Title: Blaylock v. Westlund

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed March 4, 1953.
James M. McGinty, of Myrtle Creek, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Dudley C. Walton argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Davis, Walton & Richmond, of Roseburg.
Before LATOURETTE, Chief Justice, and WARNER, ROSSMAN, LUSK and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
*537 This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the circuit court, which set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and ordered a new trial of the action. The verdict, in the amount of $543.50, was based upon damages which were inflicted upon the plaintiff's automobile, so the plaintiff alleged, when the defendant's car collided with the plaintiff's. The challenged order reads as follows:
The plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages in the amount of $543.50 which, according to him, were inflicted upon his automobile when it was struck by one driven by the defendant. The collision occurred December 26, 1950, at about 4:15 p.m., on highway No. 99 at a point about two miles north of Canyonville. Highway No. 99 runs north and south. At the time of the impact the defendant's car was proceeding north. The plaintiff's car, which had been going south a moment prior to the accident, had turned to the left and when hit was crossing the east half of the roadway preliminary to entering a private driveway. Before the plaintiff undertook to turn left, he had stopped his car upon the roadway's right shoulder for a brief pause so that some vehicles to his rear could pass him. There was attached to his car, a coupe, a small trailer which protruded ten feet to the rear.
When the plaintiff's car had crossed the yellow line which marked the center of the pavement, but before *538 it had entered upon the east shoulder, it was struck by the defendant's. The front of the latter struck the right-hand door of the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff's speed while he was undertaking to cross the pavement was no more than two or three miles per hour. The impact occurred on the east half of the pavement. From the place where the plaintiff paused for a moment, before he undertook to turn to the left across the roadway, he could look to the south down the highway for 500 feet. Thus, a car approaching from the south could be seen from the place of the mishap for 500 feet. The plaintiff swore that before he started to turn he gave a signal and looked to the south. According to him, the defendant's car was not then in sight. He claimed that when it appeared in view it was traveling at a high rate of speed. The defendant testified that he did not see the plaintiff's car until he was about 80 feet from it and that he observed no signal. He estimated his rate of speed as 45 to 50 miles an hour. The defendant's car left skid marks upon the pavement for a distance of 91 feet.
The trial judge instructed the jury, in part, as follows:
The above will suffice as a statement of the facts.
In ordering a new trial, the trial judge declared:
*540 The answer's specifications of negligence, after mentioning failure to maintain a lookout and failure to burn headlights, set forth the following:
Our right-of-way statute provides:
It will be observed that those provisions are applicable to "an intersection". Section 115-301, OCLA, defines the term "intersection" as follows:
*541 Subdivision (p) of the same section defines the words "street" and "highway" as:
It is clear that the place where the impact in question occurred was not an intersection. See Clark v. Fazio, 191 Or 522, 527, 230 P2d 553. Since the collision did not take place in an intersection, § 115-337 is not applicable to this cause.
Section 115-335 says:
1, 2. Black v. Stith, 164 Or 117, 100 P2d 485, to which the trial judge referred in entering his challenged order, rose out of circumstances substantially similar to those before us. According to the decision in that case,
When his car had crossed the yellow line which marked the center of the pavement and was near the gravel *542 shoulder, it was struck by the plaintiff's car. We now quote the following from the holding:
*544 The decision affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.
Manifestly, there is a difference, material to a motorist such as the defendant, between the privileges afforded by a right-of-way provision and the interpretation which the instructions placed upon § 115-335, OCLA.
We do not believe that the plaintiff's attack upon the challenged order discloses error.
The order awarding a new trial is affirmed.