Title: - Brandy Bain Jennings v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1016 
____________ 
 
BRANDY BAIN JENNINGS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1031 
____________ 
 
BRANDY BAIN JENNINGS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL D. CREWS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 27, 2013] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Brandy Bain Jennings, who was twenty-six years old at the time of the 
crime, was convicted and sentenced to death for the November 1995 first-degree 
 
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murders of Dorothy Siddle, Vicki Smith, and Jason Wiggins, all of which occurred 
during a robbery of the Cracker Barrel Restaurant in Naples.  On direct appeal, we 
affirmed his convictions and sentences.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 
1998).  Jennings now appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, 
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850,1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 and simultaneously 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief and deny Jennings’ petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
This Court summarized the pertinent facts underlying this crime on direct 
appeal as follows: 
Dorothy Siddle, Vicki Smith, and Jason Wiggins, all of whom 
worked at the Cracker Barrel Restaurant in Naples, were killed during 
an early morning robbery of the restaurant on November 15, 1995.  
Upon arriving on the scene, police found the bodies of all three 
victims lying in pools of blood on the freezer floor with their throats 
slashed.  Victim Siddle’s hands were bound behind her back with 
electrical tape; Smith and Wiggins both had electrical tape around 
their respective left wrists, but the tape appeared to have come loose 
from their right wrists. 
                                         
 
1.  Because Jennings initially filed his motion for postconviction relief 
before October 1, 2001, his claims are governed by Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850, rather than rule 3.851.  See Rodriguez v. State, 39 So. 3d 275, 
282 n.4 (Fla. 2010).   
 
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Police also found bloody shoe prints leading from the freezer, 
through the kitchen, and into the office, blood spots in and around the 
kitchen sink, and an opened office safe surrounded by plastic 
containers and cash.  Outside, leading away from the back of the 
restaurant, police found scattered bills and coins, shoe tracks, a Buck 
knife, a Buck knife case, a pair of blood-stained gloves, and a Daisy 
air pistol. 
Jennings (age twenty-six) and Jason Graves (age eighteen), 
both of whom had previously worked at the Cracker Barrel and knew 
the victims, were apprehended and jailed approximately three weeks 
later in Las Vegas, Nevada, where Jennings ultimately made lengthy 
statements to Florida law enforcement personnel.  In a taped 
interview, Jennings blamed the murders on Graves, but admitted his 
(Jennings’) involvement in planning and, after several aborted 
attempts, actually perpetrating the robbery with Graves.  Jennings 
acknowledged wearing gloves during the robbery and using his Buck 
knife in taping the victims’ hands, but claimed that, after doing so, he 
must have set the Buck knife down somewhere and did not remember 
seeing it again.  Jennings further stated that he saw the dead bodies in 
the freezer and that his foot slipped in some blood, but that he did not 
remember falling, getting blood on his clothes or hands, or washing 
his hands in the kitchen sink.  Jennings also stated that the Daisy air 
pistol belonged to Graves, and directed police to a canal where he and 
Graves had thrown other evidence of the crime. 
In an untaped interview the next day, during which he was 
confronted with inconsistencies in his story and the evidence against 
him, Jennings stated, “I think I could have been the killer.  In my 
mind I think I could have killed them, but in my heart I don’t think I 
could have.” 
At trial, the taped interview was played for the jury, and one of 
the officers testified regarding Jennings’ untaped statements made the 
next day.  The items ultimately recovered from the canal were also 
entered into evidence. 
The medical examiner, who performed autopsies on the 
victims, testified that they died from “sharp force injuries” to the neck 
caused by “a sharp-bladed instrument with a very strong blade,” like 
the Buck knife found at the crime scene.  A forensic serologist 
testified that traces of blood were found on the Buck knife, the Buck 
knife case, the area around the sink, and one of the gloves recovered 
from the crime scene, but in an amount insufficient for further 
 
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analysis.  An impressions expert testified that Jennings’ tennis shoes 
recovered from the canal matched the bloody shoe prints inside the 
restaurant as well as some of the shoe prints from the outside tracks 
leading away from the restaurant. 
The State also presented testimony concerning previous 
statements made by Jennings regarding robbery and witness 
elimination in general.  Specifically, Angela Chainey, who had been a 
friend of Jennings’, testified that about two years before the crimes 
Jennings said that if he ever needed any money he could always rob 
someplace or somebody.  Chainey further testified that when she 
responded, “That’s stupid.  You could get caught,” Jennings replied, 
while making a motion across his throat, “Not if you don’t leave any 
witnesses.”  On cross-examination, Chainey further testified that 
Jennings had “made statements similar to that several times.” 
The State also presented testimony concerning previous 
statements made by Jennings regarding his dislike of victim Siddle.  
Specifically, Bob Evans, one of the managers at Cracker Barrel, 
testified that Jennings perceived Siddle to be holding him back at 
work and that, just after Jennings quit, he said about Siddle, “I hate 
her.  I even hate the sound of her voice.”  Donna Howell, who also 
worked at Cracker Barrel, similarly testified that she was aware of 
Jennings’ animosity and dislike of Siddle, and that Jennings had once 
said about Siddle, “I can’t stand the bitch.  I can’t stand the sound of 
her voice.” 
The jury found Jennings guilty as charged.  In the penalty 
phase, the defense presented mitigation evidence, including general 
character testimony from witness Mary Hamler, who testified on 
direct examination that she had lived with Jennings for two and one-
half years.  She also testified that Jennings had gotten along well with 
her children during that time, and that he cried when they (Jennings 
and Hamler) broke up. 
On cross-examination, the State elicited testimony from Hamler 
that there was another side to Jennings’ character and that Jennings 
once said that if he ever committed a robbery, he would not be stupid 
enough to stick around, but would go north.  Hamler further testified 
on cross-examination that Jennings was angry at Cracker Barrel in 
general, and Siddle in particular, for “jerking him around” and holding 
him back at work, and that in this regard Jennings once said of Siddle 
that “one day she would get hers.” 
 
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The defense presented further character evidence from several 
of Jennings’ friends that he was good with children, got along with 
everybody, and was basically a nonviolent, big-brother type who was 
happy-go-lucky, fun-loving, playful, laid back, and likeable.  
Jennings’ mother testified that her son never met his father and that 
she raised Jennings herself.  She claimed that Jennings had been a 
straight-A student, but quit school to take care of her when she 
became sick. 
The jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two as to each 
of the murders.  In its sentencing order, the trial court found three 
aggravators: (1) that the murders were committed during a robbery; 
(2) that they were committed to avoid arrest; and (3) that they were 
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). 
The trial court found only one statutory mitigator: that Jennings 
had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight).  
The trial court explicitly found that two urged statutory mitigators did 
not exist: that Jennings was an accomplice in a capital felony 
committed by another and that his participation was relatively minor; 
and that Jennings acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person.  The trial court also found eight 
nonstatutory mitigators: (1) that Jennings had a deprived childhood 
(some weight); (2) that accomplice Graves was not sentenced to death 
(some weight); (3) that Jennings cooperated with police (substantial 
weight); (4) that he had a good employment history (little weight); (5) 
that he had a loving relationship with his mother (little weight); (6) 
that he had positive personality traits enabling the formation of strong, 
caring relationships (some weight); (7) that he had the capacity to care 
for and be mutually loved by children (some weight); and (8) that he 
exhibited exemplary courtroom behavior (little weight). 
 
