, in his view, Delambo
was inapplicable, the designee in the above-quoted paragraph alternatively proceeded on the
assumption that Delambo was applicable.  Both the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals
discussed this issue and took the position that Delambo applied to the type of misconduct of which
Noland was guilty.  We need not explore the issue relating to the scope of Delambo.  Since we shall
overrule Delambo, the question is moot.
legislative recognition of the severity of this type of misconduct,
which no mitigating factors can outweigh, and in which
termination should be automatic.  It also makes it clear that it is not
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious for management to terminate
for conduct of that nature.”
* * *
“I also have given my own consideration to the factors specified
in 
[Maryland 
State 
Retirement 
Agency 
v.] 
Delambo.
Unquestionably, each of the five factors weighs in Mr. Noland’s
favor.  However, the stubborn fact remains that he twice struck a
restrained and handcuffed medical patient, with unwarranted and
excessive force.  This is not outweighed by the five Delambo
factors. In this case, a reasonable employer could impose the
punishment imposed.  The punishment fits the crime, and it is clear
that the employee was not punished simply because he could be
punished: he was terminated for extreme misconduct.  None of the
alternative sanctions would have been approp riate.” 2
A final administrative order was filed separating Noland from his position at the
Maryland Aviation Administration and disqualifying him from future employment with
the Administration.
Noland filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, pursuant to the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-
222 of the State Government Article, a petition for judicial review.  Following a
hearing, the Circuit Court reversed the administrative decision and remanded the case
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for further administrative consideration of the appropriate sanction.  The reversal was
not based upon a judicial holding that any of the administrative findings of fact were
unsupported by substantial evidence.  Furthermore, the Circuit Court did not hold, as
a matter of law, that Noland was not guilty of any misconduct.  (Such a legal holding,
in light of the administrative record and the applicable regulations, would not be
sustainable).  Rather, the Circuit Court’s decision was largely based upon the Court’s
view that, in determining the appropriate sanction, the Secretary’s designee gave
insufficient consideration to what the court believed were substantial mitigating
factors.  
Thus, according to the Circuit Court, because Noland “was working with the
police and came to the scene at the request of the police, he should be afforded similar
protection under the law as to the use of force,” and that this was a “factor that should
have, at the very least, been considered in mitigation.”  In ascertaining the “similar
protection under the law as to the use of force,” the Circuit Court relied on language
from State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 762 A.2d 97 (2000), a case dealing with the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a police officer’s criminal convictions for
involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment.  The Circuit Court also relied on
language from a Supreme Court opinion, cited in Pagotto, concerning whether alleged
excessive force by a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment.  
Furthermore, the Circuit Court indicated that the Secretary’s designee failed to
give sufficient weight to the mitigating factors that Noland “was acting in self defense
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and the defense of others,” which “are recognized defenses in Maryland which may
excuse even criminal offenses.”  In addition, the Circuit Court stated that “this court
finds arbitrary the Secretary’s apparent premise that it always will constitute
unwarranted and excessive force if an individual is struck with a ‘closed fist.’”
(Emphasis in original).  While acknowledging that the Secretary’s designee purported
to have considered all of the factors set forth in Maryland State Retirement Agency v.
Delambo, supra, the Circuit Court obviously disagreed with the weight which the
designee had given to such factors.  The court stated:
“Nonetheless, he [the Secretary’s designee] found no grounds to
mitigate or reduce the maximum punishment – termination of
employment.  This peremptory dismissal of all factors in
Petitioner’s favor, again, appears arbitrary and must be reversed.
The Secretary is required to weigh the seriousness of Petitioner’s
mom entary, highly mitigated, and minor infraction, which caused
no injury to anyone and served the apparent needs of public safety
and law enforcem ent, against his 11 years of prior exemplary
service.  In this proper legal context and given the Secretary’s
approval of prior fact-finding, it is difficult to understand how the
ultimate sanction of termination could be approp riate.”
