Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Paul A. Strouse

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1619-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
Paul A. Strouse, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Paul A. Strouse, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STROUSE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 16, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Dean R. 
Dietrich and Ruder Ware L.L.S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by 
Dean R. Dietrich. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by James 
C. Reiher and The Schroder Group, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by James C. Reiher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1619-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Paul A. Strouse, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul A. Strouse, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Paul A. Strouse has appealed a 
report filed by Referee Kevin L. Ferguson, concluding that he 
engaged in professional misconduct and recommending that this 
court suspend Attorney Strouse's license to practice law for 60 
days and impose full costs, which total $67,562.12 as of May 6, 
2015. 
¶2 
Having 
considered 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
the 
parties' briefs and oral argument on appeal, we conclude that 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
2 
 
the referee's findings of fact are supported by satisfactory and 
convincing evidence and we accept his conclusions of law, with 
one exception:  we dismiss the allegation that Attorney Strouse 
violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:8.4(c).  We agree that 
Attorney Strouse's misconduct warrants the suspension of his 
license to practice law for 60 days and we impose the full costs 
of this proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Strouse was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1991.  He practices in Milwaukee, primarily 
representing 
debtors 
in 
bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
 
Attorney 
Strouse 
has 
received 
two 
previous 
public 
reprimands 
for 
misconduct that occurred between 2007 and 2009.  Public 
Reprimand of Paul A. Strouse, 2010-2; Public Reprimand of Paul 
A. Strouse, 2011-5.  In addition, during the pendency of this 
proceeding, Attorney Strouse received a third public reprimand.  
Public Reprimand of Paul Strouse, 2015-6. 
¶4 
The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed the 
complaint giving rise to this proceeding on July 22, 2013, 
alleging eights counts of professional misconduct committed in 
four separate client matters.  Attorney Strouse filed an answer 
and Referee Ferguson was appointed.  Attorney Strouse amended 
his answer, and discovery and pre-hearing motions followed.   
¶5 
Shortly 
before 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
Attorney 
Strouse entered into a stipulation with the OLR to withdraw his 
amended answer and allow entry of judgment regarding Counts One 
and Two, pertaining to the matter of F.E.  Subsequently, the 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
3 
 
parties entered into a stipulation of facts, including 59 
exhibits.  
¶6 
In June 2014, the referee commenced a four-day 
evidentiary hearing which included extensive testimony, more 
than 100 exhibits, and more than 150 pages of briefing.  The 
referee issued his report and recommendation on October 30, 
2014.  This appeal followed.  The court heard oral argument on 
April 16, 2015.   
¶7 
When reviewing a referee's report and recommendation, 
the referee, as the finder of fact, is the ultimate arbiter of 
the 
credibility 
of 
the 
witnesses. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Alia, 2006 WI 12, ¶71, 288 Wis. 2d 299, 
709 N.W.2d 399.  We affirm the referee's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 
125.  We review the referee's conclusions of law de novo.  Alia, 
2006 WI 12, ¶39.  We determine the appropriate level of 
discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefitting 
from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶8 
Each of the client matters raised in the OLR complaint 
will be addressed seriatim. 
Matter of F.E.  
¶9 
Attorney Strouse stipulated that he committed the 
misconduct alleged in connection with his representation of F.E.  
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
4 
 
