Title: Town of Leesburg v. Long Lane Assocs.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, McClanahan 
and Powell, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
TOWN OF LEESBURG, ET AL.  
 
v.     Record No. 111658  
 
 
   OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
LONG LANE ASSOCIATES 
 
 
 
  June 7, 2012 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
 
CORNERSTONE CHAPEL  
 
v.     Record No. 111662 
 
LONG LANE ASSOCIATES  
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
J. Howe Brown, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in finding that a locality needs the consent of a 
neighboring property owner to rezone a parcel that was 
originally part of an undivided property, to which certain 
proffers applied.  We also consider whether a landowner can 
acquire a vested right in a road shown on a town plan or in the 
zoning classification of neighboring property. 
Background 
In an action filed in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, 
Long Lane Associates Limited Partnership (Long Lane) challenged 
ordinances adopted by the town council of the Town of Leesburg 
(the Town) concerning property owned by an adjoining landowner.  
The challenged ordinances rezoned property owned by Cornerstone 
Chapel (Cornerstone), amended the Town Plan to remove a portion 
 
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of a public road (Tolbert Lane), which was to cross 
Cornerstone’s property, and approved a special exception to 
permit Cornerstone to operate a day care center on its 
property. 
Long Lane and Cornerstone own adjacent properties 
subdivided from a parcel formerly owned by High Point 
Associates (High Point).  Prior to subdivision, High Point 
proffered, and the Town accepted, conditions on the entire 
parcel.  The circuit court ruled that the Town lacked authority 
to approve Cornerstone’s request to rezone its property or 
amend its zoning conditions without Long Lane’s consent because 
Long Lane had a vested right in the completion of Tolbert Lane 
and the development set forth in the proffered conditions.  The 
Town and Cornerstone appeal. 
Facts 
 
In 1987, High Point applied to the Town for a zoning 
district map amendment to rezone 38.37 acres of land.  High 
Point's rezoning request proceeded through the planning 
commission to the town council.  High Point requested the 
property be rezoned to Town PEC (planned employment center) and 
added eleven enumerated proffers to its request (the ZM-98 
proffers). 
 
In 1988, the town council adopted an ordinance (“the High 
Point Rezoning Ordinance”) rezoning High Point's property to 
 
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PEC and amended the Town's zoning district map accordingly.  
The rezoning ordinance adopted by the Town specifically stated 
that the rezoning was subject to the eleven enumerated 
conditions that High Point proffered in writing in accordance 
with former Code § 15-1.491(a) (now Code § 15.2-2303(A)). 
The Town Plan included a cut-through roadway across the 
38.37-acre property, Tolbert Lane, which, when completed, would 
connect Battlefield Parkway with Sycolin Road.  One of the ZM-
98 proffers required the applicant to "construct [and dedicate 
to the Town] the on-site streets, acceleration and deceleration 
lanes, and necessary turning lanes designed on" the rezoning 
plan, as subdivided sections of the property were approved for 
development. 
 
In 1992, Long Lane purchased a 5.3-acre parcel subdivided 
from the 38.37-acre parcel owned by High Point.  Long Lane 
built a commercial building on its property, which it leased to 
C&P Telephone Company (now Verizon). 
To provide access to its property, Long Lane constructed 
an extension of Tolbert Lane.  George Shute, Jr., a principal 
of Long Lane, testified that in extending Tolbert Lane across 
its property, Long Lane built the extension longer and wider 
than necessary to maintain ingress and egress to its property, 
in reliance on the dimensions required by the ZM-98 proffers. 
 
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After Long Lane purchased its property, the American Red 
Cross and Cornerstone purchased the remaining parcels 
subdivided from the High Point property.  Cornerstone’s parcel 
is 28.32 acres.  Since the 1988 rezoning, the only building or 
development on the original 38.37-acre parcel has been on Long 
Lane’s property. 
In 2008, Cornerstone filed three applications to amend the 
zoning and conditions affecting its property in order to 
construct a church on its land.  First, Cornerstone requested 
an amendment of the Town Plan to remove a proposed section of 
Tolbert Lane that was located on Cornerstone's property and had 
not yet been constructed.  Second, Cornerstone requested a 
change in the zoning district from PEC to B-3 community retail, 
which allows a church as a permitted use.  Third, Cornerstone 
requested a special exception to allow it to operate a daycare 
center on the church premises. 
When considering the request to amend the Town Plan, the 
Town noted that its transportation needs had changed 
substantially between 1988, when the ZM-98 proffers were 
enacted, and 2008, when Cornerstone filed its application to 
amend the Town Plan.  Originally, the Town intended Tolbert 
Lane to be substantially used as a cut-through to connect 
Battlefield Parkway with Sycolin Road.  However, as other roads 
in the Town developed, Tolbert Lane evolved into a local 
 
