Title: Buehler v. City of Mandan

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

239 N.W.2d 522 (1976) Anna BUEHLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF MANDAN, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 9160. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 3, 1976. *523 Bair, Brown & Kautzmann, Mandan, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Dwight C. H. Kautzmann, Mandan. Richard P. Gallagher, Mandan, for defendant and appellee. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. In this case the plaintiff, Anna Buehler, appeals from that part of the judgment of the District Court for the County of Morton which confirmed the special assessments levied by the defendant, City of Mandan, against the plaintiff's property and which denied the plaintiff's prayer for an injunction to restrain the City from levying and collecting the special assessments against her property in Street Improvement District No. 46 within the City of Mandan. Buehler's major complaint is not that her property was assessed at a higher rate than other property within the district or that her property differed greatly or was of less value than the other property in the district. Her complaint is that the City used a formula for assessing the property throughout the district based on square feet which did not comply with Chapter 40-23.1, N.D. C.C. Her position is that if square feet are to be used as a basis for the determination of the benefits that the Special Assessment Commission must then apply the provisions of Chapter 40-23.1, N.D.C.C., rather than the provisions of Chapter 40-23, N.D.C.C. *524 The pertinent provisions of Chapter 40-23.1, N.D.C.C., follow: It is Buehler's contention that had those sections of Chapter 40-23.1 been applied to her property that her assessment would have been considerably less than it was ascertained to be by the Special Assessment Commission. The City on the other hand contends that it applied the provisions of Section 40-23-07, N.D.C.C., and that in so doing, it was permitted to use a square-foot formula in conjunction with a personal inspection of the property by the special assessment commissioners. The pertinent part of Section 40-23-07, N.D.C.C., follows: Buehler does not contend that the special assessment commissioners did not personally inspect the property but she does assert that they did not pay significant attention to the lot lines of her property which seem to be irregular and not based upon any significant plan. The commissioners, in assessing the benefits to her property, applied the same formula as they applied in assessing the benefits to all other property with the exception of the assessment of a lot designated as Lot D which was owned by one person and surrounded by lots owned by other persons and thus was not accessible. All of Buehler's lots, whether abutting on the street which was improved or not, were contiguous and thus accessible. Since the property owned by Buehler was compact, it could have been replatted and in replatting, all lots could have been made to abut onto the improved street. As we see it, the only issue that is before us in this appeal is whether a special assessment commission is required to apply the provisions of Chapter 40-23.1, N.D.C.C., when it uses square feet as a factor in *526 determining special benefits. We think not. In our view the election provided for in Section 40-23-07, N.D.C.C., is with the Special Assessment Commission. If the members of the Special Assessment Commission wish to avoid personally inspecting any and all lots and parcels of land within the improvement district, they apparently may do so by utilizing Chapter 40-23.1, N.D.C.C. If they utilize Chapter 40-23.1, they may make the benefit assessments on the basis of the provisions contained in Chapter 40-23.1 without regard to other factors and without the necessity of making a personal inspection of each of the lots and parcels of land within the district. What the constitutional consequences may be of utilizing such a method, we would not wish to speculate about today. We conclude, however, that with respect to the issue presented by Buehler today, that Chapter 40-23.1 does not prohibit the use of square feet as a factor in determining benefits under Chapter 40-23, N.D.C.C. Pertinent as to the facts, the trial court in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment said: Although in Soo Line Railroad Company v. City of Wilton, 172 N.W.2d 74 (N.D.1969), the Special Assessment Commission assessed the property on a front-footage basis, whereas in the instant case, the Special Assessment Commission is using in conjunction with the personal inspection of the property a square-foot basis for determining the benefits, we think what we said in that case is applicable in this case. Syllabuses No. 4 and No. 5 of Soo Line are especially significant. Relative to Syllabus No. 4 in Soo Line, Buehler asserts in the instant case that her property is worth less today than the total of the special assessments. Just as in Soo Line, the production of evidence of before-and-after value which was intended to prove that the property had not been benefited was held not material, we hold that the testimony in the instant case that the property has a value now of less than the total of the special assessments is also not material. Applying the principles of Syllabus No. 5 in Soo Line, we have reviewed the evidence in this case to determine whether the assessment of benefits by the Special Assessment Commission with respect to Buehler's property are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the function of this court to try the case anew. We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the assessment of benefits made by the Special Assessment Commission; that the Commission was acting within its jurisdiction; that it was not mistaken as to the applicable law; that the action of the Commission was not arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable; and that its action did not constitute constructive fraud. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. PAULSON and PEDERSON, JJ., and EMIL A. GIESE and RAY R. FRIEDERICH, District Judges, concur. ROBERT VOGEL and PAUL M. SAND, JJ., deeming themselves disqualified did not participate; EMIL A. GIESE, Judge of the Sixth Judicial District and RAY R. FRIEDERICH, Judge of the Second Judicial District sitting in their places.