Title: Clark v. Arakakai. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 10/07/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 135. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

---000!

 

EDWARD CLARK, OLLIE FULKS, and MATTHEW BINDER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JAMES ARAKAKI, in his official capacity as a candidate,
CASEY JARMAN’, in her official capacity as County Clerk

and Chief Election Officer for the County of Hawai'i,
in his official capacity as Chief Election

KEVIN B. CRONIN?,
Officer for the State of Hawai'i, COUNTY OF HAWAI‘T,
JANE DOES 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS,

JOHN DOES 1-10,
PARTNERSHIPS, GOVERNMENTAL UNITS of OTHER ENTITIES 1720,
Defendants-Appellees.

 

No, 26976

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 041-0225)

  

z
3

alms

AUGUST 29, 2008 EE

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
‘AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING el

QPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Edward Clark, Ollie Fulks
("Fulks"), and Matthew Binder (collectively, “Appellants"),
appeal from the third circuit court's (“circuit court’s”)

November 10, 2004 final judgment and order in favor of

role

 

 

8 pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure ("MRAP")
43(c) (2008), Casey Jarman has been substituted as 2 party to the instai
Appeal in place of Alan Konishi, in hie official capacity.

Pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP*)

as been substituted ass party to the instant
capacity

43(c) (2008), Kevan B. Cronin
appeal in place of Dwayne D. Yoshina, in his officia

 
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***+

 

Defendants-Appellees, James Arakaki (“Arakaki”), Casey Jarman,
Rex M. Quidilla, County of Hawai‘i, John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-
10, Doe Corporations, Partnerships, Governmental Units or Other
Entities 1-20 (collectively, “Appellees”).? On appeal,

Appellants assert generally that “the [circuit court) conmitted
error both in granting Appellees’ summary judgment motions, and
in denying Appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to

Count 1.” For the x

 

sons that follow, we hold that the circuit
court (1) did not err when it determined that an amendment to
article III, section 3-2 of the Charter of the County of Hawai‘:
(“the Charter Amendment”) was valid notwithstanding its lack of
an effective date, and (2) erred when it determined that the
first term that counted toward the limit of four consecutive two-
year terms was postponed to the term that commenced as a result
of the 1998 election. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's
Novenber 10, 2004 final judgment and order, and remand with
instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Appellants for
reasons consistent with this opinion.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Article ITI, section 3-2 of the Charter of the County

of Hawai'i provides:

 

>the Honorable Glenn §. Hara presided,

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‘There shell be a county couneti composed of nine members.
one menter shall be elected from cach of mine districts. The
teres of the council nenbers shall be two years and shail begin at
twelve of clock meridian on the first Monday of December after
their election. hall not

Hour consecutive tus year terms, Cendicates shail be elected an
Sccordance sith the election Laue of the state, inectar os
appiicabie.

 

Charter of the County of Hawai‘ (“CCH”) art. III, § 3-2 (2000)
(emphasis added) .

on January 25, 1995, the Hawai'i County Council adopted
ordinance 95-20, which proposed to place on the 1996 generat
election ballot an amendment to the Charter to be submitted to
the electorate of Hawai'i County. County of Hawai'i, Haw.,
Ordinance 95-20 (Jan. 25, 1995). The entire text of the Charter
Amendment states: “The terms of the council members shall not
exceed four consecutive two year terms.” Id, The purpose of the
Amendment was simply “to provide term limits for county council
members.” Ide

Pursuant to section § of Ordinance 95-20, Resolution
No. 298-96 was adopted by the Hawai'i County Council, which
required public notice of the proposed Charter Amendment. In the
“public Notice Of Proposed Amendments To the Hawaii County
Charter[,]” the “Digest” associated with the Charter Amendment

stated, as follows:

 

This proposal would limit the term of council menbers
40 that no Council member may be elected for more than four
Consecutive tuo year terms, If this proposal 1s passed, a
Sounesi member may only be elected for four strasght terme,
thus serving s total of eight years ina row. A council
   

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monber may be elected for sore then four terns ae long ae
the terma are not. consecutive

The public notices lacked any information on the effective date
of the Amendment.

On November 5, 1996, the voters of Hawai'i County voted
to approve the proposed Charter Amendment by a vote of 33,542 to
10,428. The results of the vote was certified by the county
clerk on November 25, 1996. The Charter Amendnent, as approved
and certified, did not contain an effective date.

on July 22, 1998, the Hawai'i County Council adopted
ordinance 98-78, which, among other things, affixed the effective
date for the Charter Amendment at “twelve of clock meridian on the
first Monday of December, 1996.” County of Hawai'i, Haw.,
ordinance 98-78, § 1 (July 22, 1998); However, the primary
purpose of this amendment was to amend Article III, section 3-2
by “chang[ing] the current Limit of four consecutive two-year
terms to two consecutive four-year terms.” Id. This ordinance
was not approved by the county electorate in the 1998 election.

