Title: State v. Jose C. McGill

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jose C. McGill,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  224 Wis. 2d 643, 590 N.W.2d 282 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 11, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petition there were 
briefs and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1409-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jose C. McGill,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is a challenge to a 
protective frisk for weapons that produced not a weapon but 
cocaine.  The defendant, Jose C. McGill, has two complaints.  
First, he says there was insufficient justification for the 
frisk because this was merely a routine traffic stop devoid of 
any circumstances suggesting that he was armed and presently 
dangerous.  And, second, he says that even if the weapons frisk 
was justified, the officer exceeded its scope by seizing and 
opening the package of cocaine that he had in his pocket.  We 
disagree and hold that both the frisk and the subsequent seizure 
and inspection of the packaged drugs in McGill's pocket were 
constitutional. 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
 Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The facts are from the suppression hearing and are 
undisputed.  On November 7, 1996, at approximately 10:10 p.m., 
City of Beloit Police Officer Curt Wald was on patrol in a 
marked squad car.  As Wald drove north on Fourth Street, 
approaching the intersection of Fourth and Portland Avenue, he 
observed a maroon vehicle traveling west on Portland.   
¶3 
The intersection of Portland and Fourth was in the 
early stages of construction and the westbound lane of Portland 
was barricaded just west of Fourth Street.  Despite posted signs 
stating "road closed," the vehicle Wald was observing drove 
around the barricades using the eastbound lane and continued 
west on Portland. 
¶4 
Officer Wald activated his squad car's emergency 
lights and pursued the vehicle down Portland.  The vehicle did 
not immediately stop and pull over, however, despite the fact 
that at the time Wald turned on his emergency lights it was only 
a short distanceabout a block and a halfaway.  Instead, it 
proceeded down Portland for several blocks, eventually turning 
north onto Vine Street with Wald still in pursuit. 
¶5 
The vehicle eventually turned into a driveway at 905 
Vine Street and stopped.1  As Wald pulled his squad behind the 
vehicle, he observed the driver get out of the car and walk 
away.  Wald testified that the driver walked away from the car 
                     
1 Court documents indicate that McGill, the driver, lived in 
South Beloit, Illinois, not at 905 Vine Street, Beloit, 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
3 
as if he were "trying to avoid being with that vehicle or being 
stopped by the police."   
¶6 
Wald got out of his squad car and ordered the driver 
to stop.  The driver stopped walking away and returned to where 
Wald was standing.  Wald asked to see his driver's license.  
Although 
there 
were 
streetlights 
in 
the 
area, 
it 
was 
sufficiently dark in the driveway that Wald needed a flashlight 
to read the license.  It identified the driver as the defendant, 
Jose C. McGill. 
¶7 
Wald testified that as McGill came closer, he appeared 
more nervous than other people he routinely stopped on his 
patrol.  Wald also noticed that McGill's hands were twitching 
and that he had the odor of intoxicants and the slight odor of 
marijuana on his person. 
¶8 
Wald decided to conduct a field sobriety test on 
McGill; however, before doing so, he frisked McGill for weapons. 
 Wald testified at the suppression hearing that he decided to 
conduct the frisk based upon a number of factors, including the 
fact that McGill did not stop for his lights, appeared unusually 
nervous, tried to walk away from the encounter, was "twitchy" 
and smelled of both drugs and alcohol.  Wald's concerns were 
raised because he viewed McGill's actions as out of the 
ordinary.  When asked what was different about McGill's actions, 
Wald replied:  
 
He didn't actually stop for my lights.  He pulled into 
a driveway.  He exited the vehicle and began to walk 
away from it as though he was trying to avoid being 
with that vehicle or being stopped by the police. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
4 
 . . . He twitched and acted nervous with his hands.  
He kept moving his hands to his pockets.  Most people 
stay in their car and pull over immediately when they 
see red and blue lights flashing behind them. 
 