After evaluating the aggravators and mitigators, the trial court 
sentenced Jennings to death for each murder.  The trial court also 
sentenced Jennings to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the robbery. 
 
Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 145-47 (footnotes omitted).  This Court affirmed Jennings’ 
convictions and sentences.  Id. at 155.2
                                         
 
2.  Jennings raised four claims on direct appeal, all of which the Court 
rejected: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he 
  Jennings filed a petition for writ of 
 
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certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied.  See Jennings 
v. Florida, 527 U.S. 1042 (1999).  
 
In March 2000, Jennings filed an initial motion for postconviction relief.  He 
filed an amended motion in June 2000 and a second amended motion in August 
2009, in which he raised twenty-five claims.3  Following a Huff4
                                                                                                                                   
made to Florida law enforcement while in custody in Las Vegas; (2) the trial court 
erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator; (3) the trial court erred in finding CCP; 
and (4) Jennings’ death sentences were impermissibly disparate from codefendant 
Graves’ sentences of life imprisonment.  Id. at 147-53.  The Court did not address 
Jennings’ challenge to his robbery sentence because it was not preserved below.  
See id. at 145 n.1.   
 hearing, the 
 
3.  Jennings’ twenty-five claims were as follows: (1) Jennings’ convictions 
are materially unreliable due to the cumulative effects of the following: (a) trial 
counsel’s failure to investigate the circumstances surrounding Jennings’ 
confession, depose or prepare for cross-examination of several State witnesses, 
investigate the crime scene and consult forensic experts, and object to prosecutorial 
misconduct; (b) improper rulings of the trial court; and (c) the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct, including the State making inconsistent arguments at 
Jennings’ and codefendant Graves’ trials; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to obtain an adequate mental health evaluation of Jennings and for failing to 
provide the necessary background information to the mental health experts in order 
to present critical information to the jury regarding Jennings’ mental state at the 
guilt, penalty, and sentencing phases of Jennings’ trial; (4) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate, prepare, and present mitigation evidence and 
for failing to adequately challenge the aggravating circumstances presented to the 
jury; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct adequate voir dire and 
for failing to request a curative instruction after the trial judge introduced the case 
to potential jurors as the “infamous Cracker Barrel case”; (6) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to establish that Jennings was not competent to waive his 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights and for failing to object to the 
admission of Jennings’ statements on the ground that they were obtained by the use 
of threats, promises, and misleading information; (7) Jennings is entitled to a new 
 
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trial as a result of newly discovered evidence regarding weaknesses in the field of 
forensic sciences; (8) there were insufficient aggravating factors to render Jennings 
eligible for the death penalty, the jury was given unconstitutionally vague 
instructions on the aggravators, and newly discovered mitigation evidence renders 
Jennings’ death sentences disproportionate; (9) the penalty phase instructions were 
improper and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions; 
(10) the State failed to prove the avoid arrest aggravator, which is 
unconstitutionally vague, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this 
issue; (11) the jury instruction on expert witness testimony was deficient and trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object; (12) the “during the commission of a 
felony” aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and trial and 
appellate counsel failed to properly litigate this issue; (13) the trial court relied on 
nonstatutory aggravating factors in sentencing Jennings to death, and trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object; (14) the trial court improperly instructed the 
jury regarding its role in the penalty phase in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320 (1985), and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate this 
issue; (15) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar is 
unconstitutional because it prohibits defense counsel from interviewing jurors to 
determine if constitutional error was present in Jennings’ case; (16) the jury was 
not adequately instructed regarding the aggravating factors, and section 921.141, 
Florida Statutes (2009), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (17) Florida’s 
capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional, and trial and appellate counsel failed 
to properly litigate this issue; (18) Jennings was denied a fair trial due to pretrial 
publicity, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to research local media 
coverage of the case in Pinellas County, where it was tried, and for failing to 
request that the trial be conducted outside the influence of the Collier County 
press; (19) the trial court improperly considered inadmissible victim impact 
evidence, and trial and appellate counsel failed to properly litigate this issue; (20) 
the sentencing order did not reflect independent weighing or reasoned judgment, 
and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate this issue; (21) the 
aggravating circumstance of commission during the course of an enumerated 
felony is unconstitutional, and trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for 
failing to litigate this issue; (22) cumulative errors entitle Jennings to relief; (23) 
Jennings was denied a proper direct appeal due to omissions in the record, and trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that a proper record was provided to 
the court; (24) Jennings is insane and cannot be executed; and (25) lethal injection 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the Department of Corrections 
unconstitutionally delegated its authority to create and implement lethal injection 
 
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postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on five of Jennings’ claims: (1) 
trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately impeach State witness Angela Cheney 
(a portion of claim 1 in Jennings’ second amended postconviction motion); (2)  
trial counsel was ineffective concerning the lack of a mental health evaluation 
(claim 3); (3) trial counsel failed to investigate mitigation evidence (claim 4); (4)  
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge aspects related to the 
admission of Jennings’ statements to law enforcement (claim 6); and (5) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues about the sentencing order and 
the trial court’s consideration of nonstatutory mitigation (claim 20).  Following a 
three-day evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Jennings’ second 
amended motion for postconviction relief. 
 
This appeal follows, and Jennings simultaneously petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  Rule 3.850 Claims 
 
In Jennings’ appeal to this Court, he raises three claims.  He first alleges that 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to discover and 
                                                                                                                                   
procedures to the Attorney General’s Office, and denial of appointed counsel to 
raise a federal civil rights action violates the Equal Protection Clause.      
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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present sufficient mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of his trial.  Second, 
Jennings alleges that trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to adequately 
impeach State witness Angela Cheney.5
Ineffective Assistance of Penalty-Phase Counsel 
  Lastly, he argues that the postconviction 
court erred in summarily denying several of his other postconviction claims.  We 
address each issue in turn, beginning with Jennings’ ineffective assistance of 
penalty-phase counsel claim.  
 
In his first claim, Jennings raises an ineffectiveness challenge focusing on 
trial counsel’s allegedly inadequate performance during the penalty phase, as well 
as counsel’s alleged lack of preparation.  Specifically, Jennings alleges that the 
pretrial mental health evaluations performed in this case were inadequate, that trial 
counsel did not conduct a full investigation of Jennings’ troubled childhood, and 
that trial counsel did not obtain or provide his experts with sufficient records to 
enable them to offer a fully informed opinion regarding mental health mitigation.   
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, a defendant must satisfy the 
following two requirements: 
                                         
 
5.  Cheney’s name was misspelled in the trial transcript as Angela Chainey. 
 
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First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).   
To establish the deficiency prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove 
that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional 
norms.”  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688).  “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The defendant 
carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel 
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential.”  Id.  “[S]trategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
 
