Title: Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP140 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium 
Association, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Village of Sister Bay, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 742, 905 N.W.2d 844 
 (2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 18, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Door 
 
JUDGE: 
D. T. Ehlers 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John B. Tuffnell, and Tuffnell Law, S.C., Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by John B. Tuffnell.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by  
Remzy D. Bitar, Luke A. Martell, and Municipal Law & Litigation 
Group, S.C., Waukesha. There was an oral argument by Remzy D. 
Bitar. 
 
 
 
 
2019 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP140 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV122) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium 
Association, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Sister Bay, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 18, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, The Yacht Club 
at Sister Bay Condominium Association, seeks review of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals 
affirming the circuit court's order that dismissed its complaint 
against the Village of Sister Bay.1  The complaint alleged that 
                                                 
1 Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Village of 
Sister Bay, No. 2017AP140, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 2017) (per curiam) (affirming in part and reversing in 
part an order of the circuit court for Door County, D.T. Ehlers, 
Judge). 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
2 
 
some summer concerts held in a public park were a public and 
private nuisance.  Affirming the dismissal, the court of appeals 
concluded that the Yacht Club failed to provide the Village with 
a timely written notice of injury and that each concert held by 
the Village does not constitute a new "event" giving rise to a 
new opportunity to file a notice of injury. 
¶2 
Before this court, the Yacht Club asserts that the 
court of appeals erred in failing to view each concert as a new 
nuisance prompting a new notice of injury period.  Thus, in the 
Yacht Club's view, it should not be barred from bringing future 
nuisance actions against the Village simply because it failed to 
complain 
within 
120 
days 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d)(a) (2015-16)2 about a noise nuisance from the first 
concert the Village held in 2014. 
¶3 
We conclude that each concert that is alleged to be a 
nuisance constitutes a separate event for purposes of filing a 
written notice of injury.  However, because the Yacht Club 
failed to serve its written notice of injury within 120 days 
after the date of the last concert alleged to be a nuisance, its 
written notice of injury was not timely filed.  Accordingly, we 
affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
3 
 
I 
¶4 
The facts set forth below are taken primarily from the 
Yacht Club's complaint.  Because we are reviewing the circuit 
court's determination of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, we must assume that these facts are true.3 
¶5 
Some time in the summer or fall of 2013, the Village 
received a donation pledge from an anonymous donor.  The donor 
stipulated that the donation would be used to construct a 
performance pavilion in Waterfront Park, a public park in the 
Village.  Accepting the pledge, the Village began construction 
on the pavilion. 
¶6 
Construction of the pavilion was completed on or about 
August 1, 2014.  Upon completion, the Village immediately began 
to host public performances at the pavilion.  Such performances 
typically involved live music and often ran after official park 
hours, occasionally as late as midnight. 
¶7 
The Yacht Club is a condominium association that 
administers a condominium complex of the same name.  The complex 
lies within several hundred feet to the southwest of the 
performance pavilion.  Facing to the southwest, the performance 
pavilion's stage is designed to amplify and aim sound in that 
direction, straight at the Yacht Club condominiums. 
¶8 
According to the Yacht Club, the performances create 
very loud noise aimed directly at its condominiums.  It alleges 
                                                 
3 MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell, 
Inc., 2012 WI 15, ¶7, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 N.W.2d 857. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
4 
 
that the music "is loud enough to cause windows and personal 
property to shake and shudder from the intensity of the volume 
produced by these performances."  Further, it claims that the 
sound "is continuous and penetrates even closed doors and 
windows."  Such noise often keeps the Yacht Club's "residents 
awake far past normal park operations." 
¶9 
Alleging that the pavilion concerts substantially 
interfere with the quiet enjoyment of its residents' property, 
the Yacht Club served the Village with a written notice of 
injury pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d) on March 7, 2016.4  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1d) provides: 
(1d) Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and 
(8), no action may be brought or maintained against 
any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of 
the circumstances of the claim signed by the 
party, agent or attorney is served on the 
volunteer fire company, political corporation, 
governmental subdivision or agency and on the 
officer, official, agent or employee under s. 
801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire 
company, corporation, subdivision or agency had 
actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows 
to the satisfaction of the court that the delay 
or failure to give the requisite notice has not 
been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency or to the 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
5 
 
