Title: Gerald W. Crews v. Otto M. McLing and Sandy M. McLing

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/04/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
____________________
1071479
____________________
Gerald W. Crews
v.
Otto M. McLing and Sandy M. McLing
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-06-19)
____________________
1071691
____________________
Crews Homes, Inc.
v.
Otto M. McLing and Sandy M. McLing
2
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-07-191)
STUART, Justice.
Otto M. McLing and his wife Sandy M. McLing sued Gerald
W. Crews, the president of Crews Homes, Inc. ("CHI"), in the
Elmore Circuit Court, alleging, among other things, that Crews
had negligently delivered and installed on the McLings'
property in Wetumpka a mobile home purchased from CHI in May
2005.  Approximately 16 months after filing the action against
Crews, and while the case against Crews was pending, the
McLings commenced a separate action, also in the Elmore
Circuit Court, against CHI, alleging that neither CHI nor the
CHI employees who delivered and installed the mobile home were
properly certified by the Alabama Manufactured Housing
Commission ("AMHC").  The McLings argued that their contract
with CHI was therefore void and that they were entitled to a
refund of the $79,863.75 they had paid for the mobile home.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
McLings in their action against CHI and awarded them the
entire $79,863.75 they sought, plus interest and costs.  The
separate case against Crews proceeded to trial, at the end of
which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the McLings for
1071479, 1071691
3
$67,235.  Both Crews and CHI appeal the judgments entered
against them.  In appeal no. 1071479, we affirm the judgment
entered against Crews, and, in appeal no. 1071691, we reverse
the judgment entered against CHI.
I.
On May 25, 2005, Otto McLing purchased, for $79,863.75,
from the CHI sales lot in Montgomery a mobile home
manufactured by Champion Home Builders Company.  As part of
the transaction, CHI agreed to deliver the mobile home to Otto
and Sandy's property in Wetumpka and to install it upon
delivery.  CHI employees Terry Mosely and Jerry Gordon
delivered the mobile home to the McLings' property the day
after the purchase; however, during the delivery the mobile
home was damaged when it struck a tree limb.  McLing also
alleges that the mobile home was placed in the wrong location
on his property and that he had to install a new septic tank
for it as a result.
Mosely, Gordon, and other CHI personnel worked on
installing the mobile home on Thursday, May 26, and Friday,
May 27; however, at the end of the day on May 27, only one-
half of the mobile home was "set" and the other half was still
1071479, 1071691
4
approximately two to three feet away from the half that was
"set."  To protect the mobile home from the elements, the
workers placed a tarp across the top of the mobile home before
leaving for the weekend.  Because it was Memorial Day weekend,
they did not return to the McLings' property until Tuesday,
May 31, at which time it was discovered that the tarp had
failed to protect the interior of the mobile home from the
thunderstorms that occurred over the weekend and that the
walls, floors, and ceiling of the mobile home were wet.  Mold
and mildew grew inside the mobile home as a result.
CHI subsequently worked to repair the damage to the
mobile home and to complete the installation; however, it did
not finish working on the mobile home until late August.  The
McLings did not move into the mobile home at that time,
however, because they still were not satisfied with its
condition.  The McLings had also made complaints to the
manufacturer, and, in January 2006, representatives from
Champion worked on the mobile home to repair certain
manufacturer's defects.  The McLings allege that Champion
inflicted additional damage upon the mobile home during that
repair process.  After Champion and CHI finished working on
1071479, 1071691
5
the mobile home, the McLings still were not satisfied with its
condition, and they accordingly continued to make repairs and
upgrades, using their own money and efforts.  The McLings
finally moved into the mobile home in December 2006.
On January 17, 2006, the McLings sued Champion and Crews
in the Elmore Circuit Court, alleging, fraud, breach of
warranty, negligence, and wantonness.  On July 31, 2006, the
McLings settled their claims against Champion for $62,500, and
Champion was dismissed from the case.  Crews thereafter
amended his answer to claim a setoff based on the pro tanto
settlement entered into to by Champion and the McLings.  The
McLings responded by moving the trial court to enter a partial
summary judgment holding that Crews was not entitled to such
a setoff and asking the trial court to bar Crews from even
referencing at trial the McLings' settlement with Champion.
