Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Stuart F. Roitburd

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2801-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Stuart F. Roitburd, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Stuart R. Roitburd, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ROITBURD 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 26, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, A.W. BRADLEY, J.J., dissent. 
(Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2801-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Stuart F. Roitburd, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Stuart R. Roitburd, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.    Attorney's license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
Referee 
Christine 
Harris 
Taylor's recommendation that the court declare Attorney Stuart 
F. Roitburd in default and suspend his Wisconsin law license for 
a period of two years for professional misconduct in connection 
with his work as personal representative of his mother's estate 
and his non-cooperation with the Office of Lawyer Regulation's 
(OLR) investigation into that misconduct.  The referee also 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
2 
 
recommended 
that 
Attorney 
Roitburd 
be 
required 
to 
make 
restitution to his mother's estate in the amount of $43,369.74, 
and to pay the full costs of this proceeding, which total 
$1,120.29 as of August 11, 2015. 
¶2 
Because no appeal has been filed, we review the 
referee's report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).1  
After conducting our independent review of the matter, we agree 
with the referee that, based on Attorney Roitburd's failure to 
answer the complaint filed by the OLR, the OLR is entitled to a 
default judgment.  However, we disagree with the referee that 
Attorney Roitburd's professional misconduct warrants a two-year 
suspension of his Wisconsin law license.  We conclude, instead, 
that a 60-day suspension is warranted.  We agree with the 
referee that Attorney Roitburd should be ordered to pay the full 
costs of the proceeding.  We decline to order restitution for 
the reasons explained below. 
¶3 
Attorney Roitburd was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1984.   He had no disciplinary history prior to the 
filing of this complaint.  According to the OLR's complaint, his 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
3 
 
law license is currently suspended for failure to cooperate with 
the OLR in the investigation that gave rise to this proceeding. 
¶4 
On December 5, 2014, the OLR filed the current 
complaint against Attorney Roitburd.  The complaint alleges 
three counts of professional misconduct in connection with his 
work as the personal representative of his mother's estate. 
¶5 
The 
following 
facts 
are 
taken 
from 
the 
OLR's 
complaint. 
 
Attorney 
Roitburd 
served 
as 
the 
personal 
representative of his father's estate and, beginning in 2006, of 
his mother's estate.  This matter primarily concerns Attorney 
Roitburd's work as the personal representative of his mother's 
estate (hereafter, the "Roitburd Estate").   
¶6 
In April 2011, in connection with the final accounting 
of the Roitburd Estate, the circuit court administering the 
estate ordered Attorney Roitburd to make payments to certain 
creditors by early June 2011.   
¶7 
In late June 2011, an attorney appeared on Attorney 
Roitburd's behalf and informed the circuit court that there were 
errors in the final accounting and that Attorney Roitburd needed 
time to correct the errors.   
¶8 
The circuit court granted a lengthy adjournment.  
Attorney Roitburd failed to appear at the adjourned hearing 
date.  The circuit court ordered Attorney Roitburd to appear at 
a subsequent hearing, which he failed to do.   
¶9 
In March 2012, the circuit court removed Attorney 
Roitburd as personal representative of the Roitburd Estate, 
appointed a different attorney to serve as successor personal 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
4 
 
