Title: Jeffrey Knight v. Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 27 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0929 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship and Protective 
Placement of Muriel K., alleged incompetent: 
 
Jeffrey Knight and Norris Knight,  
 
Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee County and Muriel K.,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 147 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 691, 633 N.W.2d 222 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
appellants-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs 
by 
Patricia M. Cavey, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Patricia M. 
Cavey. 
 
For the respondent, Milwaukee County, there was a brief (in 
the court of appeals) by Mary Ellen Poulos, principal assistant 
corporation counsel. 
 
For the respondent, Muriel K., there were briefs by Robert 
B. Peregrine and Peregrine & Roth, S.C., Milwaukee, and Pamela 
D. Crawford, Franklin, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert B. 
Peregrine. 
 
 
2
 
For Steven C. Underwood, guardian of the person, there was 
a brief by Brian W. McGrath, John F. Callan, and Foley & 
Lardner, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Brian W. McGrath. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. Donaldson, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long Term 
Care. 
 
 
2002 WI 27 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-0929  
(L.C. No. 
99 GN 648) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship and  
Protective Placement of Muriel K.,  
alleged incompetent: 
 
Jeffrey Knight and Norris Knight,  
 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County and Muriel K.,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Jeffrey and 
Norris Knight, seek review of a published court of appeals 
decision dismissing their appeal from a circuit court order that 
revoked Muriel K.'s power of attorney documents naming the 
Knights as agents, protectively placed Muriel K., and appointed 
No. 
00-0929   
 
2 
 
guardians of her person and estate.1  The Knights assert that the 
court of appeals erred in concluding that they lacked standing 
to appeal.  We determine that the Knights have standing to 
appeal under Wis. Stat. § 879.27(1) (1999-2000)2 as agents under 
health 
care 
and 
durable 
power 
of 
attorney 
documents.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision and remand 
to the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶2 
In June 1999, with the assistance of Attorney Robert 
Moodie, Muriel K. executed a durable power of attorney pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 243.07.  She named Jeffrey Knight as her agent 
under the durable power of attorney document, and granted him 
the following powers: 
 
To do and perform all and every act, deed, matter, and 
thing whatsoever in and about my estate, property and 
affairs as fully and effectually to all intents and 
purposes as I might or could do in my own proper 
person, 
if 
personally 
present, 
the 
specifically 
enumerated powers described in this power of attorney 
being 
in 
aid 
and 
exemplification 
of 
the 
full, 
complete, and general power granted and not in 
limitation or definition. 
¶3 
In accordance with § 243.07, Muriel K.'s durable power 
of attorney document contained a provision that the powers 
granted "shall not be affected by my subsequent disability or 
                                                 
1 See Knight v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI App 147, 246 
Wis. 2d 691, 633 N.W.2d 222 (dismissing an appeal from orders of 
the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Victor Manian, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-0929   
 
3 
 
incapacity."  Although § 243.07(3)(b) provides that a principal 
may nominate a guardian for the circuit court's consideration if 
protective proceedings are commenced, Muriel K.'s durable power 
of attorney document contained no nomination of a guardian.  
Subsequently, she also executed a health care power of attorney 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 155 and named Jeffrey and his father, 
Norris Knight, as her agents under that power of attorney.  
¶4 
Shortly after executing the durable power of attorney 
for Muriel K., Attorney Moodie received a letter from Steve 
Underwood, a relative of Muriel K.'s who was named in her will.  
Underwood's letter expressed concern that Jeffrey was exercising 
undue influence over Muriel K. and explained that she previously 
had executed a power of attorney with another lawyer, John 
Raasch. 
¶5 
In early September 1999, with the assistance of 
Attorney Moodie, Muriel K. memorialized her estate plan and 
advance directives on videotape.  She explained that she was 
making the video to prevent Underwood from contesting her will.  
In addition, she indicated that she was concerned that he would 
attempt to make it seem that she was subject to undue influence 
or that she was "not right in my head." 
¶6 
Near the end of October 1999 Chris Krizek, a Milwaukee 
County elder abuse investigator, received a referral that led 
her to visit Muriel K. at home.  After finding Muriel K. in what 
Krizek described as a "stuporous, possibly comatose" state, 
Krizek petitioned the circuit court to appoint guardians for 
Muriel K. and order protective placement.  In the petition, 
No. 
00-0929   
 
4 
 
Krizek alleged that the Knights were engaging in physical and 
financial abuse of Muriel K. 
¶7 
The probate court commissioner appointed a guardian ad 
litem for 
Muriel 
K. and 
issued 
an 
order 
for 
temporary 
guardianship that "suspended" Muriel K.'s powers of attorney.  
In the order, the court appointed Underwood as temporary 
guardian of her person.  The court appointed Attorney Raasch 
temporary guardian of Muriel K.'s estate.   
¶8 
After the appointment of the temporary guardians, 
Attorney Moodie and the Knights filed appearances in the ongoing 
guardianship and protective placement proceedings.  The Knights 
objected to, among other things, the suspension of Muriel K.'s 
powers of attorney.  The circuit court extended the temporary 
guardianship and appointed adversary counsel for Muriel K. 
¶9 
At the hearing for the permanent guardianship, the 
Knights appeared by counsel.  Muriel K. was not present, and the 
Knights objected.  They asserted that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed under Leinwander v. Simmons, 236 Wis. 
305, 294 N.W. 821 (1940), which requires that a proposed ward be 
present at the hearing, if possible.  See Bryn v. Thompson, 21 
Wis. 2d 24, 30, 123 N.W.2d 505 (1963).  The guardian ad litem 
argued, however, that it was not in Muriel K.'s best interest to 
attend because she became upset at the idea of coming to the 
hearing.  Adversary counsel asserted that the Knights had no 
right to participate in the proceedings.  The court agreed with 
the guardian ad litem and adversary counsel, and the hearing 
No. 
00-0929   
 
