Title: Link Snacks, Inc. v. Link

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2897 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Northern Air Services, Inc., Link Snacks Global, 
Inc. and  
Link Holdings, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Troy J. Link, Link Snacks, Inc., L.S.I., Inc. - 
New Glarus  
and L.S.I., Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
John E. Link, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jay E. Link, 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
John A. Hermeier, Lawrence J. Jarvela, Michael 
McDonald,  
Richard May, Link Buildings, Inc. and Jack Link 
Cattle  
Company, Inc., 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 322 Wis. 2d 735, 778 N.W.2d 172 
(Ct. App. 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn 
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene D. Harrington 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins concurrence. 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J. joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2
For 
the 
defendant-third-party-plaintiff-appellant-cross-
respondent-petitioner oral argument by Michael J. Aprahamian, 
Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, with whom on the briefs were 
Michael S. Heffernan, Michael A. Bowen, and Brian E. Cothroll, 
Milwaukee and Thomas O. Mulligan, Spooner. 
 
 For 
plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner 
oral 
argument by Brian P. Norton, Freeborn and Peters, Chicago.  
There were briefs by Michael D. Freeborn, Brian P. Norton, 
Michael P. Kornak, and Andrew C. Nordahl, Chicago, and Webster 
A. Hart, Stephanie L. Finn, Herrick & Hart, S.C. Eau Claire.
 
 
 
2011 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2897 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV127) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Northern Air Services, Inc., Link Snacks 
Global, Inc. and Link Holdings, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Troy J. Link, Link Snacks, Inc., L.S.I., Inc. - 
New Glarus and L.S.I., Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Cross-Appellants, 
 
John E. Link, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jay E. Link, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant- 
          Cross-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John A. Hermeier, Lawrence J. Jarvela, Michael 
McDonald, Richard May, Link Buildings, Inc. and 
Jack Link Cattle Company, Inc., 
 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case is a complex civil 
action that initially involved fourteen different parties in 
eighteen separate, but related, claims and counterclaims.  The 
controversy in this case centers on a bitter interfamilial 
dispute among John Link (Jack) and his two sons, Jay Link (Jay) 
and Troy Link (Troy).  The Link family owns various companies 
that produce and distribute meat and cheese snacks. 
¶2 
In August 2005, after a number of conflicts between 
Jack and Jay, Jay's employment ended at Link Snacks, Inc. (Link 
Snacks).  In September 2005, Jack and Troy filed suit seeking 
specific performance of a Buy-Sell Agreement that would require 
Jay 
to surrender 
his shares in Link Snacks. Jay filed 
counterclaims alleging that Jack and Troy had breached fiduciary 
duties owed to Jay as a minority shareholder by "squeezing" Jay 
out of Link Snacks in a scheme to buy Jay's shares at a 
discounted price. 
¶3 
After two years of discovery, the Washburn County 
Circuit Court, Eugene D. Harrington, Judge, presiding, conducted 
a trial in three phases, which included a six-week jury trial.  
The jury found that Jack and Troy breached fiduciary duties owed 
to Jay.  The jury also found that Jay breached fiduciary duties 
owed to Link Snacks.  During the third phase of the trifurcated 
trial, after the jury's verdicts, the circuit court granted 
specific enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement and concluded 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
3 
 
that Jay, as a matter of law, had not been oppressed under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b) (2005-06).1 
¶4 
Jay appealed three issues to the court of appeals.  
First, Jay argued that the circuit court erred in its conclusion 
that Jay had not been oppressed by Jack and Troy.  Second, Jay 
argued that the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay 
could present regarding his theory of damages relating to his 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy.  Third, 
Jay argued that the circuit court erred in remitting the 
punitive damages awarded against Jack for breaching fiduciary 
duties owed to Jay. 
¶5 
Jack 
cross-appealed 
the 
jury's 
verdict 
awarding 
punitive damages to Jay.  Link Snacks also moved to dismiss 
Jay's appeals related to: (1) Jay's contention that the evidence 
at trial established oppression as a matter of law; and (2) 
Jay's argument that the circuit court erred in limiting the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy. 
¶6 
This is a review of a judgment and an order of the 
court of appeals.2   The judgment of the court of appeals granted 
Jack and the remaining respondents and cross-appellants partial 
dismissal of Jay's appeal.  The order of the court of appeals, 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 N. Air Servs., Inc. v. Link, No.2008AP2897, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Nov. 17, 2009). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
4 
 
which was issued separately, reversed the circuit court order 
remitting a punitive damages award against Jack, reasoning that 
Jack's postverdict motion requesting the remittitur was untimely 
filed under Wis. Stat. § 805.16. 
¶7 
Three issues are before this court: 
¶8 
First, Jack argues that the court of appeals erred in 
reinstating the $5,000,000 punitive damages award against him.  
The court of appeals reinstated the punitive damages award 
because Jack's postverdict motion requesting the remittitur was 
untimely filed under Wis. Stat. § 805.16.  Jack argues that: (1) 
the circuit court properly considered his postverdict motion 
under State v. Treadway, 2002 WI App 195, 257 Wis. 2d 467, 651 
N.W.2d 334; and (2) alternatively, if the circuit court did err 
in its reliance on Treadway, the bright-line rule articulated in 
St. John's Home of Milwaukee v. Continental Casualty Co., 150 
Wis. 2d 37, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989), should be extended to limit 
the discretion of the clerk of circuit court in accepting 
pleadings received after usual business hours. 
¶9 
Second, Jay argues that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine,3 Jay waived 
his right to appeal the judicial dissolution claim under Wis. 
                                                 
3 In 
Wyandotte 
Chemicals 
Corp. 
v. 
Royal 
Electric 
Manufacturing 
Co., 
66 Wis. 2d 577, 592-93, 225 N.W.2d 648 
(1975), this court articulated the general rule applicable to 
the waiver of a party's appeal when accepting the benefits of 
the judgment appealed.  Jay refers to this general rule as the 
"benefit-estoppel doctrine."  We use this term for the purposes 
of this opinion. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
5 
 
Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  Jay argues that the benefit-estoppel 
doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case for several 
reasons. 
¶10 Third, Jay argues that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, Jay waived 
his right to appeal whether the circuit court erred in limiting 
the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy.  Jay argues that the benefit-estoppel doctrine is 
inapplicable to the instant case because, among other things, 
Jay's appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his fiduciary duty damages 
theory relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy is independent of the circuit court's order 
enforcing the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
¶11 We hold the following:4 
                                                 
4 On the first issue, the court unanimously concurs in the 
mandate that the circuit court improperly considered Jack's 
untimely postverdict motion.  However, for future cases, Chief 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler 
overrule Granado v. Sentry Insurance, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 599 
N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1999), and will then apply the bright-line 
rule in St. John's Home of Milwaukee v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989), to clerks of circuit 
court.  Accordingly, the majority of this court holds that 
Granado is overruled, and the bright-line rule in St. John's 
Home prospectively applies to clerks of circuit court. 
On the second issue, the court unanimously concurs in the 
mandate that Jay no longer has standing to maintain a claim for 
judicial dissolution. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
6 
 
(1) The circuit court erred in remitting the award of 
punitive damages against Jack.  The circuit court's reliance on 
Treadway in considering Jack's tardy postverdict motion was 
misplaced.  Treadway does not apply to multi-phase civil 
actions, such as the instant case.  Further, we would decline to 
extend the bright-line rule of St. John's Home in order to limit 
the discretion of the clerk of circuit court in accepting 
pleadings received after usual business hours.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals in its conclusion the circuit court 
improperly considered Jack's postverdict motion. 
(2) The court of appeals properly rejected Jay's oppression 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  We do not address, 
however, whether Jay waived his right to bring his oppression 
claim under the benefit-estoppel doctrine because we conclude he 
does not have standing to appeal his oppression claim under 
§ 180.1430(2)(b).  The statutory language of § 180.1430(2)(b) 
                                                                                                                                                             
On the third issue, the court unanimously concurs in the 
mandate that Jay did not, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, 
waive his right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit 
the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy.  The court remands this case to the court of appeals for a 
determination of whether the circuit court erred by limiting the 
evidence Jay could present to the jury regarding his theory of 
damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy.  Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, joined by 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks, concurs in that remand; Justice 
Ziegler writes separately, however, to point out that regardless 
of how it decides the evidentiary issue, the court of appeals 
may need to consider whether this case should be remanded to the 
circuit court for a new trial on the issue of damages because of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
failure 
to 
abide 
by 
the 
statutory 
requirements in Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
7 
 
clearly states that a party must be a "shareholder" in order to 
seek judicial dissolution of a corporation.  Jay lost his status 
as a shareholder in Link Snacks when he surrendered his shares 
under the Buy-Sell Agreement.  Therefore, we affirm the court of 
appeals on this issue, but on different grounds. 
(3) Jay did not, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, waive 
his right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy.  The contractual obligations set forth in the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, which were enforced by the circuit court, would not 
be affected if Jay, on appeal, was successful in arguing that 
the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay could 
present regarding his theory of damages relating to his breach 
of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy.  Consequently, 
the benefit-estoppel doctrine is inapplicable to Jay's appeal of 
the circuit court's decision to limit the evidence Jay could 
present regarding his fiduciary duty damages theory relating to 
his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy.  We 
therefore reverse and remand to the court of appeals to decide 
whether the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay 
could present regarding his theory of damages relating to his 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶12 In the mid-1980s, Jack began selling meat snacks in 
Minong, Wisconsin.  The business steadily expanded, and in 1995, 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
8 
 
Link Snacks, Inc.,5 became entirely family-owned when Jack's 
sons, Jay and Troy, acquired shares of the company. 
¶13 As a condition precedent to their ownership of the 
company shares, the three Links agreed to enter into a Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  Among other things, the Buy-Sell Agreement granted 
the company "the option to redeem all or a portion" of Jack, 
Troy, or Jay's shares if their employment with Link Snacks was 
terminated, with or without cause.  As set forth in the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, the purchase price for such shares would be the "fair 
market value"6 determined by an appraiser mutually agreed upon by 
the parties. 
                                                 
5 Link Snacks, Inc., is a non-statutory closely held 
corporation headquartered in Minong, Wisconsin.  Generally, a 
"closely held corporation" refers to a corporation that has a 
small number of stockholders, no ready market for the corporate 
stock, and substantial majority stockholder participation in the 
management of the corporation.  See Baruch Gitlin, When is 
Corporation Close, or Closely-Held, Corporation Under Common or 
Statutory Law, 111 A.L.R.5th 207 (2003).  The Link family has 
ownership stakes in several corporations, including Northern Air 
Services, Inc., Link Snacks Global, Inc., Link Holdings, Inc., 
Link Snacks, Inc., L.S.I., Inc.–New Glarus, L.S.I., Inc., Jack 
Link Cattle Company, Inc., and Link Buildings, Inc.  For the 
purposes of this opinion, however, "Link Snacks" refers solely 
to Link Snacks, Inc. 
6 "Fair market value" per share refers to a share's value 
after downward adjustments are made to its "fair value" to 
account for lack of control (in the case of shares representing 
a minority interest) and lack of ready marketability. See HMO-W, 
Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 2000 WI 46, ¶39, 234 Wis. 2d 707, 
611 N.W.2d 250.  This is opposed to "fair value" per share, 
which is the net worth of a closely held corporation, divided by 
the number of shares.  Id. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
9 
 
¶14 Jack, Jay and Troy managed to co-exist in a state of 
grudging comity until around 2002.  At this point, the somewhat-
amicable relations between Jack and Jay began to fray, and 
conflicts between the two arose with increasing frequency.  Jack 
and Jay had serious disagreements about how to run the company. 
Their disagreements and mutual animosity eventually culminated 
in a 2005 Departure Memorandum executed by Link Snacks and Jay.  
In the Departure Memorandum, the parties agreed that Jay would 
be terminated as an employee and officer of Link Snacks and Link 
affiliates and the parties would attempt to negotiate an 
amicable buy-out of all Jay's interests in the various Link-
related companies.7 
¶15 After executing the Departure Memorandum, there was a 
period of unsuccessful negotiation regarding the documents 
necessary to close the purchase of Jay's shares.8 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶16 On September 23, 2005, Link Snacks, Jack, Troy, and 
several other plaintiffs9 filed a complaint against Jay seeking, 
                                                 
