Title: Zanders v. Anderson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Zanders, Appellant, v. Anderson, Supt., Appellee. 
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[Cite as Zanders v. Anderson (1996), _____ Ohio St. 3d _____.] 
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Criminal law -- Probation -- Reversed criminal conviction may serve as 
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basis for probation revocation unless probationer pleads and 
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proves that reversal removes all factual support for the probation 
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revocation. 
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A reversed criminal conviction may serve as the basis for probation 
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revocation unless the probationer pleads and proves that reversal 
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removes all factual support for the probation revocation.  (State ex 
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rel. Hickman v. Capots [1989], 45 Ohio St. 3d 324, 544 N.E. 2d 639; 
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Flenoy v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. [1990], 56 Ohio St. 3d 131, 564 
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N.E. 2d 1060; and State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul [1995], 73 Ohio St. 
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3d 185, 652 N.E. 2d 746, followed.  In re Petition for Mallory [1985], 
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17 Ohio St. 3d 34, 17 OBR 28, 476 N.E. 2d 1045, overruled to the 
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extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.) 
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(No. 95-68--Submitted September 26, 1995--Decided January 10, 
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1996.) 
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 
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94CA005925. 
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In 1991, appellant, Lawrence Zanders, was convicted of grand theft 
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with a specification, and also of failure to appear, and was sentenced for 
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these crimes to consecutive terms of imprisonment of two to ten and one to 
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five years, respectively.  However, the trial court suspended execution of the 
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sentences and placed appellant on probation for two years. 
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On January 26, 1993, appellant was convicted of two felony counts of 
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involuntary manslaughter and failure to drive within marked lanes, a minor 
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misdemeanor.  He was found not guilty of two counts of aggravated 
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vehicular homicide, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of 
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failure to stop and exchange information after an accident, and one count of 
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operating a motor vehicle without lighted lights.  The jury could not agree 
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on a charge of “failure to operate a vehicle without reasonable control 
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[sic],” which the prosecution then dismissed.  He was sentenced to 
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consecutive four-to-ten year terms on each conviction of involuntary 
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manslaughter, with each minimum term to be a period of actual 
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incarceration, and was fined one hundred dollars for failure to drive within 
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marked lanes.  The conviction for failure to drive within marked lanes 
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served as the underlying misdemeanor for the involuntary manslaughter 
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convictions. 
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On January 29, 1993, the trial court also revoked appellant’s 
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probation and imposed sentence on the 1991 convictions. 
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On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the convictions for 
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involuntary manslaughter based on State v. Collins (1993), 67 Ohio St. 3d 
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115, 616 N.E. 2d 224, which held that a minor misdemeanor may not serve 
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as the underlying offense for involuntary manslaughter.  The court of 
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appeals affirmed the conviction for failure to drive within marked lanes and 
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remanded the case to the trial court to execute its judgment. 
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On June 2, 1994, appellant filed a motion to vacate the probation 
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revocation.  The trial court apparently did not act on the motion until 
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January 6, 1995, when it denied the motion, stating that the “underlying 
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misdemeanors [sic] are sufficient reasons to revoke probation.” 
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In the meantime, on August 5, 1994, appellant filed this petition for 
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habeas corpus in the court of appeals.  Both parties filed motions for 
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summary judgment.  The court of appeals granted appellee’s motion, 
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holding that by virtue of the remaining marked-lanes conviction, the trial 
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court had discretion to determine whether probation should be revoked. 
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Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
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Lawrence Zanders, pro se. 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Charles L. Wille, 
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Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
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Per Curiam.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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Habeas corpus relief is available to redress a nonjurisdictional claim 
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when there is no adequate remedy at law.  As to adequate remedy, both 
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appellant and appellee rely on In re Petition for Mallory (1985), 17 Ohio St. 