  The Maryland Aviation Administration appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals which, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
The intermediate appellate court began its opinion by pointing out that “[j]udicial
review of an agency’s factual findings does not permit the Court to make an
independent decision on the evidence.”  The appellate court then continued: “[o]n the
other hand, ‘when reviewing issues of law, . . . the court’s review is expansive and it
-13-
substitutes its judgment for that of the agency,’” quoting prior Court of Special
Appeals’ opinions.  The Court of Special Appeals then relied upon its earlier opinion
in Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, supra, saying:
“In Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, 109 Md. App.
683 (1996), this Court stated that before an agency can terminate
an employee from his or her employment, that agency must take
into consideration the employee’s (1) overall employment history
in State service, (2) attendance record during that period of time,
(3) disciplinary record at the present agency and at other State
agencies as well, (4) work habits, and (5) relations with fellow
employees and supervisors.  Id. at 691.  Delambo also held that
‘[t]he agency must prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law
that are adequate for judicial review . . . .
* * *
“We recognize that . . . the Secretary stated that he proceeded to
take the Delambo factors into consideration before terminating
appellee’s employment and that those factors did not outweigh the
seriousness of appellee’s conduct.  We hold, however, that one
sentence stating that appropriate consideration was given to those
factors is not adequate to permit meaningful judicial review.”
Like the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals characterized the
Secretary’s position as being “that striking a patient with a closed hand will
automatically constitute both unwarranted and excessive force,” and the appellate court
stated that, while it may “alw ays be unwarranted conduct for a physician or a paramedic
to strike his or her patient, that does not mean that the force is always excessive under
the circumstances, especially where that individual is acting in self-defense.”
In the Court of Special Appeals, the Maryland Aviation Admin istration had
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relied on MTA v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A.2d 1246 (2002).  This Court in King held,
inter alia, that judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision disciplining
a state governmental employee for misconduct, where the sanction imposed was lawful
and authorized, does not encompass review to determine whether the sanction was
“‘disproportionate to the offense’” or “disproportionate to [the employee’s]
misconduct” or an “abuse of discretion” unless “the disproportionality or abuse of
discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem the
decision to be ‘arbitrary or capricious.’” MTA v. King, supra, 369 Md. at 290-291, 799
A.2d at 1255-1256 (emphasis in original).  The Court of Special Appeals in the present
case distinguished King in the following language:
“The case at bar is distinguishable from King.  This is not a case
in which an individual claims that his or her punishment was
disproportional to that of others who committed the same act.  We
are not comparing appellee’s punishment to punishment imposed
upon others.”
The Maryland Aviation Administration filed in this Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari which we granted.  MAA v. Noland, 374 Md. 358, 822 A.2d 1224 (2003).
Noland did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.
II.
We shall first review some of the basic Maryland administrative law principles
applicable to cases of this nature, as well as the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in
Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, supra.  Thereafter, we shall address the
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decisions below in light of these principles.
A.
About six years ago, in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md.
59, 67-69, 729 A.2d 376, 380-381 (1999), this Court extensively reviewed the role of
a court in reviewing an adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency, stating (some
internal quotation marks omitted):
“A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency
adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People’s
Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it ‘is
limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record
as a whole to support the agen cy’s findings and conclusions, and
to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an
erroneous conclusion of law.’  United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577, 650
A.2d at 230.  See also Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(h)
of the State Government Article; District Council v. Brandywine,
350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-1351 (1998); Catonsville
Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568-569, 709 A.2d 749, 753
(1998).
“In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court
decides ‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached
the factual conclusion the agency reached.’  Bulluck v. Pelham
Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978).  See
Anderson v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187, 213, 623 A.2d
198, 210 (1993).  A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s
fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the
record.  CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 698, 575 A.2d 324, 329
(1990).  A reviewing court ‘“must review the agency’s decision in
the light most favorable to it; . . . the agency’s decision is prima
facie correct and presumed valid, and . . . it is the agency’s
province to resolve conflicting evidence” and to draw inferences
from that evidence.’  CBS v. Comptroller, supra, 319 Md. at 698,
575 A.2d at 329, quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller,
302 Md. 825, 834-835, 490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985).  See
Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, supra, 349 Md. at 569, 709 A.2d
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at 753 (final agency decisions ‘are prima facie correct and carry
with them the presumption of validity’).
“Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of
our opinions,  a ‘court’s task on review is not to ‘substitute its
judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the
administrative agency,’  United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, supra,
336 Md. at 576-577, 650 A.2d at 230, quoting Bulluck v. Pelham
Woods Apts., supra, 283 Md. at 513, 390 A.2d at 1124.  Even with
regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be
accorded the position of the administrative agen cy.  Thus, an
administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute
which the agency administers should ordinarily be given
considerab le weight by reviewing courts.  Lussier v. Md. Racing
Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-697, 684 A.2d 804, 811-812
(1996), and cases there cited; McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602,
612, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (‘The interpretation of a statute by
those officials charged with administering the statute is . . . entitled
to weight).2  Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own
field should be respected.  Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md.
441, 455, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); Christ v. Department of
Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 445, 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994)
(legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies will
often include the authority to make ‘significant discretionary policy
determinations’); Bd. of Ed. For Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305
Md. 774, 792, 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986) (‘application of the State
Board of Education’s expertise would clearly be desirable before
a court attempts to resolve the’ legal issues). 
_________
“2 On the other hand, when a statutory provision is entirely clear,
with no ambiguity whatsoever, ‘administrative constructions, no
matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.’  Macke Co. v.
Comptroller, 302 Md. 18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 254, 257 (1984).”
The principles summarized in Banks have been reaffirmed by this Court in numerous
opinions since Banks.  See, e.g., Christopher v. Dept. of Health, 381 Md. 188, 197-199,
849 A.2d 46, 51-52 (2004); Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md.
157, 164-172, 848 A.2d 642, 646-651 (2004); Finucan v. Board of Physician Quality
-17-
3
As pointed out in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68-69, 729 A.2d
376, 381 (1999), a few of this Court’s opinions, in attempting to set forth a standard for judicial
review of agency decisions on issues of law, have said that the court may “substitute the court’s
judgment for that of the agency’s.”  The Banks opinion, as well as several of the more recent
opinions cited above, have called this language “unfortunate” and have disapproved its use to
describe judicial review of legal issues.  Nonetheless, a few appellate opinions, including some by
this Court and the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in the case at bar, have continued to employ
this “substituted judgment” standard.
The “substituted judgment” language is misleading and inaccurate for several reasons.  It
suggests, with respect to legal issues, that no deference whatsoever is owed to the agency’s decision.
That is not the law.  In an action for judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision, the
“court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it,” and “the agency’s
decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid,” Banks, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 381 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  In addition, the agency’s interpretations and applications of statutory or
regulatory provisions “which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight
(continued...)
Assurance, 380 Md. 577, 590-597, 846 A.2d 377, 384-389 (2004); Sadler v.
Dimensions, 378 Md. 509, 528-530, 836 A.2d 655, 666-667 (2003); Smack v. Dept. of
Health, 378 Md. 298, 313 n.7, 835 A.2d 1175, 1183-1184 n.7 (2003); Montgomery v.
E.C.I., 377 Md. 615, 625-626, 835 A.2d 169, 175-176 (2003); Watkins v. Dept. of
Safety, 377 Md. 34, 45-46, 831 A.2d 1079, 1086 (2003); Fosler v. Panoramic Design,
Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 136-137, 829 A.2d 271, 282 (2003); Kram v. Maryland Military,
374 Md. 651, 656-657, 824 A.2d 99, 102-103 (2003); MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 56-57,
821 A.2d 62, 73 (2003); Mehrling v. Nationwide, 371 Md. 40, 57, 806 A.2d 662, 672
(2002); Annapolis Market v. Parker, 369 Md. 689, 703-704, 802 A.2d 1029, 1038
(2002); Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 449-452, 800 A.2d 768, 774-776 (2002);
Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 416-417, 784 A.2d 534, 539-540 (2001);
Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 171-173, 783 A.2d 169, 177-178 (2001); Gigeous v.
ECI, 363 Md. 481, 495-497, 769 A.2d 912, 921-922 (2001).3
-18-
3
(...continued)
by reviewing courts.”  Banks, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381.  “Furthermore, the expertise of the
agency in its own field should be respected.”  Banks, ibid.
