Title: ALICEA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALICEA v. STATE2000 WY 20513 P.3d 693Case Number: 99-212Decided: 12/01/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
FELIX ALICEA, Appellant 
(Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee, 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:G. Kevin Keller, 
Cheyenne, WY. Argument presented by Mr. Keller.Representing 
Appellee:Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Mary Beth 
Wolff, Special Assistant Attorney General. Argument presented by Ms. 
Wolff.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Felix Alicea (Alicea) seeks review of his convictions on six counts for 
committing sex crimes on children. Alicea contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to hold a pretrial hearing to determine if the children had sufficient 
memory to be considered competent to testify. He also asserts that a "taint" 
hearing should have been conducted to determine if the victims' testimony had 
been so corrupted by the investigative interviews conducted by a pastor and a 
school teacher at a religious school, as well as by a detective and a social 
worker, in preparation for prosecution, that the children's testimony was no 
longer admissible at trial. In addition, he claims that inadmissible hearsay 
testimony was admitted over his objections; that an instruction given to the 
jury relieved the State of its burden of proving all elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in that the instruction did not require the jury to 
find that the crimes charged occurred within some sort of time frame; the trial 
court erred in denying various motions for judgment of acquittal; and, under the 
somewhat unusual circumstances of this case, he was denied his right to a speedy 
trial.

[¶2] We affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing in accordance with this 
opinion.

ISSUES

[¶3] Alicea 
raises these issues:

I. Whether the trial 
court erred when it denied the Appellant's request for a pre-trial competency 
hearing of the two complaining witnesses.

II. Whether the trial 
court erred when it allowed witnesses to testify about hearsay statements made 
to them by the two complaining witnesses.

III. Whether the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury that the State's failure to establish with 
precision that the crime occurred within a specified time frame is not 
fatal.

IV. Whether the trial 
court erred in failing to grant judgments of acquittal on Counts I, II, III, IV 
and VI due to insufficient evidence.

V. Whether the Appellant 
was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

[¶4] The State 
rephrases the issues thus:

I. Whether the trial 
court properly denied Appellant's request for a pre-trial competency 
hearing.

II. Whether the trial 
court properly permitted witnesses to testify as to statements made to them by 
DC and WC.

III. Whether instruction 
10 was proper.

IV. Whether the trial 
court erred in failing to grant Appellant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal.

V. Whether Appellant was 
accorded his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

FACTS

[¶5] Child 
abuse, of course including child sexual abuse, must be reported to the 
authorities by all persons, and some classes of persons are under a heightened 
duty to report such matters. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-205 (LEXIS1999). On January 
25, 1997, Fritz Krieger, Pastor of the Cheyenne Seventh Day Adventist Church, 
was told by his daughter that a friend of hers had related a story which 
indicated that DC (born January 12, 1982) and WC (born April 17, 1985) had been 
subjected to improper and illegal sexual activity by Alicea. Krieger and a 
teacher from the church's school, Jeannie Costopoulos, met with the children on 
the evening of January 27, 1997, to ask about the story related by Kreiger's 
daughter and another of DC's friends. Based on these events, Krieger made 
reports to the Department of Family Services and to the Laramie County 
Sheriff.

[¶6] On January 
29, 1997, DC was interviewed by Sergeant Linda Renner of the Laramie County 
Sheriff's Office and Donna Lucas from the Department of Family Services. As a 
preface to her accusations, DC related that the events occurred in Alicea's 
mobile home. According to DC, Alicea would ask his own children to go to the 
"Mini Mart" Store, leaving DC and WC behind, and then he would close the blinds 
and lock the door. In that interview, DC identified her private bodily areas as 
"peaches" (breasts), vagina, and "butt." She also identified a male individual's 
private bodily areas as "dick" (penis) and "butt." DC's first revelation was 
that Alicea had her touch his "dick." She estimated the time of that occurrence 
as "two or three years ago." DC stated that both she and her brother touched 
Alicea's "dick" with their hands and with their mouths. She also stated that 
Alicea touched her vagina, but that he did not touch WC's private bodily areas. 
DC also indicated that Alicea would have her on the floor and lie on top of her, 
rubbing his "dick" both on the outside of her vagina and pushing his "dick" 
inside her vagina. DC could not remember any specific dates, but told the 
investigators that the last time it occurred was "two years ago" in April 
(1995). DC indicated that Alicea had done those sorts of things to her about 30 
times. DC indicated that the abuse began when she was five or six years old and 
ended when she was eleven or twelve.