5 
 
proceeded 
without 
Muriel 
K.'s 
presence 
and 
with 
limited 
participation by the Knights. 
¶10 After the hearing, the court adjudicated Muriel K. 
incompetent and issued an order for protective placement.  In 
the order, the court appointed Underwood as permanent guardian 
of Muriel K.'s person and Attorney Raasch as permanent guardian 
of her estate.  The order also declared all previous powers of 
attorney revoked and invalid.3  The Knights appealed. 
¶11 The guardian ad litem and adversary counsel moved the 
court of appeals to dismiss the Knights' appeal, arguing that 
the Knights lacked standing to appeal.  Although the court of 
appeals initially denied the motion, it ultimately agreed with 
the guardian ad litem and adversary counsel in its written 
decision.   
¶12 In its decision, the court of appeals determined that 
the 
question 
of 
the 
Knights' 
standing 
turned 
on 
the 
interpretation of § 879.27(1) and (4).  The court of appeals 
                                                 
3 The exact procedure by which Muriel K.'s powers of 
attorney were revoked is not critical to our decision, but we 
explain the process in more detail for the sake of clarity and 
completeness.  By operation of Wis. Stat. § 155.60(2), the order 
adjudicating Muriel K. incompetent and appointing guardians 
automatically revoked her power of attorney for health care 
because the circuit court did not make a finding that it should 
remain in effect.  Similarly, under Wis. Stat. § 243.07(3)(a), a 
guardian of the estate is authorized to revoke a durable power 
of attorney unless the court finds that it should remain in 
effect.  After Attorney Raasch was appointed temporary guardian, 
he sent a letter to Jeffrey Knight indicating that he was 
revoking Muriel K.'s durable power of attorney naming Jeffrey as 
her agent. 
No. 
00-0929   
 
6 
 
concluded that under § 879.27(1), only a "person aggrieved" may 
appeal and that the Knights were not persons aggrieved by the 
order revoking Muriel K.'s powers of attorney. 
¶13 The court of appeals noted, however, that minors and 
incompetent individuals are under a disability such that when 
they are persons aggrieved, a question remains as to who may 
assert their rights.  The court concluded that § 879.27(4) 
definitively and exclusively answers that question.  The court 
explained as follows: 
 
There are circumstances where minors would be 
"aggrieved" by an order of the probate court that 
affects them.  Incompetents might also be "aggrieved" 
by a probate-court order.  But both minors and 
incompetents are under a disability and their rights 
have to be asserted by others.  It is here where 
Wis. Stat. § 879.27(4) kicks in; the section grants 
the right to pursue an appeal on behalf of a minor or 
an incompetent to two classes of persons:  the 
guardian of the estate of the minor or incompetent, 
and the guardian ad litem.  This right to appeal on 
their behalf is exclusive. 
Knight v. 
Milwaukee County, 
2001 
WI 
App 
147, 
¶20, 246 
Wis. 2d 691, 633 N.W.2d 222 (emphasis in original).  Because the 
Knights were neither Muriel K.'s guardian ad litem nor the 
guardians of her estate, the court dismissed their appeal. 
II 
¶14 The question before us is whether the Knights, as 
Muriel K.'s named agents under her health care and durable 
powers of attorney, have standing to appeal.  The parties agree 
that § 879.27 grants a right to appeal from guardianship 
proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 880, but they disagree as to 
No. 
00-0929   
 
7 
 
its application to the Knights.  The interpretation and 
application of a statute is a question of law that we review 
independently of the determination rendered by the court of 
appeals.  Roth v. City of Glendale, 2000 WI 100, ¶15, 237 
Wis. 2d 173, 614 N.W.2d 467. 
¶15 We begin our analysis by examining § 879.27.  It 
provides in relevant part: 
 
(1)  APPEAL IS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.  Any 
person aggrieved by any appealable order or judgment 
of the court assigned to exercise probate jurisdiction 
may appeal or take writ of error therefrom to the 
court of appeals. 
 
. . . . 
 
(4)  WHO MAY APPEAL ON BEHALF OF MINOR OR 
INCOMPETENT.  In all cases the appeal on behalf of any 
minor 
or 
incompetent 
person 
may 
be 
taken 
and 
prosecuted 
by 
the 
guardian 
of 
the 
minor's 
or 
incompetent's estate or by a guardian ad litem. 
¶16 We note that there is no real dispute over the 
question of whether Muriel K. is a person aggrieved under 
§ 879.27(1).  In order to be aggrieved by a judgment or order, 
that judgment or order must operate on a person's rights of 
property or bear directly on some other interest.  See Jindra v. 
Diederich Flooring, 181 Wis. 2d 579, 611, 511 N.W.2d 855 (1994).  
"An 'aggrieved party' within the meaning of a statute governing 
appeals is one having an interest recognized by law in the 
subject matter which is injuriously affected by the judgment."  
Id. 
¶17 Muriel K. has a legally recognized interest in the 
subject matter of her own guardianship and protective placement.  
No. 
00-0929   
 
8 
 
In addition, she may be adversely affected by the order in this 
case for any number of reasons, not the least of which is the 
revocation of her powers of attorney.  Thus, because Muriel K. 
is a person aggrieved, the question, framed broadly, becomes:  
who may speak for Muriel K. under § 879.27? 
¶18 The 
guardian 
ad 
litem, 
adversary 
counsel, 
and 
Underwood ("respondents"4) argue, in agreement with the court of 
appeals, that the Knights may not appeal under § 879.27(1) 
because they are not personally aggrieved by the order.  In 
addition, and also in agreement with the court of appeals, the 
respondents assert that the Knights may not appeal under 
§ 879.27(4) because that subsection authorizes only the guardian 
ad litem and the guardian of the estate to appeal on Muriel K.'s 
behalf. 
¶19 The Knights acknowledge that § 879.27(4) may limit 
standing to appeal "on behalf of" Muriel K. to only the guardian 
ad litem and guardian of her estate.  However, the Knights 
assert, they need not proceed under § 879.27(4).  The Knights 
argue that they have standing to appeal because they were Muriel 
K.'s agents under her revoked powers of attorney.  The essence 
                                                 
