Title: Commonwealth v. Dowds

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-10340 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROY DOWDS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 7, 2018. - November 8, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Motor Vehicle, Theft.  Robbery.  
Mental Impairment.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of 
counsel, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, New trial, Motion for reconsideration, Assistance of 
counsel, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 9, 2006. 
 
 
The case was tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J.; a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 6, 2014, was heard by 
him; and a motion for reconsideration, filed on June 30, 2017, 
was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
 
David J. Nathanson (Eva G. Jellison also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In May 2006, Keith Koster was killed while 
 
 
2 
attempting to prevent the defendant from stealing Koster's sport 
utility vehicle (SUV).  The incident was seen by a number of 
witnesses, and the defendant was arrested shortly after he 
crashed the SUV to which Koster had been clinging.  Although the 
defendant suffers from long-standing brain injuries that affect 
his cognition and behavior, trial counsel took no steps to 
research or present any such evidence in the defendant's motion 
to suppress or at trial.  A Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder predicated on 
unarmed robbery.1 
 
Represented by new counsel, the defendant filed a motion 
for a new trial; he argued ineffective assistance due to trial 
counsel's failure to consult an expert about the defendant's 
mental capacity.  The motion was denied by the trial judge.  A 
different judge subsequently denied the defendant's motion to 
reopen and reconsider the motion for a new trial. 
 
We discern no error in the decisions to deny the motion for 
a new trial and the motion to reopen and reconsider that motion. 
In the circumstances of the case, however, we conclude that, 
                     
 
1 The jury did not find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, but 
did convict him of larceny of a motor vehicle.  At sentencing, 
the court placed the convictions of unarmed robbery and larceny 
of a motor vehicle on file. 
 
 
3 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the 
interests of justice require that the degree of guilt be reduced 
to murder in the second degree. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving some details for later discussion. 
 
The victim, who was twenty years old, worked at a retail 
shop located on Route 114 in Danvers.  On an evening in May 
2006, the victim parked his SUV outside the shop, leaving the 
keys inside the vehicle.  At approximately 7:30 P.M., the 
victim's coworker saw the defendant walking towards the area 
where the SUV was parked.  Seeing the SUV being driven away, the 
shop's owner alerted the victim, who ran out to the SUV as it 
prepared to merge onto Route 114. 
 
The victim banged on the front passenger's side window and 
yelled for the defendant to stop.  The victim then clung to the 
SUV's exterior as it pulled out of the parking lot and 
accelerated down Route 114.  Witnesses observed the SUV 
"shaking" as it swerved back and forth, changed lanes,2 and 
veered from side to side.  The SUV struck a telephone pole 
approximately one-half mile from the shop, causing the vehicle 
to "fl[y] up in the air," spin into two vehicles parked at a 
                     
 
2 Route 114 has two traffic lanes traveling east and two 
lanes traveling west.  It is a major State highway lined with 
retail establishments. 
 
 
4 
nearby automobile dealership, and then collide with a light 
pole, where the SUV came to a stop. 
 
A collision analyst determined that the SUV had been 
traveling forty-nine miles per hour when it was spinning, and at 
a greater speed immediately prior.  During the crash, the victim 
struck a telephone pole, was thrown into the air, and landed in 
the street.  He incurred a fractured skull, two contusions on 
his brain, numerous broken bones, a torn liver, and severe 
wounds to his right leg and arm. 
 
The defendant got out of the SUV and stumbled away from the 
scene, passing behind a row of vehicles parked at the automobile 
dealership.  A witness called the police, who arrived within 
minutes.  Officers initially requested an aerial medical 
evacuation, then canceled it due to the victim's fatal injuries.  
Approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after the crash, 
officers apprehended the defendant in a parking lot near the 
scene. 
 
