Title: Request for an Opinion of the Justices

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

‘SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE,

‘March 1, 2022
‘The Honorable David P. Sokola ‘The Honorable Peter C. Schwartzkopf
President Pro Tempore Speaker
Delaware State Senate Delaware House of Representatives

Dear President Pro Tempore Sokola and Speaker of the House Schwartzkopf:
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 63 requests the opinion of the Justices on
the construction of Article III, Section 13 of the Delaware Constitution. The
Supreme Court appointed amici counsel on January 26, 2022, to help answer the
General Assembly's questions. We have their submissions in hand and thank the
attorneys for their volunteer service to the Court and to the State. What follows are
the questions and summary answers. We then explain our answers in more detail,

1. May “reasonable cause” under Section 13 include an indictment
returned by a grand jury?

Reasonable cause for a bill of address to the Governor may include an
indictment, but an indictment standing alone is not suffi

   

2. Does the authority under Section 13 to remove a public official
implicitly include the authority to take a lesser action, such as
suspension of that public official? If Section 13 does implicitly
include the authority to take a lesser action, must the General
‘Assembly address the Governor on the lesser action or can the
Governor choose to take a lesser action than that addressed to the
Governor?
‘The Governor's authority to remove a public official upon a bill of
address does not include the authority to take a lesser action such as
suspension.

3. Does the application of Section 13 require a hearing on the matter
prior toa vote in either House to address the Governor to remove an
officer?

A hearing is required prior to the vote on a bill of address.

&. Ifthe application of Section 13 requires a hearing, must each
House hold a hearing prior to its respective vote to address
the Governor, or does 2 hearing in the first House satisfy the
requirement?

A hearing in the first House or a joint hearing in both Houses satisfies
the hearing requirement.

. If the application of Section 13 requires a hearing in each
‘House, would a joint hearing satisfy the requirement?
‘As noted in our response to Question 3(a), a hearing in the first House
ora joint hearing satisfies the hearing requirement.

c. If the application of Section 13 requires a hearing, what are
‘the elements that must be satisfied? For example, must the
person against whom each House secks to proceed be
provided the opportunity to attend the hearing, to be
represented at the hearing by counsel, to testify atthe hearing,
to call witnesses, or to introduce evidence at the hearing?

Both Houses would issue a joint notice ten days prior to the hearing,
The individual must have a hearing, which preferably would include
the right to attend, be represented by counsel, call witnesses, and
introduce evidence. The other parameters of the hearing are within the
discretion of the General Assembly.

4, Does Section 13 require # 10-day notice for only the first House to
take action, or are separate notices required for each House? If
Section 13 requires separate 10-day notices for each House’s action,
may those notices be issued concurrently, or must the second House
issue its notice only after the first House has acted pursuant to its
respective notice?
A Joint Resolution by both Houses is required at least ten days before
the hearing in the first House or before a joint hearing.

‘5. Is there a mechanism for an appeal of the decision by the Governor
to remove a public officer under Section 13?

‘There is no appeal from the Governor's decision. We do not express
an opinion on whether judicial review is available through other
avenues.

L
Section 13 of Article III of the Delaware Constitution provides as follows:

§ 13. Removal of officers by Governor, procedure.

Section 13. The Governor may for any reasonable cause remove any
officer, except the Lieutenant-Governor and members of the General
Assembly, upon the address of two-thirds of all the members elected to
each House of the General Assembly. Whenever the General Assembly
shall so address the Governor, the cause of removal shall be entered on
the journals of each House. The person against whom the General
Assembly may be about to proceed shall receive notice thereof,
accompanied with the cause alleged for his or her removal, at least ten
days before the day on which either House of the General Assembly
shall act thereon

When a constitutional provision is unambiguous, we rely on its plain
language.’ Section 13 is unambiguous in certain respects. Other than the Lieutenant
Governor and members of the General Assembly, the Governor may—not must—
remove any public officer for reasonable cause if the General Assembly presents a
bill of address to the Governor, after a vote by two-thirds of each House. The

individual to be removed must receive at least ten days’ notice of the bill of address

‘ Capriglione v. State, A. 34___, 2021 WL 4538685, at *3 (Del. Oct. 1, 2021) (quoting In re
Request of Governor for Advisory Opinion (Pepukayi), 950 A.24 651, 653 (Del. 2008)),

3
and the cause alleged for removal. What is missing from Section 13, however, and
no doubt caused the General Assembly's request for an Opinion of the Justices, are
details about how to undertake a bill of address, what constitutes reasonable cause,
and the rights of the public officer involved

When a constitutional provision is ambiguous, or its application uncertain, we
examine other sections of the Constitution that give meaning to the provision under
consideration.? We also look to the Delaware Constitutional Debates of 1897

(“Delaware Debates") to see what the Framers intended.’ In the words of Justice

 

jam Spruance, who was intimately involved in drafting the Delaware
Constitution; “In ascertaining the meaning of a remedial provision of a constitution
or statute, where the language is not clear, it is often necessary to consider the

mischief’ intended to be prevented.™ ‘The Delaware Debates are especially relevant

2 Friescleben v. Shalleross, 19 A. $76,595 (Del. 1890) (“To ascertain this, resort must be had toa
proper constuction of the entire instrument"); MeComb v. Robelen, 116 A. 74S, 747 (Del. Ch

1922) (using different constitutional provisions fo construe an earlier provision).