The notice of injury maintained that "[t]he noise pollution 
generated by the users and the performers of the performance 
pavilion is a private nuisance that directly interferes with the 
Association's use and enjoyment of its property."  It further 
stated that "[t]he last use of the pavilion occurred on or about 
September 1, 2015." 
¶10 After the Village did not respond to its notice of 
injury, the Yacht Club filed suit against the Village.  It 
alleged causes of action for both private and public nuisance.  
The Yacht Club sought damages for loss of property value, 
substantial annoyance and invasion of its property rights, as 
well as injunctive relief abating future nuisance-causing 
activities. 
¶11 Moving to dismiss the Yacht Club's complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the 
Village argued that the Yacht Club neglected to comply with the 
notice of injury and notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d).  First, the Village contended that the Yacht Club 
failed to serve the Village with a notice of injury within 120 
                                                                                                                                                             
defendant officer, official, agent or employee; 
and 
(b) A claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or 
person who performs the duties of a clerk or 
secretary 
for 
the 
defendant 
fire 
company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency and the claim 
is disallowed. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
6 
 
days of the happening of the event giving rise to its claim as 
is required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a).  Second, it asserted 
that the Yacht Club never filed an itemized statement of relief 
sought as required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(b). 
¶12 The circuit court granted the Village's motion to 
dismiss.  Relying on E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. County of Oneida, 2011 
WI 71, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 N.W.2d 421, it concluded that the 
notice of injury was served on the Village "almost 19 months 
after 
the 
happening 
of 
the 
event 
giving 
rise 
to 
the 
claim . . . It's not within 120 days, and it's too late under 
893.80."  In the circuit court's view, the pavilion: 
was constructed in August of 2014, concerts began 
almost immediately, and the residents of the plaintiff 
condominium association immediately started noticing 
problems 
and 
with 
noise, 
with 
windows 
rattling,  . . . .  And to then wait 19 months after 
the happening of that event even though the concerts 
do continue,  . . . it's violative of 893.80, namely, 
to wait that long to make your claim. 
¶13 Additionally, the circuit court rejected the Yacht 
Club's argument that its claims could proceed even though it did 
not timely file a written notice of injury because the Village 
had actual notice of the claims at issue and was not prejudiced 
by the delay in providing written notice.5  The circuit court 
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) ("Failure to give the 
requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire 
company, corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice of 
the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the 
court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has 
not been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, 
subdivision or agency or to the defendant officer, official, 
agent or employee . . . "). 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
7 
 
determined that the Yacht Club did not meet its burden to set 
forth facts showing there was no prejudice to the Village. 
¶14 After the Yacht Club appealed, the court of appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  It affirmed the circuit 
court's determination that the Yacht Club's written notice of 
injury was not timely filed.  Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay, No. 2017AP140, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶19, 25 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (per curiam).  
The court of appeals determined first that "[t]he Association's 
notice of injury was not served until March 7, 2016, and was 
therefore untimely, even with respect to the September 1, 2015 
concert."  Id., ¶19.  Further, it determined that E-Z Roll Off 
"forecloses the Association's argument that each nuisance-
causing use of the pavilion constitutes a new 'event' for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a)."  Id., ¶20. 
¶15 However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's conclusion regarding actual notice and prejudice, 
determining that the circuit court improperly placed on the 
Yacht Club the burden to produce evidence regarding lack of 
prejudice at the motion to dismiss stage.  Id., ¶30.  Neither 
party petitioned for review of the court of appeals' decision on 
actual notice and prejudice.  Accordingly, we do not further 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
8 
 
address the issue.6  Remaining for our consideration is the Yacht 
Club's petition for review regarding the timeliness of its 
notice of injury. 
II 
¶16 In our review, we consider whether the Yacht Club's 
written notice of injury was timely filed.  We begin by 
examining the language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d), the notice of 
claim statute, applying the common law of nuisance to the 
statute's plain language.  Next we examine this court's decision 
in E-Z Roll Off, 335 Wis. 2d 720, and the Village's assertion 
that the purpose of the notice of claim statute precludes the 
Yacht Club's argument here as it did the plaintiff's argument in 
                                                 
