Title: Reilly v. Reilly

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Reilly v. Reilly1983 WY 113671 P.2d 330Case Number: 83-87Case Number: 83-87Decided: 11/03/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL 
DARRYLL REILLY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
RIMVYDA 
ELEONORA REILLY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Albany County, Robert A. Hill, J.

 
 
John 
E. Masters of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Michael 
H. Schilling of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, for appellee.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment and decree of divorce. The principal issues appealed to this court 
involve the division of property.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

 
 
"A. 
FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

 
 
"THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. Defendant has been prejudiced by the Court's division of 
property without having first determin[ed] the existence and extent of the 
property ownership of the parties. This fact could be accomplished only by 
joinder of the other shareholders. Alternatively, the Defendant has been 
prejudiced by the Court's Order that the Defendant must purchase an interest 
from the Plaintiff in property the Plaintiff did not own and could not convey to 
him.

 
 
"B. 
IMPROPER USE OF DISCOVERY DEPOSITION

 
 
"THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO USE DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY 
DEPOSITION IN LIEU OF ACTUAL TESTIMONY BY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT. In addition to 
violating procedural rules for presentation of evidence, the trial court 
permitted a violation of Defendant's right to interrogate the witness in open 
court before the trier of fact. This procedure denied the Defendant the right to 
effectively confront and cross-examine the witness."

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellee-plaintiff sued 
and appellant-defendant counter-claimed for divorce from one another. Incidental 
to the divorce both parties requested an equitable division of property. There 
was a stipulation for the custody and support of the children, and that is not 
an issue in this case.

 
 

[¶5.]     The dispute at trial 
concerning the property centered primarily around the existence, the extent of 
ownership, and value of an interest in a closely held corporation known as 
Mikvyda, Inc., which owned and operated a McDonald's fast food franchise at 
Laramie, Wyoming. The corporation was owned by appellee, appellant, and 
appellant's parents. Appellee filed a Motion to Estop Defendant [appellant] From 
Denying the Existence of Certain Marital Assets. At the conclusion of the 
hearing on this motion, the court found that the appellee and 
appellant

 
 
"* 
* * are owners of an interest in Mikvyda, Inc. and such ownership constitutes a 
portion of the marital estate, and Defendant is estopped to deny the existence 
of such interest as a marital asset, subject to future determination at trial by 
this Court of the extent and valuation of such ownership."

 
 
Appellant 
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
and for failure to join indispensable parties. The court denied both of these 
motions.

 
 

[¶6.]     During the course of 
discovery, appellant noticed the taking of the deposition of appellee's expert 
witness employed to testify concerning the value of the Mikvyda marital asset. 
The notice stated that the deposition would be taken for the purpose of 
discovery upon oral examination. Appellee offered, and the discovery deposition 
of the witness was received at trial over appellant's 
objection.

 
 

[¶7.]     There was conflicting 
testimony concerning the extent of ownership in Mikvyda, Inc. The corporation 
has never issued stock nor have stock subscription agreements been executed and 
approved. At various times throughout the course of the marriage, appellant 
represented to appellee and to others that he believed he owned 44% to 49% of 
the stock of the corporation. Tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue 
Service indicated that the extent of ownership was 44%.

 
 

[¶8.]     Both parties presented 
expert testimony on the question of the value of Mikvyda, Inc. The court found 
that the extent of the appellee's marital interest in Mikvyda, Inc. was 22% and 
valued this interest at $121, 517.88. After deducting the difference between the 
equity in the respective parties' residences, the court awarded to appellee 
$75,117.88 to be paid in equal monthly installments over a ten-year period. The 
defendant was awarded as his sole and separate property such interest as the 
parties had in Mikvyda, Inc.

 
 
I

 
 
FAILURE 
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant argues that 
in order to determine the degree of ownership in the Mikvyda marital asset, it 
was essential that the non-party, co-owners be joined. Appellant contended that 
an equitable division of this interest could not be made without first 
determining the extent of all ownership in Mikvyda, and that the absence of the 
other co-owners in the corporation precluded the trial court from determining 
the rights of the husband and wife. Rule 19, W.R.C.P., governs joinder, and 
provides in part:

 
 
"(a) 
Persons to be joined if feasible. - A 
person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest 
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order 
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, 
he may be made a defendant. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder 
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the 
action."

 
 
We 
are not concerned with whether or not appellant's parents were proper parties to 
the action in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits because there was no effort 
by either party to bring them into the litigation. American Beryllium & Oil Corp. v. 
Chase, Wyo., 425 P.2d 66 (1967). Proper parties may, but need not, be 
joined.

 
 

[¶10.]  Still we have the question, were 
appellant's parents indispensable parties? We have defined an indispensable 
party as:

 
 
"`An 
indispensable party has been defined as one without whose presence before the 
court a final decree could not be made without either affecting his interest or 
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination might 
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. * * * Whether or not a 
person is an indispensable party cannot be determined by a prescribed formula 
because the facts peculiar to each case are determinative of that question. * * 
*'" Id. at 68.

