Title: CSR v Taylor

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
COURTS — PERSONAL JURISDICTION — LONG-ARM STATUTE — DUE
PROCESS — MINIMUM CONTACTS — PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT — An Australian
corporation that used the Port of Baltimore (“Port”) as a conduit in shipping raw asbestos
from Australia to United States customers located outside of Maryland did not attain
sufficient minimum contacts with Maryland so as to render lawful the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.  To attain sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state, a defendant must satisfy the “purposeful availment” requirement, thus
creating a substantial connection with the forum state.  Such a connection will be forged
where the defendant either engages in significant activities in Maryland or creates continuing
obligations with the State’s residents.  Purposeful availment does not arise from random,
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts between the defendant and the forum state, nor from the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.  Here, CSR’s use of the Port does not
constitute purposeful availment, as there existed no relationship between the defendant and
any Maryland-based entities.  Moreover, CSR’s act of shipping asbestos products into the
Port was not done at the company’s behest but, rather, at the direction of the consumers of
the company’s asbestos products.  Finally, there exist no other contacts between CSR and
Maryland that would suffice to demonstrate the defendant’s purposeful availment.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2008
CSR, LIMITED
v.
ANDREA TAYLOR, ET AL.
  
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Bell, C.J., Murphy and Raker, JJ., Dissent.
Filed: November 16, 2009
This case requires us to determine whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City would
have been justified in exercising in personam jurisdiction over Petitioner, Colonial Sugar
Refining Co., Ltd. (“CSR”), an Australian business entity, under the circumstances presented
in this case.  Andrea Taylor and Mary Fuchsluger (collectively, “Respondents”) are the
personal representatives of the estates of two former stevedores who worked at the Port of
Baltimore (“Port”) and who allegedly contracted mesothelioma from the offloading of raw
asbestos and asbestos-containing products.  Respondents attribute the stevedores’ illnesses,
in part, to CSR’s use of the Port as a conduit in shipping raw asbestos fibers from Australia
to United States consumers located outside of Maryland.
To properly assert jurisdiction over CSR, a foreign corporation, Petitioner’s actions
must satisfy the requirements set forth in Maryland’s long-arm statute, Md. Code (1974,
2006 Repl. Vol.), § 6-103 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, and the exercise of
jurisdiction must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  With
respect to the Due Process Clause, which overall requires that Petitioner have maintained
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, there must be “purposeful availment,”
meaning there exists so substantial a connection between Petitioner and the forum state that
having to defend a lawsuit there would be foreseeable.  In Maryland, a substantial
connection will be established if Petitioner either engaged in significant activities in the State
or created continuing obligations with the State’s residents, thus taking advantage of the
benefits and protections of Maryland law.  In the instant case, however, Respondents have
failed to demonstrate that CSR, in the course of any of its contacts with Maryland, satisfied
1In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 872 A.2d 969 (2005), this Court
described mesothelioma:
The National Cancer Institute defines Mesothelioma as a disease
in which cancer (malignant) cells are found in the sac lining the
chest (the pleura) or abdomen (the peritoneum).  This is a rare
form of cancer and most people with malignant mesothelioma
have worked on jobs where they breathed asbestos. National
Cancer Institute, Questions and Answers, Cancer Facts 6.36 -
Mesothelioma (May 13, 2002).
We have also described the disease of mesothelioma, “as a
malignant tumor that forms in the body cavities, predominantly
the thoracic and abdominal cavities.  In the thoracic cavity, it
directly invades and encases the pleura — the outside lining of
the lung — and eventually occupies and eradicates the pleural
space.  It frequently will grow into the lung and, over time, can
metastasize to other structures, including the diaphragm and the
abdominal cavity.”  John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369,
378-379, 800 A.2d 727, 732 (2002).
386 Md. at 474-75 n.4, 872 A.2d at 972-73 n.4.
2
the “purposeful availment” requirement.  Thus, we shall hold that the Court of Special
Appeals erred in concluding that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over CSR.
I.
Respondents are the personal representatives of the estates of Alfred B. Smith and
Joseph Anzulis.  Smith and Anzulis worked as stevedores at the Port from approximately
1942 through 1983 and 1937 through 1973, respectively.  Each man died from
mesothelioma,1 which Respondents contend was caused by exposure to asbestos while
working at the Port.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Respondents sued numerous entities involved
3
in the manufacture, supply, sale, distribution, and installation of asbestos-containing
products, alleging multiple causes of action, including strict liability, breach of warranty,
negligence, and fraud.  Respondents’ theory was that Smith and Anzulis became sick from
the offloading of raw asbestos or asbestos-containing products from ships docked at the Port.
One of the entities Respondents sued was CSR, a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of Australia.  CSR’s headquarters and principal place of business is in
Chatsworth, New South Wales, Australia, located approximately 10,000 miles and a 14-hour
time difference from Maryland.  Between approximately 1943 and 1966, CSR acted as the
exclusive distributor for a wholly-owned subsidiary, Australian Blue Asbestos Pty. Limited
(“ABA”), to sell asbestos mined in Wittenoom, Western Australia, to customers in the
United States.  Although CSR’s customers were located outside of Maryland, some of the
corporation’s shipments passed through the Port, where they were offloaded by stevedores
and forwarded via other conveyances to their final destinations.
In an affidavit submitted to the Circuit Court, Lloyd M. Gardner, Sr., a co-worker of
Smith and Anzulis at the Port, stated that he unloaded thousands of burlap bags shipped from
foreign ports and containing raw asbestos.  Gardner recalled unloading shipments of
Australian asbestos up to approximately six times per year in the 1950s and 60s.  The bags
comprising these shipments, Gardner noted, contained a diamond-shaped logo with the
letters “CSR.”
In addition, Lloyd Gardner testified at his deposition that the offloading of asbestos-
4
containing bags at the Port produced a lot of dust.  He also said, in his affidavit, “Handling
the bags of CSR asbestos was very dusty, and at times the bags would be punctured or ripped
which also created dust which I and the other workers in the area breathed.”  Gardner
remembered Smith and Anzulis being present when the dust-producing work took place.
William Gardner, Lloyd Gardner’s brother and a stevedore who worked at the Port
from 1961 until 1970, also indicated in a deposition that he recalled unloading CSR-labeled
burlap bags containing raw asbestos.  William Gardner further stated that dust would be “all
over the place,” and that Smith and Anzulis were present during these unloading jobs.
Beyond supplying raw asbestos to American consumers, CSR was involved in the
sugar industry.  For decades, including the years when Smith and Anzulis worked at the Port,
CSR had an agreement with the State of Queensland, Australia, to market all Australian
exports of raw sugar.  CSR’s duties included making arrangements for sale, transport,
insurance, and financing, and CSR performed those duties pursuant to the Sugar Acquisition
Act of 1915, by which the Australian government directed all facets of sugar production and
distribution.  Baltimore served as a significant point of entry for imports of Australian sugar,
as Maryland Port Authority statistics indicate that approximately 82,847 tons of raw sugar,
then-valued at $10,921,373, were imported into the Port from Australia during the period
from 1964 through 1966.
In response to Respondents’ lawsuit, CSR filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Edwin Anthony Smith,
2Respondents take issue with Smith’s affidavit, contending that Smith’s statements
were not based upon his own personal knowledge of the events.  From Smith’s deposition
testimony, taken on November 30, 2005, Respondents conclude that Smith’s statements are
attributable to a conversation between Smith and Keith Osborne Brown, a CSR executive,
and a conversation between Smith and CSR’s legal counsel.  Smith also indicated in his
deposition that he had not seen a contract between CSR and any of its customers, nor did he
have expertise in maritime shipments or maritime law.  We need not accord Respondents’
contention any weight in this case, as Respondents carry the burden to establish the propriety
of personal jurisdiction.  See Beyond v. Realtime, 388 Md. 1, 12, 878 A.2d 567, 574 (2005);
Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 692-93, 747 A.2d 764, 766 (2000) (“‘The burden of
alleging and proving the existence of a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
once the issue has been raised, is upon the [plaintiff].’” (quoting McKown v. Criser’s Sales
& Service, 48 Md. App. 739, 747, 430 A.2d 91, 97 (1981))).
