Title: Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Countrywide Home Loans

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 99 Ohio St.3d 522, 2003-Ohio-
4358.] 
 
 
OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, APPELLANT, v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME 
LOANS, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 99 Ohio 
St.3d 522, 2003-Ohio-4358.] 
Civil Rights Commission — Unlawful discriminatory practices — Filing of 
charge of discrimination — One-year time limit contained in R.C. 
4112.05(B)(7) is mandatory. 
(No. 2002-0150 — Submitted March 11, 2003 — Decided September 3, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-01-1285. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The one-year time limit contained in R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is mandatory. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
On June 23, 1999, Eric and Vonda Williams filed a charge with the 
Chicago, Illinois office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”).  The charge alleged that appellees, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and 
two alleged agents (collectively, “Countrywide”), engaged in sex discrimination 
and family-status discrimination by not considering Mrs. Williams’s salary during 
the loan-application process because she was on maternity leave.  On August 3, 
1999, HUD notified Countrywide of the charge.  HUD referred the charge to the 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”).  On August 10, 1999, OCRC received 
the charge and began its investigation.  OCRC filed an administrative complaint 
against Countrywide on July 13, 2000. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶2} 
Countrywide moved for summary judgment, claiming that the one-
year statute of limitations had run before OCRC filed the complaint.  OCRC filed 
the complaint one year and 20 days after the Williamses’ charge was filed with 
HUD.  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of 
a discretionary appeal. 
{¶3} 
The principal issue in this case is whether R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is a 
statute of limitations for the filing of complaints by OCRC or whether it is a 
directory provision to encourage the orderly processing of discrimination claims.  
We hold that R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is mandatory.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶4} 
R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) states that any complaint issued by OCRC 
based on the filing of a charge of unlawful discriminatory practice “shall be so 
issued within one year after the complainant filed the charge.”  In Dorrian v. 
Scioto Conservancy Dist. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 56 O.O.2d 58, 271 N.E.2d 
834, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court stated that “the word ‘shall’ shall be 
construed as mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative 
intent that [it] receive a construction other than [its] ordinary usage.”  Accord 
State v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 545-546, 692 N.E.2d 608.  We 
consider the use of the word “shall” in R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) to indicate 
unambiguously that the provision is mandatory.  See State ex rel. Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 111, 114, 4 O.O.3d 241, 
362 N.E.2d 1221 (holding similar language in predecessor statute mandatory). 
{¶5} 
Interpreting R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) to be anything other than a 
mandatory statute of limitations would disserve defendants and claimants.  
Defendants would be required to choose between being exposed to liability for 
actions long past and filing for writs of mandamus to force OCRC to act.  Such a 
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choice would subject defendants to undue burdens and be inconsistent with the 
legal principles requiring parties to act on claims or lose them. 
{¶6} 
We hold that the one-year time limit contained in R.C. 
4112.05(B)(7) is mandatory, not directory. 
{¶7} 
Concluding that R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is mandatory does not fully 
resolve this case.  OCRC argues that, in any event, it did file within the mandatory 
one-year period.  Relying on Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-01(D), OCRC contends that 
the filing date of the original charge is August 10, 1999, because that is the date 
on which it received the charge from HUD.  If August 10, 1999, were the filing 
date, then the administrative complaint, which was filed on July 13, 2000, would 
be timely. 
{¶8} 
Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-01(D) states that “[a] charge filed with * * 
* the department of housing and urban development (HUD) which indicates it is 
also filed with the commission is deemed filed with the Ohio civil rights 
commission on the date it is received at one of the commission offices.”  
According to the rule, the date of receipt is deemed the filing date only when the 
charge indicates a dual filing.  OCRC’s argument fails because the charge, when 
submitted by the complainants, did not indicate that it was filed with both HUD 
and OCRC.  Further, there is no indication that the Williamses ever filed the 
charge with OCRC. 
{¶9} 
We conclude that Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-01(D) does not change 
the filing date in this case.  Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on 
June 23, 1999, and expired June 23, 2000.  OCRC’s complaint, filed July 13, 
2000, was untimely, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. 
{¶10} Finally, OCRC argues that the Williamses have a property interest 
in the case before us and that a determination that OCRC filed the complaint 
outside the statute of limitations would deprive them of due process.  This 
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argument would be more compelling if the Williamses were not pursuing a class 
action against Countrywide for the same alleged discriminatory practice.  See 
Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-01-1473, 2002-Ohio-
5499, 2002  WL 31270283.  We conclude that whatever property interest the 
Williamses have is being protected in their separate suit against Countrywide. 
{¶11} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, SHAW and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
CARR and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
DONNA J. CARR, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
 
STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
CARR, J., dissenting. 
{¶12} I respectfully dissent, as I would hold that the term “shall” as it is 
used in R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is not mandatory but merely directory.  Consequently, 
the failure of OCRC to issue a complaint within one year after the Williamses 
filed their charge with the Department of Housing and Urban Development did 
not deprive OCRC of authority to proceed with the action and was not a proper 
basis for summary judgment in this case. 
{¶13} The majority focuses exclusively on the general rule of statutory 
construction that “the word ‘shall’ shall be construed as mandatory unless there 
appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that [it] receive a construction 
other than [its] ordinary usage.”  Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. (1971), 27 
Ohio St.2d 102, 56 O.O.2d 58, 271 N.E.2d 834, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶14} The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that this court has 
long recognized an exception to the general rule in cases such as this where the 
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statutory language relates to “the manner or time in which power or jurisdiction 
vested in a public officer is to be exercised.”  Schick v. Cincinnati (1927), 116 
Ohio St. 16, 155 N.E. 555, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “A statute specifying a 
time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights 
and duties of others is directory merely, unless the nature of the act to be 
performed or the phraseology of the statute or of other statutes relating to the same 
subject matter is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation 
upon the power of the officer.”  State ex rel. Smith v. Barnell (1924), 109 Ohio St. 
246, 255, 142 N.E. 611. 
{¶15} In State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467, 32 O.O. 
542, 66 N.E.2d 531, this court held, at paragraphs one, two, and three of the 
syllabus: 
{¶16} “1.  A statute is mandatory where noncompliance with its 
provisions will render illegal and void the steps or acts to which it relates or for 
which it provides, and is directory where noncompliance will not invalidate such 
steps or acts. 
{¶17} “2.  As a general rule, statutes which relate to the essence of the act 
to be performed or to matters of substance are mandatory, and those which do not 
relate to the essence and compliance with which is merely a matter of convenience 
rather than substance are directory. 
{¶18} “3.  As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the 
performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for 
performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for 
convenience or orderly procedure; and, unless the object or purpose of a statutory 
provision requiring some act to be performed within a specified period of time is 
discernible from the language employed, the statute is directory and not 
mandatory.” 
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{¶19} This court has continued to apply the rule set forth in Farrar, not 
Dorrian, in situations such as the one currently at issue.  See, e.g., State v. 
Bellman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 714 N.E.2d 381; In re Davis (1999), 84 
Ohio St.3d 520, 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219; State ex rel. Webb v. Bryan City School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 27, 31, 10 OBR 178, 460 N.E.2d 1121.  
As this court explained in Webb, Dorrian applies only to the question “whether 
there was a mandatory duty to act, and not when the act was to be done.”  Id. at 
31, 10 OBR 178, 460 N.E.2d 1121.  That is not the type of issue before us.  There 
is no dispute that OCRC did perform the required substantive act by filing a 
complaint in this case.  The only issue is whether the language of R.C. 
4112.05(B)(7), that a complaint by OCRC “shall be so issued within one year 
after the complainant filed the charge,” is mandatory or directory.  Consequently, 
this court should apply the rule of statutory construction set forth in Farrar and 
Barnell, not Dorrian.  See  In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d at 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219; 
Webb, 10 Ohio St.3d at 31, 10 OBR 178, 460 N.E.2d 1121. 
{¶20} Applying Farrar and Barnell to the statutory language at issue, that 
a complaint “shall” be issued within one year of the claimant’s charge, the time 
requirement is mandatory only if R.C. 4112.05, or related statutory language, 
evinces a purpose to limit the authority of OCRC to issue a complaint beyond the 
one-year period.  See Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d at 210, 714 N.E.2d 381.  There is no 
such language to be found anywhere in R.C. Chapter 4112.  In fact, this legislation 
is completely silent on the consequences of OCRC’s failure to issue a complaint 
within the one-year period.  Thus, there is no clear legislative intent that the one-
year period set forth in R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) was intended to limit the authority of 
OCRC to act beyond that time.  The legislature failed to specify any consequences 
for a late filing, which certainly suggests that it did not intend a late filing to lead 
to dismissal of the complaint.  See Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d at 210, 714 N.E.2d 381 
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(contrasting statutory speedy-trial requirements that explicitly state that dismissal 
is a consequence of noncompliance with the time requirement). 
{¶21} In addition to the language used in a statute, the character of a 
given statute may also be determined by consideration of “the nature, context and 
object of the statute” and “the consequences of the various constructions.”  
Farrar, 146 Ohio St. at 473, 32 O.O. 542, 66 N.E.2d 531; Barnell, 109 Ohio St. at 
259, 142 N.E. 611.  See, also, In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d at 522-523, 705 N.E.2d 
1219. 
{¶22} R.C. 4112.08 provides that R.C. Chapter 4112 “shall be construed 
liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.”  R.C. 4112.05(A) provides that 
the OCRC “shall prevent any person from engaging in unlawful discriminatory 
practices, provided that, before instituting the formal hearing authorized by 
division (B) of this section, it shall attempt, by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion, to induce compliance with this chapter.”  The 
purpose of R.C. Chapter 4112 is to protect victims of discrimination.  See 
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 
N.E.2d 1212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  OCRC was entrusted with the duty 