¶9 
Wald instructed McGill to keep his hands on top of the 
squad car during the frisk.  However, despite the order, McGill 
moved his hands from the hood of the squad car to his pockets 
several times while Wald attempted to pat him down.  Wald 
testified that this behavior increased his concern about the 
contents of McGill's pockets and the potential presence of a 
weapon. 
¶10 Wald continued with the frisk until he felt a "hard 
oblong shaped object" in McGill's right front pants pocket.  
Wald testified that based on the size and shape of the object, 
he believed it was possibly a pocketknife.  Wald asked McGill 
directly about the object.  McGill replied that it was nothing, 
"just some change."  The object did not feel at all like change 
to Wald. 
¶11 Wald handcuffed McGill's hands behind his back before 
removing the object.  Wald testified that he placed McGill in 
handcuffs as a precautionary measure because he "didn't want to 
be fighting over a knife."  Upon removing the object from 
McGill's pocket, Wald noted that it was not a knife (or change, 
as McGill had claimed), but an object wrapped in aluminum foil. 
 Based upon his training and experience (seven years as an 
officer), Wald believed that the item "could be any type of 
narcotic or drug."  Wald testified that he had seen drugs 
packaged that way in the past. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
5 
¶12 Wald opened the package.  Inside the foil was a 
plastic baggie containing what Wald believed was powder cocaine. 
 The powder had been packaged so tightly that it formed a hard 
block.  Wald performed a field test on the substance and 
confirmed its identity.  He then placed McGill under arrest for 
possession of cocaine.  
¶13 Sometime after Wald discovered the cocaine, Officer 
Allen Cass arrived at the scene and conducted a search of 
McGill's vehicle incident to arrest.  On the floor behind the 
driver's seat, Cass discovered a rolled-up paper bag containing 
marijuana.  
¶14 McGill was charged with one count of possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver as a second offender, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)(2) and 961.48; one count of 
possession of THC with intent to deliver as a second offender, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(h)(2) and 961.48; and two 
tax stamp violations, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 139.88 and 
139.89.  McGill moved to suppress the drug evidence, alleging 
that Officer Wald discovered the cocaine on his person pursuant 
to an illegal search.  McGill also claimed that the marijuana 
found in his car should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" because the officers would not have searched his car if 
not for the unconstitutional search of his person, which led to 
the discovery of the cocaine. 
¶15 The Rock County Circuit Court, the Honorable James E. 
Welker, denied McGill's motion, finding Wald's decision to 
conduct the frisk reasonable under the circumstances: 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
6 
 
I think you have to look at the totality of the 
circumstances . . . [I]n the course of that interview, 
he observed that this defendant who had previously 
tried to walk away, was moving his hands toward his 
pockets.  And I think that that was a reasonable basis 
for a police officer to at least determine whether 
there was a weapon in that pocket before he continued 
with the interview.2 
The court also found that Wald was justified in seizing and 
opening the foil-wrapped package in McGill's pocket.   
¶16 McGill pled guilty to a reduced charge of simple 
possession of cocaine as a second offense and possession of THC 
with intent to deliver as a second offense.  He was sentenced to 
a total of 12 years in state prison.  McGill appealed, and the 
court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed. 
¶17 We turn first to the permissibility of the frisk under 
the Fourth Amendment.  In reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence, we will uphold the circuit court's findings 
of fact unless they are against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 
389, 401, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).  We then independently review 
those facts to determine whether the constitutional requirement 
of reasonableness is satisfied.  Id.  
                     
