Title: State v. Pone

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

892 P.2d 455 (1995) 76 Hawai`i 262 STATE of Hawai`i, Respondent-Appellee, v. John G. PONE, Petitioner-Appellant. No. 16081. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. April 6, 1995. *456 Theodore Y.H. Chinn, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, Honolulu, for petitioner-appellant John G. Pone. Steven H.S. Wong, Deputy Pros. Atty., on the briefs, Honolulu, for respondent-appellee State of Hawai`i. Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. LEVINSON, Justice. On January 23, 1992, following a bench trial in the District Court of the First Circuit, the petitioner-appellant John G. Pone was convicted of criminal property damage in the fourth degree, a petty misdemeanor, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-823 (1985), for having intentionally damaged the front door of the complainant's apartment without his consent. Pone was sentenced to a fine of $25.00 and ordered to assume the cost of repairing the door. He appealed the conviction on the grounds (1) that the district court had erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case, pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) 29(a) (1981),[1] and (2) that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was insufficient as a matter of law to support the district court's judgment of conviction. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed Pone's conviction in a published opinion. State v. Pone, No. 16081, slip op., 1994 WL 14010 (Haw.Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1994). On January 31, 1994, Pone filed an application for a writ of certiorari with this court, asserting that "the ICA gravely erred in holding that in a criminal prosecution for criminal property damage which defines `consent' as an element of the offense, a presumption exists that the person whose property was allegedly damaged would not consent to the damage unless the defendant introduces evidence that consent was given." Because a portion of the ICA's decision is obviously inconsistent with this court's case law regarding the relationship between legal presumptions and improper burden shifting, we granted certiorari on February 4, 1994. See HRS § 602-59(b) (1985). Despite the ICA's partially erroneous analysis, and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Prior to the commencement of trial[2] on March 17, 1992, the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) orally charged Pone as follows: Pone represented to the court that he understood the charge and entered a plea of not guilty. Other than the testimony of the investigating police officer, who confirmed the nature of the property damage at issue, the respondent-appellee State of Hawai`i's (prosecution's) case consisted of the testimony of the "victim," Kenneth Townsend. Townsend testified as follows: On January 22, 1992, he owned and resided in an apartment located at 417 Namahana Street, in the City and County of Honolulu. He was alone in the apartment watching television in his bedroom when he heard a series of "bangings" on the locked front door of the apartment. Inasmuch as Townsend's friends customarily called him before visiting, he did not choose to respond to the "bangs." After "about maybe two hours," following more "very loud knocking," Townsend "heard the door break." Pone, whom Townsend knew to be a friend of another individual who was Townsend's tenant and roommate at the time,[3] then "appeared at the couch where [Townsend] was watching TV." Townsend asked Pone, who appeared to be intoxicated and irate, to leave. When Pone refused to do so, Townsend stated that he was going to call the police, whereupon Pone vacated the premises. Shortly thereafter, Townsend discovered that the front door to the apartment, which, in addition to being locked, had previously been in good working order, was damaged to the point that it would no longer shut. Townsend expressly testified that he had not given Pone permission to damage the door. At the close of the prosecution's case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, inter alia, on the alternative grounds that (1) the prosecution had failed to adduce prima facie evidence that Pone had caused the damage to the door, and (2) even if Pone had caused the damage, the prosecution had failed to establish that the tenant had not consented to it. The DPA opposed the motion on the basis that "[w]e have in fact proved that [there] was property damage and [that] it was the home of the victim [i.e., Townsend] ... [and] that it was without consent." "[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [prosecution] for purposes of determining [a] motion for judgment of acquittal," the district court found "that there [was] sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for criminal property damage in the fourth degree" and denied the motion. The defense rested without putting on a case, after which the parties made final argument. The district court proceeded to find Pone guilty as charged, ruling from the bench in relevant part as follows: State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 528, 865 P.2d 157, 164 (1994) (citations omitted). State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 831 P.2d 924, 931, reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992) (citations omitted). See also State v. Reed, 77 Hawai`i 72, 81-82, 881 P.2d 1218, 1227-28 (1994); In re John Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai`i 85, 92-93, 869 P.2d 1304, 1311-12 (1994); State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 432, 864 P.2d 583, 589-90 (1993). A person commits the offense of criminal property damage in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS § 708-823(1), if he or she "intentionally damages the property of another without his [or her] consent." State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i 387, 390-91, 879 P.2d 492, 495-96 (1994) (footnote and some brackets omitted). See also State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 136-37, 890 P.2d 1167, 1176-77 (1995). Inasmuch as the intent to damage the property of another must be proved in order to commit the offense of criminal property damage in the fourth degree, in violation of *459 HRS § 708-823, and no contrary purpose "plainly appears" on the face of the statute, see HRS § 702-207, it therefore follows that "intent" is the requisite state of mind for each of the elements set forth in HRS § 708-823.