Title: Estate of Nohle

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2017 ND 100In the Matter of
the Estate of Charlotte C. Nohle, deceased Dori Lentz, Petitioner and
Appellantv.Timothy A. Bruun and Sharla Faye Bruun, Successor Co-Personal
Representatives of the Estate of Charlotte C. Nohle, deceased, Respondents and AppelleesNo. 20160274Appeal from the District Court of McKenzie County,
Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Robin A.
Schmidt, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.Jordon J. Evert, P.O. Box 417, Williston, N.D.
58802-0417, for petitioner and appellant.Lisa M.
Six (Argued) and Jennifer M. Nasner (on brief),
P.O. Box 1206, Williston, N.D. 58802-1206, for respondents and appellees.Estate of NohleNo.
20160274Tufte, Justice.[¶1] Dori Lentz
appeals from an order and judgment denying her request to modify the distribution decrees of the
Estate of Charlotte C. Nohle and ordering her to pay the estate's attorney's fees. We affirm,
concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the requested modification or
by awarding attorney's fees.I[¶2] Charlotte
Nohle died in 1957. Her 1951 will provided for distribution of mineral
interests:I direct my executors that all such gas, oil and mineral rights are
to be distributed, share and share alike, between my living brothers and sisters, and further direct
that should William Freeman and Flossie Engel be deceased at the time of my death, that their
natural born children should take in their stead, and further direct that the naturalborn [sic]
children of my deceased brother, Thomas Freeman, shall take in his stead his share that he would
have received had he been living at the time of my death. This provision, however, does not hold
true with the daughter of Victoria Davis, as I have otherwise taken care of Victoria
Davis. Nohle's deceased brother Thomas Freeman had several children. Four
of his children were living when Nohle died, but one child, Margaret Hanger, died in 1941 before
Nohle executed the will. Margaret Hanger had multiple children, including Louella Bricker and
Lentz's mother, Ruth Dorfner. In short, Nohle was a sister of Lentz's
great-grandfather.[¶3] In 1957, a petition to probate the will was
filed, and a final decree distributing Nohle's estate was entered in 1961. In 1965, a supplemental
final decree was entered distributing certain mineral interests that were not conveyed by the
original final decree. The final and supplemental decrees did not distribute any property to
Margaret Hanger's children.[¶4] In June 2015, Timothy Bruun and
Sharla Bruun petitioned to be appointed successor co-personal representatives of the estate,
stating the previous personal representatives were deceased, the Bruuns had been appointed
successor co-personal representatives in a similar Montana proceeding, and there might be
information about newly discovered assets in North Dakota. Lentz, representing herself, also
petitioned to be appointed the estate's personal representative, alleging there was new
information about the "actual heirs" and there were "newly discovered assets." The Bruuns
objected to Lentz's petition. After a hearing, the district court appointed the Bruuns as
co-personal representatives of Nohle's estate. The court reopened the estate for the purpose of
distributing newly discovered assets and directed Lentz to provide any information about newly
discovered assets to the Bruuns.[¶5] In September 2015, Lentz
moved under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) to modify the
1961 final decree of distribution and the 1965 supplemental final decree. Lentz argued Margaret
Hanger's children were devisees, the mineral interests had been improperly distributed, and the
devisees who received the improper distribution were liable to return the property improperly
received and the income it had earned since distribution. She requested the court amend the final
and supplemental decrees of distribution to include Margaret Hanger's children. The motion said
Lentz, John Dorfner, Louella Bricker, and others were requesting that the court modify the final
decree. Lentz signed the motion as the petitioner. Lentz represented herself throughout these
proceedings and is not a licensed attorney in North Dakota.[¶6]
The Bruuns moved to strike Lentz's motion, arguing Lentz is not an heir at law to Nohle, she is
not a proper party in interest, and she cannot bring the action on behalf of any other person or
entity because she is not a licensed attorney. The Bruuns also opposed the motion, arguing
Margaret Hanger's children were not required to be parties to the original estate proceedings, the
doctrine of laches bars any claims Margaret Hanger's children had against the estate, Lentz's
claim that the distribution decrees improperly distributed the property is without merit, and relief
under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is not
appropriate.[¶7] Lentz filed an amended motion to modify the
decrees of distribution, signed by John Dorfner, Louella Bricker, and Lentz. The amended motion
stated it was merely adding Louella Bricker and John Dorfner's signatures to the original
September 2015 motion. Lentz also moved to dismiss the Bruuns as co-personal representatives
of the estate. The Bruuns moved to strike the motion. Lentz later moved to "strike" her motion to
dismiss the Bruuns as co-personal representatives.[¶8] In
February 2016, the district court held a hearing on Lentz's motion to modify the distribution
decrees, Lentz's motion to dismiss the personal representatives, and the Bruuns' motions to strike.
