Title: Wien v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANIEL WIEN, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 349, 2004     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0305020899 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 13, 2005 
 
 
Decided: 
July 22, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
John F. Brady, Esquire, of Brown, Shiels, Beauregard & Chasanov, 
Georgetown, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware; for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice. 
 
The defendant-below appellant, Daniel Wien, appeals from his conviction in 
the Superior Court of three counts of violating the Wetlands Act.1  On appeal Wien 
maintains that (1) the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad; and that the Superior Court erred:  (2) by denying his motion 
to suppress evidence that (Wien contends) was the product of an illegal search of 
his property; (3) by excluding as irrelevant certain testimony that Wien sought to 
have admitted; and (4) by failing properly to instruct the jury on the mental state 
required to convict him.  We conclude that the statute is not overbroad or vague 
and that Wien’s other claims of error are meritless.  We therefore affirm. 
Facts 
Wien owns waterfront property on Joseph’s Creek near Rehoboth Beach.  In 
1988, portions of Wien’s land were designated as wetlands.2  Wien was aware of 
this designation and was furnished a map indicating those portions of his land that 
qualified as “wetlands.” 
After portions of his land were eroded by storms in 1998 and 1999, Wien 
began erecting an erosion barrier in a “U” shape around a channel that penetrated 
his wetlands.  Wien constructed the barrier using 40-pound bags of concrete mixed 
                                          
 
1 7 Del. C. § 6601, et. seq. 
 
2 “Wetlands” is defined by statute to include lands on certain Delaware waterways which sit at a 
certain elevation and upon which may grow certain specified species of plants.  See 7 Del. C. § 
6603(h). 
 
 
2
with sand.  The sand and concrete bags were dry when they were stacked, but after 
the bags were exposed to the rain, the concrete hardened.  By the time the 
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”) issued a 
“cease and desist” order, the barrier consisted of about 1700 bags of concrete and 
was approximately 406 feet long. 
In April 2003, William Moyer, a DNREC official, received a complaint 
about activity on Wien’s wetlands.3  Before he went to observe Wien’s property, 
Moyer verified that Wien did not have any permit for wetlands activity.  From the 
road outside Wien’s property, Moyer observed several pallets stacked with 
concrete bags.  Moyer was familiar with Wien’s land, and from his roadside 
vantage point, he was able to conclude that the bags were placed in a wetlands or a 
subaqueous land area.4  Moyer also observed tire tracks leading farther into the 
wetlands area of Wien’s property.   
Based on these observations, Moyer concluded that Wien was violating 
Delaware’s wetlands law.  Moyer then entered the property, where he found the 
barrier Wien had constructed around the channel.  Wien admitted to Moyer that he 
                                          
 
3 Moyer is an environmental manager with DNREC, working in the Wetlands and Subaqueous 
Lands Section.   
 
4 Similar to the Wetlands Act, 7 Del. C. § 7205, prohibits a person from constructing, modifying, 
repairing, or reconstructing any structure on subaqueous lands without first obtaining a permit 
from DNREC.  Because he knew that the barrier was constructed on either wetlands or 
subaqueous lands, Moyer knew before entering the property that Wien was violating Delaware 
law.   
 
 
3
had put dirt “fill” across the wetlands so that trucks could deliver more concrete 
bags.  Wien was charged with three counts of conducting activity on wetlands 
without obtaining a permit.  Following a trial, he was convicted of all three counts.  
Wien appeals from that conviction. 
Statutory Overbreadth 
Wien first contends that the statute under which he was charged and 
convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The statute, 7 Del. C. § 
6604(a), provides that: “Any activity in the wetlands requires a permit from 
[DNREC] except the activity or activities exempted by this chapter.”  The term 
“activity” is defined as “any dredging, draining, filling, bulkheading, construction 
of any kind, including but not limited to, construction of a pier, jetty, breakwater, 
boat ramp, or mining, drilling or excavation.”5  Wien was convicted of two counts 
of “constructing” a barrier without a permit, and one count of “filling” the 
wetlands without a permit.  This Court reviews questions of statutory construction 
de novo.6  Where such review is of a constitutional nature, there is a strong 
presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional.7 
                                          
 
5 7 Del. C. § 6603(a). 
 