} Caprigione, 2021 WL. 4538685, at *3 (citing Pepukayi, 980 A.2d at 653). See also Opinion of
the Justices, 264 A.24342, 344 (Del. 1970) (“In view of the ambiguity, we look tothe Delaware
Constitutional Debates of 1897 for insight into the intent ofthe drafters..." Dorey v. City of
Dover Ba. of Bletions, 1994 WL 146012 at ®4 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 1994) (“The debates ofthe
1897 Constitution drafters can be important authority to interpret our constitutio."), Sate». Hart,
129 A. 691, 697 (Del. Super. 1925) (If, however, there was any real doubt as to what the
Constitution makers meant, it would be entirely removed by refering to said debates...)

* State x. Churchman, $1 A. 49, 61 (Del, 1902) (Spruanee, J, dissenting),

4
here because the Delaware Constitution of 1897 was not ratified by the public, but
adopted by the same men who debated the provisions (the “Delaware Delegates”)

Finally, to help interpret Section 13, we examine a similar provision in the
1874 Pennsylvania Constitution and the relevant debates of the Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention (the “Pennsylvania Debates”). While it is unclear

Whether the Delaware Delegates rel

 

on the Pennsylvania Debates, the
Pennsylvania Debates occurred relatively close in time and location to the Delaware
Debates, and Spruance, who introduced Article Ill, Section 13, relied on a
comparable provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 to draft Section 13.°
A

Having identified textual ambiguities, we begin our construction of Article
II, Section 13 by examining other provisions of the Delaware Constitution that shed
light on how Section 13 was intended to operate. Using the Pennsylvania
Constitution as a model, Spruance explained that the new Delaware Constitution

would provide three methods for removal of officers:

5 State v. Lyons, 5 A.2d 495, 501 (Del. Gen, Sess, 1939) (“Where the debates of a Constitutional
Convention clearly point out the purpose of a particular provision of the Constitution, the aid of
such debates is valuable and satisfactory. Especially is this true when the Constitution became
cffective, as in Delaware, upon its adoption by the Convention, and was not subject to subsequent
ification by vote of the people.” (citing 1 Cooley Const. Law 142; 11 Am. Jur. 706))

3 Charles G, Guyer & Edmond C. Hardesty, Debates and Proceedings of the Consti
Convention of the State of Delaware 1938 (Milford Chronicle Publ'g Co. 1958) (1897) (*
to show the gentlemen a corresponding provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution... That is
‘substantially the same as we have here”) (hereinafter “Delaware Constitutional Convention”),

 

  

5
There are three ways of getting rid of an officer. One is, under these
fines, on misbehavior in office, or any infamous crime, and the
Governor shall remove that man, because it is his duty to do so. That
means where he has been convicted on indictment of misbehavior in
office or infamous crime, The next deals with removal on the address
of the legislature; and then we have the third one, that of impeachment.”

 

Article XV, Section 6 addresses removal from office by the Govemor for
criminal convictions:

All public officers shall hold their offices on condition that they behave
themselves well. The Governor shall remove from office any public
officer convicted of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.

‘Thus, the Governor must remove a public officer when the officer is convicted
of certain crimes. A public official can also be removed from office after
impeachment proceedings in the House and a trial in the Senate:

‘The Governor and all other civil officers under this State shall be liable
to impeachment for treason, bribery, or any high crime or misdemeanor
in office. Judgment in such cases shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust or profit, under this State; but the party convicted shall,
nevertheless, be subject to indictment, tral, judgment and punishment
according to law.*

"Fd. at 1937. See also State ex rel. Craven v, Schorr, 131 A.24 158, 166 (Del. 1957) (The three
“constitutional grounds for removal are: (1) by the Governor, upon the address of two-thirds of all
the members elected to each House, art. Ill, § 13; (2) by impeachment by the House and trial by
the Senate, art. VI, § 2; and (3) by the Governor, upon conviction of misbehavior in office or any
infamous crime, art. XV, § 6.”)

"Del. Const, art. VI, §2. Article I, Section 21 also sets forth disqualifying events for holding
certain public positions and requires a conviction to disqualify an individual: “No person who shall
be convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime,
shall be eligible toa seat in either House ofthe General Assembly, or capable of holding any office
of trust, honor, or profit under this State.” Jd. at art. I, § 21.

 

 

 

6
Section 13 does not mention conviction. It refers only to “reasonable cause” for
removal, As our review of the Delaware and Pennsylvania debates shows, a bill of
‘address—with its reasonable cause requirement—was intended to cast a wider net
and covers misconduct by public officials that might lead to criminal charges but not
necessarily end in a criminal conviction,

B.