Lentz withdrew her motion to dismiss the personal representatives. The Bruuns requested an
award of attorney's fees, arguing the filings were unwarranted and not allowed by law, the
allegations were not made in good faith, and Lentz is not authorized to practice law in this state.
The Bruuns also informed the court that they had requested information about the "newly
discovered assets" multiple times but Lentz had never provided the requested information. The
court stated it was planning to grant the Bruuns' motion to strike Lentz's motion to modify the
decrees because Lentz is not a proper party, but it was also planning to alternatively rule on the
merits of the motion to modify. The court advised Lentz that she was required to have an attorney
if she wanted to file any further documents in the case, including responding to the Bruuns'
request for attorney's fees. Through counsel, Lentz objected to the estate's itemized claim for
attorney's fees and costs. The district court concluded the requested attorney's fees were
reasonable and ordered Lentz to pay $26,170.50 in attorney's fees and costs to the estate for the
fees it had incurred by Lentz's continual and unauthorized filings in the case.[¶9] In May 2016, the district court entered an order, striking the motion to
modify the decree of distribution, affirming the final and supplemental decrees of distribution,
ordering Lentz to pay the estate's attorney's fees, and ordering Lentz to deliver the real property
descriptions for any and all newly discovered assets. The court ruled Lentz was not a proper
party, she engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing others in the action, N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) was procedurally inappropriate, the
doctrine of laches forever barred any claims by Margaret Hanger's children or grandchildren, and
Lentz had not shown sufficient grounds for disturbing the final decree of distribution even if N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) applied. Lentz appeals from the
judgment that was subsequently entered.II[¶10] A district court's decision on a motion to modify a final order under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Estate of
Cashmore, 2013 ND 150, ¶ 19, 836 N.W.2d 427; Murphy v. Rossow, 2010 ND 162, ¶ 9, 787 N.W.2d 746. A court
abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, if it
misinterprets or misapplies the law, or if its decision is not the product of a rational mental
process leading to a reasoned decision. Cashmore, at ¶ 9.[¶11] Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P.,
states a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for any of the following
reasons:(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;(2)
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;(4) the judgment is void;(5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or(6) any other reason that
justifies relief.[¶12] Lentz moved to modify
the final and supplemental distribution decrees under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). This Court has said N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) is a "catch-all" provision that
"allows a district court to grant relief from a judgment for 'any other reason that justifies relief.'"
Meier v. Meier, 2014 ND 127, ¶ 7, 848 N.W.2d 253. However,
"'something more extraordinary justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order must
be present, if subsection (6) alone is relied upon.'"
Anderson v. Baker, 2015 ND 269, ¶ 10, 871 N.W.2d 830 (quoting
Bettger v. Bettger, 280 N.W.2d 915, 919 (N.D. 1979)). The party moving for relief has
the burden to establish sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment or order.
Shull v. Walcker, 2009 ND 142, ¶ 14, 770 N.W.2d 274.[¶13] The district court denied Lentz's motion,
stating:Rule 60(b),
N.D.R.Civ.P., is procedurally inappropriate as the relief sought in the Motion to Modify
Decree of Distribution . . . is limited by section 30-0308, N.D.R.C., and
forever time barred by section 30-0309, N.D.R.C. (1943).Doctrine of laches forever bars any
claims by the children or the grandchildren of Margaret Hanger as a delay in enforcing their
rights (if any) have worked a disadvantage to others in this case as others have made serious
changes in position over the last fifty years.Even if Rule 60(b)(6), N.D.R.Civ.P., applied, Lentz has not
shown sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the final decree of
distribution . . . or the supplemental final decree of
distribution . . . .[¶14] Lentz argues the district court erred in dismissing her motion to modify
under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) and erroneously found
the doctrine of laches applies. She contends a party invoking the doctrine of laches must prove
they were prejudiced, but the Bruuns failed to present any evidence of harm and no evidence of
harm exists because she was requesting the court distribute newly discovered assets. She asserts
"both the Bruuns and Dori Lentz petitioned the court to probate subsequently discovered
mineral interests not previously probated. Ms. Lentz was not requesting the district court to
re-litigate the distribution of assets from a probate proceeding which occurred in late
1957."[¶15] However, Lentz argued in her district court brief in
support of her motion to modify the decrees that the prior distribution was improper, that
Margaret Hanger's children were devisees under Nohle's will, and that "[u]nder North Dakota
Century Code § 30.1-20-09 the devisees who received the improper distribution
under the Decree of Distribution are liable to return the property improperly received and its
income since distribution." She further argued:As a matter of law, the
distribution presented to the McKenzie County District Court by [the original co-executors] was
improper. The Decree of Distribution failed to distribute the devise to all of Thomas J.
