Title: Schaad v. Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, Mobile, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Schaad v. Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile, Inc. (2001-004); 173 Vt. 629;
800 A.2d 455

[Filed 15-Apr-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                     SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.  2001-004

                             JANUARY TERM, 2002

Peter Schaad	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Bennington Superior Court
                                       }	
Bell Atlantic NYNEX, Mobile, Inc.      }
New England Telephone and Telegraph    }	DOCKET NO.  58-2-99 Bncv
d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Vermont 	       }
Central Vermont Public Service Corp    }	Trial Judge: Richard W. Norton

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Peter Schaad, while riding on his all terrain vehicle (ATV),
  struck a utility line and  brought an action for negligence against
  defendants Central Vermont Public Service (CVPS) and  Bell Atlantic NYNEX
  Mobile, Inc. (Bell Atlantic).  Following a jury verdict in favor of
  defendant  CVPS and judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant Bell
  Atlantic, plaintiff appeals claiming  the Bennington Superior Court failed
  to properly instruct the jury, erroneously dismissed the case  against Bell
  Atlantic, committed reversible error in prohibiting plaintiff's
  cross-examination of a  CVPS employee regarding statements of CVPS's
  attorney, and erred in refusing to admit certain of  plaintiff's medical
  records.  We affirm.        

       On the night of February 21, 1997, a storm brought down the top of a
  tree in Bennington,  Vermont, falling across utility lines owned by CVPS
  and Bell Atlantic.  The downed lines caused a  power outage at a home in
  Bennington; CVPS was notified, and two CVPS employees were sent to  find
  the cause of the outage and restore power.  When they arrived, the CVPS
  employees discovered  that a tree top had pinned down both the CVPS and
  Bell Atlantic lines.  The CVPS employees  removed the tree top from the
  utility lines, releasing both lines.  They then rehung the CVPS line, but 
  left the Bell Atlantic line sagging. 

       Approximately one month later, on March 21, plaintiff Peter Schaad
  road his ATV down an  access road adjoining the property on which he was a
  caretaker.  Plaintiff rode to his mailbox and  after retrieving his mail
  cut through a neighboring cornfield.  As he rode to a gap between telephone 
  poles to get back to the access road, plaintiff struck the sagging Bell
  Atlantic line, injuring his neck.   Plaintiff brought an action for
  negligence against CVPS and Bell Atlantic, and the case was tried by  a
  jury on August 18, 2000.  During trial, Bell Atlantic moved for judgment as
  a matter of law.  The  trial court granted Bell Atlantic's motion,
  dismissing the case against it.  The jury returned the  verdict in favor of
  CVPS.  
                                      
 

       Plaintiff brings this appeal claiming the trial court erred in: (1)
  failing to instruct the jury on  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A; (2)
  granting Bell Atlantic's motion for judgment as a matter  of law,
  dismissing Bell Atlantic as a party and later denying plaintiff's motion
  for a new trial on the  same issue; (3) forbidding plaintiff from
  cross-examining a CVPS employee regarding a statement  by CVPS's attorney;
  and (4) refusing to admit certain medical evidence.   

       Plaintiff's first claim of error is that the trial court failed to
  instruct the jury using the  Restatement of Torts (Second) § 324A (1965). 
  Section 324A provides

    One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
    services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
    protection of a third person or his things, is subject to
    liability of the  third person for physical harm resulting from
    his failure to exercise  reasonable care to protect his
    undertaking, if
         (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the
    risk of  such harm, or
         (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
    the  third person, or
         (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or
    the  third person upon the undertaking.   

  Plaintiff contends that when CVPS employees removed the fallen tree top,
  releasing the downed  lines, they provided a service to Bell Atlantic and
  that because they failed to use reasonable care, this  service created an
  increased risk of harm to third persons.  Plaintiff argues that CVPS
  employees  came upon a dangerous situation and made it worse by releasing
  the Bell Atlantic phone lines just  enough to leave them sagging several
  feet off the ground.  We reject plaintiff's arguments first,  because
  plaintiff waived this objection, and second, because even if the objection
  had been properly  made, there is no evidence to suggest that CVPS's
  actions were in any way a gratuitous service to  Bell Atlantic, or that
  CVPS's actions increased the risk of harm to third parties. 

       A party may appeal the trial court's decision not to give an
  instruction to the jury only where,  before the jury retired to consider
  the verdict,  that party objected to the failure to charge, stating  with
  particularity the matter of objection and its grounds.  V.R.C.P. 51(b). 
  The purpose of this rule  is to allow the trial judge a final opportunity
  to correct the charge, before the jury retires with the  case.  Winey v.
  William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 137,