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considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). 
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 691.  “This Court has recognized that ‘the obligation to investigate and 
prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated.’ ”  Sexton v. 
State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1079 (Fla. 2008) (quoting State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 
1113 (Fla. 2002)).  “Clearly, ‘[a]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of a defendant’s background for possible mitigating evidence.’ ”  Id. 
(quoting Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001)).  The focus of review 
should be “whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce 
mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
523 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).  “Trial counsel will not be held to 
be deficient when [counsel] makes a reasonable strategic decision to not present 
mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it could open the 
door to other damaging testimony.”  Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 
2002).  
“Penalty phase prejudice under the Strickland standard is measured by 
whether the error of trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the 
sentence of death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 
 
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the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.”  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 
975, 1013 (Fla. 2009).  That standard does not “require a defendant to show ‘that 
counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his 
penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 
455-56 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94) (alteration in original).   
Both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact.  
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 2004).  “In reviewing a trial court’s 
ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that they are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application 
of the law to those facts.”  Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 998 (Fla. 2006).  
Jennings presented eleven witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, including his 
lead trial counsel; three experts hired by postconviction counsel; and several 
friends and family members.6
                                         
 
6.  The State did not present any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. 
  Jennings was represented at trial by Thomas Osteen, 
who testified at the evidentiary hearing that at the time of Jennings’ trial, he was 
the deputy public defender running the Collier County office.  In addition, 
Jennings was represented by a second attorney, also with the public defender’s 
office, and counsel’s trial preparation was assisted by the chief investigator in the 
 
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public defender’s office, who was a former law enforcement officer and whom 
Osteen described as having a “good feel” for mitigation information.  While 
Osteen’s co-counsel had no experience in capital cases, Osteen had represented 
“[m]aybe 30” prior capital defendants in death penalty cases, the majority of which 
went to the penalty phase.  At the evidentiary hearing, Osteen testified that he 
began his preparations for the penalty phase at about the same time as his trial 
preparation, speaking to Jennings’ mother and people that knew Jennings.    
Jennings’ argument that trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase has 
essentially two components.  First, Jennings alleges that trial counsel failed to 
provide necessary documentation or guidance to his mental health experts and that 
because those experts conducted insufficient evaluations of Jennings, counsel’s 
decision to forego mental health mitigation in this case was not fully informed or 
reasonably determined.  Second, Jennings alleges that counsel’s mitigation 
investigation was minimal, consisting only of interviews with Jennings’ mother 
and individuals who knew Jennings in adulthood, and that substantial mitigation 
evidence about Jennings’ troubled childhood and history of substance abuse 
therefore went undiscovered.  We address each of these arguments in turn. 
Mental Health Mitigation 
 
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Jennings’ first contention is that the decision to forego mental mitigation in 
this case was unreasonable and based on insufficient and incomplete information.  
On this point, the postconviction court found as follows: 
Mr. Osteen testified that he moved for the appointment of two mental 
health experts, Dr. Wald and Dr. Masterson, with whom he had 
previously worked in several cases, who knew what he was looking 
for, and who knew what he wanted in their reports.  He further 
testified that he always spoke with the doctors after their reports were 
submitted and received more details than were included in the reports.  
He stated that the experts were retained to determine the defendant’s 
competency and the existence of any mitigators.  Once he reviewed 
the reports, Mr. Osteen concluded that the doctors would not be 
helpful.  He testified that this was not a strong mental health case, so 
he “chose to go a different route.”  Mr. Osteen further testified that if 
he had the doctors testify, the contents of their reports would have 
been “fair game,” and by not calling them to testify, the jury was not 
informed of specific details which may have harmed defendant.  
Counsel cannot be ineffective for making a reasonable strategic 
decision to forego presentation of mitigating evidence that would 
likely have been more harmful than helpful and could have damaged 
defendant’s chances with the jury.   
(Citations omitted.)  After a full review of the record, we conclude that the trial 
court’s factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
We further conclude that trial counsel made “a reasonable strategic decision 
to not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it 
could open the door to other damaging testimony.”  Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d at 
1248.  Trial counsel made this decision based on his experience, the reports of 
competent experts, and his strategy of emphasizing Jennings’ many positive 
character traits over his negative traits.  Specifically, trial counsel testified at the 
 
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evidentiary hearing that he was concerned that the mental mitigation was not 
particularly strong and had the potential to do more harm than good by revealing 
Jennings’ extensive drug use and prior criminal acts.  Counsel cannot be found 
deficient for choosing to pursue other mitigation evidence that he determined was 
more likely to help Jennings at trial.  See Winkles v. State, 21 So. 3d 19, 26 (Fla. 
2009) (“This Court previously has found no deficiency where trial counsel made a 
strategic decision not to present expert witness testimony after investigating and 
concluding that the testimony would be more harmful than helpful.”); Willacy v. 
State, 967 So. 2d 131, 143-44 (Fla. 2007) (finding that counsel could not be 
considered deficient when mental mitigation evidence “would have opened the 
door to aggravating facts,” such as the defendant’s prior bad acts and negative 
personality traits). 
 
Jennings nevertheless argues that the information on which trial counsel 
made the determination to forego mental mitigation was incomplete, in that 
counsel failed to provide his experts with complete school and medical records.  
He also contends that the mental health experts were themselves inadequate.  
Jennings relies primarily on the postconviction testimony presented at the 
evidentiary hearing of Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a clinical psychologist hired by 
postconviction counsel, who detailed what he perceived as the many inadequacies 
in Dr. Masterson’s pretrial report.  Dr. Eisenstein performed numerous 
 
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neuropsychological tests of Jennings in 2000 and again in 2010 and concluded that 
Jennings’ performance was indicative of “some brain disregulation.”  Following 
his 2010 evaluation, Dr. Eisenstein diagnosed Jennings with a learning disorder 
and with intermittent explosive disorder. 
With respect to Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony, the postconviction court found as 
follows: 
Dr. Eisenstein criticized Dr. Masterson’s report, stating his 
opinion that Dr. Masterson did not put it all together in his report, did 
not list all the tests performed, and did not list all the raw data.  Dr. 
Eisenstein disagreed with some of Dr. Masterson’s conclusions and 
how Dr. Masterson listed Defendant’s test results.  However, Dr. 
Eisenstein conceded that this was a difference of opinion, that Dr. 
Masterson’s report eluded [sic] to many of the same issues he had 
testified to, and that Dr. Masterson used the correct tests available at 
the time.  He admitted that there was no authority that dictated how to 
write a report and that is [sic] was possible a report might be tailored 
to meet an attorney’s needs.  While Dr. Eisenstein complained that 
there was a whole battery of tests available that Dr. Masterson could 
have performed on defendant, he admitted there were no required 
tests. 
In light of Mr. Osteen’s testimony that he chose to retain 
experts who were familiar with what he wanted to see and always 
spoke with his experts to obtain more detail than was listed in the 
reports, the Court finds Dr. Eisenstein’s criticism of Dr. Masterson’s 
report to be mere semantics. . . .  That the defendant has now offered 
expert opinions different from those of the experts appointed before 
trial does not mean relief is warranted.  Trial counsel made a 
reasonable tactical decision not to pursue further mental health 
investigation after receiving an initial diagnosis that there was no 
mental health mitigation, and that initial diagnosis is not rendered 
incompetent merely because defendant has now secured the testimony 
of an expert who gives a more favorable diagnosis.  Defense counsel 
is entitled to rely on the evaluations conducted by qualified mental 
 
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health experts, even if, in retrospect, those evaluations may not have 
been as complete as others may desire. 
 