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street, serving as an access street for the parcels in the 
original High Point 38.37 acres.  As the Town no longer 
considered completion of Tolbert Lane necessary, it adopted 
Cornerstone's requested ordinance removing from the Town Plan 
the proposed portion of Tolbert Lane that was to cross 
Cornerstone's property.  This resulted in Tolbert Lane ending 
at the cul-de-sac that Long Lane had constructed and dedicated 
to the Town. 
The town council also adopted an ordinance approving the 
rezoning of Cornerstone's property from PEC to B-3 community 
retail.  The ordinance amended the ZM-98 conditions affecting 
Cornerstone's property by removing them and instituting new 
conditions that Cornerstone had proffered as part of its 
rezoning application.  Additionally, the town council approved 
Cornerstone's special exception application to operate a 
daycare center.  
Shute and his attorney appeared at the public hearings 
before the planning commission and the town council and 
objected to Cornerstone's applications.  Shute argued that the 
Town could not amend the application of the conditions required 
by the High Point Rezoning Ordinance without the consent of all 
owners of property originally included in the rezoning.  Long 
Lane did not consent to the Cornerstone rezoning and proffer 
amendment because it did not want to lose the compatible zoning 
 
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that surrounded its property and the opportunity to have a 
public through-road. 
Analysis 
 
The circuit court declared Long Lane to have “a vested 
right to the completion of Tolbert Lane and the development set 
forth in the ZM-98 proffers approved by Town Ordinance . . . .”  
It ruled that the Town’s approval of Cornerstone’s request for 
rezoning was void and of no effect because it violated Long 
Lane’s vested rights under the High Point Rezoning Ordinance 
and that the rezoning as well as the amendment to the Town Plan 
and the granting of the special use permit were thus “illegal, 
void and of no effect.”  We disagree. 
 
Code § 15.2-2307, the vested rights statute, provides: 
 
Nothing in this article shall be construed to 
authorize the impairment of any vested right.  
Without limiting the time when rights might otherwise 
vest, a landowner's rights shall be deemed vested in 
a land use and such vesting shall not be affected by 
a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance when the 
landowner (i) obtains or is the beneficiary of a 
significant affirmative governmental act which 
remains in effect allowing development of a specific 
project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant 
affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs 
extensive obligations or substantial expenses in 
diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance 
on the significant affirmative governmental act. 
 
 
 
For purposes of this section and without 
limitation, the following are deemed to be 
significant affirmative governmental acts allowing 
development of a specific project: (i) the governing 
body has accepted proffers or proffered conditions 
which specify use related to a zoning amendment  
 
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. . . . 
 
The purpose of Code § 15.2-2307 is to provide "for the vesting 
of a right to a permissible use of property against any future 
attempt to make the use impermissible by amendment of the 
zoning ordinance . . . ."  Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 
275 Va. 232, 244, 657 S.E.2d 153, 160 (2008) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
The Town approved the rezoning of the High Point property 
conditioned upon the ZM-98 proffers and specified the land use 
relating to the zoning amendment.  The Town's approval of the 
proffers was a significant affirmative governmental act 
allowing development of the specific project provided for in 
the proffers.  As a subsequent owner of a subdivided parcel of 
the property governed by the ZM-98 proffers, Long Lane was a 
beneficiary of the significant affirmative governmental act. 
Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2307, Long Lane has a vested right in 
the land use allowed by the High Point Rezoning Ordinance. 
 
However, Long Lane claims not just a vested right 
concerning its own property, but also a vested right with 
respect to the zoning classification of property now owned by 
the Red Cross and Cornerstone.  Specifically, Long Lane argues 
that it has a vested right not only in the land use specified 
by the previously passed zoning ordinance, but also in the 
“development set forth in the ZM-98 proffer” approved by the 
 
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Town that would result in a road to be built in the future, and 
in the compatibility of buildings that may be built in the 
future on adjoining property.  Thus, Long Lane claims a vested 
right in the land use of property it does not own. 
 