5
manager of CSR’s Group Financial Reporting, provided the following reasons for
challenging the jurisdiction of a Maryland court:  (1) CSR never conducted or solicited any
business in Maryland; (2) CSR was never incorporated or licensed to do business in
Maryland; (3) CSR never appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service of process
in Maryland; and (4) CSR never maintained an office, telephone listing, mailing address, or
bank account in Maryland, nor did it own, lease, or possess an interest in property in the
State.  Pertaining to CSR’s supply of asbestos specifically, Smith asserted that CSR never
conducted an asbestos-related business in Maryland, nor had the company been a party to
a contract in the State or been required to perform a contract in the State.  Smith further
stated that CSR had never manufactured, produced, merchandised, marketed, supplied,
distributed, sold, or installed asbestos products in Maryland.  According to Smith, the
purchaser of the raw asbestos was “basically responsible for it” when it left Australia, and
where the shipment went “was dictated by the purchaser.”2
3The shipping invoices included one addressed to Johns-Manville Corporation in
1956, another addressed to Huxley Development Corporation in 1963, and two addressed
to Orangeburg Manufacturing Company in 1964 and 1965.  Each of these buyers was
located in New York, rather than Maryland.
4In an affidavit submitted to the Circuit Court by Respondents, Dr. Jerome Paige, an
economist, indicated that the cumulative value of the four shipments was over $100,000 in
the 1950s and 60s, now worth over $1,000,000.
5Originally, the three shipments were made pursuant to “C.&F.” agreements, short for
“Cost and Freight.”  According to Captain Stewart, however, CSR prepaid marine insurance
for these shipments, thus rendering the “C.&F.” agreements “C.I.F.” agreements. 
The fourth invoice represented an F.O.B. (“Free on Board”) arrangement.  In contrast
to a C.I.F. agreement, Captain Stewart explained that the F.O.B. agreement terminated
CSR’s responsibilities for the shipment of the cargo once the cargo was placed in the
possession of the carrier in Australia, the point of embarkation.
6
In opposition to CSR’s motion to dismiss, Respondents presented to the Circuit Court
four invoices representing asbestos shipments by CSR to Baltimore during the period when
Smith and Anzulis worked as stevedores.3  The cumulative weight of the shipments was over
1.2 million pounds, consisting of 13,332 individual bags of raw asbestos.4
Also in opposition to CSR’s motion, Respondents submitted the affidavit of Captain
Robert Stewart, a maritime expert.  Captain Stewart observed that three of the four invoiced
shipments were made pursuant to C.I.F. (“Cost, Insurance, and Freight”) arrangements.5
Captain Stewart expressed the opinion that, pursuant to the three C.I.F. arrangements, CSR,
as the “seller/shipper/consignor” of the raw asbestos, was obligated to do the following:  (1)
package and mark the goods, identifying the contents and destination; (2) prepare an invoice;
(3) contract for marine insurance; (4) obtain the necessary shipping documents, such as
export licenses; (5) pay all freight charges to the carrier, including costs associated with
7
hiring a stevedore company to unload the cargo; (6) obtain a clean negotiable bill of lading
covering the transportation to Baltimore; and (7) retain responsibility for the cargo until it
arrived and was unloaded in Baltimore, at which time the buyer accepted the cargo.  Stewart
further indicated that, under a C.I.F. contract, CSR would have access to Maryland courts
if the buyers wrongly failed to accept the goods upon delivery in Baltimore.  
Lastly,
Respondents placed into evidence the affidavit of Dr. Barry Castleman, an environmental
consultant with expertise concerning the history of the asbestos industry.  Dr. Castleman
noted that from 1943 to 1966, CSR would have known that the asbestos-containing burlap
bags shipped from ABA’s mine in Western Australia were handled and unloaded by
stevedores at various ports and that the bags would break or tear in such a manner as to
expose the stevedores to airborne asbestos.  Dr. Castleman also expressed the opinion that
CSR became aware of the health hazards associated with asbestos dust some time in the
1940s.
Dr. Castleman further stated that from approximately 1942 to 1966, CSR regularly
advertised the sale of ABA asbestos products in Asbestos, a trade magazine of the United
States asbestos industry published by a Pennsylvania company.  Specifically, from 1954
until 1960, CSR placed advertisements in the publication every other month.  Dr. Castleman
expressed the opinion that CSR would have known that its advertisements reached certain
potential consumers in Maryland, such as Porter Hayden and Wallace & Gale, Baltimore
insulation contractors.
6See Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning (Camelback II), 312 Md. 330, 539 A.2d 1107
(1988).
8
On November 2, 2006, the Circuit Court heard oral argument on CSR’s motion to
dismiss.  From the bench, the motions’ judge concluded, tentatively, that CSR lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with Maryland to satisfy due process concerns:
So the minimum contacts that are necessary to be shown,
four invoices in this Court’s opinion, at least, do not indicate
any meaningful contact with the State of Maryland such that
one could say that this indicates that they would anticipate that
the defendant could anticipate that he would be hailed into court
in this State.
I know that the plaintiff says that it is not just four
invoices, that there were substantial shipments in this matter,
but there are four.  That’s really the number that I am looking at.
And it is over a rather substantial period of time.
I don’t find that these are the substantial meaningful
contacts.  I have discussed or indicated, I guess while the
plaintiff was arguing, that the advertising was done, I think,
under the Camelback[6] case is also not significant.
The fact that the customers, mostly Johns-Manville,
directed the defendant to send the goods to the Port of Baltimore
to me is significant.
I think that when one is following the instructions of the
customer to send the shipment where they are directed to send
it that they have to follow the orders of the customer.
They are certainly not thinking that that is an action that
they could reasonably expect that they are going to be hailed
into court based on that.
And I have to say that, even if one could say that there
were certain minimal contacts here, that when you get to step
7At the November 2, 2006 hearing, while tentatively concluding that the exercise of
jurisdiction over CSR would offend due process, the Circuit Court deferred a final ruling on
the motion to dismiss to allow Respondents the opportunity to provide additional facts or
legal arguments demonstrating CSR’s contacts with Maryland.  CSR filed a motion for
reconsideration as to the court’s decision to defer judgment, and Respondents filed no
opposition thereto.  On January 8, 2007, the court heard argument on CSR’s motion for
reconsideration and clarified its ruling of November 2, 2006.  Specifically, the court stated
that it had “found in favor of the defendant” on CSR’s motion to dismiss, and “made it clear
that [the court] found no basis for personal jurisdiction.”
9
two, which is the constitutional reach, that I think that it falls short.
It has been pointed out that we are dealing with a
company that is located in another continent, many time zones
away from where we are.  And the fairness of bringing them in,
I think, is beyond the constitutional reach. 
On January 8, 2007, the Circuit Court entered an order granting CSR’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.7
Respondents appealed the decision of the Circuit Court to the Court of Special
Appeals, which reversed the judgment below.  See Taylor v. CSR, 181 Md. App. 363, 956
A.2d 754 (2008).  Relying in part on an opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Kopke v.
A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 629 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 2001), while maintaining that its decision was
“not inconsistent Maryland law,” the intermediate appellate court held that CSR’s packaging
and shipping of asbestos to the Port was sufficient to establish such minimum contacts with
Maryland as to render lawful the Circuit Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.  Taylor, 181 Md.
App. at 385-86, 956 A.2d at 766-67.  CSR filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this
Court, and we granted CSR’s petition to answer the following questions:
10
(1) Did the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion err in holding that
CSR, Limited had sufficient contacts in the State of Maryland
to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction?
(2) Did the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion err in holding that
exercise of personal jurisdiction over CSR, Limited would not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice?
II.
Standard of Review
The Circuit Court granted CSR’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is made pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(a)
(“Preliminary motions”), which provides:
(a) Mandatory.  The following defenses shall be made by
motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is
required:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . .  If not so
made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived.
In addition, “[t]he defense of lack of personal jurisdiction ordinarily is collateral to the merits
and raises questions of law.”  Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 718, 895 A.2d 990, 997
(2006) (citing Beyond v. Realtime, 388 Md. 1, 11-12, 878 A.2d 567, 573-74 (2005)).  If
factual determinations are necessary in deciding the motion, the court may consider
affidavits or testimony taken in connection with any hearing.  PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA
SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 205 (3d ed. 2003); see also Beyond, 388 Md.
at 12 n.10, 878 A.2d at 574 n.10 (“This [standard of review] contrasts with the effect of the
trial court’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure
8Maryland’s long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part:
§ 6-103. Cause of action arising from conduct in State or
(continued...)