representative, 
and 
issued 
a 
bench 
warrant 
for 
Attorney 
Roitburd.  Attorney Roitburd was taken into custody and later 
released on a signature bond.   
¶10 At a subsequent court hearing, the successor personal 
representative testified that multiple assets had not been 
transferred from Attorney Roitburd's father's estate to his 
mother.  Attorney Roitburd also canceled five meetings that the 
successor personal representative had scheduled for the purpose 
of discussing the estates of Attorney Roitburd's father and 
mother. 
¶11 Attorney 
Roitburd 
stated 
he 
would 
return 
any 
unaccounted for assets to the Roitburd Estate by December 25, 
2012, but failed to do so. 
¶12 On motion from the successor personal representative, 
the circuit court entered an order to show cause for the return 
of estate assets.  After a hearing at which both Attorney 
Roitburd and the successor personal representative testified, 
the circuit court ordered Attorney Roitburd to repay the 
Roitburd Estate $43,369.74 and to provide proof of payment of 
$13,000 in taxes by mid-March 2013.  Although Attorney Roitburd 
ultimately provided proof that he had paid the $13,000 in taxes, 
he never paid the $43,369.74 to the Roitburd Estate.  In April 
2013, the circuit court entered an order and judgment finding 
Attorney Roitburd liable to the Roitburd Estate for $43,369.74.  
The judgment remains unsatisfied.   
¶13 During the OLR investigation that gave rise to this 
proceeding, Attorney Roitburd failed to provide responses to the 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
5 
 
OLR's repeated requests for information.  On May 22, 2014, this 
court temporarily suspended Attorney Roitburd's license due to 
his willful failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation.  
Attorney Roitburd's license has remained temporarily suspended 
to the date of this opinion. 
¶14 Based on the course of conduct described above, the 
OLR alleged in its complaint that Attorney Roitburd knowingly 
disobeyed obligations under the rules of a tribunal, in 
violation of SCR 20:3.4(c)2 (Count One); engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c)3 (Count Two); and failed to cooperate 
with the OLR investigation and to provide relevant information, 
answer questions fully, or furnish documents in the course of an 
OLR 
investigation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
22.03(2)4 
and 
SCR 22.03(6),5 enforced by SCR 20:8.4(h)6 (Count Three). 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
3 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
4 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
6 
 
¶15 The OLR personally served the complaint and an order 
to answer on Attorney Roitburd.  Attorney Roitburd failed to 
file an answer, and the OLR moved for default judgment.   
¶16 The referee mailed a notice of a hearing on the OLR's 
motion for default judgment to Attorney Roitburd at his address 
on file with the State Bar of Wisconsin.  Attorney Roitburd 
failed to appear for the hearing.   
¶17 The referee issued a decision recommending that this 
court grant the OLR's motion for default judgment.  In so doing, 
the referee deemed the allegations in the OLR's complaint to be 
established.  The referee recommended a two-year suspension of 
Attorney Roitburd's Wisconsin law license, the imposition of the 
full costs of this proceeding against him, and the imposition of 
restitution to the Roitburd Estate in the amount of $43,369.74.  
                                                                                                                                                             
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
5 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, the 
respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
7 
 
¶18 Attorney Roitburd did not appeal from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  Thus, we proceed with our review of 
the matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).  We review a referee's 
findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law de novo.  Id.  We determine the appropriate 
level of discipline independent of the referee's recommendation. 
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶19 We agree with the referee that Attorney Roitburd 
should be declared in default.  Although the OLR effected 
personal service of its complaint, and although Attorney 
Roitburd was given notice of the hearing on the motion for 
default judgment, he failed to appear or present a defense. 
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to declare him in default.  
In addition, the referee properly relied on the allegations of 
the complaint, which were deemed admitted.  
See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coplien, 2010 WI 109, ¶¶10-11, 
329 Wis. 2d 311, 788 N.W.2d 376.  We therefore accept the 
referee's findings of fact based on the allegations of the 
complaint.  We also agree with the referee that those findings 
of fact adequately support the legal conclusions of professional 
misconduct with respect to the three counts of misconduct 
alleged in the complaint. 
¶20 However, we disagree with the referee's recommendation 
that this court impose a two-year license suspension.  As noted 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
8 
 