2 The circuit court apparently concluded that McGill moved 
his hands towards his pockets before Wald began the frisk, and 
considered this movement as one circumstance justifying the 
frisk.  Although the record clearly shows that McGill reached 
for his pockets during the pat-down, it is not clear from the 
record whether McGill also did so before Wald's initial decision 
to conduct the frisk.  Consequently, we do not rely on this fact 
as a justification for Wald's decision to conduct the frisk, 
although 
it 
is 
a 
significant 
factor 
justifying 
Wald's 
determination to seize the object from McGill's pocket.   
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
7 
¶18 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Courts make the determination of whether a search 
is reasonable by balancing the government's need to conduct the 
search against the invasion the search entails.  Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).   
¶19 In Terry, the United States Supreme Court struck a 
balance between the need for law enforcement officers to protect 
themselves from harm and the individual's right to personal 
security.  Id. at 23-25.  The Court recognized the dangers faced 
by the police when conducting close-range investigations of 
suspects.  Id. at 23-24.  It concluded that the "more immediate 
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself 
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a 
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him" 
justifies the limited intrusion on individual rights that the 
protective frisk entails.  Id.  Where an officer reasonably 
believes that his safety may be in danger because the suspect he 
is investigating may be armed, it would be unreasonable not to 
allow him to conduct a limited search for weapons.  Id. at 24.   
¶20 The need for officers to frisk for weapons is even 
more compelling today than it was at the time of Terry.  In 
1966, 57 law enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the 
line of duty and 23,851 officers were assaulted.  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 24 n.21.  Although the number of officers killed in the 
line of duty has increased only slightly (61 officers killed in 
1998), the number of assaults on officers has more than doubled 
(59,545 line-of-duty assaults in 1998).  Federal Bureau of 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
8 
Investigation, Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports: Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (1998) 8, 84 (1999).  
The vast majority of these assaults, approximately two-thirds, 
took place during the evening and early-morning shifts, between 
6 p.m. and 4 a.m.  Id. at 10, 85.  Thus, the justification for 
protective frisks is as vital today as it was at the time the 
Court decided Terry. 
¶21 Terry does not, however, authorize officers to conduct 
a protective frisk as a part of every investigative encounter.  
Rather, Terry limits the protective frisk to situations in which 
the officer is "justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed 
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others."  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 24.  Specifically, the Court held: 
 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and 
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed 
and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves 
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself 
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him.  Such a search is a reasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment . . . . 
Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added). 
¶22 Based upon Terry, this court has held that protective 
frisks are justified when an officer "has a reasonable suspicion 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
9 
that a suspect may be armed."  State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 
209, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995)(citing State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 
94, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 914 (1993)).  
The "reasonable suspicion" must be based upon "specific and 
articulable facts," which, taken together with any rational 
inferences that may be drawn from those facts, must establish 
that the intrusion was reasonable.  State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27).   
¶23 The reasonableness of a protective frisk is determined 
based upon an objective standard.  That standard is "whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted 
in the belief that his safety and that of others was in danger." 
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  We apply this standard in light of the 
"totality of the circumstances."  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 
139-40. 
¶24 McGill argues that this record lacks any "specific or 
articulable facts" to demonstrate that Wald reasonably suspected 
that McGill was armed and dangerous.  To the contrary, the 
record establishes a number of very specific facts that support 
such a suspicion, although not all were relied upon by the 
officer as a part of his subjective analysis of the situation.  
But as we have stated, this is an objective test, and therefore 
certain factors, such as the time of night and the fact that the 
officer was alone, can and should be part of the equation.  
Terry’s requirement that the facts supporting the frisk be 
"articulable" means that they must be concrete rather than 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
10
speculative, 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
searches 
based 
upon 
the 
proverbial "hunch."  It does not amount to a requirement that 
the court restrict its reasonableness analysis to the factors 
the officer testifies to having subjectively weighed in his 
ultimate decision to conduct the frisk.  Terry said "it is 
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.  We may look to any fact in the 
record, as long as it was known to the officer at the time he 
conducted the frisk and is otherwise supported by his testimony 
at the suppression hearing. 
¶25 This is consistent with a number of similar cases from 
this court assessing the reasonableness of protective frisks.  
In Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 204, two officers on patrol at 4 a.m. 
in what was described as a "fairly high-crime area" observed a 
car driving in and out of an alley.  The car had expired license 
plates, and the officers pulled it over.  Id.  The driver was 
unable to produce his license and appeared nervous.  Id.  We 
upheld the officers' decision to frisk the driver based upon the 
totality of these facts.  Id. at 215. 
¶26 Also, in Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d at 391, two officers 
writing out tickets in their parked squad car observed two men 
in a yard.  The men appeared startled to see the officers and 
one, the defendant, began staring at the squad car.  Id.  At the 
suppression hearing the officer described several additional 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
11
factors that led to the frisk, including the fact that the 
incident occurred at 2 a.m. and visibility was poor, the 
defendant turned away so that the officer could no longer see 
his hands, and the defendant was in the company of a man who 
admitted he was wanted and had previously been convicted for 
carrying a concealed weapon.  Id. at 393.  Based upon these 
facts, and all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from 
them, we determined that the officer reasonably concluded that 
the defendant might have been carrying a weapon.  Id. at 402. 
¶27 The facts known to Officer Wald in this case are 
arguably more compelling than the facts known to the officers in 
Morgan and Williamson.  Here, Wald initially attempted to 
perform a routine traffic stop, but McGill resisted.  Rather 
than pulling to the side of the road, as most drivers do when 
they see red and blue police lights behind them, McGill 
continued down the barricaded street, turned the corner, and 
parked in a private driveway.  Wald stated that he had conducted 
over 1,000 traffic stops and the majority of people stopped 
their cars immediately. 
¶28 Once his car was stopped, McGill did not remain in the 
driver's seat and wait for the officer to approach (as most 
people do, according to Wald's testimony), but, rather, got out 
of the car and began walking away.  It is reasonable to infer, 
as Officer Wald did, that McGill was trying to avoid the 
encounter.   
¶29 When 
McGill 
finally 
did 
submit 
to 
the 
field 
investigation, Wald noted that he was unusually nervousbeyond 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
12
the level of nervousness that the officer normally observed in 
individuals he stopped.  McGill argues that Wald's decision to 
conduct the frisk was made solely on the basis of his 
nervousness and that nervousness alone does not justify a 
protective frisk under United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th 
Cir. 
1997). 
 