11
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Maryland Rule 2-322(b).” (citing
NIEMEYER, supra, at 205)).
With respect to this Court’s role in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, we stated in Bond that:
[t]he applicable standard of appellate review of the grant of a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is whether the
trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss the
action . . . .  See Beyond Systems, Inc., 388 Md. at 12-29, 878
A.2d at 574-84 (considering the evidence presented to the trial
court regarding minimum contacts of the defendant company
with Maryland and concluding that the trial court properly
determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie
case for personal jurisdiction over the defendants); Jason
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co., Inc., 94
Md. App. 425, 431-34, 617 A.2d 1125, 1128-30 (1993)
(considering the evidence relevant to a determination of whether
the defendant business had transacted business in Maryland
under § 6-103(b)(1) of the long-arm statute and holding that the
trial court erred when it concluded that the plaintiff had not
transacted business in Maryland by negotiating and entering
into one contract for sale with a Maryland company).
391 Md. at 718-19, 895 A.2d at 998.
Discussion
Determining whether a Maryland court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant entails dual considerations.  First, we consider whether the requirements of
Maryland’s long-arm statute8 are satisfied.  Bond, 391 Md. at 721, 895 A.2d at 999; Mackey
8(...continued)
tortious injury outside State 
(a) Condition. — If jurisdiction over a person is based solely
upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action
arising from any act enumerated in this section.
(b) In general. — A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work
or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured
products in the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in
the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State
by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of
conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods,
food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in
the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the
State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person,
property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located,
executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the
contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 6-103 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. 
9The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
(continued...)
12
v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 129, 892 A.2d 479, 486 (2006); Beyond, 388 Md. at 14, 878 A.2d
at 576; Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md. 126, 130, 277 A.2d 272, 275 (1971).
Second, we consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the
requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9  Bond, 391
9(...continued)
property, without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
13
Md. at 721, 895 A.2d at 999; Beyond, 388 Md. at 15, 878 A.2d at 575; Lamprecht, 262 Md.
at 130, 277 A.2d at 275.  Nevertheless, “[w]e have construed our long-arm statute to
authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the Due
Process Clause.”  Bond, 391 Md. at 721, 895 A.2d at 999.  In the case sub judice, CSR
argues that the Circuit Court did not err in holding that a Maryland court could not justifiably
exercise personal jurisdiction over CSR.  CSR contends initially that there is no basis to
confer jurisdiction under the State’s long-arm statute.  According to CSR, there is no
“evidence of CSR’s ‘presence’ in Maryland causing a tortious injury in Maryland, regularly
conducting business, engaging in a persistent course of conduct or deriving substantial
revenue from products used in the State of Maryland.”  CSR also contends that the exercise
of jurisdiction by a Maryland court would offend due process.  In regard to the due process
issue, CSR makes two points:  first, that the company does not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Maryland because it never purposefully directed its goods toward the State;
second, that being required to defend itself in a Maryland court would impose a fundamental
unfairness upon CSR as a foreign corporation.
In contrast to CSR’s position, Respondents contend that CSR satisfies a number of
the grounds for the imposition of jurisdiction set forth in Maryland’s long-arm statute:
Section (b)(1) is satisfied because CSR transacted business in
the State of Maryland by utilizing the Port of Baltimore as the
14
port of entry for its delivery of asbestos fiber and raw sugar to
its American customers. . . .
Section (b)(1) is also satisfied by the fact that CSR, for
an extended period of time, including the years when Plaintiffs
were exposed to CSR asbestos fiber, shipped massive amounts
of Australian raw sugar to the Port of Baltimore. . . .
Section (b)(2) is also satisfied under the facts presented
which show that CSR supplied goods to the [S]tate. . . .
Section (b)(3) is satisfied as well.  When the ships
arrived in the Port of Baltimore, containing thousands of burlap
bags of asbestos labeled with CSR’s logo and Baltimore
designated as the port of destination, CSR owed a duty to the
longshoremen who unloaded the ships to warn them that caution
should be taken to prevent hazardous exposure to the  asbestos
dust.  There were a variety of ways that CSR could have
fulfilled its legal obligation to the longshoremen. . . .
Subsection (b)(4) is satisfied under the evidence.  The evidence
clearly shows that in addition to the regular deliveries of
asbestos fiber into the Port of Baltimore which directly caused
the Plaintiffs’ injuries, CSR solicited business in the [S]tate of
Maryland by advertising in an asbestos trade magazine for
decades . . . .  Also, the shipping activity at the Port of
Baltimore involving CSR’s delivery of Australian sugar and
CSR’s asbestos fiber evidence persistent and regular utilization
of the Port of Baltimore facilities for which CSR derived
substantial revenue.
Respondents further contend that in taking part in the activities that support jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute, CSR also maintained sufficient contacts with Maryland so as to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.  Lastly, Respondents
contend that the imposition of jurisdiction in this case would in fact be constitutionally fair,
15
as Maryland has an interest in the safety of its citizens and the safe transport of hazardous
materials within the State’s borders.
In analyzing the parties’ contentions, we recognize that the statutory and
constitutional components of our jurisdictional inquiry are not mutually exclusive.  Rather,
the components become merged, as this Court has held that “the long arm statute represents
an effort by the Legislature to expand the boundaries of permissible in personam jurisdiction
to the limits permitted by the Federal Constitution.”  Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 224,
352 A.2d 818, 821 (1976); see Beyond, 388 Md. at 22, 878 A.2d at 580 (“[O]ur statutory
inquiry merges with our constitutional examination.”).  To illustrate, we have noted that the
words “transacts any business” in subsection (b)(1) of the long-arm statute must be read with
a constitutional gloss, requiring some “purposeful activity” by the defendant as a prerequisite
to the exercise of jurisdiction.  Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 658, 370 A.2d 551, 554
(1977).  In other words, “if to exercise . . . jurisdiction in a given case would violate Due
Process, we construe our long-arm statute as not authorizing the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.”  Bond, 391 Md. at 721, 895 A.2d at 999.
Here, Respondents contend that CSR satisfies subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and
(b)(4) of Maryland’s long-arm statute.  We need not extensively consider whether the actions
of CSR at issue in this case meet the requirements for jurisdiction set forth in those
10In this regard, our analysis is consistent with this Court’s prior cases holding that
a violation of due process obviates the need to engage in an extensive statutory inquiry.  See,
e.g., Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 895 A.2d 990 (2006); Beyond, 388 Md. 1, 878 A.2d
567; Camelback II, 312 Md. 330, 539 A.2d 1107.
16
provisions because we conclude, infra, that the Circuit Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would
have offended the Due Process Clause.10
“To comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant requires that the defendant have
established minimum contacts with the forum state and that to hale him or her into court in
the forum state would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Bond, 391 Md. at 722, 895 A.2d at 1000 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1297-98 (1958); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945);
Mackey, 391 Md. at 129-30, 892 A.2d at 486).
The “minimum contacts” standard “is not susceptible of mechanical application, and
the facts of each case must be weighed . . . .”  Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning (Camelback
I), 307 Md. 270, 274, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (1986), vacated, 480 U.S. 901, 107 S. Ct. 1341, 94
L. Ed. 2d 512 (1987), aff’d, Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning (Camelback II), 312 Md. 330,
539 A.2d 1107 (1988).  As the United States Supreme Court observed in Kulko, the
determination as to whether a defendant has maintained sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state “is one in which few answers will be written in ‘black and white.  The greys
17
are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.’”  436 U.S. at 92, 98 S. Ct.
at 1697, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 141 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1216,
92 L. Ed. 1561, 1566 (1948)); see also Camelback II, 312 Md. at 338, 539 A.2d at 1111
(noting that “the quality and quantity of contacts required to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction will depend upon the nature of the action brought and the nexus of the contacts
to the subject matter of the action”).  As such, cases may be divided into the categories of
specific or general jurisdiction, with each category requiring a different quantum of contacts
to confer jurisdiction.  Presbyterian Hosp. v. Wilson, 337 Md. 541, 551 n.2, 654 A.2d 1324,
1329-30 n.2 (1995); Camelback II, 312 Md. at 339, 539 A.2d at 1111.
A case of specific jurisdiction arises where the cause of action arises from, or is
directly related to, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.  Wilson, 337 Md. at 550,
654 A.2d at 1329.  In Beyond, this Court set forth the following three-pronged inquiry for
determining whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction would comport with due
process:
[W]e consider (1) the extent to which the defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out
of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.
