Title: Parker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

No. 9, September Term, 2000
Mantice Parker v. State of Maryland
[Involves Peremptory Challenges Of Jurors And The Principles Of Batson v. Kentucky, 476,
U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), And Its Progeny]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 9
September Term, 2000
___________________________________________
MANTICE PARKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
        
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
        * Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
                                
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed:   August 21, 2001
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
Mantice Parker, the defendant and petitioner in this criminal case, was tried by a jury
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on several counts charging assaults and illegal use of
a handgun, based on the shooting of two persons.  During the jury selection, the State
challenged the defendant’s use of peremptory strikes as discriminatory, claiming a pattern of
racially based strikes against white prospective jurors.  The trial court sustained the State’s
objection regarding two prospective jurors and reseated the stricken persons on the jury panel.
The trial proceeded, and Parker was convicted.  Parker appealed, and the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed.  We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the trial
court’s actions regarding the two jurors were erroneous under the principles of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and its progeny.
I.
On the evening of October 14, 1996, a man armed with a gun got out of a blue Ford
Taurus automobile and chased Jamal Jones down Barclay Street in Baltimore City.  Jones ran
inside the residence at 2111 Barclay Street.  The man with the gun followed him inside and
shots were fired.  Jones sustained a gunshot wound to the arm, and Angelena Richardson, an
eight-year old child who had also been inside, sustained several wounds to her arm and back.
After the shots, the man with the gun got into the blue Ford automobile and drove away. 
The police arrived within minutes after the shooting, and witnesses described the gunman
and his vehicle.  They also gave the police a partial Maryland license tag number for the
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vehicle.  An investigation revealed that the defendant Parker had been issued a license tag
number for a Ford Taurus encompassing the partial license tag number observed by the
witnesses, and that his vehicle matched the description given by the witnesses.  Witnesses
interviewed by the police on the night of the shooting viewed a photographic array and
identified Parker as the gunman.  Two witnesses also furnished the police with written
statements implicating Parker in the crime.
Toward the end of jury selection at Parker’s trial, the prosecutor objected to defense
counsel’s use of peremptory challenges against several white prospective jurors on the ground
that the strikes were racially discriminatory.  The following colloquy took place:
“THE COURT:
Yes [defense counsel].  You owe me an
explanation. Start with [juror number] 26.
Juror 26 was seated originally in seat 8.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
She is employed by the Criminal Assignment
Office. I think that that is somewhat
problematic.  I don’t want a person employed
by Criminal Assignment sitting on my jury.
THE COURT:
All right.
PROSECUTOR:
May I answer that?
THE COURT:
You may.
PROSECUTOR:
Your honor, the juror answered that question
and said she could be fair so I find that reason
to be an unacceptable reason.
THE COURT:
I find it unacceptable as well. Okay. Go ahead.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Juror number 27, I struck people who had
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doctors’ appointments because I don’t want
somebody who has a doctor’s appointment
worrying about that [rather] than my trial.
PROSECUTOR:
I find that unacceptable because this Court
made it clear to the venireman, that the Court
would go out of its way to [accommodate]
that person with doctors’ appointments.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Doesn’t 
mean 
that 
person 
will 
not be
preoccupied with the fact that they have a
doctor’s appointment scheduled [rather] than
paying attention to the details of the trial, that
[juror 27] has made enough of a point to
approach the bench about it means [that he is]
thinking about it.  That person also happens to
be 66 years old.
* * * *
[We are] [t]alking about somebody more
concerned about their health than my trial.  It
is enough of a concern for me.
PROSECUTOR:
They are people who said they could be fair.
THE COURT:
I will put a question mark on that.
* * * * 
THE COURT:
What about juror number 30?
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Judge, with that person, ever since the person
was seated in the jury over there, I kept an eye
on him and he kept looking back in our
direction and I felt uncomfortable about him
as a juror.
PROSECUTOR:
I felt he was looking at me, too. But not being
a psychiatrist I can’t read people’s minds.  It
is not a reason to eliminate people from the
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jury.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I don’t know if he’s looking at me and my
client because my client happens to be a
black male.  But he was looking directly at
him the entire point in time he was there.
Made me feel uncomfortable, that he would
be an improper juror.