7 Jay 
had 
ownership 
stakes 
in 
several 
Link-related 
companies, a number of which have been involved in the present 
litigation over the past several years. Link Snacks, Inc., 
however, is the only Link-related company directly relevant to 
the issues before this court. 
8 The facts relevant to the court's analysis in the instant 
case are fairly simple.  Nonetheless, the parties devote a 
significant portion of their briefs giving lengthy accounts of 
the inflammatory acts each of the parties has committed against 
the other.  While these accounts certainly illuminate the 
sincerity with which the parties dislike each other, they do not 
aid our analysis, and will not be set forth herein. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
10 
 
inter alia, specific performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement and 
money damages for breach of fiduciary duties by Jay. 
¶17 On November 7, 2005, Jay filed his answer and 
counterclaims.10  Jay alleged, inter alia, that Jack and Troy 
breached fiduciary duties owed to Jay, and contended that the 
actions taken by Jack and Troy to remove him as an officer and 
shareholder in the Link Snacks companies were tortious.11  Jay 
also claimed that he was oppressed12 by Jack's and Troy's 
tortious actions.  As a remedy he sought to either dissolve the 
Link Snacks companies through a shareholder auction pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b) or, in lieu of dissolution, recover 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The plaintiffs in the September 23, 2005 complaint 
included Link Snacks, Jack, Troy, L.S.I.-New Glarus, L.S.I.-
South Dakota, Link Global, and Northern Air Services. Several 
claims were alleged against Jay, but only the claim seeking 
specific performance of Link Snacks' Buy-Sell Agreement and the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim are directly applicable on this 
appeal. 
10 Jay amended this pleading on August 11, 2006. 
11 Jay alleged several counterclaims against Link Snacks, 
Jack, Troy, L.S.I.-New Glarus, L.S.I., Link Global, Northern Air 
Services, John Hermeier, Larry Jarvela, Michael McDonald and 
Richard May, but only the judicial dissolution claim against 
Link Snacks and the breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack 
and Troy have been raised on appeal. 
12 Under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b), shareholders may seek 
judicial dissolution of a corporation when those in control of 
the corporation have acted in an "illegal, oppressive, or 
fraudulent" manner. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
11 
 
the "fair value"——as opposed to "fair market value"——of his 
shares.13  
¶18 In order to recover the fair value of his shares, Jay 
sought to recover the difference between the fair value of his 
shares and the discounted fair market value price at which Link 
Snacks was permitted to redeem his shares under the Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  He claimed that the difference between the two 
prices represented ill-gotten gain associated with Jack's and 
Troy's wrongful actions. 
¶19 After the September 23, 2005 complaint and Jay's 
counterclaims were filed, the parties engaged in discovery for 
nearly two years.  In late 2007, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment on several claims.  On February 15, 2008, 
the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Link 
Snacks on their claim for specific performance of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, but only to the extent the circuit court concluded it 
was a valid, enforceable, and unambiguous agreement.  The 
circuit court left for trial Jay's defense and counterclaim that 
enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement would be oppressive. 
A.  Circuit Court 
                                                 
13 In the instant case, the parties stipulated to the 
submission of evidence establishing that, as of July 31, 2005, 
the fair value of Jay's shares in Link Snacks was $31,800,000, 
and the fair market value was $19,400,000.  July 31, 2005 was 
the last day of the month preceding Jay's departure from Link 
Snacks, and was the date specified in the Buy-Sell Agreement to 
appraise the value of the departing shareholder's shares. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
12 
 
¶20 The case proceeded to trial in May 2008.  Due to the 
complexity of the issues presented, the circuit court ordered 
the case to proceed in three consecutive phases.  The first 
phase of the trifurcated trial ("Phase I") involved equitable 
claims not relevant to this appeal. 
¶21 For the second phase of the trifurcated trial ("Phase 
II"), the court empanelled a jury to resolve the legal claims 
that the parties had asserted against one another for money 
damages.  This phase lasted six weeks. 
¶22 On July 9, 2008, the jury returned its verdicts.  The 
jury made several findings.  Specifically relevant to this 
appeal, the jury concluded that Jack breached fiduciary duties 
to Jay, and awarded Jay $736,000 in compensatory damages14 and 
$5,000,000 in punitive damages to be paid to Jay by Jack.  The 
jury also concluded that Jay breached his fiduciary duties to 
Link Snacks and L.S.I., Inc., (L.S.I.) both before and after he 
departed from the companies, and awarded $1 in compensatory 
damages to each company, along with punitive damages of 
$3,500,000 
and 
$1,500,000 
to 
Link 
Snacks 
and 
L.S.I., 
respectively. 
¶23 After the jury returned its verdicts on July 9, 2008, 
the circuit court specifically advised the parties that any 
postverdict motions would be due on July 29, 2008, pursuant to 
                                                 
14 The award of $736,000 in actual damages was not a number 
argued by either party, but approximately equals one year of 
Jay's salary. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
13 
 
Wis. Stat. § 805.16.15  Both Jack and Jay filed postverdict 
motions, each requesting a reduction in the punitive damages 
that had been awarded against them. 
¶24 On July 29, 2008, Jay filed his postverdict motions 
with the Washburn County Clerk of Circuit Court at 4:32 pm, two 
minutes after the close of usual business hours.  Despite the 
fact that the filing occurred two minutes after the close of 
usual business hours, the clerk of circuit court accepted and 
stamped the postverdict motions as being filed on July 29, 2008. 
¶25 Also, on July 29, 2008, Jack mailed his postverdict 
motion from Chicago to the Washburn County Clerk of Circuit 
Court.  The clerk of court received and filed the postverdict 
motion on July 30, 2008, one day after the statutory deadline 
imposed by Wis. Stat. § 805.16.  Consequently, the circuit 
court, sua sponte, accepted Jay's postverdict motions but 
initially rejected Jack's postverdict motion as untimely. 
¶26 The circuit court later reversed its rejection of 
Jack's postverdict motion, and, relying on State v. Treadway, 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 805.16(1) 
states: 
"Motions 
after 
verdict shall be filed and served within 20 days after the 
verdict is rendered, unless the court, within 20 days after the 
verdict is rendered, sets a longer time by an order specifying 
the dates for filing motions, briefs or other documents." 
 
At a later proceeding, Jack's counsel suggested confusion 
existed as to whether the 20-day statutory deadline of Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16 applied to his postverdict motions.  The circuit 
court 
took 
umbrage 
at 
this 
suggestion, 
noting 
that 
it 
specifically reminded counsel that the 20-day statutory deadline 
applied: "I did that for a reason, because I knew before, I knew 
when I said it, and I know it now, that motions after verdict 
have to be filed within that period of time." 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
14 
 
257 Wis. 2d 467, decided to consider the merits of Jack's 
postverdict motion.  The circuit court was persuaded by both 
Jay's and Jack's postverdict motions and granted each of their 
motions seeking a reduction in punitive damages.16  This 
reduction brought the punitive damages and compensatory damages 
awarded to both Jay and Jack to a one to one ratio.  As a result 
of the circuit court's reduction, Jay was ordered to pay $1 in 
compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages to Link Snacks 
and $1 in compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages to 
L.S.I., and Jack was ordered to pay Jay compensatory damages in 
the amount of $736,000 and punitive damages in the amount of 
$736,000.17 
¶27 During the third phase of the trifurcated trial 
("Phase III"), the circuit court turned to the equitable claims 
for 
specific 
performance 
and 
judicial 
dissolution, 
the 
resolution of which involved the facts adduced during Phase II.  
The circuit court concluded that, as a matter of law, Jay was 
                                                 
16 The circuit court concluded that the punitive damages 
assessed against both Jay and Jack were unconstitutionally 
excessive. 
17 The jury awarded Jay $5,000,000 in punitive damages upon 
finding that Jack acted maliciously toward Jay.  Additionally, 
the jury awarded $5,000,000 in punitive damages to Link Snacks 
and L.S.I. upon finding that Jay acted maliciously toward each 
company——$3,500,000 to be paid to Link Snacks and $1,500,000 to 
be paid to L.S.I.  After the circuit court reduced the punitive 
damages awards, the amount Jay was to receive from Jack as 
punitive damages was reduced from $5,000,000 to $736,000, and, 
correspondingly, the amount Link Snacks and L.S.I. were to 
receive from Jay was reduced from $3,500,000 and $1,500,000, 
respectively, to $1 each. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
15 
 
not oppressed under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b). As a result, 
the circuit court denied Jay's claims for judicial dissolution 
of Link Snacks and L.S.I.-New Glarus under § 180.1430(2)(b) and 
granted Link Snacks' motion to compel specific performance of 
the Buy-Sell Agreement.  By granting Link Snacks' motion to 
compel specific performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement, the 
circuit court ordered Jay to surrender his shares in Link Snacks 
for $19,400,000——the appraised fair market value of his shares 
as set forth in the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
B.  Court of Appeals 
¶28 On appeal, Jay contended the evidence at trial 
established oppression as a matter of law.  In lieu of 
dissolution, however, he requested money damages as an equitable 
remedy, because he no longer owned shares in Link Snacks.  
Further, Jay requested a remand to the circuit court on the 
issue of damages, arguing that the circuit court erred in 
precluding Jay from presenting evidence to the jury on his 
theory of damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty 
damages against Jack and Troy.  Jay also appealed the circuit 
court's order reducing his $5,000,000 punitive damages award 
against Jack. 
¶29 Link Snacks cross-appealed the portion of the judgment 
awarding punitive damages to Jay.  Link Snacks also moved to 
dismiss Jay's appeals related to: (1) Jay's contention that the 
evidence at trial established oppression as a matter of law; and 
(2) Jay's argument that the circuit court erred in limiting the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
16 
 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy. 
¶30 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's decision to reduce the amount of 
punitive damages awarded to Link Snacks and L.S.I., reversed the 
circuit court's conclusion that State v. Treadway permitted 
Jack's postverdict motion to be timely, and reversed the circuit 
court's order remitting the punitive damages awarded to Jay.  
The court of appeals disagreed that State v. Treadway applies to 
multi-phase civil cases, concluding that the Treadway court 
"explicitly relied on a distinction between civil and criminal 
cases."  N. Air Servs., Inc. v. Link, No.2008AP2897, ¶8, 
unpublished 
slip 
op. 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App., 
Nov. 
17, 
2009).  
Consequently, the court of appeals concluded the circuit court's 
decision to consider the merits of Jack's postverdict motion was 
improper.  After reversing the circuit court's decision to 
consider Jack's postverdict motion, the court of appeals 
reinstated that part of the jury's original verdict which 
required Jack to pay $5,000,000 in punitive damages to Jay.18 
¶31 In a separate order, the court of appeals concluded 
that Jay voluntarily waived his right to appeal the question of 
whether the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay 
                                                 