6 See 
Novell 
v. 
Migliaccio, 
2008 
WI 
44, 
¶65, 
309 
Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544 (a party that fails to file a 
petition for cross-review does not preserve those issues for 
supreme court review); Priesler v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 
WI 135, ¶59, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136 (explaining that 
this court regularly "decline[s] to consider issues not raised 
in petitions for review"). 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
addressed 
the 
Village's 
alternative argument that the Yacht Club's claims were properly 
dismissed because the Yacht Club failed to file an itemized 
statement of the relief sought in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d)(b).  See Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n, 
Inc., No. 2017AP140, unpublished slip op., ¶31.  The court of 
appeals concluded that "[t]he Village cites no authority for the 
proposition that the Association was required to affirmatively 
allege compliance with § 893.80(1d)(b) in its complaint.  Under 
these circumstances, we cannot conclude dismissal of the 
Association's complaint was warranted based on the Association's 
alleged failure to file an itemized statement of relief."  Id., 
¶34.  Neither party petitioned for review of this determination 
and we do not address the issue further. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
9 
 
E-Z Roll Off.  Finally, we apply the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) to the notice of injury that was served on 
the Village in this action. 
¶17 This review requires us to interpret the notice of 
injury provision set forth in the notice of claim statute.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Horizon Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Marshalls Point Retreat LLC, 2018 WI 19, ¶28, 380 Wis. 2d 60, 
908 N.W.2d 797 (citation omitted). 
¶18 The application of the statute and the law of nuisance 
to the facts of this case similarly presents a question of law 
this court reviews independently, without deference to the 
circuit court or court of appeals.  MercyCare Ins. Co. v. 
Wisconsin Comm'r of Ins., 2010 WI 87, ¶26, 328 Wis. 2d 110, 786 
N.W.2d 785; see Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶16, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658. 
III 
A 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1d), the notice of claim 
statute, contains two notice provisions that serve different 
purposes.  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶22, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59; Griffin v. Milwaukee Transport 
Servs., Inc., 2001 WI App 125, ¶15, 246 Wis. 2d 433, 630 
N.W.2d 536.  When referring to the statute as a whole, we refer 
to it as the "notice of claim statute" in accordance with past 
case law.  See, e.g., E-Z Roll Off, 335 Wis. 2d 720, ¶46. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
10 
 
¶20 Subsection 
(1d)(a) 
is 
the 
"notice 
of 
injury" 
provision, which allows governmental entities to investigate and 
evaluate potential claims.  Griffin, 246 Wis. 2d 433, ¶15.  
Subsection (1d)(b) is the "notice of claim" provision, which 
affords a municipality the opportunity to compromise and settle 
a claim, thereby avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation.  
Id.; City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Bd., 216 
Wis. 2d 616, 622, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998). 
¶21 Our inquiry here focuses on the notice of injury 
provision, sub. (1d)(a), and its requirement that "written 
notice of the circumstances of the claim" be served on the 
governmental subdivision "[w]ithin 120 days after the happening 
of the event giving rise to the claim . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d)(a).  Section 893.80(1d)(a) provides that "no action 
may be brought or maintained against any . . . governmental 
subdivision" unless a claimant files with the governmental 
subdivision a notice of injury: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
11 
 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee . . . .7 
We must interpret § 893.80(1d)(a) to determine what constitutes 
"the happening of the event giving rise to the claim" in this 
nuisance action. 
¶22 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we need not further the 
inquiry.  Id. 
¶23 The Yacht Club contends that each individual concert 
is a separate "event" giving rise to a separate claim.  
Conversely, the Village asserts in its brief that the "circuit 
court and court of appeals both correctly determined that the 
notice window began to run in August of 2014, when the pavilion 
was completed, and the performances began, and did not reset 
every time there was a performance held." 
¶24 To resolve this dispute, we turn to the common law of 
nuisance and its operation in this case.  "It is well settled 
that every continuance of a nuisance is, in law, a new 
nuisance."  Kull v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 181 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1d)(b), the notice of claim 
provision, also restricts lawsuits against governmental entities 
unless the potential claimant files:  "[a] claim containing the 
address of the claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person who 
performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for the defendant 
fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency and the claim 
is disallowed."  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(b). 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
12 
 