Whether a landowner may acquire a vested right in the 
zoning classification or use of neighboring property or in a 
road shown on a town plan is a question of first impression for 
this Court.  This Court's case law addressing vested rights in 
future expectations or anticipated uses is instructive. 
It is well established that a landowner has a right to 
continue in an existing use, even after the governing body 
changes the zoning classification, causing the use to become 
nonconforming.  Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 277 Va. 250, 
271, 673 S.E.2d 170, 180 (2009).  Also, “ ‘in limited 
circumstances, private landowners may acquire a vested right in 
planned uses of their land that may not be prohibited or 
reduced by subsequent zoning legislation.' "  Id. at 271, 673 
S.E.2d at 180 (quoting City of Suffolk v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 143, 580 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003)) 
(emphasis added); see Code § 15.2-2307. 
 
In contrast, "when a landowner has only a future 
expectation that he will be allowed to develop his property in 
accord with its current classification under the local zoning 
ordinance, there is 'no vested property right in the 
 
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continuation of the land's existing zoning status.' "  Id. 
(quoting Board of Zoning Appeals v. Caselin Sys., 256 Va. 206, 
210, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998)); see also City of Suffolk, 266 
Va. at 143, 580 S.E.2d at 798 ("Generally, landowners have no 
property right in anticipated uses of their land since they 
have no vested property right in the continuation of the land's 
existing zoning status.") (emphasis added).  Cf. Code § 15.2-
2307.  " '[T]he mere reliance on a particular zoning 
classification . . . creates no vested right in the property 
owner.' "  Hale, 277 Va. at 272, 673 S.E.2d at 181 (quoting 
City of Suffolk, 266 Va. at 145, 580 S.E.2d at 799). 
 
Long Lane claims it has a vested right in the ZM-98 
proffers pursuant to Code § 15.2-2307.  One cannot, however, 
acquire a vested right in a proffer.  A landowner acquires a 
vested right to a land use that is the subject of a significant 
affirmative governmental act.  Code § 15.2-2307.  At best, Long 
Lane had a future expectation that pursuant to the High Point 
Rezoning Ordinance a road would be built as the surrounding 
property was developed, and that the buildings built on 
adjoining property would be compatible.  Future expectations 
concerning zoning do not create vested property rights.  City 
of Suffolk, 266 Va. at 143, 580 S.E.2d at 798 
 
The existence of vested property rights does not prohibit 
rezoning.  Vested rights only protect the landowner's right to 
 
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planned uses of his or her land which may not be prohibited or 
reduced by subsequent zoning.  As a result, although Long Lane 
is protected from future changes regarding the use of its own 
property, it has no vested right as to its expectation that the 
neighboring properties would continue to develop in accordance 
with the zoning they had at the time Long Lane purchased its 
property and developed it in accordance with the ZM-98 
proffers. 
Further, Code § 15.2-2307 and relevant cases indicate that 
a landowner may only acquire a vested right as to use of his 
own property.  Code § 15.2-2307 explicitly refers to the 
landowner subject to the zoning change, suggesting the vested 
right only applies to a particular landowner, as opposed to the 
aggregate of the property subject to the original significant 
affirmative governmental act.  Similarly, this Court's cases 
interpreting Code § 15.2-2307 expressly refer to the 
landowner's property, as opposed to neighboring property owned 
by a different entity.  See, e.g., Town of Vienna Council v. 
Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542, 547-48 (1978) ("We 
observe that while the views of persons owning neighboring 
property should be considered, property owners have no vested 
right to continuity of zoning of the general area in which they 
reside, and the mere purchase of land does not create a right 
to rely on existing zoning.") (emphasis in original).  The Code 
 
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and this Court's case law do not support the conclusion that a 
landowner may have vested rights in the zoning classification 
or land uses of his or her neighbor, even where the property 
was subdivided from a parcel which was rezoned subject to 
proffered conditions. 
Long Lane also contends that the Town acted in 
contravention of Code § 15.2-2303(A) when approving 
Cornerstone's application.  Code § 15.2-2303(A) provides: 
 
The governing body may also accept amended proffers 
. . . .  Once proffered and accepted as part of an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions 
shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment 
changes the zoning on the property covered by such 
conditions. 
 
In other words, once the governing body accepts voluntary 
proffers, such proffers become conditions of the rezoning and, 
once entered into law, the conditions become zoning 
regulations.  Id. 
 