6 Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144, 145-46 (Del. 1996). 
 
7 Snell v. Eng’g Sys. & Designs, Inc., 669 A.2d 13, 17 (Del. 1995). 
 
 
4
A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it “does not aim specifically at 
evils within the allowable area of government control, but sweeps within its ambit 
other activities that constitute an exercise of protected expressive or associational 
rights.”8  Wien contends that Section 6604 is overbroad because it unnecessarily 
restricts his constitutional right to access navigable waterways.  We conclude that 
Section 6604 does not restrict constitutionally protected conduct.  
Where a statute is challenged for overbreadth, the threshold inquiry is 
whether the statutory reach encompasses a substantial category of constitutionally 
protected conduct.  If not, the statute is not constitutionally overbroad.9  In this 
case, Wien’s overbreadth argument fails, because Section 6604 does not regulate 
conduct that is constitutionally protected.  The State has legitimate power to 
regulate private riparian rights.10  That is what Section 6604 regulates.  Wien’s 
argument is faulty because it mischaracterizes the nature of the statute.  The 
wetlands statute does not prohibit access to navigable waterways; rather it requires 
property owners to obtain a DNREC permit before conducting activities on their 
wetland property.  If Wien believed that the regulation restricted his property rights 
                                          
 
8 State v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Del. 1998). 
 
9 Id. at 1144 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). 
 
10 City of Wilmington v. Parcel of Land known as Tax Parcel, 607 A.2d 1163, 1169 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
5
to such a degree as to constitute a “taking,” he had an adequate remedy under the 
“takings” clause of the United States Constitution.11  
Wien also contends that Section 6604 is unconstitutionally vague because it 
does not precisely define what conduct qualifies as “construction.”  A statute is 
void for vagueness if “it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
that his contemplated behavior is forbidden by the statute, or if it encourages 
arbitrary or erratic enforcement.”12  Courts review constitutional vagueness 
challenges within the context of the defendant’s own conduct.13  Therefore, the 
question is whether a reasonable person in Wien’s position should have understood 
that the barrier he erected using concrete bags was “construction” for which he 
needed to obtain a permit. 
Although the term “construction” is not specifically defined in Section 6604, 
the ordinary meaning of the term is commonly understood.  The dictionary 
definition of construction is “a structure, such as a building, framework, or 
model.”14  The statute clarifies that meaning by providing that construction 
                                          
 
11 U.S. CONST. Amend. V.  See, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); 
Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 
12 Baker, 720 A.2d at 1147-48 (citing Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 127 (Del. 1990)). 
 
13 Crissman v. Delaware Harness Racing Comm’n, 791 A.2d 745, 747 (Del. 2002). 
 
14 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition (2000). 
 
 
6
includes a “pier, jetty, breakwater, boatramp, or mining.”  Because the erection of 
a permanent erosion barrier is similar to the examples set forth in the statute, the 
term “construction” would inform a reasonable person that such a permanent 
structure requires a permit.  Therefore, Wien should have known that the erection 
of a 406 foot long barrier was “construction” for which he needed to obtain a 
permit, and the statute is not impermissibly vague.   
Lastly, Wien contends that the statute is vague because it does not provide 
minimum guidelines for enforcement.15  The legislature may delegate to an 
administrative agency the power to apply legislative mandates, but in so doing, it 
must provide “adequate safeguards and standards to guide discretion.”16  Section 
6604 satisfies that standard, because the statute articulates six criteria that the 
Secretary of DNREC must consider in determining whether to issue a permit for 
                                          
 
15 The vagueness doctrine requires the legislature to establish minimum guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.  Baker, 720 A.2d at 1148. 
 
