Title: Adele R. Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 93 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2260 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Adele R. Garcia,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mazda Motor of America, Inc., a foreign  
corporation, and Hall Imports, Inc., a  
Wisconsin corporation,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 208 
Reported at: 267 Wis. 2d 622, 671 N.W.2d 317 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lee S. Dreyfus   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by William S. Pocan, Vincent P. Megna, Susan 
M. Grzeskowiak and Jastroch & Labarge, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by William S. Pocan. 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants there were 
briefs by Jeffrey S. Fertl, Jeffrey D. Patza and Hinshaw & 
Culbertson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey S. Fertl. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stephen E. Meili, 
Marsha M. Mansfield, and Nelle R. Rohlich, Madison, on behalf of 
the Consumer Law Litigation Clinic. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James E. Thiel, John J. 
Sobotik, Paul E. Nilsen, Madison, on behalf of State of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
2004 WI 93 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2260   
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 2812) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Adele R. Garcia,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mazda Motor of America, Inc., a foreign  
corporation, and Hall Imports, Inc., a  
Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Garcia v. Mazda Motor of 
America, Inc., 2003 WI App 208, 267 Wis. 2d 622, 671 N.W.2d 317, 
affirming the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to 
Mazda Motor, Inc. and Hall Imports, Inc. (Mazda).1  The case 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we refer to respondents collectively as 
"Mazda."  However, we recognize that Hall Imports, Inc. remains 
in the case as co-respondent. 
No. 02-2260  
 
2 
 
commenced when petitioner, Adele Garcia (Garcia), sued Mazda 
alleging that Mazda had failed to comply with Wisconsin’s "Lemon 
Law," 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 
(2001-02),2 
a 
remedial 
statute 
enacted to protect buyers of new vehicles if they experience 
certain types of problems with their purchases.  Consumers 
requesting relief under the Wisconsin Lemon Law must fulfill two 
requirements: they must elect a remedy by demanding either a 
replacement vehicle or a refund, and they must offer to transfer 
title 
to 
the 
vehicle 
back 
to 
the 
manufacturer. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)-(3).  Dissatisfied with a Mazda vehicle 
she had purchased, Garcia elected a remedy by demanding a 
replacement vehicle, but she did not explicitly offer to 
transfer title to Mazda.   
¶2 
After Garcia filed this action, Mazda moved for 
summary judgment, alleging that Garcia had failed to offer to 
transfer title to the vehicle, and thus had not complied with 
the provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law.  Both the trial court 
and the court of appeals found Garcia’s failure to explicitly 
offer to transfer title to be fatal to her cause.   
¶3 
We accepted Garcia’s petition for review to determine 
whether Garcia’s demand for a replacement vehicle under the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law complied with the notice requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) by providing notice of Garcia's 
intent to transfer title to her vehicle to Mazda.  Because we 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 02-2260  
 
3 
 
conclude that a consumer’s demand for a replacement vehicle 
under the Wisconsin Lemon Law necessarily implies an offer to 
transfer title, we reverse the court of appeals and remand this 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Garcia 
presented 
the 
following 
facts.3 
 
Garcia 
purchased a new 2001 Mazda Tribute in February of 2001.  Almost 
immediately, 
she 
experienced 
problems 
with 
the 
vehicle’s 
transmission.  These transmission problems were covered by the 
vehicle’s new car warranty.  On several occasions, Garcia 
presented the vehicle at an authorized Mazda dealer for service, 
but Mazda’s technicians never succeeded in repairing the vehicle 
to Garcia’s satisfaction.  Garcia also claimed that the vehicle 
had been completely out of service for a number of days.  The 
parties exchanged letters and phone calls.  Eventually, in 
September 2001 Garcia became fed up with the transmission 
problems and wrote Mazda a letter demanding relief under the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law.  Garcia’s letter contained the following 
statements: 
It is my understanding that the Lemon Law in the State 
of Wisconsin is that after a reasonable number of 
unsuccessful 
repair 
attempts 
by 
Mazda 
or 
its 
authorized dealers, or that the vehicle has been out 
of service a specific number of days, that I’m 
                                                 