On April 9, 2008, the trial court granted the McLings' motion
and entered the following order:
"This case came before the court for a pretrial
conference and a motion hearing.  Pending before the
court was the [McLings'] motion for partial summary
judgment or, in the alternative, [the McLings']
first motion in limine.  The issue presented to the
court is whether the [McLings'] settlement with
Champion Home Builders is available to [Crews] as a
setoff against any recovery the [McLings] make from
1071479, 1071691
Although CHI moved the trial court to consolidate the
1
case against it with the McLings' case against Crews, the
trial court never formally did so.
6
[Crews].  Upon consideration of the documents filed
and the arguments of counsel, the [McLings'] motion
be and hereby is granted.  The court finds that
there was no 'single, indivisible injury' caused by
[Crews] and Champion.  Based on the testimony of
[Crews's] own expert, Michael Bazzell, the damages
caused by setup and delivery of the home can readily
be separated from the damages caused by the
manufacturer of the home.  [Crews is] prohibited
from 
making 
any 
reference 
to 
the 
[McLings']
settlement with Champion in the presence of the jury
or the jury venire."
On the same date the trial court entered the above order,
it also entered a summary judgment in favor of the McLings in
the separate case they had filed against CHI on May 23, 2007.1
In that case, the McLings alleged that CHI had misrepresented
that both it and its employee Mosely, who drove the truck that
delivered the mobile home to their property, held the
certifications required by the AMHC to deliver and install
mobile homes.  The McLings argued that their contract with CHI
was void because, they said, neither was certified, and they
further argued that they were entitled to a refund of their
purchase price as a result.  CHI maintained that both it and
Mosely held the proper AMHC certifications and submitted
documentary evidence of the certificates they held as well as
1071479, 1071691
7
two affidavits from Jim Sloan, administrator of the AMHC and
the author of its regulations, in which he swore that both CHI
and Mosely held the necessary certifications to deliver and
install mobile homes.  Both the McLings and CHI thereafter
moved for a summary judgment, and, on April 9, 2008, the trial
court entered a summary judgment in favor of the McLings by
way of the following order:
"1.  The affidavits of Jim Sloan be and hereby
are stricken on the grounds that Mr. Sloan may not
provide oral testimony to interpret unambiguous
regulations.  See State v. Jackson Securities & Inv.
Co., 243 Ala. 83, 8 So. 2d 573 (1942).  In view of
the court's ruling on this motion to strike, the
court finds it unnecessary to address the other
grounds alleged by the [McLings] in support of their
motions to strike Mr. Sloan's testimony.
"2.  The court finds that Crews Homes, Inc.,
contracted to deliver and install the [McLings']
mobile home, and that it was not licensed to do so
as required by § 24-5-32, Ala. Code 1975, and the
regulations of the Alabama Manufactured Housing
Commission.
"3.  The court further finds that Terry Mosely,
who transported the home, was not a certified
installer and was not under written contract with a
licensed manufacturer or a licensed retailer as
required 
by 
the 
regulations 
of 
the 
Alabama
Manufactured Housing Commission.
"4.  Based on the foregoing the court finds that
the [McLings'] contract with Crews Homes, Inc., is
null and void, and that the [McLings] are entitled
1071479, 1071691
8
to a refund of their purchase price, together with
interest at the rate of 6%.
"5.  The [McLings'] motion for summary judgment
filed on or about July 17, 2007, be and hereby is
granted.  [CHI's] motion for summary judgment filed
March 11, 2008, be and hereby is denied."
After the summary judgment was entered in favor of the
McLings in their case against CHI, the McLings moved the trial
court to prohibit Crews from referring to that judgment or the
ordered refund during the upcoming trial on their claims
against him.  On April 21, 2008, the trial court granted that
motion by docket entry, noting that Crews was "[n]ot to
discuss prior judgment and refund."  The McLings' case against
Crews was also called for trial on that date.  During the
course of the trial, the McLings agreed to dismiss all the
claims they had asserted against Crews except the negligence
claim, and, on April 24, 2008, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the McLings and against Crews for $67,235.  Crews
moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.;
however, that motion was denied, and the appeal Crews
subsequently filed with this Court was docketed as appeal no.