4 Underwood filed a brief separate from the joint brief of 
the guardian ad litem and adversary counsel, but in his brief he 
states that he adopts their position. 
No. 
00-0929   
 
9 
 
of their assertion is that they stand in Muriel K.'s shoes for 
purposes of § 879.27(1).5 
¶20 We disagree with the court of appeals' interpretation 
that § 879.27(1) and (4) clearly and exclusively provide that an 
appeal can be brought by only "two classes of persons:  the 
guardian of the estate of the minor or incompetent, and the 
guardian ad litem."  Knight, 2001 WI App 147, ¶20.  By 
interpreting § 879.27(4) as a limitation on § 879.27(1) rather 
than as complementary to it, the court of appeals narrows the 
scope of the statute, writing out the ability to bring an appeal 
under § 879.27(1).  The language of the statute dictates 
otherwise. 
¶21 Section 879.27(1) provides:  "Any person aggrieved by 
any appealable order or judgment of the court assigned to 
exercise probate jurisdiction may appeal . . . ."  Yet, the 
court of appeals concludes that once a determination is made 
that an incompetent person is aggrieved under § 879.27(1), then 
                                                 
5 The Knights, secondarily, also assert that they have 
standing to appeal as petitioners who unsuccessfully moved to 
restore Muriel K.'s rights pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 880.33(3), 
and they cite to Carla S. v. Frank B., 2001 WI App 97, 242 
Wis. 2d 605, 626 N.W.2d 330.  In Carla S., the court of appeals 
determined that a daughter of a ward, Carla S., had standing to 
appeal from an order authorizing the ward's guardian to gift the 
ward's interest in his home.  Without discussing or even 
referencing Wis. Stat. § 879.27, the court concluded that Carla 
S. had standing to appeal as an "interested person" under 
Wis. Stat. § 880.01(6).  See Carla S., 2001 WI App 97, ¶9.  Our 
focus is on § 879.27(1), and because we hold that the Knights 
have standing under § 879.27(1) as Muriel K.'s power of attorney 
agents, we do not address their other assertions. 
No. 
00-0929   
 
10 
 
§ 879.27(4) "kicks in" to answer definitively and exclusively 
who may bring the appeal.  The language of § 879.27(1), however, 
provides that aggrieved persons may bring appeals in their own 
right.  Thus, as previously noted, the question becomes:  who 
may speak for Muriel K.? 
¶22 Contrary to the court of appeals' rationale, the 
respondents 
acknowledge 
that 
authority 
to 
speak 
for 
an 
incompetent individual exists under § 879.27(1).  At oral 
argument, the respondents maintained that adversary counsel, who 
is not listed under § 879.27(4) as one of the two classes of 
persons 
who 
can 
appeal 
"on 
behalf 
of" 
the 
incompetent 
individual, has authority to speak for that individual on 
appeal.  To conclude, as did the court of appeals, that an 
appeal can be pursued only under § 879.27(4) would be to 
eliminate the incompetent person's right to adversary counsel on 
appeal. 
¶23 Unlike the language of § 879.27(4), which clearly 
defines two categories of persons who may appeal "on behalf of" 
an incompetent individual, the language of § 879.27(1) provides 
no answer to the question of who may speak for an incompetent 
individual pursuant to the right to appeal it grants.  We are 
left to construe the statute to determine whether Muriel K.'s 
power of attorney agents on appeal have standing to speak for 
her under § 879.27(1). 
¶24 Our goal in construing any statute is to give effect 
to the legislative intent.  See Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement 
Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 655, 666, 562 N.W.2d 917 (1997).  In construing 
No. 
00-0929   
 
11 
 
§ 879.27, we consider the fundamentals of agency law as well as 
the purposes and history of health care and durable powers of 
attorney.  These considerations lead us to determine that the 
Knights stand in Muriel K.'s shoes for purposes of § 879.27(1) 
and, therefore, may appeal for her. 
 
¶25 The fundamentals of agency law include the concept 
that the agent is a substitute for the principal.  See 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d Agency § 1 (1986).  Stated another way, the agent "acts 
for," "in the place of," and "instead of" the principal.  Id.  
"It is, accordingly, a consequence of the [agency] relationship 
that whatever an agent does in the lawful prosecution of the 
transaction entrusted to him is the act of the principal."  Id. 
at § 2.  Adversary counsel and the guardian ad litem in their 
joint brief cite to these fundamental principles of agency law.  
Whatever an agent lawfully does is the act of the principal. 
¶26 Building upon these basic principles of agency law, 
Wisconsin has adopted both the durable power of attorney and the 
power of attorney for health care as tools in planning for 
incapacity.  See Production Credit Ass'n v. Kehl, 148 Wis. 2d 
225, 229, 434 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1988).  We consider each in 
turn. 
¶27 In creating § 243.07, the legislature adopted the 
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (hereinafter, "Act").  See 
ch. 313, Laws of 1981.  Durable powers of attorney are intended 
to give competent individuals the ability to delegate to an 
agent broad powers to manage their affairs and assets in the 
event of incompetency.  See Wis. Stat. § 243.10(1); In re Estate 
No. 
00-0929   
 
12 
 
of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ohio 1996).6  Accordingly, the 
agent under a durable power of attorney has been characterized 
as the "alter ego" of the principal.  Hegel, 668 N.E.2d at 476.   
¶28 Because § 243.07 is modeled on a uniform act, we look 
to the intent of the drafters of the Act for guidance.  We also 
look to case law from other jurisdictions that have adopted the 
Act.  Section 243.07(6) states:  "This section shall be applied 
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law with respect to the subject of this section among states 
enacting it."7 
¶29 According to its drafters, the central purpose of the 
Act is "to assist persons interested in establishing non-court 
regimes for the management of their affairs in the event of 
later incompetence or disability."  Unif. Durable Power of 
Attorney Act, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 310 (Master ed. 1993).  
                                                 
