Title: State of New Jersey v. Lamont E. Scott

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). ZAZZALI , J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether an unoccupied apartment that is available for rent retains the status of a dwelling for purposes of the criminal trespass statute. On May 28, 1997, Lamont Scott was arrested by Lindenwold police officers after being found in one of the bedrooms of apartment 502 of the Meadow View Court Apartments. The apartment had been vacant since April 30, 1997, and did not contain any furnishings, personal belongings, or amenities, other than basic appliances. On the day before Scott's arrest, the property superintendent had been in the unit getting it ready for the new tenants, who were scheduled to move in on June 1, 1997. On observing Scott in the unit the following day, the superintendent exited the apartment and asked a neighbor to call the police. Two Lindenwold police officers arrived and arrested Scott after a struggle. Scott subsequently was charged with third-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a. He entered a plea of not guilty. At the close of the trial on the charges, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the burglary charge because the apartment was vacant at the time of Scott's arrest. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the apartment was not vacant, specifically noting that the apartment contained carpeting, plumbing, pipes, and appliances. In its instructions, the trial court told the jury that it would be responsible for making a finding not only as to whether Scott was guilty of criminal trespass, but also as to whether the crime was committed in a dwelling within the meaning of the statute. The trial court further instructed the jury that [w]hen a structure sits vacant for a substantial period of time, it may lose its character as a dwellling. That charge was consistent with the decision in State v. Crutcher, 313 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 1998) and with the Model Jury Charge for criminal trespass. The jury found Scott not guilty of third-degree burglary. However, it convicted him of the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree criminal trespass as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3a, necessarily determining that Apartment 502 was a dwelling. In addition, the jury convicted Scott of the remaining charges. The Appellate Division reversed Scott's conviction of fourth-degree criminal trespass and directed entry of a judgment of conviction of the disorderly persons offense of criminal trespass. The panel agreed with Scott that the State's proofs, while adequate to sustain a conviction of the lesser-included disorderly persons offense of criminal trespass into a structure, were insufficient to support a conviction of criminal trespass into a dwelling. The Appellate Division reasoned that a dwelling is a structure that must be either occupied by people who live there or who have an immediate right of occupancy. The Appellate further determined that it was error for the trial court to charge that if a residence is vacant for a substantial period of time, it may lose its character as a dwelling. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: An unoccupied apartment that is between rentals, but is suitable for occupancy, is a dwelling for purposes of the criminal trespass statute. 1. Although the legislative history underlying the criminal trespass statute makes clear that a structure currently need not be occupied to be a dwelling, the Legislature has not defined dwelling, within the context of that statute. Thus, reference to the common-law definition of the term must be made. (p. 8) 2. There can be little doubt that rental units, including apartments, generally fall within the common-law definition of dwelling. (pp. 8-9) 3. Vacation homes, cabins, seasonal cottages, and similar residences are appropriate analogues to a vacant apartment because they are generally maintained during the off season vacancy, and are to be occupied after the period of the vacancy. Vacation homes have been considered dwelling houses even if at the time of the break-in the owner had not occupied the home for several months. (pp. 9-10) 4. Although a substantial period of time in which a home is unoccupied is a factor that courts may use to determine whether it is vacant, overemphasizing the length of the vacancy may be misleading in the context of rental apartments. Instead, the critical inquiry regarding rental apartments is whether the unit is available and suitable for rent. If it can be proven that the apartment is maintained by a landlord who is seeking new tenants, the apartment is a dwelling for purposes of the criminal trespass statute. (pp. 10-11) 5. An unoccupied apartment that is between rentals but is suitable for occupancy is a dwelling for purposes of the criminal trespass statute. (pp. 11-12) 6. Recognizing an apartment to be a dwelling within the meaning of the burglary and trespass statutes is in the best interest of the sizeable number of New Jerseyans who live in apartments and enhances the protection for the entire community. (p. 12) 7. Although the trial court charged the principles of Crutcher in this case, there is no need for a retrial, inasmuch as no reasonable jury could conclude that the apartment involved in this appeal was not a dwelling. Thus, because there was no need for the jury to consider the issue, the trial court's instructions do not warrant reversal. (p. 13) 8. The Criminal Practice Committee is directed to reconsider the Model Jury Charge in light of the Court's decision and to determine whether the Model Charge should be amended to clarify that a dwelling is any structure where individuals reside and sleep, including, but not limited to, a home, a townhouse, apartment, condominium, motel, hotel, or other structure that is dedicated to or intended for residential use, regardless of whether it is occupied, so long as it is suitable for residential use. (pp. 13-14) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and d efendant Scott's judgment of conviction for fourth-degree criminal trespass is REINSTATED. The remaining portion of the Appellate Division's decision involving defendant's consecutive sentences remains undisturbed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAMONT E. SCOTT, Defendant-Respondent. Argued March 13, 2001 -- Decided July 24, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jack L. Weinberg, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Lee A. Solomon, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney). Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Lora B. Glick, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. In other words . . . you're going to have to remember the facts of the case and make a determination whether, one, it was a structure, and two, whether the structure was a dwelling. [Emphasis added.] During deliberations, the jury requested clarification on the definition of dwelling and what constitutes a substantial amount of time. The trial court responded: [W]hen I charged you before I instructed [that] a dwelling is a private home, a place where a person resides and sleeps. Now, a building that is vacant and uninhabitable, without residents or tenants, is not a dwelling within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, if you find that something is a structure and you find it _ it was a dwelling, it's character may change. When a structure sits vacant for a substantial period of time, it may lose its character as a dwelling. Now . . . you have to determine . . . whether the nature of the structure was so altered by time that that would change its _ its definition and it would be no longer a dwelling. You may consider . . . what if anything was changed, what was lacking. Now, you have asked what is substantial. You, the jury, have to determine in your own minds and make your decision what is a substantial period of time. The dictionary defines substantial as meaning ample or considerable in importance or extent. [Emphasis added.] [Emphasis added.] The statute also provides an affirmative defense to the conviction of criminal trespass if the structure involved in an offense under subsection a. was abandoned. N.J.S.A. 2C:18- 3d(1). An earlier version of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3a provided that a person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure. L. 1978, c. 95 (emphasis added). If the offense was committed in a dwelling, it was a crime of the fourth degree. Ibid. In 1980, the Legislature amended the language of both the burglary and criminal trespass provisions to expand the categories of properties to be protected against unauthorized entry. L. 1980, c. 112. Specifically, the Legislature deleted the qualifying terms building or occupied in describing the type of structure that falls within the scope of the statute. That phrase was deleted to clarify that the unlawful entry for unlawful purposes of any room or building, or form of conveyance, as well as the unlawful entry for unlawful purposes of any place adapted for overnight accommodation or carrying on business, constitutes a burglary. This clarification is accomplished by the broadening of the term structure as used in Chapter 18 of the penal code which covers burglary and criminal trespass. [Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, Statement to S-884, June 5, 1980 (emphasis added).] See also Governor's Message to Senate Bill No. 884 (Sept. 19, 1980) (explaining that amendments expand[ed] the definition of 'structure' to include certain unoccupied places ). The legislative history makes clear that a structure currently need not be occupied to be a dwelling. Beyond that, however, the Legislature has not defined dwelling, at least not within the context of the criminal trespass statute. Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, at 496 (2001); see N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11c (defining dwelling within context of justification defense). NO. A-21 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAMONT E. SCOTT, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 23, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz