Title: Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp.1994 WY 8867 P.2d 701Case Number: 93-84Decided: 01/25/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming

Donna 
LINCOLN, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v. 

WACKENHUT CORPORATION, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District Court, Natrona County, Harry 
E. Leimback, J.

Earl R. Johnson, Jr., 
Casper, for appellant. 

Roger E. Shumate of Murane 
& Bostwick, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      A terminated 
security officer filed this action seeking damages from her former employer for 
breach of contract and tortious conduct. The security officer claims her former 
employer breached an implied in fact contract of employment by terminating her 
without following disciplinary procedures contained in an employee handbook. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former 
employer.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant frames 
two issues:

A. SUMMARY

JUDGMENT QUESTION

            
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment by failure to apply 
the correct standards for determination of summary judgment and by the finding 
that there were no issues of material fact?

B. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

QUESTION

            
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment by finding that 
there was no binding labor contract established between the parties by the terms 
of the Wackenhut Security Officer Handbook?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      The Wackenhut 
Corporation (Wackenhut) employed Donna Lincoln (Lincoln) as a security officer. 
Wackenhut provided security services, under contract, to various corporations. 
In June of 1983, Wackenhut assigned Lincoln to work at the Amoco Oil Company 
Refinery (Amoco) in Natrona County, Wyoming. As a Wackenhut employee, Lincoln 
was required to follow a "chain of command" to address security problems or 
work-related incidents at Amoco. The "chain of command" required information to 
be presented to a list of Wackenhut supervisors. Only in the event of "an 
immediate problem during nights and weekends * * *" was a Wackenhut security 
officer permitted to contact an Amoco supervisor directly.

[¶5]      On March 25, 
1991, Wackenhut suspended Lincoln's employment. Amoco's Security Supervisor had 
requested Lincoln be replaced because of unsatisfactory performance. Four days 
later, Wackenhut terminated Lincoln. Wackenhut said the termination followed 
repeated violations of the "chain of command" policy.

[¶6]      After her 
termination, Lincoln filed this action in district court seeking damages from 
Wackenhut for breach of her employment contract, breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. Lincoln averred that under terms 
of the Wackenhut Security Officer Handbook (hereinafter Wackenhut handbook), 
Wackenhut had failed to follow its discipline procedure. Lincoln also maintained 
that she was terminated without specific charges of 
misconduct.

[¶7]      Wackenhut 
answered that, despite the fact Lincoln was terminated for cause, she was at all 
times an employee at will who could be terminated at any time, for any reason or 
for no reason. After more than a year of discovery proceedings, Wackenhut filed 
a motion for summary judgment. Wackenhut claimed that the Wackenhut handbook 
contained a conspicuous disclaimer provision which preserved employment at 
will.

[¶8]      The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Wackenhut. The district court ruled 
that the Wackenhut handbook disclaimer was conspicuous as a matter of law. Prior 
to the district court's decision, Lincoln voluntarily dismissed her cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This 
appeal followed.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      This court will 
affirm a summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). 
"An issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have 
the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the 
cause of action or defense asserted by the litigants." Keehn v. Town of 
Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992). Interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a question of law for the court; therefore, summary judgment is 
appropriate for disputes relating to such a contract. Prudential Preferred 
Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993); 
Continental Ins. v. Page Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641, 651 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶10]   In Wyoming, employment at will 
permits either party to terminate a contract of employment, which is for an 
indefinite duration, at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all. Wilder 
v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, ___ P.2d ___, ___, slip op. at 6 (Wyo. 
1994) (No. 93-22, decided 1/25/94); Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1991). However, in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 1985), we found that an employee handbook or personnel manual 
may supply terms for an implied in fact contract of employment. See Wilder, ___ 
P.2d at ___ (discussing enforceability of an implied in fact contract of 
employment). In particular, a systematic discipline procedure or other language 
in an employee handbook implying termination may be for cause only may defeat 
the rebuttable presumption that employment is at will. Sanchez v. Life Care 
Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶11]   Employers do have a means to avoid 
formation of an implied in fact contract of employment while still presenting 
the employee with useful information about required performance on the job. The 
employment at will presumption of Wyoming law may be sustained when unambiguous 
language disclaiming the formation of a contract is sufficiently conspicuous and 
present in documents that would otherwise comprise terms of an implied in fact 
contract of employment. Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1259; McDonald v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo. 1991) (McDonald 
II).