6 Under traditional agency law, certain powers are generally 
considered too personal to delegate.  These include actions such 
as voting or taking a marriage vow.   See 77 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
156, 157 (1988); Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent under a 
Financial Durable Power of Attorney:  An Unscripted Role, 75 
Neb. L. Rev. 574, 582 n.38 (1996) (hereinafter "Dessin").  
Nevertheless, as a general rule, "a person may properly appoint 
an agent to do the same acts and achieve the same legal 
consequences . . . as if he had acted personally."  77 Wis. Op. 
Att'y Gen. at 157 (citing 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 20 (1986)). 
7 Most states have adopted a version of the Act, and all 50 
states have at one time or another enacted statutes authorizing 
some form of durable power.  See Unif. Durable Power of Attorney 
Act, 8A U.L.A. 309 (Master ed. 1993); Dessin at 580-81; see also 
http://www.nccusl.org (cataloguing Uniform Acts promulgated by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and compiling an act-by-act listing of adopting states). 
No. 
00-0929   
 
13 
 
Durable powers of attorney for finances have become popular 
planning tools across jurisdictions.  See Bank IV v. Capitol 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 828 P.2d 355, 358 (Kan. 1992); 
Guardianship of Smith, 684 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1997).  The dominant idea behind the Act's original draft was to 
promote durable powers of attorney as private alternatives to 
more expensive court-oriented procedures.  Prefatory Note, 8A 
U.L.A. 310. 
¶30 The Act recognizes, however, that agencies under 
durable powers may coexist with provisions for guardians or 
conservators.  Unif. Durable Power of Attorney Act, § 3 cmt., 8A 
U.L.A. 322.  To that end, the Act provides for the nomination of 
a guardian in the durable power document and discourages courts 
from appointing a guardian contrary to the individual's clearly 
expressed wishes.  Section 243.07(3)(b); Smith, 684 N.E.2d at 
618 (citing Unif. Durable Power of Attorney Act, § 3 cmt.).  The 
Act's core purpose, however, is to provide an alternative to 
guardianship with powers given to the agent that are as broad if 
not broader than those traditionally undertaken by guardians.  
See Hegel, 668 N.E.2d at 476. 
¶31 The respondents contend in their briefs that had 
Muriel K. wished to ensure that the Knights would oversee her 
personal well being and financial affairs, she should have 
availed herself of the guardian nomination procedure under 
§ 243.07(3)(b).  It may initially seem tempting to conclude that 
this procedure is the solution to the problem presented by this 
case.  Ultimately, however, such a solution is deceptively 
No. 
00-0929   
 
14 
 
simple and provides no solution at all.  Even if Muriel K. had 
nominated the Knights as guardians in the durable power of 
attorney document, we would be left with essentially the same 
question on this review. 
¶32 At 
oral 
argument 
Muriel 
K.'s 
adversary 
counsel 
asserted that even if Muriel had nominated the Knights as 
guardians, they should have been removed for good cause pursuant 
to § 243.07(3)(b).  The respondents all advance that even if 
Muriel K. had nominated the Knights as guardians, they would 
have lacked standing to appeal as power of attorney agents who 
were nominated as guardians, but then removed for good cause.  
Thus, the respondents' position on appeal would remain the same 
regardless of whether Muriel K. had nominated the Knights as 
guardians.  In the end, that position is circuitous and returns 
us to the same inquiry:  do the Knights have standing to appeal 
under § 879.27? 
¶33 The durable power of attorney form statute adopted by 
our legislature, § 243.10, suggests that the legislature assumed 
that agents under durable powers may prosecute appeals for their 
principals.  In § 243.10(1), the legislature saw fit to include 
power to litigate as a power that the principal may delegate to 
her agent in executing the standard durable power of attorney 
form:  
 
LEGAL ACTIONS: My agent may retain attorneys on 
my 
behalf; 
appear 
for 
me 
in 
all 
actions 
and 
proceedings to which I may be a party; commence 
actions and proceedings in my name; and sign in my 
name all documents or pleadings of every description. 
No. 
00-0929   
 
15 
 
The durable power of attorney document executed by Muriel K. 
contains a similar clause granting the power: 
 
 
To commence, prosecute, enforce, defend, answer, 
oppose or abandon any action, suit or other legal 
proceeding relating to any matter in which I am or may 
hereafter be interested or concerned; and also, in the 
discretion of [my agent], to compromise, settle, refer 
to arbitration, or submit to judgment any such action 
or proceeding. 
¶34 It appears that other state appellate courts have yet 
to squarely address the precise question before us.  However, 
our canvas of other jurisdictions indicates that at least two 
have assumed that under the Act, durable power of attorney 
agents 
have 
standing 
to 
appeal 
court 
orders 
appointing 
guardians.  See Smith, 684 N.E.2d at 616; In re Sylvester, 598 
A.2d 76, 78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
¶35 In Sylvester, 598 A.2d at 78, a principal granted a 
power of attorney to two agents.  Shortly thereafter, the County 
of Delaware Services petitioned for the appointment of a 
temporary guardian.  Id.  The petition contained a medical 
report and a variety of allegations against the agents.  Id.  
The agents were accused of mistreating the principal and 
engaging in other improper activity.  Id. at 78-79. 
¶36 After the Pennsylvania orphans' court appointed a 
temporary 
guardian, 
the 
County 
petitioned 
the 
court 
to 
adjudicate the principal incompetent and appoint a permanent 
guardian.  Sylvester, 598 A.2d at 78-79.  The court "summarily 
appointed" an independent permanent guardian, and dismissed the 
agents' exception to the appointment.  Id. at 79.  The agents 
No. 
00-0929   
 