* * * *
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Juror 11 said she was the victim of [a]
breaking and entering, when she was up at the
bench she said she could be unbiased, and I
looked at her in the eye and - - 
THE COURT:
I don’t think so. [Juror number] 38?
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I struck that person because, again, her
position as a physician, she indicated to the
Court if she didn’t work, somebody was
going to have to work a double shift.  She
made that point very clear, and I am more
interested in having somebody not worried
about someone working a double shift for
them than if somebody is going to be a juror
on a panel.
PROSECUTOR:
The problem I have, in sixteen years, I know
this to be the truth, jurors worried about their
private lives, if you bring each and every
juror, if you asked them if they were
concerned about their private lives, the
answer would be, you bet you.  That is not a
reason. I think that is unacceptable.
THE COURT:
I agree. That is unacceptable.
* * * *
THE COURT:
The physician lady, I’ll give you the benefit
-5-
on that.  The physician lady which was [juror
number] 38, juror number 11 [the victim of a
breaking and entering], don’t bring her back.
[Juror number] 30 [the man looking at
defense counsel].  I don’t have a problem.
That was a neutral reason. [Juror number] 29
was a neutral reason.  So as we stand, only
[juror number] 26 [the criminal assignment
clerk] is unacceptable.  We’ll go with that.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Even though she is exposed to the criminal
docket every day of the week?
THE COURT:
So am I.  She never - no.  I think that is
unacceptable.  I really do.  That is an
unacceptable reason.
PROSECUTOR:
 
Otherwise, they couldn’t send a summons at
all or to me, or to the judge.
THE COURT:
All right.
PROSECUTOR:
What about the one you had a question mark
on?
THE COURT:
Well - - 
PROSECUTOR:
That would not interfere.
THE COURT:
That was Tuesday.  Also [juror number] 27
[the juror with the doctor’s appointment]
comes back.  That is unacceptable.”
Thus, the trial court reseated juror 26, the criminal assignment clerk, and juror 27, the
man with the doctor’s appointment.  The court stated that the reasons given by defense counsel
for striking jurors 26 and 27 were “unacceptable.”  The court, however, overruled the
prosecutor’s objections to the striking of juror 11, the victim of a breaking and entering, juror
-6-
30, the man looking at defense counsel, and juror 38, the physician, finding the reasons
proffered by defense counsel for these strikes “neutral” or “acceptable.”
Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Parker of second degree assault, use
of a handgun in the commission of a violent crime, and unlawfully carrying a handgun.  Parker
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed in a
reported opinion, Parker v. State, 129 Md. App. 360, 742 A.2d 28 (1999).  
Parker filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial
court’s rejection of defense counsel’s reasons for striking two prospective jurors and reseating
them on the jury panel.  Additionally, Parker asks this Court to decide whether the trial court
erred in admitting certain hearsay statements of two unidentified declarants into evidence
under the “excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay.  We granted the petition.
Parker v. State, 358 Md. 381, 749 A.2d 172 (2000).
II.
It is now settled law that peremptory challenges may not be exercised to exclude
members of a cognizable racial group from the jury panel.  See Harley v. State, 341 Md. 395,
402, 671 A.2d 15, 18-19 (1996); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 619, 667 A.2d 876, 882
(1995); Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 534, 616 A.2d 356, 361 (1992).  In Batson v. Kentucky,
supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, the Supreme Court established a three-
step process for addressing allegations of impermissible discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.  This Court has previously reviewed the procedure set forth in Batson
and its progeny.  We explained in Gilchrist v. State, supra, 340 Md. at 625-626, 667 A.2d at
-7-
885-886:
“First, the complaining party has the burden of making a prima facie
showing that the other party has exercised its peremptory challenges on
an impermissibly discriminatory basis, such as race or gender.  See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1721-1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 85-
88.  Moreover, ‘[w]hether the requisite prima facie showing has been
made is the trial judge’s call. . . .’  Mejia v. State, supra, 328 Md. at 533,
616 A.2d at 361.”
“Second, once the trial court has determined that the party
complaining about the use of the peremptory challenges has established
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party exercising the
peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering race-
neutral explanations for challenging the excluded jurors.  The
‘explanation must be neutral, related to the case to be tried, clear and
reasonably specific, and legitimate.’ Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 78,
542 A.2d 1267, 1280 (1988).  The reason offered need not rise to the
level of a challenge for cause, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at
97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.  ‘At this step of the inquiry, the
issue is the facial validity of the explanation.’  Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 406 (1991).
