Title: Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2023AP1399-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Rebecca Clarke, Ruben Anthony, Terry Dawson,  
Dana Glasstein, Ann Groves-Lloyd, Carl 
Hujet, Jerry Iverson, Tia Johnson, Angie 
Kirst, Selika Lawton, Fabian Maldonado,  
Annemarie McClellan, James McNett, Brittany 
Muriello, Ela Joosten (Pari) Schils, 
Nathaniel Slack, Mary Smith-Johnson, Denise 
Sweet and Gabrielle Young, 
          Petitioners, 
Governor Tony Evers in his official 
capacity, Nathan Atkinson, Stephen Joseph 
Wright, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton,  
Jean-Luc Thiffeault, Somesh Jha, Joanne Kane 
and Leah Dudley, 
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Don Millis,  
Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, 
Ann S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Carrie 
Riepl, in their official capacities as  
Members of the Wisconsin Election 
Commission;, Meagan Wolfe in her official 
capacity as the Administrator of the  
Wisconsin Elections Commission;, Andre 
Jacque, Tim Carpenter, Rob Hutton, Chris 
Larson, Devin LeMahieu, Stephen L. Nass,  
John Jagler, Mark Spreitzer, Howard 
Marklein, Rachael Cabral-Guevara, Van H. 
Wanggaard, Jesse L. James, Romaine Robert 
Quinn, Dianne H. Hesselbein, Cory Tomczyk,  
Jeff Smith and Chris Kapenga  in their 
official capacities as Members of the 
Wisconsin Senate, 
          Respondents, 
Wisconsin Legislature, Billie Johnson, Chris 
Goebel, Ed Perkins, Eric O'Keefe, Joe 
Sanfelippo, Terry Moulton, Robert Jensen,  
Ron Zahn, Ruth Elmer and Ruth Streck, 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 22, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 21, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
   
 
COUNTY: 
   
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Daniel S. 
Lenz, T.R. Edwards, Elizabeth M. Pierson, Scott B. Thompson, and 
Law Forward, Inc., Madison; Douglas M. Poland, Jeffrey A. 
Mandell, Rachel E. Snyder, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; 
Elisabeth S. Theodore (pro hac vice), John A. Freedman (pro hac 
vice), and Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, D.C.; Mark P. Gaber 
(pro hac vice), Brent Ferguson (pro hac vice), Hayden Johnson 
(pro hac vice), Benjamin Phillips (pro hac vice), and Campaign 
Legal Center, D.C.; Annabelle E. Harless (pro hac vice), and 
Campaign Legal Center, Chicago; Ruth M. Greenwood (pro hac 
vice), Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos (pro hac vice), and Election 
Law Clinic at Harvard Law School, Cambridge. There was an oral 
argument by Mark Gaber.  
 
For the intervenor-petitioner, Governor Tony Evers in his 
official capacity, there were briefs filed by Anthony D. 
Russomanno, 
assistant 
attorney 
general, 
Faye 
B. 
Hipsman, 
assistant attorney general, Brian P. Keenan, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney 
 
 
3 
general; Mel Banes, and Office of Governor Tony Evers, Madison; 
Christine P. Sun (pro hac vice), Dax L. Goldstein (pro hac 
vice), and States United Democracy Center, Los Angeles; John 
Hill (pro hac vice), and States United Democracy Center, DuBois. 
There was an oral argument by Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant 
attorney general.  
 
For the intervenor-petitioner, Nathan Atkinson, Stephen 
Joseph 
Wright, 
Gary 
Krenz, 
Sarah 
J. 
Hamilton, 
Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, Somesh Jha, Joanne Kane and Leah Dudley, there were 
briefs filed by Sarah A. Zylstra, Tanner G. Jean-Louis, and 
Boardman Clark LLP, Madison; Sam Hirsch (pro hac vice), Jessica 
Ring Amunson (pro hac vice), Elizabeth B. Deutsch (pro hac 
vice), Arjun R. Ramamurti, (pro hac vice), and Jenner & Block 
LLP, D.C. There was an oral argument by Sam Hirsch.  
 
For the respondents, Tim Carpenter, Chris Larson, Mark 
Spreitzer, Dianne H. Hesselbein, and Jeff Smith, in there 
official capacities as Members of the Wisconsin Senate, there 
were briefs filed by Tamara B. Packard, Eduardo E. Castro, and 
Pines Bach LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Tamara B. 
Packard.  
 
For the intervenors-respondents, Wisconsin Legislature, and 
respondents, Andre Jacque, Rob Hutton, Devin LeMahieu, Stephen 
L. Nass, Howard Marklein, John Jagler, Rachael Cabral-Guevara, 
Van H. Wanggaard, Jesse L. James, Romaine Robert Quinn, Cory 
Tomczyk, and Chris Kapenga, in there official capacities as 
Members of the Wisconsin Senate, there were briefs filed by 
Kevin M. St. John, and Bell Giftos St. John LLC, Madison; Jessie 
Augustyn, and Augustyn Law LLC, Appleton; Adam K. Mortara, and 
Lawfair LLC, Nashville; Taylor A.R. Meehan (pro hac vice), 
Rachael C. Tucker (pro hac vice), Daniel M. Vitagliano (pro hac 
vice), C’Zar D. Bernstein (pro hac vice), and Consovoy McCarthy 
 
 
4 
PLLC, Arlington; Scott A. Keller (pro hac vice), Shannon Grammel 
(pro hac vice), Gabriela Gonzalez-Araiza (pro hac vice), and 
Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP, D.C.; Matthew H. Frederick (pro hac 
vice), and Lehotsky Keller Cohn, LLP, Austin. There was an oral 
argument by Taylor A.R. Meehan.  
 
For the intervenors-respondents, Billie Johnson, Chris 
Goebel, Ed Perkins, Eric O’Keefe, Joe Sanfelippo, Terry Moulton, 
Robert Jensen, Ron Zahn, Ruth Elmer and Ruth Streck, there were 
briefs filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Luke N. Berg, Nathalie E. 
Burmeister, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Inc., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Nathan J. Kane, and WMC 
Litigation 
Center, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Margo S. Kirchner, and 
Wisconsin 
Justice 
Initiative, 
Inc, 
Milwaukee; 
Daniel 
J. 
Schneider, and Wisconsin Fair Maps Coalition, Chicago, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. & Wisconsin Fair Maps 
Coalition.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Matthew W. O’Neill, and 
Fox, O’Neill & Shannon, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Matthew 
Petering, PhD. 
 
An 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
was 
filed 
by 
Nicholas 
E. 
Fairweather, and Hawks Quindel S.C., Madison; Jonathan B. Miller 
(pro hac vice), Michael Adame (pro hac vice), and Public Rights 
Project, Oakland, on behalf of Local Elected Officials. 
 
 
 
5 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert Yablon, Bryna 
Godar, and State Democracy Research Initiative, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Madison, on behalf of Legal Scholars. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Samuel T. Ward-Packard, 
and Elias Law Group LLP, D.C.; Abha Khanna (pro hac vice), and 
Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle; William K. Hancock (pro hac vice), 
Julie Zuckerbrod (pro hac vice), and Elias Law Group LLP, D.C., 
on behalf of Jo Ellen Burke, Jennie Tunkieicz and John Persa.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tony Wilkin Gibart, 
Adam Voskuil, Daniel P. Gustafson, and Midwest Environmental 
Advocates, Madison, on behalf of Coalition on Lead Emergency. 
 
 
2023 WI 79 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2023AP1399-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rebecca Clarke, Ruben Anthony, Terry Dawson, 
Dana Glasstein, Ann Groves-Lloyd, Carl Hujet, 
Jerry Iverson, Tia Johnson, Angie Kirst, Selika 
Lawton, Fabian Maldonado, Annemarie McClellan, 
James McNett, Brittany Muriello, Ela Joosten 
(Pari) Schils, Nathaniel Slack, Mary Smith-
Johnson, Denise Sweet and Gabrielle Young, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
Governor Tony Evers, in his official capacity; 
Nathan Atkinson, Stephen Joseph Wright, Gary 
Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Jean-Luc Thiffeault, 
Somesh Jha, Joanne Kane and Leah Dudley, 
 
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Don Millis, 
Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Joseph J. 
Czarnezki in their official capacities as 
Members of the Wisconsin Election Commission;, 
Meagan Wolfe in her official capacity as the 
Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission;, Andre Jacque, Tim Carpenter, Rob 
Hutton, Chris Larson, Devin LeMahieu, Stephen 
L. Nass, John Jagler, Mark Spreitzer, Howard 
Marklein, Rachael Cabral-Guevara, Van H. 
Wanggaard, Jesse L. James, Romaine Robert 
Quinn, Dianne H. Hesselbein, Cory Tomczyk, Jeff 
Smith and Chris Kapenga  in their official 
capacities as Members of the Wisconsin Senate, 
 
          Respondents, 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 22, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
2 
Wisconsin Legislature; Billie Johnson, Chris 
Goebel, Ed Perkins, Eric O'Keefe, Joe 
Sanfelippo, Terry Moulton, Robert Jensen, Ron 
Zahn, Ruth Elmer and Ruth Streck, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  Rights declared.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.  In Wisconsin the number of state 
legislative 
districts 
containing 
territory 
completely 
disconnected from the rest of the district is striking.  At 
least 50 of 99 assembly districts and at least 20 of 33 senate 
districts include separate, detached territory.  A particularly 
stark example is the Madison-area 47th Assembly District (shown 
in yellow below).  This district contains more than a dozen 
separate, detached parts that are home to thousands of people 
who must cross one or more other districts before reaching 
another part of the 47th.1   
                                                 
1 The following images of assembly and senate districts are 
from the Legislative Technology Services Bureau's Geographic 
Information Services website.  Legislative Technology Services 
Bureau, Geographic Information Services, Wisconsin District Maps 
(https://gis-ltsb.hub.arcgis.com/pages/district-maps). 
 
This 
court "take[s] judicial notice of the location of the various 
political subdivisions of the state," including the location of 
legislative districts.  See Ryan v. State, 168 Wis. 14, 15, 168 
N.W. 566 (1918). 
 
 
3 
¶2 
Here we are asked to determine whether these districts 
violate Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which provide that state legislative districts 
must consist of "contiguous territory."  Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§§ 4-5.  Two groups of Wisconsin voters (the Clarke Petitioners2 
                                                 
2 The Clarke Petitioners are Rebecca Clarke, Ruben Anthony, 
Terry Dawson, Dana Glasstein, Ann Groves-Lloyd, Carl Hujet, 
Jerry Iverson, Tia Johnson, Angie Kirst, Selika Lawton, Fabian 
Maldonado, Annemarie McClellan, James McNett, Brittany Muriello, 
Ela Joosten (Pari) Schils, Nathaniel Slack, Mary Smith-Johnson, 
Denise (Dee) Sweet, and Gabrielle Young.   
 
 
4 
and Wright Petitioners3), the Governor, and a
group of state
senators4 (collectively, Petitioners), argue that the current 
districts 
are 
non-contiguous, 
and 
therefore 
violate 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Petitioners ask us to enjoin their use 
in future elections and to order the adoption of remedial maps.  
Additionally, they ask us to issue a writ quo warranto declaring 
the November 2022 state senate elections unlawful, and to order 
special elections for these offices that would otherwise not be 
on the ballot until November 2026.  The Legislature, several 
senators elected in 2022,5 and a group of Wisconsin voters6 
(collectively, 
Respondents)7 
argue 
that 
the 
current 
state 
                                                 
3 The Wright Petitioners are Nathan Atkinson, Stephen Joseph 
Wright, Gary Krenz, Sara J. Hamilton, Jean-Luc Thiffeault, 
Somesh Jha, Joanne Kane, and Leah Dudley, several of whom 
participated in the Johnson litigation.  See Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 
("Johnson I"); Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 400 
Wis. 2d 26, 971 N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II"); Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 
("Johnson III").  After we denied their petition for leave to 
commence an original action, see Wright v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2023 WI 71, 409 Wis. 2d 417, 995 N.W.2d 771, they 
subsequently filed a motion to intervene in this case, which the 
Court granted.   
4 They 
are 
Senators 
Carpenter, 
Larson, 
Spreitzer, 
Hesselbein, and Smith.   
5 They are Senators Cabral-Guevara, Hutton, Jacque, Jagler, 
James, Kapenga, LeMahieu, Marklein, Nass, Quinn, Tomczyk, and 
Wanggaard.   
6 Four of these voters——Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed 
Perkins, and Ronald Zahn——were petitioners in Johnson.  They 
intervened in this case along with Chris Goebel, Robert Jensen, 
Ruth Elmer, Ruth Streck, and Terry Moulton, who were not parties 
to Johnson. 
7 One 
of 
the 
named 
Respondents, 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission, takes no position on the issues presented. 
 
 
5 
legislative districts comply with the Wisconsin Constitution's 
contiguity 
requirements. 
Respondents 
also 
contend 
that 
Petitioners' claims are barred by various defenses, and that the 
relief the Petitioners seek is otherwise unavailable.     
 
¶3 
We hold that the contiguity requirements in Article 
IV, Sections 4 and 5 mean what they say:  Wisconsin's state 
legislative districts must be composed of physically adjoining 
territory.  The constitutional text and our precedent support 
this common-sense interpretation of contiguity.  Because the 
current state legislative districts contain separate, detached 
territory and therefore violate the constitution's contiguity 
requirements, we enjoin the Wisconsin Elections Commission from 
using the current legislative maps in future elections.8  We also 
reject each of Respondents' defenses.  We decline, however, to 
issue a writ quo warranto invalidating the results of the 2022 
state senate elections.   
 
¶4 
Because we enjoin the current state legislative 
district maps from future use, remedial maps must be drawn prior 
to the 2024 elections.  The legislature has the primary 
authority and responsibility to draw new legislative maps.  See 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  Accordingly, we urge the legislature 
to 
pass 
legislation 
creating 
new 
maps 
that 
satisfy 
all 
requirements of state and federal law.  We are mindful, however, 
that the legislature may decline to pass legislation creating 
                                                 
8 Because we determine that non-contiguous districts violate 
the constitution, we need not address Petitioners' alternative 
argument that the process by which the current state legislative 
districts were adopted violated the Wisconsin Constitution's 
separation-of-powers doctrine.  Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that 
are not dispositive need not be addressed." (citation omitted)). 
 
 
6 
new maps, or
that the governor may exercise his veto power. 
Consequently, to ensure maps are adopted in time for the 2024 
election, we will proceed toward adopting remedial maps unless 
and until new maps are enacted through the legislative process.  
At the conclusion of this opinion, we set forth the process and 
relevant considerations that will guide the court in adopting 
new 
state 
legislative 
districts——and 
safeguard 
the 
constitutional rights of all Wisconsin voters.  
 I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Following the 2020 census, the legislature passed 
legislation creating new state legislative district maps, the 
governor vetoed the legislation, and the legislature did not 
attempt to override his veto.  Because the legislature and the 
governor reached an impasse, the 2011 maps remained in effect, 
even though they no longer complied with the Wisconsin or United 
States Constitutions due to population shifts.  
¶6 
Billie Johnson and other Wisconsin voters asked this 
court to redraw the unconstitutional 2011 maps.  See Johnson v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶2, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469 ("Johnson I").  In that case, we first confirmed that 
the 2011 maps no longer complied with the state and federal 
requirement that districts be equally populated.  See id.  Next, 
we identified the principles that would guide the court in 
adopting new maps, including the proposition that remedial maps 
"'should reflect the least change' necessary for the maps to 
comport with relevant legal requirements."  Id., ¶72 (quoting 
Wright v. City of Albany, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237 (M.D. Ga. 
2003)).  We then invited the parties to submit proposed state 
 
 
7 
legislative maps for our review.  See id., ¶87 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  Of the proposed maps, we adopted the Governor's.  
See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶52, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II").  The United States 
Supreme Court summarily reversed that decision, holding that the 
Governor's 
proposed 
legislative 
maps 
violated 
the 
Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
increased 
the 
number 
of 
majority-Black 
districts 
in 
the 
Milwaukee area without sufficient justification.  Wis. Legis. v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (2022) (per 
curiam).  On remand, we adopted the legislative maps proposed by 
the Legislature.  See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 
19, ¶3, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 ("Johnson III"). 
¶7 
In this case, the Clarke Petitioners filed a petition 
for leave to commence an original action challenging the maps 
adopted in Johnson III, arguing that they:  (1) are an extreme 
partisan gerrymander; (2) do not comply with the contiguity 
requirements contained in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution; and (3) were created via a process that 
violated the separation of powers.  We granted leave in part, 
allowing Petitioners' contiguity and separation-of-powers claims 
to proceed, while declining to review the issue of extreme 
partisan 
gerrymandering. 
 
We 
explained 
that 
although 
Petitioners' extreme-partisan-gerrymandering claim presented an 
important and unresolved legal question, we declined to address 
it due to the need for extensive fact-finding.  See Clarke v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 70, 409 Wis. 2d 372, 995 N.W.2d 
779. 
 
 
8 
¶8 
After granting the petition in part, we permitted 
several parties to intervene.  We ordered the parties to provide 
briefing on the following four questions: 
1.) Do the existing state legislative maps violate the 
contiguity 
requirements 
contained 
in 
Article 
IV, 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution? 
2.) Did the adoption of the existing state legislative 
maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution's separation 
of powers? 
3.) If the court rules that Wisconsin's existing state 
legislative maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution 
for 
either 
or 
both 
of 
these 
reasons 
and 
the 
legislature and the governor then fail to adopt state 
legislative maps that comply with the Wisconsin 
Constitution, what standards should guide the court in 
imposing a remedy for the constitutional violation(s)? 
4.) What fact-finding, if any, will be required if the 
court determines there is a constitutional violation 
based on the contiguity clauses and/or the separation-
of-powers doctrine and the court is required to craft 
a remedy for the violation?  If fact-finding will be 
required, what process should be used to resolve 
questions of fact?  
Id.  After all parties submitted initial briefs, Respondents 
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting various defenses.  Oral 
argument was held on November 21, 2023.  
¶9 
In this opinion, we first address whether the existing 
state legislative districts violate the Wisconsin Constitution's 
contiguity requirements.  We determine that a substantial number 
of districts do so.  Next, we turn to Respondents' motion to 
dismiss and the defenses asserted therein.  Because none of 
Respondents' proffered defenses apply here, we deny Respondents' 
motion to dismiss.  Finally, we enjoin the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission from using the maps in future elections, and we 
 
 
9 
explain the process and relevant considerations that will guide 
the court in adopting remedial maps.  
II.  CONTIGUITY 
¶10 We begin by determining the meaning of "contiguous 
territory" set out in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  To do so, we examine the constitutional 
text, 
our 
precedent 
interpreting 
that 
text, 
and 
other 
jurisdictions' interpretations of similar provisions.  Next, we 
apply that meaning to the current legislative districts to 
determine 
whether 
the 
districts 
violate 
the 
contiguity 
requirements.  We conclude that the current legislative maps 
contain 
districts 
that 
are 
not 
composed 
of 
"contiguous 
territory" and therefore violate the Wisconsin Constitution. 
A.  Text 
¶11 We start our analysis with Article IV, Section 4 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, which sets the ground rules for how 
Wisconsin Assembly members are elected and how their districts 
are to be established.  That section reads in full as follows: 
The 
members 
of 
the 
assembly 
shall 
be 
chosen 
biennially, by single districts, on the Tuesday 
succeeding the first Monday of November in even-
numbered years, by the qualified electors of the 
several districts, such districts to be bounded by 
county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist of 
contiguous territory and be in as compact form as 
practicable.   
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).  The underlined 
portion of Section 4 imposes three separate requirements for 
establishing assembly districts.  The districts must: (1) "be 
bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines;" (2) "consist 
 
 
10 
of contiguous territory;" and (3) "be in as compact form as 
practicable." 
¶12 Article IV, Section 5 sets out rules for how senators 
are elected and how their districts are established: 
The senators shall be elected by single districts of 
convenient contiguous territory, at the same time and 
in the same manner as members of the assembly are 
required to be chosen; and no assembly district shall 
be divided in the formation of a senate district.  The 
senate districts shall be numbered in the regular 
series, and the senators shall be chosen alternately 
from the odd and even-numbered districts for the term 
of 4 years. 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5 (emphasis added).  The underlined 
portion of Section 5 imposes three requirements on senate 
districts.  The senate districts must (1) be "single districts;" 
(2) be "of convenient contiguous territory;" and (3) not divide 
any assembly districts. 
¶13  Sections 4 and 5 both impose a contiguity requirement 
on districts——specifically, assembly and senate districts must 
consist of "contiguous territory."  Given the language in the 
constitution, the question before us is straightforward.  When 
legislative districts are composed of separate, detached parts, 
do they consist of "contiguous territory"?  We conclude that 
they do not. 
¶14 Much of the Wisconsin Constitution is set out in broad 
terms, the interpretation of which may lead to difficult 
questions and require a complex balancing of interests.  For 
instance, at what point does a search or seizure become 
unreasonable?  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  What does it mean 
for a person to be "entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for 
all injuries"?  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  Or even, how 
 
 
11 
compact does a district have to be in order to be in "as compact
form as practicable"?  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.   
¶15 In other places, however, our constitution imposes 
specific requirements whose meaning is immediately apparent from 
the words themselves.  For instance, assembly elections must be 
held "on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November in 
even-numbered years."  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.  And judges 
must have been licensed to practice law for "5 years immediately 
prior to appointment."  See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 24.  
¶16   The contiguous territory requirement fits squarely 
into the latter category.  It is immediately apparent, using 
practically any dictionary, that contiguous means "touching" or 
"in actual contact."  See, e.g., Contiguous, Black's Law 
Dictionary, (11th ed. 2019) ("Touching at a point or along a 
boundary."); Contiguous, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) 
("touching, in actual contact, next in space; meeting at a 
common boundary, bordering, adjoining"); Contiguous, Merriam 
Webster Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("being in actual contact: 
touching along a boundary or at a point").  These definitions 
make clear that contiguous territory is territory that is 
touching, or in actual contact.  In other words, a district must 
be physically intact such that a person could travel from one 
point in the district to any other point in the district without 
crossing district lines.  See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for 
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 
84 (1985) ("A district may be defined as contiguous if every 
part of the district is reachable from every other part without 
crossing the district boundary."). 
 
 
12 
¶17
We find additional support for this understanding of
contiguity 
in 
historical 
definitions 
and 
early 
Wisconsin 
districting practices.  In examining historical definitions of 
the word "contiguous," we see that the definition has not 
changed since the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted.  See 
Contiguous, 
A 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
(1756) 
("meeting so as to touch; bordering upon each other; not 
separate"); Contiguous, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language (1828) ("touching: meeting or joining at the surface or 
border").  Turning to early districting practices, the first 
state 
legislative 
districts, 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, were all physically contiguous.  See Wis. Const. 
art. XIV, § 12 (1848).  Additionally, the constitution specified 
that if existing towns were split or new towns were created, the 
districts had to remain physically intact.  See id.  In short, 
historical definitions and practices related to contiguity 
bolster our conclusion that contiguity does indeed require 
"touching," or "actual contact."   
¶18 Respondents assert that a district with separate, 
detached territory can still be contiguous——so long as the 
detached territory is a "municipal island"9 and the main body of 
                                                 
9 Municipal islands are portions of a municipality separated 
from the main body of the municipality.  Municipal islands are 
created via annexation, either because a municipality has 
annexed the island, or because a municipality has annexed 
territory in such a way as to isolate a portion of another 
municipality.  No party disputes that municipal islands created 
by annexation are themselves permissible.  This court said as 
much in Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 275 Wis. 342, 
347-48 81 N.W.2d 721 (1957), when it held that the City of 
Madison was not prohibited from annexing portions of the Town of 
Blooming Grove in such a way that separated unincorporated 
portions of Blooming Grove from one another. 
 
 
13 
the municipality is located elsewhere in the district. 
The 
Legislature refers to this as "political contiguity."  Adopting 
the concept of political contiguity would essentially require us 
to read an exception into the contiguity requirements——that 
district territory must be physically touching, except when the 
territory is a detached section of a municipality located in the 
same district. 
¶19 We decline to read a political contiguity exception 
into Article IV's contiguity requirements.  The text contains no 
such exception.  Both Section 4 and Section 5 include the 
discrete requirement that districts be composed of contiguous 
territory.  There are no exceptions to contiguity in the 
constitution's text, either overt or fairly implied.  True, 
assembly districts must also be "in as compact form as 
practicable" and "bounded by county, precinct, town or ward 
lines," but the existence of additional requirements does not 
constrain or limit the separate requirement that district 
territory be contiguous.   
¶20 Contiguity is binary:  territory is either contiguous 
(touching, in contact) or it is not (separate, detached).  See 
Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 24, 30 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
(describing contiguity as "an absolute standard that either is 
satisfied or not satisfied by the challenged map" because it is 
"free of any phrase that could broaden the meaning of 
'contiguous.'").  In this respect, the contiguity requirements 
are unlike, for example, the provision of Article IV, Section 4 
that requires districts be "in as compact form as practicable."  
 
 
14 
Contiguity is not required only when it is practicable——it is a 
constitutional imperative for all districts.    
B.  Precedent 
¶21 This straightforward understanding of contiguity has 
been twice confirmed by this court: first in Chicago & Northwest 
Railway Co. v. Town of Oconto, 50 Wis. 189, 196, 6 N.W. 607 
(1880), and then twelve years later in State ex rel. Lamb v. 
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 148, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).  In Oconto, we 
determined 
that 
"separate, 
detached" 
territory 
was 
not 
contiguous: 
To so construe the constitution as to [allow towns to] 
be composed of separate, detached, and non-contiguous 
territory, would most unquestionably restrict the 
sovereign power of the legislature in the organization 
of 
assembly 
districts 
'consisting 
of 
contiguous 
territory, and bounded by county, precinct, town, or 
ward lines.'  Article 4, § 4, Const.10 
50 Wis. at 196.  In Lamb, we addressed the question of district 
contiguity head on, stating that Article IV, Section 4 "requires 
that 
each 
assembly 
district 
must 
consist 
of 
contiguous 
territory; that is to say, it cannot be made up of two or more 
pieces of detached territory."  Lamb, 83 Wis. at 148. Simply 
put, this court understood the contiguity requirement to mean 
just what it says:  Districts must be made up of contiguous 
                                                 
10 This court later clarified that Oconto's holding on town 
contiguity 
did 
not 
prohibit 
municipalities 
from 
annexing 
territory in a way that created municipal islands, reasoning in 
part that annexation of some areas within a town did not change 
town boundaries, which stretched across both incorporated and 
unincorporated areas. 
Thus, all parts of the town remained 
contiguous.  Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 275 Wis. 
342, 346-47, 81 N.W.2d 721 (1957).  Blooming Grove expressly 
declined to address the impact of town contiguity on legislative 
districts, and did not revise our underlying definition of 
contiguity itself.  Id. at 346-48. 
 
 
15 
territory——i.e., territory that is not separate or detached, but
physically touching. 
¶22 Respondents argue that this court's Johnson decisions 
support their position——that the contiguity requirements are 
satisfied even when a district includes detached territory, so 
long as that territory is a municipal island.  The following is 
the full extent of our municipal island analysis in Johnson I: 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
further commands assembly districts be "contiguous," 
which generally means a district "cannot be made up of 
two or more pieces of detached territory."  State ex 
rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 148, 53 N.W. 35 
(1892).  If annexation by municipalities creates a 
municipal "island," however, the district containing 
detached portions of the municipality is legally 
contiguous even if the area around the island is part 
of a different district.  Prosser v. Elections Bd., 
793 F. Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36.  We twice repeated our cursory 
treatment of contiguity in Johnson II and Johnson III.  See 
Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶36; Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 
¶70.   
 
¶23 We take a moment to briefly examine Prosser v. 
Elections Board, 793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992), the source 
of Johnson I's proposition that districts can be legally 
contiguous if they include detached portions of a municipality.  
In Prosser, a federal district court determined that lack of 
contiguity in legislative maps was not "a serious demerit," and 
noted that the Wisconsin Legislature "treat[ed] islands as 
contiguous with the cities or villages to which they belong."  
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866.  The Prosser court did not examine 
 
 
16 
this court's precedent, but instead cited to two statutes,11 one
of which had been repealed by the time of our Johnson I 
decision.  Id. 
¶24 Our reliance on Prosser was in error.  To the extent 
that 
Johnson's 
passing 
statements 
about 
the 
contiguity 
requirements of Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 represent binding 
precedent, we overrule them.  As a court, "we have repeatedly 
recognized the importance of stare decisis to the rule of law."  
State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 195, 990 N.W.2d 
174.  But one situation in which we may depart from stare 
decisis is when a decision is "unsound in principle" because it 
"misapplies the Wisconsin Constitution."  State v. Roberson, 
2019 WI 102, ¶51, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.  Johnson is 
unsound in principle because it misapplied the constitution in 
three ways.  First, Johnson failed to analyze the contiguity 
requirements evident in the text of the constitution.  Second, 
Johnson did not attempt to square its view of contiguity with 
the court's precedential decisions regarding the constitution's 
contiguity requirements in Oconto or Lamb.  Third, Johnson I 
relied entirely upon Prosser12 which itself ignored the ordinary 
meaning of the constitutional text and instead pointed to two 
statutes, one of which had been repealed by the time of the 
Johnson I decision.  Under these circumstances, we would "do 
                                                 
11 Namely, Wis. Stat. §§ 4.001(3); 5.15(1)(b) (1991-92). 
Neither statute defines what the constitution requires, and in 
any event, § 4.001(3) was repealed in 2011.  2011 Wis. Act 43. 
§ 2. 
12 We note that "federal district court cases are not 
binding authority on this court."  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶18, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
 
 
17 
more damage to the rule of law by obstinately refusing to admit
[our] error, thereby perpetuating injustice, than by" overruling 
this part of Johnson.  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶49.  We 
therefore hold that, notwithstanding any statements to the 
contrary in Johnson, Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 mean what they 
say——districts must be composed of contiguous territory; i.e., 
territory that is touching, not separate or detached. 
C.  Persuasive Authority 
¶25 Although 
we 
are 
not 
bound 
by 
other 
states' 
interpretations of district contiguity requirements, we are 
persuaded by their near-uniform acceptance that "contiguous 
territory" does indeed mean territory that is touching, not 
separate or detached.13  See, e.g., Below v. Gardner, 963 A.2d 
785, 792 (N.H. 2002) ("Courts generally agree that contiguous 
territory is territory that touches, adjoins or is connected, as 
distinguished 
from 
territory 
that 
is 
separated 
by 
other 
territory."); In re Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d 
428, 437 (Md. 1982) ("[C]ontiguous territory is territory 
touching, 
adjoining 
and 
connected, 
as 
distinguished 
from 
territory separated by other territory."); Hickel v. Se. Conf., 
846 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1992) ("Contiguous territory is 
                                                 
13 See Yunsieg P. Kim & Jowei Chen, Gerrymandered by 
Definition: The Distortion of "Traditional" Districting Criteria 
and A Proposal for Their Empirical Redefinition, 2021 Wis. L. 
Rev. 101, 167 (noting that 49 states have imposed contiguity 
requirements on their legislative maps);  Richard G. Niemi, The 
Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in 
Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 185, 187 (1985) ("That 
political districts should be contiguous——that all parts of a 
district should be connected——is not likely to be important in 
gerrymandering 
cases 
because 
it 
is 
relatively 
noncontroversial."). 
 
 
18 
territory which is bordering or touching."); Sherill v. O'Brien, 
81 N.E. 124, 131 (N.Y. 1907) ("The ordinary and plain meaning of 
the words 'contiguous territory' is not territory nearby, in the 
neighborhood or locality of, but territory touching, adjoining, 
and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by 
other territory.").  This understanding of contiguous remains 
the same even for states, like ours, that allow non-contiguous 
municipal annexation.  See, e.g., Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 
S.E.2d 247, 254 (N.C. 2003) (upholding a lower court decision 
holding that contiguity means sharing "a common boundary", even 
though N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-58.1 allows for non-contiguous 
municipal annexation).  Clearly, the holding of this court is 
not novel.  We are simply giving effect to a constitutional 
contiguity requirement as so many other courts have done. 
¶26 The few contiguity-related issues that other courts 
have genuinely grappled with are edge cases that arise when 
district 
territory 
is 
connected 
only 
by 
water, 
or 
when 
contiguity is technically achieved, but barely (for example, 
when territory is connected only at a single point).  When edge 
cases arise, courts still understand that parts of a district 
may not be separated by other districts.  See Wilkins v. West, 
571 S.E.2d 100, 109 (Va. 2002) (holding a district was 
contiguous over water, while noting that "clearly, a district 
that contained two sections completely severed by another land 
mass 
would 
not 
meet 
this 
constitutional 
requirement 
[of 
contiguity].").  In other words, the existence of edge cases 
does not justify abandoning the requirement that territory must 
 
 
19 
indeed be touching to be contiguous. To clarify matters for the
remedial process, we discuss these ancillary issues next.   
D.  Ancillary Issues: Water Contiguity and Touch-Point 
Contiguity 
¶27 Like many other states, Wisconsin's geography is such 
that certain districts span bodies of water.14  This does not, by 
itself, violate the contiguity requirement.  A district can 
still be contiguous if it contains territory with portions of 
land separated by water.  See Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d at 31 
(noting 
that 
"the 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
'territory' 
references a geographic area without regard to whether the 
portions of the land within the geographic area are split by 
large rivers or other bodies of water.").  This understanding of 
water contiguity is common in states that include or border 
bodies of water.  See, e.g., Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 109 ("[N]o 
one 
disputes 
that 
the 
geography 
and 
population 
of 
this 
Commonwealth necessitate that some electoral districts include 
water, and that land masses separated by water may nevertheless 
satisfy the contiguity requirement in certain circumstances."); 
Hickel, 846 P.2d at 45 ("Absolute contiguity of land masses is 
impossible in Alaska, considering her numerous archipelagos.  
Accordingly, a contiguous district may contain some amount of 
open sea."); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1255 (R.I. 
2006) ("In the instant matter, while the districts are not 
contiguous on land, this Court finds that the districts are 
                                                 
14 For instance, Madeline Island in Ashland County does not 
have sufficient population to constitute its own district, so 
any district that includes it will have to span across a portion 
of Lake Superior. 
 
 
20 
contiguous on the basis of shore-to-shore contiguity."). 
As in
these states, the fact that a district's territory includes land 
separated by water will not, by itself, defeat the contiguity 
requirements in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5.   
¶28 In addition to water-contiguity, we must also address 
the issue of "touch-point contiguity."  Touch-point contiguity 
occurs when territory is contiguous only because it is joined at 
a single point.  Some states allow touch-point contiguity, and 
some do not.  Compare Stephenson, 582 S.E.2d at 254 (affirming a 
trial court's finding that "a district whose parts are 'held 
together' by the mathematical concept of 'point contiguity' does 
not meet the . . . criteria for contiguity."), with In re 1983 
Legislative Apportionment of House, Senate, & Cong. Districts, 
469 A.2d 819, 831 (Me. 1983) (holding that a district that was 
contiguous only at a single point "approach[ed] the limits of 
what is constitutionally permissible," but still met the 
contiguity requirement).   
¶29 For our purposes, since territory that touches at a 
single point is indeed touching, touch-point contiguity alone 
does not violate the contiguity requirement.  Although touch-
point contiguity can be a "sign that traditional districting 
criteria were compromised," Covington v. North Carolina, 316 
F.R.D. 117, 141 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017) 
(citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993)), such concerns 
are better addressed by examining redistricting criteria as a 
 
 
21 
whole rather than complicating the otherwise
simple contiguity
requirement.15   
E.  The Current Maps' Non-Contiguity 
¶30 Having determined that "contiguous territory" means 
that the territory must be actually touching, we now turn to the 
current legislative maps.  We examine the current maps and 
conclude 
that 
the 
non-contiguous 
districts 
violate 
the 
requirements set out in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶31 None 
of 
the 
parties 
disputes 
that 
the 
current 
legislative maps contain districts with discrete pieces of 
territory that are not in actual contact with the rest of the 
district.  We again look at the example of Assembly District 47 
which plainly includes separate, detached parts:  
                                                 
15 A district with only touch-point contiguity may not be as 
compact as reasonably practicable, for example.  See Wis. Const. 
art. IV, §§ 4-5. 
 
 
22 
¶32 Assembly district 53 in the Oshkosh area is another 
such example, with multiple separate, detached parts:  
 
 
23 
Assembly district 68 in the Eau Claire area (in yellow below) is 
another: 
 
 
24 
¶33
Many senate districts also contain separate, detached 
parts.  District 22 in the Racine area, shown in orange and 
purple below, is one example: 
District 27, shown in orange, purple, and green below, is 
another:  
 
 
25 
¶34
In total, at least 50 assembly districts and at least 
20 senate districts include separate, detached parts.  That is 
to say, a majority of the districts in both the assembly and the 
senate do not consist of "contiguous territory" within the 
meaning of Article IV, Section 4, nor are they "of convenient 
contiguous territory" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 
5.  Therefore, we hold that the non-contiguous legislative 
districts violate the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶35 We would be remiss to end our discussion on contiguity 
without emphasizing that contiguity is "not just a gracenote in 
the score of democracy; it is crucial, both practically and 
theoretically."  Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third 
Criterion: 
Compactness 
as 
a 
Procedural 
Safeguard 
Against 
Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301, 330 (1991).  
The contiguity requirement (along with compactness) helps make 
for 
districts 
that 
are 
more 
geographically 
cohesive——and 
therefore more likely to reflect a reasonably homogeneous slate 
of interests than districts with scattered pockets of isolated 
communities.  Additionally, drafters of contiguity requirements 
have viewed contiguity as no mere technical requirement, but as 
an important tool to constrain districting practices they 
consider undesirable.  See Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019) (noting that the Apportionment Act 
of 1842 required contiguity "in an attempt to forbid the 
practice of the gerrymander"); Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35, 
38 (Mo. 2012) (stating that the purpose of a contiguity 
requirement was "to guard, as far as practicable, under the 
system of representation adopted, against a legislative evil, 
 
 
26 
commonly known as the gerrymander" (citation omitted)); Hickel, 
846 P.2d at 45 ("[T]he requirements of contiguity, compactness 
and socio-economic integration were incorporated by the framers 
of the reapportionment provisions to prevent gerrymandering").  
We decline to chip away at such a consequential districting 
requirement 
by 
approving 
an 
exception 
not 
found 
in 
our 
constitution's text. 
III.  DEFENSES 
¶36 Having determined that the non-contiguous legislative 
districts violate the Wisconsin Constitution, we now turn to 
Respondents' motion to dismiss and explain why none of their 
proffered defenses preclude us from holding in favor of 
Petitioners on the merits. 
¶37 In their motion to dismiss and other briefing, 
Respondents maintain that Petitioners lack standing to challenge 
the contiguity of the current legislative districts, and that 
their claims are barred by laches, preclusion, and estoppel.  
Additionally, 
Respondents 
contend 
that 
this 
case 
is 
an 
impermissible collateral attack on this court's judgment in 
Johnson III, and that, as a result, neither the declaratory nor 
the injunctive relief Petitioners seek is available.16  We 
conclude that Respondents' defenses do not apply, and that 
                                                 
16 Respondents also make a brief argument that adjudicating 
this case in Petitioners' favor will violate Respondents' due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  These arguments are underdeveloped, and as 
such, we do not address them.  See Casanova v. Polsky, 2023 WI 
19, ¶44, 406 Wis. 2d 247, 986 N.W.2d 780 ("[W]e need not address 
underdeveloped arguments.").     
 