The facts will be summarized because the admitted misconduct is 
relevant to our assessment of appropriate discipline.  
¶10 F.E. purchased a gas station/convenience store in 
Milwaukee and, as part of that transaction, F.E. signed a 
Commercial 
Security 
Agreement 
that 
gave 
Ridgestone 
Bank 
(Ridgestone) a security interest in, as relevant here, certain 
fuel monitoring equipment.  In April 2009, Ridgestone started 
foreclosure proceedings on the gas station, and obtained a 
default judgment in June 2009.  Also in June 2009, F.E. hired 
Attorney Strouse.  Ridgestone's lawyer began asking Attorney 
Strouse to arrange for F.E. to return the fuel monitoring 
equipment.  Meanwhile, Attorney Strouse filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition on behalf of F.E. and, at some point, F.E. 
delivered the fuel monitoring equipment to Attorney Strouse's 
office.  Attorney Strouse did not give F.E. a receipt.   
¶11 On November 20, 2009, after Attorney Strouse had 
failed to respond to repeated requests for the return of the 
equipment, the gas station's receiver went unannounced to 
Attorney Strouse's office to collect the fuel monitoring 
equipment.  Attorney Strouse admitted the equipment had been 
stolen or lost.   
¶12 The complaint alleged and Attorney Strouse later 
stipulated 
that, 
by 
failing 
to 
clearly 
identify 
and 
appropriately safeguard the fuel monitoring equipment left in 
his possession, notwithstanding his receipt of written notice of 
Ridgestone's interest in the property, Attorney Strouse violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(6), which provides, in pertinent part, that 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
5 
 
"[t]he lawyer shall clearly identify and appropriately safeguard 
other property of a client or 3rd party" (Count One).   
¶13 The complaint alleged further and Attorney Strouse 
stipulated that, by failing to provide a signed, written receipt 
to F.E. describing the fuel monitoring equipment he had taken 
into custody and the date of receipt, Attorney Strouse violated 
SCR 20:1.15(j)(8)b., which provides that "[u]pon taking custody, 
as a fiduciary, of any tangible personal property or securities 
in bearer form, the lawyer shall provide to the previous 
custodian a signed receipt, with a description of the property, 
and the date of receipt" (Count Two).   
¶14 We turn to the disputed aspects of this disciplinary 
matter. 
Matter of G.B. 
¶15 Attorney Strouse appeals the referee's conclusion that 
he committed two counts of misconduct in his representation of 
G.B.  In November 2009, G.B. and his partner, C.W., met with 
Attorney Strouse to discuss Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.  
Attorney Strouse quoted each a fee of approximately $900 for 
their respective bankruptcy proceedings, consisting of $300 in 
filing fees and $600 in legal fees.  It is undisputed that the 
initial fee quote was less than $1,000. 
¶16 On February 3, 2010, they met again and G.B. offered 
to provide website design services in exchange for the $600 
attorney fee.  The OLR alleged that Attorney Strouse orally 
agreed to G.B.'s suggestion.  G.B. claimed he subsequently spent 
some 15 hours on the website project.  Attorney Strouse disputes 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
6 
 
this claim, stating that he rejected G.B.'s suggestion because a 
longtime friend did his website design.  He claims that, 
instead, he renewed his offer for a "special rate" of $975 
conditioned upon receiving $650 up front before filing the 
bankruptcy petition.  G.B. gave Attorney Strouse $300 for the 
bankruptcy filing fee that day.   
¶17 On March 6, 2010, G.B. met with Attorney Strouse's law 
associate to review and sign bankruptcy schedules for his 
bankruptcy petition.  The schedules included Form 2016(b), which 
stated that Attorney Strouse had agreed to accept $0.00 in 
attorney's fees and that no balance was due.  The form also 
contained the following certification:  "I certify that the 
foregoing 
is 
a 
complete 
statement 
of 
any 
agreement 
or 
arrangement for payment to me for representation of the 
debtor(s) in this bankruptcy proceeding." 
¶18 G.B. stated that he interpreted the $0 as evidence of 
the agreement to exchange web design for legal fees.  Attorney 
Strouse maintains that the $0 figure was an error; he stated 
that the bankruptcy petition had to be filed quickly because a 
small claims action had just been filed against G.B. 
¶19 On March 8, 2010, Attorney Strouse filed G.B.'s 
bankruptcy petition and sent G.B. a letter advising him that the 
bankruptcy petition had been filed.  This letter did not request 
any additional fee.   
¶20 On or about March 15, 2010, Attorney Strouse and G.B. 
spoke by telephone. The substance of that conversation is hotly 
contested.  G.B. claimed that Attorney Strouse abruptly stated 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
7 
 
that he no longer wanted G.B. to work on the website and 
demanded $750, increasing the total cost of representation to 
$1,050.  Attorney Strouse claims that G.B. realized that most of 
the work on his bankruptcy case was done and didn't intend to 
pay his balance.  Attorney Strouse acknowledged that he "got 
angry" and demanded payment.   
¶21 On March 17, 2010, Attorney Strouse sent G.B. an 
invoice for $1,050, reflecting a $300 payment received and a new 
balance due of $750.  A series of oral demands for payment and 
refusals 
ensued. 
 