It is insufficient, however, for the party making the peremptory
challenges to ‘merely deny[] that he had a discriminatory motive or . . .
merely affirm[] his good faith.’  Purkett v. Elem, supra, [514 U.S. at
769], 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d. at 840.  See also Chew v. State,
317 Md. 233, 242, 562 A.2d 1270, 1277 (1989); Tolbert v. State, 315
Md. 13, 19, 553 A.2d 228, 230 (1989).”
“Finally, the trial court must ‘determine[] whether the opponent of the
strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.’
Purkett v. Elem, supra, [514 U.S. at 768], 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131
L.Ed.2d at 839; Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. 359, 111 S.Ct.
at 1865, 114 L.Ed.2d at 405; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 98,
106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89.  This includes allowing the
complaining party an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons given
for the peremptory challenges are pretextual or have a discriminatory
impact.  Stanley v. State, supra, 313 Md. at 61-62, 542 A.2d at 1272-
1273.  It is at this stage ‘that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant.’  Purkett v. Elem, supra, [514 U.S. at 768], 115 S.Ct.
-8-
at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839 . . . . ‘At that stage, implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for
purposeful discrimination.’  Purkett v. Elem, [514 U.S. at 768], 115 S.Ct.
at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839.”
Parker asserts that, having found a prima facie case of discrimination in defense
counsel’s use of peremptory challenges, defense counsel tendered facially-valid, race-neutral
reasons for exercising the strikes against jurors 26 and 27.  The reasons given, Parker
contends, were sufficient to overcome the prima facie case with regard to those two jurors.
We agree that the trial court erred in rejecting the facially-valid, race-neutral reasons tendered
by defense counsel for exercising the peremptory strikes and reseating the two stricken jurors
on the panel.  We shall, therefore, reverse the defendant’s conviction and order a new trial. 
Upon finding a prima facie case of racial discrimination in defense counsel’s use of
peremptory challenges, the trial court stated: “You owe me an explanation.”  The defense
counsel responded by explaining that he had struck juror 26 because she is employed by the
Criminal Assignment Office.  The prosecutor responded that juror 26 had stated that she could
be “fair” and, that, therefore, defense counsel’s reason was “unacceptable.”  The trial court
agreed and pronounced defense counsel’s reason for striking juror 26 “unacceptable.”  Turning
to juror 27, defense counsel explained that he had struck prospective jurors that had doctors’
appointments.  The prosecutor again claimed that defense counsel’s explanation was
“unacceptable” because juror 27 said that he could be “fair.”  The court eventually deemed
defense counsel’s reason for striking juror 27 also “unacceptable.”  Without further
explanation or making additional findings, the trial judge sustained the prosecutor’s objection
-9-
to the peremptory challenges exercised against jurors 26 and 27, and proceeded to reseat the
stricken jurors on the jury panel.
This Court has recognized that a trial court’s determination of impermissible
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is ultimately a factual one and, as
such, is afforded deference on appeal.  Gilchrist v. State, supra, 340 Md. at 627, 667 A.2d at
886.   Nevertheless, the record in the case at bar does not support a conclusion that the two
peremptory strikes at issue were racially motivated.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
erred in rejecting the reasons proffered by defense counsel with regard to jurors 26 and 27.
Defense counsel tendered specific explanations for exercising peremptory strikes
against jurors 26 and 27.  Juror 27 had earlier indicated to the trial judge that he had an
“absolutely compelling reason” which made it “impossible” for him to serve, namely his
doctor’s appointment.  Parker’s attorney explained that juror 27 might be more concerned
about his doctor’s appointment than the fair trial of the defendant.  Defense counsel further
stated his belief that the criminal assignment officer, juror 26, would be less sympathetic to
his client because she is exposed to criminal cases every day.  The reasons were neutral on
their face, based on factors other than race, and specific to the individual jurors stricken.
