Title: Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water District

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
EUGENE G. PLANTIER, as Trustee, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S243360 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D069798 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2014-00083195-CU-BT-CTL 
 
 
May 30, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
S243360 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Before a local governmental agency may impose or 
increase certain property-related fees and charges, it must 
notify affected property owners and hold a public hearing.  The 
hearing requirement arises from article XIII D, section 6 of the 
California Constitution,1 which was added in 1996 by 
Proposition 218.2  The question here is a narrow one.  When an 
agency considers increasing a property-related fee, must a fee 
payor challenging the method of fee allocation first exhaust 
“administrative remedies” by participating in a Proposition 218 
hearing that addresses only a proposed rate increase?  The 
answer is no.  Even if a Proposition 218 hearing could be 
considered an administrative remedy, it would not provide an 
adequate remedy for a challenge to the method used to allocate 
the fee burden in this case. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The representative plaintiffs in this class action are 
commercial property owners seeking to invalidate a wastewater 
service charge imposed by the Ramona Municipal Water District 
                                        
1 Unspecified references to “article” refer to articles of the 
California Constitution.   
2 The terms “fee” and “charge” as used in Proposition 218 are 
synonymous (Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 205, 214, fn. 4) and are used interchangeably 
throughout this opinion. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
(the District).  They claim the District’s method for calculating 
the charge violates one of the substantive requirements of 
Proposition 218.  The District contends the suit is barred 
because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
by raising their challenge at public hearings on proposed 
increases to the rate charged for services.  The trial court agreed 
with the District but the Court of Appeal reversed and allowed 
the action to proceed. 
A. 
The District’s Wastewater Service Charge 
The District provides water and wastewater (sewer) 
services to businesses and residents in an unincorporated area 
of San Diego County.  It operates two wastewater treatment 
plants that together serve at least 6,891 parcels. 
The District is organized under the Municipal Water 
District Law of 1911 (Wat. Code, § 71000 et seq.) and is 
authorized to set, revise, and collect charges for services.  (Wat. 
Code, § 71670.)  Under the District’s legislative code, sewer 
charges are based on an “Equivalent Dwelling Unit” (EDU) 
method.  An EDU is a measure that equates to 200 gallons of 
daily sewage.  The EDU assignment method is used to allocate 
fees proportionally to different parcels that require greater or 
lesser services.  Most single-family homes are assigned one 
EDU, as is each dwelling unit in a condominium or townhouse.  
Commercial parcels are assigned EDUs by a schedule 
containing over 20 categories of commercial properties, like 
restaurants, hotels, and office buildings.  The EDU for 
commercial parcels is based upon factors that differ depending 
upon the parcel’s use.  These factors include the square footage 
of a restaurant or office building, the number of beds in a 
hospital, and the number of guest rooms in a hotel. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
A parcel’s annual sewer charge is calculated by 
multiplying the parcel’s assigned EDUs by a “per-EDU” rate.3  
Thus, the charge consists of two components: the number of 
assigned EDUs and the applicable per-EDU rate.  The sewer 
charge typically appears on a parcel’s property tax bill.  The 
EDU assignment method treats properties individually based 
on each parcel’s use.  It is different from the rate, which is the 
same for all fee payors served by a particular treatment plant.  
Some fee payors will have a larger sewer charge than others.  
This discrepancy is driven by the EDU assignment method, not 
by imposition of different rates. 
The District reviews its operations and maintenance costs 
annually.  After review in 2012, 2013, and 2014, the District 
sought to increase its rates to cover costs.  To comply with 
Proposition 218, the District mailed out notices and held what 
it describes as “Proposition 218 hearings.”  
In each of those years, property owners were notified of an 
intended rate increase.  The proposed changes involved only the 
rate and not the method of assigning EDUs to parcels.  The 2012 
and 2013 notices made no mention of the EDU assignment 
method.  The 2014 notice included a brief paragraph explaining 
the EDU system but gave no indication the District was 
considering any change in how EDUs are assigned. 
All notices stated that “[a]ny property owner or any tenant 
directly responsible for the payment of” sewer fees could submit 
a written protest to the “proposed increases in the rates and 
fees . . . .”  The District informed property owners that its board 
                                        
3 A different rate is used for each of the District’s two treatment 
plants. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
of directors would “hear and consider” all written and oral 
protests “to the proposed rate increases” at the scheduled public 
hearing.  (Italics added.)  Property owners were told that the 
District would be authorized to impose the proposed rates unless 
it received protests from a majority of affected fee payors. 
