Title: Coleman v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
IRVIN E. COLEMAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000143 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
               January 12, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether the defendant's 
convictions and punishments for the malicious wounding and 
attempted murder of the same victim subjected the defendant to 
double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal constitution. 
II 
 
A jury in the City of Petersburg convicted Irvin E. Coleman 
of the attempted murder, robbery, and malicious wounding of 
Reginald O. Vincent and of three charges of displaying or using 
a firearm while in the course of committing the first three 
felonies.  The circuit court entered judgment on the verdicts 
and imposed the jury recommended sentences totaling 46 years, to 
be served consecutively. 
 
On appeal, Coleman's convictions were affirmed in an 
unpublished memorandum opinion by the Court of Appeals, one 
judge dissenting.  Coleman v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2871-92-2 
(July 20, 1999).  On a hearing by that Court en banc, the 
convictions were affirmed by an equally divided court, one judge 
concurring in the result.  Coleman v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2871-92-2 (December 21, 1999).  Coleman appeals. 
III 
 
A 
 
 
In accordance with well-established appellate principles, 
we will state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the party prevailing in the trial court.  The 
following dispositive evidence appears in the testimony of 
Vincent, the victim.   
 
Following Coleman's armed robbery of Vincent in the 
bathroom of Vincent's apartment in the City of Petersburg, 
Coleman ordered Vincent to push his trousers down around his 
ankles and Coleman "slowly back[ed] up."  After Coleman "got 
round the corner," Vincent pulled his trousers up, and went 
toward the front room where he heard Coleman.  When Vincent 
stepped "out of the door," the two men were about eight feet 
apart, and Coleman started shooting at Vincent.  As Vincent was 
"trying to get to" Coleman, Coleman shot him several times in 
the arms and legs and finally knocked Vincent to the floor with 
a sixth shot, which was to his groin.  As Vincent lay face down 
on the kitchen floor, "ten seconds went past, and there was 
nothing said, no movement."  Vincent thought "it was all over." 
 
2
 
Coleman, however, walked over to Vincent's recumbent body, 
"straddled" it and "put the gun right at [Vincent's] neck," and 
then shot him a seventh time.  After Vincent heard Coleman exit 
the apartment, Vincent, though disabled by his wounds, was able 
to leave the apartment, attract attention, and get help. 
B 
 
 
The circuit court and the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the defendant's acts of shooting the victim six times in the 
arms and legs were separate and distinct from the defendant's 
acts, ten seconds later, of walking over to the victim's body 
and shooting the victim in the head.  The defendant contends 
that (1) the evidence established that his conduct constituted 
one continuous act and (2) the crime of attempted murder is a 
lesser included offense of malicious wounding, and, therefore, 
he is entitled to the benefit of the double jeopardy provisions 
contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.1  As pertinent, this amendment provides that "no 
person . . . shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life and limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
The Commonwealth responds that the defendant was convicted of 
separate and distinct criminal offenses, and, therefore, he was 
                     
1 Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertions, the defendant raised 
this issue in the trial court, and, therefore, the issue is not 
procedurally barred. 
 
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not “twice put in jeopardy” in contravention of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
We review the following basic principles in considering the 
defense of double jeopardy before considering the argument of 
the parties.  The Fifth Amendment guarantees protection against 
a second prosecution for the same offense after either an 
acquittal or a conviction of that offense and against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 
410, 415 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 
(1969); Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 
796, 797 (1981).  Because this appeal concerns convictions of 
malicious wounding and attempted murder occurring in a single 
trial, " 'the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to 
assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative 
authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same 
offense.' "  Payne v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 257 Va. 216, 
227, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300 (1999) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161, 165 (1977)). 
 
In the prosecution for two crimes in the same trial, the 
double jeopardy defense does not apply unless (a) the defendant 
is twice punished for one criminal act, and (b) the two 
punishments are either for the same crime or one punishment is 
for a crime which is a lesser included offense of the other.  
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 169-70. 
 
