Title: Doherty v. Civil Service Commission

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12855 
 
DENISE DOHERTY  vs.  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 9, 2020. - December 21, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
State Police.  Jurisdiction, Civil Service Commission.  Civil 
Service, Police, Decision of Civil Service Commission.  
Police, Suspension.  Statute, Construction.  Administrative 
Law, Hearing.  Criminal Offender Record Information. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 7, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael B. Halpin, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Department of State Police. 
 
Joseph P. Kittredge for the plaintiff. 
 
Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for 
Civil Service Commission. 
 
                     
 
1 Department of State Police. 
 
 
2 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case requires us to consider whether the 
Civil Service Commission (commission) has jurisdiction under 
G. L. c. 22C, § 13, and G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45, to review the 
discipline of loss of two days of accrued leave time imposed by 
the colonel of the Department of State Police (department).  The 
department contends that the Superior Court erred in finding 
that the commission had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal 
of her disciplinary sanction because loss of accrued leave time 
does not fall within the scope of appealable matters expressly 
contemplated by the statutes at issue.  The commission 
disagrees, arguing that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's 
appeal because, even if loss of accrued leave time is not 
expressly contemplated by the statutes, it is functionally 
equivalent to a suspension, which is within the commission's 
jurisdiction to review.  The commission also argues it has 
jurisdiction in light of the statutes' legislative purpose.  
Finally, the plaintiff, assuming that the commission had 
jurisdiction, contends that the Superior Court decision must be 
reversed because the commission denied the plaintiff's request 
for a public hearing and the commission's decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 
We hold that the commission did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's loss of two days of 
3 
 
 
accrued leave time under G. L. c. 22C, § 13, and G. L. c. 31, 
§§ 41-45.  We therefore vacate the judgment of the Superior 
Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Background.  We summarize the commission's relevant and 
undisputed factual findings, as well as the procedural posture 
of this case. 
 
The plaintiff has been employed by the department for over 
twenty years.  From 2007 to 2012, the plaintiff was assigned to 
the department's certification unit, which is responsible for 
providing licensing services for private security (also known as 
"watch guard") companies.  The certification unit will 
periodically conduct an administrative inspection of a watch 
guard company to ensure that the licensee company is in 
compliance with the statutory requirements.  Among other things, 
the certification unit confirms that the company has on file a 
complete list of current employees, as well as copies of 
affidavits of all employees affirming they have not been 
convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude, as required 
by statute. 
 
In October 2011, the plaintiff began an administrative 
inspection of XYZ Watch Guard Company (XYZ).3  The plaintiff 
                     
 
3 Because the actual name of the watch guard company was not 
relevant to its analysis of the issues, the commission used the 
pseudonyms "XYZ Watch Guard Company" and "XYZ" throughout its 
decision.  We adopt the same naming convention in this opinion. 
4 
 
 
reviewed the affidavits of XYZ's employees and conducted board 
of probation record checks, which led her to determine that ten 
or eleven XYZ employees had records of felony convictions.  The 
plaintiff subsequently conveyed to XYZ's director of government 
affairs that these employees jeopardized XYZ's license.  The 
plaintiff then met with XYZ's license holder and director of 
government affairs and informed them that she would contact the 
employees herself, and XYZ provided the plaintiff with the 
employees' contact information to do so. 
 
In March 2013, the department interviewed several XYZ 
employees who had been contacted by the plaintiff.  The 
employees complained that the plaintiff was "rude" and 
"unprofessional" in their interactions.  Moreover, one employee 
was incorrectly told by the plaintiff that the employee was 
unable to return to work at XYZ because of a prior felony 
conviction that, ultimately, did not exist.  As a result of the 
department's investigation, the plaintiff was charged with 
violating article 5.8 of the department's rules and regulations 
concerning unsatisfactory performance, and article 5.27 
concerning truthfulness.  In December 2015, the department 
convened a trial board, which heard evidence and ultimately 
found the plaintiff guilty of five specific violations of 
5 
 
 
article 5.8.1.4  The trial board recommended that the plaintiff 
forfeit a total of two days of accrued leave time as punishment, 
and both the trial board's findings and disciplinary 
recommendation were subsequently approved by the department 
colonel. 
 
The plaintiff then timely appealed the department's 
decision to the commission pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 13.  At 
the outset of an April 2016 evidentiary hearing before the 
commission, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting a public 
hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 43, which provides, "Any 
hearing pursuant to this section shall be public if either party 
so requests in writing."  Simultaneously, the department moved 
to impound all testimony and exhibits that were relevant to the 
appeal.  In its motion, the department argued that the bulk of 
the testimony and exhibits to be presented on appeal concerned 
the criminal offender record information (CORI) of several XYZ 
employees previously investigated by the plaintiff.  Because 
such information is "highly sensitive and not subject to 
dissemination," the department argued that it should not be put 
                     
 
4 Article 5.8.1 of the department's rules and regulations 
(effective Jan. 31, 2001) states:  "Members shall maintain 
sufficient competency to properly perform their duties and 
assume the responsibilities of their positions.  Members shall 
perform their duties in such a manner as will maintain the 
highest professionally accepted performance standards in 
carrying out the functions and objectives of the State police." 
6 
 
 
in the position of potentially compromising the privacy rights 
afforded to the XYZ employees in their CORI records in order to 
defend the disciplinary action it took against the plaintiff. 
 