The defendant, who had scratches on his arm and a small 
amount of blood on his neck, told the officers that he did not 
need medical attention.  An arresting officer informed the 
defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), and the defendant indicated that he understood those 
rights.  The defendant admitted that he stole the SUV because he 
wanted to drive it to his home in Lawrence.  He also 
 
 
5 
acknowledged that he had left the scene after the crash.  Two 
witnesses identified the defendant as the man they had seen 
leaving the SUV.3 
 
Officers brought the defendant to the Danvers police 
station, where he again waived his Miranda rights, this time by 
signing a waiver form.  Immediately before being questioned, the 
defendant was again read his Miranda rights, and signed another 
waiver form.  When interviewed by Lieutenant Norman Zuk and 
Sergeant Carole Germano, the defendant stated that at 
approximately 11:30 A.M. that day, he had smoked "weed" and had 
consumed "a forty" ounce beer at an apartment in Beverly.  At 
approximately 2 P.M., he began to walk the roughly twenty miles 
from Beverly to his home in Lawrence.  Along the way, in 
Danvers, the defendant encountered the victim's SUV.  The 
defendant said that he chose to steal that particular vehicle 
because he had looked inside and seen the keys.  Following 
questioning, the defendant said that, after getting into the 
SUV, he saw the victim at the passenger's side window.  The 
defendant also observed the victim jump onto "the side of the 
                     
 
3 Prior to trial, the defendant also moved separately to 
suppress the witness identifications.  After a hearing, the 
judge denied the motion.  On appeal, the defendant does not 
challenge this denial.  We nonetheless have reviewed the record 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice as a result of the 
denial. 
 
 
6 
vehicle," bang his fist on the closed window, and yell at the 
defendant to stop.  The defendant said that he had wanted to 
remove the victim from the SUV "through any means necessary," so 
that the defendant could "have whatever [he] felt . . . was 
right for" him.  The defendant explained that he swerved around 
other vehicles on the road in an attempt to shake the victim 
from the vehicle. 
 
The defendant mentioned that he had a history of seizures, 
but said that he had not experienced a seizure for approximately 
forty-five days.  He also discussed Michelle Kitchen, a reentry 
case manager who had helped him to secure housing after he had 
completed serving a prison sentence approximately six weeks 
earlier. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; 
unarmed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 19; and larceny of a motor 
vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28.  He filed a motion to suppress his 
statements on the ground that his Miranda waivers and subsequent 
statements had not been voluntary.  The motion was denied.  
Following a seven-day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder premised on unarmed 
robbery. 
 
After the defendant's direct appeal was entered in this 
 
 
7 
court, we allowed his motion for psychiatric evaluation and 
remanded the case to the Superior Court.  Based on evidence from 
a psychiatric evaluation obtained after trial, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial.  The trial judge denied the 
motion after a two-day hearing.  The defendant timely filed his 
notice of appeal.  He later filed a motion to reopen and 
reconsider the motion for a new trial.  A different judge denied 
that motion, and the defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.  
The defendant's direct appeal was consolidated with his appeal 
from the denials of his motions for a new trial and for 
reconsideration of that denial. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant's primary claim asserts 
ineffective assistance based on trial counsel's failure to 
obtain evidence of the defendant's childhood brain injuries and 
counsel's failure to use such evidence to challenge the 
defendant's mental capacity to commit murder or to waive his 
Miranda rights and speak with officers voluntarily.  The 
defendant also raises a number of other issues, including 
improprieties in jury voir dire and errors in jury instructions.  
We have reviewed the instructions given and discern no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Nor do we 
discern any such likelihood in the defendant's cursory claim 
 
 
8 
that the judge improperly conducted voir dire of the venire.4 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  For claims 
involving ineffective assistance, our standard of review under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is more favorable to a defendant than the 
constitutional standard for ineffective assistance applicable in 
noncapital crimes.  See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 
29, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017).  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Thus, when reviewing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, we first determine "whether there was an error in the 
course of the trial . . . and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion," 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014), such that it created a "substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice" (citation omitted).5  Fulgiam, 
                     
 
4 Because of the result we reach, the defendant's assertion 
concerning the disproportionality of his punishment for felony-
murder is moot.  For the same reason, we do not reach the 
defendant's claim regarding the elements of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
 