In 
Wisconsin, 
however, 
a 
suspect's 
overt 
nervousness is a legitimate factor to consider in determining 
whether a protective frisk was justified, Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 
213, 215, and there is no basis in this record to suggest that 
McGill’s nervousness was the only factor present to justify this 
search. 
¶30 McGill also points to the fact that Wald summoned him 
over to his squad car to support his contention that the officer 
cannot have reasonably suspected the presence of a weapon.  Why 
would the officer put himself in close proximity to someone he 
thought might be armed (so the argument goes)?  But this totally 
misses the mark.  Police officers are subjected to risky 
situations every day; that they are called upon to initiate 
field investigations involving close face-to-face contact with 
persons whom they suspect might be armed should come as no 
surprise.  The whole point of the Terry frisk is to allow the 
officer in this situation to protect himself or herself.  It 
turns Terry on its head to argue, as the defendant does here, 
that the officer cannot possibly have been concerned about the 
presence of a weapon if he initiated close proximity with the 
suspect in the first place. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
13
¶31 In addition to noting McGill's out-of-the-ordinary 
nervousness, Wald also noted that he smelled of intoxicants and 
illegal drugs.  It is logical and completely reasonable to infer 
that a person under the influence may be more likely to commit 
an impulsive violent act against a police officer than one who 
is sober.3  Wald also testified that the defendant "twitched and 
acted nervous with his hands."  This fact in particular 
justified the officer's suspicions about the presence of a 
weapon and supports the reasonableness of the frisk. 
¶32 Finally, we also consider the overall circumstances of 
the stop.  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 212-13.  In this case, the 
stop occurred after 10 p.m. in a dark driveway.  We have 
consistently upheld protective frisks that occur in the evening 
hours, recognizing that at night, an officer's visibility is 
reduced by darkness and there are fewer people on the street to 
observe the encounter.  Id. at 214; See also State v. Flynn, 92 
Wis. 2d 427, 435, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
846 (1980); Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 144.  As we have already 
noted, most assaults on police officers occur during the evening 
or nighttime hours.  We also note that unlike the officers in 
                     