The District received fewer than 15 written protests to 
proposed rate increases in 2012, 2013, and 2014.  None of the 
written protests challenged the EDU system for calculating a 
parcel’s sewer charge (number of assigned EDUs x per-EDU 
rate) or the method of allocating EDUs.  The District adopted 
the proposed rate increases at the close of each public hearing. 
B. 
Plantier’s Objection to the EDU Assignment Method 
Since 1998, Eugene Plantier has owned a restaurant 
served by the District.4  In early 2012, the District concluded the 
restaurant released significant amounts of grease into the sewer 
system.  It also learned it had assigned only 2.0 EDUs to the 
parcel instead of the 6.82 EDUs it deemed were more 
appropriate based upon the property’s size and use.  In June 
2012, the District notified Plantier that the EDUs assigned to 
his property were being changed from 2.0 to 6.82, resulting in a 
substantial fee increase. 
Plantier objected.  In a July 2012 letter to the District, his 
counsel urged that the assignment of EDUs based upon building 
square footage was “arbitrary and discriminatory.”  Counsel 
expressed the intention to “exhaust [Plantier’s] administrative 
remedies before proceeding to Judicial Review.”  In August 
2012, Plantier met with the District’s general manager and 
questioned the practice of assigning EDUs based upon square 
                                        
4 Ownership of the property is currently held by a family trust. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
footage rather than actual water use.  Plantier’s objection was 
placed on the board of directors meeting agenda. 
The board ultimately considered the matter in December 
2012.  A consumer advocacy group wrote to the board on 
Plantier’s behalf urging that the EDU-based rate structure 
violates the proportionality requirement of Proposition 218, 
which specifies that a property-related fee or charge may not 
exceed the proportional cost of the service provided to the 
property.  (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (b)(3).)  Plantier and advocacy 
group representatives spoke at the meeting.  The District denied 
each of Plantier’s claims, including his objection to the EDU 
assignment method. 
In November 2013, Plantier and two other commercial 
property owners5 submitted an administrative claim with the 
District alleging that the EDU assignment method violates 
Proposition 218’s proportionality requirement.  The board 
rejected the claim. 
C. 
Procedural History 
Following the board’s denial, Plantier and the two other 
commercial property owners (collectively, plaintiffs) sued the 
District in a putative class action.  Plaintiffs allege the EDU 
assignment method violates Proposition 218 because the charge 
“is imposed without regard to the proportional cost of providing 
a property with wastewater service.”  They seek declaratory 
relief and a refund of unlawful charges.  The trial court certified 
                                        
5 The other property owners are Progressive Properties 
Incorporated, which owns an office building, and Premium 
Development, LLC, which owns two different commercial 
entities. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
a class consisting of District customers who paid a sewer charge 
on or after November 22, 2012. 
The court bifurcated the bench trial.  The first phase 
addressed the potentially dispositive issue of whether plaintiffs 
had exhausted their available administrative remedies before 
suing.  The District conceded that the plaintiffs exhausted one 
remedy by submitting their November 2013 claim.  The only 
remaining question was whether Proposition 218 imposes yet 
another exhaustion requirement that plaintiffs had not 
satisfied. 
The trial court concluded that Proposition 218 created an 
additional unexhausted remedy.  It relied in part upon Wallich’s 
Ranch Co. v. Kern County Citrus Pest Control Dist. (2001) 87 
Cal.App.4th 878 (Wallich’s Ranch).  The Wallich’s Ranch court 
held that a party seeking to challenge an assessment under the 
Citrus Pest District Control Law (Food & Agr. Code, § 8401 et 
seq.; Pest Control Law) must first exhaust remedies by raising 
its challenge at the agency’s annual budget hearing, thus 
allowing the agency to respond, formulate a resolution, and 
modify its budget if necessary.  (Wallich’s Ranch, at p. 885.)  The 
court here reasoned that Wallich’s Ranch applies because the 
Proposition 218 hearing procedure is inextricably intertwined 
with the District’s annual budget process, which reviews costs 
and determines the need for revisions in fees.  It noted that 
Proposition 218 requires the local agency to “consider all 
protests” (art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2)) at the public hearing 
required before fees are increased but that the agency obviously 
could not consider a protest that was never made. 