16 
 
appealed, no one disputed their standing to appeal, and the 
Superior Court reversed, determining that the orphans' court 
erred by ignoring the statutory requirement that nominated 
agents be appointed guardians unless there is good cause for 
disqualification.  Id. at 77. 
¶37 Similar facts set the backdrop in Smith, where a 
principal 
appointed 
two 
long-time 
friends 
and 
business 
associates as his agents under a durable power of attorney and 
nominated them as guardians.  684 N.E.2d at 614-15.  The 
principal's wife and daughter subsequently filed a petition for 
guardianship, alleging improprieties on the part of one of the 
agents and describing a history of distrust between the 
principal's family and one of the business associates.  Id. at 
615.  The agents objected and filed their own petition.  Id. 
¶38 After a hearing with limited participation by the 
agents, the probate court appointed the principal's daughter and 
a family friend as permanent guardians.  Smith, 684 N.E.2d at 
615.  The agents appealed, and with no one disputing the agents' 
standing to appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed, 
concluding that under its version of the Act, the probate court 
had 
failed 
to 
make 
appointments 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
principal's nomination without finding good cause to disqualify 
them.  Id. at 616. 
¶39 Thus, both the Pennsylvania court in Sylvester and the 
Massachusetts court in Smith allowed agents under a durable 
power of attorney to appeal a guardianship order.  We recognize 
that these cases do not squarely address the question of 
No. 
00-0929   
 
17 
 
standing, or for that matter, discuss statutes that confer 
standing. 
 
Nonetheless, 
the 
cases 
illustrate 
that 
a 
determination that the Knights have standing to appeal would 
seem to yield consistency with other states' interpretations of 
the Act. 
¶40 Subsequent to its adoption of the Act, our legislature 
also provided that the citizens of Wisconsin may execute a power 
of attorney for health care.  See 1989 Wis. Act 200; 
Wis. Stat. ch. 155.  The power of attorney for health care, 
various forms of which have been widely adopted among the 
states, allows competent individuals to designate agents to make 
health care decisions for them should they become incompetent.  
Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 69, 482 
N.W.2d 60 (1992); see also, e.g., Wendland v. Wendland,  28 P.3d 
151, 160-61 (Cal. 2001). 
¶41 Although the health care power of attorney and the 
durable power of attorney pertain to different decision-making 
powers, they are both intended to ensure that the wishes of a 
principal made while competent are effectuated in the event of 
the individual's incapacity.  Thus, for purposes of the question 
before us, both types of powers serve the same function.  
Indeed, it is the type of decision-making powers granted under a 
power of attorney for health care that most highlight the 
gravity of what is ultimately at stake for Muriel K. in this 
litigation.  In addition, both are based upon the same 
fundamental principles of agency.  For all of these reasons, we 
No. 
00-0929   
 
18 
 
view the two powers as resting on equal footing for the purposes 
of our standing analysis. 
¶42 In short, § 879.27(1) empowers the Knights to appeal 
because of the purpose of both powers and the basic agency 
principles from which they are derived.  Just as the court of 
appeals' construction of § 879.27(1) cannot account for the role 
of adversary counsel, it also fails to account adequately for 
the existence and nature of powers of attorney.  The Knights 
have standing not because they may appeal on behalf of Muriel K. 
under § 879.27(4), but because for purposes of § 879.27(1), the 
Knights, in effect, are Muriel K.  
¶43 Though the respondents rely on In re Guardianship of 
McLaughlin, 101 Wis. 672, 78 N.W. 144 (1899), and Sanborn v. 
Carpenter, 140 Wis. 572, 123 N.W. 144 (1909), both cases are 
inapposite given our determination that the Knights have 
standing 
because they 
act 
in place 
of Muriel 
K. 
under 
§ 879.27(1).  In McLaughlin, the brother of a ward appealed the 
denial of his petition for the removal of the guardian.  101 
Wis. at 673.  The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal 
of his appeal determining that he could not appeal "on behalf 
of" the ward's minor children under a precursor statute to 
§ 879.27(4) because he was neither the guardian of the children 
nor their guardian ad litem.  Id. at 673-74.  Additionally, the 
court determined that he lacked standing to appeal on his own 
behalf.  Id. at 673. 
¶44 Similarly, in Sanborn, the sister of a proposed ward 
appealed a circuit court decision reversing the appointment of a 
No. 
00-0929   
 
19 
 
guardian.   140 Wis. at 572.  This court dismissed the case, 
concluding that her personal rights were not involved and that 
she was not a "person aggrieved."  Id. at 572, 574.  Here, 
because Muriel K. is the person aggrieved, and the Knights' 
standing derives from § 879.27(1) as they act in her place, both 
McLaughlin and Sanborn ultimately prove irrelevant to our 
analysis. 
¶45 We recognize of course that it is not, in reality, 
Muriel K. who is personally appealing, but this simply reflects 
the nature of a power of attorney.  The Knights, in effect, 
substitute for Muriel K. for purposes of § 879.27(1).  "The law 
must often adjust the manner in which it affords rights to those 
whose status renders them unable to exercise choice freely and 
rationally."  Lenz, 167 Wis. 2d at 74 (quoting Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988)). 
III 
¶46 Our interpretation of § 879.27(1) is consistent with 
our precedent that addresses the importance of judicial review 
in guardianship and protective placement proceedings.  We have 
recognized and carefully guarded the need for readily available 
judicial review in these proceedings which affect the rights of 
incapacitated individuals. 
¶47 In State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 
122 Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985), the court determined that 
the constitution requires that individuals who are protectively 
placed 
under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 55 
receive 
periodic, 
automatic 
judicial review of their placement.  Although ch. 55 provides 
No. 
00-0929   
 
