Title: Nordlund v. Van Nostrand

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 79
  

  


  

  








Nordlund
v. Van Nostrand, Van Nostrand
2007 Trust et al. (2010-283)
 
2011 VT 79
 
[Filed 15-Jul-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 79
 
No. 2010-283
 
Linda C. Nordlund
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, 
 
Environmental Division
 
 
Elizabeth M. Van Nostrand, 
Elizabeth M. Van Nostrand 2007
  Trust, 
Mark L. Van Nostrand and 
Nancy A. Van Nostrand
March Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Thomas
  S. Durkin, J.
 
Karl W. Neuse and Benjamin W. Putnam of Neuse, Duprey & Putnam, P.C., Middlebury, for
  Appellant.
 
James C. Foley, Jr. of Deppman & Foley, P.C., Middlebury, for Appellees Elizabeth Van Nostrand
  and
Elizabeth M. Van Nostrand 2007 Trust.
 
Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand, Pro Ses, Salisbury, Appellees. 
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J.,
Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
REIBER, C.J.   Plaintiff appeals a grant of summary
judgment by the Superior Court, Environmental Division (Environmental Court) in
favor of defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We
affirm.  
¶ 2.            
Plaintiff, Linda Nordlund, owns a property (Nordlund parcel) on West Shore Road in Salisbury,
Vermont.  Defendant Elizabeth Van Nostrand (Van Nostrand) owns the abutting property (front parcel), which
is also along West Shore Road.  Defendants Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand (defendants) are Elizabeth Van Nostrand’s
son and daughter-in-law.  They own a property (back parcel), which runs
behind and is contiguous with both the Nordlund and
front parcels.  The back parcel does not border a public road. 
¶
3.            
These parcels have been the subject of numerous proceedings.  In a
2006 quiet title action, the superior court determined that the Nordlund parcel was burdened by an existing right-of-way
benefiting the back parcel (Nordlund right-of-way),
and this Court affirmed the decision in 2007.  See Nordlund
v. Van Nostrand, 2007 VT 27, 181 Vt. 599, 925 A.2d 1011 (mem.).  The Nordlund right-of-way is approximately eighteen feet
wide.  Beginning at West Shore Road, it runs across the front parcel and
continues over the northwest corner of the Nordlund
parcel for about forty-four feet before reaching the back parcel. 
¶ 4.            
In 2004, defendants applied for a zoning permit to build a house on the
back parcel.  The zoning administrator originally granted the permit, but
plaintiff appealed the decision to the Town of Salisbury Development Review
Board (DRB).  The DRB reversed, finding that the Nordlund
right-of-way did not meet Town of Salisbury Zoning Regulation § 502, which
requires a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way in order to develop landlocked
property.  Defendants appealed the DRB’s decision to the Environmental
Court. 
¶
5.            
While that appeal was pending, defendants applied for a variance from
the fifty-foot-minimum-width regulation.  The DRB denied the variance
application, and all three defendants appealed to the Environmental Court,
which consolidated the variance appeal with the original zoning permit appeal.
 The Environmental Court granted the zoning permit based on a subdivision
permit which had been obtained by defendants’ predecessors-in-interest on April
4, 2000.  As a consequence of this determination, the Environmental Court
held that they had no need for a variance.  Plaintiff appealed this
determination, and this Court reversed, concluding that despite the subdivision
permit, defendants were nevertheless required to demonstrate compliance with
the zoning regulations.  In re Van Nostrand, 2008 VT 77, ¶ 13, 184 Vt. 557, 957 A.2d 399.
 We held that the Nordlund right-of-way did not
comply with § 502 and remanded the question of whether to grant a variance to
the Environmental Court.  Id. ¶ 14.
¶ 6.            
On October 21, 2009, the Environmental Court denied defendants’ request
for a variance, finding that the Nordlund
right-of-way failed to meet the requirements for a variance under 24 V.S.A. §
4469(a).  Without variance approval, the Nordlund
right-of-way remained too narrow to satisfy § 502 of the Town’s zoning
ordinance, and thus, the court denied a zoning permit based on this
right-of-way.  Defendants Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand
did not appeal this decision.
¶ 7.            
However, prior to this determination, defendant Elizabeth Van Nostrand granted defendants Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way (Van Nostrand right-of-way) across her property, the front
parcel, which connects the back parcel to West Shore Road without crossing onto
the Nordlund parcel.  Defendants applied for a
new zoning permit citing the Van Nostrand
right-of-way as the means of complying with § 502.  The DRB approved the
permit on September 6, 2005, and defendants subsequently constructed a house on
the back parcel.
¶ 8.            
The present action arises from what plaintiff claims is a misuse of the Nordlund right-of-way to access the now-completed home on
the back parcel.  It is uncontested that defendants and their guests use
the Nordlund right-of-way to access the back
parcel.  Plaintiff contends that this use violates the prior zoning
decisions which disallowed the right-of-way as a basis for development of the
back parcel.  Plaintiff brought a private zoning enforcement action under
24 V.S.A. § 4470(b) in the Environmental Court seeking an injunction
restricting defendants’ use of the Nordlund
right-of-way to access their parcel and permission to erect a gate or signs
along the Nordlund right-of-way to enforce the prior
decisions.  Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the
Environmental Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. 
The Environmental Court agreed and granted the motion.  Plaintiff
appeals.
¶ 9.            
On appeal from summary judgment, “[w]e review
the trial court’s decision de novo, using the same standard as the trial
court.”  Clayton v. Unsworth, 2010 VT 84,
¶ 15, ___ Vt. ___, 8 A.3d 1066.  Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, referred to in the
[statements of material facts], show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”  V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).
¶ 10.         Plaintiff
brought her claim as a private zoning enforcement action under 24 V.S.A. §
4470(b), which provides a means of enforcing prior court or municipal
decisions.  The Environmental Court found that this statute did not
properly confer subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case because there
was no decision to enforce on the issue presented within the meaning of the
statute.  In relevant part 24 V.S.A. § 4470(b) reads:
  A
municipality shall enforce all decisions of its appropriate municipal panels,
and further, the superior court, or the environment court shall enforce such
decisions upon petition, complaint or appeal or other means in accordance with
the laws of this state by such municipality or any interested person by means
of mandamus, injunction, process of contempt, or otherwise.
 