It was undisputed that none of the representative 
plaintiffs participated in the Proposition 218 rate increase 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
hearings by either submitting a written protest or speaking at a 
hearing.6  It was also undisputed that the District did not 
receive a single written or oral protest objecting to the EDU 
assignment method at the hearings conducted in 2012, 2013, 
and 2014.  
 Plaintiffs’ counsel urged that any protest at these 
Proposition 218 hearings would have been futile.  Counsel cited 
the District’s repeated rejection of the EDU assignment 
challenge at various meetings and in response to plaintiffs’ 
administrative claim.  The trial court rejected the futility 
argument because District witnesses testified that any 
challenge to the EDU assignment method would have received 
careful consideration at the Proposition 218 hearings. 
 The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that plaintiffs’ 
class action is not barred by their failure to participate in the 
hearings.  The appellate court reasoned that a challenge to a fee 
on the ground it violates one of the substantive requirements of 
article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b) exceeds the scope of a 
Proposition 218 hearing limited to protests over whether a 
proposed fee should be imposed or increased.  (See art. XIII D, 
§ 6, subd. (a).)  Further, even if plaintiffs’ challenge did come 
within the scope of a hearing, any remedy it afforded is 
inadequate.  According to the appellate court, it is implausible 
that a majority of parcel owners would submit written protests 
under the circumstances presented here to trigger the majority 
                                        
6 As used in this opinion, “participation” in a Proposition 218 
hearing refers to either submitting a written protest or speaking 
at the hearing.  Even under the District’s view that a 
Proposition 218 hearing is an administrative remedy that must 
be exhausted, neither the District nor plaintiffs suggest that 
mere attendance at a hearing suffices as participation. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
protest remedy of article XIII D, section 6, and invalidate a 
proposed fee or fee increase.  Addressing Proposition 218’s 
requirement that an agency “ ‘consider all protests’ at the public 
meeting,” the court stated that “merely having an agency 
consider a protest—without more—is insufficient to create a 
mandatory exhaustion requirement.”  The Court of Appeal 
concluded that Wallich’s Ranch is distinguishable. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We granted review to resolve whether a fee payor seeking 
to challenge an agency’s method of calculating a property-
related fee must first participate in a Proposition 218 public 
hearing at which the agency considers a proposed rate increase.  
Review is de novo.  (See Greene v. Marin County Flood Control 
& Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 287; Citizens 
for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 865, 
873.) 
A. 
Proposition 218 
Proposition 218, approved by voters in 1996, is one of a 
series of voter initiatives restricting the ability of state and local 
governments to impose taxes and fees.  (Jacks v. City of Santa 
Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 258–260.)  The first of these 
measures was Proposition 13, adopted in 1978, which limited ad 
valorem7 property taxes to 1 percent of a property’s assessed 
valuation and limited annual increases in valuation to 2 percent 
without a change in ownership.  (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, 
at p. 258; art. XIII A, §§ 1, 2.)  To prevent local governments 
                                        
7 “An ad valorem tax is a tax levied on property in proportion to 
its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal.”  (American 
Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 
1124.) 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
from increasing special taxes to offset restrictions on ad valorem 
property taxes, Proposition 13 prohibited counties, cities, and 
special districts from imposing special taxes without a two-
thirds vote of the electorate.  (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, at 
p. 258; art. XIII A, § 4.)  But local governments were able to 
circumvent Proposition 13’s limitations by relying on Knox v. 
City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132, 141, which held a “special 
assessment” was not a “special tax” within the meaning of 
Proposition 13.  (See Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 839.)  
Consequently, without voter approval, local governments were 
able to increase rates for services by labeling them fees, charges, 
or assessments rather than taxes.  (Ibid.) 
To address these and related concerns, voters approved 
Proposition 218, known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” 
which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California 
Constitution.  (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 259.)  Article XIII C concerns voter approval for many types 
of local taxes other than property taxes.  Article XIII D 
addresses property-based taxes and fees.   
Article XIII D allows only four types of local property 
taxes:  (1) an ad valorem tax, (2) a special tax, (3) an assessment, 
and (4) a property-related fee.  (Art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a).)  
Proposition 218 supplements Proposition 13’s limitations on ad 
valorem and special taxes by placing similar restrictions on 
assessments and property-related fees.  (Apartment Assn. of Los 
Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 
p. 837.) 