388 Md. at 26, 878 A.2d at 582.
“[U]nder general jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action need not
arise out of the defendant’s contacts in the forum.”  Wilson, 337 Md. at 550, 654 A.2d at
18
1329.  To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state must be continuous and systematic.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 412 (1984); Wilson, 337
Md. at 552, 654 A.2d at 1330 (“[A] holding that a forum may exert general jurisdiction over
a party involves a legal finding that the defendant maintains continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum which constitute doing business in the forum.”).  Nevertheless, even
in the context of general jurisdiction, we must consider whether the defendant “purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State,” and “whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.”  Beyond, 388 Md. at 26, 878
A.2d at 582; Camelback I, 307 Md. at 277, 513 A.2d at 877; see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 543 (1985) (“Once
it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial
justice.’”).
In Camelback II, this Court rejected a strict dichotomy of the concepts of specific and
general jurisdiction:
The concept of specific and general jurisdiction is a useful tool
in the sometimes difficult task of detecting how much contact
is enough, and most cases will fit nicely into one category or the
other.  If, however, the facts of a given case do not naturally
place it at either end of the spectrum, there is no need to jettison
the concept, or to force-fit the case.  In that instance, the proper
19
approach is to identify the approximate position of the case on
the continuum that exists between the two extremes, and apply
the corresponding standard, recognizing that the quantum of
required contacts increases as the nexus between the contacts
and the cause of action decreases.
312 Md. at 339, 539 A.2d at 1111; see also Wilson, 337 Md. at 551 n.2, 654 A.2d at 1329
n.2 (noting that under the reasoning of Camelback II “a trial judge need not segregate factors
tending to support general jurisdiction from those supporting specific jurisdiction”).
The instant case involves, primarily, an issue of specific jurisdiction because
Respondents’ cause of action resulted allegedly from CSR’s use of the Maryland Port as a
conduit in shipping raw asbestos to United States customers.  The contacts supporting a
specific jurisdiction analysis are CSR’s acts of shipping asbestos into the Port, as evidenced
by the affidavits of Lloyd and William Gardner, and the four invoices submitted to the
Circuit Court by Respondents.  There are also contacts in this case that, because
Respondents’ cause of action does not arise therefrom, trigger a general jurisdiction analysis.
The “general” jurisdictional contacts are CSR’s various acts of shipping sugar into the
Maryland Port.  Finally, CSR maintained additional contacts with Maryland that do not fit
neatly into the categories of either specific or general jurisdiction, instead falling somewhere
in the middle of the spectrum.  Those contacts are CSR’s acts of advertising asbestos
products in the Asbestos trade publication.  In accordance with Camelback II, supra, we
shall consider the totality of CSR’s contacts with the forum state to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with due process.
20
Purposeful Availment Analysis
Notwithstanding the distinctions between general and specific personal jurisdiction,
“‘[i]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.’”  Camelback I, 307 Md. at 277, 513 A.2d at 877
(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S. Ct. at 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1298).  Thus, the absence
of any purposeful availment by the defendant stands as an obstacle to whether the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state amount to the sufficient minimum contacts
necessary to confer jurisdiction in either a specific or general jurisdiction context.
The United States Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the “purposeful
availment” requirement in Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S. Ct. at 2183-84,
85 L. Ed. 2d at 542-43:
T[he] “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result
of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts, or of the
“unilateral activity of another party or a third person.”
Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a
“substantial connection” with the forum State.  Thus where the
defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities
within a State, or has created “continuing obligations” between
himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed
himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and
because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and
protections” of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not
unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of
litigation in that forum as well.
21
(Citations and footnotes omitted).
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the Supreme Court also held that Oklahoma did
not have personal jurisdiction over a New York auto dealer after the plaintiffs, Oklahoma
residents, purchased a vehicle in New York and were injured in an auto accident in their
home state.  444 U.S. at 298-99, 100 S. Ct. at 567-68, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 502.  The plaintiffs
argued that, based on the “mobility” of cars, and because the defendant auto dealer could
have clearly foreseen that a car sold in New York could be driven in Oklahoma, there was
purposeful availment.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at 566,
62 L. Ed. 2d at 500.  The Supreme Court disagreed, however, noting that:
“foreseeability” alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. . . .
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant.  But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State.  Rather, it is that the defendant’s
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. . . .
When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there . . . .  The forum State
does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295, 297-98, 100 S. Ct. at 566, 567, 62 L. Ed.
2d at 500, 501-02 (citations omitted).
22
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 105, 107
S. Ct. 1026, 1029, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 100-01 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a California court could exert jurisdiction over Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. (“Asahi”), a Japanese producer of tire valve assemblies that sold its products to a
Taiwanese tire manufacturer.  An individual injured when he lost control of his motorcycle
in California sued the Taiwanese manufacturer in the State, alleging that the cycle’s tire,
tube, and sealant were defective.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06, 107 S. Ct. at 1029, 94 L. Ed.
2d at 100.  The Taiwanese tire manufacturer then cross-claimed against Asahi.  Asahi, 480
U.S. at 106, 107 S. Ct. at 1029, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 100.
The Asahi Court split over whether Asahi satisfied the “purposeful availment”
requirement, thereby attaining sufficient minimum contacts with California.  In one plurality
opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by three of the other Justices, adopted the
view that mere awareness that the stream of commerce might sweep Asahi’s products into
the forum state did not constitute purposeful availment.  Justice O’Connor explained:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.  Additional conduct of the
defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market
in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers
in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State.  But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State
does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
23
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S. Ct. at 1032, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 104 (plurality opinion).  In a
second plurality opinion, Justice William Brennan, joined by three Justices, disagreed with
Justice O’Connor’s position, concluding that Asahi’s mere placement of a product into the
stream of commerce was purposeful availment and therefore sufficient to satisfy the
minimum contacts standard.  According to Justice Brennan,
[t]he stream of commerce refers to not unpredictable currents or
eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacture to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there
cannot come as a surprise.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117, 107 S. Ct. at 1034, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107 (plurality opinion).
Notwithstanding the Justices’ disagreement over whether the Asahi company satisfied
the “purposeful availment” requirement, the Asahi Court held ultimately that the exercise of
jurisdiction by a California court would offend traditional notions of “fair play and
substantial justice,” thus making the exercise of jurisdiction constitutionally unreasonable.
480 U.S. at 116, 107 S. Ct. at 1034, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107.  Among the factors considered by
the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be
constitutionally reasonable were “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.”  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 107 S. Ct. at
1033, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 105.  It also considered “the interstate judicial system’s interest in
24
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”  Id.
We consider Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi, advocating what we shall term the
“stream-of-commerce-plus” theory, to be more persuasive than Justice Brennan’s opinion
in that case with regard to what constitutes purposeful availment.  Indeed, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion is most consistent with the Court’s earlier pronouncements in such cases
as Burger King Corp. and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra.  Moreover, the majority
of federal and state courts have not adopted the more lenient theory of personal jurisdiction
advanced by Justice Brennan.  See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st
Cir. 1992) (“[T]hose circuits that have squarely addressed the stream-of-commerce issue
since Asahi have adopted Justice O’Connor’s plurality view.”); Alison G. Myhra, Civil
Procedure, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 689, 706 n.120 (2007) (surveying cases); see also Luv n’
Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 474 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., specially
concurring) (“Justice O’Connor’s stream-of-commerce-plus theory is the more
constitutionally defensible of the two theories of minimum contacts to emerge from Asahi.”).
For example, in Boit the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a
foreign manufacturer’s sale of its products to a mail-order company, which later sold those
products in the forum state, did not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
foreign manufacturer.  967 F.2d at 683.  “Mere awareness” that the foreign manufacturer’s
25
products might end up in the forum state through the mail, the court held, did not constitute
purposeful availment.  Id.
Similar to Boit, the Fourth Circuit held in Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35
F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994), that a Massachusetts manufacturer’s sale of cigarette filters to a
cigarette company, with plants in Kentucky and New Jersey, that then distributed those
filters nationally in its Kent brand of cigarettes, was insufficient to support jurisdiction in
Maryland.  The Lesnick court stated:
The touchstone of the minimum contacts analysis remains that
an out-of-state person have engaged in some activity
purposefully directed toward the forum state. . . .  To permit a
state to assert jurisdiction over any person in the country whose
product is sold in the state simply because a person must expect
that to happen destroys the notion of individual sovereignties
inherent in our system of federalism.