We turn to the Delaware Debates. The Delaware Delegates adopted the most
recent Delaware Constitution on July 4, 1897.? The debates and proceedings leading
to its adoption took place from December 1, 1896, through June 4, 1897.!° The
discussions often drew from the recently adopted Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874,
in both language and practice.

William C, Spruance, a lawyer and delegate, introduced Article III, Section
13. He explained that he found the “provision in the Constitution of Pennsylvania
and it is a good safe one.”"! The Delaware Delegates first discussed requiring
removal from office if an officer had been “‘convict[ed] of misbehavior in office or

of any infamous crime” and agreed that when an individual “has had his day in

° Secretary of State, Constitution of the State of Delaware (Dover, Press of the Delawarean 1899).
‘There were three previous Constitutions, adopted in 1776, 1792, and 1831. Del, Const. of 1776;
Del. Const. of 1792; Del. Const. of 1831.

'© Henry R. Horsey, Henry N. Hemdon, Jr. & Barbara MacDonald, The Delaware Constitutional
Convention of 1897: Dec, 1, 1896-June 4, 1897, in The Delaware Constitution of 1897: The First
(One Hundred Years 58 (Randy J. Holland & Harvey Bernard Rubenstein eds., 1997).

Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1937.
Court, and he has been indicted and he has been convicted[,]” “he certainly ought to
come out of office.”" The Governor was therefore required, under the new
Constitution, to remove any officer who had been convicted."

After agreeing on the infamous crime provision, the Delaware Delegates
considered removal by bill of address to the Governor. Spruance, the author of
Section 13, explained that the Governor could not remove appointed officials
without cause under the provision—a crucial difference from the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1874." He also stressed that the Delaware provision was “more

irefully framed and safer” than its Pennsylvania counterpart because it required a

 

vote of two-thirds of the General Assembly rather than just two-thirds of the

Senate." He gave an example of conduct which would justify removal:

 

‘And we have had an instance in the two late Honorable gentlemen who
were on the Judiciary, and who had come to the condition of health and
mind and body that they could not perform their functions, and unless
they had resigned, there would have been no way of carrying on the
business of the Courts except by their removal by the General
Assembly.!®

 

The Delaware Delegates then extensively debated the notice requirement.'”

William Saulsbury, a lawyer and member of the Delaware House of Representatives,

ta.
'8 This provision was later moved elsewhere in the Constitution. Del. Const, art. XV, § 6
Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1938.

"Td.

"6d a 1939,

fd, a 1939-46.
worried that the notice requirement was “needlessly long” because it would require
ten days’ notice from the House of Representatives, followed by ten days’ notice
from the Senate, before the Houses could bring proceedings against the individual'*
He also pointed out that the individual was “entitled to have a hearing before that
house,” a hearing that could “take several days” in each House."”

Spruance disputed that understanding: “I do not understand that it is to be two

notices at all. .

 

. When charges were made against a man, the General Assembly
‘would pass a joint resolution. ... It seems to me that one notice is enough.””

Saulsbury conceded the point: “I supposed from this language that it certainly meant

 

that a person should receive ten days notice from each house . . if it is to be by joint

resolution of both houses, I do not think ten days notice is too much, that is, one ten
days notice.”*' Finally, Wilson T. Cavender spoke:

The spirit of the language of this section, it seems to me, is very clear
that this notice should be given in the shape of a joint resolution. It
seems to me it would not be proper in any other shape.

What is the General Assembly? The General Assembly is not the
House, nor the Senate separately, but itis the Senate and House both,
and a notice coming from the General Assembly would come in the
shape of a joint resolution.”?

1 fd at 1940,
id,

2 Fd at 1941
21 fd at 1942.
2 7d a 1945

 
Saulsbury agreed, and confirmed the consensus among the Delaware
Delegates:

[AJs the other Members of the Committee are so entirely in the
majority, who think the other way .... that only one notice would be
required under this provision, I feel inclined, if there is no objection, to
withdraw my proposed amendment....1 thought there were two
notices required, and that was the ground for my amendment.

 

They also debated the nature of the hearing, and where it should take place.
Saulsbury believed the language required a joint trial" but Spruance replied that he
thought the provision required only ten days’ notice before the hearing in the first
House—and that the other House could then proceed to address the Governor
without having its own, independent hearing.*> This is supported by the discussion
between Ezekiel Cooper, another delegate, and Spruance, about whether a Senator
could vote to send a bill of address to the Governor without being present at the
proceedings taking place in the House:

EZEKIEL W. COOPER: Yes; but is a Senator going to agree to issue

an address to the Governor to remove an officer when he has heard no

statement of the case, or no trial, or when the trial has been in the
House?

WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: I do not know. If that testimony was taken
in writing and brought up, it might be sufficient. I do not know how
that may be.

 

 

2 Id. at 1946,

2% J at 1944 (“WILLIAM SAULSBURY: [like in some respects the suggestion of the gentleman
from North Murderkill Hundred (Mr. Cooper), to let the trial be in joint Assembly, but I would
require when the vote is taken that there shall be a separate vote”).