¶ 11.         This
statute requires the Environmental Court, if adequately prompted, to enforce
the decisions of municipal panels.  The Environmental Court dismissed plaintiff’s
case because it could not find a decision within the orders that restricted
defendants’ access to the back parcel using the Nordlund
right-of-way sufficient to provide jurisdiction under § 4470(b).  On
appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants are acting in contravention of two
prior decisions in a manner sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Environmental Court: (1) the Environmental Court’s October 21, 2009 denial of
defendants’ building permit based on the Nordlund
right-of-way; and (2) the DRB’s 2005 decision to approve a building permit
based on the Van Nostrand right-of-way.
¶
12.        
Plaintiff does not contest the validity of the Nordlund
right-of-way.  Rather, she claims defendants’ use of the Nordlund right-of-way is improper “to access the dwelling
house on the back parcel” since it does not meet state and local width
requirements.   First, plaintiff argues the Environmental Court’s
October 21, 2009 order denying the variance and zoning permit for the back
parcel, relying on the Nordlund right-of-way,
implicitly restricts defendants’ ability to use that right-of-way.  The
denial was based upon § 502 of the Salsbury Zoning
Regulations, which mandates that “[no] land development may be permitted on
lots which do not have either frontage on a public road or public waters or . .
. access to such a road or waters by a permanent right-of-way or right-of-way
at least fifty (50) feet in width.”  Town of Salsbury Zoning Regulations § 502 (2003).  The
order concluded the Nordlund right-of-way, at only
eighteen feet wide, did not meet the criteria in § 502, and thus, no permit for
development could be based upon it.  However, the court’s decision did not
limit the scope of use of the Nordlund right-of-way,
nor did it in any way invalidate it.  
¶ 13.         To
find a right-of-way insufficient to support a zoning permit is not the same as
finding it void for all purposes.  The Environmental Court inquired only
as to whether the Nordlund right-of-way met the
requirements of § 502 in order to grant defendants a zoning permit.  It
performed no analysis as to the scope of this right-of-way.  To hold that
this decision implicitly includes a reduction in the scope of the right-of-way
would deny defendants a hearing on the scope of their right-of-way.  An action
for judicial enforcement under § 4470 is a specialized procedural device to
enforce court decisions, not the general law.  A holding that this
specialized device may be used to enforce general rights implicit in the law
but outside the decision itself renders the section’s purpose—to provide a
means of enforcing decisions—moot and is duplicative of remedies already
available.*
¶ 14.         Plaintiff
claims Sunset Cliff Homeowners Association v. City of Burlington, demonstrates
that this Court has allowed the Environmental Court to assume jurisdiction
under § 4470 in similar circumstances.  2008 VT 56,
184 Vt. 533, 955 A.2d 524 (mem.). 
However, in that case, the Environmental Court’s enforcement prevented the
landowners from continuing activities that a prior decision had squarely
prohibited.  A city development review board had denied a developer’s
application to build in part “because it concluded that developer’s
tree-retention plan was . . . inadequate under the City’s subdivision
regulations.”  Id. ¶ 5.  The
developer announced his intention to engage in cutting trees and clearing land
despite this denial.  A homeowners’ association filed for a preliminary
injunction through § 4470 based on the permit denial, and we held that § 4470
provided proper jurisdiction in that instance.  Id.
¶ 11.  Thus, in Sunset Cliff, the developer’s permit was
denied because his plan to clear trees did not conform to the zoning
requirements, and the homeowners’ association sued to stop him from clearing
trees in contravention of the previous order.  In the case before us, the
Environmental Court’s October 21, 2009 order denying defendants’ building
permit was based on the fact that this existing right-of-way was not wide
enough to comport with zoning regulations.  Had defendants ignored that
order and begun building without obtaining the zoning-compliant Van Nostrand right-of-way, then this case would be on all fours
with Sunset Cliff and plaintiff could bring a § 4470 action to enjoin the
development.  If, on the other hand, after a denial of the permit,
defendants had decided to makes use of the Nordlund
right-of-way to access their property for a picnic twice a day—without ever
having developed their property— plaintiff could not bring an action under
§ 4470 based on the permit decision because that decision in no way
invalidated the use of the Nordlund
right-of-way.  Sunset Cliff is inapposite and lends no aid to
plaintiff’s argument.  
¶ 15.         Plaintiff
also contends that because the Van Nostrand
right-of-way provided the basis for the approval of the September 6, 2005
zoning permit, the permit decision implicitly forbids the use of the Nordlund right-of-way.  Plaintiff relies on the
language in both 24 V.S.A. § 4412(3) and Zoning Regulation §
502, alleging these preclude the use of any means of access other than the
approved right-of-way.  Section 4412(3) of Title 24 allows:
[l]and development
. . . on lots that do not have frontage either on a public road or public
waters, provided that access through a permanent easement or right-of-way has
been approved in accordance with standards and process specified in the
bylaws. . . . Any permanent easement or right-of-way
providing access to such a road or waters shall be at least 20 feet in width.
 