35 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added).
In recognizing the “stream-of-commerce-plus” theory, we also acknowledge that the
theory is consistent with the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis in Hollingsworth v. Connor,
136 Md. App. 91, 764 A.2d 318 (2000).  Hollingsworth concerned the same facts as in
Lesnick, supra.  In holding that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City could not justifiably
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, H&V, located in Massachusetts, the intermediate
appellate court recognized that H&V did no more than place its products into the stream of
commerce.  Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 114-15, 764 A.2d at 330-31.  The court stated
that “[a]lthough it is reasonable to assume that H&V was aware that its filters, as
11Even if we concluded that the mere entry of a product into the stream-of-commerce
satisfies the “purposeful availment” requirement, we would nevertheless hesitate to apply
that principle in this case, which is not a typical “stream-of-commerce” case.  A typical
stream of commerce case arises where a manufacturer sells its goods to another manufacturer
and those goods cause an injury to someone further down the stream.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92
(1987); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994); Boit v. Gar-Tec
(continued...)
26
components of Kent cigarettes, would be purchased and smoked within the State of
Maryland, this will not suffice to establish minimum contacts.”  Hollingsworth, 136 Md.
App. at 114, 539 A.2d at 331.
Turning now to the instant case, we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’
reliance, in the proceedings below, on Kopke, supra, a case decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.  See Taylor, 181 Md. App. at 384-85, 956 A.2d at 766-67.  The intermediate
appellate court held “that CSR’s packaging and shipping of asbestos, during which it
identified the contents and port destination of Baltimore, [was] tantamount to the kind of
purposeful distribution of goods that the Kopke court concluded supported a finding of
sufficient minimum contacts.”  Taylor, 181 Md. App. at 385, 956 A.2d at 767.  In Kopke,
a Wisconsin truck driver was injured when a pallet loaded with paper fell on him while he
was unloading an ocean-going container that allegedly had been negligently packed by an
Italian loading company.  629 N.W.2d at 666-67.  In contrast to the Kopke court, we do not
consider cargo “introduced into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it w[ill]
arrive in th[e] forum,” 629 N.W.2d at 675, sufficient to constitute purposeful availment in
Maryland.11
11(...continued)
Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); Hollingsworth v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 764
A.2d 318 (2000).  Under such circumstances, the original manufacturer of the defective
product may be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum where the injury occurred.  In
the case sub judice, however, Respondents’ injuries allegedly resulted from circumstances
preceding the entry of CSR’s goods into the “stream-of-commerce,”as such goods were still
raw materials, in transit as between CSR and other manufacturers.
27
To satisfy the “purposeful availment” requirement in Maryland, mere foreseeability
that a defendant’s products will enter the State and cause injury here is insufficient.  Bond,
391 Md. at 730, 895 A.2d at 1005.  Rather, the defendant must “create a ‘substantial
connection’” with Maryland such that having to defend a lawsuit in the State would be
foreseeable.  See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at
542.  A substantial connection is forged where the defendant either engages in significant
activities in the State or creates continuing obligations with the State’s residents, thus taking
advantage of the benefits and protections of Maryland law.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at
475-76, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543.  “Designing [a] product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State” exemplify purposeful availment.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S. Ct. at 1032, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 104 (plurality opinion); see
also, e.g., Wilson, 337 Md. 541, 654 A.2d 1324 (holding that a Maryland court could
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state hospital that provided services to Maryland
28
residents and registered as a Maryland provider, designating itself as a liver transplant
referral center); Mohamed, 279 Md. at 659, 370 A.2d at 554 (holding that a Maryland court
could exert jurisdiction over a Kentucky resident whose agent engaged in “intensive”
negotiations with a temporary resident of Maryland to resolve a contract dispute); Harris v.
Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969) (holding that a Maryland court could
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state real estate development company that scouted
potential development sites in Maryland and, through its agents, filed a building permit in
the State and arranged for the Washington Suburban Sanitation Commission to install a
storm drain).  Purposeful availment, however, will not arise from “‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’
or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or [from] the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’”
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. at 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542 (citations
omitted); see also Bond, 391 Md. at 731, 895 A.2d at 1005 (holding that a Maryland court
could not exercise jurisdiction over an Ohio lawyer when a Maryland client initiated five of
seven contacts with the lawyer, the parties created the attorney-client relationship in Ohio,
and the attorney-client relationship involved only events in, and the law of, Ohio).  We shall
analyze all of CSR’s contacts with Maryland in light of our standard for purposeful
availment.
A.  Shipments of Asbestos
The first contact that we shall analyze is CSR’s use of the Port as a conduit in
shipping raw asbestos to United States consumers located outside of Maryland.  Again, in
29
determining whether such activity constitutes purposeful availment, we look for the presence
of a substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state, manifested either by
engaging in significant activities in the state or creating continuing obligations with the
state’s residents.
CSR’s shipments of raw asbestos do not satisfy the “purposeful availment”
requirement because CSR neither engaged in significant activities in Maryland nor created
continuing obligations with residents of the State.  With respect to our conclusion that CSR
did not engage in significant activities in Maryland, we observe that CSR did not maintain
a place of business in Maryland, nor was the company licensed to do business in the State.
In addition, Respondents have not demonstrated that any agents of CSR conducted activities
in Maryland.  Although CSR’s asbestos products allegedly caused injury here, the site of the
“effect of the injury” is not relevant to our analysis.  Indeed, as this Court acknowledged in
Bond, 
the “effect of the injury” analysis “is not a sufficient benchmark
for exercising personal jurisdiction.”  Burger King Corp., 471
U.S. at 471-76, 105 S. Ct. at 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528.
[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether
the defendant purposefully established “minimum
contacts” in the forum State.  Although it has
been argued that foreseeability of causing injury
in another State should be sufficient to establish
such contacts there when policy considerations so
require,[] the [United States Supreme] Court has
consistently held that this kind of foreseeability is
not a “sufficient benchmark” for exercising
personal jurisdiction.  Instead, the foreseeability
30
that is critical to due process analysis [] is that the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there . . . .
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474-76, 105 S. Ct. at 2183, 85
L. Ed. 2d at 542.
391 Md. at 730, 895 A.2d at 1005.
As to our conclusion that CSR did not create continuing obligations with any
Maryland residents, we note that Respondents have not demonstrated the existence of a
relationship between either CSR and any consumers of asbestos in Maryland or CSR and the
Maryland stevedores.  In Camelback II we stated that “[o]rdinarily, one who purposefully
sends a product into another jurisdiction for purposes of sale may reasonably expect to be
haled into court in that State if the product proves to be defective and causes injury there.”
312 Md. at 340, 539 A.2d at 1112 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Here, however,
Respondents have not demonstrated that CSR shipped asbestos products to any Maryland
consumers; instead, CSR used the Maryland Port as a conduit in shipping asbestos to
consumers located outside of the State, in locations such as New York.  Although our
statement in Camelback II would support hailing CSR into a New York court, that statement
is irrelevant to whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City may justifiably exercise
jurisdiction over CSR in the case sub judice.
In addition, although Respondents’ maritime expert, Captain Robert Stewart, stated
that CSR was responsible for paying freight charges, including the costs of hiring a stevedore
12It appears to be undisputed that CSR did not select Baltimore as the port of delivery
for its shipments of asbestos.  The buyers, and more particularly one of the buyers, Johns-
Manville Corporation, a non-Maryland company, made that selection.  Thus, any contact
with Maryland came from the buyers’ or one of the buyers’ decision to direct the shipment
of asbestos through the State.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980) (holding that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident auto distributor whose only connection to the forum
resulted from a customer’s decision to drive there failed to provide the defendant with “clear
notice that it [would be] subject to suit” in the forum state and thus an opportunity to
“alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation” there).  Notwithstanding these factors, the
dissent maintains that CSR purposefully directed its activities toward Maryland because CSR
sent asbestos into Maryland knowing that stevedores would have to unload the asbestos,
thereby subjecting CSR to the reach of Maryland’s long-arm jurisdiction.  Such a broad
application of Maryland’s long-arm statute, essentially, would permit the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over every nonresident seller, for any product sold in Maryland, even
if the seller had no business “presence” in the State.  As the United States Supreme Court
pointed out in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., in analyzing the question of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the focus is on whether the “defendant’s conduct
and connection with the forum state are such that [the defendant] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. (emphasis added).  The facts of this case,
unfortunately, do not satisfy the minimum conduct or connection that would justify the
(continued...)