18  The jury verdicts initially required Jay and Jack to 
each pay $5,000,000 in punitive damages.  The effect of the 
holding of the court of appeals was that Jack was required to 
pay Jay $5,000,000 in punitive damages, and Jay was required to 
pay $1 in punitive damages to Link Snacks and $1 in punitive 
damages to L.S.I. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
17 
 
could present regarding his theory of damages relating to his 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy, as well 
as the oppression claim against Link Snacks, because he complied 
with the circuit court's order that he surrender his shares in 
Link Snacks.  Relying on Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. v. Royal 
Electric Manufacturing Co., 66 Wis. 2d 577, 225 N.W.2d 648 
(1975), the court of appeals concluded that, under the benefit-
estoppel doctrine, Jay waived his right to appeal all portions 
of the judgment except those awarding reduced punitive damages.  
Thus, the court of appeals dismissed Jay's appeal from most of 
the portions of the judgment and other orders adverse to him. 
¶32 Jack and Jay separately petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶33 The issues before this court all present questions of 
law that we review de novo. 
¶34 The court is asked to clarify the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16 in civil trials with multiple phases.  This is a 
matter of statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is 
a question of law that the court reviews de novo.  Noffke ex 
rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156. 
¶35 The court is also asked to clarify the scope of 
discretion granted to the clerk of circuit court when accepting 
motions and pleadings.  This issue presents a question of law, 
subject to de novo review in this court. Granado v. Sentry Ins., 
228 Wis. 2d 794, 798, 599 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
18 
 
¶36 Finally, this court is asked to determine whether the 
benefit-estoppel doctrine required dismissal of certain aspects 
of Jay's appeal.  This issue presents a question of law, subject 
to de novo review in this court.  Id. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
¶37 We first consider whether the court of appeals erred 
in restoring the $5,000,000 punitive damages award that Jack was 
ordered to pay Jay when it concluded that his postverdict 
motions were untimely filed under Wis. Stat. § 805.16.  Second, 
we address whether Jay waived his right to appeal his judicial 
dissolution claim under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  Third, we 
consider whether Jay, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, 
waived his right to appeal the question of whether the circuit 
court erred in limiting the evidence Jay could present regarding 
his theory of damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against Jack and Troy. 
A. 
Jack's Postverdict Motion  
¶38 We first address Jack's challenge to the court of 
appeals decision to restore the $5,000,000 punitive damages 
award that Jack was ordered to pay Jay.  As detailed above, 
during Phase II of the trifurcated trial, the circuit court 
empanelled a jury to resolve legal claims the parties had 
asserted against one another for money damages.  After this six-
week trial, the jury concluded, inter alia, that Jack had 
breached fiduciary duties to Jay, resulting in a $736,000 
compensatory damages award and a $5,000,000 punitive damages 
award against Jack. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
19 
 
¶39 The jury also concluded, inter alia, that Jay had 
breached his fiduciary duties to Link Snacks and L.S.I., 
resulting in a judgment ordering Jay to pay $1 in compensatory 
damages to each company, along with punitive damages of 
$3,500,000 
and 
$1,500,000 
to 
Link 
Snacks 
and 
L.S.I., 
respectively. 
¶40 Following Phase II of the trifurcated trial, the 
circuit court ordered the parties to file "motions after 
verdict" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.16.19  Jack and Jay each 
filed motions seeking to reduce their respective punitive 
damages awards on constitutional grounds. 
¶41 The circuit court initially ruled, sua sponte, that 
Jack's postverdict motion was late because it was filed 21 days 
after the end of Phase II, one day beyond the statutory 
deadline. The circuit court later reconsidered this ruling, 
however, and, after reviewing Jack's motion on the merits, 
reduced the punitive damages award that Jack was ordered to pay 
Jay from $5,000,000 to $736,000.20 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 805.16(1) states: "Motions after verdict 
shall be filed and served within 20 days after the verdict is 
rendered, unless the court, within 20 days after the verdict is 
rendered, sets a longer time by an order specifying the dates 
for filing motions, briefs or other documents."  In the instant 
case, none of the parties requested an extension of time for 
filing postverdict motions within 20 days after the end of Phase 
II of the trifurcated trial and the circuit court did not extend 
the time. 
20 The circuit court based the reduction to the punitive 
damages award against Jack on a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to 
punitive damages. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
20 
 
¶42 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order remitting Jack's punitive damages, and concluded that the 
circuit court erred in addressing Jack's postverdict motion 
because it was untimely filed under Wis. Stat. § 805.16. 
¶43 Jack argues that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court's decision to remit the punitive 
damages award against him.  First, Jack argues that the circuit 
court was correct in addressing his postverdict motion under 
State v. Treadway, 257 Wis. 2d 467.  Second, Jack argues that 
Wis. Stat. § 805.16 is ambiguous and should therefore be 
liberally construed in Jack's favor.  Third, Jack argues that if 
this court concludes the circuit court did not have jurisdiction 
to address Jack's tardy postverdict motion, then fairness 
requires that we adopt a bright-line rule that any documents 
delivered or received by the clerk of circuit court after 
business hours will be treated as having been filed on the 
following day.  Jack notes that under this suggested bright-line 
rule, the circuit court in the instant case lacked jurisdiction 
to consider both Jack's and Jay's postverdict motions seeking a 
remittitur of their respective punitive damages awards. We 
address each argument in turn. 
¶44 Jack first argues that the circuit court properly 
relied on the holding of Treadway to address his postverdict 
motion.  Treadway involved a defendant who was found by a jury 
to be a sexually violent person. Id., ¶4.  Treadway failed to 
file his postverdict motions within 20 days of the jury verdict, 
as required under Wis. Stat. § 805.16, but did file his motions 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
21 
 
within fifteen days after the commitment order.21  Id., ¶¶6-7.  
The court of appeals in Treadway affirmed the circuit court's 
decision to recognize the defendant's tardy postverdict motions 
because of the "piecemeal appeals" that would otherwise result 
and the constitutional rights that were in jeopardy. Id., ¶9. 
¶45 Here, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
holding that Treadway did not apply because Treadway narrowly 
addressed Wis. Stat. § 805.16 only as it applies to sexually 
violent person commitment cases.22  We agree. 
¶46 Treadway held that a sexually violent person who is 
committed by court order under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980 may 
preserve appellate rights by filing postverdict motions within 
20 days of the commitment order, even if that is more than 20 
days after the verdict itself.  Id., ¶11.  As the court of 
appeals in the instant case correctly noted, Treadway was an 
intentionally narrow holding that was never meant to apply to 
all civil cases. 
                                                 
21 The circuit court in Treadway accepted the defendant's 
postverdict motions because of the "hybrid nature of sexual 
predator cases."  Unlike in civil cases, the "jury's verdict [in 
sexual predator cases] does not represent the final disposition 
of the case." State v. Treadway, 2002 WI App 195, ¶6, 257 
Wis. 2d 467, 651 N.W.2d 334. 
22 By "sexual violent person commitments," we refer to 
individuals who are found to be sexually violent and are ordered 
by the court to be placed in the custody of the Wisconsin 
Department of Health and Family Services for institutional care 
in a secure mental health unit or facility under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.065. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
22 
 
¶47 Jack argues that if this court agrees with the court 
of 
appeals' 
narrow 
interpretation 
of 
Treadway's 
holding, 
Treadway should nevertheless be extended to apply to all civil 
trials with multiple phases.  Otherwise, Jack argues, piecemeal 
appeals, multiple rounds of post-trial motions, and protracted 
litigation will result.  We are not persuaded. 
¶48 Treadway's narrow holding that defendants may preserve 
their right to appeal by filing postverdict motions within 20 
days of a commitment order, rather than 20 days after verdict, 
is inapplicable to complex civil cases with multiple phases for 
two reasons. 
¶49 First, 
Chapter 
980 
trials 
require 
a 
separate 
dispositional phase after verdict.  The circuit court in 
Treadway noted, and the court of appeals agreed, that this made 
the strict civil timeline for postverdict motions undesirable, 
and would lead to piecemeal appeals.  This narrowly-tailored 
exception to the postverdict timeline for atypical, civil 
commitment proceedings is clearly distinguishable from standard 
complex civil actions. 
¶50 Second, the Treadway court noted that precluding a 
sexually violent person's right to appeal because their counsel 
failed to file postverdict motions within 20 days of the verdict 
would be a "manifest miscarriage of justice."  Id., ¶10.  No 
similar personal liberty interest is in peril in the instant 
case, nor is typically in peril in complex civil actions. 
¶51 In fact, the Wisconsin legislature also agreed that 
the civil timeline for postverdict motions under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
23 
 
§ 805.16 should not apply to sexually violent person commitment 
cases.  At the express suggestion of the court of appeals in 
Treadway, 
257 
Wis. 2d 467, ¶11, the Wisconsin legislature 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 980.038.  As the court of appeals noted, by 
making ch. 980 appeals subject to the criminal procedures in 
§ 809.30, the legislature effectively superseded the holding in 
Treadway.  N. Air Servs., Inc. v. Link, No.2008AP2897, ¶7. 
¶52 We also find unconvincing Jack's contention that 
failing to extend Treadway to all civil cases with multiple 
phases will cause confusion and protract litigation.  As Jay 
correctly notes, Wis. Stat. § 805.16 already provides the 
flexibility that Jack suggests this court should read into the 
statute.  If a judge believes that it would be more efficient to 
have postverdict motions filed after a later phase of a multi-
phase trial, the circuit court can exercise its discretion to 
lengthen the 20-day time limit prescribed by § 805.16(1).  
Further, any party who believes it would be more efficient to 
have postverdict motions filed at a later phase in a multi-phase 
trial can simply request the circuit court to exercise its 
authority under § 805.16(1) to extend the statutory deadline for 
filing.  Accordingly, we decline to extend Treadway to civil 
trials with multiple phases. 
¶53 Jack next argues that Wis. Stat. § 805.16 is ambiguous 
and that rules of statutory construction therefore require that 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
24 
 
the statute be construed to preserve Jack's right to appeal.23  
Jack notes, for example, that § 805.16 does not explicitly say 
"jury verdict" and does not define "verdict." 
¶54 Further, while conceding that courts have held Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16 applies to postverdict motions in jury cases, 
Jack argues that in such proceedings there is only one verdict 
and no question of when the time for filing motions begins to 
run.  Jack argues that this ambiguity in the statutory language 
makes it unclear in multi-phase civil trials whether § 805.16 
requires postverdict motions to be filed at the end of each 
phase of the trial, or at the end of the trial after all of the 
claims have finally been resolved.  We reject this argument for 
two reasons. 
¶55 First, Jack's argument that the applicability of Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16 is ambiguous because the statute does not 
explicitly use the phrase "jury verdict" or otherwise define 
"verdict" lacks merit.  Since 1958, this court has defined 
"verdict" as including only a jury verdict and not a court order 
following a bench trial.  See Gillard v. Aaberg, 5 Wis. 2d 216, 
220, 92 N.W.2d 856 (1958).  As Jay correctly notes, Wisconsin 
courts have continued Gillard's interpretation when addressing 
                                                 
23 Jack cites Sutherland Statutory Construction for the 
general rule that "[s]tatutes giving the right of appeal are 
liberally construed, and an interpretation which will work a 
forfeiture of that right are not favored."  3 Sutherland 
Statutory Construction 67.08 (1974).  Therefore, Jay argues, 
"ambiguities" should be construed to "preserve the right of 
appeal."  Wambolt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, ¶50, 
299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
25 
 
the current postverdict motion statutes, holding that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 805.15 and 805.16 "apply specifically to motions after 
verdict in jury cases." Manly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 139 
Wis. 2d 249, 254, 407 N.W.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶56 Also, an examination of the statutory scheme in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 805 further undermines Jack's argument that the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 805.16 is unclear.  As this court has 
frequently noted, "statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circ. Ct. for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.17, which directly follows § 805.16, 
applies specifically to motions that follow a bench trial.  The 
statutory language of § 805.16 and the statutory scheme of 
Chapter 805 clearly indicate the legislature intended § 805.16 
to apply to jury trials.24 
¶57 Second, while Jack argues that the statutory language 
of Wis. Stat. § 805.16 generates confusion regarding filing 
deadlines in complex civil actions, the record clearly shows 
that no confusion existed for Jack regarding the operation of 
                                                 
24 We assume that the statutory language expresses the 
legislature's intent and when the statutory language manifests a 
clear meaning, our inquiry ceases and we will apply that 
meaning. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. River City Refuse 
Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 27, ¶26, 299 Wis. 2d 561, 576, 729 
N.W.2d 396.  See also Lincoln Sav. Bank, S.A. v. Wisconsin Dep't 
of Revenue, 215 Wis. 2d 430, 443, 573 N.W.2d 522 (1998). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
26 
 