¶ 16.         Thus,
for development of a landlocked property, the statute requires a permanent
right-of-way that conforms with the applicable
municipal regulations.  The back parcel was developed pursuant to such a
right-of-way—the DRB-approved Van Nostrand
right-of-way, which at fifty-feet wide met the requirements of Zoning
Regulation § 502 and 24 V.S.A. § 4412(3).  Plaintiff
maintains that the latter portion of § 4412(3), requiring a twenty-foot width,
applies to any and all rights-of-way to developed landlocked property. 
However, the proviso relates the twenty-foot requirement to the permanent
right-of-way used as a basis for developing a landlocked parcel.  The
section sets a twenty foot minimum width for rights-of-way to an otherwise inaccessible
property before there can be any development, independent of the local
government’s bylaws (or lack there of).  The
statute is not concerned with, much less does it invalidate, additional
rights-of-way, which are not relied upon for development.  
¶ 17.         The
Environmental Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the relief plaintiff
pursues. Plaintiff has no private zoning enforcement action available to her
because there is no violation of an existing zoning decision.  The earlier
2005 decision of the DRB to approve the building permit for the back parcel did
nothing to affect the validity of the Nordlund
right-of-way—as plaintiff concedes here.  In addition, the approval did
not compel exclusive use of the Van Nostrand
right-of-way to gain access to the back parcel.  The Environmental Court
has no jurisdiction because there is no violation of a zoning decision
respecting defendants’ property or use of the rights-of-way in question.
Affirmed.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief
  Justice
 

*  Furthermore,
this Court does not presume jurisdiction when interpreting statutes of entities
that did not exist at common law. See Trybulski
v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Elec. Corp., 112 Vt. 1, 7, 20 A.2d 117, 120 (1941)
(“It is [an administrative] body exercising special and statutory powers not
according to the course of the common law, as to which nothing will be presumed
in favor of its jurisdiction.”).