G.B. 
terminated 
Attorney 
Strouse's 
representation and Attorney Strouse withdrew as counsel for 
G.B.'s bankruptcy case.   
¶22 On March 26, 2010, G.B. filed a small claims action 
against Attorney Strouse in Kenosha County, seeking a refund of 
his $300 filing fee, and alleging that Attorney Strouse reneged 
on a barter for services agreement.  On July 21, 2010, G.B. 
prevailed at a bench trial.  The transcript from this small 
claims proceeding reflects that the circuit court found that 
Attorney Strouse reneged on a barter agreement for services.  
The circuit court deemed significant the $0 in fees claimed in 
the bankruptcy disclosure.  The circuit court awarded G.B. 
$459.50. 
¶23 Turning to this disciplinary proceeding, the referee 
concluded that "Attorney Strouse failed to provide to [G.B.] a 
written 
fee 
agreement 
setting 
forth 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
representation and the basis or rate of the fees or expenses for 
representation" and that "Attorney Strouse reneged on an 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
8 
 
agreement to provide legal services to [G.B.] for $900.00 and 
subsequently failed to abide by the agreement when he increased 
the fee to $1,050.00 without his client's consent."  The referee 
thus concluded that Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) 
(Count 
Three) 
and 
SCR 20:8.4(c) 
(Count 
Four) 
in 
his 
representation of G.B.   
¶24 We first consider whether Attorney Strouse violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).  SCR 20:1.5(b)(l) provides: 
The scope of the representation and the basis or 
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 
be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 
writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing 
the 
representation . . . . 
 
If 
it 
is 
reasonably foreseeable that the total cost of the 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1,000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing.  Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.  
¶25 The 
American 
Bar 
Association 
Comment 
to 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) reminds us of the reason for this rule:  
In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an 
understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly 
established.  Generally, it is desirable to furnish 
the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy 
of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states 
the general nature of the legal services to be 
provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee 
and whether and to what extent the client will be 
responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements 
in the course of the representation.  A written 
statement concerning the terms of the engagement 
reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. 
¶26 Attorney 
Strouse 
takes 
issue 
with 
the 
referee's 
statement that he "failed to provide to [G.B.] a written fee 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
9 
 
agreement."  Attorney Strouse correctly notes that the term 
"written fee agreement" does not appear in the rule and that no 
written fee communication is required when it is foreseeable 
that the total cost of representation will be $1,000 or less.   
¶27 However, our rule requires that certain information 
with respect to fees and expenses be communicated to the client, 
whether orally or in writing.  The rule expressly requires that 
any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall 
also be communicated in writing to the client.  The first 
paragraph of the Wisconsin Committee Comment to SCR 20:1.5 
observes that "communication to the client through the billing 
statement should clearly indicate that a change in the basis or 
rate of the fee or expenses has occurred along with an indication 
of the new basis or rate of the fee or expenses."  This was not 
done. 
¶28 The referee found that "Strouse unilaterally set 
[G.B.'s] account at his regular flat rate of $1,050 and sent the 
Statement . . . to [G.B.] because he was angry with [G.B.]" 
(emphasis added).  Attorney Strouse sent a brief cover letter 
and a cursory billing statement that makes absolutely no mention 
of any change in the fee charged to G.B., much less setting 
forth the reason for the change.  Simply put, the cursory 
billing statement submitted to G.B., unilaterally increasing the 
fee for legal services in the wake of an acrimonious telephone 
call, does not satisfy the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b).  
Notwithstanding 
the 
imprecise 
language 
in 
the 
referee's 
conclusion regarding a "written fee agreement," the record 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
10 
 