 
27 
declaratory and injunctive relief are available.
Accordingly, 
we deny the motion to dismiss.17  
 A.  Standing 
¶38 At the outset, we deny Respondents' motion to dismiss 
for lack of standing.  The Governor indisputably has standing, 
and that is all that is required for this case to proceed.       
¶39 Respondents do not argue that the Governor lacks 
standing, nor could they.  Our cases make clear that "the state, 
acting either through the Governor or the Attorney General, may 
challenge the constitutionality of a state reapportionment plan 
as a violation of state constitutional rights of the citizens."  
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 126 
N.W.2d 551 (1964) (emphasis added).18  Importantly, as long as 
                                                 
17 The Clarke and Wright Petitioners assert that the motion 
to dismiss is procedurally improper because the rules governing 
original actions do not permit it, see Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.70, and because we implicitly rejected these arguments when 
we granted in part leave to commence this original action.  
Since we reject Respondents' arguments on the merits, we need 
not address the procedural propriety of the motion.   
18  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 
N.W.2d 
551 
(1964) 
involved 
a 
challenge 
based 
on 
equal 
population, but it supported its proposition that the governor 
had standing by pointing to cases in which the executive branch 
challenged maps on other state constitutional grounds, including 
contiguity.  Id. at 552 n.3 (citing State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892)).  Therefore, it is 
difficult to see why Reynolds' holding would be limited to equal 
population 
challenges, 
particularly 
given 
Reynolds' 
broad 
language referring to "violation[s] of state constitutional 
rights of the citizens."  Id. at 552. 
 
 
28 
one of the Petitioners has standing, this case may proceed.19
See City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 232, 
332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) ("Having determined that one party has 
standing to maintain this action, we next turn to the merits."); 
see also Chi. Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, 894 
F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2018) ("As long as there is at least one 
individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert 
these rights as his own, a court need not consider whether the 
other plaintiffs . . . have standing to maintain the suit." 
(quoting Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 2009)) 
(quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, we need not address 
Respondents' standing arguments further.  
B.  Laches, Issue Preclusion, Claim Preclusion, and Judicial 
Estoppel 
¶40 For a myriad of reasons, Respondents have failed to 
demonstrate that Petitioners' claims are barred by laches, issue 
preclusion, claim preclusion, or judicial estoppel.   
1.  Laches 
 
¶41 Laches is an affirmative defense that applies when the 
failure to promptly bring a claim prejudices the party defending 
against that claim.  See Wis. Small Bus. United, Inc. v. 
Brennan, 2020 WI 69, ¶12, 393 Wis. 2d 308, 946 N.W.2d 101.  A 
laches defense has three elements:  "(1) a party unreasonably 
delays in bringing a claim; (2) a second party lacks knowledge 
                                                 
19 The fact that the Governor is an intervenor-petitioner is 
immaterial.  When a party intervenes, they become "a full 
participant in the proceedings, having all the same rights as 
all other parties to the action."  Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. 
Bostelmann, 2020 WI 80, ¶9, 394 Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423.   
 
 
29 
that the first party would raise that claim; and (3) the second
party is prejudiced by the delay."  Id. (citing State ex rel. 
Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶15, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 
N.W.2d 587).   
 
¶42 Respondents have failed to demonstrate two necessary 
elements of laches: unreasonable delay and prejudice.  Taking 
unreasonable delay first, this case was filed less than a year-
and-a-half after Johnson III adopted the state legislative 
district maps at issue in this case.  Johnson III was decided on 
April 15, 2022, the last possible day for districts to be 
established prior to the 2022 fall elections.  See Johnson III, 
401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶138 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(explaining that "Wisconsin law authorizes candidates to begin 
circulating nomination papers for [the fall] primary on April 
15.").  Petitioners ran out of time and could not obtain relief 
prior to the 2022 elections.  As a result, Petitioners decided 
to request relief in time for the 2024 elections——the soonest 
elections for which relief could be granted. Given the timing of 
legislative elections, filing this case in August of 2023 is not 
unreasonable delay.  See also State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. 
Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, ¶28 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480 
("'[T]he overriding responsibility of [the Supreme] Court is to 
the Constitution of the United States' and of this court, to the 
Wisconsin Constitution as well, 'no matter how late it may be 
that a violation of the Constitution is found to exist.'" 
(quoting Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957))).    
¶43 As for prejudice, Respondents have not demonstrated 
any relevant prejudice stemming from Petitioners' delay.  The 
 
 
30 
only harms Respondents cite are litigation costs (both in 
Johnson and in this case) and vague assertions about disruption 
to the status quo.  But litigation costs alone cannot constitute 
prejudice for laches purposes, and any disruption to the current 
state legislative districts is necessary to serve the public's 
interest in having districts that comply with each of the 
requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See, e.g., Goodman 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 808 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(rejecting the argument that "the cost of litigation . . . by 
itself could constitute prejudice within the contemplation of a 
laches defense.").  Accordingly, we hold that laches does not 
apply.20       
2.  Issue Preclusion 
¶44 Issue preclusion is an equitable defense that "is 
designed to limit the relitigation of issues that have been 
actually litigated in a previous action."  Dostal v. Strand, 
2023 WI 6, ¶22, 405 Wis. 2d 572, 984 N.W.2d 382 (quoting Aldrich 
v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, ¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433).  In 
an issue preclusion analysis, we determine:  (1) whether issue 
preclusion can be applied as a matter of law, and (2) if so, 
whether applying issue preclusion would be "fundamentally fair." 
Id., ¶23.  Issue preclusion can be applied as a matter of law 
                                                 
20 We also note that this case is distinguishable from Trump 
v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568, where we were 
asked to overturn the results of a legally conducted election, 
and we held that several of the claims failed under the doctrine 
of laches.  Here we are asked to determine whether state 
legislative maps are constitutional, and because we determine 
they are not, we establish a process going forward so that 
constitutional maps are adopted in time for the next election. 
 
 
31 
when a factual
or legal issue was "actually
litigated and 
determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a 
previous action" and "the determination was essential to the 
judgment."  Id., ¶24; see also N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 
189 Wis. 2d 541, 550-51, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). 
¶45 Issue preclusion does not bar Petitioners' contiguity 
claims 
because 
contiguity 
was 
not 
actually 
litigated 
in 
Johnson.21  In Johnson, all agreed that the state legislative 
districts 
enacted 
in 
2011 
were 
unconstitutional 
due 
to 
population shifts that occurred prior to the 2020 census.  
Johnson I, Wis. 2d 623, ¶2.  The sole claim in Johnson was 
malapportionment.  Of import, none of the parties argued that 
either the 2011 state legislative districts or any of the 
parties' 
proposed 
remedial 
district 
maps 
violated 
the 
constitution's contiguity requirements.  Indeed, in their 
briefing, the Johnson parties scarcely mentioned contiguity at 
all.  As discussed above, when the parties did mention 
contiguity, they primarily cited Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866, a 
non-binding 
federal 
district 
court 
decision, 
which 
said 
(contrary to this court's prior precedent), the Wisconsin 
                                                 
21 Since we determine that issue preclusion cannot be 
applied because Petitioners' contiguity claim was not actually 
litigated, we do not reach the second question of whether the 
application of issue preclusion is "fundamentally fair."  See 
Dostal v. Strand, 2023 WI 6, ¶23, 405 Wis. 2d 572, 984 N.W.2d 
382. 
 
 
32 
constitution does not require
"literal contiguity."22
Under 
these circumstances, we hold that no party in Johnson "actually 
litigated" whether the current state legislative districts 
satisfy Article IV, Sections 4 and 5's contiguity requirements.23  
Therefore, issue preclusion does not apply in this case. 
                                                 
22 Moreover, before we decided Johnson I, we ordered the 
parties to submit a joint stipulation of facts and law.  In that 
joint stipulation, the parties agreed that "[c]ontiguity for 
state assembly districts is satisfied when a district boundary 
follows municipal boundaries.  Municipal 'islands' are legally 
contiguous with the municipality to which the 'island' belongs."    
This further underscores the fact that no party in Johnson 
actually litigated the issue of contiguity.  See also City of 
Sheboygan v. Nytsch, 2006 WI App 191, ¶12, 296 Wis. 2d 73, 722 
N.W.2d 626 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. 
e (1982)) (explaining an issue is not actually litigated for 
issue-preclusion 
purposes 
when 
the 
issue 
is 
resolved 
by 
stipulation of the parties), vacated in part on other grounds 
2008 WI 64, ¶5, 310 Wis. 2d 337, 750 N.W.2d 475.  Such an 
agreement also undermines Respondents' argument that judicial 
estoppel should bar the Petitioners' contiguity claim, as will 
be explained later. 
23 Even if contiguity were actually litigated, the Clarke 
Petitioners (and several of the Wright Petitioners) were not 
parties in Johnson, nor do they have a "sufficient identity of 
interest" with any of the Johnson parties to preclude them from 
litigating the issue here.  See Paige K.B. ex rel. Peterson v. 
Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 223, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999).  The 
United States Supreme Court has emphasized that applying "issue 
preclusion to nonparties" raises due process issues and "runs up 
against the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should 
have his [or her] own day in court.'"  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 
U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).  Respondents' only argument regarding 
the Clarke Petitioners is that they have sufficient identity of 
interest with the parties in Johnson since some of the Clarke 
Petitioners' attorneys represented other parties in Johnson.  
But the identity of the lawyers hired by the Clarke Petitioners 
is irrelevant to whether the Clarke Petitioners' due process 
rights were protected.  See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892-93.  Thus, 
our decisions in Johnson cannot preclude the Clarke Petitioners 
from raising the contiguity issue here. 
 
 
33 
3.  Claim Preclusion  
¶46 We 
also 
reject 
Respondents' 
argument 
that 
the 
Governor's and the Wright Petitioners' contiguity claims are 
barred by claim preclusion.  Unlike issue preclusion, which 
applies only to issues that were actually litigated in a prior 
proceeding, claim preclusion prevents relitigation of "all 
matters 'which were litigated or which might have been litigated 
in the former proceedings.'"  Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, 
¶19, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879 (quoting Sopha v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 233, 601 N.W.2d 627 
(1999)).  Claim preclusion has three requirements:  "(1) 
identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and 
present suits; (2) prior litigation resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits by a court with jurisdiction; and (3) identity of 
the causes of action in the two suits."  Sopha, 230 Wis.2d at 
233-34.   
¶47  Claim preclusion does not apply to the Governor's or 
the Wright Petitioners' claims because this case and Johnson 
involve different causes of action.  In determining whether 
causes of action are identical for claim-preclusion purposes, 
Wisconsin applies the "transactional approach," which views 
claims "in factual terms and coterminous with the transaction, 
rather than in terms of legal theories."  Fed. Nat'l Mortg. 
Ass'n v. Thompson, 2018 WI 57, ¶¶33-34, 381 Wis. 2d 609, 912 
N.W.2d 364.  Put another way, we look to whether there is a 
shared set of operative facts at issue in the two proceedings, 
not whether the two cases involved similar or related legal 
theories.  See id., ¶34.   
 
 
34 
¶48
Applying the transactional approach, we conclude that 
the causes of action in Johnson and here are fundamentally 
different.  Johnson involved claims regarding the legislatively 
enacted 
2011 
state 
legislative 
maps 
which 
became 
unconstitutionally 
malapportioned 
after 
the 
2020 
census.  
Everyone 
agreed 
that 
the 
maps 
were 
unconstitutionally 
malapportioned.  The operative facts in Johnson thus concerned 
only the 2011 maps and the 2020 census results.  In this case, 
by contrast, the Governor and the Wright Petitioners argue that 
the Johnson remedy was unconstitutional on grounds not raised in 
Johnson.  None of the apportionment facts underlying Johnson are 
relevant to that remedy question; only the maps the court 
adopted 
at 
the 
conclusion 
of 
that 
case 
are 
pertinent.  
Therefore, the judgment in Johnson does not preclude either the 
Governor's or Wright Petitioners' contiguity claims.24  
4.  Judicial Estoppel 
¶49 Respondents also contend that the Governor and Wright 
Petitioners are judicially estopped from asserting contiguity 
                                                 
24 Additionally, because claim preclusion requires "identity 
between the parties or their privies in the prior and present 
suits," it cannot apply to Wright Petitioners Atkinson, Kane, 
and Dudley, who were not parties in Johnson.  Kruckenberg v. 
Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶21, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879.  
Although the Legislature argues that these individuals may be 
precluded based on their "identity of interest" with the other 
Wright 
Petitioners, 
the 
case 
they 
cite 
involves 
issue 
preclusion, 
not 
claim 
preclusion. 
 
See 
Paige 
K.B., 
226 
Wis. 2d at 226.  In the claim-preclusion context, privity or an 
"absolute identity of interest," such as successorship-in-
interest, is required.  Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, 
¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72.  Because Respondents have not 
established such a relationship, claim preclusion cannot be 
applied to these individuals.   
 
 
35 
arguments inconsistent with those asserted in Johnson. 
See
Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶22, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 
699 N.W.2d 54 ("Judicial estoppel precludes a party from 
asserting 
one 
position 
in 
a 
legal 
proceeding 
and 
then 
subsequently asserting an inconsistent position.").  There are 
three requirements for applying judicial estoppel:  "(1) the 
later position must be clearly inconsistent with the earlier 
position; (2) the facts at issue should be the same in both 
cases; and (3) the party to be estopped must have convinced the 
first court to adopt its position."  Salveson v. Douglas County, 
2001 WI 100, ¶38, 245 Wis. 2d 497, 630 N.W.2d 182.  Even when 
all of these elements are met, the court applies judicial 
estoppel at its discretion.  See State v. Harrison, 2020 WI 35, 
¶21, 391 Wis. 2d 161, 942 N.W.2d 310.  Because judicial estoppel 
is meant to prevent "cold manipulation and not unthinking or 
confused blunder, it has never been applied where plaintiff's 
assertions were based on fraud, inadvertence, or mistake."  
State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) 
(citing State v. Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d 546, 558, 510 N.W.2d 837 
(Ct. App. 1993)). 
¶50 We decline to exercise our discretion to apply 
judicial estoppel here.  Even assuming the elements of judicial 
estoppel were met, there are compelling public policy reasons 
why this court should not exercise its discretion to apply 
estoppel in this case.  As for the Governor, "[a]s a general 
rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the 
public, the United States government, or the state governments, 
where the application of that doctrine would encroach upon the 
 
 
36 
sovereignty of the government and interfere with the proper 
discharge of governmental duties."  Park Bldg. Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 78, 88, 100 N.W.2d 571 (1960) (quoting P.H. 
Vartanian, Comment Note, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel 
Against Government and its Governmental Agencies, 1 A.L.R.2d 
338, 
340-41 
(1948)). 
 
Additionally, 
given 
the 
parties' 
stipulation 
in 
Johnson, 
it 
is 
difficult 
to 
view 
any 
inconsistency in position as "cold manipulation" which judicial 
estoppel seeks to deter.  Instead any inconsistency is more 
easily explained as "inadvertence" or "mistake," which does not 
merit judicial estoppel.  Given our past case law on contiguity, 
as well as the primacy of our constitution, preventing parties 
from litigating this issue would not serve the goals of this 
doctrine.  Therefore, we decline to apply judicial estoppel. 
C.  Availability of Relief 
 
¶51 Respondents contend that this case should be dismissed 
because it is an impermissible collateral attack on this court's 
judgment in Johnson III.  According to the Respondents, the 
relief Petitioners seek is unavailable as a result.   
¶52 This argument comes in two parts.  First, Respondents 
argue that a declaratory judgment is unavailable because the 
Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04 (2021-22),25 does 
not allow the court to declare its own prior judgment 
                                                 
25 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
37 
unconstitutional.26
Second, Respondents assert that in order to
challenge this court's judgment in Johnson III, Petitioners must 
either:  (a) demonstrate that the judgment was either issued 
without jurisdiction or procured by fraud; or (b) move to reopen 
or modify the judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  Respondents 
urge that since Petitioners have done neither, the judgment in 
Johnson III may not be disturbed. 
¶53 Respondents first argue that declaratory judgment is 
unavailable under the Declaratory Judgments Act.  Respondents 
point to Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2), which provides that courts may 
issue declarations resolving "any question of construction or 
validity arising under" a "deed, will, written contract, or 
other writings constituting a contract" or "a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise."  Because prior judgments of 
this court are absent from this list, Respondents reason that we 
cannot declare the state legislative districts adopted in 
Johnson III unconstitutional.  But Respondents ignore Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(1) and (5), which together make clear that we "have 
power to declare rights, status and other legal relations" and 
that sub. (2) "does not limit or restrict the exercise of" that 
                                                 
26 In a single sentence in both its opening brief and motion 
to 
dismiss, 
the 
Legislature 
additionally 
asserts 
that 
declaratory relief is unavailable because Petitioners have not 
complied with Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11), which requires that "all 
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest 
which would be affected by the declaration."  This argument is 
underdeveloped.  The Legislature cites no authority suggesting 
that dismissal is the proper remedy for failing to comply with 
§ 806.04(11) and, in any event, the prevailing parties in 
Johnson are parties to this case.  Accordingly, we decline to 
address this argument further.  See Casanova v. Polsky, 2023 WI 
19, ¶44, 406 Wis. 2d 247, 986 N.W.2d 780 ("[W]e need not address 
underdeveloped arguments."). 
 
 
38 
general power. 
See
§ 806.04(5) (emphasis added). 
For this 
reason, the non-exhaustive list in § 806.04(2) does not prohibit 
the court from issuing the declaratory relief Petitioners 
request.   
¶54 Respondents' assertion that injunctive relief is not 
available in this case is similarly unavailing.  The argument 
that injunctive relief is available only by "reopening" Johnson 
and modifying its injunction under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 flies in 
the face of decades of practice in redistricting cases.  The 
court-ordered redistricting plan adopted by the federal court in 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. 859, was enjoined by the federal court in 
Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-C-0121, 02-C-0366, 2002 WL 
34127471, at *8 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002).  And Johnson itself 
enjoined the use of a court-ordered plan adopted by the federal 
courts in Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 
862 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Wis. 2012).  Yet neither the Johnson 
nor Baumgart courts "reopened" these prior cases or modified the 
injunctions issued in them.  Instead, those courts simply issued 
their 
own 
injunctions, 
superseding 
the 
previously 
issued 
injunctions.   
¶55 In summary, we determine that none of Respondents' 
defenses preclude us from deciding this case on the merits.  We 
now turn to remedy. 
IV.  REMEDY  
¶56 As we declared above, the current legislative maps 
contain districts that violate Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  At least 50 of 99 assembly 
districts and at least 20 of 33 senate districts contain 
 
 
39 
territory completely disconnected from the rest of the district.  
Given this pervasiveness, a remedy modifying the boundaries of 
the non-contiguous districts will cause a ripple effect across 
other areas of the state as populations are shifted throughout.  
Consequently, it is necessary to enjoin the use of the 
legislative maps as a whole, rather than only the non-contiguous 
districts. 
 
We 
therefore 
enjoin 
the 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission from using the current legislative maps in all future 
elections.  Accordingly, remedial legislative district maps must 
be adopted.  We recognize that next year's legislative elections 
are fast-approaching, and that remedial maps must be adopted in 
time for the fall primary in August 2024.  With that in mind, 
the following section first describes the role of the court in 
the remedial process.  Second, we articulate the principles the 
court will follow when adopting remedial maps.  Third, we 
explain why the court is denying Petitioners' quo warranto 
claim.  We conclude with the next steps in the remedial process. 
A.  This Court's Role in Redistricting 
¶57 It is essential to emphasize that the legislature, not 
this court, has the primary authority and responsibility for 
drawing assembly and senate districts.  Jensen v. Wisconsin 
Elections Board, 2002 WI 13, ¶6, 249 Wis. 2d 706 (citing Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 3).  Therefore, when an existing plan is 
declared 
unconstitutional, 
it 
is 
"appropriate, 
whenever 
practicable, 
to 
afford 
a 
reasonable 
opportunity 
for 
the 
legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a 
substitute measure."  Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 
(1978).  There may be exceptions to this general rule, but we 
 
 
40 
decline Petitioners' request to apply one here. 
Should the 
legislative process produce a map that remedies the contiguity 
issues discussed above, there would be no need for this court to 
adopt remedial maps.  
¶58 We remain cognizant, however, of the possibility that 
the legislative process may not result in remedial maps.  In 
such an instance, it is this court's role to adopt valid 
remedial maps.  Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 571 ("[W]e do not 
abdicate our power to draft and execute a final plan of 
apportionment which conforms to the requirements of art. IV, 
Wis. Const., should the other arms of our state government be 
unable to resolve their differences and adopt a valid plan.").  
The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized the 
ability 
of 
a 
state 
judiciary 
to 
remedy 
unconstitutional 
legislative districts by crafting new remedial maps.  Growe v. 
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("[S]tate courts have a 
significant role in redistricting.  'The power of the judiciary 
of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a 
valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this 
Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has 
been specifically encouraged.'" (quoting Scott v. Germano, 381 
U.S. 407, 409 (1965))).  And this court has exercised such 
authority in the past when faced with unconstitutional maps.  
See, e.g., Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 571; Johnson III, 401 
Wis. 2d 198, ¶73.  If the legislative process does not result in 
remedial legislative maps, then it will be the job of this court 
to adopt remedial maps. 
 
 
41 
¶59
It is important (though perhaps obvious) to note that 
although we enjoin the Wisconsin Elections Commission's use of 
the present maps because they contain districts that are non-
contiguous, 
this 
court 
must 
consider 
other 
districting 
requirements, in addition to contiguity, when adopting remedial 
maps.  Just as a court fashioning a remedy in an apportionment 
challenge must ensure that remedial maps comply with state and 
federal law, so too must this court in remedying a different 
constitutional violation.   
¶60 Before laying out the principles this court will use 
in adopting remedial maps, we pause to address the "least 
change" approach articulated by this court in Johnson I.  The 
parties differ over the extent to which this court should rely 
on least change in our evaluation of remedial maps.  In 
Respondents' view, least change should not just serve as one 
principle among others, but as the predominant principle driving 
the court's process in adopting new maps.  Petitioners, by 
contrast, offer various rationales for why least change should 
not be applied at all.  For the reasons set forth below, this 
court will not consider least change when adopting remedial 
maps.  
¶61 At first glance, the concept of least change might 
appear simple.  At its most basic level, it is the idea that our 
remedial maps "'should reflect the least change'" from the prior 
maps 
"necessary 
. 
. 
. 
to 
comport 
with 
relevant 
legal 
requirements."  See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶72 (quoting 
Wright, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1237).  But as this court learned 
during the Johnson litigation, what appeared simple in theory 
 
 
42 
was far more complicated in reality. The fundamental problem in 
Johnson was the inability of this court to agree upon the actual 
meaning of "least change" in practice.  Some members of the 
court argued that least change simply meant "core retention——a 
measure of voters who remain in their prior districts."  Johnson 
II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶7 (explaining that core retention is "the 
best metric of least change").  Others, who had initially 
endorsed the least-change approach, insisted that core retention 
was "a previously unknown[] judicial test" and an "extra-legal 
criterion," and that least change actually meant minimizing 
population deviations or splits of local government units.  See 
id., ¶¶67, 74-75 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting); id., ¶211 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Because no majority of the 
court agreed on what least change actually meant, the concept 
amounted to little more than an unclear assortment of possible 
redistricting metrics.  The Johnson majority opinions never 
fully enumerated these metrics or explained their relative 
importance, let alone defined a least-change approach in a 
coherent way.  See Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶¶71-72. 
¶62 Additionally, least change did not fit easily or 
consistently 
into 
the 
balance 
of 
other 
requirements 
and 
considerations essential to the mapmaking process.  As will be 
discussed below, 
we must consider numerous constitutional 
requirements when adopting remedial maps.  We cannot allow a 
judicially-created metric, not derived from the constitutional 
text, to supersede the constitution.  Conceivably, least change 
(if actually agreed upon) could be relevant to traditional 
districting criteria, commonly considered in redistricting but 
 
 
43 
not constitutionally or statutorily mandated. 
See
infra, ¶68.  
In that instance, least change would be secondary to the 
constitutional requirements and balanced with other factors, 
such as "preserving communities of interest."  However, Johnson 
I did not adopt a cabined approach to least change.  Instead, 
Johnson I declared that the overarching approach to adopting 
remedial maps was for them to "reflect the least change 
necessary" from the previous maps.  See Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶72.   
¶63 As illustrated across the course of the Johnson 
litigation, "least change" is unworkable in practice.  As such, 
we overrule any portions of Johnson I, Johnson II, and Johnson 
III that mandate a least change approach.  See Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (explaining that the unworkability of 
a decision is one justification for departing from precedent).  
It is impractical and unfeasible to apply a standard that (1) is 
based on fundamentals that never garnered consensus, and (2) is 
in tension with established districting requirements.  Here we 
must first focus on established districting requirements set out 
in state and federal law, and only then on other districting 
criteria.  With that in mind, we set out the following 
principles that will guide the court's process in adopting 
remedial maps. 
B.  Redistricting Principles 
¶64 The following principles will guide our process in 
adopting remedial legislative maps.  First, the remedial maps 
must comply with population equality requirements.  State and 
 
 
44 
federal law require a state's
population to
be distributed
equally 
amongst 
legislative 
districts 
with 
only 
minor 
deviations.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3; Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 
555-56; U.S. Const. amend XIV; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
577-79 (1964).  When it comes to population equality, courts are 
held to a higher standard than state legislatures as we have a 
"judicial duty to 'achieve the goal of population equality with 
little more than de minimis variation.'"  Connor v. Finch, 431 
U.S. 407, 420 (1977) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-
27 (1975)); see Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. 
Supp. 630, 637 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (allowing a deviation of 1.74% 
for assembly districts); Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866, 870 
(formulating a map with a total deviation of 0.52% and noting 
that "[b]elow 1 percent, there are no legally or politically 
relevant degrees of perfection"); Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at 
*7 (1.48% deviation for assembly districts); Baldus, 849 F. 
Supp. 2d at 851 (0.62% deviation for senate districts and 0.76% 
for assembly districts); Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶36 (1.20% 
for senate districts and 1.88% for assembly districts); Johnson 
III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶61 (0.57% deviation for senate districts 
and 0.76% deviation for assembly districts). 
¶65 Second, districts must meet the basic requirements set 
out in Article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Assembly 
districts must be (a) bounded by county, precinct, town or ward 
lines; (b) composed of contiguous territory; and (c) in as 
compact form as practicable.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.  Senate 
districts must be composed of "convenient contiguous territory."  
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5  Additionally, districts must be 
 
 
45 
single-member districts that meet the numbering and nesting27
requirements set out in Article IV, Sections 2, 4, and 5. 
¶66 The contiguity requirement for assembly and senate 
districts was discussed at length above.  To reiterate, for a 
district to be composed of contiguous territory, its territory 
must be touching such that one could travel from one point in 
the district to any other point in the district without crossing 
district lines.  As to the "bounded" requirement, this court 
considers the extent to which assembly districts split counties, 
towns, and wards28 (particularly towns and wards as the smaller 
political subdivisions), although we no longer interpret the 
requirement to entirely prohibit any splitting of the enumerated 
political subdivisions, as we once did.  See Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶35; AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. 630, 635-36 (E.D. Wis. 
1982); Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3.  Compactness is 
generally defined as "closely united in territory," see AFL-CIO 
543 F. Supp. at 634, although this court has never adopted a 
particular 
measure 
of 
compactness. 
 
See 
Johnson 
I, 
399 
Wis. 2d 23, ¶37. 
¶67 Third, remedial maps must comply with all applicable 
federal law.  In addition to the population equality requirement 
                                                 
27 Assembly districts must be "nested" within a senate 
district——that is, "no assembly district shall be divided in the 
formation of a senate district."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5.  
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 4.001 requires that there be "33 
senate districts, each composed of 3 assembly districts." 
28 The "bounded" requirement also refers to precincts, but 
"the precinct of the constitution disappeared when the uniform 
system 
of 
town 
and 
county 
government 
prescribed 
by 
the 
constitution 
(article 
4, 
§ 
23) 
became 
fully 
operative."  
Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 520 (Lyon, C.J., concurring). 
 
 
46 
discussed above, maps must comply with the Equal
Protection 
Clause and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  See Wis. Legislature 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 401 (2022) (explaining 
that race-conscious districting is permitted by the Equal 
Protection Clause only if strict scrutiny is satisfied).    
¶68 Fourth, the court will consider other traditional 
districting criteria not specifically outlined in the Wisconsin 
or United States Constitution, but still commonly considered by 
courts tasked with formulating maps.  These other traditional 
districting criteria include reducing municipal splits29 and 
preserving communities of interest.  See AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. 
at 636 (comparing the number of municipal splits across maps); 
Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 856-57 (considering whether district 
lines were disruptive to a community of interest).  These 
criteria will not supersede constitutionally mandated criteria, 
such as equal population requirements, but may be considered 
when evaluating submitted maps.  AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 636 
(considering the number of municipal splits, but acknowledging 
that "the splitting of municipal boundaries is necessary to 
adhere to the one person, one vote, principle."). 
¶69 Fifth, 
we 
will 
consider 
partisan 
impact 
when 
evaluating remedial maps.  When granting the petition for 
original action that commenced this case, we declined to hear 
                                                 
29 Municipalities include towns, cities, and villages.  
Although Article IV, Section 4's "bounded by" requirement refers 
to towns, it does not refer to city or village boundaries, or 
"municipal" boundaries in general.  As such, consideration of 
municipal 
splits 
does 
not 
derive 
from 
our 
constitution.  
Nonetheless, this court has still considered the number of 
municipal splits when evaluating maps.  See Johnson III, 401 
Wis. 2d 198, ¶69. 
 
 
47 
the issue of whether extreme partisan gerrymandering violates 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  As such, we do not decide whether a 
party may challenge an enacted map on those grounds.   
¶70 However, that does not mean that we will ignore 
partisan 
impact 
in 
adopting 
remedial 
maps. 
 
Unlike 
the 
legislative and executive branches, which are political by 
nature, this court must remain politically neutral.  We do not 
have free license to enact maps that privilege one political 
party over another.  Our political neutrality must be maintained 
regardless of whether a case involves an extreme partisan 
gerrymandering challenge.  As we have stated, "judges should not 
select a plan that seeks partisan advantage——that seeks to 
change the ground rules so that one party can do better than it 
would do under a plan drawn up by persons having no political 
agenda——even if they would not be entitled to invalidate an 
enacted plan that did so."  Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶12 
(quoting Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867).  Other courts have held 
the same.  See Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 (also quoting 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp at 867); Burling v. Chandler, 804 A.2d 471, 
483 (N.H. 2002) (devising its own redistricting plan because 
"[e]ach plan ha[d] calculated partisan political consequences"); 
Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 2003) ("Whatever 
role politics may legitimately play in the decisions and 
maneuverings of the legislative and executive branches, if those 
branches cannot reach a political resolution and the dispute 
spills over into an Indiana court, the resolution must be 
judicial, not political."); Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 76 
(N.M. 2012) ("A court's adoption of a plan that represents one 
 
 
48 
political party's idea of how district boundaries should be 
drawn does not conform to the principle of judicial independence 
and neutrality."). 
¶71 It bears repeating that courts can, and should, hold 
themselves 
to 
a 
different 
standard 
than 
the 
legislature 
regarding the partisanship of remedial maps.  As a politically 
neutral and independent institution, we will take care to avoid 
selecting remedial maps designed to advantage one political 
party over another.  Importantly, however, it is not possible to 
remain neutral and independent by failing to consider partisan 
impact entirely.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Gaffney v. 
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973), "this politically mindless 
approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly 
gerrymandered 
results." 
 
As 
such, 
partisan 
impact 
will 
necessarily be one of many factors we will consider in adopting 
remedial legislative maps, and like the traditional districting 
criteria discussed above, consideration of partisan impact will 
not supersede constitutionally mandated criteria such as equal 
apportionment or contiguity. 
C.  Petitioners' Quo Warranto Claim 
¶72 Before we explain the process by which the court will 
adopt remedial maps, we turn to the Petitioners' request for us 
to order special elections in 2024 for senators in odd-numbered 
districts who would otherwise not be up for reelection until 
2026.  The Petitioners ground this request in a request for a 
writ quo warranto, arguing that state senators have "usurp[ed], 
intrud[ed] into or unlawfully [held] or exercise[d] any public 
office" and therefore should be "excluded from the office" 
 
 
49 
because they took office in unconstitutionally configured 
districts.  Wis. Stat. §§ 784.04(1)a; 784.13. 
¶73 As a preliminary matter, quo warranto actions may be 
brought by private individuals under Wis. Stat. § 784.04, but 
the action must be in the name of the state.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 784.04(2); 
Boerschinger 
v. 
Elkay 
Enterprises, 
Inc., 
26 
Wis. 2d 102, 110, 132 N.W.2d 258 (1965).  The Petitioners have 
not brought a quo warranto action in the name of the state; 
therefore, Wis. Stat. § 784.04 does not provide us the authority 
to determine whether any party has a right to hold office, much 
less 
to 
order 
any 
special 
elections. 
 
Boerschinger, 
26 
Wis. 2d at 
110 
("In 
quo 
warranto 
brought 
under 
the 
statute . . . the action must be in the name of the state."). 
¶74 Although the quo warranto statute does not apply in 
this case, we acknowledge that a party's right to a public 
office can also be determined in a declaratory judgment action 
when the right "is only ancillary to the principal cause of 
action in the complaint."  See id. at 114.  However, as the 
Petitioners 
acknowledge, 
courts 
tasked 
with 
remedying 
unconstitutional maps in Wisconsin have not ordered special 
elections as a remedy.  Nor are special elections the standard 
remedy elsewhere.  See North Carolina v. Covington, 581 U.S. 
486, 488 (2017) (noting that the Supreme Court has never 
addressed whether a special election may be a proper remedy for 
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and reversing a federal 
district court that ordered special elections without adequately 
weighing the interests at stake).  We decline to implement such 
a drastic remedy here. 
 
 
50 
D.
Remedial Process
¶75 The process by which the court will adopt remedial 
maps will be set out in an order issued concurrently with this 
opinion.  In broad strokes, all parties will be given the 
opportunity to submit remedial legislative district maps to the 
court, along with expert evidence and an explanation of how 
their maps comport with the principles laid out in this opinion.  
The court will appoint one or more consultants who will aid in 
evaluating the remedial maps.  Parties will have the opportunity 
to respond to each other, and to the consultant's report. 
¶76 We set out this process in order to afford all parties 
a chance to be heard, while bearing in mind the need for 
expediency 
given 
that 
next 
year's 
elections 
are 
fast-
approaching.  We begin our process now instead of waiting to see 
whether the legislative process results in new maps.  In other 
words, both the legislative process (should there be one) and 
our process will proceed concurrently.  This will allow the 
court to adopt remedial legislative maps in time for the 
upcoming elections if legislation creating remedial maps is not 
enacted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶77 Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution mean what they say:  state legislative districts 
must be composed of "contiguous territory."  At least 50 of 99 
assembly districts and at least 20 of 33 senate districts 
violate this mandate, rendering them unconstitutional.  We 
therefore enjoin the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using 
the current maps in all future elections.  As such, remedial 
 
 
51 
maps must be adopted prior to
the 2024 elections. 
We are
hopeful 
that 
the 
legislative 
process 
will 
produce 
new 
legislative district maps.  However, should that fail to happen, 
this court is prepared to adopt remedial maps based on the 
criteria, process, and dates set forth in this opinion and the 
concurrent order.  
By the Court.—Rights declared. 
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
1 
 
¶78 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  This 
deal was sealed on election night.  Four justices remap 
Wisconsin even though this constitutional responsibility is to 
occur every ten years, after a census, by the other two branches 
of government.1  The public understands this.2  Nonetheless, four 
justices impose their will on the entire Assembly and half of 
the Senate, all of whom are up for election in 2024.  Almost 
every legislator in the state will need to respond, with 
lightning speed, to the newly minted maps, deciding if they can 
or want to run, and scrambling to find new candidates for new 
districts.3  All of this remains unknown until the court of four, 
and its hired "consultants," reveal the answer.  The parties' 
dilatory behavior in bringing this suit at this time should not 
                                                 
1 The Legislature exercises its constitutional authority to 
redistrict per Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 ("At its first session 
after each enumeration made by the authority of the United 
States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of 
inhabitants.").  The Governor exercises his constitutional 
authority to either sign the legislature's maps into law or veto 
them per Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(2)a.   
2 See Marquette Law School Poll: Oct. 26-Nov.2, 2023, 
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ 
MLSP76Toplines.html#E8:_SCOWIS_map_case 
(51% 
of 
registered 
voters surveyed want to "keep [current] maps in place"). 
3 Neither citizens nor legislators will know if they will 
have the same representation or constituency, whether the 
legislator still lives in the district they once represented, 
whether legislators will be pitted against one another in newly 
combined districts or whether the district even resembles its 
former 
self. 
 
We 
will 
not 
know 
implications 
of 
dual 
representation 
for 
citizens 
who 
may 
have 
new 
and 
old 
representation, as they may have just elected their senator 
under the existing maps. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
2 
 
be rewarded by the court's granting of such an extreme remedy, 
along such a constrained timeline.  Big change is ahead.  The 
new majority seems to assume that their job is to remedy 
"rigged" maps which cause an "inability to achieve a Democratic 
majority in the state legislature."4  These departures from the 
judicial role are terribly dangerous to our constitutional, 
judicial framework.  No longer is the judicial branch the least 
dangerous in Wisconsin.  See The Federalist No. 78, (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
¶79 Redistricting was just decided by this court in the 
Johnson 
litigation.5 
 
This 
court 
was 
saddled 
with 
the 
responsibility to adopt maps because the legislative and 
executive branches were at an impasse, and absent court action, 
                                                 
4 Pet. to Take Juris. of Original Action, at 8; Aug. 2, 
2023, 
https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/document/eFiled/ 
2023AP001399/687203 
5 The phrase "Johnson litigation" (and "Johnson") throughout 
this dissent refers to the redistricting original action, 
Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2021AP1450-OA, 
which this court decided during the 2021-22 term.  See Johnson 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469 ("Johnson I"); Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 
WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II"), summarily 
rev'd sub nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 
U.S. 398, 142 S Ct. 1245 (2022) (per curiam); and Johnson v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 
N.W.2d 559 ("Johnson III"). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
3 
 
there would be a constitutional crisis.6  Johnson v. Wisconsin 
Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶68, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469 ("Johnson I").  As a result of Johnson, there are 
census-responsive maps in place.  Nonetheless, the four robe-
wearers grab power and fast-track this partisan call to remap 
Wisconsin.  Giving preferential treatment to a case that should 
have been denied, smacks of judicial activism on steroids.  The 
court of four takes a wrecking ball to the law, making no room, 
nor having any need, for longstanding practices, procedures, 
traditions, the law, or even their co-equal fellow branches of 
government.  Their activism damages the judiciary as a whole.  
Regrettably, I must dissent. 
¶80 The court of four's outcome-based, end-justifies-the-
means judicial activist approach conflates the balance of 
governmental power the people separated into three separate 
branches, to but one:  the judiciary.  Such power-hungry 
activism is dangerous to our constitutional framework and 
undermines the judiciary.  When four members of this court 
"throw off constraints, revise the rules of decision, and set 
                                                 
6 Clarke presents none of the time constraints this court 
faced in Johnson I, where "judicial action [became] appropriate 
to 
prevent 
a 
constitutional 
crisis." 
 
Johnson 
I, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶68.  Nonetheless, the court of four rushes ahead, 
making every attempt to evade judicial review, crafting the 
selection of only one, not both petitions for original action, 
and only two, not all, issues having no need for traditional 
practice and procedure.  See Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
2023 WI 70, 409 Wis. 2d 372, 995 N.W.2d 779 (granting petition 
for original action, but only with respect to issues 4 and 5); 
Wright v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 71, 409 Wis. 2d 417, 
995 N.W.2d 771 (denying petition for leave to commence original 
action).  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
4 
 
the law on a new course," it is prudent for all of us to 
"question whether that power has been exercised judiciously" or 
whether it is instead an exercise in judicial activism.7  Today 
is the latest in a series of power grabs by this new rogue court 
of four, creating a pattern of illicit power aggregation which 
disrupts, if not destroys, stability in the law. 
¶81 This pattern of conduct is entrenched even further to 
achieve particular political outcomes regardless of principles 
fundamental to the constitution and the law.  The court of four 
accepted and now begin to decide a procedurally and legally 
flawed original action in order to "take a fresh look at the 
gerrymandering question"8 over maps one of them has repeatedly 
called "absolutely, positively rigged."9  What other settled 
areas of law might be next?  Without all four members of this 
court acting in lockstep, there could be no such overreach and 
disrespect for the law.  To be clear, it is sheer will, not the 
law, which drives the decision of Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, 
Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz.  They may 
                                                 
7 Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 723, 725-26 (2006).   
8 Jessie Opoien and Jack Kelly, Protasiewicz would "enjoy 
taking a fresh look" at Wisconsin voting Maps, The Cap Times 
(Mar. 
2, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/ 
protasiewicz-would-enjoy-taking-a-fresh-look-at-wisconsin-
voting-maps/article_d07fbe12-79e6-5c78-a702-3de7b444b332.html 
9 Paul Fanlund, Supreme Court election is a chance to beat 
the far right at its long game, The Cap Times (Jan. 13, 2023), 
https://captimes.com/opinion/paul-fanlund/opinion-supreme-court-
election-is-a-chance-to-beat-the-far-right-at-its-
long/article_af9b5d76-a584-54ad-9226-7c9d7a806d12.html. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
5 
 
please a particular constituency, but it is at great cost to the 
judicial institution.  Any one of the four could change the 
trajectory set, with the courage to change their seemingly 
preordained vote.  But instead, each fall in line, and, like the 
past, allow pure will, instead of the law, to drive and guide 
the outcomes they invent. 
¶82 Unfortunately, this latest unlawful power grab is not 
an outlier, but is further evidence of a bold, agenda-driven 
pattern of conduct.  To set the stage, recall that these four 
members of the court came out swinging, when they secretly and 
unilaterally 
planned 
and 
dispensed 
with 
court 
practices, 
procedures, traditions, and norms.10  Preordained and planned 
even before day one of the new justice's term on August 1, 2023, 
but unknown to the other members of the court, the four acted to 
aggregate power, meeting in secret as a "super-legislature."  
They met behind closed doors, at a rogue, unscheduled and 
illegitimate 
meeting, 
over 
the 
protestations 
of 
their 
colleagues, in violation of longstanding court rules and 
procedures.  Even before day one of the newest justice's term, 
and before the court term started in September, they met, in 
secret, to carry out their plan, only known to them, to dispense 
with over 40 years of court-defined precedent.  They even took 
the unprecedented action to strip the constitutional power of 
the chief justice, which had been understood for decades of 
chief justices and different court membership, instead usurping 
                                                 
10 Press Release, Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler 
(Aug. 4, 2023), https://www.wispolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2023/08/230804SCOWIS.pdf 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
6 
 
that role through an administrative committee.  For nearly four 
decades and five chief justices, every member of the court had 
respected the power the people of Wisconsin constitutionally 
vested in the chief justice to administrate the court system.11 
¶83 Not content with taking over the chief justice's 
power, they secretly pre-planned the firing of, for admittedly 
no reason, then-Director of State Courts Randy Koschnick before 
the official court term had begun and before our newest 
justice's term began on August 1.12  The court of four presumed 
to hire a sitting circuit court judge, Audrey Skwierawski, as 
the Interim Director of State Courts even though that decision 
violated the public trust doctrine as set forth in the 
                                                 
11 It is noteworthy that for the first time in 26 years, 
since 1996, our court released to the public all of its opinions 
from the 2022-23 term by June 30, 2023.  In addition, the court 
did not have a backlog of cases entering into the 2023-24 term.  
12 This was another shameful incident in this raw judicial 
power pattern, as Justice Jill Karofsky made it known before 
Justice Protasiewicz was even sworn in that the yet-to-be-
officially-formed court of four would fire Director Koschnick. 
Molly Beck and Daniel Bice, New Liberal Majority on State 
Supreme Court fires Director of State Court System, Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
(Aug. 
1, 
2023), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/08/01/new-
majority-on-supreme-court-to-fire-director-of-state-court-
system/70502650007/ 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
7 
 
constitution, statutes, and case law.13  Judge Audrey Skwierawski 
was recently permanently hired as Director of State Courts 
despite these significant issues.14  The court should have hired 
a fully qualified candidate who did not have any of these legal 
impediments.  
¶84 But wait:  there's more.  Also in an underhanded and 
unprecedented manner, these four members of the court met in 
secret, before the court term began, conniving and then 
implementing a plan to eliminate the court of its longstanding 
                                                 
13 See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 10(1) ("No . . . judge of any 
court of record shall hold any other office of public trust, 
except a judicial office, during the term for which elected."); 
Wis. Stat. § 757.02(2) ("The judge of any court of record in 
this state shall be ineligible to hold any office of public 
trust, except a judicial office, during the term for which he or 
she was elected or appointed."); see also Wagner v. Milwaukee 
Cnty. Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶2, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 
N.W.2d 816 (holding that the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits a 
judge or justice from holding a non-judicial position of public 
trust during the entire term for which he or she was originally 
elected). 
14 I requested to see and have input on the contents of the 
press release hiring Judge Skwierawski as the Director before 
its release.  However, the court of four issued it on 
December 14, 2023, without that occurring.  Interestingly, they 
use the words "transparency and accountability" in the press 
release, but those words must mean something else to them.  See 
"The Supreme Court of Wisconsin announces Judge Audrey K. 
Skwierawski as the next Director of State Courts" (Dec. 14, 
2023), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/news/view.jsp?id=1604#:~:text= 
MADISON%2C%20Wis.,is%20effective%20December%2031%2C%202023. 
In addition, aside from the public trust doctrine's 
constitutional and statutory roadblocks to her serving as 
Director, Judge Skwierawski is supposed to be on the bench, in 
Milwaukee, serving the citizens as a duly elected, full-time 
judicial officer.  The court could have hired a fully qualified 
candidate who did not have any of these impediments.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
8 
 
practices and procedures in violation of the existing internal 
operating procedures and rules.  The four conjured up new rules 
and procedures that are designed to ensure complete control 
over, and no speed bumps to, their preferences. 
¶85 We all know that the Johnson litigation definitively 
decided all issues, including contiguity.  Nonetheless, the four 
eagerly received this original action which the parties filed to 
coincide with Justice Protasiewicz's swearing in, ensuring that 
she would sit in judgment.15  And because the four had met 
previously to attempt to grab all the power they could find, 
this case was set to be fast-tracked and skip to the front of 
the line. 
¶86 The court of four conduct themselves in a manner that 
lacks accountability and transparency.  They exhibit a striking 
pattern of disrespect for their colleagues, court practices and 
procedures, the law, and the constitution.  They upend the 
                                                 
15 The majority opinion fails to mention or even acknowledge 
this glaring fact, that this petition was intentionally brought 
the day after the court composition changed.  Why is this?  
Steve Schuster, Lawsuit to challenge Wisconsin's legislative 
maps 
to 
be 
filed, 
Wis. 
Law 
Journal 
(Apr. 
6, 
2023), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2023/04/06/lawsuit-to-challenge-
wisconsins-legislative-maps-to-be-filed/ ("A Madison-based law 
firm 
is 
planning 
to 
challenge 
the 
state's 
gerrymandered 
legislative maps . . . . The lawsuit will be filed after 
Justice-elect Janet Protasiewicz is sworn in on Aug. 1, Nicole 
Safar, 
executive 
director 
of 
Madison-based 
Law 
Forward, 
said . . . ."); see also Jack Kelly, Liberal law firm to argue 
gerrymandering violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times 
(Apr. 6, 
2023), https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-
law-firm-to-arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin-
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
9 
 
constitutional call for a court of seven, not a court of four.16   
Historically, our court of seven has always met at agreed upon 
dates and times, with ample notice of the issues to be 
discussed, and the opportunity to hear respective, knowing, 
positions, only then reaching determinations.  Traditions, 
practices, procedures, and constitutional mandates were long 
respected over many decades.  Regardless of the fact that these 
have been time-honored through many variations and machinations 
of court membership, and over a span of five chief justices, 
four rogue members of the court nonetheless brazenly seized all 
the power they can find.  Power at any cost is the new normal 
for this crew.  So, in true form to the new court of four, the 
law will not stand in the way of what they wish to accomplish.  
¶87 This original action, filed to coincide with the 
change in court membership,17 requests this court to remedy an 
"inability to achieve a Democratic majority in the state 
legislature" which in turn, "harms their ability to see laws and 
                                                 
16 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4(1) ("The supreme court shall 
have 7 members. . . .").  
17 Steve 
Schuster, 
Lawsuit 
to 
challenge 
Wisconsin's 
legislative maps to be filed, Wis. Law Journal (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2023/04/06/lawsuit-to-challenge-
wisconsins-legislative-maps-to-be-filed/ ("A Madison-based law 
firm 
is 
planning 
to 
challenge 
the 
state's 
gerrymandered 
legislative maps . . . . The lawsuit will be filed after 
Justice-elect Janet Protasiewicz is sworn in on Aug. 1, Nicole 
Safar, 
executive 
director 
of 
Madison-based 
Law 
Forward, 
said . . . ."); see also Jack Kelly, Liberal law firm to argue 
gerrymandering violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times 
(Apr. 6, 2023), https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-
law-firm-to-arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin-
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
10 
 
policies they favor enacted."18  As much as the majority and 
others like to call this case "redistricting," it is not.  
Redistricting occurs once every ten years and that fact was just 
conclusively decided.19  They know contiguous maps, responsive to 
the census, were fully litigated in Johnson.  The people of 
Wisconsin, through their constitution, placed the partisan 
officeholders——the legislature, with oversight by the governor——
in charge of the partisan process of redistricting.20  The 
constitution does not call for maps to be redrawn every time a 
                                                 
18 Pet. to Take Juris. of Original Action supra note 4, at 
8.  
19 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 ("At its first session after 
each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the 
legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the 
senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants."); 
see also State ex rel. Smith v. Zimmerman, 266 Wis. 307, 312, 63 
N.W.2d 
52 
(1954) 
("It 
is 
now 
settled 
that 
without 
a 
constitutional change permitting it no more than one legislative 
apportionment between two federal [censuses].")  
20 The legislature exercises its constitutional authority to 
redistrict per Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3, and the governor 
exercises his constitutional authority to either sign the 
legislature's maps into law or veto them per Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 10(2)a.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
11 
 
new justice is elected.21  This court of four abandons its 
judicial responsibility and instead reimagines the law to 
achieve an outcome.   
¶88 More specifically, just last year in Johnson, the 
court determined, and all agreed, that the maps complied with 
the contiguity requirement. "Contiguity for state assembly 
districts is satisfied when a district boundary follows the 
municipal 
boundaries. 
 
Municipal 
'islands' 
are 
legally 
contiguous with the municipality to which the 'island' belongs."  
Joint 
Stip. 
of 
Facts 
& 
Law, 
at 
¶20 
(Nov. 
4, 
2021) 
https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/document/uploaded/2021AP001450/45
0892.  Even the parties now arguing that the maps are not 
contiguous recognize that the contiguity requirement has been 
deemed satisfied not only in the maps the parties submitted in 
                                                 
21 As the new court of four knows, this court just 
conclusively addressed redistricting in the Johnson litigation, 
observing 
that 
"[t]he 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
'textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment' to confer the duty of 
redistricting on the state legislature evidences the non-
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims" under Article 
IV, Section 3.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶51 (quoting Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  It is only natural——in 
fact, it is inevitable——that a partisan body engaging in a 
partisan process will reach a result that is in some measure 
partisan.  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 939 (W.D. 
Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting) ("[P]artisan intent is 
not illegal, but is simply the consequence of assigning the task 
of redistricting to the political branches of government."), 
rev'd sub nom., Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018).  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
12 
 
the Johnson litigation, but also in the maps the state has 
relied on for the last 60 to 70 years.22   
¶89 Moreover, every person who wished to have a say or 
participate in the Johnson litigation was welcome to do so and 
did.  No one sought reconsideration of the Johnson litigation 
while it was within their power to do so.  Johnson went all the 
way to the United States Supreme Court and back.  Some of the 
litigants now were part of the Johnson litigation, some chose 
not to engage.  But the law imposes consequences for those who 
choose to sit out of litigation entirely, and for those who 
stipulate to or do not make an argument in litigation.  Finality 
of litigation does not endow one with the authority to wait to 
see what happens in that litigation cycle, forego timely filing 
a motion for reconsideration, and then bring arguments years 
after the fact, with the only intervening change being the 
court's composition.  Four members of this court choose to not 
let pesky parameters like finality or other foundational 
judicial principles, or even the constitution, stand in the way 
of 
the 
predetermined 
political 
outcome 
which 
they 
seem 
preordained to deliver.  Given the new court of four's conduct 
so far, we can expect more such judicial mischief in the future. 
On their watch, Wisconsin is poised to become a litigation 
nightmare.  What is next? 
                                                 
22 Oral argument in Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2023AP1399-OA, held Nov. 21, 2023, available on WisconsinEye 
https://wiseye.org/2023/11/21/wisconsin-supreme-court-rebecca-
clarke-v-wisconsin-elections-commission/ (Rebuttal arguments of 
Attorneys Sam Hirsch and Mark Gaber at 2:53:00 and 3:01, 
respectively.) 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
13 
 
¶90 The processes normally required in litigation before 
the supreme court seem nothing more than window dressing in this 
case.  Briefing and oral argument occurred, but the conclusion 
seemed preordained.  It seems all that is left are the words to 
be written in a fast-tracked, handpicked case wherein the issues 
were chosen in an effort to evade any judicial review.23  
Apparently process is now unimportant to the court of four.24   
¶91 It is the parties who are required to develop the 
facts and a full record for the court to review.  We are not a 
factfinding court.  One would think that the very justices who 
previously 
believed 
factfinding 
critically 
important 
in 
Johnson,25 would pause, and allow factfinding to occur by the 
parties instead of handpicking their hired "consultants."  
Factfinding in this case should occur utilizing traditional 
process, as there are no time constraints which would otherwise 
drive the need for a legal determination by original action.  
                                                 
23 Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 70, 409  
Wis. 2d 372, 995 N.W.2d 779 (granting petition for original 
action, but only with respect to issues 4 and 5); Wright v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 71, 409 Wis. 2d 417, 995 N.W.2d 771 
(denying petition for leave to commence original action). 
24 Recently, members of the majority declined to hear "hot" 
issues because process was important.  But now, members of the 
majority decide to hear "hot" issues because process is not 
important.  Have they changed their position on process?  See 
Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI 65, ¶39, 403 
Wis. 2d 369, 976 N.W.2d 584 ("Litigation rules and processes 
matter to the rule of law just as much as rendering ultimate 
decisions based on the law."); see also Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 
91, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568. 
25 Johnson 
III, 
401 
Wis. 2d 198, 
¶161 
(Karofsky, 
J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
14 
 
Particularly for something as important as "redistricting," why 
be afraid of developing a full record and considering all legal 
principles subjecting the decision to further review?  What of 
the fact that the citizens of Wisconsin and the litigants are 
forced, by judicial fiat, to have out-of-state, not stipulated 
to, unreviewable "consultants" who are seemingly unaccountable 
to anyone but the court of four.  In fact, the idea of hiring 
"consultant 
map 
drawers" 
was 
sprung 
on 
counsel 
at 
oral 
arguments.  The court of four has now hired these "consultants" 
who will presumably affect the outcome of the case.  We have no 
idea what, if any, parameters exist to guide the "consultants," 
the litigants, or the court.  Will they have free reign to do 
whatever they see fit, to achieve the requested remedy of making 
the state legislature more Democratic?  Deference to these 
"consultants" and a hidden, unreviewable process smacks of 
outcome-based decision making.  What gives them that authority? 
They rely on no statutes to give them that authority.26  It is 
                                                 
26 What 
are 
the 
parameters 
of 
the 
consultant's 
responsibilities, and under what constitutional or statutory 
authority do they operate?  Are they and their decisions 
reviewable and subject to cross-examination, as court-appointed 
expert witnesses are?  Wis. Stat. § 907.06.  Can they make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as referees can?  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.06(5)(a).  Additionally, the majority fails to 
answer, in either its order appointing these "consultants" or 
its majority opinion, how the parties are to consider and 
implement the majority's newly contrived "partisan impact" 
factor in their proposed maps.  How will these "consultants" 
measure "partisan impact" in the parties' proposed maps, or 
their own submissions?  It is hard to say, given the majority's 
painstaking efforts to avoid providing any such clarity or 
methodology.  The majority cites no statutory authority these 
"consultants" are appointed under, because none exists:  this 
court does not hire third-party "consultants" to assist it in 
decision making.  Wis. Stat. § 751.09 ("In actions where the 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
15 
 
not normal process for our court to hire experts to present new 
evidence and influence decision making with information outside 
the record.  The "consultants" unchecked by the parties, will 
most certainly influence, if not decide, the outcome of this 
litigation.  The parties do not stipulate to proceeding with 
this forced factfinding map drawing method.  Is the procedure 
the court imposes on the litigants even constitutional as 
applied?  Reaching for evidence outside of the record is highly 
unusual.  The court should not require it here.  Yet, the court 
of four imposes its will to rush to an outcome.  This is 
completely 
unnecessary 
and 
violative 
of 
every 
notion 
of 
traditional factfinding, fairness and judicial decision making.  
The constitution certainly does not call for "consultants" to 
redistrict anew; instead the constitution vests that power in 
the legislative branch as approved by the executive branch.  In 
fact, 
the 
constitution 
makes 
no 
room 
for 
unreviewable 
"consultants" to be arbiters of the state's maps.  These 
consultants sure do seem like hand-picked cover for the court of 
four's decision to throw out "rigged maps" and remedy the 
parties' "inability to achieve a Democratic majority in the 
state legislature."27  
                                                                                                                                                             
supreme court has taken original jurisdiction, the court may 
refer issues of fact or damages to a circuit court or referee 
for determination.")  See also Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's 
dissent to order appointing Dr. Bernard Grofman and Dr. Jonathan 
Cervas as court "consultants," Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
No. 2023AP1399-OA, unpublished order at 5-7 (Wis. Dec. 22, 2023) 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). 
27 Pet. to Take Juris. of Original Action supra note 4, at 
8. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
16 
 
¶92 Turning to the text and content of this opinion, fully 
joined by all four, it clearly lacks in legal discourse and 
analysis that should accompany such an important determination.  
The opinion is a sea change in the law.  While a picture may 
generally be worth a thousand words, pictures do not replace the 
need to properly conduct the required legal analysis.  Yet, the 
new rogue court of four continues its pattern of being quick to 
engage in partisan political power grabs, while short on 
respecting legal traditions, practices, procedures, and the law.  
It is the law, not personal preference, that should be the 
judicial lodestar.  In short, the opinion is sorely lacking in 
sound jurisprudential analysis. 
¶93 More specifically, this original action is wrongly 
taken and decided for a host of heretofore understood and 
respected legally-binding tenets.  However, the court of four 
glosses right over them.  
 For starters, this original action fails as it amounts 
to 
nothing 
more 
than 
an 
untimely 
motion 
for 
reconsideration of this court's decision in Johnson, 
which is now time-barred.  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.64.   
 The proponents of this case and the majority fail to 
meaningfully address stare decisis.  This legal 
principle demands a "respect for prior decisions" such 
as this court's decisions throughout the Johnson 
litigation "[as] fundamental to the rule of law."  
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
17 
 
 It overlooks that parties such as the Governor and the 
Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists28 are judicially 
estopped from advancing different positions now from 
the positions they took in the Johnson litigation.  
State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 
(1996) (citing Coconate v. Schwanz, 165 Wis. 2d 226, 
231, 477 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1991)) ("[A] party [is 
precluded] from asserting [one] position in a legal 
proceeding 
and 
then 
subsequently 
asserting 
an 
inconsistent position.").   
 Similarly, laches bars these claims, as "equity aids 
the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights."  
Kenosha Cnty. v. Town of Paris, 148 Wis. 2d 175, 188, 
434 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1988).   
 The majority's analysis turns a blind eye to the fact 
that "[i]n order to have standing to sue, a party must 
have 
a 
personal 
stake 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
the 
controversy," a personal stake not met by those who do 
not reside in these alleged municipal islands and 
especially 
for 
those 
who 
merely 
border 
these 
"municipal islands" of which more than a third contain 
zero residents.  City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 
                                                 
28 Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, 
Jean-Luc Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha were labeled the "Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists" in the Johnson litigation.  They 
are each intervenors-petitioners in this case.  For ease of 
reference, 
I 
refer 
to 
them 
collectively 
as 
"Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists" in this writing. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
18 
 
112 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) (emphasis 
added).   
 And, this case is barred by claim and issue preclusion 
principles, 
which 
"are 
designed 
to 
limit 
the 
relitigation 
of 
issues 
that 
have 
been 
actually 
litigated in a previous action," Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 
WI 53, ¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433, and 
"extends to all claims that either were or could have 
been asserted in the previous litigation."  Dostal v. 
Strand, 
2023 
WI 
6, 
¶24, 
405 
Wis. 2d 572, 
984 
N.W.2d 382.  
¶94 But the court of four gives little consideration to 
that jurisprudence.  Instead of letting the law get in the way, 
they proceed to the task at hand:  to redraw the "rigged" maps 
and remedy an "inability to achieve a Democratic majority in the 
state legislature."29  
¶95 To be clear, this case is nothing more than a now 
time-barred motion to reconsider Johnson.30  An honest look at 
the plain law would require that this petition be dismissed.  
Instead, the creative legal machinations engaged in by the 
masters of this lawsuit, emboldened and encouraged by the new 
court of four, requires mind-boggling contortion of the law to 
                                                 
29 Pet. to Take Juris. of Original Action supra note 4, at 
8. 
30 Wis. 
Stat. 
(Rule) 
§ 809.64 
("A 
party 
may 
seek 
reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of the supreme court 
by filing a motion under s. 809.14 for reconsideration within 20 
days after the date of the decision of the supreme court.") 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
19 
 
achieve a particular political outcome.  Sadly, judicial 
activism is once again alive and well in Wisconsin, creating 
great instability. 
¶96 In addition, the demanding legal analysis of stare 
decisis is completely absent from the majority opinion.  Stare 
decisis, the requirement to follow legal precedent, means this 
case ends before it even starts, since the Johnson litigation 
already declared what the law is.  This petition is a political 
quest masquerading as a legal query, filed to coincide with the 
seating of the parties' "judge of choice" and not coincidently, 
filed the day after she assumed the bench.31  Judge shopping 
should be verboten to all.  Allowing this sham experiment to 
continue under a nebulous guise of "fairness," should be beneath 
my colleagues.32  In any court, but especially a court of last 
resort, sound legal principles, including stare decisis, should 
                                                 
31 Steve 
Schuster, 
Lawsuit 
to 
Challenge 
Wisconsin's 
Legislative Maps to Be Filed, Wis. L.J. (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2023/04/06/lawsuit-to-challenge-
wisconsins-legislative-maps-to-be-filed/ ("A Madison-based law 
firm 
is 
planning 
to 
challenge 
the 
state's 
gerrymandered 
legislative maps . . . . The lawsuit will be filed after 
Justice-elect Janet Protasiewicz is sworn in on Aug. 1, Nicole 
Safar, 
executive 
director 
of 
Madison-based 
Law 
Forward, 
said . . . ."); see also Jack Kelly, Liberal Law Firm to Argue 
Gerrymandering Violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times 
(Apr. 6, 2023), https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-
law-firm-to-arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin-
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html. 
32 Wis. Stat. § 757.02(1) ("I. . . . do solemnly swear that 
I will support the constitution of the United States and the 
constitution of the state of Wisconsin; that I will administer 
justice without respect to persons and will faithfully and 
impartially discharge the duties of said office to the best of 
my ability.  So help me God.") (emphasis added). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
20 
 
prevail over political and personal preferences, even when one 
might not like the results.  Numerous jurisprudential tenets 
require that this matter now be deemed improvidently granted, as 
application of the law so clearly dictates that this original 
action never should have been granted in the first instance.33  
It fails legal scrutiny.  Any remedy which this court might now 
conjure up to justify this preordained outcome is devoid of 
legal merit. 
¶97 In no small measure, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, the 
most senior member of the court, knows better than to join this 
judicial mischief.  She used to respect the doctrine of stare 
decisis.34  And, if the shoe were on the other foot——much like 
when some on the court previously tried to usurp the role of 
Chief Justice Abrahamson——she would be raucously objecting.35  
Then, she declared that this court should "call a spade a 
spade. . . . This is about personal ambition, politics and 
                                                 
33 Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 70, 409 
Wis. 2d 372, 
995 
N.W.2d 779 
(order 
granting 
petition 
for 
original action) (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting). 
34 See Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 
2018 WI 78, ¶110, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The decision to overturn a prior case 
must not be undertaken merely because the composition of the 
court has changed."); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Empr's Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 ("Stare 
decisis is fundamental to the rule of law. Indeed, this court 
follows the doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously because of 
our abiding respect for the rule of law.") 
35 In 1998, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley was convinced that the 
creation of an administrative committee, which would take over 
the role of the chief justice, was unconstitutional.  She 
threatened to sue her colleagues over the matter.  What changed?  
Shirley Abrahamson is no longer the chief justice. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
21 
 
pettiness. . . . [The four] justices are interested in toppling 
the chief."36  Her fondness for sound legal principles like stare 
decisis seems to vary depending on whether she is the majority 
or the minority.  
¶98 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's former colleague, now 
federal Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Sykes, reminded us all of 
the inherent institutional and reputational dangers the court 
faced when it previously departed from its constitutional role.  
History teaches us that when the balance of power on the court 
shifted for the 2004-2005 court term, making then a new majority 
consisting of Ann Walsh Bradley and three others, the newly 
constituted court majority of four, issued a series of blatantly 
activist decisions.  See Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 723 (2006).  In one of 
many such activist-driven decisions from that new majority, she 
and three others appeared to yield to political pressure and 
abrogated its barely two year-old decision in Panzer v. Doyle, 
2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, with Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 
N.W.2d 408.  Similarly, though the court a year prior had upheld 
noneconomic damage caps for medical malpractice in personal 
injury cases in Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866, the new court abruptly changed course and undermined 
the notion of judicial deference to legislative policy choices 
                                                 
36 Statement of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, printed in, Cary 
Segall, Justice Lay Bare Problems with Abrahamson; Four Upset 
They're Left Out of Decisions, Wis. State Journal (Feb. 14, 
1999). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
22 
 
in Ferdon, justifying their unprecedented move by declaring that 
"a statute may be constitutionally valid when enacted but may 
become constitutionally invalid because of changes in the 
conditions to which the statute applies."  Ferdon v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶114, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 
N.W.2d 440.  In yet another instance, the court expanded its 
supervisory role beyond the permissible bounds of saying what 
the law is, to endow themselves with a "broad authority to 
mandate 
desirable 
policy 
ostensibly 
related 
to 
judicial 
proceedings" in the vein of the executive branch, which then 
"extend[ed] far beyond the litigants in [that] specific case."37  
The activism that took over that new court majority's decision-
making coursed through virtually every area of the law:  civil, 
criminal, juvenile, and even rule-making.  Throughout that time, 
members of the court lay aside their robes of judicial 
independence to affix their campaign pins of judicial activism 
and tipped the scales of the court's independent decision making 
power in their favor.  Here we go again. 
¶99 Will this redistricting original action be the first 
in a series of outcome-based legal decisions of the new court of 
four?  In the 2004-2005 term, when Justice Ann Walsh Bradley was 
                                                 
37 Rick Esenberg, A Court Unbound? The Recent Jurisprudence 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 10 (Federalist Society White 
Paper 
Mar. 
2007), 
https://fedsoc-cms-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/IhZ6cE38iAto3CRWgllVqKrbM9j2I
kM6y7zNZE56.pdf.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
23 
 
then in the new majority,38 the court "signaled a dramatic shift 
in [their] jurisprudence."  Sykes, supra ¶98 at 725.  With Ann 
Walsh Bradley in tow, that iteration of the court of four 
throughout the 2004-2005 term and beyond, "depart[ed] from some 
familiar and long-accepted principles that normally operate as 
constraints on the court's use of power" including such 
principles as "the presumption that statutes are constitutional, 
judicial deference to legislative policy choices, respect for 
precedent and authoritative sources of legal interpretation, and 
the prudential institutional caution that counsels against 
imposing broad-brush judicial solutions to difficult social 
problems."  Sykes, supra ¶98 at 725-26.  The 2004-2005 court 
majority proceeded to make a mockery of the law, throwing wide 
open the door of judicial activism in cases that ranged from 
criminal law to civil law to torts to juvenile to rulemaking and 
everything in between.  As Judge Sykes recounts in her Hallows 
lecture39 reflecting on the court's activist missteps from that 
term, that court of four: 
 "rewrote the rational basis test for evaluating 
challenges to state statutes under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, striking down the statutory limit 
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases;[40]  
                                                 
38 The new majority consisted of Shirley Abrahamson, Ann 
Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and Louis Butler (who filled 
the vacancy created by Diane Sykes' appointment to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.)  
39 Case summary excerpts taken from Sykes, Reflections on 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, supra note 7.  
40 Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
24 
 
 eliminated the individual causation requirement 
for 
tort 
liability 
in 
lawsuits 
against 
manufacturers of lead-paint pigment, expanding 
"risk contribution" theory, a form of collective 
industry liability;[41]  
 expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule under 
the state constitution to require suppression of 
physical evidence obtained as a result of law 
enforcement's 
failure 
to 
administer 
Miranda 
warnings;[42]  
 declared a common police identification procedure 
inherently 
suggestive 
and 
the 
resulting 
identification evidence generally inadmissible in 
criminal 
prosecutions 
under 
the 
state 
constitution's due process clause;[43] and  
 invoked its supervisory authority over the state 
court system to impose a new rule on law 
enforcement 
that 
all 
juvenile 
custodial 
interrogations be electronically recorded."[44]  
Sykes, supra ¶98 at 725. 
¶100 Most of our current court composition knows about the 
historic missteps of that court, second-hand.  But Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley knows about it first-hand, as she was one of the 
then court of four.  She has the benefit of having been a 
justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court for about three decades, 
                                                 
41 Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 
N.W.2d 523. 
42 State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 N.W.2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899. 
43 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 
N.W.2d 582. 
44 State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 
N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
25 
 
since 1995, and a member of the bench for nearly 40 years.45  
Past error should counsel her to depart from lending her name to 
the activism embraced by the new majority.  
¶101 Instead, all of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's years of 
collective judicial experience takes the majority right back 
full-circle to the 2004-2005 court and its penchant for judicial 
activism.  Any one of the current court of four could refrain 
from lending her vote to the exploration of such judicial 
mischief.  The 2004-2005 court term became irrevocably branded, 
which should serve as a cautionary tale against justices 
engaging in judicial activism.  Activism is destructive to the 
institution of the court, whether to achieve liberal or 
conservative outcomes.  That is the point.  The court's role is 
only to declare what the law is.46  The Johnson litigation 
declared what the law is. 
¶102 Does anyone wonder how Wisconsin became a nationwide 
hotbed for political spending, a record holder for the most 
                                                 
45 For added perspective, at the time Ann Walsh Bradley 
first started serving as a judge, her three other colleagues 
were not even lawyers yet:  Justice Rebecca Dallet was in high 
school, Justice Jill Karofsky was just starting out as a 
freshman at Duke University, and Justice Janet Protasiewicz was 
wrapping up her undergraduate studies at U.W.-Milwaukee.   
46 In doing so, as United States Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Roberts reminds us, "[j]udges are [to be] like umpires.  
Umpires 
don't 
make 
the 
rules; 
they 
apply 
them. . . . ."  
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to be Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (Sept. 12, 2005). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
26 
 
expensive judicial campaign in our nation's history?47  Is this 
the new norm?  The state Democratic Party chair has already said 
that "[t]he stakes [of Ann Walsh Bradley's upcoming campaign] 
will be enormous," and that "[a]s a party, [Democrats will] be 
just about ready to do anything to avoid returning to a 'rogue 
court'."48  Ann Walsh Bradley once upon a time found this 
problematic.49  She claimed to "have [had] a vision for our court 
system where political parties [do not] hav[e] undue input" on 
judicial races, as she "strongly believe[d] political parties 
should stay out of judicial races."50  Time will tell whether Ann 
Walsh Bradley will change her position on that as well.   
¶103 The majority leaves behind fundamental judicial tenets 
giving no deference to longstanding legal parameters.  These 
                                                 
47 Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost Record $51 Million, 
Wisconsin 
Democracy 
Campaign 
(July 
18, 
2023), 
https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/139-press-release-
2023/7390-wisconsin-supreme-court-race-cost-record-51m. 
48 Steven Walters, Schimel Could Be Potent Supreme Court 
Candidate, 
Urban 
Milwaukee 
(Dec. 
4, 
2023), 
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2023/12/04/the-state-of-politics-
schimel-could-be-potent-supreme-court-candidate  
49 Quote of Ann Walsh Bradley, Wisconsin Public Television, 
Candidate 
Debate, 
Mar. 
27, 
2015, 
https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Wisconsin_Supreme_Court_elections,_2015 
("This 
has 
never 
happened before in the state of Wisconsin to this degree that a 
political party would be inserted into a nonpartisan race. 
Political parties have agendas and we can't have courts with 
agendas because that undermines the public's trust in the people 
in our decisions.") 
50 Scott Bauer, Supreme Court candidates spar over partisan 
influences, 
Green 
Bay 
Press 
Gazette 
(Mar. 
24, 
2015), 
https://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/story/news/politics/2015/03
/24/supreme-court-candidates-partisan-influences/70405490/ 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
27 
 
four members of the court exhibit a continuing and escalating 
pattern of power-starved behavior which amounts to an exercise 
of sheer raw power accumulation, at any cost.  This original 
action is their latest power grab.  Power-aggregation of this 
nature is often "clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing," in 
hopes that others will not recognize the danger they are in 
until it is too late.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The court of four hopes that 
their innocuously clad actions can escape immediate detection as 
usually "the potential of the asserted principle to effect 
important change in the equilibrium of power [between the 
branches] is not immediately evident," so it "must be discerned 
by a careful and perceptive analysis.  But this wolf comes as a 
wolf."  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The four justices' 
evident lack of regard for fundamental sound judicial principles 
requires me to vociferously dissent. 
I 
¶104 The legislative power, per the Wisconsin Constitution, 
is vested in the legislative branch, not the judicial branch.  
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power shall be vested 
in a senate and assembly.")  This grant of legislative power 
includes the power to carry out redistricting.  Per the 
Wisconsin Constitution, it is the legislature, following the 
United States census, who shall "apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and the assembly, according to the number 
of inhabitants." Wis. Const. art. IV, §3.  It is the 
legislature, not the judiciary, who is responsible for creating 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
28 
 
maps which comply with the limited expressed apportionment 
guidelines under both the federal and state constitutions.  
Under 
normally 
functioning 
political 
process, 
when 
the 
legislature "redistricts anew" every 10 years and passes 
compliant maps, those maps take effect upon being signed into 
law by the governor or when the governor's veto of those maps is 
overridden.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(2)a.  
¶105 As a political process delegated to the political 
branches, redistricting was not, and is not, the responsibility 
of the courts.  The court's responsibility as an impartial, 
apolitical branch is to declare what the law is.  See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added) ("It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is."); see also Wis. Justice Initiative v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶18, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990 
N.W.2d 122 ("The main power we have been given in the 
constitution is the judicial power, which by necessity means the 
power to interpret the law in appropriate cases.").  Thus, the 
apolitical judicial branch normally has no role to play in this 
political process.  
¶106 But 
sometimes 
that 
traditional 
political 
process 
fails. Where that political process fails, and there is a 
constitutional crisis such that there are no compliant maps in 
place with which to conduct state elections, then the judiciary 
does 
have 
an 
important——albeit 
limited——role 
to 
play 
in 
providing a judicial remedy to solve the issue.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
29 
 
¶107 Such was the unappealing situation we found ourselves 
in during the Johnson redistricting litigation cycle.  The 
majority's discussion of our expansive Johnson redistricting 
history was underdeveloped.  Their framing, all two scant 
paragraphs of it, combined with their assertion that this 
court's treatment of the issue of contiguity was somehow 
"cursory", majority op. at ¶22, conveniently lacks important 
context and pertinent details on how this court——which included 
three current members of the majority——definitively answered 
these 
and 
all 
redistricting 
questions 
multiple 
times, 
conclusively, throughout our Johnson litigation these last two 
years.   
¶108 Following the 2020 census, Wisconsin voters filed a 
petition for an original action in this court claiming the then-
existing 
congressional 
and 
state 
legislative 
maps 
were 
malapportioned under the state and federal constitutions, 
requiring that new maps be drawn.  See State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 556, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964) (finding 
"the principle of per capita equality of representation" in 
Article IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution).  We 
granted the petition.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Sept. 22, 2021).  The majority 
seems to overlook the inconvenient fact that during the 
resulting litigation, this court liberally permitted parties to 
intervene, and then "grant[ed] intervention to all parties that 
sought it."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶2, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II"), summarily rev'd 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
30 
 
sub nom., Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 
398, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (2022) (per curiam).  These intervenors are 
listed below.51  This original action commenced an "odyssey" that 
brought this court face-to-face with every issue and claim the 
parties could garner in support of their proposed maps——
including the contiguity issue raised here.  See Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 
(Karofsky, J., dissenting) ("Johnson III"). 
A.  Johnson I 
¶109 It 
is 
worth 
remembering 
how 
this 
most 
recent 
redistricting challenge came to the court.  In Johnson I, we 
laid the groundwork for how we would proceed with the unenviable 
task of settling the inter-branch dispute over redistricting 
maps.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623.  That year, "[t]he political 
process failed . . . , necessitating our involvement."  Id., 
¶19.  Called upon to remedy this failure so a map would be in 
place for the upcoming election, this court resolved to remedy 
the existing malapportionment by selecting a map submitted to us 
by the parties.  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶6.   This 
approach sought to preserve our role as an independent judiciary 
free of the political thicket.  "[N]othing in the constitution 
vests this court with the power of the legislature to enact new 
                                                 
51 Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces de la 
Frontera, League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, 
Lauren Stephenson, Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan Steil, Congressman 
Tom Tiffany, Congressman Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob 
Zabel, Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, Kathleen 
Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, 
Jean-Luc Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
31 
 
maps.  Our role in redistricting remains a purely judicial one, 
which limits us to declaring what the law is and affording the 
parties 
a 
remedy 
for 
its 
violation." 
 
