Title: Hall v. Jones

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:12/20/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120950
____________________
Ex parte Chad Jones
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Demetrius Hall, a minor, suing by and through his
mother and next friend, Latonya Hall; Latonya Hall,
individually; and Maurice Caffie, individually
v.
Chad Jones et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-08-901397)
BOLIN, Justice.
1120950
Chad Jones petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order
denying his motion for a summary judgment in an action filed
against him by Latonya Hall, individually and as mother and
next friend of Demetrius Hall, a minor, and Maurice Caffie,
individually 
(hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"Hall"),
and to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the basis of
State-agent immunity.  We deny the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the events giving rise to this action,
Jones was employed as a physical-education teacher at Gresham
Middle School and Demetrius Hall and Michael Boyd were
students at Gresham Middle School.  On May 5, 2006, a physical
altercation occurred between Demetrius and Boyd during a
basketball game.  According to Demetrius, he was guarding Boyd
tightly when Boyd became angry and threw the basketball at
him, striking him in the face with the ball.  Demetrius
responded by pushing Boyd and throwing a punch; a fight then
ensued between Demetrius and Boyd.  Demetrius and Boyd were
separated by other students but continued to argue with each
other.  After the two exchanged insults for approximately a
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minute, another student unexpectedly shoved Demetrius into
Boyd, and Boyd responded by "slamming" Demetrius into some
nearby metal stairs and striking him in the head.  Demetrius
was seriously injured as the result of the altercation.  Jones
contends that he was at the opposite end of the gym when the
altercation occurred, having walked there to deliver 
a 
message
to Miriam Sokol, the girls physical-education teacher, that
she was needed in the office.
On May 5, 2008, Hall sued Jones, Sokol, and Sammy Queen,
who was also a physical-education teacher at Gresham Middle
School (hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the
defendants"), asserting claims of negligence and wantonness
and alleging that the defendants had breached their duty to
reasonably supervise Demetrius and Boyd by leaving them
unattended for an extended length of time.  On June 5, 2008,
Jones and Sokol answered the complaint, asserting, 
among 
other
things, the defense of State-agent immunity.  On July 22,
2011, the defendants moved the trial court for a summary
judgment as to the claims asserted against them, arguing,
among other things, that they were entitled to State-agent
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immunity under the test set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.
2d 392 (Ala. 2000).   
1
On October 4, 2011, Hall filed a response in opposition
to the defendants' motion for a summary judgment.  In this
response Hall voluntarily abandoned all claims against Sokol
and Queen.  As for Jones, Hall argued that a question of fact
existed as to whether Jones had left the gym floor at the time
of the altercation.  Hall argued that, if he was not present
on the gym floor at the time of the altercation, Jones had
acted beyond his authority and thereby lost the protection
from suit afforded to him by State-agent immunity.
On December 19, 2011, the trial court entered an order
denying the defendants' summary-judgment motion. On January
18, 2012, Sokol and Queen moved the trial court to alter,
amend, or vacate its judgment denying the motion for a summary
judgment, noting that Hall had abandoned all claims against
them and had conceded that Sokol and Queen were entitled to a
summary judgment.  On January 30, 2012, the trial court
Although Cranman was a plurality opinion, the test set
1
forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority of the
Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).
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granted the postjudgment motion filed by Sokol and Queen and
dismissed all claims asserted against them with prejudice.
On February 24, 2012, Jones petitioned this Court for a
writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment and
to enter a summary judgment in his favor based on State-agent
immunity.  On March 19, 2012, this Court issued an order
denying Jones's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to
Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., which provides:
"Time for Filing.  The petition s h a l l  b e  f i l e d
within a reasonable time.  The presumptively
reasonable time for filing a petition seeking 
review of an order of a trial court or of a lower
appellate court shall be the same as the time for
taking an appeal.  If a petition is filed outside
this presumptively reasonable time, it shall include
a statement of circumstances constituting good cause
for the appellate court to consider the petition,
notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the
presumptively reasonable time." 
The presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition for a
writ of mandamus from the denial of a motion for a summary
judgment is 42 days. See Ex parte Noland Hosp. Montgomery,
LLC, [Ms. 1110240, August 10, 2012] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2012). 
The petition for a writ of mandamus filed on February 24,
2012, was filed well beyond 42 days, the presumptively
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1120950
reasonable time, after the trial court denied Jones's motion
for a summary judgment, i.e., after December 19, 2011.  Jones
failed to include a statement of circumstances constituting
good cause as to why  this Court should consider his petition. 
The pendency of the postjudgment motion filed by Sokol and
Queen did not toll the running of the presumptively reasonable
time in which to file the petition for a writ of mandamus
seeking a review of  the trial court's interlocutory order
denying Jones's motion for a summary judgment. Ex parte
Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 2003). This Court
overruled Jones's application for a rehearing on May 2, 2012.