31
company, it is not apparent that CSR actually hired the stevedore company.  Rather, it is
more likely that CSR paid freight charges to a carrier that then contracted with the stevedores
who worked at the Maryland Port.  “‘The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State.’”  Bond, 391 Md. at 731, 895 A.2d at 1005 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253,
78 S. Ct. at 1239-40, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1298)).
Furthermore, it is relevant to our analysis that CSR’s act of shipping asbestos into the
Port was not done at the company’s behest.  Rather, the company’s customers, all of which
were located outside of Maryland, directed CSR where to make the asbestos shipments.12
12(...continued)
exercise of personal jurisdiction over CSR by a Maryland court.
32
In Bond, supra, this Court considered whether the communications of an Ohio attorney with
a Maryland resident sufficed to establish sufficient minimum contacts with the State of
Maryland.  “The relevant contacts by Messerman [the Ohio lawyer] with Bond [the
Maryland resident] consisted of the alleged provision of legal advice by telephone and letters
concerning the effect of and/or need for expungement of Ohio juvenile proceedings.”  Id.
In holding that Messerman, the Ohio lawyer, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Maryland courts, we emphasized that:
[t]he number of contacts over nine years were few and the
number of those initiated by Messerman were fewer still. . . .
[O]nly two of the seven relevant contacts were initiated by
Messerman:  Messerman sent two letters to Bond in Maryland
— one in January of 1986 and one in May of 1994.  The other
five contacts were commenced by Bond.
Id. (citations omitted).  Similar to the attorney in Bond, CSR’s asbestos-related contacts with
Maryland were initiated by other parties — here, non-Maryland consumers — and the
unilateral activity of a third party is not a grounds for conferring personal jurisdiction.  Thus,
we hold that CSR’s use of the Port as a conduit in shipping raw asbestos to a non-Maryland
ultimate destination and user does not suffice to establish the defendant’s purposeful
availment.
In concluding that CSR’s use of the Port in supplying raw asbestos to United States
customers does not amount to purposeful availment, we need not consider the specific effect
13Md. Code (1975, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 2-320 of the Commercial Law Article
provides:
§ 2-320.  C.I.F. and C. & F. terms.
(1) The term C.I.F. means that the price includes in a lump sum
the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the named
destination. The term C. & F. or C.F. means that the price so
includes cost and freight to the named destination.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed and even though used only in
connection with the stated price and destination, the term C.I.F.
(continued...)
33
of CSR’s participation in three C.I.F. arrangements during the period when Smith and
Anzulis worked at the Port.  Captain Stewart expressed the opinion that, under a C.I.F.
agreement, CSR would have access to the Maryland courts if its goods were unjustifiably
rejected.  Accordingly, there is potential for the assertion that such court access constitutes
CSR’s taking advantage of the benefits and protections of Maryland law, thus satisfying the
“purposeful availment” requirement and, ultimately, due process concerns.  In other words,
Captain Stewart’s characterization of CSR’s participation in the three C.I.F. arrangements
evokes the question of whether potential “offensive” use of the Maryland courts by CSR
justifies the “defensive” use of those courts against the company.  We conclude that it does
not, as settled Maryland law contradicts Captain Stewart’s observations regarding what a
C.I.F. agreement entails; specifically, the presence of a C.I.F. agreement bears no relevance
as to where a seller may sue a buyer that unjustifiably rejects the seller’s goods.  For
instance, the provision of the Maryland Code governing C.I.F. agreements, Md. Code (1975,
2002 Repl. Vol.), § 2-320 of the Commercial Law Article (“C.I.F. and C. & F. terms”),13 is
13(...continued)
destination or its equivalent requires the seller at his own
expense and risk to
(a) Put the goods into the possession of a carrier at the port for
shipment and obtain a negotiable bill or bills of lading covering
the entire transportation to the named destination; and
(b) Load the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier
(which may be contained in the bill of lading) showing that the
freight has been paid or provided for; and
(c) Obtain a policy or certificate of insurance, including any
war risk insurance, of a kind and on terms then current at the
port of shipment in the usual amount, in the currency of the
contract, shown to cover the same goods covered by the bill of
lading and providing for payment of loss to the order of the
buyer or for the account of whom it may concern; but the seller
may add to the price the amount of the premium for any such
war risk insurance; and
(d) Prepare an invoice of the goods and procure any other
documents required to effect shipment or to comply with the
contract; and
(e) Forward and tender with commercial promptness all the
documents in due form and with any indorsement necessary to
perfect the buyer’s rights.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term C. & F. or its equivalent
has the same effect and imposes upon the seller the same
obligations and risks as a C.I.F. term except the obligation as to
insurance.
(4) Under the term C.I.F. or C. & F. unless otherwise agreed the
buyer must make payment against tender of the required
documents and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand
delivery of the goods in substitution for the documents.
34
silent as to what a seller’s remedies are if its goods are rejected.  Moreover, under a C.I.F.
contract, the buyer pays the price of the goods prior to their arrival at the port of destination,
thus obviating the need for the seller to sue the buyer in the jurisdiction where the goods are
14Without any citation to the record, Respondents contend in their brief that the sugar
shipments “were purposefully directed to the Port of Baltimore for the obvious reason that
the Domino sugar plant is located in the Inner Harbor.”  Respondents, however, have not
demonstrated the existence of any relationship between CSR and Domino.
35
rejected.  See Official Comment 1 to Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 2-320 of the
Commercial Law Article.  The Official Comment to § 2-320 thus provides:
Under a C.I.F. contract the buyer, as under the common
law, must pay the price upon tender of the required documents
without first inspecting the goods, but his payment in these
circumstances does not constitute an acceptance of the goods
nor does it impair his right of subsequent inspection or his
options and remedies in the case of improper delivery.  All
remedies and rights for the seller’s breach are reserved to him.
The buyer must pay before inspection and assert his remedy
against the seller afterward unless the nonconformity of the
goods amounts to a real failure of consideration, since the
purpose of choosing this form of contract is to give the seller
protection against the buyer’s unjustifiable rejection of the
goods at a distant port of destination which would necessitate
taking possession of the goods and suing the buyer there.
Id. at Official Comment 12 (emphasis added).
B.  Shipments of Sugar
Next in our analysis of CSR’s contacts with Maryland, we shall consider whether
CSR’s shipments of sugar into the Maryland Port satisfy the “purposeful availment”
requirement.  Like CSR’s shipments of raw asbestos, Respondents have not demonstrated
that CSR shipped sugar to, or engaged in business with, any consumers in Maryland.14
Moreover, although substantial in amount and value, the record indicates that the Australian
government directed the sugar shipments pursuant to the Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915,
36
controlling all facets of production and distribution.  We consider the role of the Australian
government tantamount to the unilateral activity of a third party, which, again, does not
suffice to demonstrate a defendant’s purposeful availment.
C.  Advertising
The final contacts that we shall consider are CSR’s acts of advertising asbestos
products in the Asbestos trade publication.  In the Circuit Court, Respondents produced the
affidavit of Dr. Barry Castleman, who observed that CSR regularly advertised the sale of
asbestos products in the Asbestos publication during the period when Smith and Anzulis
worked at the Port.  Dr. Castleman also expressed the opinion that CSR would have known
that such advertisements would reach potential consumers in Maryland.
In Camelback II, this Court considered advertising efforts similar to those of CSR in
determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant would
comport with due process.  312 Md. 330, 539 A.2d 1107.  In that case, the defendant, a
Pennsylvania ski resort, supplied brochures to ski shops in Maryland and provided a toll-free
telephone number by which Maryland residents, among others, could obtain information
about snow conditions.  Camelback II, 312 Md. at 333-34, 539 A.2d at 1108-09.  In addition,
the defendant was aware that wire services carried information concerning snow conditions
at the resort and that such information was reproduced in Maryland newspapers.  Camelback
II, 312 Md. at 341, 539 A.2d at 1112.  We declined to hold that the defendant’s advertising-
related contacts met the standard for purposeful availment, as “[the resort] did not devote its
37
energy or financial resources to the marketing of Maryland.”  Camelback II, 312 Md. at 341,
539 A.2d at 1112.  Similarly, in the case sub judice, CSR did not target its advertising efforts
toward potential consumers in Maryland; it advertised asbestos products in a general trade
publication, and although it was foreseeable that such advertisements would be viewed in
Maryland, that fact alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction in light of Camelback II.