Johnson 
I, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶3.  We therefore proceeded, seeing our only 
permissible 
task 
as 
"ensuring 
the 
maps 
satisfy 
all . . . constitutional and statutory requirements"; not to 
adjudicate "[c]laims of political unfairness in the maps[, 
which] present political questions, not legal ones."  Id., ¶4.  
After all, "[t]he job of the judiciary is to decide cases based 
on the law."  Id., ¶82 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
¶110 This court began by stating the obvious:  the map 
selected 
must 
comply 
with 
state 
law, 
but 
also 
federal 
constitutional and statutory requirements.  Id., ¶¶24-27.  These 
include 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause's 
one-person-one-vote 
requirement, 
the 
prohibition 
on 
multimember 
congressional 
districts under 2 U.S.C. § 2c, and the Voting Rights Act's 
("VRA's") prohibition of "the denial or abridgment of the right 
to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language 
minority group."  Id.; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 
(1964) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State 
make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in 
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as 
practicable."); 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (establishing the framework 
for 
so-called 
vote 
dilution 
claims). 
 
Like 
the 
federal 
constitution, we recognized that Article IV, Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution also imposes a one-person-one-vote rule, 
requiring 
reapportionment 
"according 
to 
the 
number 
of 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
32 
 
inhabitants" in new districts.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶28-38 (confirming that this interpretation comports with the 
constitution's original meaning). 
¶111 The parties further asked this court to consider 
partisan fairness in selecting a new map.  This ask ran headlong 
into our role as an apolitical branch whose sole purpose is to 
resolve legal disputes.  See Wis. Justice Initiative, 407 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶18 ("The main power we have been given in the 
constitution is the judicial power, which by necessity means the 
power to interpret the law in appropriate cases.").  We do not 
resolve partisan power politics.  We resolve parties' rights and 
responsibilities under the law by "focus[ing] on the language of 
the adopted text and historical evidence" of its meaning.  State 
v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶22, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847.  
Some questions, while they may be intriguing, nonetheless lie 
outside the legal boundaries of what courts can answer.   
¶112 The 
majority 
calls 
partisan 
gerrymandering 
an 
"important and unresolved legal question," majority op., ¶7, 
that they declined to take up in the petition for original 
action over concerns of the extensive factfinding required.  See 
Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 70, 409 Wis. 2d 372, 
995 N.W.2d 779.  But this court answered the question of 
partisan gerrymandering in Johnson I, when this court concluded 
the Wisconsin Constitution has nothing to say about partisan 
gerrymandering, and therefore it is not a justiciable legal 
claim this court can resolve.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶81 
(lead op.).  Partisan gerrymandering is "[t]he practice of 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
33 
 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of 
highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair 
advantage 
by 
diluting 
the 
opposition's 
voting 
strength."  
Gerrymandering, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  This 
begs the question:  "Diluted relative to what benchmark?"  
Gonzalez v. Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(recognizing 
that 
VRA 
vote-dilution 
claims 
beg 
the 
same 
question). 
 
That 
benchmark 
is 
proportional 
partisan 
representation——"the political theory that a party should win a 
percentage of seats, on a statewide basis, that is roughly equal 
to the percentage of votes it receives."  Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶42.  We recognized that nothing in the law 
authorizes this court to grant parties relief based on whether a 
particular map achieves proportional partisan representation.  
"The people have never consented to the Wisconsin judiciary 
deciding what constitutes a 'fair' partisan divide; seizing such 
power would encroach on the constitutional prerogatives of the 
political branches."  Id., ¶45.  Seats in a representative body 
must be earned via the political process.  That is what makes 
the political branches accountable to the people.  "It hardly 
follows from the principle that each person must have an equal 
say in the election of representatives that a person is entitled 
to have his political party achieve representation in some way 
commensurate to its share of statewide support."  Id., ¶42 
(quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 
2501 (2019)). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
34 
 
¶113 Not only did this court conclude partisan fairness is 
a political question assigned to the legislature, but our 
searching review of the Wisconsin Constitution revealed nothing 
setting forth any cognizable right to partisan fairness in 
redistricting.  We concluded, "[n]othing supports the notion 
that Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution was 
originally understood——or has ever been interpreted——to regulate 
partisanship in redistricting."52  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶58.  "Likewise, Article I, Sections 3[53] and 4[54] of the 
Wisconsin Constitution do not inform redistricting challenges" 
because "[n]othing about the shape of a district infringes 
anyone's ability to speak, publish, assemble, or petition."  
Id., ¶¶59-60.  We further said finding a legal standard for 
partisan fairness in Article I, Section 22, which provides, 
                                                 
52 "All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments 
are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  
53 "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge 
the liberty of speech or of the press.  In all criminal 
prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in 
evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter 
charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives 
and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the 
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact."  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 3. 
54 "The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to 
consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or 
any department thereof, shall never be abridged."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 4. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
35 
 
"[t]he blessings of a free government can only be maintained by 
a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality 
and 
virtue, 
and 
by 
frequent 
recurrence 
to 
fundamental 
principles," and to "fabricate a legal standard of partisan 
fairness . . . would represent anything but 'moderation' or 
'temperance[.]'"  Id., ¶62.  Whatever operative effect Section 
22 may have, it cannot constitute an open invitation to the 
judiciary to rewrite duly enacted law by imposing our subjective 
policy preferences in the name of "justice."  Id.  Instead, 
Article IV, Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution express a series of discrete requirements 
governing redistricting.  These are the only Wisconsin 
constitutional limits we have ever recognized on the 
legislature's discretion to redistrict.  The last time 
we 
implemented 
a 
judicial 
remedy 
for 
an 
unconstitutional redistricting plan, we acknowledged 
Article IV as the exclusive repository of state 
constitutional limits on redistricting: 
[T]he Wisconsin constitution itself provides 
a standard of reapportionment "meet for 
judicial judgment."  The legislature shall 
reapportion "according to the number of 
inhabitants" subject to some geographical 
and political unit limitations in execution 
of this standard.  We need not descend into 
the "thicket" to fashion standards whole-
cloth.  
Id., ¶63 (quoting Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 562 (alterations in 
original).  
¶114 Finally, rejecting the Johnson I dissent's assertion 
that the task of adopting remedial maps required this court to 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
36 
 
rule as a partisan actor,55 we adopted "[a] least-change 
approach[, 
which] 
is 
the 
most 
consistent, 
neutral, 
and 
appropriate use of our limited judicial power to remedy the 
constitutional violations in this case."  Id., ¶85 (Hagedorn, 
J., concurring); see also id., ¶¶69-72.  Least change, as a 
framework 
this 
court 
put 
forward 
throughout 
the 
Johnson 
litigation, properly reflects the limited role the judicial 
branch plays in redistricting, as it is the legislature, not the 
judiciary, 
which 
is 
granted 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
redistrict.  Least change remains the law.  Until today.  Now, 
the majority, citing to nothing, declares instead that the 
standard this court implemented barely two years ago "is 
unworkable in practice," majority op., ¶63, simply so that they 
can overrule it, and move this institution down the darkened 
path of outcome-based judicial activism.   
B.  Johnson II 
¶115 Having made clear the ground rules in Johnson I, this 
court proceeded to select remedial maps in Johnson II, 400 
Wis. 2d 626.  To repeat, we decided the proper way for this 
court to select remedial maps is to "implement judicial remedies 
only to the extent necessary to remedy the violation of a 
justiciable and cognizable right found in the United States 
Constitution, the VRA, or Article IV, Sections 3, 4, or 5 of the 
                                                 
55 The 
Johnson 
I 
dissent 
incorrectly 
interpreted 
the 
majority's "least change" approach as "inherently political" in 
its determination to limit the judiciary's role in a political 
process granted to the legislature and the governor.  Johnson I, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶88-89 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
37 
 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶81 (lead 
op.).  As the judiciary, we cannot "consider the partisan makeup 
of districts because it does not implicate any justiciable or 
cognizable right," and we implement "the least-change approach 
to remedying any constitutional or statutory infirmities in the 
existing maps because the constitution precludes the judiciary 
from 
interfering 
with 
the 
lawful 
policy 
choices 
of 
the 
legislature."  Id.  Instead of requesting a hearing or a referee 
to engage in factfinding, the parties agreed to proceed on 
stipulated facts and expert reports.  Parties, including the 
Governor, Senate Democrats, and Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists, stipulated at the outset of the Johnson litigation 
that Article IV's contiguity requirement is satisfied by 
municipal islands, and these islands are constitutionally 
permissible.  Joint Stip. of Facts & Law, supra ¶88 ("Contiguity 
for state assembly districts is satisfied when a district 
boundary follows the municipal boundaries.  Municipal 'islands' 
are legally contiguous with the municipality to which the 
'island' belongs.") 
¶116 Applying this framework to the maps, a majority of the 
court first concluded that the Governor's proposed congressional 
map "best follow[ed] our directive to make the least changes 
from existing congressional district boundaries while complying 
with all relevant state and federal laws."  Johnson II, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶25.  A majority of the court accordingly adopted 
Democratic Governor Evers' proposed congressional map as the 
remedial map.  Id.  Curiously, no challenge is made to that 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
38 
 
Democratically drawn map which was chosen with the "least 
change" methodology.  Could it be that it already achieves the 
desired partisan outcome? 
¶117 In selecting the proper remedial maps for the state 
legislature, however, a majority of this court initially went 
astray.  The Johnson II majority adopted Governor Evers' 
proposed 
legislative 
maps——"which 
carve[d] 
seven 
Assembly 
districts with populations that [were] curiously at almost exact 
51% 
African-American 
populations"——based 
on 
an 
erroneous 
application of Section 2 of the VRA and the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Id., ¶72 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).  A majority of 
this court misunderstood and misapplied VRA § 2 in creating a 
race-based remedy in the absence of a VRA violation or 
wrong:  creating such an untethered race-based remedy out of 
thin air, as a majority of the court had done, is in fact, 
unconstitutional.  
¶118 "A State may not use race as the predominant factor in 
drawing district lines unless it has a compelling reason."  
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017).  If there is no 
compelling reason, using race as the predominant factor in 
drawing district lines creates an unjustified, unconstitutional 
racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).  The United States Supreme 
Court has specified three elements, known as the "Gingles 
preconditions," 
which 
must 
be 
established 
in 
order 
to 
demonstrate a VRA § 2 violation necessitating the creation of an 
additional minority opportunity district:   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
39 
 
(1)  the racial group must be "sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member 
district"; 
(2) 
the 
group 
must 
be 
"politically cohesive"; and (3) the white majority 
must 
"vot[e] 
sufficiently 
as 
a 
bloc 
to 
enable 
it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred 
candidate."  
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425 
(2006) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 
(1986)).  "If all three Gingles requirements are established, 
the statutory text directs us to consider the 'totality of 
circumstances' to determine whether members of a racial group 
have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate."  
Id. at 425-26.  Section 2 further provides, though "[t]he extent 
to 
which 
members 
of 
a 
protected 
class 
have 
been 
elected . . . may 
be 
considered," 
"nothing 
in 
[VRA 
§ 2] 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected 
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."  52 
U.S.C. 
§ 10301(b). 
 
Unless 
"each 
of 
the 
three 
Gingles 
prerequisites is established, 'there neither has been a wrong 
nor can be a remedy.'"  Cooper, 581 U.S. at 306 (quoting Growe 
v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993)).  The Supreme Court therefore 
"insist[s] on a strong basis in evidence of the harm being 
remedied" under the VRA in order to survive strict scrutiny.  
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995); accord Shaw, 509 
U.S. at 653 ("[R]acial bloc voting and minority-group political 
cohesion [the requirements of a VRA redistricting violation] 
never can be assumed, but specifically must be proved in each 
case in order to establish that a redistricting plan dilutes 
minority voting strength in violation of § 2.").  "[T]he purpose 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
40 
 
of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race 
by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal 
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."  City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co,, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).   
¶119 The Johnson II majority improperly concluded that 
Democratic Governor Evers' racial gerrymander was proper, even 
though it did not meet this minimum threshold necessary to 
survive strict scrutiny.  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶¶47, 50 
("[W]e cannot say for certain on this record that seven 
majority-Black assembly districts are required by the VRA.  But 
based on our assessment of the totality of the circumstances and 
given the discretion afforded states implementing the Act, we 
conclude the Governor's configuration is permissible.").  The 
majority's violation of the law was sufficient cause for the 
United States Supreme Court, three weeks after the Johnson II 
majority selected the Governor's maps, to take the rarely 
invoked 
action 
of 
summarily 
reversing 
the 
majority's 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
41 
 
interpretation of the VRA56 and the Equal Protection Clause, 
while leaving the rest of the analysis intact.  Wis. Legislature 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (2022) 
(per curiam).  The Supreme Court determined that the majority of 
this court had "failed to answer" "whether a race-neutral 
alternative that did not add a seventh majority-black district 
would deny black voters' equal political opportunity" in trying 
to determine whether there was a VRA violation which justified 
                                                 
56 First, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the Johnson II majority mistook the VRA § 2 as requiring the 
creation of as many majority opportunity districts as possible, 
thus "embracing just the sort of uncritical majority-minority 
district maximization that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] expressly 
rejected."  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 
398, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1249 (2022) (per curiam) (citing Johnson 
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994) ("Failure to maximize 
cannot be the measure of § 2.")).  The Johnson II majority 
improperly took Cooper's "leeway" language as indicating that 
"it had to conclude only that the VRA might support race-based 
districting——not that the statute required it."  Id.; Cooper v. 
Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 306 (2017).  The Supreme Court explained 
that its "precedent instructs otherwise"; "that 'leeway' does 
not allow a State to adopt a racial gerrymander that the State 
does not, at the time of imposition 'judg[e] necessary under a 
proper interpretation of the VRA.'"  Wis. Legislature, 142 S. 
Ct. at 1250 (quoting Cooper, 581 U.S. at 306).   
Second, the Court observed that the Johnson II majority's 
"analysis of Gingles' preconditions fell short of [the Court's] 
standards" by "improperly rel[ying] on generalizations to reach 
the conclusion that the preconditions were satisfied" "[r]ather 
than carefully evaluating evidence at the district level."  Id.  
In fact, the "sole piece of cited record evidence came from an 
intervenor who argued that the Governor's map violated the VRA."  
Id. at 1250 n.2.   
Finally, the Supreme Court faulted the Johnson II majority 
for "improperly reduc[ing] Gingles' totality-of-circumstances 
analysis to a single factor" and "focus[ing] exclusively on 
proportionality," an approach the Court previously rejected as 
contrary to the VRA's language.  Id. at 1250.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
42 
 
the Governor's racially gerrymandered maps.  Wis. Legislature, 
142 S. Ct. at 1250-51.  
¶120 The Supreme Court's repudiation of this court was only 
the third time that this court has ever been summarily reversed. 
The first was about 73 years ago, and the second being about 55 
years ago.57  As a result of that rare repudiation, the court was 
required to revisit state legislative maps for the upcoming 
election, but congressional maps selected by the court majority 
were left intact.   
C.  Johnson III 
¶121 We finally brought this line of cases to an end——or so 
we thought!——and settled this issue in Johnson III on remand 
from the Supreme Court's summary reversal.  Johnson III, 401 
Wis. 2d 198.  It is worth repeating that any map this court 
could select as a judicial remedy had to first comply with 
federal constitutional and statutory requirements, including the 
VRA, Equal Protection Clause, one-person-one-vote requirement, 
and the Wisconsin Constitution, and then had to align with the 
court's "least change approach" adopted in Johnson I.  The maps 
also had to comply with state law.  All parties were free to, 
and invited to, submit maps for our consideration which met 
these foundational compliance requirements.  Among the five maps 
submitted to us, we ultimately selected the Legislature's maps 
because, of the maps submitted, these maps were "the only 
legally compliant maps" and were thus "the best, and only, 
                                                 
57 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Bd., 338 U.S. 
953 (1950); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968).  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
43 
 
viable proposal."  Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶22.  These 
court-selected 
remedial 
maps——the 
Democratic 
Governor's 
congressional map and the Republican Legislature's state senate 
and assembly maps——were then used to conduct the state's 2022 
elections and remained in place and in effect until this most 
recent collateral attack on the court's judgment in Johnson III.  
Notably, all parties agreed, and the court concluded, that the 
selected maps complied with contiguity.   
II 
¶122 The majority's decision to hear this present case and 
now overrule its own less than two-year-old decision following a 
change in court membership is a resurrection of the contempt 
voiced by the Johnson III dissenters following the United States 
Supreme Court's summary reversal.  The Johnson III dissenters 
demonstrated 
an 
open 
and 
notorious 
disregard 
for 
their 
fundamental duty to neutrally apply the law.  "Rather than 
admitting [their] error" the Johnson III dissenters "launche[d] 
an indignant attack on this nation's highest court," echoing 
arguments from Justice Sotomayor's dissent to the per curiam and 
chastising this court for applying binding Supreme Court 
precedents that the dissenters felt were "gaslighting."  Johnson 
III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶¶137-39 & n.33 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., concurring); id., ¶175 (Karofsky, J., dissenting).  Not 
content with the outcome of the Johnson litigation, the majority 
hopes that having a fourth "kick at the cat," provides them with 
the predetermined outcome they desire——both state and federal 
all democratic maps.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
44 
 
¶123 This original action comes camouflaged as something 
other than what it is:  a motion for reconsideration of this 
court's decision in Johnson III, a procedurally problematic 
avenue these parties cannot avail themselves of as it is now 
time-barred.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.64 ("A party may seek 
reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of the supreme court 
by filing a motion under s. 809.14 for reconsideration within 20 
days after the date of the decision of the supreme court.").  
All other legal bases and procedural mechanisms for this court 
to reexamine these maps once again are likewise barred.  Yet 
here we are.  
¶124 This case, along with all the factual disputes and 
legal issues it presents, or could even possibly present, have 
already been thoroughly litigated at the highest courts of this 
state and the nation.  The parties are precluded from bringing 
new claims now over the same maps this court has already 
rendered judgment on.  Accordingly, this court should not be 
reexamining the congressional or state legislative maps we 
imposed as a judicial remedy less than two years ago under the 
guise of seeking district "contiguity" or avoiding violation of 
the principle of "separation of powers." 
¶125 The new court majority's handling of this case strikes 
a resounding blow at the root of our shared foundational 
judicial principles and duties.  We should never have taken this 
case.  This court should not have engaged in a vaunted show of 
judicial window dressing in pretending that the outcome of this 
case was not already predetermined from the outset.  There is 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
45 
 
only one way the majority can justify its extraordinary steps 
taken in flagrant defiance of our precedent, our law, and our 
nation's highest court:  raw judicial power. 
¶126 This 
case 
should 
be 
dismissed 
as 
improvidently 
granted.  Be that as it may, this court cannot now address 
issues which these parties had a prior opportunity to raise, 
decided not to, and now seek to raise before Johnson III is even 
cold, and do so in an unnecessarily constrained timeframe that 
runs up against our 2024 election cycle.  Justice, due process, 
and the court system's reliance on finality of judgments, demand 
this case's dismissal and its arguments precluded under stare 
decisis, standing, judicial estoppel, issue preclusion, claim 
preclusion, laches, and due process.  Unlike the majority 
opinion, I will address them in detail. 
A.  Stare Decisis 
¶127 These 
four 
members 
of 
the 
court 
fundamentally 
undermine this essential legal principle in their quest to 
deliver a predetermined outcome to their constituents.   
¶128 The doctrine of stare decisis inhibits the majority's 
exercise of raw judicial power in seeking to overrule a case so 
recently decided.  We do not formulaically adhere to, or quickly 
dispense with, stare decisis simply as a means for avoiding hard 
questions.  Stare decisis is not judicial window dressing.  
Rather, stare decisis is a foundational concept in our legal 
system because "respect for prior decisions is fundamental to 
the rule of law."  Johnson Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶94.  
Stare decisis "ensures the integrity of the judicial system by 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
46 
 
developing consistency in legal principles and establishing that 
cases are grounded in the law, not in the will of individual 
members of the court."  State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶97, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (Dallet, J., dissenting).  "This 
court follows the doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously because 
of our abiding respect for the rule of law."  Hinrichs v. DOW 
Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (quoting 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶94).  "That is why we 
require a special justification in order to overturn our 
precedent."  State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 195, 
990 N.W.2d 174.  A mere change in the composition of the court 
does not rise to the high level of the "special justification" 
standard required to overturn a prior case.  Mayo v. Wis. 
Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶110, 383 
Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) 
("The decision to overturn a prior case must not be undertaken 
merely because the composition of the court has changed.")   
¶129 Adherence to stare decisis is essential because there 
is 
no 
finality 
in 
judgement 
"[w]hen 
constitutional 
interpretation is open to revision in every case, [as] 'deciding 
cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary 
and unpredictable results.'"  Citizens Util. Bd. v. Klauser, 194 
Wis. 2d 484, 513, 534 N.W.2d 608 (1995) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting) 
(quoting 
Appeal 
of 
Concerned 
Corporators 
of 
Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 525 A.2d 671, 701 (N.H. 1987) (Souter, J., 
dissenting)).  Departing from a prior decision——decided so 
recently and affecting the same set of facts——erodes "public 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
47 
 
faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments."  Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
403 (1970).   
¶130 From the start of this Johnson litigation cycle, the 
relevant parties, including the Governor, Senate Democrats, and 
the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists, agreed and this court 
determined that "municipal islands" are "legally contiguous even 
if the area around the island is part of a different district."  
Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36; see also Joint Stip. of Facts & 
Law supra ¶88 ("Contiguity for state assembly districts is 
satisfied when a district boundary follows the municipal 
boundaries.  Municipal 'islands' are legally contiguous with the 
municipality to which the 'island' belongs.")  And they have 
been, for years.58  That holding was reiterated by this court 
again in Johnson II and yet again in Johnson III when we adopted 
proposed remedial maps——including remedial maps proposed by 
parties who now argue for a different interpretation of 
contiguity——which contained municipal islands.  These holdings 
on contiguity, which three members of the current majority did 
not take fault with in their dissents, were in line with the 
court's understanding of contiguity, as reflected in the maps 
that existed since the 1950s or 1960s, according to counsel, 
previous 50 years of law on the topic, the parties own agreement 
                                                 
58 Oral argument in Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2023AP1399-OA, held Nov. 21, 2023, available on WisconsinEye 
https://wiseye.org/2023/11/21/wisconsin-supreme-court-rebecca-
clarke-v-wisconsin-elections-commission/ (Rebuttal arguments of 
Attorneys Sam Hirsch and Mark Gaber at 2:53:00 and 3:01, 
respectively.) 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
48 
 
that the maps are contiguous, and the court's reliance on 
Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992) 
(per curiam) ("Since the distance between town and island is 
slight, we do not think the failure of the legislative plan to 
achieve literal contiguity a serious demerit; and we note that 
it has been the practice of the Wisconsin legislature to treat 
islands as contiguous with the cities or villages to which they 
belong.").   
¶131 The court's determination that municipal islands were 
constitutionally permissible in Johnson I was essential to the 
court's provision of a remedy, so the allegation that these 
repeated holdings and determinations were dicta or simply 
"cursory" comments is farcical.  Majority. op., ¶¶22-23.  Using 
a dicta allegation as an "end run around stare decisis" in this 
present case "undermines our common law tradition of fidelity to 
precedent."  Est. of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶85, 
318 
Wis. 2d 553, 
769 
N.W.2d 481 
(Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Picotte, 
2003 WI 42, ¶61, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381. 
¶132 The majority dismisses 50 years of precedent, a 
federal court determination in Prosser, and three successive 
binding determinations by this court in Johnson I, II, and III 
in order to do away with a necessary stare decisis analysis 
which does not trend in their favor.  As an analysis shows, this 
contiguity precedent did not demand a literal physically 
touching definition.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36; see also 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866 ("Since the distance between town 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
49 
 
and island is slight, we do not think the failure of the 
legislative plan to achieve literal contiguity a serious 
demerit; and we note that it has been the practice of the 
Wisconsin legislature to treat islands as contiguous with the 
cities or villages to which they belong.").  The court then, as 
the court should now be, was "not persuaded . . . that the 
Wisconsin Constitution requires literal contiguity."  Id.  Stare 
decisis, as a principle, does not require the court to "retain 
constitutional interpretations that were objectively wrong when 
made."  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶8 n.5, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 
929 N.W.2d 600.  But "objectively wrong" is a high bar to 
overcome, one which is not overcome here, as there is simply no 
reason for overruling Johnson I and Johnson III that would not 
also counsel overruling any other case.   
¶133 The law demands a stare decisis analysis.  That is 
notably absent from the majority opinion.  The court's new 
composition does not dispense with the need for such analysis, 
and the opinion they put forward does not satisfy the "special 
justification" bar required to overturn a precedential case.  
See 
Mayo, 
383 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶110 
(Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) ("The decision to overturn a prior case must not be 
undertaken merely because the composition of the court has 
changed.")   
¶134 Given that the court's membership is all that has 
changed, it lends credence to the fact that overruling a case so 
recently 
decided——in 
violation 
of 
foundational 
legal  
principles——is little more than the majority's impermissible 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
50 
 
exercise of raw judicial power for activist means.  Fidelity to 
stare decisis and the rule of law impedes these activist means. 
B.  Standing 
¶135 The majority donates barely a paragraph to dispel of a 
rather 
glaring 
issue——whether 
the 
parties 
even 
have 
the 
requisite standing necessary to bring their claims.  The 
majority's retreat to a position of "we need not address" the 
arguments that we find potentially problematic is unsurprising, 
yet disappointing.  The issue of standing is not so easily 
dispensed with as the majority opinion suggests.  Majority op., 
¶¶38-39.  Standing may actually prove to be rather problematic 
to them.  
¶136 Standing 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
"not 
a 
matter 
of 
jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy."  Friends of Black 
River 
Forest 
v. 
Kohler 
Company, 
2022 
WI 52, 
¶17, 
402 
Wis. 2d 587, 977 N.W.2d 342; Wis. Bankers Ass'n Inc. v. Mut. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Wis., 96 Wis. 2d 438, 444 n.1, 291 
N.W.2d 869 (1980); State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank of Wisconsin 
Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308 n.5, 
290 N.W.2d 321 (1980).  "[T]he Wisconsin standing analysis is 
conceptually similar to the federal analysis."  Waste Mgmt. of 
Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 509, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988).  
With this approach, the court asks, "Does the challenged action 
cause the petitioner injury in fact?"  And "is the interest 
allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected 
or 
regulated 
by 
the 
statute 
or 
constitutional 
guarantee in question?"  Friends of Black River Forest, 402 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
51 
 
Wis. 2d 587, ¶18 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).  "'Standing' is a concept that 
restricts access to judicial remedy to those who have suffered 
some injury because of something that someone else has either 
done or not done."  Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 
Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517 (quoting Three T's Trucking v. Kost, 
2007 WI App 158, ¶16, 303 Wis. 2d 681, 736 N.W.2d 239).  "In 
order to have standing to sue, a party must have a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy."  Madison v. Fitchburg, 
112 Wis. 2d at 228 (emphasis added); see also Mast v. Olsen, 89 
Wis. 2d 12, 
16, 
278 
N.W.2d 205 
(1979); 
Tri-State 
Home 
Improvement Co. Inc. v. LIRC, 111 Wis. 2d 103, 113, 330 
N.W.2d 186 (1983); Moedern v. McGinnis, 70 Wis. 2d 1056, 1064, 
236 N.W.2d 240 (1975).  Being harmed "without more, does not 
automatically confer standing."  Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶20. 
¶137 Standing analysis can vary "depending on the nature of 
the claim asserted."  Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village 
of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶13, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 
N.W.2d 573.  In dealing with redistricting claims however, the 
United States Supreme Court has determined that residents cannot 
allege 
harms 
"result[ing] 
from 
the 
boundaries" 
of 
other 
residents' districts, but the harms allegedly suffered must 
emanate from the boundaries of the particular resident's 
"particular district":  they must be "district specific" harms 
suffered.  Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 
(2018).  If a harm is found, "the remedy that is proper and 
sufficient lies in the revision of the boundaries of the 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
52 
 
individual's own district," a remedy "does not necessarily 
require restructuring all of the State's legislative districts."  
Id. at 1930-31.   
¶138 Petitioners' assertion that they have standing because 
the allegedly non-contiguous districts render a "less responsive 
and less representative" legislature, and they are thus harmed 
by legislators who have "difficulty advancing constituent 
interests" in fragmented districts, cannot advance a cognizable 
injury which this court can remedy.  Many of the petitioners do 
not live in the municipal islands in question, let alone the 
supposedly non-contiguous districts surrounding them.59  For 
these parties who do not live in these scrutinized districts, 
the Supreme Court outlined in Sinkfield v. Kelley that they also 
cannot allege a harm or present a cognizable injury on the basis 
of 
residing 
in 
districts 
which 
merely 
border 
allegedly 
unconstitutional districts.  Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 
30-31 (2000) (per curiam).  The majority seems to have misplaced 
these pertinent facts somewhere along the way, and has not had 
the good fortune to stumble back over them.  Parties cannot 
assert a generalized grievance when they themselves do not live 
in, nor are directly harmed by, the presence of municipal 
islands which have been in place for over 50 years.  In many of 
                                                 
59 Only some of the petitioners allege to live in a district 
with a municipal island, and none articulate a concrete 
injury:  two petitioners live in districts with islands of zero 
residents, three petitioners live in districts with islands of 
one to four residents, and the remaining petitioners and Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists don't claim to live in districts 
with municipal islands. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
53 
 
the districts of which they complain, the "islands" can be 
absorbed into the existing district so not to require much 
judicial map drawing at all.   
¶139 The majority also fails to advance a compelling answer 
for how the petitioners' alleged initial harm, that they are 
unable 
"to 
achieve 
a 
Democratic 
majority 
in 
the 
state 
legislature," 
is 
the 
fault 
of 
municipal 
islands 
which 
overwhelmingly contain zero to 20 residents.60   Nor is it clear 
why this court, in order to remedy that far-fetched alleged 
harm, must toss statewide maps it adopted as a judicial remedy 
just last year.  The majority's lack of methodology leaves the 
public and members of the legislature in limbo.  Majority op., 
¶3.  The majority plays the game without letting anyone else 
know the rules. 
¶140 Connections between the alleged harm and the extreme 
remedy initially sought are strained to the point of breaking.  
Perhaps the majority recognizes this, as they duck any and all 
discussion or analysis of Gill v. Whitford.  Gill helpfully 
limits alleged harms to what parties can show is "district 
specific," not "result[ing] from the boundaries" of other 
people's districts, and would, if harms were nonetheless found, 
limit remedy to "revision of the boundaries of the individual's 
own district" instead of "requir[ing] restructuring all of the 
State's legislative districts."  Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930-31.  
                                                 
60 In briefing and oral argument, the parties identified 211 
"municipal islands," of which approximately 33% have zero 
residents, more than 80% have less than 20 residents, and a mere 
5% of these contain 100 or more residents. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
54 
 
Parties alleging generalized grievances lack standing to demand 
the extreme statewide remedy they seek.   
¶141 While this court has previously recognized that the 
Governor has standing to bring a redistricting challenge on 
behalf of the state's citizens,61 a point the majority clings to, 
the Governor had his day in court and agreed the maps were 
contiguous.  The majority fails to wrestle with the very real 
reality of what happens when the Governor——who they argue has 
the clearest claim to standing——was a party in the previous 
judicial proceedings and is precluded for a host of reasons from 
bringing these claims now.  Evidently then, the rest of this 
hastily erected house of cards starts to crumble, and the 
majority would then be forced to address the numerous standing 
issues of the remainder of the parties.  But it fails to even 
begin this analysis.   
¶142 Stated differently, if the one party who may have the 
clearest claim to standing, the Governor, is nonetheless 
estopped and precluded from relitigating claims this court has 
already addressed, then the others are left without a leg to 
stand on.  Nothing plus nothing is still nothing, unless your 
judges do not require that the parties have standing in order to 
wholesale redraw only the maps that do not lean Democratic. 
C.  Judicial Estoppel 
                                                 
61 "[The] state, acting . . . through the Governor . . . , 
may challenge the constitutionality of a state reapportionment 
plan as a violation of state constitutional rights of the 
citizens."  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 
552, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
55 
 
¶143 Judicial estoppel is a preclusion principle "intended 
to protect the judiciary as an institution from the perversion 
of judicial machinery[.]"  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 346 (quoting 
Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 
1982)).  Simply, judicial estoppel "protect[s] [courts] against 
a litigant playing 'fast and loose with the courts' by asserting 
inconsistent positions" at different stages of the litigation 
cycle.  State v. Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d 546, 557, 510 N.W.2d 837 
(1993) (quoting Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th 
Cir. 1993)).  Thus, a party is judicially estopped from 
"asserting 
a 
position 
in 
a 
legal 
proceeding 
and 
then 
subsequently asserting an inconsistent position."  Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d at 347; see also State v. Mendez, 157 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 
459 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. 1990); Coconate, 165 Wis. 2d at 
231.  "[T]he doctrine is not reducible to a pat formula."  
Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 348.  But the analysis conducted 
"recognize[s] certain boundaries," Levinson v. United States, 
969 F.2d 260, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1992), including whether (1) the 
party's later position is clearly inconsistent with the earlier 
position; (2) whether the facts at issue are the same in both 
cases; and (3) whether the party to be estopped convinced the 
first court to adopt its position.  State v. Harrison, 2020 WI 
35, ¶27, 391 Wis. 2d 161, 942 N.W.2d 310. 
¶144 In the Johnson litigation, the parties' "earlier 
position" was that Article IV's contiguity requirement was 
satisfied without requiring literal physical contiguity.  Both 
Governor Evers and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
56 
 
stipulated that municipal islands are legally contiguous with 
the municipality to which the "island" belongs, so literal 
contiguity was essentially not required.  Joint Stip. of Facts & 
Law supra ¶88; see Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866 (three-judge 
panel).  And that made sense.  So the court concluded municipal 
islands were thus allowable within the understanding and 
precedent of contiguity.  According to counsel at oral argument, 
Wisconsin has utilized faulty, "non-contiguous" maps since the 
1950s or 1960s.62  The Governor had no quarrel with this, as just 
last year he proposed remedial maps containing the municipal 
islands which he now decries.  He now argues in direct 
opposition to the argument then made.  He now avers that our 
constitution requires literal physical contiguity and municipal 
islands are not allowable.  Why the change of heart?  A change 
in the court.  The facts at issue between the earlier round of 
Johnson litigation and this current round of litigation are the 
same, satisfying the second element.   
¶145 The Governor and the Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists 
persuaded 
the 
court 
to 
adopt 
a 
position 
on 
contiguity, as evidenced in their initial briefing in Johnson.  
These parties also stipulated to contiguity.  Joint Stip. of 
Facts & Law supra ¶88 ("Contiguity for state assembly districts 
is satisfied when a district boundary follows the municipal 
                                                 
62 Oral argument in Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2023AP1399-OA, held Nov. 21, 2023, available on WisconsinEye 
https://wiseye.org/2023/11/21/wisconsin-supreme-court-rebecca-
clarke-v-wisconsin-elections-commission/ (Rebuttal arguments of 
Attorneys Sam Hirsch and Mark Gaber at 2:53:00 and 3:01, 
respectively.) 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
57 
 
boundaries.  Municipal 'islands' are legally contiguous with the 
municipality to which the 'island' belongs.")  The Governor 
proposed maps in Johnson that contained what he now argues is 
noncontiguous 
territory, 
yet 
he 
then 
argued 
it 
was 
a 
constitutionally compliant map.63  This court initially adopted 
his maps in Johnson II on the grounds of their purported 
constitutional compliance.  These facts collectively beggar 
belief then that the court was not "convinced" by the parties to 
adopt a position on contiguity one way or the other.  The 
parties convinced this court to adopt their positions related to 
contiguity 
in 
Johnson 
and 
now 
attempt 
to 
convince 
this 
differently constituted court to adopt their changed position.  
¶146 Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which is a 
matter of discretion.  That fact should not give the court pause 
when that analysis is overlaid on the facts of the case before 
us now.  Even where courts have hesitated to exercise their 
judicial discretion in invoking this doctrine, they have 
nonetheless recognized that such hesitancy arises in cases where 
courts are "more uncertain . . . that the two judicial actions 
concern the same factual issues or positions," as judicial 
estoppel "should be used only when the positions taken are 
clearly inconsistent."  Harrison v. LIRC, 187 Wis. 2d 491, 497-
                                                 
63 See, generally, State v. English-Lancaster, 2002 WI App 
74, 252 Wis. 2d 388, 642 N.W.2d 627; see also Cnty. of Milwaukee 
v. Edwards S., 2001 WI App 169, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241 
(concluding when a party asks the court for something, and the 
court provides it, the party cannot later argue that the very 
thing they requested was unlawful.) 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
58 
 
98, 523 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1994).  Petitioners64 advanced 
positions here which are clearly inconsistent with their 
positions advanced in Johnson I and II.  Hesitation to invoke 
judicial 
estoppel 
is 
not 
necessary. 
 