20 
 
that a guardian, ward, agency, or interested person may petition 
for termination of protective placement, the court in Watts 
concluded that these protections were inadequate to protect the 
interests of the ward.  Id. at 77-78.  Such protections, the 
court reasoned, are insufficient when those protected cannot 
realistically be expected to set proceedings in motion on their 
own.  See id. at 78 (citing Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1023 
(9th Cir. 1981)). 
¶48 Recently, this court underscored the importance of 
judicial 
review 
of 
proceedings 
affecting 
incapacitated 
individuals in County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 2001 WI 102, 245 
Wis. 2d 538, 629 N.W.2d 189.  In Goldie H., the court determined 
that the periodic judicial review required under Watts must 
include a hearing and fact findings demonstrating the need for 
continued placement.  Goldie H., 2001 WI 102, ¶6.  Acknowledging 
that 
the 
safeguards 
provided 
by 
judicial 
review 
require 
substantial resources, the court reasoned as follows: 
 
Taking a few moments to protect the rights of our most 
vulnerable citizens is not an unacceptable cost to 
society.  It is an expression of our humanity.  It is 
a commitment that no person will be warehoused and 
forgotten by the legal system. 
Id. at ¶35.  Thus, judicial review of guardianship and 
protective 
placement 
proceedings 
is 
a 
carefully 
guarded 
protection despite the undeniable burden on court resources. 
¶49 Although Goldie H. and Watts involved ongoing circuit 
court level review, their rationales are readily applicable to 
the question of appellate standing.  The combined thrust of the 
No. 
00-0929   
 
21 
 
cases is the notion that when individuals are no longer able 
personally to ensure that their rights and interests are 
protected, mechanisms such as judicial review are necessary to 
safeguard those rights and interests. 
¶50 The respondents maintain, however, that Muriel K.'s 
rights and interests are sufficiently protected by the guardian 
ad litem, the guardian of the estate, and adversary counsel.  We 
disagree. 
¶51 As the facts of this case illustrate, standing to 
appeal in the guardian ad litem, the guardian of the estate, and 
adversary counsel will sometimes prove inadequate.  The guardian 
ad litem, guardian of the estate, and adversary counsel will 
not, in all cases, choose to advocate for the ward's directives 
made while competent. 
¶52 The guardian ad litem is charged with advocating for 
the 
ward's 
"best 
interests." 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 880.331(3) 
specifically provides that "[t]he guardian ad litem shall be an 
advocate for the best interests of the proposed ward or alleged 
incompetent . . . and shall consider, but shall not be bound by, 
the wishes of the proposed ward or alleged incompetent . . . ."  
Similarly, the guardian of the estate has a fiduciary-type duty 
to manage the ward's assets in a way consistent with the ward's 
best interests.  V.D.H. v. Circuit Court, 154 Wis. 2d 576, 583, 
453 N.W.2d 882 (1990); see also Wis. Stat. § 880.19(5)(b). 
¶53 The best interests of a ward and the ward's wishes 
expressed while competent may overlap.  See Spahn v. Eisenberg, 
210 Wis. 2d 557, 565, 563 N.W.2d 485 (1997).  Ultimately, 
No. 
00-0929   
 
22 
 
however, "best interests" is a standard that is not necessarily 
coextensive with what an individual has chosen or would choose 
were she competent to do so.  See Lenz, 167 Wis. 2d at 81.  
Here, neither the guardian ad litem nor the guardian of Muriel 
K.'s estate viewed Muriel K.'s desires as expressed in her 
health care and durable powers of attorney as indicative of her 
best interests. 
¶54 Adversary counsel, unlike the guardian ad litem and 
the guardian of the estate, is not charged with representing the 
best interests of the ward.  Rather, as the court of appeals 
correctly noted, adversary counsel is "duty bound to represent 
his or her client's wishes."  Apparently, however, in this case, 
after seeing Muriel K. on only one occasion in mid-February 
2000, adversary counsel concluded that Muriel K.'s wishes 
included a revocation of her health care and durable powers of 
attorney and the appointment of Underwood as guardian of her 
person. 
¶55 In short, 
the 
respondents' 
analysis 
of standing 
pursuant to § 879.27 fails to protect adequately Muriel K.'s 
rights and wishes as indicated in her health care and durable 
powers of attorney.  The respondents' analysis undercuts the 
availability of judicial review of determinations that may 
adversely affect the rights and wishes of a ward.  In some cases 
it may be difficult or impossible to know the wishes of a ward 
expressed while competent.  Here, however, Muriel K. expressed 
her wishes by hiring an attorney, executing health care and 
durable power of attorney documents, and memorializing an 
No. 
00-0929   
 
23 
 
explanation of advance directives on a videotape.  In this case, 
the Knights are the only ones advocating a position consistent 
with Muriel K.'s directives made while competent. 
IV 
¶56 In sum, we conclude that the Knights, as the agents 
Muriel K. named in her health care and durable power of attorney 
documents, have standing to appeal under § 879.27(1).  Because 
they were Muriel K.'s agents under these two documents, they are 
her substitutes for purposes of § 879.27(1).  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals decision and remand to the court of 
appeals with directions to reinstate the appeal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that Muriel K. is a "person aggrieved" by the 
guardianship order, and that the Knights, as Muriel K.'s agents 
under her health care and durable powers of attorney, have 
standing to appeal on her behalf under Wis. Stat. § 879.27(1).  
While I certainly agree with the first proposition, I disagree 
with the second, at least under the circumstances of this case. 
¶58 As the majority notes, the Knights do not argue that 
they were personally aggrieved by the guardianship order; they 
wish to appeal only on behalf of Muriel K., by virtue of their 
status as her health care and durable power of attorney agents.  
In other words, they appear in a representative capacity only, 
asserting no personal rights or interests of their own, only 
those of Muriel K.  The question, therefore, is not so much 
whether the Knights have standing to appeal, but whether Muriel 
K. has standing to appeal and the Knights have authority to do 
so as her surrogates. 
¶59 As the subject of the guardianship petition and order, 
Muriel K. unquestionably qualifies as a "person aggrieved" for 
purposes of standing to appeal under Wis. Stat. § 879.27(1).  
Where, 
as 
here, 
the 
"person 
aggrieved" 
is 
a 
minor 
or 
incompetent, Wis. Stat. § 879.27(4) specifies who may bring the 
appeal: "[i]n all cases the appeal on behalf of any minor or 
incompetent person may be taken and prosecuted by the guardian 
of the minor's or incompetent's estate or by a guardian ad 
litem." 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
2 
 