16 Atlantis I Condo. Ass’n v. Bryson, 403 A.2d 711, 713 (Del. 1979). 
 
 
7
wetlands activity.17   Because those criteria provide a definite standard that the 
DNREC Secretary must apply, Section 6604 is not unconstitutionally vague.18 
                                          
 
17 7 Del. C. § 6604(b) provides that: The Secretary shall consider the following factors prior to 
issuance of any permit: 
 
(1) Environmental impact, including but not limited to, likely destruction of 
wetlands and flora and fauna; impact of the site preparation on tidal ebb and flow 
and the otherwise normal drainage of the area in question, especially as it relates 
to flood control; impact of the site preparation and proposed activity on land 
erosion; effect of site preparation and proposed activity on the quality and 
quantity of tidal waters, surface, ground and subsurface water resources and other 
resources; 
 
(2) Aesthetic effect, such as the impact on scenic beauty of the surrounding area; 
 
(3) The number and type of public and private supporting facilities required and 
the impact of such facilities on all factors listed in this subsection; 
 
(4) Effect on neighboring land uses, including but not limited to, public access to 
tidal waters, recreational areas and effect on adjacent residential and agricultural 
areas; 
 
(5) State, county and municipal comprehensive plans for the development and/or 
conservation of their areas of jurisdiction; 
 
(6) Economic effect, including the number of jobs created and the income which 
will be generated by the wages and salaries of the jobs in relation to the amount of 
land required, and the amount of tax revenues potentially accruing to the state, 
county and local governments. 
 
18 Wien also appears to suggest that the statute is vague because DNREC officials arbitrarily 
enforced the Wetlands Act.  That is a factual assertion which lacks support in the record.  Wien 
bases his argument solely on the fact that two years before Moyer visited the property, another 
DNREC official had observed Wien’s barrier and had not taken any action against Wien.  That 
does not demonstrate arbitrary enforcement, however, because, unlike Moyer, the first official 
was unfamiliar with Wien’s land and also was unaware that Wien did not have a permit for any 
activity.  The first official was there by reason of an unrelated issue.  DNREC’s failure to 
recognize Wien’s violations on the earlier visit is not evidence of arbitrary enforcement, where 
the official had no reason to suspect that a wetlands violation had occurred. 
 
 
8
Motion to Suppress 
Wien next claims that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress the evidence Moyer found upon entering Wien’s property.  This Court 
reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of 
discretion.19  Wien contends that Moyer’s entry onto his land was illegal, because 
Moyer did not provide written notice as required by 7 Del. C. § 6616.  The 
Superior Court held that although Moyer had not provided the statutory notice 
required by Section 6616, his presence on Wien’s land was justified under the 
“plain view” exception to the warrant requirement.   
7 Del. C. § 6616 provides that a DNREC official “may enter, at reasonable 
times, upon any private or public property for the purpose of determining whether 
a violation [of the Wetlands Act] exists … upon giving written notice.…”  The 
State concedes that Moyer did not provide written notice to Wien.  The lack of 
written notice does not invalidate Moyer’s search, however, because Section 6616 
does not define the only or exclusive circumstance where a DNREC official is 
permitted to enter private property for purposes of enforcement.  Rather, Section 
6616 authorizes DNREC officials to conduct administrative “spot checks” without 
requiring that the official have any reason to suspect that a violation of the 
Wetlands Act has occurred.  The statute does not displace the well-established 
                                          
 
19 McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Del. 2002). 
 
 
9
body of Delaware law that defines the circumstances under which law enforcement 
officers may search property without first obtaining a warrant.   
Because Moyer was not conducting an administrative spot-check, his actions 
were not constrained by Section 6616’s notice requirement.  A law enforcement 
officer may enter onto property to conduct a warrantless search where he sees 
evidence of a crime in plain view, provided that the officer is lawfully in a position 
from which he observes the evidence and the criminal nature of the evidence is 
immediately apparent.20  Moyer’s entrance onto Wien’s property was a warrantless 
search that was justified under the “plain view” exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Moyer entered Wien’s property after he saw, in plain view, evidence 
that Wien was violating the Wetlands Act.  Before he entered Wien’s property, 
Moyer knew that Wien did not have a permit for any wetlands or subaqueous 
activity.  Moyer also observed pallets of concrete bags upon, and observed tire 
tracks across, an area that he believed to be wetlands or subaqueous lands.  Based 
on Moyer’s knowledge of Wien’s land, it was immediately apparent to him that 
Wien was violating Delaware law.  Because Moyer was justified in searching 
Wien’s property under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement, the 
Superior Court did not err in denying Wien’s motion to suppress. 
                                          
 
20 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 358 (Del. 1998). 
 