contains clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Attorney 
Strouse 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirements 
of 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(l).  
¶29 We next consider Attorney Strouse's appeal from the 
referee's conclusion that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) in his 
representation of G.B.  SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation."  
Attorney Strouse contends that the referee failed to make 
necessary or sufficient credibility determinations to support 
his findings and conclusions on this point.  We agree.  Our 
review would be simpler had the referee made more explicit 
findings to support his conclusion that Attorney Strouse's 
conduct constituted fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
¶30 The OLR alleged that, by reneging on an alleged 
agreement to provide legal services to G.B. in exchange for 
website design services or, in the alternative, by agreeing to 
provide legal services for $900 and subsequently failing to 
abide by that agreement, unilaterally increasing the fee to 
$1,050 without his client's consent, Attorney Strouse violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶31 The referee made a factual finding that the small 
claims court "found in favor of [G.B.] and awarded [G.B.] a 
judgment of $300.00 plus costs against Strouse to be paid 
[G.B.]" and that the court "concluded that there was an 
agreement between [G.B.] and Strouse for website design services 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
11 
 
in lieu of bankruptcy legal fees [when he stated]:  'I'm 
satisfied there was an agreement.  You were taking it out in 
work.'"  However, the referee's mere recognition of the prior 
small claims proceeding is insufficient, alone, to sustain a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) under these facts, particularly in 
view of the lower burden of proof applicable in small claims 
proceedings.  The referee did find that Attorney Strouse 
"reneged" on an agreement with G.B., but the precise nature of 
that 
agreement 
remains 
unclear 
and 
the 
circumstances 
as 
reflected in the referee's findings do not establish that 
Attorney 
Strouse's 
conduct 
rose 
to 
the 
level 
of 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  This court 
will not make a finding that the referee could have made but did 
not. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Wood, 
122 Wis. 2d 610, 
363 N.W.2d 220 
(1985); 
see 
also 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 
342 N.W.2d 406 (1984).  We conclude that the referee's findings 
do not support the conclusion that Attorney Strouse's conduct 
constituted misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and 
we dismiss this charge.  
Matter of Y.W. 
¶32 Attorney 
Strouse 
appeals 
Referee 
Ferguson's 
determination that Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) in 
his representation of Y.W.  In February 2010, Attorney Strouse 
agreed to represent Y.W. in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy matter and, 
on February 4, 2010, Y.W. paid Attorney Strouse $100 to start 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
12 
 
the proceeding.  The receipt reflects payment but does not state 
a balance due. 
¶33 On April 3, 2010, Y.W. paid an additional $300.  The 
receipt reflects a balance due of $650. 
¶34 On April 15, 2010, Attorney Strouse filed Y.W.'s 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, without schedules.  He sent a 
billing statement to Y.W. dated April 15, 2010, reflecting an 
opening balance of $1,050 with a balance due of $650.1   
¶35 On April 22, 2010, Attorney Strouse met with Y.W. and 
told her she owed him an additional $700.  Attorney Strouse 
later told the OLR that Y.W. agreed to pay the extra $50, a 
claim Y.W. disputes.  Attorney Strouse agreed to accept two 
post-dated checks, each in the amount of $350, as payment, now 
reflecting a total cost of representation of $1,100. 
¶36 The same day, Attorney Strouse filed the requisite 
bankruptcy schedules with the bankruptcy court and certified to 
the court that he was charging Y.W. $750 for legal services, of 
which $50 had been paid, with a balance due of $700.  
¶37 Y.W. filed a grievance claiming that Attorney Strouse 
agreed to represent her for a fee of $500.  Attorney Strouse 
denied that he would have agreed to a $500 fee.  
                                                 
1 Attorney Strouse paid $300 for the bankruptcy filing fee 
and $28 for the purchase of three credit reports from the $400 
he had received from Y.W. 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
13 
 