The presiding commissioner at the hearing noted that there 
was a conflict between G. L. c. 31, § 43, which affords an 
appellant before the commission the right to a public hearing 
upon request, and the CORI statute, which protects the privacy 
of individuals with respect to the dissemination of their CORI 
records.  After hearing argument from both parties, the 
presiding commissioner closed the hearing to members of the 
public.  The presiding commissioner permitted the plaintiff's 
husband to remain for the hearing but advised him to exercise 
caution with respect to the sensitive information that was to be 
disclosed at the hearing.  Ultimately, the commission issued a 
decision affirming the department's discipline of the plaintiff, 
concluding that the department's actions were supported by "just 
cause" and that the forfeiture of two days of accrued leave time 
was an appropriate sanction. 
 
The plaintiff then commenced a civil action in the Superior 
Court, seeking judicial review of the commission's decision.  
The department, which was named as a codefendant, filed a motion 
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and asserted that the 
commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
plaintiff's appeal.  Specifically, the department argued that 
7 
 
 
the commission lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal 
because loss of accrued leave time is not one of the appealable 
disciplinary sanctions expressly contemplated by civil service 
law, G. L. c. 31, § 41.  The Superior Court judge denied the 
department's motion to dismiss and concluded that (1) under 
department regulations, loss of accrued leave time was the 
equivalent of a suspension; and (2) commission review of the 
plaintiff's appeal was consistent with the statutory goal of 
providing appeal rights to State employees across a broad range 
of disciplinary matters. 
 
Subsequently, the plaintiff moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.  In her motion, the plaintiff argued that the 
commission's decision to close the April 2016 evidentiary 
hearing was error requiring reversal and that the commission's 
decision affirming the department trial board's sanction was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  The department and the 
commission cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Superior Court judge entered judgment on the pleadings 
for the defendants and affirmed the commission's decision in 
full.  Specifically, the Superior Court judge concluded that (1) 
while it was error for the commission to close the evidentiary 
hearing to the public, the decision did not prejudice the 
plaintiff; and (2) the commission's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious.  The 
8 
 
 
plaintiff then appealed from the judgment on the pleadings, 
while the department appealed from the Superior Court judge's 
order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The case is now before this court on sua sponte 
transfer from the Appeals Court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Subject matter jurisdiction.  "[W]henever 
a problem of subject matter jurisdiction becomes apparent to a 
court, the court has 'both the power and the obligation' to 
resolve it."  Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. 
542, 547 (2018), quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 
193, 199 (2013).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of a party or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action").  In addition, 
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, 
conduct or waiver."  Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs., 479 Mass. at 547, 
quoting Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981).  Moreover, "a question of statutory 
interpretation is a question of law for the court to resolve."  
Matter of the Valuation of Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp., 456 
Mass. 728, 733 (2010).  Accordingly, because "lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is fatal to a plaintiff's claims," Everett 
v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 612 (2009), we must first address 
the threshold issue whether the commission had jurisdiction to 
9 
 
 
hear the plaintiff's appeal.  For the following reasons, we 
conclude that the commission did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction under G. L. c. 22C, § 13, and G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-
45, to hear the plaintiff's appeal of loss of two days of 
accrued leave time. 
 
We begin our analysis with text of the relevant statutes.  
It is a familiar rule that, "[w]here the language of a statute 
is clear, courts must give effect to its plain and ordinary 
meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words of the statute 
itself" (citation omitted).  Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 756 
(2001).  In addition, we have consistently held that when 
interpreting a statute, "none of its words is to be regarded as 
superfluous," id. at 757, and we must "avoid a construction 
which would make statutory language meaningless," Commonwealth 
v. Super, 431 Mass. 492, 497-498 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Maher, 408 Mass. 34, 37 (1990). 
 