1071479.  
1071479, 1071691
Michael T. Brunner, Annotation, Recovery Back of Money
2
Paid to Unlicensed Person Required by Law to Have Occupational
or Business License or Permit to Make Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d
637, 642-44 (1976).
9
On May 6, 2008, CHI also moved the trial court, pursuant
to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or vacate the
summary judgment entered against it.  On May 23, 2008, after
that motion was filed, but before a hearing was held on it,
this Court released its opinion in Fausnight v. Perkins, 994
So. 2d 912 (Ala. 2008), in which we reversed a summary
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff-homebuyers who had
instituted an action seeking a refund of the $195,359.83 they
had paid for their house because the builder of that house was
not properly licensed.  We stated in Fausnight:
"On the same bases as articulated in the above-
referenced annotation from American Law Reports,[2]
we conclude that the fact that the home builder in
this case was not licensed, standing alone, is not
a sufficient basis on which to require [the builder]
to return the funds he has received from the
[homebuyers].  We note as to the first four reasons
stated in that annotation that Alabama's statute
contains 
no 
provision 
expressly 
requiring 
an
unlicensed home builder to refund moneys paid to it.
To read the statute as containing such a provision
would be to read into the statute a private cause of
action for homeowners that easily could have been,
but was not, expressed by the legislature in the
statute.  The statute expressly deprives the
unlicensed home builder of the right to use Alabama
courts to collect unpaid moneys otherwise owed it;
1071479, 1071691
10
it does not purport to provide homeowners with a
cause of action to obtain refunds of amounts paid to
unlicensed home builders."
994 So. 2d at 921.  On June 11, 2008, CHI filed a "supplement"
to its previous Rule 59 motion calling the trial court's
attention to Fausnight and arguing for the first time that the
McLings had no legal basis upon which to claim a refund of
their purchase price.  The McLings filed an objection, arguing
that CHI had failed to raise this argument previously and
that, because the argument had not been made before the
summary judgment was entered, it could not be raised in the
Rule 59 motion.  They also argued that CHI's "supplement" was
untimely because all posttrial motions filed pursuant to Rule
59 are to be filed within 30 days of judgment.  The trial
court denied CHI's Rule 59 motion, and CHI then filed this
appeal, docketed as appeal no. 1071691.
II.
Appeal no. 1071479 
Crews argues that the judgment entered on the jury
verdict against him should be reversed for three reasons.
First, he argues that he was entitled, as a matter of law, to
a setoff in the amount of the pro tanto settlement entered
1071479, 1071691
11
into by Champion and the McLings because, he argues, he and
Champion were joint tortfeasors inasmuch as their wrongful
acts combined to cause a single injury –– a reduction in the
value of the McLings' mobile home.  Therefore, Crews argues,
the trial court erred by granting the McLings' motion for a
partial summary judgment and holding that he was not entitled
to a setoff.  "We review a summary judgment and all questions
of law de novo."  Pinkerton Sec. & Investigation Servs., Inc.
v. Chamblee, 961 So. 2d 97, 101 (Ala. 2006) (citing Smith v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342 (Ala. 2006)).
In support of his argument that he was entitled to a
setoff, Crews cites Ex parte Goldsen, 783 So. 2d 53, 56 (Ala.
2000), in which this Court stated:
"'It is a universal rule that a plaintiff, although
entitled to full compensation for an injury, is
entitled to only one recovery for a single injury
caused by two or more tortfeasors.'  Shepherd v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 614 So. 2d 1048, 1051 (Ala.
1993); see also Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704
(Ala. 1987).  In those cases where one tortfeasor
settles, we have allowed the nonsettling tortfeasor
to have the jury award reduced by the amount of any
pro tanto settlement. Campbell v. Williams, 638 So.