3 The dissent is concerned that we have established in this 
case a per se rule that "police officers may infer that anyone 
who has an odor of intoxicants or marijuana is armed and 
presently dangerous and may be frisked."  Dissent at ¶56.  We 
have not.  The odor of intoxicants and marijuana (and the common 
sense inference that the defendant was under the influence and 
therefore potentially more dangerous to the officer) represents 
only one piece of the total factual picture here and therefore 
only part of the constitutional justification for this frisk. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
14
Morgan and Williamson, Wald was alone with McGill and had no 
back-up, making him more vulnerable. 
¶33 Wald found himself alone at night in a dark driveway 
with a suspect who was demonstrating unusual behaviorfailure to 
stop, an attempt to walk away and avoid the encounter (as if he 
had somethingperhaps a weaponto hide), nervousness beyond 
that exhibited by most traffic suspects, hand twitches and 
apparent alcohol and drug intoxication.  This is not behavior 
associated with a "routine traffic stop," as the defendant 
argues this was.  A reasonably prudent officer in possession of 
these facts would be warranted in the belief that his suspect 
may be armed and presently dangerous.  We find that the 
protective frisk was reasonable. 
¶34 We now turn to the issue of whether Wald exceeded the 
limited scope of the Terry frisk when he removed the foil-
wrapped package of cocaine from McGill's pocket and opened it.  
Protective frisks under Terry must be confined in scope "to an 
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, 
or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police 
officer."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.  McGill argues that Wald 
exceeded that scope because the object that the officer felt in 
his pocket could not possibly have been a weapon and that the 
officer never stated that he actually believed it was a weapon. 
¶35 Terry 
has 
never 
been 
interpreted 
to 
impose 
a 
subjective requirement that the officer conducting the search be 
convinced that the object he detects on the suspect's person is 
a weapon before he may legally seize it.  All that is required 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
15
is a reasonable belief that the object might be a weapon.  
Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d at 403; 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.5(c), at 276-77 (3rd ed. 1996). 
¶36 Here, the size, shape and feel of the object the 
officer felt in the defendant's pocket were consistent with its 
being a pocketknife.  Wald described it as a hard, oblong object 
between two to four and one-half inches long.  He said he 
thought the object "could have been a pocket knife."  Although 
the object turned out to be packaged cocaine instead, Wald 
testified that it was so compacted that it felt like a hard, 
solid object. 
¶37 In addition, when Wald felt the object in McGill's 
pocket and asked him what it was, McGill lied to him, saying it 
was "just change."  It was clear to Wald from the object's size 
and shape that it was not change.  Finally, during the course of 
the frisk, McGill kept reaching for his pockets, despite being 
told by the officer not to.  McGill's attempt to deceive Wald as 
to his pocket's contents, combined with his twitchy hand 
movements and his general nervousness, reinforced the officer's 
reasonable belief that the defendant was concealing something, 
perhaps a weapon, in that pocket.  The seizure of the object 
from the defendant's pocket was justified. 
¶38 The fact that Wald handcuffed McGill before removing 
the object does not render the search illegal.  In State v. Guy, 
172 Wis. 2d at 96, we upheld a frisk performed while a suspect 
was in handcuffs. An officer may place a suspect in restraints 
in order to protect himself during a Terry frisk.  See generally 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
16
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993).  
Here, McGill did not cooperate with Wald's commands to keep his 
hands on the squad car, but continually reached for his pockets 
instead, increasing the officer's concerns.  "I didn't want to 
be fighting over a knife," Officer Wald testified.  Under these 
circumstances, the use of handcuffs to restrain the defendant 
during the frisk was a reasonable measure to ensure the 
officer's safety.   
¶39 In Terry itself, and several subsequent cases, the 
United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the need 
for an officer to pursue his investigation without the fear of 
violence.  See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).  It makes 
no sense to require an officer to cease a Terry frisk simply 
because he or she has found it necessary to place the individual 
he or she is searching in handcuffs.  If the officer ultimately 
finds no probable cause to arrest and releases the suspect, he 
remains at risk of an armed assault because he has not removed 
the threat by completing the protective frisk.  Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 
at 96; 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 252-53 
(3rd ed. 1996).  Police officers do not need to choose between 
completing a protective frisk and handcuffing a suspect in a 
field investigation.  They may do both, if the circumstances 
reasonably warrant it, as they clearly did in this case. 
¶40 Once Officer Wald removed the object from McGill's 
pocket, it became apparent that it was not in fact a knife, but 
was a small package wrapped in aluminum foil.  McGill argues 
that Wald illegally opened the package.  McGill is incorrect.  
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
17
An officer may inspect an object seized in a Terry frisk when it 
is immediately apparent that the object is, or contains, 
contraband.  See Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 101.  While a Terry frisk 
is not a general evidentiary search, an officer is not required 
to look the other way when he inadvertently discovers evidence 
of a crime during the course of a legitimate protective frisk.  
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 150; State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 
108, 123, 396 N.W.2d 156 (1986).  Seizure and inspection of 
evidence without a warrant is justified when the officer is 
lawfully in a position to observe the evidence, the evidence is 
in plain view of the officer, the discovery is inadvertent, and 
"[t]he item seized in itself or in itself with facts known to 
the officer at the time of the seizure, provides probable cause 
to believe there is a connection between the evidence and 
criminal activity."  Washington, 134 Wis. 2d at 121 (quoting 
Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 464, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977)).  See 
also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.5(d), at 283 
(3rd ed. 1996)(if stop and frisk is lawful, then seizure of 
evidence of a crime on probable cause is fully justified).   
¶41 This was a lawful protective frisk, and the officer 
discovered 
the foil-wrapped 
package 
inadvertently, in the 
reasonable belief that it might be a weapon.  The only remaining 
question is whether Wald had probable cause to believe that the 
package contained evidence of a crimein this case, drugs.  
Probable cause only requires that the facts available to the 
officer would "'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in 
[the] belief,' that certain items may be contraband."  Texas v. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
18
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)(quoted sources and citations 
omitted).   
¶42 In determining whether probable cause exists, we may 
consider the officer's previous experience, State v. DeSmidt, 
155 Wis. 2d 119, 134-35, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990), and also the 
inferences that the officer draws from that experience and the 
surrounding circumstances.  State v. Pozo, 198 Wis. 2d 705, 713, 
544 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995).  Officer Wald testified that the 
object he removed from McGill's pocket was a plastic baggie with 
aluminum foil wrap, and that he knew illegal drugs were packaged 
in this way.  In addition, McGill smelled of intoxicants and 
marijuana.  He kept reaching for the pocket with the package 
during the course of the frisk and he lied about its contents.  
Under these circumstances, there was probable cause to open and 
inspect the foil-wrapped package lawfully seized from McGill's 
pocket. 
¶43 We conclude, therefore, that Wald's frisk of McGill 
was based upon specific, articulable facts leading the officer 
to reasonably believe that the defendant might be armed.  The 
seizure of the object discovered during the frisk was based upon 
a reasonable belief that it was a knife.  The inspection of the 
foil-wrapped package removed from McGill's pocket was based upon 
probable cause that the item contained contraband.  Accordingly, 
the search, seizure, and inspection of the evidence seized in 
this case were reasonable and fully consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
No. 
98-1409-CR 
 