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3d 34, 17 OBR 28, 476 N.E. 2d 1045.  In Mallory, the appellee had been 
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convicted of two counts of receiving stolen property, but was placed on five 
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years’ probation.  During the probation period, he was convicted of carrying 
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a concealed weapon, and his probation was revoked.  The concealed 
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weapons violation was reversed on appeal.  Then Mallory, like appellant, 
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requested the trial court to vacate the probation revocation.  Receiving no 
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decision for several months, Mallory filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
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court of appeals.  The court of appeals allowed the writ and, apparently, 
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discharged Mallory from custody.  The state appealed.  We affirmed, 
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holding that when the concealed weapons conviction was overturned, the 
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probation revocation order was based on a nullity and therefore void.  17 
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Ohio St. 3d at 35, 17 OBR at 29, 476 N.E. 2d at 1047.  We further reasoned 
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that even though the trial court may have had jurisdiction to consider the 
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motion to vacate the probation revocation, after a reasonable time had 
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elapsed without action by the trial court, habeas corpus would lie.  17 Ohio 
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St. 3d at 36, 17 OBR at 29-30, 476 N.E. 2d at 1047. 
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In Mallory, we emphasized the importance of habeas corpus as an 
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effective and speedy remedy.  Accordingly, although a motion to vacate 
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may be an adequate remedy if it is acted upon quickly, it was not an 
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adequate remedy in this case. 
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Appellant argues that he was denied due process of law by being 
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sentenced to long terms of imprisonment on the probation violation for 
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committing only a minor misdemeanor.  He cites no authority which 
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supports this proposition. 
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In Collins, we stated that a minor misdemeanor could not be the 
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predicate for an involuntary manslaughter conviction.  However, that 
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decision was based on statutory construction, not due process.  The Sixth 
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Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the former involuntary manslaughter 
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statute did not violate the Due Process Clause even though it did not contain 
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a mens rea: 
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“*** [W]here a criminal statute prohibits and punishes conduct not 
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innocent or innocuous in itself, the criminal intent element may be 
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dispensed with if the criminal statute is designed for the protection of the 
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public health and safety and if it has no common law background that 
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included a particular criminal intent.  Because citizens are presumed to 
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know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that violating them is dangerous 
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and wrong, Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute, as applied in this case, 
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is based on the obviously wrongful and blameworthy conduct of violating 
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traffic safety laws.  Accordingly, it is not the kind of statute that requires a 
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formally stated criminal intent element in order to comport with the Due 
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Process Clause.”  Stanley v. Turner (C.A. 6, 1993), 6 F. 3d 399, 404. 
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Applying this reasoning to probation revocation, appellant is 
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presumed to know that violating the marked-lane statute was “dangerous 
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and wrong.”  Moreover, since Mallory was decided, we have stated in 
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parole cases that “parole may be revoked even though criminal charges 
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based on the same facts are dismissed, the defendant is acquitted, or the 
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conviction is overturned,” unless “all factual support” for the revocation is 
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removed.  State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 324, 544 
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N.E. 2d 639, 640; Flenoy v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1990), 56 Ohio St. 3d 
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131, 132, 564 N.E. 2d 1060, 1062; State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 
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73 Ohio St. 3d 185, 188, 652 N.E. 2d 746, 749.  Hickman additionally 
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requires the offender to plead specific facts to show that all factual support 
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has been removed from the revocation.  We now apply these cases to 
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probation revocation.  Appellant pled no contest to the probation revocation 
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and, in the instant case, has not attempted to plead any specific facts 
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showing why the reversal of his conviction for involuntary manslaughter 
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removed all factual support for the probation revocation. 
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R.C. 2951.02 (C) provides in part that probation “shall be at least on 
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condition that during the period of the probation or other suspension, [the 
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offender] shall abide by the law.”  Appellant violated probation by 
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committing a traffic misdemeanor--failing to drive within marked lanes-- a 
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clear violation of “law” that he can be presumed to know was “dangerous 
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and wrong.”  Stanley, supra.  This violation caused the deaths of two 
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people, a fact adjudicated beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we 
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hold, consistent with Hickman, Flenoy, and Jackson, that a reversed 
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criminal conviction may serve as the basis for probation revocation unless 
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the probationer pleads and proves that reversal removes all factual support 
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for the probation revocation.  We also overrule Mallory to the extent it 
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holds that the reversal of a conviction on which a probation revocation is 
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based makes that crime a “nullity” for all purposes. 
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For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., 
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concur. 
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WRIGHT and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
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