N.W.2d 393 (1970) (citing Ramsdale v. Foote, 55 Wis. 557, 562, 
13 N.W. 557 (1882)); Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 
Wis. 575, 590, 227 N.W. 385 (1929)).  This rule has been 
consistently applied throughout our jurisprudence: 
There can be no doubt, under the authorities ancient 
and modern, that an action lies against him who 
erects, and against him who continues a nuisance 
erected by another.  The continuance and every use of 
that which is, in its erection and use, a nuisance, is 
a new nuisance, for which the party injured has a 
remedy for his damages. 
Kull; 49 Wis. 2d at 9 (citing Cobb v. Smith, 38 Wis. 21, 33 
(1875)). 
¶25 Applied to the facts here, this precedent establishes 
that each use of the performance pavilion that constitutes a 
nuisance, is a new nuisance for which an injured party has a 
remedy for any damages incurred.  Some concerts may be nuisances 
and some may not. 
¶26 A hypothetical scenario illustrates this point.  If 
the first concert held by the Village in the newly built 
performance pavilion were an unamplified performance by a string 
quartet that concluded by 8:00 p.m., it seems unlikely that such 
a display would offend the Yacht Club or those similarly 
situated so as to occasion the filing of a notice of injury 
within 120 days of the event.  However, if after the 120 day 
claim period for the first concert had expired the Village then 
held a heavy metal concert lasting until midnight, under the 
Village's argument the Yacht Club would forever lose the ability 
to sue to abate any nuisance caused by the heavy metal concert. 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
13 
 
¶27 Thus, for purposes of the notice of claim statute, we 
conclude that each individual concert that is alleged to be a 
nuisance constitutes a new "event" giving rise to a new 120-day 
notice of injury period. 
B 
¶28 We examine next the Village's assertion that this 
court's decision in E-Z Roll Off, 335 Wis. 2d 720, requires a 
determination in its favor.  The Village contends that the 
purpose of the notice of claim statute precludes the Yacht 
Club's argument here as it did the plaintiff's argument in E-Z 
Roll Off. 
¶29 In E-Z Roll Off, the plaintiff company was engaged in 
the business of solid waste hauling.  Id., ¶4.  Oneida County 
executed a contract with another waste hauling company, Waste 
Management, whereby Waste Management would pay a $5.25 per ton 
"tipping fee" for municipal solid waste it delivered to the 
county solid waste facility.  Id., ¶5.  All other haulers, 
including E-Z Roll Off, paid a lot more——a $54.00 per ton 
tipping fee.  Id.  E-Z Roll Off eventually served the County 
with a notice of injury and subsequently filed suit, claiming 
violations of Wisconsin antitrust law.  Id., ¶11. 
¶30 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
County, dismissing E-Z Roll Off's complaint for failure to 
timely comply with the statutory notice of claim requirements.  
Id., ¶12.  On appeal, E-Z Roll Off argued that for purposes of 
the notice of claim statute, there was a new injury and 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
14 
 
therefore a new claim on each occasion it paid the higher $54.00 
per ton tipping fee.  Id., ¶44. 
¶31 This court rejected E-Z Roll Off's argument.  The 
reasons for its determination were twofold.  First, E-Z Roll Off 
"fail[ed] 
to 
cite 
any 
authority 
applying 
the 
continuing 
violations doctrine to the notice of claim statute under 
Wisconsin law."  Id., ¶46. 
¶32 Second, the court determined that E-Z Roll Off's 
interpretation of the notice of claim statute is inconsistent 
with the statute's purpose.  Id.  Specifically, a purpose of the 
notice of claim statute "is to afford governmental entities the 
opportunity to compromise and budget for potential settlement or 
litigation."  Id. (citing Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶23, 28).  
The court concluded that accepting E-Z Roll Off's argument would 
undermine this purpose.  "If the continuing violations doctrine 
were to apply, it would be much more difficult for governmental 
entities to budget for potential litigation."  E-Z Roll Off, 335 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶46. 
¶33 Such a result would create limitless exposure for 
governmental entities.  "The legislature did not intend for 
governmental entities to be exposed to indefinite periods of 
liability for potential violations of Wis. Stat. § 133.18.  Such 
a result would be unreasonable given the purposes of the notice 
of claim requirements found in § 893.80."  Id. 
¶34 The court of appeals here determined that E-Z Roll Off 
controls the outcome.  In the court of appeals' view, the 
concerns that drove the decision in E-Z Roll Off "are as 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
15 
 