These 
parties 
are 
judicially estopped from launching this unprincipled attack on 
the court's prior decisions in the Johnson litigation.  And, as 
referenced earlier in this dissent's section on standing, supra 
section II B., the fact that the Governor can be judicially 
estopped from bringing this claim directs the court majority 
back to the foundational——and in this instance, foundationally 
problematic——issue of addressing the other parties' severely 
weakened assertions of standing to bring these claims in the 
first place. 
D.  Issue Preclusion 
¶147 Any trial lawyer or judge knows that parties in 
litigation 
often 
stipulate 
to 
certain 
elements 
of 
that 
litigation.  And when they do, those stipulations are largely 
accepted by the court, and not necessarily analyzed to the same 
extent 
as 
the 
remaining 
live 
issues 
before 
the 
court.  
Stipulations often streamline litigation and allow resources to 
be devoted to the crux of the case.  Quite obviously then, when 
all parties agree on an issue, that matter may not receive the 
same precise detailed scrutiny and analysis as the matters that 
are 
fully 
at 
issue 
and 
being 
fully 
litigated 
without 
stipulation.  Contiguity was agreed upon and concluded in 
Johnson.  
                                                 
64 Governor Evers and Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
59 
 
¶148 Were this problematic original action to somehow 
survive the numerous procedural issues already facing it, it 
would still not hold up under an issue and claim preclusion 
analysis.  The doctrine of issue preclusion, previously known as 
collateral estoppel, clearly bars the parties from relitigating 
what was already decided in the Johnson litigation.  "The 
doctrine of issue preclusion . . . is designed to limit the 
relitigation of issues that have been actually litigated in a 
previous action."  Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶88.  The focus of 
the analysis is on whether a particular issue——that is, the 
application of law to a given set of facts——was decided in a 
previous case.  See N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 
Wis. 2d 541, 550-51, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995).  "[T]he rights of 
persons 
not 
parties 
to 
the 
original 
litigation 
may 
be 
implicated . . . ."  Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57, 279 
Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879.  
¶149 "In the first step of the analysis, we must determine 
whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined 
in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action 
and whether the determination was essential to the judgment."  
Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24.  "An issue is 'actually litigated' 
when it is 'properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and 
is submitted for determination, and is determined.'"  Id.; see 
also Randall v. Felt, 2002 WI App 157, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 563, 647 
N.W.2d 373 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. 
d (1980)).  If the issue is properly raised and thus actually 
litigated, then a court conducts a fundamental fairness analysis 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
60 
 
based on the facts of the case, to see if applying the doctrine 
of issue preclusion comports with principles of fundamental 
fairness.  Est. of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2007 WI 36, 
¶38, 300 Wis. 2d 1, 728 N.W.2d 693; see also Mozrek v. Intra 
Fin. Corp, 2005 WI 73, ¶17, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54.  
¶150 Contiguity was actually litigated and determined in a 
prior proceeding.  The assertion that an essential element of 
the Johnson litigation which parties stipulated to, was not 
"actually litigated," struggles to find basis in the law.  The 
majority cites to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to 
bolster their claim.65  The parties' stipulation was, "Contiguity 
for state assembly districts is satisfied when a district 
boundary follows the municipal boundaries.  Municipal 'islands' 
are legally contiguous with the municipality to which the 
'island' belongs."  Joint Stip. of Facts & Law supra ¶88.   
¶151 The parties' stipulation and conclusions of the court 
in Johnson end the analysis.  In Johnson this court asked the 
parties 
to 
address 
in 
their 
briefing 
the 
constitutional 
parameters that the court should be bound by in drawing or 
appointing constitutionally compliant maps.  The parties did so.  
This court, as the parties did, determined that municipal 
islands 
were 
constitutionally 
permissible 
within 
the 
understanding of contiguity:   the parties drew and proposed 
remedial maps containing municipal islands, arguing that their 
maps containing these islands satisfied contiguity, and the 
                                                 
65 "An issue is not actually litigated if . . .  it is the 
subject of a stipulation between the parties."  Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments 27 cmt. e (1982). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
61 
 
court accepted three times that municipal islands satisfied 
contiguity in Johnson I, II, and III.  The court's decision in 
the Johnson litigation was central to the judgment.  The issue 
of contiguity was thus "properly raised" by the parties and 
"actually litigated." 
¶152 Parties' stipulations in litigation are an everyday 
occurrence, and they are relied upon.  The court should not 
upend this commonplace understanding. 
¶153 Though a court "may permit or deny the application of 
the doctrine of issue preclusion on the basis of fundamental 
fairness," no recognized factors counsel against the doctrine's 
application.  Est. of Rille, 300 Wis. 2d 1, ¶60.  We consider 
five factors for determining whether issue preclusion should be 
applied: 
1)  Could the party against whom preclusion is sought 
have obtained review of the judgment as a matter of 
law; 
2)  Is the question one of law that involves two 
distinct claims or intervening contextual shifts in 
the law; 
3)  Do significant differences in the quality or 
extensiveness of proceedings between the two courts 
warrant relitigation of the issue; 
4)  Have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that 
the party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; 
and 
5)  Are matters of public policy and individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application 
of 
collateral 
estoppel 
to 
be 
fundamentally 
unfair, 
including 
inadequate 
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair 
adjudication in the initial action? 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
62 
 
Id., ¶61.  None of these factors are applicable to this case.  
The Governor and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists 
obtained review when this court addressed redistricting in 
Johnson.  We "granted intervention to all parties that sought 
it."  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.  As for the second 
factor, nothing has changed.  We are looking at the same maps 
and the same sort of claims.  There has not even been an 
intervening change in the law, merely an intervening change in 
the court's membership.  Despite requests by Alabama for the 
Supreme 
Court 
to 
significantly 
rework 
its 
voting 
rights 
jurisprudence, the Court recently reaffirmed the very same VRA 
framework we applied in Johnson.  See Allen v. Milligan, 599 
U.S. 1, 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023).   
¶154 The parties have insisted on bringing these claims as 
original actions and decline to go the route of traditional 
factfinding.  This court may use factfinding procedures such as 
referees in actions where it has taken original jurisdiction.66  
This court cannot delegate to this referee the judicial power 
vested solely in them by the Wisconsin Constitution, however.  
Universal Processing Servs. v. Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee Cnty., 2017 
WI 26, ¶36, 374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267.  Nor is there 
anything in the permissive language of this statute enabling 
this court to force parties to utilize such factfinding 
procedures now after the fact.  If the parties now have issues 
or complaints with the quality of this court's proceedings in 
the Johnson cases, they have only themselves to blame in 
                                                 
66 Wis. Stat. § 751.09. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
63 
 
foregoing the routine factfinding process.  The opportunity to 
address contiguity was in Johnson or via a possible motion for 
reconsideration.  
At any measure, this court is not a 
factfinding tribunal.  The parties have decided to bring this 
case 
as 
an 
original 
action 
and 
forego 
the 
traditional 
factfinding processes.  So, it is this court's loss that we do 
not have a record before us to otherwise help inform on our 
decision.  
¶155 Finally, 
the 
fifth 
factor 
counsels 
against 
relitigation.  Redistricting is a process that, under our state 
constitution, is only supposed to occur once every decade.  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 3 ("At its first session after each 
enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the 
legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the 
senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants.").  
"It is now settled that without a constitutional change 
permitting it no more than one legislative apportionment between 
two federal [censuses]."  State ex rel. Smith v. Zimmerman, 266 
Wis. 307, 312, 63 N.W.2d 52 (1954).  "No doubt, one of the 
objections of the constitutional provision was to prevent 
juggling with apportionments."  State ex rel. Hicks v. Stevens, 
112 Wis. 170, 180, 88 N.W. 48 (1901).  Reopening these 
previously resolved issues wreaks havoc on judicial finality and 
distorts our constitutional policy of ensuring that settled 
legislative and congressional maps remain that way.  Issue 
preclusion effectively bars the Governor and the Citizen 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
64 
 
Mathematicians and Scientists from undermining these settled 
principles.  
¶156 This original action involves the same maps, the same 
redistricting processes, many of the same parties, and already-
addressed claims.  This court reviewed the proposed maps for 
compliance with federal and state constitutional law, as well as 
compliance with this court's limited judicial role (least 
change), ultimately selecting the Legislature's maps on those 
grounds.  Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶¶60-73.  Now, after the 
litigation cycle has run its course, these parties, the Governor 
and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists, are dissatisfied 
with the outcome and want to make claims and raise issues which 
we have already decided and are now precluded.  Issue preclusion 
effectively bars their attempt to do so.  While the outcome may 
not have been what these parties wanted, they must nonetheless 
live with the court's decision.  
¶157 As a side note, the parties attempted to backdoor 
considerations 
of 
"partisan 
fairness" 
or 
"partisan 
gerrymandering" back into the court's analysis by way of at 
least initially confining it to the remedy phase.  The majority 
continues that ill-fated venture of taking up an issue that both 
this court and the United States Supreme Court have determined 
is non-justiciable,67 by attempting to wrap it up in the perhaps 
more pleasant euphemism of "partisan impact," which the majority 
"will consider. . . . when evaluating remedial maps."  Majority. 
                                                 
67 See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623; Rucho v. Common Cause, 
588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
65 
 
op., ¶69.  Never mind figuring out how exactly the majority 
plans to go about evaluating "partisan impact" or determining 
how much "partisan impact" is permissible and how much is too 
much.  They provide no measurable standard for calculating it.  
Apparently then, it is for them to know, and for us to find out!  
"The fact that the majority imposes its own unique and undefined 
standard further demonstrates that it exercises its will rather 
than its judgment."  Hawkins v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2020 WI 
75, 
¶49, 
393 
Wis. 2d 629, 
948 
N.W.2d 877 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
dissenting).   
¶158 Why backdoor an issue that they did not think merited 
full consideration as they refused to take it up in the petition 
for original action?  Perhaps because in going about it this 
way, members of the majority hope to evade appellate review.  
Perhaps because with this issue, members of the majority are 
more wary of stare decisis.  The majority knows that this court 
has already directly addressed the issue at length.  We already 
considered and settled the issue of partisan gerrymandering as 
related 
to 
these 
maps, 
determining 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution has nothing to say about partisan gerrymandering or 
partisan fairness, and therefore it is not a justiciable legal 
claim which this court can resolve.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623.  
This court, in line with the United States Supreme Court, 
determined 
previously 
that 
"[t]he 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
contains 'no plausible grant of authority' to the judiciary to 
determine whether maps are fair to the major parties . . . ."  
Id., ¶52 (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507).  Finally, this 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
66 
 
court recognized that nothing in the law authorizes this court 
to grant parties relief based on whether a particular map 
achieves proportional partisan representation.  Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶45 ("The people have never consented to the 
Wisconsin judiciary deciding what constitutes a 'fair' partisan 
divide.").  So, if this court were to get involved in this 
discussion, it would violate the separation of powers principle 
these parties are concerned with by "encroach[ing] on the 
constitutional prerogative of the political branches."  Id.  
¶159 As explained above, Johnson I thoroughly examined the 
question of whether the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits the 
legislature from engaging in partisan gerrymandering.  Id., 
¶¶39–63.  We explained that partisan fairness is a political 
question constitutionally assigned to the legislature, and that 
no provision of our state constitution forbids the legislature 
from gerrymandering to produce a partisan advantage.  Id.  
Again, this court is not a political body empowered to resolve 
political disputes: it is a judicial body empowered to resolve 
legal disputes.  Wis. Justice Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶¶68-
69 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  It is inevitable 
that a partisan body, such as the legislature, would reach a 
result that is in some measure, partisan.  See Whitford v. Gill, 
218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 939 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., 
dissenting) ("[P]artisan intent is not illegal, but is simply 
the consequence of assigning the task of redistricting to the 
political branches of government.") rev'd sub nom., Whitford v. 
Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
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¶160 The majority's reliance on foreign case law fares no 
better in propping up their attempt to relitigate partisan 
fairness outside of the pesky limitations of "least change." 
Foreign cases are not binding on this court.  Additionally, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded in Rucho that "judicial 
review of partisan gerrymandering does not meet th[e] basic 
requirements" 
that 
judicial 
action 
"must 
be 
governed 
by 
standard, by rule," and must be "'principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions' found in the Constitution or 
laws" so partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable.  
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.  The parties rush right past the 
clear directive in Rucho and fail to cite to or even address its 
influence over the various federal cases they cite.   
¶161 This court must not allow a non-justiciable, political 
question like partisan fairness to be camouflaged into the 
majority's decision.  The majority declines to put forward a 
measurable standard by which this court is supposed to define or 
determine 
"partisan 
impact," 
demonstrating 
that 
they 
"exercise[]. . . . [their] will rather than [their] judgment."  
Hawkins, 393 Wis. 2d 629, ¶49 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  Their 
standard-deficient 
approach 
evokes 
recollections 
of 
the 
"eyeballing" tests from bygone legal eras encapsulated in "we'll 
know it when we see it" terminology.68  This court has already 
                                                 
68 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, 
J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it. . . .").  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
68 
 
addressed the issues of partisan gerrymandering and political 
fairness, as well as contiguity.  Issue preclusion bars us now 
from allowing these relevant parties to relitigate what has 
already been litigated. 
E.  Claim Preclusion 
¶162 The Governor and the Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists raise an issue which was decided in Johnson——
contiguity——and raised an issue which was not decided in Johnson 
——separation of powers.  Regardless, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion bars both claims from being brought now.  See Dostal, 
405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24 ("[C]laim preclusion . . . extends to all 
claims that either were or could have been asserted in the 
previous litigation.").   
Three elements must be present for an earlier action 
to bar a subsequent action:  "(1) an identity between 
the parties or their privies in the prior and present 
suits; (2) an identity between the causes of action in 
the two suits; and, (3) a final judgment on the merits 
in a court of competent jurisdiction."   
Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Thompson, 2018 WI 57, ¶31, 381 
Wis. 2d 609, 912 N.W.2d 364 (quoting N. State Power Co., 189 
Wis. 2d at 551).  "A final judgment is conclusive in all 
subsequent actions between the same parties [or their privies] 
as to all matters which were litigated or which might have been 
litigated in the former proceedings."  Lindas v. Cady, 183 
Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994) (quoting Depratt v. West 
Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 
(1983)). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
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¶163 The first element of claim preclusion is easily met.  
Both the Governor and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists 
were parties to the initial Johnson litigation.   
¶164 In order to satisfy the remaining second element 
necessary for claim preclusion to apply, Wisconsin has adopted a 
"transactional 
approach" 
from 
the 
Second 
Restatement 
of 
Judgments to inform when there is an "identity between the 
causes of action in the two suits."  N. States Power Co., 189 
Wis. 2d at 551, 553-55; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24 (1982).  Simply, "if both suits arise from the 
same 
transaction, 
incident, 
or 
factual 
situation, 
[claim 
preclusion] generally will bar the second suit."  N. States 
Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 554.  "The concept of a transaction 
connotes a common nucleus of operative facts."  Kruckenberg, 279 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶26.  "It is irrelevant that 'the legal theories, 
remedies sought, and evidence used may be different between the 
first and second actions.'"  Menard v. Liteway Lighting Prods., 
2005 WI 98, ¶32, 282 Wis. 2d 582, 698 N.W.2d 738; see also N. 
States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 555 ("[T]he number of 
substantive theories that may be available to the plaintiff is 
immaterial——if 
they 
all 
arise 
from 
the 
same 
factual 
underpinnings.").  To determine whether claims arise from one 
transaction, the court "consider[s] whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation."  Menard, 282 
Wis. 2d 582, ¶30 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 
cmt. B (1982)). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
70 
 
¶165 The majority contends that these causes of action are 
"fundamentally different."  Majority op., ¶48.  In this current 
case, there is far more than a "common nucleus of operative 
facts," Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶26, connecting the prior 
and current actions, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
the second element of claim preclusion.  We have the Governor 
and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists, which are 
identical to the parties from our Johnson litigation.  These 
parties brought claims and advanced legal theories "arising from 
the same transaction and factual situations" as those this court 
already addressed in Johnson I and Johnson III.  These parties' 
claims are based on the same maps, which are rooted in the same 
"factual situations" previously addressed by this court.  The 
causes of action are related in time, as this most recent 
petition was filed a little over a year after this court 
concluded this line of litigation involving these legislative 
maps in Johnson III, and less than two years since this court 
initiated 
this 
line 
of 
litigation 
in 
Johnson 
I. 
 
The 
motivations, declaring the current maps unconstitutional on 
various grounds, remains the same.  While the remedies sought 
and some of the legal theories advanced in the subsequent action 
differ from those of the prior action, that discrepancy is 
immaterial 
as 
"they 
all 
arise 
from 
the 
same 
factual 
underpinnings":  this court's adoption of the Legislature's 
redistricting maps.  N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 555.  
The 
common 
thread 
running 
through 
this 
line 
of 
Johnson 
litigation connects them all to this "common nucleus of 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
71 
 
operative facts."  The second element of claim preclusion is 
satisfied. 
¶166 The doctrine of "claim preclusion . . . extends to all 
claims that either were or could have been asserted in the 
previous litigation."  See Dostal, 405 Wis. 2d 572, ¶24.  
Contiguity was already raised, addressed, and decided on 
previously by a court of competent jurisdiction:  this court.  
See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623; Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198.  
Claim 
preclusion 
forbids 
the 
Governor 
and 
the 
Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists from relitigating the question of 
contiguity.  Additionally, though they were free to do so, these 
parties failed to present their additional separation of powers 
claim or advance their additional legal theories in our prior 
Johnson litigation cycle.  Following this court's decision in 
Johnson III, claims which could have been, but for whatever 
reason were not raised (separation of powers) are now barred, as 
this court's final judgement "is conclusive in all subsequent 
actions between the same parties as to all matters which were 
litigated or which might have been litigated in the former 
proceedings."  Lindas, 183 Wis. 2d at 558 (quoting Depratt, 113 
Wis. 2d at 310).  While claim preclusion bars this separation of 
powers argument from being brought now, this argument seemed 
destined to be relegated to an honorable mention in a footnote 
anyway; perhaps the result of an over-eager party grasping at 
baseless straws emanating from a disgruntled dissenter to this 
court's decision in Johnson III.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
72 
 
¶167 If the majority's logic holds true, and contiguity was 
not properly raised and actually litigated, then there is 
nothing stopping any party from waiting this litigation round 
out and in similar fashion, waiting until next year and 
litigating other issues or points which the court did not 
address here.  Could parties raise the remaining issues which 
the majority declined to take up in the Clarke petition for 
original action,69 since they have not been fully litigated 
either?  What about those similarly raised in Wright which this 
court declined to take up?  The resulting application of the 
majority's logic should be enough to condemn it. 
F.  Laches 
¶168 Where were these parties throughout the 
Johnson 
redistricting litigation? 
Just over two years ago in Johnson, 
under a different court composition, we liberally and freely 
"granted intervention to all parties that sought it."  Johnson 
II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.  Nothing prevented any of the previous 
or new parties to this case from presenting their claims, along 
with everyone else, when it was appropriate to do so in Johnson.  
Some of these parties, like the Clarke petitioners, for whatever 
reason, chose not to accept the open invitation to participate 
                                                 
69 The three remaining issues which the court declined to 
take up all center around whether the state legislative 
redistricting plans proposed by the legislature and judicially 
imposed by this court in Johnson III are "extreme partisan 
gerrymanders" 
implicating 
various 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
provisions and protections.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
73 
 
at the time this court addressed these issues in Johnson.70    
While we should tackle issues that remain to be decided and not 
abdicate our responsibility, we should not relitigate issues 
that were just decided.  The fact that these parties chose not 
to participate, or at best made no effort to do so, should not 
necessitate the court to now reward that unexplainable dilatory 
behavior and encourage litigants to play the same "wait and see" 
game.  
¶169 "Laches is founded on the notion that equity aids the 
vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights to the 
detriment of the opposing party . . . ."  State ex rel. Wren v. 
Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶14, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587; 
see also Town of Paris, 148 Wis. 2d at 188 ("[E]quity aids the 
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights."); 27A Am. Jur. 
2d Equity § 108 (2023).  At its core, laches is "an equitable 
defense designed to bar relief when a claimant's failure to 
promptly bring a claim causes prejudice to the party having to 
defend against that claim."  Wis. Small Business United, Inc. v. 
Brennan, 2020 WI 69, ¶11, 393 Wis. 2d 308, 946 N.W.2d 101.  
Courts may apply laches where (1) a party unreasonably delays in 
bringing a claim; (2) a second party lacks knowledge that the 
first party would raise that claim; and (3) the second party is 
prejudiced by that delay.  Id., ¶12.  Laches, as an equitable 
                                                 
70 The Clarke petitioners were not parties in the Johnson 
litigation.  However, many of the same law firms and lawyers who 
represented parties previously in the Johnson litigation are now 
continuing their redistricting litigation fight through new 
representation of the Clarke petitioners, including Law Forward, 
Inc.; Stafford Rosenbaum LLP; and the Campaign Legal Center.    
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
74 
 
bar, is "designed to bar relief when a claimant's failure to 
promptly bring a claim causes prejudice to the party having to 
defend against that claim."  Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Midelfort, 
227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999)).   
¶170 This court had a different composition two years ago, 
but that fact alone cannot be why these parties chose not to 
actively participate in that litigation at that time.  To the 
dispassionate observer, such contortions of the law appear 
questionable and should come with consequences.  Surprisingly, 
the parties are forthright enough to tell us themselves that 
this is in fact their reason for bringing this claim now——after 
waiting two years in alleged ongoing state of harm——to ensure 
that this case coincided with the changed composition of the 
court.71  It defies reason for parties to sit out litigation, 
obtain the benefit of seeing how arguments are presented, and 
then with that benefit of hindsight, bring their now modified 
claims over the same issues, with the same legal representation, 
at their leisure, years later.  It further defies reason that 
given those same facts, and the fact that the respondents would 
not have had knowledge of the parties bringing new claims over 
the same maps a year later, that the parties can now demand that 
                                                 
71 Steve 
Schuster, 
Lawsuit 
to 
challenge 
Wisconsin's 
legislative maps to be filed, Wis. Law Journal (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2023/04/06/lawsuit-to-challenge-
wisconsins-legislative-maps-to-be-filed/ ("A Madison-based law 
firm 
is 
planning 
to 
challenge 
the 
state's 
gerrymandered 
legislative maps . . . . The lawsuit will be filed after 
Justice-elect Janet Protasiewicz is sworn in on Aug. 1, Nicole 
Safar, 
executive 
director 
of 
Madison-based 
Law 
Forward, 
said . . . ."). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
75 
 
this court provide them an extraordinary remedy (overturning 
decades 
of 
precedent 
and 
the 
votes 
of 
millions 
of 
Wisconsinites), and do so in a constrained timeframe of mere 
months before another round of elections gets underway.  Such 
unnecessary fast tracking due to the parties' own inexplicable 
delay may rightfully raise questions of intrusion on the 
opposing party's rights to fully litigate the claims presented. 
¶171 There was unreasonable delay and prejudice here 
because "unreasonable delay in laches is based not on what 
litigants know, but what they might have known with the exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence." 
 
Wren, 
389 
Wis. 2d 516, 
¶20.  
Additionally, "[w]hat amounts to prejudice . . . depends upon 
the facts and circumstances of each case, but it is generally 
held to be anything that places the party in a less favorable 
position."  Id., ¶32.  Respondents could not have known that 
parties which brought claims in Johnson would bring claims again 
after the result did not go their way:  nor could the 
respondents 
have 
known 
that 
parties 
which 
could 
have 
participated in Johnson but chose not to, would bring modified 
claims after the fact.  Rather, respondents as well as millions 
of Wisconsinites relied on the court's judicially imposed maps 
to conduct the 2022 elections.   
¶172 If ever a case was foreclosed by laches, this is that 
case.  A laches analysis essentially asks, "whether a party 
delayed without good reason," and then beyond that, whether that 
party's delay "prejudiced the party seeking to defend against 
that claim."  Brennan, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶11; see also Wren, 389 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
76 
 
Wis. 2d 516, ¶14.  When correctly applied, laches forbids the 
court from addressing issues the court has already decided.  
This present case is unlike our prior election-related cases 
where laches was at issue, because in those cases, the court 
shirked its responsibility to consider and address live issues 
the court had not already decided, but were issues that would 
recur and be left uncertain for future elections.72  See Trump v. 
Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶107, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d  568 
(Ziegler, J., dissenting) ("Once again, in an all too familiar 
pattern, 
four 
members 
of 
this 
court 
abdicate 
their 
responsibility to [declare what the law is]."); Hawkins, 393 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶32 (Ziegler, J., dissenting); Trump v. Evers, No. 
2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 3. 2020); Wis. 
Voters Alliance v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2020AP1930-OA, 
unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 4, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., 
dissenting).  Choosing rather to kick the can down the road to 
some indeterminate time in the unknown future for anyone but 
                                                 
72 The majority misrepresents what happened in Trump v. 
Biden, focusing on the remedy rather than the issues.  Majority 
op., ¶43 n.20.  Trump v. Biden was not singularly about a 
requested remedy, of this court "overturn[ing] the results of 
[an] election."  Id.  Rather, Trump v. Biden posed four 
election-related issues which, absent this court declaring what 
the law is, would be left uncertain for future elections; 
namely, "[a]bsentee ballots lacking a separate application; 
absentee envelopes that are missing or have a defective witness 
address; 
indefinitely 
confined 
voters/faulty 
advice 
from 
election officials; and ballots cast at Madison's Democracy in 
the Park/ballot drop boxes."  Trump v. Biden, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 
¶114 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). To say that the Trump v. Biden 
case was limited to a decision regarding one remedy lacks an 
understanding about the many issues that were ripe for legal 
analysis and should have been decided regardless of the 
requested remedy.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
77 
 
that current court majority to have to deal with, is not a 
proper application of laches.  Here though, we have already 
decided 
the 
case 
and 
its 
issues 
throughout 
the 
Johnson 
litigation.  This is not a live, undecided issue.  There is no 
constitutional crisis whereby absent a court decision there are 
no existing maps.   
¶173 The parties present no compelling reason why they 
should have been allowed to "sit on their hands" and prejudice 
the opposing party in not bringing their claims at the time that 
the door to such claims was open.  The majority echoes the 
questionable assertions of counsel at oral argument, that they 
could not participate in Johnson because they "ran out of time" 
to do so.  Majority op., ¶42.  Surely, both counsel and the 
majority are familiar with the existence of varied deadlines 
which constrain parties' actions and reactions throughout a 
litigation cycle.  Additionally, the majority appears to make 
the mistake of starting to toll the laches clock at the 
conclusion of Johnson III, instead of where it properly should 
start:  at Johnson I, when this court invited parties to 
participate and granted intervention to those who sought it.  
Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶6.  These contortions around laches 
to reach a pre-determined outcome make a mockery of our legal 
system and prejudice the opposing party who relies on the 
finality of this court's decision.  This court should not reward 
such behavior.  Laches applies, and laches bars these untimely 
claims. 
G.  Due Process 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
78 
 
¶174 Not only has the majority ignored procedural and legal 
principles which would bar consideration of this case, but it 
hides from the law concerning due process,73 contributing a mere 
two sentences to the important issue.  They relegate litigants' 
fundamental due process rights to hopeful inconspicuousness in a 
footnote.74  What's the rush?  Why hide from the issue? 
¶175 The foundational legal principle that "no [wo]man can 
be a judge in [her] own case" is essential to maintaining a 
fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.  Williams v. 
Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8—9 (2016).  An independent judiciary 
protects "[t]he Constitution and the rights of individuals from 
the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing 
men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes 
disseminate among the people themselves."  The Federalist No. 
78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
It instills public confidence in the fairness of the judicial 
process and system, and in the judiciary's role "as apolitical 
and neutral arbiters of the law."  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶72.  In contrast, it is the legislature's duty to write the 
law, and "until the legislature changes the law it is [the 
court's] duty to construe the law as we find it."  Fredricks v. 
                                                 
73 The United States Constitution provides that no state may 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
74 "Respondents also make a brief argument that adjudicating 
this case in Petitioners' favor will violate Respondents' due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  These arguments are underdeveloped, and as 
such, we do not address them."  Majority op., ¶37 n.16. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
79 
 
Kohler Co., 4 Wis. 2d 519, 525-26, 91 N.W.2d 93 (1958); see also 
State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis. 278, 288, 2 N.W. 439 (1879) ("It is 
our duty to expound and execute the law as we find it . . . .").  
These principles are not only fundamental to our governmental 
system, but they protect a litigant's constitutional right to 
due process of law.  This right to due process includes the 
right to have one's day in court and to have one's case heard by 
a neutral arbiter, as "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process."  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136 (1955).  "The operation of the due process clause in 
the realm of judicial impartiality, then, is primarily to 
protect the individual's right to a fair trial."  People v. 
Freeman, 222 P.3d 177, 181 (Cal. 2010).  A justice violates 
litigants' constitutional rights to due process if there is 
"objective proof of actual bias" or "a serious risk of actual 
bias."  State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶113, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 
867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (citing Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-84 (2009)). 
¶176 In Caperton, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that a justice was disqualified from hearing an appeal because 
his sitting as a judicial officer on the case violated 
litigants' due process rights.  In a very fact-specific 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court 
because a recently elected justice failed to recuse himself when 
the justice had an "unconstitutional potential for bias."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.  A future litigant had spent 
significant funds ensuring the judge's election, including the 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
80 
 
statutory minimum $1,000 to his campaign committee, another 
nearly $2.5 million to a political organization supporting the 
candidate, and another over $500,000 on independent expenditures 
to support the candidate.  Id. at 873.  This future potential 
litigant's $3 million contribution was "more than the total 
amount spent by all other [] supporters and three times the 
amount spent by [the candidate's] own committee.  Id.  The 
contributor had a case that would most certainly be heard by the 
newly elected justice.  In other words, that contributor made 
sure that candidate would decide his case.  The Court concluded 
that his sitting on a case that would come to him shortly after 
his election, was a due process violation because "under a 
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee 
of due process is to be adequately implemented.'"  Id. at 883-84 
(quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).   
¶177 The crux of Caperton is that a due process violation 
occurs when a party who would like that judicial officer to hear 
their case, essentially picks that judicial officer to hear 
their case, by funding that judge's election, and knowing that 
the newly minted judge will surely sit in judgment of that 
interested party's case in the near future.  "Approximately 11 
months after [the judge] won the election, and shortly before 
A.T. Massey filed its petition for appeal, Caperton moved to 
disqualify [the judge] in the particular case that was pending 
the entire election . . . ."  Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
81 
 
¶70, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  
The judge denied the motion nearly six months later, eight 
months before the appeal was filed.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874.  
Based on the relative size of [the] contribution in 
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to 
the campaign; the total amount spent in the election; 
the apparent effect such contribution had on the 
outcome of the election; and the temporal relationship 
between the contribution, the election, and the 
pendency of the case, the Supreme Court concluded 
there was a serious, objective risk of the [the 
justice]'s actual bias in sitting on that particular 
case . . . . 
State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶268, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 
N.W.2d 863 (per curiam) (Ziegler, J., concurring).  The facts of 
Caperton were so extreme75 that the Supreme Court found that "due 
process require[d] recusal" as "the probability of actual bias 
[rose] to an unconstitutional level."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
872, 887.   
¶178 Reviewing the facts of Caperton versus the facts of 
Clarke, it is clear that due process deserves more than a two-
sentence consideration.  In Caperton, the interested party knew 
that whoever "won the[] election would most certainly be on the 
court when it decided whether to sustain or overturn" the 
court's verdict against him but that case did not arise for 11 
months.  Miller v. Carroll, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶70 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872).  With Clarke, 
                                                 
75 "Caperton involved extreme and extraordinary facts which 
the Supreme Court recognized in its majority opinion no less 
than a dozen times."  State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶128, 364 
Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (citing 
State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶261, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 
863 (per curiam) (Ziegler, J., concurring)). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
82 
 
the interested parties filed this case directly with the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court just after its candidate was sworn in.  
With Caperton, the interested party knew the state's highest 
court would consider his pending case on appeal, so he supported 
the candidate he wanted to have sit in judgment of his case.  
With Clarke, the interested parties supported their candidate so 
she would be sitting on their future redistricting case.  In 
Caperton, the interested party donated or spent $3 million to 
help elect his candidate of choice.  In Clarke, the interested 
parties donated at least $10 million, in a record-breaking 
election, to elect their judge who spoke freely of her thoughts 
on 
redistricting.76 
 
In 
Caperton, 
the 
interested 
party's 
"outsized" donation was "more than the total amount spent by all 
other[] supporters and three times the amount spent by the [the 
candidate's] own committee."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.  With 
Clarke, 
nearly 
$60 
million 
was 
spent,77 
ranking 
Justice 
Protasiewicz's campaign as the most expensive judicial campaign 
                                                 
76 WisPolitics tracks $56 million in spending on Wisconsin 
Supreme Court race (July 19, 2023), https://www.wispolitics.com/ 
2023/wispolitics-tracks-56-million-in-spending-on-wisconsin-
supreme-court-race/; see also Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost 
Record $51 Million, Wis. Democracy Campaign (Mar. 29, 2023), 
https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/139-press-release-
2023/7351-protasiewicz-received-2-of-every-3-from-democratic-
party. 
77 Id., https://www.wispolitics.com/2023/wispolitics-tracks-
56-million-in-spending-on-wisconsin-supreme-court-race/. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
83 
 
in United States history.78  In Caperton, the interested parties' 
chosen judicial candidate won with 53.3% of the vote.79  In 
Clarke, the interested parties' chosen judicial candidate won 
with 55.5% of the vote.80  In Caperton, the petitioner moved to 
disqualify the recently elected justice before bringing his 
appeal, but the newly elected judge denied the motion to recuse 
six months later.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874-75.  With Clarke, 
members of the Wisconsin Legislature filed a recusal motion 
against Justice Protasiewicz, but she, also a recently elected 
justice, denied their recusal motion.  Clarke v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2023 WI 66, ¶5, 409 Wis. 2d 249, 995 N.W.2d 735.  
¶179 The 
parties 
interested 
in 
Justice 
Protasiewicz's 
election are intricately involved with, and beneficiaries of, 
the case they filed directly before her in this original action 
right after she was sworn in.  Their timing of selecting her as 
                                                 
78 This campaign's spending is five times higher than the 
previous state record ($10 million for the 2020 Wisconsin 
Supreme Court race) and more than three times higher than the 
national record spent on a judicial race ($15 million on a 2004 
Illinois race).  See Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost Record 
$51 
Million, 
Wis. 
Democracy 
Campaign 
(July 
18, 
2023), 
https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/139-press-release-
2023/7390-wisconsin-supreme-court-race-cost-record-51m. 
79 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 
(2009). 
80 Liberal 
judge 
Janet 
Protasiewicz 
won 
a 
seat 
on 
Wisconsin's state Supreme Court, flipping the body's ideological 
majority, 
Politico 
(last 
updated 
Nov. 
26, 
2023), 
https://www.politico.com/2023-election/results/wisconsin/ 
supreme-court/ 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
84 
 
their judge and then bringing this petition is irrefutable.81  
Now, the four members of the court have fast-tracked this 
litigation, bypassing and rushing the traditional court steps, 
processes, and the law. 
¶180 To 
be 
clear, 
Justice 
Protasiewicz 
was 
not 
shy 
expressing her personal viewpoint during her campaign.  For 
example, at a candidate forum hosted by WisPolitics, then-
candidate Protasiewicz indicated that she entered the race 
because she "could not sit back and watch extreme right-wing 
partisans hijack our Supreme Court" and remarked, "let's be 
clear here, the maps are rigged . . . bottom line, absolutely, 
positively rigged.  They do not reflect the people of this 
state."82  Then-candidate Protasiewicz went on to criticize this 
court's "least change approach" to redistricting, saying that it 
"might sound good for some people, [but] I see no basis for it 
in the constitution, no basis in case law.  Basically, what the 
                                                 
81 Steve 
Schuster, 
Lawsuit 
to 
challenge 
Wisconsin's 
legislative maps to be filed, Wis. Law Journal (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2023/04/06/lawsuit-to-challenge-
wisconsins-legislative-maps-to-be-filed/ ("A Madison-based law 
firm 
is 
planning 
to 
challenge 
the 
state's 
gerrymandered 
legislative maps . . . . The lawsuit will be filed after 
Justice-elect Janet Protasiewicz is sworn in on Aug. 1, Nicole 
Safar, 
executive 
director 
of 
Madison-based 
Law 
Forward, 
said . . . ."); see also Jack Kelly, Liberal law firm to argue 
gerrymandering violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times 
(Apr. 6, 2023), https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-
law-firm-to-arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin-
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html. 
82 Paul Fanlund, Supreme Court election is a chance to beat 
the far right at its long game, The Cap Times (Jan. 13, 2023), 
https://captimes.com/opinion/paul-fanlund/opinion-supreme-court-
election-is-a-chance-to-beat-the-far-right-at-its-
long/article_af9b5d76-a584-54ad-9226-7c9d7a806d12.html. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
85 
 
least-change approach has done, it has taken . . . meaningful 
votes away from people in larger communities in Dane County and 
Milwaukee 
County."83 
 
From 
the 
outset, 
then-candidate 
Protasiewicz indicated what she, as a presumed future member of 
the court, would do:   remove least change as an "unworkable" 
governing standard in order to clear the way for the newly 
constituted court to redraw the maps.  Even more directly, then-
candidate 
Protasiewicz 
celebrated 
via 
her 
Facebook 
page, 
Politico's highlighting of the Wisconsin Supreme Court race, 
exclaiming "POLITICO says that our race could challenge the 
court's narrow 4-3 conservative majority and have ramifications 
over future redistricting decisions in Wisconsin.  Judge Janet 
Protasiewicz (@Janet for Justice) Facebook, (Jan. 9, 2023) 
(emphasis added) https://www.facebook.com/JanetforJustice.  Her 
colleague, 
Justice 
Rebecca 
Dallet, 
campaigned 
invoking 
tremendous out-of-state support, and when at a Democratic-hosted 
California fundraiser she said, "I know that [California] values 
are our Wisconsin values that we've lost along the way."84  
Justice Protasiewicz, also having received much out-of-state 
support, has remarked, "I would anticipate that at some point, 
we'll be looking at those maps" and that she "would anticipate 
that [she] would enjoy taking a fresh look at the gerrymandering 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Patrick Marley, Court candidate Rebecca Dallet rells San 
Francisco 
crowd 
"your 
values 
are 
our 
Wisconsin 
values," 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
(Mar. 
21, 
2018), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/21/court-
candidate-rebecca-dallet-tells-san-francisco-crowd-your-values-
our-wisconsin-values/445869002/. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
86 
 
question."85  The parties even said that this case would be filed 
once the new justice was sworn in.  And it was.86  
¶181 A person, including a justice, has the right to free 
speech 
as 
protected 
under 
both 
our 
federal 
and 
state 
                                                 
85 Jessie Opoien and Jack Kelly, Protasiewicz would "enjoy 
taking a fresh look" at Wisconsin voting Maps, The Cap Times 
(Mar. 
2, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/ 
protasiewicz-would-enjoy-taking-a-fresh-look-at-wisconsin-
voting-maps/article_d07fbe12-79e6-5c78-a702-3de7b444b332.html. 
86 While then-candidate Protasiewicz did then say, "I can't 
ever tell you what I am going to do on a particular case, but I 
can tell you my values and common sense tells that it's wrong," 
can you un-ring the bell?  Id. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
87 
 
constitutions.87  But, that free speech may affect whether that 
justice may sit on a case.88   
¶182 Due Process does not reward the petitioners' "judge 
shopping," as "'[j]udge shopping' has always been taboo."  
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶262 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  "In 
Caperton, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that basic tenet when it 
concluded that a litigant's efforts to "choose[] the judge," 
through directing a justice's election campaign and thus placing 
that justice on that contributing party's pending case did not 
pass 
constitutional 
muster." 
 