 
19
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Police safety is of paramount importance in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Every person whom a law enforcement officer 
stops presents a risk to the officer.  Perhaps police officers 
should be allowed to frisk anyone and everyone stopped for a 
violation of the law.  But in our country police officers do not 
have this power.  Police officers are not authorized under the 
federal constitution to frisk every person they stop.4 
¶45 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court 
made the limits on frisking clear.  The court began by 
recognizing the importance of individual freedom from government 
restraint, stating: 
 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority 
of law.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 
¶46 Terry went on to hold that an officer may perform a 
limited frisk "[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that 
the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at 
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or 
                     
4 "The police officer is not entitled to seize and search 
every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes 
inquiries.  Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen 
in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, 
reasonable grounds for doing so.  In the case of the self-
protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to 
particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the 
individual was armed and dangerous."  Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40, 64 (1968). 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
2 
to others."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.  The Terry exception to the 
probable cause requirement has a "narrow scope."  Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979). 
¶47 Terry requires "reasonable, individualized suspicion" 
that the person is armed and dangerous before undertaking a 
frisk; the officer must point to specific and articulable facts 
that would warrant a reasonably cautious officer in light of his 
or her experience to believe that the defendant was armed.  
Terry frisk cases are fact-sensitive. The necessary articulable 
facts are, in my opinion, missing in this case. 
¶48 I conclude that the officer acted on an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'"  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
The hunch here did not prove correct.  The defendant was not 
armed. 
 