287d, (*But ten days upon which either house, that means the first one that has the hearing.”)

10
EZEKIEL W. COOPER: Legislative enactment would provide the
formula, would it?

WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: | think so.”*
‘The Delaware Delegates thought the number and structure of hearings would

be a matter of preference for the legislature—each House of the General Assembly
‘was entitled, but not required, to have its own proceeding. If the second House
believed that the first hearing had shown reasonable cause, it was entitled to vote on
the bill of address without a second hearing,2”

‘The nature of the hearing also came up in the Debates. At various times, the
Delaware Delegates discussed allowing enough time for the individuals to provide
a defense to the charges laid against them.* One delegate referred to the hearing as
fa jury trial, distinguishing it from the process for impeachment.” Again, the
Delegates reached agreement: “A man is entitled, when he gets this notice, to a
hearing, and in the question of introducing testimony, and the things that are to be

brought in....” It appears the Delegates intended the hearing to afford the

% Fd. at 1945,

MH,

28 jd, at 1941 ("It is a matter of a great deal of consequence that when a man is about to be
proceeded upon, that he have proper notice to defend himself. Five days is pretty short notice for
‘aman to be brought up in a round term, and to say to him, “We are going to kick you out of office’,
‘and to furnish him withthe charges and give him only five days in which to make his defense.”)
% Jd. at 1943; see also d. (Cooper: “certainly the House of Representatives won't issue their
‘address until they have tried the case and the culprit must have ten days notice to appear atthe Bar
of the House.”).

3d, at 1944,

"
individuals a full and fair presentation of the evidence against them and an
‘opportunity to respond.
c
‘As mentioned above, the Delaware Delegates drew from Pennsylvania's

Constitution of 1874.2! The relevant Pennsylvania provision is Article VI:

 

 

Impeachment and Removal from Office. Section 4 addresses “Condition of offici

tenure” and “Removal:”

All officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave
themselves while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of
misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil
officers, other than judges of the courts of record and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure
of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All officers
elected by the people, except Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members
of the General Assembly, and judges of the courts of record learned in
the law, shall be removed by the Govemnor for reasonable cause, after
‘due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.”

  

In drafting this provision, the Pennsylvania Delegates drew a distinction

between the grounds for impeachment and the grounds for removal by address:

 

[William Darlington:] The Constitution now provides that all civil
officers shall be impeached and removed from office for misbehavior
or infamous crime. A provision also exists, and it is proper that it
should exist, for the removal of officers who shall be found

3! The Pennsylvania Constitution was amended by a convention in 1967. We differentiate by
referring tothe Constitution of 1874 (Pa. Const. of 1874), andthe current Constitution (Pa. Const).
Pa. Const, (“The Constitution of 1874... . went into effect January 1, 1874, By statute, 1 PCS.
§ 906, the Constitution, as amended by referenda of May 17, 1966, November 8, 1966, May 16,
1967, and April 23, 1968, and as numbered by proclamation ofthe Governor of July 7, 1967, shall,
bbe known and may be cited asthe Constitution of 1968.”)

Pa, Const. of 1874, art. VI, § 4

 

2
incompetent, or whose continuance in office would be prejudicial to the
public interest, although they may not be convicted of any infamous
crime or misdemeanor within the meaning of the Constitution.”®

In other words, the Pennsylvania Delegates wanted to address a situation
where it “may become necessary to remove an officer more speedily than trial by
impeachment may accomplish.” The goal was to provide “a more speedy remedy”
than impeachment or a criminal trial but not one “without due consideration” or the

“check” of each House of the General Assembly.®* As Darlington commented:

 

Take for instance your office of State Treasurer, who will be elected by
the people. Immediately upon his election he may be discovered to be
totally unfit for the office, or he may have designs upon the treasury,
by the removal of its funds, and for which his security may be
inadequate or insufficient as a remedy, and it may be important that he
should be removed, and prompily .... without waiting for the tedious,
troublesome and expensive method of impeachment. The safety of the
public interest may require prompt action. °°

‘The Pennsylvania Delegates also discussed whether the power to remove
included the power to suspend, They decided it did not:

Mr. CURTIN. Mr. Chairman : Allow me to ask, if the Convention
adopt [sic] this section of the article on impeachment and removal from
office, do you intend to give the Governor any power to suspend any of

® 1 Benjamin Singerly, Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania 6
(Harrisburg, tate of Pennsylvania 1873); 3 Debates ofthe Convention to Amend the Constitution
of Pennsylvania 231 (hereinafter, “Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention”).

33 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention 231. See also Thomas Raeburn White,
Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania 343 (1907) “As, unfortunately, officers who
have been elected or appointed do not always perform their duties wit fidelity, it is necessary to
have some method by which unfaithful servants may be removed from ofice.”)

