Title: MILTON BROWN, III V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MILTON BROWN, III V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 37109 P.3d 52Case Number: 03-225Decided: 04/01/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
MILTON 
BROWN, III,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, 
D.J.

 
 
  
GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]          
Milton 
Brown III (Brown) appeals from the judgment and sentence of the District Court, 
First Judicial District, following a jury verdict convicting him of felony 
interference with a peace officer as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) 
(LexisNexis 2003).1  Brown assigns three errors:  (1) The trial court erred in admitting 
irrelevant, prejudicial testimony from prosecution witness Mary Love; (2) plain 
error occurred because the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of 
the crime, namely, the officer-victim was in the lawful performance of his 
official duties; and (3) the prosecutor elicited and argued impermissible victim 
impact testimony.

 
 

[¶2]          
We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
FACTS2

 
 
General

 
 

[¶3]          
The 
evidence adduced at trial showed the following events.  In the late night hours of December 14, 
2002, into the morning hours of December 15, 2002, the swing shift officers 
(4:15 p.m. to 2:45 a.m.) and the midnight shift officers (9:30 p.m. to 8:00 
a.m.) of the Cheyenne Police Department were extremely busy.  The majority of the swing shift was 
standing over to help the midnight shift because of the volume of disturbance 
calls.   There were many 
fights, a stabbing, intoxicated juveniles fleeing an accident scene, to name a 
few.  Around 3:40 a.m., December 15, 
2002, Officer Thomas Hood, working the midnight shift, received and responded to 
a call of a loud party at the Pershing Point apartments.  Upon Officer Hood's arrival at the 
apartments, he contacted two females and one male who were arguing with each 
other.  Officer Hood spoke to the 
older of the two women, Mary Love.  
Ms. Love told Officer Hood that people in the apartment above her were 
having a party and she wanted them to quiet down and one of those persons had 
tried to get into her apartment.  
Officer Hood told Ms. Love that he would go to the apartment above hers, 
contact those people, and have them quiet down. Because the police department 
was so busy, with many calls stacked, Officer Hood's intention was to quiet down 
the partying people, then leave to handle the many calls that were coming into 
the police department.  While 
speaking to Ms. Love, Officer Hood saw a male wearing an orange jersey and 
orange head-covering walking down the stairs of the apartment complex.  The male was directly in front of 
Officer Hood and the stairs were directly behind the male, so the male was in 
front of the stairwell.  The male, 
who was Brown, told Officer Hood, "You're not going up there.  My family is up there."  Officer Hood smelled "a very strong odor 
of alcoholic beverage" on Brown and noticed that Brown's eyes were "very 
bloodshot, watery."  Brown's speech 
was "very slurred."  Officer Hood 
believed Brown to be "very intoxicated."  
Officer Hood asked Brown if he lived there; Brown said no.  Officer Hood said to Brown, "Well, I'm 
going up there and contact the folks up there."   Brown replied, "Fuck you.  You're not going up there."  Officer Hood once more asked Brown if he 
lived in the apartment, and Brown said no.  
Officer Hood once more told Brown he was going up to contact the people 
upstairs.  Brown again said, "Fuck 
you."  Officer Hood then told Brown 
he needed to move out of his way, but Brown did not move.  Officer Hood went to step around Brown, 
and Brown yelled, "Fuck you."  
Officer Hood testified that he believed Brown was going to continue to be 
a problem and was interfering with his contacting the residents of the upstairs 
apartment to have them quiet down.  
Officer Hood told Brown he was under arrest and going to jail; Officer 
Hood moved toward Brown and grabbed his left hand.  As Officer Hood tried to put Brown into 
a wristlock, Brown spun around, grabbed Officer Hood by the waist and lifted him 
off the ground, and both men moved backwards.  Officer Hood's back struck a car and 
both men fell to the ground with Brown on top of Officer Hood. 

 
 

[¶4]          
Officer 
Rick Wood, who had arrived at the apartments a few minutes after Officer Hood 
had arrived, had seen Officer Hood talking to some people and began to talk to 
others nearby.  Officer Wood heard 
Brown's verbal abuse of Officer Hood, saw Officer Hood grab Brown's arm and 
Brown's physical reaction.  
According to Officer Wood's description, Brown grabbed Officer Hood in a 
bear hug, picked him off the ground, pushed him backwards several feet, and 
slammed him against a car.  Officer 
Wood ran to the men, grabbed Brown, and all three men went to the ground.  The two officers struggled to control 
Brown who was fighting them.  
Eventually, the officers subdued Brown.  When the police transported Brown in a 
patrol car to the detention center, Brown passed out and had to be awakened upon 
arrival at the detention center. 