Article XIII D imposes distinct procedural and substantive 
limitations.  (§§ 4, 6.)  The procedures an agency must follow 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
before “imposing or increasing any fee or charge” are found in 
subdivision (a) of article XIII D, section 6. 8  An agency seeking 
to impose or increase a property-related fee must hold a hearing 
and send written notice of the hearing to the owner of each 
affected parcel.  (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(1).)  The notice must 
specify the amount of the proposed fee, the basis of calculation, 
and the reason for the fee.  It must note the date, time, and 
location of the public hearing.  (Ibid.)  At that hearing, “the 
agency shall consider all protests against the proposed fee or 
charge.”  (Id., § 6, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)  In addition to 
mandating 
that 
the 
agency 
“consider” 
all 
protests, 
Proposition 218 establishes a majority protest remedy.  “If 
written protests against the proposed fee or charge are 
presented by a majority of owners of the identified parcels, the 
agency shall not impose the fee or charge.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
Article XIII D does not define the term “protest” or explain what 
form a written protest must take.9  Here, well over 3,000 written 
protests would have been required to reject a rate increase. 
Even when an agency is generally authorized to impose or 
modify fees, so long as it complies with the notice and hearing 
                                        
8 Subdivision (c) of article XIII D, section 6 establishes a 
separate procedure applicable to certain property-related fees.  
That procedure does not apply to fees for sewer, water, and 
refuse collection services. 
9 The legislation implementing Proposition 218 does not provide 
any additional guidance concerning the required form or content 
of a written protest.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 53750–53756.)  
However, that legislation does clarify that a written protest may 
be submitted by an owner or tenant of an identified parcel as 
long as only one protest per parcel is counted in determining 
whether the majority protest threshold is met.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 53755, subd. (b).) 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
requirements, Proposition 218 places other substantive 
limitations on the agency.  Those substantive limitations on 
property-related fees appear in subdivision (b) of article XIII D, 
section 6.  Under these limitations: (1) revenues derived from 
the fee may not exceed the cost of providing the property-related 
service (id., § 6, subd. (b)(1)); (2) those revenues may not be used 
for any purpose other than the one for which the fee was 
imposed (id., § 6, subd. (b)(2)); (3) the amount of the fee “shall not 
exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the 
parcel” (id., § 6, subd. (b)(3), italics added); (4) a fee may not be 
imposed for a service unless that service is available to the 
property owner (id., § 6, subd. (b)(4)); and (5) a fee may not be 
imposed upon property owners for a general governmental 
service, like fire protection, if the service is available to the 
general public in substantially the same manner as it is to 
property owners (id., § 6, subd. (b)(5)). 
Plaintiffs’ complaint here turns on the substantive 
proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6, 
subdivision (b)(3), italicized above.  The requirement “ensures 
that the aggregate fee collected on all parcels is distributed 
among those parcels in proportion to the cost of service for each 
parcel.”  (Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 
Cal.App.4th 892, 908.)  The proportionality requirement 
concerns the method used to allocate a property-related service’s 
aggregate cost among fee payors.  It is separate from an agency’s 
obligation not to collect more revenue than necessary to provide 
that service to all identified parcels.  (See art. XIII D, § 6, subd. 
(b)(1).)  Plaintiffs’ complaint here is that the EDU assignment 
method does not properly allocate costs among parcels served. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
B. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Generally, “a party must exhaust administrative remedies 
before resorting to the courts.  [Citations.]  Under this rule, an 
administrative remedy is exhausted only upon ‘termination of 
all 
available, 
nonduplicative 
administrative 
review 
procedures.’ ”  (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. 
v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 1072, 1080; see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal 
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292–293.)  “The rule ‘is not a matter of 
judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure . . . 
binding upon all courts.’ ”  (Campbell v. Regents of University of 
California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.) 
The exhaustion doctrine is primarily grounded on policy 
concerns related to administrative autonomy and judicial 
efficiency.  (See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 377, 391.)  The doctrine favors administrative 
autonomy by allowing an agency to reach a final decision 
without interference from the courts.  (Ibid.)  Unless 
circumstances warrant judicial involvement, allowing a court to 
intervene before an agency has fully resolved the matter would 
“constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of another 
tribunal.”  (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State 
Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1151.)  If exhaustion were 
not required, a litigant would have an incentive to avoid 
securing an agency decision that might later be afforded 
deference.  (See Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of 
Placer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 577, 594.)  Further, creating an 
agency with particular expertise to administer a specific 
legislative scheme would be frustrated if a litigant could bypass 
the agency in the hope of seeking a different decision in court. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
As to judicial efficiency, the doctrine allows an 
administrative agency to provide relief without requiring resort 
to costly litigation.  (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency 
Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 501.)  Even when an 
administrative remedy does not resolve all issues or provide 
complete relief, it still may reduce the scope of litigation.  (See 
Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 
465, 476.)  Requiring a party to pursue an available 
administrative remedy aids judicial review by allowing the 
agency to draw upon its expertise and develop a factual record 
for the court’s consideration.  (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local 
Agency Formation Com., at p. 501.) 