353 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania Convention 231

3% [d. Mr. Daslington continued: “So with regard to your Auditor General; he has vast power. He
{sto be elected by the people. He may pass an account through his office, which may take millions
of dollars from the Treasury. It should be inthe power ofthe representatives of the people and the
executive to remove him promptly, and if anything serious should be wrong.” Id.

 

B
the officers of the State temporarily, as for instance the Auditor General
or the State Treasurer, or any other officer ?

Mr. BIDDLE. Mr. Chairman : I will answer the gentleman from Centre,

by saying, speaking for the Committee on Impeachment and Removal

from Office, that it was not the intention of that committee to give to

the Executive any power of suspending any officer.””

‘The Pennsylvania Delegates then discussed whether to change the language
from “after a full hearing” to “after due notice and an opportunity to be heard[,]”
Which would allow the accused to refuse to speak at his hearing.”* ‘They decided
against it” Finally, they agreed that the Senate would have the power of address,
rather than both Houses of the General Assembly.

a

Having reviewed the debates surrounding the removal provisions in the
Pennsylvania and Delaware Constitutions, we answer the questions posed by the
General Assembly.

Response to Question 1, Reasonable cause for a bill of address to the Governor
may include an indictment, but an indictment standing alone is not sufficient.

¥ Id, 1233, See also MeSorley v. Penn. Tpk Comm'n, 134 A.24.201, 205 (Pa. 1957) (“Of course,
Article VI, Section 4, did not confer upon the Governor power to suspend elected officers. His
power with respect to such is to remove them for reasonable cause on the address of two-thirds of
the Senate.” (emphasis in original).

383 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention 233-34,

id.

1d, 0232-33.

4
 

As noted earlier, when a constitutional provision is uncertain as to its meaning,

‘we read the section considering all others to produce a harmonious whole.*' When
addressing removal, the Framers targeted three ways to remove a public official—
certain criminal convictions, impeachment and conviction, and a bill of address. The
first two means of removal from office concem only convictions. The third—the
bill of address—was intended to cast a wider net and to capture criminal conduct
that has not yet resulted in a conviction, general misbehavior in office, and incapacity

of many kinds. As was discussed during the Delaware Debates:

‘Tumto Section 14, and you find another way, and that may or may not
be for offenses committed in office, or for crimes not connected with the
office, or for no crime at all, but for mere misfortune, for mere
incapacity, or for unseemly conduct which does not reach a degree of
crime of any sort, but more particularly, probably, would be applied to
‘cases of mental or physical disability . .

William Spruance spoke at various points about what reasonable cause meant

under Delaware's Section 13:

on the address of two-thirds of the General Assembly to the Governor.
‘The Governor may then remove a man from office-not that he ‘shall”
but he ‘may’. That might be a case in which a man had misbehaved

*' Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.34 536, 538 (Del. 2011) (when construing a statute
“we consider the statute as a whole, rather than in parts, and we read each section in light of all
others to produce a harmonious whole.”),

Delaware Constitutional Convention at 2967 (emphasis added), See also id. at 3188 (“The
Governor may then remove a man from office-not that he ‘shall’ but he ‘may’. That might be a
case in which a man had misbehaved himself in office or had become incompetent physically ot
mentally; then he might be removed from office.”)

13
himself in office or had become incompetent physically or mentally;
then he might be removed from office."

‘The Pennsylvania Delegates also discussed the reason to have a “catch-all”

 

removal provision—the need to take prompt action in certain cases to protect “the

safety of the public interest:”

Take for instance your office of State Treasurer, who will be elected by
the people. Immediately upon his election he may be discovered to be
totally unfit for the office, or he may have designs upon the treasury,
by the removal of its funds, and for which his security may be
inadequate or insufficient as a remedy, and it may be important that he
should be removed, and promptly .. . without waiting for the tedious,
troublesome and expensive method of impeachment. The safety of the
public interest may require prompt action.“*

 

The Delaware Delegates remarked about the breadth of the reasons for
removal: “there is another class of cases where there is no crime, but there is physical
disability, or 1000 other things that might make it desirable that a man should be
taken off the Bench or removed from any other office."* Thus, reasonable cause
can include an indictment. For instance, the public official might be indicted for a

crime that makes it impossible for an officer to perform their duties. Nonetheless,

© Ja. at 3188 (emphasis added). We note that “misbehavior in office” are the words used to
describe criminal conduct in Article XV, Section 6 ofthe Delaware Constitution

“3 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention 231. Mr. Darlington went on: “So with regard 10
your Auditor General; he has vast power. He is to be elected by the people. He may pass an
account through his office, which may take millions of dollars from the Treasury. It should be in
the power of the representatives of the people and the executive to remove him promptly, and if
anything serious should be wrong.” Id.

* Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1855.

* Saul Ewing Arstein & Lehr Amicus Brief inthe Affirmative at 10-11 “(hereinafter, Saul Ewing.
Br," (citing Sussex County Dept. of Elections v. Sussex County Republican Commitee, 58 A3d

   

  

16
as we explain later, before a bill of address, there must be a hearing and an
opportunity for the accused public official to be heard on the grounds for removal.
“The legislative body must also make a specific finding of reasonable cause to support
‘the removal.” While the conduct underlying an indictment may ultimately support

that finding, the mere fact of an indictment is not reasonable cause.