That 
fact 
is 
not 
relevant 
in 
determining 
the 
constitutionality of the frisk. 
¶49 The facts relied on by the majority were articulated 
by the officer.  The court may draw reasonable inferences from 
those articulated facts.  The officer’s decision to frisk the 
defendant should be judged on whether the facts articulated by 
the officer, and facts reasonably inferred, were sufficient to 
justify the officer's suspicion that the defendant was armed and 
presently dangerous.  In my view, this standard is not met here. 
¶50 The stop occurred at night, it was dark, and the 
officer was alone.  The officer frisked the defendant "because 
he didn’t stop right away, smell of intoxicants.  He was acting 
nervous, his hands were twitching by his sides.  For my safety 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
3 
and his safety I decided I should pat him down before I 
continued any further.  Was going to do a field sobriety test." 
¶51 These facts simply do not add up to a reasonable 
belief that the defendant was armed and presented a danger to 
the officer. 
¶52 The majority opinion infers from the facts, including 
that the defendant was attempting to walk away from the officer 
and avoid the encounter, that the defendant had something to 
hide.  The majority opinion then infers from the "attempt to 
hide something" that the something was "perhaps a weapon."  See 
majority op. at ¶33.  The majority's inference that the 
defendant was attempting to hide a weapon is not based on any 
articulated fact.  The officer in this case may have indeed 
reasonably suspected that the defendant had something to hide.  
But that suspicion does not justify a Terry frisk for a weapon.  
¶53 A Terry frisk is not to see if the defendant is hiding 
something that may be evidence of illegal activity.  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has made clear, "[n]othing in Terry can be 
understood to allow a generalized cursory search for weapons or, 
indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons."  Ybarra 
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
¶54 An officer may not conduct a Terry frisk unless the 
officer has reasonable suspicion that the defendant is armed and 
presently dangerous.  No facts justifying such a reasonable 
suspicion are articulated or may be inferred in this case. 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
4 
¶55 The majority opinion also errs in relying on the fact 
that the defendant "smelled of intoxicants and illegal drugs 
[marijuana]."  Majority op. at ¶31.  The officer testified that 
the defendant had an "odor of intoxicants and a slight odor of 
marijuana."  The majority jumps from the officer's statement 
about what he smelled to conclude that the defendant "was under 
the influence" and not sober.  Majority op. at ¶31.  From there 
the majority opinion further declares that a person who is not 
sober is more likely to commit an impulsive violent act than one 
who is sober.  Majority op. at ¶31.  The majority opinion thus 
infers facts that are not rationally related to the officer's 
observation that the defendant had an odor of intoxicants and a 
slight odor of marijuana. 
¶56 The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly told us that we 
cannot adopt per se rules in search and seizure cases based on 
the fact that many involved with illegal drugs carry weapons.  
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).  The majority 
opinion suggests that police officers may infer that anyone who 
has an odor of intoxicants or marijuana is armed and presently 
dangerous and may be frisked.  I disagree.5 
                     
5 In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997), the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
overturned 
this 
court's 
blanket 
generalization that all drug dealers may be presumed armed and 
that therefore no-knock entries to the home are justified.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court condemned this court's categorical rule on 
the grounds that the generalization could be applied to many 
crimes and thus undercut the Fourth Amendment requirement of 
individualized suspicion.  Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.  I believe 
the same concern applies to the suggestion in this case that all 
persons who smell of intoxicants can be frisked for weapons. 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
5 
¶57 My decision rests, as does the U.S. Supreme Court's 
Terry opinion, and as the majority opinion does not, on a 
recognition that subjecting an individual to being frisked is 
not a small invasion of privacy.  The Terry Court viewed a frisk 
as "a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal 
security," an "annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.  The court further 
described the "stop and frisk" as "a serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and 
arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken 
lightly."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.6 
                                                                  