2d 804 (Ala. 1994)."
The McLings, however, argue that the rule cited in Ex parte
Goldsen is inapplicable because, they argue, Crews and
1071479, 1071691
12
Champion were not joint tortfeasors.  The McLings argue that
each damaged the mobile home at different times and it is
possible to identify and separate the specific damage caused
by each of them.  In support of this argument, the McLings
rely on Ex parte Martin, 598 So. 2d 1381 (Ala. 1992), in which
this Court considered a judgment entered against an insurance
company alleged to have fraudulently induced the plaintiff to
replace her Medicare supplemental policy with that company's
inferior policy.  After a $300,000 judgment was entered
against the insurance company, it petitioned this Court for a
writ of mandamus arguing that it was entitled to a setoff
based on a $225,000 settlement the plaintiff had entered into
with a codefendant insurance company that had allegedly
committed an identical fraud upon the plaintiff, albeit 14
months after the other insurance company.  This Court declined
to grant the petition and issue the writ, stating:
"We hold that, as a matter of law, non-joint tort-
feasor defendants whose acts do not combine to cause
one single injury cannot claim a set-off as a matter
of law of any amount received by the plaintiff in
settlement 
with 
other 
non-joint 
tort-feasor
defendants 
based 
on 
distinct 
acts 
of 
those
defendants.
"The second issue raised by the petitioners is
whether they are entitled to a satisfaction of the
1071479, 1071691
13
judgment on the theory that to require them to pay
the full $300,000 would result in a double recovery
for [the plaintiff] for a single injury.  However,
we do not believe that [the plaintiff] has alleged
a 'single' injury.   She claimed to have suffered
the humiliation, mental anguish, and embarrassment
as a result of the settling defendants' conduct in
April 1986, and she claimed to have suffered the
same type of injury as a result of the petitioners'
conduct in February 1985.  Because the actions of
the defendants did not combine to cause a single
injury, we cannot say that [the plaintiff] has
received double compensation.
"While, in cases such as this, evidence of the
existence 
of 
similar 
claims 
against 
multiple
defendants who acted separately in time and manner
may be probative on the issue of the amount of
damage attributable to each defendant, the question
whether testimony concerning the actual settlement
will be allowed is, by necessity, within the trial
court's discretion and, therefore, would not be
reviewable by a writ of mandamus when the right to
appeal exists.
"We have considered this petition because the
trial 
court 
had 
denied 
a 
set-off 
where 
the
petitioners claimed the law required it.  We now
hold that the law did not require a set-off.
Because codefendants who are not joint tort-feasors
are not entitled to a set-off of the settlement
amount, the petitioners have failed to show that
they have a 'clear legal right' to have their
judgment reduced by the amount of the settlement;
therefore, we deny the petition for the writ of
mandamus."
598 So. 2d at 1385.
We must determine, therefore, whether Champion and Crews
were in fact joint tortfeasors so that Crews would be entitled
1071479, 1071691
14
to a setoff based on the settlement entered into by the
McLings and Champion.  The answer to that question in turn
hinges on whether their actions combined to cause a single
injury.  The trial court held that there was no "single,
indivisible injury" and cited the deposition testimony of
Crews's own expert, Michael Bazzell, in support of that
holding.  Bazzell testified as follows in that deposition:
"Q:
And what you have put down here on your report
on plaintiff's exhibit #702 are things that in
your judgment were related to setup of the
[mobile] home?
"A:
Yes.
"Q:
And not related to the manufacture of the home?
"A:
Correct.
"Q:
In other words, this is not a situation where
it's just totally impossible to go in there and
sort out or separate the manufacturing problems
from the setup items?  It's not impossible to
do that, is it?
"A:
No.
"Q:
Have you had cases where you felt that was in
fact the case, you just couldn't sort them out,
or can you always sort them out?
"A:
You pretty much can always."