On November 21, 2012, Jones filed a "renewed" motion for
a summary judgment, expressly adopting the argument and
supporting evidentiary submissions in his previous motion for
a summary judgment filed on July 22, 2011.  Additionally,
Jones stated in the "renewed" motion for a summary judgment
that subsequent to the trial court's denial of his initial
summary-judgment motion, this Court had issued its 
decision 
in
Ex parte Montgomery County Board of Education, 88 So. 3d 837
(Ala. 2012), in which the "Alabama Supreme Court again upheld
[an] 
educator's 
entitlement 
to 
State-agent 
immunity 
protection
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1120950
against [a] plaintiff's claims for negligent and/or wanton
supervision of students."
On March 5, 2013, Hall filed a
2
response in opposition to Jones's motion for a "renewed"
summary judgment, arguing that Jones had failed to assert any
new grounds as the basis for his "renewed" summary-judgment
motion and that Jones had merely asked the trial court instead
to reconsider the previously rejected grounds as the basis for
the "renewed" summary-judgment motion.  Hall also argued that
the decision in Ex parte Montgomery County Board of Education
did not work a fundamental change in the law of State-agent
immunity that would mandate the entry of a summary judgment in
favor of Jones in this case.  Hall noted that this Court
merely concluded in Ex parte Montgomery County Board of
Education that, based on the facts of that case, the teacher
there was exercising discretion in the supervision of her
students 
and 
was, 
therefore, 
entitled 
to 
State-agent 
immunity. 
Hall argued that the facts of the present case are
The decision in Ex parte Montgomery County Board of
2
Education was released on January 27, 2012, after the trial
court's denial of Jones's summary-judgment motion but before
Jones filed the initial petition for a writ of mandamus in
this case.  Jones cited and quoted from the decision
extensively in the brief in support of his initial petition
for a writ of mandamus.
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distinguishable from the facts presented in Ex parte
Montgomery County Board of Education, because the facts
presented in this case create a question of fact as to whether
Jones was present on the gym floor and properly supervising
the students as was required of him, thus preventing a
judgment as a matter of law holding that Jones was entitled to
State-agent immunity. 
Following a hearing, the trial court, on April 2, 2013, 
denied Jones's renewed motion for a summary judgment.  This
petition followed. 
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996) ....
"'Summary judgment 
is 
appropriate 
only
when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La
Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996). A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.
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1120950
2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel
Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992);
and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.  Fuqua,
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha
Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala. 1991),
Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So.
2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.
2d 35 (Ala. 1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912–13 (Ala. 2000)).  This Court
may affirm the judgment of the trial court upon any valid
legal ground even if that ground was not argued before or
considered by, and even if it was rejected by, the trial
court.   Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 2000).
See also Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d
1059, 1082 (Ala. 2004) ("'This Court may affirm a trial
court's judgment on "any valid legal ground presented by the
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1120950
record, regardless of whether that ground was considered, or
even if it was rejected, by the trial court."'" (quoting
General Motors Corp. v. Stokes Chevrolet, Inc., 885 So. 2d
119, 124 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881
So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003))). 
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when the petitioner can demonstrate: "'(1) a clear legal
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d
541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So.
2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).  
Discussion
Hall argues that Jones's present petition for a writ of
mandamus should also be denied as untimely because, Hall says,
in reality, Jones seeks appellate review of the trial court's
order denying his first motion for a summary judgment based on
his claim to State-agent immunity, simply by filing a
"renewed" motion for a summary judgment based on no new
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1120950
arguments or facts and no fundamental change in the applicable
law.  Hall argues that Jones is merely seeking a "second bite"
at mandamus review after failing to timely file a petition for
a writ of mandamus following the trial court's denial of his
first motion for a summary judgment based on his claim of
State-agent immunity. 
After this Court denied Jones's first petition for a writ
of mandamus as untimely pursuant to Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.