§ 805.16 in the instant case.25  Confusion regarding the 
applicability of § 805.16 did not cause Jack to file his 
postverdict motions one day past the statutory deadline.26   The 
circuit court clearly directed counsel that Wis. Stat. § 805.16 
required filing and service within 20 days of the jury's verdict 
at the end of Phase II of the trifurcated trial.  Instead, as 
the court of appeals noted, Jack simply missed the statutory 
deadline required by § 805.16. 
¶58 We conclude that Jack's argument that Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.16 is ambiguous lacks merit. 
¶59 Third, Jack argues that if this court declines to 
extend the holding of Treadway to all civil trials with multiple 
phases, we should adopt a bright-line rule that any documents 
intended for filing that have been delivered to or received by a 
clerk of circuit court after business hours will be treated as 
                                                 
25 In Jack's Petition for Review, he notes: "The appellate 
court's conclusion that the historical facts defy Jack's logic 
because he did not wait until final disposition of the case to 
file his post-trial motion is misplaced.  At the time the issue 
of 
such 
motions 
was 
raised, 
Jack's 
counsel 
specifically 
questioned whether they were required to be filed at the end of 
Phase II, when the court still had claims to adjudicate in Phase 
III.  [citation omitted]  Nonetheless, the court instructed the 
parties to file the motions, so Jack complied.  That, however, 
does not mean that Jack agreed that § 805.16 required his post-
trial motion to be filed at that time."  Petition at 14 n.7. 
26 We recognize that Jack is entitled to advocate an 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 805.16 that is inconsistent with 
his own interpretation of the statute during trial.  We merely 
wish to clarify that Jack was not struggling during the 
trifurcated trial in navigating what he now argues are the 
enigmatic contours of Wis. Stat. § 805.16. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
27 
 
having been filed on the following day.  Jack notes that, under 
this 
proposed 
bright-line 
rule, 
both 
Jack's 
and 
Jay's 
postverdict motions would be deemed untimely under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.16.27 
¶60 As support for his proposed bright-line rule, Jack 
relies extensively on St. John's Home, 150 Wis. 2d 37, where 
this court held that papers filed with the clerk of the supreme 
court must be filed before the close of business on the last day 
of the applicable statutory deadline in order to be considered 
timely.  Jack argues that the reasoning of our holding in St. 
John's Home applies to the instant case, and therefore, the 
bright-line rule adopted in St. John's Home should be extended 
to all pleadings received or delivered to circuit court clerks. 
¶61 In St. John's Home, an attorney arrived at the supreme 
court clerk's office at approximately 5:15 p.m. intending to 
deliver and file a petition for review.  Id. at 41.  The 
business hours of the supreme court clerk's office ended at 5:00 
p.m. and it was closed for the day.  Id.  However, a law clerk 
employed by one of the justices of the court was leaving 
chambers and encountered the attorney in the hallway outside the 
clerk's office.  In response to the attorney's request, the law 
clerk unlocked the supreme court clerk's office outer door and 
                                                 
27 As explained above, Jay filed his postverdict motion at 
4:32 p.m. on the last day of the applicable statutory deadline 
imposed by Wis. Stat. § 805.16.  Jack filed his postverdict 
motion one day after the last day of the applicable statutory 
deadline.  Consequently, under the bright-line rule suggested by 
Jack, both postverdict motions would be deemed late. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
28 
 
permitted the attorney to leave the petition for review on the 
receptionist's counter.  Id.  Because the petition for review 
had not been received in the supreme court clerk's office for 
filing before 5:00 p.m., the petition was deemed to be late and 
this court issued an order dismissing the petition on timeliness 
grounds.  Id. 
¶62 On a motion for reconsideration, we acknowledged that, 
on occasion, lawyers and litigants had arrived at the supreme 
court clerk's office after 5:00 p.m. to find the office still 
open and were permitted to file their documents.  Concerned that 
the filing of petitions for review "should not be governed by 
happenstance," id. at 43, we established a bright-line rule that 
"[a]ny papers or documents delivered or received at the clerk's 
office after 5 p.m. will be treated as having been filed as of 
the following day."  Id. at 45-46.  We concluded that any rule 
that would condone after-hours delivery and receipt of a 
petition for review was "too problematic and cumbersome."  Id. 
at 43-44. 
¶63 In examining the question of whether the bright-line 
rule of St. John's Home should be extended to circuit court 
clerks, the reasoning of the court of appeals in Granado and 
Hartford provides guidance.  See Granado, 228 Wis. 2d 794; 
Hartford Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. City of Hartford Bd. 
of Zoning, 2008 WI App 107, 313 Wis. 2d 431, 756 N.W.2d 454. 
¶64 In Granado, the court of appeals addressed whether a 
summons and complaint given to the clerk of circuit court at his 
home at 9:30 p.m. on the last day of the applicable statutory of 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
29 
 
limitations period was timely filed.  Granado, 228 Wis. 2d 794.  
The court of appeals held that "the legislature intended that a 
pleading is filed when it is properly deposited with the clerk."  
Id. at 796.  In examining the meaning of "properly deposited," 
the court of appeals looked to the circuit court clerk's power 
and authority. 
¶65 
The Granado court observed that the clerk of circuit court is an elected 
constitutional officer.28  As elected officials, the Granado court concluded that circuit court 
clerks "are entitled to some discretion in the performance of their duties."  Id. at 800.  Further, 
the Granado court noted that the circuit court clerk's authority "is conferred and may therefore be 
limited by the legislature."  For example, Wis. Stat. § 59.20(3)(a) provides in pertinent part: 
Every . . . clerk of the circuit court . . . shall 
keep his or her office at the county seat in the 
offices provided by the county or by special provision 
of law; or if there is none, then at such place as the 
board directs . . . . All such officers shall keep 
their offices open during the usual business hours of 
any day except Sunday, as the board directs. 
¶66 The court of appeals in Granado emphasized the wide 
latitude provided by the legislature in setting the scope of the 
                                                 
28 Article VII, § 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) There shall be a clerk of the circuit court chosen 
in each county organized for judicial purposes by the 
qualified 
electors 
thereof, 
who . . . shall 
hold 
office for two years, subject to removal as shall be 
provided by law. 
. . . . 
(5) The supreme court shall appoint its own clerk, and 
may appoint a clerk of circuit court to be the clerk 
of the supreme court. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
30 
 
circuit court clerk's authority.  "For example, the legislature 
has directed the county board to give the [circuit court] clerk 
an office that is open during some business hours at some point 
from Monday through Saturday. 59.20(3)(a) [].  It did not 
restrict those hours or define usual business hours."  Granado, 
228 Wis. 2d at 802. 
¶67 In light of the fact that the circuit court clerk is 
an 
elected 
constitutional 
officer 
and 
the 
legislature's 
"imprecise and inexhaustive guidelines indicating when and where 
the clerk's duties should be performed," the Granado court 
declined to extend the bright-line rule set forth in St. John's 
Home to restrict clerks of circuit court from accepting papers 
after business hours.  Id. at 804.  Instead, the court of 
appeals held that "the further removed from an office's 
legislative guidelines and usual business hours a transaction 
occurs, 
the 
less 
likely 
the 
papers 
have 
been 
properly 
deposited."  Id. at 804-05.  Further, the Granado court held 
that the clerk of circuit court, by accepting a summons and 
complaint at his home at 9:30 p.m. on the last day of the 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations 
period 
"exercised 
his 
discretion 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
impermissibly 
surpassed 
the 
legislative strictures he was subject to."  Id. at 805. 
¶68 In Hartford, 313 Wis. 2d 431, the court of appeals 
addressed whether the clerk of circuit court's office properly 
exercised its discretion in not accepting and filing a party's 
papers three minutes after the close of usual business hours.  
The hours of operation for the Washington County Clerk of 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
31 
 
Circuit Court's office were from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.  Id., 
¶20.  The Washington County Clerk of Circuit Court had a rigid 
policy, which was consistently applied, that any papers received 
after usual business hours would not be filed until the next 
business day.  Id.  The appellant in Hartford argued that, under 
Granado, the clerk of circuit court must exercise discretion in 
accepting pleadings after usual business hours.  Id., ¶9.  The 
Hartford 
court 
rejected 
this 
interpretation 
of 
Granado, 
concluding that clerks of circuit court have "the discretion to 
adopt a policy, as long as the policy complies with the 
statutory guidelines indicating when and where the clerk's 
duties should be performed."  Id., ¶22.  Accordingly, "the clerk 
may adopt a policy that is flexible or one that restricts 
filings to regular business hours."  Id.  The Hartford court 
concluded that the Washington County Clerk of Circuit Court 
properly exercised her discretion in not filing the appellant's 
papers until the following business day.  Id., ¶23. 
¶69 After examining the holdings of St. John's Home, 
Granado, and Hartford, we agree with Jack's argument that 
extending the bright-line rule of St. John's Home would 
alleviate the potential for abuse and unpredictability.  We 
conclude, however, that such a rigid rule would cause more 
problems than it would solve. 
¶70 Accordingly, we would adopt the reasoning of Granado 
and Hartford.  Jack's proposed bright-line rule would strip the 
circuit court clerk of the discretion to handle a variety of 
situations that require a certain amount of flexibility, such as 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
32 
 
long lines, understaffing, and other unanticipated events.29  For 
example, as noted in Granado, a rigid rule would arguably 
prohibit the clerk of circuit court from having his or her 
office open after usual business hours on election night.  
"Similarly, the rule would prevent a clerk of circuit court 
traveling with a judge to a court outside the county seat from 
accepting pleadings or filing papers associated with a jury 
trial that continues beyond business hours."  Granado, 228 
Wis. 2d at 802. 
¶71 This does not mean that the clerk of circuit court has 
a limitless amount of discretion in accepting pleadings after 
usual business hours.  As Granado explained, when considering 
                                                 
29 In Giese v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, the 
court of appeals addressed the question of whether a circuit 
court clerk abuses his or her discretion by refusing to accept 
papers for filing on the day they are received because they are 
unaccompanied by a prescribed filing fee.  153 Wis. 2d 212, 213-
14, 450 N.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1989).  The court noted the 
legislature's intention to have "uniform appellate procedures 
across the state," but held that this desired uniformity did not 
extend to the discretion provided to the circuit court clerk 
under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(a) (formerly § 59.42(1)).  Id. at 
216.  Rather, unlike the statute governing appellate practice, 
§ 59.40(3)(a) "requires each circuit court clerk to exercise his 
or her discretion within the respective circuit.  Although this 
may result in some inconsistencies among various counties, the 
plain language of the statute compels this result."  Id.  Our 
holdings in St. John's Home and the instant case align with the 
legislature's intent to have uniform appellate procedure across 
the state.  The bright-line rule in St. John's Home recognized 
the need for a uniform procedure for the timely filing of 
petitions 
for 
review 
in 
order 
to 
invoke 
our 
appellate 
jurisdiction.  Unlike St. John's Home, however, the instant case 
does not involve appellate procedure and instead considers the 
legislatively-prescribed discretion of the clerk of circuit 
court to accept filings after usual business hours. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
33 
 
whether a clerk erroneously exercises his or her discretion in 
filing a pleading, "the further removed from an office's 
legislative guidelines and usual business hours a transaction 
occurs, the less likely it is that the papers have been properly 
deposited." Granado, 228 Wis. 2d at 804-05.  We believe this 
flexible case-by-case approach provides an appropriate amount of 
discretion to the clerk of circuit court. 
¶72 The instant case is a prime example of why this 
flexible approach is preferable to Jack's proposed bright-line 
rule.  Jay's counsel called the Washburn County Clerk of Circuit 
Court at 4:17 p.m. on the twentieth day following the jury's 
verdict for Phase II of the trifurcated trial——the final day the 
parties could timely file their postverdict motions under Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16——to tell the clerk they would be late, but they 
were in route to the clerk's office.  At 4:32 p.m., two minutes 
after the close of usual business hours, Jay's counsel submitted 
Jay's postverdict motions, which the clerk accepted and filed.  
We conclude this was not an abuse of the circuit court clerk's 
discretion.30 
¶73 We would hold it is within the clerk of circuit 
court's discretion as an elected constitutional officer to 
accept and file pleadings received after the end of usual 
business hours, so long as that discretion is exercised 
                                                 