Arakaki has continuously served on the Hawai'i County
Council since 1992. He filed nomination papers for the 1996
election on July 23, 1996, at which time there were no term
limits in effect. On November 5, 1996, Arakaki was elected to
serve a two-year term on the Hawai'i County Council commencing

the first Monday of December 1996, On November 25, 1996, the
 

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county clerk certified the results of Arakaki’s election.

Arakaki has served as an elected member of the county
council during the following consecutive two-year terms: 1992-
1994, 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1998-2000, and 2000-2002. When the
complaint that initiated the instant case was filed on July 27,
2004, he was serving a two-year term that began in December 2002.
B. Procedural Background

on July 19, 2004, Arakaki filed nomination papers for
‘the Hawai'i County Council District Three seat for a two-year
‘term commencing December 6, 2004. Arakaki and Fulks were the
only candidates running for the District Three seat in the
September 18, 2004 nonpartisan county election.

on July 27, 2004, Fulks and two other voters, Edward
Clark and Matthew Binder, filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment and other relief in the circuit court challenging
Arakaki’s eligibility as a candidate in the 2004 election.
Specifically, Appellants sought a declaration that Arakaki’s
candidacy for re-election violated the term limits of the Charter
of the County of Hawai‘i, and for Arakaki’s name to be stricken
from the ballot. On August 16, 2004, Appellants filed 2 motion
for partial summary judgment.
on September 7, 2004, Arakaki filed a cross-claim

asserting that the Charter Amendment was void because of its lack
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of an effective dati

 

On Septenber 10, 2004, Arakaki filed a
motion for summary Judgment on his cross-claim.

on Septenber 18, 2004, Arakaki was elected to the
Hawai'i County Council seat for District Three. The election
results were as follows: 3,104 votes for Arakaki, 796 votes for
Fulks, and $60 blank votes. Zulke vs Konishi, No. 26834, slip
op. at 2 (Haw. October 8, 2004).

on Septenber 24, 2004, Fulks filed @ complaint in this
court challenging the results of the election. Id. This court
dismissed his complaint because, even if this court accepted all
of Fulks’ allegations as true, this court had no jurisdiction to
declare Fulks the winner of the 2004 election and order his term
of office to begin in accordance with Hawai'i Revised Statutes

(CHRS") § 12-42 (1993), inasmuch as Fulks was not unopposed.

+ MRS § 12-42 provides, An ite entirety:

(a) Any candidate running for any office in the state
of Hawaii in’s special election or special prinary election
‘eho. is the sole candidate for that office shall, after the
Dlose of filing of nomination papers, be deemed’ and declared
fo be duly and Legelly elected to the office for which che
person is a candidate, The term of office for a candidate
elected under this subsection shall begin respectively on
the day of the special election or on the day of the
innediately succeeding special general election.

(b) Any candidate running for any office in the state
of Hawaii n/a spectal genesal election who was only opposes
by a candidate of candidates running on the sane ticket in
the special primary election ana ie not opposed by spy
Candidate running on any other ticket, nonpartisan or
Otherwise, and if nominated at the special primary election
shell, after the epecisl primary, be dened ang declares to
be duly and legally electes to the office for which the
person is a candidate at the special primary election

 

 

 

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1d. This court also determined that it had no jurisdiction “in

 

this election contest to declare a provision in the Hawai'i

 

County Charter invalid and meaningless.” Ide

on November 10, 2004, the circuit court filed its final
judgment and order granting Arakaki’s motion for summary
judgment, and denying Appellants’ motion for partial summary
judgment. In its order, the circuit court determined that the
Charter Amendment was valid, and the first election to which it
applied was to candidates elected to serve a term commencing the
first Monday in December 1998. Because of the court's
determination, Arakaki’s 1996-1998 term would not count towards
the four consecutive term limit promulgated by the Charter
Amendment. The cizcuit court reasoned that application of the
charter Amendment “to the election of 1996 council members raises
issues of retroactive application.” Consequently, because the
“charter Amendment contained no express provision as to its
operative date[,]” it “shall be prospectively applied with the
operative election being the 1998 election.”

On November 30, 2004, Appellants timely filed their

notice of appeal.

regardless of the nunber of votes received. The term of
Office for 3 candisate elected under this subsection shall
begin on the day of the special general election.

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IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. See State ex, rel, Anzai v. City and County of
Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 514, $7 P.3d 433, 439 (2002); Bitney v,
Honolulu Police Dep't, 96 Hawai'i 243, 250, 30 P.3d 257, 264

(2002).

