Title: McClure v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

William Shiloh McCLURE v. STATE of Arkansas

96-1310                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 7, 1997


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- defendant has burden of proving that
     transfer is warranted. -- Generally, it is the moving party that
     carries the burden of proof; specifically with respect to
     juvenile-transfer motions, a defendant seeking a transfer from
     circuit court to juvenile court has the burden of proving that
     a transfer is warranted under Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e);
     although the circuit court did not follow the usual procedure
     of allowing the party with the burden of proof to present its
     evidence first, appellant not only did not object to the
     unusual procedure of the hearing but also moved for a directed
     verdict at the close of the State's case and then proceeded
     with evidence in his behalf.

2.   Appeal & error -- contemporaneous-objection rule applied to juvenile-
     transfer hearings. -- The contemporaneous-objection rule, which
     bars appellate consideration of arguments that were not raised
     in the trial court, has been applied by the supreme court to
     juvenile-transfer hearings. 

3.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- decision to retain jurisdiction must be
     supported by clear and convincing evidence -- standard of review. -- A
     circuit court's decision to retain jurisdiction of criminal
     charges against a juvenile must be supported by clear and
     convincing evidence; clear and convincing evidence is that
     degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm
     conviction as to the allegation sought to be established; when
     reviewing the denial of a motion to transfer to juvenile
     court, the supreme court views the evidence in the light most
     favorable to the State and does not reverse a circuit court's
     decision to retain jurisdiction unless the decision is clearly
     erroneous.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors considered. -- When deciding
     whether to retain jurisdiction of or to transfer a case to
     juvenile court, the factors for the circuit court to consider
     are the seriousness of the offense and whether the juvenile
     used violence in committing the offense; whether the offense
     is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses
     leading to the conclusion that the juvenile is beyond
     rehabilitation in the juvenile system; and the juvenile's
     prior history, character traits, mental maturity, or any other
     factor reflecting upon the juvenile's prospects for
     rehabilitation; a circuit court need not give equal weight to
     each factor, nor need evidence be presented on each factor.

5.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- serious and violent nature of offense
     sufficient for denial of motion to transfer. -- The serious and
     violent nature of an offense is a sufficient basis for denying
     a motion to transfer and for trying a juvenile as an adult;
     however, that a crime is serious without the use of violence
     is not a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit
     court to retain jurisdiction.

6.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- commission of serious crime without use
     of violence -- may support retention of jurisdiction when combined with
     other factors. -- The commission of a serious crime without the
     use of violence may be considered as a factor, and when
     combined with evidence of either of the other two factors, it
     may, depending upon the particular evidence presented,
     constitute clear and convincing evidence to support a decision
     to retain jurisdiction.

7.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court was not clearly erroneous in
     denying motion to transfer case to juvenile court. -- Where evidence
     was presented of the commission of a serious offense (the
     delivery of a controlled substance and noncontrolled
     substances represented to be controlled substances), a prior
     adjudication for two offenses (commercial burglary and theft)
     that would have been felonies if committed by an adult,
     previous treatment under the juvenile justice system followed
     by violation of probation conditions, the failure to attend
     school or to obtain a GED, and an impossibility of future
     rehabilitation with the Department of Youth Services due to
     age, the supreme court could not say that the trial court was
     clearly erroneous in denying the motion to transfer
     appellant's case to juvenile court.

8.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court did not abuse discretion in
     admitting two documents pertaining to prior adjudications. -- Where
     appellant testified that he was on probation and had violated
     his curfew on isolated occasions and that he had not completed
     his community service, although he stated he that had not been
     asked to do so, and where his mother also testified that
     appellant had not completed his community service, appellant's
     claim of prejudice from the admission of two documents
     pertaining to prior adjudications was without merit; the
     supreme court could not say that the trial court abused its
     discretion in admitting the two documents.

9.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- testimony concerning subsequent criminal
     acts indicative of prospects for rehabilitation -- trial court did not err
     in considering evidence of appellant's complicity in unrelated murder. --
     Testimony concerning subsequent criminal acts is indicative of
     a juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation under Ark. Code Ann.
      9-27-318(e)(3); where the trial judge stated from the bench
     that he was considering appellant's actions in an unrelated
     murder and that appellant could possibly be considered an
     accomplice; where appellant did not argue to the trial court
     that it was going beyond the testimony of record; and where,
     even if the trial court improperly relied on its memory of the
     unrelated murder trial, the testimony of a police investigator
     was entirely consistent with the court's recollection, the
     supreme court could not say that the trial court erred; the
     circuit court's decision to retain jurisdiction was affirmed.


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     David H. McCormick, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant William Shiloh McClure appeals the order of the Pope
County Circuit Court denying his motion to transfer the charges
against him to juvenile court.  We have jurisdiction of this
interlocutory appeal.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(11) (as amended by
per curiam July 15, 1996); Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(h) (Supp.
1995).  We cannot say the trial court's decision to retain
jurisdiction of the case was clearly erroneous, and therefore we
affirm.
     Pursuant to the prosecutor's discretion in section 9-27-
318(b)(1), Appellant was charged in circuit court with one count of
delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, a Class C felony,
and two counts of delivery of a non-controlled substance
represented to be a controlled substance, methamphetamine, Class B
felonies.  The information alleged that Appellant was born August
15, 1978, and that the crimes occurred on June 27, 1995, April 18,
1995, and May 12, 1995, respectively.  According to the
information, he was aged sixteen years when the crimes were
committed.  
     Appellant moved to transfer the charges to juvenile court. 
After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court considered the
three factors in section 9-27-318(e) and decided to retain
jurisdiction of Appellant's case.  Appellant was aged seventeen
years when the hearing was held on his transfer motion.  Appellant
asserts five points of error in the transfer hearing.  We find no
merit to his assertions of error and affirm the circuit court's
decision to retain jurisdiction.
                 I.  Procedure -- Order of Proof
     Appellant's first point of error is the manner in which the
circuit court conducted the transfer hearing.  At the hearing, the
state presented two witnesses:  James Krohn, Appellant's probation
officer, and Aaron Duvall, a criminal investigator for the Pope
County Sheriff's office.  Appellant then moved for a directed
verdict on the basis that the State had not met its burden of
proof.  Appellant then presented testimonies from three witnesses: 
himself, his mother, and Kenneth Canitz, the youth director at the
Baptist church where Appellant sometimes attended.  On appeal,
Appellant claims this procedure was error because, as the moving
party, it was his burden to prove the transfer was warranted.  He
contends he was prejudiced by the presentation of the State's case
prior to his because that placed him in the position of having to
rebut the State's evidence.
     Generally, it is the moving party that carries the burden of
proof.  Specifically with respect to juvenile-transfer motions, a
defendant seeking a transfer from circuit court to juvenile court
has the burden of proving that a transfer is warranted under
section 9-27-318(e).  Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128,