Id., 
¶262 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
                                                 
87 U.S. 
Const. 
amend. 
I 
("Congress 
shall 
make 
no 
law. . . . abridging the freedom of speech."); Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 3 ("Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge 
the liberty of speech or of the press.") 
88 The Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that a 
restriction on an announcement by a candidate for judicial 
office of his or her views on disputed legal and political 
issues during a campaign violates the First Amendment), is not 
incompatible with the Court's decision in Caperton.  Put 
together, these cases address issues that while complementary, 
are yet distinct.  In White, the Court was more concerned with 
the First Amendment claims and concerns of the judicial 
candidate.  In Caperton, the Court was more concerned with the 
due process claims and concerns of the litigant.  Neither 
invalidates the other; rather, when contextually read together, 
both cases shed some light on the careful balancing act that 
courts are routinely engaged in.  In the case before us, we must 
conduct the unenviable yet necessary act of balancing a judicial 
candidate's right to freedom of speech against a claimant's 
fundamental right to due process and having his or her claim 
heard before a neutral arbiter.  The constitutional right to 
speak freely is not without its limits. It must yield to 
Wisconsin claimants' constitutional rights to due process before 
an impartial tribunal.    
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
88 
 
concurring) 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Judges 
with 
an 
"unconstitutional potential for bias" are required to recuse 
themselves to preserve litigants' due process rights.  Caperton, 
556 U.S. at 881.  Even before Caperton, "if a justice should 
have 
been 
disqualified 
from 
considering 
the 
case 
and 
nevertheless participates, the decision is void."  State v. 
Henley, 2011 WI 67, ¶45 n.5, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
and 
Crooks, 
JJ., 
dissenting) (citing State v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, 
Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 179, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989)); see also 
Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.  That determination is even clearer 
post-Caperton.   
¶183 We don't know whether Caperton will be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.  But if not, it seems a new bar has been set.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶184 This original action should never have been accepted.  
It is nothing more than a motion for reconsideration, which is 
time-barred; ignores stare decisis, standing, judicial estoppel, 
issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and laches.   Not only is 
this a fundamentally legally flawed proceeding for these 
preceding listed reasons, but it also raises serious questions 
regarding Caperton and whether this proceeding is a violation of 
litigants' due process rights.  What's next?  Pre-selected 
"consultants" who will decide the fate of Wisconsin voters even 
though the Wisconsin Supreme Court already decided these issues 
conclusively 
in 
the 
Johnson 
litigation? 
 
Will 
these 
"consultants" be endowed with the authority to reach all factual 
No.  2023AP1399-OA.akz 
 
89 
 
and legal conclusions necessary to draw the maps, while evading 
review and the constitutional protections due the parties?  The 
four rogue members of the court have upended judicial practices, 
procedures, and norms, as well as legal practices, procedures, 
and precedent, yielding only to sheer will to create a 
particularized 
outcome 
which 
will 
please 
a 
particular 
constituency.  At a minimum, this is harmful to the judicial 
branch and the institution as a whole.  I dissent.   
 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶185 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Riding a 
Trojan horse named Contiguity, the majority breaches the lines 
of demarcation separating the judiciary from the political 
branches in order to transfer power from one political party to 
another.  Alexander Hamilton forewarned us that "liberty can 
have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have 
everything to fear from its union with either of the other 
departments."  The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (J. Cooke ed., 
1961).  With its first opinion as an openly progressive faction, 
the members of the majority shed their robes, usurp the 
prerogatives of the legislature, and deliver the spoils to their 
preferred political party.  These handmaidens of the Democratic 
Party trample the rule of law, dishonor the institution of the 
judiciary, and undermine democracy. 
¶186 The outcome in this case was preordained with the 
April 2023 election of a candidate who ran on a platform of 
"taking a fresh look"1 at the "rigged" maps.2  As promised just 
                                                 
1 Jessie Opoien & Jack Kelly, Protasiewicz Would 'Enjoy 
Taking a Fresh Look' at Wisconsin Voting Maps, The Cap Times 
(Mar. 
2, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/protasiewicz-would-enjoy-
taking-a-fresh-look-at-wisconsin-voting-maps/article_d07fbe12-
79e6-5c78-a702-3de7b444b332.html. 
2 Corrinne Hess, Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Janet 
Protasiewicz 
Assails 
State's 
Election 
Maps 
as 
'Rigged', 
Milwaukee 
J. 
Sentinel 
(Jan. 
9, 
2023), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/01/09/wisconsi
n-supreme-court-candidate-protasiewicz-assails-election-
maps/69790966007/. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
two days after Protasiewicz's election,3 petitioners filed this 
case only one day after she joined the court.  The majority 
chooses contiguity as a convenient conduit by which to toss the 
legislative maps adopted by this court in 2022 as a remedy for 
malapportionment, but any issue grounded in state law would 
suffice in order to insulate the majority's activism from review 
by the United States Supreme Court.  The majority's machinations 
do not shield it from the Court vindicating the respondents' due 
process rights, however.  See Appendix A.  Litigants are 
constitutionally entitled to have their cases heard by a fair 
and impartial tribunal, an issue of primary importance the 
majority absurdly dismisses as "underdeveloped."  Majority op., 
¶37 n.16.  The parties fully briefed the due process claim, 
which Protasiewicz unilaterally rejected.  Clarke v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 66, 995 N.W.2d 735.  While this court 
is powerless to override her recusal decision,4 the United States 
Supreme Court is not. 
¶187 The majority's treatment of the remaining issue 
sophomorically 
parrots 
the 
petitioners' 
briefing           
and undermines the rule of law.  The Wisconsin Constitution 
requires assembly districts "to consist of contiguous territory" 
                                                 
 
3 Jack Kelly, Liberal Law Firm to Argue Gerrymandering 
Violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-law-firm-to- 
arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin- 
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html.  
 
4 State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 
175 (per curium).  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
and senate districts "of convenient contiguous territory."  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, §§ 4-5.  For fifty years, maps drawn by both 
Republican 
and 
Democratic 
legislative 
majorities 
contained 
districts with detached territory.  State and federal courts 
uniformly declared such districts to be "legally contiguous even 
if the area around the island is part of a different district."  
Johnson 
v. 
Wis. 
Elections 
Comm'n, 
2021 
WI 87, 
¶36, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Johnson I); Prosser v. Elections 
Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992).  Just last year, 
three members of the majority in this very case adopted maps 
containing districts with detached territory.  Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶¶34-36, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 
N.W.2d 402 (Johnson II), rev'd sub nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per curiam).  This well-
established 
legal 
conclusion 
having 
become 
politically 
inconvenient, the same three justices now deem the existence of 
such districts "striking."  Majority op., ¶1.  If this creative 
constitutional "problem" were so glaringly obvious, then the 
attorneys who neglected to raise the issue over the last five 
decades committed malpractice, and the federal and state judges 
who adopted maps with districts containing detached territory 
should resign for incompetency. 
¶188 No one is fooled, however.  The members of the 
majority refashion the law to achieve their political agenda.  
The precedent they set (if anything remains of the principle) 
devastates the rule of law.  The Wisconsin Constitution commands 
redistricting to occur once every ten years.  Wis. Const. art. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
IV, § 3.  Both state and federal courts have always respected 
"the command in the Wisconsin Constitution not to re-district 
more than once each 10 years."  Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't 
Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 859 (E.D. Wis. 2012) 
(citing State ex rel. Smith v. Zimmerman, 266 Wis. 307, 63 
N.W.2d 52 (1954)).   
¶189 The majority's machinations in this case open the door 
to redistricting every time court membership changes.  A supreme 
court election in 2025 could mean Clarke is overturned, Johnson 
is restored, and new maps adopted.  In 2026 or 2027, Johnson 
could be overturned (again), Clarke resurrected, and new maps 
adopted.  This cycle could repeat itself in 2028.  And in 2029.  
And in 2030.   
¶190 Although the majority endorses repeated kicks at the 
redistricting cat, this is not normal in redistricting, or any 
other sort of case.  The majority rewrites history to suggest 
otherwise.  As but one example, the majority claims "Johnson 
itself enjoined the use of a court-ordered plan adopted by the 
federal courts [sic] in Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't 
Accountability Bd., 862 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Wis. 2012)."  
Majority op., ¶54.  The majority disingenuously ignores the fact 
that this court's actions in Johnson occurred ten years after 
Baldus and only after the 2020 census rendered the prior 
decade's maps malapportioned.  See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶4.  After the federal court in Baldus identified a violation of 
federal law——shortly after the legislature enacted the maps——the 
federal court (there was only one) decided it "will not tread 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
into the black water of re-drawing the redistricting boundaries 
itself.  Instead, as discussed above, the Court will allow the 
Legislature to sort out the redistricting maps' infirmities on 
its own."  Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (internal citation 
omitted).    The federal court in Baldus ultimately ordered "that 
the redistricting plans adopted pursuant to Act 43 for all 
Assembly Districts and Senate Districts, with the exception of 
Assembly Districts 8 and 9 to the extent noted above, shall 
remain unchanged."  Baldus 862 F. Supp. 2d at 863.  A "slight 
adjustment" 
to 
two 
assembly 
districts 
hardly 
transforms 
legislatively-enacted plans into court-developed ones as the 
majority misleadingly insinuates.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶4 (citing Baldus, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 863).   
¶191 Upon completion of the 2020 census, the governor vetoed 
the redistricting plans passed by the legislature, so the court 
in Johnson enjoined the 2011 legislative maps that had become 
unconstitutionally malapportioned due to population shifts.  
Political impasse left the judiciary as the only branch able to 
act.  There is absolutely no precedent for a supreme court to 
enjoin its own remedy one year later.  Perhaps if the majority 
focused on studying the law rather than rushing to set its 
political machinations on a ridiculous fast track, it would 
avoid such embarrassing errors. 
¶192 When the people shift political power to a different 
party, they vote for changes in the law.  The constitution 
limits the judicial power, however, to declaring what the law 
is.  The majority elevates its political desires over the 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
structural separation of powers on which the preservation of our 
republic depends.  The majority imperils freedom and opens the 
door to judicial tyranny.  I dissent.5 
I.  JOHNSON I RESOLVED THE CONTIGUITY QUESTION 
¶193 Riddled with non sequiturs, heavy on hypocrisy, and 
laden with law review citations but light on actual law, the 
majority opinion presents a misleading caricature of the court's 
decision in Johnson I, necessitating an overview of what that 
opinion actually says.  Just twenty months ago, this court used 
its 
limited 
remedial 
powers 
to 
reapportion 
Wisconsin's 
legislative districts in order to bring them into compliance 
with the constitutional guarantee of equality in representation.  
See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 19, ¶73, 401 
Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Johnson III).  The inability of the 
legislature and the governor to agree on new legislative maps 
after the 2020 census necessitated the court's involvement in 
redistricting. 
 
Johnson 
I, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶17-18, 
68 
("Judicial 
action 
becomes 
appropriate 
to 
prevent 
a 
constitutional crisis.").  The 2011 legislative maps——enacted by 
                                                 
5 The 
majority 
punts 
on 
the 
petitioners' 
nonsensical 
separation of powers argument, which was inspired by the 
rhetorical bluster of a dissenting justice unhappy with the 
court's decision.  See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 
19, ¶187, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Johnson III) 
(Karofsky, J., dissenting).  While dissents may embellish for 
rhetorical effect, their "silly 
extravagances" 
should not 
migrate into an official court opinion.  See Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 719 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  If 
the separation of powers argument had any legal merit, it is 
inexplicable why the majority doesn't embrace it.  Three-fourths 
of the justices comprising today's majority already did, in 
Johnson III.      
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
the legislature, signed into law by the governor, and upheld by 
a federal court (with a slight adjustment)——had become non-
compliant "with the constitutional requirement of an equal 
number of citizens in each legislative district, due to shifts 
in population across the state."  Id., ¶4.  This court allowed 
every interested party to participate in Johnson, granting every 
motion for intervention.  See Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.   
¶194 Every party in Johnson stipulated before we decided 
Johnson I that the contiguity requirements under Article IV, 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution permit municipal 
islands detached from their assigned districts.  See Joint Stip. 
of Facts and Law, Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2021AP1450, at 15 (Nov. 4, 2021).  We agreed.  Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶36.  So did the dissenters.  See id., ¶¶88-115 
(Dallet, J., dissenting).  Every party——including the Governor——
submitted maps containing municipal islands.  A majority in 
Johnson II,6 selected the Governor's proposed legislative maps, 
municipal islands and all; three justices in this current 
majority blessed those maps as constitutional.7  400 Wis. 2d 626, 
¶36.     
                                                 
 
6 Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶8, 400 Wis. 
2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 (Johnson II), rev'd sub nom. Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per 
curiam).  The United States Supreme Court summarily reversed 
Johnson II because the majority in that case improperly applied 
the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
of 
equal 
protection 
in 
its 
selection of the Governor's maps, which sorted voters based on 
race without constitutionally permissible justification. Wis. 
Legislature, 595 U.S. at 406.  
7 For example, Assembly Districts 3, 5, 26, 46, and 96 in 
the Governor's proposed maps contain detached municipal islands. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶195 The majority in this case misrepresents the Johnson I 
court's holding on contiguity, misleadingly asserting the court 
"failed to analyze the contiguity requirements evident in the 
text of the constitution" and "did not attempt to square its 
view of contiguity with" our past cases, such as State ex rel. 
Lamb v. Cunningham.  Majority op., ¶24.  Quoting Lamb in Johnson 
I, the court acknowledged constitutional contiguity "generally 
means a district 'cannot be made up of two or more pieces of 
detached territory.'"  399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36 (quoting State ex 
rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 148, 53 N.W. 35 (1892)).  
We continued, "[i]f annexation by municipalities creates a 
municipal 'island,' however, the district containing detached 
portions of the municipality is legally contiguous even if the 
area around the island is part of a different district."  Id. 
(citing Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866).  
¶196 After the court decided Johnson I, the Governor, or 
any other petitioner who participated in the case, could have 
filed a motion for reconsideration8 on contiguity, asking the 
court to correct the allegedly flagrant constitutional error 
somehow repeatedly overlooked by countless lawyers, federal 
judges,9 and justices of this court for five decades.10  To no 
                                                 
8 Wis. S. Ct. IOP, IV, J. (Aug. 4, 2023). 
9 In 1992, a panel of three federal judges declared that the 
Wisconsin Constitution did not require "literal contiguity" 
because "it has been the practice of the Wisconsin legislature 
to treat islands as contiguous with the cities or villages to 
which they belong."  Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 
866 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
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one's surprise, they instead waited for the Clarke petitioners 
to file this suit immediately after the makeup of the court 
changed, courtesy of an election bought and paid for by the 
Democratic Party of Wisconsin.11  
¶197 "Legal opinions are important . . . for the reasons 
they give, not the result they announce[.]  . . . An opinion 
that gets the reasons wrong gets everything wrong . . . ."  
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 
33, 33 (1994).  An apt description of the majority opinion.  
Although the majority purports to interpret our constitution, it 
fails to follow our judicial methodology——or any methodology at 
all.  See Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
2023 WI 38, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990 N.W.2d 122 (originalism).  
Unbounded by methodological discipline, the majority opinion is 
devoid of an intellectual foundation and without integrity.   
¶198 The majority misuses dictionaries to declare the 
constitutional contiguity requirements "mean what they say."  
Majority op., ¶3.  Although the words "contiguous territory" 
come from our original constitution of 1848, the majority relies 
most heavily on modern dictionaries, considering contemporaneous 
dictionaries and practices from the founding of the state mere 
"support."  Id., ¶17.  It is elementary that words don't have 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 It appears that at least since the 1970s, Wisconsin's 
legislative maps, whether drawn by the legislature or adopted by 
a court, have contained municipal islands. 
11 See WisPolitics Tracks $56 Million in Spending on 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Race, WisPolitics (July 19, 2023), 
https://www.wispolitics.com/2023/wispolitics-tracks-56-million-
in-spending-on-wisconsin-supreme-court-race/.  
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10 
 
meaning on their own; their meaning comes from the context in 
which they are used.  See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 
(1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916) ("A 
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin 
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used.").  The majority's reliance on modern dictionaries is 
misplaced.   
¶199 The majority resorts to verifiable fibs, maintaining 
that "using practically any dictionary" "contiguous means 
'touching' or 'in actual contact.'"  Majority op., ¶16.  That is 
patently untrue, and the majority knows it.  The respondents 
cited 
a 
litany 
of 
contemporaneous 
dictionaries 
defining 
contiguous to mean "near" or "close" to, but not necessarily 
touching:   
Nathan 
Bailey, 
An 
Universal 
Etymological 
English 
Dictionary (1775) (Contiguous:  "that touches, or is 
next; very near, close, adjoining"); Samuel Johnson & 
John Walker, A Dictionary of the English Language 153 
(1828) (Contiguity:  "Actual contact; nearness of 
situation"; Contiguousness:  "Close connection"); John 
Ogilvie & Charles Annandale, The Imperial Dictionary 
of the English Language 571 (1885) (Contiguity:  
"Actual contact of bodies; a touching; nearness of 
situation or place; a linking together, as a series of 
objects; 
a 
continuity."; 
Contiguous: 
 
"Touching; 
meeting or joining at the surface or border; close 
together; 
neighbouring; 
bordering 
or 
adjoining"); 
Contiguity, Black's Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) ("In 
close proximity; in actual close contact."); James 
A.H. Murray, A New English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles 903 (1893) (Contiguity:  "loosely. Close 
proximity, 
without 
actual 
contact"; 
Contiguous:  
"loosely.  Neighbouring, situated in close proximity 
(though not in contact)"); Robert Hunter & Charles 
Morris, Universal Dictionary of the English Language 
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11 
 
1238 (1897) (Contiguity:  "Ordinary language:  (1) 
Contact with, or (more loosely) immediate proximity 
to, 
nearness 
in 
place"; 
Contiguous: 
 
"Ordinary 
language:  1. Meeting so as to touch; adjoining, 
touching, close together, connected.  . . . 2. Used 
more loosely in the sense of neighbouring, close, 
near.").  
It is intellectually dishonest to pretend these definitions do 
not exist and that the respondents never provided them.  The 
majority also neglects to mention that this court has recognized 
the term "contiguous" is often used to mean near, but not 
necessarily touching.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Douglas Cnty., 145 
Wis. 288, 291, 130 N.W. 246, 248 (1911) ("'Adjacent' is 
sometimes used for touching on or bounded by; but strictly 
speaking it signifies, near to but not touching; contiguous is 
probably sometimes also used in the former sense and sometimes 
and more properly in the latter, while 'adjoining' is really the 
proper term for in contact with, though each of such words is 
occasionally used in a perverted way.  It will be found that 
they have been construed variously by courts according to 
circumstances."); Hennessy v. Douglas Cnty., 99 Wis. 129, 136-
37, 
74 
N.W. 
983 
(1898) 
("'Adjacent' 
signifies, 
in 
this 
connection, 'lying near, close to, or contiguous, but not 
actually touching.'").       
¶200 The majority's misuse of dictionaries betrays a 
profound misunderstanding of how these resources are used in 
legal analysis.  A dictionary is not a talisman that a judge can 
invoke to provide the definitive meaning of a term used in a 
statute or constitution.  It is merely a tool among several a 
judge may use to understand a text's meaning.  Care must be 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
taken for a number of reasons.  Dictionaries "define the core 
meanings of a term" but often omit "the periphery."  Antonin 
Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 418 (2012).  Dictionaries also often omit typical, 
ordinary uses of terms, or list the order of 
possible 
definitions differently and for different reasons.  Ellen P. 
Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme 
Court, 30 Ariz. State L.J. 275, 298 (1998).  Because words often 
have more than one meaning, context matters a great deal.  
Dictionaries cannot tell you what, in context, a word means.  A 
dictionary is merely a "museum of words."  Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 67 (1994).  Accordingly, "a 
comparative weighing of dictionaries is often necessary" when 
they 
are 
employed. 
 
Scalia 
& 
Garner, 
supra, 
at 
417.  
Dictionaries cannot communicate what words mean in a specific 
context.   
¶201 The majority does not seem to recognize the limits of 
dictionaries, or the importance of acknowledging and weighing 
different definitions.  The majority resorts to fabrication with 
its obviously false claim that all dictionaries define the term 
"contiguous" the way the majority prefers.  The remarkable power 
to declare something unconstitutional——and forever remove it 
from democratic decision making——should be exercised carefully 
and with humility.  The majority's drive-by dictionary citations 
exhibit a slipshod analysis.   
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13 
 
¶202 The majority's lack of intellectual foundation is on 
full display with its asymmetrical treatment of cases and 
dictionaries.  For reasons left unexplained, the majority treats 
dictionaries contemporaneous to the constitution's ratification 
as less authoritative than modern dictionaries.  Majority op., 
¶¶16-17.  But the majority treats older cases as more 
authoritative than recent cases.  See id., ¶¶21-23.  The 
majority does not even attempt to square the circle.  This 
inconsistency reveals the majority is not searching for the 
constitution's meaning, but carefully cherry-picking sources to 
feign support for its preferred outcome.   
¶203 True to form, the majority mischaracterizes the 
respondents' contiguity argument.  The majority contends that 
respondents claim "a district with separate, detached territory" 
is contiguous provided it is a municipal island and "the main 
body of the municipality is located elsewhere in the district."  
Id., ¶18.  But the respondents' actual argument on the 
contiguity 
requirement 
doesn't 
resemble 
the 
majority's 
retelling.   
¶204 The respondents argue the term "contiguous territory" 
in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
allows for the use of existing municipal boundaries to form a 
single district.  For example, if town and city boundaries are 
used to form an assembly district, as long as the town and city 
share a border, or are near each other, the "contiguous 
territory" requirement is met, even if the city or town has 
municipal islands.   
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14 
 
¶205 Central 
to 
respondents' 
interpretation, 
the 
term 
"territory" in the phrase "contiguous territory" refers to the 
various government entities (like towns and wards) that are used 
to create an assembly or senate district.  See State ex rel. 
Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 Wis. 2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) (per 
curium) (requiring "individual senate districts [to] consist[ ] 
of contiguous assembly districts").  Under respondents' theory, 
an assembly district contains "detached territory" if, for 
example, it includes a town that does not touch, or is not near, 
any other government entity used to form the assembly district.  
Accordingly, 
respondents 
believe 
their 
interpretation 
is 
consistent with Lamb's statement that an assembly district 
"cannot be made up of two or more pieces of detached territory."  
Lamb, 83 Wis. at 148.  Contrary to the majority's recasting of 
respondents' argument, respondents do not believe that "detached 
territory can still be contiguous——so long as the detached 
territory is a 'municipal island[ ].'"  Majority op., ¶18.  
Respondents reject the idea that municipal islands are "detached 
territory" in the context of the contiguity requirement.   
¶206 Based on its own mischaracterization of respondents' 
argument, the majority 
claims 
the respondents' 
contiguity 
interpretation 
"would 
essentially 
require 
us 
to 
read 
an 
exception 
into 
the 
contiguity 
requirements——that 
district 
territory must be physically touching, except when the territory 
is a detached section of a municipality located in the same 
district."  Id.  And because "the text contains no such 
exception," the court rejects the respondents' argument.  Id., 
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15 
 
¶19.  This is sophistry.  The respondents never even suggested 
the "district['s] territory" must be touching.  Nor did the 
respondents ask the majority to create an exception to the 
constitution's commands.  Instead, the respondents provided an 
interpretation of "contiguous territory" the majority finds too 
difficult to refute.  In response, the majority tilts at 
windmills——pretending the respondents made an argument that is 
easier for the majority to dismiss.  After completing its 
exercise in deception, the majority simply assumes——without any 
analysis whatsoever——that the word "territory" refers to the 
land comprising a district.      
¶207 Glossing over these glaring analytical errors, the 
majority obliges its political benefactor, seizing the exclusive 
constitutional roles of the legislature and the governor in the 
redistricting process, and anointing itself an all-powerful 
committee of four to supplant the political choices of the 
coordinate branches with its subjective notions of what is 
"fair."  Such "accumulation of all powers legislative, executive 
and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, 
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."  The Federalist 
No. 47, supra, at 324 (Madison).  
II.  THE CONSTITUTION CONSTRAINS THIS COURT FROM OVERSTEPPING 
ITS AUTHORITY AND INVADING THE POLITICAL BRANCHES' DOMAIN 
¶208 If the current maps were unconstitutional, the only 
proper exercise of this court's power would be a remedy that 
respects the legislature's and the governor's constitutionally 
prescribed roles in the redistricting process.  If the members 
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16 
 
of the majority were acting as a court rather than a super 
legislature of four, they would modify the maps only to the 
extent necessary to comply with the law.  Specifically, if the 
majority wished to remedy only detached municipal islands, as it 
professes, it would adopt the respondents' proposal and redraw 
only those districts containing detached territory.  The 
majority refuses to do so, with nothing more than a single 
sentence explanation in which the majority says a more modest 
remedy would "cause a ripple effect across other areas of the 
state" so new maps are "necessary."  Majority op., ¶56.  The 
majority offers zero support for this conclusory assertion 
because none exists.  The majority instead dispenses with the 
existing maps in order to confer an advantage on its preferred 
political party with new ones.    
¶209 The 
majority 
abandons 
the 
court's 
least-change 
approach adopted in Johnson I in order to fashion legislative 
maps that "intrude upon the constitutional prerogatives of the 
political branches and unsettle the constitutional allocation of 
power."  399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶64.  The least-change approach in 
Johnson I guaranteed the court would ground any reapportionment 
decisions in the law alone, leaving the political decisions of 
redistricting to the political branches where they belong.  Id., 
¶71.  The majority's decision to discard the judicially 
restrained methodology of Johnson I unveils its motivation to 
redraw the legislative maps for the benefit of Democratic state 
legislative candidates.  By design, the majority's transparently 
political approach will reallocate political power in Wisconsin 
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via a draconian remedy, under the guise of a constitutional 
"error" easily rectified by modest modifications to existing 
maps. 
¶210 The majority misrepresents the least-change approach 
as "an unclear assortment of possible redistricting metrics," 
majority op., ¶61, a hypocritical stance for justices who 
replace it with a "partisan impact" factor bereft of any 
definition.  The majority misleads the public to disguise what 
it is actually doing:  abandoning the law and giving itself free 
reign to shift political power from Republicans to Democrats.  
In overruling the following holding, the majority rejects the 
notion that it should confine its actions to the powers the 
people gave the judiciary:  "Because the judiciary lacks the 
lawmaking power constitutionally conferred on the legislature, 
we will limit our remedy to achieving compliance with the law 
rather than imposing policy choices."  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 
623, ¶72; accord id., ¶85 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("A least-
change approach is the most consistent, neutral, and appropriate 
use of our limited judicial power to remedy the constitutional 
violations in this case").     
¶211 The majority professes to overrule Johnson I's least-
change 
approach 
because 
it 
is 
supposedly 
"unworkable 
in 
practice."  Majority op., ¶63.  The voters of Wisconsin should 
remember that four justices have confessed an inability to 
conform their official actions to the law.  It should be neither 
"impracticable" nor "unfeasible," id., for any jurist to set 
aside policy preferences and instead apply the law.  As a 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
18 
 
barrier to judges basing their decisions on political leanings, 
the 
least-change 
approach 
is 
only 
"impracticable" 
and 
"unfeasible" 
for 
justices 
who 
wish 
to 
act 
as 
a 
super 
legislature, as the members of the majority do in this case.  A 
majority may dismantle that barrier but the judicial oath of 
office remains.   
¶212 As the respondents proposed, any contiguity violation 
could be remedied by simply dissolving municipal islands into 
their surrounding assembly districts.  The majority dismisses 
the idea without explaining why the maps must instead be redrawn 
in their entirety.  To say the quiet part out loud, confining 
the court's remedy to districts with municipal islands would 
deprive the majority of its desired political outcome.  Its 
overreach flouts not only Johnson I but also black-letter law 
limiting the judiciary's remedial powers. 
¶213 "The remedial powers of an equity court must be 
adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited."  Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971).  Under this longstanding 
principle of judicial restraint, the remedy in this case——as in 
all cases——should be tailored to the actual violation.  If a 
district contains unconstitutionally noncontiguous territory, 
then dissolving the detached territory into its surrounding 
district represents the most logical and adequate remedy.  This 
more modest remedy would minimize disruption to Wisconsin 
voters.  The majority's drastic remedy of overhauling the 
entirety of the legislative maps will maximize it.    
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19 
 
¶214 A district-by-district remedy rather than a full 
redrawing of the legislative maps would follow the federal 
approach to redistricting cases the majority once professed to 
revere.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶88 (Dallet, J. dissenting) 
("[T]he 
federal 
courts . . . are 
best 
suited 
to 
handle 
redistricting cases.").  In Gill v. Whitford, the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether voters had federal standing to 
challenge the entirety of the 2011 Wisconsin state legislative 
maps as an unfair partisan gerrymander.  585 U.S. ___, 138 S. 
Ct. 1916, 1929-30 (2018).  Without deciding the merits of the 
voters' partisan gerrymandering claims, the Court said if a harm 
were found it "does not necessarily require restructuring all of 
the State's legislative districts."  Id. at 1931.  This holding 
relied on the following principle:  A "remedy must of course be 
limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that 
the plaintiff has established."  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
357 
(1996). 
 
A 
court's 
modifications 
of 
an 
otherwise 
constitutional map should be confined to those necessary to 
remedy the constitutional violations.  Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 
37, 42-43 (1982).  
¶215 The parties identified approximately 200 municipal 
islands surrounded by another assembly district in violation of 
the majority's crabbed reading of the contiguity requirement in 
Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
vast majority of these districts contain few people; many are 
uninhabited.  The majority opinion does not address these facts 
and instead emphasizes a few districts it believes are the most 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
20 
 
egregious 
to 
justify 
the 
unwarranted 
redrawing 
of 
the 
legislative maps in their entirety.  Majority op., ¶¶31-33.  
Less than five percent of the roughly 200 municipal islands have 
more than 100 people.  The court could easily satisfy the 
majority's new definition of contiguity by dissolving each 
municipal island into its surrounding district.  Some tinkering 
would have to be done to bring the maps into compliance with the 
one-person, one-vote principle, but this remedy would stop short 
of wading into the political morass of redrawing maps from 
scratch.  The majority shuns a modest remedy because it would 
foreclose consideration of the partisan "impact" factor the 
majority buries at the end of its opinion but which will 
dominate the entire process going forward. 
III.  PARTISAN FAIRNESS IS NOT A JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE STANDARD 
¶216 Buried at the end of its opinion, the majority 
identifies 
"partisan 
impact" 
as 
the 
fifth 
and 
last 
"redistricting principle" it will consider in reallocating 
political power in this state.  Id., ¶69.  Its placement 
disguises the primacy this factor will have in the majority's 
schemes.  The majority neglects to offer a single measure, 
metric, standard, or criterion by which it will gauge "partisan 
impact."  Most convenient for the majority's endgame, there 
aren't any, lending the majority unfettered license to design 
remedial 
maps 
fulfilling 
the 
majority's 
purely 
political 
objectives.  See Harper v. Hall, 881 S.E.2d 156, ¶124 (2023) 
(Newby, J., dissenting), opinion withdrawn and superseded on 
reh'g, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023) ("By intentionally stating vague 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
21 
 
standards, it ensures that four members of this Court alone 
understand 
what 
redistricting 
plan 
is 
constitutionally 
compliant.").    
¶217 In considering "partisan impact," the majority acts 
without 
authority. 
 