(S)unmary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
anauers to interrogatories, and sdmissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issve es to
ny aaterial fact and that the moving party 12 entitled

Sudgnent as a matter of law. A fact ss material if proof of that
Zact would have the effect of establishing er refuting one of the
Steential elenents of # cause of action of defense asserted by the
partion, The evidence mast be viewed in the Light most. favorable
fo\the non-noving party. In other words, We sust view all of the
Svidence and inferences dravn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion:

Kahale v. City and County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 341, 344, 90
P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (citation omitted)

     

 

 

III, DISCUSSION
‘The instant case presents the novel issue of how to
properly construe the Charter Amendnent’s lack of an effective

date.* As discussed supra, the Charter Amendment was approved

+ Arakaki asserts that Appellants’ point of error does not comply
with lawai's Rules of Appellate Procedure ("HRAP") Rule 26(b) (4) {A-D) {2008}
Technically, there 12 2 defect. inasmuch ag Appellante do not include
Squatation of the finding or conclusion urges se error[.]”  SRAP Role
26(b) (4) (C), This court has Consistently held that fesiure to comply with the
Feguirenent® of HRAP 26(b) (4) 1s alone sufficient to affimm the ciecuie
court’s judgment. Margen v. Planning Don't County of Kalai, 104 Hawas's 173
380, 86 P.3d 962, 989 (200¢), Nevertheless, this court has also “adhered to
the’ policy of affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases heard on
the merits, where possible.” dd, at 180-81, 66 .34 at 985-90 (citation and
quetation tarks omitted). Inasmuch as the instant appeal requests 2 review of
the circuit coure's dectoion to judicially impose an effective date for the
Charter Anendnent, which was approved by the county electorate in the 1996

8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
   

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without an effective date by the county electorate in the 1996
election. Arakaki was elected as a Hawai'i County council member
in the same election, and has since served four consecutive two-
year terms between 1996 and 2004. Notwithstanding its silence,
if the Charter Amendment became effective with its electorate
approval in 1996, then by its terms, Arakaki would be proscribed
from seeking election in 2004 as a Hawai'i County council menber
See CCH art. 111, § 3-2.

Preliminarily, we note briefly that the question before
us is moot, inasmuch as the 2004 election has already occurred.
See Okada Trucking Co., Ltd. v. Sd. of Water Supply, 99 Hawai's
191, 196, $3 P.3d 798, 804 (2002) (“Inter Ieland’s appeal is moot
because the contract has already been completed.) .

IA] case is moot where the question to be determined
As abstract and does not rest on existing facts or rights.
Thos, the mootness doctrine 1s properly invoked unere

“evento”... have so affected the relations betueen the
parties that ine two conditions for justiciability relevant
fon appeal =~ adverse interest and effective renedy ~~ have

been! compront sea.
Doe vs Dos, 116 Hawai'i 323, 326, 172 P.2d 1067, 1070 (2007)
(citation omitted, brackets added, and ellipsis in original).
Because the 2004 election has already taken place, “[t}he

controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be

 

election without an effective date, the resolution of this issue is of great
importance to the county and voting public of Hawaii, See ig. Accordingly,
because of the importance of the issue raised, we will addres the naries of
Appellants’ point of error aotuithstanding its vechnical vislatian of HEAP
Rule 28(D) (41 (C)

 
   

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‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touches the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest.’” wong vw.
Bd. of Regents, Univ, of Hawaii, 62 Haw. 391, 396, 616 P.2d 201,
205 (1980) (citation omitted).

However, there is an exception to the mootness doctrine
“that occure in cases involving a legal issue which is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Life of the Land v. Burns, 59
Haw. 244, 251, $80 P.24 405, 409 (1978) (block format and
citation omitted); see Rees v. Carlisle, 113 Hawai'i 446, 456,
483 p.3d 1232, 1142 (2007).

“capable of repetition, yet evading review,”

2*case on the grounds of
octness where a challenged governmental action would evade
fll review because of the passage of tine would prevent any
Single plaintiff from remaining subject to the restriction
Conplained of for the period necessary to complete the
Yenouie-

   

 

fo of the Land, $9 Haw, at 251, 580 P.2d at 409-10 (citation
omitted).

on July 19, 2004, Arakaki filed his nomination papers
for the District Three seat of the Hawai'i County Council. on
July 27, 2004, Appellants filed their complaint in the circuit
court challenging Arakaki's eligibility as a candidate in the
2004 election. Arakaki was elected by majority vote on september
18, 2004, In light of the brief period of time between the
filing of Arakaki’s nomination papers and the election, it is

Likely that this action not only “would evade full review because

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of the passage of tine(,]” but also could “reasonably be expected
to recur” thereby preventing a plaintiff from seeking relief
under section 3-2 of the Hawai'i County Charter. See id. at 251-
52, $80 P24 at 410 (citation and quotation marke omitted).
Because this case falls under the “capable of repetition, yet
evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine, we will
consider the merits of this appeal.

