Title: State v. Schlee

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SCHLEE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545.] 
Criminal law – Procedure – Crim.R. 57(B) – Applicability of Rules of Civil 
Procedure when no applicable Criminal Rule exists – Motion filed as 
Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment may be recast by trial court 
as petition for postconviction relief. 
(No. 2006-1608 — Submitted August 14, 2007 — Decided February 20, 2008.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lake County,  
No. 2005-L-105, 2006-Ohio-3208. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The trial court may recast an appellant’s motion for relief from judgment as a 
petition for postconviction 
relief 
when the motion has been 
unambiguously presented as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant Larry M. Schlee was convicted of aggravated murder in 
1993 and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years.  
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Schlee’s conviction and sentence.  State 
v. Schlee (Dec. 23, 1994), Lake App. No. 93-L-082, 1994 WL 738452.  We 
declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 1518, 649 
N.E.2d 278. 
{¶ 2} Schlee then filed two postconviction-relief petitions, both of which 
the trial court denied.  Schlee appealed, and the court of appeals, after remanding 
the first petition for further findings, eventually affirmed the denial of both 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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petitions.  State v. Schlee (Dec. 17, 1999), Lake App. No. 98-L-187, 1999 WL 
1313651; State v. Schlee (Sept. 22, 2000), Lake App. No. 99-L-112, 2000 WL 
1387985.  We declined to accept jurisdiction of either appeal. (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 1481, 727 N.E.2d 131 (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1428, 741 N.E.2d 893. 
{¶ 3} Having 
exhausted 
all 
appeals 
and 
postconviction-relief 
proceedings, Schlee filed a motion for a new trial, which was granted.  After a 
new trial in March 2004, Schlee was again convicted of aggravated murder.  He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 15 years.  Schlee 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.  State v. 
Schlee, Lake App. No. 2004-L-070, 2005-Ohio-5117.  We declined to accept 
jurisdiction of the appeal.  108 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2006-Ohio-665, 842 N.E.2d 
1053. 
{¶ 4} On March 16, 2005, Schlee filed a motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Schlee alleged prosecutorial misconduct in both of his 
trials.  He also alleged that he had been unconstitutionally subjected to double 
jeopardy.  He requested reversal of his conviction and dismissal of the indictment 
with prejudice. 
{¶ 5} The trial court treated Schlee’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a petition 
for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 and dismissed the petition as 
untimely.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.  State v. Schlee, 
Lake App. No. 2005-L-105, 2006-Ohio-3208.  We declined to accept jurisdiction 
of the appeal, 111 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2006-Ohio-5351, 855 N.E.2d 497, but the 
Lake County Court of Appeals certified this case as being in conflict with the 
decision of the Hamilton County Court of Appeals in State v. Lehrfeld, Hamilton 
App. No. C-030390, 2004-Ohio-2277.  We determined that a conflict existed.  
111 Ohio St.3d 1429, 2006-Ohio-5351, 855 N.E.2d 495. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 6} Accordingly, we now consider the following certified question:  
“Whether the trial court can recast [a]ppellant’s Motion For Relief From 
Judgment as a petition for postconviction relief when it has been unambiguously 
presented as a Civil Rule 60(B) [motion].”  For the reasons that follow, we answer 
the certified question in the affirmative. 
{¶ 7} Crim.R. 57(B) states, “If no procedure is specifically prescribed by 
rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules 
of criminal procedure, and shall look to the rules of civil procedure and to the 
applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure exists.” 
{¶ 8} Civ.R. 60(B) allows relief from a judgment or order based on 
“fraud * * *, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party,” or “any 
other reason justifying relief from the judgment.”  Civ.R. 60(B)(3) and (5). 
{¶ 9} When a defendant in a criminal case files a Civ.R. 60(B) motion 
requesting relief from a judgment, how is a trial court to proceed?  The courts of 
appeals in Ohio have crossed the intersection of Civ.R. 60(B) and Crim.R. 57(B) 
in both directions.  See, e.g., State v. Israfil (Nov. 15, 1996), Montgomery App. 
No. 15572, 1996 WL 665006, *1 (“Civ.R. 60(B) has no application to judgments 
in criminal cases”); State v. Johnson (Jan. 17, 2002), Richland App. No. 01-CA-
88, 2002 WL 110571, *1 (“the Civil Rules do not apply in criminal cases”); State 
v. Plassman, Fulton App. No. F-03-017, 2004-Ohio-279, ¶7 (“Civ.R. 60(B) is 
available in criminal cases for certain procedures that were not anticipated by the 
criminal rules”); State v. Wooden, Franklin App. No. 02AP-473, 2002-Ohio-7363, 
¶8 (“Crim.R. 57(B) permits a court to look to the rules of civil procedure if no 
applicable rule of criminal procedure exists”).  This split of authority is puzzling 
given the plain language of Crim.R. 57(B) that courts “shall look to the rules of 
civil procedure * * * if no rule of criminal procedure exists.”   We would have 
thought that the clarity of that command would be impossible to miss if we had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
not made the same mistake ourselves.  See State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. 
Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 104, 108, 556 N.E.2d 
1120 (“this order was issued in a criminal case, and hence Civ.R. 65 does not 
apply”).  But see id. at 117, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Douglas, J., concurring) (the 
majority’s statement that Civ.R. 65 does not apply “ignores Crim.R. 57(B)”). 
{¶ 10} We had previously acknowledged that Crim.R. 57(B) allows courts 
to apply the Civil Rules in criminal proceedings.  State v. Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2d 23, 25, 24 O.O.3d 64, 434 N.E.2d 723 (Crim.R. 57(B) “directs courts to the 
Civil Rules when no procedure is specifically prescribed by Criminal Rule”); see 
also State v. McGettrick (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 138, 141, 31 OBR 296, 509 N.E.2d 
378, fn. 5 (Crim.R. 57(B) permits use of Civ.R. 25(A) for substitution of parties).  
Today we hold that the plain language of Crim.R. 57(B) permits a trial court in a 
criminal case to look to the Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance when no 
applicable Rule of Criminal Procedure exists.  We therefore overrule Natl. 
Broadcasting Co., 52 Ohio St.3d 104, 556 N.E.2d 1120, to the extent that it stands 
for a contrary proposition of law. 
{¶ 11} We must now consider whether Schlee properly resorted to Civ.R. 
60(B) in this case, that is, whether the absence of an applicable Criminal Rule 
justified invoking a Civil Rule in its place.  The state contends, and we agree, that 
Crim.R. 35, which sets forth the procedure by which criminal defendants can file 
petitions for postconviction relief, was available to Schlee and serves the same 
purpose as the Civ.R. 60(B) motion he filed. 
{¶ 12} Schlee’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was labeled a “Motion For Relief 
From Judgment.”  Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category 
necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be 
judged.  State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522, 
citing State v. Reynolds (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131.  In 
January Term, 2008 
5 
Reynolds, we concluded that a motion styled “Motion to Correct or Vacate 
Sentence” met the definition of a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to 
R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), because it was “(1) filed subsequent to [the defendant’s] 
direct appeal, (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights, (3) sought to render the 
judgment void, and (4) asked for vacation of the judgment and sentence.”  Id. at 
160, 679 N.E.2d 1131.  The Civ.R. 60(B) motion filed by Schlee was filed 
subsequent to his direct appeal, claimed a denial of constitutional rights, and 
sought reversal of the judgment rendered against him.  We conclude, therefore, 
that the Civ.R. 60(B) motion filed by Schlee could have been filed as a petition 
for postconviction relief.  Thus, it is not necessary to look to the Civil Rules or 
other applicable law for guidance in the way Crim.R. 57(B) intends, because a 
procedure “specifically prescribed by rule” exists, i.e., Crim.R. 35. 
{¶ 13} We recognize that some motions may not be recast by a trial court.  
In Bush, for example, the trial court treated the defendant’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it.  
Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d at 236, 773 N.E.2d 522.  The court of appeals affirmed, but 
we reversed, holding that “R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 do not govern a Crim.R. 
32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  Postsentence motions to 
withdraw guilty or no contest pleas and postconviction relief petitions exist 
independently.”  Id. at 239, 773 N.E.2d 522.  The Civ.R. 60(B) motion filed in 
this case does not exist “independently” from a petition for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Crim.R. 35 and R.C. 2953.21. 
{¶ 14} We conclude that the trial court in this case did not err when it 
considered Schlee’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion as if it were a petition for postconviction 
relief.  Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 15} I concur in the judgment of the court.  I agree that the Civ.R. 60(B) 
motion filed by Schlee ought to have been filed as a petition for postconviction 
relief because Crim.R. 35 prescribes the attendant procedures. 
{¶ 16} However, I do not believe that trial courts – and specifically the 
trial court in this case – should “recast” motions that are clearly labeled.  The 
motion filed by Schlee was not an “irregular ‘no-name’ ” motion requiring the 
court to categorize it.  State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 
N.E.2d 522, ¶10.  Rather, it was specifically delineated as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion.  
In such situations, the proper course for a trial court, in my view, is to simply deny 
the motion as improper under the rules, with, if appropriate, an explanation for the 
denial.  Such a practice would allow the filing party to refile the motion under the 
proper procedural rule and is more consistent with our disposition in Bush. 
{¶ 17} Moreover, there may be some unintended, unwanted consequences 
resulting from a trial court’s recasting of a motion.  As appellant asserts, the trial 
court’s actions may abridge due process protections or adversely affect federal 
habeas corpus proceedings.  For these reasons, I would answer the certified 
question in the negative, but I would nonetheless affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig A. 
Swenson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
Jones Day, Douglas R. Cole, Gene Crawford, and Erik J. Clark, for 
appellant. 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Kenneth R. Spiert, Assistant 
State Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
Charles B. Clovis, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin Country Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien. 
______________________