30 For the reasons stated above, we believe the bright-line 
rule of St. John adopted by the majority has the potential to 
lead to both inequitable and unduly harsh results. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
34 
 
reasonably and is within the guidelines provided by the 
legislature.31 
                                                 
31 Jack further argues that permitting the clerk of the 
circuit court to determine when filings are "timely" or not is 
an exercise of judicial power, which is outside the scope of the 
ministerial and clerical acts a circuit court clerk is permitted 
to exercise by statute.  We find this to be unconvincing. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(2) provides, in part, that the 
clerk of circuit court shall "[f]ile and keep all papers 
properly deposited with him or her in every action or proceeding 
unless required to transmit the papers. . . . "  Further, Wis. 
Stat. § 59.20(3)(a), which provides that the county board is to 
give the county clerk an office that is open during some 
business hours at some point from Monday through Saturday, does 
not restrict those hours or define usual business hours. See 
Granado, 228 Wis. 2d at 802. 
Regardless, it is beyond dispute in the instant case that 
Jack filed his postverdict motion with the clerk of Washburn 
County one day after the 20-day statutory guideline mandated by 
Wis. Stat. § 805.16.  The circuit court "loses its competency to 
consider 
postverdict 
motions 
filed 
after 
the 
twenty 
day 
deadline, unless the court has granted an extension within that 
time."  Ahrens Cadillac Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Belongia, 151 
Wis. 2d 763, 767, 445 N.W.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1989).  See also 
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Wales, 138 Wis. 2d 508, 406 N.W.2d 426 
(1987) (similarly concluding that "the circuit court lacked the 
competency 
to 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
to 
decide 
the 
[postverdict] motions").  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
correctly held that the circuit court improperly considered the 
merits of Jack's tardy postverdict motion. 
This holding of the court of appeals did not, however, 
strip Jack of his ability to appeal his tardy postverdict 
motion.  As this court in Hartford explained, "[n]umerous 
Wisconsin cases have held that a party's failure to properly or 
timely raise issues in the trial court by postverdict motions 
results only in a waiver of the opportunity for an appeal as of 
right on those issues.  The reviewing court does not lose 
discretion to consider such issues but may consider them in its 
discretion."  Hartford Ins., 138 Wis. 2d at 510-11.  Here, the 
court of appeals simply declined to do so. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
35 
 
¶74 We therefore would decline to adopt Jack's proposed 
bright-line rule, and affirm the order of the court of appeals 
reinstating the punitive damages award against Jack. 
B.  Jay's Judicial Dissolution Claim 
¶75 Jay argues that the court of appeals erred in holding 
that the benefit-estoppel doctrine precluded Jay from appealing 
the circuit court's conclusion that he was not oppressed as a 
matter of law.32 
¶76 While still a shareholder in Link Snacks, Jay argued 
to the circuit court that he was entitled to a buyout of his 
shares at fair value on the basis of shareholder oppression, as 
a remedy in lieu of judicial dissolution under Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1430.  Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1430 provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
 
The circuit court . . . may dissolve a corporation in 
a proceeding: 
                                                 
32 "An allegation of oppression is not a claim for relief, 
but rather, is a legal standard to be fulfilled before a circuit 
court may order liquidation of a corporation based on the acts 
of those who control it."  Reget v. Paige, 2001 WI App 73, ¶23, 
242 Wis. 2d 278, 626 N.W.2d 302.  Although "oppression" is not 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 180.1430, we defined oppressive conduct 
for the purposes of this statute in Jorgensen: 
[B]urdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of 
probity and fair dealing in the affairs of the company 
to the prejudice of some of its members; or a visual 
departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a 
violation of fair play on which every shareholder who 
entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely. 
Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 218 Wis. 2d 761, 783, 582 
N.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body 
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628-29, 507 P.2d 387 (1973)). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
36 
 
 
. . . .  
 
(2) By a shareholder, if any of the following is 
established:  
 
. . . .  
 
(b) That the directors or those in control of the 
corporation have acted, are acting or will act in a 
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent. 
¶77 During Phase III of the trifurcated trial, the circuit 
court denied Jay's claim for dissolution under Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1430 
and 
granted 
Link 
Snacks' 
motion 
for 
specific 
enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement.  The court therefore 
required Jay to surrender his shares in Link Snacks for their 
fair market value of $19,400,000.33  On June 30, 2009, Jay 
complied 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
order 
granting 
specific 
enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement and surrendered his shares 
in Link Snacks. 
¶78 The court of appeals concluded that, under the 
benefit-estoppel doctrine, Jay waived his right to appeal the 
circuit court's judgment denying his oppression claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1430. 
                                                 
33 As stated above, during Phase III, the parties stipulated 
to the submission of evidence establishing that, as of July 31, 
2005, the fair value of Jay's shares in Link Snacks was 
$31,800,000, and the fair market value was $19,400,000.  The 
Buy-Sell Agreement provided that the departing shareholder's 
shares were to be appraised on the last day of the month 
preceding the shareholder's departure from the company.  July 
31, 2005 was the last day of the month preceding Jay's departure 
from Link Snacks, and, accordingly, was the date Jay's shares 
were appraised. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
37 
 
¶79 The benefit-estoppel doctrine states that, "[a]s a 
general rule, . . . if a benefit received is dependent upon, or 
was granted as a condition of, the order or judgment attacked 
the party ought not be permitted to carry on his warfare."  
Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 66 Wis. 2d at 592.  Consequently, "a 
party waives his right to appeal when he accepts the fruits of a 
judgment to which he may not be entitled if his appeal 
succeeds."  Stevens Constr. Corp. v. Draper Hall, Inc., 73 
Wis. 2d 104, 111, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).  However, if the "order 
or judgment under which the person is granted a favor are 
independent and separable from those sought to be overturned, 
then he may appeal a right denied in the trial court."  
Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 66 Wis. 2d at 592. 
¶80 The court of appeals reasoned that, because Jay had 
accepted payment for his shares in Link Snacks, Jay waived his 
right to appeal the circuit court judgment that granted Link 
Snacks specific performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement and denied 
Jay's request for judicial dissolution.  We affirm the court of 
appeals holding that Jay may not appeal the circuit court's 
judgment denying Jay's oppression claim, but on different 
grounds. 
¶81 Link Snacks argues that Jay, by surrendering his 
shares in Link Snacks under the Buy-Sell Agreement, lost his 
shareholder status.  Consequently, Jay is no longer a Link 
Snacks 
"shareholder" 
entitled 
to 
invoke 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1430(2)(b).  We agree. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
38 
 
¶82 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b) requires that a party 
pursuing 
a 
dissolution 
claim 
be 
a 
"shareholder."34 
 
A 
"shareholder" is defined by the Wisconsin Business Corporation 
Law as "the person in whose name shares are registered in the 
records of a corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to 
the extent of the rights granted by a nominee certificate on 
file with a corporation."  § 180.0103(14). 
¶83 On June 30, 2009, when Jay surrendered his shares in 
Link Snacks under the Buy-Sell Agreement, he was no longer a 
"shareholder" in Link Snacks, as that term is defined by the 
Wisconsin Business Corporation Law.35  Consequently, Jay no 
longer has standing to maintain an oppression claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b). 
¶84 Jay 
does 
not dispute that he is no longer a 
shareholder in Link Snacks.  He contends, however, that a party, 
by losing shareholder status, does not lose individual claims 
that have fully accrued while the party was still a shareholder.  
Jay relies on one case, Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd., 2009 
WI 30, 316 Wis. 2d 640, 764 N.W.2d 904, to support his argument 
                                                 
34 As detailed above, whether Jay has standing to continue 
to 
seek 
dissolution 
of 
Link 
Snacks 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1430(2)(b) presents an issue of law.  This is a matter of 
statutory interpretation.  The goal of statutory interpretation 
is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.  
Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997).  To achieve this goal, the court first 
resorts to the statute's plain language.  Id. 
35 Wisconsin's business corporation law is encompassed in 
Wis. Stat. Ch. 180 and is cited to as "Wisconsin Business 
Corporation Law."  See Wis. Stat. § 180.0101. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
39 
 
that he maintains standing to appeal his judicial dissolution 
claim.  The holding of Notz, however, does not extend to Jay's 
judicial dissolution claim and is therefore inapplicable to the 
instant case. 
¶85 Notz involved a minority shareholder who brought suit 
against a majority shareholder, among others, claiming that the 
defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and had oppressed 
the minority shareholder under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  
Id., ¶10.  The circuit court in Notz dismissed Notz's breach of 
fiduciary duty claims but declined to dismiss the judicial 
dissolution claim based on allegedly oppressive conduct.  Id., 
¶11.  Both parties appealed the circuit court's order, and while 
the appeal was pending, the defendant corporation initiated a 
cash-out 
merger36 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 180.1101(2)(c) 
and 
180.1103(3).  Id., ¶12.  The merger was successful and 
consequently stripped Notz of his shareholder status in the 
defendant corporation.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that 
Notz lost standing because he was no longer a shareholder.  On 
appeal, however, this court reversed the court of appeals and 
concluded that Notz had not lost standing.  Id., ¶39. 
¶86 Jay argues that, like Notz, his standing to bring a 
judicial dissolution claim against Link Snacks vested when he 
                                                 
36 A cash-out merger occurs when "Corporation A, which holds 
a controlling interest in Corporation B, uses its control to 
merge Corporation B into itself or into a wholly owned 
subsidiary, and the minority shareholders in Corporation B are, 
in effect, forced to sell their stock."  19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 2179. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
40 
 
initially made the judicial dissolution claim at the circuit 
court level.  Jay, however, ignores a key distinction between 
Notz and the instant case: the question of standing in Notz 
centered 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1106(1)(d), 
which 
expressly 
discusses standing in the context of a cash-out merger. 
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1106(1)(d), the statute at issue 
in Notz, states: 
A civil, criminal, administrative, or investigatory 
proceeding pending by or against any business entity 
that is a party to the merger may be continued as if 
the merger did not occur, or the surviving business 
entity may be substituted in the proceeding for the 
business entity whose existence ceased. 
As the court in Notz emphasized, the statute was written 
specifically to preserve a claim in the event a party was 
stripped of their status as a shareholder.37 
¶88 Unlike Notz, Jay's shareholder status was not lost 
because majority shareholders completed a cash-out merger.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1106(1)(d), which preserves a plaintiff's 
standing in such a situation, is therefore inapplicable.  The 
applicable 
statute 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1430(2)(b), which expressly requires that a party be a 
                                                 
37 The statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 180.1106(1)(d), 
which permits the shareholder's status as a shareholder to vest 
once suit has been brought against the defendant business 
entity, is consistent with all other state jurisdictions. As we 
have noted in other cases construing Wis. Stat. § 180.1106, this 
provision is based on Model Business Corporation Act § 11.07, 
"Effect of Merger or Share Exchange."  See generally Model Bus. 
Corp. Act Ann. § 11.07 cmt. (4th ed. 2008) (Statutes) (listing 
all fifty states as having adopted this rule under the Model 
Business Corporation Act). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
41 
 