[¶7] WC was also 
interviewed by Sergeant Renner and Donna Lucas. His interview was considerably 
less revealing. WC identified his penis and his "butt" as his private bodily 
parts. WC related that Alicea would have the children "touch the penis and then, 
ummm, move up and down and stuff." Alicea's pants were pulled down when this 
occurred. WC could not recall how many times these events occurred but indicated 
that it happened every time they were there, and they were there about once 
every two weeks. WC § s indication was that the abusive conduct occurred at 
least 20 times, but he was not able to give a more precise number. Alicia told 
both children not to tell anyone about what they were doing. Many of WC's 
recollections were vague, but he did say, "I know for sure that I had to touch 
his penis." As will become evident as we progress through the issues in this 
opinion, the testimony furnished at trial by DC and WC differed significantly 
from the statements outlined above.

[¶8] On August 
13, 1997, an information was filed in the district court alleging ten counts of 
violation of sexual assault in the second degree or immoral or indecent 
liberties with a child by Alicea. In the context of that case, the prosecution 
gave notice that it intended to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. Specifically, they asked the trial court to approve use of 
similar allegations made by a third female child as evidence in the case. The 
district court conducted a hearing as required by Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 
357 (Wyo. 1996), and concluded that the proffered W.R.E. 404(b) evidence was not 
admissible. The prosecutor then filed a motion asking the trial court to 
reconsider its ruling, or, in the alternative, to permit the State to dismiss 
the charges without prejudice (i.e., they could be subsequently refiled in a 
second case). The trial court declined to reconsider its ruling, but did dismiss 
the charges without prejudice by order entered on July 6, 
1998.

[¶9] On July 27, 
1998, a second information was filed in the district court. This information 
also alleged 10 counts involving three different children, DC, WC, and KW. Four 
of the ten counts involved KW, and recounted events that the prosecution had 
attempted to use as W.R.E. 404(b) evidence in the first go-around. At the 
preliminary hearing stage, the county court did not find probable cause to bind 
Alicea over on the counts involving KW; however, it did bind over the other six 
counts affecting DC and WC. Preparation then went forward for trial on those six 
counts.

NEED FOR PRETRIAL 
COMPETENCY HEARING

[¶10] Alicea 
maintains that the district court abused its discretion in denying a pretrial 
competency hearing to address Alicea's contention that neither DC nor WC were 
competent to testify because their memories of the events at issue and, hence, 
their proposed trial testimony, were too deficient and had been tainted in the 
process of interviews with the church pastor and school teacher, as well as law 
enforcement personnel. We have held that when a child is called into the 
courtroom to testify, and the child's competency is called into question by 
either party, it is the duty of the trial court to make an independent 
examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will 
not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999). In English, we also held that an assertion that a 
child's testimony was tainted could best be comprehended as a part of the 
competency hearing and that a separate taint hearing is not required. 982 P.2d  
at 146. In English, we established that the requirement that a competency 
hearing on the issue of "taint," based on an assertion that the child's 
statements were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques, or 
some other potentially improper influence, is triggered whenever a party 
presents the court with "some evidence" that a child witness is incompetent.1 982 P.2d at 146-47; Ryan v. State, 
988 P.2d 46, 58 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶11] Alicea 
contends that he presented the trial court with "some evidence" that the 
children's memories were both faulty and tainted and, therefore, it abused its 
discretion in not conducting a full-fledged "taint" hearing that included 
questioning of the children. It is clear from the record that the trial court 
comprehensively reviewed all materials of record that had a bearing on this 
issue, and that he patiently considered all arguments and testimony offered by 
Alicea with an open mind. His conclusion was tacitly that the required showing 
of "some evidence" was not achieved. The standard, "some evidence" has been 
defined in a similar context as follows: "§ Some evidence means a quantity more 
than none or a scintilla, that rationally may lead to a conclusion of 
incompetency. § " Hatten v. State, 978 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex.App. - Corpus 
Christi 1998). In a dissimilar context (threshold for discovery in allegation of 
selective prosecution), "some evidence" was said to mean that the showing must 
be more than frivolous and based on more than conclusory allegations. United 
States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995). In English, we did not 
define what the standard "some evidence" was intended to mean, other than by 
example. In that case, we held that the following facts were "more than 
necessary" to meet the "some evidence" standard: The victim was five years of 
age (weighed heavily in the assessment); the circumstances surrounding the 
questioning of the child suggested taint (Mother, who did questioning, assumed 
the sexual touching and asked leading questions that conformed to that 
assumption); the Mother was a trusted authority figure; Mother used rewards to 
pressure child (trading secrets game); and the child's initial statements were 
not spontaneous but the product of interrogation (of great importance). 982 P.2d  
at 147.