[4] Accordingly, there were three material elements of the offense of criminal property damage in the fourth degree, as prohibited by HRS § 708-823 and alleged in the oral charge against Pone, each of which the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These three elements were: (1) that Pone damaged the property (i.e., the relevant conduct) of Townsend (i.e., the attendant circumstance that the property was that of another); (2) that Pone did so without Townsend's consent (i.e., another attendant circumstance); and (3) that Pone did so intentionally. HRS § 708-800 (Supp.1992) defines "property of another" in relevant part to mean "property which any person, other than the defendant, has possession of or any other interest in, even though the possession or interest is unlawful[.]" Thus, at the time of the incident in question, Townsend's tenant had some "interest" in the damaged door. For this reason, Pone urges that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tenant had not somehow consented to the damage. Pone's argument is a red herring. It is undisputed that the damaged door was Townsend's property, inasmuch as Townsend was the owner of the apartment. Pone was expressly charged with damaging Townsend's property without Townsend's consent; by the plain language of the oral charge, he was not charged with damaging the tenant's property without the tenant's consent. See supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 456. Pone has cited no authority (and we are aware of none) suggesting, on the record before us, that the tenant could possess the authority to consent to the damage on Townsend's behalf. Accordingly, proof of the tenant's nonconsent to the alleged damage to Townsend's property was not a material element of the prosecution's case in chief. As will become clear infra, it is precisely this red herring that generated the confusion in the ICA's opinion regarding presumptions and improper burden shifting. We now reach the precise issue that necessitated our grant of certiorari in this case. The ICA analyzed Pone's contention that because "lack of the owner's consent is an element of criminal property damage under HRS § 708-823, the [prosecution] was required to prove [Townsend's] and [the tenant's] non-consent to [Pone's] damaging the door," Pone, slip op. at 2, as follows: Id. (emphasis added).[5] The quoted portion of the ICA's opinion is erroneous on at least three grounds. First, as we have indicated, lack of prior consent by the tenant to the damage to Townsend's property was not a material element of the offense of criminal property damage in the fourth degree in the manner charged against Pone. Second, even if Pone had sought to adduce evidence that the tenant had purported to give prior consent to the damage, the evidence would have been irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible,[6] without a further showing that the tenant somehow possessed the authority to give consent on Townsend's behalf. Third, and most importantly for present purposes, the ICA confused the fundamental and constitutionally critical distinction between legal presumptions having the effect of shifting the prosecution's burden of proof to the defendant, on the one hand, and legitimate inferences drawn circumstantially from the direct evidence presented, on the other. This court appears initially to have addressed the third ground in State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971). Following a jury trial, Cuevas appealed his conviction of second degree murder under a statute, now repealed, that required the prosecution to prove that he had killed the victim with "malice aforethought and without authority, justification, or extenuation by law." Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 111, 488 P.2d at 323. The trial court, tracking the language of a related statute, had instructed the jury that "[w]hen the act of killing another is proved, malice aforethought shall be presumed, and the burden shall rest upon the party who committed the killing to show that it did not exist, or a legal justification or extenuation therefor." Id. At issue was the constitutionality of the statute upon which the jury instruction was based. Holding the statute unconstitutional and therefore reversing Cuevas's conviction, this court engaged in the following analysis: Id. at 112-16, 488 P.2d at 324-25. See also State v. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. 596, 617-18, 634 P.2d 80, 94 (1981). In 1972, the legislature enacted the Hawai`i Penal Code (HPC), HRS Title 37, chs. 701 through 712, of which HRS § 708-823 is a part. 1972 Haw.Sess.L.Act 9, § 1 at 32-142. The HPC, as originally enacted, took effect on January 1, 1973. 1972 Haw.Sess. L.Act 9, § 3 at 142. HRS § 701-117 (1985), entitled "[p]rima facie evidence," provided that "[p]rima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which, if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact, provided that no evidence negativing the fact, which raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, is introduced."