 
 

[¶5]          
As we 
address the specific errors raised by Brown, we will set forth as necessary more 
specific facts which frame each issue.

 
 
 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
ISSUE 
ONE

 
 

[¶6]          
Whether 
the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the prosecution's witness Mary 
Love that before the police arrived at the apartments (1) Love had asked Brown's 
girlfriend, Tiffany Smith, to lower the volume of the music in her apartment and 
Smith had threatened to kick Love's ass and push her down the stairs; and (2) as 
Love returned to her own apartment after speaking with Smith, Brown had followed 
her and tried to force his way into her apartment.

 
 
 
 

Specific 
Facts on the Smith-Love Confrontation 

 
 

[¶7]          
In the 
prosecutor's opening statement to the jury, he previewed the expected testimony 
of witness Love.  Defense counsel 
did not object when the prosecutor told the jury that witness Love would testify 
that Smith threatened to "kick her ass" and push her down the stairs.  Defense counsel did not object when 
witness Love testified about Smith's threats.  

 
 
 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶8]          
When 
trial counsel does not object at trial to testimony later challenged on appeal, 
as in this case, the applicable standard of review is plain error, the three 
requirements of which are a clear record of the alleged error, demonstration of 
the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and proof that the 
challenging party has been denied a substantial right and he has been materially 
prejudiced as a result of that denial.  
Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶7, 49 P.3d 975, ¶7 (Wyo. 2002).  The parties here agree that we have a 
clear record of the alleged error but disagree on the presence of the rule's two 
other requirements.

 
 
 
 
Resolution

 
 

[¶9]          
Brown 
argues the Smith-Love confrontation evidence was irrelevant to Brown's later 
statements and actions toward Officer Hood which gave rise to Brown's 
prosecution, and, therefore, violated W.R.E. 402 (evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible).  While the State 
agrees that the Smith-Love confrontation evidence had little direct bearing on 
the ultimate issue before the jury  whether Brown was guilty of felony 
interference with a peace officer  the State argues the evidence was relevant, 
and therefore admissible, because it helped explain why the police were 
summoned, and it enhanced the natural development of the facts in the case.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 28, 31 
(Wyo. 1999), Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 1997).  Additionally, the State impliedly 
contends that Brown has failed to prove the denial of a substantial right and 
resulting material prejudice because Brown played no part in the Smith-Love 
confrontation and the evidence of that confrontation was a very minute part of 
the State's other strong evidence against Brown.

 
 

[¶10]      
We hold 
that Brown has not satisfied the second and third requirements of the plain 
error rule.

 
 
 
 

Specific 
Facts of the Brown-Love Confrontation

 
 

[¶11]      
In the 
prosecutor's opening statement to the jury, he also previewed Love's expected 
testimony that, as Love returned to her apartment after her confrontation with 
Smith, Brown and another man followed her and Brown tried to force his way into 
her apartment.  Defense counsel did 
not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's preview.   The prosecutor continued and then 
concluded his opening statement.  
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel orally moved in limine 
to exclude any testimony about the Brown-Love confrontation on relevancy and 
probative grounds under W.R.E. 404(b), 401, and 403.  The trial court initially reserved 
ruling until after defense counsel's opening statement, but when defense counsel 
informed the trial court he was reserving opening statement the trial court 
permitted the prosecutor to respond to defense counsel's liminal motion.  Contending that the Brown-Love 
confrontation was relevant and probative, the prosecutor argued that this 
evidence showed Brown's state of mind "right before" Brown's confrontation with 
Officer Hood and was "probative of what's going on, it all happened within a 
matter of minutes."  The trial court 
denied defense counsel's liminal motion. Defense counsel then moved for a 
mistrial, if Love testified about Brown's confrontation with her, claiming "this 
evidence is so prejudicial [and has no] probative value."  The trial court denied the mistrial 
motion.  During Love's direct 
testimony for the prosecution, Love testified about Brown's confrontation with 
her. 

 
 
 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶12]      
When 
this Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary ruling, the standard 
is:

 
 
"Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion."  
Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted).  We have described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound 
judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In 
the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination."  [Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).]  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such abuse.

 
 

Wilks, ¶19 
(quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2001)) (alterations in original).

 
 
 
 
Resolution

 
 

[¶13]      
Brown 
claims the Brown-Love confrontation evidence was irrelevant to Brown's later 
statements and actions toward Officer Hood which gave rise to Brown's 
prosecution and, therefore, violated W.R.E. 402 (evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible).  Additionally, 
Brown asserts that this evidence was impermissible character or uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) which the prosecutor used in closing 
argument to imply that Brown acted in conformity with his confrontational 
character when he confronted Officer Hood.  
Brown concludes his argument by stating such evidence was overwhelmingly 
prejudicial because any rational juror would be prejudiced against a man who 
tried to force his way into a woman's home.