above, it is ultimately this court's responsibility, rather than 
the referee's, to determine the appropriate level of discipline.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, 
¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894.  We owe no deference to 
the referee's recommended sanctions.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶37, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  In considering the appropriate sanction, this 
court seeks to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the 
misconduct, to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar 
misconduct, and to protect the public, the courts, and the legal 
system from a repetition of the misconduct.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2011 WI 7, ¶17, 
331 Wis. 2d 341, 795 N.W.2d 745. 
¶21 Under the unique circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that a 60-day suspension is sufficient to accomplish 
these goals.  This is the first time in the more than three 
decades since Attorney Roitburd's admission to the Wisconsin bar 
that he has been the subject of professional discipline in this 
state.  Until now, Attorney Roitburd has not created a reason to 
believe that the public, the courts, or the legal system must be 
protected from the risk of his misconduct.  We note, too, that 
the three counts of misconduct at issue here do not evince an 
extensive 
pattern 
of 
indifference 
to 
our 
ethical 
rules.  
Finally, we note that our knowledge of Attorney Roitburd's 
misconduct is limited to the facts alleged in the OLR's 
complaint and established by Attorney Roitburd's default.  As a 
result, there is much we do not know about his work as personal 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
9 
 
representative of his mother's estate, and about the estate 
itself.  For example, while we know that certain assets went 
unaccounted for, we do not know whether any mistakes Attorney 
Roitburd made in the administration of the estate rose to the 
level of dishonesty or bad faith.  We do not know whether 
Attorney Roitburd was an heir to the estate, such that he might 
otherwise have been entitled to receive some amount of the 
assets at issue.  We do not know whether his actions affected 
the rights and realization of payments to creditors of the 
estate.   
¶22 We have, in the past, imposed far less than a two-year 
suspension for either comparable or more serious misconduct.  
For 
example, 
in 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Fitzgerald, 2008 WI 101, 314 Wis. 2d 7, 752 N.W.2d 879, we 
suspended Attorney Fitzgerald's license for 60 days based on a 
six-count disciplinary complaint.  The misconduct included 
Attorney Fitzgerald's appearing on behalf of clients during her 
law license suspension; billing the State Public Defender and 
accepting payment for appearances made on behalf of clients 
during her law license suspension; misleading a county clerk 
about her law license status; and failing to cooperate with the 
OLR.  Our 60-day suspension of Attorney Fitzgerald's license 
followed a previous 90-day suspension for numerous instances of 
misconduct.  In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 
2014 WI 33, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 847 N.W.2d 343, this court imposed 
a 60-day suspension based on Attorney Osicka's default to a 
four-count disciplinary complaint.  The misconduct included 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
10 
 
failing to place a client's advanced fee into a client trust 
account or to provide the notices required by the alternative 
advanced fee procedure; charging an unreasonable fee; failing to 
refund unearned fees; and failing to cooperate with the OLR.  
Our 60-day suspension of Attorney Osicka's license followed two 
previous public reprimands.   Finally, in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Lamb, 2011 WI 101, 338 Wis. 2d 1, 806 N.W.2d 
439, this court imposed a 60-day suspension for 21 counts of 
misconduct related to Attorney Lamb's handling of four client 
matters.  Our 60-day suspension of Attorney Lamb's license 
followed a previous private reprimand.   
¶23 In light of our resolutions of prior disciplinary 
actions, and in light of the unique circumstances of this case, 
we deem the OLR's and the referee's recommended two-year 
suspension to be excessive.   To be clear, Attorney Roitburd 
should not construe this opinion as a vindication of any aspect 
of his misconduct or his failure to appear at any stage of these 
disciplinary proceedings.  We simply conclude that, while 
Attorney Roitburd violated his ethical duties as an attorney, a 
60-day 
suspension 
will 
be 
sufficient 
to 
accomplish 
the 
objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system.   
¶24 As to the issue of restitution, the OLR requested and 
the referee recommended that this court order Attorney Roitburd 
to pay restitution to the Roitburd Estate in the amount of 
$43,369.74.  However, we note that the OLR states in its 
complaint that the circuit court administering the estate has 
entered an order and judgment directing Attorney Roitburd to pay 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
11 
 