 
5 A motion judge in a capital case who reviews a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel must conduct "a discerning 
examination and appraisal of the specific circumstances of the 
given case" to determine whether counsel fell "measurably below 
that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer" 
and, "if that is found, then, typically, whether it has likely 
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defence."  See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 
96 (1974).  As stated, on appeal to this court, we review the 
defendant's claim under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, which provides a 
 
 
9 
supra. 
 
i.  Motion for a new trial.  Represented by new counsel 
posttrial, the defendant acquired medical records demonstrating 
that he long has suffered from frontal brain injuries that 
impair his cognition and behavior.  The defendant also obtained 
an expert witness, Dr. Montgomery C. Brower, who interviewed the 
defendant and conducted a forensic evaluation of the defendant's 
medical, educational, and criminal records.  Based on these 
materials, Brower opined that, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant lacked the mental capacity to commit murder, or waive 
Miranda rights and speak with officers voluntarily, due to the 
defendant's intoxication, depression, and brain injuries.  
Accordingly, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.  
After a two-day hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. 
 
The defendant contends that trial counsel was aware of his 
seizure disorder and unreasonably failed to obtain and review 
his medical records.  Had those records been obtained, the 
defendant argues, counsel would have learned of the defendant's 
                     
standard of review more favorable to the defendant.  We consider 
"whether there was an error in the course of the trial (by 
defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there 
was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  The defendant requests that 
motion judges in capital cases be required to apply the standard 
of Wright, supra, rather than that of Saferian, supra.  We 
decline to adopt this request. 
 
 
10 
long-standing brain injuries, and would have been able to 
consult an expert concerning the defendant's capacity to act 
with conscious disregard for human life, as well as his capacity 
to waive his Miranda rights and to speak with police 
voluntarily. 
 
We review the consolidated appeal of the defendant's 
conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 805 
(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 840, 
(2013).  Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge may grant a new trial "if it 
appears that justice may not have been done."  In reviewing the 
denial of a motion for a new trial, we "examine the motion 
judge's conclusions only to determine whether there has been a 
significant error of law or other abuses of discretion" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 
648 (2019).  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014). 
 
Findings of fact made by a judge after an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion for a new trial "will be accepted if 
supported by the record."  Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 
213, 224 (2005).  The judge is the "final arbiter" on "questions 
of credibility."  Id.  Where, as here, the motion judge was also 
the trial judge, "we give 'special deference' to the judge's 
 
 
11 
findings of fact and the ultimate decision on the motion" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 
672-673 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).  If a motion for a 
new trial is premised on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, "the burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with the 
defendant" (citation omitted).  Id. at 673. 
 
Although the defendant did not specifically inform his 
attorney about his brain injuries, trial counsel was aware that 
the defendant suffered from seizures.  We agree with the motion 
judge that "a history of seizures alone might alert defense 
counsel" to the fact that medical records "would be worth 
examining."  We agree also that, had trial counsel subpoenaed 
the defendant's medical records, counsel "rather easily" could 
have discovered that the defendant suffered from long-term brain 
injuries first sustained when he was a young child. 
 
Armed with the defendant's medical records, counsel readily 
could have obtained the services of a forensic psychiatrist to 
assist the defense.  Therefore, we conclude that trial counsel 
erred in failing to consult with an expert regarding the 
defendant's brain injuries.  See Commonwealth v. Field, 477 
Mass. 553, 557 (2017) (failure to consult expert constitutes 
error when facts known to counsel raise "reasonable doubt" as to 
defendant's mental condition). 
 
Accordingly, the question is whether counsel's error likely 
 
 
12 
influenced the jury's verdict.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
 
A.  Capacity to commit murder.  At the time of the 
defendant's trial, a conviction of felony-murder required proof 
of three elements:  first, that the defendant committed or 
attempted to commit a felony with a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment; second, that the killing occurred during the 
commission or attempted commission of that felony; and, third, 
that the felony was inherently dangerous, or that the defendant 
acted with conscious disregard of human life.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 15-16 (1999).6  In his final charge, the 
judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of felony-
murder.  As to the third element, the judge instructed only on 
conscious disregard of human life, and the jury convicted the 
defendant on that basis. 
 