 
 
In 
Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1936), the court set out the following criteria for 
determining whether or not a party is indispensable:

 
 
"* 
* * After first determining that such party is interested in the controversy, 
the court must make a determination of the following questions applied to the 
particular case: (1) Is the interest of the absent party distinct and severable? 
(2) In the absence of such party, can the court render justice between the 
parties before it? (3) Will the decree made, in the absence of such party, have 
no injurious effect on the interest of such absent party? (4) Will the final 
determination, in the absence of such party, be consistent with equity and good 
conscience? "If, after the court determines that an absent party is interested 
in the controversy, it finds that all of the four questions outlined above are 
answered in the affirmative with respect to the absent party's interest, then 
such absent party [may be a proper or] a necessary party. However, if any one of 
the four questions is answered in the negative, then the absent party is 
indispensable." See also, Photometric Products Corp. v. Radtke, 17 F.R.D. 103, 
109 (D.C.N.Y. 1954); American Beryllium & Oil Corp. v. Chase, supra; Oxley 
v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., Wyo., 439 P.2d 661 
(1968).

 
 

[¶11.]  Some courts make a distinction between 
necessary and indispensable parties. Necessary parties are those who might be 
joined to save further litigation or to protect the interest of another party. 
59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 12. It is not error for the court to refuse to join 
either proper or necessary parties. Only indispensable parties must be 
joined.

 
 

[¶12.]  In this situation, the four questions can 
be answered in the affirmative. The interests of the co-owners were not 
adjudicated in this proceeding. There was no disposition of the property of 
third parties. Stock did not change hands; the ownership and the control of the 
corporation was not affected. The effect of this decision did not declare 
appellee an owner in the corporation nor did she receive a transfer of any 
stock. We fail to see how such a limited finding could be prejudicial to the 
corporation or the shareholders. Coman v. Coman, 492 F.2d 273 (3rd Cir. 1974). 
Between the husband and wife, the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
character of any property claimed to be a marital asset. Merritt v. Merritt, Wyo., 586 P.2d 550 
(1978); Melny v. Melny, 90 Cal. App. 2d 672, 203 P.2d 588 (1949).

 
 

[¶13.]  In situations where a third party is not 
indispensable, the third party may either seek to intervene or be joined by 
either party. Merritt v. Merritt, 
supra. In this case, appellant could have brought his parents, the co-owners, 
into the lawsuit. He could have taken affirmative action himself to negate any 
difficulties. He did not take this action and, therefore, can only blame himself 
if there are future problems.

 
 

[¶14.]  The trial court exercises discretion in 
dividing marital property. The result will not be disturbed on appeal except on 
clear grounds and extreme cases. Kane v. 
Kane, Wyo., 577 P.2d 172 (1978); Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, Wyo., 443 P.2d 524 (1968). There was no abuse of discretion in this 
case.

 
 
II

 
 
IMPROPER 
USE OF DISCOVERY DEPOSITION.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in allowing appellee to put into evidence the discovery deposition taken 
by appellant in lieu of appellee presenting his expert as a witness at the 
trial. Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in receiving 
in evidence the deposition of appellee's expert witness because: (a) the 
deposition was for the purpose of discovery rather than preserving testimony; 
and (b) the party in control of selecting the witness should insure the presence 
of that witness at trial or be considered to have "procured" the absence of the 
witness in the event the witness does not appear for 
trial.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant contends that because the 
deposition was identified as being taken for discovery purposes, it could not be 
used at trial to supply evidence on valuation. We must agree with Savoie v. 
LaFourche Boat Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980), which states that 
appellant "cites no authority, and we know of none, in support of the 
proposition that discovery depositions may not be used at trial against the 
party who conducted them." There is not a distinction as to the admissibility at 
trial between a deposition taken solely for purposes of discovery and one which 
is taken for use at trial. 23 Am.Jur.2d Depositions and Discovery § 
174.

 
 

[¶17.]  The decision to avail oneself of 
depositions of witnesses involves the risk that these depositions will have an 
evidentiary value and may be used at trial. One should prepare 
accordingly.

 
 

[¶18.]  Rule 32(a)(3), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

 
 
"(a) 
Use of depositions. - At the trial or 
upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of 
a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who 
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable 
notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following 
provisions:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(3) 
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party 
for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that 
the witness is absent from the county where the trial or hearing is held, unless 
it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering 
the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because 
of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party offering the 
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; 
or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as 
to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the 
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to 
allow the deposition to be used."

 
 

[¶19.]  The trial court received in evidence the 
deposition of the expert witness because the witness was a non-resident and, 
therefore, "absent from the county where the trial" was being held. Appellant 
would have us find that the absence of the witness was "procured" by appellee. 
He argues that a party in control of selecting a non-resident expert witness 
should insure his presence at trial. If the witness is unavailable for trial, 
the deposition should not be allowed.

 
 

[¶20.]  Appellee did not "procure" the absence of 
the witness. The witness was never within the jurisdiction of the court. 
Appellant should have known from the beginning that there was a risk that 
appellee's expert would not be at trial. We do not see how appellant can 
complain. He had his own expert witness present and testifying at the trial to 
the evaluation of the corporation; by knowing in advance the evidence of 
appellee's expert witness, offered by deposition, he was in a position to refute 
that testimony.

 
 

[¶21.]  We fail to see how this advantage was 
prejudicial.

 
 

[¶22.]  Affirmed.