Title: STATE EX REL. SNOHOMISH CTY. v. Sperry

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

79 Wn.2d 69 (1971) 483 P.2d 608 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of the Superior Court of Snohomish County, Respondent, v. SAM SPERRY et al., Appellants. No. 41792. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. April 8, 1971. Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Jones, Charles H. Todd, and Duncan A. Bayne, for appellants. Robert E. Schillberg, Prosecuting Attorney, David G. Metcalf and Bruce A. Keithly, Deputies, for respondent. *70 McGOVERN, J. "[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them." Justice Black, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R. 1346 (1941). Because the trial court here improperly made a choice between the two rights, we reverse the convictions for contempt of court entered against the appellants. In the fall of 1970, two young men charged with the crime of first-degree murder were about to be tried by jury in the Snohomish County Superior Court. Comprehensive press coverage of the proceeding was anticipated because of the facts surrounding the alleged murder. The Honorable Thomas G. McCrea was to preside as the trial judge. The defendants, the prosecuting attorney and the court agreed that the jury need not be sequestered during the trial.[1] As a cautionary measure, and in dedication to his responsibilities to provide the defendants a jury trial free from outside prejudicial influences, the distinguished trial judge entered an order on October 8, 1970, which provided, among other things, that: October 26, 1970, the jury trial commenced and appellant newspaper reporters were among the numerous news media representatives in daily attendance at the trial. October 28, 1970, the admissibility of certain evidence became *71 an issue at the trial and a hearing was held in open court and in the absence of the jury to decide its admissibility. Some of the offered testimony was deemed to be inadmissible by the court and the state was ordered not to present that part of the testimony to the jury. October 29, 1970, the following article, prepared by the appellants, appeared in two editions of The Seattle Times, a daily newspaper of general circulation in many areas of the state, including the Snohomish County area: After receiving and reading a copy of the newspaper account, the trial court summoned appellants before it, barred them from further attendance at the murder trial, and ordered them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violating the court's October 8, 1970 order. A written order to show cause followed. The appellants immediately petitioned this court for relief. We stayed that part of the trial court's ruling barring the appellants from the courtroom, but allowed the hearing on the alleged contempt to proceed. Subsequently, the show cause hearing was held in open court and appellants' counsel stipulated to the basic facts leading to the alleged contemptuous publication. November 6, 1970, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions and order adjudging the appellants in contempt. This appeal followed. We first dispose of the state's argument that the appellants are precluded from attacking the constitutionality of the October 8, 1970 order because the instant appeal constitutes a collateral attack on that order. The state claims that the order should have been attacked directly by appeal, by motion to set aside or by other immediate review. As authority for its proposition it cites Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1210, 87 S. Ct. 1824 (1967). In Walker, a state court held petitioners in contempt of court for violating an injunction which had prohibited them from participating in or encouraging mass parades or processions without first obtaining a city parade permit. Because the petitioners had not directly challenged the injunction, but instead violated its terms and then appealed from a subsequent contempt of court conviction, they were not permitted to collaterally attack the constitutionality of the injunctive order. *74 [1] The rule of Walker is inapposite here. There the order was not patently invalid, as compared to the order challenged here which is void on its face, as later in this opinion explained. We have held in a number of cases that a void order or decree, as distinguished from one that is merely erroneous, may be attacked in a collateral proceeding. State ex rel. Ewing v. Morris, 120 Wash. 146, 207 P. 18 (1922); State v. Lew, 25 Wn.2d 854, 172 P.2d 289 (1946). Also see, State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wn.2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). The violation of an order patently in excess of the jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt. In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 (1968). The "collateral bar" rule which the state contends to be enunciated in Walker has justifiably been subjected to much legal criticism, particularly as it applies to free speech cases. Frequently an injunction issues immediately before the planned activity is to occur and there is then no time available to the enjoined party to make a direct attack upon the injunction. The practical result then is that the enjoined party has no adequate remedy at law and cannot engage in a lawful activity because of an unconstitutional order. To us "It ... seems unlikely that allowing collateral attack would significantly reduce citizen compliance with lawful decrees; the citizen still faces a substantial risk of criminal penalties if proved wrong in collateral, rather than direct, attack on the decree's validity." Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 635 (1970). Additionally, it is likely that we would have declined to review the October 8, 1970 order by direct appeal or review. The issue which we would have been asked to consider would have been purely academic. At that time there would have been no assurance that the parties and the court would at the time of commencement of trial continue to agree on a jury separation. There would have been no indication that a hearing would be held in the absence of the jury or, if held, that the court would declare any of the offered testimony inadmissible. There would have *75 been no showing that the appellants had an intention to violate the order. See Grays Harbor Paper Co. v. Grays Harbor County, 74 Wn.2d 70, 442 P.2d 967 (1968). Appellants' principal assignment of error concerns the question of whether a newspaper may constitutionally be proscribed in advance from reporting to the public those events which occur during an open and public court proceeding. Limiting our opinion to the facts at hand, we hold that it may not. Our decision here today is premised first on Const. art. 1, § 10, which provides: This constitutional provision which appears in only nine state constitutions[2] mandated an open hearing in the first-degree murder trial of the two young men. In so doing, it put into immediate effect the provisions of Const. art. 1, § 5: and the first amendment to the United States Constitution: In a long line of cases it has been held that an injunction which constitutes a prior restraint on speech violates the principles of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Those principles are applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 63 S. Ct. 870, 891, 146 A.L.R. 81 (1943); Adams v. Hinkle, 51 *76 Wn.2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958); Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wn.2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968). [2] The trial court's order of October 8, 1970 was obviously and admittedly in limitation of the appellants' liberty to write and publish an account of those things which occurred in open court. That order therefore comes to us with a presumption of constitutional invalidity. If it is to be sustained, the necessity for the limitation must be supported by a different constitutional right which requires the limitation. The state argues that such is the case, for the trial court's order rests fundamentally upon the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the due process clause. It contends that because the jury was allowed to separate, the order was necessary to prevent prejudicial matter from reaching members of the jury while they were outside the courtroom. [3] We point out that it was not necessary to allow the jury to separate. RCW 10.49.110 provides that the court may not allow the jury to separate in a criminal case without the consent of the defendant and the prosecuting attorney. Under that statute the parties to a criminal case cannot create the right to a jury separation. By refusing to consent, the parties prohibit separation; by consenting, they permit the court to grant a separation. The ultimate decision following the consent of the parties to a jury separation still rests with the trial court. The fact that the parties here consented to a jury separation did not therefore necessitate a separation. We also note that the trial court issued an appropriate instruction to the jury at the time it was empaneled to hear the criminal trial. It was: We believe it appropriate to assume that the jury would obey that instruction. Ketchem v. Wood, 73 Wn.2d 335, 438 P.2d 596 (1968). If it did not and prejudicial matter reached and affected a member of the jury, the proper remedy would be a new trial. [4] The judiciary cannot under circumstances like those before us, suppress, edit, or censor from the public those events which occur in open court proceedings. The principle is clear: under ordinary circumstances "A trial is a public event.... Those who see and hear what transpire[s] can report it with impunity." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 91 L. Ed. 1546, 67 S. Ct. 1249 (1947). And "reporters of all media, including television ... are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 85 S. Ct. 1628 (1965). *78 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court's order of October 8, 1970, was void and it cannot therefore support the contempt convictions of appellants who violated the order. The trial court's earnest effort to secure and maintain a fair and impartial jury for the defendants about to be tried for a criminal offense resulted in a deprivation of the appellants' constitutional right to report to the public what happened in the open trial. If restraints upon the exercise of First Amendment rights are necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, then those restraints must be narrowly drawn. The limitations imposed cannot be greater than is necessary to accomplish the desired constitutional purpose. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.1970). That is not what occurred here. To sustain this judgment of contempt would be to say that the mere possibility of prejudicial matter reaching a juror outside the courtroom is more important in the eyes of the law than is a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. This we cannot say. The judgment of contempt is vacated and held for naught. HAMILTON, C.J., ROSELLINI, HALE, NEILL, STAFFORD, and WRIGHT, JJ., concur. ROSELLINI, J. (concurring) I agree with the majority that the appellants have the right to challenge the validity of the order entered in the criminal case by appealing from a contempt citation issued against them. I do not think it is necessary, however, to belabor a distinction between this case and Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1210, 87 S. Ct. 1824 (1967). The petitioners in that action were named as defendants in an injunction action and the injunction was served upon some, if not all, of them. They, at least, were parties to the injunction action and could have taken an appeal from the order issuing the injunction. The appellants here were not parties to the criminal action in which the order prohibiting certain reporting of *79 the facts was entered. They had no standing to appeal from that order when it was entered. Rule on Appeal I-14, RCW vol. 0. Sheets v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 34 Wn.2d 851, 210 P.2d 690 (1949). In that case, we said that one not a party to an action cannot appeal from a judgment, order, or decree entered therein. For this reason, I am of the opinion that Walker v. Birmingham, supra, has no application here. There was no order from which the appellants could appeal until the contempt citation was entered. This being their first opportunity to raise the question, they certainly have the right to challenge the validity of the order upon which the contempt citation was based. It would be an anomaly indeed if the law, while decreeing that a reporter may report with impunity falsehoods about a public official or public figure (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wn.2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969)), decreed at the same time that he could not print the truth about judicial proceedings. A rule allowing a court to suppress publication of the facts about those matters which occur before it, even though the rule were to be used only for supposedly "legitimate" purposes and never to conceal improper acts of the court itself, would hardly be calculated to inspire in the public that respect for the judicial system which "law and order" require. The very notion of such a power in the court is utterly incompatible with the principle of equal justice, openly administered, which is fundamental to the health of a democratic society. FINLEY, J. (concurring specially in the result) The facts as stated in the majority opinion are quite acceptable. However, I cannot agree with certain aspects of the reasoning. I do reach the same result by a different route. I think something needs to be said about this different route, and more needs to be said about this case than has been set out in the majority opinion. *80 The majority opinion commences with the quotation that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R. 1346 (1941). The quotation is an appealing one, and by that eminent expositor of free speech Mr. Justice Black; but it seems to me the quotation is somewhat misleading and not analytically relevant in a strict sense to the problem involved and its disposition in the instant case. I can certainly agree that it would be a trying task to choose between the constitutional concepts of free press and fair trial; but recognition and statement of the difficulties inherent in such a process do not assist, and certainly do not resolve, the juristic problem involved when there is actual conflict between the two constitutional concepts. In other words, it would be nice to say that the problem is a most difficult one and leave it at that, as Justice Black's quoted statement seems to do. But we can indulge in no such philosophical luxury. We are faced with we must evaluate and resolve an actual conflict between the constitutional concepts of free press and fair trial posed by the prohibitory order of the trial judge and publication of the article by The Seattle Times contrary to the order. Thus, it should be rather obvious that this is not a simple, run-of-the-mill case involving a single issue as to the interpretation of specific state or federal constitutional language involving in isolation only one constitutional concept. Also, it is an oversimplification to say that the exercise of freedom of the press by the news media is in fact, or is in effect, absolute once a trial has begun, and events occurring in public and in open court are involved. It is, likewise, I think, oversimplification to assume that the article published by The Seattle Times could not under any circumstances prejudice the rights of the defendants to a fair trial. I have in mind particularly that portion of the article focusing upon testimony and evidence of the witness *81 Mrs. Howardine Mease[3] recounting the commission of crimes of violence in California ostensibly by the two defendants on trial in Snohomish County. Such evidence was offered and excluded by the trial judge at a hearing in the absence of the jury. The article focused upon, reported and described this inadmissible evidence. Several questions arise. First, did the order of the trial judge prohibiting the news media from reporting the inadmissible and excluded evidence constitute censorship or a prior restraint and an improper judicial effort to restrict the constitutional right of freedom of the press? Second, did the newspaper article reporting and describing evidence ruled inadmissible and excluded in the absence of the jury constitute a "clear and present danger" to the administration of justice involving prejudice to the rights of the defendants to a fair trial? Third, did the publication of the article "have a tendency" to disrupt and frustrate the administration of justice, particularly in relation to the rights of the defendants then on trial? Lastly, was the contempt proceeding premature in the absence of reasonably convincing proof that a juror or jurors had seen, had read, and had understood the significance of, and had been influenced by, that portion of the article reporting and