In the context of the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
Brower opined that, at the time of the offense, the defendant 
had been incapable of consciously disregarding the risk to human 
life due to intoxication, depression, and "traumatic brain 
injury," which resulted in "impulsivity, lack of insight, 
failure to anticipate the consequences, and other impairments" 
                     
 
6 In a case tried today, the requirements to establish 
felony-murder differ and require proof of malice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) (prospective convictions of felony-murder 
require proof of malice); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
59-60 (2018). 
 
 
13 
that made him "essentially unable to reason through or 
anticipate or weigh the consequences of his actions at the 
time."  The motion judge found portions of Brower's testimony, 
namely his discussion of the defendant's brain injuries, 
"credible" and "convincing," and "assume[d] that a jury would 
also."  The judge found other portions of Brower's testimony -- 
the degree of the defendant's intoxication, depression, and 
cognitive ability -- "without support," based on "faulty 
information," and "undermined" by a "lack of balanced 
evaluation."  The judge ultimately concluded that Brower's 
opinion would not have altered the jury's verdict with respect 
to the conviction of felony-murder. 
 
Although the judge did not decide whether Brower's 
testimony would have had an effect on the jury's verdict with 
respect to the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, when, as 
here, a conviction of murder in the first degree is based on 
more than one theory, "the verdict remains even if only one 
theory is sustained on appeal."  Field, 477 Mass. at 558. 
 
As to Brower's opinion concerning the defendant's asserted 
intoxication, the judge found that the facts at trial 
demonstrated that the defendant was not inebriated at the time 
of the crash.  The defendant had smoked marijuana and consumed 
forty ounces of beer at approximately 11:30 A.M. that day.  He 
did not "black out."  Rather, at approximately 2 P.M., the 
 
 
14 
defendant left his cousin's apartment and began walking from 
Beverly to Lawrence.  At approximately 7:30 P.M., the defendant 
stole the victim's SUV.  The judge thus determined that the 
crash occurred approximately eight hours after the defendant 
last had consumed marijuana and beer, and that the defendant had 
not been intoxicated at that point.  While one officer noted 
that, when he was arrested, the defendant "exuded a slight odor" 
of alcohol and his eyes were "glassy," the judge's finding that 
the defendant was not intoxicated is not inconsistent with the 
record.  See Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 Mass. 847, 855 
(2006); Walker, 443 Mass. at 226-227. 
 
In addition, because Brower's opinion concerning the 
defendant's depression was premised primarily on observations 
that Brower made during his interview of the defendant nearly 
six years after the offense, and while the defendant was serving 
a life sentence, the judge concluded that Brower's opinion shed 
little light on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the 
offense.7  See Commonwealth v. Foster, 471 Mass. 236, 245-246 
(2015) ("the defendant's mental state in response to his 
                     
 
7 Although the defendant's educational and medical records 
indicate that he experienced depression and physical and mental 
traumas in his childhood, and attempted suicide multiple times, 
the records also suggest that the defendant's depression might 
have abated as an adult.  The medical record most 
contemporaneous to the events at issue, from the Department of 
Corrections, indicates that the defendant did not require mental 
health services at that point. 
 
 
15 
incarceration does not bear on his mental state at the time of 
the killing").  Moreover, at the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial, Brower agreed that, to the extent that the defendant had 
been depressed on the day of the offense, any depression did not 
meaningfully contribute to his state of mind at that time.  We 
conclude that the judge's finding as to the defendant's 
depression is not inconsistent with the record.  See Walker, 443 
Mass. at 224. 
 