the estate the amount of $43,369.74.  Neither the OLR nor the 
referee explains why this court should order restitution that 
would duplicate that already ordered by the circuit court.  We 
therefore deny the referee's recommendation for restitution.  We 
deem it appropriate, however, to require, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his Wisconsin law license, that Attorney 
Roitburd demonstrate to the court that he has satisfied the 
judgment entered by the circuit court against him in the 
Roitburd Estate. 
¶25 Finally, we agree that Attorney Roitburd should pay 
the full costs of the proceeding.  
¶26 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Stuart F. Roitburd 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
60 days, effective April 26, 2016. 
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary license 
suspension of May 22, 2014, which arose out of Stuart F. 
Roitburd's 
willful 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
OLR's 
investigation in this matter, is lifted. 
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Stuart F. Roitburd shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2).  This requirement includes Stuart F. Roitburd's 
obligation to demonstrate to the court that he has satisfied the 
judgment entered by the circuit court against him in Estate of 
No. 
2014AP2801-D   
 
12 
 
Shirley Roitburd, Milwaukee County Case No. 06-PR-1840, as 
described above. 
¶30 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (separate writing to follow). 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   The OLR charged Attorney Roitburd with 
three violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys.  I agree with the per curiam that the three 
violations were established by virtue of Attorney Roitburd's 
default in these proceedings.  I also agree that Attorney 
Roitburd should pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
I 
agree, 
finally, 
that 
Attorney 
Roitburd's 
compliance with all conditions imposed in the per curiam, 
including satisfaction of the judgment entered by the circuit 
court against him in Estate of Shirley Roitburd, Milwaukee 
County 
Case 
No. 
06-PR-1840, 
should 
be 
required 
for 
reinstatement.   
¶32 I disagree, however, with two aspects of the per 
curiam:   
¶33 (I) I disagree with the four justices joining the OLR 
per curiam1 blocking release of Justice David T. Prosser's 
separate writing and insisting that his writing be released at a 
later time.  No basis exists for this action.  Indeed, the four 
justices have violated the Supreme Court's Internal Operating 
Procedures (IOP). 
¶34 (II) I disagree with the length of suspension imposed 
by the per curiam opinion. The per curiam grants Attorney 
Roitburd a 22-month reduction in the sanction requested in the 
                                                 
1 I use the phrase "OLR per curiam" to refer to a per curiam 
in an attorney discipline proceedings prepared by a court 
commissioner.  See Internal Operating Procedure (IOP) II H.  
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
OLR complaint to which he defaulted.  There is no justification 
for this significant downward departure. 
I 
¶35 The per curiam insists that Justice Prosser's separate 
writing be held and not be released at the same time as the OLR 
per curiam.  They want the per curiam to bear the notation 
"separate writing to follow."2   
¶36 The instant OLR per curiam does not explain why 
Justice Prosser's separate writing will follow later rather than 
be released with the per curiam. 
¶37 There is, however, only one possible explanation.  The 
four justices must be relying on the procedure for opinion 
preparation and mandate adopted by a majority of the court in 
September 2014.3      
¶38 The 
September 
9, 
2014 
procedure 
for 
opinion 
preparation and mandate is set forth in the Supreme Court's 
Internal Operating Procedures (IOP) at II G.  A reading of the 
plain language of IOP II G. demonstrates, however, that IOP II 
G. does not govern the instant OLR per curiam. 
¶39 I have attached a copy of Internal Operating Procedure 
II G. as Attachment A.4  Attachment A also includes paragraphs 
                                                 
2 Per curiam, ¶30. 
3 See State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶30-31, 359 
Wis. 2d 1, 
856 
N.W.2d 580 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(setting forth in full the procedure adopted by the court and 
disagreeing with its adoption).   
4 The Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures are 
printed in volume 6 of the Wisconsin Statutes.   
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
adjacent to IOP II G. to put II G. in context.  Attachment A 
sets forth paragraphs E, F, G, and H of "II. Decisional 
Procedure—Appellate and Original Jurisdiction."     
¶40 Apparently 
Justice 
Prosser's 
separate 
writing 
is 
viewed by the four justices as falling within IOP II G. 55 and 
IOP II G. 66 because  Justice Prosser's separate writing compares 
in general terms the instant case with a pending OLR case that 
raises similar issues.   
                                                 