(Citations and paragraph numbers omitted.)  The postconviction court further 
found that Dr. Wald’s and Dr. Masterson’s reports “show they were aware of and 
considered defendant’s history of head injuries, drug and alcohol use, and 
childhood psychiatric treatment for anger issues,” which were all issues raised by 
postconviction counsel through testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
The postconviction court’s factual findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record, and the court did not err as to its legal 
conclusions.  Jennings predominantly attributes the deficiencies in the presentation 
of mental health mitigation to the experts and not to counsel, and the 
postconviction court found that Dr. Eisenstein’s criticisms of Dr. Masterson’s 
report amounted to “mere semantics.”  Thus, Jennings has failed to establish that 
trial counsel was deficient for not presenting mental mitigation at trial.  See 
Sexton, 997 So. 2d at 1084-85.  As this Court has previously stated, the fact that a 
defendant “produced more favorable expert testimony at his evidentiary hearing is 
not reason enough to deem trial counsel ineffective.”  Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 
480, 494 (Fla. 2007).  Trial counsel cannot be deficient for relying on the 
evaluations of qualified mental health experts, “even if, in retrospect, those 
evaluations may not have been as complete as others may desire.”  Darling v. 
State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007). 
 
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Moreover, although Jennings argues that trial counsel did not provide his 
experts with complete school or medical records, Dr. Wald’s report indicates that 
he reviewed Lee County school records, as well as medical records from the 
Collier County Jail.  Further, even assuming trial counsel should have sought 
further records, Jennings has not demonstrated prejudice.  Although Dr. Eisenstein 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had reviewed additional records, 
Jennings has not shown what specific information in these records was different 
from the information to which counsel was already privy, or what effect those 
additional records would have had.  
 
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.  
Childhood and Background Mitigation 
Jennings also alleges that trial counsel conducted an insufficient background 
investigation of available mitigation information in this case.  In support of his 
argument, Jennings presented testimony from Dr. Faye Sultan, a clinical 
psychologist hired by postconviction counsel, and from several individuals who 
knew Jennings and his mother during Jennings’ childhood.  Dr. Sultan testified in 
particular that through her investigation, she learned of pervasive sexual abuse in 
Jennings’ family.  Dr. Sultan’s evaluation of Jennings, however, revealed similar 
findings to those of Dr. Masterson’s pretrial report, and her review of Dr. 
Masterson’s and Dr. Wald’s reports indicated that they did address Jennings’ 
 
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history of substance abuse but not, in her opinion, “the severity of [Jennings’] 
substance abuse” or the sexual violence.  Dr. Sultan opined that, although Jennings 
does not suffer from any major mental illness, he “is quite a damaged person” and 
he “operates in the world . . . in a highly dysfunctional way.”   
Jennings also presented testimony at the evidentiary hearing from his cousin, 
Patricia Scudder, and her husband Lloyd, both of whom testified that Jennings was 
exposed to child molesters in his youth and that Jennings’ mother exhibited poor 
parenting skills.  However, Patricia also testified that the relationship between 
Jennings and his mother was “very loving” and that Jennings’ mother was “very, 
very overly protective” of Jennings.   
Jennings argues that this postconviction testimony on the whole establishes 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present as mitigating 
evidence the history of sexual abuse and incest in Jennings’ family and the 
dysfunctional home situation in which Jennings was raised.  Jennings contrasts 
these witnesses’ testimony with that of trial counsel, who testified that “[i]f there 
was one thing Mr. Jennings had, he had a mother.  A good one.”  Jennings thus 
suggests that counsel was deficient for failing to uncover mitigating information 
about Jennings’ childhood and for relying on Jennings’ mother to establish the 
mitigation he chose to present. 
On this claim, the postconviction court found as follows: 
 
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As it relates to information regarding sexual abuse or emotional 
neglect, Mr. Osteen could not be ineffective for failing to present 
evidence of which he was not aware, since he testified this 
information was not reported to him.  In fact, in Dr. Masterson’s 
report, defendant specifically denied any history of sexual abuse.  
Furthermore, sexual abuse of defendant’s mother or other family 
members would not be significantly mitigating.  In Dr. Wald’s report, 
defendant also denied being intoxicated or under the influence of 
drugs at the time the crimes were committed.  Mr. Osteen testified that 
he chose to rely on the positive statements by defendant’s mother and 
friends, and the good, loving relationship between defendant and his 
mother in order to attempt to elicit sympathy from the jury.  Again, 
this was proper trial strategy to focus on positive information, rather 
than negative information such as poverty or extreme drug and 
alcohol use.   
(Citation omitted.)  As the postconviction court’s findings demonstrate, this is not 
a case where trial counsel failed to investigate, obtain, or provide any background 
information to the experts and therefore could not have made a reasoned strategic 
decision about its presentation.  Cf. State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 
2000) (holding that counsel’s performance was deficient where he “was unable to 
provide any explanation as to why he did not conduct an investigation or contact 
witnesses available to him”).  Trial counsel stated that it was his practice that either 
he or his investigator would ask about a history of sexual abuse and that it “never 
came up as an issue” in this case.  Counsel further testified that he spoke to 
Jennings’ mother several times and that he tried to arrange for her to meet with Dr. 
Wald but that she did not want to participate.  None of the witnesses counsel 
questioned, including Jennings and his mother, revealed any history of sexual 
 
- 21 - 
abuse in the family, and Jennings specifically denied that he himself had been 
abused.  In previous cases, we have found that trial counsel was not deficient for 
failing to present evidence of sexual abuse when the defendant, who was the abuse 
victim, denied or did not inform counsel or mental health experts about it.  See, 
e.g., Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 510 (Fla. 2009); Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 
233, 240 (Fla. 2008); Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1110 (Fla. 2005).   
The facts of this case present an even stronger reason not to find deficient 
performance by trial counsel because, in this case, the defendant was not the victim 
of the abuse and counsel testified that it was his practice to affirmatively ask 
potential witnesses about any history of sexual abuse.  Counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to discover and present evidence of sexual abuse in Jennings’ 
family when none of the witnesses questioned provided any information to suggest 
that there was a history of familial abuse.  See Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 614 
(Fla. 2002) (stating that the reasonableness of counsel’s decisions may be 
influenced by the defendant’s own statements).   
Even assuming trial counsel should have learned about the abuse of 
Jennings’ family members through other means, Jennings has not demonstrated 
prejudice.  While information concerning the sexual abuse of his family members 
might have been mitigating in establishing Jennings’ troubled childhood and 
emotional development, the trial court found as nonstatutory mitigation that 
 
- 22 - 
Jennings had a deprived childhood, and the presentation of this testimony might 
have run contrary to counsel’s reasonable strategic decision of finding friends who 
could speak positively about Jennings.  In addition, this information does not rise 
to the level of unpresented mitigation previously held to be prejudicial.  Cf. 
Winkles, 21 So. 3d at 27 (finding that unpresented testimony that the defendant 
himself had suffered sexual abuse was not prejudicial).   
Jennings’ further contention that trial counsel should have done more to 
investigate out-of-state friends and records is likewise unavailing.  Counsel was 
already aware of Jennings’ childhood background through Jennings’ own detailed 
self-reports, and in any event, this presentation would have been contrary to 
counsel’s strategic decision, based on his investigation, to present positive penalty-
phase witnesses who could speak to Jennings’ good character traits.  
In sum, we conclude that the postconviction court did not err in finding that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain or present childhood and 
background mitigation.  Jennings has not “overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy.’ ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel, 350 U.S. at 101).  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Failure to Impeach 
 