Response to Question 2. The Governor's authority to remove a public official upon
a bill of address does not include the authority to take a lesser action such as
suspension.

Section 13 states that the Governor may “remove any officer.” It does not
mention suspension. During the Delaware Debates, all discussion about Section 13
focused on removing an officer from office. The Delaware Delegates did not
contemplate a lesser included remedy, such as the ability to suspend an officer.

While the Delaware Delegates did not specifically address the power to
suspend, the Pennsylvania Delegates were clear:

Mr. CURTIN. Mr. Chairman ; Allow me to ask, if the Convention
adopt [sic] this section of the article on impeachment and removal from

418 (Del. 2013) (finding that a candidate's indictment on 113 counts of child abuse created an
““ineapacity” such that he could not continue in the race).

"Id, at 1939 (explaining that “the Legislature” will be “the judge of the cause for which [the
officer] should be expelled."), Amicus points us to another quote from Spruance and argues that
‘Spruance intended to limit reasonable cause to conduct that is notacrime, Amicus Brief of Rodney
‘Smolla in Support ofthe Negative Position at 13 (quoting Delaware Constitutional Convention at
1855 (Spruance: “But there is another class of cases where there is no crime, but there is physical
disability, or 1000 other things that might make it desirable that @ man should be taken off the
Bench or removed from any other offie.”)). We do not read these remarks to exclude criminal
conduct from reasonable cause. Instead, Spruance was simply describing grounds for removal
other than through criminal convictions. AS noted above, Spruance believed that criminal conduct
‘would be included in Section 13.

 

 

”
office, do you intend to give the Governor any power to suspend any of
the officers ofthe State temporarily, as for instance the Auditor General
or the State Treasurer, or any other officer ?

Mr. BIDDLE. Mr. Chairman : I will answer the gentleman from Centre,
by saying, speaking for the Committee on Impeachment and Removal
from Office, that it was not the intention of that committee to give to
the Executive any power of suspending any officer."*

In In re Matter of Rowe, the Delaware Court on the Judiciary did interpret
another constitutional provision, which gave the Court on the Judiciary the authority
to censure, remove, or retire any judicial officer appointed by the Governor. The
court found the language of Article IV, Section 37 implicitly included the power to
suspend judicial officers.® It reasoned that:

‘The constitution provides a system of judicial discipline which is
designed to deal with all cases which might arise in any varied factual
context. We cannot accept the argument that the drafters of this
important amendment to the constitution intended to limit the
disciplinary action to “censure, removal, or retirement” with no
sanctions available short of retirement or removal except a mere
censure.*!

 

Article IV, Se

 

in 37 is different, however, from Article III, Section 13.
Section 13 concerns the removal of civil officers (with exceptions), whereas Section

37 is limited to judicial officers. And Section 37 includes more than removal. It

 

83 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania Convention 233.

4 366 A.24 1001, 1008-10 (Del. Jud. 1989) (discussing Del. Const. art 1V, § 37).

5 Jd, (We conclude that the power to suspend a judicial officer is inherent in the express powers
granted to the Court pursuant to art. 1V, § 37 ofthe Delaware Constitution.”

Pd a 1010.

18
addresses a range of powers—“censure, removal, or retirement”—not found in
Section 13. Censure alone could cover several types of disciplinary sanctions.
Section 13 also allows the General Assembly and Govemor to remove both
lected and appointed officers, not just appointed officers. Pennsylvania saw this as,
key distinction in its analogous provision. In MeSorley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1874 gave the govemor the right to suspend appointed officials—
but not elected ones—given his power to remove appointees at his pleasure.* The

Delaware Delegates, on the other hand, intentionally left out the Pennsylvani

 

provision allowing the Govemor to remove appointees at his pleasure.” Article Ill,
Section 13 of the Delaware Constitution, as such, does not include the power to
suspend officials, To interpret Section 13 that broadly would expand its power
beyond what its Framers contemplated.

Reading the removal provision to include lesser powers would also have

significant policy implications. If the Governor could suspend or conditionally

5 134 A.2d at 205 (“Of course, Article VI, Section 4, did not confer upon the Governor power to
suspend elected officers, His power with fespect to Such is to remove them for reasonable cause
‘on the address of two-thirds of the Senate. As to appointed officers, the power ofthe appointor
under Article VI, Section 4, to remove appointees at his pleasure embraces at all times the power
to remove for reasonable cause, as well, and that power includes the right to suspend for cause, as
we have already seen.”)

5 Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1938.

¥ See MeSorley, 134 A.2d at 205 (“It would do violence to the words employed to infer anything
more.”)

 

19
suspend public officers, this would create limbo in those offices, and a new level of
power in the executive, one of supervisory authority, While the Constitution
provides a method for replacement of officers when there is a vacancy in office,"
there is no provision for dealing with officers who have been suspended, and no
potential check on any conditions the Governor could choose to adopt before the
officers could be reinstated. Functionally, this would be a delegation of legislative
power to the executive, and is not a reasonable reading of the provision.