A. The Charter Amendment Is Valid Notwithstanding Its Lack Of
An Effective Date.

Appellees reiterate their argument made in the circuit
court that the Charter Amendnent is void because of its lack of
an effective date. Appellees also contend that the Charter
Amendment is void because it is dissimilar from other state and
federal term Limit provisions.

1. The waw node!
uant to similar state an

term Limit provisions.

“upon the adoption of [a county’s] charter, it shall
become the organic law of the county superceding any existing
charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of
the county which are in conflict therewith.” Hawaii Gov't,
Employees’ Ass'n v. County of Mau‘, 59 Haw. 65, 79, 576 P.2d
1029, 1038 (1978) (quoting HRS § 50-10 (1993)) (quotation marks
omitted). This court observed that the delegates to the 1968

Constitutional Convention “intended that county charters acquire

1
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a stature which would resist legislative interference in sone
areas.” Id, at 75-76, 576 P.2d at 1036. These areas encompass
those charter provisions that “affect |] the organization and
government of the county... ." Ids at 78-79, 576 P.2d at 1038

(quoting HRS § 50-10) (quotation marks omitted).

 

As presented . , . the erea which the proposal places beyond
Tagislative control so limited to charter provisions as to the
executive, Legislative ond acninistrative structure
organization of the political subdivision. for example, the
Jegisiature could not change che composition of the legislativ
body of county. Hovever

ihe authority of che legislature to enact general lass aliccstine
Midteallocating powers and functions, This means that the
{tgisieture could transfer a function from the county to the state
Jevel even Af the result would be to eliminate » department of the
cSunty government provides for in its charter-

   

 

 

Id, at 75, $76 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Vol.1 Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1968, 229) (emphasis
added) «

‘The Charter Amendment, as adopted and approved in
article III, section 3-2 of the Hawai'i County Charter, provides
for term limits for Hawai'i County council members. Appellees
seen to contend that because term limits “allocat{e] and
reallocat{e] powers and functions” of the county, the Charter
Amendnent is required to be drafted in a similar manner as other
state and federal term limit provisions. However, term limits
for council menbers clearly affects the “structure and
organization” of the membership of the Hawai'i County council.

See id, at 84, 576 P.2d at 1040-41 ("The revised charter

12
 

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provision changing the number of menbers serving on the Maui
police commission is a matter of executive and adninistrative
structure and organization and is superior to conflicting
statute.” (Footnote omitted.)}. Therefore, inasmuch as it
appears that a term limit for council members was intended to be
one of those areas that is “beyond legislative control,” we hold
that the Hawai's County Council is not required to model the
Charter Amendment pursuant to other similar state and federal

term limit provisions. See id. at 75, 576 P.2d at 1036.

 

‘The Charter Amendment's lack of an effective date does
not render the Amendment void.

Provisions in a county charter that “affect(] the
organization and government of the county” are construed pursvant
to fundamental principles of construction relating to
constitutional provisions. See id. at 80-82, 576 P.2d at 1039.

As such, we must “give effect to the intention of the framers and

 

the people adopting” the provision in the county charter.

 

Ide
“(T]he general rule is that, if the words used in a
constitutional provision. . . are clear and unambiguous, they
are to be construed as written.” Hatland v, Lingle, 104 Hawai'i
128, 139, 85 P.3d 1079, 1090 (2004) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In this regard, “the words are presumed to be used in
their natural sense unless the context furnishes some ground to

control, qualify, or enlarge them.” Id. (quotation marks and

3
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citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he provisions of a constitution
which regulate its own amendnent are not merely directory, but
mandatory. [S]trict observance of every substantial requirement
is essential to the validity of the proposed amendment.” ids
(block format, emphasis, and citations omitted).

Arakaki asserts that the county charter requires an
amendment to contain an effective date in order to be valid.

Because of this requirement, Arakaki asserts that the Charter

 

Amendment’s lack of an effective date renders the Amendment

 

void.
HRS § 50-11 (1993) provides, in its entirety:

Every charter established under this chapter shall provide
neans by which the charter may be anended or revised. The
provisions for anendnent and fevieion mist provide for approval of
Hl anenaments and revisions by referendua to the electors of the
County. The anendnent or revision shall be considered ratified if
a’najority of the electors voting on the anendnent or revision
cast thesr ballots in favor of adoption

Article XV of the 1991 charter of the County of Hawai'i

provides for amendment or revision in the following manner:

+ Appellants assert that estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and waiver
preclude Appellees from claiming that the Charter Anenanent is void because,
famong other reasons, many years have passed since the Anendment was ratified.