Unlike 
other 
state 
constitutions,12 
"[n]othing in the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes this court 
to recast itself as a redistricting commission in order 'to make 
[its] own political judgment about how much representation 
particular political parties deserve——based on the votes of 
their supporters——and to rearrange the challenged districts to 
achieve that end.'"  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶45 (quoting 
Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 
(2019)).  "The people have never consented to the Wisconsin 
judiciary deciding what constitutes a 'fair' partisan divide; 
seizing 
such 
power 
would 
encroach 
on 
the 
constitutional 
prerogatives of the political branches."  Id., ¶45 (citing Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) (plurality opinion)).  
¶218 The majority's decision to consider the "partisan 
impact" of proposed maps lacks any legal foundation, enabling 
the majority to engage in a purely political exercise.  As the 
court explained in Johnson I, the "lack of standards by which to 
                                                 
12 See Fla. Const. art. III, § 21(a) ("No apportionment plan 
or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor 
a political party or an incumbent[.]"); Ohio Const. art. XI, § 6 
(prohibiting 
redistricting 
commission 
from 
creating 
a 
legislative district plan that favors or disfavors a political 
party); Mo. Const. art. III, § 3 ("Districts shall be designed 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
achieves 
both 
partisan 
fairness 
and, 
secondarily, 
competitiveness."); 
Colo. 
Const. 
art. 
V, 
§ 
48.1(3)(a) (directing the redistricting commission to "maximize 
the number of politically competitive districts").  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
22 
 
judge partisan fairness is obvious from even a cursory review of 
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence."  399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶41.  
Accordingly, courts "'have no license to reallocate political 
power between the two major political parties,' because 'no 
legal standards [exist] to limit and direct [our] decisions.'"  
Id., ¶52 (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507).  
¶219 The majority says it will "take care to avoid 
selecting remedial maps designed to advantage one political 
party over another," but provides no guiding principles to 
govern its actions.  Majority op., ¶71.  The majority doesn't 
offer any limiting principles because there aren't any.  By its 
nature, redistricting involves political decisions entrusted to 
the legislative branch.  Despite its unconvincing attempts to 
shroud its "partisan impact" lodestar with empty invocations of 
judicial neutrality and impartiality, adjudicating "partisan 
impact" unavoidably "recast[s] this court as a policymaking body 
rather than a law-declaring one."  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶52.   
¶220 The majority says it won't select a map "designed to 
advantage one political party over another" or one that 
"privilege[s] one political party over another."  Majority op., 
¶¶70-71.  Words like "advantage" and "privilege" imply a 
baseline of fairness, but the court never defines it.  It can't; 
no law says what an "unfair" political advantage in a 
legislative map looks like.  And what about third parties?  The 
majority will marginalize and exclude minority interests if it 
fails to bestow proportional representation on every minor 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
23 
 
party; after all, the constitution does not privilege the 
dominant parties.  The novice map drawers in the majority would 
then discover what "unworkable in practice," id., ¶63, really 
means.    
¶221 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
comprehensively 
described 
the 
impossibility 
of 
judicially 
defining 
or 
identifying 
what 
constitutes 
politically 
"fair" 
maps, 
an 
irrefutable point we echoed in Johnson I.  399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶40-41.  In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court documented the 
presence 
of 
partisanship 
in 
the 
drawing 
of 
legislative 
districts——by 
the 
political 
branches——dating 
back 
to 
the 
founding of our nation.  139 S. Ct. at 2494-95.  There is 
nothing surprising about it; the legislative and executive 
branches are, well, political.  The judiciary is not supposed to 
be.13  In declaring such claims nonjusticiable, the Court 
highlighted two of its prior cases,14 in which it attempted to 
define what constitutes an unfair partisan apportionment.  Id. 
at 2497-98.  In doing so, it reiterated Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's earlier admonition that judicial standards must be 
"'clear, manageable, and politically neutral.'"  Id. at 2498 
(quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
                                                 
13 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 437 (2015) 
("Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench 
by way of the ballot."). 
14 In both of those cases, the United States Supreme Court 
did not reach a majority and the number of separate writings 
reveal the utter confusion over what judicial standard to apply 
when 
judges 
are 
tasked 
with 
determining 
what 
level 
of 
partisanship is "fair."  See Davis v Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
24 
 
the judgment)).  Because the Court was unable to identify any 
legal standards by which to adjudicate partisan fairness, it 
determined 
such 
claims 
involve 
nonjusticiable 
political 
questions "beyond the competence of the federal courts."  Id. at 
2500.  The majority in this case believes it possesses a 
judicial ability the United States Supreme Court somehow lacks.  
What extraordinary hubris.     
¶222 In successfully convincing the majority to consider 
partisan fairness, petitioners point to the difference between 
the statewide percentage of votes received by Democrats compared 
to the number of Democrats in the state legislature.  Their 
argument presumes that an individual voter who votes for a 
Democrat at the top of the ticket will automatically support a 
Democratic state legislative candidate.  Voters do not, however, 
blindly cast their ballots for one party.  Whitford v. Gill, 218 
F. Supp. 3d 837, 936 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) ("Party affiliation 
is not set in stone or in a voter's genes[.]").  A variety of 
factors influence electoral choices.  See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 
2503.  Partisan preferences can change rapidly and social 
science cannot reliably predict voters' future choices among 
candidates.  Id.  Political identification is not an immutable 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
25 
 
characteristic; election results in Wisconsin reveal recurring 
shifts in party preferences and loyalties.15 
¶223 What the majority calls "partisan impact" will mean 
proportional representation.  See id. at 2499 ("Partisan 
gerrymandering 
claims 
invariably 
sound 
in 
a 
desire 
for 
proportional representation.").  Proportionality is far from 
politically neutral and is incompatible with the constitution, 
which requires single-member legislative districts.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, §§ 4–5.  Requiring single-member districts renders 
proportionality 
impossible 
because 
single-member 
district 
elections unavoidably produce disproportionate results.  See 
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 950 (Griesbach, J., dissenting) 
("Another reason proportionality is not a right is that 
disproportionality is built in, and in fact even assumed, in 
winner-take-all systems of voting.").  Proportionality is also 
in tension with our state constitution "because Article IV of 
the Wisconsin Constitution specifies requirements that favor the 
preservation 
of 
communities 
of 
interest, 
irrespective 
of 
individual partisan alignment."  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶47.  The majority attacks our representative form of government 
by introducing the extra-constitutional criterion of "partisan 
impact."  
                                                 
15 Craig Gilbert, What 30 Years of Voting History Tells Us 
about Wisconsin's Shifting Suburban Vote, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 
May 
10, 
2023, 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/analysis/2023/05/10
/how-the-2024-presidential-race-in-wisconsin-hinges-on-suburban-
trends/70179579007/.  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
26 
 
¶224 Perfect political symmetry between the statewide vote 
and the composition of the legislature is unattainable because 
of the geographic distribution of the state's voters.  While 
Wisconsin has had close statewide races over the prior decade, 
the concentration of voters differs dramatically among urban, 
suburban, and rural areas of the state.  For example, in the 
2020 presidential election, Dane County and Milwaukee County, 
the two largest counties by total votes, cast approximately 35 
percent of the total statewide votes for Joe Biden.16  Waukesha 
and Brown County17 accounted for only 14 percent of the total 
statewide votes for Donald Trump.  Increasingly, the large 
percentage of Democratic votes from Dane County has been a 
determining factor in otherwise close statewide elections.18  
Republican statewide candidates receive support from more rural 
and less densely populated counties throughout the state.  This 
                                                 
16 President 
Biden 
received 
1,630,866 
total 
votes 
in 
Wisconsin in 2020 and Dane County recorded 260,121 votes for 
Biden and Milwaukee County recorded 317,527 votes for Biden.  
2020 Wisconsin Election Results, N.Y. Times, (Accessed Nov. 30, 
2023), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/resu
lts-wisconsin.html.  
17 These two counties were chosen for comparison because 
their voters cast the two highest number of ballots for Donald 
Trump.  Of the 1,610,184 total votes Donald Trump received in 
Wisconsin in 2020, Waukesha County recorded 159,649 votes and 
Brown County recorded 75,871 votes.  Id. 
18 Ruth Conniff, How Dane County is Making Wisconsin Less 
Red, 
Isthmus, 
Dec. 
3, 
2022, 
https://isthmus.com/opinion/opinion/how-dane-county-is-making-
wisconsin-less-red/.  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
27 
 
political reality19 illustrates why the statewide vote is a 
flawed indicator of what the makeup of the state legislature 
"should" be.  Even if representative proportionality were an 
attainable goal, the constitution gives the judiciary, the only 
non-partisan branch of state government, no role to play in such 
political calculations. 
¶225 Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a former 
state legislator, recognized the unsound premises underlying 
proportional representation, which the majority fails to grasp 
in its quest to enforce partisan "fairness":   
This preference for proportionality is in serious 
tension with essential features of state legislative 
elections.  Districting itself represents a middle 
ground between winner-take-all statewide elections and 
proportional representation for political parties.  If 
there 
is 
a 
constitutional 
preference 
for 
proportionality, the legitimacy of districting itself 
is called into question:  the voting strength of less 
evenly 
distributed 
groups 
will 
invariably 
be 
diminished by districting as compared to at-large 
proportional systems for electing representatives.  
Moreover, one implication of the districting system is 
that voters cast votes for candidates in their 
districts, not for a statewide slate of legislative 
candidates put forward by the parties.  Consequently, 
efforts to determine party voting strength presuppose 
a norm that does not exist——statewide elections for 
representatives along party lines. 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 159 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).  Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained that the federal Constitution, like ours, does 
                                                 
19 "Democrats have often been concentrated in cities while 
Republicans 
have 
often 
been 
concentrated 
in 
suburbs 
and 
sometimes rural areas."  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 359 (2004) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
28 
 
not 
guarantee 
"equal 
representation 
in 
government 
to 
equivalently sized groups.  It nowhere says that farmers or 
urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans 
or Democrats, must be accorded political strength proportionate 
to their numbers."  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288. 
¶226 By shoehorning consideration of "partisan impact" into 
the remedial phase of this litigation, the majority strikes a 
blow against our republican form of government.  Forcing 
legislative representation reflecting the statewide strength of 
a political party on citizens in less populated areas of the 
state overrides their choice of candidates without their 
consent. 
 
"Proportional 
party 
representation 
is 
simply 
incompatible with the constitutionally prescribed form of 
representative government chosen by the people of Wisconsin."  
Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶50.   
¶227 The majority says it must consider "partisan impact" 
in redrawing the state's legislative maps in order to remain 
politically "neutral and independent."  Majority op., ¶71.  If 
that "sounds contradictory," Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶112 
(Dallet, J., dissenting), that's because it is.  The court 
concedes its decision does not derive from the Wisconsin 
Constitution or any other law.  And the gerrymander-claim-
versus-judicial-remedy distinction, which "appears at first to 
be an escape hatch" for the majority is "upon reflection, a trap 
door."  Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding 
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 673 (2002).  The 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
29 
 
majority's fixation on "partisan impact" might, intentionally or 
unintentionally, run afoul of the Voting Rights Act.  52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301.  Historically, a preoccupation with "fair maps" has 
come at the expense of communities of color.  Johnson III, 401 
Wis. 2d 198, ¶¶96-104 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  
By injecting "partisan impact" into the calculation, the 
majority transforms itself into a legislative body making 
political and policy decisions.  A pledge to be "neutral and 
independent" cannot be fulfilled when the majority appropriates 
the political tasks of redistricting that belong to the 
political branches.   
¶228 Since the majority recognizes its focus on partisan 
fairness is untethered to law, it must explain, in a politically 
neutral way, why judicial neutrality does not require the 
consideration of countless other factors.  The majority's choice 
to 
consider 
"partisan 
impact" 
is 
imbued 
with 
policy 
determinations necessitating overtly political choices.  Opening 
the door to judicial policymaking in this manner invites 
interest 
groups 
of 
every 
kind 
to 
demand 
"fairness" 
in 
representation on any basis whatsoever:  sex, religion, age, 
socioeconomic status, gender identity, etc.  As a matter of 
policy, why wouldn't the majority ensure that farmers, union 
members, property owners, renters, small business owners, and 
hunters have representation in proportion to their numbers?  See 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288; Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶57 (citing 
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty 
Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
30 
 
50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (2008)) (noting that if 
proportionality for partisan affiliation is required, every 
group, including gun owners and vegetarians, has a valid claim 
to proportional representation in the legislature because 
"[n]othing distinguishes partisan affiliation from hundreds——
perhaps thousands——of other variables").  Is it acceptable to 
increase partisan fairness at the expense of the ability of 
Evangelical Christians to elect their preferred candidates?  Why 
does 
the 
majority 
prioritize 
partisan 
fairness 
over 
the 
interests of the elderly?  The answer is obvious; the majority's 
decision is deeply partisan.  So much for judicial neutrality. 
¶229 "A government of laws means a government of rules."  
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  The majority replaces rules with whim, preferring 
its own malleable notions of fairness over constitutional 
commands, in order to engineer districts more favorable for 
Democratic state legislative candidates.  The majority succumbs 
to the temptation of results at the expense of its own 
legitimacy.  Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The 
Political Seduction of the Law 2 (1990).  
IV.  LACHES AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD BAR THIS CASE 
¶230 Redistricting 
is 
the 
quintessential 
"political 
thicket."  See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) 
(plurality opinion).  We should not decide such cases unless, as 
in 2021, we must.  In this case, we need not enter the thicket.  
Unlike the majority, I would not address the merits.  A 
collateral attack on a supreme court judgment, disguised as an 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
31 
 
original action petition, would ordinarily be dismissed upon 
arrival.  Allowing petitioners' stale claims to proceed makes a 
mockery of our judicial system, politicizes the court, and 
incentivizes litigants to sit on manufactured redistricting 
claims in the hopes that a later, more favorable makeup of the 
court will accept their arguments.  The doctrines of laches and 
judicial estoppel exist to prevent such manipulation of the 
judicial system.  
A.  Laches 
¶231 Two days after Protasiewicz's election, one of the six 
law firms representing the petitioners announced its plan "to 
challenge the state's voting maps based on the assertion that 
partisan gerrymandering violates the Wisconsin Constitution," 
although at that point the lawyers were "still putting the 
pieces together about what we think the most successful 
arguments will be."20  It is hard to imagine a more fitting case 
for the application of laches than a tardy litigant calling to 
collect on judicial campaign trail promises.  To preserve its 
institutional legitimacy, the court should have applied the 
doctrine and dismissed this action.   
¶232 The doctrine of laches bars relief "when a claimant's 
failure to promptly bring a claim causes prejudice to the party 
having to defend against that claim."  Wis. Small Bus. United, 
Inc. 
v. 
Brennan, 
2020 
WI 69, 
¶11, 
393 
Wis. 2d 308, 
946 
N.W.2d 101 (citation omitted).  This affirmative, equitable 
                                                 
 
20 Kelly, supra note 3.  
 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
32 
 
defense ensures that "'equity aids the vigilant, and not those 
who sleep on their rights to the detriment of the opposing 
party.'"  State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶14, 
389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587 (quoting 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
§ 108).  "Application of laches is within the court's discretion 
upon a showing by the party raising the claim of [1] 
unreasonable delay, [2] lack of knowledge the claim would be 
raised, and [3] prejudice."  Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶10, 
394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568 (citation omitted).  The 
doctrine of laches is of particular importance in election-
related disputes.  Id., ¶11.  
¶233 All three elements of laches exist in this case.  The 
constitution limits redistricting to occur once every ten years, 
after the federal census, and the constitution gives the 
legislature the power of reapportionment.  Only political 
stalemate triggers court involvement.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 3; Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶18; Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 
859 (citing Zimmerman, 266 Wis. 307) (noting the Wisconsin 
Constitution's "command" "not to re-district more than once each 
10 years.").  We should not indulge litigants who sat out 
Johnson——or 
worse 
yet, 
were 
parties 
in 
Johnson——and 
who 
strategically conjure legal claims that could have been made 
more than two years ago.  "The doctrine of laches is derived 
from the maxim that those who sleep on their rights, lose them."  
Chattanoga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 301 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 
2002).   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
33 
 
¶234 As a preliminary matter, the doctrine of laches 
applies to redistricting claims, as well as requests for 
injunctive relief, notwithstanding an alleged ongoing harm.  
Petitioners contend laches does not apply in this case because 
an alleged harm——constitutionally noncontiguous districts——is 
ongoing and they are requesting prospective relief.  The 
majority appears to agree.  See majority op., ¶43 n.20.  But as 
one court explained, an ongoing-violation theory "is contrary to 
well settled reapportionment and laches case law."  Fouts v. 
Harris, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff'd sub 
nom. Chandler v. Harris, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000) (citation omitted) 
(barring claim that districts were racially gerrymandered 
contrary to the United States Constitution with the doctrine of 
laches); see also White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(applying laches to bar redistricting claim under Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Sanders v. Dooly County, 245 
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying laches to deny request for 
injunctive relief related to a districting plan containing 
racially gerrymandered districts violating the Equal Protection 
Clause); Knox v. Milwaukee Cnty. Bd. of Elections Comm'rs, 581 
F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (applying laches to deny request 
to enjoin implementation of a Milwaukee reapportionment plan, 
which plaintiffs claimed violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965); Mac Govern v. Connolly, 637 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass. 
1986) (applying laches to bar injunctive relief for plaintiffs 
claiming 
the 
state 
legislative 
maps 
where 
not 
equally 
apportioned under the Equal Protection Clause); Chestnut v. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
34 
 
Merrill, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (applying laches 
to deny injunctive relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 against challenged districts).  Wisconsin precedent 
accords with federal cases.  This court has approved the use of 
laches to deny prospective injunctive relief, even against 
government actors seeking to vindicate public rights.  Forest 
Cnty. v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 681-84, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998) 
(stating that laches should be considered by the circuit court 
when deciding whether to issue an injunction against one 
violating a zoning ordinance).  The doctrine of laches applies 
to claims for prospective relief, even in the redistricting 
context. 
1.  Unreasonable Delay 
¶235 The first element of laches concerns whether the 
petitioners "unreasonably delayed" in bringing their claim.  
Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶13.  "What constitutes an unreasonable 
delay varies and 'depends on the facts of a particular case.'"  
Id. (quoting Brennan, 
393 Wis. 2d 308, 
¶14).  Because 
redistricting cases require the court to enter the political 
thicket, and in light of the disruption another round of 
redistricting may cause, this requirement has extra force in 
redistricting cases and analogous contexts.  See id., ¶30 
("Parties bringing election-related claims have a special duty 
to bring their claims in a timely manner.").  This element is 
met.  
¶236 The Wisconsin legislature last enacted legislative 
maps in 2011 and those maps contained municipal islands.  2011 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
35 
 
Wis. Act 44; 2011 Wis. Act 43.  None of the petitioners argued 
the maps were unconstitutional for containing noncontiguous 
territory within one or more districts.  The maps created in 
2011 became unconstitutionally malapportioned due to population 
shifts identified following the census of 2020.  Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶16.  Four voters filed an original action with 
this 
court, 
seeking 
a 
mandatory 
injunction 
to 
remedy 
malapportionment.  Id., ¶5.  We invited any prospective 
intervenor to move to participate in Johnson and granted every 
motion to intervene.  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.  Many of 
the parties in this case——the Governor and all but two of the 
Atkinson intervenor-petitioners21——participated in Johnson.  They 
did not argue the 2011 maps contained unconstitutionally 
noncontiguous districts nor did they propose the definition of 
contiguity advanced and adopted in this case.  In fact, the 
petitioners 
who 
participated 
in 
Johnson 
stipulated 
that 
municipal 
islands 
are 
constitutionally 
contiguous. 
 
The 
petitioners who participated in both cases could have raised the 
contiguity issue in Johnson.  They didn't.  They could have 
moved the court for reconsideration after we issued our 
decision.  They didn't.  To wait nearly two years after our 
decision in Johnson I addressed the meaning of contiguous 
territory constitutes unreasonable delay, even setting aside the 
admitted gamesmanship of the litigants.   
¶237 The majority starts the unreasonable-delay clock after 
Johnson III was decided and insists the Clarke petitioners did 
                                                 
21 The two newcomers are Nathan Atkinson and Leah Dudley.   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
36 
 
not immediately raise the contiguity issue after Johnson III 
because petitioners "could not obtain relief prior to the 2022 
elections."  Majority op., ¶42.  But the majority presupposes 
something prevented the Clarke petitioners from participating in 
the Johnson litigation.  Nothing did.  The petitioners who sat 
out Johnson have never explained why they did not participate in 
Johnson, even when given the opportunity to explain themselves 
at oral argument.  Nor did they show they were reasonably 
unaware of the contiguity issue at that time.  "[U]nreasonable 
delay in laches is based not on what litigants know, but what 
they might have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence.  
This underlying constructive knowledge requirement arises from 
the general rule that 'ignorance of one's legal rights is not a 
reasonable excuse in a laches case.'"  Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 
¶20 (quoting 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 138) (emphasis added).  
Everyone 
knows 
this 
action 
was 
brought 
promptly 
after 
Protasiewicz joined the court because the petitioners knew she 
and 
the 
three 
dissenters 
in 
Johnson 
would 
welcome 
any 
opportunity to redraw the maps they viewed as "rigged."  Laches 
bars such tactics.  See Knox, 581 F. Supp. at 403-04  (finding 
unreasonable delay when the plaintiffs were given opportunities 
to participate in the districting process, voice their concerns, 
and even submit alternative plans, but chose not to).   
¶238 If waiting to file this original action until August 
2, 2023, one day after Protasiewicz's investiture, were not 
blatant enough, the law firm representing the petitioners said 
the quiet part out loud two days after Protasiewicz won her 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
37 
 
election, promising to file a gerrymandering claim and admitting 
the firm would not have brought any claim if Protasiewicz had 
lost the election.22  Contrary to the majority's telling, the 
petitioners did not just wait until "August of 2023" to bring 
their claims, majority op., ¶42; they waited until the day after 
the composition of the court changed——a fact so embarrassing the 
majority never acknowledges it.  Such gamesmanship and delay 
would not be rewarded by a court with integrity.  Trump v. Biden 
conveyed the court's expectation for parties to act diligently 
when bringing election-related claims.  Relaxing the rule when 
the petitioners seek partisan advantage on behalf of Democrats 
signals that different standards apply to Republicans.  Putting 
a partisan thumb on the scales of justice calls into question 
the court's legitimacy. 
2.  Lack of Knowledge 
¶239 The 
second 
element 
of 
laches 
asks 
whether 
the 
respondents lacked knowledge that the petitioners would bring 
the 
contiguity 
claim. 
 
Brennan, 
393 
Wis. 2d 308, 
¶18.  
Respondents assert they were unaware the petitioners would bring 
the contiguity claim.  Nothing in the record suggests otherwise.  
The petitioners who did participate in Johnson all stipulated 
that municipal islands were constitutionally contiguous.  The 
                                                 
22 Kelly, supra note 3 ("When asked if she and her 
colleagues would be discussing a potential legal challenge if 
Protasiewicz hadn't won on Tuesday, Safar said, 'There wouldn't 
be an opportunity to have a fair argument, I don't think, under 
Justice Kelly.'").  This undermines——to put it mildly——the 
believability of counsel's statement at oral argument that 
petitioners would have filed this original action even if 
Protasiewicz had lost the election.   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
38 
 
second element is met.  See id. (holding the second element of 
laches is met if respondent "had no advance knowledge or warning 
of [the] particular claim").23 
3.  Prejudice 
¶240 The third and final element of laches requires a 
showing of prejudice, which means "'anything that places the 
party in a less favorable position.'"  Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 
¶24 (quoting Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶32).  In a context 
analogous to redistricting, this court has considered prejudice 
to third parties.  See id., ¶¶25-27 (considering prejudice to 
voters in election-related context); id., ¶125 (Ziegler, J., 
dissenting) (noting the majority focused "on the prejudice to 
third 
parties"). 
 
Other 
courts 
have 
likewise 
considered 
prejudice to third parties in redistricting cases.  White, 909 
F.2d at 103-04 (considering the prejudicial effect judicially 
mandated redistricting would have on voters not party to the 
suit); Chestnut, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1317 (similar); Fouts, 88 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1354 (similar); see Sanders, 245 F.3d at 1291.  The 
third element of laches is met.   
¶241 The respondents assert they spent considerable time 
and resources in the Johnson litigation to ensure Wisconsin 
voters would have constitutionally permissible maps for future 
elections.  This court also spent considerable time and 
                                                 
23 Although the respondents meet the second element of 
laches, it does not always apply because the requirement 
"focuses on the ability of the asserting party to mitigate any 
resulting prejudice when notice is provided.  But this may not 
be possible in all types of claims."  Trump v. Biden, 2020 
WI 91, ¶23 n.10, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
39 
 
resources on Johnson.  Petitioners seek to wipe out all of the 
work done in Johnson——and the majority obliges.  This is an 
accepted form of prejudice to respondents.  See Wren, 389 Wis. 
2d 516, ¶33 (noting economic prejudice is a cognizable form of 
prejudice for purposes of laches); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 144 
(footnotes omitted) ("Prejudice may also be invoked by the 
expenditure of time and the effort that the plaintiff's delayed 
claim would defeat.").   
¶242 Because the majority errs by starting the clock at the 
end of Johnson III, the majority fails to find any prejudice 
against the respondents.  The respondents do not claim the costs 
of litigating this suit cause them prejudice.  Instead, the 
respondents claim that wiping away all of the money, time, and 
effort devoted to Johnson is prejudicial.  Contrary to what the 
majority asserts, prejudice in the form of wasted money, time, 
and 
effort 
on 
an 
action 
already 
concluded 
distinguishes 
respondents' claim of prejudice from the case on which the 
majority relies, which states that costs incurred in litigating 
a current suit are not prejudicial.  Majority op., ¶43 (citing 
Goodman v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 808 (8th Cir. 
1979)).  The prejudice to respondents is especially acute 
because all of the petitioners were either parties in Johnson or 
could have been.  The contiguity challenge could have been 
resolved in that case.  It is extremely prejudicial to the 
respondents for the petitioners to sit out litigation they were 
invited to join, "'gamble on the outcome'" of the litigation, 
"'and then challenge it when dissatisfied with the results.'"  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
40 
 
See Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶11 (quoting 29 C.J.S. Elections § 
459 (2020)).  But the majority doesn't care about that kind of 
unfairness.     
¶243 Respondents are not the only ones to suffer prejudice 
as a result of the majority entertaining the petitioners' claim.  
The petitioners waited until after the maps adopted in Johnson 
had been used and after voters and legislators became accustomed 
to their new districts.  Both voters and legislators are 
prejudiced by this suit because many legislators have developed 
relationships with their constituents.  Redrawing the maps so 
soon after Johnson, and after elections have occurred under 
those maps, risks severe voter confusion——a well-recognized form 
of prejudice in the redistricting context.  E.g., White, 909 
F.2d at 104 ("We believe that two reapportionments within a 
short period of two years would greatly prejudice the County and 
its citizens by creating instability and dislocation in the 
electoral system and by imposing great financial and logistical 
burdens."); Chestnut, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1317 ("[W]hile 
congressional 
races 
are 
better 
funded 
and 
more 
highly 
publicized, the court remains unconvinced that a more publicized 
election will necessarily educate voters on where the newly 
drawn district lines lay."); see also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 
144 
(Prejudice 
"may 
further 
arise 
from 
delayed 
actions 
challenging elections or election procedures, due to confusion 
to voters . . . .").   
¶244 The majority unconvincingly attempts to dismiss the 
prejudice 
to 
voters 
engendered 
by 
redrawing 
the 
state 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
41 
 
legislative maps.  First, the majority minimizes this well-
recognized form of prejudice as merely "vague assertions about 
disruption to the status quo."  Majority op., ¶43.  Second, the 
majority insists that "any disruption . . . is necessary to 
serve the public's interest in having districts that comply with 
each of the requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Id., 
¶43.  The majority's dismissiveness perfunctorily discounts the 
prejudice to confused voters.  The majority surely did not apply 
this logic in Trump v. Biden.  In that case, the petitioners 
sought the invalidation of several thousands of ballots because 
they were cast unlawfully or were otherwise invalid.  394 Wis. 
2d 629, ¶1.  The court held laches barred the petitioners from 
bringing their claims.  Id., ¶3.  The court held that voters 
would be prejudiced if their ballots were struck.  Id., ¶¶24-28.  
The court did not disregard prejudice to voters simply because 
the public also has an interest in elections being conducted in 
accordance with state law.  It would be one thing if the 
majority acknowledged this prejudice and then, using its 
discretion, decided not to apply laches because it thinks other 
interests outweigh the prejudice to confused voters.  But to 
pretend no prejudice exists, because concluding otherwise would 
thwart the majority's political agenda, is shameful. 
¶245 This 
court 
has 
applied 
the 
laches 
doctrine 
in 
election-related disputes specifically when the relief sought 
"would be an extraordinary step for this court to take."  Trump, 
394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶31.  The petitioners in this case seek the 
extraordinary remedy of tossing the legislative maps in their 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
42 
 
entirety and upending the political balance of the state 
legislature just months before the 2024 elections, yet the 
majority entertains a claim that could have been brought in 
Johnson I.  Petitioners waited until the court's membership 
changed with the hope of achieving a more favorable outcome.  An 
impartial application of this court's recent laches doctrine 
would bar the petitioners' claims.   
4. Discretion 
¶246 Even though all of the elements of laches are met, it 
remains within our discretion to apply the doctrine.  Wren, 389 
Wis. 2d 516, ¶15 (citing State ex rel. Washington v. State, 2012 
WI App 74, ¶26, 343 Wis. 2d 434, 819 N.W.2d 305).  Applying the 
doctrine of laches is the only "appropriate and equitable" 
decision in this case.  Id.  The constitution does not permit 
redistricting to be a yearly affair.  It is a fundamentally 
political process in which this court acted in Johnson only to 
avoid a constitutional crisis.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶68 
("Judicial 
action 
becomes 
appropriate 
to 
prevent 
a 
constitutional crisis.").  Absent political impasse, for the 
sake of our institutional legitimacy and out of respect for 
roles the constitution assigns to the political branches, we 
keep 
ourselves 
out 
of 
the 
process. 
 
Failure 
to 
bring 
redistricting claims promptly poses a great danger "to the 
entire administration of justice."  Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶30.  
Entertaining political claims delayed until the seating of a 
justice who had prejudged the existing maps as "rigged" poses a 
great danger to the integrity of this court.  The majority could 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
43 
 
have its integrity by properly applying the doctrine of laches 
but instead forges ahead to the detriment of this court's 
institutional legitimacy.   
B.  Judicial Estoppel 
¶247 The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the Governor 
and the Atkinson petitioner-intervenors who participated in the 
Johnson 
litigation24 
from 
arguing 
municipal 
islands 
are 
unconstitutionally noncontiguous.  "The equitable doctrine of 
judicial 
estoppel . . . is 
intended 
to 
protect 
against 
a 
litigant playing fast and loose with the courts . . . .  The 
doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal 
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent 
position."  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 
(1996) 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citations 
omitted).  
Judicial estoppel applies if:  (1) the party's later position is 
inconsistent with its earlier position; (2) the facts at issue 
are the same in both cases; and (3) the party convinced the 
first court to adopt its position.  Id. at 348 (quoted source 
omitted).   
¶248 Both 
the 
Governor 
and 
the 
Atkinson 
petitioner-
intervenors deny taking a position in this case at odds with 
their position in Johnson and further claim the court never 
adopted their initial position.  The facts betray their 
duplicity.   
                                                 
24 Stephen Wright, Gary Krenz, Sarah Hamilton, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha all participated in Johnson.   
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44 
 
¶249 The 
Governor 
and 
Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors 
contend 
they 
never 
argued 
that 
municipal 
islands 
are 
constitutionally contiguous in Johnson.  This is false.  The 
Atkinson petitioner-intervenors, then identifying as "Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists," argued for the permissibility of 
municipal islands in Johnson I.25  Both the Governor and Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors stipulated that municipal islands are 
constitutionally contiguous.26  The stipulation verifies the 
parties' position that municipal islands are constitutional.27  
Having 
lost 
in 
Johnson, 
the 
Governor 
and 
the 
Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors 
now 
argue 
municipal 
islands 
are 
unconstitutional, the opposite of the position they advanced in 
Johnson.  The court adopted their position in Johnson I, holding 
                                                 
25 "This Court has defined 'contiguous' to mean that a 
district 'cannot be made up of two or more pieces of detached 
territory.'  State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 148, 
53 N.W. 35, 57 (1892); but cf. Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866 
(holding that the Wisconsin Constitution does not require 
'literal contiguity' where a town had annexed noncontiguous 
'islands' 
and 
'the 
distance 
between 
town 
and 
island 
is 
slight')."  Br. Intervenors-Pet'rs Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists, Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450, at 
22 (Oct. 25, 2021).   
26 "Contiguity for state assembly districts is satisfied 
when a district boundary follows the municipal boundaries.  
Municipal 'islands' are legally contiguous with the municipality 
to which the 'island' belongs.  Wis. Stat. §5.15(1)(b); Wis. 
Stat. §4.001(2) (1972); see Prosser v. Election Bd., 793 F. 
Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (three-judge court)."  Joint 
Stip. of Facts and Law, Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2021AP1450, at 15 (Nov. 4, 2021).   
27 A stipulation, by definition, is an "agreement between 
opposing 
parties 
concerning 
some 
relevant 
point[.]"  
Stipulation, Black's Law Dictionary 1712 (11th ed. 2019).   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
45 
 
municipal islands are constitutional.  399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36.  No 
justice dissented on this point.  Shifting majorities in Johnson 
II and Johnson III adopted maps with municipal islands.  See 
Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶¶8-10; Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 
198, ¶70.  No justice dissented on this point in either of those 
decisions.  Notably, the court adopted the Governor's proposed 
state legislative maps in Johnson II, municipal islands and all.  
In his brief urging the court to adopt his legislative maps in 
Johnson II, the Governor argued his maps were constitutionally 
contiguous despite having municipal islands.28     
¶250 The Governor contends the court was not convinced to 
adopt his position because there was no adversarial briefing on 
the issue of municipal islands in the Johnson litigation.  The 
Governor, however, fails to cite any legal authority requiring 
adversarial briefing on an issue before judicial estoppel may 
apply. 
 
Precedent 
supports 
its 
application 
even 
absent 
adversarial briefing.  E.g., Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Edward S., 
2001 WI App 169, ¶11, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241 (estopping 
a litigant from arguing an adjournment was improper when the 
parties stipulated to the adjournment).  Regardless, courts may 
not blindly accept a stipulation of law; they have a duty to 
independently determine what the law is.  "[W]e are not bound by 
the parties' interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a 
party's concession of law.  This court, not the parties, decides 
questions of law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 327 Wis. 
                                                 
28 Gov. Tony Evers's Br. Support Proposed Maps, Johnson v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450, at 17 (Dec. 15, 2021).   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
46 
 
2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516.  Irrespective of the parties' stipulation 
of law, this court was duty-bound to satisfy itself that 
remedial maps met the constitutional command of contiguity and 
it did so, irrespective of the parties' shared position on the 
issue. 
¶251 The 
Governor 
fundamentally 
misconstrues 
the 
requirement that the party to be estopped must have convinced 
the earlier court to adopt its position.  Applying judicial 
estoppel does not require us to peer into the minds of judges to 
ascertain whether a court was actually convinced of the party's 
position.  The requirement merely means that the party estopped 
needs to have "succeed[ed] in maintaining that position," Matter 
of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Davis v. 
Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)); or, stated differently, the 
party is estopped if "the court maintains that [same] position."  
State v. English-Lancaster, 2002 WI App 74, ¶19, 252 Wis. 2d 
388, 642 N.W.2d 627 (citing State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 944, 
437 N.W.2d 218 (1989)).  Stated conversely, "[a] party is not 
bound to a position it unsuccessfully maintained."  Matter of 
Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 641; Olson v. Darlington Mut. Ins. Co., 
2006 WI App 204, ¶6, 296 Wis. 2d 716, 723 N.W.2d 713 ("Because 
'a litigant is not forever bound to a losing argument,' there 
must be an action of the court adopting a party's position to 
give rise to judicial estoppel.").  If the estopped party 
advanced a position the court later adopted, the requirement is 
met.  See English-Lancaster, 252 Wis. 2d 388, ¶22 (holding that 
a defendant was judicially estopped from arguing that a 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
47 
 
cautionary instruction was inadequate because it was the 
defendant who asked for the cautionary instruction and accepted 
the wording of the court's proposed instruction, calling it a 
case of "classic judicial estoppel").  The Governor and Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors stipulated that municipal islands are 
constitutional, and the court held as much in Johnson I.  399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶36.  The Governor proposed state legislative maps 
containing municipal islands, and this court adopted them in 
Johnson II.  400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶¶8-10.  The court clearly adopted 
their position on contiguity in the Johnson litigation.   
¶252 The Governor and the Atkinson petitioner-intervenors 
do not advance their contiguity arguments in good faith.  Like 
the majority, they could not care less what "contiguous 
territory" means in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Everyone understands their argument is 
not based on a newfound concern for the court's fidelity to the 
constitution.  It is merely an argument onto which the parties 
have latched in order to smuggle a partisan "fairness" claim 
through the court.  The call for a partisan power shift 
permeates their briefs.  The Atkinson petitioner-intervenors 
falsely deny asserting the contiguity of municipal islands in 
Johnson and falsely claim they argued that municipal islands are 
not constitutionally contiguous.  Not only did the Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors argue such islands are constitutional in 
their brief in 
Johnson I, they also stipulated to the 
constitutionality of municipal islands.  Judicial estoppel bars 
such duplicity.  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 354 ("The doctrine looks 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
48 
 
toward 
cold 
manipulation, 
not 
an 
unthinking 
or 
confused 
blunder."). 
 
The 
Governor 
and 
the 
Atkinson 
petitioner-
intervenors should be barred by the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel 
from 
arguing 
that 
municipal 
islands 
are 
unconstitutional.   
¶253 The majority does not contest that the elements of 
judicial estoppel are met.  See majority op., ¶50.  Instead, the 
majority simply "decline[s] to exercise [its] discretion to 
apply judicial estoppel here."  Id.  In doing so, the majority 
invokes "compelling public policy reasons."  Id. 
¶254 Harkening back to the monarchical principle that the 
king can do no wrong,29 the majority privileges the Governor's 
duplicity because he is a government actor.  See id.  No 
precedent insulates the Governor from application of the 
doctrine.  While some courts have been reluctant to apply 
judicial estoppel to government actors,30 this court has never 
limited the doctrine to non-government actors.  To bolster their 
flawed argument, the Governor and the majority rely solely on 
cases concerning equitable estoppel, and fail to cite a single 
case involving judicial estoppel:  Turkow v. DNR, 216 Wis. 2d 
273, 576 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1998); DOR v. Moebius Printing 
Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979); Vill. of Hobart v. 
                                                 
29 See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962) (quoting Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 
386, 51 N.W.2d 30 (1952)) (holding that the government does not 
have common law immunity from tort suits for harms wrongfully 
caused by it, noting that the doctrine was rooted "'in the 
ancient and fallacious notion that the king can do no wrong'").   
 