Moreover, the reasons were not “‘implausible or fantastic’” so as to support an inference that
the explanations were merely pretexts for intentional discrimination. Gilchrist v. State, supra,
340 Md. at 626, 667 A.2d at 886, quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769,
1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (1995).  The trial court did not make any findings to the contrary
or articulate any factors that would indicate otherwise. 
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Indeed, the colloquy indicates that the trial court agreed with the prosecutor that,
because prospective jurors 26 and 27 answered that they could be “fair,” defense counsel’s
reasons were “unacceptable” to support peremptory strikes.  A prospective juror’s statement
that he or she has the ability to be fair, however, does not preclude a valid peremptory
challenge of that juror.  If the juror had stated otherwise, an exclusion for cause would have
been justified.  As this Court noted in Gilchrist v. State, supra, “‘the peremptory [challenge]
permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or
demonstrable’ than that required for a challenge for cause.”  340 Md. at 620, 667 A.2d at 883,
quoting Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220, 85 S.Ct. 824, 836, 13 L.Ed.2d 759,
772 (1965). 
Under the circumstances presented in this case, the reasons tendered by defense
counsel for exercising the peremptory challenges to jurors 26 and 27 were sufficient to
overcome a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  The trial judge erred in deeming the
facially-valid, race-neutral reasons “unacceptable” and in reseating the stricken jurors.   The
defendant is entitled to a new trial.
III.
The defendant Parker next argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence
the hearsay statements of two unidentified declarants pursuant to the excited utterance
exception to the rule against hearsay.  Although we have reversed the conviction on the
peremptory challenge issue, and thus need not reach this question, we shall address the
evidentiary question because it might arise again at Parker’s new trial.
-11-
Officer Kevin Feser of the Baltimore City Police Department testified that he was the
first police officer on the scene, arriving at 2111 Barclay Street within minutes after the
shooting.  Upon entering the residence, he observed bullet casings and blood throughout the
living room and kitchen.  Officer Feser encountered two women in the residence, both of
whom, he testified, were “visibly upset.”  He described the older woman as “almost like
hysterical,” and he testified that she was “crying, running back and forth” in a “panic.”  The
other woman was “crying [and] emotional.”  The women made statements about the gunman to
Officer Feser.  The officer testified that he remembered the substance of the women’s
statements, but that he could not identify the women by name and that he could not recall
precisely which words were spoken by which woman.
The prosecutor then asked Officer Feser to tell the jury what the women told him.
Defense counsel objected on the ground of hearsay.  The trial court overruled the defense
counsel’s objection, holding that the statements were admissible into evidence under the
“excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay.  The officer proceeded to testify that
the women told him that they were in the residence when a black male came into the residence
followed by another black male who was shooting at him.  The women, the officer testified,
described the gunman as “a black male, 5 foot 11, 5-10, 5-11, medium build, plaits in the hair,
wearing blue jeans and a white T-shirt and one of the ladies said that he was driving a blue Ford
Taurus station wagon, and I got a partial tag [number].”
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the statements of the two
unidentified witnesses under the excited utterance exception because the State did not
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establish the requisite elements of personal observation and spontaneity.   The statements, the
defendant asserts, did not qualify as excited utterances because the officer had no knowledge
of the declarants’ whereabouts at the time of the shooting and could not, therefore, establish
that the women personally observed the incident.  The defendant further argues that, because
the women had the capacity to report a physical description of the gunman and provide a partial
licence plate number, their statements were the products of thoughtful reflection in response
to police interrogation and, therefore, lacked the requisite indicia of reliability to be
admissible as excited utterances.
We begin our discussion by noting that hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial because
of its inherent untrustworthiness.  “Exceptions to the rule usually involve those situations
where circumstances lend credibility to the statement, thus vitiating the reason for the rule.”
Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 696, 452 A.2d 661, 663 (1982).  Maryland case law and
Maryland Rule 5-803(2) recognize such an exception for  “[a] statement relating to the
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition.”  In Mouzone, 294 Md. at 697, 452 A.2d at 664, Judge Cole for the
Court discussed the rationale for the excited utterance exception:
“The essence of the excited utterance exception is the inability of the
declarant to have reflected on the events about which the statement is
concerned.  It requires a startling event and a spontaneous statement
which is the result of the declarant’s reaction to the occurrence.