The more difficult question is whether Brower's opinion 
with respect to the defendant's brain injuries was likely to 
have influenced the jury's verdict.  In 1978, when the defendant 
was four years old, a motor vehicle hit him, fracturing his 
skull and leg, causing brain damage, and requiring him to be 
hospitalized for at least six weeks.  After the accident, the 
defendant engaged in impulsive and self-harmful behaviors, 
including setting fire to his own bed; swallowing shoe polish, 
furniture polish, and fingernail polish; and eating paint.  He 
also was reported to have experienced lead poisoning.  He had an 
individual education plan and received special services in 
school; he demonstrated repeated difficulties with impulse 
control. 
 
In 1987, when the defendant was a young teenager, he again 
was struck by a vehicle, this time while riding his bicycle.  
The accident left the defendant unconscious for two days and 
 
 
16 
caused him to suffer additional brain damage.  An 
electroencephalogram conducted in 1988 demonstrated abnormal 
rhythmic spikes and slow wave activity over the right frontal 
polar region of the defendant's brain.  This abnormal brain 
activity was observed both while the defendant was awake and 
asleep.  The patterns were determined to represent focal 
pathology.  Moreover, computerized tomography scans conducted in 
1987 and 1991 showed areas of low density in the right frontal 
and left front parietal cerebral regions of the brain, 
representing an "old injury" with "atrophy."  Although further 
clinical examination was recommended, it does not appear that 
any was completed. 
 
After the 1987 accident, the defendant "exhibited 
noticeable changes in behavior," began to experience seizures, 
and struggled to control his impulses and his conduct.  He was 
diagnosed with a seizure disorder, and he presented with 
antisocial qualities, learning disabilities, and poor judgment.  
He also evinced impatient behaviors, such as "want[ing] things 
or results right away."  In addition, the defendant stole from 
his foster family, was consistently disruptive at school, 
urinated on the floor, and urinated in a vase before pouring the 
urine onto the floor at a "Dare Mentor home."  In 1990, the 
defendant was "functioning in the 'Borderline' range of 
intelligence," or "at about the 5th percentile overall," with 
 
 
17 
some areas "below the 1st percentile" and other areas in the 
"low average" range. 
 
The defendant continued to experience seizures into 
adulthood, was easily aggravated, and struggled to control his 
temper.  As an adult, the defendant remained typically "slow to 
respond" to questions, needed "time to retrieve detailed 
information," and generally provided laconic verbal answers.  
Although, as an adult, the defendant generally tested 
academically at "low elementary school" levels, his spelling and 
oral word recognition abilities were at an "eighth grade level" 
and a "[h]igh school level," respectively.  The defendant also 
tested at a high school level for such things as visual memory, 
visual reasoning, and motor functioning.  The defendant 
presented considerable difficulty, however, with "executive 
functioning," testing in the "mentally handicapped range" for 
such things as self-monitoring, attentional control, idea 
generation, and problem solving.  The defendant also tested in 
the mentally handicapped range in a number of verbal skills, 
such as when attempting to recall information told to him by 
others. 
 
Based on the defendant's medical history, and his own 
observations of the defendant, Brower opined that the 
defendant's "impulsivity, lack of insight, failure to 
anticipate . . . consequences, and other impairments related to 
 
 
18 
his brain injury made him essentially unable to reason through 
or anticipate or weigh the consequences of his actions at the 
time." 
 
We turn to the record of the defendant's mental capacity at 
the time of the offense, bearing in mind Brower's opinion and 
the defendant's medical record.  Before he stole the victim's 
SUV, the defendant peered into several vehicles, settling on the 
victim's SUV because he could see the keys inside it.  The 
defendant said that he knew the vehicle did not belong to him 
but chose to steal it anyway.  He explained that he quickly 
"tried to get away" with the SUV because after "get[ting] in the 
car that's not [his], . . . it's only natural that [he was] 
going to think that people [were] going to be watching" him.  He 
also said that Kitchen, his reentry case manager, would be upset 
with him when she learned that he had caused the victim's death 
by stealing and crashing the victim's SUV, indicating that he 
understood his conduct had consequences. 
 