describing the excluded evidence of previous crimes of violence committed allegedly by the defendants in the state of California. The fact pattern of the instant case and the above questions present rather new and unique juristic problems; as *82 there are no clear-cut, well-established controlling precedents where the legal issues are identical, and the facts are also identical, or so closely comparable, to be indistinguishable. However, considerable help, I think, may be gleaned from decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 85 S. Ct. 1628 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190 (1941); and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. Ed. 1295, 66 S. Ct. 1029 (1946); and from the reasoning of Justice Traynor in People v. Lambright, 61 Cal. 2d 482, 393 P.2d 409, 39 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1964). In this connection, I cannot rule out consideration of the reasoning of Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Bridges, and concurring in Pennekamp. Even so, most careful and meticulous analysis of these cases must be made, if not as to the specific rulings and the facts in those cases, then to ascertain some guiding statements, principles, or perhaps even dicta of a particularly pertinent and persuasive character. There has been both underreaction and overreaction in the interpretation of the decision of the court in Estes and Sheppard. This has been to the effect either (a) that there has been absolutely no change in the law as to the scope and amplitude of the right of free press or conversely (b) that the decisions have effected sweeping changes in this respect. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that, reduced to bare essentials. Estes and Sheppard stand for the proposition that massive news coverage, overreporting of pretrial and trial proceedings, gives rise to a legal presumption of prejudice regarding the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Furthermore, a quick comparison with the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the celebrated Hauptmann case (State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649, 80 L. Ed. 461, 56 S. Ct. 310 (1935), petition for writ of habeas corpus denied, 297 U.S. 693, 80 L. Ed. 985, 56 S. Ct. 385 (1936)), seems to me to demonstrate quite *83 clearly that significant change has been wrought in the law by the United States Supreme Court in the Estes and Sheppard decisions. It should be remembered in this connection that the Hauptmann case was decided more than 35 years ago. At that time the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized the scope and amplitude of freedom of the press, saying: (Italics mine.) State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 443, 180 A. 809, 827-28 (1935). In reading and analyzing the Sheppard case, it must be kept in mind that after determining that prejudice to the rights of the defendant was conclusively presumed, the court commented on several alternatives, controls, or remedies in regard to invasion, and prejudice, or protection of the rights of criminal defendants. Among the methods or remedies suggested as available to trial courts, the court suggested change of venue, carefully worded instructions to the jury to disregard prejudicial material not presented to them in court as evidence, and, in the final analysis, the *84 court granted a new trial to the defendants. In referring to the granting of the new trial, the court described this remedy as merely a palliative. The opinion in Sheppard, states: (Italics mine.) Sheppard, 384 U.S., at 363. It seems to me this language of the court, reasonably construed, gives some leeway to trial judges to take appropriate measures to control and prevent prejudicial influences from affecting the deliberations and the verdict of the jury in a criminal case. The problem is how to establish and describe such preventive measures without improperly limiting freedom of speech and of the press as safeguarded by both state and United States constitutional provisions. At this point it is appropriate to note decisions of our own court apropos of the subject of prior restraints. In Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wn.2d 503, 512, 445 P.2d 602 (1968), we noted that: (Footnote omitted. Italics mine.) Additionally, it is useful to restate the comments of Professor Thomas I. Emerson of the Yale Law School which appeared in Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wn.2d 763, 772, 322 P.2d 844 (1958): (Italics mine.) Thus, according to Adams v. Hinkle, supra, a prior restraint effected by an order of the trial judge designed to meet or negate a "clear and present danger" that extra-legal factors would be prejudicial to, and violate the fair trial rights of, a criminal defendant may not necessarily be unconstitutional. *86 It may be of some interest to digress momentarily for a brief discussion of the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Committee and its program of voluntary cooperation for commonsense accommodation of the principles of free press and fair trial. This program was launched prior to the decisions in Estes and Sheppard and has been actively pursued and developed in the state of Washington for a period of several years by dedicated members of the news media, the bar, the bench, and law enforcement agencies in the state of Washington. Several basic assumptions or convictions underlie and constitute the foundations of the bench-bar-press program. The first of these has been an abiding conviction after the advent of the decisions in Estes and Sheppard that the United States Supreme Court, in those decisions, has changed the law affecting free press and fair trial and the interrelationships