30 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 755-56 (2001). 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
49 
 
Brown Cnty., 2005 WI 78, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 698 N.W.2d 83; State 
v. Chippewa Cable Co., 21 Wis. 2d 598, 124 N.W.2d 616 (1963); 
Park Bldg. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 78, 100 N.W.2d 571 
(1960).  This court has hesitated to apply equitable estoppel 
only when applying it would interfere with the state's exercise 
of its police powers.  Vill. of Hobart, 281 Wis. 2d 628, ¶29 
n.9.  But hesitancy does not translate to immunity.  The 
Governor changed his position on the issue of contiguity to 
benefit his political party, not the public interest.31  There 
has been no change in state public policy or material facts 
since the Johnson litigation.  Notably, some of the respondents 
in this case are also government actors, and "each owes the 
other a full measure of respect."  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 
U.S. 742, 756 (2001).  The Governor's change in position 
embodies political gamesmanship, and the majority's embrace of 
it belies their hollow professions of neutrality.  The Governor 
"'make[s] a mockery out of justice,'" and the court should bar 
him from doing so.  Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 
1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001).   
¶255 The majority's feeble defense for declining to apply 
judicial estoppel in this case is a procession of non sequiturs.  
The majority posits that "[g]iven our past case law on 
contiguity, as well as the primacy of our constitution, 
preventing parties from litigating this issue would not serve 
the goals" of judicial estoppel.  Majority op., ¶50.  It should 
                                                 
31 Tony Evers was the Governor during the Johnson litigation 
and currently holds that office.  There has not been a change in 
officeholder to justify the Governor's flip-flop on the issue. 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
50 
 
be self-evident that neither our past cases on contiguity nor 
the primacy of the constitution have anything to do with 
preventing the Governor and the Atkinson petitioner-intervenors 
from re-litigating the issue of contiguity in order to protect 
the court from assaults on its integrity.  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 
354.  The majority dismisses the judicial estoppel doctrine 
because "[g]iven the parties' stipulation in Johnson, it is 
difficult to view any inconsistency in position as 'cold 
manipulation' which judicial estoppel seeks to deter."  Majority 
op., ¶50.  There is, however, no relationship between a party's 
stipulation 
to 
a 
legal 
position 
and 
the 
party's 
later 
manipulation of willing justices.  In a footnote the majority 
states it will "explain" why the stipulation "undermines 
Respondents' argument that judicial estoppel should bar the 
Petitioners' contiguity claim" "later."  Id., ¶45 n.22.  The 
majority, however, neglects to provide its promised explanation.  
Regardless, 
the 
majority's 
myopic 
focus 
on 
the 
parties' 
stipulation misses the point.  The Governor not only stipulated 
that municipal islands are constitutionally contiguous.  The 
Governor 
also 
proposed 
state 
legislative 
maps——containing 
municipal islands——in Johnson II and argued that those maps were 
constitutionally contiguous.  The majority's non sequiturs and 
narrow focus on the stipulation create a smoke screen to obscure 
the bad faith of the Governor and the Atkinson petitioner-
intervenors.  Because the majority yearns to redraw the state 
legislative maps, it rebrands the petitioners' manipulations as 
mere "mistakes."  Id., ¶50.   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
51 
 
¶256 The Governor offers one final reason to not apply the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel:  public policy.32  See May v. May, 
2012 WI 35, ¶14, 339 Wis. 2d 626, 813 N.W.2d 179 ("If a trial 
court's decision to apply estoppel would violate public policy, 
a reviewing court must reverse that decision as an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.").  Public policy interests squarely 
favor estopping the Governor's gamesmanship.  Because this 
second round of redistricting litigation seeks to shift the 
balance of political power, this court should be a bulwark 
against such attacks on the integrity of our court system.  The 
majority's indulgence of the Governor's manipulation of the law 
for 
political 
advantage 
only 
confirms 
suspicions 
that 
redistricting cases are nothing more than exercises of raw 
political power by judicial partisans.  Judicial estoppel 
developed as a doctrine to protect the judiciary's integrity——an 
interest at its apex when this court enters the "'political 
thicket' that judges 'ought not to enter.'"  See Jensen v. Wis. 
Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 
(quoting Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556).   
¶257 In any ordinary case, the Governor and the Atkinson 
petitioner-intervenors would be barred by the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel from arguing that municipal islands are 
unconstitutional.  Both previously argued that municipal islands 
are constitutional.  The court accepted their argument, holding 
                                                 
32 The majority similarly says there are "compelling public 
policy reasons why this court should not exercise its discretion 
to apply estoppel in this case."  Majority op., ¶50.  The 
majority fails to actually articulate any reasons.   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
52 
 
municipal islands are constitutional.  The Governor and the 
Atkinson petitioner-intervenors made an about-face as soon as it 
was advantageous to do so.  This is a textbook example of when 
judicial estoppel applies.  Just like its selective application 
of 
laches, 
the 
majority 
abuses 
its 
discretion, 
applying 
equitable doctrines against Republicans, Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 
but not Democrats.  The doctrine of judicial estoppel is meant 
to protect the integrity of courts by prohibiting parties from 
manipulating the judicial process.  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 354 
(stating that the "doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to 
combat" "manipulative perversion[s] of the judicial process").  
The majority's rejection of the doctrine in this political case 
betrays its lack of integrity and its complicity in the 
manipulation.33   
V.  STARE DECISIS 
¶258 "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and 
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in 
every particular case that comes before them."  The Federalist 
No. 78, supra, at 529 (Hamilton).  Expounding the value of 
following prior precedent, the court recognizes this judicial 
maxim "ensures that existing law will not be abandoned lightly.  
                                                 
33 See Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 70, 995 
N.W.2d 779, 801-02 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
court was "happy to oblige" the petitioners' requests, despite 
their obvious partisan ambitions, going so far as to "dutifully 
adopt[ ] an accelerated briefing and oral argument schedule" and 
"change[ ] our internal writing deadline on original actions to 
ensure this case would be fast-tracked").   
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53 
 
When existing law is open to revision in every case, deciding 
cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary 
and unpredictable results."  Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, 
¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266 (footnotes and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Johnson litigation concluded last 
year.  The constitution's meaning has not changed in the 
interim——just the court's membership.     
¶259 Two 
members 
of 
the 
majority 
once 
extolled 
the 
importance of stare decisis "'because it promotes evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development 
of 
legal 
principles . . . and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process.'"  Mayo v. Wis. Injured 
Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶110, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
61, 914 N.W.2d 678, 707 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 
108, ¶95, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (2003)).  "Stare 
decisis, the principle that courts must stand by things decided, 
is fundamental to the rule of law."  State v. Prado, 2021 WI 64, 
¶67, 
397 
Wis. 2d 719, 
960 
N.W.2d 869 
(Per 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, J.).  "We have repeatedly recognized the importance of 
stare decisis."  State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶19, 407 
Wis. 2d 195, 90 N.W.2d 174 (Per Dallet, J.).  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley has specifically lamented, "[a] change in membership of 
the court does not justify a departure from precedent."  St. 
Croix Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Michael D., 2016 WI 
35, ¶93, 368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh 
Bradley, JJ., dissenting).  Despite their lip service to the 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
54 
 
doctrine in previous cases, the justices now "throw[ ] the 
doctrine of stare decisis out the window" and retread paths this 
court only just traveled.  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶62, 
387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
dissenting).      
¶260 While this court is not inexorably bound by stare 
decisis, respecting this well-established legal maxim "reduces 
incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties 
and courts the expense of endless relitigation."  Kimbel v. 
Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015).  The doctrine's 
preservation of stability and finality are especially important 
in the context of redistricting. 
¶261 Reopening the redistricting door and rehearing the 
same arguments we addressed and resolved in the Johnson cases——
just two terms ago——feeds the perception that the majority will 
discard 
settled 
cases 
when 
politically 
advantageous 
for 
implementing the four justices' policy preferences.  Voters and 
their representatives should now expect their districts to 
change after each state supreme court election cycle.  The 
majority sows confusion and disorder that will inexorably lead 
to instability in the balance of power and conflict between the 
political branches.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶262 "[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not 
separated from the legislative and the executive," the French 
philosopher Montesquieu warned.  "Were  it  joined  with  the  
legislative,  the  life  and  liberty  of  the  subject  would  
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
55 
 
be exposed  to  arbitrary  control;  for  the  judge  would  be  
then  the  legislator."  Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of 
Laws 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Company 1949) 
(1748).  The majority appoints itself as a redistricting 
commission to impose legislative maps it deems politically 
"fair."  The court arrogates unto itself the power to make 
purely political decisions——untethered to any law, and with no 
lawful authority.  Democrats may cheer the majority's mission to 
bestow political power on their party, but the majority's 
abandonment of neutrality delegitimizes the institution.  See 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court's authority . . . ultimately rests on 
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.  Such feeling 
must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment . . . from 
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself 
into the clash of political forces in political settlements.").  
The majority crowns itself supreme over the governor and the 
legislature, but the people never gave the judiciary such 
authority.  An election never overrides the constitution. 
¶263 "Do Justice!" counsel for the Democratic Senators 
proclaimed as she concluded her oral argument before the court.  
"[A] 
[c]ourt-managed 
version 
of 
the 
French 
Revolution,"34 
however, is not the kind of justice this court is supposed to 
dispense.  Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 313 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Bork, J., dissenting from denial of reh. en banc), rev'd, 
                                                 
34 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The 
Political Seduction of the Law 207 (1990).   
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
56 
 
482 U.S. 64 (1987)) ("[W]e administer justice according to law.  
Justice in a larger sense, justice according to morality, is for 
[the legislature] and the [governor] to administer . . . .").  
The majority's diktat transforms the judiciary from the "least 
dangerous"35 branch into one of the greatest threats to liberty 
the people of Wisconsin have ever faced.   
 
                                                 
35 The Federalist No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. 
Cooke ed., 1961) 
No.  23AP1399-OA.rgb 
 
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Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2023AP1399-OA, 2023 WI 70, 995 
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¶264 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  This is a sad turn 
for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Today, the court dives 
headlong into politics, choosing to wield the power it has while 
it 
has 
it. 
 
Wisconsinites 
searching 
for 
an 
institution 
unpolluted by partisan warfare will not find it here.     
¶265 No matter how today's decision is sold, it can be 
boiled down to this:  the court finds the tenuous legal hook it 
was looking for to achieve its ultimate goal——the redistribution 
of political power in Wisconsin.  Call it "promoting democracy" 
or "ending gerrymandering" if you'd like; but this is good, old-
fashioned power politics.  The court puts its thumb on the scale 
for one political party over another because four members of the 
court believe the policy choices made in the last redistricting 
law were harmful and must be undone.  This decision is not the 
product of neutral, principled judging.   
¶266 The matter of legislative redistricting was thoroughly 
litigated and resolved after the 2020 census.  We adopted a 
judicial remedy (new maps) and ordered that future elections be 
conducted using these maps until the legislature and governor 
enact new ones.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 19, 
¶3, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Johnson III).  That remedy 
remains in place, and under Wisconsin law, is final.  Now 
various parties, new and old, want a mulligan.  But litigation 
doesn't work that way.  Were this case about almost any other 
legal matter, the answer would be cut-and-dried.  We would 
unanimously dismiss the case and reject this impermissible 
collateral attack on a prior, final decision.     
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
2 
 
¶267 So why are the ordinary methods of deciding cases now 
thrown by the wayside?  Because a majority of the court imagines 
it has some moral authority, dignified by a black robe, to 
create "fair maps" through judicial decree.  To be sure, one can 
in good faith disagree with Johnson's holding that adhering as 
closely as possible to the last maps enacted into law——an 
approach called "least change"——is the most appropriate use of 
our remedial powers.  And the claim here that the constitution's 
original meaning requires the territory in all legislative 
districts to be physically contiguous is probably correct, 
notwithstanding 
decades 
of 
nearly 
unquestioned 
practice 
otherwise.  But that does not give litigants a license to ignore 
procedure and initiate a new case to try arguments they had 
every opportunity to raise in the last action, but did not.  
Procedural rules exist for a reason, and we should follow them.  
As we have previously explained, "Litigation rules and processes 
matter to the rule of law just as much as rendering ultimate 
decisions based on the law.  Ignoring the former to reach the 
latter 
portends 
of 
favoritism 
to 
certain 
litigants 
and 
outcomes."  Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI 65, ¶39, 
403 Wis. 2d 369, 976 N.W.2d 584.  Indeed it does.   
¶268 The majority heralds a new approach to judicial 
decision-making.  It abandons prior-stated principles regarding 
finality in litigation, standing, stare decisis, and other 
normal restraints on judicial will——all in favor of expediency.  
But principles adopted when convenient, and ignored when 
inconvenient, are not principles at all.  It is precisely when 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
3 
 
one's 
principles 
are 
tested 
and 
costly——yet 
are 
kept 
nonetheless——that they prove themselves truly held.  The 
unvarnished truth is that four of my colleagues deeply dislike 
maps that give Republicans what they view as an inappropriate 
partisan advantage.  Alas, when certain desired results are in 
reach, fidelity to prior ideals now seems . . . a bit less 
important than before.  No matter how pressing the problem may 
seem, that is no excuse for abandoning the rules of judicial 
process that make this institution a court of law.   
¶269 The majority's outcome-focused decision-making in this 
case will delight many.  A whole cottage industry of lawyers, 
academics, and public policy groups searching for some way to 
police partisan gerrymandering will celebrate.  My colleagues 
will be saluted by the media, honored by the professoriate, and 
cheered by political activists.  But after the merriment 
subsides, the sober reality will set in.  Without legislative 
resolution, Wisconsin Supreme Court races will be a perpetual 
contest between political forces in search of political power, 
who now know that four members of this court have assumed the 
authority to bestow it.  A court that has long been accused of 
partisanship will now be enmeshed in it, with no end in sight.  
Rather 
than 
keep 
our 
role 
in 
redistricting 
narrow 
and 
circumspect, the majority seizes vast new powers for itself.  We 
can only hope that this once great court will see better days in 
the future.  I respectfully dissent.   
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
4 
 
I.  REDISTRICTING BACKGROUND——HOW WE GOT HERE 
¶270 I begin by answering the question that many are 
probably asking:  why is the Wisconsin Supreme Court involved in 
drawing maps in the first place?  The short story is as follows. 
¶271 The Wisconsin Constitution requires the legislature to 
draw new state legislative maps after the federal census every 
ten years.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  This means the 
legislature must enact new maps into law, which requires the 
governor's signature or an override of the governor's veto.  
Wis. Const. art. V, § 10.  In 2011, after the 2010 census, the 
legislature did enact new maps into law.  See 2011 Wis. Act 43 
(state legislative maps); 2011 Wis. Act 44 (congressional maps).  
Following the 2020 census, however, the governor and legislature 
could not agree on district lines and, thus, no maps were 
enacted.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶2, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Johnson I).  The 2011 maps remained 
the law.  
¶272 In 2021, this court entered the fray at the request of 
a group of voters.  Johnson, No. 2021AP1450-OA, Order (Wis. 
Sept. 22, 2021).  Given the constitutional right of citizens to 
proportionate representation following updated census numbers,1 
we were asked to fill the void and adopt temporary maps (what I 
will call "remedial maps") reflecting population changes.  We 
invited almost anyone to participate in the litigation as a 
party, including interest groups, voters, elected officials, the 
                                                 
1 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); State ex 
rel. Att'y Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 484, 51 N.W. 724 
(1892). 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
5 
 
Governor, and the Legislature.  Id.  Each party briefed us on 
all relevant legal requirements, including contiguity.  In the 
end, we adopted remedial maps for use until either new maps are 
enacted into law or a new census triggers the constitutional 
duty to reapportion again.  Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶3.  
To this day, the governor and legislature have not complied with 
their constitutional obligation to enact new maps into law, so 
the remedial maps remain in place. 
¶273 It is important to understand that when a court draws 
legislative maps, it is not making new law.  When this court 
adopted new maps two years ago, it only imposed a temporary 
legal remedy. 
It is the legislature's responsibility to 
"district anew" through the legislative process.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 3.  The constitution does not contemplate courts 
drawing maps in the ordinary course.  Redistricting is, after 
all, "an inherently political and legislative——not judicial——
task."  Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶10, 249 
Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537.  We step in if and only if the 
political process fails.   
¶274 In Johnson I, we concluded that remedial maps should 
be based on the last maps enacted into law, and that they should 
only modify what is necessary to remedy any constitutional 
violations.  399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶76-78.  This respects the 
constitutional role of the political branches and keeps the 
judiciary out of policymaking to the maximum amount possible.  
Id.  Thus, our aim was to alter existing law only as necessary 
to vindicate the constitutional rights at stake, and no more.  
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
6 
 
Additionally, we concluded that partisan outcomes would not and 
should not guide our decision, and that partisan gerrymandering 
is neither a cognizable nor justiciable legal claim under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶¶39-63.  We further agreed with 
all the parties and held that when annexation creates municipal 
islands, "the district containing detached portions of the 
municipality is legally contiguous even if the area around the 
island is part of a different district."  Id., ¶36. 
¶275 Now, a year and a half after the dust settled, the 
petitioners come to us requesting a do-over.  They raise several 
claims regarding the remedial maps we adopted in Johnson.  But 
in timing and substance, the petitioners have proven their goal 
is to obtain new maps that give more political power in the 
state legislature to Democratic Party candidates.2  The majority 
has the same goal, but sidestepped taking this issue directly 
when 
it 
chose 
not 
to 
hear 
the 
petitioners' 
partisan 
gerrymandering claim.  Clarke v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2023AP1399-OA, Order (Wis. Oct. 6, 2023).  Rather, the court has 
chosen to shift the political balance of power indirectly by 
tossing out the maps adopted barely two years ago and drawing 
new ones more to its liking.   
¶276 The court today rests its conclusion on the grounds 
that maps must be physically contiguous.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 24.  
                                                 
2 The petition alleges that the remedial maps we adopted in 
Johnson harmed the petitioners because they cannot "achieve a 
Democratic majority in the state legislature."  Clarke v. Wis. 
Elections Comm’n, 2023AP1399-OA, Petition at 8, ¶5 (Aug. 2, 
2023). 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
7 
 
The court also holds that it will not confine its remedy to 
curing the purported unlawfulness, but will fashion new maps 
from scratch.  Id., ¶56.  It sees itself as being empowered to 
"district anew," even though the constitution gives that 
responsibility to the legislature.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  
Further, the court holds that political outcomes should, and 
will, guide its decision.3  Id., ¶¶69-71.  Each of these 
overrules and departs from our decision in Johnson.   
¶277 All in all, the court's opinion ignores inconvenient 
facts and issues, mischaracterizes the relevant arguments, and 
finds dubious grounds on which to achieve its politically 
motivated goals.4  And to boot, the remedial process we now 
embark on is hazy at best, and perfectly tailored for political 
manipulation.  An odd recipe for "fair" maps.  
                                                 
3 The majority also says that the petitioners' partisan 
gerrymandering 
claim 
is 
an 
"unresolved 
legal 
question."  
Majority op., ¶7.  It is not.  Johnson did address it, because 
we needed to address all relevant legal requirements necessary 
to draw lawful maps.  2021 WI 87, ¶¶53-63, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469.  The majority here, like it does elsewhere, simply 
ignores statements and holdings that do not support its goals——
now or in the future. 
4 Take, for example, the majority's conclusion that it is 
"immediately apparent, using practically any dictionary, that 
contiguous means 'touching' or 'in actual contact.'"  Majority 
op., ¶16.  Seems simple enough.  But a cursory look under the 
hood reveals quite a different picture.  As Justice Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley explains, the respondents pointed us to heaps of 
dictionaries defining contiguity as "very near" or "close" or 
"adjoining."  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶199.  
Maybe those definitions do not comport with the original meaning 
of the contiguity requirement.  But rather than face the issue 
head-on, the majority ducks for cover.   
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
8 
 
II.  THE MAJORITY'S PROCEDURAL ERRORS  
¶278 The 
majority 
opinion 
offers 
only 
a 
perfunctory 
analysis of the significant procedural objections that should 
dispose of this case.  
¶279 Among them, the majority falls woefully short in 
supporting its conclusion that the parties met the requirements 
for standing.  "Standing is the foundational principle that 
those who seek to invoke the court's power to remedy a wrong 
must face a harm which can be remedied by the exercise of 
judicial power."  Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 64, 
¶160, 
403 
Wis. 2d 607, 
976 
N.W.2d 519 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring).  Courts do not have the power to "weigh in on 
issues whenever the respective members of the bench find it 
desirable."  Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. Ass'n, 
Inc., 
2011 
WI 36, 
¶131, 
333 
Wis. 2d 402, 
797 
N.W.2d 789 
(Prosser, J., concurring).  As three members of today's majority 
have previously opined, "standing is important . . . because it 
reins in unbridled attempts to go beyond the circumscribed 
boundaries that define the proper role of courts."  Fabick v. 
Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶92, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting); 
see 
also 
Teigen, 
403 
Wis. 2d 607, ¶160 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (standing "serves 
as a vital check on unbounded judicial power").  
¶280 So what is the harm being claimed here?  The 
petitioner-voters say they suffer the harm of a "less responsive 
and representative" legislature because of the contiguity 
deficiency.  That is, they are claiming that legislators 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
9 
 
representing districts with municipal islands (the detached 
parts of a municipality) surrounded by another district are less 
able to respond to the constituents residing in those islands.  
Given that almost all of the challenged municipal islands have a 
population smaller than the roster of the Milwaukee Brewers, and 
that the citizens living in them are kept in the same district 
as the rest of their municipality, this alleged harm might 
charitably be called a head-scratcher.  The majority surely 
recognizes this, so it goes another route.  It quotes State ex 
rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman for the proposition that the Governor 
"may challenge the constitutionality of a state reapportionment 
plan as a violation of state constitutional rights of the 
citizens."5  Majority op., ¶39.  Then, it argues that because the 
Governor has standing, there's no need to consider the standing 
problems of the other parties seeking relief.  Id. 
¶281 But relying on the Governor here does not work.  Under 
claim preclusion, and other equitable bars,6 the Governor cannot 
                                                 
5 22 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964). 
6 My colleagues lay out a convincing case for judicial 
estoppel as well.  Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶143-46; 
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶¶247-57.  Judicial 
estoppel generally precludes parties from convincing a court to 
adopt a position in one case, only to take an inconsistent 
position in a later case.  See State v. Harrison, 2020 WI 35, ¶27, 
391 Wis. 2d 161, 942 N.W.2d 310.  The majority says the Governor's 
changed position on contiguity arises from inadvertence or 
mistake, but as Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent 
explains, his "about-face" is a "textbook example of when 
judicial estoppel applies."  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's 
dissent, ¶257.   
In addition, the Governor and the petitioners deliberately 
delayed bringing this case until August 2, 2023, the day after a 
new justice joined the court.  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
10 
 
litigate contiguity again and should be dismissed from the case.7  
And it's not a close call.   
¶282 The 
Governor's 
legal 
positions 
throughout 
this 
redistricting 
litigation 
saga 
are 
astonishing; 
any 
other 
litigant in any other lawsuit would be promptly dismissed from 
the case.  In Johnson, the Governor initially argued that the 
constitution's 
contiguity 
requirement 
mandated 
physical 
contiguity, just like the petitioners argue in this case.8  Then, 
the Governor changed course and agreed with all the other 
parties that keeping municipalities together did not violate the 
contiguity requirement.9  We agreed and so held, and invited map 
proposals consistent with our decision.  Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶36; id., ¶87 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  The 
Governor then submitted proposed remedial maps with municipal 
islands——the very thing the Governor now argues violates the 
                                                                                                                                                             
lays out a strong case that laches, which bars litigants from 
sitting on their hands to the detriment of others, also 
prohibits the relief being sought.  Justice Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley's dissent, ¶¶231-46. 
7 Claim preclusion also bars the Governor's separation-of-
powers claim because he could have argued in Johnson that 
adopting the Legislature's proposed maps would be unlawful on 
this basis. 
8 In his initial brief in Johnson, he argued that contiguous 
"means not 'made up of two or more pieces of detached 
territory.'"  Brief of Intervenor-Respondent Governor Tony Evers 
at 6, No. 2021AP1450-OA (Oct. 25, 2021) (quoting another 
source). 
9 All parties eventually stipulated that municipal islands 
"are legally contiguous with the municipality to which the 
'island' belongs" and therefore do not affront Article IV's 
contiguity requirement.  Johnson, No. 2021AP1450-OA, Joint 
Stipulations of Law 15, ¶20 (Nov. 4, 2021).   
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
11 
 
constitution!10  And in briefing regarding the other map 
proposals, which also contained municipal islands, the Governor 
never questioned their legality——even though he was invited to 
address any and all legal deficiencies in those proposals.  
Johnson, No. 2021AP1450-OA, Order (Wis. Nov. 17, 2021).   
¶283 Yet the Governor now tells us that our judicial remedy 
violates the constitution's contiguity requirement.  Lady 
Justice may be blind, but she need not let a party pull the wool 
over her eyes.  The doctrine of claim preclusion exists to 
prevent this kind of gamesmanship.  Parties cannot relitigate 
"any claim that arises out of the same relevant facts, 
transactions or occurrences" underlying a final judgment on the 
merits.  Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 WI 62, ¶23, 387 
Wis. 2d 213, 928 N.W.2d 555 (quoting another source).  This 
applies to claims that were litigated, and to claims that could 
have been litigated.  Id.  Claim preclusion is not concerned 
simply with the initial cause of action, but rather, the 
"transaction or factual situation."  Id., ¶31.  A "transaction" 
involves "a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative 
facts."  Id., ¶32.  When we ask "if the claims of an action 
arise from a single transaction, we may consider whether the 
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation."  Id. 
(quoting another source). 
¶284 The 
Governor's 
flip-flopping 
is 
classic 
claim 
preclusion.  The Governor came before this court to litigate how 
                                                 
10 https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1fPl8On9q8ZyTa6A
1V3CJDzry3YR_pGNt≪=43.04928877881408%2C-
89.34731737718982&z=12.  
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
12 
 
to remedy malapportionment; argued that contiguity permits 
municipal islands; submitted maps (that this court initially 
adopted) containing dozens of municipal islands; and now, in a  
subsequent action, complains that this court's remedy violated 
the constitution because its map contained municipal islands.  
This argument was litigated in Johnson.  And even if it wasn't, 
it obviously could have been litigated.  If the legislature's 
proposed maps that we ultimately adopted violated the contiguity 
requirements, the Governor could have said so.  He did not; no 
one did.  The Governor is barred by claim preclusion from 
litigating the issues before us again.  
¶285 Courts do not usually welcome Harvey Dent impressions 
from litigants before them.  The majority, however, is just fine 
with it. It argues that claim preclusion does not apply because 
the causes of action were different.  Majority op., ¶¶47-48.  
We're told that Johnson was about the 2011 maps, but this case 
is about the maps we adopted in our Johnson decision.  Different 
maps, different facts, they say.  But this makes no sense.  
Imagine how this would play out in a contract dispute.  If 
parties stipulate to a breach of contract but litigate the 
contractual remedies, claim preclusion would apply to the 
remedial claims that were and could have been litigated.  A 
party could not come back later, file a new case, and seek a 
modified remedy because it made ill-advised arguments about the 
contractual remedies the first time.  So too here.   
¶286 The Johnson litigation arose because the 2011 maps 
were no longer lawful.  The case was entirely about the legal 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
13 
 
and equitable principles that must govern remedial maps, and 
which remedial maps should be adopted.  The petition here is 
nothing more than a continuation of Johnson.  It simply seeks a 
different remedy to address the ongoing unlawfulness of the last 
maps enacted into law——those passed in 2011.  Contrary to the 
majority's conclusion, the facts here are part of the same 
common nucleus of facts:  the nature and substance of the 
judicial remedy that must be in place due to the continued 
unlawfulness of the 2011 maps.   
¶287 If the majority is correct that the only transaction 
in Johnson was the malapportionment problem with the 2011 maps, 
then almost everything litigated in that case was part of a 
different transaction that apparently could not have been 
litigated in any preclusive way.  The Voting Rights Act?  
Different transaction, despite a decision from the U.S. Supreme 
Court and two decisions from this court on the matter.  
Political impact as a relevant consideration in remedial maps?  
Different set of facts apparently, despite published decisions 
from this court addressing the issue.  If the majority is right 
that we look only to the narrow legal argument made rather than 
the factual situation, then everything that this court says and 
decides in this case, other than the contiguity issue itself, 
will lack preclusive effect.  That's absurd, of course.  The 
majority's attempt to get past claim preclusion by defining the 
set of facts so narrowly disrupts the law and does not withstand 
scrutiny. 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
14 
 
¶288 Given this, I do not see how the court can bypass the 
voter standing problems by relying on the Governor's purported 
authority to challenge a districting plan.  Even if the Governor 
has standing to litigate on behalf of Wisconsinites to ensure a 
districting plan complies with the constitution, this does not 
end the matter.  The question the majority must answer——but does 
not——is whether the Governor has the right to litigate on behalf 
of Wisconsin voters over and over again, taking different 
positions each time, until he gets the result he wants.  The 
ordinary application of claim preclusion prohibits the Governor 
from relitigating the issues he either raised or could have 
raised during the last litigation.  The majority's standing 
decision——resting on a party that should be dismissed——once 
again looks like an outcome in search of a theory.   
¶289 Next, the majority ignores the impropriety of the 
court issuing an injunction on our own injunction.  The majority 
enjoins the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using the 
legislative maps that we, just 20 months ago, mandated they use.  
Majority op., ¶¶3, 77.  I've never seen anything quite like it.  
The general rule is that judgments——and injunctions along with 
them——are final and, absent fraud, cannot be collaterally 
attacked.  Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 
WI 30, ¶28, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652.  This case is 
exactly that——an impermissible collateral attack on a prior, 
final case.   
¶290 The majority's response is that courts regularly 
modify 
prior 
injunctions 
in 
redistricting 
cases 
without 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
15 
 
reopening old cases.  Majority op., ¶54.  This is true, but only 
because there is an intervening event every ten years:  the U.S. 
Census. 
 
And 
following 
completion 
of 
the 
census, 
the 
constitution requires that population shifts be accounted for 
afresh.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  So when courts issue a new 
injunction in new redistricting cases, they do so because the 
law provides that every districting plan, whether adopted by a 
court or the legislature, must be updated following the census.  
Id.  That is not the case here.     
¶291 The majority also zooms by the question of whether we 
can even issue a declaratory judgment in the first place.  I 
have serious doubts.  The purpose of the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments 
Act 
is 
to 
resolve 
uncertainty. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.04(12).  The Act evinces a strong preference for that 
goal.  See Wis. Stat. §§  806.04(5) (the enumerated subject 
matter upon which courts can declare rights can only be expanded 
where the judgment would "remove an uncertainty"); 806.04(6) 
(courts may refuse to render declaratory judgments where the 
judgment "would not terminate the uncertainty").  These textual 
clues 
have 
been 
"universally 
accepted 
by 
courts 
and 
commentators" as prohibiting courts from issuing declaratory 
judgments 
that 
revisit 
prior 
adjudications——a 
move 
that 
perpetuates uncertainty, rather than resolves it (as this case 
exemplifies).  Oregonian Publ'g Co., LLC v. Waller, 293 
P.3d 1046, 1052 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); see also Royal v. Royal, 
271 S.E.2d 144, 145 (Ga. 1980) ("The Act does not authorize a 
petitioner to brush aside previous judgments of the same court, 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
16 
 
and seek a determination of his rights as if they had never been 
adjudicated.") (cleaned up); E.H. Schopler, Validity and effect 
of former judgment or decree as proper subject for consideration 
in declaratory action, 154 A.L.R. 740 (Originally published in 
1945) ("As a general observation from the cases, it may be 
stated that an action for a declaratory judgment cannot be used 
as a subterfuge for the purpose of relitigating a question as to 
which a former judgment is conclusive.").  True to form, the 
majority never wrestles with this. 
III.  THE MAJORITY'S REMEDIAL ERRORS 
¶292 The 
majority 
pushes 
past 
all 
these 
procedural 
roadblocks and still declares the maps this court adopted 
unconstitutional.  With remarkably little content, it then gives 
the parties vague directions on what it wants for the new maps 
it intends to adopt.   
¶293 The court first overturns Johnson's least change 
approach to redistricting.  Majority op., ¶63.  The majority 
then discards the policy choices the legislature made in passing 
the 2011 districting law still on the books, and determines it 
can and should draft a new law from scratch, consistent with its 
own policy concerns.  The majority never grapples with the 
limited remedial powers of courts, which is the main idea 
animating the least change approach.  That's because here, the 
majority sees itself as a substitute legislature rather than a 
court.  The majority does not try to fix the contiguity 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
17 
 
problems; it uses its contiguity holding as an excuse to create 
new maps reflecting its own policy and partisan concerns.   
¶294 In particular, the majority says "partisan impact" 
will guide its decision in selecting new remedial maps.  But 
what does this mean?  Should the maps maximize the number of 
competitive districts?  Should the maps seek to achieve 
something close to proportionate representation?11  Should the 
maps pick some reasonable number of acceptable Republican and 
Democratic-leaning seats in each legislative chamber?  I have no 
idea, and neither do the parties.  The court nonetheless invites 
the submission of maps motivated by partisan goals, just as the 
petitioners hoped.  And with a certain amount of gusto, the 
majority insists it is being neutral by openly seeking maps 
aimed at tilting the partisan balance in the legislature.  The 
court announces it does not have "free license to enact[12] maps 
that privilege one political party over another," all the while 
obliging the wishes of litigants who openly seek to privilege 
one political party over another.  Majority op., ¶70.  The irony 
could not be any thicker. 
¶295 The court does not provide any meaningful guidance to 
the parties on how to satisfy its "political impact" criteria.13  
                                                 
11 For an excellent discussion of the problems with this 
approach, see Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶¶223-
25. 
12 Courts do not enact anything, however.  The legislature, 
in our constitutional order, enacts laws.   
13 This even though the petitioners urged us during oral 
argument to give "clear instructions" regarding the criteria we 
would use to evaluate proposals. 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
18 
 
No standards, no metrics, nothing.  Instead, it appears the 
majority wishes to hide behind two "consultants" who will make 
recommendations on which maps are preferable.  Those consultants 
will presumably use some standards to make this kind of 
judgment,14 but the majority will not permit them to be subject 
to discovery or witness examination.15  Like the great and 
powerful Oz, our consultants will dispense wisdom without 
allowing the parties to see and question what is really behind 
the curtain.  And at the end of this, the consultants will offer 
options from which the court can choose.  This attempt at 
insulating the court from being transparent about its decisional 
process is hiding in plain sight.   
¶296 The 
court 
also 
fails 
to 
interact 
with 
the 
constitutional requirement that districts "be bounded by county, 
precinct, town or ward lines."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.  
Currently, districts that are not physically contiguous are that 
way because the legislature (and courts) have attempted to 
comply with the requirement that counties, towns, and wards not 
                                                 
14 One of the experts has already opined on how he thinks 
partisan fairness should be measured.  Brief of Professors Gary 
King, Bernard Grofman, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 
U.S. 399 (2006), 2006 WL 53994. 
15 To the extent the consultants either pick which party's 
map is best or compose their own, they may be acting as court-
appointed experts.  Our rules of evidence expressly give parties 
the opportunity to depose and cross-examine court-appointed 
experts.  Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1); see Martin v. Mabus, 700 
F. Supp. 327, 331 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (permitting parties to 
depose court-appointed expert who assisted court in drawing new 
electoral maps). 
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
19 
 
be 
split——thus, 
keeping 
municipal 
islands 
in 
the 
same 
legislative district as the rest of the municipality.  The court 
now determines that strict compliance with contiguity is 
required, but it ignores how that may be in tension with the 
equally required constitutional command to keep county, town, 
and ward lines sacrosanct.  See State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 2d 440, 521, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).  While 
absolute compliance with the "bounded by" clause is impossible 
given the one-person, one-vote decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, a return to a more exacting constitutional 
standard would likely prohibit running districts across county 
lines, or breaking up towns or wards (of which municipalities 
are composed) unless necessary to comply with Supreme Court 
precedent.  This could conflict with strict physical contiguity.   
¶297 In the past, the legislature and the courts permitted 
some play in the joints, allowing deviation from strict physical 
contiguity to keep towns and municipalities together.  But in 
demanding perfect adherence to physical contiguity, the court 
once again pits the two requirements against each other.  Will 
we receive maps that accomplish physical contiguity, but do not 
comply with the requirement that county lines not be crossed, 
towns 
not 
be 
broken 
up, 
and 
ward 
lines 
(from 
which 
municipalities are constructed) not be split?  If so, will the 
court bless one constitutional infirmity to remedy the other?  
In requiring strict physical contiguity, the majority may end up 
picking and choosing which constitutional provisions to honor 
based on which ones will serve its goals.    
No.  2023AP1399.bh 
 
20 
 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
¶298 Although this litigation is not yet over, it is clear 
to me that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not well equipped to 
undertake redistricting cases without a set of rules governing 
the process.  In Jensen, this court recognized the need for 
special procedures governing future redistricting cases.  249 
Wis. 2d 706, ¶20.  We received a rule petition seeking to do 
exactly that prior to Johnson, but this court could not come to 
an agreement about what such a process would look like or 
whether we should have one.  I believed then, and am now fully 
convinced, that some formalized process is desperately needed 
before we are asked to do this again. 
¶299 The problem with this and the Johnson case is that the 
parties were and are largely concerned with serving their own 
interests.  In Johnson, for example, we asked the parties to 
propose constitutionally compliant maps that made the fewest 
changes from existing law.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶87 
(Hagedorn, J., concurring).  From my vantage point, none of the 
parties followed our directive well.  Each submitted maps that 
sought their own parochial and partisan interests, making many 
unnecessary changes, while trying to stay somewhat close to the 
prior maps.  In this case, I have no doubt we will see the same 
kind of partisan maneuvering, which the court here explicitly 
invites.  This is a mistake.   
¶300 Having parties submit maps also leaves little space 
for factual determinations in adjudicating Voting Rights Act 
issues.  While federal panels handling redistricting cases can 
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take and receive evidence, manage discovery, and are otherwise 
institutionally equipped to make factual findings, we have no 
easy mechanism for resolving complicated factual questions.  And 
our process last time simply did not account for the fact-
intensive VRA adjudication the Supreme Court said was necessary.  
See Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 
403-04 (2022) (per curiam).  The majority in this case barely 
mentions the VRA, but that doesn't mean it won't be a problem 
down the line.  Whether the parties submit maps that are race-
neutral, or determine the VRA requires race-conscious line 
drawing, could pose a significant problem.  The court gives no 
instruction on how to handle this, and we have no mechanism in 
place for resolving these disputes.   
¶301 Perhaps a better approach in the future is for the 
court to draw a politically agnostic and race-neutral base map 
using the most recent maps enacted into law, and then allow the 
parties to seek refinements.  No matter the approach, without 
any kind of structure to govern a case that is plainly our 
responsibility, this court is left to the whims of partisan 
agendas.  This has not——and will not——serve us well.  An orderly 
and predictable process may also incentivize the regular 
enactment of new maps into law the way the constitution 
envisions, rather than litigating over every inch of political 
power.     
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V.  CONCLUSION 
¶302 In a politically charged world, the judiciary should 
be a bulwark against the tribalism so prevalent among us.  We 
should neutrally and consistently apply our rules of judicial 
process, no matter where that leads us.  We should have no 
favored litigants or preferred outcomes.  At the end of the day, 
the majority acts not to vindicate some legal principle, but to 
achieve a long sought-after goal:  the redistribution of 
political power in the Wisconsin legislature.  Rather than start 
with the law and see it through to the end, the court starts 
with the goal and works backwards to justify it.  This is not 
faithful judging, and I will have no part of it.  I dissent.       
 
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