3 As this case is before us on Mazda’s motion for summary 
judgment, we must interpret the facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences from the facts in favor of Garcia, the nonmoving 
party.  Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶7 
n.3, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443 (citing Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980)). 
No. 02-2260  
 
4 
 
entitled to either a comparable replacement vehicle or 
a refund of the purchase price.  At this time the 
automobile has been out of service for a period of 16 
days and I would like to have a replacement. 
¶5 
Mazda and Garcia exchanged several additional rounds 
of correspondence.  Mazda attempted to negotiate a settlement 
with Garcia, offering her reimbursements of car payments and an 
extended warranty, but Garcia refused these overtures.  In 
October 2001 Mazda informed Garcia that it could not locate a 
replacement vehicle and that she should select a new vehicle.  
While selecting the vehicle, Garcia claims a dispute arose 
regarding payment of fees and taxes.4 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Garcia filed this action on November 21, 2001, 
alleging that Mazda had violated the provisions of the Wisconsin 
Lemon Law.  On May 15, 2002, Mazda moved for summary judgment on 
grounds that Garcia’s letter was insufficient to establish her 
claim under the Wisconsin Lemon Law because she did not offer to 
transfer title to the vehicle.  The Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, Lee S. Dreyfus, Jr., Judge, granted Mazda’s motion 
because it agreed that Garcia’s notice was deficient.  A divided 
court of appeals affirmed.  As the majority opinion put it: "We 
see 
no 
ambiguity 
in 
the 
first 
two 
sentences 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c): the consumer must offer to the 
manufacturer to transfer title to the . . . vehicle . . . .  
                                                 
4 Mazda, on the other hand, asserts that the parties reached 
a settlement agreement in late October 2001.  However, as 
already noted, at this stage of the case we must construe all 
facts against the party moving for summary judgment.   
No. 02-2260  
 
5 
 
Garcia’s reading——that the request for a replacement vehicle is 
implicitly an offer to transfer title that triggers [the 
statute]——is 
not 
a 
reasonable 
reading 
of 
the 
statutory 
language."  Garcia, 267 Wis. 2d 622, ¶11.  One judge dissented, 
finding it "nonsensical for the owner of a 'lemon' to demand a 
replacement and not, at the same time, be offering to transfer 
title."  Id., ¶21 (Lundsten, J., dissenting). 
III. WISCONSIN’S LEMON LAW 
¶7 
The issue in this case, whether Garcia's written 
demand for a replacement vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law 
complied 
with 
the 
notice 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c), presents us with a question of 
statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation and the 
application of a statute to specific facts are questions of law 
that we review de novo.  In re Commitment of Franklin, 2004 WI 
38, ¶5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 677 N.W.2d 276.    
¶8 
We begin the process of statutory interpretation by 
analyzing the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  As we have repeatedly stated, we construe 
remedial, consumer protection statutes like the Wisconsin Lemon 
Law "with 
a 
view 
towards 
the social 
problem 
which the 
legislature was addressing when enacting the law."  Dieter v. 
Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832 
(citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 982, 
542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)).  Put another way, we will liberally 
construe remedial statutes to suppress the mischief and advance 
No. 02-2260  
 
6 
 
the remedy that the legislature intended to afford.  Hughes, 197 
Wis. 2d at 979 (citing Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 
364, 373, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976)). 
¶9 
Wisconsin’s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, became 
effective on November 3, 1983.  Like similar laws nationwide, 
the statute was enacted to protect purchasers of new vehicles 
that turn out to be defective (colloquially known as "lemons").  
See, e.g., Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978-80.  Wisconsin’s Lemon Law 
provides a remedy to the purchaser of a new vehicle if the 
purchaser, within one year of the purchase date, experiences 
problems with the vehicle that (1) are covered by the vehicle’s 
warranty; and (2a) are severe enough to keep the vehicle out of 
service for a total of 30 days; or (2b) the manufacturer or the 
manufacturer’s authorized representative are unsuccessful in 
repairing after four attempts.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(h) and 
218.0171(2)(a).   
¶10 Although the Wisconsin Lemon Law is clearly a consumer 
protection statute, it does not absolve the consumer from 
responsibility.  See Smyser v. W. Star Trucks Corp., 2001 WI App 
180, 
¶¶13-14, 
247 
Wis. 
2d 
281, 
634 
N.W.2d 
134.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0171 
reads 
in 
part: 
"To 
receive 
a 
comparable new motor vehicle or a refund due under [the 
Wisconsin 
Lemon Law], a 
consumer . . . shall 
offer to the 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to 
transfer title of that motor vehicle to that manufacturer."  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c).  In another section, the Wisconsin 
Lemon Law requires a consumer to notify the manufacturer of the 
No. 02-2260  
 