5 Section 5 of IOP II G. provides as follows relating to the  
"separate writing to follow" notation: 
5.  Separate Writings to Follow.  If, during the 
course of a separate writing, the author cites to a 
case then pending before the court for which the 
opinion of the court has not been released, the 
majority 
opinion 
shall 
be 
released 
with 
the 
designation "separate opinion(s) to follow," unless 
the citation can be replaced with ellipses in which 
case the separate opinion shall be released with the 
majority opinion and the ellipses shall be replaced 
with the omitted citation when the cited opinion is 
released.  There shall be no further changes to the 
separate writings after mandate.  Separate writings 
for which the citation cannot be replaced with 
ellipses shall be released when the then unreleased 
decision that was cited in the separate opinion is 
released. 
6 Section 6 of IOP II G. provides as follows relating to the 
"separate writing to follow" notation: 
6.  Holds; Tying Together Release of Two Pending 
Cases.  No one justice may block the release of a 
majority opinion by a "Hold."  It shall take the 
affirmative vote of the majority of the participating 
justices to block the release of a majority opinion.  
No one justice may tie together the release of two 
pending cases.  It shall take the affirmative vote of 
a majority of the participating justices in each case 
to tie together the release of two pending cases. 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶41 I conclude that IOP II G. does not apply to OLR per 
curiam opinions.  OLR per curiam opinions are governed by IOP II 
H. (entitled Per Curiam Opinion) and IOP II I. (entitled 
Mandate).   
¶42 I would follow the Internal Operating Procedures.  
Therefore the opinion in the instant OLR per curiam should not 
be released at this time.  The per curiam in the instant OLR 
case and Justice Prosser's separate writing should be released 
at the same time as (or after) the other OLR per curiam to which 
Justice Prosser's separate writing refers.     
¶43 Applying IOP II G. to the instant OLR per curiam 
violates the text of IOP II G.  IOP II G. is written entirely in 
terms of opinions authored by a justice.  See the text of IOP II 
G. set forth in Attachment A.  OLR per curiams are not authored 
by a justice.   
¶44 Furthermore, IOP II H. and IOP II I. explicitly govern 
the procedure to be followed for per curiam opinions in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings.  IOP II H. provides (emphasis added): 
H. Per Curiam Opinion 
Per curiam opinions may be prepared by a justice 
or a court commissioner for consideration by the 
court.  Per curiam opinions in judicial and attorney 
disciplinary proceedings are prepared by a court 
commissioner for the court's consideration.  The 
decisions in all cases are made by the court, and the 
per curiam opinions are reviewed by the entire court 
and are approved as to form and substance by the court 
prior to issuance.  
¶45 IOP II I. provides (emphasis added):   
I.  Mandate 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
The court's decision in a case is mandated 
promptly upon approval of the opinion by the court, as 
set forth above, and upon notification by the chief 
justice to the clerk, or upon notification by the 
author of the majority opinion if the chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to notify the clerk.  The court's 
opinion is issued simultaneously with any concurring 
or 
dissenting 
opinions, 
unless 
concurring 
or 
dissenting opinion or opinions come within paragraph 5 
above as "Separate Writing to Follow." 
¶46 In contrast to IOP II G. 5., relating to "separate 
writing to follow," IOP II I. sets forth the general rule that a 
court's opinion is mandated simultaneously with any concurring 
or dissenting opinions (except when a  concurring or dissenting 
opinion or opinions falls within section 5 of IOP II G.).      
¶47 Here is how justice-authored opinions governed by IOP 
II G. differ from OLR per curiam opinions: 
• The September 2014 procedure speaks to a majority 
opinion authored by a justice.  But an OLR per curiam 
is not authored by a justice.   
• A justice-authored opinion is assigned to a justice by 
the court.  In contrast, an OLR attorney discipline 
matter 
is 
assigned 
to 
a 
supreme 
court 
staff 
commissioner by the Clerk of the Supreme Court.   
• The justice who authors a majority opinion has been 
instructed with regard to the writing by the court.  
With 
regard 
to 
an 
OLR 
per 
curiam, 
the 
court 
commissioner recommends a resolution to the court.  
The court may accept or change the recommended 
resolution of the OLR matter.  The commissioner drafts 
the per curiam and circulates it to the justices for 
approval or separate writings. 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
• Four justices must agree to hold a conference to 
discuss a draft of a justice-authored opinion.  In 
contrast, four votes are not needed for a court 
conference on a circulated OLR per curiam opinion.   
• The Internal Operating Procedures state procedures and 
time periods for circulating and mandating a justice-
authored opinion.  In contrast, an OLR per curiam and 
separate writings relating to the per curiam are not 
governed by the procedures or time periods set forth 
by IOP II G.  
¶48 In sum, IOP II G. entitled "Opinions" relates to 
justice-authored majority and lead opinions. IOP II G. does not 
relate to OLR per curiams.  OLR per curiams are governed by IOP 
II H. and IOP II I. 
¶49 Several justices have become so enamored with the 
"separate writing to follow" notation that they have threatened 
its use in situations that have no relationship to IOP II G. 5.  
In other words, they want to extend the "separate writing to 
follow" practice to separate writings that do not have anything 
to do with a pending case that has not yet been released.   
¶50 For example, as I noted in my dissent to an order 
issued on December 4, 2015 in what is collectively known as "the 
John Doe trilogy,"7 I was directed that any separate writing I 
                                                 
