Title: In re MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF YENNE-TULLY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF YENNE-TULLY2000 WY 18112 P.3d 170Case Number: 99-208Decided: 09/29/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: BRETT C. YENNE-TULLY, Appellant 
(Petitioner),v. WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT, STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Carbon County:

The Honorable Jeffrey A. 
Donnell, Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Donald L. Painter, 
Casper, WY. Argument by Mr. Painter.Representing Appellee: Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. 
Haggerty.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Brett C. 
Yenne-Tully (Yenne-Tully) appeals a denial of workers' compensation benefits. 
Finding that the Hearing Examiner failed to apply the correct burden of proof, 
we reverse the Order Denying Benefits and remand for 
reconsideration.

ISSUES

[¶2] Yenne-Tully 
presents this statement of the issues:

1. Whether the Hearing 
Examiner correctly invoked the burden of proof under W.S. 1977 § 
27-14-603(a).

2. Whether the hearing 
examiner correctly relied upon the apportionment of an injury between 
employment-related and non-employment-related in determining that there had been 
a failure to meet the burden of proof.

[¶3] The 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) states the issues 
as:

[¶4] The 
Employee hurt his back at work in 1989, and the Division paid benefits to [him] 
for an L5-S1 disc injury. After a six-year lapse in benefits his symptoms 
worsened, and he underwent surgery for an L4- L5 disc 
herniation.

A. Did substantial 
evidence support the application of the burden of proof for injuries occurring 
over time?

B. Did the Hearing 
Examiner properly require proof that the disc herniation was directly caused by 
work?

FACTS

[¶5] Yenne-Tully 
suffered his first back injury when a snow fence fell on him in 1982. He 
received treatment and missed two or three days of work. He had no further back 
problems until August 1989, when he fell down a flight of stairs while working 
as a guard at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. CT scans the following summer 
revealed a disc bulge at the L3-L4 level, as well as "some significant 
irregularity, primarily at the L5-S1, more minor at the L4-L5 level." An MRI in 
December 1991 showed "early degenerative changes of the intervertebral disk at 
the L5-S1 level, without herniation." The Division paid for Yenne-Tully's 
conservative treatment for his back through December 1991. Yenne-Tully continued 
to lead an active life, but experienced constant back pain and had to leave work 
early or miss work on many occasions. In December 1997, he awoke one morning and 
could not move due to extreme pain. An MRI the following month revealed a 
herniated disc at the L4-L5 level. The disc was surgically repaired in January 
1998.

[¶6] Yenne-Tully 
sought workers' compensation benefits for his surgery, believing the herniated 
disc to be causally related to his 1989 fall. The Division denied benefits, 
stating that, "[t]he current condition is due to a herniation at the L4-L5 level 
which was not effected in the original injury." A hearing was held at 
Yenne-Tully's request on September 23, 1998. Four of his coworkers testified 
that since the 1989 accident, Yenne-Tully complained of, and exhibited symptoms 
of, back pain. Exhibits included the report and deposition of a physician 
appointed by the Division to examine Yenne-Tully and review his medical 
records.

[¶7] The Hearing 
Examiner issued an Order Denying Benefits on October 20, 1998. Yenne-Tully 
sought review in the district court, which affirmed the Hearing Examiner's 
order. Yenne-Tully then appealed to this court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8] We review 
workers' compensation cases using the following standard:

[¶9] The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act is a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997); Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991). 
Conclusions of law made by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they 
are in accord with the law. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996); 
Aaneson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 
(Wyo. 1992). We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, and 
we will correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying 
the law. Matter of Gneiting, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1995); City of Casper v. 
Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 587 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶10] Wright v. 
State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1998).

DISCUSSION

[¶11] In his 
first issue, Yenne-Tully contends the Hearing Examiner erred when she found that 
the injury for which he sought benefits occurred over a substantial period of 
time. In accordance with that finding, the Hearing Examiner applied the burden 
of proof from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (Lexis 1999).1 Yenne-Tully argues that his injury 
occurred at the time of the 1989 accident, but grew worse over time. The 
Division responds that the injury did occur over time, as the result of 
cumulative trauma from day-to-day living.