However, one of the argunents nade by Appellants in their opening brief is
that the Charter Anendnent is “presumed valid, and Appellees cannot show
matter of law that the anendment was invalid beyond 2 reasonable doubt [-]""
Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP") Rule 28(c) (2005) states that an
ancwering brief “shall be of like character ag that required for an opening
Brief except that no statement of points shall be required, and no cther

 

 

 

Section is required unless the sect is
Sontrovertes.” (Emphasis added.) accordingly, we Tail vo find any error

‘Appellees’ argument was merely nade to ‘controvert {)” Appellants’
he Charter Ancnament 19 "presumed valid.” S20 ia."

  

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Section 15-1. initiation of Amendments or Revisions
Amendments of revisions of this cherter may be initiates
oniy in the following manner:

Ta} By ordinance of the council adopted after three
readings on separate says snd pasced by the affirmative vote
Of twocthirds of the entire menbership.

 

Section 15-2. Elections te be Called. upon adoption
of an ordinance proposing anendnents or revisions of this
Charter... the council shall by resolution provide that
the proposed anendsents or rovisions be submitted to the
electors of the county for approval at the next general
Siection. Any such resolution shall provide for the
publication cf the full text of the proposed amenduente or
Fevisions in at least two daily newspapers of general
Eizculation in the county at least forty-five (49) days
Bricr co submission to the electors of che county.

Section 15-3. Mandatory Charter Reviews. The charter
shall be reviewed in 1989 ana every tenth year thereafter
Not later than the fifteenth day of January of che charter
review year, the mayor with the confireation of the council,
Shall appoint a charter commission composed of eleven
eabers to study and review the operation of the government
Of the county under this charter... » The council shail
Sppropriate funds to enable the comission to carry out its
Guties, including the niring of necessary state.

‘Me connission shall hold at Least one public
in each of the geographical areas. the commission may
Propose anendnente to the existing charter or a draft of a
few charter which shall be supeitted to the county clerk.
Open receipt of the amendnents or charter in the form as
proposed by the conmission, the county clerk shall provide
forthe sobmission of such amendnents cr charter to the
Glectors of the county at either a special election as
Seternines by the commission or at the first general
Siection following the charter review year. The connission
Shall prepare che language of the question to be submitted
fo the voters for each of the amendments it proposes.

‘The conmiseicn shall publish not less than forty-five
(45) days before any election, at least two daily newspapers
of general circulation within the county, a brief sigest of
the anendsents or charter and the purpose theres! and 2
notice to the electorate that copies of the anendnents of
Charter are available st the office of the county clerk.

Members of the commission ghall hold office until the
anendnents oF charter is ratified or rejected.

Ifthe majority of the voters voting upon a chaster
anendnent votes in favor of Tt ox anew charter, if a nee
‘hater ig proposed, the enenaeent or oon chareer shal
become effective at the tine fixed in the anenduent or

Sherer

 

 

 

ring

 

 

 

ccH art. XV (1991) (emphasis added); Arakaki asserts that the

above emphasized portion requires the inclusion of an effective

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date for the Charter Amendment to be valid.

Standing by itself, it appears that the disputed
portion of section 15-3 clearly and unambiguously states that
when a majority of the voters vote in favor of an amendment, that
amendment “shall become effective at the time fixed in the
amendment . . . .” Logically, in order for the amendment to
becone effective “at the time fixed in the amendment {,)” the
amendment itself must contain the “time” that it becomes
effective, Hence, it can be inferred that section 15-3 mandates
that an amendment must contain the “time” that it becomes
effective. See Natland, 104 Hawai's at 139, 85 P.3d at 1090
("T]he settled rule is that in the construction of a
constitutional provision the words are presumed to be used in
their natural sense unless the context furnishes some ground to
control, qualify, or enlarge them.” (Emphasis added.)).

However, this mandate is subsumed under section 15-3,
which is entitled "Mandatory Charter Reviews.” According to this
section, “[t]he charter shall be reviewed in 1989 and every tenth
year thereafter.” CCH art. xv, § 18-3. The vote on the Charter
Amendment took place on Novenber 5, 1996, which is less than the
ten-year time frame contemplated by section 15-3. Moreover, the
record on appeal does not indicate that a “charter commission

composed of eleven members” was appointed by the “mayor with

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confirmation of the council[.1” Id, Accordingly, we cannot say
that the Charter Amendment was anended pursuant to section 15-3.
See HRS § 50-11.