¶60 Despite this rather straightforward and conclusive 
language ("in all cases"), the majority reads the statute as 
nonexclusive, leaving open the possibility that in some cases 
someone other than the guardian of the estate or the guardian ad 
litem may appeal on behalf of a minor or incompetent under 
Wis. Stat. § 879.27(1) and (4).  This conclusion conflicts with 
In re Guardianship of McLaughlin, 101 Wis. 672, 78 N.W. 144 
(1899), which the majority does not overrule but merely 
dismisses as irrelevant.  Majority op. at ¶44.  But McLaughlin 
is directly on point, and, while old, remains good law, as the 
court of appeals correctly noted.  See Knight v. Milwaukee 
County, 2001 WI App 147, ¶21 n.5, 246 Wis. 2d 691, 633 N.W.2d 
222.   
¶61 In McLaughlin, an uncle, claiming to represent the 
interests of his brother's children as well as his own, 
petitioned for the removal of the children's mother as their 
guardian, alleging misconduct and waste.  McLaughlin, 101 Wis. 
2d at 672.  When the petition was denied, the uncle appealed, 
and this court rejected the appeal, citing a predecessor statute 
to Wis. Stat. § 879.27.  Noting that the uncle conceded he 
lacked standing to appeal in his individual capacity, this court 
addressed whether he could appeal in a representative capacity 
on behalf of the minors.  The court concluded that the statute 
specifying who may appeal on behalf of a minor was exclusive: 
 
Sec.[tion] 4031, Stats. 1898, provides that 'the 
appeal of any minor may be taken in and prosecuted in 
the name of the general guardian of such minor or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed for that purpose.'  No 
reason appears to us why this court should enlarge or 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
3 
 
diminish this statute.  It must be deemed exclusive.  
While the duty is not upon this court to find reasons 
for plain legislation, we may remark that it is of 
primary importance that the proceedings of county 
courts, with the important property interests placed 
in 
their 
care, 
should 
not 
be 
interrupted 
by 
unwarranted appeals, nor the rights of minors therein 
jeopardized, and their estates burdened with expense, 
at the discretion of people having no authority to 
represent 
them, 
and 
who 
in 
many 
cases 
may 
be 
antagonistic to their interests.  Compliance with the 
statute is easy, and no doubt can be entertained at 
any 
time 
county 
courts 
will 
certify 
to 
the 
qualifications of some proper person to care for the 
minors' 
interests, 
by 
conferring 
upon 
him 
an 
appointment as guardian ad litem when the occasion 
demands. 
McLaughlin, 101 Wis. at 674 (emphasis added). 
 
¶62 Here, the Knights seek to appeal on behalf of Muriel 
K., just as the uncle in McLaughlin sought to appeal on behalf 
of his brother's children.  The statutes at issue are almost 
identical. 
Yet 
here, 
the 
majority 
reaches 
the 
opposite 
conclusion, 
interpreting 
the 
statute 
as 
nonexclusive.  
McLaughlin, and the plain language of the statute, cannot be so 
easily disregarded. 
¶63 Even assuming the majority has correctly interpreted 
the statute,8 its conclusion that the Knights may appeal on 
behalf of Muriel K. remains flawed.  The Knights' authority to 
                                                 
8 In In re Guardianship of Tamara L.P. v. County of Dane, 
177 Wis. 2d 770, 503 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of 
appeals heard and decided an appeal brought on behalf of an 
incompetent by an attorney who was not the guardian ad litem and 
was not identified as the guardian of the estate or other court-
appointed fiduciary.  The opinion is unclear by what authority 
or in what capacity the attorney was appealing on behalf of the 
incompetent; standing, or the attorney’s authority to take and 
prosecute the appeal on the incompetent’s behalf, was simply not 
addressed. 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
4 
 
act on Muriel K.'s behalf as her health care and durable power 
of attorney agents is statutorily subordinate to the authority 
of the court-appointed fiduciaries, and does not survive the 
appointment of a guardian unless the circuit court says so. 
¶64 Here, the circuit court specifically ordered the health 
care and durable powers of attorney revoked, terminating any and 
all authority the Knights had to act as Muriel K.'s agents, 
including, necessarily, any authority to prosecute an appeal on 
her behalf.  Accordingly, while Muriel K. has standing to appeal 
the 
guardianship 
order, 
and 
one 
of 
her 
court-appointed 
fiduciaries may do so on her behalf, the Knights may not, 
because their agency under the health care and durable powers of 
attorney no longer exists.  
¶65 Health care and durable powers of attorney are governed 
by statute, and the legislature has set forth a clear hierarchy 
of authority as between health care and durable power of 
attorney agents nominated in a written advance directive and 
guardians appointed by the court.  The authority of court-
appointed fiduciaries supersedes that of agents nominated in 
written advance directives. 
¶66 Chapter 155 provides that a health care power of 
attorney is automatically revoked by a finding of incompetency 
and appointment of a guardian, unless the court orders it 
continued: 
 