McCormick, Evidence § 297 (2nd ed. 1972).  The rationale for
overcoming the inherent untrustworthiness of hearsay is that the
situation produced such an effect on the declarant as to render his
reflective capabilities inoperative.  See Wright v. State, 88 Md. 705, 41
-13-
A. 1060 (1898).  See also, McCormick, supra, § 297.  The admissibility
of evidence under this exception is, therefore, judged by the spontaneity
of the declarant’s statement and an analysis of whether it was the result
of thoughtful consideration or the product of the exciting event.”
The proponent of a statement purporting to fall within the excited utterance exception
must establish the foundation for admissibility, namely personal knowledge and spontaneity.
Parker does not argue that an excited utterance is inadmissible simply because the declarant
is unidentified.  Cf. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 325, 508 A.2d 976, 981-982 (1986)
(“Identification of the declarant, while often helpful in establishing that he or she was a
percipient witness, is not a condition of admissibility [under the present sense impression
exception]”).  Parker does argue, however, that the proponent of an excited utterance carries
a heavier burden in meeting the foundation for admissibility where the declarant is
unidentified. 
An examination of the cases in other jurisdictions indicates that, where the identity of
the hearsay declarant is unknown, the courts hold that the party seeking to introduce the excited
utterance carries a heavy burden to prove the requisite indicia of reliability.  It is held that the
burden on the proponent is heightened, primarily because it is more difficult to establish
personal observation and spontaneity where the declarant is unknown.  For example, in Miller
v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3rd Cir. 1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered the admissibility of a hearsay statement of an unidentified declarant at the
scene of an automobile accident.  The unknown bystander made a remark amounting to an
accusation that the accident was the fault of one of the parties.  The United States Court of
-14-
Appeals explained (754 F.2d at 510):
“A party seeking to introduce such a statement carries a burden heavier
than where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the statement’s
circumstantial trustworthiness. 
“At minimum, when the declarant of an excited utterance is
unidentified, it becomes more difficult to satisfy the established case
law requirements for the admission of a statement under [the excited
utterance exception].”
The Court of Appeals cautioned that, in determining admissibility, “circumstantial evidence of
[spontaneity and] the declarant’s personal perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the
‘guarantees of trustworthiness’ which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.”
754 F.2d at 511.  The record, the court pointed out, was void of any circumstances from which
it could be inferred that the declarant personally observed the accident and that the declarant
was excited when he spoke.  Thus, the court held the proponent of the hearsay statement had
not satisfied the burden of admissibility for the excited utterance exception. See also United
States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
Similarly, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held the statement
of an unknown bystander inadmissible in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296, 569 N.Y.S.2d
689 (1991).  The defendant in that case was charged with burglary.  The trial court allowed the
prosecution to elicit testimony from a police officer that the officer was informed by a crowd
of twenty or thirty people that they saw the defendant climb out of a second story window and
descend a fire escape.  The appellate court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances,
-15-
“there is no proof of the identity of the declarants or of whether they had an ‘adequate
opportunity to observe’ the event.”   173 A.D.2d at 298, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 691, quoting People
v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 232, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1975).  It was
error, the court concluded, to permit such testimony. 
We agree with Parker that where the hearsay declarant is unidentified, heightened
scrutiny of the purported excited utterance is appropriate.  The hearsay statement of an
unknown or anonymous declarant presents serious concerns as to whether sufficient
trustworthiness can be established.  Notwithstanding the heightened burden, however, the
requisite elements of personal observation and spontaneity were established under the
circumstances in this case.  
Preliminarily, we point out that the declarants here were not entirely unidentified, but
they were simply unnamed.  The responding officer described the two women who made the
statements in the officer’s presence, observed their emotional state, and spoke to the women
about the shooting.  This is hardly the situation of the anonymous, unknown bystander making
a statement from a crowd.  See, e.g., State v. Hill, 331 S.C. 94, 501 S.E.2d 122 (1998)
(hearsay statement of unidentified bystander in a crowd was inadmissible because it could not
be demonstrated that the declarant witnessed the shooting or that the declarant was under the
stress of the excitement when the statement was made); State v. Harris, 207 W.Va. 275, 531
S.E.2d 340 (2000) (hearsay statement of  “unavailable, anonymous, unknown” declarant who
shouted from a crowd that defendant had beaten the victim was inadmissible where it was not
accompanied by requisite indicia of reliability).