Here, the District claims a Proposition 218 rate hearing is 
an “administrative remedy” plaintiffs were required to exhaust.  
Before considering whether exhaustion is required under these 
particular circumstances, we pause to narrow the inquiry.   
We need not here formulate a general definition that a 
procedure must satisfy to constitute an “administrative 
remedy.”  Such a question may vary among agencies and 
legislative schemes.  For purposes of this analysis, we will 
assume 
that 
a 
Proposition 
218 
rate 
hearing 
is 
an 
“administrative remedy” because that is the way the parties and 
the courts below have framed the issue presented by this 
dispute.  We do not decide the broader question of whether, 
when, and under what circumstances a public comment process 
may be considered an administrative remedy.  We consider only 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
whether these Proposition 218 hearings were adequate to 
resolve plaintiffs’ substantive challenge.10 
Even when a procedure is considered an administrative 
remedy, a party may be excused from exhausting it if an 
exception applies.  (Campbell v. Regents of University of 
California, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 322; see 1 Cal. Administrative 
Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 2018) §§ 3.32–3.48, pp. 3-24 to 3-34.2 
[listing exceptions].)  One recognized exception arises if the 
remedy is inadequate to resolve a challenger’s dispute.  
(Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 
15 Cal.3d 328, 342.) 
As a general matter, a remedy is not adequate unless it 
“establishes clearly defined machinery for the submission, 
evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.”  
(Rosenfield v. Malcolm (1967) 65 Cal.2d 559, 566.)   City of 
Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com. (1989) 210 
Cal.App.3d 1277, 1287 held that a public hearing process did not 
provide an adequate remedy because the agency was not 
required to “do anything in response to submissions or 
testimony received by it incident to those hearings.”  Similarly, 
in City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System 
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 237, a public hearing process 
without “clearly defined procedures” for the conduct of the 
hearing and “no standards for decisionmaking” was determined 
to be inadequate as a remedy. 
                                        
10 This narrow analytical approach is driven in part by the 
unique procedure set forth in Proposition 218.  It should not be 
interpreted to suggest that every public meeting at which a local 
government adopts legislation constitutes an “administrative 
remedy.” 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
The primary procedural remedy afforded by article XIII D, 
section 6, subdivision (a) is that a majority of fee payors may 
reject a new or increased fee by submitting written protests.  
(Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2).)  But a single written protest would 
seldom, if ever, determine whether a proposed fee would be 
rejected.  That is particularly true here, where thousands of 
individual property owners would have to protest in writing to 
meet the rejection threshold. 
Further, the District only gave notice that it sought to 
raise the rate for all parcels serviced.  It gave no notice that it 
was proposing to change the EDU assignment method.  
Accordingly, whatever the result of the public hearings on rates, 
the board essentially would have been without authority to 
modify the assignment method. 
This is so because a change to the method for calculating 
a fee is considered an increase in the fee for purposes of 
Proposition 218 if it results in an increased amount being levied 
on any person or parcel.  (Gov. Code, § 53750, subd. (h)(1)(B).)  
A methodological change in the allocation of costs among fee 
payors will almost always result in some parcels paying a higher 
fee to offset those that will now be required to pay less.  If, 
instead of rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge, the agency determined 
it should change its EDU assignment method, it would have had 
to give notice of an intended change as Proposition 218 requires.  
The notice here, informing fee payors of a proposed rate 
increase, would not permit the agency to tinker with the method 
for calculating the fee, because a fee increase on certain fee 
payors resulting from a methodological change would be beyond 
the scope of the notice. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Here, plaintiffs objected to the sewer charge by urging that 
the EDU assignment method itself violates Proposition 218’s 
proportionality requirement.  They fully adjudicated their 
challenge using the District’s own administrative procedures.  