of these two most significant and basic constitutional concepts. Collateral to this is the assumption that free press and fair trial can be antithetical and in direct conflict depending upon specific factual situations, in specific cases having to do, principally, perhaps, with pretrial criminal proceedings, but also, I believe, with other aspects of the judicial administration of criminal justice. The factual pattern in the instant case as it relates to The Seattle Times article reporting on the inadmissible and excluded evidence is a classic example of conflict or collision between fair trial and free press constitutional concepts. Another basic assumption of the bench-bar-press program is that responsibility for commonsense accommodation of free press and fair trial is a joint and several responsibility of the bench, the bar, the news media, and law enforcement. In this context, another most important assumption has been that free press and fair trial cannot be regarded as absolutes; otherwise, one or the other in an absolute sense depreciates limits and is capable of negativing or destroying the other. Guidelines and Principles for the Reporting of Criminal Proceedings (carefully developed by the Bench-Bar-Press Committee, after full interchange and discussion among representatives of the bench, *87 the bar, the news media and the law enforcement agencies) provide as follows: (Italics mine.) It comes as something of a disappointment that both the trial judge and The Seattle Times seem to have given less than appropriate attention and emphasis to the spirit and intent of the Statement of Principles and the Guidelines for the Reporting of Criminal Proceedings developed so carefully and so hopefully by the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Committee. Apparently the trial judge was principally concerned with the rights of the criminal defendants then on trial, and believed that it was essentially or even solely his responsibility, and within his authority, to safeguard those rights. Perhaps also, The Seattle Times principally was concerned for the right of free press and the newspapers' responsibilities in this regard to keep the public fully informed about the criminal proceedings then in progress. Neither seem to have given much thought to the interrelationship of the two rights and possible conflict and, therefore, the need for the exercise of careful, cautious *92 judgment to allow optimal emphasis and realization as to both free press and fair trial. It seems to me that both the trial judge and the newspaper were partly right, both were partly wrong at least potentially so. On the one hand, the jury was carefully and properly instructed by the trial judge that they would consider and render their verdict in accordance only with the evidence presented to them in open court. The trial judge could and did give consideration to sequestration[4] of the jury. This procedure, as instanced by the decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966), provides reasonably reliable safeguards so that only matters adduced in open court will be considered by the jury. However, this method, although hopeful in potential with respect to assuring a fair trial, is not without some serious difficulties. One of these is the extra cost involved in housing, feeding, and accommodating jurors segregated for the duration of a trial. As to this, perhaps, it can be said that the costs and budgets of government, and the courts, concerning the administration of justice should not be considered a serious bar when the desirability or necessity exists for sequestration of the jury in criminal trials of great moment and public interest. Even so, it must be realized that there are practical problems involving not only county finances and budgeting, but the availability of housing and other accommodations for sequestered jurors in particular areas of our state. In addition, there is the most sensitive and complex problem, particularly in a criminal trial which is expected to last weeks or even months, of selecting jurors who are willing to and, who without serious inconvenience, can be sequestered and separated from their families, friends, and from business and other commitments throughout a trial lasting several weeks or months. In this connection, there is, in addition, the possibility of a serious *93 objection from defense counsel in behalf of his client, the criminal defendant. Such objection takes the form of a criticism that sequestration has its difficulties and complications and has a tendency, or will actually result in, a jury that is not representative of the community in the truest sense. In other words, it may be contended that the prospect of sequestration may have a tendency, or will not result in, a freely and impartially selected jury and is, therefore, prejudicial to the rights of a defendant to full due process and a fair trial. Thus, sequestration of a jury may not be without its problems for a trial judge. In the instant case, the trial was apparently expected to last 4 or 5 weeks. Perhaps somewhat unfortunately, in terms of effective administration of justice, a trial lasting 4 or 5 weeks currently does not seem to be unusual, nor inordinate. In any event, through careful pretrial proceedings designed to organize and direct the trial properly without unnecessary delay, the anticipated length of trial and the period of sequestration of the jury might well have been lessened and reduced by several days or even a week or so. It is hindsight, and perhaps subject to debate, but in the position of the trial judge which I was not the indicated doubts or problems would have been resolved in sequestration of the jury. It is safe to say as a matter of