Title: State v. Thompson

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§
§
No.246, 2004
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below: Superior Court
§
of Delaware in and for New
v.
§
Castle County
§
REBECCA THOMPSON,
§
C.A. No. 03A-07-003 
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellees.
§
Submitted: October 29, 2004
Decided: December 2, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 2  day of December, 2004, on consideration of the briefs of the
nd
parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1)  This is an appeal by the State of Delaware from a decision of  the
Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”), granting the petition of the
employee/Appellee, Rebecca Thompson, to determine compensation due,
denying the State’s petition to terminate benefits, and awarding Thompson
ongoing total disability at the rate of $318.24 per week.  The State contends that
the Superior Court erred by: (i) failing to critically assess evidence that
2
Thompson’s medical expert was unaware of Thompson’s long history of
preexisting back conditions; (ii) failing to critically assess evidence of a
medically-unexplained, substantial gap in Thompson’s treatment between the
date of the industrial accident and the date of the alleged outset of Thompson’s
back pain after the industrial accident; and (iii) affirming the Board’s decision
that Thompson was totally disabled from returning to work.  We find the
Board’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
Accordingly, we affirm.
(2)  On December 18, 2001, Thompson was involved in an automobile
accident while driving a bus for the State.  Thompson was employed by the
State as a bus driver in the Christiana School District.  As a result of this
industrial accident, Thompson injured her neck and back, for which she was
initially treated by Dr. Hsu, her primary physician.  Dr. Hsu subsequently
referred Thompson to Dr. Rastogi, a board-certified neurosurgeon.  On January
8, 2002, Dr. Rastogi performed surgery on Thompson’s neck.  In July 2002,
Thompson began to experience pain in her back along with numbness in her
legs.  Thompson noticed the pain in her back after an automobile trip to Florida
in which she was a passenger.    
3
(3)  Thompson has a long history of back problems.  Before the industrial
accident, Thompson had undergone two surgeries on her lower back and
continued being treated by a physician, Dr. Boulos, approximately once a year
for pain injections.  Thompson’s most recent pain injection occurred in October
2001, two months before the industrial accident.      
(4)  On November 26, 2002, Thompson filed a petition to determine
compensation due, seeking temporary total disability benefits.  On December
19, 2002, the State filed a petition to terminate Thompson’s disability benefits,
alleging that Thompson was capable of returning to work.  The parties resolved
the issue of compensability of Thompson’s neck injury, leaving the
compensability of her back injury and the State’s petition to terminate disability
benefits as the sole issues for the Board’s consideration.  On June 3, 2003, the
Board determined that Thompson’s back injury was compensable and denied
the State’s petition to terminate Thompson’s disability benefits.  In reaching its
decision, the Board accepted the testimony of Dr. Rastogi, Thompson’s medical
expert, and rejected the testimony of Dr. Hogan, the State’s medical expert.
(5)  “This Court, replicating the role of the Superior Court, reviews de
novo legal issues decided by the Board and reviews factual findings to
Keeler v. Metal Masters Foodservice Equip. Co., Inc., 712 A.2d 1004, 1005 (Del.
1
1998) (citing Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994)).
 
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981) (citing Consolo v. Federal Maritime
2
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).  
Id. (citing Cross v. Calfano, 475 F.Supp. 896, 898 (M.D.Fla. 1979)).   
3
Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1992) (citing 
4
DiSabatino Brothers, Inc. v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102, 105-06 (Del. 1982)).  
4
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence.”   Substantial
1
evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”   It is “‘more than a scintilla but
2
less than a preponderance ....’”   Further, the Board is free to choose between
3
conflicting medical expert opinions, and either opinion constitutes substantial
evidence for purposes of appeal.4
(6)  The State’s first argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred
by failing to critically assess evidence that Dr. Rastogi was unaware of
Thompson’s long history of preexisting back conditions.  In essence, the State
contends that there was not substantial evidence in the present record to support
the Board’s decision to accept Dr. Rastogi’s opinion concerning the causation
of Thompson’s back injury.  We disagree and find that there was substantial
evidence in the present record to support the Board’s decision.  The record
shows that the Board clearly explained its reasons for accepting Dr. Rastogi’s
5
opinion and rejecting Dr. Hogan’s opinion.  The Board noted that Dr. Rastogi
stood in a better position to assess Thompson’s condition because he performed
Thompson’s prior neck surgery and followed up with Thompson on two
occasions.  The Board also found that Dr. Hogan examined Thompson only
once.  In addition, Dr. Rastogi testified that his causation opinion remained
unchanged even considering Thompson’s prior back problem. (7)  The State’s
second argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred by failing to
critically assess evidence of a medically-unexplained, substantial gap in
Thompson’s treatment between the date of the industrial accident on December
18, 2001 and the date of the alleged outset of Thompson’s back pain in July
2002 after her automobile trip from Delaware to Florida and back.  The State
is essentially arguing that because of  the gap in Thompson’s treatment,
Thompson’s back condition was therefore attributable to her prior back
conditions and not the industrial accident.  We disagree and find that there is
substantial evidence in the present record to explain the gap in treatment for
Thompson’s back injury.  First, as the record shows, Dr. Rastogi testified that
he initially focused on Thompson’s neck injury, rather than her back injury,
because Thompson’s  neck injury appeared to be a more urgent problem.
Second, Dr. Rastogi testified that Thompson’s neck injury masked her lower
Id.  
5
6
back symptoms, thereby making her back injury appear to be not as significant
as it was in actuality.  Finally, Thompson discussed the back pain initially with
Dr. Hsu and Dr. Rastogi was under the impression that Dr. Hsu had discussed
the back injury with Thompson. 
(8)  Thompson’s third argument on appeal is that the Superior Court
erred by affirming the Board’s decision that Thompson was totally disabled
from returning to work.  Because we find substantial evidence in the present
record to support the Board’s finding that the accident exacerbated Thompson’s
underlying back condition, it logically follows, and we therefore hold, that the
Board  did not err in denying the State’s petition to terminate benefits.  The
record shows that Thompson was totally disabled from returning to work.  It is
well settled in Delaware that the Board’s acceptance of Dr. Rastogi’s testimony,
even though contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Hogan, qualifies as
substantial evidence for purposes of this appeal.   After a careful review of the
5
record, we find that the decisions of the Board are supported by substantial
evidence and are free of legal error.  The Superior Court was correct in its
judgment that the decisions must be affirmed.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the
7
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
BY THE COURT:
    /s/Henry duPont Ridgely       
Justice