[¶12] We have 
comprehensively reviewed the record with respect to this issue. We conclude that 
Alicea's argument boils down to this: The children's testimony was tainted 
because the various interviewers asked leading and suggestive questions and 
lacked expertise and experience in interviewing children in circumstances such 
as those peculiar to this case. Use of leading questions to facilitate an 
examination of child witnesses who are hesitant, evasive, or reluctant is not 
improper. State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376, 730 A.2d 311, 319 (N.J. 1999). Moreover, 
Alicea's contentions in this regard were based solely upon the opinion of an 
expert witness, the psychologist, Dr. Esplin. An examination of his testimony 
reveals that his opinions were uncertain because of a lack of information and, 
for the most part, were conclusory and speculative. DC was about 15 years of age 
when her initial revelations were made, and DC made similar statements between 
the ages of 10 and 11. Although leading questions were asked by all 
interviewers, there was no evidence that those interviewers assumed the 
existence of the criminal conduct, and, as we set out above, the use of leading 
questions is not improper in this context. While all interviewers were authority 
figures of various sorts, the record does not suggest that their status as such 
was used to coerce information from the children. Finally, the record fully 
supports a conclusion that the children's initial statements to peers were 
spontaneous and voluntary. Based on the totality of this record, we conclude 
that Alicea did not meet the threshold requirement of "some evidence" of "taint" 
to trigger the requirement that the trial court conduct a hearing to enquire of 
the children as to quality of their memories of the experiences they intended to 
relate to the jury at trial. We hold that the trial court's resolution of this 
issue was within its sound discretion and not clearly 
erroneous.

ADMISSION OF 
"HEARSAY"

[¶13] Alicea 
contends that the admission of statements made by DC and WC to friends were 
hearsay, whereas the State contends each such statement was "consistent with his 
[DC's or WC's] testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive[,]" and, 
therefore, admissible because they were not hearsay. W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B).

[¶14] Alicea 
contends that the statements were not admissible because, at the time the trial 
court allowed their admission, no express charge against the children of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive had been made. In addition, Alicea 
asserts that the statements are not consistent with the children's testimony. As 
noted earlier, the statements given to the police by DC and WC were different 
from their testimony at trial. DC testified only that she told her friends "what 
[Alicea] had done to me when I was a little girl," but was unable to recall 
other details. Eventually, the trial court ruled that she could not testify 
about the conversations with her friends because she was unable to give answers 
that were clear enough or definite enough to lay a foundation for that 
testimony. DC did testify that she was frequently at the Alicea household, as 
much as two or three times a week, and WC was with her twice a week - and this 
was true for a period of many years (approximately nine years). Sometimes when 
DC and WC were with Alicea, he would send his children to the MiniMart. On such 
occasions, Alicea would have DC "suck his dick." She could not recall when or 
how many times that happened. She testified to one occasion where Alicea made 
her take her pants off and lie on the floor. He also took his pants off and laid 
on top of her and "started moving." DC also testified that he would have her 
take her pants off and he would put his fingers inside her vagina, but she could 
not recall how many times that happened. DC repeated that Alicea would sometimes 
make her "suck his dick," and that he would then also have WC "suck his dick." 
She did not know how many times that happened. DC testified that she did not 
tell anyone about these events because she was afraid Alicea would hurt her. WC 
testified that when he was at Alicea's home, Alicea would have his children go 
to MiniMart or Safeway, and then he would lock the door, pull the blinds, and 
have him and his sister touch Alicea's penis and rub it. WC testified that this 
first occurred when he was in the first grade, but did not know how many times 
it happened between then and the time he reached the fifth grade, when the abuse 
stopped. WC testified that both he and his sister would touch Alicea's penis, 
but he did not see anything else that happened to his sister. That is a brief 
sketch of the substantive testimony upon which Alicea's convictions 
rest.