7 
 
consumer’s elected remedy (the consumer may choose a replacement 
vehicle or a refund).  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 (2)(b); see also 
Berends v. Mack Truck, Inc., 2002 WI App 69, ¶11, 252 Wis. 2d 
371, 643 N.W.2d 158. 
¶11 This is not the first time that we have been called 
upon to interpret Wis. Stat. § 218.0171.  In Hughes, we had to 
determine whether consumers could recover the purchase price of 
the car as "pecuniary damages" under the Wisconsin Lemon Law.  
Because the statutory language did not directly address that 
question, we began by reviewing the history of lemon laws in 
general and Wisconsin’s Lemon Law in particular.  Hughes, 197 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
980-82. 
 
Adhering 
to 
our 
rule 
of 
liberal 
interpretation of consumer protection statutes, we determined 
that the purchase price of the car did qualify as pecuniary 
damages.   
¶12 In Dieter, decided four years after Hughes, we faced 
the question of whether consumers who are aware of defects in a 
vehicle upon delivery may still sue the manufacturer under the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law.  We held that they could, overruling a 
court of appeals decision to the contrary, because the statute 
contained no "hidden" defect provision and expressly disallowed 
waiver by the consumer.  Dieter, 234 Wis. 2d  670, ¶¶21-22.   
¶13 Today, we need not revisit the historical discourse of 
Hughes because the plain language of the Wisconsin Lemon Law 
appears to settle the issue.  Mazda based its motion for summary 
judgment upon Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c), relying on Berends 
for the proposition that a manufacturer has no obligation to act 
No. 02-2260  
 
8 
 
until the consumer has given it proper notice (consisting of 
election of remedy and offer to transfer title) under the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law.  Mazda admits that Garcia elected a remedy 
but disputes whether she offered to transfer title.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals agreed with Mazda.  Both 
courts found the statutory language to be dispositive, and found 
that Garcia had not complied with the statute.  Accordingly, 
those two courts found that Garcia did not qualify for relief 
under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. 
¶14 We have no doubt that a consumer must offer to 
transfer title to her vehicle to qualify for relief under the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law.  But that is not the end of our inquiry.  
Rather, the question we attempt to answer is: What form must 
that offer take?  The definitions section of the Wisconsin Lemon 
Law does not define "offer to transfer title."  The language of 
the rest of the Wisconsin Lemon Law provides no further guidance 
as to the required form of the consumer’s offer to transfer 
title.  As we have repeatedly held, if a word is not defined in 
a statute, we look next to recognized dictionary definitions to 
determine the common and ordinary meaning of a word.  See, e.g., 
State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶19, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 
330 (using dictionary to discern meaning of statutory text); 
Smith v. Katz, 218 Wis. 2d 442, 451 n.4, 578 N.W.2d 202 (1998) 
(using dictionary to discern meaning of words in insurance 
policy); State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 300, 366 N.W.2d 871 
(1985) (using dictionary to discern meaning of words in 
general). 
No. 02-2260  
 
9 
 
¶15 In this case, though, we do not analyze the words of 
the statute itself, but rather the words of Garcia’s demand, to 
determine whether that demand implies an offer to transfer title 
and therefore conforms to the statute.  Garcia demanded a 
"replacement" vehicle from Mazda.  The dictionary definition of 
"replacement" is "the act or process of replacing or of being 
replaced; substitution."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1531 (3d ed. 1992).  In turn, the ordinary 
definition of "substitute" is "one that takes the place of 
another."  Id. at 1792.  Applying these dictionary definitions 
to this case, we believe that Garcia’s demand for a replacement 
implied that she wanted "one (vehicle) that takes the place of 
another (vehicle)"——i.e., a new vehicle to take the place of the 
one she originally bought.  Although Mazda attempts to convince 
us that a demand for a replacement does not equate to an offer 
to transfer title, we do not see how it can seriously be argued 
that Garcia intended to retain both vehicles or turn over the 
vehicle without the title.5  We agree with the dissenting judge 
in the court of appeals that it would be "nonsensical" for a 
consumer to demand a replacement without offering to transfer 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) reads in part: "When the 
manufacturer provides the new motor vehicle . . . the consumer 
shall return the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to the 
manufacturer and provide the manufacturer with the certificate 
of title and all endorsements necessary to transfer title to the 
manufacturer."  (Emphasis added).  We think it is unlikely that 
the manufacturer would permit the consumer to drive off with a 
replacement vehicle and new title until the consumer has 
complied with these requirements.   
No. 02-2260  
 