In the context of a determination by an agency or official in the Executive Branch of the State
Government, the term “judgment” is often used to mean the exercise of discretion, such as an official
exercising “good judgment.”  See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, at
1223 (1981).  Obviously a court may not substitute its exercise of discretion for that exercised by the
Executive Branch agency or official.
More importantly, however, when an agency or official in the Executive Branch of Government
exercises “judgment,” the agency or official is ordinarily performing a task which the Maryland
Constitution or statutes have assigned to the Executive Branch and not to the Judicial Branch.  The
phrase that a court “substitutes its judgment” for the judgment of the Executive Branch suggests that
the court is engaging in precisely the same type of determination, and is performing a function,
which has been assigned to the Executive.  Nevertheless, for the court to perform the same function
as the Executive Branch would not be consonant with the express separation of powers mandate set
forth in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See Sadler v. Dimensions, 378 Md. 509,
530, 836 A.2d 655, 667-668 (2003), where Judge Raker for the Court recently emphasized that
“judicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is restricted primarily because of the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Maryland Constitution.”  See also, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 21-22, 782 A.2d
791, 803 (2001); Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 220-221, 334 A.2d 514, 521-522
(1975).
If there is a need to articulate a “standard” for judicial review of an agency’s legal rulings, it is
sufficient to say that a reviewing court must “determine if the administrative decision is premised
upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”  United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650
A.2d 226, 230 (1994), and cases there cited.
Turning specifically to administrative decisions imposing discipline or sanctions
upon individuals, in MTA v. King, supra, 369 Md. at 290, 799 A.2d at 1255, the Court
of Special Appeals mandated a reversal of an administrative decision terminating the
employment of a state government employee.  The intermediate appellate court based
its decision on the grounds, inter alia, “that termination of King’s employment ‘was
disproportionate to the offense’ and that King’s misconduct was not ‘so serious as to
warrant dismissal.’”  This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals,
-19-
pointing out that, under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Code (1984, 2004
Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-201 et seq. of the State Government Article, “[t]he grounds set forth
in § 10-222(h) for reversing or modifying an adjudicatory administrative decision do
not include disproportionality or abuse of discretion.” MTA v. King, supra, 369 Md. at
291, 799 A.2d at 1255. We continued in King to set forth the appropriate standard for
reviewing the administrative discipline or sanction imposed in cases of this nature (369
Md. at 291, 799 A.2d at 1255-1256):
“As long as an administrative sanction or decision does not
exceed the agency’s authority, is not unlawfu l, and is supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence, there can be no
judicial reversal or modification of the decision based on
disproportionality or abuse of discretion unless, under the facts of
a particular case, the disproportionality or abuse of discretion was
so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly
deem the decision to be ‘arbitrary or capricious.’”
More recently, in Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529-531, 846
A.2d 341, 349-350 (2004), Judge Raker for the Court explained that judicial review of
a lawful and authorized administrative disciplinary decision or sanction, ordinarily
within the discretion of the administrative agen cy, is more limited than judicial review
of either factual findings or legal conclusions (footnote omitted):
“Logically, the courts owe a higher level of deference to functions
specifically committed to the agency’s discretion than they do to an
agency’s legal conclusions or factual findings.  Therefore, the
discretionary functions of the agency must be reviewed under a
standard more deferential than either the . . . review afforded an
agency’s legal conclusions or the substantial evidence review
-20-
afforded an agency’s factual findings.  In this regard, the standard
set forth in § 10-222(h)(3)(vi), review of ‘arbitrary or capricious’
agency actions, provides guidance for the courts as they seek to
apply the correct standard of review to discretionary functions of
the agency.”
* * *
“[I]n MTA v. King, we held that an agency’s discretion to
determine the magnitude of a sanction could only be reviewed
pursuant to § 10-222(h)(3)(vi), i.e., for arbitrariness or
capriciousness.  369 Md. at 291, 799 A.2d at 1255-56.  Even if the
court felt the punishment to be ‘disproportionate’ to the violation,
the agency’s determination of the amount or level of sanction could
not be second-guessed, unless the sanction ‘was so extreme and
egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem the decision
to be “arbitrary or capricious,”’ as set forth in § 10-222(h)(3)(vi).