The McLings' expert, Randall Chesser, also testified that the
estimated cost to repair only the problems specifically
1071479, 1071691
Crews also argues that, even if it is possible to
3
separate the damage to the mobile home caused by Crews from
the damage caused by Champion, it was impossible for the
McLings to state what percentage of the mental anguish they
suffered was attributable to each defendant; therefore, Crews
argues, that mental anguish should accordingly be viewed as a
single indivisible injury, and Crews and Champion should be
considered joint tortfeasors on that basis.  However, Crews
did not make this argument until after judgment was entered;
therefore, it has not been preserved for appellate review.
See Williford v. Emerton, 935 So. 2d 1155 (Ala. 2004) (holding
that an argument made for the first time in a posttrial motion
was not preserved for appellate review).  The McLings argue
that this argument is inconsistent with Ex parte Martin,
supra, and Torsch v. McLeod, 665 So. 2d 934 (Ala. 1995).
15
attributable to installation and setup was $14,200, further
indicating that it was possible to separate the damage done by
Crews from the manufacturer's defects and damage done by
Champion in repairing those defects.  In light of this
evidence, the trial court's holding that Crews was not
entitled to a setoff because there was no single indivisible
injury is due to be affirmed.3
Crews next argues that he was wrongfully prohibited from
cross-examining the McLings about actions of Champion that may
have contributed to the McLings' mental anguish.  In support
of this argument, he cites multiple cases standing for the
proposition that a defendant is entitled to question a
plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries, including
1071479, 1071691
16
mental-anguish damages, about other conditions or injuries
that the plaintiff has suffered that might, in fact, have been
the actual source of the injury in question.  See, e.g.,
Lassie v. Progressive Ins. Co., 655 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala.
1995) (holding that the trial court properly permitted the
defendant to question the plaintiff about other conditions
that might be the true source of his injury).
The McLings do not dispute the correctness of the legal
principle that forms the basis for Crews's argument; however,
they contend that his argument is nevertheless without merit
because, they say, the trial court never prevented Crews from
asking the McLings whether Champion's actions contributed to
their mental anguish.  They note that Crews has not cited any
specific ruling in which the trial court limited Crews's
cross-examination of the McLings in this regard, and they
further note that the trial court's April 9, 2008, order
stated only that "[t]he defendants are prohibited from making
any reference to the plaintiffs' settlement with Champion
...."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the McLings argue, although
the trial court prevented Crews from referencing their
settlement with Champion, it did not prohibit Crews from
1071479, 1071691
17
asking the McLings about damage to their home caused by
Champion and any mental anguish they may have suffered as a
result of that damage.
Furthermore, the McLings argue, Crews in fact asked Otto
McLing about other possible sources of his mental anguish
during the trial, as evidenced by the following transcript of
his cross-examination:
"Q:
One more thing, Mr. McLing.  I think you
testified earlier that you suffered a great
deal 
of 
annoyance 
and 
disappointment 
and
inconvenience resulting from this lawsuit; is
that right?
"A:
Yes, sir.
"Q:
Was there anything else going on in your life
that could have also caused inconvenience,
disappointment, or annoyance?
"A:
Not at that time I don't believe.
"
Q:
Not at this time?
"A:
No, sir.
"Q:
Not at any time when you filed this lawsuit?
"A:
No, sir."
An off-the-record discussion was held immediately following
this testimony; however, the testimony quoted above was not
stricken, and there is no indication that the trial court
1071479, 1071691
18
prevented Crews from continuing to pursue that line of
questioning.  Because it is not clear that the trial court
prohibited Crews from asking the McLings whether a portion of
the mental anguish they claimed to have suffered was
attributable to Champion, much less that the trial court
exceeded its discretion by doing so, see Kingsley v.
Sachitano, 783 So. 2d 824, 827 (Ala. 2000) ("It is settled
that decisions concerning evidentiary matters are left to the
discretion of the trial judge ...."),  Crews is not entitled
to relief on this argument.