General Laws c. 22C, § 13, provides that any uniformed 
member of the State police who has served for more than one year 
and who is charged with misconduct shall be tried by a 
department trial board at the direction of the colonel.  The 
statute further provides:  "Any person aggrieved by the finding 
of such a trial board may appeal the decision of the trial board 
under sections 41 to 45, inclusive of chapter 31."  G. L. 
c. 22C, § 13.  Tracking these cross-references, G. L. c. 31, 
10 
 
 
§ 41, provides for protection against the imposition of certain 
enumerated disciplinary actions unless there is "just cause."  
Finally, G. L. c. 31, § 43, provides that any person who is 
"aggrieved by a decision of an appointing authority made 
pursuant to [§ 41]" may appeal that decision to the commission.  
Taken together, whether a State police trooper may appeal a 
disciplinary matter to the commission is essentially determined 
by whether the matter falls within the scope of G. L. c. 31, 
§ 41.  This requires a close reading of the specific language of 
§ 41, which provides in relevant part: 
"Except for just cause . . . , a tenured employee shall not 
be discharged, removed, suspended for a period of more than 
five days, laid off, . . . lowered in rank or compensation 
without his written consent, nor his position be 
abolished."5 
 
The statute expressly enumerates specific disciplinary actions 
that may be appealed to the commission if they are not supported 
by "just cause."  Importantly, "loss of accrued leave time" is 
not among the list of contemplated disciplinary actions.  There 
is also no language in the statute suggesting that the list 
includes, but is not limited to, the enumerated disciplinary 
actions.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 112, § 5B ("'Disciplinary action' 
includes, but is not limited to, revocation, suspension, 
                     
 
5 The second paragraph of G. L. c. 31, § 41, also extends 
"just cause" protection for suspensions of five days or less, 
although it provides a different process for internal review for 
these shorter suspensions. 
11 
 
 
censure, reprimand, restriction, nonrenewal, denial, or 
restriction of privileges, or resignation").  Nor is there other 
equivalency or catch-all language in the statute. 
We have recognized that "a statutory expression of one 
thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the 
statute."  Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521 (2001), 
quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 
(2000).  The listed disciplinary actions are of a common type, 
involving significant personnel decisions that will be upheld 
only if there is "just cause" for the disciplinary action.  
"Just cause," in this context, is defined by "substantial 
misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by 
impairing the efficiency of the public service" (emphasis 
added).  Police Comm'r of Boston v. Civil Service Comm'n, 39 
Mass. App. Ct. 594, 599 (1996), quoting Murray v. Second Dist. 
Court of E. Middlesex, 389 Mass. 508, 514 (1983).  Accordingly, 
we read G. L. c. 31, § 41, to provide that only the serious 
disciplinary decisions expressly contemplated by the statute may 
be appealed to the commission.6 
                     
 
6 We note the commission itself has previously acknowledged 
that it does not have jurisdiction over department disciplinary 
actions that are not enumerated in G. L. c. 31, § 41.  See, 
e.g., Hackett vs. Department of State Police, Civil Serv. Comm'n 
No. D-06-191, at 16 (Jan. 15, 2009) (acknowledging "the 
Commission pursuant to [G. L. c. 31 §§ 41-43,] only has 
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions involving a termination, 
suspension, involuntary transfer or punishment duty"); Bretta 
12 
 
 
In the face of a plain language interpretation of the 
statute, the commission contends that the loss of accrued leave 
time is the functional equivalent of a suspension.  We are not 
persuaded.  While the department trial board is permitted the 
flexibility to impose loss of accrued leave time as an 
"alternative" to suspension, the availability of accrual leave 
time as an alternative indicates that accrual leave time is a 
lesser sanction to suspension and not an equivalent.  In 
addition, the department's interpretation of its own regulations 
suggests significant distinctions between the two sanctions.  
For example, article 5.17.2 of the department's rules and 
regulations provides that State police troopers who are 
suspended "shall be deprived of all Massachusetts State Police 
powers and privileges and must not represent themselves as 
members of the Massachusetts State Police."  That same rule also 
provides that State police troopers who are suspended for five 
or more consecutive days must also relinquish their issued 
badges, identification cards, and weapons to their division 
commanders for the duration of the suspension.  In essence, 
State police troopers who are "suspended" by the department are 
temporarily separated from their employment and may not avail 
                     
vs. Department of State Police, Civil Serv. Comm'n No. D-05-1, 
at 52 (Jul. 31, 2008) (finding commission lacks jurisdiction to 
address discipline of "reprimand" under provisions of G. L. 
c. 31, § 41). 
13 
 
 
themselves of the privileges of being a State police trooper.  
We note that this interpretation of "suspension" is also 
consistent with civil service law.  See G. L. c. 31, § 1 
(defining "suspension" as "temporary, involuntary separation of 
a person from his civil service employment by the appointing 
authority").  In contrast, a State police trooper ordered to 
forfeit accrued leave time is not subject to any of the 
aforementioned penalties apart from the actual forfeiture of 
such leave time, and at no point is the trooper separated from 
his or her employment.7  Accordingly, we conclude that loss of 
accrued leave time is not covered by the statutory language 
referencing suspensions, nor is loss of accrued leave time the 
functional equivalent of a suspension for purposes of G. L. 
c. 31, § 41.8 
 
The commission also argues that the plain reading of G. L. 
c. 22C, § 13, should be disregarded based on the Legislature's 
                     
 
7 We also recognize that the department has consistently 
construed suspension and loss of accrued leave time as distinct 
punishments, with the latter being a less severe sanction 
attended with far fewer consequences.  The record in this case 
includes numerous instances in which the department has argued 
that loss of accrued leave time is not equivalent to a 
suspension. 
 