Conclusion
Because we conclude in the foregoing analysis that CSR has not, in the course of any
of its contacts with Maryland, satisfied the “purposeful availment” requirement, thus
attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State, we need not consider whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable as required by our tests
for either specific or general jurisdiction.  See Camelback I, 307 Md. at 286, 513 A.2d at 882
(noting that the fairness factors “cannot alone serve as the foundation for assumption of
jurisdiction” (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294, 100 S. Ct. at 565, 62
L. Ed. 2d at 499; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 78 S. Ct. at 1238, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1296)).  We also
note that any apparent unfairness to Respondents in this case must be considered in light of
the fact that
[t]he law of personal jurisdiction . . . is asymmetrical.  The
primary concern is for the burden on a defendant.  If the burdens
of trial are too great for a plaintiff, the plaintiff can decide not
to sue or, perhaps, to sue elsewhere.  A defendant has no such
luxury.  The burdens on a defendant are of particular
significance if . . . the defendant has done little to reach out to
the forum state.
38
Ins. Co. of N. America v. Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 498).  The Court of
Special Appeals erred in concluding that CSR had sufficient minimum contacts with the
State of Maryland to support the Circuit Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENTS. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2008
CSR, LIMITED
v.
ANDREA TAYLOR, ET AL.
  
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Murphy, J.,
which Bell, C.J., and Raker, J., join.
Filed:  November 16, 2009
I do not agree with the majority’s holding “that the Court of Special Appeals erred in
concluding that [Petitioner] had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Maryland to
support the Circuit Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.”  In Taylor v. CSR, 181 Md.
App. 363, 956 A.2d 754 (2008), the Court of Special Appeals stated:
Taylor presented evidence that the cause of action arose
from CSR's direct shipment of asbestos to the Port of Baltimore,
where Smith and Anzulis were stevedores, and expert testimony
that CSR would reasonably expect that its cargo of asbestos
would be unloaded by stevedores  at the port, who could be
exposed to the asbestos if the burlap bags were ripped. Taylor
also presented evidence that CSR had other contacts with
Maryland unrelated to Smith's or Anzulis' injuries, when they
advertised regularly in a United States asbestos industry
magazine. CSR also marketed and arranged all Australian
exports of sugar and, from 1964 to 1966, $ 66.5 million dollars
worth of sugar (in 2005 dollars) arrived at the Port of Baltimore
from Australia.
Id. at 383-84, 956 A.2d at 766.
Unlike Camelback ski resort, CSR's asbestos shipments
are examples of purposeful directing of product to Maryland. In
shipping the asbestos to the Port of Baltimore, to be first
unloaded before being sent on for sale elsewhere, CSR did not
just knowingly accept the benefit that would be brought through
an interstate distribution of goods. CSR, instead, purposefully
sent asbestos into Maryland with an expectation that it
would be handled by Maryland stevedores. By doing so,
CSR might reasonably have expected to be haled into court
in Maryland if its asbestos shipments proved to be
dangerously packaged, causing injury to the stevedores in
Maryland. This does not mean, necessarily, that Maryland
would have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a person who
happened to be near the place where the stevedores were
unloading the asbestos. Nor does it mean that Maryland would
have jurisdiction in suits brought by other Maryland residents
claiming injury from asbestos. The case for jurisdiction when
the stevedores or their representatives are plaintiffs has the
2
additional and significant factor that CSR knew when it
shipped the asbestos that stevedores would unload the bags.
Id. at 387-88, 956 A.2d at 768.  (Emphasis supplied).  I agree with those statements.
In my opinion, it is of no consequence that -- because of the “payment in advance”
requirement in the “C.&F./C.I.F.” shipping contracts -- Petitioner did not need access to
Maryland courts to sue a buyer who rejected the cargo.  What is of consequence,
however, is that Petitioner would certainly have expected to be haled into a Maryland
court by a dissatisfied buyer who rejected the goods delivered to the Port of Baltimore
and sued Petitioner for breach of contract. 
The holding of the Court of Special Appeals is actually more limited than the
holdings in State ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, et al., 441 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1994) and
W. R. Grace & Co. v. Ensey, 666 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. 1996), in which the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia and the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, affirmed
trial court rulings requiring CSR to defend lawsuits filed against it in those states.  In each
of those cases, (1) the lawsuits at issue sought to hold CSR liable for injuries resulting
from “job site” exposure to building materials manufactured by Johns Manville that
contained asbestos purchased by Johns Manville from CSR, (2) CSR moved to dismiss
the lawsuits on the ground that it had no control over the distribution of products that
Johns Manville manufactured and thereafter shipped into the forum state, and (3) the trial
court denied CSR’s motion.  
3
In MacQueen, supra, while affirming the decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County (by denying CSR’s petition for writ of prohibition in which it challenged Judge
MacQueen’s ruling on jurisdiction), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
stated: 
Specifically, the plaintiffs-respondents contend that CSR
sought to exploit the American market for raw asbestos by
systematically and continuously selling substantial quantities
(37,000 tons) of crocidolite asbestos to Johns Manville between
1948 and 1966.  CSR’s own sales records, plaintiffs-respondents
argue, show that CSR shipped fiber to ports in various states.
Notably, CSR does not contest jurisdiction in the states to which
the fiber then was routed -- specifically, Johns Manville plants
located in Louisiana, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas and
California.1  
 
1    We note that CSR made these representations 
at oral argument.
* * *
At oral argument, it became apparent that CSR has
confused jurisdictional issues with questions of CSR’s
innocence of wrongdoing.  In a nutshell, CSR argues that as
simply a manufacturer of raw materials, it is not liable to the
plaintiffs in this mass tort case.  Unlike a manufacturer of a
defective component part that caused some end product to fail,
CSR contends its role was more comparable to a manufacturer
of raw steel, with no control over the end product into which its
raw material was incorporated.
This Court, however, is satisfied that CSR introduced a
product into the stream of American commerce that it knew
would be used in West Virginia. 
* * *
4
Obviously, as the Supreme Court of the United States
held in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 294, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), jurisdiction
cannot be asserted over a defendant with which a state has no
contacts, no ties and no relations.  However, in the case before
us, the evidence is virtually incontrovertible that CSR
introduced its asbestos fibers into the stream of American
commerce; CSR knew the products containing their fibers
would be distributed throughout the United States; CSR had an
ongoing commercial relationship with Johns Manville, the
largest American manufacturer of asbestos products; and, CSR
was actively engaged in the development and introduction of
products that contained their raw materials. These circumstances
are sufficient at this time to give our courts jurisdiction.
Id. at 660-61.
In W. R. Grace & Co., supra, while affirming the Circuit Court of Rock Island
County (after the Supreme Court of Illinois entered a supervisory order that CSR be
granted the right to file an interlocutory appeal), the Appellate Court of Illinois stated:
Between 1948 and 1966, CSR acted as the sales agent for
its partially-owned subsidiary which mined raw asbestos fibers.
CSR sold the asbestos to Manville, F.O.B. various ports in
Australia.  Manville then used the asbestos, along with asbestos
from various other suppliers from around the world, to
manufacture asbestos-containing products at its plants
throughout the United States.  Manville was one of the world’s
largest manufacturers of asbestos products.  The record before
us establishes that CSR sold Manville 37,000 tons of crocidolite
asbestos (blue fiber) from 1948 until 1966.
CSR maintains there is no evidence to support Ensey’s
claim that CSR was aware that its blue fiber was coming to
Illinois.  In oral argument before this court, CSR claimed that if
its asbestos made its way to Illinois, Manville is to blame, not
CSR. . . .  We note initially that CSR has confused jurisdictional
issues with causation and proof issues.  The jurisdictional issue
5
before us is preliminary to, and independent of, any
determination of the merits of Ensey’s claims.