- 23 - 
 
Jennings next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately investigate and impeach State witness Angela Cheney at trial.  The 
postconviction court denied this claim, finding that Jennings’ postconviction 
counsel did not question trial counsel about any alleged failure to adequately cross-
examine Cheney and that Jennings therefore “failed to present any evidence that 
would show Mr. Osteen was in any way deficient on this issue.”  After considering 
the pertinent testimony from both the evidentiary hearing and Jennings’ trial, we 
conclude that trial counsel was in fact deficient with respect to this claim.  
However, a close examination of the record in this case reveals that Jennings has 
not established that trial counsel’s failure in this regard “so affected the fairness 
and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.”  
Pittman v. State, 90 So. 3d 794, 812 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 
932).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
 
Angela Cheney testified at Jennings’ trial regarding a statement Jennings 
made in November 1993.  According to Cheney, Jennings said that if he ever 
needed money, “he could always rob someplace or somebody.”  When Cheney told 
Jennings that he could get caught, Jennings replied, while making a gesture across 
his throat, “Not if you don’t leave any witnesses.”  On cross-examination, Cheney 
indicated that Jennings had made similar statements “several times.”  Jennings’ 
trial counsel questioned Cheney on cross-examination only about the context in 
 
- 24 - 
which the original statement occurred and when Cheney alerted police to Jennings’ 
remark.   
At the evidentiary hearing, Cheney testified that she was friends with 
Jennings’ codefendant, Jason Graves, in high school and that she met Jennings 
through Graves.  Cheney dated Jennings for about a month, after which she did not 
maintain any friendship or acquaintance with Jennings.  Cheney later married 
Graves’ brother, but was either in the process of divorce or already divorced from 
him when she testified at Jennings’ trial.  Cheney also testified that she had thirty 
or forty conversations with Graves after he and Jennings were arrested for the 
Cracker Barrel murders, that she was concerned for Graves’ physical and 
emotional well-being while he was in jail, that she attended the first meeting with 
Graves’ lawyers, and that her husband at the time (Graves’ brother) was present 
with her when she gave her statement to police regarding Jennings’ prior 
comments.   
Although the postconviction court denied this claim, the court did note that 
Jennings had established that trial counsel should have been aware, based on 
information provided during pretrial discovery, of the nature of Cheney’s 
relationships with both Jennings and Graves, and of what Cheney would testify to 
at trial.  Given the information trial counsel knew from discovery material, a 
complete review of the trial transcript reveals that counsel was deficient with 
 
- 25 - 
respect to his preparation for and cross-examination of Cheney.  The cross-
examination consisted merely of a few basic questions and actually led Cheney to 
disclose that Jennings had made several statements similar to the one to which she 
originally testified on direct examination.  Counsel’s failure to inquire of Cheney 
regarding the nature of her relationships with Jennings and Graves, and of her 
desire to help Graves, was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards.   
Cheney’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that her trial testimony was 
truthful and uninfluenced by her relationship with Graves does not alter our 
assessment of counsel’s cross-examination.  Determining the credibility of a 
witness is up to the jury, and by failing to question Cheney about her potential 
motivations and biases in this case, regardless of whether any such biases 
influenced her testimony, counsel deprived the jury of the ability to make a fully 
informed decision about Cheney’s credibility.  This is not a case where the jury 
had other “ample information from which to assess [the witness’s] credibility and 
weigh [her] testimony accordingly.”  Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 694 (Fla. 
1998).  Furthermore, there is no suggestion that trial counsel had any strategic 
reason to limit his cross-examination of Cheney.  See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 941 
So. 2d 1109, 1122 (Fla. 2006) (finding no deficient performance when defense 
counsel made “reasonable strategic decisions . . . in an attempt to avoid confusing 
the jury by attacking a witness that was not relevant to the defense case”).  Thus, 
 
- 26 - 
given the available impeachment evidence and the incriminating nature of 
Cheney’s testimony, trial counsel’s failure to adequately prepare for and cross-
examine Cheney was deficient performance. 
Because we have concluded that counsel was deficient with respect to this 
claim, it is necessary to determine whether Jennings was prejudiced as a result.  
Jennings argues that prejudice is evident because Cheney’s testimony helped to 
establish guilt and two aggravators in the penalty phase.  Indeed, the trial court’s 
sentencing order and this Court’s direct appeal opinion refer to Cheney’s testimony 
in finding and upholding the avoid arrest aggravator and CCP.  See Jennings, 718 
So. 2d at 150-52.  This Court also referred to Cheney’s testimony in concluding 
that the evidence was sufficient to support Jennings’ murder convictions.  See id. at 
154.  However, we conclude that Jennings has not demonstrated that counsel’s 
deficient performance on this issue undermines the Court’s confidence in the 
outcome of either the guilt phase or penalty phase of Jennings’ trial.   
 
While this Court did note Jennings’ “past statements about committing a 
robbery and not leaving any witnesses” in finding that the evidence was sufficient 
to support Jennings’ murder convictions, see id., these statements did not represent 
the only evidence against Jennings, and the State presented considerable other 
evidence of Jennings’ guilt such that trial counsel’s failure to impeach Cheney 
does not undermine confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict in this case.  
 
- 27 - 
Specifically, Jennings made inculpatory statements to law enforcement, owned the 
murder weapon, and left bloody shoe prints leading away from the murder scene.  
See id. 
 
With respect to CCP, this Court stated the following on direct appeal: 
The scenario of events supports the elements of a calculated 
plan and heightened premeditation.  We begin with witness Chainey’s 
[sic] testimony that, approximately two years before these crimes, 
Jennings made general statements and gestures to the effect that if he 
ever needed any money, he would simply rob someplace or someone 
and eliminate any witnesses by slitting their throats.  Moreover, 
Jennings admitted to several aborted robbery attempts of the Cracker 
Barrel in close proximity to the actual crimes that he ultimately 
committed there.  
Evidence of a plan to commit a crime other than murder (such 
as, in this case, robbery) is in and of itself insufficient to support CCP.  
However, the execution-style murders, combined with the advance 
procurement of the murder weapon, the previously expressed dislike 
for victim Siddle, and the previously expressed intent not to leave any 
victims if robbery were committed are all additional factors that 
support the elements of a calculated plan and heightened 
premeditation.  The evidence here does not suggest a “robbery gone 
bad.” 
 