"shareholder" in order to bring a claim against a business 
entity for judicial dissolution.  Nothing in the statutory 
language of § 180.1430(2)(b) indicates a legislative intent to 
allow 
a 
non-shareholder 
to 
bring 
a 
claim 
for 
judicial 
dissolution.  
¶89 Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 180.1430 to require a 
plaintiff to be a shareholder in order to bring a judicial 
dissolution claim is not only a straightforward reading of the 
statute's plain language; it is also the logical interpretation 
given the statute's purpose.  A shareholder oppression claim is, 
by definition, a claim brought by an individual shareholder in 
his or her capacity as shareholder for injury done to his 
individual interests that arise out of his or her share 
ownership. 
¶90 The purpose of a shareholder oppression claim is to 
provide a method of recourse to minority shareholders who are 
subject to "burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct" at the 
hands of the majority shareholder.  By forcing a corporation to 
dissolve, it enables a minority shareholder to obtain value for 
their shares.  It is contrary to reason that a party could 
assert a claim for judicial dissolution——an extreme remedy 
wherein minority shareholders may obtain value for their shares—
—for a company in which the party owns no shares. 
¶91 Jay argues that he was stripped of his shareholder 
status because of the order issued by the circuit court granting 
specific enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement, and that he 
never intended to lose his right to appeal his oppression claim.  
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
42 
 
The record supports Jay's argument that he intended to maintain 
his right to appeal his judicial dissolution claim for the 
allegedly 
oppressive 
conduct 
he 
suffered 
as 
a 
minority 
shareholder in Link Snacks. 
¶92 In the instant case, however, Jay's intention to 
maintain standing to appeal the circuit court's judgment denying 
his oppression claim is irrelevant.  Once Jay transferred his 
shares to Link Snacks under the Buy-Sell Agreement, Jay lost his 
status as a shareholder in Link Snacks, and consequently lost 
standing to bring a judicial dissolution claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1430.  Jay's intention to maintain standing does not trump 
the clear statutory language of § 180.1430, which requires a 
plaintiff to be a shareholder in order to bring a judicial 
dissolution claim. 
¶93 The circuit court concluded in Phase III of the 
trifurcated trial that Jay had not, as a matter of law, been 
oppressed by the majority shareholders in Link Snacks.  Having 
reached the conclusion that Jay was not oppressed, the circuit 
court granted specific enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement.  
Under the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, Jay surrendered his 
shares in Link Snacks for the appraised fair market value of the 
shares.  Jay never argued that the Buy-Sell Agreement was not a 
valid, 
enforceable 
agreement. 
 
Instead, 
Jay's 
oppression 
argument has centered on being subject to "burdensome, harsh, 
and wrongful conduct" that effectively "squeezed" Jay out of 
Link 
Snacks, 
thereby 
improperly 
triggering 
the 
Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  Having been allegedly "squeezed" out of the company, 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
43 
 
Jay 
seeks, 
under 
the 
judicial 
dissolution 
statute, 
the 
difference between the fair value of his shares in Link Snacks——
which he argues is a widely accepted damages remedy in judicial 
dissolution cases——and the fair market value of his shares in 
Link Snacks, which Jay is owed under the terms of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. 
¶94 Jay's theory of damages for his oppression claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 180.1430 is well articulated, but the judicial 
dissolution statute simply is not the proper vehicle in which to 
bring his claim.  Jay is no longer a shareholder in Link Snacks.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b) is a judicial dissolution 
statute wherein shareholders may move to dissolve a business 
entity when they have been subject to oppressive conduct.  We 
therefore conclude that Jay does not have standing to appeal his 
oppression claim under § 180.1430(2)(b). 
C.  Jay's Fiduciary Duty Damages Argument 
¶95 Jay next argues that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that Jay, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, waived 
his right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
44 
 
Troy.38  The court of appeals denied Jay's appeal relating to his 
fiduciary duty damages theory for the same reason it denied his 
oppression claim, relying on the principle that "a party waives 
his right to appeal when he accepts the fruits of a judgment to 
which he may not be entitled if his appeal succeeds."  Stevens 
Constr. Corp., 73 Wis. 2d at 111. 
¶96 The court of appeals reasoned that Jay could not 
prevail on his appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit 
the evidence Jay could present regarding his fiduciary duty 
damages theory relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against Jack and Troy unless specific enforcement of the Buy-
Sell Agreement was reversed.  Therefore, because Jay already 
accepted payments under the Buy-Sell Agreement, he waived his 
right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy under the benefit-estoppel doctrine. 
¶97 We conclude the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
Jay's appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his fiduciary duty damages 
                                                 
38 On January 11, 2011, and June 16, 2011, Link Snacks 
submitted letters to this court with supplemental information 
related to Jay's acceptance of benefits under the Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  On January 14, 2011, and June 20, 2011, Jay 
submitted letters in response.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we are not persuaded by Link Snack's argument that Jay is barred 
from raising his breach of fiduciary duty argument because he 
accepted benefits under the Buy-Sell Agreement. Accordingly, 
these post-argument submissions need not be addressed. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
45 
 
theory relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy on the basis of the benefit-estoppel doctrine.  In 
order to fully articulate why the court of appeals erred in its 
decision to dismiss Jay's appeal, it is necessary to explain 
Jay's theory of damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against Jack and Troy in more detail. 
¶98 During Phase II of the trifurcated trial, the jury 
found that Jack and Troy breached fiduciary duties owed to Jay 
as a minority shareholder.  As damages for Jack's and Troy's 
breach of fiduciary duties, Jay sought the difference between 
the fair value of Jay's shares and the fair market value of 
Jay's shares.  Jay argues that the difference between the fair 
value and the fair market value of his shares is a well-
established theory of damages in breach of fiduciary duty cases 
and would effectively disgorge any profit that Jack and Troy 
obtained by their tortious conduct. 
¶99 The circuit court disagreed with Jay, and declined to 
introduce Jay's theory of damages to the jury.39  On appeal, the 
                                                 
39 In pretrial and trial rulings, the circuit court denied 
Jay's request to present evidence to the jury in support of 
Jay's fiduciary duty damages theory.  The circuit court 
precluded Jay from offering evidence on the fair value of his 
shares in Link Snacks and also rejected Jay's proposed damages 
instruction. 
The circuit court reasoned that any error in excluding 
Jay's fiduciary duty damages theory from the jury was harmless: 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
46 
 
court of appeals did not reach the substantive issue of whether 
the circuit court erred in not accepting Jay's theory of damages 
because it concluded Jay had waived his right to appeal under 
the benefit-estoppel doctrine. 
¶100 As noted above, the benefit-estoppel doctrine holds 
that "an appellant is not permitted to take an appeal when he 
voluntarily accepts a benefit which is dependent upon that part 
of the order or judgment which he attacks on appeal."  Id. at 
110. 
¶101 Here, the benefits that Jay has accepted under the 
Buy-Sell Agreement are not——in any conceivable way——dependent on 
the question of whether the circuit court erred in limiting the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy.  For one, Jay is not appealing the specific enforcement of 
the Buy-Sell Agreement under which Jay has received payments for 
his shares in Link Snacks.  Under no scenario could the payments 
that Jay has received under the Buy-Sell Agreement be put in 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the jury finds a breach of fiduciary duty, such a 
finding by necessity probably requires a finding by 
the Court that oppression occurred, thus entitling Jay 
to full value as his remedy. At least that's what 
appears to be the implication from both the case law 
and the other professional materials the Court has 
read. 
The circuit court concluded that Jay was limited to seeking 
as damages any diminution in the value of his shares that he 
could prove were caused by Jack and Troy's tortious conduct, 
plus any "perks" that Jack and Troy received but that Jay was 
denied. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
47 
 
jeopardy by pursuing his appeal of the circuit court's decision 
to limit the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of 
damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy.  And as this court explained in Stevens 
Construction, "[a]s long as the party accepting money has not 
put his right to that money in jeopardy in his own appeal, there 
is no waiver . . . ."  Id. at 111. 
¶102 Further, 
Jay's 
fiduciary 
duty 
damages 
argument 
involves what Jack and Troy allegedly owe Jay in tort damages.  
The specific enforcement of the Buy-Sell Agreement, which is not 
even being challenged on appeal, involves what Link Snacks 
contractually owes Jay under the Buy-Sell Agreement.  Put 
simply, Jay's appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit 
the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy and the specific performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement——the 
enforcement of which Jay is not appealing——are different claims 
involving different parties.40  Therefore, if Jay was successful 
in his appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his fiduciary duty damages 
theory relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy, the benefits he has accepted under the Buy-Sell 
Agreement 
would, 
without 
question, 
remain 
untouched.  
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Riley v. Lawson, 210 Wis. 2d 478, 489, 565 
N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the appeal of claims 
involving different defendants could proceed because they did 
not challenge the judgment relating to the benefit). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
48 
 
Consequently, the benefit-estoppel doctrine is inapplicable to 
Jay's appeal of the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy. 
¶103 We therefore reverse and remand to the court of 
appeals to decide Jay's appeal of the circuit court's decision 
to limit the evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of 
damages relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Jack and Troy.41 
                                                 
41 Justice Ziegler's concurrence notes that the circuit 
court 
was 
statutorily 
required, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.15(6), to order a new trial because neither Jay, Link 
Snacks, nor L.S.I. accepted the circuit court's reduction of the 
punitive damages the jury awarded each of them. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(6) provides: 
If a trial court determines that a verdict is 
excessive 
or 
inadequate . . . the 
court 
shall 
determine the amount which as a matter of law is 
reasonable, and shall order a new trial on the issue 
of damages, unless within 10 days the party to whom 
the option is offered elects to accept judgment in the 
changed amount. 
We acknowledge that the unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.15(6) required the circuit court to grant the parties "the 
option of remitting the excess over and above such sum as the 
court 
[had] 
determine[d] 
[was] 
the 
reasonable 
amount 
of . . . damages, or of having a new trial on the issue of 
damages."  Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 92, 102 
N.W.2d 393 
(1960) 
(subsequently 
codified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.15(6)).  Prior to announcing its decision to remit the 
punitive damages against Jay and Jack, the circuit court noted 
it was "run[ning] a considerable risk" by doing so.  The record 
is silent as to what specific risk the circuit court perceived 
it was taking. 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
49 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶104 Accordingly, we hold the following: 
(1) The circuit court erred in remitting the award of 
punitive damages against Jack.  The circuit court's reliance on 
Treadway in considering Jack's tardy postverdict motion was 
misplaced.  Treadway does not apply to multi-phase civil 
actions, such as the instant case.  Further, we would decline to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although 
the 
precise 
nature 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
perceptions are unknown to us, we can say with certainty that we 
share its general observation that it took a considerable risk 
when it ordered a reduction in the respective parties' punitive 
damages awards without simultaneously providing them with the 
option of a new trial.  Specifically, the risk the circuit court 
took was that one or more of the parties would seek appellate 
relief from the circuit court's failure to offer the option of a 
new trial on the issue of damages and that such a new trial 
would be ordered.  This, however, the parties did not do. 
That being said, it would not be appropriate for us to 
order a new trial.  First, no party asked the circuit court to 
reconsider its failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6).  
Second, no party requested the court of appeals to direct the 
circuit court to order a new trial pursuant to § 805.15(6).  
Finally, no party has made the argument to us that they are 
entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages pursuant to 
§ 805.15(6). 
We think it more prudent to follow our long-standing 
practice of refraining from taking up issues which have been 
neither presented nor argued before us, and accordingly, do not 
remand to the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of 
damages.  See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 
107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Roggensack, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("As various members of 
this court have said, we should not 'reach out and decide 
issues' that were not presented to the court by the parties").  
See also Bartley v. Thompson, 198 Wis. 2d 323, 341-42 n.10, 542 
N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the court will not 
consider an issue that the parties failed to develop). 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
50 
 
extend the bright-line rule of St. John's Home in order to limit 
the discretion of the clerk of circuit court in accepting 
pleadings received after usual business hours.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals in its conclusion the circuit court 
improperly considered Jack's postverdict motion. 
(2) The court of appeals properly rejected Jay's oppression 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  We do not address, 
however, whether Jay waived his right to bring his oppression 
claim under the benefit-estoppel doctrine because we conclude he 
does not have standing to appeal his oppression claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b).  The statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1430(2)(b) 
clearly 
states 
that 
a 
party 
must 
be 
a 
"shareholder" in order to seek judicial dissolution of a 
corporation.  Jay lost his status as a shareholder in Link 
Snacks when he surrendered his shares under the Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals on this 
issue, but on different grounds. 
(3) Jay did not, under the benefit-estoppel doctrine, waive 
his right to appeal the circuit court's decision to limit the 
evidence Jay could present regarding his theory of damages 
relating to his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and 
Troy.  The contractual obligations set forth in the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, which were enforced by the circuit court, would not 
be affected if Jay, on appeal, was successful in arguing that 
the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay could 
present regarding his theory of damages relating to his breach 
of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy.  Consequently, 
No. 
2008AP2897   
 