of investigating and remedying the Williamses’ claim that they had been the 
victims of unlawful discrimination, on behalf of the Williamses and the public at 
large. 
{¶23} The purpose of R.C. Chapter 4112 would clearly be thwarted if the 
failure of OCRC to pursue remedies on behalf of alleged victims in a timely 
manner would always lead to dismissal of the complaint.  In Brock v. Pierce Cty. 
(1986), 476 U.S. 253, 260, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248, the United States 
Supreme Court noted, when construing similar language in a federal statute:  
{¶24} “We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an 
agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, 
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especially when important public rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less 
drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should 
not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to act.”  (Footnote 
omitted.) 
{¶25} The District of Columbia Court of Appeals construed the word 
“shall” in a similar statute to be directory.  JBG Properties, Inc. v. Dist. of 
Columbia Office of Human Rights (D.C.App.1976), 364 A.2d 1183, 1186.  The 
court focused on the purpose of Human Rights Law in the District of Columbia, to 
aid both the individual claimant and the public at large in ending employment 
discrimination, and quoted a passage from 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction 
(3d Ed.Rev.1973) 443-444, Section 57.19: 
{¶26} “ ‘[F]or obvious reasons founded in fairness and justice, time 
provisions are often found to be directory merely, where a mandatory construction 
might do great injury to persons not at fault, as in a case where slight delay on the 
part of a public officer might prejudice private rights or the public interest. * * * 
{¶27} “For the reason that individuals or the public should not be made to 
suffer for the dereliction of public officers, provisions regulating the duties of 
public officers and specifying the time for their performance are in that regard 
generally directory.  A statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to 
perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others is directory unless 
the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute, is such that 
the designation of time must be considered a limitation of the power of the officer.  
[Footnotes omitted.]’ ”  Id. at 1185. 
{¶28} No one disputes that the Williamses filed their charge with OCRC 
within the time limits set forth in R.C. 4112.05(B)(1), the limitations period set 
forth for claimants. 
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{¶29} The majority is concerned that defendants will be unduly burdened 
if the one-year time period of R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) is not construed as a statute of 
limitations.  “[I]t is not insignificant that the section is not in any way the typical 
limitation imposed on the plaintiffs to ensure that they expeditiously pursue their 
claims and to protect defendants against stale claims.”  West Virginia Human 
Rights Comm. v. Garretson (1996), 196 W.Va. 118, 125, 468 S.E.2d 733 
(construing a similar provision in a West Virginia state statute).  The Williamses 
timely filed their charge with OCRC, and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development notified the defendant, Countrywide Home Loans, within a few 
weeks.  Any concerns that OCRC will be filing complaints years after the alleged 
discriminatory conduct occurred, thereby prejudicing defendants are unfounded.  
OCRC has an incentive to prosecute claims in a timely manner because it does not 
want its evidence to become stale any more than defendants do. 
{¶30} In addition to thwarting the purpose of the statute, the consequence 
of the majority’s construing this language as mandatory is that claimants will be 
deprived of due process whenever OCRC fails to timely issue complaints.  In 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 
L.Ed.2d 265, the United States Supreme Court held that a claimant who timely 
filed a charge under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act had a property 
interest in the statutory procedures and that he could not be deprived of those 
procedures simply because the state agency had failed to meet a filing deadline.  I 
can see no sound legal basis to distinguish the due process argument raised in 
Logan from the argument raised by the Williamses here.  It is a well-settled 
principle of statutory construction that courts should liberally construe a statute to 
save it from constitutional infirmities.  State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 
101, 72 O.O.2d 54, 330 N.E.2d 896.  Consequently, the word “shall” as it is used 
in R.C. 4112.05(B)(7) must be construed as directory. 
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{¶31} Courts from several other jurisdictions have held that similar 
language is directory, not mandatory, and that the agency, which acts on behalf of 
the claimant, has the authority to proceed beyond the time constraints set forth in 
the statute.  See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Pataki (1998), 
180 Misc.2d 778, 693 N.Y.S.2d 795;  West Virginia Human Rights Comm., 196 
W.Va. at 127, 468 S.E.2d 733; Wildwood Industries v. Illinois Human Rights 
Comm. (1991), 220 Ill.App.3d 12, 22, 162 Ill.Dec. 546, 580 N.E.2d 172; Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. Dist. of Columbia Comm. on Human Rights (D.C.App.1986), 515 
A.2d 1095, 1102-1103 (contrasting an untimely claim filed by a claimant, which 
is time-barred, with a claim pursued by the commission on behalf of an aggrieved 
party);  Brock, 476 U.S. at 262, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (“the mere use of 
the word ‘shall’ * * * standing alone, is not enough to remove the Secretary’s 
power to act after 120 days”). 
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of common 
pleas. 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephanie 
Bostos Demers, Duffy Jamieson and Marilyn Tobocman, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for appellant. 
 
Gressley, Kaplin & Parker and George James Conklin; Goodwin Proctor, 
L.L.P., John C. Englander, F. Dennis Saylor IV and Jennifer B. Brown, for 
appellees. 
 
Cooper & Walinski, L.P.A., Stephen M. Dane and Janet E. Hales, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Eric and Vonda Williams, Toledo Fair Housing Center, 
Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Advocates Association, the 
January Term, 2003 
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Housing Advocates, Fair Housing Contact Service, and Housing Opportunities 
Made Equal of Greater Cincinnati. 
__________________