Id. at 152 (citation omitted).  Although it is true that the trial court and this Court 
noted Cheney’s testimony in finding CCP in this case, other evidence supported 
the CCP aggravator.  The trial court also cited Jennings’ established dislike for one 
of the victims, the speed with which the robbery and murders were accomplished, 
and Jennings’ ownership of the murder weapon as evidence of “a plan that was 
carried out with ruthless efficiency.”  Id.  Further, in affirming the death sentences, 
this Court noted the execution-style nature of the killings, id., which the Court has 
 
- 28 - 
previously said are inherently “cold.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 299 (Fla. 
2009).  Indeed, as outlined by the Court on direct appeal, the very nature of the 
way these murders were committed—binding the victims, placing them in the 
freezer, and then slashing their throats—alone strongly supports a finding of CCP. 
We recognize that the trial court and this Court also cited Cheney’s 
testimony in finding and upholding the avoid arrest aggravator.  However, 
regarding this aggravating circumstance, this Court found it “significant that the 
victims all knew and could identify their killer.”  Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 151.  The 
Court also stressed that “the facts of the present case show that the victims had 
been bound,” and that “all three victims were confined to the freezer, and any 
immediate threat to Jennings could have been eliminated by simply closing and 
securing the freezer door.”  Id.   In other words, we emphasized multiple facts, 
including that Jennings used gloves and did not use a mask, that supported the 
avoid arrest aggravator, outside of the prior statements allegedly made by Jennings 
to Cheney.   
While we recognize that Cheney’s testimony was used by the State both for 
guilt and for the CCP and avoid arrest aggravators, the impeachment value of what 
was not presented must be considered in analyzing whether the defendant has 
demonstrated prejudice.  Cf. Hunter v. State, 29 So. 3d 256, 271 (Fla. 2008) 
(stating that the impeachment value of the undisclosed evidence must be 
 
- 29 - 
considered in determining whether prejudice ensued in the context of a newly 
discovered evidence claim).  Although the information concerning Cheney’s 
relationships with Graves and Jennings would have been impeaching, it is unlikely 
that it would have entirely destroyed Cheney’s credibility as Jennings assumes.  In 
Parker v. State, 89 So. 3d 844, 868-69 (Fla. 2011), we considered a similar 
argument regarding the value and effect of additional witness impeachment 
information and concluded that, although the information would have provided the 
jury with additional impeachment material regarding the witness’s motive to 
testify, it would not have destroyed the witness’s credibility.  Similarly, the judge 
and jury in Jennings’ case were aware that Cheney was at one time friends with 
Graves and Jennings.  We conclude that the jury would not have fully discounted 
Cheney’s testimony, as Jennings contends, even assuming an adequate cross-
examination, simply because additional motives for testifying were brought forth.    
In light of the fact that there was other compelling evidence that clearly 
supports Jennings’ guilt and the CCP and avoid arrest aggravators, Jennings has 
not established prejudice so as to undermine our confidence in the outcome of 
either the guilt phase or penalty phase of this case.  Accordingly, we deny relief on 
this claim.  
Summary Denial of Claims 
Jennings next argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
 
- 30 - 
denying various claims, primarily regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Specifically, Jennings contends that three claims warranted an evidentiary hearing: 
(1) the prosecutor made improper comments at trial and Jennings’ trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object; (2) Jennings’ trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge forensic evidence presented at trial; and (3) Jennings’ trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of Jennings’ post-
arrest statements.  Because each of these claims is either procedurally barred, 
refuted by the record, or both, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary 
denial of all three claims. 
 
A postconviction court’s decision of whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on a rule 3.850 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court.  
Therefore, the court’s ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de 
novo review.  See Van Poyck v. State, 961 So. 2d 220, 224 (Fla. 2007).  When 
reviewing the summary denial of a claim raised in a rule 3.850 motion, the court 
must accept the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not 
refuted by the record.  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1041.  Generally, a defendant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.850 motion unless: (1) the motion, 
files, and records in the case conclusively demonstrate that the movant is entitled 
to no relief; or (2) the motion or particular claim is legally insufficient.  Freeman v. 
State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).  The defendant bears the burden of 
 
- 31 - 
establishing a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim; mere conclusory 
allegations are insufficient.  Id.   
 
With this background established, we now address each of Jennings’ three 
summarily denied claims in turn. 
Improper Prosecutorial Arguments 
In his first claim, Jennings asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that the prosecutor made improper comments during 
his trial and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object.  To the extent 
Jennings argues that the comments themselves were improper, this issue is 
procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.  See 
Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 60 (Fla. 2003) (“[C]laims of prosecutorial 
misconduct could and should have been raised on direct appeal and thus are 
procedurally barred from consideration in a postconviction motion.”).  In addition, 
Jennings’ argument that the prosecutor took inconsistent positions between his trial 
and the trial of codefendant Graves was previously litigated and rejected, and is 
therefore likewise procedurally barred.  See Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 154.  
With respect to Jennings’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Jennings 
initially asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper 
comments at the guilt phase of his trial.  However, Jennings does not point to any 
specific comments in particular.  We therefore deny this part of Jennings’ claim.  
 
- 32 - 
See Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004) (holding that conclusory 
allegations are insufficient for appellate purposes). 
 
Next, Jennings asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to improper prosecutorial comments at the penalty phase of his trial, and he cites to 
three instances in which he alleges that trial counsel should have objected.  
Jennings first challenges the prosecutor’s comment that the presentation of 
mitigation evidence was “another desperate effort to escape accountability.”  
Jennings has not established, however, how this comment prejudiced his trial.  This 
claim was therefore properly summarily denied by the postconviction court.   
Jennings also alleges that the prosecution argued impermissible aggravating 
circumstances in stating that Jennings spent the robbery money at a “topless dance 
club.”  The assertion that Jennings visited a “topless dance club” after the robberies 
was supported by trial testimony from a club employee, and in any event, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court relied on any impermissible 
aggravating factors in sentencing Jennings to death.   
Finally, Jennings takes issue with the prosecutor’s comment that Jennings’ 
codefendant was convicted of the same crime and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
Again, however, Jennings has not established how this comment prejudiced his 
penalty-phase proceeding.  Additionally, the trial court found the codefendant’s 
life sentence to be a mitigating factor, and it is therefore illogical for Jennings to 
 
- 33 - 
now argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s 
reference to mitigation evidence submitted by defense counsel and found by the 
trial court.   
 
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.  
Forensic Evidence 
In his second claim, Jennings asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the forensic evidence presented at trial.  Because this claim is legally 
insufficient, we deny relief. 
Jennings argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate the crime scene 
and the forensic evidence presented by the State and that counsel was deficient for 
failing to call any expert to testify on Jennings’ behalf.  However, while Jennings 
generally argues that trial counsel should have presented his own forensic 
witnesses to rebut the State’s evidence, he does not allege what specific 
information other experts would have been able to offer or how this presentation 
would have impacted the case.  Without more specific factual allegations about 
how further investigation or challenge of the State’s evidence would have 
benefited Jennings, trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient.  See Bryant v. State, 
901 So. 2d 810, 821 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]hen a defendant alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to call specific witnesses, a defendant is ‘required 
 
- 34 - 
to allege what testimony defense counsel could have elicited from witnesses and 
how defense counsel’s failure to call, interview, or present the witnesses who 
would have testified prejudiced the case.’ ” (quoting Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 
579, 583 (Fla. 2004))).  Accordingly, summary denial was proper.  See Freeman, 
761 So. 2d at 1061 (stating that “[m]ere conclusory allegations are not sufficient” 
to meet the defendant’s burden).   
Admissibility of Statements 
In his third and final claim, Jennings asserts that the postconviction court 
erred in summarily denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise issues related to Jennings’ post-arrest statements.  Although Jennings 
challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of this claim, we note at the 
outset that Jennings was granted an evidentiary hearing with respect to his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to establish that Jennings was not 
competent to waive his constitutional Miranda rights and for failing to object to the 
admission of Jennings’ statements.  The record reflects, however, that aside from 
briefly inquiring whether trial counsel was aware of any substance abuse by 
Jennings around the time he gave his confession to police, Jennings did not present 
any witnesses or make any argument at the evidentiary hearing regarding this 
claim.   
 