judicial notice that reasonably adequate hotel and other accommodations would have been available in Everett, Washington. This brings me to another point. Although the trial judge, in discharging what he regarded as his responsibility, did not sequester the jury, news media people under the guidelines of the Bench-Bar-Press Committee and otherwise were not relieved of their joint and several responsibility for commonsense accommodation of problems of free press and fair trial. There was at least some serious potential danger that the inadmissible and excluded evidence would reach the jury by reason of publication of the article in The Seattle Times. It seems to me that the right of the public to be informed and to know about the trial proceedings *94 was not such a supervening, compulsive, and absolute right to justify action potentially seriously prejudicial to the rights of the criminal defendants then on trial. In numerous other instances the news media have time and again exercised most admirable journalistic or editorial judgment and restraint and have refrained from publication of material having serious potential prejudice to the rights of criminal defendants. The question has been a constantly recurring one and has to be asked, "Why did this not happen in the instant case? Was it because of the breadth and scope of the order of the trial judge, and because of his apparent assertion of authority and right, constitutional or otherwise, to restrict, restrain and limit news reporting? Was this what prompted a challenge and the assertion by The Seattle Times of an absolute right to publish, perhaps irrespective of potential harm and prejudice to fair trial rights of the criminal defendants?" There is, perhaps, no answer except possibly that the situation just got out of hand on the part of those concerned, or who should have been more concerned. And, it is really a case of "too bad," where the hopes and expectations of the Guidelines and Principles of the Bench-Bar-Press Committee simply did not work out. It seems beyond peradventure of doubt and debate that under our system of justice, "fair trial" means, among other things, that a criminal defendant can be convicted only on the basis of evidence properly admitted in open court and properly before the jury for its consideration and evaluation. If the proffered testimony clearly implicating defendants in murder and attempted murder in California conceivably had been admitted unqualifiedly by Judge McCrea, this would have been prejudicial to a fair trial and reversible error. If this testimony reached the jury through publication and dissemination of news by the news media, its potentially prejudicial effect upon fair trial would be no less. In fact, in either event, the potentiality of prejudice, reversible error, and the granting of a new trial for the defendants would seem to be about the same. The crucial *95 question, of course, is whether the newspaper article describing the inadmissible evidence actually reached the jury, was read, then given consideration by the jury, and whether it can be said this prejudicially affected the jury's consideration of the case. In a somewhat comparable situation, the California Supreme Court in People v. Lambright, 61 Cal. 2d 482, 487, 393 P.2d 409, 412, 39 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1964), in an opinion by Justice Traynor stated: (Footnote omitted.) In an interesting, and, I think relevant, footnote, Justice Traynor stated: (Italics mine.) Lambright, 61 Cal. 2d at 487, n. 2. Recently, in State v. Miles, 73 Wn.2d 67, 71, 436 P.2d 198 (1968), we stated: The principle seems so well established in the law that there should be no question that if the excluded evidence reached and was considered by the jury, this presumptively would be prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial. Of course, the significant question remains as to whether the excluded evidence, via the newspaper article, improperly reached, was improperly considered by, and it can be said improperly prejudiced the jury in the instant case. This seems to be sufficient discussion of one horn of our dilemma. Now, as to the other focus of our dilemma, i.e., freedom of the press, the question is whether this constitutional concept and its concomitant ramifications has a super-sacrosanct status setting it apart and above other basic constitutional rights including fair trial rights of criminal defendants. Stating this another and perhaps extreme way, this horn of our dilemma is whether the right of free speech and freedom of the press are of such moment and scope that they may be employed in an absolute sense by the media to prejudice or destroy the right of a criminal defendant to a fair and impartial trial. I think the dilemma, or the basic question, may be the same under some circumstances, whether related either to pretrial or to trial proceedings. *97 In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190 (1941), decided by a five to four divided court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts and Byrnes in dissent, stated, at page 282: Further comments by Justice Frankfurter at page 293 seem apropos and worth noting: In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. Ed. 1295, 66 S. Ct. 1029 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed, writing the majority opinion for the court, stated at page 336: (Italics mine.) This statement, in my judgment, aptly describes the problem on appeal in the instant case. Concurring with the majority in Pennekamp, Mr. Justice *98 Frankfurter emphasized the fact that the provisions of many state constitutions concerning freedom of the press are coupled with provisions or specific constitutional language prescribing