¶38 The referee found that "the testimony of [Y.W.] on the 
total amount of fees was not credible," but concluded that 
Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) (Count Five). 
¶39 On 
appeal, 
Attorney 
Strouse 
maintains 
that 
the 
April 15 
billing 
statement 
sent 
to 
Y.W. 
satisfies 
the 
requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).  We disagree.  
¶40 The referee found that Attorney Strouse agreed to 
represent Y.W. for $1,050, consistent with his standard fee for 
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, and that Attorney Strouse did 
not "provide [Y.W.] with a written document stating the scope of 
the representation to be provided and the basis of the fee of 
$1,050."  The evidence supports the referee's findings and we 
accept them.   
¶41 The barebones billing statement sent to Y.W. does not 
satisfy the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1), which required 
Attorney Strouse to provide to Y.W., in writing, the scope of 
the representation and the basis or rate of the fee.  Nor, to 
the extent there was a change in the fee from $1,050 to $1,100, 
does the billing statement adequately denote the change in the 
basis or rate of the fee or expenses.  We agree with the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Strouse 
violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) in his representation of Y.W.   
E.J. and S.J. 
¶42 Attorney Strouse next appeals the referee's conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Strouse 
violated 
SCR 20:1.2(a) 
(Scope 
of 
Representation) 
and 
SCRs 
20:1.4(a)(2), 
20:1.4(a)(4), 
and 
20:1.4(b) (Communication) in his representation of E.J. and S.J.  
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
14 
 
He contends that Referee Ferguson fails to make necessary 
credibility 
determinations 
to 
support 
his 
findings 
and 
conclusions.  We disagree. 
¶43 In 2009, E.J. and S.J. retained Attorney Strouse to 
file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding for them.  The parties 
disagree as to whether Attorney Strouse also agreed to represent 
them in an adversary proceeding involving the discharge of 
E.J.'s student loans.  E.J. and S.J. claim there was such an 
agreement.  Attorney Strouse denies it; he claims they had a 
limited agreement whereby he would look into the issue of 
potentially representing them on the discharge of the student 
loan and evaluate the likelihood of success of such a claim.  
¶44 On August 1, 2009, E.J. and S.J. paid Attorney Strouse 
$750.  No written fee agreement was executed.  It is undisputed 
that Attorney Strouse filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on 
the clients' behalf, which proceeded without incident.  In 
November 2009, when E.J. and S.J. sent Attorney Strouse a final 
check for his services, however, they inquired about the student 
loan discharge.  In early January 2010, E.J. and S.J. hand-
delivered to Attorney Strouse's office a letter expressing 
concern about Attorney Strouse's failure to return their calls 
or communicate about the bankruptcy matter and the student loan 
issue.  Attorney Strouse did not respond.   
¶45 On January 31, 2010, E.J. and S.J. again wrote to 
Attorney Strouse about the student loan issue, requesting 
information regarding a hearing date.  Attorney Strouse did not 
respond.  On February 4, 2010, E.J. sent another letter to 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
15 
 
Attorney Strouse regarding the student loan issue.  Attorney 
Strouse did not respond.  
¶46 Finally, E.J. and S.J. claim that on April 8, 2010, 
they met with Attorney Strouse to discuss the student loan 
matter.  At this meeting, they say Attorney Strouse admitted 
that he missed a relevant filing date and returned their file.  
Attorney Strouse refutes this claim.   
¶47 During the ensuing disciplinary proceeding, Attorney 
Strouse told the OLR that he had prepared and delivered a legal 
research memorandum to E.J. and S.J. addressing the student loan 
issue.  E.J. and S.J. deny receiving any such memorandum and 
deny that Attorney Strouse discussed the contents of such a memo 
with them.  
¶48 The referee concluded that, by failing to consult with 
E.J. and S.J. regarding the means by which the objectives of the 
representation were to be pursued, including the discharge of 
student loan debt, Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.2(a)2 and 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)3 (Count Six).  In addition, the referee 
concluded that, by failing to explain to E.J. and S.J. the 
issues associated with the discharge of student loan debt, 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides, in relevant part, "Subject to 
pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by 
SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished." 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
16 
 