Id.” 
See also Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, supra, 381 Md. at 171, 848
A.2d at 650 (“The arbitrary or capricious standard, as we have stated before, sets a high
bar for judicial intervention, meaning the agency action must be ‘extreme and
egregious’ to warrant judicial reversal under that standard”); Dept. of Corrections v.
Howard, 339 Md. 357, 367, 663 A.2d 74, 78 (1995) (State employee termination
decision reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard); Maryland State
Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557-558, 625 A.2d 914, 922 (1993) (“[A]s long as an
administrative agency’s exercise of discretion does not violate regulations, statutes,
common law principles, due process and other constitutional requirements, it is
ordinarily unreview able by the courts. * * * It is only when an agency’s exercise of
discretion, in an adjudicatory proceeding, is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ that courts are
-21-
authorized to intervene”); Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 225, 334 A.2d
514, 524 (1975) (“[T]he judiciary is constitutionally ‘without authority to interfere . . .
with the lawful exercise of administrative . . . discretion, quoting Heaps v. Cobb, 185
Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945)); Solomon v. Board of Physicians, 155 Md. App.
687, 707-708, 845 A.2d 47, 59-60 (2003).
The Court of Special Appeals, in the case at bar, indicated that the principles set
forth in MTA v. King and its progeny applied only to “a case in which an individual
claims that his or her punishment was disproportional to that of others who committed
the same act.”  The appellate court declined to apply the standard set forth in King on
the ground that “[w]e are not comparing appellee’s punishment to the punishment
imposed on others.”  
The Court of Special Appeals’ narrow interpretation of King and other Court of
Appeals’ cases is erroneous.  No language in King or any other Court of Appeals’
opinion suggests such a limitation.  On the contrary, the King opinion stated that
judicial review does not include review to determine whether a sanction was
“‘disproportionate to the offense’” or “disproportionate to [the employee’s]
misconduct,” King, supra, 369 Md. at 290-291, 799 A.2d at 1255-1256 (emphasis
added).  No issue was raised in King, or mentioned in the King opinion, about any
sanction that might have been imposed on someone else.  See also, e.g., Spencer v.
Board of Pharmacy, supra, 380 Md. at 531, 846 A.2d at 350 (“Even if the court felt the
punishment to be ‘disproportionate’ to the violation, the agency’s determination of the
-22-
amount or level of sanction [can] not be second-guessed, unless the sanction ‘was so
extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem the decision to be
‘arbitrary or capricious’”) (emphasis added and some internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, the limitation upon the judicial review authority of courts, with
regard to a lawful and authorized sanction, imposed by an Executive Branch
administrative agen cy, applies broadly.  It encompasses argumen ts that the discipline
or sanction imposed was “disproportionate to the offense,” or “disproportionate to the
miscon duct,” or “disproportionate to the violation.”
B.
The Court of Special Appeals also erred in Maryland State Retirement Agency
v. Delambo, supra, 109 Md. App. 683, 675 A.2d 1018 (1996), and in the present case,
by imposing upon Executive Branch administrative agencies numerous non-statutory
requirements in employee disciplinary cases.  Delambo, like the instant case, involved
a final administrative decision removing a state government employee for misconduct.
Upon judicial review of the agen cy’s decision, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
held that the administrative findings of fact, that the employee engaged in specified
misconduct, were “supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence,” and
that the administrative “decision is not affected by any error of law.”  Delambo, 109
Md. App. at 687-688, 675 A.2d at 1020.  Nevertheless, the Circuit Court reduced the
sanction to a seventeen-month suspension without pay on the ground that “substantial
evidence” did not support the administrative determination that the employee’s
-23-
“‘actions made her unfit for the performance of her duties.’” 109 Md. App. at 688, 675
A.2d at 1020.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the appellate court also upheld the
administrative finding of fact that Ms. Delambo had engaged in misconduct.  On the
other hand, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court was not authorized
to substitute a different sanction in place of the sanction imposed by the agen cy.  The
Court of Special Appeals vacated the decisions below, ordered that the case be
remanded to the agency for the imposition of a new sanction, and that the agency
prepare findings of fact justifying the particular sanction imposed.  The intermediate
appellate court in Delambo explained (109 Md. App. at 691-692, 675 A.2d at 1022):
“In this case, appellant failed adequately to articulate why
removal of appellee was an appropriate exercise of discretion.