In fact, it appears that the language of article xv
provides for two distinct procedures through which the charter of
the County of Hawai‘ may be amended. As discussed above, the
mandatory charter review required by section 15-3 “in 1989 and
every tenth year thereafter()" provides one procedure through
which the charter may be amended. The second procedure is
provided through sections 15-1 and 15-2.

Section 15-1 of article XV provides that an amendnent
may be initiated through an ordinance that is adopted by the
council “after three readings on separate days and passed by the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership.” CCH
art. XV, § 1-1(a). Ordinance 95-20 was properly adopted by the
council in this manner, and Appellees do not dispute its
propriety.

Section 15-2 requires the council to submit a
resolution that provides (1) that the amendment will be submitted
to the electorate for their approval at the next election, and
(2) that the proposed amendment be published “in at least tvo
daily newspapers of general circulation in the county at least

forty-five (45) days prior to submission to the electors of the

vv
   

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county.” CCH art. XV, § 15-2. Appellees do not dispute the
propriety of ordinance 95-20's publication.

Comparing sections 15-1 and 15-2 to section 15-3
reveals that, unlike section 15-1's method of initiating an

amendment, section 15-3 requires only that an “eleven member”

 

charter commission, as created by section 15-3, “hold at least
one public hearing in each of the geographical areas” of the
County of Hawai'i, and “may propose amendments to the existing
charter . . . which shall be submitted to the county clerk.” ccH
art. Xv, § 15-3, Additionally, publication is separately
provided for in section 15-3 in a very similar manner as section
15-2. See id However, neither section 15-1 nor section 15-2
contains section 15-3's requirement that an anendment “shall
becone effective at the time fixed in the amendment...” Id.
Because sections 15-1 and 15-2 lack an effective date
requirement, and article XV clearly and unambiguously provides
for txo distinct procedures through which the charter may be
amended, we cannot say that the Charter Amendment's lack of an
effective date presents a “plain, clear, manifest, and
unmistakable” violation of article XV of the charter of the
county of Hawaii. See Taonae v. Lingle, 108 Hawai'i 245, 251,

118 P.3d 1188, 1194 (2005). Accordingly, we hold that the

circuit court did not err when it determined that the Charter

ae
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Amendment was valid notwithstanding its lack of an effective

date.”

B. The First Term Counted Towards the Limit Enumerated In the
Charter Amendment Is the Term That Commenced At Twelve
O'clock Meridian On the First Monday of December After the
1996 Election.

Appellants assert that the Charter Amendnent became
effective on the date of either the 1996 election (Novenber 5,
1996), or the certification of the 1996 election results
(Woverber 25, 1996). Under either scenario, Appellants assert
that the first tern counted toward the limit enumerated in the
Charter Amendment is the term that commences as a result of the
1996 election. Appellees, however, contend that the first term
counted toward the limit enumerated in the Charter Amendment is
the term that commences as a result of the 1998 election.

To reiterate, the entire text of the Charter Anendnent
provides that “(tJhe terms of the counci} menbers shail not
exceed four consecutive two year terms.” County of Hawai'i,
Haw., Ordinance 95-20. The Charter Amendment was approved by the
county electorate in the 1996 election. However, as discussed
supa, the text of the Charter Amendnent is silent as to which

terms count towards the limit of “four consecutive two year

 

We note that Appellants aesert that the Charter Anendnent is
Sait face However, Appellees do not contest che

ity of the Anendment. Moreover, this issue is not dispositive

1. accordingly, we decline to express an opinion aa to this

      

constitutio
te this apps

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terms.” Moreover, legislative history or its equivalent that
could be used to clarify the intent of the framers of the Charter
Amendment is also silent on this issue. Consequently, a puzzling
anomaly appears within the language of article XV of the county
charter, insofar as section 15-3 describes the mode of approval
of charter amendments while sections 15-1 and 15-2 are silent.
‘Thus, in order to clarify that for which there is only silence,
we will resort to HRS § S0-11.

HRS § 50-11 mandates that an amendment or revision to a
county charter “shall be considered ratified if a majority of the
electors voting on the amendment or revision cast their ballote

An favor of adoption.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the vord

 

“ratification” as an “[aldoption or enactment, esp. where the act
is the last in a series of necessary steps or consents... . In
this sense, ratification” includes “a formal approval of a
Black's Law Dictionary 1289
(8th ed. 2004); see Druagan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36, 39 (1925)

("The moment that the Amendment was ratified it became effective

 

constitutional amendment . .

asa law.