including the cost to pursue an adversary proceeding, the 
likelihood of success of such efforts, and the results of his 
research into the viability of such a claim, Attorney Strouse 
failed to explain matters sufficiently to enable E.J. and S.J. 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.  In so 
doing, Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.4(b)4 (Count Seven).  
In addition, the referee concluded that, by failing to respond 
to the multiple requests for information from E.J. and S.J., 
including letters dated November 7, 2009, January 4, 2010, 
January 31, 2010, and February 4, 2010, Attorney Strouse 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4)5 (Count Eight). 
¶49 Attorney Strouse appeals, claiming, inter alia, that 
the referee's findings are insufficient to support these charges 
and that his credibility determinations are clearly erroneous.   
¶50 The referee found that that E.J. and S.J. sought 
Attorney Strouse's representation in filing for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy and to discharge E.J.'s student loan debt.  The 
referee found that "[b]oth [E.J. and S.J.] offered credible 
testimony there was such an agreement."  The referee explicitly 
stated that, "[h]aving weighed the contradictory testimony and 
evidence on the issue of the scope of representation, I did not 
find the testimony of Strouse to be credible."  (Emphasis 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
5 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information."   
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
17 
 
added.)  The referee found that Attorney Strouse failed to 
respond to E.J.'s and S.J.'s repeated requests for information 
related to the discharge of the student loan.  The referee found 
that Attorney Strouse never consulted with E.J. and S.J. 
concerning 
the 
means 
by 
which 
the 
objectives 
of 
his 
representation were to be pursued to secure the discharge of the 
student loan.  The referee found that Attorney Strouse never 
explained to E.J. and S.J. the issues associated with the 
discharge of the student loan debt, the costs of pursuing any 
adversary proceedings, the likelihood of success, or the results 
of any research he had done.  The referee found that Attorney 
Strouse never explained matters sufficiently to E.J. and S.J. to 
enable them to make informed decisions regarding the student 
loan discharge.  The evidence supports these findings and we 
adopt them. 
¶51 Attorney Strouse contends that this is not enough and 
proceeds to outline a number of additional factual findings he 
thinks the referee should have made.  He reminds the court that 
the 
"testimony, 
documentation, 
and 
argument 
the 
parties 
presented 
to 
Referee 
Ferguson 
was 
substantial 
and 
hotly 
contested in many respects."  He claims that Referee Ferguson 
failed to make necessary credibility determinations or to 
include specific findings of fact to support his conclusions of 
law.  He suggests that Referee Ferguson's finding that he "did 
not find the testimony of Strouse to be credible" is somehow 
inadequate and "does not go to the merits of the parties' 
contested arguments."   
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
18 
 
¶52 From 
our 
perspective, 
Attorney 
Strouse 
simply 
disagrees with the referee's credibility determinations, as 
evidenced by his claim that it is "contrary to the evidence."  
He suggests that the referee should have made a different 
credibility determination.  Attorney Strouse states:   
[E.J.'s] credibility must be doubted in this respect 
as well as others concerning the representation.  
First, she has a mental condition that affects memory 
and ability to remember the dates of events.  This was 
demonstrated numerous times throughout the hearing. 
She denied meeting with Strouse on July 22, 2009, 
which was corroborated by Strouse's calendar and the 
intake questionnaire that was completed and dated by 
her.  She could not recall the date of the meeting 
between [E.J. and S.J.] and Strouse on September 12, 
2009, to sign the bankruptcy petition.  She denied 
meeting with Strouse on January 20, 2009, an event 
listed on Strouse's calendar maintained in the normal 
course of business.  Further, she was fixated on the 
adversary proceeding as the method to discharge her 
student loans.  This is demonstrated in the fact that 
she brought case law with her at the initial meeting 
on the issue, allegedly other case law in a subsequent 
meeting, and in her written communications to Strouse.  
(Record citations omitted.)  Attorney Strouse thus claims that 
he is more credible than E.J.  He asks the court to find Referee 
Ferguson's 
credibility 
determination 
with 
respect 
to 
E.J. 
clearly erroneous.   
¶53 We reject this invitation to disregard the referee's 
credibility determination.  The referee is the ultimate arbiter 
of the facts and credibility of witnesses and there is no reason 
to deem these findings clearly erroneous.  E.J. was very 
forthright in her testimony about the fact that a medical 
condition affected her ability to recall specific details such 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
19 
 