Freeman's children, as clearly stated in Paragraph Nine of Charlotte Nohle's
estate. . . .Since liability follows the property and the property currently
exists (mineral rights held in family members' names) an adjustment in Decree of Distribution
such that the parties in the original Decree of Distribution now include the interest of Margaret
Hanger which is then devised to her eight children due to the anti-lapse
statute. . . .. . . .The law requires that an improper distribution be
remedied and it is a simple task to follow the property and re-devise the mineral rights according
to Charlotte Nohle's will. Lentz specifically requested that the district court
"amend the Final Decree of Distribution to correct the distribution by including the the [sic] eight
children of Margaret Hanger who will take Margaret Hanger's share, pursuant to
anti-lapse."[¶16] Lentz requested that the district court modify
the 1961 final decree and the 1965 supplemental final decree and redistribute the mineral
interests. The known mineral interests were distributed in the final and supplemental decrees at
least fifty years before Lentz moved to modify the decrees. Lentz did not present any evidence
about "newly discovered" assets. The court ruled Lentz did not show sufficient grounds for
disturbing the finality of the decrees. On appeal, Lentz does not argue the court erred by denying
her motion as to the mineral interests previously distributed in 1961 and 1965. Lentz's appellate
brief states, "Lentz is not asking this Court for a re-distribution of the decades old Final Decree
of Distribution of Nohel's [sic] Estate. Instead, Lentz is merely asking this Court for a correct
distribution of the newly discovered oil, gas and mineral
interests . . . ." We conclude Lentz has abandoned any argument that
the mineral interests distributed in the 1961 and 1965 decrees were improperly distributed and
that the district court erred in denying her motion to modify the decrees as they relate to
previously distributed mineral interests. See Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, N.A.,
449 N.W.2d 804, 807 (N.D. 1989) (holding
issues that were not briefed or argued are deemed abandoned).[¶17] To the extent Lentz argues the district court erred in denying her motion to
modify the final decrees for mineral interests that are newly discovered and were not previously
distributed, she seeks an advisory opinion. "Courts should think carefully before expending
'scarce judicial resources' to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory
interpretation that will 'have no effect on the outcome of the case.'" Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). We have consistently recognized that we do not have authority to
issue advisory opinions. See Richland
County Water Resource Board v. Pribbernow, 442 N.W.2d 916, 918-19 (N.D. 1989). Our decisions are limited to
questions involving existing rights in real controversies. Id. at 919. We are not authorized to render an advisory
opinion merely because the issue may arise in the future. Rodriguez v. North Dakota State Penitentiary,
2014 ND 49, ¶ 7, 843 N.W.2d 692.[¶18] The district court ordered Lentz to disclose
information about any newly discovered assets to the Bruuns, but she failed to provide any such
information. There is no evidence in the record about the existence of mineral interests that were
not previously distributed. Because there is no evidence of any mineral interests that were not
previously distributed, any decision on the issues Lentz raises about how new assets should be
distributed would be advisory only, and we do not issue advisory opinions.[¶19] Moreover, the final and supplemental final decrees were entered at least
fifty years before Lentz moved to modify the decrees. "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after notice of entry of the judgment or order in
the action or proceeding if the opposing party appeared, but not more than one year after a default
judgment has been entered." N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).
What constitutes a reasonable time varies from case to case and must be determined on the basis
of the facts before the court. Kukla v.