- 35 - 
Accordingly, it appears that the only issue Jennings is now raising with 
respect to the admission of his post-arrest statements is the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
fully investigate and effectively cross-examine a key State witness about the 
circumstances surrounding Jennings’ statements.  Jennings argues that if trial 
counsel had properly investigated discrepancies between several versions of events 
relayed by witnesses in the case, counsel would have been able to effectively 
challenge the admissibility and reliability of Jennings’ statements.  However, 
Jennings does not specifically allege what these inconsistencies are or what 
information trial counsel should have been aware of or used as impeachment 
evidence.  Because he has not established what testimony would have been offered 
or what information would have been discovered through a more thorough 
investigation and questioning of the State witness, Jennings’ claim is legally 
insufficient, and the postconviction court’s summary denial was proper.   
II.  Habeas Corpus Petition 
 
In his habeas corpus petition, Jennings argues that certain omissions by his 
appellate counsel on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  “Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”  Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 
199, 213 (Fla. 2009) (citing Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069).  To grant habeas relief 
 
- 36 - 
on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must resolve the 
following two issues: 
[W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 
So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)).  Under this standard, “[t]he defendant has the burden 
of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Anderson, 18 So. 3d at 520 
(quoting Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069).  Importantly, “[i]f a legal issue ‘would in 
all probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 
1156, 1175-76 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000)).  We address each of Jennings’ habeas claims in turn. 
Admissibility of State Witness Testimony 
 
In his first habeas claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Jennings argues that his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge on 
direct appeal portions of the testimony of three State witnesses.  Specifically, 
Jennings contends that appellate counsel should have raised the claim that Officer 
 
- 37 - 
Robert Browning, examiner David Grimes, and Corporal Joe Barber used non-
standard terminology to render expert testimony opinions.  We discuss each 
witness individually. 
Officer Browning, the supervisor of the Collier County Sheriff’s Office 
crime scene section, testified at trial that blood transfers found in the kitchen of the 
Cracker Barrel Restaurant “looked like shoe tracks” going in a certain direction.  
Defense counsel objected to this testimony, stating that the witness was “testifying 
as an expert, giving his opinion as to reconstruction of the crime scene” and “not 
testifying just to what he saw.”  The trial court overruled this objection, stating that 
the alignment of the blood tracks was “a physical observation.”  Jennings now 
claims that it was error for appellate counsel not to raise this issue on direct appeal.   
This argument is without merit.  Jennings does not cite any case law or other 
authority to support his claim that appellate counsel should have raised this issue.  
Instead, he merely points out that defense counsel objected to the testimony at trial 
and assumes prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on 
direct appeal.  The testimony Officer Browning offered was based on his physical 
observations of the blood tracks and did not require any specialized knowledge or 
skill.  It was therefore not improper, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to raise this meritless issue on appeal.  See Walls, 926 So. 2d at 1175-76.   
 
- 38 - 
Jennings next challenges portions of the testimony of David Grimes, a 
document and impressions examiner who testified as an expert in the field of 
footwear and shoe print examination.  Defense counsel did not object to Grimes’ 
qualification as an expert witness.  Grimes’ testimony concerned comparisons 
between crime scene impressions and particular shoes, stating that several 
impressions “match[ed]” or “correspond[ed].”  Jennings argues that Grimes’ use of 
these types of descriptive terms and phrases were subjective and lacked a scientific 
basis.  We disagree.   
Grimes was qualified as an expert in the field of shoe print examination and 
therefore was permitted to testify in the form of an opinion as to his specialized 
knowledge.  § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (1995).  Jennings does not cite, and we have not 
located, any authority for the proposition that an expert witness’s use of terms such 
as “match” or “correspond” lacks a reasonable basis in science and is improper for 
a qualified expert to employ.  To the extent Jennings alleges that Grimes’ 
testimony contained legal conclusions, statements that a particular shoe made a 
particular impression merely represent the kind of opinion an expert specialized in 
the field of shoe print examination is entitled to, and would be expected to, offer.  
There was no error in the trial judge’s rulings with respect to trial counsel’s 
objections to Grimes’ testimony, and appellate counsel therefore cannot be deemed 
 
- 39 - 
ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue.  See Walls, 926 So. 2d at 1175-
76.   
Lastly, Jennings challenges Corporal Joe Barber’s testimony that the air 
pistol that law enforcement found in this case was “almost identical” to a “real 
firearm,” and Corporal Barber’s use of an actual firearm as a demonstrative aid to 
show the jury the similarity between the two items.  Defense counsel objected to 
Corporal Barber’s demonstration as cumulative, but the trial court overruled the 
objection and Corporal Barber proceeded to hold the two items up for the jury to 
observe.  In response to a question about which was the “real gun,” Corporal 
Barber stated that the air pistol “seem[ed] as [if] it’s almost a perfect replica.”  
Jennings now asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
Corporal Barber’s testimony on direct appeal.  However, Jennings presents no 
support for his contention that there was error in the trial court’s ruling on this 
issue or that it would have been a meritorious argument on appeal.  Thus, appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to raise this meritless issue.  See 
Walls, 926 So. 2d at 1175-76.   
Alleged State Misconduct 
In his second habeas claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Jennings argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the 
trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial based on an incident at trial in which 
 
- 40 - 
an employee of the State Attorney’s Office provided a cough drop to a member of 
the jury.  This claim is without merit. 
 
“A motion for mistrial should be granted only when the error is deemed so 
prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of a fair 
proceeding.  The standard of review applied to motions for mistrial is abuse of 
discretion.”  Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 (Fla. 2005) (citation omitted).  “A 
motion for mistrial is properly denied where the matter on which the motion is 
based is rendered harmless by a curative instruction.”  Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 
347, 364 (Fla. 2005). 
 
In this case, Jennings’ motion for mistrial was based on the allegedly 
improper conduct of an individual seated at the prosecution’s counsel table who 
furnished a cough drop to a juror suffering from a coughing spell.  Defense counsel 
brought the matter to the court’s attention, and the trial judge immediately 
dismissed the jury and inquired into the incident.  The trial court admonished the 
parties involved and emphasized the importance of avoiding the appearance of 
impropriety, but denied Jennings’ motion for mistrial.  The trial court did, 
however, provide a curative instruction, informing the jury that the conduct in 
question was “very inappropriate” and that the jury should “not be influenced in 
any way by this gesture on the part of the individual who passed whatever it was to 
you.”   
 