If a court under s. 880.33 determines that an 
individual who is a principal is incompetent or makes 
a finding of limited incompetency under s. 880.33(3) 
and appoints a guardian for the individual, the power 
of attorney for health care executed under this 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
5 
 
chapter by the principal is revoked and the power of 
attorney for health care instrument is invalid, unless 
the court finds that the power of attorney for health 
care and power of attorney for health care instrument 
should remain in effect.  If the court makes this 
finding, the guardian for the individual may not make 
health care decisions for the ward that may be made by 
the health care agent, unless the guardian is the 
health care agent. 
Wis. Stat. § 155.60(2)(emphasis added). 
¶67 Similarly, the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, 
Wis. Stat. § 243.07 ("the Act"), provides that a durable power 
of 
attorney 
agent 
is 
accountable 
to 
any 
court-appointed 
fiduciary, such as a guardian, and that the fiduciary may revoke 
the power of attorney on behalf of the principal: 
 
(3) 
RELATION 
OF 
AGENT 
TO 
COURT-APPOINTED 
FIDUCIARY. (a) If, following execution of a durable 
power of attorney, a court of the principal's domicile 
appoints a conservator, guardian of the estate, or 
other fiduciary charged with the management of all of 
the principal's property or all of his or her property 
except specified exclusions, the agent is accountable 
to the fiduciary as well as to the principal.  Unless 
the court finds that the durable power of attorney 
should remain in effect, the fiduciary has the same 
power to revoke or amend the power of attorney that 
the principal would have had if the principal were not 
disabled or incapacitated. 
Wis. Stat. § 243.07(3)(emphasis added). 
¶68 To avoid a conflict between an agent and a court-
appointed guardian, the Act allows a principal to nominate a 
guardian in a durable power of attorney, and requires the 
appointment of the nominated guardian, with limited exceptions: 
 
A principal may nominate, by a durable power of 
attorney, the conservator, guardian of his or her 
estate, 
or 
guardian 
of 
his 
or 
her 
person 
for 
consideration by the court if protective proceedings 
for the principal's person or estate are thereafter 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
6 
 
commenced.  The court shall make its appointment in 
accordance with the principal's most recent nomination 
in a durable power of attorney except for good cause 
or disqualification. 
Wis. Stat. § 243.07(3)(b)(emphasis added). 
¶69 
The 
statutory 
scheme 
is 
therefore 
very 
clear: 
individuals may nominate agents to act on their behalf in the 
event they are disabled or incapacitated.  Those agents are 
empowered to act for the principal pursuant to the advance 
directive if disability or incapacity occurs, in the absence of 
and without having to initiate formal guardianship proceedings.  
But if a formal guardianship proceeding is commenced and a 
guardian appointed, any agency established by an advance 
directive is automatically revoked or revocable by the guardian, 
unless the court orders otherwise.  The court-appointed guardian 
thereafter speaks and acts for the principal, not the former 
health care or durable power of attorney agent.  If the durable 
power of attorney nominates a guardian in addition to an agent 
(and this may be the same person), the court must appoint the 
nominated guardian unless there is good cause not to, or the 
nominated guardian is disqualified.  
¶70 The majority opinion upsets this statutory hierarchy, 
and confers standing to appeal on agents whose power to act for 
the principal has been nullified.  There is no authority for 
this conclusion, and the majority essentially admits as much, 
relying instead on the notion that the legislature must have 
assumed that agents would have the authority to appeal because 
the Act allows delegation of the power to litigate.  Majority 
op. at ¶33.  But the power to litigate, if indeed conferred by a 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
7 
 
durable power of attorney, is only good as long as the document 
remains in effect.  The majority does not explain how it 
independently survives the revocation of the power of attorney. 
¶71 The majority also relies on two cases from other 
jurisdictions, but acknowledges that neither addressed the 
standing issue.9  Majority op. at ¶39.  Nevertheless, the 
majority pronounces its conclusion "consisten[t] with other 
states' interpretations of the Act."  Id.  It is hard to 
understand how one court's conclusion can be consistent with 
another's if the other did not even address the same issue. 
¶72 Muriel K. did not nominate the Knights as her 
guardians, although she could have done so in her durable power 
of attorney and the circuit court would have been required to 
appoint them absent a showing of good cause or disqualification.  
Whether there would have been good cause to disregard their 
nomination (had they been nominated), or to disqualify them, is 
not before us.10  As it stands, the Knights are former health 
                                                 
9 Guardianship of Smith, 684 N.E.2d 613 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1997); In re Sylvester, 598 A.2d 76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 
10 Muriel K. is a 78-year-old unmarried woman with no 
children and substantial assets.  Jeffrey Knight is her 38-year-
old groundskeeper; Norris Knight is Jeffrey's father.  During 
the time period in question, the Knights apparently saw Muriel 
nearly every day.  This case was begun as an emergency 
protective placement due to Muriel K.'s extremely precarious 
physical and mental condition.  The Milwaukee County Department 
on Aging received a complaint that the Knights were exploiting 
Muriel K.  A caseworker responding to the complaint found her 
essentially nonresponsive, or at best extremely disoriented, and 
her diagnosis upon admission to the hospital was malnutrition 
and dehydration.  She fell into this condition within two months 
of executing the powers of attorney in favor of the Knights and 
amending her will to designate them as beneficiaries. 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
8 
 
care and durable power of attorney agents.  Muriel K. now has 
court-appointed guardians of her estate and person, as well as 
adversary counsel and a guardian ad litem. 
¶73 The law, therefore, no longer recognizes the Knights as 
agents for Muriel K., and they have no power or standing to 
speak or act for her in a representational capacity at all.  
They could not, under these circumstances, purport to make 
financial or medical decisions for her under either the health 
care or durable power of attorney documents, because those 
documents have been revoked.  How is it that they retain the 
authority to make legal decisions for her, such as whether to 
appeal?  They do not have that authority, only the court- 
appointed guardians do, and the majority's conclusion to the 
contrary is simply wrong.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  00-0929.dss 
 
 
 
1