[8] The commentary on HRS § 701-117[9] provides in relevant part: (Emphasis added.) With the advent of the HPC, this court was confronted with the distinction between legal presumptions, which improperly shifted the prosecution's burden of proof, and "permissible inferences," which did not. In State v. Dwyer, 57 Haw. 526, 560 P.2d 110 (1977), this court reviewed a conviction of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument in violation of HRS § 708-857 (1985).[10] Pursuant *462 to the statute, a person commits the offense of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument if he or she "intentionally issues or negotiates a negotiable instrument knowing that it will not be honored by the maker or drawee." HRS § 708-857(1). On appeal, the defendant asserted that the prosecution had failed to adduce substantial evidence that he had signed the check (i.e., negotiable instrument) in question knowing that it would not be honored by his bank. Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 527, 560 P.2d at 111. The "gravamen of the offense" being "the issuance of a check knowing at that time that it will not be honored," the "prosecution ... had the burden of proving the existence of [the defendant's] knowledge" on the day he signed and delivered the check to a third party. Id. at 527-28, 560 P.2d at 111. At trial, the prosecution had sought to discharge its burden by relying on HRS § 708-857(2)(b), which provides that: (1) when a check is dishonored due to lack of funds; (2) upon presentation within a reasonable time; (3) and the drawer fails to make the check good within ten days of receiving actual notice of dishonor; (4) the foregoing facts constitute prima facie evidence that the drawer knew when he or she issued the check that it would not be honored upon presentation. Id. at 528, 560 P.2d at 111-12. Having reviewed the record before it, the Dwyer court observed that "[t]he facts required by the statute are present in this case, but aside from these facts and any inferences which may properly be drawn therefrom the record contains no direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge." Id. at 528, 560 P.2d at 112. Thus, the Dwyer court concluded that "we are left with only the prima facie evidence provided by HRS § 708-857(2)(b) to support the conviction." Id. The Dwyer court therefore reversed the defendant's conviction based on the following analysis: Id. at 529-30, 560 P.2d at 112-13 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). See also Bumanglag, 63 Haw. at 618, 634 P.2d at 94. *463 This court revisited the legal presumption/permissible inference dichotomy in State v. Brighter, 61 Haw. 99, 595 P.2d 1072 (1979). Brighter was convicted of promoting a detrimental drug in the second degree. He appealed on the basis that the trial court had erroneously given a jury instruction (State's Requested Instruction No. 2) relating to the statutory inference set out in HRS § 712-1251(1) (1985),[11] which he contended had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense, thereby violating his due process right to be convicted only upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brighter, 61 Haw. at 100, 102, 595 P.2d at 1073, 1075. State's Requested Instruction No. 2, as given, advised the jury that "[t]he presence of a detrimental drug in a motor vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug was found." Id. at 102 n. 6, 595 P.2d at 1075 n. 6. For reasons not relevant to our analysis, the Brighter court salvaged the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1251 by construing it narrowly and thus found "no impropriety per se in the content of State's Requested Instruction No. 2 as given." Id. at 109-10, 595 P.2d at 1079. However, the following discussion regarding prima facie evidence and the character of permissive inferences is germane: Id. at 103-05, 109, 595 P.2d at 1075-76, 1078 (citations, footnotes, and some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and some brackets in original). Notwithstanding that the Brighter court deemed State's Requested Instruction No. 2, as given, to set forth a legitimate "permissible inference," it nevertheless expressly disapproved the giving of State's Requested Instruction No. 4, which provided that "[p]rima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact, provided that no evidence negativing the fact, which raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, is introduced." Id. at 110, 595 P.2d at 1079. Reversing Brighter's conviction, this court ruled that Id. at 111-12, 595 P.2d at 1079-80 (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Pimentel, 61 Haw. 308, 603 P.2d 141 (1979) (defendant deprived of due process when trial court gave instruction that shifted to defendant burden of proving lack of knowledge that substance was heroin, with result that prosecution was not required to prove every element of offense of promoting dangerous drug in second degree beyond reasonable doubt; instruction likewise deficient for failing clearly to indicate that any inference that could have been drawn was merely permissive). As we have indicated, in 1986 the legislature amended HRS § 701-117, inter alia, to provide that all provisions of the HPC purporting to establish "prima facie" evidence of particular offenses were to be governed by Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 306.