51 
 
the benefit-estoppel doctrine is inapplicable to Jay's appeal of 
the circuit court's decision to limit the evidence Jay could 
present regarding his fiduciary duty damages theory relating to 
his breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy.  We 
therefore reverse and remand to the court of appeals to decide 
whether the circuit court erred in limiting the evidence Jay 
could present regarding his theory of damages relating to his 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Jack and Troy. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
No.  2008AP2897.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶105 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the circuit court improperly considered Jack's 
untimely motion after verdict, that Jay may no longer maintain a 
claim 
for 
judicial 
dissolution, and that benefit-estoppel 
doctrine does not preclude Jay from appealing the circuit 
court's decision to limit the evidence he could present in 
support of his breach of fiduciary duty claims.    
¶106 For the reasons set forth in Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence, I join her conclusion that the court should 
overrule Granado v. Sentry Insurance, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 599 
N.W.2d 62 (1999) and prospectively apply the bright-line rule 
articulated in St. John's Home of Milwaukee v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989), to circuit 
court clerks.   
¶107 I do not join Justice Ziegler's concurrence because I 
would not address the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6).  
See 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrence, 
¶140. 
 
Neither 
party 
addressed the applicability of that statute in his argument to 
this court.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate.       
¶108 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.   
 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶109 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the conclusions of the majority opinion, namely that (1) the 
circuit court improperly considered Jack Link's untimely motion 
after verdict; (2) Jay Link does not have standing to appeal his 
oppression claim under Wis. Stat. § 180.1340(2)(b); and (3) Jay 
did not waive his right to appeal from the circuit court's order 
that precluded him from introducing to the jury his theory of 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty.  See majority op., ¶11. 
¶110 As to the first issue, however, I write separately and 
concur because I believe this case underscores the disparate 
treatment that can result under the court of appeals' rationale 
in Granado v. Sentry Insurance, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 599 N.W.2d 62 
(Ct. App. 1999).  Unlike the majority, I would overrule Granado 
and, in the future, apply the bright-line rule articulated in 
St. John's Home of Milwaukee v. Continental Casualty Co., 150 
Wis. 2d 37, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989), to the clerks of circuit 
court.1  A clerk of circuit court has the discretionary authority 
to accept papers after-hours but cannot exercise the judicial 
                                                 
1 In light of the fact that Granado v. Sentry Insurance, 228 
Wis. 2d 794, 599 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1999), is a published 
decision and that in the past clerks of circuit court have filed 
papers received after the normal business hours, I concur with 
the majority's holding in the instant case.  See St. John's Home 
of Milwaukee v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 43-44, 441 
N.W.2d 219 (1989).  For future cases, however, I would apply the 
bright-line rule in St. John's Home to clerks of circuit court. 
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley, Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and I overrule Granado.  
Accordingly, the majority of this court holds that Granado is 
overruled 
and 
the 
bright-line 
rule 
in 
St. 
John's 
Home 
prospectively applies to clerks of circuit court. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
2 
 
power to determine whether such papers were timely filed.  
Rather, even if papers are somehow delivered to the clerk after-
hours, the clerk should treat the papers as having been filed on 
the following business day. 
¶111 A clerk of circuit court should strive to treat all 
litigants the same.  When access to the clerk, rather than 
courthouse hours, is determinative of whether papers are timely 
filed and thus can be considered by the circuit court judge, the 
result is unequal treatment under the law.  Equal treatment 
under the law is fundamental to our system of justice, and I 
cannot support a practice that operates otherwise. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶112 To explain my position, it is necessary to first 
recount certain aspects of this case's procedural history. 
¶113 On July 9, 2008, after a six-week trial, a jury found, 
inter alia, that Jack breached his fiduciary duties to Jay and 
that Jay breached his fiduciary duties to Link Snacks, Inc. 
(Link Snacks) and to L.S.I., Inc. (L.S.I.).2   
¶114 To compensate Jay for the damage caused by Jack's 
breach of fiduciary duties, the jury awarded Jay $736,000.  In 
addition, upon finding that Jack acted maliciously toward Jay, 
the jury awarded Jay $5,000,000 in punitive damages. 
¶115 At the same time, to compensate Link Snacks and L.S.I. 
for the damage caused by Jay's breach of fiduciary duties, the 
jury awarded each company $1.  In addition, upon finding that 
                                                 
2 Link Snacks was then owned by Jack, Troy, and Jay Link, 
and L.S.I. was then owned by Troy and Jay Link. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
3 
 
Jay acted maliciously toward Link Snacks and L.S.I., the jury 
assessed a total of $5,000,000 in punitive damages against Jay——
$3,500,000 to be paid to Link Snacks and $1,500,000 to be paid 
to L.S.I. 
¶116 Consequently, with regard to punitive damages, the 
jury verdict effectively created a wash.  That is, the jury 
awarded Jay $5,000,000 in punitive damages and, at the same 
time, assessed $5,000,000 in punitive damages against Jay. 
¶117 After the verdict was announced, the circuit court 
specifically instructed the parties that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.16(1),3 any motions after verdict must be filed within 20 
days.  In other words, the parties were required to file their 
motions after verdict by July 29, 2008. 
¶118 Jack and Jay filed cross motions after the verdict.  
In relevant part, both Jack and Jay sought a new trial under 
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6),4 arguing that the punitive damages 
assessed against them were grossly excessive. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.16(1) states: "Motions after verdict 
shall be filed and served within 20 days after the verdict is 
rendered, unless the court, within 20 days after the verdict is 
rendered, sets a longer time by an order specifying the dates 
for filing motions, briefs or other documents."  In this case, 
within 20 days after the verdict was rendered, the circuit court 
did not set a longer time for the parties to file their motions 
after verdict. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(6) provides:  
Excessive or Inadequate Verdicts.  If a trial court 
determines that a verdict is excessive or inadequate, 
not due to perversity or prejudice or as a result of 
error during trial (other than an error as to 
damages), the court shall determine the amount which 
as a matter of law is reasonable, and shall order a 
new trial on the issue of damages, unless within 10 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
4 
 
¶119 The business hours of the Washburn County Clerk of 
Circuit Court are 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
excluding legal holidays.  On July 29, 2008, the 20th day after 
the jury rendered its verdict in this case, at 4:17 p.m., Jay's 
attorney called the office of the Washburn County Clerk of 
Circuit Court, informing the clerk that he was on his way to the 
courthouse to file Jay's motion after verdict.  Jay filed his 
motion at 4:32 p.m., two minutes after the office closed.  
Nevertheless, the clerk of circuit court accepted Jay's filing 
and stamped the motion as being filed on July 29, 2008.  The 
clerk explained, "I find that [Jay's attorney's] documents were 
filed in a timely manner on July 29, 2008 due to the fact that 
his office had given the clerk of court office a call regarding 
the filing . . . ." 
¶120 Jack, on the other hand, mailed his motion after 
verdict from Chicago to the Washburn County Clerk of Circuit 
Court.  The motion was mailed on July 29, 2008, but it was not 
received and filed by the clerk until July 30, 2008, at 11:19 
a.m. 
¶121 On July 31, 2008, the circuit court, sua sponte, 
issued an order finding that both Jack's motion after verdict 
and Jay's motion after verdict were filed after the Washburn 
County Clerk of Circuit Court officially closed on July 29, 
                                                                                                                                                             
days the party to whom the option is offered elects to 
accept judgment in the changed amount.  If the option 
is not accepted, the time period for petitioning the 
court of appeals for leave to appeal the order for a 
new trial under ss. 808.03(2) and 809.50 commences on 
the last day of the option period. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
5 
 
2008.  The circuit court concluded that it lacked competency to 
consider Jack's motion because the motion was filed on July 30, 
2008, one day after the strict 20-day deadline set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 805.16(1).  However, the circuit court concluded that 
Jay's motion was timely filed.  The circuit court reasoned, 
"[The clerk of circuit court] filed the pleading and this Court 
is bound by the date stamped by the Clerk." 
¶122 On August 6, 2008, the circuit court reconsidered its 
earlier ruling and decided to consider the merits of Jack's 
motion after verdict——in addition to the merits of Jay's motion 
after verdict.  The circuit court concluded that the punitive 
damages 
assessed 
against 
both 
Jack 
and 
Jay 
were 
unconstitutionally excessive and that a more appropriate ratio 
between the compensatory damages and punitive damages is one to 
one.  Consequently, the circuit court reduced the parties' 
punitive damages awards as follows: the court reduced Jay's 
punitive damages award from $5,000,000 to $736,000 (equal to his 
award of compensatory damages); the court reduced Link Snacks' 
punitive damages award from $3,500,000 to $1 (equal to its award 
of compensatory damages); and reduced L.S.I.'s punitive damages 
award from $1,500,000 to $1 (equal to its award of compensatory 
damages).  As a practical matter, after the circuit court's 
remittitur of the punitive damages awards, the awards were no 
longer a wash as far as Jay was concerned; rather, the circuit 
court's reduction created a $735,998 award in Jay's favor. 
¶123 Notably, the circuit court remitted the punitive 
damages awards without ordering a new trial on the issue of 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
6 
 
damages, as expressly directed in Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6).  
Moreover, the parties never elected to accept judgment in the 
remitted amount.  See § 805.15(6).  To the contrary, the parties 
cross-appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
reducing 
their 
respective punitive damages awards. 
¶124 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order reducing Jay's punitive damages award and affirmed the 
circuit court's order reducing Link Snacks and L.S.I.'s punitive 
damages awards.  N. Air Servs., Inc. v. Link, No. 2008AP2897, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009).  The court 
of appeals concluded that the circuit court lacked competency to 
reduce Jay's punitive damages award because Jack's motion after 
verdict was untimely.  Id., ¶4.  Citing Granado, the court of 
appeals dismissed Jack's argument that his motion should be 
considered timely if Jay's motion, also filed late, was 
considered timely:  
Jay's motion . . . was filed on the twentieth day just 
minutes after the clerk's office closed, after counsel 
had called the office while it was open to inform the 
clerk the motion was on its way.  The clerk placed a 
memo 
in 
the 
file 
stating 
the 
clerk 
exercised 
discretion to accept the motion for filing.  We 
recognized the clerk's discretion to do so in Granado, 
228 Wis. 2d at 797, 800.  Nothing about the acceptance 
of Jay's filing presents any inequality vis-à-vis 
Jack's tardy filing the following day. 
N. Air Servs., Inc., No. 2008AP2897, unpublished slip op., ¶11.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered the circuit court to 
reinstate the full $5,000,000 punitive damages award to Jay.  
Id., ¶1. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
7 
 
¶125 This case is before the supreme court today on Jack 
and Jay's cross-appeals, largely because the clerk of circuit 
court deemed timely one of the two late motions after verdict.   
II. ANALYSIS 
¶126 The majority affirms the decision of the court of 
appeals that reversed the circuit court's order reducing Jay's 
punitive damages award.  Majority op., ¶¶11, 74.  I agree with 
that result.  As the court of appeals correctly recognized, the 
circuit court lacked competency to consider Jack's motion after 
verdict because the motion was not timely filed; the motion was 
filed on July 30, 2008, one day after the 20-day deadline set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.16(1). 
 