Long Lane contends that "on the property covered by such 
conditions" in Code § 15.2-2303(A) refers to the undivided 
property originally owned by High Point, to which the ZM-98 
proffers applied.  Under Long Lane's theory, the Town cannot 
subsequently amend zoning relating to property governed by 
approved proffers unless all landowners subject to the proffers 
consent.  Long Lane contends that Code § 15.2-2303(A) 
 
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implicitly requires its consent because otherwise the Town 
would be imposing involuntary proffers upon it. 
 
The ordinance changing the zoning of Cornerstone’s 
property was a subsequent amendment that changed the zoning of 
part of the property covered by the previously accepted ZM-98 
proffers.  As a result of the rezoning, the ZM-98 proffers 
properly no longer applied to Cornerstone's property.  See Code 
§ 15.2-2303(A). 
Long Lane's parcel was not rezoned and the ZM-98 proffers 
"continue in effect" because a subsequent amendment has not 
changed the zoning on its "property covered by such 
conditions."  See Code § 15.2-2303(A).  Although the rezoning 
peripherally changes Long Lane's expectations as to its 
property, it does not directly affect the zoning of Long Lane's 
property.  Because the Town did not impose any new proffers or 
conditions on Long Lane's property, the rezoning of 
Cornerstone's property did not subject Long Lane to any 
involuntary proffers. 
 
It is undisputed that it is within the Town's authority to 
enact zoning ordinances.  See Code § 15.2-2285(A) ("The 
planning commission of each locality may . . . prepare a 
proposed zoning ordinance . . . .").  It is also undisputed 
that it is within the Town's authority to amend zoning 
ordinances.  Code § 15.2-2286(A)(7) provides: 
 
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Whenever the public necessity, convenience, general 
welfare, or good zoning practice requires, the 
governing body may by ordinance amend, supplement, or 
change the regulations, district boundaries, or 
classifications of property.  Any such amendment may 
be initiated (i) by resolution of the governing body; 
(ii) by motion of the local planning commission; or 
(iii) by petition of the owner . . . of the property 
which is the subject of the proposed zoning map 
amendment . . . . 
 
The adoption of written proffers is a legislative act.  
Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass'n v. Gwinn, 262 Va. 449, 458, 
551 S.E.2d 339, 343 (2001) ("[A] zoning ordinance may include 
written proffers.  Thus, the proffers become part of the zoning 
ordinance.  As such, they are legislative enactments.").  
Legislative actions of a local government are 
 
presumed to be valid and will not be disturbed by a 
court absent clear proof that the action is 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and bears no reasonable 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare.  If the reasonableness of the 
enactment is fairly debatable, a court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the legislative 
body, and the legislation will be sustained. 
 
City Council v. Harrell, 236 Va. 99, 101-02, 372 S.E.2d 139, 
141 (1988). 
 
The Leesburg Town Council had the authority to amend the 
High Point Rezoning Ordinance, in whole or in part.  When 
considering the rezoning application, the Town took into 
account the effect the zoning legislation would have on the 
citizens of the Town.  Long Lane was able to raise its concerns 
 
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to the planning commission and town council before the Town 
approved Cornerstone's application. 
 
There is no authority for the circuit court's ruling that 
the voluntary proffer requirement of Code § 15.2-2303(A) 
required all successors in title to High Point to agree prior 
to any portion of the subdivided parcel being rezoned.  Long 
Lane had no vested right that deprived the Town of its 
legislative authority to enact zoning ordinances. 
The Town acted pursuant to its statutory authority in 
rezoning Cornerstone’s property and granting it a special use 
permit and there is no evidence that its actions in doing so 
were unreasonable.  The circuit court erred in holding that the 
rezoning of Cornerstone’s property and issuance of the special 
use permit were illegal and void. 
 
In the instant case, the Town amended its Town Plan as a 
result of the Cornerstone rezoning application.  In amending 
the Town Plan, the Town determined that it no longer desired to 
have Tolbert Lane intersect with Battlefield Parkway because 
other roads in the vicinity had developed.  The Town's 
amendment of the Town Plan was a legislative act that was not 
unreasonable.  Long Lane did not have a vested right in the 
construction of a road shown on the Town Plan and the Town did 
not need Long Lane's consent to amend its plan.  The circuit 
 
15 
court erred in holding that the amendment to the Town Plan was 
null and void. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter final 
judgment for the Town and Cornerstone. 
Reversed and final judgment.