Finally, we need not reach whether the General Assembly's bill of address to
the Governor can recommend suspension rather than removal, as we find that the
Governor cannot suspend public officials.

Response to Question 3. A hearing is required prior to the vote on a bill of address.

Section 13 states that “{tJhe person against whom the General Assembly may
bbe about to proceed shall receive notice thereof...” but does not address what it
‘means to proceed against a public officer. We therefore tur to the Debates.

‘The delegates in both conventions raised the need for a hearing prior to a vote
‘on the charges. To quote from the Delaware Delegates during the Constitutional

Convention: “A man is entitled, when he gets this notice, to a hearing, and in the

5 Del. Const, art. I, §9.
question of introducing testimony, and the things that are to be brought in ...."56

‘The Pennsylvania Delegates agreed: “An officer elected by the people should only

be removed in some proper and judicious way....”8” And the Pennsylvania

 

Delegates added “a full hearing” and “due notice” to their provision during their
debates.** One delegate added: “I desire to preserve the right to trial and that I do
not desire to lodge in any person, however respectable or conservative, the right of
removal without cause, and without giving the accused a fair and full hearing and an
impartial trial J"?

As the Framers anticipated, the notice requirement allows the individual time
to provide a defense and to allow both Houses to consider the matter.” The hearing
serves as “a more speedy remedy” than impeachment, but not one “without due
consideration” or the “check” of each House of the General Assembly." As stated
succinctly by Spruance: “Suppose proceedings were started in the House. They
‘would immediately give notice to the man that charges had been made. They would

ive him that notice, and they could not take it up for vote until the expiration of that

Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1944. See also id at 1941 (Spruance: “there is no ease
in which a man ought tobe removed by the Governor upon the address ofthe General Assembly
unless he should have had fair notice of it and an opportunity to be heard. ...").

5°53 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention 231

id a 232.

oi

© Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1945 (Wilson T. Cavender: “As tothe question of the
length of time, Iam opposed to shortening the time, I think when a man is to be tied he ought to
have ample notice in onder that he may prepare himself for his defense.)

53 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania Convention 231

a
ten days."® The “notice” of “charges” required at least 10 days for the accused to
mount a defense. The Delaware Delegates also anticipated that the hearing would
take place before any vote on the charges and the hearing could take several days.
While the Delaware Delegates were discussing the structure of the hearing
and whether it needed to take place in each House of the General Assembly, Cooper
asked, “[Jegislative enactment would provide the formula, would it?” and Spruance
replied, “I think so.”* We understand those remarks to mean that the General
Assembly can decide how the hearing will proceed, other than the minimum
requirement of the public officer’s notice of the charges and the right to be heard.

Response to Question 3a, and b. A hearing in the first House or a joint hearing
satisfies the hearing requirement.

While Section 13 addresses the notice requirement and refers to a proceeding,
those references do not explain what the hearing requires, nor which House must

conduct the hearing. The Delaware Debates offer guidance on the question.’ The

© Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1943.

© See id. at 1940 (Saulsbury: “Suppose the proceeding started in the House of Representatives,
and aftr it begins its sessions, this notice could be served right away, but [the officer] is entitled
tohave ten days notice. Then he is entitled to have a hearing before that house, which would take
several days. Then that matter goes over to the Senate and he is entitled there to have ten days
notice, and to have a hearing there, and altogether, it would necessarily consume thirty days atthe
very least”); id at 1941 (discussing the notice requirement as a way “to give notice to the accused
that on such a day there would be taken up for consideration these charges which are

  

specified, ... Iisa matter of a great deal of consequence that when a man is about to be proceeded
‘upon, that he have proper notice to defend himself.”
dat 1945,

© The Pennsylvania debates are less applicable here, because the Pennsylvania Constitution
removal provision limited the removal hearing to the Senate alone. 3 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania,
Convention 232-33,

2
conduct the hearing. The Delaware Debates offer guidance on the question.* The
Delaware Delegates were concerned about the notice and hearing requirement taking
too long, and discussed the issues that would arise with two separate trials:

MARTIN B. BURRIS: Then he must have two trials.
EZEKIEL W. COOPER: Yes.
MARTIN B. BURRIS: Why not a trial upon joint Assembly?

EZEKIEL W. COOPER: That is exactly what I mean. Change the
phraseology in some way, or else confine it to one house.

WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: I insist upon it that this word is right as it
is, and that there is but one notice required. Ifit had said ten days notice
before the day on which either house of the General Assembly shall
proceed, then it would require two notices. But ten days upon which
either house, that means the first one that has the hearing,

EZEKIEL W. COOPER: Yes; but is a Senator going to agree to issue
an address to the Governor to remove an officer when he has heard no
statement of the case, or no trial, or when the trial has been in the
House?

WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: I do not know. If that testimony was taken
in writing and brought up, it might be sufficient. I do not know how
that may be.