The defendant refused a sobriety test when he was in police 
custody, "figur[ing] that it wouldn't do [him] any good to take 
one" after he had been drinking.8  He realized that a condition 
of his probation required him to abstain from alcohol, and he 
                     
 
8 Because trial counsel argued that the defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the crash, the judge concluded that 
the defendant's testimony about refusing a sobriety test 
properly was admitted to show his state of mind.  We agree. 
 
 
19 
was concerned about the likely ramifications of taking the 
sobriety test after drinking beer.9  Brower opined that the 
defendant's statements demonstrated "self-preservation 
thinking," and showed that the defendant was aware there likely 
would be consequences for his actions.  Brower also testified 
that, when the defendant initially told the police that he did 
not remember stealing or driving the victim's SUV, the defendant 
was "not credible," and again was engaging in self-preservation 
thinking.  According to Brower, this demonstrated that the 
defendant understood that there would be consequences for what 
he had done, and that he was attempting to escape those 
consequences. 
 
Taking into account the defendant's brain injuries and his 
cognitive impairments, the judge found that the defendant knew 
the victim was clinging to the exterior of the SUV, and that the 
victim had banged on the SUV window and yelled for the defendant 
to stop.  Aware that the victim was on the SUV, the defendant 
chose to accelerate down Route 114, swerving through traffic in 
an attempt to "shake" the victim from the vehicle. 
 
On this record, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
finding that the defendant possessed the factual knowledge and 
                     
 
9 The defendant explained that he was on probation as a 
result of a previous offense during which he attempted to steal 
a vehicle and nearly hit a police officer with that vehicle 
before stalling and crashing. 
 
 
20 
the intellectual capacity to comprehend the clear danger posed 
to the victim.  Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's 
conclusion that expert testimony would not have altered the jury 
verdict as to felony-murder. 
 
B.  Voluntariness.  The defendant also argues that he 
received ineffective assistance based on trial counsel's failure 
to obtain an expert witness to challenge the voluntariness of 
the defendant's Miranda waivers and his subsequent statements to 
police.  We conclude that the judge's decision did not 
constitute a clear error of judgment such that it fell outside 
the range of reasonable alternatives.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 
185 n.27. 
 
A defendant who suffers from a cognitive disability may 
waive his or her Miranda rights and provide statements to police 
so long as he or she does so voluntarily.  See Commonwealth v. 
Zagrodny, 443 Mass. 93, 99-100 (2004).  "The voluntariness of 
the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the voluntariness of the 
statements on due process grounds are separate and distinct 
issues but they are both determined in light of the totality of 
the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant 
factors" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 
Mass. 720, 729 (2012).  A defendant must voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently waive his or her Miranda rights after being 
informed of those rights.  See Commonwealth v. Clark, 461 Mass. 
 
 
21 
336, 342 (2012).  A defendant's subsequent statements must be 
made of a rational intellect and a free will.  See Woodbine, 
supra. 
 
As stated, Brower opined that the defendant was unable 
voluntarily to waive his Miranda rights or voluntarily to speak 
to officers because he was intoxicated and depressed, and had 
long-standing brain injuries at the time of the crash.  The 
judge disagreed; he found it "highly unlikely" that depression 
rendered the defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving his 
Miranda rights or speaking intelligently and knowingly with 
officers, and discerned "no evidence of intoxication."  For the 
reasons discussed, we conclude that the record supports the 
judge's findings with regard to the absence of intoxication and 
depression at the time of the offense. 
 
The judge who heard the motion for a new trial also 
concluded that the judge who conducted the hearing on the motion 
to suppress had evaluated carefully the conduct of the police 
during the interview.  The motion for a new trial judge 
determined that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights prior to speaking with officers,10 and that the 
                     
 
10 The defendant argues that one of the interviewing 
officers trivialized the significance of the defendant's Miranda 
rights by treating them as a nuisance to be rushed through.  As 
with the prior administrations of Miranda warnings, the motion 
judge found that this administration was legally sufficient.  
The audio-visual recording supports this finding; it reveals 
 
 
22 
defendant's subsequent statements had been made of a free will 
and a rational intellect.  In his decision on the motion for a 
new trial, the judge noted that the defendant was "cogent" and 
that his responses had been "appropriate, throughout."  The 
judge also found that the defendant's conduct during the 
interview suggested "careful calculation on his part."  This 
conclusion is consistent with Brower's testimony that the 
defendant intentionally modified his statements to avoid harmful 
personal consequences, and knowingly lied to police in an 
attempt to avoid the repercussions of his conduct. 
 