4
 
Without deciding, we will assume the evidence established 
that defendant's course of conduct was a continuous act, as the 
defendant contends.  See id. at 169.  Since the two convictions 
of malicious wounding and attempted murder occurred in a single 
trial, we must decide whether the trial court exceeded "its 
legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for 
the same offense."  Payne, 257 Va. at 227, 509 S.E.2d at 300.  
When "the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether 
each [offense charged] requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
 
In applying the Blockburger test, we look at the offenses 
charged in the abstract, without referring to the particular 
facts of the case under review.  Blythe, 222 Va. at 726-27, 284 
S.E.2d at 798–799 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 
694 n.8 (1980)).  Looking at the elements of the two crimes in 
the abstract, the parties agree the required proof that the 
defendant shot, stabbed, cut, or wounded the victim for a  
malicious wounding conviction is not required for an attempted 
murder conviction.  They disagree, however, whether the proof of 
a specific intent to kill required in an attempted murder case, 
 
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Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 660, 180 S.E. 395, 398 
(1935), is also required in a malicious wounding case. 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, the defendant 
contends that such proof is required.  In considering the crime 
in the abstract, the defendant overlooks the plain language of 
the malicious wounding statute, which describes the required 
intent as that of "the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or 
kill."  Code § 18.2-51 (emphasis added).  Noting the use of the 
disjunctive "or" in the statute, we agree with the Commonwealth 
that a malicious wounding charge does not require proof of the 
specific intent to kill.  Thus, each of the convictions involved 
in this appeal contains required elements of proof not contained 
in the other conviction as required in the Blockburger test. 
 
The defendant, relying upon Brown v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
111, 279 S.E.2d 142 (1981), asserts that "attempted murder and 
malicious wounding convictions cannot arise from one 
transaction."  The defendant's reliance is misplaced.  In Brown, 
the defendant was indicted for attempted murder and malicious 
wounding.  The jury, however, convicted him of assault and 
battery under an indictment charging attempted murder and of 
unlawful wounding under an indictment charging malicious 
wounding.  On appeal, this Court held that it was improper for 
the jury to return a verdict finding the defendant guilty of 
assault and battery under the indictment charging attempted 
 
6
murder.  Assault and battery and unlawful wounding each are 
lesser included offenses of malicious wounding.  Therefore, the 
defendant’s conviction for unlawful wounding barred his further 
conviction “of all other offenses of a higher grade and of any 
lesser included offense encompassed by the malicious wounding 
indictment.”  We reversed the assault and battery conviction and 
dismissed the indictment charging the defendant with attempted 
murder.  Id. at 116, 279 S.E.2d at 145-46. 
 
Additionally, defendant relies on the following statement 
in Brown v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 116, 279 S.E.2d at 145-146:  
It is our conclusion that the court should 
have instructed the jury that if it found 
the defendant guilty under either the 
indictment which charged attempted murder or 
that which charged malicious wounding, it 
should not consider further the other 
indictment. 
 
In Brown, the parties apparently agreed that assault and battery 
was a lesser-included offense of attempted murder since there 
was no apparent objection to the jury verdict form permitting 
such a finding.  The parties were wrong.  Since assault and 
battery requires proof of a battery, it is not a lesser-included 
offense of attempted murder.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 
757, 759, 240 S.E.2d 658, 660, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 909 
 
7
(1978)(if second offense contains element of proof not contained 
in first offense, second offense not lesser-included offense).2
 
We decline to apply the quoted language from Brown in the 
broad manner suggested by the defendant.  We regard it as 
limited to the issue erroneously framed by the parties in Brown. 
 
We reject the defendant's contention that an attempted 
murder in which there was a wounding is a lesser-included crime 
of malicious wounding under the Blockburger test.  This 
contention is based upon the particular facts of this specific 
case and not upon a consideration of the crimes in the abstract, 
which, as we have noted, is the manner in which we apply the 
Blockburger test.  In sum, we conclude that a malicious wounding 
charge does not require the element of a specific intent to kill 
as is required in an attempted murder charge and thus satisfies 
the Blockburger test in this case as a matter of law. 
 
Even though attempted murder is not a lesser-included 
offense of malicious wounding, as we have held, the defendant 
argues that the lighter punishment specified by the legislature 
for an attempted murder conviction than that for a malicious 
wounding conviction indicates a legislative intent "to 
distinguish attempted murders which resulted in significant 
                     
2 The same principle applies in comparing the offenses of 
malicious wounding and attempted murder, as we have noted 
earlier in this opinion. 
 
8
bodily harm to the victim from other attempted murders."  He 
cites, and we find, no authority in support of this statement. 
For all the above reasons, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals will be  
Affirmed. 
 
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