* * *
The record before us supports a finding of minimum
contacts. This result is obtained under any of the three Supreme
Court views [in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987),] discussed
above.  Under Justice Brennan’s analysis, it is clear that CSR
introduced tons of asbestos into the stream of commerce with
knowledge that it was being incorporated into products
manufactured by Manville for use in Illinois and every other
state.  Moreover, under Brennan’s analysis, because CSR was
aware that its asbestos was being sold in Illinois, it cannot claim
it is an unfair surprise that it is required to defend a lawsuit in
this state.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
Jurisdiction is also proper under Justice O’Connor’s
analysis.  The record before us supports the assertion that CSR
did more than just place its asbestos into the stream of
commerce.  CSR had an on-going commercial relationship with
Manville.  CSR officials visited the United States to promote the
use of their blue fiber, suggest new uses, and assure competitive
pricing and quality.  In October 1956, a CSR official attended a
Manville sales conference in the United States and met with
senior officers from all Manville plants.  At the time, Manville
had a factory in Waukegan, Illinois.  A CSR official interviewed
a number of Manville officials and received no complaints
regarding the quality of CSR’s blue fiber.  CSR advertised in a
national trade magazine.  As a result, we find ample evidence of
“additional conduct” by CSR in reaching out to Illinois and
promoting the sale and use of its product here.
We further conclude that the contacts mentioned above
also satisfy the requirements of World-Wide.  Through its on-
going and continuous relationship with Manville, nation-wide
advertising, and the promotion of expanded use of its asbestos,
CSR sought to serve the market for its product in Illinois.  As a
6
consequence, CSR could certainly anticipate being haled into
court in this forum.
* * *
After establishing that CSR has the required minimum
contacts with Illinois, we must examine other relevant factors to
determine whether it is reasonable and fair for our courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over CSR.  Such factors may
include (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the
forum state; (3) the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining relief;
(4) the interest of the interstate judicial system in obtaining the
most efficient relief; and (5) the interests of our sister states in
furthering their own policies.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 94 L. Ed.
2d at 105.  An analysis of the relevant factors clearly reveals that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Illinois is reasonable and
fair.
While we are mindful that CSR is a foreign corporation,
the record indicates only a slight burden for CSR to defend this
action in Illinois.  CSR has been a party to litigation in several
states and has retained local counsel.  As a result, CSR is no
stranger to the United States legal system.  In addition, some
discovery has already occurred, and documentation is available
in Illinois.  In contrast, Ensey’s interest in obtaining relief in
Illinois is great.  As CSR’s counsel conceded in oral argument
before this court, Ensey would be forced to seek relief in
Australia if she is not afforded the opportunity to maintain her
lawsuit in Illinois.  Clearly, such a burden on Ensey would be
prohibitive.  Similarly, Illinois has a great interest in providing
a forum by which its citizens may seek relief from wrongs they
have suffered.
Id. at 9-12.  
The holding of the Court of Special Appeals is not inconsistent with the case of
CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996), in which the Supreme Court of Texas (by
“conditionally” granting CSR’s petition for writ of mandamus) held that the District
7
Court of Harris County erroneously asserted personal jurisdiction over CSR on the basis
of the following facts:
On August 23, 1957, CSR sold 363 tons of raw
Australian blue asbestos to Johns-Manville.  CSR sold the
asbestos to Johns-Manville F.O.B. Fremantle, Australia, so that
title to the fiber passed to Johns-Manville when Johns-Manville
loaded the fiber onto the ship in Australia.  Johns-Mansville
shipped the asbestos to Houston; the fiber was eventually used
for the manufacture of transite pipe.  The plaintiffs in the
underlying suit allege that they were injured by exposure to CSR
asbestos used to manufacture pipe.  
Id. at 594.  While I agree with the Supreme Court of Texas that those facts did not permit
the Harris County District Court to assert either “general” or “specific” jurisdiction over
CSR, the case at bar does not involve either (1) a single shipment of asbestos to the Port
of Baltimore, or (2) plaintiffs who allege that they were injured by exposure to a
manufactured product that contained asbestos sold by CSR.  I am persuaded that the
Supreme Court of Texas would not have issued a writ of mandamus if the record showed
that (1) CSR had shipped to Houston the amount of asbestos and sugar that it had shipped
to the Port of Baltimore, and (2) the plaintiffs were stevedores who alleged that they had
been injured when unloading “CSR-labeled burlap bags containing asbestos, [under
circumstances when] dust would be ‘all over the place.’” 
While forcing Respondents to assert their claims in Australia is (in the words of
the W.R. Grace & Co. Court) “prohibitive,” CSR’s litigation history includes a lawsuit
that it filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against
8
various insurance companies -- including Australian companies from whom CSR
purchased insurance in Australia.  The second amended complaint that CSR filed in that
case (Civil Action No. 95-2947 (HAA)) includes the following assertions:
10.  Plaintiff CSR is an Australian public company with
its principal place of business at Level 24, 1 O’Connell Street,
Sydney 2000 Australia.  CSR is a diversified company engaged
in, among other things, the sugar and building materials
businesses.  From approximately 1948 through 1966, CSR
acting as sale agent for one of its subsidiaries, sold raw asbestos
fiber to certain companies (primarily Johns-Manville) located in
the United States.  The first delivery of such fiber to the United
States took place in 1949.
* * *
27.  To date, more than 116,000 Asbestos Claims have
been asserted against CSR and/or CSR America in the United
States as a result of alleged exposure to the fiber CSR sold to
Manville or exposure to finished products allegedly
manufactured by Manville with CSR’s asbestos fiber as an
ingredient.  CSR and/or CSR America have spent approximately
$62 million to settle approximately 114,000 of those Asbestos
Claims, including more than $22 million to settle more than
2,400 New Jersey Asbestos Claims principally brought against
CSR by former employees at the Manville plant in Manville,
Middlesex County, New Jersey.  In addition, CSR and/or CSR
America have spent about $22 million in attorneys’ fees and
other legal expenses to defend against the Asbestos Claims.
CSR and CSR America expect to spent millions more in
settlement and defense costs in the future.
* * *
34.  The Policies issued to CSR provide standard from
“occurrence” based coverage for asbestos-related claims against
CSR and additional insureds (including Midalco and CSR
America) “anywhere in the world,” including the United States.
9
Such coverage exists so long as one or more of the Policies was
in place at any time from an underlying asbestos plaintiff’s first
exposure to asbestos through at least the time that plaintiff
manifested an asbestos-related disease.  In at least one of the
Policies, to which many of the Defendant Insurers subscribed,
the insurers expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of any
Court of competent jurisdiction in the United States, to comply
with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction,
and to have all matters arising under their coverage determined
in accordance with the law and practice of such Court.
* * *
71.  One month after the original complaint was filed in
the instant litigation (the “U.S. Action”), CIGNA Australia and
a number of other Defendants filed a parallel suit in Australia
(the “Australian Action”), seeking a declaratory judgment that
Defendants here have no liability to CSR or CSR America, as
well as injunctive relief preventing Plaintiffs from pursuing the
U.S. Action.
72.  Although the Defendants were initially successful in
enjoining prosecution of the instant litigation, the High Court of
Australia, on August 5, 1997, ultimately terminated the
injunction.  The High Court found that the Australian Action
was “vexatious and oppressive,” and had been instituted for the
purpose of terminating the U.S. Action.  Finding this U.S.
Action to be a more appropriate forum for the claims,
particularly given the U.S. antitrust issues which cannot be
adjudicated in Australia, the High court stayed the Australian
Action pending the outcome of this U.S. Action.
* * *
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against
Defendants as follows:
* * *
10
2.
On Count II, for declaratory and injunctive relief
requiring that Defendants defend and indemnify
CSR and CSR America with respect to the
asbestos-related claims that have been and will
continue to be filed against them in New Jersey
and elsewhere in the United States[.]
In CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D.N.J. 2005), the Honorable
Harold A. Ackerman ruled on motions for summary judgment on Counts III and IV of the
Second Amended Complaint, but did not address Count II.  
I decline to hypothesize that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was
erroneous in stating that, at oral argument in the MacQueen case, CSR’s counsel
represented that “CSR does not contest jurisdiction in the states to which the fiber . . . was
routed” after CSR “shipped [that] fiber to ports in various states[.]” In light of that
representation, and (in the words of the Court of Special Appeals) “the additional and
significant factor that CSR knew when it shipped the asbestos that stevedores would
unload the bags,” the conclusion that Respondents have to assert their claims in Australia
strikes me as the antithesis of “fair play and substantial justice.”
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Raker have authorized me to state that they join this
dissenting opinion.