As noted, the record indicates that the defendant often is 
slow to comprehend and respond to questions.  Brower testified, 
however, that when provided sufficient time to think, the 
defendant is capable of reasoning and considering the 
consequences of his actions.  We have reviewed an audio-visual 
recording of the interview,11 which demonstrates that the 
                     
that the officer recited the Miranda rights in a clear voice, 
provided the defendant with a written copy of those rights, 
allowed the defendant ample time to consider and sign the waiver 
form, and verbally verified that the defendant understood the 
rights and wished to speak with officers. 
 
 
The defendant asserts also that his verbal waiver was 
equivocal.  Even assuming this statement is accurate, the 
defendant unambiguously agreed to speak with the officers only 
moments thereafter, and again agreed to speak with police later 
during the interview. 
 
 
11 The defendant consented to the recording of the 
interview. 
 
 
23 
officers spoke calmly and slowly when asking the defendant 
questions.  They did not rush the defendant to answer those 
questions, and allowed adequate time for him to consider the 
questions and proffer his responses. 
 
In addition, the defendant maintains that, during the 
interview, the officers used tactics that overpowered his will, 
and that his statements to Brower nearly six years later 
indicate that the defendant apathetically had "abandon[ed] 
himself to fate" during the interview.  We have reviewed the 
entire record and discern no appreciable basis to conclude that 
the police employed tactics that overpowered the defendant's 
will or that the defendant abandoned himself to fate. 
 
ii.  Motion to reopen and reconsider motion for a new 
trial.  In June, 2006, one of the interviewing officers spoke by 
telephone with Kitchen, the defendant's reentry case manager, 
and documented the conversation with handwritten notes.  Kitchen 
told him that the defendant had been struck by vehicles twice 
when he was a child.  In addition, Kitchen said that she 
suspected the defendant suffered from a "head injury."  Kitchen 
also told the officer, however, that the defendant was "not 
mentally impaired" and had "no retardation."  Although the 
officer and Kitchen initially scheduled a time to complete a 
more formal interview, it was rescheduled multiple times. 
 
On May 18, 2007, three days before trial, the officer again 
 
 
24 
interviewed Kitchen; this time, he recorded the conversation.  
Kitchen reiterated that the defendant twice had been struck by 
vehicles when he was a child.  Because the defendant often was 
slow to respond to questions, Kitchen said that she suspected 
the defendant's childhood accidents had caused him to incur 
permanent brain injuries.  Kitchen also noted that she had 
attempted to schedule an appointment for the defendant to be 
examined by a neurologist.  The defendant never saw a 
neurologist, however, because he was arrested prior to the 
scheduled appointment.  In any event, Kitchen told the officer 
that she did not believe the defendant suffered from mental 
impairment or "retardation," but that she feared that he 
suffered from a physical brain injury.  She also observed that, 
when provided sufficient time to think, the defendant understood 
what others said to him. 
 
Although the interviewing officer did not share the initial 
Kitchen interview with the prosecutor, he did disclose the 
second interview.  On May 21, 2007, prior to jury empanelment, 
the prosecutor provided defense counsel with a compact disc 
containing an audio recording of that interview.  Defense 
counsel did not listen to the recording at that point, and did 
not request a delay in empanelment or a continuance in order to 
review the recording.  The recording was not presented to the 
jury, and Kitchen was not called as a witness. 
 