-16-
Turning to the personal knowledge requirement, the content of the statements and the
surrounding circumstances clearly show that the declarants personally observed the shooting.
See State v. Jones, 311 Md. 23, 30-31, 532 A.2d 169, 172 (1987) (hearsay statements of the
unidentified declarants were admissible under the present sense impression exception where
the contents of the statements were sufficient to support the conclusion that declarants spoke
from personal knowledge); Booth v. State, supra, 306 Md. at 325, 508 A.2d at 982 (“[w]hen
the statement itself, or other circumstantial evidence demonstrates the percipiency of a
declarant, whether identified or unidentified, this condition of competency is met”).   The
police arrived at the scene of the crime within minutes of the shooting.  The responding officer
testified that the women were emotional and visibly shaken.  The women stated to the officer
that they were in the residence when two men ran through the residence.  Thus, we conclude
that the State met its burden of establishing personal observation. 
The defendant Parker additionally challenges the spontaneity of the declarations,
arguing that the descriptions of the vehicle and the gunman were the products of reflective
thought in response to police interrogation.  The petitioner relies, in part, on this Court’s
decision in Neusbaum v. State, 156 Md. 149, 143 A. 872 (1928), in which the Court held that
the declarant’s announcement of a license plate number was the result of a voluntary, deliberate
investigation made by the declarant and that, therefore, the statement was inadmissible as an
excited utterance.   Parker’s argument is not persuasive.
In Mouzone v. State, supra, we explained that the decision in Neusbaum demonstrated
that whether the declarant’s statement is exclaimed impulsively or is the result of the inquiry
-17-
of another party is not dispositive but, instead, is only one factor to be considered in the
admissibility of an excited utterance.  Compare State v. Harrell, 348 Md. at 78, 82, 702 A.2d
723, 728 (1997) (statement that the defendant “beat me up” in response to a police inquiry was
admissible as an excited utterance where the police questioning commenced minutes after the
assault and the victim was still emotionally overwhelmed by the situation), with Mouzone v.
State, supra, 294 Md. at 700-701, 452 A.2d at 665-666 (statement given to the police by a
witness to a double murder, five hours after the incident, was not admissible under the excited
utterance exception).  The record in the case at bar is unclear whether the police asked the
women to explain what happened or whether the women impulsively began to recount the
events.  Assuming arguendo that the statements were made in response to police questioning,
this would not necessarily bar their admission.
In Mouzone, we stressed the importance of examining the surrounding circumstances
for an indication that the startling event dominated the declarant’s thought process when the
statement was made.  In Neusbaum, the Court held that the declarant’s statement regarding the
license plate number was outside of the excited utterance exception because the declarant had
overcome the shock of seeing a person hit by a car and had begun a course of measured,
deliberate thought.  This, however, is not the situation here.  As the Court of Special Appeals
aptly noted (Parker v. State, supra, 129 Md. App. at 395-396, 742 A.2d at 47),
“the declarants’ statements established that they had just witnessed a
startling ‘event’ that consisted of a man running into 2111 Barclay Street
in chase of another man, shooting a gun, and then leaving the scene in a
vehicle.  The declarants had not observed the incident from a distance or
-18-
from a point of safety.  Rather, they were in the midst of it.  When they
made their remarks to Officer Feser moments later, they had perceived
and to some extent absorbed the event and were excitedly exclaiming
about it.  Their perception of the physical characteristics of the shooter
and the vehicle was part and parcel of their experience of the startling
event, the effects of which still were evident.  It was not the product of
an after-the-fact deliberate effort on their part to gather information.”
The record indicates that the startling event of the shooting dominated the thought processes
of the declarants when the statements were made.  The women’s statements were not the
thoughtful reflection or product of deliberate investigation held inadmissible in Neusbaum.
The State met its burden of demonstrating spontaneity. 
In sum, the content of the statements and the surrounding circumstances were sufficient
proof that the women personally observed the shooting and that the descriptions of the gunman
and the car were given under the excitement of the situation.  The trial court properly admitted
the statements into evidence.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.