responsibility for the exercise of freedom of the press and for its abuse. At page 356 in Pennekamp, he stated: The footnote to this statement reads: (Italics mine.) It is apt and legally relevant to note and emphasize that article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides: (Italics mine.) Alluding to critics of the press and alleged journalistic excesses categorized as "trial by newspaper," and referring to proposed legislative restrictions on the press, Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp, at pages 364-65, stated: (Italics mine.) Both Bridges and Pennekamp involved contempt proceedings against newspapers for alleged attacks upon judges allegedly to influence the outcome of litigation. In support of the contempt proceedings, it was contended that the particular newspaper reports or articles constituted a "clear and present danger" or a "reasonable tendency" to interfere with and obstruct the administration of justice. In both cases, the court rejected the applicability of the suggested tests as judicial determinants of what constituted freedom of the press or abuse of it. In Bridges, 314 U.S. at 296, Justice Frankfurter commented that: (Italics mine.) While the indicated tests have been useful and may be apt in some contexts, I agree with the court in Bridges and Pennekamp that the tests are speculative and conjectural and may be too imprecise and unpredictable in weighing the values inherent in the sensitive interrelationships of free speech and press, and fair trial. In other words, a contempt proceeding based upon such tests is tenuous and speculative at best. The "clear and present danger test," any variation of it, or other language indicative of tendency, inference, or possibility constitutes a test or formula *100 too tenuous and unreal for judicial application under the circumstances in the instant case involving sensitive interrelationships or conflicts between free press and fair trial. In any event, the primary and the crucial question in the instant case was not just susceptible to, or a matter of, speculation. Rather, it could have been reduced to certainty and reality. That crucial question was simply whether a juror or jurors read, understood, and considered the article published in The Seattle Times reporting and describing the evidence excluded by the trial judge concerning alleged crimes of violence committed by the defendants in California. On this question, the jury could have been polled immediately after the publication of the article or subsequently during the trial. The polling, at least in my judgment, could have been accomplished at the time by simply inquiring about the article without revealing its contents and thereby precipitating prejudice to the due process-fair trial rights of the defendants. Actually, the question could have been asked whether the jurors had read an article concerning the trial, published in the particular issues or editions of The Seattle Times. If no juror had read the article, it seems to me that would have ended the matter as to any potential prejudice of the rights of the defendants then on trial, and a fortiori as to any actual contempt of court. On the other hand, if a juror or jurors had read the article and recalled and understood its significance, this was the time, and would have been a proper basis, for granting a new trial, and possibly for more realistic rationally based contempt proceedings. The record in the instant case does not indicate whether the article was or was not read by a juror or jurors. The potential evil involved is, as of now, tenuous and speculative too much so, in my judgment, to support the contempt proceeding against the appellants, reporters of The Seattle Times. Additionally, it should be pointed out that the contempt proceeding was predicated upon appellants' alleged violation of the trial court's October 8 pretrial order. That order purported to bar news media publication regarding evidence *101 offered or proceedings occurring in open court out of the presence of the jury. Appellants' alleged disregard of this order falls initially, or inchoately within the ambit of RCW 7.20.010, which provides in part: However, it is clear that the trial court's adjudication that appellants were in contempt is based upon provisions of the order of October 8, which if literally and immediately applied and enforced, rather than retrospectively would amount to a prior restraint and prepublication censorship. As previously noted, such prior censorship cannot be sustained under the provisions of Const. art. 1, § 5. Consequently, in this respect, the order of October 8 is unconstitutional and void. Thus, the subsequent order adjudicating appellants in contempt cannot be sustained, and I concur with the opinion of the majority that the order must be reversed and, furthermore, the contempt proceeding dismissed with prejudice. Although the order of October 8 is constitutionally void insofar as it was applied to constitute a prior restraint and prepublication censorship, somewhat comparable orders carefully worked out with all concerned, cautiously worded and meticulously tailored can serve a unique and most useful purpose. That purpose is notice not only to the news media but to all concerned regarding appropriate ground rules and guidelines, such as those of the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Committee, to safeguard the administration of justice and to bring about a commonsense accommodation of both free press and fair trial constitutional rights. We would be presented with quite a different matter had the instant contempt adjudication involved and had been based upon allegations concerning post-publication results of appellants' actions, i.e., contamination