They now seek judicial intervention to challenge the District’s 
rejection of their request for a change. The noticed Proposition 
218 hearings did not offer them the possibility of any effective 
relief.  If a majority of property owners had rejected a proposed 
fee increase, the District would lose the authority to adopt the 
increase.  The existing charge would have remained in place, 
with the same rate structure, and plaintiffs’ proportionality 
objection would have remained unresolved. 
Even in the absence of a majority protest, the agency is 
still required to “consider all protests against the proposed fee 
or charge” at the public hearing.  (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2).)  
There is some dispute over whether “consider[ing]” all protests 
is a requirement separate from the majority protest procedure.  
Plaintiffs and amicus curiae Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
Association urge that “consider” in this context simply means to 
count all written protests to see if a majority is achieved.  That 
contention is unpersuasive.  Article XIII D, section 6, 
subdivision (a)(2) provides that an agency may not impose a fee 
if a majority of owners present written protests.  It follows that 
an agency must count all qualified protest votes it is required to 
receive.  Further, although an agency is required to count all 
written protests, it must “consider” all protests at the hearing, 
even those not reduced to writing.  (Ibid.)  Thus, to “consider” all 
protests must mean more than simply counting the number of 
written protests.  To interpret “consider all protests” as simply 
a vote-counting requirement would render that language 
redundant.  Interpretations that render statutory language 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
meaningless are to be avoided.  (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1002, 1010.)   
To “consider” means to “think about carefully” or to “take 
into account.”  (Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1987) pp. 
279–280.)  The requirement to “consider all protests” (art. 
XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2)) at a Proposition 218 hearing compels an 
agency to not only receive written protests and hear oral ones, 
but to take all protests into account when deciding whether to 
approve the proposed fee, even if the written protesters do not 
constitute a majority.  The question remains whether requiring 
an agency to “consider all protests” (ibid.) at a public hearing, 
without more, constitutes an adequate administrative remedy 
under the circumstances presented here. 
While Proposition 218 arguably provides a framework to 
hear relevant challenges (see art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2)), a fee 
payor has little control over when or even if its complaints may 
be heard.  Here, it was purely coincidental that the District held 
Proposition 218 rate increase hearings around the same time 
plaintiffs pursued a proportionality challenge to the existing fee 
structure.  The District did so because of the conclusion it 
needed to increase its fees to cover costs.  If the District had 
chosen to delay increasing its rates, there would have been no 
need for a Proposition 218 hearing.  Alternatively, the District 
could have dispensed with a Proposition 218 hearing if it limited 
any fee increases to an adjustment for inflation in compliance 
with Government Code section 53756.  In either case, plaintiffs 
would have had no opportunity to have their methodology 
challenge heard at a Proposition 218 hearing until the District 
ultimately decided to make such a change and notice a hearing 
to consider it. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
Proposition 218 also provides a limited opportunity for an 
agency to evaluate protests.  The requirement that a local 
government “consider all protests” is restricted to considering 
protests “[a]t the public hearing.”  (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(2).)  
While an agency may continue a hearing to allow additional 
time for consideration (see Gov. Code, § 53753, subd. (d)), 
nothing compels the agency to do so.  Further, nothing in 
Proposition 218 or the legislation implementing it defines what 
level of consideration must be given.  A hearing convened to 
consider protests to a proposed rate increase will generally be a 
poor forum for evaluation of an established method for 
allocating fees.  That is particularly true when an objection to 
the method is first raised at the hearing itself.   
We note that plaintiffs’ complaint challenges the existing 
structure for allocating fees, not any proposed new fee or 
increased rate.  The purpose of the notice and hearing 
procedures in article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (a) is to 
provide property owners an opportunity to protest the “proposed 
fee or charge.”  (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(1) & (2), italics added.)  
By contrast, the substantive requirements in section 6, 
subdivision (b) govern existing as well as proposed fees.  Section 
6, subdivision (b) provides that an existing fee may not be 
“extended” without complying with substantive requirements.  
Thus, a Proposition 218 rate increase hearing is not a forum to 
protest an existing rate structure that will remain unchanged 
by the proposal.  The District suggests otherwise, arguing that 
the method for allocating fees is necessarily at issue in a 
Proposition 218 rate increase hearing because that method will 
effectively be reenacted when the proposed rate increase is 
adopted.  That argument misses the mark.  In a hearing called  
only to consider a rate increase, the existing allocation method 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
will be reenacted regardless of whether the rate increase is 
adopted or rejected.  Therefore, the District cannot legitimately 
claim the method for calculating the fee is part of what is being 
newly “proposed,” and thus subject to protest, because that 
method will remain unchanged no matter the outcome of the 
hearing. 