[¶15] We will 
quickly put to rest Alicea's first basis for his assertion of error by the trial 
court. It is abundantly clear that although counsel for the defense studiously 
avoided cross- examining most witnesses and deferred his opening statement until 
after the State had presented its case, the principal defenses to be offered by 
Alicea were an express charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive for the testimony given by DC and WC. Throughout the pretrial proceedings 
Alicea injected his concerns that the children were not competent to testify 
because of improper influence from church officials and law enforcement 
personnel and because their memories were faulty because of their tender ages 
when many of the events occurred. It was also suggested that their memories were 
influenced by material they may have come in contact with over the internet at 
home. Alicea called an expert witness (psychologist) to testify on several 
occasions (both live and via affidavit) as to the reliability of the children's 
testimony. The thrust of that testimony was mainly aimed at the suggestive 
nature of the interviews conducted with the children, but it also contained 
elements of recent fabrication and improper influence. Of course, at trial the 
full range of the sort of testimony contemplated by W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) was 
introduced, including expert testimony, as well as testimony that the children 
were telling their stories to get even with Alicea because he had told DC she 
would not be permitted to continue in a church youth group because she was 
attending with insufficient regularity. Thus, the trial court did not err in 
admitting the testimony before any of the defense witnesses testified about 
fabrication or improper motive. In this regard, we find no error in the trial 
court's ruling. See Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 871-72 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶16] Alicea 
also contends that the statements of the children's friends were not 
"consistent" with the testimony of DC and WC. In this regard, we note that JS12 testified only that Alicea was 
"doing naughty things to [DC]". This testimony is unclear, at best, but in 
context it is consistent with what DC related to the court and jury. AG 
testified that Alicea had "touched her [DC] in ways," had made her "suck his 
thing," and "had done it to her." AG also asked WC if what DC had told her was 
true, and he shook his head "yes." JS2 testified that DC told him Alicea had 
"touched" her, and that he had also "touched" WC. While not on all fours with 
the testimony of DC and WC, we are persuaded that the testimony was sufficiently 
consistent with the testimony of DC and WC that we do not view the admission of 
that testimony as an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. See Curl v. 
State, 898 P.2d 369, 374-75 (Wyo. 1995); Sorensen v. State, 895 P.2d 454, 459 
(Wyo. 1995); and Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 367-68 (Wyo. 1991). It may have 
been more prudent not to have allowed the testimony, but to the extent that the 
trial court's ruling may have been questionable, an instruction could have been 
offered by the defense to cure the very problems now complained of on appeal. 
See Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 367. Absent such a request for such a limiting 
instruction, we decline to treat this disputed testimony as grounds for 
reversal.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
10

[¶17] One of the 
central problems encountered in this case was the inability of either DC or WC 
to recall with much specificity dates, or even general time frames, for the 
occurrences of the various sexual encounters with Alicea. The prosecutor seemed 
to have difficulty in phrasing her questions; to the extent the questions were 
satisfactory, the trial court frequently interjected himself, and the children 
seem to have been frightened and ill at ease testifying in the courtroom. 
Instruction Nos. 2-6 listed the elements of each of the six counts charged. 
Included among those elements were dates. Most of the "time" elements of those 
instructions were stated as being between a period of months, e.g. "between the 
time period of October 1990, through May 1991," "February 1992 through March 
1992," and "during the summer of 1993." That portion of those instructions was 
modified by Instruction No. 10:

[¶18] Even 
though you have been instructed that the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a crime was committed within a specified time frame, the failure to 
establish with precision that the crime occurred within that time frame is not 
fatal, especially in the case of alleged abuse to children. A witness'es [sic] 
inability to recall specific time frames may be taken into account in weighing 
the credibility of any witness, along with those factors mentioned in the last 
paragraph of instruction No. 1.