Crews's final argument in appeal no. 1071479 is that the
trial court wrongfully precluded him from presenting evidence
showing that CHI, in the separate action the McLings had filed
against it, had been ordered to refund the McLings the
$79,863.75 that they paid for their mobile home, plus interest
and costs.  Crews argues that the judgment entered against CHI
fully compensated the McLings for any injuries they suffered
and that the subsequent judgment entered against him in this
case should have been barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The only cases cited by Crews in support of this argument are
Hughes v. Allenstein, 514 So. 2d 858 (Ala. 1987), and
1071479, 1071691
19
Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala.
1990), which are both cited to illustrate the elements of res
judicata.  
The McLings argue that Crews waived this argument because
he never raised it in the trial court.  See, e.g., Imperial
Crown Marketing Corp. v. Wright, 560 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala.
1989) ("Res judicata is an affirmative defense and if it is
not raised in the trial court, it is deemed to have been
waived.").  The record supports the McLings' assertion that
Crews never raised the issue of the applicability of the
doctrine of res judicata in the trial court, and we
accordingly cannot consider the merits of Crews's argument in
this regard.  See Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409,
410 (Ala. 1992) ("This Court cannot consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal; rather, our review is restricted
to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.")
(citing Rodriguez-Ramos v. J. Thomas Williams, Jr., M.D.,
P.C., 580 So. 2d 1326 (Ala. 1991)).
III.
Appeal no. 1071691
1071479, 1071691
The McLings argue that CHI has not properly raised the
4
issue whether the evidence before the trial court was
sufficient to establish as a matter of law that CHI and Mosely
were not properly certified.  We disagree.  CHI has clearly
articulated its arguments on this issue on pages 21-29 of its
appellate brief and, in its statement of the standard of
review, cites Jefferson County Commission v. ECO Preservation
Services, L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 126 (Ala. 2000), for the
proposition that this Court must review "'whether the evidence
before the [trial] court made out a genuine issue of material
fact.'"  (Quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860,
862 (Ala. 1988).)
20
CHI makes essentially three arguments in this appeal: (1)
that the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law
that CHI and Mosely did not hold the certifications required
by the AMHC for delivering and installing the McLings' mobile
home; (2) that the trial court erred by excluding the two
affidavits of AMHC administrator Jim Sloan in which he
indicated that CHI and Mosely were both properly certified to
deliver and install the McLings' mobile home; and (3) that the
trial court erred by failing to apply this Court's decision in
Fausnight to this case.  Because we agree that the evidence
before the trial court was insufficient to establish as a
matter of law that CHI and Mosely were not properly certified,
we reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court and
pretermit discussion of the other arguments raised by CHI.4
See Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402, 403 (Ala.
1071479, 1071691
21
1996) ("A summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.").  
We first consider the evidence indicating whether CHI was
properly licensed to install the McLings' mobile home.
Section 24-5-32(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a]ll
installers of manufactured homes and manufactured buildings
must be certified by the [AMHC] to install such structures."
The legislature, in § 24-4A-3, Ala. Code 1975, authorized the
AMHC to promulgate the rules necessary to fulfill its
purposes, and, pursuant to that authority, the AMHC has
adopted a rule providing that a "certified installer" is any
"person, firm or corporation certified by the [AMHC] to
install a manufactured home or manufactured building."  Rule
535-X-12-.02(2), Ala. Admin. Code (Ala. Manufactured Housing
Comm'n).  An installation certificate can be obtained by
successfully completing an installer's course conducted by the
AMHC, passing a written or an oral test, and then completing
and filing the AMHC application form, which is submitted to
the AMHC along with the appropriate certification fee.  Rules
535-X-12-.03(2) and (3), Ala. Admin. Code (Ala. Manufactured
1071479, 1071691
22
Housing Comm'n).  The McLings argue that the trial court
correctly determined that CHI was not licensed to install
their mobile home because an installation certificate was
never issued in CHI's corporate name; rather, the only
installation certificate produced in this case, certificate
number 109, was issued in Crews's individual name.  The
McLings argue that Rule 535-X-12-.02(2) clearly indicates that
a certificate can be issued to any "person, firm or
corporation" and that a corporation in the business of
installing mobile homes, like CHI, cannot therefore operate
under the installation certificate of one of its officers or
employees.