7 The John Doe case comprises the following matters:  Three 
Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, Nos. 2013AP2504-2508-W;  Two 
Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No. 2014AP296-OA; Schmitz v. 
Peterson, Nos. 2014AP427-421-W. 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
prepared would not be issued along with the order unless I 
circulated my separate writing within a short time after the 
majority writing was circulated.8  The same thing happened about 
a month later, with regard to another order in the John Doe 
trilogy that was issued on January 12, 2016.9  Again I objected.   
¶51 In both orders, I noted that the court's practice of 
using "separate writing to follow" serves to stifle minority 
views and full consideration of the case and in fact may 
encourage a later circulation of a separate writing.   
¶52 In any event, this "separate writing to follow" 
intimidation in the John Doe trilogy violates IOP II H. which 
clearly states as follows:  "The court's opinion is issued 
simultaneously with any concurring or dissenting opinion or 
opinions, unless concurring or dissenting opinion or opinions 
come within paragraph 5 above as "separate writing to follow."  
In the John Doe trilogy my separate writings made no reference 
to any pending but unreleased opinion.10   
                                                 
8 Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, Nos. 2013AP2504-
2508-W;  Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No. 2014AP296-OA; 
Schmitz v. Peterson, Nos. 2014AP427-421-W, unpublished order, 
¶¶23-32 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (Dec. 4, 2015). 
9 Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, Nos. 2013AP2504-
2508-W;  Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No. 2014AP296-OA; 
Schmitz v. Peterson, Nos. 2014AP427-421-W, unpublished order, 
¶¶31-35 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (Jan. 12, 2016). 
10 I have also noted my objections to the court's recent 
failure to follow our IOPs in State v. Finley, No. 2014AP2488-
CR, unpublished order (Jan. 11, 2016); Regency West Apts. LLC v. 
City of Racine, No. 2014AP2947, unpublished order (Jan. 11, 
2016); and Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, No. 2015AP146, 
unpublished order (Jan. 11, 2016). 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶53 In sum, IOP II G. does not apply to OLR per curiams.  
Per curiam opinions relating to attorney discipline are governed 
by IOP II H. and IOP II I. 
¶54 Moreover, the "separate writing to follow" tool in IOP 
II G. 5. and IOP II G. 6. is peculiar to Wisconsin appellate 
practice.  "Separate writing to follow" will be confusing to the 
litigants, readers of opinions, and publishers of opinions.  It 
raises numerous problems.  Under these circumstances, it is best 
to cabin "separate writing to follow," not expand it beyond its 
present borders.  
II 
¶55 I turn now to the length of suspension imposed by the 
per curiam.  Attorney Roitburd has known since he received the 
OLR complaint that the OLR sought a two-year suspension.  He has 
also known since he received the referee's report that the 
referee recommended a two-year suspension.  Yet he has never 
questioned or challenged that recommended suspension.  He has 
not been heard from whatsoever.    
¶56 Problematically, the 
per curiam appears to give 
Attorney Roitburd the benefit of  the doubts created by his own 
non-participation.  The per curiam notes, for example, that we 
do not know all the facts concerning Attorney Roitburd's work as 