[¶12]   When properly drafted, a sufficient 
disclaimer constitutes an express statement in the employment application and 
subsequent relevant documents, such as an employee handbook, that places the 
employee on notice that general statements or conduct do not promise employment 
security and are not to be relied upon by the employee. 1 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Employee Dismissal Law And Practice § 4.25 at 310 (3rd ed. 1992). A conspicuous 
and unambiguous disclaimer would then make any reliance on the subsequent 
statements of the employer unreasonable. Jones v. Central Peninsula General 
Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989) (holding disclaimer in employee handbook 
which was not conspicuous and unambiguous failed to preserve at will employment 
status); Hogge v. Champion Laboratories, Inc., 190 Ill. App.3d 620, 137 Ill.Dec. 
912, 918, 546 N.E.2d 1025, 1031 (1989) (holding express disclaimer in employee 
handbook prevented reasonable reliance); Fournier v. United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co., 82 Md. App. 31, 569 A.2d 1299, 1304, cert. denied, 319 Md. 581, 
573 A.2d 1337 (1990) (holding express disclaimer in application form prevented 
reasonable reliance). See McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 
870 (Wyo. 1990) (McDonald I).

[¶13]   In McDonald II, 820 P.2d  at 988, 
the employer included a disclaimer in its employment application form stating 
that any offer would be for employment at will. In addition, a disclaimer was 
included within a welcoming statement contained on page one of an employee 
handbook. Id. at 989. The court applied a rule stated in Jimenez v. Colorado 
Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D.Wyo. 1988), and held that the 
disclaimers in the application form and employee handbook were not sufficiently 
conspicuous. McDonald II, 820 P.2d  at 989.

[¶14]   Specifically, the McDonald II court 
pointed to deficiencies of the disclaimer in the employee handbook. Three 
factors were used to test both the conspicuous presence of the language and the 
unambiguous meaning of the language. First, the prominence of the text of the 
disclaimer was examined. The court concluded the text of the disclaimer was not 
set off such as by the use of a border or larger, contrasting print and it was 
not capitalized. Id. Second, the placement of the disclaimer relative to the 
other text in the handbook was considered. The court found the disclaimer was 
contained within a welcoming section of the employee handbook rather than in a 
separate provision where a reasonable person ought to have noticed it. Id. 
Third, the language of the disclaimer was construed to determine whether it was 
unambiguous. The court decided that the language was unclear about the 
disclaimer's effect on the employment relationship. Id. As a result, under the 
objective theory of contract formation, the meaning and effect of the implied in 
fact contract of employment that may have been formed between the employer and 
the employee created a genuine issue of material fact which precluded summary 
judgment. Id. at 990-91.

[¶15]   Similarly, in Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 
1259, this court held that a disclaimer included in the "Introduction" section 
of an employee handbook was not sufficient to preserve an employment at will 
relationship as a matter of law. Again, the three factors of prominence, 
placement and language outlined in McDonald II were used to test whether the 
disclaimer was conspicuous and unambiguous. The text of the disclaimer was not 
in bold lettering. Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1259. The disclaimer was "buried" in the 
introductory paragraphs of the employee handbook. Id. The language of the 
disclaimer was ambiguous and other language in the handbook inferred termination 
would only be for cause. Id. The court held that the meaning and effect of the 
employment relationship was an unresolved mixed question of law and fact which 
precluded summary judgment. Id.

[¶16]   Applying the teachings of McDonald 
II and Sanchez, the summary judgment in favor of Wackenhut on the breach of 
contract claim will be affirmed if we determine, as a matter of law, that the 
language of the Wackenhut handbook provision disclaiming the formation of any 
implied in fact contract of employment is sufficiently conspicuous and 
unambiguous to preserve an employment at will 
relationship.