CHI, however, argues that it is a certified installer
even though the installation certificate it claims to operate
under was issued in Crews's name.  In support of this
argument, CHI submitted to the trial court the official
"application for installer certification" form that it filed
with the AMHC.  The first item of information requested on
that application is the "name of applicant (person or
company)."  The application form submitted to the trial court
by CHI lists the applicant in this case as "Crews Homes,
1071479, 1071691
Rule 535-X-15-.03, Ala. Admin. Code (Ala. Manufactured
5
Housing 
Comm'n), 
provides 
that 
"to 
obtain 
licensure
manufacturers, retailers, and installers must hold a valid
bond and general liability insurance coverage ...."
We further note that Rule 535-X-12-.03(3) provides that
6
"[e]ach 
applicant 
[for 
installer 
certification] 
shall
satisfactorily complete an installer's course conducted by the
[AMHC] and pass a written or oral test prior to being issued
a certification to install manufactured homes ...."  Clearly,
a corporation can fulfill this requirement only through its
employees or officers.
23
Inc./Gerald W. Crews."  The next line states "if this is a
firm or corp. list name of officer to be certified" and
specifically requests that the person listed be the "same as
[the] principal on bond."   (Emphasis added.)  The official
5
AMHC application form therefore indicates, CHI argues, that if
a corporation applies for certification, that certification
will be issued in the name of the officer listed as the
principal on the corporation's bond.   In light of this
6
evidence, we agree with CHI that there is, at least, a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether it was properly certified
by the AMHC as a mobile-home installer.  The trial court
accordingly erred by holding, as a matter of law, that it was
not. 
We next consider the evidence indicating whether Mosely
was properly certified to transport the McLings' mobile home.
1071479, 1071691
24
Rule 535-X-12-.03(1), Ala. Admin. Code (Ala. Manufactured
Housing Comm'n), requires that "transporters of manufactured
homes or manufactured buildings who are not under written
contract with a licensed manufacturer or licensed retailer
must be a certified installer with the [AMHC]."  It is
undisputed in this case that Mosely had completed AMHC
training and held what is referred to by the AMHC as an
"installation certificate of training."  Mosely's certificate
of training states on its face that it is "not an installer
certification" but that "this trained worker will be working
with certified installer Gerald Crews, certification number,
109."  The McLings argue that under the plain language of Rule
535-X-12-.03(1), Mosely, the driver of the truck delivering
their mobile home, was required to be "a certified installer,"
that is, to hold his own installation certificate.  CHI argues
that it was sufficient that its employee Mosely held an
"installation 
certificate 
of 
training" 
because 
that
certificate expressly authorized him to work under the
direction of CHI/Crews, a certified installer, and he was in
fact operating under Crews's direction when he delivered the
McLings' mobile home.  We agree with CHI that the evidence in
1071479, 1071691
25
the record is at least sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mosely was properly certified.
Besides Mosely's "installation certificate of training"
itself, that evidence also includes Rule 533-X-12-.02(4), Ala.
Admin. Code (Ala. Manufactured Housing Comm'n), which provides
that "[t]o be a certified installer a person, firm or
corporation must maintain a minimum of one driver/installer
who possesses a current Certificate of Training from the
[AMHC]."  It is implicit in this rule that there are drivers
who hold only a certificate of training.  The trial court
accordingly erred by holding as a matter of law that Mosely
did not hold the necessary certification to deliver the
McLings' mobile home.  Because it has not been established by
substantial evidence that CHI and Mosely did not hold the
proper AMHC certifications to deliver and install the McLings'
mobile home, the summary judgment entered against CHI is due
to be reversed.  All other arguments raised by CHI are
accordingly pretermitted.
IV.
In appeal no. 1071479, Crews appealed the $67,235
judgment that the trial court entered on the jury's verdict
1071479, 1071691
26
against him and in favor of the McLings.  We hereby affirm
that judgment.  In appeal no. 1071691, CHI appealed the
summary judgment entered against it.  That judgment is hereby
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
1071479 –– AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents (writing to follow).
1071691 –– REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.