significant in a case involving nuisance claims——where, as the 
Association argues, each continued nuisance is a new nuisance——
as they are in a case involving alleged antitrust violations."  
Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 2017AP140, 
unpublished slip op., ¶25.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
reasoned that the policy behind the notice of claim statute——
affording governmental entities the opportunity to compromise 
and budget for potential settlement or litigation and shielding 
them from "indefinite periods of liability"——are as germane and 
dispositive in this case as they were in E-Z Roll Off.  Id. 
¶35 We disagree with the court of appeals that this 
purpose mandates the same conclusion in this case as in E-Z Roll 
Off.  First, the court in E-Z Roll Off explicitly limited its 
holding to the anti-trust context when it wrote, "[t]he 
legislature did not intend for governmental entities to be 
exposed to indefinite periods of liability for potential 
violations of § 133.18."  E-Z Roll Off, 335 Wis. 2d 270, ¶46 
(emphasis added). 
¶36 Second, acceptance of the Yacht Club's argument here 
does not create the same limitless liability that E-Z Roll Off's 
argument would have in the context of that case.  In E-Z Roll 
Off, the plaintiff's assertion was that each and every payment 
of the tipping fee constituted a new "event" triggering a new 
notice of claim period.  Here, in contrast, there is no 
assertion that each and every concert is a nuisance.  The Yacht 
Club seeks redress only for those concerts that it alleges to be 
nuisances.  Each concert is a unique event that is different 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
16 
 
from previous concerts with respect to noise levels and length 
of time.  Some concerts may be nuisances and some may not. 
¶37 The 
notice 
of 
claim 
statute 
seeks 
to 
provide 
governmental entities with sufficient information to allow them 
to budget accordingly for either a settlement or litigation.  
State Dep't of Nat. Res. v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 
198, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) abrogated on other grounds by State 
ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 
547 N.W.2d 587 (1996); Van v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids, 150 
Wis. 2d 929, 933, 442 N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1989)).  This purpose 
is not compromised by our determination here.  A governmental 
entity is given enough information to budget for settlement or 
litigation resulting from any concert that is alleged to be a 
nuisance. 
¶38 Allowing the Yacht Club to serve a written notice of 
injury and bring suit for a future concert that is alleged to be 
a noise nuisance therefore does not contravene the purpose of 
the notice of claim statute.  A municipality is not subject to 
"limitless" liability.  It faces potential liability for each 
discrete concert for a discrete 120 day period.  We thus 
conclude that E-Z Roll Off does not apply to this nuisance 
action. 
C 
¶39 Finally, we apply the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1d)(a) to the written notice of injury filed in this 
action.  The written notice of injury the Yacht Club served on 
the Village states:  "[t]he last use of the pavilion occurred on 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
17 
 
or about September 1, 2015."  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) 
requires that written notice of injury be served on the 
municipality "[w]ithin 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim . . . ."  In this case, that means that 
the Yacht Club needed to serve the Village with its written 
notice of injury by December 30, 2015. 
¶40 The Yacht Club did not serve its written notice of 
injury until March 7, 2016, well after the 120 day deadline.  
Therefore, the written notice of injury was untimely with 
respect to the September 1, 2015 concert.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals' determination that the written 
notice of injury was not timely filed on this basis.  See Yacht 
Club 
at 
Sister 
Bay 
Condo. 
Ass'n, 
Inc., 
No. 
2017AP140, 
unpublished slip op., ¶19. 
¶41 Finally, as stated above, we do not opine on the court 
of appeals' determination that the circuit court erred by 
requiring the Yacht Club to present evidence regarding lack of 
prejudice at the motion to dismiss stage.  See supra, ¶15.  We 
therefore do not upset the court of appeals' direction to remand 
the cause to the circuit court for consideration of whether the 
Village had actual notice of the Yacht Club's claim and was not 
prejudiced by the late filing of the notice of injury. 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that each concert that is alleged 
to be a nuisance constitutes a separate event for purposes of 
filing a written notice of injury.  However, because the Yacht 
Club failed to serve its notice of injury within 120 days after 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
18 
 
the date of the last concert alleged to be a nuisance, its 
written notice of injury was not timely filed. 
¶43 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to consider whether the Village had actual notice 
of the Yacht Club's claim and was not prejudiced by the late 
filing of the notice of injury. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
 
No. 
2017AP140   
 
 
 
1