[12]*465 HRE 306, entitled "presumptions in criminal proceedings," provides in relevant part: (Emphasis added.) Thus, HRE 306(a) applies equally to statutory and common law "presumptions against an accused." HRE 306(a)(1). Pursuant to HRS § 701-117, a fact is presumed if it is supported by "evidence which, if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact." Moreover, when a "presumed" fact establishes an element of a charged offense or negatives a defense thereto, its existence must be found beyond a reasonable doubt based "on the evidence as a whole." HRE 306(a)(2) and (3). A. Bowman, Hawaii Rules of Evidence Manual 62-63 (1990) (some citations omitted). Particularly in light of the commentary on HRS § 701-117, supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 461, we agree with Professor Bowman that "presumptions against the accused," within the meaning of HRE 306(a), do not impose upon a defendant the burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of a material element of a charged offense, but "are rather a form of gently commended inference that has been held not to violate due process." Put differently, an HRE 306(a) presumption against the accused, whether recognized at common law or enacted by statute, see HRE 306(a)(1), merely creates a "permissible inference of fact" whereby the trier of fact "is permitted but not compelled to draw an inference of guilt from the circumstances which constitute a prima facie case" and retains the prerogative "to determine whether a reasonable doubt of guilt exists despite the permitted inference, whether or not the accused has offered any evidence." See Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 529, 560 P.2d at 112. In any event, as a constitutional matter, an "inference of fact" is not "permissible" unless "there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the fact proven and the . . . fact [inferred]." Id. And there can be no such natural and rational evidentiary relation "`if the inference of one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of a lack of connection between the two in common experience.'" Id. at 530, 560 P.2d at 112-13 (quoting Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-68, 63 S.Ct. at 1245). Viewed in this manner, it becomes apparent that HRE 306(a) "presumptions against the accused" are no more than legislatively or judicially enshrined and constitutionally circumscribed corollaries to the proposition, "well settled in this jurisdiction[,] that guilt may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence." State v. Simpson, 64 Haw. 363, 373 n. 7, 641 P.2d 320, 326 n. 7 (1982) (emphasis added). See also State v. Bright, 64 Haw. 226, 228, 638 P.2d 330, 332 (1981) (per curiam); State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 528-29, 616 P.2d 1383, 1391 (1980); State v. Murphy, 59 Haw. 1, 19, 575 P.2d 448, 460 (1978). Like a jury, "the trial court, as trier of fact, `may draw all reasonable and legitimate inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced....'" Batson, 73 Haw. at 245-46, 831 P.2d at 930 (quoting State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 469, 748 P.2d 365, 370 (1987) (emphasis added)). And an inference is nothing more than "a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact ... from the establishment of other facts[,] from which, by the process of logic and reason, and based upon human experience, the existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact." State v. Emmsley, 3 Haw.App. 459, 464-65, 652 P.2d 1148, 1153, cert. denied, 65 Haw. 683 (1982) (emphasis in original). As noted above, the ICA purported to apply a common law, albeit ipse dixit, presumption "that the person whose property was allegedly damaged would not consent to the violent destruction of the property[.]" Pone, slip op. at 2. According to the ICA, "until the defendant introduces evidence that... consent was given, the [prosecution] is not required to show ... non-consent." Id. Thus, the ICA concluded that because Pone offered no evidence of consent,[15] the prosecution *467 "was not required to prove otherwise." Id. Lack of Townsend's consent to the damage to his front door was a material element of the offense with which Pone was charged. See supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 459.[16] Accordingly, the burden was upon the prosecution to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 113, 488 P.2d at 324. As articulated by the ICA, however, the "presumption" of nonconsent imposed on Pone "a burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of an essential element of the crime" with which he was charged. See id. at 112-13, 488 P.2d at 324. So construed, the "presumption" would violate the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawai`i Constitution by virtue of improperly shifting the burden of proof to Pone. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. at 617-18, 634 P.2d at 94; Pimentel, supra; Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 114-15, 488 P.2d at 325; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1072. The ICA therefore erred in its characterization of the "presumption." At most, the proposition that a "person whose property was allegedly damaged would not consent to the violent destruction of the property" is a "permissible inference of fact," which the trier of fact is permitted, but not compelled, to draw from common experience and the evidence as a whole, and which need not eliminate reasonable doubt of guilt. See Pimentel, supra; Brighter, 61 Haw. at 111-12, 595 P.2d at 1079-80; Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 529-30, 560 P.2d at 112-13; HRE 306(a). Put simply, lack of consent to the violent destruction of a person's property may be proved circumstantially on the basis of logical and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence adduced and common human experience. Batson, 73 Haw. at 245-46, 831 P.2d at 930; Simpson, 64 Haw. at 373 n. 7, 641 P.2d at 326 n. 7; Bright, 64 Haw. at 228, 638 P.2d at 332; O'Daniel, 62 Haw. at 528-29, 616 P.2d at 1391; Murphy, 59 Haw. at 19, 575 P.2d at 460; Emmsley, 3 Haw. App. at 464-65, 652 P.2d at 1153. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we agree with the ICA that "the trial judge did not err either in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal or in finding [Pone] guilty." Pone, slip op. at 3. Viewing the trial record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could fairly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved that Pone intentionally damaged the front door to Townsend's apartment without Townsend's consent. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in denying Pone's motion for judgment of acquittal. Alston, 75 Haw. at 528, 865 P.2d at 164. Moreover, Pone's conviction was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in convicting Pone of criminal property damage in the fourth degree. Reed, 77 Hawai`i at 81-82, 881 P.2d at 1227-28; In re John Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai`i at 92-93, 869 P.2d at 1311-12; Silva, 75 Haw. at 432, 864 P.2d at 589-90; Batson, 73 Haw. at 248-49, 831 P.2d at 931. For the foregoing reasons, and despite the ICA's mistaken invocation of an evidentiary "presumption" that would improperly shift the prosecution's burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal case, the ICA's judgment affirming the district court's judgment of conviction is affirmed. [1] HRPP 29(a) provides in relevant part: Motion Before Submission to Jury. Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses alleged in the charge after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.... HRPP 1 (1988) provides that the HRPP "shall govern the procedure in the courts of the State in all penal proceedings, with the exceptions stated in Rule 54." The exceptions stated in HRPP 54 are not material to this appeal. [2] The entire trial transcript, including the cover sheet, index, and court reporter's certificate, is only twenty-eight pages in length. [3] Townsend testified that the tenant, whose tenure in the apartment spanned "a few months," was "at work" at the time of the incident in question. [4] HRS § 702-206 (1985) provides in relevant part: Definitions of states of mind. (1) "Intentionally." (a) A person acts intentionally with respect to his [or her] conduct when it is his [or her] conscious object to engage in such conduct. (b) A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he [or she] is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist. (c) A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his [or her] conduct when it is his [or her] conscious object to cause such a result. [5] Although the ICA accurately characterized the holding in Maertz, as reaffirmed in May, we note that the Maertz court cited no authority for its invocation of the "presumption" in question, and the May court simply cited to Maertz. Thus, the Maertz/May "presumption" is pure ipse dixit. As demonstrated infra, it would appear that the Maertz and May courts were actually describing an inference that they drew from the particular records before them. [6] See Kealoha v. County of Hawai`i, 74 Haw. 308, 314-15, 319-20, 844 P.2d 670, 674, 676 (rulings on admissibility of allegedly relevant evidence, within meaning of Hawai`i Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, being susceptible to only one correct result, are reviewed under right/wrong standard), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 847 P.2d 263 (1993). [7] This principle is now codified in HRS §§ 701-114(1)(a) and (b) (1985), 702-204 (1985), 702-205 (1985), and 702-207 (1985). See supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 458. [8] The legislature amended HRS § 701-117 in 1986. 1986 Haw.Sess.L. Act 314, § 3 at 594. As amended, the statute now reads: "Prima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which, if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact. Prima facie evidence provisions in this Code are governed by section 626-1 [Hawai`i Rules of Evidence], rule 306." HRS § 701-117 (Supp.1992). See infra at ___, 892 P.2d at 464. [9] "[A]lthough not direct evidence of legislative intent, we look to the commentary to the Hawai`i Penal Code (HPC), HRS Title 37, `as an aid in understanding' [it]." State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 139, 890 P.2d 1167, 1179 (1995) (citing HRS § 701-105 (1985) and State v. Alo, 57 Haw. 418, 426-27, 558 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 2193, 53 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1977)). [10] HRS § 708-857 was enacted in 1972 as part of the HPC. 1972 Haw.Sess.L. Act 9, pt. of § 1 at 104-05. It has never been amended. [11] HRS § 712-1251(1) provides in relevant part that "the presence of a dangerous drug, harmful drug, or detrimental drug in a motor vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug was found." HRS § 712-1251 was enacted in 1972 as part of the HPC. 1972 Haw.Sess.L. Act 9, pt. of § 1 at 137. It has never been amended. [12] See supra note 8. [13] HRE 301 provides in relevant part: Definitions. The following definitions apply under this article: (1) "Presumption" is (A) a rebuttable assumption of fact, (B) that the law requires to be made, (C) from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. (2) The following are not presumptions under this article: . . . . (B) Inference. The trier of fact may logically and reasonably make an assumption from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action, but is not required to do so[.] Were an HRE 306(a) "presumption against the accused" a presumption in the HRE 301(1) sense, then it would indeed impose upon a criminal defendant "a burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of an essential element" of a charged offense. See Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 113, 488 P.2d at 324. [14] We perceive no need at this time to augment the general sufficiency requirement codified in HRE 306(a)(2). [15] As we have noted supra at ___-___, 892 P.2d at 459-460 the focus of the ICA's attention was on Townsend's tenant (whose consent or lack thereof was irrelevant), rather than on Townsend. [16] Ironically, the only element of the offense of criminal property damage in the fourth degree as to which the prosecution produced direct evidence was that of Townsend's nonconsent.