[¶17]   Lincoln does not contend that she 
was hired as other than an employee at will. Instead, she argues that the 
discipline procedure of the Wackenhut handbook constituted a term of an implied 
in fact contract of employment which modified her at will status to that of an 
employee subject to termination for cause only and with certain procedural 
rights. However, if the Wackenhut handbook disclaimer is conspicuous and 
unambiguous as a matter of law, then it would constitute an effective notice to 
Lincoln that Wackenhut did not promise to abide by the discipline procedure in 
terminating at will employees and any reliance would have been 
unreasonable.

[¶18]   The Wackenhut handbook contains the 
following language:

WACKENHUT

SECURITY 
OFFICER HANDBOOK

THIS 
HANDBOOK IS INTENDED AS A GUIDE FOR THE EFFICIENT AND PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE 
OF YOUR JOB. NOTHING HEREIN CONTAINED SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO BE A CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE. ADDITIONALLY, THIS HANDBOOK IS NOT TO BE 
CONSTRUED BY ANY EMPLOYEE AS CONTAINING BINDING TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT. THE COMPANY RETAINS THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO TERMINATE ANY EMPLOYEE, AT 
ANY TIME, WITH OR WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. MANAGEMENT RETAINS THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE 
CONTENTS OF THIS HANDBOOK AS IT DEEMS NECESSARY, WITH OR WITHOUT 
NOTICE.

The application of the 
factors identified in McDonald II to the language of the Wackenhut handbook 
reveals that this disclaimer is conspicuous and unambiguous as a matter of law. 
McDonald II, 820 P.2d  at 989.

[¶19]   FIRST, THE TEXT OF THE DISCLAIMER IS 
PROMINENT. The lettering is approximately twice the size of the lettering 
used for the remaining text in the Wackenhut handbook. The lettering is also in 
bold print and it is capitalized.

[¶20]   SECOND, THE PLACEMENT OF THE DISCLAIMER IS 
SUCH THAT A REASONABLE PERSON OUGHT TO NOTICE IT. The disclaimer is 
contained on the first interior page of the Wackenhut handbook. The disclaimer 
is the first text a reader would find after opening the cover. No other text or 
material appears on that page.

[¶21]   THIRD, THE LANGUAGE DISCLAIMING THE 
FORMATION OF ANY IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY 
UNAMBIGUOUS TO CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO A REASONABLE PERSON THAT NO 
PROMISES MODIFYING THE EXISTING CONTRACT FOR EMPLOYMENT AT WILL ARE OFFERED. 
The disclaimer specifically informs the employee that no contract is being 
formed and no binding terms or conditions of employment are being stated. The 
disclaimer acknowledges that employment is at will and may be terminated "at any 
time, with or without good cause."

[¶22]   FINALLY, THE DISCLAIMER PRESERVES 
WACKENHUT'S RIGHT TO ALTER THE LANGUAGE OF THE HANDBOOK. Therefore, 
Wackenhut was free to terminate Lincoln's employment without cause and without 
adhering to the discipline procedure of the Wackenhut 
handbook.

[¶23]   Lincoln argues that because she was 
not provided with an individual copy of the Wackenhut handbook with a copyright 
date of 1986, summary judgment was inappropriate. We agree that a careful 
employer should provide each employee with an individual copy of an employee 
handbook or personnel policy manual at the time of employment and at any time 
the contents are revised or policies changed. Additionally, some employers may 
find it appropriate to have employees sign acknowledgement statements indicating 
they are aware of any language disclaiming the formation of an implied in fact 
contract of employment. See Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1258. Wackenhut did not take 
these precautions. However, Lincoln admits that she did read the first several 
pages of the Wackenhut handbook at her work station after the 1986 version was 
available. Therefore, she had notice of the disclaimer prior to her 
termination.

[¶24]   We find it unnecessary to address 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wackenhut on the 
negligence cause of action. On appeal, Lincoln failed to state any issue or 
provide any argument regarding this claim. This court will not consider issues 
presented without cogent argument and citation to authority. Triton Coal Co., 
Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 512 (Wyo. 1990); Smith v. 
Ensley, 752 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1988).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Lincoln was hired as an at will 
employee. While the provisions of the Wackenhut handbook do describe a 
discipline procedure, a conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer provided 
sufficient notice to a reasonable person that no terms were stated for an 
implied in fact contract of employment. As a result, Wackenhut was free to 
terminate Lincoln as an at will employee.

[¶26]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.