 
 

[¶14]      
The 
State counters Brown's position on this allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling 
with several points.  The State 
first asserts the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) to show both 
Brown's intent or state of mind a short time before Brown's confrontation with 
Officer Hood and the absence of accident in light of Brown's claim that he 
accidentally stumbled into Officer Hood when the officer tried to execute a 
wristlock on Brown.  Wilson v. 
State, 14 P.3d 912, 918 (Wyo. 2000) (evidence of similar assaultive behavior 
admissible to show intent and refute claim of accident).  The State reasons that the evidence had 
probative value as it made more probable Brown's intentional assault on Officer 
Hood.  The State also contends that 
the prosecutor's closing argument reference to Brown's confrontation with Love 
when viewed in context of the entire closing argument was nothing more than a 
recap of the evidence and was not a call to convict Brown because of his bad 
character.

 
 

[¶15]      
Our 
study of the record reveals that Brown's defense counsel objected on relevancy 
grounds only and not on grounds of impermissible character evidence and made no 
cogent argument with respect to W.R.E. 404(b).  On appeal, Brown raises for the first 
time the ground of impermissible character evidence, but not under a plain error 
analysis.  We will not consider this 
late-raised issue.  At trial, in 
response to Brown's liminal motion to exclude the Brown-Love confrontation 
evidence, the prosecutor urged that the evidence showed Brown's state of mind 
minutes before his confrontation with Officer Hood and was probative of "what 
was going on" in the context of the Brown-Officer Hood confrontation.  After hearing the prosecutor's argument, 
the trial court ruled without comment, denying Brown's motion.  We believe it is fair to infer that the 
trial court accepted the prosecutor's reasoning. We hold that the trial court 
exercised sound judgment with regard to what was right under the circumstances 
based on objective criteria before it at the time.  We hold the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in making its admissibility determination in this 
instance.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE 
TWO

 
 

[¶16]      
Whether 
plain error occurred because the prosecution failed to prove Officer Hood was in 
the lawful performance of his official duties, an essential element of the crime 
charged.

 
 

[¶17]      
Brown 
maintains that 

 
 
[e]ven 
accepting Officer Hood's testimony in its entirety, there is no showing that 
Officer Hood was in the lawful performance of his official duties when he 
grabbed Mr. Brown by the arm and told him he was under arrest.  This is true because Officer Hood lacked 
any probable cause whatsoever to arrest Mr. Brown.

 
 
 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶18]      
Both 
Brown and the State correctly note that although Brown's counsel moved for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, Brown's 
counsel did not move for judgment of acquittal after the close of Brown's 
case-in-chief.  Consequently, the 
plain error requirements, referred to earlier in this opinion, apply in 
reviewing Brown's appellate issue of insufficiency of the evidence that Officer 
Hood lacked probable cause to arrest Brown in the initial phase of their 
interaction at the apartments.  
Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 (Wyo. 1999).  Also, we apply the familiar standard 
that we accept as true the prosecution's evidence, give to the prosecution those 
inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence, and do 
not consider the defendant's evidence in conflict with the prosecution's 
evidence and the inferences therefrom.  
See Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶44, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶44 (Wyo. 
2003), and Tillett, 637 P.2d  at 263.  "[O]ur only duty is to determine whether a quorum 
of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the 
same result as the jury actually did."  
Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resolution

 
 

[¶19]      
Brown 
acknowledges that Officer Hood, as a peace officer under Wyoming law, may arrest a 
person without a warrant when, among other situations, any criminal offense is 
being committed in the officer's presence by the person to be arrested.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-102(b)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003).  Brown also acknowledges that 
a person commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes 
with a peace officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 
2003).3  An officer's belief that the criminal 
offense of misdemeanor interference has been committed in his presence must be 
based on "reasonable grounds."  
Simmons v. State, 712 P.2d 887, 889 (Wyo. 1986).  We have used the term "reasonable 
grounds" interchangeably with the term "probable cause."  Id.  "Probable cause exists when at the 
moment the arrest is made the facts and circumstances within the officer's 
knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient 
to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused has committed or is 
committing an offense."  Id.  The facts and circumstances within 
the officer's knowledge need not rise to the level of proving guilt or even to 
the level of prima facie evidence of guilt for probable cause for an arrest to 
arise.  Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 518 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶20]      
In the 
face of these review principles and substantive law, the viscera of Brown's 
argument are that although Brown verbally abused he did not make physical 
contact with or threatening gestures toward Officer Hood, and that the totality 
of his behavior did not constitute unlawful obstruction, impedance or 
interference with Officer Hood as that officer was investigating and handling 
the disturbance call.