Instead, appellant merely adopted the ALJ's finding that appellee's
‘exceedingly poor judgment, resulting in her misconduct reflects
that she is unfit to hold a position in this agency.’  There is no
indication that either the ALJ or the Secretary (1) considered any
of the other relevant factors that must be considered in determining
the severity of appellee's punishment, or (2) considered imposing
any of the alternative sanctions that might have been appropriate
under the circumstances.  Cf., Colter, supra, 297 Md. at 430-431,
466 A.2d 1286. 
“For all that appears in the record before us, appellee was fired
because she could be fired.  We cannot determine what - if any -
consideration was given to appellee's (1) overall employment
history in State service, (2) attendance record during that period of
time, (3) disciplinary record at the present agency and at other
State agencies as well, (4) work habits, and (5) relations with
fellow employees and supervisors.  All these factors should have
been considered by the ALJ and the Secretary.  Appropriate
consideration should also have been given to making ‘the
-24-
punishment fit the crime.’ 
* * *
“The agency must prepare findings of fact and conclusions of
law that are adequate for judicial review.  Redden v. Montgomery
County, 270 Md. 668, 685 (1974).  Consistent with the example
contained in Redden, we recommend that the agen cy's ‘bottom line’
sanction be accompanied by a statement that explains . . . why the
agency has decided against imposing any of the other sanctions that
it has discretion to impose, i.e., why, under the circumstances, the
punishment ‘fits’ the miscon duct.”
The requirements imposed upon administrative agencies in the Delambo opinion,
i.e., that the agencies in employee disciplinary cases make findings of fact showing that
consideration was given to various enumerated factors, showing that alternate sanctions
were considered, and explaining why “the punishment ‘fits’ the miscon duct,” find no
support in the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act or in Maryland administrative
law generally.  It is true that administrative agencies in adjudicatory cases are required
to make findings of fact with respect to factual matters.  See, e.g., Code (1984, 2004
Repl. Vol.), § 10-221(b)(1)(i), (b)(3), and (b)(4) of the State Government Article;
Bucktail v. Talbot County, 352 Md. 530, 552-553, 723 A.2d 440, 450-451 (1999) (In
a non-statutory judicial review action, as in a statutory judicial review action, findings
of fact concerning factual issues are required in order for a reviewing court to
determine if the agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and to comply
with the “‘fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency
. . . to be apprised of the facts relied on by the agency”); District Council v.
-25-
Brandywine, 350 Md. 339, 347, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1998) (“[W]hen a decision is
rendered in a contested [matter] . . ., written findings of fact and conclusions must be
provided”); Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 332 Md. 201, 221, 630 A.2d 753,
764 (1993) (“Without findings of fact on all material issues, . . . a reviewing court
cannot properly perform its function”) (emphasis added); Mossburg v. Montgomery
County, 329 Md. 494, 507, 620 A.2d 886, 893 (1993) (“[W]e have held that the
decision of” an administrative agency “must be reversed where the [agency] failed to
make findings of fact resolving a particular conflict”) (emphasis added); Harford
County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991) (The requirement of
findings of fact “is in recognition of the fundamental right of a party to a proceeding
before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency
in reaching its decision and to permit meaningful judicial review of those findings”),
and cases there cited.
Thus, in an administrative governmental employment disciplinary case based on
alleged misconduct, the agency is required to make findings of fact concerning the
alleged misconduct.  Moreover, to the extent that the nature of the sanction imposed
depends upon the resolution of disputed facts or conflicting inferences, the agency must
make findings of fact resolving such disputes or conflicts.  Nevertheless, no statutory
provision or Court of Appeals administrative law opinion has been called to our
attention which requires that the imposition of a lawful and authorized sanction, within
the discretion of the administrative agen cy, be justified by findings of fact.  This
-26-
4
The Court of Special Appeals in its Delambo opinion relied upon two Court of Appeals’
opinions as support for its holding that an administrative agency must render findings of fact
justifying a lawful, authorized sanction which is within the agency’s discretion to impose.  They
were Redden v. Montgomery County, 270 Md. 668, 685, 313 A.2d 481, 490 (1974), and Colter v.