On this issue see State v. Thomas, 542 A.2d 912, 916-18 
(N.J. 1988) (where officer was investigating report that 
defendant was in possession of narcotics, nothing in record 
justified officer in frisking the defendant); State v. Cobbs, 
711 P.2d 900, 907 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) ("In order, however, to 
conduct a frisk of a person suspected of engaging in a non-
violent offense, such as possession of small amounts of 
marijuana, 
vagrancy, 
or 
possession 
of 
liquor, 
additional 
articulable facts of potential danger must be present, as well 
as the suspicion of criminal activity"). 
6 Today's 
decision 
affects 
not 
only 
this 
individual 
defendant, but all of us.  I quote from Justice Stevens: 
. . . the potential daily burden on thousands of 
innocent citizens is obvious.  That burden may well be 
minimal in individual cases.  But countless citizens 
who cherish individual liberty and are offended, 
embarrassed, 
and 
sometimes 
provoked 
by 
arbitrary 
official commands may well consider the burden to be 
significant.  In all events, the aggregation of 
thousands upon thousands of petty indignities has an 
impact on freedom that I would characterize as 
substantial, and which in my view clearly outweighs 
the 
evanescent 
safety 
concerns 
pressed 
by 
the 
majority. 
 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
6 
¶58 I agree with Judge Friendly that "courts should not 
set the test of sufficient suspicion that the individual is 
'armed and presently dangerous' too high when protection of the 
investigating officer is at stake."  United States v. Riggs, 474 
F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1973).  With this in mind, I conclude 
that this record does not establish a basis for an objectively 
reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous. 
¶59 Because the frisk was conducted in violation of the 
Wisconsin and U.S. constitutions, the evidence found by the 
subsequent seizure and search of the plastic bag must be 
suppressed.  Alternatively, even if the Terry frisk were 
justified, I conclude that the officer did not have probable 
cause to open the plastic bag and unwrap the aluminum foil that 
he had seized from the defendant’s pocket.  
¶60 The majority recognizes that the officer’s decision to 
open and unwrap the plastic bag cannot be justified as a Terry 
search.  See majority op. at ¶40.  After removing the plastic 
bag from the defendant’s pocket, the officer knew that the 
plastic bag was not a weapon.  The Terry frisk was therefore 
completed.7  
¶61 The 
majority 
nonetheless 
upholds 
the 
officer's 
decision to open the plastic bag and unwrap the aluminum foil, 
                                                                  
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 419 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary 
to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer 
valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
7 
stating that the object was in plain view of the officer and he 
had probable cause to believe that it contained illegal drugs.  
See majority op. at ¶42. 
¶62 The majority opinion reasons as follows: the officer 
had seen drugs in other cases packaged in aluminum foil within a 
plastic bag, the defendant smelled of intoxicants and marijuana, 
the defendant lied about the contents of the plastic bag, and 
the defendant reached for his pocket while the officer was 
frisking him.  See majority op. at ¶42. 
¶63 The officer’s testimony in this case is revealing.  
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that when he 
saw the object he thought it "could be any type of narcotic or 
drug."  Majority op. at ¶11.  He further stated that he did not 
know what was in the foil until he opened it.  The words "could 
be" and "did not know" are not those of probable cause or 
immediate apparency.8  Regarding the officer’s experience with 
drugs packaged this way, he testified he had seen such packaging 
"less than" 10 times during a seven-year career.  
                     
8 See State v. Paul T., 993 P.2d 74, 83 (N.M. 1999).  In 
that case, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that although the 
officer had grounds to conduct a Terry frisk on a juvenile he 
was transporting, the officer exceeded the "plain feel" doctrine 
when he removed a plastic bag from the defendant’s pocket.  The 
court stated: 
Finally, the State appears to make a sub-argument 
under Terry and its progeny regarding the "plain feel" 
doctrine, which embraces soft objects. . . .  Even if 
we were to reach the issue of "plain feel," the fact 
that Officer Serna merely speculated about what the 
object in Paul's pocket "could have been" indicates 
that it was not immediately apparent to him that the 
object was in fact contraband. This argument is 
therefore unavailing. 
No. 98-1409-CR.ssa 
 
8 
¶64 This case is similar to Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 
218, 220-21 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1992), in which an officer, 
during a legal Terry stop of a suspected drug dealer, seized and 
opened a box of matches that contained drugs.  The court 
concluded that the officer had proper grounds to remove the 
matchbox from the defendant’s pocket to see if it was a weapon. 
 However, even though the officer was investigating a possible 
narcotics sale and testified that he had seen drugs kept in 
matchboxes previously, the court held that the officer's 
testimony could not justify the search under the "plain view" 
doctrine.  The court suppressed the evidence.  829 S.W.2d at 221 
and n.5. 
¶65 The facts of this case are very similar to those in 
Davis.  The incriminating character of the object was not 
immediately apparent to the officer.  The object that was just a 
second ago thought to be a weapon, now "could have been" drugs. 
 Such testimony does not equal the probable cause required, 
unless every opaque container in the pocket of every suspect can 
be presumed to contain contraband.  Such a presumption, such a 
per se rule, is inconsistent with the constitutional protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure. 
¶66 For the reasons stated, I dissent.