10 
 
title to the original vehicle.  One enduring principle of 
statutory interpretation is that statutes are to be interpreted 
reasonably to give effect to the textually manifest statutory 
purpose.  Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44, 46, 49.  A literalistic 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Lemon Law on these facts would 
not be consistent with the statute's remedial purpose.  See 
Dieter, 234 Wis. 2d 670, ¶19; Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 982. 
¶16 Garcia's letter asking for a replacement vehicle also 
linked her demand to the Wisconsin Lemon Law.  Garcia referenced 
the "Lemon Law in the State of Wisconsin" after detailing her 
problems with the vehicle (in a different paragraph), and she 
described the conditions for invoking the law and her options 
under the law.  No reasonable person could confuse the letter as 
something other than an attempt to invoke and comply with the 
law. 
¶17 Mazda’s heavy reliance on the court of appeals 
decision in Berends is misplaced.  Mazda, citing Berends, first 
argues that a manufacturer has no duty to seek clarification of 
a consumer’s notice invoking the Wisconsin Lemon Law.  Berends, 
252 Wis. 2d 371, ¶¶19-23.  We do not disturb that holding of the 
court of appeals.  However, we disagree with Mazda that this 
aspect of Berends bears on the issue we face today.  A 
manufacturer 
remains 
free 
to 
decide 
whether 
to 
seek 
clarification of a consumer’s notice invoking the Wisconsin 
Lemon Law, but a manufacturer who does not seek clarification of 
a valid notice, believing it invalid, runs the risk of 
noncompliance with the statute.   
No. 02-2260  
 
11 
 
¶18 Next, Mazda directs us to a footnote in Berends in 
which the court of appeals, although not basing its holding on 
the issue, stated that a consumer’s "most prudent approach would 
be to explicitly offer to transfer title of the motor vehicle to 
the manufacturer."  Berends, 252 Wis. 2d 371, ¶1 n.2.  We cannot 
disagree.  However, we are also cognizant that consumers do not 
carry statute books under their arms.  An explicit offer to 
transfer title is surely the best path for a dissatisfied 
consumer to follow when invoking the protections of the 
Wisconsin Lemon Law; but for the reasons already stated we 
believe 
that 
Garcia’s 
demand 
for 
a 
replacement 
vehicle 
adequately implied an offer to transfer title.  The statute does 
not require the consumer to use any "magic words." 
¶19 Finally, Mazda warns us that manufacturers would be 
forced to "speculate" as to whether a particular consumer’s 
notice "implies" an offer to transfer title.  We do not share 
Mazda’s concern.  We are satisfied that when a consumer demands 
a replacement vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, the 
consumer impliedly offers to transfer title to the old vehicle, 
and we so hold in this case.  Garcia's demand for a replacement 
satisfies the Wisconsin Lemon Law’s requirement of an offer to 
transfer title. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶20 Our holding today resolves the issue we accepted for 
review, but other factual issues remain for trial.  We do not 
No. 02-2260  
 
12 
 
address the issues of whether the parties reached a settlement,6 
whether Garcia’s vehicle actually was a lemon, or whether Mazda 
complied with the provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law.  These 
are 
factual 
issues 
properly 
before 
the 
circuit 
court.  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court for 
determination of these factual issues.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Garcia filed a motion to strike Mazda's reply brief 
because it raised an issue——whether the parties had reached an 
enforceable settlement agreement——that it believed was not 
properly presented to the court.  Because we are remanding this 
matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, we deny 
Garcia's motion to strike. 
No. 02-2260  
 
 
 
1