Fundamentally, the Proposition 218 hearings held by the 
District were inadequate because they did not allow the District 
to resolve plaintiffs’ particular dispute.  Even if the District had 
considered the substance of plaintiffs’ proportionality objection 
and concluded it had merit, the District would not have been 
able to address the matter in the context of the pending 
Proposition 218 hearing.  As the District acknowledges, if a valid 
methodological challenge were raised, the most an agency could 
do is formulate a new fee proposal to resolve the challenge and 
initiate a Proposition 218 hearing to consider that proposal.  It 
would be oddly burdensome to require an aggrieved party to 
participate in a Proposition 218 hearing simply to raise an 
objection that could only be addressed meaningfully in a 
separate public hearing that is subject to its own notice 
requirements.  Further, an aggrieved party has no power to 
compel an agency to conduct a public hearing to change the 
method for imposing a fee.  Because nothing requires the agency 
to initiate a new Proposition 218 hearing, there is no guarantee 
a challenge would be addressed even if valid.   
The District argues that “consideration” necessarily 
entails resolving any protests, presumably because objections 
are impliedly either accepted or rejected when an agency’s board 
ultimately votes on a proposed fee.  The contention fails.  
Adoption of a proposed fee increase does not resolve a 
proportionality challenge to a fee’s calculation because the 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
agency is not empowered to change the method by which a fee is 
calculated when considering whether to increase a preexisting 
fee.  An agency’s ultimate decision to adopt or reject a proposed 
rate increase cannot be interpreted as a resolution of all issues 
presented to it. 
The District falls back on the principle that exhaustion of 
remedies is required even if an administrative remedy does not 
dispose of the entire dispute or afford the precise relief sought.  
(See Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501.)  When a party challenges the 
method used to calculate a fee, a Proposition 218 hearing limited 
to a proposed fee increase does not simply offer incomplete relief, 
it offers no relief at all.  Moreover, the purpose for applying the 
exhaustion rule even when complete relief is unavailable is that 
exhaustion of remedies serves to ensure administrative 
autonomy and promote judicial efficiency.  (Sierra Club v. San 
Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com, at p. 501.)  But the 
purposes of the exhaustion rule are not served by the public 
hearing here.  That process does not narrow the scope of the 
claims and relieve the burden on the courts.  It does not promote 
the development of a factual record for review.  And, it does not 
give the administrative agency a meaningful opportunity to 
apply its expertise because the agency will typically have no 
power to modify a proposed fee to address a valid methodological 
challenge.  
For the reasons discussed above, a party may challenge 
the method used to calculate a fee without first having 
participated in a Proposition 218 hearing called to consider a 
rate increase.  Such a hearing does not provide an adequate 
remedy for a methodological challenge.  We do not decide and 
express no view on the broader question of whether a 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
Proposition 218 hearing could ever be considered an 
administrative remedy that must be exhausted before 
challenging the substantive propriety of a fee in court. 
Along with various amici curiae, the District contends that 
allowing a party to sue without having first participated in the 
Proposition 218 hearing process renders that process and the 
duty to consider all protests meaningless.  That is not so.  This 
hearing process did what it is intended to do:  give a majority of 
fee payors the chance to veto a rate increase and ensure the 
decisionmakers are aware of public opposition.  It would be a 
meaningless exercise, however, to require a party to raise a 
methodological challenge at a hearing where the agency has no 
obligation to respond and cannot resolve the challenge. 
As a final matter, it is necessary to address the import of 
Wallich’s Ranch, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 878, the decision relied 
upon by the trial court and distinguished by the Court of Appeal.  
The District cites Wallich’s Ranch for the principle that a 
“remedy exists if the law provides for notice, opportunity to 
protest and a hearing.”  Wallich’s Ranch does not stand for such 
a broad proposition.  But even if it could be interpreted to 
describe a public comment procedure as a “remedy,” it does not 
establish that the mere opportunity to comment at a public 
hearing constitutes an adequate remedy. 
In Wallich’s Ranch, the plaintiff brought an action against 
various agencies seeking a refund of assessments imposed under 
the Pest Control Law.  (Wallich’s Ranch, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 880.)  Although the plaintiff raised a claim that the 
assessments violated Proposition 218, the trial court concluded 
the assessments were not governed by its provisions.  (Id. at p. 