See 
Ahrens-Cadillac 
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Belongia, 151 Wis. 2d 763, 766-67, 445 
N.W.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he trial court loses its 
competency to consider postverdict motions filed after the 
twenty day deadline, unless the court has granted an extension 
within that time.").   
¶127 At the same time, the majority declines to adopt a 
bright-line rule that if any documents or papers are delivered 
or received in the office of the clerk of circuit court after 
the specified closing time, they will be treated as having been 
filed on the following day.  See St. John's Home, 150 Wis. 2d at 
44.  Under that bright-line rule, both Jack's motion after 
verdict and Jay's motion after verdict would be deemed filed on 
July 30, 2008, and hence would be untimely.  Instead of adopting 
that bright-line rule, the majority adopts the court of appeals' 
rationale in Granado, concluding that "it is within the clerk of 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
8 
 
circuit court's discretion as an elected constitutional officer 
to accept and file pleadings received after the end of usual 
business hours, so long as that discretion is exercised 
reasonably and is within the guidelines provided by the 
legislature."  Majority op., ¶73.  The majority reasons that 
"[t]he instant case is a prime example of why this flexible 
approach is preferable to Jack's proposed bright-line rule."  
Id., ¶72.  I respectfully disagree.  In fact, I believe this 
case underscores the disparate treatment that can result under 
the court of appeals' rationale in Granado.  I would overrule 
Granado 
and, 
in 
the 
future, 
apply 
the 
bright-line 
rule 
articulated in St. John's Home to the clerks of circuit court. 
¶128 To more fully explain my position, I begin by 
discussing why I believe Granado is not grounded in the law.  I 
then turn to the instant case and discuss why it underscores the 
disparate treatment that can result under the rationale in 
Granado, now adopted by the majority. 
A. Granado is not grounded in the law. 
¶129 This court has made clear that the acts of the clerk 
of circuit court are "ministerial and clerical," and the clerk 
"may not exercise judicial power except in accordance with the 
strict language of a statute conferring such power upon him."  
Pac. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Irmiger, 254 Wis. 207, 212, 36 
N.W.2d 89 (1949); see also State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, ¶22, 
239 
Wis. 2d 244, 
618 
N.W.2d 857; 
Hamilton 
v. 
DILHR, 
56 
Wis. 2d 673, 682, 203 N.W.2d 7 (1973); State v. Dickson, 53 
Wis. 2d 532, 540-41, 193 N.W.2d 17 (1972); State v. Johnston, 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
9 
 
133 
Wis. 2d 261, 
265, 
394 
N.W.2d 915 
(Ct. 
App. 
1986).  
Ministerial acts are, by definition, non-discretionary.  See 
State ex rel. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee 
Cnty., 
2000 
WI 
30, 
¶20, 
233 
Wis. 2d 428, 
608 
N.W.2d 679; Johnston, 133 Wis. 2d at 267; Black's Law Dictionary 
1011 (7th ed. 1999). 
¶130 Nevertheless, 
in 
Granado, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined that the clerk of circuit court is entitled to some 
discretion in the discharge of its duties, including the 
requirement under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(2)(a)5 that a paper be 
"properly deposited" before a clerk may file it.6  228 Wis. 2d at 
804-05.  For purposes of reviewing the clerk's exercise of its 
discretion under § 59.40(2)(a), the court of appeals concluded 
that 
"the 
further 
removed 
from 
an 
office's 
legislative 
guidelines and usual business hours a transaction occurs, the 
less likely it is that the papers have been properly deposited."  
Id. 
¶131 The Granado court recognized that the authority of the 
clerk of circuit court is conferred and limited by the 
legislature, id. at 800, but nevertheless expanded the clerk's 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.40(2)(a) 
to 
include 
the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(2) provides, in relevant part, 
that "[t]he clerk of circuit court shall: (a) File and keep all 
papers properly deposited with him or her in every action or 
proceeding unless required to transmit the papers. . . . " 
6 Notably, the court of appeals' decision in Granado makes 
no mention of the word "ministerial."  See 228 Wis. 2d 794.  The 
majority too dismisses the concept, acknowledging only in a 
footnote that the acts of the clerk of circuit court are 
ministerial and clerical.  Majority op., ¶73 n.31. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
10 
 
discretion to accept papers after-hours and make a judicially-
binding 
determination 
whether 
such 
papers 
are 
"properly 
deposited."7  In doing so, the Granado court ignored the 
distinction between a clerk's discretionary authority to stay 
after-hours and physically accept delivery of papers and the 
judicial power to determine whether such papers were timely 
filed.  Indeed, under the rationale in Granado, a clerk's 
discretionary determination that a paper delivered after-hours 
is or is not "properly deposited" has the effect of conferring 
or depriving a circuit court's competence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.16(1) to consider a motion after verdict.  See Ahrens-
Cadillac Oldsmobile, 151 Wis. 2d at 766.  Absent express 
statutory authority, a clerk may not exercise such judicial 
power.  Irmiger, 254 Wis. at 212. 
¶132 For these very reasons, in St. John's Home, this court 
recognized that "the timeliness of the filing of a petition for 
review should not be governed by happenstance."  150 Wis. 2d at 
43.  We noted that the clerk of the supreme court has been 
designated to receive petitions for review and that "the timely 
filing of a petition for review is necessary to invoke this 
court's appellate jurisdiction."  Id. at 42.  Concerned about 
unpredictability and the potential for abuse, we "reject[ed]——as 
too problematic and cumbersome——any rule which would condone the 
                                                 
7 Likewise, the majority acknowledges that the discretion of 
the clerk of circuit court must be "legislatively-prescribed," 
majority op., ¶70 n.29, but then inappropriately expands the 
discretion to accept filings after-hours into the authority to 
determine whether such filings are timely.  See id., ¶71. 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
11 
 
after-hours delivery and receipt of a petition for review."  Id. 
at 43-44.  Instead, we adopted a bright-line rule that if any 
documents or papers are delivered or received in the office of 
the clerk of the supreme court after the specified closing time 
of 5:00 p.m., they will be treated as having been filed on the 
following day.  Id. at 44.   
¶133 In the future, I would apply this same bright-line 
rule to the clerks of circuit court.  While a clerk of circuit 
court has the discretionary authority to accept papers after-
hours, such papers should be treated as having been filed on the 
following business day. 
B. This case underscores the disparate treatment that can 
result under the rationale in Granado, now adopted by  
the majority. 
¶134 To appreciate the potential for unpredictability and 
abuse under the rationale in Granado, one need not look any 
further than the instant case and the result advanced by the 
majority opinion. 
¶135 A jury found that Jack acted maliciously toward Jay 
and that Jay acted maliciously toward Link Snacks and L.S.I.  
They calculated punitive damages accordingly and effectively 
created a wash, awarding Jay $5,000,000 and at the same time 
assessing $5,000,000 against Jay.  It must be remembered that 
"[i]n punitive damages, as in damages for pain and suffering, 
the 
law 
furnishes 
no 
mechanical 
legal 
rule 
for 
their 
measurement.  The amount rests initially in the discretion of 
the jury."  Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 236, 291 
N.W.2d 516 (1980). 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
12 
 
¶136 Jack and Jay filed cross motions after the verdict, 
both of which were delivered to the Washburn County Clerk of 
Circuit Court after the office officially closed on July 29, 
2008, the 20th day after the jury rendered its verdict in this 
case.  Still, in an act of discretion upheld by the majority, 
the clerk found that Jay's motion was timely filed.  As a 
result, the clerk effectively conferred competence upon the 
circuit court to consider Jay's otherwise late motion.  The 
effect was considerable.  The circuit court agreed with Jay that 
the $5,000,000 assessed against him was grossly excessive and 
consequently reduced Link Snacks and L.S.I.'s punitive damages 
awards to $1, creating a one to one ratio between their 
compensatory damages and punitive damages.  While this court has 
recognized that "a reasonable relationship" between the amount 
of compensatory damages and the amount of punitive damages is 
required, we have also specifically "reject[ed] the notion that 
courts can use a multiplier, or fixed ratio of compensatory-to-
punitive damages or criminal fines-to-punitive damages, to 
calculate the amount of reasonable punitive damages."  Mgmt. 
Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 
Wis. 2d 158, 194, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996). 
¶137 Because Jack's motion after verdict was not timely 
filed, the circuit court lacked competence to consider it, and 
Jay's 
punitive 
damages 
award 
remains 
at 
$5,000,000.  
Consequently, as far as Jay is concerned, what was once a wash 
calculated by the jury is now a $4,999,998 award in his favor.  
That near $5,000,000 difference is the result of the clerk of 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
13 
 
circuit court's discretionary determination that Jay's motion 
after verdict was timely filed. 
¶138 What is more, the circuit court remitted Link Snacks 
and L.S.I.'s punitive damages awards without providing the 
parties the option of a new trial on the issue of damages, as 
statutorily mandated.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6); Mgmt. 
Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 175 & n.14. 
¶139 The disparate treatment between Jack and Jay is 
potentially compounded if only Jay gets a new trial on the issue 
of damages.  The majority remands this case to the court of 
appeals for a determination of whether the circuit court erred 
by precluding Jay from introducing to the jury his theory of 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty.  See majority op., ¶¶99, 
103.  If the court of appeals answers that question in the 
affirmative, it seems that this case must at least be remanded 
to the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of Jay's 
damages for Jack's breach of fiduciary duties.8   
¶140 As a practical matter, on remand, regardless of how 
the court of appeals decides the evidentiary issue of whether 
the circuit court erred by precluding Jay from introducing to 
the jury his theory of damages for breach of fiduciary duty, 
                                                 
8 What remains unclear is whether all parties herein would 
receive a new trial on the issue of damages such that the jury 
would hear the entire body of evidence, or whether it is 
contemplated that only Jay is to receive a new trial on damages 
for Jack's breach of fiduciary duties.  In other words, while 
Link Snacks and L.S.I. had their punitive damages awards reduced 
to $1 without the benefit of a new trial on damages pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(6), may Jay now obtain a new trial on 
damages and potentially receive an even more lucrative jury 
verdict——without the jury being able to hear the whole story? 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
14 
 
this case could very well be sent back to the circuit court for 
a new trial on the issue of damages because of the circuit 
court's failure to abide by the statutory requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 805.15(6).  The circuit court remitted the punitive 
damages awards without providing the parties the option of a new 
trial on the issue of damages, as statutorily mandated in 
§ 805.15(6).  Pursuant to § 805.15(6), when the circuit court 
determines that a verdict is excessive, "the court shall 
determine the amount which as a matter of law is reasonable, and 
shall order a new trial on the issue of damages, unless within 
10 days the party to whom the option is offered elects to accept 
judgment in the changed amount."  (Emphasis added.)  In this 
case, neither Jay, Link Snacks, nor L.S.I. accepted judgment in 
the changed amount.  It follows that the court of appeals may 
need to address whether a new trial on the issue of damages is 
the proper remedy in this case and for whom.9 
¶141 In summary, this disparate treatment is the upshot of 
the clerk of circuit court's discretionary determination, upheld 
by the majority, that Jay's motion after verdict was timely 
filed.  In contrast, under a bright-line rule that any papers 
received in the office of the clerk of circuit court after the 
specified closing time will be treated as having been filed on 
the following day, both Jack's motion after verdict and Jay's 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals may need to address whether the 
circuit court nonetheless had the authority to adjust all 
parties' punitive damages awards, even though the circuit court 
was deciding only Jay's motion after verdict brought under Wis. 
Stat. § 805.15(6). 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
15 
 
motion after verdict would have been deemed untimely.  In that 
case, the circuit court would have lacked competency to consider 
both motions, and the jury verdict would have stood.  I favor 
that equitable result over the result advanced by the majority 
today. 
¶142 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶143 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2008AP2897.akz 
 
 
 
1