personal representative of his mother's estate, nor do we know 
the details of the estate itself.  The per curiam holds open the 
possibility that Attorney Roitburd did not engage in dishonest 
or bad faith behavior at all.  According to the per curiam, this 
uncertainty justifies an over 90% reduction in the OLR's and the 
No.  2014AP2801-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
referee's recommended suspension, even though Attorney Roitburd 
never made an appearance to oppose that suspension.  Based on 
this result, a lawyer facing misconduct charges could hardly be 
blamed for believing that the best defense is no defense—indeed, 
no cooperation with the disciplinary process at all.     
¶57 In my view, Attorney Roitburd cannot supply by default 
the grounds for a reduction of a sanction that he never opposed.  
It must be remembered that Attorney Roitburd has neither alleged 
nor offered any evidence from which any fact in his favor could 
possibly be found.  There is also no claim that the facts 
alleged in the OLR's complaint, which the referee deemed 
admitted 
by 
virtue 
of 
Attorney 
Roitburd's 
default, 
are 
erroneous, much less clearly so.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 
675 N.W.2d 747 (referee's findings of fact must be affirmed 
unless clearly erroneous).   
¶58 We 
must 
therefore 
resolve 
this 
case 
with 
the 
understanding that the facts are exactly as the OLR alleges.  
Those facts include Attorney Roitburd's failure to return to his 
mother's estate over $43,000 in unaccounted-for assets; his 
repeated failure to appear at court hearings scheduled to 
discuss estate assets; the circuit court's issuance of a bench 
warrant for him; the circuit court's removal of him as personal 
representative; his repeated failure to meet with the successor 
personal representative to discuss estate assets; and his total 
refusal to cooperate with the OLR.  
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10 
 
¶59 Our precedent shows that these facts merit a two-year 
license suspension.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Goldstein, 2010 WI 26, 323 Wis. 2d 706, 782 N.W.2d 388 
(imposing a two-year suspension for misconduct that included 
converting nearly $70,000 from three probate estates for which 
the attorney served as special administrator or personal 
representative); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Krezminski, 
2007 
WI 
21, 
299 
Wis. 2d 152, 
727 
N.W.2d 492 
(imposing a two-year suspension for converting client funds that 
the lawyer held in his capacity as personal representative for 
an estate, knowingly offering false evidence, and failing to 
communicate with a client).   
¶60 I would therefore order a two-year suspension.  I 
would not do as the majority has done:  construe the slimness of 
the default record——caused by Attorney Roitburd's total failure 
to join issue——as a mitigating circumstance.  We recently 
explained that it is unnecessary for a referee to take evidence 
regarding 
the 
allegations 
of 
an 
OLR 
complaint 
after 
a 
declaration of default.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Boyle, 2015 WI 90, ¶¶53-55, 364 Wis. 2d 544, 869 
N.W.2d 475 
(deeming 
unnecessary 
the 
referee's 
post-default 
"prove-up" hearing and reducing requested costs by 40% as a 
result).  Today's decision teaches just the opposite.   
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I dissent regarding the 
discipline. 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
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