882.)  On appeal, the issue was limited to whether the plaintiff 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
had exhausted available remedies under the Pest Control Law.  
(Id. at pp. 883–885.)  The appellate court concluded the plaintiff 
was 
required 
to 
exhaust 
administrative 
remedies 
by 
participating in the public hearing process associated with the 
adoption of the agency’s annual budget.  (Id. at p. 885.)  The 
court in Wallich’s Ranch had no occasion to consider whether 
Proposition 218 imposes a separate exhaustion requirement.11 
Although the public hearing in Wallich’s Ranch had some 
similarities to the Proposition 218 process, the decision is 
distinguishable. 12  Under the Pest Control Law, an agency must 
adopt a preliminary fiscal year budget and hold a public hearing 
on that budget.  (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 8559–8561.)  Any owner 
of citrus acreage subject to an assessment may protest in 
writing.  (Id., § 8564.)  At the hearing, the agency must “hear 
and pass upon all protests so made and its decision shall be final 
and conclusive.”  (Id., § 8565, italics added.)  The Pest Control 
Law gives the agency the authority to “make such changes in 
the proposed budget as it finds are proper and advisable.”  (Id., 
§ 8566.) 
                                        
11 In distinguishing Wallich’s Ranch, the Court of Appeal noted 
that the plaintiffs here had exhausted the remedy afforded by 
the District’s own legislative code.  By contrast, the plaintiff in 
Wallich’s Ranch had not attempted to exhaust any available 
administrative remedy.  To be clear, our decision does not turn 
on plaintiffs’ exhaustion of administrative remedies set forth in 
the District’s legislative code.  A party must exhaust all 
available nonduplicative remedies.  (Coachella Valley Mosquito 
& Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment 
Relations Bd., supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1080.) 
12 The propriety of the holding in Wallich’s Ranch is not before 
us.  We express no view on whether it was correctly decided. 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
The Pest Control Law not only requires the agency to rule 
upon any protests, it also gives the agency the authority to 
adjust its budget and make any necessary changes in response 
to protests.  (Wallich’s Ranch, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.)  
By contrast, an agency seeking to increase the rate at a 
Proposition 218 hearing has no authority 
to resolve 
methodological challenges or to modify the fee structure.  
In addition, the Pest Control Law affords a property owner 
an opportunity to be heard at least once a year, when an agency 
adopts its fiscal year budget.  (Food & Agr. Code, § 8560.)  
Proposition 218 offers no guarantee a fee payor like Plantier will 
be given an opportunity to be heard in that forum.  It was purely 
serendipitous that plaintiffs brought their proportionality 
challenge around the same time the District held Proposition 
218 hearings to consider increasing its rates.   
Plaintiffs here seek judicial review of their claim that the 
method used to allocate fees among parcels violates a 
substantive limitation imposed by the state Constitution.  It 
would serve no purpose and make little sense to require that, in 
order to do so, they must participate in a hearing convened to 
consider a different question and at which they could not secure 
relief. 
Under appropriate circumstances, the exhaustion doctrine 
appropriately provides a defensive shield for administrative 
agencies to insulate their actions from judicial intervention until 
a challenger gives the agency an opportunity to resolve the 
dispute in the first instance.  Here, however, the District seeks 
to strike down claims not properly encompassed in the 
Proposition 218 rate increase hearings.  In effect, it seeks to use 
PLANTIER v. RAMONA MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
the exhaustion doctrine as a sword rather than a shield.  That 
it cannot do.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water District 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 12 Cal.App.5th 856 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S243360 
Date Filed: May 30, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Timothy B. Taylor 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Patterson Law Group, James R. Patterson, Allison H. Goddard, Catherine S. Wicker; Carlson Lynch Sweet 
Kilpela & Carpenter and Todd D. Carpenter for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle and Laura E. Murray for Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall, Gregory V. Moser, John D. Alessio and Adriana R. 
Ochoa for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Daniel S. Hentschke; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono and Eduardo Jansen for 
League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, California Association of Sanitation 
Agencies, California Special Districts Association and Association of California Water Agencies as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Mary R. Casey; Bertrand, Fox, Elliot, Osman & Wenzel and Thomas F. Bertrand for Main Municipal 
Water District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Allison H. Goddard 
Patterson Law Group 
1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 756-6990 
 
Laura E. Murray 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation 
921 Eleventh Street, Suite 1201 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-9950 
 
Kendra J. Hall 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch 
525 B Street, Suite 2200 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-1900