of the jury verdict *102 and post-publication accountability. In other words, although prior restraint and prepublication censorship are verboten under our state constitution post-publication accountability, responsibility, and liability of the news media is constitutionally supportable. Actions by members of the news media amounting to potential contamination of a criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial cannot be proscribed in advance. But, such actions where provably harmful to fair trial constitutional rights may subject the news media to post-publication accountability. Such accountability or responsibility is supported by the wording and what seems to me the intent and meaning of our state constitution. In such instances, accountability may be implemented either under the provisions of RCW 7.20.010 (9), as enacted by the legislature, which provides that any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court shall constitute contempt; or, accountability can be implemented by the trial court's exercise of its inherent powers to provide protection for its proceedings. In short, actions of the news media resulting in provable harm to a criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial may subject the news media to post-publication responsibility and accountability. It could be argued that under the above-stated principle or standard, any contamination of the jury verdict in the instant case resulting from appellants' actions presently remains open to proof, and that the proceedings in contempt should not be dismissed with prejudice. However, in light of the uniqueness of the problem and the absence of guiding precedents clear-cut and well-established it is my conviction that fundamental and essential principles of fair play dictate that any implementation of the principle of post-publication accountability should be reserved for prospective application in future cases. Thus, I reach the conclusion that appellants herein should not be subject to further contempt proceedings based upon allegations in regard to post-publication accountability. As to any future cases of this nature, it seems prudent to *103 emphasize that this court should have no reservations in applying the principle or standard relative to post-publication accountability. The comments, the discussion, and guidelines indicated herein should provide notice to all concerned and avoid any inference or contention as to surprise that post-publication accountability dictated by our state constitution will be the applicable principle or standard in future cases of this nature. In my opinion, the indicated standard is both legally and pragmatically sound which, incidentally, may be something of a rarity these days. It is my belief the standard indicates or provides, among other things, an appropriate and necessary solution of the sensitive and delicate problem of conflict between the constitutional concepts of free press and fair trial. Namely, the suggested solution would be based upon actual proof of tangible harm rather than upon mere suspicion, speculation, and conjecture. Such a solution avoids the problem of any prior restraint or censorship of the news media. It also avoids tenuous speculation in any application of the "clear and present danger" tests or any semantical variations thereof. Such a solution is consistent with the principles and objectives of the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines. Such a solution allows amplitude for the exercise of freedom of the press and the application of sound editorial, journalistic judgment. Concomitantly, such a solution emphasizes the sensitive and significant responsibility of the news media in the exercise of freedom of the press in relation to the constitutional concept of fair trial. While eliminating the possibility of prior restraints and censorship, such a solution is consistent with the language of our state constitution and that of other state constitutions that freedom of speech and of the press may be exercised but with those concerned "being responsible for the abuse of that right." HUNTER and WRIGHT, JJ., concur with FINLEY, J. Petition for rehearing denied June 4, 1971. [1] RCW 10.49.110 provides: "Juries in criminal cases shall not be allowed to separate, except by consent of the defendant and the prosecuting attorney, but shall be kept together, without meat or drink, unless otherwise ordered by the court, to be furnished at the expense of the county." [2] The other eight are: Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 11 (1912); Cal. Const. art. 1, § 13 (1879); Idaho Const. art. 1, § 18 (1889); Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 18 (1859); Mont. Const. art. 3, § 6 (1889); Neb. Const. art. 1, § 13 (1875); Ore. Const. art. 1, § 10 (1857); S.D. Const. art. 6, § 20 (1889). [3] The article in the October 29 issue of The Seattle Times reported: Mrs. Howardine Mease, of Gaviota, Calif., testified earlier yesterday that she and her family discovered the girl sprawled in the middle of a highway near Jamestown. Stopping to assist her, Mrs. Mease said the girl told her two men had killed her companion, shot her and driven off in a 1967 green Mercury sedan. Officer Lloyd Berry of the highway patrol then testified he was ordered to the scene and broadcast on his radio the information given him by Mrs. Mease. Mrs. Mease also said the girl told her the assailants were named "Mike and John." The Seattle Times, Oct. 29, 1970, at C4. [4] Under an order of sequestration, the jury would be provided room and board, and virtually kept in seclusion apart from the parties and public, and from outside or out-of-court contacts and influences for the duration of the trial proceedings.