[¶19] We have 
held that where the specific date is not a required element of the crime, then 
alleging a general time period, in lieu of a specific date, is sufficient to 
give a defendant notice and allow him to adequately prepare a defense. Vernier 
v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1350-52 (Wyo. 1996); Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 75 
(Wyo. 1995). Indeed, we have even held that it is sufficient for a finding of 
guilt that the prosecution establish the transaction rather than the exact dates 
in question. Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 437-38 (Wyo. 1991). However, we are 
unable to stretch the spirit, as well as the letter, of those cases to fit the 
use of Instruction No. 10 as it was employed in this case. The instruction makes 
it impossible to differentiate between Count I and Count II, between Count III 
and Count IV, or between Count V and Count VI, because the elements of each of 
those pairs became exactly the same as a result of the challenged instruction. 
It is as likely as not that the jury may have found Alicea guilty twice for the 
exact same act. Therefore, we disapprove of the instruction and find that its 
use in this case necessitates that we reverse the Judgment and Sentence to the 
extent Alicea was found guilty of Count II, Count IV, and Count 
VI.

DENIAL OF MOTIONS FOR 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

[¶20] We have 
set out in detail the key evidence presented at trial. We will direct that the 
district court vacate Alicea's convictions for Counts II, IV, and VI, and remand 
to the district court so that he can be resentenced accordingly. We are fully 
satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Alicea's conviction for 
Count I (indecent liberties with DC, contact with Alicea's penis), Count III 
(sexual assault in the second degree, insertion of Alicea's finger(s) in DC's 
vagina); and Count V (indecent liberties with WC, contact with Alicea's penis). 
We note at this juncture that in the Judgment and Sentence the district court 
directed that all imposed sentences were to run concurrently, so the result of 
partial reversal is minimal in effect with respect to 
punishment.

SPEEDY TRIAL 
VIOLATIONS

[¶21] As we 
noted in our narration of the facts and proceedings in this case, Alicea was 
initially charged in August of 1997 with the crimes for which he now stands 
convicted. He was originally arraigned on September 29, 1997. He waived his 
right to a speedy trial in those proceedings. The charges associated with that 
arraignment were dismissed on July 6, 1998. Alicea was arraigned on newly filed 
charges on September 21, 1998, and he was tried during the time period December 
14-17, 1998. These time frames are well within the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 48. A 
prosecutor may, with leave of the court, dismiss an information. W.R.Cr.P. 
48(a). Refiling of those same charges caused the 120-day speedy trial rule to 
begin to run anew. Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Wyo. 1996). Alicea was 
tried well within 120 days of his second arraignment. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2). 
Because there were about 16 months between Alicea's initial arraignment and his 
trial, we will briefly discuss the four factors to be considered in the 
evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 
(4) the prejudice to the defendant. Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1370-71. As noted, the 
delay was, in part, caused because the State dismissed the original charges and 
then reinstituted similar proceedings. Alicea has cited no authority to indicate 
that this factor would weigh in his favor in this context, and we have found 
none in our own search. Even considering the full length of time from original 
arraignment to trial, the delay was not unusual. In the first proceeding, Alicea 
waived his right to a speedy trial and this Court has invested the district 
courts with the discretion to extend the time of trial beyond 180 days. 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(5). After the second arraignment, trial was promptly set for 
November 2, 1998. A continuance was granted at Alicea's request. The delay, if 
indeed these circumstances can be characterized as delay at all, was not 
prejudicial to Alicea, at least he asserts no specific prejudice and we discern 
none.

[¶22] The 
Judgment and Sentence of the district court is reversed in part, as set out 
above, affirmed in part, and remanded to the district court for resentencing in 
conformity with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Guidance on 
the sort of questioning which may be appropriate in such a hearing is found at 
35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 665, "Qualifying Child Witness to Testify," (1983 
and 1999 Supp.).

2 Because two 
of the children called to testify to prior consistent statements had the same 
initials, we will refer to them as JS1 and JS2.