App. P., Jones filed a "renewed" motion for a summary judgment
on November 21, 2012, in which he expressly adopted the
evidentiary submissions and the State-agent-immunity argument
that were originally submitted in support of his initial
motion for a summary judgment.  Jones noted in the "renewed"
motion for a summary judgment that, subsequent to the trial
court's denial of his initial motion for a summary judgment,
this Court had issued its decision in Ex parte Montgomery
County Board of Educucation, supra, in which, he points out,
the  "Alabama Supreme Court again upheld [an] educator's
entitlement to State-agent immunity protection against [a]
plaintiff's claims for negligent and/or wanton supervision of
students."   To the extent that Jones contends that the
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1120950
decision in Ex parte Montgomery County Board of Education
mandates a summary judgment in his favor based on State-agent
immunity, Jones has given too much weight to this Court's
decision in that case.  This Court's decision in Ex parte
Montgomery County Board of Education did not work a
fundamental change in the law of State-agent immunity as it
pertains to educators.  This Court simply applied well
established law to the particular facts of that case and
determined that the teacher in that case was entitled to
State-agent immunity.  Further, although Jones presented his
argument based on this Court's decision in Ex parte Montgomery
County Board of Education to the trial court for the first
time in his "renewed" motion for a summary judgment,  Jones
did not present to the trial court a new ground or argument in
support of his motion for summary judgment -- the basis for
the motion remained his claim of State-agent immunity. 
Rather, Jones simply presented the trial court with the same
argument, i.e., that he was entitled to State-agent immunity,
with a citation to additional and more recent authority. 
 Generally, "a court may reconsider its ruling on a
motion for summary judgment and may correct an erroneous
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1120950
ruling at any time before final judgment .... The number of
times a subsequent motion for summary judgment will be allowed
rests within the sound discretion of the judge before whom the
case is to be tried."  Food Serv. Distribs., Inc. v. Barber,
429 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1983).  However, the situation
presented here is unique because it involves the subsequent
filing  and denial of a motion for summary judgment based on
immunity grounds from which a petition for a writ of mandamus
was  taken, after a prior petition for a writ of mandamus
challenging a previously denied motion for a 
summary 
judgment,
based on the same State-agent immunity grounds, had been
determined by this Court to be untimely pursuant to Rule
21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.  Jones presented no new grounds,
argument, evidence, or change in the applicable law in support
of his "renewed" motion for a summary judgment.  To allow
Jones  to now petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
following the denial of the "renewed" motion for a summary
judgment, after this Court had determined that his previously
filed mandamus petition challenging the denial of his first
summary-judgment motion based on the same arguments and
grounds as the "renewed" motion for a summary judgment, would
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1120950
undermine the spirit and purpose of Rule 21(a)(3) and render
that rule meaningless.  In essence, Jones seeks a "second
bite" at appellate review of the denial of his summary-
judgment motion based on immunity grounds, having failed to
timely seek appellate review of the trial court's denial of
the initial motion for a summary judgment. Accordingly, we
conclude that Jones has failed to demonstrate that he has a
clear legal right to the relief sought, and we deny the
petition for a writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Murdock, J., dissents.
 
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).  
I agree that the petition for the writ of mandamus should
be denied.  I write to note the following.
The issue whether State-agent immunity applies may at
times rely heavily on the facts of the case.  Thus, the course
of discovery may reveal new evidence or factors that show that
a previously denied motion for a summary judgment was
premature.  A second or renewed motion for a summary judgment
may be necessary to present that evidence or those factors to
the trial court; the trial court, as noted in the main
opinion, is free to consider such a motion.  In that scenario,
I see no barrier to this Court's reviewing a second petition
for writ of mandamus challenging the denial of such second or
renewed motion, and I see nothing in the main opinion contrary
to that notion.
In the instant matter, the second or renewed motion for
a summary judgment raised no new significant factual or legal
arguments differing from the first motion: it was, for all
intents and purposes, the same motion.  The trial court's
denial was the same denial challenged in the previous untimely
petition for a writ of mandamus.  I do not believe that the
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petitioner has demonstrated that the trial court in this case
had the "imperative duty" to grant a summary-judgment motion
that, in essence, it had already considered and rejected.  I
thus agree that this Court is not required to address the
underlying merits of the instant petition.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
As the main opinion correctly notes: 
"'[A] court may reconsider its ruling on a motion
for summary judgment and may correct an erroneous
ruling at any time before final judgment .... The
number of times a subsequent motion for summary
judgment will be allowed rests within the sound
discretion of the judge before whom the case is to
be tried.'" 
___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Food Serv. Distribs., Inc. v.
Barber, 429 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1983)).  If, as explained
in the main opinion, a second motion for a summary judgment is
itself permissible, I see nothing in Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.,
that disallows a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking this
Court's review of the trial court's ruling on the permitted
motion.  On the contrary, the language of Rule 21 prescribes
the procedures by which that petition may be pursued.  
Furthermore, it is not as if we are concerned in this
case with some transient matter, such as a discovery deadline
or a trial setting, as to which the passage of time is likely
to make a difference.  Instead, we are dealing here with an
immunity defense that will persist and that falls within the
limited categories of cases in which we have determined that
it is important to make pretrial mandamus review available
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when a trial court has denied a motion to dismiss or for a
summary judgment in the face of such a defense.
For the foregoing reason, I would address the merits of
the petition; I therefore dissent.
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