EZEKIEL W. COOPER: Legislative enactment would provide the
formula, would it?

WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: | think so.”

 

The Pennsylvania debates are less applicable here, because the Pennsylvania Constitution
‘removal provision limited the removal hearing to the Senate alone, 3 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania,
Convention 232-33.

© Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1944-45,

 

23
‘The Delaware Delegates concluded that one hearing would be sufficient, or

that the General Assembly could conduct a joint hearing. This reading is supported

 

by the thoughtful comments from one of the amici:

There is also no reason to think that the members of one chamber could
not rely on a report and transcript generated by the other chamber—
after all, if, in impeachment proceedings, the members of the U.S.
Senate can rely on a report and summary generated by a committee of
the Senate, there is no reason why the members of the Delaware House
could not...

It is acceptable to have one hearing—in either House of the General Assembly
which has provided the ten-day notice—or a joint hearing before both Houses.

Response to Question 3e. Both Houses would issue a joint notice ten days prior to
the hearing. The individual must have a hearing, which preferably would include
the right to attend, be represented by counsel, call witnesses, and introduce evidence.
‘The other parameters of the hearing are within the discretion of the General
Assembly.

‘The Delaware Delegates described the opportunity to be heard as akin to a
‘jury trial." By this time, the role of the jury and structure of a jury trial were
largely analogous to what we have today.” Section 13’s notice requirement

protected the individual's right to prepare for the “trial:” “A proceeding of this sort

Saul Ewing Br. at 23
© Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1943,

® See, eg, Stephan Landsman & James F. Holderman, The Evolution ofthe Jury Trial in Americ,
37 Litigation 32,35 (Fall 2010) (“Until the nineteenth century it was thought thatthe jury, a least
arguably, had the authority to decide the lw for itself. This option was ever more firmly hemmed
in and forcefully rejected in cases like Sparf v. United States, 156 US. $1 (1895).... The
nineteenth- and early twenteth-century ‘modern’ jury retained the size (12) and decison rule
(unanimity) that juries had relied on for hundreds of years... . This jury was far more passive than
‘what had come before...)

 

 

Py
would not be brought, or is not likely to be brought against a man unless there is
pretty strong ground against him.””! As such, the Delaware Delegates argued
against providing only five days’ notice: it “is pretty short notice for a man to be
brought up in a round term, and to say to him, ‘We are going to kick you out of

office’, and to furnish him with the charges and give him only five days in which to

 

make his defense.” Although the Delaware Debates do not provide a definitive
answer to the question, given the reference to a trial, and a trial similar to one

involving a jury, we believe the Delaware Delegates would have wanted to give the

 

accused the procedural protections associated with a trial—the right to be
represented by counsel, the right to offer evidence, and the right to call witnesses—
as would be expected for an individual making their own “defense.”

The Pennsylvania Delegates debated changing the language of their provision
from “after a full hearing” to “after due notice and an opportunity to be heard”

because “[i}t might happen that the accused will say nothing, and then, according to

the terms of the proposition, you never could remove him.”” The Delaware

 

provision dropped the reference to a full hearing, and instead simply refers to the
proceeding. We conclude from these comments that the hearing need not be a “full

hearing,” which is to say, an individual need not testify on their own behalf, As
7 Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1940.

dat 1941.
73 Debates ofthe Pennsylvania Convention 233-34

28
amicus points out, this proceeding is not a criminal trial, and there is no
“determination of guilt or innocence . .. the only question is whether ‘reasonable
cause” exists for removal from office.” As such, the public officer must be offered
the chance to mount a defense but need not testify.

Response to Question 4. A Joint Resolution by both Houses is required at least ten
days before the hearing in the first House or before a joint hearing.

‘As discussed above, this was a point that was heavily debated at the Delaware
Constitutional Convention. Wilson T. Cavender, a Delaware State Senator from
Kent County, carried the argument:

The spirit of the language of this section, it seems to me, is very clear
that this notice should be given in the shape of a joint resolution, It
‘seems to me it would not be proper in any other shape.

What is the General Assembly? The General Assembly is not the
House, nor the Senate separately, but itis the Senate and House both,
and a notice coming from the General Assembly would come in the
shape of a joint resolution.”*

The Delegates contemplated that the General Assembly would adopt a Joint

 

 

 

Resolution a least ten days before the hearing date, Either House may hold a hearing
after that 10-day period has elapsed, or the General Assembly may hold a joint

hearing.

 

Response to Question 5. There is no appeal from the Governor's decision. We
do not express an opinion on whether judicial review is available through other
avenues.

% Saul Ewing Br. at 23-24
* Delaware Constitutional Convention at 1945.

26
Section 13 has no mechanism for a direct appeal of the Governor's decision

to remove an official upon a bill of address. We were not asked to explore whether

there are other avenues for relief through the courts.

4s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice

(s/ Karen L, Valihura
Justice

Abdames T Vaughn Je.
Justice

27

(/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

/s/ Tamika R.
Justice