 

After the day of the election, HRS § 11-156 (1993)
mandates that “[t]he chief election officer or county clerk shall
deliver certificates of election to the persons elected as

determined under section 11-155.” Additionally, “[tJhe chief

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election officer or county clerk in county elections shall issue
certificates of results where a question has been voted upon.”
Id. In relevant part, HRS § 11-155 (1993) provides that,

(oln receipt of certified tabulations from the election
Officials concerned, the chief election officer or county
Elerk in. county elections

Eelaasge the election reaules after the expiration of the
tine for bringing an election contest The position
fon the question receiving the appropriate majority of the
Sores cast shell be reflected inva certificate of results
Sesued pursuant to section 11-256.

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
The result of the vote on the Charter Amendment was
certified by the county clerk on November 25, 1996, Consonant
with the foregoing, because the mandated certification is “the
last in a series of necessary steps or consents[,]” see Black's
Lau Dictionary 1289, the Charter Amendment was ratified on
November 25, 1996. See HRS § 50-11. Accordingly, the Charter
Amendment could theoretically be construed to apply to any one of
the following scenarios: (1) retroactively to include those
terms that preceded the Amendment's ratification; (2)
prospectively where the first term counted towards the limit is
the term that commenced at twelve o’clock meridian on the first
Monday of December after the 1996 election: or (3) prospectively,
as the circuit court determined, where the first tern counted
towards the limit is the term that would commence on the first

Monday in December after the 1998 election.

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This court has acknowledged that “[nJo law has any

retrospective operation, unless otherwise expressed or obviously
intended.” Graham Constr. Supply, Inc, v. Schrader Constra,
Anse, 63 Haw. 540, 546, 632 F.2d 648, 653 (1961) (quoting HRS §
1-3 (1993)) (quotation marks omitted). Based on the plain
Language of the Charter Amendment and its lack of legislative
history on this issue, we cannot say that there is “an expression
or obvious intendment” that the Charter Amendment was intended to
have “any retrospective operation.” See ids Accordingly, we
decline to apply the Charter Amendment retroactively to include
those terms that preceded the Anendnent’s ratification towards

© terms.”

 

the limit of “four consecutive tuo y
Tt has been said that “[ujniess otherwise provided by

law, amendments of constitutional charters take effect from the

 

date of their approval by the people.” 2A Eugene McQuillin, ‘The

ax of Municipal Corporations § 9:30 (3d ed. 2006). similarly,

this court has held that “[ajn Act of the legislature becomes a

law upon its approval by the governor.” In re Marques, 37 Haw.
260, 268 (Hawai'i Terr, 1945) (footnote omitted). As such,

iwlhexe an Act of the Legislature contains certain
provisions that are postponed co take effect at a future
Gate ana there is no implication or expression therein that
the Act itself should be postponed, the Act itself takes
effect upon approval and the only sections postponed to take
effect are those where the postponement is expressed therein
OF is to be implied therefton.

Id. (footnote omitted).

 

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEH

 

In this case, the Charter Amendnent fails to indicate
whether ite effective date or the first term to count towards the
Limit of “four consecutive two year terms” is to be postponed to
1998. See id, In Light of the Charter Amendment’s silence, we
hold that the Amendment becane effective on Novenber 25, 1996,
which is the day that the Amendment was “ratified” by a “majority
of the electors voting on the amendment . . . .” See HRS § 50-
11; see also HRS $$ 11-155 to -156. Consequently, we also hold
that the first term counted towards the limit of “four
consecutive two year terms” is the term that commenced “at twelve
o'clock meridian on the first Monday of Decenber after” the 1996
election. See CCH art. III, $ 3-2) Ine Marques, 37 Haw. at
268

‘The County of Hawai‘ relies on U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
ve Hill, 072 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994), Moo vy. Superior Court, 83
cal. App. 4th 967, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000),
and Kurvak v. Adamcevk, 705 N.¥.S.2d 739, 265 A.D.2d 796 (App.
Div. 1999), in support of its assertion that the Charter
Amendnent’'s silence begets an ambiguity that must be resolved in
favor of Arakaki. lo and Kurvak, however, are inapposite.

In fgg, a new charter repealed the former charter and,
in repealing the former charter, omitted certain language from

the existing term limit provision. 93 Cal. App. 4th at 970-72,

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100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-60. The new charter was approved by the
voters in June 1999. Id, at 159, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159. The
California court was confronted with the issue of whether certain
terms that preceded the approval of the 1999 charter were to be
counted towards the two-term limit enumerated therein. Id. at

976, 100 cal. Aptr. 2d at 163, Similarly, in Kurvak, th

 

tiew
York court addressed the issue of whether the respondents were
proscribed from serving a third term when, during their iret
term in public office, the term limit provision was amended to a
maximum limit of two consecutive terms. 705 N.¥.S.2d at 739, 265
A.D.24 at 796,

As discussed above, however, we decline to apply the
Charter Amendment retroactively to include those terms that
preceded the Amendment's ratification towards the limit of “four
consecutive two year tems.” Therefore, these cases are
inapposite.