 
10
Exclusion of Testimony 
Wien next claims that the Superior Court erred by excluding as irrelevant the 
proffered testimony of two Sussex County officials.  This Court reviews rulings on 
the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.21   
In an effort to prove that the barrier that he constructed did not fit within the 
statutory definition of “construction,” Wien sought to introduce the testimony of 
two Sussex County officials.  He offered the testimony of Joe Thomas, head of 
Emergency Operations in Sussex County, to show that the County often distributes 
sand bags to property owners to use in protecting their property from flooding.  An 
official from the Sussex Planning and Zoning Council was also prepared to testify 
that the Council would not have required Wien to obtain a permit before 
constructing the barrier.  The Superior Court determined that the County’s permit 
requirements and definition of construction were irrelevant in determining whether 
a violation of State law had occurred.  Accordingly, the trial court excluded the 
proffered testimony of those two officials. 
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
                                          
 
21 Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 590 (Del. 2000); Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 
1059 (Del. 1994). Where a court "has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce 
injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused."  Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 
A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
11
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  Wien bases his relevancy 
argument on the fact that Section 6604(a) provides that “no permit may be granted 
unless the county or municipality having jurisdiction has first approved the activity 
in question by zoning procedures provided by law.”  Based on that statutory 
language, Wien contends that the fact that County officials did not consider the 
wall to be “construction” requiring a permit, was relevant to whether the wall was 
“construction” under the Wetlands Act. 
Wien’s argument fails, because the proffered testimony had no probative 
value on the question of whether the wall violated the Wetlands Act.  Although the 
statute requires prior approval from the zoning commission, the fact that Wien’s 
activity did not require a permit from the Sussex County Zoning Council has no 
bearing on whether that activity was “construction” within the meaning of the 
Wetlands Act.  Because the County does not regulate wetlands, the fact that the 
County Zoning Commission did not consider the barrier to be “construction” 
would not affect the barrier’s status under the Wetlands Act.  Similarly, the fact 
that the County encourages landowners to use sand bags to protect their non-
wetland property from flooding is not probative of whether that activity is 
prohibited “construction” if it occurs on wetlands.  Because the testimony 
proffered by Wien did not make it less probable that the wall was “construction” 
 
12
requiring a permit under the Wetlands Act, the Superior Court did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding that testimony. 
Jury Instruction 
For his final claim of error, Wien contends that the Superior Court erred in 
not instructing the jury that it must find that he intentionally and knowingly 
violated the Wetlands Act in order to convict him.  This Court reviews de novo the 
Superior Court’s denial of a proposed jury instruction.22 
7 Del. C. § 6617(a) provides that “any person who intentionally or 
knowingly violates any rule, regulation, order, permit condition, or provision of 
[the Wetlands Act] shall be fined not less than $500 or more than $10,000 for each 
offense.”  The Superior Court instructed the jury that in order to convict Wien, the 
jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wien had intentionally and 
knowingly conducted or maintained an activity in wetlands.  Wien argues that the 
Superior Court should also have instructed the jury that it had to find either that 
Wien specifically intended to violate the Wetlands Act, or that he knew he was 
doing so.  In other words, Wien requested an instruction requiring the jury to find 
that Wien was specifically aware of the Wetlands law and knew that his activity 
violated that law. 
                                          
 
22 Hendricks v. State, 871 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Del. 2005). 
 
 
13
Wien’s argument fails, because ignorance of the law is not a defense to a 
crime.23  To prove a violation of the wetlands law, the State was required to show 
that Wien intentionally or knowingly constructed a barrier on wetlands and that he 
intentionally or knowingly filled wetlands.  That standard does not require the 
State to show that Wien was aware that his conduct violated the statute.  That 
conclusion is consistent with judicial decisions in other jurisdictions, holding that 
the phrase “knowingly violated” requires the government to prove only 
“knowledge of facts and attendant circumstance to comprise a violation of the 
statute, not specific knowledge that one’s conduct is illegal.”24  Because the jury 
instruction Wien requested was not a correct statement of the law, the Superior 
Court did not err by refusing to issue that instruction. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, the judgments of the Superior Court are 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
23 See, Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1998); State v. LeCompte, 538 A.2d 1102, 1103 
(Del. 1988). 
 
24 See, U.S. v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 (2nd 
Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991).