State, 297 Md. 423, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983).  Neither opinion supports the Court of Special Appeals
holding in Delambo.  Redden was a zoning case, and the administrative agency had failed to set forth
findings of fact concerning the grounds relied upon by those opposing the application for a special
exception.  Colter was a criminal case where the trial judge, in imposing a sanction for violation of
a discovery rule, had misapplied the rule.  
With reference to criminal cases, it is noteworthy that the Court of Special Appeals’ Delambo
opinion required much more of an Executive Branch adjudicator imposing a discretionary sanction
than Maryland law requires of trial courts imposing a criminal sanction where there is no separation
of powers consideration.  Cf. State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 678-680, 602 A.2d 1185, 1188-1189
(1992); Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 819-820, 490 A.2d 1289, 1293-1294 (1985), and cases there
cited,
Court’s holdings make it clear that there is no such requirement.  As earlier pointed out,
the Court in Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy, supra, 380 Md. at 529, 846 A.2d at 349,
reaffirmed the principle that “the courts owe a higher level of deference to functions
specifically committed to the agency’s discretion than they do to an agency’s legal
conclusions or factual findings.  Therefore, the discretionary functions of the agency
must be reviewed under a standard more deferential than . . . the substantial evidence
review afforded any agency’s factual finding s.”4
In sum, when the discretionary sanction imposed upon an employee by an
adjudicatory administrative agency is lawful and authorized, the agency need not justify
its exercise of discretion by findings of fact or reasons articulating why the agency
decided upon the particular discipline.  A reviewing court is not authorized to overturn
a lawful and authorized sanction unless the “disproportionality [of the sanction] or
abuse of discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly
-27-
deem the decision to be ‘arbitrary or capricious.’” MTA v. King, supra, 369 Md. at 291,
799 A.2d at 1255-1256.  Furthermore, the employing agency does not have the burden,
in the reviewing court, of justifying such a sanction.   Instead, in accordance with the
principle that the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, Board
of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, supra, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 381, the
burden in a judicial review action is upon the party challenging the sanction to persuade
the reviewing court that the agency abused his discretion and that the decision was “so
extreme and egregious” that it constituted “arbitrary or capricious” agency action.
Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, supra, 109 Md. App. 683, 675 A.2d
1018, is inconsistent with these principles and is overruled in its entirety.
C.
In the case at bar, the application of the principles outlined above clearly
requires a reversal of the Court of Special Appeals’ and the Circuit Court’s judgments,
coupled with a direction to affirm the administrative decision.  
The Court of Special Appeals’ judgment in this case was essentially based upon
that court’s earlier decision in Maryland State Retirement Agency v. Delambo, supra,
and upon that court’s mis-interpretation of MTA v. King, supra.  The overruling of
Delambo, and our re-affirmation of King and its progeny, mandate a reversal of the
Court of Special Appeals’ decision.
Moreover, Noland in the Circuit Court did not meet his burden of demonstrating
that the administrative decision “was so extreme and egregious” that it amounted to
-28-
“arbitrary or capricious” action.  The testimony of Dr. Phillips, who was BWI’s
Medical Director, as well as the testimony of the Chief of the BWI Fire Departm ent,
was that “it is never warranted to strike a patient.”  This testim ony, coupled with other
evidence, would preclude a reviewing court from holding that the administrative
decision was arbitrary or capricious.
While the Circuit Court, or the Court of Special Appeals, or this Court might
have imposed a lesser sanction if the decision were for them to make, none of these
entities constituted the authorized decision-makers.  The sanction imposed was lawful,
authorized, and within the discretion of the Executive Branch agency having the
authority to render the decision.  It was not shown to be arbitrary or capricious.
Therefore the Circuit Court should have affirmed the administrative decision.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L
APPEALS REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCU IT 
COURT 
WITH 
DIRECTIONS 
TO
AFFIRM THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENT NOLAND.