In HiLL, the Arkansas state constitution was amended to
establish a limitation on the nusber of terms that, inter alia,
state public officials could serve. 872 $.W.2d at 351. This
amendment was approved by the voters in the Novenber 3, 1992
general election, and by its terms, became effective on January
1, 1993, Id. Similar to the instant case, the issue before the

Arkansas court was which terms of service should be counted

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
toward the term limit enumerated in the amendment. Id, at 360-
61. Pursuant to the law of its jurisdiction, the court
ultimately held that “fo]nly periods of service commencing on or
after January 1, 1993, will be counted as a term for limitations
purposes under” the amendment. Id, at 361 (emphasis added).
Similar to Hi1L, the Charter Amendment was ratified by
the voters of Hawai'i County on November 25, 1996. Pursuant to
section 3-2 of the Hawai'i County Charter, “(t]he terms of the
council members shall . . . begin at twelve o'clock meridian on
the first Monday of December after their election.” As discussed
above, the Charter Amendment fails to indicate (1) whether those
terms of service that preceded the Anendment’s ratification are
to be counted toward the limit of “four consecutive two year
verms[,]" see Graham Constr. Supply, Inc., 63 Haw. at 546, 632
P.2d at 653, and (2) whether the first term counted towards the
limit is to be postponed to the term commencing as a result of
the 1998 election, see Marques, 37 Haw. at 268. ‘Therefore, the
first term counted towards the limit of “four consecutive two
year terms” is the term commencing “at twelve of clock meridian on
the first Monday of December after” the 1996 election. See CCH
art. IIT, § 3-2.
Finally, Arakaki contends that the Charter Amendment

cannot apply to the term that conmences as a result of the 1996

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{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
election because the Anendnent was not part of the “election laws
of the state(]” when Arakaki filed his nomination papers for the
council seat in 1996." Consequently, Arakaki asserts that
application of the Charter Anendnent’s term limit should be
postponed to the term commencing as a result of the 1998
election.

However, the issue in this case is not whether Arakaki,
in 1996, was nominated and elected in accordance with the laws of

the sta

 

Rather, the issue is whether, after being elected,
Arakaki’'s two-year term that commenced as a result of the 1996
election was the first term counted toward the limit enumerated

in the Charter Amendment.’ Inasmuch as we hold that the Charter

+ tn 1996, section 3-2 of the Hawai'i County Charter stated that
“{cJandidates' shail’ be nominates and elected in accordance with the election
laa of the state,”

 

"the dissent appears concerned that our holding will give the
Charter Amendment retrospective effect because it was not part of the election
laws Of the state when Arataki filed his nomination papers. Dissenting
opinion at s-11." However, aur halaing in'ehis case interpreting the language
of the Charter Amendment does not implicate the nomination process prior to
the 1596 ‘election or the 1996 election results. Further, if is undlapured
that Arakski was an elected nenber of the Hawai'i County Council at all vines
jant to this case, In fact, Arakaki, as a elected menber of the county
perticipated in ail three readings of the Charter Amenanent. Seq CCH
XV, § 15-1 (a) (hnendnents oF revisions of this charter may be initiated
in'the following manner: (a] By ordinance of the council adopted after
Feadings on separate days and pasted by the affireative vote of tuo
is of the entire menberahip."}- In the second and third resdings, Arakaki
against adopting the Anendnent apparently because he snstead favored &
init consisting of two foursyear terms, ‘therefore, it cannot be
disputed that Arskaki knew (1) of the Charter Anendeent’s existence, 12) that
it would be submitted to the county electorate for ita approval in the 1996
election, “and, (3) if approved by the county electorate and the results
certified by the county clerk, that st would be effective on the date of ite

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Amendnent was effective when ratified on November 25, 1996, and
the language of the Anendnent fails to indicate that its
applicability should be postponed to 1998, gee Marques, 37 Haw.
at 268, Arakaki's two-year term that began “at twelve of clock
meridian on the first Monday of December after” the 1996 election
was the first term that counted toward the “four consecutive two
year tern” limit.
Iv. concLusron

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we vacate the
circuit court's Novenber 10, 2004 final judgment and order, and
remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of

Appellants for reasons consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs:

Fred Paul Benco for

Plaintiffs~Appellants

Edward Clark, Ollie Fulks

and Matthew Binder Messer

Joseph K. Kanelamela and »
Katherine A. Garson, deputies este OTe Ones
Corporation Counsel, for

Defendants-Aappellees County of

Hawai'i and Casey Jarman, in Game. OuQiion,

her official capacity as County

Clerk and Chief Election Officer

Brian J. De Lima of Crudele 6

De Lima for Defendant-Appellee
James Y, Arakaki

20