 
25 
 
The defendant's appellate counsel was unaware of either 
Kitchen interview until March 2017, when the Commonwealth 
provided defense counsel with the interviewing officer's 
handwritten notes from the first interview and an audio 
recording of the second interview.  Based on the content of 
those interviews, the defendant filed a motion to reopen and to 
reconsider the motion for a new trial.  He argued prejudice as a 
result of the Commonwealth's late disclosure, and ineffective 
assistance due to trial counsel's failure to review the 
recording of the second Kitchen interview.  After a hearing at 
which Kitchen testified, a different judge denied the motion.  
The judge found that the second Kitchen interview had been 
disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial, and also that it 
was largely duplicative of the evidence considered by the judge 
who had denied the motion for a new trial.  The defendant timely 
filed a notice of appeal. 
 
Before us, the defendant summarily reasserts his prior 
arguments.  The motion judge is correct that the Commonwealth 
"should have disclosed the first Kitchen interview long before 
trial," because the interview provided potentially exculpatory 
information that the Commonwealth was constitutionally required 
to disclose.  We also agree with the judge, however, that, by 
disclosing the second Kitchen interview, the Commonwealth shared 
"all of the information that [the officer] had learned the first 
 
 
26 
time he spoke with Kitchen."  Noting that delay alone does not 
necessarily constitute prejudice, see Commonwealth v. Molina, 
454 Mass. 232, 236 (2009), the judge rejected the defendant's 
argument on that ground.  We discern no error in the judge's 
ruling. 
 
Moreover, as stated, trial counsel was provided with a 
recording of the second interview prior to jury empanelment, but 
chose not to seek a continuance of trial or a delay of 
empanelment.  Those decisions are not fairly attributable to the 
Commonwealth.  In these circumstances, the last-minute 
disclosure of the second Kitchen interview, although improper, 
did not itself create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Accordingly, there was no error in the decision to 
deny the motion to reopen and reconsider the motion for a new 
trial. 
 
b.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The scope of our 
review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is broader than the scope of 
review employed by a trial or motion judge, because we may 
consider the entirety of the appellate record, including 
evidence that was not before any one judge.  Kolenovic, 478 
Mass. at 209-210.  Our duty is not to sit as "a second jury" 
but, rather, to consider "whether the verdict returned is 
consonant with justice" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 (2014).  After such consideration, we 
 
 
27 
"may, if satisfied that the verdict was against the law or the 
weight of the evidence, or because of newly discovered evidence, 
or for any other reason that justice may require (a) order a new 
trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of 
guilt."  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 364 (2016). 
 
Here, the jury concluded that the defendant was culpable of 
having committed murder, and we do not upset the jury's finding 
on that issue.  In the circumstances of this case, "there is no 
question of reducing the verdict below murder" (citation 
omitted).  See Berry, 466 Mass. at 772.  Rather, the "less 
drastic" question presented is whether there is ground to reduce 
the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the 
second degree (citation omitted).  Id.  We conclude that there 
is. 
 
As stated, the defendant sustained two serious brain 
injuries as a child, which produced long-term brain damage.  The 
injuries caused abnormal brain functioning that inhibits the 
defendant's ability to control his impulses.  The defendant's 
traumatic brain injuries prevented him from restraining his 
impulses such that, at the time of the offense, his conduct was 
driven by his incapacity for self-monitoring or self-control.  
These uncommon facts were not presented to the jury.  In such 
unique circumstances, a verdict of murder in the second degree 
 
 
28 
is more consonant with justice than is a verdict of murder in 
the first degree.  See Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 
434 (2008) ("We are left with the clear sense that this 
defendant's conduct, although culpable, was very much driven by 
[his] mental condition").  See, e.g., Berry, 466 Mass. at 772-
774.  Compare Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421 
(2011) (declining to reduce verdict where "defendant's 
psychological diagnosis, while significant, does not reach [a 
sufficient] level of severity, and there is no evidence that it 
was intertwined with the victim's killing"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of guilt of murder in the 
first degree is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded 
to the Superior Court for entry of a verdict of guilty of murder 
in the second degree, and for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.