as dates, but her testimony as to the substance of what occurred 
was clear and bolstered by documentary evidence, including 
letters to Attorney Strouse.  The referee's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law relating to this matter are substantiated by 
clear and convincing evidence from the record and we adopt them.  
¶54 We turn to the question of appropriate discipline.  
The OLR sought and the referee recommends a 60-day suspension.  
Attorney Strouse seeks a private reprimand or, at most, a public 
reprimand.  Attorney Strouse reasons that the matter of F.E. 
involved 
minor 
technical 
violations 
and 
that 
the 
other 
allegations are similarly de minimus. 
¶55 Even 
with 
our 
decision 
to 
dismiss 
the 
alleged 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Four), the record before this 
court and the concept of progressive discipline support a 60-day 
suspension.  The record here suggests that Attorney Strouse is a 
busy, aggressive lawyer who serves an important role in the 
Milwaukee 
legal 
community, 
providing 
affordable 
bankruptcy 
representation. 
 
It 
bears 
noting 
that 
Attorney 
Strouse 
successfully obtained bankruptcy discharges for all the clients 
at issue in this proceeding.  We also accept and acknowledge the 
mitigating fact that Attorney Strouse has taken steps to 
establish better written fee communications in his office.  
However, the record before us also reveals a persistent pattern 
of failure to abide by the requirements of our rules of 
professional conduct.  Attorney Strouse has thrice been publicly 
reprimanded by this court, once for conduct that also resulted 
in being suspended by a bankruptcy court.   
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
20 
 
¶56 While the misconduct committed in this matter is not 
identical, we observe a continuing pattern of disregard of 
supreme court rule requirements.  Representation anticipated to 
exceed $1,000 requires a written fee communication.  See 
SCR 20:1.5.  Unilateral changes to fees charged to clients 
certainly require more than a single line on an invoice.  We 
note, 
with 
some 
concern, 
repeated 
discrepancies 
between 
disclosures on bankruptcy filings and invoices submitted to 
clients, a factor that adds to client confusion.  As the referee 
observed, "by failing to accept responsibility for his actions 
and attempting to shift the blame to others for the poor 
handling of these matters, Attorney Strouse demonstrates that he 
lacks both remorse and insight into the impact of his repeated 
violations on his clients and other third parties."  
¶57 We acknowledge that none of the cases cited by the 
parties are directly on point.  This is not unusual in 
disciplinary matters.  We find In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kitchen, 2004 WI 83, 273 Wis. 2d 279, 682 N.W.2d 780 
provides 
useful 
guidance, 
and 
ultimately, 
we 
accept 
the 
referee's recommendation for a 60-day suspension as consistent 
with the principles of progressive discipline. 
¶58 Finally, we consider Attorney Strouse's objection to 
the costs of this proceeding.  We consider the factors set forth 
in SCR 22.24(1m), which include the number of counts charged, 
contested, and proven; the nature of the misconduct; the level 
of discipline sought and recommended; cooperation with the OLR; 
prior discipline; and other relevant circumstances.  We are not 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
21 
 
persuaded that this scope of the appeal was enlarged due to 
Referee Ferguson's insufficient credibility determinations or 
failure to discuss the parties' arguments.  Full costs are 
appropriate in this vigorously litigated case.  
¶59 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Paul A. Strouse to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective August 14, 2015. 
¶60 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Paul A. Strouse shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $67,562.12. 
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Paul A. Strouse shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
¶63 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2013AP1619-D   
 
 
 
1