- 41 - 
 
Despite the curative instruction, Jennings argues that appellate counsel 
should have raised the denial of his motion for mistrial on appeal.  Jennings does 
not allege, however, how the improper conduct may have affected the jury or why 
the curative instruction was insufficient.  Because Jennings has not demonstrated 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, appellate counsel 
cannot be deficient for failing to raise the meritless issue on direct appeal.  See 
Walls, 926 So. 2d at 1175-76.   
Admissibility of Photographs 
In his third habeas claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Jennings argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the 
admission of several allegedly prejudicial photographs at trial.  Because the 
underlying claim lacks merit, we deny habeas relief. 
“This Court has long followed the rule that photographs are admissible if 
they are relevant and not so shocking in nature as to defeat the value of their 
relevance.”  Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 641 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Czubak v. 
State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990)).  “The test for admissibility of photographic 
evidence is relevancy rather than necessity.”  Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 
(Fla. 1996).  “Crime scene photographs are considered relevant when they 
establish the manner in which the murder was committed, show the position and 
location of the victim when he or she is found by police, or assist crime scene 
 
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technicians in explaining the condition of the crime scene when police arrived.”  
Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004).  This Court has “consistently 
upheld the admission of allegedly gruesome photographs where they were 
independently relevant or corroborative of other evidence.”  Hertz, 803 So. 2d at 
641 (quoting Czubak, 570 So. 2d at 928).  In addition, the Court has stated in 
particular that “autopsy photographs are relevant to show the manner of death, 
location of wounds, and identity of the victim, and to assist the medical examiner.”  
Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 587 (Fla. 2001).   
However, “[t]o be relevant, a photo of a deceased victim must be probative 
of an issue that is in dispute.”  Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 88 (Fla. 2010) 
(quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1999)) (alteration in original).  
Furthermore, even relevant photographs must be carefully scrutinized by the trial 
court to determine whether the “gruesomeness of the portrayal is so inflammatory 
as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jur[ors] and [distract] them from 
a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the evidence.”  Czubak, 570 So. 2d at 
928 (quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 329, 331-32 (Fla. 1961)) (second alteration 
in original).  In other words, the relevancy standard “by no means constitutes a 
carte blanche for the admission of gruesome photos.”  Almeida, 748 So. 2d at 929.  
Jennings first challenges the admission of photographs, over defense 
objection, of Jennings and codefendant Graves with exotic dancers sitting on their 
 
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laps, arguing that the pictures’ probative value in relation to the crime was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The trial court found 
that the pictures were relevant to demonstrate that Jennings was not acting afraid of 
Graves and to show the affluent lifestyle Jennings and Graves were living after the 
robbery.   
We conclude that Jennings has not demonstrated any error in the trial court’s 
ruling.  Because the photos at issue were relevant, probative of several issues in the 
case, and “not so shocking in nature as to defeat the value of their relevance,” 
Hertz, 803 So. 2d at 641 (quoting Czubak, 570 So. 2d at 928), the trial court did 
not err in admitting these photographs. 
Next, Jennings challenges the admission of crime scene photographs 
depicting the deceased victims and the bloody surroundings.  Jennings claims that 
appellate counsel should have raised an issue regarding the trial court’s denial of 
defense objections to these crime scene photographs as cumulative and unduly 
prejudicial.  While depicting a murder scene, the photographs at issue do not 
appear to be overly gruesome or shocking, and they were used by law enforcement 
officers in describing how the officers found the victims and other evidence, such 
as bloody shoe tracks, upon arrival at the restaurant.  A reconstruction of the crime 
scene and the fact that the victims’ hands were tied behind their backs were 
 
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relevant issues in the case, and the pertinent photographs were probative of those 
issues.  The trial court therefore did not err in admitting these photographs. 
 
Lastly, Jennings challenges the admission of three autopsy photographs 
admitted during the medical examiner’s testimony.  This Court has previously 
upheld the admission of autopsy photographs when they were relevant to assist the 
medical examiner’s testimony and to demonstrate premeditation.  See, e.g., 
Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 932 (Fla. 2002).  While “trial courts must be 
cautious in not permitting unduly prejudicial or particularly inflammatory 
photographs before the jury,” photographs “are admissible ‘to show the manner of 
death, location of wounds, and the identity of the victim.’ ”  Brooks v. State, 787 
So. 2d 765, 781 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 
1995)).  The three autopsy photographs to which Jennings objects show the neck 
wounds suffered by each victim in this case and were therefore relevant to the 
medical examiner’s testimony and properly admitted.   
 
Accordingly, we deny habeas relief on this claim.  
Trial Judge’s Comment 
In his fourth habeas claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Jennings argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise on appeal 
the trial judge’s characterization of the case during pretrial jury selection as “the 
infamous Cracker Barrel case.”  Jennings’ trial counsel did not contemporaneously 
 
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object to this comment, so the issue was not preserved for appellate review.  
Accordingly, Jennings must demonstrate that the underlying claim constituted 
fundamental error.  See Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 963 (Fla. 2004).  
“Fundamental error is the type of error which reaches down into the validity of the 
trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Id.  Because Jennings cannot meet this 
high burden on the alleged facts, we deny habeas relief on this claim. 
 
A review of the context surrounding the remark reveals that, at the time it 
was uttered, the judge was trying to aid a potential juror in remembering whether 
the venireperson had heard anything about the case or formed any fixed opinion.  
In fact, the record clearly displays that the judge was in actuality attempting to 
determine the potential juror’s familiarity with the facts of the case for the very 
purpose of ascertaining the presence of potential bias.  Jennings does not raise any 
specific challenge to jury selection or composition, or allege impermissible pretrial 
publicity, but instead relies on a general allegation that the judge’s reference to the 
case as “infamous” tainted the entire proceeding from the start.  This argument is 
unavailing and falls short of the required showing needed to demonstrate 
fundamental error.  We therefore deny habeas relief on this claim.   
Rule Regarding Juror Interviews 
In his final habeas claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
 
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Jennings contends that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to assert that 
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which imposes restrictions on post-
trial juror interviews by lawyers, violates his constitutional rights.  Although 
Jennings refers to two events that he alleges may have biased jurors, Jennings 
asserts only that appellate counsel was deficient because he failed to bring a 
constitutional challenge to the rule.   
The underlying issue was not preserved for review.  Moreover, this Court 
has on numerous occasions rejected similar constitutional challenges to rule 4-
3.5(d)(4).  See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 459 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting claim 
that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) violated due process rights as well as the First, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments); Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 522 (Fla. 2008) 
(rejecting claim that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) violates constitutional rights of due process 
and equal protection); Power, 886 So. 2d at 957 (rejecting contention that rule 4-
3.5(d)(4) violated appellant’s right of access to courts under article I, section 21, of 
the Florida Constitution).  In addition, “where the defendant merely complains 
about the ‘inability to conduct “fishing expedition” interviews,’ the claim is 
without merit.”  Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 952 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Johnson 
v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Fla. 2001)).   
Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to 
raise a nonmeritorious issue on direct appeal.  See Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 
 
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626 (Fla. 2006) (holding as meritless defendant’s claim that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge rule 4-3.5(d)(4) as unconstitutional).   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief, 
and we also deny Jennings’ habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Collier County,  
Two Cases:  
Frederick Robert Hardt, Judge - Case No. 95-2284-CFA  
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Paul Kalil, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, and Elizabeth 
Stewart, Staff Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Sernior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
For Appellee/Respondent