[¶12] Neither 
party cites authority for the propositions that Yenne-Tully's herniated disc 
was, or was not, an injury occurring over a substantial period of time. We 
believe that § 27-14-603 was intended to require a higher burden of proof for 
workers claiming benefits for illnesses or injuries developing over time without 
a definite triggering accident or event. Such situations might include 
repetitive motion injuries or repeated exposure to caustic or carcinogenic 
substances. In contrast, we have rejected the application of § 27-14-603 when 
the claimant's injury was precipitated by a single, identifiable incident. 
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 2000); Dougherty v. 
J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 555 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶13] In cases 
such as this one, where an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition 
requiring additional medical intervention, the second compensable injury rule is 
applicable. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995). In Casper 
Oil, we quoted the following explanation of the second compensable injury rule 
from Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 
(1936):

[¶14] [I]t seems 
to us palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has 
tried to keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and 
then has found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which 
medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not 
forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. We do not 
think the language employed in the law by our State Legislature was reasonably 
intended to produce any such result.

[¶15] Casper 
Oil, 888 P.2d  at 224.

[¶16] We 
recently invoked the second compensable injury rule in a factually similar case. 
Pino v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. , 996 P.2d 679, 685 
(Wyo. 2000). A workplace accident resulted in a mild disc bulge in Pino's spine. 
He received treatment, but continued to experience pain that occasionally 
required him to miss work. About 21 months after his accident, the disc 
herniated when Pino coughed. We held that the herniation was compensable because 
it resulted from the initial accident. The greater period of time and absence of 
a specific event marking the herniation do not significantly distinguish the 
case at hand from Pino. We hold, therefore, that the Hearing Examiner erred when 
she imposed the burden of proof for injuries occurring over a substantial period 
of time.

[¶17] The 
Division argues, in the alternative, that even if the injury did not occur over 
a substantial period of time, the Hearing Examiner correctly applied the similar 
burden of proof from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (Lexis 1999).2 In a prior decision applying the 
second compensable injury rule, we held that the claimant need not comply with 
the provisions of § 27-14-605, because the case is not actually being reopened. 
Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d  at 225. Our rationale 
was:

[¶18] Wyo. Stat. 
§ 27-14-605 applies to original benefits awarded after a determination in favor 
of the employee. Medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits 
awarded at a later date pursuant to the second compensable injury rule are not 
among the benefits the statute controls.

[¶19] Id. 
Finding that same reasoning applicable here, we hold that the Hearing Examiner 
incorrectly applied the burden of proof imposed by § 
27-14-605.

[¶20] Having 
determined that the Hearing Examiner invoked the inappropriate burdens of proof, 
it is of no consequence whether those burdens were met. The decision of the 
Hearing Examiner is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings for reconsideration in light of the second compensable 
injury rule.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-603(a) reads:

The 
burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) 
There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under 
which the work is performed and the injury;

(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the 
work as a result of the employment;

(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have 
been equally exposed outside of the employment; and

(v) 
The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of 
the relation of employer and employee.

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-605 reads:

(a) 
If a determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act, an application may be made to the division by any party 
within four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional benefits 
or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or 
decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud. The division may, upon the same grounds and within the same time period, 
apply for modification of medical and disability benefits to a hearing examiner 
or the medical commission, as appropriate.

(b) 
Any right to benefits shall be terminated and is no longer under the 
jurisdiction of this act if a claim for any benefit is not filed with the 
division within the four (4) year limitation prescribed under subsection (a) of 
this section.

(c) 
A claim for medical benefits which would otherwise be terminated under 
subsection (b) of this section and barred under W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b) may be 
paid by the division if the claimant:

(i) 
Submits medical reports to the division substantiating his 
claim;

(ii) Proves by competent medical authority and to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that the condition is directly related to the original injury; 
and

(iii) Submits to an examination by a health care provider selected by the 
division and results of the examination validate his 
claim.