 
8 We reach this conclusion in part based on the fact that 
only two days of lost accrued leave time were involved here.  If 
the disciplinary sanction imposed had required weeks or months 
of lost accrued leave time, a more difficult question would have 
been presented. 
14 
 
 
intent in promulgating the statute.  Specifically, the 
commission relies on the statute's original 1993 language, which 
stated: 
"Any person aggrieved by the finding of such trial board 
may . . . bring a petition in the district court within the 
judicial district of which he resides . . .  [to] review 
such finding and determine whether or not upon all the 
evidence such finding and punishment was justified." 
 
St. 1991, c. 412, § 22.  The commission contends, based on this 
pre-2002 amendment language, that the Legislature did not intend 
to substantively limit the disciplinary matters that a State 
police trooper could appeal. 
 
We disagree.  By amending G. L. c. 22C, § 13, as it did in 
2002, see St. 2002, c. 43, the Legislature substantively altered 
the plain and natural meaning of the statute in two important 
ways.  First, the Legislature redirected appeals of department 
discipline from the District Court to the commission.  Second, 
and more importantly for our purposes, the Legislature 
conditioned the commission's jurisdiction to hear such appeals 
on the express language of G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45.  It is 
reasonable for the Legislature, when it transferred appeals from 
the District Court to the commission, to have the commission's 
subject matter jurisdiction over department discipline track the 
language of its jurisdiction over other civil service employees.9  
                     
 
9 The legislative history of the 2002 amendment to G. L. 
c. 22C, § 13, supports this conclusion.  In voting to override 
15 
 
 
In sum, the commission's pre-amendment interpretation of the 
statute would essentially jettison the amended text's express 
reference to "sections 41 to 45, inclusive of chapter 31," which 
we decline to do. 
 
Finally, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
leave without recourse those State police troopers who have been 
subject to department level discipline that does not meet the 
requirements of G. L. c. 31, § 41.  General Laws c. 22C, § 43, 
expressly provides that any person may appeal a department order 
to the colonel, "who shall thereupon grant a hearing, and after 
such hearing the colonel may amend, suspend or revoke such 
order."  Such internal appellate rights provide State police 
troopers protection against less significant forms of 
discipline. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the commission does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction under G. L. c. 22C, § 13, and 
G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45, to hear the plaintiff's appeal of loss of 
two days of accrued leave time. 
                     
the Acting Governor's veto of the amended statute, legislators 
stated that they wanted to provide "the State Police the same 
types of access to a review that other police are entitled to," 
and to provide State police troopers "fairness" by redirecting 
appeals to the commission.  State House News Service (House 
Sess.), Jan. 16, 2002 (statement of Rep. Timothy J. Toomey, 
Jr.); State House News Service (Senate Sess.), Feb. 12, 2002 
(statement of Sen. Robert S. Creedon, Jr.). 
16 
 
 
2.  Public hearing.  Because of the above jurisdictional 
defect, we need not address the issue whether it was error for 
the commission to close the evidentiary hearing.  Nonetheless, 
we acknowledge that the presiding commissioner had a difficult 
task in reconciling the plaintiff's right to a public hearing 
under G. L. c. 31, § 43, which the plaintiff duly chose to 
exercise here, with the privacy rights afforded to the witnesses 
in their CORI records under G. L. c. 6, § 172.  Although not 
necessary for our decision today, we emphasize that in future 
cases in which a plaintiff requests a public hearing under G. L. 
c. 31, § 43, we caution the commission against blanket closures 
of hearings where a less restrictive option is available, such 
as impoundment or redaction of specific exhibits, or similar 
limitations on witness testimony.10 
                     
 
10 We also nonetheless agree with the Superior Court judge 
here that, even if the commission improperly closes proceedings 
to the public, the appropriate standard of review is not 
structural error, as argued by the plaintiff.  We apply 
structural error to protect an individual's constitutional right 
to a public trial in criminal cases.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 357 (2016) (affirming that criminal 
defendants' right to public trial is guaranteed by Sixth 
Amendment to United States Constitution and that violation of 
such right is structural error requiring reversal); Commonwealth 
v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 (2010) ("Generally, [structural 
error] is error that necessarily render[s] a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt or innocence" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Such a 
standard, with its presumption of prejudice, is not applicable 
to the closure of commission proceedings. 
17 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for an order 
of dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.