 
 

[¶21]      
The 
State's counter to Brown's position notes that Officer Hood was lawfully 
performing his official duty in responding to and trying to quickly investigate 
and settle the disturbance complaint at the apartments; Brown unilaterally and 
with verbal abuse inserted himself into Officer Hood's conversation with Love; 
Brown declared several times that Officer Hood was not going upstairs to talk 
with Smith and the others about the disturbance complaint; and Brown was 
physically positioned between Officer Hood and the stairs.  Our study of the record reveals that 
Officer Hood observed that Brown was inebriated and was behaving and speaking in 
an aggressive manner, and Brown's behavior was preventing Officer Hood from 
timely handling and settling the disturbance complaint and returning to service 
to handle the many other calls coming into the police department at that 
time.  Both Brown and the State 
acknowledge that this Court has reviewed this genre of interference cases 
before.  In both Newton v. 
State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Wyo. 1985), and Tillett, 637 P.2d  at 
264, this Court reviewed relevant authority and noted that verbal abuse alone 
may become sufficient to constitute unlawful interference where its intensity or 
the totality of several acts is such as to amount to an interference with an 
officer in the performance of his duty.  
We hold that Brown's abusive language, several declarations that Officer 
Hood was not going upstairs to handle the disturbance complaint, and the 
reasonable and fair inferences to be drawn from such declarations, the physical 
position of Brown between the stairs and Officer Hood, the inebriated condition, 
and the reasonable and fair inferences to be drawn from such condition, and 
Officer Hood's being delayed in handling the disturbance call and returning to 
other service because of Brown's behavior provided Officer Hood with reasonable 
grounds/probable cause to believe that Brown was unlawfully interfering with the 
officer's lawful performance of his duty.  
The criminality of Brown's behavior toward Officer Hood was for the trier 
of fact to decide.  We hold the 
evidence sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Brown guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt as charged.

 
 
 
 

ISSUE 
THREE

 
 

[¶22]      
Whether 
the prosecutor elicited and argued impermissible victim impact 
testimony.

 
 
 
 
Specific 
Facts

 
 

[¶23]      
Brown 
identified as plain error two comments made by the prosecutor in opening 
statement, one that Love would testify she was scared and the other that Officer 
Hood's fear factor increased during his altercation with Brown.  Brown identifies as plain error4 three times during Love's direct 
testimony when she testified she was scared when Brown and others came to her 
apartment.  Brown identifies one 
time when Love testified she was nervous being at the trial, but defense 
counsel's objection was sustained by the trial court.

 
 
 
 
Resolution

 
 

[¶24]      
In what 
may be fairly characterized as extremely shallow bordering on incogency, Brown's 
argument lumps the prosecutor's two comments in opening statement and Love's 
testimony she was scared and nervous into a victim impact category and baldly 
claims they had no probative value and were extremely inflammatory.  The prosecutor's opening statement 
comments did not constitute victim impact testimony.  The trial court instructed the jury that 
counsel statements are not evidence, and we presume the jury followed that 
instruction.  Brown weakly asserts 
that Love was a victim for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-101(a) (LexisNexis 
2003), a provision concerning victim impact testimony; the State does not weigh 
in on the point.  We are skeptical 
of Brown's assertion but need not decide the point.  The trial court sustained Brown's 
objection to Love's "nervous" testimony, so it was not considered by the jury 
under the trial court's jury instructions.   That leaves for plain error review 
Love's "scare" testimony.  Our study 
of the record reveals that such testimony was of so little substance in light of 
what the trial was all about, Brown's alleged interference with Officer Hood, 
that it had no possible effect on the outcome of the trial.  We hold that Brown has not proved a 
substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially 
prejudiced by those three small instances of Love's testimony.  We find no plain 
error.

 
 

[¶25]      
In 
summary, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting 
Love's testimony, plain error did not occur in the sufficiency of the evidence, 
and plain error did not occur in the prosecutor's opening statement or in Love's 
testimony that she was scared and nervous.

 
 

[¶26]      
We 
affirm the judgment and conviction in all respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This 
statute reads:  "(b) A person who 
intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace 
officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years."

 
 

2In 
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court accepts as 
true the evidence of the prosecution, does not consider the evidence of the 
defendant in conflict with the prosecution's evidence, and gives to the 
prosecution those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the 
prosecution's evidence.  Tillett 
v. State, 637 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1981). 

3The 
State's brief informs the Court that § 
9.04.020, a Cheyenne municipal ordinance, makes it unlawful 
for any person, in any manner, be it physical or verbal, to interfere with or 
otherwise obstruct any city officer engaged in the performance or discharge of 
his duties.

4Brown's 
counsel did not object.