Kukla, 2013 ND 192, ¶ 25, 838 N.W.2d 434. "'Rule 60(b) attempts to strike a proper balance between
the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be
done, and accordingly . . . should be invoked only when extraordinary
circumstances are present.'" Kukla, at ¶ 25 (quoting Bellefeuille v. Bellefeuille, 2001 ND 192, ¶¶ 15-16, 636 N.W.2d
195).[¶20] Lentz has not provided any explanation about why it
took fifty years to bring these claims, other than claiming her mother did not have actual
knowledge about the prior probate proceedings and this was a family issue that had been
lingering for fifty years. The property was distributed at least fifty years ago. Under the facts and
circumstances of this case, fifty years is too long to wait to bring a motion to modify the prior
distribution decrees. See Bellefeuille, 2001 ND 192, ¶ 16, 636 N.W.2d 195 (affirming
decision that a motion for relief from a divorce judgment was not filed within a reasonable time
when it was filed twenty-one years after the judgment). We conclude the motion to modify the
final decrees was not made within a reasonable time.[¶21] The
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. We affirm the district court's
decision denying Lentz's motion to modify the final and supplemental final distribution
decrees.III[¶22] Lentz argues the district
court erred in ordering her to pay the Bruuns' attorney's fees. She contends the award of attorney's
fees was not proper because her claims were not frivolous and were made in good
faith.[¶23] This Court has explained that parties generally are
responsible for their own attorney's fees, but:The district court has
authority to stem abuses of the judicial process, which comes not only from applicable rules and
statutes, such as N.D.R.Civ.P. 11, but "from the
court's inherent power to control its docket and to protect its jurisdiction and judgments, the
integrity of the court, and the orderly and expeditious administration of justice." Federal Land Bank v. Ziebarth, 520 N.W.2d 51, 58 (N.D.1994). A district court has
discretion under N.D.C.C.
§ 28-26-01(2) to decide whether a claim is frivolous and the amount and
reasonableness of an award of attorney fees, but when the court decides a claim is frivolous, the
court must award attorney fees. See Strand v. Cass Cnty., 2008 ND 149, ¶¶ 12-1 3, 753 N.W.2d 872.
"A claim for relief is frivolous under N.D.C.C.
§ 28-26-01(2) only if there is such a complete absence of actual facts or law a
reasonable person could not have expected a court would render a judgment in that person's
favor." [In re ] Estate of Dion, 2001 ND
53, ¶ 46, 623 N.W.2d 720. We
review the district court's decision under the statute for an abuse of discretion. Id. Rath v. Rath, 2016 ND 46, ¶ 26, 876 N.W.2d 474 (quoting
Estate of Pedro, 2014 ND 237, ¶ 14, 856 N.W.2d 775). A court
also has authority to award attorney's fees for "[a]llegations and denials in any pleadings in court,
made without reasonable cause and not in good faith, and found to be
untrue . . . ." N.D.C.C.
§ 28-26-31. An award of attorney's fees under N.D.C.C.
§ 28-26-31 is within the court's discretion. Rath, at ¶ 26.[¶24] The district court found Lentz's allegation of newly discovered assets was
untrue and not in good faith. At Lentz's request, the court reopened the estate for the purpose of
distributing newly discovered assets. The court informed Lentz on the record that she should
identify these assets to the Bruuns, who had been appointed successor co-personal
representatives. When, several months later, Lentz had failed to identify any newly discovered
assets, the court specifically ordered Lentz to provide information about the assets to the Bruuns.
Lentz never provided any information to support her assertion that there were newly discovered
assets to distribute. Rather than proceeding to identify and distribute newly discovered assets,
Lentz sought modification of the 1965 supplemental decree of distribution, arguing that it was
"egregiously incorrect" as a matter of law. The court also found Lentz engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law by appearing on behalf of Bricker, Dorfner, and others in this
action. The district court ordered Lentz to pay $26,170.50 to the estate for attorney's fees and
costs incurred "for unnecessarily opening this Estate and for the Estate being required to respond
to the Motion to Modify Decree of Distribution . . . and the Motion to
Dismiss Co-Executors . . . , which motions were frivolous and
contained allegations not made in good faith." The Bruuns were required to respond to Lentz's
frivolous claims, including a motion she later withdrew. Lentz unnecessarily drove up the costs
of the proceedings. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering Lentz to pay the estate's reasonable attorney's fees.IV[¶25] The Bruuns argue this appeal is frivolous and request this Court award
them attorney's fees and costs under N.D.R.App.P.
38. We may award damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, for an appeal
that is frivolous. N.D.R.App.P. 38. An appeal is
frivolous if it is flagrantly groundless, devoid of merit, or demonstrates bad faith in pursuing the
litigation. Gray v. Berg, 2016 ND 82, ¶ 16, 878 N.W.2d 79. Our ability
to impose sanctions under N.D.R.App.P. 38 is
independent of the district court's ability to impose sanctions under N.D.C.C.
§§ 28-26-01 and 28-26-31, and
therefore the district court's determination that a claim is frivolous does not compel this Court to
conclude the appeal is also frivolous. Gray, at ¶ 16. We deny the Bruuns' request
for costs and attorney's fees for this appeal.V[¶26] We do not address the remaining issues and arguments because they are
either unnecessary to this decision or are without merit. We affirm the order and
judgment.[¶27] Jerod E. TufteCarol Ronning KapsnerLisa Fair
McEversDaniel J. CrothersGerald W. VandeWalle,
C.J.